8,extraordinarily interesting4 4 4 4 ,he is erudite and he is intelligent2 he makes the courageous attempt to be at the same time scientific and psychological2 and he has the great advantage of having at his disposal a knowledge of semantics4 ,his terms are clear1 useful1 and conveniently few40--,the ,nation4 8,what he has done is to make thinking about art clearer1 and about life1 too4 ,this is precisely the merit of ,richards' remarkable volume40--,christian ,science ,monitor4 8,the book is compact with stimulating criticism of the great critics of the ages1 and with numberless original suggestions on all phases of the creation and appreciation of art40--,springfield ,republican4 8,an important contribution to the rehabilitation of ,english criticism--perhaps1 because of its sustained scientific nature1 the most important yet made4 4 4 4 ,the principles enunciated are pursued in more particular aspects of literary criticism1 always with a clear rest and consequent elucidation4 ,parallel applications to the arts of painting1 sculpture1 and music form the subjects of three chapters4 ,another important chapter deals with the availability of the poet's experience40--,the ,criterion1 ,london4 8,mr4 ,richards is an entertaining writer1 whose work avoids easily the tedium of a technical treatise40--,the ,british ,journal of ,psychology4 ,transcriber's ,note3 ,this e,book was created from a #aibh edition1 scans of which are available from the ,internet ,archive4 ,tildes 77 indicate words that were set in ,fraktur script in the original text4 ,new original cover art included with this e,book is granted to the public domain4 ,international ,library of ,psychology ,philosophy and ,scientific ,method ,,principles ,,of ,,literary ,,criticism ,,by ,i4 ,a4 ,,richards ,,fellow ,,of ,,magdalene ,,college1 ,,cambridge ,,new ,,york ,,harcourt1 ,,brace ,,and ,,company ,,london3 ,,kegan ,,paul1 ,,trench1 ,,trubner ,,co4 ,,ltd4 ,,printed ,,in ,,great ,,britain ,,by ,,lund ,,humphries ,,london ,,bradford ,,contents ,i4 ,,the ,,chaos ,,of ,,critical ,,theories ,,ii4 ,,the ,,phantom ,,sthetic ,,state ,,iii4 ,,the ,,language ,,of ,,criticism ,,iv4 ,,communication ,,and ,,the ,,artist ,v4 ,,the ,,critics' ,,concern ,,with ,,value ,,vi4 ,,value ,,as ,,an ,,ultimate ,,idea ,,vii4 ,a ,,psychological ,,theory ,,of ,,value ,,viii4 ,,art ,,and ,,morals ,,ix4 ,,actual ,,and ,,possible ,,misapprehensions ,x4 ,,poetry ,,for ,,poetry',s ,,sake ,,xi4 ,a ,,sketch ,,for ,a ,,psychology ,,xii4 ,,pleasure ,,xiii4 ,,emotion ,,and ,,the ,c,,nesthesia ,,xiv4 ,,memory ,,xv4 ,,attitudes ,,xvi4 ,,the ,,analysis ,,of ,a ,,poem ,,xvii4 ,,rhythm ,,and ,,metre ,,xviii4 ,,on ,,looking ,,at ,a ,,picture ,,xix4 ,,sculpture ,,and ,,the ,,construction ,,of ,,form ,,xx4 ,,the ,,impasse ,,of ,,musical ,,theory ,,xxi4 ,a ,,theory ,,of ,,communication ,,xxii4 ,,the ,,availability ,,of ,,the ,,poet',s ,,experience ,,xxiii4 ,,tolstoy',s ,,infection ,,theory ,,xxiv4 ,,the ,,normality ,,of ,,the ,,artist ,,xxv4 ,,badness ,,in ,,poetry ,,xxvi4 ,,judgment ,,and ,,divergent ,,readings ,,xxvii4 ,,levels ,,of ,,response ,,and ,,the ,,width ,,of ,,appeal ,,xxviii4 ,,the ,,allusiveness ,,of ,,modern ,,poetry ,,xxix4 ,,permanence ,,as ,a ,,criterion ,,xxx4 ,,the ,,definition ,,of ,a ,,poem ,,xxxi4 ,,art1 ,,play1 ,,and ,,civilisation ,,xxxii4 ,,the ,,imagination ,,xxxiii4 ,,truth ,,and ,,revelation ,,theories ,,xxxiv4 ,,the ,,two ,,uses ,,of ,,language ,,xxxv4 ,,poetry ,,and ,,beliefs ,,appendix ,a ,,on ,,value ,,appendix ,b ,,on ,,mr4 ,,eliot',s ,,poetry ,,preface ,a book is a machine to think with1 but it need not1 therefore1 usurp the functions either of the bellows or the locomotive4 ,this book might better be compared to a loom on which it is proposed to re-weave some ravelled parts of our civilisation4 ,what is most important about it1 the interconnection of its several points of view1 might have been exhibited1 though not with equal clarity1 in a pamphlet or in a two-volume work4 ,few of the separate items are original4 ,one does not expect novel cards when playing so traditional a game2 it is the hand which matters4 ,i have chosen to present it here on the smallest scale which would allow me to fit together the various positions adopted into a whole of some firmness4 ,the elaborations and expansions which suggest themselves have been constantly cut short at the point at which ,i thought that the reader would be able to see for himself how they would continue4 ,the danger of this procedure1 which otherwise has great advantages both for him and for me1 is that the different parts of a connected account such as this mutually illumine one another4 ,the writer1 who has1 or should have1 the whole position in his mind throughout1 may overlook sources of obscurity for the reader1 due to the serial form of the exposition4 ,this ,i have endeavoured to prevent by means of numerous cross-references1 forwards and backwards4 ,but some further explanation of the structure of the book is due to the reader4 ,at sundry points--notably in ,chapters ,,vi1 ,,vii1 and ,,xi-,,xv--its progress appears to be interrupted by lengthy excursions into theory of value1 or into general psychology4 ,these ,i would have omitted if it had seemed in any way possible to develop the argument of the rest strongly and clearly in their absence4 ,criticism1 as ,i understand it1 is the endeavour to discriminate between experiences and to evaluate them4 ,we cannot do this without some understanding of the nature of experience1 or without theories of valuation and communication4 ,such principles as apply in criticism must be taken from these more fundamental studies4 ,all other critical principles are arbitrary1 and the history of the subject is a record of their obstructive influence4 ,the view of value implied throughout is one which must be held in some form by very many persons4 ,yet ,i have been unable to discover anywhere any statement of it to which ,i might satisfactorily refer the reader4 ,i had to make a fairly full statement with applications and illustrations myself4 ,and ,i had to put in the forefront of the book where1 to the more exclusively literary reader1 it will appear a dry and uninviting tract to be crossed for problematical advantages4 ,the same remarks apply to the second theoretical expansion1 the psychological chapters2 they are to the value chapters1 ,i fear1 as a ,sahara to a ,gobi4 ,no other choice seemed open if ,i did not wish my later1 critical1 sections to be misunderstood1 than to include as a preliminary what amounts to a concise treatise on psychology4 ,for nearly all the topics of psychology are raised at one point or another by criticism1 but raised from an angle which ordinary text-books do not contemplate4 ,these two deserts passed1 the rest of the book accords1 ,i believe1 much more closely with what may be expected of an essay in criticism1 although the language in which some of the more obvious remarks are couched may seem unnecessarily repellant4 ,the explanation of much of the turgid uncouthness of its terminology is the desire to link even the commonplaces of criticism to a systematic exposition of psychology4 ,the reader who appreciates the advantages so gained will be forgiving4 ,i have carefully remembered throughout that ,i am not writing for specialists alone4 ,the omissions1 particularly as to qualifications and reservations1 which this fact entails1 should in fairness to myself be mentioned4 ,my book1 ,i fear1 will seem to many sadly lacking in the condiments which have come to be expected in writings upon literature4 ,critics and even theorists in criticism currently assume that their first duty is to be moving1 to excite in the mind emotions appropriate to their august subject-matter4 ,this endeavour ,i have declined4 ,i have used1 ,i believe1 few words which ,i could not define in the actual use which ,i have made of them1 and necessarily such words have little or no emotive power4 ,i have comforted myself with the reflection that there is perhaps something debilitated about a taste for speculation which requires a flavouring of the eternal and the ultimate or even of the literary spices1 mystery and profundity4 ,mixed modes of writing which enlist the reader's feeling as well as his thinking are becoming dangerous to the modern consciousness with its increasing awareness of the distinction4 ,thought and feeling are able to mislead one another at present in ways which were hardly possible six centuries ago4 ,we need a spell of purer science and purer poetry before the two can again be mixed1 if indeed this will ever become once more desirable4 ,in the ,second ,edition ,i added a note on ,mr4 ,eliot's poetry which will elucidate what ,i mean here by purity1 and some supplementary remarks upon ,value2 in the ,third1 a few minor improvements have been made4 ,it should be borne in mind that the knowledge which the men of ,a4,d4 #cjjj will possess1 if all goes well1 may make all our sthetics1 all our psychology1 all our modern theory of value1 look pitiful4 ,poor indeed would be the prospect if this were not so4 ,the thought1 8,what shall we do with the powers1 which we are so rapidly developing1 and what will happen to us if we cannot learn to guide them in time80 already marks for many people the chief interest of existence4 ,the controversies which the world has known in the past are as nothing to those which are ahead4 ,i would wish this book to be regarded as a contribution towards these choices of the future4 ,between the possession of ideas and their application there is a gulf4 ,every teacher winces when he remembers this4 ,as an attempt to attack this difficulty1 ,i am preparing a companion volume1 ,practical ,criticism4 ,extremely good and extremely bad poems were put unsigned before a large and able audience4 ,the comments they wrote at leisure give1 as it were1 a stereoscopic view of the poem and of possible opinion on it4 ,this material when systematically analysed1 provides1 not only an interesting commentary upon the state of contemporary culture1 but a new and powerful educational instrument4 ,i4 ,a4 ,r4 ,cambridge1 ,may1 #aibh4 ,,chapter ,i ,the ,chaos of ,critical ,theories ,o monstrous6 but one half-pennyworth of bread to this intolerable deal of sack6--,the ,first ,part of ,king ,henry the ,fourth4 ,the literature of ,criticism is not small or negligible1 and its chief figures1 from ,aristotle onwards1 have often been among the first intellects of their age4 ,yet the modern student1 surveying the field and noting the simplicity of the task attempted and the fragments of work achieved1 may reasonably wonder what has been and is amiss4 ,for the experiences with which criticism is concerned are exceptionally accessible1 we have only to open the book1 stand before the picture1 have the music played1 spread out the rug1 pour out the wine1 and the material upon which the critic works is presently before us4 ,even too abundantly1 in too great fullness perhaps3 8,more warmth than ,adam needs0 the critic may complain1 echoing ,milton's complaint against the climate of the ,garden of ,eden2 but he is fortunate not to be starved of matter like the investigator of psychoplasm4 ,and the questions which the critic seeks to answer1 intricate though they are1 do not seem to be extraordinarily difficult4 ,what gives the experience of reading a certain poem its value8 ,how is this experience better than another8 ,why prefer this picture to that8 ,in which ways should we listen to music so as to receive the most valuable moments8 ,why is one opinion about works of art not as good as another8 ,these are the fundamental questions which criticism is required to answer1 together with such preliminary questions--,what is a picture1 a poem1 a piece of music8 ,how can experiences be compared8 ,what is value8--as may be required in order to approach these questions4 ,but if we now turn to consider what are the results yielded by the best minds pondering these questions in the light of the eminently accessible experiences provided by the ,arts1 we discover an almost empty garner4 ,a few conjectures1 a supply of admonitions1 many acute isolated observations1 some brilliant guesses1 much oratory and applied poetry1 inexhaustible confusion1 a sufficiency of dogma1 no small stock of prejudices1 whimsies and crotchets1 a profusion of mysticism1 a little genuine speculation1 sundry stray inspirations1 pregnant hints and random aperus2 of such as these1 it may be said without exaggeration1 is extant critical theory composed4 ,a few specimens of the most famous utterances of ,aristotle1 ,longinus1 ,horace1 ,boileau1 ,dryden1 ,addison1 ,wordsworth1 ,coleridge1 ,carlyle1 ,matthew ,arnold1 and some more modern authors1 will justify this assertion4 8,all men naturally receive pleasure from imitation40 8,poetry is chiefly conversant about general truth40 8,it demands an enthusiasm allied to madness2 transported out of ourselves we become what we imagine40 8,beautiful words are the very and peculiar light of the mind40 8,let the work be what you like1 provided it has simplicity and unity40 8,de ,gustibus4 4 40 8,of writing well right thinking is the beginning and the fount40 8,we must never separate ourselves from ,nature40 8,delight is the chief1 if not the only end2 instruction can be admitted but in the second place40 8,the pleasures of ,fancy are more conducive to health than those of the understanding40 8,the spontaneous overflow of powerful feeling40 8,the best words in the best order40 8,the whole soul of man in activity40 8,unity in variety40 8,the synthetic and magical power of the imagination40 8,the eye on the object40 8,the disimprisonment of the soul of fact40 8,the identification of content and form40 8,a criticism of ,life40 8,empathy favourable to our existence40 8,significant form40 8,the expression of impressions10 etc4 etc4 ,such are the pinnacles1 the apices of critical theory1 the heights gained in the past by the best thinkers in their attempt to reach explanations of the value of the arts4 ,some of them1 many of them indeed1 are profitable starting-points for reflection1 but neither together1 nor singly1 nor in any combination do they give what is required4 ,above them and below them1 around and about them can be found other things of value1 of service for the appreciation of particular poems and works of art2 comment1 elucidation1 appraisal1 much that is fit occupation for the contemplative mind4 ,but apart from hints such as have been cited1 no explanations4 ,the central question1 ,what is the value of the arts1 why are they worth the devotion of the keenest hours of the best minds1 and what is their place in the system of human endeavours8 is left almost untouched1 although without some clear view it would seem that even the most judicious critic must often lose his sense of position4 ,but perhaps the literature of ,criticism is the wrong place in which to expect such an inquiry4 ,philosophers1 ,moralists and stheticians are perhaps the competent authorities8 ,there is certainly no lack of treatises upon the ,good and the ,beautiful1 upon ,value and upon the sthetic ,state1 and the treasures of earnest endeavour lavished upon these topics have not been in vain4 ,those investigators who have relied upon ,reason1 upon the ,select ,intuition and the ,ineluctable ,argument1 who have sat down without the necessary facts to think the matter out1 have at least thoroughly discredited a method which apart from their labours would hardly have been suspected of the barrenness it has shown4 ,and those who1 following ,fechner1 have turned instead to the collection and analysis of concrete1 particular facts and to empirical research into sthetics have supplied a host of details to psychology4 ,in recent years especially1 much useful information upon the processes which make up the appreciation of works of art has been skilfully elicited4 ,but it is showing no ingratitude to these investigators if we point out certain defects of almost all experimental work on sthetics1 which make their results at best of only indirect service to our wider problems4 ,the most obvious of these concerns their inevitable choice of experiments4 ,only the simplest human activities are at present amenable to laboratory methods4 stheticians have therefore been compelled to begin with as simple forms of #8sthetic choice' as can be devised4 ,in practice1 line-lengths and elementary forms1 single notes and phrases1 single colours and simple collocations1 nonsense syllables1 metronomic beats1 skeleton rhythms and metres and similar simplifications have alone been open to investigation4 ,such more complex objects as have been examined have yielded very uncertain results1 for reasons which anyone who has ever both looked at a picture or read a poem and been inside a psychological laboratory or conversed with a representative psychologist will understand4 ,the generalisations to be drawn from these simple experiments are1 if we do not expect too much1 encouraging4 ,some light upon obscure processes1 such as empathy1 and upon the intervention of muscular imagery and tendencies to action into the apprehension of shapes and of sequences of sounds which had been supposed to be apprehended by visual or auditory apparatus alone1 some interesting facts about the plasticity of rhythm1 some approach towards a classification of the different ways in which colours may be regarded1 increased recognition of the complexity of even the simplest activities1 these and similar results have been well worth the trouble expended4 ,but more important has been the revelation of the great variety in the responses which even the simplest stimuli elicit4 ,even so unambiguous an object as a plain colour1 it has been found1 can arouse in different persons and in the same person at different times extremely different states of mind4 ,from this result it may seem no illegitimate step to conclude that highly complex objects1 such as pictures1 will arouse a still greater variety of responses1 a conclusion very awkward for any theory of criticism1 since it would appear to decide adversely the preliminary question3 8,how may experiences be compared80 which any such theory must settle if the more fundamental questions of value are to be satisfactorily approached4 ,but just here a crucial point arises4 ,there seems to be good reason to suppose that the more simple the object contemplated the more varied the responses will be which can be expected from it4 ,for it is difficult1 perhaps impossible1 to contemplate a comparatively simple object by itself4 ,inevitably it is taken by the contemplator into some context1 and made part of some larger whole1 and under such experimental conditions as have yet been devised it seems not possible to guarantee the kind of context into which it is taken4 ,a comparison with the case of words is instructive4 ,a single word by itself1 let us say #8night1' will raise almost as many different thoughts and feelings as there are persons who hear it4 ,the range of variety with a single word is very little restricted4 ,but put it into a sentence and the variation is narrowed2 put it into the context of a whole passage1 and it is still further fixed2 and let it occur in such an intricate whole as a poem and the responses of competent readers may have a similarity which only its occurrence in such a whole can secure4 ,the point will arise for discussion when the problem of corroboration for critical judgments is dealt with later 7cf4 pp4 #aff1 #agh1 #aib74 ,it had to be mentioned here in order to explain why the theory of criticism shows no great dependence upon experimental sthetics1 useful in many respects as these investigations are4 ,,chapter ,,ii ,the ,phantom sthetic ,state ,none of his follies will he repent1 none will he wish to repeat2 no happier lot can be assigned to man4--,wilhelm ,mester4 ,a more serious defect in sthetics is the avoidance of considerations as to value4 ,it is true that an ill-judged introduction of value considerations usually leads to disaster1 as in ,tolstoy's case4 ,but the fact that some of the experiences to which the arts give rise are valuable and take the form they do because of their value is not irrelevant4 ,whether this fact is of service in analysis will naturally depend upon the theory of value adopted4 ,but to leave it out of account altogether is to run the risk of missing the clue to the whole matter4 ,and the clue has in fact been missed4 ,all modern sthetics rests upon an assumption which has been strangely little discussed1 the assumption that there is a distinct kind of mental activity present in what are called sthetic experiences4 ,ever since 8the first rational word concerning beauty0#a was spoken by ,kant1 the attempt to define the #8judgment of taste' as concerning pleasure which is disinterested1 universal1 unintellectual1 and not to be confused with the pleasures of sense or of ordinary emotions1 in short to make it a thing sui generis1 has continued4 ,thus arises the phantom problem of the sthetic mode or sthetic state1 a legacy from the days of abstract investigation into the ,good1 the ,beautiful and the ,true4 ,the temptation to align this tripartite division with a similar division into ,will1 ,feeling and ,thought was irresistible4 8,all the faculties of the ,soul1 or capacities1 are reducible to three1 which do not admit of any further derivation from a common ground3 the faculty of knowledge1 the feeling of pleasure or displeasure1 and the faculty of desire0#b said ,kant4 ,legislative for each of these faculties stood ,understanding1 ,judgment and ,reason respectively4 8,between the faculties of knowledge and desire stands the feeling of pleasure1 just as judgment is intermediate between understanding and reason40 ,and he went on to discuss sthetics as appertaining to the province of judgment1 the middle one of these three1 the first and last having already occupied him in his two other ,critiques of ,pure and ,practical ,reason respectively4 ,the effect was virtually to annex sthetics to ,idealism1 in which fabric it has ever since continued to serve important purposes4 ,this accident of formal correspondence has had an influence upon speculation which would be ridiculous if it had not been so disastrous4 ,it is difficult even now to get out of ruts which have been seen to lead nowhere4 ,with the identification of the provinces of ,truth and ,thought no quarrel arises1 and the ,will and the ,good are1 as we shall see1 intimately connected1 but the attempts to fit ,beauty into a neat pigeon-hole with ,feeling have led to calamitous distortions4 ,it is now generally abandoned1#c although echoes of it can be heard everywhere in critical writings4 ,the peculiar use of #8emotion' by reviewers1 and the prevalence of the phrase #8sthetic emotion' is one of them4 ,in view1 then1 of the objections to ,feeling1 something else1 some special mode of mental activity1 had to be found1 to which ,beauty could belong4 ,hence arose the sthetic mode4 ,truth was the object of the inquiring activity1 of the ,intellectual or ,theoretical part of the mind1 and the ,good that of the willing1 desiring1 practical part2 what part could be found for the ,beautiful8 ,some activity that was neither inquisitive nor practical1 that did not question and did not seek to use4 ,the result was the sthetic1 the contemplative1 activity which is still defined1 in most treatments#d1 by these negative conditions alone1 as that mode of commerce with things which is neither intellectual inquiry into their nature1 nor an attempt to make them satisfy our desire4 ,the experiences which arise in contemplating objects of art were then discovered to be describable in some such terms1 and system secured a temporary triumph4 ,it is true that many of these experiences do present peculiarities1 both in the intellectual interest which is present and in the way in which the development of desires within them takes place1 and these peculiarities--detachment1 impersonality1 serenity and so forth--are of great interest4 ,they will have to be carefully examined in the sequel4 ,we shall find that two entirely different sets of characters are involved4 ,they arise from quite different causes but are hard to distinguish introspectively4 ,taken as marking off a special province for inquiry they are most unsatisfactory4 ,they would yield for our purposes1 even if they were not so ambiguous1 a diagonal or slant classification4 ,some of the experiences which most require to be considered would be left out and many which are without importance brought in4 ,to choose the sthetic ,state as the starting-point for an inquiry into the values of the arts is in fact somewhat like choosing #8rectangular1 and red in parts' as a definition of a picture4 ,we should find ourselves ultimately discussing a different collection of things from those we intended to discuss4 ,but the problem remains--,is there any such thing as the sthetic state1 or any sthetic character of experiences which is sui generis8 ,not many explicit arguments have ever been given for one4 ,vernon ,lee1 it is true1 in ,beauty and ,ugliness1 p4 #aj1 argues that 8a relation entirely sui generis between visible and audible forms and ourselves0 can be deduced from the fact 8that given proportions1 shapes1 patterns1 compositions have a tendency to recur in art40 ,how this can be done it is hard to divine4 ,arsenic tends to recur in murder cases1 and tennis in the summer1 but no characters or relations sui generis anywhere are thereby proved4 ,obviously you can only tell whether anything is like or unlike other things by examining it and them1 and to notice that one case of it is like another case of it1 is not helpful4 ,it may be suspected that where the argument is so confused1 the original question was not very clear4 ,the question is whether a certain kind of experience is or is not like other kinds of experience4 ,plainly it is a question as to degree of likeness4 ,be it granted at once1 to clear the air1 that there are all sorts of experiences involved in the values of the arts1 and that attributions of ,beauty spring from all sorts of causes4 ,is there among these one kind of experience as different from experiences which don't so occur as1 say envy is from remembering1 or as mathematical calculation is from eating cherries8 ,and what degree of difference would make it specific8 ,put this way it is plainly not an easy question to answer4 ,these differences1 none of them measurable1 are of varying degree1 and all are hard to estimate4 ,yet the vast majority of post-,kantian writers1 and many before him1 have unhesitatingly replied1 8,yes6 the sthetic experience is peculiar and specific40 ,and their grounds1 when not merely verbal1 have usually been those of direct inspection4 ,it requires some audacity to run counter to such a tradition1 and ,i do not do so without reflection4 ,yet1 after all1 the matter is one of classification1 and when so many other divisions in psychology are being questioned and re-organised1 this also may be re-examined4 ,the case for a distinct sthetic species of experience can take two forms4 ,it may be held that there is some unique kind of mental element which enters into sthetic experiences and into no others4 ,thus ,mr ,clive ,bell used to maintain the existence of an unique emotion #8sthetic emotion' as the differentia4 ,but psychology has no place for such an entity4 ,what other will be suggested8 ,empathy1 for example1 as ,vernon ,lee herself insists1 enters into innumerable other experiences as well as into sthetic experiences4 ,i do not think any will be proposed4 ,alternatively1 the sthetic experience may contain no unique constituent1 and be of the usual stuff but with a special form4 ,this is what it is commonly supposed to be4 ,now the special form as it is usually described--in terms of disinterestedness1 detachment1 distance1 impersonality1 subjective universality1 and so forth--this form1 ,i shall try to show later1 is sometimes no more than a consequence of the incidence of the experience1 a condition or an effect of communication4 ,but sometimes a structure which can be described in the same terms is an essential feature of the experience1 the feature in fact upon which its value depends4 ,in other words1 at least two different sets of characters1 due to different causes1 are1 in current usage1 ambiguously covered by the term #8sthetic4' ,it is very necessary to distinguish the sense in which merely putting something in a frame or writing it in verse gives it an #8sthetic character1' from a sense in which value is implied4 ,this confusion1 together with other confusions1#e has made the term nearly useless4 ,the sthetic mode is generally supposed to be a peculiar way of regarding things which can be exercised1 whether the resulting experiences are valuable1 disvaluable or indifferent4 ,it is intended to cover the experience of ugliness as well as that of beauty1 and also intermediate experiences4 ,what ,i wish to maintain is that there is no such mode1 that the experience of ugliness has nothing in common with that of beauty1 which both do not share with innumerable other experiences no one 7except ,croce2 but this qualification is often required7 would dream of calling sthetic4 ,but a narrower sense of sthetic is also found in which it is confined to experiences of beauty and does imply value4 ,and with regard to this1 while admitting that such experiences can be distinguished1 ,i shall be at pains to show that they are closely similar to many other experiences1 that they differ chiefly in the connections between their constituents1 and that they are only a further development1 a finer organisation of ordinary experiences1 and not in the least a new and different kind of thing4 ,when we look at a picture1 or read a poem1 or listen to music1 we are not doing something quite unlike what we were doing on our way to the ,gallery or when we dressed in the morning4 ,the fashion in which the experience is caused in us is different1 and as a rule the experience is more complex and1 if we are successful1 more unified4 ,but our activity is not of a fundamentally different kind4 ,to assume that it is1 puts difficulties in the way of describing and explaining it1 which are unnecessary and which no one has yet succeeded in overcoming4 ,the point here raised1 and particularly the distinction between the two quite different sets of characters1 on the ground of which an experience may be described as sthetic or impersonal and disinterested1 will become clearer at a later stage4#f ,a further objection to the assumption of a peculiar sthetic attitude is that it makes smooth the way for the idea of a peculiar sthetic value1 a pure art value4 ,postulate a peculiar kind3 of experience1 sthetic experience1 and it is an easy step to the postulation of a peculiar unique value1 different in kind and cut off from the other values of ordinary experiences4 8,to appreciate a work of art we need bring with us nothing from life1 no knowledge of its ideas and affairs1 no familiarity with its emotions40#g ,so runs a recent extreme statement of the sthetic ,hypothesis1 which has had much success4 ,to quote another example less drastic but also carrying with it the implication that sthetic experiences are sui generis1 and their value not of the same kind as other values4 8,its nature is to be not a part1 nor yet a copy1 of the real world 7as we commonly understand that phrase71 but a world in itself independent1 complete1 autonomous40#h ,this view of the arts as providing a private heaven for sthetes is1 as will appear later1 a great impediment to the investigation of their value4 ,the effects upon the general attitudes of those who accept it uncritically are also often regrettable2 while the effects upon literature and the arts have been noticeable1 in a narrowing and restriction of the interests active1 in preciousness1 artificiality and spurious aloofness4 ,art envisaged as a mystic1 ineffable virtue is a close relative of the #8sthetic mood'1 and may easily be pernicious in its effects1 through the habits of mind which1 as an idea1 it fosters1 and to which1 as a mystery1 it appeals4 #a ,hegel's dictum1 ,history of ,philosophy1 iii1 #edc4 #b ,critique of ,judgment1 transl4 by ,meredith1 p4 #ae4 #c ,dr ,bosanquet was one of the last adherents4 ,see his ,three ,lectures on sthetics4 #d ,e4g4 ,vernon ,lee1 ,the ,beautiful4 #e ,e4g4 ,any choice for which the chooser cannot give his reasons tends in the laboratory to be called an #8sthetic choice4' #f ,cf4 ,chapters ,x and ,,xxxii1 and ,impersonality1 ,index4 #g ,clive ,bell1 ,art1 p4 #be4 #h ,a4,c4 ,bradley1 ,oxford ,lectures on ,poetry1 p4 #e4 ,,chapter ,,iii ,the ,language of ,criticism 4 4 4 4 ,i too have seen ,my vision of the rainbow ,aureoled face ,of her whom men name ,beauty3 proud1 austere3 ,divinely fugitive1 that haunts the world4 4 4 4 ,the ,dominion of ,dreams4 ,whatever the disadvantages of modern sthetics as a basis for a theory of ,criticism1 the great advance made upon prescientific speculation into the nature of ,beauty must also be recognised4 ,that paralysing apparition ,beauty1 the ineffable1 ultimate1 unanalysable1 simple ,idea1 has at least been dismissed and with her have departed or will soon depart a flock of equally bogus entities4 ,poetry and inspiration together1 it is true1 still dignify respectable quarters with their presence4 8,poetry1 like life1 is one thing4 4 4 4 ,essentially a continuous substance or energy1 poetry is historically a connected movement1 a series of successive integrated manifestations4 ,each poet1 from ,homer or the predecessors of ,homer to our own day1 has been1 to some degree and at some point1 the voice of the movement and energy of poetry2 in him1 poetry has for the moment become visible1 audible1 incarnate2 and his extant poems are the record left of that partial and transitory incarnation4 4 4 4 ,the progress of poetry1 with its vast power and exalted function1 is immortal40#i ,a diligent search will still find many other ,mystic ,beings1 for the most part of a less august nature1 sheltering in verbal thickets4 ,construction1 ,design1 ,form1 ,rhythm1 ,expression 4 4 4 are more often than not mere vacua in discourse1 for which a theory of criticism should provide explainable substitutes4 ,while current attitudes to language persist1 this difficulty of the linguistic phantom must still continue4 ,it has to be recognised that all our natural turns of speech are misleading1 especially those we use in discussing works of art4 ,we become so accustomed to them that even when we are aware that they are ellipses1 it is easy to forget the fact4 ,and it has been extremely difficult in many cases to discover that any ellipsis is present4 ,we are accustomed to say that a picture is beautiful1 instead of saying that it causes an experience in us which is valuable in certain ways4#aj ,the discovery that the remark1 8,this is beautiful01 must be turned round and expanded in this way before it is anything but a mere noise signalling the fact that we approve of the picture1 was a great and difficult achievement4 ,even to-day1 such is the insidious power of grammatical forms1 the belief that there is such a quality or attribute1 namely ,beauty1 which attaches to the things which we rightly call beautiful1 is probably inevitable for all reflective persons at a certain stage of their mental development4 ,even among those who have escaped from this delusion and are well aware that we continually talk as though things possess qualities1 when what we ought to say is that they cause effects in us of one kind or another1 the fallacy of #8projecting' the effect and making it a quality of its cause tends to recur4 ,when it does so it gives a peculiar obliquity to thought and although few competent persons are nowadays so deluded as actually to hold the mystical view that there is a quality ,beauty which inheres or attaches to external objects1 yet throughout all the discussion of works of art the drag exercised by language towards this view can be felt4 ,it perceptibly increases the difficulty of innumerable problems and we shall have constantly to allow for it4 ,such terms as #8construction'1 #8form'1 #8balance'1 #8composition'1 #8design'1 #8unity'1 #8expression'1 for all the arts2 as #8depth'1 #8movement'1 #8texture'1 #8solidity'1 in the criticism of painting2 as #8rhythm'1 #8stress'1 #8plot'1 #8character'1 in literary criticism2 as #8harmony'1 #8atmosphere'1 #8development'1 in music1 are instances4 ,all these terms are currently used as though they stood for qualities inherent in things outside the mind1 as a painting1 in the sense of an assemblage of pigments1 is undoubtedly outside the mind4 ,even the difficulty of discovering1 in the case of poetry1 what thing other than print and paper is there for these alleged qualities to belong to1 has not checked the tendency4 ,but indeed language has succeeded until recently in hiding from us almost all the things we talk about4 ,whether we are discussing music1 poetry1 painting1 sculpture or architecture1 we are forced to speak as though certain physical objects--vibrations of strings and of columns of air1 marks printed on paper1 canvasses and pigments1 masses of marble1 fabrics of freestone1 are what we are talking about4 ,and yet the remarks we make as critics do not apply to such objects but to states of mind1 to experiences4 ,a certain strangeness about this view is often felt but diminishes with reflection4 ,if anyone says that #8,the ,may ,queen' is sentimental1 it is not difficult to agree that he is referring to a state of mind4 ,but if he declares that the masses in a ,giotto exactly balance one another1 this is less apparent1 and1 if he goes on to discuss time in music1 form in visual art1 plot in drama1 the fact that he is all the while talking about mental happenings becomes concealed4 ,the verbal apparatus comes between us and the things with which we are really dealing4 ,words which are useful1 indeed invaluable1 as handy stop-gaps and makeshifts in conversation1 but which need elaborate expansions before they can be used with precision1 are treated as simply as people's proper names4 ,so it becomes natural to seek for the things these words appear to stand for1 and thus arise innumerable subtle investigations1 doomed ab initio as regards their main intent to failure4 ,we must be prepared then to translate1 into phrases pedantic and uncouth1 all the too simple utterances which the conversational decencies exact4 ,we shall find later1 in their peculiar emotive power the main reason why1 in spite of all manner of confusions and inconveniences1 these current ways of speaking are retained4 ,for emotive purposes they are indispensable1 but for clarity1 for the examination of what is actually happening1 translations are equally a necessity4 ,most critical remarks state in an abbreviated form that an object causes certain experiences1 and as a rule the form of the statement is such as to suggest that the object has been said to possess certain qualities4 ,but often the critic goes further and affirms that the effect in his mind is due to special particular features of the object4 ,in this case he is pointing out something about the object in addition to its effect upon him1 and this fuller kind of criticism is what we desire4 ,before his insight can greatly benefit1 however1 a very clear demarcation between the object1 with its features1 and his experience1 which is the effect of contemplating it1 is necessary4 ,the bulk of critical literature is unfortunately made up of examples of their confusion4 ,it will be convenient at this point to introduce two definitions4 ,in a full critical statement which states not only that an experience is valuable in certain ways1 but also that it is caused by certain features in a contemplated object1 the part which describes the value of the experience we shall call the critical part4 ,that which describes the object we shall call the technical part4 ,thus to say that we feel differently towards wooden crosses and stone crosses is a technical remark4 ,and to say that metre is more suited to the tender passion than is prose would be1 as it stands1 a technical remark1 but here it is evident that a critical part might easily be also present4 ,all remarks as to the ways and means by which experiences arise or are brought about are technical1 but critical remarks are about the values of experiences and the reasons for regarding them as valuable1 or not valuable4 ,we shall endeavor in what follows to show that critical remarks are merely a branch of psychological remarks1 and that no special ethical or metaphysical ideas need be introduced to explain value4 ,the distinction between technical and critical remarks is of real importance4 ,confusion here is responsible for some most curious passages in the histories of the arts4 ,a certain technique in certain cases produces admirable results2 the obvious features of this technique come to be regarded at first as sure signs of excellence1 and later as the excellence itself4 ,for a while nothing1 however admirable1 which does not show these superficial marks1 gets fair consideration4 ,thomas ,rymer's denigration of ,shakespeare1 ,dr ,johnson's view of ,milton's pauses1 the aftermath of the triumph of ,pope1 archaistic sculpture1 the ,greek poses in the compositions of ,david1 the imitations of ,czanne1 are famous instances2 they could be multiplied indefinitely4 ,the converse case is equally common4 ,an obvious technical blemish in a special case is recognised4 ,it may be too many ,s's in a particular line1 or the irregularity and rimelessness of a #8,pindaric' ,ode2 henceforth any line superficially similar1 ,the lustre of the long convolvulusses1 any unrhymed lyric1 is regarded as defective4 ,this trick of judging the whole by the detail1 instead of the other way about1 of mistaking the means for the end1 the technique for the value1 is in fact much the most successful of the snares which waylay the critic4 ,only the teacher knows 7and sometimes he is guilty himself7 how great is the number of readers who think1 for example1 that a defective rime--bough's house1 bush thrush1 blood good--is sufficient ground for condemning a poem in the neglect of all other considerations4 ,such sticklers1 like those with a scansion obsession 7due as a rule to ,exercises in ,latin ,verse71 have little understanding of poetry4 ,we pay attention to externals when we do not know what else to do with a poem4 #i ,g4 ,w4 ,mackail1 ,lectures on ,poetry4 ,introduction4 #aj ,we can diagrammatically represent the delusion as follows4 ,what actually occurs is that ,a1 a work of art1 causes ,e an effect in us1 which has the character b2 ,a causes ,eb4 ,we speak as though we perceived that ,a has the quality ,b 7,beauty72 we are perceiving ,a,b2 and if we are not careful we think so too4 ,no one of our recent revolutions in thought is more important than this progressive rediscovery of what we are talking about4 ,it is being inevitably followed by wide changes in our attitudes to the world and to fellow-creatures4 ,one current in this change is towards tolerance1 another towards scepticism1 a third towards far more secure founding of our motives of action4 ,the startling philosophical changes in the general outlook sometimes' predicted for ,relativity 7or for popular ideas about it when once they become widespread7 appear likely1 if they occur at all1 to be engulfed by these more unobtrusive but more domestic changes4 ,,chapter ,,iv ,communication and the ,artist ,poetry is the record of the best and happiest moments of the happiest and best minds4--,the ,defence of ,poetry4 ,the two pillars upon which a theory of criticism must rest are an account of value and an account of communication4 ,we do not sufficiently realise how great a part of our experience takes the form it does1 because we are social beings and accustomed to communication from infancy4 ,that we acquire many of our ways of thinking and feeling from parents and others is1 of course1 a commonplace4 ,but the effects of communication go much deeper than this4 ,the very structure of our minds largely determined by the fact that man has been engaged in communicating for so many hundreds of thousands of years1 throughout the course of his human development and beyond even that4 ,a large part of the distinctive features of the mind are due to its being an instrument for communication4 ,an experience has to be formed1 no doubt1 before it is communicated1 but it takes the form it does largely because it may have to be communicated4 ,the emphasis which natural selection has put upon communicative ability is overwhelming4 ,there are very many problems of psychology1 from those with which some of the exponents of ,gestalt theorie are grappling to those by which psycho-analysts are bewildered1 for which this neglected1 this almost overlooked aspect of the mind may provide a key1 but it is pre-eminently in regard to the arts that it is of service4 ,for the arts are the supreme form of the communicative activity4 ,as we shall see1 most of the difficult and obscure points about the structures of the arts1 for example the priority of formal elements to content1#aa or the impersonality and detachment so much stressed by stheticians1 become easily intelligible as soon as we consider them from this angle4 ,but a possible misunderstanding must be guarded against4 ,although it is as a communicator that it is most profitable to consider the artist1 it is by no means true that he commonly looks upon himself in this light4 ,in the course of his work he is not as a rule deliberately and consciously engaged in a communicative endeavour4 ,when asked1 he is more likely than not to reply that communication is an irrelevant or at best a minor issue1 and that what he is making is something which is beautiful in itself1 or satisfying to him personally1 or something expressive1 in a more or less vague sense1 of his emotions1 or of himself1 something personal and individual4 ,that other people are going to study it1 and to receive experiences from it may seem to him a merely accidental1 inessential circumstance4 ,more modestly still1 he may say that when he works he is merely amusing himself4 ,that the artist is not as a mule consciously concerned with communication1 but with getting the work1 the poem or play or statue or painting or whatever it is1 #8right'1 apparently regardless of its communicative efficacy1 is easily explained4 ,to make the work #8embody'1 accord with1 and represent the precise experience upon which its value depends is his major preoccupation1 in difficult cases an overmastering preoccupation1 and the dissipation of attention which would be involved if he considered the communicative side as a separate issue would be fatal in most serious work4 ,he cannot stop to consider how the public or even how especially well qualified sections of the public may like it or respond to it4 ,he is wise1 therefore1 to keep all such considerations out of mind altogether4 ,those artists and poets who can be suspected of close separate attention to the communicative aspect tend 7there are exceptions to this1 of which ,shakespeare might be one7 to fall into a subordinate rank4 ,but this conscious neglect of communication does not in the least diminish the importance of the communicative aspect4 ,it would only do so if we were prepared to admit that only our conscious activities matter4 ,the very process of getting the work #8right' has itself1 so far as the artist is normal1#ab immense communicative consequences4 ,apart from certain special cases1 to be discussed later1 it will1 when #8right'1 have much greater communicative power than it would have had if #8wrong'4 ,the degree to which it accords with the relevant experience of the artist is a measure of the degree to which it will arouse similar experiences in others4 ,but more narrowly the reluctance of the artist to consider communication as one of his main aims1 and his denial that he is at all influenced in his' work by a desire to affect other people1 is no evidence that communication is not actually his principal object4 ,on a simple view of psychology1 which overlooked unconscious motives1 it would be1 but not on any view of human behaviour which is in the least adequate4 ,when we find the artist constantly struggling towards impersonality1 towards a structure for his work which excludes his private1 eccentric1 momentary idiosyncrasies1 and using always as its basis those elements which are most uniform in their effects upon impulses2 when we find private works of art1 works which satisfy the artist1#ac but are incomprehensible to everybody else1 so rare1 and the publicity of the work so constantly and so intimately bound up with its appeal to the artist himself1 it is difficult to believe that efficacy for communication is not a main part of the #8rightness'#ad which the artist may suppose to be something quite different4 ,how far desire actually to communicate1 as distinguished from desire to produce something with communicative efficacy 7however disguised71 is an #8unconscious motive' in the artist is a question to which we need not hazard an answer4 ,doubtless individual artists vary enormously4 ,to some the lure of #8immortality' of enduring fame1 of a permanent place in the influences which govern the human mind1 appears to be very strong4 ,to others it is often negligible4 ,the degree to which such notions are avowed certainly varies with current social and intellectual fashions4 ,at present the appeal to posterity1 the #8nurslings of immortality' attitude to works of art appears to be much out of favour4 8,how do we know what posterity will be like8 ,they may be awful people60 a contemporary is likely to remark1 thus confusing the issue4 ,for the appeal is not to posterity merely as living at a certain date1 but as especially qualified to judge1 a qualification most posterities have lacked4 ,what concerns criticism is not the avowed or unavowed motives of the artist1 however interesting these may be to psychology1 but the fact that his procedure does1 in the majority of instances1 make the communicative efficacy of his work correspond with his own satisfaction and sense of its rightness4 ,this may be due merely to his normality1 or it may be due to unavowed motives4 ,the first suggestion is the more plausible4 ,in any case it is certain that no mere careful study of communicative possibilities1 together with any desire to communicate1 however intense1 is ever sufficient without close natural correspondence between the poet's impulses and possible impulses in his reader4 ,all supremely successful communication involves this correspondence1 and no planning can take its place4 ,nor is the deliberate conscious attempt directed to communication so successful as the unconscious indirect method4 ,thus the artist is entirely justified in his apparent neglect of the main purpose of his work4 ,and when in what follows he is alluded to without qualification as being primarily concerned with communication1 the reservations here made should be recalled4 ,since the poet's unconscious motives have been alluded to1 it may be well at this point to make a few additional remarks4 ,whatever psycho-analysts may aver1 the mental processes of the poet are not a very profitable field for investigation4 ,they offer far too happy a hunting-ground for uncontrollable conjecture4 ,much that goes to produce a poem is1 of course1 unconscious4 ,very likely the unconscious processes are more important than the conscious1 but even if we knew far more than we do about how the mind works1 the attempt to display the inner working of the artist's mind by the evidence of his work alone must be subject to the gravest dangers4 ,and to judge by the published work of ,freud upon ,leonardo da ,vinci or of ,jung upon ,goethe 7e4g4 ,the ,psychology of the ,unconscious1 p4 #cje71 psycho-analysts tend to be peculiarly inept as critics4 ,the difficulty is that nearly all speculations as to what went on in the artist's mind are unverifiable1 even more unverifiable than the similar speculations as to the dreamer's mind4 ,the most plausible explanations are apt to depend upon features whose actual causation is otherwise4 ,i do not know whether anyone but ,mr ,graves has attempted to analyse ,kubla ,khan1 a poem which by its mode of composition and by its subject suggests itself as well fitted for analysis4 ,the reader acquainted with current methods of analysis can imagine the results of a thoroughgoing ,freudian onslaught4 ,if he will then open ,paradise ,lost1 ,book ,,iv at line #bbc1 and read onwards3 for sixty lines1 he will encounter the actual sources of not a few of the images and phrases of the poem4 ,in spite of-- ,southward through ,eden went a ,river large1 ,nor changed his course1 but through the shaggie hill ,pass'd underneath ingulft 4 4 4 in spite of-- ,rose a fresh ,fountain1 and with many a rill ,waterd the ,garden2 thence united fell ,down the steep glade1 and met the neather ,flood 4 4 4 in spite of-- ,rowling on ,orient ,pearl and sands of ,gold ,with mazie error under pendant shades ,ran ,nectar 4 4 4 in spite of-- ,meanwhile murmuring waters fall ,down the slope hills1 disperst 4 4 4 his doubts may still linger until he reaches ,nor where ,abassin ,kings thir issue ,guard1 ,mount ,amara4 and one of the most cryptic points in ,coleridge's poem1 the ,abyssinian maid1 singing of ,mount ,abora1 finds its simple explanation4 ,the closing line of the poem perhaps hardly needs this kind of derivation4 ,from one source or another almost all the matter of ,kubla ,khan came to ,coleridge in a similar fashion4 ,i do not know whether this particular indebtedness has been remarked before1 but ,purchas his ,pilgrimage1 ,bartram's ,travels in ,north and ,south ,carolina1 and ,maurice's ,history of ,hindostan are well-known sources1 some of them indicated by ,coleridge himself4 ,this very representative instance of the unconscious working of a poet's mind may serve as a not inapposite warning against one kind at least of possible applications of psychology in criticism4 ,the extent to which the arts and their place in the whole scheme of human affairs have been misunderstood1 by ,critics1 ,moralists1 ,educators1 stheticians 4 4 4 is somewhat difficult to explain4 ,often those who most misunderstood have been perfect in their taste and ability to respond1 ,ruskin for example4 ,those who both knew what to do with a work of art and also understood what they were doing1 have been for the most part artists and little inclined for1 or capable of1 the rather special task of explaining4 ,it may have seemed to them too obvious to need explanation4 ,those who have tried have as a rule been foiled by language4 ,for the difficulty which has always prevented the arts from being explained as well as #8enjoyed' 7to use an inadequate word in default of an adequate7 is language4 8,happy who can ,appease this virtuous enemy of man60 ,it was perhaps never so necessary as now that we should know why the arts are important and avoid inadequate answers4 ,it will probably become increasingly more important in the future4 ,remarks such as these1 it is true1 are often uttered by enthusiastic persons1 and are apt to be greeted with the same smile as the assertion that the future of ,england is bound up with ,hunting4 ,yet their full substantiation will be found to involve issues which are nowhere lightly regarded4 ,the arts are our storehouse of recorded values4 ,they spring from and perpetuate hours in the lives of exceptional people1 when their control and command of experience is at its highest1 hours when the varying possibilities of existence are most clearly seen and the different activities which may arise are most exquisitely reconciled1 hours when habitual narrowness of interests or confused bewilderment are replaced by an intricately wrought composure4 ,both in the genesis of a work of art1 in the creative moment1 and in its aspect as a vehicle of communication1 reasons can be found for giving to the arts a very important place in the theory of ,value4 ,they record the most important judgments we possess as to the values of experience4 ,they form a body of evidence which1 for lack of a serviceable psychology by which to interpret it1 and through the desiccating influence of abstract ,ethics1 has been left almost untouched by professed students of value4 ,an odd omission1 for without the assistance of the arts we could compare very few of our experiences1 and without such comparison we could hardly hope to agree as to which are to be preferred4 ,very simple experiences--a cold bath in an enamelled tin1 or running for a train--may to some extent be compared without elaborate vehicles2 and friends exceptionally well acquainted with one another may manage some rough comparisons in ordinary conversation4 ,but subtle or recondite experiences are for most men incommunicable and indescribable1 though social conventions or terror of the loneliness of the human situation may make us pretend the contrary4 ,in the arts we find the record in the only form in which these things can be recorded of the experiences which have seemed worth having to the most sensitive and discriminating persons4 ,through the obscure perception of this fact the poet has been regarded as a seer and the artist as a priest1 suffering from usurpations4 ,the arts1 if rightly approached1 supply the best data available for deciding what experiences are more valuable than others4 ,the qualifying clause is all-important however4 ,happily there is no lack of glaring examples to remind us of the difficulty of approaching them rightly4 #aa ,see ,chapter ,,xxiv4 #ab ,this point will be discussed in ,chapter ,,xxiv4 #ac ,again the normality of the artist has to be considered4 #ad ,as will be seen1 ,i am not going to identify #8beauty' with #8communicative efficacy'4 ,this is a trap which it is easy to fall into4 ,a number of the exoteric followers of ,croce may be found in it1 though not ,croce himself4 ,,chapter ,v ,the ,critics' ,concern with ,value ,what hinders8 ,are you beam-blind1 yet to a fault ,in a neighbour deft-handed8 ,are you that liar8 ,and cast by conscience out1 spendsavour salt8 ,gerard ,hopkins4 ,between the general inquiry into the nature of the good and the appreciation of particular works of art1 there may seem to be a wide gap1 and the discussion upon which we are about to embark may appear a roundabout way of approaching our subject4 ,morals have often been treated1 especially in recent times1 as a side-issue for criticism1 from which the special concern of the critic must be carefully separated4 ,his business1 so it has been said1 is with the work of art in itself1 not with any consequences which lie outside it4 ,these may be left1 it has been supposed1 to others for attention1 to the clergy perhaps or to the police4 ,that these authorities are sadly incompetent is a minor disadvantage4 ,their blunderings are as a rule so ridiculous that the effects are brief4 ,they often serve a useful purpose in calling attention to work which might be overlooked4 ,what is more serious is that these indiscretions1 vulgarities and absurdities encourage the view that morals have little or nothing to do with the arts1 and the even more unfortunate opinion that the arts have no connection with morality4 ,the ineptitudes of censors1 their choice of censorable objects1 ignoble blasphemy1 such as that which declared ,esther ,waters an impure book1 displays of such intelligence as considered ,madame ,bovary an apology for adulterous wrong1 innumerable comic1 stupefying1 enraging interferences fully explain this attitude1 but they do not justify it4 ,the common avoidance of all discussion of the wider social and moral aspects of the arts by people of steady judgment and strong heads is a misfortune1 for it leaves the field free for folly1 and cramps the scope of good critics unduly4 ,so loath have they been to be thought at large with the wild asses that they have virtually shut themselves up in a paddock4 ,if the competent are to refrain because of the antics of the unqualified1 an evil and a loss which are neither temporary nor trivial increase continually4 ,it is as though medical men were all to retire because of the impudence of quacks4 ,for the critic is as closely occupied with the health of the mind as the doctor with the health of the body4 ,in a different way1 it is true1 and with a wider and subtler definition of health1 by which the healthiest mind is that capable of securing the greatest amount of value4 ,the critic cannot possibly avoid using some ideas about value4 ,his whole occupation is an application and exercise of his ideas on the subject1 and an avoidance of moral preoccupations on his part can only be either an abdication or a rejection under the title of #8morality' of what he considers to be mistaken or dishonest ideas and methods4 ,the term has a dubious odour1 it has been handled by many objectionable as well as admirable people1 and we may agree to avoid it4 ,but the errors exemplified by censorship exploits are too common1 and misconceptions as to the nature of value too easy to fall into and too widespread1 for useful criticism to remain without a general theory and an explicit set of principles4 ,what is needed is a defensible position for those who believe that the arts are of value4 ,only a general theory of value which will show the place and function of the arts in the whole system of values will provide such a stronghold4 ,at the same time we need weapons with which to repel and overthrow misconceptions4 ,with the increase of population the problem presented by the gulf between what is preferred by the majority and what is accepted as excellent by the most qualified opinion has become infinitely more serious and appears likely to become threatening in the near future4 ,for many reasons standards are much more in need of defence than they used to be4 ,it is perhaps premature to envisage a collapse of values1 a transvaluation by which popular taste replaces trained discrimination4 ,yet commercialism has done stranger things3 we have not yet fathomed the more sinister potentialities of the cinema and the loud-speaker1 and there is some evidence1 uncertain and slight no doubt1 that such things as #8best-sellers' 7compare ,tarzan with ,she71 magazine verses1 mantelpiece pottery1 ,academy pictures1 ,music ,hall songs1 ,county ,council buildings1 ,war ,memorials 4 4 4 are decreasing in merit4 ,notable exceptions1 in which the multitude are better advised than the experts1 of course occur sometimes1 but not often4 ,to bridge the gulf1 to bring the level of popular appreciation nearer to the consensus of best qualified opinion1 and to defend this opinion against damaging attacks 7,tolstoy's is a typical example71 a much clearer account than has yet been produced1 of why this opinion is right1 is essential4 ,these attacks are dangerous1 because they appeal to a natural instinct1 hatred of #8superior persons'4 ,the expert in-matters of taste is in an awkward position when he differs from the majority4 ,he is forced to say in effect1 8,i am better than you4 ,my taste is more refined1 my nature more cultured1 you will do well to become more like me than you are40 ,it is not his fault that he has to be so arrogant4 ,he may1 and usually does1 disguise the fact as far as possible1 but his claim to be heard as an expert depends upon the truth of these assumptions4 ,he ought then to be ready with reasons of a clear and convincing kind as to why his preferences are worth attention1 and until these reasons are forthcoming1 the accusations that he is a charlatan and a prig are embarrassing4 ,he may indeed point to years of preoccupation with his subject1 he may remark like the wiseacre ,longinus1 sixteen hundred years ago1 8,the judgment of literature is the final outcome of much endeavour10 but with him are many ,professors to prove that years of endeavour may lead to nothing very remarkable in the end4 ,to habilitate the critic1 to defend accepted standards against ,tolstoyan attacks1 to narrow the interval between these standards and popular taste1 to protect the arts against the crude moralities of ,puritans and perverts1 a general theory of value1 which will not leave the statement 8,this is good1 that bad10 either vague or arbitrary1 must be provided4 ,there is no alternative open4 ,nor is it such an excursus from the inquiry into the nature of the arts as may be supposed4 ,for if a well-grounded theory of value is a necessity for criticism1 it is no less true that an understanding of what happens in the arts is needed for the theory4 ,the two problems 8,what is good80 and 8,what are the arts80 reflect light upon one another4 ,neither in fact can be fully answered without the other4 ,to the unravelling of the first we may now proceed4 ,,chapter ,,vi ,value as an ,ultimate ,idea ,some lovely glorious nothing ,i did see4--,aire and ,angels4 ,it has always been found far more easy to divide experiences#ae into good and bad1 valuable and the reverse1 than to discover what we are doing when we make the division4 ,the history of opinions as to what constitutes value1 as to why and when anything is rightly called good1 shows a bewildering variety4 ,but in modern times the controversy narrows itself down to two questions4 ,the first of these is whether the difference between experiences which are valuable and those which are not can be fully described in psychological terms2 whether some additional distinctive #8ethical' or #8moral' idea of a non-psychological nature is or is not required4 ,the second question concerns the exact psychological analysis needed in order to explain value if no further #8ethical' idea is shown to be necessary4 ,the first question will not detain us long4 ,it has been ably maintained#af and widely accepted that when we say that an experience is good we are simply saying that it is endowed with a certain ethical property or attribute not to be reduced to any psychological properties or attributes such as being desired or approved1 and that no further elucidation of this special ethical property by way of analysis is possible4 #8,good' on this view is in no way a shorthand term for some more explicit account4 ,the things which are good1 it is held1 are just good1 possess a property which can be recognised by immediate intuition1 and here1 since good is unanalysable1 the matter must rest4 ,all that the study of value can do is to point out the things which possess this property1 classify them1 and remove certain confusions between ends which are good in themselves and means which are only called good1 because they are instrumental in the attainment of intrinsically good ends4 ,usually those who maintain this view also hold that the only things which are good for their own sakes and not merely as a means are certain conscious experiences1 for example1 knowledge1 admiring contemplation of beauty1 and feelings of affection and veneration under some circumstances4 ,other things1 such as mountains1 books1 railways1 courageous actions1 are good instrumentally because1 and in so far as1 they cause or make possible states of mind which are valuable intrinsically4 ,thus the occurrence of states of mind which are recognised as good is regarded as an isolated fact of experience1 not capable of being accounted for1 or linked up with the rest of human peculiarities as a product of development in the way made familiar by the biological sciences4 ,the plausibility of this view derives principally from the metaphysical assumption that there are properties1 in the sense of subsistent entities1 which attach to existent particulars1 but which might without absurdity be supposed to attach to nothing4 ,these metaphysical entities1 variously named ,ideas1 ,notions1 ,concepts or ,universals1 may be divided into two kinds1 sensuous and supersensuous4#ag ,the sensuous are those which may be apprehended by the senses1 such as #8red'1 #8cold'1 #8round'1 #8swift'1 #8painful'1 and the supersensuous1 those apprehended not in sensuous perception but otherwise4 ,logical relations1 #8necessity' or #8impossibility1' and such ideas as #8willing'1 #8end'1 #8cause'1 and #8being three in number'1 have in this way been supposed to be directly apprehensible by the mind4 ,amongst these supersensuous ,ideas good is to be found4 ,nothing could be simpler than such a view1 and to many people the subsistence of such a property of goodness appears not surprising4 ,but to others the suggestion seems merely a curious survival of abstractionism1 if such a term may be defended by its close parallel with obstructionism4 ,a blind man in a dark room chasing a black cat which is not there would seem to them well employed in comparison with a philosopher apprehending such #8,concepts'4 ,while ready for convenience of discourse to talk and even to think as though ,concepts and ,particulars were separable and distinct kinds of entities1 they refuse to believe that the structure of the world actually contains such a cleavage4 ,the point is perhaps undiscussable1 and is probably unimportant1 except in so far as the habit of regarding the world as actually so cloven is a fruitful source of bogus entities1 usually hypostatised words4 ,the temptation to introduce premature ultimates--,beauty in sthetics1 the ,mind and its faculties in psychology1 ,life in physiology1 are representative examples--is especially great for believers in ,abstract ,entities4 ,the objection to such ,ultimates is that they bring an investigation to a dead end too suddenly4 ,an ultimate ,good is1 in this instance1 just such an arbitrary full stop4 ,it will be agreed that a less cryptic account of good1 if one can be given1 which is in accordance with verifiable facts1 would be preferable1 even though no means were available for refuting the simpler theory4 ,upholders of this theory1 however1 have produced certain arguments to show that no other view of good is possible1 and these must first be briefly examined4 ,they provide1 in addition1 an excellent example of the misuse of psychological assumptions in research1 for although a psychological approach is often of the utmost service1 it can also be a source of obscurantism and over-confidence4 ,the arguments against any naturalistic account depend upon the alleged results of directly inspecting what is before our minds when we judge that anything is good4 ,if we substitute1 it is maintained1 any account of good whatever for #8good' in the assertion1 #8,this is good'--for example1 #8,this is desired' or #8,this is approved'--we can detect that what is substituted is different from #8good'1 and that we are not then making the same judgment4 ,this result1 it is claimed1 is confirmed by the fact that we can always ask1 8,is what is desired1 or what is approved1 good80 however we may elaborate the account provided1 and that this is always a genuine question which would be impossible were the substituted account actually the analysis of good4 ,the persuasiveness of this refutation is found to vary enormously from individual to individual1 for the results of the experiments upon which it relies differ4 ,those who have accustomed themselves to the belief that good is a supersensuous simple ,idea readily discover the fraudulent character of any offered substitute1 while those who hold some psychological theory of value1 with equal ease identify their account with #8good'4 ,the further question1 8,when and under what conditions can judgments be distinguished80 arises1 a question so difficult to answer that any argument becomes suspect which depends upon assuming that they can be infallibly recognised as different4 ,if for any reason we wish to distinguish two judgments1 we can persuade ourselves1 in any case in which they are differently formulated1 that they are different4 ,thus it has been thought that #8a exceeds b' and #8a is greater than b' are distinguishable1 the first being supposed to state simply that a has the relation #8exceeds' to b1 while the second is supposed to state that a has the relation #8is' to greater which again has the relation #8than' to b4#ah ,the conclusion to be drawn from the application of such methods to the problem of the meaning of ,good would seem to be that they are not competent to decide anything about it--by no means a valueless result4 ,since nothing can be concluded from a comparison of #8,this is good' with1 let us say1 #8,this is sought by an impulse belonging to a dominant group'1 let us see whether light can be gained by considering analogous instances in which special distinct ideas have for a time been thought indispensable only to yield later to analysis and substitution4 ,the case of ,beauty is perhaps too closely related to that of ,good for our purpose4 ,those who can persuade themselves that ,good is an unique irreducible entity might believe the same of ,beauty4 ,an episode in the theory of the tides is more instructive4 ,it was once thought that the moon must have a peculiar ,affinity with water3 ,when the moon is full the tides are higher4 ,clearly the seas swell in sympathy with the increase of the moon4 ,the history of science is full of mysterious unique entities which have gradually evaporated as explanation advanced4 ,the struggles of economists with #8utility'1 of mathematical philosophers with #8points' and #8instants'1 of biologists with #8entelechies'1 and the adventures of psycho-analysts with #8the libido' and #8the collective unconscious' are instances in point4 ,at present theoretical psychology in particular is largely made up of the manipulation of similar suspects4 ,the ,act of ,judgment1 the relation of ,presentation1 ,immediate ,awareness1 ,direct ,inspection1 the ,will1 ,feeling1 ,assumption1 ,acceptance1 are only a few of the provisional ultimates introduced for convenience of discussion4 ,some of them may in the end prove to be indispensable1 but meanwhile they are not1 to prudent people1 more than symbolic conveniences2 theories dependent upon them must not be allowed to shut off from investigation fields which may be fruitful4 #ae ,throughout this discussion #8experience' will be used in a wide sense to stand for any occurrence in the mind4 ,it is equivalent to #8mental state1 or process4' ,the term has often unfortunate suggestions of passiveness and of consciousness1 but many of the #8experiences' here referred to would ordinarily be called #8actions' and have parts which are not conscious and not accessible to introspection as important as those which are4 #af ,a chief advocate of this view is ,dr ,g4 ,e4 ,moore1 whose ,principia ,ethica and ,ethics contain brilliant statements of the position4 #ag ,cf4 ,f4 ,brentano1 ,the ,origin of the ,knowledge of ,right and ,wrong1 pp4 #ab1 #df4 #ah ,cf4 ,russell1 ,the ,principles of ,mathematics1 p4 #ajj4 8,on this principle1 from which ,i can see no escape1 that every genuine word must have some meaning1 the is and than must form part of #8a is greater than b'1 which thus contains more than two terms and a relation4 ,the is seems to state that a has to greater the relation of referent1 while the than states similarly that b has to greater the relation of relatum4 ,but #8a exceeds b' may be held to express solely the relation of a to b1 without including any of the implications of further relations40 ,on the introspective comparison of judgments ,the ,meaning of ,meaning1 by ,c4 ,k4 ,ogden and the writer1 may be consulted4 ,,chapter ,,vii ,a ,psychological ,theory of ,value ,hands that can grasp1 eyes that can dilate1 hair that can rise if it must1 these things are important not because a high-sounding interpretation can be put upon them1 but because they are useful4--,marianne ,moore4 ,the method then by which any attempt to analyse #8good' has been condemned is itself objectionable1 and yields no sound reason why a purely psychological account of the differences between good1 bad1 and indifferent experiences should not be given4 ,the data for the inquiry are in part supplied by anthropology4 ,it has become clear that the disparity among the states of mind recognised as good by persons of different races1 habits and civilisations is overwhelming4 ,any observant child1 it is true1 might discover in the home circle how widely people disagree1 but the effect of education is to suppress these scientific efforts4 ,it has needed the vast accumulations of anthropological evidence now available to establish the fact that as the organisation of life and affairs alters very different experiences are perceived to be good or bad1 are favoured or condemned4 ,the ,bakairi of ,central ,brazil and the ,tahitians1 among others1 are reported1 for example1 to look upon eating with the same feelings which we reserve for quite different physiological performances1 and to regard the public consumption of food as a grave breach of decency4 ,in many parts of the world feelings of forgiveness towards enemies1 for example1 are looked upon as low and ignoble4 ,the experiences which one person values are thought vicious by another4 ,we must allow1 it is true1 for widespread confusion between intrinsic and instrumental values1 and for the difficulty of identifying experiences4 ,many states of mind in other people which we judge to be bad or indifferent are no doubt unlike what we imagine them to be1 or contain elements which we overlook1 so that with fuller knowledge we might discover them to be good4 ,in this manner it may be possible to reduce the reported disparity of value intuitions1 but few people acquainted with the varying moral judgments of mankind will doubt that circumstances and necessities1 present and past1 explain our approval and disapproval4 ,we start1 then1 with a hearty scepticism of all immediate intuitions1 and inquire how it is that individuals in different conditions1 and at different stages of their development1 esteem things so differently4 ,with the exception of some parents and nursemaids we have lately all been aghast at revelations of the value judgments of infants4 ,their impulses1 their desires1 their preferences1 the things which they esteem1 as displayed by the psycho-analysts1 strike even those whose attitude towards humanity is not idealistic with some dismay4 ,even when the stories are duly discounted1 enough which is verifiable remains for infans polypervers to present a truly impressive figure dominating all future psychological inquiry into value4 ,there is no need here to examine in detail how these early impulses are diverted and disguised by social pressures4 ,the rough outlines are familiar of the ways in which by growth1 by the appearance of fresh instinctive tendencies1 by increase of knowledge and of command over the world1 under the control of custom1 magical beliefs1 public opinion1 inculcation and example1 the primitive new-born animal may be gradually transformed into a bishop4 ,at every stage in the astonishing metamorphosis1 the impulses1 desires1 and propensities of the individual take on a new form1 or1 it may be1 a further degree of systematisation4 ,this systematisation is never complete4 ,always some impulse1 or set of impulses1 can be found which in one way or another interferes1 or conflicts1 with others4 ,it may do so in two ways1 directly or indirectly4 ,some impulses are in themselves psychologically incompatible1 some are incompatible only indirectly1 through producing contrary effects in the world outside4 ,the difficulty some people have in smoking and writing at the same time is a typical instance of the first kind of incompatibility2 the two activities get in each other's way by a psychological accident as it were4 ,interference of this kind can be overcome by practice to an unexpected degree1 as the feats of jugglers show2 some1 however1 are insurmountable2 and these incompatibilities are often1 as we shall see1 of supreme consequence in moral development4 ,indirect incompatibilities arising through the consequences of our acts are more easy to find4 ,our whole existence is one long study of them1 from the infant's first choice whether he shall use his mouth for screaming or for sucking1 to the last codicil to his ,will4 ,these are simple instances1 but the conduct of life is throughout an attempt to organise impulses so that success is obtained for the greater number or mass of them1 for the most important and the weightiest set4 ,and here we come face to face again with the problem of value4 ,how shall we decide which among these are more important than3 others1 and how shall we distinguish different organisations as yielding more or less value one than another8 ,at this point we need to be on our guard not to smuggle in any peculiar ethical1 non-psychological1 idea under some disguise1 under #8important' or #8fundamental'1 for example4 ,among those who reject any metaphysical view of value it has become usual to define value as capacity for satisfying feeling and desire in various intricate ways4#ai ,for the purpose of tracing in detail the very subtle and varied modes in which people actually value things1 a highly intricate treatment is indispensable1 but here a simpler definition will suffice4 ,we may start from the fact that impulses may be divided into appetencies and aversions1 and begin by saying that anything is valuable which satisfies an appetency or #8seeking after4' ,the term #8desire' would do as well if we could avoid the implication of accompanying conscious beliefs as to what is sought and a further restriction to felt and recognised longings4 ,the term #8want' used so much by economists has the same disadvantages4 ,appetencies may be1 and for the most part are1 unconscious1 and to leave out those which we cannot discover by introspection would involve extensive errors4 ,for the same reason it is wiser not to start from feeling4 ,appetencies then1 rather than felt appetencies or desires1 shall be our starting-point4 ,the next step is to agree that apart from consequences anyone will actually prefer to satisfy a greater number of equal appetencies rather than a less4 ,observation of people's behaviour1 including our own1 is probably sufficient to establish this agreement4 ,if now we look to see what consequences can intervene to upset this simple principle1 we shall find that only interferences1 immediate or remote1 direct3 or indirect1 with other appetencies1 need to be considered4 ,the only psychological restraints upon appetencies are other appetencies4#bj ,we can now extend our definition4 ,anything is valuable which will satisfy an appetency without involving the frustration of some equal or more important appetency2 in other words1 the only reason which can be given for not satisfying a desire is that more important desires will thereby be thwarted4 ,thus morals become purely prudential1 and ethical codes merely the expression of the mast general scheme of expediency#ba to which an individual or a race has attained4 ,but we have still to say what #8important' stands for in this formulation4 7,cf4 p4 #ea74 ,there are certain evident priorities among impulses1 some of which have been studied in various ways by economists under the headings of primary wants and secondary wants4 ,some needs or impulses must be satisfied in order that others may be possible4 ,we must eat1 drink1 sleep1 breathe1 protect ourselves and carry on an immense physiological business as a condition for any further activities4 ,some of these impulses1 breathing1 for example1 can be satisfied directly1 but most of them involve us in complicated cycles of instrumental labour4 ,man for the most part must exert himself half his life to satisfy even the primitive needs1 and these activities1 failing other means of reaching the same ends1 share their priority4 ,in their turn they involve as conditions a group of impulses1 whose satisfaction becomes only second in importance to physiological necessities1 those1 namely1 upon which communication and the ability to co-operate depend4 ,but these1 since man is a social creature1 also become more directly necessary to his well-being4 ,the very impulses which enable him to co-operate in gaining his dinner would themselves1 if not satisfied1 wreck by their mere frustration all his activities4 ,this happens all through the hierarchy4 ,impulses1 whose exercise may have been originally only important as means1 and which might once have been replaced by quite different sets1 become in time necessary conditions for innumerable quite different performances4 ,objects1 again1 originally valued because they satisfy one need1 are found later to be also capable of satisfying others4 ,dress1 for example1 appears to have originated in magical1 #8life-giving1' ornaments#bb1 but so many other interests derive satisfaction from it that controversy can still arise as to its primitive uses4 ,the instances of priorities given must only be taken as examples4 ,it is hardly necessary to remind the reader that for a civilised man1 activities originally valuable as means only1 often become so important through their connections with the rest of his activities1 that life without them is regarded as intolerable4 ,thus acts which will debar him from his normal relations with his fellows are often avoided1 even at the cost of death4 ,total cessation of all activities is preferred to the dreadful thwarting and privation which would ensue4 ,the case of the soldier1 or of the conscientious objector1 is thus no exception to the principle4 ,life deprived of all but the barest physiological necessities1 for example1 prison life1 is for many people worse than non-existence4 ,those who even so incur it in defence of some #8moral ideal' do so because they are so organised1 either permanently or temporarily1 that only in this way can their dominant impulses secure satisfaction4 ,the self-regarding impulses form only a part of the total activities of social man1 and the impulse of the martyr to bear witness at any cost to what he regards as truth1 is only one extreme instance of the degree to which other impulses often assume supremacy4 ,for another reason any priorities mentioned must be taken only as illustrations4 ,we do not know enough yet about the precedences1 the hierarchies1 the modes of systematisation1 actual and possible1 in that unimaginable organisation1 the mind1 to say what order in any case actually exists1 or between what the order holds4 ,we only know that a growing order is the principle of the mind1 that its function is to co-ordinate1 and we can detect that in some of its forms the precedence is different from that in others4 ,this we could do by observation1 by comparing the drunken man with the sober1 but from our own experience of our own activity we can go much further4 ,we can feel differences between clear coherent thinking and confusion or stupidity1 between free1 controlled emotional response and dull or clogged impassivity1 between moments when we do with our bodies more delicate and dexterous things than seem possible1 and moments of clumsiness1 when we are #8all thumbs'1 have no #8balance' or #8timing'1 and nothing #8comes off'4 ,these differences are differences in momentary organisation1 differences in precedence between rival possible systematisations4 ,the more permanent and more specifically #8moral' differences between individuals grow out of differences such as these and correspond to similar precedences between larger systems4 ,the complications possible in the systematisation of impulses might be illustrated indefinitely4 ,the plasticity of special appetencies and activities varies enormously4 ,some impulses can be diverted more easily than others4 ,sex has a wider range of satisfactions than hunger1 for example2 some are weaker than others2 some 7not the same necessarily7 can be suppressed in the long run with less difficulty4 ,some can be modified2 some obey the #8all or none' rule--they must either be satisfied specifically or completely inhibited--well-established habits may have this peculiarity4 ,in judging the importance of any impulse all these considerations must be taken into account4 ,the affiliations of impulses1 at present often inexplicable1 need especially to be considered4 ,within the whole partially systematised organisation1 numerous sub-systems can be found1 and what would be expected to be quite trivial impulses are often discovered to be important1 because they belong to powerful groups4 ,thus there are reasonable persons who1 without a high polish on their shoes1 are almost incapacitated4 ,the importance of an impulse1 it will be seen1 can be defined for our purposes as the extent of the disturbance of other impulses in the individual's activities which the thwarting of the impulse involves4 ,a vague definition1 it is true1 but therefore suitable to our at present incomplete and hazy knowledge of how impulses are related4 ,it will be observed that no special ethical idea is introduced4 ,we can now take our next step forward and inquire into the relative merits of different systematisations4 ,no individual can live one minute without a very intricate and1 so far as it goes1 very perfect co-ordination of impulses4 ,it is only when we pass from the activities which from second to second maintain life to those which from hour to hour determine what kind of life it shall be1 that we find wide differences4 ,fortunately for psychology we can each find wide enough differences in ourselves from hour to hour4 ,most people in the same day are ,bonaparte and ,oblomov by turns4 ,before breakfast ,diogenes1 after dinner ,petronius or ,bishop ,usher4 ,but throughout these mutations certain dispositions usually remain much the same1 those which govern public behaviour in a limited number of affairs varying very greatly from one society or civilisation to another4 ,every systematisation in the degree to which it is stable involves a degree of sacrifice1 but for some the price to be paid in opportunities foregone is greater than for others4 ,by the extent of the loss1 the range of impulses thwarted or starved1 and their degree of importance1 the merit of a systematisation is judged4 ,that organisation which is least wasteful of human possibilities is1 in short1 the best4 ,some individuals1 hag-ridden by their vices1 or their virtues1 to a point at which the law of diminishing returns has deprived even these of their appropriate satisfactions1 are still unable to reorganise2 they go through life incapacitated for most of its possible enjoyments4#bc ,others1 paralysed with their conflicts1 are unable to do anything freely2 whatever they attempt some implicated but baffled impulse is still fitfully and fretfully stirring4 ,the debauchee and the victim of conscience alike have achieved organisations whose price in sacrifice is excessive4 ,both their individual satisfactions1 and those for which they are dependent upon sympathetic relations with their fellows1 an almost equal group1 are unduly restricted4 ,upon grounds of prudence alone they have been injudicious1 and they may be condemned without any appeal to peculiarly #8ethical' standards4 ,the muddle in which they are forced to live is itself sufficient ground for reprobation4 ,at the other extreme are those fortunate people who have achieved an ordered life1 whose systems have developed clearing-houses by which the varying claims of different impulses are adjusted4 ,their free1 untrammelled activity gains for them a maximum of varied satisfactions and involves a minimum of suppression and sacrifice4 ,particularly is this so with regard to those satisfactions which require humane1 sympathetic1 and friendly relations between individuals4 ,the charge of egoism1 or selfishness1 can be brought against a naturalistic or utilitarian morality such as this only by overlooking the importance of these satisfactions in any well-balanced life4 ,unfair or aggressive behaviour1 and preoccupation with self-regarding interests to the exclusion of due sensitiveness to the reciprocal claims of human intercourse1 lead to a form of organisation which deprives the person so organised of whole ranges of important values4 ,no mere loss of social pleasures is in question1 but a twist or restriction of impulses1 whose normal satisfaction is involved in almost all the greatest goods of life4 ,the two senses in which a man may #8take advantage' of his fellows can be observed in practice to conflict4 ,swindling and bullying1 whether in business matters or in personal relations1 have their cost2 which the best judges agree to be excessive4 ,and the greater part of the cost lies of in the consequences of being found out1 in the loss of social esteem and so forth1 but in actual systematic disability to attain important values4 ,although the person who habitually disregards the claims of his fellows to fair treatment and sympathetic understanding may be condemned1 in most cases1 upon the ground of his own actual loss of values in such behaviour1 this of course is not the reason for the steps which may have to be taken against him4 ,it may very well be the case that a person's own interests are such that1 if he understood them1 were well organised in other words1 he would be a useful and charming member of his community2 but1 so long as people are about who are not well organised1 communities must protect themselves4 ,they can defend their action on the ground that the general loss of value which would follow if they did not protect themselves far outweighs such losses as are incurred by the people whom they suppress or deport4 ,to extend this individual morality to communal affairs is not difficult4 ,probably the best brief statement upon the point is the following note by ,bentham1 if we interpret #8happiness' in his formula not as pleasure but as the satisfaction of impulses4 ,june #bi1 #ahbg4 #a4 ,constantly actual end of action on the part of every individual at the moment of action1 his greatest happiness1 according to his view of it at that moment4 #b4 ,constantly proper end of action on the part of every individual at the moment of action1 his real greatest happiness from that moment to the end of life4 #c4 ,constantly proper end of action on the part of every individual considered as trustee for the community1 of which he is considered as a member1 the greatest happiness of that same community1 in so far as it depends upon the interest which forms the bond of union between its members4#bd ,but communities1 as is well known1 tend to behave in the same way to people who are better organised as well as to people who are worse organised than the standard of the group4 ,they deal with ,socrates or ,bruno as severely as with ,turpin or ,bottomley4 ,thus mere interference with ordinary activities is not by itself a sufficient justification for excluding from the group people who are different and therefore nuisances4 ,the precise nature of the difference must be considered1 and whether and to what degree it is the group1 not the exceptional member1 which ought to be condemned4 ,the extent to which alteration is practicable is also relevant1 and the problem in particular cases becomes very intricate4 ,but the final court of appeal concerns itself in such cases with questions1 not of the wishes of majorities1 but of the actual range and degree of satisfaction which different possible systematisations of impulse yield4 ,resentment at interference and gratitude for support and assistance are to be distinguished from disapproval and approval4 ,the esteem and respect accorded to persons with the social#be virtues well developed is only in a small degree due to the use which we find we can make of them4 ,it is much more a sense that their lives are rich and full4 ,when any desire is denied for the sake of another1 the approved and accepted activity takes on additional value2 it is coveted and pursued all the more for what it has cost4 ,thus the spectacle of other people enjoying both activities without difficulty1 thanks to some not very obvious adjustment1 is peculiarly distressing1 and such people are usually regarded as especially depraved4 ,in different circumstances this view may or may not be justified4 ,the element of sacrifice exacted by any stable system explains to a large extent the tenacity with which custom is clung to1 the intolerance directed sea innovations1 the fanaticism of converts1 the hypocrisy of teachers1 and many other lamentable phenomena of the moral attitudes4 ,however much an individual may privately find his personality varying from hour to hour1 he is compelled to join in maintaining a public facade of some rigidity and buttressed with every contrivance which can be invented4 ,the ,wills of ,gods1 the ,conscience1 the ,catechism1 ,taboos1 ,immediate ,intuitions1 ,penal ,laws1 ,public ,opinion1 ,good ,form1 are all more or less ingenious and efficient devices with the same aim--to secure the uniformity which social life requires4 ,by their means and by ,custom1 ,convention1 and ,superstition1 the underlying basis of morality1 the effort to attain maximum satisfaction through coherent systematisation1 is a veiled and disguised to an extraordinary degree4 ,whence arise great difficulties and many disasters4 ,it is so necessary and so difficult to secure a stable and general system of public behaviour that any means whatever are justifiable1 failing the discovery of better4 ,all societies hitherto achieved1 however1 involve waste and misery of appalling extent4 ,any public code of behaviour must1 it is generally agreed1 represent a cruder and more costly systematisation than those attained to by many of the individuals who live under the code1 a point obviously to be remembered in connection with censorship problems4 ,customs change more slowly than conditions1 and every change in conditions brings with it new possibilities of systematisation4 ,none of the afflictions of humanity are worse than its obsolete moral principles4 ,consider the effects of the obsolete virtues of nationalism under modern conditions1 or the absurdity of the religious attitude to birth control4 ,the present lack of plasticity in such things involves a growing danger4 ,human conditions and possibilities have altered more in a hundred years than they had in the previous ten thousand1 and the next fifty may overwhelm us1 unless we can devise a more adaptable morality4 ,the view that what we need in this tempestuous turmoil of change is a ,rock to shelter under or to cling to1 pane than an efficient aeroplane in which to ride it1 is comprehensible but mistaken4 ,to guard against a possible misunderstanding it may be added that the organisation and systematisation of which ,i have been speaking in this chapter are not primarily an affair of conscious planning or arrangement1 as this is understood1 for example1 by a great business house or by a railway4 7,cf4 p4 #bjb47 ,we pass as a rule from a chaotic to a better organised state by ways which we know nothing about4 ,typically through the influence of other minds4 ,literature and the arts are the chief means by which these influences are diffused4 ,it should be unnecessary to insist upon the degree to which high civilisation1 in other words1 free1 varied and unwasteful life1 depends upon them in a numerous society4 #ai ,e4g41 8,the value of the object is its capacity of becoming the object of feeling and desire through actualisation of dispositional tendencies by acts of presumption1 judgment1 and assumption40 ,urban1 ,valuation1 p4 #ec4 #bj ,or1 of course1 aversions4 ,in what follows we shall take no further note of aversions4 ,to do so would introduce inessential complications4 ,the omission in no way affects the argument1 since for our present purposes they may be counted in with appetencies4 #ba ,this view plainly has close connections with ,utilitarianism4 ,in fact if ,bentham's editor is to be trusted in his interpretation of his master's doctrine1 it would be what ,bentham intended to teach4 8,the term nearest to being synonymous with pleasure is volition3 what it pleases a man to do is simply what he wills to do4 4 4 4 ,what a man wills to do1 or what he pleases to do1 may be far from giving him enjoyment2 yet shall we say that in doing it1 he is not following his own pleasure8 44 4 ,a native of ,japan1 when he is offended1 stabs himself to prove the intensity of his feelings4 ,it is difficult to prove enjoyment in this case3 yet the man obeyed his impulses40 ,john ,hill ,burton1 ,jeremy ,bentham's ,works1 vol4 #a1 p4 #bb4 #bb ,cf4 ,w4 ,j4 ,perry1 ,the ,origin of ,magic and ,religion1 p4 #ae4 #bc ,both #8enjoyment' and #8satisfaction' are unsuitable terms in this connection4 ,an unfortunate linguistic gap must be recognised4 ,the full exercise of an activity is commonly its own #8satisfaction'1 and1 as we shall see later1 what pleasure may accompany it is derivative and incidental4 8,beatitudo non est virtutis premium1 sed ipsa virtus40 #bd ,works1 ,vol4 ,x1 p4 #efj4 #be ,not necessarily #8social workers4' ,only personal communication can show who have the virtues here referred to4 ,,chapter ,,viii ,art and ,morals ,com1 no more1 ,this is meer moral babble1 and direct ,against the canon laws of our foundation4--,comus4 ,from this excursus let us return to our proper task1 the attempt to outline a morality which will change its values as circumstances alter1 a morality free from occultism1 absolutes and arbitrariness1 a morality which will explain1 as no morality has yet explained1 the place and value of the arts in human affairs4 ,what is good or valuable1 we have said1 is the exercise of impulses and the satisfaction of their appetencies4 ,when we say that anything is good we mean that it satisfies1 and by a good experience we mean one in which the impulses which make it are fulfilled and successful1 adding as the necessary qualification that their exercise and satisfaction shall not interfere in any way with more important impulses4 ,importance we have seen to be a complicated matter1 and which impulses are by an extensive inquiry into what actually happens4 ,the problem of morality then1 the problem of how we are to obtain the greatest possible value from life1 becomes a problem of organisation1 both in the individual life and in the adjustment of individual lives to one another1 and is delivered from all non-psychological ideas1 from absolute goods and immediate convictions1 which incidentally help greatly to give unnecessary stiffness and fixity to obsolescent codes4 ,without system1 needless to say1 value vanishes1 since in a state of chaos important and trivial impulses alike are frustrated4 ,a minor problem may occur here to the reader4 ,it concerns the choice between a #8crowded hour' and an age without a name1 and the place of the time factor in valuation4 ,there are many very valuable states which cannot last very long in the nature of the case1 and some of these seem to have disabling consequences4 ,but1 to take merely the most interesting instance1 if we knew more about the nervous constitution of genius we might discover that the instability from which so many people suffer who are at times best able to actualise the possibilities of life is merely a consequence of their plasticity2 not in the least a price which they pay for such #8high moments1' but rather a result in systems of great delicacy of wear and tear at lower levels of adjustment4 ,it is generally those who have the least refined views of value who most readily believe that highly valuable hours must be paid for afterwards4 ,their conception of a #8hectic time' as the summit of human possibilities explains the opinion4 ,for those who find that the most valuable experiences are those which are also most fruitful of further valuable experiences no problem arises4 ,to the query whether they prefer a long life to a joyous one1 they will reply that they find very satisfactory a life which is both4 ,the most valuable states of mind then are those which involve the widest and most comprehensive co-ordination of activities and the least curtailment1 conflict1 starvation and restriction4 ,states of mind in general are valuable in the degree in which they tend to reduce waste and frustration4 ,we must be careful in considering this formulation to remember how varied human activities are and avoid1 for example1 undue admiration for practical efficient persons whose emotional life is suppressed4 ,but1 thanks to the psycho-analysts1 we are hardly likely at the moment to overlook the consequences of suppressions4 ,it is plain that no one systematisation can claim a supreme position4 ,men are naturally different and in any society specialisation is inevitable4 ,there are evidently a great number of good systematisations and what is good for one person will not be good for another4 ,a sailor1 a doctor1 a mathematician and a poet can hardly have the same organisation throughout4 ,with different conditions different values necessarily arise4 ,doubtless conditions may be1 and too often are1 such that no life of high value is possible4 ,with a naturalistic morality the reasons for altering them and the way to do so both become clearer4 ,but even with our present resources and command over nature1 it is universally agreed that intelligence and goodwill could contrive that no man should be so situated as to be deprived of all the generally accessible values4 ,the clearing away from moral questions of all ethical lumber and superstitious interpolations is a step long overdue in this undertaking4 ,but until it has been carried further1 so it is often thought1 to be busied with such apparently #8unpractical' activities as art or criticism is to behave too much like a passenger on a short-handed ship4 ,this is true enough doubtless of some who so busy themselves4 ,but it is not true that criticism is a luxury trade4 ,the rear-guard of society cannot be extricated until the vanguard has gone further4 ,goodwill and intelligence are still too little available4 ,the critic1 we have said1 is as much concerned with the health of the mind as any doctor with the health of the body4 ,to set up as a critic is to set up as a judge of values4 ,what are the other qualifications required we shall see later4 ,for the arts are inevitably and quite apart from any intentions of the artist an appraisal of existence4 ,matthew ,arnold when he said that poetry is a criticism of life was saying something so obvious that it is constantly overlooked4 ,the artist is concerned with the record and perpetuation of the experiences which seem to him most worth having4 ,for reasons which we shall consider in ,chapter ,,xxii1 he is also the man who is most likely to have experiences of value to record4 ,he is the point at which the growth of the mind shows itself4 ,his experiences those at least which give value to his work1 represent conciliations of impulses which in most minds are still confused1 intertrammelled and conflicting4 ,his work is the ordering of what in most minds is disordered4 ,that his failures to bring order out of chaos are often more conspicuous than those of other men is due in part at least to his greater audacity2 it is a penalty of ambition and a consequence of his greater plasticity4 ,but when he succeeds1 the value of what he has accomplished is found always in a more perfect organisation which makes more of the possibilities of response and activity available4 ,what value is and which experiences are most valuable will never be understood so long as we think in terms of those large abstractions1 the virtues and the vices4 8,you do invert the covenants of her trust10 said ,comus1 that disreputable advocate of ,utilitarianism1 to the ,lady1 that enemy of ,nature4 ,instead of recognising that value lies in the #8minute particulars' of response and attitude1 we have tried to find it in conformity to abstract prescriptions and general rules of conduct4 ,the artist is an expert in the #8minute particulars' and qua artist pays little or no attention to generalisations which he finds in actual3 practice are too crude to discriminate between what is valuable and the reverse4 ,for this reason the moralist has always tended to distrust or to ignore him4 ,yet since the fine conduct of life springs only from fine ordering of responses far too subtle to be touched by any general ethical maxims1 this neglect of art by the moralist has been tantamount to a disqualification4 ,the basis of morality1 as ,shelley insisted1 is laid not by preachers but by poets4 ,bad taste and crude responses are not mere flaws in an otherwise admirable person4 ,they are actually a root evil from which other defects follow4 ,no life can be excellent in which the elementary responses are disorganised and confused4 ,,chapter ,,ix ,actual and ,possible ,misapprehensions ,who ,saith that8 ,it is not written so on high6--,cain4 ,every true view1 perhaps1 has its crude analogues1 due sometimes to a confused perception of the real state of affairs1 sometimes to faulty statement4 ,often these clumsy or mistaken offshoots are responsible for the difficulty with which the true view gains acceptance4 ,like shadows1 reflections1 or echoes1 they obscure and baffle apprehension4 ,nowhere are they more inconvenient than in the problem of the moral function of art4 ,a consideration of some instances will help to make clearer what has been said1 to distinguish the view recommended from its disreputable relatives and to remove possible misapprehensions4 ,allusion has several times been made to ,tolstoy1 and nothing in the recent history of sthetic opinion is so remarkable as the onslaught made by that great artist against all the arts4 ,no better example could be found of how not to introduce moral preoccupations into the judgment of values4 ,blinded by the light of a retarded conversion1 knowing1 as an artist1 the extreme importance of the arts1 but forgetting in the fierceness of his new convictions all the experience that had in earlier years made up his own creations1 he flung himself1 a ,principle in each hand1 upon the whole host of ,european masterpieces and left as he believed hardly a survivor standing4 ,he begins by emphasising the enormous output of energy which is devoted to ,art in civilised countries4 ,he then very rightly asserts that it is of great importance to know what this activity is about2 and he devotes thirty pages to the various definitions which have been attempted of ,art and ,beauty4 ,he concludes1 after ransacking the somewhat uncritical compilations of ,schasler and ,knight1 that sthetics have been hitherto an idle amalgam of reverie and phantasy1 from which no definition of ,art emerges4 ,partly he traces this result to the use in sthetics of notions of beauty2 partly to an anxiety in the critics to justify the existent forms of ,art4 ,they are1 he insists1 less concerned to discover what ,art is1 than to show that those things which are currently termed ,art must in fact be ,art4 ,to these sections of ,what is ,art8 assent may be accorded4 ,he then sets out his own definition4 8,to evoke in oneself a sensation which one has experienced before1 and having evoked it in oneself1 to communicate this sensation in such a way that others may experience the same sensation 4 4 4 so that other men are infected by these sensations and pass through them2 in this does the activity of ,art consist40#bf ,so far excellent2 if we translate #8sensation'1 the current sthetico-psychological jargon of the art schools in ,tolstoy's day1 by some more general term such as experience4 ,but this is only a first stage of the definition2 there are additions to be made4 ,any ,art which is infective1 as he uses that word in the quotation above1 is pure ,art as opposed to modern or adulterated ,art2 but in deciding the full value of any work of ,art we have to consider the nature of its contents1 the nature1 that is1 of the experiences communicated4 ,the value of art contents is judged1 according to ,tolstoy1 by the religious consciousness of the age4 ,for ,tolstoy the religious consciousness is the higher comprehension of the meaning of life1 and this1 according to him1 is the universal union of men with ,god and with one another4 ,when ,tolstoy applies his criterion to the judgment of particular works of art1 he is able to deduce striking results3 8,christian ,art1 that is1 the ,art of our time1 must be catholic in the direct sense of that word--that is1 universal--and so must unite all men4 ,there are but two kinds of sensations which unite all men--the sensations which arise from the recognition of man's filial relation to ,god and of the brotherhood of men1 and the simplest vital sensations which are accessible to all men without exception1 such as the sensations of joy1 meekness of spirit1 alacrity1 calm1 etc4 ,it is only these two kinds of sensations that form the subject of the ,art of our time1 which is good according to its contents40 ,tolstoy in fact denied the value of all human endeavours except those which tend directly to the union of men4 ,it may be suspected that his religious enthusiasm was due to his belief that ,religion had this tendency4 ,he distinguished1 it will be remembered1 very sharply between ,religion and religions2 a distinction with which many besides ,tolstoy have consoled themselves4 ,but his essential aim1 his single value1 was the union of men4 ,all other things are of value only in so far as they tend to promote this1 and art shares the general subordination4 ,even a joke1 for ,tolstoy1 is only a joke so long as all men may share in it1 a truly revolutionary amendment4 ,the sharing is more important than the merriment4 ,on these principles he surveys ,european ,art and ,literature4 ,with magnificent defiance of accepted values1 and the hardness of heart of a supreme doctrinaire1 one after another of the unassailables is toppled from its eminence4 ,shakespeare1 ,dante1 ,goethe1 etc41 are rejected2 ,wagner in especial is the object of a critical tour de force4 ,in their place are set ,a ,tale of ,two ,cities1 ,the ,chimes1 ,adam ,bede1 ,les ,miserables 7almost the only thing in ,french literature of which ,tolstoy could approve71 and ,uncle ,tom's ,cabin4#bg ,all art which does not directly urge the union of men1 or whose appeal is suspected to be limited to cultured and aristocratic circles1 is condemned4 8,all who are not hand in hand with me are against me10 thought ,tolstoy1 under the urgency of his sense of human misery4 ,any diversion of art from a single narrow channel seemed to him an irreparable waste4 ,remembering no doubt how deeply he had been affected and influenced in the past by the things which he now deplored1 he came in the end to assign unlimited powers to art when rightly directed4 ,but1 if we think of the other things which he also invoked to the same end1 there is a ring of despair in his final cry3 8,art must remove violence1 only ,art can do this40 ,we may compare with this a famous utterance of another aristocrat1 equally a supreme artist1 equally in rebellion against the whole fabric of conventional civilisation1 whose 8passion for reforming the world0 was not less than ,tolstoy's1 but who differed from him in the possession of a wider and more complete sense of values and a mind not riven and distorted by a late conversion4 8,the whole objection of the immorality of poetry rests upon a misconception of the manner in which poetry acts to produce the moral improvement of man4 ,ethical science arranges the elements which poetry has created1 and propounds schemes and proposes examples of civil and domestic life3 nor is it for want of admirable doctrines that men hate1 and despise1 and censure1 and deceive and subjugate one another4 8,but poetry acts in a diviner manner4 ,it awakens and enlarges the mind itself by rendering it the receptacle of a thousand unapprehended combinations of thought4 ,whatever strengthens and purifies the affections1 enlarges the imagination1 and adds spirit to sense1 is useful4 ,it exceeds all imagination to conceive what would have been the moral condition of the world if neither ,dante1 ,petrarch1 ,boccaccio1 ,chaucer1 ,shakespeare1 ,calderon1 ,lord ,bacon1 nor ,milton1 had ever existed40 ,it is curious how the insertion of particular names here seems to weaken the argument4 ,the world1 we feel fairly certain1 would be on the whole much the same even if there had been no ,boccaccio and no ,lord ,bacon4 ,things would not be very different1 some people will think1 even if none of these authors had ever bestirred themselves to write4 ,shakespeare1 as so often1 would perhaps be counted an exception4 ,but this sense that there are1 after all1 very few poets who individually make much difference is not in the least an objection to ,shelley's main thesis4 ,we could bale a vast amount of water out of the sea without making any apparent difference to it1 but this would not prove that it does not consist of water4 ,even if the removal of the influence of all the poets whose names we know made no appreciable difference in human affairs1 it would still be true that the enlargement of the mind1 the widening of the sphere of human sensibility1 is brought about through poetry4 ,a too narrow view of values1 or a too simple conception of morality is usually the cause of these misunderstandings of the arts4 ,the agelong controversy as to whether the business of poetry is to please or to instruct shows this well4 8,poets wish either to instruct or to delight or to combine solid and useful with the agreeable40 8,it is only for the purpose of being useful that ,poetry ought to be agreeable2 pleasure is only a means which she uses for the end of profit40 ,so thought ,boileau and ,rapin4 ,dryden1 modest and penetrating in his fashion1 was 8satisfied if it cause delight3 for delight is the chief1 if not the only1 end of poetry3 instruction can be admitted but in the second place2 for poesy only instructs as it delights40 ,but he does not further specify the nature of the delight or the instruction1 an omission in which most critics except ,shelley agree4 ,our view on the point entirely depends upon this4 ,if we set the sugarcoated-pill view aside as beneath serious consideration1 there still remains a problem4 ,a reviewer of the recent performance of the ,cenci will state it excellently for us4 8,it had been better had ,shelley's ,cenci remained for ever banned4 ,it represents three hours of unrelieved1 agonising misery4 4 4 4 ,what excuse is there for the depicting of horrors such as these8 ,there must be some1 for a house packed with literary celebrities fiercely applauded4 ,if the function of the theatre is to amuse1 then in the presentation of the ,cenci it has missed its aim4 ,if it is to instruct1 what moral can be pointed for the better conduct of our lives by a tragedy such as this8 ,if ,art be the answer1 then ,art may well be sacrificed40 ,no doubt the literary celebrities1 with their applause1 were to blame1 in part1 for this4 ,our relic of the ,age of ,good ,sense made a just reaction4 ,he accurately registered the effect to which bad acting and inept production#bh gave rise4 ,but it is with his argument not with his reaction that we are concerned4 ,the celebrities1 if they had not been too busy giving vent 7though in a mistaken form7 to their loyalty to the memory of ,shelley1 and to their sense of triumph over the ,censor1 might have told him that neither amusement nor instruction is what the judicious seek from ,tragedy1 and referred him to ,aristotle4 ,neither term1 unless we wrench it right out of its usual setting1 is appropriate to the greater forms of art4 ,the experiences which they occasion are too full1 too varied1 too whole1 too subtly balanced upon opposing impulses1 whether of pity and terror or of joy and despair1 to be so easily described4 ,tragedy-- beneath whose sable roof ,of boughs as if for festal purpose decked ,with unrejoicing berries--ghostly shapes ,may meet at noontide2 ,fear and ,trembling ,hope1 ,silence and ,foresight1 ,death the ,skeleton ,and ,time the ,shadow1 is still the form under which the mind may most clearly and freely contemplate the human situation1 its issues unclouded1 its possibilities revealed4 ,to this its value is due and the supreme position among the arts which it has occupied in historical times and still occupies2 what will happen in the future we can only conjecture4 ,tragedy is too great an exercise of the spirit to be classed among amusements or even delights1 or to be regarded as a vehicle for the inculcation of such crude valuations as may be codified in a moral4 ,but the fuller discussion of ,tragedy we must defer4 ,these remarks seemed necessary in order to avoid the impression1 which our theory of value might have given1 that the arts are merely concerned with happy solutions and ingenious reconciliations of diverse gratifications1 8a box where sweets compacted lie40 ,it is not so4 ,only a crude psychology1 as we shall see1 would identify the satisfaction of an impulse with a pleasure4 ,no hedonic theory of value will fit the facts over even a small part of the field1 since it must take what is a concomitant merely of a phase in the process of satisfaction as the mainspring of the whole4 ,pleasure1 however1 has its place in the whole account of values1 and an important place1 as we shall see later4 ,but it must not be allowed to encroach on ground to which it has no right4 #bf ,what is ,art8 ,section ,v4 #bg ,what is ,art8 ,section ,,xvi4 #bh 8,this story of the ,cenci is indeed eminently fearful and monstrous3 anything like a dry exhibition of it on the stage would be insupportable4 ,the person who would treat such a subject must increase the ideal1 and diminish the actual horror of the events40 ,from ,shelley's preface4 ,the producers1 however1 were of the contrary opinion4 ,,chapter ,x ,poetry for ,poetry's ,sake ,on passe plus facilement d'un extrme un autre que d'une nuance une autre nuance4 ,attirance de la ,mort4 ,another possible misapprehension which cannot be left unmentioned arises in connection with the doctrine #8,art for ,art's sake'1 a doctrine definitely and detrimentally dated2 it concerns the place of what are called ulterior effects in the valuing of a work of art4 ,it has been very fashionable to turn up the nose at any attempt to apply1 as it is said1 #8external canons' to art4 ,but it may be recalled that of all the great critical doctrines1 the #8moral'1 theory of art 7it would be better to call it the #8,ordinary values' theory7 has the most great minds behind it4 ,until ,whistler came to start the critical movements of the last half-century1 few poets1 artists or critics had ever doubted that the value of art experiences was to be judged as other values are4 ,plato1 ,aristotle1 ,horace1 ,dante1 ,spenser1 ,milton1 the ,eighteenth ,century1 ,coleridge1 ,shelley1 ,matthew ,arnold and ,pater1 to name only the most prominent1 all with varying degrees of refinement1 held the same view4#bi ,the last is a somewhat unexpected adherent4 8,given the conditions ,i have tried to explain as constituting good art1 then if it be devoted further to the increase of men's happiness1 to the redemption of the oppressed1 or to the enlargement of our sympathies with each other1 or to such presentment of new and old truth about ourselves and our relation to the world as may fortify us in our sojourn here 4 4 4 it will also be great art2 if1 over and above those qualities which ,i have summed up 4 4 4 it has something of the soul of humanity in it1 and finds its logical1 its architectural place1 in the great structure of human life40#cj ,no better brief emotive account of the conditions under which an experience has value could be desired4 ,against all these weighty opinions1 the view--supported largely by a distinction between ,form and ,content1 ,subject and ,handling1 which will be examined elsewhere1#ca and relying upon the doctrine of intrinsic1 supersensible1 ultimate ,goods discussed above--that the values of art are unique1 or capable of being considered in isolation from all others1 has held sway for some thirty years in many most reputable quarters4 ,the reasons for this attempted severance have already been touched upon2 they are of all sorts4 ,partly it may be due to the influence of ,whistler and ,pater1 and of those still more influential disciples who spread their doctrines4 ,partly it may be due to a massed reaction against ,ruskin4 ,partly again we may suspect the influence1 rather suddenly encountered1 of ,continental and ,german sthetics upon the ,english mind4 ,almost from the beginning of scientific sthetics1 the insistence on the sthetic experience as an experience1 peculiar1 complete1 and capable of being studied in isolation1 has received prominence4 ,often it is no more than an extension into this considering1 whenever possible1 one thing at a time4 ,when critics in ,england1 not very long ago1 heard that there was something connected with art and poetry--namely1 the sthetic experience--which could be considered and examined in isolation by the methods of introspection1 they not unnaturally leapt to the conclusion that its value also could be isolated and described without reference to other things4 ,in some hands the further conclusions drawn were too queer to outlive their hour of fashion4 ,they amounted often to the postulation of a #8specific thrill' yielded by works of art and nothing else1 unlike and unconnected with all other experiences4 8,no queerer10 it was said1 8than anything else in this incredibly queer universe40#cb ,but the queerness of the universe is of a different and a more interesting sort4 ,it may be a curiosity shop but it nowhere seems to be a chaos4 ,for our present purposes we need only consider the view as it is put forward by its ablest exponent1 a critic who by his own explanations of this formula goes very far towards meeting the objection we urge4 8,what then does the formula #8,poetry for ,poetry's sake' tell us about this experience8 ,it says1 as ,i understand it1 these things4 ,first1 this experience is an end in itself1 is worth having on ifs own account1 has an intrinsic value4 ,next1 its poetic value is this intrinsic worth alone4 ,poetry may have also have an ulterior value as a means to culture or religion2 because it conveys instruction or softens the passions1 or furthers a good cause2 because it brings the poet fame1 or money1 or a quiet conscience4 ,so much the better3 let it be valued for these reasons too4 ,but its ulterior worth neither is nor can directly determine its poetic worth as a satisfying imaginative experience2 and this is to be judged entirely from within4 4 4 4 ,the consideration of ulterior ends whether by the poet in the act of composing or by the reader in the act of experiencing1 tends to lower poetic value4 ,it does so because it tends to change the nature of poetry by taking it out of its own atmosphere4 ,for its nature is to be not a part1 nor yet a copy of the real world 7as we commonly understand that phrase7 but to be a world by itself1 independent1 complete1 autonomous#cc40 ,there seem four points well worth close consideration here4 ,the first is that the things mentioned as possible ulterior values in ,dr ,bradley's list--culture1 religion1 instruction1 softening of the passions1 furtherance of good causes1 the poet's fame1 or money1 or quiet conscience--these things are plainly upon quite different levels4 ,he says of all of them that they cannot possibly determine the poetic worth of an sthetic experience2 that whether or no any poetic experience is poetically valuable cannot depend upon any of these ulterior values4 ,but it is certain that some of these stand in a quite different relation to the poetic experience than do others4 ,culture1 religion1 instruction in some special senses1 softening of the passions1 and the furtherance of good causes may be directly concerned in our judgments of the poetic values of experiences4 ,otherwise1 as we shall see1 the word #8poetic' becomes a useless sound4 ,on the other hand1 the poet's fame1 his reward1 or his conscience1 seem plainly to be irrelevant4 ,that is the first point4 ,the second point is that what ,dr ,bradley says as to the imaginative experience--that it is to be judged entirely from within--is misleading4 ,in most cases we do not judge it from within4 ,our judgment as to its value is no part of it4 ,in rare instances such a judgment may be part of it1 but this is exceptional4 ,as a rule we have to come out of it in order to judge it1 and we judge it by memory or by other residual effects which we learn to be good indices to its value4 ,if by judging it in the experience we mean merely while these residual effects are fresh1 we may agree4 ,in so judging it1 however1 it's 8place in the great structure of human life0 cannot possibly be ignored4 ,the value which it has is dependent upon this1 and we cannot judge that value without taking this place1 and with it innumerable ulterior worths1 into account4 ,it is not that we shall evaluate it wrongly if we neglect them1 but that evaluation is just this taking account of everything1 and of the way things hang together4 ,the third point arises with regard to ,dr ,bradley's third position1 that the consideration of ulterior ends1 whether by the poet in the act of composing1 or by the reader in the act of experiencing1 tends to lower poetic value4 ,here all depends upon which are the ulterior ends in question1 and what the kind of poetry4 ,it will not be denied that for some kinds of poetry the intrusion of certain ulterior ends may1 and often does1 lower their value2 but there seem plainly to be other kinds of poetry in which its value as poetry definitely and directly depends upon the ulterior ends involved4 ,consider the ,psalms1 ,isaiah1 the ,new ,testament1 ,dante1 the ,pilgrim's ,progress1 ,rabelais1 any really universal satire1 ,swift1 ,voltaire1 ,byron4 ,in all these cases the consideration of ulterior ends has been certainly essential to the act of composing4 ,that needs no arguing2 but1 equally1 this consideration of the ulterior ends involved is inevitable to the reader4 ,dr ,bradley puts this third position forward in a tentative form2 he says that the ulterior tends to lower poetic value1 an important reservation1 but it would be better to distinguish two kinds of poetry1 one to which his doctrine applies and one to which it does not4 ,as illustrations of the cases in which his doctrine does apply1 ,the ,ancient ,mariner and ,hartleap ,well may be mentioned4 ,here in both cases the experiences are of a kind into which no ulterior ends enter in any important degree4 ,thus when ,coleridge and ,wordsworth introduce moral considerations1 the effect is undeniably one of intrusion4 ,as ,mrs ,meynell comically remarks1 8,the ,ancient ,mariner offends upon a deliberate plan4 ,it denies the natural function of observation when it invents sanctions for the protection of a wild bird's life1 and for the punishment of its slaughter4 ,coleridge intends to enforce a lesson by telling us that #bjj mariners died of thirst because they had--with the superstition pardonable in their state of education--supposed an albatross to be the bringer of foggy weather1 and had approved its slaughter1 as almost all men implicitly approve the daily slaughter of innocent beast and bird40 ,but this charge against ,coleridge is only reasonable if we make of this ulterior end1 this #8lesson' against cruelty to animals1 a vital part of the poem4 ,mrs ,meynell1 we may think1 takes ,coleridge's moral too seriously4 ,it may be this possibility which ,coleridge had in mind when he said1 long afterwards1 that ,the ,ancient ,mariner did not contain enough of the moral4 ,as the poem stands1 it is of a kind into which ulterior ends do not enter4 ,if we are to take this alien element1 this lesson1 into account in our judgment1 we shall have deliberately to misread the poem1 with ,mrs ,meynell4 ,the same considerations apply to ,hartleap ,well2 and so far as ,dr ,bradley is merely enforcing this point1 we may agree2 but he fails to notice--it is only fair to say that few critics seem ever to notice it--that poetry is of more than one kind1 and that the different kinds are to be judged by different principles4 ,there is a kind of poetry into the judgment of which ulterior ends directly and essentially enter2 a kind part of whose value is directly derivable from the value of the ends with which it is associated4 ,there are other kinds1 into which ulterior ends do not enter in any degree1 and there are yet other kinds whose value may be lowered by the intrusion of ends relatively trivial in value4 ,dr ,bradley is misled by the usual delusion that there is in this respect only one kind of poetry1 into saying far more than the facts of poetic experience will justify4 ,the fourth point is of more general importance perhaps than these three4 ,it is in fact the real point of disagreement between the view we are upholding and the doctrine which ,dr ,bradley1 together with the vast majority of modern critics1 wishes to maintain4 ,it is stated in the concluding sentence of the paragraph which ,i have quoted4 ,he says of poetry that 8its nature is to be1 not a part nor yet a copy of the real world1 as we commonly understand that phrase1 but to be a world by itself1 independent1 complete1 autonomous4 ,to possess it fully1 you must enter that world1 conform to its laws1 and ignore1 for the time being1 the beliefs1 aims1 and particular conditions which belong to you in the other world of reality40 ,this doctrine insists3 upon a severance between poetry and what1 in opposition1 may be called life2 a complete severance1 allowing however1 as ,dr ,bradley goes on to insist--an #8underground' connection4 ,but this #8underground' connection is all-important4 ,whatever there is in the poetic experience has come through it4 ,the world of poetry has in no sense any different reality from the rest of the world and it has no special laws and no other-worldly peculiarities4 ,it is made up of experiences of exactly the same kinds as those that come to us in other ways4 ,every poem however is a strictly limited piece of experience1 a piece which breaks up more or less easily if alien elements intrude4 ,it is more highly and more delicately organised than ordinary experiences of the street or of the hillside2 it is fragile4 ,further it is communicable4 ,it may be experienced by many different minds with only slight variations4 ,that this should be possible is one of the conditions of its organisation4 ,it differs from many other experiences1 whose value is very similar1 in this very communicability4 ,for these reasons when we experience it1 or attempt to1 we must preserve it from contamination1 from the irruptions of personal particularities4 ,we must keep the poem undisturbed by these or we fail to read it and have some other experience instead4 ,for these reasons we establish a severance1 we draw a boundary between the poem and what is not the poem in our experience4 ,but this is no severance between unlike things but between different systems of the same activities4 ,the gulf between them is no greater than that between the impulses which direct the pen and those which conduct the pipe of a man who is smoking and writing at once1 and the #8disassociation' or severance of the poetic experience is merely a freeing of it from extraneous ingredients and influences4 ,the myth of a #8transmutation' or #8poetisation' of experience and that other myth of the #8contemplative' or #8sthetic' attitude1 are in part due to talking about ,poetry and the #8poetic' instead of thinking about the concrete experiences which are poems4 ,the separation of poetic experience from its place in life and its ulterior worths1 involves a definite lop-sidedness1 narrowness1 and incompleteness in those who preach it sincerely4 ,no one1 of course1 would bring such charges against the author of ,shakespearean ,tragedy2 his is that welcome and not unfamiliar case of the critic whose practice is a refutation of his principles4 ,when genuinely held the view leads to an attempted splitting up of the experiencing reader into a number of distinct faculties or departments which have no real existence4 ,it is impossible to divide a reader into so many men--an sthetic man1 a moral man1 a practical man1 a political man1 an intellectual man1 and so on4 ,it cannot be done4 ,in any genuine experience all these elements inevitably enter4 ,but if it could be done1 as many critics pretend1 the result would be fatal to the wholeness and sanction of the critical judgment4 ,we cannot e4g4 read ,shelley adequately while believing that all his views are moonshine--read ,prometheus ,unbound while holding that #8the perfectibility of man is an undesirable ideal' and that #8hangmen are excellent things4' ,to say that there is a purely sthetic or poetic approach to1 let us say1 the ,sermon on the ,mount1 by which no consideration of the intention or ulterior end of the poem enters1 would appear to be merely mental timidity1 the shrinking remark of a person who finds essential literature too much for him4 ,into an adequate reading of the greater kinds of poetry everything not private and peculiar to the individual reader must come in4 ,the reader must be required to wear no blinkers1 to overlook nothing which is relevant1 to shut off no part of himself from participation4 ,if he attempts to assume the peculiar attitude of disregarding all but some hypothetically-named sthetic elements1 he joins ,henry ,james' ,osmond in his tower1 he joins ,blake's ,kings and ,priests in their ,high ,castles and ,spires4 #bi ,it is true that in mechanics one might draw up a formidable list of names and say 8,opposed to all these appeared a certain ,einstein01 but the cases are not parallel4 ,a scientific advance is different from a change of fashion1 and no new facts nor any new hypothesis--no ,michelson-,morley experiment1 nor any widened purview--led up to the separate value theory of art4 ,although historians of sthetics are sometimes pleased to present their facts as though they represented a progress from cruder to more refined opinion1 from ignorance to wisdom1 there is no sound basis for the procedure4 ,aristotle was at least as clearly and fully aware of the relevant facts and as adequate in his explanations as any later inquirers4 sthetics in fact has hardly yet reached the scientific stage1 in which succeeding investigators can start where their predecessors left off4 #cj ,an ,essay on ,style4 ,the final paragraph4 #ca ,see ,chapters ,,xvi1 ,,xviii and ,,xxxi4 #cb ,clive ,bell1 ,art1 p4 #di4 #cc ,a4 ,c4 ,bradley1 ,oxford ,lectures on ,poetry1 p4 #e4 ,,chapter ,,xi ,a ,sketch for a ,psychology 8,wot's wot80 repeated one of the buccaneers in a deep growl4 8,ah1 he'd be a lucky one as knowed that60--,treasure ,island4 ,m4 ,jules ,romains recently observed#cd that psychology hitherto has merely contrived to say laboriously and obscurely1 and with less precision1 what we all know without its aid already4 ,this is regrettably difficult to deny2 any particular remark of a psychologist1 if true1 is unlikely to be startling4 ,but at certain points new light has none the less crept in4 ,incoherences and flaws have been found in the common-sense picture1 adumbration rather1 of the mind2 connections between bits of our behaviour1 which common-sense had missed1 have been noted2 and1 still more important1 a general outline of the kind of thing a mind is has begun to take shape4 ,the next age but two1 if an oncoming ,age of ,relativity is to be followed as ,mr ,haldane supposes#ce by an ,age of ,biology1 will be introduced by a recognition on the part of many minds of their own nature1 a recognition which is certain to change their behaviour and their outlook considerably4 ,we are still far removed from such an age4 ,none the less enough is known for an analysis of the mental events which make up the reading of a poem to be attempted4 ,and such an analysis is a primary necessity for criticism4 ,the psychological distinctions which have hitherto served the critic are too few and his use of them in most cases too unsystematic1 too vague1 and too uncertain1 for his insight to yield its full advantages4 ,the view put forward here is in many respects heterodox1 a disadvantage in a sketch4 ,but so many difficulties attend any exposition of psychology1 however orthodox and however full1 that the dangers of misunderstanding are outweighed by the advantages of a fresh point of view4 ,it is the general outline and in particular the insistence upon an account of knowledge in terms merely of the causation of our thoughts which is contrary to received opinion4 ,the detail of the analysis of poetic experience1 the account of imagery1 of emotion1 of pleasure1 of incipient action and so forth1 although1 so far as ,i am aware1 no similar analysis has before been explicitly set out1 may be taken as comparatively orthodox4 ,for our immediate purpose1 for a clearer understanding of values and for the avoidance of unnecessary confusions in criticism1 it is necessary to break away from the set of ideas by which popular and academic psychology alike attempt to describe the mind4 ,we naturally tend to conceive it as a thing of a peculiar spiritual kind1 fairly3 persistent though variable1 endowed with attributes1 three in number1 its capacities namely for knowing1 willing and feeling1 three irreducible modes of being aware of or concerned with objects4 ,a violent shock to this entity comes when we are forced by a closer examination of the facts to conceive it as doing all these three unconsciously as well as consciously4 ,an unconscious mind is a fairly evident fiction1 useful though it may be1 and goings on in the nervous system are readily accepted as a satisfactory substitute4 ,from this to the recognition of the conscious mind as a similar fiction is no great step1 although one which many people find difficult4 ,some of this difficulty is due to habit4 ,it wears off as we notice how many of the things which we believed true of the fiction can be stated in terms of the less fictitious substitute4 ,but much of the difficulty is emotive1 non-intellectual1 more specifically religious1 in origin4#cf ,it is due to desire1 to fear1 or to exaltation as the case may be1 to emotion masquerading as thought1 and is a difficulty not so easily removed4 ,that the mind is the nervous system1 or rather a part of its activity1 has long been evident1 although the prevalence among psychologists of persons with philosophic antecedents has delayed the recognition of the fact in an extraordinary fashion4 ,with every advance of neurology--and a decided advance here was perhaps the only good legacy left by the ,war#cg--the evidence becomes more overwhelming4 ,it is true that as our knowledge of the nervous system stands at present much of the detail of the identification is impenetrably obscure1 and the account which we give must frankly be admitted to be only a degree less fictitious than one in terms of spiritual happenings4 ,but the kind of account which is likely to be substantiated by future research has become clear1 largely through the work of ,behaviourists and ,psycho-analysts1 the assumptions and results of both needing to be corrected however in ways which the recent experimental and theoretical investigations of the #8,gestalt' ,school are indicating4 ,the view that we are our bodies1 more especially our nervous systems1 more especially still the higher or more central co-ordinating parts of it1 and that the mind is a system of impulses should not be described as ,materialism4 ,it might equally well be called ,idealism4 ,neither term in this connection has any scientific1 any strictly symbolic meaning or reference4 ,neither stands for any separable1 observable group of things1 or character in things4 ,each is primarily an emotive term used to incite or support certain emotional attitudes4 ,like all terms used in the vain attempt 7vain because the question is nonsensical7 to say what things are1 instead of to say how they behave1 they state nothing4 ,like all such terms they change in different hands from banners to bludgeons1 being each for some people an emotive agent round which attitudes1 aspirations1 values are rallied1 and for other people a weapon of offence by which persons supposed adverse to these attitudes1 aspirations and values may1 it is hoped1 be discomfited4 ,that the ,materialist and the ,idealist believe themselves to be holding views which are incompatible with one another is but an instance of a very widespread confusion between scientific statement and emotive appeal1 with which we shall in later chapters be much concerned4 ,the ,mind-,body problem is strictly speaking no problem2 it is an imbroglio due to failure to settle a real problem1 namely1 as to when we are making a statement and when merely inciting an attitude4 ,a problem simpler here than in many cases1 since the alleged statement is of an impossible form#ch1 but complicated on both sides of the controversy by misunderstanding of the attitudes which the other side is concerned to maintain4 ,for if mental events are recognised as identical with certain neural events1 neither the attitudes which ensue towards them nor the attitudes they themselves will warrantably take up1 are changed so much as either ,idealists or ,materialists have commonly supposed4 ,to call anything mental or spiritual1 as opposed to material1 or to call anything material as opposed to mental1 is only to point out a difference between the two kinds4 ,the differences which can actually be detected between a mental event1 such as a toothache1 and a non-mental event1 such as a sunspot1 remain when we have identified the mental event with a neural change4 ,so recognised1 it loses none of its observable peculiarities1 only certain alleged unstatable and ineffable attributes are removed4 ,it remains unlike any event which is not mental2 it is as unparalleled as before4 ,it retains its privileges as the most interesting of all events1 and our relations to one another and to the world remain essentially as they were before the recognition4 ,the extreme ecstasies of the mystic1 like the attitudes of the engineer towards a successful contrivance1 remain just as much and just as little appropriate with regard to the humblest or the proudest of our acts4 ,thus the identification of the mind with a part of the working of the nervous system1 need involve1 theology apart1 no disturbance of anyone's attitude to the world1 his fellow-men1 or to himself4 ,theology1 however1 is still more implicit in current attitudes than traditional sceptics suspect4 ,the nervous system is the means by which stimuli from the environment1 or from within the body1 result in appropriate behaviour4 ,all mental events occur in the course of processes of adaptation1 somewhere between a stimulus and a response4 ,thus every mental event has an origin in stimulation1 a character1 and consequences1 in action or adjustment for action4 ,its character is sometimes accessible to introspection4 ,what it feels like1 in those cases in which it feels or is felt at all1 is consciousness1 but in many cases nothing is felt1 the mental event is unconscious4 ,why some events are conscious but not others is at present a mystery2 no one has yet succeeded in bringing the various hints which neurology may offer into connection with one another4 ,in some important respects conscious and unconscious mental events must differ1 but what these are no one can as yet safely conjecture4 ,on the other hand there are many respects in which they are similar1 and these are the respects which are at present most open to investigation4 ,the process in the course of which a mental event may occur1 a process apparently beginning in a stimulus and ending in an act1 is what we have called an impulse4 ,in actual experience single impulses of course never occur4 ,even the simplest human reflexes are very intricate bundles of mutually dependent impulses1 and in any actual human behaviour the number of simultaneous and connected impulses occurring is beyond estimation4 ,the simple impulse in fact is a limit1 and the only impulses psychology is concerned with are complex4 ,it is often convenient to speak as though simple impulses were in question1 as when we speak of an impulse of hunger1 or an impulse to laugh1 but we must not forget how intricate all our activities are4 ,to take the stimulus as a starting-point is in some ways misleading4 ,of the possible stimuli which we might at any moment receive1 only a few actually take effect4 ,which are received and which impulses ensue depends upon which of our interests is active1 upon the general set1 that is1 of our activities4 ,this is conditioned in a large degree by the state1 of satisfaction or unrest1 of the recurrent and persistent needs of the body4 ,when hungry and when replete we respond differently to the stimulus of a smell of cooking4 ,a change in the wind unnoticed by the passengers causes the captain to reduce sail4 ,social needs in this respect are often as important as individual4 ,thus some people walking in a ,gallery with friends before whom they wish to shine will actually receive far more stimulus from the pictures than they would if by themselves4 ,a stimulus then must not be conceived as an alien intruder which thrusts itself upon us and1 after worming a devious way through our organism as through a piece of cheese1 emerges at the other end as an act4 ,stimuli are only received if they serve some need of the organism and the form which the response to them takes depends only in part upon the nature of the stimulus1 and much more upon what the organism #8wants'1 i4e4 the state of equilibrium of its multifarious activities4 ,thus experience has two sources which in different cases have very different importance4 ,so far as we are thinking about or referring to certain definite things our behaviour in all probability will only be appropriate 7i4e4 our thoughts true7 in so far as it is determined by the nature of the present and past stimuli we have received from those things and things like them4 ,so far as we are satisfying our needs and desires a much less strict connection between stimulus and response is sufficient4 ,a baby howls at first in much the same way1 whatever the cause of his unrest1 and older persons behave not unlike him4 ,any occasion may be sufficient for taking exercise1 or for a quarrel1 for falling in love or having a drink4 ,to this partial independence of behaviour 7from stimulus7 is due the sometimes distressing fact that views1 opinions and beliefs vary so much with our differing moods4 ,such variation shows that the view1 belief or opinion is not a purely intellectual product1 is not due to thinking in the narrower sense1 of response that is governed by stimuli1 present or past1 but is an attitude adopted to satisfy some desire1 temporary or lasting4 ,thought in the strictest sense varies only with evidence3 but attitudes and feelings change for all manner of reasons4 ,the threefold division between the causes1 character and consequences of a mental event1 conscious or unconscious1 corresponds1 with certain qualifications1 to the usual division in traditional psychology of thought 7or cognition71 feeling1 and will 7or conation74 ,to be cognisant of anything1 to know it1 is to be influenced by it2 to desire1 to seek1 to will anything is to act towards it4 ,in between these two are the conscious accompaniments1 if any1 of the whole process4 ,these last1 the conscious characters of the mental event1 include evidently both sensations and feelings4 7,cf4 ,chapter ,,xvl1 pp4 #abe-abh47 ,the correspondence is not by any means simple4 ,many things are included under knowing1 for example1 which on this reconstruction of psychology would have to be counted as willing4#ci ,expectation1 usually described as a cognitive attitude1 becomes a peculiar form of action1 getting ready1 namely1 to receive certain kinds of stimuli rather than others4 ,the opposite case is equally common4 ,hunger1 a typical desire on the usual account1 would become knowledge1 giving us1 when genuine hunger1 obscure awareness of a lack of nourishment1 when habit-hunger1 awareness of a certain phase in a cyclic visceral process4 ,these illustrations bring out clearly what is everywhere recognised1 that the customary cognition-feeling-conation classification of mental goings on is not a pigeon-holing of exclusive processes4 ,every mental event has1 in varying degrees1 all three characteristics4 ,thus expectation as a preparation for certain stimuli may lower the threshold for them1 and sometimes makes their reception more and sometimes less discriminating2 hunger also is characteristically accompanied by a search for food4 ,the advantage of substituting the causation1 the character and the consequences of a mental event as its fundamental aspects in place of its knowing1 feeling1 and willing aspects is that instead of a trio of incomprehensible ultimates we have a set of aspects which not only mental events but all events share4 ,we have1 of course1 to introduce qualifications4 ,stimuli1 as we have mentioned above1 are not the only causes of mental events4 ,the nervous system is specialised to receive impressions through the organs of sense1 but its state at any moment is also determined by a host of other factors4 ,the condition of the blood and the position of the head are typical instances4 ,only that part of the cause of a mental event which takes effect through incoming 7sensory7 impulses or through effects of past sensory impulses can be said to be thereby known4 ,the reservation no doubt involves complications4 ,but any plausible account of what knowledge is and how it happens is bound to be complicated4 ,similarly1 not all the effects of a mental event are to be counted as what that event wills or seeks after2 apoplectic strokes1 for example1 can be ruled out4 ,only those movements which the nervous system is specialised to incite1 which take place through motor impulses1 should be included4 ,on all other accounts the relation between an awareness and what it is aware of is a mystery4 ,we can name the relation as we please1 apprehension1 presentation1 cognition or knowledge1 but there we have to leave the matter4 ,on this account we make use of the fact that an awareness1 say of a variety of black marks on this page1 is caused in a certain peculiar way1 namely through impressions on a part of the brain 7the retina7 and various complicated connected goings on in other parts of the brain4 ,to say that the mental 7neural7 event so caused is aware of the black marks is to say that it is caused by them1 and here #8aware of' #8caused by'4 ,the two statements are merely alternative formulations4 ,in extending this account to more complicated situations where we know or1 less ambiguously1 refer to things which are past or future we have to make use of the fact that impressions are commonly signs1 have effects which depend not on themselves alone but upon the other impressions which have co-operated with them in the past4 ,a sign#dj is something which has once been a member of a context or configuration that worked in the mind as a whole4 ,when it reappears its effects are as though the rest of the context were present4 ,in analysing complex events of referring we have to break them up artificially into the simpler sign-situations out of which they arise2 not forgetting meanwhile how interdependent the parts of any interpretation of a complex sign are4 ,the detail of this procedure is most easily studied in connection with the use of words4 ,we shall deal with it therefore in ,chapter ,,xvi1 where the reading of a poem is discussed4 ,here only the general principle matters that to know anything is to be influenced by it1 directly when we sense it1 indirectly when the effects of past conjunctions of impressions come into play4 ,more will be added later1 in connection with the process of reading1 about the receptive1 the knowledge aspect of mental events4 ,the other two aspects need less explanation4 ,they are also more generally important for the understanding of poetic1 musical and other experiences4 ,for a theory of knowledge is needed only at one point1 the point at which we wish to decide whether a poem1 for example1 is true1 or reveals reality1 and if so in what sense2 admittedly a very important question4 ,whereas a theory of feeling1 of emotion1 of attitudes and desires1 of the affective-volitional aspect of mental activity1 is required at all points of our analysis4 #cd ,eyeless ,sight1 p4 #bb4 #ce ,dedalus1 or ,science and the ,future1 by ,j4 ,b4 ,s4 ,haldane4 #cf ,compare ,chapter ,,xxxiv where the ways in which emotive factors interfere with thought are considered4 #cg ,cf4 ,piron1 ,thought and the ,brain1 ,chapter ,i4 #ch ,many apparent questions which begin with the words #8,what' and #8,why' are not questions at all1 but requests for emotive ,satisfaction4 #ci #8,willing' is a bad word2 ,i would use conation throughout were it not so likely to increase unnecessarily the difficulty which this chapter will unavoidably present to readers who are not familiar with psychological jargon4 ,the essential thing is to think of willing 7desiring1 striving towards1 trying7 as an unconscious as much as a conscious process4 #dj ,this topic is discussed at length in ,the ,meaning of ,meaning4 ,,chapter ,,xii ,pleasure ,the poor benefit of a bewitching minute4--,the ,revenger's ,tragedy4 ,sensation1 imagery1 feeling1 emotion1 together with pleasure1 unpleasure and pain are names for the conscious characteristics of impulses3 ,how they may best be sorted out is a problem whose difficulty is much aggravated by the shortcomings of language at this point4 ,we speak1 for instance1 of pleasures and pains in the same fashion1 as though they were of the same order1 but1 strictly1 although pains as single self-sufficing modifications of consciousness are easily enough obtainable1 pleasures by themselves do not seem to occur4 ,pleasure seems to be a way in which something happens1 rather than an independent happening which can occur by itself in a mind4 ,we have1 not pleasures1 but experiences of one kind or another1 visual1 auditory1 organic1 motor1 and so forth1 which are pleasant4 ,similarly we have experiences which are unpleasant4 ,if1 however1 we call them painful we give rise to an ambiguity4 ,we may be saying that they are unpleasant or we may be saying that they are accompanied by pains1 which is a different matter4 ,the use of the term pleasure1 as though like pain it was itself a complete experience1 instead of being something which attaches to or follows along with or after other experiences1 has led to a number of confusions2 especially in those critical theses1 to which objection has already been taken in ,chapter ,,ix1 which identify value with pleasure4 ,the twenty or more distinct kinds of sensations1 into which modern psychology has elaborated the old five senses1 can be observed to differ very widely in the degree to which they are susceptible of and accompanied by pleasantness and unpleasantness4 ,the higher senses1 sight and hearing1 in most persons seem to yield sensations which vary much less from neutrality or indifference than the others4 ,we must be careful to understand this difference correctly however4 ,an arrangement of colours and shapes1 a sequence of notes or a musical phrase may1 of course1 in suitable people1 be as intensely toned1 pleasantly or unpleasantly1 as any organic or taste sensations1 for example4 ,but even this is not usual4 ,the right experiment is to compare a single colour1 say1 or a single note1 with such a sensation as a uniform touch or temperature gives rise to1 a bath for example1 or with a simple uniform taste or smell1 or with hunger1 or nausea4 ,fair comparison is difficult1 equivalent levels of simplicity and uniformity being impossible to discover1 but few will doubt that the degree of pleasure-unpleasure aroused by tastes1 for example1 far exceeds that which auditory or visual sensations excite by themselves4 ,we must of course be careful here to avoid confusing the intrinsic pleasure-unpleasure of the sensations with that which arises through memory1 through the effects of other sensations1 pleasant or unpleasant1 which may have accompanied them in the past1 and through expectations agreeable or disagreeable4 ,to speak of the intrinsic pleasure-unpleasure of a sensation is perhaps misleading4 ,the pleasantness of a sensation as we know is a highly variable thing4 ,it may alter completely while the strictly sensory characteristics of the sensation remain as before4 ,the difference in the same smell of liquor1 before and after an alcoholic excess is a striking example4 ,a sound which is pleasant for a while may become very unpleasant if it continues and does not lapse from consciousness4 ,and yet indisputably it may remain qua sensation the same4 ,a sound-sensation may remain unchanged in tone1 volume and intensity yet vary widely in pleasure-unpleasure4 ,this difference is important4 ,it is one of the chief reasons which have caused feeling 7pleasure-unpleasure7 to be distinguished from sensation as altogether of a different nature4 ,tone1 volume and intensity are features in the sound closely dependent upon the stimulus1 pleasantness is dependent not on external stimulus but upon factors1 very obscure at present1 in us4 ,all here is conjecture4 ,the close connection of stimulus with sensation we know because it happens to be comparatively accessible to experiment4 ,and introspection of sensations of external origin is for that reason much more easy than introspection of most visceral or organic sensations4 ,we can practise it freely and repeat it and so control our results4 ,to a lesser extent those sensations of internal origin which we can in part consciously control1 those due to voluntary movements1 share this double accessibility4 ,but all the rest of the multifarious conscious goings on in the nervous system remain obscure4 ,one broad fact1 however1 is important4 ,the effects in the body of almost all stimuli of whatever nature are extraordinarily numerous and varied4 8,you cannot show the observer a wall-paper pattern without by that very fact disturbing his respiration and circulation40#da ,and no man knows what other disturbances do not join in4 ,the whole body resounds in what would seem to be a fairly systematic way4 ,whether the outpouring of this tide of disturbance makes up a part of1 gives a tone to consciousness1 or whether only the incoming reports of the results can be conscious is a question upon which no conclusive evidence would seem to be yet available4 ,the incoming reports of some at least of these disturbances certainly can become conscious4 ,a lump in the throat1 a yearning of the bowels1 horripilation1 breathlessness1 these are their coarser and more obvious forms4 ,usually1 they are less salient and fuse with the whole mass of internal sensations to form the cnesthesia1 the whole bodily consciousness1 tinging it1 altering its general character in some one of perhaps a thousand different ways4 ,it has been much disputed whether pleasure-unpleasure is a quality of general bodily or organic consciousness1 of some part of it perhaps1 or whether it is something quite different from any quality of any sensation or set of sensations4 ,as we have seen1 it is not a quality of an auditory sensation in the sense in which its loudness1 for instance1 is a quality4 ,there seem to be similar objections to making it a quality of any sensation of any kind4 ,a sensation is what an impulse at a certain stage in its development feels like1 and its sensory qualities are characters#db of the impulse at that stage4 ,the pleasure-unpleasure attaching to the impulse may be no character of the impulse itself1 but of its fate1 its success or failure in restoring equilibrium to the system to which it belongs4 ,this is perhaps as good a guess at what pleasure and unpleasure are as can yet be made1 pleasure being successful activity of some kind1 not necessarily of a biologically useful kind1 and unpleasure being frustrated1 chaotic1 mal-successful activity4 ,we shall consider this theory again at a later stage 7cf4 ,chapter ,,xxiv74 ,the point to be made here is that pleasure and unpleasure are complicated matters arising in the course of activities which are directed to other ends4 ,the old controversies as to whether pleasure is the goal of all striving or whether avoidance of unpleasure the starting-point1 are thus escaped4 ,as ,ribot pointed out#dc the exclusive quest of pleasure for itself1 plaisir-passion1 is a morbid form of activity and self-destructive4 ,pleasure on this view is originally an effect signifying that certain positive or negative tendencies have instinctively attained their aim and are satisfied4 ,later through experience it becomes a cause4 ,instructed by experience man and animal alike place themselves in circumstances which will arouse desire and so through satisfaction lead to pleasure4 ,the gourmet1 the libertine1 the sthete1 the mystic do so alike4 ,but when the pleasure which is the result of satisfying the tendency becomes the end pursued rather than the satisfying of the tendency itself1 then an #8inversion of the psychological mechanism' comes about4 ,in the one case the activity is propagated from below upwards1 in the other from above downwards1 from the brain to the organic functions4 ,the result is often an exhaustion of the tendency1 #8disillusionment' and the blas1 world-wearied attitude4 ,the evil results1 as ,ribot remarks1 are largely confined to those individuals in whom the quest for pleasure has the force of an obsession4 ,but on the view of pleasure which we have indicated above1 it is clear that all those doctrines1 very common in critical literature1 which set up pleasure as the goal of activity1 are mistaken4 ,every activity has its own specific goal4 ,pleasure very probably ensues in most cases when this goal is reached1 but that is a different matter4 ,to read a poem for the sake of the pleasure which will ensue if it is successfully read is to approach it in an inadequate attitude4 ,obviously it is the poem in which we should be interested1 not in a by-product of having managed successfully to read it4 ,the orientation of attention is wrong if we put the pleasure in the forefront4 ,such a mistake is perhaps not common among instructed persons1 but to judge by many remarks which appear in reviews and dramatic notices the percentage of instructed persons among reviewers and theatre-goers does not seem high4 ,this error1 a legacy in part from the criticism of an age which had a still poorer psychological vocabulary#dd than ,our own1 is one reason why ,tragedy1 for example1 is so often misapproached4 ,it is no less absurd to suppose that a competent reader sits down to read for the sake of pleasure1 than to suppose that a mathematician sets out to solve an equation with a view to the pleasure its solution will afford him4 ,the pleasure in both cases may1 of course1 be very great4 ,but the pleasure1 however great it may be1 is no more the aim of the activity in the course of which it arises1 than1 for example1 the noise made by a motor-cycle--useful though it is as an indication of the way the machine is running--is the reason in the normal case for its having been started4 ,this very common mistake noted1 the significance of pleasure and unpleasure may be insisted upon without misgiving4 ,they are our most delicate signs of how our activities are thriving4 ,but since even the most intense delight may indicate only a local success and the activity be generally detrimental1 they are signs which need a very wary interpretation4 #da ,titchener1 ,text-book of ,psychology1 p4 #bdh4 #db ,into conjectures as to what these are1 it seems as yet not profitable to enter4 #dc ,problmes de ,psychologie affective1 pp4 #ada-add4 #dd ,it is probable that ,wordsworth and certain that ,coleridge if writing to-day would use quite other terms in place of pleasure for describing poetic values4 ,,chapter ,,xiii ,emotion and the ,cnesthesia ,they are the silent griefs that cut the heart-strings4 ,the ,broken ,heart4 ,in alluding to the cnesthesia we came very near to giving an account of emotion as an ingredient of consciousness4 ,stimulating situations give rise to widespread ordered repercussions throughout the body1 felt as clearly marked colourings of consciousness4 ,these patterns in organic response are fear1 grief1 joy1 anger and the other emotional states4 ,they arise for the most part when permanent or periodical tendencies of the individual are suddenly either facilitated or frustrated4 ,thus they depend far less upon the nature of the external stimulus than upon the general internal circumstances of the individual's life at the time the stimulus occurs4 ,these emotional states1 with pleasure and unpleasure1 are customarily distinguished under the head of feeling#de from sensations1 which are1 as we have seen1 very closely dependent for their character upon their stimulus4 ,thus sensations are ranked together as cognitive elements1 concerned1 that is1 with our knowledge of things rather than with our attitude or behaviour towards them1 or our emotion about them4 ,pleasure1 however1 and emotion have1 on our view1 also a cognitive aspect4 ,they give us knowledge2 in the case of pleasure1 of how our activities are going on1 successfully or otherwise2 in the case of emotion1 knowledge primarily of our attitudes4 ,but emotion may give us further knowledge4 ,it is a remarkable fact that persons with exceptional colour sense apparently judge most accurately whether two colours are the same1 for example1 or whether they have or have not some definite harmonic relation to one another1 not by attentive optical comparison or examination1 but by the general emotional or organic reaction which the colours evoke when simply glanced at4 ,this is an indirect way of becoming aware of the specific nature of the external world1 but none the less a very valuable way4 ,a similar method is probably involved in those apparently immediate judgments of the moral character of persons met with for the first time which many people make so readily and successfully4 ,they may be quite unable to mention any definite feature of the person upon which their judgment could be based4 ,it is none the less often extraordinarily just and discriminating4 ,the remarkable sensitiveness to its mother's expression which the infant shows is a striking example4 ,the part played by this kind of judgment in all sthetic appreciation need not be insisted upon4 ,it is notable that artists are often pre-eminently adepts at such judgments4 ,the topic is usually discussed under the wide and vague heading of intuition2 a rubric which completely obscures and befogs the issues4 ,for such judgments are not a simpler and more direct way of taking cognisance of things1 but a more indirect and more complex way4 ,it is not thereby shown to be a less primitive process4 ,on the contrary1 simplified ways of thinking are commonly advanced products4 ,the #8intuitive' person uses his cnesthesia as a chemist uses his reagents or a physiologist his galvanometer4 ,as far as the sensations which the colour stimuli excite can be optically discriminated1 no difference is perceptible4 ,but an actual yet sensorily imperceptible difference becomes apparent through the difference in organic reaction4 ,the process is merely one of adding further and more delicate signs to the situation1 it is analogous to attaching a recording lever to a barograph4 ,the differences between sensitive or #8intuitive' and more #8rational' and obtuse individuals may be of two kinds4 ,it may be that the sensitive person's organic response is more delicate4 ,this is a difficult matter to decide4 ,it is certain1 however1 that the chief difference 7a derivative difference very likely7 lies in the fact that the obtuse person has not learned to interpret the changes in his general bodily consciousness in any systematic fashion4 ,the changes may occur and occur systematically1 but they mean nothing definite to him4 ,this kind of intervention of organic sensation in perception plays a part in all the arts4 ,much neglected1 it is probably of very great importance4 ,what here needs to be noticed is that it is not a mode of gaining knowledge which differs in any essential way from other modes4 ,no unique and peculiar relation of #8feeling' towards things needs to be introduced to explain it1 any more than a unique and peculiar mode of #8cognitively apprehending' them needs to be introduced to explain ordinary knowing4 ,in both instances their causes1 which have to be assumed in any case1 will suffice4 ,when we sense something our sensation is caused by what we sense4 ,when we refer to something absent1 a present sensation similar to sensations which in the past have been coincident with it1 is thereby a sign for it1 and so on1 through more and more intricate mnemic sign-situations4 ,here a present colour sensation gives rise to an organic response which has in the past accompanied a definite colour2 the response becomes then a sign of that colour which the sensitive and discriminating person trusts1 although he is optically unable to make sure whether that colour is present or merely one very like it4 ,other cases differ from this in complexity but not in principle4 ,if it is objected that this account of referring or thinking in terms of causes gives us at best but a very indirect way of knowing1 the reply is that the prevalence of error is itself a strong argument against a too direct theory of knowledge4 ,in popular parlance the term #8emotion' stands for those happenings in minds which accompany such exhibitions of unusual excitement as weeping1 shouting1 blushing1 trembling1 and so on4 ,but in the usage of most critics it has taken an extended sense1 thereby suffering quite needlessly in its usefulness4 ,for them it stands for any noteworthy #8goings on' in the mind almost regardless of their nature4 ,the true and profound emotions1 as spoken of by critics1 are often lacking in all the characteristics which govern the more refined linguistic usage of common people1 and1 as it happens1 of psychologists also1 for what may perhaps be regarded now as the standard usage in psychology1 sets out from the very same bodily changes accompanying experience as were noted above4 ,two main features characterise every emotional experience4 ,one of these is a diffused reaction in the organs of the body brought about through the sympathetic systems4 ,the other is a tendency to action of some definite kind or group of kinds4 ,these extensive changes in the visceral and vascular systems1 characteristically in respiration and in glandular secretion1 commonly take place in response to situations which call some instinctive tendency into play4 ,as a result of all these changes a tide of sensations of internal bodily origin comes into consciousness4 ,it is generally agreed that these sensations make up at least the main part of the peculiar consciousness of an emotion4 ,whether they are necessary to it or not is disputed4 ,it may perhaps be suggested that insufficient attention has been paid in the theory of emotion to images of such sensations4 ,the fact that fear1 for example1 may be felt in the absence of any detectable bodily changes of the kind described 7a disputed fact7 may be explained by supposing images of these sensations to be taking their place4 ,these sensations1 or images of them1 are then a main ingredient of an emotional experience and account for its peculiar #8colour' or tone1 for the voluminousness and massiveness as well as for the extreme acuteness of emotions4 ,but of equal or greater importance are the changes in consciousness due to reactions in the nervous systems which control movement1 governing muscular response to the stimulating situation4 ,these range1 in the case of fear1 from the awakening of a simple tendency1 an impulse to run away or hide under the table1 to such elaborate readjustments as we make when we prepare to counter a threat against some favourite opinion4 ,as a rule a process of extraordinary complexity takes place between perceiving the situation and finding a mode of meeting it4 ,this complicated process contributes the rest of its peculiar flavour to an emotional experience4 ,a more detailed discussion from the same angle of the points raised in this and the surrounding chapters will be found in ,the ,meaning of ,psychology 7#aibf7 by ,c4 ,k4 ,ogden1 where the author's view of mental activity is elaborated4 #de ,the fashion in which the term #8feeling' shifts about in psychology is notorious as a source of confusion4 ,it would be convenient if it could be kept for pleasure-unpleasure1 and used no longer as a synonym for #8emotion'1 since emotions can much more easily be regarded as built up from organic sensations4 ,,chapter ,,xiv ,memory ,within the surface of ,time's fleeting river ,its wrinkled image lies1 as then it lay ,immovably unquiet1 and for ever ,it trembles1 but it cannot pass away6 ,shelley1 ,ode to ,liberty4 ,so far we have alluded only casually to memory1 to that apparent revival of past experience to which the richness and complexity of experience is due4 ,every stimulus which is ever received leaves behind it1 so it is said1 an imprint1 a trace capable of being revived later and of contributing its quota to consciousness and to behaviour4 ,to these effects of past experience the systematic1 the organised character of our behaviour is due2 the fact that they intervene is the explanation of our ability to learn by experience4 ,it is a way peculiar to living tissue by which the past influences our present behaviour across1 as it might appear1 a gulf of time4 ,how we should conceive this influence is perhaps the most puzzling point in psychology4 ,the old theory of a kind of ,somerset ,house of past impressions has given place to an account in terms of facilitations of neural paths1 lowered resistances in synapses1 and so forth4 ,it was natural that as the broad outlines of neural activity came to be known1 psychologists should attempt to make use of them4 ,but on close examination it is clear that their interpretations were far too crude4 ,fixed #8paths'1 one for every item of experience which has ever taken place1 and others for every kind of connection into which the items come1 however multitudinous we make them1 no longer explain what can be observed in behaviour and experience4 ,as ,von ,kries and1 more recently1 ,koffka have insisted1 the fact1 for example1 that we recognise things in cases where it is certain that quite different paths must be involved1 is fatal to the scheme4 ,and mere multiplication of the entities invoked leads to no solution4 ,semon even goes so far as to say that when we listen to a song for the hundredth time we hear not only the singer but a chorus of nine and ninety mnemic voices4 ,this corollary by itself is almost a refutation of his theory4 ,we have to escape from the crude assumption that the only way in which what is past can be repeated is by records being kept4 ,the old associationists supposed the records to be writ small inside separate cells4 ,the more modern view was that they were scored large through a deepening of the channels of conduction4 ,neither view is adequate4 ,imagine an energy system of prodigious complexity and extreme delicacy of organisation which has an indefinitely large number of stable poises4 ,imagine it thrown from one poise to another with great facility1 each poise being the resultant of all the energies of the system4 ,suppose now that the partial return of a situation which has formerly caused it to assume a stable poise1 throws it into an unstable condition1 from which it most easily returns to equilibrium by reassuming the former poise4 ,such a system would exhibit the phenomena of memory2 but it would keep no records though appearing to do so4 ,the appearance would be due merely to the extreme accuracy and sensitiveness of the system and the delicacy of its balances4 ,its state on the later occasion would appear to be a revival of its state on the former1 but this would not be the case any more than a cumulus cloud this evening is a revival of those which decorated the heavens last year4 ,this imaginary construction can be made more concrete by imagining a solid with a large number of facets upon any one of which it can rest4 ,if we try to balance it upon one of its coigns or ridges it settles down upon the nearest facet4 ,in the case of the neural system we are trying to suggest each stable poise has been determined by a definite set1 or better1 context of conditions4 ,membership of this context is what corresponds to nearness to a facet4 ,the partial return of the context causes the system to behave as though conditions were present which are not1 and this is what is essential in memory4 ,that this suggestion in the form here presented is unsatisfactory and incomplete is evident4 ,it is wildly conjectural no doubt1 but so are the ,archival and ,pathway ,theories4 ,yet it does avoid the chief deficiencies of those theories1 it does suggest why only some conjunctions of experiences become #8associated'1 those namely which yield a stable poise4 ,and it suggests why a thing should be recognised as the same though appearing in countless different aspects2 every time it appears different conditions occur which1 none the less1 lead to one and the same stable poise1 as the polyhedron we imagined may settle down on one and the same facet from all the surrounding ridges4 ,one of the collateral advantages of such a view is that it removes some of the temptations to revert to animism from which psychologists1 and especially literary psychologists1 suffer4 ,dissatisfaction with current hypotheses as to the mechanism of reflex arcs is a main cause for the scientifically desperate belief in the soul4 ,and apart from this1 the special emotive factors which disturb judgment on this point are less obtrusive when this account is substituted for the usual story of the conditioned reflex1 that sacrilegious contrivance of the mechanists4 ,there is no kind of mental activity in which memory does not intervene4 ,we are most familiar with it in the case of images1 those fugitive elusive copies of sensations with which psychology has been hitherto so much1 perhaps too much1 concerned4 ,visual images are the best known of them1 but it is important to recognise that every kind of sensation may have its corresponding image4 ,visceral1 kinsthetic1 thermal images can with a little practice be produced1 even by people who have never noticed their occurrence4 ,but individual differences as regards imagery are enormous1 more in the degree to which images become conscious1 however1 than in their actual presence or absence on the needful occasion4 ,those people who1 by their own report1 are devoid of images1 none the less behave in a way which makes it certain that the same processes are at work in them as in producers of the most flamboyant images4 ,,chapter ,,xv ,attitudes ,my ,sences want their outward motion ,which now within ,reason doth win1 ,redoubled by her secret notion4--,john ,hoskins4 ,the interventions of memory are not confined to sensation and emotion4 ,they are of equal importance in our active behaviour4 ,the acquisition of any muscular accomplishment1 dancing or billiards1 for example1 shows this clearly4 ,what we have already done in the past controls what we shall do in the future4 ,if the perception of an object and the recognition that it is a tree1 for example1 involve a poise in the sensory system concerned1 a certain completeness or #8closure1' to use the term employed by ,kohler1 so an act1 as opposed to a random movement1 involves a similar poise in a motor system4 ,but sensory and motor systems are not independent2 they work together2 every perception probably includes a response in the form of incipient action4 ,we constantly overlook the extent to which all the while we are making preliminary adjustments1 getting ready to act in one way or another4 ,reading ,captain ,slocum's account of the centipede which bit him on the head when alone in the middle of the ,atlantic1 the writer has been caused to leap right out of his chair by a leaf which fell upon his face from a tree4 ,only occasionally does some such accident show how extensive are the motor adjustments made in what appear to be the most unmuscular occupations4 ,this incipient activity stands to overt action much as an image stands to a sensation4 ,but such #8imaginal' activity is1 by its very nature1 extraordinarily hard to detect or to experiment upon4 ,psychology has only dealt with fringes of the mind hitherto and the most accessible fringe is on the side of sensation4 ,we have therefore to build up our conjectures as to the rest of mental happenings by analogy with the perhaps not entirely representative specimens which sensation supplies4 ,this limitation has led the majority of psychologists to see in imaginal movement no more than images of the sensations from muscle1 joint1 and tendon1 which would arise if the movement were actually made4 ,it is certain that before any action takes place a preliminary organisation must occur which ensures that the parts do not get in one another's way4 ,it appears to the writer that these preliminaries in his case make up part of consciousness1 but there is a heavy weight of authority against him4 ,the point is no doubt exceptionally hard to determine4 ,in any case1 whether the consciousness of activity is due to sensations and images of movements alone1 or whether the outgoing part of the impulse and its preparatory organisation help to make up consciousness1 there is no doubt about the importance of incipient and imaginal movement in experience4 ,the work done by ,lipps1 ,groos and others on einfhlung1 or empathy1 however we may prefer to restate their results1 shows that when we perceive spatial or musical form we commonly accompany our perception with closely connected motor activity4 ,we cannot leave this activity out of our account of what happens in the experiences of the arts1 although we may think that those who have built upon this fact what they have put forward as a complete sthetic--,vernon ,lee1 for example--have been far from clear as to what questions they were answering4 ,the extent to which any activity is conscious seems to depend very largely upon how complex and how novel it is4 ,the primitive and in a sense natural outcome of stimulus is action2 the more simple the situation with which the mind is engaged1 the closer is the connection between the stimulus and some overt response in action1 and in general the less rich and full is the consciousness attendant4 ,a man walking over uneven ground1 for example1 makes without reflection or emotion a continuous adjustment of his steps to his footing2 but let the ground become precipitous and1 unless he is used to such places1 both reflection and emotion will appear4 ,the increased complexity of the situation and the greater delicacy and appropriateness of the movements required for convenience and safety1 call forth far more complicated goings on in the mind4 ,besides his perception of the nature of the ground1 the thought may occur that a false move would be perilous and difficult to retrieve4 ,this1 when accompanied by emotion1 is called a #8realisation' of his situation4 ,the adjustment to one another of varied impulses--to go forward carefully1 to lie down and grasp something with the hands1 to go back1 and so forth--and their co-ordination into useful behaviour alters the whole character of his experience4 ,most behaviour is a reconciliation between the various acts which would satisfy the different impulses which combine to produce it2 and the richness and interest of the feel of it in consciousness depends upon the variety of the impulses engaged4 ,any familiar activity1 when set in different conditions so that the impulses which make it up have to adjust themselves to fresh streams of impulses due to the new conditions1 is likely to take on increased richness and fullness in consciousness4 ,this general fact is of great importance for the arts1 particularly for poetry1 painting and sculpture1 the representative or mimetic arts4 ,for in these a totally new setting for what may be familiar elements is essentially involved4 ,instead of seeing a tree we see something in a picture which may have similar effects upon us but is not a tree4 ,the tree impulses which are aroused have to adjust themselves to their new setting of other impulses due to our awareness that it is a picture which we are looking at4 ,thus an opportunity arises for those impulses to define themselves in a way in which they ordinarily do not4 ,this1 of course1 is only the most obvious and simple instance of the way in which1 thanks to the unusual circumstances in which things depicted1 or in literature described1 come before us1 the experiences that result are modified4 ,to take another obvious example1 the description or the theatrical presentation of a murder has a different effect upon us from that which would be produced by most actual murders if they took place before us4 ,these considerations1 of vast importance in the discussion of artistic form1 will occupy us later 7pp4 #ade1 #bcg74 ,here it is sufficient to point out that these differences between ordinary experiences and those due to works of art are only special cases of the general difference between experiences made up of a less and of a greater number of impulses which have to be brought into co-ordination with one another4 ,the bearing of this point upon the problem of the sthetic mode with its detachment1 impersonality1 etc41 discussed in the second chapter1 will be apparent4 7,compare ,chapter ,,xxxii1 p4 #bdi47 ,the result of the co-ordination of a great number of impulses of different kinds is very often that no overt action takes place4 ,there is a danger here of supposing that no action whatever results or that there is something incomplete or imperfect about such a state of affairs4 ,but imaginal action and incipient action which does not go so far as actual muscular movement are more important than ,overt action in the well-developed human being4 ,indeed the difference between the intelligent or refined1 and the stupid or crass person is a difference in the extent to which overt action can be replaced by incipient and imaginal action4 ,an intelligent man can #8see how a thing works' when a less intelligent man has to #8find out by trying'4 ,similarly with such responses as are aroused by a work of art4 ,the difference between #8understanding' it and failing to do so is1 in most cases1 a difference between being able to make the required responses in an imaginal or incipient degree1 adjusting them to one another at that stage1 and being unable to produce them or adjust them except overtly and at their fullest development4 ,though the kinds of activity involved are different1 the analogy with the case of the mathematician is not misleading4 ,the fact that he will not make half so many marks on paper as a schoolboy does not show that he is any less active4 ,his activity takes place at an earlier stage in which his responses are merely incipient or imaginal4 ,in a similar manner the absence of any overt movements or external signs of emotion in an experienced reader of poetry1 or concert-goer1 compared to the evident disturbances which are sometimes to be seen in the novice1 is no indication of any lack of internal activity4 ,the response required in many cases by works of art is of a kind which can only be obtained in an incipient or imaginal stage4 ,practical considerations often prevent their being worked out in overt form1 and this is1 as a rule1 not in the least to be regretted4 ,for these responses are commonly of the nature of solutions to problems1 not of intellectual research1 but of emotional accommodation and adjustment1 and can usually be best achieved while the different impulses which have to be reconciled are still in an incipient or imaginal stage1 and before the matter has become further complicated by the irrelevant accidents which attend overt responses4 ,these imaginal and incipient activities or tendencies to action1 ,i shall call attitudes4 ,when we realise how many and how different may be the tendencies awakened by a situation1 and what scope there is for conflict1 suppression and interplay--all contributing something to our experience--it will not appear surprising that the classification and analysis of attitudes is not yet far advanced4 ,a thousand tendencies to actions1 which do not overtly take place1 may well occur in complicated adjustments4 ,for these what evidence there is must be indirect4 ,in fact1 the only attitudes which are capable of clear and explicit analysis are those in which some simple mode of observable behaviour gives the clue to what has been taking place1 and even here only a part of the reaction is open to this kind of examination4 ,among the experiences which are by the nature of the case hidden from observation are found almost all those with which criticism is concerned4 ,the outward aspect and behaviour of a man reading ,the ,prioresses' ,tale and ,the ,miller's ,tale may well be indistinguishable4 ,but this should not lead us to overlook how great a part in the whole experience is taken by attitudes4 ,many experiences which1 if examined by introspection for their actual content of sensation and imagery1 differ very little1 are totally diverse in the kind and degree of implicit activity present4 ,this aspect of experiences as filled with incipient promptings1 lightly stimulated tendencies to acts of one kind or another1 faint preliminary preparations for doing this or that1 has been constantly overlooked in criticism4 ,yet it is in terms of attitudes1 the resolution1 inter-inanimation1 and balancing of impulses--,aristotle's definition of ,tragedy#df is an instance--that all the most valuable effects of poetry must be described4 #df 8,tragedy is an imitation of an action444 effecting through ,pity and ,terror the correction and refinement 77 of such passions40 ,poetics1 ,,vi4 ,cf4 p4 #bdg1 infra4 ,,chapter ,,xvi ,the ,analysis of a ,poem ,toutes choses sont dites dj1 mais comme personne n'coute il faut toujours recommencer4--,andr ,gide4 ,the qualifications of a good critic are three4 ,he must be an adept at experiencing1 without eccentricities1 the state of mind relevant to the work of art he is judging4 ,secondly1 he must be able to distinguish experiences from one another as regards their less superficial features4 ,thirdly1 he must be a sound judge of values4 ,upon all these matters psychology1 even in its present conjectural state1 has a direct bearing4 ,the critic is1 throughout1 judging of experiences1 of states of mind2 but too often he is needlessly ignorant of the general psychological form of the experiences with which he is concerned4 ,he has no clear ideas as to the elements present or as to their relative importance4 ,thus1 an outline or schema of the mental events which make up the experience of #8looking at' a picture or #8reading' a poem1 can be of great assistance4 ,at the very least an understanding of the probable structures of these experiences can remove certain misconceptions which tend to make the opinions of individuals of less service to other individuals than need be4 ,two instances will show this4 ,there are certain broad features in which all agree a poem of ,swinburne is unlike a poem of ,hardy4 ,the use of words by the two poets is different4 ,their methods are dissimilar1 and the proper approach for a reader differs correspondingly4 ,an attempt to read them in the same way is unfair to one of the poets1 or to both1 and leads inevitably to defects in criticism which a little reflection would remove4 ,it is absurd to read ,pope as though he were ,shelley1 but the essential differences cannot be clearly marked out unless such an outline of the general form of a poetic experience1 as is here attempted1 has been provided4 ,the psychological means employed by these poets are demonstrably different4 ,whether the effects are also dissimilar is a further question for which the same kind of analysis is equally required4 ,this separation inside the poetic experience of certain parts which are means from certain other parts which are the ends upon which the poetic value of the experience depends1 leads up to our other instance4 ,it is unquestionable that the actual experiences1 which even good critics undergo when reading1 as we say1 the same poem1 differ very widely4 ,in spite of certain conventions1 which endeavour to conceal these inevitable discrepancies for social purposes1 there can be no doubt that the experiences of readers in connection with particular poems are rarely similar4 ,this is unavoidable4 ,some differences are1 however1 much more important than others4 ,provided the ends1 in which the value of the poem lies1 are attained1 differences in the means need not prevent critics from agreement or from mutual service4 ,those discrepancies alone are fatal which affect the fundamental features of experiences1 the features upon which their value depends4 ,but enough is now known of the ways in which minds work for superficial and fundamental parts of experiences to be distinguished4 ,one of the greatest living critics praises the line3 ,the fringed curtain of thine eyes advance1 for the #8ravishing beauty' of the visual images excited4 ,this common mistake of exaggerating personal accidents in the means by which a poem attains its end into the chief value of the poem is due to excessive trust in the commonplaces#dg of psychology4 ,illustration3 ,arcadia1 ,night1 a ,cloud1 ,pan1 and the ,moon ,in the analysis of the experience of reading a poem1 a diagram1 or hieroglyph1 is convenient1 provided that its limitations are clearly recognised4 ,the spatial relations of the parts of the diagram1 for instance1 are not intended to stand for spatial relations between parts of what is represented2 it is not a picture of the nervous system4 ,nor are temporal relations intended4 ,spatial metaphors1 whether drawn as diagrams or merely imagined1 are dangers only to the unwary4 ,the essential service which pictures can give in abstract matters1 namely1 the simultaneous and compact representation of states of affairs which otherwise tend to remain indistinct and confused1 is worth the slight risk of misunderstanding which they entail4 ,we may begin then with a diagrammatic representation of the events which take place when we read a poem4 ,other literary experiences will only differ from this in their greater simplicity4 ,the eye is depicted as reading a succession of printed words4 ,as a result there follows a stream of reaction in which six distinct kinds of events may be distinguished4 ,i ,the visual sensations of the printed words4 ,,ii ,images very closely associated with these sensations4 ,,iii ,images relatively free4 ,,iv ,references to1 or #8thinkings of1' various things4 ,v ,emotions4 ,,vi ,affective-volitional attitudes4 ,each of these kinds of occurrences requires some brief description and explanation4 ,upon the visual sensations of the printed words all the rest depends 7in the case of a reader not previously acquainted with the poem72 but with most readers they have in themselves no great importance4 ,the individual shapes of the letters1 their size and spacing1 have only a minor effect upon the whole reaction4 ,no doubt readers differ greatly in this respect2 with some1 familiarity plays a great part4 ,they find it unpleasant and disturbing to read a poem in any but the edition in which they first became acquainted with it4 ,but the majority of readers are less exigent4 ,provided that the print is clear and legible1 and allows the habitual eye-movements of reading to be easily performed1 the full response arises equally well from widely differing sensations4 ,those for whom this is true have1 in the present state of economic organisation1 a decided advantage over the more fastidious4 ,this does not show that good printing is a negligible consideration2 and the primary place of calligraphy in the ,chinese arts is an indication to the contrary4 ,it shows merely that printing belongs to another branch of the arts4 ,in the poetic experience words take effect through their associated images1 and through what we are1 as a rule1 content to call their meaning4 ,what meaning is and how it enters into the experience we shall consider4 ,tied ,images4--,visual sensations of words do not commonly occur by themselves4 ,they have certain regular companions so closely tied to them as to be only with difficulty disconnected4 ,the chief of these are the auditory image--the sound of the words in the mind's ear--and the image of articulation--the feel in the lips1 mouth1 and throat1 of what the words would be like to speak4 ,auditory images of words are among the most obvious of mental happenings4 ,any line of verse or prose slowly read1 will1 for most people1 sound mutely in the imagination somewhat as it would if read aloud4 ,but the degree of correspondence between the image-sounds1 and the actual sounds that the reader would produce1 varies enormously4 ,many people are able to imagine word-sounds with greater delicacy and discrimination than they can utter them4 ,but the reverse case is also found4 ,what importance then is to be attached to clear1 rich and delicate sound imagery in silent reading8 ,how far must people who differ in their capacity to produce such images differ in their total reactions to poems8 ,and what are the advantages of reading aloud8 ,here we reach one of the practical problems of criticism for which this analysis is required4 ,a discussion is best postponed until the whole analysis has been given4 ,the principal confusion which prevents a clear understanding of the point at issue does1 however1 concern images and may be dealt with here4 ,it is of great importance in connection with the topic of the following section4 ,the sensory qualities of images1 their vivacity1 clearness1 fullness of detail and so on1 do not bear any constant relation to their effects4 ,images differing in these respects may have closely similar consequences4 ,too much importance has always been attached to the sensory qualities of images4 ,what gives an image efficacy is less its vividness as an image than its character as a mental event peculiarly connected with sensation4 ,lissette way which no one yet knows how to explain1 a relict of sensation and our intellectual and emotional response to it depends far more upon its being1 through this fact1 a representative of a sensation1 than upon its sensory resemblance to one4 ,an image may lose almost all its sensory nature to the point of becoming scarcely an image at all1 a mere skeleton1 and yet represent a sensation quite as adequately as if it were flaring with hallucinatory vividity4 ,in other words1 what matters is not the sensory resemblance of an image to the sensation which is its prototype1 but some other relation1 at present hidden from us in the jungles of neurology4 7,cf4 ,chapter ,,xiv47 ,care then should be taken to avoid the natural tendency to suppose that the more clear and vivid an image the greater will be its efficacy4 ,there are trustworthy people who1 according to their accounts1 never experience any imagery at all4 ,if certain views commonly expressed about the arts are true1 by which vivid imagery is an all-important part of the experience1 then these people are incapable of art experiences1 a conclusion which is contrary to the facts4 ,the views in question are overlooking the fact that something takes the place of vivid images in these people1 and that1 provided the image-substitute is efficacious1 their lack of mimetic imagery is of no consequence4 ,the efficacy required must1 of course1 include control over emotional as well as intellectual reactions4 ,needless perhaps to add that with persons of the image-producing types an increase in delicacy and vivacity in their imagery will probably be accompanied by increased subtlety in effects4 ,thus it is not surprising that certain great poets and critics have been remarkable for the vigour of their imagery1 and dependent upon it4 ,no one would deny the usefulness of imagery to some people2 the mistake is to suppose that it is indispensable to all4 ,articulatory imagery is less noticeable2 yet the quality of silent speech is perhaps even more dependent upon these images than upon sound-images4 ,collocations of syllables which are awkward or unpleasant to utter are rarely delightful to the ear4 ,as a rule the two sets of images are so intimately connected that it is difficult to decide which is the offender4 ,in #8,heaven1 which man's generation draws1' the sound doubtless is as harsh as the movements required are cramping to the lips4 ,the extent to which interference with one set of images will change the other may be well seen by a simple experiment4 ,most people1 if they attempt a silent recitation while opening the mouth to its fullest stretch or holding the tongue firmly between the teeth1 will notice curious transformations in the auditory images4 ,how the experiment should be interpreted is uncertain1 but it is of use in making the presence of both kinds of verbal imagery evident to those who may have overlooked them hitherto4 ,images of articulation should not1 however1 be confused with those minimal actual movements which for some people 7for all1 as behaviourists maintain7 accompany the silent rehearsing of words4 ,these two forms of tied imagery might also be called verbal images1 and supply the elements of what is called the #8formal structure' of poetry4 ,they differ from those to which we now proceed in being images of words1 not of things words stand for1 and in their very close connection with the visual sensations of printed words4 ,free ,imagery4--,free images1 or rather one form of these1 visual images1 pictures in the mind's eye1 occupy a prominent place in the literature of criticism1 to the neglect somewhat of other forms of imagery1 since1 as was remarked in a preceding chapter1 for every possible kind of sensation there is a corresponding possible image4 ,the assumption1 natural before investigation1 that all attentive and sensitive readers will experience the same images1 vitiates most of the historical discussions from that of ,longinus to that of ,lessing4 ,even in the present day1 when there is no excuse for such ignorance1 the mistake still thrives1 and an altogether too crude1 too hasty1 and too superficial form of criticism is allowed to pass unchallenged4 ,it cannot be too clearly recognised that individuals differ not only in the type of imagery which they employ1 but still more in the particular images which they produce4 ,in their whole reactions to a poem1 or to a single line of it1 their free images are the point at which two readings are most likely to differ1 and the fact that they differ may very well be quite immaterial4 ,fifty different readers will experience not one common picture but fifty different pictures4 ,if the value of the poem derived from the value qua picture of the visual image excited then criticism might well despair4 ,those who would stress this part of the poetic reaction can have but crude views on pictures4 ,but if the value of the visual image in the experience is not pictorial1 if the image is not to be judged as a picture1 how is it to be judged8 ,it is improbable that the many critics1 some of them peculiarly well qualified in the visual arts1 who have insisted upon the importance of imagery1 have been entirely wasting their time4 ,it ought to be possible to give an account of the place of free imagery in the whole poetic experience which will explain this insistence4 ,what is required will be found if we turn our attention from the sensory qualities of the imagery to the more fundamental qualities upon which its efficacy in modifying the rest of the experience depends4 ,it has been urged above that images which are different in their sensory qualities may have the same effects4 ,if this were not the case the absence of glaring differences between people of different image-types would be astonishing4 ,but since images may represent sensations without resembling them1 and represent them in the sense of replacing them1 as far as effects in directing thought and arousing emotion go1 differences in their mimetic capacity become of minor importance4 ,as we have seen1 it is natural for those whose imagery is vivid1 to suppose that vivacity and clearness go together with power over thought and feeling4 ,it is the power of an image over these that is as a rule being praised when an intelligent and sensitive critic appears merely to be praising the picture floating before his mind's eye4 ,to judge the image as a picture is judged1 would1 as we have seen1 be absurd2 and what is sought in poetry by those painters and others whose interest in the world is primarily visual is not pictures but records of observation1 or stimuli of emotion4 ,thus1 provided the images 7or image-substitutes for the imageless7 have the due effects1 deficiencies in their sensory aspect do not matter4 ,but the proviso is important4 ,in all forms of imagery sensory deficiencies are for many people signs and accompaniments of defective efficacy1 and the habit of reading so as to allow the fullest development to imagery in its sensory aspect is likely to encourage the full development of this more essential feature1 its efficacy1 if the freaks and accidents of the sensory side are not taken too seriously4 ,some exceptions to this general recommendation will occur to the reader4 ,instances in plenty may be found in which a full development of the sensory aspect of images is damaging to their effects4 ,meredith is a master of this peculiar kind of imagery3-- ,thus piteously ,love closed what he begat ,the union of this ever diverse pair6 ,these two were rapid falcons in a snare1 ,condemned to do the flitting of the bat4 ,the emotional as well as the intellectual effects of the various images here suggested are much impaired if we produce them vividly and distinctly4 ,impulses1 and ,references4--,we have now to consider those more fundamental effects upon which stress has been laid above as the true places of the values of the experience4 ,it will be well at this point to reconsult the diagram4 ,the vertical lines which run capriciously downwards from the visual sensations of the words1 through their tied imagery and onward to the bottom of the diagram1 are intended to represent1 schematically1 streams of impulses flowing through in the mind4 ,they start in the visual sensations1 but the depiction of the tied imagery is intended to show how much of their further course is due to it4 ,the placing of the free imagery in the third division is intended to suggest that while some free images may arise from visual words alone1 they take their character in a large part as a consequence of the tied imagery4 ,thus the great importance of the tied imagery1 of the formal elements1 is emphasised in the diagram4 ,these impulses are the weft of the experience1 the warp being the pre-existing systematic structure of the mind1 that organised system of possible impulses4 ,the metaphor is of course inexact1 since weft and warp here are not independent4 ,where these impulses run1 and how they develop1 depends entirely upon the condition of the mind1 and this depends upon the impulses which have previously been active in it4 ,it will be seen then that impulses--their direction1 their strength1 how they modify one another--are the essential and fundamental things in any experience4 ,all else1 whether intellectual or emotional1 arises as a consequence of their activity4 ,the thin trickle of stimulation which comes in through the eye finds an immense hierarchy of systems of tendencies poised in the most delicate stability4 ,it is strong enough and rightly enough directed to disturb some of these without assistance4 ,the literal sense of a word can be grasped on the prompting of the mere sight of it1 without hearing it or mentally pronouncing it4 ,but the effects of this stimulation are immensely increased and widened when it is reinforced by fresh stimulation from tied images1 and it is through these that most of the emotional effects are produced4 ,as the agitation proceeds new reinforcement comes with every fresh system which is excited4 ,thus1 the paradoxical fact that so trifling an irritation as the sight of marks on paper is able to arouse the whole energies of the mind becomes explicable4 ,to turn now to references1 the only mental happenings which are as closely connected with visual words as their tied images are those mysterious events which are usually called thoughts4 ,thus the arrow symbol in the hieroglyph should perhaps properly be placed near the visual impression of the word4 ,the mere sight of any familiar word is normally followed by a thought of whatever the word may stand for4 ,this thought is sometimes said to be the #8meaning'1 the literal or prose #8meaning' of the word4 ,it is wise1 however1 to avoid the use of #8meaning' as a symbol altogether4 ,the terms #8thought' and #8idea' are less subtle in their ambiguities1 and when defined may perhaps be used without confusion4 ,what is essential in thought is its direction or reference to things4 ,what is this direction or reference8 ,how does a thought come to be #8of' one thing rather than another8 ,what is the link between a thought and what it is #8of'8 ,the outline of one answer to these questions has been suggested in ,chapter ,,xi4 ,a further account must here be attempted4 ,without a fairly clear1 although1 of course1 incomplete view1 it is impossible to avoid confusion and obscurity in discussing such topics as truth in art1 the intellect-versus-emotion imbroglio1 the scope of science1 the nature of religion and many others with which criticism must deal4 ,the facts upon which speculations as to the relations between thoughts and the things which they are #8of' have been based1 have as a rule been taken from introspection4 ,but the facts which introspection yields are notoriously uncertain1 and the special position of the observer may well preclude success4 ,introspection is competent1 in some cases1 to discover the relations between events which take place within the mind1 but cannot by itself give information as to the relations of these events with the external world1 and it is precisely this which we are inquiring into when we ask1 ,what connection is there between a thought and that which it is a thought of8 ,for an answer to this question we must look further4 ,there is no doubt that causal relations hold between events in the mind and events outside it4 ,sometimes these relations are fairly simple4 ,the striking of a clock is the cause of our thinking of its striking4 ,in such a case the external thing is linked with the thought #8of' it in a fairly direct fashion1 and the view here taken is that to be a thought #8of' the striking is to be merely a thought caused in this fashion by the striking4 ,a thought of the striking is nothing else and nothing more than a thought caused by it4 ,but most thoughts are #8of' things which are not present and not producing direct effects in the mind4 ,this is so when we read4 ,what is directly affecting the mind is words on paper1 but the thoughts aroused are not thoughts #8of' the words1 but of other things which the words stand for4 ,how1 then1 can a causal theory of thinking explain the relation between these remote things and the thoughts which are #8of' them8 ,to answer this we must look at the way in which we learn what words stand for4 ,without a process of learning we should only think of the words4 ,the process of learning to use words is not difficult to analyse4 ,on a number of occasions the word is heard in connection with objects of a certain kind4 ,later the word is heard in the absence of any such object4 ,in accordance with one of the few fundamental laws known about mental process1 something then happens in the mind which is like what would happen if such an object were actually present and engaging the attention4 ,the word has become a sign of an object of that kind4 ,the word which formerly was a part of the cause of a certain effect in the mind is now followed by a similar effect in the absence of the rest of the previous cause1 namely1 an object of the kind in question4 ,this kind of causation appears to be peculiar to living tissue4 ,the relation now between the thought and what it is #8of' is more indirect1 the thought is #8of' something which formerly was part cause1 together with the sign1 of similar thoughts4 ,it is #8of' the missing part of the sign1 or more strictly #8of' anything which would complete the sign as a cause4 ,thoughts by this account are general1 they are of anything like such and such things1 except when the object thought of and the thought are connected by direct causal relations1 as1 for instance1 when we think of a word we are hearing4 ,only when these direct relations hold can we succeed in thinking simply of #8,that'4 ,we have to think instead of #8something of a kind'4 ,by various means1 however1 we can contrive that there shall only be one thing of the kind1 and so the need for particularity in our thoughts is satisfied4 ,the commonest way in which we do this is by thoughts which make the kind spatial and temporal4 ,a thought of #8mosquito' becomes a thought of #8mosquito there now' by combining a thought of #8thing of mosquito kind' with a thought of #8thing of there kind' and a thought of #8thing of now kind'4 ,the awkwardness of these phrases1 it may be mentioned1 is irrelevant4 ,combined thoughts of this sort1 we may notice1 are capable of truth and falsity1 whereas a simple thought--of #8whatever is now' for instance--can only be true4 ,whether a thought is true or false depends simply upon whether there is anything of the kind referred to1 and there must be something now4 ,it is by no means certain that there must be anything there always4 ,and most probably no mosquito is where we thought it was then4 ,the natural generality and vagueness of all reference which is not made specific by the aid of space and time is of great importance for the understanding of the senses in which poetry may be said to be true4 7,cf4 ,chapter ,,xxxv47 ,in the reading of poetry the thought due simply to the words1 their sense it may be called1 comes first2 but other thoughts are not of less importance4 ,these may be due to the auditory verbal imagery1 and we have onomatopia1#dh but this is rarely independent of the sense4 ,more important are the further thoughts caused by the sense1 the network of interpretation and conjecture which arises therefrom1 with its opportunities for aberrations and misunderstanding4 ,poems1 however1 differ fundamentally in the extent to which such further interpretation is necessary4 ,the mere sense without any further reflection is very often sufficient thought1 in ,swinburne1 for instance1 for the full response-- ,there glowing ghosts of flowers ,draw down1 draw nigh2 ,and wings of swift spent hours ,take flight and fly2 ,she sees by formless gleams ,she hears across cold streams ,dead mouths of many dreams that sing and sigh4 ,little beyond vague thoughts of the things the words stand for is here required4 ,they do not have to be brought into intelligible connection with one another4 ,on the other hand1 ,hardy would rarely reach his full effect through sound and sense alone-- #8,who's in the next room8--who8 ,i seemed to see ,somebody in the dawning passing through ,unknown to me4' #8,nay3 you saw nought4 ,he passed invisibly'4 ,between these and even more extreme cases1 every degree of variation in the relative importance of sound1 sense1 and further interpretation1 between form and content in short1 can be found4 ,a temptation to which few do not succumb is to suppose that there is some #8proper relation' for these different parts of the experience1 so that a poem whose parts are in this relation must thereby be a greater or better poem than another whose parts are differently disposed4 ,this is another instance of the commonest of critical mistakes1 the confusion of means with ends1 of technique with value4 ,there is no more a #8proper place' for sound or for sense in poetry than there is one and only one #8proper shape' for an animal4 ,a dog is not a defective kind of cat1 nor is ,swinburne a defective kind of ,hardy4 ,but this sort of criticism is extraordinarily prevalent4 ,the objection to ,swinburne on the ground of a lack of thought is a popular specimen4 ,within certain types1 needless to say1 some structures are more likely to be successful than others4 ,given some definite kind of effect as the goal1 or some definite structure already being used1 a good deal can of course be said as to the most probable means1 or as to what may or may not be added4 ,lyric cannot dispense with tied imagery1 it is clear1 nor can we neglect the character of this imagery in reading it4 ,a prose composition has to be longer than a lyric to produce an equal definiteness of developed effect4 ,poems in which there is much turmoil of emotion are likely to be strongly rhythmical and to be in metre1 as we shall see when we come to discuss rhythm and metre4 ,drama can hardly dispense with a great deal of conjecture and further interpretation which in most forms of the novel is replaced by analysis and explanation1 and in narrative poetry is commonly omitted altogether2 and so on4 ,but no general prescription that in great poetry there must always be this or that1--deep thought1 superb sound or vivid imagery--is more than a piece of ignorant dogmatism4 ,poetry may be almost devoid even of mere sense1 let alone thought1 or almost without sensory 7or formal7 structure1 and yet reach the point than which no poem goes further4 ,the second case1 however1 is very rare4 ,almost always1 what seems structureless proves to have still a loose and tenuous 7it may be an intermittent7 structure4 ,but we can for example shift the words about very often in ,walt ,whitman without loss1 even when he is almost at his best4 ,it is difficult to represent diagrammatically what takes place in thought in any satisfactory fashion4 ,the impulse coming in from the visual stimulus of the printed word must be imagined as reaching some system in the brain in which effects take place not due merely to this present stimulus1 but also to past occasions on which it has been combined with other stimulations4 ,these effects are thoughts2 and they in their groupings act as signs for yet other thoughts4 ,the little arrows are intended to symbolise these references to things outside the mind4 ,emotions1 and ,attitudes4 ,feeling or emotion is not1 we have insisted above1 another and a rival mode of apprehending nature4 ,so far as a feeling or an emotion does refer to anything1 it refers in the way described1 through its origin4 ,feelings1 in fact1 are commonly signs1 and the differences between those who #8see' things by intuition1 or #8feel' them1 and those who reason them out1 is commonly only a difference between users of signs and users of symbols4 ,both signs and symbols are means by which our past experience assists our present responses4 ,the advantages of symbols1 due to the ease with which they are controlled and communicated1 their public nature1 as it were1 are obvious4 ,their disadvantages as compared with such relatively private signs as emotions or organic sensations are perhaps less evident4 ,words1 when used symbolically or scientifically1 not figuratively and emotively1 are only capable of directing thought to a comparatively few features of the more common situations4 ,but feeling is sometimes a more subtle way of referring1 more dangerous also1 because more difficult to corroborate and to control1 and more liable to confusion4 ,there is no inherent superiority1 however1 in feeling as opposed to thought1 there is merely a difference in applicability2 nor is there any opposition or clash between them except for those who are mistaken either in their thinking or in their feeling1 or in both4 ,how such mistakes arise will be discussed in ,chapter ,,xxxiv4 ,as regards emotions and attitudes little need be added to what has already been said4 ,emotions are primarily signs of attitudes and owe their great prominence in the theory of art to this4 ,for it is the attitudes evoked which are the all-important part of any experience4 ,upon the texture and form of the attitudes involved its value depends4 ,it is not the intensity of the conscious experience1 its thrill1 its pleasure or its poignancy which gives it value1 but the organisation of its impulses for freedom and fullness of life4 ,there are plenty of ecstatic instants which are valueless2 the character of consciousness at any moment is no certain sign of the excellence of the impulses from which it arises4 ,it is the most convenient sign that is available1 but it is very ambiguous and may be very misleading4 ,a more reliable but less accessible set of signs can be found in the readiness for this or that kind of behaviour in which we find ourselves after the experience4 ,too great insistence upon the quality of the momentary consciousness which the arts occasion has in recent times been a prevalent critical blunder4 ,the ,epilogue to ,pater's ,renaissance is the locus classicus4 ,the after-effects1 the permanent modifications in the structure of the mind1 which works of art can produce1 have been overlooked4 ,no one is ever quite the same again after any experience1 his possibilities have altered in some degree4 ,and among all the agents by which 8the widening of the sphere of human sensibility0 may be brought about1 the arts are the most powerful1 since it is through them that men may most co-operate and in these experiences that the mind most easily and with least interference organises itself4 #dg ,the description of images belongs to the first steps in psychology1 and it is often possible to judge the rank and standing of a psychologist by the degree of importance which he attaches to their peculiarities4 ,on theoretical grounds it seems probable that they are luxury products 7cf4 ,the ,meaning of ,meaning1 pp4 #adh-aea7 peculiarly connected with the reproduction of emotion4 ,for a discussion of some experimental investigations into their utility1 ,spearman1 ,the ,nature of ,intelligence1 ,ch4 ,,xii1 may be consulted4 #dh ,two kinds of onomatopia should be distinguished4 ,in one the sound of the words 7actual or imaginal7 is like some natural sound 7the buzzing of bees1 galloping horses1 and so forth74 ,in the other it is not like any such sound but such as merely to call up free auditory images of the sounds in question4 ,the second case is by far the more common4 ,,chapter ,,xvii ,rhythm and ,metre 4 4 4 when it approaches with a divine hopping4 ,the ,joyful ,wisdom4 ,rhythm and its specialised form1 metre1 depend upon repetition1 and expectancy4 ,equally where what is expected recurs and where it fails1 all rhythmical and metrical effects spring from anticipation4 ,as a rule this anticipation is unconscious4 ,sequences of syllables both as sounds and as images of speech-movements leave the mind ready for certain further sequences rather than for others4 ,our momentary organisation is adapted to one range of possible stimuli rather than to another4 ,just as the eye reading print unconsciously expects the spelling to be as usual1 and the fount of type to remain the same1 so the mind after reading a line or two of verse1 or half a sentence of prose1 prepares itself ahead for any one of a number of possible sequences1 at the same time negatively incapacitating itself for others4 ,the effect produced by what actually follows depends very closely upon this unconscious preparation and consists largely of the further twist which it gives to expectancy4 ,it is in terms of the variation in these twists that rhythm is to be described4 ,both prose and verse vary immensely in the extent to which they excite this #8getting ready' process1 and in the narrowness of the anticipation which is formed1 ,prose on the whole1 with the rare exceptions of a ,landor1 a ,de ,quincey1 or a ,ruskin1 is accompanied by a very much vaguer and more indeterminate expectancy than verse4 ,in such prose as this page1 for example1 little more than a preparedness for further words not all exactly alike in sound and with abstract polysyllables preponderating is all that arises4 ,in short1 the sensory or formal effect of words has very little play in the literature of analysis and exposition4 ,but as' soon as prose becomes more emotive than scientific1 the formal side becomes prominent4 ,let us take ,landor's description#di of a lioness suckling her young-- ,on perceiving the countryman1 she drew up her feet gently1 and squared her mouth1 and rounded her eyes1 slumberous with content2 and they looked1 he said1 like sea-grottoes1 obscurely green1 interminably deep1 at once awakening fear and stilling and suppressing it4 ,after #8obscurely green' would it be possible 7quite apart from sense7 to have #8deeply dark' or #8impenetrably gloomy'8 ,why1 apart from sense1 can so few of the syllables be changed in vowel sound1 in emphasis1 in duration or otherwise1 without disaster to the total effect8 ,as with all such questions about sensory form and its effects1 only an incomplete answer can be given4 ,the expectancy caused by what has gone before1 a thing which must be thought of as a very complex tide of neural settings1 lowering the threshold for some kinds of stimuli and raising it for others1 and the character of the stimulus which does actually come1 both play their part4 ,even the most highly organised lyrical or #8polyphonic' prose raises as it advances only a very ambiguous expectation4 ,until the final words of the passage1 there are always a great number of different sequences which would equally well fit in1 which would satisfy the expectancy so far as that is merely due to habit1 to the routine of sensory stimulation4 ,what is expected in fact is not this sound or that sound1 not even this kind of sound or that kind of sound1 but some one of a certain thousand kinds of sounds4 ,it is much more a negative thing than a positive4 ,as in the case of many social conventions it is easier to say what disqualifies than to say what is required4 ,into this very indeterminate expectancy the new element comes with its own range of possible effects4 ,there is1 of course1 no such thing as the effect of a word or a sound4 ,there is no one effect which belongs to it4 ,words have no intrinsic literary characters4 ,none are either ugly or beautiful1 intrinsically displeasing or delightful4 ,every word has instead a range of possible effects1 varying with the conditions into which it is received4 ,all that we can say as to the sorting out of words1 whether into the #8combed' and #8slippery'1 the #8shaggy' and #8rumpled' as with ,dante1 or in any other manner1 is that some1 through long use1 have narrower ranges than others and require more extraordinary conditions if they are to change their #8character'4 ,what effect the word has is a compromise between some one of its possible effects and the special conditions into which it comes4 ,thus in ,shakespeare hardly any word ever looks odd until we consider it2 whereas even in ,keats the #8cold mushrooms' in the ,satyrs' ,song give the mind a shock of astonishment1 an astonishment which is full of delight1 but none the less is a shock4 ,but with this example we have broken down the limitation to the mere sound1 to the strictly formal or sensory aspect of word sequences1 and in fact the limitation is useless4 ,for the effect of a word as sound cannot be separated from its contemporaneous other effects4 ,they become inextricably mingled at once4 ,the sound gets its character by compromise with what is going on already4 ,the preceding agitation of the mind selects from a range of possible characters which the word might present1 that one which best suits with what is happening4 ,there are no gloomy and no gay vowels or syllables1 and the army of critics who have attempted to analyse the effects of passages into vowel and consonantal collocations have1 in fact1 been merely amusing themselves4 ,the way in which the sound of a word is taken varies with the emotion already in being4 ,but1 further1 it varies with the sense4 ,for the anticipation of the sound due to habit1 to the routine of sensation1 is merely a part of the general expectancy4 ,grammatical regularities1 the necessity for completing the thought1 the reader's state of conjecture as to what is being said1 his apprehension in dramatic literature of the action1 of the intention1 situation1 state of mind generally1 of the speaker1 all these and many other things intervene4 ,the way the sound is taken is much less determined by the sound itself than by the conditions into which it enters4 ,all these anticipations form a very closely woven network and the word which can satisfy them all simultaneously may well seem triumphant4 ,but we should not attribute to the sound alone virtues which involve so many other factors4 ,to say this is not in the least to belittle the importance of the sound2 in most cases it is the key to the effects of poetry4 ,this texture of expectations1 satisfactions1 disappointments1 surprisals1 which the sequence of syllables brings about1 is rhythm4 ,and the sound of words comes to its full power only through rhythm4 ,evidently there can be no surprise and no disappointment unless there is expectation and most rhythms perhaps are made up as much of disappointments and postponements and surprises and betrayals as of simple1 straightforward satisfactions4 ,hence the rapidity with which too simple rhythms1 those which are too easily #8seen through'1 grow cloying or insipid unless hypnoidal states intervene1 as with much primitive music and dancing and often with metre4 ,the same definition of rhythm may be extended to the plastic arts and to architecture4 ,temporal sequence is not strictly necessary for rhythm1 though in the vast majority of cases it is involved4 ,the attention usually passes successively from one complex to another1 the expectations1 the readiness to perceive this rather than that1 aroused by the one being either satisfied or surprised by the other4 ,surprise plays an equally important part here2 and the difference in detail between a surprising and delightful variation and one which merely irritates and breaks down the rhythm1 as we say1 is here1 as elsewhere1 a matter of the combination and resolution of impulses too subtle for our present means of investigation4 ,all depends upon whether what comes can be an ingredient in the further response1 or whether the mind must1 as it were1 start anew2 in more ordinary language1 upon whether there is any #8connection' between the parts of the whole4 ,but the rhythmic elements in a picture or a building may be not successive but simultaneous4 ,a quick reader who sees a word as a whole commonly overlooks misprints because the general form of the word is such that he is only able at that instant to perceive one particular letter in a particular place and so overlooks what is discrepant4 ,the parts of a visual field exert what amounts to a simultaneous influence over one another4 ,more strictly what is discrepant does not get through to more central regions4 ,similarly1 with those far more intricate wholes1 made up of all kinds of imagery and incipient action of which works of art consist4 ,the parts of a growing response mutually modify one another and this is all that is required for rhythm to be possible4 ,we may turn now to that more complex and1 more specialised form of temporal rhythmic sequence which is known as metre4 ,this is the means by which words may be made to influence one another to the greatest possible extent4 ,in metrical reading the narrowness and definiteness of expectancy1 as much unconscious as ever in most cases1 is very greatly increased1 reaching in some cases1 if rime also is used1 almost exact precision4 ,furthermore1 what is anticipated becomes through the regularity of the time intervals in metre virtually dated4 ,this is no mere matter of more or less perfect correspondence with the beating of some internal metronome4 ,the whole conception of metre as #8uniformity in variety'1 a kind of mental drill in which words1 those erratic and varied things1 do their best to behave as though they were all the same1 with certain concessions1 licences and equivalences allowed1 should nowadays be obsolete4 ,it is a survivor which is still able to do a great deal of harm to the uninitiated1 however1 and although it has been knocked on the head vigorously enough by ,professor ,saintsbury and others1 it is as difficult to kill as ,punch4 ,most treatises on the subject1 with their talk of feet and of stresses1 unfortunately tend to encourage it1 however little this may be the aim of the authors4 ,as with rhythm so with metre1 we must not think of it as in the words themselves or in the thumping of the drum4 ,it is not in the stimulation1 it is in our response4 ,metre adds to all the variously fated expectancies which make up rhythm a definite temporal pattern and its effect is not due to our perceiving a pattern in something outside us1 but to our becoming patterned ourselves4 ,with every beat of the metre a tide of anticipation in us turns and swings1 setting up as it does so extraordinarily extensive sympathetic reverberations4 ,we shall never understand metre so long as we ask1 #8,why does3 temporal pattern so excite us'8 and fail to realise that the pattern itself is a vast cyclic agitation spreading all over the body1 a tide of excitement pouring through the channels of the mind4 ,the notion that there is any virtue in regularity or in variety1 or in any other formal feature1 apart from its effects upon us1 must be discarded before any metrical problem can be understood4 ,the regularity to which metre tends acts through the definiteness of the anticipations which are thereby aroused4 ,it is through these that it gets such a hold upon the mind4 ,once again1 here too1 the failure of our expectations is often more important than success4 ,verse in which we constantly get exactly what we are ready for and no more1 instead of something which we can and must take up and incorporate as another stage in a total developing response is merely toilsome and tedious4 ,in prose1 the influence of past words extends only a little way ahead4 ,in verse1 especially when stanza-form and rime co-operate to give a larger unit than the line1 it may extend far ahead4 ,it is this knitting together of the parts of the poem which explains the mnemonic power of verse1 the first of the suggestions as to the origin of metre to be found in the ,fourteenth ,chapter of ,biographia ,literaria1 that lumber-room of neglected wisdom which contains more hints towards a theory of poetry than all the rest ever written upon the subject4 ,we do great violence to the facts if we suppose the expectations excited as we read verse to be concerned only with the stress1 emphasis1 length1 foot structure and so forth of the syllables which follow4 ,even in this respect the custom of marking syllables in two degrees only1 long and short1 light and full1 etc41 is inadequate1 although doubtless forced upon metrists by practical considerations4 ,the mind in the poetic experience responds to subtler niceties than these4 ,when not in that experience but coldly considering their several qualities as sounds by the ear alone1 it may well find two degrees all that are necessary4 ,in ,chapter ,,xiii we saw an analogous situation arising in the case of the discrimination of colours4 ,the obvious comparison with the difference between what even musical notation can record in music and the player's interpretation can usefully be made here4 ,a more serious omission is the neglect by the majority of metrists of the pitch relations of syllables4 ,the reading of poetry is of course not a monotonous and subdued form of singing4 ,there is no question of definite pitches at which the syllables must be taken1 nor perhaps of definite harmonic relations between different sounds4 ,but that a rise and fall of pitch is involved in metre and is as much part of the poet's technique as any other feature of verse1 as much under his control also1 is indisputable4 ,anyone who is not clear upon this point may compare as a striking instance ,milton's ,hymn on the ,morning of ,christ's ,nativity with ,collins' ,ode to ,simplicity and both with the second ,chorus of ,hellas discussed in ,chapter ,,xxviii4 ,due allowances made for the natural peculiarities of different readers1 the scheme of pitch relations1 in their contexts1 of ,that on the bitter cross ,must redeem our loss2 and of ,but com'st a decent maid1 ,in ,attic robe array'1 are clearly different4 ,there is nothing arbitrary or out of the poet's control in this1 as there is nothing arbitrary or out of his control in the way in which an adequate reader will stress particular syllables4 ,he brings both about by the same means1 the modification of the reader's impulses by what has gone before4 ,it is true that some words resist emphasis far more than perhaps any resist change of pitch1 yet this difference is merely one of degree4 ,it is as natural to lower the pitch in reading the word #8loss' as it is to emphasise it as compared with #8our' in the same context4 ,here again we see how impossible it is to consider rhythm or metre as though it were purely an affair of the sensory aspect of syllables and could be dissociated from their sense and from the emotional effects which come about through their sense4 ,one principle may1 however1 be hazarded4 ,as in the case of painting the more direct means are preferable to the less direct 7see ,chapter ,,xviii71 so in poetry4 ,what can be done by sound should not be done otherwise or in violation of the natural effects of sound4 ,violations of the natural emphases and tones of speech brought about for the sake of the further effects due to thought and feeling are perilous1 though1 on occasion1 they may be valuable devices4 ,the use of italics in ,cain to straighten out the blank verse is as glaring an instance as any4 ,but more liberties are justified in dramatic writing than elsewhere1 and poetry is full of exceptions to such principles4#ej ,we must not forget that ,milton did not disdain to use special spelling1 #8mee'1 for example1 in place of #8me'1 in order to suggest additional emphasis when he feared that the reader might be careless4 ,so far we have been concerned with metre only as a specialised form of rhythm1 giving an increased interconnection between words through an increased control of anticipation4 ,but it has other1 in some cases even more important powers4 ,its use as an hypnotic agent is probably very ancient4 ,coleridge once again drops his incidental remark1 just beside yet extremely close to the point4 8,it tends to increase the vivacity and susceptibility both of the general feelings and of the attention4 ,this effect it produces by the continued excitement of surprise1 and by the quick reciprocations of curiosity still gratified and still re-excited1 which are too slight indeed to be at any moment objects of distinct consciousness1 yet become considerable in their aggregate influence4 ,as a medicated atmosphere1 or as wine during animated conversation1 they act powerfully1 though themselves unnoticed40 7,biographia ,literaria1 ,chap4 ,,xviii47 ,mr ,yeats1 when he speaks of the function of metre being to 8lull the mind into a waking trance0 is describing the same effect1 however strange his conception of this trance may be4 ,that certain metres1 or rather that a certain handling of metre should produce in a slight degree a hypnoidal state is not surprising4 ,but it does so not as ,coleridge suggests1 through the surprise element in metrical effects1 but through the absence of surprise1 through the lulling effects more than through the awakening4 ,many of the most characteristic symptoms of incipient hypnosis are present in a slight degree4 ,among these susceptibility and vivacity of emotion1 suggestibility1 limitations of the field of attention1 marked differences in the incidence of belief-feelings closely analogous to those which alcohol and nitrous oxide can induce1 and some degree of hypersthesia 7increased power of discriminating sensations7 may be noted4 ,we need not boggle at the word #8hypnosis'4 ,it is sufficient to say1 borrowing a phrase from ,m4 ,jules ,romains1 that there is a change in the regime of consciousness1 which is directly due to the metre1 and that to this regime the above-mentioned characteristics attach4 ,as regards the hypersthesia1 there may be several ways of interpreting what can be observed4 ,all that matters here is that syllables1 which in prose or in vers libres sound thin1 tinny and flat1 often gain an astonishing sonority and fullness even in verse which seems to possess no very subtle metrical structure4 ,metre has another mode of action not hitherto mentioned4 ,there can be little doubt that historically it has been closely associated with dancing1 and that the connections of the two still hold4 ,this is true at least of some #8measures'4 ,either motor images1 images of the sensations of dancing1 or1 more probably1 imaginal and incipient movements follow the syllables and make up their #8movement'4 ,a place for these accompaniments should be found in the diagram in ,chapter ,,xvi4 ,once the metre has begun to #8catch on' they are almost as closely bound up with the sequence of the words as the tied #8verbal' images themselves4 ,the extension of this #8movement' of the verse from dance forms to more general movements is natural and inevitable4 ,that there is a very close connection between the sense and the metrical movement of ,and now the numerous tramplings quiver lightly ,along a huge cloud's ridge2 and now with sprightly ,wheel downward come they into fresher skies1 cannot be doubted whatever we may think of the rime4 ,it is not less clear in ,where beyond the extreme sea wall1 and between the remote sea gates1 ,waste water washes1 and tall ships founder1 and deep death waits1 or in ,ran on embattell'd ,armies clad in ,iron1 than it is in ,we sweetly curtsied each to each ,and deftly danced a saraband4 ,nor is it always the case that the movement takes its cue from the sense4 ,it is often a commentary on the sense and sometimes may qualify it1 as when the resistless strength of ,coriolanus in battle is given an appearance of dreadful ease by the leisureliness of the description1 ,death1 that dark spirit1 in's nervy arm doth lie ,which being advanc'd declines1 and then men die4 ,movement in poetry deserves at least as much study as onomatopia4 ,this account1 of course1 by no means covers all the ways by which metre takes effect in poetry4 ,the fact that we appropriately use such words as #8lulling'1 #8stirring'1 #8solemn'1 #8pensive'1 #8gay' in describing metres is an indication of their power more directly to control emotion4 ,but the more general effects are more important4 ,through its very appearance of artificiality metre produces in the highest degree the #8frame' effect1 isolating the poetic experience from the accidents and irrelevancies of everyday existence4 ,we have seen in ,chapter ,x how necessary this isolation is and how easily it may be mistaken for a difference in kind4 ,much which in prose would be too personal or too insistent1 which might awaken irrelevant conjectures or might #8overstep itself' is managed without disaster in verse4 ,there are1 it is true1 equivalent resources in prose--irony1 for example1 very frequently has this effect--but their scope is far more limited4 ,metre for the most difficult and most delicate utterances is the all but inevitable means4 #di ,works1 ,,ii1 #aga4 #ej ,it is worth remarking that any application of critical principles must be indirect4 ,they are not any the less useful because this is so4 ,misunderstanding on this point has often led artists to accuse critics of wishing to make art a matter of rules1 and their objection to any such attempt is entirely justified4 ,,chapter ,,xviii ,on ,looking at a ,picture ,hived in our bosoms like the bag o' the bee1 ,think'st thou the honey with those objects grew8 ,don ,juan4 ,the diagram and account given of the processes which make up the reading of a poem may be easily modified to represent what happens when we look at a picture1 a statue or building1 or listen to a piece of music4 ,the necessary changes are fairly obvious1 and it will only be necessary here to indicate them briefly4 ,needless to say the importance to the whole response of different kinds of elements varies enormously from art to art2 so much so as to explain without difficulty the opinion so often held by persons interested primarily in one of the arts--that the others 7or some of them7 are entirely different in nature4 ,thus painters often aver that poetry is so different1 so indirect1 so second-hand in the way in which it produces its results1 as hardly to deserve the name of an art at all4 ,but1 as we shall see1 the differences between separate arts are sometimes no greater than differences to be found in each of them2 and close analogies can be discovered by careful analysis between all of them4 ,these analogies indeed are among the most interesting features which such scrutiny as we are here attempting can make clear4 ,for an understanding of the problems of one art is often of great service in avoiding misconceptions in another4 ,the place of representation in painting1 for example1 is greatly elucidated by a sound comprehension of the place of reference or thought in poetry1 just as a crude view on this latter point is likely to involve unfortunate mistakes upon the first4 ,similarly a too narrow view of music which would limit it to an affair merely of the appreciation of the pitch and time relations of notes may be corrected most easily by a comparison with the phenomena of colour in the plastic arts4 ,comparison of the arts is1 in fact1 far the best means by which an understanding of the methods and resources of any one of them can be attained4 ,we must be careful of course not to compare the wrong features of two arts and not to find merely fanciful or insecurely grounded analogies4 ,the dangers both of too close assimilation and too wide separation of the structures of different arts are well illustrated in criticism1 both before and since the days of ,lessing4 ,only a thorough psychological analysis will allow them to be avoided1 and those whose experience leads them to doubt whether analogies are of service1 may be asked whether their objection is not directed merely to attempts to compare different arts without a sufficient analysis4 ,with such an analysis1 comparison and the elaboration of analogies involve no attempt to make one art legislate for another1 no attempt to blur their differences or to destroy their autonomy4 ,in analysing the experiences of the visual arts the first essential is to avoid the word #8see'1 a term which is treacherous in its ambiguity4 ,if we say that we see a picture we may mean either that we see the pigment-covered surface1 or that we see the image on the retina cast by this surface1 or that we see certain planes or volumes in what is called the #8picture-space'4 ,these senses are completely distinct4 ,in the first case we are speaking of the source of the stimulus1 in the second of the immediate effect of the stimulus on the retina1 in the third we are referring to a complex response made up of perceivings and imaginings due to the intervention of mental structures left behind by past experience1 and excited by the stimulus4 ,the first case we may leave out of account as a matter of purely technical interest4 ,the degree of similarity holding between the second and third1 between the first effect of the stimulus and the whole visual response1 will of course vary greatly in different cases4 ,a perfectly flat1 meticulously detailed depiction of conventionally conceived objects1 such as is so often praised in the ,academy for its #8finish'1 may be very nearly the same from its first impression on the retina to the last effort which vision can make upon it4 ,at the other extreme a ,czanne1 for example1 which to the eye of a person quite unfamiliar with such a manner of painting may at first seem only a field or area of varied light1 may1 as the response develops1 through repeated glances1 become first an assemblage of blots and patches of colour1 and then1 as these recede and advance1 tilt and spread relatively to one another and become articulated1 a system of volumes4 ,finally1 as the distances and stresses of their volumes become more definitely imagined1 it becomes an organisation of the entire #8picture-space' into a three-dimensional whole with the characters of the solid masses which appear in it1 their weights1 textures1 tensions and what not1 very definitely1 as it seems1 given4 ,with familiarity the response is of course shortened4 ,its final visual stage is reached much sooner1 and the stages outlined above become1 through this telescoping1 too fleeting to be noticed4 ,none the less the great difference between the first retinal impression and the complete visual response remains4 ,the retinal impression1 the sign1 that is1 for the response1 contains actually but a small part of the whole final product1 an all-important part it is true1 the seed in fact from which the whole response grows4 ,the additions made in the course of the response are of several kinds4 ,they may1 perhaps1 for our present purposes be spoken of without misunderstanding as images1 or image-substitutes 7see ,chapter ,,xvi74 ,the eye1 as is well known1 is peculiar among our sense organs in that the receptor1 the retina1 is a part of the brain1 instead of being a separate thing connected with the brain more or less remotely by a peripheral nerve4 ,moreover there are certain connections leading from other parts of the brain outwards to the retina as well as connections leading inwards4 ,thus there is some ground for supposing that through these outgoing connections actual retinal effects may accompany some visual images1 which would thereby become much more like actual sensations than is the case with the other senses4 ,however this may be1 the process whereby an impression which1 if interpreted in one way 7e4g4 by a person measuring the pigmented areas of a canvas71 is correctly counted as a sign of a flat coloured surface1 becomes1 when differently interpreted1 an intricately divided three-dimensional space--this process is one of the intervention of images of several kinds4 ,the order of these interventions probably varies from case to case4 ,perhaps the most important of the images which come in to give depth1 volume1 solidity to the partly imagined and partly perceived #8picture-space' are those which are relicts of eye movements1 kinsthetic images of the convergence of the eyes and accommodation of the lenses according to the distance of the object contemplated4 ,when1 as it seems1 we look past an object in a picture to some more distant object1 seeming in so doing to change the focus of our eyes1 we do not as a rule actually make any change4 ,but certainly we feel as though we were focussing differently and as though the convergence were different4 ,this felt difference which mainly gives the sense of greater distance is due to kinsthetic imagery4 ,correspondingly the parts of the #8picture-space' upon which we seem to be focussing1 upon which we are imaginally focussing1 become definite and distinct1 and parts much nearer or much more distant become to some extent blurred and diffused4 ,this effect is probably due to visual images1 simulating the sensations which would normally ensue were we actually making a change of focus4 ,the degree to which these last effects occur appears to differ very greatly from one person to another4 ,insufficient attention to the great variation in the means by which these images are involved by the painting is responsible for much bad criticism4 ,thus artists can commonly be found who are quite unable1 when looking at paintings3 in which the means employed are unlike their own1 to apprehend forms over which less specialised persons find no difficulty4 ,in general most visitors to ,galleries pay too little attention to the fact that few pictures can be instantaneously apprehended1 that even ten minutes' study is quite inadequate in the case of unfamiliar kinds of work1 and that the capacity for #8seeing' pictures 7in sense three71 an indispensable but merely an initial step to appreciating them1 is something which has to be acquired4 ,it is naturally of great assistance if many works by the same painter or of the same ,school can be seen together1 for then the essential methods employed become clearer4 ,in a general collection it is difficult not to look at too great a variety of pictures1 and a confusion results1 perhaps unnoticed1 which is a serious obstacle to the coherent building up of any one picture4 ,the fashion in which most ,old ,masters are hidden away under grime and glass and the efforts which are necessary in order to reconstruct them are additional obstacles4 ,the neglect of these obvious facts is the chief explanation of the low level of appreciation and criticism from which the art of painting at present suffers4 ,following upon the visual images are a swarm of others varying from picture to picture3 tactile images giving the appearance of texture to surfaces1 muscular images giving hardness1 stiffness1 softness1 flexibility and so on to the volumes imagined--the lightness and insubstantiality of muslin1 the solidity and fixity of rock being matters of the intervention of images due originally to the sensations we have received in the past from these materials4 ,this muscular imagery is of course called up in differing ways in different cases4 ,primarily it is due to the imitation by the artist of subtleties in the light given off by the materials1 or characteristic peculiarities in their form1 but there are1 as we shall see1 more indirect but also less stable1 less reliable and less efficacious ways by which they may be evoked4 ,the same applies to the other images1 thermal1 olfactory1 auditory and the rest1 which may be involved in particular cases4 ,there is a direct and an indirect way in which they can be evoked4 ,they may spring up at the visual appeal or they may only respond at a later stage as a result of roundabout trains of thinking4 ,thus a silk scarf may look soft and light2 or we may imagine it as light1 it looking all the while iron-hard and heavy1 because we know that it is a scarf and that scarves are soft and light4 ,the two methods are very different4 ,the second is a reversal of the natural order of perception and for this reason the condemnation so often heard from painters1 of the literary or #8detective' approach to pictures1 of which this would be a representative specimen1 is well merited4 ,we must1 however1 distinguish cases in which there is this reversal from those in which it does not occur1 those namely in which by a process of inference we arrive at conclusions about the represented objects which could not possibly be directly given4 ,but this question may be deferred until we come to discuss representation4 ,hitherto in considering the growth of the three-dimensional imagined picture-space we have not explicitly mentioned the part played by colour nor the equally important effect of this growth in modifying the original colours of the first retinal impression4 ,but not only may colour be the chief factor determining form1 i4e4 the three-dimensional organisation of space1 but it is itself most vitally modified by form4 ,colours as signs1 that is to say even at the most optical and least elaborated stage1 have certain very marked spatial characters of their own4 ,red1 for example1 seems to advance towards the eye and to swell out of its boundaries1 while blue seems to retreat and to withdraw into itself#ea4 ,degree of saturation may also give recession in obvious and in more recondite ways4 ,pure colours in the foreground and greyed colours in the background are a simple example4 ,similarly opposition of colours is one of the main means by which the stresses and strains of volumes may be suggested4 ,these characters of colours1 especially when they reinforce and co-operate with one another1 may be made to play a very important part in determining the way in which the picture-space is constructed when we look at a picture4 ,equally important are the less direct effects upon our picture-space imagining of the emotional or organic responses which we make to different colours4 ,individuals vary greatly in the extent to which they notice and can reflectively distinguish these responses1 and probably also in the degree to which they actually make different responses4 ,to persons sensitive in this respect1 the colours excite each a distinct1 well-marked emotion 7and attitude7 capable of being clearly differentiated from others4 ,the sad poverty and vagueness of the colour vocabulary1 however1 misleads many people with regard to these4 ,each of the #8puces'1 #8mauves'1 #8magentas' etc4 has to cover numbers of distinguishable colours1 often with strikingly different effects upon us4 ,thus people who are content to say that pink is their favourite colour1 or that green always suits them1 are either quite undiscriminating in their attitude towards colour or little attentive to the actual effects produced upon them4 ,a similar obtuseness or insincerity is evidenced when it is maintained1 as is often done1 that pink and green do not go together4 ,some pinks and some greens do not1 but some do1 and the test of a colourist is just his ability to feel which are which4 ,few if any1 in fact1 of the colour relations with which the painter is concerned can be stated with the aid of such general terms--#8red'1 #8brown'1 #8yellow'1 #8grey'1 #8primrose'1 etc4--as are at present available4 ,each of these stands for a number of different colours whose relations to a given colour will commonly be different4 ,taking #8colour' in this sense to stand for specific colours1 not for classes or ranges of varying hues1 sets of colours1 where in certain spatial proportions and in certain relations of saturation1 brightness and luminosity relatively to one another1 excite responses of emotion and attitude with marked individual characteristics4 ,colours1 in fact1 have harmonic relations1 although the physical laws governing these relations are at present unknown1 and the relations themselves only imperfectly ascertained4 ,for every colour another can be found such that the combined response to the two will be of a recognisable kind1 whose peculiarities are due probably to the compatibility with one another of the impulses set up by each4 ,this compatibility varies in a number of ways4 ,the result is that for every colour a set of other colours is discoverable such that the response to each of them is compatible with the response to the tonic colour in a definite way4#eb ,a sensitive colourist feels these compatibilities as giving to these combinations of colours a definite character1 which no other combinations possess4 ,similarly relations of incompatibility between colours can also be felt such that their combination yields no ordered response but merely a clash and confusion of responses4 ,colours which just fail to be complementary are a typical example4 ,similarly the primary colours in combination are offensive2 should this precise kind of offensiveness be part of the artist's purpose1 he will1 of course1 make use of them4 ,the fact that roses1 sunsets1 and so forth are so often found to present harmonious combinations of colour may appear a little puzzling by this account4 ,but the vast range of close gradations1 which a rose petal1 for example1 presents1 supplies the explanation4 ,out of all these the eye picks that gradation which best accords with the other colours chosen4 ,there is usually some set of colours in some harmonious relation to one another to be selected out of the multitudinous gradations which natural objects in most lightings present2 and there are evident reasons why the eye of a sensitive person should1 when it can1 pick out those gradations which best accord4 ,the great range of different possible selections is1 however1 of importance4 ,it explains the fact that we see such different colours for instance when gloomy and when gay1 and thus how the actual selection made by an artist may reveal the kind and direction of the impulses which are active in him at the moment of selection4 ,needless to say in the absence of a clear nomenclature and standardisation of colours the task of describing and recording colour relations is of great difficulty1 but the unanimity of competent1 that is1 sensitive persons as to which colours are related in specific ways to which1 is too great to be disregarded4 ,it is as great as the unanimity among musicians as to the harmonic relations of notes to one another4 ,the great differences between the two cases are not likely to be overlooked4 ,the presence of physical laws in many cases connecting notes harmonically related and the absence of similar known physical laws connecting colours is a glaring difference4 ,but it should not be forgotten that these physical laws are1 as it were1 an extra-musical piece of knowledge4 ,what matters to the musician is not the physical connections between notes but the compatibilities and incompatibilities in the responses of emotion and attitude which they excite4 ,the musical relations between the notes would be the same even though the physical relations between the stimuli which arouse them were quite different4 ,naturally enough the analogy with the harmonic relations of music has been the chief guide to those who have systematically investigated colour relations4 ,whatever may be the precise limits to which it may profitably be carried1 for anyone who wishes to form a general conception of the emotional effects of colours in combination it is of very great value4 ,colour is of course primarily the cause and controlling factor of emotional response to painting1 but1 as we have said1 it may1 and commonly does1 help to determine form4 ,parts of a picture which are through their colour out of all emotional connection with the rest of the picture1 tend1 other things being equal1 to fall out of the picture altogether1 appearing as patches accidentally adhering to the surface or as gaps through which something else irrelevant is seen4 ,this is the extreme instance1 but the influence of colour upon form through the emotional relations of colours to one another is all-pervading ,sometimes colour strengthens and solidifies the structure1 sometimes it fights against it1 sometimes it turns into a commentary1 as it were1 the colour response modifying the form response and vice versa4 ,the great complexity of the colour and form interactions needs no insistence4 ,they are so various that no rule can possibly be laid down as to a right relation for all cases4 ,all depends upon what the whole response which the painter is seeking to record may be4 ,as with attempts to define a universal proper relation of rhythm to thought in poetry 7e4g4 the assertion that rhythm should echo or correspond to thought1 etc471 so with general remarks as to how form and colour should be related4 ,all depends upon the purpose1 the total response to which both form and colour are merely means4 ,mistakes between means and ends1 glorifying particular techniques into inexplicable virtues are at least as common in the criticism of painting as with any other of the arts4 ,one other aspect of the picture-space needs consideration4 ,it is not necessarily a fixed and static construction1 but may in several ways contain elements of movement4 ,some of these may be eye movements1 or kinsthetic images of eye movements4 ,as the eye wanders imaginally from point to point the relations between the parts of the picture-space change2 thus an effect of movement is induced4 ,equally important are the fusions of successive visual images which may be suggested by drawing4 ,as we watch1 for example1 an arm being flexed1 the eye receives a series of successive and changing retinal impressions4 ,certain combinations of these1 which represent not the position and form of the arm at any instant1 but a compromise or fusion of different positions and forms1 have an easily explicable capacity to represent the whole series1 and thus to represent movement4 ,the use of such fused images in drawing may easily be mistaken for distortion1 but when properly interpreted it may yield normal forms in movement4 ,many other means by which movement is given in ,painting might be mentioned4 ,one means by which colour1 may suggest it1 for example1 is well indicated in the following description by ,signac of ,muley-abd-er ,rahman entour de sa garde3 8la tumulte est traduit par l'accord presque dissonant du grand parasol vert sur le bleu du ciel1 surexcit dj par l'orang des murailles#ec04 ,it need hardly be pointed out that the response made to the picture-space varies enormously according to whether the forms in it are seen as in rest or in movement4 ,so far we have merely discussed what may be described as the sensory elements in the picture1 and the responses in emotion and attitude due to these elements4 ,but in most painting there are further elements essentially involved4 ,it has been asserted that all further elements are irrelevant1 at least to appreciation2 and as a reaction to common views that seem to overlook the sensory elements altogether the doctrine is comprehensible and perhaps not without value4 ,for too many people do look at pictures primarily with intent to discover what they are #8of'1 what they represent1 without allowing the most important thing in the picture1 its sensory stimulation through colour and form1 to take effect4 ,but the reaction goes too far when it denies the relevance of the representative elements in all cases4 ,it may be freely granted that there are great pictures in which nothing is represented1 and great pictures in which what is represented is trivial and may be disregarded4 ,it is equally certain that there are great pictures in which the contribution to the whole response made through representation is not less than that made more directly through form and colour4 ,to those who can accept the general psychological standpoint already outlined1 or indeed any modern account of the working of the mind1 the assertion that there is no reason why representative and formal factors in an experience should conflict1 but much reason why they should co-operate1 will need no discussion4 ,the psychology of #8unique sthetic emotions' and #8pure art values' upon which the contrary view relies is merely a caprice of the fancy4 ,the place of representation in the work o different masters varies enormously and it is not true that the value of their works varies correspondingly4 ,from ,raphael and ,picasso at one extreme to ,rembrandt1 ,goya and ,hogarth at the other1 ,rubens1 ,delacroix and ,giotto occupying an intermediate position1 all degrees of participation between non-representative form and represented subject in the building up of the whole response can be found4 ,we may perhaps hazard1 for reasons indicated already1 as a principle admitting of exception1 that what can be done by sensory means should not be done indirectly through representation4 ,but to say more than this is to give yet another instance of the commonest of critical mistakes3 the exaltation of a method into an end4 ,representation in painting corresponds to thought in poetry4 ,the same battles over the ,intellect-,emotion imbroglio rage in both fields4 ,the views recently so fashionable that representation has no place in art and that treatment not subject is what matters in poetry spring ultimately from the same mistakes as to the relation of thinking to feeling1 from an inadequate psychology which would set up one as inimical to the other4 ,reinforced as they are by the illusion1 supported by language1 that ,beauty is a quality of things1 not a character of our response to them1 and thus that all beautiful things as sharing this ,beauty must be alike1 the confusion which such views promote is a main cause of the difficulty which is felt so widely in appreciating both the arts and poetry4 ,they give an air of an esoteric mystery to what is1 if it can be done at all1 the simplest and most natural of proceedings4 ,the fundamental features of the experiences of reading poetry and of appreciating pictures1 the features upon which their value depends1 are alike4 ,the means by which they are brought about are unlike1 but closely analogous critical and technical problems arise1 as we have seen1 for each4 ,the misapprehensions to which thought is liable recur in all the fields in which it is exercised1 and the fact that it is sometimes more easy to detect a mistake in one field than in another is a strong argument for comparing such closely allied subjects4 #ea ,this character of blue is the basis of the doctrine of ,reynolds1 that blue is unsuitable in foregrounds1 which led ,gainsborough1 according to the well-known story1 to paint ,the ,blue ,boy4 #eb ,this account of harmony also applies to music4 ,few modern authorities are content to regard harmony as an affair merely of the physical relationships of notes4 #ec ,d',eugne ,delacroix au ,no-,impressionisme1 p4 #ci4 ,,chapter ,,xix ,sculpture and the ,construction of ,form ,thus men forgot ,that ,all ,deities reside in the ,human breast4 ,the ,marriage of ,heaven and ,hell4 ,the initial signs from which the work of art is built up psychologically in the case of sculpture differ in several respects from the initial signs of painting4 ,there are of course forms of sculpture for which the difference is slight4 ,some bas-reliefs1 for example1 can be considered as essentially drawings1 and sculpture placed as a decorative detail in architecture so that it can only be viewed from one angle has necessarily to be interpreted in much the same manner4 ,similarly some primitive sculpture in which only one aspect is represented may be considered as covered by what has been said about painting1 although the fact that the relief and the relation of volumes is more completely given and less supplied by imaginative effort is of some consequence4 ,further1 the changes1 slight though they may be1 which accompany slight movements of the contemplator have their effect4 ,his total attitude is altered in a way which may or may not be important according to circumstances4 ,with sculpture in which a number 7four for example7 of aspects are fully treated without any attempt to fill in the intermediate connecting aspects1 the whole state of affairs is changed1 since there arises the interpretative task of uniting these aspects into a whole4 ,this connection of a number of aspects into a whole may be made in varying ways4 ,the signs may receive a visual interpretation and the form be mainly built up of visual images combined in sequences or fused4 ,this1 however1 is an unsatisfactory method4 ,it tends to leave out or blur too many of the possible responses to the statue and there is usually something unstable about such syntheses4 ,the form so constructed is insubstantial and incomplete4 ,thus those sculptors whose work primarily asks for such a visual interpretation are commonly felt to be lacking in what is called a #8sense of form'4 ,the reasons for this are to be found in the nature of visual imagery and in the necessarily limited character of our purely visual awareness of space4 ,but the connection may be made1 not through visual combination1 but through combination of the various muscular images whereby we feel1 or imaginatively construct the tensions1 weights1 stresses1 etc4 of physical objects4 ,each sequence of visual impressions as we look at the statue from varying standpoints calls up a group of these muscular images1 and these images are capable of much more subtle and stable combinations than the corresponding visual images4 ,thus two visual images which are incompatible with one another may be each accompanied by muscular images 7feelings of stress1 tension1 etc47 which are perfectly compatible and unite to form a coherent whole free from conflict4 ,by this means we may realise the solidity of forms far more perfectly than if we rely upon visual resources alone1 and since it is mainly through the character of the statue as a solid that the sculptor works1 this muscular interpretation has1 as a rule1 obvious and overwhelming advantages4 ,none the less a place remains for sculpture whose primary interpretation is in visual terms4 ,looking at any of the more recent work of ,epstein1 for example1 a feeling of quick and active intelligence on the part of the contemplator arises1 and this sense of his own activity is the source of much that follows in his response4 ,by contrast a work of ,rodin seems to be not so much exciting activity in him as active itself4 ,the correlation of visual aspects1 in other words1 is a conscious process compared with the automatic correlation of muscular image responses4 ,the first we seem to be doing ourselves1 the second seems to be something which belongs to the statue4 ,this difference as we have described it is of course a technical difference and by itself involves nothing as to the value of the different works concerned4 ,a similar difference may be found in the apprehension of form in painting4 ,these two modes are not as separate as our account would suggest2 neither occurs in purity4 ,their interaction is further complicated through the highly representational character of most sculpture1 and through the interlinking of different interpretations due to the congruences and incompatibilities of the emotional responses to which they give rise4 ,with sculpture perhaps more than with any other of the plastic arts we are in danger of overlooking the work of the contemplator's imagination in filling out and interpreting the sign4 ,what we transport from ,egypt to ,london is merely a set of signs1 from which a suitable interpreter setting about it rightly can produce a certain state of mind4 ,it is this state of mind which matters and which gives its value to the statue4 ,but so obscure to ordinary introspection are the processes of the interpretation that we tend to think that none occur4 ,that we interpret a picture or a poem is obvious upon very little reflection4 ,that we interpret a mass of marble is less obvious4 ,the historical accident that speculation upon ,beauty largely developed in connection with sculpture is responsible in great degree for the fixity of the opinion that ,beauty is something inherent in physical objects1 not a character of some of our responses to objects4 ,from certain visual signs1 then1 the contemplator constructs1 muscularly as well as visually1 the spatial form of the statue4 ,we have seen that the picture-space is a construction1 similarly the statue-space is a construction1 and the proportions and relations of the volumes which in this statue-space make up the statue are by no means necessarily the same as those of the mass of marble from which we receive our signs4 ,in other words1 the scientific examination of the statue and the imaginative contemplation of it do not yield the same spatial results4 ,thus the process of measuring#ed statues with a view to discovering a numerical formula for ,beauty is little likely to be fruitful4 ,and the work of those1 such as ,havard ,thomas1 who have attempted to use this method1 show the features which we should expect4 ,their merits derive from factors outside the range of the theory4 ,the psychological processes involved in the construction of space are too subtle1 and the differences between the actual configuration of the marble and the configuration of the statue in the statue-space are brought about in too many ways for any correlation to be established4 ,among the factors which intervene in the building up of the imaginative form the most obvious are the lighting1 and the material4 ,with change of lighting1 change of form follows at once through change in the visual signs1 and since stone is often a translucent not an opaque material1 lighting is by no means such a simple matter as is sometimes supposed4 ,more is involved than the avoidance of distracting cast shadows and the disposal of the brightest illumination upon the right portions of the statue4 ,the general aim should obviously be to reproduce the lighting for which the sculptor designed his work1 an aim which requires very sensitive and full appreciation for its success4 ,an aim1 moreover1 which in the case of works transported from ,north to ,south and vice versa is sometimes impossible of realisation4 ,the interpretation of form is an extraordinarily complex affair4 ,the consequences of the asymmetricality of space as we construct it must be noted4 ,up and down have distinct characters which differ from those of right and left1 which differ again from those of away and towards us4 ,a measured vertical distance does not seem to us the same as an equal horizontal distance4 ,nor does a equal distance away from us seem equal to either4 ,these effects are modified again1 sometimes reinforced1 sometimes reduced1 by effects due to quite a different source1 to the relative ease or difficulty with which the eye follows certain lines4 ,the greater and less compatibility of certain eye movements with others is the cause of much of what is confusedly called ,rhythm in the plastic arts4 ,after certain lines we expect others1 and the success or failure of our expectation modifies our response4 ,unexpectedness1 of course1 is an obvious technical resource for the artist4 ,the intervention here of the representational factor cannot be overlooked4 ,an eye movement which encounters difficulty for any of a number of possible reasons1 among which so-called rhythmical factors deserve special notice1 is interpreted as standing for a greater distance than an equal but more easy movement4 ,this is only a rough rule1 for yet other psychological factors may come in to nullify or even reverse the effect2 for example1 an explicit recognition of the difficulty4 ,yet another determining condition in our estimation of intervals of space is the uniformity of their filling4 ,thus a line one inch long hatched across will generally seem longer than an equal line unhatched1 and a modulated surface seem larger than a smooth one4 ,these instances of the psychological factors which help to make the imaginatively constructed statue-space different from the actual space occupied by the marble will be enough to show how intricate is the interpretation by which we take even the first step towards the appreciation of a statue4 ,our full response of attitude and emotion is entirely dependent upon how we perform the initial operations4 ,it is of course impossible to make these interpretations separately1 consciously and deliberately4 ,neural arrangements over which we have little or no direct control perform them for us4 ,thanks to their complexity the resultant effect1 the imagined form of the statue1 will vary greatly from individual to individual and in the same individual from time to time4 ,it might be thought therefore that the hope that a statue will be a vehicle of the same experience for many different individuals is vain4 ,certain simplifications1 however1 save the situation4 ,form1 we have seen1 is1 through our selection among the possible signs present1 within certain limits what we like to make it4 ,as it varies1 so do our further or deeper responses of feeling and attitude vary4 ,but just as there are congruences and compatibilities among the responses we make1 in the case of colour1 which tend1 given certain colours1 to make us pick out of a range of possible colours one which will give us a congruent 7or harmonious7 response1 so it is with form4 ,out of the multitude of different forms which we might construct by stressing certain of the signs rather than others1 the fixing even temporarily of a part of the form tends to bias us towards so interpreting the rest as to yield responses accordant with those already active4 ,hence a great reduction of the disparity of the interpretations which arise1 hence also the danger of an initial misapprehension which perverts the rest of the interpretation4 ,this ,chapter1 like the last1 is intended as an indication1 merely1 of the ways in which a psychological analysis may assist the critic and help to remove misconceptions4 ,the usual practice of alluding to ,form as though it were a simple unanalysable virtue of objects--a procedure most discouraging to those who like to know what they are doing1 and thus very detrimental to general appreciation--will lapse when a better understanding of the situation becomes general4 ,none the less there are certain very puzzling facts as to the effects of forms when apprehended which in part explain this way of talking4 ,these are perhaps best considered in connection with ,music1 the most purely formal of the arts4 #ed ,this remark applies equally strongly to the attempts which are from time to time made to find formul for the proportions of buildings4 ,no one with an adequate idea of the complexity of the factors which determine our responses is likely to attach great importance to these investigations1 interesting though they are4 ,the interpretation of the results is not within sight of even the most optimistic of psychologists4 ,,chapter ,,xx ,the ,impasse of ,musical ,theory ,will twenty chapters render plain ,those lonely lights that still remain ,just breaking over land and main8 ,for fairly obvious reasons the psychology of ,music is often regarded as more backward than that of the other arts1 and the impasse which has here been reached more baffling and more exasperating4 ,but such advance as has been possible in the theory of the other arts has been mainly concerned with them as representational or as serviceable4 ,for poetry1 for painting1 for architecture there still remain problems as perplexing as any which can be raised about music4 ,for example1 what is the difference between good and bad blank verse in its formal aspect1 between delightful and distressing alliteration1 between euphony and cacophony1 between metrical triumph and metrical failure8 ,or in the case of ,painting1 why do certain forms excite such marked responses of emotion and attitude and others1 so very like them geometrically1 excite none or produce merely confusion8 ,why have colours their specific responses and how is it that their combinations have such subtle and yet definite effects8 ,or what is the reason that spaces and volumes in ,architecture affect us as they do8 ,these questions are at present as much without answers as any that we can raise about ,music2 but the fact that in these arts other questions arise which can in part be answered1 whereas in ,music questions about the effects of form overwhelmingly preponderate1 has in part obscured the situation4 ,other effects are of course also involved2 in programme music something analogous to representation in painting2 in opera and much other music1 dramatic action2 and so forth4 ,but these effects1 although often contributing to the total value1 are plainly subordinate in music to its more direct influence as sound alone4 ,the difficulties which they raise have such close analogies in painting and poetry that a separate discussion may be omitted4 ,the problem of #8pure form' arises1 however1 with peculiar insistence in music4 ,more than forty years ago ,gurney summed up the state of musical theory as follows3 8,when we come to actual forms1 and to the startling differences of merit which the very simplest known to us present1 the musical faculty defies all explanation of its action and its judgements4 ,the only conceivable explanation indeed would be an analogy1 and we know not where to look for it#ee04 ,and the work done since has added remarkably little4 ,as he so admirably insisted1 even though we confine ourselves to the responses of one individual1 all general explanations of the musical effect apply equally to the ineffective1 to the distressing and the delightful1 to the admirable and the atrocious alike4 ,but the same is true of all attempts to explain the effects upon us of any forms which neither represent something nor are in obvious ways serviceable4 ,whether they are forms seen or heard1 whether they are made up of notes or of movements1 of intervals of time or of images of speech1 the same is true of them all4 ,whatever effects cannot be traced to some practical use we might make of them 7as we use a plate to eat from or a house to live in71 or to some interference with or threat against the ways in which we might act1 or to some object practically interesting to us1 which they represent--all such effects are necessarily very difficult to explain4 ,there is nothing in the least mysterious1 however1 about the difficulty of explaining them4 ,the facts required happen to be beyond our present powers of observation4 ,they belong to a branch of psychology for which we have as yet no methods of investigation4 ,it seems likely that we shall have to wait a long while1 and that very great advances must first be made in neurology before these problems can profitably be attacked4 ,but however regrettable this may be1 there is no justification whatever for the invention of unique faculties and ultimate1 analysable1 indefinable entities4 ,to say that a thing is unanalysable may be to assert either that it is simple or that we do not know yet how to analyse it4 ,musical effects1 like the effects of forms in general1 are inexplicable in the second sense only4 ,to pretend that they are inexplicable in the first sense is mere mystery-mongering4 ,to take two parallel cases1 trade booms and fine weather were until recently inexplicable1 and are doubtless still in many respects difficult to account for4 ,but no one would pretend that these blessings require us to assume unique sui generis tendencies in economic or meteorological affairs4 ,but the practice of describing the #8musical faculty' and the formal effects of the arts in general as sui generis has another cause in addition to intellectual bewilderment4 ,many people think that to say that a mental activity is unique1 or sui generis1 in some way gives it a more exalted standing than if it were recognised as merely too complicated or too inaccessible to experiment to be at present explained4 ,in part this is a relic of the old opinion that explanation is itself derogatory1 an opinion which only those who are1 in this respect1 uneducated1 still entertain4 ,partly also this preference for #8unique' things is due to confusion with the sense in which ,st ,paul's may be said to be unique4 ,but the experience of #8seeing stars' after a bang on the nose is just as #8unique' as any act of musical appreciation and shares any exalted quality which such uniqueness may be supposed to confer4 ,every element in a form1 whether it be a musical form or any other1 is capable of exciting a very intricate and widespread response4 ,usually the response is of a minimal order and escapes introspection4 ,thus a single note or a uniform colour has for most people hardly any observable effect beyond its sensory characteristics4 ,when it occurs along with other elements the form which they together make up may have striking consequences in emotion and attitude4 ,if we regard this as an affair of mere summation of effects it may seem impossible that the effect of the form can be the result of the effects of the elements1 and thus it is natural and easy to invent ultimate properties of #8forms' by way of pseudo-explanation4 ,but a little more psychological insight makes these inventions appear quite unnecessary4 ,the effects of happenings in the mind rarely add themselves up4 ,our more intense experiences are not built up of less intense experiences as a wall is built up of bricks4 ,the metaphor of addition is utterly misleading4 ,that of the resolution of forces would be better1 but even this does not adequately represent the behaviour of the mind4 ,the separate responses which each element in isolation would tend to excite are so connected with one another that their combination is1 for our present knowledge1 incalculable in its effects4 ,two stimuli which1 when separated by one interval of time or space1 would merely cancel one another1 with another interval produce an effect which is far beyond anything which either alone could produce4 ,and the combined response when they are suitably arranged may be of quite another kind than that of either4 ,we may1 if we like1 think of the effects of impulses at various intervals of time upon a pendulum1 but this metaphor is1 as we have suggested1 insufficient4 ,it is over simple4 ,the intricacies of chemical reactions come nearer to being what we need4 ,the great quantities of latent energy which may be released by quite slight changes in conditions suggest better what happens when stimuli are combined4 ,but even this metaphor incompletely represents the complexity of the interactions in the nervous system4 ,it is only by conjecture that its working can as yet be divined4 ,what is certain is chat it is the most complex and the most sensitive thing of which we know4 ,the unpredicable and miraculous differences1 then1 in the total responses which slight changes in the arrangement of stimuli produce1 can be fully accounted for in terms of the sensitiveness of the nervous system2 and the mysteries of #8forms' are merely a consequence of our present ignorance of the detail of its action4 ,we have spoken above of the #8elements' of a form1 but in fact we do not yet know which these are4 ,any musical sound1 for example1 is plainly complex1 though how complex it is from the point of view of its musical effects is still very uncertain4 ,it has pitch1 it has timbre1 the characters which change as it is played upon one kind of instrument or another1 the characters which are sometimes called its colour4 ,its effects also vary with its loudness and with its volume4 ,it may be far more complex still4 ,its relations again to other musical sounds may be of at least three kinds3 pitch relations1 harmonic relations and temporal relations1 complicated1 all of them1 in the utmost degree by ,rhythm4 ,possibly other relations still are involved4 ,there would be no advantage here in entering into the detail of the analysis of these qualities and relations4 ,the one point of importance for our present purpose is the immense scope for the resolution1 interinanimation1 conflict and equilibrium of impulses opened up by this extraordinary complexity of musical sounds and of their possible arrangement4 ,it is not in the least surprising that so few invariable correspondences between stimuli and total responses have as yet been discovered4 ,the same state of affairs recurs wherever forms by themselves1 dissociated from all practical uses and from all representation produce immediate effects upon the mind4 ,in painting1 in sculpture1 in architecture and in poetry1 we need equally to be on our guard against those who would attribute peculiar1 unique and mystic virtues to forms in themselves4 ,in every case their effect is due to the interplay 7not the addition7 of the effects which their elements excite4 ,especially we do well to beware of empty speculations upon #8necessary and inevitable relations' as the source of the effect4 ,of course in a given case a certain relation1 a certain arrangement1 may be necessary1 in the sense that the elements if differently disposed would have a quite different combined effect4 ,but this is not the sense in which necessity is usually claimed4 ,it is necessity1 in the metaphysical sense1 some here utterly obscure kind of #8logical necessity' which is the favourite toy of a number of art critics4 ,to those who have some familiarity both with ,logic and with ,psychology the regular appearance of the term #8logical' in describing these relations is the clearest indication that nothing definite or adequately considered is being said4 ,the fact that1 given certain elements arranged in a certain way1 a certain further element can usually be introduced in one way and one way only if a certain total effect is to be produced1 does1 it is true1 give a certain #8inevitability' to the artist's work4 ,but what the effect is and whether the effect is worth while have still to be considered1 and this inevitability has nothing to do with a priori rightness and is a matter simply of cause and effect4 ,the salt required to make a soup palatable is #8logically necessitated' in this sense as much as any relation in a picture4 ,the value lies not in the apprehension1 conscious or subconscious1 of the rightness of the relations1 but in the total mental effect which1 since they are right 7i4e4 since they work71 they produce4 #ee ,the ,power of ,sound1 p4 #agf4 ,,chapter ,,xxi ,a ,theory of ,communication ,for surely once1 they feel1 we were ,parts of a single continent4 ,matthew ,arnold4 ,artificial mysteries are as prevalent in unreflecting and even in elaborately excogitated opinion upon communication as elsewhere4 ,on the one hand are some who define communication as the actual transference of experiences in the strictest possible sense of transference--the sense in which a penny can be transferred from one pocket to another--and are led to most fantastic hypotheses4 ,blake seems sometimes to have believed that one single1 the same1 identical state of mind1 imagined as a being or power1 can occupy now one mind1 now another1 or many minds at once4 ,other thinkers1 in less picturesque manners1 have fallen back upon no less transcendental considerations as necessities in the explanation of communication4 ,we must suppose1 it is alleged1 that human minds are wider than we ordinarily believe1 that parts of one mind may pass over to become parts of another1 that minds interpenetrate and intermingle1 or even that particular minds are merely an illusory appearance and the underlying reality one mind whose facets or aspects are many4 ,in this way it is easy to enter the maze4 ,probably some wanderings in it are unavoidable for all speculative persons at some period of their mental development4 ,the only escape from it is by the original entrance4 ,for communication defined as strict transference of or participation in identical experiences does not occur4 ,this is not a heart-breaking conclusion4 ,no general theory1 in fact1 as to the nature or conditions of experiences can affect their value4 ,for value is prior to all explanations4 ,if actual transference and participation did occur we should of course be compelled to adopt a transcendental theory4 ,it does not occur#ef and no arguments which assume it have the least weight4 ,all that occurs is that1 under certain conditions1 separate minds have closely similar experiences4 ,those who are unable to accept this view reject it not on grounds of evidence1 not through the ways in which the world influences them1 but on grounds of desire1 due to the influence of the contrary opinion on their attitudes to their fellows4 ,at moments anyone may wish it otherwise2 severance seems a deprivation2 caught in a moment of maladjustment we feel that our essential insularity is a blight and a defect1 and to accept the facts and upon them to found a new and more perfect adjustment is for all sensitive people in some situations difficult4 ,but the true belief does not1 and perhaps no true belief can1 really deprive anyone of any values4 ,sad cases of bad systematisations there doubtless are1 for which no readjustment is possible4 ,a false belief may become an indispensable condition for the most important activities of individuals who without it break down into confusion4 ,so it is with many religious beliefs2 and in saying that the removal of such beliefs need involve no loss1 and may involve great gains in values1 we do not say that there are not certain individuals whose values will be destroyed in the process4 ,we say only that adaptable people will find that most of their values can be retained after rejecting their errors1 that compensations and equivalents for their losses are available1 and that whole sets of fresh values become open to them through their better adjustment to the actual world in which they live4 ,this is the justification for the opinion which has so often been held1 that knowledge is the greatest of all goods4 ,the opinion appears to be warranted4 ,knowledge is1 we are slowly finding out1 an indispensable condition for the attainment of the widest1 most stable1 and most important values4 ,we start then from the natural isolation and severance of minds4 ,their experiences at the best1 under the most favourable circumstances1 can be but similar4 ,communication1 we shall say1 takes place when one mind so acts upon its environment that another mind is influenced1 and in that other mind an experience occurs which is like the experience in the first mind1 and is caused in part by that experience4 ,communication is evidently a complicated affair1 and capable of degrees at least in two respects4 ,the two experiences may be more or less similar1 and the second may be more or less dependent upon the first4 ,if ,a and ,b are walking in the street together and ,a touches ,b and says1 8,there is the ,lord ,chief ,justice10 ,b's experience while he contemplates the dignitary is only adventitiously dependent upon ,a's experience4 ,but if ,a1 having met the ,lord ,chief ,justice1 describes him to a friend afterwards in a quarry at ,portland1 for example1 his friend's experience will depend very largely upon the particular judges he may himself have encountered1 and for the rest will derive its special features from ,a's description4 ,unless ,a has remarkable gifts of description and ,b extraordinarily sensitive and discriminating receptive ability1 their two experiences will tally at best but roughly4 ,they may completely fail to tally without either being clearly aware of the fact4 ,in general1 long and varied acquaintanceship1 close familiarity1 lives whose circumstances have often corresponded1 in short an exceptional fund of common experience is needed1 if people1 in the absence of special communicative gifts1 active and receptive1 are to communicate1 and even with these gifts the success of the communication in difficult cases depends upon the extent to which past similarities in experience can be made use of4 ,without such similarities communication is impossible4 ,difficult cases are those in which the speaker must himself supply and control a large part of the causes of the listener's experience2 in which correspondingly the listener has to struggle against the intrusions of elements from his own past experience which are irrelevant4 ,when ,a can point and ,b gaze1 the matter is sometimes easy2 although1 as is well known1 a complex object1 for example a landscape1 where many different selections are possible corresponding to different emphases of interest1 cannot be dealt with in so simple a manner4 ,less complex things in which the interesting feature is more salient1 for example1 a gentleman asleep in ,church1 may be merely indicated with more confidence of communication1 although here again one person may feel indignation and another amusement at the sight4 ,in difficult cases the vehicle of communication must inevitably be complex4 ,the effect of a word varies with the other words among which it is placed4 ,what would be highly ambiguous by itself becomes definite in a suitable context4 ,so it is throughout2 the effect of any element depends upon the other elements present with it4 ,even in such shallow communication as is involved in merely making out the letters in a handwriting this principle is all-important1 and in the deepest forms of communication the same principle holds good4 ,to this is due the superiority of verse to prose for the most difficult and deepest communications1 poetry being by far the more complex vehicle4 ,a similar instance is the increased ambiguity of a monochromatic reproduction as compared with the original painting4 ,what difficulty of communication depends upon we have already considered4 ,it should not be confused with the difficulty of the matter communicated1 although the two are often connected4 ,some very difficult calculations1 for example1 can be communicated with ease4 ,depth of communication likewise is not necessarily connected with difficulty4 ,it is a name for the degree of completeness in the response required4 ,a glance at the diagram on p4 #aaf will make this use of the term clear4 ,communications involving attitudes are deeper than those in which references alone are concerned4 ,abstract and analytic prose1 in fact1 depends for its success upon the shallowness of its draught4 ,it must avoid any stirring of the emotions lest its required distinctions become obscured4 #ef ,the very strange and important phenomena of apparent telepathy1 and the feats of some #8psychometrists' and #8clairvoyants'1 although they may call for a great extension of our ideas as to how minds influence one another1 do not require any such desperate devices as transference of1 or participation in1 identical experiences4 ,if they did1 the possibility of investigating them by the only technique with which anything has ever been successfully investigated would be remote4 ,on any #8identity' or #8participation' theory1 communication becomes an ineffable and irremovable mystery4 ,there may1 of course1 be any number of strange events occurring about which we cannot know1 but to discuss such events is unprofitable4 ,,chapter ,,xxii ,the ,availability of the ,poet's ,experience ,that he is the wisest1 the happiest and the best1 inasmuch as he is a poet1 is equally incontrovertible2 the greatest poets have been men of the most spotless virtue1 of the most consummate prudence1 and1 if we would look into the interior of their lives1 the most fortunate of men4--,the ,defence of ,poetry4 ,the special communicative gifts1 either active or passive1 which have been alluded to1 are no peculiar irreducible abilities4 ,they can be described in terms of activities already mentioned4 ,the use of past similarities in experience and the control of these elements through the dependence of their effects upon one another1 make up the speaker's1 the active communicator's gift4 ,discrimination1 suggestibility1 free and clear resuscitation of elements of past experience disentangled from one another1 and control of irrelevant personal details and accidents1 make up the recipient's gift4 ,we may now consider these more closely4 ,certain favourable and unfavourable special circumstances in the temperaments or characters of the persons concerned may be set aside4 ,thus courage or audacity1 enterprise1 goodwill1 absence of undue pride or conceit1 honesty1 humaneness1 humility in its finest sense1 humour1 tolerance1 good health1 and the ,confucian characteristics of the #8superior man' are favourable general conditions for communication4 ,but we will assume them present in sufficient degree and pass on to the less evident because more fundamental conditions4 ,in the first place all those which we have enumerated as desirable in the recipient are also necessary in the artist4 ,he is pre-eminently accessible to external influences and discriminating with regard to them4 ,he is distinguished further by the freedom in which all these impressions are held in suspension1 and by the ease with which they form new relations between themselves4 ,the greatest difference between the artist or poet and the ordinary person is found1 as has often been pointed out1 in the range1 delicacy1 and freedom of the connections he is able to make between different elements of his experience4 8,all the images of nature were still present to him10 says ,dryden1 with felicity1 of ,shakespeare1 8and he drew them not laboriously but luckily40 ,it is this available possession of the past which is the first characteristic of the adept in communication1 of the poet or the artist4 ,availability1 not mere possession1 however1 is what is essential4 ,many people are endowed with memories of marble upon which time can do little to efface even the slightest mark1 but they benefit little from their endowment4 ,a merely repetitive retention is rather a disability than an asset in communication1 since it makes the separation of the private and irrelevant from the essential so difficult4 ,persons to whom the past comes back as a whole are likely to be found in an asylum4 ,what is in question here is not memory1 in the stricter sense in which past experience is dated and placed1 but free reproduction4 ,to be able to revive an experience is not to remember when and where and how it occurred1 but merely to have that peculiar state of mind available4 ,why some experiences are available and others not is unfortunately still a matter for conjecture merely4 ,the difficulty upon most accounts1 ,semon's for example1 is to explain why all our past experience is not being revived all the time4 ,but some plausible conjectures are not difficult to make1 and the absence of clear evidence or conclusive proof should not prevent our making them if they are recognised for conjectures4 ,how far an experience is revivable would seem to depend in the first place upon the interests1 the impulses1 active in the experience4 ,unless similar interests recur its revival would seem to be difficult4 ,the original experience is built upon a number of impulses2 it came about only through these impulses4 ,we may even say that it is those impulses4 ,the first condition for its revival is the occurrence of impulses similar to some of these4 ,the patient in the asylum occupied in reliving the same piece of experience indefinitely does so 7if he does7 because he is limited very strictly in the range of his possible impulses1 other impulses not being allowed to intervene4 ,hence the completeness with which he is said to reconstruct the past4 ,most revival is distorted because only some of the original impulses are repeated1 new impulses being-involved and a compromise resulting4 ,the impulses implicated in experiences may be many and varied or few and alike4 ,an experience which has a very simple impulse structure will1 we may suppose1 tend to come back only when these impulses are again relatively dominant4 ,other things being equal it will have less chance of revival than an experience with a more complex structure4 ,recalling the illustration used in ,chapter ,,xiv1 the broader the facet the more numerous are the positions from which the polyhedron will settle down on that facet4 ,it is a first principle of psychology that the partial return only of a situation may reinstate the whole1 and since most impulses have belonged in the past to many varied wholes there must evidently be much rivalry as to which wholes do actually recur4 ,what seems to decide the dispute more than anything else is the character of the original connections between the parts4 ,as has recently been emphasised by the exponents of ,gestalt-psychologie1 mere original contiguity or simultaneity is comparatively powerless to control revival4 ,compare the learning of a geometric theorem by heart with understanding it1 or even a brief study of some building with mere daily familiarity4 ,what then is the difference between understanding a situation and the more usual reactions to it8 ,it is a difference in the degree of organisation of the impulses which it arouses4 ,it is the difference between a systematised complex response1 or ordered sequence of responses1 and a welter of responses4 ,we must not take #8understanding' in too specialised a sense here1 or we shall overlook the immense importance of this difference in determining revival4 ,we are accustomed to make an artificial distinction between intellectual or theoretical and non-intellectual or emotional mental activities4 ,to understand a situation in the sense here intended is not necessarily to reflect upon it1 to inquire into its principles and consciously distinguish its characters1 but to respond to it as a whole1 in a coherent way which allows its parts their due share and their proper independence in the response4 ,experience which has this organised character1 it is reasonable to suppose1 has more chance of revival1 is more available as a whole and in parts1 than more confused experience4 ,contrast the behaviour of the sleepy and the fully awake1 of the normal man with the lightly and the more deeply ansthetised patient1 of the starved or fevered with the healthy4 ,to describe these differences in neural potency1 and to mark the degree of physiological efficiency1 ,dr ,head has recently#eg suggested the term vigilance1 a useful addition to our symbolic machinery4 ,in a high state of vigilance the nervous system reacts to stimuli with highly adapted1 discriminating1 and ordered responses2 in a lowered state of vigilance the responses are less discriminating1 less delicately adapted4 ,whether we are considering the decerebrate preparation or the intact poet1 the simplest automatisms or the most highly conscious acts1 what happens in a given stimulus situation varies with the vigilance of the appropriate portion of the nervous system4 ,the point as regards revival can be put conveniently by saying that experiences of high vigilance are the most likely to be available4 ,the degree of vigilance of the individual at the moment at which revival is attempted is1 of course1 equally but more evidently an important factor4 ,the answer then1 at least in part1 to the problem of how the poet's experience is more than usually available to him is that it is1 as he undergoes it1 more than usually organised through his more than usual vigilance4 ,connections become established for him which in the ordinary mind1 much more rigid and exclusive in its play of impulses1 are never effected1 and it is through these original connections that so much more of his past comes to be freely revivable for him at need4 ,the same explanation may be put in another way4 ,in order to keep any steadiness and clarity in his attitudes the ordinary man is under the necessity on most occasions of suppressing the greater part of the impulses which the situation might arouse4 ,he is incapable of organising them2 therefore they have to be left out4 ,in the same situation the artist is able to admit far more without confusion4 ,hence the fact that his resultant behaviour is apt to cause dismay1 irritation or envy1 or to seem incomprehensible4 ,the wheeling of the pigeons in ,trafalgar ,square may seem to have no relation to the colour of the water in the basins1 or to the tones of a speaker's voice or to the drift of his remarks4 ,a narrow field of stimulation is all that we can manage1 and we overlook the rest4 ,but the artist does not1 and when he needs it1 he has it at his disposal4 ,the dangers to which he is exposed1 the apparent inconsequence1 the difficulty on many occasions of co-operating with him1 of relying upon him1 of predicting what he will do1 are evident and often expatiated upon4 ,his superficial resemblance to persons who are merely mental chaoses1 unorganised1 without selective ability and of weak and diffused attention1 is likewise clear4 ,essentially he is the opposite of these4 #eg ,henry ,head1 #8,the ,conception of ,nervous and ,mental ,energy' in the ,british ,journal of ,psychology1 ,oct4 #aibc1 ,vol4 ,,xiv1 p4 #abf4 ,,chapter ,,xxiii ,tolstoy's ,infection ,theory ,beauty is no quality in things themselves2 it exists merely in the mind which contemplates them4--,hume4 ,it is strange that speculations upon the arts should so rarely have begun from the most obvious fact about them4 ,mr ,roger ,fry1 in his interesting ,retrospect1 records the shock with which ,tolstoy's insistence upon communication struck contemporary students in ,england4 8,what remained of immense importance was the idea that a work of art was not the record of beauty already existent elsewhere1 but the expression of an emotion felt by the artist and conveyed to the spectator40#eh ,it will be useful to examine ,tolstoy's account4 ,he formulates his theory#ei as follows3 8,art becomes more or less infectious in consequence of three conditions3 7i7 ,in consequence of a greater or lesser peculiarity of the sensation conveyed4 7ii7 ,in consequence of a greater or lesser clearness of the transmission of this sensation4 7iii7 ,in consequence of the sincerity of the artist1 that is1 of the greater or lesser force with which the artist himself experiences the sensation which he is conveying40 ,he adds1 in curious contradiction to his other view which we have already discussed1 8,not only is the infectiousness a certain sign of art1 but the degree of the infection is the only standard of the value of art40 ,this contradiction we may perhaps remove or at least mitigate if we notice that #8degree of infection' is a highly ambiguous phrase4 ,it may be equivalent to-- 7i7 the number of persons who may be infected1 7ii7 the completeness with which the experience is reproduced in them4 ,these are the two most relevant senses here1 and both are involved in ,tolstoy's exposition4 ,the first would bring this view into connection with his doctrine that only so far as art is accessible to all men is it valuable4 ,the second1 however1 cannot be reconciled with that view1 but that he held it cannot be doubted4 8,the more the sensation to be conveyed is special10 he goes on1 8the more strongly does it act upon the receiver2 the more special the condition of the mind is1 to which the reader is transferred1 the more willingly and the more powerfully does he blend with it40 ,this is plainly untrue4 ,what ,tolstoy would have said with more reflection is that some special experiences are interesting and owe their attraction partly to their strangeness1 their unusual character4 ,but many unusual and special experiences are unattractive and repellent4 ,dyspeptics1 amateurs of psycho-analysis1 fishermen1 and golfers1 have very often most remarkable things to recount4 ,we shun having to listen precisely because they are so special4 ,further1 many experiences by their very oddness are incommunicable4 ,only so far as common interests are aroused does the ease and completeness of transmission depend upon the rarity and strangeness of the experience communicated4 ,with this proviso ,tolstoy's remark is obviously justified4 ,that he should have stressed it is an indication of his sincerity and candour4 ,so much of his doctrine is a simple denial that special experiences are a fit subject for art4 ,a division between experiences which though special are yet in the main path of humanity and accessible to all men if they are sufficiently finely developed in normal directions1 and those other special experiences which are due to abnormality1 disease1 or eccentric and erratic specialisation1 is what he would have added if his attention had been drawn to the point4 ,he would have enjoyed classifying the fashionables and intellectuals1 the etiolate cultured classes1 among the insane4 ,the second condition of infectiousness1 the greater or less clearness of the transmission of the sensation1 is more important4 ,how to obtain clear transmission is precisely the problem of communication4 ,we have seen that it is a matter of the availability of common experiences1 the elicitation of these by a suitable vehicle1 and the control and extrusion of irrelevant elements1 so far as they arise1 through the complexity of the vehicle4 ,the third condition1 the sincerity of the artist1 is more obscure4 ,tolstoy's own elucidation carries us but a little way4 ,what is this force with which an experience occurs8 ,certainly experiences may be of the utmost intensity without thereby being any more easy to convey4 ,a lightning flash1 for example1 which just misses one upon a summit1 is much more difficult to describe than the same flash seen from the valley4 ,tolstoy1 however1 is speaking of the experience as evoked by the artist in the course of communication1 of the 8emotion1 kindred to that which was before the subject of contemplation01 which then 8is gradually produced and does itself exist in the mind01 to quote ,wordsworth's celebrated account of the source of poetry4 ,he is speaking of the fullness1 steadiness and clearness with which the experience to be communicated develops in the mind of the communicator at the moment of expression4 ,inrushes of emotion1 accompanied by scraps and odd bits of imagery1 thought and incipient activity1 are not uncommon1 and the process of jotting down what comes to mind at the moment is all that the would-be poet can achieve4 ,round him much embryo1 much abortion lay1 ,much future ode and abdicated play3 ,nonsense precipitate like running lead1 ,which slipped through cracks and zigzags of the head4 ,opposed to him is the poet who 8described in ideal perfection1 brings the whole soul of man into activity4 4 4 40 ,his is 8a more than usual state of emotion1 with more than usual order2 judgment ever awake1 and steady self-possession1 with enthusiasm and feeling profound or vehement#fj40 ,as so often1 ,coleridge drops the invaluable hint almost inadvertently4 ,the wholeness of the mind in the creative moment is the essential consideration1 the free participation in the evocation of the experience of all the impulses1 conscious or unconscious1 relevant to it1 without suppressions or restrictions4 ,as we have seen1 this completeness or wholeness is the rarest and the most difficult condition required for supreme communicative ability4 ,how it works we have also seen1 and if this is1 as doubtless it must be1 what ,tolstoy meant by sincerity1 however queer some of his tests for it were1 we have found yet another indication of how great his contribution to critical theory1 under happier circumstances1 might have been4 #eh ,vision and ,design1 p4 #aid4 #ei ,what is ,art1 ,sect4 ,,xv4 #fj ,biographia ,literaria1 ,vol4 #aa1 ,ch4 ,,xiv1 p4 #ab4 ,,chapter ,,xxiv ,the ,normality of the ,artist ,prose is an uninterrupted1 polite warfare with poetry 4 4 4 every abstraction wants to have a jibe at poetry and wishes to be uttered with a mocking voice4--,the ,joyful ,wisdom4 ,if the availability of his past experience is the first characteristic of the poet1 the second is what we may provisionally call his normality4 ,so far as his experience does not tally with that of those with whom he communicates1 there will be failure4 ,but both the sense in which it must tally and the sense in which the artist is normal need to be carefully considered4 ,within racial#fa boundaries1 and perhaps within the limits of certain very general types1#fb many impulses are common to all men4 ,their stimuli and the courses which they take seem to be uniform4 ,at the same time there are many other impulses which are not uniform4 ,it is difficult to give instances1 since there are so few names for impulses1 but sounds are fairly uniform while words used in isolation are fairly ambiguous stimuli4 ,impulses could1 if we knew enough1 be arranged in an order of general uniformity or stability4 ,some impulses remain the same1 taking the same course on the same occasions1 from age to age1 from prehistoric times until to-day4 ,some change as fashions change4 ,between the two extremes are the vast majority2 neither1 when the nervous system is vigilant1 very fixed nor very erratic2 set off by a given stimulus and taking the course they do because other impulses are also active or have just been active4 ,for successful communication a number of impulses with their effective stimuli must be common to the communicators1 and further the general ways in which impulses modify one another must be shared4 ,we evidently cannot expect that many total situations and responses will have been common1 and it is not necessary that they should be4 ,within limits the disparities can be overcome by what is called imagination4 ,there is nothing peculiarly mysterious about imagination4 ,it is no more marvellous than any other of the ways of the mind4 ,yet it has so often been treated as an arcanum that we naturally approach it with caution4 ,it is desirable at least to avoid part of the fate which befell ,coleridge1#fc and our account will be devoid of theological implications4 ,given some impulses active others are thereby aroused in the absence of what would otherwise be their necessary stimuli4 ,such impulses ,i call imaginative1 whether images occur or not1 for image-production is not at all essentially involved in what the critic is interested in as imagination4 ,which other impulses are brought in is in part determined by which were co-operative together originally when all the impulses had their own stimuli1 that is to say1 in the non-imaginary experiences from which the imaginary experience derives4 ,in so far as this factor comes in the imagination may be said to be repetitive4 ,the imagination we are concerned with may be called formative#fd by way of distinction4 ,for present circumstances are at least as important4 ,remember in a changed mood a scene which took place under a strong emotion4 ,how altered is its every aspect6 ,the selection of the impulses which take effect is changed2 the impulses are distorted1 they run in different courses4 ,the imaginative construction is always at least as much determined by what is going on in the present as by what went on in the past1 pasts rather1 whence it springs4 ,many of the most curious features of the arts1 the limitation of their number1 their formal characteristics and the conditions of impersonality1 detachment and so forth1 which have given rise to much confused discussion of the #8sthetic' state for example1 are explained by this fact4 ,in difficult communication the artist must find some means of so controlling a part of the recipient's experience that the imaginative development will be governed by this part and not left to the accidents of repetition which will differ naturally from individual to individual4 ,as a basis for every art1 therefore1 will be found a type of impulse which is extraordinarily uniform1 which fixes the framework1 as it were1 within which the rest of the response develops4 ,these are among the most uniform impulses1 among those which come nearest to having a one-one correlation with their stimuli1 of all those which we experience4 ,in poetry1 rhythm metre and tune or cadence2 in music1 rhythm pitch timbre and tune2 in painting1 form and colour2 in sculpture1 volume and stress2 in all the arts1 what are usually called the formal elements are the stimuli1 simple or complex1 which can be most depended upon to produce uniform responses4 ,it is true that these responses are not so uniform as the reflexes1 as sneezing or blinking for example4 ,but even these are to a considerable extent subject to interference and modification by impulses of higher levels4 ,what communication requires is responses which are uniform1 sufficiently varied1 and capable of being set off by stimuli which are physically manageable4 ,these three requisites explain why the number of the arts is limited and why formal elements have such importance4 ,they are the skeleton or scaffolding upon or within which the further impulses involved in the communication are supported4 ,they supply the present dependable part of the experience by which the rest1 the more erratic1 ambiguous part of the imaginative development1 is controlled4 ,by themselves 7although there has been a natural tendency in criticism to maintain the contrary opinion7 they are often quite inadequate4 ,as we have seen1 differences of all degrees1 both between and within the arts1 exist4 ,the fashion in which the poet's impulses must tally with those of his readers1 will now be moderately clear4 ,the poet is in the least favourable position1 perhaps1 among the artists1 but as a compensation the range and fullness of the communications open to him is1 if he can overcome the difficulties1 very great4 ,but evidently the least eccentricity on his part1 either in the responses which he makes to rhythms and verbal tunes1 or in the ways in which these govern and modify his further responses or are modified by them1 will be disastrous4 ,it is the same for all the arts4 ,a defective or eccentric colour sensibility1 a common defect as is well known1 may play havoc with an artist's work1 qua communication1 without necessarily involving any deficiency of value in his own experience4 ,it is theoretically possible for an individual to develop in himself states of mind of very high value and yet to be so unusual in his own sensibility as to seem ridiculous or be incomprehensible to others4 ,the question then arises as to which is in the right1 the artist or his uncomprehending critics4 ,this frequent dilemma raised alike by great innovating artists and by nincompoops brings us back to the problem of normality4 ,to be normal is to be a standard1 but not1 as things are and are likely to remain1 an average2 and to inquire into the characters of the norm or to ask who are normal is to raise a question as to value4 ,the artist departs from the average1 but so do other people4 ,his departure1 however1 is one of the reasons why we attend to his work2 other people's departures may be reasons why we should not4 ,what are the main differences which decide whether a departure is a merit or a defect8 ,the theory of value outlined above indicates some of these differences4 ,if the artist's organisation is such as to allow him a fuller life than the average1 with less unnecessary interference between its component impulses1 then plainly we should do well to be more like him1 if we can and as far as we can4 ,but the qualification1 if we can1 has far-reaching consequences4 ,politically it might be better for the community to be organised on the model of ant and bee communities1 but1 since it cannot1 the question whether we should try to make it so does not arise4 ,similarly1 if the artist's organisation#fe is so eccentric as to make general approximation to it impossible1 or if a general approximation would involve 7people being what they are7 greater losses than gains1 then however admirable it may be in itself1 we shall be justified in neglecting it4 ,the case1 if it indeed occurs1 is exceptional but instructive theoretically4 ,what is excellent and what is to be imitated are not necessarily the same4 ,but it is interesting to note that mentalities to which the usual and ordinary man is not capable of approximating without loss can almost always be shown to be defective1 and that the defects themselves are the barrier to approximation4 ,certain mystical poets are perhaps as good an example of this as any4 ,however admirable the experience of a ,boehme or a ,blake1 of a ,nietzsche or of the ,apocalypst1 the features which prevent general participation in it1 the barriers to communication1 are not the features upon which its value chiefly depends4 ,it is the inchoate part of ,blake's personality which makes him incomprehensible1 not the parts which were better organised than those of every one else4 ,the explanation of the rarity of admirable though utterly eccentric experience is not difficult4 ,the metaphorical remark that we are all branches of the same tree is its most compendious form4 ,so much must be alike in the nature of all men1 their situation in the world so much the same1 and organisation building upon this basis must depend upon such similar processes1 that variation both wide and successful is most unlikely4 ,that we are apt to exaggerate the differences between men is well known4 ,if we consider what is usually called mind1 alone1 we may well suppose that minds may differ toto clo1 but if we look more carefully1 taking account of the whole man1 including his spinal reflexes for example1 seeing his mind as but the most delicate and most advanced part of his total organisation1 we shall not be tempted to think him so diverse4 ,people of course do seem extraordinarily different in the ways in which they think and feel4 ,but we are specialised to detect these differences4 ,further1 we tend constantly to overlook differences in situation which would explain differences in behaviour4 ,we assume to a ridiculous extent that what is stimulating us will stimulate others in the same way1 forgetting that what will happen depends upon what has happened before and upon what is already happening within1 about which we can usually know little4 ,the ways then in which the artist will differ from the average will as a rule presuppose an immense degree of similarity4 ,they will be further developments of organisations already well advanced in the majority4 ,his variations will be confined to the newest1 the most plastic1 the least fixed part of the mind1 the parts for which reorganisation is most easy4 ,thus his differences are far less serious obstacles to communication than1 shall we say1 such differences as divide the hypochondriac from the healthy4 ,and1 further1 so far as they require reorganisation there will commonly be good reasons why this should be carried out4 ,we should not forget that finer organisation is the most successful way of relieving strain1 a fact of relevance in the theory of evolution4 ,the new response will be more advantageous than the old1 more successful in satisfying varied appetencies4 ,but the advantages may be localised or general1 minor as well as major4 ,the artist stands at the parting of a multitude of ways4 ,his advance may be and often is in a direction which if followed up would be generally disadvantageous although for the moment it leads to an increase of value4 ,the metaphor is of course insufficient4 ,we can improve it by substituting a manifold of many dimensions for the cross-roads4 ,which way is the mind to grow and which ways are compatible with which is the question4 ,there are specialist and universal poets1 and the specialist may be developing in a manner either consistent or inconsistent#ff with general development1 a consideration of extreme importance in judging the value of his work4 ,its bearing upon the permanence of his work will be discussed later4 ,at any moment1 in any situation1 a variety of attitudes is possible4 ,which is the best is decided not only by the impulses which gain organised satisfaction in the attitude but also by the effect of the attitude upon the rest of the organisation of the individual4 ,we should have to consider the whole system and all the possibilities of all probable situations which might arise if we were to be sure that any one attitude is the best4 ,since we cannot do this1 but can only note the most obvious objections to some1 we have to be content if we can avoid those attitudes which are most evidently wasteful4 ,for the normality of the poet is to be estimated in terms of waste4 ,most human attitudes are wasteful1 some to a shocking degree4 ,the mind which is1 so far as can be seen1 least wasteful1 we take as a norm or standard1 and1 if possible1 we develop in our degree similar experiences4 ,the taking of the norm is for the most part done unconsciously by mere preference1 by the shock of delight which follows the release of stifled impulse into organised freedom4 ,often the choice is mistaken1 the advantage which leads to preference is too localised1 involves losses in the end1 losses round the next corner as it were4 ,little by little experience corrects such illusory preference1 not through reflection--almost all critical choices are irreflective1 spontaneous1 as some say--but through unconscious reorganisation of impulses4 ,we rarely change our tastes1 we rather find them changed4 ,we return to the poems which made us weep tears of delight when we were young and find them dusty rhetoric4 ,with a tender hurt inside we wonder what has happened4 ,sometimes1 of course1 experience corrects nothing4 ,there may be nothing which needs correcting1 or too much4 ,the localised advantage1 the sweet aching thrill of the ,boosey ,ballad-- ,i have a rose1 a white1 white rose1 ',twas given me long ago1 ,when the winds had fallen to silence1 ,and the stars were dim and low4 ,it lies in an old book faded1 ,between the pages white1 ,but the ages cannot dim the dream ,it brings to me to-night6 ,the localised advantage may be irresistible in its appeal2 the personality will not surrender it1 no matter what1 of greater worth is forgone for its sake1 or what possibilities passing by are lost1 unglimpsed in the enthralment4 #fa ,the degree of racial difference is peculiarly difficult to estimate4 ,in view of the extent of mixture which has taken place it may be of great importance in considering even the art of one culture or tradition alone4 ,cf4 ,f4 ,g4 ,crookshank1 ,the ,mongol in our ,midst4 #fb ,these types if they must be admitted1 have not yet been described satisfactorily4 ,the defects of such attempts as those of ,jung1 for example1 are shown by the fact that individuals change so readily and so freely from #8type' to #8type'1 being extrovert one hour and introvert the next1 rationalist and intuitive from moment to moment4 ,this is of course denied by the ,zurich ,school but not by the majority of observers4 ,to point it out is not to overlook much that is valuable in these distinctions4 ,a satisfactory classification would doubtless be very complex1 and perhaps of the form3 ,an individual of ,type ,a is extrovert under these conditions1 introvert under those1 etc4 #fc ,biographia ,literaria1 ,ch4 ,,xiii4 8,the primary ,,imagination ,i hold to be the living ,power and prime ,agent of all human perception1 and as a repetition in the finite mind of the eternal act of creation in the infinite ,i ,,am40 ,the luminous hints dropped by ,coleridge in the neighbourhood of this sentence would seem to have dazzled succeeding speculators4 ,how otherwise explain why they have been overlooked4 #fd ,coleridge's distinction between ,,imagination and ,fancy was in part the same as this4 ,but he introduced value considerations also1 ,imagination being such combination or fusion of mental elements as resulted in certain valuable states of mind1 and ,fancy being a mere trivial playing with these elements4 ,the discussion of this distinction will be postponed to ,chapter ,,xxxii1 where the different uses of the term #8imagination' are separated4 #fe ,it is useful in this discussion to distinguish between the artist's personality as involved in his work and such other parts of it as are not involved4 ,with these last we are not here concerned4 #ff ,a weakness of the modern ,irish school 7even at its best1 in ,mr ,yeats7 or of the exquisite poetry of ,mr ,de la ,mare1 may be that its sensibility is a development out of the main track4 ,it is this which seems to make it minor poetry in a sense in which ,mr ,hardy's best work or ,mr ,eliot's ,the ,waste ,land is major poetry4 ,,chapter ,,xxv ,badness in ,poetry ,il faut dissiper un malentendu3 nous sommes pourris d'art6 ,le ,corbusier-,saugnier4 ,the theory of badness in poetry has never received the study which it deserves1 partly on account of its difficulty4 ,for with bad art even more than with good unless we are careful to distinguish the communicative from the value aspects1 even when these are connected1 we shall find the issues obscured4 ,sometimes art is bad because communication is defective1 the vehicle inoperative2 sometimes because the experience communicated is worthless2 sometimes for both reasons4 ,it would perhaps be best to restrict the term bad art to cases in which genuine communication does to a considerable degree take place1 what is communicated being worthless1 and to call the other cases defective art4 ,but this is not the usual practice of critics1 any work which produces an experience displeasing to the critic being commonly called bad1 whether or not this experience is like that responsible for the work4 ,let us begin by considering an instance of defective communication2 choosing an example in which it is likely that the original experience had some value4 ,,the ,,pool ,are you alive8 ,i touch you4 ,you quiver like a sea-fish4 ,i cover you with my net4 ,what are you--banded one8 ,i take a complete work to avoid possible unfairness4 ,here we have the whole of the link which is to mediate between the experiences of the author and of the reader4 ,aristotle1 in a different connection1 it is true1 and for different reasons1 affirmed that a work of art must possess a certain magnitude1 and we can adapt his remark here4 ,not the brevity only of the vehicle1 but its simplicity1 makes it ineffective4 ,the sacrifice of metre in free verse needs1 in almost all cases1 to be compensated by length4 ,the loss of so much of the formal structure leads otherwise to tenuousness and ambiguity4 ,even when1 as here1 the original experience is presumably slight1 tenuous and fleeting1 the mere correspondence of matter to form is insufficient4 ,the experience evoked in the reader is not sufficiently specific4 ,a poet may1 it is true1 make an unlimited demand upon his reader1 and the greatest poets make the greatest claim1 but the demand made must be proportional to the poet's own contribution4 ,the reader here supplies too much of the poem4 ,had the poet said only1 8,i went and poked about for rocklings and caught the pool itself01 the reader1 who converts what is printed above into a poem1 would still have been able to construct an experience of equal value2 for what results is almost independent of the author4 ,to pass to a case in which communication is successful1 where the objection lies to what is communicated3 ,after the fierce midsummer all ablaze ,has burned itself to ashes and expires ,in the intensity of its own fires1 ,then come the mellow1 mild1 ,st ,martin days ,crowned with the calm of peace1 but sad with haze4 ,so after ,love has led us1 till he tires ,of his own throes and torments1 and desires1 ,comes large-eyed ,friendship3 with a restful gaze ,he beckons us to follow1 and across ,cool1 verdant vales we wander free from care4 ,is it a touch of frost lies in the air8 ,why are we haunted with a sense of loss8 ,we do not wish the pain back1 or the heat2 ,and yet1 and yet1 these days are incomplete4 ,as to the success of the communication there can be no question4 ,both the popularity of the author1 ,ella ,wheeler ,wilcox1 of whose work this is a favourable specimen1 and records of the response made by well-educated persons1 who read it without being aware of the authorship1 leave this beyond doubt4 ,it reproduces the state of mind of the writer very exactly4 ,with a very numerous class of readers pleasure and admiration ensue4 ,the explanation is1 probably1 in the soothing effect of aligning the very active ,love-,friendship groups of impulses with so settled yet rich a group as the ,summer-,autumn simile brings in4 ,the mind finds for a moment an attitude in which to contemplate a pair of situations 7,love and ,friendship7 together1 situations which are for many minds particularly difficult to see together4 ,the heavy regular rhythm1 the dead stamp of the rimes1 the obviousness of the descriptions 7#8mellow1 mild1 ,st ,martin'2 #8cool verdant vales'7 their alliteration1 the triteness of the close1 all these accentuate the impression of conclusiveness4 ,the restless spirit is appeased1 one of its chief problems is made to seem as if1 regarded from a lofty1 all-embracing standpoint1 it is no problem but a process of nature4 ,this reconciliation1 this appeasement1 is common to much good and to much bad poetry alike4 ,but the value of it depends upon the level of organisation at which it takes place1 upon whether the reconciled impulses are adequate or inadequate4 ,in this case those who have adequate impulses as regards any of the four main systems involved1 ,summer1 ,autumn1 ,love1 ,friendship1 are not appeased4 ,only for those who make certain conventional1 stereotyped maladjustments instead1 does the magic work4 ,the nature and source of these stock conventional attitudes is of great interest4 ,suggestion is very largely responsible for them4 ,the normal child under the age of ten is probably free from them1 or at least with him they have no fixity or privileged standing4 ,but as general reflection develops the place of the free direct play of experience is taken by the deliberate organisation of attitudes1 a clumsy and crude substitute4 #8,ideas'1 as they are commonly called1 arise4 ,a boy's #8,idea' of ,friendship or of ,summer or of his ,country is not1 though the name would seem to imply it1 primarily an intellectual affair4 ,it is rather an attitude1 or set of attitudes1 of tendencies to act in certain fashions rather than others4 ,now reflection1 unless very prolonged and very arduous1 tends to fix the attitude by making us dwell in it1 by removing us from experience4 ,in the development of any attitude there are stages1 points of rest1 of relatively greater stability4 ,these1 as we dwell in them1 become more and more difficult to pass1 and it is not surprising that most people remain all their lives in various halfway houses4 ,these stages or levels of emotional adjustment seem1 for the most part1 to be fixed not by any special suitability to circumstances1 certainly not to present circumstances1 but much more by social suggestion and by accidents which withdraw us from actual experience1 the one force which might push us further4 ,at present bad literature1 bad art1 the cinema1 etc41 are an influence of the first importance in fixing immature and actually inapplicable attitudes to most things4 ,even the decision as to what constitutes a pretty girl or a handsome young man1 an affair apparently natural and personal enough1 is largely determined by magazine covers and movie stars4 ,the quite common opinion that the arts have after all very little effect upon the community shows only that too little attention is being paid to the effects of bad art4 ,the losses incurred by these artificial fixations of attitudes are evident4 ,through them the average adult is worse1 not better adjusted to the possibilities of his existence than the child4 ,he is even in the most important things functionally unable to face facts3 do what he will he is only able to face fictions1 fictions projected by his own stock responses4 ,against these stock responses the artist's internal and external conflicts are fought1 and with them the popular writer's triumphs are made4 ,any combination of these general ,ideas1 hit at the right level or halting point of development1 is1 if suitably advertised1 certain of success4 ,best-sellers in all the arts1 exemplifying as they do the most general levels of attitude development1 are worthy of very close study4 ,no theory of criticism is satisfactory which is not able to explain their wide appeal and to give clear reasons why those who disdain them are not necessarily snobs4 ,the critic and the ,sales ,manager are not ordinarily regarded as of the same craft1 nor are the poet and the advertising agent4 ,it is true that some serious artists are occasionally tempted into poster designing4 ,it is1 however1 doubtful whether their work pays4 ,but the written appeals which have the soundest financial prospects as estimated by the most able ,american advertisers are such that no critic can safely ignore them4 ,for they do undoubtedly represent the literary ideals present and future of the people to whom they are addressed4#fg ,they are tested in a way which few other forms of literature are tested1 their effects are watched by adepts whose livelihood depends upon the accuracy of their judgment1 and they are among the best indices available of what is happening to taste4 ,criticism will justify itself as an applied1 science when it is able to indicate how an advertisement may be profitable without necessarily being crass4 ,we shall see later under what conditions popularity and possible high value are compatible4 ,the strongest objection to1 let us say1 the sonnet we have quoted1 is that a person who enjoys it1 through the very organisation of his responses which enables him to enjoy it1 is debarred from appreciating many things which1 if he could appreciate them1 he would prefer4 ,we must not1 of course1 forget those variations in psychological efficiency discussed in ,chapter ,,xxii as degrees of vigilance4 ,even a good critic at a sufficiently low ebb of neural potency might mistake such a sonnet for one of ,shakespeare's or with more ease for one of ,rossetti's4 ,but when vigilance was restored he would see1 or at least feel1 the differences4 ,the point is that a reader who1 at a high degree of vigilance1 thoroughly enters into and enjoys this class of verse1 is necessarily so organised that he will fail to respond to poetry4 ,time and much varied experience might change him sufficiently1 but by then he would no longer be able to enjoy such verse1 he would no longer be the same person4 ,a general statement such as this about the incompatibility of inexpressibly complex adjustments must naturally be incapable of strict proof4 ,individuals with alternating personalities and subject to fugues would have to be considered4 ,so would the phenomena of #8mutations of regime' unaccompanied by change of vigilance if such occur4 ,none the less very much evidence substantiates the statement4 ,the experience of all those who have passed through the stages in the development of attitudes presupposed by great poetry is probably conclusive4 ,even though the intricacies of the nervous system should be capable of getting round this objection1 there remain sufficient other reasons why indulgence in verse of this character should be condemned4 ,there can be no doubt whatever that the value of the experience which results from it is small4 ,on a pleasure theory of value there might well be doubt1 since those who do enjoy it certainly appear to enjoy it in a high degree4 ,but on the theory here maintained1 the fact that those who have passed through the stage of enjoying the ,poems of ,passion to that of enjoying the bulk of the contents of the ,golden ,treasury1 for example1 do not return1 settles the matter4 ,we must bear in mind1 of course1 the conditions which have to be satisfied before this test is conclusive4 ,that a man who has passed through the stage of drinking nothing but beer to the stage of drinking nothing but brandy rarely returns1 does not prove that brandy is the better drink4 ,it merely proves that it is the more efficient intoxicant4 ,we have to ask in applying the test what the responses in question are1 and in the case of poetry they are so varied1 so representative of all the activities of life1 that actual universal preference on the part of those who have tried both kinds fairly is the same 7on our view7 as superiority in value of the one over the other4 ,keats1 by universal qualified opinion1 is a more efficient poet than ,wilcox1 and that is the same thing as saying that his works are more valuable4 #fg ,a specimen3 8,the thoughtful man1 the man on business bent1 wends his way to ,wembley with definite purpose4 ,he seeketh knowledge1 desireth increase of commerce or willeth to study new epoch-making inventions40--,official ,advertisement4 ,,chapter ,,xxvi ,judgment and ,divergent ,readings ,the ,prime ,minister--,the misunderstanding--in so far as it is a misunderstanding--is purely a misunderstanding4 4 4 4 ,the ,leader of the ,opposition--,with the utmost goodwill on this side1 ,i find myself with far less grasp of the whole subject than ,i had4 4 4 4--,the ,times1 #hth ,july #aibd4 ,ambiguity in a poem1 as with any other communication1 may be the fault of the poet or of the reader4 ,the ambiguities due to erratic reading are as important for criticism as others1 and practically more troublesome4 ,there are strong social incentives for overlooking them4 ,talking to one another we assume1 in nine cases out of ten like the merest simpletons1 that our readings agree1 and that when we differ in our opinions it is something else1 not our experiences but our judgments about them which are at variance4 ,most discussion about works of art is waste of time as communication for this reason4 ,it may1 of course1 have great value as a means by which people may severally develop their own reactions4 ,these assumptions which so densely obscure the issue raise innumerable practical difficulties both for criticism and for the construction of a theory of criticism4 ,it is well worth while to analyse typical situations a little further4 ,the closing lines of the ,fifth ,sonnet of ,wordsworth's ,river ,duddon series will afford a convenient instance3-- ,sole listener1 ,duddon6 to the breeze that played ,with thy clear voice1 ,i caught the fitful sound ,wafted o'er sullen moss and craggy mound1 ,unfruitful solitudes that seemed to upbraid ,the sun in heaven6--but now1 to form a shade ,for thee1 green alders have together wound ,their foliage2 ashes flung their arms around2 ,and birch trees risen in silver colonnade4 ,and thou hast also tempted here to rise1 ,mid sheltering pines1 this cottage rude and grey2 ,whose ruddy children1 by the mother's eyes ,carelessly watched1 sport through the summer day1 ,thy pleased associates--light as endless ,may ,on infant bosoms lonely nature lies4 ,two readers who found themselves1 as they thought1 in entire agreement as to the excellence of this sonnet1 and especially as to the beauty of its close1 were surprised shortly afterwards to discover that they had been reading quite different poems4 ,by the one the last sentence was interpreted as saying that the gloom of lonely nature1 of sullen moss and craggy ground1 however it might seem later on in life1 had no oppressive effect upon the children4 ,by the other it was read as saying that however barren and gloomy might be the scene1 actually lonely nature there in itself had no such character1 but was1 as it were1 floating 8light as endless ,may on infant bosoms04 ,the two readings1 by throwing their effect back upon what had preceded and in addition completely altering the rhythm of the close1 produced what it is no exaggeration to describe as two different poems4 ,neither would be uncharacteristic of ,wordsworth1 although doubtless the first reading is the one to be accepted4 ,this exemplifies what is perhaps the rarest case1#fh that in which agreement as to value covers an actual grave difference in the experiences valued4 ,more usually there is some genuine source for the agreement1 to be found in some common character of the experiences4 ,what this common character is may be difficult to discover4 ,it may be merely the rhythm1 or the cadence of some phrase1 or the form of a sequence of references4 ,but sometimes1 if it is a more obvious part1 such as a description or metaphor1 a discussion between critical readers1 who are aware that their experiences differ1 will bring it to light4 ,another common case is exemplified by some famous discussions of ,hamlet4 ,it is curious that people with such different conceptions of the character of ,hamlet himself and of the action of the play1 have been able to agree none the less as to its value as a whole1 apart1 of course1 from its incidental values4 ,much has to be discounted in estimating this agreement4 ,on some interpretations praise of the play as a whole is certainly insincere4 ,on the interpretation which makes ,claudius the hero1 whose tragic frailty lies in the fact that his long-suffering patience with the baseless suspicions of the crazy nuisance ,hamlet breaks down in the end and brings the noble monarch to disaster1 there would be little beyond the playwright's subtlety which could honestly be commended4 ,but with all allowances it seems certain that widely different interpretations have seemed to good critics to result in the same peculiar high value of tragedy4 ,the explanation is that tragic value is a general not a specific character of responses4 ,just as a collision between motorcars and a collision between ships are equally collisions1 so the impulses whose equilibrium produces the catharsis of tragedy may be very varied1 provided that their relations to one another are correct4 ,very many of the values of the arts are of this general kind4 ,besides the experiences which result from the building up of connected attitudes1 there are those produced by the breaking down of some attitude which is a clog and a bar to other activities4 ,from ,blake's 8,truly1 my ,satan1 thou art but a dunce01#fi to ,voltaire's 8,bon pre de famille est capable de tout01 such works can be found in all degrees4 ,it matters little what the detail of the impulses which make up the obstructing attitude for different people in each case may be4 ,this often varies1 but when the attitude collapses the effect can be agreed upon4 ,the great masters of irony--,rabelais and the ,flaubert of ,bouvard et ,pcuchet--are the chief exponents of this kind of exorcism4 #fh ,for another instance see ,browning1 ,parting at ,morning4 #fi ,the ,keys of the ,gates3 ,to the ,accuser who is the ,god of this ,world4 ,,chapter ,,xxvii ,levels of ,response and the ,width of ,appeal ,l'art n'est pas chose populaire1 encore moins #8poule de luxe'4 4 4 4 ,l'art est d'essence hautaine4--,le ,corbusier-,saugnier4 ,there still remains the most interesting of the cases in which apparent agreement disguises real differences1 that in which a work occasions valuable responses of the same kind at a number of different levels4 ,macbeth is as good an example as any4 ,its very wide popularity is due to the fact that crude responses to its situations integrate with one another1 not so well as more refined responses1 but still in something of the same fashion4 ,at one end of the scale it is a highly successful1 easily apprehended1 two-colour melodrama1 at the other a peculiarly enigmatic and subtle tragedy1 and in between there are various stages which give fairly satisfactory results4 ,thus people of very different capacities for discrimination and with their attitudes developed in very different degrees can join in admiring it4 ,this possibility of being enjoyed at many levels#gj is a recognised characteristic of ,elizabethan ,drama4 ,the ,pilgrim's ,progress1 ,robinson ,crusoe1 ,gulliver's ,travels1 the ,ballads1 are other instances4 ,the differences between such things and1 for example1 the work of ,donne1 ,milton1 ,blake1 ,landor1 ,stendhal1 ,henry ,james1 ,baudelaire raise some of the most interesting of critical problems4 ,there is a common opinion1 sometimes very strongly held1 that a work which appeals to all kinds and all degrees of men is thereby proved to be greater1 more valuable1 than one which appeals only to some4 ,there may be a confusion in this opinion4 ,the sum of value yielded1 since men actually are of different degrees1 the social value that is to say of such work1 will naturally be greater4 ,but it does not follow that the maximum value for the reader of the highest level need be greater4 ,the common belief that it is necessarily greater1 that the work of wide appeal must be in itself a more admirable thing than work which appeals only to those who discriminate finely1 is due to the assumption that it appeals everywhere for the same reasons and thus is shown to touch something essential and fundamental in human nature4 ,but no one in a position to judge1 who has1 for example1 some experience of the teaching of ,english1 will maintain that ,shakespeare's appeal1 to take the chief instance1 is homogeneous4 ,different people read and go to see the same play for utterly different reasons4 ,where two people applaud we tend to assume1 in spite of our better knowledge1 that their experiences have been the same3 the experience of the first would often be nauseous to the second1 if by accident they were exchanged1 and the first would be left helpless1 lost and bewildered4 ,on this false assumption it is easy to build up a formidable theory about art's concern with the basic elements of human nature and to arraign modern art for superficiality4 ,but there have always been these two kinds1 work with the wide1 and work with only the special appeal4 ,what actually are the differences between them8 ,the one1 the art which keeps the child from play and the old man from his chimney-corner1 evidently builds up its attitudes with the simplest1 most aboriginal impulses1 and it handles them so that the undeveloped mind can weave them into some sort of satisfying fabric while the more mature mind1 qualifying and complicating them until they perhaps lose all likeness to their earlier form1 still finds them serve its needs4 ,the other is built up from impulses which1 except in a personality capable of very nice adjustments1 do not unite in any valuable way1 and often the impulses themselves are of a kind of which only a highly developed mind or one with special experience is capable4 ,this last point1 however1 is separable1 and raises a question which will be discussed later4 ,plainly each of the two methods has its advantages4 ,the poet of wide appeal1 it is tempting to suppose1 has an advantage in that the impulses involved are general1 have been interested all through life and are very representative of experience4 ,and he has the further advantage perhaps of avoiding a certain dangerous finality4 ,impulses which adjust themselves at so many levels may go on doing so perhaps indefinitely4 ,there may be something in the suggestion that ,shakespeare wrote better than he knew4 ,certainly it is a serious charge against much of ,henry ,james1 for example1 that when the reader has once successfully read it there is nothing further which he can do4 ,he can only repeat his reading4 ,there is often a point at which the parts of the experience click together1 the required attitude is achieved1 and no further development is possible4 ,together with this goes the sense in the reader that all had to be just as it is and not otherwise1 whereas with much of ,shakespeare we feel that anything might have been different and the result the same4 8,not laboriously but luckily40 ,but this is only sometimes true of the sophisticated poet who makes no appeal below a certain level4 ,it is not true of ,pope1 for example1 or of ,walt ,whitman1 to choose two unlike authors who at their best are not generally appreciated4 ,and as a counterbalancing advantage for such poets their greater freedom must be noticed4 ,perhaps the chief reason for the decline of drama in the seventeenth century 7social factors apart7 was the exhaustion of the best themes which could be used in order to appeal at all levels4 ,drama1 to secure audiences large enough to be encouraging1 must make a wide-spread appeal2 but the limitations which this condition imposes upon action are very strict4 ,there are no similar restrictions for lyric poetry1 and it is significant that the greatest lyrics have so often a high-level appeal only4 ,the ,mad ,song of ,blake1 ,the ,phnix and the ,turtle1 ,the ,hymn of ,pan1 most great sonnets1 are instances in point4 ,there is1 too1 no good reason why impulses which only begin to make up valuable attitudes in highly organised and discriminating minds should lead to attitudes less valuable or more fragile1 more fixed and final than others4 ,we must not allow the unique instance of ,shakespeare to weigh too heavily2 after all1 ,king ,lear1 the most inexhaustible of his works1 is not a thing which has great popular appeal4 #gj ,we must1 of course1 distinguish art of this kind from the ,christmas party or magazine kind of production1 in which the author provides something 7different and in a different place7 for everybody4 ,the works of ,dickens might be cited as examples4 ,,chapter ,,xxviii ,the ,allusiveness of ,modern ,poetry ,tehee6 ,tehee6 ,o sweet delight6 ,he tickles this age who can ,call ,tullia's ape a marmosyte1 ,and ,leda's goose a swan6 ,anon4 ,we have distinguished between impulses which are involved at all stages of development1 their course and fate naturally varying with the stage1 and those which do not go off at all except in developed minds4 ,the responses of the non-mathematical and the mathematical mind to a formula illustrate the difference4 ,it is the use of responses not available without special experience1 which more than anything else narrows the range of the artist's communication and creates the gulf between expert and popular taste4 ,in the second chorus of ,hellas in the middle of the second stanza the rhythm1 tune1 and handling1 though not the metre1 become suddenly uncharacteristic of ,shelley4 ,a fullness of tone1 a queer1 gentle cadence1 and a leisurely ease of movement belong to the fifth and following lines3 ,a mortal shape to him ,was like the vapour dim ,which the orient planet animates with light4 ,hell1 sin1 and slavery1 came1 ,like bloodhounds mild and tame1 ,nor preyed until their ,lord had taken flight4 ,and this tone and movement are in clear contrast with the fever1 the impetuosity1 the shrillness and rapidity of the first stanza1 or of the closing lines of the second3 ,the moon of ,mahomet ,arose1 and it shall set3 ,while1 blazoned as on heaven's immortal noon1 ,the ,cross leads generations on4 ,the difference is difficult to describe except perhaps3 by the aid of a musical notation4 ,it is like the difference between two voices1 and in spite of the highly characteristic matter#ga of the lines1 the reader feels that not ,shelley but some other poet is speaking4 ,what ,shelley is doing becomes unmistakable in the third and last stanza4 ,the corresponding lines1 again in clear contrast with the lines surrounding them1 have the same strange modulation3 ,so fleet1 so faint1 so fair1 ,the ,powers of ,earth and ,air ,fled from the folding-star of ,bethlehem4 ,apollo1 ,pan and ,love1 ,and even ,olympian ,jove1 ,grew weak1 for killing ,truth had glared on them4 ,in a manner more familiar perhaps in music than in poetry ,shelley is echoing another poem1 borrowing1 as it were1 ,milton's voice though not his words1 making in fact a musical quotation1 a poetical allusion of an exquisite felicity4 ,but by so doing he is necessarily restricting the number of the readers who will fully appreciate him4 ,such allusions are a normal and regular part of the resources of all poets who belong to the literary tradition1 that is to say1 of the vast majority of poets in modern times4 ,they are not often so unobtrusive and the place which they are given in the structure of the poem varies4 ,sometimes1 as in this instance1 a failure on the part of the reader has no important consequences4 ,one familiar with the ,hymn on the ,morning of ,christ's ,nativity will respond more fully and with a deeper sense of the situation2 but a reader unfamiliar with it is not deprived of any major part of the poem4 ,in other cases the loss is more serious4 ,another instance from ,shelley will illustrate this1 and it is interesting for its own sake4 ,the ,shape which guides the ,chariot in the ,triumph of ,life is described and identified for the reader in a large degree through another ,miltonic quotation or allusion3 ,a ,shape ,so sate within1 as one whom years deform1 ,beneath a dusky hood and double cape1 ,crouching within the shadow of a tomb1 ,and o'er what seemed the head a cloud-like crape ,was bent4 ,shelley1 it is known1 crystallised much of his philosophy in the sentence3 #8,death is the veil which those who live call life'1 and the reference#gb here to the guardian of ,hell ,gate1 ,what seem'd his head ,the likeness of a ,kingly ,crown had on1 is not accidental or unimportant for the understanding of the poem4 ,some care is needed in considering the problem of allusions4 ,there may be worthy and unworthy motives behind their employment ad their enjoyment4 ,there are some to whom a familiarity with literature occasions a sense of superiority over others which is trivial and mean4 ,the pleasure of recognition1 proportional as it is to the difficulty or unobtrusiveness of the allusion is a thing of slight value1 not to be confused with literary or poetic values4 ,it is perfectly possible for a reader1 familiar with the ,nativity ,hymn1 for example1 to receive all that ,shelley intended without ever noticing the allusion1 without1 that is to say1 any recognition4 ,but the erudite often forget that this happens4 ,to turn the capacity of recognising recondite references into a shibboleth by which culture may be estimated is a perversion to which scholarly persons are too much addicted4 ,the point is worth mentioning1 since this snobbishness1 percolating down 7or1 if the metaphor be preferred1 by repercussion7 is responsible for much insincerity and timidity1 for wrong attitudes of many kinds towards literature1 for irritation and oppression developing into distaste and neglect of poetry4 ,allusion is a trap for the writer almost as effective as for the academic critic4 ,it invites insincerity4 ,it may encourage and disguise laziness4 ,when it becomes a habit it is a disease4 ,but these dangers form no ground for denying to allusion1 and the similar resources of which it is typical1 a fit and justifiable place in poetry4 ,allusion is the most striking of the ways in which poetry takes into its service elements and forms of experience which are not inevitable to life but need to be specially acquired4 ,and the difficulty which it raises is merely a special instance of a general communicative difficulty which will probably increase for the poetry of the future4 ,all the thought and feeling of recent man goes on in terms of experience which is much more likely to be special and peculiar to the individual1 than1 let us say1 the experience of medieval man4 ,the survival of medieval man on such a vast scale among us should not mislead in this matter4 ,the people who are most keenly and variously interested1 that is to say1 the people whose lives are most valuable on our theory of value1 the people for whom the poet writes and by his appeal to whom he is judged1 inevitably build up their minds with far more varied elements than has ever been the case before4 ,and the poet1 in so far as he is equal to his opportunities1 does the same4 ,it is hard1 and1 in fact1 impossible1 to deny him his natural and necessary resources on the ground that a majority of his readers will not understand4 ,this is not his fault but the fault of the social structure4 ,given present conditions and future developments in the directions indicated by the changes of the last two hundred years1 it is extremely probable that poets will become not less but more allusive1 that their work will depend more and more not only upon other poetry but upon all manner of special fields of familiarity4#gc ,many of the finest and most widely significant experiences1 and those therefore most suitable for poetry1 come nowadays1 for example1 through reading pieces of advanced research4 ,there is nothing new in this1 of course1 nothing that was not happening when ,donne wrote4 ,the difficulty springs from the fact that research is so much further ahead than it used to be4 #ga ,cf4 ,prometheus ,unbound1 ,act #a3 #8the air around them looks radiant as the air around a star'2 also ,triumph of ,life3 #8as veil by veil the silent splendour drops ,from ,lucifer'4 #gb ,paradise ,lost1 ,bk4 ,,ii1 line #fgb4 #gc ,a very interesting contemporary example in connection with which the problem arises perhaps more acutely than ever before is ,mr ,eliot's ,the ,waste ,land already mentioned4 ,the impatience of so many critics and the fact that they have complained of the presence and necessity of notes well illustrates the confusion which prevails upon this question4 ,a more reasonable complaint would have been that ,mr ,eliot did not provide a larger apparatus of elucidation4 7,see ,appendix74 ,,chapter ,,xxix ,permanence as a ,criterion ,wherewith being crown'd1 ,crooked eclipses 'gainst his glory fight4 ,shakespeare1 ,sonnet ,,lx4 ,the permanence of poetry is a subject closely connected with the foregoing4 ,just as there is a prejudice in favour of work with a wide popular appeal1 so there is another in favour of work which lasts1 which has 8stood the verdict of the centuries01 or is thought likely to stand it4 ,both are in part due to critical timidity2 if we cannot decide ourselves1 let us at least count hands and go with the majority4 ,but circumstances which have nothing to do with value sometimes determine survival1 and work which is of great value must often perish for that very reason4 ,it never gets printed1 none will look at it or listen to it4 ,and immortality often attaches itself to the bad as firmly as to the good4 ,few things are worse than ,hiawatha or ,the ,black ,cat1 ,lorna ,doone or ,le ,crime de ,silvestre ,bonnard1 and some of the greatest favourites#gd of the anthologies figure there through their #8bad eminence'4 ,there are1 however1 reasons for connecting persistence of appeal with a certain type of structure1 and1 which is more interesting1 instant fame with a failure to appeal to subsequent generations4 ,work which relies upon ready-made attitudes1 without being able to reconstitute similar attitudes when they are not already existent1 will often make an appeal to one generation which is a mystery to the generations with different attitudes which follow4 ,but this disadvantage from the point of view of permanence of communication does not necessarily involve any lack of value for those to whom the experiences are accessible4 ,very often1 of course1 it will accompany low value2 but this need not be so4 ,the permanence of some art has often been an excuse for fantastic hypotheses4 ,such art has been thought to embody immortal essences1 to reveal special kinds of #8eternal' truths4 ,but such debilitating speculations here no less than elsewhere should be avoided4 ,those are not the terms in which the matter may best be discussed4 ,the uniformity of the impulses from which the work of art starts is a sufficient explanation of its permanence4 ,where the impulses involved are only accidentally touched off through being temporarily in a heightened state of excitability1 we may reasonably expect that there will be little permanence4 ,as a catchword will work one year like magic1 since certain attitudes are for social reasons ready poised on a hair-trigger adjustment1 and the next year be inoperative and incomprehensible1 so1 on a larger scale and in less striking degree1 men's special social circumstances often provide opportunities for works of art which at other times are quite inadequate stimuli4 ,there are fashions in the most important things as in the least1 but for the artist to profit by them is usually to forgo permanence4 ,the greater the ease of communication under such conditions the greater the danger of obsolescence4 ,far more of the great art of the past is actually obsolete than certain critics pretend1 who forget what a special apparatus of erudition they themselves bring to their criticism4 ,the ,divina ,commedia is a representative example4 ,it is true that for adequately equipped readers who can imaginatively reproduce the world outlook of ,aquinas1 and certain attitudes to woman and to chastity1 which are even more inaccessible1 there is no obsolescence4 ,but this is true of the most forgotten poems4 ,actual obsolescence is not in general a sign of low value1 but merely of the use of special circumstances for communication4 ,that a work reflects1 summarises and is penetrated by its age and period is not a ground for assigning it a low value1 and yet this saturation more than anything else limits the duration of its appeal4 ,only so far as a work avoids the catchword type in its method1 and relies upon elements likely to remain stable1 formal elements for example1 can it escape the touch of time4 ,that ,dante is neglected is due only indirectly to his present-day obscurity2 he is still as accessible as ever through his formal side4 ,it is the labour required from readers who are not content with a partial approach which explains why he is so little read even by the scholarly4 ,what can be translated in3 him1 the content1 is precisely what is of least present and future interest1 and at the same time most difficult to understand4 #gd ,e4g4 #8,when lovely woman stoops to folly1' ,heraclitus1 ,the ,millers ,daughter1 ,alexander ,selkirk1 and 7its best known parts at least7 ,the ,skylark4 ,,chapter ,,xxx ,the ,definition of a ,poem ,men take the words they find in use among their neighbours1 and that they may not seem ignorant what they stand for use them confidently without much troubling their heads about a certain fixed meaning4 4 4 4 it being all one to draw these men out of their mistakes1 who have no settled notions1 as to dispossess a ,vagrant of his habitation1 who has no settled abode4 ,this ,i guess to be so2 and every one may observe in himself or others whether it be so or not4 ,locke4 ,it may be useful to collect here some of the results of the foregoing sections and consider them from the point of view of the practising critic4 ,the most salient perhaps is the desirability of distinguishing clearly between the communicative and the value aspects of a work of art4 ,we may praise or condemn a work on either ground or upon both1 but if it fails entirely as a vehicle of communication we are1 to say the least1 not well placed for denying its value4 ,but1 it may be said1 it will then have no value for us and its value or disvalue for us is all that we as critics pretend or should pretend to judge4 ,to make such a reply1 however1 is to abdicate as a critic4 ,at the least a critic is concerned with the value of things for himself and for people like him4 ,otherwise his criticism is mere autobiography4 ,and any critic worth attention makes a further claim1 a claim to sanity4 ,his judgment is only of general interest in so far as it is representative and reflects what happens in a mind of a certain kind1 developed in a certain fashion4 ,the services of bad critics are sometimes not less than those of good critics1 but that is only because we can divine from their responses what other people's responses are likely to be4 ,we must distinguish between standard or normal criticism and erratic or eccentric criticism4 ,as critics ,lamb or ,coleridge are very far from normal2 none the less they are of extraordinary fertility in suggestion4 ,their responses are often erratic even when of most revelatory character4 ,in such cases we do not take them as standards to which we endeavour to approximate1 we do not attempt to see eye to eye with them4 ,instead we use them as means by which to make quite different approaches ourselves to the works which they have characteristically but eccentrically interpreted4 ,the distinction between a personal or idiosyncratic judgment and a normative is sometimes overlooked4 ,a critic should often be in a position to say1 8,i don't like this but ,i know it is good01 or 8,i like this and condemn it01 or 8,this is the effect which it produces upon me1 and this quite different effect is the one it should produce40 ,for obvious reasons he rarely makes any such statements4 ,but many people would regard praise of a work which is actually disliked by the praiser as immoral4 ,this is a confusion of ideas4 ,any honest reader knows fairly well the points at which his sensibility is distorted1 at which he fails as a normal critic and in what ways4 ,it is his duty to take these into consideration in passing judgment upon the value of a work4 ,his rank as a critic depends at least as much upon his ability to discount these personal peculiarities as upon any hypothetical impeccability of his actual responses4 ,so far we have been considering those cases in which the vehicle is sufficiently adequate and the critic sufficiently representative and careful for the response to be a good index of the value of the poem4 ,but these cases are comparatively rare4 ,the superstition which any language not intolerably prolix and uncouth encourages that there is something actual1 the poem1 which all readers have access to and upon which they pass judgment1 misleads us4 ,we naturally talk about poems 7and pictures1 etc47 in a way which makes it impossible for anybody to discover what it is we are talking about4 ,most critical discussion1 in other words1 is primarily emotive with only a very loose and fourfold equivocal reference4 ,we may be talking about the artist's experience1 such of it as is relevant ,,of about ,the experience of a qualified reader who made no mistakes1 or about an ideal and perfect reader's possible experience1 or about our own actual experience4 ,all four in most cases will be qualitatively different4 ,communication is perhaps never perfect1 so the first and the last will differ4 ,the second and third differ also1 from the others and from one another1 the third being what we ought unrestrictedly to experience1 or the best experience we could possibly undergo1 whereas the second is merely what we ought to experience as things are1 or the best experience that we can expect4 ,which of these possible definitions of a poem shall we adopt8 ,the question is one of convenience merely2 but it is by no means easy to decide4 ,the most usual practice is to mean by the poem either the first or the last2 or1 by forgetting what communication is1 to mean both confusedly together4 ,the last involves the personal judgment to which exception was taken on the previous page1 and has the further disadvantage that there would be for every sonnet as many poems as readers4 ,a and ,b1 discussing ,westminster ,bridge as they thought1 would unwittingly be discussing two different things4 ,for some purposes1 for the disentanglement of some misunderstandings1 it is convenient to define a poem temporarily in this manner4 ,to define the poem as the artist's experience is a better solution4 ,but it will not do as it stands since nobody but the artist has that experience4 ,we must be more ingenious4 ,we cannot take any single experience as the poem2 we must have a class of more or less similar experiences instead4 ,let us mean by ,westminster ,bridge not the actual experience which led ,wordsworth on a certain morning about a century ago to write what he did1 but the class composed of all actual experiences1 occasioned by the words1 which do not differ within certain limits from that experience4 ,then anyone who has had one of the experiences comprised in the class can be said to have read the poem4 ,the permissible ranges of variation in the class need 7of course7 very careful scrutiny4 ,to work them out fully and draw up a neat formal definition of a poem would be an amusing and useful occupation for any literary logician with a knowledge of psychology4 ,the experiences must evidently include the reading of the words with fairly close correspondence in rhythm and tune4 ,pitch difference would not matter1 provided that pitch relations were preserved4 ,imagery might be allowed to vary indefinitely in its sensory aspect but would be narrowly restricted otherwise4 ,if the reader will run over the diagram of a poetic experience given in ,chapter ,,xvi and consider in what respects his and his friends' experiences must agree if they are to be able to refer to them indifferently as though they were one and the same without confusion or misunderstanding1 he will see what kind of thing a detailed definition of a poem would be4 ,this1 although it may seem odd and complicated1 is by far the most convenient1 in fact it is the only workable way of defining a poem2 namely1 as a class of experiences which do not differ in any character more than a certain amount1 varying for each character1 from a standard experience4 ,we may take as this standard experience the relevant experience of the poet when contemplating the completed composition#ge4 ,anyone whose experience approximates in this degree to the standard experience will be able to judge the poem and his remarks about it will be about some experience which is included in the class4 ,thus we have what we want1 a sense1 namely1 in which a critic can be said to have not read the poem or to have misread it4 ,in this sense unrecognised failures are extremely common4 ,the justification for this outbreak of pedantry1 as it may appear1 is that it brings into prominence one of the reasons for the backwardness of critical theory4 ,if the definition of a poem is a matter of so much difficulty and complexity1 the discussion of the principles by which poetry should be judged may be expected to be confused4 ,critics have as yet hardly begun to ask themselves what they are doing or under what conditions they work4 ,it is true that a recognition of the critic's predicament need not be explicit in order to be effective1 but few with much experience of literary debate will underestimate the extent to which it is disregarded or the consequences which ensue from this neglect4 ,the discussions in the foregoing chapters are intended as no more than examples of the problems which an explicit recognition of the situation will admit and of the ways in which they will be solved4 #ge ,difficulties even here arise1 e4g4 the poet may be dissatisfied without reason4 ,coleridge thought ,kubla ,khan merely #8a psychological curiosity' without poetic merits1 and may have been justified in some degree4 ,if he was not1 it is his dream experience which we should presumably have to take as our standard4 ,,chapter ,,xxxi ,art1 ,play1 and ,civilisation ,l'heure est la construction1 pas au badinage4 ,le ,corbuster-,saugnier4 ,the value of the experiences which we ,seek from the arts does not lie1 so we have insisted1 in the exquisiteness of the moment of consciousness2 a set of isolated ecstasies is not a sufficient explanation4 ,its inadequacy is additional evidence that the theories of value and of the mind upon which it rests are defective4 ,we must now consider what wider explanations are made possible by the theory of value and the outline account of mental activity and of communication above indicated4 ,the ground1 in part at least1 is cleared4 ,what now can be said as to why the arts are important and why good taste and sound criticism are not mere luxuries1 trivial excrescences grafted upon an independent civilisation8 ,a number of accounts of varying adequacy each in some degree interesting but needing careful interpretation have been put forward4 ,the arts communicate experiences1 it has been said1 and make states of mind accessible to the many which otherwise would be only possible to few4 ,to this it might be added that the arts are also a means by which experiences arise in the mind of the artist which would never otherwise come about4 ,both as an occasion for a collectedness and concentration difficult to attain in the ordinary course of life1 and as the means by which human effort may acquire a continuity analogous to but more subtle than the continuity of science1 the study and practice of the arts can give immensely increased power to the artist1 preserving him from that diffusion of his energies which is perhaps his greatest danger4 ,all this is true1 but it does not go to the root of the matter4 ,again the educational aspect of the arts is constantly being stressed1 sometimes in a manner which does them disservice4 #8,message' hunting--the type of interest which discovers in ,macbeth the moral that #8,honesty is the best policy'2 in ,othello a recommendation to #8,look before you leap'1 in ,hamlet perhaps a proof that #8,procrastination is the ,thief of ,time'1 or in ,king ,lear an indication that #8,your sins will find you out#gf'1 in ,shelley an exhortation to ,idealism1 in ,browning comfort for the discouraged and assurances as to a future life2 but in ,donne or ,keats no #8message'--this mode of interpreting the phrase #8a criticism of life'1 though to a minute degree on the right lines1 is probably more damaging than those entirely erratic theories1 of which #8,art for ,art's sake' is an example1 with which we have been more concerned4 ,none the less but in subtler ways the educational influence of the arts is all-pervasive4 ,we must not overlook bad art in estimating it4 8,i should be said to insist absurdly on the power of my own confraternity0 wrote a novelist of the #aith century 8if ,i were to declare that the bulk of the young people in the upper and middle classes receive their moral teaching chiefly from the novels that they read4 ,mothers would no doubt think of their own sweet teaching2 fathers of the examples which they set2 and schoolmasters of the excellence of their instructions4 ,happy is the country which has such mothers1 fathers and schoolmasters6 ,but the novelist creeps in closer than the father1 closer than the schoolmaster1 closer almost than the mother4 ,he is the chosen guide1 the tutor whom the young pupil chooses for herself4 ,she retires with him1 suspecting no lesson 4 4 4 and there she is taught how she shall learn to love2 how she shall receive the lover when he comes2 how far she should advance to meet the joy2 why she should be reticent and not throw herself at once into this new delight40 ,the influence is also exerted in more indirect ways4 ,there need be1 we must remember1 no discernible connection or resemblance whatever between the experience due to the work of art and the later behaviour and experience which is modified through it4 ,without such resemblance the influence may easily be overlooked or denied1 but not by anyone who has a sufficient conception of the ways in which attitudes develop4 ,no one who has repeatedly lived through experiences at the level of discrimination and co-ordination presupposed by the greater writers1 can ever1 when fully #8vigilant'1 be contented with ordinary crudities though a touch of liver may of course suspend these superior responses4 ,and conversely1 keen and vigilant enjoyment of ,miss ,dell1 ,mr ,burroughs1 ,mrs ,wilcox or ,mr ,hutchinson1 when untouched by doubts or the joys of ironic contemplation1 is likely to have as a consequence not only an acceptance of the mediocre in ordinary life1 but a blurring and confusion of impulses and a very widespread loss of value4 ,these remarks apply even more evidently to the ,cinema4 ,people do not much imitate what they see upon the screen or what they read of in best-sellers4 ,it would matter little if they did4 ,such effects would show themselves clearly and the evil would be of a manageable kind4 ,they tend instead to develop stock attitudes and stereotyped ideas1 the attitudes and ideas of producers3 attitudes and ideas which can be #8put across' quickly through a medium that lends itself to crude rather than to sensitive handling4 ,even a good dramatist's work will tend to be coarser than that of a novelist of equal ability4 ,he has to make his effects more quickly and in a more obvious way4 ,the ,cinema suffers still more than the stage from this disability4 ,it has its compensating advantages in the greater demands which it makes of the audience1 but hitherto very few producers have been able to turn them to account4 ,thus the ideas and attitudes with which the #8movie fan' becomes familiar tend to be peculiarly clumsy and inapplicable to life4 ,other causes1 connected with the mentality of producers1 increase the effect4 ,the danger lies not in the fact that school-girls are sometimes incited to poke revolvers at taximen1 but in much subtler and more insinuating influences4 ,most films indeed are much more suited to children than to adults1 and it is the adults who really suffer from them4 ,no one can intensely and whole-heartedly enjoy and enter into experiences whose fabric is as crude as that of the average super-film without a disorganisation which has its effects in everyday life4 ,the extent to which second-hand experience of a crass and inchoate type is replacing ordinary life offers a threat which has not yet been realised4 ,if a false theory of the severance and disconnection between #8sthetic' and ordinary experience has prevented the value of the arts from being understood1 it has also preserved their dangers from recognition4 ,those who have attempted to find a place in the whole structure of life for the arts have often made use of the conception of ,play2 and ,groos and ,herbert ,spencer are famous exponents of the theory4 ,as with so many other sthetic ,doctrines the opinion that ,art is a form of ,play may indicate either a very shallow or a very penetrating view4 ,all depends upon the conception of ,play which is entertained4 ,originally the view arose in connection with survival values4 ,art1 it was thought1 had little practical value of the obvious kinds1 so some indirect means must be found by which it could be thought to be of service4 ,perhaps1 like play1 it was a means of harmlessly expending superfluous energy4 ,a more useful contribution was made when the problem of the value of play itself was seriously attacked4 ,the immense practical utility of most forms of play then became evident4 ,characteristically play is the preparatory organisation and development of impulses4 ,it may easily become too narrowly specialised1 and the impulses active may be such as never to receive #8serious' exercise4 ,none the less with our present understanding of the amazingly recondite interactions between what appear to be totally different activities of the nervous system1 the importance of play is not likely to need much insistence4 ,there are many human activities which1 fortunately or unfortunately as the case may be1 are no longer required of or possible to civilised man4 ,yet their total discontinuance may lead to grave disturbances4 ,for some of these play serves as an opportunity4 ,the view that art provides in some cases an analogous outlet through vicarious experience has naturally been put forward1 notably by ,mr ,havelock ,ellis4 8,we have lost the orgy1 but in its place we have art#gg40 ,if we do not extend the #8sublimation' theory too far or try to bring under this ,safety-valve heading work with which it has no concern1 it may be granted that in some cases the explanation is in place4 ,but the temptation to extend it1 and so to misconceive the whole matter1 is great4 ,the objection to the ,play ,theory1 unless very carefully stated1 lies in its suggestion that the experiences of ,art are in some way incomplete1 that they are substitutes1 meagre copies of the real thing1 well enough for those who cannot obtain better4 8,the moralising force of ,art lies1 not in its capacity to present a timid imitation of our experiences1 but in its power to go beyond our experience1 satisfying and harmonising the unfulfilled activities of our nature40#gh ,the ,copy ,view1 with the antithesis between ,life and ,literature which so often accompanies it1 is a devastating misconception4 ,coupled with the suggestion involved by the word #8,play1' that such things are for the young rather than for the mature1 and that ,art is something one grows out of1 it has a large share of the responsibility for the present state of the ,arts and of ,criticism4 ,its only rival in obscuring the issues is its close cousin the ,amusement or ,relaxation ,theory4 ,the experiences which the arts offer are not obtainable1 or but rarely1 elsewhere4 ,would that they were6 ,they are not incomplete2 they might better be described as ordinary experiences completed4 ,they are not such that the most adequately equipped person can dispense with them and suffer no loss1 and this loss is not momentary1 but recurrent and permanent2 the best equipped are precisely the people who most value these experiences4 ,nor is ,art1 as by way of corollary is sometimes maintained1 a thing which had its' function in the youth of the world1 but with the development of ,science becomes obsolete4 ,it may very possibly decline and even disappear1 but if it does a biological calamity of the first order will have occurred4 ,nor again is it something which may be postponed while premillennial man grapples with more immediate problems4 ,the raising of the standard of response is as immediate a problem as any1 and the arts are the chief instrument by which it may be raised or lowered4 ,hitherto we have been concerned chiefly with more or less specific effects of the experiences of the arts1 with the effects1 upon single definite groups or systems of impulses1 of their exercise in these experiences4 ,the ,play ,theory tends to limit us to these consequences4 ,important though they are1 we must not overlook the more general effects which any well-organised experience produces4 ,they may in certain cases be extraordinarily widespread4 ,such an apparently irrelevant test as the ability to stand upon one foot without unsteadiness has recently been employed1 by ,mr ,burt1 as an index to mental and especially to emotional organisation4 ,all our activities react upon one another to a prodigious extent in ways which we can only as yet conjecture4 ,finer adjustment1 clearer and more delicate accommodation or reconciliation of impulses in any one field tends to promote it in others4 ,a step in mathematical accomplishment1 other things being equal1 facilitates the acquisition of a new turn in ski-ing4 ,other things are rarely equal it should perhaps be remarked4 ,if this is true even of such special narrowly restricted impulses as are involved in a scientific technique1 it is far more evident when the major1 the most widespread systems1 those active in our responses to human beings and to the exigences of existence1 are engaged4 ,there is abundant evidence that removal of confusion in one sphere of activity tends to be favourable to its removal elsewhere4 ,the ease with which a trained mind approaches a new subject is the plainest example1 but equally a person whose ordinary emotional experience is clear1 controlled and coherent1 is the least likely to be thrown into confusion by an unheard-of predicament4 ,complications sometimes obscure this effect3 a mathematician approaching psychology may attempt to apply methods which are inappropriate1 and the sanest people may prove stupid in their dealings with individuals of other races4 ,the specialist1 either intellectual or moral1 who is helpless outside his own narrow field is a familiar figure in inferior comedy4 ,but what would have to be shown before the principle is invalidated is that1 granted equal specialisation1 the successful specialist is not better fitted for life in general than his unsuccessful confrre4 ,few people1 however1 will dispute the assertion that transference of ability frequently occurs although the mode by which it comes about may be obscure4 ,when very widespread and very fundamental impulses are implicated1 where attitudes constantly taken up in ordinary life are aroused1 this transference effect may be very marked4 ,everybody knows the feeling of freedom1 of relief1 of increased competence and sanity1 that follows any reading in which more than usual order and coherence has been given to our responses4 ,we seem to feel that our command of life1 our insight into it and our discrimination of its possibilities1 is enhanced1 even for situations having little or nothing to do with the subject of the reading4 ,it may be a chapter of ,gsta ,berling or of ,the ,,abc of ,atoms1 the close of the ,vanity of ,human ,wishes1 or the opening of ,harry ,richmond2 whatever the differences the refreshment is the same4 ,and conversely everybody knows the diminution of energy1 the bafflement1 the sense of helplessness1 which an ill-written1 crude1 or muddled book1 or a badly acted play1 will produce1 unless the critical task of diagnosis is able to restore equanimity and composure4 ,neither the subject nor the closeness of correspondence between the experience and the reader's own situation has any bearing upon these effects4 ,but indeed1 to anyone who realises what kind of a thing an experience is1 and through what means it comes about1 the old antithesis between subject and treatment ceases to be of interest 7cf4 ,chapter ,,xvi74 ,they are not separable or distinct things and the division is of no service4 ,in this case the effects we are considering depend only upon the kind and degree of organisation which is given to the experiences4 ,if it is at the level of our own best attempts or above it 7but not so far above as to be out of reach7 we are refreshed4 ,but if our own organisation is broken down1 forced to a cruder1 a more wasteful level1 we are depressed and temporarily incapacitated1 not only locally but generally4 ,it is when what we are offered1 and inveigled into accepting1 is only slightly inferior to our own developed capacity1 so that it is no easy matter to see what is wrong1 that the effect is greatest4 ,stuff of an evident and extreme badness is exhilarating rather than depressing when taken from a discriminating standpoint2 and there need be nothing snobbish or self-congratulatory in such reading4 ,what is really discomposing and damaging to the critical reader is the mediocre1 the work which falls just below his own standards of response4 ,hence the rage which some feel at the productions of ,sir ,james ,barrie1 ,mr ,locke1 or ,sir ,hall ,caine1 a rage which work comparatively devoid of merits fails to excite4 ,these effects are not merely momentary or evanescent2 if we would understand the place of the arts in civilisation we must consider them more closely4 ,an improvement of response is the only benefit which anyone can receive1 and the degradation1 the lowering of a response1 is the only calamity4 ,when we take into account not merely the impulses actually concerned in the experience but all the allied groups which thrive or suffer with it1 and all the far-reaching effects of success or failure upon activities which may seem to be independent1 the fact that some people feel so keenly about the arts is no longer surprising4 ,underestimation of the importance of the arts is nearly always due to ignorance of the workings of the mind4 ,experiences such as these1 into which we willingly and whole-heartedly enter1 or into which we may be enticed and inveigled1 present peculiar opportunities for betrayal4 ,they are the most formative of experiences1 because in them the development and systematisation of our impulses goes to the furthest lengths4 ,in ordinary life a thousand considerations prohibit for most of us any complete working out of our response2 the range and complexity of the impulse-systems involved is less2 the need for action1 the comparative uncertainty and vagueness of the situation1 the intrusion of accidental irrelevancies1 inconvenient temporal spacing--the action being too slow or too fast--all these obscure the issue and prevent the full development of the experience4 ,we have to jump to some rough and ready solution4 ,but in the #8imaginative experience' these obstacles are removed4 ,thus what happens here1 what precise stresses1 preponderances1 conflicts1 resolutions and interinanimations1 what remote relationships between different systems of impulses arise1 what before unapprehended and inexecutable connections are established1 is a matter which1 we see clearly1 may modify all the rest of life4 ,as a chemist's balance to a grocer's scales1 so is the mind in the imaginative moment to the mind engaged in ordinary intercourse or practical affairs4 ,the comparison will bear pressing4 ,the results1 for good or evil1 of the untrammelled response are not lost to us in our usual trafficking4 #gf ,even ,coleridge was not exempt from this failing4 ,cf4 his comments on ,gloster4 #gg ,essay on ,casanova1 in ,affirmations1 p4 #aae4 #gh ,affirmations1 p4 #aae4 ,,chapter ,,xxxii ,the ,imagination ,reason1 in itself confounded1 ,saw division grow together2 ,to themselves yet either neither1 ,simple were so well compounded4 ,the ,phnix and the ,turtle4 ,at least six distinct senses of the word #8imagination' are still current in critical discussion4 ,it is convenient to separate them before passing on to consider the one which is most important4 7i7 ,the production of vivid images1 usually visual images1 already sufficiently discussed1 is the commonest and the least interesting thing which is referred to by imagination4 7ii7 ,the use of figurative language is frequently all that is meant4 ,people who naturally employ metaphor and simile1 especially when it is of an unusual kind1 are said to have imagination4 ,this may or may not be accompanied by imagination in the other senses4 ,it should not be overlooked that metaphor and simile--the two may be considered together--have a great variety of functions in speech4 ,a metaphor may be illustrative or diagrammatical1 providing a concrete instance of a relation which would otherwise have to be stated in abstract terms4 ,this is the most common scientific or prose use of metaphor4 ,it is rare in emotive language and in poetry2 ,shelley's 8,dome of many-coloured glass0 is almost the only example which springs to mind4 ,more usually the elucidation is a mere pretence2 some attitude of the speaker to his subject or to his audience is using the metaphor as a means of expression4 8,the freedom of my writings has indeed provoked an implacable tribe0 said ,gibbon1 8but as ,i was safe from the stings1 ,i was soon accustomed to the buzzing of the hornets04 ,but metaphor has yet further uses4 ,it is the supreme agent by which disparate and hitherto unconnected things are brought together in poetry for the sake of the effects upon attitude and impulse which spring from their collocation and from the combinations which the mind then establishes between them4 ,there are few metaphors whose effect1 if carefully examined1 can be traced to the logical relations involved4 ,metaphor is a semi-surreptitious method by which a greater variety of elements can be wrought into the fabric of the experience4 ,not that there is any virtue in variety by itself1 though the list of critics who seem to have thought so would be lengthy2 a page of the dictionary can show more variety than any page of poetry4 ,but what is needed for the wholeness of an experience is not always naturally present1 and metaphor supplies an excuse by which what is needed may be smuggled in4 ,this is an instance of a very strange phenomenon constantly appearing in the arts4 ,what is most essential often seems to be done as it were inadvertently1 to be a by-product1 an accidental concomitant4 ,those who look only to the ostensible purposes for the explanation of the effects1 who make prose analyses of poems1 must inevitably find them a mystery4 ,but why overt and evident intention should so often destroy the effect is certainly a difficult problem4 7iii7 ,a narrower sense is that in which sympathetic reproducing of other people's states of mind1 particularly their emotional states1 is what is meant4 8,you haven't enough imagination10 the dramatist says to the critic who thinks that his persons behave unnaturally4 ,this kind of imagination is plainly a necessity for communication1 and is covered by what has already been said in ,chapter ,,xxiv4 ,it has no necessary connection with senses of imagination which imply value4 ,bad plays to be successful require it as much as good4 7iv7 ,inventiveness1 the bringing together of elements which are not ordinarily connected1 is another sense4 ,according to this ,edison is said to have possessed imagination1 and any fantastic romance will show it in excelsis4 ,although this comes nearer to a sense in which value is implied1 it is still too general4 ,the lunatic will beat any of us at combining odd ideas3 ,dr ,cook outstrips ,peary1 and ,bottomley outshines ,sir ,john ,bradbury4 7v7 ,next we have that kind of relevant connection of things ordinarily thought of as disparate which is exemplified in scientific imagination4 ,this is an ordering of experience in definite ways and for a definite end or purpose1 not necessarily deliberate and conscious1 but limited to a given field of phenomena4 ,the technical triumphs of the arts are instances of this kind of imagination4 ,as with all ordering1 value considerations are very likely to be implied1 but the value may be limited or conditional4 7vi7 ,finally we come to the sense of imagination with which we are here most concerned4 ,the original formulation#gi was ,coleridge's greatest contribution to critical theory1 and except in the way of interpretation1 it is hard to add anything to what he has said1 though1 as we have already noted in ,chapter ,,xxiv1 some things might be taken away from it with advantage4 8,that synthetic and magical power1 to which we have exclusively appropriated the name of imagination 4 4 4 reveals itself in the balance or reconciliation of opposite or discordant qualities 4 4 4 the sense of novelty and freshness1 with old and familiar objects2 a more than usual state of emotion1 with more than usual order2 judgement ever awake and steady self-possession with enthusiasm and feeling profound or vehement40 8,the sense of musical delight 4 4 4 with the power of reducing multitude into unity of effect1 and modifying a series of thoughts by some one predominant thought or feeling#hj0 these are gifts of the imagination4 ,it was natural1 we shall shortly see why1 for ,coleridge to carry his further speculations upon ,imagination into the realms of ,transcendentalism1 but setting this aside1 there is enough in this description and in the many applications and elucidations scattered through the ,biographia and the ,lectures to justify ,coleridge's claim to have put his finger more nearly than anyone else upon the essential characteristic of poetic as of all valuable experience4 ,in describing the poet we laid stress upon the availability of his experience1 upon the width of the field of stimulation which he can accept1 and the completeness of the response which he can make4 ,compared with him the ordinary man suppresses nine-tenths of his impulses1 because he is incapable of managing them without confusion4 ,he goes about in blinkers because what he would otherwise see would upset him4 ,but the poet through his superior power of ordering experience is freed from this necessity4 ,impulses which commonly interfere with one another and are conflicting1 independent1 and mutually distractive1 in him combine into a stable poise4 ,he selects1 of course1 but the range of suppression which is necessary for him is diminished1 and for this very reason such suppressions as he makes are more rigorously carried out4 ,hence the curious local callousness of the artist which so often strikes the observer4 ,but these impulses active in the artist become mutually modified and thereby ordered to an extent which only occurs in the ordinary man at rare moments1 under the shock of1 for example1 a great bereavement or an undreamt-of happiness2 at instants when the 8film of familiarity and selfish solicitude01 which commonly hides nine-tenths of life from him1 seems to be lifted and he feels strangely alive and aware of the actuality of existence4 ,in these moments his myriad inhibitions are weakened2 his responses1 canalised--to use an inappropriate metaphor--by routine and by practical but restricted convenience1 break loose and make up a new order with one another2 he feels as though everything were beginning anew4 ,but for most men after their early years such experiences are infrequent2 a time comes when they are incapable of them unaided1 and they receive them only through the arts4 ,for great art has this effect1 and owes thereto its supreme place in human life4 ,the poet makes unconsciously a selection which outwits the force of habit2 the impulses he awakens are freed1 through the very means by which they are aroused1 from the inhibitions that ordinary circumstances encourage2 the irrelevant and the extraneous is excluded2 and upon the resulting simplified but widened field of impulses he imposes an order which their greater plasticity allows them to accept4 ,almost always too the chief part of his work is done through those impulses which we have seen to be most uniform and regular1 those which are aroused by what are called the #8formal elements'4 ,they are also the most primitive1 and for that reason commonly among those which are most inhibited1 most curtailed and subordinated to superimposed purposes4 ,we rarely let a colour affect us purely as a colour1 we use it as a sign by which we recognise some coloured object4 ,thus our responses to colours in themselves become so abbreviated that many people come to think that the pigments painters use are in some way more colourful than ,nature4 ,what happens is that inhibitions are released1 and at the same time mutual interactions between impulses take place which only sunsets seem to evoke in everyday experience4 ,we have seen in discussing communication one reason for the pre-eminence of #8formal elements' in art1 the uniformity of the responses which they can be depended upon to produce4 ,in their primitiveness we find another4 ,the sense that the accidental and adventitious aspect of life has receded1 that we are beginning again1 that our contact with actuality is increased1 is largely due to this restoration of their full natural powers to sensations4 ,but this restoration is not enough2 merely looking at a landscape in a mirror1 or standing on one's head will do it4 ,what is much more essential is the increased organisation1 the heightened power of combining all the several effects of formal elements into a single response1 which the poet bestows4 ,to point out that 8the sense of musical delight is a gift of the imagination0 was' one of ,coleridge's most brilliant feats4 ,it is in such resolution of a welter of disconnected impulses into a single ordered response that in all the arts imagination is most shown1 but for the reason that here its operation is most intricate and most inaccessible to observation1 we shall study it more profitably in its other manifestations4 ,we have suggested1 but only by accident1 that imagination characteristically produces effects similar to those which accompany great and sudden crises in experience4 ,this would be misleading4 ,what is true is that those imaginative syntheses which most nearly approach to these climaxes1 ,tragedy for example1 are the most easy to analyse4 ,what clearer instance of the 8balance or reconciliation of opposite and discordant qualities0 can be found than ,tragedy4 ,pity1 the impulse to approach1 and ,terror1 the impulse to retreat1 are brought in ,tragedy to a reconciliation which they find nowhere else1 and with them who knows what other allied groups of equally discordant impulses4 ,their union in an ordered single response is the catharsis by which ,tragedy is recognised1 whether ,aristotle meant anything of this kind or not4 ,this is the explanation of that sense of release1 of repose in the midst of stress1 of balance and composure1 given by ,tragedy1 for there is no other way in which such impulses1 once awakened1 can be set at rest without suppression4 ,it is essential to recognise that in the full tragic experience there is no suppression4 ,the mind does not shy away from anything1 it does not protect itself with any illusion1 it stands uncomforted1 unintimidated1 alone and self-reliant4 ,the test of its success is whether it can face what is before it and respond to it without any of the innumerable subterfuges by which it ordinarily dodges the full development of experience4 ,suppressions and sublimations alike are devices by which we endeavour to avoid issues which might bewilder us4 ,the essence of ,tragedy is that it forces us to live for a moment without them4 ,when we succeed we find1 as usual1 that there is no difficulty2 the difficulty came from the suppressions and sublimations4 ,the joy which is so strangely the heart of the experience is not an indication that #8all's right with the world' or that #8somewhere1 somehow1 there is ,justice'2 it is an indication that all is right here and now in the nervous system4 ,because ,tragedy is the experience which most invites these subterfuges1 it is the greatest and the rarest thing in literature1 for the vast majority of works which pass by that name are of a different order4 ,tragedy is only possible to a mind which is for the moment agnostic or ,manichean4 ,the least touch of any theology which has a compensating ,heaven to offer the tragic hero is fatal4 ,that is why ,romeo and ,juliet is not a ,tragedy in the sense in which ,king ,lear is4 ,but there is more in ,tragedy than unmitigated experience4 ,besides ,terror there is ,pity1 and if there is substituted for either something a little different--,horror or ,dread1 say1 for ,terror2 ,regret or ,shame for ,pity2 or that kind of ,pity which yields the adjective #8,pitiable' in place of that which yields #8,piteous'--the whole effect is altered4 ,it is the relation between the two sets of impulses1 ,pity and ,terror1 which gives its specific character to ,tragedy1 and from that relation the peculiar poise of the ,tragic experience springs4 ,the metaphor of a balance or poise will bear consideration4 ,for ,pity and ,terror are opposites in a sense in which ,pity and ,dread are not4 ,dread or ,horror are nearer than ,terror to ,pity1 for they contain attraction as well as repulsion4 ,as in colour1 tones just not in harmonic relation are peculiarly unmanageable and jarring1 so it is with these more easily describable responses4 ,the extraordinarily stable experience of ,tragedy1 which is capable of admitting almost any other impulses so long as the relation of the main components is exactly right1 changes at once if these are altered4 ,even if it keeps its coherence it becomes at once a far narrower1 more limited1 and exclusive thing1 a much more partial1 restricted and specialised response4 ,tragedy is perhaps the most general1 all-accepting1 all-ordering experience known4 ,it can take anything into its organisation1 modifying it so that it finds a place4 ,it is invulnerable2 there is nothing which does not present to the tragic attitude when fully developed a fitting aspect and only a fitting aspect4 ,its sole rivals in this respect are the attitudes of ,falstaff and of the ,voltaire of ,candide4 ,but pseudo-tragedy--the greater part of ,greek ,tragedy as well as almost all ,elizabethan ,tragedy outside ,shakespeare's six masterpieces comes under this head--is one of the most fragile and precarious of attitudes4 ,parody easily overthrows it1 the ironic addition paralyses it2 even a mediocre joke may make it look lopsided and extravagant4 ,this balanced poise1 stable through its power of inclusion1 not through the force of its exclusions1 is not peculiar to ,tragedy4 ,it is a general characteristic of all the most valuable experiences of the arts4 ,it can be given by a carpet or a pot or by a gesture as unmistakably as by the ,parthenon1 it may come about through an epigram as clearly as through a ,sonata4 ,we must resist the temptation to analyse its cause into sets of opposed characters in the object4 ,as a rule no such analysis can be made4 ,the balance is not in the structure of the stimulating object1 it is in the response4 ,by remembering this we escape the danger of supposing that we have found a formula for ,beauty4 ,although for most people these experiences are infrequent apart from the arts1 almost any occasion may give rise to them4 ,the most important general condition is mental health1 a high state of #8vigilance'2 the next is the frequent occurrence of such experiences in the recent past4 ,none of the effects of art is more transferable than this balance or equilibrium4 ,despite all differences in the impulses concerned1 a certain general similarity can be observed in all these cases of supremely fine and complete organisation4 ,it is this similarity which has led to the legends of the #8sthetic state'1 the #8sthetic emotion' and the single quality ,beauty1 the same in all its manifestations4 ,we had occasion in ,chapter ,,ii to suggest that the characteristics by which sthetic experience is usually defined--that impersonality1 disinterestedness and detachment so much stressed and so little discussed by stheticians--are really two sets of quite different characters4 ,one set we have seen 7,chapters ,x and ,,xxiv7 to be merely conditions of communication having nothing essentially to do with value1 conditions involved in valueless and valuable communications alike4 ,we have suggested above1 however1 that this kind of detachment and severance from ordinary circumstances and accidental personal interests may be of special service in these supremely valuable#ha communications1 since it makes the breaking down of inhibitions more easy4 ,this same facilitation of response is also1 it should be added1 the explanation of the peculiarly pernicious effect of bad but competent art4 ,we may now turn to consider that other set of characters which have been confused with these communicative conditions1 and which may justifiably be taken as defining a special field for those interested in the values of experience4 ,there are two ways in which impulses may be organised2 by exclusion and by inclusion1 by synthesis and by elimination4 ,although every coherent state of mind depends upon both1 it is permissible to contrast experiences which win stability and order through a narrowing of the response with those which widen it4 ,a very great deal of poetry and art is content with the full1 ordered development of comparatively special and limited experiences1 with a definite emotion1 for example1 ,sorrow1 ,joy1 ,pride1 or a definite attitude1 ,love1 ,indignation1 ,admiration1 ,hope1 or with a specific mood1 ,melancholy1 ,optimism or ,longing4 ,and such art has its own value and its place in human affairs4 ,no one will quarrel with #8,break1 break1 break1' or with the ,coronach or with ,rose ,aylmer or with ,love's ,philosophy1#hb although clearly they are limited and exclusive4 ,but they are not the greatest kind of poetry2 we do not expect from them what we find in the ,ode to the ,nightingale1 in ,proud ,maisie1 in ,sir ,patrick ,spens1 in ,the ,definition of ,love or in the ,nocturnall upon ,s4 ,lucie's ,day4 ,the structures of these two kinds of experiences are different1 and the difference is not one of subject but of the relations inter se of the several impulses active in the experience4 ,a poem of the first group is built out of sets of impulses which run parallel1 which have the same direction4 ,in a poem of the second group the most obvious feature is the extraordinarily heterogeneity of the distinguishable impulses4 ,but they are more than heterogeneous1 they are opposed4 ,they are such that in ordinary1 non-poetic1 non-imaginative experience1 one or other set would be suppressed to give as it might appear freer development to the others4 ,the difference comes out clearly if we consider how comparatively unstable poems of the first kind are4 ,they will not bear an ironical contemplation4 ,we have only to read ,the ,war ,song of ,dinas ,vawr in close conjunction with the ,coronach1 or to remember that unfortunate phrase #8,those lips1 ,o slippery blisses'6 from ,endymion1 while reading ,love's ,philosophy1 to notice this4 ,irony in this sense consists in the bringing in of the opposite1 the complementary impulses2 that is why poetry which is exposed to it is not of the highest order1 and why irony itself is so constantly a characteristic of poetry which is4 ,these opposed impulses from the resolution of which such experiences spring cannot usually be analysed4 ,when1 as is most often the case1 they are aroused through formal means1 it is evidently impossible to do so4 ,but sometimes1 as in the above cited cases1 they can1 and through this accident literary criticism is able to go a step further than the criticism of the other arts4 ,we can only conjecture dimly what difference holds between a balance and reconciliation of impulses and a mere rivalry or conflict4 ,one difference is that a balance sustains one state of mind1 but a conflict two alternating states4 ,this1 however1 does not take us very far4 ,the chief misconception which prevents progress here is the switchboard view of the mind4 ,what conception should be put in its place is still doubtful1 but we have already 7,chapters ,,xiv and ,,xx7 discussed the reasons which make a more adequate conception imperative4 ,the rest of the difficulty is due merely to ignorance2 we do not yet know enough about the central nervous system4 ,with this preliminary disavowal of undue certainty we may proceed4 ,the equilibrium#hc of opposed impulses1 which we suspect to be the ground-plan of the most valuable sthetic responses1 brings into play far more of our personality than is possible in experiences of a more defined emotion4 ,we cease to be orientated in one definite direction2 more facets of the mind are exposed and1 what is the same thing1 more aspects of things are able to affect us4 ,to respond1 not through one narrow channel of interest1 but simultaneously and coherently through many1 is to be disinterested in the only sense of the word which concerns us here4 ,a state of mind which is not disinterested is one which sees things only from one standpoint or under one aspect4 ,at the same time since more of our personality is engaged the independence and individuality of other things becomes greater4 ,we seem to see #8all round' them1 to see them as they really are2 we see them apart from any one particular interest which they may have for us4 ,of course without some interest we should not see them at all1 but the less any one particular interest is indispensable1 the more detached our attitude becomes4 ,and to say that we are impersonal is merely a curious way of saying that our personality is more completely involved4 ,these characters of sthetic experiences can thus be shown to be very natural consequences of the diversity1 of their components4 ,but that so many different impulses should enter in is only what may be expected in an experience whose ground-plan is a balance of opposites4 ,for every impulse which does not complete itself in isolation tends to bring in allied systems4 ,the state of irresolution shows this clearly4 ,the difference between any such welter of vacillating impulses and the states of composure we are considering may well be a matter of mediating relations between the supporting systems brought in from either side4 ,one thing only perhaps is certain2 what happens is the exact opposite to a deadlock1 for compared to the experience of great poetry every other state of mind is one of bafflement4 ,the consciousness which arises in these moments of completed being lends itself inevitably to transcendental descriptions4 8,this ,exstasie doth unperplex01 we seem to see things as they really are1 and because we are freed from the bewilderment which our own maladjustment brings with it1 ,the heavy and the weary weight ,of all this unintelligible world ,is lightened4 ,wordsworth's ,pantheistic interpretation of the imaginative experience in ,tintern ,abbey#hd is one which in varying forms has been given by many poets and critics4 ,the reconciliation of it with the account here presented raises a point of extreme importance1 the demarcation of the two main uses of language4 #gi ,coleridge's debt here to ,schelling has been over-estimated4 ,such borrowings as he made were more hampering to him than helpful4 #hj ,biographia ,literaria1 ,,ii1 pp4 #ab1 #ad4 #ha ,it may perhaps be desirable to point out that this description of the effects of art follows from the theory of value outlined in ,chapter ,,vii4 ,they are the most valuable experiences because they are the least wasteful4 ,thus the place assigned to them is not a mere personal expression of preference4 #hb ,may ,i assume that references here will not distress the reader8 ,tennyson1 ,scott1 ,landor1 ,shelley1 ,keats1 ,scott1 ,anon2 ,marvell1 ,donne1 ,peacock4 ,i am anxious to facilitate the actual detailed comparison of these poems4 #hc ,this topic is discussed from a slightly different angle in ,the ,foundations of sthetics 7,allen and ,unwin1 #aibb74 #hd ,i will quote the familiar passage for the reader's convenience3 ,i have felt ,a presence that disturbs me with the joy ,of elevated thoughts3 a sense sublime ,of something far more deeply interfused1 ,whose dwelling is the light of setting suns1 ,and the round ocean and the living air1 ,and the blue sky1 and in the mind of man3 ,a motion and a spirit that impels ,all thinking things1 all objects of all thought ,and rolls through all things4 ,not itself an instance of imaginative utterance1 although some instances can be found in the poem4 ,,chapter ,,xxxiii ,truth and ,revelation ,theories ,oh never rudely will ,i blame his faith ,in the might of stars and angels6 ',tis not merely ,the human being's pride that peoples space ,with life and mystical predominance2 ,since likewise for the stricken heart of ,love ,this visible nature1 and this common world ,is all too narrow 4 4 4 4 ,coleridge1 ,piccolomini4 ,knowledge1 it is recognised1 is good1 and since the experiences which we have been discussing may readily be supposed to give knowledge1 there is a strong tradition in criticism which seeks to derive their value from the worth of knowledge4 ,but not all knowledge is equally valuable3 the kind of information which we can acquire indefinitely by steady perusal of ,whitaker or of an ,encyclopdia is of negligible value4 ,therefore a special kind of knowledge has been alleged4 ,the problem which ensues is for many people the most interesting part of critical theory4 ,that so many capital-letter words--such as ,real1 ,ideal1 ,essential1 ,necessary1 ,ultimate1 ,absolute1 ,fundamental1 ,profound1 and many others--tend to appear in ,truth doctrines is evidence of the interest4 ,this heavy artillery is more than anything else a mode of emphasis1 analogous to italics1 underlining and solemn tones of utterance4 ,it serves to impress upon the reader that he would do well to become serious and attentive1 and like all such devices it tends to lose its effect unless cunningly employed4 ,we may most conveniently begin by considering a range of representative doctrines chosen from the writings of famous critics with a view to illustrating chiefly their differences4 ,some1 it is true1 will hardly repay investigation4 ,it is far too easy to write1 with ,carlyle 8,all real art is the disimprisonment of the soul of fact#he0 or 8,the infinite is made to blend itself with the finite2 to stand visible1 and1 as it were1 attainable there4 ,of this sort are all true works of art2 in this 7if we know a work of art from the daub of artifice7 we discern eternity looking through time1 the ,god-like rendered visible#hf04 ,all the difficulty begins when this has been written1 and what has been said is of no assistance towards its elucidation4 ,nor is ,pater1 for all his praise of clarity and accuracy1 of much better quality4 8,truth6 there can be no merit1 no craft at all1 without that4 ,and1 further1 all beauty is in the long run only fineness of truth or what we call expression1 the finer accommodation of speech to that vision within0#hg4 ,it would perhaps be difficult1 outside ,croce1#hh to find a more unmistakable confusion between value and communicative efficacy4 ,but the ,essay is a veritable museum of critical blunders4 ,the extracts which follow are arranged approximately in order of obscurity4 ,they rise from the most matter of fact to the most mystical uses of truth-notions in criticism4 ,all might be taken as glosses upon the phrase #8,truth to ,nature'2 they serve to show what different things may be meant by what is apparently simple language4 ,we may begin with ,aristotle4 ,he makes three remarks which bear upon the matter4 ,the first is in connection with the antithesis between ,tragedy and ,history4 8,poetry is a more philosophical and a more serious thing than ,history3 for ,poetry is chiefly conversant about general 7universal7 truth1 ,history about particular4 ,in what manner1 for example1 any person of a certain character would speak or act1 probably or necessarily--this is universal2 and this is the object of ,poetry4 ,but what ,alcibiades did1 or what happened to him--this is particular truth40 7,poetics1 ,,ix74 ,his second remark is made in connection with the requisites of ,tragic ,character3-- 8,the third requisite 7in addition to goodness in a special sense1 appropriateness1 and consistency7 of ,character is that it have verisimilitude#hi04 7,poetics1 ,,xv74 ,aristotle's third observation is in the same chapter3-- 8,the poet when he imitates passionate or indolent men and such1 should preserve the type and yet ennoble it#ij04 ,wordsworth's interpretation carries us a definite stage nearer to the mystical3-- 8,aristotle1 ,i have been told1 has said that poetry is the most philosophic of all writing4 ,it is so4 ,its object is truth--not individual and local1 but general and operative4 ,not standing upon external testimony1 but carried alive into the heart by passion3 truth which is its own testimony2 which gives competence and confidence to the tribunal to which it appeals1 and receives them from the same tribunal#ia04 ,wordsworth remains still on the hither side of the gap1 as does ,goethe in suggesting that 8,the beautiful is the manifestation of secret laws of nature which1 but for this disclosure1 had been for ever concealed from us#ib04 ,but ,coleridge1 from whom ,wordsworth probably heard about ,aristotle1 takes the step into mysticism unhesitatingly3-- 8,if the artist copies the mere nature1 the natura naturata1 what idle rivalry6--if he proceeds only from a given form which is supposed to answer to the notion of beauty--what an emptiness1 what an unreality1 there always is in his productions4 ,believe me1 you must master the essence1 the natura naturans1 which presupposes a bond between nature in the higher sense and the soul of man#ic04 ,but ,coleridge held many mystical views1 not always easy to reconcile with one another4 ,in the same ,essay he continues3-- 8,in the objects of nature are presented as in a mirror all the possible elements1 steps and processes of intellect antecedent to consciousness1 and therefore to the full development of the intelligential act2 and man's mind is the very focus of all the rays of intellect which are scattered throughout the images of nature4 ,now so to place these images1 totalised and fitted to the limits of the human mind1 as to elicit from and to superinduce upon the forms themselves the moral reflections to which they approximate1 to make the external internal1 the internal external1 to make nature thought and thought nature--this is the mystery of genius in the ,fine ,arts40 ,even when ,coleridge is most #8the ,god-intoxicated man' his remarks to a careful reader suggest that if they could be decoded1 as it were1 they would provide at the least a basis for interesting speculation4 ,many adumbrations of this mystical view might be quoted4 8,there is a communication between mystery and mystery1 between the unknown soul and the unknown reality2 at one particular point in the texture of life the hidden truth seems to break through the veil01 writes ,mr ,middleton ,murry in an ,essay#id which as an emotive utterance disguised to resemble an argument is of interest4 ,how this feeling of insight arises we have seen in the foregoing chapter2 the sense of immediate revelation of which he treats as 8the primary stuff out of which literature is created0 is certainly characteristic of the greater kinds of art4 ,and there must be few who have not by one arrangement or another contrived from these visionary moments a philosophy which1 for a time1 has seemed to them unshakable because for a time emotionally satisfying4 ,but emotional satisfaction gained at the cost of intellectual bondage is unstable4 ,when it does not induce a partial stupor it breaks down4 ,the freely inquiring mind has a fatal way of overthrowing all immediate and mystical intuitions which1 instead of being duly subordinate1 insist on giving it orders4 ,for the inquiring mind is simply the human being's way of finding a place and function for all its experiences and activities1 a place and function compatible with the rest of its experience4 ,when the mystical insight is understood1 and its claims fitly directed1 although it may seem to those who still misunderstand it to have lost all the attributes for which they have sought to retain it1 and to be no longer either mystical or an insight1 it does not lose but gains in value4 ,but this further adjustment is often very difficult to make4 ,these ,revelation ,doctrines1 when we know what they are really about1 come nearer1 we shall see1 to supplying an explanation of the value of the arts than any of the other traditional accounts4 ,but the process of translation is no easy matter4 ,they are not what they seem1 these utterances apparently about ,truth4 ,in interpreting them we shall find ourselves forced to consider language from an angle and with a closeness which are not usual1 and to do so1 certain very powerful resistances and deeply ingrained habits of the mind have first to be broken down4 #he ,shooting ,niagara4 #hf ,sartor ,resartus4 #hg ,essay on ,style4 #hh ,a discussion of ,croce's doctrines might seem advisable at some point4 ,but all that is strictly necessary has already been said in ,the ,foundations of sthetics4 ,it may be repeated here in the vigorous terms of ,giovanni ,papini 7,four and ,twenty ,minds73 8,if you disregard critical trivialities and didactic accessories1 the entire sthetic system of ,croce amounts merely to a hunt for pseudonyms of the word #8art'1 and may indeed be stated briefly and accurately in this formula3 art intuition expression feeling imagination fancy lyricism beauty4 ,and you must be careful not to take these words with the shadings and distinctions which they have in ordinary or scientific language4 ,not a bit of it4 ,every word is merely a different series of syllables signifying absolutely and completely the same thing40 ,when you are not careful the amalgam of confusions and contradictions which ensues is very remarkable4 ,it is interesting to notice that ,croce's appeal has been exclusively to those unfamiliar with the subject1 to the man of letters and the dilettante4 ,he has been ignored by serious students of the mind4 ,how many of those for example who have been impressed by his dicta as to expression and language have been aware of how the problem has been discussed before1 or have ever heard of the #8imageless thought' controversy8 ,upon the ways in which ,croce's strategy has inveigled the guileless into supposing him to be saying something1 ,papini is excellent4 #8,the ,barabbas of art1 the ,thug of philosophy1 the ,apache of culture'--,papini so describes himself--has here rendered a notable service to those who have been depressed by the vogue of #8,expressionism'4 #hi 4 ,this word is variously translated #8resemblance' 7,twining71 and #8truth to life'8 7,butcher74 ,its usual meaning in the ,poetics is #8the quality of being like ourselves'1 #8average humanity'4 #ij ,cf4 ,eastlake1 ,literature of the ,fine ,arts4 8,the elephant with his objectionable legs and inexpressive hide may still be supposed to be a very normal specimen and may accordingly be a fit object for artistic imitation40 #ia ,preface to ,lyrical ,ballads4 #ib ,compare ,thomas ,rymer1 ,a ,short ,view of ,tragedy4 8,a little preparation and forecast might do well now and then4 ,for his ,desdemona's ,marriage1 he might have helped out the probability by figuring how that some way or other a ,blackamoor woman had been her nurse and suckled her2 or that once upon a time some ,virtuoso had transfused into her veins the ,blood of a ,black ,sheep40 ,we may take it such are not the secret laws of nature to which ,goethe was alluding4 #ic ,on ,poesy or ,art4 #id #8,literature and ,religion' in ,the ,necessity of ,art1 published by ,the ,student ,christian ,movement1 p4 #aee4 ,,chapter ,,xxxiv ,the ,two ,uses of ,language ,the intelligible forms of ancient poets ,the fair humanities of old religion 4 4 4 ,they live no longer in the faith of reason3 ,but still the heart doth need a language1 still ,doth the old instinct bring back the old names4 ,coleridge1 ,piccolomini4 ,there are two totally distinct uses of language4 ,but because the theory of language is the most neglected of all studies they are in fact hardly ever distinguished4 ,yet both for the theory of poetry and for the narrower aim of understanding much which is said about poetry a clear comprehension of the differences between these uses is indispensable4 ,for this we must look somewhat closely at the mental processes which accompany them4 ,it is unfortunate but not surprising that most of the psychological terms which we naturally employ tend to blur the distinction4 #8,knowledge'1 #8belief'1 #8assertion'1 #8thought'1 and #8understanding'1 for1 example1 as ordinarily used1 are ambiguous in a fashion which disguises and obscures the point which must be brought out4 ,they record distinctions which are oblique to the distinctions required1 they are cross-cuts of analysis made in the wrong place and in the wrong direction1 useful enough for some purposes no doubt1 but for this present purpose very confusing4 ,we shall do well to put them out of mind for a while if possible4 ,the chief departure made from current conceptions in the sketch of the mind given in ,chapter ,,xi lay in the substitution of the causes1 the characters and the consequences of a mental event1 for its aspects as thought1 feeling and will4 ,this treatment was introduced with a view to the analysis which now occupies us4 ,among the causes of most mental events1 we urged1 two sets may be distinguished4 ,on the one hand there are the present stimuli reaching the mind through the sensory nerves1 and1 in co-operation with these1 the effects of past stimuli associated with them4 ,on the other hand is a set of quite different factors1 the state of the organism1 its needs1 its readiness to respond to this or that kind of stimulus4 ,the impulses which arise take their character and their course from the interaction of these two sets4 ,we must keep them clearly distinguished4 ,the relative importance of the two sets of factors varies enormously4 ,a sufficiently hungry man will eat almost anything which can be chewed or swallowed4 ,the nature of the substance1 within these limits1 has very little effect upon his behaviour4 ,a replete person1 by contrast1 will only eat such things as he expects will taste pleasant1 or regards as possessing definite beneficial properties1 for example1 medicines4 ,his behaviour1 in other words1 depends almost entirely upon the character of his optical or olfactory stimulation4 ,so far as an impulse owes its character to its stimulus 7or to such effects of past accompanying or connected stimuli as are revived7 so far is it a reference1 to use the term which we introduced in ,chapter ,,xi1 to stand for the property of mental events which we substitute for thought or cognition4#ie ,it is plain that the independent internal conditions of the organism usually intervene to distort reference in some degree4 ,but very many of our needs can only be satisfied if the impulses are left undistorted4 ,bitter experience has taught us to leave some of them alone1 to let them reflect or correspond with external states of affairs as much as they can1 undisturbed as far as possible by internal states of affairs1 our needs and desires4 ,in all our behaviour can be distinguished stimuli we receive1 and the ways in which we use them4 ,what we receive may be any kind of stimulus1 but only when the reaction we make to it tallies with its nature and varies with it in quasi-independence of the uses we make of it does reference occur4 ,those to whom visual images are of service in considering complex matters may find it convenient at this point to imagine a circle or sphere constantly bombarded by minute particles 7stimuli74 ,within the sphere may be pictured complex mechanisms continually changing for reasons having nothing to do with the external stimuli4 ,these mechanisms by opening little gateways select which of the stimuli shall be allowed to come in and take effect4 ,so far as the subsequent convulsions are due to the nature of the impacts and to lingering effects of impacts which have accompanied similar impacts in the past1 the convulsions are referential4 ,so far as they are due to the independent motions of the internal mechanisms themselves1 reference fails4 ,this diagrammatic image may possibly be of convenience to some4 ,by those who distrust such things it may with advantage be disregarded4 ,it is not introduced as a contribution to neurology1 and is in no way a ground for the author's view4 ,the extent to which reference is interfered with by needs and desires is underestimated even by those who1 not having yet forgotten the events of #aiad-aiah1 are most sceptical as to the independence of opinions and desires4 ,even the most ordinary and familiar objects are perceived as it pleases us to perceive them rather than as they are1 whenever error does not directly deprive us of advantages4 ,it is almost impossible for anyone to secure a correct impression of his own personal appearance or of the features of anyone in whom he is personally interested4 ,nor is it perhaps often desirable that he should4 ,for the demarcation of the fields where impulse should be as completely as possible dependent upon and correspondent with external situation1 those in which reference should take prior place from those in which it may be subordinated to appetencies with advantage1 is not a simple matter4 ,on many views of the good and of what should be1 themselves results of subordinating reference to emotional satisfactions1 there could be no question4 ,truth1 it would be said1 has claims prior to all other considerations4 ,love not grounded upon knowledge would be described as worthless4 ,we ought not to admire what is not beautiful and if our mistress be not really beautiful when impartially considered we ought1 so the doctrine runs1 to admire her1 if at all1 for other reasons4 ,the chief points of interest about such views are the confusions which make them plausible4 ,beauty as an internal quality of things is usually involved1 as well as ,good the unanalysable ,idea4 ,both are special twists given to some of our impulses by habits deriving ultimately from desires4 ,they linger in our minds because to think of a thing as ,good or ,beautiful gives more immediate emotional satisfaction than to refer to it as satisfying our impulses in one special fashion 7cf4 ,chapter ,,vii7 or another 7cf4 ,chapter ,,xxxii74 ,to think about ,good or ,beauty is not necessarily to refer to anything4 ,for the term #8thinking' covers mental operations in which the impulses are so completely governed by internal factors and so out of control of stimulus that no reference occurs4 ,most #8thinking of' includes reference in some degree1 of course1 but not all1 and similarly much reference would not commonly be described as thinking4 ,when we drop something which is too hot to hold we would not usually be said to have done so through thinking4 ,the two terms overlap1 and their definitions1 if there be a definition of #8thinking' as commonly used1 are of different types4 ,this is why #8,thought' was on an earlier page described as marking an oblique distinction4 ,to return1 the claims of reference are by no means easy to adjust with other claims4 ,an immense extension of our powers of referring has recently been made4 ,with amazing swiftness ,science has opened out field after field of possible reference4 ,science is simply the organisation of references with a view solely to the convenience and facilitation of reference4 ,it has advanced mainly because other claims1 typically the claims of our religious desires1 have been set aside4 ,for it is no accident that ,science and ,religion conflict4 ,they are different principles upon which impulses may be organised1 and the more closely they are examined the more inevitable is the incompatibility seen to be4 ,any so-called reconciliation which is ever effected will involve bestowing the name ,religion upon something utterly different from any of the systematisations of impulses which it now denotes1 for the reason that the belief elements present would have a different character4 ,many attempts have been made to reduce ,science to a position of subjection to some instinct or emotion or desire1 to curiosity for example4 ,a special passion for knowledge for its own sake has even been invented4 ,but in fact all the passions and all the instincts1 all human needs and desires may on occasion supply the motive force for ,science4 ,there is no human activity which may not on occasion require undistorted reference4 ,the essential point1 however1 is that ,science is autonomous4 ,the impulses developed in it are modified only by one another1 with a view to the greatest possible completeness and systematisation1 and for the facilitation of further references4 ,so far as other considerations distort them they are not yet ,science or have fallen out of it4 ,to declare ,science autonomous is very different from subordinating all our activities to it4 ,it is merely to assert that so far as any body of references is undistorted it belongs to ,science4 ,it is not in the least to assert that no references may be distorted if advantage can thereby be gained4 ,and just as there are innumerable human activities which require undistorted references if they are to be satisfied1 so there are innumerable other human activities not less important which equally require distorted references or1 more plainly1 fictions4 ,the use of fictions1 the imaginative use of them rather1 is not a way of hoodwinking ourselves4 ,it is not a process of pretending to ourselves that things are not as they are4 ,it is perfectly compatible with the fullest and grimmest recognition of the exact state of affairs on all occasions4 ,it is no make-believe4 ,but so awkwardly have our references and our attitudes become entangled that such pathetic spectacles as ,mr ,yeats trying desperately to believe in fairies or ,mr ,lawrence impugning the validity of solar physics1 are all too common4 ,to be forced by desire into any unwarrantable belief is a calamity4 ,the state which ensues is often extraordinarily damaging to the mind4 ,but this common misuse of fictions should not blind us to their immense services provided we do not take them for what they are not1 degrading the chief means by which our attitudes to actual life may be adjusted into the material of a long-drawn delirium#if4 ,if we knew enough it might be possible that all necessary attitudes could be obtained through scientific references alone4 ,since we do not know very much yet1 we can leave this very remote possibility1 once recognised1 alone4 ,fictions whether aroused by statements or by analogous things in other arts may be used in many ways4 ,they may be used1 for example1 to deceive4 ,but this is not a characteristic use in poetry4 ,the distinction which needs to be kept clear does not set up fictions in opposition to verifiable truths in the scientific sense4 ,a statement may be used for the sake of the reference1 true or false1 which it causes4 ,this is the scientific use of language4 ,but it may also be used for the sake of the effects in emotion and attitude produced by the reference it occasions4 ,this is the emotive use of language4 ,the distinction once clearly grasped is simple4 ,we may either use words for the sake of the references they promote1 or we may use them for the sake of the attitudes and emotions which ensue4 ,many arrangements of words evoke attitudes without any reference being required en route4 ,they-operate like musical phrases4 ,but usually references are involved as conditions for1 or stages in1 the ensuing development of attitudes1 yet it is still the attitudes not the references which are important4 ,it matters not at all in such cases whether the references are true or false4 ,their sole function is to bring about and support the attitudes which are the further response4 ,the questioning1 verificatory way of handling them is irrelevant1 and in a competent reader it is not allowed to interfere4 8,better a plausible impossibility than an improbable possibility0 said ,aristotle very wisely2 there is less danger of an inappropriate reaction4 ,the differences between the mental processes involved in the two cases are very great1 though easily overlooked4 ,consider what failure for each use amounts to4 ,for scientific language a difference in the references is itself failure3 the end has not been attained4 ,but for emotive language the widest differences in reference are of no importance if the further effects in attitude and emotion are of the required kind4 ,further1 in the scientific use of language not only must the references be correct for success1 but the connections and relations of references to one another must be of the kind which we call logical4 ,they must not get in one another's way1 and must be so organised as not to impede further reference4 ,but for emotive purposes logical arrangement is not necessary4 ,it may be and often is an obstacle4 ,for what matters is that the series of attitudes due to the references should have their own proper organisation1 their own emotional interconnection1 and this often has no dependence upon the logical relations of such references as may be concerned in bringing the attitudes into being4 ,a few notes of the chief uses of the word #8,truth' in ,criticism may help to prevent misunderstanding3-- #a4 ,the scientific sense that1 namely1 in which references1 and derivatively statements symbolising references1 are true1 need not delay us4 ,a reference is true when the things to which it refers are actually together in the way in which it refers to them4 ,otherwise it is false4 ,this sense is one very little involved by any of the arts4 ,for the avoidance of confusions it would be well if the term #8true' could be reserved for this use4 ,in purely scientific discourse it could and should be1 but such discourse is uncommon4 ,in point of fact the emotive power which attaches to the word is far too great for it to be abandoned in general discussion2 the temptation to a speaker who needs to stir certain emotions and evoke certain attitudes of approval and acceptance is overwhelming4 ,no matter how various the senses in which it may be used1 and even when it is being used in no sense whatever1 its effects in promoting attitudes will still make it indispensable2 people will still continue to use the word with the same promiscuity as ever4 #b4 ,the most usual other sense is that of acceptability4 ,the #8,truth' of ,robinson ,crusoe is the acceptability of the things we are told1 their acceptability in the interests of the effects of the narrative1 not their correspondence with any actual facts involving ,alexander ,selkirk or another4 ,similarly the falsity of happy endings to ,lear or to ,don ,quixote1 is their failure to be acceptable to those who have fully responded to the rest of the work4 ,it is in this sense that #8,truth' is equivalent to #8internal necessity' or rightness4 ,that is #8true' or #8internally necessary' which completes or accords with the rest of the experience1 which co-operates to arouse our ordered response1 whether the response of ,beauty or another4 8,what the ,imagination seizes as ,beauty must be ,truth01 said ,keats1 using this sense of #8,truth'1 though not without confusion4 ,sometimes it is held that whatever is redundant or otiose1 whatever is not required1 although not obstructive or disruptive1 is also false4 8,surplusage60 said ,pater1 8the artist will dread that1 as the runner on his muscles#ig0 himself perhaps in this instance sweating his sentence down too finely4 ,but this is to make excessive demands upon the artist4 ,it is to apply the axe of retrenchment in the wrong place4 ,superabundance is a common characteristic of great art1 much less dangerous than the preciousness that too contrived an economy tends to produce4 ,the essential point is whether what is unnecessary interferes or not with the rest of the response4 ,if it does not1 the whole thing is all the better probably for the extra solidity which it thereby gains4 ,this internal acceptability or #8convincingness' needs to be contrasted with other acceptabilities4 ,thomas ,rymer1 for example1 refused to accept ,iago for external reasons3 8,to entertain the audience with something new and surprising against common sense and nature1 he would pass upon us a close1 dissembling rascal1 instead of an open-hearted1 frank1 plain-dealing ,souldier1 a character constantly born by them for some thousands of years in the ,world40 8,the truth is0 he observes 8this authors head was full of villainous1 unnatural images0#ih4 ,he is remembering no doubt ,aristotle's remark that 8the artist must preserve the type and yet ennoble it01 but interpreting it in his own way4 ,for him the type is fixed simply by convention and his acceptances take no note of internal necessities but are governed merely by accordance with external canons4 ,his is an extreme case1 but to avoid his error in subtler matters is in fact sometimes the hardest part of the critic's undertaking4 ,but whether our conception of the type is derived in some such absurd way1 or taken1 for example1 as from a handbook of zoology1 is of slight consequence4 ,it is the taking of any external canon which is critically dangerous4 ,when in the same connection ,rymer objects that there never was a ,moorish ,general in the service of the ,venetian ,republic1 he is applying another external canon1 that of historic fact4 ,this mistake is less insidious1 but ,ruskin used to be particularly fond of the analogous mistake in connection with the #8truth' of drawing4 #c4 ,truth may be equivalent to ,sincerity4 ,this character of the artist's work we have already touched upon briefly in connection with ,tolstoy's theory of communication 7,chapter ,,xxiii74 ,it may perhaps be most easily defined from the critic's point of view negatively1 as the absence of any apparent attempt on the part of the artist to work effects upon the reader which do not work for himself4 ,too simple definitions must be avoided4 ,it is well known that ,burns in writing #8,ae fond kiss' was only too anxious to escape ,nancy's 7,mrs ,maclehose's7 attentions1 and similar instances could be multiplied indefinitely4 ,absurdly naive views upon the matter#ii exemplified by the opinion that ,bottomley must have believed himself to be inspired or he would not have moved his audiences1 are far too common4 ,at the level at which ,bottomley harangued any kind of exaltation in the orator1 whether due to pride or to champagne1 would make his stuff effective4 ,but at ,burns' level a very different situation arises4 ,here his probity and sincerity as an artist are involved2 external circumstances are irrelevant1 but there is perhaps internal evidence in the poem of a flaw in its creating impulse4 ,compare as a closely similar poem in which there is no flaw1 ,byron's #8,when we two parted'4 #ie ,the reader who is a psychologist will notice many points in this statement at which elaboration and qualifications are required4 ,for example1 when we are #8introspecting' factors normally belonging to the second set may enter the first4 ,but he will be able1 if he grasps the general theory1 to supply these complications himself4 ,i did not wish to burden the text with unnecessary intricacies4 #if ,revelation ,doctrines when once given a foothold tend to interfere everywhere4 ,they serve as a kind of omnipotent major premise justifying any and every conclusion4 ,a specimen3 8,since the function of ,art is to pierce through to the ,real ,world1 then it follows that the artist cannot be too definite in his outlines1 and that good drawing is the foundation of all good art40--,charles ,gardner1 ,vision and ,vesture1 p4 #ed4 #ig ,essay on ,style1 p4 #ai4 #ii ,short ,view of ,tragedy4 #ii ,cf4 ,a4 ,clutton-,brock1 ,the ,times1 #aath ,july #aibb1 p4 #ac4 ,,chapter ,,xxxv ,poetry and ,beliefs ,what ,i see very well is the wide-spread1 infinite harm of putting fancy for knowledge 7to speak like ,socrates71 or rather of living by choice in a twilight of the mind where fancy and knowledge are indiscernible4--,euripides the ,rationalist4 ,it is evident that the bulk of poetry consists of statements which only the very foolish would think of attempting to verify4 ,they are not the kind of things which can be verified4 ,if we recall what was said in ,chapter ,,xvi as to the natural generality or vagueness of reference we shall see another reason why references as they occur in poetry are rarely susceptible of scientific truth or falsity4 ,only references which are brought into certain highly complex and very special combinations1 so as to correspond to the ways in which things actually hang together1 can be either true or false1 and most references in poetry are not knit together in this way4 ,but even when they are1 on examination1 frankly false1 this is no defect4 ,unless1 indeed1 the obviousness of the falsity forces the reader to reactions which are incongruent or disturbing to the poem4 ,and equally1 a point more often misunderstood1 their truth1 when they are true1 is no merit#ajj4 ,the people who say #8,how ,true6' at intervals while reading ,shakespeare are misusing his work1 and1 comparatively speaking1 wasting their time4 ,for all that matters in either case is acceptance1 that is to say1 the initiation and development of the further response4 ,poetry affords the clearest examples of this subordination of reference to attitude4 ,it is the supreme form of emotive language4 ,but there can be no doubt that originally all language was emotive2 its scientific use is a later development1 and most language is still emotive4 ,yet the late development has come to seem the natural and the normal use1 largely because the only people who have reflected upon language were at the moment of reflection using it scientifically4 ,the emotions and attitudes resulting from a statement used emotively need not be directed towards anything to which the statement refers4 ,this is clearly evident in dramatic poetry1 but much more poetry than is usually supposed is dramatic in structure4 ,as a rule a statement in poetry arouses attitudes much more wide and general in direction than the references of the statement4 ,neglect of this fact makes most verbal analysis of poetry irrelevant4 ,and the same is true of those critical but emotive utterances about poetry which gave rise to this discussion4 ,no one1 it is plain1 can read poetry successfully without1 consciously or unconsciously1 observing the distinction between the two uses of words4 ,that does not need to be insisted upon4 ,but further no one can understand such utterances about poetry as that quoted from ,dr ,mackail in our third chapter1 or ,dr ,bradley's cry that 8,poetry is a spirit01 or ,shelley's that 8,a poem is the very image of life expressed in its eternal truth01 or the passages quoted above from ,coleridge1 without distinguishing the making of a statement from the incitement or expression of an attitude4 ,but too much inferior poetry has been poured out as criticism1 too much sack and too little bread2 confusion between the two activities1 on the part of writers and readers alike1 is what is primarily responsible for the backwardness of critical studies4 ,what other stultifications of human endeavour it is also responsible for we need not linger here to point out4 ,the separation of prose from poetry1 if we may so paraphrase the distinction1 is no mere academic activity4 ,there is hardly a problem outside mathematics which is not complicated by its neglect1 and hardly any emotional response which is not crippled by irrelevant intrusions4 ,no revolution in human affairs would be greater than that which a wide-spread observance of this distinction would bring about4 ,one perversion in especial needs to be noticed4 ,it is constantly present in critical discussion1 and is in fact responsible for ,revelation ,doctrines4 ,many attitudes1 which arise without dependence upon any reference1 merely by the interplay and resolution of impulses otherwise awakened1 can be momentarily encouraged by suitable beliefs held as scientific beliefs are held4 ,so far as this encouragement is concerned1 the truth or falsity of these beliefs does not matter1 the immediate effect is the same in either case4 ,when the attitude is important1 the temptation to base it upon some reference which is treated as established scientific truths are treated is very great1 and the poet thus easily comes to invite the destruction of his work2 ,wordsworth puts forward his ,pantheism1 and other people doctrines of ,inspiration1 ,idealism and ,revelation4 ,the effect is twofold2 an appearance of security and stability is given to the attitude1 which thus seems to be justified2 and at the same time it is no longer so necessary to sustain this attitude by the more difficult means peculiar to the arts1 or to pay full attention to form4 ,the reader can be relied upon to do more than his share4 ,that neither effect is desirable is easily seen4 ,the attitude for the sake of which the belief is introduced is thereby made not more but less stable4 ,remove the belief1 once it has affected the attitude2 the attitude collapses4 ,it may later be restored by more appropriate means1 but that is another matter4 ,and all such beliefs are very likely to be removed2 their logical connections with other beliefs scientifically entertained are1 to say the least1 shaky4 ,in the second place these attitudes1 produced not by the appropriate means but1 as it were by a short cut1 through beliefs1 are rarely so healthy1 so vigorous and full of life as the others4 ,unlike attitudes normally produced they usually require an increased stimulus every time that they are reinstated4 ,the belief has to grow more and more fervent1 more and more convinced1 in order to produce the same attitude4 ,the believer has to pass from one paroxysm of conviction to another1 enduring each time a greater strain4 ,this substitution of an intellectual formula for the poem or work of art is of course most easily observed in the case of religion1 where the temptation is greatest4 ,in place of an experience1 which is a direct response to a certain selection of the possibilities of stimulation1 we have a highly indirect response1 made1 not to the actual influences of the world upon us1 but to a special kind of belief as to some particular state of affairs4#aja ,there is a suppressed conditional clause implicit in all poetry4 ,if things were such and such then 4 4 4 and so the response develops4 ,the amplitude and fineness of the response1 its sanction and authority1 in other words1 depend upon this freedom from actual assertion in all cases in which the belief is questionable on any ground whatsoever4 ,for any such assertion involves suppressions1 of indefinite extent1 which may be fatal to the wholeness1 the integrity of the experience4 ,and the assertion is almost always unnecessary2 if we look closely we find that the greatest poets1 as poets1 though frequently not as critics1 refrain from assertion4 ,but it is easy1 by what seems only a slight change of approach1 to make the initial step an act of faith1 and to make the whole response dependent upon a belief as to a matter of fact4 ,even when the belief is true1 the damage done to the whole experience may be great1 in the case of a person whose reasons for this belief are inadequate1 for example1 and the increased temporary vivacity which is the cause of perversion is no sufficient compensation4 ,as a convenient example it may be permissible to refer to the ,poet ,laureate's anthology1 ,the ,spirit of ,man1 and ,i have the less hesitation since the passages there gathered together are chosen with such unerring taste and discrimination4 ,but to turn them into a statement of a philosophy is very noticeably to degrade them and to restrict and diminish their value4 ,the use of verse quotations as chapter headings is open to the same objection4 ,the experiences which ensue may seem very similar to the experiences of free reading2 they feel similar2 but all the signs which can be most trusted1 after-effects for example1 show them to be different4 ,the vast differences in the means by which they are brought about is also good ground for supposing them to be dissimilar1 but this difference is obscured through the ambiguities of the term #8belief'4 ,there are few terms which are more troublesome in psychology than belief1 formidable though this charge may seem4 ,the sense in which we believe a scientific proposition is not the sense in which we believe emotive utterances1 whether they are political #8,we will not sheathe the sword'1 or critical #8,the progress of poetry is immortal'1 or poetic4 ,both senses of belief are complicated and difficult1 to define4 ,yet we commonly appear to assume that they are the same or that they differ only in the kind and degree of evidence available4 ,scientific belief we may perhaps define as readiness to act as though the reference symbolised by the proposition which is believed were true4 ,readiness to act in all circumstances and in all connections into which it can enter4 ,this rough definition would1 of course1 need elaborating to be complete1 but for our present purposes it may suffice4 ,the other element usually included in a definition of belief1 namely a feeling or emotion of acceptance1 the #8,this is sooth1 accept it6' feeling1 is often absent in scientific belief and is not essential4 ,emotive belief is very different4 ,readiness to act as though some references were true is often involved1 but the connections and circumstances in which this readiness remains are narrowly restricted4 ,similarly the extent of the action is ordinarily limited4 ,consider the acceptances involved in the understanding of a play1 for example4 ,they form a system any element of which is believed while the rest are believed and so long as the acceptance of the whole growing system leads to successful response4 ,some1 however1 are of the form #8,given this then that would follow'1 general beliefs1 that is to say1 of the kind which led ,aristotle1 in the passage quoted above1 to describe ,poetry as a more philosophical thing than history because chiefly conversant of universal truth4 ,but if we look closely into most instances of such beliefs we see that they are entertained only in the special circumstances of the poetic experience4 ,they are held as conditions for further effects1 our attitudes and emotional responses1 and not as we hold beliefs in laws of nature1 which we expect to find verified on all occasions4 ,if dramatic necessities were actually scientific laws we should know much more psychology than any reasonable person pretends that we do4 ,that these beliefs as to 8how any person of a certain character would speak or act1 probably or necessarily01 upon which so much drama seems to depend1 are not scientific1 but are held only for the sake of their dramatic effect1 is shown clearly by the ease with which we abandon them if the advantage lies the other way4 ,the medical impossibility of ,desdemona's last speech is perhaps as good an example as any4 ,the bulk of the beliefs involved in the arts are of this kind1 provisional acceptances1 holding only in special circumstances 7in the state of mind which is the poem or work of art7 acceptances made for the sake of the #8imaginative experience' which they make possible4 ,the difference between these emotive beliefs and scientific beliefs is not one of degree but of kind4 ,as feelings they are very similar1 but as attitudes their difference in structure has widespread consequences4 ,there remains to be discussed another set of emotive effects which may also be called beliefs4 ,instead of occurring part way in1 or at the beginning of a response1 they come as a rule at the end1 and thus are less likely to be confused with scientific beliefs4 ,very often the whole state of mind in which we are left by a poem1 or by music1 or1 more rarely perhaps1 by other forms of art1 is of a kind which it is natural to describe as a belief4 ,when all provisional acceptances have lapsed1 when the single references and their connections which may have led up to the final response are forgotten1 we may still have an attitude and an emotion which has to introspection all the characters of a belief4 ,this belief1 which is a consequence not a cause of the experience1 is the chief source of the confusion upon which ,revelation ,doctrines depend4 ,if we ask what in such cases it is which is believed1 we are likely to receive1 and to offer1 answers both varied and vague4 ,for strong belief-feelings1 as is well known and as is shown by certain doses of alcohol or hashish1 and pre-eminently of nitrous oxide1 will readily attach themselves to almost any reference1 distorting it to suit their purpose4 ,few people without experience of the nitrous-oxide revelation have any conception of their capacity for believing or of the extent to which belief-feelings and attitudes are parasitic4 ,thus when1 through reading ,adonais1 for example1 we are left in a strong emotional attitude which feels like belief1 it is only too easy to think that we are believing in immortality or survival1 or in something else capable of statement1 and fatally easy also to attribute the value of the poem to the alleged effect1 or conversely to regret that it should depend upon such a scientifically doubtful conclusion4 ,scientific beliefs1 as opposed to these emotive beliefs1 are beliefs #8that so and so'4 ,they can be stated with greater or less precision1 as the case may be1 but always in some form4 ,it is for some people difficult to admit beliefs which are objectless1 which are not about anything or in anything2 beliefs which cannot be stated4 ,yet most of the beliefs of children and primitive peoples1 and of the unscientific generally seem to be of this kind4 ,their parasitic nature helps to confuse the issue4 ,what we have to distinguish are beliefs which are grounded in fact1 i4e41 are due to reference1 and beliefs which are due to other causes1 and merely attach themselves to such references as will support them4 ,that an objectless belief is a ridiculous or an incomplete thing is a prejudice deriving only from confusion4 ,such beliefs have1 of course1 no place in science1 but in themselves they are often of the utmost value4 ,provided always that they do not furnish themselves with illicit objects4 ,it is the objectless belief which is masquerading as a belief in this or that1 which is ridiculous2 more often than not it is also a serious nuisance4 ,when they are kept from tampering with the development of reference such emotional attitudes may be1 as revelation doctrines in such strange forms maintain1 among the most important and valuable effects which the arts can produce4 ,it is often held that recent generations suffer more from nervous strain than some at least of their predecessors1 and many reasons for this have been suggested4 ,certainly the types of nervous disease most prevalent seem to have changed4 ,an explanation not sufficiently noticed perhaps is the break-down of traditional accounts of the universe1 and the strain imposed by the vain attempt to orient the mind by belief of the scientific kind alone4 ,in the pre-scientific era1 the devout adherent to the ,catholic account of the world1 for example1 found a sufficient basis for nearly all his main attitudes in what he took to be scientific truth4 ,it would be fairer to say that the difference between ascertained fact and acceptable fiction did not obtrude itself for him4 ,to-day this is changed1 and if he believes such an account1 he does not do so1 if intelligent1 without considerable difficulty or without a fairly persistent strain4 ,the complete sceptic1 of course1 is a new phenomenon1 dissenters in the past having commonly disbelieved only because they held a different belief of the same kind4 ,these topics have1 it is true1 been touched upon by psycho-analysts1 but not with a very clear understanding of the situation4 ,the ,vienna ,school would merely have us away with antiquated lumber2 the ,zurich ,school would hand us a new outfit of superstitions4 ,actually what is needed is a habit of mind which allows both reference and the development of attitudes their proper independence4 ,this habit of mind is not to be attained at once1 or for most people with ease4 ,we try desperately to support our attitudes with beliefs as to facts1 verified or accepted as scientifically established1 and by so doing we weaken our own emotional backbone4 ,for the justification of any attitude per se is its success for the needs of the being4 ,it is not justified by the soundness of the views which may seem to be1 and in pathological cases are1 its ground and causes4 ,the source of our attitudes should be in experience itself2 compare ,whitman's praise of the cow which does not worry about its soul4 ,opinion as to matters of fact1 knowledge1 belief1 are not necessarily involved in any of our attitudes to the world in general1 or to particular phases of it4 ,if we bring them in1 if1 by a psychological perversion only too easy to fall into1 we make them the basis of our adjustment1 we run extreme risks of later disorganisation elsewhere4 ,many people find great difficulty in accepting or even in understanding this position4 ,they are so accustomed to regarding #8recognised facts' as the natural basis of attitudes1 that they cannot conceive how anyone can be otherwise organised4 ,the hard-headed positivist and the convinced adherent of a religion from opposite sides encounter the same difficulty4 ,the first at the best suffers from an insufficient material for the development of his attitudes2 the second from intellectual bondage and unconscious insincerity4 ,the one starves himself2 the other is like the little pig in the fable who chose to have his house built of cabbages and ate it1 and so the grim wolf with privy paw devoured him4 ,for clear and impartial awareness of the nature of the world in which we live and the development of attitudes which will enable us to live in it finely are both necessities1 and neither can be subordinated to the other4 ,they are almost independent1 such connections as exist in well-organised individuals being adventitious4 ,those who find this a hard saying may be invited to consider the effect upon them of those works of art which most unmistakably attune them to existence4 ,the central experience of ,tragedy and its chief value is an attitude indispensable for a fully developed life4 ,but in the reading of ,king ,lear what facts verifiable by science1 or accepted and believed in as we accept and believe in ascertained facts1 are relevant8 ,none whatever4 ,still more clearly in the experiences of some music1 of some architecture and of some abstract design1 attitudes are evoked and developed which are unquestionably independent of all beliefs as to fact1 and these are exceptional only in being protected by accident from the most insidious perversion to which the mind is liable4 ,for the intermingling of knowledge and belief is indeed a perversion1 through which both activities suffer degradation4 ,these objectless beliefs1 which though merely attitudes seem to be knowledge1 are not difficult to explain4 ,some system of impulses not ordinarily in adjustment within itself or adjusted to the world finds something which orders it or gives it fit exercise4 ,then follows the peculiar sense of ease1 of restfulness1 of free1 unimpeded activity1 and the feeling of acceptance1 of something more positive than acquiescence4 ,this feeling is the reason why such states may be called beliefs4 ,they share this feeling with1 for example1 the state which follows the conclusive answering of a question4 ,most attitude-adjustments which are successful possess it in some degree1 but those which are very regular and familiar1 such as sitting down to meat or stretching out in bed1 naturally tend to lose it4 ,but when the required attitude has been long needed1 where its coming is unforeseen and the manner in which it is brought about complicated and inexplicable1 where we know no more than that formerly we were unready and that now we are ready for life in some particular phase1 the feeling which results may be intense4 ,such are the occasions upon which the arts seem to lift away the burden of existence1 and we seem ourselves to be looking into the heart of things4 ,to be seeing whatever it is as it really is1 to be cleared in vision and to be recipients of a revelation4 ,we have considered already the detail of these states of consciousness and their conjectural impulse basis4 ,we can now take this feeling of a revealed significance1 this attitude of readiness1 acceptance and understanding1 which has led to so many ,revelation ,doctrines1 not as actually implying knowledge1 but for what it is--the conscious accompaniment of our successful adjustment to life4 ,but it is1 we must admit1 no certain sign by itself that our adjustment is adequate or admirable4 ,even the most firm adherents to ,revelation ,doctrines admit that there are bogus revelations1 and on our account it is equally important to distinguish between #8feelings of significance' which indicate that all is well and those which do not4 ,in a sense all indicate that something is going well1 otherwise there would be no acceptance1 no belief but rejection4 ,the real question is #8,what is it8' ,thus after the queer reshuffling of inhibitions and releases which follows the taking of a dose of alcohol1 for example1 the sense of revelation is apt to occur with unusual authority4 ,doubtless this feeling of significance is a sign that as the organism is for the moment1 its affairs are for the moment thriving4 ,but when the momentary special condition of the system has given place to the more usual1 more stable and more generally advantageous adjustment1 the authority of the vision falls away from it2 we find that what we were doing is by no means so wonderful or so desirable as we thought and that our belief was nonsensical4 ,so it is less noticeably with many moments in which the world seems to be showing its real face to us4 ,the chief difficulty of all ,revelation ,doctrines has always been to discover what it is which is revealed4 ,if these states of mind are knowledge it should be possible to state what it is that they know4 ,it is often easy enough to find something which we can suppose to be what we know4 ,belief feelings1 we have seen1 are parasitic1 and will attach themselves to all kinds of hosts4 ,in literature it is especially easy to find hosts4 ,but in music1 in the non-representative arts of design1 in architecture or ceramics1 for example1 the task of finding something to believe1 or to believe in1 is not so easy4 ,yet the #8feeling of significance' is as common#ajb in these other arts as in literature4 ,denial of this is usually proof only of an interest limited to literature4 ,this difficulty has usually been met by asserting that the alleged knowledge given in the revelation is non-intellectual4 ,it refuses to be rationalised1 it is said4 ,well and good2 but if so why call it knowledge8 ,either it is capable of corroborating or of conflicting with the other things we usually call knowledge1 such as the laws of thermodynamics1 capable of being stated and brought into connection with what else we know2 or it is not knowledge1 not capable of being stated4 ,we cannot have it both ways1 and no sneers at the limitations of logic1 the commonest of the resources of the confused1 amend the dilemma4 ,in fact it resembles knowledge only in being an attitude and a feeling very similar to some attitudes and feelings which may and often do accompany knowledge4 ,but #8,knowledge' is an immensely potent emotive word engendering reverence towards any state of mind to which it is applied4 ,and these #8feelings of significance' are those among our states of mind which most deserve to be revered4 ,that they should be so obstinately described as knowledge even by those who most carefully remove from them all the characteristics of knowledge is not surprising4 ,traditionally what is said to be known thus mystically through the arts is ,beauty1 a remote and divine entity not otherwise to be apprehended1 one of the ,eternal ,absolute ,values4 ,and this is doubtless emotively a way of talking which is effective for a while4 ,when its power abates1 as the power of such utterances will1 there are several developments which may easily be used to revive it4 8,beauty is eternal1 and we may say that it is already manifest as a heavenly thing--the beauty of ,nature is indeed an earnest to us of the ultimate goodness which lies behind the apparent cruelty and moral confusion of organic life4 4 4 4 ,yet we feel that these three are ultimately one1 and human speech bears constant witness to the universal conviction that ,goodness is beautiful1 that ,beauty is good1 that ,truth is ,beauty4 ,we can hardly avoid the use of the word #8trinity'1 and if we are theists at all we cannot but say that they are one1 because they are the manifestation of one ,god4 ,if we are not theists there is no explanation40#ajc ,human speech is indeed the witness1 and to what else does it not witness8 ,it would be strange if in a matter of such moment as this the greatest of all emotive words did not come into play4 8,in religion we believe that ,god is ,beauty and ,life1 that ,god is ,truth and ,light1 that ,god is ,goodness and ,love1 and that because he is all these they are all one1 and the ,trinity in ,unity and ,unity in ,trinity is to be worshipped40#ajd ,no one who can interpret emotive language1 who can avoid the temptation to illicit belief so constantly presented by it need find such utterances #8meaningless4' ,but the wrong approach is easy and far too often pressingly invited by the speakers1 labouring themselves under misconceptions4 ,to excite a serious and reverent attitude is one thing4 ,to set forth an explanation is another4 ,to confuse the two and mistake the incitement of an attitude for a statement of fact is a practice which should be discouraged4 ,for intellectual dishonesty is an evil which is the more dangerous the more it is hedged about with emotional sanctities4 ,and after all there is another explanation1 which would long ago have been quietly established to the world's great good had men been less ready to sacrifice the integrity of their thought and feeling for the sake of a local and limited advantage4 ,the last movement of this machine to think with is now completed4 ,i am too well acquainted with it1 and have spent too many hours putting it together to suppose that it can be worked equally well by every reader4 ,half these hours have in fact been spent in simplifying its structure1 in taking out reservations and qualifications1 references to other views1 controversial matter1 and supernumerary distinctions4 ,from one point of view1 it would be a better book with these left in1 but ,i wished to make it manageable by those who had not spent a quite disproportionate amount of energy in reflection upon abstract matters4 ,and if to some readers parts of it appear unnecessary--either irrelevant1 in the one case2 or over-obvious in the other--,i have nothing to add which would make them change their opinion4 ,the first ,i can only ask to look again1 with the hope that a connection which has been missed will be noticed4 ,the second1 ,i would remind that ,i write in an age when1 in the majority of social circles1 to be seriously interested in art is to be thought an oddity4 #ajj ,no merit1 that is1 in this connection4 ,there may be some exceptions to this1 cases in which the explicit recognition of the truth of a statement as opposed to the simple acceptance of it1 is necessary to the full development of the further response4 ,but ,i believe that such cases will on careful examination be found to be very rare with competent readers4 ,individual differences1 corresponding to the different degrees to which individuals have their belief feelings1 their references1 and their attitudes entangled1 are to be expected4 ,there are1 of course1 an immense number of scientific beliefs present among the conditions of every attitude4 ,but since acceptances would do equally well in their place they are not necessary to it4 #aja ,in view of a possible misunderstanding at this point1 compare ,chapter ,x1 especially the final paragraph4 ,if a belief in ,retributive ,justice1 for example1 is fatal to ,prometheus ,unbound1 so in another way is the belief that the ,millennium is at hand4 ,to steer an unperplexed path between these opposite dangers is extremely difficult4 ,the distinctions required are perhaps better left to the reader's reflection than laboured further in the faulty terminology which alone at present is available4 #ajb ,cf4 ,gurney1 ,the ,power of ,sound1 p4 #abf4 8,a splendid melodic phrase seems continually not like an object of sense1 but like an affirmation2 not so much prompting admiring ejaculation as compelling passionate assent40 ,his explanation1 through association with speech1 seems to me inadequate4 ,he adds that the use of terms such as 8expressiveness and significance1 as opposed to meaninglessness and triviality1 may be allowed1 without the implication of any reference to transcendental views which one may fail to understand1 or theories of interpretation which one may entirely repudiate40 #ajc ,percy ,dearmer1 ,the ,necessity of ,art1 p4 #ahj4 #ajd ,a4,w4 ,pollard1 ibidem1 p4 #ace4 ,,appendix ,a4 ,on ,value ,a friendly reviewer1 ,mr4 ,conrad ,aiken1 complains that my theory of value is not sufficiently relativistic1 that it inevitably involves the surreptitious re-entrance of the #8absolute' value which we had been at such pains to exclude4 ,except for the word #8surreptitious' and the suggestion that the #8absolute' value we arrive at is the same thing as the ultimate idea discussed in ,chapter ,,vi41 ,i agree to this4 ,the purpose of the theory is just to enable us to compare different experiences in respect of their value2 and their value1 ,i suggest1 is a quantitative matter4 ,to put it briefly the best life is that in which as much as possible of our possible personality is engaged4 ,and of two personalities that one is the better in which there is more which can be engaged without confusion4 ,we all know people of unusually wide and varied possibilities who pay for their width in disorder1 and we know others who pay for their order by narrowness4 ,what the theory attempts to provide is a system of measurement by which we can compare not only different experiences belonging to the same personality but different personalities4 ,we do not yet know how to make the measurements required4 ,we have to use the roughest kinds of estimates and very indirect indications4 ,but to know at least what would have to be measured if we were to reach precision and how to make the comparison is a step towards the goal4 ,the parallel1 though ,i am not fond of it1 between the new absolutism which ,relativity has reached and this quantitative way of comparing the experiences and preferences of individuals may perhaps be helpful4 ,but whereas the physicist has measurements to work from1 the psychologist as yet has none4 ,and further1 it is likely that modes of mental organisation which are at present impossible or dangerously unstable may become possible and even easy in the future with changes in social structure and material conditions4 ,this last consideration might give any critic a nightmare4 ,nothing less than our whole sense of man's history and destiny is involved in our final decision as to value4 ,,appendix ,b4 ,,the ,,poetry ,,of ,t4 ,s4 ,,eliot ,we too readily forget that1 unless something is very wrong with our civilisation1 we should be producing three equal poets at least for every poet of high rank in our great-great-grandfathers' day4 ,something must indeed be wrong2 and since ,mr4 ,eliot is one of the very few poets that current conditions have not overcome1 the difficulties which he has faced1 and the cognate difficulties which his readers encounter1 repay study4 ,mr4 ,eliot's poetry has occasioned an unusual amount of irritated or enthusiastic bewilderment4 ,the bewilderment has several sources4 ,the most formidable is the unobtrusiveness1 in some cases the absence1 of any coherent intellectual thread upon which the items of the poem are strung4 ,a reader of #8,gerontion1' of #8,preludes1' or of #8,the ,waste ,land1' may1 if he will1 after repeated readings1 introduce such a thread4 ,another reader after much effort may fail to contrive one4 ,but in either case energy will have been misapplied4 ,for the items are united by the accord1 contrast1 and interaction of their emotional effects1 not by an intellectual scheme that analysis must work out4 ,the value lies in the unified response which this interaction creates in the right reader4 ,the only intellectual activity required takes place in the realisation of the separate items4 ,we can1 of course1 make a #8rationalisation' of the whole experience1 as we can of any experience4 ,if we do1 we are adding something which does not belong to the poem4 ,such a logical scheme is1 at best1 a scaffolding that vanishes when the poem is constructed4 ,but we have so built into our nervous systems a demand for intellectual coherence1 even in poetry1 that we find a difficulty in doing without it4 ,this point may be misunderstood1 for the charge most usually brought against ,mr4 ,eliot's poetry is that it is overintellectualised4 ,one reason for this is his use of allusion4 ,a reader who in one short poem picks up allusions to ,the ,aspern ,papers1 ,othello1 #8,a ,toccata of ,galuppi's1' ,marston1 ,the ,phnix and the ,turtle1 ,antony and ,cleopatra 7twice71 #8,the ,extasie1' ,macbeth1 ,the ,merchant of ,venice1 and ,ruskin1 feels that his wits are being unusually well exercised4 ,he may easily leap to the conclusion that the basis of the poem is in wit also4 ,but this would be a mistake4 ,these things come in1 not that the reader may be ingenious or admire the writer's erudition 7this last accusation has tempted several critics to disgrace themselves71 but for the sake of the emotional aura which they bring and the attitudes they incite4 ,allusion in ,mr4 ,eliot's hands is a technical device for compression4 #8,the ,waste ,land' is the equivalent in content to an epic4 ,without this device twelve books would have been needed4 ,but these allusions and the notes in which some of them are elucidated have made many a petulant reader turn down his thumb at once4 ,such a reader has not begun to understand what it is all about4 ,this objection is connected with another1 that of obscurity4 ,to quote a recent pronouncement upon #8,the ,waste ,land' from ,mr4 ,middleton ,murry3 #8,the reader is compelled1 in the mere effort to understand1 to adopt an attitude of intellectual suspicion1 which makes impossible the communication of feeling4 ,the work offends against the most elementary canon of good writing3 that the immediate effect should be unambiguous4' ,consider first this canon4 ,what would happen1 if we pressed it1 to ,shakespeare's greatest sonnets or to ,hamlet8 ,the truth is that very much of the best poetry is necessarily ambiguous in its immediate effect4 ,even the most careful and responsive reader must reread and do hard work before the poem forms itself clearly and unambiguously in his mind4 ,an original poem1 as much as a new branch of mathematics1 compels the mind which receives it to grow1 and this takes time4 ,anyone who upon reflection asserts the contrary for his own case must be either a demigod or dishonest2 probably ,mr4 ,murray was in haste4 ,his remarks show that he has failed in his attempt to read the poem1 and they reveal1 in part1 the reason for his failure--namely1 his own overintellectual approach4 ,to read it successfully he would have to discontinue his present self-mystifications4 ,the critical question in all cases is whether the poem is worth the trouble it entails4 ,for #8,the ,waste ,land' this is considerable4 ,there is ,miss ,weston's ,from ,ritual to ,romance to read1 and its #8astral' trimmings to be discarded--they have nothing to do with ,mr4 ,eliot's poem4 ,there is ,canto xxvi of the ,purgatorio to be studied--the relevance of the close of that canto to the whole of ,mr4 ,eliot's work must be insisted upon4 ,it illuminates his persistent concern with sex1 the problem of our generation1 as religion was the problem of the last4 ,there is the central position of ,tiresias in the poem to be puzzled out--the cryptic form of the note which ,mr4 ,eliot writes on this point is just a little tiresome4 ,it is a way of underlining the fact that the poem is concerned with many aspects of the one fact of sex1 a hint that is perhaps neither indispensable nor entirely successful4 ,when all this has been done by the reader1 when the materials with which the words are to clothe themselves have been collected1 the poem still remains to be read4 ,and it is easy to fail in this undertaking4 ,an #8attitude of intellectual suspicion' must certainly be abandoned4 ,but this is not difficult to those who still know how to give their feelings precedence to their thoughts1 who can accept and unify an experience without trying to catch it in an intellectual net or to squeeze out a doctrine4 ,one form of this attempt must be mentioned4 ,some1 misled no doubt by its origin in a ,mystery1 have endeavoured to give the poem a symbolical reading4 ,but its symbols are not mystical1 but emotional4 ,they stand1 that is1 not for ineffable objects1 but for normal human experience4 ,the poem1 in fact1 is radically naturalistic2 only its compression makes it appear otherwise4 ,and in this it probably comes nearer to the original ,mystery which it perpetuates than transcendentalism does4 ,if it were desired to label in three words the most characteristic feature of ,mr4 ,eliot's technique1 this might be done by calling his poetry a music of ideas4 ,the ideas are of all kinds1 abstract and concrete1 general and particular1 and1 like the musician's phrases1 they are arranged1 not that they may tell us something1 but that their effects in us may combine into a coherent whole of feeling and attitude and produce a peculiar liberation of the will4 ,they are there to be responded to1 not to be pondered or worked out4 ,this is1 of course1 a method used intermittently in very much poetry1 and only an accentuation and isolation of one of its normal resources4 ,the peculiarity of ,mr4 ,eliot's later1 more puzzling1 work is his deliberate and almost exclusive employment of it4 ,in the earlier poems this logical freedom appears only occasionally4 ,in #8,the ,love ,song of ,j4 ,alfred ,prufrock1' for example1 there is a patch at the beginning and another at the end1 but the rest of the poem is quite straightforward4 ,in #8,gerontion1' the first long poem in this manner1 the air of monologue1 of a stream of associations1 is a kind of disguise1 and the last two lines1 ,tenants of the house1 ,thoughts of a dry brain in a dry season1 are almost an excuse4 ,the close of #8,a ,cooking ,egg' is perhaps the passage in which the technique shows itself most clearly4 ,the reader who appreciates the emotional relevance of the title has the key to the later poems in his hand4 ,i take ,pipit to be the retired nurse of the hero of the poem1 and ,views of the ,oxford ,colleges to be the1 still treasured1 present which he sent her when he went up to the ,university4 ,the middle section of the poem ,i read as a specimen of the rather withered pleasantry in which contemporary culture has culminated and beyond which it finds much difficulty in passing4 ,the final section gives the contrast which is pressed home by the title4 ,even the most mature egg was new laid once4 ,the only other title of equal significance that ,i can recall is ,mrs4 ,wharton's ,the ,age of ,innocence1 which might well be studied in this connection4 #8,the ,waste ,land' and #8,the ,hollow ,men' 7the most beautiful of ,mr4 ,eliot's poems1 and in the last section a new development7 are purely a #8music of ideas1' and the pretence of a continuous thread of associations is dropped4 ,how this technique lends itself to misunderstandings we have seen4 ,but many readers who have failed in the end to escape bewilderment have begun by finding on almost every line that ,mr4 ,eliot has written--if we except certain youthful poems on ,american topics--that personal stamp which is the hardest thing for the craftsman to imitate and perhaps the most certain sign that the experience1 good or bad1 rendered in the poem is authentic4 ,only those unfortunate persons who are incapable of reading poetry can resist ,mr4 ,eliot's rhythms4 ,the poem as a whole may elude us while every fragment1 as a fragment1 comes victoriously home4 ,it is difficult to believe that this is ,mr4 ,eliot's fault rather than his reader's1 because a parallel case of a poet who so constantly achieves the hardest part of his task and yet fails in the easier is not to be found4 ,it is much more likely that we have been trying to put the fragments together on a wrong principle4 ,another doubt has been expressed4 ,mr4 ,eliot repeats himself in two ways4 ,the nightingale1 ,cleopatra's barge1 the rats1 and the smoky candle-end1 recur and recur4 ,is this a sign of a poverty of inspiration8 ,a more plausible explanation is that this repetition is in part a consequence of the technique above described1 and in part something which many writers who are not accused of poverty also show4 ,shelley1 with his rivers1 towers1 and stars1 ,conrad1 ,hardy1 ,walt ,whitman1 and ,dostoevski spring to mind4 ,when a writer has found a theme or image which fixes a point of relative stability in the drift of experience1 it is not to be expected that he will avoid it4 ,such themes are a means of orientation4 ,and it is quite true that the central process in all ,mr4 ,eliot's best poems is the same2 the conjunction of feelings which1 though superficially opposed1--as squalor1 for example1 is opposed to grandeur1--yet tend as they develop to change places and even to unite4 ,if they do not develop far enough the intention of the poet is missed4 ,mr4 ,eliot is neither sighing after vanished glories nor holding contemporary experience up to scorn4 ,both bitterness and desolation are superficial aspects of his poetry4 ,there are those who think that he merely takes his readers into the ,waste ,land and leaves them there1 that in his last poem he confesses his impotence to release the healing waters4 ,the reply is that some readers find in his poetry not only a clearer1 fuller realisation of their plight1 the plight of a whole generation1 than they find elsewhere1 but also through the very energies set free in that realisation a return of the saving passion4