,,the ,,hell ,,bomb ,,by ,william ,l4 ,laurence ,illustration3 ,logo #aiea ,,new ,,york ,,alfred ,a4 ,,knopf ,illustration3 ,,this ,,is ,a ,,borzoi ,,book1 ,,published ,,by ,,alfred ,a4 ,,knopf1 ,,inc4 ,copyright #aiej by ,the ,curtis ,publishing ,co4 ,copyright #aiej by ,william ,l4 ,laurence4 ,all rights reserved4 ,no part of this book may be reproduced in any form without permission in writing from the publisher1 except by a reviewer who may quote brief passages in a review to be printed in a magazine or newspaper4 ,manufactured in the ,united ,states of ,america4 ,published simultaneously in ,canada by ,mc,clelland ,stewart ,limited4 ,,first ,,and ,,second ,,printings ,,before ,,publication ,,third ,,printing1 ,,january #aiea ,to ,,florence ,,foreword ,the material in this book falls into two categories3 7#a7 a popular version in terms understandable to the layman of technical data published in scientific literature in this country and abroad1 and widely known among scientists everywhere2 and 7#b7 technical conclusions reached by deduction based on these published facts and theory1 for which ,i assume the sole responsibility4 ,in doing so1 ,i wish to make it emphatically clear that ,i have had no access to any classified information on the current hydrogen-bomb program1 and also that whatever access ,i had to ,h-bomb information during my stay at ,los ,alamos in the spring and summer of #aide was strictly limited to the somewhat vague and general discussions carried on there in #aide and earlier4 ,i hereby take the opportunity to express my profound appreciation to ,dr4 ,james ,g4 ,beckerley1 ,director of ,classification1 ,atomic ,energy ,commission1 ,washington1 ,d4 ,c41 and to ,mr4 ,corbin ,allardice1 ,director1 ,public ,information ,service1 of the ,,aec's ,new ,york ,operations ,office1 for their generous cooperation in clearing this manuscript for publication4 ,it must be strictly understood that any such clearance merely means that the ,,aec has 8no objection to publication0 on the grounds of security4 ,it does not in any way vouch for the accuracy or correctness of the book's contents4 ,,william ,l4 ,,laurence ,new ,york ,city ,july #cj1 #aiej ,,contents ,i ,the ,truth about the ,hydrogen ,bomb #c ,,ii ,the ,real ,secret of the ,hydrogen ,bomb #bi ,,iii ,shall ,we ,renounce the ,use of the ,h-bomb8 #eg ,,iv ,korea ,cleared the ,air #hh ,v ,a ,primer of ,atomic ,energy #aad ,,appendix3 ,the ,hydrogen ,bomb and ,international ,control #adi ,a4 ,significant ,events in the ,history of ,international ,control of ,atomic ,weapons #aea ,b4 ,the ,international ,control of ,atomic ,weapons3 a ,brief ,history of ,proposals and ,negotiations #aee ,c4 ,the ,atomic ,impasse #afh ,d4 ,possible ,questions ,regarding ,h-bombs and ,international ,control #aga ,,introduction 8,democracy ,depends on an ,informed ,electorate0 8,it is most important in our democracy that our government be frank and open with the citizens4 ,in a democracy it is only possible to have good government when the citizens are well informed4 ,it is difficult enough for them to become well informed when the information is easily available4 ,when that information is not available1 it is impossible4 ,while there may be some cases in which the information which the citizen needs1 in order to make an intelligent judgment of national policy1 must be kept secret1 so that military potential will not be jeopardized1 the present use of secrecy far exceeds this minimum limit4 ,these are the methods of an authoritarian government and should be vigorously opposed in our democracy4444 8,the citizen must choose insofar as that is possible4 ,today1 if he tries to come to some conclusion about what should be done to increase the national security1 the citizen runs up against a high wall of secrecy4 ,he can1 of course1 take the easy solution and say that these are questions which should be left to the upper echelons of the military establishment to decide4 ,but these questions are so important today1 that to leave them to the military men to decide is for the citizen essentially to abrogate his basic responsibility4 ,if1 in time of peace1 questions on which the future of our country depends are left to any small group1 not representative of the people1 to decide1 we have gone a long way toward authoritarian government4 8,the ,united ,states has grown to be a strong nation under a constitution which wisely has laid great emphasis upon the importance of free and open discussion4 ,urged by a large number of people who have fallen for the fallacy that in secrecy there is security1 and1 ,i regret1 encouraged by many1 including eminent scientists1 to prophesy doom just around the corner1 we are dangerously close to abandoning those principles of free speech and open discussion which have made our country great4 ,the democratic system depends on making intelligent decisions by the electorate4 ,our democratic heritage can only be carried on if the citizen has the information with which to make an intelligent decision40 7,from a talk on the hydrogen bomb1 ,march #bg1 #aiej1 at ,town ,hall1 ,los ,angeles1 by ,,professor ,,robert ,f4 ,,bacher1 head of the ,physics ,department1 ,california ,institute of ,technology4 ,professor ,bacher served as the first scientific member of the ,atomic ,energy ,commission and was one of the major architects of the atomic bomb at ,los ,alamos1 ,new ,mexico47 ,,the ,,hell ,,bomb ,i ,,the ,,truth ,,about ,,the ,,hydrogen ,,bomb ,i first heard about the hydrogen bomb in the spring of #aide in ,los ,alamos1 ,new ,mexico1 where our scientists were putting the finishing touches on the model-,t uranium1 or plutonium1 fission bomb4 ,i learned to my astonishment that1 in addition to this work1 they were already considering preliminary designs for a hydrogen-fusion bomb1 which in their lighter moments they called the 8,superduper0 or just the 8,super40 ,i can still remember my shock and incredulity when ,i first heard about it from one of the scientists assigned to me by ,dr4 ,j4 ,robert ,oppenheimer as guides in the ,dantesque world that was ,los ,alamos1 where the very atmosphere gave one the sense of being in the presence of the supernatural4 ,it seemed so fantastic to talk of a superatomic bomb even before the uranium1 or the plutonium1 bomb had been completed and tested--in fact1 even before anybody knew that it would work at all--that ,i was inclined at first to disbelieve it4 ,could anything be more powerful1 ,i found myself thinking1 than a weapon that1 on paper at least1 promised to release an explosive force of #bj1jjj tons of ,,tnt8 ,it was a screwball world1 this world of ,los ,alamos1 ,i kept saying to myself1 and this was just a screwball notion of my younger scientific mentors4 ,so at the first opportunity ,i put the question to ,professor ,hans ,a4 ,bethe1 of ,cornell ,university1 one of the world's top atomic scientists1 who headed the elite circle of theoretical physicists at ,los ,alamos4 ,dr4 ,bethe1 ,i knew1 was the outstanding authority in the world qualified to talk about the subject1 since he was the very man who first succeeded in explaining how the fusion of hydrogen in the sun is the source of energy that will make it possible for life to continue on earth for billions of years4 8,is it true about the superbomb80 ,i asked him4 8,will it really be as much as fifty times as powerful as the uranium or plutonium bomb80 ,i shall never forget the impact on me of his quiet answer as he looked away toward the ,sangre de ,cristo 7,blood of ,christ7 mountain range1 their peaks turning blood-red in the ,new ,mexico twilight4 8,yes10 he said1 8it could be made to equal a million tons of ,,tnt40 ,then1 after a pause3 8,even more than a million40 ,the tops of the mountains seemed to catch fire as he spoke4 ,long before it was discovered that vast amounts of energy could be liberated by the fission 7splitting7 of the nuclei of a twin of the heaviest element in nature--namely1 uranium of atomic mass #bce 7#bce times the mass of the hydrogen atom1 lightest of all the elements7--scientists had known that truly staggering amounts of energy would be released if one could fuse together four atoms of hydrogen1 the first element on the atomic table1 into one atom of helium1 element number two on that table1 which weighs about four times as much as hydrogen4 ,in ,december #aich--three weeks before the discovery of uranium fission was announced in ,germany--,dr4 ,bethe had published his famous hypothesis about the fusion of four hydrogen atoms in the sun to form helium4 ,this provided the first satisfactory explanation of the mechanism that enables the sun to radiate away in space every second a quantity of light and heat equivalent to the energy content of nearly fifteen quadrillion tons of coal4 ,and while ,dr4 ,bethe was the first to work out the fine details of the process1 scientists had been speculating for more than twenty years on the likelihood of hydrogen fusion in the sun as source of the sun's eternal radiance4 ,american audiences first heard about hydrogen as the solar fuel in a lecture1 on ,march #aj1 #aibb1 at the ,franklin ,institute1 ,philadelphia1 by ,professor ,francis ,william ,aston1 famous ,british ,nobel-,prize-winning chemist1 who even at that early date warned mankind against what he called 8tinkering with the angry atoms40 ,his words on that occasion have a strange prophetic ring1 though most of what he said is now known to be wrong4 8,should the research worker of the future discover some means of releasing this energy from hydrogen in a form which could be employed10 he predicted1 8the human race will have at its command powers beyond the dreams of scientific fiction1 but the remote possibility must always be considered that the energy1 once liberated1 will be completely uncontrollable and by its violence detonate a neighboring substance4 ,if this happens1 all of the hydrogen on earth might be transformed into helium at once1 and this most successful experiment might be published to the rest of the universe in the form of a new star of extraordinary brilliance1 as the earth blew up in one vast explosion40 ,by #aide we had learned that many things were wrong in ,professor ,aston's prophecy4 ,it had been definitely established1 for example1 that it would be impossible to 8transform all the hydrogen on earth at once10 no matter how many superduper hydrogen bombs were to be exploded4 ,in fact1 we had learned that1 under conditions as they exist on earth1 we could never use common hydrogen1 the element that makes up one ninth by weight of all water1 either in a superduper bomb or as an atomic fuel for power4 ,on the other hand1 ten years after ,dr4 ,aston's lecture a new type of hydrogen was discovered to exist in nature4 ,it was found to constitute one five-thousandth part of the earth's waters1 including the water in the tissues of plants and animals4 ,it was shown to have an atomic weight of two--double the weight of common hydrogen--and was named deuterium4 ,the nucleus1 or center1 of the deuterium atom was named the deuteron1 to distinguish it from the nucleus of common hydrogen1 known as the proton4 ,deuterium also became popularly known as 8heavy hydrogen40 ,water containing two deuterium atoms in place of the two atoms of light hydrogen became known as 8heavy water40 ,the most startling fact learned about deuterium soon after its discovery in #aicb was that it offered potentialities as an atomic fuel1 or an explosive1 of tremendous energy1 provided one condition could be met4 ,this condition was a 8match0 to light it with4 ,and here was the catch4 ,the flame of this match1 it was found1 would have to have a temperature of the order of #ej1jjj1jjj degrees centigrade1 two and a half times the temperature in the interior of the sun4 ,oddly enough1 the discovery of the principle that made the atomic bomb possible also brought with it the promise that a 8deuterium fire0 might1 after all1 be lighted on earth4 ,early studies had revealed that the explosion of an atomic bomb1 if it lived up to expectations1 would generate a central temperature of about #ej1jjj1jjj degrees centigrade4 ,here1 at last1 was the promise of realization of the impossible--the #ej1jjj1jjj degree match4 ,the men of ,los ,alamos thus knew that if the atomic bomb they were just completing for its first test worked as they hoped it would1 it could be used as the match to light the deuterium fire4 ,they could build a superduper bomb of a thousand times the power of the atomic bomb by incorporating deuterium in the ,a-bomb1 the explosion of which would act as the trigger for the superexplosion4 ,and they also knew that the deuterium bomb held such additional potentialities of terror1 beyond its vastly greater blasting and burning power1 that the step from the duper to the super would be just as great as the step from ,,tnt to the duper4 ,the hydrogen bomb1 ,h-bomb1 or hell bomb1 as the fusion bomb had become popularly known1 thus became a reality in the flash of the explosion of the first atomic bomb at #e3cj of the morning of ,july #af1 #aide1 on the ,new ,mexico desert4 ,as the men of ,los ,alamos1 of whom ,i was at that time a privileged member1 watched the supramundane light and the apocalyptic mushroom-topped mountain of nuclear fire rising to a height of more than eight miles through the clouds1 they did not have to wait until they checked with their measuring instruments to know that a match sparking a flame of about #ej1jjj1jjj degrees centigrade had been lighted on earth for the first time4 ,the size of the fire mountain and the end-of-the-world-like thunder that reverberated all around1 told the tale better than any puny man-made instruments4 ,and there in our midst1 as we learned only recently1 stood a ,judas1 ,klaus ,fuchs1 a name that 8will live in infamy0 along with that of other archtraitors of history4 ,by the greatest of ironies1 there he was1 this spy1 standing right in the center of what we believed at the time to be the world's greatest secret1 waiting at that very moment to tell the ,russians of our success and how we achieved it4 ,as he confessed five years later1 he betrayed to them the most intimate details not only about the ,a-bomb but about the ,h-bomb as well--details that he learned as a member of the innermost of inner circles4 ,for1 alas1 he was a trusted member of the theoretical division1 the sanctum sanctorum of ,los ,alamos4 ,this select group of scientists1 behind doubly and triply locked doors1 discussed in whispers their ideas about the superduper4 ,his associates at ,los ,alamos1 who should know1 sadly admit that ,fuchs made it possible for ,russia to develop her ,a-bomb at least a year ahead of time4 ,it is my own conviction that the information he gave the ,russians made it possible for their scientists to attain their goal at least three1 and possibly as much as ten1 years sooner than they could have done it on their own4 ,yet1 though ,fuchs confessed everything he told the ,russians1 the content of his confession is still kept a top secret from the ,american people1 who sadly need information on one of the greatest problems facing mankind4 ,the reason given is that we cannot actually be sure that ,fuchs told the ,russians all that he says he did1 and1 if published1 his confession might1 by his tricky design1 give the ,russians additional information4 ,of course1 anything is possible for a warped mind such as that of ,fuchs4 ,nevertheless1 it seems highly implausible that this traitor1 who went to the ,russians voluntarily1 should withhold any vital information from them for as long as five years4 ,the best evidence that he didn't is the ,russian ,a-bomb4 ,yet some good comes even of the greatest evil4 ,all the circumstantial evidence points to the fact that during the five-year period following the end of the war our work on the hydrogen bomb had stopped completely4 ,the ,a-bomb was the mightiest weapon in the world1 we seem to have reasoned1 and it would take ,russia many years before she would get an ,a-bomb of her own4 ,why spend great efforts on a superbomb8 ,the shock when ,russia exploded her first ,a-bomb much sooner than we expected1 topped by the second shock that ,fuchs had handed ,moscow all our major secrets on a platter--including1 as must be surmised1 those of the ,h-bomb--awakened us to the facts of life4 ,it is no accident that ,president ,truman's official announcement of the order to build 8the so-called hydrogen bomb or superbomb0 came within three days of the announcement of ,fuchs's arrest and confession4 ,the ,president gave his order with full knowledge of ,fuchs's confession1 which made it evident that the ,russians were already at work on the hydrogen bomb and had probably been working on it uninterruptedly since #aide4 ,the tragic prospect is that instead of the ,russians catching up with us1 it is we who may have to catch up with them4 ,five years after the first announcement of the explosion of the ,a-bomb over ,hiroshima1 even the most intelligent ,americans still have only the vaguest idea about the facts4 ,yet these facts are within the understanding of the average man4 ,if we keep the earlier analogy of the match in mind1 it becomes simple to understand the principles underlying both the ,a-bomb1 now more correctly identified as the 8fission bomb10 and the hydrogen bomb1 more properly described as the 8fusion bomb40 ,our principal fuel is coal1 which1 as everyone knows1 is 8bottled sunshine10 stored up in plants that grew about two hundred million years ago4 ,when we apply the small amount of heat energy from a match1 the bottled energy is released in the form of light and heat1 which we can use in a great variety of ways4 ,the point here is that it requires only the application of a very small amount of energy from a match to release a very large amount of energy that has been stored for millions of years in the ancient plants we know as coal4 ,now1 during the past half century we discovered that the nuclei1 or centers1 of the smallest units of which the ninety-odd elements of the material universe are made up--units we know as atoms--had stored up within them since the beginning of creation amounts of energy millions of times greater than is stored up by the sun in coal4 ,but we had no match with which to start an atomic fire burning4 ,then1 in ,january #aici1 came the world-shaking discovery of the phenomenon known as uranium fission4 ,in simple language1 we had found a proper 8match0 for lighting a fire with a twin of uranium1 the ninety-second1 and last1 natural element4 ,this twin is a rare form of uranium known as uranium #bce--the figure signifying that it is #bce times heavier than common hydrogen4 ,doubly phenomenal1 the discovery of uranium fission meant that to light the atomic fire1 with the release of stored-up energy three million times greater than that of coal and twenty million times that of ,,tnt 7on an equal-weight basis7 would require no match at all4 ,when proper conditions are met1 the atomic fire would be lighted automatically by spontaneous combustion4 ,what are these proper conditions8 ,in the presence of certain chemical agencies1 spontaneous combustion will take place when an easily burning substance1 such as sawdust1 for example1 accumulates heat until it reaches the kindling temperature at which it ignites4 ,the chemical agencies here are the equivalent of a match4 ,the requirement to start the spontaneous combustion of uranium #bce1 and also of two man-made elements named plutonium and uranium #bcc 7all three known as fissionable materials or nuclear fuels71 is just as simple4 ,in this operation you do not need a critical temperature1 but what is known as a critical mass4 ,this simply means that spontaneous combustion of any one of the three atomic fuels takes place as soon as you assemble a lump of a certain weight4 ,the actual critical mass is a top secret4 ,but the noted ,british physicist1 ,dr4 ,m4 ,l4 ,e4 ,oliphant1 of radar fame1 published in #aidf his own estimate1 which places its weight between ten and thirty kilograms4 ,if so1 this would mean that a lump of uranium #bce 7,u-#bce71 plutonium1 or ,u-#bcc1 weighing ten or thirty kilograms1 as the case may be1 would explode automatically by spontaneous combustion and release an explosive force of #bj1jjj tons of ,,tnt for each kilogram undergoing complete combustion4 ,in the conventional ,a-bomb a critical mass is assembled in the last split second by a timing mechanism that brings together1 let us say1 one tenth and nine tenths of a critical mass4 ,the spontaneous combustion that followed such a consummation on ,august #f and #i1 #aide destroyed ,hiroshima and ,nagasaki4 ,thus1 if we substitute the familiar phrase 8spontaneous combustion0 for the less familiar word 8fission10 we get a clear understanding of what is known in scientific jargon as the 8fission process10 a 8self-multiplying chain reaction with neutrons10 and similar technical mumbo-jumbo4 ,these terms simply mean the lighting of an atomic fire and the release of great amounts of the energy stored in the nuclei of ,u-#bce since the beginning of the universe4 ,the two so-called man-made elements are not really created4 ,they are merely transformed out of two natural heavy elements in such a way that their stored energy is liberated by the process of spontaneous combustion4 ,why1 one may ask1 does not spontaneous combustion of ,u-#bce take place in nature8 ,why1 indeed1 has not all the ,u-#bce in nature caught fire automatically long ago8 ,to this also there is a simple answer4 ,just as in the spontaneous combustion of sawdust the material must be dry enough to burn1 so must the ,u-#bce4 ,only in place of the word 8dry0 we must use the word 8concentrated40 ,the ,u-#bce found in nature is very much diluted with another element that makes it 8wet40 ,it therefore must be separated first1 by a very laborious and costly process1 from the nonfissionable1 or 8wetting10 element4 ,even then it won't catch fire1 and could not be made to burn by any means1 until the amount separated 78dried07 reaches the critical mass4 ,when these two conditions--conditions that do not exist in nature--are met1 the ,u-#bce catches fire just as sawdust does when it reaches the critical temperature4 ,the fact that as soon as a critical mass is assembled the three elemental atomic fuels burst into flame automatically thus puts a definite limit to the amount of material that can be used in the conventional ,a-bomb4 ,the best you can do is to incorporate into a bomb two fragments1 let us say1 of nine tenths of a critical mass each4 ,to enclose more than two such fragments would present difficulties that appear impossible to overcome4 ,it is this limitation of size1 an insurmountable roadblock put there by mother nature1 that makes the basic difference between the ,a-bomb and the ,h-bomb4 ,for1 as we have already seen1 to light an atomic fire with deuterium it is necessary to strike a match generating a flame with a temperature of about #ej1jjj1jjj degrees centigrade4 ,as long as no such match is applied1 no fire can start4 ,it thus becomes obvious that deuterium is not limited by nature to a critical mass4 ,a quantity of deuterium a thousand times the amount of the ,u-#bce1 and hence a thousand times more powerful1 can therefore be incorporated in an ordinary ,a-bomb1 where it would remain quiescent until the ,a-bomb match is struck4 ,weight for weight1 deuterium has only a little more energy content than ,u-#bce1 so that a bomb incorporating a #a1jjj kilograms 7one ton7 of deuterium would thus have an energy of #bj1jjj1jjj tons of ,,tnt4 ,here must be mentioned another form of hydrogen1 named tritium4 ,it has long ago disappeared from nature but it is now being re-created in ponderable amounts in our atomic furnaces4 ,tritium1 the nucleus of which is known as a triton1 weighs three times as much as the lightest form of hydrogen4 ,it has an energy content nearly twice that of deuterium4 ,but it is very difficult to make and is extremely expensive4 ,its cost per kilogram at present ,,aec prices is close to a billion dollars1 as compared with no more than #d1ejj for a kilogram of deuterium4 ,a combination of deuterons and tritons would release the greatest energy of all1 #c4e times the energy of deuterons alone4 ,it would reduce the amount of tritons required to half the volume and three fifths of the weight required in a pure triton bomb1 thus making the cost considerably lower4 ,but why bother with such fantastically costly tritons when we can get all the deuterium we want at no more than #d1ejj a kilogram1 while we can make up the difference in energy by merely incorporating two to three and a half times as much deuterium8 ,here we are dealing with what is probably the most ticklish question in the design of the ,h-bomb4 ,to light a fire successfully1 it is not enough merely to have a match4 ,the match must burn for a time long enough for its flame to act4 ,if you try to light a cigarette in a strong wind1 the wind may blow out your match so fast that your cigarette will not light4 ,the same question presents itself here1 but on a much greater scale4 ,the match for lighting deuterium--namely1 the ,a-bomb--burns only for about a hundred billionths of a second4 ,is this time long enough to light the 8cigarette0 with this one and only 8match08 ,it is known that the time is much too slow for lighting deuterium in its gaseous form4 ,but it is also known that the inflammability is much faster when the gas is compressed to its liquid form1 at which its density is #gij times greater4 ,at this density it would take only seven liters 7about #g4d quarts7 per one kilogram 7#b4b pounds71 as compared with #e1eee liters for gaseous deuterium4 ,and it catches fire in a much shorter time4 ,is this time long enough8 ,on the answer to this question will depend whether the hydrogen bomb will consist of deuterium alone or of deuterium and tritium1 for it is known that the deuteron-triton combination catches fire much faster than deuterons or tritons alone4 ,we were already working with tritium in ,los ,alamos as far back as #aide4 ,i remember the time when ,dr4 ,oppenheimer1 wartime scientific director of ,los ,alamos1 went to a large safe and brought out a small vial of a clear liquid that looked like water4 ,it was the first highly diluted minute sample of superheavy water1 composed of tritium and oxygen1 ever to exist in the world1 or anywhere in the universe1 for that matter4 ,we both looked at it in silent1 rapt admiration4 ,though we did not speak1 each of us knew what the other was thinking4 ,here was something1 our thoughts ran1 that existed on earth in gaseous form some two billion years ago1 long before there were any waters or any forms of life4 ,here was something with the power to return the earth to its lifeless state of two billion years ago4 ,the question of what type of hydrogen is to be used in the ,h-bomb therefore hangs on the question of which one of the possible combinations will catch fire by the light of a match that is blown out after an interval of about a hundred billionths of a second4 ,on the answer to this question will also depend the time it will take us to complete the ,h-bomb and its cost4 ,to make a bomb of a thousand times the power of the ,a-bomb would require a #a1jjj kilograms of deuterium at a cost of #d1ejj1jjj1 or #aga kilograms of tritium and #aad kilograms of deuterium at a total cost of more than #aff1jjj1jjj1jjj at current prices1 not counting the cost of the ,a-bomb trigger4 ,large-scale production of tritium1 however1 will most certainly reduce its cost enormously1 possibly by a factor of ten thousand or more1 while1 as will be indicated later1 the amount of tritium1 if required1 may turn out to be much smaller4 ,illustration3 ,,map ,,by ,,daniel ,,brownstein ,we can thus see that if deuterium alone is found to be all that is required to set off an ,h-bomb it will be cheap and relatively easy to make in a short time--both for us and for ,russia4 ,furthermore1 such a deuterium bomb would be practically limitless in size4 ,one of a million times the power of the ,hiroshima bomb is possible1 since deuterium can be extracted in limitless amounts from plain water4 ,on the other hand1 if sizable amounts of tritium are found necessary1 the cost will be much higher and it will take a considerably longer time1 since the production of tritium is very slow and costly4 ,this1 in turn1 will place a definite limit on the power of the ,h-bomb1 since1 unlike deuterium1 the amounts of tritium will necessarily always be limited4 ,as will be shown later1 we are at present in a much more advantageous position to produce tritium than is ,russia1 so that if tritium is found necessary1 we have a head start on her in ,h-bomb development4 ,the radius of destructiveness by the blast of a bomb with a thousand times the energy of the ,a-bomb will be only ten times greater1 since the increase goes by the cube root of the energy4 ,the radius of total destruction by blast in ,hiroshima was one mile4 ,therefore the radius of a superbomb a thousand times more powerful will be ten miles1 or a total area of #cad square miles4 ,a bomb a million times the power of the ,hiroshima bomb would require #a1jjj tons of deuterium4 ,such a super-superduper could be exploded at a distance from an abandoned1 innocent-looking tramp ship4 ,it would have a radius of destruction by blast of #ajj miles and a destructive area of more than #cj1jjj square miles4 ,the time may come when we shall have to search every vessel several hundred miles off shore4 ,and the time may be nearer than we think4 ,the radius over which the tremendous heat generated by a bomb of a thousandfold the energy would produce fatal burns would be as far as twenty miles from the center of the explosion4 ,this radius increases as the square root1 instead of the cube root1 of the power4 ,the ,hiroshima bomb caused fatal burns at a radius of two thirds of a mile4 ,the effects of the radiations from a hydrogen bomb are so terrifying that by describing them ,i run the risk of being branded a fearmonger4 ,yet facts are facts1 and they have been known to scientists for a long time4 ,it would be a disservice to the people if the facts were further denied to them4 ,we have already paid too high a price for a secrecy that now turns out never to have been secret at all4 ,i can do no better than quote ,albert ,einstein4 8,the hydrogen bomb10 he said1 8appears on the public horizon as a probably attainable goal4444 ,if successful1 radioactive poisoning of the atmosphere1 and hence annihilation of any life on earth1 has been brought within the range of technical possibilities40 ,what ,dr4 ,einstein meant by 8radioactive poisoning of the atmosphere1 and hence the annihilation of any life on earth10 was explained in realistic detail by such eminent physicists as ,dr4 ,bethe1 ,dr4 ,leo ,szilard1 ,dr4 ,edward ,teller1 and others4 ,all of them may even now be engaged on work on the hydrogen bomb4 ,here is how 8poisoning of the atmosphere0 may result from the explosion of a hydrogen bomb3 ,tremendous quantities of neutrons1 which can enter any substance in nature and make it radioactive1 are liberated4 ,in the case of a deuterium bomb1 one eighth of the mass used--#abe grams per kilogram--is liberated4 ,in the case of a deuteron-tritium bomb1 fully one fifth of the mass--#bjj grams per kilogram--is released1 while in a bomb using pure tritium1 fully one third of the mass--#ccc grams per kilogram--is liberated as free neutrons4 ,there are #fjj1jjj billion billion neutrons in each gram1 each capable of producing a radioactive atom in its environment4 ,the neutron is one of the two building blocks of the nuclei of all atoms4 ,these neutrons can be used to make any element radioactive1 ,professor ,szilard and his colleagues point out4 ,it follows that the casing of the bomb could be selected with a view to producing1 after the neutrons enter it1 an especially powerful radioactive substance4 ,since each artificially made1 radioactive element gives out a specific type of radiation and has a definite life span1 after which it decays to one half of its radioactivity1 the designer of the bomb could rig it in such a way that its explosion would spread into the air a tremendous cloud of specially selected radioactive substances that would give off lethal radiations for a definite period of time4 ,in such a way a large area could be made unfit for human or animal habitation for a definite period of time1 months or years4 ,take1 for example1 the very common element cobalt4 ,when bombarded with neutrons1 it turns into an intensely radioactive element1 #cbj times more powerful than radium4 ,any given quantity of neutrons would produce sixty times its weight in radioactive cobalt4 ,if the bomb contains a ton of deuterium1 #bej pounds would come out as neutrons4 ,on the assumption that every neutron enters a cobalt atom1 this would produce #g4e tons of radioactive cobalt4 ,that quantity would give out as much radioactivity as #b1djj tons of radium4 ,now1 this radioactive cobalt has a half-life of five years1 meaning that it loses half of its radioactive power at every five-year period4 ,so after a lapse of that period of time its radioactivity would be equal to #a1bjj tons of radium1 in ten years to #fjj tons1 and so on4 ,if used as a bomb-casing it would be pulverized and converted into a gigantic radioactive cloud that would kill everything in the area it blankets4 ,nor would it be confined to a particular area1 since the winds would take it thousands of miles1 carrying death to distant places4 ,the radioactivity produced by the ,bikini bombs was detected within one week in the ,united ,states4 ,in that short time the westerly winds swept the radioactive air mass from ,bikini1 #d1aej miles away1 to ,san ,francisco4 ,when it reached our shores1 the activity was weak and completely harmless1 but it was still detectable4 ,that1 by the way1 was how we learned that the ,russians had exploded their first atomic bomb4 ,but1 in the words of ,professor ,teller1 one of the ,los ,alamos men who made the preliminary studies on the hydrogen bomb1 8if the activity liberated at ,bikini were multiplied by a factor of a hundred thousand or a million1 and if it were to be released off our ,pacific ,coast1 the whole of the ,united ,states would be endangered40 ,he added that 8if such a quantity of radioactivity should become available1 an enemy could make life hard or even impossible for us without delivering a single bomb into our territory40 ,one limitation to such an attack1 ,professor ,teller points out1 is the boomerang effect of these gases on the attacker himself4 ,the radioactive gases would eventually drift over his own country1 too4 ,he adds1 however1 that since these gases have different rates of decay--some faster1 some slower--the attacker is in a position to choose those radioactive products best suited to his attack4 8,with the proper choice he could ensure that his victim would be seriously damaged by them1 and that they would have decayed by the time they reached his own country40 8,it is not even impossible to imagine10 in the words of ,professor ,teller1 8that the effects of an atomic war fought with greatly perfected weapons and pushed by utmost determination will endanger the survival of man4444 ,this specific possibility of destruction may help us realize more clearly the probable consequences of an atomic war for our civilization and the possible consequences for the whole human race40 ,on this point ,professor ,szilard is much more specific4 8,let us assume10 he said at a ,university of ,chicago ,round ,table1 8that we make a radioactive element which will live for five years and that we just let it go into the air4 ,during the following years it will gradually settle out and cover the whole earth with dust4 ,i have asked myself1 #8,how many neutrons or how much heavy hydrogen do we have to detonate to kill everybody on earth by this particular method8' ,i come up with about fifty tons of neutrons as being plenty to kill everybody1 which means about #djj tons of heavy hydrogen0 7deuterium74 ,now1 obviously ,professor ,szilard was stating the extreme case4 ,he merely called attention to the scientific fact that man now has at his disposal1 or soon will have1 means that not only could wipe out all life on earth1 but could also make the earth itself unfit for life for many generations to come1 if not forever4 ,here we have indeed what is probably the greatest example of irony in man's history4 ,the very process in the sun that made life possible on earth1 and is responsible for its being maintained here1 can now be used by man to wipe out that very life and to ruin the earth for good4 ,it is inconceivable that any leaders of men today1 or in the near future1 would resort to such an extreme measure4 ,but the fact remains that such a measure is possible4 ,and it is by no means unthinkable that a ,hitler1 faced with certain defeat1 would not choose to die in a great ,gtterdmmerung in which he would pull down the whole of humanity with him to destruction4 ,and who can be bold enough to guarantee that another ,hitler might not arise sometime1 somewhere1 possibly in a rejuvenated ,germany making another bid for world domination or total annihilation8 ,it is more likely1 of course1 that an attacker1 particularly if he is otherwise faced with certain defeat1 might choose the less drastic method outlined by ,professor ,teller1 selecting for his weapon a short-lived radioactive element that would have spent itself by the time it reached his shores4 ,if he is the sole possessor of the hydrogen bomb1 he may not even have to use it1 a threat of its use being sufficient to end the war on terms to his liking4 ,in the face of such a threat1 as ,professor ,szilard pointed out1 who would dare take the responsibility of refusing8 ,these are the stark1 unvarnished facts about the 8so-called hydrogen bomb40 ,they raise many questions to which the ,american people as a whole will have to find the answer4 ,it is possible1 and the odds here are more than even1 that the very possession of the hydrogen bomb by both ourselves and ,russia will make war unthinkable1 since neither side could be the winner4 ,this would be a near certainty if we had the answer to ,russia's ,trojan ,horse method of taking over nations by first taking over their governments1 as was done in ,poland1 ,czechoslovakia1 ,hungary1 and the ,balkan countries4 ,suppose the ,communists take over ,italy1 then ,germany1 by the same method4 ,what would we do then8 ,the answer is1 of course1 that if we wait until 8then10 everything would be lost1 no matter what we did4 ,it therefore becomes obvious that our very existence may depend on what we do here and now to prevent such an eventuality4 ,now that the hydrogen bomb has come out into the open after five years as a super-top secret1 the authorities1 and particularly the ,atomic ,energy ,commission1 may be called upon to answer some embarrassing questions4 8,why10 we may ask1 8was the work on the hydrogen bomb apparently dropped altogether during the past five years80 ,according to ,professor ,bethe1 it would take about three years to develop it4 ,this means that1 had we continued working on it in #aide and thereafter1 we would have had it as far back as #aidh4 ,we have thus lost five precious years1 our loss being ,russia's gain4 ,some scientists and others contend that1 because of our great harbor and industrial cities1 the hydrogen bomb would be a greater threat to us than to the ,soviet1 because most ,russian cities are much smaller than ours1 while her industries are much more dispersed4 ,there may be some truth in this4 ,but on the other hand there are some great advantages on our side4 ,with a strong ,navy and good submarine-detecting devices we may have control of the seas and be able to prevent the delivery of the hydrogen bomb by ship or submarine4 ,with a strong ,air ,force and radar system we could prevent the delivery of hydrogen bombs from the air4 ,by far the most important advantage the possession of the hydrogen bomb would give us against ,russia is its possible use as a tactical weapon against huge land armies4 ,since they can devastate such large areas1 one or two hydrogen bombs1 depending on their size1 could wipe out entire armies on the march1 even before they succeeded in crossing the border of an intended victim4 ,the ,h-bomb would thus counterbalance1 if not completely nullify1 the one great advantage ,russia possesses--huge land armies capable of overrunning western ,europe4 ,the bomb might thus serve as the final deterrent to any temptation the ,kremlin's rulers may have to invade the ,atlantic ,pact countries4 ,yet no matter how one looks at it1 the advent of the ,h-bomb constitutes the greatest threat to the survival of the human race since the ,black ,death4 ,one is reminded of a dinner conversation in ,paris in #ahfi1 recorded in the ,journal of the ,goncourt brothers4 ,some of the famous savants of the day were crystal-gazing into the scientific future a hundred years away4 ,the great chemist ,pierre ,berthelot predicted that by #aifi 8man would know of what the atom is constituted and would be able1 at will1 to moderate1 extinguish1 and light up the sun as if it were a gas lamp40 7,this prophecy has almost come true47 ,claude ,bernard1 the greatest physiologist of the day1 saw a future in which 8man would be so completely the master of organic law that he would create life artificially in competition with ,god40 ,to which the ,goncourt brothers added the postscript3 8,to all of this we raised no objection4 ,but we have the feeling that when this time comes to science1 ,god with ,his white beard will come down to earth1 swinging a bunch of keys1 and will say to humanity1 the way they say at five o'clock at the salon3 #8,closing time1 gentlemen6'0 ,,ii ,,the ,,real ,,secret ,,of ,,the ,,hydrogen ,,bomb ,can the hydrogen bomb actually be made8 ,if so1 how soon8 ,how much will it cost in money and vital materials8 ,above all1 will it1 if made1 add enough to our security to make the effort worth while8 ,as was pointed out by ,prof4 ,robert ,f4 ,bacher of the ,california ,institute of ,technology1 one of the chief architects of the wartime atomic bomb and the first scientific member of the ,atomic ,energy ,commission1 8since the ,president has directed the ,,aec to continue with the development #8of the so-called hydrogen1 or super bomb' we can assume that this development is regarded as both possible and feasible40 ,many eminent physicists believe that it can be made1 and the use by the ,president of the word 8continue0 suggests that this belief is based on more than theory4 ,no less an authority than ,albert ,einstein has stated publicly that he regards the ,h-bomb as 8a probably attainable goal40 ,on the other hand1 there are scientists of high eminence1 such as ,dr4 ,robert ,a4 ,millikan1 our oldest living ,nobel-,prize-winner in physics1 who doubt whether the ,h-bomb can be made at all4 ,and there are also those who express the view that1 while it probably could be made1 it would not offer advantages great enough1 if any1 to justify the cost in vital strategic materials necessary for our security4 ,fortunately1 facts mostly buried in technical literature make it possible for us to go behind the scientific curtain and look intimately at the reasons for these differences in opinion4 ,more important still1 these facts not only provide us with a clearer picture of the nature of the problem but also enable us to make some reasonable deductions or speculations4 ,the scientists directly involved do not feel free to discuss these matters openly1 not because they would be violating security1 but because of the jittery atmosphere that acts as a damper on open discussion even of subjects known to be non-secret4 ,we already know that the so-called hydrogen bomb1 if it is to be made at all1 cannot be made of the abundant common hydrogen of atomic mass one1 and that there are only two possible materials that could be used for such a purpose3 deuterium1 a hydrogen twin twice the weight of common hydrogen1 which constitutes two hundredths of one per cent of the hydrogen in all waters2 and a man-made variety of hydrogen1 three times the weight of the lightest variety1 known as tritium4 ,we also know that to explode either deuterium or tritium 7also known1 respectively1 as heavy and superheavy hydrogen7 a temperature measured in millions of degrees is required4 ,this is attainable on earth only in the explosion of an ,a-bomb1 and therefore the ,a-bomb would have to serve as the fuse to set off an explosion of deuterium1 tritium1 or a mixture of the two4 ,these facts1 fundamental as they are1 merely give us a general idea of the conditions required to make the ,h-bomb4 ,all concerned1 including ,dr4 ,millikan1 fully accept the validity of these facts4 ,but there is one other factor at the very heart of the problem--the extremely short time at our disposal in which to kindle the hydrogen bomb with the ,a-bomb match4 ,according to statements attributed to him in the press1 ,dr4 ,millikan believes that the time is too short2 in other words1 he seems to be convinced that the ,a-bomb match will be blown out before we have time to light the fire4 ,those of opposite view believe that methods can be devised for 8shielding the match against the wind0 for just long enough to light the fire4 ,as we shall presently see1 it is these methods for shielding the match that lead some to doubt whether the game would be worth the candle1 or the match1 if you will4 ,these honest doubts are based on the possibility that1 even if successful1 the shielding might exact too high a price in terms of vital materials1 particularly the stuff out of which ,a-bombs are made--plutonium4 ,according to this view1 we may at best be getting but a very small return for our investment in materials vitally important in war as well as in peace4 ,even though the price in dollars were to be brought down to a negligible amount4 ,a closer look at the details of the problem may enable us to penetrate the thick fog that now envelops the subject4 ,we may begin with a quotation from ,dr4 ,bacher1 who outlined the principle involved with remarkable clarity4 8,the real problem in developing and constructing a hydrogen bomb10 he said in a notable address before the ,los ,angeles ,town ,hall1 is1 8,how do you get it going80 ,the heavy hydrogens1 deuterium and tritium1 are suitable substances if somehow they could be heated hot enough and kept hot4 ,this problem is a little bit like the job of making a fire at #bj degrees below zero in the mountains with green wood which is covered with ice and with very little kindling4 ,today1 scientists tell us that such a fire can probably be kindled4 ,once you get the fire going1 of course1 you can pile on the wood and make a very sizeable conflagration4 ,in the same way with the hydrogen bomb1 more heavy hydrogen can be used and a bigger explosion obtained4 ,it has been called an open-ended weapon1 meaning that more materials can be added and a bigger explosion obtained4 ,the phrase that goes to the very heart of the problem is 8very little kindling10 which is another way of illustrating the difficulty of lighting a fire in a high wind when you have only one match4 ,we know that to ignite deuterium1 by far the cheaper and more abundant of the two ,h-bomb elements1 a temperature comparable to those existing in the interior of the sun1 some #bj1jjj1jjj degrees centigrade1 is necessary4 ,this temperature can be realized on earth only in the explosion of an ,a-bomb4 ,we also know that the wartime model ,a-bombs generated a temperature of about #ej1jjj1jjj degrees1 more than enough to light a deuterium fire4 ,the trouble lies in the extremely short time interval1 of the order of a millionth of a second 7microsecond71 and a fraction thereof1 during which the ,a-bomb is held together before it flies apart4 ,in the words of ,professor ,bacher1 we must make our green1 ice-covered wood catch fire in the subzero mountain weather before the 8very little kindling0 we have is burned up4 ,the times at which deuterium will ignite at any given temperature1 in both its gaseous and its liquid form1 are widely known among nuclear scientists everywhere1 including ,russia1 through publication in official scientific literature of a well-known formula1 originally worked out by two ,european scientists as far back as #aibi1 and more recently improved upon by ,professor ,george ,gamow and ,professor ,teller4 ,by this formula1 derived from actual experiments1 it is known that deuterium in its gaseous form will require as long as #abh seconds to ignite at a temperature of #ej1jjj1jjj degrees centigrade1 well above #ajj1jjj1jjj times longer than the time in which our little kindling is used up4 ,this obviously rules out deuterium in its natural gaseous form as material for an ,h-bomb4 ,how about liquid deuterium8 ,we know that the more atoms there are per unit volume 7namely1 the greater the density71 the faster is the time of the reaction4 ,the increase in the speed of the reaction 7in this case the ignition of the deuterium7 is directly proportional to the square of the density4 ,for example1 if the density1 7that is1 the number of atoms per unit volume7 is increased by a factor of #aj1 the time of ignition will be speeded up by the square of #aj1 or #ajj times faster4 ,since liquid deuterium has a density nearly #hjj times that of gaseous deuterium1 this means that liquid deuterium 7which must be maintained at a temperature of #dbc degrees below zero ,fahrenheit at a pressure above one atmosphere7 would ignite #fdj1jjj times faster 7namely1 in #a_/fdj1jjjth part of the time7 than its gaseous form4 ,arithmetic shows that the ignition time for liquid deuterium at #ej1jjj1jjj degrees centigrade will be #bjj microseconds1 still #bjj times longer than the period in which our kindling is consumed4 ,the same formula also reveals the time it would take liquid deuterium to ignite at higher temperatures1 the increase of which shortens the ignition time4 ,these figures show that the ignition time for liquid deuterium at #ge1jjj1jjj degrees centigrade is #dj microseconds4 ,at #ajj1jjj1jjj degrees the time is #cj microseconds2 at #aej1jjj1jjj degrees1 #ae microseconds2 and at #bjj1jjj1jjj degrees on the centigrade scale1 about #d4h millionths of a second4 ,doubling the temperature speeds up the ignition time for liquid deuterium by a factor of about six4 ,the problem thus is a dual one3 to raise the temperature at which the ,a-bomb explodes1 and to extend the time before the ,a-bomb flies apart4 ,it is also obvious that if the liquid deuterium is to be ignited at all1 it must be done before the bomb has disintegrated--that is1 during the incredibly short time interval before it expands into a cloud of vapor and gas1 since by then the deuterium would no longer be liquid4 ,can we increase the ,a-bomb's temperature fourfold to #bjj1jjj1jjj degrees and literally make time stand still while it holds together for nearly five millionths of a second8 ,to get a better understanding of the problem we must take a closer look at what takes place inside the ,a-bomb during the infinitesimal interval in which it comes to life4 ,this life history of the ,a-bomb is an incredible tale1 from the time its inner mechanisms are set in motion until its metamorphosis into a great ball of fire4 ,as explained earlier1 the ,a-bomb's explosion takes place through a process akin to spontaneous combustion as soon as a certain minimum amount 7critical mass7 of either one of two fissionable 7combustible7 elements--uranium #bce or plutonium--is assembled in one unit4 ,the most obvious way it takes place is by bringing together two pieces of uranium #bce 7,u-#bce71 or plutonium1 each less than a critical mass1 firing one of these into the other with a gun mechanism1 thus creating a critical mass at the last minute4 ,if1 for example1 the critical mass at which spontaneous combustion takes place is ten kilograms 7the actual figure is a top secret71 then the firing of a piece of one kilogram into another of nine kilograms would bring together a critical mass that would explode faster than the eye could wink--in fact1 some thousands of times faster than ,,tnt4 ,just as an ordinary fire needs oxygen1 so does an atomic fire require the tremendously powerful atomic particles known as neutrons4 ,unlike oxygen1 however1 neutrons do not exist in a free state in nature4 ,their habitat is the nuclei1 or hearts1 of the atoms4 ,how1 then1 does the spontaneous combustion of the critical mass of ,u-#bce or plutonium begin8 ,all we need is a single neutron to start things going1 and this one neutron may be supplied in one of several ways4 ,it can come from the nucleus of an atom in the atmosphere1 or inside the bomb1 shattered by a powerful cosmic ray that comes from outside the earth4 ,or the emanation from some radioactive element in the atmosphere1 or from one introduced into the body of the bomb1 may split the first ,u-#bce or plutonium atom1 knock out two neutrons1 and thus start a chain reaction of self-multiplying neutrons4 ,to understand the chain reaction requires only a little arithmetic4 ,the first atom split releases1 on the average1 two neutrons1 which split two atoms1 which release four neutrons1 which split four atoms1 which release eight neutrons1 and so on1 in a geometric progression that1 as can be seen1 doubles itself at each successive step4 ,arithmetic shows that anything that is multiplied by two at every step will reach a #a1jjj 7in round numbers7 in the first ten steps1 and will multiply itself by a #a1jjj at every ten steps thereafter1 reaching a million in twenty steps1 a billion in thirty1 a trillion in forty1 and so on4 ,it can thus be seen that after seventy generations of self-multiplying neutrons the astronomical figure of two billion trillion 7#b followed by #ba zeros7 atoms have been split4 ,at this point let us hold our breath and get set to believe what at first glance may appear to be unbelievable4 ,the time it takes to split these two billion trillion atoms is no more than one millionth of a second 7one microsecond74 ,if we keep this time element in mind we can arrive at a clear understanding of the tremendous problem involved in exploding an ,a- or an ,h-bomb4 ,and while we are recovering from the first shock we may as well get set for another4 ,that unimaginable figure of two billion trillion atoms represents the splitting 7explosion7 of no more than one gram 7#a_/bhth of an ounce7 of ,u-#bce1 or plutonium4 ,now1 the energy released in the splitting of one gram of ,u-#bce is equivalent in power to the explosive force of #bj tons of ,,tnt1 or two old-fashioned blockbusters4 ,since we know from ,president ,truman's announcement following the bombing of ,hiroshima that the wartime ,a-bomb 8had more power than #bj1jjj tons of ,,tnt10 it means that the atoms in an entire kilogram 7#a1jjj grams7 of ,u-#bce or plutonium must have been split4 ,in other words1 after the ,a-bomb had reached a power of #bj tons of ,,tnt1 it had to be kept together long enough to increase its power a thousandfold to #bj1jjj tons4 ,this1 as we have seen1 requires only ten more steps4 ,it can also be seen that it is these ten final crucial steps that make all the difference between a bomb equal to only two blockbusters1 which would have been a most miserable two-billion-dollar fiasco1 and an atomic bomb equal in power to two thousand blockbusters4 ,with the aid of these facts we are at last in a position to grasp the enormousness of the problem that confronted our ,a-bomb designers at ,los ,alamos and is confronting them again today4 ,it can be seen that for a bomb to multiply itself from #bj to #bj1jjj tons in ten steps by doubling its power at every step1 it has to pass successively the stages of #dj1 #hj1 #afj1 #cbj1 and so on1 until it reaches an explosive power of #b1ejj tons at the seventh step4 ,yet it still has to be held together for three more steps1 during which it reaches the enormous power of #e1jjj and #aj1jjj tons of ,,tnt1 without exploding4 ,here was an irresistible force1 and the problem was to surround it with an immovable body1 or at least a body that would remain immovable long enough for the chain reaction to take just ten additional steps following the first seventy4 ,there is only one fact of nature that makes this possible1 or even thinkable--the last ten steps from #bj to #bj1jjj tons take only one tenth of a millionth of a second4 ,the problem thus was to find a body that would remain immovable against an irresistible force for no longer than one tenth of a microsecond1 #ajj billionths of a second4 ,this immovable body is known technically as a 8tamper10 which pits inertia against an irresistible force that builds up in #ajj billionths of a second from an explosive power of #bj tons of ,,tnt to #bj1jjj tons4 ,the very inertia of the tamper delays the expansion of the active substance and makes for a longer-lasting1 more energetic1 and more efficient explosion4 ,the tamper1 which also serves as a reflector of neutrons1 must be a material of very high density4 ,since gold has the fifth highest density of all the elements 7next only to osmium1 iridium1 platinum1 and rhenium71 at one time the use of part of our huge gold hoard at ,fort ,knox was seriously considered4 ,with these facts and figures in mind1 it becomes clear that an ,h-bomb made of deuterium alone is not feasible4 ,it is certainly out of the question with an ,a-bomb of the ,hiroshima or ,nagasaki types1 which generate a temperature of about #ej1jjj1jjj degrees1 since1 as we have seen1 it would take fully #bjj microseconds to ignite it at that temperature4 ,it is one thing to devise a tamper that would hold back a force of #bj tons for #ajj billionths of a second1 and thus allow it to build up to #bj1jjj tons4 ,it is quite another matter to devise an immovable body that would hold back an irresistible force of #bj1jjj tons for a time interval #b1jjj times larger1 particularly if one remembers that in another tenth of a microsecond the irresistible force would increase again by #a1jjj to #bj1jjj1jjj tons4 ,obviously this is impossible1 for if it were possible we would have a superbomb without any need for hydrogen of any kind4 ,it is known that we have developed a much more efficient ,a-bomb1 which1 as ,senator ,edwin ,c4 ,johnson of ,colorado has inadvertently blurted out1 8has six times the effectiveness of the bomb that was dropped over ,nagasaki40 ,we are further informed by ,dr4 ,bacher that 8significant improvements0 in atomic bombs since the war 8have resulted in more powerful bombs and in a more efficient use of the valuable fissionable material40 ,it is conceivable and even probable that the improvements1 among other things1 include better tampers that delay the new ,a-bombs long enough to fission two1 four1 or even eight times as many atoms as in the wartime models4 ,but since1 as we have seen1 the ten steps of the final stages require only an average of #aj billionths of a second per step1 increasing the power of the new models even to #afj1jjj tons 7eight times the power of the ,hiroshima type7 would take only three steps1 in an elapsed time of no more than #cj billionths of a second4 ,and even if we assume that the improved bomb generates a temperature of #bjj1jjj1jjj degrees1 it would still be too cold to ignite the deuterium during the interval of its brief existence1 since1 as we have seen1 it would take #d4h microseconds to ignite it at that temperature4 ,in fact1 calculations indicate that it would require a temperature in the neighborhood of #djj1jjj1jjj degrees to ignite deuterium in the time interval during which the assembly of the improved ,a-bomb appears to be held together1 which1 as may be surmised from the known data1 is within the range of #a4b microseconds4 ,from all this it may be concluded with practical certainty that an ,h-bomb of deuterium only is out of the question4 ,equally good1 though entirely different1 reasons also rule out an ,h-bomb using only tritium as its explosive element4 ,there are several important reasons why an ,h-bomb made of tritium alone is not feasible4 ,the most important by far1 which alone excludes it from any serious consideration1 is the staggering cost we would have to pay in terms of priceless ,a-bomb material1 as each kilogram of tritium produced would exact the sacrifice of eighty times that amount in plutonium4 ,the reason for this is simple4 ,both plutonium and tritium have to be created with the neutrons released in the splitting of ,u-#bce1 each atom of plutonium and each atom of tritium made requiring one neutron4 ,since an atom of plutonium has a weight of #bci atomic mass units1 whereas an atom of tritium has an atomic weight of only three1 it can be seen that a kilogram1 or any given weight1 of tritium would contain eighty times as many atoms as a corresponding weight of plutonium1 and hence would require eighty times as many neutrons to produce4 ,in other words1 we would be buying each kilogram of tritium at a sacrifice of eighty kilograms of plutonium1 which1 of course1 would mean a considerable reduction in our potential stockpile of plutonium bombs4 ,we would cut this loss by more than half because a kilogram of tritium would yield about two and a half times the explosive power of plutonium4 ,but even this advantage would soon be lost1 since tritium decays at the rate of fifty per cent every twelve years1 so that a kilogram produced in #aiea would decay to only half a kilogram by #aifc4 ,plutonium1 on the other hand1 can be stored indefinitely without any significant loss1 since it changes slowly 7at the rate of fifty per cent every twenty-five thousand years7 into the other fissionable element1 ,u-#bce1 which in turn decays to one half in no less than nine hundred million years4 ,what is more1 plutonium1 if the day comes when we can beat our swords into plowshares1 will become one of the most valuable fuels for industrial power1 the propulsion of ships1 globe-circling airplanes1 and even1 someday1 interplanetary rockets4 ,it holds enormous potentialities as one of the major power sources of the twenty-first century4 ,tritium1 on the other hand1 can be used only as an agent of terrible destruction4 ,it will yield its energy in a fraction of a millionth of a second or not at all4 ,the only other possible uses it may have would be as a research tool for probing the structure of the atom1 and as a potential new agent in medicine1 in which it may be used for its radiations4 ,how much tritium would it take to make an ,h-bomb #a1jjj times the power of the wartime model ,a-bombs8 ,since tritium has about #b4e times the power per given weight of ,u-#bce or plutonium1 it would take #djj kilograms 7about #a1hhj quarts of the liquid form7 of tritium to make a bomb that would equal the power of #a1jjj kilograms of plutonium4 ,such a bomb1 we can see1 would have to be made at the sacrifice of #cb1jjj kilograms of plutonium4 ,in other words1 we would be getting a return1 in terms of energy content1 of #a1jjj kilograms for an investment of #cb1jjj4 ,and we would be losing fully half of even this small return every twelve years4 ,how many ,a-bombs would we be sacrificing through this investment8 ,on the basis of ,professor ,oliphant's estimate that the critical mass of an ,a-bomb is between #aj and #cj kilograms1 we would sacrifice at least #a1jff1 and possibly as many as #c1bjj1 if we take the lower figure4 ,and we must not forget that a bomb a thousand times the power will produce only ten times the destructiveness by blast and thirty times the damage by fire of an ,a-bomb of the old-fashioned variety4 ,these cold facts make it clear that a tritium bomb1 particularly one a thousand times the power of the ,a-bomb1 is completely out of the picture4 ,but1 one may ask1 if a deuterium bomb is not possible and a tritium bomb is not feasible1 and these are the only two substances that can possibly be used at all1 isn't all this talk about a superbomb sheer moonshine8 ,and if so1 how explain ,president ,truman's directive 8to continue0 work on it8 ,to find the answer let us go back for a moment to ,dr4 ,bacher's man in the mountains1 confronted with the problem of lighting a fire with green1 ice-covered wood at twenty degrees below zero with 8very little kindling40 ,obviously the poor fellow would be doomed to freeze to death were it not for one little item he had almost forgotten4 ,somewhere in his belongings he discovers a container filled with gasoline1 which increases the inflammability of the wet wood to the point at which it will catch fire with a quantity of kindling that would otherwise be much too small4 ,something closely analogous is true with the ,h-bomb4 ,it so happens that a mixture of deuterium and tritium is the most highly inflammable atomic fuel on earth4 ,it yields #c4e times the energy of deuterium and about twice the energy of tritium when they are burned individually4 ,most important of all1 the deuterium-tritium mixture1 known as ,d-,t1 ignites much faster than either deuterium or tritium by themselves4 ,for example1 the ,d-,t combination ignites #be times faster than deuterium alone at a temperature of #ajj1jjj1jjj degrees1 and the ignition time is fully #cg4e times faster than for deuterium at #aej1jjj1jjj degrees4 ,the published technical data show that at a temperature of #ej million degrees the ,d-,t mixture ignites in only #aj microseconds1 or #bj times faster than deuterium alone4 ,at #ge million degrees it takes only #c microseconds1 as against #dj for deuterium1 while at #ajj million degrees it needs only #a4b microseconds to catch fire1 a time1 as we have seen1 only #j4a microsecond longer than it took the wartime ,a-bomb to fly apart4 ,since the latter held together for #a4a microseconds at a temperature of about #ej million degrees1 it is reasonable to assume that the improved and more efficient models generate a temperature at least twice as high1 and that this is done by holding them together for about #a4b microseconds4 ,it can thus be deduced that the only feasible ,h-bomb is one in which a relatively small amount of a deuterium-tritium mixture will serve as additional superkindling1 to boost the kindling supplied by the improved model ,a-bomb1 for lighting a fire with a vast quantity of deuterium4 ,this1 it appears1 is the real secret of the ,h-bomb1 which is really no secret at all1 since all the deductions here presented are arrived at on the basis of data widely known to scientists everywhere1 including ,russia4 ,and since it is no secret from the ,russians1 whom the arch-traitor ,fuchs has supplied with the details still classified top secret1 the ,american people are certainly entitled to the known facts1 so vitally necessary for an intelligent understanding of one of the most important problems facing them today4 ,a deuterium bomb with a ,d-,t booster would become a certainty if the temperature of the ,a-bomb trigger could be raised to #aej million or1 better still1 to #bjj million degrees4 ,at the former temperature the ,d-,t superkindling ignites in #j4ch microseconds2 at the higher temperature the ignition time goes down to as low as #j4bh microseconds4 ,now1 the ,d-,t mixture releases four times as much energy as plutonium1 and the faster the time in which energy is released1 the higher goes the temperature4 ,since four times as much energy is released at a rate four times faster than in the wartime model ,a-bomb1 it is not unreasonable to assume that the temperature generated would be high enough to ignite the green wood in the bomb--its load of deuterium4 ,how much tritium would be required for the kindling mixture8 ,on this we can only speculate at present4 ,since the ,d-,t kindling calls for the fusion of one atom of tritium with one atom of deuterium1 and the atomic weight of tritium is three as compared with two for deuterium1 the weight of the two substances will be in the ratio of #c for tritium to #b for deuterium4 ,thus if the amount to be used for the kindling mixture is to be one kilogram1 it will be made up of #fjj grams of tritium and #djj grams of deuterium4 ,since1 as we have seen1 it would take eighty kilograms of plutonium to produce one kilogram of tritium1 we would have to use up only #dh kilograms of plutonium to create the #fjj grams1 or the equivalent of one and a half to about five ,a-bombs1 according to ,dr4 ,oliphant's estimate4 ,but would we need as much as #fjj grams of tritium8 ,such an amount1 mixed with #djj grams of deuterium1 would yield an explosive power equal to #hj1jjj tons of ,,tnt1 an energy equivalent of #ajj million kilowatt-hours4 ,a twentieth part of this amount would still be equal in power to #d1jjj tons of ,,tnt1 equivalent in terms of energy to #e1jjj1jjj kilowatt-hours4 ,now one twentieth of #fjj grams1 just #cj grams of tritium1 could be made at a cost of no more than #b4d kilograms of plutonium4 ,thus we would be paying only one twelfth to one fourth of an ,a-bomb 7in addition to the one used as the trigger7 to get the equivalent of ten ,a-bombs in blasting power and of thirty times the incendiary power1 which would totally devastate an area of more than #cjj square miles by blast and of more than #a1bjj square miles by fire4 ,would #cj grams of tritium be enough to serve as the superkindling for exploding1 let's say1 #a1jjj kilograms 7one ton7 of deuterium8 ,we shall probably not know until we actually try it4 ,it will largely depend on the temperature generated by our more powerful ,a-bomb models4 ,if it is true1 as ,senator ,johnson informed his television audience1 that they have 8six times the effectiveness of the bomb that was dropped over ,nagasaki0 7which1 by the way1 had more than twice the effectiveness of the ,hiroshima model71 it is quite possible that their temperature is as high as #aej million1 or even #bjj million1 degrees4 ,in that case1 the extra kindling of a #bj-cj gram ,d-,t mixture1 with its tremendous burst of #e1jjj1jjj kilowatt-hours of energy in #j4bh to #j4ch microseconds 7added to the vast quantity already being liberated by the exploding plutonium1 or ,u-#bce71 might well heat the deuterium to the proper ignition temperature and keep it hot long enough for its mass to explode well within #a4b microseconds4 ,in any case it would appear logical to expect that a mixture of #aej grams of tritium and #ajj grams of deuterium1 which would release an energy equal to that of the ,hiroshima bomb1 should be able to do the job with plenty of time to spare4 ,we thus have a threefold answer to the question3 ,can the ,h-bomb actually be made8 ,as we have seen1 the deuterium bomb is definitely not possible4 ,the tritium bomb is theoretically possible1 but definitely not practicable4 ,but a large deuterium bomb using a reasonably small amount of a deuterium and tritium mixture as extra kindling is both possible and feasible4 ,we now also stand on solid ground in dealing with the questions of cost and of the time it would take us to get into production4 ,with these questions answered1 we can then decide whether the ,h-bomb1 if made1 will add enough to our security to make the effort worth while4 ,we know at this stage that the ,h-bomb requires three essential ingredients4 ,it needs1 first of all1 an ,a-bomb to set if off4 ,we have a sizable stockpile of them4 ,it needs large quantities of deuterium4 ,we have built several deuterium plants during the war1 and they should be large enough to supply our needs4 ,since it is extracted from water1 the raw material will cost us nothing4 ,the only item of cost will be the electric power required for the concentration process1 and this should not be above #ajj per kilogram1 and probably less4 ,the third vital ingredient1 tritium1 can be made in the giant plutonium plants at ,hanford1 ,washington4 ,thus it can be seen that all the essential ingredients of the ,h-bomb1 the costliest and those that would take longest to produce1 as well as the multimillion-dollar plants required for their production1 are already at hand4 ,this means that as far as the essential materials are concerned1 we are ready to go right now4 ,and as for the cost1 it would appear to require hardly any new appropriations by ,congress1 or1 at any rate1 only appropriations that would be mere chicken feed compared with the five billion we have already invested in our ,a-bomb program4 ,the raw material out of which tritium is made is the common1 cheap light metal lithium1 the lightest1 in fact1 of all the metals4 ,it has an atomic weight of six1 its nucleus consisting of three protons and three neutrons4 ,when an extra neutron invades its nucleus1 it becomes unstable and breaks up into two lighter elements1 helium 7two protons and two neutrons7 and tritium 7one proton and two neutrons74 ,they are both gases and they are readily separated4 ,and while lithium of atomic weight six constitutes only #g4e per cent of the element as found in nature 7it comes mixed with #ib4e per cent of lithium of atomic weight seven71 there is no need to separate it from its heavier twin1 since the latter has no affinity for neutrons and nearly all of them are gobbled up by the lighter element4 ,the production of tritium1 even in small amounts1 will nevertheless be a formidable process4 ,as we have seen1 it takes eighty times as many neutrons to produce any given amount of tritium as to produce a corresponding amount of plutonium4 ,since the lithium will have to compete with uranium #bch 7parent of plutonium7 for the available supply of neutrons1 and since the number of atoms of ,u-#bch per given volume is nearly forty times greater than the number of lithium atoms1 the rate of tritium production would be very much slower than that of plutonium4 ,on the other hand1 even if it took as much as two hundred times as long to produce a given quantity of tritium1 the handicap would be considerably overcome because of the relatively small amounts that may be required4 ,if1 for example1 we should need only #cj to #aej grams of tritium per bomb1 it would take our present plutonium plants only six to thirty times longer to produce these quantities than it takes them to produce one kilogram of plutonium4 ,a hypothetical plant such as the one mentioned in the official ,smyth ,report1 designed to produce one kilogram of plutonium per day1 would thus yield #cj grams of tritium in six days4 ,how much tritium would be needed for an adequate stockpile of ,h-bombs8 ,since our primary reasons for building it are to deter aggression1 to prevent its use against us or our allies1 and as a tactical weapon against large land armies1 it would appear that as few as twenty-five1 or fifty at the most1 would be adequate for the purpose4 ,on the basis of the larger figure 7assuming #cj to #aej grams of tritium per bomb71 it would mean an initial stockpile of only #a4e to #g4e kilograms of tritium1 which would entail the sacrifice of about #abj to #fjj kilograms of plutonium4 ,once this initial outlay had been made1 however1 our plutonium sacrifice would be reduced annually to only one twenty-fourth of the original respective amounts--namely1 #e to #be kilograms a year--just enough to make up for the decay of the tritium at the rate of fifty per cent every twelve years4 ,one of the major problems to be solved1 in addition to the main problem of designing the assembly1 arises from the fact that the deuterium and the tritium booster will have to be in liquid form4 ,liquid hydrogen boils 7that is1 reverts to gas7 at a temperature of #dbc degrees below zero ,fahrenheit under a pressure of one atmosphere 7fifteen pounds per square inch74 ,to liquefy it1 it is necessary to cool it in liquid air 7at #cac4if below zero ,f47 while keeping it at the same time under a pressure of #ahj atmospheres4 ,to transport it1 it must be placed in a vacuum vessel surrounded by an outer vessel of liquid air4 ,this would point to the need of giant refrigeration and storage plants1 as well as of refrigerator planes for transporting large quantities of liquid deuterium and its tritium spark plug4 ,will the ,h-bomb1 if made1 add enough to our security to make the effort worth while8 ,we have seen that the required effort may1 after all1 not be very great4 ,in fact1 it may turn out to be a relatively small one1 in view of the fact that all the basic ingredients and plants are already at hand and fully paid for4 ,but supposing even that the effort turns out to be much more costly than it now appears8 ,the question we must then ask ourselves is3 ,can we afford not to make the effort8 ,it is true1 of course1 as some have pointed out1 that ten or even fewer ,a-bombs could destroy the heart of any metropolitan city1 while only one would be quite enough1 as we know1 for cities the size of ,hiroshima or ,nagasaki4 ,but that neglects to take into consideration the fact that one ,h-bomb concentrates within itself the power of thirty ,a-bombs to destroy by fire and by burns an area of more than #a1bjj square miles at one blow4 ,nor does it take into consideration the military advantage of delivering the power of a combination of ten and thirty ,a-bombs in one concentrated package1 which would make it a tremendous tactical weapon against a huge land army scattered over many miles1 or its possible enormous psychological effect against such an army4 ,most important of all1 this view grossly minimizes the apocalyptic potentialities of the ,h-bomb for poisoning large areas with deadly clouds of radioactive particles4 ,it is a monstrous fact that an ,h-bomb incorporating one ton of deuterium1 encased in a shell of cobalt1 would liberate #bej pounds of neutrons1 which would create #ae1jjj pounds of highly radioactive cobalt1 equivalent in their deadliness to #d1hjj1jjj pounds of radium4 ,such bombs1 according to ,professor ,harrison ,brown1 ,university of ,chicago nuclear chemist1 could be set on a north-south line in the ,pacific approximately a thousand miles west of ,california4 8,the radioactive dust would reach ,california in about a day1 and ,new ,york in four or five days1 killing most life as it traverses the continent40 8,similarly10 ,professor ,brown stated in the ,american ,scholar1 8the ,western powers could explode ,h-bombs on a north-south line about the longitude of ,prague which would destroy all life within a strip #a1ejj miles wide1 extending from ,leningrad to ,odessa1 and #c1jjj miles deep1 from ,prague to the ,ural ,mountains4 ,such an attack would produce a #8scorched earth' of an extent unprecedented in history40 ,professor ,szilard1 one of the principal architects of the ,a-bomb1 has estimated1 as already stated1 that four hundred one-ton deuterium bombs would release enough radioactivity to extinguish all life on earth4 ,professor ,einstein1 as we have seen1 has publicly stated that the ,h-bomb1 if successful1 will bring the annihilation of all life on earth within the range of technical possibilities4 ,the question we must therefore ask ourselves is3 ,can we allow ,russia to be the sole possessor of such a weapon8 ,there can be no question that ,russia is already at work on an ,h-bomb4 ,like ourselves1 she already has the plutonium plants for producing both ,a-bombs and tritium4 ,she can produce deuterium in the same quantities as we can4 ,in ,professor ,peter ,kapitza she has the world's greatest authority on liquid hydrogen4 ,furthermore1 she has great incentives to produce ,h-bombs4 ,since she is still behind us in her ,a-bomb stockpile1 she can1 in a sense1 catch up with us much more quickly by converting her fewer ,a-bombs into ,h-bombs that would be the equivalents of ten to thirty ,a-bombs each1 thus increasing the power of her stockpile ten to thirty times4 ,equally if not more important from ,russia's point of view is the stark fact that an ,h-bomb could be much more easily exploded near a coastal city from a submarine or innocent-looking tramp steamer1 since most of our great cities are on the seacoast1 whereas ,russia practically has no coastal cities4 ,even if we openly announced that we would not make any ,h-bombs1 it would not deter ,russia from making them as fast as she could1 not only because she would not believe us but also because her sole possession would greatly weight the scales in her favor4 ,if1 ,god forbid1 she finds herself one day with a stockpile of ,h-bombs when we have none1 she would be in a position to send us an ultimatum similar to the one we sent to the ,japanese after ,hiroshima3 8,surrender or be destroyed60 ,valuing their liberty more than their lives1 the ,american people will never surrender4 ,but while there is time1 would anyone advocate that we run the risk of ever facing such a choice8 ,,iii ,,shall ,,we ,,renounce ,,the ,,use ,,of ,,the ,h-,,bomb8 ,a few days after ,president ,truman announced that he had directed work 8to continue0 on 8the so-called hydrogen1 or super bomb10 a group of twelve eminent physicists1 including half a dozen of the major architects of the atomic bomb at ,los ,alamos1 who1 no doubt1 are playing a similar role in the development of the ,h-bomb1 issued a statement urging the ,united ,states to make 8a solemn declaration that we shall never use the bomb first10 and 8that the only circumstances which might force us to use it would be if we or our allies were attacked by this bomb40 ,they added that 8there can be only one justification for our development of the hydrogen bomb1 and that is to prevent its use40 ,signers of the statement1 unprecedented in the annals of science 7with the possible exception of a secret memorandum submitted to the government just before the ,a-bomb was used71 included such outstanding physicists as ,hans ,a4 ,bethe of ,cornell2 ,kenneth ,t4 ,bainbridge of ,harvard2 ,samuel ,k4 ,allison1 ,university of ,chicago2 ,dean ,george ,b4 ,pegram1 ,columbia2 ,c4 ,c4 ,lauritsen1 ,california ,institute of ,technology2 ,bruno ,rossi and ,victor ,f4 ,weisskopf1 ,massachusetts ,institute of ,technology2 ,f4 ,w4 ,loomis and ,frederick ,seitz1 ,university of ,illinois2 ,merle ,a4 ,tuve1 ,carnegie ,institution of ,washington2 ,r4 ,b4 ,brode1 ,university of ,california2 and ,m4 ,g4 ,white1 ,princeton--all1 with the exception of ,dr4 ,tuve1 professors of physics at their respective universities4 ,those among them who did not directly participate in the development of the ,a-bomb played major parts in other scientific wartime projects1 such as radar and the proximity fuse4 ,implicit in their statement was the first confirmation--indeed1 the most authoritative we have had so far from scientists with first-hand knowledge of the subject--that a hydrogen bomb of a thousand times the power of the ,a-bomb could be made4 ,more than that1 they informed us that ,russia may complete the ,h-bomb in less than four years1 meaning1 of course1 that we too could achieve the same goal in the same period4 ,we were thus provided by the experts with a time-table on which we must act if we are not to run the risk of ,russia's getting the ,h-bomb ahead of us1 and so being in a position to use it1 or threaten its use1 against the nations of western ,europe1 as the greatest blackmail weapon in history4 ,the statement summarizes in essence the principal points of view that have been advanced so far on what policy we should adopt on the ,h-bomb1 and since it was promulgated by men known to have definite inside knowledge of the subject1 it deserves closer scrutiny than it has hitherto received4 8,it was stated correctly10 they inform us at the outset1 that a hydrogen bomb1 if it can be made1 would be capable of developing a power #a1jjj times greater than the present atomic bomb4 ,new ,york1 or any of the greatest cities of the world1 could be destroyed by a single hydrogen bomb4 ,we believe that no nation has the right to use such a bomb1 no matter how righteous its cause4 ,the bomb is no longer a weapon of war1 but a means of extermination of whole populations4 ,its use would be a betrayal of morality and of ,christian civilization itself4 ,senator ,brien ,mc,mahon has pointed out to the ,american people that the possession of the hydrogen bomb will not give positive security to this country4 ,we shall not have a monopoly of this bomb1 but it is certain that the ,russians will be able to make one1 too4 ,in the case of the fission bomb the ,russians required four years to parallel our development4 ,in the case of the hydrogen bomb they will probably need a shorter time4 ,we must remember that we do not possess the bomb but are only developing it1 and ,russia has received1 through indiscretion1 the most valuable hint that our experts believe the development possible4 ,perhaps the development of the hydrogen bomb has already been under way in ,russia for some time4 ,but if it was not1 our decision to develop it must have started the ,russians on the same program4 ,if they had already a going program1 they will redouble their efforts4 ,statements in the press have given the power of the ,h-bomb as between two and #a1jjj times that of the present fission bomb4 ,actually1 the thermonuclear reaction on which the ,h-bomb is based is limited in its power only by the amount of hydrogen which can be carried in the bomb4 ,even if the power were limited to #a1jjj times that of a present atomic bomb1 the step from an ,a-bomb to an ,h-bomb would be as great as that from an ordinary ,,tnt bomb to the atom bomb4 ,to create such an ever-present danger for all the nations of the world is against the vital interests of both ,russia and the ,united ,states4 ,three prominent ,senators have called for renewed efforts to eliminate this weapon and other weapons of mass destruction from the arsenals of all nations4 ,such efforts should be made1 and made in all sincerity from both sides4 ,in the meantime1 we urge that the ,united ,states1 through its elected government1 make a solemn declaration that we shall never use this bomb first4 ,before discussing in detail the merits of the proposal that the ,united ,states renounce the use of the ,h-bomb1 8no matter how righteous its cause10 except in retaliation for its use against us or our allies1 it behooves us to examine the effect of our decisions to proceed with the development of the ,h-bomb on ,russia's ,a-bomb progress4 ,we know that the ,h-bomb requires an ,a-bomb for its trigger4 ,we also have strong grounds for assuming that1 in addition to the ,a-bomb1 an ,h-bomb will require certain quantities of tripleweight hydrogen1 or tritium1 as extra superkindling to boost the ,a-bomb4 ,we know1 furthermore1 that it takes eighty times as many neutrons to make a given quantity of tritium as it does to make a corresponding amount of plutonium1 which1 of course1 means a reduction in ,a-bombs4 ,hence1 should ,russia decide to embark on an ,h-bomb program of her own1 or to 8redouble her efforts10 it would lead inevitably to a serious curtailment in her stockpile of ,a-bombs4 ,while we would have to make the same sacrifice of plutonium1 it is obvious that we can afford the sacrifice much better than ,russia1 since we already have a sizable stockpile of both plutonium and uranium bombs1 whereas she has just begun building her stockpile4 ,the situation for her would be much worse if she has put all her atomic eggs in the plutonium basket without bothering to build the much more complicated and costly uranium separation plants1 as the incomplete evidence available would seem to indicate4 ,in that case she would be faced with a serious dilemma indeed1 for you cannot have ,h-bombs without ,a-bombs1 and you cannot have ,a-bombs without plutonium1 and if1 as the evidence indicates1 she has built her ,a-bomb program exclusively around plutonium1 she would have to sacrifice quantities she could ill afford to spare1 at this stage of her development1 of the only element she desperately needs for building up her ,a-bomb stockpile4 ,how do we know that ,russia's ,a-bomb is made of plutonium8 ,we have the testimony of ,senator ,johnson of ,colorado1 who assured us in his famous television broadcast of ,november #a1 #aidi that 8there's no question at all that the ,russians have a bomb more or less similar to the bomb that we dropped at ,nagasaki1 a plutonium bomb40 ,in this single sentence the ,senator from ,colorado1 who as a member of the ,joint ,congressional ,committee on ,atomic ,energy has access to such information1 inadvertently let at least three cats out of the bag4 ,he confirmed that the ,nagasaki bomb was made of plutonium 7though1 in fairness1 it must be said that this had been known unofficially for some time72 he told us that we had found out not only that 8an atomic explosion had occurred in the ,u4,s4,s4,r410 as the ,president had announced in carefully chosen words1 but that the explosion was that of an atomic bomb and that1 more important still1 the bomb was made of plutonium4 ,and in doing so he1 furthermore1 gave away the secret of how we had obtained that information1 something the ,russians very much wanted to know4 ,not being a scientist1 ,senator ,johnson obviously did not realize that the split fragments 7fission products7 of a plutonium bomb differ from those given off by the explosion of a uranium bomb1 so that in revealing that we knew what the bomb was made of he would also be revealing at the same time that we found it out by examining radioactive air samples and finding them to contain fission fragments of plutonium1 as well as whole plutonium atoms that escaped fission4 ,there is thus no doubt that the ,russians have built nuclear reactors for producing plutonium from nonfissionable uranium #bch4 ,we cannot1 of course1 be sure that they have not at the same time also built plants for concentrating uranium #bce1 but the odds favor the negative4 ,we built uranium separation plants at ,oak ,ridge1 ,tennessee1 and plutonium plants at ,hanford1 ,washington1 during the war because we didn't know at the time which method would work1 and we gambled on the chance that1 by building plants for producing fissionable materials by four different methods1 at least one of them might work4 ,had we known at the time that the plutonium plants were practical1 it is quite likely that we would not have invested a billion dollars in building the uranium separation plants4 ,since the ,russians have obviously decided on plutonium plants as the simplest and cheapest 7three plutonium plants cost us a total of #djj1jjj1jjj1 whereas a single large uranium separation plant cost half a billion71 it is hardly likely that they would consider it worth while to invest in the much more costly uranium separation plants4 ,as ,senator ,johnson said in the same broadcast3 8,we tried out four different methods of making a bomb and all of them succeeded1 but one of these methods was superior to all the others in simplicity and effectiveness1 and we told the ,russians and we told the world that fact4 ,of course1 they didn't have to make the experiments that we had to make to find out by elimination which method was the most effective and which the one that they should follow40 ,the evidence is thus strongly in favor of the assumption that ,russia has only plutonium plants as her sole source of ,a-bomb material1 whereas we have both plutonium plants and gigantic uranium plants in full operation4 ,if that is so1 then our forcing ,russia to embark on an ,h-bomb program1 at a time when her ,a-bomb program is barely started1 will place her under a double handicap in her race to catch up with us in ,a-bombs1 and at least to keep abreast of us1 if not ahead1 in ,h-bombs4 ,for in this grim race we have a dual if not a triple advantage3 our much superior stockpile1 both in numbers and no doubt in quality1 and our gigantic plants for concentrating ,u-#bce1 the production of which would not have to be curtailed at all1 since tritium can be made only in plutonium plants4 ,in fact1 we are now in the process of construction of two great additions to the uranium plant at ,oak ,ridge4 ,one may visualize the masters of the ,kremlin gnashing their teeth in impotent rage at what they no doubt regard as a diabolical plot on our part to sabotage their ,a-bomb effort4 ,indeed1 there can be no question that our decision to proceed with the ,h-bomb was an answer to ,russia's challenge to our atomic supremacy1 and it appears quite plausible that one of the motives behind the decision was the knowledge that it would force ,russia either to build great additions to her atomic plants1 at great expense in money and materials and at the loss of considerable precious time1 or to curtail her production of ,a-bomb material4 ,and while any such motive could not possibly have been the determining factor1 the ultimate effect of our decision was the same as though we had succeeded in getting a team of expert saboteurs behind the ,iron ,curtain to plant a good-sized monkey wrench in the ,soviet atomic machinery4 ,with this in mind we begin to appreciate how dangerous a move it would be1 to ourselves and to world peace1 if we were to make a solemn declaration at the outset1 even before we have a single ,h-bomb1 that we will never use it1 8no matter how righteous our cause10 unless it is used first against us or our allies4 ,by making such a unilateral declaration1 without even making it conditional upon ,russia issuing a similar solemn renunciation1 we would1 in effect1 be saying to ,russia3 8,we humbly beg your pardon4 ,we did not realize that we would be putting a nasty monkey wrench in the machinery of your vital ,a-bomb program4 ,we shall remove the wrench at once so that you may proceed with your program unhindered by us in any way40 ,the masters of the ,kremlin would1 indeed1 have every right to laugh long and loud1 and to take such foolhardy action on our part as further evidence of what they call 8the decadence of the bourgeois democracies40 ,for1 once we make such a magnanimous unilateral solemn renunciation of the one weapon that promises to become the greatest single deterrent against war1 without even bothering to ask ,russia publicly to do likewise1 ,russia could then proceed calmly at her leisure to build up her ,a-bomb stockpile1 with the complete assurance from us that she need not worry about our ,h-bomb as long as she does not use one against us or our allies4 ,after she has accumulated an adequate ,a-bomb stockpile--and fifty to one hundred would be adequate from her standpoint--she would then be in a position1 already attained by us now1 to proceed with her ,h-bomb program1 knowing full well that we would never use ,h-bombs against her while she is still without them4 ,and while she obviously could not use anything she does not have1 she could well afford to make aggressive war even before she has an ,h-bomb1 or to bide her time until she does1 the choice being entirely hers4 ,and if she waits until she has the ,h-bomb1 the decision whether to use it or not would still be entirely hers1 so that she could use it whenever she decides it is to her advantage to do so1 whereas we should have to wait on her pleasure1 having morally bound ourselves1 without qualification1 not to use it first1 even if our very existence depended on it4 ,it can thus be easily seen that this 8after you1 my dear ,alphonse0 gesture on our part in a matter that may involve our very existence would be more than quixotic4 ,it is likely to prove suicidal4 ,it will not improve the prospects of world peace2 on the contrary it will weaken them4 ,it will not enhance our moral stature1 since the world does not have much respect for starry-eyed dreamers with their heads in the clouds4 ,but while we must keep our feet planted on the ground1 we need not lose sight of the stars4 ,our refusal to expose ourselves by giving ,russia the great advantages mentioned1 does not mean that we retain the right to use the ,h-bomb indiscriminately as though it were just another weapon4 ,there are1 ,i shall presently show1 both legitimate and illegitimate uses to which the ,h-bomb can be put1 and it is the failure so far1 even by eminent scientists1 to distinguish between these two types of possible uses that is responsible for a great deal1 if not all1 of the confusion and much futile debate that have followed the ,president's announcement of his directive to continue work on the hydrogen bomb1 and for the flood of verbiage that will continue to plague and bewilder us until we take time to acquaint ourselves with the facts about the ,h-bomb4 ,one of the major difficulties in our approach to the subject stems from the general tendency to talk about the ,h-bomb as though it were just one weapon1 which obviously it is not4 ,as we know1 it is several weapons in one package1 which can be designed for various uses1 depending on the intent of its designer4 ,it is1 on the one hand1 a weapon that can cause total destruction by blast over a radius of ten miles1 or an area of more than #cjj square miles1 with graduated lesser damage over a much larger area4 ,secondly1 it is a weapon that can produce fires and severe flash burns over a radius of twenty miles--that is1 over an area of more than #a1bjj square miles4 ,these two functions1 destruction by blast and by fire1 go together4 ,they are inseparable as far as the bomb itself is concerned1 though their relative effects can be regulated by the height from which the bomb is dropped1 by the terrain over which it is used1 and by its mode of delivery other than by air4 ,then1 of course1 there is the third weapon of terror1 the tremendous quantities of deadly radioactive particles that the ,h-bomb may release in the atmosphere1 which1 as ,dr4 ,einstein said1 would bring within the range of technical possibilities 8the annihilation of life on earth40 ,this1 however1 would depend on the choice and purpose of the designer4 ,if he so chooses1 he can design an ,h-bomb that would produce only slightly greater radioactivity than its ,a-bomb trigger4 ,or he can rig it in such a manner that one bomb would release into the atmosphere the equivalent of nearly five million pounds of radium that would poison the atmosphere for thousands of miles1 killing all life wherever it goes4 ,the catchword here is 8rig10 and the rigging depends entirely1 not on the contents of the bomb itself1 but on the material of which its outer shell is composed4 ,if1 for example1 the casing chosen is a material such as steel1 the radioactivity produced would be practically harmless4 ,if the shell is made of cobalt1 the radiations released would cause untold havoc4 ,the reason for the vast difference is not difficult to understand4 ,the ,h-bomb1 when it explodes1 releases tremendous quantities of neutrons1 the most penetrating particles in nature4 ,as soon as it is liberated1 a neutron enters the nucleus of the nearest element at hand4 ,this may produce a wide variety of changes in the nature of the element penetrated by the neutron1 the changes depending on the element4 ,some elements1 such as cobalt1 become intensely radioactive1 others only mildly so1 and still others not at all4 ,furthermore1 each element thus made radioactive has its own characteristic decay period1 lasting from seconds to many years1 so that the designer of the bomb has a great variety to choose from4 ,from this it can be seen that1 instead of one1 there are actually two types of ,h-bombs--the non-rigged and the rigged4 ,with this vital distinction in mind the problem of its use becomes much more simplified4 ,we are in a position to reach full agreement with the scientists that no nation has the right to use such a 8rigged0 bomb1 no matter how righteous its cause4 ,for the rigged ,h-bomb would add nothing to the military value of the non-rigged ,h-bomb1 which is already more than enough to achieve any military objective4 ,it would merely be piling horror upon horror for no purpose beyond wanton destruction for its own sake4 ,its use even in small numbers would ruin large segments of the earth for years4 ,it would1 as the scientists said1 8be a betrayal of morality and of ,christian civilization itself40 ,there can therefore be no question that when this distinction between the non-rigged and the rigged ,h-bomb is made clear to the ,american people--something the scientists failed to do--they would overwhelmingly lend their support to a move on the part of our government solemnly declaring that we would never use the rigged ,h-bomb first2 that our only aim in building it is to prevent its use1 and that the only circumstances under which we would find ourselves forced to use it would be in retaliation for its use against us or our allies4 ,we can1 and should1 make such a solemn declaration unilaterally1 regardless of whether ,russia makes a similar declaration4 ,we would lose nothing by doing so from a military or strategic point of view1 and we would gain enormously in moral stature and on the battlefront of ideas if we were to do it now4 ,otherwise we run the risk that ,russia might do it first4 ,if she takes advantage of this lost opportunity of ours1 we shall have handed her a great moral victory4 ,in fact1 the law of nations compels us to make such a declaration4 ,unlike the ,a-bomb1 in which the radioactivity is part and parcel of the bomb itself1 the rigged ,h-bomb is purposely designed to produce radioactive poisoning in the atmosphere4 ,since it has to be specially incorporated into the casing of the bomb1 it comes under the international convention outlawing the use of poison gas4 ,for there can be no question that a radioactive cloud that may lay waste to whole areas is the most diabolical and deadly poison gas so far invented4 ,but the twelve scientists do not seem to be satisfied with the mere renunciation of the rigged ,h-bomb4 ,they ask us to declare that we would not be the first to use even the non-rigged bomb1 on the grounds that it 8is no longer a weapon of war1 but a means of extermination of whole populations40 ,this requires closer scrutiny4 ,it has become customary to think of the ,a-bomb1 and now of the ,h-bomb1 as purely strategic weapons for destroying industrial centers producing war materials1 thus depriving the armies at the front of the vital sinews of war4 ,it is also regarded as a weapon of superterror to bring a nation to its knees1 as the ,a-bomb did in ,japan4 ,since industrial centers1 particularly in the ,united ,states1 are densely populated areas1 and since1 conversely1 all large cities are also important industrial centers1 it has become almost axiomatic that the ,a-bomb and the ,h-bomb could be used only in strategic bombing of large centers of population1 which1 of course1 means the wholesale slaughter of millions of civilians and the wiping out of cities with populations of more than #bjj1jjj4 ,but to think along such lines would be thinking of ,world ,war ,,iii1 which we must do our utmost to prevent1 in terms of ,world ,war ,,ii1 which would be just as fatal as thinking in terms of ,world ,war ,i was to the ,french in ,world ,war ,,ii4 ,for even a cursory examination of the situation should reveal that strategic bombing of cities may1 and very likely would be1 as obsolete in the next war as trench warfare was in the last4 ,one does not have to be a military expert to know the reason why4 ,in the last war strategic bombing was resorted to in order to deprive the army at the front of weapons and supplies4 ,obviously1 if you had a superweapon that could wipe out an entire army in the field or on the march at one blow1 there would be no further need of depriving an army that was no longer in being4 ,that is exactly what the non-rigged ,h-bomb is4 ,as a blast weapon1 we have seen1 it can cause total destruction of everything within an area of more than #cjj square miles4 ,as an incinerator it would severely burn everything within an area of more than #a1bjj square miles4 ,it is thus the tactical weapon par excellence4 ,no army in the field or on the march could stand up against it4 ,had we possessed it at the ,battle of the ,bulge1 just one could have wiped out the entire ,bulge4 ,if the ,nazis had had it before ,d-,day1 one would have been enough to wipe out our entire invasion army even before it landed2 or they could have waited and wiped out our entire ,normandy beachhead4 ,in a word1 the non-rigged ,h-bomb has produced a major revolution in tactics and strategy4 ,it has made strategic bombing of cities as obsolete as the trench of ,world ,war ,i1 except as a weapon of pure terror and wanton wholesale destruction of life and property4 ,it would be absolutely useless to the victor as well as to the vanquished1 as the victor would have no spoils of victory left and would have to rebuild what he had needlessly destroyed4 ,viewed in this light1 the non-rigged ,h-bomb1 just because it is the weapon for the annihilation of armies1 becomes vis--vis ,russia1 the greatest deterrent against war that could possibly be devised in the present state of affairs4 ,for1 after all1 the only great advantage ,russia has over us today is her land army and her great reserve of manpower4 ,the non-rigged ,h-bomb1 supported by a large and up-to-date air force capable of delivering it either by air or from a seized airhead behind the lines1 could nullify that advantage in a few hours4 ,at least the threat of such a possibility will always be there4 ,it is therefore doubtful1 to say the least1 that any group of men would willingly take such a risk4 ,since the greatest and most effective use of the non-rigged ,h-bomb would thus be as a tactical weapon against armies in the field1 while its strategic use against civilian populations would be simple wanton destruction from the point of view of both victor and vanquished1 then not only morality and ,christian civilization but plain common sense would dictate the wisdom of our solemnly declaring right now that we will never be the first to use either the non-rigged ,h-bomb or even the ,a-bomb against civilian populations1 and that the only circumstance that would compel us to use them so would be in retaliation for their use against us or our allies4 ,in fact1 we could renounce strategic bombing altogether4 ,by doing so we would gain one of the greatest moral victories1 for then if ,russia failed to make a similar declaration1 as she most likely would1 she would stand before the world as a nation bent on wholesale slaughter of civilian populations4 ,we have nothing to lose and everything to gain by such a declaration1 and the sooner we make it the better4 ,should we make such a declaration1 it would place ,russia in an embarrassing position indeed4 ,for while as a tactical weapon the non-rigged ,h-bomb offers us great advantages as a counterforce to neutralize her huge army1 she can use the ,h-bomb1 both the rigged and the non-rigged1 as a constant threat against our densely populated cities4 ,as ,senator ,brien ,mc,mahon1 of ,connecticut1 chairman of the ,joint ,congressional ,committee on ,atomic ,energy1 has warned1 an ,h-bomb attack 8might incinerate #ej1jjj1jjj ,americans--not in the space of an evening but in the space of a few minutes40 ,we have eleven cities of one million or more inhabitants1 whereas ,russia has only three or four4 ,we have forty cities of #bjj1jjj and over1 inhabited by #dj1jjj1jjj1 or #bg per cent of our population1 whereas ,russia has only twenty cities of #bjj1jjj and over1 inhabited by only #bj1jjj1jjj1 or #aj per cent of her population4 ,furthermore1 her industries are now largely dispersed1 whereas our industries are highly centralized4 ,russia would thus get much the worse of the bargain if she were to accept our challenge to renounce the use of strategic bombing1 particularly that of the ,a- and ,h-bombs1 while we still retain the right to use them in tactical bombing against her armies4 ,suppose ,russia in this dilemma1 and recognizing the need to avoid the moral opprobrium of the peoples of the world that her refusal to meet our renunciation would entail1 comes forth with a counterproposal to renounce the use of both ,a- and ,h-bombs altogether1 as strategic as well as tactical weapons1 thus exchanging the elimination of the threat of the annihilation of our teeming cities and industries1 for the removal of the threat of destruction to her armies4 ,suppose that at the same time she repeats her demand1 frequently voiced by her in the ,united ,nations1 that all stockpiles of ,a- and ,h-bombs be destroyed and a convention signed to outlaw their uses4 ,the world already knows the answer1 for we have already made it again and again4 ,immediately after the close of the last war we declared our readiness to give up the ,a-bomb4 ,in #aidf1 at a time when we were the sole possessor of the bomb1 when we had every reason to believe that our monopoly would last for a number of years1 we submitted a far-reaching plan for the international control of atomic energy1 the most generous offer by far ever made by any nation in history4 ,in this historic plan we not only declared our readiness to give up our stockpile of ,a-bombs and to agree to refrain from further production2 we even offered to give up our sovereignty over our multibillion-dollar atomic plants to an international agency4 ,we further agreed to submit to unhindered1 free inspection by such an agency to assure the world1 and ,russia in particular1 that we were not manufacturing ,a-bombs1 or ,a-bomb materials1 in secret4 ,no nation in history had ever gone so far in its desire to show its goodwill and its peaceful intentions as to make a voluntary offer to surrender the world's most powerful weapon of war1 and an important part of its sovereignty to boot4 ,the offer still stands4 ,it has been enthusiastically endorsed by all the members of the ,united ,nations except ,russia and her satellites4 ,after three years of futile negotiations and discussions ,russia still insists that she would not surrender any part of her sovereignty or submit to the only kind of inspection that could assure the world against clandestine production of atomic bombs and materials4 ,hence1 should ,russia demand that we renounce the right to use the ,a- and ,h-bombs not only as strategic but also as tactical weapons against her armies in exchange for a similar offer on her part1 it would on the face of it be a mere repetition of her earlier efforts to trick us into giving up our greatest weapons while she remained free to produce them in secret1 since she insists upon her right to retain ownership of the atomic plants and materials and upon the inspection of only those plants she acknowledges to exist1 thus making it impossible to find plants whose existence she does not admit4 ,to accept such an offer would be tantamount to surrender1 since our giving up the right to use the ,h-bomb as a tactical weapon against her armies would leave her free to march into the countries of western ,europe4 ,it would then be too late to stop her1 for we could not drop the ,h-bomb on the cities of western ,europe4 ,the only time to stop ,russia's armies is before they cross into the territory of our allies1 during the crucial period when they are mobilized in large numbers and on the march4 ,the ,american people1 and the other free peoples of the world1 could not agree to such a scheme to disarm them in advance and thus give the masters of the ,kremlin a free hand4 ,to do so would not prevent war1 it would encourage it4 ,it would not even delay it1 it would hasten it4 ,instead of being preventable1 it would become inevitable4 ,we wouldn't even save our cities from the fate of strategic bombing with ,a- and ,h-bombs1 since the ,kremlin has never kept its promises when they did not suit its purposes4 ,when we had lost our greatest chance to wipe out her armies in one mighty blow1 ,russia would be in a position to trade our industries and cities for her dispersed and still primitive industrial plants and cities4 ,if at that stage she should offer us1 as well as our neighbors to the south and ,britain and her ,dominions1 independence and complete sovereignty1 while she assumed hegemony over all of ,europe and ,asia1 could we then refuse1 at the risk of the lives of our millions8 ,supposing the nations of western ,europe1 overrun by the ,red ,army1 become 8people's democracies10 ,russian style1 would we risk our millions to liberate nations whose governments would by then have joined the ranks of our enemy8 ,these are the brutal facts that would confront us were we to renounce the right to use ,a- and ,h-bombs as tactical weapons against armies in the field4 ,as long as we retain that right1 the chances are good that we could prevent global war1 for no nation would be likely to risk such a war in the face of the possibility that the main bulk of its armies might be wiped out at the outset4 ,if we give up that right1 we would also prevent war--by surrendering in advance4 ,russia1 of course1 might figure that she could still make war1 when she decides the time is ripe1 taking the calculated risk that we would not use the ,a- and ,h-bombs against her armies for fear of her retaliation against our cities and industries4 ,but whether she would consider that calculated risk worth taking would depend on how good our defenses were4 ,senator ,mc,mahon's warning that an ,h-bomb attack 8might incinerate #ej1jjj1jjj ,americans 444 in the space of a few minutes0 would become a possibility only if we allowed ourselves to be surprised for a second time by a 8super ,pearl ,harbor10 which1 of course1 is inconceivable4 ,while it is generally agreed that it is impossible to decentralize our cities and industries1 because of the tremendous cost 7estimated at #cjj billion7 and the short time at our disposal between now and the ultimate showdown1 when ,russia is expected to be ready to make major moves at the risk of 8accepting0 war1 we have many advantages not possessed by ,britain and ,germany during the last war as far as defenses against strategic bombing were concerned4 ,britain1 as well as ,poland1 ,holland1 and ,belgium--little1 densely populated countries--were within very short range of ,germany's airfields4 ,so was ,germany1 in her turn1 within easy range from ,britain4 ,radar1 as compared with its modern types1 was primitive in quality and inadequate in quantity4 ,automatic antiaircraft guns1 interceptor planes1 and night fighters were either nonexistent in the early days of the blitz or in a crude stage of development compared with present equivalents4 ,how vastly different is our situation today vis--vis ,russia6 ,instead of a short hop across the ,english ,channel she would have to cross the ,atlantic or the ,pacific to reach our continent1 whereas we can reach her heartland from bases all around her borders4 ,it is unthinkable that any of her bombers can cross either ocean without being detected hundreds of miles before they reach our shores4 ,with modern radar devices1 which are constantly being improved1 and fleets of fast interceptors far in advance of anything ,russia could develop1 we would destroy them long before they would do us any harm4 ,if she attempts to fly over the ,north ,pole1 she will still have to cross all of ,canada before she can reach us1 and if we and our ,canadian friends are on the alert1 as we must and shall be1 any hostile planes could be detected and destroyed over the ,arctic4 ,there is1 of course1 the possibility of exploding an ,h-bomb some distance off shore from a submarine or from a tramp steamer1 but here1 too1 eternal vigilance will be the price of our liberties and our lives4 ,there can be no question that we shall succeed in finding the answer to the detection of the ,snorkel-type submarine and master it just as we mastered the earlier types4 ,american ingenuity and superior technology have never failed yet in the face of an emergency1 and it is unthinkable that they should fail now4 ,we often hear it said that an enemy could smuggle an ,a-bomb in small parts into this country and assemble it here4 ,while such an operation is possible1 its successful execution against a nation fully on guard is highly improbable4 ,as for the ,h-bomb1 it requires large quantities of liquefied gas1 which must be kept in a vacuum surrounded by large vessels of liquid air4 ,in addition it must have its ,a-bomb trigger and other complicated devices4 ,all this makes its surreptitious smuggling into a country such as ours even more improbable4 ,we have had it dinned into our ears for so long that there is no defense against the atomic bomb1 and that the only choice confronting us is 8one world or none10 without anyone taking the trouble to challenge these two pernicious catch-phrases1 that we have accepted them as gospel truth1 particularly since they were uttered by some of our more articulate atomic scientists4 ,that scientists should at last step out from their laboratories and classrooms to take an active interest in public affairs is highly commendable and welcome4 ,but that does not give them the right to take advantage of the great respect and confidence the public has for them with utterances that serve only to create fear and hysteria and a sense of helplessness1 while at the same time offering remedies they know to be unattainable4 ,the truth of the matter is that there can be and there is a defense against atomic weapons1 as against any other weapon4 ,basically it is the same as the defense against submarines or enemy bombers3 detect them and destroy them before they reach you4 ,the difference is largely a matter of degree4 ,since the atomic-bomb carrier can do greater damage1 the measures of defense against it must be correspondingly greater4 ,with the aid of the vast stretches of the ,atlantic and the ,pacific1 augmented by an effective radar and interceptor system1 on the one hand2 and with effective counter-submarine measures on the other1 the odds would be against a single ,a- or ,h-bomb reaching our shores4 ,faced with such an impregnable system of defense1 and with a threat of the swift annihilation of its armies as soon as they begin marching for war1 the ,kremlin could no longer1 unless its masters went completely berserk1 regard war1 or even a challenge to war1 a risk worth taking4 ,the cold war may get warmer1 as it did in ,korea1 but as long as we keep our heads and don't give way to fear and hysteria1 trusting in ,god and keeping our ,h-bombs 8wet10 it may never reach the boilingpoint4 ,and we have in addition a weapon even more powerful than the ,h-bomb or any other physical weapon1 which instead of bringing misery and death would bring new life and new hope to hundreds of millions now enslaved4 ,we have not yet even begun to fight on the battlefield of ideas1 in which we can match freedom against tyranny1 friendship against class hatred1 truth against lies1 a society based on the respect and dignity of the individual and the giving of full scope to human aspirations against a society modeled after the beehive and the ant-heap4 8,real peace10 former ,assistant ,secretary of ,state ,adolf ,a4 ,berle1 ,jr41 said in the ,new ,leader1 8is deeper than absence of war4 ,that will be won in the realm of philosophy and ideas4 ,indeed1 the great reason for preventing war is to permit ideas to meet ideas on their own merits4444 ,the statesman's business is to keep the conflagration at bay and give ideas their chance1 relying on the moral strength of the ideals he represents to bring to their support the masses throughout the world40 ,in such a war of ideas1 he adds1 there could be no doubt about the outcome1 as the ,west can oppose all its positives against ,moscow's negatives4 ,we meet 8a betrayed revolution1 in a decadent1 imperialist1 dictatorial phase1 building an empire on the negatives of human behavior4 ,such empires engage no permanent loyalties2 they invariably break up4 ,war would defeat this empire in any case4 ,first rate statesmanship can avoid that war40 ,in the words of ,general ,george ,c4 ,marshall1 8the most important thing for the world today is a spiritual regeneration4444 ,we must present democracy as a force holding within itself the seeds of unlimited progress for the human race4 ,we should make it clear that it is a means to a better way of life within nations and to a better understanding among nations4 ,tyranny inevitably must fall back before the tremendous moral strength of the gospel of freedom and self-respect for the individual40 ,as an advance army in this war of ideas we already have a fifth column of millions waiting for our signal to march1 the millions of the enslaved satellite countries--,poland1 ,czechoslovakia1 the ,baltic countries1 ,hungary1 ,bulgaria1 ,rumania--as well as millions upon millions behind the ,iron ,curtain in ,russia itself4 ,the greatest mistake made by ,hitler was his failure to utilize the readiness and eagerness of a large percentage of the ,russian masses to turn against their oppressors4 ,when the ,nazi armies marched into the ,ukraine1 large numbers of ,ukrainians1 who had been longing for independence for centuries1 greeted them as their liberators with the traditional bread and salt1 symbol of welcome4 ,russian soldiers surrendered by the thousands and they1 along with the men of the villages1 volunteered in great numbers to fight against their enslavers4 ,in the hearts of millions of ,russians behind the front1 the longing for liberty1 never extinguished1 was given its greatest stimulus since the days when they overthrew the ,czarist regime4 ,they1 too1 were waiting for the ,germans to give them back the revolution the ,communists had stolen from them with lies and deceit4 ,with the stupidity characteristic of all criminals1 ,hitler and ,himmler proclaimed that the ,russians were to be treated as an 8inferior race40 ,everywhere their armies went they burned and pillaged and raped4 ,instead of liberators they turned out to be most savage barbarians1 who behaved even worse than the commissars4 ,it was this inconceivable folly of ,hitler1 as well as our ,lend-,lease1 that played a major role in enabling the ,kremlin to win the war4 ,the ,russian masses and those of the enslaved satellite countries are still waiting for their liberators4 ,the masters of the ,kremlin know it1 but they hope that1 like the ,nazis1 we will be too stupid to take advantage of it4 ,if a war ever breaks out1 we shall have millions joining our ranks provided we do not destroy these millions1 those not in uniform1 with ,a- or ,h-bombs in the strategic bombing of their cities4 ,but we should not wait until a war breaks out4 ,we must begin mobilizing them right now for the war of ideas4 ,the so-called ,iron ,curtain is a fake1 like the rest of the ,communist set-up4 ,it is made of tinsel and is full of thousands of holes1 through which we can pass if we will4 ,those thousands of miles of border ringing the vast ,russian ,empire could be utilized as great thoroughfares of ideas1 to be smuggled to the millions waiting for them4 ,there isn't a guard on those borders who couldn't1 with the proper approach and inducements1 be enlisted in our army of ideas4 ,in addition to flooding the air over ,russia with tiny balloons1 each carrying a message of freedom and hope1 we could also smuggle into the country small radio receiving sets by the millions to bring the ,voice of ,america to millions of ,russian homes4 ,we could attach to those balloons small loaves of bread1 packages of cigarettes1 little trinkets for babies1 nylon stockings for women1 on a scale that no police could cope with4 ,nor could the ,kremlin risk forbidding it1 as that would place it in the position of further depriving its starved and hungry people of things they badly need and want4 ,with these weapons on the battlefront in the war of ideas1 and with the ,a- and ,h-bomb to give the ,kremlin pause1 we would be well on the way to win any war1 cold or hot4 ,our justification for building the hydrogen bomb is thus not merely to prevent its use1 but to prevent ,world ,war ,,iii1 and to win it if it comes4 ,we are not building it to bring ,russia to her knees4 ,we are building it to bring her to her senses4 ,we must make the ,kremlin realize with ,general ,marshall that 8tyranny inevitably must fall back before the tremendous moral strength of the gospel of freedom and self-respect for the individual40 ,,iv ,,korea ,,cleared ,,the ,,air ,as this is being written1 the ,korean war is just one month old4 ,by the time these lines appear in print we may know whether the naked ,communist aggression on the ,republic of ,south ,korea was an episode1 a prelude1 or the first act of ,world ,war ,,iii4 ,but whatever history records1 the first flash of the ,communist guns1 supplied by the ,kremlin1 has revealed to the free world at last the face of the enemy in all its hideousness4 ,it brought the first phase of the so-called cold war to a definite end4 ,it aroused freedom-loving peoples everywhere and put them on the alert4 ,it served as a powerful headlight in the night1 revealing many dangerous curves on the road ahead4 ,it has given the ,united ,nations its first great opportunity to display its vitality for all the world to see4 ,among other things1 the flash of the ,north ,korean guns has illumined for us more clearly than ever before the path we must follow in our policy on atomic weapons1 both the ,a-bomb and the ,h-bomb4 ,it has revealed the extreme danger lurking in any plan to outlaw production and use of atomic weapons in a world constantly threatened by a savage dictatorship1 ready to pounce on it at the first sign of weakening in its armor4 ,the flash of the ,red guns1 in the first place1 made it clear to free men everywhere that to renounce our right to the production of atomic weapons as potentially the greatest deterrents against the further spread of ,communist aggression1 and as the most powerful defenders of the spiritual and moral values without which our way of life would become meaningless1 would allow the ,red ,army to overrun what remains of the free world4 ,such a move on our part1 for the present and the foreseeable future1 may herald the last appearance of free men on the stage of history4 ,it would be1 as the ,goncourt brothers feared1 8closing time1 gentlemen60 ,in addition to warning us what we must not do1 the ,red guns also gave warning of a more positive nature4 ,they warned us to make all haste in the construction of the hydrogen bomb1 to get it ready as soon as possible1 against the eventuality that ,russia may decide it would be to her advantage to precipitate ,world ,war ,,iii before our ,h-bomb is ready4 ,instead of the estimated pre-,korea time-table of three years1 it now becomes a vital necessity for us to complete our ,h-bomb1 and facilities for its production at a speedy rate1 within a year4 ,and if the history of our development of the ,a-bomb may serve as an example1 it almost becomes a certainty that we shall do so4 ,while we may not announce it to the world1 we have good reason to expect that the first ,h-bomb will be ready for testing sometime in #aiea1 possibly in early summer4 ,this forecast is not based on merely guesswork4 ,when we decided to go all out in developing the ,a-bomb--and we didn't really go to work in earnest until ,may #aidc--nobody knew that it could be successfully made4 ,there were two enormous major problems to be solved1 and solved in time to be of use in winning the war4 ,one was to produce unheard-of quantities of fissionable materials 7,u-#bce and plutonium71 literally in quantities billions of times greater than had ever been produced before4 ,nobody knew whether it could be done or how it could be done4 ,three gigantic plants were built1 at a cost of #a1ejj1jjj1jjj1 on the mere chance1 8calculated risk0 we called it1 that one of them would work4 ,as it turned out1 they all worked1 some more efficiently than others1 though all contributed to the shortening of the war4 ,the second major problem1 among a host of smaller ones1 all important to the successful attainment of the goal1 was how to assemble the materials produced in the billion-dollar plants into a bomb that would live up to expectations4 ,both major problems had to be solved simultaneously4 ,the designing of the bomb went on for more than two years with only trickles of the active material4 ,yet despite all these enormous difficulties the ,a-bomb was completed for testing in about two years and three months after the beginning of the large-scale effort4 ,compared with the enormousness of the problems that had to be solved1 and were solved successfully in this remarkably short time1 the problems still to be solved for building the hydrogen bomb appear relatively simple1 since all the materials required and the plants to produce them are already built1 paid for1 and operating successfully4 ,as already pointed out1 we have the ,a-bombs to serve as triggers1 large stockpiles of deuterium1 and the refrigeration equipment and techniques to liquefy it4 ,we have an adequate supply of lithium for the production of tritium1 which1 as explained earlier1 would be used as the extra kindling to the ,a-bomb match4 ,and we have1 of course1 our gigantic plutonium factories at ,hanford1 ,washington1 in which the lithium could be converted into tritium in the desired amounts4 ,thus1 instead of having to start from scratch as we were forced to do with the ,a-bomb1 we have at hand all the necessary ingredients for the ,h-bomb with the possible exception of sufficient tritium1 and since we have the plutonium plants1 greatly expanded and improved since the end of the war1 it is reasonable to make a 8guestimate10 to use a word popular in wartime1 that a few months should suffice for them1 if they are employed exclusively for that purpose1 to produce tritium in proper amounts4 ,that we have decided to complete the construction of the ,h-bomb in the shortest possible time was made clear on ,july #g1 two weeks following the ,communist attack on ,south ,korea1 when ,president ,truman asked ,congress to furnish #bfj1jjj1jjj in cash 8to build additional and more efficient plants and related facilities0 for materials that can be used either for weapons or for fuels potentially useful for power purposes4 ,the appropriation1 he said1 was required 8in furtherance of my directive of ,january #ca1 #aiej10 in which he had ordered the ,atomic ,energy ,commission 8to continue its work on the so-called hydrogen bomb02 and this was further clarified in a letter to the ,president by the ,budget ,director1 ,frederick ,j4 ,lawton1 recommending the money request1 to the effect that the materials to be produced in the proposed plants could be used for either atomic bombs or hydrogen bombs4 ,since the only type of plant that could produce materials for both the ,a-bomb and the ,h-bomb is a nuclear reactor for producing plutonium1 and since tritium is the only ,h-bomb element that could be produced in a plutonium plant1 the request by the ,president may be interpreted as the first1 though indirect1 official confirmation that tritium is looked upon as one of the ingredients necessary for a successful ,h-bomb4 ,we were given a hint of a possible time-table when it was revealed that the all-cash request would have to be obligated in one year though its actual disbursal could be spread over four years4 ,this suggests the possibility that the nuclear reactors for the large-scale production of tritium might be rushed to completion within one year4 ,while these new reactors for the production of tritium are being built1 we can convert all our ,hanford reactors for that purpose so that no time need be lost4 ,whatever amounts of plutonium would have to be sacrificed by diverting the ,hanford plants from plutonium to tritium would be offset by the new uranium concentration plants at ,oak ,ridge1 and by the fact that we already have a large stockpile of both ,u-#bce and plutonium accumulated over a period of five years4 ,the one and only major problem to be solved is how to assemble into an efficient ,h-bomb the materials we already have at hand or will have in a few months4 ,here1 too1 we are much farther advanced than we were at the time we decided to build the ,a-bomb1 as we are not called upon to start from scratch4 ,for whereas in the early days of the ,a-bomb development scientists were doubtful whether it could be made at all and were actually hoping that their investigations would prove that it was impossible1 for the ,nazis as well as for us1 no such doubts seem to exist in the minds of those most intimately associated with the problem4 ,on this score we have had more than hints from a number of those in the know1 among them ,senator ,mc,mahon4 8,the scientists10 he said in a historic address to the ,united ,states ,senate on ,february #b1 #aiej1 8feel more confident that this most horrible of armaments the hydrogen bomb can be developed successfully than they felt in #aidj when the original bomb was under consideration4 ,the hydrogen development will be cheaper than its uranium forerunner4 ,theoretically1 it is without limit in destructive capacity4 ,a weapon made of such material would destroy any military or other target1 including the largest city on earth40 ,what is this confidence based on8 ,scientists are a very conservative lot1 not given to jumping to conclusions without experimental evidence on which to base them4 ,i remember well the agonizing hours preceding the test of the first ,a-bomb in ,new ,mexico1 when everyone present1 particularly the intellectual hierarchy that was most responsible1 was beset by grave doubts whether the ,a-bomb would go off at all1 and if it did1 whether it would live up to expectations or turn out to be no more than an improved blockbuster4 ,very few1 if any1 felt confident that it would be as good as it finally turned out to be4 ,for example1 in a pool in which everyone bet a dollar to guess the ultimate power of the bomb in terms of ,,tnt1 ,dr4 ,oppenheimer placed his bet on #cjj tons4 ,this makes it evident that the scientists were not very confident even as late as #aide1 up to the very last minute1 when 8the brain child of many minds came forth in physical shape and performed as it was supposed to do40 ,if the scientists are more confident today than they were in #aidj1 and even1 it would seem1 in #aide1 when the bomb stood on its steel tower ready for its first test1 it can only mean that their confidence is based on innumerable experiments carried out during the five years that have elapsed since ,hiroshima4 ,by the semiannual reports to ,congress by the ,atomic ,energy ,commission1 and reports presented before the ,american ,physical ,society1 or published in official publications1 by members of the ,los ,alamos ,scientific ,laboratory and other leading institutions1 we have been officially informed of many experiments that have been carried out on nuclear reactions between deuterons and deuterons1 tritons and tritons1 and deuterons and tritons--namely1 the very reactions to be expected in an ,h-bomb using deuterium1 tritium1 or a mixture of the two4 ,this makes it obvious that during the five years since ,hiroshima we have accumulated a vast body of knowledge about the reactions necessary for a successful ,h-bomb4 ,furthermore1 this gives us the assurance that we are five years ahead of ,russia on the ,h-bomb as well as the ,a-bomb1 since we have had plutonium plants in which to make tritium for at least five years1 whereas she has just placed her plutonium plants in operation and1 as we have seen1 can ill afford to sacrifice the vital plutonium she needs for building up her ,a-bomb stockpile to begin experiments we had most likely carried out five years ago4 ,the best evidence so far that we have made much progress during the past five years on the design of the ,h-bomb--evidence strongly indicating that it had passed the blueprint stage and was ready for construction--was supplied recently by ,lewis ,l4 ,strauss1 a member of the original ,atomic ,energy ,commission1 when he revealed that 8the greatest issue of division0 7between himself and other members of the ,,aec7 8was whether or not to proceed with the hydrogen bomb1 as for some time ,i had strongly urged to do40 ,now1 ,strauss1 who went into the ,navy in ,world ,war ,,ii as a lieutenant commander and rose to be a rear admiral1 is a leading financier of wide experience1 so it may be taken for granted that if for some time he had 8strongly urged0 proceeding with the hydrogen bomb1 it must have been because he had been assured by the scientific experts that it was feasible4 ,men of his background and experience do not 8strongly urge0 the diversion of resources to projects unless they are strongly convinced that the project is both practical and feasible4 ,his words1 when read in the light of statements by other members of the ,,aec1 suggest that the division of opinion on this score among the members of the ,commission was not over the feasibility of the ,h-bomb but over the belief that the ,a-bomb was good enough as long as we were its sole possessors and that we could maintain our advantage for a long time by building more and better ,a-bombs4 ,on the other hand1 the fact that the majority of the ,,aec did not agree with ,strauss on the necessity of proceeding with the hydrogen bomb must certainly not be interpreted to mean that they halted all studies on the subject1 for that would be charging them with gross negligence4 ,it is much more reasonable to assume that the 8greatest issue of division0 7mark the use of the word 8greatest10 which indicates many a heated debate7 was whether or not to proceed at once with the actual building of the bomb1 after it had been fully designed and shown to be feasible in a host of painstaking studies over a period of at least four years4 ,there can therefore be no question that as soon as the ,president issued his directive to the ,,aec 8to continue0 its work on the hydrogen bomb1 the first item on the program was to proceed at once with the production of tritium in sizable amounts1 since all known facts point to the need of tritium as extra kindling for the ,a-bomb trigger4 ,we can also be sure that the production of whatever other auxiliary paraphernalia may be necessary was at once placed on the top-priority list4 ,by the end of #aiej1 if not earlier1 we should thus have all the necessary materials ready in the desired amounts4 ,meantime1 we can be sure that our top scientists have been putting the finishing touches on designs for assembling the materials--the finishing touches1 since there can be no doubt that the blueprints for a successful ,h-bomb have been completed for at least a year and possibly for three or four4 ,it would be unthinkable that we were so careless as to drop all work on such a vital matter1 which as far back as #aide appeared to be a definite possibility4 ,for this we have no less an authority than ,dr4 ,oppenheimer4 ,in an article in the book ,one ,world or ,none1 published late in #aide1 discussing atomic weapons of the future1 he described bombs 8that would reduce the cost of destruction per square mile probably by a factor of #aj or more10 which1 as we now know1 would be a bomb of a thousand times the power that destroyed ,hiroshima--namely1 a hydrogen bomb4 8,preliminary investigations0 of proposals for such a bomb1 ,dr4 ,oppenheimer wrote at that early date1 8appeared sound40 ,if the preliminary investigations 8appeared sound0 to scientists such as ,dr4 ,oppenheimer in #aide1 and bearing in mind ,president ,truman's orders to the ,,aec in #aiej 8to continue its work10 we can only conclude that the interim years produced results far beyond the preliminary stage1 when they merely 8appeared0 to be sound4 ,judging by the reaction of some leading physicists to the ,president's order1 the ,h-bomb appears to be an ominous reality1 a completed architectural plan requiring only a few polishing touches4 ,in a word1 we are almost ready to go4 ,and while ,dr4 ,bethe estimated that it would take three years to complete the first ,h-bomb1 we must remember that he spoke several months before the guns of ,korea gave the alarm4 ,and we must not forget that had it not been for the threat of the ,nazis we might not have had the ,a-bomb in less than twenty-five and possibly fifty years1 according to the best estimates1 though the present ,communist threat might have reduced the time considerably4 ,furthermore1 we also have the word of ,senator ,mc,mahon1 who should know1 that 8the hydrogen development will be cheaper than its uranium forerunner40 ,this lends weight to the earlier deduction that only relatively small amounts of tritium will be necessary1 since1 as we have seen1 large amounts would be prohibitively costly in terms of vast quantities of plutonium4 ,small amounts of tritium1 in turn1 mean that it would take a relatively short time to produce them4 ,a reasonable 8guestimate10 assuming that #aej to #cjj grams of tritium would be required1 is that such amounts could be produced within a few months1 particularly if we employ all our huge plutonium plants at ,hanford on the task of producing tritium4 ,it is therefore within the realm of possibility that when we carry out the announced tests of the latest models of our ,a-bombs at ,eniwetok1 sometime in the spring or summer of #aiea1 one of them will be the first ,h-bomb4 ,it may not be the best model1 and it need not be the equal in power to a thousand wartime model ,a-bombs4 ,in fact1 it would be highly inadvisable to use such a bomb in a mere test4 ,it will be an ,h-bomb1 nevertheless1 and from it we shall learn how to make bigger and better ones1 which is all that a test is supposed to do4 ,for unlike the ,a-bomb1 which cannot be made below or above a certain size1 the ,h-bomb can be made as small or as large as the designer wants it to be4 ,as ,professor ,bacher has pointed out1 the ,h-bomb is 8an open-ended weapon40 ,one of the major outcomes of the ,korean aggression instigated by the ,kremlin has thus been to bring the ,h-bomb into being much sooner than it would otherwise have been4 ,and that is only one branch of the chain reaction that the ,korean guns have set in motion4 ,in addition to unmasking completely the ,kremlin's ultimate intentions to enslave mankind1 and alerting the free nations of the world to the danger facing them as they had not been alerted since ,hitler's attack on ,poland1 the flash of the ,korean guns has also shed new light on the ,politburo's strategy of conquest4 ,the best-informed opinion in the summer of #aiej holds that the ,kremlin has decided on a series of little wars that would slowly drain our lifeblood and ruin our economy1 and thus bring about the collapse and ruin of the rest of the world's free nations1 rather than force a global war1 ,german style4 ,among other reasons for such a strategy--and there are many logical reasons for it from ,russia's point of view--is the fact1 already become evident in ,korea1 that in such little wars1 fought with ,russian equipment and other people's blood1 we would not use atomic weapons of any kind1 not only because there are no suitable targets1 but because dictates of humanity make the use of such weapons on little peoples1 caught in the net of ,communism1 wholly inconceivable4 ,by deciding on a series of little wars1 over a prolonged period1 one following the other or coming simultaneously1 ,russia may thus figure that she could gain her ultimate objective in the cheapest possible way1 while at the same time making sure that our atomic-bomb stockpile is wholly neutralized4 ,if this turns out to be true1 we would at least escape atomic warfare1 and since we1 and the rest of the civilized world1 fervently wish to avoid being forced to use atomic weapons1 this would be all to the good4 ,but we must also take into consideration the possibility that the very decision on ,russia's part to wage little wars and avoid a global war may have been greatly influenced by the fact that we have a large stockpile of ,a-bombs while her stockpile is still negligible1 forcing her to adopt a strategy in which our superiority would be nullified4 ,it is also possible that after her first experience with the production of ,a-bombs she may have realized that it would be much too costly to try to catch up with us and have therefore decided on a strategy in which atomic weapons could not possibly play any part4 ,on the other hand1 it may also mean that she will not risk a global war until she has built up an adequate stockpile of her own1 meantime softening us up with a series of little wars4 ,with all this in mind1 it behooves us to take a closer look at our program for the outlawing of atomic weapons and the placing of atomic energy under international control4 ,it was a noble ideal1 one of the noblest conceived by man3 the most powerful nation in the world voluntarily offered to give up the right to produce or use the greatest weapon ever designed4 ,alas1 it almost died at birth1 and now1 after four years of nursing in an incubator1 the ,korean guns have given it a fatal blow4 ,we might as well face the facts squarely3 the majority plan for the international control of atomic energy1 the only acceptable plan possible1 is dead1 one of the first casualties of the ,korean guns4 ,we still talk about trying to find ways for compromise between our plan1 accepted by all the nations outside the ,iron ,curtain1 and that of ,russia4 ,we are still talking1 at least officially1 as though somehow a compromise can and will be found4 ,the truth of the matter is that the plan as it stands today is completely out of tune with the times4 ,as we look on it by the light of the ,north ,korean guns1 it becomes clear that it is wholly visionary1 without any relation to the realities4 ,we still talk as though our original offer still stands4 ,the truth of the matter is that even were the impossible to happen and ,russia were to say to the world3 8,we have been mistaken4 ,we accept the ,american and the majority plan in toto without any reservations10 we should be forced to say3 8,sorry1 it is too late1 you have missed your chance4 ,your actions have made the plan unworkable1 since it cannot possibly work in an atmosphere of mutual distrust and the constant threat of little wars60 ,and even if wise diplomacy prevented us from saying it in such blunt language1 and though we may still find it expedient to pay lip service to the majority plan1 so that ,russia could not use it in her propaganda war as evidence that we were insincere from the very beginning1 we would have to wriggle to get out of the very serious predicament in which ,russia's acceptance would place us4 ,and even if diplomacy dictated that we sign a convention with ,russia to outlaw production and use of all atomic weapons1 to destroy our stockpiles and hand over all our atomic plants to an international atomic authority1 as our present plan calls for1 there can be no question that such a convention could never muster the approval of even a majority of the ,senate1 and certainly not the required consent of two thirds of the ,senate called for by the ,constitution4 ,what is more1 such a rejection would have the overwhelming approval of ,american people1 once the facts were made clear to them1 and any administration daring to enter such a pact would be overwhelmingly defeated4 ,all this has been so evident for more than two years that it is remarkable that the ,russians have failed so far to take advantage of our potential embarrassment and thus win one of their greatest victories on the propaganda front4 ,in fact1 their failure to do so1 with the sure knowledge that they would risk nothing by accepting a plan that would most certainly be rejected by our own people1 not only reveals lack of subtlety on their part1 but appears on the surface as crass stupidity1 the same type of stupidity displayed by ,hitler1 which appears to be an inevitable trait of all monolithic dictatorships that must lead to their ultimate undoing4 ,the time has come for us to stop talking about giving away our greatest weapons1 the only ones1 as ,president ,truman and ,winston ,churchill have told us1 that have kept the ,red ,army hordes from overrunning the free world4 ,it is time for us to face reality and place the blame where it belongs4 ,the evil does not lie in weapons per se4 ,it lies in war itself4 ,it is no evil to build and possess the most powerful weapons at our command with which to defend ourselves against a ruthless aggressor4 ,on the contrary1 it would be an evil thing to throw away the principal weapon standing between us and possible defeat4 ,it is no evil to use a weapon to destroy your enemy just because your weapon happens to be the most powerful in existence4 ,it is no greater evil to destroy thousands of your enemy in one great flash than to destroy them by goring them with bayonets4 ,the real evildoer is the nation that starts an aggressive war4 ,those attacked have the right and duty to defend themselves by all means at their command4 ,our confusion has been the result of our first use of the ,a-bomb to destroy a city with thousands of its civilian population4 ,let us admit that the mass bombing of large populated cities 7which1 by the way1 was started by the ,nazis7 is wholly inexcusable with any kind of weapons1 and that we should never resort to such strategic bombing again4 ,that does not mean that we should renounce our right to use ,a-bombs to destroy an enemy's armies1 navies1 and airfields1 his transportation facilities and his oil wells--in a word1 his capacity to make war against us4 ,and as long as we use the ,a-bomb and the ,h-bomb only as weapons of tremendous power to destroy by blast and by fire1 they are no different from ordinary blockbusters or incendiaries except that they concentrate their power in a small package4 ,is there any difference1 morally speaking1 between the use of thousands of blockbusters and tens of thousands of incendiaries and a weapon that concentrates all their power in one8 ,probably the main reason for the confused thinking that has singled out atomic weapons as a greater evil than other weapons of mass destruction has been their radioactivity4 ,but even the ,a-bombs exploded over ,japan were purposely dropped from a height that carried most of the radioactivity away into the upper atmosphere4 ,nor will the ,h-bomb1 as explained earlier1 release great quantities of radioactivity unless it is purposely rigged to do so4 ,we should1 therefore1 lose nothing and gain much if we renounced the use of ,a- and ,h-bombs as radioactive weapons except in retaliation against the use of such weapons on us or our allies4 ,but to renounce their use altogether would be tantamount not only to physical but to spiritual suicide as well1 for it would mean condoning the advance of the ,red ,army4 ,it has become customary to talk about ,russia's atom bomb as though she already was1 or soon will be1 on a par with us4 ,it is true that eventually she will catch up with us in the development of a large stockpile of her own and in designing more efficient models4 ,but that is only one side of the picture4 ,as of #aiej1 and for at least until #aieb1 years that may well be crucial1 our superiority in ,a-bombs will remain unchallenged1 not only qualitatively but quantitatively4 ,by that time we shall have greatly increased our lead by the possession of an effective stockpile of ,h-bombs4 ,since ,russia cannot build ,h-bombs at the present stage without sacrificing quantities of plutonium she needs to build up her ,a-bomb stockpile1 she will find herself compelled to build additional plutonium plants1 which not only will greatly strain her resources but1 more important from our point of view1 will gain us additional time4 ,how many ,a-bombs can ,russia make8 ,former ,secretary of ,war ,henry ,l4 ,stimson has told us that the ,a-bombs we dropped on ,japan 8were the only ones we had ready40 ,counting the test bomb at ,alamogordo1 we had thus produced three bombs by mid-,august #aide4 ,this represented the total output of a two-billion-dollar plant1 employing three major methods of production1 after the plants had been in operation for an average of about six months4 ,in other words1 it took our two-billion-dollar plant about six months to produce three ,a-bombs--a rate of six ,a-bombs a year4 ,now all the evidence at hand1 as already pointed out1 indicates that1 instead of building three different types of plants for producing ,a-bomb materials1 ,russia is concentrating entirely on plutonium4 ,hence1 if we assume that she built a plutonium plant equal in output to the total capacity of our wartime uranium and plutonium plants1 and further assuming that her methods for producing plutonium are as efficient as ours1 the best she could do at present would be at the rate of six plutonium bombs a year4 ,at this rate she would have about eighteen by the middle of #aieb4 ,this would be a sizable stockpile for a nation in sole possession of such a weapon4 ,but would any nation with such a stockpile dare challenge a nation with a stockpile many times bigger1 consisting of bombs many times more powerful1 and possessing a few hydrogen bombs to boot8 ,russia will1 no doubt1 improve her production methods4 ,but to improve them to the extent of producing1 let us say1 two bombs per month1 she would have to step up her production by four hundred per cent4 ,it is doubtful if such a step-up could be achieved in less than three years4 ,then there are other factors to be considered that greatly balance the scales in our favor4 ,to produce plutonium bombs requires tremendous quantities of uranium1 something that cannot be conjured up by just dialectic materialism4 ,it so happens that we have access to the only two rich uranium deposits known in the world3 the ,belgian ,congo1 and the ,great ,bear ,lake area in ,canada4 ,there were no known rich uranium deposits in ,russia proper or in the territories of her satellites1 with the possible exception of ,czechoslovakia4 ,we know this from the fact that she never competed for the world markets for radium1 extracted economically only from rich uranium ores1 which sold before the war at #be1jjj per gram1 or at the rate of nearly #ab1jjj1jjj a pound4 ,the best evidence1 however1 that she does not have at her command rich uranium deposits either in ,russia or elsewhere is her ruthless exploitation1 at the cost of thousands of human lives1 of the depleted uranium mines in the mountains of ,saxony1 which had long been abandoned by their ,german owners4 ,the only other known source of pitchblende 7the mineral richest in uranium7 under ,russian control is ,joachimsthal 7,jachymov7 in ,bohemia1 from which came the first radium sample isolated by ,mme ,curie about fifty years ago4 ,this mine1 too1 has been largely depleted1 though much of its uranium may possibly be recoverable from the dump-heaps1 if they have not in the meantime been disposed of4 ,now1 every ton of pure uranium metal contains just fourteen pounds of the fissionable element uranium #bce4 ,the latter1 when split1 releases the neutrons that create plutonium out of nonfissionable uranium #bch4 ,on the basis of one hundred per cent efficiency1 impossible in this operation1 the yield of plutonium would thus be fourteen pounds per ton4 ,since the plutonium must be extracted long before all the ,u-#bce atoms have been split1 however1 the likelihood is that the yield would be no more than two to four pounds per ton4 ,russia would thus need tens of thousands of tons of uranium ore to build up a sizable stockpile of ,a-bombs1 and while she may be able to process low-grade ores1 it would take her much longer to produce a given quantity of plutonium than it takes us to produce it from our much richer ores4 ,for example1 an ore containing fifty per cent uranium would yield a given quantity of plutonium ten times faster than an ore containing only five per cent1 unless a refining plant ten times the size is built at ten times the cost of construction and of operation4 ,if we take ,professor ,oliphant's published estimate that the critical mass 7that is1 the minimum amount7 needed for an ,a-bomb is between #aj and #cj kilograms 7#bb and #ff pounds71 we get a clear picture of the enormous difference there is between rich ores and poor ores for the building up of an ,a-bomb stockpile1 and a further concept of the difficulties that ,russia will face in trying to produce an ,h-bomb4 ,according to the best available prewar information1 the pitchblende of the ,belgian ,congo has a uranium content as high as #fj to #hj per cent2 the ,canadian ore yields from #cj to #dj per cent4 ,a conservative estimate would thus place the average uranium content of ,belgian and ,canadian ores at somewhere around #ej per cent4 ,this contrasts sharply with a prewar figure of around #c per cent uranium for the pitchblende of ,czechoslovakia1 and the ore in the mountains of ,saxony is of even lower grade4 ,hence on the basis of two to four pounds of plutonium per ton of uranium metal1 it would require the mining and processing of only #b tons of ,belgian and ,canadian ore to obtain that amount as compared with #cd tons for the ore from ,czechoslovakia1 and a larger amount for the ,saxon ore4 ,to make a bomb containing #bb pounds of plutonium would thus require us to mine and process from #aa to #bb tons of ore1 whereas ,russia would need from #ahg to #cgd tons4 ,for a bomb requiring #ff pounds1 the amount1 of course1 would be correspondingly tripled1 reaching a possible figure of #a1abb tons of ore to produce one ,a-bomb1 as compared with a maximum of no more than #ff tons of the ores available to us4 ,in a state employing slave labor and heedless of the wastage of human lives1 the production cost does not count4 ,but even ,russia's manpower is not unlimited1 and workers removed from other lines of production must inevitably hurt the economy4 ,this factor must put a definite limit to ,russia's capacity to produce ,a-bombs and will make it very difficult1 if not impossible1 for her to produce a large stockpile in a short time4 ,when it comes to producing an ,h-bomb1 the disparity between ourselves and ,russia assumes astronomical proportions4 ,it takes #hj pounds of uranium #bce to produce one pound of tritium4 ,since1 as we have seen1 there are only #ad pounds of ,u-#bce in a ton of natural uranium metal1 this means that #e4g tons of uranium metal would be required1 assuming one hundred per cent efficiency of utilization1 which is out of the question4 ,on the basis of figures already given1 it can be seen that we would require the mining and processing of only #aa4d tons of ore whereas ,russia would have to use as much as #aid tons to produce that single pound of the element which1 as the facts cited earlier appear to demonstrate1 is vital for the construction of a successful ,h-bomb4 ,all these basic facts1 never presented before1 should convince us that1 despite the fact that ,russia has exploded her first ,a-bomb1 we still have tremendous advantages over her that she will find extremely difficult to overcome4 ,and we must not forget other advantages on our side that may prove decisive even after ,russia succeeds in building up a sizable stockpile4 ,bombs can be delivered against us at present only by airplane or by submarine4 ,a look at the map will show that whereas the ,atlantic and ,pacific ,oceans stand between us and ,russia's nearest bases1 we are in a much better position to deliver ,a-bombs to her vital centers1 such as the oil fields in the ,caucasus1 for example1 from bases close by4 ,it is1 furthermore1 not unreasonable to assume that we1 as the most advanced industrial nation in the world1 will manage to maintain our lead not only in methods of delivery by superior and faster airplanes1 or by guided missiles1 but also in the development of radar1 sonar1 and other detection devices1 as well as of superior interceptors and other defensive measures1 which would make delivery of ,a-bombs against us much more difficult than it would be for us to deliver them against ,russia4 ,for the next three years1 it can thus be seen1 and possibly for a considerably longer period1 the initiative1 as far as atomic weapons are concerned1 will remain with us4 ,let us therefore be done with all visionary plans for destroying the shield that now protects civilization as we know it1 and proceed to build bigger and better shields1 hoping that by our very act of doing so we can prevent the ultimate cataclysm4 ,right now the outlook is not bright1 but our strength1 physical and spiritual1 should give us faith that the forces of good will prevail in the end over the forces of evil1 as they have always done throughout history2 that the four freedoms will triumph over the ,four ,horsemen of the ,apocalypse4 ,v ,a ,,primer ,,of ,,atomic ,,energy ,the material universe1 the earth and everything in it1 all things living and non-living1 the sun and its planets1 the stars and the constellations1 the galaxies and the supergalaxies1 the infinitely large and the infinitesimally small1 manifests itself to our senses in two forms1 matter and energy4 ,we do not know1 and probably never can know1 how the material universe began1 and whether1 indeed1 it ever had a beginning1 but we do know that it is constantly changing and that it did not always exist in its present form4 ,we also know that in whatever form the universe may have existed1 matter and energy have always been inseparable1 no energy being possible without matter1 and no matter without energy1 each being a form of the other4 ,while we do not know how and when matter and energy came into being1 or whether they ever had a beginning in time as we perceive it1 we do know that while the relative amounts of matter and energy are constantly changing1 the total amount of both1 in one form or the other1 always remains the same4 ,when a plant grows1 energy from the sun1 in the form of heat and light1 is converted into matter1 so that the total weight of the plant is greater than that of the elementary material constituents1 water and carbon-dioxide gas1 out of which its substance is built up4 ,when the substance of the plant is again broken up into its original constituents by burning1 the residual ashes and gases weigh less than the total weight of the intact plant1 the difference corresponding to the amount of matter that had been converted into energy1 liberated once again in the form of heat and light4 ,all energy as we know it manifests itself through motion or change in the physical or chemical state of matter1 or both1 though these changes and motions may be so slow as to be imperceptible4 ,as the ancient ,greek philosopher ,heraclitus perceived more than two thousand years ago1 all things are in a constant state of flux1 this flux being due to an everlasting conversion of matter into energy and energy into matter1 everywhere over the vast stretches of the material universe1 to its outermost and innermost limits1 if any limits there be4 ,each manifestation of energy involves either matter in motion or a change in its physical state1 which we designate as physical energy2 a change in the chemical constitution of matter1 which we know as chemical energy2 or a combination of the two4 ,physical energy can be converted into chemical energy and vice versa4 ,for example1 heat and light are forms of physical energy1 each consisting of a definite band of waves of definite wave lengths in violent1 regular1 rhythmic oscillations4 ,a mysterious mechanism in the plant1 known as photosynthesis1 uses the heat and light energy from the sun to create complex substances1 such as sugars1 starches1 and cellulose1 out of simpler substances1 such as carbon dioxide and water1 converting physical energy1 heat1 and light into the chemical energy required to hold together the complex substances the plant produces4 ,when we burn the cellulose in the form of wood or coal 7coal is petrified wood71 the chemical energy is once again converted into physical energy in the form of the original heat and light4 ,as we have seen1 the chemical energy stored in the plant manifested itself by an increase in the plant's weight as compared with that of its original constituents4 ,similarly1 the release of the energy manifests itself through a loss in the total weight of the plant's substance4 ,it can thus be seen that neither matter nor energy can be created4 ,all we can do is to manipulate certain types of matter in a way that liberates whatever energy had been in existence1 in one form or another1 since the beginning of time4 ,all the energy that we had been using on earth until the advent of the atomic age had originally come from the sun4 ,coal1 as already said1 is a petrified plant that had stored up the energy of the sun in the form of chemical energy millions of years ago1 before man made his appearance on the earth4 ,oil comes from organic matter that also had stored up light and heat from the sun in the form of chemical energy4 ,water power and wind power are also made possible by the sun's heat1 since all water would freeze and no winds would blow were it not for the sun's heat energy keeping the waters flowing and the air moving1 the latter by creating differences in the temperature of air masses4 ,there are two forms of energy that we take advantage of which are not due directly to the sun's radiations--gravitation and magnetism--but the only way we can utilize these is by employing energy derived from the sun's heat4 ,in harnessing ,niagara1 or in the building of great dams1 we utilize the fall of the water because of gravitation4 ,but as ,i have already pointed out1 without the sun's heat water could not flow4 ,to produce electricity we begin with the chemical energy in coal or oil1 which is first converted into heat energy1 then to mechanical energy1 and finally1 through the agency of magnetism1 into electrical energy4 ,the radiations of the sun1 of the giant stars millions of times larger than the sun1 come from an entirely different source1 the greatest source of energy in the universe1 known as atomic or1 more correctly1 nuclear energy4 ,but even here the energy comes as the result of the transformation of matter4 ,the difference between nuclear energy and chemical energy is twofold4 ,in chemical energy1 such as the burning of coal1 the matter lost in the process comes from the outer shell of the atoms1 and the amount of matter lost is so small that it cannot be weighed directly by any human scale or other device4 ,in nuclear energy1 on the other hand1 the matter lost by being transformed into energy comes from the nucleus1 the heavy inner core1 of the atom1 and the amount of matter lost is millions of times greater than in coal1 great enough to be weighed4 ,an atom is the smallest unit of any of the elements of which the physical universe is constituted4 ,atoms are so small that if a drop of water were magnified to the size of the earth the atoms in the drop would be smaller than oranges4 ,the structure of atoms is like that of a minuscule solar system1 with a heavy nucleus in the center as the sun1 and much smaller bodies revolving around it as the planets4 ,the nucleus is made up of two types of particles3 protons1 carrying a positive charge of electricity1 and neutrons1 electrically neutral4 ,the planets revolving about the nucleus are electrons1 units of negative electricity1 which have a mass about one two-thousandth the mass of the proton or the neutron4 ,the number of protons in the nucleus determines the chemical nature of the element1 and also the number of planetary electrons1 each proton being electrically balanced by an electron in the atom's outer shells4 ,the total number of protons and neutrons in the nucleus is known as the mass number1 which is very close to the atomic weight of the element but not quite equal4 ,protons and neutrons are known under the common name 8nucleons40 ,there are two important facts to keep constantly in mind about protons and neutrons4 ,the first is that the two are interchangeable4 ,a proton1 under certain conditions1 loses its positive charge by emitting a positive electron 7positron7 and thus becomes a neutron4 ,similarly1 a neutron1 when agitated1 emits a negative electron and becomes a proton4 ,as we shall see1 the latter process is taken advantage of in the transmutation of nonfissionable uranium into plutonium1 and of thorium into fissionable uranium #bcc4 ,the transmutation of all other elements1 age-old dream of the alchemists1 is made possible by the interchangeability of protons into neutrons1 and vice versa4 ,the second all-important fact about protons and neutrons1 basic to the understanding of atomic energy1 is that each proton and neutron in the nuclei of the elements weighs less than it does in the free state1 the loss of weight being equal to the energy binding the nucleons4 ,this loss becomes progressively greater for the elements in the first half of the periodic table1 reaching its maximum in the nucleus of silver1 element #dg4 ,after that the loss gets progressively smaller4 ,hence1 if we were to combine 7fuse7 two elements in the first half of the periodic table1 the protons and the neutrons would lose weight if the newly formed nucleus is not heavier than that of silver1 but would gain weight if the new nucleus thus formed is heavier than silver4 ,the opposite is true with the elements in the second half of the periodic table1 the protons and neutrons losing weight when a heavy element is split into two lighter ones1 and gaining weight if two elements are fused into one4 ,since each loss of mass manifests itself by the release of energy1 it can be seen that to obtain energy from the atom's nucleus requires either the fusion of two elements in the first half of the periodic table or the fission of an element in the second half4 ,from a practical point of view1 however1 fusion is possible only with two isotopes 7twins7 of hydrogen1 at the beginning of the periodic table1 while fission is possible only with twins of uranium1 ,u-#bcc and ,u-#bce1 and with plutonium1 at the lower end of the table4 ,the diameter of the atom is #ajj1jjj times greater than the diameter of the nucleus4 ,this means that the atom is mostly empty space1 the volume of the atom being #ejj1jjj billion times the volume of the nucleus4 ,it can thus be seen that most of the matter in the universe is concentrated in the nuclei of the atoms4 ,the density of matter in the nucleus is such that a dime would weigh #fjj million tons if its atoms were as tightly packed as are the protons and neutrons in the nucleus4 ,the atoms of the elements 7of which there are ninety-two in nature1 and six more man-made elements7 have twins1 triplets1 quadruplets1 etc41 known as isotopes4 ,the nuclei of these twins all contain the same number of protons and hence all have the same chemical properties4 ,they differ1 however1 in the number of neutrons in their nuclei and hence have different atomic weights4 ,for example1 an ordinary hydrogen atom has a nucleus of one proton4 ,the isotope of hydrogen1 deuterium1 has one proton plus one neutron in its nucleus4 ,it is thus twice as heavy as ordinary hydrogen4 ,the second hydrogen isotope1 tritium1 has one proton and two neutrons in its nucleus and hence an atomic mass of three4 ,on the other hand1 a nucleus containing two protons and one neutron is no longer hydrogen but helium1 also of atomic mass three4 ,there are hundreds of isotopes1 some occurring in nature1 others produced artificially by shooting atomic bullets1 such as neutrons1 into the nuclei of the atoms of various elements4 ,a natural isotope of uranium1 the ninety-second and last of the natural elements1 contains #ib protons and #adc neutrons in its nucleus1 hence its name ,u-#bce1 one of the two atomic-bomb elements4 ,the most common isotope of uranium has #ib protons and #adf neutrons in its nucleus and hence is known as ,u-#bch4 ,it is #adj times more plentiful than ,u-#bce1 but cannot be used for the release of atomic energy4 ,atomic1 or rather nuclear1 energy is the cosmic force that binds together the protons and the neutrons in the nucleus4 ,it is a force millions of times greater than the electrical repulsion force existing in the nucleus because of the fact that the protons all have like charges4 ,this force1 known as the coulomb force1 is tremendous1 varying inversely as the square of the distance separating the positively charged particles4 ,professor ,frederick ,soddy1 the noted ,english physicist1 has figured out that two grams 7less than the weight of a dime7 of protons placed at the opposite poles of the earth would repel each other with a force of twenty-six tons4 ,yet the nuclear force is millions of times greater than the coulomb force4 ,this force acts as the cosmic cement that holds the material universe together and is responsible for the great density of matter in the nucleus4 ,we as yet know very little about the basic nature of this force1 but we can measure its magnitude by a famous mathematical equation originally presented by ,dr4 ,einstein in his special theory of relativity in #aije4 ,this formula1 one of the great intellectual achievements of man1 together with the discovery of the radioactive elements by ,henri ,becquerel and ,pierre and ,marie ,curie1 provided the original clues as well as the key to the discovery and the harnessing of nuclear energy4 ,einstein's formula1 ,e mc1 revealed that matter and energy are two different manifestations of one and the same cosmic entity1 instead of being two different entities1 as had been generally believed4 ,it led to the revolutionary concept that matter1 instead of being immutable1 was energy in a frozen state1 while1 conversely1 energy was matter in a fluid state4 ,the equation revealed that any one gram of matter was the equivalent in ergs 7small units of energy7 to the square of the velocity of light in centimeters per second--namely1 #ijj billion billion ergs4 ,in more familiar terms1 this means that one gram of matter represents #be1jjj1jjj kilowatt-hours of energy in the frozen state4 ,this equals the energy liberated in the burning of three billion grams 7three thousand tons7 of coal4 ,the liberation of energy in any form1 chemical1 electrical1 or nuclear1 involves the loss of an equivalent amount of mass1 in accordance with the ,einstein formula4 ,when #c1jjj metric tons of coal are burned to ashes1 the residual ashes and the gaseous products weigh one gram less than #c1jjj tons2 that is1 one three-billionth part of the original mass will have been converted into energy4 ,the same is true with the liberation of nuclear energy by the splitting or fusing 7as will be explained later7 of the nuclei of certain elements4 ,the difference is merely that of magnitude4 ,in the liberation of chemical energy by the burning of coal1 the energy comes from a very small loss of mass resulting from the rearrangement of electrons on the surface of the atoms4 ,the nucleus of the coal atoms is not involved in any way1 remaining exactly the same as before4 ,the amount of mass lost by the surface electrons is one thirtieth of one millionth of one per cent4 ,on the other hand1 nuclear energy involves vital changes in the atomic nucleus itself1 with a consequent loss of as high as one tenth to nearly eight tenths of one per cent in the original mass of the nuclei4 ,this means that from one to nearly eight grams per thousand grams are liberated in the form of energy1 as compared with only one gram in three billion grams liberated in the burning of coal4 ,in other words1 the amount of nuclear energy liberated in the transmutation of atomic nuclei is from #c1jjj1jjj to #bd1jjj1jjj times as great as the chemical energy released by the burning of an equal amount of coal4 ,in terms of ,,tnt the figure is seven times greater than for coal1 as the energy from ,,tnt1 while liberated at an explosive rate1 is about one seventh the total energy content for an equivalent amount of coal4 ,this means that the nuclear energy from one kilogram of uranium #bce1 or plutonium1 when released at an explosive rate1 is equal to the explosion of twenty thousand tons of ,,tnt4 ,nuclear energy can be utilized by two diametrically opposed methods4 ,one is fission--the splitting of the nuclei of the heaviest chemical elements into two uneven fragments consisting of nuclei of two lighter elements4 ,the other is fusion--combining1 or fusing1 two nuclei of the lightest elements into one nucleus of a heavier element4 ,in both methods the resulting elements are lighter than the original nuclei4 ,the loss of mass in each case manifests itself in the release of enormous amounts of nuclear energy4 ,when two light atoms are combined to form a heavier atom1 the weight of the heavier is less than the total weight of the two light atoms4 ,if the heavier atom could again be split into the two lighter ones1 the latter would resume their original weight4 ,as explained before1 however1 this is true only with the light elements1 such as hydrogen1 deuterium1 and tritium1 in the first half of the periodic table of the elements4 ,the opposite is true with the heavier elements of the second half of the periodic table4 ,for example1 if krypton and barium1 elements #cf and #ef1 were to be combined to form uranium1 element #ib1 the protons and the neutrons in the uranium nucleus would each weigh about #j4a per cent more than they weighed in the krypton and barium nuclei4 ,it can thus be seen that energy could be gained either through the loss of mass resulting from the fusion of two light elements1 or from the similar loss of mass resulting from the fission of one heavy atom into two lighter ones4 ,in the fusion of two lighter atoms1 the addition of one and one yields less than two1 and yet half of two will be more than one4 ,in the case of the heavy elements the addition of one and one yields more than two1 yet half of two makes less than one4 ,this is the seeming paradox of atomic energy4 ,three elements are known to be fissionable4 ,only one of these is found in nature3 the uranium isotope #bce 7,u-#bce74 ,the other two are man-made4 ,one is plutonium1 transmuted by means of neutrons from the nonfissionable ,u-#bch1 by the addition of one neutron to the #adf present in the nucleus1 which leads to the conversion of two of the #adg neutrons into protons1 thus creating an element with a nucleus of #id protons and #ade neutrons4 ,the second man-made element 7not yet in wide use1 as far as is known7 is uranium isotope #bcc 7#ib protons and #ada neutrons71 created out of the element thorium 7#ij protons1 #adb neutrons7 by the same method used in the production of plutonium4 ,when the nucleus of any one of these elements is fissioned1 each proton and neutron in the two resulting fragments weighs one tenth of one per cent less than it weighed in the original nucleus4 ,for example1 if ,u-#bce atoms totaling #a1jjj grams in weight are split1 the total weight of the fragments will be #iii grams4 ,the one missing gram is liberated in the form of #be1jjj1jjj kilowatt-hours of energy1 equivalent in explosive terms to #bj1jjj tons of ,,tnt4 ,but the original number of protons and neutrons in the #a1jjj grams does not change4 ,the fission process1 the equivalent of the 8burning0 of nuclear fuels1 is maintained by what is known as a chain reaction4 ,the bullets used for splitting are neutrons1 which1 because they do not have an electric charge1 can penetrate the heavily fortified electrical wall surrounding the positively charged nuclei4 ,just as a coal fire needs oxygen to keep it going1 a nuclear fire needs the neutrons to maintain it4 ,neutrons do not exist free in nature1 all being tightly locked up within the nuclei of atoms4 ,they are liberated1 however1 from the nuclei of the three fissionable elements by a self-multiplication process in the chain reaction4 ,the process begins when a cosmic ray from outer space1 or a stray neutron1 strikes one nucleus and splits it4 ,the first atom thus split releases an average of two neutrons1 which split two more nuclei1 which in turn liberate four more neutrons1 and so on4 ,the reaction is so fast that in a short time trillions of neutrons are thus liberated to split trillions of nuclei4 ,as each nucleus is split1 it loses mass1 which is converted into great energy4 ,there are two types of chain reactions3 controlled and uncontrolled4 ,the controlled reaction is analogous to the burning of gasoline in an automobile engine4 ,the atom-splitting bullets--the neutrons--are first slowed down from speeds of more than ten thousand miles per second to less than one mile per second by being made to pass through a moderator before they reach the atoms at which they are aimed4 ,neutron-8killers0--materials absorbing neutrons in great numbers--keep the neutrons liberated at any given time under complete control in a slow but steady nuclear fire4 ,the uncontrolled chain reaction is one in which there is no moderator--and no neutron-absorbers4 ,it is analogous to the dropping of a match in a gasoline tank4 ,in the uncontrolled chain reaction the fast neutrons1 with nothing to slow them down or to devour them1 build up by the trillion and quadrillion in a fraction of a millionth of a second4 ,this leads to the splitting of a corresponding number of atoms1 resulting in the release of unbelievable quantities of nuclear energy at a tremendously explosive rate4 ,one kilogram of atoms split releases energy equivalent to that of #bj1jjj1jjj kilograms 7#bj1jjj metric tons7 of ,,tnt4 ,it is the uncontrolled reaction that is employed in the explosion of the atomic bomb4 ,the controlled reaction is expected to be used in the production of vast quantities of industrial power4 ,it is now being employed in the creation of radioactive isotopes1 for use in medicine and as the most powerful research tool since the invention of the microscope for probing into the mysteries of nature1 living and non-living4 ,in the controlled reaction the material used is natural uranium1 which consists of a mixture of #ii4c per cent ,u-#bch and #j4g of the fissionable ,u-#bce4 ,the neutrons from the ,u-#bce are made to enter the nuclei of ,u-#bch and convert them to the fissionable element plutonium1 for use in atomic bombs4 ,the large quantities of energy liberated by the split ,u-#bce nuclei in the form of heat is at too low a temperature for efficient utilization as power1 and is at present wasted4 ,to be used for power1 nuclear reactors capable of operating at high temperatures are now being designed4 ,in the atomic bomb only pure ,u-#bce1 or plutonium1 is used4 ,in both the controlled and the uncontrolled reactions a minimum amount of material1 known as the 8critical mass10 must be used1 as otherwise too many neutrons would escape and the nuclear fire would thus be extinguished1 as would an ordinary fire for lack of oxygen4 ,in the atomic bomb two masses1 each less than a critical mass1 which together equal or exceed it1 are brought in contact at a predetermined instant4 ,the uncontrolled reaction then comes automatically1 since1 in the absence of any control1 the neutrons1 which cannot escape to the outside1 build up at an unbelievable rate4 ,whereas the fission process for the release of nuclear energy entails making little ones out of big ones1 the fusion process involves making big ones out of little ones4 ,in both processes the products weigh less than the original materials1 the loss of mass coming out in the form of energy4 ,according to the generally accepted hypothesis1 the fusion process is the one operating in the sun and the stars of the same family4 ,the radiant energy given off by them1 it is believed1 is the result of the fusion of four hydrogen atoms into one atom of helium1 two of the protons losing their positive charge1 thus becoming neutrons4 ,since a helium atom weighs nearly eight tenths of one per cent less than the total weight of the four hydrogen atoms1 the loss of mass is thus nearly eight times that produced by fission1 with a corresponding eightfold increase in the amount of energy liberated4 ,this process1 using light hydrogen1 is not feasible on earth4 ,the nuclei of all atoms are thus vast storage depots of cosmic energy4 ,we must think of them as cosmic safe-deposit vaults1 in which the ,creator of the universe1 if you will1 deposited at the time of creation most of the energy in the universe for safekeeping4 ,the sun and the other giant stars that give light have1 as it were1 drawing accounts in this 8,first ,national ,bank and ,trust ,company of the ,universe10 whereas we on this little planet of ours in the cosmic hinterland are much too poor to have such a bank account4 ,so we have been forced all these years we have been on earth to subsist on small handouts from our close neighbor the sun1 which squanders millions all over space1 but can spare us only nickels1 dimes1 and quarters 7depending on the seasons of the year7 for a cup of coffee and a sandwich4 ,we are thus in the true sense of the word cosmic beggars1 living off the bounty of a distant relative4 ,the discovery of fission in #aici meant that after a million years of exclusive dependence on the sun we had suddenly managed to open a modest drawing account of our own in this bank of the cosmos4 ,we were enabled to do it by stumbling upon two special master keys to five of the cosmic vaults4 ,one of these keys we call fission2 the other1 which allows us entry into a much richer chamber of the vault1 we call fusion4 ,we can get a lot of the stored-up cosmic treasure by using the key to the fission vaults alone1 but1 as with our terrestrial bank vaults1 which generally require two keys before they can be opened1 it is not possible to use the key to the fusion vault unless we first use the fission key4 ,except for the payment of our heat and light bill1 the sun gives us nothing directly in cash4 ,instead it deposits a very small pittance in the plants1 which serve as its major terrestrial banks4 ,the animals then rob the plants and we rob them both4 ,when we eat the food we live by we thus actually eat sunshine4 ,the sun makes its deposits in the plant through an agent named chlorophyll1 the stuff that makes the grass green4 ,chlorophyll has the uncanny ability to catch sunbeams and to hand them over to the plant4 ,a chemical supergenius inside the plant changes the sunlight energy into chemical energy1 just as a bank teller changes bills into silver4 ,with this chemical energy at their disposal1 a great number of devilishly clever chemists in the plants' chemical factory go to work building up many substances to serve as vaults in which to store up a large part of the energy1 using only part of it for their own subsistence4 ,the building materials used by these chemists inside the plants consist mainly of carbon-dioxide gas from the atmosphere1 and water from the soil1 plus small amounts of minerals either supplied by the good earth or by fertilizers4 ,carbon dioxide1 by the way1 composed of one atom of carbon and two atoms of oxygen1 is the stuff you exhale4 ,in solid form it is what we know as dry ice1 used in efforts to make rain4 ,it is present in the atmosphere in large amounts4 ,out of the carbon dioxide and water the chemists in the plants build cellulose1 starch1 sugar1 fat1 proteins1 vitamins1 and scores of other substances1 all of which serve as vaults for the sun's rays caught by the chlorophyll4 ,the biggest vaults of all1 storing most of the energy1 are the cellulose1 sugars and starches1 fats and proteins4 ,there the stored energy remains until it is released by processes we call burning or digestion1 both of which1 as we shall see1 are different terms for the same chemical reaction4 ,when we burn wood1 or the petrified ancient wood we know as coal1 we burn largely the cellulose1 the chief component of the solid part of plants4 ,when we eat the plants1 or the animals in whom the plant tissues are transformed into flesh by the solar energy stored within them1 it is the sugars1 starches1 fats1 and proteins that give us the energy we live by4 ,in the process of burning wood or coal the large cellulose vaults1 composed of carbon1 hydrogen1 and oxygen1 are broken up1 thus allowing the original solar energy1 stored up within them as chemical energy1 to escape in the form of heat and light4 ,this is the same heat and light deposited there by the sun many years before--in the case of coal1 some two hundred million years back4 ,the process of burning thus transforms the chemical energy in the plants back to its original form of light and radiant heat energy4 ,the complex carbon and hydrogen units in the cellulose are broken up1 each freed carbon atom uniting within two oxygen atoms in the air to form carbon dioxide again1 while two hydrogen atoms unite with one of oxygen to form water4 ,thus we see that the cellulose vaults are broken up once more into the original building bricks out of which the chemists in the plants had fashioned them4 ,when we eat plant or animal food to get the energy to live by1 exactly the same process takes place except at a lower temperature4 ,the sunlight deposit vaults of sugar1 starch1 and fat1 also composed1 like cellulose1 of carbon1 hydrogen1 and oxygen1 are broken up by the digestive system into their component parts1 thus allowing the original solar energy stored within them to get free in the form of chemical energy1 which our body uses in its essential processes4 ,here1 too1 the end products are carbon dioxide1 which we exhale1 and water4 ,about half the energy we thus obtain is used by us for the work we do4 ,the other half is used by the body for building up the tissues burned up as part of the regular wear and tear of life4 ,we thus burn food for our internal energy as we burn cellulose for our external energy4 ,the interesting thing here is that1 in both types of burning1 fission as well as fusion processes take place4 ,the fission is the splitting of the cellulose1 sugar1 fats1 starches1 and proteins into carbon and hydrogen atoms4 ,the fusion part is the union of the carbon and the hydrogen with oxygen to form carbon dioxide and water4 ,the fusion part is just as necessary to release the stored-up solar energy in the wood or coal as is the fission part1 for1 as everyone knows1 unless there is oxygen for the carbon to fuse with1 no combustion 7burning7 can take place and hence no release of energy4 ,the plant vaults would remain closed absolutely tight4 ,at this point two things become clear4 ,we see1 in the first place1 that whenever we get any kind of energy in any form we do not in any way create any of it4 ,all we do is merely draw on something that is already stored up2 in the case of coal and wood by the sun1 in the case of uranium and hydrogen by the same power that created the sun and all energy4 ,we draw water from the spring1 but we do not make the water4 ,on the other hand1 we cannot draw the water unless we first find the spring1 and even then we cannot draw it unless we have a pitcher4 ,and we also see1 in the second place1 that fission and fusion are common everyday phenomena that occur any time you burn anything4 ,both are essential whenever energy is released1 whether it is the chemical energy from coal or the atomic energy from the nuclei of uranium1 deuterium1 or tritium4 ,when you light a cigarette you employ both fission and fusion or you don't smoke4 ,the first fission and fusion take place in the lighting of the match1 the cellulose in the match 7whether it is wood or paper7 being fissioned 7that is1 split into its component atoms of carbon and hydrogen74 ,these atoms are then fusioned with the oxygen in the air4 ,the same thing happens when the tobacco catches fire4 ,in each case the fusion with the oxygen makes possible the fission of the cellulose4 ,when we burn ,u-#bce1 or plutonium1 we again get both fission and fusion1 except that1 instead of oxygen1 the nuclei of these elements first fuse with a neutron before they are split apart4 ,thus we see that the process of burning ,u-#bce1 or plutonium1 requires not only fission but fusion as well1 without which they could not burn4 ,this is true also in hydrogen fusion4 ,when you burn deuterium by fusing two deuterons 7nuclei of deuterium7 to form helium of atomic weight three1 plus a neutron1 one of the two deuterons is split in half in the process4 ,similarly1 when you burn tritium by fusion two tritons 7nuclei of tritium71 one of the tritons splits into two neutrons and a proton1 the one proton joining the other triton to form helium of atomic weight four4 ,thus we see that fission and fusion are the cosmic firebrands that are always present whenever a fire is lighted1 chemical or atomic1 whether the fuel is wood1 coal1 or oil1 or uranium1 plutonium1 deuterium1 or tritium4 ,both1 with some variations1 are essential for opening the cosmic safe where the energy of the universe is kept in storage4 ,the only reason you get much more energy in the fission and fusion of atomic nuclei is that so much more had been stored in them than in the cellulose vaults on this planet4 ,the same reason that limits our ability to obtain stored chemical energy to a few fuels also limits our ability to obtain atomic energy4 ,coal1 oil1 and wood are the only dividend-paying chemical-energy stocks4 ,similarly only five elements1 uranium #bcc and #bce1 plutonium1 deuterium1 and tritium are the only dividend-paying atomic-energy stocks1 and of these only two 7,u-#bce and deuterium7 exist in nature4 ,the other three are re-created from other elements by modern alchemical legerdemain4 ,what is more1 we know for a certainty that it will never be possible to obtain atomic energy from any other element1 by either fission or fusion4 ,this should put to rest once and for all the notion of many1 including some self-styled scientists1 that the explosion of a hydrogen bomb would set the hydrogen in the waters1 and the oxygen and the nitrogen in the air1 on fire and thus blow up the earth4 ,the energy in common hydrogen is locked up in one of those cosmic vaults which only the sun and the stars that shine can open and which no number of ,h-bombs could blow apart4 ,oxygen and nitrogen are locked even for the sun4 ,as for the deuterium in the water1 it cannot catch fire unless it is highly concentrated1 condensed to its liquid form1 and heated to a temperature of several hundred million degrees4 ,hence all this talk about blowing up the earth is pure moonshine4 ,but while we know that we have reached the limit of what can be achieved either by fission or by fusion1 that by no means justifies the conclusion that we have reached the ultimate in discovery and that fission and fusion are the only possible methods for tapping the energy locked up in matter4 ,we must remember that fifty years ago we did not even suspect that nuclear energy existed and that until #aici no one1 including ,dr4 ,einstein1 believed that it would ever become possible to use it on a practical scale4 ,we simply stumbled upon the phenomenon of fission1 which in its turn opened the way to fusion4 ,if science tells us anything at all1 it tells us that nature is infinite and that the human mind1 driven by insatiable curiosity and probing ever deeper into nature's mysteries1 will inevitably find ever greater treasures1 treasures that are at present beyond the utmost stretches of the imagination--as far beyond fission and fusion as these are beyond man's first discovery of how to make a fire by striking a spark with a laboriously made flint4 ,the day may yet come1 and past history makes it practically certain that it will come1 when man will look upon the discovery of fission and fusion as we look today upon the crudest tools made by primitive man4 ,a great measure of man's progress has been the result of serendipity1 the faculty of making discoveries1 by chance or sagacity1 of things not sought for4 ,many an adventure has led man to stumble upon something much better than he originally set out to find4 ,like ,columbus1 many an explorer into the realms of the unknown has set his sights on a shorter route to the spices of ,india only to stumble upon a new continent4 ,unlike ,columbus1 however1 the explorers in the field of science1 instead of being confined to this tiny little earth of ours1 have the whole infinite universe as the domain of their adventures1 and many a virgin continent1 richer by far than any yet discovered1 still awaits its ,columbus4 ,roentgen and ,becquerel were exploring what they thought was an untrodden path in the forest and came upon a new road that led their successors to the very citadel of the material universe4 ,young ,enrico ,fermi was curious to find out what would happen if he fired a neutron into the nucleus of uranium1 hoping only to create a heavier isotope of uranium1 or at best a new element4 ,his rather modest goal led five years later to the fission of uranium1 and in another six years to the atomic bomb4 ,yet1 as we have seen1 in both fission and fusion only a very small fraction of the mass of the protons and neutrons in the nuclei of the elements used is liberated in the form of energy1 while #ii4c to #ii4i per cent of their substance remains in the form of matter4 ,we know of no process in nature which converts #ajj per cent of the matter in protons and neutrons into energy1 but scientists are already talking about finding means for bringing about such a conversion4 ,they are seeking clues for such a process in the mysterious cosmic rays that bombard the earth from outer space with energies billions of times greater than those released by fission or fusion1 great enough to smash atoms of oxygen or nitrogen1 or whatever other atoms they happen to hit in the upper atmosphere1 into their component protons and neutrons4 ,luckily1 their number is small and most of their energy is spent long before they reach sea level4 ,but we have already learned how to create secondary cosmic-ray particles of relatively low energies 7#cej1jjj1jjj electron-volts7 with our giant cyclotrons4 ,the creation of these particles1 known as mesons1 which are believed to be the cosmic cement responsible for the nuclear forces1 represents the actual conversion of energy into matter4 ,this is the exact reverse of the process taking place in fission and fusion1 in which1 as we have seen1 matter is converted into energy4 ,and we are now about to complete multibillion-volt atom-smashers that will hurl atomic bullets of energies of from three to ten billion volts at the nuclei of atoms4 ,with these gigantic machines1 known as the cosmotron 7at the ,brookhaven ,national ,laboratory of the ,atomic ,energy ,commission7 and the bevatron 7at the ,university of ,california71 we shall be able to smash nuclei into their individual component protons and neutrons and thus get a much more intimate glimpse of the forces that hold the nuclei together4 ,what is more1 instead of creating only mesons1 particles with only #cjj electron masses1 we shall be able for the first time to convert energy into protons and neutrons1 duplicating1 as far as is known1 an act of creation that has not taken place since the beginning of the universe4 ,man at last will be creating the very building blocks out of which the universe is made1 as well as the cosmic cement that holds them together4 ,what new continents will our first glimpse into the mechanism of the very act of creation of matter out of energy reveal8 ,what new secrets will be uncovered before the dazzled eyes and mind of man when he takes the nucleus of the atom completely apart at last8 ,not even ,einstein could tell us4 ,but1 as ,omar ,khayym divined1 8a single ,alif0 may provide 8the clue0 that1 could we but find it1 leads 8to the ,treasure-,house1 and peradventure to the ,master too40 ,the fact is that we already have opened the door to the anteroom of the treasure-house1 and we are about to unlock the door to one of its inner chambers4 ,what shall we find there8 ,no one as yet knows4 ,but we do know that every door man has opened so far has led to riches beyond his wildest dreams1 each new door bringing greater rewards than the one before4 ,on the other hand1 we also know that the treasure-house has many mansions1 and that no matter how many chambers he may enter1 he will always find new doors to unlock4 ,for we have learned that the solution of any one secret always opens up a thousand new mysteries4 ,we also have learned1 to our sorrow1 that any new insight gained into nature's laws and forces can be used for great good and for equally great evil4 ,the greater the insight1 the greater the potentialities for good or evil4 ,the new knowledge he is about to gain by his deeper insight into the heart of matter1 and by his ability to create it out of energy1 may offer man the means to make himself complete master of the world he lives in4 ,it is equally true1 alas1 that he could use it to destroy that world even more thoroughly than with the hydrogen bomb4 ,as already stated1 scientists are even now discussing the possibility of finding means for the complete annihilation of matter by the conversion of the entire mass of protons and neutrons into energy1 instead of only #j4a to #j4g per cent4 ,and while the total annihilation of protons and neutrons still seems highly speculative1 we already know that such a process actually does take place in the realm of the electron4 ,this is the phenomenon already achieved numerous times on a small scale in the laboratory1 in which a positive electron 7positron7 and an electron with a negative charge completely destroy each other1 their entire mass being converted into energy4 ,luckily1 this is at present only a laboratory experiment1 in which each positron must be individually produced1 since there are hardly any positive electrons in our part of the universe4 ,but suppose the new knowledge we are about to pry loose from the inner citadel of matter reveals to us a new process1 at present not even suspected1 that would release positrons in large numbers1 just as the fission and fusion processes made possible for the first time the liberation of large quantities of neutrons4 ,such an eventuality1 by no means beyond the realm of the possible1 would open potentialities of horror alongside which those of the ,h-bomb1 even the rigged one1 would be puny4 ,for any process that would release large numbers of positrons in the atmosphere1 in a chain reaction similar to the one now liberating neutrons1 may envelop the earth in one deadly flash of radioactive lightning that would instantly kill all sensate things4 ,and although this is admittedly purely speculative1 no one dare say that such a discovery will not be made1 not when one remembers how remote and unlikely a process such as fission seemed to be just before it was made4 ,though many of the great discoveries came about as the result of chance1 they came because1 as ,pasteur said1 8chance favors the prepared mind40 ,actually they came largely through the intellectual synthesis of what had originally appeared as unrelated phenomena or concepts4 ,when ,faraday discovered the principle of electromagnetic induction1 he established for the first time that electricity and magnetism1 looked upon since prehistoric times as two separate and distinct phenomena1 were actually only two aspects of one basic natural force1 which we know today as electromagnetism4 ,this great intellectual synthesis led directly to the age of electricity and all its wonders4 ,about thirty years later the great ,scottish physicist ,james ,clerk ,maxwell demonstrated that electromagnetic action traveled through space in the form of transverse waves similar to those of light and having the same velocity4 ,this revealed the existence in nature of electromagnetic waves1 better known to us today as radio waves4 ,about a quarter century later the great ,german-,jewish physicist ,heinrich ,hertz not only produced these electromagnetic waves but showed that they are propagated just as waves of light are1 possessing all other properties of light1 such as reflection1 refraction1 and polarization4 ,this led directly to wireless telegraphy and telephony1 radio and television1 radiophotography and radar4 ,when ,einstein1 in his special theory of relativity of #aije1 united matter and energy in one basic cosmic entity1 the road was opened to the atomic age4 ,yet ,einstein was never satisfied and has devoted more than forty-five years of his life to the search for a greater1 all-embracing unity underlying the great diversity of natural phenomena4 ,in his general theory of relativity of #aiae he formulated a concept that encompasses the universal law of gravitation in his earlier synthesis of space and time1 of which matter and energy were an integral part4 ,this synthesis1 wrote ,bertrand ,russell in #aibd1 8is probably the greatest synthetic achievement of the human intellect up to the present time4 ,it sums up the mathematical and physical labors of more than two thousand years4 ,pure geometry from ,pythagoras to ,riemann1 the dynamics and astronomy of ,galileo and ,newton1 the theory of electromagnetism as it resulted from the researches of ,faraday1 ,maxwell1 and their successors1 all are absorbed1 with the necessary modifications1 in the theories of ,einstein1 ,weyl1 and ,eddington4 8,so comprehensive a synthesis10 he continued1 8might have represented a dead end1 leading to no further progress for a long time4 ,fortunately1 at this moment quantum theory the theory applying to the forces within the atom has appeared1 with a new set of facts outside the scope of relativity physics which applies to the forces governing the cosmos at large4 ,this has saved us1 in the nick of time1 from the danger of supposing that we know everything40 ,yet ,einstein1 working away in majestic solitude1 has been trying all these years to construct a vast intellectual edifice that would embrace all the laws of the cosmos known so far1 including the quantum1 in one fundamental concept1 which he designates as a 8unified field theory40 ,early in #aiej he published the results of his arduous labors since #aiae4 ,this he regards as the crowning achievement of his life's work1 a unified theory that bridges the vast gulf that had existed between relativity and quantum1 between the infinite universe of the stars and galaxies and the equally infinite universe within the nucleus of the atom4 ,if he is right1 and he has always been right before1 his latest contribution will prove to be a greater synthetic achievement of the human intellect than ever before1 embracing space and time1 matter and energy1 gravitation and electromagnetism1 as well as the nuclear forces within the atom1 in one all-encompassing concept4 ,in due time this concept should lead to new revelations of nature's mysteries1 and to triumphs even greater than those which followed as a direct consequence of all earlier intellectual syntheses4 ,if the synthesis of matter and energy led to the atomic age1 what may we expect of the latest1 all-inclusive synthesis8 ,when ,einstein was asked about it he replied3 8,come back in twenty years60 which happens to coincide with the end of the hundred-year period recorded by the brothers ,goncourt3 ,god swinging a bunch of keys1 and saying to humanity3 8,closing time1 gentlemen60 ,the search for new intellectual syntheses goes on1 and no doubt new relationships between the diverse phenomena of nature will be found1 regardless of whether ,einstein's latest theory stands or falls in the light of further discovery4 ,physicists1 for example1 are speculating about a fundamental relationship between time and the electronic charge1 one of the most basic units of nature1 and there are those who believe that this relationship will turn out to be much more fundamental than that between matter and energy4 ,should this be found to be true1 then the discovery of the relationship between time and charge may lead to finding a way for starting a self-multiplying positron-electron chain reaction1 just as the relationship between matter and energy led inevitably to the self-multiplying chain reaction with neutrons4 ,if this comes about1 then closing time will come much closer4 ,yet the sound of the swinging keys need not necessarily mean closing time for man at the twilight of his day on this planet4 ,it could also mean the opening of gates at a new dawn1 to a new earth--and a new heaven4 ,,appendix ,,the ,,hydrogen ,,bomb ,,and ,,international ,,control ,in the fall of #aidi ,senator ,mc,mahon directed the staff of the ,joint ,congressional ,committee on ,atomic ,energy to study the hydrogen bomb in relation to international control of atomic energy4 ,the material in the following pages1 with the exception of the comments in ,appendix ,d1 was prepared by the staff at the chairman's request to assist the joint committee in considering the problem4 ,it is my belief that this valuable material1 until now unavailable in such excellent summary form1 will also assist ,americans in general in considering this vital problem4 ,readers of this volume should find it helpful in arriving at conclusions of their own1 particularly in the light of the facts and discussion presented in ,chapters ,,iii and ,,iv4 ,i further believe that a careful perusal of the following material will lend strong support to my view that the international control of atomic weapons1 as envisaged in the majority plan of the ,united ,nations1--the only plan that may give assurance against a surprise atomic attack--had become wholly impractical even before the entry of the ,h-bomb into the picture1 and that the imminent development of the ,h-bomb has made it so unworkable that any further plan to revive it would be futile4 ,this material makes it clear 7a7 that ,russia never had any intention of reaching any agreement on international control and had set out to sabotage any plan from the very beginning2 and 7b7 that no plan1 no matter how foolproof1 could hope to succeed in the absence of complete mutual trust and confidence4 ,events in ,korea1 ,i am convinced1 have driven the last nail into the coffin of the ,,un control plan4 ,a ,,significant ,,events ,,in ,,the ,,history ,,of ,,international ,,control ,,of ,,atomic ,,weapons ,may #aide3 ,secretary of ,war ,stimson appoints interim ,committee to study problem of atomic energy4 ,august #f1 #aide3 ,hiroshima4 ,october #c1 #aide3 ,president's message to ,congress outlines necessity for international control of atomic energy and proposes conversations with ,canada and ,united ,kingdom4 ,november #ae1 #aide3 ,three-nation agreed declaration on atomic energy 7,truman-,attlee-,king declaration74 ,calls for ,united ,nations ,commission to make proposals for international control plan4 ,proposals should provide safeguards 8by way of inspection and other means40 7,wherever used in the following pages1 italics are supplied47 ,december #bg1 #aide3 ,u4,s4-,u4,k4-,u4,s4,s4,r4 ,foreign ,minister communiqu on results of ,moscow ,conference4 ,proposes that ,canada1 ,china1 and ,france join with ,big ,three in sponsoring resolution calling for ,united ,nations ,atomic ,energy ,commission with terms of reference stipulated in ,truman-,attlee-,king declaration4 ,january #bd1 #aidf3 ,general ,assembly resolution establishing ,united ,nations ,commission on ,atomic ,energy4 ,composed of members of ,security ,council plus ,canada4 ,march #bh1 #aidf3 ,acheson-,lilienthal report4 ,urges that mines and 8dangerous0 atomic-energy facilities be put under international ownership and management of ,atomic ,development ,authority4 ,additional safeguards in the form of inspection4 ,nations to operate 8safe0 plants under ,,ada license4 ,plants to be distributed among nations in keeping with strategic balance4 ,control plan to be implemented by stages4 ,june #ad1 #aidf3 ,baruch proposals to ,united ,nations4 ,closely follow ,acheson-,lilienthal recommendations4 ,ask 8condign punishment10 for violations1 and request agreement that ,,un ,charter veto clause not apply to sanctions for stipulated violations of atomic-energy treaty4 ,june #ai1 #aidf3 ,soviet ,union counterproposals4 ,demand prohibition of atomic weapons and destruction of existing stockpiles before international control plan is negotiated4 ,soviet proposals provide no safeguards against evasion4 ,december #ca1 #aidf3 ,first ,report of ,,unaec4 ,incorporates essential features of ,baruch proposals into statement of principles for plan for international control of atomic energy4 ,adopted #aj to #j1 with ,u4,s4,s4,r4 and ,poland abstaining4 ,june #aa1 #aidg3 ,u4,s4,s4,r4 control proposals4 ,soviets assent to periodic inspection1 but this would apply only to declared plants4 ,august #aa1 #aidg3 ,soviets consent in principle to concept of quotas4 ,september #aa1 #aidg3 ,second ,report of ,,unaec4 ,outlines powers1 functions1 and limitations thereon of any international agency in implementing effective control plan4 ,may #ag1 #aidh3 ,third ,report of ,,unaec4 ,reports impasse because ,soviets refuse to accept majority plan and persist in refusing to put forward effective proposals of their own4 ,concludes that further work in ,,unaec is fruitless until ,soviet cooperation in broader fields of policy is secured4 ,recommends that ,commission's work be suspended until sponsoring powers find that basis for agreement exists4 ,september #be1 #aidh3 ,soviets modify position by asking that conventions for prohibition of atomic weapons and for international control go into effect simultaneously4 ,november #d1 #aidh3 ,by vote of #dj to #f1 ,,un ,general ,assembly endorses majority control plan4 ,calls upon ,,unaec to continue work and requests that sponsoring powers consult to explore possible basis of agreement4 ,august #i1 #aidi3 ,first meeting of sponsoring powers of ,,unaec4 ,september #bc1 #aidi3 ,president ,truman's announcement of ,soviet atomic explosion4 ,october #be1 #aidi3 ,canada1 ,china1 ,france1 ,united ,kingdom1 ,united ,states statement reveals ,soviet attitude still prevents agreement4 ,november #bc1 #aidi3 ,general ,assembly resolution calls upon sponsoring powers to continue consultations4 ,november #bc1 #aidi3 ,soviets reverse position on quotas1 abandoning previous assent in principle4 ,january #ai1 #aiej3 ,u4,s4,s4,r4 walks out of sponsoring powers consultations over ,china recognition issue4 ,january #ca1 #aiej3 ,president ,truman announces that ,united ,states will proceed with development of hydrogen bomb4 ,b ,,the ,,international ,,control ,,of ,,atomic ,,weapons3 ,a ,,brief ,,history ,,of ,,proposals ,,and ,,negotiations ,early steps looking toward international control ,even before the test explosion at ,alamogordo1 ,n4 ,mex41 had ushered in the atomic age1 the ,united ,states ,government was studying methods of making atomic energy a socially constructive force4 ,in ,may #aide an ,interim ,committee appointed by ,secretary of ,war ,stimson commenced investigating the problem4 ,the ,committee recognized 8that the means of producing the atomic bomb would not forever remain the exclusive property of the ,united ,states44440 ,therefore1 8,secretary of ,war ,stimson was one of the first to recommend a policy of international supervision and control of the entire field of atomic energy44440 ,when on ,august #f1 #aide1 ,president ,truman made the first public statement on the atomic bomb1 he made clear that 8under present circumstances it is not intended to divulge the technical process of production or all the military application1 pending further examination of possible methods of protecting us and the rest of the world from the danger of sudden destruction40 ,he assured the ,american people that he would 8make further recommendations to the ,congress as to how atomic power can become a powerful and forceful influence toward the maintenance of world peace40 ,the ,president's recommendations were transmitted to the ,congress on ,october #c1 #aide4 ,he spoke of the necessity for 8international arrangements looking1 if possible1 to the renunciation of the use and development of the atomic bomb1 and directing 444 atomic energy 444 toward peaceful and humanitarian ends40 ,so great a challenge could not await the full development of the ,united ,nations4 ,the ,president1 therefore1 proposed initiating discussions 8first with our associates in this discovery1 ,great ,britain and ,canada1 and then with other nations44440 ,the ,truman-,attlee-,king declaration ,in the three nations agreed declaration of ,november #ae1 #aide--;frequently called the ,truman-,attlee-,king declaration--was recorded the concerted objectives of the three nations that had developed the atomic bomb4 ,according to the declaration1 any international arrangements should have a dual goal3 ,preventing the use of atomic energy for destructive purposes1 and promoting its use for peaceful and humanitarian ends4 ,to reach these objectives1 the signatory nations proposed a ,united ,nations ,commission empowered to make recommendations to the parent body4 ,it was asked that the ,commission make specific proposals 8for effective safeguards by way of inspection and other means to protect states against the hazards of violations and evasions40 ,it was further suggested that the ,commission's work 8proceed by separate stages1 the successful completion of each of which will develop the necessary confidence of the world before the next stage is undertaken40 ,contained in the agreed declaration was the genesis of the basic feature of the control proposals subsequently advanced by the ,united ,states1 and accepted by a large majority of the ,united ,nations3 safeguards through inspection and other means4 ,it was recognized even at this early date that 8effective1 reciprocal1 and enforceable safeguards0 against evasion represented the minimum prerequisite of a satisfactory international arrangement4 ,at the ,moscow meeting of the ,council of ,foreign ,ministers1 held in ,december #aide1 the ,truman-,attlee-,king proposals received the ,soviet ,union's endorsement4 ,the ,united ,states1 ,great ,britain1 and the ,soviet ,union agreed to invite ,canada1 ,china1 and ,france to join with them in sponsoring a resolution calling for a ,united ,nations ,atomic ,energy ,commission4 ,such a ,commission would consist of the #aa members of the ,security ,council plus ,canada when that state was not sitting on the ,council4 ,it is noteworthy that the ,commission's proposed terms of reference were exactly those suggested by the ,truman-,attlee-,king declaration4 ,in its first substantive resolution1 the ,united ,nations ,general ,assembly unanimously adopted the recommendations of the ,moscow ,conference and established the ,united ,nations ,commission on ,atomic ,energy on ,january #bd1 #aidf4 ,the ,acheson-,lilienthal report ,in order to inquire into the nature of the 8effective1 reciprocal1 and enforceable safeguards0 called for in the ,truman-,attlee-,king declaration1 ,secretary of ,state ,byrnes in ,january #aidf appointed a ,committee headed by ,under ,secretary of ,state ,dean ,acheson4 ,the ,committee in turn enlisted the aid of a ,board of ,consultants under the chairmanship of ,david ,lilienthal4 ,the findings of the two groups were made public on ,march #bh1 #aidf1 in the ,report on the ,international ,control of ,atomic ,energy1 commonly called the ,acheson-,lilienthal report4 ,it was advanced 8not as a final plan but as a place to begin1 a foundation on which to build40 ,the report concluded that no security against atomic attack could be found in an agreement that merely 8outlawed0 these weapons4 ,nor was it considered feasible to control atomic energy 8only by a system which relies on inspection and similar police-like methods40 ,instead1 inspection must be supplemented by international ownership and management of raw materials and key installations4 8,dangerous0 operations--those of potential military consequence--would be carried out by an ,atomic ,development ,authority1 an international agency under the ,united ,nations4 ,only 8safe0 activities--those of no military importance--would be conducted by the individual nations1 under licenses from the ,atomic ,development ,authority4 ,any plan finally agreed upon would be implemented by stages with the ,united ,states progressively transferring its fund of theoretical and technological knowledge to an international authority as safeguards were put into effect4 ,the report amplified the ,truman-,attlee-,king proposals in two important respects4 ,first1 it stated that international ownership--not specifically mentioned in the earlier declaration--was a necessary adjunct of international inspection4 ,second1 it advanced the concept of 8strategic balance0 or 8quotas40 ,the ,report held that an acceptable plan must be 8such that if it fails or the whole international situation collapses1 any nations such as the ,united ,states will still be in a relatively secure position1 compared to any other nation40 ,to help attain this end1 it was proposed that the ,atomic ,development ,authority's stock piles and plants be well distributed geographically4 ,the ,baruch proposals to the ,united ,nations ,less than #c months after the publication of the ,acheson-,lilienthal report1 the ,united ,states ,government gave the world its proposals for the international control of atomic energy4 ,on ,june #ad1 #aidf1 ,bernard ,baruch presented them to the ,united ,nations ,atomic ,energy ,commission 8as a basis for beginning our discussion40 ,mr4 ,baruch stated that3 ,when an adequate system for control of atomic energy1 including the renunciation of the bomb as a weapon1 has been agreed upon and put into effective operation and condign punishments set up for violations of the rules of control which are to be stigmatized as international crimes1 we propose that3 #a4 manufacture of atomic bombs shall stop2 #b4 existing bombs shall be disposed of pursuant to the terms of the treaty2 and #c4 the ,authority shall be in possession of full information as to the know-how for the production of atomic energy4 ,the methods suggested for achieving international control were the following3 ,the ,united ,states proposes the creation of an ,international ,atomic ,development ,authority1 to which should be entrusted all phases of the development and use of atomic energy1 starting with the raw material and including-- #a4 ,managerial control or ownership of all atomic energy activities potentially dangerous to world security4 #b4 ,power to control1 inspect1 and license all other atomic activities4 #c4 ,the duty of fostering the beneficial uses of atomic energy4 #d4 ,research and development responsibilities of an affirmative character intended to put the ,authority in the forefront of atomic knowledge and thus to enable it to comprehend1 and therefore to detect--misuse of atomic energy4 ,to be effective1 the ,authority must itself be the world's leader in the field of atomic knowledge and development and thus supplement its legal authority with the great power inherent in possession of leadership in knowledge4 ,these proposals represented a broadening--rather than essential modification--of the ,acheson-,lilienthal recommendations4 ,the additional features concerned 7#a7 condign punishment1 and 7#b7 the so-called power of veto of the ,united ,nations ,charter4 ,whereas the ,acheson-,lilienthal report had not dealt with the subject of sanctions1 ,mr4 ,baruch held that a realistic agreement must provide for penalties 8of as severe a nature as the nations may wish and as immediate and certain in their execution as possible44440 ,such 8condign punishment0 would be meted out if previously stipulated violations of a control plan occurred4 ,this problem1 ,mr4 ,baruch stated1 was intimately related with the veto provisions of the ,united ,nations ,charter4 ,under the ,charter1 sanctions can be invoked only with the concurrence of the five permanent members of the ,security ,council1 i4e41 ,china1 ,france1 ,united ,kingdom1 ,united ,states1 and the ,soviet ,union4 ,mr4 ,baruch maintained1 however1 that 8there must be no veto to protect those who violate their solemn agreements not to develop or use atomic energy for destructive purposes4444 ,the bomb does not wait on debate40 ,he pointed out that the ,united ,states was 8concerned here with the veto power only as it affects this particular problem40 ,a ,united ,states memorandum of ,july #ab1 #aidf1 stressed that 8,voluntary relinquishment of the veto on questions relating to a specific weapon previously outlawed by unanimous agreement because of its uniquely destructive character1 in no wise involves any compromise of the principle of unanimity of action as applied to general problems or to particular situations not foreseeable and therefore not susceptible of advance unanimous agreement40 ,the first ,soviet proposals--,gromyko's statement of ,june #ai1 #aidf ,a week after the ,american plans were put forward1 the ,soviet ,union announced its own proposals4 ,they were marked chiefly by ,soviet insistence that the ,united ,states agree to stop the production of atomic weapons and destroy existing bombs before international control arrangements were negotiated4 ,although they called for 8an international convention for outlawing weapons based on the use of atomic energy10 the ,soviet proposals did not provide 8effective safeguards by way of inspection and other means to protect complying states against the hazards of violations and evasions40 ,they proposed that the 8rule of unanimity0 in the ,security ,council apply to atomic-energy matters4 ,hence if one of the permanent members of the ,security ,council or a friend violated a control scheme1 the other members of the ,united ,nations would have no legal means1 under the ,charter1 of invoking sanctions against it4 ,throughout #aidf the ,united ,nations ,atomic ,energy ,commission continued its investigations of the control problem4 ,on ,december #ca1 #aidf1 the ,commission issued its ,first ,report4 ,it revealed that the essential features of the ,baruch proposals had won the support of all the members of the ,commission except the ,soviet ,union and ,poland4 ,the ,soviet ,proposals of ,june #aa1 #aidg ,a year after it suggested a convention for 8outlawing0 atomic weapons1 the ,soviet ,union came forward with a set of control proposals4 ,a chief point of interest in the plan was the fact that the ,soviets now assented to 8periodic inspection of facilities for mining and production of atomic materials0 by an international inspectorate4 ,in answer to a ,united ,kingdom inquiry1 however1 the ,russians stated that 8normally1 inspectors will visit only declared plants0--with this supplemented by special investigations when there were 8grounds for suspicion0 of violation of the convention for the prohibition of atomic weapons4 ,the power of the ,control ,commission would be further limited to making recommendations to governments and to the ,security ,council4 ,on other matters that separated the ,soviet ,union from the majority position--such as international ownership and management1 and the veto question--there was no change in the ,russian position4 ,the subsequent half-year brought one sign of a further modification of the ,u4,s4,s4,r4 stand4 ,on ,august #aa1 #aidg1 ,mr4 ,gromyko seemingly brought the ,soviets closer to the majority position by agreeing that 8the idea of quotas deserves attention and serious consideration by the ,atomic ,energy ,commission44440 ,the ,second and ,third ,reports of the ,united ,nations ,atomic ,energy ,commission--,september #aa1 #aidg1 and ,may #ag1 #aidh ,the ,second ,report of the ,atomic ,energy ,commission spelled out in detail the precise powers and functions and the limitations thereon of any international agency in implementing an effective control plan4 ,when the ,report was approved by the ,general ,assembly by a vote of #dj to #f1 the plan developed in the ,,unaec became a world plan--to which only the ,soviet ,union and her satellites took exception4 ,by the spring of #aidh the ,,unaec became convinced that the ,soviet ,union's refusal to accept any plan that met the technical requirements of controlling atomic energy was symptomatic of broader differences which made further negotiations on the ,commission level fruitless4 ,the ,third ,report stated that 8the majority of the ,commission has been unable to secure the agreement of the ,soviet ,union to even those elements of effective control from the technical point of view1 let alone their acceptance of the nature and extent of participation in the world community required of all nations in this field44440 ,it appeared to the ,commission that the atomic deadlock was but one manifestation of the more widespread dispute between the ,soviet ,union and the rest of the world4 ,in view of this1 the ,commission majority recommended that negotiations in the ,commission be suspended until the permanent members of the ,,unaec found that 8there exists a basis for agreement on the international control of atomic energy44440 ,the following were regarded as the basic considerations which1 even on a technical level1 made the ,u4,s4,s4,r4 position untenable3 ,i4 ,the powers provided for the ,international ,control ,commission by the ,soviet ,union proposals1 confined as they are to periodic inspection and special investigations1 are insufficient to guarantee against the diversion of dangerous materials from known atomic facilities1 and do not provide the means to detect secret activities4 ,,ii4 ,except by recommendations to the ,security ,council of the ,united ,nations1 the ,international ,control ,commission has no powers to enforce either its own decisions or the terms of the convention or conventions on control4 ,,iii4 ,the ,soviet ,union ,government insists that the convention establishing a system of control1 even so limited as that contained in the ,soviet ,union proposals1 can be concluded only after a convention providing for the prohibition of atomic weapons and the destruction of existing atomic weapons has been 8signed1 ratified1 and put into effect40 ,italics in original4 ,the ,commission's work had come to a standstill4 ,atomic energy negotiations since #aidh ,meeting in ,paris in the fall of #aidh the ,general ,assembly1 by a vote of #dj to #f1 approved the general findings and recommendations of the ,,first ,,report and the specific proposals of part ,,ii of the ,,second ,,report 8as constituting the necessary basis for the establishing of an effective system of international control of atomic energy40 ,however1 it called upon the ,,unaec to continue its work and to study such subjects as it deemed 8practicable and useful10 and asked that the permanent members of the ,commission 8consult in order to determine if there exists a basis for agreement44440 ,the permanent members were requested to transmit the results of their consultations to the ,general ,assembly4 ,in the meanwhile1 the ,soviet ,union had served notice of what appeared to be a significant change in its position4 ,in a draft resolution dated ,september #be1 #aidh1 the ,soviets proposed-- ,to elaborate draft conventions for the banning of atomic weapons and conventions for the establishment of international effective control over atomic energy1 taking into account that the convention for the banning of atomic weapons and the convention for the establishment of international control over atomic energy must be signed and implemented and entered into force simultaneously4 ,it was the last word of this resolution that marked a change in the ,u4,s4,s4,r4 stand4 ,previously1 the ,soviets had demanded that atomic weapons production be prohibited and stock piles be destroyed before a control plan was discussed4 ,nonetheless1 the new ,soviet proposal gave no indication that the ,soviets would accede to what the majority regard as an effective control plan4 ,furthermore1 the proposal for simultaneous prohibition and control was considered to be physically impossible to implement4 8,the development of atomic energy is the world's newest industry1 and already is one of the most complicated4 ,it would not be reasonable to assume that any effective system of control could be introduced and enforced overnight4 ,control and prohibition must1 therefore1 go into effect over a period of time and by a series of stages40 ,the record of negotiations from the fall of #aidh to the present is largely one of inaction4 ,on ,september #bc1 #aidi1 ,president ,truman announced that an atomic explosion had occurred in the ,soviet ,union4 ,one month later1 the sponsoring powers of the ,,unaec revealed that the consultations between them 8had not yet succeeded in bringing about agreement between the ,u4,s4,s4,r4 and the other five powers40 ,despite this1 the ,general ,assembly1 on ,november #bc1 #aidi1 asked that the permanent members of the ,commission continue their consultations and keep the ,commission and the ,general ,assembly informed of their work4 ,on the same day1 ,vishinsky revealed that the ,soviets no longer entertained favorably the principle of quotas4 ,on ,january #ai1 #aiej1 consultations came to an end when the ,soviet ,union withdrew from the discussions over the question of recognition of the ,chinese ,government4 ,c ,,the ,,atomic ,,impasse ,regarded in fundamental terms1 the deadlock in international control negotiations reflects diametrically opposed notions of the responsibilities of individual nations in a world of atomic energy4 ,all nations except the ,soviet ,union and her satellites 8put world security first1 and are prepared to accept innovations in traditional concepts of international cooperation1 national sovereignty1 and economic organization where these are necessary for security4 ,the government of the ,u4,s4,s4,r4 puts its sovereignty first and is unwilling to accept measures which may impinge upon or interfere with its rigid exercise of unimpeded state sovereignty40 ,this basic variance in the objectives of the ,soviet ,union and the other members of the ,united ,nations is mirrored in the majority and minority control proposals4 ,the specific differences in the two plans may be summarized as follows3 ,,international ,,inspection ,united ,nations4--,complete and continuing inspection by international personnel1 including aerial and ground surveys1 and inspection of atomic facilities4 ,soviet ,union4--,periodic inspection of declared plants4 ,special investigations when there exist 8grounds for suspicion0--not that the control agreement has been violated--but that the convention outlawing atomic weapons has been violated4 7,this could mean that only if a nation were subjected to surprise atomic attack would the necessary 8grounds for suspicion0 enter into existence47 ,,international ,,ownership ,,and ,,management ,united ,nations4--,international ownership or management of dangerous facilities and international ownership of source materials and their fissionable derivatives--in order to prevent diversion of such material from existing plants4 ,soviet ,union4--,complete opposition to international ownership or management provisions4 ,,strategic ,,balance 7,,quotas7 ,united ,nations4--,national quotas to be incorporated into international control treaty4 ,soviet ,union4--,sees in quotas an instrument for 8,american domination40 ,,sanctions ,united ,nations4--,no veto to protect those who violate stipulated provisions of international agreement4 ,soviet ,union4--,all decisions require unanimous consent of permanent members of ,security ,council4 ,the permanent members of the ,,unaec have summarized the differences between the ,soviet plan and the world plan in the following fashion3 8,the ,soviet ,union proposes that nations should continue to own explosive atomic materials4 8,the other five ,powers feel that under such conditions there would be no effective protection against the sudden use of these materials as atomic weapons4 8,the ,soviet ,union proposes that nations continue1 as at present1 to own1 operate1 and manage facilities making or using dangerous quantities of such materials4 8,the other five ,powers believe that1 under such conditions1 it would be impossible to detect or prevent the diversion of such materials for use in atomic weapons4 8,the ,soviet ,union proposes a system of control depending on periodic inspection of facilities the existence of which the national government concerned reports to the international agency1 supplemented by special investigations on suspicion of treaty violations4 8,the other five ,powers believe that periodic inspection would not prevent the diversion of dangerous materials and that the special investigations envisaged would be wholly insufficient to prevent clandestine activities40 ,d ,,possible ,,questions ,,regarding ,h-,,bombs ,,and ,,international ,,control#a ,the answers to many of the questions which follow are obvious4 ,the answer to other questions are less obvious4 ,each question has been selected to suggest and to illustrate the kind of problem which may be involved1 whether easy or difficult of solution4 ,it should be emphasized that the original ,united ,states proposals and the existing ,united ,nations plan foresee and carefully take into account the possibility of an ,h-bomb1 as evidenced by the language they contain4 ,the same is true of the ,mc,mahon ,act for domestic control of atomic energy within the ,united ,states4 ,footnote #a3 ,all material in this appendix1 except those paragraphs headed 8,author's ,comments10 has been prepared by the staff of the ,joint ,committee on ,atomic ,energy4 #a4 ,,is ,,the ,,hydrogen ,,bomb ,a ,,more ,,or ,,less ,,important ,,weapon ,,than ,,the ,,atomic ,,bomb8 ,,might ,,hydrogen ,,bombs ,,prove ,,to ,,be ,,decisive ,,in ,,war1 ,,or ,,has ,,their ,,significance ,,been ,,exaggerated8 ,dr4 ,harold ,urey1 a ,nobel ,prize winner in chemistry1 has suggested that the ,h-bomb would be militarily decisive2 ,dr4 ,hans ,bethe1 and other noted physicists1 have indicated that the step from ,a-bombs to ,h-bombs is as great as the original step from conventional to atomic explosives4 ,however1 ,dr4 ,robert ,f4 ,bacher1 a former ,,aec ,commissioner1 states that-- while it the ,h-bomb is a terrible weapon1 its military effectiveness seems to have been grossly overrated in the minds of laymen4 ,some of the questions which may bear upon this difference of opinion are as follows3 7#a7 ,shock effect4--,to what extent do ,h-bombs excel ,a-bombs in permitting a highly destructive attack to be compressed in time8 7#b7 ,comparative numbers4--,what quantity of ,a-bombs are required to do the same job as a given number of ,h-bombs8 7#c7 ,neutron economy4--,how much fissionable material for ,a-bombs is sacrificed by using the neutrons available in reactors for making ,h-bomb materials8 7#d7 ,deliverability4--,under various combat conditions1 is the delivery of ,h-bombs cheaper and surer than delivery of an 8equivalent0 number of ,a-bombs8 7#e7 ,aiming accuracy4--,how superior is a weapon which need strike only within a number of miles in order to destroy its target over one which must strike within #a or #b miles8 7#f7 ,psychology4--,as compared with the ,a-bomb1 to what extent might the ,h-bomb impair an enemy's will to resist and accelerate recognition of defeat8 7#g7 ,tactical employment4--,what is the relative value of ,a-bombs and ,h-bombs in tactical situations--when used against troops in the field1 guerrilla fighters1 forces preparing for amphibious invasion1 a fleet1 a string of air strips or submarine bases1 atomic facilities1 underground installations1 etc48 7#h7 ,definition of 8military effectiveness40--,would the use of ,h-bombs to destroy large urban centers containing no armaments plants have no 8military effectiveness10 or would such destruction aid the attacker and therefore represent 8militarily effective0 use of the weapon8 ,is it possible to distinguish1 in an era of total war1 between 8military0 and 8nonmilitary0 targets8 ,,author',s ,,comment ,the answer to 7#a7 becomes obvious in light of the answers to 7#b71 7#c71 7#d71 7#e71 and 7#f71 all of which must be considered together4 ,we know that a standard ,h-bomb would be the equal to ten nominal ,a-bombs in its power to destroy by blast and to as many as thirty ,a-bombs in its incendiary effects4 ,in terms of total area1 the ,h-bomb can destroy by blast an area of more than #cjj square miles1 as compared with an area of only ten square miles for the nominal ,a-bomb1 and more than #a1bjj square miles by fire and burns1 as compared with only four square miles for the early ,a-bomb model4 ,as for neutron economy1 we have seen that this vast increase in power could be achieved at a cost in fissionable ,a-bomb material possibly as low as one twelfth1 and no higher1 at the most1 than the plutonium required 7according to ,professor ,oliphant's estimate7 for just one ,a-bomb4 ,it thus becomes obvious that such a weapon not only is much cheaper1 in terms of destruction and cost of materials1 than the conventional ,a-bomb1 but is much more easily and safely delivered1 since it would still be highly effective as a blasting weapon if exploded more than five miles from its target1 while as an incendiary it would still be highly effective as far as fifteen miles away4 ,hence there can be no question that ,h-bombs vastly excel ,a-bombs in permitting a highly destructive attack to be compressed in time1 and that its psychological effect in impairing an enemy's will to resist is also incalculably greater4 ,its vastly greater range of destructiveness1 its economy of material1 and its surer delivery also make the ,h-bomb vastly superior to the ,a-bomb as a tactical weapon4 ,neither the ,h-bomb nor the ,a-bomb appears to be practical for use against guerrilla fighters1 except possibly as a threat4 ,as already discussed at length in ,chapter ,,iii1 there could be no possible justification1 on moral as well as military grounds1 for using the ,h-bomb as a strategic weapon to destroy large urban centers1 especially those containing no armaments plants1 except in retaliation for such use against us or our allies4 #b4 ,,if ,,the ,h-,,bomb ,,is ,,deemed ,,to ,,be ,,decisive ,,or ,,far ,,more ,,dangerous ,,than ,,the ,a-,,bomb1 ,,should ,,international ,,control ,,of ,,hydrogen ,,weapons ,,take ,,priority ,,over ,,control ,,of ,,ordinary ,,atomic ,,weapons8 ,,should ,,the ,,united ,,states ,,propose ,a ,,separate ,,plan ,,exclusively ,,designed ,,to ,,regulate ,h-,,bombs8 ,the official ,united ,nations proposals for international control of atomic energy apparently involve the assumption that ,a-bombs are so unique technically and so menacing as to set them apart from conventional weapons and to justify separate consideration in the ,united ,nations and a separate regulatory system4 ,if the step from ,a-bombs to ,h-bombs is considered to be as great as the step from conventional weapons to ,a-bombs1 does it follow that hydrogen warfare should become the subject of a separate control proposal and should receive separate consideration in the ,united ,nations8 ,are the technical facts of atomic and hydrogen weapons so intimately related that both must be controlled if either is to be controlled8 ,are the political facts such that the two problems must be regarded inseparably8 ,,author',s ,,comment ,since the ,h-bomb requires the ,a-bomb as a trigger1 it becomes obvious that the two problems are inseparable4 #c4 ,,is ,,the ,,existing ,,united ,,nations ,,plan ,,technically ,,adequate ,,to ,,control ,h-,,bombs8 ,the ,united ,nations plan has been couched in such a manner that an international agency would possess discretionary authority in defining and controlling materials and processes that may be employed to manufacture nuclear weapons of mass destruction4 ,for instance1 the ,second ,report of the ,united ,nations ,atomic ,energy ,commission defines 8atomic energy0 as including 8all forms of energy released in the course of1 or as a result of1 nuclear fission or of other nuclear transformation40 8,source material0 is taken to mean 8any material containing one or more key substances in such concentration as the international agency may by regulation determine40 8,key substance0 is defined to mean 8uranium1 thorium and any other element from which nuclear fuel can be produced1 as may be determined by the international agency40 7p4 #ga74 ,similarly1 the report defines 8nuclear fuel0 as 8plutonium1 ,u-#bcc1 ,u-#bce1 uranium enriched in ,u-#bce1 material containing the foregoing1 and any other material which the international agency determines to be capable of releasing substantial quantities of atomic energy through nuclear chain reaction of the material40 7p4 #ga47 ,the report likewise observes that3 8,dangerous activities or facilities are those which are of military significance in the production of atomic weapons4 ,the word 8dangerous0 is used in the sense of potentially dangerous to world security40 7p4 #gj74 ,italics supplied throughout4 ,does such breadth of phraseology mean that manufacturing processes and source materials needed in the production of ,h-bombs could be properly controlled1 through the existing ,,un plan8 ,since nearly #b years of work were required to formulate the ,,un plan1 can this plan be regarded as adequate for hydrogen weapons so long as the control measures for the atomic energy industry are not explicitly elaborated with the same detail as the arrangements evolved for controlling ,u-#bce and plutonium8 ,it may also be pointed out that the existing ,,un plan contains no provision for physically protecting informants who advise the international agency of violations4 ,might potential informants keep silent for fear of being punished by their national governments8 ,is this factor important if the existing ,,un plan were subjected to the added strain of controlling hydrogen weapons as well as atomic weapons8 ,what safeguards would assure that the employees of an international control agency would be faithful and loyal to the objectives of the agency and that they would not work purely in the interests of some national government--perhaps a national government other than that of their own country8 ,,author',s ,,comment ,the language makes it obvious that the ,united ,nations plan 8foresees and carefully takes into account the possibility of an ,h-bomb40 ,in view of ,russia's attitude1 however1 and to leave no room for future quibbling1 the present plan should be explicitly elaborated to include hydrogen weapons4 ,on the other hand1 since ,russia will have none of the plan1 such elaboration would at best be purely academic4 ,as for protecting informants1 certainly no plan could contemplate that citizens would act as spies against their own country1 even if they find that their country is violating an international agreement4 ,the plan is designed so that such violations could be detected by the official employees of the international control agency4 ,obviously1 such official employees stationed in any country should not be nationals of that country and should be protected by diplomatic immunity4 ,each country1 in selecting its representatives to the control agency1 would naturally subject them to a most careful screening as to their character and loyalty1 and would use all necessary checks to make certain that they are faithful and loyal to the objectives of the agency4 #d4 ,,is ,,control ,,over ,,fissionable ,,materials ,,sufficient ,,to ,,prevent ,,the ,,production ,,of ,,hydrogen ,,bombs8 ,,if ,,so1 ,,is ,,the ,,existing ,,un ,,plan ,,adequate ,,to ,,this ,,task8 ,the technical facts suggest that ,h-bombs may be regulated in at least two ways3 7#a7 ,control over the fissionable material usable as a 8trigger0 and 7#b7 control over deuterium and tritium4 ,perhaps control over all fissionable material would give effective control over hydrogen weapons4 ,however1 by way of specific example1 the introduction to volume ,,vi of the ,scientific ,information ,transmitted to the ,united ,nations ,atomic ,energy ,commission1 ,june #ad1 #aidf-,october #ad1 #aidf 7see ,state ,department ,publication #bffa1 pp4 #aea-aeb71 comments as follows3 ,it is difficult to define the amount of activity in the illicit production of atomic weapons which is significant4 ,the illicit construction of a single atomic bomb by means of a decade of successful evasion would not provide an overwhelming advantage1 if it can be assumed that it would take another decade to produce a second bomb4 ,but the secret production of one bomb per year would create a definite danger1 and the secret production of five or more per year would be disastrous4 ,this report assumes arbitrarily that the minimum unit of noncompliance is the secret production of one atomic bomb per year or a total of five bombs over any period of time4 ,this example is chosen because ,,un documents published later omit concrete illustrations1 although the stress which these documents place upon international ownership1 operation1 and management clearly reflects a determination to reduce to the rock-bottom minimum any illicit mining or production4 ,considering that five illicit ,a-bombs might1 under certain circumstances1 lead to five illicit ,h-bombs1 what margin of inefficiency--if any--in controlling source and fissionable material is permissible8 ,is absolute protection against illegal diversion of source and fissionable material technically possible8 ,does the existing ,,un plan provide absolute or near-absolute protection8 ,can greater technical protection be secured than under the present ,,un plan8 ,,author',s ,,comment ,it can be stated unequivocally that1 in the absence of complete mutual faith and goodwill on the part of all concerned1 neither the existing ,,un plan nor any other technical plan that can be devised will provide absolute or near-absolute protection4 ,no plan could be devised that would provide assurance against the diversion of enough material in any one year to make at least one atomic bomb4 ,in five years this would mean the secret production of five hydrogen bombs4 #e4 ,,must ,h-,,bomb ,,controls ,,relate ,,to ,,deuterium ,,and ,,tritium ,,as ,,well ,,as ,,to ,,fissionable ,,material8 ,,if ,,they ,,must1 ,,can ,,the ,,present ,,un ,,plan ,,fully ,,provide ,,for ,,these ,,controls ,,or ,,does ,,it ,,require ,,revision ,,or ,,changes ,,in ,,emphasis8 ,should control over both fissionable material and deuterium and tritium call for the same emphasis and consideration which the ,united ,nations ,atomic ,energy ,commission has already given to control of ,u-#bce and plutonium8 ,would surveillance of deuterium and tritium manufacture furnish better insurance against illicit ,h-bomb construction than surveillance of ,u-#bce and plutonium1 or is the reverse more apt to be true8 ,are added safeguards necessary to regulate deuterium and tritium8 ,or is the ,,un plan1 as now constituted1 sufficiently flexible and comprehensive to take care of light-element control8 ,,author',s ,,comment ,since ,h-bombs require either ,u-#bce or plutonium1 as well as deuterium and tritium1 and since absolute or near-absolute control of ,u-#bce or plutonium is not possible1 it becomes obvious that ,h-bomb controls must relate to both deuterium and tritium as well as to fissionable material4 ,since the ,,un plan does not mention them by name1 added safeguards are necessary to regulate deuterium and tritium4 ,no safeguards1 however1 could be devised even in this respect to provide absolute or near-absolute protection4 #f4 ,,is ,,it ,,technically ,,possible ,,to ,,detect ,,the ,,manufacture ,,of ,,heavy ,,water ,,and ,,deuterium ,,through ,,international ,,inspection8 ,,would ,,an ,,international ,,agreement ,,flatly ,,prohibiting ,,production ,,in ,,quantity ,,be ,,desirable8 ,the manufacture of heavy water and the separation of deuterium are relatively simple processes4 ,they may be carried out in small plants which can exist in a variety of locales4 ,the ,second ,report of the ,,un ,commission comments as follows3 ,the international agency shall have the authority to require periodic reports from nations regarding the production1 shipment1 location1 and use of specialized equipment and supplies directly related to the production and use of atomic energy1 such as mass spectrometers1 diffusion barriers1 gas centrifuges1 electromagnetic isotope separation units1 very pure graphite in large amounts1 heavy water1 and beryllium or beryllium compounds in large amounts4 ,in addition1 the agency shall have authority to require reports as specified of certain distinctive facilities and construction projects having features of size and design1 or construction or operation1 which1 in combination with their location and_/or production or consumption of heat or electricity1 are peculiarly comparable to those of known atomic facilities of dangerous character 7p4 #ed74 ,would inspectors possessing freedom of movement be able to locate deuterium and heavy water plants8 ,would aerial surveys and aerial photographs of industrial areas help detect processes which produce hydrogen as a byproduct and which might therefore be concerned with the manufacture of heavy water or deuterium8 ,should quantity production of deuterium be prohibited even though it is used in certain types of peacetime reactors such as the ,canadian reactor at ,chalk ,river1 the ,french reactor at ,chatillon1 ,swedish reactors under construction1 and a research reactor at the ,argonne ,national ,laboratory8 ,is it possible on technical grounds to enforce such a prohibition8 ,,author',s ,,comment ,it would not be desirable to prohibit production of heavy water and deuterium in quantity since heavy water is the best moderator of neutrons in the large-scale production of atomic power for industrial uses4 ,furthermore1 such a prohibition could never be enforced1 since1 as stated1 the manufacture of heavy water and the separation of deuterium are relatively simple processes that 8may be carried out in small plants which can exist in a variety of locales40 ,what makes it even more difficult1 if not impossible1 to detect any violation of such a prohibition is the fact that the raw material for heavy water or deuterium is just plain water4 #g4 ,,should ,,the ,,provisions ,,of ,,the ,,present ,,un ,,plan ,,relating ,,to ,,inspection1 ,,surveys1 ,,and ,,explorations ,,be ,,modified ,,to ,,control ,,heavy ,,water ,,and ,,deuterium ,,production8 ,the ,united ,nations plan assumes that the production of fissionable material cannot be regulated without strict supervision over the mining of source materials such as uranium and thorium3 ,without the control of raw materials1 any other controls that might be applied in the various processes of atomic energy production would be inadequate because of the uncertainty as to whether or not the international agency has knowledge of the disposition of all raw material4 7,second ,report1 p4 #cj47 ,whereas uranium and thorium are needed to produce ,u-#bce1 ,u-#bcc and plutonium1 the production of deuterium is not subject to such limitation of source materials4 ,only water1 the existence of power1 and comparatively simple plants are needed for the manufacture of heavy water and deuterium4 ,in view of these facts1 can the existing ,united ,nations plan cope with the problem of regulating deuterium production8 ,in commenting upon spot aerial surveys1 for example1 the ,second ,report recommends that 8the international agency shall conduct spot aerial surveys in each period of #b years over areas not exceeding #e percent of the territory under the control of each nation or areas not to exceed #b1jjj square miles1 whichever is the larger4 7,these area limitations apply to spot aerial surveys only70 7p4 #fh74 ,if aerial surveys were to be used not only in controlling raw materials but also to help in spotting deuterium and heavy water plants1 must they be carried out more frequently than is provided in the existing plan8 ,the ,second ,report also indicates that a ,,un inspectorate should be compelled to secure permission1 through a warrant procedure1 before inspecting 8private and restricted property not open to visitation by the population in the locality1 and in the case of certain ground surveys and aerial surveys which are additional to others which the agency may conduct without warrant or other special authorization0 7p4 #fj74 ,do the technical facts surrounding heavy water and deuterium production suggest that such a restriction on an international agency's authority would have to be modified8 ,,author',s ,,comment ,see comment on question #f4 #h4 ,,what ,,safeguards ,,are ,,necessary ,,to ,,prevent ,,clandestine ,,production ,,of ,,tritium8 ,,would ,,an ,,international ,,agreement ,,flatly ,,prohibiting ,,production ,,in ,,quantity ,,be ,,desirable8 ,u-#bce and plutonium may be used either in weapons or as fuels for peacetime reactors4 ,here is the reason most frequently cited for requiring that international control include not only inspection but also such further guaranties as ,united ,nations ownership1 operation1 and management of 8dangerous0 plants4 ,the potentiality1 both for good and evil1 that characterizes fissionables does not appear to characterize tritium1 which has no known peacetime uses except as a laboratory research tool4 ,is it therefore possible that the reason for requiring inspection plus other guaranties as regards ,u-#bce and plutonium does not apply to tritium and that inspection alone would answer8 ,if quantity production of tritium were altogether forbidden--as having no peacetime purpose--the mere act of preparing lithium 7the tritium raw material7 for irradiation and the mere act of inserting it in a nuclear reactor might be considered a violation4 ,would such action be impossible to conceal from managers and inspectors stationed at each reactor permitted under the control agreement8 ,would an illegal reactor itself be impossible to conceal from inspectors enjoying freedom of movement8 ,a few private commentators have argued that the ,,un plan fundamentally errs in assuming industrial power to be around the corner4 ,they estimate that this goal is actually a decade or two away and that meanwhile the control problem would be simplified if all high-powered reactors were dismantled4 ,does the role of reactor-produced tritium in ,h-bomb production strengthen such an argument8 ,the ,,un plan distinguishes between atomic facilities which are sufficiently 8dangerous0 to require ,,un management and facilities which may be operated by national governments and merely require international inspection4 ,since all reactors produce neutrons and hence might be useful in some degree--however small--in manufacturing tritium1 is it now necessary to regard certain reactors formerly considered to be 8non-dangerous0 as now being in the 8dangerous0 category8 ,are there other methods1 apart from reactors1 for producing tritium8 ,if so1 how can they be controlled8 ,would the right of the international control agency to own1 operate1 and manage 8dangerous0 plants and to own and regulate both fissionable materials and 8fusionable materials0 meet such a situation8 ,,author',s ,,comment ,the most efficient and rapid method for producing tritium is by inserting lithium metal into a large nuclear reactor1 thus exposing it to irradiation by neutrons1 which transmute the lithium into tritium and helium4 ,tritium could also be produced in a similar manner in the smaller nuclear reactors used for research purposes1 and though these smaller reactors would produce it at a considerably slower rate1 the fact that the amounts of tritium required may be rather small would inevitably shift these reactors from the 8non-dangerous0 to the 8dangerous0 category4 ,such small reactors are essential for research1 and their prohibition would strike a vital blow at the progress of science4 ,furthermore1 they could be much more easily hidden than large reactors4 ,this fact1 therefore1 weakens1 rather than strengthens the argument for the dismantling of all high-powered reactors1 as such dismantling would not prevent the production of tritium4 ,there are other1 though less efficient1 methods for producing tritium1 however1 that do not require any reactors at all4 ,a good neutron source can be provided by exposing beryllium to radium1 radon1 or polonium4 ,these neutrons could then be used to bombard lithium and convert it into tritium4 ,nor is lithium necessary1 for at least four other elements1 including deuterium1 helium #c1 boron1 and nitrogen1 can be transmuted by neutrons from the beryllium into tritium4 ,what is more1 even neutrons are not absolutely essential1 since deuterons 7nuclei of deuterium7 and beryllium could be made to yield tritium by bombarding them with other deuterons4 ,the latter method1 however1 would require the use of giant cyclotrons and would be very slow4 ,all this would indicate that it would be extremely difficult1 if not impossible1 to provide safeguards against the clandestine production of tritium4 #i4 ,,should ,a ,,world-,,wide ,,geological ,,survey ,,cover ,,concentrated ,,lithium ,,deposits8 ,a key feature of the ,united ,nations plan is the provision for a world-wide geological survey of uranium and thorium--the raw materials potentially usable in ,a-bombs4 ,this survey is considered necessary in order to permit tracing of materials as they progress from the mines through various processing phases and finally enter a nuclear reactor4 ,does the same kind of logic apply to lithium--raw material for tritium8 ,how formidable is the technical problem of locating and controlling deposits of lithium8 ,pegmatite minerals constitute a principal source of lithium ores1 which are currently produced as a byproduct of the nonmetallic mineral industry4 ,commercial deposits of lithium are known to exist in the ,black ,hills of ,north ,dakota2 northern ,new ,mexico2 ,saskatchewan1 ,canada2 and southwest ,africa4 ,production of ores rose to about #ijj tons of lithium oxide in #aidd and is now about #bjj tons4 ,so long as requirements do not exceed byproduct production1 supply does not appear to present a problem4 ,if requirements exceed byproduct supply1 the cost of the excess might be high4 ,lithium is now used commercially in glass1 as a compound in welding fluxes1 in storage batteries1 in fluorescent light tubes1 and as an alloying element4 ,are the quantities of lithium ore required on an order of magnitude that makes control feasible8 ,,author',s ,,comment ,such a world-wide geological survey would be futile1 as only a few hundred pounds of lithium would be necessary to produce enough tritium for a relatively large ,h-bomb stockpile1 and such amounts could be hidden right now from available stocks4 #aj4 ,,do ,,the ,,technical ,,facts ,,of ,,the ,h-,,bomb ,,mean ,,that ,,now1 ,,more ,,than ,,ever1 ,,the ,,united ,,nations ,,plan ,,is ,,the ,,correct ,,approach ,,to ,,international ,,control8 ,various critics of the ,,un plan have denied that management control over 8dangerous0 plants is essential to protect against violations4 ,high-power reactors are among the plants to be classified as 8dangerous0 under the ,,un plan1 and these same reactors are the ones which might produce not merely plutonium but tritium in quantity4 ,likewise1 an international agency would possess authority to check the design of any isotope separation unit and to assume the right of construction and operation if these fall into the 8dangerous0 category4 ,deuterium may be obtained through isotopic separation4 ,do such facts as these refute the critics and demonstrate that managerial and material control by the ,united ,nations1 over and above inspection1 is more than ever necessary in order to prevent diversion of nuclear fuel or illegal irradiation of lithium8 ,,author',s ,,comment ,in the light of the technical facts about the ,h-bomb1 the argument as to whether managerial control over 8dangerous0 plants is essential to protect against violations becomes wholly academic4 ,we have seen that even managerial control would not offer either absolute or near-absolute protection4 ,no plan that does not offer at least near-absolute protection against the clandestine production of even one ,h-bomb per year could be trusted when a nation's very existence may be at stake4 #aa4 ,,how ,,does ,,the ,h-,,bomb ,,affect ,,the ,,problem ,,of 8,,stages08 ,the ,united ,nations plan would take effect by 8stages0--one stage to include1 among other projects1 a world-wide geological survey1 another stage1 to involve1 among other projects1 the taking over of atomic installations1 and still another to bring about the disposition of fissionable materials4 ,at what point in some such progression would national stockpiles of deuterium and tritium be placed under control8 ,when this point was reached1 would they be destroyed or be held in storage under ,united ,nations auspices8 ,if a nation pretended to make known its entire stockpile of tritium and deuterium while actually it kept hidden a substantial portion1 how would the international agency discover such a violation8 ,,authors ,,comment ,see comment on questions #ab and #ac4 #ab4 ,,how ,,does ,,the ,h-,,bomb ,,bear ,,upon ,,the ,,problem ,,of ,,disposition ,,of ,,existing ,,stocks ,,of ,,fissionable ,,material8 ,when a control plan takes effect1 what should be done with supplies of ,u-#bce and plutonium in excess of a quantity immediately usable for peacetime purposes8 ,this problem has received relatively little consideration in the ,united ,nations ,atomic ,energy ,commission4 ,if excess stocks were destroyed1 a valuable future source of energy and storehouse of neutrons would be lost4 ,on the other hand1 if the stocks were kept in existence under ,,un guard1 seizure by an aggressor state might rapidly permit it to attack with atomic bombs--and innocent countries might have relatively little warning4 ,such seizures might quickly lead1 under certain circumstances1 to the construction of 8triggers0 for ,h-bombs4 ,does this fact tip the balance in favor of destroying excess ,u-#bce and plutonium8 ,or are these substances still too valuable and too difficult to replace to justify destruction8 ,is there a third alternative--possibly involving partial destruction or the use of 8denaturants0 or the construction of many power reactors1 regardless of cost factors--to keep excess stocks of fissionables contaminated with fission products8 ,,authors ,,comment ,the problem of the disposition of existing stocks of fissionable materials was given little consideration because it was too hot to handle4 ,from the very beginning ,russia insisted that all atomic bombs be destroyed1 and she left no doubt that she meant the destruction of the fissionable materials with which bombs could be quickly assembled4 ,even before the ,h-bomb1 such destruction might have meant suicide to nations that complied1 since they would have been at the complete mercy of noncomplying nations4 ,the advent of the ,h-bomb makes all talk of such destruction1 wholly apart from the waste of a priceless1 irreplaceable natural resource1 completely unrealistic1 as any such act would be tantamount to abdication1 a prelude to a super-,munich by the free nations4 ,denaturing1 which makes fissionable materials temporarily useless for bombs1 is also out of the question1 since it would take a long time to reconcentrate them1 giving nations with a hidden stock of nondenatured material a tremendous advantage that might well mean the difference between survival and annihilation for a nation that acted in good faith4 ,all this also applies to the destruction of stocks of deuterium and tritium4 #ac4 ,,how ,,does ,,the ,h-,,bomb ,,bear ,,upon 8,,quotas08 ,the ,united ,nations plan envisages that reactors and other atomic facilities will be distributed among the nations according to 8quotas0 and a 8strategic balance0--whereby no one nation1 by seizing the plants within or near its borders1 could gain an undue military advantage over innocent nations4 ,this 8quota0 feature has been criticized as unnecessary and as likely to hinder individual countries in developing the peacetime uses of atomic energy to the maximum extent4 ,does the fact that reactor fuels1 if seized by an aggressor1 might make available ,h-bomb 8triggers0 tend to render all the more desirable the 8quota0 idea8 ,how long a time would an aggressor require to make enough deuterium and tritium for ,h-bombs in seized plants8 ,could a world control authority1 by requiring that certain design features be incorporated in the plants under its control1 extend this time period8 ,what should be done with plants in existence at the time a control agreement takes effect and well suited to ,h-bomb production but poorly suited to peacetime uses8 ,how should such plants1 if they were not dismantled1 figure in 8quota0 allotments8 ,,author',s ,,comment ,from its very inception the quota system was totally impossible of realization4 ,today it is likely to prove a snare and a delusion1 giving a false sense of security1 since it could not guarantee against the clandestine production of at least one ,h-bomb a year4 ,the plutonium for the trigger could be produced in hidden small reactors1 while the deuterium and tritium could be produced in other small plants that could be equally hidden4 ,as we have seen1 tritium production does not even require a nuclear reactor4 ,like the 8quota system10 the system of 8stages0 has also become completely out of date1 since it was predicated on the control system taking effect before ,russia developed her own atomic bombs or had built her own nuclear reactors4 ,today there is no longer any logical reason for any stages1 since any delay would make effective control more difficult4 ,even today1 if an international agency were to take over stockpiles1 it could never be certain that considerable amounts had not been hidden away4 ,in other words1 even if the ,,un plan were to be adopted today1 it would not give security against a surprise atomic attack1 which is the very purpose of the plan4 #ad4 ,,how ,,does ,,the ,h-,,bomb ,,bear ,,upon ,,research ,,to ,,be ,,performed ,,by ,,the ,,united ,,nations ,,control ,,agency8 ,under the ,united ,nations plan1 individual nations would be forbidden to engage in atomic weapons research1 but such research would be performed by the world control agency itself1 as a means of keeping it at the forefront of knowledge in this field and thereby enabling it to detect violations which might otherwise pass unnoticed through ignorance4 ,is research upon ,h-bombs so dangerous that not even the world control agency should be allowed to undertake it8 ,,author',s ,,comment ,if an international agency is ever established1 it is obvious that it would have to carry on research on ,h-bombs for the same reason that would make it vital for it to carry on research on ,a-bombs--8to keep at the forefront of knowledge0 so that it would be in a position to 8detect violations40 ,this would become all the more imperative just because the ,h-bomb is so much more dangerous4 #ae4 ,,should ,,technical ,,information ,,regarding ,,the ,h-,,bomb ,,be ,,transmitted ,,to ,,the ,,united ,,nations ,,as ,a ,,basis ,,for ,a ,,discussion ,,of ,,hydrogen ,,control8 ,in #aidf the ,united ,states transmitted six volumes of technical information on atomic energy to the ,united ,nations4 ,this was one important means of providing members of the ,united ,nations ,atomic ,energy ,commission with sufficient basic data to discuss international control4 ,no similar body of material on hydrogen bombs has been transmitted to the ,united ,nations4 ,can the ,commission now discuss the control of hydrogen warfare without further official information on its technical aspects8 ,if such information is to be provided1 who should be the provider1 the ,united ,states or the ,soviet ,union1 or both8 ,,author',s ,,comment ,all the information so far has come from the ,united ,states4 ,in fact1 the ,smyth ,report1 the six volumes of technical information submitted to the ,,un1 the testimony by scientists at the ,congressional hearings on the ,mc,mahon ,act1 and much declassified information have been of invaluable aid to ,russia in developing her own atomic bomb4 ,it is about time that this one-way flow of information came to a stop4 ,not a trickle has so far come out of ,russia--not even an official acknowledgment that she has exploded her first ,a-bomb--and until she shows her willingness to co-operate fully1 we must stop playing ,santa ,claus4 #af4 ,,should ,a ,,new ,,panel ,,of ,,experts ,,analogous ,,to ,,the ,,acheson-,,lilienthal ,,board ,,be ,,appointed ,,to ,,study ,,the ,h-,,bomb ,,in ,,relation ,,to ,,international ,,control8 ,it is now more than #d years since the ,acheson-,lilienthal ,board made its recommendations on international control4 ,their findings have since been largely incorporated into the ,,un plan4 ,do the events of the last #d years make it desirable1 for technical reasons1 to rethink the control problem8 ,are the technical data of hydrogen bombs such1 as to demand a recasting and change of emphasis in the existing ,,un plan8 ,have the prospects of large-scale peacetime applications of atomic energy sufficiently changed that a different orientation in control measures is desirable8 ,if re-examination of the control question is indicated1 should this inquiry be undertaken in the first instance by a group of qualified ,americans8 ,or should the ,united ,states suggest that an internationally constituted board initially take on this assignment8 ,considering the strong ,soviet opposition to the ,,un plan1 is it useful to consider the problem of control8 ,is the ,soviet attitude at all likely to change in the foreseeable future8 ,would a rethinking of the control problem contribute to a solution unless ,soviet representatives participated8 ,would the appointment of a new 8,acheson-,lilienthal ,board0 raise false hopes8 ,,author',s ,,comment ,as indicated in ,chapter ,,iv and in the preceding comments1 the ,,un plan for the international control of atomic energy is wholly out of date1 and the sooner we realize it1 the better for us and for the world4 ,it was at best a noble ideal1 which did not have the slightest chance of realization from the very start4 ,a re-examination of the entire problem1 even before the advent of the ,h-bomb1 had been long overdue4 ,today it is all the more imperative4 ,since such a re-examination requires1 or at least implies1 the withdrawal of the plan1 originally sponsored by this country1 it should be done by an international board1 preferably at the suggestion of some nation other than the ,united ,states4 ,the new board1 in considering the whole problem anew1 should avoid our original error of regarding control of atomic weapons as a problem wholly separate from that of other weapons of mass destruction4 ,it should recognize the facts of life and not aim at bringing the millennium overnight4 ,it should not seek absolute security1 since the facts show it to be unattainable4 ,rather should it accept as a wise maxim that even partial security is better than none4 ,if the board set for itself certain limited objectives1 they would have a much better chance of universal acceptance than if its aims were too high1 as they were in the original ,united ,states plan1 now the plan of the majority of ,united ,nations4 ,its first limited objective should be a general agreement to outlaw the use of all weapons of mass destruction against civilian populations4 ,this would mean outlawing the use not only of ,a- and ,h-bombs against large urban centers of population1 but also of all other conventional weapons for the mass killing of noncombatants4 ,a second limited objective should be the outlawing of radiological warfare in all forms1 which should include the use of the rigged ,h-bomb as well as the use of ,a-bombs in a manner that takes advantage of their radioactive effects4 ,this would mean the prohibition of the explosion of ,a- or ,h-bombs from a low altitude1 or their explosion underwater in a harbor4 ,these limited objectives would still permit nations to manufacture atomic weapons and to use them as tactical weapons against military personnel1 while they would eliminate their use as strategic weapons against large urban centers4 ,the very possession of atomic weapons by both sides1 however1 may in itself prevent their use even tactically4 ,in fact1 there would still be the hope that they would serve as effective deterrents against war itself4 ,the advantage of such a plan of limited objectives is the likelihood1 or at least the possibility1 that even ,russia would not dare to turn it down and thus stand before the world as preventing the prohibition of the use of atomic weapons against civilian populations4 ,and once we reached agreement with ,russia on one set of limited objectives1 the door may possibly have been opened for further agreement on other limited objectives4 ,peace1 step by step1 appears to be the only alternative to possible catastrophe4 ,one limited objective after another must become our major policy4 ,a ,,note ,,on ,,the ,,type ,,in ,,which ,,this ,,book ,,is ,,set ,the text of this book is set in ,caledonia1 a ,linotype face designed by ,w4 ,a4 ,dwiggins4 ,this type belongs to the family of printing types called 8modern face0 by printers--a term used to mark the change in style of type-letters that occurred about #ahjj4 ,caledonia borders on the general design of ,scotch ,modern1 but is more freely drawn than that letter4 ,the book was composed1 printed1 and bound by ,kingsport ,press1 ,inc41 ,kingsport1 ,tennessee4 ,illustration3 ,logo ---------------------------------------- -------------------------------- ,also by ,,william ,l4 ,,laurence ,,dawn ,,over ,,zero #aidf1 #aidg ,this is a ,borzoi ,book1 published in ,new ,york by ,alfred ,a4 ,knopf ---------------------------------------- -------------------------------- ,,transcriber',s ,,notes ,page ,changed from ,changed to #ef ,valuing their liberty more their ,valuing their liberty more than lives1 the ,american their lives1 the ,american #abb ,einstein's formula1 ,e mc1 ,einstein's formula1 ,e mc1 revealed that matter revealed that matter ,typos fixed2 non-standard spelling and dialect retained4 ,enclosed italics font in underscores4