---------------------------------------- -------------------------------- ,transcriber's ,note3 ,this version of the text cannot represent certain typographical effects4 ,italics are delimited with the #8' character as italic4 ,footnotes have been moved to follow the paragraphs in which they are referenced4 ,minor errors1 attributable to the printer1 have been corrected4 ,please see the transcriber's note at the end of this text for details regarding the handling of any textual issues encountered during its preparation4 ,,the ,,english ,,works ,,of ,,thomas ,,hobbes4 ,,london3 ,c ,,richards1 ,,printer1 ,,st4 ,,martin',s ,,lane4 ,,the ,,english ,,works ,,of ,,thomas ,,hobbes ,,of ,,malmesbury2 ,,now ,,first ,,collected ,,and ,,edited ,,by ,,sir ,,william ,,molesworth1 ,,bart4 --- ,,vol4 ,,ii4 --- ,,london3 ,,john ,,bohn1 ,,henrietta ,,street1 ,,covent ,,garden4 --- ,,mdcccxli4 ,,philosophical ,,rudiments ,,concerning ,,government ,,and ,,society4 ,,by ,,thomas ,,hobbes ,,of ,,malmesbury4 ,,to ,,the ,,right ,,honourable ,,william ,,earl ,,of ,,devonshire1 ,,my ,,most ,,honoured ,,lord4 --- ,,may ,,it ,,please ,,your ,,lordship1 ,it was the speech of the ,roman people1 to whom the name of king had been rendered odious1 as well by the tyranny of the ,tarquins as by the genius and decretals of that city2 it was the speech1 ,i say1 of the public1 however pronounced from a private mouth1 7if yet ,cato the censor were no more than such73 that all kings are to be reckoned amongst ravenous beasts4 ,but what a beast of prey was the ,roman people2 whilst with its conquering eagles it erected its proud trophies so far and wide over the world1 bringing the ,africans1 the ,asiatics1 the ,macedonians1 and the ,achans1 with many other despoiled nations1 into a specious bondage1 with the pretence of preferring them to be denizens of ,rome6 ,so that if ,cato's saying were a wise one1 it was every whit as wise1 that of ,pontius ,telesinus2 who flying about with open mouth through all the companies of his army in that famous encounter which he had with ,sylla1 cried out3 that ,rome herself as well as ,sylla1 was to be razed2 for that there would always be wolves and depredators of their liberty1 unless the forest that lodged them were grubbed up by the roots4 ,to speak impartially1 both sayings are very true3 that man to man is a kind of ,god2 and that man to man is an arrant wolf4 ,the first is true1 if we compare citizens amongst themselves2 and the second1 if we compare cities4 ,in the one1 there is some analogy of similitude with the ,deity2 to wit1 justice and charity1 the twin sisters of peace4 ,but in the other1 good men must defend themselves by taking to them for a sanctuary the two daughters of war1 deceit and violence3 that is1 in plain terms1 a mere brutal rapacity4 ,which although men object to one another as a reproach1 by an inbred custom which they have of beholding their own actions in the persons of other men1 wherein1 as in a mirror1 all things on the left side appear to be on the right1 and all things on the right side to be as plainly on the left2 yet the natural right of preservation1 which we all receive from the uncontrolable dictates of necessity1 will not admit it to be a vice1 though it confess it to be an unhappiness4 ,now that with ,cato himself1 a person of so great a renown for wisdom1 animosity should so prevail instead of judgment1 and partiality instead of reason1 that the very same thing which he thought just in his popular state1 he should censure as unjust in a monarchical2 other men perhaps may have leisure to admire4 ,but ,i have been long since of this opinion2 that there was never yet any more than vulgar prudence1 that had the luck of being acceptable to the giddy people2 but either it hath not been understood1 or else having been so hath been levelled and cried down4 ,the more eminent actions and apothegms1 both of the ,greeks and ,romans1 have been indebted for their eulogies not so much to the reason1 as to the greatness of them2 and very many times to that prosperous usurpation1 7with which our histories do so mutually upbraid each other71 which as a conquering torrent carries all before it1 as well public agents as public actions1 in the stream of time4 ,wisdom1 properly so called1 is nothing else but this3 the perfect knowledge of the truth in all matters whatsoever4 ,which being derived from the registers and records of things2 and that as it were through the conduit of certain definite appellations2 cannot possibly be the work of a sudden acuteness1 but of a well-balanced reason2 which by the compendium of a word1 we call philosophy4 ,for by this it is that a way is opened to us1 in which we travel from the contemplation of particular things to the inference or result of universal actions4 ,now look1 how many sorts of things there are1 which properly fall within the cognizance of human reason2 into so many branches does the tree of philosophy divide itself4 ,and from the diversity of the matter about which they are conversant1 there hath been given to those branches a diversity of names too4 ,for treating of figures1 it is called geometry2 of motion1 physic2 of natural right1 morals2 put altogether1 and they make up philosophy4 ,just as the ,british1 the ,atlantic1 and the ,indian seas1 being diversely christened from the diversity of their shores1 do notwithstanding all together make up the ocean4 ,and truly the geometricians have very admirably performed their part4 ,for whatsoever assistance doth accrue to the life of man1 whether from the observation of the heavens or from the description of the earth1 from the notation of times1 or from the remotest experiments of navigation2 finally1 whatsoever things they are in which this present age doth differ from the rude simpleness of antiquity1 we must acknowledge to be a debt which we owe merely to geometry4 ,if the moral philosophers had as happily discharged their duty1 ,i know not what could have been added by human industry to the completion of that happiness1 which is consistent with human life4 ,for were the nature of human actions as distinctly known as the nature of quantity in geometrical figures1 the strength of avarice and ambition1 which is sustained by the erroneous opinions of the vulgar as touching the nature of right and wrong1 would presently faint and languish2 and mankind should enjoy such an immortal peace1 that unless it were for habitation1 on supposition that the earth should grow too narrow for her inhabitants1 there would hardly be left any pretence for war4 ,but now on the contrary1 that neither the sword nor the pen should be allowed any cessation2 that the knowledge of the law of nature should lose its growth1 not advancing a whit beyond its ancient stature2 that there should still be such siding with the several factions of philosophers1 that the very same action should be decried by some1 and as much elevated by others2 that the very same man should at several times embrace his several opinions1 and esteem his own actions far otherwise in himself than he does in others3 these1 ,i say1 are so many signs1 so many manifest arguments1 that what hath hitherto been written by moral philosophers1 hath not made any progress in the knowledge of the truth2 but yet hath took with the world1 not so much by giving any light to the understanding as entertainment to the affections1 whilst by the successful rhetorications of their speech they have confirmed them in their rashly received opinions4 ,so that this part of philosophy hath suffered the same destiny with the public ways1 which lie open to all passengers to traverse up and down3 or the same lot with highways and open streets1 some for divertisement1 and some for business2 so that what with the impertinences of some and the altercations of others1 those ways have never a seed time1 and therefore yield never a harvest4 ,the only reason of which unluckiness should seem to be this2 that amongst all the writers of that part of philosophy there is not one that hath used an idoneous principle of tractation4 ,for we may not1 as in a circle1 begin the handling of a science from what point we please4 ,there is a certain clue of reason1 whose beginning is in the dark2 but by the benefit of whose conduct1 we are led as it were by the hand into the clearest light4 ,so that the principle of tractation is to be taken from that darkness2 and then the light to be carried thither for irradiating the doubts4 ,as often therefore as any writer doth either weakly forsake that clue1 or wilfully cut it asunder2 he describes the footsteps1 not of his progress in science1 but of his wanderings from it4 ,and from this it was1 that when ,i applied my thoughts to the investigation of natural justice1 ,i was presently advertised from the very word justice1 7which signifies a steady will of giving every one his own71 that my first enquiry was to be1 from whence it proceeded that any man should call anything rather his own1 than another man's4 ,and when ,i found that this proceeded not from nature1 but consent2 7for what nature at first laid forth in common1 men did afterwards distribute into several impropriations72 ,i was conducted from thence to another inquiry2 namely1 to what end and upon what impulsives1 when all was equally every man's in common1 men did rather think it fitting that every man should have his inclosure4 ,and ,i found the reason was1 that from a community of goods there must needs arise contention1 whose enjoyment should be greatest4 ,and from that contention all kind of calamities must unavoidably ensue1 which by the instinct of nature every man is taught to shun4 ,having therefore thus arrived at two maxims of human nature2 the one arising from the concupiscible part1 which desires to appropriate to itself the use of those things in which all others have a joint interest2 the other proceeding from the rational1 which teaches every man to fly a contra-natural dissolution1 as the greatest mischief that can arrive to nature3 which principles being laid down1 ,i seem from them to have demonstrated by a most evident connexion1 in this little work of mine1 first1 the absolute necessity of leagues and contracts1 and thence the rudiments both of moral and of civil prudence4 ,that appendage which is added concerning the regiment of ,god1 hath been done with this intent2 that the dictates of ,god ,almighty in the law of nature1 might not seem repugnant to the written law1 revealed to us in his word4 ,i have also been very wary in the whole tenour of my discourse1 not to meddle with the civil laws of any particular nation whatsoever3 that is to say1 ,i have avoided coming ashore1 which those times have so infested both with shelves and tempests4 ,at what expense of time and industry ,i have been in this scrutiny after truth1 ,i am not ignorant2 but to what purpose1 ,i know not4 ,for being partial judges of ourselves1 we lay a partial estimate upon our own productions4 ,i therefore offer up this book to your ,lordship's1 not favour1 but censure first2 as having found by many experiments1 that it is not the credit of the author1 nor the newness of the work1 nor yet the ornament of the style1 but only the weight of reason1 which recommends any opinion to your ,lordship's favour and approbation4 ,if it fortune to please1 that is to say1 if it be sound1 if it be useful1 if it be not vulgar2 ,i humbly offer it to your ,lordship1 as both my glory and my protection4 ,but if in anything ,i have erred1 your ,lordship will yet accept it as a testimony of my gratitude2 that the means of study1 which ,i enjoyed by your ,lordship's goodness1 ,i have employed to the procurement of your ,lordship's favour4 ,the ,god of heaven crown your ,lordship with length of days1 in this earthly station2 and in the heavenly ,jerusalem with a crown of glory4 ,your ,honour's most humble1 and most devoted ,servant1 ,,thomas ,,hobbes4 ------- ,,the ,,author',s ,,preface ,,to ,,the ,,reader4 ,reader1 ,i promise thee here such things1 which ordinarily promised do seem to challenge the greatest attention1 7whether thou regard the dignity or profit of the matter treated1 or the right method of handling it1 or the honest motive and good advice to undertake it1 or lastly the moderation of the author17 and ,i lay them here before thine eyes4 ,in this book thou shalt find briefly described the duties of men3 first1 as men2 then as subjects2 lastly1 as ,christians4 ,under which duties are contained1 not only the elements of the laws of nature and of nations1 together with the true original and power of justice2 but also the very essence of ,christian religion itself1 so far forth as the measure of this my purpose could well bear it4 ,which kind of doctrine1 excepting what relates to ,christian religion1 the most ancient sages did judge fittest to be delivered to posterity1 either curiously adorned with verse1 or clouded with allegories1 as a most beautiful and hallowed mystery of royal authority2 lest by the disputations of private men it might be defiled4 ,other philosophers in the mean time1 to the advantage of mankind1 did contemplate the faces and motions of things2 others1 without disadvantage1 their natures and causes4 ,but in after times1 ,socrates is said to have been the first who truly loved this civil science2 although hitherto not thoroughly understood1 yet glimmering forth as through a cloud in the government of the commonweal3 and that he set so great a value on this1 that utterly abandoning and despising all other parts of philosophy1 he wholly embraced this1 as judging it only worthy the labour of his mind4 ,after him comes ,plato1 ,aristotle1 ,cicero1 and other philosophers1 as well ,greek as ,latin4 ,and now at length all men of all nations1 not only philosophers but even the vulgar1 have and do still deal with this as a matter of ease1 exposed and prostitute to every mother-wit1 and to be attained without any great care or study4 ,and1 which makes mainly for its dignity1 those who suppose themselves to have it1 or are in such employment as they ought to have it1 do so wonderfully please themselves in its idea1 as they easily brook the followers of other arts to be esteemed and styled ingenuous1 learned1 skilful1 and what you will1 except prudent3 for this name1 in regard of civil knowledge1 they presume to be due to themselves only4 ,whether therefore the worth of arts is to be weighed by the worthiness of the persons who entertain them1 or by the number of those who have written of them1 or by the judgment of the wisest2 certainly this must carry it1 which so nearly relates to princes1 and others engaged in the government of mankind2 in whose adulterate species also the most part of men do delight themselves1 and in which the most excellent wits of philosophers have been conversant4 ,the benefit of it1 when rightly delivered1 that is1 when derived from true principles by evident connection1 we shall then best discern1 when we shall but well have considered the mischiefs that have befallen mankind from its counterfeit and babbling form4 ,for in matters wherein we speculate for the exercise of our wits1 if any error escape us1 it is without hurt2 neither is there any loss1 but of time only4 ,but in those things which every man ought to meditate for the steerage of his life1 it necessarily happens that not only from errors1 but even from ignorance itself1 there arise offences1 contentions1 nay1 even slaughter itself4 ,look now1 how great a prejudice these are2 such and so great is the benefit arising from this doctrine of morality truly declared4 ,how many kings1 and those good men too1 hath this one error1 that a tyrant king might lawfully be put to death1 been the slaughter of6 ,how many throats hath this false position cut1 that a prince for some causes may by some certain men be deposed6 ,and what bloodshed hath not this erroneous doctrine caused1 that kings are not superiors to1 but administrators for the multitude6 ,lastly1 how many rebellions hath this opinion been the cause of1 which teacheth that the knowledge whether the commands of kings be just or unjust1 belongs to private men2 and that before they yield obedience1 they not only may1 but ought to dispute them6 ,besides1 in the moral philosophy now commonly received1 there are many things no less dangerous than those1 which it matters not now to recite4 ,i suppose those ancients foresaw this1 who rather chose to have the science of justice wrapped up in fables1 than openly exposed to disputations4 ,for before such questions began to be moved1 princes did not sue for1 but already exercised the supreme power4 ,they kept their empire entire1 not by arguments1 but by punishing the wicked and protecting the good4 ,likewise subjects did not measure what was just by the sayings and judgments of private men1 but by the laws of the realm2 nor were they kept in peace by disputations1 but by power and authority4 ,yea1 they reverenced the supreme power1 whether residing in one man or in a council1 as a certain visible divinity4 ,therefore they little used1 as in our days1 to join themselves with ambitious and hellish spirits1 to the utter ruin of their state4 ,for they could not entertain so strange a fancy1 as not to desire the preservation of that by which they were preserved4 ,in truth1 the simplicity of those times was not yet capable of so learned a piece of folly4 ,wherefore it was peace and a golden age1 which ended not before that1 ,saturn being expelled1 it was taught lawful to take up arms against kings4 ,this1 ,i say1 the ancients not only themselves saw1 but in one of their fables they seem very aptly to have signified it to us4 ,for they say1 that when ,ixion was invited by ,jupiter to a banquet1 he fell in love1 and began to court ,juno herself4 ,offering to embrace her1 he clasped a cloud2 from whence the ,centaurs proceeded1 by nature half men1 half horses1 a fierce1 a fighting1 and unquiet generation4 ,which changing the names only1 is as much as if they should have said1 that private men being called to councils of state1 desired to prostitute justice1 the only sister and wife of the supreme1 to their own judgments and apprehensions2 but embracing a false and empty shadow instead of it1 they have begotten those hermaphrodite opinions of moral philosophers1 partly right and comely1 partly brutal and wild2 the causes of all contentions and bloodsheds4 ,since therefore such opinions are daily seen to arise1 if any man now shall dispel those clouds1 and by most firm reasons demonstrate that there are no authentical doctrines concerning right and wrong1 good and evil1 besides the constituted laws in each realm and government2 and that the question whether any future action will prove just or unjust1 good or ill1 is to be demanded of none but those to whom the supreme hath committed the interpretation of his laws3 surely he will not only show us the highway to peace1 but will also teach us how to avoid the close1 dark1 and dangerous by-paths of faction and sedition2 than which ,i know not what can be thought more profitable4 ,concerning my method1 ,i thought it not sufficient to use a plain and evident style in what ,i have to deliver1 except ,i took my beginning from the very matter of civil government1 and thence proceeded to its generation and form1 and the first beginning of justice4 ,for everything is best understood by its constitutive causes4 ,for as in a watch1 or some such small engine1 the matter1 figure1 and motion of the wheels cannot well be known1 except it be taken insunder and viewed in parts2 so to make a more curious search into the rights of states and duties of subjects1 it is necessary1 ,i say1 not to take them insunder1 but yet that they be so considered as if they were dissolved2 that is1 that we rightly understand what the quality of human nature is1 in what matters it is1 in what not1 fit to make up a civil government1 and how men must be agreed amongst themselves that intend to grow up into a well-grounded state4 ,having therefore followed this kind of method1 in the first place ,i set down for a principle1 by experience known to all men and denied by none1 to wit1 that the dispositions of men are naturally such1 that except they be restrained through fear of some coercive power1 every man will distrust and dread each other2 and as by natural right he may1 so by necessity he will be forced to make use of the strength he hath1 toward the preservation of himself4 ,you will object perhaps1 that there are some who deny this4 ,truly so it happens1 that very many do deny it4 ,but shall ,i therefore seem to fight against myself1 because ,i affirm that the same men confess and deny the same thing8 ,in truth ,i do not2 but they do1 whose actions disavow what their discourses approve of4 ,we see all countries1 though they be at peace with their neighbours1 yet guarding their frontiers with armed men1 their towns with walls and ports1 and keeping constant watches4 ,to what purpose is all this1 if there be no fear of the neighbouring power8 ,we see even in well-governed states1 where there are laws and punishments appointed for offenders1 yet particular men travel not without their sword by their sides for their defences2 neither sleep they without shutting not only their doors against their fellow subjects1 but also their trunks and coffers for fear of domestics4 ,can men give a clearer testimony of the distrust they have each of other1 and all of all8 ,now1 since they do thus1 and even countries as well as men1 they publicly profess their mutual fear and diffidence4 ,but in disputing they deny it2 that is as much as to say1 that out of a desire they have to contradict others1 they gainsay themselves4 ,some object that this principle being admitted1 it would needs follow1 not only that all men were wicked1 7which perhaps though it seem hard1 yet we must yield to1 since it is so clearly declared by holy writ71 but also wicked by nature1 which cannot be granted without impiety4 ,but this1 that men are evil by nature1 follows not from this principle4 ,for though the wicked were fewer than the righteous1 yet because we cannot distinguish them1 there is a necessity of suspecting1 heeding1 anticipating1 subjugating1 self-defending1 ever incident to the most honest and fairest conditioned4 ,much less does it follow1 that those who are wicked1 are so by nature4 ,for though from nature1 that is1 from their first birth1 as they are merely sensible creatures1 they have this disposition1 that immediately as much as in them lies they desire and do whatsoever is best pleasing to them1 and that either through fear they fly from1 or through hardness repel those dangers which approach them2 yet are they not for this reason to be accounted wicked4 ,for the affections of the mind1 which arise only from the lower parts of the soul1 are not wicked themselves2 but the actions thence proceeding may be so sometimes1 as when they are either offensive or against duty4 ,unless you give children all they ask for1 they are peevish and cry1 aye1 and strike their parents sometimes2 and all this they have from nature4 ,yet are they free from guilt1 neither may we properly call them wicked2 first1 because they cannot hurt2 next1 because wanting the free use of reason they are exempted from all duty4 ,these when they come to riper years1 having acquired power whereby they may do hurt1 if they shall continue to do the same things1 then truly they both begin to be1 and are properly accounted wicked4 ,insomuch as a wicked man is almost the same thing with a child grown strong and sturdy1 or a man of a childish disposition2 and malice the same with a defect of reason in that age when nature ought to be better governed through good education and experience4 ,unless therefore we will say that men are naturally evil1 because they receive not their education and use of reason from nature1 we must needs acknowledge that men may derive desire1 fear1 anger1 and other passions from nature1 and yet not impute the evil effects of those unto nature4 ,the foundation therefore which ,i have laid1 standing firm1 ,i demonstrate1 in the first place1 that the state of men without civil society1 which state we may properly call the state of nature1 is nothing else but a mere war of all against all2 and in that war all men have equal right unto all things4 ,next1 that all men as soon as they arrive to understanding of this hateful condition1 do desire1 even nature itself compelling them1 to be freed from this misery4 ,but that this cannot be done1 except by compact1 they all quit that right they have to all things4 ,furthermore1 ,i declare and confirm what the nature of compact is2 how and by what means the right of one might be transferred unto another to make their compacts valid2 also what rights1 and to whom they must necessarily be granted1 for the establishing of peace2 ,i mean1 what those dictates of reason are1 which may properly be termed the laws of nature4 ,and all these are contained in that part of this book which ,i entitle ,liberty4 ,these grounds thus laid1 ,i show further what civil government1 and the supreme power in it1 and the divers kinds of it are2 by what means it becomes so2 and what rights particular men1 who intend to constitute this civil government1 must so necessarily transfer from themselves on the supreme power1 whether it be one man or an assembly of men1 that1 except they do so1 it will evidently appear to be no civil government1 but the rights which all men have to all things1 that is1 the rights of war will still remain4 ,next ,i distinguish the divers kinds of it1 to wit1 monarchy1 aristocracy1 democracy2 and paternal dominion1 and that of masters over their servants4 ,i declare how they are constituted1 and ,i compare their several conveniences and inconveniences1 each with other4 ,furthermore1 ,i unfold what those things are which destroy it1 and what his or their duty is1 who rule in chief4 ,last of all1 ,i explicate the natures of law and of sin2 and ,i distinguish law from counsel1 from compact1 from that which ,i call right4 ,all which ,i comprehend under the title of ,dominion4 ,in the last part of it1 which is entitled ,religion1 lest that right1 which by strong reason1 in the preceding discourse1 ,i had confirmed the sovereign powers to have over their subjects1 might seem to be repugnant to the sacred ,scriptures2 ,i show1 in the first place1 how it repugns not the divine right1 for as much as ,god overrules all rulers by nature1 that is1 by the dictates of natural reason4 ,in the second1 forasmuch as ,god himself had a peculiar dominion over the ,jews1 by virtue of that ancient covenant of circumcision4 ,in the third1 because ,god doth now rule over us ,christians1 by virtue of our covenant of baptism4 ,and therefore the authority of rulers in chief1 or of civil government1 is not at all1 we see1 contrary to religion4 ,in the last place1 ,i declare what duties are necessarily required from us1 to enter into the kingdom of heaven4 ,and of those ,i plainly demonstrate1 and conclude out of evident testimonies of holy writ according to the interpretation made by all1 that the obedience1 which ,i have affirmed to be due from particular ,christian subjects unto their ,christian princes1 cannot possibly in the least sort be repugnant unto ,christian religion4 ,you have seen my method3 receive now the reason which moved me to write this4 ,i was studying philosophy for my mind sake1 and ,i had gathered together its first elements in all kinds2 and having digested them into three sections by degrees1 ,i thought to have written them1 so as in the first ,i would have treated of body and its general properties2 in the second of man and his special faculties and affections2 in the third1 of civil government and the duties of subjects4 ,wherefore the first section would have contained the first philosophy1 and certain elements of physic2 in it we would have considered the reasons of time1 place1 cause1 power1 relation1 proportion1 quantity1 figure1 and motion4 ,in the second1 we would have been conversant about imagination1 memory1 intellect1 ratiocination1 appetite1 will1 good and evil1 honest and dishonest1 and the like4 ,what this last section handles1 ,i have now already showed you4 ,whilst ,i contrive1 order1 pensively and slowly compose these matters2 7for ,i only do reason1 ,i dispute not72 it so happened in the interim1 that my country1 some few years before the civil wars did rage1 was boiling hot with questions concerning the rights of dominion and the obedience due from subjects1 the true forerunners of an approaching war2 and was the cause which1 all those other matters deferred1 ripened and plucked from me this third part4 ,therefore it happens1 that what was last in order1 is yet come forth first in time4 ,and the rather1 because ,i saw that1 grounded on its own principles sufficiently known by experience1 it would not stand in need of the former sections4 ,yet ,i have not made it out of a desire of praise3 although if ,i had1 ,i might have defended myself with this fair excuse1 that very few do things laudably1 who are not affected with commendation3 but for your sakes1 readers1 who ,i persuaded myself1 when you should rightly apprehend and thoroughly understand this doctrine ,i here present you with1 would rather choose to brook with patience some inconveniences under government1 7because human affairs cannot possibly be without some71 than self-opiniatedly disturb the quiet of the public2 that1 weighing the justice of those things you are about1 not by the persuasion and advice of private men1 but by the laws of the realm1 you will no longer suffer ambitious men through the streams of your blood to wade to their own power2 that you will esteem it better to enjoy yourselves in the present state1 though perhaps not the best1 than by waging war endeavour to procure a reformation for other men in another age1 yourselves in the meanwhile either killed or consumed with age4 ,furthermore1 for those who will not acknowledge themselves subject to the civil magistrate1 and will be exempt from all public burthens1 and yet will live under his jurisdiction1 and look for protection from the violence and injuries of others1 that you would not look on them as fellow-subjects1 but esteem them for enemies and spies2 and that ye rashly admit not for ,god's word all which1 either openly or privately1 they shall pretend to be so4 ,i say more plainly1 if any preacher1 confessor1 or casuist1 shall but say that this doctrine is agreeable with ,god's word1 namely1 that the chief ruler1 nay1 any private man may lawfully be put to death without the chief's command1 or that subjects may resist1 conspire1 or covenant against the supreme power2 that ye by no means believe them1 but instantly declare their names4 ,he who approves of these reasons1 will also like my intentions in writing this book4 ,last of all1 ,i have propounded to myself this rule through this whole discourse4 ,first1 not to define aught which concerns the justice of single actions1 but leave them to be determined by the laws4 ,next1 not to dispute the laws of any government in special1 that is1 not to point which are the laws of any country1 but to declare what the laws of all countries are4 ,thirdly1 not to seem of opinion1 that there is a less proportion of obedience due to an aristocracy or democracy than a monarchy4 ,for though ,i have endeavoured1 by arguments in my tenth chapter1 to gain a belief in men1 that monarchy is the most commodious government2 which one thing alone ,i confess in this whole book not to be demonstrated1 but only probably stated2 yet every where ,i expressly say1 that in all kind of government whatsoever there ought to be a supreme and equal power4 ,fourthly1 not in anywise to dispute the positions of divines1 except those which strip subjects of their obedience1 and shake the foundations of civil government4 ,lastly1 lest ,i might imprudently set forth somewhat of which there would be no need1 what ,i had thus written ,i would not presently expose to the public4 ,wherefore ,i got some few copies privately dispersed among some of my friends2 that discrying the opinions of others1 if any things appeared erroneous1 hard1 or obscure1 ,i might correct1 soften and explain them4 ,these things ,i found most bitterly excepted against4 ,that ,i had made the civil powers too large2 but this by ecclesiastical persons4 ,that ,i had utterly taken away liberty of conscience2 but this by sectaries4 ,that ,i had set princes above the civil laws2 but this by lawyers4 ,wherefore ,i was not much moved by these men's reprehensions1 as who in doing this1 did but do their own business2 except it were to tie those knots somewhat faster4 ,but for their sakes who have a little been staggered at the principles themselves1 to wit1 the nature of men1 the authority or right of nature1 the nature of compacts and contracts1 and the original of civil government2 because in finding fault they have not so much followed their passions1 as their common-sense1 ,i have therefore in some places added some annotations1 whereby ,i presumed ,i might give some satisfaction to their differing thoughts4 ,lastly1 ,i have endeavoured to offend none1 beside those whose principles these contradict1 and whose tender minds are lightly offended by every difference of opinions4 ,wherefore1 if ye shall meet with some things which have more of sharpness1 and less of certainty than they ought to have1 since they are not so much spoken for the maintenance of parties as the establishment of peace1 and by one whose just grief for the present calamities of his country may very charitably be allowed some liberty2 it is his only request to ye1 ,readers1 ye will deign to receive them with an equal mind4 ------- ---------------------------------------- -------------------------------- ,,the ,,index4 --- ,,of ,,liberty4 ,,chap4 ,,page #a4 ,of the state of men without civil society #a #b4 ,of the law of nature concerning contracts #ad #c4 ,of the other laws of nature #bi #d4 ,that the law of nature is a divine law #ei ,,of ,,dominion4 #e4 ,of the causes and first original of civil #fc government #f4 ,of the right1 whether we consider it in an #ga assembly or in one person1 which he hath who is endued with supreme authority #g4 ,of the three kinds of government1 ,democracy1 #ib ,aristocracy1 and ,monarchy #h4 ,of the right which lords and masters have over #ajh their servants #i4 ,of the right which parents have over their #aad children1 and of a kingdom paternal #aj4 ,a comparison of the three kinds of government1 #abf each with other1 according to the inconveniences of each one #aa4 ,the places and examples of ,scripture concerning #adc the right of government1 which make for proof of the foresaid doctrines #ab4 ,of the inward causes which dissolve all civil #adi government #ac4 ,of the duties of those men who sit at the helm of #afe state #ad4 ,of laws and sins #ahb ,,of ,,religion4 #ae4 ,of ,god's government by nature #bja #af4 ,of his government by the old covenant #bbf #ag4 ,of his government by the new covenant #bej #ah4 ,of those things which are necessary for our #bih entrance into the kingdom of heaven ,,philosophical ,,elements ,,of ,a ,,true ,,citizen4 --- ,,liberty4 --- ,,chapter ,i4 ,,of ,,the ,,state ,,of ,,men ,,without ,,civil ,,society4 #a4 ,the ,introduction4 #b4 ,that the beginning of civil society is from mutual fear4 #c4 ,that men by nature are all equal4 #d4 ,whence the will of mischieving each other ariseth4 #e4 ,the discord arising from comparison of wits4 #f4 ,from the appetite many have to the same thing4 #g4 ,the definition of right4 #h4 ,a right to the end1 gives a right to the means necessary to that end4 #i4 ,by the right of nature1 every man is judge of the means which tend to his own preservation4 #aj4 ,by nature all men have equal right to all things4 #aa4 ,this right which all men have to all things1 is unprofitable4 #ab4 ,the state of men without civil society1 is a mere state of war3 the definitions of peace and war4 #ac4 ,war is an adversary to man's preservation4 #ad4 ,it is lawful for any man1 by natural right1 to compel another whom he hath gotten in his power1 to give caution of his future obedience4 #ae4 ,nature dictates the seeking after peace4 ,sidenote3 ,introduction4 ,the faculties of human nature may be reduced unto four kinds2 bodily strength1 experience1 reason1 passion4 ,taking the beginning of this following doctrine from these1 we will declare1 in the first place1 what manner of inclinations men who are endued with these faculties bear towards each other1 and whether1 and by what faculty they are born apt for society1 and to preserve themselves against mutual violence2 then proceeding1 we will shew what advice was necessary to be taken for this business1 and what are the conditions of society1 or of human peace2 that is to say1 7changing the words only71 what are the fundamental laws of nature4 ,sidenote3 ,that the beginning of mutual society is from fear4 #b4 ,the greatest part of those men who have written aught concerning commonwealths1 either suppose1 or require us or beg of us to believe1 that man is a creature born fit#a for society4 ,the ,greeks call him 2 and on this foundation they so build up the doctrine of civil society1 as if for the preservation of peace1 and the government of mankind1 there were nothing else necessary than that men should agree to make certain covenants and conditions together1 which themselves should then call laws4 ,which axiom1 though received by most1 is yet certainly false2 and an error proceeding from our too slight contemplation of human nature4 ,for they who shall more narrowly look into the causes for which men come together1 and delight in each other's company1 shall easily find that this happens not because naturally it could happen no otherwise1 but by accident4 ,for if by nature one man should love another1 that is1 as man1 there could no reason be returned why every man should not equally love every man1 as being equally man2 or why he should rather frequent those1 whose society affords him honour or profit4 ,we do not therefore by nature seek society for its own sake1 but that we may receive some honour or profit from it2 these we desire primarily1 that secondarily4 ,how1 by what advice1 men do meet1 will be best known by observing those things which they do when they are met4 ,for if they meet for traffic1 it is plain every man regards not his fellow1 but his business2 if to discharge some office1 a certain market-friendship is begotten1 which hath more of jealousy in it than true love1 and whence factions sometimes may arise1 but good will never2 if for pleasure and recreation of mind1 every man is wont to please himself most with those things which stir up laughter1 whence he may1 according to the nature of that which is ridiculous1 by comparison of another man's defects and infirmities1 pass the more current in his own opinion4 ,and although this be sometimes innocent and without offence1 yet it is manifest they are not so much delighted with the society1 as their own vain glory4 ,but for the most part1 in these kinds of meeting we wound the absent2 their whole life1 sayings1 actions are examined1 judged1 condemned4 ,nay1 it is very rare but some present receive a fling as soon as they part2 so as his reason was not ill1 who was wont always at parting to go out last4 ,and these are indeed the true delights of society1 unto which we are carried by nature1 that is1 by those passions which are incident to all creatures1 until either by sad experience or good precepts it so fall out1 which in many it never happens1 that the appetite of present matters be dulled with the memory of things past3 without which the discourse of most quick and nimble men on this subject1 is but cold and hungry4 ,footnote #a3 ,born fit4 ,since we now see actually a constituted society among men1 and none living out of it1 since we discern all desirous of congress and mutual correspondence1 it may seem a wonderful kind of stupidity1 to lay in the very threshold of this doctrine such a stumbling block before the reader1 as to deny man to be born fit for society4 ,therefore ,i must more plainly say1 that it is true indeed1 that to man by nature1 or as man1 that is1 as soon as he is born1 solitude is an enemy2 for infants have need of others to help them to live1 and those of riper years to help them to live well4 ,wherefore ,i deny not that men 7even nature compelling7 desire to come together4 ,but civil societies are not mere meetings1 but bonds1 to the making whereof faith and compacts are necessary2 the virtue whereof to children and fools1 and the profit whereof to those who have not yet tasted the miseries which accompany its defects1 is altogether unknown2 whence it happens1 that those1 because they know not what society is1 cannot enter into it2 these1 because ignorant of the benefit it brings1 care not for it4 ,manifest therefore it is1 that all men1 because they are born in infancy1 are born unapt for society4 ,many also1 perhaps most men1 either through defect of mind or want of education1 remain unfit during the whole course of their lives2 yet have they1 infants as well as those of riper years1 a human nature4 ,wherefore man is made fit for society not by nature1 but by education4 ,furthermore1 although man were born in such a condition as to desire it1 it follows not1 that he therefore were born fit to enter into it4 ,for it is one thing to desire1 another to be in capacity fit for what we desire2 for even they1 who through their pride1 will not stoop to equal conditions1 without which there can be no society1 do yet desire it4 ,but if it so happen1 that being met they pass their time in relating some stories1 and one of them begins to tell one which concerns himself2 instantly every one of the rest most greedily desires to speak of himself too2 if one relate some wonder1 the rest will tell you miracles1 if they have them2 if not1 they will feign them4 ,lastly1 that ,i may say somewhat of them who pretend to be wiser than others3 if they meet to talk of philosophy1 look1 how many men1 so many would be esteemed masters1 or else they not only love not their fellows1 but even persecute them with hatred4 ,so clear is it by experience to all men who a little more narrowly consider human affairs1 that all free congress ariseth either from mutual poverty1 or from vain glory1 whence the parties met endeavour to carry with them either some benefit1 or to leave behind them that same 1 some esteem and honour with those1 with whom they have been conversant4 ,the same is also collected by reason out of the definitions themselves of will1 good1 honour1 profitable4 ,for when we voluntarily contract society1 in all manner of society we look after the object of the will1 that is1 that which every one of those who gather together1 propounds to himself for good4 ,now whatsoever seems good1 is pleasant1 and relates either to the senses1 or the mind4 ,but all the mind's pleasure is either glory1 7or to have a good opinion of one's self71 or refers to glory in the end2 the rest are sensual1 or conducing to sensuality1 which may be all comprehended under the word conveniences4 ,all society therefore is either for gain1 or for glory2 that is1 not so much for love of our fellows1 as for the love of ourselves4 ,but no society can be great or lasting1 which begins from vain glory4 ,because that glory is like honour2 if all men have it no man hath it1 for they consist in comparison and precellence4 ,neither doth the society of others advance any whit the cause of my glorying in myself2 for every man must account himself1 such as he can make himself without the help of others4 ,but though the benefits of this life may be much furthered by mutual help2 since yet those may be better attained to by dominion than by the society of others1 ,i hope no body will doubt1 but that men would much more greedily be carried by nature1 if all fear were removed1 to obtain dominion1 than to gain society4 ,we must therefore resolve1 that the original of all great and lasting societies consisted not in the mutual good will men had towards each other1 but in the mutual fear#b they had of each other4 ,footnote #b3 ,the mutual fear4 ,it is objected3 it is so improbable that men should grow into civil societies out of fear1 that if they had been afraid1 they would not have endured each others looks4 ,they presume1 ,i believe1 that to fear is nothing else than to be affrighted4 ,i comprehend in this word fear1 a certain foresight of future evil2 neither do ,i conceive flight the sole property of fear1 but to distrust1 suspect1 take heed1 provide so that they may not fear1 is also incident to the fearful4 ,they who go to sleep1 shut their doors2 they who travel1 carry their swords with them1 because they fear thieves4 ,kingdoms guard their coasts and frontiers with forts and castles2 cities are compact with walls2 and all for fear of neighbouring kingdoms and towns4 ,even the strongest armies1 and most accomplished for fight1 yet sometimes parley for peace1 as fearing each others power1 and lest they might be overcome4 ,it is through fear that men secure themselves by flight indeed1 and in corners1 if they think they cannot escape otherwise2 but for the most part1 by arms and defensive weapons2 whence it happens1 that daring to come forth they know each other's spirits4 ,but then if they fight1 civil society ariseth from the victory2 if they agree1 from their agreement4 ,sidenote3 ,that men by nature are all equal4 #c4 ,the cause of mutual fear consists partly in the natural equality of men1 partly in their mutual will of hurting3 whence it comes to pass1 that we can neither expect from others1 nor promise to ourselves the least security4 ,for if we look on men full-grown1 and consider how brittle the frame of our human body is1 which perishing1 all its strength1 vigour1 and wisdom itself perisheth with it2 and how easy a matter it is1 even for the weakest man to kill the strongest3 there is no reason why any man1 trusting to his own strength1 should conceive himself made by nature above others4 ,they are equals1 who can do equal things one against the other2 but they who can do the greatest things1 namely1 kill1 can do equal things4 ,all men therefore among themselves are by nature equal2 the inequality we now discern1 hath its spring from the civil law4 ,sidenote3 ,whence the will of mischieving each other ariseth4 #d4 ,all men in the state of nature have a desire and will to hurt1 but not proceeding from the same cause1 neither equally to be condemned4 ,for one man1 according to that natural equality which is among us1 permits as much to others as he assumes to himself2 which is an argument of a temperate man1 and one that rightly values his power4 ,another1 supposing himself above others1 will have a license to do what he lists1 and challenges respect and honour1 as due to him before others2 which is an argument of a fiery spirit4 ,this man's will to hurt ariseth from vain glory1 and the false esteem he hath of his own strength2 the other's from the necessity of defending himself1 his liberty1 and his goods1 against this man's violence4 ,sidenote3 ,the discord arising from comparison of wits4 #e4 ,furthermore1 since the combat of wits is the fiercest1 the greatest discords which are1 must necessarily arise from this contention4 ,for in this case it is not only odious to contend against1 but also not to consent4 ,for not to approve of what a man saith1 is no less than tacitly to accuse him of an error in that thing which he speaketh3 as in very many things to dissent1 is as much as if you accounted him a fool whom you dissent from4 ,which may appear hence1 that there are no wars so sharply waged as between sects of the same religion1 and factions of the same commonweal1 where the contestation is either concerning doctrines or politic prudence4 ,and since all the pleasure and jollity of the mind consists in this1 even to get some1 with whom comparing1 it may find somewhat wherein to triumph and vaunt itself2 it is impossible but men must declare sometimes some mutual scorn and contempt1 either by laughter1 or by words1 or by gesture1 or some sign or other2 than which there is no greater vexation of mind1 and than from which there cannot possibly arise a greater desire to do hurt4 ,sidenote3 ,from the appetite many have to the same thing4 #f4 ,but the most frequent reason why men desire to hurt each other1 ariseth hence1 that many men at the same time have an appetite to the same thing2 which yet very often they can neither enjoy in common1 nor yet divide it2 whence it follows that the strongest must have it1 and who is strongest must be decided by the sword4 ,sidenote3 ,the definition of right4 #g4 ,among so many dangers therefore1 as the natural lusts of men do daily threaten each other withal1 to have a care of one's self is so far from being a matter scornfully to be looked upon1 that one has neither the power nor wish to have done otherwise4 ,for every man is desirous of what is good for him1 and shuns what is evil1 but chiefly the chiefest of natural evils1 which is death2 and this he doth by a certain impulsion of nature1 no less than that whereby a stone moves downward4 ,it is therefore neither absurd nor reprehensible1 neither against the dictates of true reason1 for a man to use all his endeavours to preserve and defend his body and the members thereof from death and sorrows4 ,but that which is not contrary to right reason1 that all men account to be done justly1 and with right4 ,neither by the word right is anything else signified1 than that liberty which every man hath to make use of his natural faculties according to right reason4 ,therefore the first foundation of natural right is this1 that every man as much as in him lies endeavour to protect his life and members4 ,sidenote3 ,a right to the end gives also a right to the means4 #h4 ,but because it is in vain for a man to have a right to the end1 if the right to the necessary means be denied him1 it follows1 that since every man hath a right to preserve himself1 he must also be allowed a right to use all the means1 and do all the actions1 without which he cannot preserve himself4 ,sidenote3 ,by the right of nature1 every man is judge of the means which tend to his preservation4 #i4 ,now whether the means which he is about to use1 and the action he is performing1 be necessary to the preservation of his life and members or not1 he himself1 by the right of nature1 must be judge4 ,for if it be contrary to right reason that ,i should judge of mine own peril1 say1 that another man is judge4 ,why now1 because he judgeth of what concerns me1 by the same reason1 because we are equal by nature1 will ,i judge also of things which do belong to him4 ,therefore it agrees with right reason1 that is1 it is the right of nature that ,i judge of his opinion1 that is1 whether it conduce to my preservation or not4 ,sidenote3 ,by right of nature1 all men have equal right to all things4 #aj4 ,nature hath given to every one a right to all2 that is1 it was lawful for every man1 in the bare state of nature1#c or before such time as men had engaged themselves by any covenants or bonds1 to do what he would1 and against whom he thought fit1 and to possess1 use1 and enjoy all what he would1 or could get4 ,now because whatsoever a man would1 it therefore seems good to him because he wills it1 and either it really doth1 or at least seems to him to contribute towards his preservation1 7but we have already allowed him to be judge1 in the foregoing article1 whether it doth or not1 insomuch as we are to hold all for necessary whatsoever he shall esteem so71 and by the #gth article it appears that by the right of nature those things may be done1 and must be had1 which necessarily conduce to the protection of life and members1 it follows1 that in the state of nature1 to have all1 and do all1 is lawful for all4 ,and this is that which is meant by that common saying1 nature hath given all to all4 ,from whence we understand likewise1 that in the state of nature profit is the measure of right4 ,footnote #c3 ,in the bare state of nature4 ,this is thus to be understood3 what any man does in the bare state of nature1 is injurious to no man2 not that in such a state he cannot offend ,god1 or break the laws of nature2 for injustice against men presupposeth human laws1 such as in the state of nature there are none4 ,now the truth of this proposition thus conceived1 is sufficiently demonstrated to the mindful reader in the articles immediately foregoing2 but because in certain cases the difficulty of the conclusion makes us forget the premises1 ,i will contract this argument1 and make it most evident to a single view4 ,every man hath right to protect himself1 as appears by the seventh article4 ,the same man therefore hath a right to use all the means which necessarily conduce to this end1 by the eighth article4 ,but those are the necessary means which he shall judge to be such1 by the ninth article4 ,he therefore hath a right to make use of1 and to do all whatsoever he shall judge requisite for his preservation2 wherefore by the judgment of him that doth it1 the thing done is either right or wrong1 and therefore right4 ,true it is therefore in the bare state of nature1 c4 ,but if any man pretend somewhat to tend necessarily to his preservation1 which yet he himself doth not confidently believe so1 he may offend against the laws of nature1 as in the third chapter of this book is more at large declared4 ,it hath been objected by some3 if a son kill his father1 doth he him no injury8 ,i have answered1 that a son cannot be understood to be at any time in the state of nature1 as being under the power and command of them to whom he owes his protection as soon as ever he is born1 namely1 either his father's or his mother's1 or him that nourished him2 as is demonstrated in the ninth chapter4 ,sidenote3 ,the right of all to all is unprofitable4 #aa4 ,but it was the least benefit for men thus to have a common right to all things4 ,for the effects of this right are the same1 almost1 as if there had been no right at all4 ,for although any man might say of every thing1 this is mine1 yet could he not enjoy it1 by reason of his neighbour1 who having equal right and equal power1 would pretend the same thing to be his4 ,sidenote3 ,the state of men without society is a state of war4 #ab4 ,if now to this natural proclivity of men1 to hurt each other1 which they derive from their passions1 but chiefly from a vain esteem of themselves1 you add1 the right of all to all1 wherewith one by right invades1 the other by right resists1 and whence arise perpetual jealousies and suspicions on all hands1 and how hard a thing it is to provide against an enemy invading us with an intention to oppress and ruin1 though he come with a small number1 and no great provision2 it cannot be denied but that the natural state of men1 before they entered into society1 was a mere war1 and that not simply1 but a war of all men against all men4 ,sidenote3 ,the definition of war and peace4,for what is ,,war1 but that same time in which the will of contesting by force is fully declared1 either by words or deeds8 ,the time remaining is termed ,,peace4 ,sidenote3 ,war is an adversary to man's preservation4 #ac4 ,but it is easily judged how disagreeable a thing to the preservation either of mankind1 or of each single man1 a perpetual war is4 ,but it is perpetual in its own nature2 because in regard of the equality of those that strive1 it cannot be ended by victory4 ,for in this state the conqueror is subject to so much danger1 as it were to be accounted a miracle1 if any1 even the most strong1 should close up his life with many years and old age4 ,they of ,america are examples hereof1 even in this present age3 other nations have been in former ages2 which now indeed are become civil and flourishing1 but were then few1 fierce1 short-lived1 poor1 nasty1 and deprived of all that pleasure and beauty of life1 which peace and society are wont to bring with them4 ,whosoever therefore holds1 that it had been best to have continued in that state in which all things were lawful for all men1 he contradicts himself4 ,for every man by natural necessity desires that which is good for him3 nor is there any that esteems a war of all against all1 which necessarily adheres to such a state1 to be good for him4 ,and so it happens1 that through fear of each other we think it fit to rid ourselves of this condition1 and to get some fellows2 that if there needs must be war1 it may not yet be against all men1 nor without some helps4 ,sidenote3 ,that by the right of nature1 it is lawful for any man to compel him whom he hath in his power1 to give him caution for his future obedience4 #ad4 ,fellows are gotten either by constraint1 or by consent2 by constraint1 when after fight the conqueror makes the conquered serve him1 either through fear of death1 or by laying fetters on him3 by consent1 when men enter into society to help each other1 both parties consenting without any constraint4 ,but the conqueror may by right compel the conquered1 or the strongest the weaker1 7as a man in health may one that is sick1 or he that is of riper years a child71 unless he will choose to die1 to give caution of his future obedience4 ,for since the right of protecting ourselves according to our own wills1 proceeded from our danger1 and our danger from our equality1 it is more consonant to reason1 and more certain for our conservation1 using the present advantage to secure ourselves by taking caution1 than when they shall be full grown and strong1 and got out of our power1 to endeavour to recover that power again by doubtful fight4 ,and on the other side1 nothing can be thought more absurd1 than by discharging whom you already have weak in your power1 to make him at once both an enemy and a strong one4 ,from whence we may understand likewise as a corollary in the natural state of men1 that a sure and irresistible power confers the right of dominion and ruling over those who cannot resist2 insomuch1 as the right of all things that can be done1 adheres essentially and immediately unto this omnipotence hence arising4 ,sidenote3 ,nature dictates the seeking after peace4 #ae4 ,yet cannot men expect any lasting preservation1 continuing thus in the state of nature1 that is1 of war1 by reason of that equality of power1 and other human faculties they are endued withal4 ,wherefore to seek peace1 where there is any hopes of obtaining it1 and where there is none1 to enquire out for auxiliaries of war1 is the dictate of right reason1 that is1 the law of nature2 as shall be showed in the next chapter4 ------- ,,chapter ,,ii ,,of ,,the ,,law ,,of ,,nature ,,concerning ,,contracts4 #a4 ,that the law of nature is not an agreement of men1 but the dictate of reason4 #b4 ,that the fundamental law of nature1 is to seek peace1 where it may be had1 and where not1 to defend ourselves4 #c4 ,that the first special law of nature1 is not to retain our right to all things4 #d4 ,what it is to quit our right3 what to transfer it4 #e4 ,that in the transferring of our right1 the will of him that receives it is necessarily required4 #f4 ,no words but those of the present tense1 transfer any right4 #g4 ,words of the future1 if there be some other tokens to signify the will1 are valid in the translation of right4 #h4 ,in matters of free gift1 our right passeth not from us through any words of the future4 #i4 ,the definition of contract and compact4 #aj4 ,in compacts1 our right passeth from us through words of the future4 #aa4 ,compacts of mutual faith1 in the state of nature are of no effect and vain2 but not so in civil government4 #ab4 ,that no man can make compacts with beasts1 nor yet with ,god without revelation4 #ac4 ,nor yet make a vow to ,god4 #ad4 ,that compacts oblige not beyond our utmost endeavour4 #ae4 ,by what means we are freed from our compacts4 #af4 ,that promises extorted through fear of death1 in the state of nature are valid4 #ag4 ,a later compact contradicting the former1 is invalid4 #ah4 ,a compact not to resist him that shall prejudice my body1 is invalid4 #ai4 ,a compact to accuse one's self1 is invalid4 #bj4 ,the definition of swearing4 #ba4 ,that swearing is to be conceived in that form which he useth that takes the oath4 #bb4 ,an oath superadds nothing to the obligation which is made by compact4 #bc4 ,an oath ought not to be pressed1 but where the breach of compacts may be kept private1 or cannot be punished but from ,god himself4 ,sidenote3 ,that the law of nature is not an agreement of men1 but the dictate of reason4 #a4 ,all authors agree not concerning the definition of the natural law1 who notwithstanding do very often make use of this term in their writings4 ,the method therefore wherein we begin from definitions and exclusion of all equivocation1 is only proper to them who leave no place for contrary disputes4 ,for the rest1 if any man say that somewhat is done against the law of nature1 one proves it hence2 because it was done against the general agreement of all the most wise and learned nations3 but this declares not who shall be the judge of the wisdom and learning of all nations4 ,another hence1 that it was done against the general consent of all mankind2 which definition is by no means to be admitted4 ,for then it were impossible for any but children and fools1 to offend against such a law2 for sure1 under the notion of mankind1 they comprehend all men actually endued with reason4 ,these therefore either do nought against it1 or if they do aught1 it is without their own consent1 and therefore ought to be excused4 ,but to receive the laws of nature from the consents of them who oftener break than observe them1 is in truth unreasonable4 ,besides1 men condemn the same things in others1 which they approve in themselves2 on the other side1 they publicly commend what they privately condemn2 and they deliver their opinions more by hearsay1 than any speculation of their own2 and they accord more through hatred of some object1 through fear1 hope1 love1 or some other perturbation of mind1 than true reason4 ,and therefore it comes to pass1 that whole bodies of people often do those things with the greatest unanimity and earnestness1 which those writers most willingly acknowledge to be against the law of nature4 ,but since all do grant1 that is done by right1 which is not done against reason1 we ought to judge those actions only wrong1 which are repugnant to right reason1 that is1 which contradict some certain truth collected by right reasoning from true principles4 ,but that which is done wrong1 we say it is done against some law4 ,therefore true reason is a certain law2 which1 since it is no less a part of human nature1 than any other faculty or affection of the mind1 is also termed natural4 ,therefore the law of nature1 that ,i may define it1 is the dictate of right reason1#d conversant about those things which are either to be done or omitted for the constant preservation of life and members1 as much as in us lies4 ,footnote #d3 ,right reason4 ,by right reason in the natural state of men1 ,i understand not1 as many do1 an infallible faculty1 but the act of reasoning1 that is1 the peculiar and true ratiocination of every man concerning those actions of his1 which may either redound to the damage or benefit of his neighbours4 ,i call it peculiar1 because although in a civil government the reason of the supreme1 that is1 the civil law1 is to be received by each single subject for the right2 yet being without this civil government1 in which state no man can know right reason from false1 but by comparing it with his own1 every man's own reason is to be accounted1 not only the rule of his own actions1 which are done at his own peril1 but also for the measure of another man's reason1 in such things as do concern him4 ,i call it true1 that is1 concluding from true principles rightly framed1 because that the whole breach of the laws of nature consists in the false reasoning1 or rather folly of those men1 who see not those duties they are necessarily to perform towards others in order to their own conservation4 ,but the principles of right reasoning about such like duties1 are those which are explained in the second1 third1 fourth1 fifth1 sixth1 and seventh articles of the first chapter4 ,sidenote3 ,that the fundamental law of nature1 is to seek peace where it may be had1 and1 where not1 to defend ourselves4 #b4 ,but the first and fundamental law of nature is1 that peace is to be sought after1 where it may be found2 and where not1 there to provide ourselves for helps of war4 ,for we showed in the last article of the foregoing chapter1 that this precept is the dictate of right reason2 but that the dictates of right reason are natural laws1 that hath been newly proved above4 ,but this is the first1 because the rest are derived from this1 and they direct the ways either to peace or self-defence4 ,sidenote3 ,the first special law of nature is1 that our rights to all things ought not to be retained4 #c4 ,but one of the natural laws derived from this fundamental one is this3 that the right of all men to all things ought not to be retained2 but that some certain rights ought to be transferred or relinquished4 ,for if every one should retain his right to all things1 it must necessarily follow1 that some by right might invade1 and others1 by the same right1 might defend themselves against them4 ,for every man by natural necessity endeavours to defend his body1 and the things which he judgeth necessary towards the protection of his body4 ,therefore war would follow4 ,he therefore acts against the reason of peace1 that is1 against the law of nature1 whosoever he be1 that doth not part with his right to all things4 ,sidenote3 ,what it is to quit our right3 what to convey it4 #d4 ,but he is said to part with his right1 who either absolutely renounceth it1 or conveys it to another4 ,he absolutely renounceth it1 who by some sufficient sign or meet tokens declares1 that he is willing that it shall never be lawful for him to do that again1 which before by right he might have done4 ,but he conveys it to another1 who by some sufficient sign or meet tokens declares to that other1 that he is willing it should be unlawful for him to resist him1 in going about to do somewhat in the performance whereof he might before with right have resisted him4 ,but that the conveyance of right consists merely in not resisting1 is understood by this1 that before it was conveyed1 he to whom he conveyed it1 had even then also a right to all2 whence he could not give any new right2 but the resisting right he had before he gave it1 by reason whereof the other could not freely enjoy his rights1 is utterly abolished4 ,whosoever therefore acquires some right in the natural state of men1 he only procures himself security and freedom from just molestation in the enjoyment of his primitive right4 ,as for example1 if any man shall sell or give away a farm1 he utterly deprives himself only from all right to this farm2 but he does not so others also4 ,sidenote3 ,the will of the receiver must necessarily be declared1 before the right be conveyed4 #e4 ,but in the conveyance of right1 the will is requisite not only of him that conveys1 but of him also that accepts it4 ,if either be wanting1 the right remains4 ,for if ,i would have given what was mine to one who refused to accept of it1 ,i have not therefore either simply renounced my right1 or conveyed it to any man4 ,for the cause which moved me to part with it to this man1 was in him only1 not in others too4 ,sidenote3 ,words convey not1 except they relate to the time present4 #f4 ,but if there be no other token extant of our will either to quit or convey our right1 but only words2 those words must either relate to the present or time past2 for if they be of the future only1 they convey nothing4 ,for example1 he that speaks thus of the time to come1 ,i will give to-morrow1 declares openly that yet he hath not given it4 ,so that all this day his right remains1 and abides to-morrow too1 unless in the interim he actually bestows it3 for what is mine1 remains mine till ,i have parted with it4 ,but if ,i shall speak of the time present1 suppose thus2 ,i do give or have given you this to be received to-morrow3 by these words is signified that ,i have already given it1 and that his right to receive it to-morrow is conveyed to him by me to-day4 ,sidenote3 ,words of the future suffice to convey1 if other testimonies of our will be not wanting4 #g4 ,nevertheless1 although words alone are not sufficient tokens to declare the will2 if yet to words relating to the future there shall some other signs be added1 they may become as valid as if they had been spoken of the present4 ,if therefore1 as by reason of those other signs1 it appear that he that speaks of the future1 intends those words should be effectual toward the perfect transferring of his right1 they ought to be valid4 ,for the conveyance of right depends not on words1 but1 as hath been instanced in the fourth article1 on the declaration of the will4 ,sidenote3 ,in matters of free gift1 words of the future convey no right4 #h4 ,if any man convey some part of his right to another1 and doth not this for some certain benefit received1 or for some compact1 a conveyance in this kind is called a gift or free donation4 ,but in free donation1 those words only oblige us1 which signify the present or the time past2 for if they respect the future1 they oblige not as words1 for the reason given in the foregoing article4 ,it must needs therefore be1 that the obligation arise from some other tokens of the will4 ,but1 because whatsoever is voluntarily done1 is done for some good to him that wills it2 there can no other token be assigned of the will to give it1 except some benefit either already received1 or to be acquired4 ,but it is supposed that no such benefit is acquired1 nor any compact in being2 for if so1 it would cease to be a free gift4 ,it remains therefore1 that a mutual good turn without agreement be expected4 ,but no sign can be given1 that he1 who used future words toward him who was in no sort engaged to return a benefit1 should desire to have his words so understood as to oblige himself thereby4 ,nor is it suitable to reason1 that those who are easily inclined to do well to others1 should be obliged by every promise1 testifying their present good affection4 ,and for this cause1 a promiser in this kind must be understood to have time to deliberate1 and power to change that affection1 as well as he to whom he made that promise1 may alter his desert4 ,but he that deliberates1 is so far forth free1 nor can be said to have already given4 ,but if he promise often1 and yet give seldom1 he ought to be condemned of levity1 and be called not a donor1 but doson4 ,sidenote3 ,the definition of contract and covenant4 #i4 ,but the act of two1 or more1 mutually conveying their rights1 is called a contract4 ,but in every contract1 either both parties instantly perform what they contract for1 insomuch as there is no trust had from either to other2 or the one performs1 the other is trusted2 or neither perform4 ,where both parties perform presently1 there the contract is ended as soon as it is performed4 ,but where there is credit given1 either to one or both1 there the party trusted promiseth after-performance2 and this kind of promise is called a covenant4 ,sidenote3 ,in covenants1 we pass away our rights by words signifying the future4 #aj4 ,but the covenant made by the party trusted with him who hath already performed1 although the promise be made by words pointing at the future1 doth no less transfer the right of future time1 than if it had been made by words signifying the present or time past4 ,for the other's performance is a most manifest sign that he so understood the speech of him whom he trusted1 as that he would certainly make performance also at the appointed time2 and by this sign the party trusted knew himself to be thus understood2 which because he hindered not1 was an evident token of his will to perform4 ,the promises therefore which are made for some benefit received1 which are also covenants1 are tokens of the will2 that is1 as in the foregoing section hath been declared1 of the last act of deliberating1 whereby the liberty of non-performance is abolished1 and by consequence are obligatory4 ,for where liberty ceaseth1 there beginneth obligation4 ,sidenote3 ,covenants1 in the state of nature1 are in vain and of none effect3 not so in civil government4 #aa4 ,but the covenants which are made in contract of mutual trust1 neither party performing out of hand1 if there arise#e a just suspicion in either of them1 are in the state of nature invalid4 ,for he that first performs1 by reason of the wicked disposition of the greatest part of men studying their own advantage either by right or wrong1 exposeth himself to the perverse will of him with whom he hath contracted4 ,for it suits not with reason1 that any man should perform first1 if it be not likely that the other will make good his promise after2 which1 whether it be probable or not1 he that doubts it must be judge of1 as hath been showed in the foregoing chapter in the ninth article4 ,thus1 ,i say1 things stand in the state of nature4 ,but in a civil state1 when there is a power which can compel both parties1 he that hath contracted to perform first1 must first perform2 because1 that since the other may be compelled1 the cause which made him fear the other's non-performance1 ceaseth4 ,footnote #e3 ,arise4 ,for1 except there appear some new cause of fear1 either from somewhat done1 or some other token of the will not to perform from the other part1 it cannot be judged to be a just fear2 for the cause which was not sufficient to keep him from making compact1 must not suffice to authorize the breach of it1 being made4 ,sidenote3 ,that no man can make compacts with beasts2 neither with ,god1 without revelation4 #ab4 ,but from this reason1 that in all free gifts and compacts there is an acceptance of the conveyance of right required3 it follows that no man can compact with him who doth not declare his acceptance4 ,and therefore we cannot compact with beasts1 neither can we give or take from them any manner of right1 by reason of their want of speech and understanding4 ,neither can any man covenant with ,god1 or be obliged to him by vow2 except so far forth as it appears to him by ,holy ,scriptures1 that he hath substituted certain men who have authority to accept of such-like vows and covenants1 as being in ,god's stead4 ,sidenote3 ,nor yet vow to ,god4 #ac4 ,those therefore do vow in vain1 who are in the state of nature1 where they are not tied by any civil law1 except1 by most certain revelation1 the will of ,god to accept their vow or pact1 be made known to them4 ,for if what they vow be contrary to the law of nature1 they are not tied by their vow2 for no man is tied to perform an unlawful act4 ,but if what is vowed1 be commanded by some law of nature1 it is not their vow1 but the law itself which ties them4 ,but if he were free1 before his vow1 either to do it or not do it1 his liberty remains2 because that the openly declared will of the obliger is requisite to make an obligation by vow2 which1 in the case propounded1 is supposed not to be4 ,now ,i call him the obliger1 to whom any one is tied2 and the obliged1 him who is tied4 ,sidenote3 ,compacts oblige not beyond our utmost endeavours4 #ad4 ,covenants are made of such things only as fall under our deliberation4 ,for it can be no covenant without the will of the contractor4 ,but the will is the last act of him who deliberates2 wherefore they only concern things possible and to come4 ,no man1 therefore1 by his compact obligeth himself to an impossibility4 ,but yet1 though we often covenant to do such things as then seemed possible when we promised them1 which yet afterward appear to be impossible1 are we not therefore freed from all obligation4 ,the reason whereof is1 that he who promiseth a future1 in certainty receives a present benefit1 on condition that he return another for it4 ,for his will1 who performs the present benefit1 hath simply before it for its object a certain good1 equally valuable with the thing promised2 but the thing itself not simply1 but with condition if it could be done4 ,but if it should so happen1 that even this should prove impossible1 why then he must perform as much as he can4 ,covenants1 therefore1 oblige us not to perform just the thing itself covenanted for1 but our utmost endeavour2 for this only is1 the things themselves are not in our power4 ,sidenote3 ,in what manner we are freed from compacts4 #ae4 ,we are freed from covenants two ways1 either by performing1 or by being forgiven4 ,by performing1 for beyond that we obliged not ourselves4 ,by being forgiven1 because he whom we obliged ourselves to1 by forgiving is conceived to return us that right which we passed over to him4 ,for forgiving implies giving1 that is1 by the fourth article of this chapter1 a conveyance of right to him to whom the gift is made4 ,sidenote3 ,promises forced from us through fear of death1 are valid in the state of nature4 #af4 ,it is a usual question1 whether compacts extorted from us through fear1 do oblige or not4 ,for example1 if1 to redeem my life from the power of a robber1 ,i promise to pay him #ajjl4 next day1 and that ,i will do no act whereby to apprehend and bring him to justice3 whether ,i am tied to keep promise or not4 ,but though such a promise must sometimes be judged to be of no effect1 yet it is not to be accounted so because it proceedeth from fear4 ,for then it would follow1 that those promises which reduced men to a civil life1 and by which laws were made1 might likewise be of none effect2 7for it proceeds from fear of mutual slaughter1 that one man submits himself to the dominion of another72 and he should play the fool finely1 who should trust his captive covenanting with the price of his redemption4 ,it holds universally true1 that promises do oblige1 when there is some benefit received1 and when the promise1 and the thing promised1 be lawful4 ,but it is lawful1 for the redemption of my life1 both to promise and to give what ,i will of mine own to any man1 even to a thief4 ,we are obliged1 therefore1 by promises proceeding from fear1 except the civil law forbid them2 by virtue whereof1 that which is promised becomes unlawful4 ,sidenote3 ,a latter compact contradicting the former1 is invalid4 #ag4 ,whosoever shall contract with one to do or omit somewhat1 and shall after covenant the contrary with another1 he maketh not the former1 but the latter contract unlawful4 ,for he hath no longer right to do or to omit aught1 who by former contracts hath conveyed it to another4 ,wherefore he can convey no right by latter contracts1 and what is promised is promised without right4 ,he is therefore tied only to his first contract1 to break which is unlawful4 ,sidenote3 ,a promise not to resist him that prejudices my body is invalid4 #ah4 ,no man is obliged by any contracts whatsoever not to resist him who shall offer to kill1 wound1 or any other way hurt his body4 ,for there is in every man a certain high degree of fear1 through which he apprehends that evil which is done to him to be the greatest2 and therefore by natural necessity he shuns it all he can1 and it is supposed he can do no otherwise4 ,when a man is arrived to this degree of fear1 we cannot expect but he will provide for himself either by flight or fight4 ,since therefore no man is tied to impossibilities1 they who are threatened either with death1 7which is the greatest evil to nature71 or wounds1 or some other bodily hurts1 and are not stout enough to bear them1 are not obliged to endure them4 ,furthermore1 he that is tied by contract is trusted2 for faith only is the bond of contracts2 but they who are brought to punishment1 either capital or more gentle1 are fettered or strongly guarded2 which is a most certain sign that they seemed not sufficiently bound from non-resistance by their contracts4 ,it is one thing1 if ,i promise thus3 if ,i do it not at the day appointed1 kill me4 ,another thing1 if thus3 if ,i do it not1 though you should offer to kill me1 ,i will not resist4 ,all men1 if need be1 contract the first way1 and there is need sometimes4 ,this second way1 none2 neither is it ever needful4 ,for in the mere state of nature1 if you have a mind to kill1 that state itself affords you a right2 insomuch as you need not first trust him1 if for breach of trust you will afterwards kill him4 ,but in a civil state1 where the right of life and death and of all corporal punishment is with the supreme1 that same right of killing cannot be granted to any private person4 ,neither need the supreme himself contract with any man patiently to yield to his punishment2 but only this1 that no man offer to defend others from him4 ,if in the state of nature1 as between two realms1 there should a contract be made on condition of killing if it were not performed1 we must presuppose another contract of not killing before the appointed day4 ,wherefore on that day1 if there be no performance1 the right of war returns1 that is a hostile state1 in which all things are lawful1 and therefore resistance also4 ,lastly1 by the contract of not resisting1 we are obliged1 of two evils to make choice of that which seems the greater4 ,for certain death is a greater evil than fighting4 ,but of two evils it is impossible not to choose the least4 ,by such a compact1 therefore1 we should be tied to impossibilities2 which is contrary to the very nature of compacts4 ,sidenote3 ,the compact of self-accusation is invalid4 #ai4 ,likewise no man is tied by any compacts whatsoever to accuse himself1 or any other1 by whose damage he is like to procure himself a bitter life4 ,wherefore neither is a father obliged to bear witness against his son1 nor a husband against his wife1 nor a son against his father1 nor any man against any one by whose means he hath his subsistence2 for in vain is that testimony which is presumed to be corrupted from nature4 ,but although no man be tied to accuse himself by any compact1 yet in a public trial he may by torture be forced to make answer4 ,but such answers are no testimony of the fact1 but helps for the searching out of truth2 so that whether the party tortured his answer be true or false1 or whether he answer not at all1 whatsoever he doth1 he doth it by right4 ,sidenote3 ,the definition of an oath4 #bj4 ,swearing is a speech joined to a promise1 whereby the promiser declares his renouncing of ,god's mercy1 unless he perform his word4 ,which definition is contained in the words themselves1 which have in them the very essence of an oath1 to wit1 so ,god help me1 or other equivalent1 as with the ,romans1 do thou ,jupiter so destroy the deceiver1 as ,i slay this same beast4 ,neither is this any let1 but that an oath may as well sometimes be affirmatory as promissory2 for he that confirms his affirmation with an oath1 promiseth that he speaks truth4 ,but though in some places it was the fashion for subjects to swear by their kings1 that custom took its original hence1 that those kings took upon them divine honour4 ,for oaths were therefore introduced1 that by religion and consideration of the divine power1 men might have a greater dread of breaking their faiths1 than that wherewith they fear men1 from whose eyes their actions may lie hid4 ,sidenote3 ,the swearing must be conceived in that fashion which he uses who takes it4 #ba4 ,whence it follows that an oath must be conceived in that form1 which he useth who takes it2 for in vain is any man brought to swear by a ,god whom he believes not1 and therefore neither fears him4 ,for though by the light of nature it may be known that there is a ,god1 yet no man thinks he is to swear by him in any other fashion1 or by any other name1 than what is contained in the precepts of his own proper1 that is 7as he who swears imagines7 the true religion4 ,sidenote3 ,swearing adds nothing to the obligation which is by compact4 #bb4 ,by the definition of an oath1 we may understand that a bare contract obligeth no less1 than that to which we are sworn4 ,for it is the contract which binds us2 the oath relates to the divine punishment1 which it could not provoke1 if the breach of contract were not in itself unlawful2 but it could not be unlawful1 if the contract were not obligatory4 ,furthermore1 he that renounceth the mercy of ,god1 obligeth himself not to any punishment2 because it is ever lawful to deprecate the punishment1 howsoever provoked1 and to enjoy ,god's pardon if it be granted4 ,the only effect therefore of an oath is this2 to cause men1 who are naturally inclined to break all manner of faith1 through fear of punishment to make the more conscience of their words and actions4 ,sidenote3 ,an oath is not to be pressed1 but where the breach of contract can either be kept private1 or not be punished but from ,god alone4 #bc4 ,to exact an oath where the breach of contract1 if any be made1 cannot but be known1 and where the party compacted withal wants not power to punish1 is to do somewhat more than is necessary unto self-defence1 and shews a mind desirous not so much to benefit itself1 as to prejudice another4 ,for an oath1 out of the very form of swearing1 is taken in order to the provocation of ,god's anger1 that is to say1 of him that is omnipotent1 against those who therefore violate their faith1 because they think that by their own strength they can escape the punishment of men2 and of him that is omniscient1 against those who therefore usually break their trust1 because they hope that no man shall see them4 ------- ,,chapter ,,iii4 ,,of ,,the ,,other ,,laws ,,of ,,nature4 #a4 ,the second law of nature1 is to perform contracts4 #b4 ,that trust is to be held with all men without exception4 #c4 ,what injury is4 #d4 ,injury can be done to none but those with whom we contract4 #e4 ,the distinction of justice into that of men1 and that of actions4 #f4 ,the distinction of commutative and distributive justice examined4 #g4 ,no injury can be done to him that is willing4 #h4 ,the third law of nature1 concerning ingratitude4 #i4 ,the fourth law of nature1 that every man render himself useful4 #aj4 ,the fifth law1 of mercy4 #aa4 ,the sixth law1 that punishments regard the future only4 #ab4 ,the seventh law1 against reproach4 #ac4 ,the eighth law1 against pride4 #ad4 ,the ninth law1 of humility4 #ae4 ,the tenth1 of equity1 or against acceptance of persons4 #af4 ,the eleventh1 of things to be had in common4 #ag4 ,the twelfth1 of things to be divided by lot4 #ah4 ,the thirteenth1 of birthright and first possession4 #ai4 ,the fourteenth1 of the safeguard of them who are mediators for peace4 #bj4 ,the fifteenth1 of constituting an umpire4 #ba4 ,the sixteenth1 that no man is judge in his own cause4 #bb4 ,the seventeenth1 that umpires must be without all hope of reward from those whose cause is to be judged4 #bc4 ,the eighteenth1 of witnesses4 #bd4 ,the nineteenth1 that there can no contract be made with the umpire4 #be4 ,the twentieth1 against gluttony1 and all such things as hinder the use of reason4 #bf4 ,the rule by which we may presently know1 whether what we are doing be against the law of nature or not4 #bg4 ,the laws of nature oblige only in the court of conscience4 #bh4 ,the laws of nature are sometimes broke by doing things agreeable to those laws4 #bi4 ,the laws of nature are unchangeable4 #cj4 ,whosoever endeavours to fulfil the laws of nature1 is a just man4 #ca4 ,the natural and moral law are one4 #cb4 ,how it comes to pass1 that what hath been said of the laws of nature1 is not the same with what philosophers have delivered concerning the virtues4 #cc4 ,the law of nature is not properly a law1 but as it is delivered in ,holy ,writ4 ,sidenote3 ,the second law of nature1 to perform contracts4 #a4 ,another of the laws of nature is1 to perform contracts1 or to keep trust4 ,for it hath been showed in the foregoing chapter1 that the law of nature commands every man1 as a thing necessary1 to obtain peace1 to convey certain rights from each to other2 and that this1 as often as it shall happen to be done1 is called a contract4 ,but this is so far forth only conducible to peace1 as we shall perform ourselves what we contract with others shall be done or omitted2 and in vain would contacts be made1 unless we stood to them4 ,because therefore to stand to our covenants1 or to keep faith1 is a thing necessary for the obtaining of peace2 it will prove1 by the second article of the second chapter1 to be a precept of the natural law4 ,sidenote3 ,that faith is to be kept with all men without exception4 #b4 ,neither is there in this matter any exception of the persons with whom we contract2 as if they keep no faith with others1 or hold that none ought to be kept1 or are guilty of any other kind of vice4 ,for he that contracts1 in that he doth contract1 denies that action to be in vain2 and it is against reason for a knowing man to do a thing in vain2 and if he think himself not bound to keep it1 in thinking so he affirms the contract to be made in vain4 ,he therefore who contracts with one with whom he thinks he is not bound to keep faith1 he doth at once think a contract to be a thing done in vain1 and not in vain2 which is absurd4 ,either therefore we must hold trust with all men1 or else not bargain with them2 that is1 either there must be a declared war1 or a sure and faithful peace4 ,sidenote3 ,injury defined4 #c4 ,the breaking of a bargain1 as also the taking back of a gift1 7which ever consists in some action or omission71 is called an injury4 ,but that action or omission is called unjust2 insomuch as an injury1 and an unjust action or omission1 signify the same thing1 and both are the same with breach of contract and trust4 ,and it seems the word injury came to be given to any action or omission1 because they were without right2 he that acted or omitted1 having before conveyed his right to some other4 ,and there is some likeness between that which in the common course of life we call injury1 and that which in the ,schools is usually called absurd4 ,for even as he who by arguments is driven to deny the assertion which he first maintained1 is said to be brought to an absurdity2 in like manner1 he who through weakness of mind does or omits that which before he had by contract promised not to do or omit1 commits an injury1 and falls into no less contradiction than he who in the ,schools is reduced to an absurdity4 ,for by contracting for some future action1 he wills it done2 by not doing it1 he wills it not done3 which is to will a thing done and not done at the same time1 which is a contradiction4 ,an injury therefore is a kind of absurdity in conversation1 as an absurdity is a kind of injury in disputation4 ,sidenote3 ,an injury can only be done to him with whom we contract4 #d4 ,from these grounds it follows1 that an injury can be done to no man#f but him with whom we enter covenant1 or to whom somewhat is made over by deed of gift1 or to whom somewhat is promised by way of bargain4 ,and therefore damaging and injuring are often disjoined4 ,for if a master command his servant1 who hath promised to obey him1 to pay a sum of money1 or carry some present to a third man2 the servant1 if he do it not1 hath indeed damaged this third party1 but he injured his master only4 ,so also in a civil government1 if any man offend another with whom he hath made no contract1 he damages him to whom the evil is done2 but he injures none but him to whom the power of government belongs4 ,for if he who receives the hurt should expostulate the mischief1 he that did it should answer thus3 what art thou to me2 why should ,i rather do according to your than mine own will1 since ,i do not hinder but you may do your own1 and not my mind8 ,in which speech1 where there hath no manner of pre-contract passed1 ,i see not1 ,i confess1 what is reprehensible4 ,footnote #f3 ,injury can be done to no man1 c4 ,the word injustice relates to some law3 injury1 to some person1 as well as some law4 ,for what is unjust1 is unjust to all2 but there may an injury be done1 and yet not against me1 nor thee1 but some other2 and sometimes against no private person1 but the magistrate only2 sometimes also neither against the magistrate1 nor any private man1 but only against ,god4 ,for through contract and conveyance of right1 we say1 that an injury is done against this or that man4 ,hence it is1 which we see in all kind of government1 that what private men contract between themselves by word or writing1 is released again at the will of the obliger4 ,but those mischiefs which are done against the laws of the land1 as theft1 homicide1 and the like1 are punished1 not as he wills to whom the hurt is done1 but according to the will of the magistrate2 that is1 the constituted laws4 ,sidenote3 ,the distinction of justice into that of men and actions4 #e4 ,these words1 just and unjust1 as also justice and injustice1 are equivocal2 for they signify one thing when they are attributed to persons1 another when to actions4 ,when they are attributed to actions1 just signifies as much as what is done with right1 and unjust1 as what is done with injury4 ,he who hath done some just thing1 is not therefore said to be a just person1 but guiltless2 and he that hath done some unjust thing1 we do not therefore say he is an unjust1 but guilty man4 ,but when the words are applied to persons1 to be just signifies as much as to be delighted in just dealing1 to study how to do righteousness1 or to endeavour in all things to do that which is just2 and to be unjust is to neglect righteous dealing1 or to think it is to be measured not according to my contract1 but some present benefit4 ,so as the justice or injustice of the mind1 the intention1 or the man1 is one thing1 that of an action or omission another2 and innumerable actions of a just man may be unjust1 and of an unjust man1 just4 ,but that man is to be accounted just1 who doth just things because the law commands it1 unjust things only by reason of his infirmity2 and he is properly said to be unjust1 who doth righteousness for fear of the punishment annexed unto the law1 and unrighteousness by reason of the iniquity of his mind4 ,sidenote3 ,the distinction of commutative and distributive justice1 examined4 #f4 ,the justice of actions is commonly distinguished into two kinds1 commutative and distributive2 the former whereof1 they say1 consists in arithmetical1 the latter in geometrical proportion2 and that is conversant in exchanging1 in buying1 selling1 borrowing1 lending1 location and conduction1 and other acts whatsoever belonging to contractors2 where1 if there be an equal return made1 hence1 they say1 springs a commutative justice3 but this is busied about the dignity and merits of men2 so as if there be rendered to every man 1 more to him who is more worthy1 and less to him that deserves less1 and that proportionably2 hence1 they say1 ariseth distributive justice4 ,i acknowledge here some certain distinction of equality3 to wit1 that one is an equality simply so called2 as when two things of equal value are compared together1 as a pound of silver with twelve ounces of the same silver3 the other is an equality secundum quod2 as when a thousand pounds is to be divided to a hundred men1 six hundred pounds are given to sixty men1 and four hundred to forty1 where there is no equality between six hundred and four hundred2 but when it happens that there is the same inequality in the number of them to whom it is distributed1 every one of them shall take an equal part1 whence it is called an equal distribution4 ,but such like equality is the same thing with geometrical proportion4 ,but what is all this to justice8 ,for neither if ,i sell my goods for as much as ,i can get for them1 do ,i injure the buyer1 who sought and desired them of me2 neither if ,i divide more of what is mine to him who deserves less1 so long as ,i give the other what ,i have agreed for1 do ,i wrong to either4 ,which truth our ,saviour himself1 being ,god1 testifies in the ,gospel4 ,this therefore is no distinction of justice1 but of equality4 ,yet perhaps it cannot be denied but that justice is a certain equality1 as consisting in this only2 that since we are all equal by nature1 one should not arrogate more right to himself than he grants to another1 unless he have fairly gotten it by compact4 ,and let this suffice to be spoken against this distinction of justice1 although now almost generally received by all2 lest any man should conceive an injury to be somewhat else than the breach of faith or contract1 as hath been defined above4 ,sidenote3 ,no injury can be done to him that is willing4 #g4 ,it is an old saying1 volenti non fit injuria1 the willing man receives no injury2 yet the truth of it may be derived from our principles4 ,for grant that a man be willing that that should be done which he conceives to be an injury to him2 why then1 that is done by his will1 which by contract was not lawful to be done4 ,but he being willing that should be done which was not lawful by contract1 the contract itself 7by the fifteenth article of the foregoing chapter7 becomes void4 ,the right therefore of doing it returns2 therefore it is done by right2 wherefore it is no injury4 ,sidenote3 ,the third law of nature1 of ingratitude4 #h4 ,the third precept of the natural law is1 that you suffer not him to be the worse for you1 who1 out of the confidence he had in you1 first did you a good turn2 or that you accept not a gift1 but with a mind to endeavour that the giver shall have no just occasion to repent him of his gift4 ,for without this1 he should act without reason1 that would confer a benefit where he sees it would be lost2 and by this means all beneficence and trust1 together with all kind of benevolence1 would be taken from among men1 neither would there be aught of mutual assistance among them1 nor any commencement of gaining grace and favour2 by reason whereof the state of war would necessarily remain1 contrary to the fundamental law of nature4 ,but because the breach of this law is not a breach of trust or contract1 7for we suppose no contracts to have passed among them71 therefore is it not usually termed an injury2 but because good turns and thanks have a mutual eye to each other1 it is called ingratitude4 ,sidenote3 ,the fourth law of nature1 that every man render himself useful4 #i4 ,the fourth precept of nature is1 that every man render himself useful unto others3 which that we may rightly understand1 we must remember that there is in men a diversity of dispositions to enter into society1 arising from the diversity of their affections1 not unlike that which is found in stones1 brought together in the building1 by reason of the diversity of their matter and figure4 ,for as a stone1 which in regard of its sharp and angular form takes up more room from other stones than it fills up itself1 neither because of the hardness of its matter can it well be pressed together1 or easily cut1 and would hinder the building from being fitly compacted1 is cast away1 as not fit for use3 so a man1 for the harshness of his disposition in retaining superfluities for himself1 and detaining of necessaries from others1 and being incorrigible by reason of the stubbornness of his affections1 is commonly said to be useless and troublesome unto others4 ,now1 because each one not by right only1 but even by natural necessity1 is supposed with all his main might to intend the procurement of those things which are necessary to his own preservation2 if any man will contend on the other side for superfluities1 by his default there will arise a war2 because that on him alone there lay no necessity of contending2 he therefore acts against the fundamental law of nature4 ,whence it follows1 7which we were to show71 that it is a precept of nature1 that every man accommodate himself to others4 ,but he who breaks this law may be called useless and troublesome4 ,yet ,cicero opposeth inhumanity to this usefulness1 as having regard to this very law4 ,sidenote3 ,the fifth law of nature1 of mercifulness4 #aj4 ,the fifth precept of the law of nature is1 that we must forgive him who repents and asks pardon for what is past1 having first taken caution for the time to come4 ,the pardon of what is past1 or the remission of an offence1 is nothing else but the granting of peace to him that asketh it1 after he hath warred against us1 and now is become penitent4 ,but peace granted to him that repents not1 that is1 to him that retains a hostile mind1 or that gives not caution for the future1 that is1 seeks not peace1 but opportunity2 is not properly peace1 but fear1 and therefore is not commanded by nature4 ,now to him that will not pardon the penitent and that gives future caution1 peace itself it seems is not pleasing3 which is contrary to the natural law4 ,sidenote3 ,the sixth law1 that punishments only regard the future4 #aa4 ,the sixth precept of the natural law is1 that in revenge and punishments we must have our eye not at the evil past1 but the future good3 that is1 it is not lawful to inflict punishment for any other end1 but that the offender may be corrected1 or that others warned by his punishment may become better4 ,but this is confirmed chiefly from hence1 that each man is bound by the law of nature to forgive one another1 provided he give caution for the future1 as hath been showed in the foregoing article4 ,furthermore1 because revenge1 if the time past be only considered1 is nothing else but a certain triumph and glory of mind1 which points at no end2 for it contemplates only what is past1 but the end is a thing to come2 but that which is directed to no end1 is vain3 that revenge therefore which regards not the future1 proceeds from vain glory1 and is therefore without reason4 ,but to hurt another without reason1 introduces a war1 and is contrary to the fundamental law of nature4 ,it is therefore a precept of the law of nature1 that in revenge we look not backwards1 but forward4 ,now the breach of this law is commonly called cruelty4 ,sidenote3 ,the seventh law of nature1 against slander4 #ab4 ,but because all signs of hatred and contempt provoke most of all to brawling and fighting1 insomuch as most men would rather lose their lives 7that ,i say not1 their peace7 than suffer slander2 it follows in the seventh place1 that it is prescribed by the law of nature1 that no man1 either by deeds or words1 countenance or laughter1 do declare himself to hate or scorn another4 ,the breach of which law is called reproach4 ,but although nothing be more frequent than the scoffs and jeers of the powerful against the weak1 and namely1 of judges against guilty persons1 which neither relate to the offence of the guilty1 nor the duty of the judges2 yet these kind of men do act against the law of nature1 and are to be esteemed for contumelious4 ,sidenote3 ,the eighth law1 against pride4 #ac4 ,the question whether of two men be the more worthy1 belongs not to the natural1 but civil state4 ,for it hath been showed before 7,chap4 ,i4 ,art4 #c7 that all men by nature are equal2 and therefore the inequality which now is1 suppose from riches1 power1 nobility of kindred1 is come from the civil law4 ,i know that ,aristotle1 in his first book of ,politics1 affirms as a foundation of the whole political science1 that some men by nature are made worthy to command1 others only to serve2 as if lord and servant were distinguished not by consent of men1 but by an aptness1 that is1 a certain kind of natural knowledge or ignorance4 ,which foundation is not only against reason1 7as but now hath been showed71 but also against experience4 ,for neither almost is any man so dull of understanding as not to judge it better to be ruled by himself1 than to yield himself to the government of another2 neither if the wiser and stronger do contest1 have these always or often the upper hand of those4 ,whether therefore men be equal by nature1 the equality is to be acknowledged2 or whether unequal1 because they are like to contest for dominion1 it is necessary for the obtaining of peace1 that they be esteemed as equal2 and therefore it is in the eighth place a precept of the law of nature1 that every man be accounted by nature equal to another2 the contrary to which law is pride4 ,sidenote3 ,the ninth law1 of humility4 #ad4 ,as it was necessary to the conservation of each man that he should part with some of his rights1 so it is no less necessary to the same conservation that he retain some others1 to wit1 the right of bodily protection1 of free enjoyment of air1 water1 and all necessaries for life4 ,since therefore many common rights are retained by those who enter into a peaceable state1 and that many peculiar ones are also acquired1 hence ariseth this ninth dictate of the natural law1 to wit1 that what rights soever any man challenges to himself1 he also grant the same as due to all the rest2 otherwise he frustrates the equality acknowledged in the former article4 ,for what is it else to acknowledge an equality of persons in the making up of society1 but to attribute equal right and power to those whom no reason would else engage to enter into society8 ,but to ascribe equal things to equals1 is the same with giving things proportional to proportionals4 ,the observation of this law is called meekness1 the violation 2 the breakers by the ,latins are styled immodici et immodesti4 ,sidenote3 ,the tenth law of equity1 or against acceptance of persons4 #ae4 ,in the tenth place it is commanded by the law of nature1 that every man in dividing right to others1 shew himself equal to either party4 ,by the foregoing law we are forbidden to assume more right by nature to ourselves1 than we grant to others4 ,we may take less if we will2 for that sometimes is an argument of modesty4 ,but if at any time matter of right be to be divided by us unto others1 we are forbidden by this law to favour one more or less than another4 ,for he that by favouring one before another observes not this natural equality1 reproaches him whom he thus undervalues3 but it is declared above1 that a reproach is against the laws of nature4 ,the observance of this precept is called equity2 the breach1 respect of persons4 ,the ,greeks in one word term it 4 ,sidenote3 ,the eleventh law1 of things to be had in common4 #af4 ,from the foregoing law is collected this eleventh1 those things which cannot be divided1 must be used in common if they can1 and if the quantity of the matter permit1 every man as much as he lists2 but if the quantity permit not1 then with limitation1 and proportionally to the number of the users4 ,for otherwise that equality can by no means be observed1 which we have showed in the foregoing article to be commanded by the law of nature4 ,sidenote3 ,the twelfth law1 of things to be divided by lot4 #ag4 ,also what cannot be divided nor had in common1 it is provided by the law of nature1 which may be the twelfth precept1 that the use of that thing be either by turns1 or adjudged to one only by lot2 and that in the using it by turns1 it be also decided by lot1 who shall have the first use of it4 ,for here also regard is to be had unto equality3 but no other can be found but that of lot4 ,sidenote3 ,the thirteenth law1 of birthright and first possession4 #ah4 ,but all lot is twofold1 arbitrary or natural4 ,arbitrary is that which is cast by the consent of the contenders1 and it consists in mere chance1 as they say1 or fortune4 ,natural is primogeniture1 in ,greek 1 as it were1 given by lot2 or first possession4 ,therefore the things which can neither be divided nor had in common1 must be granted to the first possessor2 as also those things which belonged to the father are due to the son1 unless the father himself have formerly conveyed away that right to some other4 ,let this therefore stand for the thirteenth law of nature4 ,sidenote3 ,the fourteenth law1 of the safety of those who are mediators for peace4 #ai4 ,the fourteenth precept of the law of nature is1 that safety must be assured to the mediators for peace4 ,for the reason which commands the end1 commands also the means necessary to the end4 ,but the first dictate of reason is peace2 all the rest are means to obtain it1 and without which peace cannot be had4 ,but neither can peace be had without mediation1 nor mediation without safety4 ,it is therefore a dictate of reason1 that is1 a law of nature1 that we must give all security to the mediators for peace4 ,sidenote3 ,the fifteenth law1 of appointing an umpire4 #bj4 ,furthermore because1 although men should agree to make all these and whatsoever other laws of nature1 and should endeavour to keep them1 yet doubts and controversies would daily arise concerning the application of them unto their actions1 to wit1 whether what was done were against the law or not1 which we call the question of right2 whence will follow a fight between parties1 either-sides supposing themselves wronged3 it is therefore necessary to the preservation of peace1 because in this case no other fit remedy can possibly be thought on1 that both the disagreeing parties refer the matter unto some third1 and oblige themselves by mutual compacts to stand to his judgment in deciding the controversy4 ,and he to whom they thus refer themselves1 is called an arbiter4 ,it is therefore the fifteenth precept of the natural law1 that both parties disputing concerning the matter of right1 submit themselves unto the opinion and judgment of some third4 ,sidenote3 ,the sixteenth law1 that no man be judge in his own cause4 #ba4 ,but from this ground1 that an arbiter or judge is chosen by the differing parties to determine the controversy1 we gather that the arbiter must not be one of the parties4 ,for every man is presumed to seek what is good for himself naturally1 and what is just only for peace sake and accidentally2 and therefore cannot observe that same equality commanded by the law of nature1 so exactly as a third man would do4 ,it is therefore in the sixteenth place contained in the law of nature1 that no man must be judge or arbiter in his own cause4 ,sidenote3 ,the seventeenth law1 that arbiters must be without all hope of reward from the parties whose cause is to be judged4 #bb4 ,from the same ground follows in the seventeenth place1 that no man must be judge1 who propounds unto himself any hope of profit or glory from the victory of either part3 for the like reason sways here1 as in the foregoing law4 ,sidenote3 ,the eighteenth law1 of witnesses4 #bc4 ,but when there is some controversy of the fact itself1 to wit1 whether that be done or not which is said to be done1 the natural law wills that the arbiter trust both parties alike1 that is1 because they affirm contradictories1 that he believe neither4 ,he must therefore give credit to a third1 or a third and fourth1 or more1 that he may be able to give judgment of the fact1 as often as by other signs he cannot come to the knowledge of it4 ,the eighteenth law of nature therefore enjoins arbiters and judges of fact1 that where firm and certain signs of the fact appear not1 there they rule their sentence by such witnesses as seem to be indifferent to both parts4 ,sidenote3 ,the nineteenth law1 that no contract is to be made with the judge4 #bd4 ,from the above declared definition of an arbiter may be furthermore understood1 that no contract or promise must pass between him and the parties whose judge he is appointed1 by virtue whereof he may be engaged to speak in favour of either part1 nay1 or be obliged to judge according to equity1 or to pronounce such sentence as he shall truly judge to be equal4 ,the judge is indeed bound to give such sentence as he shall judge to be equal1 by the law of nature recounted in the #aeth article3 to the obligation of which law nothing can be added by way of compact4 ,such compact therefore would be in vain4 ,besides1 if giving wrong judgment he should contend for the equity of it1 except such compact be of no force1 the controversy would remain after judgment given3 which is contrary to the constitution of an arbiter1 who is so chosen1 as both parties have obliged themselves to stand to the judgment which he should pronounce4 ,the law of nature therefore commands the judge to be disengaged1 which is its nineteenth precept4 ,sidenote3 ,the twentieth law1 against gluttony and such things as hinder the use of reason4 #be4 ,furthermore1 forasmuch as the laws of nature are nought else but the dictates of reason2 so as1 unless a man endeavour to preserve the faculty of right reasoning1 he cannot observe the laws of nature2 it is manifest1 that he who knowingly or willingly doth aught whereby the rational faculty may be destroyed or weakened1 he knowingly and willingly breaks the law of nature4 ,for there is no difference between a man who performs not his duty1 and him who does such things willingly as make it impossible for him to do it4 ,but they destroy and weaken the reasoning faculty1 who do that which disturbs the mind from its natural state2 that which most manifestly happens to drunkards1 and gluttons4 ,we therefore sin1 in the twentieth place1 against the law of nature by drunkenness4 ,sidenote3 ,the rule by which a man may presently know1 whether what he is about to act be against the law of nature or not4 #bf4 ,perhaps some man1 who sees all these precepts of nature derived by a certain artifice from the single dictate of reason advising us to look to the preservation and safeguard of ourselves1 will say that the deduction of these laws is so hard1 that it is not to be expected they will be vulgarly known1 and therefore neither will they prove obliging3 for laws1 if they be not known1 oblige not1 nay indeed1 are not laws4 ,to this ,i answer1 it is true1 that hope1 fear1 anger1 ambition1 covetousness1 vain glory1 and other perturbations of mind1 do hinder a man1 so as he cannot attain to the knowledge of these laws whilst those passions prevail in him3 but there is no man who is not sometimes in a quiet mind4 ,at that time therefore there is nothing easier for him to know1 though he be never so rude and unlearned1 than this only rule1 that when he doubts whether what he is now doing to another may be done by the law of nature or not1 he conceive himself to be in that other's stead4 ,here instantly those perturbations which persuaded him to the fact1 being now cast into the other scale1 dissuade him as much4 ,and this rule is not only easy1 but is anciently celebrated in these words1 quod tibi fieri non vis1 alteri ne feceris3 do not that to others1 you would not have done to yourself4 ,sidenote3 ,the laws of nature oblige only in the court of conscience4 #bg4 ,but because most men1 by reason of their perverse desire of present profit1 are very unapt to observe these laws1 although acknowledged by them2 if perhaps some1 more humble than the rest1 should exercise that equity and usefulness which reason dictates1 the others not practising the same1 surely they would not follow reason in so doing3 nor would they hereby procure themselves peace1 but a more certain quick destruction1 and the keepers of the law become a mere prey to the breakers of it4 ,it is not therefore to be imagined1 that by nature1 that is1 by reason1 men are obliged to the exercise of all these laws#g in that state of men wherein they are not practised by others4 ,we are obliged yet1 in the interim1 to a readiness of mind to observe them1 whensoever their observation shall seem to conduce to the end for which they were ordained4 ,we must therefore conclude1 that the law of nature doth always and everywhere oblige in the internal court1 or that of conscience2 but not always in the external court1 but then only when it may be done with safety4 ,footnote #g3 ,the exercise of all these laws4 ,nay1 among these laws some things there are1 the omission whereof1 provided it be done for peace or self-preservation1 seems rather to be the fulfilling1 than breach of the natural law4 ,for he that doth all things against those that do all things1 and plunders plunderers1 doth equity4 ,but on the contrary1 to do that which in peace is a handsome action1 and becoming an honest man1 is dejectedness and poorness of spirit1 and a betraying of one's self1 in the time of war4 ,but there are certain natural laws1 whose exercise ceaseth not even in the time of war itself4 ,for ,i cannot understand what drunkenness or cruelty1 that is1 revenge which respects not the future good1 can advance toward peace1 or the preservation of any man4 ,briefly1 in the state of nature1 what is just and unjust1 is not to be esteemed by the actions but by the counsel and conscience of the actor4 ,that which is done out of necessity1 out of endeavour for peace1 for the preservation of ourselves1 is done with right1 otherwise every damage done to a man would be a breach of the natural law1 and an injury against ,god4 ,sidenote3 ,the laws of nature are sometimes broken by an act agreeable to those laws4 #bh4 ,but the laws which oblige conscience1 may be broken by an act not only contrary to them1 but also agreeable with them2 if so be that he who does it1 be of another opinion4 ,for though the act itself be answerable to the laws1 yet his conscience is against them4 ,sidenote3 ,the laws of nature are immutable and eternal4 #bi4 ,the laws of nature are immutable and eternal3 what they forbid1 can never be lawful2 what they command1 can never be unlawful4 ,for pride1 ingratitude1 breach of contracts 7or injury71 inhumanity1 contumely1 will never be lawful1 nor the contrary virtues to these ever unlawful1 as we take them for dispositions of the mind1 that is1 as they are considered in the court of conscience1 where only they oblige and are laws4 ,yet actions may be so diversified by circumstances and the civil law1 that what is done with equity at one time1 is guilty of iniquity at another2 and what suits with reason at one time1 is contrary to it another4 ,yet reason is still the same1 and changeth not her end1 which is peace and defence1 nor the means to attain them1 to wit1 those virtues of the mind which we have declared above1 and which cannot be abrogated by any custom or law whatsoever4 ,sidenote3 ,he who endeavours to fulfil the laws of nature1 is just4 #cj4 ,it is evident by what hath hitherto been said1 how easily the laws of nature are to be observed1 because they require the endeavour only1 7but that must be true and constant72 which whoso shall perform1 we may rightly call him just4 ,for he who tends to this with his whole might1 namely1 that his actions be squared according to the precepts of nature1 he shows clearly that he hath a mind to fulfil all those laws2 which is all we are obliged to by rational nature4 ,now he that hath done all he is obliged to1 is a just man4 ,sidenote3 ,the natural law is the same with the moral4 #ca4 ,all writers do agree1 that the natural law is the same with the moral4 ,let us see wherefore this is true4 ,we must know1 therefore1 that good and evil are names given to things to signify the inclination or aversion of them1 by whom they were given4 ,but the inclinations of men are diverse1 according to their diverse constitutions1 customs1 opinions2 as we may see in those things we apprehend by sense1 as by tasting1 touching1 smelling2 but much more in those which pertain to the common actions of life1 where what this man commends1 that is to say1 calls good1 the other undervalues1 as being evil4 ,nay1 very often the same man at diverse times praises and dispraises the same thing4 ,whilst thus they do1 necessary it is there should be discord and strife4 ,they are1 therefore1 so long in the state of war1 as by reason of the diversity of the present appetite1 they mete good and evil by diverse measures4 ,all men easily acknowledge this state1 as long as they are in it1 to be evil1 and by consequence that peace is good4 ,they therefore who could not agree concerning a present1 do agree concerning a future good2 which indeed is a work of reason2 for things present are obvious to the sense1 things to come to our reason only4 ,reason declaring peace to be good1 it follows by the same reason1 that all the necessary means to peace be good also2 and therefore that modesty1 equity1 trust1 humanity1 mercy1 7which we have demonstrated to be necessary to peace71 are good manners or habits1 that is1 virtues4 ,the law therefore1 in the means to peace1 commands also good manners1 or the practice of virtue2 and therefore it is called moral4 ,sidenote3 ,whence it comes to pass1 that what hath been said concerning the law1 is not the same with what hath been delivered by philosophers concerning the virtues4 #cb4 ,but because men cannot put off this same irrational appetite1 whereby they greedily prefer the present good 7to which1 by strict consequence1 many unforseen evils do adhere7 before the future2 it happens1 that though all men do agree in the commendation of the foresaid virtues1 yet they disagree still concerning their nature1 to wit1 in what each of them doth consist4 ,for as oft as another's good action displeaseth any man1 that action hath the name given of some neighbouring vice2 likewise the bad actions which please them1 are ever intituled to some virtue4 ,whence it comes to pass that the same action is praised by these1 and called virtue1 and dispraised by those1 and termed vice4 ,neither is there as yet any remedy found by philosophers for this matter4 ,for since they could not observe the goodness of actions to consist in this1 that it was in order to peace1 and the evil in this1 that it related to discord1 they built a moral philosophy wholly estranged from the moral law1 and unconstant to itself4 ,for they would have the nature of virtues seated in a certain kind of mediocrity between two extremes1 and the vices in the extremes themselves2 which is apparently false4 ,for to dare is commended1 and1 under the name of fortitude is taken for a virtue1 although it be an extreme1 if the cause be approved4 ,also the quantity of a thing given1 whether it be great or little1 or between both1 makes not liberality1 but the cause of giving it4 ,neither is it injustice1 if ,i give any man more of what is mine own than ,i owe him4 ,the laws of nature1 therefore1 are the sum of moral philosophy2 whereof ,i have only delivered such precepts in this place1 as appertain to the preservation of ourselves against those dangers which arise from discord4 ,but there are other precepts of rational nature1 from whence spring other virtues2 for temperance1 also1 is a precept of reason1 because intemperance tends to sickness and death4 ,and so fortitude too1 that is1 that same faculty of resisting stoutly in present dangers1 and which are more hardly declined than overcome2 because it is a means tending to the preservation of him that resists4 ,sidenote3 ,the law of nature is not properly a law1 but as it is delivered in ,holy ,scripture4 #cc4 ,but those which we call the laws of nature1 7since they are nothing else but certain conclusions1 understood by reason1 of things to be done and omitted2 but a law1 to speak properly and accurately1 is the speech of him who by right commands somewhat to others to be done or omitted71 are not in propriety of speech laws1 as they proceed from nature4 ,yet1 as they are delivered by ,god in holy ,scriptures1 as we shall see in the chapter following1 they are most properly called by the name of laws4 ,for the sacred ,scripture is the speech of ,god commanding over all things by greatest right4 ------- ,,chapter ,,iv4 ,,that ,,the ,,law ,,of ,,nature ,,is ,a ,,divine ,,law4 #a4 ,the natural and moral law is divine4 #b4 ,which is confirmed in ,scripture1 in general4 #c4 ,specially1 in regard of the fundamental law of nature in seeking of peace4 #d4 ,also in regard of the first law of nature in abolishing all things to be had in common4 #e4 ,also of the second law of nature1 concerning faith to be kept4 #f4 ,also of the third law1 of thankfulness4 #g4 ,also of the fourth law1 of rendering ourselves useful4 #h4 ,also of the fifth law1 concerning mercy4 #i4 ,also of the sixth law1 that punishment only looks at the future4 #aj4 ,also of the seventh law1 concerning slander4 #aa4 ,also of the eighth law1 against pride4 #ab4 ,also of the ninth law1 of equity4 #ac4 ,also of the tenth law1 against respect of persons4 #ad4 ,also of the eleventh law1 of having those things in common which cannot be divided4 #ae4 ,also of the twelfth law1 of things to be divided by lot4 #af4 ,also of appointing a judge4 #ag4 ,also of the seventeenth law1 that the arbiters must receive no reward for their sentence4 #ah4 ,also of the eighteenth law1 concerning witnesses4 #ai4 ,also of the twentieth law1 against drunkenness4 #bj4 ,also in respect of that which hath been said1 that the law of nature is eternal4 #ba4 ,also that the laws of nature do pertain to conscience4 #bb4 ,also that the laws of nature are easily observed4 #bc4 ,lastly1 in respect of the rule by which a man may presently know1 whether what he is about to act1 be against the law of nature1 or not4 #bd4 ,the law of ,christ is the law of nature4 ,sidenote3 ,the natural and moral law is divine4 #a4 ,the same law which is natural and moral1 is also wont to be called divine1 nor undeservedly2 as well because reason1 which is the law of nature1 is given by ,god to every man for the rule of his actions2 as because the precepts of living which are thence derived1 are the same with those which have been delivered from the divine ,majesty for the laws of his heavenly kingdom1 by our ,lord ,jesus ,christ1 and his holy prophets and apostles4 ,what therefore by reasoning we have understood above concerning the law of nature1 we will endeavour to confirm the same in this chapter by holy writ4 ,sidenote3 ,which is confirmed in ,scripture1 in general4 #b4 ,but first we will shew those places in which it is declared1 that the divine law is seated in right reason4 ,psalm xxxvii4 #cj1 #ca3 ,the mouth of the righteous will be exercised in wisdom1 and his tongue will be talking of judgment3 the law of ,god is in his heart4 ,jeremiah xxx4 #cc3 ,i will put my law in their inward parts1 and write it in their hearts4 ,psalm xix4 #g3 ,the law of the ,lord is an undefiled law1 converting the soul4 ,verse #h3 ,the commandment of the ,lord is pure1 and giveth light unto the eyes4 ,deuteron4 xxx4 #aa3 ,this commandment1 which ,i command thee this day1 it is not hidden from thee1 neither is it far off1 c4 ,verse4 #ad3 ,but the word is very nigh unto thee in my mouth1 and in thine heart1 that thou mayest do it4 ,psalm cxix4 #cd3 ,give me understanding1 and ,i shall keep thy law4 ,verse #aje3 ,thy word is a lamp unto my feet1 and a light unto my paths4 ,prov4 ix4 #aj3 ,the knowledge of the holy is understanding4 ,christ the law-giver1 himself is called 7,john i4 #a73 the word4 ,the same ,christ is called 7verse #i73 the true light1 that lighteth every man that cometh in the world4 ,all which are descriptions of right reason1 whose dictates1 we have showed before1 are the laws of nature4 ,sidenote3 ,specially in regard of the fundamental law of nature in seeking of peace4 #c4 ,but that that which we set down for the fundamental law of nature1 namely1 that peace was to be sought for1 is also the sum of the ,divine law1 will be manifest by these places4 ,rom4 iii4 #ag3 ,righteousness1 which is the sum of the law1 is called the way of peace4 ,psalm lxxxv4 #aj3 ,righteousness and peace have kissed each other4 ,matth4 v4 #i3 ,blessed are the peace-makers1 for they shall be called the children of ,god4 ,and after ,st4 ,paul1 in his sixth chapter to the ,hebrews1 and the last verse1 had called ,christ 7the legislator of that law we treat of71 an ,high-priest for ever after the order of ,melchisedec3 he adds in the following chapter1 the first verse3 ,this ,melchisedec was king of ,salem1 priest of the most high ,god1 c4 7,verse #b73 ,first being by interpretation king of righteousness1 and after that also king of ,salem1 which is1 king of peace4 ,whence it is clear1 that ,christ1 the ,king1 in his kingdom placeth righteousness and peace together4 ,psalm xxxiv4 #ad3 ,eschew evil and do good2 seek peace and pursue it4 ,isaiah ix4 #f1 #g3 ,unto us a child is born1 unto us a son is given1 and the government shall be upon his shoulder1 and his name shall be called ,wonderful1 ,counsellor1 the ,mighty ,god1 the everlasting ,father1 the ,prince of ,peace4 ,isaiah lii4 #g3 ,how beautiful upon the mountains are the feet of him that bringeth good tidings1 that publisheth peace1 that bringeth good tidings of good1 that publisheth salvation1 that saith unto ,sion1 thy ,god reigneth6 ,luke ii4 #ad3 ,in the nativity of ,christ1 the voice of them that praised ,god1 saying1 ,glory be to ,god on high1 and in earth peace1 good-will towards men4 ,and ,isaiah liii4 #e3 the ,gospel is called the chastisement of our peace4 ,isaiah lix4 #h3 ,righteousness is called the way of peace4 ,the way of peace they know not1 and there is no judgment in their goings4 ,micah v4 #d1 #e1 speaking of the ,messias1 he saith thus3 ,he shall stand and feed in the strength of the ,lord1 in the majesty of the name of the ,lord his ,god1 and they shall abide1 for now shall he be great unto the end of the earth2 and this man shall be your peace1 c4 ,prov4 iii4 #a1 #b3 ,my son1 forget not my law1 but let thine heart keep my commandments2 for length of days1 and long life1 and peace1 shall they add to thee4 ,sidenote3 ,also in regard of the first law of nature1 in abolishing all things to be had in common4 #d4 ,what appertains to the first law of abolishing the community of all things1 or concerning the introduction of meum and tuum2 we perceive in the first place1 how great an adversary this same community is to peace1 by those words of ,abraham to ,lot 7,gen4 xiii4 #h1 #i73 ,let there be no strife1 ,i pray thee1 between thee and me1 and between thy herdmen and my herdmen2 for we be brethren4 ,is not the whole land before thee8 ,separate thyself1 ,i pray thee from me4 ,and all those places of ,scripture by which we are forbidden to trespass upon our neighbours3 as1 ,thou shalt not kill1 thou shalt not commit adultery1 thou shalt not steal1 c4 do confirm the law of distinction between mine and thine2 for they suppose the right of all men to all things to be taken away4 ,sidenote3 ,also of the second law of nature1 concerning faith to be kept4 #e4 ,the same precepts establish the second law of nature1 of keeping trust4 ,for what doth1 ,thou shalt not invade another's right1 import1 but this8 ,thou shalt not take possession of that1 which by thy contract ceaseth to be thine3 but it is expressly set down8 ,psalm xv4 #a3 to him that asked1 ,lord who shall dwell in thy tabernacle8 it is answered 7verse #d73 ,he that sweareth unto his neighbour1 and disappointeth him not4 ,and ,prov4 vi4 #ab3 ,my son1 if thou be surety for thy friend1 if thou have stricken thy hand with a stranger1 thou art snared with the words of thy mouth4 ,sidenote3 ,also of the third law1 of thankfulness4 #f4 ,the third law concerning gratitude1 is proved by these places4 ,deut4 xxv4 #d3 ,thou shalt not muzzle the ox1 when he treadeth out the corn3 which ,st4 ,paul 7#a ,cor4 ix4 #i7 interprets to be spoken of men1 not oxen only4 ,prov4 xvii4 #ac2 ,whoso rewardeth evil for good1 evil shall not depart from his house4 ,and ,deut4 xx4 #aj1 #aa3 ,when thou comest nigh unto a city to fight against it1 then proclaim peace unto it4 ,and it shall be1 if it make thee answer of peace1 and open unto thee1 then it shall be that all the people that is found therein1 shall be tributaries unto thee1 and they shall serve thee4 ,prov4 iii4 #bi3 ,devise not evil against thy neighbour1 seeing he dwelleth securely by thee4 ,sidenote3 ,also of the fourth law1 of rendering ourselves useful4 #g4 ,to the fourth law of accommodating ourselves1 these precepts are conformable3 ,exod4 xxiii4 #d1 #e3 ,if thou meet thine enemy's ox1 or his ass going astray1 thou shalt surely bring it back to him again4 ,if thou see the ass of him that hateth thee1 lying under his burden1 and wouldst forbear to help him1 thou shalt surely help with him4 ,also 7verse #i73 ,thou shalt not oppress a stranger4 ,prov4 iii4 #cj3 ,strive not with a man without a cause1 if he have done thee no harm4 ,prov4 xv4 #ah3 ,a wrathful man stirreth up strife2 but he that is slow to anger1 appeaseth strife4 ,prov4 xviii4 #bd3 ,there is a friend that sticketh closer than a brother4 ,the same is confirmed1 ,luke x1 by the parable of the ,samaritan1 who had compassion on the ,jew that was wounded by thieves2 and by ,christ's precept 7,matth4 v4 #ci73 ,but ,i say unto you that ye resist not evil2 but whosoever shall smite thee on the right cheek1 turn to him the other also4 ,sidenote3 ,also of the fifth law1 concerning mercy4 #h4 ,among infinite other places which prove the fifth law1 these are some3 ,matth4 vi4 #ad1 #ae3 ,if you forgive men their trespasses1 your heavenly ,father will also forgive you3 but if you forgive not men their trespasses1 neither will your ,father forgive your trespasses4 ,matth4 xviii4 #ba1 #bb3 ,lord how oft shall my brother sin against me1 and ,i forgive him8 ,till seven times8 ,jesus saith unto him2 ,i say not till seven times1 but till seventy times seven times2 that is1 toties quoties4 ,sidenote3 ,also of the sixth law1 that punishment only looks at the future4 #i4 ,for the confirmation of the sixth law1 all those places are pertinent which command us to shew mercy1 such as ,matth4 v4 #g3 ,blessed are the merciful1 for they shall obtain mercy4 ,levit4 xix4 #ah3 ,thou shalt not avenge1 nor bear any grudge against the children of thy people4 ,but there are1 who not only think this law is not proved by ,scripture1 but plainly disproved from hence2 that there is an eternal punishment reserved for the wicked after death1 where there is no place either for amendment or example4 ,some resolve this objection by answering1 that ,god1 whom no law restrains1 refers all to his glory1 but that man must not do so2 as if ,god sought his glory1 that is to say1 pleased himself in the death of a sinner4 ,it is more rightly answered1 that the institution of eternal punishment was before sin1 and had regard to this only1 that men might dread to commit sin for the time to come4 ,sidenote3 ,also of the seventh law1 concerning slander4 #aj4 ,the words of ,christ prove this seventh3 7,matth4 v4 #bb73 ,but ,i say unto you1 that whosoever is angry with his brother without a cause1 shall be in danger of the judgment2 and whosoever shall say unto his brother ,racha1 shall be in danger of the council2 but whosoever shall say1 thou fool1 shall be in danger of hell-fire4 ,prov4 x4 #ah3 ,he that uttereth a slander1 is a fool4 ,prov4 xiv4 #ba3 ,he that despiseth his neighbour1 sinneth4 ,prov4 xv4 #a3 ,grievous words stir up anger4 ,prov4 xxii4 #aj3 ,cast out the scorner1 and contention shall go out1 and reproach shall cease4 ,sidenote3 ,also of the eighth1 against pride4 #aa4 ,the eighth law of acknowledging equality of nature1 that is1 of humility1 is established by these places3 ,matth4 v4 iii3 ,blessed are the poor in spirit1 for theirs is the kingdom of heaven4 ,prov4 vi4 #af-ai3 ,these six things doth the ,lord hate1 yea1 seven are an abomination unto him4 ,a proud look1 c4 ,prov4 xvi4 #e3 ,every one that is proud1 is an abomination unto the ,lord2 though hand join in hand1 he shall not be unpunished4 ,prov4 xi4 #b3 ,when pride cometh1 then cometh shame2 but with the lowly is wisdom4 ,thus ,isaiah xl4 #c3 7where the coming of the ,messias is shewed forth1 for preparation towards his kingdom73 ,the voice of him that cried in the wilderness1 was this3 ,prepare ye the way of the ,lord1 make straight in the desert a highway for our ,god4 ,every valley shall be exalted1 and every mountain and hill shall be made low3 which doubtless is spoken to men1 and not to mountains4 ,sidenote3 ,also of the ninth1 of equity4 #ab4 ,but that same equity1 which we proved in the ninth place to be a law of nature1 which commands every man to allow the same rights to others they would be allowed themselves1 and which contains in it all the other laws besides1 is the same which ,moses sets down 7,levit4 xix4 #ah73 ,thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself4 ,and our ,saviour calls it the sum of the moral law3 ,matth4 xxii4 #cf-dj3 ,master1 which is the great commandment in the law8 ,jesus said unto him1 ,thou shalt love the ,lord thy ,god with all thine heart1 and with all thy soul1 and with all thy mind2 this is the first and great commandment2 and the second is like unto it1 ,thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself4 ,on these two commandments hang all the law and the prophets4 ,but to love our neighbour as ourselves1 is nothing else but to grant him all we desire to have granted to ourselves4 ,sidenote3 ,also the tenth1 against respect of persons4 #ac4 ,by the tenth law respect of persons is forbid2 as also by these places following3 ,matth4 v4 #de3 ,that ye may be children of your ,father which is in heaven2 for he maketh the sun to rise on the evil1 and on the good1 c4 ,coloss4 iii4 #aa3 ,there is neither ,greek nor ,jew1 circumcision nor uncircumcision1 barbarian or ,scythian1 bond or free1 but ,christ is all1 and in all4 ,acts x4 #cd3 ,of a truth ,i perceive that ,god is no respecter of persons4 #b ,chron4 xix4 #g3 ,there is no iniquity with the ,lord our ,god1 nor respect of persons1 nor taking of gifts4 ,ecclesiasticus xxxv4 #ab3 ,the ,lord is ,judge1 and with him is no respect of persons4 ,rom4 ii4 #aa3 ,for there is no respect of persons with ,god4 ,sidenote3 ,also of the eleventh law1 of having those things in common which cannot be divided4 #ad4 ,the eleventh law1 which commands those things to be held in common which cannot be divided1 ,i know not whether there be any express place in ,scripture for it or not2 but the practice appears every where1 in the common use of wells1 ways1 rivers1 sacred things1 c42 for else men could not live4 ,sidenote3 ,also of the twelfth1 of things to be divided by lot4 #ae4 ,we said in the twelfth place1 that it was a law of nature1 that where things could neither be divided nor possessed in common1 they should be disposed by lot4 ,which is confirmed1 as by the example of ,moses who1 by ,god's command 7,numb4 xxvi4 #ee71 divided the several parts of the land of promise unto the tribes by lot3 so 7,acts i4 #bd7 by the example of the ,apostles1 who received ,matthias before ,justus into their number1 by casting lots1 and saying1 ,thou1 ,lord1 who knowest the hearts of all men1 show whether of these two thou hast chosen1 c4 ,prov4 xvi4 #cc3 ,the lot is cast into the lap1 but the whole disposing thereof is of the ,lord4 ,and1 which is the thirteenth law1 the succession was due unto ,esau1 as being the first born of ,isaac2 if himself had not sold it 7,gen4 xxv4 #cc71 or that the father had not otherwise appointed4 ,sidenote3 ,also of appointing a judge4 #af4 ,st4 ,paul1 writing to the ,corinthians 7#a ,epist4 vi71 reprehends the ,corinthians of that city for going to law one with another before infidel judges1 who were their enemies3 calling it a fault1 that they would not rather take wrong1 and suffer themselves to be defrauded2 for that is against that law1 whereby we are commanded to be helpful to each other4 ,but if it happen the controversy be concerning things necessary1 what is to be done8 ,therefore the ,apostle 7verse #e7 speaks thus3 ,i speak to your shame4 ,is it so1 that there is not one wise man among you1 no1 not one that shall be able to judge between his brethren8 ,he therefore1 by those words1 confirms that law of nature which we called the fifteenth1 to wit1 where controversies cannot be avoided2 there by the consent of parties to appoint some arbiter1 and him some third man2 so as 7which is the sixteenth law7 neither of the parties may be judge in his own cause4 ,sidenote3 ,also of the seventeenth law1 that the arbiters must receive no reward for their sentence4 #ag4 ,but that the judge or arbiter must receive no reward for his sentence1 which is the seventeenth law appears1 ,exod4 xxiii4 #h3 ,thou shalt take no gift2 for the gift blindeth the wise1 and perverteth the words of the righteous4 ,ecclesiasticus xx4 #bi3 ,presents and gifts blind the eyes of the wise4 ,whence it follows1 that he must not be more obliged to one part than the other2 which is the nineteenth law2 and is also confirmed1 ,deut4 i4 #ag3 ,ye shall not respect persons in judgment1 ye shall hear the small as well as the great2 and in all those places which are brought against respect of persons4 ,sidenote3 ,also of the eighteenth1 concerning witnesses4 #ah4 ,that in the judgment of fact witnesses must be had1 which is the eighteenth law1 the ,scripture not only confirms1 but requires more than one4 ,deut4 xvii4 #f3 ,at the mouth of two witnesses1 or three witnesses1 shall he that is worthy of death be put to death4 ,the same is repeated ,deut4 xix4 #ae4 ,sidenote3 ,also of the twentieth law1 against drunkenness4 #ai4 ,drunkenness1 which we have therefore in the last place numbered among the breaches of the natural law1 because it hinders the use of right reason1 is also forbid in ,sacred ,scripture for the same reason4 ,prov4 xx4 #a3 ,wine is a mocker1 strong drink is raging1 whosoever is deceived thereby is not wise4 ,and ,prov4 xxxi4 #d1 #e3 ,it is not for kings to drink wine1 lest they drink and forget the law1 and pervert the judgment of any of the afflicted4 ,but that we might know that the malice of this vice consisted not formally in the quantity of the drink1 but in that it destroys judgment and reason1 it follows in the next verse3 ,give strong drink to him that is ready to perish1 and wine to those that be heavy of heart4 ,let him drink and forget his poverty1 and remember his misery no more4 ,christ useth the same reason in prohibiting drunkenness 7,luke xxi4 #cd73 ,take heed to yourselves1 lest at any time your hearts be overcharged with surfeiting and drunkenness4 ,sidenote3 ,also in respect of that which hath been said1 that the law of nature is eternal4 #bj4 ,that we said in the foregoing chapter1 the law of nature is eternal1 is also proved out of ,matth4 v4 #ah3 ,verily ,i say unto you1 till heaven and earth pass1 one jot or one tittle shall in no wise pass from the law2 and ,psalm cxix4 #afj3 ,every one of thy righteous judgments endureth for ever4 ,sidenote3 ,also that the laws of nature do pertain to conscience4 #ba4 ,we also said1 that the laws of nature had regard chiefly unto conscience2 that is1 that he is just1 who by all possible endeavour strives to fulfil them4 ,and although a man should order all his actions so much as belongs to external obedience just as the law commands1 but not for the law's sake1 but by reason of some punishment annexed unto it1 or out of vain glory2 yet he is unjust4 ,both these are proved by the ,holy ,scriptures4 ,the first 7,isaiah lv4 #g73 ,let the wicked forsake his way1 and the unrighteous man his thoughts1 and let him return unto the ,lord1 and he will have mercy upon him2 and to our ,god1 for he will abundantly pardon4 ,ezek4 xviii4 #ca3 ,cast away from you all your transgressions whereby you have transgressed1 and make you a new heart and a new spirit2 for why will you die1 ,o ,house of ,israel8 ,by which1 and the like places1 we may sufficiently understand that ,god will not punish their deeds whose heart is right4 ,the second1 out of ,isaiah xxix4 #ac1 #ad3 ,the ,lord said1 forasmuch as this people draw near me with their mouth1 and with their lips do honour me1 but have removed their hearts far from me1 therefore ,i will proceed1 c4 ,matth4 v4 #bj3 ,except your righteousness shall exceed the righteousness of the ,scribes and ,pharisees1 ye shall in no case enter into the kingdom of heaven4 ,and in the following verses1 our ,saviour explains to them how that the commands of ,god are broken1 not by deeds only1 but also by the will4 ,for the ,scribes and ,pharisees did in outward act observe the law most exactly1 but for glory's sake only2 else they would as readily have broken it4 ,there are innumerable places of ,scripture in which is most manifestly declared1 that ,god accepts the will for the deed1 and that as well in good as in evil actions4 ,sidenote3 ,also that the laws of nature are easily observed4 #bb4 ,that the law of nature is easily kept1 ,christ himself declares 7,matth4 xi4 #bh1 #bi1 #cj73 ,come unto me1 c4 ,take my yoke upon you1 and learn of me1 c42 for my yoke is easy1 and my burden light4 ,sidenote3 ,lastly1 in respect of the rule by which a man may presently know1 whether what he is about to act be against the law of nature1 or not4 #bc4 ,lastly1 the rule by which ,i said any man might know1 whether what he was doing were contrary to the law or not1 to wit1 what thou wouldst not be done to1 do not that to another2 is almost in the self-same words delivered by our ,saviour 7,matth4 vii4 #ab73 ,therefore all things whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you1 do you even so to them4 ,sidenote3 ,the law of ,christ is the law of nature4 #bd4 ,as the law of nature is all of it divine1 so the law of ,christ by conversion 7which is wholly explained in the v4 vi4 and vii4 chapters of ,st4 ,matthew's ,gospel71 is all of it also 7except that one commandment1 of not marrying her who is put away for adultery2 which ,christ brought for explication of the divine positive law1 against the ,jews1 who did not rightly interpret the ,mosaical law7 the doctrine of nature4 ,i say1 the whole law of ,christ is explained in the fore-named chapters1 not the whole doctrine of ,christ2 for faith is a part of ,christian doctrine1 which is not comprehended under the title of a law4 ,for laws are made and given in reference to such actions as follow our will2 not in order to our opinions and belief1 which being out of our power1 follow not the will4 ,,dominion4 --- ,,chapter ,v4 ,,of ,,the ,,causes ,,and ,,first ,,beginning ,,of ,,civil ,,government4 #a4 ,that the laws of nature are not sufficient to preserve peace4 #b4 ,that the laws of nature1 in the state of nature1 are silent4 #c4 ,that the security of living according to the laws of nature1 consists in the concord of many persons4 #d4 ,that the concord of many persons is not constant enough for a lasting peace4 #e4 ,the reason why the government of certain brute creatures stands firm in concord only1 and why not of men4 #f4 ,that not only consent1 but union also1 is required to establish the peace of men4 #g4 ,what union is4 #h4 ,in union1 the right of all men is conveyed to one4 #i4 ,what civil society is4 #aj4 ,what a civil person is4 #aa4 ,what it is to have the supreme power1 and what to be a subject #ab4 ,two kinds of cities1 natural1 and by institution4 ,sidenote3 ,that the laws of nature suffice not for the conservation of peace4 #a4 ,it is of itself manifest that the actions of men proceed from the will1 and the will from hope and fear1 insomuch as when they shall see a greater good or less evil likely to happen to them by the breach than observation of the laws1 they will wittingly violate them4 ,the hope therefore which each man hath of his security and self-preservation1 consists in this1 that by force or craft he may disappoint his neighbour1 either openly or by stratagem4 ,whence we may understand1 that the natural laws1 though well understood1 do not instantly secure any man in their practice2 and consequently1 that as long as there is no caution had from the invasion of others1 there remains to every man that same primitive right of self-defence by such means as either he can or will make use of1 that is1 a right to all things1 or the right of war4 ,and it is sufficient for the fulfilling of the natural law1 that a man be prepared in mind to embrace peace when it may be had4 ,sidenote3 ,that the laws of nature1 in a state of nature1 are silent4 #b4 ,it is a trite saying1 that all laws are silent in the time of war1 and it is a true one1 not only if we speak of the civil1 but also of the natural laws1 provided they be referred not to the mind1 but to the actions of men1 by chap4 iii4 art4 #bg4 ,and we mean such a war1 as is of all men against all men2 such as is the mere state of nature2 although in the war of nation against nation1 a certain mean was wont to be observed4 ,and therefore in old time1 there was a manner of living1 and as it were a certain economy1 which they called 1 living by rapine2 which was neither against the law of nature 7things then so standing71 nor void of glory to those who exercised it with valour1 not with cruelty4 ,their custom was1 taking away the rest1 to spare life1 and abstain from oxen fit for plough1 and every instrument serviceable to husbandry4 ,which yet is not so to be taken1 as if they were bound to do thus by the law of nature2 but that they had regard to their own glory herein1 lest by too much cruelty they might be suspected guilty of fear4 ,sidenote3 ,that the security of living according to the laws of nature1 consists in the agreement of many4 #c4 ,since therefore the exercise of the natural law is necessary for the preservation of peace1 and that for the exercise of the natural law security is no less necessary2 it is worth the considering what that is which affords such a security4 ,for this matter nothing else can be imagined1 but that each man provide himself of such meet helps1 as the invasion of one on the other may be rendered so dangerous1 as either of them may think it better to refrain than to meddle4 ,but first1 it is plain that the consent of two or three cannot make good such a security2 because that the addition but of one1 or some few on the other side1 is sufficient to make the victory undoubtedly sure1 and heartens the enemy to attack us4 ,it is therefore necessary1 to the end the security sought for may be obtained1 that the number of them who conspire in a mutual assistance be so great1 that the accession of some few to the enemy's party may not prove to them a matter of moment sufficient to assure the victory4 ,sidenote3 ,that the agreement of many is not constant enough to preserve a lasting peace4 #d4 ,furthermore1 how great soever the number of them is who meet on self-defence1 if yet they agree not among themselves of some excellent means whereby to compass this1 but every man after his own manner shall make use of his endeavours1 nothing will be done2 because that1 divided in their opinions1 they will be a hinderance to each other2 or if they agree well enough to some one action1 through hope of victory1 spoil1 or revenge1 yet afterward1 through diversity of wits and counsels1 or emulation and envy1 with which men naturally contend1 they will be so torn and rent1 as they will neither give mutual help nor desire peace1 except they be constrained to it by some common fear4 ,whence it follows that the consent of many1 7which consists in this only1 as we have already defined in the foregoing section1 that they direct all their actions to the same end and the common good71 that is to say1 that the society proceeding from mutual help only1 yields not that security which they seek for1 who meet and agree in the exercise of the above-named laws of nature2 but that somewhat else must be done1 that those who have once consented for the common good to peace and mutual help1 may by fear be restrained lest afterwards they again dissent1 when their private interest shall appear discrepant from the common good4 ,sidenote3 ,why the government of some brute creatures stands firm in concord alone1 and not so of men4 #e4 ,aristotle reckons among those animals which he calls politic1 not man only1 but divers others1 as the ant1 the bee1 c42 which1 though they be destitute of reason1 by which they may contract and submit to government1 notwithstanding by consenting1 that is to say1 ensuing or eschewing the same things1 they so direct their actions to a common end1 that their meetings are not obnoxious unto any seditions4 ,yet is not their gathering together a civil government1 and therefore those animals not to be termed political2 because their government is only a consent1 or many wills concurring in one object1 not 7as is necessary in civil government7 one will4 ,it is very true1 that in those creatures living only by sense and appetite1 their consent of minds is so durable1 as there is no need of anything more to secure it1 and by consequence to preserve peace among them1 than barely their natural inclination4 ,but among men the case is otherwise4 ,for1 first1 among them there is a contestation of honour and preferment2 among beasts there is none3 whence hatred and envy1 out of which arise sedition and war1 is among men2 among beasts no such matter4 ,next1 the natural appetite of bees1 and the like creatures1 is conformable2 and they desire the common good1 which among them differs not from their private4 ,but man scarce esteems anything good1 which hath not somewhat of eminence in the enjoyment1 more than that which others do possess4 ,thirdly1 those creatures which are void of reason1 see no defect1 or think they see none1 in the administration of their commonweals2 but in a multitude of men there are many who1 supposing themselves wiser than others1 endeavour to innovate1 and divers innovators innovate divers ways2 which is a mere distraction and civil war4 ,fourthly1 these brute creatures1 howsoever they may have the use of their voice to signify their affections to each other1 yet want they that same art of words which is necessarily required to those motions in the mind1 whereby good is represented to it as being better1 and evil as worse than in truth it is4 ,but the tongue of man is a trumpet of war and sedition3 and it is reported of ,pericles1 that he sometimes by his elegant speeches thundered and lightened1 and confounded whole ,greece itself4 ,fifthly1 they cannot distinguish between injury and harm2 thence it happens that as long as it is well with them1 they blame not their fellows4 ,but those men are of most trouble to the republic1 who have most leisure to be idle2 for they use not to contend for public places1 before they have gotten the victory over hunger and cold4 ,last of all1 the consent of those brutal creatures is natural2 that of men by compact only1 that is to say1 artificial4 ,it is therefore no matter of wonder1 if somewhat more be needful for men to the end they may live in peace4 ,wherefore consent or contracted society1 without some common power whereby particular men may be ruled through fear of punishment1 doth not suffice to make up that security1 which is requisite to the exercise of natural justice4 ,sidenote3 ,that not only consent1 but union also1 is required to establish the peace of men4 #f4 ,since therefore the conspiring of many wills to the same end doth not suffice to preserve peace1 and to make a lasting defence1 it is requisite that1 in those necessary matters which concern peace and self-defence1 there be but one will of all men4 ,but this cannot be done1 unless every man will so subject his will to some other one1 to wit1 either man or council1 that whatsoever his will is in those things which are necessary to the common peace1 it be received for the wills of all men in general1 and of every one in particular4 ,now the gathering together of many men1 who deliberate of what is to be done or not to be done for the common good of all men1 is that which ,i call a council4 ,sidenote3 ,what union is4 #g4 ,this submission of the wills of all those men to the will of one man or one council1 is then made1 when each one of them obligeth himself by contract to every one of the rest1 not to resist the will of that one man or council1 to which he hath submitted himself2 that is1 that he refuse him not the use of his wealth and strength against any others whatsoever2 for he is supposed still to retain a right of defending himself against violence3 and this is called union4 ,but we understand that to be the will of the council1 which is the will of the major part of those men of whom the council consists4 ,sidenote3 ,in union1 the right of all men is transferred to one4 #h4 ,but though the will itself be not voluntary1 but only the beginning of voluntary actions2 7for we will not to will1 but to act72 and therefore falls least of all under deliberation and compact2 yet he who submits his will to the will of another1 conveys to that other the right of his strength and faculties4 ,insomuch as when the rest have done the same1 he to whom they have submitted1 hath so much power1 as by the terror of it he can conform the wills of particular men unto unity and concord4 ,sidenote3 ,what civil society is4 #i4 ,now union thus made1 is called a city or civil society2 and also a civil person4 ,for when there is one will of all men1 it is to be esteemed for one person2 and by the word one1 it is to be known and distinguished from all particular men1 as having its own rights and properties4 ,insomuch as neither any one citizen1 nor all of them together1 7if we except him1 whose will stands for the will of all71 is to be accounted a city4 ,a city therefore1 7that we may define it71 is one person1 whose will1 by the compact of many men1 is to be received for the will of them all2 so as he may use all the power and faculties of each particular person to the maintenance of peace1 and for common defence4 ,sidenote3 ,what a civil person is4 #aj4 ,but although every city be a civil person1 yet every civil person is not a city2 for it may happen that many citizens1 by the permission of the city1 may join together in one person1 for the doing of certain things4 ,these now will be civil persons2 as the companies of merchants1 and many other convents4 ,but cities they are not1 because they have not submitted themselves to the will of the company simply and in all things1 but in certain things only determined by the city1 and on such terms as it is lawful for any one of them to contend in judgment against the body itself of the sodality2 which is by no means allowable to a citizen against the city4 ,such like societies1 therefore1 are civil persons subordinate to the city4 ,sidenote3 ,what it is to have the supreme power1 what to be subject4 #aa4 ,in every city1 that man or council1 to whose will each particular man hath subjected his will so as hath been declared1 is said to have the supreme power1 or chief command1 or dominion4 ,which power and right of commanding1 consists in this1 that each citizen hath conveyed all his strength and power to that man or council2 which to have done1 because no man can transfer his power in a natural manner1 is nothing else than to have parted with his right of resisting4 ,each citizen1 as also every subordinate civil person1 is called the subject of him who hath the chief command4 ,sidenote3 ,two kinds of cities1 natural1 and by institution4 #ab4 ,by what hath been said1 it is sufficiently showed in what manner and by what degrees many natural persons1 through desire of preserving themselves and by mutual fear1 have grown together into a civil person1 whom we have called a city4 ,but they who submit themselves to another for fear1 either submit to him whom they fear1 or some other whom they confide in for protection4 ,they act according to the first manner1 who are vanquished in war1 that they may not be slain2 they according to the second1 who are not yet overcome1 that they may not be overcome4 ,the first manner receives its beginning from natural power1 and may be called the natural beginning of a city2 the latter from the council and constitution of those who meet together1 which is a beginning by institution4 ,hence it is that there are two kinds of cities2 the one natural1 such as the paternal and despotical2 the other institutive1 which may be also called political4 ,in the first1 the lord acquires to himself such citizens as he will2 in the other1 the citizens by their own wills appoint a lord over themselves1 whether he be one man or one company of men1 endued with the command in chief4 ,but we will speak1 in the first place1 of a city political or by institution2 and next1 of a city natural4 ------- ,,chapter ,,vi4 ,,of ,,the ,,right ,,of ,,him1 ,,whether ,,council ,,or ,,one ,,man ,,only1 ,,who ,,hath ,,the ,,supreme ,,power ,,in ,,the ,,city4 #a4 ,there can no right be attributed to a multitude out of civil society1 nor any action to which they have not under seal consented4 #b4 ,the right of the greater number consenting1 is the beginning of a city4 #c4 ,that every man retains a right to protect himself according to his own free will1 so long as there is no sufficient regard had to his security4 #d4 ,that a coercive power is necessary to secure us4 #e4 ,what the sword of justice is4 #f4 ,that the sword of justice belongs to him1 who hath the chief command4 #g4 ,that the sword of war belongs to him also4 #h4 ,all judicature belongs to him too4 #i4 ,the legislative power is his only4 #aj4 ,the naming of magistrates and other officers of the city belongs to him4 #aa ,also the examination of all doctrines4 #ab4 ,whatsoever he doth is unpunishable4 #ac4 ,that the command his citizens have granted is absolute1 and what proportion of obedience is due to him4 #ad4 ,that the laws of the city bind him not4 #ae4 ,that no man can challenge a propriety to anything against his will4 #af4 ,by the laws of the city only we come to know what theft1 murder1 adultery1 and injury is4 #ag4 ,the opinion of those who would constitute a city1 where there should not be any one endued with an absolute power4 #ah4 ,the marks of supreme authority4 #ai4 ,if a city be compared with a man1 he that hath the supreme power is in order to the city1 as the human soul is in relation to the man4 #bj4 ,that the supreme command cannot by right be dissolved through their consents1 by whose compacts it was first constituted4 ,sidenote3 ,there can no right be attributed to a multitude1 considered out of civil society2 nor any action1 to which they have not given their particular consents4 #a4 ,we must consider1 first of all1 what a multitude#h of men1 gathering themselves of their own free wills into society1 is2 namely1 that it is not any one body1 but many men1 whereof each one hath his own will and his peculiar judgment concerning all things that may be proposed4 ,and though by particular contracts each single man may have his own right and propriety1 so as one may say this is mine1 the other1 that is his2 yet will there not be anything of which the whole multitude1 as a person distinct from a single man1 can rightly say1 this is mine1 more than another's4 ,neither must we ascribe any action to the multitude1 as its own2 but if all or more of them do agree1 it will not be an action1 but as many actions as men4 ,for although in some great sedition1 it is commonly said1 that the people of that city have taken up arms2 yet is it true of those only who are in arms1 or who consent to them4 ,for the city1 which is one person1 cannot take up arms against itself4 ,whatsoever1 therefore1 is done by the multitude1 must be understood to be done by every one of those by whom it is made up2 and that he1 who being in the multitude1 and yet consented not1 nor gave any helps to the things that were done by it1 must be judged to have done nothing4 ,besides1 in a multitude not yet reduced into one person1 in that manner as hath been said1 there remains that same state of nature in which all things belong to all men2 and there is no place for meum and tuum1 which is called dominion and propriety1 by reason that that security is not yet extant1 which we have declared above to be necessarily requisite for the practice of the natural laws4 ,footnote #h3 ,multitude1 c4 ,the doctrine of the power of a city over its citizens1 almost wholly depends on the understanding of the difference which is between a multitude of men ruling1 and a multitude ruled4 ,for such is the nature of a city1 that a multitude or company of citizens not only may have command1 but may also be subject to command2 but in diverse senses4 ,which difference ,i did believe was clearly enough explained in the first article2 but by the objections of many against those things which follow1 ,i discern otherwise4 ,wherefore it seemed good to me1 to the end ,i might make a fuller explication1 to add these few things4 ,by multitude1 because it is a collective word1 we understand more than one3 so as a multitude of men is the same with many men4 ,the same word1 because it is of the singular number1 signifies one thing2 namely1 one multitude4 ,but in neither sense can a multitude be understood to have one will given to it by nature1 but to each a several2 and therefore neither is any one action whatsoever to be attributed to it4 ,wherefore a multitude cannot promise1 contract1 acquire right1 convey right1 act1 have1 possess1 and the like1 unless it be every one apart1 and man by man2 so as there must be as many promises1 compacts1 rights1 and actions1 as men4 ,wherefore a multitude is no natural person4 ,but if the same multitude do contract one with another1 that the will of one man1 or the agreeing wills of the major part of them1 shall be received for the will of all2 then it becomes one person4 ,for it is endued with a will1 and therefore can do voluntary actions1 such as are commanding1 making laws1 acquiring and transferring of right1 and so forth2 and it is oftener called the people1 than the multitude4 ,we must therefore distinguish thus4 ,when we say the people or multitude wills1 commands1 or doth anything1 it is understood that the city which commands1 wills and acts by the will of one1 or the concurring wills of more2 which cannot be done but in an assembly4 ,but as oft as anything is said to be done by a multitude of men1 whether great or small1 without the will of that man or assembly of men1 that is understood to be done by a subjected people2 that is1 by many single citizens together2 and not proceeding from one will1 but from diverse wills of diverse men1 who are citizens and subjects1 but not a city4 ,sidenote3 ,the beginning of a city is the right of the major part agreeing4 #b4 ,next1 we must consider that every one of the multitude1 by whose means there may be a beginning to make up the city1 must agree with the rest1 that in those matters which shall be propounded by any one in the assembly1 that be received for the will of all1 which the major part shall approve of2 for otherwise there will be no will at all of a multitude of men1 whose wills and votes differ so variously4 ,now1 if any one will not consent1 the rest1 notwithstanding1 shall among themselves constitute the city without him4 ,whence it will come to pass1 that the city retains its primitive right against the dissenter2 that is1 the right of war1 as against an enemy4 ,sidenote3 ,that every man retains a right of protecting himself according to his own judgment1 as long as he is not secured4 #c4 ,but because we said in the foregoing chapter1 the sixth article1 that there was required to the security of men1 not only their consent1 but also the subjection of their wills in such things as were necessary to peace and defence2 and that in that union and subjection the nature of a city consisted2 we must discern now in this place1 out of those things which may be propounded1 discussed1 and stated in an assembly of men1 all whose wills are contained in the will of the major part1 what things are necessary to peace and common defence4 ,but first of all1 it is necessary to peace1 that a man be so far forth protected against the violence of others1 that he may live securely2 that is1 that he may have no just cause to fear others1 so long as he doth them no injury4 ,indeed1 to make men altogether safe from mutual harms1 so as they cannot be hurt or injuriously killed1 is impossible2 and1 therefore1 comes not within deliberation4 ,but care may be had1 there be no just cause of fear2 for security is the end wherefore men submit themselves to others2 which if it be not had1 no man is supposed to have submitted himself to aught1 or to have quitted his right to all things1 before that there was a care had of his security4 ,sidenote3 ,that a coercive power is necessary for security4 #d4 ,it is not enough to obtain this security1 that every one of those who are now growing up into a city1 do covenant with the rest1 either by words or writing1 not to steal1 not to kill1 and to observe the like laws2 for the pravity of human disposition is manifest to all1 and by experience too well known how little 7removing the punishment7 men are kept to their duties through conscience of their promises4 ,we must therefore provide for our security1 not by compacts1 but by punishments2 and there is then sufficient provision made1 when there are so great punishments appointed for every injury1 as apparently it prove a greater evil to have done it1 than not to have done it4 ,for all men1 by a necessity of nature1 choose that which to them appears to be the less evil4 ,sidenote3 ,what the sword of justice is4 #e4 ,now1 the right of punishing is then understood to be given to any one1 when every man contracts not to assist him who is to be punished4 ,but ,i will call this right1 the sword of justice4 ,but these kind of contracts men observe well enough1 for the most part1 till either themselves or their near friends are to suffer4 ,sidenote3 ,that the sword of justice belongs to him who hath the chief command4 #f4 ,because1 therefore1 for the security of particular men1 and1 by consequence1 for the common peace1 it is necessary that the right of using the sword for punishment be transferred to some man or council2 that man or council is necessarily understood by right to have the supreme power in the city4 ,for he that by right punisheth at his own discretion1 by right compels all men to all things which he himself wills2 than which a greater command cannot be imagined4 ,sidenote3 ,that the sword of war belongs to him also4 #g4 ,but in vain do they worship peace at home1 who cannot defend themselves against foreigners2 neither is it possible for them to protect themselves against foreigners1 whose forces are not united4 ,and therefore it is necessary for the preservation of particulars1 that there be some one council or one man1 who hath the right to arm1 to gather together1 to unite so many citizens1 in all dangers and on all occasions1 as shall be needful for common defence against the certain number and strength of the enemy2 and again1 as often as he shall find it expedient1 to make peace with them4 ,we must understand1 therefore1 that particular citizens have conveyed their whole right of war and peace unto some one man or council2 and that this right1 which we may call the sword of war1 belongs to the same man or council1 to whom the sword of justice belongs4 ,for no man can by right compel citizens to take up arms and be at the expenses of war1 but he who by right can punish him who doth not obey4 ,both swords therefore1 as well this of war as that of justice1 even by the constitution itself of a city and essentially do belong to the chief command4 ,sidenote3 ,the power of judicature belongs to him4 #h4 ,but because the right of the sword1 is nothing else but to have power by right to use the sword at his own will1 it follows1 that the judgment of its right use pertains to the same party2 for if the power of judging were in one1 and the power of executing in another1 nothing would be done4 ,for in vain would he give judgment1 who could not execute his commands2 or1 if he executed them by the power of another1 he himself is not said to have the power of the sword1 but that other1 to whom he is only an officer4 ,all judgment therefore1 in a city1 belongs to him who hath the swords2 that is1 to him who hath the supreme authority4 ,sidenote3 ,the legislative power is his also4 #i4 ,furthermore1 since it no less1 nay1 it much more conduceth to peace1 to prevent brawls from arising than to appease them being risen2 and that all controversies are bred from hence1 that the opinions of men differ concerning meum and tuum1 just and unjust1 profitable and unprofitable1 good and evil1 honest and dishonest1 and the like2 which every man esteems according to his own judgment3 it belongs to the same chief power to make some common rules for all men1 and to declare them publicly1 by which every man may know what may be called his1 what another's1 what just1 what unjust1 what honest1 what dishonest1 what good1 what evil2 that is summarily1 what is to be done1 what to be avoided in our common course of life4 ,but those rules and measures are usually called the civil laws1 or the laws of the city1 as being the commands of him who hath the supreme power in the city4 ,and the civil laws 7that we may define them7 are nothing else but the commands of him who hath the chief authority in the city1 for direction of the future actions of his citizens4 ,sidenote3 ,that the naming of magistrates and officers belongs to him also4 #aj4 ,furthermore1 since the affairs of the city1 both those of war and peace1 cannot possibly be all administered by one man or one council without officers and subordinate magistrates2 and that it appertaineth to peace and common defence1 that they to whom it belongs justly to judge of controversies1 to search into neighbouring councils1 prudently to wage war1 and on all hands warily to attend the benefit of the city1 should also rightly exercise their offices2 it is consonant to reason that they depend on1 and be chosen by him who hath the chief command both in war and in peace4 ,sidenote3 ,the examination of doctrine belongs to him likewise4 #aa4 ,it is also manifest1 that all voluntary actions have their beginning from1 and necessarily depend on the will2 and that the will of doing or omitting aught1 depends on the opinion of the good and evil1 of the reward or punishment which a man conceives he shall receive by the act or omission3 so as the actions of all men are ruled by the opinions of each4 ,wherefore1 by evident and necessary inference1 we may understand that it very much concerns the interest of peace1 that no opinions or doctrines be delivered to citizens1 by which they may imagine that either by right they may not obey the laws of the city1 that is1 the commands of that man or council to whom the supreme power is committed1 or that it is lawful to resist him1 or that a less punishment remains for him that denies1 than for him that yields obedience4 ,for if one command somewhat to be done under penalty of natural death1 another forbid it under pain of eternal death1 and both by their own right1 it will follow that the citizens1 although innocent1 are not only by right punishable1 but that the city itself is altogether dissolved4 ,for no man can serve two masters2 nor is he less1 but rather more a master1 whom we believe we are to obey for fear of damnation1 than he whom we obey for fear of temporal death4 ,it follows therefore that this one1 whether man or court1 to whom the city hath committed the supreme power1 have also this right2 that he both judge what opinions#i and doctrines are enemies unto peace1 and also that he forbid them to be taught4 ,footnote #i3 ,judge what opinions1 c4 ,there is scarce any principle1 neither in the worship of ,god nor in human sciences1 from whence there may not spring dissensions1 discords1 reproaches1 and by degrees war itself4 ,neither doth this happen by reason of the falsehood of the principle1 but of the disposition of men1 who1 seeming wise to themselves1 will needs appear such to all others4 ,but though such dissensions cannot be hindered from arising1 yet may they be restrained by the exercise of the supreme power1 that they prove no hindrance to the public peace4 ,of these kinds of opinions1 therefore1 ,i have not spoken in this place4 ,there are certain doctrines wherewith subjects being tainted1 they verily believe that obedience may be refused to the city1 and that by right they may1 nay ought1 to oppose and fight against chief princes and dignities4 ,such are those which1 whether directly and openly1 or more obscurely and by consequence1 require obedience to be given to others beside them to whom the supreme authority is committed4 ,i deny not but this reflects on that power which many1 living under other government1 ascribe to the chief head of the ,church of ,rome1 and also on that which elsewhere1 out of that ,church1 bishops require in their's to be given to them2 and last of all1 on that liberty which the lower sort of citizens1 under pretence of religion1 do challenge to themselves4 ,for what civil war was there ever in the ,christian world1 which did not either grow from1 or was nourished by this root8 ,the judgment therefore of doctrines1 whether they be repugnant to civil obedience or not1 and if they be repugnant1 the power of prohibiting them to be taught1 ,i do here attribute to the civil authority4 ,for since there is no man who grants not to the city the judgment of those things which belong to its peace and defence1 and it is manifest that the opinions which ,i have already recited do relate to its peace2 it follows necessarily1 that the examination of those opinions1 whether they be such or not1 must be referred to the city2 that is1 to him who hath the supreme authority4 ,sidenote3 ,whatsoever he doth is unpunishable4 #ab4 ,last of all1 from this consideration1 that each citizen hath submitted his will to his who hath the supreme command in the city1 so as he may not employ his strength against him2 it follows manifestly1 that whatsoever shall be done by him who commands1 must not be punished4 ,for as he who hath not power enough1 cannot punish him naturally1 so neither can he punish him by right1 who by right hath not sufficient power4 ,sidenote3 ,that he hath an absolute dominion granted him by his citizens1 and what proportion of obedience is due unto him4 #ac4 ,it is most manifest by what hath been said1 that in every perfect city1 that is1 where no citizen hath right to use his faculties at his own discretion for the preservation of himself1 or where the right of the private sword is excluded2 there is a supreme power in some one1 greater than which cannot by right be conferred by men1 or greater than which no mortal man can have over himself4 ,but that power1 greater than which cannot by men be conveyed on a man1 we call absolute4#aj ,for whosoever hath so submitted his will to the will of the city1 that he can1 unpunished1 do any thing1 make laws1 judge controversies1 set penalties1 make use at his own pleasure of the strength and wealth of men1 and all this by right2 truly he hath given him the greatest dominion that can be granted4 ,this same may be confirmed by experience1 in all the cities which are or ever have been4 ,for though it be sometimes in doubt what man or council hath the chief command1 yet ever there is such a command and always exercised1 except in the time of sedition and civil war2 and then there are two chief commands made out of one4 ,now1 those seditious persons who dispute against absolute authority1 do not so much care to destroy it1 as to convey it on others3 for removing this power1 they together take away civil society1 and a confusion of all things returns4 ,there is so much obedience joined to this absolute right of the chief ruler1 as is necessarily required for the government of the city1 that is to say1 so much as that right of his may not be granted in vain4 ,now this kind of obedience1 although for some reasons it may sometimes by right be denied1 yet because a greater cannot be performed1 we will call it simple4 ,but the obligation to perform this grows not immediately from that contract1 by which we have conveyed all our right on the city2 but immediately from hence1 that without obedience the city's right would be frustrate1 and by consequence there would be no city constituted4 ,for it is one thing if ,i say1 ,i give you right to command what you will2 another1 if ,i say1 ,i will do whatsoever you command4 ,and the command may be such1 as ,i would rather die than do it4 ,forasmuch1 therefore1 as no man can be bound to will being killed1 much less is he tied to that which to him is worse than death4 ,if therefore ,i be commanded to kill myself1 ,i am not bound to do it4 ,for though ,i deny to do it1 yet the right of dominion is not frustrated2 since others may be found1 who being commanded will not refuse to do it2 neither do ,i refuse to do that1 which ,i have contracted to do4 ,in like manner1 if the chief ruler command any man to kill him1 he is not tied to do it2 because it cannot be conceived that he made any such covenant4 ,nor if he command to execute a parent1 whether he be innocent or guilty and condemned by the law2 since there are others who being commanded will do that1 and a son will rather die than live infamous and hated of all the world4 ,there are many other cases in which1 since the commands are shameful to be done by some and not by others1 obedience may by right be performed by these1 and refused by those2 and this without breach of that absolute right which was given to the chief ruler4 ,for in no case is the right taken away from him1 of slaying those who shall refuse to obey him4 ,but they who thus kill men1 although by right given them from him that hath it1 yet if they use that right otherwise than right reason requires1 they sin against the laws of nature1 that is1 against ,god4 ,footnote #aj3 ,absolute4 ,a popular state openly challengeth absolute dominion1 and the citizens oppose it not4 ,for1 in the gathering together of many men1 they acknowledge the face of a city2 and even the unskilful understand1 that matters there are ruled by council4 ,yet monarchy is no less a city than democraty2 and absolute kings have their counsellors1 from whom they will take advice1 and suffer their power1 in matters of greater consequence1 to be guided but not recalled4 ,but it appears not to most men1 how a city is contained in the person of a king4 ,and therefore they object against absolute command3 first1 that if any man had such a right1 the condition of the citizens would be miserable4 ,for thus they think2 he will take all1 spoil all1 kill all2 and every man counts it his only happiness1 that he is not already spoiled and killed4 ,but why should he do thus8 ,not because he can2 for unless he have a mind to it1 he will not do it4 ,will he1 to please one or some few1 spoil all the rest8 ,first1 though by right1 that is1 without injury to them1 he may do it1 yet can he not do it justly1 that is1 without breach of the natural laws and injury against ,god4 ,and therefore there is some security for subjects in the oaths which princes take4 ,next1 if he could justly do it1 or that he made no account of his oath1 yet appears there no reason why he should desire it1 since he finds no good in it4 ,but it cannot be denied1 but a prince may sometimes have an inclination to do wickedly4 ,but grant then1 that thou hadst given him a power which were not absolute1 but so much only as sufficed to defend thee from the injuries of others2 which1 if thou wilt be safe1 is necessary for thee to give2 are not all the same things to be feared8 ,for he that hath strength enough to protect all1 wants not sufficiency to oppress all4 ,here is no other difficulty then1 but that human affairs cannot be without some inconvenience4 ,and this inconvenience itself is in the citizens1 not in the government4 ,for if men could rule themselves1 every man by his own command1 that is to say1 could they live according to the laws of nature1 there would be no need at all of a city1 nor of a common coercive power4 ,secondly1 they object1 that there is no dominion in the ,christian world absolute4 ,which1 indeed1 is not true2 for all monarchies1 and all other states1 are so4 ,for although they who have the chief command1 do not all those things they would1 and what they know profitable to the city2 the reason of that is1 not the defect of right in them1 but the consideration of their citizens1 who busied about their private interest1 and careless of what tends to the public1 cannot sometimes be drawn to perform their duties without the hazard of the city4 ,wherefore princes sometimes forbear the exercise of their right2 and prudently remit somewhat of the act1 but nothing of their right4 ,sidenote3 ,that he is not tied to observe the laws of the city4 #ad4 ,neither can any man give somewhat to himself2 for he is already supposed to have what he can give himself4 ,nor can he be obliged to himself2 for the same party being both the obliged and the obliger1 and the obliger having power to release the obliged1 it were merely in vain for a man to be obliged to himself2 because he can release himself at his own pleasure1 and he that can do this is already actually free4 ,whence it is plain1 that the city is not tied to the civil laws2 for the civil laws are the laws of the city1 by which1 if she were engaged1 she should be engaged to herself4 ,neither can the city be obliged to her citizen2 because1 if he will1 he can free her from her obligation2 and he will1 as oft as she wills2 for the will of every citizen is in all things comprehended in the will of the city2 the city therefore is free when she pleaseth1 that is1 she is now actually free4 ,but the will of a council1 or one who hath supreme authority given him1 is the will of the city3 he therefore contains the wills of all particular citizens4 ,therefore neither is he bound to the civil laws2 for this is to be bound to himself2 nor to any of his citizens4 ,sidenote3 ,that no man can challenge a propriety in aught against him who hath the supreme power4 #ae4 ,now because1 as hath been shown above1 before the constitution of a city all things belonged to all men2 nor is there that thing which any man can so call his1 as any other may not1 by the same right1 claim as his own2 for where all things are common1 there can be nothing proper to any man2 it follows1 that propriety received its beginning#aa when cities received their's1 and that that only is proper to each man1 which he can keep by the laws and the power of the whole city1 that is1 of him on whom its chief command is conferred4 ,whence we understand1 that each particular citizen hath a propriety to which none of his fellow-citizens hath right1 because they are tied to the same laws2 but he hath no propriety in which the chief ruler 7whose commands are the laws1 whose will contains the will of each man1 and who by every single person is constituted the supreme judge7 hath not a right4 ,but although there be many things which the city permits to its citizens1 and therefore they may sometimes go to law against their chief2 yet is not that action belonging to civil right1 but to natural equity4 ,neither is it concerning what#ab by right he may do who hath the supreme power1 but what he hath been willing should be done2 and therefore he shall be judge himself1 as though 7the equity of the cause being well understood7 he could not give wrong judgment4 ,footnote #aa3 ,propriety received its beginning1 c4 ,what is objected by some1 that the propriety of goods1 even before the constitution of cities1 was found in fathers of families1 that objection is vain2 because ,i have already declared1 that a family is a little city4 ,for the sons of a family have a propriety of their goods granted them by their father1 distinguished indeed from the rest of the sons of the same family1 but not from the propriety of the father himself4 ,but the fathers of divers families1 who are subject neither to any common father nor lord1 have a common right in all things4 ,footnote #ab3 ,what by right he may do1 c4 ,as often as a citizen is granted to have an action of law against the supreme1 that is1 against the city1 the question is not in that action1 whether the city may by right keep possession of the thing in controversy1 but whether by the laws formerly made she would keep it2 for the law is the declared will of the supreme4 ,since then the city may raise money from the citizens under two titles1 either as tribute1 or as debt2 in the former case there is no action of law allowed1 for there can be no question whether the city have right to require tribute2 in the latter it is allowed1 because the city will take nothing from its citizens by fraud or cunning1 and yet if need require1 all they have1 openly4 ,and therefore he that condemns this place1 saying1 that by this doctrine it is easy for princes to free themselves from their debts1 he does it impertinently4 ,sidenote3 ,it is known by the civil laws what theft1 murder1 adultery1 and injury are4 #af4 ,theft1 murder1 adultery1 and all injuries1 are forbid by the laws of nature2 but what is to be called theft1 what murder1 what adultery1 what injury in a citizen1 this is not to be determined by the natural1 but by the civil law4 ,for not every taking away of the thing which another possesseth1 but only another man's goods1 is theft2 but what is our's1 and what another's1 is a question belonging to the civil law4 ,in like manner1 not every killing of a man is murder1 but only that which the civil law forbids2 neither is all encounter with women adultery1 but only that which the civil law prohibits4 ,lastly1 all breach of promise is an injury1 where the promise itself is lawful2 but where there is no right to make any compact1 there can be no conveyance of it1 and therefore there can no injury follow1 as hath been said in the second chapter1 ,article #ag4 ,now what we may contract for1 and what not1 depends wholly upon the civil laws4 ,the city of ,lacedmon therefore rightly ordered1 that those young men who could so take away certain goods from others as not to be caught1 should go unpunished2 for it was nothing else but to make a law1 that what was so acquired should be their own1 and not another's4 ,rightly also is that man everywhere slain1 whom we kill in war or by the necessity of self-defence4 ,so also that copulation which in one city is matrimony1 in another will be judged adultery4 ,also those contracts which make up marriage in one citizen1 do not so in another1 although of the same city2 because that he who is forbidden by the city1 that is1 by that one man or council whose the supreme power is1 to contract aught1 hath no right to make any contract1 and therefore having made any1 it is not valid1 and by consequence no marriage4 ,but his contract which received no prohibition1 was therefore of force1 and so was matrimony4 ,neither adds it any force to any unlawful contracts1 that they were made by an oath or sacrament2#ac for those add nothing to the strengthening of the contract1 as hath been said above1 ,chap4 ,,ii4 ,art4 #bb4 ,what therefore theft1 what murder1 what adultery1 and in general what injury is1 must be known by the civil laws2 that is1 the commands of him who hath the supreme authority4 ,footnote #ac3 ,that they were made by an oath or sacrament1 c4 ,whether matrimony be a sacrament1 7in which sense that word is used by some divines71 or not1 it is not my purpose to dispute4 ,only ,i say1 that the legitimate contract of a man and woman to live together1 that is1 granted by the civil law1 whether it be a sacrament or not1 is surely a legitimate marriage2 but that copulation which the city hath prohibited is no marriage1 since it is of the essence of marriage to be a legitimate contract4 ,there were legitimate marriages in many places1 as among the ,jews1 the ,grecians1 the ,romans1 which yet might be dissolved4 ,but with those who permit no such contracts but by a law that they shall never be broke1 wedlock cannot be dissolved2 and the reason is1 because the city hath commanded it to be indissoluble1 not because matrimony is a sacrament4 ,wherefore the ceremonies which at weddings are to be performed in the temple1 to bless1 or1 if ,i may say so1 to consecrate the husband and wife1 will perhaps belong only to the office of clergymen2 all the rest namely1 who1 when1 and by what contracts marriages may be made1 pertains to the laws of the city4 ,sidenote3 ,the opinion of those who would constitute a city1 where there should not be any one endued with absolute power4 #ag4 ,this same supreme command and absolute power1 seems so harsh to the greatest part of men1 as they hate the very naming of them2 which happens chiefly through want of knowledge1 what human nature and the civil laws are2 and partly also through their default1 who1 when they are invested with so great authority1 abuse their power to their own lust4 ,that they may therefore avoid this kind of supreme authority1 some of them will have a city well enough constituted1 if they who shall be the citizens' convening1 do agree concerning certain articles propounded1 and in that convent agitated and approved1 and do command them to be observed1 and punishments prescribed to be inflicted on them who shall break them4 ,to which purpose1 and also to the repelling of a foreign enemy1 they appoint a certain and limited return1 with this condition1 that if that suffice not1 they may call a new convention of estates4 ,who sees not in a city thus constituted1 that the assembly who prescribed those things had an absolute power8 ,if therefore the assembly continue1 or from time to time have a certain day and place of meeting1 that power will be perpetual4 ,but if they wholly dissolve1 either the city dissolves with them1 and so all is returned to the state of war3 or else there is somewhere a power left to punish those who shall transgress the laws1 whosoever or how many soever they be that have it2 which cannot possibly be without an absolute power4 ,for he that by right hath this might given1 by punishments to restrain what citizens he pleaseth1 hath such a power as a greater cannot possibly be given by any citizens4 ,sidenote3 ,the notes of supreme authority4 #ah4 ,it is therefore manifest1 that in every city there is some one man1 or council1 or court1 who by right hath as great a power over each single citizen1 as each man hath over himself considered out of that civil state2 that is1 supreme and absolute1 to be limited only by the strength and forces of the city itself1 and by nothing else in the world4 ,for if his power were limited1 that limitation must necessarily proceed from some greater power4 ,for he that prescribes limits1 must have a greater power than he who is confined by them4 ,now that confining power is either without limit1 or is again restrained by some other greater than itself2 and so we shall at length arrive to a power1 which hath no other limit but that which is the terminus ultimus of the forces of all the citizens together4 ,that same is called the supreme command2 and if it be committed to a council1 a supreme council1 but if to one man1 the supreme lord of the city4 ,now the notes of supreme command are these3 to make and abrogate laws1 to determine war and peace1 to know and judge of all controversies1 either by himself1 or by judges appointed by him2 to elect all magistrates1 ministers1 and counsellors4 ,lastly1 if there be any man who by right can do some one action1 which is not lawful for any citizen or citizens to do beside himself1 that man hath obtained the supreme power4 ,for those things which by right may not be done by any one or many citizens1 the city itself can only do4 ,he therefore that doth those things1 useth the city's right2 which is the supreme power4 ,sidenote3 ,if the city be compared with a man1 he who hath the supreme command is in order to the city1 as the human soul is to the man4 #ai4 ,they who compare a city and its citizens with a man and his members1 almost all say1 that he who hath the supreme power in the city is in relation to the whole city1 such as the head is to the whole man4 ,but it appears by what hath been already said1 that he who is endued with such a power1 whether it be a man or a court1 hath a relation to the city1 not as that of the head1 but of the soul to the body4 ,for it is the soul by which a man hath a will1 that is1 can either will or nill2 so by him who hath the supreme power1 and no otherwise1 the city hath a will1 and can either will or nill4 ,a court of counsellors is rather to be compared with the head1 or one counsellor1 whose only counsel 7if of any one alone7 the chief ruler makes use of in matters of greatest moment3 for the office of the head is to counsel1 as the soul's is to command4 ,sidenote3 ,that the supreme power cannot by right be dissolved by their consents1 by whose compacts it was constituted2 #bj4 ,forasmuch as the supreme command is constituted by virtue of the compacts which each single citizen or subject mutually makes with the other2 but all contracts1 as they receive their force from the contractors1 so by their consent they lose it again and are broken3 perhaps some may infer hence1 that by the consent of all the subjects together the supreme authority may be wholly taken away4 ,which inference1 if it were true1 ,i cannot discern what danger would thence by right arise to the supreme commanders4 ,for since it is supposed that each one hath obliged himself to each other2 if any one of them shall refuse1 whatsoever the rest shall agree to do1 he is bound notwithstanding4 ,neither can any man without injury to me1 do that which by contract made with me he hath obliged himself not to do4 ,but it is not to be imagined that ever it will happen1 that all the subjects together1 not so much as one excepted1 will combine against the supreme power4 ,wherefore there is no fear for rulers in chief1 that by any right they can be despoiled of their authority4 ,if1 notwithstanding1 it were granted that their right depended only on that contract which each man makes with his fellow-citizen1 it might very easily happen that they might be robbed of that dominion under pretence of right4 ,for subjects being called either by the command of the city1 or seditiously flocking together1 most men think that the consents of all are contained in the votes of the greater part2 which in truth is false4 ,for it is not from nature that the consent of the major part should be received for the consent of all1 neither is it true in tumults2 but it proceeds from civil institution3 and is then only true1 when that man or court which hath the supreme power1 assembling his subjects1 by reason of the greatness of their number allows those that are elected a power of speaking for those who elected them2 and will have the major part of voices1 in such matters as are by him propounded to be discussed1 to be as effectual as the whole4 ,but we cannot imagine that he who is chief1 ever convened his subjects with intention that they should dispute his right2 unless weary of the burthen of his charge1 he declared in plain terms that he renounces and abandons his government4 ,now1 because most men through ignorance esteem not the consent of the major part of citizens only1 but even of a very few1 provided they be of their opinion1 for the consent of the whole city2 it may very well seem to them1 that the supreme authority may by right be abrogated1 so it be done in some great assembly of citizens by the votes of the greater number4 ,but though a government be constituted by the contracts of particular men with particulars1 yet its right depends not on that obligation only2 there is another tie also towards him who commands4 ,for each citizen compacting with his fellow1 says thus3 ,i convey my right on this party1 upon condition that you pass yours to the same3 by which means1 that right which every man had before to use his faculties to his own advantage1 is now wholly translated on some certain man or council for the common benefit4 ,wherefore what by the mutual contracts each one hath made with the other1 what by the donation of right which every man is bound to ratify to him that commands1 the government is upheld by a double obligation from the citizens2 first1 that which is due to their fellow-citizens2 next1 that which they owe to their prince4 ,wherefore no subjects1 how many soever they be1 can with any right despoil him who bears the chief rule of his authority1 even without his own consent4 ------- ,,chapter ,,vii ,,of ,,the ,,three ,,kinds ,,of ,,government1 ,,democracy1 ,,aristocracy1 ,,monarchy4 #a4 ,that there are three kinds of government only1 democracy1 aristocracy1 monarchy4 #b4 ,that oligarchy is not a diverse form of government distinct from aristocracy1 nor anarchy any form at all4 #c4 ,that a tyranny is not a diverse state from a legitimate monarchy4 #d4 ,that there cannot be a mixed state1 fashioned out of these several species4 #e4 ,that democracy1 except there be certain times and places of meeting prefixed1 is dissolved4 #f4 ,in a democracy the intervals of the times of meeting must be short1 or the administration of government during the interval committed to some one4 #g4 ,in a democracy1 particulars contract with particulars to obey the people3 the people is obliged to no man4 #h4 ,by what acts aristocracy is constituted4 #i4 ,in an aristocracy the nobles make no compact1 neither are they obliged to any citizen or to the whole people4 #aj4 ,the nobles must necessarily have their set meetings4 #aa4 ,by what acts monarchy is constituted4 #ab4 ,monarchy is by compact obliged to none for the authority it hath received4 #ac4 ,monarchy is ever in the readiest capacity to exercise all those acts which are requisite to good government #ad4 ,what kind of sin that is1 and what sort of men are guilty of it1 when the city performs not its office towards the citizens1 nor the citizens towards the city4 #ae4 ,a monarch made without limitation of time hath power to elect his successor4 #af4 ,of limited monarchs4 #ag4 ,a monarch1 retaining his right of government1 cannot by any promise whatsoever be conceived to have parted with his right to the means necessary to the exercise of his authority4 #ah4 ,how a citizen is freed from subjection4 ,sidenote3 ,there are three kinds of government only2 democracy1 aristocracy1 and monarchy4 #a4 ,we have already spoken of a city by institution in its genus2 we will now say somewhat of its species4 ,as for the difference of cities1 it is taken from the difference of the persons to whom the supreme power is committed4 ,this power is committed either to one man1 or council1 or some one court consisting of many men4 ,furthermore1 a council of many men consists either of all the citizens1 insomuch as every man of them hath a right to vote1 and an interest in the ordering of the greatest affairs1 if he will himself2 or of a part only4 ,from whence there arise three sorts of government2 the one1 when the power is in a council where every citizen hath a right to vote2 and it is called a democracy4 ,the other1 when it is in a council1 where not all1 but some part only have their suffrages2 and we call it an aristocracy4 ,the third is that1 when the supreme authority rests only in one2 and it is styled a monarchy4 ,in the first1 he that governs is called 1 the people2 in the second1 the nobles2 in the third1 the monarch4 ,sidenote3 ,oligarchy is no state of a city distinct from aristocracy2 neither is anarchy any state at all4 #b4 ,now1 although ancient writers of politics have introduced three other kinds of government opposite to these2 to wit1 anarchy or confusion to democracy2 oligarchy1 that is1 the command of some few1 to aristocracy1 and tyranny to monarchy2 yet are not these three distinct forms of government1 but three diverse titles given by those who were either displeased with that present government or those that bare rule4 ,for men1 by giving names1 do usually not only signify the things themselves1 but also their own affections1 as love1 hatred1 anger1 and the like4 ,whence it happens that what one man calls a democracy1 another calls an anarchy2 what one counts an aristocracy1 another esteems an oligarchy2 and whom one titles a king1 another styles him a tyrant4 ,so as we see1 these names betoken not a diverse kind of government1 but the diverse opinions of the subjects concerning him who hath the supreme power4 ,for first1 who sees not that anarchy is equally opposite to all the aforenamed forms8 ,for that word signifies that there is no government at all1 that is1 not any city4 ,but how is it possible that no city should be the species of a city8 ,furthermore1 what difference is there between an oligarchy1 which signifies the command of a few or grandees1 or an aristocracy1 which is that of the prime or chief heads1 more than that men differ so among themselves1 that the same things seem not good to all men8 ,whence it happens that those persons1 who by some are looked on as the best1 are by others esteemed to be the worst of all men4 ,sidenote3 ,that a tyranny is not a diverse state from a legitimate monarchy4 #c4 ,but men1 by reason of their passions1 will very hardly be persuaded that a kingdom and tyranny are not diverse kinds of cities2 who though they would rather have the city subject to one than many1 yet do they not believe it to be well governed unless it accord with their judgments4 ,but we must discover by reason1 and not by passion1 what the difference is between a king and a tyrant4 ,but first1 they differ not in this1 that a tyrant hath the greater power2 for greater than the supreme cannot be granted2 nor in this1 that one hath a limited power1 the other not2 for he whose authority is limited1 is no king1 but his subject that limits him4 ,lastly1 neither differ they in their manner of acquisition2 for if in a democratical or aristocratical government some one citizen should1 by force1 possess himself of the supreme power1 if he gain the consent of all the citizens1 he becomes a legitimate monarch2 if not1 he is an enemy1 not a tyrant4 ,they differ therefore in the sole exercise of their command1 insomuch as he is said to be a king who governs well1 and he a tyrant that doth otherwise4 ,the case therefore is brought to this pass2 that a king1 legitimately constituted in his government1 if he seem to his subjects to rule well and to their liking1 they afford him the appellation of a king2 if not1 they count him a tyrant4 ,wherefore we see a kingdom and tyranny are not diverse forms of government1 but one and the self-same monarch hath the name of a king given him in point of honour and reverence to him1 and of a tyrant in way of contumely and reproach4 ,but what we frequently find in books said against tyrants1 took its original from ,greek and ,roman writers1 whose government was partly democratical1 and partly aristocratical1 and therefore not tyrants only1 but even kings were odious to them4 ,sidenote3 ,that there can no mixed state be formed out of these forenamed kinds of government4 #d4 ,there are1 who indeed do think it necessary that a supreme command should be somewhere extant in a city2 but if it should be in any one1 either man or council1 it would follow1 they say1 that all the citizens must be slaves4 ,avoiding this condition1 they imagine that there may be a certain form of government compounded of those three kinds we have spoken of1 yet different from each particular2 which they call a mixed monarchy1 or mixed aristocracy1 or mixed democracy1 according as any one of these three sorts shall be more eminent than the rest4 ,for example1 if the naming of magistrates and the arbitration of war and peace should belong to the ,king1 judicature to the ,lords1 and contribution of monies to the ,people1 and the power of making laws to all together1 this kind of state would they call a mixed monarchy forsooth4 ,but if it were possible that there could be such a state1 it would no whit advantage the liberty of the subject4 ,for as long as they all agree1 each single citizen is as much subject as possibly he can be3 but if they disagree1 the state returns to a civil war and the right of the private sword2 which certainly is much worse than any subjection whatsoever4 ,but that there can be no such kind of government1#ad hath been sufficiently demonstrated in the foregoing chapter1 art4 #f-ab4 ,footnote #ad3 ,but that there can be no such kind of government4 ,most men grant1 that a government ought not to be divided2 but they would have it moderated and bounded by some limits4 ,truly it is very reasonable it should be so2 but if these men1 when they speak of moderating and limiting1 do understand dividing it1 they make a very fond distinction4 ,truly1 for my part1 ,i wish that not only kings1 but all other persons endued with supreme authority1 would so temper themselves as to commit no wrong1 and only minding their charges1 contain themselves within the limits of the natural and divine laws4 ,but they who distinguish thus1 they would have the chief power bounded and restrained by others3 which1 because it cannot be done but they who do set the limits must needs have some part of the power1 whereby they may be enabled to do it1 the government is properly divided1 not moderated4 ,sidenote3 ,that democracy1 except it have certain times and places of meeting prescribed1 is dissolved4 #e4 ,let us see a little now1 in the constituting of each form of government what the constitutors do4 ,those who met together with intention to erect a city1 were almost in the very act of meeting1 a democracy4 ,for in that they willingly met1 they are supposed obliged to the observation of what shall be determined by the major part2 which1 while that convent lasts1 or is adjourned to some certain days and places1 is a clear democracy4 ,for that convent1 whose will is the will of all the citizens1 hath the supreme authority2 and because in this convent every man is supposed to have a right to give his voice1 it follows that it is a democracy1 by the definition given in the first article of this chapter4 ,but if they depart and break up the convent1 and appoint no time or place where and when they shall meet again1 the public weal returns to anarchy and the same state it stood in before their meeting1 that is1 to the state of all men warring against all4 ,the people1 therefore1 retains the supreme power1 no longer than there is a certain day and place publicly appointed and known1 to which whosoever will may resort4 ,for except that be known and determined1 they may either meet at divers times and places1 that is1 in factions1 or not at all2 and then it is no longer 1 the people1 but a dissolute multitude1 to whom we can neither attribute any action or right4 ,two things therefore frame a democracy2 whereof one1 to wit1 the perpetual prescription of convents1 makes 1 the people2 the other1 which is a plurality of voices1 1 or the power4 ,sidenote3 ,in democracy1 the intervals of the times of convening must be short1 or the administration of the government committed to some one4 #f4 ,furthermore1 it will not be sufficient for the people1 so as to maintain its supremacy1 to have some certain known times and places of meeting1 unless that either the intervals of the times be of less distance1 than that anything may in the meantime happen whereby1 by reason of the defect of power1 the city may be brought into some danger2 or at least that the exercise of the supreme authority be1 during the interval1 granted to some one man or council4 ,for unless this be done1 there is not that wary care and heed taken for the defence and peace of single men1 which ought to be2 and therefore it will not deserve the name of a city1 because that in it1 for want of security1 every man's right of defending himself at his own pleasure returns to him again4 ,sidenote3 ,in a democracy1 particulars contract with particulars to obey the people3 the people is obliged to no man4 #g4 ,democracy is not framed by contract of particular persons with the people1 but by mutual compacts of single men each with other4 ,but hence it appears1 in the first place1 that the persons contracting must be in being before the contract itself4 ,but the people is not in being before the constitution of government1 as not being any person1 but a multitude of single persons2 wherefore there could then no contract pass between the people and the subject4 ,now1 if after that government is framed1 the subject make any contract with the people1 it is in vain2 because the people contains within its will the will of that subject1 to whom it is supposed to be obliged2 and therefore may at its own will and pleasure disengage itself1 and by consequence is now actually free4 ,but in the second place1 that single persons do contract each with other1 may be inferred from hence2 that in vain sure would the city have been constituted1 if the citizens had been engaged by no contracts to do or omit what the city should command to be done or omitted4 ,because1 therefore1 such kind of compacts must be understood to pass as necessary to the making up of a city1 but none can be made 7as is already shewed7 between the subject and the people2 it follows1 that they must be made between single citizens1 namely1 that each man contract to submit his will to the will of the major part1 on condition that the rest also do the like4 ,as if every one should say thus3 ,i give up my right unto the people for your sake1 on condition that you also deliver up yours for mine4 ,sidenote3 ,by what acts an aristocracy is framed4 #h4 ,an aristocracy or council of nobles endowed with supreme authority1 receives its original from a democracy1 which gives up its right unto it4 ,where we must understand that certain men distinguished from others1 either by eminence of title1 blood1 or some other character1 are propounded to the people1 and by plurality of voices are elected2 and being elected1 the whole right of the people or city is conveyed on them1 insomuch as whatsoever the people might do before1 the same by right may this court of elected nobles now do4 ,which being done1 it is clear that the people1 considered as one person1 its supreme authority being already transferred on these1 is no longer now in being4 ,sidenote3 ,in an aristocracy the nobles make no contract1 nor are they obliged to any citizen1 or to the whole people4 #i4 ,as in democracy the people1 so in an aristocracy the court of nobles is free from all manner of obligation4 ,for seeing subjects not contracting with the people1 but by mutual compacts among themselves1 were tied to all that the people did2 hence also they were tied to that act of the people1 in resigning up its right of government into the hands of nobles4 ,neither could this court1 although elected by the people1 be by it obliged to anything4 ,for being elected1 the people is at once dissolved1 as was declared above1 and the authority it had as being a person1 utterly vanisheth4 ,wherefore the obligation which was due to the person1 must also vanish1 and perish together with it4 ,sidenote3 ,the nobles must necessarily have their set meetings4 #aj4 ,aristocracy hath these considerations1 together with democracy4 ,first1 that without an appointment of some certain times and places1 at which the court of nobles may meet1 it is no longer a court1 or one person1 but a dissolute multitude without any supreme power4 ,secondly1 that the times of their assembling cannot be disjoined by long intervals without prejudice to the supreme power1 unless its administration be transferred to some one man4 ,now the reasons why this happens1 are the same which we set down in the fifth article4 ,sidenote3 ,by what acts a monarchy is framed4 #aa4 ,as an aristocracy1 so also a monarchy is derived from the power of the people1 transferring its right1 that is1 its authority on one man4 ,here also we must understand1 that some one man1 either by name or some other token1 is propounded to be taken notice of above all the rest2 and that by a plurality of voices the whole right of the people is conveyed on him2 insomuch as whatsoever the people could do before he were elected1 the same in every respect may he by right now do1 being elected4 ,which being done1 the people is no longer one person1 but a rude multitude1 as being only one before by virtue of the supreme command1 whereof they now have made a conveyance from themselves on this one man4 ,sidenote3 ,that the monarch is by compact obliged to none for the authority he hath received4 #ab4 ,and therefore neither doth the monarch oblige himself to any for the command he receives4 ,for he receives it from the people2 but as hath been shewed above1 the people1 as soon as that act is done1 ceaseth to be a person2 but the person vanishing1 obligation to the person vanisheth4 ,the subjects therefore are tied to perform obedience to the monarch1 by those compacts only by which they mutually obliged themselves to the observation of all that the people should command them1 that is1 to obey that monarch1 if he were made by the people4 ,sidenote3 ,a monarch is ever in the readier capacity to exercise all those acts which are requisite to well governing4 #ac4 ,but a monarchy differs as well from an aristocracy as a democracy1 in this chiefly2 that in those there must be certain set times and places for deliberation and consultation of affairs1 that is1 for the actual exercise of it in all times and places4 ,for the people or the nobles not being one natural person1 must necessarily have their meetings4 ,the monarch1 who is one by nature1 is always in a present capacity to execute his authority4 ,sidenote3 ,what kind of sin that is1 and what sort of men are guilty of it1 when the city performs not its office to the citizens1 nor the citizens towards the city4 #ad4 ,because we have declared above1 7in art4 #g1 #i1 #ab71 that they who have gotten the supreme command1 are by no compacts obliged to any man1 it necessarily follows1 that they can do no injury to the subjects4 ,for injury1 according to the definition made in chap4 ,,iii4 art4 #c1 is nothing else but a breach of contract2 and therefore where no contracts have part1 there can be no injury4 ,yet the people1 the nobles1 and the monarch may diverse ways transgress against the other laws of nature1 as by cruelty1 iniquity1 contumely1 and other like vices1 which come not under this strict and exact notion of injury4 ,but if the subject yield not obedience to the supreme1 he will in propriety of speech be said to be injurious1 as well to his fellow-subjects1 because each man hath compacted with the other to obey2 as to his chief ruler1 in resuming that right which he hath given him1 without his consent4 ,and in a democracy or aristocracy1 if anything be decreed against any law of nature1 the city itself1 that is1 the civil person sins not1 but those subjects only by whose votes it was decreed2 for sin is a consequence of the natural express will1 not of the political1 which is artificial4 ,for if it were otherwise1 they would be guilty by whom the decree was absolutely disliked4 ,but in a monarchy1 if the monarch make any decree against the laws of nature1 he sins himself2 because in him the civil will and the natural are all one4 ,sidenote3 ,a monarch made without limitation of time1 may elect his successors4 #ae4 ,the people who are about to make a monarch1 may give him the supremacy either simply without limitation of time1 or for a certain season and time determined4 ,if simply1 we must understand that he who receives it1 hath the self-same power which they had who gave it4 ,on the same grounds1 therefore1 that the people by right could make him a monarch1 may he make another monarch4 ,insomuch as the monarch to whom the command is simply given1 receives a right not of possession only1 but of succession also2 so as he may declare whom he pleaseth for his successor4 ,sidenote3 ,of limited monarchs4 #af4 ,but if the power be given for a time limited1 we must have regard to somewhat more than the bare gift only4 ,first1 whether the people conveying its authority1 left itself any right to meet at certain times and places1 or not4 ,next1 if it have reserved this power1 whether it were done so as they might meet before that time were expired1 which they prescribed to the monarch4 ,thirdly1 whether they were contented to meet only at the will of that temporary monarch1 and not otherwise4 ,suppose now the people had delivered up its power to some one man for term of life only2 which being done1 let us suppose in the first place1 that every man departed from the council without making any order at all concerning the place1 where after his death they should meet again to make a new election4 ,in this case1 it is manifest by the fifth article of this chapter1 that the people ceaseth to be a person1 and is become a dissolute multitude2 every one whereof hath an equal1 to wit1 a natural right to meet with whom he lists at divers times1 and in what places shall best please him2 nay1 and if he can1 engross the supreme power to himself1 and settle it on his own head4 ,what monarch soever1 therefore1 hath a command in such a condition1 he is bound by the law of nature1 set down in chap4 ,,iii4 art4 #h1 of not returning evil for good1 prudently to provide that by his death the city suffer not a dissolution2 either by appointing a certain day and place1 in which those subjects of his1 who have a mind to it1 may assemble themselves1 or else by nominating a successor2 whether of these shall to him seem most conducible to their common benefit4 ,he therefore1 who on this foresaid manner hath received his command during life1 hath an absolute power1 and may at his discretion dispose of the succession4 ,in the next place1 if we grant that the people departed not from the election of the temporary monarch1 before they decreed a certain time and place of meeting after his death2 then the monarch being dead1 the authority is confirmed in the people1 not by any new acts of the subjects1 but by virtue of the former right4 ,for all the supreme command1 as dominion1 was in the people2 but the use and exercise of it was only in the temporary monarch1 as in one that takes the benefit1 but hath not the right4 ,but if the people after the election of a temporary monarch1 depart not from the court before they have appointed certain times and places to convene during the time prescribed him2 as the dictators in ancient times were made by the people of ,rome2 such an one is not to be accounted a monarch1 but the prime officer of the people4 ,and if it shall seem good1 the people may deprive him of his office even before that time2 as the people of ,rome did1 when they conferred an equal power on ,minutius1 master of the horse1 with ,quintus ,fabius ,maximus1 whom before they had made dictator4 ,the reason whereof is1 that it is not to be imagined1 that he1 whether man or council1 who hath the readiest and most immediate power to act1 should hold his command on such terms1 as not to be able actually to execute it2 for command is nothing else but a right of commanding1 as oft as nature allows it possible4 ,lastly1 if the people having declared a temporary monarch1 depart from the court on such terms1 as it shall not be lawful for them to meet without the command of the monarch1 we must understand the people to be immediately dissolved1 and that his authority1 who is thus declared1 is absolute2 forasmuch as it is not in the power of all the subjects to frame the city anew1 unless he give consent who hath now alone the authority4 ,nor matters it1 that he hath perhaps made any promise to assemble his subjects on some certain times2 since there remains no person now in being1 but at his discretion1 to whom the promise was made4 ,what we have spoken of these four cases of a people electing a temporary monarch1 will be more clearly explained by comparing them with an absolute monarch who hath no heir-apparent4 ,for the people is lord of the subject in such a manner1 as there can be no heir but whom itself doth appoint4 ,besides1 the spaces between the times of the subjects' meeting1 may be fitly compared to those times wherein the monarch sleeps2 for in either the acts of commanding cease1 the power remains4 ,furthermore1 to dissolve the convent1 so as it cannot meet again1 is the death of the people2 just as sleeping1 so as he can never wake more1 is the death of a man4 ,as therefore a king who hath no heir1 going to his rest so as never to rise again1 that is1 dying1 if he commit the exercise of his regal authority to any one till he awake1 does by consequence give him the succession2 the people also electing a temporary monarch1 and not reserving a power to convene1 delivers up to him the whole dominion of the country4 ,furthermore1 as a king going to sleep for some season1 entrusts the administration of his kingdom to some other1 and waking takes it again2 so the people having elected a temporary monarch1 and withal retaining a right to meet at a certain day and place1 at that day receives its supremacy again4 ,and as a king who hath committed the execution of his authority to another1 himself in the meanwhile waking1 can recal this commission again when he pleaseth2 so the people1 who during the time prescribed to the temporary monarch doth by right convene1 may if they please deprive the monarch of his authority4 ,lastly1 the king1 who commits his authority to another while himself sleeps1 not being able to wake again till he whom he entrusted give consent1 loses at once both his power and his life2 so the people1 who hath given the supreme power to a temporary monarch in such sort as they cannot assemble without his command1 is absolutely dissolved1 and the power remains with him whom they have chosen4 ,sidenote3 ,a monarch retaining his right of government1 cannot1 by any promise whatsoever1 be conceived to have parted with his right to the means necessary to the exercise of his authority4 #ag4 ,if the monarch promise aught to any one or many subjects together1 by consequence whereof the exercise of his power may suffer prejudice1 that promise or compact1 whether made by oath or without it1 is null4 ,for all compact is a conveyance of right1 which by what hath been said in the fourth article of the second chapter1 requires meet and proper signs of the will in the conveyer4 ,but he who sufficiently signifies his will of retaining the end1 doth also sufficiently declare that he quits not his right to the means necessary to that end4 ,now he who hath promised to part with somewhat necessary to the supreme power1 and yet retains the power itself1 gives sufficient tokens that he no otherwise promised it1 than so far forth as the power might be retained without it4 ,whensoever therefore it shall appear1 that what is promised cannot be performed without prejudice to the power1 the promise must be valued as not made1 that is1 of no effect4 ,sidenote3 ,by what means a subject is freed from his subjection4 #ah4 ,we have seen how subjects1 nature dictating1 have obliged themselves by mutual compacts to obey the supreme power4 ,we will see now by what means it comes to pass1 that they are released from these bonds of obedience4 ,and first of all1 this happens by rejection1 namely1 if a man cast off or forsake1 but convey not the right of his command on some other4 ,for what is thus rejected1 is openly exposed to all alike1 catch who catch can2 whence again1 by the right of nature1 every subject may heed the preservation of himself according to his own judgment4 ,in the second place1 if the kingdom fall into the power of the enemy1 so as there can no more opposition be made against them1 we must understand that he who before had the supreme authority1 hath now lost it3 for when the subjects have done their full endeavour to prevent their falling into the enemy's hands1 they have fulfilled those contracts of obedience which they made each with other2 and what1 being conquered1 they promise afterwards to avoid death1 they must with no less endeavour labour to perform4 ,thirdly1 in a monarchy1 7for a democracy and aristocracy cannot fail71 if there be no successor1 all the subjects are discharged from their obligations2 for no man is supposed to be tied he knows not to whom2 for in such a case it were impossible to perform aught4 ,and by these three ways1 all subjects are restored from their civil subjection to that liberty which all men have to all things2 to wit1 natural and savage2 for the natural state hath the same proportion to the civil1 7,i mean1 liberty to subjection71 which passion hath to reason1 or a beast to a man4 ,furthermore1 each subject may lawfully be freed from his subjection by the will of him who hath the supreme power1 namely1 if he change his soil2 which may be done two ways1 either by permission1 as he who gets license to dwell in another country2 or command1 as he who is banished4 ,in both cases1 he is free from the laws of his former country2 because he is tied to observe those of the latter4 ------- ,,chapter ,,viii4 ,,of ,,the ,,rights ,,of ,,lords ,,over ,,their ,,servants4 #a4 ,what lord and servant signify4 #b4 ,the distinction of servants1 into such as upon trust enjoy their natural liberty1 and slaves1 or such as serve being imprisoned or bound in fetters4 #c4 ,the obligation of a servant arises from the liberty of body allowed him by his lord4 #d4 ,servants that are bound1 are not by any compacts tied to their lords4 #e4 ,servants have no propriety in their goods against their lord4 #f4 ,the lord may sell his servant1 or alienate him by testament #g4 ,the lord cannot injure his servant4 #h4 ,he that is lord of the lord1 is lord also of his servants4 #i4 ,by what means servants are freed4 #aj4 ,dominion over beasts belongs to the right of nature4 ,sidenote3 ,what lord and servant are4 #a4 ,in the two foregoing chapters we have treated of an institutive or framed government1 as being that which receives its original from the consent of many1 who by contract and faith mutually given have obliged each other4 ,now follows what may be said concerning a natural government2 which may also be called acquired1 because it is that which is gotten by power and natural force4 ,but we must know in the first place1 by what means the right of dominion may be gotten over the persons of men4 ,where such a right is gotten1 there is a kind of a little kingdom2 for to be a king1 is nothing else but to have dominion over many persons2 and thus a great family is a kingdom1 and a little kingdom a family4 ,let us return again to the state of nature1 and consider men as if but even now sprung out of the earth1 and suddenly1 like mushrooms1 come to full maturity1 without all kind of engagement to each other4 ,there are but three ways only1 whereby one can have a dominion over the person of another2 whereof the first is1 if by mutual contract made between themselves1 for peace and self-defence's sake1 they have willingly given up themselves to the power and authority of some man1 or council of men2 and of this we have already spoken4 ,the second is1 if a man taken prisoner in the wars1 or overcome1 or else distrusting his own forces1 to avoid death1 promises the conqueror or the stronger party his service1 that is1 to do all whatsoever he shall command him4 ,in which contract1 the good which the vanquished or inferior in strength doth receive1 is the grant of his life1 which by the right of war in the natural state of men he might have been deprived of2 but the good which he promises1 is his service and obedience4 ,by virtue therefore of this promise1 there is as absolute service and obedience due from the vanquished to the vanquisher1 as possibly can be1 excepting what repugns the divine laws2 for he who is obliged to obey the commands of any man before he knows what he will command him1 is simply and without any restriction tied to the performance of all commands whatsoever4 ,now he that is thus tied1 is called a servant2 he to whom he is tied1 a lord4 ,thirdly1 there is a right acquired over the person of a man by generation2 of which kind of acquisition somewhat shall be spoken in the following chapter4 ,sidenote3 ,the distinction of servants1 into such as upon trust enjoy their natural liberty1 and slaves1 or such as serve being imprisoned or fettered4 #b4 ,every one that is taken in the war1 and hath his life spared him1 is not supposed to have contracted with his lord2 for every one is not trusted with so much of his natural liberty1 as to be able1 if he desired it1 either to fly away1 or quit his service1 or contrive any mischief to his lord4 ,and these serve indeed1 but within prisons or bound within irons2 and therefore they were called not by the common name of servant only1 but by the peculiar name of slave2 even as now at this day1 un serviteur1 and un serf1 or un esclave have diverse significations4 ,sidenote3 ,the obligation of a servant ariseth from that freedom which is granted him by his lord4 #c4 ,the obligation therefore of a servant to his lord1 ariseth not from a simple grant of his life2 but from hence rather1 that he keeps him not bound or imprisoned4 ,for all obligation derives from contract2 but where there is no trust1 there can be no contract1 as appears by chap4 ii4 art4 #i2 where a compact is defined to be the promise of him who is trusted4 ,there is therefore a confidence and trust which accompanies the benefit of pardoned life1 whereby the lord affords him his corporal liberty2 so that if no obligation nor bonds of contract had happened1 he might not only have made his escape1 but also have killed his lord who was the preserver of his life4 ,sidenote3 ,servants that are bound1 are not obliged to their lord by any contract4 #d4 ,wherefore such kind of servants as are restrained by imprisonment or bonds1 are not comprehended in that definition of servants given above2 because those serve not for the contract's sake1 but to the end they may not suffer4 ,and therefore if they fly1 or kill their lord1 they offend not against the laws of nature4 ,for to bind any man1 is a plain sign that the binder supposes him that is bound1 not to be sufficiently tied by any other obligation4 ,sidenote3 ,servants have no propriety in their goods against their lord4 #e4 ,the lord therefore hath no less dominion over a servant that is not1 than over one that is bound2 for he hath a supreme power over both1 and may say of his servant no less than of another thing1 whether animate or inanimate1 this is mine4 ,whence it follows1 that whatsoever the servant had before his servitude1 that afterwards becomes the lord's2 and whatsoever he hath gotten1 it was gotten for his lord4 ,for he that can by right dispose of the person of a man1 may surely dispose of all those things which that person could dispose of4 ,there is therefore nothing which the servant may retain as his own against the will of his lord2 yet hath he1 by his lord's distribution1 a propriety and dominion over his own goods3 insomuch as one servant may keep and defend them against the invasion of his fellow-servant1 in the same manner as hath been shewed before1 that a subject hath nothing properly his own against the will of the supreme authority1 but every subject hath a propriety against his fellow-subject4 ,sidenote3 ,the lord may sell his servant1 or alienate him by testament4 #f4 ,since therefore both the servant himself1 and all that belongs to him are his lord's1 and by the right of nature every man may dispose of his own in what manner he pleases2 the lord may either sell1 lay to pledge1 or by testament convey the dominion he hath over his servant1 according to his own will and pleasure4 ,sidenote3 ,the lord cannot be injurious to his servant4 #g4 ,furthermore1 what hath before been demonstrated concerning subjects in an institutive government1 namely1 that he who hath the supreme power can do his subject no injury2 is true also concerning servants1 because they have subjected their will to the will of the ,lord4 ,wherefore1 whatsoever he doth1 it is done with their will2 but no injury can be done to him that willeth it4 ,sidenote3 ,he that is lord of the lord1 is lord also of his servants4 #h4 ,but if it happen that the lord1 either by captivity or voluntary subjection1 doth become a servant or subject to another1 that other shall not only be lord of him1 but also of his servants2 supreme lord over these1 immediate lord over him4 ,now because not the servant only1 but also all he hath1 are his lord's2 therefore his servants now belong to this man1 neither can the mediate lord dispose otherwise of them than shall seem good to the supreme4 ,and therefore1 if sometime in civil governments the lord have an absolute power over his servants1 that is supposed to be derived from the right of nature1 and not constituted1 but slightly passed over by the civil law4 ,sidenote3 ,by what means servants are freed4 #i4 ,a servant is by the same manner freed from his servitude1 that a subject in an institutive government is freed from his subjection4 ,first1 if his lord enfranchise him2 for the right which the servant transferred to his lord over himself1 the same may the lord restore to the servant again4 ,and this manner of bestowing of liberty is called manumission2 which is just as if a city should permit a citizen to convey himself under the jurisdiction of some other city4 ,secondly1 if the lord cast off his servant from him2 which in a city is banishment2 neither differs it from manumission in effect1 but in manner only4 ,for there1 liberty is granted as a favour1 here1 as a punishment3 in both1 the dominion is renounced4 ,thirdly1 if the servant be taken prisoner1 the old servitude is abolished by the new2 for as all other things1 so servants also are acquired by war1 whom in equity the lord must protect1 if he will have them to be his4 ,fourthly1 the servant is freed for want of knowledge of a successor1 the lord dying 7suppose7 without any testament or heir4 ,for no man is understood to be obliged1 unless he know to whom he is to perform the obligation4 ,lastly1 the servant that is put in bonds1 or by any other means deprived of his corporal liberty1 is freed from that other obligation of contract4 ,for there can be no contract where there is no trust1 nor can that faith be broken which is not given4 ,but the lord who himself serves another1 cannot so free his servants1 but that they must still continue under the power of the supreme2 for1 as hath been shewed before1 such servants are not his1 but the supreme lord's4 ,sidenote3 ,the dominion over beasts is by the right of nature4 #aj4 ,we get a right over irrational creatures1 in the same manner that we do over the persons of men2 to wit1 by force and natural strength4 ,for if in the state of nature it is lawful for every one1 by reason of that war which is of all against all1 to subdue and also to kill men as oft as it shall seem to conduce unto their good2 much more will the same be lawful against brutes2 namely1 at their own discretion to reduce those to servitude1 which by art may be tamed and fitted for use1 and to persecute and destroy the rest by a perpetual war as dangerous and noxious4 ,our dominion therefore over beasts1 hath its original from the right of nature1 not from divine positive right4 ,for if such a right had not been before the publishing of the ,sacred ,scriptures1 no man by right might have killed a beast for his food1 but he to whom the divine pleasure was made manifest by holy writ2 a most hard condition for men indeed1 whom the beasts might devour without injury1 and yet they might not destroy them4 ,forasmuch therefore as it proceeds from the right of nature1 that a beast may kill a man1 it is also by the same right that a man may slay a beast4 ------- ,,chapter ,,ix4 ,,of ,,the ,,right ,,of ,,parents ,,over ,,their ,,children1 ,,and ,,of ,,hereditary ,,government4 #a4 ,paternal dominion ariseth not from generation4 #b4 ,dominion over infants belongs to him or her who first hath them in their power4 #c4 ,dominion over infants is originally the mother's4 #d4 ,the exposed infant is his1 from whom he receives his preservation4 #e4 ,the child that hath one parent a subject1 and the other a sovereign1 belongs to him or her in authority4 #f4 ,in such a conjunction of man and woman1 as neither hath command over the other1 the children are the mother's1 unless by compact or civil law it be otherwise determined4 #g4 ,children are no less subject to their parents1 than servants to their lords and subjects to their princes4 #h4 ,of the honour of parents and lords4 #i4 ,wherein liberty consists1 and the difference of subjects and servants4 #aj4 ,there is the same right over subjects in an hereditary government1 which there is in an institutive government4 #aa4 ,the question concerning the right of succession belongs only to monarchy4 #ab4 ,a monarch may by his will and testament dispose of his supreme authority3 #ac4 ,or give it1 or sell it4 #ad4 ,a monarch dying without testament1 is ever supposed to will that a monarch should succeed him3 #ae4 ,and some one of his children3 #af4 ,and a male rather than female3 #ag4 ,and the eldest rather than the younger3 #ah4 ,and his brother1 if he want issue1 before all others4 #ai4 ,in the same manner that men succeed to the power1 do they also succeed to the right of succession4 ,sidenote3 ,paternal dominion ariseth not from generation4 #a4 ,,socrates is a man1 and therefore a living creature1 is right reasoning2 and that most evident1 because there is nothing needful to the acknowledging of the truth of the consequence1 but that the word man be understood2 because a living creature is in the definition itself of a man1 and every one makes up the proposition which was desired1 namely this1 man is a living creature4 ,and this1 ,sophroniscus is ,socrates' father1 and therefore his lord1 is perhaps a true inference1 but not evident2 because the word lord is not in the definition of a father3 wherefore it is necessary1 to make it more evident1 that the connexion of father and lord be somewhat unfolded4 ,those that have hitherto endeavoured to prove the dominion of a parent over his children1 have brought no other argument than that of generation2 as if it were of itself evident1 that what is begotten by me is mine2 just as if a man should think1 that because there is a triangle1 it appears presently1 without any further discourse1 that its angles are equal to two right4 ,besides1 since dominion1 that is1 supreme power is indivisible1 insomuch as no man can serve two masters2 but two persons1 male and female1 must concur in the act of generation2 it is impossible that dominion should at all be acquired by generation only4 ,wherefore we will1 with the more diligence1 in this place inquire into the original of paternal government4 ,sidenote3 ,dominion over infants belongs to him who first hath them in his power4 #b4 ,we must therefore return to the state of nature1 in which1 by reason of the equality of nature1 all men of riper years are to be accounted equal4 ,there by right of nature the conqueror is lord of the conquered4 ,by the right therefore of nature1 the dominion over the infant first belongs to him who first hath him in his power4 ,but it is manifest that he who is newly born1 is in the mother's power before any others2 insomuch as she may rightly1 and at her own will1 either breed him up or adventure him to fortune4 ,sidenote3 ,dominion over infants is originally the mother's4 #c4 ,if therefore she breed him1 because the state of nature is the state of war1 she is supposed to bring him up on this condition2 that being grown to full age he become not her enemy2 which is1 that he obey her4 ,for since by natural necessity we all desire that which appears good unto us1 it cannot be understood that any man hath on such terms afforded life to another1 that he might both get strength by his years1 and at once become an enemy4 ,but each man is an enemy to that other1 whom he neither obeys nor commands4 ,and thus in the state of nature1 every woman that bears children1 becomes both a mother and a lord4 ,but what some say1 that in this case the father1 by reason of the pre-eminence of sex1 and not the mother becomes lord1 signifies nothing4 ,for both reason shows the contrary2 because the inequality of their natural forces is not so great1 that the man could get the dominion over the woman without war4 ,and custom also contradicts not2 for women1 namely ,amazons1 have in former times waged war against their adversaries1 and disposed of their children at their own wills4 ,and at this day1 in divers places women are invested with the principal authority2 neither do their husbands dispose of their children1 but themselves2 which in truth they do by the right of nature2 forasmuch as they who have the supreme power1 are not tied at all 7as hath been shewed7 to the civil laws4 ,add also1 that in the state of nature it cannot be known who is the father1 but by the testimony of the mother2 the child therefore is his whose the mother will have it1 and therefore her's4 ,wherefore original dominion over children belongs to the mother3 and among men no less than other creatures1 the birth follows the belly4 ,sidenote3 ,the exposed infant is his that preserves him4 #d4 ,the dominion passes from the mother to others1 divers ways4 ,first1 if she quit and forsake her right by exposing the child4 ,he therefore that shall bring up the child thus exposed1 shall have the same dominion over it which the mother had4 ,for that life which the mother had given it1 7not by getting but nourishing it71 she now by exposing takes from it4 ,wherefore the obligation also which arose from the benefit of life1 is by this exposition made void4 ,now the preserved oweth all to the preserver1 whether in regard of his education as to a mother1 or of his service as to a lord4 ,for although the mother in the state of nature1 where all men have a right to all things1 may recover her son again1 namely1 by the same right that anybody else might do it2 yet may not the son rightly transfer himself again unto his mother4 ,sidenote3 ,the son of a subject and chief1 is his that commands4 #e4 ,secondly1 if the mother be taken prisoner1 her son is his that took her2 because that he who hath dominion over the person1 hath also dominion over all belonging to the person2 wherefore over the son also1 as hath been shewed in the foregoing chapter1 in the fifth article4 ,thirdly1 if the mother be a subject under what government soever1 he that hath the supreme authority in that government1 will also have the dominion over him that is born of her2 for he is lord also of the mother1 who is bound to obey him in all things4 ,fourthly1 if a woman for society's sake give herself to a man on this condition1 that he shall bear the sway2 he that receives his being from the contribution of both parties1 is the father's1 in regard of the command he hath over the mother4 ,but if a woman bearing rule shall have children by a subject1 the children are the mother's2 for otherwise the woman can have no children without prejudice to her authority4 ,and universally1 if the society of the male and female be such an union1 as the one have subjected himself to the other1 the children belong to him or her that commands4 ,sidenote3 ,in such a conjunction of male and female1 as neither hath the commanding power over the other1 the children are the mother's2 except by pact or civil law it be otherwise determined4 #f4 ,but in the state of nature1 if a man and woman contract so1 as neither is subject to the command of the other1 the children are the mother's1 for the reasons above given in the third article1 unless by pacts it be otherwise provided4 ,for the mother may by pact dispose of her right as she lists2 as heretofore hath been done by the ,amazons1 who of those children which have been begotten by their neighbours1 have by pact allowed them the males1 and retained females to themselves4 ,but in a civil government1 if there be a contract of marriage between a man and woman1 the children are the father's2 because in all cities1 to wit1 constituted of fathers1 not mothers governing their families1 the domestical command belongs to the man2 and such a contract1 if it be made according to the civil laws1 is called matrimony4 ,but if they agree only to lie together1 the children are the father's or the mother's variously1 according to the differing civil laws of divers cities4 ,sidenote3 ,children are no less subject to their parents1 than servants to their lords1 and subjects to their city4 #g4 ,now because1 by the third article1 the mother is originally lord of her children1 and from her the father1 or somebody else by derived right2 it is manifest that the children are no less subject to those by whom they are nourished and brought up1 than servants to their lords1 and subjects to him who bears the supreme rule2 and that a parent cannot be injurious to his son1 as long as he is under his power4 ,a son also is freed from subjection in the same manner as a subject and servant are4 ,for emancipation is the same thing with manumission1 and abdication with banishment4 ,sidenote3 ,of the honour due to parents and lords4 #h4 ,the enfranchised son or released servant1 do now stand in less fear of their lord and father1 being deprived of his natural and lordly power over them2 and1 if regard be had to true and inward honour1 do honour him less than before4 ,for honour1 as hath been said in the section above1 is nothing else but the estimation of another's power2 and therefore he that hath least power1 hath always least honour4 ,but it is not to be imagined1 that the enfranchiser ever intended so to match the enfranchised with himself1 as that he should not so much as acknowledge a benefit1 but should so carry himself in all things as if he were become wholly his equal4 ,it must therefore be ever understood1 that he who is freed from subjection1 whether he be a servant1 son1 or some colony1 doth promise all those external signs at least1 whereby superiors used to be honoured by their inferiors4 ,from whence it follows1 that the precept of honouring our parents1 belongs to the law of nature1 not only under the title of gratitude1 but also of agreement4 ,sidenote3 ,wherein liberty doth consist2 and the difference between subjects and servants4 #i4 ,what then1 will some one demand1 is the difference between a son1 or between a subject and a servant8 ,neither do ,i know that any writer hath fully declared what liberty and what slavery is4 ,commonly1 to do all things according to our own fancies1 and that without punishment1 is esteemed to be liberty2 not to be able to do this1 is judged bondage2 which in a civil government1 and with the peace of mankind1 cannot possibly be done2 because there is no city without a command and a restraining right4 ,liberty1 that we may define it1 is nothing else but an absence of the lets and hindrances of motion2 as water shut up in a vessel is therefore not at liberty1 because the vessel hinders it from running out2 which1 the vessel being broken1 is made free4 ,and every man hath more or less liberty1 as he hath more or less space in which he employs himself3 as he hath more liberty1 who is in a large1 than he that is kept in a close prison4 ,and a man may be free toward one part1 and yet not toward another2 as the traveller is bounded on this and that side with hedges or stone walls1 lest he spoil the vines or corn neighbouring on the highway4 ,and these kinds of lets are external and absolute4 ,in which sense all servants and subjects are free1 who are not fettered and imprisoned4 ,there are others which are arbitrary1 which do not absolutely hinder motion1 but by accident1 to wit1 by our own choice2 as he that is in a ship1 is not so hindered but he may cast himself into the sea1 if he will4 ,and here also the more ways a man may move himself1 the more liberty he hath4 ,and herein consists civil liberty2 for no man1 whether subject1 son1 or servant1 is so hindered by the punishments appointed by the city1 the father1 or the lord1 how cruel soever1 but that he may do all things1 and make use of all means necessary to the preservation of his life and health4 ,for my part therefore ,i cannot find what reason a mere servant hath to make complaints1 if they relate only to want of liberty2 unless he count it a misery to be restrained from hurting himself1 and to receive that life1 which by war1 or misfortune1 or through his own idleness was forfeited1 together with all manner of sustenance1 and all things necessary to the conservation of health1 on this condition only1 that he will be ruled4 ,for he that is kept in by punishments laid before him1 so as he dares not let loose the reins to his will in all things1 is not oppressed by servitude1 but is governed and sustained4 ,but this privilege free subjects and sons of a family have above servants in every government and family where servants are2 that they may both undergo the more honourable offices of the city or family1 and also enjoy a larger possession of things superfluous4 ,and herein lies the difference between a free subject and a servant1 that he is free indeed1 who serves his city only2 but a servant is he1 who also serves his fellow-subject4 ,all other liberty is an exemption from the laws of the city1 and proper only to those that bear rule4 ,sidenote3 ,there is the same right in an hereditary1 which there is in an institutive government4 #aj4 ,a father with his sons and servants1 grown into a civil person by virtue of his paternal jurisdiction1 is called a family4 ,this family1 if through multiplying of children and acquisition of servants it becomes numerous1 insomuch as without casting the uncertain die of war it cannot be subdued1 will be termed an hereditary kingdom4 ,which though it differ from an institutive monarchy1 being acquired by force1 in the original and manner of its constitution2 yet being constituted1 it hath all the same properties1 and the right of authority is everywhere the same2 insomuch as it is not needful to speak anything of them apart4 ,sidenote3 ,the question concerning the right of succession belongs only to monarchy4 #aa4 ,it hath been spoken1 by what right supreme authorities are constituted4 ,we must now briefly tell you1 by what right they may be continued4 ,now the right by which they are continued1 is that which is called the right of succession4 ,now because in a democracy the supreme authority is with the people1 as long as there be any subjects in being1 so long it rests with the same person2 for the people hath no successor4 ,in like manner in an aristocracy1 one of the nobles dying1 some other by the rest is substituted in his place2 and therefore except they all die together1 which ,i suppose will never happen1 there is no succession4 ,the query therefore of the right of succession takes place only in an absolute monarchy4 ,for they who exercise the supreme power for a time only1 are themselves no monarchs1 but ministers of state4 ,sidenote3 ,a monarch may dispose of the command of his government by testament3 #ab4 ,but first1 if a monarch shall by testament appoint one to succeed him1 the person appointed shall succeed4 ,for if he be appointed by the people1 he shall have all the right over the city which the people had1 as hath been showed in chap4 ,,vii4 art4 #aa4 ,but the people might choose him2 by the same right therefore may he choose another4 ,but in an hereditary kingdom1 there are the same rights as in an institutive4 ,wherefore every monarch may by his will make a successor4 ,sidenote3 ,or give it away1 or sell it4 #ac4 ,but what a man may transfer on another by testament1 that by the same right may he1 yet living1 give or sell away4 ,to whomsoever therefore he shall make over the supreme power1 whether by gift or sale1 it is rightly made4 ,sidenote3 ,a monarch dying without testament1 is ever understood to will that a monarch should succeed him3 #ad4 ,but if living he have not declared his will concerning his successor by testament nor otherwise1 it is supposed1 first1 that he would not have his government reduced to an anarchy or the state of war1 that is1 to the destruction of his subjects2 as well because he could not do that without breach of the laws of nature1 whereby he was obliged to the performance of all things necessarily conducing to the preservation of peace2 as also because1 if that had been his will1 it had not been hard for him to have declared that openly4 ,next1 because the right passeth according to the will of the father1 we must judge of the successor according to the signs of his will4 ,it is understood therefore1 that he would have his subjects to be under a monarchical government1 rather than any other1 because he himself in ruling hath before approved of that state by his example1 and hath not afterward either by any word or deed condemned it4 ,sidenote3 ,and some one of his children3 #ae4 ,furthermore1 because by natural necessity all men wish them better1 from whom they receive glory and honour1 than others2 but every man after death receives honour and glory from his children1 sooner than from the power of any other men3 hence we gather1 that a father intends better for his children than any other person's4 ,it is to be understood therefore1 that the will of the father1 dying without testament1 was that some of his children should succeed him4 ,yet this is to be understood with this proviso1 that there be no more apparent tokens to the contrary3 of which kind1 after many successions1 custom may be one4 ,for he that makes no mention of his succession1 is supposed to consent to the customs of his realm4 ,sidenote3 ,and a male rather than female3 #af4 ,among children the males carry the pre-eminence2 in the beginning perhaps1 because for the most part1 although not always1 they are fitter for the administration of greater matters1 but specially of wars2 but afterwards1 when it was grown a custom1 because that custom was not contradicted4 ,and therefore the will of the father1 unless some other custom or sign do clearly repugn it1 is to be interpreted in favour of them4 ,sidenote3 ,and of the males1 the eldest rather than the younger3 #ag4 ,now because the sons are equal1 and the power cannot be divided1 the eldest shall succeed4 ,for if there be any difference by reason of age1 the eldest is supposed more worthy2 for nature being judge1 the most in years 7because usually it is so7 is the wisest2 but other judge there cannot be had4 ,but if the brothers must be equally valued1 the succession shall be by lot4 ,but primogeniture is a natural lot1 and by this the eldest is already preferred2 nor is there any that hath power to judge1 whether by this or any other kind of lots the matter is to be decided4 ,now the same reason which contends thus for the first-born son1 doth no less for the first-born daughter4 ,sidenote3 ,and his brother1 if he want issue1 before all others4 #ah4 ,but if he have no children1 then the command shall pass to his brothers and sisters2 for the same reason that the children should have succeeded1 if he had had them4 ,for those that are nearest to us in nature1 are supposed to be nearest in benevolence4 ,and to his brothers sooner than his sisters1 and to the elder sooner than the younger2 for the reason is the same for these1 that it was for the children4 ,sidenote3 ,in the same manner that men succeed to the power1 do they also succeed to the right of succession4 #ai4 ,furthermore1 by the same reason that men succeed to the power1 do they also succeed to the right of succession4 ,for if the first-born die before the father1 it will be judged that he transferred his right of succession unto his children2 unless the father have otherwise decreed it4 ,and therefore the nephews will have a fairer pretence to the succession1 than the uncles4 ,i say all these things will be thus1 if the custom of the place 7which the father by not contradicting will be judged to have consented to7 do not hinder them4 ------- ,,chapter ,x4 ,,comparison ,,between ,,three ,,kinds ,,of ,,government ,,according ,,to ,,their ,,several ,,inconveniences4 #a4 ,a comparison of the natural state with the civil4 #b4 ,the conveniences and inconveniences of the ruler and his subjects are alike4 #c4 ,the praise of monarchy4 #d4 ,the government under one1 cannot be said to be unreasonable in this respect1 namely1 because one hath more power than all the rest4 #e4 ,a rejection of their opinion1 who say1 that a lord with his servants cannot make a city4 #f4 ,exactions are more grievous under a popular state1 than a monarchy4 #g4 ,innocent subjects are less exposed to penalties under a monarch1 than under the people4 #h4 ,the liberty of single subjects is not less under a monarch1 than under a people4 #i4 ,it is no disadvantage to the subjects1 that they are not all admitted to public deliberations4 #aj4 ,civil deliberations are unadvisedly committed to great assemblies1 by reason of the unskilfulness of the most part of men3 #aa4 ,in regard of eloquence3 #ab4 ,in regard of faction3 #ac4 ,in regard of the unstableness of the laws3 #ad4 ,in regard of the want of secrecy4 #ae4 ,that these inconveniences adhere to democracy1 forasmuch as men are naturally delighted with the esteem of wit4 #af4 ,the inconveniences of a city arising from a king that is a child4 #ag4 ,the power of generals is an evident sign of the excellence of monarchy4 #ah4 ,the best state of a city is that1 where the subjects are the ruler's inheritance4 #ai4 ,the nearer aristocracy draws to monarchy1 the better it is2 the further it keeps from it1 the worse4 ,sidenote3 ,a comparing the state of nature with the civil4 #a4 ,what democracy1 aristocracy1 and monarchy are1 hath already been spoken2 but which of them tends most to the preservation of the subjects' peace and procuring their advantages1 we must see by comparing them together4 ,but first let us set forth the advantages and disadvantages of a city in general2 lest some perhaps should think it better1 that every man be left to live at his own will1 than to constitute any society at all4 ,every man indeed out of the state of civil government hath a most entire1 but unfruitful liberty2 because that he who by reason of his own liberty acts all at his own will1 must also by reason of the same liberty in others suffer all at another's will4 ,but in a constituted city1 every subject retains to himself as much freedom as suffices him to live well and quietly2 and there is so much taken away from others1 as may make them not to be feared4 ,out of this state1 every man hath such a right to all1 as yet he can enjoy nothing2 in it1 each one securely enjoys his limited right4 ,out of it1 any man may rightly spoil or kill another2 in it1 none but one4 ,out of it1 we are protected by our own forces2 in it1 by the power of all4 ,out of it1 no man is sure of the fruit of his labours2 in it1 all men are4 ,lastly1 out of it1 there is a dominion of passions1 war1 fear1 poverty1 slovenliness1 solitude1 barbarism1 ignorance1 cruelty2 in it1 the dominion of reason1 peace1 security1 riches1 decency1 society1 elegancy1 sciences1 and benevolence4 ,sidenote3 ,the gains and losses of the ruler and his subjects are alike4 #b4 ,aristotle1 in his seventh book and fourteenth chapter of his ,politics1 saith1 that there are two sorts of governments2 whereof the one relates to the benefit of the ruler1 the other to that of the subjects4 ,as if where subjects are severely dealt with1 there were one1 and where more mildly1 there were another form of government4 ,which opinion may by no means be subscribed to2 for all the profits and disprofits arising from government are the same1 and common both to the ruler and the subject4 ,the damages which befall some particular subjects through misfortune1 folly1 negligence1 sloth1 or his own luxury1 may very well be severed from those which concern the ruler4 ,but those relate not to the government itself1 being such as may happen in any form of government whatsoever4 ,if these same happen from the first institution of the city1 they will then be truly called the inconveniences of government2 but they will be common to the ruler with his subjects1 as their benefits are common4 ,but the first and greatest benefit1 peace and defence1 is to both2 for both he that commands1 and he who is commanded1 to the end that he may defend his life makes use at once of all the forces of his fellow-subjects4 ,and in the greatest inconvenience that can befall a city1 namely1 the slaughter of subjects arising from anarchy1 both the commander and the parties commanded are equally concerned4 ,next1 if the ruler levy such a sum of vast moneys from his subjects1 as they are not able to maintain themselves and their families1 nor conserve their bodily strength and vigor1 the disadvantage is as much his as theirs1 who1 with never so great a stock or measure of riches1 is not able to keep his authority or his riches without the bodies of his subjects4 ,but if he raise no more than is sufficient for the due administration of his power1 that is a benefit equally to himself and his subjects1 tending to a common peace and defence4 ,nor is it imaginable which way public treasures can be a grievance to private subjects1 if they be not so exhausted as to be wholly deprived from all possibility to acquire1 even by their industry1 necessaries to sustain the strength of their bodies and minds4 ,for even thus the grievance would concern the ruler2 nor would it arise from the ill-institution or ordination of the government1 because in all manner of governments subjects may be oppressed2 but from the ill-administration of a well-established government4 ,sidenote3 ,the praise of monarchy4 #c4 ,now that monarchy1 of the foresaid forms of democracy1 aristocracy1 and monarchy1 hath the pre-eminence1 will best appear by comparing the conveniences and inconveniences arising in each one of them4 ,those arguments therefore1 that the whole universe is governed by one ,god2 that the ancients preferred the monarchical state before all others1 ascribing the rule of the gods to one ,jupiter2 that in the beginning of affairs and of nations1 the decrees of princes were held for laws2 that paternal government1 instituted by ,god himself in the creation1 was monarchical2 that other governments were compacted by the artifice of men#ae out of the ashes of monarchy1 after it had been ruined with seditions2 and that the people of ,god were under the jurisdiction of kings3 although1 ,i say1 these do hold forth monarchy as the more eminent to us1 yet because they do it by examples and testimonies1 and not by solid reason1 we will pass them over4 ,footnote #ae3 ,compacted by the artifice of men1 c4 ,it seems the ancients who made that same fable of ,prometheus1 pointed at this4 ,they say that ,prometheus1 having stolen fire from the sun1 formed a man out of clay1 and that for this deed he was tortured by ,jupiter with a perpetual gnawing in his liver4 ,which is1 that by human invention1 which is signified by ,prometheus1 laws and justice were by imitation taken from monarchy2 by virtue whereof1 as by fire removed from its natural orb1 the multitude1 as the dirt and dregs of men1 was as it were quickened and formed into a civil person2 which is termed aristocracy or democracy4 ,but the author and abettors being found1 who might securely and quietly have lived under the natural jurisdiction of kings1 do thus smart for it2 that being exposed still to alteration1 they are tormented with perpetual cares1 suspicions1 and dissensions4 ,sidenote3 ,the government of one cannot be said to be evil in this respect1 namely1 because one hath more power than all the rest4 #d4 ,some there are1 who are discontented with the government under one1 for no other reason but because it is under one2 as if it were an unreasonable thing1 that one man among so many should so far excel in power1 as to be able at his own pleasure to dispose of all the rest4 ,these men1 sure1 if they could1 would withdraw themselves from under the dominion of one ,god4 ,but this exception against one is suggested by envy1 while they see one man in possession of what all desire4 ,for the same cause1 they would judge it to be as unreasonable if a few commanded1 unless they themselves either were1 or hoped to be of the number4 ,for if it be an unreasonable thing that all men have not an equal right1 surely an aristocracy must be unreasonable also4 ,but because we have showed that the state of equality is the state of war1 and that therefore inequality was introduced by a general consent2 this inequality1 whereby he whom we have voluntarily given more to1 enjoys more1 is no longer to be accounted an unreasonable thing4 ,the inconveniences therefore which attend the dominion of one man1 attend his person1 not his unity4 ,let us therefore see whether brings with it the greater grievances to the subject1 the command of one man1 or of many4 ,sidenote3 ,rejection of their opinion1 who say that a lord with his servants cannot make a city4 #e4 ,but first we must remove their opinion1 who deny that to be any city at all1 which is compacted of never so great a number of servants under a common lord4 ,in the ninth article of the fifth chapter1 a city is defined to be one person made out of many men1 whose will by their own contracts is to be esteemed as the wills of them all2 insomuch as he may use the strength and faculties of each single person for the public peace and safety4 ,and by the same article of the same chapter1 one person is that1 when the wills of many are contained in the will of one4 ,but the will of each servant is contained in the will of his lord2 as hath been declared in the fifth article of the eighth chapter2 so as he may employ all their forces and faculties according to his own will and pleasure4 ,it follows therefore that that must needs be a city1 which is constituted by a lord and many servants4 ,neither can any reason be brought to contradict this1 which doth not equally combat against a city constituted by a father and his sons4 ,for to a lord who hath no children1 servants are in the nature of sons2 for they are both his honour and safeguard2 neither are servants more subject to their lords1 then children to their parents1 as hath been manifested above in the fifth article of the eighth chapter4 ,sidenote3 ,the exactions are more grievous under command of the people1 than under the monarch4 #f4 ,among other grievances of supreme authority one is1 that the ruler1 beside those monies necessary for public charges1 as the maintaining of public ministers1 building1 and defending of castles1 waging wars1 honourably sustaining his own household1 may also1 if he will1 exact others through his lust1 whereby to enrich his sons1 kindred1 favourites1 and flatterers too4 ,i confess this is a grievance1 but of the number of those which accompany all kinds of government1 but are more tolerable in a monarchy than in a democracy4 ,for though the monarch would enrich them1 they cannot be many1 because belonging but to one4 ,but in a democracy1 look how many demagogues1 that is1 how many powerful orators there are with the people1 7which ever are many1 and daily new ones growing71 so many children1 kinsmen1 friends1 and flatterers are to be rewarded4 ,for every of them desire not only to make their families as potent1 as illustrious in wealth1 as may be1 but also to oblige others to them by benefits1 for the better strengthening of themselves4 ,a monarch may in great part satisfy his officers and friends1 because they are not many1 without any cost to his subjects2 ,i mean without robbing them of any of those treasures given in for the maintenance of war and peace4 ,in a democracy1 where many are to be satisfied1 and always new ones1 this cannot be done without the subject's oppression4 ,though a monarch may promote unworthy persons1 yet oft times he will not do it2 but in a democracy1 all the popular men are therefore supposed to do it1 because it is necessary2 for else the power of them who did it1 would so increase1 as it would not only become dreadful to those others1 but even to the whole city also4 ,sidenote3 ,innocent subjects are less obnoxious to punishment under a monarch1 than under the people4 #g4 ,another grievance is1 that same perpetual fear of death1 which every man must necessarily be in while he considers with himself1 that the ruler hath power not only to appoint what punishments he lists on any transgressions1 but that he may also in his wrath and sensuality slaughter his innocent subjects1 and those who never offended against the laws4 ,and truly this is a very great grievance in any form of government1 wheresoever it happens2 for it is therefore a grievance1 because it is1 not because it may be done4 ,but it is the fault of the ruler1 not of the government4 ,for all the acts of ,nero are not essential to monarchy2 yet subjects are less often undeservedly condemned under one ruler1 than under the people4 ,for kings are only severe against those who either trouble them with impertinent counsels1 or oppose them with reproachful words1 or control their wills2 but they are the cause that that excess of power which one subject might have above another1 becomes harmless4 ,wherefore some ,nero or ,caligula reigning1 no men can undeservedly suffer but such as are known to him1 namely1 courtiers1 and such as are remarkable for some eminent charge2 and not all neither1 but they only who are possessed of what he desires to enjoy4 ,for they that are offensive and contumelious1 are deservedly punished4 ,whosoever therefore in a monarchy will lead a retired life1 let him be what he will that reigns1 he is out of danger4 ,for the ambitious only suffer2 the rest are protected from the injuries of the more potent4 ,but in a popular dominion1 there may be as many ,neros as there are orators who soothe the people4 ,for each one of them can do as much as the people1 and they mutually give way to each other's appetite1 as it were by this secret pact1 spare me to-day and ,i'll spare thee to-morrow1 while they exempt those from punishment1 who to satisfy their lust and private hatred have undeservedly slain their fellow-subjects4 ,furthermore1 there is a certain limit in private power1 which if it exceed1 it may prove pernicious to the realm2 and by reason whereof it is necessary sometimes for monarchs to have a care1 that the common weal do thence receive no prejudice4 ,when therefore this power consisted in the multitude of riches1 they lessened it by diminishing their heaps2 but if it were in popular applause1 the powerful party1 without any other crime laid to his charge1 was taken from among them4 ,the same was usually practised in democracies4 ,for the ,athenians inflicted a punishment of ten years' banishment on those that were powerful1 merely because of their powers1 without the guilt of any other crime4 ,and those who by liberal gifts did seek the favour of the common people1 were put to death at ,rome1 as men ambitious of a kingdom4 ,in this democracy and monarchy were even2 yet differed they much in fame4 ,because fame derives from the people2 and what is done by many1 is commended by many4 ,and therefore what the monarch does1 is said to be done out of envy to their virtues2 which if it were done by the people1 would be accounted policy4 ,sidenote3 ,single persons have no less liberty under a monarch1 than under the people4 #h4 ,there are some1 who therefore imagine monarchy to be more grievous then democracy1 because there is less liberty in that1 than in this4 ,if by liberty they mean an exemption from that subjection which is due to the laws1 that is1 the commands of the people2 neither in democracy1 nor in any other state of government whatsoever1 is there any such kind of liberty4 ,if they suppose liberty to consist in this1 that there be few laws1 few prohibitions1 and those too such1 that except they were forbidden1 there could be no peace2 then ,i deny that there is more liberty in democracy than monarchy2 for the one as truly consisteth with such a liberty1 as the other4 ,for although the word liberty may in large and ample letters be written over the gates of any city whatsoever1 yet is it not meant the subject's1 but the city's liberty2 neither can that word with better right be inscribed on a city which is governed by the people1 than that which is ruled by a monarch4 ,but when private men or subjects demand liberty1 under the name of liberty they ask not for liberty1 but dominion2 which yet for want of understanding they little consider4 ,for if every man would grant the same liberty to another1 which he desires for himself1 as is commanded by the law of nature2 that same natural state would return again1 in which all men may by right do all things2 which if they knew1 they would abhor1 as being worse than all kinds of civil subjection whatsoever4 ,but if any man desire to have his single freedom1 the rest being bound1 what does he else demand but to have the dominion8 ,for whoso is freed from all bonds1 is lord over all those that still continue bound4 ,subjects therefore have no greater liberty in a popular1 than in a monarchical state4 ,that which deceives them1 is the equal participation of command and public places4 ,for where the authority is in the people1 single subjects do so far forth share in it1 as they are parts of the people ruling2 and they equally partake in public offices1 so far forth as they have equal voices in choosing magistrates and public ministers4 ,and this is that which ,aristotle aimed at1 himself also through the custom of that time miscalling dominion liberty4 7,polit4 lib4 vi4 cap4 #b47 ,in a popular state there is liberty by supposition2 which is a speech of the vulgar1 as if no man were free out of this state4 ,from whence1 by the way1 we may collect1 that those subjects who in a monarchy deplore their lost liberty1 do only stomach this1 that they are not received to the steerage of the commonweal4 ,sidenote3 ,it is no disadvantage to the subjects1 that they are not all admitted to the public deliberations4 #i4 ,but perhaps for this very reason1 some will say that a popular state is much to be preferred before a monarchical2 because that where all men have a hand in public businesses1 there all have an opportunity to shew their wisdom1 knowledge1 and eloquence1 in deliberating matters of the greatest difficulty and moment2 which by reason of that desire of praise which is bred in human nature1 is to them who excel in such-like faculties1 and seem to themselves to exceed others1 the most delightful of all things4 ,but in a monarchy1 this same way to obtain praise and honour is shut up to the greatest part of subjects2 and what is a grievance if this be none8 ,i will tell you3 to see his opinion1 whom we scorn1 preferred before ours2 to have our wisdom undervalued before our own faces2 by an uncertain trial of a little vain glory1 to undergo most certain enmities 7for this cannot be avoided1 whether we have the better or the worse72 to hate and to be hated1 by reason of the disagreement of opinions2 to lay open our secret councils and advices to all1 to no purpose and without any benefit2 to neglect the affairs of our own family3 these1 ,i say1 are grievances4 ,but to be absent from a trial of wits1 although those trials are pleasant to the eloquent1 is not therefore a grievance to them2 unless we will say1 that it is a grievance to valiant men to be restrained from fighting1 because they delight in it4 ,sidenote3 ,civil deliberations are unadvisedly committed to many1 by reason of the unskilfulness of most men3 #aj4 ,besides1 there are many reasons1 why deliberations are less successful in great assemblies than in lesser councils4 ,whereof one is1 that to advise rightly of all things conducing to the preservation of a commonweal1 we must not only understand matters at home1 but foreign affairs too4 ,at home1 by what goods the country is nourished and defended1 and whence they are fetched2 what places are fit to make garrisons of2 by what means soldiers are best to be raised and maintained2 what manner of affections the subjects bear towards their prince or governors of their country2 and many the like4 ,abroad1 what the power of each neighbouring country is1 and wherein it consists2 what advantage or disadvantage we may receive from them2 what their dispositions are both to us-ward1 and how affected to each other among themselves2 and what counsel daily passeth among them4 ,now1 because very few in a great assembly of men understand these things1 being for the most part unskilful1 that ,i say not incapable of them1 what can that same number of advisers with their impertinent opinions contribute to good counsels1 other than mere lets and impediments8 ,sidenote3 ,by reason of their eloquence3 #aa4 ,another reason why a great assembly is not so fit for consultation is1 because every one who delivers his opinion holds it necessary to make a long-continued speech2 and to gain the more esteem from his auditors1 he polishes and adorns it with the best and smoothest language4 ,now the nature of eloquence is to make good and evil1 profitable and unprofitable1 honest and dishonest1 appear to be more or less than indeed they are2 and to make that seem just which is unjust1 according as it shall best suit with his end that speaketh3 for this is to persuade4 ,and though they reason1 yet take they not their rise from true principles1 but from vulgar received opinions1 which for the most part are erroneous4 ,neither endeavour they so much to fit their speech to the nature of the things they speak of1 as to the passions of their minds to whom they speak2 whence it happens1 that opinions are delivered not by right reason1 but by a certain violence of mind4 ,nor is this fault in the man1 but in the nature itself of eloquence1 whose end1 as all the masters of rhetoric teach us1 is not truth 7except by chance71 but victory2 and whose property is not to inform1 but to allure4 ,sidenote3 ,by reason of faction3 #ab4 ,the third reason why men advise less successfully in a great convent is1 because that thence arise factions in a commonweal2 and out of factions1 seditions and civil war4 ,for when equal orators do combat with contrary opinions and speeches1 the conquered hates the conqueror and all those that were of his side1 as holding his council and wisdom in scorn1 and studies all means to make the advice of his adversaries prejudicial to the state3 for thus he hopes to see the glory taken from him1 and restored unto himself4 ,furthermore1 where the votes are not so unequal1 but that the conquered have hopes1 by the accession of some few of their own opinion1 at another sitting to make the stronger party1 the chief heads do call the rest together2 they advise a part how they may abrogate the former judgment given2 they appoint to be the first and earliest at the next convent2 they determine what1 and in what order each man shall speak1 that the same business may again be brought to agitation2 that so what was confirmed before by the number of their then present adversaries1 the same may now in some measure become of no effect to them1 being negligently absent4 ,and this same kind of industry and diligence which they use to make a people1 is commonly called a faction4 ,but when a faction is inferior in votes1 and superior1 or not much inferior in power1 then what they cannot obtain by craft and language1 they attempt by force of arms2 and so it comes to a civil war4 ,but some will say1 these things do not necessarily1 nor often happen4 ,he may as well say1 that the chief parties are not necessarily desirous of vain glory1 and that the greatest of them seldom disagree in great matters4 ,sidenote3 ,by reason of the unsettledness of the laws3 #ac4 ,it follows hence1 that when the legislative power resides in such convents as these1 the laws must needs be inconstant2 and change1 not according to the alteration of the state of affairs1 nor according to the changeableness of men's minds1 but as the major part1 now of this1 then of that faction1 do convene4 ,insomuch as the laws do float here and there1 as it were upon the waters4 ,sidenote3 ,for want of secrecy4 #ad4 ,in the fourth place1 the counsels of great assemblies have this inconvenience2 that whereas it is oft of great consequence that they should be kept secret1 they are for the most part discovered to the enemy before they can be brought to any effect2 and their power and will is as soon known abroad1 as to the people itself commanding at home4 ,sidenote3 ,these inconveniences do adhere to democracy1 forasmuch as men are naturally delighted with an opinion of wit4 #ae4 ,these inconveniences1 which are found in the deliberations of great assemblies1 do so far forth evince monarchy to be better than democracy1 as in democracy affairs of great consequence are oftener trusted to be discussed by such like committees1 than in a monarchy4 ,neither can it easily be done otherwise4 ,for there is no reason why every man should not naturally mind his own private1 than the public business1 but that here he sees a means to declare his eloquence1 whereby he may gain the reputation of being ingenious and wise1 and returning home to his friends1 to his parents1 to his wife and children1 rejoice and triumph in the applause of his dexterous behaviour4 ,as of old1 all the delight ,marcus ,coriolanus had in his warlike actions1 was to see his praises so well pleasing to his mother4 ,but if the people in a democracy would bestow the power of deliberating in matters of war and peace1 either on one1 or some very few1 being content with the nomination of magistrates and public ministers1 that is to say1 with the authority without the ministration2 then it must be confessed1 that in this particular democracy and monarchy would be equal4 ,sidenote3 ,the inconveniences of government proceeding from a king who is a child4 #af4 ,neither do the conveniences or inconveniences which are found to be more in one kind of government than another1 arise from hence1 namely1 because the government itself1 or the administration of its affairs1 are better committed to one than many2 or on the other side1 to many than to some few4 ,for government is the power1 the administration of it is the act4 ,now the power in all kinds of government is equal2 the acts only differ1 that is to say1 the actions and motions of a commonweal1 as they flow from the deliberations of many or few1 of skilful or impertinent men4 ,whence we understand1 that the conveniences or inconveniences of any government depend not on him in whom the authority resides1 but on his officers2 and therefore nothing hinders but that the commonweal may be well governed1 although the monarch be a woman1 or youth1 or infant1 provided that they be fit for affairs who are endued with the public offices and charges4 ,and that which is said1 woe to the land whose king is a child1 doth not signify the condition of a monarchy to be inferior to a popular state2 but contrariwise1 that by accident it is the grievance of a kingdom1 that the king being a child1 it often happens1 that many by ambition and power intruding themselves into public councils1 the government comes to be administered in a democratical manner2 and that thence arise those infelicities1 which for the most part accompany the dominion of the people4 ,sidenote3 ,the power of generals is an argument of the excellency of monarchy4 #ag4 ,but it is a manifest sign that the most absolute monarchy is the best state of government1 that not only kings1 but even those cities which are subject to the people or to nobles1 give the whole command of war to one only2 and that so absolute1 as nothing can be more4 ,wherein1 by the way1 this must be noted also2 that no king can give a general greater authority over his army1 than he himself by right may exercise over all his subjects4 ,monarchy therefore is the best of all governments in the camps4 ,but what else are many commonwealths1 than so many camps strengthened with arms and men against each other2 whose state1 because not restrained by any common power1 howsoever an uncertain peace1 like a short truce1 may pass between them1 is to be accounted for the state of nature2 which is the state of war4 ,sidenote3 ,the best state of a commonweal1 is that where the subjects are the ruler's inheritance4 #ah4 ,lastly1 since it was necessary for the preservation of ourselves to be subject to some man or council1 we cannot on better condition be subject to any1 than one whose interest depends upon our safety and welfare2 and this then comes to pass1 when we are the inheritance of the ruler4 ,for every man of his own accord endeavours the preservation of his inheritance4 ,but the lands and monies of the subjects are not only the prince's treasure1 but their bodies and wildy minds4 ,which will be easily granted by those1 who consider at how great rates the dominion of lesser countries is valued2 and how much easier it is for men to procure money1 than money men4 ,nor do we readily meet with any example that shows us when any subject1 without any default of his own1 hath by his prince been despoiled of his life or goods1 through the sole licentiousness of his authority4 ,sidenote3 ,aristocracy is so much better1 by how much it approaches nearer to monarchy2 the worse1 by how much it is more distant from it4 #ai4 ,hitherto we have compared a monarchical with a popular state2 we have said nothing of aristocracy4 ,we may conclude of this1 by what hath been said of those1 that that which is hereditary1 and content with the election of magistrates2 which transmits its deliberations to some few1 and those most able2 which simply imitates the government of monarchs most1 and the people least of all2 is for the subjects both better and more lasting than the rest4 ------- ,,chapter ,,xi4 ,,places ,,and ,,examples ,,of ,,scripture ,,of ,,the ,,rights ,,of ,,government1 ,,agreeable ,,to ,,what ,,hath ,,been ,,said ,,before4 #a4 ,the beginning of institutive government from the consent of the people4 #b4 ,judicature and wars depend on the will of supreme commanders4 #c4 ,that they who have the chief authority1 are by right unpunishable4 #d4 ,that without a supreme power there is no government1 but anarchy4 #e4 ,that from servants and sons there is a simple obedience due to their lords and parents4 #f4 ,absolute authority proved by most evident places1 as well of the ,new as the ,old ,testament4 ,sidenote3 ,the beginning of institutive government from the consent of the people4 #a4 ,we have1 in the sixth chapter and the second article1 so derived the original of institutive or political government from the consent of the multitude1 that it appears they must either all consent1 or be esteemed as enemies4 ,such was the beginning of ,god's government over the ,jews instituted by ,moses1 7,exod4 xix4 #e-h73 ,if ye will obey my voice indeed1 c4 ,ye shall be unto me a kingdom of priests1 c4 ,and ,moses came and called the elders of the people1 c4 ,and all the people answered1 and said3 ,all that the ,lord hath spoken we will do4 ,such also was the beginning of ,moses's power under ,god1 or his vicegerency1 7,exod4 xx4 #ah-ai73 ,and all the people saw the thunderings and lightenings1 and the noise of the trumpet1 c4 ,and they said unto ,moses1 speak thou unto us1 and we will hear4 ,the like beginning also had ,saul's kingdom1 7#a ,sam4 xii4 #ab1 #ac73 ,when ye saw that ,nahash king of the children of ,ammon came out against you1 ye said unto me1 nay1 but a king shall reign over us1 when the ,lord your ,god was your king4 ,now therefore behold the king whom ye have chosen1 and whom ye have desired4 ,but the major part only consenting1 and not all2 for there were certain sons of ,belial1 who said1 7#a ,sam4 x4 #bg71 ,how shall this man save us8 ,and they despised him2 those who did not consent1 were put to death as enemies4 ,and the people said unto ,samuel 7#a ,sam4 xi4 #ab73 ,who is he that said1 shall ,saul reign over us8 ,bring the men1 that we may put them to death4 ,sidenote3 ,the power of judicature1 and determination of wars1 depend on the will of the supreme officer4 #b4 ,in the same sixth chapter1 the sixth and seventh articles1 ,i have showed that all judgment and wars depend upon the will and pleasure of him who bears the supreme authority2 that is to say1 in a monarchy1 on a monarch or king2 and this is confirmed by the people's own judgment4 #a ,sam4 viii4 #bj2 ,we also will be like all the nations1 and our king shall judge us1 and go out before us1 and fight our battles4 ,and what pertains to judgments1 and all other matters whereof there is any controversy1 whether they be good or evil1 is confirmed by the testimony of ,king ,solomon1 7#a ,kings iii4 #i73 ,give therefore thy servant an understanding heart to judge thy people1 that ,i may discern between good and evil4 ,and that of ,absolom1 7#b ,sam4 xv4 #c73 ,there is no man deputed of the king to hear thee4 ,sidenote3 ,they who have the supreme authority are by right unpunishable4 #c4 ,that kings may not be punished by their subjects1 as hath been showed above in the sixth chapter and the twelfth article1 ,king ,david also confirms2 who1 though ,saul sought to slay him1 did notwithstanding refrain his hand from killing him1 and forbade ,abishai1 saying1 7#a ,sam4 xxvi4 #i73 ,destroy him not2 for who can stretch forth his hand against the ,lords anointed1 and be innocent8 ,and when he had cut off the skirt of his garment1 7#a ,sam4 xxiv4 #f73 ,the ,lord forbid1 saith he1 that ,i should do this thing unto my master the ,lord's anointed1 to stretch forth mine hand against him4 ,and 7#b ,sam4 i4 #ae7 commanded the ,amalekite1 who for his sake had slain ,saul1 to be put to death4 ,sidenote3 ,that without a supreme power there is no government1 but confusion4 #d4 ,that which is said in the seventeenth chapter of ,judges1 at the sixth verse3 ,in those days there was no king in ,israel1 but every man did that which was right in his own eyes3 as though where there were not a monarchy1 there were an anarchy or confusion of all things3 may be brought as a testimony to prove the excellency of monarchy above all other forms of government2 unless that by the word king may perhaps be understood not one man only1 but also a court2 provided that in it there reside a supreme power4 ,which if it be taken in this sense1 yet hence it may follow1 that without a supreme and absolute power 7which we have endeavoured to prove in the sixth chapter7 there will be a liberty for every man to do what he hath a mind1 or whatsoever shall seem right to himself2 which cannot stand with the preservation of mankind4 ,and therefore in all government whatsoever1 there is ever a supreme power understood to be somewhere existent4 ,sidenote3 ,that servants and sons owe their lords and parents simple obedience4 #e4 ,we have1 in chap4 ,,viii4 art4 #g and #h1 said that servants must yield a simple obedience to their lords1 and in chap ,,ix4 art4 #g1 that sons owe the same obedience to their parents4 ,saint ,paul says the same thing concerning servants 7,coloss4 iii4 #bb73 ,servants obey in all things your masters according to the flesh1 not with eye-service1 as men-pleasers1 but in singleness of heart1 fearing ,god4 ,concerning sons 7,colos4 iii4 #bj73 ,children obey your parents in all things1 for this is well-pleasing unto the ,lord4 ,now as we by simple obedience understand all things which are not contrary to the laws of ,god2 so in those cited places of ,st4 ,paul1 after the word all things1 we must suppose1 excepting those which are contrary to the laws of ,god4 ,sidenote3 ,the absolute power of princes proved by most evident testimonies of the ,scripture1 as well ,new as ,old4 #f4 ,but that ,i may not thus by piecemeal prove the right of princes1 ,i will now instance those testimonies which altogether establish the whole power2 namely1 that there is an absolute and simple obedience due to them from their subjects4 ,and first out of the ,new ,testament3 ,matth4 xxiii4 #b1 #c3 ,the ,scribes and ,pharisees sit in ,moses' seat2 all therefore1 whatsoever they bid you observe1 that observe and do4 ,whatsoever they bid you 7says ,christ7 observe1 that is to say1 obey simply4 ,why8 ,because they sit in ,moses' seat2 namely1 the civil magistrate's1 not ,aaron1 the priest's4 ,rom4 xiii4 #a1 #b3 ,let every soul be subject to the higher powers2 for there is no power but of ,god2 the powers that be are ordained of ,god2 whosoever therefore resisteth the power1 resisteth the ordinance of ,god2 and they that resist1 shall receive to themselves damnation4 ,now because the powers that were in ,st4 ,paul's time1 were ordained of ,god1 and all kings did at that time require an absolute entire obedience from their subjects1 it follows that such a power was ordained of ,god4 #a ,peter ii4 #ac-ae3 ,submit yourselves unto every ordinance of man for the ,lord's sake1 whether it be to the king as supreme1 or unto governors as unto them that are sent by him for the punishment of wicked doers1 and for the praise of them that do well2 for so is the will of ,god4 ,again ,st4 ,paul to ,titus1 7chap4 iii4 #a73 ,put them in mind to be subject to principalities and powers1 to obey magistrates1 c4 ,what principalities8 ,was it not to the principalities of those times1 which required an absolute obedience8 ,furthermore1 that we may come to the example of ,christ himself1 to whom the kingdom of the ,jews belonged by hereditary right derived from ,david himself2 he1 when he lived in the manner of a subject1 both paid tribute unto ,csar1 and pronounced it to be due to him1 ,matth4 xxii4 #ba3 ,give unto ,csar 7saith he7 the things which are ,csar's1 and unto ,god the things which are ,god's4 ,when it pleased him to show himself a king1 he required entire obedience1 ,matth4 xxi4 #b1 #c3 ,go 7said he7 into the village over against you1 and straight-way ye shall find an ass tied1 and a colt with her2 loose them1 and bring them unto me2 and if any man say aught unto you1 ye shall say the ,lord hath need of them4 ,this he did therefore by the right of being lord1 or a king of the ,jews4 ,but to take away a subject's goods on this pretence only1 because the ,lord hath need of them1 is an absolute power4 ,the most evident places in the ,old ,testament are these3 ,deut4 v4 #bg3 ,go thou near1 and hear all that the ,lord our ,god shall say2 and speak thou unto us all that the ,lord our ,god shall speak unto thee1 and we will hear it1 and do it4 ,but under the word all1 is contained absolute obedience4 ,again to ,joshua 7,joshua i4 #af-ah73 ,and they answered ,joshua1 saying1 all that thou commandest us1 we will do2 and whithersoever thou sendest us1 we will go2 according as we hearkened unto ,moses in all things1 so will we hearken unto thee2 only the ,lord thy ,god be with thee1 as he was with ,moses2 whosoever he be that doth rebel against thy commandment1 and will not hearken unto thy words in all that thou commandest him1 he shall be put to death4 ,and the parable of the bramble 7,judges ix4 #ad1 #ae73 ,then said all the trees unto the bramble1 ,come thou and reign over us4 ,and the bramble said unto the trees1 ,if in truth ye anoint me king over you1 then come and put your trust in my shadow2 and if not1 let fire come out of the bramble1 and devour the cedars of ,lebanon4 ,the sense of which words is1 that we must acquiesce to their sayings1 whom we have truly constituted to be kings over us1 unless we would choose rather to be consumed by the fire of a civil war4 ,but the regal authority is more particularly described by ,god himself1 in #a ,sam4 viii4 #i1 c43 ,show them the right of the king that shall reign over them1 c4 ,this shall be the right of the king that shall reign over you2 he will take your sons1 and appoint them for himself1 for his chariots1 and to be his horsemen1 and some shall run before his chariots1 c4 ,and he will take your daughters to be confectionaries1 c4 ,and he will take your vineyards1 and give them to his servants1 c4 ,is not this power absolute8 ,and yet it is by ,god himself styled the king's right4 ,neither was any man among the ,jews1 no not the high-priest himself1 exempted from this obedience4 ,for when the king1 namely1 ,solomon1 said to ,abiathar the priest 7#a ,kings ii4 #bf1 #bg73 ,get thee to ,anathoth unto thine own fields2 for thou art worthy of death2 but ,i will not at this time put thee to death1 because thou barest the ark of the ,lord ,god before ,david my father1 and because thou hast been afflicted in all wherein my father was afflicted4 ,so ,solomon thrust out ,abiathar from being priest unto the ,lord2 it cannot by any argument be proved1 that this act of his displeased the ,lord2 neither read we1 that either ,solomon was reproved1 or that his person at that time was any whit less acceptable to ,god4 ------- ,,chapter ,,xii4 ,,of ,,the ,,internal ,,causes ,,tending ,,to ,,the ,,dissolution ,,of ,,any ,,government4 #a4 ,that the judging of good and evil belongs to private persons is a seditious opinion4 #b4 ,that subjects do sin by obeying their princes is a seditious opinion4 #c4 ,that tyrannicide is lawful is a seditious opinion4 #d4 ,that those who have the supreme power are subject to the civil laws is a seditious opinion4 #e4 ,that the supreme power may be divided is a seditious opinion4 #f4 ,that faith and sanctity are not acquired by study and reason1 but always supernaturally infused and inspired1 is a seditious opinion4 #g4 ,that each subject hath a propriety or absolute dominion of his own goods is a seditious opinion4 #h4 ,not to understand the difference between the people and the multitude1 prepares toward sedition4 #i4 ,too great a tax of money1 though never so just and necessary1 prepares toward sedition4 #aj4 ,ambition disposeth us to sedition4 #aa4 ,so doth the hope of success4 #ab4 ,eloquence alone without wisdom1 is the only faculty needful to raise seditions4 #ac4 ,how the folly of the common people1 and the elocution of ambitious men1 concur to the destruction of a common-weal4 ,sidenote3 ,that the judgment of good and evil belongs to private persons1 is a seditious opinion4 #a4 ,hitherto hath been spoken1 by what causes and pacts commonweals are constituted1 and what the rights of princes are over their subjects4 ,now we will briefly say somewhat concerning the causes which dissolve them1 or the reasons of seditions4 ,now as in the motion of natural bodies three things are to be considered1 namely1 internal disposition1 that they be susceptible of the motion to be produced2 the external agent1 whereby a certain and determined motion may in act be produced2 and the action itself3 so also in a commonweal where the subjects begin to raise tumults1 three things present themselves to our regard2 first1 the doctrines and the passions contrary to peace1 wherewith the minds of men are fitted and disposed2 next1 their quality and condition who solicit1 assemble1 and direct them1 already thus disposed1 to take up arms and quit their allegiance2 lastly1 the manner how this is done1 or the faction itself4 ,but one and the first which disposeth them to sedition1 is this1 that the knowledge of good and evil belongs to each single man4 ,in the state of nature indeed1 where every man lives by equal right1 and has not by any mutual pacts submitted to the command of others1 we have granted this to be true2 nay1 proved it in chap4 ,i4 art4 #i4 ,but in the civil state it is false4 ,for it was shown 7chap4 ,,vi4 art4 #i7 that the civil laws were the rules of good and evil1 just and unjust1 honest and dishonest2 that therefore what the legislator commands1 must be held for good1 and what he forbids for evil4 ,and the legislator is ever that person who hath the supreme power in the commonweal1 that is to say1 the monarch in a monarchy4 ,we have confirmed the same truth in chap4 ,,xi4 art4 #b1 out of the words of ,solomon4 ,for if private men may pursue that as good and shun that as evil1 which appears to them to be so1 to what end serve those words of his3 ,give therefore unto thy servant an understanding heart1 to judge thy people1 that ,i may discern between good and evil8 ,since therefore it belongs to kings to discern between good and evil1 wicked are those1 though usual1 sayings1 that he only is a king who does righteously1 and that kings must not be obeyed unless they command us just things2 and many other such like4 ,before there was any government1 just and unjust had no being1 their nature only being relative to some command3 and every action in its own nature is indifferent2 that it becomes just or unjust1 proceeds from the right of the magistrate4 ,legitimate kings therefore make the things they command just1 by commanding them1 and those which they forbid1 unjust1 by forbidding them4 ,but private men1 while they assume to themselves the knowledge of good and evil1 desire to be even as kings2 which cannot be with the safety of the commonweal4 ,the most ancient of all ,god's commands is1 7,gen4 ii4 #ag73 ,thou shalt not eat of the tree of knowledge of good and evil3 and the most ancient of all diabolical temptations1 7,gen4 iii4 #e73 ,ye shall be as gods1 knowing good and evil2 and ,god's expostulation with man1 7verse #aa73 ,who told thee that thou wert naked8 ,hast thou eaten of the tree1 whereof ,i commanded thee that thou shouldst not eat8 ,as if he had said1 how comest thou to judge that nakedness1 wherein it seemed good to me to create thee1 to be shameful1 except thou have arrogated to thyself the knowledge of good and evil4 ,sidenote3 ,that subjects do sin in obeying their princes1 is a seditious opinion4 #b4 ,whatsoever any man doth against his conscience1 is a sin2 for he who doth so1 contemns the law4 ,but we must distinguish4 ,that is my sin indeed1 which committing ,i do believe to be my sin2 but what ,i believe to be another man's sin1 ,i may sometimes do that without any sin of mine4 ,for if ,i be commanded to do that which is a sin in him who commands me1 if ,i do it1 and he that commands me be by right lord over me1 ,i sin not4 ,for if ,i wage war at the commandment of my prince1 conceiving the war to be unjustly undertaken1 ,i do not therefore do unjustly2 but rather if ,i refuse to do it1 arrogating to myself the knowledge of what is just and unjust1 which pertains only to my prince4 ,they who observe not this distinction1 will fall into a necessity of sinning1 as oft as anything is commanded them which either is1 or seems to be unlawful to them3 for if they obey1 they sin against their conscience2 and if they obey not1 against right4 ,if they sin against their conscience1 they declare that they fear not the pains of the world to come2 if they sin against right1 they do1 as much as in them lies1 abolish human society and the civil life of the present world4 ,their opinion therefore who teach1 that subjects sin when they obey their prince's commands which to them seem unjust1 is both erroneous1 and to be reckoned among those which are contrary to civil obedience2 and it depends upon that original error which we have observed above1 in the foregoing article4 ,for by our taking upon us to judge of good and evil1 we are the occasion that as well our obedience1 as disobedience1 becomes sin unto us4 ,sidenote3 ,that tyrannicide is lawful1 is a seditious opinion4 #c4 ,the third seditious doctrine springs from the same root1 that tyrannicide is lawful2 nay1 at this day it is by many divines1 and of old it was by all the philosophers1 ,plato1 ,aristotle1 ,cicero1 ,seneca1 ,plutarch1 and the rest of the maintainers of the ,greek and ,roman anarchies1 held not only lawful1 but even worthy of the greatest praise4 ,and under the title of tyrants1 they mean not only monarchs1 but all those who bear the chief rule in any government whatsoever2 for not ,pisistratus only at ,athens1 but those ,thirty also who succeeded him1 and ruled together1 were all called tyrants4 ,but he whom men require to be put to death as being a tyrant1 commands either by right or without right4 ,if without right1 he is an enemy1 and by right to be put to death2 but then this must not be called the killing a tyrant1 but an enemy4 ,if by right1 then the divine interrogation takes place3 ,who hath told thee that he was a tyrant8 ,hast thou eaten of the tree1 whereof ,i commanded thee that thou shouldst not eat8 ,for why dost thou call him a tyrant1 whom ,god hath made a king1 except that thou1 being a private person1 usurpest to thyself the knowledge of good and evil8 ,but how pernicious this opinion is to all governments1 but especially to that which is monarchical1 we may hence discern2 namely1 that by it every king1 whether good or ill1 stands exposed to be condemned by the judgment1 and slain by the hand of every murderous villain4 ,sidenote3 ,that even they who have the supreme power are subject to the civil laws1 is a seditious opinion4 #d4 ,the fourth opinion adversary to civil society1 is their's who hold1 that they who bear rule are subject also to the civil laws4 ,which hath been sufficiently proved before not to be true1 in chap ,,vi4 art4 #ad1 from this argument3 that a city can neither be bound to itself1 nor to any subject2 not to itself1 because no man can be obliged except it be to another2 not to any subject1 because the single wills of the subjects are contained in the will of the city2 insomuch that if the city will be free from all such obligation1 the subjects will so too2 and by consequence she is so4 ,but that which holds true in a city1 that must be supposed to be true in a man1 or an assembly of men who have the supreme authority2 for they make a city1 which hath no being but by their supreme power4 ,now that this opinion cannot consist with the very being of government1 is evident from hence2 that by it the knowledge of what is good and evil1 that is to say1 the definition of what is1 and what is not against the laws1 would return to each single person4 ,obedience therefore will cease1 as oft as anything seems to be commanded contrary to the civil laws1 and together with it all coercive jurisdiction2 which cannot possibly be without the destruction of the very essence of government4 ,yet this error hath great props1 ,aristotle and others2 who1 by reason of human infirmity1 suppose the supreme power to be committed with most security to the laws only4 ,but they seem to have looked very shallowly into the nature of government1 who thought that the constraining power1 the interpretation of laws1 and the making of laws1 all which are powers necessarily belonging to government1 should be left wholly to the laws themselves4 ,now although particular subjects may sometimes contend in judgment1 and go to law with the supreme magistrate2 yet this is only then1 when the question is not what the magistrate may1 but what by a certain rule he hath declared he would do4 ,as1 when by any law the judges sit upon the life of a subject1 the question is not whether the magistrate could by his absolute right deprive him of his life2 but whether by that law his will was that he should be deprived of it4 ,but his will was1 he should1 if he brake the law2 else his will was1 he should not4 ,this therefore1 that a subject may have an action of law against his supreme magistrate1 is not strength of argument sufficient to prove1 that he is tied to his own laws4 ,on the contrary1 it is evident that he is not tied to his own laws2 because no man is bound to himself4 ,laws therefore are set for ,titius and ,caius1 not for the ruler4 ,however1 by the ambition of lawyers it is so ordered1 that the laws to unskilful men seem not to depend on the authority of the magistrate1 but their prudence4 ,sidenote3 ,that the supreme power may be divided1 is a seditious opinion4 #e4 ,in the fifth place1 that the supreme authority may be divided1 is a most fatal opinion to all commonweals4 ,but diverse men divide it diverse ways4 ,for some divide it1 so as to grant a supremacy to the civil power in matters pertaining to peace and the benefits of this life2 but in things concerning the salvation of the soul they transfer it on others4 ,now1 because justice is of all things most necessary to salvation1 it happens that subjects measuring justice1 not as they ought1 by the civil laws1 but by the precepts and doctrines of them who1 in regard of the magistrate1 are either private men or strangers1 through a superstitious fear dare not perform the obedience due to their princes2 through fear falling into that which they most feared4 ,now what can be more pernicious to any state1 than that men should1 by the apprehension of everlasting torments1 be deterred from obeying their princes1 that is to say1 the laws2 or from being just8 ,there are also some1 who divide the supreme authority so as to allow the power of war and peace unto one whom they call a monarch2 but the right of raising money they give to some others1 and not to him4 ,but because monies are the sinews of war and peace1 they who thus divide the authority1 do either really not divide it at all1 but place it wholly in them in whose power the money is1 but give the name of it to another3 or if they do really divide it1 they dissolve the government4 ,for neither upon necessity can war be waged1 nor can the public peace be preserved without money4 ,sidenote3 ,that faith and holiness are not acquired by study and reason1 but are ever supernaturally infused and inspired1 is a seditious opinion4 #f4 ,it is a common doctrine1 that faith and holiness are not acquired by study and natural reason1 but are always supernaturally infused and inspired into men4 ,which1 if it were true1 ,i understand not why we should be commanded to give an account of our faith2 or why any man1 who is truly a ,christian1 should not be a prophet2 or lastly1 why every man should not judge what is fit for him to do1 what to avoid1 rather out of his own inspiration1 than by the precepts of his superiors or right reason4 ,a return therefore must be made to the private knowledge of good and evil2 which cannot be granted without the ruin of all governments4 ,this opinion hath spread itself so largely through the whole ,christian world1 that the number of apostates from natural reason is almost become infinite4 ,and it sprang from sick-brained men1 who having gotten good store of holy words by frequent reading of the ,scriptures1 made such a connexion of them usually in their preaching1 that their sermons1 signifying just nothing1 yet to unlearned men seemed most divine4 ,for he whose nonsense appears to be a divine speech1 must necessarily seem to be inspired from above4 ,sidenote3 ,that single subjects have any propriety or absolute dominion over their own goods1 is a seditious opinion4 #g4 ,the seventh doctrine opposite to government1 is this2 that each subject hath an absolute dominion over the goods he is in possession of3 that is to say1 such a propriety as excludes not only the right of all the rest of his fellow-subjects to the same goods1 but also of the magistrate himself4 ,which is not true2 for they who have a lord over them1 have themselves no lordship1 as hath been proved chap4 viii4 art4 #e4 ,now the magistrate is lord of all his subjects1 by the constitution of government4 ,before the yoke of civil society was undertaken1 no man had any proper right2 all things were common to all men4 ,tell me therefore1 how gottest thou this propriety but from the magistrate8 ,how got the magistrate it1 but that every man transferred his right on him8 ,and thou therefore hast also given up thy right to him4 ,thy dominion therefore1 and propriety1 is just so much as he will1 and shall last so long as he pleases2 even as in a family1 each son hath such proper goods1 and so long lasting1 as seems good to the father4 ,but the greatest part of men who profess civil prudence1 reason otherwise4 ,we are equal1 say they1 by nature2 there is no reason why any man should by better right take my goods from me1 than ,i his from him4 ,we know that money sometimes is needful for the defence and maintenance of the public2 but let them who require it1 show us the present necessity1 and they shall receive it4 ,they who talk thus know not1 that what they would have1 is already done from the beginning1 in the very constitution of government2 and therefore speaking as in a dissolute multitude and yet not fashioned government1 they destroy the frame4 ,sidenote3 ,not to know the difference between a people and a multitude1 prepares to sedition4 #h4 ,in the last place1 it is a great hindrance to civil government1 especially monarchical1 that men distinguish not enough between a people and a multitude4 ,the people is somewhat that is one1 having one will1 and to whom one action may be attributed2 none of these can properly be said of a multitude4 ,the people rules in all governments4 ,for even in monarchies the people commands2 for the people wills by the will of one man2 but the multitude are citizens1 that is to say1 subjects4 ,in a democracy and aristocracy1 the citizens are the multitude1 but the court is the people4 ,and in a monarchy1 the subjects are the multitude1 and 7however it seem a paradox7 the king is the people4 ,the common sort of men1 and others who little consider these truths1 do always speak of a great number of men as of the people1 that is to say1 the city4 ,they say1 that the city hath rebelled against the king 7which is impossible71 and that the people will and nill what murmuring and discontented subjects would have or would not have2 under pretence of the people stirring up the citizens against the city1 that is to say1 the multitude against the people4 ,and these are almost all the opinions1 wherewith subjects being tainted do easily tumult4 ,and forasmuch as in all manner of government majesty is to be preserved by him or them1 who have the supreme authority2 the crimen ls majestatis naturally cleaves to these opinions4 ,sidenote3 ,too great a tax of money1 though never so just and necessary1 disposeth men to sedition4 #i4 ,there is nothing more afflicts the mind of man than poverty1 or the want of those things which are necessary for the preservation of life and honour4 ,and though there be no man but knows1 that riches are gotten with industry1 and kept by frugality1 yet all the poor commonly lay the blame on the evil government1 excusing their own sloth and luxury2 as if their private goods forsooth were wasted by public exactions4 ,but men must consider1 that they who have no patrimony1 must not only labour that they may live1 but fight too that they may labour4 ,every one of the ,jews1 who in ,esdras' time built the walls of ,jerusalem1 did the work with one hand1 and held the sword in the other4 ,in all government1 we must conceive that the hand which holds the sword1 is the king or supreme council1 which is no less to be sustained and nourished by the subjects' care and industry1 than that wherewith each man procures himself a private fortune2 and that customs and tributes are nothing else but their reward who watch in arms for us1 that the labours and endeavours of single men may not be molested by the incursion of enemies2 and that their complaint1 who impute their poverty to public persons1 is not more just1 than if they should say that they are become in want by paying of their debts4 ,but the most part of men consider nothing of these things4 ,for they suffer the same thing with them who have a disease they call an incubus2 which springing from gluttony1 it makes men believe they are invaded1 oppressed1 and stifled with a great weight4 ,now it is a thing manifest of itself1 that they who seem to themselves to be burthened with the whole load of the commonweal1 are prone to be seditious2 and that they are affected with change1 who are distasted at the present state of things4 ,sidenote3 ,ambition disposeth men to sedition3 #aj4 ,another noxious disease of the mind is theirs1 who having little employment1 want honour and dignity4 ,all men naturally strive for honour and preferment2 but chiefly they1 who are least troubled with caring for necessary things4 ,for these men are invited by their vacancy1 sometimes to disputation among themselves concerning the commonweal1 sometimes to an easy reading of histories1 politics1 orations1 poems1 and other pleasant books2 and it happens that hence they think themselves sufficiently furnished both with wit and learning1 to administer matters of the greatest consequence4 ,now because all men are not what they appear to themselves2 and if they were1 yet all 7by reason of the multitude7 could not be received to public offices2 it is necessary that many must be passed by4 ,these therefore conceiving themselves affronted1 can desire nothing more1 partly out of envy to those who were preferred before them1 partly out of hope to overwhelm them1 than ill-success to the public consultations4 ,and therefore it is no marvel1 if with greedy appetites they seek for occasions of innovations4 ,sidenote3 ,so doth hope of success4 #aa4 ,the hope of overcoming is also to be numbered among other seditious inclinations4 ,for let there be as many men as you will1 infected with opinions repugnant to peace and civil government2 let there be as many as there can1 never so much wounded and torn with affronts and calumnies by them who are in authority2 yet if there be no hope of having the better of them1 or it appear not sufficient1 there will no sedition follow2 every man will dissemble his thoughts1 and rather content himself with the present burthen than hazard a heavier weight4 ,there are four things necessarily requisite to this hope4 ,numbers1 instruments1 mutual trust1 and commanders4 ,to resist public magistrates without a great number1 is not sedition1 but desperation4 ,by instruments of war1 ,i mean all manner of arms1 munition1 and other necessary provision3 without which number can do nothing4 ,nor arms neither1 without mutual trust4 ,nor all these1 without union under some commander1 whom of their own accord they are content to obey2 not as being engaged by their submission to his command2 7for we have already in this very chapter1 supposed these kind of men not to understand being obliged beyond that which seems right and good in their own eyes72 but for some opinion they have of his virtue1 or military skill1 or resemblance of humours4 ,if these four be near at hand to men grieved with the present state1 and measuring the justice of their actions by their own judgments2 there will be nothing wanting to sedition and confusion of the realm1 but one to stir up and quicken them4 ,sidenote3 ,eloquence alone without wisdom is the only faculty needful to raise seditions4 #ab4 ,sallust's character of ,cataline1 than whom there never was a greater artist in raising seditions1 is this3 that he had great eloquence1 and little wisdom4 ,he separates wisdom from eloquence2 attributing this as necessary to a man born for commotions2 adjudging that as an instructress of peace and quietness4 ,now eloquence is twofold4 ,the one is an elegant and clear expression of the conceptions of the mind2 and riseth partly from the contemplation of the things themselves1 partly from an understanding of words taken in their own proper and definite signification4 ,the other is a commotion of the passions of the mind1 such as are hope1 fear1 anger1 pity2 and derives from a metaphorical use of words fitted to the passions4 ,that forms a speech from true principles2 this from opinions already received1 what nature soever they are of4 ,the art of that is logic1 of this rhetoric2 the end of that is truth1 of this victory4 ,each hath its use2 that in deliberations1 this in exhortations2 for that is never disjoined from wisdom1 but this almost ever4 ,but that this kind of powerful eloquence1 separated from the true knowledge of things1 that is to say1 from wisdom1 is the true character of them who solicit and stir up the people to innovations1 may easily be gathered out of the work itself which they have to do4 ,for they could not poison the people with those absurd opinions contrary to peace and civil society1 unless they held them themselves2 which sure is an ignorance greater than can well befall any wise man4 ,for he that knows not whence the laws derive their power1 which are the rules of just and unjust1 honest and dishonest1 good and evil2 what makes and preserves peace among men1 what destroys it2 what is his1 and what another's2 lastly1 what he would have done to himself1 that he may do the like to others3 is surely to be accounted but meanly wise4 ,but that they can turn their auditors out of fools into madmen2 that they can make things to them who are ill-affected1 seem worse1 to them who are well-affected1 seem evil2 that they can enlarge their hopes1 lessen their dangers beyond reason3 this they have from that sort of eloquence1 not which explains things as they are1 but from that other1 which by moving their minds1 makes all things to appear to be such as they in their minds1 prepared before1 had already conceived them4 ,sidenote3 ,how the folly of the common people1 and the eloquence of ambitious men1 concur to the dissolution of a commonweal4 #ac4 ,many men1 who are themselves very well affected to civil society1 do through want of knowledge co-operate to the disposing of subjects' minds to sedition1 whilst they teach young men a doctrine conformable to the said opinions in their schools1 and all the people in their pulpits4 ,now they who desire to bring this disposition into act1 place their whole endeavour in this3 first1 that they may join the ill-affected together into faction and conspiracy2 next1 that themselves may have the greatest stroke in the faction4 ,they gather them into faction1 while they make themselves the relators and interpreters of the counsels and actions of single men1 and nominate the persons and places to assemble and deliberate of such things whereby the present government may be reformed1 according as it shall seem best to their interests4 ,now to the end that they themselves may have the chief rule in the faction1 the faction must be kept in a faction2 that is to say1 they must have their secret meetings apart with a few1 where they may order what shall afterward be propounded in a general meeting1 and by whom1 and on what subject1 and in what order each of them shall speak1 and how they may draw the powerfullest and most popular men of the faction to their side4 ,and thus when they have gotten a faction big enough1 in which they may rule by their eloquence1 they move it to take upon it the managing of affairs4 ,and thus they sometimes oppress the commonwealth1 namely1 where there is no other faction to oppose them2 but for the most part they rend it1 and introduce a civil war4 ,for folly and eloquence concur in the subversion of government1 in the same manner 7as the fable hath it7 as heretofore the daughters of ,pelias1 king of ,thessaly1 conspired with ,medea against their father4 ,they going to restore the decrepit old man to his youth again1 by the counsel of ,medea they cut him into pieces1 and set him in the fire to boil2 in vain expecting when he would live again4 ,so the common people1 through their folly1 like the daughters of ,pelias1 desiring to renew the ancient government1 being drawn away by the eloquence of ambitious men1 as it were by the witchcraft of ,medea2 divided into faction they consume it rather by those flames1 than they reform it4 ------- ,,chapter ,,xiii4 ,,concerning ,,the ,,duties ,,of ,,them ,,who ,,bear ,,rule4 #a4 ,the right of supreme authority is distinguished from its exercise4 #b4 ,the safety of the people is the supreme law4 #c4 ,it behoves princes to regard the common benefit of many1 not the peculiar interest of this or that man4 #d4 ,that by safety is understood all manner of conveniences4 #e4 ,a query1 whether it be the duty of kings to provide for the salvation of their subjects' souls1 as they shall judge best according to their own consciences4 #f4 ,wherein the safety of the people consists4 #g4 ,that discoverers are necessary for the defence of the people4 #h4 ,that to have soldiers1 arms1 garrisons1 and moneys in readiness1 in time of peace1 is also necessary for the defence of the people4 #i4 ,a right instruction of subjects in civil doctrines1 is necessary for the preserving of peace4 #aj4 ,equal distributions of public offices conduces much to the preservation of peace4 #aa4 ,it is natural equity1 that monies be taxed according to what every man spends1 not what he possesses4 #ab4 ,it conduceth to the preservation of peace1 to keep down ambitious men4 #ac4 ,and to break factions4 #ad4 ,laws whereby thriving arts are cherished and great costs restrained1 conduce to the enriching of the subject4 #ae4 ,that more ought not to be defined by the laws1 than the benefit of the prince and his subjects requires4 #af4 ,that greater punishments must not be inflicted1 than are prescribed by the laws4 #ac4 ,subjects must have right done them against corrupt judges4 ,sidenote3 ,the right of supreme authority is distinguished from its exercise4 #a4 ,by what hath hitherto been said1 the duties of citizens and subjects in any kind of government whatsoever1 and the power of the supreme ruler over them are apparent4 ,but we have as yet said nothing of the duties of rulers1 and how they ought to behave themselves towards their subjects4 ,we must then distinguish between the right and the exercise of supreme authority2 for they can be divided4 ,as for example1 when he who hath the right1 either cannot or will not be present in judging trespasses1 or deliberating of affairs4 ,for kings sometimes by reason of their age cannot order their affairs2 sometimes also1 though they can do it themselves1 yet they judge it fitter1 being satisfied in the choice of their officers and counsellors1 to exercise their power by them4 ,now where the right and exercise are severed1 there the government of the commonweal is like the ordinary government of the world2 in which ,god1 the mover of all things1 produceth natural effects by the means of secondary causes4 ,but where he to whom the right of ruling doth belong1 is himself present in all judicatures1 consultations1 and public actions1 there the administration is such1 as if ,god1 beyond the ordinary course of nature1 should immediately apply himself unto all matters4 ,we will therefore in this chapter summarily and briefly speak somewhat concerning their duties1 who exercise authority1 whether by their own or other's right4 ,nor is it my purpose to descend into those things1 which being diverse from others1 some princes may do1 for this is to be left to the political practices of each commonweal4 ,sidenote3 ,the safety of the people is the supreme law4 #b4 ,now all the duties of rulers are contained in this one sentence1 the safety of the people is the supreme law4 ,for although they who among men obtain the chiefest dominion1 cannot be subject to laws properly so called1 that is to say1 to the will of men1 because to be chief and subject1 are contradictories2 yet is it their duty in all things1 as much as possibly they can1 to yield obedience unto right reason1 which is the natural1 moral1 and divine law4 ,but because dominions were constituted for peace's sake1 and peace was sought after for safety's sake2 he1 who being placed in authority1 shall use his power otherwise than to the safety of the people1 will act against the reasons of peace1 that is to say1 against the laws of nature4 ,now as the safety of the people dictates a law by which princes know their duty1 so doth it also teach them an art how to procure themselves a benefit2 for the power of the citizens is the power of the city1 that is to say1 his that bears the chief rule in any state4 ,sidenote3 ,it is the duty of princes to respect the common benefit of many1 not the peculiar interest of this or that man4 #c4 ,by the people in this place we understand1 not one civil person1 namely1 the city itself which governs1 but the multitude of subjects which are governed4 ,for the city was not instituted for its own1 but for the subjects' sake3 and yet a particular care is not required of this or that man4 ,for the ruler 7as such7 provides no otherwise for the safety of his people1 than by his laws1 which are universal2 and therefore he hath fully discharged himself1 if he have thoroughly endeavoured by wholesome constitutions to establish the welfare of the most part1 and made it as lasting as may be2 and that no man suffer ill1 but by his own default1 or by some chance which could not be prevented4 ,but it sometimes conduces to the safety of the most part1 that wicked men do suffer4 ,sidenote3 ,by safety is understood all manner of benefits4 #d4 ,but by safety must be understood1 not the sole preservation of life in what condition soever1 but in order to its happiness4 ,for to this end did men freely assemble themselves and institute a government1 that they might1 as much as their human condition would afford1 live delightfully4 ,they therefore who had undertaken the administration of power in such a kind of government1 would sin against the law of nature1 7because against their trust1 who had committed that power unto them71 if they should not study1 as much as by good laws could be effected1 to furnish their subjects abundantly1 not only with the good things belonging to life1 but also with those which advance to delectation4 ,they who have acquired dominion by arms1 do all desire that their subjects may be strong in body and mind1 that they may serve them the better4 ,wherefore if they should not endeavour to provide them1 not only with such things whereby they may live1 but also with such whereby they may grow strong and lusty1 they would act against their own scope and end4 ,sidenote3 ,query1 whether it be the duty of kings to provide for the salvation of their subjects' souls1 as they shall judge best in their own consciences4 #e4 ,and first of all1 princes do believe that it mainly concerns eternal salvation1 what opinions are held of the ,deity1 and what manner of worship he is to be adored with4 ,which being supposed1 it may be demanded whether chief rulers1 and whosoever they be1 whether one or more1 who exercise supreme authority1 sin not against the law of nature1 if they cause not such a doctrine and worship to be taught and practised1 or permit a contrary to be taught and practised1 as they believe necessarily conduceth to the eternal salvation of their subjects4 ,it is manifest that they act against their conscience2 and that they will1 as much as in them lies1 the eternal perdition of their subjects4 ,for if they willed it not1 ,i see no reason why they should suffer 7when being supreme they cannot be compelled7 such things to be taught and done1 for which they believe them to be in a damnable state4 ,but we will leave this difficulty in suspense4 ,sidenote3 ,wherein the safety of the people consists4 #f4 ,the benefits of subjects1 respecting this life only1 may be distributed into four kinds4 #a4 ,that they be defended against foreign enemies4 #b4 ,that peace be preserved at home4 #c4 ,that they be enriched1 as much as may consist with public security4 #d4 ,that they enjoy a harmless liberty4 ,for supreme commanders can confer no more to their civil happiness1 than that being preserved from foreign and civil wars1 they may quietly enjoy that wealth which they have purchased by their own industry4 ,sidenote3 ,that discoverers are necessary for the defence of the people4 #g4 ,there are two things necessary for the people's defence2 to be warned and to be forearmed4 ,for the state of commonwealths considered in themselves1 is natural1 that is to say1 hostile4 ,neither if they cease from fighting1 is it therefore to be called peace2 but rather a breathing time1 in which one enemy observing the motion and countenance of the other1 values his security not according to the pacts1 but the forces and counsels of his adversary4 ,and this by natural right1 as hath been showed in chap4 ,,ii4 art4 #aa1 from this1 that contracts are invalid in the state of nature1 as oft as any just fear doth intervene4 ,it is therefore necessary to the defence of the city1 first1 that there be some who may1 as near as may be1 search into and discover the counsels and motions of all those who may prejudice it4 ,for discoverers to ministers of state1 are like the beams of the sun to the human soul4 ,and we may more truly say in vision political1 than natural1 that the sensible and intelligible species of outward things1 not well considered by others1 are by the air transported to the soul2 that is to say1 to them who have the supreme authority3 and therefore are they no less necessary to the preservation of the state1 than the rays of the light are to the conservation of man4 ,or if they be compared to spider's webs1 which1 extended on all sides by the finest threads1 do warn them1 keeping in their small holes1 of all outward motions2 they who bear rule1 can no more know what is necessary to be commanded for the defence of their subjects without spies1 than those spiders can1 when they shall go forth1 and whither they shall repair1 without the motion of those threads4 ,sidenote3 ,to have soldiers1 arms1 garrisons1 and money in readiness in time of peace1 is necessary for the people's defence4 #h4 ,furthermore1 it is necessarily requisite to the people's defence1 that they be forearmed4 ,now to be forearmed is to be furnished with soldiers1 arms1 ships1 forts1 and monies1 before the danger be instant2 for the lifting of soldiers and taking up of arms after a blow is given1 is too late at least1 if not impossible4 ,in like manner1 not to raise forts and appoint garrisons in convenient places before the frontiers are invaded1 is to be like those country swains1 7as ,demosthenes said71 who ignorant of the art of fencing1 with their bucklers guarded those parts of the body where they first felt the smart of the strokes4 ,but they who think it then seasonable enough to raise monies for the maintenance of soldiers and other charges of war1 when the danger begins to show itself1 they consider not1 surely1 how difficult a matter it is to wring suddenly out of close-fisted men so vast a proportion of monies4 ,for almost all men1 what they once reckon in the number of their goods1 do judge themselves to have such a right and propriety in it1 as they conceive themselves to be injured whensoever they are forced to employ but the least part of it for the public good4 ,now a sufficient stock of monies to defend the country with arms1 will not soon be raised out of the treasure of imposts and customs4 ,we must therefore1 for fear of war1 in time of peace hoard up good sums1 if we intend the safety of the commonweal4 ,since therefore it necessarily belongs to rulers1 for the subjects' safety to discover the enemy's counsel1 to keep garrisons1 and to have money in continual readiness2 and that princes are1 by the law of nature1 bound to use their whole endeavour in procuring the welfare of their subjects3 it follows1 that it is not only lawful for them to send out spies1 to maintain soldiers1 to build forts1 and to require monies for these purposes2 but also not to do thus is unlawful4 ,to which also may be added1 whatsoever shall seem to conduce to the lessening of the power of foreigners whom they suspect1 whether by slight or force4 ,for rulers are bound according to their power to prevent the evils they suspect2 lest peradventure they may happen through their negligence4 ,sidenote3 ,a right instruction of subjects in civil doctrines1 is necessary for the preserving of peace4 #i4 ,but many things are required to the conservation of inward peace2 because many things concur 7as hath been showed in the foregoing chapter7 to its perturbation4 ,we have there showed1 that some things there are1 which dispose the minds of men to sedition1 others which move and quicken them so disposed4 ,among those which dispose them1 we have reckoned in the first place certain perverse doctrines4 ,it is therefore the duty of those who have the chief authority1 to root those out of the minds of men1 not by commanding1 but by teaching2 not by the terror of penalties1 but by the perspicuity of reasons4 ,the laws whereby this evil may be withstood1 are not to be made against the persons erring1 but against the errors themselves4 ,those errors which1 in the foregoing chapter1 we affirmed were inconsistent with the quiet of the commonweal1 have crept into the minds of ignorant men1 partly from the pulpit1 partly from the daily discourses of men1 who1 by reason of little employment otherwise1 do find leisure enough to study2 and they got into these men's minds by the teachers of their youth in public schools4 ,wherefore also1 on the other side1 if any man would introduce sound doctrine1 he must begin from the academies4 ,there the true and truly demonstrated foundations of civil doctrine are to be laid2 wherewith young men1 being once endued1 they may afterward1 both in private and public1 instruct the vulgar4 ,and this they will do so much the more cheerfully and powerfully1 by how much themselves shall be more certainly convinced of the truth of those things they profess and teach4 ,for seeing at this day men receive propositions1 though false1 and no more intelligible than if a man should join together a company of terms drawn by chance out of an urn1 by reason of the frequent use of hearing them2 how much more would they for the same reason entertain true doctrines1 suitable to their own understandings and the nature of things8 ,i therefore conceive it to be the duty of supreme officers1 to cause the true elements of civil doctrine to be written1 and to command them to be taught in all the colleges of their several dominions4 ,sidenote3 ,equal distribution of public burthens conduceth much to the preservation of peace4 #aj4 ,in the next place we showed1 that grief of mind arising from want did dispose the subjects to sedition2 which want1 although derived from their own luxury and sloth1 yet they impute it to those who govern the realm1 as though they were drained and oppressed by public pensions4 ,notwithstanding1 it may sometimes happen that this complaint may be just2 namely1 when the burthens of the realm are unequally imposed on the subjects2 for that which to all together is but a light weight1 if many withdraw themselves it will be very heavy1 nay1 even intolerable to the rest3 neither are men wont so much to grieve at the burthen itself1 as at the inequality4 ,with much earnestness therefore men strive to be freed from taxes2 and in this conflict the less happy1 as being overcome1 do envy the more fortunate4 ,to remove therefore all just complaint1 it is the interest of the public quiet1 and by consequence it concerns the duty of the magistrate1 to see that the public burthens be equally borne4 ,furthermore1 since what is brought by the subjects to public use1 is nothing else but the price of their bought peace1 it is good reason that they who equally share in the peace1 should also pay an equal part1 either by contributing their monies or their labours to the commonweal4 ,now it is the law of nature1 7by art4 #ae1 chap4 ,,iii71 that every man in distributing right to others1 do carry himself equal to all4 ,wherefore rulers are1 by the natural law1 obliged to lay the burthens of the commonweal equally on their subjects4 ,sidenote3 ,it is natural equity1 that monies be taxed according to what every man spends1 not to what he possesseth4 #aa4 ,now in this place we understand an equality1 not of money1 but of burthen2 that is to say1 an equality of reason between the burthens and the benefits4 ,for although all equally enjoy peace1 yet the benefits springing from thence are not equal to all2 for some get greater possessions1 others less2 and again1 some consume less1 others more4 ,it may therefore be demanded1 whether subjects ought to contribute to the public according to the rate of what they gain1 or of what they spend3 that is to say1 whether the persons must be taxed1 so as to pay contribution according to their wealth2 or the goods themselves1 that every man contribute according to what he spends4 ,but if we consider1 where monies are raised according to wealth1 there they who have made equal gain1 have not equal possessions1 because that one preserves what he hath got by frugality1 another wastes it by luxury1 and therefore equally rejoicing in the benefit of peace1 they do not equally sustain the burthens of the commonweal3 and on the other side1 where the goods themselves are taxed1 there every man1 while he spends his private goods1 in the very act of consuming them he undiscernably pays part due to the commonweal1 according to1 not what he hath1 but what by the benefit of the realm he hath had3 it is no more to be doubted1 but that the former way of commanding monies is against equity1 and therefore against the duty of rulers2 the latter is agreeable to reason1 and the exercise of their authority4 ,sidenote3 ,it conduces to the preservation of peace1 to depress the ambitious4 #ab4 ,in the third place we said1 that that trouble of mind which riseth from ambition1 was offensive to public peace4 ,for there are some1 who seeming to themselves to be wiser than others1 and more sufficient for the managing of affairs than they who at present do govern1 when they can no otherwise declare how profitable their virtue would prove to the commonweal1 they show it by harming it4 ,but because ambition and greediness of honours cannot be rooted out of the minds of men1 it is not the duty of rulers to endeavour it2 but by constant application of rewards and punishments they may so order it1 that men may know that the way to honour is not by contempt of the present government1 nor by factions and the popular air1 but by the contraries4 ,they are good men who observe the decrees1 the laws1 and rights of their fathers4 ,if with a constant order we saw these adorned with honours1 but the factious punished and had in contempt by those who bear command1 there would be more ambition to obey than withstand4 ,notwithstanding1 it so happens sometimes1 that as we must stroke a horse by reason of his too much fierceness1 so a stiff-necked subject must be flattered for fear of his power2 but as that happens when the rider1 so this when the commander is in danger of falling4 ,but we speak here of those whose authority and power is entire4 ,their duty1 ,i say1 it is to cherish obedient subjects1 and to depress the factious all they can2 nor can the public power be otherwise preserved1 nor the subjects' quiet without it4 ,sidenote3 ,and to dissolve factions4 #ac4 ,but if it be the duty of princes to restrain the factious1 much more does it concern them to dissolve and dissipate the factions themselves4 ,now ,i call a faction1 a multitude of subjects gathered together either by mutual contracts among themselves1 or by the power of some one1 without his or their authority who bear the supreme rule4 ,a faction1 therefore1 is as it were a city in a city3 for as by an union of men in the state of nature1 a city receives its being1 so by a new union of subjects there ariseth a faction4 ,according to this definition1 a multitude of subjects who have bound themselves simply to obey any foreign prince or subject1 or have made any pacts or leagues of mutual defence between themselves against all men1 not excepting those who have the supreme power in the city1 is a faction4 ,also favour with the vulgar1 if it be so great that by it an army may be raised1 except public caution be given either by hostages or some other pledges1 contains faction in it4 ,the same may be said of private wealth1 if it exceed2 because all things obey money4 ,forasmuch therefore as it is true1 that the state of cities among themselves is natural and hostile1 those princes who permit factions1 do as much as if they received an enemy within their walls3 which is contrary to the subjects' safety1 and therefore also against the law of nature4 ,sidenote3 ,laws whereby gaining arts are cherished and great expenses restrained1 do conduce much to the enriching of the subject4 #ad4 ,there are two things necessary to the enriching of the subjects1 labour and thrift2 there is also a third which helps1 to wit1 the natural increase of the earth and water2 and there is a fourth too1 namely1 the militia1 which sometimes augments1 but more frequently lessens the subjects' stock4 ,the two first only are necessary4 ,for a city constituted in an island of the sea1 no greater than will serve for dwelling1 may grow rich without sowing or fishing1 by merchandize and handicrafts only2 but there is no doubt1 if they have a territory1 that they may be richer with the same number1 or equally rich being a greater number4 ,but the fourth1 namely1 the militia1 was of old reckoned in the number of the gaining arts1 under the notion of booting or taking prey2 and it was by mankind1 dispersed by families before the constitution of civil societies1 accounted just and honourable4 ,for preying is nothing else but a war waged with small forces4 ,and great commonweals1 namely1 that of ,rome and ,athens1 by the spoils of war1 foreign tribute1 and the territories they have purchased by their arms1 have sometimes so improved the commonwealth1 that they have not only not required any public monies from the poorer sort of subjects1 but have also divided to each of them both monies and lands4 ,but this kind of increase of riches is not to be brought into rule and fashion4 ,for the militia1 in order to profit1 is like a die2 wherewith many lose their estates1 but few improve them4 ,since therefore there are three things only1 the fruits of the earth and water1 labour1 and thrift1 which are expedient for the enriching of subjects1 the duty of commanders in chief shall be conversant only about those three4 ,for the first those laws will be useful1 which countenance the arts that improve the increase of the earth and water2 such as are husbandry and fishing4 ,for the second all laws against idleness1 and such as quicken industry1 are profitable2 as such whereby the art of navigation1 by help whereof the commodities of the whole world1 bought almost by labour only1 are brought into one city2 and the mechanics1 under which ,i comprehend all the arts of the most excellent workmen2 and the mathematical sciences1 the fountains of navigatory and mechanic employments1 are held in due esteem and honour4 ,for the third those laws are useful1 whereby all inordinate expense1 as well in meats as in clothes1 and universally in all things which are consumed with usage1 is forbidden4 ,now because such laws are beneficial to the ends above specified1 it belongs also to the office of supreme magistrates to establish them4 ,sidenote3 ,that more ought not to be determined by the laws1 than the benefit of prince and subjects require4 #ae4 ,the liberty of subjects consists not in being exempt from the laws of the city1 or that they who have the supreme power cannot make what laws they have a mind to4 ,but because all the motions and actions of subjects are never circumscribed by laws1 nor can be1 by reason of their variety2 it is necessary that there be infinite cases which are neither commanded nor prohibited1 but every man may either do or not do them as he lists himself4 ,in these1 each man is said to enjoy his liberty2 and in this sense liberty is to be understood in this place1 namely1 for that part of natural right which is granted and left to subjects by the civil laws4 ,as water inclosed on all hands with banks1 stands still and corrupts2 having no bounds1 it spreads too largely1 and the more passages it finds the more freely it takes its current2 so subjects1 if they might do nothing without the commands of the law1 would grow dull and unwieldy2 if all1 they would be dispersed2 and the more is left undetermined by the laws1 the more liberty they enjoy4 ,both extremes are faulty2 for laws were not invented to take away1 but to direct men's actions2 even as nature ordained the banks1 not to stay1 but to guide the course of the stream4 ,the measure of this liberty is to be taken from the subjects' and the city's good4 ,wherefore1 in the first place1 it is against the charge of those who command and have the authority of making laws1 that there should be more laws than necessarily serve for good of the magistrate and his subjects4 ,for since men are wont commonly to debate what to do or not to do1 by natural reason rather than any knowledge of the laws1 where there are more laws than can easily be remembered1 and whereby such things are forbidden as reason of itself prohibits not of necessity1 they must through ignorance1 without the least evil intention1 fall within the compass of laws1 as gins laid to entrap their harmless liberty2 which supreme commanders are bound to preserve for their subjects by the laws of nature4 ,sidenote3 ,that greater punishments must not be inflicted1 than are prescribed by the laws4 #af4 ,it is a great part of that liberty1 which is harmless to civil government and necessary for each subject to live happily1 that there be no penalties dreaded but what they may both foresee and look for2 and this is done1 where there are either no punishments at all defined by the laws1 or greater not required than are defined4 ,where there are none defined1 there he that hath first broken the law1 expects an indefinite or arbitrary punishment2 and his fear is supposed boundless1 because it relates to an unbounded evil4 ,now the law of nature commands them who are not subject to any civil laws1 by what we have said in chap4 ,,iii4 art4 #aa1 and therefore supreme commanders1 that in taking revenge and punishing they must not so much regard the past evil as the future good2 and they sin1 if they entertain any other measure in arbitrary punishment than the public benefit4 ,but where the punishment is defined2 either by a law prescribed1 as when it is set down in plain words that he that shall do thus or thus1 shall suffer so and so2 or by practice1 as when the penalty1 not by any law prescribed1 but arbitrary from the beginning1 is afterward determined by the punishment of the first delinquent2 7for natural equity commands that equal transgressors be equally punished72 there to impose a greater penalty than is defined by the law1 is against the law of nature4 ,for the end of punishment is not to compel the will of man1 but to fashion it1 and to make it such as he would have it who hath set the penalty4 ,and deliberation is nothing else but a weighing1 as it were in scales1 the conveniences and inconveniences of the fact we are attempting2 where that which is more weighty1 doth necessarily according to its inclination prevail with us4 ,if therefore the legislator doth set a less penalty on a crime1 than will make our fear more considerable with us than our lust1 that excess of lust above the fear of punishment1 whereby sin is committed1 is to be attributed to the legislator1 that is to say1 to the supreme2 and therefore if he inflict a greater punishment than himself hath determined in his laws1 he punisheth that in another in which he sinned himself4 ,sidenote3 ,subjects must have right restored to them against corrupt judges4 #ag4 ,it pertains therefore to the harmless and necessary liberty of subjects1 that every man may without fear enjoy the rights which are allowed him by the laws4 ,for it is in vain to have our own distinguished by the laws from another's1 if by wrong judgment1 robbery1 or theft1 they may be again confounded4 ,but it falls out so1 that these do happen where judges are corrupted4 ,for the fear whereby men are deterred from doing evil1 ariseth not from hence1 namely1 because penalties are set1 but because they are executed4 ,for we esteem the future by what is past1 seldom expecting what seldom happens4 ,if therefore judges corrupted either by gifts1 favour1 or even by pity itself1 do often forbear the execution of the penalties due by the law1 and by that means put wicked men in hope to pass unpunished3 honest subjects encompassed with murderers1 thieves1 and knaves1 will not have the liberty to converse freely with each other1 nor scarce to stir abroad without hazard2 nay1 the city itself is dissolved1 and every man's right of protecting himself at his own will returns to him4 ,the law of nature therefore gives this precept to supreme commanders1 that they not only do righteousness themselves1 but that they also by penalties cause the judges1 by them appointed1 to do the same2 that is to say1 that they hearken to the complaints of their subjects2 and as oft as need requires1 make choice of some extraordinary judges1 who may hear the matter debated concerning the ordinary ones4 ------- ,,chapter ,,xiv4 ,,of ,,laws ,,and ,,trespasses4 #a4 ,how law differs from counsel4 #b4 ,how from covenant4 #c4 ,how from right4 #d4 ,division of laws into divine and human3 the divine into natural and positive2 and the natural into the laws of single men and of nations4 #e4 ,the division of human1 that is to say1 of civil laws into sacred and secular4 #f4 ,into distributive and vindicative4 #g4 ,that distributive and vindicative are not species1 but parts of the laws4 #h4 ,all law is supposed to have a penalty annexed to it4 #i4 ,the precepts of the decalogue of honouring parents1 of murder1 adultery1 theft1 false witness1 are civil laws4 #aj4 ,it is impossible to command aught by the civil law contrary to the law of nature4 #aa4 ,it is essential to a law1 both that itself and also the lawgiver be known4 #ab4 ,whence the lawgiver comes to be known4 #ac4 ,publishing and interpretation are necessary to the knowledge of a law4 #ad4 ,the division of the civil law into written and unwritten4 #ae4 ,the natural laws are not written laws2 neither are the wise sentences of lawyers nor custom laws of themselves1 but by the consent of the supreme power4 #af4 ,what the word sin1 most largely taken1 signifies4 #ag4 ,the definition of sin4 #ah4 ,the difference between a sin of infirmity and malice4 #ai4 ,under what kind of sin atheism is contained4 #bj4 ,what treason is4 #ba4 ,that by treason not the civil1 but the natural laws are broken4 #bb4 ,and that therefore it is to be punished not by the right of dominion1 but by the right of war4 #bc4 ,that obedience is not rightly distinguished into active and passive4 ,sidenote3 ,how law differs from counsel4 #a4 ,they who less seriously consider the force of words1 do sometimes confound law with counsel1 sometimes with covenant1 sometimes with right4 ,they confound law with counsel1 who think that it is the duty of monarchs not only to give ear to their counsellors1 but also to obey them2 as though it were in vain to take counsel1 unless it were also followed4 ,we must fetch the distinction between counsel and law1 from the difference between counsel and command4 ,now counsel is a precept1 in which the reason of my obeying it is taken from the thing itself which is advised2 but command is a precept1 in which the cause of my obedience depends on the will of the commander4 ,for it is not properly said1 thus ,i will and thus ,i command1 except the will stand for a reason4 ,now when obedience is yielded to the laws1 not for the thing itself1 but by reason of the adviser's will1 the law is not a counsel1 but a command1 and is defined thus3 law is the command of that person1 whether man or court1 whose precept contains in it the reason of obedience3 as the precepts of ,god in regard of men1 of magistrates in respect of their subjects1 and universally of all the powerful in respect of them who cannot resist1 may be termed their laws4 ,law and counsel therefore differ many ways4 ,law belongs to him who hath power over them whom he adviseth2 counsel to them who have no power4 ,to follow what is prescribed by law1 is duty2 what by counsel1 is free-will4 ,counsel is directed to his end1 that receives it2 law1 to his that gives it4 ,counsel is given to none but the willing2 law even to the unwilling4 ,to conclude1 the right of the counsellor is made void by the will of him to whom he gives counsel2 the right of the law-giver is not abrogated at the pleasure of him who hath a law imposed4 ,sidenote3 ,how it differs from a covenant4 #b4 ,they confound law and covenant1 who conceive the laws to be nothing else but certain 1 or forms of living determined by the common consent of men4 ,among whom is ,aristotle1 who defines law on this manner2 ' 1 3 that is to say1 law is a speech1 limited according to the common consent of the city1 declaring every thing that we ought to do4 ,which definition is not simply of law1 but of the civil law4 ,for it is manifest that the divine laws sprang not from the consent of men1 nor yet the laws of nature4 ,for if they had their original from the consent of men1 they might also by the same consent be abrogated2 but they are unchangeable4 ,but indeed1 that is no right definition of a civil law4 ,for in that place1 a city is taken either for one civil person1 having one will2 or for a multitude of men1 who have each of them the liberty of their private wills4 ,if for one person1 those words common consent are ill-placed here2 for one person hath no common consent4 ,neither ought he to have said1 declaring what was needful to be done1 but commanding2 for what the city declares1 it commands its subjects4 ,he therefore by a city understood a multitude of men1 declaring by common consent 7imagine it a writing confirmed by votes7 some certain forms of living4 ,but these are nothing else but some mutual contracts1 which oblige not any man 7and therefore are no laws7 before that a supreme power being constituted1 which can compel1 have sufficient remedy against the rest1 who otherwise are not likely to keep them4 ,laws therefore1 according to this definition of ,aristotle1 are nothing else but naked and weak contracts2 which then at length1 when there is one who by right doth exercise the supreme power1 shall either become laws or no laws at his will and pleasure4 ,wherefore he confounds contracts with laws1 which he ought not to have done2 for contract is a promise1 law a command4 ,in contracts we say1 ,i will do this2 in laws1 do this4 ,contracts oblige us2#af laws tie us fast1 being obliged4 ,a contract obligeth of itself2 the law holds the party obliged by virtue of the universal contract of yielding obedience4 ,therefore in contract1 it is first determined what is to be done1 before we are obliged to do it2 but in law1 we are first obliged to perform1 and what is to be done is determined afterwards4 ,aristotle therefore ought to have defined a civil law thus3 a civil law is a speech limited by the will of the city1 commanding everything behoveful to be done4 ,which is the same with that we have given above1 in chap4 ,,vi4 art4 #i3 to wit1 that the civil laws are the command of him1 whether man or court of men1 who is endued with supreme power in the city1 concerning the future actions of his subjects4 ,footnote #af3 ,contracts oblige us4 ,to be obliged1 and to be tied being obliged1 seems to some men to be one and the same thing2 and that therefore here seems to be some distinction in words1 but none indeed4 ,more clearly therefore1 ,i say thus3 that a man is obliged by his contracts1 that is1 that he ought to perform for his promise sake2 but that the law ties him being obliged1 that is to say1 it compels him to make good his promise for fear of the punishment appointed by the law4 ,sidenote3 ,how it differs from right4 #c4 ,they confound laws with right1 who continue still to do what is permitted by divine right1 notwithstanding it be forbidden by the civil law4 ,that which is prohibited by the divine law1 cannot be permitted by the civil2 neither can that which is commanded by the divine law1 be prohibited by the civil4 ,notwithstanding1 that which is permitted by the divine right1 that is to say1 that which may be done by divine right1 doth no whit hinder why the same may not be forbidden by the civil laws2 for inferior laws may restrain the liberty allowed by the superior1 although they cannot enlarge them4 ,now natural liberty is a right not constituted1 but allowed by the laws4 ,for the laws being removed1 our liberty is absolute4 ,this is first restrained by the natural and divine laws2 the residue is bounded by the civil law2 and what remains1 may again be restrained by the constitutions of particular towns and societies4 ,there is great difference therefore between law and right4 ,for law is a fetter1 right is freedom2 and they differ like contraries4 ,sidenote3 ,the division of laws into divine and human2 and of the divine into natural and positive2 and of the natural into those laws of single men1 and those of nations4 #d4 ,all law may be divided1 first according to the diversity of its authors into divine and human4 ,the divine1 according to the two ways whereby ,god hath made known his will unto men1 is twofold2 natural or moral1 and positive4 ,natural is that which ,god hath declared to all men by his eternal word born with them1 to wit1 their natural reason2 and this is that law1 which in this whole book ,i have endeavoured to unfold4 ,positive is that1 which ,god hath revealed to us by the word of prophecy1 wherein he hath spoken unto men as a man4 ,such are the laws which he gave to the ,jews concerning their government and divine worship2 and they may be termed the divine civil laws1 because they were peculiar to the civil government of the ,jews1 his peculiar people4 ,again1 the natural law may be divided into that of men1 which alone hath obtained the title of the law of nature2 and that of cities1 which may be called that of nations1 but vulgarly it is termed the right of nations4 ,the precepts of both are alike4 ,but because cities once instituted do put on the personal proprieties of men1 that law1 which speaking of the duty of single men we call natural1 being applied to whole cities and nations1 is called the right of nations4 ,and the same elements of natural law and right1 which have hitherto been spoken of1 being transferred to whole cities and nations1 may be taken for the elements of the laws and right of nations4 ,sidenote3 ,the division of human1 that is to say1 civil laws into secular and sacred4 #e4 ,all human law is civil4 ,for the state of men considered out of civil society1 is hostile2 in which1 because one is not subject to another1 there are no other laws beside the dictates of natural reason1 which is the divine law4 ,but in civil government the city only1 that is to say1 that man or court to whom the supreme power of the city is committed1 is the legislator2 and the laws of the city are civil4 ,the civil laws may be divided1 according to the diversity of their subject matter1 into sacred or secular4 ,sacred are those which pertain to religion1 that is to say1 to the ceremonies and worship of ,god3 to wit1 what persons1 things1 places1 are to be consecrated1 and in what fashion2 what opinions concerning the ,deity are to be taught publicly2 and with what words and in what order supplications are to be made2 and the like2 and are not determined by any divine positive law4 ,for the civil sacred laws are the human laws 7which are also called ecclesiastical7 concerning things sacred2 but the secular1 under a general notion1 are usually called the civil laws4 ,sidenote3 ,into distributive and vindicative4 #f4 ,again1 the civil law 7according to the two offices of the legislator1 whereof one is to judge1 the other to constrain men to acquiesce to his judgments7 hath two parts2 the one distributive1 the other vindicative or penal4 ,by the distributive it is1 that every man hath his proper rights2 that is to say1 it sets forth rules for all things1 whereby we may know what is properly our's1 what another man's2 so as others may not hinder us from the free use and enjoyment of our own1 and we may not interrupt others in the quiet possession of their's2 and what is lawful for every man to do or omit1 and what is not lawful4 ,vindicative is that1 whereby it is defined what punishment shall be inflicted on them who break the law4 ,sidenote3 ,distributive and vindicative are not two species of the laws4 #g4 ,now distributive and vindicative are not two several species of the laws1 but two parts of the same law4 ,for if the law should say no more1 but 7for example7 whatsoever you take with your net in the sea1 be it yours1 it is in vain4 ,for although another should take that away from you which you have caught1 it hinders not but that it still remains yours4 ,for in the state of nature where all things are common to all1 yours and others are all one2 insomuch as what the law defines to be yours1 was yours even before the law1 and after the law ceases not to be yours1 although in another man's possession4 ,wherefore the law doth nothing1 unless it be understood to be so yours1 as all other men be forbidden to interrupt your free use and secure enjoyment of it at all times1 according to your own will and pleasure4 ,for this is that which is required to a propriety of goods2 not that a man may be able to use them1 but to use them alone2 which is done by prohibiting others to be an hinderance to him4 ,but in vain do they also prohibit any men1 who do not withal strike a fear of punishment into them4 ,in vain therefore is the law1 unless it contain both parts1 that which forbids injuries to be done1 and that which punisheth the doers of them4 ,the first of them1 which is called distributive1 is prohibitory1 and speaks to all2 the second1 which is styled vindicative or penary1 is mandatory1 and only speaks to public ministers4 ,sidenote3 ,all law is supposed to have a penalty annexed to it4 #h4 ,from hence also we may understand1 that every civil law hath a penalty annexed to it1 either explicitly or implicitly4 ,for where the penalty is not defined1 neither by any writing1 nor by example of any who hath suffered the punishment of the transgressed law1 there the penalty is understood to be arbitrary2 namely1 to depend on the will of the legislator1 that is to say1 of the supreme commander4 ,for in vain is that law1 which may be broken without punishment4 ,sidenote3 ,the precepts of the ,decalogue of honouring parents1 of murder1 adultery1 theft1 false witnesses1 are the civil laws4 #i4 ,now because it comes from the civil laws1 both that every man have his proper right and distinguished from another's1 and also that he is forbidden to invade another's rights2 it follows that these precepts3 ,thou shalt not refuse to give the honour defined by the laws1 unto thy parents3 ,thou shalt not kill the man1 whom the laws forbid thee to kill3 ,thou shalt avoid all copulation forbidden by the laws3 ,thou shalt not take away another's goods1 against the lords will3 ,thou shalt not frustrate the laws and judgments by false testimony3 are civil laws4 ,the natural laws command the same things1 but implicitly4 ,for the law of nature 7as hath been said in chap4 ,,iii4 art4 #b7 commands us to keep contracts2 and therefore also to perform obedience1 when we have covenanted obedience1 and to abstain from another's goods1 when it is determined by the civil law what belongs to another4 ,but all subjects 7by chap4 ,,vi4 art4 #ac7 do covenant to obey his commands who hath the supreme power1 that is to say1 the civil laws1 in the very constitution of government1 even before it is possible to break them4 ,for the law of nature did oblige in the state of nature2 where first1 because nature hath given all things to all men1 nothing did properly belong to another1 and therefore it was not possible to invade another's right2 next1 where all things were common1 and therefore all carnal copulations lawful2 thirdly1 where was the state of war1 and therefore lawful to kill2 fourthly1 where all things were determined by every man's own judgment1 and therefore paternal respects also2 lastly1 where there were no public judgments1 and therefore no use of bearing witness1 either true or false4 ,sidenote3 ,it is not possible to command aught by the civil law1 contrary to the laws of nature4 #aj4 ,seeing therefore our obligation to observe those laws is more ancient than the promulgation of the laws themselves1 as being contained in the very constitution of the city2 by the virtue of the natural law which forbids breach of covenant1 the law of nature commands us to keep all the civil laws4 ,for where we are tied to obedience before we know what will be commanded us1 there we are universally tied to obey in all things4 ,whence it follows1 that no civil law whatsoever1 which tends not to a reproach of the ,deity1 7in respect of whom cities themselves have no right of their own1 and cannot be said to make laws71 can possibly be against the law of nature4 ,for though the law of nature forbid theft1 adultery1 c2 yet if the civil law command us to invade anything1 that invasion is not theft1 adultery1 c4 ,for when the ,lacedmonians of old permitted their youths1 by a certain law1 to take away other men's goods1 they commanded that these goods should not be accounted other men's1 but their own who took them2 and therefore such surreptions were no thefts4 ,in like manner1 copulations of heathen sexes1 according to their laws1 were lawful marriages4 ,sidenote3 ,it is essential to a law1 that both it and the legislator be known4 #aa4 ,it is necessary to the essence of a law1 that the subjects be acquainted with two things3 first1 what man or court hath the supreme power1 that is to say1 the right of making laws2 secondly1 what the law itself says4 ,for he that neither knew either to whom or what he is tied to1 cannot obey2 and by consequence is in such a condition as if he were not tied at all4 ,i say not that it is necessary to the essence of a law1 that either one or the other be perpetually known1 but only that it be once known4 ,and if the subject afterward forget either the right he hath who made the law1 or the law itself1 that makes him no less tied to obey2 since he might have remembered it1 had he a will to obey4 ,sidenote3 ,whence the legislator is known4 #ab4 ,the knowledge of the legislator depends on the subject himself2 for the right of making laws could not be conferred on any man without his own consent and covenant1 either expressed or supposed2 expressed1 when from the beginning the citizens do themselves constitute a form of governing the city1 or when by promise they submit themselves to the dominion of any one2 or supposed at least1 as when they make use of the benefit of the realm and laws for their protection and conservation against others4 ,for to whose dominion we require our fellow subjects to yield obedience for our good1 his dominion we acknowledge to be legitimate by that very request4 ,and therefore ignorance of the power of making laws1 can never be a sufficient excuse2 for every man knows what he hath done himself4 ,sidenote3 ,promulgation and interpretation are necessary to the knowledge of a law4 #ac4 ,the knowledge of the laws depends on the legislator2 who must publish them2 for otherwise they are not laws4 ,for law is the command of the law-maker1 and his command is the declaration of his will2 it is not therefore a law1 except the will of the law-maker be declared1 which is done by promulgation4 ,now in promulgation two things must be manifest2 whereof one is1 that he or they who publish a law1 either have a right themselves to make laws1 or that they do it by authority derived from him or them who have it2 the other is the sense of the law itself4 ,now1 that the first1 namely1 published laws1 proceed from him who hath the supreme command1 cannot be manifest 7speaking exactly and philosophically7 to any1 but them who have received them from the mouth of the commander4 ,the rest believe2 but the reasons of their belief are so many1 that it is scarce possible they should not believe4 ,and truly in a democratical city1 where every one may be present at the making of laws if he will1 he that shall be absent1 must believe those that were present4 ,but in monarchies and aristocracies1 because it is granted but to few to be present1 and openly to hear the commands of the monarch or the nobles1 it was necessary to bestow a power on those few of publishing them to the rest4 ,and thus we believe those to be the edicts and decrees of princes1 which are propounded to us for such1 either by the writings or voices of them whose office it is to publish them4 ,but yet1 when we have these causes of belief2 that we have seen the prince or supreme counsel constantly use such counsellors1 secretaries1 publishers1 and seals1 and the like arguments for the declaring of his will2 that he never took any authority from them2 that they have been punished1 who not giving credit to such like promulgations have transgressed the law2 not only he who thus believing shall obey the edicts and decrees set forth by them1 is everywhere excused1 but he that not believing shall not yield obedience1 is punished4 ,for the constant permission of these things is a manifest sign enough and evident declaration of the commander's will2 provided there be nothing contained in the law1 edict1 or decree1 derogatory from his supreme power4 ,for it is not to be imagined that he would have aught taken from his power by any of his officers1 as long as he retains a will to govern4 ,now the sense of the law1 when there is any doubt made of it1 is to be taken from them to whom the supreme authority hath committed the knowledge of causes or judgments2 for to judge1 is nothing else than by interpretation to apply the laws to particular cases4 ,now we may know who they are that have this office granted them1 in the same manner as we know who they be that have authority given them to publish laws4 ,sidenote3 ,the civil law divided into written and unwritten4 #ad4 ,again the civil law1 according to its two-fold manner of publishing1 is of two sorts1 written and unwritten4 ,by written1 ,i understand that which wants a voice1 or some other sign of the will of the legislator1 that it may become a law4 ,for all kind of laws are of the same age with mankind1 both in nature and time2 and therefore of more antiquity than the invention of letters1 and the art of writing4 ,wherefore not a writing1 but a voice is necessary for a written law2 this alone is requisite to the being1 that to the remembrance of a law4 ,for we read1 that before letters were found out for the help of memory1 that laws1 contracted into metre1 were wont to be sung4 ,the unwritten1 is that which wants no other publishing than the voice of nature or natural reason2 such are the laws of nature4 ,for the natural law1 although it be distinguished from the civil1 forasmuch as it commands the will2 yet so far forth as it relates to our actions1 it is civil4 ,for example1 this same1 thou shalt not covet1 which only appertains to the mind1 is a natural law only2 but this1 thou shalt not invade1 is both natural and civil4 ,for seeing it is impossible to prescribe such universal rules1 whereby all future contentions1 which perhaps are infinite1 may be determined2 it is to be understood that in all cases not mentioned by the written laws1 the law of natural equity is to be followed1 which commands us to distribute equally to equals2 and this by the virtue of the civil law1 which also punisheth those who knowingly and willingly do actually transgress the laws of nature4 ,sidenote3 ,that the natural laws are not written laws1 neither are the sentences of lawyers or customs laws of themselves1 but by the consent of the supreme power4 #ae4 ,these things being understood1 it appears1 first1 that the laws of nature1 although they were described in the books of some philosophers1 are not for that reason to be termed written laws3 and that the writings of the interpreters of the laws1 were no laws1 for want of the supreme authority2 nor yet those orations of the wise1 that is to say1 judges1 but so far forth as by the consent of the supreme power they part into custom2 and that then they are to be received among the written laws1 not for the custom's sake1 7which by its own force doth not constitute a law71 but for the will of the supreme commander2 which appears in this1 that he hath suffered his sentence1 whether equal or unequal1 to pass into custom4 ,sidenote3 ,what the word sin1 taken in its largest sense1 signifies4 #af4 ,sin1 in its largest signification1 comprehends every deed1 word1 and thought against right reason4 ,for every man1 by reasoning1 seeks out the means to the end which he propounds to himself4 ,if therefore he reason right1 that is to say1 beginning from most evident principles he makes a discourse out of consequences continually necessary1 he will proceed in a most direct way4 ,otherwise he will go astray1 that is to say1 he will either do1 say1 or endeavour somewhat against his proper end2 which when he hath done1 he will indeed in reasoning be said to have erred1 but in action and will to have sinned4 ,for sin follows error1 just as the will doth the understanding4 ,and this is the most general acception of the word2 under which is contained every imprudent action1 whether against the law1 as to overthrow another man's house1 or not against the law1 as to build his own upon the sand4 ,sidenote3 ,the definition of sin4 #ag4 ,but when we speak of the laws1 the word sin is taken in a more strict sense1 and signifies not every thing done against right reason1 but that only which is blameable2 and therefore it is called malum culp1 the evil of fault4 ,but yet if anything be culpable1 it is not presently to be termed a sin or fault2 but only if it be blameable with reason4 ,we must therefore enquire what it is to be blameable with reason1 what against reason4 ,such is the nature of man1 that every one calls that good which he desires1 and evil which he eschews4 ,and therefore through the diversity of our affections it happens1 that one counts that good1 which another counts evil2 and the same man what now he esteemed for good1 he immediately after looks on as evil3 and the same thing which he calls good in himself1 he terms evil in another4 ,for we all measure good and evil by the pleasure or pain we either feel at present1 or expect hereafter4 ,now seeing the prosperous actions of enemies1 because they increase their honours1 goods1 and power2 and of equals1 by reason of that strife of honours which is among them2 both seem and are irksome1 and therefore evil to all2 and men use to repute those evil1 that is to say1 to lay some fault to their charge1 from whom they receive evil2 it is impossible to be determined by the consent of single men1 whom the same things do not please and displease1 what actions are1 and what not to be blamed4 ,they may agree indeed in some certain general things1 as that theft1 adultery1 and the like are sins2 as if they should say that all men account those things evil1 to which they have given names which are usually taken in an evil sense4 ,but we demand not whether theft be a sin1 but what is to be termed theft2 and so concerning others1 in like manner4 ,forasmuch therefore as in so great a diversity of censurers1 what is by reason blameable is not to be measured by the reason of one man more than another1 because of the equality of human nature2 and there are no other reasons in being1 but only those of particular men1 and that of the city3 it follows1 that the city is to determine what with reason is culpable4 ,so as a fault1 that is to say1 a sin1 is that which a man does1 omits1 says1 or wills1 against the reason of the city1 that is1 contrary to the laws4 ,sidenote3 ,the difference between a sin of infirmity and malice4 #ah4 ,but a man may do somewhat against the laws through human infirmity1 although he desire to fulfil them2 and yet his action1 as being against the laws1 is rightly blamed1 and called a sin4 ,but there are some who neglect the laws2 and as oft as any hope of gain and impunity doth appear to them1 no conscience of contracts and betrothed faith can withhold them from their violation4 ,not only the deeds1 but even the minds of these men are against the laws4 ,they who sin only through infirmity1 are good men even when they sin2 but these1 even when they do not sin1 are wicked4 ,for though both the action and the mind be repugnant to the laws1 yet those repugnances are distinguished by different appellations4 ,for the irregularity of the action is called 1 unjust deed2 that of the mind and 1 injustice and malice2 that is the infirmity of a disturbed soul1 this the pravity of a sober mind4 ,sidenote3 ,under what kind of sin atheism is contained4 #ai4 ,but seeing there is no sin which is not against some law1 and that there is no law which is not the command of him who hath the supreme power1 and that no man hath a supreme power which is not bestowed on him by our own consent2 in what manner will he be said to sin1 who either denies that there is a ,god1 or that he governs the world1 or casts any other reproach upon him8 ,for he will say3 that he never submitted his will to ,god's will1 not conceiving him so much as to have any being3 and granting that his opinion were erroneous1 and therefore also a sin1 yet were it to be numbered among those of imprudence or ignorance1 which by right cannot be punished4 ,this speech seems so far forth to be admitted1 that though this kind of sin be the greatest and most hurtful1 yet is it to be referred to sins of imprudence2#ag but that it should be excused by imprudence or ignorance1 is absurd4 ,for the atheist is punished either immediately by ,god himself1 or by kings constituted under ,god2 not as a subject is punished by a king1 because he keeps not the laws2 but as one enemy by another1 because he would not accept of the laws2 that is to say1 by the right of war1 as the giants warring against ,god4 ,for whosoever are not subject either to some common lord1 or one to another1 are enemies among themselves4 ,footnote #ag3 ,yet is it to be referred to sins of imprudence4 ,many find fault that ,i have referred atheism to imprudence1 and not to injustice2 yea by some it is taken so1 as if ,i had not declared myself an enemy bitter enough against atheists4 ,they object further1 that since ,i had elsewhere said that it might be known there is a ,god by natural reason1 ,i ought to have acknowledged that they sin at least against the law of nature1 and therefore are not only guilty of imprudence1 but injustice too4 ,but ,i am so much an enemy to atheists1 that ,i have both diligently sought for1 and vehemently desired to find some law whereby ,i might condemn them of injustice4 ,but when ,i found none1 ,i inquired next what name ,god himself did give to men so detested by him4 ,now ,god speaks thus of the atheist3 ,the fool hath said in his heart1 there is no ,god4 ,wherefore ,i placed their sin in that rank which ,god himself refers to4 ,next ,i show them to be enemies of ,god4 ,but ,i conceive the name of an enemy to be sometimes somewhat sharper1 than that of an unjust man4 ,lastly1 ,i affirm that they may under that notion be justly punished both by ,god1 and supreme magistrates2 and therefore by no means excuse or extenuate this sin4 ,now that ,i have said1 that it might be known by natural reason that there is a ,god1 is so to be understood1 not as if ,i had meant that all men might know this2 except they think1 that because ,archimedes by natural reason found out what proportion the circle hath to the square1 it follows thence1 that every one of the vulgar could have found out as much4 ,i say therefore1 that although it may be known to some by the light of reason that there is a ,god2 yet men that are continually engaged in pleasures or seeking of riches and honour2 also men that are not wont to reason aright1 or cannot do it1 or care not to do it2 lastly1 fools1 in which number are atheists1 cannot know this4 ,sidenote3 ,what the sin of treason is4 #bj4 ,seeing that from the virtue of the covenant1 whereby each subject is tied to the other to perform absolute and universal obedience 7such as is defined above1 chap4 ,,vi4 art4 #ac7 to the city1 that is to say1 to the sovereign power1 whether that be one man or council1 there is an obligation derived to observe each one of the civil laws2 so that that covenant contains in itself all the laws at once2 it is manifest that the subject who shall renounce the general covenant of obedience1 doth at once renounce all the laws4 ,which trespass is so much worse than any other one sin1 by how much to sin always1 is worse than to sin once4 ,and this is that sin which is called treason2 and it is a word or deed whereby the citizen or subject declares1 that he will no longer obey that man or court to whom the supreme power of the city is entrusted4 ,and the subject declares this same will of his by deed1 when he either doth or endeavours to do violence to the sovereign's person1 or to them who execute his commands4 ,of which sort are traitors1 regicides1 and such as take up arms against the city1 or during a war fly to the enemy's side4 ,and they show the same will in word1 who flatly deny that themselves or other subjects are tied to any such kind of obedience1 either in the whole1 as he who should say that we must not obey him 7keeping the obedience which we owe to ,god entire7 simply1 absolutely1 and universally2 or in part1 as he who should say1 that he had no right to wage war at his own will1 to make peace1 enlist soldiers1 levy monies1 elect magistrates and public ministers1 enact laws1 decide controversies1 set penalties1 or do aught else without which the state cannot stand4 ,and these and the like words and deeds are treason by the natural1 not the civil law4 ,but it may so happen1 that some action1 which before the civil law was made1 was not treason1 yet will become such if it be done afterwards4 ,as if it be declared by the law1 that it shall be accounted for a sign of renouncing public obedience1 that is to say1 for treason1 if any man shall coin monies1 or forge the privy-seal2 he that after that declaration shall do this1 will be no less guilty of treason than the other4 ,yet he sins less1 because he breaks not all the laws at once1 but one law only4 ,for the law by calling that treason which by nature is not so1 doth indeed by right set a more odious name1 and perhaps a more grievous punishment on the guilty persons2 but it makes not the sin itself more grievous4 ,sidenote3 ,treason breaks not the civil1 but the natural law4 #ba4 ,but that sin1 which by the law of nature is treason1 is a transgression of the natural1 not the civil law4 ,for since our obligation to civil obedience1 by virtue whereof the civil laws are valid1 is before all civil law1 and the sin of treason is naturally nothing else but the breach of that obligation2 it follows1 that by the sin of treason that law is broken which preceded the civil law1 to wit1 the natural1 which forbids us to violate covenants and betrothed faith4 ,but if some sovereign prince should set forth a law on this manner1 thou shalt not rebel1 he would effect just nothing4 ,for except subjects were before obliged to obedience1 that is to say1 not to rebel1 all law is of no force4 ,now the obligation which obligeth to what we were before obliged to1 is superfluous4 ,sidenote3 ,and therefore is punished not by the right of sovereignty1 but by the right of war4 #bb4 ,hence it follows1 that rebels1 traitors1 and all others convicted of treason1 are punished not by civil1 but natural right2 that is to say1 not as civil subjects1 but as enemies to the government2 not by the right of sovereignty and dominion1 but by the right of war4 ,sidenote3 ,obedience not rightly distinguished into active and passive4 #bc4 ,there are some who think that those acts which are done against the law1 when the punishment is determined by the law itself1 are expiated1 if the punished willingly undergo the punishment2 and that they are not guilty before ,god of breaking the natural law1 7although by breaking the civil laws1 we break the natural too1 which command us to keep the civil71 who have suffered the punishment which the law required2 as if by the law the fact were not prohibited1 but a punishment were set instead of a price1 whereby a license might be bought of doing what the law forbids4 ,by the same reason they might infer too1 that no transgression of the law were a sin2 but that every man might enjoy the liberty which he hath bought by his own peril4 ,but we must know1 that the words of the law may be understood in a two-fold sense4 ,the one as containing two parts1 7as hath been declared above in art4 #g71 namely1 that of absolutely prohibiting1 as1 thou shalt not do this2 and revenging1 as1 he that doth this1 shall be punished4 ,the other1 as containing a condition1 for example1 thou shalt not do this thing1 unless thou wilt suffer punishment2 and thus the law forbids not simply1 but conditionally4 ,if it be understood in the first sense1 he that doth it sins1 because he doth what the law forbids to be done2 if in the second1 he sins not1 because he cannot be said to do what is forbidden him1 that performs the condition4 ,for in the first sense1 all men are forbidden to do it2 in the second1 they only who keep themselves from the punishment4 ,in the first sense1 the vindicative part of the law obligeth not the guilty1 but the magistrate to require punishment2 in the second1 he himself that owes the punishment1 is obliged to exact it2 to the payment whereof1 if it be capital or otherwise grievous1 he cannot be obliged4 ,but in what sense the law is to be taken1 depends on the will of him who hath the sovereignty4 ,when therefore there is any doubt of the meaning of the law1 since we are sure they sin not who do it not1 it will be sin if we do it1 howsoever the law may afterward be explained4 ,for to do that which a man doubts whether it be a sin or not1 when he hath freedom to forbear it1 is a contempt of the laws2 and therefore by chap4 ,,iii4 art4 #bh1 a sin against the law of nature4 ,vain therefore is that same distinction of obedience into active and passive2 as if that could be expiated by penalties constituted by human decrees1 which is a sin against the law of nature1 which is the law of ,god2 or as though they sinned not1 who sin at their own peril4 ,,religion --- ,,chapter ,,xv4 ,,of ,,the ,,kingdom ,,of ,,god ,,by ,,nature4 #a4 ,the proposition of the following contents4 #b4 ,over whom ,god is said to rule by nature4 #c4 ,the word of ,god threefold2 reason1 revelation1 prophecy4 #d4 ,the kingdom of ,god twofold2 natural1 and prophetic4 #e4 ,the right whereby ,god reigns1 is seated in his omnipotence4 #f4 ,the same proved from ,scripture4 #g4 ,the obligation of yielding obedience to ,god1 proceeds from human infirmity4 #h4 ,the laws of ,god in his natural kingdom1 are those which are recited above in chapters ,,ii4 ,,iii4 #i4 ,what honour and worship is4 #aj4 ,worship consists either in attributes or in actions4 #aa4 ,and there is one sort natural1 another arbitrary4 #ab4 ,one commanded1 another voluntary4 #ac4 ,what the end or scope of worship is4 #ad4 ,what the natural laws are concerning ,god's attributes4 #ae4 ,what the actions are whereby naturally we do give worship4 #af4 ,in ,god's natural kingdom1 the city may appoint what worship of ,god it pleaseth4 #ag4 ,god ruling by nature only1 the city1 that is to say1 that man or court who under ,god hath the sovereign authority of the city1 is the interpreter of all the laws4 #ah4 ,certain doubts removed4 #ai4 ,what sin is in the natural kingdom of ,god2 and what treason against the ,divine ,majesty4 ,sidenote3 ,the proposition of the following contents4 #a4 ,we have already in the foregoing chapters1 proved both by reason and testimonies of holy writ1 that the estate of nature1 that is to say1 of absolute liberty1 such as is theirs who neither govern nor are governed1 is an anarchy or hostile state2 that the precepts whereby to avoid this state1 are the laws of nature2 that there can be no civil government without a sovereign2 and that they who have gotten this sovereign command1 must be obeyed simply1 that is to say1 in all things which repugn not the commandments of ,god4 ,there is this one thing only wanting to the complete understanding of all civil duty1 and that is1 to know which are the laws and commandments of ,god4 ,for else we cannot tell whether that which the civil power commands us1 be against the laws of ,god1 or not2 whence it must necessarily happen1 that either by too much obedience to the civil authority we become stubborn against the divine ,majesty2 or for fear of sinning against ,god we run into disobedience against the civil power4 ,to avoid both these rocks1 it is necessary to know the divine laws4 ,now because the knowledge of the laws depends on the knowledge of the kingdom1 we must in what follows speak somewhat concerning the kingdom of ,god4 ,sidenote3 ,over whom ,god is said to reign3 #b4 ,the ,lord is king1 the earth may be glad thereof2 saith the psalmist1 7,psalm xcvii4 #a74 ,and again the same psalmist1 7,psalm xcix4 #a73 ,the ,lord is king1 be the people never so impatient2 he sitteth between the cherubims1 be the earth never so unquiet2 to wit1 whether men will or not1 ,god is the king over all the earth2 nor is he moved from his throne1 if there be any who deny either his existence or his providence4 ,now although ,god govern all men so by his power1 that none can do anything which he would not have done3 yet this1 to speak properly and accurately1 is not to reign4 ,for he is said to reign1 who rules not by acting1 but speaking1 that is to say1 by precepts and threatenings4 ,and therefore we count not inanimate nor irrational bodies for subjects in the kingdom of ,god1 although they be subordinate to the divine power2 because they understand not the commands and threats of ,god3 nor yet the atheists1 because they believe not that there is a ,god2 nor yet those who believing there is a ,god1 do not yet believe that he rules these inferior things3 for even these1 although they be governed by the power of ,god1 yet do they not acknowledge any of his commands1 nor stand in awe of his threats4 ,those only therefore are supposed to belong to ,god's kingdom1 who acknowledge him to be the governor of all things1 and that he hath given his commands to men1 and appointed punishments for the transgressors4 ,the rest we must not call subjects1 but enemies of ,god4 ,sidenote3 ,the word of ,god threefold2 reason1 revelation1 prophesy4 #c4 ,but none are said to govern by commands1 but they who openly declare them to those who are governed by them4 ,for the commands of the rulers1 are the laws of the ruled2 but laws they are not1 if not perspicuously published1 insomuch as all excuse of ignorance may be taken away4 ,men indeed publish their laws by word or voice2 neither can they make their will universally known any other way4 ,but ,god's laws are declared after a threefold manner3 first1 by the tacit dictates of right reason2 next1 by immediate revelation1 which is supposed to be done either by a supernatural voice1 or by a vision or dream1 or divine inspiration2 thirdly1 by the voice of one man1 whom ,god recommends to the rest1 as worthy of belief1 by the working of true miracles4 ,now he whose voice ,god thus makes use of to signify his will unto others1 is called a prophet4 ,these three manners may be termed the threefold word of ,god1 to wit1 the rational word1 the sensible word1 and the word of prophecy4 ,to which answer the three manners whereby we are said to hear ,god2 right reasoning1 sense1 and faith4 ,god's sensible word hath come but to few2 neither hath ,god spoken to men by revelation1 except particularly to some1 and to diverse diversely2 neither have any laws of his kingdom been published on this manner unto any people4 ,sidenote3 ,the kingdom of ,god two-fold3 natural1 and prophetic4 #d4 ,and according to the difference which is between the rational word and the word of prophecy1 we attribute a two-fold kingdom unto ,god3 natural1 in which he reigns by the dictates of right reason2 and which is universal over all who acknowledge the divine power1 by reason of that rational nature which is common to all3 and prophetical1 in which he rules also by the word of prophecy2 which is peculiar1 because he hath not given positive laws to all men1 but to his peculiar people and some certain men elected by him4 ,sidenote3 ,the right whereby ,god governs1 is seated in his omnipotence4 #e4 ,god in his natural kingdom hath a right to rule1 and to punish those who break his laws1 from his sole irresistible power4 ,for all right over others is either from nature1 or from contract4 ,how the right of governing springs from contract1 we have already showed in chap4 ,,vi4 ,and the same right is derived from nature1 in this very thing1 that it is not by nature taken away4 ,for when by nature all men had a right over all things1 every man had a right of ruling over all as ancient as nature itself4 ,but the reason why this was abolished among men1 was no other but mutual fear1 as hath been declared above in chap4 ,,ii4 art4 #c2 reason1 namely1 dictating that they must forego that right for the preservation of mankind2 because the equality of men among themselves1 according to their strength and natural powers1 was necessarily accompanied with war2 and with war joins the destruction of mankind4 ,now if any man had so far exceeded the rest in power1 that all of them with joined forces could not have resisted him1 there had been no cause why he should part with that right1 which nature had given him4 ,the right therefore of dominion over all the rest would have remained with him1 by reason of that excess of power whereby he could have preserved both himself and them4 ,they therefore whose power cannot be resisted1 and by consequence ,god ,almighty derives his right of sovereignty from the power itself4 ,and as oft as ,god punisheth or slays a sinner1 although he therefore punish him because he sinned1 yet may we not say that he could not justly have punished or killed him although he had not sinned4 ,neither1 if the will of ,god in punishing may perhaps have regard to some sin antecedent1 doth it therefore follow1 that the right of afflicting and killing depends not on divine power1 but on men's sins4 ,sidenote3 ,the same proved from ,scripture4 #f4 ,that question made famous by the disputations of the ancients3 why evil things befal the good1 and good things the evil3 is the same with this of ours2 by what right ,god dispenseth good and evil things unto men2 and with its difficulty it not only staggers the faith of the vulgar concerning the divine ,providence1 but also philosophers1 and which is more1 even of holy men4 ,psalm lxxiii4 #a1 #b1 #c3 ,truly ,god is good to ,israel1 even to such as are of a clean heart2 but as for me1 my feet were almost gone1 my steps had well nigh slipped4 ,and why8 ,i was grieved at the wicked2 ,i do also see the ungodly in such prosperity4 ,and how bitterly did ,job expostulate with ,god1 that being just he should yet be afflicted with so many calamities6 ,god himself with open voice resolved this difficulty in the case of ,job1 and hath confirmed his right by arguments drawn not from ,job's sin1 but from his own power4 ,for ,job and his friends had argued so among themselves2 that they would needs make him guilty1 because he was punished2 and he would reprove their accusation by arguments fetched from his own innocence4 ,but ,god1 when he had heard both him and them1 refutes his expostulation1 not by condemning him of injustice or any sin1 but by declaring his own power1 7,job xxxviii4 #d73 ,where wast thou 7says he7 when ,i laid the foundation of the earth1 c4 ,and for his friends1 ,god pronounces himself angry against them 7,job4 xlii4 #g73 ,because they had not spoken of him the thing that is right1 like his servant ,job4 ,agreeable to this is that speech of our ,saviour's in the man's case who was born blind3 when his disciples asking him whether he or his parents had sinned1 that he was born blind1 he answered1 7,john ix4 #c73 ,neither hath this man sinned1 nor his parents2 but that the works of ,god should be manifest in him4 ,for though it be said1 7,rom4 v4 #ab71 that death entered into the world by sin3 it follows not but that ,god by his right might have made men subject to diseases and death1 although they had never sinned2 even as he hath made the other animals mortal and sickly1 although they cannot sin4 ,sidenote3 ,the obligation of yielding obedience unto ,god1 proceeds from human infirmity4 #g4 ,now if ,god have the right of sovereignty from his power1 it is manifest that the obligation of yielding him obedience lies on men by reason of their weakness4#ah ,for that obligation which rises from contract1 of which we have spoken in chap4 ,,ii4 can have no place here2 where the right of ruling1 no covenant passing between1 rises only from nature4 ,but there are two species of natural obligation4 ,one1 when liberty is taken away by corporal impediments1 according to which we say that heaven and earth1 and all creatures1 do obey the common laws of their creation4 ,the other1 when it is taken away by hope or fear1 according to which the weaker1 despairing of his own power to resist1 cannot but yield to the stronger4 ,from this last kind of obligation1 that is to say1 from fear or conscience of our own weakness in respect of the divine power1 it comes to pass that we are obliged to obey ,god in his natural kingdom2 reason dictating to all1 acknowledging the divine power and providence1 that there is no kicking against the pricks4 ,footnote #ah3 ,by reason of their weakness4 ,if this shall seem hard to any man1 ,i desire him with a silent thought to consider1 if there were two ,omnipotents1 whether were bound to obey4 ,i believe he will confess that neither is bound4 ,if this be true1 then it is also true what ,i have set down2 that men are subject unto ,god1 because they are not omnipotent4 ,and truly our ,saviour admonishing ,paul1 who at that time was an enemy to the ,church1 that he should not kick against the pricks2 seems to require obedience from him for this cause1 because he had not power enough to resist4 ,sidenote3 ,the laws of ,god in his natural kingdom1 are those which are above set down in chaps4 ,,ii4 ,,iii4 #h4 ,because the word of ,god1 ruling by nature only1 is supposed to be nothing else but right reason1 and the laws of kings can be known by their word only2 it is manifest that the laws of ,god1 ruling by nature alone1 are only the natural laws2 namely1 those which we have set down in chaps4 ,,ii4 and ,,iii4 and deduced from the dictates of reason1 humility1 equity1 justice1 mercy2 and other moral virtues befriending peace1 which pertain to the discharge of the duties of men one toward the other2 and those which right reason shall dictate besides1 concerning the honour and worship of the ,divine ,majesty4 ,we need not repeat what those natural laws or moral virtues are2 but we must see what honours and what divine worship1 that is to say1 what sacred laws the same natural reason doth dictate4 ,sidenote3 ,what honour and worship are4 #i4 ,honour to speak properly1 is nothing else but an opinion of another's power joined with goodness2 and to honour a man1 is the same with highly esteeming him3 and so honour is not in the party honoured1 but in the honourer4 ,now three passions do necessarily follow honour thus placed in opinion2 love1 which refers to goodness2 hope and fear1 which regard power4 ,and from these arise all outward actions1 wherewith the powerful are appeased and become propitious2 and which are the effects1 and therefore also the natural signs of honour itself4 ,but the word honour is transferred also to those outward effects of honour2 in which sense1 we are said to honour him1 of whose power we testify ourselves1 either in word or deed1 to have a very great respect2 insomuch as honour is the same with worship4 ,now worship is an outward act1 the sign of inward honour2 and whom we endeavour by our homage to appease if they be angry1 or howsoever to make them favourable to us1 we are said to worship4 ,sidenote3 ,worship consists either in attributes1 or in actions4 #aj4 ,all signs of the mind are either words or deeds2 and therefore all worship consists either in words or deeds4 ,now both the one and the other are referred to three kinds2 whereof the first is praise1 or public declaration of goodness2 the second a public declaration of present power1 which is to magnify1 2 the third is a public declaration of happiness1 or of power secure also for the future1 which is called 4 ,i say that all kinds of honour may be discerned1 not in words only1 but in deeds too4 ,but we then praise and celebrate in words1 when we do it by way of proposition1 or dogmatically1 that is to say1 by attributes or titles2 which may be termed praising and celebrating categorically and plainly2 as when we declare him whom we honour to be liberal1 strong1 wise4 ,and then in deeds1 when it is done by consequence or by hypothesis or supposition2 as by thanksgiving1 which supposeth goodness2 or by obedience1 which supposeth power2 or by congratulation1 which supposeth happiness4 ,sidenote3 ,and there is one sort natural1 and another arbitrary4 #aa4 ,now whether we desire to praise a man in words or deeds1 we shall find some things which signify honour with all men3 such as among attributes1 are the general words of virtues and powers1 which cannot be taken in ill sense2 as good1 fair1 strong1 just1 and the like3 and among actions1 obedience1 thanksgiving1 prayers1 and others of that kind1 by which an acknowledgment of virtue and power is ever understood4 ,others1 which signify honour but with some1 and scorn with others1 or else neither2 such as in attributes1 are those words1 which1 according to the diversity of opinions1 are diversely referred to virtues or vices1 to honest or dishonest things4 ,as that a man slew his enemy1 that he fled1 that he is a philosopher1 or an orator1 and the like2 which with some are had in honour1 with others in contempt4 ,in deeds1 such as depend on the custom of the place1 or prescriptions of civil laws2 as in saluting to be bareheaded1 to put off the shoes1 to bend the body1 to petition for anything standing1 prostrate1 kneeling1 forms of ceremony1 and the like4 ,now that worship which is always and by all men accounted honourable1 may be called natural2 the other1 which follows places and customs1 arbitrary4 ,sidenote3 ,one commanded1 another voluntary4 #ab4 ,furthermore1 worship may be enjoined1 to wit1 by the command of him that is worshipped1 and it may be voluntary1 namely1 such as seems good to the worshipper4 ,if it be enjoined1 the actions expressing it do not signify honour1 as they signify actions1 but as they are enjoined3 for they signify obedience immediately1 obedience power2 insomuch as worship enjoined consists in obedience4 ,voluntary is honourable only in the nature of the actions2 which if they do signify honour to the beholders1 it is worship1 if not1 it is reproach4 ,again1 worship may be either public or private4 ,but public1 respecting each single worshipper1 may not be voluntary2 respecting the city1 it may4 ,for seeing that which is done voluntarily1 depends on the will of the doer1 there would not one worship be given1 but as many worships as worshippers2 except the will of all men were united by the command of one4 ,but private worship may be voluntary1 if it be done secretly2 for what is done openly1 is restrained either by laws or through modesty2 which is contrary to the nature of a voluntary action4 ,sidenote3 ,what the end or aim of worship is4 #ac4 ,now that we may know what the scope and end of worshipping others is1 we must consider the cause why men delight in worship4 ,and we must grant what we have showed elsewhere2 that joy consists in this1 that a man contemplates virtue1 strength1 science1 beauty1 friends1 or any power whatsoever1 as being1 or as though it were his own2 and it is nothing else but a glory or triumph of the mind1 conceiving itself honoured1 that is to say1 loved and feared1 that is to say1 having the services and assistances of men in readiness4 ,now because men believe him to be powerful1 whom they see honoured1 that is to say1 esteemed powerful by others2 it falls out that honour is increased by worship2 and by the opinion of power true power is acquired4 ,his end therefore1 who either commands or suffers himself to be worshipped1 is1 that by this means he may acquire as many as he can1 either through love or fear1 to be obedient unto him4 ,sidenote3 ,what the natural laws are concerning ,god's attributes4 #ad4 ,but that we may understand what manner of worship of ,god natural reason doth assign us1 let us begin from his attributes4 ,where first1 it is manifest that existence is to be allowed him2 for there can be no will to honour him1 who1 we think1 hath no being4 ,next1 those philosophers who said1 that ,god was the world or the world's soul1 that is to say1 a part of it1 spake unworthily of ,god2 for they attribute nothing to him1 but wholly deny his being4 ,for by the word ,god we understand the world's cause4 ,but in saying that the world is ,god1 they say that it hath no cause1 that is as much as there is no ,god4 ,in like manner1 they who maintain the world not to be created1 but eternal2 because there can be no cause of an eternal thing1 in denying the world to have a cause1 they deny also that there is a ,god4 ,they also have a wretched apprehension of ,god1 who imputing idleness to him1 do take from him the government of the world and of mankind4 ,for say1 they should acknowledge him omnipotent2 yet if he mind not these inferior things1 that same thread-bare sentence will take place with them3 quod supra nos1 nihil ad nos2 what is above us1 doth not concern us4 ,and seeing there is nothing for which they should either love or fear him1 truly he will be to them as though he were not at all4 ,moreover1 in attributes which signify greatness or power1 those which signify some finite or limited thing1 are not signs at all of an honouring mind4 ,for we honour not ,god worthily1 if we ascribe less power or greatness to him than possibly we can4 ,but every finite thing is less than we can2 for most easily we may always assign and attribute more to a finite thing4 ,no shape therefore must be assigned to ,god1 for all shape is finite2 nor must he be said to be conceived or comprehended by imagination1 or any other faculty of our soul2 for whatsoever we conceive is finite4 ,and although this word infinite signify a conception of the mind1 yet it follows not that we have any conception of an infinite thing4 ,for when we say that a thing is infinite1 we signify nothing really1 but the impotency in our own mind2 as if we should say1 we know not whether or where it is limited4 ,neither speak they honourably enough of ,god1 who say we have an idea of him in our mind3 for an idea is our conception2 but conception we have none1 except of a finite thing4 ,nor they1 who say that he hath parts1 or that he is some certain entire thing2 which are also attributes of finite things4 ,nor that he is in any place2 for nothing can be said to be in a place1 but what hath bounds and limits of its greatness on all sides4 ,nor that he is moved or is at rest2 for either of them suppose a being in some place4 ,nor that there are many ,gods2 because not many infinites4 ,furthermore1 concerning attributes of happiness1 those are unworthy of ,god which signify sorrow2 7unless they be taken not for any passion1 but1 by a metonomy1 for the effect72 such as repentance1 anger1 pity4 ,or want2 as appetite1 hope1 concupiscence1 and that love which is also called lust2 for they are signs of poverty2 since it cannot be understood that a man should desire1 hope1 and wish for aught1 but what he wants and stands in need of4 ,or any passive faculty2 for suffering belongs to a limited power1 and which depends upon another4 ,when we therefore attribute a will to ,god1 it is not to be conceived like unto ours1 which is called a rational desire2 7for if ,god desires1 he wants1 which for any man to say1 is a contumely72 but we must suppose some resemblance which we cannot conceive4 ,in like manner when we attribute sight and other acts of the sense to him1 or knowledge1 or understanding1 which in us are nothing else but a tumult of the mind1 raised from outward objects pressing the organs2 we must not think that any such thing befalls the ,deity2 for it is a sign of power depending upon some other1 which is not the most blessed thing4 ,he therefore who would not ascribe any other titles to ,god than what reason commands1 must use such as are either negative1 as infinite1 eternal1 incomprehensible1 c42 or superlative1 as most good1 most great1 most powerful1 c42 or indefinite1 as good1 just1 strong1 creator1 king1 and the like2 in such sense1 as not desiring to declare what he is2 7which were to circumscribe him within the narrow limits of our phantasy72 but to confess his own admiration and obedience1 which is the property of humility and of a mind yielding all the honour it possibly can do4 ,for reason dictates one name alone which doth signify the nature of ,god1 that is1 existent1 or simply1 that he is2 and one in order to1 and in relation to us1 namely ,god1 under which is contained both ,king1 and ,lord1 and ,father4 ,sidenote3 ,what those actions are1 whereby naturally we do give worship4 #ae4 ,concerning the outward actions wherewith ,god is to be worshipped1 as also concerning his titles2 it is a most general command of reason1 that they be signs of a mind yielding honour4 ,under which are contained in the first place1 prayers4 8,qui fingit sacros auro vel marmore vultus1 ,non facit ille deos2 qui rogat1 ille facit40 ,for prayers are the signs of hope2 and hope is an acknowledgment of the divine power or goodness4 ,in the second place1 thanksgiving2 which is a sign of the same affection1 but that prayers go before the benefit1 and thanks follow it4 ,in the third1 gifts1 that is to say1 oblations and sacrifices2 for these are thanksgivings4 ,in the fourth1 not to swear by any other4 ,for a man's oath is an imprecation of his wrath against him if he deceive1 who both knows whether he do or not1 and can punish him if he do1 though he be never so powerful2 which only belongs to ,god4 ,for if there were any man from whom his subjects' malice could not lie hid1 and whom no human power could resist1 plighted faith would suffice without swearing2 which broken1 might be punished by that man4 ,and for this very reason there would be no need of an oath4 ,in the fifth place1 to speak warily of ,god2 for that is a sign of fear1 and fear is an acknowledgment of power4 ,it follows from this precept1 that we may not take the name of ,god in vain1 or use it rashly2 for either are inconsiderate4 ,that we must not swear1 where there is no need2 for that is in vain4 ,but need there is none1 unless it be between cities1 to avoid or take away contention by force1 which necessarily must arise where there is no faith kept in promises3 or in a city1 for the better certainty of judicature4 ,also1 that we must not dispute of the divine nature2 for it is supposed that all things in the natural kingdom of ,god are inquired into by reason only1 that is to say1 out of the principles of natural science4 ,but we are so far off by these to attain to the knowledge of the nature of ,god1 that we cannot so much as reach to the full understanding of all the qualities of our own bodies1 or of any other creatures4 ,wherefore there comes nothing from these disputes1 but a rash imposition of names to the divine ,majesty according to the small measure of our conceptions4 ,it follows also1 7which belongs to the right of ,god's kingdom71 that their speech is inconsiderate and rash1 who say1 that this or that doth not stand with divine justice4 ,for even men count it an affront that their children should dispute their right1 or measure their justice otherwise than by the rule of their commands4 ,in the sixth1 whatsoever is offered up in prayers1 thanksgivings1 and sacrifices1 must in its kind be the best and most betokening honour2 namely1 prayers must not be rash1 or light1 or vulgar1 but beautiful1 and well composed4 ,for though it were absurd in the heathen to worship ,god in an image1 yet was it not against reason to use poetry and music in their churches4 ,also oblations must be clean1 and presents sumptuous2 and such as are significative either of submission or gratitude1 or commemorative of benefits received4 ,for all these proceed from a desire of honouring4 ,in the seventh1 that ,god must be worshipped not privately only1 but openly and publicly in the sight of all men2 because that worship is so much more acceptable1 by how much it begets honour and esteem in others2 as hath been declared before in art4 #ac4 ,unless others therefore see it1 that which is most pleasing in our worship vanisheth4 ,in the last place1 that we use our best endeavour to keep the laws of nature4 ,for the undervaluing of our master's command1 exceeds all other affronts whatsoever2 as on the other side1 obedience is more acceptable than all other sacrifices4 ,and these are principally the natural laws concerning the worship of ,god2 those1 ,i mean1 which reason dictates to every man4 ,but to whole cities1 every one whereof is one person1 the same natural reason further commands an uniformity of public worship4 ,for the actions done by particular persons1 according to their private reasons1 are not the city's actions2 and therefore not the city's worship4 ,but what is done by the city1 is understood to be done by the command of him or them who have the sovereignty2 wherefore also together with the consent of all the subjects1 that is to say1 uniformly4 ,sidenote3 ,in the natural kingdom of ,god1 the city may appoint what worship it pleaseth4 #af4 ,the natural laws set down in the foregoing article concerning the divine worship1 only command the giving of natural signs of honour4 ,but we must consider that there are two kinds of signs2 the one natural2 the other done upon agreement1 or by express or tacit composition4 ,now because in every language the use of words and names come by appointment1 it may also by appointment be altered2 for that which depends on and derives its force from the will of men1 can by the will of the same men agreeing be changed again or abolished4 ,such names therefore as are attributed to ,god by the appointment of men1 can by the same appointment be taken away4 ,now what can be done by the appointment of men1 that the city may do4 ,the city therefore by right1 that is to say1 they who have the power of the whole city1 shall judge what names or appellations are more1 what less honourable for ,god2 that is to say1 what doctrines are to be held and professed concerning the nature of ,god and his operations4 ,now actions do signify not by men's appointment1 but naturally2 even as the effects are signs of their causes4 ,whereof some are always signs of scorn to them before whom they are committed2 as those whereby the body's uncleanness is discovered1 and whatsoever men are ashamed to do before those whom they respect4 ,others are always signs of honour1 as to draw near and discourse decently and humbly1 to give way or to yield in any matter of private benefit4 ,in these actions the city can alter nothing4 ,but there are infinite others1 which1 as much as belongs to honour or reproach1 are indifferent4 ,now these1 by the institution of the city1 may both be made signs of honour1 and being made so1 do in very deed become so4 ,from whence we may understand1 that we must obey the city in whatsoever it shall command to be used for a sign of honouring ,god1 that is to say1 for worship2 provided it can be instituted for a sign of honour2 because that is a sign of honour1 which by the city's command is used for such4 ,sidenote3 ,god ruling by nature only1 the city1 that is to say1 that man or court which under ,god hath the sovereignty1 is the interpreter of all the laws4 #ag4 ,we have already declared which were the laws of ,god1 as well sacred as secular1 in his government by the way of nature only4 ,now because there is no man but may be deceived in reasoning1 and that it so falls out that men are of different opinions concerning the most actions2 it may be demanded further1 whom ,god would have to be the interpreter of right reason1 that is to say1 of his laws4 ,and as for the secular laws1 7,i mean those which concern justice and the carriage of men towards men71 by what hath been said before of the constitution of a city1 we have demonstratively showed it agreeable to reason1 that all judicature belongs to the city2 and that judicature is nothing else but an interpretation of the laws2 and by consequence1 that every where cities1 that is to say1 those who have the sovereign power1 are the interpreters of the laws4 ,as for the sacred laws1 we must consider what hath been before demonstrated in chap4 ,v4 art4 #ac1 that every subject hath transferred as much right as he could on him or them who had the supreme authority4 ,but he could have transferred his right of judging the manner how ,god is to be honoured2 and therefore also he hath done it4 ,that he could1 it appears hence2 that the manner of honouring ,god before the constitution of a city1 was to be fetched from every man's private reason4 ,but every man can subject his private reason to the reason of the whole city4 ,moreover1 if each man should follow his own reason in the worshipping of ,god1 in so great a diversity of worshippers one would be apt to judge another's worship uncomely1 or impious2 neither would the one seem to the other to honour ,god4 ,even that therefore which were most consonant to reason1 would not be a worship2 because that the nature of worship consists in this1 that it be the sign of inward honour4 ,but there is no sign1 but whereby somewhat becomes known to others2 and therefore is there no sign of honour1 but what seems so to others4 ,again1 that is a true sign1 which by the consent of men becomes a sign2 therefore also that is honourable1 which by the consent of men1 that is to say1 by the command of the city1 becomes a sign of honour4 ,it is not therefore against the will of ,god1 declared by the way of reason only1 to give him such signs of honour as the city shall command4 ,wherefore subjects can transfer their right of judging the manner of ,god's worship1 on him or them who have the sovereign power4 ,nay1 they must do it2 for else all manner of absurd opinions concerning the nature of ,god1 and all ridiculous ceremonies which have been used by any nations1 will be seen at once in the same city4 ,whence it will fall out1 that every man will believe that all the rest do offer ,god an affront2 so that it cannot be truly said of any1 that he worships ,god2 for no man worships ,god1 that is to say1 honours him outwardly1 but he who doth those things1 whereby he appears to others for to honour him4 ,it may therefore be concluded1 that the interpretation of all laws1 as well sacred as secular1 7,god ruling by the way of nature only71 depends on the authority of the city1 that is to say1 that man or counsel to whom the sovereign power is committed2 and that whatsoever ,god commands1 he commands by his voice4 ,and on the other side1 that whatsoever is commanded by them1 both concerning the manner of honouring ,god1 and concerning secular affairs1 is commanded by ,god himself4 ,sidenote3 ,certain doubts removed4 #ah4 ,against this1 some man may demand1 first1 whether it doth not follow that the city must be obeyed1 if it command us directly to affront ,god1 or forbid us to worship him8 ,i say1 it does not follow1 neither must we obey4 ,for to affront1 or not to worship at all1 cannot by any man be understood for a manner of worshipping4 ,neither also had any one1 before the constitution of a city1 of those who acknowledge ,god to rule1 a right to deny him the honour which was then due unto him2 nor could he therefore transfer a right on the city of commanding any such things4 ,next1 if it be demanded whether the city must be obeyed1 if it command somewhat to be said or done1 which is not a disgrace to ,god directly1 but from whence by reasoning disgraceful consequences may be derived2 as for example1 if it were commanded to worship ,god in an image1 before those who account that honourable3 truly it is to be done4#ai ,for worship is instituted in sign of honour2 but to worship him thus1 is a sign of honour1 and increaseth ,god's honour among those who do so account of it4 ,or if it be commanded to call ,god by a name1 which we know not what it signifies1 or how it can agree with this word ,god2 that also must be done4 ,for what we do for honour's sake1 7and we know no better71 if it be taken for a sign of honour1 it is a sign of honour2 and therefore if we refuse to do it1 we refuse the enlarging of ,god's honour4 ,the same judgment must be had of all the attributes and actions about the merely rational worship of ,god1 which may be controverted and disputed4 ,for though this kind of commands may be sometimes contrary to right reason1 and therefore sins in them who command them2 yet are they not against right reason1 nor sins in subjects2 whose right reason1 in points of controversy1 is that which submits itself to the reason of the city4 ,lastly1 if that man or counsel who hath the supreme power1 command himself to be worshipped with the same attributes and actions1 wherewith ,god is to be worshipped2 the question is1 whether we must obey8 ,there are many things1 which may be commonly attributed both to ,god and men2 for even men may be praised and magnified4 ,and there are many actions1 whereby ,god and men may be worshipped4 ,but the significations of the attributes and actions are only to be regarded4 ,those attributes therefore1 whereby we signify ourselves to be of an opinion1 that there is any man endued with a sovereignty independent from ,god1 or that he is immortal1 or of infinite power1 and the like2 though commanded by princes1 yet must they be abstained from4 ,as also from those actions signifying the same2 as prayer to the absent2 to ask those things which ,god alone can give1 as rain and fair weather2 to offer him what ,god can only accept1 as oblations1 holocausts2 or to give a worship1 than which a greater cannot be given1 as sacrifice4 ,for these things seem to tend to this end1 that ,god may not be thought to rule2 contrary to what was supposed from the beginning4 ,but genuflection1 prostration1 or any other act of the body whatsoever1 may be lawfully used even in civil worship2 for they may signify an acknowledgment of the civil power only4 ,for divine worship is distinguished from civil1 not by the motion1 placing1 habit1 or gesture of the body1 but by the declaration of our opinion of him whom we do worship4 ,as if we cast down ourselves before any man1 with intention of declaring by that sign that we esteem him as ,god1 it is divine worship2 if we do the same thing as a sign of our acknowledgment of the civil power1 it is civil worship4 ,neither is the divine worship distinguished from civil1 by any action usually understood by the words and 2 whereof the former marking out the duty of servants1 the latter their destiny1 they are words of the same action in degree4 ,footnote #ai3 ,truly it is to be done4 ,we said in art4 #ad of this chapter1 that they who attributed limits to ,god1 transgressed the natural law concerning ,god's worship4 ,now they who worship him in an image1 assign him limits4 ,wherefore they do that which they ought not to do4 ,and this place seems to contradict the former4 ,we must therefore know first1 that they who are constrained by authority1 do not set ,god any bounds2 but they who command them4 ,for they who worship unwillingly1 do worship in very deed3 but they either stand or fall there1 where they are commanded to stand or fall by a lawful sovereign4 ,secondly1 ,i say it must be done1 not at all times and everywhere1 but on supposition that there is no other rule of worshipping ,god1 beside the dictates of human reason2 for then the will of the city stands for reason4 ,but in the kingdom of ,god by way of covenant1 whether old or new1 where idolatry is expressly forbid1 though the city commands us to worship thus1 yet must we not do it4 ,which1 if he shall consider1 who conceived some repugnancy between this and art4 #ad1 will surely cease to think so any longer4 ,sidenote3 ,what is sin in the natural kingdom of ,god1 and what treason against the divine majesty4 #ai4 ,from what hath been said may be gathered1 that ,god reigning by the way of natural reason only1 subjects do sin1 first if they break the moral laws2 which are unfolded in chapters ,,ii4 and ,,iii4 ,secondly1 if they break the laws or commands of the city1 in those things which pertain to justice4 ,thirdly1 if they worship not ,god ,fourthly1 if they confess not before men1 both in words and deeds1 that there is one ,god most good1 most great1 most blessed1 the ,supreme ,king of the world and of all worldly kings2 that is to say1 if they do not worship ,god4 ,this fourth sin in the natural kingdom of ,god1 by what hath been said in the foregoing chapter in art4 #b1 is the sin of treason against the ,divine ,majesty4 ,for it is a denying of the ,divine ,power1 or atheism4 ,for sins proceed here1 just as if we should suppose some man to be the sovereign king1 who being himself absent1 should rule by his viceroy4 ,against whom sure they would transgress1 who should not obey his viceroy in all things2 except he usurped the kingdom to himself1 or would give it to some other4 ,but they who should so absolutely obey him1 as not to admit of this exception1 might be said to be guilty of treason4 ------- ,,chapter ,,xvi4 ,,of ,,the ,,kingdom ,,of ,,god ,,under ,,the ,,old ,,covenant4 #a4 ,superstition possessing foreign nations1 ,god instituted true religion by the means of ,abraham4 #b4 ,by the covenant between ,god and ,adam1 all dispute is forbidden concerning the commands of superiors4 #c4 ,the manner of the covenant between ,god and ,abraham4 #d4 ,in that covenant is contained an acknowledgment of ,god1 not simply1 but of him who appeared unto ,abraham4 #e4 ,the laws unto which ,abraham was tied1 were no other beside those of nature1 and the law of circumcision4 #f4 ,abraham was the interpreter of the word of ,god1 and of all laws among those that belonged to him4 #g4 ,abraham's subjects could not sin by obeying him4 #h4 ,god's covenant with the ,hebrews on ,mount ,sinai4 #i4 ,from thence ,god's government took the name of a kingdom4 #aj4 ,what laws were by ,god given to the ,jews4 #aa4 ,what the word of ,god is1 and how to be known4 #ab4 ,what was held the written word of ,god among the ,jews4 #ac4 ,the power of interpreting the word of ,god1 and the supreme civil power1 were united in ,moses while he lived4 #ad4 ,they were also united in the high-priest1 during the life of ,joshua4 #ae4 ,they were united too in the high-priest until king ,saul's time4 #af4 ,they were also united in the kings until the captivity4 #ag4 ,they were so in the high-priests after the captivity4 #ah4 ,denial of the ,divine ,providence1 and idolatry1 were the only treasons against the ,divine ,majesty among the ,jews2 in all things else they ought to obey their princes4 ,sidenote3 ,superstition possessing foreign nations1 ,god instituted the true religion by the means of ,abraham4 #a4 ,mankind1 from conscience of its own weakness and admiration of natural events1 hath this2 that most men believe ,god to be the invisible maker of all invisible things2 whom they also fear1 conceiving that they have not a sufficient protection in themselves4 ,but the imperfect use they had of their reason1 the violence of their passions did so cloud them1 that they could not rightly worship him4 ,now the fear of invisible things1 when it is severed from right reason1 is superstition4 ,it was therefore almost impossible for men1 without the special assistance of ,god1 to avoid both rocks of atheism and superstition4 ,for this proceeds from fear without right reason2 that1 from an opinion of right reason without fear4 ,idolatry therefore did easily fasten upon the greatest part of men2 and almost all nations did worship ,god in images and resemblances of finite things2 and they worshipped spirits or vain visions1 perhaps out of fear calling them devils4 ,but it pleased the ,divine ,majesty1 as we read it written in the sacred history1 out of all mankind to call forth ,abraham1 by whose means he might bring men to the true worship of him2 and to reveal himself supernaturally to him1 and to make that most famous covenant with him and his seed1 which is called the old covenant or testament4 ,he therefore is the head of true religion2 he was the first that after the deluge taught1 that there was one ,god1 the ,creator of the universe4 ,and from him the kingdom of ,god by way of covenants1 takes its beginning4 ,joseph4 ,antiq4 ,jews1 lib4 ,i44 cap4 #g4 ,sidenote3 ,by the covenant between ,god and ,adam1 all dispute is forbidden concerning the commands of superiors4 #b4 ,in the beginning of the world ,god reigned indeed1 not only naturally1 but also by way of covenant1 over ,adam and ,eve2 so as it seems he would have no obedience yielded to him1 beside that which natural reason should dictate1 but by the way of covenant1 that is to say1 by the consent of men themselves4 ,now because this covenant was presently made void1 nor ever after renewed1 the original of ,god's kingdom 7which we treat of in this place7 is not to be taken thence4 ,yet this is to be noted by the way2 that by that precept of not eating of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil1 7whether the judicature of good and evil1 or the eating of the fruit of some tree were forbidden71 ,god did require a most simple obedience to his commands1 without dispute whether that were good or evil which was commanded4 ,for the fruit of the tree1 if the command be wanting1 hath nothing in its own nature1 whereby the eating of it could be morally evil1 that is to say1 a sin4 ,sidenote3 ,the manner of the covenant between ,god and ,abraham4 #c4 ,now the covenant between ,god and ,abraham was made in this manner1 7,gen4 xvii4 #g1 #h73 ,i will establish my covenant between me and thee1 and thy seed after thee in their generations1 for an everlasting covenant1 to be a ,god unto thee and to thy seed after thee4 ,and ,i will give unto thee and to thy seed after thee1 the land wherein thou art a stranger1 all the land of ,canaan1 for an everlasting possession2 and ,i will be their ,god4 ,now it was necessary to institute some sign1 whereby ,abraham and his seed should retain the memory of this covenant2 wherefore circumcision was added to the covenant1 but yet as a sign only1 7verse #aj1 #aa73 ,this is my covenant which ye shall keep between me and thee1 and thy seed after thee2 every man-child among you shall be circumcised1 and ye shall circumcise the flesh of your foreskin2 and it shall be a token of the covenant between me and you4 ,it is therefore covenanted1 that ,abraham shall acknowledge ,god to be his ,god and the ,god of his seed1 that is to say1 that he shall submit himself to be governed by him2 and that ,god shall give unto ,abraham the inheritance of that land wherein he then dwelt but as a pilgrim2 and that ,abraham1 for a memorial sign of this covenant1 should take care to see himself and his male seed circumcised4 ,sidenote3 ,in that covenant is contained an acknowledgment of ,god1 not simply1 but of him who appeared unto ,abraham4 #d4 ,but seeing that ,abraham1 even before the covenant1 acknowledged ,god to be the ,creator and ,king of the world2 7for he never doubted either of the being or the providence of ,god72 how comes it not to be superfluous1 that ,god would purchase to himself with a price and by contract an obedience which was due to him by nature2 namely1 by promising ,abraham the land of ,canaan1 upon condition that he would receive him for his ,god2 when by the right of nature he was already so8 ,by those words therefore1 to be a ,god unto thee and to thy seed after thee1 we understand not that ,abraham satisfied this covenant by a bare acknowledgment of the power and dominion which ,god had naturally over men1 that is to say1 by acknowledging ,god indefinitely1 which belongs to natural reason2 but he must definitely acknowledge him1 who said unto him1 7,gen4 xii4 #a1 #b73 ,get thee out of thy country2 c4 7,gen4 xiii4 #ad73 ,lift up thine eyes1 c43 who appeared unto him1 7,gen4 xviii4 #a1 #b71 in the shape of three celestial men2 and 7,gen4 xv4 #a71 in a vision2 and 7verse #ac71 in a dream1 which is matter of faith4 ,in what shape ,god appeared unto ,abraham1 by what kind of sound he spake to him1 is not expressed4 ,yet it is plain that ,abraham believed that voice to be the voice of ,god and a true revelation1 and would have all his to worship him1 who had so spoken unto him1 for ,god the ,creator of the world2 and that his faith was grounded on this1 not that he believed ,god to have a being or that he was true in his promises1 that which all men believe1 but that he doubted not him to be ,god1 whose voice and promises he had heard1 and that the ,god of ,abraham signified not simply ,god1 but that ,god which appeared unto him2 even as the worship1 which ,abraham owed unto ,god in that notion1 was not the worship of reason1 but of religion and faith1 and that which not reason1 but ,god had supernaturally revealed4 ,sidenote3 ,the laws to which ,abraham was tied were no other1 but those of nature and that of circumcision4 #e4 ,but we read of no laws given by ,god to ,abraham1 or by ,abraham to his family1 either then or after1 secular or sacred2 excepting the commandment of circumcision1 which is contained in the covenant itself4 ,whence it is manifest1 that there were no other laws or worship1 which ,abraham was obliged to1 but the laws of nature1 rational worship1 and circumcision4 ,sidenote3 ,abraham among his own was the interpreter of the word of ,god and of all laws4 #f4 ,now ,abraham was the interpreter of all laws1 as well sacred as secular1 among those that belonged to him2 not merely naturally1 as using the laws of nature only1 but even by the form of the covenant itself2 in which obedience is promised by ,abraham1 not for himself only1 but for his seed also2 which had been in vain1 except his children had been tied to obey his commands4 ,and how can that be understood1 which ,god says 7,gen4 xviii4 #ah1 #ai73 ,all the nations of the earth shall be blessed in him2 for ,i know him1 that he will command his children and his household after him1 and they shall keep the way of the ,lord to do justice and judgment3 unless his children and his household were supposed to be obliged to yield obedience unto his commands8 ,sidenote3 ,abraham's subjects could not sin in obeying him4 #g4 ,hence it follows1 that ,abraham's subjects could not sin in obeying him1 provided that ,abraham commanded them not to deny ,god's existence or providence1 or to do somewhat expressly contrary to the honour of ,god4 ,in all other things1 the word of ,god was to be fetched from his lips only1 as being the interpreter of all the laws and words of ,god4 ,for ,abraham alone could teach them who was the ,god of ,abraham1 and in what manner he was to be worshipped4 ,and they who after ,abraham's death were subject to the sovereignty of ,isaac or ,jacob1 did by the same reason obey them in all things without sin1 as long as they acknowledged and professed the ,god of ,abraham to be their ,god4 ,for they had submitted themselves to ,god simply1 before they did it to ,abraham1 and to ,abraham before they did it to the ,god of ,abraham3 again1 to the ,god of ,abraham1 before they did it to ,isaac4 ,in ,abraham's subjects therefore1 to deny ,god was the only treason against the divine ,majesty2 but in their posterity1 it was also treason to deny the ,god of ,abraham1 that is to say1 to worship ,god otherwise than was instituted by ,abraham1 to wit1 in images made with hands1#bj as other nations did2 which for that reason were called idolaters4 ,and hitherto1 subjects might easily enough discern what was to be observed1 what avoided in the commands of their princes4 ,footnote #bj3 ,in images made with hands4 ,in chap4 ,,xv4 art4 #ad1 there we have showed such a kind of worship to be irrational4 ,but if it be done by the command of a city1 to whom the written word of ,god is not known nor received1 we have then showed this worship 7in article #ah7 to be rational4 ,but where ,god reigns by way of covenant1 in which it is expressly warned not to worship thus1 as in the covenant made with ,abraham2 there1 whether it be with or without the command of the city1 it is ill done4 ,sidenote3 ,god's covenant with the ,hebrews at ,mount ,sinai4 #h4 ,to go on now1 following the guidance of the holy ,scripture2 the same covenant was renewed 7,gen4 xxvi4 #c1 #d7 with ,isaac2 and 7,gen4 xxviii4 #ac1 #ad7 with ,jacob2 where ,god styles himself not simply ,god1 whom nature doth dictate him to be1 but distinctly the ,god of ,abraham and ,isaac4 ,afterward being about to renew the same covenant by ,moses with the whole people of ,israel1 7,exod4 iii4 #f73 ,i am1 saith he1 the ,god of thy ,father1 the ,god of ,abraham1 the ,god of ,isaac1 and the ,god of ,jacob4 ,afterward1 when that people1 not only the freest1 but also the greatest enemy to human subjection1 by reason of the fresh memory of their ,egyptian bondage1 abode in the wilderness near mount ,sinai1 that ancient covenant was propounded to them all to be renewed in this manner 7,exod4 xix4 #e1 #f73 ,therefore if ye will obey my voice indeed1 and keep my covenant1 7to wit1 that covenant which was made with ,abraham1 ,isaac and ,jacob72 then shall ye be a peculiar treasure unto me1 above all people2 for all the earth is mine1 and ye shall be to me a kingdom of priests1 and an holy nation4 ,and all the people answered together1 and said1 7verse #h7 ,all that the ,lord hath spoken1 will we do4 ,sidenote3 ,from thence ,god's government was called a kingdom4 #i4 ,in this covenant1 among other things1 we must consider well the appellation of kingdom1 not used before4 ,for although ,god1 both by nature and by covenant made with ,abraham1 was their king1 yet owed they him an obedience and worship only natural1 as being his subjects2 and religious1 such as ,abraham instituted1 as being the subjects of ,abraham1 ,isaac1 and ,jacob1 their natural princes4 ,for they had received no word of ,god beside the natural word of right reason2 neither had any covenant passed between ,god and them1 otherwise than as their wills were included in the will of ,abraham1 as their prince4 ,but now by the covenant made at ,mount ,sinai1 the consent of each man being had1 there becomes an institutive kingdom of ,god over them4 ,that kingdom of ,god1 so renowned in ,scriptures and writings of divines1 took its beginning from this time2 and hither tends that which ,god said to ,samuel1 when the ,israelites asked a king 7#a ,sam4 viii4 #g73 ,they have not rejected thee1 but they have rejected me1 that ,i should not reign over them2 and that which ,samuel told the ,israelites 7#a ,sam4 xii4 #ab73 ,ye said unto me1 nay1 but a king shall reign over us1 when the ,lord your ,god was your king2 and that which is said1 ,jer4 xxxi4 #ca3 ,i will make a new covenant1 c4 although ,i was an husband unto them2 and the doctrine also of ,judas ,galilus1 where mention is made in ,josephus' ,antiq4 of the ,jews1 7,book xviii4 chap4 #b71 in these words3 ,but ,judas ,galilus was the first author of this fourth way of those who followed the study of wisdom4 ,these agree in all the rest with the ,pharisees1 excepting that they burn with a most constant desire of liberty2 believing ,god alone to be held for their ,lord and prince2 and will sooner endure even the most exquisite kinds of torments1 together with their kinsfolks and dearest friends1 than call any mortal man their ,lord4 ,sidenote3 ,what laws were by ,god given to the ,jews4 #aj4 ,the right of the kingdom being thus constituted by way of covenant1 let us see in the next place1 what laws ,god propounded to them4 ,now those are known to all1 to wit1 the decalogue1 and those other1 as well judicial as ceremonial laws1 which we find from the twentieth chapter of ,exodus to the end of ,deuteronomy and the death of ,moses4 ,now of those laws1 delivered in general by the hand of ,moses1 some there are which oblige naturally1 being made by ,god1 as the ,god of nature1 and had their force even before ,abraham's time4 ,others there are which oblige by virtue of the covenant made with ,abraham1 being made by ,god as the ,god of ,abraham1 which had their force even before ,moses's time1 by reason of the former covenant4 ,but there are others which oblige by virtue of that covenant only1 which was made last with the people themselves2 being made by ,god1 as being the peculiar king of the ,israelites4 ,of the first sort are all the precepts of the decalogue which pertain unto manners2 such as1 honour thy parents1 thou shalt not kill1 thou shalt not commit adultery1 thou shalt not steal1 thou shalt not bear false witness1 thou shalt not covet2 for they are the laws of nature4 ,also the precept of not taking ,god's name in vain2 for it is a part of natural worship1 as hath been declared in the foregoing chapter 7art4 #ae74 ,in like manner the second commandment1 of not worshipping by way of any image made by themselves2 for this also is a part of natural religion1 as hath been showed in the same article4 ,of the second sort is the first commandment of the decalogue1 of not having any other ,gods2 for in that consists the essence of the covenant made with ,abraham1 by which ,god requires nothing else1 but that he should be his ,god1 and the ,god of his seed4 ,also the precept of keeping holy the ,sabbath2 for the sanctification of the seventh day is instituted in memorial of the six days' creation1 as appears out of these words 7,exod4 xxxi4 #af-ag73 ,it is a perpetual covenant1 7meaning the ,sabbath71 and a sign between me and the children of ,israel for ever2 for in six days the ,lord made heaven and earth1 and on the seventh day he rested1 and was refreshed4 ,of the third kind are the politic1 judicial1 and ceremonial laws2 which only belonged to the ,jews4 ,the laws of the first and second sort written in tables of stone1 to wit1 the decalogue1 was kept in the ark itself4 ,the rest written in the volume of the whole law1 were laid up in the side of the ark1 7,deut4 xxxi4 #bf74 ,for these1 retaining the faith of ,abraham1 might be changed2 those could not4 ,sidenote3 ,what the word of ,god is1 and how to be known4 #aa4 ,all ,god's laws are ,god's word2 but all ,god's word is not his law4 ,i am the ,lord thy ,god which brought thee out of the land of ,egypt1 is the word of ,god2 it is no law4 ,neither is all that1 which for the better declaring of ,god's word is pronounced or written together with it1 instantly to be taken for ,god's word4 ,for1 ,thus saith the ,lord1 is not the voice of ,god1 but of the preacher or prophet4 ,all that1 and only that1 is the word of ,god1 which a true prophet hath declared ,god to have spoken4 ,now the writings of the prophets1 comprehending as well those things which ,god1 as which the prophet himself speaks1 are therefore called the word of ,god1 because they contain the word of ,god4 ,now because all that1 and that alone1 is the word of ,god1 which is recommended to us for such by a true prophet1 it cannot be known what ,god's word is1 before we know who is the true prophet2 nor can we believe ,god's word1 before we believe the prophet4 ,moses was believed by the people of ,israel for two things2 his miracles and his faith4 ,for how great and most evident miracles soever he had wrought1 yet would they not have trusted him1 at least he was not to have been trusted1 if he had called them out of ,egypt to any other worship than the worship of the ,god of ,abraham1 ,isaac1 and ,jacob their fathers4 ,for it had been contrary to the covenant made by themselves with ,god4 ,in like manner two things there are2 to wit1 supernatural prediction of things to come1 which is a mighty miracle2 and faith in the ,god of ,abraham1 their deliverer out of ,egypt2 which ,god proposed to all the ,jews to be kept for marks of a true prophet4 ,he that wants either of these1 is no prophet2 nor is it to be received for ,god's word1 which he obtrudes for such4 ,if faith be wanting1 he is rejected in these words1 7,deut4 xiii4 #a1 #b1 #c1 #d1 #e73 ,if there arise among you a prophet or a dreamer of dreams1 and giveth thee a sign1 or a wonder2 and the sign or the wonder come to pass1 whereof he spake unto thee1 saying1 ,let us go after other gods1 c4 that prophet1 or that dreamer of dreams shall be put to death4 ,if prediction of events be wanting1 he is condemned by these1 7,deut4 xviii4 #ba1 #bb73 ,and if thou say in thine heart1 how shall we know the word which the ,lord hath not spoken8 ,when a prophet speaketh in the name of the ,lord1 if the thing follow not nor come to pass1 that is the thing which the ,lord hath not spoken2 but the prophet hath spoken it presumptuously4 ,now1 that that is the word of ,god which is published for such by a true prophet2 and that he was held to be a true prophet among the ,jews1 whose faith was true1 and to whose predictions the events answered2 is without controversy4 ,but what it is1 to follow other gods1 and whether the events which are affirmed to answer their predictions1 do truly answer them or not1 may admit many controversies2 especially in predictions which obscurely and enigmatically foretel the event2 such as the predictions of almost all the prophets are2 as who saw not ,god apparently1 like unto ,moses1 but in dark speeches1 and in figures4 7,numb4 xii4 #h74 ,but of these we cannot judge1 otherwise than by the way of natural reason2 because that judgment depends on the prophet's interpretation1 and on its proportion with the event4 ,sidenote3 ,what was held for the written word of ,god among the ,jews4 #ab4 ,the ,jews did hold the book of the whole law1 which was called ,deuteronomy1 for the written word of ,god2 and that only 7forasmuch as can be collected out of sacred history7 until the captivity4 ,for this book was delivered by ,moses himself to the priests1 to be kept and laid up in the side of the ark of the covenant1 and to be copied out by the kings2 and the same a long time after1 by the authority of king ,josiah 7#b ,kings xxiii4 #b71 acknowledged again for the word of ,god4 ,but it is not manifest1 when the rest of the books of the ,old ,testament were first received into canon4 ,but what concerns the prophets1 ,isaiah and the rest1 since they foretold no other things than what were to come to pass1 either in or after the captivity1 their writings could not at that time be held for prophetic2 by reason of the law cited above 7,deut4 xviii4 #ba1 #bb71 whereby the ,israelites were commanded not to account any man for a true prophet1 but him whose prophecies were answered by the events4 ,and hence peradventure it is1 that the ,jews esteemed the writings of those whom they slew when they prophesied1 for prophetic afterward2 that is to say1 for the word of ,god4 ,sidenote3 ,the power of interpreting the word of ,god1 and the supreme civil power1 were united in ,moses while he lived4 #ac4 ,it being known what laws there were under the old covenant1 and what word of ,god received from the beginning2 we must furthermore consider1 with whom the authority of judging1 whether the writings of the prophets arising afterward were to be received for the word of ,god2 that is to say1 whether the events did answer their predictions or not2 and with whom also the authority of interpreting the laws already received1 and the written word of ,god1 did reside3 which thing is to be traced through all the times and several changes of the commonwealth of ,israel4 ,but it is manifest that this power1 during the life of ,moses1 was entirely in himself4 ,for if he had not been the interpreter of the laws and word1 that office must have belonged either to every private person1 or to a congregation or synagogue of many1 or to the high-priest or to other prophets4 ,first1 that that office belonged not to private men1 or any congregation made of them1 appears hence2 that they were not admitted1 nay1 they were prohibited with most heavy threats1 to hear ,god speak1 otherwise than by the means of ,moses4 ,for it is written1 7,exod4 xix4 #bd1 #be73 ,let not the priests and the people break through1 to come up unto the ,lord1 lest he break forth upon them4 ,so ,moses went down unto the people1 and spake unto them4 ,it is further manifestly and expressly declared1 upon occasion given by the rebellion of ,corah1 ,dathan1 and ,abiram1 and the two hundred and fifty princes of the assembly1 that neither private men nor the congregation should pretend that ,god had spoken by them1 and by consequence that they had the right of interpreting ,god's word4 ,for they contending1 that ,god spake no less by them than by ,moses1 argue thus1 7,numbers xvi4 #c73 ,ye take too much upon you1 seeing all the congregation are holy1 every one of them1 and the ,lord is among them4 ,wherefore then lift ye up yourselves above the congregation of the ,lord8 ,but how ,god determined this controversy1 is easily understood by verses #cc and #ce of the same chapter1 where ,corah1 ,dathan1 and ,abiram went down alive into the pit1 c4 ,and there came out fire from the ,lord1 and consumed the two hundred and fifty men that offered incense4 ,secondly1 that ,aaron the high-priest had not this authority1 is manifest by the like controversy between him 7together with his sister ,miriam7 and ,moses4 ,for the question was1 whether ,god spake by ,moses only1 or by them also2 that is to say1 whether ,moses alone1 or whether they also were interpreters of the word of ,god4 ,for thus they said1 7,numb4 xii4 #b73 ,hath the ,lord indeed spoken only by ,moses8 ,hath he not also spoken by us8 ,but ,god reproved them2 and made a distinction between ,moses and other prophets1 saying1 7verse #f1 #g1 #h73 ,if there be a prophet among you1 ,i the ,lord will make myself known unto him in a vision1 and will speak unto him in a dream3 my servant ,moses is not so1 c4 ,for with him will ,i speak mouth to mouth1 even apparently1 and not in dark speeches1 and the similitude of the ,lord shall he behold4 ,wherefore then were ye not afraid to speak against my servant ,moses8 ,lastly1 that the interpretation of the word of ,god as long as ,moses lived1 belonged not to any other prophets whatsoever1 is collected out of that place which we now cited1 concerning his eminency above all others2 and out of natural reason1 for as much as it belongs to the same prophet1 who brings the commands of ,god1 to unfold them too2 but there was then no other word of ,god1 beside that which was declared by ,moses4 ,and out of this also1 that there was no other prophet extant at that time1 who prophesied to the people1 excepting the seventy elders who prophesied by the spirit of ,moses4 ,and even that ,joshua1 who was then ,moses' servant1 his successor afterward1 believed to be injuriously done1 till he knew it was by ,moses' consent2 which thing is manifest by text of ,scripture1 7,numb4 xi4 #be73 ,and the ,lord came down in a cloud1 c4 and took of the spirit that was upon ,moses1 and gave it unto the seventy elders4 ,now after it was told that they prophesied1 ,joshua said unto ,moses1 ,forbid them1 my lord4 ,but ,moses answered3 ,why enviest thou for my sake8 ,seeing therefore ,moses alone was the messenger of ,god's word1 and that the authority of interpreting it pertained neither to private men1 nor to the synagogue1 nor to the high-priest1 nor to other prophets2 it remains that ,moses alone was the interpreter of ,gods word1 who also had the supreme power in civil matters2 and that the conventions of ,corah with the rest of his complices against ,moses and ,aaron1 and of ,aaron with his sister against ,moses1 were raised1 not for the salvation of their souls1 but by reason of their ambition and desire of dominion over the people4 ,sidenote3 ,they were also united in the high-priest1 during the life of ,joshua4 #ad4 ,in ,joshua's time the interpretation of the laws1 and of the word of ,god1 belonged to ,eleazar the high-priest2 who was also1 under ,god1 their absolute king4 ,which is collected1 first of all1 out of the covenant itself2 in which the commonwealth of ,israel is called a priestly kingdom1 or1 as it is recited in #a ,peter ii4 #i1 a royal priesthood4 ,which could in no wise be said1 unless by the institution and covenant of the people1 the regal power were understood to belong to the high-priest4 ,neither doth this repugn what hath been said before1 where ,moses1 and not ,aaron1 had the kingdom under ,god4 ,since it is necessary1 when one man institutes the form of a future commonwealth1 that one should govern the kingdom which he institutes during his life1 7whether it be monarchy1 aristocracy1 or democracy72 and have all that power for the present1 which he is bestowing on others for the future4 ,now1 that ,eleazar the priest had not only the priesthood1 but also the sovereignty1 is expressly set down in ,joshua's call to the administration4 ,for thus it is written 7,numb1 xxvii4 #ah1 #ai1 #bj1 #ba73 ,take thee ,joshua the son of ,nun1 a man in whom is the ,spirit1 and lay thine hand upon him1 and set him before ,eleazar the priest1 and before all the congregation1 and give him a charge in their sight2 and thou shalt put some of thine honour upon him1 that all the congregation of the children of ,israel may be obedient2 and he shall stand before ,eleazar the priest1 who shall ask counsel for him after the judgment of ,urim1 before the ,lord2 at his word shall they go out1 and at his word shall they come in1 and all the children of ,israel with him1 even all the congregation4 ,where to ask counsel of ,god for whatsoever is to be done1 that is1 to interpret ,god's word1 and in the name of ,god to command in all matters1 belongs to ,eleazar2 and to go out and to come in at his word1 that is to say1 to obey1 belongs both to ,joshua and to all the people4 ,it is to be observed also1 that that speech1 part of thy glory1 clearly denotes that ,joshua had not a power equal with that which ,moses had4 ,in the meantime it is manifest1 that even in ,joshua's time the supreme power and authority of interpreting the word of ,god1 were both in one person4 ,sidenote3 ,they were also united in the high-priest1 until king ,saul's time4 #ae4 ,after ,joshua's death follow the times of the ,judges until king ,saul2 in which it is manifest that the right of the kingdom instituted by ,god1 remained with the high-priest4 ,for the kingdom was by covenant priestly1 that is to say1 ,god's government by priests4 ,and such ought it to have been1 until that form1 with ,god's consent1 were changed by the people themselves2 which was not done before that requiring a king ,god consented unto them1 and said unto ,samuel 7#a ,sam4 viii4 #g73 ,hearken unto the voice of the people in all that they say unto thee2 for they have not rejected thee1 but they have rejected me1 that ,i should not reign over them4 ,the supreme civil power was therefore rightly due by ,god's own institution to the high-priest2 but actually that power was in the prophets1 to whom 7being raised by ,god in an extraordinary manner7 the ,israelites1 a people greedy of prophets1 submitted themselves to be protected and judged1 by reason of the great esteem they had of prophecies4 ,the reason of this thing was1 because that though penalties were set and judges appointed in the institution of ,god's priestly kingdom2 yet1 the right of inflicting punishment depended wholly on private judgment2 and it belonged to a dissolute multitude and each single person to punish or not to punish1 according as their private zeal should stir them up4 ,and therefore ,moses by his own command punished no man with death2 but when any man was to be put to death1 one or many stirred up the multitude against him or them1 by divine authority1 and saying1 ,thus saith the ,lord4 ,now this was conformable to the nature of ,god's peculiar kingdom4 ,for there ,god reigns indeed1 where his laws are obeyed not for fear of men1 but for fear of himself4 ,and truly1 if men were such as they should be1 this were an excellent state of civil government2 but as men are1 there is a coercive power 7in which ,i comprehend both right and might7 necessary to rule them4 ,and therefore also ,god1 from the beginning1 prescribed laws by ,moses for the future kings 7,deut4 xvii4 #ad-bj74 ,and ,moses foretold this in his last words to the people1 saying 7,deut4 xxxi4 #bi73 ,i know that after my death ye will utterly corrupt yourselves1 and turn aside from the way that ,i have commanded you1 c4 ,when therefore according to this prediction there arose another generation 7,judges ii4 #aj-aa7 who knew not the ,lord1 nor yet the works which he had done for ,israel1 the children of ,israel did evil in the sight of the ,lord1 and served ,balaam2 to wit1 they cast off ,god's government1 that is to say1 that of the priest1 by whom ,god ruled2 and afterward1 when they were overcome by their enemies and oppressed with bondage1 they looked for ,god's will1 not at the hands of the priest any more1 but of the prophets4 ,these therefore actually judged ,israel2 but their obedience was rightly due to the high-priest4 ,although therefore the priestly kingdom1 after the death of ,moses and ,joshua1 was without power2 yet was it not without right4 ,now that the interpretation of ,god's word did belong to the same high-priest1 is manifest by this2 that ,god1 after the tabernacle and the ark of the covenant was consecrated1 spake no more in ,mount ,sinai1 but in the tabernacle of the covenant1 from the propitiatory which was between the cherubims1 whither it was not lawful for any to approach except the high-priest4 ,if therefore regard be had to the right of the kingdom1 the supreme civil power and the authority of interpreting ,god's word were joined in the high-priest4 ,if we consider the fact1 they were united in the prophets who judged ,israel4 ,for as judges1 they had the civil authority2 as prophets1 they interpreted ,god's word4 ,and thus every way hitherto these two powers continued inseparable4 ,sidenote3 ,they were united in the kings1 until the captivity4 #af4 ,kings being once constituted1 it is no doubt but the civil authority belonged to them4 ,for the kingdom of ,god by the way of priesthood 7,god consenting to the request of the ,israelites7 was ended2 which ,hierom also marks1 speaking of the books of ,samuel4 ,samuel1 says he1 ,eli being dead and ,saul slain1 declares the old law abolished4 ,furthermore1 the oaths of the new priesthood and new sovereignty in ,zadok and ,david1 do testify that the right1 whereby the kings did rule1 was founded in the very concession of the people4 ,the priest could rightly do whatsoever every man could rightly do himself2 for the ,israelites granted him a right to judge of all things1 and to wage war for all men2 in which two are contained all right whatsoever can be conceived from man to man4 ,our king say they 7#a ,sam4 viii4 #bj7 shall judge us1 and go out before us1 and fight our battles4 ,judicature therefore belonged to the kings4 ,but to judge is nothing else1 than by interpreting to apply the laws to the facts4 ,to them therefore belonged the interpretation of laws too4 ,and because there was no other written word of ,god acknowledged beside the law of ,moses1 until the captivity2 the authority of interpreting ,god's word did also belong to the kings4 ,nay1 forasmuch as the word of ,god must be taken for a law1 if there had been another written word beside the ,mosaical law1 seeing the interpretation of laws belonged to the kings1 the interpretation of it must also have belonged to them4 ,when the book of ,deuteronomy1 in which the whole ,mosaical law was contained1 being a long time lost was found again2 the priests indeed asked counsel of ,god concerning that book1 but not by their own authority1 but by the commandment of ,josiah2 and not immediately neither1 but by the means of ,holda the prophetess4 ,whence it appears that the authority of admitting books for the word of ,god1 belonged not to the priest4 ,neither yet follows it1 that that authority belonged to the prophetess2 because others did judge of the prophets1 whether they were to be held for true or not4 ,for to what end did ,god give signs and tokens to all the people1 whereby the true prophets might be discerned from the false2 namely1 the event of predictions1 and conformity with the religion established by ,moses2 if they might not use those marks8 ,the authority therefore of admitting books for the word of ,god1 belonged to the king2 and thus that book of the law was approved1 and received again by the authority of king ,josiah2 as appears by the second book of the ,kings1 chap1 xxii4 xxiii43 where it is reported that he gathered together all the several degrees of his kingdom1 the elders1 priests1 prophets1 and all the people2 and he read in their ears all the words of the covenant2 that is to say1 he caused that covenant to be acknowledged for the ,mosaical covenant2 that is to say1 for the word of ,god2 and to be again received and confirmed by the ,israelites4 ,the civil power therefore1 and the power of discerning ,god's word from the words of men1 and of interpreting ,god's word even in the days of the kings1 was wholly belonging to themselves4 ,prophets were sent not with authority1 but in the form and by the right of proclaimers and preachers1 of whom the hearers did judge4 ,and if perhaps these were punished who did not listen to them plainly1 teaching easy things2 it doth not thence follow1 that the kings were obliged to follow all things which they1 in ,god's name1 did declare were to be followed4 ,for though ,josiah1 the good king of ,judah1 were slain because he obeyed not the word of the ,lord from the mouth of ,necho king of ,egypt2 that is to say1 because he rejected good counsel though it seemed to come from an enemy2 yet no man ,i hope will say that ,josiah was1 by any bond either of divine or human laws1 obliged to believe ,pharaoh ,necho king of ,egypt1 because he said that ,god had spoken to him4 ,but what some man may object against kings1 that for want of learning they are seldom able enough to interpret those books of antiquity1 in the which ,god's word is contained2 and that for this cause1 it is not reasonable that this office should depend on their authority2 he may object as much against the priests and all mortal men2 for they may err4 ,and although priests were better instructed in nature and arts than other men1 yet kings are able enough to appoint such interpreters under them2 and so1 though kings did not themselves interpret the word of ,god1 yet the office of interpreting them might depend on their authority4 ,and they who therefore refuse to yield up this authority to kings1 because they cannot practice the office itself1 do as much as if they should say1 that the authority of teaching geometry must not depend upon kings1 except they themselves were geometricians4 ,we read that kings have prayed for the people2 that they have blessed the people2 that they have consecrated the temple2 that they have commanded the priests2 that they have removed priests from their office2 that they have constituted others4 ,sacrifices indeed they have not offered2 for that was hereditary to ,aaron and his sons4 ,but it is manifest1 as in ,moses' lifetime1 so throughout all ages1 from king ,saul to the captivity of ,babylon1 that the priesthood was not a maistry1 but a ministry4 ,sidenote3 ,the same were united in the priests1 after the captivity4 #ag4 ,after their return from ,babylonian bondage1 the covenant being renewed and signed1 the priestly kingdom was restored to the same manner it was in from the death of ,joshua to the beginning of the kings2 excepting that it is not expressly set down1 that the returned ,jews did give up the right of sovereignty either to ,esdras1 by whose direction they ordered their state1 or to any other beside ,god himself4 ,that reformation seems rather to be nothing else1 than the bare promises and vows of every man1 to observe those things which were written in the book of the law4 ,notwithstanding1 7perhaps not by the people's intention71 by virtue of the covenant which they then renewed1 7for the covenant was the same with that which was made at ,mount ,sinai71 that same state was a priestly kingdom2 that is to say1 the supreme civil authority and the sacred were united in the priests4 ,now1 howsoever through the ambition of those who strove for the priesthood1 and by the interposition of foreign princes1 it was so troubled till our ,saviour ,jesus ,christ's time1 that it cannot be understood out of the histories of those times1 where that authority resided2 yet it is plain1 that in those times the power of interpreting ,god's word was not severed from the supreme civil power4 ,sidenote3 ,among the ,jews1 the denial of the ,divine providence and idolatry1 were the only treasons against the ,divine ,majesty3 in all other things they ought to obey their princes4 #ah4 ,out of all this1 we may easily know how the ,jews1 in all times from ,abraham unto ,christ1 were to behave themselves in the commands of their princes4 ,for as in kingdoms merely human1 men must obey a subordinate magistrate in all things1 excepting when his commands contain in them some treason2 so in the kingdom of ,god1 the ,jews were bound to obey their princes1 ,abraham1 ,isaac1 ,jacob1 ,moses1 the priest1 the king1 every one during their time in all things1 except when their commands did contain some treason against the ,divine ,majesty4 ,now treason against the ,divine ,majesty was1 first1 the denial of divine providence2 for this was to deny ,god to be a king by nature3 next1 idolatry1 or the worship not of other1 7for there is but one ,god71 but of strange ,gods2 that is to say1 a worship though of one ,god1 yet under other titles1 attributes1 and rites1 than what were established by ,abraham and ,moses2 for this was to deny the ,god of ,abraham to be their king by covenant made with ,abraham and themselves4 ,in all other things they were to obey4 ,and if a king or priest1 having the sovereign authority1 had commanded somewhat else to be done which was against the laws1 that had been his sin1 and not his subject's2 whose duty it is1 not to dispute1 but to obey the commands of his superiors4 ------- ,,chapter ,,xvii4 ,,of ,,the ,,kingdom ,,of ,,god ,,by ,,the ,,new ,,covenant4 #a4 ,the prophecies concerning ,christ's dignity4 #b4 ,the prophecies concerning his humility and passion4 #c4 ,that ,jesus was that ,christ4 #d4 ,that the kingdom of ,god by the new covenant1 was not the kingdom of ,christ1 as ,christ1 but as ,god4 #e4 ,that the kingdom by the new covenant is heavenly1 and shall begin from the day of judgment4 #f4 ,that the government of ,christ in this world was not a sovereignty1 but counsel1 or a government by the way of doctrine and persuasion4 #g4 ,what the promises of the new covenant are1 on both parts4 #h4 ,that no laws are added by ,christ1 beside the institution of the sacraments4 #i4 ,repent ye1 be baptized1 keep the commandments1 and the like forms of speech1 are not laws4 #aj4 ,it pertains to the civil authority1 to define what the sin of injustice is4 #aa4 ,it pertains to the civil authority1 to define what conduces to the peace and defence of the city4 #ab4 ,it pertains to the civil authority1 to judge 7when need requires7 what definitions and what inferences are true4 #ac4 ,it belongs to the office of ,christ1 to teach morally1 not by the way of speculation1 but as a law2 to forgive sins1 and to teach all things whereof there is no science1 properly so called4 #ad4 ,a distinction of things temporal from spiritual4 #ae4 ,in how many several sorts the word of ,god may be taken4 #af4 ,that all which is contained in ,holy ,scripture1 belongs not to the canon of ,christian faith4 #ag4 ,that the word of a lawful interpreter of ,holy ,scriptures1 is the word of ,god4 #ah4 ,that the authority of interpreting ,scriptures1 is the same with that of determining controversies of faith4 #ai4 ,divers significations of a ,church4 #bj4 ,what a ,church is1 to which we attribute rights1 actions1 and the like personal capacities4 #ba4 ,a ,christian city is the same with a ,christian ,church4 #bb4 ,many cities do not constitute one ,church4 #bc4 ,who are ecclesiastical persons4 #bd4 ,that the election of ecclesiastical persons belongs to the ,church1 their consecration to pastors4 #be4 ,that the power of remitting the sins of the penitent1 and retaining those of the impenitent1 belongs to the pastors2 but that of judging concerning repentance belongs to the ,church4 #bf4 ,what excommunication is1 and on whom it cannot pass4 #bg4 ,that the interpretation of ,scripture depends on the authority of the city4 #bh4 ,that a ,christian city ought to interpret ,scriptures by ecclesiastical pastors4 ,sidenote3 ,the prophecies concerning ,christ's dignity4 #a4 ,there are many clear prophecies extant in the ,old ,testament concerning our ,saviour ,jesus ,christ1 who was to restore the kingdom of ,god by a new covenant2 partly foretelling his regal dignity1 partly his humility and passion4 ,among others concerning his dignity1 these4 ,god1 blessing ,abraham1 makes him a promise of his son ,isaac2 and adds 7,gen4 xvii4 #af73 ,and kings of people shall be of him4 ,jacob blessing his son ,judah 7,gen4 xlix4 #aj73 ,the sceptre1 quoth he1 shall not depart from ,judah4 ,god to ,moses 7,deut4 xviii4 #ah73 ,a prophet1 saith he1 will ,i raise them up from among their brethren1 like unto thee1 and will put my words in his mouth1 and he shall speak unto them all that ,i shall command him2 and it shall come to pass1 that whosoever will not hearken unto my words1 which he shall speak in my name1 ,i will require it of him4 ,isaiah 7,isai4 vii4 #ad73 ,the ,lord himself shall give thee a sign2 ,behold a virgin shall conceive and bear a son1 and shall call his name ,emmanuel4 ,the same prophet 7,isaiah ix4 #f73 ,unto us a child is born1 unto us a son is given1 and the government shall be upon his shoulders2 and his name shall be called wonderful1 counsellor1 the mighty ,god1 the everlasting ,father1 the ,prince of ,peace4 ,and again 7,isaiah xi4 #a-e73 ,there shall come forth a rod out of the stem of ,jesse1 and a branch shall grow out of his roots2 the spirit of the ,lord shall rest upon him1 c42 ,he shall not judge after the sight of his eyes1 neither reprove after the hearing of his ears2 but with righteousness shall he judge the poor1 c42 ,and he shall smite the earth with the rod of his mouth1 and with the breath of his lips shall he slay the wicked4 ,furthermore in the same ,isaiah 7chapters li4 to lxii471 there is almost nothing else contained but a description of the coming and the works of ,christ4 ,jeremiah 7,jerem4 xxxi4 #ca73 ,behold the days come1 saith the ,lord1 that ,i will make a new covenant with the house of ,israel1 and with the house of ,judah4 ,and ,baruch 7,bar4 iii4 #ce-cg73 ,this is our ,god1 c4 ,afterward did he show himself upon earth1 and conversed with men4 ,ezekiel 7,ezek4 xxxiv4 #bc-be73 ,i will set up one shepherd over them1 and he shall feed them2 even my servant ,david4 ,and ,i will make with them a covenant of peace1 c4 ,daniel 7,dan4 vii4 #ac-ad73 ,i saw in the night visions2 and behold one like the ,son of ,man came with the clouds of heaven1 and came to the ancient of days2 and they brought him near before him2 and there was given him dominion1 and glory1 and a kingdom1 that all people1 nations1 and languages should serve him2 his dominion is an everlasting dominion1 c4 ,haggai 7,haggai ii4 #f-g73 ,yet once it is a little while1 and ,i will shake the heaven1 and the earth1 and the sea1 and the dry land2 and ,i will shake all nations2 and the desire of all nations shall come4 ,zachariah1 under the type of ,joshua the high-priest 7,zach4 iii4 #h73 ,i will bring forth my servant the branch1 c4 ,and again 7,zach4 vi4 #ab73 ,behold the man whose name is the ,branch4 ,and again 7,zach4 ix4 #i73 ,rejoice greatly ,o daughter of ,zion1 shout ,o daughter of ,jerusalem2 behold thy king cometh to thee2 he is just1 having salvation4 ,the ,jews moved by these and other prophecies1 expected ,christ their king to be sent from ,god2 who should redeem them1 and furthermore bear rule over all nations4 ,yea1 this prophecy had spread over the whole ,roman empire2 which ,vespasian too1 though falsely1 interpreted in favour of his own enterprises2 that out of ,judea should come he that should have dominion4 ,sidenote3 ,the prophecies of ,christ's humility and passion4 #b4 ,now the prophecies of ,christ's humility and passion1 amongst others are these3 7,isaiah liii4 #d73 ,he hath borne our griefs1 and carried our sorrows2 yet we did esteem him stricken1 smitten of ,god1 and afflicted2 and by and by 7verse #g73 ,he was oppressed1 he was afflicted1 yet he opened not his mouth2 he is brought as a lamb to the slaughter1 and as a sheep before her shearer is dumb1 so opened he not his mouth1 c4 ,and again 7verse #h73 ,he was cut out of the land of the living2 for the transgression of my people was he stricken1 c4 7,verse #ab73 ,therefore ,i will divide him a portion with the great1 and he shall divide the spoil with the strong2 because he hath poured out his soul unto death1 and he was numbered with the transgressors1 and he bare the sin of many1 and made intercession for the transgressors4 ,and that of ,zachariah 7,zach4 ix4 #i73 ,he is lowly1 riding upon an ass1 and upon a colt the foal of an ass4 ,sidenote3 ,that ,jesus was the ,christ4 #c4 ,in the reign of ,tiberius ,csar1 ,jesus our ,saviour1 a ,galilean1 began to preach2 the son1 as was supposed1 of ,joseph2 declaring to the people of the ,jews1 that the kingdom of ,god expected by them was now come1 and that himself was a king1 that is to say1 the ,christ2 explaining the law1 choosing twelve apostles and seventy disciples1 after the number of the princes of the tribes1 and seventy elders 7according to the pattern of ,moses7 to the ministry2 teaching the way of salvation by himself and them2 purging the temple1 doing great signs1 and fulfilling all those things which the prophets had foretold of ,christ to come4 ,that this man1 hated of the ,pharisees1 whose false doctrine and hypocritical sanctity he had reproved2 and by their means1 of the people accused of unlawful seeking for the kingdom1 and crucified2 was the true ,christ and king promised by ,god1 and sent from his ,father to renew the new covenant between them and ,god2 both the evangelists do show1 describing his genealogy1 nativity1 life1 doctrine1 death1 and resurrection2 and by comparing the things which he did with those which were foretold of him1 all ,christians do consent to4 ,sidenote3 ,that the kingdom of ,god by the new covenant1 was not the kingdom of ,christ1 as ,christ1 but as ,god4 #d4 ,now from this1 that ,christ was sent from ,god his ,father to make a covenant between him and the people1 it is manifest1 that though ,christ were equal to his ,father according to his nature1 yet was he inferior according to the right of the kingdom4 ,for this office1 to speak properly1 was not that of a king1 but of a viceroy2 such as ,moses' government was2 for the kingdom was not his1 but his ,father's4 ,which ,christ himself signified when he was baptized as a subject1 and openly professed when he taught his disciples to pray1 ,our ,father1 thy kingdom come1 c43 and when he said 7,matth4 xxvi4 #bi73 ,i will not drink of the blood of the grape1 until that day when ,i shall drink it new with you in the kingdom of my ,father4 ,and ,st4 ,paul 7#a ,cor4 xv4 #bb-bd73 ,as in ,adam all die1 so in ,christ shall all be made alive2 but every man in his own order2 ,christ the first fruits2 afterward they that are ,christ's1 who believed in his coming2 then cometh the end when he shall have delivered up the kingdom to ,god even his ,father4 ,the same notwithstanding is also called the kingdom of ,christ3 for both the mother of the sons of ,zebedee petitioned ,christ1 saying 7,matth4 xx4 #ba73 ,grant that these my two sons may sit1 the one on thy right hand1 the other on thy left1 in thy kingdom3 and the thief on the cross 7,luke xxiii4 #db73 ,lord remember me when thou comest into thy kingdom3 and ,st4 ,paul 7,ephes4 v4 #e73 ,for this know ye1 that no whoremonger1 c4 shall enter into the kingdom of ,god1 and of ,christ3 and elsewhere 7#b ,tim4 iv4 #a73 ,i charge thee before ,god1 and the ,lord ,jesus ,christ1 who shall judge the quick and dead at his appearing1 and his kingdom1 c43 7verse #ah73 ,and the ,lord shall deliver me from every evil work1 and will preserve me unto his heavenly kingdom4 ,nor is it to be marveled at1 that the same kingdom is attributed to them both2 since both the ,father and the ,son are the same ,god2 and the new covenant concerning ,god's kingdom1 is not propounded in the name of the ,father2 but in the name of the ,father1 of the ,son1 and of the ,holy ,ghost1 as of one ,god4 ,sidenote3 ,that the kingdom of ,god by the new covenant is heavenly1 and begins from the day of judgment4 #e4 ,but the kingdom of ,god1 for restitution whereof ,christ was sent from ,god his ,father1 takes not its beginning before his second coming2 to wit1 from the day of judgment1 when he shall come in majesty accompanied with his angel4 ,for it is promised the apostles1 that in the kingdom of ,god they shall judge the twelve tribes of ,israel1 7,matth4 xix4 #bh73 ,ye which have followed me in the regeneration1 when the ,son of man shall sit in the throne of his glory1 ye also shall sit upon twelve thrones judging the twelve tribes of ,israel3 which is not to be done till the day of judgment4 ,christ therefore is not yet in the throne of his majesty2 nor is that time1 when ,christ was conversant here in the world1 called a kingdom1 but a regeneration2 that is to say1 a renovation or restitution of the kingdom of ,god1 and a calling of them who were hereafter to be received into his kingdom4 ,and where it is said 7,matth4 xxv4 #ca-cb73 ,when the ,son of man shall come in his glory1 and all the holy angels with him1 then shall he sit upon the throne of his glory1 and before him shall be gathered all nations2 and he shall separate them one from another1 as a shepherd divideth his sheep from the goats3 we may manifestly gather that there will be no local separation of ,god's subjects from his enemies1 but that they shall live mixed together until ,christ's second coming4 ,which is also confirmed by the comparison of the kingdom of heaven with wheat mingled with darnell1 and with a net containing all sorts of fish4 ,but a multitude of men1 enemies and subjects1 living promiscuously together1 cannot properly be termed a kingdom4 ,besides1 the apostles1 when they asked our ,saviour1 whether he would at that time when he ascended into heaven1 restore the kingdom unto ,israel2 did openly testify1 that they then1 when ,christ ascended1 thought the kingdom of ,god not to be yet come4 ,furthermore1 the words of ,christ1 ,my kingdom is not of this world3 and1 ,i will not drink1 c4 till the kingdom of ,god come3 and1 ,god hath not sent his ,son into the world1 to judge the world1 but that the world through him might be saved3 and1 ,if any man hear my words1 and keep them not1 ,i judge him not2 for ,i came not to judge the world1 but to save the world3 and1 ,man1 who made me a judge or divider between you8 and the very appellation of the kingdom of heaven testifies as much4 ,the same thing is gathered out of the words of the prophet ,jeremiah1 speaking of the kingdom of ,god by the new covenant 7,jer4 xxxi4 #cd73 ,they shall teach no more every man his neighbour2 saying1 ,know the ,lord4 ,for they shall all know me1 from the least of them to the greatest of them1 saith the ,lord3 which cannot be understood of a kingdom in this world4 ,the kingdom of ,god therefore1 for the restoring whereof ,christ came into the world2 of which the prophets did prophecy1 and of which praying we say1 ,thy kingdom come2 if it is to have subjects locally separated from enemies1 if judicature1 if majesty1 according as hath been foretold2 shall begin from that time1 wherein ,god shall separate the sheep from the goats2 wherein the apostles shall judge the twelve tribes of ,israel2 wherein ,christ shall come in majesty and glory2 wherein lastly1 all men shall so know ,god1 that they shall not need to be taught2 that is to say1 at ,christ's second coming1 or the day of judgment4 ,but if the kingdom of ,god were now already restored1 no reason could be rendered why ,christ1 having completed the work for which he was sent1 should come again2 or why we should pray1 ,thy kingdom come4 ,sidenote3 ,the government of ,christ in this world was not a sovereignty1 but counsel1 or a government by way of doctrine and persuasion4 #f4 ,now1 although the kingdom of ,god by ,christ to be established with a new covenant1 were heavenly2 we must not therefore think1 that they1 who believing in ,christ would make that covenant1 were not so to be governed here on the earth too1 as that they should persevere in their faith and obedience promised by that covenant4 ,for in vain had the kingdom of heaven been promised1 if we were not to have been led into it2 but none can be led1 but those who are directed in the way4 ,moses1 when he had instituted the priestly kingdom1 himself though he were no priest1 yet ruled and conducted the people all the time of their peregrination1 until their entrance into the promised land4 ,in the same manner is it our ,saviour's office1 7whom ,god in this thing would have like unto ,moses71 as he was sent from his ,father1 so to govern the future subjects of his heavenly kingdom in this life1 that they might attain to and enter into that2 although the kingdom were not properly his1 but his ,father's4 ,but the government whereby ,christ rules the faithful ones in this life1 is not properly a kingdom or dominion1 but a pastoral charge1 or the right of teaching2 that is to say1 ,god the ,father gave him not a power to judge of meum and tuum1 as he doth to the kings of the earth2 nor a coercive power1 nor legislative2 but of showing to the world1 and teaching them the way and knowledge of salvation2 that is to say1 of preaching and declaring what they were to do1 who would enter into the kingdom of heaven4 ,that ,christ had received no power from his ,father to judge in questions of meum and tuum1 that is to say1 in all questions of right among those who believed not1 those words above cited do sufficiently declare3 ,man1 who made me a judge or divider between you8 ,and it is confirmed by reason4 ,for seeing ,christ was sent to make a covenant between ,god and men2 and no man is obliged to perform obedience before the contract be made2 if he should have judged of questions of right1 no man had been tied to obey his sentence4 ,but that the discerning of right was not committed to ,christ in this world1 neither among the faithful nor among infidels1 is apparent in this2 that that right without all controversy belongs to princes1 as long as it is not by ,god himself derogated from their authority4 ,but it is not derogated before the day of judgment2 as appears by the words of ,st4 ,paul1 speaking of the day of judgment 7#a ,cor4 xv4 #bd73 ,then cometh the end1 when he shall have delivered up the kingdom to ,god even the ,father1 when he shall have put down all rule1 and all authority1 and power4 ,secondly1 the words of our ,saviour reproving ,james and ,john1 when they had said 7,luke ix4 #ed73 ,wilt thou that we call for fire from heaven1 that it may consume them8 7namely the ,samaritans1 who had denied to receive him going up to ,jerusalem73 and replying 7verse #ef71 ,the ,son of man is not come to destroy souls1 but to save them2 and those words3 ,behold ,i send you as sheep among wolves2 ,shake off the dust of your feet2 and the like2 and those words1 ,god sent not his ,son into the world1 to judge the world1 but that the world through him might be saved2 and those3 ,if any man hear my words1 and keep them not1 ,i judge him not2 for ,i came not to judge the world1 c43 do all show1 that he had no power given him to condemn or punish any man4 ,we read indeed1 that the ,father judgeth no man1 but hath committed all judgment to the ,son2 but since that both may1 and must be understood of the day of future judgment1 it doth not at all repugn what hath been said before4 ,lastly1 that he was not sent to make new laws1 and that therefore by his office and mission he was no legislator properly so called1 nor ,moses neither1 but a bringer and publisher of his ,father's laws1 7for ,god only1 and neither ,moses nor ,christ1 was a king by covenant71 is collected hence2 that he said1 ,i came not to destroy1 7to wit1 the laws before given from ,god by ,moses1 which he presently interprets71 but to fulfil2 and1 ,he that shall break one of the least of these commandments1 and shall teach men so1 he shall be called least in the kingdom of heaven4 ,christ therefore had not a royal or sovereign power committed to him from his ,father in this world1 but councillary and doctrinal only2 which himself signifies1 as well then when he calls his apostles not hunters1 but fishers of men2 as when he compares the kingdom of ,god to a grain of mustard-seed1 and to a little leaven hid in meal4 ,sidenote3 ,what the promises of the new covenant are on both parts4 #g4 ,god promised unto ,abraham1 first1 a numerous seed1 the possession of the land of ,canaan1 and a blessing upon all nations in his seed1 on this condition2 that he and his seed should serve him3 next1 unto the seed of ,abraham according to the flesh1 a priestly kingdom1 a government most free1 in which they were to be subject to no human power1 on this condition2 that they should serve the ,god of ,abraham on that fashion which ,moses should teach3 lastly1 both to them and to all nations1 a heavenly and eternal kingdom1 on condition that they should serve the ,god of ,abraham on that manner which ,christ should teach4 ,for by the new1 that is to say1 the ,christian covenant1 it is covenanted on men's part1 to serve the ,god of ,abraham on that manner which ,jesus should teach3 on ,god's part1 to pardon their sins1 and bring them into his celestial kingdom4 ,we have already spoken of the quality of the heavenly kingdom1 above in art4 #e2 but it is usually called1 sometimes the kingdom of heaven1 sometimes the kingdom of glory1 sometimes the life eternal4 ,what is required on men's part1 namely1 to serve ,god as ,christ should teach1 contains two things2 obedience to be performed to ,god1 7for this is to serve ,god72 and faith in ,jesus1 to wit1 that we believe ,jesus to be that ,christ who was promised by ,god2 for that only is the cause why his doctrine is to be followed1 rather than any other's4 ,now in holy ,scriptures1 repentance is often put instead of obedience2 because ,christ teacheth everywhere1 that with ,god the will is taken for the deed2 but repentance is an infallible sign of an obedient mind4 ,these things being understood1 it will most evidently appear out of many places of sacred ,scripture1 that those are the conditions of the ,christian covenant which we have named2 to wit1 giving remission of sins and eternal life on ,god's part2 and repenting and believing in ,jesus ,christ1 on men's part4 ,first1 the words1 7,mark i4 #ae73 ,the kingdom of ,god is at hand2 ,repent ye and believe the gospel1 contain the whole covenant4 ,in like manner those 7,luke xxiv4 #df-dg73 ,thus it is written1 and thus it behoved ,christ to suffer1 and to rise from the dead the third day2 and that repentance and remission of sins should be preached in his name among all nations1 beginning at ,jerusalem4 ,and those 7,acts iii4 #ai73 ,repent and be converted1 that your sins may be blotted out when the times of refreshing shall come1 c4 ,and sometimes one part is expressly propounded1 and the other understood1 as here 7,john iii4 #cf73 ,he that believeth in the ,son1 hath everlasting life2 ,he that believeth not the ,son1 shall not see life1 but the wrath of ,god abideth on him3 where faith is expressed1 repentance not mentioned2 and in ,christ's preaching 7,matth4 iv4 #ag73 ,repent1 for the kingdom of heaven is at hand3 where repentance is expressed1 faith is understood4 ,but the parts of this new contract are most manifestly and formally set down there1 where a certain ruler1 bargaining as it were for the kingdom of ,god1 asketh our ,saviour 7,luke xviii4 #ah73 ,good ,master1 what shall ,i do to inherit eternal life8 ,but ,christ first propounds one part of the price1 namely1 observation of the commandments1 or obedience2 which when he answered that he had kept1 he adjoins the other1 saying 7verse #bb73 ,yet lackest thou one thing2 ,sell all that thou hast1 and distribute to the poor1 and thou shalt have treasure in heaven2 and come1 follow me4 ,this was matter of faith4 ,he therefore not giving sufficient credit to ,christ and his heavenly treasures1 went away sorrowful4 ,the same covenant is contained in these words 7,mark xvi4 #af73 ,he that believeth and is baptized1 shall be saved2 but he that believeth not1 shall be damned3 where faith is expressed1 repentance is supposed in those that are baptized4 ,and in these words 7,john iii4 #e73 ,except a man be born again of water and the ,holy ,ghost1 he cannot enter into the kingdom of heaven3 where1 to be born of water1 is the same with regeneration1 that is to say1 conversion to ,christ4 ,now that baptism is required in the two places cited just before1 and in divers others1 we must understand1 that what circumcision was to the old covenant1 that baptism is to the new4 ,seeing therefore that was not of the essence1 but served for a memorial of the old covenant1 as a ceremony or sign1 7and was omitted in the wilderness72 in like manner this also is used1 not as pertaining to the essence1 but in memory and for a sign of the new covenant which we make with ,god4 ,and provided the will be not wanting1 the act through necessity may be omitted2 but repentance and faith1 which are of the essence of the covenant1 are always required4 ,sidenote3 ,there are no laws added by ,christ1 beside the institution of the sacraments4 #h4 ,in the kingdom of ,god after this life1 there will be no laws2 partly1 because there is no room for laws1 where there is none for sins2 partly1 because laws were given us from ,god1 not to direct us in heaven1 but unto heaven4 ,let us now therefore inquire what laws ,christ established not himself2 for he would not take upon him any legislative authority1 as hath been declared above in art4 #f2 but propounded to us for his ,father's4 ,we have a place in ,scripture1 where he contracts all the laws of ,god published till that time1 into two precepts4 7,matth4 xxii4 #cg1 #ch1 #ci1 #dj73 ,thou shalt love the ,lord thy ,god with all thine heart1 with all thy soul1 and with all thy mind2 this is the greatest and first commandment4 ,and the second is like unto it1 ,thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself4 ,on these two commandments hang all the law and the prophets4 ,the first of these was given before by ,moses in the same words 7,deut4 vi4 #e72 and the second even before ,moses2 for it is the natural law1 having its beginning with rational nature itself3 and both together is the sum of all laws4 ,for all the laws of divine natural worship1 are contained in these words1 ,thou shalt love ,god2 and all the laws of divine worship due by the old covenant1 in these words1 ,thou shalt love thy ,god1 that is to say1 ,god1 as being the peculiar ,king of ,abraham and his seed2 and all the laws natural and civil1 in these words1 ,thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself4 ,for he that loves ,god and his neighbour1 hath a mind to obey all laws1 both divine and human4 ,but ,god requires no more than a mind to obey4 ,we have another place where ,christ interprets the laws1 namely1 the fifth1 sixth1 and seventh entire chapters of ,st4 ,matthew's ,gospel4 ,but all those laws are set down either in the decalogue or in the moral law1 or are contained in the faith of ,abraham2 as that law of not putting away a wife is contained in the faith of ,abraham4 ,for that same1 two shall be one flesh1 was not delivered1 either by ,christ first1 or by ,moses1 but by ,abraham1 who first preached the creation of the world4 ,the laws therefore which ,christ contracts in one place1 and explains in another1 are no other than those to which all mortal men are obliged1 who acknowledge the ,god of ,abraham4 ,beside these1 we read not of any law given by ,christ1 beside the institution of the sacraments of baptism and the eucharist4 ,sidenote3 ,that these and the like forms1 repent1 be baptized1 keep the commandments1 are not laws4 #i4 ,what may be said then of these kind of precepts1 ,repent1 ,be baptized1 ,keep the ,commandments1 ,believe the ,gospel1 ,come unto me1 ,sell all that thou hast1 ,give to the poor1 ,follow me2 and the like8 ,we must say that they are not laws1 but a calling of us to the faith3 such as is that of ,isaiah 7lv4 #a73 ,come2 buy wine and milk without money and without price4 ,neither if they come not1 do they therefore sin against any law1 but against prudence only2 neither shall their infidelity be punished1 but their former sins4 ,wherefore ,st4 ,john saith of the unbeliever1 ,the wrath of ,god abideth on him2 he saith not1 ,the wrath of ,god shall come upon him4 ,and1 ,he that believeth not1 is already judged2 he saith not1 shall be judged1 but is already judged4 ,nay1 it cannot be well conceived1 that remission of sins should be a benefit arising from faith1 unless we understand also on the other side1 that the punishment of sins is an hurt proceeding from infidelity4 ,sidenote3 ,it belongs to the civil authority1 to define what the sin of injustice is4 #aj4 ,from hence1 that our ,saviour hath prescribed no distributive laws to the subjects of princes1 and citizens of cities2 that is to say1 hath given no rules whereby a subject may know and discern what is his own1 what another man's1 nor by what forms1 words1 or circumstances a thing must be given1 delivered1 invaded1 possessed1 that it may be known by right to belong to the receiver1 invader1 or possessor3 we must necessarily understand that each single subject 7not only with unbelievers1 among whom ,christ himself denied himself to be a judge and distributor1 but even with ,christians7 must take those rules from his city1 that is to say1 from that man or council which hath the supreme power4 ,it follows therefore1 that by those laws2 ,thou shalt not kill1 ,thou shalt not commit adultery1 ,thou shalt not steal1 ,honour thy father and mother2 nothing else was commanded1 but that subjects1 and citizens1 should absolutely obey their princes in all questions concerning meum and tuum1 their own and others' right4 ,for by that precept1 ,thou shalt not kill1 all slaughter is not prohibited2 for he that said1 ,thou shalt not kill1 said also1 7,exod4 xxxv4 #b73 ,whosoever doth work upon the sabbath1 shall be put to death4 ,no1 nor yet all slaughter1 the cause not being heard2 for he said1 7,exod4 xxxii4 #bg73 ,slay every man his brother1 and every man his companion1 and every man his neighbour4 7,verse #bh73 ,and there fell of the people about three thousand men4 ,nor yet all slaughter of an innocent person2 for ,jephtha vowed 7,judges xi4 #ca73 ,whosoever cometh forth1 c4 ,i will offer him up for a burnt offering unto the ,lord2 and his vow was accepted of ,god4 ,what then is forbidden8 ,only this3 that no man kill another1 who hath not a right to kill him2 that is to say1 that no man kill1 unless it belong to him to do so4 ,the law of ,christ therefore concerning killing1 and consequently all manner of hurt done to any man1 and what penalties are to be set1 commands us to obey the city only4 ,in like manner1 by that precept1 ,thou shalt not commit adultery1 all manner of copulation is not forbidden2 but only that of lying with another man's wife4 ,but the judgment1 which is another man's wife1 belongs to the city2 and is to be determined by the rules which the city prescribes4 ,this precept therefore commands both male and female to keep that faith entire1 which they have mutually given according to the statutes of the city4 ,so also by the precept1 thou shalt not steal1 all manner of invasion or secret surreption is not forbidden2 but of another man's only4 ,the subject therefore is commanded this only1 that he invade not nor take away aught which the city prohibits to be invaded or taken away2 and universally1 not to call anything murder1 adultery1 or theft1 but what is done contrary to the civil laws4 ,lastly1 seeing ,christ hath commanded us to honour our parents1 and hath not prescribed with what rites1 what appellations1 and what manner of obedience they are to be honoured2 it is to be supposed that they are to be honoured with the will indeed1 and inwardly1 as kings and lords over their children1 but outwardly1 not beyond the city's permission1 which shall assign to every man1 as all things else1 so also his honour4 ,but since the nature of justice consists in this1 that every man have his own given him2 it is manifest1 that it also belongs to a ,christian city to determine what is justice1 what injustice1 or a sin against justice4 ,now what belongs to a city1 that must be judged to belong to him or them who have the sovereign power of the city4 ,sidenote3 ,it belongs to civil authority1 to define what conduces to the peace and safety of the city4 #aa4 ,moreover1 because our ,saviour hath not showed subjects any other laws for the government of a city1 beside those of nature1 that is to say1 beside the command of obedience2 no subject can privately determine who is a public friend1 who an enemy1 when war1 when peace1 when truce is to be made1 nor yet what subjects1 what authority and of what men1 are commodious or prejudicial to the safety of the commonweal4 ,these and all like matters therefore are to be learned1 if need be1 from the city1 that is to say1 from the sovereign powers4 ,sidenote3 ,it belongs to the civil authority1 to judge1 when need requires1 what definitions and what inferences are true4 #ab4 ,furthermore1 all these things1 to build castles1 houses1 temples2 to move1 carry1 take away mighty weights2 to send securely over seas2 to contrive engines1 serving for all manner of uses2 to be well acquainted with the face of the whole world1 the courses of the stars1 the seasons of the year1 the accounts of the times1 and the nature of all things2 to understand perfectly all natural and civil rights2 and all manner of sciences1 which1 comprehended under the title of philosophy1 are necessary partly to live1 partly to live well2 ,i say1 the understanding of these 7because ,christ hath not delivered it7 is to be learnt from reasoning2 that is to say1 by making necessary consequences1 having first taken the beginning from experience4 ,but men's reasonings are sometimes right1 sometimes wrong2 and consequently1 that which is concluded and held for a truth1 is sometimes truth1 sometimes error4 ,now errors1 even about these philosophical points1 do sometimes public hurt1 and give occasions of great seditions and injuries4 ,it is needful therefore1 as oft as any controversy ariseth in these matters contrary to public good and common peace1 that there be somebody to judge of the reasoning1 that is to say1 whether that which is inferred1 be rightly inferred or not2 that so the controversy may be ended4 ,but there are no rules given by ,christ to this purpose1 neither came he into the world to teach logic4 ,it remains therefore that the judges of such controversies1 be the same with those whom ,god by nature had instituted before1 namely1 those who in each city are constituted by the sovereign4 ,moreover1 if a controversy be raised of the accurate and proper signification1 that is1 the definition of those names or appellations which are commonly used2 insomuch as it is needful for the peace of the city1 or the distribution of right1 to be determined2 the determination will belong to the city4 ,for men1 by reasoning1 do search out such kind of definitions in their observation of diverse conceptions1 for the signification whereof those appellations were used at diverse times and for diverse causes4 ,but the decision of the question1 whether a man do reason rightly1 belongs to the city4 ,for example1 if a woman bring forth a child of an unwonted shape1 and the law forbid to kill a man2 the question is1 whether the child be a man4 ,it is demanded therefore1 what a man is4 ,no man doubts but the city shall judge it1 and that without taking an account of ,aristotle's definition1 that man is a rational creature4 ,and these things1 namely1 right1 policy1 and natural sciences1 are subjects concerning which ,christ denies that it belongs to his office to give any precepts1 or teach any thing beside this only2 that in all controversies about them1 every single subject should obey the laws and determinations of his city4 ,yet must we remember this1 that the same ,christ1 as ,god1 could not only have taught1 but also commanded what he would4 ,sidenote3 ,it belongs to the office of ,christ1 to teach morality1 not as a speculation1 but as a law2 to forgive sins1 and to teach all things whereof there is no science properly so called4 #ac4 ,the sum of our ,saviour's office was1 to teach the way and all the means of salvation and eternal life4 ,but justice and civil obedience1 and observation of all the natural laws1 is one of the means to salvation4 ,now these may be taught two ways2 one1 as theorems1 by the way of natural reason1 by drawing right and the natural laws from human principles and contracts2 and this doctrine thus delivered1 is subject to the censure of civil powers4 ,the other1 as laws1 by divine authority1 in showing the will of ,god to be such2 and thus to teach1 belongs only to him to whom the will of ,god is supernaturally known1 that is to say1 to ,christ4 ,secondly1 it belonged to the office of ,christ to forgive sins to the penitent2 for that was necessary for the salvation of men who had already sinned4 ,neither could it be done by any other4 ,for remission of sins follows not repentance naturally1 as a debt2 but it depends1 as a free gift1 on the will of ,god supernaturally to be revealed4 ,thirdly1 it belongs to the office of ,christ to teach all those commandments of ,god1 whether concerning his worship1 or those points of faith which cannot be understood by natural reason1 but only by revelation2 of which nature are those1 that he was the ,christ2 that his kingdom was not terrestrial1 but celestial2 that there are rewards and punishments after this life2 that the soul is immortal2 that there should be such1 and so many sacraments2 and the like4 ,sidenote3 ,a distinction of things temporal from spiritual4 #ad4 ,from what hath been said in the foregoing chapter1 it is not hard to distinguish between things spiritual and temporal4 ,for since by spiritual1 those things are understood1 which have their foundation on the authority and office of ,christ1 and1 unless ,christ had taught them1 could not have been known2 and all other things are temporal2 it follows1 that the definition and determination of what is just and unjust1 the cognizance of all controversies about the means of peace and public defence1 and the examination of doctrines and books in all manner of rational science1 depends upon the temporal right2 but those which are mysteries of faith1 depending on ,christ's word and authority only1 their judgments belong to spiritual right4 ,but it is reason's inquisition1 and pertains to temporal right to define what is spiritual1 and what temporal2 because our ,saviour hath not made that distinction4 ,for although ,st4 ,paul in many places distinguish between spiritual things and carnal things2 and call 7,rom4 viii4 #e3 #a ,cor4 xii4 #h-aj7 those things spiritual1 which are of the spirit1 to wit1 the word of wisdom1 the word of knowledge1 faith1 the gift of healing1 the working of miracles1 prophecy1 divers kind of tongues1 interpretation of tongues2 all supernaturally inspired by the ,holy ,ghost1 and such as the carnal man understands not1 but he only who hath known the mind of ,christ 7#b ,cor4 ii4 #ad-af72 and those things carnal1 which belong to worldly wealth 7,rom4 xv4 #bg72 and the men carnal men 7#a ,cor4 iii4 #a-c73 yet hath he not defined1 nor given us any rules whereby we may know what proceeds from natural reason1 what from supernatural inspiration4 ,sidenote3 ,the word of ,god many ways taken4 #ae4 ,seeing therefore it is plain that our ,saviour hath committed to1 or rather not taken away from princes1 and those who in each city have obtained the sovereignty1 the supreme authority of judging and determining all manner of controversies about temporal matters2 we must see henceforth to whom he hath left the same authority in matters spiritual4 ,which because it cannot be known1 except it be out of the word of ,god and the tradition of the ,church1 we must enquire in the next place what the word of ,god is1 what to interpret it1 what a ,church is1 and what the will and command of the ,church4 ,to omit that the word of ,god is in ,scripture taken sometimes for the ,son of ,god1 it is used three manner of ways4 ,first1 most properly for that which ,god hath spoken4 ,thus1 whatsoever ,god spake unto ,abraham1 the patriarchs1 ,moses1 and the prophets1 our ,saviour to his disciples1 or any others2 is the word of ,god4 ,secondly1 whatsoever hath been uttered by men on the motion or by command of the ,holy ,ghost2 in which sense we acknowledge the ,scriptures to be the word of ,god4 ,thirdly1 in the ,new ,testament indeed1 the word of ,god most frequently signifies the doctrine of the gospel1 or the word concerning ,god1 or the word of the kingdom of ,god by ,christ4 ,as where it is said 7,matth4 iv4 #bc7 that ,christ preached the gospel of the kingdom3 where the apostles are said to preach the word of ,god 7,acts xiii4 #df73 where the word of ,god is called the word of life 7,acts v4 #bj73 of the word of the gospel 7,acts xv4 #g73 the word of faith 7,rom4 x4 #h73 the word of truth1 that is to say1 7adding an interpretation7 the gospel of salvation1 7,eph4 i4 #ac73 and where it is called the word of the apostles2 for ,st4 ,paul says 7#b ,thess4 iii4 #ad73 ,if any man obey not our word1 c4 ,which places cannot be otherwise meant than of the doctrine evangelical4 ,in like manner1 where the word of ,god is said to be sown1 to increase1 and to be multiplied 7,acts xii4 #bd3 and xiii4 #di73 it is very hard to conceive this to be spoken of the voice of ,god or of his apostles2 but of their doctrine1 easy4 ,and in this third acception is all that doctrine of the ,christian faith1 which at this day is preached in pulpits and contained in the books of divines1 the word of ,god4 ,sidenote3 ,all things contained in the ,scripture1 belong not to the canon of ,christian faith4 #af4 ,now the sacred ,scripture is entirely the word of ,god in this second acception1 as being that which we acknowledge to be inspired from ,god2 and innumerable places of it1 in the first4 ,and seeing the greatest part of it is conversant either in the prediction of the kingdom of heaven1 or in prefigurations before the incarnation of ,christ1 or in evangelization and explication after2 the sacred ,scripture is also the word of ,god1 and therefore the canon and rule of all evangelical doctrine1 in this third signification2 where the word of ,god is taken for the word concerning ,god1 that is to say1 for the gospel4 ,but because in the same ,scriptures we read many things political1 historical1 moral1 physical1 and others which nothing at all concern the mysteries of our faith2 those places1 although they contain true doctrine1 and are the canon of such kind of doctrines1 yet can they not be the canon of the mysteries of ,christian religion4 ,sidenote3 ,the word of a lawful interpreter of ,scriptures1 is the word of ,god4 #ag4 ,and truly1 it is not the dead voice or letter of the word of ,god1 which is the canon of ,christian doctrine2 but a true and genuine determination4 ,for the mind is not governed by ,scriptures1 unless they be understood4 ,there is need therefore of an interpreter to make the ,scriptures canon1 and hence follows one of these two things2 that either the word of the interpreter is the word of ,god1 or that the canon of ,christian doctrine is not the word of ,god4 ,the last of these must necessarily be false2 for the rule of that doctrine which cannot be known by any human reason1 but by divine revelation only1 cannot be less than divine2 for whom we acknowledge not to be able to discern whether some doctrine be true or not1 it is impossible to account his opinion for a rule in the same doctrine4 ,the first therefore is true1 that the word of an interpreter of ,scriptures is the word of ,god4 ,the authority of interpreting ,scriptures1 is the same with that of determining controversies of faith4 #ah4 ,now that interpreter whose determination hath the honour to be held for the word of ,god1 is not every one that translates the ,scriptures out of the ,hebrew and ,greek tongue1 to his ,latin auditors in ,latin1 to his ,french in ,french1 and to other nations in their mother tongue2 for this is not to interpret4 ,for such is the nature of speech in general1 that although it deserve the chief place among those signs whereby we declare our conceptions to others1 yet cannot it perform that office alone without the help of many circumstances4 ,for the living voice hath its interpreters present1 to wit1 time1 place1 countenance1 gesture1 the counsel of the speaker1 and himself unfolding his own meaning in other words as oft as need is4 ,to recall these aids of interpretation1 so much desired in the writings of old time1 is neither the part of an ordinary wit1 nor yet of the quaintest1 without great learning and very much skill in antiquity4 ,it sufficeth not therefore for interpretation of ,scriptures1 that a man understand the language wherein they speak4 ,neither is every one an authentic interpreter of ,scriptures1 who writes comments upon them4 ,for men may err2 they may also either bend them to serve their own ambition2 or even resisting1 draw them into bondage by their forestallings2 whence it will follow1 that an erroneous sentence must be held for the word of ,god4 ,but although this might not happen1 yet as soon as these commentators are departed1 their commentaries will need explications2 and in process of time1 those explications expositions2 those expositions new commentaries1 without any end4 ,so as there cannot1 in any written interpretation whatsoever1 be a canon or rule of ,christian doctrine1 whereby the controversies of religion may be determined4 ,it remains1 that there must be some canonical interpreter1 whose legitimate office it is to end controversies begun1 by explaining the word of ,god in the judgments themselves2 and whose authority therefore must be no less obeyed1 than theirs who first recommended the ,scripture itself to us for a canon of faith2 and that one and the same person be an interpreter of ,scripture1 and a supreme judge of all manner of doctrines4 ,sidenote3 ,divers significations of a ,church4 #ai4 ,what concerns the word ecclesia1 or ,church1 originally it signifies the same thing that concio or a congregation does in ,latin2 even as ecclesiastes or churchman1 the same that concionator or preacher1 that is to say1 he who speaks to the congregation4 ,in which sense we read in the ,acts of the ,apostles1 of a ,church confused1 and of a lawful ,church 7,acts xix1 #cb-ci73 that1 taken for a concourse of people meeting in way of tumult2 this1 for a convocated assembly4 ,but in holy writ by a ,church of ,christians1 is sometimes understood the assembly1 and sometimes the ,christians themselves1 although not actually assembled1 if they be permitted to enter into the congregation and to communicate with them4 ,for example1 ,tell it to the ,church1 7,matth4 xviii4 #ag71 is meant of a ,church assembled2 for otherwise it is impossible to tell any thing to the ,church4 ,but ,he laid waste the ,church1 7,acts viii4 #c71 is understood of a ,church not assembled4 ,sometimes a ,church is taken for those who are baptized1 or for the professors of the ,christian faith1 whether they be ,christians inwardly or feignedly2 as when we read of somewhat said or written to the ,church1 or said1 or decreed1 or done by the ,church4 ,sometimes for the elect only1 as when it is called holy and without blemish 7,ephes4 v4 #bg74 ,but the elect1 as they are militant1 are not properly called a ,church2 for they know not how to assemble2 but they are a future ,church1 namely1 in that day when severed from the reprobate they shall be triumphant4 ,again1 a ,church may be sometimes taken for all ,christians collectively2 as when ,christ is called the head of his ,church 7,ephes4 v4 #bc72 and the head of his body the ,church 7,coloss4 i4 #ah74 ,sometimes for its parts2 as the ,church of ,ephesus1 the ,church which is in his house1 the seven ,churches1 c4 ,lastly1 a ,church1 as it is taken for a company actually assembled1 according to the divers ends of their meeting1 signifies sometimes those who are met together to deliberate and judge2 in which sense it is also called a council and a synod2 sometimes those who meet together in the house of prayer to worship ,god1 in which signification it is taken in the #a ,cor4 xiv4 #d1 #e1 #bc1 #bh1 c4 ,sidenote3 ,what a ,church is1 to whom we attribute rights1 actions1 and the like appellations proper to a person4 #bj4 ,now a ,church1 which hath personal rights and proper actions attributed to it1 and of which that same must necessarily be understood1 ,tell it to the ,church1 and he that obeys not the ,church1 and all such like forms of speech1 is to be defined so as by that word may be understood a multitude of men1 who have made a new covenant with ,god in ,christ1 that is to say1 a multitude of them who have taken upon them the sacrament of baptism2 which multitude may both lawfully be called together by some one into one place1 and1 he so calling them1 are bound to be present either in person or by others4 ,for a multitude of men1 if they cannot meet in assembly when need requires1 is not to be called a person4 ,for a ,church can neither speak1 nor discern1 nor hear1 but as it is a congregation4 ,whatsoever is spoken by particular men1 7to wit1 as many opinions almost as heads71 that is the speech of one man1 not of the ,church4 ,furthermore1 if an assembly be made1 and it be unlawful1 it shall be considered as null4 ,not any one of these therefore who are present in a tumult1 shall be tied to the decree of the rest2 but specially if he dissent4 ,and therefore neither can such a ,church make any decree2 for then a multitude is said to decree somewhat1 when every man is obliged by the decree of the major part4 ,we must therefore grant to the definition of a ,church1 to which we attribute things belonging to a person1 not only a possibility of assembling1 but also of doing it lawfully4 ,besides1 although there be some one who may lawfully call the rest together2 yet if they who are called1 may lawfully not appear2 which may happen among men who are not subject one to another2 that same ,church is not one person4 ,for by what right they1 who being called to a certain time and place do meet together1 are one ,church2 by the same1 others flocking to another place appointed by them1 are another ,church4 ,and every number of men of one opinion is a ,church2 and by consequence1 there will be as many ,churches as there are divers opinions2 that is to say1 the same multitude of men will at once prove to be one1 and many ,churches4 ,wherefore a ,church is not one1 except there be a certain and known1 that is to say1 a lawful power1 by means whereof every man may be obliged to be present in the congregation1 either himself in person1 or by proxy2 and that becomes one1 and is capable of personal functions1 by the union of a lawful power of convocating synods and assemblies of ,christians2 not by uniformity of doctrine2 and otherwise it is a multitude1 and persons in the plural1 howsoever agreeing in opinions4 ,sidenote3 ,a ,christian city is the same with a ,christian ,church4 #ba4 ,it follows what hath been already said by necessary connexion1 that a city of ,christian men and a ,church is altogether the same thing1 of the same men1 termed by two names1 for two causes4 ,for the matter of a city and a ,church is one1 to wit1 the same ,christian men4 ,and the form1 which consists in a lawful power of assembling them1 is the same too2 for it is manifest that every subject is obliged to come thither1 whither he is summoned by his city4 ,now that which is called a city1 as it is made up of men1 the same1 as it consists of ,christians1 is styled a ,church4 ,sidenote3 ,many cities do not constitute one ,church4 #bb4 ,this too is very coherent with the same points3 if there be many ,christian cities1 they are not altogether personally one ,church4 ,they may indeed by mutual consent become one ,church1 but no otherwise than as they must also become one city4 ,for they cannot assemble but at some certain time1 and to some place appointed4 ,but persons1 places1 and times1 belong to civil right2 neither can any subject or stranger lawfully set his foot on any place1 but by the permission of the city1 which is lord of the place4 ,but the things which cannot lawfully be done but by the permission of the city1 those1 if they be lawfully done1 are done by the city's authority4 ,the universal ,church is indeed one mystical body1 whereof ,christ is the head2 but in the same manner that all men together1 acknowledging ,god for the ruler of the world1 are one kingdom and one city2 which notwithstanding is neither one person1 nor hath it one common action or determination4 ,furthermore1 where it is said that ,christ is the head of his body the ,church1 it manifestly appears that that was spoken by the ,apostle of the elect2 who1 as long as they are in this world1 are a ,church only in potentia2 but shall not actually be so before they be separated from the reprobate1 and gathered together among themselves in the day of judgment4 ,the ,church of ,rome of old was very great1 but she went not beyond the bounds of her empire1 and therefore neither was she universal2 unless it were in that sense1 wherein it was also said of the city of ,rome1 ,orbem jam totum victor ,romanus habebat2 when as yet he had not the twentieth part of it4 ,but after that the civil empire was divided into parts1 the single cities thence arising were so many ,churches3 and that power which the ,church of ,rome had over them1 might perhaps wholly depend on the authority of those ,churches1 who having cast off the emperors1 were yet content to admit the doctors of ,rome4 ,sidenote3 ,who are clergymen4 #bc4 ,they may be called churchmen1 who exercise a public office in the ,church4 ,but of offices1 there was one a ministery1 another a maistery4 ,the offices of the ministers1 was to serve tables1 to take care of the temporal goods of the ,church1 and to distribute1 at that time when all propriety of riches being abolished they were fed in common1 to each man his portion4 ,the maisters1 according to their order1 were called some apostles1 some bishops1 some presbyters1 that is to say1 elders2 yet not so1 as that by the name of presbyter1 the age1 but the office might be distinguished4 ,for ,timothy was a presbyter1 although a young man4 ,but because for the most part the elders were received into the maistership1 the word1 denoting age1 was used to signify the office4 ,the same maisters1 according to the diversity of their employments1 were called some of them apostles1 some prophets1 some evangelists1 some pastors or teachers4 ,and the apostolical work indeed was universal2 the prophetical1 to declare their own revelations in the ,church2 the evangelical1 to preach or to be publishers of the gospel among the infidels2 that of the pastors1 to teach1 confirm1 and rule the minds of those who already believed4 ,sidenote3 ,the election of churchmen belongs to the ,church2 their consecration to the pastors4 #bd4 ,in the election of churchmen two things are to be considered2 the election of the persons1 and their consecration or institution1 which also is called ordination4 ,the first twelve apostles ,christ himself both elected and ordained4 ,after ,christ's ascension1 ,matthias was elected in the room of ,judas the traitor2 the ,church1 which at that time consisted of a congregation of about one hundred and twenty men1 choosing two men3 and they appointed two1 ,joseph and ,matthias3 but ,god himself by lot approving of ,matthias4 ,and ,st4 ,paul calls these twelve the first and great apostles2 also the apostles of the circumcision4 ,afterward were added two other apostles1 ,paul and ,barnabas2 ordained indeed by the doctors and prophets of the ,church of ,antioch 7which was a particular ,church7 by the imposition of hands2 but elected by the command of the ,holy ,ghost4 ,that they were both apostles1 is manifest in ,acts xiii4 #b1 #c4 ,that they received their apostleship from hence1 namely1 because they were separated1 by command of the spirit1 for the work of ,god from the rest of the prophets and doctors of the ,church of ,antioch1 ,st4 ,paul himself shows2 who calls himself1 for distinction sake 7,rom4 i4 #a71 an apostle separated unto the ,gospel of ,god4 ,but if it be demanded further1 by what authority it came to pass1 that that was received for the command of the ,holy ,ghost1 which those prophets and doctors did say proceeded from him2 it must necessarily be answered1 by the authority of the ,church of ,antioch4 ,for the prophets and doctors must be examined by the ,church1 before they be admitted4 ,for ,st4 ,john 7#a ,epist4 iv4 #a7 saith3 ,believe not every spirit2 but try the spirits1 whether they are of ,god2 because many false prophets are gone out into the world4 ,but by what ,church1 but that to which that epistle was written8 ,in like manner ,st4 ,paul 7,gal4 ii4 #ad7 reproves the ,churches of ,galatia1 because they ,judaized2 although they seemed to do so by the authority of ,peter4 ,for when he had told them1 that he had reprehended ,peter himself in these words3 ,if thou being a ,jew1 livest after the manner of ,gentiles1 and not as do the ,jews2 why compellest thou the ,gentiles to live as do the ,jews3 not long after he questions them1 saying 7,gal4 iii4 #b73 ,this only would ,i learn of you3 received ye the ,spirit by the works of the law1 or by the hearing of faith8 ,where it is evident1 that it was ,judaism which he reprehended the ,galatians for1 notwithstanding that the apostle ,peter compelled them to ,judaize4 ,seeing therefore it belonged to the ,church1 and not to ,peter1 and therefore also not to any man1 to determine what doctors they should follow2 it also pertained to the authority of the ,church of ,antioch1 to elect their prophets and doctors4 ,now1 because the ,holy ,ghost separated to himself the apostles ,paul and ,barnabas by the imposition of hands from doctors thus elected1 it is manifest1 that imposition of hands and consecration of the prime doctors in each ,church1 belongs to the doctors of the same ,church4 ,but bishops1 who were also called presbyters1 although all presbyters were not bishops1 were ordained sometimes by apostles2 for ,paul and ,barnabas1 when they had taught in ,derbe1 ,lystra1 and ,iconium1 ordained elders in every ,church 7,acts xiv4 #bc73 sometimes by other bishops2 for ,titus was by ,paul left in ,crete1 that he should ordain elders in every city 7,tit4 i4 #e74 ,and ,timothy was advised 7#a ,tim4 iv4 #ad7 ,not to neglect the gift that was in him1 which was given him by prophecy with the laying on of the hands of the presbytery4 ,and he had rules given him concerning the election of presbyters4 ,but that cannot be understood otherwise1 than of the ordination of those who were elected by the ,church2 for no man can constitute a doctor in the ,church1 but by the ,church's permission4 ,for the duty of the apostles themselves was not to command1 but to teach4 ,and although they who were recommended by the apostles or presbyters1 were not rejected1 for the esteem that was had of the recommenders2 yet seeing they could not be elected without the will of the ,church1 they were also supposed elected by the authority of the ,church4 ,in like manner ministers1 who are called deacons1 were ordained by the apostles2 yet elected by the ,church4 ,for when the seven deacons were to be elected and ordained1 the apostles elected them not3 but1 look ye out1 say they 7,acts vi4 #c1 #e1 #f71 among you1 brethren1 seven men of honest report1 c43 and they chose ,stephen1 c43 and they set them before the apostles4 ,it is apparent therefore by the custom of the primitive ,church under the apostles1 that the ordination or consecration of all churchmen1 which is done by prayer and imposition of hands1 belonged to the apostles and doctors2 but the election of those who were to be consecrated1 to the ,church4 ,sidenote3 ,the power of remitting sins to the penitent1 and retaining those of the impenitent1 belongs to the pastors2 but judgment of the repentance1 to the ,church4 #be4 ,concerning the power of binding and loosing1 that is to say1 of remitting and retaining of sins2 there is no doubt but it was given by ,christ to the pastors then yet for to come1 in the same manner as it was to the present apostles4 ,now the apostles had all the power of remitting of sins given them1 which ,christ himself had4 ,as the ,father hath sent me1 says ,christ1 7,john xx4 #ba71 so send ,i you2 and he adds 7verse #bc73 ,whose soever sins ye remit1 they are remitted2 and whose soever sins ye retain1 they are retained4 ,but what binding and loosing1 or remitting and retaining of sins1 is1 admits of some scruple4 ,for first1 to retain his sins1 who being baptized into remission of sins1 is truly penitent1 seems to be against the very covenant itself of the ,new ,testament2 and therefore could not be done by ,christ himself1 much less by his pastors4 ,and to remit the impenitent1 seems to be against the will of ,god the ,father1 from whom ,christ was sent to convert the world and to reduce men unto obedience4 ,furthermore1 if each pastor had an authority granted him to remit and retain sins in this manner1 all awe of princes and civil magistrates1 together with all kind of civil government would be utterly destroyed4 ,for ,christ hath said it1 nay even nature itself dictates1 that we should not fear them who slay the body1 but cannot kill the soul2 but rather fear him1 who can cast both soul and body into hell 7,matth4 x4 #bh74 ,neither is any man so mad1 as not to choose to yield obedience rather to them who can remit and retain their sins1 than to the powerfulest kings4 ,nor yet on the other side is it to be imagined1 that remission of sins is nothing else but an exemption from ecclesiastical punishments4 ,for what evil hath excommunication in it1 beside the eternal pains which are consequent to it8 ,or what benefit is to be received into the ,church1 if there were salvation out of it8 ,we must therefore hold1 that pastors have power truly and absolutely to forgive sins2 but to the penitent3 and to retain them2 but of the impenitent4 ,but while men think that to repent1 is nothing else1 but that every one condemn his actions and change those counsels which to himself seem sinful and blameable2 there is an opinion risen1 that there may be repentance before any confession of sins to men1 and that repentance is not an effect1 but a cause of confession4 ,and thence the difficulty of those1 who say that the sins of the penitent are already forgiven in baptism1 and theirs who repent not1 cannot be forgiven at all1 is against ,scripture1 and contrary to the words of ,christ1 whose soever sins ye remit1 c4 ,we must therefore1 to resolve this difficulty1 know in the first place1 that a true acknowledgment of sin is repentance4 ,for he that knows he hath sinned1 knows he hath erred2 but to will an error1 is impossible2 therefore he that knows he hath sinned1 wishes he had not done it2 which is to repent4 ,further1 where it may be doubtful whether that which is done be a sin or not1 we must consider1 that repentance doth not precede confession of sins1 but is subsequent to it3 for there is no repentance but of sins acknowledged4 ,the penitent therefore must both acknowledge the fact1 and know it to be a sin1 that is to say1 against the law4 ,if a man therefore think1 that what he hath done is not against the law1 it is impossible he should repent of it4 ,before repentance therefore1 it is necessary there be an application of the facts unto the law4 ,but it is in vain to apply the facts unto the law without an interpreter3 for not the words of the law1 but the sentence of the law-giver is the rule of men's actions4 ,but surely either one man1 or some men are the interpreters of the law2 for every man is not judge of his own fact1 whether it be a sin or not4 ,wherefore the fact1 of which we doubt whether it be a sin or not1 must be unfolded before some man or men2 and the doing of this is confession4 ,now when the interpreter of the law hath judged the fact to be a sin1 if the sinner submit to his judgment and resolve with himself not to do so any more1 it is repentance2 and thus1 either it is not true repentance1 or else it is not antecedent1 but subsequent to confession4 ,these things being thus explained1 it is not hard to understand what kind of power that of binding and loosing is4 ,for seeing in remission of sins there are two things considerable2 one1 the judgment or condemnation whereby the fact is judged to be a sin2 the other1 when the party condemned does acquiesce and obey the sentence1 that is to say1 repents1 the remission of the sin2 or1 if he repent not1 the retention3 the first of these1 that is to say1 the judging whether it be a sin or not1 belongs to the interpreter of the law1 that is1 the sovereign judge2 the second1 namely1 remission or retention of the sin1 to the pastor2 and it is that1 concerning which the power of binding and loosing is conversant4 ,and that this was the true meaning of our ,saviour ,christ in the institution of the same power1 is apparent in ,matth4 xviii4 #ae-ah1 thus4 ,he there speaking to his disciples1 says3 ,if thy brother sin against thee1 go and tell him his fault between him and thee alone4 ,where we must observe by the way1 that if thy brother sin against thee1 is the same with1 if he do thee injury2 and therefore ,christ spake of those matters which belonged to the civil tribunal4 ,he adds2 if he hear thee not1 7that is to say1 if he deny that he hath done it1 or if having confessed the fact1 he denies it to be unjustly done71 take with thee yet one or two2 and if he refuse to hear them1 tell it to the ,church4 ,but why to the ,church1 except that she might judge whether it were a sin or not8 ,but if he refuse to hear the ,church2 that is1 if he do not submit to the ,church's sentence1 but shall maintain that to be no sin1 which she judges to be a sin2 that is to say1 if he repent not2 7for certain it is1 that no man repents himself of the action which he conceives not to be a sin72 he saith not1 ,tell it to the apostles2 that we might know that the definitive sentence in the question1 whether it were a sin or not1 was not left unto them2 but to the ,church4 ,but let him be unto thee1 says he1 as an heathen1 or publican2 that is1 as one out of the ,church1 as one that is not baptized1 that is to say1 as one whose sins are retained4 ,for all ,christians were baptized into remission of sins4 ,but because it might have been demanded1 who it was that had so great a power1 as that of withholding the benefit of baptism from the impenitent2 ,christ shows that the same persons1 to whom he had given authority to baptize the penitent into the remission of sins1 and to make them of heathen men ,christians1 had also authority to retain their sins who by the ,church should be adjudged to be impenitent1 and to make them of ,christian men heathens3 and therefore presently subjoins3 ,verily ,i say unto you1 whose soever sins ye shall bind upon earth1 they shall be bound also in heaven2 and whose soever sins ye shall loose upon earth1 they shall be loosed also in heaven4 ,whence we may understand1 that the power of binding and loosing1 or of remitting and retaining of sins1 which is called in another place the power of the keys1 is not different from the power given in another place in these words 7,matth4 xxviii4 #ai73 ,go1 and teach all nations1 baptizing them in the name of the ,father1 and of the ,son1 and of the ,holy ,ghost4 ,and even as the pastors cannot refuse to baptize him whom the ,church judges worthy1 so neither can they retain his sins whom the ,church holds fitting to be absolved1 nor yet remit his sins whom the ,church pronounceth disobedient4 ,and it is the ,church's part to judge of the sin1 the pastor's to cast out or to receive into the ,church those that are judged4 ,thus ,st4 ,paul to the ,church of ,corinth 7#a ,cor4 v4 #ab73 ,do not ye judge1 saith he1 of those that are within8 ,yet he himself pronounced the sentence of excommunication against the incestuous person4 ,i indeed1 saith he 7verse #c71 as absent in body1 but present in ,spirit1 c4 ,sidenote3 ,what excommunication is1 and on whom it cannot pass4 #bf4 ,the act of retaining sins is that which is called by the ,church excommunication1 and by ,st4 ,paul delivering over to ,satan4 ,the word excommunication sounding the same with poiein1 casting out of the synagogue1 seems to be borrowed from the ,mosaical law2 wherein they who were by the priest adjudged leprous1 were commanded 7,levit4 xiii4 #df7 to be kept apart out of the camp1 until by the judgment of the priest they were again pronounced clean1 and by certain rites1 among which the washing of the body was one1 were purified4 ,from hence in process of time it become a custom of the ,jews1 not to receive those who passed from ,gentilism to ,judaism1 supposing them to be unclean1 unless they were first washed2 and those who dissented from the doctrine of the synagogue1 they cast out of the synagogue4 ,by resemblance of this custom1 those that came to ,christianity1 whether they were ,jews or ,gentiles1 were not received into the ,church without baptism2 and those that dissented from the ,church1 were deprived of the ,church's communion4 ,now1 they were therefore said to be delivered over to ,satan1 because all that was out of the ,church1 was comprehended within his kingdom4 ,the end of this kind of discipline was1 that being destitute for a time of the grace and spiritual privileges of the ,church1 they might be humbled to salvation2 but the effect in regard of secular matters1 that being excommunicated1 they should not only be prohibited all congregations or churches1 and the participation of the mysteries1 but as being contagious they should be avoided by all other ,christians1 even more than heathen4 ,for the apostle allowed to accompany with heathen2 but with these1 not so much as to eat 7#a ,cor4 v4 #aj-aa74 ,seeing then the effect of excommunication is such1 it is manifest1 in the first place1 that a ,christian city cannot be excommunicated4 ,for a ,christian city is a ,christian ,church1 7as hath been declared above1 in art4 #ba71 and of the same extension2 but a ,church cannot be excommunicated4 ,for either she must excommunicate herself1 which is impossible2 or she must be excommunicated by some other ,church2 and this1 either universal or particular4 ,but seeing an universal ,church is no person1 7as hath been proved in art4 #bb71 and therefore neither acts nor does any thing1 it cannot excommunicate any man2 and a particular ,church by excommunicating another ,church1 doth nothing4 ,for where there is not one common congregation1 there cannot be any excommunication4 ,neither if some one ,church 7suppose that of ,jerusalem71 should have excommunicated another1 7suppose that of ,rome71 would it any more have excommunicated this1 than herself3 for he that deprives another of his communion1 deprives himself also of the communion of that other4 ,secondly1 no man can excommunicate the subjects of any absolute government all at once1 or forbid them the use of their temples or their public worship of ,god4 ,for they cannot be excommunicated by a ,church1 which themselves do constitute4 ,for if they could1 there would not only not remain a ,church1 but not so much as a commonweal1 and they would be dissolved of themselves2 and this were not to be excommunicated or prohibited4 ,but if they be excommunicated by some other ,church1 that ,church is to esteem them as heathen4 ,but no ,christian ,church1 by the doctrine of ,christ1 can forbid the heathen to gather together and communicate among themselves1 as it shall seem good to their cities2 especially if they meet to worship ,christ1 although it be done in a singular custom and manner3 therefore also not the excommunicated1 who are to be dealt with as heathen4 ,thirdly1 a prince who hath the sovereign power1 cannot be excommunicated4 ,for by the doctrine of ,christ1 neither one nor many subjects together can interdict their prince any public or private places1 or deny him entrance into any assembly whatsoever1 or prohibit him the doing of what he will with his own jurisdiction4 ,for it is treason among all cities1 for any one or many subjects jointly to arrogate to themselves any authority over the whole city4 ,but they who arrogate to themselves an authority over him who hath the supreme power of the city1 do arrogate the same authority over the city itself4 ,besides1 a sovereign prince1 if he be a ,christian1 hath this further advantage2 that the city whose will is contained in his1 is that very thing which we call a ,church4 ,the ,church therefore excommunicates no man1 but whom it excommunicates by the authority of the prince4 ,but the prince excommunicates not himself2 his subjects therefore cannot do it4 ,it may be indeed1 that an assembly of rebellious citizens or traitors may pronounce the sentence of excommunication against their prince2 but not by right4 ,much less can one prince be excommunicated by another2 for this would prove not an excommunication1 but a provocation to war by the way of affront4 ,for since that is not one ,church1 which is made up of citizens belonging to two absolute cities1 for want of power of lawfully assembling them1 7as hath been declared before1 in art4 #bb72 they who are of one ,church are not bound to obey another1 and therefore cannot be excommunicated for their disobedience4 ,now1 what some may say1 that princes1 seeing they are members of the universal ,church1 may also by the authority of the universal ,church be excommunicated1 signifies nothing3 because the universal ,church1 7as hath been showed in art4 #bb71 is not one person1 of whom it may be said that she acted1 decreed1 determined1 excommunicated1 absolved1 and the like personal attributes2 neither hath she any governor upon earth1 at whose command she may assemble and deliberate4 ,for to be guide of the universal ,church1 and to have the power of assembling her1 is the same thing as to be governor and lord over all the ,christians in the world2 which is granted to none1 but ,god only4 ,sidenote3 ,the interpretation of ,scripture depends on the authority of the city4 #bg4 ,it hath been showed above in art4 #ah1 that the authority of interpreting the ,holy ,scriptures consisted not in this1 that the interpreter might without punishment expound and explicate his sentence and opinion taken thence unto others1 either by writing or by his own voice2 but that others have not a right to do or teach aught contrary to his sentence2 insomuch as the interpretation we speak of1 is the same with the power of defining in all manner of controversies to be determined by sacred ,scriptures4 ,now we must show that that power belongs to each ,church2 and depends on his or their authority who have the supreme command1 provided that they be ,christians4 ,for if it depend not on the civil authority1 it must either depend on the opinion of each private subject1 or some foreign authority4 ,but among other reasons1 the inconveniences that must follow private opinions1 cannot suffer its dependance on them4 ,of which this is the chief2 that not only all civil obedience would be taken away 7contrary to ,christ's precept72 but all human society and peace would be dissolved 7contrary to the laws of nature74 ,for seeing every man is his own interpreter of ,scripture1 that is to say1 since every man makes himself judge of what is pleasing and displeasing unto ,god2 they cannot obey their princes1 before that they have judged whether their commands be conformable to the word of ,god1 or not4 ,and thus either they obey not1 or they obey for their own opinion's sake2 that is to say1 they obey themselves1 not their sovereign2 civil obedience therefore is lost4 ,again1 when every man follows his own opinion1 it is necessary that the controversies which rise among them1 should become innumerable and indeterminable2 whence there will breed among men1 who by their own natural inclinations do account all dissensions an affront1 first hatred1 then brawls and wars2 and thus all manner of peace and society would vanish4 ,we have furthermore for an example1 that which ,god under the old law required to be observed concerning the book of the law2 namely1 that it should be transcribed and publicly used2 and he would have it to be the canon of divine doctrine1 but the controversies about it not to be determined by private persons1 but only by the priests4 ,lastly1 it is our ,saviour's precept1 that if there be any matter of offence between private persons1 they should hear the ,church4 ,wherefore it is the ,church's duty to define controversies2 it therefore belongs not to private men1 but to the ,church to interpret ,scriptures4 ,but that we may know that the authority of interpreting ,god's ,word1 that is to say1 of determining all questions concerning ,god and religion1 belongs not to any foreign person whatsoever2 we must consider1 first1 what weight such a power has in the minds of the citizens1 and their actions4 ,for no man can be ignorant that the voluntary actions of men1 by a natural necessity1 do follow those opinions which they have concerning good and evil1 reward and punishment4 ,whence it happens1 that necessarily they would choose rather to obey those1 by whose judgment they believe that they shall be eternally happy or miserable4 ,now1 by whose judgment it is appointed what doctrines are necessary to salvation1 by their judgment do men expect their eternal bliss or perdition2 they will therefore yield them obedience in all things4 ,which being thus1 most manifest it is1 that those subjects1 who believe themselves bound to acquiesce to a foreign authority in those doctrines which are necessary to salvation1 do not per se constitute a city1 but are the subjects of that foreign power4 ,nor therefore1 although some sovereign prince should by writing grant such an authority to any other1 yet so as he would be understood to have retained the civil power in his own hands1 shall such a writing be valid1 or transfer aught necessary for the retaining or good administration of his command4 ,for by chap4 ,,ii4 art4 #d1 no man is said to transfer his right1 unless he give some proper sign1 declaring his will to transfer it4 ,but he who hath openly declared his will to keep his sovereignty1 cannot have given a sufficient sign of transferring the means necessary for the keeping it4 ,this kind of writing therefore will not be a sign of will1 but of ignorance in the contractors4 ,we must consider next1 how absurd it is for a city or sovereign to commit the ruling of his subjects' consciences to an enemy2 for they are1 as hath been showed above in chap4 ,v4 art4 #f1 in an hostile state1 whosoever have not joined themselves into the unity of one person4 ,nor contradicts it this truth1 that they do not always fight3 for truces are made between enemies4 ,it is sufficient for an hostile mind1 that there is suspicion2 that the frontiers of cities1 kingdoms1 empires1 strengthened with garrisons1 do with a fighting posture and countenance1 though they strike not1 yet as enemies mutually behold each other4 ,lastly1 how unequal is it to demand that1 which by the very reason of your demand you confess to be the right of another4 ,i am the interpreter of ,scriptures to you1 who are the subject of another state4 ,why8 ,by what covenants passed between you and me8 ,by divine authority4 ,whence known8 ,out of holy ,scripture3 behold the book1 read it4 ,in vain1 unless ,i may also interpret the same for myself4 ,that interpretation therefore doth by right belong to me1 and the rest of my private fellow-subjects2 which we both deny4 ,it remains therefore that in all ,christian ,churches1 that is to say1 in all ,christian cities1 the interpretation of sacred ,scripture1 that is to say1 the right of determining all controversies1 depends on and derives from the authority of that man or council1 which hath the sovereign power of the city4 ,sidenote3 ,a ,christian city must interpret ,scriptures by clergymen4 #bh4 ,now because there are two kinds of controversies3 the one about spiritual matters1 that is to say1 questions of faith1 the truth whereof cannot be searched into by natural reason2 such are the questions concerning the nature and office of ,christ1 of rewards and punishments to come1 of the sacraments1 of outward worship1 and the like3 the other1 about questions of human science1 whose truth is sought out by natural reason and syllogisms1 drawn from the covenants of men1 and definitions1 that is to say1 significations received by use and common consent of words2 such as are all questions of right and philosophy2 for example1 when in matter of right it is questioned1 whether there be a promise and covenant1 or not1 that is nothing else but to demand whether such words1 spoken in such a manner1 be by common use and consent of the subjects a promise or covenant2 which if they be so called1 then it is true that a contract is made2 if not1 then it is false3 that truth therefore depends on the compacts and consents of men4 ,in like manner1 when it is demanded in philosophy1 whether the same thing may entirely be in divers places at once2 the determination of the question depends on the knowledge of the common consent of men1 about the signification of the word entire4 ,for if men1 when they say a thing is entirely somewhere1 do signify by common consent that they understand nothing of the same to be elsewhere2 it is false that the same thing is in divers places at once4 ,that truth therefore depends on the consents of men1 and by the same reason1 in all other questions concerning right and philosophy4 ,and they who do judge that anything can be determined1 contrary to this common consent of men concerning the appellations of things1 out of obscure places of ,scripture2 do also judge that the use of speech1 and at once all human society1 is to be taken away4 ,for he who hath sold a whole field1 will say he meant one whole ridge2 and will retain the rest as unsold4 ,nay1 they take away reason itself2 which is nothing else but a searching out of the truth made by such consent4 ,this kind of questions1 therefore1 need not be determined by the city by way of interpretation of ,scriptures2 for they belong not to ,god's ,word1 in that sense wherein the ,word of ,god is taken for the ,word concerning ,god2 that is to say1 for the doctrine of the gospel4 ,neither is he who hath the sovereign power in the ,church1 obliged to employ any ecclesiastical doctors for the judging of any such kind of matters as these4 ,but for the deciding of questions of faith1 that is to say1 concerning ,god1 which transcend human capacity1 we stand in need of a divine blessing1 7that we may not be deceived at least in necessary points71 to be derived from ,christ himself by the imposition of hands4 ,for1 seeing to the end we may attain to eternal salvation we are obliged to a supernatural doctrine1 and which therefore it is impossible for us to understand2 to be left so destitute as that we can be deceived in necessary points1 is repugnant to equity4 ,this infallibility our ,saviour ,christ promised 7in those things which are necessary to salvation7 to his apostles until the day of judgment2 that is to say1 to the apostles1 and pastors succeeding the apostles1 who were to be consecrated by the imposition of hands4 ,he therefore1 who hath the sovereign power in the city1 is obliged as a ,christian1 where there is any question concerning the mysteries of faith1 to interpret the ,holy ,scriptures by clergymen lawfully ordained4 ,and thus in ,christian cities1 the judgment both of spiritual and temporal matters belongs unto the civil authority4 ,and that man or council who hath the supreme power1 is head both of the city and of the ,church2 for a ,church and a ,christian city is but one thing4 ------- ,,chapter ,,xviii4 ,,concerning ,,those ,,things ,,which ,,are ,,necessary ,,for ,,our ,,entrance ,,into ,,the ,,kingdom ,,of ,,heaven4 #a4 ,the difficulty propounded concerning the repugnancy of obeying ,god and men1 is to be removed by the distinctions between the points necessary and not necessary to salvation4 #b4 ,all things necessary to salvation1 are contained in faith and obedience4 #c4 ,what kind of obedience that is1 which is required of us4 #d4 ,what faith is1 and how distinguished from profession1 from science1 from opinion4 #e4 ,what it is to believe in ,christ4 #f4 ,that that article alone1 that ,jesus is the ,christ1 is necessary to salvation2 is proved from the scope of the evangelists4 #g4 ,from the preachings of the apostles4 #h4 ,from the easiness of ,christian religion4 #i4 ,from this also1 that it is the foundation of faith4 #aj4 ,from the most evident words of ,christ and his apostles4 #aa4 ,in that article is contained the faith of the ,old ,testament4 #ab4 ,how faith and obedience concur to salvation4 #ac4 ,in a ,christian city1 there is no contradiction between the commands of ,god and of the city4 #ad4 ,the doctrines which this day are controverted about religion1 do for the most part relate to the right of dominion4 ,sidenote3 ,the difficulty propounded concerning the repugnance of obeying ,god and men1 is to be removed by the distinction between the points necessary1 and not necessary to salvation4 #a4 ,it was ever granted1 that all authority in secular matters derived from him who had the sovereign power1 whether he were one man or an assembly of men4 ,that the same in spiritual matters depended on the authority of the ,church1 is manifest by the lastly foregoing proofs2 and besides by this1 that all ,christian cities are ,churches endued with this kind of authority4 ,from whence a man1 though but dull of apprehension1 may collect1 that in a ,christian city1 that is to say1 in a city whose sovereignty belongs to a ,christian prince or council1 all power1 as well spiritual as secular1 is united under ,christ1 and therefore it is to be obeyed in all things4 ,but on the other side1 because we must rather obey ,god than men1 there is a difficulty risen1 how obedience may safely be yielded to them1 if at any time somewhat should be commanded by them to be done which ,christ hath prohibited4 ,the reason of this difficulty is1 that seeing ,god no longer speaks to us by ,christ and his prophets in open voice1 but by the holy ,scriptures1 which by divers men are diversely understood2 they know indeed what princes and a congregated ,church do command2 but whether that which they do command1 be contrary to the word of ,god or not1 this they know not2 but with a wavering obedience between the punishments of temporal and spiritual death1 as it were sailing between ,scylla and ,charybdis1 they often run themselves upon both4 ,but they who rightly distinguish between the things necessary to salvation1 and those which are not necessary1 can have none of this kind of doubt4 ,for if the command of the prince or city be such1 that he can obey it without hazard of his eternal salvation1 it is unjust not to obey them2 and the apostle's precepts take place 7,col4 iii4 #bj-bb73 ,children obey your parents in all things3 servants in all things obey your masters according to the flesh4 ,and the command of ,christ 7,matth4 xxiii4 #b-c73 ,the ,scribes and ,pharisees sit in ,moses' chair2 all things therefore whatsoever they command you1 that observe and do4 ,on the contrary1 if they command us to do those things which are punished with eternal death1 it were madness not rather to choose to die a natural death1 than by obeying to die eternally3 and then comes in that which ,christ says 7,matth4 x4 #bh73 ,fear not them who kill the body1 but cannot kill the soul4 ,we must see1 therefore1 what all those things are1 which are necessary to salvation4 ,sidenote3 ,all things necessary to salvation1 are contained in faith and obedience4 #b4 ,now all things necessary to salvation are comprehended in two virtues1 faith and obedience4 ,the latter of these1 if it could be perfect1 would alone suffice to preserve us from damnation2 but because we have all of us been long since guilty of disobedience against ,god in ,adam1 and besides we ourselves have since actually sinned1 obedience is not sufficient without remission of sins4 ,but this1 together with our entrance into the kingdom of heaven1 is the reward of faith2 nothing else is requisite to salvation4 ,for the kingdom of heaven is shut to none but sinners1 that is to say1 those who have not performed due obedience to the laws2 and not to those neither1 if they believe the necessary articles of the ,christian faith4 ,now1 if we shall know in what points obedience doth consist1 and which are the necessary articles of the ,christian faith2 it will at once be manifest what we must do1 and what abstain from1 at the command of cities and of princes4 ,sidenote3 ,what kind of obedience that is1 which is required of us4 #c4 ,but by obedience in this place is signified not the fact1 but the will and desire wherewith we purpose1 and endeavour as much as we can1 to obey for the future4 ,in which sense the word obedience is equivalent to repentance2 for the virtue of repentance consists not in the sorrow which accompanies the remembrance of sin2 but in our conversion into the way1 and full purpose to sin no more2 without which that sorrow is said to be the sorrow not of a penitent1 but a desperate person4 ,but because they who love ,god cannot but desire to obey the divine law1 and they who love their neighbours cannot but desire to obey the moral law2 which consists 7as hath been showed above in chap4 ,,iii47 in the prohibition of pride1 ingratitude1 contumely1 inhumanity1 cruelty1 injury1 and the like offences1 whereby our neighbours are prejudiced2 therefore also love1 or charity1 is equivalent to the word obedience4 ,justice1 also1 which is a constant will of giving to every man his due1 is equivalent with it4 ,but that faith and repentance are sufficient for salvation1 is manifest by the covenant itself of baptism4 ,for they who were by ,peter converted on the day of ,pentecost1 demanding him1 what they should do3 he answered 7,acts ii4 #ch73 ,repent and be baptized every one of you1 in the name of ,jesus1 for the remission of your sins4 ,there was nothing therefore to be done for the obtaining of baptism1 that is to say1 for to enter into the kingdom of ,god1 but to repent and believe in the name of ,jesus2 for the kingdom of heaven is promised by the covenant which is made in baptism4 ,furthermore1 by the words of ,christ1 answering the lawyer who asked him what he should do to inherit eternal life 7,luke xviii4 #bj73 ,thou knowest the commandments3 ,thou shalt not kill1 thou shalt not commit adultery1 c43 which refer to obedience2 and 7,mark x4 #ba73 ,sell all that thou hast1 and come and follow me3 which relates to faith4 ,and by that which is said3 ,the just shall live by faith2 not every man1 but the just2 for justice is the same disposition of will which repentance and obedience are4 ,and by the words of ,st4 ,mark 7i4 #ae73 ,the time is fulfilled1 and the kingdom of ,god is at hand2 repent ye1 and believe the gospel2 by which words is not obscurely signified1 that there is no need of other virtues for our entrance into the kingdom of ,god1 excepting those of repentance and faith4 ,the obedience therefore which is necessarily required to salvation1 is nothing else but the will or endeavour to obey2 that is to say1 of doing according to the laws of ,god2 that is1 the moral laws1 which are the same to all men1 and the civil laws2 that is to say1 the commands of sovereigns in temporal matters1 and the ecclesiastical laws in spiritual4 ,which two kinds of laws are divers in divers cities and ,churches1 and are known by their promulgation and public sentences4 ,sidenote3 ,what faith is1 and how distinguished from profession1 from science1 and from opinion4 #d4 ,that we may understand what the ,christian faith is1 we must define faith in general2 and distinguish it from those other acts of the mind1 wherewith commonly it is confounded4 ,the object of faith universally taken1 namely1 for that which is believed1 is evermore a proposition1 that is to say1 a speech affirmative or negative1 which we grant to be true4 ,but because propositions are granted for divers causes1 it falls out that these kind of concessions are diversely called4 ,but we grant propositions sometimes1 which notwithstanding we receive not into our minds2 and this either for a time1 to wit1 so long1 till by consideration of the consequences we have well examined the truth of them1 which we call supposing2 or also simply1 as through fear of the laws1 which is to profess1 or confess by outward tokens2 or for a voluntary compliance sake1 which men use out of civility to those whom they respect1 and for love of peace to others1 which is absolute yielding4 ,now the propositions which we receive for truth1 we always grant for some reasons of our own2 and these are derived either from the proposition itself1 or from the person propounding4 ,they are derived from the proposition itself1 by calling to mind what things those words1 which make up the proposition1 do by common consent usually signify4 ,if so1 then the assent which we give1 is called knowledge or science4 ,but if we cannot remember what is certainly understood by those words1 but sometimes one thing1 sometimes another seem to be apprehended by us1 then we are said to think4 ,for example1 if it be propounded that two and three make five2 and by calling to mind1 that the order of numeral words is so appointed by the common consent of them who are of the same language with us1 7as it were1 by a certain contract necessary for human society71 that five shall be the name of so many unities as are contained in two and three taken together1 a man assent that this is therefore true1 because two and three together are the same with five3 this assent shall be called knowledge4 ,and to know this truth is nothing else1 but to acknowledge that it is made by ourselves4 ,for by whose will and rules of speaking the number is called two1 is called three1 and is called five2 by their will also it comes to pass that this proposition is true1 two and three taken together make five4 ,in like manner if we remember what it is that is called theft1 and what injury2 we shall understand by the words themselves1 whether it be true that theft is an injury1 or not4 ,truth is the same with a true proposition2 but the proposition is true in which the word consequent1 which by logicians is called the predicate1 embraceth the word antecedent in its amplitude1 which they call the subject4 ,and to know truth1 is the same thing as to remember that it was made by ourselves by the very usurpation of the words4 ,neither was it rashly nor unadvisedly said by ,plato of old1 that knowledge was memory4 ,but it happens sometimes1 that words although they have a certain and defined signification by constitution1 yet by vulgar use either to adorn or deceive1 they are so wrested from their own significations1 that to remember the conceptions for which they were first imposed on things1 is very hard1 and not to be mastered but by a sharp judgment and very great diligence4 ,it happens too that there are many words1 which have no proper1 determined1 and everywhere the same signification2 and are understood not by their own1 but by virtue of other signs used together with them4 ,thirdly1 there are some words of things unconceivable4 ,of those things1 therefore1 whereof they are the words1 there is no conception2 and therefore in vain do we seek for the truth of those propositions1 which they make out of the words themselves4 ,in these cases1 while by considering the definitions of words we search out the truth of some proposition1 according to the hope we have of finding it1 we think it sometimes true1 and sometimes false2 either of which apart is called thinking1 and also believing2 both together1 doubting4 ,but when our reasons1 for which we assent to some proposition1 derive not from the proposition itself1 but from the person propounding1 whom we esteem so learned that he is not deceived1 and we see no reason why he should deceive us2 our assent1 because it grows not from any confidence of our own1 but from another man's knowledge1 is called faith4 ,and by the confidence of whom we do believe1 we are said to trust them1 or to trust in them4 ,by what hath been said1 the difference appears1 first1 between faith and profession2 for that is always joined with inward assent2 this not always4 ,that is an inward persuasion of the mind1 this an outward obedience4 ,next1 between faith and opinion2 for this depends on our own reason1 that on the good esteem we have of another4 ,lastly1 between faith and knowledge2 for this deliberately takes a proposition broken and chewed2 that swallows it down whole and entire4 ,the explication of words1 whereby the matter enquired after is propounded1 is conducible to knowledge2 nay1 the only way to know1 is by definition4 ,but this is prejudicial to faith2 for those things which exceed human capacity1 and are propounded to be believed1 are never more evident by explication1 but1 on the contrary1 more obscure and harder to be credited4 ,and the same thing befalls a man1 who endeavours to demonstrate the mysteries of faith by natural reason1 which happens to a sick man1 who will needs chew before he will swallow his wholesome but bitter pills2 whence it comes to pass1 that he presently brings them up again2 which perhaps would otherwise1 if he had taken them well down1 have proved his remedy4 ,sidenote3 ,what it is to believe in ,christ4 #e4 ,we have seen therefore what it is to believe4 ,but what is it to believe in ,christ8 ,or what proposition is that1 which is the object of our faith in ,christ8 ,for when we say1 ,i believe in ,christ1 we signify indeed whom1 but not what we believe4 ,now1 to believe in ,christ is nothing else but to believe that ,jesus is the ,christ1 namely1 he who according to the prophecies of ,moses and the prophets of ,israel1 was to come into this world to institute the kingdom of ,god4 ,and this sufficiently appears out of the words of ,christ himself to ,martha 7,john xi4 #be-bg73 ,i am1 saith he1 the resurrection and the life2 he that believeth in me1 though he were dead1 yet shall he live2 and whosoever liveth and believeth in me1 shall never die4 ,believest thou this8 ,she saith unto him1 yea1 ,lord1 ,i believe that thou art the ,christ the ,son of ,god1 which should come into the world4 ,in which words1 we see that the question1 believest thou in me1 is expounded by the answer1 thou art the ,christ4 ,to believe in ,christ therefore is nothing else but to believe ,jesus himself1 saying that he is the ,christ4 ,sidenote3 ,that that article alone1 that ,jesus is the ,christ1 is necessary to salvation1 is proved out of the scope of the evangelists4 #f4 ,faith and obedience both necessarily concurring to salvation1 what kind of obedience that same is1 and to whom due1 hath been showed above in art4 #c4 ,but now we must enquire what articles of faith are requisite4 ,and ,i say1 that to a ,christian#ba there is no other article of faith requisite as necessary to salvation1 but only this1 that ,jesus is the ,christ4 ,but we must distinguish1 as we have already done before in art4 #d1 between faith and profession4 ,a profession1 therefore1 of more articles1 if they be commanded1 may be necessary2 for it is a part of our obedience due to the laws4 ,but we enquire not now what obedience1 but what faith is necessary to salvation4 ,and this is proved1 first1 out of the scope of the ,evangelists1 which was1 by the description of our ,saviour's life1 to establish this one article3 and we shall know that such was the scope and counsel of the ,evangelists1 if we observe but the history itself4 ,st4 ,matthew 7chap4 i471 beginning at his genealogy1 shows that ,jesus was of the lineage of ,david1 born of a virgin3 chap1 ii41 that he was adored by the wise men as king of the ,jews2 that ,herod for the same cause sought to slay him3 chap4 iii41 iv41 that his kingdom was preached both by ,john the ,baptist and himself3 chapters v4 vi4 vii41 that he taught the laws1 not as the ,scribes1 but as one having authority3 chapters viii4 ix41 that he cured diseases miraculously3 chap4 x41 that he sent his apostles1 the preachers of his kingdom1 throughout all the parts of ,judea to proclaim his kingdom3 chap4 xi41 that he commanded the messengers1 sent from ,john to enquire whether he were the ,christ or not1 to tell him what they had seen1 namely1 the miracles which were only compatible with ,christ3 chap4 xii41 that he proved and declared his kingdom to the ,pharisees and others by arguments1 parables1 and signs2 and the following chapters to xxi41 that he maintained himself to be the ,christ against the ,pharisees3 chap4 xxi41 that he was saluted with the title of king1 when he entered into ,jerusalem3 chaps4 xxii41 xxiii41 xxiv41 xxv41 that he forewarned others of false ,christs2 and that he showed in parables what manner of kingdom his should be3 chaps4 xxvi4 xxvii41 that he was taken and accused for this reason1 because he said he was a king2 and that a title was written on his cross1 this is ,jesus the king of the ,jews3 lastly1 chap4 xxviii41 that after his resurrection1 he told his apostles that all power was given unto him both in heaven and in earth4 ,all which tends to this end2 that we should believe ,jesus to be the ,christ4 ,such therefore was the scope of ,st4 ,matthew in describing his gospel4 ,but such as his was1 such also was the rest of the ,evangelists2 which ,st4 ,john sets down expressly in the end of his gospel 7,john xx4 #ca73 ,these things1 saith he1 are written1 that ye may know that ,jesus is the ,christ1 the ,son of the living ,god4 ,footnote #ba3 ,i say1 that to a ,christian4 ,although ,i conceive this assertion to be sufficiently proved by the following reasons1 yet ,i thought it worth my labour to make a more ample explication of it2 because ,i perceive that being somewhat new1 it may possibly be distasteful to many divines4 ,first therefore1 when ,i say this article1 that ,jesus is the ,christ1 is necessary to salvation2 ,i say not that faith only is necessary1 but ,i require justice also1 or that obedience which is due to the laws of ,god2 that is to say1 a will to live righteously4 ,secondly1 ,i deny not but the profession of many articles1 provided that that profession be commanded by the ,church1 is also necessary to salvation4 ,but seeing faith is internal1 profession external1 ,i say that the former only is properly faith2 the latter a part of obedience2 insomuch as that article alone sufficeth for inward belief1 but is not sufficient for the outward profession of a ,christian4 ,lastly1 even as if ,i had said that true and inward repentance of sins was only necessary to salvation1 yet were it not to be held for a paradox2 because we suppose justice1 obedience1 and a mind reformed in all manner of virtues to be contained in it4 ,so when ,i say that the faith of one article is sufficient to salvation1 it may well be less wondered at2 seeing that in it so many other articles are contained4 ,for these words1 ,jesus is the ,christ1 do signify that ,jesus was that person1 whom ,god had promised by his prophets should come into the world to establish his kingdom2 that is to say1 that ,jesus is the ,son of ,god1 the creator of heaven and earth1 born of a virgin1 dying for the sins of them who should believe in him2 that he was ,christ1 that is to say1 a king2 that he revived 7for else he were not like to reign7 to judge the world1 and to reward every one according to his works 7for otherwise he cannot be a king72 also that men shall rise again1 for otherwise they are not like to come to judgment4 ,the whole symbol of the apostles is therefore contained in this one article4 ,which1 notwithstanding1 ,i thought reasonable to contract thus2 because ,i found that many men for this alone1 without the rest1 were admitted into the kingdom of ,god1 both by ,christ and his apostles2 as the thief on the cross1 the eunuch baptized by ,philip1 the two thousand men converted to the ,church at once by ,st4 ,peter4 ,but if any man be displeased that ,i do not judge all those eternally damned1 who do not inwardly assent to every article defined by the ,church1 and yet do not contradict1 but1 if they be commanded1 do submit3 ,i know not what ,i shall say to them4 ,for the most evident testimonies of ,holy ,writ1 which do follow1 do withhold me from altering my opinion4 ,sidenote3 ,by the apostles' sermons4 #g4 ,secondly1 this is proved by the preaching of the apostles4 ,for they were the proclaimers of his kingdom2 neither did ,christ send them to preach aught but the kingdom of ,god 7,luke ix4 #b3 ,acts x4 #db74 ,and what they did after ,christ's ascension1 may be understood by the accusation which was brought against them 7,acts xvii4 #f-g73 ,they drew ,jason1 saith ,st4 ,luke1 and certain brethren unto the rulers of the city1 crying1 these are the men that have turned the world upside down1 and are come hither also1 whom ,jason hath received2 and these all do contrary to the decrees of ,csar1 saying that there is another king1 one ,jesus4 ,it appears also1 what the subject of the apostle's sermon was1 out of these words 7,acts xvii4 #b-c73 ,opening and alleging out of the ,scriptures 7to wit1 of the ,old ,testament7 that ,christ must needs have suffered and risen again from the dead2 and that this ,jesus is the ,christ4 ,sidenote3 ,by the easiness of ,christian religion4 #h4 ,thirdly1 by the places1 in which the easiness of those things1 which are required by ,christ to the attaining of salvation1 is declared4 ,for if an internal assent of the mind were necessarily required to the truth of all and each proposition1 which this day is controverted about the ,christian faith1 or by divers churches is diversely defined2 there would be nothing more difficult than the ,christian religion4 ,and how then would that be true 7,matth4 xi4 #cj73 ,my yoke is easy and my burden light2 and that 7,matth4 xviii4 #f73 little ones do believe in him2 and that 7#a ,cor4 i4 #ba73 it pleased ,god by the foolishness of preaching1 to save those that believe8 ,or how was the thief hanging on the cross sufficiently instructed to salvation1 the confession of whose faith was contained in these words3 ,lord1 remember me when thou comest into thy kingdom8 ,or how could ,st4 ,paul himself1 from an enemy1 so soon become a doctor of ,christians8 ,sidenote3 ,by this1 that it is the foundation of faith4 #i4 ,fourthly1 by this1 that that article is the foundation of faith2 neither rests it on any other foundation4 ,matth4 xxiv4 #bc1 #bd3 ,if any man shall say unto you1 ,lo here is ,christ1 or he is there2 believe it not4 ,for there shall arise false ,christs and false prophets1 and shall show great signs and wonders1 c4 ,whence it follows1 that for the faith's sake which we have in this article1 we must not believe any signs and wonders4 ,gal4 i4 #h3 ,although we or an angel from heaven1 saith the apostle1 should preach to you any other gospel1 than what we have preached2 let him be accursed4 ,by reason of this article1 therefore1 we might not trust the very apostles and angels themselves1 and therefore1 ,i conceive1 not the ,church neither1 if they should teach the contrary4 #a ,john iv4 #a-b3 ,beloved1 believe not every spirit1 but try the spirits whether they are of ,god2 because many false prophets are gone out into the world4 ,hereby know ye the spirit of ,god2 every spirit that confesseth ,jesus ,christ is come in the flesh1 is of ,god1 c4 ,that article therefore is the measure of the spirits1 whereby the authority of the doctors is either received1 or rejected4 ,it cannot be denied1 indeed1 but that all who at this day are ,christians1 did learn from the doctors that it was ,jesus1 who did all those things whereby he might be acknowledged to be the ,christ4 ,yet it follows not1 that the same persons believed that article for the doctor's or the ,church's1 but for ,jesus' own sake4 ,for that article was before the ,christian ,church1 7,matth4 xvi4 #ah71 although all the rest were after it2 and the ,church was founded upon it1 not it upon the ,church4 ,besides1 this article1 that ,jesus is the ,christ1 is so fundamental1 that all the rest are by ,st4 ,paul 7#a ,cor4 iii4 #aa-ae7 said to be built upon it3 ,for other foundation can no man lay1 than that which is laid2 which is ,jesus ,christ2 that is to say1 that ,jesus is the ,christ4 ,now if any man build upon this foundation1 gold1 silver1 precious stones1 wood1 hay1 stubble2 every man's work shall be made manifest2 if any man's work abide1 which he hath built thereupon1 he shall receive a reward2 if any man's work shall be burnt1 he shall suffer loss1 but he himself shall be saved4 ,from whence it plainly appears1 that by foundation is understood this article1 that ,jesus is the ,christ3 for gold1 and silver1 precious stones1 wood1 hay1 stubble1 whereby the doctrines are signified1 are not built upon the person of ,christ3 and also1 that false doctrines may be raised upon this foundation2 yet not so as they must necessarily be damned who teach them4 ,sidenote3 ,by the plain words of ,christ and his apostles4 #aj4 ,lastly1 that this article alone is needful to be inwardly believed1 may be most evidently proved out of many places of holy ,scripture1 let who will be the interpreter4 ,john v4 #ci3 ,search the ,scriptures2 for in them ye think ye have eternal life2 and they are they which testify of me4 ,but ,christ meant the ,scriptures of the ,old ,testament only2 for the ,new was then not yet written4 ,now1 there is no other testimony concerning ,christ in the ,old ,testament1 but that an eternal king was to come in such a place1 that he was to be born of such parents1 that he was to teach and do such things whereby1 as by certain signs1 he was to be known4 ,all which testify this one thing2 that ,jesus who was so born1 and did teach and do such things1 was the ,christ4 ,other faith then was not required to attain eternal life1 besides this article1 ,john xi4 #bf3 ,whosoever liveth and believeth in me1 shall never die4 ,but to believe in ,jesus1 as is there expressed1 is the same with believing that ,jesus was the ,christ4 ,he therefore that believes that1 shall never die2 and by consequence1 that article alone is necessary to salvation4 ,john xx4 #ca3 ,these are written1 that ye might believe that ,jesus is the ,christ1 the ,son of ,god2 and that believing1 ye might have life through his name4 ,wherefore he that believes thus1 shall have eternal life2 and therefore needs no other faith4 #a ,john iv4 #b3 ,every spirit1 that confesseth that ,jesus ,christ is come in the flesh1 is of ,god4 ,and #a ,john v4 #a3 ,whosoever believeth that ,jesus is the ,christ1 is born of ,god4 ,and verse #e3 ,who is he that overcometh the world1 but he that believeth that ,jesus is the ,son of ,god8 ,if therefore there be no need to believe anything else1 to the end a man may be of ,god1 born of ,god1 and overcome the world1 than that ,jesus is the ,christ2 that one article then is sufficient to salvation4 ,acts viii4 #cf-cg3 ,see1 here is water2 what doth hinder me to be baptized8 ,and ,philip said1 ,if thou believest with all thine heart1 thou mayest4 ,and he answered and said1 ,i believe that ,jesus ,christ is the ,son of ,god4 ,if then this article being believed with the whole heart1 that is to say1 with inward faith1 was sufficient for baptism2 it is also sufficient for salvation4 ,besides these places1 there are innumerable others1 which do clearly and expressly affirm the same thing4 ,nay1 wheresoever we read that our ,saviour commended the faith of any one1 or that he said1 thy faith hath saved thee1 or that he healed any one for his faith's sake2 there the proposition believed was no other but this1 ,jesus is the ,christ1 either directly or consequently4 ,sidenote3 ,in this article is contained the faith of the ,old ,testament4 #aa4 ,but because no man can believe ,jesus to be the ,christ1 who1 when he knows that by ,christ is understood that same king1 who was promised from ,god by ,moses and the prophets for to be the king and ,saviour of the world1 doth not also believe ,moses and the prophets2 neither can he believe these1 who believes not that ,god is1 and that he governs the world2 it is necessary1 that the faith of ,god and of the ,old ,testament be contained in this faith of the ,new4 ,seeing therefore that atheism1 and the denial of the ,divine ,providence1 were the only treason against the ,divine ,majesty in the kingdom of ,god by nature2 but idolatry also in the kingdom of ,god by the old covenant2 now in this kingdom1 wherein ,god rules by way of a new covenant1 apostacy is also added1 or the renunciation of this article once received1 that ,jesus is the ,christ4 ,truly other doctrines1 provided they have their determination from a lawful ,church1 are not to be contradicted2 for that is the sin of disobedience4 ,but it hath been fully declared before1 that they are not needful to be believed with an inward faith4 ,sidenote3 ,how faith and obedience do concur to salvation4 #ab4 ,faith and obedience have divers parts in accomplishing the salvation of a ,christian2 for this contributes the power or capacity1 that the act2 and either is said to justify in its kind4 ,for ,christ forgives not the sins of all men1 but of the penitent or the obedient1 that is to say1 the just4 ,i say not the guiltless1 but the just2 for justice is a will of obeying the laws1 and may be consistent with a sinner2 and with ,christ1 the will to obey is obedience4 ,for not every man1 but the just shall live by faith4 ,obedience therefore justifies1 because it maketh just2 in the same manner as temperance maketh temperate1 prudence prudent1 chastity chaste2 namely1 essentially2 and puts a man in such a state1 as makes him capable of pardon4 ,again1 ,christ hath not promised forgiveness of sins to all just men2 but only those of them who believe him to be the ,christ4 ,faith therefore justifies in such a sense as a judge may be said to justify1 who absolves1 namely1 by the sentence which actually saves a man2 and in this acception of justification 7for it is an equivocal term7 faith alone justifies2 but in the other1 obedience only4 ,but neither obedience alone1 nor faith alone1 do save us2 but both together4 ,sidenote3 ,in a ,christian city there is no contrariety between the command of ,god1 and of the city4 #ac4 ,by what hath been said hitherto1 it will be easy to discern what the duty of ,christian subjects is towards their sovereigns2 who1 as long as they profess themselves ,christians1 cannot command their subjects to deny ,christ1 or to offer him any contumely3 for if they should command this1 they would profess themselves to be no ,christians4 ,for seeing we have showed1 both by natural reason and out of holy ,scriptures1 that subjects ought in all things to obey their princes and governors1 excepting those which are contrary to the command of ,god2 and that the commands of ,god1 in a ,christian city1 concerning temporal affairs1 that is to say1 those which are to be discussed by human reason1 are the laws and sentence of the city1 delivered from those who have received authority from the city to make laws and judge of controversies2 but concerning spiritual matters1 that is to say1 those which are to be defined by the holy ,scripture1 are the laws and sentences of the city1 that is to say1 the ,church1 7for a ,christian city and a ,church1 as hath been showed in the foregoing chapter1 art4 #aj1 are the same thing71 delivered by pastors lawfully ordained1 and who have to that end authority given them by the city2 it manifestly follows1 that in a ,christian commonweal obedience is due to the sovereign in all things1 as well spiritual as temporal4 ,and that the same obedience1 even from a ,christian subject1 is due in all temporal matters to those princes who are no ,christians1 is without any controversy2 but in matters spiritual1 that is to say1 those things which concern ,god's worship1 some ,christian ,church is to be followed4 ,for it is an hypothesis of the ,christian faith1 that ,god speaks not in things supernatural but by the way of ,christian interpreters of holy ,scriptures4 ,but what8 ,must we resist princes1 when we cannot obey them8 ,truly1 no2 for this is contrary to our civil covenant4 ,what must we do then8 ,go to ,christ by martyrdom2 which if it seem to any man to be a hard saying1 most certain it is that he believes not with his whole heart1 that ,jesus is the ,christ1 the ,son of the living ,god2 for he would then desire to be dissolved1 and to be with ,christ2 but he would by a feigned ,christian faith elude that obedience1 which he hath contracted to yield unto the city4 ,sidenote3 ,the doctrines which this day are controverted about religion1 do for the most part belong to the right of dominion4 #ad4 ,but some men perhaps will wonder1 if 7excepting this one article1 that ,jesus is the ,christ1 which only is necessary to salvation in relation to internal faith7 all the rest belong to obedience2 which may be performed1 although a man do not inwardly believe1 so he do but desire to believe1 and make an outward profession1 as oft as need requires1 of whatsoever is propounded by the ,church2 how it comes about that there are so many tenets1 which are all held so to concern our faith1 that except a man do inwardly believe them1 he cannot enter into the kingdom of heaven4 ,but if he consider that1 in most controversies1 the contention is about human sovereignty2 in some1 matter of gain and profit2 in others1 the glory of wits3 he will surely wonder the less4 ,the question about the propriety of the ,church1 is a question about the right of sovereignty4 ,for it being known what a ,church is1 it is known at once to whom the rule over ,christians doth belong4 ,for if every ,christian city be that ,church1 which ,christ himself hath commanded every ,christian1 subject to that city1 to hear2 then every subject is bound to obey his city1 that is to say1 him or them who have the supreme power1 not only in temporal1 but also in spiritual matters4 ,but if every ,christian city be not that ,church1 then is there some other ,church more universal1 which must be obeyed4 ,all ,christians therefore must obey that ,church1 just as they would obey ,christ1 if he came upon earth4 ,it will therefore rule either by the way of monarchy1 or by some assembly4 ,this question then concerns the right of ruling4 ,to the same end belongs the question concerning infallibility4 ,for whosoever were truly and internally believed by all mankind1 that he could not err1 would be sure of all dominion1 as well temporal as spiritual1 over all mankind1 unless himself would refuse it4 ,for if he say that he must be obeyed in temporals1 because it is supposed he cannot err1 that right of dominion is immediately granted him4 ,hither also tends the privilege of interpreting ,scriptures4 ,for he to whom it belongs to interpret the controversies arising from the divers interpretations of ,scriptures1 hath authority also simply and absolutely to determine all manner of controversies whatsoever4 ,but he who hath this1 hath also the command over all men who acknowledge the ,scriptures to be the word of ,god4 ,to this end drive all the disputes about the power of remitting and retaining sins2 or the authority of excommunication4 ,for every man1 if he be in his wits1 will in all things yield that man an absolute obedience1 by virtue of whose sentence he believes himself to be either saved or damned4 ,hither also tends the power of instituting societies4 ,for they depend on him by whom they subsist1 who hath as many subjects as monks1 although living in an enemy's city4 ,to this end also refers the question concerning the judge of lawful matrimony4 ,for he to whom that judicature belongs1 to him also pertains the knowledge of all those cases which concern the inheritance and succession of all the goods and rights1 not of private men only1 but also of sovereign princes4 ,and hither also in some respect tends the virgin life of ecclesiastical persons2 for unmarried men have less coherence than others with civil society4 ,and besides1 it is an inconvenience not to be slighted1 that princes must either necessarily forego the priesthood1 which is a great bond of civil obedience2 or have no hereditary kingdom4 ,to this end also tends the canonization of saints1 which the heathen called apotheosis4 ,for he that can allure foreign subjects with so great a reward1 may bring those who are greedy of such glory1 to dare and do anything4 ,for what was it but an honourable name with posterity1 which the ,decii and other ,romans sought after2 and a thousand others1 who cast themselves upon incredible perils8 ,the controversies about purgatory1 and indulgences1 are matter of gain4 ,the questions of free-will1 justification1 and the manner of receiving ,christ in the sacrament1 are philosophical4 ,there are also questions concerning some rites not introduced1 but left in the ,church not sufficiently purged from ,gentilism4 ,but we need reckon no more4 ,all the world knows that such is the nature of men1 that dissenting in questions which concern their power1 or profit1 or pre-eminence of wit1 they slander and curse each other4 ,it is not therefore to be wondered at1 if almost all tenets1 after men grew hot with disputings1 are held forth by some or other to be necessary to salvation and for our entrance into the kingdom of heaven4 ,insomuch as they who hold them not1 are not only condemned as guilty of disobedience2 which in truth they are1 after the ,church hath once defined them2 but of infidelity3 which ,i have declared above to be wrong1 out of many evident places of ,scripture4 ,to which ,i add this one of ,saint ,paul's 7,rom4 xiv4 #c1 #e73 ,let not him that eateth1 despise him that eateth not1 and let not him that eateth not1 judge him that eateth2 for ,god hath received him4 ,one man esteemeth one day above another1 another esteemeth every day alike4 ,let every man be fully persuaded in his own mind4 ,,end ,,of ,,vol4 ,,ii4 ---------------------------------------- -------------------------------- ,transcriber's ,note ,in the summary of ,chapter ,,xiii1 the last article is misnumbered as #8#ac'1 rather than #8#ag4' ,on p4 #bba1 a reference to article #ac in ,chapter ,v almost certainly should have been to the #abth article of that chapter4 ,other errors deemed most likely to be the printer's have been corrected1 and are noted here4 ,the references are to the page and line in the original4 #c4a _/ ,replaced4 #e4e that same _/ ,replaced4 #ef4ad ,prov4 xxii4 #aj73 ,removed4 #ii4ca ,for being er_/lected1 the people is at once ,replaced4 dissolved #ajb4bj make him a monaa_/rch ,replaced4 #ajf4ca have obliged themselu_/ves ,replaced4 #adg4e the will of ,god4 ,added4 #aif4c ,the defininition of sin4 ,removed4 #aif4cb to which tha_/ey have given ,replaced4 #aig4bh _/ ,stress added4 #bbh4c concern-_/ing the commands ,added4 #bch4bj that is to say ,added4 #bgb4be the word of faith ,added4 #bhc4cd 7verse #bb_/c7 ,replaced4 #bhe4g and their's who repent not ,removed4 #cab4h in the ,old ,testi_/ament ,replaced4 #caf4ca the rule over ,christai_/ians ,transposed4