,a ,,guide ,,to ,,stoicism  by ,st4     
,george ,stock    ,,ten ,,cent ,,pocket 
,,series ,,no4 #cdg  ,edited by ,e4     
,haldeman-,julius4    ,,foreword  ,if   
you strip ,stoicism of its paradoxes and
 its wilful misuse of language1 what is 
left is simply the moral philosophy of  
,socrates1 ,plato and ,aristotle1 dashed
 with the physics of ,heraclitus4       
,stoicism was not so much a new doctrine
 as the form under which the old ,greek 
philosophy finally presented itself to  
the world at large4 ,it owed its        
popularity in some measure to its       
extravagance4 ,a great deal might be    
said about ,stoicism as a religion and  
about the part it played in the         
formation of ,christianity but these    
subjects were excluded by the plan of   
this volume which was to present a      
sketch of the ,stoic doctrine based on  
the original authorities4      ,,st     
,,george ,,stock ,m ,a         ,pemb4   
,coll4 ,oxford           ,a ,,guide ,,to
 ,,stoicism4           ,,st ,,george    

,,stock   ,,philosophy ,,among ,,the    
,,greeks ,,and ,,romans4  ,among the    
,greeks and ,romans of the classical age
 philosophy occupied the place taken by 
religion among ourselves4 ,their appeal 
was to reason not to revelation4 ,to    
what1 asks ,cicero in his ,offices1 are 
we to look for training in virtue1 if   
not to philosophy8 ,now1 if truth is    
believed to rest upon authority it is   
natural that it should be impressed upon
 the mind from the earliest age1 since  
the essential thing is that it should be
 believed1 but a truth which makes its  
appeal to reason must be content to wait
 till reason is developed4 ,we are born 
into the ,eastern1 ,western or ,anglican
 communion or some other denomination1  
but it was of his own free choice that  
the serious minded young ,greek or      
,roman embraced the tenets of one of the
 great sects which divided the world of 
philosophy4 ,the motive which led him to
 do so in the first instance may have   
been merely the influence of a friend or

 a discourse from some eloquent speaker1
 but the choice once made was his own   
choice1 and he adhered to it as such4   
,conversions from one sect to another   
were of quite rare occurrence4 ,a       
certain ,dionysius of ,heraclea1 who    
went over from the ,stoics to the       
,cyrenaics1 was ever afterward known as 
the deserter4 ,it was as difficult to be
 independent in philosophy as it is with
 us to be independent in politics4 ,when
 a young man joined a school1 he        
committed himself to all its opinions1  
not only as to the end of life1 which   
was the main point of division1 but as  
to all questions on all subjects4 ,the  
,stoic did not differ merely in his     
ethics from the ,epicurean2 he differed 
also in his theology and his physics and
 his metaphysics4 ,aristotle1 as        
,shakespeare knew1 thought young men    
unfit to hear moral philosophy4 ,and yet
 it was a question--or rather the       
question--of moral philosophy1 the      
answer to which decided the young man's 

opinions on all other points4 ,the      
language which ,cicero sometimes uses   
about the seriousness of the choice made
 in early life and how a young man gets 
entrammelled by a school before he is   
really able to judge1 reminds us of what
 we hear said nowadays about the danger 
of a young man's taking orders before   
his opinions are formed4 ,to this it was
 replied that a young man only exercised
 the right of private judgment in       
selecting the authority whom he should  
follow1 and1 having once done that1     
trusted to him for all the rest4 ,with  
the analogue of this contention also we 
are familiar in modern times4 ,cicero   
allows that there would be something in 
it1 if the selection of the true        
philosopher did not above all things    
require the philosophic mind4 ,but in   
those days it was probably the case1 as 
it is now1 that1 if a man did not form  
speculative opinions in youth1 the      
pressure of affairs would not leave him 
leisure to do so later4  ,the life span 

of ,zeno1 the founder of ,stoicism1 was 
from ,b4,c4 #cdg to #bge4 ,he did not   
begin teaching till #cae1 at the mature 
age of forty4 ,aristotle had passed away
 in #cbb1 and with him closed the great 
constructive era of ,greek thought4 ,the
 ,ionian philosophers had speculated on 
the physical constitution of the        
universe1 the ,pythagoreans on the      
mystical properties of numbers2         
,heraclitus had propounded his          
philosophy of fire1 ,democritus and     
,leucippus had struck out a rude form of
 the atomic theory1 ,socrates had raised
 questions relating to man1 ,plato had  
discussed them with all the freedom of  
the dialogue1 while ,aristotle had      
systematically worked them out4 ,the    
later schools did not add much to the   
body of philosophy4 ,what they did was  
to emphasize different sides of the     
doctrine of their predecessors and to   
drive views to their logical            
consequences4 ,the great lesson of      
,greek philosophy is that it is worth   

while to do right irrespective of reward
 and punishment and regardless of the   
shortness of life4 ,this lesson the     
,stoics so enforced by the earnestness  
of their lives and the influence of     
their moral teaching that it has become 
associated more particularly with them4 
,cicero1 though he always classed       
himself as an ,academic1 exclaims in one
 place that he is afraid the ,stoics are
 the only philosophers1 and whenever he 
is combating ,epicureanism his language 
is that of a ,stoic4 ,some of ,vergil's 
most eloquent passages seem to be       
inspired by ,stoic speculation4 ,even   
,horace1 despite his banter about the   
sage1 in his serious moods borrows the  
language of the ,stoics4 ,it was they   
who inspired the highest flights of     
declamatory eloquence in ,persius and   
,juvenal4 ,their moral philosophy       
affected the world through ,roman law1  
the great masters of which were brought 
up under its influence4 ,so all         
pervasive indeed was this moral         

philosophy of the ,stoics that it was   
read by the ,jews of ,alexandria into   
,moses under the veil of allegory and   
was declared to be the inner meaning of 
the ,hebrew ,scriptures4 ,if the ,stoics
 then did not add much to the body of   
,philosophy1 they did a great work in   
popularising it and bringing it to bear 
upon life4  ,an intense practicality was
 a mark of the later ,greek philosophy4 
,this was common to ,stoicism with its  
rival ,epicureanism4 ,both regarded     
philosophy as 'the art of life1' though 
they differed in their conception of    
what that art should be4 ,widely as the 
two schools were opposed to one another1
 they had also other features in common4
 ,both were children of an age in which 
the free city had given way to          
monarchies1 and personal had taken the  
place of corporate life4 ,the question  
of happiness is no longer1 as with      
,aristotle1 and still more with ,plato1 
one for the state1 but for the          
individual4 ,in both schools the        

speculative interest was feeble from the
 first1 and tended to become feebler as 
time went on4 ,both were new departures 
from pre-existent schools4 ,stoicism was
 bred out of ,cynicism1 as ,epicureanism
 out of ,cyrenaicism4 ,both were content
 to fall back for their physics upon the
 pre-,socratic schools1 the one adopting
 the firm philosophy of ,heraclitus1 the
 other the atomic theory of ,democritus4
 ,both were in strong reaction against  
the abstractions of ,plato and          
,aristotle1 and would tolerate nothing  
but concrete reality4 ,the ,stoics were 
quite as materialistic in their own way 
as the ,epicureans4 ,with regard indeed 
to the nature of the highest god we may1
 with ,senaca represent the difference  
between the two schools as a question of
 the senses against the intellect1 but  
we shall see presently that the ,stoics 
regarded the intellect itself as being a
 kind of body4  ,the ,greeks were all   
agreed that there was an end or aim of  
life1 and that it was to be called      

'happiness1' but at that point their    
agreement ended4 ,as to the nature of   
happiness there was the utmost variety  
of opinion4 ,democritus had made it     
consist in mental serenity1 ,anaxagoras 
in speculation1 ,socrates in wisdom1    
,aristotle in the practise of virtue    
with some amount of favour from fortune1
 ,aristippus simply in pleasure4 ,these 
were opinions of the philosophers4 ,but1
 besides these1 there were the opinions 
of ordinary men1 as shown by their lives
 rather than by their language4 ,zeno's 
contribution to thought on the subject  
does not at first sight appear          
illuminating4 ,he said that the end was 
'to live consistently1' the implication 
doubtless being that no life but the    
passionless life of reason could        
ultimately be consistent with itself4   
,cleanthes1 his immediate successor in  
the school1 is credited with having     
added the words 'with nature1' thus     
completing the well-known ,stoic formula
 that the end is 'to live consistently  

with nature4'  ,it was assumed by the   
,greeks that the ways of nature were    
'the ways of pleasantness1' and that    
'all her paths' were 'peace4' ,this may 
seem to us a startling assumption1 but  
that is because we do not mean by       
'nature' the same thing as they did4 ,we
 connect the term with the origin of a  
thing1 they connected it rather with the
 end2 by the 'natural state' we mean a  
state of savagery1 they meant the       
highest civilization2 we mean by a      
thing's nature what it is or has been1  
they meant what it ought to become under
 the most favourable conditions2 not the
 sour crab1 but the mellow glory of the 
,hesperides worthy to be guarded by a   
sleepless dragon1 was to the ,greeks the
 natural apple4 ,hence we find          
,aristotle maintaining that the ,state  
is a natural product1 because it is     
evolved out of social relations which   
exist by nature4 ,nature indeed was a   
highly ambiguous term to the ,greeks no 
less than to ourselves1 but in the sense

 with which we are now concerned1 the   
nature of anything was defined by the   
,peripatetics as 'the end of its        
becoming4' ,another definition of theirs
 puts the matter still more clearly4    
',what each thing is when its growth has
 been completed1 that we declare to be  
the nature of each thing'4  ,following  
out this conception the ,stoics         
identified a life in accordance with    
nature with a life in accordance with   
the highest perfection to which man     
could attain4 ,now1 as man was          
essentially a rational animal1 his work 
as man lay in living the rational life4 
,and the perfection of reason was       
virtue4 ,hence the ways of nature were  
no other than the ways of virtue4 ,and  
so it came about that the ,stoic formula
 might be expressed in a number of      
different ways which yet all amounted to
 the same thing4 ,the end was to live   
the virtuous life1 or to live           
consistently1 or to live in accordance  
with nature1 or to live rationally4     

,,division ,,of ,,philosophy4           
,philosophy was defined by the ,stoics  
as 'the knowledge of things divine and  
human'4 ,it was divided into three      
departments2 logic1 ethic1 and physic4  
,this division indeed was in existence  
before their time1 but they have got the
 credit of it as of some other things   
which they did not originate4 ,neither  
was it confined to them1 but was part of
 the common stock of thought4 ,even the 
,epicureans1 who are said to have       
rejected logic can hardly be counted as 
dissentients from this threefold        
division4 ,for what they did was to     
substitute for the ,stoic logic a logic 
of their own1 dealing with the notions  
derived from sense1 much in the same way
 as ,bacon substituted his ,novum       
,organum for the ,organon of ,aristotle4
 ,cleanthes we are told recognised six  
parts of philosophy1 namely1 dialectic1 
rhetoric1 ethic1 politic1 physic1 and   
theology1 but these are obviously the   
result of subdivision of the primary    

ones4 ,of the three departments we may  
say that logic deals with the form and  
expression of knowledge1 physic with the
 matter of knowledge1 and ethic with the
 use of knowledge4 ,the division may    
also be justified in this way4          
,philosophy must study either nature    
7including the divine nature7 or man2   
and1 if it studies man1 it must regard  
him either from the side of the         
intellect or of the feelings1 that is   
either as a thinking 7logic7 or as an   
acting 7ethic7 being4  ,as to the order 
in which the different departments      
should be studied1 we have had preserved
 to us the actual words of ,chrysippus  
in his fourth book on ,lives4 ',first of
 all then it seems to me that1 as has   
been rightly said by the ancients1 there
 are three heads under which the        
speculations of the philosopher fall1   
logic1 ethic1 physic2 next1 that of     
these the logical should come first1 the
 ethical second1 and the physical third1
 and that of the physical the treatment 

of the gods should come last1 whence    
also they have given the name of        
completions to the instruction delivered
 on this subject'4 ,that this order     
however might yield to convenience is   
plain from another book on the use of   
reason1 where he says that 'the student 
who takes up logic first need not       
entirely abstain from the other branches
 of philosophy1 but should study them   
also as occasion offers4'  ,plutarch    
twits ,chrysippus with inconsistency1   
because in the face of this declaration 
as to the order of treatment1 he        
nevertheless says that morals rest upon 
physics4 ,but to this charge it may     
fairly be replied that the order of     
exposition need not coincide with the   
order of existence4 ,metaphysically     
speaking1 morals may depend upon physics
 and the right conduct of man be        
deducible from the structure of the     
universe but for all that1 it may be    
advisable to study physics later4       
,physics meant the nature of ,god and   

the ,universe4 ,our nature may be       
deducible from that but it is better    
known to ourselves to start with1 so    
that it may be well to begin from the   
end of the stick that we have in our    
hands4 ,but that ,chrysippus did teach  
the logical dependence of morals on     
physics is plain from his own words4 ,in
 his third book on the ,gods he says    
'for it is not possible to find any     
other origin of justice or mode of its  
generation save that from ,zeus and the 
nature of the universe for anything we  
have to say about good and evil must    
needs derive its origin therefrom'1 and 
again in his ,physical ,theses1 'for    
there is no other or more appropriate   
way of approaching the subject of good  
and evil on the virtues or happiness    
than from the nature of all things and  
the administration of the universe--for 
it is to these we must attach the       
treatment of good and evil inasmuch as  
there is no better origin to which we   
can refer them and inasmuch as physical 

speculation is taken in solely with a   
view to the distinction between good and
 evil4'  ,the last words are worth      
noting as showing that even with        
,chrysippus who has been called the     
intellectual founder of ,stoicism the   
whole stress of the philosophy of the   
,porch fell upon its moral teaching4 ,it
 was a favourite metaphor with the      
school to compare philosophy to a       
fertile vineyard or orchard4 ,ethic was 
the good fruit1 physic the tall plants1 
and logic the strong wall4 ,the wall    
existed only to guard the trees1 and the
 trees only to produce the fruit4 ,or   
again philosophy was likened to an egg  
of which ethic was the yolk containing  
the chick1 physic the white which formed
 its nourishment while logic was the    
hard outside shell4 ,posidonius1 a later
 member of the school1 objected to the  
metaphor from the vineyard on the ground
 that the fruit and the trees and the   
wall were all separable whereas the     
parts of philosophy were inseparable4   

,he preferred therefore to liken it to a
 living organism1 logic being the bones 
and sinews1 physic the flesh and blood1 
but ethic the soul4   ,,logic  ,the     
,stoics had a tremendous reputation for 
logic4 ,in this department they were the
 successors or rather the supersessors  
of ,aristotle4 ,for after the death of  
,theophrastus the library of the ,lyceum
 is said to have been buried underground
 at ,scepsis until about a century      
before ,christ1 ,so that the ,organon   
may actually have been lost to the world
 during that period4 ,at all events     
under ,strato the successor of          
,theophrastus who specialized in natural
 science the school had lost its        
comprehensiveness4 ,cicero even finds it
 consonant with dramatic propriety to   
make ,cato charge the later             
,peripatetics with ignorance of logic6  
,on the other hand ,chrysippus became so
 famous for his logic as to create a    
general impression that if there were a 
logic among the gods it would be no     

other than the ,chrysippean4  ,but if   
the ,stoics were strong in logic they   
were weak in rhetoric4 ,this strength   
and weakness were characteristic of the 
school at all periods4 ,cato is the only
 ,roman ,stoic to whom ,cicero accords  
the praise of real eloquence4 ,in the   
dying accents of the school as we hear  
them in ,marcus ,aurelius the imperial  
sage counts it a thing to be thankful   
for that he had learnt to abstain from  
rhetoric1 poetic1 and elegance of       
diction4 ,the reader however cannot help
 wishing that he had taken some means to
 diminish the crabbedness of his style4 
,if a lesson were wanted in the         
importance of sacrificing to the ,graces
 it might be found in the fact that the 
early ,stoic writers despite their      
logical subtlety have all perished and  
that their remains have to be sought for
 so largely in the pages of ,cicero4 ,in
 speaking of logic as one of the three  
departments of philosophy we must bear  
in mind that the term was one of much   

wider meaning than it is with us4 ,it   
included rhetoric1 poetic1 and grammar  
as well as dialectic or logic proper1 to
 say nothing of disquisitions on the    
senses and the intellect which we should
 now refer to psychology4  ,logic as a  
whole being divided into rhetoric and   
dialectic3 rhetoric was defined to be   
the knowledge of how to speak well in   
expository discourses and dialectic as  
the knowledge of how to argue rightly in
 matters of question and answer4 ,both  
rhetoric and dialectic were spoken of by
 the ,stoics as virtues for they divided
 virtue in its most generic sense in the
 same way as they divided philosophy    
into physical1 ethical1 and logical4    
,rhetoric and dialectic were thus the   
two species of logical virtue4 ,zeno    
expressed their difference by comparing 
rhetoric to the palm and dialectic to   
the fist4  ,instead of throwing in      
poetic and grammar with rhetoric1 the   
,stoics subdivided dialectic into the   
part which dealt with the meaning and   

the part which dealt with the sound1 or 
as ,chrysippus phrased it1 concerning   
significants and significates4 ,under   
the former came the treatment of the    
alphabet1 of the parts of speech1 of    
solecism1 of barbarism1 of poems1 of    
amphibolies1 of metre and music--a list 
which seems at first sight a little     
mixed1 but in which we can recognise the
 general features of grammar1 with its  
departments of phonology1 accidence1 and
 prosody4 ,the treatment of solecism and
 barbarism in grammar corresponded to   
that of fallacies in logic4 ,with regard
 to the alphabet it is worth noting that
 the ,stoics recognised seven vowels and
 six mutes4 ,this is more correct than  
our way of talking of nine mutes1 since 
the aspirate consonants are plainly not 
mute4 ,there were1 according to the     
,stoics1 five parts of speech--name1    
appellative1 verb1 conjunction1 article4
 ',name' meant a proper name1 and       
'appellative' a common term4  ,there    
were reckoned to be five virtues of     

speech--,hellenism1 clearness1          
conciseness1 propriety1 distinction4 ,by
 ',hellenism' was meant speaking good   
,greek4 ',distinction' was defined to be
 'a diction which avoided homeliness4'  
,over against these there were two      
comprehensive vices1 barbarism and      
solecism1 the one being an offence      
against accidence1 the other against    
syntax4  ,the famous comparison of the  
infant mind to a blank sheet of paper1  
which we connect so closely with the    
name of ,locke1 really comes from the   
,stoics4 ,the earliest characters       
inscribed upon it were the impressions  
of sense1 which the ,greeks called      
phantasies4 ,a phantasy was defined by  
,zeno as an impression in the soul4     
,cleanthes was content to take this     
definition in its literal sense1 and    
believe that the soul was impressed by  
external objects as wax by a signet     
ring4 ,chrysippus1 however1 found a     
difficulty here1 and preferred to       
interpret the ,master's saying to mean  

an alteration or change in the soul4 ,he
 figured to himself the soul as         
receiving a modification from every     
external object which acts upon it just 
as the air receives countless strokes   
when many people are speaking at once4  
,further1 he declared that in receiving 
an impression the soul was purely       
passive and that the phantasy revealed  
not only its own existence1 but that    
also of its cause1 just as light        
displays itself and the things that are 
in it4 ,thus1 when through sight we     
receive an impression of white1 an      
affection takes place in the soul1 in   
virtue whereof we are able to say that  
there exists a white object affecting   
us4 ,the power to name the object       
resides in the understanding4 ,first    
must come the phantasy1 and the         
understanding1 having the power of      
utterance1 expresses in speech the      
affection it receives from the object4  
,the cause of the phantasy was called   
the phantast1 e4 g4 the white or cold   

object4 ,if there is no external cause1 
then the supposed object of the         
impression was a phantasm1 such as a    
figure in a dream1 or the ,furies whom  
,orestes sees in his frenzy4  ,how then 
was the impression which had reality    
behind it to be distinguished from that 
which had not8 ,by the feel is all that 
the ,stoics really had to say in answer 
to this question4 ,just as ,hume made   
the difference between sense-impressions
 and ideas to lie in the greater        
vividness of the former1 so did they2   
only ,hume saw no necessity to go beyond
 the impression1 whereas the ,stoics    
did4 ,certain impressions1 they         
maintained1 carried with them an        
irresistible conviction of their own    
reality1 and this1 not merely in the    
sense that they existed2 but also that  
they were referable to an external      
cause4 ,these were called gripping      
phantasies4 ,such a phantasy did not    
need proof of its own existence1 or of  
that of its object4 ,it possessed       

self-evidence4 ,its occurrence was      
attended with yielding and assent on the
 part of the soul4 ,for it is as natural
 for the soul to assent to the          
self-evident as it is for it to pursue  
its proper good4 ,the assent to a       
griping phantasy was called             
comprehension1 as indicating the firm   
hold that the soul thus took of reality4
 ,a gripping phantasy was defined as one
 which was stamped and impressed from an
 existing object1 in virtue of that     
object itself1 in such a way as it could
 not be from a non-existent object4 ,the
 clause in virtue of that object itself 
was put into the definition to provide  
against such a case as that of the mad  
,orestes1 who takes his sister to be a  
,fury4 ,there the impression was derived
 from an existing object1 but not from  
that object as such1 but as coloured by 
the imagination of the percipient4  ,the
 criterion of truth then was no other   
than the gripping phantasy4 ,such at    
least was the doctrine of the earlier   

,stoics1 but the later added a saving   
clause1 when there is no impediment4    
,for they were pressed by their         
opponents with such imaginary cases as  
that of ,admetus1 seeing his wife before
 him in very deed1 and yet not believing
 it to be her4 ,but here there was an   
impediment4 ,admetus did not believe    
that the dead could rise4 ,again        
,menelaus did not believe in the real   
,helen when he found her on the island  
of ,pharos4 ,but here again there was an
 impediment4 ,for ,menelaus could not   
have been expected to know that he had  
been for ten years fighting for a       
phantom4 ,when1 however1 there was no   
such impediment1 then they said the     
gripping phantasy did indeed deserve its
 name1 for it almost took men by the    
hair of the head and dragged them to    
assent4  ,so far we have used phantasy  
only of real or imaginary impressions of
 sense4 ,but the term was not thus      
restricted by the ,stoics1 who divided  
phantasies into sensible and not        

sensible4 ,the latter came through the  
understanding and were of bodiless      
things which could only be grasped by   
reason4 ,the ideas of ,plato they       
declared existed only in our minds4     
,horse1 man1 and animal had no          
substantial existence but were phantasms
 of the soul4 ,the ,stoics were thus    
what we should call ,conceptualists4    
,comprehension too was used in a wider  
sense than that in which we have so far 
employed it4 ,there was comprehension by
 the senses as of white and black1 of   
rough and smooth1 but there was also    
comprehension by the reason of          
demonstrative conclusions such as that  
the gods exist and that they exercise   
providence4 ,here we are reminded of    
,locke's declaration3 ',tis as certain  
there's a ,god as that the opposite     
angles made by the intersection of two  
straight lines are equal4 ,the ,stoics  
indeed had great affinities with that   
thinker or rather he with them4 ,the    
,stoic account of the manner in which   

the mind arrives at its ideas might     
almost be taken from the first book of  
,locke's ,essay4 ,as many as nine ways  
are enumerated of which the first       
corresponds to simple ideas--  7#a7 by  
presentation1 as objects of sense  7#b7 
by likeness1 as the idea of ,socrates   
from his picture  7#c7 by analogy1 that 
is1 by increase or decrease1 as ideas of
 giants and pigmies from men1 or as the 
notion of the centre of the earth1 which
 is reached by the consideration of     
smaller spheres4  7#d7 by transposition1
 as the idea of men with eyes in their  
breasts4  7#e7 by composition1 as the   
idea of a ,centaur4  7#f7 by opposition1
 as the idea of death from that of life4
  7#g7 by a kind of transition1 as the  
meaning of words and the idea of place4 
7#h7;by nature1 as the notion of the    
just and the good  7#i7;by privation1 as
 handless  ,the ,stoics resembled ,locke
 again in endeavoring to give such a    
definition of knowledge as should cover 
at once the reports of the senses and   

the relation between ideas4 ,knowledge  
was defined by them as a sure           
comprehension or a habit in the         
acceptance of phantasies which was not  
liable to be changed by reason4 ,on a   
first hearing these definitions might   
seem limited to sense knowledge but if  
we bethink ourselves of the wider       
meanings of comprehension and of        
phantasy1 we see that the definitions   
apply as they were meant to apply to the
 mind's grasp upon the force of a       
demonstration no less than upon the     
existence of a physical object4  ,zeno1 
with that touch of oriental symbolism   
which characterized him1 used to        
illustrate to his disciples the steps to
 knowledge by means of gestures4        
,displaying his right hand with the     
fingers outstretched he would say1 ,that
 is a phantasy1 then contracting the    
fingers a little1 ,that is assent1 then 
having closed the fist1 ,that is        
comprehension1 then clasping the fist   
closely with the left hand1 he would    

add1 ,that is knowledge4  ,a notion     
which corresponds to our word concept   
was defined as a phantasm of the        
understanding of a rational animal4 ,for
 a notion was but a phantasm as it      
presented itself to a rational mind4 ,in
 the same way so many shillings and     
sovereigns are in themselves but        
shillings and sovereigns1 but when used 
as passage money they become fare4      
,notions were arrived at partly by      
nature1 partly by teaching and study4   
,the former kind of notions were called 
preconceptions2 the latter went merely  
by the generic name4  ,out of the       
general ideas which nature imparts to   
us1 reason was perfected about the age  
of fourteen1 at the time when the       
voice--its outward and visible          
sign--attains its full development1 and 
when the human animal is complete in    
other respects as being able to         
reproduce its kind4 ,thus reason which  
united us to the gods was not1 according
 to the ,stoics1 a pre-existent         

principal1 but a gradual development out
 of sense4 ,it might truly be said that 
with them the senses were the intellect4
  ,being was confined by the ,stoics to 
body1 a bold assertion of which we shall
 meet the consequences later4 ,at       
present it is sufficient to notice what 
havoc it makes among the categories4 ,of
 ,aristotle's ten categories it leaves  
only the first1 ,substance1 and that    
only in its narrowest sense of ,primary 
,substance4 ,but a substance or body    
might be regarded in four ways--    7#a7
 simply as a body   7#b7 as a body of a 
particular kind   7#c7 as a body in a   
particular state   7#d7 as a body in a  
particular relation4  ,hence result the 
four ,stoic categories of--             
substrates     suchlike     so disposed 
so related  ,but the bodiless would not 
be thus conjured out of existence4 ,for 
what was to be made of such things as   
the meaning of words1 time1 place1 and  
the infinite void8 ,even the ,stoics did
 not assign body to these1 and yet they 

had to be recognized and spoken of4 ,the
 difficulty was got over by the         
invention of the higher category of     
somewhat1 which should include both body
 and the bodiless4 ,time was a somewhat1
 and so was space1 though neither of    
them possessed being4  ,in the ,stoic   
treatment of the proposition1 grammar   
was very much mixed up with logic4 ,they
 had a wide name which applied to any   
part of diction1 whether a word or      
words1 a sentence1 or even a syllogism4 
,this we shall render by dict4 ,a dict1 
then1 was defined as that which subsists
 in correspondence with a rational      
phantasy4 ,a dict was one of the things 
which the ,stoics admitted to be devoid 
of body4 ,there were three things       
involved when anything was said--the    
sound1 the sense1 and the external      
object4 ,of these the first and the last
 were bodies1 but the intermediate one  
was not a body4 ,this we may illustrate 
after ,seneca1 as follows3 ,you see     
,cato walking4 ,what your eyes see and  

your mind attends to is a body in       
motion4 ,then you say1 ',cato is        
walking'4 ,the mere sound indeed of     
these words is air in motion and        
therefore a body but the meaning of them
 is not a body but an enouncement about 
a body1 which is quite a different      
thing4  ,on examining such details as   
are left us of the ,stoic logic1 the    
first thing which strikes one is its    
extreme complexity as compared with the 
,aristotelian4 ,it was a scholastic age1
 and the ,stoics refined and            
distinguished to their hearts' content4 
,as regards immediate inference1 a      
subject which has been run into         
subtleties among ourselves1 ,chrysippus 
estimated that the changes which could  
be rung on ten propositions exceeded a  
million1 but for this assertion he was  
taken to task by ,hipparchus the        
mathematician1 who proved that the      
affirmative proposition yielded exactly 
#ajc1jdi forms and the negative         
#caj1ifb4 ,with us the affirmative      

proposition is more prolific in         
consequences than the negative4 ,but    
then1 the ,stoics were not content with 
so simple a thing as mere negation1 but 
had negative arnetic and privative1 to  
say nothing of supernegative            
propositions4 ,another noticeable       
feature is the total absence of the     
three figures of ,aristotle and the only
 moods spoken of are the moods of the   
complex syllogism1 such as the modus    
penens in a conjunctive4 ,their type of 
reasoning was--    ,if ,a1 then ,b      
,but ,a   ,b  ,the important part played
 by conjunctive propositions in their   
logic led the ,stoics to formulate the  
following rule with regard to the       
material quality of such propositions3  
,truth can only be followed by truth1   
but falsehood may be followed by        
falsehood or truth4  ,thus if it be     
truly stated that it is day1 any        
consequence of that statement1 e4g4 that
 it is light1 must be true also4 ,but a 
false statement may lead either way4    

,for instance1 if it be falsely stated  
that it is night then the consequence   
that it is dark is false also4 ,but if  
we say1 ,the earth flies1 which was     
regarded as not only false but          
impossible ,footnote3 ,here we may      
recall the warning of ,arago to call    
nothing impossible outside the range of 
pure mathematics this involves the true 
consequence that the earth is4 ,though  
the simple syllogism is not alluded to  
in the sketch which ,diogenes ,laertius 
gives of the ,stoic logic1 it is of     
frequent occurrence in the accounts left
 us of their arguments4 ,take for       
instance the syllogism wherewith ,zeno  
advocated the cause of temperance--     
,one does not commit a secret to a man  
who is drunk4   ,one does commit a      
secret to a good man4   ,a good man will
 not get drunk4  ,the chain argument    
which we wrongly call the ,sorites was  
also a favorite resource with the       
,stoics4 ,if a single syllogism did not 
suffice to argue men into virtue surely 

a condensed series must be effectual4   
,and so they demonstrated the           
sufficiency of wisdom for happiness as  
follows----    ,the wise man is         
temperate   ,the temperate is constant  
,the constant is unperturbed   ,the     
unperturbed is free from sorrow   ,whoso
 is free from sorrow is happy   ,the    
wise man is happy  ,the delight which   
the early ,stoics took in this pure play
 of the intellect led them to pounce    
with avidity upon the abundant stock of 
fallacies current among the ,greeks of  
their time4 ,these seem--most of        
them--to have been invented by the      
,megarians and especially by ,eubulides 
of ,miletus a disciple of ,eucleides but
 they became associated with the ,stoics
 both by friends and foes who either    
praise their subtlety or deride their   
solemnity in dealing with them4         
,chrysippus himself was not above       
propounding such sophisms as the        
following--    ,whoever divulges the    
mysteries to the uninitiated commits    

impiety   ,the hierophant divulged the  
mysteries to the uninitiated   ,the     
hierophant commits impiety    ,anything 
that you say passes through your mouth  
,you say a wagon   ,a wagon passes      
through your mouth  ,he is said to have 
written eleven books on the ,no-one     
fallacy4 ,but what seems to have        
exercised most of his ingenuity was the 
famous ,liar1 the invention of which is 
ascribed to ,eubulides4 ,this fallacy in
 its simplest form is as follows4 ,if   
you say truly that you are telling a    
lie1 are you lying or telling the truth8
 ,chrysippus set this down as           
inexplicable4 ,nevertheless he was far  
from declining to discuss it4 ,for we   
find in the list of his works a treatise
 in five books on the ,inexplicables an 
,introduction to the ,liar and ,liars   
for ,introduction1 six books on the     
,liar itself1 a work directed against   
those who thought that such propositions
 were both false and true1 another      
against those who professed to solve the

 ,liar by a process of division1 three  
books on the solution of the ,liar1 and 
finally a polemic against those who     
asserted that the ,liar had its premises
 false4 ,it was well for poor ,philetas 
of ,cos that he ended his days before   
,chrysippus was born1 though as it was  
he grew thin and died of the ,liar1 and 
his epitaph served as a solemn reminder 
to poets not to meddle with logic--     
,philetas of ,cos am ,i     ',twas the  
,liar who made me die     ,and the bad  
nights caused thereby4  ,perhaps we owe 
him an apology for the translation4     
,,ethic  ,we have already had to touch  
upon the psychology of the ,stoics in   
connection with the first principles of 
logic4 ,it is no less necessary to do so
 now in dealing with the foundation of  
ethic4  ,the ,stoics we are told        
reckoned that there were eight parts of 
the soul4 ,these were the five senses1  
the organ of sound1 the intellect and   
the reproductive principle4 ,the        
passions1 it will be observed1 are      

conspicuous by their absence4 ,for the  
,stoic theory was that the passions were
 simply the intellect in a diseased     
state owing to the perversions of       
falsehood4 ,this is why the ,stoics     
would not parley with passion1          
conceiving that if once it were let into
 the citadel of the soul it would       
supplant the rightful ruler4 ,passion   
and reason were not two things which    
could be kept separate in which case it 
might be hoped that reason would control
 passion1 but were two states of the    
same thing--a worse and a better4  ,the 
unperturbed intellect was the legitimate
 monarch in the kingdom of man4 ,hence  
the ,stoics commonly spoke of it as the 
leading principle4 ,this was the part of
 the soul which received phantasies and 
it was also that in which impulses were 
generated with which we have now more   
particularly to do4  ,impulse or        
appetition was the principle in the soul
 which impelled to action4 ,in an       
unperverted state it was directed only  

to things in accordance with nature4    
,the negative form of this principle or 
the avoidance of things as being        
contrary to nature1 we shall call       
repulsion4  ,notwithstanding the sublime
 heights to which ,stoic morality rose4 
,it was professedly based on self-love1 
wherein the ,stoics were at one with the
 other schools of thought in the ancient
 world4  ,the earliest impulse that     
appeared in a newly born animal was to  
protect itself and its own constitution 
which were conciliated to it by nature4 
,what tended to its survival1 it sought2
 what tended to its destruction1 it     
shunned4 ,thus self-preservation was the
 first law of life4  ,while man was     
still in the merely animal stage1 and   
before reason was developed in him1 the 
things that were in accordance with his 
nature were such as health1 strength1   
good bodily condition1 soundness of all 
the senses1 beauty1 swiftness--in short 
all the qualities that went to make up  
richness of physical life and that      

contributed to the vital harmony4 ,these
 were called the first things in        
accordance with nature4 ,their opposites
 were all contrary to nature1 such as   
sickness1 weakness1 mutilation4 ,under  
the first things in accordance with     
nature came also congenial advantages of
 soul such as quickness of intelligence1
 natural ability1 industry1 application1
 memory1 and the like4 ,it was a        
question whether pleasure was to be     
included among the number4 ,some members
 of the school evidently thought that it
 might be1 but the orthodox opinion was 
that pleasure was a sort of aftergrowth 
and that the direct pursuit of it was   
deleterious to the organism4 ,the after 
growths of virtue were joy1             
cheerfulness1 and the like4 ,these were 
the gambolings of the spirit like the   
frolicsomeness of an animal in the full 
flush of its vitality or like the       
blooming of a plant4 ,for one and the   
same power manifested itself in all     
ranks of nature1 only at each stage on a

 higher level4 ,to the vegetative powers
 of the plant the animal added sense and
 ,impulse4 ,it was in accordance        
therefore with the nature of an animal  
to obey the ,impulses of sense1 but to  
sense and ,impulse man superadded reason
 so that when he became conscious of    
himself as a rational being1 it was in  
accordance with his nature to let all   
his ,impulses be shaped by this new and 
master hand4 ,virtue was therefore      
pre-eminently in accordance with nature4
 ,what then we must now ask is the      
relation of reason to impulse as        
conceived by the ,stoics8 ,is reason    
simply the guiding1 and impulse the     
motive power8 ,seneca protests against  
this view1 when impulse is identified   
with passion4 ,one of his grounds for   
doing so is that reason would be put on 
a level with passion1 if the two were   
equally necessary for action4 ,but the  
question is begged by the use of the    
word 'passion1' which was defined by the
 ,stoics as 'an excessive impulse4' ,is 

it possible then1 even on ,stoic        
principles1 for reason to work without  
something different from itself to help 
it8 ,or must we say that reason is      
itself a principle of action8 ,here     
,plutarch comes to our aid1 who tells us
 on the authority of ,chrysippus in his 
work on ,law that impulse is 'the reason
 of man commanding him to act1' and     
similarly that repulsion is 'prohibitive
 reason4' ,this renders the ,stoic      
position unmistakable1 and we must      
accomodate our minds to it in spite of  
its difficulties4 ,just as we have seen 
already that reason is not something    
radically different from sense1 so now  
it appears that reason is not different 
from impulse1 but itself the perfected  
form of impulse4 ,whenever impulse is   
not identical with reason--at least in a
 rational being--it is not truly        
impulse1 but passion4  ,the ,stoics1 it 
will be observed1 were ,evolutionists in
 their psychology4 ,but1 like many      
,evolutionists at the present day1 they 

did not believe in the origin of mind   
out of matter4 ,in all living things    
there existed already what they called  
'seminal reasons1' which accounted for  
the intelligence displayed by plants as 
well as by animals4 ,as there were four 
cardinal virtues1 so there were four    
primary passions4 ,these were delight1  
grief1 desire and fear4 ,all of them    
were excited by the presence or the     
prospect of fancied good or ill4 ,what  
prompted desire by its prospect caused  
delight by its presence1 and what       
prompted fear by its prospect caused    
grief by its presence4 ,thus two of the 
primary passions had to do with good and
 two with evil4 ,all were furies which  
infested the life of fools1 rendering it
 bitter and grievous to them2 and it was
 the business of philosophy to fight    
against them4 ,nor was this strife a    
hopeless one1 since the passions were   
not grounded in nature1 but were due to 
false opinion4 ,they originated in      
voluntary judgements1 and owed their    

birth to a lack of mental sobriety4 ,if 
men wished to live the span of life that
 was allotted to them in quietness and  
peace1 they must by all means keep clear
 of the passions4  ,the four primary    
passions having been formulated1 it     
became necessary to justify the division
 by arranging the specific forms of     
feeling under these four heads4 ,in this
 task the ,stoics displayed a subtlety  
which is of more interest to the        
lexicographer than to the student of    
philosophy4 ,they laid great stress on  
the derivation of words as affording a  
clue to their meaning2 and1 as their    
etymology was bound by no principles1   
their ingenuity was free to indulge in  
the wildest freaks of fancy4  ,though   
all passion stood self-condemned1 there 
were nevertheless certain 'eupathies1'  
or happy affections1 which would be     
experienced by the ideally good and wise
 man4 ,these were not perturbations of  
the soul1 but rather 'constancies'2 they
 were not opposed to reason1 but were   

rather part of reason4 ,though the sage 
would never be transported with delight1
 he would still feel an abiding 'joy' in
 the presence of the true and only good2
 he would never indeed be agitated by   
desire1 but still he would be animated  
by 'wish1' for that was directed only to
 the good2 and though he would never    
feel fear still he would be actuated in 
danger by a proper caution4  ,there was 
therefore something rational            
corresponding to three out of four      
primary passions--against delight was to
 be set joy2 against grief there was    
nothing to be set1 for that arose from  
the presence of ill which would rather  
never attach to the sage4 ,grief was the
 irrational conviction that one ought to
 afflict oneself where there was no     
occasion for it4 ,the ideal of the      
,stoics was the unclouded serenity of   
,socrates of whom ,xanthippe declared   
that he had always the same face whether
 on leaving the house ,in the morning or
 on returning to it at night4  ,as the  

motley crowd of passions followed the   
banners of their four leaders so        
specific forms of feeling sanctioned by 
reason were severally assigned to the   
three eupathies4  ,things were divided  
by ,zeno into good1 bad1 and            
indifferent4 ,to good belonged virtue   
and what partook of virtue2 to bad1 vice
 and what partook of vice4 ,all other   
things were indifferent4  ,to the third 
class then belonged such things as life 
and death1 health and sickness1 pleasure
 and pain1 beauty and ugliness1 strength
 and weakness1 honour and dishonour1    
wealth and poverty1 victory and defeat1 
nobility and baseness of birth4  ,good  
was defined as that which benefits4 ,to 
confer benefit was no less essential to 
good than to impart warmth was to heat4 
,if one asked in what 'to benefit' lay  
one received the reply that it lay in   
producing an act or state in accordance 
with virtue1 and similarly it was laid  
down that 'to hurt' lay in producing an 
act or state in accordance with vice4   

,the indifference of things other than  
virtue and vice was apparent from the   
definition of good which made it        
essentially beneficial4 ,such things as 
health and wealth might be beneficial or
 not according to circumstances2 they   
were therefore no more good than bad4   
,again1 nothing could be really good of 
which the good or ill depended on the   
use made of it1 but this was the case   
with things like health and wealth4     
,the true and only good then was        
identical with what the ,greeks called  
'the beautiful' and what we call 'the   
right'4 ,to say that a thing was right  
was to say that it was good1 and        
conversely to say that it was good was  
to say that it was right2 this absolute 
identity between the good and the right 
and1 on the other hand1 between the bad 
and wrong1 was the head and front of the
 ,stoic ethics4 ,the right contained in 
itself all that was necessary for the   
happy life1 the wrong was the only evil1
 and made men miserable whether they    

knew it or not4  ,as virtue was itself  
the end1 it was of course choiceworthy  
in and for itself1 apart from hope or   
fear with regard to its consequences4   
,moreover1 as being the highest good1 it
 could admit of no increase from the    
addition of things indifferent4 ,it did 
not even admit of increase from the     
prolongation of its own existence1 for  
the question was not one of quantity1   
but of quality4 ,virtue for an eternity 
was no more virtue1 and therefore no    
more good1 than virtue for a moment4    
,even so one circle was no more round   
than another1 whatever you might choose 
to make its diameter1 nor would it      
detract from the perfection of a circle 
if it were to be obliterated immediately
 in the same dust in which it had been  
drawn4  ,to say that the good of men lay
 in virtue was another way of saying    
that it lay in reason1 since virtue was 
the perfection of reason4  ,as reason   
was the only thing whereby ,nature had  
distinguished man from other creatures1 

to live the rational life was to follow 
,nature4  ,nature was at once the law of
 ,god and the law for man4 ,for by the  
nature of anything was meant1 not that  
which we actually find it to be1 but    
that which in the eternal fitness of    
things it was obviously intended to     
become4  ,to be happy then was to be    
virtuous1 to be virtuous was to be      
rational1 to be rational was to follow  
,nature1 and to follow ,nature was to   
obey ,god4 ,virtue imparted to life that
 even flow in which ,zeno declared      
happiness to consist4 ,this was attained
 when one's own genius was in harmony   
with the will that disposed of all      
things4  ,virtue having been purified   
from all the dross of the emotions1 came
 out as something purely intellectual1  
so that the ,stoics agreed with the     
,socratic conception that virtue is     
knowledge4 ,they also took on from      
,plato the four cardinal virtues of     
,wisdom1 ,temperance1 ,courage1 and     
,justice1 and defined them as so many   

branches of knowledge4 ,against these   
were set four cardinal vices of ,folly1 
,intemperance1 ,cowardice1 and          
,injustice4 ,under both the virtues and 
vices there was an elaborate            
classification of specific qualities4   
,but notwithstanding the care with which
 the ,stoics divided and subdivided the 
virtues1 virtue1 according to their     
doctrine1 was all the time one and      
indivisible4 ,for virtue was simply     
reason and reason1 if it were there1    
must control every department of conduct
 alike4 ',he who has one virtue has     
all1' was a paradox with which the      
,greek thought was already familiar4    
,but ,chrysippus went beyond this1      
declaring that he who displayed one     
virtue did thereby display all4 ,neither
 was the man perfect who did not possess
 all the virtues1 nor was the act       
perfect which did not involve them all4 
,where the virtues differed from one    
another was merely in the order in which
 they put things4 ,each was primarily   

itself1 secondarily all the rest4       
,wisdom had to determine what it was    
right to do1 but this involved the other
 virtues4 ,temperance had to impart     
stability to the impulses1 but how could
 the term 'temperate' be applied to a   
man who deserted his post through       
cowardice1 or who failed to return a    
deposit through avarice1 which is a form
 of injustice1 or yet to one who        
misconducted affairs through rashness1  
which falls under folly8 ,courage had to
 face dangers and difficulties1 but it  
was not courage unless its cause were   
just4 ,indeed one of the ways in which  
courage was defined was a virtue        
fighting on behalf of justice4          
,similarly justice put first the        
assigning to each man his due1 but in   
the act of doing so had to bring in the 
other virtues4 ,in short1 it was the    
business of the man of virtue to know   
and to do what ought to be done1 for    
what ought to be done implied wisdom in 
choice1 courage in endurance1 justice in

 assignment and temperance in abiding by
 ones conviction4 ,one virtue never     
acted by itself1 but always on the      
advice of a committee4 ,the obverse to  
this paradox--,he who has one vice has  
all vices--was a conclusion which the   
,stoics did not shrink from drawing4    
,one might lose part of one's           
,corinthian ware and still retain the   
rest1 but to lose one virtue--if virtue 
could be lost--would be to lose all     
along with it4  ,we have now encountered
 the first paradox of ,stoicism1 and can
 discern its origin in the              
identification of virtue with pure      
reason4 ,in getting forth the novelties 
in ,zeno's teaching1 ,cicero mentions   
that1 while his predecessors had        
recognized virtues due to nature and    
habit1 he made all dependent upon       
reason4 ,a natural consequence of this  
was the reassertion of the position     
which ,plato held or wished to hold1    
namely1 that virtue can be taught4 ,but 
the part played by nature in virtue     

cannot be ignored4 ,it was not in the   
power of ,zeno to alter facts4 ,all he  
could do was to legislate as to names4  
,and this he did vigorously4 ,nothing   
was to be called virtue which was not of
 the nature of reason and knowledge1 but
 still it had to be admitted that nature
 supplied the starting points for the   
four cardinal virtues--for the discovery
 of one's impulses1 for right endurances
 and harmonious distributions4  ,from   
things good and bad we now turn to      
things indifferent4 ,hitherto the ,stoic
 doctrine has been stern and            
uncompromising4 ,we have now to look at 
it under a different aspect1 and to see 
how it tried to conciliate common sense4
  ,by things indifferent were meant such
 as did not necessarily contribute to   
virtue1 for instance health1 wealth1    
strength1 and honor4 ,it is possible to 
have all these and not be virtuous1 it  
is possible also to be virtuous without 
them4 ,but we have now to learn that    
though these things are neither good nor

 evil1 and are therefore not matter for 
choice or avoidance1 they are far from  
being indifferent in the sense of       
arousing neither impulse nor repulsion4 
,there are things indeed that are       
indifferent in the latter sense1 such as
 whether you put out your finger this   
way or that1 whether you stoop to pick  
up a straw or not1 whether the number of
 hairs on your head be odd or even4 ,but
 things of this sort are exceptional4   
,the bulk of things other than virtue   
and vice do arouse in us either impulse 
or repulsion4 ,let it be understood then
 that there are two senses of the word  
indifferent--     7#a7 neither good nor 
bad    7#b7 neither awaking impulse nor 
repulsion  ,among things indifferent in 
the former sense1 some were in          
accordance with nature1 some were       
contrary to nature and some were neither
 one nor the other4 ,health1 strengths  
and soundness of the senses were in     
accordance with nature2 sickness        
weakness and mutilation were contrary to

 nature1 but such things as the         
fallibility of the soul and the         
vulnerability of the body were neither  
in accordance with nature nor yet       
contrary to nature1 but just nature4    
,all things that were in accordance with
 nature had 'value' and all things that 
were contrary to nature had what we must
 call 'disvalue'4 ,in the highest sense 
indeed of the term 'value'--namely that 
of absolute value or worth--things      
indifferent did not possess any value at
 all4 ,but still there might be assigned
 to them what ,antipater expressed by   
the term 'a selective value' or what he 
expressed by its barbarous privative1 'a
 disselective disvalue'4 ,if a thing    
possessed a selective value you took    
that thing rather than its contrary1    
supposing that circumstances allowed1   
for instance1 health rather than        
sickness1 wealth rather than poverty1   
life rather than death4 ,hence such     
things were called takeable and their   
contraries untakeable4 ,things that     

possessed a high degree of value were   
called preferred1 those that possessed a
 high degree of disvalue were called    
rejected4 ,such as possessed no         
considerable degree of either were      
neither preferred nor rejected4 ,zeno1  
with whom these names originated1       
justified their use about things really 
indifferent on the ground that at court 
preferment could not be bestowed upon   
the king himself1 but only on his       
ministers4  ,things preferred and       
rejected might belong to mind1 body or  
estate4 ,among things preferred in the  
case of the mind were natural ability1  
art1 moral progress1 and the like1 while
 their contraries were rejected4 ,in the
 case of the body1 life1 health1        
strength1 good condition1 completeness1 
and beauty were preferred1 while death1 
sickness1 weakness1 ill condition1      
mutilation and ugliness were rejected4  
,among things external to soul and body1
 wealth1 reputation1 and nobility were  
preferred1 while poverty1 ill repute1   

and baseness of birth were rejected4    
,in this way all mundane and marketable 
goods1 after having been solemnly       
refused admittance by the ,stoics at the
 front door1 were smuggled in at a kind 
of tradesman's entrance under the name  
of things indifferent4 ,we must now see 
how they had1 as it were1 two moral     
codes1 one for the sage and the other   
for the world in general4  ,the sage    
alone could act rightly1 but other      
people might perform the proprieties4   
,any one might honor his parents1 but   
the sage alone did it as the outcome of 
wisdom1 because he alone possessed the  
art of life1 the peculiar work of which 
was to do everything that was done as   
the result of the best disposition4 ,all
 the acts of the sage were perfect      
proprieties1 which were called          
rightnesses4 ,all acts of all other men 
were sins or wrongnesses4 ,at their best
 they could only be intermediate        
proprieties4 ,the term propriety1 then1 
is a generic one4 ,but1 as often        

happens1 the generic term got determined
 in use to a specific meaning1 so that  
intermediate acts are commonly spoken of
 as proprieties in opposition to        
rightnesses4 ,instances of rightnesses  
are displaying wisdom and dealing       
justly1 instances of proprieties or     
intermediate acts are marrying1 going on
 an embassy1 and dialectic4  ,the word  
duty is often employed to translate the 
,greek term which we are rendering by   
propriety4 ,any translation is no more  
than a choice of evils1 since we have no
 real equivalent for the term4 ,it was  
applicable not merely to human conduct1 
but also to the acting of the lower     
animals1 and even to the growth of      
plants4 ,now1 apart from a craze of     
generalization we should hardly think of
 the stern daughter of the voice of ,god
 in connection with an amoeba           
corresponding successfully to stimulus1 
yet the creature in its inchoate way is 
exhibiting a dim analogy to duty4 ,the  
term in question was first used by      

,zeno1 and was explained by him1 in     
accordance with its etymology1 to mean  
what it came to one to do1 so that as   
far as this goes1 'becomingness' would  
be the most appropriate translation4    
,the sphere of propriety was confined to
 things indifferent1 so that there were 
proprieties which were common to the    
sage and the fool4 ,it had to do with   
taking the things which were in         
accordance with nature and rejecting    
those that were not4 ,even the propriety
 of living or dying was determined1 not 
by reference to virtue or vice1 but to  
the preponderance or deficiency of      
things in accordance with nature4 ,it   
might thus be a propriety for the sage  
in spite of his happiness1 to depart    
from life of his own accord1 and for the
 fool notwithstanding his misery1 to    
remain in it4 ,life1 being in itself    
indifferent1 the whole question was one 
of opportunism4 ,wisdom might prompt the
 leaving herself should occasion seem to
 call for it4  ,we pass on now another  

instance of accommodation4 ,according to
 the high ,stoic doctrine1 there was no 
mean between virtue and vice4 ,all men  
indeed received from nature the         
starting-points for virtue1 but until   
perfection had been attained they rested
 under the condemnation of vice4 ,it    
was1 to employ an illustration of the   
poet-philosopher ,cleanthes1 as though  
,nature had begun an iambic line and    
left men to finish it4 ,until that was  
done they were to wear the fool's cap4  
,the ,peripatetics1 on the other hand1  
recognized an intermediate state between
 virtue and vice1 to which they gave the
 name of progress and proficience4 ,yet 
so entirely had the ,stoics1 for        
practical purposes1 to accept this lower
 level1 that the word proficience has   
come to be spoken of as though it were  
of ,stoic origin4  ,seneca is fond of   
contrasting the sage with the           
proficient4 ,the sage is like a man in  
the enjoyment of perfect health4 ,but   
the proficient is like a man recovering 

from a severe illness1 with whom an     
abatement of the paroxysm is equivalent 
to health1 and who is always in danger  
of a relapse4 ,it is the business of    
philosophy to provide for the needs of  
these weaker brethren4 ,the proficient  
is still called a fool1 but it is       
pointed out that he is a very different 
kind of fool from the rest4 ,further1   
proficients are arranged into three     
classes1 in a way that reminds one of   
the technicalities of ,calvinistic      
theology4 ,first of all1 there are those
 who are near wisdom1 but1 however near 
they may be to the door of ,heaven1 they
 are still on the wrong side of it4     
,according to some doctors1 these were  
already safe from backsliding1 differing
 from the sage only in not having yet   
realized that they had attained to      
knowledge2 other authorities1 however1  
refused to admit this1 and regarded the 
first class as being exempt only from   
settled diseases of the soul1 but not   
from passing attacks of passion4 ,thus  

did the ,stoics differ among themselves 
as to the doctrine of final assurance4  
,the second class consisted of those who
 had laid aside the worst diseases and  
passions of the soul1 but might at any  
moment relapse into them4 ,the third    
class was of those who had escaped one  
mental malady but not another2 who had  
conquered lust1 let us say1 but not     
ambition2 who disregarded death1 but    
dreaded pain1 ,this third class1 adds   
,seneca1 is by no means to be despised4 
,from these concessions to the weakness 
of humanity we now pass to the ,stoic   
paradoxes1 where we shall see their     
doctrine in its full rigor4 ,it is      
perhaps these very paradoxes which      
account for the puzzled fascination with
 which ,stoicism affected the mind of   
antiquity1 just as obscurity in a poet  
may prove a surer passport to fame than 
more strictly poetical merits4  ,the    
root of ,stoicism being a paradox1 it is
 not surprising that the offshoots      
should be so too4 ,to say that ,virtue  

is the highest good is a proposition to 
which every one who aspires to the      
spiritual life must yield assent with   
his lips1 even if he has not yet learned
 to believe it in his heart4 ,but alter 
it into ,virtue is the only good and by 
that slight change it becomes at once   
the teeming mother of paradoxes4 ,by a  
paradox is meant that which runs counter
 to general opinion4 ,now it is quite   
certain that men have regarded1 do      
regard1 and1 we may safely add will     
regard things as good which are not     
virtue4 ,but if we grant this initial   
paradox1 a great many others will follow
 along with it--as for instance that    
,virtue is sufficient of itself for     
happiness4 ,the fifth book of ,cicero's 
,tusculan ,disputations is an eloquent  
defense of this thesis1 in which the    
orator combats the suggestion that a    
good man is not happy when he is being  
broken on the wheel4  ,another glaring  
paradox of the ,stoics is that ,all     
faults are equal4 ,they took their stand

 upon a mathematical conception of      
rectitude4 ,an angle must be either a   
right angle or not1 a line must be      
either straight or crooked1 so an act   
must be either right or wrong4 ,there is
 no mean between the two and there are  
no degrees of either4 ,to sin is to     
cross the line4 ,when once that has been
 done it makes no difference to the     
offense how far you go4 ,trespassing at 
all is forbidden4 ,this doctrine was    
defended by the ,stoics on account of   
its bracing moral effect as showing the 
heinousness of sin4 ,horace gives the   
judgment of the world in saying that    
common sense and morality1 to say       
nothing of utility1 revolt against it4  
,here are some other specimens of the   
,stoic paradoxes4 ,every fool is mad4   
,only the sage is free and every fool is
 a slave4 ,the sage alone is wealthy4   
,good men are always happy and bad men  
always miserable4 ,all goods are equal4 
,no one is wiser or happier than        
another4 ,but may not one man we ask be 

more nearly wise or more nearly happy   
than another8 ,that may be1 the ,stoics 
would reply1 but the man who is only one
 stade from ,canopus is as much not in  
,canopus as the man who is a hundred    
stades off2 and the eight day old puppy 
is still as blind as on the day of its  
birth2 nor can a man who is near the    
surface of the sea breathe any more than
 if he were full five hundred fathom    
down4  ,it is only fair to the ,stoics  
to add that paradoxes were quite the    
order of the day in ,greece1 though they
 greatly outdid other schools in        
producing them4 ,socrates himself was   
the father of paradox4 ,epicurus        
maintained as staunchly as any ,stoic   
that ,no wise man is unhappy1 and1 if he
 be not belied1 went the length of      
declaring that the wise man1 if put into
 the bull of ,phalaris would exclaim3   
,how delightful6 ,how little ,i mind    
this6  ,it is out of keeping with common
 sense to draw a hard and fast          
distinction between good and bad4 ,yet  

this was what the ,stoics did4 ,they    
insisted on effecting here and now that 
separation between the sheep and the    
goats1 which ,christ postponed to the   
,day of ,judgment4 ,unfortunately1 when 
it came to practice1 all were found to  
be goats1 so that the division was a    
merely formal one4  ,the good man of the
 ,stoics was variously known as 'the    
sage'1 or1 'the serious man'1 the latter
 name being inherited from the          
,peripatetics4 ,we used to hear it said 
among ourselves that a person had become
 serious1 when he or she had taken to   
religion4 ,another appellation which the
 ,stoics had for the sage was 'the      
urbane man'1 while the fool in          
contradistinction was called 'a boor'4  
,boorishness was defined as an          
inexperience of the customs and laws of 
the state4 ,by the state was meant1 not 
,athens or ,sparta1 as would have been  
the case in a former age1 but the       
society of all rational beings into     
which the ,stoics spiritualised the     

state4 ,the sage alone had the freedom  
of this city and the fool was therefore 
not only a boor1 but an alien or an     
exile4 ,in this city1 ,justice was      
natural and not conventional1 for the   
law by which it was governed was the law
 of right reason4 ,the law then was     
spiritualised by the ,stoics1 just as   
the state was4 ,it no longer meant the  
enactments of this or that community1   
but the mandates of the eternal reason  
which ruled the world and which would   
prevail in the ideal state4 ,law was    
defined as right reason commanding what 
was to be done and forbidding what was  
not to be done4 ,as such1 it in no way  
differed from the impulse of the sage   
himself4  ,as a member of a state and by
 nature subject to law1 man was         
essentially a social being4 ,between all
 the wise there existed unanimity1 which
 was a knowledge of the common good1    
because their views of life were        
harmonious4 ,fools1 on the other hand1  
whose views of life were discordant1    

were enemies to one another and bent on 
mutual injury4  ,as a member of society 
the sage would play his part in public  
life4 ,theoretically this was always    
true1 and practically he would do so1   
wherever the actual constitution made   
any tolerable approach to the ideal     
type4 ,but1 if the circumstances were   
such as to make it certain that his     
embarking on politics would be of no    
service to his country1 and only a      
source of danger to himself1 then he    
would refrain4 ,the kind of constitution
 of which the ,stoics most approved was 
a mixed government containing           
democratic1 aristocratic1 and           
monarchical elements4 ,where            
circumstances allowed the sage would act
 as legislator1 and would educate       
mankind1 one way of doing which was by  
writing books which would prove of      
profit to the reader4  ,as a member of  
existing society the sage would marry   
and beget children1 both for his own    
sake and for that of his country1 on    

behalf of which1 if it were good1 he    
would be ready to suffer and die4 ,still
 he would look forward to a better time 
when1 in ,zeno's as in ,plato's         
republic1 the wise would have women and 
children in common1 when the elders     
would love all the rising generation    
equally with parental fondness1 and when
 marital jealousy would be no more4  ,as
 being essentially a social being1 the  
sage was endowed not only with the      
graver political virtues1 but also with 
the graces of life4 ,he was sociable1   
tactful and stimulating1 using          
conversation as a means for promoting   
good will and friendship2 so far as     
might be1 he was all things to all men1 
which made him fascinating and charming1
 insinuating and even wily2 he know how 
to hit the point and to choose the right
 moment1 yet with it all he was plain   
and unostentatious and simple and       
unaffected2 in particular he never      
delighted in irony much less in sarcasm4
  ,from the social characteristics of   

the sage we turn now to a side of his   
character which appears eminently       
anti-social4 ,one of his most highly    
vaunted characteristics was his         
self-sufficingness4 ,he was to be able  
to step out of a burning city1 coming   
from the wreck not only of his fortunes1
 but of his friends and family1 and to  
declare with a smile that he has lost   
nothing4 ,all that he truly cared for   
was to be centered in himself4 ,only    
thus could he be sure that ,fortune     
would not wrest it from him4  ,the      
apathy or passionlessness of the sage is
 another of his most salient features4  
,the passions being1 on ,zeno's showing1
 not natural1 but forms of disease1 the 
sage1 as being the perfect man1 would of
 course be wholly free from them4 ,they 
were so many disturbances of the even   
flow in which his bliss lay4 ,the sage  
therefore would never be moved by a     
feeling of favour towards any one2 he   
would never pardon a fault2 he would    
never feel pity2 he would never be      

prevailed upon by entreaty2 he would    
never be stirred to anger4  ,as to the  
absence of pity in the sage1 the ,stoics
 themselves must have felt some         
difficulty there since we find          
,epictetus recommending his hearers to  
show grief out of sympathy for another1 
but to be careful not to feel it4 ,the  
inexorability of the sage was a mere    
consequence of his calm reasonableness1 
which would lead him to take the right  
view from the first4 ,lastly1 the sage  
would never be stirred to anger4 ,for   
why should it stir his anger to see     
another in his ignorance injuring       
himself8  ,one more touch has yet to be 
added to the apathy of the sage4 ,he was
 impervious to wonder4 ,no miracle of   
nature could excite his astonishment--no
 mephitic caverns1 which men deemed the 
mouths of hell1 no deep-drawn ebb       
tides--the standing marvel of the       
,mediterranean dweller1 no hot springs1 
no spouting jets of fire4  ,from the    
absence of passion it is but a step to  

the absence of error4 ,so we pass now to
 the infallibility of the sage--a       
monstrous doctrine which was never      
broached in the schools before ,zeno4   
,the sage1 it was maintained1 held no   
opinions1 he never repented of his      
conduct1 he was never deceived in       
anything4 ,between the daylight of      
knowledge and darkness of nescience     
,plato had interposed the twilight of   
opinion wherein men walked for the most 
part4 ,not so however the ,stoic sage4  
,of him it might be said1 as ,charles   
,lamb said of the ,scotchman with whom  
he so imperfectly sympathized3 ,his     
understanding is always at its          
meridian--you never see the first dawn1 
the early streaks4 ,he has no falterings
 of self suspicion4 ,surmises1 guesses1 
misgivings1 half intuitions1            
semiconsciousness1 partial              
illuminations1 dim instincts1 embryo    
conceptions1 have no place in his brain 
or vocabulary4 ,the twilight of dubiety 
never falls upon him4 ,opinion1 whether 

in the form of an ungripped assent1 or a
 weak supposition1 was alien from the   
mental disposition of the serious man4  
,with him there was no hasty or         
premature assent of the understanding1  
no forgetfulness1 no distrust4 ,he never
 allowed himself to be overreached or   
deluded1 never had need of an arbiter1  
never was out in his reckoning nor put  
out by another4 ,no urbane man ever     
wandered from his way1 or missed his    
mark1 or saw wrong1 or heard amiss1 or  
erred in any of his senses2 he never    
conjectured nor thought of a better     
thing1 for the one was a form of        
imperfect assent1 and the other a sign  
of previous precipitancy4 ,there was    
with him no change1 no retraction1 and  
no tripping4 ,these things were for     
those whose dogmas could alter4 ,after  
this it is almost superfluous for us to 
be assured that the sage never got      
drunk4 ,drunkenness1 as ,zeno pointed   
out1 involved babbling1 and of that the 
sage would never be guilty4 ,he would   

not1 however1 altogether eschew         
banquets4 ,indeed1 the ,stoics          
recognized a virtue under the name of   
'conviviality1' which consisted in the  
proper conduct of them4 ,it was said of 
,chrysippus that his demeanor was always
 quiet1 even if his gait were unsteady1 
so that his housekeeper declared that   
only his legs were drunk4  ,there were  
pleasantries even within the school on  
this subject of infallibility of the    
sage4 ,aristo of ,chios1 while seceding 
on some other matters1 held fast to the 
dogma that the sage never opined4       
,whereupon ,persaeus played a trick upon
 him4 ,he made one of two twin brothers 
deposit a sum of money with him and the 
other call to reclaim it4 ,the success  
of the trick however only went to       
establish that ,aristo was not the sage1
 an admission which each of the ,stoics 
seems to have been ready enough to make 
on his own part1 as the responsibilities
 of the position were so fatiguing4     
,there remains one more leading         

characteristic of the sage1 the most    
striking of them all1 and the most      
important from the ethical point of     
view4 ,this was his innocence or        
harmlessness4 ,he would not harm others 
and was not to be harmed by them4 ,for  
the ,stoics believed with ,socrates that
 it was not permissible by the divine   
law for a better man to be harmed by a  
worse4 ,you could not harm the sage any 
more than you could harm the sunlight2  
he was in our world1 but not of it4     
,there was no possibility of evil for   
him1 save in his own will1 and that you 
could not touch4 ,and as the sage was   
beyond harm1 so also was he above       
insult4 ,men might disgrace themselves  
by their insolent attitude towards his  
mild majesty1 but it was not in their   
power to disgrace him4  ,as the ,stoics 
had their analogue to the tenet of final
 assurance1 so had they also to that of 
sudden conversion4 ,they held that a man
 might become a sage without being at   
first aware of it4 ,the abruptness of   

the transition from folly to wisdom was 
in keeping with their principle that    
there was no medium between the two1 but
 it was naturally a point which         
attracted the strictures of their       
opponents4 ,that a man should be at one 
moment stupid and ignorant and unjust   
and intemperate1 a slave and poor1 and  
destitute1 at the next a king1 rich1 and
 prosperous1 temperate1 and just1 secure
 in his judgements and exempt from      
error1 was a transformation1 they       
declared1 which smacked more of the     
fairy tales of the nursery than of the  
doctrines of a sober philosophy4        
,,physic  ,we have now before us the    
main facts with regard to the ,stoic    
view of man's nature1 but we have yet to
 see in what setting they were put4     
,what was the ,stoic outlook upon the   
universe8 ,the answer to this question  
is supplied by their ,physic4  ,there   
were1 according to the ,stoics1 two     
first principles of all things1 the     
active and the passive4 ,the passive was

 that unqualified being which is known  
as ,matter4 ,the active was the ,logos1 
or reason in it1 which is ,god4 ,this1  
it was held1 eternally pervades matter  
and creates all things4 ,this dogma1    
laid down by ,zeno1 was repeated after  
him by the subsequent heads of the      
school4  ,there were then two first     
principles1 but there were not two      
causes of things4 ,the active principle 
alone was cause1 the other was mere     
material for it to work on--inert1      
senseless1 destitute in itself of all   
shape and qualities1 but ready to assume
 any qualities or shape4  ,matter was   
defined as that out of which anything is
 produced4 ,the ,prime ,matter1 or      
unqualified being1 was eternal and did  
not admit of increase or decrease1 but  
only of change4 ,it was the substance or
 being of all things that are4  ,the    
,stoics1 it will be observed1 used the  
term matter with the same confusing     
ambiguity with which we use it          
ourselves1 now for sensible objects     

which have shape and other qualities1   
now for the abstract conception of      
matter1 which is devoid of all          
qualities4  ,both these first           
principles1 it must be understood1 were 
conceived of as bodies1 though without  
form1 the one everywhere                
interpenetrating the other4 ,to say that
 the passive principle1 or matter1 is a 
body comes easy to us1 because of the   
familiar confusion adverted to above4   
,but how could the active principle1 or 
,god1 be conceived of as a body8 ,the   
answer to this question may sound       
paradoxical4 ,it is because ,god is a   
spirit4 ,a spirit in its original sense 
meant air in motion4 ,now the active    
principle was not air1 but it was       
something which bore an analogy to      
it--namely aether4 ,aether in motion    
might be called a 'spirit' as well as   
air in motion4 ,it was in this sense    
that ,chrysippus defined the thing that 
is1 to be a spirit moving itself into   
and out of itself1 or spirit moving     

itself to and fro4  ,from the two first 
principles which are ungenerated and    
indestructible must be distinguished the
 four elements which1 though ultimate   
for us1 yet were produced in the        
beginning by ,god and are destined some 
day to be reabsorbed into the divine    
nature4 ,these with the ,stoics were the
 same which had been accepted since     
,empedocles--namely earth1 air1 fire and
 water4 ,the elements1 like the two     
first principles were bodies2 unlike    
them1 they were declared to have shape  
as well as extension4  ,an element was  
defined as that out of which things at  
first come into being and into which    
they are at last resolved4 ,in this     
relation did the four elements stand to 
all the compound bodies which the       
universe contained4 ,the terms earth1   
air1 fire and water had to be taken in a
 wide sense3 earth meaning all that was 
of the nature of earth1 air all that was
 of the nature of air and so on4 ,thus1 
in the human frame1 the bones and sinews

 pertained to earth4  ,the four         
qualities of matter--hot1 cold1 moist   
and dry--were indicative of the presence
 of the four elements4 ,fire was the    
source of heat1 air of cold1 water of   
moisture1 and earth of dryness4 ,between
 them1 the four elements made up the    
unqualified being called ,matter4 ,all  
animals and other compound natures on   
earth had in them representatives of the
 four great physical constituents of the
 universe1 but the moon1 according to   
,chrysippus1 consisted only of fire and 
air1 while the sun was pure fire4       
,while all compound bodies were         
resolvable into the four elements1 there
 were important differences among the   
elements1 themselves4 ,two of them1 fire
 and air1 were light2 the other two1    
water and earth1 were heavy4 ,by 'light'
 was meant that which tends away from   
its own centre1 by 'heavy1' that which1 
tends towards it4 ,the two light        
elements stood to the two heavy ones in 
much the same relation as the active to 

the passive principle generally4 ,but   
further1 fire had such a primary as     
entitles it1 if the definition of       
element were pressed1 to be considered  
alone worthy of the name4 ,for the three
 other elements arose out of it and were
 to be again resolved into it4  ,we     
should obtain a wholly wrong impression 
of what ,bishop ,berkeley calls 'the    
philosophy of fire' if we set before our
 minds in this connection1 the raging   
element whose strength is in            
destruction4 ,let us rather picture to  
ourselves as the type of fire the benign
 and beatific solar heat1 the quickener 
and fosterer of all terrestrial life4   
,for according to ,zeno1 there were two 
kinds of fire1 the one destructive1 the 
other what we may call 'constructive1'  
and which he called 'artistic'4 ,this   
latter kind of fire1 which was known as 
aether1 was the substance of the        
heavenly bodies1 as it was also of the  
soul of animals and of the 'nature' of  
plants4 ,chrysippus1 following          

,heraclitus1 taught that the elements   
passed into one another by a process of 
condensation and rarefaction4 ,fire     
first became solidified into air1 then  
air into water and lastly water into    
earth4 ,the process of dissolution took 
place in the reverse order1 earth being 
rarefied into water1 water into air1 and
 air into fire4 ,it is allowable to see 
in this old world doctrine an           
anticipation of the modern idea of      
different states of matter--the solid1  
the liquid1 and the gaseous1 with a     
fourth beyond the gaseous which science 
can still only guess at1 and in which   
matter seems almost to merge into       
spirit4  ,each of the four elements had 
its own abode in the universe4          
,outermost of all was the ethereal      
'fire' which was divided into two       
spheres3 first that of the fixed stars  
and next that of the planets4 ,below    
this lay the sphere of 'air'1 below this
 again that of 'water'1 and lowest or in
 other words1 most central of all was   

the sphere of 'earth'1 the solid        
foundation of the whole structure4      
,water might be said to be above earth  
because nowhere was there water to be   
found without earth beneath it1 but the 
surface of water was always equidistant 
from the centre1 whereas earth had      
prominences which rose above water4     
,when we say that the ,stoics regarded  
the universe as a plenum1 the reader    
must understand by 'the universe' the   
,cosmos or ordered whole4 ,within this  
there was no emptiness owing to the     
pressure of the celestial upon the      
terrestrial sphere4 ,but outside of this
 lay the infinite void without          
beginning1 middle1 or end4 ,this        
occupied a very ambiguous position ,in  
their scheme4 ,it was not being1 for    
being was confined to body and yet it   
was there4 ,it was in fact nothing1 and 
that was why it was infinite4 ,for as   
nothing cannot be bound to any thing1 so
 neither can there be any bound to      
nothing4 ,but while bodiless itself1 it 

had the capacity to contain body1 a fact
 which enabled it1 despite its          
non-entity1 to serve1 as we shall see1 a
 useful purpose4  ,did the ,stoics then 
regard the universe as finite or as     
infinite8 ,in answering this question we
 must distinguish our terms1 as they    
did4 ,the ,all1 they said1 was infinite1
 but the ,whole was finite4 ,for the    
',all' was the cosmos and the void1     
whereas the ',whole' was the cosmos     
only4 ,this distinction we may suppose  
to have originated with the later       
members of the school4 ,for ,appolodorus
 noted the ambiguity of the word ',all' 
as meaning1     7#a7 the cosmos only1   
7#b7 cosmos  void  ,if then by the term 
universe we understand the cosmos1 or   
ordered whole1 we must say that the     
,stoics regarded the universe as finite4
 ,all being and all body1 which was the 
same thing with being1 had necessarily  
bounds1 it was only not being1 which was
 boundless4  ,another distinction1 due  
this time to ,chrysippus himself1 which 

the ,stoics found it convenient to draw1
 was between the three words 'void1'    
'place' and 'space'4 ,void was defined  
as 'the absence of body'1 place was that
 which was occupied by body1 the term   
'space' was reserved for that which was 
partly occupied and partly unoccupied4  
,as there was no corner of the cosmos   
unfilled by body1 space1 it will be     
seen1 was another name for the ,all4    
,place was compared to a vessel that was
 full1 void to one that was empty1 and  
space to the vast wine-cask1 such as    
that in which ,diogenes made his home1  
which was kept partly fully1 but in     
which there was always room for more4   
,the last comparison must of course not 
be pressed4 ,for if space be a cask1 it 
is one without top1 bottom or sides4    
,but while the ,stoics regarded our     
universe as an island of being in an    
ocean of void1 they did not admit the   
possibility that other such islands     
might exist beyond our ken4 ,the        
spectacle of the starry heavens1 which  

presented itself nightly to their gaze  
in all the brilliancy of a southern     
sky--that was all there was of being1   
beyond that lay nothingness4 ,democritus
 or the ,epicureans might dream of other
 worlds1 but the ,stoics contended for  
the unity of the cosmos as staunchly as 
the ,mahometans for the unity of ,god1  
for with them the cosmos was ,god4  ,in 
shape they conceived of it as spherical1
 on the ground that the sphere was the  
perfect figure and was also the best    
adapted for motion4 ,not that the       
universe as a whole moved4 ,the earth   
lay in its centre1 spherical and        
motionless1 and round it coursed the    
sun1 moon1 and planets1 fixed each in   
its respective sphere as in so many     
concentric rings1 while the outermost   
ring of all1 which contained the fixed  
stars1 wheeled round the rest with an   
inconceivable velocity4  ,the tendency  
of all things in the universe to the    
centre kept the earth fixed in the      
middle as being subject to an equal     

pressure on every side4 ,the same cause 
also1 according to ,zeno1 kept the      
universe itself at rest in the void4    
,but in an infinite void1 it could make 
no difference whether the whole were at 
rest or in motion4 ,it may have been a  
desire to escape the notion of a        
migratory whole which led ,zeno to      
broach the curious doctrine that the    
universe has no weight1 as being        
composed of elements whereof two are    
heavy and two are light4 ,air and fire  
did indeed tend to the centre like      
everything else in the cosmos1 but not  
till they had reached their natural     
home4 ,till then they were of an        
upward-growing nature4 ,it appears then 
that the upward and downward tendencies 
of the elements were held to neutralise 
one another and to leave the universe   
devoid of weight4  ,the universe was the
 only thing which was perfect in itself1
 the one thing which was an end in      
itself4 ,all other things were perfect  
indeed as parts1 when considered with   

reference to the whole1 but were none of
 them ends in themselves1 unless man    
could be deemed so who was born to      
contemplate the universe and imitate its
 perfections4 ,thus1 then1 did the      
,stoics envisage the universe on its    
physical side--as one1 finite1 fixed in 
space1 but revolving round its own      
centre1 earth1 beautiful beyond all     
things1 and perfect as a whole4  ,but it
 was impossible for this order and      
beauty to exist without mind4 ,the      
universe was pervaded by intelligence as
 man's body is pervaded by his soul4    
,but as the human soul though everywhere
 present in the body is not present     
everywhere in the same degree1 so it was
 with the world-soul4 ,the human soul   
presents itself not only as intellect1  
but also in the lower manifestations of 
sense1 growth1 and cohesion4 ,it is the 
soul which is the cause of the plant    
life1 which displays itself more        
particularly in the nails and hair2 it  
is the soul also which causes cohesion  

among the parts of the solid substances 
such as bones and sinews1 that make up  
our frame4 ,in the same way the         
world-soul displayed itself in rational 
beings as intellect1 in the lower       
animals as mere souls1 in plants as     
nature or growth1 and in inorganic      
substances as 'holding' or cohesion4 ,to
 this lowest stage add change1 and you  
have growth or plant nature2 super-add  
to this phantasy and impulse and you    
rise to the soul of irrational animals2 
at a yet higher stage you reach the     
rational and discursive intellect1 which
 is peculiar to man among mortal        
natures4  ,we have spoken of soul as the
 cause of the plant life in our bodies1 
but plants were not admitted by the     
,stoics to be possessed of soul in the  
strict sense4 ,what animated them was   
'nature' or1 as we have called it above1
 'growth'4 ,nature1 in this sense of the
 principle of growth1 was defined by the
 ,stoics as 'a constructive fire1       
proceeding in a regular way to          

production1' or 'a fiery spirit endowed 
with artistic skill'4 ,that ,nature was 
an artist needed no proof1 since it was 
her handiwork that human art essayed to 
copy4 ,but she was an artist who        
combined the useful with the pleasant1  
aiming at once at beauty and            
convenience4 ,in the widest sense1      
,nature was another name for            
,providence1 or the principle which held
 the universe together1 but1 as the term
 is now being employed1 it stood for    
that degree of existence which is above 
cohesion and below soul4 ,from this     
point of view1 it was defined as a      
cohesion subject to self originated     
change in accordance with seminal       
reasons effecting and maintaining its   
results in definite times1 and          
reproducing in the offspring the        
characteristics of the parent4 ,this    
sounds about as abstract as ,herbert    
,spencer's definition of life1 but it   
must be borne in mind that nature was   
all the time a 'spirit'1 and as such a  

body4 ,it was a body of a less subtle   
essence than soul4 ,similarly1 when the 
,stoics spoke of cohesion1 they are not 
to be taken as referring to some        
abstract principle like attraction4     
',cohesions1' said ,chrysippus1 'are    
nothing else than airs1 for it is by    
these that bodies are held together1 and
 of the individual qualities of things  
which are held together by cohesion1 it 
is the air which is the compressing     
cause which in iron is called hardness1 
in stone thickness and in solver        
whiteness'4 ,not only solidarity then1  
but also colours1 which ,zeno called    
'the first schematisms' of matter were  
regarded as due to the mysterious agency
 of air4 ,in fact1 qualities in general 
were but blasts and tensions of the air1
 which gave form and figure to the inert
 matter underlying them4  ,as the man is
 in one sense the soul1 in another the  
body1 and in a third the union of both1 
so it was with the cosmos4 ,the word was
 used in three senses--    7#a7 ,god    

7#b7 the arrangement of the stars1 etc4 
7#c7 the combination of both4  ,the     
cosmos as identical with ,god was       
described as an individual made up of   
all being who is incorruptible and      
ungenerated1 the fashioner of the       
ordered frame of the universe1 who at   
certain periods of time absorbs all     
being into himself and again generates  
it from himself4 ,thus the cosmos on its
 external side was doomed to perish and 
the mode of its destruction was to be by
 fire1 a doctrine which has been stamped
 upon the world's belief down to the    
present day4 ,what was to bring about   
this consummation was the soul of the   
universe becoming too big for its body1 
which it would eventually swallow up    
altogether4 ,in the efflagration1 when  
everything went back to the primeval    
aether1 the universe would be pure soul 
and alive equally through and through4  
,in this subtle and attenuated state1 it
 would require more room than before and
 so expand into the void1 contracting   

again when another period of cosmic     
generation had set in4 ,hence the ,stoic
 definition of the ,void or ,infinite as
 that into which the cosmos is resolved 
at the efflagration4  ,in this theory of
 the contraction of the universe out of 
an ethereal state and ultimate return to
 the same condition one sees a          
resemblance to the modern scientific    
hypothesis of the origin of our         
planetary system out of the solar       
nebula1 and its predestined end in the  
same4 ,especially is this the case with 
the form in which the theory was held by
 ,cleanthes1 who pictured the heavenly  
bodies as hastening to their own        
destruction by dashing themselves1 like 
so many gigantic moths1 into the sun4   
,cleanthes however did not conceive mere
 mechanical force to be at work in this 
matter4 ,the grand apotheosis of suicide
 which he foresaw was a voluntary act2  
for the heavenly bodies were ,gods and  
were willing to lose their own in a     
larger life4  ,thus all the deities     

except ,zeus were mortal1 or at all     
events1 perishable4 ,gods1 like men1    
were destined to have an end some day4  
,they would melt in the great furnace of
 being as though they were made of wax  
or tin4 ,zeus then would be left alone  
with his own thoughts1 or as the ,stoics
 sometimes put it1 ,zeus would fall back
 upon ,providence4 ,for by ,providence  
they meant the leading principle or mind
 of the whole1 and by ,zeus1 as         
distinguished from ,providence1 this    
mind together with the cosmos1 which was
 to it as body4 ,in the efflagration the
 two would be fused into one in the     
single substance of aether4 ,and then in
 the fulness of time there would be a   
restitution of all things4 ,everything  
would come round regularly again exactly
 as it had been before4  ,to us who have
 been taught to pant for progress1 this 
seems a dreary prospect4 ,but the       
,stoics were consistent ,optimists1 and 
did not ask for a change in what was    
best4 ,they were content that the one   

drama of existence should enjoy a       
perpetual run without perhaps too nice a
 consideration for the actors4 ,death   
intermitted life1 but did not end it4   
,for the candle of life1 which was      
extinguished now1 would be kindled again
 hereafter4 ,being and not being came   
round in endless succession for all save
 him1 into whom all being was resolved1 
and out of whom it emerged again1 as    
from the vortex of some aeonian         
,maelstrom4   ,,conclusion  ,when       
,socrates declared before his judges    
that there is no evil to a good man     
either in life or after death1 nor are  
his affairs neglected by the gods1 he   
sounded the keynote of ,stoicism1 with  
its two main doctrines of virtue as the 
only good1 and the government of the    
world by ,providence4 ,let us weigh his 
words1 lest we interpret them by the    
light of a comfortable modern piety4 ,a 
great many things that are commonly     
called evil may and do happen to a good 
man in this life1 and therefore         

presumably misfortunes may also overtake
 him in any other life that there may   
be4 ,the only evil that can never befall
 him is vice1 because that would be a   
contradiction in terms4 ,unless         
therefore ,socrates was uttering idle   
words on the most solemn occasion of his
 life1 he must be taken to have meant   
that there is no evil but vice1 which   
implies that there is no good but       
virtue4 ,thus we are landed at once in  
the heart of the ,stoic morality4 ,to   
the question why1 if there be a         
providence1 so many evils happen to good
 men1 ,seneca unflinchingly replies3 ,no
 evil can happen to a good man1         
contraries do not mix4 ,god has removed 
from the good all evil3 because he has  
taken from them crimes and sins1 bad    
thoughts and selfish designs and blind  
lust and grasping avarice4 ,he has      
attended well to themselves1 but he     
cannot be expected to look after their  
luggage3 they relieve him of that care  
by being indifferent about it4 ,this is 

the only form in which the doctrine of  
divine providence can be held           
consistently with the facts of life     
,again1 when ,socrates on the same      
occasion expressed his belief that it   
was not permitted by the divine law for 
a better man to be harmed by a worse1 he
 was asserting by implication the ,stoic
 position4 ,neither ,meletus nor ,anytus
 could harm him1 though they might have 
him killed or banished1 or              
disfranchised4 ,this passage of the     
,apology1 in a condensed form1 is       
adopted by ,epictetus as one of the     
watchwords of ,stoicism4  ,there is     
nothing more distinctive of ,socrates   
than the doctrine that virtue is        
knowledge4 ,here too the ,stoics        
followed him1 ignoring all that         
,aristotle had done in showing the part 
played by the emotions and the will in  
virtue4 ,reason was with them a         
principle of action2 with ,aristotle it 
was a principle that guided action1 but 
the motive power had to come from       

elsewhere4 ,socrates must even be held  
responsible for the ,stoic paradox of   
the madness of all ordinary folk4  ,the 
,stoics did not owe much to the         
,peripatetics4 ,there was too much      
balance about the master mind of        
,aristotle for their narrow intensity4  
,his recognition of the value of the    
passions was to them an advocacy of     
disease in moderation3 his admission of 
other elements besides virtue into the  
conception of happiness seemed to them  
to be a betrayal of the citadel1 to say 
as he did that the exercise of virtue   
was the highest good was no merit in    
their eyes1 unless it were added to the 
confession that there was none beside   
it4 ,the ,stoics tried to treat man as a
 being of pure reason4 ,the             
,peripatetics would not shut their eyes 
to his mixed nature1 and contended that 
the good of such a being must also be   
mixed1 containing in it elements which  
had reference to the body and its       
environment4 ,the goods of the soul     

indeed1 they said1 far outweighed those 
of body and estate1 but still the latter
 had a right to be considered4  ,though 
the ,stoics were religious to the point 
of superstition1 yet they did not invoke
 the terrors of theology to enforce the 
lesson of virtue4 ,plato does this even 
in the very work1 the professed object  
of which is to prove the intrinsic      
superiority of justice to injustice4    
,but ,chrysippus protested against      
,plato's procedure on this point1       
declaring that the talk about punishment
 by the gods was mere 'bugaboo'4 ,by the
 ,stoics indeed1 no less than by the    
,epicureans1 fear of the gods was       
discarded from philosophy4 ,the         
,epicurean gods took no part in the     
affairs of men2 the ,stoic ,god was     
incapable of anger4  ,the absence of any
 appeal to rewards and punishments was a
 natural consequence of the central     
tenet of the ,stoic morality3 that      
virtue is in itself the most desirable  
of all things4 ,another corollary that  

flows with equal directness from the    
same principle is that is better to be  
than to seem virtuous4 ,those who are   
sincerely convinced that happiness is to
 be found in wealth or pleasure or power
 prefer the reality to the appearance of
 these goods2 it must be the same with  
him who is sincerely convinced that     
happiness lies in virtue4  ,despite the 
want of feeling in which the ,stoics    
gloried1 it is yet true to say that the 
humanity of their system constitutes one
 of its most just claims on our         
admiration4 ,they were the first fully  
to recognise the worth of man as man2   
they heralded the reign of peace for    
which we are yet waiting2 they          
proclaimed to the world the fatherhood  
of ,god and the brotherhood of man2 they
 were convinced of the solidarity of    
mankind1 and laid down that the interest
 of one must be subordinated to that of 
all4 ,the word philanthrop1 though not  
unheard before their time1 was brought  
into prominence by them as a name for a 

virtue among the virtues4  ,aristotle's 
ideal state1 like the ,republic of      
,plato1 is still an ,hellenic city2     
,zeno was the first to dream of a       
republic which should embrace all       
mankind4 ,in ,plato's ,republic all the 
material goods are contemptuously thrown
 to the lower classes1 all the mental   
and spiritual reserved for the higher4  
,in ,aristotle's ideal the bulk of the  
population are mere conditions1 not     
integral parts of the state4            
,aristotle's callous acceptance of the  
existing fact of slavery blinded his    
eyes to the wider outlook1 which already
 in his time was beginning to be taken4 
,his theories of the natural slave and  
of the natural nobility of the ,greeks  
are mere attempts to justify practice4  
,in the ,ethics there is indeed a       
recognition of the rights of man1 but it
 is faint and grudging4 ,aristotle there
 tells us that a slave1 as a man1 admits
 of justice1 and therefore of           
friendship1 but unfortunately it is not 

this concession which is dominant in his
 system1 but rather the reduction of a  
slave to a living tool by which it is   
immediately preceded4 ,in another       
passage ,aristotle points out that men1 
like other animals1 have a natural      
affection for the members of their own  
species1 a fact1 he adds1 which is best 
seen in travelling4 ,this incipient     
humanitarianism seems to have been      
developed in a much more marked way by  
,aristotle's followers1 but it is the   
,stoics who have won the glory of having
 initiated humanitarian sentiment4      
,virtue1 with the earlier ,greek        
philosophers1 was aristocratic and      
exclusive4 ,stoicism1 like              
,christianity1 threw it open to the     
meanest of mankind4 ,in the kingdom of  
wisdom1 as in the kingdom of ,christ1   
there was neither barbarian1 ,scythian1 
bond1 nor free4 ,the only true freedom  
was to serve philosophy1 or1 which was  
the same thing1 to serve ,god2 and that 
could be done in any station in life4   

,the sole condition of communion with   
gods and good men was the possession of 
a certain frame of mind1 which might    
belong equally to a gentleman1 to a     
freedman1 or to a slave4 ,in place of   
the arrogant assertion of the natural   
nobility of the ,greeks1 we now hear    
that a good mind is the true nobility4  
,birth is of no importance2 all are     
sprung from the gods4 ,the door of      
virtue is shut to no man2 it is open to 
all1 admits all1 invites all--free men1 
freedmen1 slaves1 kings and exiles4 ,its
 election is not of family or fortune2  
it is content with the bare man4        
,wherever there was a human being1 there
 ,stoicism saw a field for well doing4  
,its followers were always to have in   
their mouths and hearts the well-known  
line--   ,homo sum humani nihil a me    
allenum puto  ,closely connected with   
the humanitarianism of the ,greeks is   
their cosmopolitanism4  ,cosmopolitanism
 is a word which has contracted rather  
than expanded in meaning with the       

advance of time4 ,we mean by it freedom 
from the shackles of nationality4 ,the  
,stoics meant this and more4 ,the city  
of which they claimed to be citizens was
 not merely this round world on which we
 dwell1 but the universe at large with  
all the mighty life therein contained4  
,in this city1 the greatest of earth's  
cities--,rome1 ,ephesus or ,alexandria1 
were but houses4 ,to be exiled from one 
of them was only like changing your     
lodgings1 and death but a removal from  
one quarter to another4 ,the freemen of 
this city were all rational             
beings--sages on earth and the stars in 
heaven4 ,such an idea was thoroughly in 
keeping with the soaring genius of      
,stoicism4 ,it was proclaimed by ,zeno  
in his ,republic1 and after him by      
,chrysippus and his followers4 ,it      
caught the imagination of alien writers 
as of the author of the ,peripatetic ,de
 ,mundo who was possibly of ,jewish     
origin and of ,philo and ,st ,paul who  
were certainly so4 ,cicero does not fail

 to make of it on behalf of the ,stoics2
 ,seneca revels in it2 ,epictetus       
employs it for edification and ,maucus  
,aurelius finds solace in his heavenly  
citizenship for the cares of an earthly 
ruler--as ,antoninus indeed his city is 
,rome1 but as a man it is the universe4 
,the philosophy of an age cannot perhaps
 be inferred from its political         
conditions with that certainty which    
some writers assume2 still there are    
cases in which the connection is        
obvious4 ,on a wide view of the matter  
we may say that the opening up of the   
,east by the arms of ,alexander was the 
cause of the shifting of the philosophic
 standpoint from ,hellenism to          
cosmopolitanism4 ,if we reflect that the
 ,cynic and ,stoic teachers were mostly 
foreigners in ,greece we shall find a   
very tangible reason for the change of  
view4 ,greece had done her work in      
educating the world and the world was   
beginning to make payment in kind4      
,those who had been branded as natural  

slaves were now giving laws to          
philosophy4 ,the kingdom of wisdom was  
suffering violence at the hands of      
barbarians4    ,,dates ,,and            
,,authorities                           
,,bc ,death of ,socrates                
#cii ,death of ,plato                   
#cdg ,zeno                              
#cdg #bge   ,studied under ,crates      
#cbe   ,studied under ,stilpo and       
,xenocrates      #cbe #cae   ,began     
teaching                                
#cae ,epicurus                          
#cda #bgj ,death of ,aristotle          
#cbb ,death of ,xenocrates              
#cae ,cleanthes succeeded ,zeno         
#bge ,chrysippus died                   
#bjg ,zeno of ,tarsus succeeded         
,chrysippus            --- ,decree of   
the ,senate forbidding the              
teaching of philosophy at ,rome         
#afa ,diogenes of ,babylon ,embassy of  
the philosophers to ,rome               
#aee ,antipater of ,tarsus ,panaetius   
,accompanied ,africanus on   his mission

 to the ,east                      #adc 
,his treatise on ,propriety was the     
basis of ,cicero's ,de ,officiis4 ,the  
,scipionic ,circle at ,rome   ,the      
coterie was deeply tinctured with       
,stoicism4 ,its chief members were--    
,the younger ,africanus     the younger 
,laelius     ,l4 ,furius ,philus        
,manilius     ,spurius ,mummius     ,p4 
,rutillus ,rufus     ,q4 ,aelius1       
,tubero     ,polybius and     ,panaetius
 ,suicide of ,blossius of ,cumae1 the   
adviser   of ,tiberius ,gracchus and a  
disciple   of ,antipater of ,tarsus     
#acj ,mnesarchus1 a disciple of         
,panaetius1 was   teaching at ,athens   
when the orator   ,crassus visited that 
city                    #aaa ,hecaton of
 ,rhodes   ,a great ,stoic writer1 a    
disciple of   ,panaetius and a friend of
 ,tubero ,posidonius                    
,about #abh-dd   ,born at ,apameia in   
,syria   ,became a citizen of ,rhodes   
,represented the ,rhodians at ,rome     
#hf   ,cicero studied under him at      

,rhodes            #gh   ,came to ,rome 
again at an advanced age         #ea    
,cicero's philosophical works           
#ed-dd   ,these are a main authority for
 our   knowledge of the ,stoics4        
,a4,d4 ,philo of ,alexandria came on an 
embassy to ,rome  #ci   ,the works of   
,philo are saturated with ,stoic   ideas
 and he displays an exact acquaintance  
with their terminology ,seneca   ,exiled
 to ,corsica                            
#da   ,recalled from exile              
#di   ,forced by ,nero to commit suicide
              #fe   ,his ,moral         
,epistles and philosophical     works   
generally are written from     the      
,stoic standpoint though somewhat       
affected by ,eclecticism ,plutarch      
,flor4 #hj   ,the ,philosophical works  
of ,plutarch     which have most bearing
 upon the     ,stoics are--       ,de   
,alexandri ,magni fortuna aut virtute1  
,de ,virtute ,morali1       ,de         
,placitis ,philosophorum1       ,de     
,stoicorum ,repugnantiis1       ,stoicos

 absurdiora poetis dicere1       ,de    
,communibus ,notitiis4 ,epictetus       
,flor4 #ij   ,a freedman of             
,epaphroditus1   ,disciple of ,c        
,musonius ,rufus1   ,lived and taught at
 ,rome until ,a4 ,d4 #ij     when the   
philosophers were expelled by           
,domitian4 ,then retired to ,nicopolis  
in     ,epirus1 where he spent the rest 
of his life4   ,epictetus wrote nothing 
himself1 but his     ,dissertations1 as 
preserved by ,arrian1     from which the
 ,encheiridion is excerpted1     contain
 the most pleasing presentation that    
we have of the moral philosophy of the  
,stoics4 ,c ,musonius ,rufus   ,banished
 to ,gyaros 444                         
#fe   ,returned to ,rome 444            
#fh   ,tried to intervene between the   
armies     of ,vitellius and ,vespasian 
444              #fi   ,procured the    
condemnation of ,publius ,celer    7,tac
 ,h iv #aj1 ,juv ,sat iii #aaf7 444     
-- ,q ,junius ,rusticus 444             
,cos #afb   ,teacher of ,m ,aurelius who

 learnt     from him to appreciate      
,epictetus  ,m ,aurelius ,antoninus     
,emperor 444           #afa-ahj   ,wrote
 the book commonly called his           
,meditations under the title of     to  
himself   ,he may be considered the last
 of the     ,stoics  ,three later       
authorities for the ,stoic teaching     
are--   ,diogenes ,laertius 444         
#bjj8   ,sextus ,empiricus 444          
#bbe8   ,stobaeus 444                   
#ejj8  ,modern works--   ,von ,arnim's  
edition of the ,fragmenta ,stoicorum    
,veterum   ,pearson's ,fragments of     
,zeno and ,cleanthes ,pitt ,press       
,remains of ,c ,musonius ,rufus in the  
,teubner series   ,zeller's ,stoics and 
,epicureans4   ,sir ,alexander ,grant1  
,ethics of ,aristotle   ,essay ,,vi on  
the ,ancient ,stoics   ,lightfoot on the
 ,philippians1 ,dissertation ,,ii1      
,st4 ,paul and ,seneca4