,,! ,,hell ,,bomb ,,by ,william ,l4 ,laur5ce ,illu/ration3 ,logo #aiea ,,new ,,york ,,alfr$ ,a4 ,,knopf ,illu/ration3 ,,?is ,,is ,a ,,borzoi ,,book1 ,,publi%$ ,,by ,,alfr$ ,a4 ,,knopf1 ,,inc4 ,copyright #aiej by ,! ,curtis ,publi%+ ,co4 ,copyright #aiej by ,william ,l4 ,laur5ce4 ,all rights res]v$4 ,no "p ( ?is book may be reproduc$ 9 any =m )\t p]mission 9 writ+ f ! publi%]1 except by a review] :o may quote brief passages 9 a review to be pr9t$ 9 a magaz9e or newspap]4 ,manufactur$ 9 ! ,unit$ ,/ates ( ,am]ica4 ,publi%$ simultane\sly 9 ,canada by ,mc,clelland ,/ew>t ,limit$4 ,,fir/ ,,& ,,second ,,pr9t+s ,,be=e ,,publication ,,?ird ,,pr9t+1 ,,janu>y #aiea ,to ,,flor5ce ,,=eword ,! mat]ial 9 ?is book falls into two categories3 7#a7 a popul> v]sion 9 t]ms und]/&able to ! layman ( te*nical data publi%$ 9 sci5tific lit]ature 9 ?is c\ntry & abroad1 & widely kn[n among sci5ti/s ev]y:]e2 & 7#b7 te*nical conclusions rea*$ by d$uction bas$ on ^! publi%$ facts & !ory1 = :i* ,i assume ! sole responsibility4 ,9 do+ s1 ,i wi% to make x emphatically cle> t ,i h _h no access to any classifi$ in=mation on ! curr5t hydrog5-bomb program1 & also t :atev] access ,i _h to ,h-bomb in=mation dur+ my /ay at ,los ,alamos 9 ! spr+ & summ] ( #aide 0 /rictly limit$ to ! some:at vague & g5]al discussions c>ri$ on !re 9 #aide & e>li]4 ,i h]eby take ! opportunity to express my pr(\nd appreciation to ,dr4 ,james ,g4 ,beck]ley1 ,director ( ,classification1 ,atomic ,en]gy ,commission1 ,wa%+ton1 ,d4 ,c41 & to ,mr4 ,corb9 ,all>dice1 ,director1 ,public ,in=mation ,s]vice1 ( ! ,,aec's ,new ,york ,op]ations ,(fice1 = _! g5]\s coop]ation 9 cle>+ ?is manuscript = publication4 ,x mu/ be /rictly und]/ood t any su* cle>ance m]ely means t ! ,,aec has 8no objection to publication0 on ! gr\nds ( security4 ,x does n 9 any way v\* = ! accuracy or correctness ( ! book's cont5ts4 ,,william ,l4 ,,laur5ce ,new ,york ,city ,july #cj1 #aiej ,,cont5ts ,i ,! ,tru? ab\t ! ,hydrog5 ,bomb #c ,,ii ,! ,real ,secret ( ! ,hydrog5 ,bomb #bi ,,iii ,%all ,we ,r5\nce ! ,use ( ! ,h-bomb8 #eg ,,iv ,korea ,cle>$ ! ,air #hh ,v ,a ,prim] ( ,atomic ,en]gy #aad ,,app5dix3 ,! ,hydrog5 ,bomb & ,int]national ,control #adi ,a4 ,significant ,ev5ts 9 ! ,hi/ory ( ,int]national ,control ( ,atomic ,weapons #aea ,b4 ,! ,int]national ,control ( ,atomic ,weapons3 a ,brief ,hi/ory ( ,proposals & ,negotiations #aee ,c4 ,! ,atomic ,impasse #afh ,d4 ,possible ,que/ions ,reg>d+ ,h-bombs & ,int]national ,control #aga ,,introduction 8,democracy ,dep5ds on an ,in=m$ ,electorate0 8,x is mo/ important 9 our democracy t our gov]nm5t be frank & op5 ) ! citiz5s4 ,9 a democracy x is only possible to h good gov]nm5t :5 ! citiz5s are well in=m$4 ,x is difficult en\gh = !m to become well in=m$ :5 ! in=mation is easily available4 ,:5 t in=mation is n available1 x is impossible4 ,:ile !re may be "s cases 9 :i* ! in=mation :i* ! citiz5 ne$s1 9 ord] to make an intellig5t judgm5t ( national policy1 mu/ be kept secret1 s t milit>y pot5tial w n be jeop>diz$1 ! pres5t use ( secrecy f> exce$s ?is m9imum limit4 ,^! are ! me?ods ( an au?orit>ian gov]nm5t & %\ld be vigor\sly oppos$ 9 our democracy4444 8,! citiz5 mu/ *oose ins(> z t is possible4 ,today1 if he tries to come to "s conclusion ab\t :at %\ld be done to increase ! national security1 ! citiz5 runs up aga9/ a high wall ( secrecy4 ,he c1 ( c\rse1 take ! easy solution & say t ^! are que/ions :i* %\ld be left to ! upp] e*elons ( ! milit>y e/abli%m5t to decide4 ,b ^! que/ions are s important today1 t to leave !m to ! milit>y m5 to decide is = ! citiz5 ess5tially to abrogate 8 basic responsibility4 ,if1 9 "t ( peace1 que/ions on :i* ! future ( our c\ntry dep5ds are left to any small gr\p1 n repres5tative ( ! p1 to decide1 we h gone a long way t[>d au?orit>ian gov]nm5t4 8,! ,unit$ ,/ates has gr[n to be a /rong nation "u a con/itution :i* wisely has laid great emphasis ^u ! importance ( free & op5 discussion4 ,urg$ by a l>ge numb] ( p :o h fall5 = ! fallacy t 9 secrecy !re is security1 &1 ,i regret1 enc\rag$ by _m1 includ+ em95t sci5ti/s1 to prophesy doom j ar\nd ! corn]1 we are dang]\sly close to ab&on+ ^? pr9ciples ( free spee* & op5 discussion :i* h made our c\ntry great4 ,! democratic sy/em dep5ds on mak+ intellig5t decisions by ! electorate4 ,our democratic h]itage c only be c>ri$ on if ! citiz5 has ! in=mation ) :i* to make an intellig5t decision40 7,f a talk on ! hydrog5 bomb1 ,m>* #bg1 #aiej1 at ,t[n ,hall1 ,los ,angeles1 by ,,pr(essor ,,rob]t ,f4 ,,ba*]1 head ( ! ,physics ,dep>tm5t1 ,cali=nia ,in/itute ( ,te*nology4 ,pr(essor ,ba*] s]v$ z ! fir/ sci5tific memb] ( ! ,atomic ,en]gy ,commission & 0 "o ( ! major ar*itects ( ! atomic bomb at ,los ,alamos1 ,new ,mexico47 ,,! ,,hell ,,bomb ,i ,,! ,,tru? ,,ab\t ,,! ,,hydrog5 ,,bomb ,i fir/ he>d ab\t ! hydrog5 bomb 9 ! spr+ ( #aide 9 ,los ,alamos1 ,new ,mexico1 :]e our sci5ti/s 7 putt+ ! f9i%+ t\*es on ! model-,t uranium1 or plutonium1 fission bomb4 ,i le>n$ to my a/oni%m5t t1 9 addition to ?is "w1 !y 7 already consid]+ prelim9>y designs = a hydrog5-fusion bomb1 :i* 9 _! light] mom5ts !y call$ ! 8,sup]dup]0 or j ! 8,sup]40 ,i c /ill rememb] my %ock & incr$ulity :5 ,i fir/ he>d ab\t x f "o ( ! sci5ti/s assign$ to me by ,dr4 ,j4 ,rob]t ,opp5heim] z guides 9 ! ,dantesque _w t 0 ,los ,alamos1 :]e ! v atmosph]e gave "o ! s5se ( be+ 9 ! pres5ce ( ! sup]natural4 ,x seem$ s fanta/ic to talk ( a sup]atomic bomb ev5 be=e ! uranium1 or ! plutonium1 bomb _h be5 complet$ & te/$--9 fact1 ev5 be=e anybody knew t x w\ld "w at all--t ,i 0 incl9$ at fir/ to disbelieve x4 ,c\ld any?+ be m p[]ful1 ,i f\nd myself ?9k+1 ?an a weapon t1 on pap] at lea/1 promis$ to release an explosive =ce ( #bj1jjj tons ( ,,tnt8 ,x 0 a screwball _w1 ?is _w ( ,los ,alamos1 ,i kept say+ to myself1 & ?is 0 j a screwball notion ( my y\ng] sci5tific m5tors4 ,s at ! fir/ opportunity ,i put ! "q to ,pr(essor ,hans ,a4 ,be!1 ( ,cornell ,univ]sity1 "o ( ! _w's top atomic sci5ti/s1 :o head$ ! elite circle ( !oretical physici/s at ,los ,alamos4 ,dr4 ,be!1 ,i knew1 0 ! out/&+ au?ority 9 ! _w qualifi$ to talk ab\t ! subject1 s9ce he 0 ! v man :o fir/ succe$$ 9 expla9+ h[ ! fusion ( hydrog5 9 ! sun is ! s\rce ( en]gy t w make x possible = life to cont9ue on e>? = billions ( ye>s4 8,is x true ab\t ! sup]bomb80 ,i ask$ him4 8,w x really be z mu* z fifty times z p[]ful z ! uranium or plutonium bomb80 ,i %all nev] =get ! impact on me ( 8 quiet answ] z he look$ away t[>d ! ,sangre de ,cri/o 7,blood ( ,*ri/7 m\nta9 range1 _! peaks turn+ blood-r$ 9 ! ,new ,mexico twilight4 8,yes10 he said1 8x c\ld be made to equal a million tons ( ,,tnt40 ,!n1 aft] a pause3 8,ev5 m ?an a million40 ,! tops ( ! m\nta9s seem$ to cat* fire z he spoke4 ,long be=e x 0 discov]$ t va/ am\nts ( en]gy c\ld be lib]at$ by ! fission 7splitt+7 ( ! nuclei ( a tw9 ( ! heavie/ elem5t 9 nature--namely1 uranium ( atomic mass #bce 7#bce times ! mass ( ! hydrog5 atom1 lighte/ ( all ! elem5ts7--sci5ti/s _h kn[n t truly /agg]+ am\nts ( en]gy w\ld be releas$ if "o c\ld fuse toge!r f\r atoms ( hydrog51 ! fir/ elem5t on ! atomic table1 into "o atom ( helium1 elem5t numb] two on t table1 :i* weighs ab\t f\r times z mu* z hydrog54 ,9 ,decemb] #aich--?ree weeks be=e ! discov]y ( uranium fission 0 ann\nc$ 9 ,g]many--,dr4 ,be! _h publi%$ 8 fam\s hypo!sis ab\t ! fusion ( f\r hydrog5 atoms 9 ! sun to =m helium4 ,?is provid$ ! fir/ satisfactory explanation ( ! me*anism t enables ! sun to radiate away 9 space e second a quantity ( light & heat equival5t to ! en]gy cont5t ( ne>ly fifte5 quadrillion tons ( coal4 ,& :ile ,dr4 ,be! 0 ! fir/ to "w out ! f9e details ( ! process1 sci5ti/s _h be5 speculat+ = m ?an tw5ty ye>s on ! likelihood ( hydrog5 fusion 9 ! sun z s\rce ( ! sun's et]nal radiance4 ,am]ican audi5ces fir/ he>d ab\t hydrog5 z ! sol> fuel 9 a lecture1 on ,m>* #aj1 #aibb1 at ! ,frankl9 ,in/itute1 ,philadelphia1 by ,pr(essor ,francis ,william ,a/on1 fam\s ,briti% ,nobel-,prize-w9n+ *emi/1 :o ev5 at t e>ly date w>n$ mank9d aga9/ :at he call$ 8t9k]+ ) ! angry atoms40 ,8 words on t occasion h a /range prophetic r+1 ?\gh mo/ ( :at he said is n[ kn[n to be wrong4 8,%\ld ! rese>* work] ( ! future discov] "s means ( releas+ ?is en]gy f hydrog5 9 a =m :i* c\ld be employ$10 he pr$ict$1 8! human race w h at its comm& p[]s beyond ! dreams ( sci5tific fiction1 b ! remote possibility mu/ always be consid]$ t ! en]gy1 once lib]at$1 w be completely uncontrollable & by its viol5ce detonate a neighbor+ sub/ance4 ,if ?is happ5s1 all ( ! hydrog5 on e>? might be trans=m$ into helium at once1 & ?is mo/ successful exp]im5t might be publi%$ to ! re/ ( ! univ]se 9 ! =m ( a new /> ( extraord9>y brilliance1 z ! e>? blew up 9 "o va/ explosion40 ,by #aide we _h le>n$ t _m ?+s 7 wrong 9 ,pr(essor ,a/on's prophecy4 ,x _h be5 def9itely e/abli%$1 = example1 t x w\ld be impossible to 8trans=m all ! hydrog5 on e>? at once10 no matt] h[ _m sup]dup] hydrog5 bombs 7 to be explod$4 ,9 fact1 we _h le>n$ t1 "u conditions z !y exi/ on e>?1 we c\ld nev] use common hydrog51 ! elem5t t makes up "o n9? by weight ( all wat]1 ei!r 9 a sup]dup] bomb or z an atomic fuel = p[]4 ,on ! o!r h&1 t5 ye>s aft] ,dr4 ,a/on's lecture a new type ( hydrog5 0 discov]$ to exi/ 9 nature4 ,x 0 f\nd to con/itute "o five-?\s&? "p ( ! e>?'s wat]s1 includ+ ! wat] 9 ! tissues ( plants & animals4 ,x 0 %[n to h an atomic weight ( two--d\ble ! weight ( common hydrog5--& 0 nam$ deut]ium4 ,! nucleus1 or c5t]1 ( ! deut]ium atom 0 nam$ ! deut]on1 to di/+ui% x f ! nucleus ( common hydrog51 kn[n z ! proton4 ,deut]ium also became popul>ly kn[n z 8heavy hydrog540 ,wat] conta9+ two deut]ium atoms 9 place ( ! two atoms ( light hydrog5 became kn[n z 8heavy wat]40 ,! mo/ />tl+ fact le>n$ ab\t deut]ium soon aft] its discov]y 9 #aicb 0 t x (f]$ pot5tialities z an atomic fuel1 or an explosive1 ( trem5d\s en]gy1 provid$ "o condition c\ld be met4 ,?is condition 0 a 8mat*0 to light x )4 ,& "h 0 ! cat*4 ,! flame ( ?is mat*1 x 0 f\nd1 w\ld h to h a temp]ature ( ! ord] ( #ej1jjj1jjj degrees c5tigrade1 two & a half times ! temp]ature 9 ! int]ior ( ! sun4 ,oddly en\gh1 ! discov]y ( ! pr9ciple t made ! atomic bomb possible also br\ght ) x ! promise t a 8deut]ium fire0 might1 aft] all1 be light$ on e>?4 ,e>ly /udies _h reveal$ t ! explosion ( an atomic bomb1 if x liv$ up to expectations1 w\ld g5]ate a c5tral temp]ature ( ab\t #ej1jjj1jjj degrees c5tigrade4 ,"h1 at la/1 0 ! promise ( realization ( ! impossible--! #ej1jjj1jjj degree mat*4 ,! m5 ( ,los ,alamos ?us knew t if ! atomic bomb !y 7 j complet+ = its fir/ te/ work$ z !y hop$ x w\ld1 x c\ld be us$ z ! mat* to light ! deut]ium fire4 ,!y c\ld build a sup]dup] bomb ( a ?\s& times ! p[] ( ! atomic bomb by incorporat+ deut]ium 9 ! ,a-bomb1 ! explosion ( :i* w\ld act z ! trigg] = ! sup]explosion4 ,& !y also knew t ! deut]ium bomb held su* additional pot5tialities ( t]ror1 beyond its va/ly great] bla/+ & burn+ p[]1 t ! /ep f ! dup] to ! sup] w\ld be j z great z ! /ep f ,,tnt to ! dup]4 ,! hydrog5 bomb1 ,h-bomb1 or hell bomb1 z ! fusion bomb _h become popul>ly kn[n1 ?us became a reality 9 ! fla% ( ! explosion ( ! fir/ atomic bomb at #e3cj ( ! morn+ ( ,july #af1 #aide1 on ! ,new ,mexico des]t4 ,z ! m5 ( ,los ,alamos1 ( :om ,i 0 at t "t a privileg$ memb]1 wat*$ ! supramundane light & ! apocalyptic mu%room-topp$ m\nta9 ( nucle> fire ris+ to a height ( m ?an eight miles ?r\gh ! cl\ds1 !y did n h to wait until !y *eck$ ) _! measur+ in/rum5ts to "k t a mat* sp>k+ a flame ( ab\t #ej1jjj1jjj degrees c5tigrade _h be5 light$ on e>? = ! fir/ "t4 ,! size ( ! fire m\nta9 & ! end-(-!-_w-l ?und] t rev]b]at$ all ar\nd1 told ! tale bett] ?an any puny man-made in/rum5ts4 ,& !re 9 our mid/1 z we le>n$ only rec5tly1 /ood a ,judas1 ,klaus ,fu*s1 a "n t 8w live 9 infamy0 along ) t ( o!r ar*traitors ( hi/ory4 ,by ! greate/ ( ironies1 !re he 01 ?is spy1 /&+ "r 9 ! c5t] ( :at we believ$ at ! "t to be ! _w's greate/ secret1 wait+ at t v mom5t to tell ! ,russians ( our success & h[ we a*iev$ x4 ,z he confess$ five ye>s lat]1 he betray$ to !m ! mo/ intimate details n only ab\t ! ,a-bomb b ab\t ! ,h-bomb z well--details t he le>n$ z a memb] ( ! inn]mo/ ( inn] circles4 ,=1 alas1 he 0 a tru/$ memb] ( ! !oretical division1 ! sanctum sanctorum ( ,los ,alamos4 ,?is select gr\p ( sci5ti/s1 beh9d d\bly & triply lock$ doors1 discuss$ 9 :isp]s _! ideas ab\t ! sup]dup]4 ,8 associates at ,los ,alamos1 :o %\ld "k1 sadly admit t ,fu*s made x possible = ,russia to develop h] ,a-bomb at lea/ a ye> ahead ( "t4 ,x is my own conviction t ! in=mation he gave ! ,russians made x possible = _! sci5ti/s to atta9 _! goal at lea/ ?ree1 & possibly z mu* z t51 ye>s soon] ?an !y c\ld h done x on _! own4 ,yet1 ?\gh ,fu*s confess$ ev]y?+ he told ! ,russians1 ! cont5t ( 8 confession is /ill kept a top secret f ! ,am]ican p1 :o sadly ne$ in=mation on "o ( ! greate/ problems fac+ mank9d4 ,! reason giv5 is t we _c actually be sure t ,fu*s told ! ,russians all t he says he did1 &1 if publi%$1 8 confession might1 by 8 tricky design1 give ! ,russians additional in=mation4 ,( c\rse1 any?+ is possible = a w>p$ m9d su* z t ( ,fu*s4 ,nev]!less1 x seems highly implausible t ?is traitor1 :o w5t to ! ,russians volunt>ily1 %\ld )hold any vital in=mation f !m = z long z five ye>s4 ,! be/ evid5ce t he didn't is ! ,russian ,a-bomb4 ,yet "s good comes ev5 ( ! greate/ evil4 ,all ! circum/antial evid5ce po9ts to ! fact t dur+ ! five-ye> p]iod foll[+ ! end ( ! w> our "w on ! hydrog5 bomb _h /opp$ completely4 ,! ,a-bomb 0 ! mightie/ weapon 9 ! _w1 we seem to h reason$1 & x w\ld take ,russia _m ye>s be=e %e w\ld get an ,a-bomb ( h] own4 ,:y sp5d great ef=ts on a sup]bomb8 ,! %ock :5 ,russia explod$ h] fir/ ,a-bomb mu* soon] ?an we expect$1 topp$ by ! second %ock t ,fu*s _h h&$ ,mosc[ all our major secrets on a platt]--includ+1 z mu/ be surmis$1 ^? ( ! ,h-bomb--awak5$ u to ! facts ( life4 ,x is no accid5t t ,presid5t ,truman's (ficial ann\ncem5t ( ! ord] to build 8! s-call$ hydrog5 bomb or sup]bomb0 came )9 ?ree days ( ! ann\ncem5t ( ,fu*s's arre/ & confession4 ,! ,presid5t gave 8 ord] ) full k ( ,fu*s's confession1 :i* made x evid5t t ! ,russians 7 already at "w on ! hydrog5 bomb & _h probably be5 work+ on x un9t]rupt$ly s9ce #aide4 ,! tragic prospect is t in/ead ( ! ,russians cat*+ up ) u1 x is we :o may h to cat* up ) !m4 ,five ye>s aft] ! fir/ ann\ncem5t ( ! explosion ( ! ,a-bomb ov] ,hiro%ima1 ev5 ! mo/ intellig5t ,am]icans /ill h only ! vague/ idea ab\t ! facts4 ,yet ^! facts are )9 ! und]/&+ ( ! av]age man4 ,if we keep ! e>li] analogy ( ! mat* 9 m9d1 x becomes simple to und]/& ! pr9ciples und]ly+ bo? ! ,a-bomb1 n[ m correctly id5tifi$ z ! 8fission bomb10 & ! hydrog5 bomb1 m prop]ly describ$ z ! 8fusion bomb40 ,our pr9cipal fuel is coal1 :i*1 z ev]yone kn[s1 is 8bottl$ sun%9e10 /or$ up 9 plants t grew ab\t two hundr$ million ye>s ago4 ,:5 we apply ! small am\nt ( heat en]gy f a mat*1 ! bottl$ en]gy is releas$ 9 ! =m ( light & heat1 :i* we c use 9 a great v>iety ( ways4 ,! po9t "h is t x requires only ! application ( a v small am\nt ( en]gy f a mat* to release a v l>ge am\nt ( en]gy t has be5 /or$ = millions ( ye>s 9 ! anci5t plants we "k z coal4 ,n[1 dur+ ! pa/ half c5tury we discov]$ t ! nuclei1 or c5t]s1 ( ! smalle/ units ( :i* ! n9ety-odd elem5ts ( ! mat]ial univ]se are made up--units we "k z atoms--_h /or$ up )9 !m s9ce ! beg9n+ ( creation am\nts ( en]gy millions ( times great] ?an is /or$ up by ! sun 9 coal4 ,b we _h no mat* ) :i* to />t an atomic fire burn+4 ,!n1 9 ,janu>y #aici1 came ! _w-%ak+ discov]y ( ! ph5om5on kn[n z uranium fission4 ,9 simple language1 we _h f\nd a prop] 8mat*0 = light+ a fire ) a tw9 ( uranium1 ! n9ety-second1 & la/1 natural elem5t4 ,?is tw9 is a r>e =m ( uranium kn[n z uranium #bce--! figure signify+ t x is #bce times heavi] ?an common hydrog54 ,d\bly ph5om5al1 ! discov]y ( uranium fission meant t to light ! atomic fire1 ) ! release ( /or$-up en]gy ?ree million times great] ?an t ( coal & tw5ty million times t ( ,,tnt 7on an equal-weight basis7 w\ld require no mat* at all4 ,:5 prop] conditions are met1 ! atomic fire w\ld be light$ automatically by spontane\s combu/ion4 ,:at are ^! prop] conditions8 ,9 ! pres5ce ( c]ta9 *emical ag5cies1 spontane\s combu/ion w take place :5 an easily burn+ sub/ance1 su* z sawdu/1 = example1 accumulates heat until x rea*es ! k9dl+ temp]ature at :i* x ignites4 ,! *emical ag5cies "h are ! equival5t ( a mat*4 ,! requirem5t to />t ! spontane\s combu/ion ( uranium #bce1 & also ( two man-made elem5ts nam$ plutonium & uranium #bcc 7all ?ree kn[n z fissionable mat]ials or nucle> fuels71 is j z simple4 ,9 ?is op]ation y d n ne$ a critical temp]ature1 b :at is kn[n z a critical mass4 ,?is simply means t spontane\s combu/ion ( any "o ( ! ?ree atomic fuels takes place z soon z y assemble a lump ( a c]ta9 weight4 ,! actual critical mass is a top secret4 ,b ! not$ ,briti% physici/1 ,dr4 ,m4 ,l4 ,e4 ,oliphant1 ( rad> fame1 publi%$ 9 #aidf 8 own e/imate1 :i* places its weight betwe5 t5 & ?irty kilograms4 ,if s1 ?is w\ld mean t a lump ( uranium #bce 7,u-#bce71 plutonium1 or ,u-#bcc1 weigh+ t5 or ?irty kilograms1 z ! case may be1 w\ld explode automatically by spontane\s combu/ion & release an explosive =ce ( #bj1jjj tons ( ,,tnt = ea* kilogram und]go+ complete combu/ion4 ,9 ! conv5tional ,a-bomb a critical mass is assembl$ 9 ! la/ split second by a tim+ me*anism t br+s toge!r1 let u say1 "o t5? & n9e t5?s ( a critical mass4 ,! spontane\s combu/ion t foll[$ su* a consummation on ,augu/ #f & #i1 #aide de/roy$ ,hiro%ima & ,nagasaki4 ,?us1 if we sub/itute ! famili> phrase 8spontane\s combu/ion0 = ! less famili> ^w 8fission10 we get a cle> und]/&+ ( :at is kn[n 9 sci5tific j>gon z ! 8fission process10 a 8self-multiply+ *a9 reaction ) neutrons10 & simil> te*nical mumbo-jumbo4 ,^! t]ms simply mean ! light+ ( an atomic fire & ! release ( great am\nts ( ! en]gy /or$ 9 ! nuclei ( ,u-#bce s9ce ! beg9n+ ( ! univ]se4 ,! two s-call$ man-made elem5ts are n really creat$4 ,!y are m]ely trans=m$ out ( two natural heavy elem5ts 9 su* a way t _! /or$ en]gy is lib]at$ by ! process ( spontane\s combu/ion4 ,:y1 "o may ask1 does n spontane\s combu/ion ( ,u-#bce take place 9 nature8 ,:y1 inde$1 has n all ! ,u-#bce 9 nature caught fire automatically long ago8 ,to ?is also !re is a simple answ]4 ,j z 9 ! spontane\s combu/ion ( sawdu/ ! mat]ial mu/ be dry en\gh to burn1 s mu/ ! ,u-#bce4 ,only 9 place ( ! ^w 8dry0 we mu/ use ! ^w 8conc5trat$40 ,! ,u-#bce f\nd 9 nature is v mu* dilut$ ) ano!r elem5t t makes x 8wet40 ,x !re=e mu/ be sep>at$ fir/1 by a v labori\s & co/ly process1 f ! nonfissionable1 or 8wett+10 elem5t4 ,ev5 !n x won't cat* fire1 & c\ld n be made to burn by any means1 until ! am\nt sep>at$ 78dri$07 rea*es ! critical mass4 ,:5 ^! two conditions--conditions t d n exi/ 9 nature--are met1 ! ,u-#bce cat*es fire j z sawdu/ does :5 x rea*es ! critical temp]ature4 ,! fact t z soon z a critical mass is assembl$ ! ?ree elem5tal atomic fuels bur/ into flame automatically ?us puts a def9ite limit to ! am\nt ( mat]ial t c be us$ 9 ! conv5tional ,a-bomb4 ,! be/ y c d is to incorporate into a bomb two fragm5ts1 let u say1 ( n9e t5?s ( a critical mass ea*4 ,to enclose m ?an two su* fragm5ts w\ld pres5t difficulties t appe> impossible to ov]come4 ,x is ?is limitation ( size1 an insurm\ntable roadblock put !re by "m nature1 t makes ! basic diff]5ce betwe5 ! ,a-bomb & ! ,h-bomb4 ,=1 z we h already se51 to light an atomic fire ) deut]ium x is necess>y to /rike a mat* g5]at+ a flame ) a temp]ature ( ab\t #ej1jjj1jjj degrees c5tigrade4 ,z long z no su* mat* is appli$1 no fire c />t4 ,x ?us becomes obvi\s t deut]ium is n limit$ by nature to a critical mass4 ,a quantity ( deut]ium a ?\s& times ! am\nt ( ! ,u-#bce1 & h5ce a ?\s& times m p[]ful1 c !re=e be incorporat$ 9 an ord9>y ,a-bomb1 :]e x w\ld rema9 quiesc5t until ! ,a-bomb mat* is /ruck4 ,weight = weight1 deut]ium has only a little m en]gy cont5t ?an ,u-#bce1 s t a bomb incorporat+ a #a1jjj kilograms 7"o ton7 ( deut]ium w\ld ?us h an en]gy ( #bj1jjj1jjj tons ( ,,tnt4 ,"h mu/ be m5tion$ ano!r =m ( hydrog51 nam$ tritium4 ,x has long ago disappe>$ f nature b x is n[ be+ re-creat$ 9 pond]able am\nts 9 our atomic furnaces4 ,tritium1 ! nucleus ( :i* is kn[n z a triton1 weighs ?ree times z mu* z ! lighte/ =m ( hydrog54 ,x has an en]gy cont5t ne>ly twice t ( deut]ium4 ,b x is v difficult to make & is extremely exp5sive4 ,its co/ p] kilogram at pres5t ,,aec prices is close to a billion doll>s1 z comp>$ ) no m ?an #d1ejj = a kilogram ( deut]ium4 ,a comb9ation ( deut]ons & tritons w\ld release ! greate/ en]gy ( all1 #c4e times ! en]gy ( deut]ons alone4 ,x w\ld r$uce ! am\nt ( tritons requir$ to half ! volume & ?ree fif?s ( ! weight requir$ 9 a pure triton bomb1 ?us mak+ ! co/ consid]ably l[]4 ,b :y bo!r ) su* fanta/ically co/ly tritons :5 we c get all ! deut]ium we want at no m ?an #d1ejj a kilogram1 :ile we c make up ! diff]5ce 9 en]gy by m]ely incorporat+ two to ?ree & a half times z mu* deut]ium8 ,"h we are deal+ ) :at is probably ! mo/ tickli% "q 9 ! design ( ! ,h-bomb4 ,to light a fire successfully1 x is n en\gh m]ely to h a mat*4 ,! mat* mu/ burn = a "t long en\gh = its flame to act4 ,if y try to light a cig>ette 9 a /rong w9d1 ! w9d may bl[ out y\r mat* s fa/ t y\r cig>ette w n light4 ,! same "q pres5ts itself "h1 b on a mu* great] scale4 ,! mat* = light+ deut]ium--namely1 ! ,a-bomb--burns only = ab\t a hundr$ billion?s ( a second4 ,is ?is "t long en\gh to light ! 8cig>ette0 ) ?is "o & only 8mat*08 ,x is kn[n t ! "t is mu* too sl[ = light+ deut]ium 9 its gase\s =m4 ,b x is also kn[n t ! inflammability is mu* fa/] :5 ! gas is compress$ to its liquid =m1 at :i* its d5sity is #gij times great]4 ,at ?is d5sity x w\ld take only sev5 lit]s 7ab\t #g4d qu>ts7 p] "o kilogram 7#b4b p\nds71 z comp>$ ) #e1eee lit]s = gase\s deut]ium4 ,& x cat*es fire 9 a mu* %ort] "t4 ,is ?is "t long en\gh8 ,on ! answ] to ?is "q w dep5d :e!r ! hydrog5 bomb w consi/ ( deut]ium alone or ( deut]ium & tritium1 = x is kn[n t ! deut]on-triton comb9ation cat*es fire mu* fa/] ?an deut]ons or tritons alone4 ,we 7 already work+ ) tritium 9 ,los ,alamos z f> back z #aide4 ,i rememb] ! "t :5 ,dr4 ,opp5heim]1 w>time sci5tific director ( ,los ,alamos1 w5t to a l>ge safe & br\ght out a small vial ( a cle> liquid t look$ l wat]4 ,x 0 ! fir/ highly dilut$ m9ute sample ( sup]heavy wat]1 compos$ ( tritium & oxyg51 ev] to exi/ 9 ! _w1 or any:]e 9 ! univ]se1 = t matt]4 ,we bo? look$ at x 9 sil5t1 rapt admiration4 ,?\gh we did n speak1 ea* ( u knew :at ! o!r 0 ?9k+4 ,"h 0 some?+1 our ?\ghts ran1 t exi/$ on e>? 9 gase\s =m "s two billion ye>s ago1 long be=e !re 7 any wat]s or any =ms ( life4 ,"h 0 some?+ ) ! p[] to return ! e>? to its lifeless /ate ( two billion ye>s ago4 ,! "q ( :at type ( hydrog5 is to be us$ 9 ! ,h-bomb !re=e hangs on ! "q ( :i* "o ( ! possible comb9ations w cat* fire by ! light ( a mat* t is bl[n out aft] an int]val ( ab\t a hundr$ billion?s ( a second4 ,on ! answ] to ?is "q w also dep5d ! "t x w take u to complete ! ,h-bomb & its co/4 ,to make a bomb ( a ?\s& times ! p[] ( ! ,a-bomb w\ld require a #a1jjj kilograms ( deut]ium at a co/ ( #d1ejj1jjj1 or #aga kilograms ( tritium & #aad kilograms ( deut]ium at a total co/ ( m ?an #aff1jjj1jjj1jjj at curr5t prices1 n c\nt+ ! co/ ( ! ,a-bomb trigg]4 ,l>ge-scale production ( tritium1 h[ev]1 w mo/ c]ta9ly r$uce its co/ enorm\sly1 possibly by a factor ( t5 ?\s& or m1 :ile1 z w be indicat$ lat]1 ! am\nt ( tritium1 if requir$1 may turn out to be mu* small]4 ,illu/ration3 ,,map ,,by ,,daniel ,,br[n/e9 ,we c ?us see t if deut]ium alone is f\nd to be all t is requir$ to set (f an ,h-bomb x w be *eap & relatively easy to make 9 a %ort "t--bo? = u & = ,russia4 ,fur!rmore1 su* a deut]ium bomb w\ld be practically limitless 9 size4 ,"o ( a million times ! p[] ( ! ,hiro%ima bomb is possible1 s9ce deut]ium c be extract$ 9 limitless am\nts f pla9 wat]4 ,on ! o!r h&1 if sizable am\nts ( tritium are f\nd necess>y1 ! co/ w be mu* high] & x w take a consid]ably long] "t1 s9ce ! production ( tritium is v sl[ & co/ly4 ,?is1 9 turn1 w place a def9ite limit on ! p[] ( ! ,h-bomb1 s9ce1 unlike deut]ium1 ! am\nts ( tritium w necess>ily always be limit$4 ,z w be %[n lat]1 we are at pres5t 9 a mu* m advantage\s position to produce tritium ?an is ,russia1 s t if tritium is f\nd necess>y1 we h a head />t on h] 9 ,h-bomb developm5t4 ,! radius ( de/ructiv5ess by ! bla/ ( a bomb ) a ?\s& times ! en]gy ( ! ,a-bomb w be only t5 times great]1 s9ce ! increase goes by ! cube root ( ! en]gy4 ,! radius ( total de/ruction by bla/ 9 ,hiro%ima 0 "o mile4 ,!re=e ! radius ( a sup]bomb a ?\s& times m p[]ful w be t5 miles1 or a total area ( #cad squ>e miles4 ,a bomb a million times ! p[] ( ! ,hiro%ima bomb w\ld require #a1jjj tons ( deut]ium4 ,su* a sup]-sup]dup] c\ld be explod$ at a di/ance f an ab&on$1 innoc5t-look+ tramp %ip4 ,x w\ld h a radius ( de/ruction by bla/ ( #ajj miles & a de/ructive area ( m ?an #cj1jjj squ>e miles4 ,! "t may come :5 we %all h to se>* e vessel sev]al hundr$ miles (f %ore4 ,& ! "t may be ne>] ?an we ?9k4 ,! radius ov] :i* ! trem5d\s heat g5]at$ by a bomb ( a ?\s&fold ! en]gy w\ld produce fatal burns w\ld be z f> z tw5ty miles f ! c5t] ( ! explosion4 ,?is radius increases z ! squ>e root1 in/ead ( ! cube root1 ( ! p[]4 ,! ,hiro%ima bomb caus$ fatal burns at a radius ( two ?irds ( a mile4 ,! effects ( ! radiations f a hydrog5 bomb are s t]rify+ t by describ+ !m ,i run ! risk ( be+ br&$ a fe>mong]4 ,yet facts are facts1 & !y h be5 kn[n to sci5ti/s = a long "t4 ,x w\ld be a diss]vice to ! p if ! facts 7 fur!r d5i$ to !m4 ,we h already paid too high a price = a secrecy t n[ turns out nev] to h be5 secret at all4 ,i c d no bett] ?an quote ,alb]t ,e9/e94 8,! hydrog5 bomb10 he said1 8appe>s on ! public horizon z a probably atta9able goal4444 ,if successful1 radioactive poison+ ( ! atmosph]e1 & h5ce annihilation ( any life on e>?1 has be5 br\ght )9 ! range ( te*nical possibilities40 ,:at ,dr4 ,e9/e9 meant by 8radioactive poison+ ( ! atmosph]e1 & h5ce ! annihilation ( any life on e>?10 0 expla9$ 9 reali/ic detail by su* em95t physici/s z ,dr4 ,be!1 ,dr4 ,leo ,szil>d1 ,dr4 ,edw>d ,tell]1 & o!rs4 ,all ( !m may ev5 n[ be engag$ on "w on ! hydrog5 bomb4 ,"h is h[ 8poison+ ( ! atmosph]e0 may result f ! explosion ( a hydrog5 bomb3 ,trem5d\s quantities ( neutrons1 :i* c ent] any sub/ance 9 nature & make x radioactive1 are lib]at$4 ,9 ! case ( a deut]ium bomb1 "o eigh? ( ! mass us$--#abe grams p] kilogram--is lib]at$4 ,9 ! case ( a deut]on-tritium bomb1 fully "o fif? ( ! mass--#bjj grams p] kilogram--is releas$1 :ile 9 a bomb us+ pure tritium1 fully "o ?ird ( ! mass--#ccc grams p] kilogram--is lib]at$ z free neutrons4 ,!re are #fjj1jjj billion billion neutrons 9 ea* gram1 ea* capable ( produc+ a radioactive atom 9 its environm5t4 ,! neutron is "o ( ! two build+ blocks ( ! nuclei ( all atoms4 ,^! neutrons c be us$ to make any elem5t radioactive1 ,pr(essor ,szil>d & 8 colleagues po9t out4 ,x foll[s t ! cas+ ( ! bomb c\ld be select$ ) a view to produc+1 aft] ! neutrons ent] x1 an especially p[]ful radioactive sub/ance4 ,s9ce ea* artificially made1 radioactive elem5t gives out a specific type ( radiation & has a def9ite life span1 aft] :i* x decays to "o half ( its radioactivity1 ! design] ( ! bomb c\ld rig x 9 su* a way t its explosion w\ld spread into ! air a trem5d\s cl\d ( specially select$ radioactive sub/ances t w\ld give (f le?al radiations = a def9ite p]iod ( "t4 ,9 su* a way a l>ge area c\ld be made unfit = human or animal habitation = a def9ite p]iod ( "t1 mon?s or ye>s4 ,take1 = example1 ! v common elem5t cobalt4 ,:5 bomb>d$ ) neutrons1 x turns into an int5sely radioactive elem5t1 #cbj times m p[]ful ?an radium4 ,any giv5 quantity ( neutrons w\ld produce sixty times its weight 9 radioactive cobalt4 ,if ! bomb conta9s a ton ( deut]ium1 #bej p\nds w\ld come out z neutrons4 ,on ! assumption t e neutron ent]s a cobalt atom1 ?is w\ld produce #g4e tons ( radioactive cobalt4 ,t quantity w\ld give out z mu* radioactivity z #b1djj tons ( radium4 ,n[1 ?is radioactive cobalt has a half-life ( five ye>s1 mean+ t x loses half ( its radioactive p[] at e five-ye> p]iod4 ,s aft] a lapse ( t p]iod ( "t its radioactivity w\ld be equal to #a1bjj tons ( radium1 9 t5 ye>s to #fjj tons1 & s on4 ,if us$ z a bomb-cas+ x w\ld be pulv]iz$ & conv]t$ into a gigantic radioactive cl\d t w\ld kill ev]y?+ 9 ! area x blankets4 ,nor w\ld x be conf9$ to a p>ticul> area1 s9ce ! w9ds w\ld take x ?\s&s ( miles1 c>ry+ dea? to di/ant places4 ,! radioactivity produc$ by ! ,bik9i bombs 0 detect$ )9 "o week 9 ! ,unit$ ,/ates4 ,9 t %ort "t ! we/]ly w9ds swept ! radioactive air mass f ,bik9i1 #d1aej miles away1 to ,san ,francisco4 ,:5 x rea*$ our %ores1 ! activity 0 weak & completely h>mless1 b x 0 /ill detectable4 ,t1 by ! way1 0 h[ we le>n$ t ! ,russians _h explod$ _! fir/ atomic bomb4 ,b1 9 ! words ( ,pr(essor ,tell]1 "o ( ! ,los ,alamos m5 :o made ! prelim9>y /udies on ! hydrog5 bomb1 8if ! activity lib]at$ at ,bik9i 7 multipli$ by a factor ( a hundr$ ?\s& or a million1 & if x 7 to be releas$ (f our ,pacific ,coa/1 ! :ole ( ! ,unit$ ,/ates w\ld be endang]$40 ,he add$ t 8if su* a quantity ( radioactivity %\ld become available1 an enemy c\ld make life h>d or ev5 impossible = u )\t deliv]+ a s+le bomb into our t]ritory40 ,"o limitation to su* an attack1 ,pr(essor ,tell] po9ts out1 is ! boom]ang effect ( ^! gases on ! attack] himself4 ,! radioactive gases w\ld ev5tually drift ov] 8 own c\ntry1 too4 ,he adds1 h[ev]1 t s9ce ^! gases h diff]5t rates ( decay--"s fa/]1 "s sl[]--! attack] is 9 a position to *oose ^? radioactive products be/ suit$ to 8 attack4 8,) ! prop] *oice he c\ld ensure t 8 victim w\ld be s]i\sly damag$ by !m1 & t !y w\ld h decay$ by ! "t !y rea*$ 8 own c\ntry40 8,x is n ev5 impossible to imag9e10 9 ! words ( ,pr(essor ,tell]1 8t ! effects ( an atomic w> f\ght ) greatly p]fect$ weapons & pu%$ by utmo/ det]m9ation w endang] ! survival ( man4444 ,?is specific possibility ( de/ruction may help u realize m cle>ly ! probable consequ5ces ( an atomic w> = our civilization & ! possible consequ5ces = ! :ole human race40 ,on ?is po9t ,pr(essor ,szil>d is mu* m specific4 8,let u assume10 he said at a ,univ]sity ( ,*icago ,r\nd ,table1 8t we make a radioactive elem5t :i* w live = five ye>s & t we j let x g into ! air4 ,dur+ ! foll[+ ye>s x w gradually settle out & cov] ! :ole e>? ) du/4 ,i h ask$ myself1 #8,h[ _m neutrons or h[ mu* heavy hydrog5 d we h to detonate to kill ev]ybody on e>? by ?is p>ticul> me?od8' ,i come up ) ab\t fifty tons ( neutrons z be+ pl5ty to kill ev]ybody1 :i* means ab\t #djj tons ( heavy hydrog50 7deut]ium74 ,n[1 obvi\sly ,pr(essor ,szil>d 0 /at+ ! extreme case4 ,he m]ely call$ att5tion to ! sci5tific fact t man n[ has at 8 disposal1 or soon w h1 means t n only c\ld wipe out all life on e>?1 b c\ld also make ! e>? itself unfit = life = _m g5]ations to come1 if n =ev]4 ,"h we h inde$ :at is probably ! greate/ example ( irony 9 man's hi/ory4 ,! v process 9 ! sun t made life possible on e>?1 & is responsible = its be+ ma9ta9$ "h1 c n[ be us$ by man to wipe out t v life & to ru9 ! e>? = good4 ,x is inconceivable t any lead]s ( m5 today1 or 9 ! ne> future1 w\ld resort to su* an extreme measure4 ,b ! fact rema9s t su* a measure is possible4 ,& x is by no means un?9kable t a ,hitl]1 fac$ ) c]ta9 defeat1 w\ld n *oose to die 9 a great ,gtt]dmm]ung 9 :i* he w\ld pull d[n ! :ole ( humanity ) him to de/ruction4 ,& :o c be bold en\gh to gu>antee t ano!r ,hitl] might n arise sometime1 some:]e1 possibly 9 a rejuv5at$ ,g]many mak+ ano!r bid = _w dom9ation or total annihilation8 ,x is m likely1 ( c\rse1 t an attack]1 p>ticul>ly if he is o!rwise fac$ ) c]ta9 defeat1 might *oose ! less dra/ic me?od outl9$ by ,pr(essor ,tell]1 select+ = 8 weapon a %ort-liv$ radioactive elem5t t w\ld h sp5t itself by ! "t x rea*$ 8 %ores4 ,if he is ! sole possessor ( ! hydrog5 bomb1 he may n ev5 h to use x1 a ?reat ( its use be+ suffici5t to end ! w> on t]ms to 8 lik+4 ,9 ! face ( su* a ?reat1 z ,pr(essor ,szil>d po9t$ out1 :o w\ld d>e take ! responsibility ( refus+8 ,^! are ! />k1 unv>ni%$ facts ab\t ! 8s-call$ hydrog5 bomb40 ,!y raise _m que/ions to :i* ! ,am]ican p z a :ole w h to f9d ! answ]4 ,x is possible1 & ! odds "h are m ?an ev51 t ! v possession ( ! hydrog5 bomb by bo? ourselves & ,russia w make w> un?9kable1 s9ce nei!r side c\ld be ! w9n]4 ,?is w\ld be a ne> c]ta9ty if we _h ! answ] to ,russia's ,trojan ,horse me?od ( tak+ ov] nations by fir/ tak+ ov] _! gov]nm5ts1 z 0 done 9 ,pol&1 ,cze*oslovakia1 ,hung>y1 & ! ,balkan c\ntries4 ,suppose ! ,communi/s take ov] ,italy1 !n ,g]many1 by ! same me?od4 ,:at w\ld we d !n8 ,! answ] is1 ( c\rse1 t if we wait until 8!n10 ev]y?+ w\ld be lo/1 no matt] :at we did4 ,x !re=e becomes obvi\s t our v exi/5ce may dep5d on :at we d "h & n[ to prev5t su* an ev5tuality4 ,n[ t ! hydrog5 bomb has come out into ! op5 aft] five ye>s z a sup]-top secret1 ! au?orities1 & p>ticul>ly ! ,atomic ,en]gy ,commission1 may be call$ ^u to answ] "s emb>rass+ que/ions4 8,:y10 we may ask1 80 ! "w on ! hydrog5 bomb app>5tly dropp$ altoge!r dur+ ! pa/ five ye>s80 ,accord+ to ,pr(essor ,be!1 x w\ld take ab\t ?ree ye>s to develop x4 ,?is means t1 _h we cont9u$ work+ on x 9 #aide & !reaft]1 we w\ld h _h x z f> back z #aidh4 ,we h ?us lo/ five preci\s ye>s1 our loss be+ ,russia's ga94 ,"s sci5ti/s & o!rs cont5d t1 because ( our great h>bor & indu/rial cities1 ! hydrog5 bomb w\ld be a great] ?reat to u ?an to ! ,soviet1 because mo/ ,russian cities are mu* small] ?an ours1 :ile h] indu/ries are mu* m disp]s$4 ,!re may be "s tru? 9 ?is4 ,b on ! o!r h& !re are "s great advantages on our side4 ,) a /rong ,navy & good subm>9e-detect+ devices we may h control ( ! seas & be able to prev5t ! deliv]y ( ! hydrog5 bomb by %ip or subm>9e4 ,) a /rong ,air ,=ce & rad> sy/em we c\ld prev5t ! deliv]y ( hydrog5 bombs f ! air4 ,by f> ! mo/ important advantage ! possession ( ! hydrog5 bomb w\ld give u aga9/ ,russia is its possible use z a tactical weapon aga9/ huge l& armies4 ,s9ce !y c deva/ate su* l>ge areas1 "o or two hydrog5 bombs1 dep5d+ on _! size1 c\ld wipe out entire armies on ! m>*1 ev5 be=e !y succe$$ 9 cross+ ! bord] ( an int5d$ victim4 ,! ,h-bomb w\ld ?us c\nt]balance1 if n completely nullify1 ! "o great advantage ,russia possesses--huge l& armies capable ( ov]runn+ we/]n ,europe4 ,! bomb might ?us s]ve z ! f9al det]r5t to any temptation ! ,kreml9's rul]s may h to invade ! ,atlantic ,pact c\ntries4 ,yet no matt] h[ "o looks at x1 ! adv5t ( ! ,h-bomb con/itutes ! greate/ ?reat to ! survival ( ! human race s9ce ! ,black ,dea?4 ,"o is rem9d$ ( a d9n] conv]sation 9 ,p>is 9 #ahfi1 record$ 9 ! ,j\rnal ( ! ,gonc\rt bro!rs4 ,"s ( ! fam\s savants ( ! day 7 cry/al-gaz+ into ! sci5tific future a hundr$ ye>s away4 ,! great *emi/ ,pi]re ,b]!lot pr$ict$ t by #aifi 8man w\ld "k ( :at ! atom is con/itut$ & w\ld be able1 at w1 to mod]ate1 ext+ui%1 & light up ! sun z if x 7 a gas lamp40 7,?is prophecy has almo/ come true47 ,claude ,b]n>d1 ! greate/ physiologi/ ( ! day1 saw a future 9 :i* 8man w\ld be s completely ! ma/] ( organic law t he w\ld create life artificially 9 competition ) ,god40 ,to :i* ! ,gonc\rt bro!rs add$ ! po/script3 8,to all ( ?is we rais$ no objection4 ,b we h ! feel+ t :5 ?is "t comes to sci5ce1 ,god ) ,8 :ite be>d w come d[n to e>?1 sw++ a bun* ( keys1 & w say to humanity1 ! way !y say at five o'clock at ! salon3 #8,clos+ "t1 g5tlem56'0 ,,ii ,,! ,,real ,,secret ,,( ,,! ,,hydrog5 ,,bomb ,c ! hydrog5 bomb actually be made8 ,if s1 h[ soon8 ,h[ mu* w x co/ 9 money & vital mat]ials8 ,above all1 w x1 if made1 add en\gh to our security to make ! ef=t wor? :ile8 ,z 0 po9t$ out by ,pr(4 ,rob]t ,f4 ,ba*] ( ! ,cali=nia ,in/itute ( ,te*nology1 "o ( ! *ief ar*itects ( ! w>time atomic bomb & ! fir/ sci5tific memb] ( ! ,atomic ,en]gy ,commission1 8s9ce ! ,presid5t has direct$ ! ,,aec to cont9ue ) ! developm5t #8( ! s-call$ hydrog51 or sup] bomb' we c assume t ?is developm5t is reg>d$ z bo? possible & feasible40 ,_m em95t physici/s believe t x c be made1 & ! use by ! ,presid5t ( ! ^w 8cont9ue0 sugge/s t ?is belief is bas$ on m ?an !ory4 ,no less an au?ority ?an ,alb]t ,e9/e9 has /at$ publicly t he reg>ds ! ,h-bomb z 8a probably atta9able goal40 ,on ! o!r h&1 !re are sci5ti/s ( high em95ce1 su* z ,dr4 ,rob]t ,a4 ,millikan1 our olde/ liv+ ,nobel-,prize-w9n] 9 physics1 :o d\bt :e!r ! ,h-bomb c be made at all4 ,& !re are also ^? :o express ! view t1 :ile x probably c\ld be made1 x w\ld n (f] advantages great en\gh1 if any1 to ju/ify ! co/ 9 vital /rategic mat]ials necess>y = our security4 ,=tunately1 facts mo/ly buri$ 9 te*nical lit]ature make x possible = u to g beh9d ! sci5tific curta9 & look intimately at ! reasons = ^! diff]5ces 9 op9ion4 ,m important /ill1 ^! facts n only provide u ) a cle>] picture ( ! nature ( ! problem b also enable u to make "s reasonable d$uctions or speculations4 ,! sci5ti/s directly involv$ d n feel free to discuss ^! matt]s op5ly1 n because !y w\ld be violat+ security1 b because ( ! jitt]y atmosph]e t acts z a damp] on op5 discussion ev5 ( subjects kn[n to be non-secret4 ,we already "k t ! s-call$ hydrog5 bomb1 if x is to be made at all1 _c be made ( ! abundant common hydrog5 ( atomic mass "o1 & t !re are only two possible mat]ials t c\ld be us$ = su* a purpose3 deut]ium1 a hydrog5 tw9 twice ! weight ( common hydrog51 :i* con/itutes two hundr$?s ( "o p] c5t ( ! hydrog5 9 all wat]s2 & a man-made v>iety ( hydrog51 ?ree times ! weight ( ! lighte/ v>iety1 kn[n z tritium4 ,we also "k t to explode ei!r deut]ium or tritium 7also kn[n1 respectively1 z heavy & sup]heavy hydrog57 a temp]ature measur$ 9 millions ( degrees is requir$4 ,?is is atta9able on e>? only 9 ! explosion ( an ,a-bomb1 & !re=e ! ,a-bomb w\ld h to s]ve z ! fuse to set (f an explosion ( deut]ium1 tritium1 or a mixture ( ! two4 ,^! facts1 fundam5tal z !y are1 m]ely give u a g5]al idea ( ! conditions requir$ to make ! ,h-bomb4 ,all conc]n$1 includ+ ,dr4 ,millikan1 fully accept ! validity ( ^! facts4 ,b !re is "o o!r factor at ! v he>t ( ! problem--! extremely %ort "t at our disposal 9 :i* to k9dle ! hydrog5 bomb ) ! ,a-bomb mat*4 ,accord+ to /atem5ts attribut$ to him 9 ! press1 ,dr4 ,millikan believes t ! "t is too %ort2 9 o!r words1 he seems to be conv9c$ t ! ,a-bomb mat* w be bl[n out be=e we h "t to light ! fire4 ,^? ( opposite view believe t me?ods c be devis$ = 8%ield+ ! mat* aga9/ ! w9d0 = j long en\gh to light ! fire4 ,z we %all pres5tly see1 x is ^! me?ods = %ield+ ! mat* t lead "s to d\bt :e!r ! game w\ld be wor? ! c&le1 or ! mat*1 if y w4 ,^! hone/ d\bts are bas$ on ! possibility t1 ev5 if successful1 ! %ield+ might exact too high a price 9 t]ms ( vital mat]ials1 p>ticul>ly ! /uff out ( :i* ,a-bombs are made--plutonium4 ,accord+ to ?is view1 we may at be/ be gett+ b a v small return = our inve/m5t 9 mat]ials vitally important 9 w> z well z 9 peace4 ,ev5 ?\gh ! price 9 doll>s 7 to be br\ght d[n to a negligible am\nt4 ,a clos] look at ! details ( ! problem may enable u to p5etrate ! ?ick fog t n[ envelops ! subject4 ,we may beg9 ) a quotation f ,dr4 ,ba*]1 :o outl9$ ! pr9ciple involv$ ) rem>kable cl>ity4 8,! real problem 9 develop+ & con/ruct+ a hydrog5 bomb10 he said 9 a notable address be=e ! ,los ,angeles ,t[n ,hall1 is1 8,h[ d y get x go+80 ,! heavy hydrog5s1 deut]ium & tritium1 are suitable sub/ances if someh[ !y c\ld be heat$ hot en\gh & kept hot4 ,?is problem is a little bit l ! job ( mak+ a fire at #bj degrees bel[ z]o 9 ! m\nta9s ) gre5 wood :i* is cov]$ ) ice & ) v little k9dl+4 ,today1 sci5ti/s tell u t su* a fire c probably be k9dl$4 ,once y get ! fire go+1 ( c\rse1 y c pile on ! wood & make a v sizeable conflagration4 ,9 ! same way ) ! hydrog5 bomb1 m heavy hydrog5 c be us$ & a bigg] explosion obta9$4 ,x has be5 call$ an op5-end$ weapon1 mean+ t m mat]ials c be add$ & a bigg] explosion obta9$4 ,! phrase t goes to ! v he>t ( ! problem is 8v little k9dl+10 :i* is ano!r way ( illu/rat+ ! difficulty ( light+ a fire 9 a high w9d :5 y h only "o mat*4 ,we "k t to ignite deut]ium1 by f> ! *eap] & m abundant ( ! two ,h-bomb elem5ts1 a temp]ature comp>able to ^? exi/+ 9 ! int]ior ( ! sun1 "s #bj1jjj1jjj degrees c5tigrade1 is necess>y4 ,?is temp]ature c be realiz$ on e>? only 9 ! explosion ( an ,a-bomb4 ,we also "k t ! w>time model ,a-bombs g5]at$ a temp]ature ( ab\t #ej1jjj1jjj degrees1 m ?an en\gh to light a deut]ium fire4 ,! tr\ble lies 9 ! extremely %ort "t int]val1 ( ! ord] ( a million? ( a second 7microsecond71 & a fraction !re(1 dur+ :i* ! ,a-bomb is held toge!r be=e x flies ap>t4 ,9 ! words ( ,pr(essor ,ba*]1 we mu/ make our gre51 ice-cov]$ wood cat* fire 9 ! subz]o m\nta9 wea!r be=e ! 8v little k9dl+0 we h is burn$ up4 ,! times at :i* deut]ium w ignite at any giv5 temp]ature1 9 bo? its gase\s & its liquid =m1 are widely kn[n among nucle> sci5ti/s ev]y:]e1 includ+ ,russia1 ?r\gh publication 9 (ficial sci5tific lit]ature ( a well-kn[n =mula1 orig9ally work$ out by two ,european sci5ti/s z f> back z #aibi1 & m rec5tly improv$ ^u by ,pr(essor ,george ,gam[ & ,pr(essor ,tell]4 ,by ?is =mula1 d]iv$ f actual exp]im5ts1 x is kn[n t deut]ium 9 its gase\s =m w require z long z #abh seconds to ignite at a temp]ature ( #ej1jjj1jjj degrees c5tigrade1 well above #ajj1jjj1jjj times long] ?an ! "t 9 :i* our little k9dl+ is us$ up4 ,?is obvi\sly rules out deut]ium 9 its natural gase\s =m z mat]ial = an ,h-bomb4 ,h[ ab\t liquid deut]ium8 ,we "k t ! m atoms !re are p] unit volume 7namely1 ! great] ! d5sity71 ! fa/] is ! "t ( ! reaction4 ,! increase 9 ! spe$ ( ! reaction 79 ?is case ! ignition ( ! deut]ium7 is directly proportional to ! squ>e ( ! d5sity4 ,= example1 if ! d5sity1 7t is1 ! numb] ( atoms p] unit volume7 is increas$ by a factor ( #aj1 ! "t ( ignition w be spe$$ up by ! squ>e ( #aj1 or #ajj times fa/]4 ,s9ce liquid deut]ium has a d5sity ne>ly #hjj times t ( gase\s deut]ium1 ?is means t liquid deut]ium 7:i* mu/ be ma9ta9$ at a temp]ature ( #dbc degrees bel[ z]o ,fahr5heit at a pressure above "o atmosph]e7 w\ld ignite #fdj1jjj times fa/] 7namely1 9 #a_/fdj1jjj? "p ( ! "t7 ?an its gase\s =m4 ,ari?metic %[s t ! ignition "t = liquid deut]ium at #ej1jjj1jjj degrees c5tigrade w be #bjj microseconds1 /ill #bjj times long] ?an ! p]iod 9 :i* our k9dl+ is consum$4 ,! same =mula also reveals ! "t x w\ld take liquid deut]ium to ignite at high] temp]atures1 ! increase ( :i* %ort5s ! ignition "t4 ,^! figures %[ t ! ignition "t = liquid deut]ium at #ge1jjj1jjj degrees c5tigrade is #dj microseconds4 ,at #ajj1jjj1jjj degrees ! "t is #cj microseconds2 at #aej1jjj1jjj degrees1 #ae microseconds2 & at #bjj1jjj1jjj degrees on ! c5tigrade scale1 ab\t #d4h million?s ( a second4 ,d\bl+ ! temp]ature spe$s up ! ignition "t = liquid deut]ium by a factor ( ab\t six4 ,! problem ?us is a dual "o3 to raise ! temp]ature at :i* ! ,a-bomb explodes1 & to ext5d ! "t be=e ! ,a-bomb flies ap>t4 ,x is also obvi\s t if ! liquid deut]ium is to be ignit$ at all1 x mu/ be done be=e ! bomb has dis9tegrat$--t is1 dur+ ! incr$ibly %ort "t int]val be=e x exp&s into a cl\d ( vapor & gas1 s9ce by !n ! deut]ium w\ld no long] be liquid4 ,c we increase ! ,a-bomb's temp]ature f\rfold to #bjj1jjj1jjj degrees & lit]ally make "t /& /ill :ile x holds toge!r = ne>ly five million?s ( a second8 ,to get a bett] und]/&+ ( ! problem we mu/ take a clos] look at :at takes place inside ! ,a-bomb dur+ ! inf9itesimal int]val 9 :i* x comes to life4 ,?is life hi/ory ( ! ,a-bomb is an incr$ible tale1 f ! "t its inn] me*anisms are set 9 motion until its metamorphosis into a great ball ( fire4 ,z expla9$ e>li]1 ! ,a-bomb's explosion takes place ?r\gh a process ak9 to spontane\s combu/ion z soon z a c]ta9 m9imum am\nt 7critical mass7 ( ei!r "o ( two fissionable 7combu/ible7 elem5ts--uranium #bce or plutonium--is assembl$ 9 "o unit4 ,! mo/ obvi\s way x takes place is by br++ toge!r two pieces ( uranium #bce 7,u-#bce71 or plutonium1 ea* less ?an a critical mass1 fir+ "o ( ^! into ! o!r ) a gun me*anism1 ?us creat+ a critical mass at ! la/ m9ute4 ,if1 = example1 ! critical mass at :i* spontane\s combu/ion takes place is t5 kilograms 7! actual figure is a top secret71 !n ! fir+ ( a piece ( "o kilogram into ano!r ( n9e kilograms w\ld br+ toge!r a critical mass t w\ld explode fa/] ?an ! eye c\ld w9k--9 fact1 "s ?\s&s ( times fa/] ?an ,,tnt4 ,j z an ord9>y fire ne$s oxyg51 s does an atomic fire require ! trem5d\sly p[]ful atomic p>ticles kn[n z neutrons4 ,unlike oxyg51 h[ev]1 neutrons d n exi/ 9 a free /ate 9 nature4 ,_! habitat is ! nuclei1 or he>ts1 ( ! atoms4 ,h[1 !n1 does ! spontane\s combu/ion ( ! critical mass ( ,u-#bce or plutonium beg98 ,all we ne$ is a s+le neutron to />t ?+s go+1 & ?is "o neutron may be suppli$ 9 "o ( sev]al ways4 ,x c come f ! nucleus ( an atom 9 ! atmosph]e1 or inside ! bomb1 %att]$ by a p[]ful cosmic ray t comes f outside ! e>?4 ,or ! emanation f "s radioactive elem5t 9 ! atmosph]e1 or f "o introduc$ into ! body ( ! bomb1 may split ! fir/ ,u-#bce or plutonium atom1 knock out two neutrons1 & ?us />t a *a9 reaction ( self-multiply+ neutrons4 ,to und]/& ! *a9 reaction requires only a little ari?metic4 ,! fir/ atom split releases1 on ! av]age1 two neutrons1 :i* split two atoms1 :i* release f\r neutrons1 :i* split f\r atoms1 :i* release eight neutrons1 & s on1 9 a geometric progression t1 z c be se51 d\bles itself at ea* successive /ep4 ,ari?metic %[s t any?+ t is multipli$ by two at e /ep w rea* a #a1jjj 79 r\nd numb]s7 9 ! fir/ t5 /eps1 & w multiply itself by a #a1jjj at e t5 /eps !reaft]1 rea*+ a million 9 tw5ty /eps1 a billion 9 ?irty1 a trillion 9 =ty1 & s on4 ,x c ?us be se5 t aft] sev5ty g5]ations ( self-multiply+ neutrons ! a/ronomical figure ( two billion trillion 7#b foll[$ by #ba z]os7 atoms h be5 split4 ,at ?is po9t let u hold our brea? & get set to believe :at at fir/ glance may appe> to be unbelievable4 ,! "t x takes to split ^! two billion trillion atoms is no m ?an "o million? ( a second 7"o microsecond74 ,if we keep ?is "t elem5t 9 m9d we c arrive at a cle> und]/&+ ( ! trem5d\s problem involv$ 9 explod+ an ,a- or an ,h-bomb4 ,& :ile we are recov]+ f ! fir/ %ock we may z well get set = ano!r4 ,t unimag9able figure ( two billion trillion atoms repres5ts ! splitt+ 7explosion7 ( no m ?an "o gram 7#a_/bh? ( an ounce7 ( ,u-#bce1 or plutonium4 ,n[1 ! en]gy releas$ 9 ! splitt+ ( "o gram ( ,u-#bce is equival5t 9 p[] to ! explosive =ce ( #bj tons ( ,,tnt1 or two old-fa%ion$ blockbu/]s4 ,s9ce we "k f ,presid5t ,truman's ann\ncem5t foll[+ ! bomb+ ( ,hiro%ima t ! w>time ,a-bomb 8_h m p[] ?an #bj1jjj tons ( ,,tnt10 x means t ! atoms 9 an entire kilogram 7#a1jjj grams7 ( ,u-#bce or plutonium mu/ h be5 split4 ,9 o!r words1 aft] ! ,a-bomb _h rea*$ a p[] ( #bj tons ( ,,tnt1 x _h to be kept toge!r long en\gh to increase its p[] a ?\s&fold to #bj1jjj tons4 ,?is1 z we h se51 requires only t5 m /eps4 ,x c also be se5 t x is ^! t5 f9al crucial /eps t make all ! diff]5ce betwe5 a bomb equal to only two blockbu/]s1 :i* w\ld h be5 a mo/ mis]able two-billion-doll> fiasco1 & an atomic bomb equal 9 p[] to two ?\s& blockbu/]s4 ,) ! aid ( ^! facts we are at la/ 9 a position to grasp ! enorm\sness ( ! problem t confront$ our ,a-bomb design]s at ,los ,alamos & is confront+ !m aga9 today4 ,x c be se5 t = a bomb to multiply itself f #bj to #bj1jjj tons 9 t5 /eps by d\bl+ its p[] at e /ep1 x has to pass successively ! /ages ( #dj1 #hj1 #afj1 #cbj1 & s on1 until x rea*es an explosive p[] ( #b1ejj tons at ! sev5? /ep4 ,yet x /ill has to be held toge!r = ?ree m /eps1 dur+ :i* x rea*es ! enorm\s p[] ( #e1jjj & #aj1jjj tons ( ,,tnt1 )\t explod+4 ,"h 0 an irresi/ible =ce1 & ! problem 0 to surr\nd x ) an immovable body1 or at lea/ a body t w\ld rema9 immovable long en\gh = ! *a9 reaction to take j t5 additional /eps foll[+ ! fir/ sev5ty4 ,!re is only "o fact ( nature t makes ?is possible1 or ev5 ?9kable--! la/ t5 /eps f #bj to #bj1jjj tons take only "o t5? ( a million? ( a second4 ,! problem ?us 0 to f9d a body t w\ld rema9 immovable aga9/ an irresi/ible =ce = no long] ?an "o t5? ( a microsecond1 #ajj billion?s ( a second4 ,?is immovable body is kn[n te*nically z a 8tamp]10 :i* pits in]tia aga9/ an irresi/ible =ce t builds up 9 #ajj billion?s ( a second f an explosive p[] ( #bj tons ( ,,tnt to #bj1jjj tons4 ,! v in]tia ( ! tamp] delays ! expansion ( ! active sub/ance & makes = a long]-la/+1 m en]getic1 & m effici5t explosion4 ,! tamp]1 :i* also s]ves z a reflector ( neutrons1 mu/ be a mat]ial ( v high d5sity4 ,s9ce gold has ! fif? highe/ d5sity ( all ! elem5ts 7next only to osmium1 iridium1 plat9um1 & rh5ium71 at "o "t ! use ( "p ( our huge gold ho>d at ,=t ,knox 0 s]i\sly consid]$4 ,) ^! facts & figures 9 m9d1 x becomes cle> t an ,h-bomb made ( deut]ium alone is n feasible4 ,x is c]ta9ly out ( ! "q ) an ,a-bomb ( ! ,hiro%ima or ,nagasaki types1 :i* g5]ate a temp]ature ( ab\t #ej1jjj1jjj degrees1 s9ce1 z we h se51 x w\ld take fully #bjj microseconds to ignite x at t temp]ature4 ,x is "o ?+ to devise a tamp] t w\ld hold back a =ce ( #bj tons = #ajj billion?s ( a second1 & ?us all[ x to build up to #bj1jjj tons4 ,x is q ano!r matt] to devise an immovable body t w\ld hold back an irresi/ible =ce ( #bj1jjj tons = a "t int]val #b1jjj times l>g]1 p>ticul>ly if "o rememb]s t 9 ano!r t5? ( a microsecond ! irresi/ible =ce w\ld increase aga9 by #a1jjj to #bj1jjj1jjj tons4 ,obvi\sly ?is is impossible1 = if x 7 possible we w\ld h a sup]bomb )\t any ne$ = hydrog5 ( any k9d4 ,x is kn[n t we h develop$ a mu* m effici5t ,a-bomb1 :i*1 z ,s5ator ,edw9 ,c4 ,johnson ( ,colorado has inadv]t5tly blurt$ out1 8has six times ! effectiv5ess ( ! bomb t 0 dropp$ ov] ,nagasaki40 ,we are fur!r in=m$ by ,dr4 ,ba*] t 8significant improvem5ts0 9 atomic bombs s9ce ! w> 8h result$ 9 m p[]ful bombs & 9 a m effici5t use ( ! valuable fissionable mat]ial40 ,x is conceivable & ev5 probable t ! improvem5ts1 among o!r ?+s1 include bett] tamp]s t delay ! new ,a-bombs long en\gh to fission two1 f\r1 or ev5 eight times z _m atoms z 9 ! w>time models4 ,b s9ce1 z we h se51 ! t5 /eps ( ! f9al /ages require only an av]age ( #aj billion?s ( a second p] /ep1 increas+ ! p[] ( ! new models ev5 to #afj1jjj tons 7eight times ! p[] ( ! ,hiro%ima type7 w\ld take only ?ree /eps1 9 an elaps$ "t ( no m ?an #cj billion?s ( a second4 ,& ev5 if we assume t ! improv$ bomb g5]ates a temp]ature ( #bjj1jjj1jjj degrees1 x w\ld /ill be too cold to ignite ! deut]ium dur+ ! int]val ( its brief exi/5ce1 s9ce1 z we h se51 x w\ld take #d4h microseconds to ignite x at t temp]ature4 ,9 fact1 calculations indicate t x w\ld require a temp]ature 9 ! neighborhood ( #djj1jjj1jjj degrees to ignite deut]ium 9 ! "t int]val dur+ :i* ! assembly ( ! improv$ ,a-bomb appe>s to be held toge!r1 :i*1 z may be surmis$ f ! kn[n data1 is )9 ! range ( #a4b microseconds4 ,f all ?is x may be conclud$ ) practical c]ta9ty t an ,h-bomb ( deut]ium only is out ( ! "q4 ,equally good1 ?\gh entirely diff]5t1 reasons also rule out an ,h-bomb us+ only tritium z its explosive elem5t4 ,!re are sev]al important reasons :y an ,h-bomb made ( tritium alone is n feasible4 ,! mo/ important by f>1 :i* alone excludes x f any s]i\s consid]ation1 is ! /agg]+ co/ we w\ld h to pay 9 t]ms ( priceless ,a-bomb mat]ial1 z ea* kilogram ( tritium produc$ w\ld exact ! sacrifice ( eighty times t am\nt 9 plutonium4 ,! reason = ?is is simple4 ,bo? plutonium & tritium h to be creat$ ) ! neutrons releas$ 9 ! splitt+ ( ,u-#bce1 ea* atom ( plutonium & ea* atom ( tritium made requir+ "o neutron4 ,s9ce an atom ( plutonium has a weight ( #bci atomic mass units1 :]eas an atom ( tritium has an atomic weight ( only ?ree1 x c be se5 t a kilogram1 or any giv5 weight1 ( tritium w\ld conta9 eighty times z _m atoms z a correspond+ weight ( plutonium1 & h5ce w\ld require eighty times z _m neutrons to produce4 ,9 o!r words1 we w\ld be buy+ ea* kilogram ( tritium at a sacrifice ( eighty kilograms ( plutonium1 :i*1 ( c\rse1 w\ld mean a consid]able r$uction 9 our pot5tial /ockpile ( plutonium bombs4 ,we w\ld cut ?is loss by m ?an half because a kilogram ( tritium w\ld yield ab\t two & a half times ! explosive p[] ( plutonium4 ,b ev5 ?is advantage w\ld soon be lo/1 s9ce tritium decays at ! rate ( fifty p] c5t e twelve ye>s1 s t a kilogram produc$ 9 #aiea w\ld decay to only half a kilogram by #aifc4 ,plutonium1 on ! o!r h&1 c be /or$ indef9itely )\t any significant loss1 s9ce x *anges sl[ly 7at ! rate ( fifty p] c5t e tw5ty-five ?\s& ye>s7 into ! o!r fissionable elem5t1 ,u-#bce1 :i* 9 turn decays to "o half 9 no less ?an n9e hundr$ million ye>s4 ,:at is m1 plutonium1 if ! day comes :5 we c beat our swords into pl[%>es1 w become "o ( ! mo/ valuable fuels = indu/rial p[]1 ! propulsion ( %ips1 globe-circl+ airplanes1 & ev51 som$ay1 int]planet>y rockets4 ,x holds enorm\s pot5tialities z "o ( ! major p[] s\rces ( ! tw5ty-fir/ c5tury4 ,tritium1 on ! o!r h&1 c be us$ only z an ag5t ( t]rible de/ruction4 ,x w yield its en]gy 9 a fraction ( a million? ( a second or n at all4 ,! only o!r possible uses x may h w\ld be z a rese>* tool = prob+ ! /ructure ( ! atom1 & z a pot5tial new ag5t 9 m$ic9e1 9 :i* x may be us$ = its radiations4 ,h[ mu* tritium w\ld x take to make an ,h-bomb #a1jjj times ! p[] ( ! w>time model ,a-bombs8 ,s9ce tritium has ab\t #b4e times ! p[] p] giv5 weight ( ,u-#bce or plutonium1 x w\ld take #djj kilograms 7ab\t #a1hhj qu>ts ( ! liquid =m7 ( tritium to make a bomb t w\ld equal ! p[] ( #a1jjj kilograms ( plutonium4 ,su* a bomb1 we c see1 w\ld h to be made at ! sacrifice ( #cb1jjj kilograms ( plutonium4 ,9 o!r words1 we w\ld be gett+ a return1 9 t]ms ( en]gy cont5t1 ( #a1jjj kilograms = an inve/m5t ( #cb1jjj4 ,& we w\ld be los+ fully half ( ev5 ?is small return e twelve ye>s4 ,h[ _m ,a-bombs w\ld we be sacrific+ ?r\gh ?is inve/m5t8 ,on ! basis ( ,pr(essor ,oliphant's e/imate t ! critical mass ( an ,a-bomb is betwe5 #aj & #cj kilograms1 we w\ld sacrifice at lea/ #a1jff1 & possibly z _m z #c1bjj1 if we take ! l[] figure4 ,& we mu/ n =get t a bomb a ?\s& times ! p[] w produce only t5 times ! de/ructiv5ess by bla/ & ?irty times ! damage by fire ( an ,a-bomb ( ! old-fa%ion$ v>iety4 ,^! cold facts make x cle> t a tritium bomb1 p>ticul>ly "o a ?\s& times ! p[] ( ! ,a-bomb1 is completely out ( ! picture4 ,b1 "o may ask1 if a deut]ium bomb is n possible & a tritium bomb is n feasible1 & ^! are ! only two sub/ances t c possibly be us$ at all1 isn't all ?is talk ab\t a sup]bomb %e] moon%9e8 ,& if s1 h[ expla9 ,presid5t ,truman's directive 8to cont9ue0 "w on x8 ,to f9d ! answ] let u g back = a mom5t to ,dr4 ,ba*]'s man 9 ! m\nta9s1 confront$ ) ! problem ( light+ a fire ) gre51 ice-cov]$ wood at tw5ty degrees bel[ z]o ) 8v little k9dl+40 ,obvi\sly ! poor fell[ w\ld be doom$ to freeze to dea? 7 x n = "o little item he _h almo/ =gott54 ,some:]e 9 8 belong+s he discov]s a conta9] fill$ ) gasol9e1 :i* increases ! inflammability ( ! wet wood to ! po9t at :i* x w cat* fire ) a quantity ( k9dl+ t w\ld o!rwise be mu* too small4 ,some?+ closely analog\s is true ) ! ,h-bomb4 ,x s happ5s t a mixture ( deut]ium & tritium is ! mo/ highly inflammable atomic fuel on e>?4 ,x yields #c4e times ! en]gy ( deut]ium & ab\t twice ! en]gy ( tritium :5 !y are burn$ individually4 ,mo/ important ( all1 ! deut]ium-tritium mixture1 kn[n z ,d-,t1 ignites mu* fa/] ?an ei!r deut]ium or tritium by !mselves4 ,= example1 ! ,d-,t comb9ation ignites #be times fa/] ?an deut]ium alone at a temp]ature ( #ajj1jjj1jjj degrees1 & ! ignition "t is fully #cg4e times fa/] ?an = deut]ium at #aej1jjj1jjj degrees4 ,! publi%$ te*nical data %[ t at a temp]ature ( #ej million degrees ! ,d-,t mixture ignites 9 only #aj microseconds1 or #bj times fa/] ?an deut]ium alone4 ,at #ge million degrees x takes only #c microseconds1 z aga9/ #dj = deut]ium1 :ile at #ajj million degrees x ne$s only #a4b microseconds to cat* fire1 a "t1 z we h se51 only #j4a microsecond long] ?an x took ! w>time ,a-bomb to fly ap>t4 ,s9ce ! latt] held toge!r = #a4a microseconds at a temp]ature ( ab\t #ej million degrees1 x is reasonable to assume t ! improv$ & m effici5t models g5]ate a temp]ature at lea/ twice z high1 & t ?is is done by hold+ !m toge!r = ab\t #a4b microseconds4 ,x c ?us be d$uc$ t ! only feasible ,h-bomb is "o 9 :i* a relatively small am\nt ( a deut]ium-tritium mixture w s]ve z additional sup]k9dl+1 to boo/ ! k9dl+ suppli$ by ! improv$ model ,a-bomb1 = light+ a fire ) a va/ quantity ( deut]ium4 ,?is1 x appe>s1 is ! real secret ( ! ,h-bomb1 :i* is really no secret at all1 s9ce all ! d$uctions "h pres5t$ are arriv$ at on ! basis ( data widely kn[n to sci5ti/s ev]y:]e1 includ+ ,russia4 ,& s9ce x is no secret f ! ,russians1 :om ! ar*-traitor ,fu*s has suppli$ ) ! details /ill classifi$ top secret1 ! ,am]ican p are c]ta9ly entitl$ to ! kn[n facts1 s vitally necess>y = an intellig5t und]/&+ ( "o ( ! mo/ important problems fac+ !m today4 ,a deut]ium bomb ) a ,d-,t boo/] w\ld become a c]ta9ty if ! temp]ature ( ! ,a-bomb trigg] c\ld be rais$ to #aej million or1 bett] /ill1 to #bjj million degrees4 ,at ! =m] temp]ature ! ,d-,t sup]k9dl+ ignites 9 #j4ch microseconds2 at ! high] temp]ature ! ignition "t goes d[n to z l[ z #j4bh microseconds4 ,n[1 ! ,d-,t mixture releases f\r times z mu* en]gy z plutonium1 & ! fa/] ! "t 9 :i* en]gy is releas$1 ! high] goes ! temp]ature4 ,s9ce f\r times z mu* en]gy is releas$ at a rate f\r times fa/] ?an 9 ! w>time model ,a-bomb1 x is n unreasonable to assume t ! temp]ature g5]at$ w\ld be high en\gh to ignite ! gre5 wood 9 ! bomb--its load ( deut]ium4 ,h[ mu* tritium w\ld be requir$ = ! k9dl+ mixture8 ,on ?is we c only speculate at pres5t4 ,s9ce ! ,d-,t k9dl+ calls = ! fusion ( "o atom ( tritium ) "o atom ( deut]ium1 & ! atomic weight ( tritium is ?ree z comp>$ ) two = deut]ium1 ! weight ( ! two sub/ances w be 9 ! ratio ( #c = tritium to #b = deut]ium4 ,?us if ! am\nt to be us$ = ! k9dl+ mixture is to be "o kilogram1 x w be made up ( #fjj grams ( tritium & #djj grams ( deut]ium4 ,s9ce1 z we h se51 x w\ld take eighty kilograms ( plutonium to produce "o kilogram ( tritium1 we w\ld h to use up only #dh kilograms ( plutonium to create ! #fjj grams1 or ! equival5t ( "o & a half to ab\t five ,a-bombs1 accord+ to ,dr4 ,oliphant's e/imate4 ,b w\ld we ne$ z mu* z #fjj grams ( tritium8 ,su* an am\nt1 mix$ ) #djj grams ( deut]ium1 w\ld yield an explosive p[] equal to #hj1jjj tons ( ,,tnt1 an en]gy equival5t ( #ajj million kil[att-h\rs4 ,a tw5tie? "p ( ?is am\nt w\ld /ill be equal 9 p[] to #d1jjj tons ( ,,tnt1 equival5t 9 t]ms ( en]gy to #e1jjj1jjj kil[att-h\rs4 ,n[ "o tw5tie? ( #fjj grams1 j #cj grams ( tritium1 c\ld be made at a co/ ( no m ?an #b4d kilograms ( plutonium4 ,?us we w\ld be pay+ only "o twelf? to "o f\r? ( an ,a-bomb 79 addition to ! "o us$ z ! trigg]7 to get ! equival5t ( t5 ,a-bombs 9 bla/+ p[] & ( ?irty times ! inc5di>y p[]1 :i* w\ld totally deva/ate an area ( m ?an #cjj squ>e miles by bla/ & ( m ?an #a1bjj squ>e miles by fire4 ,w\ld #cj grams ( tritium be en\gh to s]ve z ! sup]k9dl+ = explod+1 let's say1 #a1jjj kilograms 7"o ton7 ( deut]ium8 ,we %all probably n "k until we actually try x4 ,x w l>gely dep5d on ! temp]ature g5]at$ by our m p[]ful ,a-bomb models4 ,if x is true1 z ,s5ator ,johnson in=m$ 8 television audi5ce1 t !y h 8six times ! effectiv5ess ( ! bomb t 0 dropp$ ov] ,nagasaki0 7:i*1 by ! way1 _h m ?an twice ! effectiv5ess ( ! ,hiro%ima model71 x is q possible t _! temp]ature is z high z #aej million1 or ev5 #bjj million1 degrees4 ,9 t case1 ! extra k9dl+ ( a #bj-cj gram ,d-,t mixture1 ) its trem5d\s bur/ ( #e1jjj1jjj kil[att-h\rs ( en]gy 9 #j4bh to #j4ch microseconds 7add$ to ! va/ quantity already be+ lib]at$ by ! explod+ plutonium1 or ,u-#bce71 might well heat ! deut]ium to ! prop] ignition temp]ature & keep x hot long en\gh = its mass to explode well )9 #a4b microseconds4 ,9 any case x w\ld appe> logical to expect t a mixture ( #aej grams ( tritium & #ajj grams ( deut]ium1 :i* w\ld release an en]gy equal to t ( ! ,hiro%ima bomb1 %\ld be able to d ! job ) pl5ty ( "t to sp>e4 ,we ?us h a ?reefold answ] to ! "q3 ,c ! ,h-bomb actually be made8 ,z we h se51 ! deut]ium bomb is def9itely n possible4 ,! tritium bomb is !oretically possible1 b def9itely n practicable4 ,b a l>ge deut]ium bomb us+ a reasonably small am\nt ( a deut]ium & tritium mixture z extra k9dl+ is bo? possible & feasible4 ,we n[ also /& on solid gr\nd 9 deal+ ) ! que/ions ( co/ & ( ! "t x w\ld take u to get into production4 ,) ^! que/ions answ]$1 we c !n decide :e!r ! ,h-bomb1 if made1 w add en\gh to our security to make ! ef=t wor? :ile4 ,we "k at ?is /age t ! ,h-bomb requires ?ree ess5tial +r$i5ts4 ,x ne$s1 fir/ ( all1 an ,a-bomb to set if (f4 ,we h a sizable /ockpile ( !m4 ,x ne$s l>ge quantities ( deut]ium4 ,we h built sev]al deut]ium plants dur+ ! w>1 & !y %\ld be l>ge en\gh to supply our ne$s4 ,s9ce x is extract$ f wat]1 ! raw mat]ial w co/ u no?+4 ,! only item ( co/ w be ! electric p[] requir$ = ! conc5tration process1 & ?is %\ld n be above #ajj p] kilogram1 & probably less4 ,! ?ird vital +r$i5t1 tritium1 c be made 9 ! giant plutonium plants at ,han=d1 ,wa%+ton4 ,?us x c be se5 t all ! ess5tial +r$i5ts ( ! ,h-bomb1 ! co/lie/ & ^? t w\ld take longe/ to produce1 z well z ! multimillion-doll> plants requir$ = _! production1 are already at h&4 ,?is means t z f> z ! ess5tial mat]ials are conc]n$1 we are ready to g "r n[4 ,& z = ! co/1 x w\ld appe> to require h>dly any new appropriations by ,congress1 or1 at any rate1 only appropriations t w\ld be m]e *ick5 fe$ comp>$ ) ! five billion we h already inve/$ 9 our ,a-bomb program4 ,! raw mat]ial out ( :i* tritium is made is ! common1 *eap light metal li?ium1 ! lighte/1 9 fact1 ( all ! metals4 ,x has an atomic weight ( six1 its nucleus consi/+ ( ?ree protons & ?ree neutrons4 ,:5 an extra neutron invades its nucleus1 x becomes un/able & breaks up into two light] elem5ts1 helium 7two protons & two neutrons7 & tritium 7"o proton & two neutrons74 ,!y are bo? gases & !y are readily sep>at$4 ,& :ile li?ium ( atomic weight six con/itutes only #g4e p] c5t ( ! elem5t z f\nd 9 nature 7x comes mix$ ) #ib4e p] c5t ( li?ium ( atomic weight sev571 !re is no ne$ to sep>ate x f its heavi] tw91 s9ce ! latt] has no aff9ity = neutrons & ne>ly all ( !m are gobbl$ up by ! light] elem5t4 ,! production ( tritium1 ev5 9 small am\nts1 w nev]!less be a =midable process4 ,z we h se51 x takes eighty times z _m neutrons to produce any giv5 am\nt ( tritium z to produce a correspond+ am\nt ( plutonium4 ,s9ce ! li?ium w h to compete ) uranium #bch 7p>5t ( plutonium7 = ! available supply ( neutrons1 & s9ce ! numb] ( atoms ( ,u-#bch p] giv5 volume is ne>ly =ty times great] ?an ! numb] ( li?ium atoms1 ! rate ( tritium production w\ld be v mu* sl[] ?an t ( plutonium4 ,on ! o!r h&1 ev5 if x took z mu* z two hundr$ times z long to produce a giv5 quantity ( tritium1 ! h&icap w\ld be consid]ably ov]come because ( ! relatively small am\nts t may be requir$4 ,if1 = example1 we %\ld ne$ only #cj to #aej grams ( tritium p] bomb1 x w\ld take our pres5t plutonium plants only six to ?irty times long] to produce ^! quantities ?an x takes !m to produce "o kilogram ( plutonium4 ,a hypo!tical plant su* z ! "o m5tion$ 9 ! (ficial ,smy? ,report1 design$ to produce "o kilogram ( plutonium p] day1 w\ld ?us yield #cj grams ( tritium 9 six days4 ,h[ mu* tritium w\ld be ne$$ = an adequate /ockpile ( ,h-bombs8 ,s9ce our prim>y reasons = build+ x are to det] aggression1 to prev5t its use aga9/ u or our allies1 & z a tactical weapon aga9/ l>ge l& armies1 x w\ld appe> t z few z tw5ty-five1 or fifty at ! mo/1 w\ld be adequate = ! purpose4 ,on ! basis ( ! l>g] figure 7assum+ #cj to #aej grams ( tritium p] bomb71 x w\ld mean an initial /ockpile ( only #a4e to #g4e kilograms ( tritium1 :i* w\ld entail ! sacrifice ( ab\t #abj to #fjj kilograms ( plutonium4 ,once ?is initial outlay _h be5 made1 h[ev]1 our plutonium sacrifice w\ld be r$uc$ annually to only "o tw5ty-f\r? ( ! orig9al respective am\nts--namely1 #e to #be kilograms a ye>--j en\gh to make up = ! decay ( ! tritium at ! rate ( fifty p] c5t e twelve ye>s4 ,"o ( ! major problems to be solv$1 9 addition to ! ma9 problem ( design+ ! assembly1 arises f ! fact t ! deut]ium & ! tritium boo/] w h to be 9 liquid =m4 ,liquid hydrog5 boils 7t is1 rev]ts to gas7 at a temp]ature ( #dbc degrees bel[ z]o ,fahr5heit "u a pressure ( "o atmosph]e 7fifte5 p\nds p] squ>e in*74 ,to liquefy x1 x is necess>y to cool x 9 liquid air 7at #cac4if bel[ z]o ,f47 :ile keep+ x at ! same "t "u a pressure ( #ahj atmosph]es4 ,to transport x1 x mu/ be plac$ 9 a vacuum vessel surr\nd$ by an out] vessel ( liquid air4 ,?is w\ld po9t to ! ne$ ( giant refrig]ation & /orage plants1 z well z ( refrig]ator planes = transport+ l>ge quantities ( liquid deut]ium & its tritium sp>k plug4 ,w ! ,h-bomb1 if made1 add en\gh to our security to make ! ef=t wor? :ile8 ,we h se5 t ! requir$ ef=t may1 aft] all1 n be v great4 ,9 fact1 x may turn out to be a relatively small "o1 9 view ( ! fact t all ! basic +r$i5ts & plants are already at h& & fully paid =4 ,b suppos+ ev5 t ! ef=t turns out to be mu* m co/ly ?an x n[ appe>s8 ,! "q we mu/ !n ask ourselves is3 ,c we af=d n to make ! ef=t8 ,x is true1 ( c\rse1 z "s h po9t$ out1 t t5 or ev5 few] ,a-bombs c\ld de/roy ! he>t ( any metropolitan city1 :ile only "o w\ld be q en\gh1 z we "k1 = cities ! size ( ,hiro%ima or ,nagasaki4 ,b t neglects to take into consid]ation ! fact t "o ,h-bomb conc5trates )9 itself ! p[] ( ?irty ,a-bombs to de/roy by fire & by burns an area ( m ?an #a1bjj squ>e miles at "o bl[4 ,nor does x take into consid]ation ! milit>y advantage ( deliv]+ ! p[] ( a comb9ation ( t5 & ?irty ,a-bombs 9 "o conc5trat$ package1 :i* w\ld make x a trem5d\s tactical weapon aga9/ a huge l& army scatt]$ ov] _m miles1 or its possible enorm\s psy*ological effect aga9/ su* an army4 ,mo/ important ( all1 ?is view grossly m9imizes ! apocalyptic pot5tialities ( ! ,h-bomb = poison+ l>ge areas ) deadly cl\ds ( radioactive p>ticles4 ,x is a mon/r\s fact t an ,h-bomb incorporat+ "o ton ( deut]ium1 encas$ 9 a %ell ( cobalt1 w\ld lib]ate #bej p\nds ( neutrons1 :i* w\ld create #ae1jjj p\nds ( highly radioactive cobalt1 equival5t 9 _! deadl9ess to #d1hjj1jjj p\nds ( radium4 ,su* bombs1 accord+ to ,pr(essor ,h>rison ,br[n1 ,univ]sity ( ,*icago nucle> *emi/1 c\ld be set on a nor?-s\? l9e 9 ! ,pacific approximately a ?\s& miles we/ ( ,cali=nia4 8,! radioactive du/ w\ld rea* ,cali=nia 9 ab\t a day1 & ,new ,york 9 f\r or five days1 kill+ mo/ life z x trav]ses ! cont95t40 8,simil>ly10 ,pr(essor ,br[n /at$ 9 ! ,am]ican ,s*ol>1 8! ,we/]n p[]s c\ld explode ,h-bombs on a nor?-s\? l9e ab\t ! longitude ( ,prague :i* w\ld de/roy all life )9 a /rip #a1ejj miles wide1 ext5d+ f ,l5+rad to ,odessa1 & #c1jjj miles deep1 f ,prague to ! ,ural ,m\nta9s4 ,su* an attack w\ld produce a #8scor*$ e>?' ( an ext5t unprec$5t$ 9 hi/ory40 ,pr(essor ,szil>d1 "o ( ! pr9cipal ar*itects ( ! ,a-bomb1 has e/imat$1 z already /at$1 t f\r hundr$ "o-ton deut]ium bombs w\ld release en\gh radioactivity to ext+ui% all life on e>?4 ,pr(essor ,e9/e91 z we h se51 has publicly /at$ t ! ,h-bomb1 if successful1 w br+ ! annihilation ( all life on e>? )9 ! range ( te*nical possibilities4 ,! "q we mu/ !re=e ask ourselves is3 ,c we all[ ,russia to be ! sole possessor ( su* a weapon8 ,!re c be no "q t ,russia is already at "w on an ,h-bomb4 ,l ourselves1 %e already has ! plutonium plants = produc+ bo? ,a-bombs & tritium4 ,%e c produce deut]ium 9 ! same quantities z we c4 ,9 ,pr(essor ,pet] ,kapitza %e has ! _w's greate/ au?ority on liquid hydrog54 ,fur!rmore1 %e has great inc5tives to produce ,h-bombs4 ,s9ce %e is /ill beh9d u 9 h] ,a-bomb /ockpile1 %e c1 9 a s5se1 cat* up ) u mu* m quickly by conv]t+ h] few] ,a-bombs into ,h-bombs t w\ld be ! equival5ts ( t5 to ?irty ,a-bombs ea*1 ?us increas+ ! p[] ( h] /ockpile t5 to ?irty times4 ,equally if n m important f ,russia's po9t ( view is ! />k fact t an ,h-bomb c\ld be mu* m easily explod$ ne> a coa/al city f a subm>9e or innoc5t-look+ tramp /eam]1 s9ce mo/ ( our great cities are on ! seacoa/1 :]eas ,russia practically has no coa/al cities4 ,ev5 if we op5ly ann\nc$ t we w\ld n make any ,h-bombs1 x w\ld n det] ,russia f mak+ !m z fa/ z %e c\ld1 n only because %e w\ld n believe u b also because h] sole possession w\ld greatly weight ! scales 9 h] favor4 ,if1 ,god =bid1 %e f9ds h]self "o day ) a /ockpile ( ,h-bombs :5 we h none1 %e w\ld be 9 a position to s5d u an ultimatum simil> to ! "o we s5t to ! ,japanese aft] ,hiro%ima3 8,surr5d] or be de/roy$60 ,valu+ _! lib]ty m ?an _! lives1 ! ,am]ican p w nev] surr5d]4 ,b :ile !re is "t1 w\ld anyone advocate t we run ! risk ( ev] fac+ su* a *oice8 ,,iii ,,%all ,,we ,,r5\nce ,,! ,,use ,,( ,,! ,h-,,bomb8 ,a few days aft] ,presid5t ,truman ann\nc$ t he _h direct$ "w 8to cont9ue0 on 8! s-call$ hydrog51 or sup] bomb10 a gr\p ( twelve em95t physici/s1 includ+ half a doz5 ( ! major ar*itects ( ! atomic bomb at ,los ,alamos1 :o1 no d\bt1 are play+ a simil> role 9 ! developm5t ( ! ,h-bomb1 issu$ a /atem5t urg+ ! ,unit$ ,/ates to make 8a solemn decl>ation t we %all nev] use ! bomb fir/10 & 8t ! only circum/ances :i* might =ce u to use x w\ld be if we or our allies 7 attack$ by ?is bomb40 ,!y add$ t 8!re c be only "o ju/ification = our developm5t ( ! hydrog5 bomb1 & t is to prev5t its use40 ,sign]s ( ! /atem5t1 unprec$5t$ 9 ! annals ( sci5ce 7) ! possible exception ( a secret memor&um submitt$ to ! gov]nm5t j be=e ! ,a-bomb 0 us$71 includ$ su* out/&+ physici/s z ,hans ,a4 ,be! ( ,cornell2 ,k5ne? ,t4 ,ba9bridge ( ,h>v>d2 ,samuel ,k4 ,allison1 ,univ]sity ( ,*icago2 ,dean ,george ,b4 ,pegram1 ,columbia2 ,c4 ,c4 ,laurits51 ,cali=nia ,in/itute ( ,te*nology2 ,bruno ,rossi & ,victor ,f4 ,weisskopf1 ,massa*usetts ,in/itute ( ,te*nology2 ,f4 ,w4 ,loomis & ,fr$]ick ,seitz1 ,univ]sity ( ,ill9ois2 ,m]le ,a4 ,tuve1 ,c>negie ,in/itution ( ,wa%+ton2 ,r4 ,b4 ,brode1 ,univ]sity ( ,cali=nia2 & ,m4 ,g4 ,:ite1 ,pr9ceton--all1 ) ! exception ( ,dr4 ,tuve1 pr(essors ( physics at _! respective univ]sities4 ,^? among !m :o did n directly p>ticipate 9 ! developm5t ( ! ,a-bomb play$ major p>ts 9 o!r sci5tific w>time projects1 su* z rad> & ! proximity fuse4 ,implicit 9 _! /atem5t 0 ! fir/ confirmation--inde$1 ! mo/ au?oritative we h _h s f> f sci5ti/s ) fir/-h& k ( ! subject--t a hydrog5 bomb ( a ?\s& times ! p[] ( ! ,a-bomb c\ld be made4 ,m ?an t1 !y in=m$ u t ,russia may complete ! ,h-bomb 9 less ?an f\r ye>s1 mean+1 ( c\rse1 t we too c\ld a*ieve ! same goal 9 ! same p]iod4 ,we 7 ?us provid$ by ! exp]ts ) a "t-table on :i* we mu/ act if we are n to run ! risk ( ,russia's gett+ ! ,h-bomb ahead ( u1 & s be+ 9 a position to use x1 or ?reat5 its use1 aga9/ ! nations ( we/]n ,europe1 z ! greate/ blackmail weapon 9 hi/ory4 ,! /atem5t summ>izes 9 ess5ce ! pr9cipal po9ts ( view t h be5 advanc$ s f> on :at policy we %\ld adopt on ! ,h-bomb1 & s9ce x 0 promulgat$ by m5 kn[n to h def9ite inside k ( ! subject1 x des]ves clos] scrut9y ?an x has hi!rto receiv$4 8,x 0 /at$ correctly10 !y in=m u at ! outset1 t a hydrog5 bomb1 if x c be made1 w\ld be capable ( develop+ a p[] #a1jjj times great] ?an ! pres5t atomic bomb4 ,new ,york1 or any ( ! greate/ cities ( ! _w1 c\ld be de/roy$ by a s+le hydrog5 bomb4 ,we believe t no nation has ! "r to use su* a bomb1 no matt] h[ righte\s its cause4 ,! bomb is no long] a weapon ( w>1 b a means ( ext]m9ation ( :ole populations4 ,its use w\ld be a betrayal ( morality & ( ,*ri/ian civilization itself4 ,s5ator ,bri5 ,mc,mahon has po9t$ out to ! ,am]ican p t ! possession ( ! hydrog5 bomb w n give positive security to ?is c\ntry4 ,we %all n h a monopoly ( ?is bomb1 b x is c]ta9 t ! ,russians w be able to make "o1 too4 ,9 ! case ( ! fission bomb ! ,russians requir$ f\r ye>s to p>allel our developm5t4 ,9 ! case ( ! hydrog5 bomb !y w probably ne$ a %ort] "t4 ,we mu/ rememb] t we d n possess ! bomb b are only develop+ x1 & ,russia has receiv$1 ?r\gh indiscretion1 ! mo/ valuable h9t t our exp]ts believe ! developm5t possible4 ,p]haps ! developm5t ( ! hydrog5 bomb has already be5 "u way 9 ,russia = "s "t4 ,b if x 0 n1 our decision to develop x mu/ h />t$ ! ,russians on ! same program4 ,if !y _h already a go+ program1 !y w r$\ble _! ef=ts4 ,/atem5ts 9 ! press h giv5 ! p[] ( ! ,h-bomb z betwe5 two & #a1jjj times t ( ! pres5t fission bomb4 ,actually1 ! !rmonucle> reaction on :i* ! ,h-bomb is bas$ is limit$ 9 its p[] only by ! am\nt ( hydrog5 :i* c be c>ri$ 9 ! bomb4 ,ev5 if ! p[] 7 limit$ to #a1jjj times t ( a pres5t atomic bomb1 ! /ep f an ,a-bomb to an ,h-bomb w\ld be z great z t f an ord9>y ,,tnt bomb to ! atom bomb4 ,to create su* an ev]-pres5t dang] = all ! nations ( ! _w is aga9/ ! vital int]e/s ( bo? ,russia & ! ,unit$ ,/ates4 ,?ree prom95t ,s5ators h call$ = r5ew$ ef=ts to elim9ate ?is weapon & o!r weapons ( mass de/ruction f ! ars5als ( all nations4 ,su* ef=ts %\ld be made1 & made 9 all s9c]ity f bo? sides4 ,9 ! meantime1 we urge t ! ,unit$ ,/ates1 ?r\gh its elect$ gov]nm5t1 make a solemn decl>ation t we %all nev] use ?is bomb fir/4 ,be=e discuss+ 9 detail ! m]its ( ! proposal t ! ,unit$ ,/ates r5\nce ! use ( ! ,h-bomb1 8no matt] h[ righte\s its cause10 except 9 retaliation = its use aga9/ u or our allies1 x behooves u to exam9e ! effect ( our decisions to proce$ ) ! developm5t ( ! ,h-bomb on ,russia's ,a-bomb progress4 ,we "k t ! ,h-bomb requires an ,a-bomb = its trigg]4 ,we also h /rong gr\nds = assum+ t1 9 addition to ! ,a-bomb1 an ,h-bomb w require c]ta9 quantities ( tripleweight hydrog51 or tritium1 z extra sup]k9dl+ to boo/ ! ,a-bomb4 ,we "k1 fur!rmore1 t x takes eighty times z _m neutrons to make a giv5 quantity ( tritium z x does to make a correspond+ am\nt ( plutonium1 :i*1 ( c\rse1 means a r$uction 9 ,a-bombs4 ,h5ce1 %\ld ,russia decide to emb>k on an ,h-bomb program ( h] own1 or to 8r$\ble h] ef=ts10 x w\ld lead inevitably to a s]i\s curtailm5t 9 h] /ockpile ( ,a-bombs4 ,:ile we w\ld h to make ! same sacrifice ( plutonium1 x is obvi\s t we c af=d ! sacrifice mu* bett] ?an ,russia1 s9ce we already h a sizable /ockpile ( bo? plutonium & uranium bombs1 :]eas %e has j begun build+ h] /ockpile4 ,! situation = h] w\ld be mu* worse if %e has put all h] atomic eggs 9 ! plutonium basket )\t bo!r+ to build ! mu* m complicat$ & co/ly uranium sep>ation plants1 z ! incomplete evid5ce available w\ld seem to indicate4 ,9 t case %e w\ld be fac$ ) a s]i\s dilemma inde$1 = y _c h ,h-bombs )\t ,a-bombs1 & y _c h ,a-bombs )\t plutonium1 & if1 z ! evid5ce indicates1 %e has built h] ,a-bomb program exclusively ar\nd plutonium1 %e w\ld h to sacrifice quantities %e c\ld ill af=d to sp>e1 at ?is /age ( h] developm5t1 ( ! only elem5t %e desp]ately ne$s = build+ up h] ,a-bomb /ockpile4 ,h[ d we "k t ,russia's ,a-bomb is made ( plutonium8 ,we h ! te/imony ( ,s5ator ,johnson ( ,colorado1 :o assur$ u 9 8 fam\s television broadca/ ( ,novemb] #a1 #aidi t 8!re's no "q at all t ! ,russians h a bomb m or less simil> to ! bomb t we dropp$ at ,nagasaki1 a plutonium bomb40 ,9 ?is s+le s5t5ce ! ,s5ator f ,colorado1 :o z a memb] ( ! ,jo9t ,congressional ,committee on ,atomic ,en]gy has access to su* in=mation1 inadv]t5tly let at lea/ ?ree cats out ( ! bag4 ,he confirm$ t ! ,nagasaki bomb 0 made ( plutonium 7?\gh1 9 fairness1 x mu/ be said t ?is _h be5 kn[n un(ficially = "s "t72 he told u t we _h f\nd out n only t 8an atomic explosion _h occurr$ 9 ! ,u4,s4,s4,r410 z ! ,presid5t _h ann\nc$ 9 c>efully *os5 words1 b t ! explosion 0 t ( an atomic bomb & t1 m important /ill1 ! bomb 0 made ( plutonium4 ,& 9 do+ s he1 fur!rmore1 gave away ! secret ( h[ we _h obta9$ t in=mation1 some?+ ! ,russians v mu* want$ to "k4 ,n be+ a sci5ti/1 ,s5ator ,johnson obvi\sly did n realize t ! split fragm5ts 7fission products7 ( a plutonium bomb diff] f ^? giv5 (f by ! explosion ( a uranium bomb1 s t 9 reveal+ t we knew :at ! bomb 0 made ( he w\ld also be reveal+ at ! same "t t we f\nd x out by exam9+ radioactive air samples & f9d+ !m to conta9 fission fragm5ts ( plutonium1 z well z :ole plutonium atoms t escap$ fission4 ,!re is ?us no d\bt t ! ,russians h built nucle> reactors = produc+ plutonium f nonfissionable uranium #bch4 ,we _c1 ( c\rse1 be sure t !y h n at ! same "t also built plants = conc5trat+ uranium #bce1 b ! odds favor ! negative4 ,we built uranium sep>ation plants at ,oak ,ridge1 ,t5nessee1 & plutonium plants at ,han=d1 ,wa%+ton1 dur+ ! w> because we didn't "k at ! "t :i* me?od w\ld "w1 & we gambl$ on ! *ance t1 by build+ plants = produc+ fissionable mat]ials by f\r diff]5t me?ods1 at lea/ "o ( !m might "w4 ,_h we kn[n at ! "t t ! plutonium plants 7 practical1 x is q likely t we w\ld n h inve/$ a billion doll>s 9 build+ ! uranium sep>ation plants4 ,s9ce ! ,russians h obvi\sly decid$ on plutonium plants z ! simple/ & *eape/ 7?ree plutonium plants co/ u a total ( #djj1jjj1jjj1 :]eas a s+le l>ge uranium sep>ation plant co/ half a billion71 x is h>dly likely t !y w\ld consid] x wor? :ile to inve/ 9 ! mu* m co/ly uranium sep>ation plants4 ,z ,s5ator ,johnson said 9 ! same broadca/3 8,we tri$ out f\r diff]5t me?ods ( mak+ a bomb & all ( !m succe$$1 b "o ( ^! me?ods 0 sup]ior to all ! o!rs 9 simplicity & effectiv5ess1 & we told ! ,russians & we told ! _w t fact4 ,( c\rse1 !y didn't h to make ! exp]im5ts t we _h to make to f9d out by elim9ation :i* me?od 0 ! mo/ effective & :i* ! "o t !y %\ld foll[40 ,! evid5ce is ?us /rongly 9 favor ( ! assumption t ,russia has only plutonium plants z h] sole s\rce ( ,a-bomb mat]ial1 :]eas we h bo? plutonium plants & gigantic uranium plants 9 full op]ation4 ,if t is s1 !n our =c+ ,russia to emb>k on an ,h-bomb program1 at a "t :5 h] ,a-bomb program is b>ely />t$1 w place h] "u a d\ble h&icap 9 h] race to cat* up ) u 9 ,a-bombs1 & at lea/ to keep abrea/ ( u1 if n ahead1 9 ,h-bombs4 ,= 9 ?is grim race we h a dual if n a triple advantage3 our mu* sup]ior /ockpile1 bo? 9 numb]s & no d\bt 9 quality1 & our gigantic plants = conc5trat+ ,u-#bce1 ! production ( :i* w\ld n h to be curtail$ at all1 s9ce tritium c be made only 9 plutonium plants4 ,9 fact1 we are n[ 9 ! process ( con/ruction ( two great additions to ! uranium plant at ,oak ,ridge4 ,"o may visualize ! ma/]s ( ! ,kreml9 gna%+ _! tee? 9 impot5t rage at :at !y no d\bt reg>d z a diabolical plot on our "p to sabotage _! ,a-bomb ef=t4 ,inde$1 !re c be no "q t our decision to proce$ ) ! ,h-bomb 0 an answ] to ,russia's *all5ge to our atomic supremacy1 & x appe>s q plausible t "o ( ! motives beh9d ! decision 0 ! k t x w\ld =ce ,russia ei!r to build great additions to h] atomic plants1 at great exp5se 9 money & mat]ials & at ! loss ( consid]able preci\s "t1 or to curtail h] production ( ,a-bomb mat]ial4 ,& :ile any su* motive c\ld n possibly h be5 ! det]m9+ factor1 ! ultimate effect ( our decision 0 ! same z ?\gh we _h succe$$ 9 gett+ a team ( exp]t saboteurs beh9d ! ,iron ,curta9 to plant a good-siz$ monkey wr5* 9 ! ,soviet atomic ma*9]y4 ,) ?is 9 m9d we beg9 to appreciate h[ dang]\s a move x w\ld be1 to ourselves & to _w peace1 if we 7 to make a solemn decl>ation at ! outset1 ev5 be=e we h a s+le ,h-bomb1 t we w nev] use x1 8no matt] h[ righte\s our cause10 unless x is us$ fir/ aga9/ u or our allies4 ,by mak+ su* a unilat]al decl>ation1 )\t ev5 mak+ x conditional ^u ,russia issu+ a simil> solemn r5unciation1 we w\ld1 9 effect1 be say+ to ,russia3 8,we humbly beg y\r p>don4 ,we did n realize t we w\ld be putt+ a na/y monkey wr5* 9 ! ma*9]y ( y\r vital ,a-bomb program4 ,we %all remove ! wr5* at once s t y may proce$ ) y\r program unh9d]$ by u 9 any way40 ,! ma/]s ( ! ,kreml9 w\ld1 inde$1 h e "r to laugh long & l\d1 & to take su* foolh>dy action on our "p z fur!r evid5ce ( :at !y call 8! decad5ce ( ! b\rgeois democracies40 ,=1 once we make su* a magnanim\s unilat]al solemn r5unciation ( ! "o weapon t promises to become ! greate/ s+le det]r5t aga9/ w>1 )\t ev5 bo!r+ to ask ,russia publicly to d likewise1 ,russia c\ld !n proce$ calmly at h] leisure to build up h] ,a-bomb /ockpile1 ) ! complete assurance f u t %e ne$ n worry ab\t our ,h-bomb z long z %e does n use "o aga9/ u or our allies4 ,aft] %e has accumulat$ an adequate ,a-bomb /ockpile--& fifty to "o hundr$ w\ld be adequate f h] /&po9t--%e w\ld !n be 9 a position1 already atta9$ by u n[1 to proce$ ) h] ,h-bomb program1 kn[+ full well t we w\ld nev] use ,h-bombs aga9/ h] :ile %e is /ill )\t !m4 ,& :ile %e obvi\sly c\ld n use any?+ %e does n h1 %e c\ld well af=d to make aggressive w> ev5 be=e %e has an ,h-bomb1 or to bide h] "t until %e does1 ! *oice be+ entirely h]s4 ,& if %e waits until %e has ! ,h-bomb1 ! decision :e!r to use x or n w\ld /ill be entirely h]s1 s t %e c\ld use x :5ev] %e decides x is to h] advantage to d s1 :]eas we %\ld h to wait on h] pleasure1 hav+ morally b\nd ourselves1 )\t qualification1 n to use x fir/1 ev5 if our v exi/5ce dep5d$ on x4 ,x c ?us be easily se5 t ?is 8aft] y1 my de> ,alphonse0 ge/ure on our "p 9 a matt] t may involve our v exi/5ce w\ld be m ?an quixotic4 ,x is likely to prove suicidal4 ,x w n improve ! prospects ( _w peace2 on ! contr>y x w weak5 !m4 ,x w n enhance our moral /ature1 s9ce ! _w does n h mu* respect = />ry-ey$ dream]s ) _! heads 9 ! cl\ds4 ,b :ile we mu/ keep our feet plant$ on ! gr\nd1 we ne$ n lose sight ( ! />s4 ,our refusal to expose ourselves by giv+ ,russia ! great advantages m5tion$1 does n mean t we reta9 ! "r to use ! ,h-bomb indiscrim9ately z ?\gh x 7 j ano!r weapon4 ,!re are1 ,i %all pres5tly %[1 bo? legitimate & illegitimate uses to :i* ! ,h-bomb c be put1 & x is ! failure s f>1 ev5 by em95t sci5ti/s1 to di/+ui% betwe5 ^! two types ( possible uses t is responsible = a great deal1 if n all1 ( ! confusion & mu* futile debate t h foll[$ ! ,presid5t's ann\ncem5t ( 8 directive to cont9ue "w on ! hydrog5 bomb1 & = ! flood ( v]biage t w cont9ue to plague & bewild] u until we take "t to acqua9t ourselves ) ! facts ab\t ! ,h-bomb4 ,"o ( ! major difficulties 9 our approa* to ! subject /ems f ! g5]al t5d5cy to talk ab\t ! ,h-bomb z ?\gh x 7 j "o weapon1 :i* obvi\sly x is n4 ,z we "k1 x is sev]al weapons 9 "o package1 :i* c be design$ = v>i\s uses1 dep5d+ on ! int5t ( its design]4 ,x is1 on ! "o h&1 a weapon t c cause total de/ruction by bla/ ov] a radius ( t5 miles1 or an area ( m ?an #cjj squ>e miles1 ) graduat$ less] damage ov] a mu* l>g] area4 ,secondly1 x is a weapon t c produce fires & sev]e fla% burns ov] a radius ( tw5ty miles--t is1 ov] an area ( m ?an #a1bjj squ>e miles4 ,^! two functions1 de/ruction by bla/ & by fire1 g toge!r4 ,!y are insep>able z f> z ! bomb itself is conc]n$1 ?\gh _! relative effects c be regulat$ by ! height f :i* ! bomb is dropp$1 by ! t]ra9 ov] :i* x is us$1 & by its mode ( deliv]y o!r ?an by air4 ,!n1 ( c\rse1 !re is ! ?ird weapon ( t]ror1 ! trem5d\s quantities ( deadly radioactive p>ticles t ! ,h-bomb may release 9 ! atmosph]e1 :i*1 z ,dr4 ,e9/e9 said1 w\ld br+ )9 ! range ( te*nical possibilities 8! annihilation ( life on e>?40 ,?is1 h[ev]1 w\ld dep5d on ! *oice & purpose ( ! design]4 ,if he s *ooses1 he c design an ,h-bomb t w\ld produce only slightly great] radioactivity ?an its ,a-bomb trigg]4 ,or he c rig x 9 su* a mann] t "o bomb w\ld release into ! atmosph]e ! equival5t ( ne>ly five million p\nds ( radium t w\ld poison ! atmosph]e = ?\s&s ( miles1 kill+ all life :]ev] x goes4 ,! cat*word "h is 8rig10 & ! rigg+ dep5ds entirely1 n on ! cont5ts ( ! bomb itself1 b on ! mat]ial ( :i* its out] %ell is compos$4 ,if1 = example1 ! cas+ *os5 is a mat]ial su* z /eel1 ! radioactivity produc$ w\ld be practically h>mless4 ,if ! %ell is made ( cobalt1 ! radiations releas$ w\ld cause untold havoc4 ,! reason = ! va/ diff]5ce is n difficult to und]/&4 ,! ,h-bomb1 :5 x explodes1 releases trem5d\s quantities ( neutrons1 ! mo/ p5etrat+ p>ticles 9 nature4 ,z soon z x is lib]at$1 a neutron ent]s ! nucleus ( ! ne>e/ elem5t at h&4 ,?is may produce a wide v>iety ( *anges 9 ! nature ( ! elem5t p5etrat$ by ! neutron1 ! *anges dep5d+ on ! elem5t4 ,"s elem5ts1 su* z cobalt1 become int5sely radioactive1 o!rs only mildly s1 & /ill o!rs n at all4 ,fur!rmore1 ea* elem5t ?us made radioactive has its own *>act]i/ic decay p]iod1 la/+ f seconds to _m ye>s1 s t ! design] ( ! bomb has a great v>iety to *oose f4 ,f ?is x c be se5 t1 in/ead ( "o1 !re are actually two types ( ,h-bombs--! non-rigg$ & ! rigg$4 ,) ?is vital di/9ction 9 m9d ! problem ( its use becomes mu* m simplifi$4 ,we are 9 a position to rea* full agreem5t ) ! sci5ti/s t no nation has ! "r to use su* a 8rigg$0 bomb1 no matt] h[ righte\s its cause4 ,= ! rigg$ ,h-bomb w\ld add no?+ to ! milit>y value ( ! non-rigg$ ,h-bomb1 :i* is already m ?an en\gh to a*ieve any milit>y objective4 ,x w\ld m]ely be pil+ horror ^u horror = no purpose beyond wanton de/ruction = its own sake4 ,its use ev5 9 small numb]s w\ld ru9 l>ge segm5ts ( ! e>? = ye>s4 ,x w\ld1 z ! sci5ti/s said1 8be a betrayal ( morality & ( ,*ri/ian civilization itself40 ,!re c !re=e be no "q t :5 ?is di/9ction betwe5 ! non-rigg$ & ! rigg$ ,h-bomb is made cle> to ! ,am]ican p--some?+ ! sci5ti/s fail$ to d--!y w\ld ov]:elm+ly l5d _! support to a move on ! "p ( our gov]nm5t solemnly decl>+ t we w\ld nev] use ! rigg$ ,h-bomb fir/2 t our only aim 9 build+ x is to prev5t its use1 & t ! only circum/ances "u :i* we w\ld f9d ourselves =c$ to use x w\ld be 9 retaliation = its use aga9/ u or our allies4 ,we c1 & %\ld1 make su* a solemn decl>ation unilat]ally1 reg>dless ( :e!r ,russia makes a simil> decl>ation4 ,we w\ld lose no?+ by do+ s f a milit>y or /rategic po9t ( view1 & we w\ld ga9 enorm\sly 9 moral /ature & on ! battlefront ( ideas if we 7 to d x n[4 ,o!rwise we run ! risk t ,russia might d x fir/4 ,if %e takes advantage ( ?is lo/ opportunity ( ours1 we %all h h&$ h] a great moral victory4 ,9 fact1 ! law ( nations compels u to make su* a decl>ation4 ,unlike ! ,a-bomb1 9 :i* ! radioactivity is "p & p>cel ( ! bomb itself1 ! rigg$ ,h-bomb is purposely design$ to produce radioactive poison+ 9 ! atmosph]e4 ,s9ce x has to be specially incorporat$ into ! cas+ ( ! bomb1 x comes "u ! int]national conv5tion outlaw+ ! use ( poison gas4 ,= !re c be no "q t a radioactive cl\d t may lay wa/e to :ole areas is ! mo/ diabolical & deadly poison gas s f> inv5t$4 ,b ! twelve sci5ti/s d n seem to be satisfi$ ) ! m]e r5unciation ( ! rigg$ ,h-bomb4 ,!y ask u to decl>e t we w\ld n be ! fir/ to use ev5 ! non-rigg$ bomb1 on ! gr\nds t x 8is no long] a weapon ( w>1 b a means ( ext]m9ation ( :ole populations40 ,?is requires clos] scrut9y4 ,x has become cu/om>y to ?9k ( ! ,a-bomb1 & n[ ( ! ,h-bomb1 z purely /rategic weapons = de/roy+ indu/rial c5t]s produc+ w> mat]ials1 ?us depriv+ ! armies at ! front ( ! vital s9ews ( w>4 ,x is also reg>d$ z a weapon ( sup]t]ror to br+ a nation to its knees1 z ! ,a-bomb did 9 ,japan4 ,s9ce indu/rial c5t]s1 p>ticul>ly 9 ! ,unit$ ,/ates1 are d5sely populat$ areas1 & s9ce1 conv]sely1 all l>ge cities are also important indu/rial c5t]s1 x has become almo/ axiomatic t ! ,a-bomb & ! ,h-bomb c\ld be us$ only 9 /rategic bomb+ ( l>ge c5t]s ( population1 :i*1 ( c\rse1 means ! :olesale slaught] ( millions ( civilians & ! wip+ out ( cities ) populations ( m ?an #bjj1jjj4 ,b to ?9k along su* l9es w\ld be ?9k+ ( ,_w ,w> ,,iii1 :i* we mu/ d our utmo/ to prev5t1 9 t]ms ( ,_w ,w> ,,ii1 :i* w\ld be j z fatal z ?9k+ 9 t]ms ( ,_w ,w> ,i 0 to ! ,fr5* 9 ,_w ,w> ,,ii4 ,= ev5 a cursory exam9ation ( ! situation %\ld reveal t /rategic bomb+ ( cities may1 & v likely w\ld be1 z obsolete 9 ! next w> z tr5* w>f>e 0 9 ! la/4 ,"o does n h to be a milit>y exp]t to "k ! reason :y4 ,9 ! la/ w> /rategic bomb+ 0 resort$ to 9 ord] to deprive ! army at ! front ( weapons & supplies4 ,obvi\sly1 if y _h a sup]weapon t c\ld wipe out an entire army 9 ! field or on ! m>* at "o bl[1 !re w\ld be no fur!r ne$ ( depriv+ an army t 0 no long] 9 be+4 ,t is exactly :at ! non-rigg$ ,h-bomb is4 ,z a bla/ weapon1 we h se51 x c cause total de/ruction ( ev]y?+ )9 an area ( m ?an #cjj squ>e miles4 ,z an inc9]ator x w\ld sev]ely burn ev]y?+ )9 an area ( m ?an #a1bjj squ>e miles4 ,x is ?us ! tactical weapon p> excell5ce4 ,no army 9 ! field or on ! m>* c\ld /& up aga9/ x4 ,_h we possess$ x at ! ,battle ( ! ,bulge1 j "o c\ld h wip$ out ! entire ,bulge4 ,if ! ,nazis _h _h x be=e ,d-,day1 "o w\ld h be5 en\gh to wipe out our entire invasion army ev5 be=e x l&$2 or !y c\ld h wait$ & wip$ out our entire ,norm&y bea*head4 ,9 a ^w1 ! non-rigg$ ,h-bomb has produc$ a major revolution 9 tactics & /rategy4 ,x has made /rategic bomb+ ( cities z obsolete z ! tr5* ( ,_w ,w> ,i1 except z a weapon ( pure t]ror & wanton :olesale de/ruction ( life & prop]ty4 ,x w\ld be absolutely useless to ! victor z well z to ! vanqui%$1 z ! victor w\ld h no spoils ( victory left & w\ld h to rebuild :at he _h ne$lessly de/roy$4 ,view$ 9 ?is light1 ! non-rigg$ ,h-bomb1 j because x is ! weapon = ! annihilation ( armies1 becomes vis--vis ,russia1 ! greate/ det]r5t aga9/ w> t c\ld possibly be devis$ 9 ! pres5t /ate ( affairs4 ,=1 aft] all1 ! only great advantage ,russia has ov] u today is h] l& army & h] great res]ve ( manp[]4 ,! non-rigg$ ,h-bomb1 support$ by a l>ge & up-to-date air =ce capable ( deliv]+ x ei!r by air or f a seiz$ airhead beh9d ! l9es1 c\ld nullify t advantage 9 a few h\rs4 ,at lea/ ! ?reat ( su* a possibility w always be !re4 ,x is !re=e d\btful1 to say ! lea/1 t any gr\p ( m5 w\ld will+ly take su* a risk4 ,s9ce ! greate/ & mo/ effective use ( ! non-rigg$ ,h-bomb w\ld ?us be z a tactical weapon aga9/ armies 9 ! field1 :ile its /rategic use aga9/ civilian populations w\ld be simple wanton de/ruction f ! po9t ( view ( bo? victor & vanqui%$1 !n n only morality & ,*ri/ian civilization b pla9 common s5se w\ld dictate ! wisdom ( our solemnly decl>+ "r n[ t we w nev] be ! fir/ to use ei!r ! non-rigg$ ,h-bomb or ev5 ! ,a-bomb aga9/ civilian populations1 & t ! only circum/ance t w\ld compel u to use !m s w\ld be 9 retaliation = _! use aga9/ u or our allies4 ,9 fact1 we c\ld r5\nce /rategic bomb+ altoge!r4 ,by do+ s we w\ld ga9 "o ( ! greate/ moral victories1 = !n if ,russia fail$ to make a simil> decl>ation1 z %e mo/ likely w\ld1 %e w\ld /& be=e ! _w z a nation b5t on :olesale slaught] ( civilian populations4 ,we h no?+ to lose & ev]y?+ to ga9 by su* a decl>ation1 & ! soon] we make x ! bett]4 ,%\ld we make su* a decl>ation1 x w\ld place ,russia 9 an emb>rass+ position inde$4 ,= :ile z a tactical weapon ! non-rigg$ ,h-bomb (f]s u great advantages z a c\nt]=ce to neutralize h] huge army1 %e c use ! ,h-bomb1 bo? ! rigg$ & ! non-rigg$1 z a con/ant ?reat aga9/ our d5sely populat$ cities4 ,z ,s5ator ,bri5 ,mc,mahon1 ( ,connecticut1 *airman ( ! ,jo9t ,congressional ,committee on ,atomic ,en]gy1 has w>n$1 an ,h-bomb attack 8might inc9]ate #ej1jjj1jjj ,am]icans--n 9 ! space ( an ev5+ b 9 ! space ( a few m9utes40 ,we h elev5 cities ( "o million or m inhabitants1 :]eas ,russia has only ?ree or f\r4 ,we h =ty cities ( #bjj1jjj & ov]1 inhabit$ by #dj1jjj1jjj1 or #bg p] c5t ( our population1 :]eas ,russia has only tw5ty cities ( #bjj1jjj & ov]1 inhabit$ by only #bj1jjj1jjj1 or #aj p] c5t ( h] population4 ,fur!rmore1 h] indu/ries are n[ l>gely disp]s$1 :]eas our indu/ries are highly c5traliz$4 ,russia w\ld ?us get mu* ! worse ( ! b>ga9 if %e 7 to accept our *all5ge to r5\nce ! use ( /rategic bomb+1 p>ticul>ly t ( ! ,a- & ,h-bombs1 :ile we /ill reta9 ! "r to use !m 9 tactical bomb+ aga9/ h] armies4 ,suppose ,russia 9 ?is dilemma1 & recogniz+ ! ne$ to avoid ! moral opprobrium ( ! peoples ( ! _w t h] refusal to meet our r5unciation w\ld entail1 comes =? ) a c\nt]proposal to r5\nce ! use ( bo? ,a- & ,h-bombs altoge!r1 z /rategic z well z tactical weapons1 ?us ex*ang+ ! elim9ation ( ! ?reat ( ! annihilation ( our teem+ cities & indu/ries1 = ! removal ( ! ?reat ( de/ruction to h] armies4 ,suppose t at ! same "t %e repeats h] dem&1 frequ5tly voic$ by h] 9 ! ,unit$ ,nations1 t all /ockpiles ( ,a- & ,h-bombs be de/roy$ & a conv5tion sign$ to outlaw _! uses4 ,! _w already kn[s ! answ]1 = we h already made x aga9 & aga94 ,imm$iately aft] ! close ( ! la/ w> we decl>$ our read9ess to give up ! ,a-bomb4 ,9 #aidf1 at a "t :5 we 7 ! sole possessor ( ! bomb1 :5 we _h e reason to believe t our monopoly w\ld la/ = a numb] ( ye>s1 we submitt$ a f>-rea*+ plan = ! int]national control ( atomic en]gy1 ! mo/ g5]\s (f] by f> ev] made by any nation 9 hi/ory4 ,9 ?is hi/oric plan we n only decl>$ our read9ess to give up our /ockpile ( ,a-bombs & to agree to refra9 f fur!r production2 we ev5 (f]$ to give up our sov]eignty ov] our multibillion-doll> atomic plants to an int]national ag5cy4 ,we fur!r agre$ to submit to unh9d]$1 free inspection by su* an ag5cy to assure ! _w1 & ,russia 9 p>ticul>1 t we 7 n manufactur+ ,a-bombs1 or ,a-bomb mat]ials1 9 secret4 ,no nation 9 hi/ory _h ev] gone s f> 9 its desire to %[ its goodwill & its peaceful int5tions z to make a volunt>y (f] to surr5d] ! _w's mo/ p[]ful weapon ( w>1 & an important "p ( its sov]eignty to boot4 ,! (f] /ill /&s4 ,x has be5 en?usia/ically endors$ by all ! memb]s ( ! ,unit$ ,nations except ,russia & h] satellites4 ,aft] ?ree ye>s ( futile negotiations & discussions ,russia /ill insi/s t %e w\ld n surr5d] any "p ( h] sov]eignty or submit to ! only k9d ( inspection t c\ld assure ! _w aga9/ cl&e/9e production ( atomic bombs & mat]ials4 ,h5ce1 %\ld ,russia dem& t we r5\nce ! "r to use ! ,a- & ,h-bombs n only z /rategic b also z tactical weapons aga9/ h] armies 9 ex*ange = a simil> (f] on h] "p1 x w\ld on ! face ( x be a m]e repetition ( h] e>li] ef=ts to trick u into giv+ up our greate/ weapons :ile %e rema9$ free to produce !m 9 secret1 s9ce %e insi/s ^u h] "r to reta9 own]%ip ( ! atomic plants & mat]ials & ^u ! inspection ( only ^? plants %e ackn[l$ges to exi/1 ?us mak+ x impossible to f9d plants ^: exi/5ce %e does n admit4 ,to accept su* an (f] w\ld be tantam\nt to surr5d]1 s9ce our giv+ up ! "r to use ! ,h-bomb z a tactical weapon aga9/ h] armies w\ld leave h] free to m>* into ! c\ntries ( we/]n ,europe4 ,x w\ld !n be too late to /op h]1 = we c\ld n drop ! ,h-bomb on ! cities ( we/]n ,europe4 ,! only "t to /op ,russia's armies is be=e !y cross into ! t]ritory ( our allies1 dur+ ! crucial p]iod :5 !y are mobiliz$ 9 l>ge numb]s & on ! m>*4 ,! ,am]ican p1 & ! o!r free peoples ( ! _w1 c\ld n agree to su* a s*eme to dis>m !m 9 advance & ?us give ! ma/]s ( ! ,kreml9 a free h&4 ,to d s w\ld n prev5t w>1 x w\ld enc\rage x4 ,x w\ld n ev5 delay x1 x w\ld ha/5 x4 ,in/ead ( be+ prev5table1 x w\ld become inevitable4 ,we w\ldn't ev5 save our cities f ! fate ( /rategic bomb+ ) ,a- & ,h-bombs1 s9ce ! ,kreml9 has nev] kept its promises :5 !y did n suit its purposes4 ,:5 we _h lo/ our greate/ *ance to wipe out h] armies 9 "o mighty bl[1 ,russia w\ld be 9 a position to trade our indu/ries & cities = h] disp]s$ & /ill primitive indu/rial plants & cities4 ,if at t /age %e %\ld (f] u1 z well z our neighbors to ! s\? & ,brita9 & h] ,dom9ions1 indep5d5ce & complete sov]eignty1 :ile %e assum$ hegemony ov] all ( ,europe & ,asia1 c\ld we !n refuse1 at ! risk ( ! lives ( our millions8 ,suppos+ ! nations ( we/]n ,europe1 ov]run by ! ,r$ ,army1 become 8p's democracies10 ,russian /yle1 w\ld we risk our millions to lib]ate nations ^: gov]nm5ts w\ld by !n h jo9$ ! ranks ( our enemy8 ,^! are ! brutal facts t w\ld confront u 7 we to r5\nce ! "r to use ,a- & ,h-bombs z tactical weapons aga9/ armies 9 ! field4 ,z long z we reta9 t "r1 ! *ances are good t we c\ld prev5t global w>1 = no nation w\ld be likely to risk su* a w> 9 ! face ( ! possibility t ! ma9 bulk ( its armies might be wip$ out at ! outset4 ,if we give up t "r1 we w\ld also prev5t w>--by surr5d]+ 9 advance4 ,russia1 ( c\rse1 might figure t %e c\ld /ill make w>1 :5 %e decides ! "t is ripe1 tak+ ! calculat$ risk t we w\ld n use ! ,a- & ,h-bombs aga9/ h] armies = fe> ( h] retaliation aga9/ our cities & indu/ries4 ,b :e!r %e w\ld consid] t calculat$ risk wor? tak+ w\ld dep5d on h[ good our def5ses 74 ,s5ator ,mc,mahon's w>n+ t an ,h-bomb attack 8might inc9]ate #ej1jjj1jjj ,am]icans 444 9 ! space ( a few m9utes0 w\ld become a possibility only if we all[$ ourselves to be surpris$ = a second "t by a 8sup] ,pe>l ,h>bor10 :i*1 ( c\rse1 is inconceivable4 ,:ile x is g5]ally agre$ t x is impossible to dec5tralize our cities & indu/ries1 because ( ! trem5d\s co/ 7e/imat$ at #cjj billion7 & ! %ort "t at our disposal betwe5 n[ & ! ultimate %[d[n1 :5 ,russia is expect$ to be ready to make major moves at ! risk ( 8accept+0 w>1 we h _m advantages n possess$ by ,brita9 & ,g]many dur+ ! la/ w> z f> z def5ses aga9/ /rategic bomb+ 7 conc]n$4 ,brita91 z well z ,pol&1 ,holl&1 & ,belgium--little1 d5sely populat$ c\ntries--7 )9 v %ort range ( ,g]many's airfields4 ,s 0 ,g]many1 9 h] turn1 )9 easy range f ,brita94 ,rad>1 z comp>$ ) its mod]n types1 0 primitive 9 quality & inadequate 9 quantity4 ,automatic antiaircraft guns1 int]ceptor planes1 & night fight]s 7 ei!r nonexi/5t 9 ! e>ly days ( ! blitz or 9 a crude /age ( developm5t comp>$ ) pres5t equival5ts4 ,h[ va/ly diff]5t is our situation today vis--vis ,russia6 ,in/ead ( a %ort hop across ! ,engli% ,*annel %e w\ld h to cross ! ,atlantic or ! ,pacific to rea* our cont95t1 :]eas we c rea* h] he>tl& f bases all ar\nd h] bord]s4 ,x is un?9kable t any ( h] bomb]s c cross ei!r ocean )\t be+ detect$ hundr$s ( miles be=e !y rea* our %ores4 ,) mod]n rad> devices1 :i* are con/antly be+ improv$1 & fleets ( fa/ int]ceptors f> 9 advance ( any?+ ,russia c\ld develop1 we w\ld de/roy !m long be=e !y w\ld d u any h>m4 ,if %e attempts to fly ov] ! ,nor? ,pole1 %e w /ill h to cross all ( ,canada be=e %e c rea* u1 & if we & our ,canadian fri5ds are on ! al]t1 z we mu/ & %all be1 any ho/ile planes c\ld be detect$ & de/roy$ ov] ! ,arctic4 ,!re is1 ( c\rse1 ! possibility ( explod+ an ,h-bomb "s di/ance (f %ore f a subm>9e or f a tramp /eam]1 b "h1 too1 et]nal vigilance w be ! price ( our lib]ties & our lives4 ,!re c be no "q t we %all succe$ 9 f9d+ ! answ] to ! detection ( ! ,snorkel-type subm>9e & ma/] x j z we ma/]$ ! e>li] types4 ,am]ican +5uity & sup]ior te*nology h nev] fail$ yet 9 ! face ( an em]g5cy1 & x is un?9kable t !y %\ld fail n[4 ,we (t5 he> x said t an enemy c\ld smuggle an ,a-bomb 9 small p>ts into ?is c\ntry & assemble x "h4 ,:ile su* an op]ation is possible1 its successful execution aga9/ a nation fully on gu>d is highly improbable4 ,z = ! ,h-bomb1 x requires l>ge quantities ( liquefi$ gas1 :i* mu/ be kept 9 a vacuum surr\nd$ by l>ge vessels ( liquid air4 ,9 addition x mu/ h its ,a-bomb trigg] & o!r complicat$ devices4 ,all ?is makes its surreptiti\s smuggl+ into a c\ntry su* z ours ev5 m improbable4 ,we h _h x d9n$ into our e>s = s long t !re is no def5se aga9/ ! atomic bomb1 & t ! only *oice confront+ u is 8"o _w or none10 )\t anyone tak+ ! tr\ble to *all5ge ^! two p]nici\s cat*-phrases1 t we h accept$ !m z gospel tru?1 p>ticul>ly s9ce !y 7 utt]$ by "s ( our m articulate atomic sci5ti/s4 ,t sci5ti/s %\ld at la/ /ep out f _! laboratories & classrooms to take an active int]e/ 9 public affairs is highly comm5dable & welcome4 ,b t does n give !m ! "r to take advantage ( ! great respect & confid5ce ! public has = !m ) utt]ances t s]ve only to create fe> & hy/]ia & a s5se ( helplessness1 :ile at ! same "t (f]+ rem$ies !y "k to be unatta9able4 ,! tru? ( ! matt] is t !re c be & !re is a def5se aga9/ atomic weapons1 z aga9/ any o!r weapon4 ,basically x is ! same z ! def5se aga9/ subm>9es or enemy bomb]s3 detect !m & de/roy !m be=e !y rea* y4 ,! diff]5ce is l>gely a matt] ( degree4 ,s9ce ! atomic-bomb c>ri] c d great] damage1 ! measures ( def5se aga9/ x mu/ be correspond+ly great]4 ,) ! aid ( ! va/ /ret*es ( ! ,atlantic & ! ,pacific1 augm5t$ by an effective rad> & int]ceptor sy/em1 on ! "o h&2 & ) effective c\nt]-subm>9e measures on ! o!r1 ! odds w\ld be aga9/ a s+le ,a- or ,h-bomb rea*+ our %ores4 ,fac$ ) su* an impregnable sy/em ( def5se1 & ) a ?reat ( ! swift annihilation ( its armies z soon z !y beg9 m>*+ = w>1 ! ,kreml9 c\ld no long]1 unless its ma/]s w5t completely b]s]k1 reg>d w>1 or ev5 a *all5ge to w>1 a risk wor? tak+4 ,! cold w> may get w>m]1 z x did 9 ,korea1 b z long z we keep our heads & don't give way to fe> & hy/]ia1 tru/+ 9 ,god & keep+ our ,h-bombs 8wet10 x may nev] rea* ! boil+po9t4 ,& we h 9 addition a weapon ev5 m p[]ful ?an ! ,h-bomb or any o!r physical weapon1 :i* in/ead ( br++ mis]y & dea? w\ld br+ new life & new hope to hundr$s ( millions n[ enslav$4 ,we h n yet ev5 begun to fight on ! battlefield ( ideas1 9 :i* we c mat* fre$om aga9/ tyranny1 fri5d%ip aga9/ class hatr$1 tru? aga9/ lies1 a society bas$ on ! respect & dignity ( ! individual & ! giv+ ( full scope to human aspirations aga9/ a society model$ aft] ! beehive & ! ant-heap4 8,real peace10 =m] ,assi/ant ,secret>y ( ,/ate ,adolf ,a4 ,b]le1 ,jr41 said 9 ! ,new ,lead]1 8is deep] ?an abs5ce ( w>4 ,t w be won 9 ! realm ( philosophy & ideas4 ,inde$1 ! great reason = prev5t+ w> is to p]mit ideas to meet ideas on _! own m]its4444 ,! /atesman's bus9ess is to keep ! conflagration at bay & give ideas _! *ance1 rely+ on ! moral /r5g? ( ! ideals he repres5ts to br+ to _! support ! masses ?r\gh\t ! _w40 ,9 su* a w> ( ideas1 he adds1 !re c\ld be no d\bt ab\t ! outcome1 z ! ,we/ c oppose all its positives aga9/ ,mosc['s negatives4 ,we meet 8a betray$ revolution1 9 a decad5t1 imp]iali/1 dictatorial phase1 build+ an empire on ! negatives ( human behavior4 ,su* empires engage no p]man5t loyalties2 !y inv>iably break up4 ,w> w\ld defeat ?is empire 9 any case4 ,fir/ rate /atesman%ip c avoid t w>40 ,9 ! words ( ,g5]al ,george ,c4 ,m>%all1 8! mo/ important ?+ = ! _w today is a spiritual reg5]ation4444 ,we mu/ pres5t democracy z a =ce hold+ )9 itself ! se$s ( unlimit$ progress = ! human race4 ,we %\ld make x cle> t x is a means to a bett] way ( life )9 nations & to a bett] und]/&+ among nations4 ,tyranny inevitably mu/ fall back be=e ! trem5d\s moral /r5g? ( ! gospel ( fre$om & self-respect = ! individual40 ,z an advance army 9 ?is w> ( ideas we already h a fif? column ( millions wait+ = our signal to m>*1 ! millions ( ! enslav$ satellite c\ntries--,pol&1 ,cze*oslovakia1 ! ,baltic c\ntries1 ,hung>y1 ,bulg>ia1 ,rumania--z well z millions ^u millions beh9d ! ,iron ,curta9 9 ,russia itself4 ,! greate/ mi/ake made by ,hitl] 0 8 failure to utilize ! read9ess & eag]ness ( a l>ge p]c5tage ( ! ,russian masses to turn aga9/ _! oppressors4 ,:5 ! ,nazi armies m>*$ into ! ,ukra9e1 l>ge numb]s ( ,ukra9ians1 :o _h be5 long+ = indep5d5ce = c5turies1 greet$ !m z _! lib]ators ) ! traditional bread & salt1 symbol ( welcome4 ,russian soldi]s surr5d]$ by ! ?\s&s & !y1 along ) ! m5 ( ! villages1 volunte]$ 9 great numb]s to fight aga9/ _! enslav]s4 ,9 ! he>ts ( millions ( ,russians beh9d ! front1 ! long+ = lib]ty1 nev] ext+ui%$1 0 giv5 its greate/ /imulus s9ce ! days :5 !y ov]?rew ! ,cz>i/ regime4 ,!y1 too1 7 wait+ = ! ,g]mans to give !m back ! revolution ! ,communi/s _h /ol5 f !m ) lies & deceit4 ,) ! /upidity *>act]i/ic ( all crim9als1 ,hitl] & ,himml] proclaim$ t ! ,russians 7 to be treat$ z an 8inf]ior race40 ,ev]y:]e _! armies w5t !y burn$ & pillag$ & rap$4 ,in/ead ( lib]ators !y turn$ out to be mo/ savage b>b>ians1 :o behav$ ev5 worse ?an ! commiss>s4 ,x 0 ?is inconceivable folly ( ,hitl]1 z well z our ,l5d-,lease1 t play$ a major role 9 enabl+ ! ,kreml9 to w9 ! w>4 ,! ,russian masses & ^? ( ! enslav$ satellite c\ntries are /ill wait+ = _! lib]ators4 ,! ma/]s ( ! ,kreml9 "k x1 b !y hope t1 l ! ,nazis1 we w be too /upid to take advantage ( x4 ,if a w> ev] breaks out1 we %all h millions jo9+ our ranks provid$ we d n de/roy ^! millions1 ^? n 9 uni=m1 ) ,a- or ,h-bombs 9 ! /rategic bomb+ ( _! cities4 ,b we %\ld n wait until a w> breaks out4 ,we mu/ beg9 mobiliz+ !m "r n[ = ! w> ( ideas4 ,! s-call$ ,iron ,curta9 is a fake1 l ! re/ ( ! ,communi/ set-up4 ,x is made ( t9sel & is full ( ?\s&s ( holes1 ?r\gh :i* we c pass if we w4 ,^? ?\s&s ( miles ( bord] r++ ! va/ ,russian ,empire c\ld be utiliz$ z great ?or\ghf>es ( ideas1 to be smuggl$ to ! millions wait+ = !m4 ,!re isn't a gu>d on ^? bord]s :o c\ldn't1 ) ! prop] approa* & inducem5ts1 be enli/$ 9 our army ( ideas4 ,9 addition to flood+ ! air ov] ,russia ) t9y balloons1 ea* c>ry+ a message ( fre$om & hope1 we c\ld also smuggle into ! c\ntry small radio receiv+ sets by ! millions to br+ ! ,voice ( ,am]ica to millions ( ,russian homes4 ,we c\ld atta* to ^? balloons small loaves ( bread1 packages ( cig>ettes1 little tr9kets = babies1 nylon /ock+s = wom51 on a scale t no police c\ld cope )4 ,nor c\ld ! ,kreml9 risk =bidd+ x1 z t w\ld place x 9 ! position ( fur!r depriv+ its />v$ & hungry p ( ?+s !y badly ne$ & want4 ,) ^! weapons on ! battlefront 9 ! w> ( ideas1 & ) ! ,a- & ,h-bomb to give ! ,kreml9 pause1 we w\ld be well on ! way to w9 any w>1 cold or hot4 ,our ju/ification = build+ ! hydrog5 bomb is ?us n m]ely to prev5t its use1 b to prev5t ,_w ,w> ,,iii1 & to w9 x if x comes4 ,we are n build+ x to br+ ,russia to h] knees4 ,we are build+ x to br+ h] to h] s5ses4 ,we mu/ make ! ,kreml9 realize ) ,g5]al ,m>%all t 8tyranny inevitably mu/ fall back be=e ! trem5d\s moral /r5g? ( ! gospel ( fre$om & self-respect = ! individual40 ,,iv ,,korea ,,cle>$ ,,! ,,air ,z ?is is be+ writt51 ! ,korean w> is j "o mon? old4 ,by ! "t ^! l9es appe> 9 pr9t we may "k :e!r ! nak$ ,communi/ aggression on ! ,republic ( ,s\? ,korea 0 an episode1 a prelude1 or ! fir/ act ( ,_w ,w> ,,iii4 ,b :atev] hi/ory records1 ! fir/ fla% ( ! ,communi/ guns1 suppli$ by ! ,kreml91 has reveal$ to ! free _w at la/ ! face ( ! enemy 9 all its hide\sness4 ,x br\ght ! fir/ phase ( ! s-call$ cold w> to a def9ite end4 ,x ar\s$ fre$om-lov+ peoples ev]y:]e & put !m on ! al]t4 ,x s]v$ z a p[]ful headlight 9 ! night1 reveal+ _m dang]\s curves on ! road ahead4 ,x has giv5 ! ,unit$ ,nations its fir/ great opportunity to display its vitality = all ! _w to see4 ,among o!r ?+s1 ! fla% ( ! ,nor? ,korean guns has illum9$ = u m cle>ly ?an ev] be=e ! pa? we mu/ foll[ 9 our policy on atomic weapons1 bo? ! ,a-bomb & ! ,h-bomb4 ,x has reveal$ ! extreme dang] lurk+ 9 any plan to outlaw production & use ( atomic weapons 9 a _w con/antly ?reat5$ by a savage dictator%ip1 ready to p\nce on x at ! fir/ sign ( weak5+ 9 its armor4 ,! fla% ( ! ,r$ guns1 9 ! fir/ place1 made x cle> to free m5 ev]y:]e t to r5\nce our "r to ! production ( atomic weapons z pot5tially ! greate/ det]r5ts aga9/ ! fur!r spread ( ,communi/ aggression1 & z ! mo/ p[]ful def5d]s ( ! spiritual & moral values )\t :i* our way ( life w\ld become mean+less1 w\ld all[ ! ,r$ ,army to ov]run :at rema9s ( ! free _w4 ,su* a move on our "p1 = ! pres5t & ! =eseeable future1 may h]ald ! la/ appe>ance ( free m5 on ! /age ( hi/ory4 ,x w\ld be1 z ! ,gonc\rt bro!rs fe>$1 8clos+ "t1 g5tlem560 ,9 addition to w>n+ u :at we mu/ n d1 ! ,r$ guns also gave w>n+ ( a m positive nature4 ,!y w>n$ u to make all ha/e 9 ! con/ruction ( ! hydrog5 bomb1 to get x ready z soon z possible1 aga9/ ! ev5tuality t ,russia may decide x w\ld be to h] advantage to precipitate ,_w ,w> ,,iii be=e our ,h-bomb is ready4 ,in/ead ( ! e/imat$ pre-,korea "t-table ( ?ree ye>s1 x n[ becomes a vital necessity = u to complete our ,h-bomb1 & facilities = its production at a spe$y rate1 )9 a ye>4 ,& if ! hi/ory ( our developm5t ( ! ,a-bomb may s]ve z an example1 x almo/ becomes a c]ta9ty t we %all d s4 ,:ile we may n ann\nce x to ! _w1 we h good reason to expect t ! fir/ ,h-bomb w be ready = te/+ sometime 9 #aiea1 possibly 9 e>ly summ]4 ,?is =eca/ is n bas$ on m]ely guesswork4 ,:5 we decid$ to g all out 9 develop+ ! ,a-bomb--& we didn't really g to "w 9 e>ne/ until ,may #aidc--nobody knew t x c\ld be successfully made4 ,!re 7 two enorm\s major problems to be solv$1 & solv$ 9 "t to be ( use 9 w9n+ ! w>4 ,"o 0 to produce unhe>d-( quantities ( fissionable mat]ials 7,u-#bce & plutonium71 lit]ally 9 quantities billions ( times great] ?an _h ev] be5 produc$ be=e4 ,nobody knew :e!r x c\ld be done or h[ x c\ld be done4 ,?ree gigantic plants 7 built1 at a co/ ( #a1ejj1jjj1jjj1 on ! m]e *ance1 8calculat$ risk0 we call$ x1 t "o ( !m w\ld "w4 ,z x turn$ out1 !y all work$1 "s m effici5tly ?an o!rs1 ?\gh all contribut$ to ! %ort5+ ( ! w>4 ,! second major problem1 among a ho/ ( small] ones1 all important to ! successful atta9m5t ( ! goal1 0 h[ to assemble ! mat]ials produc$ 9 ! billion-doll> plants into a bomb t w\ld live up to expectations4 ,bo? major problems _h to be solv$ simultane\sly4 ,! design+ ( ! bomb w5t on = m ?an two ye>s ) only trickles ( ! active mat]ial4 ,yet despite all ^! enorm\s difficulties ! ,a-bomb 0 complet$ = te/+ 9 ab\t two ye>s & ?ree mon?s aft] ! beg9n+ ( ! l>ge-scale ef=t4 ,comp>$ ) ! enorm\sness ( ! problems t _h to be solv$1 & 7 solv$ successfully 9 ?is rem>kably %ort "t1 ! problems /ill to be solv$ = build+ ! hydrog5 bomb appe> relatively simple1 s9ce all ! mat]ials requir$ & ! plants to produce !m are already built1 paid =1 & op]at+ successfully4 ,z already po9t$ out1 we h ! ,a-bombs to s]ve z trigg]s1 l>ge /ockpiles ( deut]ium1 & ! refrig]ation equipm5t & te*niques to liquefy x4 ,we h an adequate supply ( li?ium = ! production ( tritium1 :i*1 z expla9$ e>li]1 w\ld be us$ z ! extra k9dl+ to ! ,a-bomb mat*4 ,& we h1 ( c\rse1 our gigantic plutonium factories at ,han=d1 ,wa%+ton1 9 :i* ! li?ium c\ld be conv]t$ into tritium 9 ! desir$ am\nts4 ,?us1 in/ead ( hav+ to />t f scrat* z we 7 =c$ to d ) ! ,a-bomb1 we h at h& all ! necess>y +r$i5ts = ! ,h-bomb ) ! possible exception ( suffici5t tritium1 & s9ce we h ! plutonium plants1 greatly exp&$ & improv$ s9ce ! end ( ! w>1 x is reasonable to make a 8gue/imate10 to use a ^w popul> 9 w>time1 t a few mon?s %\ld suffice = !m1 if !y are employ$ exclusively = t purpose1 to produce tritium 9 prop] am\nts4 ,t we h decid$ to complete ! con/ruction ( ! ,h-bomb 9 ! %orte/ possible "t 0 made cle> on ,july #g1 two weeks foll[+ ! ,communi/ attack on ,s\? ,korea1 :5 ,presid5t ,truman ask$ ,congress to furni% #bfj1jjj1jjj 9 ca% 8to build additional & m effici5t plants & relat$ facilities0 = mat]ials t c be us$ ei!r = weapons or = fuels pot5tially useful = p[] purposes4 ,! appropriation1 he said1 0 requir$ 89 fur!rance ( my directive ( ,janu>y #ca1 #aiej10 9 :i* he _h ord]$ ! ,atomic ,en]gy ,commission 8to cont9ue its "w on ! s-call$ hydrog5 bomb02 & ?is 0 fur!r cl>ifi$ 9 a lett] to ! ,presid5t by ! ,budget ,director1 ,fr$]ick ,j4 ,lawton1 recomm5d+ ! money reque/1 to ! effect t ! mat]ials to be produc$ 9 ! propos$ plants c\ld be us$ = ei!r atomic bombs or hydrog5 bombs4 ,s9ce ! only type ( plant t c\ld produce mat]ials = bo? ! ,a-bomb & ! ,h-bomb is a nucle> reactor = produc+ plutonium1 & s9ce tritium is ! only ,h-bomb elem5t t c\ld be produc$ 9 a plutonium plant1 ! reque/ by ! ,presid5t may be int]pret$ z ! fir/1 ?\gh indirect1 (ficial confirmation t tritium is look$ ^u z "o ( ! +r$i5ts necess>y = a successful ,h-bomb4 ,we 7 giv5 a h9t ( a possible "t-table :5 x 0 reveal$ t ! all-ca% reque/ w\ld h to be obligat$ 9 "o ye> ?\gh its actual disbursal c\ld be spread ov] f\r ye>s4 ,?is sugge/s ! possibility t ! nucle> reactors = ! l>ge-scale production ( tritium might be ru%$ to completion )9 "o ye>4 ,:ile ^! new reactors = ! production ( tritium are be+ built1 we c conv]t all our ,han=d reactors = t purpose s t no "t ne$ be lo/4 ,:atev] am\nts ( plutonium w\ld h to be sacrific$ by div]t+ ! ,han=d plants f plutonium to tritium w\ld be (fset by ! new uranium conc5tration plants at ,oak ,ridge1 & by ! fact t we already h a l>ge /ockpile ( bo? ,u-#bce & plutonium accumulat$ ov] a p]iod ( five ye>s4 ,! "o & only major problem to be solv$ is h[ to assemble into an effici5t ,h-bomb ! mat]ials we already h at h& or w h 9 a few mon?s4 ,"h1 too1 we are mu* f>!r advanc$ ?an we 7 at ! "t we decid$ to build ! ,a-bomb1 z we are n call$ ^u to />t f scrat*4 ,= :]eas 9 ! e>ly days ( ! ,a-bomb developm5t sci5ti/s 7 d\btful :e!r x c\ld be made at all & 7 actually hop+ t _! inve/igations w\ld prove t x 0 impossible1 = ! ,nazis z well z = u1 no su* d\bts seem to exi/ 9 ! m9ds ( ^? mo/ intimately associat$ ) ! problem4 ,on ?is score we h _h m ?an h9ts f a numb] ( ^? 9 ! "k1 among !m ,s5ator ,mc,mahon4 8,! sci5ti/s10 he said 9 a hi/oric address to ! ,unit$ ,/ates ,s5ate on ,febru>y #b1 #aiej1 8feel m confid5t t ?is mo/ horrible ( armam5ts ! hydrog5 bomb c be develop$ successfully ?an !y felt 9 #aidj :5 ! orig9al bomb 0 "u consid]ation4 ,! hydrog5 developm5t w be *eap] ?an its uranium =]unn]4 ,!oretically1 x is )\t limit 9 de/ructive capacity4 ,a weapon made ( su* mat]ial w\ld de/roy any milit>y or o!r t>get1 includ+ ! l>ge/ city on e>?40 ,:at is ?is confid5ce bas$ on8 ,sci5ti/s are a v cons]vative lot1 n giv5 to jump+ to conclusions )\t exp]im5tal evid5ce on :i* to base !m4 ,i rememb] well ! agoniz+ h\rs prec$+ ! te/ ( ! fir/ ,a-bomb 9 ,new ,mexico1 :5 ev]yone pres5t1 p>ticul>ly ! intellectual hi]>*y t 0 mo/ responsible1 0 beset by grave d\bts :e!r ! ,a-bomb w\ld g (f at all1 & if x did1 :e!r x w\ld live up to expectations or turn out to be no m ?an an improv$ blockbu/]4 ,v few1 if any1 felt confid5t t x w\ld be z good z x f9ally turn$ out to be4 ,= example1 9 a pool 9 :i* ev]yone bet a doll> to guess ! ultimate p[] ( ! bomb 9 t]ms ( ,,tnt1 ,dr4 ,opp5heim] plac$ 8 bet on #cjj tons4 ,?is makes x evid5t t ! sci5ti/s 7 n v confid5t ev5 z late z #aide1 up to ! v la/ m9ute1 :5 8! bra9 *ild ( _m m9ds came =? 9 physical %ape & p]=m$ z x 0 suppos$ to d40 ,if ! sci5ti/s are m confid5t today ?an !y 7 9 #aidj1 & ev51 x w\ld seem1 9 #aide1 :5 ! bomb /ood on its /eel t[] ready = its fir/ te/1 x c only mean t _! confid5ce is bas$ on innum]able exp]im5ts c>ri$ out dur+ ! five ye>s t h elaps$ s9ce ,hiro%ima4 ,by ! semiannual reports to ,congress by ! ,atomic ,en]gy ,commission1 & reports pres5t$ be=e ! ,am]ican ,physical ,society1 or publi%$ 9 (ficial publications1 by memb]s ( ! ,los ,alamos ,sci5tific ,laboratory & o!r lead+ in/itutions1 we h be5 (ficially in=m$ ( _m exp]im5ts t h be5 c>ri$ out on nucle> reactions betwe5 deut]ons & deut]ons1 tritons & tritons1 & deut]ons & tritons--namely1 ! v reactions to be expect$ 9 an ,h-bomb us+ deut]ium1 tritium1 or a mixture ( ! two4 ,?is makes x obvi\s t dur+ ! five ye>s s9ce ,hiro%ima we h accumulat$ a va/ body ( k ab\t ! reactions necess>y = a successful ,h-bomb4 ,fur!rmore1 ?is gives u ! assurance t we are five ye>s ahead ( ,russia on ! ,h-bomb z well z ! ,a-bomb1 s9ce we h _h plutonium plants 9 :i* to make tritium = at lea/ five ye>s1 :]eas %e has j plac$ h] plutonium plants 9 op]ation &1 z we h se51 c ill af=d to sacrifice ! vital plutonium %e ne$s = build+ up h] ,a-bomb /ockpile to beg9 exp]im5ts we _h mo/ likely c>ri$ out five ye>s ago4 ,! be/ evid5ce s f> t we h made mu* progress dur+ ! pa/ five ye>s on ! design ( ! ,h-bomb--evid5ce /rongly indicat+ t x _h pass$ ! bluepr9t /age & 0 ready = con/ruction--0 suppli$ rec5tly by ,lewis ,l4 ,/rauss1 a memb] ( ! orig9al ,atomic ,en]gy ,commission1 :5 he reveal$ t 8! greate/ issue ( division0 7betwe5 himself & o!r memb]s ( ! ,,aec7 80 :e!r or n to proce$ ) ! hydrog5 bomb1 z = "s "t ,i _h /rongly urg$ to d40 ,n[1 ,/rauss1 :o w5t into ! ,navy 9 ,_w ,w> ,,ii z a lieut5ant comm&] & rose to be a re> admiral1 is a lead+ f9anci] ( wide exp]i5ce1 s x may be tak5 = grant$ t if = "s "t he _h 8/rongly urg$0 proce$+ ) ! hydrog5 bomb1 x mu/ h be5 because he _h be5 assur$ by ! sci5tific exp]ts t x 0 feasible4 ,m5 ( 8 backgr\nd & exp]i5ce d n 8/rongly urge0 ! div]sion ( res\rces to projects unless !y are /rongly conv9c$ t ! project is bo? practical & feasible4 ,8 words1 :5 read 9 ! light ( /atem5ts by o!r memb]s ( ! ,,aec1 sugge/ t ! division ( op9ion on ?is score among ! memb]s ( ! ,commission 0 n ov] ! feasibility ( ! ,h-bomb b ov] ! belief t ! ,a-bomb 0 good en\gh z long z we 7 its sole possessors & t we c\ld ma9ta9 our advantage = a long "t by build+ m & bett] ,a-bombs4 ,on ! o!r h&1 ! fact t ! majority ( ! ,,aec did n agree ) ,/rauss on ! necessity ( proce$+ ) ! hydrog5 bomb mu/ c]ta9ly n be int]pret$ to mean t !y halt$ all /udies on ! subject1 = t w\ld be *>g+ !m ) gross neglig5ce4 ,x is mu* m reasonable to assume t ! 8greate/ issue ( division0 7m>k ! use ( ! ^w 8greate/10 :i* indicates _m a heat$ debate7 0 :e!r or n to proce$ at once ) ! actual build+ ( ! bomb1 aft] x _h be5 fully design$ & %[n to be feasible 9 a ho/ ( pa9/ak+ /udies ov] a p]iod ( at lea/ f\r ye>s4 ,!re c !re=e be no "q t z soon z ! ,presid5t issu$ 8 directive to ! ,,aec 8to cont9ue0 its "w on ! hydrog5 bomb1 ! fir/ item on ! program 0 to proce$ at once ) ! production ( tritium 9 sizable am\nts1 s9ce all kn[n facts po9t to ! ne$ ( tritium z extra k9dl+ = ! ,a-bomb trigg]4 ,we c also be sure t ! production ( :atev] o!r auxili>y p>aph]nalia may be necess>y 0 at once plac$ on ! top-priority li/4 ,by ! end ( #aiej1 if n e>li]1 we %\ld ?us h all ! necess>y mat]ials ready 9 ! desir$ am\nts4 ,meantime1 we c be sure t our top sci5ti/s h be5 putt+ ! f9i%+ t\*es on designs = assembl+ ! mat]ials--! f9i%+ t\*es1 s9ce !re c be no d\bt t ! bluepr9ts = a successful ,h-bomb h be5 complet$ = at lea/ a ye> & possibly = ?ree or f\r4 ,x w\ld be un?9kable t we 7 s c>eless z to drop all "w on su* a vital matt]1 :i* z f> back z #aide appe>$ to be a def9ite possibility4 ,= ?is we h no less an au?ority ?an ,dr4 ,opp5heim]4 ,9 an article 9 ! book ,"o ,_w or ,none1 publi%$ late 9 #aide1 discuss+ atomic weapons ( ! future1 he describ$ bombs 8t w\ld r$uce ! co/ ( de/ruction p] squ>e mile probably by a factor ( #aj or m10 :i*1 z we n[ "k1 w\ld be a bomb ( a ?\s& times ! p[] t de/roy$ ,hiro%ima--namely1 a hydrog5 bomb4 8,prelim9>y inve/igations0 ( proposals = su* a bomb1 ,dr4 ,opp5heim] wrote at t e>ly date1 8appe>$ s\nd40 ,if ! prelim9>y inve/igations 8appe>$ s\nd0 to sci5ti/s su* z ,dr4 ,opp5heim] 9 #aide1 & be>+ 9 m9d ,presid5t ,truman's ord]s to ! ,,aec 9 #aiej 8to cont9ue its "w10 we c only conclude t ! int]im ye>s produc$ results f> beyond ! prelim9>y /age1 :5 !y m]ely 8appe>$0 to be s\nd4 ,judg+ by ! reaction ( "s lead+ physici/s to ! ,presid5t's ord]1 ! ,h-bomb appe>s to be an om9\s reality1 a complet$ ar*itectural plan requir+ only a few poli%+ t\*es4 ,9 a ^w1 we are almo/ ready to g4 ,& :ile ,dr4 ,be! e/imat$ t x w\ld take ?ree ye>s to complete ! fir/ ,h-bomb1 we mu/ rememb] t he spoke sev]al mon?s be=e ! guns ( ,korea gave ! al>m4 ,& we mu/ n =get t _h x n be5 = ! ?reat ( ! ,nazis we might n h _h ! ,a-bomb 9 less ?an tw5ty-five & possibly fifty ye>s1 accord+ to ! be/ e/imates1 ?\gh ! pres5t ,communi/ ?reat might h r$uc$ ! "t consid]ably4 ,fur!rmore1 we also h ! ^w ( ,s5ator ,mc,mahon1 :o %\ld "k1 t 8! hydrog5 developm5t w be *eap] ?an its uranium =]unn]40 ,?is l5ds weight to ! e>li] d$uction t only relatively small am\nts ( tritium w be necess>y1 s9ce1 z we h se51 l>ge am\nts w\ld be prohibitively co/ly 9 t]ms ( va/ quantities ( plutonium4 ,small am\nts ( tritium1 9 turn1 mean t x w\ld take a relatively %ort "t to produce !m4 ,a reasonable 8gue/imate10 assum+ t #aej to #cjj grams ( tritium w\ld be requir$1 is t su* am\nts c\ld be produc$ )9 a few mon?s1 p>ticul>ly if we employ all our huge plutonium plants at ,han=d on ! task ( produc+ tritium4 ,x is !re=e )9 ! realm ( possibility t :5 we c>ry out ! ann\nc$ te/s ( ! late/ models ( our ,a-bombs at ,eniwetok1 sometime 9 ! spr+ or summ] ( #aiea1 "o ( !m w be ! fir/ ,h-bomb4 ,x may n be ! be/ model1 & x ne$ n be ! equal 9 p[] to a ?\s& w>time model ,a-bombs4 ,9 fact1 x w\ld be highly inadvisable to use su* a bomb 9 a m]e te/4 ,x w be an ,h-bomb1 nev]!less1 & f x we %all le>n h[ to make bigg] & bett] ones1 :i* is all t a te/ is suppos$ to d4 ,= unlike ! ,a-bomb1 :i* _c be made bel[ or above a c]ta9 size1 ! ,h-bomb c be made z small or z l>ge z ! design] wants x to be4 ,z ,pr(essor ,ba*] has po9t$ out1 ! ,h-bomb is 8an op5-end$ weapon40 ,"o ( ! major outcomes ( ! ,korean aggression in/igat$ by ! ,kreml9 has ?us be5 to br+ ! ,h-bomb into be+ mu* soon] ?an x w\ld o!rwise h be54 ,& t is only "o bran* ( ! *a9 reaction t ! ,korean guns h set 9 motion4 ,9 addition to unmask+ completely ! ,kreml9's ultimate int5tions to enslave mank9d1 & al]t+ ! free nations ( ! _w to ! dang] fac+ !m z !y _h n be5 al]t$ s9ce ,hitl]'s attack on ,pol&1 ! fla% ( ! ,korean guns has also %$ new light on ! ,politburo's /rategy ( conque/4 ,! be/-in=m$ op9ion 9 ! summ] ( #aiej holds t ! ,kreml9 has decid$ on a s]ies ( little w>s t w\ld sl[ly dra9 our lifeblood & ru9 our economy1 & ?us br+ ab\t ! collapse & ru9 ( ! re/ ( ! _w's free nations1 r ?an =ce a global w>1 ,g]man /yle4 ,among o!r reasons = su* a /rategy--& !re are _m logical reasons = x f ,russia's po9t ( view--is ! fact1 already become evid5t 9 ,korea1 t 9 su* little w>s1 f\ght ) ,russian equipm5t & o!r p's blood1 we w\ld n use atomic weapons ( any k9d1 n only because !re are no suitable t>gets1 b because dictates ( humanity make ! use ( su* weapons on little peoples1 caught 9 ! net ( ,communism1 :olly inconceivable4 ,by decid+ on a s]ies ( little w>s1 ov] a prolong$ p]iod1 "o foll[+ ! o!r or com+ simultane\sly1 ,russia may ?us figure t %e c\ld ga9 h] ultimate objective 9 ! *eape/ possible way1 :ile at ! same "t mak+ sure t our atomic-bomb /ockpile is :olly neutraliz$4 ,if ?is turns out to be true1 we w\ld at lea/ escape atomic w>f>e1 & s9ce we1 & ! re/ ( ! civiliz$ _w1 f]v5tly wi% to avoid be+ =c$ to use atomic weapons1 ?is w\ld be all to ! good4 ,b we mu/ also take into consid]ation ! possibility t ! v decision on ,russia's "p to wage little w>s & avoid a global w> may h be5 greatly influ5c$ by ! fact t we h a l>ge /ockpile ( ,a-bombs :ile h] /ockpile is /ill negligible1 =c+ h] to adopt a /rategy 9 :i* our sup]iority w\ld be nullifi$4 ,x is also possible t aft] h] fir/ exp]i5ce ) ! production ( ,a-bombs %e may h realiz$ t x w\ld be mu* too co/ly to try to cat* up ) u & h !re=e decid$ on a /rategy 9 :i* atomic weapons c\ld n possibly play any "p4 ,on ! o!r h&1 x may also mean t %e w n risk a global w> until %e has built up an adequate /ockpile ( h] own1 meantime s(t5+ u up ) a s]ies ( little w>s4 ,) all ?is 9 m9d1 x behooves u to take a clos] look at our program = ! outlaw+ ( atomic weapons & ! plac+ ( atomic en]gy "u int]national control4 ,x 0 a noble ideal1 "o ( ! noble/ conceiv$ by man3 ! mo/ p[]ful nation 9 ! _w volunt>ily (f]$ to give up ! "r to produce or use ! greate/ weapon ev] design$4 ,alas1 x almo/ di$ at bir?1 & n[1 aft] f\r ye>s ( nurs+ 9 an incubator1 ! ,korean guns h giv5 x a fatal bl[4 ,we might z well face ! facts squ>ely3 ! majority plan = ! int]national control ( atomic en]gy1 ! only acceptable plan possible1 is dead1 "o ( ! fir/ casualties ( ! ,korean guns4 ,we /ill talk ab\t try+ to f9d ways = compromise betwe5 our plan1 accept$ by all ! nations outside ! ,iron ,curta91 & t ( ,russia4 ,we are /ill talk+1 at lea/ (ficially1 z ?\gh someh[ a compromise c & w be f\nd4 ,! tru? ( ! matt] is t ! plan z x /&s today is completely out ( tune ) ! times4 ,z we look on x by ! light ( ! ,nor? ,korean guns1 x becomes cle> t x is :olly vision>y1 )\t any relation to ! realities4 ,we /ill talk z ?\gh our orig9al (f] /ill /&s4 ,! tru? ( ! matt] is t ev5 7 ! impossible to happ5 & ,russia 7 to say to ! _w3 8,we h be5 mi/ak54 ,we accept ! ,am]ican & ! majority plan 9 toto )\t any res]vations10 we %\ld be =c$ to say3 8,sorry1 x is too late1 y h miss$ y\r *ance4 ,y\r actions h made ! plan unworkable1 s9ce x _c possibly "w 9 an atmosph]e ( mutual di/ru/ & ! con/ant ?reat ( little w>s60 ,& ev5 if wise diplomacy prev5t$ u f say+ x 9 su* blunt language1 & ?\gh we may /ill f9d x exp$i5t to pay lip s]vice to ! majority plan1 s t ,russia c\ld n use x 9 h] propag&a w> z evid5ce t we 7 ins9c]e f ! v beg9n+1 we w\ld h to wriggle to get out ( ! v s]i\s pr$icam5t 9 :i* ,russia's acceptance w\ld place u4 ,& ev5 if diplomacy dictat$ t we sign a conv5tion ) ,russia to outlaw production & use ( all atomic weapons1 to de/roy our /ockpiles & h& ov] all our atomic plants to an int]national atomic au?ority1 z our pres5t plan calls =1 !re c be no "q t su* a conv5tion c\ld nev] mu/] ! approval ( ev5 a majority ( ! ,s5ate1 & c]ta9ly n ! requir$ cons5t ( two ?irds ( ! ,s5ate call$ = by ! ,con/itution4 ,:at is m1 su* a rejection w\ld h ! ov]:elm+ approval ( ,am]ican p1 once ! facts 7 made cle> to !m1 & any adm9i/ration d>+ to ent] su* a pact w\ld be ov]:elm+ly defeat$4 ,all ?is has be5 s evid5t = m ?an two ye>s t x is rem>kable t ! ,russians h fail$ s f> to take advantage ( our pot5tial emb>rassm5t & ?us w9 "o ( _! greate/ victories on ! propag&a front4 ,9 fact1 _! failure to d s1 ) ! sure k t !y w\ld risk no?+ by accept+ a plan t w\ld mo/ c]ta9ly be reject$ by our own p1 n only reveals lack ( subtlety on _! "p1 b appe>s on ! surface z crass /upidity1 ! same type ( /upidity display$ by ,hitl]1 :i* appe>s to be an inevitable trait ( all monoli?ic dictator%ips t mu/ lead to _! ultimate undo+4 ,! "t has come = u to /op talk+ ab\t giv+ away our greate/ weapons1 ! only ones1 z ,presid5t ,truman & ,w9/on ,*ur*ill h told u1 t h kept ! ,r$ ,army hordes f ov]runn+ ! free _w4 ,x is "t = u to face reality & place ! blame :]e x belongs4 ,! evil does n lie 9 weapons p] se4 ,x lies 9 w> itself4 ,x is no evil to build & possess ! mo/ p[]ful weapons at our comm& ) :i* to def5d ourselves aga9/ a ru?less aggressor4 ,on ! contr>y1 x w\ld be an evil ?+ to ?r[ away ! pr9cipal weapon /&+ betwe5 u & possible defeat4 ,x is no evil to use a weapon to de/roy y\r enemy j because y\r weapon happ5s to be ! mo/ p[]ful 9 exi/5ce4 ,x is no great] evil to de/roy ?\s&s ( y\r enemy 9 "o great fla% ?an to de/roy !m by gor+ !m ) bayonets4 ,! real evildo] is ! nation t />ts an aggressive w>4 ,^? attack$ h ! "r & duty to def5d !mselves by all means at _! comm&4 ,our confusion has be5 ! result ( our fir/ use ( ! ,a-bomb to de/roy a city ) ?\s&s ( its civilian population4 ,let u admit t ! mass bomb+ ( l>ge populat$ cities 7:i*1 by ! way1 0 />t$ by ! ,nazis7 is :olly inexcusable ) any k9d ( weapons1 & t we %\ld nev] resort to su* /rategic bomb+ aga94 ,t does n mean t we %\ld r5\nce our "r to use ,a-bombs to de/roy an enemy's armies1 navies1 & airfields1 8 transportation facilities & 8 oil wells--9 a ^w1 8 capacity to make w> aga9/ u4 ,& z long z we use ! ,a-bomb & ! ,h-bomb only z weapons ( trem5d\s p[] to de/roy by bla/ & by fire1 !y are no diff]5t f ord9>y blockbu/]s or inc5di>ies except t !y conc5trate _! p[] 9 a small package4 ,is !re any diff]5ce1 morally speak+1 betwe5 ! use ( ?\s&s ( blockbu/]s & t5s ( ?\s&s ( inc5di>ies & a weapon t conc5trates all _! p[] 9 "o8 ,probably ! ma9 reason = ! confus$ ?9k+ t has s+l$ out atomic weapons z a great] evil ?an o!r weapons ( mass de/ruction has be5 _! radioactivity4 ,b ev5 ! ,a-bombs explod$ ov] ,japan 7 purposely dropp$ f a height t c>ri$ mo/ ( ! radioactivity away into ! upp] atmosph]e4 ,nor w ! ,h-bomb1 z expla9$ e>li]1 release great quantities ( radioactivity unless x is purposely rigg$ to d s4 ,we %\ld1 !re=e1 lose no?+ & ga9 mu* if we r5\nc$ ! use ( ,a- & ,h-bombs z radioactive weapons except 9 retaliation aga9/ ! use ( su* weapons on u or our allies4 ,b to r5\nce _! use altoge!r w\ld be tantam\nt n only to physical b to spiritual suicide z well1 = x w\ld mean condon+ ! advance ( ! ,r$ ,army4 ,x has become cu/om>y to talk ab\t ,russia's atom bomb z ?\gh %e already 01 or soon w be1 on a p> ) u4 ,x is true t ev5tually %e w cat* up ) u 9 ! developm5t ( a l>ge /ockpile ( h] own & 9 design+ m effici5t models4 ,b t is only "o side ( ! picture4 ,z ( #aiej1 & = at lea/ until #aieb1 ye>s t may well be crucial1 our sup]iority 9 ,a-bombs w rema9 un*all5g$1 n only qualitatively b quantitatively4 ,by t "t we %all h greatly increas$ our lead by ! possession ( an effective /ockpile ( ,h-bombs4 ,s9ce ,russia _c build ,h-bombs at ! pres5t /age )\t sacrific+ quantities ( plutonium %e ne$s to build up h] ,a-bomb /ockpile1 %e w f9d h]self compell$ to build additional plutonium plants1 :i* n only w greatly /ra9 h] res\rces b1 m important f our po9t ( view1 w ga9 u additional "t4 ,h[ _m ,a-bombs c ,russia make8 ,=m] ,secret>y ( ,w> ,h5ry ,l4 ,/imson has told u t ! ,a-bombs we dropp$ on ,japan 87 ! only ones we _h ready40 ,c\nt+ ! te/ bomb at ,alamogordo1 we _h ?us produc$ ?ree bombs by mid-,augu/ #aide4 ,?is repres5t$ ! total output ( a two-billion-doll> plant1 employ+ ?ree major me?ods ( production1 aft] ! plants _h be5 9 op]ation = an av]age ( ab\t six mon?s4 ,9 o!r words1 x took our two-billion-doll> plant ab\t six mon?s to produce ?ree ,a-bombs--a rate ( six ,a-bombs a ye>4 ,n[ all ! evid5ce at h&1 z already po9t$ out1 indicates t1 in/ead ( build+ ?ree diff]5t types ( plants = produc+ ,a-bomb mat]ials1 ,russia is conc5trat+ entirely on plutonium4 ,h5ce1 if we assume t %e built a plutonium plant equal 9 output to ! total capacity ( our w>time uranium & plutonium plants1 & fur!r assum+ t h] me?ods = produc+ plutonium are z effici5t z ours1 ! be/ %e c\ld d at pres5t w\ld be at ! rate ( six plutonium bombs a ye>4 ,at ?is rate %e w\ld h ab\t eighte5 by ! middle ( #aieb4 ,?is w\ld be a sizable /ockpile = a nation 9 sole possession ( su* a weapon4 ,b w\ld any nation ) su* a /ockpile d>e *all5ge a nation ) a /ockpile _m times bigg]1 consi/+ ( bombs _m times m p[]ful1 & possess+ a few hydrog5 bombs to boot8 ,russia w1 no d\bt1 improve h] production me?ods4 ,b to improve !m to ! ext5t ( produc+1 let u say1 two bombs p] mon?1 %e w\ld h to /ep up h] production by f\r hundr$ p] c5t4 ,x is d\btful if su* a /ep-up c\ld be a*iev$ 9 less ?an ?ree ye>s4 ,!n !re are o!r factors to be consid]$ t greatly balance ! scales 9 our favor4 ,to produce plutonium bombs requires trem5d\s quantities ( uranium1 some?+ t _c be conjur$ up by j dialectic mat]ialism4 ,x s happ5s t we h access to ! only two ri* uranium deposits kn[n 9 ! _w3 ! ,belgian ,congo1 & ! ,great ,be> ,lake area 9 ,canada4 ,!re 7 no kn[n ri* uranium deposits 9 ,russia prop] or 9 ! t]ritories ( h] satellites1 ) ! possible exception ( ,cze*oslovakia4 ,we "k ?is f ! fact t %e nev] compet$ = ! _w m>kets = radium1 extract$ economically only f ri* uranium ores1 :i* sold be=e ! w> at #be1jjj p] gram1 or at ! rate ( ne>ly #ab1jjj1jjj a p\nd4 ,! be/ evid5ce1 h[ev]1 t %e does n h at h] comm& ri* uranium deposits ei!r 9 ,russia or else:]e is h] ru?less exploitation1 at ! co/ ( ?\s&s ( human lives1 ( ! deplet$ uranium m9es 9 ! m\nta9s ( ,saxony1 :i* _h long be5 ab&on$ by _! ,g]man own]s4 ,! only o!r kn[n s\rce ( pit*bl5de 7! m9]al ri*e/ 9 uranium7 "u ,russian control is ,joa*im/hal 7,ja*ymov7 9 ,bohemia1 f :i* came ! fir/ radium sample isolat$ by ,mme ,curie ab\t fifty ye>s ago4 ,?is m9e1 too1 has be5 l>gely deplet$1 ?\gh mu* ( its uranium may possibly be recov]able f ! dump-heaps1 if !y h n 9 ! meantime be5 dispos$ (4 ,n[1 e ton ( pure uranium metal conta9s j f\rte5 p\nds ( ! fissionable elem5t uranium #bce4 ,! latt]1 :5 split1 releases ! neutrons t create plutonium out ( nonfissionable uranium #bch4 ,on ! basis ( "o hundr$ p] c5t effici5cy1 impossible 9 ?is op]ation1 ! yield ( plutonium w\ld ?us be f\rte5 p\nds p] ton4 ,s9ce ! plutonium mu/ be extract$ long be=e all ! ,u-#bce atoms h be5 split1 h[ev]1 ! likelihood is t ! yield w\ld be no m ?an two to f\r p\nds p] ton4 ,russia w\ld ?us ne$ t5s ( ?\s&s ( tons ( uranium ore to build up a sizable /ockpile ( ,a-bombs1 & :ile %e may be able to process l[-grade ores1 x w\ld take h] mu* long] to produce a giv5 quantity ( plutonium ?an x takes u to produce x f our mu* ri*] ores4 ,= example1 an ore conta9+ fifty p] c5t uranium w\ld yield a giv5 quantity ( plutonium t5 times fa/] ?an an ore conta9+ only five p] c5t1 unless a ref9+ plant t5 times ! size is built at t5 times ! co/ ( con/ruction & ( op]ation4 ,if we take ,pr(essor ,oliphant's publi%$ e/imate t ! critical mass 7t is1 ! m9imum am\nt7 ne$$ = an ,a-bomb is betwe5 #aj & #cj kilograms 7#bb & #ff p\nds71 we get a cle> picture ( ! enorm\s diff]5ce !re is betwe5 ri* ores & poor ores = ! build+ up ( an ,a-bomb /ockpile1 & a fur!r concept ( ! difficulties t ,russia w face 9 try+ to produce an ,h-bomb4 ,accord+ to ! be/ available prew> in=mation1 ! pit*bl5de ( ! ,belgian ,congo has a uranium cont5t z high z #fj to #hj p] c5t2 ! ,canadian ore yields f #cj to #dj p] c5t4 ,a cons]vative e/imate w\ld ?us place ! av]age uranium cont5t ( ,belgian & ,canadian ores at some:]e ar\nd #ej p] c5t4 ,?is contra/s %>ply ) a prew> figure ( ar\nd #c p] c5t uranium = ! pit*bl5de ( ,cze*oslovakia1 & ! ore 9 ! m\nta9s ( ,saxony is ( ev5 l[] grade4 ,h5ce on ! basis ( two to f\r p\nds ( plutonium p] ton ( uranium metal1 x w\ld require ! m9+ & process+ ( only #b tons ( ,belgian & ,canadian ore to obta9 t am\nt z comp>$ ) #cd tons = ! ore f ,cze*oslovakia1 & a l>g] am\nt = ! ,saxon ore4 ,to make a bomb conta9+ #bb p\nds ( plutonium w\ld ?us require u to m9e & process f #aa to #bb tons ( ore1 :]eas ,russia w\ld ne$ f #ahg to #cgd tons4 ,= a bomb requir+ #ff p\nds1 ! am\nt1 ( c\rse1 w\ld be correspond+ly tripl$1 rea*+ a possible figure ( #a1abb tons ( ore to produce "o ,a-bomb1 z comp>$ ) a maximum ( no m ?an #ff tons ( ! ores available to u4 ,9 a /ate employ+ slave labor & he$less ( ! wa/age ( human lives1 ! production co/ does n c\nt4 ,b ev5 ,russia's manp[] is n unlimit$1 & work]s remov$ f o!r l9es ( production mu/ inevitably hurt ! economy4 ,?is factor mu/ put a def9ite limit to ,russia's capacity to produce ,a-bombs & w make x v difficult1 if n impossible1 = h] to produce a l>ge /ockpile 9 a %ort "t4 ,:5 x comes to produc+ an ,h-bomb1 ! disp>ity betwe5 ourselves & ,russia assumes a/ronomical proportions4 ,x takes #hj p\nds ( uranium #bce to produce "o p\nd ( tritium4 ,s9ce1 z we h se51 !re are only #ad p\nds ( ,u-#bce 9 a ton ( natural uranium metal1 ?is means t #e4g tons ( uranium metal w\ld be requir$1 assum+ "o hundr$ p] c5t effici5cy ( utilization1 :i* is out ( ! "q4 ,on ! basis ( figures already giv51 x c be se5 t we w\ld require ! m9+ & process+ ( only #aa4d tons ( ore :]eas ,russia w\ld h to use z mu* z #aid tons to produce t s+le p\nd ( ! elem5t :i*1 z ! facts cit$ e>li] appe> to demon/rate1 is vital = ! con/ruction ( a successful ,h-bomb4 ,all ^! basic facts1 nev] pres5t$ be=e1 %\ld conv9ce u t1 despite ! fact t ,russia has explod$ h] fir/ ,a-bomb1 we /ill h trem5d\s advantages ov] h] t %e w f9d extremely difficult to ov]come4 ,& we mu/ n =get o!r advantages on our side t may prove decisive ev5 aft] ,russia succe$s 9 build+ up a sizable /ockpile4 ,bombs c be deliv]$ aga9/ u at pres5t only by airplane or by subm>9e4 ,a look at ! map w %[ t :]eas ! ,atlantic & ,pacific ,oceans /& betwe5 u & ,russia's ne>e/ bases1 we are 9 a mu* bett] position to deliv] ,a-bombs to h] vital c5t]s1 su* z ! oil fields 9 ! ,caucasus1 = example1 f bases close by4 ,x is1 fur!rmore1 n unreasonable to assume t we1 z ! mo/ advanc$ indu/rial nation 9 ! _w1 w manage to ma9ta9 our lead n only 9 me?ods ( deliv]y by sup]ior & fa/] airplanes1 or by guid$ missiles1 b also 9 ! developm5t ( rad>1 son>1 & o!r detection devices1 z well z ( sup]ior int]ceptors & o!r def5sive measures1 :i* w\ld make deliv]y ( ,a-bombs aga9/ u mu* m difficult ?an x w\ld be = u to deliv] !m aga9/ ,russia4 ,= ! next ?ree ye>s1 x c ?us be se51 & possibly = a consid]ably long] p]iod1 ! initiative1 z f> z atomic weapons are conc]n$1 w rema9 ) u4 ,let u !re=e be done ) all vision>y plans = de/roy+ ! %ield t n[ protects civilization z we "k x1 & proce$ to build bigg] & bett] %ields1 hop+ t by our v act ( do+ s we c prev5t ! ultimate cataclysm4 ,"r n[ ! outlook is n bright1 b our /r5g?1 physical & spiritual1 %\ld give u fai? t ! =ces ( good w prevail 9 ! end ov] ! =ces ( evil1 z !y h always done ?r\gh\t hi/ory2 t ! f\r fre$oms w triumph ov] ! ,f\r ,horsem5 ( ! ,apocalypse4 ,v ,a ,,prim] ,,( ,,atomic ,,en]gy ,! mat]ial univ]se1 ! e>? & ev]y?+ 9 x1 all ?+s liv+ & non-liv+1 ! sun & its planets1 ! />s & ! con/ellations1 ! galaxies & ! sup]galaxies1 ! inf9itely l>ge & ! inf9itesimally small1 manife/s itself to our s5ses 9 two =ms1 matt] & en]gy4 ,we d n "k1 & probably nev] c "k1 h[ ! mat]ial univ]se began1 & :e!r1 inde$1 x ev] _h a beg9n+1 b we d "k t x is con/antly *ang+ & t x did n always exi/ 9 its pres5t =m4 ,we also "k t 9 :atev] =m ! univ]se may h exi/$1 matt] & en]gy h always be5 insep>able1 no en]gy be+ possible )\t matt]1 & no matt] )\t en]gy1 ea* be+ a =m ( ! o!r4 ,:ile we d n "k h[ & :5 matt] & en]gy came into be+1 or :e!r !y ev] _h a beg9n+ 9 "t z we p]ceive x1 we d "k t :ile ! relative am\nts ( matt] & en]gy are con/antly *ang+1 ! total am\nt ( bo?1 9 "o =m or ! o!r1 always rema9s ! same4 ,:5 a plant gr[s1 en]gy f ! sun1 9 ! =m ( heat & light1 is conv]t$ into matt]1 s t ! total weight ( ! plant is great] ?an t ( ! elem5t>y mat]ial con/itu5ts1 wat] & c>bon-dioxide gas1 out ( :i* its sub/ance is built up4 ,:5 ! sub/ance ( ! plant is aga9 brok5 up into its orig9al con/itu5ts by burn+1 ! residual a%es & gases weigh less ?an ! total weight ( ! intact plant1 ! diff]5ce correspond+ to ! am\nt ( matt] t _h be5 conv]t$ into en]gy1 lib]at$ once aga9 9 ! =m ( heat & light4 ,all en]gy z we "k x manife/s itself ?r\gh motion or *ange 9 ! physical or *emical /ate ( matt]1 or bo?1 ?\gh ^! *anges & motions may be s sl[ z to be imp]ceptible4 ,z ! anci5t ,greek philosoph] ,h]aclitus p]ceiv$ m ?an two ?\s& ye>s ago1 all ?+s are 9 a con/ant /ate ( flux1 ?is flux be+ due to an ev]la/+ conv]sion ( matt] into en]gy & en]gy into matt]1 ev]y:]e ov] ! va/ /ret*es ( ! mat]ial univ]se1 to its out]mo/ & inn]mo/ limits1 if any limits !re be4 ,ea* manife/ation ( en]gy involves ei!r matt] 9 motion or a *ange 9 its physical /ate1 :i* we designate z physical en]gy2 a *ange 9 ! *emical con/itution ( matt]1 :i* we "k z *emical en]gy2 or a comb9ation ( ! two4 ,physical en]gy c be conv]t$ into *emical en]gy & vice v]sa4 ,= example1 heat & light are =ms ( physical en]gy1 ea* consi/+ ( a def9ite b& ( waves ( def9ite wave l5g?s 9 viol5t1 regul>1 rhy?mic oscillations4 ,a my/]i\s me*anism 9 ! plant1 kn[n z photosyn!sis1 uses ! heat & light en]gy f ! sun to create complex sub/ances1 su* z sug>s1 />*es1 & cellulose1 out ( simpl] sub/ances1 su* z c>bon dioxide & wat]1 conv]t+ physical en]gy1 heat1 & light into ! *emical en]gy requir$ to hold toge!r ! complex sub/ances ! plant produces4 ,:5 we burn ! cellulose 9 ! =m ( wood or coal 7coal is petrifi$ wood71 ! *emical en]gy is once aga9 conv]t$ into physical en]gy 9 ! =m ( ! orig9al heat & light4 ,z we h se51 ! *emical en]gy /or$ 9 ! plant manife/$ itself by an increase 9 ! plant's weight z comp>$ ) t ( its orig9al con/itu5ts4 ,simil>ly1 ! release ( ! en]gy manife/s itself ?r\gh a loss 9 ! total weight ( ! plant's sub/ance4 ,x c ?us be se5 t nei!r matt] nor en]gy c be creat$4 ,all we c d is to manipulate c]ta9 types ( matt] 9 a way t lib]ates :atev] en]gy _h be5 9 exi/5ce1 9 "o =m or ano!r1 s9ce ! beg9n+ ( "t4 ,all ! en]gy t we _h be5 us+ on e>? until ! adv5t ( ! atomic age _h orig9ally come f ! sun4 ,coal1 z already said1 is a petrifi$ plant t _h /or$ up ! en]gy ( ! sun 9 ! =m ( *emical en]gy millions ( ye>s ago1 be=e man made 8 appe>ance on ! e>?4 ,oil comes f organic matt] t also _h /or$ up light & heat f ! sun 9 ! =m ( *emical en]gy4 ,wat] p[] & w9d p[] are also made possible by ! sun's heat1 s9ce all wat] w\ld freeze & no w9ds w\ld bl[ 7 x n = ! sun's heat en]gy keep+ ! wat]s fl[+ & ! air mov+1 ! latt] by creat+ diff]5ces 9 ! temp]ature ( air masses4 ,!re are two =ms ( en]gy t we take advantage ( :i* are n due directly to ! sun's radiations--gravitation & magnetism--b ! only way we c utilize ^! is by employ+ en]gy d]iv$ f ! sun's heat4 ,9 h>ness+ ,niag>a1 or 9 ! build+ ( great dams1 we utilize ! fall ( ! wat] because ( gravitation4 ,b z ,i h already po9t$ out1 )\t ! sun's heat wat] c\ld n fl[4 ,to produce electricity we beg9 ) ! *emical en]gy 9 coal or oil1 :i* is fir/ conv]t$ into heat en]gy1 !n to me*anical en]gy1 & f9ally1 ?r\gh ! ag5cy ( magnetism1 into electrical en]gy4 ,! radiations ( ! sun1 ( ! giant />s millions ( times l>g] ?an ! sun1 come f an entirely diff]5t s\rce1 ! greate/ s\rce ( en]gy 9 ! univ]se1 kn[n z atomic or1 m correctly1 nucle> en]gy4 ,b ev5 "h ! en]gy comes z ! result ( ! trans=mation ( matt]4 ,! diff]5ce betwe5 nucle> en]gy & *emical en]gy is tw(old4 ,9 *emical en]gy1 su* z ! burn+ ( coal1 ! matt] lo/ 9 ! process comes f ! out] %ell ( ! atoms1 & ! am\nt ( matt] lo/ is s small t x _c be weigh$ directly by any human scale or o!r device4 ,9 nucle> en]gy1 on ! o!r h&1 ! matt] lo/ by be+ trans=m$ into en]gy comes f ! nucleus1 ! heavy inn] core1 ( ! atom1 & ! am\nt ( matt] lo/ is millions ( times great] ?an 9 coal1 great en\gh to be weigh$4 ,an atom is ! smalle/ unit ( any ( ! elem5ts ( :i* ! physical univ]se is con/itut$4 ,atoms are s small t if a drop ( wat] 7 magnifi$ to ! size ( ! e>? ! atoms 9 ! drop w\ld be small] ?an oranges4 ,! /ructure ( atoms is l t ( a m9uscule sol> sy/em1 ) a heavy nucleus 9 ! c5t] z ! sun1 & mu* small] bodies revolv+ ar\nd x z ! planets4 ,! nucleus is made up ( two types ( p>ticles3 protons1 c>ry+ a positive *>ge ( electricity1 & neutrons1 electrically neutral4 ,! planets revolv+ ab\t ! nucleus are electrons1 units ( negative electricity1 :i* h a mass ab\t "o two-?\s&? ! mass ( ! proton or ! neutron4 ,! numb] ( protons 9 ! nucleus det]m9es ! *emical nature ( ! elem5t1 & also ! numb] ( planet>y electrons1 ea* proton be+ electrically balanc$ by an electron 9 ! atom's out] %ells4 ,! total numb] ( protons & neutrons 9 ! nucleus is kn[n z ! mass numb]1 :i* is v close to ! atomic weight ( ! elem5t b n q equal4 ,protons & neutrons are kn[n "u ! common "n 8nucleons40 ,!re are two important facts to keep con/antly 9 m9d ab\t protons & neutrons4 ,! fir/ is t ! two are int]*angeable4 ,a proton1 "u c]ta9 conditions1 loses its positive *>ge by emitt+ a positive electron 7positron7 & ?us becomes a neutron4 ,simil>ly1 a neutron1 :5 agitat$1 emits a negative electron & becomes a proton4 ,z we %all see1 ! latt] process is tak5 advantage ( 9 ! transmutation ( nonfissionable uranium into plutonium1 & ( ?orium into fissionable uranium #bcc4 ,! transmutation ( all o!r elem5ts1 age-old dream ( ! al*emi/s1 is made possible by ! int]*angeability ( protons into neutrons1 & vice v]sa4 ,! second all-important fact ab\t protons & neutrons1 basic to ! und]/&+ ( atomic en]gy1 is t ea* proton & neutron 9 ! nuclei ( ! elem5ts weighs less ?an x does 9 ! free /ate1 ! loss ( weight be+ equal to ! en]gy b9d+ ! nucleons4 ,?is loss becomes progressively great] = ! elem5ts 9 ! fir/ half ( ! p]iodic table1 rea*+ its maximum 9 ! nucleus ( silv]1 elem5t #dg4 ,aft] t ! loss gets progressively small]4 ,h5ce1 if we 7 to comb9e 7fuse7 two elem5ts 9 ! fir/ half ( ! p]iodic table1 ! protons & ! neutrons w\ld lose weight if ! newly =m$ nucleus is n heavi] ?an t ( silv]1 b w\ld ga9 weight if ! new nucleus ?us =m$ is heavi] ?an silv]4 ,! opposite is true ) ! elem5ts 9 ! second half ( ! p]iodic table1 ! protons & neutrons los+ weight :5 a heavy elem5t is split into two light] ones1 & ga9+ weight if two elem5ts are fus$ into "o4 ,s9ce ea* loss ( mass manife/s itself by ! release ( en]gy1 x c be se5 t to obta9 en]gy f ! atom's nucleus requires ei!r ! fusion ( two elem5ts 9 ! fir/ half ( ! p]iodic table or ! fission ( an elem5t 9 ! second half4 ,f a practical po9t ( view1 h[ev]1 fusion is possible only ) two isotopes 7tw9s7 ( hydrog51 at ! beg9n+ ( ! p]iodic table1 :ile fission is possible only ) tw9s ( uranium1 ,u-#bcc & ,u-#bce1 & ) plutonium1 at ! l[] end ( ! table4 ,! diamet] ( ! atom is #ajj1jjj times great] ?an ! diamet] ( ! nucleus4 ,?is means t ! atom is mo/ly empty space1 ! volume ( ! atom be+ #ejj1jjj billion times ! volume ( ! nucleus4 ,x c ?us be se5 t mo/ ( ! matt] 9 ! univ]se is conc5trat$ 9 ! nuclei ( ! atoms4 ,! d5sity ( matt] 9 ! nucleus is su* t a dime w\ld weigh #fjj million tons if its atoms 7 z tightly pack$ z are ! protons & neutrons 9 ! nucleus4 ,! atoms ( ! elem5ts 7( :i* !re are n9ety-two 9 nature1 & six m man-made elem5ts7 h tw9s1 triplets1 quadruplets1 etc41 kn[n z isotopes4 ,! nuclei ( ^! tw9s all conta9 ! same numb] ( protons & h5ce all h ! same *emical prop]ties4 ,!y diff]1 h[ev]1 9 ! numb] ( neutrons 9 _! nuclei & h5ce h diff]5t atomic weights4 ,= example1 an ord9>y hydrog5 atom has a nucleus ( "o proton4 ,! isotope ( hydrog51 deut]ium1 has "o proton plus "o neutron 9 its nucleus4 ,x is ?us twice z heavy z ord9>y hydrog54 ,! second hydrog5 isotope1 tritium1 has "o proton & two neutrons 9 its nucleus & h5ce an atomic mass ( ?ree4 ,on ! o!r h&1 a nucleus conta9+ two protons & "o neutron is no long] hydrog5 b helium1 also ( atomic mass ?ree4 ,!re are hundr$s ( isotopes1 "s occurr+ 9 nature1 o!rs produc$ artificially by %oot+ atomic bullets1 su* z neutrons1 into ! nuclei ( ! atoms ( v>i\s elem5ts4 ,a natural isotope ( uranium1 ! n9ety-second & la/ ( ! natural elem5ts1 conta9s #ib protons & #adc neutrons 9 its nucleus1 h5ce its "n ,u-#bce1 "o ( ! two atomic-bomb elem5ts4 ,! mo/ common isotope ( uranium has #ib protons & #adf neutrons 9 its nucleus & h5ce is kn[n z ,u-#bch4 ,x is #adj times m pl5tiful ?an ,u-#bce1 b _c be us$ = ! release ( atomic en]gy4 ,atomic1 or r nucle>1 en]gy is ! cosmic =ce t b9ds toge!r ! protons & ! neutrons 9 ! nucleus4 ,x is a =ce millions ( times great] ?an ! electrical repulsion =ce exi/+ 9 ! nucleus because ( ! fact t ! protons all h l *>ges4 ,?is =ce1 kn[n z ! c\lomb =ce1 is trem5d\s1 v>y+ inv]sely z ! squ>e ( ! di/ance sep>at+ ! positively *>g$ p>ticles4 ,pr(essor ,fr$]ick ,soddy1 ! not$ ,engli% physici/1 has figur$ out t two grams 7less ?an ! weight ( a dime7 ( protons plac$ at ! opposite poles ( ! e>? w\ld repel ea* o!r ) a =ce ( tw5ty-six tons4 ,yet ! nucle> =ce is millions ( times great] ?an ! c\lomb =ce4 ,?is =ce acts z ! cosmic cem5t t holds ! mat]ial univ]se toge!r & is responsible = ! great d5sity ( matt] 9 ! nucleus4 ,we z yet "k v little ab\t ! basic nature ( ?is =ce1 b we c measure its magnitude by a fam\s ma!matical equation orig9ally pres5t$ by ,dr4 ,e9/e9 9 8 special !ory ( relativity 9 #aije4 ,?is =mula1 "o ( ! great intellectual a*ievem5ts ( man1 toge!r ) ! discov]y ( ! radioactive elem5ts by ,h5ri ,becqu]el & ,pi]re & ,m>ie ,curie1 provid$ ! orig9al clues z well z ! key to ! discov]y & ! h>ness+ ( nucle> en]gy4 ,e9/e9's =mula1 ,e mc1 reveal$ t matt] & en]gy are two diff]5t manife/ations ( "o & ! same cosmic entity1 in/ead ( be+ two diff]5t entities1 z _h be5 g5]ally believ$4 ,x l$ to ! revolution>y concept t matt]1 in/ead ( be+ immutable1 0 en]gy 9 a froz5 /ate1 :ile1 conv]sely1 en]gy 0 matt] 9 a fluid /ate4 ,! equation reveal$ t any "o gram ( matt] 0 ! equival5t 9 ergs 7small units ( en]gy7 to ! squ>e ( ! velocity ( light 9 c5timet]s p] second--namely1 #ijj billion billion ergs4 ,9 m famili> t]ms1 ?is means t "o gram ( matt] repres5ts #be1jjj1jjj kil[att-h\rs ( en]gy 9 ! froz5 /ate4 ,?is equals ! en]gy lib]at$ 9 ! burn+ ( ?ree billion grams 7?ree ?\s& tons7 ( coal4 ,! lib]ation ( en]gy 9 any =m1 *emical1 electrical1 or nucle>1 involves ! loss ( an equival5t am\nt ( mass1 9 accordance ) ! ,e9/e9 =mula4 ,:5 #c1jjj metric tons ( coal are burn$ to a%es1 ! residual a%es & ! gase\s products weigh "o gram less ?an #c1jjj tons2 t is1 "o ?ree-billion? "p ( ! orig9al mass w h be5 conv]t$ into en]gy4 ,! same is true ) ! lib]ation ( nucle> en]gy by ! splitt+ or fus+ 7z w be expla9$ lat]7 ( ! nuclei ( c]ta9 elem5ts4 ,! diff]5ce is m]ely t ( magnitude4 ,9 ! lib]ation ( *emical en]gy by ! burn+ ( coal1 ! en]gy comes f a v small loss ( mass result+ f ! re>rangem5t ( electrons on ! surface ( ! atoms4 ,! nucleus ( ! coal atoms is n involv$ 9 any way1 rema9+ exactly ! same z be=e4 ,! am\nt ( mass lo/ by ! surface electrons is "o ?irtie? ( "o million? ( "o p] c5t4 ,on ! o!r h&1 nucle> en]gy involves vital *anges 9 ! atomic nucleus itself1 ) a consequ5t loss ( z high z "o t5? to ne>ly eight t5?s ( "o p] c5t 9 ! orig9al mass ( ! nuclei4 ,?is means t f "o to ne>ly eight grams p] ?\s& grams are lib]at$ 9 ! =m ( en]gy1 z comp>$ ) only "o gram 9 ?ree billion grams lib]at$ 9 ! burn+ ( coal4 ,9 o!r words1 ! am\nt ( nucle> en]gy lib]at$ 9 ! transmutation ( atomic nuclei is f #c1jjj1jjj to #bd1jjj1jjj times z great z ! *emical en]gy releas$ by ! burn+ ( an equal am\nt ( coal4 ,9 t]ms ( ,,tnt ! figure is sev5 times great] ?an = coal1 z ! en]gy f ,,tnt1 :ile lib]at$ at an explosive rate1 is ab\t "o sev5? ! total en]gy cont5t = an equival5t am\nt ( coal4 ,?is means t ! nucle> en]gy f "o kilogram ( uranium #bce1 or plutonium1 :5 releas$ at an explosive rate1 is equal to ! explosion ( tw5ty ?\s& tons ( ,,tnt4 ,nucle> en]gy c be utiliz$ by two diametrically oppos$ me?ods4 ,"o is fission--! splitt+ ( ! nuclei ( ! heavie/ *emical elem5ts into two unev5 fragm5ts consi/+ ( nuclei ( two light] elem5ts4 ,! o!r is fusion--comb9+1 or fus+1 two nuclei ( ! lighte/ elem5ts into "o nucleus ( a heavi] elem5t4 ,9 bo? me?ods ! result+ elem5ts are light] ?an ! orig9al nuclei4 ,! loss ( mass 9 ea* case manife/s itself 9 ! release ( enorm\s am\nts ( nucle> en]gy4 ,:5 two light atoms are comb9$ to =m a heavi] atom1 ! weight ( ! heavi] is less ?an ! total weight ( ! two light atoms4 ,if ! heavi] atom c\ld aga9 be split into ! two light] ones1 ! latt] w\ld resume _! orig9al weight4 ,z expla9$ be=e1 h[ev]1 ?is is true only ) ! light elem5ts1 su* z hydrog51 deut]ium1 & tritium1 9 ! fir/ half ( ! p]iodic table ( ! elem5ts4 ,! opposite is true ) ! heavi] elem5ts ( ! second half ( ! p]iodic table4 ,= example1 if krypton & b>ium1 elem5ts #cf & #ef1 7 to be comb9$ to =m uranium1 elem5t #ib1 ! protons & ! neutrons 9 ! uranium nucleus w\ld ea* weigh ab\t #j4a p] c5t m ?an !y weigh$ 9 ! krypton & b>ium nuclei4 ,x c ?us be se5 t en]gy c\ld be ga9$ ei!r ?r\gh ! loss ( mass result+ f ! fusion ( two light elem5ts1 or f ! simil> loss ( mass result+ f ! fission ( "o heavy atom into two light] ones4 ,9 ! fusion ( two light] atoms1 ! addition ( "o & "o yields less ?an two1 & yet half ( two w be m ?an "o4 ,9 ! case ( ! heavy elem5ts ! addition ( "o & "o yields m ?an two1 yet half ( two makes less ?an "o4 ,?is is ! seem+ p>adox ( atomic en]gy4 ,?ree elem5ts are kn[n to be fissionable4 ,only "o ( ^! is f\nd 9 nature3 ! uranium isotope #bce 7,u-#bce74 ,! o!r two are man-made4 ,"o is plutonium1 transmut$ by means ( neutrons f ! nonfissionable ,u-#bch1 by ! addition ( "o neutron to ! #adf pres5t 9 ! nucleus1 :i* leads to ! conv]sion ( two ( ! #adg neutrons into protons1 ?us creat+ an elem5t ) a nucleus ( #id protons & #ade neutrons4 ,! second man-made elem5t 7n yet 9 wide use1 z f> z is kn[n7 is uranium isotope #bcc 7#ib protons & #ada neutrons71 creat$ out ( ! elem5t ?orium 7#ij protons1 #adb neutrons7 by ! same me?od us$ 9 ! production ( plutonium4 ,:5 ! nucleus ( any "o ( ^! elem5ts is fission$1 ea* proton & neutron 9 ! two result+ fragm5ts weighs "o t5? ( "o p] c5t less ?an x weigh$ 9 ! orig9al nucleus4 ,= example1 if ,u-#bce atoms total+ #a1jjj grams 9 weight are split1 ! total weight ( ! fragm5ts w be #iii grams4 ,! "o miss+ gram is lib]at$ 9 ! =m ( #be1jjj1jjj kil[att-h\rs ( en]gy1 equival5t 9 explosive t]ms to #bj1jjj tons ( ,,tnt4 ,b ! orig9al numb] ( protons & neutrons 9 ! #a1jjj grams does n *ange4 ,! fission process1 ! equival5t ( ! 8burn+0 ( nucle> fuels1 is ma9ta9$ by :at is kn[n z a *a9 reaction4 ,! bullets us$ = splitt+ are neutrons1 :i*1 because !y d n h an electric *>ge1 c p5etrate ! heavily =tifi$ electrical wall surr\nd+ ! positively *>g$ nuclei4 ,j z a coal fire ne$s oxyg5 to keep x go+1 a nucle> fire ne$s ! neutrons to ma9ta9 x4 ,neutrons d n exi/ free 9 nature1 all be+ tightly lock$ up )9 ! nuclei ( atoms4 ,!y are lib]at$1 h[ev]1 f ! nuclei ( ! ?ree fissionable elem5ts by a self-multiplication process 9 ! *a9 reaction4 ,! process beg9s :5 a cosmic ray f out] space1 or a /ray neutron1 /rikes "o nucleus & splits x4 ,! fir/ atom ?us split releases an av]age ( two neutrons1 :i* split two m nuclei1 :i* 9 turn lib]ate f\r m neutrons1 & s on4 ,! reaction is s fa/ t 9 a %ort "t trillions ( neutrons are ?us lib]at$ to split trillions ( nuclei4 ,z ea* nucleus is split1 x loses mass1 :i* is conv]t$ into great en]gy4 ,!re are two types ( *a9 reactions3 controll$ & uncontroll$4 ,! controll$ reaction is analog\s to ! burn+ ( gasol9e 9 an automobile eng9e4 ,! atom-splitt+ bullets--! neutrons--are fir/ sl[$ d[n f spe$s ( m ?an t5 ?\s& miles p] second to less ?an "o mile p] second by be+ made to pass ?r\gh a mod]ator be=e !y rea* ! atoms at :i* !y are aim$4 ,neutron-8kill]s0--mat]ials absorb+ neutrons 9 great numb]s--keep ! neutrons lib]at$ at any giv5 "t "u complete control 9 a sl[ b /eady nucle> fire4 ,! uncontroll$ *a9 reaction is "o 9 :i* !re is no mod]ator--& no neutron-absorb]s4 ,x is analog\s to ! dropp+ ( a mat* 9 a gasol9e tank4 ,9 ! uncontroll$ *a9 reaction ! fa/ neutrons1 ) no?+ to sl[ !m d[n or to dev\r !m1 build up by ! trillion & quadrillion 9 a fraction ( a million? ( a second4 ,?is leads to ! splitt+ ( a correspond+ numb] ( atoms1 result+ 9 ! release ( unbelievable quantities ( nucle> en]gy at a trem5d\sly explosive rate4 ,"o kilogram ( atoms split releases en]gy equival5t to t ( #bj1jjj1jjj kilograms 7#bj1jjj metric tons7 ( ,,tnt4 ,x is ! uncontroll$ reaction t is employ$ 9 ! explosion ( ! atomic bomb4 ,! controll$ reaction is expect$ to be us$ 9 ! production ( va/ quantities ( indu/rial p[]4 ,x is n[ be+ employ$ 9 ! creation ( radioactive isotopes1 = use 9 m$ic9e & z ! mo/ p[]ful rese>* tool s9ce ! inv5tion ( ! microscope = prob+ into ! my/]ies ( nature1 liv+ & non-liv+4 ,9 ! controll$ reaction ! mat]ial us$ is natural uranium1 :i* consi/s ( a mixture ( #ii4c p] c5t ,u-#bch & #j4g ( ! fissionable ,u-#bce4 ,! neutrons f ! ,u-#bce are made to ent] ! nuclei ( ,u-#bch & conv]t !m to ! fissionable elem5t plutonium1 = use 9 atomic bombs4 ,! l>ge quantities ( en]gy lib]at$ by ! split ,u-#bce nuclei 9 ! =m ( heat is at too l[ a temp]ature = effici5t utilization z p[]1 & is at pres5t wa/$4 ,to be us$ = p[]1 nucle> reactors capable ( op]at+ at high temp]atures are n[ be+ design$4 ,9 ! atomic bomb only pure ,u-#bce1 or plutonium1 is us$4 ,9 bo? ! controll$ & ! uncontroll$ reactions a m9imum am\nt ( mat]ial1 kn[n z ! 8critical mass10 mu/ be us$1 z o!rwise too _m neutrons w\ld escape & ! nucle> fire w\ld ?us be ext+ui%$1 z w\ld an ord9>y fire = lack ( oxyg54 ,9 ! atomic bomb two masses1 ea* less ?an a critical mass1 :i* toge!r equal or exce$ x1 are br\ght 9 contact at a pr$et]m9$ in/ant4 ,! uncontroll$ reaction !n comes automatically1 s9ce1 9 ! abs5ce ( any control1 ! neutrons1 :i* _c escape to ! outside1 build up at an unbelievable rate4 ,:]eas ! fission process = ! release ( nucle> en]gy entails mak+ little ones out ( big ones1 ! fusion process involves mak+ big ones out ( little ones4 ,9 bo? processes ! products weigh less ?an ! orig9al mat]ials1 ! loss ( mass com+ out 9 ! =m ( en]gy4 ,accord+ to ! g5]ally accept$ hypo!sis1 ! fusion process is ! "o op]at+ 9 ! sun & ! />s ( ! same family4 ,! radiant en]gy giv5 (f by !m1 x is believ$1 is ! result ( ! fusion ( f\r hydrog5 atoms into "o atom ( helium1 two ( ! protons los+ _! positive *>ge1 ?us becom+ neutrons4 ,s9ce a helium atom weighs ne>ly eight t5?s ( "o p] c5t less ?an ! total weight ( ! f\r hydrog5 atoms1 ! loss ( mass is ?us ne>ly eight times t produc$ by fission1 ) a correspond+ eightfold increase 9 ! am\nt ( en]gy lib]at$4 ,?is process1 us+ light hydrog51 is n feasible on e>?4 ,! nuclei ( all atoms are ?us va/ /orage depots ( cosmic en]gy4 ,we mu/ ?9k ( !m z cosmic safe-deposit vaults1 9 :i* ! ,creator ( ! univ]se1 if y w1 deposit$ at ! "t ( creation mo/ ( ! en]gy 9 ! univ]se = safekeep+4 ,! sun & ! o!r giant />s t give light h1 z x 71 draw+ acc\nts 9 ?is 8,fir/ ,national ,bank & ,tru/ ,company ( ! ,univ]se10 :]eas we on ?is little planet ( ours 9 ! cosmic h9t]l& are mu* too poor to h su* a bank acc\nt4 ,s we h be5 =c$ all ^! ye>s we h be5 on e>? to subsi/ on small h&\ts f our close neighbor ! sun1 :i* squ&]s millions all ov] space1 b c sp>e u only nickels1 dimes1 & qu>t]s 7dep5d+ on ! seasons ( ! ye>7 = a cup ( c(fee & a s&wi*4 ,we are ?us 9 ! true s5se ( ! ^w cosmic begg>s1 liv+ (f ! b\nty ( a di/ant relative4 ,! discov]y ( fission 9 #aici meant t aft] a million ye>s ( exclusive dep5d5ce on ! sun we _h sudd5ly manag$ to op5 a mode/ draw+ acc\nt ( our own 9 ?is bank ( ! cosmos4 ,we 7 enabl$ to d x by /umbl+ ^u two special ma/] keys to five ( ! cosmic vaults4 ,"o ( ^! keys we call fission2 ! o!r1 :i* all[s u entry into a mu* ri*] *amb] ( ! vault1 we call fusion4 ,we c get a lot ( ! /or$-up cosmic treasure by us+ ! key to ! fission vaults alone1 b1 z ) our t]re/rial bank vaults1 :i* g5]ally require two keys be=e !y c be op5$1 x is n possible to use ! key to ! fusion vault unless we fir/ use ! fission key4 ,except = ! paym5t ( our heat & light bill1 ! sun gives u no?+ directly 9 ca%4 ,in/ead x deposits a v small pittance 9 ! plants1 :i* s]ve z its major t]re/rial banks4 ,! animals !n rob ! plants & we rob !m bo?4 ,:5 we eat ! food we live by we ?us actually eat sun%9e4 ,! sun makes its deposits 9 ! plant ?r\gh an ag5t nam$ *lorophyll1 ! /uff t makes ! grass gre54 ,*lorophyll has ! uncanny ability to cat* sunbeams & to h& !m ov] to ! plant4 ,a *emical sup]g5ius inside ! plant *anges ! sunlight en]gy into *emical en]gy1 j z a bank tell] *anges bills into silv]4 ,) ?is *emical en]gy at _! disposal1 a great numb] ( devili%ly clev] *emi/s 9 ! plants' *emical factory g to "w build+ up _m sub/ances to s]ve z vaults 9 :i* to /ore up a l>ge "p ( ! en]gy1 us+ only "p ( x = _! own subsi/5ce4 ,! build+ mat]ials us$ by ^! *emi/s inside ! plants consi/ ma9ly ( c>bon-dioxide gas f ! atmosph]e1 & wat] f ! soil1 plus small am\nts ( m9]als ei!r suppli$ by ! good e>? or by f]tiliz]s4 ,c>bon dioxide1 by ! way1 compos$ ( "o atom ( c>bon & two atoms ( oxyg51 is ! /uff y exhale4 ,9 solid =m x is :at we "k z dry ice1 us$ 9 ef=ts to make ra94 ,x is pres5t 9 ! atmosph]e 9 l>ge am\nts4 ,out ( ! c>bon dioxide & wat] ! *emi/s 9 ! plants build cellulose1 />*1 sug>1 fat1 prote9s1 vitam9s1 & scores ( o!r sub/ances1 all ( :i* s]ve z vaults = ! sun's rays caught by ! *lorophyll4 ,! bigge/ vaults ( all1 /or+ mo/ ( ! en]gy1 are ! cellulose1 sug>s & />*es1 fats & prote9s4 ,!re ! /or$ en]gy rema9s until x is releas$ by processes we call burn+ or dige/ion1 bo? ( :i*1 z we %all see1 are diff]5t t]ms = ! same *emical reaction4 ,:5 we burn wood1 or ! petrifi$ anci5t wood we "k z coal1 we burn l>gely ! cellulose1 ! *ief compon5t ( ! solid "p ( plants4 ,:5 we eat ! plants1 or ! animals 9 :om ! plant tissues are trans=m$ into fle% by ! sol> en]gy /or$ )9 !m1 x is ! sug>s1 />*es1 fats1 & prote9s t give u ! en]gy we live by4 ,9 ! process ( burn+ wood or coal ! l>ge cellulose vaults1 compos$ ( c>bon1 hydrog51 & oxyg51 are brok5 up1 ?us all[+ ! orig9al sol> en]gy1 /or$ up )9 !m z *emical en]gy1 to escape 9 ! =m ( heat & light4 ,?is is ! same heat & light deposit$ !re by ! sun _m ye>s be=e--9 ! case ( coal1 "s two hundr$ million ye>s back4 ,! process ( burn+ ?us trans=ms ! *emical en]gy 9 ! plants back to its orig9al =m ( light & radiant heat en]gy4 ,! complex c>bon & hydrog5 units 9 ! cellulose are brok5 up1 ea* fre$ c>bon atom unit+ )9 two oxyg5 atoms 9 ! air to =m c>bon dioxide aga91 :ile two hydrog5 atoms unite ) "o ( oxyg5 to =m wat]4 ,?us we see t ! cellulose vaults are brok5 up once m into ! orig9al build+ bricks out ( :i* ! *emi/s 9 ! plants _h fa%ion$ !m4 ,:5 we eat plant or animal food to get ! en]gy to live by1 exactly ! same process takes place except at a l[] temp]ature4 ,! sunlight deposit vaults ( sug>1 />*1 & fat1 also compos$1 l cellulose1 ( c>bon1 hydrog51 & oxyg51 are brok5 up by ! dige/ive sy/em into _! compon5t p>ts1 ?us all[+ ! orig9al sol> en]gy /or$ )9 !m to get free 9 ! =m ( *emical en]gy1 :i* our body uses 9 its ess5tial processes4 ,"h1 too1 ! end products are c>bon dioxide1 :i* we exhale1 & wat]4 ,ab\t half ! en]gy we ?us obta9 is us$ by u = ! "w we d4 ,! o!r half is us$ by ! body = build+ up ! tissues burn$ up z "p ( ! regul> we> & te> ( life4 ,we ?us burn food = our int]nal en]gy z we burn cellulose = our ext]nal en]gy4 ,! int]e/+ ?+ "h is t1 9 bo? types ( burn+1 fission z well z fusion processes take place4 ,! fission is ! splitt+ ( ! cellulose1 sug>1 fats1 />*es1 & prote9s into c>bon & hydrog5 atoms4 ,! fusion "p is ! union ( ! c>bon & ! hydrog5 ) oxyg5 to =m c>bon dioxide & wat]4 ,! fusion "p is j z necess>y to release ! /or$-up sol> en]gy 9 ! wood or coal z is ! fission "p1 =1 z ev]yone kn[s1 unless !re is oxyg5 = ! c>bon to fuse )1 no combu/ion 7burn+7 c take place & h5ce no release ( en]gy4 ,! plant vaults w\ld rema9 clos$ absolutely tight4 ,at ?is po9t two ?+s become cle>4 ,we see1 9 ! fir/ place1 t :5ev] we get any k9d ( en]gy 9 any =m we d n 9 any way create any ( x4 ,all we d is m]ely draw on some?+ t is already /or$ up2 9 ! case ( coal & wood by ! sun1 9 ! case ( uranium & hydrog5 by ! same p[] t creat$ ! sun & all en]gy4 ,we draw wat] f ! spr+1 b we d n make ! wat]4 ,on ! o!r h&1 we _c draw ! wat] unless we fir/ f9d ! spr+1 & ev5 !n we _c draw x unless we h a pit*]4 ,& we also see1 9 ! second place1 t fission & fusion are common ev]yday ph5om5a t occur any "t y burn any?+4 ,bo? are ess5tial :5ev] en]gy is releas$1 :e!r x is ! *emical en]gy f coal or ! atomic en]gy f ! nuclei ( uranium1 deut]ium1 or tritium4 ,:5 y light a cig>ette y employ bo? fission & fusion or y don't smoke4 ,! fir/ fission & fusion take place 9 ! light+ ( ! mat*1 ! cellulose 9 ! mat* 7:e!r x is wood or pap]7 be+ fission$ 7t is1 split into its compon5t atoms ( c>bon & hydrog574 ,^! atoms are !n fusion$ ) ! oxyg5 9 ! air4 ,! same ?+ happ5s :5 ! tobacco cat*es fire4 ,9 ea* case ! fusion ) ! oxyg5 makes possible ! fission ( ! cellulose4 ,:5 we burn ,u-#bce1 or plutonium1 we aga9 get bo? fission & fusion1 except t1 in/ead ( oxyg51 ! nuclei ( ^! elem5ts fir/ fuse ) a neutron be=e !y are split ap>t4 ,?us we see t ! process ( burn+ ,u-#bce1 or plutonium1 requires n only fission b fusion z well1 )\t :i* !y c\ld n burn4 ,?is is true also 9 hydrog5 fusion4 ,:5 y burn deut]ium by fus+ two deut]ons 7nuclei ( deut]ium7 to =m helium ( atomic weight ?ree1 plus a neutron1 "o ( ! two deut]ons is split 9 half 9 ! process4 ,simil>ly1 :5 y burn tritium by fusion two tritons 7nuclei ( tritium71 "o ( ! tritons splits into two neutrons & a proton1 ! "o proton jo9+ ! o!r triton to =m helium ( atomic weight f\r4 ,?us we see t fission & fusion are ! cosmic firebr&s t are always pres5t :5ev] a fire is light$1 *emical or atomic1 :e!r ! fuel is wood1 coal1 or oil1 or uranium1 plutonium1 deut]ium1 or tritium4 ,bo?1 ) "s v>iations1 are ess5tial = op5+ ! cosmic safe :]e ! en]gy ( ! univ]se is kept 9 /orage4 ,! only reason y get mu* m en]gy 9 ! fission & fusion ( atomic nuclei is t s mu* m _h be5 /or$ 9 !m ?an 9 ! cellulose vaults on ?is planet4 ,! same reason t limits our ability to obta9 /or$ *emical en]gy to a few fuels also limits our ability to obta9 atomic en]gy4 ,coal1 oil1 & wood are ! only divid5d-pay+ *emical-en]gy /ocks4 ,simil>ly only five elem5ts1 uranium #bcc & #bce1 plutonium1 deut]ium1 & tritium are ! only divid5d-pay+ atomic-en]gy /ocks1 & ( ^! only two 7,u-#bce & deut]ium7 exi/ 9 nature4 ,! o!r ?ree are re-creat$ f o!r elem5ts by mod]n al*emical leg]dema94 ,:at is m1 we "k = a c]ta9ty t x w nev] be possible to obta9 atomic en]gy f any o!r elem5t1 by ei!r fission or fusion4 ,?is %\ld put to re/ once & = all ! notion ( _m1 includ+ "s self-/yl$ sci5ti/s1 t ! explosion ( a hydrog5 bomb w\ld set ! hydrog5 9 ! wat]s1 & ! oxyg5 & ! nitrog5 9 ! air1 on fire & ?us bl[ up ! e>?4 ,! en]gy 9 common hydrog5 is lock$ up 9 "o ( ^? cosmic vaults :i* only ! sun & ! />s t %9e c op5 & :i* no numb] ( ,h-bombs c\ld bl[ ap>t4 ,oxyg5 & nitrog5 are lock$ ev5 = ! sun4 ,z = ! deut]ium 9 ! wat]1 x _c cat* fire unless x is highly conc5trat$1 cond5s$ to its liquid =m1 & heat$ to a temp]ature ( sev]al hundr$ million degrees4 ,h5ce all ?is talk ab\t bl[+ up ! e>? is pure moon%9e4 ,b :ile we "k t we h rea*$ ! limit ( :at c be a*iev$ ei!r by fission or by fusion1 t by no means ju/ifies ! conclusion t we h rea*$ ! ultimate 9 discov]y & t fission & fusion are ! only possible me?ods = tapp+ ! en]gy lock$ up 9 matt]4 ,we mu/ rememb] t fifty ye>s ago we did n ev5 suspect t nucle> en]gy exi/$ & t until #aici no "o1 includ+ ,dr4 ,e9/e91 believ$ t x w\ld ev] become possible to use x on a practical scale4 ,we simply /umbl$ ^u ! ph5om5on ( fission1 :i* 9 its turn op5$ ! way to fusion4 ,if sci5ce tells u any?+ at all1 x tells u t nature is inf9ite & t ! human m9d1 driv5 by insatiable curiosity & prob+ ev] deep] into nature's my/]ies1 w inevitably f9d ev] great] treasures1 treasures t are at pres5t beyond ! utmo/ /ret*es ( ! imag9ation--z f> beyond fission & fusion z ^! are beyond man's fir/ discov]y ( h[ to make a fire by /rik+ a sp>k ) a labori\sly made fl9t4 ,! day may yet come1 & pa/ hi/ory makes x practically c]ta9 t x w come1 :5 man w look ^u ! discov]y ( fission & fusion z we look today ^u ! crude/ tools made by primitive man4 ,a great measure ( man's progress has be5 ! result ( s]5dipity1 ! faculty ( mak+ discov]ies1 by *ance or sagacity1 ( ?+s n s\ght =4 ,_m an adv5ture has l$ man to /umble ^u some?+ mu* bett] ?an he orig9ally set out to f9d4 ,l ,columbus1 _m an explor] into ! realms ( ! unkn[n has set 8 sights on a %ort] r\te to ! spices ( ,india only to /umble ^u a new cont95t4 ,unlike ,columbus1 h[ev]1 ! explor]s 9 ! field ( sci5ce1 in/ead ( be+ conf9$ to ?is t9y little e>? ( ours1 h ! :ole inf9ite univ]se z ! doma9 ( _! adv5tures1 & _m a virg9 cont95t1 ri*] by f> ?an any yet discov]$1 /ill awaits its ,columbus4 ,ro5tg5 & ,becqu]el 7 explor+ :at !y ?\ght 0 an untrodd5 pa? 9 ! =e/ & came ^u a new road t l$ _! successors to ! v citadel ( ! mat]ial univ]se4 ,"y ,enrico ,f]mi 0 curi\s to f9d out :at w\ld happ5 if he fir$ a neutron into ! nucleus ( uranium1 hop+ only to create a heavi] isotope ( uranium1 or at be/ a new elem5t4 ,8 r mode/ goal l$ five ye>s lat] to ! fission ( uranium1 & 9 ano!r six ye>s to ! atomic bomb4 ,yet1 z we h se51 9 bo? fission & fusion only a v small fraction ( ! mass ( ! protons & neutrons 9 ! nuclei ( ! elem5ts us$ is lib]at$ 9 ! =m ( en]gy1 :ile #ii4c to #ii4i p] c5t ( _! sub/ance rema9s 9 ! =m ( matt]4 ,we "k ( no process 9 nature :i* conv]ts #ajj p] c5t ( ! matt] 9 protons & neutrons into en]gy1 b sci5ti/s are already talk+ ab\t f9d+ means = br++ ab\t su* a conv]sion4 ,!y are seek+ clues = su* a process 9 ! my/]i\s cosmic rays t bomb>d ! e>? f out] space ) en]gies billions ( times great] ?an ^? releas$ by fission or fusion1 great en\gh to sma% atoms ( oxyg5 or nitrog51 or :atev] o!r atoms !y happ5 to hit 9 ! upp] atmosph]e1 into _! compon5t protons & neutrons4 ,luckily1 _! numb] is small & mo/ ( _! en]gy is sp5t long be=e !y rea* sea level4 ,b we h already le>n$ h[ to create second>y cosmic-ray p>ticles ( relatively l[ en]gies 7#cej1jjj1jjj electron-volts7 ) our giant cyclotrons4 ,! creation ( ^! p>ticles1 kn[n z mesons1 :i* are believ$ to be ! cosmic cem5t responsible = ! nucle> =ces1 repres5ts ! actual conv]sion ( en]gy into matt]4 ,?is is ! exact rev]se ( ! process tak+ place 9 fission & fusion1 9 :i*1 z we h se51 matt] is conv]t$ into en]gy4 ,& we are n[ ab\t to complete multibillion-volt atom-sma%]s t w hurl atomic bullets ( en]gies ( f ?ree to t5 billion volts at ! nuclei ( atoms4 ,) ^! gigantic ma*9es1 kn[n z ! cosmotron 7at ! ,brookhav5 ,national ,laboratory ( ! ,atomic ,en]gy ,commission7 & ! bevatron 7at ! ,univ]sity ( ,cali=nia71 we %all be able to sma% nuclei into _! individual compon5t protons & neutrons & ?us get a mu* m intimate glimpse ( ! =ces t hold ! nuclei toge!r4 ,:at is m1 in/ead ( creat+ only mesons1 p>ticles ) only #cjj electron masses1 we %all be able = ! fir/ "t to conv]t en]gy into protons & neutrons1 duplicat+1 z f> z is kn[n1 an act ( creation t has n tak5 place s9ce ! beg9n+ ( ! univ]se4 ,man at la/ w be creat+ ! v build+ blocks out ( :i* ! univ]se is made1 z well z ! cosmic cem5t t holds !m toge!r4 ,:at new cont95ts w our fir/ glimpse into ! me*anism ( ! v act ( creation ( matt] out ( en]gy reveal8 ,:at new secrets w be uncov]$ be=e ! dazzl$ eyes & m9d ( man :5 he takes ! nucleus ( ! atom completely ap>t at la/8 ,n ev5 ,e9/e9 c\ld tell u4 ,b1 z ,om> ,khayym div9$1 8a s+le ,alif0 may provide 8! clue0 t1 c\ld we b f9d x1 leads 8to ! ,treasure-,h\se1 & p]adv5ture to ! ,ma/] too40 ,! fact is t we already h op5$ ! door to ! ant]oom ( ! treasure-h\se1 & we are ab\t to unlock ! door to "o ( its inn] *amb]s4 ,:at %all we f9d !re8 ,no "o z yet kn[s4 ,b we d "k t e door man has op5$ s f> has l$ to ri*es beyond 8 wilde/ dreams1 ea* new door br++ great] rew>ds ?an ! "o be=e4 ,on ! o!r h&1 we also "k t ! treasure-h\se has _m mansions1 & t no matt] h[ _m *amb]s he may ent]1 he w always f9d new doors to unlock4 ,= we h le>n$ t ! solution ( any "o secret always op5s up a ?\s& new my/]ies4 ,we also h le>n$1 to our sorr[1 t any new insight ga9$ into nature's laws & =ces c be us$ = great good & = equally great evil4 ,! great] ! insight1 ! great] ! pot5tialities = good or evil4 ,! new k he is ab\t to ga9 by 8 deep] insight into ! he>t ( matt]1 & by 8 ability to create x out ( en]gy1 may (f] man ! means to make himself complete ma/] ( ! _w he lives 94 ,x is equally true1 alas1 t he c\ld use x to de/roy t _w ev5 m ?or\ghly ?an ) ! hydrog5 bomb4 ,z already /at$1 sci5ti/s are ev5 n[ discuss+ ! possibility ( f9d+ means = ! complete annihilation ( matt] by ! conv]sion ( ! entire mass ( protons & neutrons into en]gy1 in/ead ( only #j4a to #j4g p] c5t4 ,& :ile ! total annihilation ( protons & neutrons /ill seems highly speculative1 we already "k t su* a process actually does take place 9 ! realm ( ! electron4 ,?is is ! ph5om5on already a*iev$ num]\s times on a small scale 9 ! laboratory1 9 :i* a positive electron 7positron7 & an electron ) a negative *>ge completely de/roy ea* o!r1 _! entire mass be+ conv]t$ into en]gy4 ,luckily1 ?is is at pres5t only a laboratory exp]im5t1 9 :i* ea* positron mu/ be individually produc$1 s9ce !re are h>dly any positive electrons 9 our "p ( ! univ]se4 ,b suppose ! new k we are ab\t to pry loose f ! inn] citadel ( matt] reveals to u a new process1 at pres5t n ev5 suspect$1 t w\ld release positrons 9 l>ge numb]s1 j z ! fission & fusion processes made possible = ! fir/ "t ! lib]ation ( l>ge quantities ( neutrons4 ,su* an ev5tuality1 by no means beyond ! realm ( ! possible1 w\ld op5 pot5tialities ( horror alongside :i* ^? ( ! ,h-bomb1 ev5 ! rigg$ "o1 w\ld be puny4 ,= any process t w\ld release l>ge numb]s ( positrons 9 ! atmosph]e1 9 a *a9 reaction simil> to ! "o n[ lib]at+ neutrons1 may envelop ! e>? 9 "o deadly fla% ( radioactive lightn+ t w\ld in/antly kill all s5sate ?+s4 ,& al?\gh ?is is admitt$ly purely speculative1 no "o d>e say t su* a discov]y w n be made1 n :5 "o rememb]s h[ remote & unlikely a process su* z fission seem$ to be j be=e x 0 made4 ,?\gh _m ( ! great discov]ies came ab\t z ! result ( *ance1 !y came because1 z ,pa/eur said1 8*ance favors ! prep>$ m9d40 ,actually !y came l>gely ?r\gh ! intellectual syn!sis ( :at _h orig9ally appe>$ z unrelat$ ph5om5a or concepts4 ,:5 ,f>aday discov]$ ! pr9ciple ( electromagnetic induction1 he e/abli%$ = ! fir/ "t t electricity & magnetism1 look$ ^u s9ce prehi/oric times z two sep>ate & di/9ct ph5om5a1 7 actually only two aspects ( "o basic natural =ce1 :i* we "k today z electromagnetism4 ,?is great intellectual syn!sis l$ directly to ! age ( electricity & all its wond]s4 ,ab\t ?irty ye>s lat] ! great ,scotti% physici/ ,james ,cl]k ,maxwell demon/rat$ t electromagnetic action travel$ ?r\gh space 9 ! =m ( transv]se waves simil> to ^? ( light & hav+ ! same velocity4 ,?is reveal$ ! exi/5ce 9 nature ( electromagnetic waves1 bett] kn[n to u today z radio waves4 ,ab\t a qu>t] c5tury lat] ! great ,g]man-,jewi% physici/ ,he9ri* ,h]tz n only produc$ ^! electromagnetic waves b %[$ t !y are propagat$ j z waves ( light are1 possess+ all o!r prop]ties ( light1 su* z reflection1 refraction1 & pol>ization4 ,?is l$ directly to wireless telegraphy & telephony1 radio & television1 radiophotography & rad>4 ,:5 ,e9/e91 9 8 special !ory ( relativity ( #aije1 unit$ matt] & en]gy 9 "o basic cosmic entity1 ! road 0 op5$ to ! atomic age4 ,yet ,e9/e9 0 nev] satisfi$ & has devot$ m ?an =ty-five ye>s ( 8 life to ! se>* = a great]1 all-embrac+ unity und]ly+ ! great div]sity ( natural ph5om5a4 ,9 8 g5]al !ory ( relativity ( #aiae he =mulat$ a concept t encompasses ! univ]sal law ( gravitation 9 8 e>li] syn!sis ( space & "t1 ( :i* matt] & en]gy 7 an integral "p4 ,?is syn!sis1 wrote ,b]tr& ,russell 9 #aibd1 8is probably ! greate/ syn!tic a*ievem5t ( ! human intellect up to ! pres5t "t4 ,x sums up ! ma!matical & physical labors ( m ?an two ?\s& ye>s4 ,pure geometry f ,py?agoras to ,riemann1 ! dynamics & a/ronomy ( ,galileo & ,newton1 ! !ory ( electromagnetism z x result$ f ! rese>*es ( ,f>aday1 ,maxwell1 & _! successors1 all are absorb$1 ) ! necess>y modifications1 9 ! !ories ( ,e9/e91 ,weyl1 & ,edd+ton4 8,s compreh5sive a syn!sis10 he cont9u$1 8might h repres5t$ a dead end1 lead+ to no fur!r progress = a long "t4 ,=tunately1 at ?is mom5t quantum !ory ! !ory apply+ to ! =ces )9 ! atom has appe>$1 ) a new set ( facts outside ! scope ( relativity physics :i* applies to ! =ces gov]n+ ! cosmos at l>ge4 ,?is has sav$ u1 9 ! nick ( "t1 f ! dang] ( suppos+ t we "k ev]y?+40 ,yet ,e9/e91 work+ away 9 maje/ic solitude1 has be5 try+ all ^! ye>s to con/ruct a va/ intellectual edifice t w\ld embrace all ! laws ( ! cosmos kn[n s f>1 includ+ ! quantum1 9 "o fundam5tal concept1 :i* he designates z a 8unifi$ field !ory40 ,e>ly 9 #aiej he publi%$ ! results ( 8 ardu\s labors s9ce #aiae4 ,?is he reg>ds z ! cr[n+ a*ievem5t ( 8 life's "w1 a unifi$ !ory t bridges ! va/ gulf t _h exi/$ betwe5 relativity & quantum1 betwe5 ! inf9ite univ]se ( ! />s & galaxies & ! equally inf9ite univ]se )9 ! nucleus ( ! atom4 ,if he is "r1 & he has always be5 "r be=e1 8 late/ contribution w prove to be a great] syn!tic a*ievem5t ( ! human intellect ?an ev] be=e1 embrac+ space & "t1 matt] & en]gy1 gravitation & electromagnetism1 z well z ! nucle> =ces )9 ! atom1 9 "o all-encompass+ concept4 ,9 due "t ?is concept %\ld lead to new revelations ( nature's my/]ies1 & to triumphs ev5 great] ?an ^? :i* foll[$ z a direct consequ5ce ( all e>li] intellectual syn!ses4 ,if ! syn!sis ( matt] & en]gy l$ to ! atomic age1 :at may we expect ( ! late/1 all-inclusive syn!sis8 ,:5 ,e9/e9 0 ask$ ab\t x he repli$3 8,come back 9 tw5ty ye>s60 :i* happ5s to co9cide ) ! end ( ! hundr$-ye> p]iod record$ by ! bro!rs ,gonc\rt3 ,god sw++ a bun* ( keys1 & say+ to humanity3 8,clos+ "t1 g5tlem560 ,! se>* = new intellectual syn!ses goes on1 & no d\bt new relation%ips betwe5 ! div]se ph5om5a ( nature w be f\nd1 reg>dless ( :e!r ,e9/e9's late/ !ory /&s or falls 9 ! light ( fur!r discov]y4 ,physici/s1 = example1 are speculat+ ab\t a fundam5tal relation%ip betwe5 "t & ! electronic *>ge1 "o ( ! mo/ basic units ( nature1 & !re are ^? :o believe t ?is relation%ip w turn out to be mu* m fundam5tal ?an t betwe5 matt] & en]gy4 ,%\ld ?is be f\nd to be true1 !n ! discov]y ( ! relation%ip betwe5 "t & *>ge may lead to f9d+ a way = />t+ a self-multiply+ positron-electron *a9 reaction1 j z ! relation%ip betwe5 matt] & en]gy l$ inevitably to ! self-multiply+ *a9 reaction ) neutrons4 ,if ?is comes ab\t1 !n clos+ "t w come mu* clos]4 ,yet ! s\nd ( ! sw++ keys ne$ n necess>ily mean clos+ "t = man at ! twilight ( 8 day on ?is planet4 ,x c\ld also mean ! op5+ ( gates at a new dawn1 to a new e>?--& a new heav54 ,,app5dix ,,! ,,hydrog5 ,,bomb ,,& ,,int]national ,,control ,9 ! fall ( #aidi ,s5ator ,mc,mahon direct$ ! /aff ( ! ,jo9t ,congressional ,committee on ,atomic ,en]gy to /udy ! hydrog5 bomb 9 relation to int]national control ( atomic en]gy4 ,! mat]ial 9 ! foll[+ pages1 ) ! exception ( ! comm5ts 9 ,app5dix ,d1 0 prep>$ by ! /aff at ! *airman's reque/ to assi/ ! jo9t committee 9 consid]+ ! problem4 ,x is my belief t ?is valuable mat]ial1 until n[ unavailable 9 su* excell5t summ>y =m1 w also assi/ ,am]icans 9 g5]al 9 consid]+ ?is vital problem4 ,read]s ( ?is volume %\ld f9d x helpful 9 arriv+ at conclusions ( _! own1 p>ticul>ly 9 ! light ( ! facts & discussion pres5t$ 9 ,*apt]s ,,iii & ,,iv4 ,i fur!r believe t a c>eful p]usal ( ! foll[+ mat]ial w l5d /rong support to my view t ! int]national control ( atomic weapons1 z envisag$ 9 ! majority plan ( ! ,unit$ ,nations1--! only plan t may give assurance aga9/ a surprise atomic attack--_h become :olly impractical ev5 be=e ! entry ( ! ,h-bomb into ! picture1 & t ! imm95t developm5t ( ! ,h-bomb has made x s unworkable t any fur!r plan to revive x w\ld be futile4 ,?is mat]ial makes x cle> 7a7 t ,russia nev] _h any int5tion ( rea*+ any agreem5t on int]national control & _h set out to sabotage any plan f ! v beg9n+2 & 7b7 t no plan1 no matt] h[ foolpro(1 c\ld hope to succe$ 9 ! abs5ce ( complete mutual tru/ & confid5ce4 ,ev5ts 9 ,korea1 ,i am conv9c$1 h driv5 ! la/ nail into ! c(f9 ( ! ,,un control plan4 ,a ,,significant ,,ev5ts ,,9 ,,! ,,hi/ory ,,( ,,int]national ,,control ,,( ,,atomic ,,weapons ,may #aide3 ,secret>y ( ,w> ,/imson appo9ts int]im ,committee to /udy problem ( atomic en]gy4 ,augu/ #f1 #aide3 ,hiro%ima4 ,octob] #c1 #aide3 ,presid5t's message to ,congress outl9es necessity = int]national control ( atomic en]gy & proposes conv]sations ) ,canada & ,unit$ ,k+dom4 ,novemb] #ae1 #aide3 ,?ree-nation agre$ decl>ation on atomic en]gy 7,truman-,attlee-,k+ decl>ation74 ,calls = ,unit$ ,nations ,commission to make proposals = int]national control plan4 ,proposals %\ld provide safegu>ds 8by way ( inspection & o!r means40 7,:]ev] us$ 9 ! foll[+ pages1 italics are suppli$47 ,decemb] #bg1 #aide3 ,u4,s4-,u4,k4-,u4,s4,s4,r4 ,=eign ,m9i/] communiqu on results ( ,mosc[ ,conf]5ce4 ,proposes t ,canada1 ,*9a1 & ,france jo9 ) ,big ,?ree 9 sponsor+ resolution call+ = ,unit$ ,nations ,atomic ,en]gy ,commission ) t]ms ( ref]5ce /ipulat$ 9 ,truman-,attlee-,k+ decl>ation4 ,janu>y #bd1 #aidf3 ,g5]al ,assembly resolution e/abli%+ ,unit$ ,nations ,commission on ,atomic ,en]gy4 ,compos$ ( memb]s ( ,security ,c\ncil plus ,canada4 ,m>* #bh1 #aidf3 ,a*eson-,lili5?al report4 ,urges t m9es & 8dang]\s0 atomic-en]gy facilities be put "u int]national own]%ip & managem5t ( ,atomic ,developm5t ,au?ority4 ,additional safegu>ds 9 ! =m ( inspection4 ,nations to op]ate 8safe0 plants "u ,,ada lic5se4 ,plants to be di/ribut$ among nations 9 keep+ ) /rategic balance4 ,control plan to be implem5t$ by /ages4 ,june #ad1 #aidf3 ,b>u* proposals to ,unit$ ,nations4 ,closely foll[ ,a*eson-,lili5?al recomm5dations4 ,ask 8condign puni%m5t10 = violations1 & reque/ agreem5t t ,,un ,*>t] veto clause n apply to sanctions = /ipulat$ violations ( atomic-en]gy treaty4 ,june #ai1 #aidf3 ,soviet ,union c\nt]proposals4 ,dem& prohibition ( atomic weapons & de/ruction ( exi/+ /ockpiles be=e int]national control plan is negotiat$4 ,soviet proposals provide no safegu>ds aga9/ evasion4 ,decemb] #ca1 #aidf3 ,fir/ ,report ( ,,unaec4 ,incorporates ess5tial features ( ,b>u* proposals into /atem5t ( pr9ciples = plan = int]national control ( atomic en]gy4 ,adopt$ #aj to #j1 ) ,u4,s4,s4,r4 & ,pol& ab/a9+4 ,june #aa1 #aidg3 ,u4,s4,s4,r4 control proposals4 ,soviets ass5t to p]iodic inspection1 b ?is w\ld apply only to decl>$ plants4 ,augu/ #aa1 #aidg3 ,soviets cons5t 9 pr9ciple to concept ( quotas4 ,septemb] #aa1 #aidg3 ,second ,report ( ,,unaec4 ,outl9es p[]s1 functions1 & limitations !reon ( any int]national ag5cy 9 implem5t+ effective control plan4 ,may #ag1 #aidh3 ,?ird ,report ( ,,unaec4 ,reports impasse because ,soviets refuse to accept majority plan & p]si/ 9 refus+ to put =w>d effective proposals ( _! own4 ,concludes t fur!r "w 9 ,,unaec is fruitless until ,soviet coop]ation 9 broad] fields ( policy is secur$4 ,recomm5ds t ,commission's "w be susp5d$ until sponsor+ p[]s f9d t basis = agreem5t exi/s4 ,septemb] #be1 #aidh3 ,soviets modify position by ask+ t conv5tions = prohibition ( atomic weapons & = int]national control g into effect simultane\sly4 ,novemb] #d1 #aidh3 ,by vote ( #dj to #f1 ,,un ,g5]al ,assembly endorses majority control plan4 ,calls ^u ,,unaec to cont9ue "w & reque/s t sponsor+ p[]s consult to explore possible basis ( agreem5t4 ,augu/ #i1 #aidi3 ,fir/ meet+ ( sponsor+ p[]s ( ,,unaec4 ,septemb] #bc1 #aidi3 ,presid5t ,truman's ann\ncem5t ( ,soviet atomic explosion4 ,octob] #be1 #aidi3 ,canada1 ,*9a1 ,france1 ,unit$ ,k+dom1 ,unit$ ,/ates /atem5t reveals ,soviet attitude /ill prev5ts agreem5t4 ,novemb] #bc1 #aidi3 ,g5]al ,assembly resolution calls ^u sponsor+ p[]s to cont9ue consultations4 ,novemb] #bc1 #aidi3 ,soviets rev]se position on quotas1 ab&on+ previ\s ass5t 9 pr9ciple4 ,janu>y #ai1 #aiej3 ,u4,s4,s4,r4 walks out ( sponsor+ p[]s consultations ov] ,*9a recognition issue4 ,janu>y #ca1 #aiej3 ,presid5t ,truman ann\nces t ,unit$ ,/ates w proce$ ) developm5t ( hydrog5 bomb4 ,b ,,! ,,int]national ,,control ,,( ,,atomic ,,weapons3 ,a ,,brief ,,hi/ory ,,( ,,proposals ,,& ,,negotiations ,e>ly /eps look+ t[>d int]national control ,ev5 be=e ! te/ explosion at ,alamogordo1 ,n4 ,mex41 _h u%]$ 9 ! atomic age1 ! ,unit$ ,/ates ,gov]nm5t 0 /udy+ me?ods ( mak+ atomic en]gy a socially con/ructive =ce4 ,9 ,may #aide an ,int]im ,committee appo9t$ by ,secret>y ( ,w> ,/imson comm5c$ inve/igat+ ! problem4 ,! ,committee recogniz$ 8t ! means ( produc+ ! atomic bomb w\ld n =ev] rema9 ! exclusive prop]ty ( ! ,unit$ ,/ates44440 ,!re=e1 8,secret>y ( ,w> ,/imson 0 "o ( ! fir/ to recomm5d a policy ( int]national sup]vision & control ( ! entire field ( atomic en]gy44440 ,:5 on ,augu/ #f1 #aide1 ,presid5t ,truman made ! fir/ public /atem5t on ! atomic bomb1 he made cle> t 8"u pres5t circum/ances x is n int5d$ to divulge ! te*nical process ( production or all ! milit>y application1 p5d+ fur!r exam9ation ( possible me?ods ( protect+ u & ! re/ ( ! _w f ! dang] ( sudd5 de/ruction40 ,he assur$ ! ,am]ican p t he w\ld 8make fur!r recomm5dations to ! ,congress z to h[ atomic p[] c become a p[]ful & =ceful influ5ce t[>d ! ma9t5ance ( _w peace40 ,! ,presid5t's recomm5dations 7 transmitt$ to ! ,congress on ,octob] #c1 #aide4 ,he spoke ( ! necessity = 8int]national arrangem5ts look+1 if possible1 to ! r5unciation ( ! use & developm5t ( ! atomic bomb1 & direct+ 444 atomic en]gy 444 t[>d peaceful & humanit>ian ends40 ,s great a *all5ge c\ld n await ! full developm5t ( ! ,unit$ ,nations4 ,! ,presid5t1 !re=e1 propos$ initiat+ discussions 8fir/ ) our associates 9 ?is discov]y1 ,great ,brita9 & ,canada1 & !n ) o!r nations44440 ,! ,truman-,attlee-,k+ decl>ation ,9 ! ?ree nations agre$ decl>ation ( ,novemb] #ae1 #aide--;frequ5tly call$ ! ,truman-,attlee-,k+ decl>ation--0 record$ ! conc]t$ objectives ( ! ?ree nations t _h develop$ ! atomic bomb4 ,accord+ to ! decl>ation1 any int]national arrangem5ts %\ld h a dual goal3 ,prev5t+ ! use ( atomic en]gy = de/ructive purposes1 & promot+ its use = peaceful & humanit>ian ends4 ,to rea* ^! objectives1 ! signatory nations propos$ a ,unit$ ,nations ,commission emp[]$ to make recomm5dations to ! p>5t body4 ,x 0 ask$ t ! ,commission make specific proposals 8= effective safegu>ds by way ( inspection & o!r means to protect /ates aga9/ ! haz>ds ( violations & evasions40 ,x 0 fur!r sugge/$ t ! ,commission's "w 8proce$ by sep>ate /ages1 ! successful completion ( ea* ( :i* w develop ! necess>y confid5ce ( ! _w be=e ! next /age is und]tak540 ,conta9$ 9 ! agre$ decl>ation 0 ! g5esis ( ! basic feature ( ! control proposals subsequ5tly advanc$ by ! ,unit$ ,/ates1 & accept$ by a l>ge majority ( ! ,unit$ ,nations3 safegu>ds ?r\gh inspection & o!r means4 ,x 0 recogniz$ ev5 at ?is e>ly date t 8effective1 reciprocal1 & en=ceable safegu>ds0 aga9/ evasion repres5t$ ! m9imum pr]equisite ( a satisfactory int]national arrangem5t4 ,at ! ,mosc[ meet+ ( ! ,c\ncil ( ,=eign ,m9i/]s1 held 9 ,decemb] #aide1 ! ,truman-,attlee-,k+ proposals receiv$ ! ,soviet ,union's endorsem5t4 ,! ,unit$ ,/ates1 ,great ,brita91 & ! ,soviet ,union agre$ to invite ,canada1 ,*9a1 & ,france to jo9 ) !m 9 sponsor+ a resolution call+ = a ,unit$ ,nations ,atomic ,en]gy ,commission4 ,su* a ,commission w\ld consi/ ( ! #aa memb]s ( ! ,security ,c\ncil plus ,canada :5 t /ate 0 n sitt+ on ! ,c\ncil4 ,x is notewor?y t ! ,commission's propos$ t]ms ( ref]5ce 7 exactly ^? sugge/$ by ! ,truman-,attlee-,k+ decl>ation4 ,9 its fir/ sub/antive resolution1 ! ,unit$ ,nations ,g5]al ,assembly unanim\sly adopt$ ! recomm5dations ( ! ,mosc[ ,conf]5ce & e/abli%$ ! ,unit$ ,nations ,commission on ,atomic ,en]gy on ,janu>y #bd1 #aidf4 ,! ,a*eson-,lili5?al report ,9 ord] to inquire into ! nature ( ! 8effective1 reciprocal1 & en=ceable safegu>ds0 call$ = 9 ! ,truman-,attlee-,k+ decl>ation1 ,secret>y ( ,/ate ,byrnes 9 ,janu>y #aidf appo9t$ a ,committee head$ by ,"u ,secret>y ( ,/ate ,dean ,a*eson4 ,! ,committee 9 turn enli/$ ! aid ( a ,bo>d ( ,consultants "u ! *airman%ip ( ,david ,lili5?al4 ,! f9d+s ( ! two gr\ps 7 made public on ,m>* #bh1 #aidf1 9 ! ,report on ! ,int]national ,control ( ,atomic ,en]gy1 commonly call$ ! ,a*eson-,lili5?al report4 ,x 0 advanc$ 8n z a f9al plan b z a place to beg91 a f\ndation on :i* to build40 ,! report conclud$ t no security aga9/ atomic attack c\ld be f\nd 9 an agreem5t t m]ely 8outlaw$0 ^! weapons4 ,nor 0 x consid]$ feasible to control atomic en]gy 8only by a sy/em :i* relies on inspection & simil> police-l me?ods40 ,in/ead1 inspection mu/ be supplem5t$ by int]national own]%ip & managem5t ( raw mat]ials & key in/allations4 8,dang]\s0 op]ations--^? ( pot5tial milit>y consequ5ce--w\ld be c>ri$ out by an ,atomic ,developm5t ,au?ority1 an int]national ag5cy "u ! ,unit$ ,nations4 ,only 8safe0 activities--^? ( no milit>y importance--w\ld be conduct$ by ! individual nations1 "u lic5ses f ! ,atomic ,developm5t ,au?ority4 ,any plan f9ally agre$ ^u w\ld be implem5t$ by /ages ) ! ,unit$ ,/ates progressively transf]r+ its fund ( !oretical & te*nological k to an int]national au?ority z safegu>ds 7 put into effect4 ,! report amplifi$ ! ,truman-,attlee-,k+ proposals 9 two important respects4 ,fir/1 x /at$ t int]national own]%ip--n specifically m5tion$ 9 ! e>li] decl>ation--0 a necess>y adjunct ( int]national inspection4 ,second1 x advanc$ ! concept ( 8/rategic balance0 or 8quotas40 ,! ,report held t an acceptable plan mu/ be 8su* t if x fails or ! :ole int]national situation collapses1 any nations su* z ! ,unit$ ,/ates w /ill be 9 a relatively secure position1 comp>$ to any o!r nation40 ,to help atta9 ?is end1 x 0 propos$ t ! ,atomic ,developm5t ,au?ority's /ock piles & plants be well di/ribut$ geographically4 ,! ,b>u* proposals to ! ,unit$ ,nations ,less ?an #c mon?s aft] ! publication ( ! ,a*eson-,lili5?al report1 ! ,unit$ ,/ates ,gov]nm5t gave ! _w its proposals = ! int]national control ( atomic en]gy4 ,on ,june #ad1 #aidf1 ,b]n>d ,b>u* pres5t$ !m to ! ,unit$ ,nations ,atomic ,en]gy ,commission 8z a basis = beg9n+ our discussion40 ,mr4 ,b>u* /at$ t3 ,:5 an adequate sy/em = control ( atomic en]gy1 includ+ ! r5unciation ( ! bomb z a weapon1 has be5 agre$ ^u & put into effective op]ation & condign puni%m5ts set up = violations ( ! rules ( control :i* are to be /igmatiz$ z int]national crimes1 we propose t3 #a4 manufacture ( atomic bombs %all /op2 #b4 exi/+ bombs %all be dispos$ ( pursuant to ! t]ms ( ! treaty2 & #c4 ! ,au?ority %all be 9 possession ( full in=mation z to ! "k-h[ = ! production ( atomic en]gy4 ,! me?ods sugge/$ = a*iev+ int]national control 7 ! foll[+3 ,! ,unit$ ,/ates proposes ! creation ( an ,int]national ,atomic ,developm5t ,au?ority1 to :i* %\ld be entru/$ all phases ( ! developm5t & use ( atomic en]gy1 />t+ ) ! raw mat]ial & includ+-- #a4 ,manag]ial control or own]%ip ( all atomic en]gy activities pot5tially dang]\s to _w security4 #b4 ,p[] to control1 inspect1 & lic5se all o!r atomic activities4 #c4 ,! duty ( fo/]+ ! b5eficial uses ( atomic en]gy4 #d4 ,rese>* & developm5t responsibilities ( an affirmative "* int5d$ to put ! ,au?ority 9 ! =efront ( atomic k & ?us to enable x to compreh5d1 & !re=e to detect--misuse ( atomic en]gy4 ,to be effective1 ! ,au?ority mu/ itself be ! _w's lead] 9 ! field ( atomic k & developm5t & ?us supplem5t its legal au?ority ) ! great p[] inh]5t 9 possession ( lead]%ip 9 k4 ,^! proposals repres5t$ a broad5+--r ?an ess5tial modification--( ! ,a*eson-,lili5?al recomm5dations4 ,! additional features conc]n$ 7#a7 condign puni%m5t1 & 7#b7 ! s-call$ p[] ( veto ( ! ,unit$ ,nations ,*>t]4 ,:]eas ! ,a*eson-,lili5?al report _h n dealt ) ! subject ( sanctions1 ,mr4 ,b>u* held t a reali/ic agreem5t mu/ provide = p5alties 8( z sev]e a nature z ! nations may wi% & z imm$iate & c]ta9 9 _! execution z possible44440 ,su* 8condign puni%m5t0 w\ld be met$ out if previ\sly /ipulat$ violations ( a control plan occurr$4 ,?is problem1 ,mr4 ,b>u* /at$1 0 intimately relat$ ) ! veto provisions ( ! ,unit$ ,nations ,*>t]4 ,"u ! ,*>t]1 sanctions c be invok$ only ) ! concurr5ce ( ! five p]man5t memb]s ( ! ,security ,c\ncil1 i4e41 ,*9a1 ,france1 ,unit$ ,k+dom1 ,unit$ ,/ates1 & ! ,soviet ,union4 ,mr4 ,b>u* ma9ta9$1 h[ev]1 t 8!re mu/ be no veto to protect ^? :o violate _! solemn agreem5ts n to develop or use atomic en]gy = de/ructive purposes4444 ,! bomb does n wait on debate40 ,he po9t$ out t ! ,unit$ ,/ates 0 8conc]n$ "h ) ! veto p[] only z x affects ?is p>ticul> problem40 ,a ,unit$ ,/ates memor&um ( ,july #ab1 #aidf1 /ress$ t 8,volunt>y rel9qui%m5t ( ! veto on que/ions relat+ to a specific weapon previ\sly outlaw$ by unanim\s agreem5t because ( its uniquely de/ructive "*1 9 no wise involves any compromise ( ! pr9ciple ( unanimity ( action z appli$ to g5]al problems or to p>ticul> situations n =eseeable & !re=e n susceptible ( advance unanim\s agreem5t40 ,! fir/ ,soviet proposals--,gromyko's /atem5t ( ,june #ai1 #aidf ,a week aft] ! ,am]ican plans 7 put =w>d1 ! ,soviet ,union ann\nc$ its own proposals4 ,!y 7 m>k$ *iefly by ,soviet insi/5ce t ! ,unit$ ,/ates agree to /op ! production ( atomic weapons & de/roy exi/+ bombs be=e int]national control arrangem5ts 7 negotiat$4 ,al?\gh !y call$ = 8an int]national conv5tion = outlaw+ weapons bas$ on ! use ( atomic en]gy10 ! ,soviet proposals did n provide 8effective safegu>ds by way ( inspection & o!r means to protect comply+ /ates aga9/ ! haz>ds ( violations & evasions40 ,!y propos$ t ! 8rule ( unanimity0 9 ! ,security ,c\ncil apply to atomic-en]gy matt]s4 ,h5ce if "o ( ! p]man5t memb]s ( ! ,security ,c\ncil or a fri5d violat$ a control s*eme1 ! o!r memb]s ( ! ,unit$ ,nations w\ld h no legal means1 "u ! ,*>t]1 ( invok+ sanctions aga9/ x4 ,?r\gh\t #aidf ! ,unit$ ,nations ,atomic ,en]gy ,commission cont9u$ its inve/igations ( ! control problem4 ,on ,decemb] #ca1 #aidf1 ! ,commission issu$ its ,fir/ ,report4 ,x reveal$ t ! ess5tial features ( ! ,b>u* proposals _h won ! support ( all ! memb]s ( ! ,commission except ! ,soviet ,union & ,pol&4 ,! ,soviet ,proposals ( ,june #aa1 #aidg ,a ye> aft] x sugge/$ a conv5tion = 8outlaw+0 atomic weapons1 ! ,soviet ,union came =w>d ) a set ( control proposals4 ,a *ief po9t ( int]e/ 9 ! plan 0 ! fact t ! ,soviets n[ ass5t$ to 8p]iodic inspection ( facilities = m9+ & production ( atomic mat]ials0 by an int]national inspectorate4 ,9 answ] to a ,unit$ ,k+dom inquiry1 h[ev]1 ! ,russians /at$ t 8normally1 inspectors w visit only decl>$ plants0--) ?is supplem5t$ by special inve/igations :5 !re 7 8gr\nds = suspicion0 ( violation ( ! conv5tion = ! prohibition ( atomic weapons4 ,! p[] ( ! ,control ,commission w\ld be fur!r limit$ to mak+ recomm5dations to gov]nm5ts & to ! ,security ,c\ncil4 ,on o!r matt]s t sep>at$ ! ,soviet ,union f ! majority position--su* z int]national own]%ip & managem5t1 & ! veto "q--!re 0 no *ange 9 ! ,russian position4 ,! subsequ5t half-ye> br\ght "o sign ( a fur!r modification ( ! ,u4,s4,s4,r4 /&4 ,on ,augu/ #aa1 #aidg1 ,mr4 ,gromyko seem+ly br\ght ! ,soviets clos] to ! majority position by agree+ t 8! idea ( quotas des]ves att5tion & s]i\s consid]ation by ! ,atomic ,en]gy ,commission44440 ,! ,second & ,?ird ,reports ( ! ,unit$ ,nations ,atomic ,en]gy ,commission--,septemb] #aa1 #aidg1 & ,may #ag1 #aidh ,! ,second ,report ( ! ,atomic ,en]gy ,commission spell$ out 9 detail ! precise p[]s & functions & ! limitations !reon ( any int]national ag5cy 9 implem5t+ an effective control plan4 ,:5 ! ,report 0 approv$ by ! ,g5]al ,assembly by a vote ( #dj to #f1 ! plan develop$ 9 ! ,,unaec became a _w plan--to :i* only ! ,soviet ,union & h] satellites took exception4 ,by ! spr+ ( #aidh ! ,,unaec became conv9c$ t ! ,soviet ,union's refusal to accept any plan t met ! te*nical requirem5ts ( controll+ atomic en]gy 0 symptomatic ( broad] diff]5ces :i* made fur!r negotiations on ! ,commission level fruitless4 ,! ,?ird ,report /at$ t 8! majority ( ! ,commission has be5 unable to secure ! agreem5t ( ! ,soviet ,union to ev5 ^? elem5ts ( effective control f ! te*nical po9t ( view1 let alone _! acceptance ( ! nature & ext5t ( p>ticipation 9 ! _w community requir$ ( all nations 9 ?is field44440 ,x appe>$ to ! ,commission t ! atomic deadlock 0 b "o manife/ation ( ! m widespread dispute betwe5 ! ,soviet ,union & ! re/ ( ! _w4 ,9 view ( ?is1 ! ,commission majority recomm5d$ t negotiations 9 ! ,commission be susp5d$ until ! p]man5t memb]s ( ! ,,unaec f\nd t 8!re exi/s a basis = agreem5t on ! int]national control ( atomic en]gy44440 ,! foll[+ 7 reg>d$ z ! basic consid]ations :i*1 ev5 on a te*nical level1 made ! ,u4,s4,s4,r4 position unt5able3 ,i4 ,! p[]s provid$ = ! ,int]national ,control ,commission by ! ,soviet ,union proposals1 conf9$ z !y are to p]iodic inspection & special inve/igations1 are insuffici5t to gu>antee aga9/ ! div]sion ( dang]\s mat]ials f kn[n atomic facilities1 & d n provide ! means to detect secret activities4 ,,ii4 ,except by recomm5dations to ! ,security ,c\ncil ( ! ,unit$ ,nations1 ! ,int]national ,control ,commission has no p[]s to en=ce ei!r its own decisions or ! t]ms ( ! conv5tion or conv5tions on control4 ,,iii4 ,! ,soviet ,union ,gov]nm5t insi/s t ! conv5tion e/abli%+ a sy/em ( control1 ev5 s limit$ z t conta9$ 9 ! ,soviet ,union proposals1 c be conclud$ only aft] a conv5tion provid+ = ! prohibition ( atomic weapons & ! de/ruction ( exi/+ atomic weapons has be5 8sign$1 ratifi$1 & put into effect40 ,italics 9 orig9al4 ,! ,commission's "w _h come to a /&/ill4 ,atomic en]gy negotiations s9ce #aidh ,meet+ 9 ,p>is 9 ! fall ( #aidh ! ,g5]al ,assembly1 by a vote ( #dj to #f1 approv$ ! g5]al f9d+s & recomm5dations ( ! ,,fir/ ,,report & ! specific proposals ( "p ,,ii ( ! ,,second ,,report 8z con/itut+ ! necess>y basis = ! e/abli%+ ( an effective sy/em ( int]national control ( atomic en]gy40 ,h[ev]1 x call$ ^u ! ,,unaec to cont9ue its "w & to /udy su* subjects z x deem$ 8practicable & useful10 & ask$ t ! p]man5t memb]s ( ! ,commission 8consult 9 ord] to det]m9e if !re exi/s a basis = agreem5t44440 ,! p]man5t memb]s 7 reque/$ to transmit ! results ( _! consultations to ! ,g5]al ,assembly4 ,9 ! mean:ile1 ! ,soviet ,union _h s]v$ notice ( :at appe>$ to be a significant *ange 9 its position4 ,9 a draft resolution dat$ ,septemb] #be1 #aidh1 ! ,soviets propos$-- ,to elaborate draft conv5tions = ! bann+ ( atomic weapons & conv5tions = ! e/abli%m5t ( int]national effective control ov] atomic en]gy1 tak+ into acc\nt t ! conv5tion = ! bann+ ( atomic weapons & ! conv5tion = ! e/abli%m5t ( int]national control ov] atomic en]gy mu/ be sign$ & implem5t$ & ent]$ into =ce simultane\sly4 ,x 0 ! la/ ^w ( ?is resolution t m>k$ a *ange 9 ! ,u4,s4,s4,r4 /&4 ,previ\sly1 ! ,soviets _h dem&$ t atomic weapons production be prohibit$ & /ock piles be de/roy$ be=e a control plan 0 discuss$4 ,none!less1 ! new ,soviet proposal gave no indication t ! ,soviets w\ld acc$e to :at ! majority reg>d z an effective control plan4 ,fur!rmore1 ! proposal = simultane\s prohibition & control 0 consid]$ to be physically impossible to implem5t4 8,! developm5t ( atomic en]gy is ! _w's newe/ indu/ry1 & already is "o ( ! mo/ complicat$4 ,x w\ld n be reasonable to assume t any effective sy/em ( control c\ld be introduc$ & en=c$ ov]night4 ,control & prohibition mu/1 !re=e1 g into effect ov] a p]iod ( "t & by a s]ies ( /ages40 ,! record ( negotiations f ! fall ( #aidh to ! pres5t is l>gely "o ( inaction4 ,on ,septemb] #bc1 #aidi1 ,presid5t ,truman ann\nc$ t an atomic explosion _h occurr$ 9 ! ,soviet ,union4 ,"o mon? lat]1 ! sponsor+ p[]s ( ! ,,unaec reveal$ t ! consultations betwe5 !m 8_h n yet succe$$ 9 br++ ab\t agreem5t betwe5 ! ,u4,s4,s4,r4 & ! o!r five p[]s40 ,despite ?is1 ! ,g5]al ,assembly1 on ,novemb] #bc1 #aidi1 ask$ t ! p]man5t memb]s ( ! ,commission cont9ue _! consultations & keep ! ,commission & ! ,g5]al ,assembly in=m$ ( _! "w4 ,on ! same day1 ,vi%9sky reveal$ t ! ,soviets no long] ent]ta9$ favorably ! pr9ciple ( quotas4 ,on ,janu>y #ai1 #aiej1 consultations came to an end :5 ! ,soviet ,union )drew f ! discussions ov] ! "q ( recognition ( ! ,*9ese ,gov]nm5t4 ,c ,,! ,,atomic ,,impasse ,reg>d$ 9 fundam5tal t]ms1 ! deadlock 9 int]national control negotiations reflects diametrically oppos$ notions ( ! responsibilities ( individual nations 9 a _w ( atomic en]gy4 ,all nations except ! ,soviet ,union & h] satellites 8put _w security fir/1 & are prep>$ to accept innovations 9 traditional concepts ( int]national coop]ation1 national sov]eignty1 & economic organization :]e ^! are necess>y = security4 ,! gov]nm5t ( ! ,u4,s4,s4,r4 puts its sov]eignty fir/ & is unwill+ to accept measures :i* may imp+e ^u or int]f]e ) its rigid ex]cise ( unimp$$ /ate sov]eignty40 ,?is basic v>iance 9 ! objectives ( ! ,soviet ,union & ! o!r memb]s ( ! ,unit$ ,nations is mirror$ 9 ! majority & m9ority control proposals4 ,! specific diff]5ces 9 ! two plans may be summ>iz$ z foll[s3 ,,int]national ,,inspection ,unit$ ,nations4--,complete & cont9u+ inspection by int]national p]sonnel1 includ+ a]ial & gr\nd surveys1 & inspection ( atomic facilities4 ,soviet ,union4--,p]iodic inspection ( decl>$ plants4 ,special inve/igations :5 !re exi/ 8gr\nds = suspicion0--n t ! control agreem5t has be5 violat$--b t ! conv5tion outlaw+ atomic weapons has be5 violat$4 7,?is c\ld mean t only if a nation 7 subject$ to surprise atomic attack w\ld ! necess>y 8gr\nds = suspicion0 ent] into exi/5ce47 ,,int]national ,,own]%ip ,,& ,,managem5t ,unit$ ,nations4--,int]national own]%ip or managem5t ( dang]\s facilities & int]national own]%ip ( s\rce mat]ials & _! fissionable d]ivatives--9 ord] to prev5t div]sion ( su* mat]ial f exi/+ plants4 ,soviet ,union4--,complete opposition to int]national own]%ip or managem5t provisions4 ,,/rategic ,,balance 7,,quotas7 ,unit$ ,nations4--,national quotas to be incorporat$ into int]national control treaty4 ,soviet ,union4--,sees 9 quotas an in/rum5t = 8,am]ican dom9ation40 ,,sanctions ,unit$ ,nations4--,no veto to protect ^? :o violate /ipulat$ provisions ( int]national agreem5t4 ,soviet ,union4--,all decisions require unanim\s cons5t ( p]man5t memb]s ( ,security ,c\ncil4 ,! p]man5t memb]s ( ! ,,unaec h summ>iz$ ! diff]5ces betwe5 ! ,soviet plan & ! _w plan 9 ! foll[+ fa%ion3 8,! ,soviet ,union proposes t nations %\ld cont9ue to own explosive atomic mat]ials4 8,! o!r five ,p[]s feel t "u su* conditions !re w\ld be no effective protection aga9/ ! sudd5 use ( ^! mat]ials z atomic weapons4 8,! ,soviet ,union proposes t nations cont9ue1 z at pres5t1 to own1 op]ate1 & manage facilities mak+ or us+ dang]\s quantities ( su* mat]ials4 8,! o!r five ,p[]s believe t1 "u su* conditions1 x w\ld be impossible to detect or prev5t ! div]sion ( su* mat]ials = use 9 atomic weapons4 8,! ,soviet ,union proposes a sy/em ( control dep5d+ on p]iodic inspection ( facilities ! exi/5ce ( :i* ! national gov]nm5t conc]n$ reports to ! int]national ag5cy1 supplem5t$ by special inve/igations on suspicion ( treaty violations4 8,! o!r five ,p[]s believe t p]iodic inspection w\ld n prev5t ! div]sion ( dang]\s mat]ials & t ! special inve/igations envisag$ w\ld be :olly insuffici5t to prev5t cl&e/9e activities40 ,d ,,possible ,,que/ions ,,reg>d+ ,h-,,bombs ,,& ,,int]national ,,control#a ,! answ]s to _m ( ! que/ions :i* foll[ are obvi\s4 ,! answ] to o!r que/ions are less obvi\s4 ,ea* "q has be5 select$ to sugge/ & to illu/rate ! k9d ( problem :i* may be involv$1 :e!r easy or difficult ( solution4 ,x %\ld be emphasiz$ t ! orig9al ,unit$ ,/ates proposals & ! exi/+ ,unit$ ,nations plan =esee & c>efully take into acc\nt ! possibility ( an ,h-bomb1 z evid5c$ by ! language !y conta94 ,! same is true ( ! ,mc,mahon ,act = dome/ic control ( atomic en]gy )9 ! ,unit$ ,/ates4 ,footnote #a3 ,all mat]ial 9 ?is app5dix1 except ^? p>agraphs head$ 8,au?or's ,comm5ts10 has be5 prep>$ by ! /aff ( ! ,jo9t ,committee on ,atomic ,en]gy4 #a4 ,,is ,,! ,,hydrog5 ,,bomb ,a ,,m ,,or ,,less ,,important ,,weapon ,,?an ,,! ,,atomic ,,bomb8 ,,might ,,hydrog5 ,,bombs ,,prove ,,to ,,be ,,decisive ,,9 ,,w>1 ,,or ,,has ,,_! ,,significance ,,be5 ,,exagg]at$8 ,dr4 ,h>old ,urey1 a ,nobel ,prize w9n] 9 *emi/ry1 has sugge/$ t ! ,h-bomb w\ld be milit>ily decisive2 ,dr4 ,hans ,be!1 & o!r not$ physici/s1 h indicat$ t ! /ep f ,a-bombs to ,h-bombs is z great z ! orig9al /ep f conv5tional to atomic explosives4 ,h[ev]1 ,dr4 ,rob]t ,f4 ,ba*]1 a =m] ,,aec ,commission]1 /ates t-- :ile x ! ,h-bomb is a t]rible weapon1 its milit>y effectiv5ess seems to h be5 grossly ov]rat$ 9 ! m9ds ( laym54 ,"s ( ! que/ions :i* may be> ^u ?is diff]5ce ( op9ion are z foll[s3 7#a7 ,%ock effect4--,to :at ext5t d ,h-bombs excel ,a-bombs 9 p]mitt+ a highly de/ructive attack to be compress$ 9 "t8 7#b7 ,comp>ative numb]s4--,:at quantity ( ,a-bombs are requir$ to d ! same job z a giv5 numb] ( ,h-bombs8 7#c7 ,neutron economy4--,h[ mu* fissionable mat]ial = ,a-bombs is sacrific$ by us+ ! neutrons available 9 reactors = mak+ ,h-bomb mat]ials8 7#d7 ,deliv]ability4--,"u v>i\s combat conditions1 is ! deliv]y ( ,h-bombs *eap] & sur] ?an deliv]y ( an 8equival5t0 numb] ( ,a-bombs8 7#e7 ,aim+ accuracy4--,h[ sup]ior is a weapon :i* ne$ /rike only )9 a numb] ( miles 9 ord] to de/roy its t>get ov] "o :i* mu/ /rike )9 #a or #b miles8 7#f7 ,psy*ology4--,z comp>$ ) ! ,a-bomb1 to :at ext5t might ! ,h-bomb impair an enemy's w to resi/ & accel]ate recognition ( defeat8 7#g7 ,tactical employm5t4--,:at is ! relative value ( ,a-bombs & ,h-bombs 9 tactical situations--:5 us$ aga9/ troops 9 ! field1 gu]rilla fight]s1 =ces prep>+ = amphibi\s invasion1 a fleet1 a /r+ ( air /rips or subm>9e bases1 atomic facilities1 und]gr\nd in/allations1 etc48 7#h7 ,def9ition ( 8milit>y effectiv5ess40--,w\ld ! use ( ,h-bombs to de/roy l>ge urban c5t]s conta9+ no armam5ts plants h no 8milit>y effectiv5ess10 or w\ld su* de/ruction aid ! attack] & !re=e repres5t 8milit>ily effective0 use ( ! weapon8 ,is x possible to di/+ui%1 9 an era ( total w>1 betwe5 8milit>y0 & 8nonmilit>y0 t>gets8 ,,au?or',s ,,comm5t ,! answ] to 7#a7 becomes obvi\s 9 light ( ! answ]s to 7#b71 7#c71 7#d71 7#e71 & 7#f71 all ( :i* mu/ be consid]$ toge!r4 ,we "k t a /&>d ,h-bomb w\ld be ! equal to t5 nom9al ,a-bombs 9 its p[] to de/roy by bla/ & to z _m z ?irty ,a-bombs 9 its inc5di>y effects4 ,9 t]ms ( total area1 ! ,h-bomb c de/roy by bla/ an area ( m ?an #cjj squ>e miles1 z comp>$ ) an area ( only t5 squ>e miles = ! nom9al ,a-bomb1 & m ?an #a1bjj squ>e miles by fire & burns1 z comp>$ ) only f\r squ>e miles = ! e>ly ,a-bomb model4 ,z = neutron economy1 we h se5 t ?is va/ increase 9 p[] c\ld be a*iev$ at a co/ 9 fissionable ,a-bomb mat]ial possibly z l[ z "o twelf?1 & no high]1 at ! mo/1 ?an ! plutonium requir$ 7accord+ to ,pr(essor ,oliphant's e/imate7 = j "o ,a-bomb4 ,x ?us becomes obvi\s t su* a weapon n only is mu* *eap]1 9 t]ms ( de/ruction & co/ ( mat]ials1 ?an ! conv5tional ,a-bomb1 b is mu* m easily & safely deliv]$1 s9ce x w\ld /ill be highly effective z a bla/+ weapon if explod$ m ?an five miles f its t>get1 :ile z an inc5di>y x w\ld /ill be highly effective z f> z fifte5 miles away4 ,h5ce !re c be no "q t ,h-bombs va/ly excel ,a-bombs 9 p]mitt+ a highly de/ructive attack to be compress$ 9 "t1 & t its psy*ological effect 9 impair+ an enemy's w to resi/ is also incalculably great]4 ,its va/ly great] range ( de/ructiv5ess1 its economy ( mat]ial1 & its sur] deliv]y also make ! ,h-bomb va/ly sup]ior to ! ,a-bomb z a tactical weapon4 ,nei!r ! ,h-bomb nor ! ,a-bomb appe>s to be practical = use aga9/ gu]rilla fight]s1 except possibly z a ?reat4 ,z already discuss$ at l5g? 9 ,*apt] ,,iii1 !re c\ld be no possible ju/ification1 on moral z well z milit>y gr\nds1 = us+ ! ,h-bomb z a /rategic weapon to de/roy l>ge urban c5t]s1 especially ^? conta9+ no armam5ts plants1 except 9 retaliation = su* use aga9/ u or our allies4 #b4 ,,if ,,! ,h-,,bomb ,,is ,,deem$ ,,to ,,be ,,decisive ,,or ,,f> ,,m ,,dang]\s ,,?an ,,! ,a-,,bomb1 ,,%\ld ,,int]national ,,control ,,( ,,hydrog5 ,,weapons ,,take ,,priority ,,ov] ,,control ,,( ,,ord9>y ,,atomic ,,weapons8 ,,%\ld ,,! ,,unit$ ,,/ates ,,propose ,a ,,sep>ate ,,plan ,,exclusively ,,design$ ,,to ,,regulate ,h-,,bombs8 ,! (ficial ,unit$ ,nations proposals = int]national control ( atomic en]gy app>5tly involve ! assumption t ,a-bombs are s unique te*nically & s m5ac+ z to set !m ap>t f conv5tional weapons & to ju/ify sep>ate consid]ation 9 ! ,unit$ ,nations & a sep>ate regulatory sy/em4 ,if ! /ep f ,a-bombs to ,h-bombs is consid]$ to be z great z ! /ep f conv5tional weapons to ,a-bombs1 does x foll[ t hydrog5 w>f>e %\ld become ! subject ( a sep>ate control proposal & %\ld receive sep>ate consid]ation 9 ! ,unit$ ,nations8 ,are ! te*nical facts ( atomic & hydrog5 weapons s intimately relat$ t bo? mu/ be controll$ if ei!r is to be controll$8 ,are ! political facts su* t ! two problems mu/ be reg>d$ insep>ably8 ,,au?or',s ,,comm5t ,s9ce ! ,h-bomb requires ! ,a-bomb z a trigg]1 x becomes obvi\s t ! two problems are insep>able4 #c4 ,,is ,,! ,,exi/+ ,,unit$ ,,nations ,,plan ,,te*nically ,,adequate ,,to ,,control ,h-,,bombs8 ,! ,unit$ ,nations plan has be5 c\*$ 9 su* a mann] t an int]national ag5cy w\ld possess discretion>y au?ority 9 def9+ & controll+ mat]ials & processes t may be employ$ to manufacture nucle> weapons ( mass de/ruction4 ,= in/ance1 ! ,second ,report ( ! ,unit$ ,nations ,atomic ,en]gy ,commission def9es 8atomic en]gy0 z includ+ 8all =ms ( en]gy releas$ 9 ! c\rse (1 or z a result (1 nucle> fission or ( o!r nucle> trans=mation40 8,s\rce mat]ial0 is tak5 to mean 8any mat]ial conta9+ "o or m key sub/ances 9 su* conc5tration z ! int]national ag5cy may by regulation det]m9e40 8,key sub/ance0 is def9$ to mean 8uranium1 ?orium & any o!r elem5t f :i* nucle> fuel c be produc$1 z may be det]m9$ by ! int]national ag5cy40 7p4 #ga74 ,simil>ly1 ! report def9es 8nucle> fuel0 z 8plutonium1 ,u-#bcc1 ,u-#bce1 uranium enri*$ 9 ,u-#bce1 mat]ial conta9+ ! =ego+1 & any o!r mat]ial :i* ! int]national ag5cy det]m9es to be capable ( releas+ sub/antial quantities ( atomic en]gy ?r\gh nucle> *a9 reaction ( ! mat]ial40 7p4 #ga47 ,! report likewise obs]ves t3 8,dang]\s activities or facilities are ^? :i* are ( milit>y significance 9 ! production ( atomic weapons4 ,! ^w 8dang]\s0 is us$ 9 ! s5se ( pot5tially dang]\s to _w security40 7p4 #gj74 ,italics suppli$ ?r\gh\t4 ,does su* bread? ( phraseology mean t manufactur+ processes & s\rce mat]ials ne$$ 9 ! production ( ,h-bombs c\ld be prop]ly controll$1 ?r\gh ! exi/+ ,,un plan8 ,s9ce ne>ly #b ye>s ( "w 7 requir$ to =mulate ! ,,un plan1 c ?is plan be reg>d$ z adequate = hydrog5 weapons s long z ! control measures = ! atomic en]gy indu/ry are n explicitly elaborat$ ) ! same detail z ! arrangem5ts evolv$ = controll+ ,u-#bce & plutonium8 ,x may also be po9t$ out t ! exi/+ ,,un plan conta9s no provision = physically protect+ in=mants :o advise ! int]national ag5cy ( violations4 ,might pot5tial in=mants keep sil5t = fe> ( be+ puni%$ by _! national gov]nm5ts8 ,is ?is factor important if ! exi/+ ,,un plan 7 subject$ to ! add$ /ra9 ( controll+ hydrog5 weapons z well z atomic weapons8 ,:at safegu>ds w\ld assure t ! employees ( an int]national control ag5cy w\ld be fai?ful & loyal to ! objectives ( ! ag5cy & t !y w\ld n "w purely 9 ! int]e/s ( "s national gov]nm5t--p]haps a national gov]nm5t o!r ?an t ( _! own c\ntry8 ,,au?or',s ,,comm5t ,! language makes x obvi\s t ! ,unit$ ,nations plan 8=esees & c>efully takes into acc\nt ! possibility ( an ,h-bomb40 ,9 view ( ,russia's attitude1 h[ev]1 & to leave no room = future quibbl+1 ! pres5t plan %\ld be explicitly elaborat$ to include hydrog5 weapons4 ,on ! o!r h&1 s9ce ,russia w h none ( ! plan1 su* elaboration w\ld at be/ be purely academic4 ,z = protect+ in=mants1 c]ta9ly no plan c\ld contemplate t citiz5s w\ld act z spies aga9/ _! own c\ntry1 ev5 if !y f9d t _! c\ntry is violat+ an int]national agreem5t4 ,! plan is design$ s t su* violations c\ld be detect$ by ! (ficial employees ( ! int]national control ag5cy4 ,obvi\sly1 su* (ficial employees /ation$ 9 any c\ntry %\ld n be nationals ( t c\ntry & %\ld be protect$ by diplomatic immunity4 ,ea* c\ntry1 9 select+ its repres5tatives to ! control ag5cy1 w\ld naturally subject !m to a mo/ c>eful scre5+ z to _! "* & loyalty1 & w\ld use all necess>y *ecks to make c]ta9 t !y are fai?ful & loyal to ! objectives ( ! ag5cy4 #d4 ,,is ,,control ,,ov] ,,fissionable ,,mat]ials ,,suffici5t ,,to ,,prev5t ,,! ,,production ,,( ,,hydrog5 ,,bombs8 ,,if ,,s1 ,,is ,,! ,,exi/+ ,,un ,,plan ,,adequate ,,to ,,?is ,,task8 ,! te*nical facts sugge/ t ,h-bombs may be regulat$ 9 at lea/ two ways3 7#a7 ,control ov] ! fissionable mat]ial usable z a 8trigg]0 & 7#b7 control ov] deut]ium & tritium4 ,p]haps control ov] all fissionable mat]ial w\ld give effective control ov] hydrog5 weapons4 ,h[ev]1 by way ( specific example1 ! introduction to volume ,,vi ( ! ,sci5tific ,in=mation ,transmitt$ to ! ,unit$ ,nations ,atomic ,en]gy ,commission1 ,june #ad1 #aidf-,octob] #ad1 #aidf 7see ,/ate ,dep>tm5t ,publication #bffa1 pp4 #aea-aeb71 comm5ts z foll[s3 ,x is difficult to def9e ! am\nt ( activity 9 ! illicit production ( atomic weapons :i* is significant4 ,! illicit con/ruction ( a s+le atomic bomb by means ( a decade ( successful evasion w\ld n provide an ov]:elm+ advantage1 if x c be assum$ t x w\ld take ano!r decade to produce a second bomb4 ,b ! secret production ( "o bomb p] ye> w\ld create a def9ite dang]1 & ! secret production ( five or m p] ye> w\ld be disa/r\s4 ,?is report assumes arbitr>ily t ! m9imum unit ( noncompliance is ! secret production ( "o atomic bomb p] ye> or a total ( five bombs ov] any p]iod ( "t4 ,?is example is *os5 because ,,un docum5ts publi%$ lat] omit concrete illu/rations1 al?\gh ! /ress :i* ^! docum5ts place ^u int]national own]%ip1 op]ation1 & managem5t cle>ly reflects a det]m9ation to r$uce to ! rock-bottom m9imum any illicit m9+ or production4 ,consid]+ t five illicit ,a-bombs might1 "u c]ta9 circum/ances1 lead to five illicit ,h-bombs1 :at m>g9 ( ineffici5cy--if any--9 controll+ s\rce & fissionable mat]ial is p]missible8 ,is absolute protection aga9/ illegal div]sion ( s\rce & fissionable mat]ial te*nically possible8 ,does ! exi/+ ,,un plan provide absolute or ne>-absolute protection8 ,c great] te*nical protection be secur$ ?an "u ! pres5t ,,un plan8 ,,au?or',s ,,comm5t ,x c be /at$ unequivocally t1 9 ! abs5ce ( complete mutual fai? & goodwill on ! "p ( all conc]n$1 nei!r ! exi/+ ,,un plan nor any o!r te*nical plan t c be devis$ w provide absolute or ne>-absolute protection4 ,no plan c\ld be devis$ t w\ld provide assurance aga9/ ! div]sion ( en\gh mat]ial 9 any "o ye> to make at lea/ "o atomic bomb4 ,9 five ye>s ?is w\ld mean ! secret production ( five hydrog5 bombs4 #e4 ,,mu/ ,h-,,bomb ,,controls ,,relate ,,to ,,deut]ium ,,& ,,tritium ,,z ,,well ,,z ,,to ,,fissionable ,,mat]ial8 ,,if ,,!y ,,mu/1 ,,c ,,! ,,pres5t ,,un ,,plan ,,fully ,,provide ,,= ,,^! ,,controls ,,or ,,does ,,x ,,require ,,revision ,,or ,,*anges ,,9 ,,emphasis8 ,%\ld control ov] bo? fissionable mat]ial & deut]ium & tritium call = ! same emphasis & consid]ation :i* ! ,unit$ ,nations ,atomic ,en]gy ,commission has already giv5 to control ( ,u-#bce & plutonium8 ,w\ld surveillance ( deut]ium & tritium manufacture furni% bett] insurance aga9/ illicit ,h-bomb con/ruction ?an surveillance ( ,u-#bce & plutonium1 or is ! rev]se m apt to be true8 ,are add$ safegu>ds necess>y to regulate deut]ium & tritium8 ,or is ! ,,un plan1 z n[ con/itut$1 suffici5tly flexible & compreh5sive to take c>e ( light-elem5t control8 ,,au?or',s ,,comm5t ,s9ce ,h-bombs require ei!r ,u-#bce or plutonium1 z well z deut]ium & tritium1 & s9ce absolute or ne>-absolute control ( ,u-#bce or plutonium is n possible1 x becomes obvi\s t ,h-bomb controls mu/ relate to bo? deut]ium & tritium z well z to fissionable mat]ial4 ,s9ce ! ,,un plan does n m5tion !m by "n1 add$ safegu>ds are necess>y to regulate deut]ium & tritium4 ,no safegu>ds1 h[ev]1 c\ld be devis$ ev5 9 ?is respect to provide absolute or ne>-absolute protection4 #f4 ,,is ,,x ,,te*nically ,,possible ,,to ,,detect ,,! ,,manufacture ,,( ,,heavy ,,wat] ,,& ,,deut]ium ,,?r\gh ,,int]national ,,inspection8 ,,w\ld ,,an ,,int]national ,,agreem5t ,,flatly ,,prohibit+ ,,production ,,9 ,,quantity ,,be ,,desirable8 ,! manufacture ( heavy wat] & ! sep>ation ( deut]ium are relatively simple processes4 ,!y may be c>ri$ out 9 small plants :i* c exi/ 9 a v>iety ( locales4 ,! ,second ,report ( ! ,,un ,commission comm5ts z foll[s3 ,! int]national ag5cy %all h ! au?ority to require p]iodic reports f nations reg>d+ ! production1 %ipm5t1 location1 & use ( specializ$ equipm5t & supplies directly relat$ to ! production & use ( atomic en]gy1 su* z mass spectromet]s1 diffusion b>ri]s1 gas c5trifuges1 electromagnetic isotope sep>ation units1 v pure graphite 9 l>ge am\nts1 heavy wat]1 & b]yllium or b]yllium comp\nds 9 l>ge am\nts4 ,9 addition1 ! ag5cy %all h au?ority to require reports z specifi$ ( c]ta9 di/9ctive facilities & con/ruction projects hav+ features ( size & design1 or con/ruction or op]ation1 :i*1 9 comb9ation ) _! location &_/or production or consumption ( heat or electricity1 are peculi>ly comp>able to ^? ( kn[n atomic facilities ( dang]\s "* 7p4 #ed74 ,w\ld inspectors possess+ fre$om ( movem5t be able to locate deut]ium & heavy wat] plants8 ,w\ld a]ial surveys & a]ial photographs ( indu/rial areas help detect processes :i* produce hydrog5 z a byproduct & :i* might !re=e be conc]n$ ) ! manufacture ( heavy wat] or deut]ium8 ,%\ld quantity production ( deut]ium be prohibit$ ev5 ?\gh x is us$ 9 c]ta9 types ( peacetime reactors su* z ! ,canadian reactor at ,*alk ,riv]1 ! ,fr5* reactor at ,*atillon1 ,sw$i% reactors "u con/ruction1 & a rese>* reactor at ! ,argonne ,national ,laboratory8 ,is x possible on te*nical gr\nds to en=ce su* a prohibition8 ,,au?or',s ,,comm5t ,x w\ld n be desirable to prohibit production ( heavy wat] & deut]ium 9 quantity s9ce heavy wat] is ! be/ mod]ator ( neutrons 9 ! l>ge-scale production ( atomic p[] = indu/rial uses4 ,fur!rmore1 su* a prohibition c\ld nev] be en=c$1 s9ce1 z /at$1 ! manufacture ( heavy wat] & ! sep>ation ( deut]ium are relatively simple processes t 8may be c>ri$ out 9 small plants :i* c exi/ 9 a v>iety ( locales40 ,:at makes x ev5 m difficult1 if n impossible1 to detect any violation ( su* a prohibition is ! fact t ! raw mat]ial = heavy wat] or deut]ium is j pla9 wat]4 #g4 ,,%\ld ,,! ,,provisions ,,( ,,! ,,pres5t ,,un ,,plan ,,relat+ ,,to ,,inspection1 ,,surveys1 ,,& ,,explorations ,,be ,,modifi$ ,,to ,,control ,,heavy ,,wat] ,,& ,,deut]ium ,,production8 ,! ,unit$ ,nations plan assumes t ! production ( fissionable mat]ial _c be regulat$ )\t /rict sup]vision ov] ! m9+ ( s\rce mat]ials su* z uranium & ?orium3 ,)\t ! control ( raw mat]ials1 any o!r controls t might be appli$ 9 ! v>i\s processes ( atomic en]gy production w\ld be inadequate because ( ! unc]ta9ty z to :e!r or n ! int]national ag5cy has k ( ! disposition ( all raw mat]ial4 7,second ,report1 p4 #cj47 ,:]eas uranium & ?orium are ne$$ to produce ,u-#bce1 ,u-#bcc & plutonium1 ! production ( deut]ium is n subject to su* limitation ( s\rce mat]ials4 ,only wat]1 ! exi/5ce ( p[]1 & comp>atively simple plants are ne$$ = ! manufacture ( heavy wat] & deut]ium4 ,9 view ( ^! facts1 c ! exi/+ ,unit$ ,nations plan cope ) ! problem ( regulat+ deut]ium production8 ,9 comm5t+ ^u spot a]ial surveys1 = example1 ! ,second ,report recomm5ds t 8! int]national ag5cy %all conduct spot a]ial surveys 9 ea* p]iod ( #b ye>s ov] areas n exce$+ #e p]c5t ( ! t]ritory "u ! control ( ea* nation or areas n to exce$ #b1jjj squ>e miles1 :i*ev] is ! l>g]4 7,^! area limitations apply to spot a]ial surveys only70 7p4 #fh74 ,if a]ial surveys 7 to be us$ n only 9 controll+ raw mat]ials b also to help 9 spott+ deut]ium & heavy wat] plants1 mu/ !y be c>ri$ out m frequ5tly ?an is provid$ 9 ! exi/+ plan8 ,! ,second ,report also indicates t a ,,un inspectorate %\ld be compell$ to secure p]mission1 ?r\gh a w>rant proc$ure1 be=e inspect+ 8private & re/rict$ prop]ty n op5 to visitation by ! population 9 ! locality1 & 9 ! case ( c]ta9 gr\nd surveys & a]ial surveys :i* are additional to o!rs :i* ! ag5cy may conduct )\t w>rant or o!r special au?orization0 7p4 #fj74 ,d ! te*nical facts surr\nd+ heavy wat] & deut]ium production sugge/ t su* a re/riction on an int]national ag5cy's au?ority w\ld h to be modifi$8 ,,au?or',s ,,comm5t ,see comm5t on "q #f4 #h4 ,,:at ,,safegu>ds ,,are ,,necess>y ,,to ,,prev5t ,,cl&e/9e ,,production ,,( ,,tritium8 ,,w\ld ,,an ,,int]national ,,agreem5t ,,flatly ,,prohibit+ ,,production ,,9 ,,quantity ,,be ,,desirable8 ,u-#bce & plutonium may be us$ ei!r 9 weapons or z fuels = peacetime reactors4 ,"h is ! reason mo/ frequ5tly cit$ = requir+ t int]national control include n only inspection b also su* fur!r gu>anties z ,unit$ ,nations own]%ip1 op]ation1 & managem5t ( 8dang]\s0 plants4 ,! pot5tiality1 bo? = good & evil1 t *>act]izes fissionables does n appe> to *>act]ize tritium1 :i* has no kn[n peacetime uses except z a laboratory rese>* tool4 ,is x !re=e possible t ! reason = requir+ inspection plus o!r gu>anties z reg>ds ,u-#bce & plutonium does n apply to tritium & t inspection alone w\ld answ]8 ,if quantity production ( tritium 7 altoge!r =bidd5--z hav+ no peacetime purpose--! m]e act ( prep>+ li?ium 7! tritium raw mat]ial7 = irradiation & ! m]e act ( ins]t+ x 9 a nucle> reactor might be consid]$ a violation4 ,w\ld su* action be impossible to conceal f manag]s & inspectors /ation$ at ea* reactor p]mitt$ "u ! control agreem5t8 ,w\ld an illegal reactor itself be impossible to conceal f inspectors enjoy+ fre$om ( movem5t8 ,a few private comm5tators h argu$ t ! ,,un plan fundam5tally errs 9 assum+ indu/rial p[] to be ar\nd ! corn]4 ,!y e/imate t ?is goal is actually a decade or two away & t mean:ile ! control problem w\ld be simplifi$ if all high-p[]$ reactors 7 dismantl$4 ,does ! role ( reactor-produc$ tritium 9 ,h-bomb production /r5g!n su* an argum5t8 ,! ,,un plan di/+ui%es betwe5 atomic facilities :i* are suffici5tly 8dang]\s0 to require ,,un managem5t & facilities :i* may be op]at$ by national gov]nm5ts & m]ely require int]national inspection4 ,s9ce all reactors produce neutrons & h5ce might be useful 9 "s degree--h[ev] small--9 manufactur+ tritium1 is x n[ necess>y to reg>d c]ta9 reactors =m]ly consid]$ to be 8non-dang]\s0 z n[ be+ 9 ! 8dang]\s0 category8 ,are !re o!r me?ods1 ap>t f reactors1 = produc+ tritium8 ,if s1 h[ c !y be controll$8 ,w\ld ! "r ( ! int]national control ag5cy to own1 op]ate1 & manage 8dang]\s0 plants & to own & regulate bo? fissionable mat]ials & 8fusionable mat]ials0 meet su* a situation8 ,,au?or',s ,,comm5t ,! mo/ effici5t & rapid me?od = produc+ tritium is by ins]t+ li?ium metal into a l>ge nucle> reactor1 ?us expos+ x to irradiation by neutrons1 :i* transmute ! li?ium into tritium & helium4 ,tritium c\ld also be produc$ 9 a simil> mann] 9 ! small] nucle> reactors us$ = rese>* purposes1 & ?\gh ^! small] reactors w\ld produce x at a consid]ably sl[] rate1 ! fact t ! am\nts ( tritium requir$ may be r small w\ld inevitably %ift ^! reactors f ! 8non-dang]\s0 to ! 8dang]\s0 category4 ,su* small reactors are ess5tial = rese>*1 & _! prohibition w\ld /rike a vital bl[ at ! progress ( sci5ce4 ,fur!rmore1 !y c\ld be mu* m easily hidd5 ?an l>ge reactors4 ,?is fact1 !re=e1 weak5s1 r ?an /r5g!ns ! argum5t = ! dismantl+ ( all high-p[]$ reactors1 z su* dismantl+ w\ld n prev5t ! production ( tritium4 ,!re are o!r1 ?\gh less effici5t1 me?ods = produc+ tritium1 h[ev]1 t d n require any reactors at all4 ,a good neutron s\rce c be provid$ by expos+ b]yllium to radium1 radon1 or polonium4 ,^! neutrons c\ld !n be us$ to bomb>d li?ium & conv]t x into tritium4 ,nor is li?ium necess>y1 = at lea/ f\r o!r elem5ts1 includ+ deut]ium1 helium #c1 boron1 & nitrog51 c be transmut$ by neutrons f ! b]yllium into tritium4 ,:at is m1 ev5 neutrons are n absolutely ess5tial1 s9ce deut]ons 7nuclei ( deut]ium7 & b]yllium c\ld be made to yield tritium by bomb>d+ !m ) o!r deut]ons4 ,! latt] me?od1 h[ev]1 w\ld require ! use ( giant cyclotrons & w\ld be v sl[4 ,all ?is w\ld indicate t x w\ld be extremely difficult1 if n impossible1 to provide safegu>ds aga9/ ! cl&e/9e production ( tritium4 #i4 ,,%\ld ,a ,,_w-,,wide ,,geological ,,survey ,,cov] ,,conc5trat$ ,,li?ium ,,deposits8 ,a key feature ( ! ,unit$ ,nations plan is ! provision = a _w-wide geological survey ( uranium & ?orium--! raw mat]ials pot5tially usable 9 ,a-bombs4 ,?is survey is consid]$ necess>y 9 ord] to p]mit trac+ ( mat]ials z !y progress f ! m9es ?r\gh v>i\s process+ phases & f9ally ent] a nucle> reactor4 ,does ! same k9d ( logic apply to li?ium--raw mat]ial = tritium8 ,h[ =midable is ! te*nical problem ( locat+ & controll+ deposits ( li?ium8 ,pegmatite m9]als con/itute a pr9cipal s\rce ( li?ium ores1 :i* are curr5tly produc$ z a byproduct ( ! nonmetallic m9]al indu/ry4 ,comm]cial deposits ( li?ium are kn[n to exi/ 9 ! ,black ,hills ( ,nor? ,dakota2 nor!rn ,new ,mexico2 ,saskat*ewan1 ,canada2 & s\?we/ ,africa4 ,production ( ores rose to ab\t #ijj tons ( li?ium oxide 9 #aidd & is n[ ab\t #bjj tons4 ,s long z requirem5ts d n exce$ byproduct production1 supply does n appe> to pres5t a problem4 ,if requirem5ts exce$ byproduct supply1 ! co/ ( ! excess might be high4 ,li?ium is n[ us$ comm]cially 9 glass1 z a comp\nd 9 weld+ fluxes1 9 /orage batt]ies1 9 fluoresc5t light tubes1 & z an alloy+ elem5t4 ,are ! quantities ( li?ium ore requir$ on an ord] ( magnitude t makes control feasible8 ,,au?or',s ,,comm5t ,su* a _w-wide geological survey w\ld be futile1 z only a few hundr$ p\nds ( li?ium w\ld be necess>y to produce en\gh tritium = a relatively l>ge ,h-bomb /ockpile1 & su* am\nts c\ld be hidd5 "r n[ f available /ocks4 #aj4 ,,d ,,! ,,te*nical ,,facts ,,( ,,! ,h-,,bomb ,,mean ,,t ,,n[1 ,,m ,,?an ,,ev]1 ,,! ,,unit$ ,,nations ,,plan ,,is ,,! ,,correct ,,approa* ,,to ,,int]national ,,control8 ,v>i\s critics ( ! ,,un plan h d5i$ t managem5t control ov] 8dang]\s0 plants is ess5tial to protect aga9/ violations4 ,high-p[] reactors are among ! plants to be classifi$ z 8dang]\s0 "u ! ,,un plan1 & ^! same reactors are ! ones :i* might produce n m]ely plutonium b tritium 9 quantity4 ,likewise1 an int]national ag5cy w\ld possess au?ority to *eck ! design ( any isotope sep>ation unit & to assume ! "r ( con/ruction & op]ation if ^! fall into ! 8dang]\s0 category4 ,deut]ium may be obta9$ ?r\gh isotopic sep>ation4 ,d su* facts z ^! refute ! critics & demon/rate t manag]ial & mat]ial control by ! ,unit$ ,nations1 ov] & above inspection1 is m ?an ev] necess>y 9 ord] to prev5t div]sion ( nucle> fuel or illegal irradiation ( li?ium8 ,,au?or',s ,,comm5t ,9 ! light ( ! te*nical facts ab\t ! ,h-bomb1 ! argum5t z to :e!r manag]ial control ov] 8dang]\s0 plants is ess5tial to protect aga9/ violations becomes :olly academic4 ,we h se5 t ev5 manag]ial control w\ld n (f] ei!r absolute or ne>-absolute protection4 ,no plan t does n (f] at lea/ ne>-absolute protection aga9/ ! cl&e/9e production ( ev5 "o ,h-bomb p] ye> c\ld be tru/$ :5 a nation's v exi/5ce may be at /ake4 #aa4 ,,h[ ,,does ,,! ,h-,,bomb ,,affect ,,! ,,problem ,,( 8,,/ages08 ,! ,unit$ ,nations plan w\ld take effect by 8/ages0--"o /age to include1 among o!r projects1 a _w-wide geological survey1 ano!r /age1 to involve1 among o!r projects1 ! tak+ ov] ( atomic in/allations1 & /ill ano!r to br+ ab\t ! disposition ( fissionable mat]ials4 ,at :at po9t 9 "s su* progression w\ld national /ockpiles ( deut]ium & tritium be plac$ "u control8 ,:5 ?is po9t 0 rea*$1 w\ld !y be de/roy$ or be held 9 /orage "u ,unit$ ,nations auspices8 ,if a nation pret5d$ to make kn[n its entire /ockpile ( tritium & deut]ium :ile actually x kept hidd5 a sub/antial portion1 h[ w\ld ! int]national ag5cy discov] su* a violation8 ,,au?ors ,,comm5t ,see comm5t on que/ions #ab & #ac4 #ab4 ,,h[ ,,does ,,! ,h-,,bomb ,,be> ,,^u ,,! ,,problem ,,( ,,disposition ,,( ,,exi/+ ,,/ocks ,,( ,,fissionable ,,mat]ial8 ,:5 a control plan takes effect1 :at %\ld be done ) supplies ( ,u-#bce & plutonium 9 excess ( a quantity imm$iately usable = peacetime purposes8 ,?is problem has receiv$ relatively little consid]ation 9 ! ,unit$ ,nations ,atomic ,en]gy ,commission4 ,if excess /ocks 7 de/roy$1 a valuable future s\rce ( en]gy & /oreh\se ( neutrons w\ld be lo/4 ,on ! o!r h&1 if ! /ocks 7 kept 9 exi/5ce "u ,,un gu>d1 seizure by an aggressor /ate might rapidly p]mit x to attack ) atomic bombs--& innoc5t c\ntries might h relatively little w>n+4 ,su* seizures might quickly lead1 "u c]ta9 circum/ances1 to ! con/ruction ( 8trigg]s0 = ,h-bombs4 ,does ?is fact tip ! balance 9 favor ( de/roy+ excess ,u-#bce & plutonium8 ,or are ^! sub/ances /ill too valuable & too difficult to replace to ju/ify de/ruction8 ,is !re a ?ird alt]native--possibly involv+ p>tial de/ruction or ! use ( 8d5aturants0 or ! con/ruction ( _m p[] reactors1 reg>dless ( co/ factors--to keep excess /ocks ( fissionables contam9at$ ) fission products8 ,,au?ors ,,comm5t ,! problem ( ! disposition ( exi/+ /ocks ( fissionable mat]ials 0 giv5 little consid]ation because x 0 too hot to h&le4 ,f ! v beg9n+ ,russia insi/$ t all atomic bombs be de/roy$1 & %e left no d\bt t %e meant ! de/ruction ( ! fissionable mat]ials ) :i* bombs c\ld be quickly assembl$4 ,ev5 be=e ! ,h-bomb1 su* de/ruction might h meant suicide to nations t compli$1 s9ce !y w\ld h be5 at ! complete m]cy ( noncomply+ nations4 ,! adv5t ( ! ,h-bomb makes all talk ( su* de/ruction1 :olly ap>t f ! wa/e ( a priceless1 irreplaceable natural res\rce1 completely unreali/ic1 z any su* act w\ld be tantam\nt to abdication1 a prelude to a sup]-,muni* by ! free nations4 ,d5atur+1 :i* makes fissionable mat]ials tempor>ily useless = bombs1 is also out ( ! "q1 s9ce x w\ld take a long "t to reconc5trate !m1 giv+ nations ) a hidd5 /ock ( nond5atur$ mat]ial a trem5d\s advantage t might well mean ! diff]5ce betwe5 survival & annihilation = a nation t act$ 9 good fai?4 ,all ?is also applies to ! de/ruction ( /ocks ( deut]ium & tritium4 #ac4 ,,h[ ,,does ,,! ,h-,,bomb ,,be> ,,^u 8,,quotas08 ,! ,unit$ ,nations plan envisages t reactors & o!r atomic facilities w be di/ribut$ among ! nations accord+ to 8quotas0 & a 8/rategic balance0--:]eby no "o nation1 by seiz+ ! plants )9 or ne> its bord]s1 c\ld ga9 an undue milit>y advantage ov] innoc5t nations4 ,?is 8quota0 feature has be5 criticiz$ z unnecess>y & z likely to h9d] individual c\ntries 9 develop+ ! peacetime uses ( atomic en]gy to ! maximum ext5t4 ,does ! fact t reactor fuels1 if seiz$ by an aggressor1 might make available ,h-bomb 8trigg]s0 t5d to r5d] all ! m desirable ! 8quota0 idea8 ,h[ long a "t w\ld an aggressor require to make en\gh deut]ium & tritium = ,h-bombs 9 seiz$ plants8 ,c\ld a _w control au?ority1 by requir+ t c]ta9 design features be incorporat$ 9 ! plants "u its control1 ext5d ?is "t p]iod8 ,:at %\ld be done ) plants 9 exi/5ce at ! "t a control agreem5t takes effect & well suit$ to ,h-bomb production b poorly suit$ to peacetime uses8 ,h[ %\ld su* plants1 if !y 7 n dismantl$1 figure 9 8quota0 allotm5ts8 ,,au?or',s ,,comm5t ,f its v inception ! quota sy/em 0 totally impossible ( realization4 ,today x is likely to prove a sn>e & a delusion1 giv+ a false s5se ( security1 s9ce x c\ld n gu>antee aga9/ ! cl&e/9e production ( at lea/ "o ,h-bomb a ye>4 ,! plutonium = ! trigg] c\ld be produc$ 9 hidd5 small reactors1 :ile ! deut]ium & tritium c\ld be produc$ 9 o!r small plants t c\ld be equally hidd54 ,z we h se51 tritium production does n ev5 require a nucle> reactor4 ,l ! 8quota sy/em10 ! sy/em ( 8/ages0 has also become completely out ( date1 s9ce x 0 pr$icat$ on ! control sy/em tak+ effect be=e ,russia develop$ h] own atomic bombs or _h built h] own nucle> reactors4 ,today !re is no long] any logical reason = any /ages1 s9ce any delay w\ld make effective control m difficult4 ,ev5 today1 if an int]national ag5cy 7 to take ov] /ockpiles1 x c\ld nev] be c]ta9 t consid]able am\nts _h n be5 hidd5 away4 ,9 o!r words1 ev5 if ! ,,un plan 7 to be adopt$ today1 x w\ld n give security aga9/ a surprise atomic attack1 :i* is ! v purpose ( ! plan4 #ad4 ,,h[ ,,does ,,! ,h-,,bomb ,,be> ,,^u ,,rese>* ,,to ,,be ,,p]=m$ ,,by ,,! ,,unit$ ,,nations ,,control ,,ag5cy8 ,"u ! ,unit$ ,nations plan1 individual nations w\ld be =bidd5 to engage 9 atomic weapons rese>*1 b su* rese>* w\ld be p]=m$ by ! _w control ag5cy itself1 z a means ( keep+ x at ! =efront ( k 9 ?is field & !reby enabl+ x to detect violations :i* might o!rwise pass unnotic$ ?r\gh ignorance4 ,is rese>* ^u ,h-bombs s dang]\s t n ev5 ! _w control ag5cy %\ld be all[$ to und]take x8 ,,au?or',s ,,comm5t ,if an int]national ag5cy is ev] e/abli%$1 x is obvi\s t x w\ld h to c>ry on rese>* on ,h-bombs = ! same reason t w\ld make x vital = x to c>ry on rese>* on ,a-bombs--8to keep at ! =efront ( k0 s t x w\ld be 9 a position to 8detect violations40 ,?is w\ld become all ! m imp]ative j because ! ,h-bomb is s mu* m dang]\s4 #ae4 ,,%\ld ,,te*nical ,,in=mation ,,reg>d+ ,,! ,h-,,bomb ,,be ,,transmitt$ ,,to ,,! ,,unit$ ,,nations ,,z ,a ,,basis ,,= ,a ,,discussion ,,( ,,hydrog5 ,,control8 ,9 #aidf ! ,unit$ ,/ates transmitt$ six volumes ( te*nical in=mation on atomic en]gy to ! ,unit$ ,nations4 ,?is 0 "o important means ( provid+ memb]s ( ! ,unit$ ,nations ,atomic ,en]gy ,commission ) suffici5t basic data to discuss int]national control4 ,no simil> body ( mat]ial on hydrog5 bombs has be5 transmitt$ to ! ,unit$ ,nations4 ,c ! ,commission n[ discuss ! control ( hydrog5 w>f>e )\t fur!r (ficial in=mation on its te*nical aspects8 ,if su* in=mation is to be provid$1 :o %\ld be ! provid]1 ! ,unit$ ,/ates or ! ,soviet ,union1 or bo?8 ,,au?or',s ,,comm5t ,all ! in=mation s f> has come f ! ,unit$ ,/ates4 ,9 fact1 ! ,smy? ,report1 ! six volumes ( te*nical in=mation submitt$ to ! ,,un1 ! te/imony by sci5ti/s at ! ,congressional he>+s on ! ,mc,mahon ,act1 & mu* declassifi$ in=mation h be5 ( invaluable aid to ,russia 9 develop+ h] own atomic bomb4 ,x is ab\t "t t ?is "o-way fl[ ( in=mation came to a /op4 ,n a trickle has s f> come out ( ,russia--n ev5 an (ficial ackn[l$gm5t t %e has explod$ h] fir/ ,a-bomb--& until %e %[s h] will+ness to co-op]ate fully1 we mu/ /op play+ ,santa ,claus4 #af4 ,,%\ld ,a ,,new ,,panel ,,( ,,exp]ts ,,analog\s ,,to ,,! ,,a*eson-,,lili5?al ,,bo>d ,,be ,,appo9t$ ,,to ,,/udy ,,! ,h-,,bomb ,,9 ,,relation ,,to ,,int]national ,,control8 ,x is n[ m ?an #d ye>s s9ce ! ,a*eson-,lili5?al ,bo>d made its recomm5dations on int]national control4 ,_! f9d+s h s9ce be5 l>gely incorporat$ into ! ,,un plan4 ,d ! ev5ts ( ! la/ #d ye>s make x desirable1 = te*nical reasons1 to re?9k ! control problem8 ,are ! te*nical data ( hydrog5 bombs su*1 z to dem& a reca/+ & *ange ( emphasis 9 ! exi/+ ,,un plan8 ,h ! prospects ( l>ge-scale peacetime applications ( atomic en]gy suffici5tly *ang$ t a diff]5t ori5tation 9 control measures is desirable8 ,if re-exam9ation ( ! control "q is indicat$1 %\ld ?is inquiry be und]tak5 9 ! fir/ in/ance by a gr\p ( qualifi$ ,am]icans8 ,or %\ld ! ,unit$ ,/ates sugge/ t an int]nationally con/itut$ bo>d initially take on ?is assignm5t8 ,consid]+ ! /rong ,soviet opposition to ! ,,un plan1 is x useful to consid] ! problem ( control8 ,is ! ,soviet attitude at all likely to *ange 9 ! =eseeable future8 ,w\ld a re?9k+ ( ! control problem contribute to a solution unless ,soviet repres5tatives p>ticipat$8 ,w\ld ! appo9tm5t ( a new 8,a*eson-,lili5?al ,bo>d0 raise false hopes8 ,,au?or',s ,,comm5t ,z indicat$ 9 ,*apt] ,,iv & 9 ! prec$+ comm5ts1 ! ,,un plan = ! int]national control ( atomic en]gy is :olly out ( date1 & ! soon] we realize x1 ! bett] = u & = ! _w4 ,x 0 at be/ a noble ideal1 :i* did n h ! slighte/ *ance ( realization f ! v />t4 ,a re-exam9ation ( ! entire problem1 ev5 be=e ! adv5t ( ! ,h-bomb1 _h be5 long ov]due4 ,today x is all ! m imp]ative4 ,s9ce su* a re-exam9ation requires1 or at lea/ implies1 ! )drawal ( ! plan1 orig9ally sponsor$ by ?is c\ntry1 x %\ld be done by an int]national bo>d1 pref]ably at ! sugge/ion ( "s nation o!r ?an ! ,unit$ ,/ates4 ,! new bo>d1 9 consid]+ ! :ole problem anew1 %\ld avoid our orig9al error ( reg>d+ control ( atomic weapons z a problem :olly sep>ate f t ( o!r weapons ( mass de/ruction4 ,x %\ld recognize ! facts ( life & n aim at br++ ! mill5nium ov]night4 ,x %\ld n seek absolute security1 s9ce ! facts %[ x to be unatta9able4 ,r %\ld x accept z a wise maxim t ev5 p>tial security is bett] ?an none4 ,if ! bo>d set = itself c]ta9 limit$ objectives1 !y w\ld h a mu* bett] *ance ( univ]sal acceptance ?an if its aims 7 too high1 z !y 7 9 ! orig9al ,unit$ ,/ates plan1 n[ ! plan ( ! majority ( ,unit$ ,nations4 ,its fir/ limit$ objective %\ld be a g5]al agreem5t to outlaw ! use ( all weapons ( mass de/ruction aga9/ civilian populations4 ,?is w\ld mean outlaw+ ! use n only ( ,a- & ,h-bombs aga9/ l>ge urban c5t]s ( population1 b also ( all o!r conv5tional weapons = ! mass kill+ ( noncombatants4 ,a second limit$ objective %\ld be ! outlaw+ ( radiological w>f>e 9 all =ms1 :i* %\ld include ! use ( ! rigg$ ,h-bomb z well z ! use ( ,a-bombs 9 a mann] t takes advantage ( _! radioactive effects4 ,?is w\ld mean ! prohibition ( ! explosion ( ,a- or ,h-bombs f a l[ altitude1 or _! explosion und]wat] 9 a h>bor4 ,^! limit$ objectives w\ld /ill p]mit nations to manufacture atomic weapons & to use !m z tactical weapons aga9/ milit>y p]sonnel1 :ile !y w\ld elim9ate _! use z /rategic weapons aga9/ l>ge urban c5t]s4 ,! v possession ( atomic weapons by bo? sides1 h[ev]1 may 9 itself prev5t _! use ev5 tactically4 ,9 fact1 !re w\ld /ill be ! hope t !y w\ld s]ve z effective det]r5ts aga9/ w> itself4 ,! advantage ( su* a plan ( limit$ objectives is ! likelihood1 or at lea/ ! possibility1 t ev5 ,russia w\ld n d>e to turn x d[n & ?us /& be=e ! _w z prev5t+ ! prohibition ( ! use ( atomic weapons aga9/ civilian populations4 ,& once we rea*$ agreem5t ) ,russia on "o set ( limit$ objectives1 ! door may possibly h be5 op5$ = fur!r agreem5t on o!r limit$ objectives4 ,peace1 /ep by /ep1 appe>s to be ! only alt]native to possible cata/rophe4 ,"o limit$ objective aft] ano!r mu/ become our major policy4 ,a ,,note ,,on ,,! ,,type ,,9 ,,:i* ,,?is ,,book ,,is ,,set ,! text ( ?is book is set 9 ,cal$onia1 a ,l9otype face design$ by ,w4 ,a4 ,dwigg9s4 ,?is type belongs to ! family ( pr9t+ types call$ 8mod]n face0 by pr9t]s--a t]m us$ to m>k ! *ange 9 /yle ( type-lett]s t occurr$ ab\t #ahjj4 ,cal$onia bord]s on ! g5]al design ( ,scot* ,mod]n1 b is m freely drawn ?an t lett]4 ,! book 0 compos$1 pr9t$1 & b\nd by ,k+sport ,press1 ,inc41 ,k+sport1 ,t5nessee4 ,illu/ration3 ,logo ---------------------------------------- -------------------------------- ,also by ,,william ,l4 ,,laur5ce ,,dawn ,,ov] ,,z]o #aidf1 #aidg ,?is is a ,borzoi ,book1 publi%$ 9 ,new ,york by ,alfr$ ,a4 ,knopf ---------------------------------------- -------------------------------- ,,transcrib]',s ,,notes ,page ,*ang$ f ,*ang$ to #ef ,valu+ _! lib]ty m _! ,valu+ _! lib]ty m ?an lives1 ! ,am]ican _! lives1 ! ,am]ican #abb ,e9/e9's =mula1 ,e mc1 ,e9/e9's =mula1 ,e mc1 reveal$ t matt] reveal$ t matt] ,typos fix$2 non-/&>d spell+ & dialect reta9$4 ,enclos$ italics font 9 und]scores4