,,second ,,treatise ,,of ,,government by ,,john ,,locke ,digitized by ,dave ,gowan4 ,john ,locke's 8,second ,treatise of ,government0 was published in #afij4 ,the complete unabridged text has been republished several times in edited commentaries4 ,this text is recovered entire from the paperback book1 8,john ,locke ,second ,treatise of ,government01 ,edited1 with an ,introduction1 ,by ,c4,b4 ,mc,pherson1 ,hackett ,publishing ,company1 ,indianapolis and ,cambridge1 #aihj4 ,none of the ,mc,pherson edition is included in the ,etext below2 only the original words contained in the #afij ,locke text is included4 ,the #afij edition text is free of copyright4 99 99 99 99 99 ,,two ,,treatises ,,of ,,government ,,by ,,iohn ,,locke ,,salus ,,populi ,,suprema ,,lex ,,esto ,,london ,,printed ,,mdclxxxviii ,,reprinted1 ,,the ,,sixth ,,time1 ,,by ,a4 ,,millar1 ,h4 ,,woodfall1 #a4 ,,whiston ,,and ,b4 ,,white1 #a4 ,,rivington1 ,l4 ,,davis ,,and ,c4 ,,reymers1 ,r4 ,,baldwin1 ,,hawes ,,clarke ,,and ,,collins2 ,w4 ,,iohnston1 ,w4 ,,owen1 #a4 ,,richardson1 ,s4 ,,crowder1 ,t4 ,,longman1 ,b4 ,,law1 ,c4 ,,rivington1 ,e4 ,,dilly1 ,r4 ,,withy1 ,c4 ,,and ,r4 ,,ware1 ,s4 ,,baker1 ,t4 ,,payne1 ,a4 ,,shuckburgh1 #a4 ,,hinxman ,,mdcclxiii ,,two ,,treatises ,,of ,,government4 ,,in ,,the ,,former ,,the ,,false ,,principles ,,and ,,foundation ,,of ,,sir ,,robert ,,filmer ,,and ,,his ,,followers ,,are ,,detected ,,and ,,overthrown4 ,,the ,,latter ,,is ,,an ,,essay ,,concerning ,,the ,,true ,,original ,,extent ,,and ,,end ,,of ,,civil ,,government4 #agfd ,,editor',s ,,note ,the present ,edition of this ,book has not only been collated with the first three ,editions1 which were published during the ,author's ,life1 but also has the ,advantage of his last ,corrections and ,improvements1 from a ,copy delivered by him to ,mr4 ,peter ,coste1 communicated to the ,editor1 and now lodged in ,christ ,college1 ,cambridge4 ,,preface ,reader1 thou hast here the beginning and end of a discourse concerning government2 what fate has otherwise disposed of the papers that should have filled up the middle1 and were more than all the rest1 it is not worth while to tell thee4 ,these1 which remain1 ,i hope are sufficient to establish the throne of our great restorer1 our present ,king ,william2 to make good his title1 in the consent of the people1 which being the only one of all lawful governments1 he has more fully and clearly1 than any prince in ,christendom2 and to justify to the world the people of ,england1 whose love of their just and natural rights1 with their resolution to preserve them1 saved the nation when it was on the very brink of slavery and ruin4 ,if these papers have that evidence1 ,i flatter myself is to be found in them1 there will be no great miss of those which are lost1 and my reader may be satisfied without them3 for ,i imagine1 ,i shall have neither the time1 nor inclination to repeat my pains1 and fill up the wanting part of my answer1 by tracing ,sir ,robert again1 through all the windings and obscurities1 which are to be met with in the several branches of his wonderful system4 ,the king1 and body of the nation1 have since so thoroughly confuted his ,hypothesis1 that ,i suppose no body hereafter will have either the confidence to appear against our common safety1 and be again an advocate for slavery2 or the weakness to be deceived with contradictions dressed up in a popular stile1 and well-turned periods3 for if any one will be at the pains1 himself1 in those parts1 which are here untouched1 to strip ,sir ,robert's discourses of the flourish of doubtful expressions1 and endeavour to reduce his words to direct1 positive1 intelligible propositions1 and then compare them one with another1 he will quickly be satisfied1 there was never so much glib nonsense put together in well-sounding ,english4 ,if he think it not worth while to examine his works all thro'1 let him make an experiment in that part1 where he treats of usurpation2 and let him try1 whether he can1 with all his skill1 make ,sir ,robert intelligible1 and consistent with himself1 or common sense4 ,i should not speak so plainly of a gentleman1 long since past answering1 had not the pulpit1 of late years1 publicly owned his doctrine1 and made it the current divinity of the times4 ,it is necessary those men1 who taking on them to be teachers1 have so dangerously misled others1 should be openly shewed of what authority this their ,patriarch is1 whom they have so blindly followed1 that so they may either retract what upon so ill grounds they have vented1 and cannot be maintained2 or else justify those principles which they preached up for gospel2 though they had no better an author than an ,english courtier3 for ,i should not have writ against ,sir ,robert1 or taken the pains to shew his mistakes1 inconsistencies1 and want of 7what he so much boasts of1 and pretends wholly to build on7 scripture-proofs1 were there not men amongst us1 who1 by crying up his books1 and espousing his doctrine1 save me from the reproach of writing against a dead adversary4 ,they have been so zealous in this point1 that1 if ,i have done him any wrong1 ,i cannot hope they should spare me4 ,i wish1 where they have done the truth and the public wrong1 they would be as ready to redress it1 and allow its just weight to this reflection1 viz4 that there cannot be done a greater mischief to prince and people1 than the propagating wrong notions concerning government2 that so at last all times might not have reason to complain of the ,drum ,ecclesiastic4 ,if any one1 concerned really for truth1 undertake the confutation of my ,hypothesis1 ,i promise him either to recant my mistake1 upon fair conviction2 or to answer his difficulties4 ,but he must remember two things4 ,first1 ,that cavilling here and there1 at some expression1 or little incident of my discourse1 is not an answer to my book4 ,secondly1 ,that ,i shall not take railing for arguments1 nor think either of these worth my notice1 though ,i shall always look on myself as bound to give satisfaction to any one1 who shall appear to be conscientiously scrupulous in the point1 and shall shew any just grounds for his scruples4 ,i have nothing more1 but to advertise the reader1 that ,observations stands for ,observations on ,hobbs1 ,milton1 c4 and that a bare quotation of pages always means pages of his ,patriarcha1 ,edition #afhj4 ,book ,,ii ,,chapter4 ,i4 ,,an ,,essay ,,concerning ,,the ,,true ,,original1 ,,extent ,,and ,,end ,,of ,,civil ,,government ,sect4 #a4 ,it having been shewn in the foregoing discourse1 7i#a_/;i74 ,that ,adam had not1 either by natural right of fatherhood1 or by positive donation from ,god1 any such authority over his children1 or dominion over the world1 as is pretended3 7i#b_/;i74 ,that if he had1 his heirs1 yet1 had no right to it3 7i#c_/;i74 ,that if his heirs had1 there being no law of nature nor positive law of ,god that determines which is the right heir in all cases that may arise1 the right of succession1 and consequently of bearing rule1 could not have been certainly determined3 7i#d_/;i74 ,that if even that had been determined1 yet the knowledge of which is the eldest line of ,adam's posterity1 being so long since utterly lost1 that in the races of mankind and families of the world1 there remains not to one above another1 the least pretence to be the eldest house1 and to have the right of inheritance3 ,all these premises having1 as ,i think1 been clearly made out1 it is impossible that the rulers now on earth should make any benefit1 or derive any the least shadow of authority from that1 which is held to be the fountain of all power1 ,adam's private dominion and paternal jurisdiction2 so that he that will not give just occasion to think that all government in the world is the product only of force and violence1 and that men live together by no other rules but that of beasts1 where the strongest carries it1 and so lay a foundation for perpetual disorder and mischief1 tumult1 sedition and rebellion1 7things that the followers of that hypothesis so loudly cry out against7 must of necessity find out another rise of government1 another original of political power1 and another way of designing and knowing the persons that have it1 than what ,sir ,robert ,filmer hath taught us4 ,sect4 #b4 ,to this purpose1 ,i think it may not be amiss1 to set down what ,i take to be political power2 that the power of a ,,magistrate over a subject may be distinguished from that of a ,,father over his children1 a ,,master over his servant1 a ,,husband over his wife1 and a ,,lord over his slave4 ,all which distinct powers happening sometimes together in the same man1 if he be considered under these different relations1 it may help us to distinguish these powers one from wealth1 a father of a family1 and a captain of a galley4 ,sect4 #c4 ,,political ,,power1 then1 ,i take to be a ,,right of making laws with penalties of death1 and consequently all less penalties1 for the regulating and preserving of property1 and of employing the force of the community1 in the execution of such laws1 and in the defence of the commonwealth from foreign injury2 and all this only for the public good4 ,,chapter4 ,,ii4 ,,of ,,the ,,state ,,of ,,nature4 ,sect4 #d4 ,,to understand political power right1 and derive it from its original1 we must consider1 what state all men are naturally in1 and that is1 a state of perfect freedom to order their actions1 and dispose of their possessions and persons1 as they think fit1 within the bounds of the law of nature1 without asking leave1 or depending upon the will of any other man4 ,a state also of equality1 wherein all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal1 no one having more than another2 there being nothing more evident1 than that creatures of the same species and rank1 promiscuously born to all the same advantages of nature1 and the use of the same faculties1 should also be equal one amongst another without subordination or subjection1 unless the lord and master of them all should1 by any manifest declaration of his will1 set one above another1 and confer on him1 by an evident and clear appointment1 an undoubted right to dominion and sovereignty4 ,sect4 #e4 ,this equality of men by nature1 the judicious ,hooker looks upon as so evident in itself1 and beyond all question1 that he makes it the foundation of that obligation to mutual love amongst men1 on which he builds the duties they owe one another1 and from whence he derives the great maxims of justice and charity4 ,his words are1 _/ ,the like natural inducement hath brought men to know that it is no less their duty1 to love others than themselves2 for seeing those things which are equal1 must needs all have one measure2 if ,i cannot but wish to receive good1 even as much at every man's hands1 as any man can wish unto his own soul1 how should ,i look to have any part of my desire herein satisfied1 unless myself be careful to satisfy the like desire1 which is undoubtedly in other men1 being of one and the same nature8 ,to have any thing offered them repugnant to this desire1 must needs in all respects grieve them as much as me2 so that if ,i do harm1 ,i must look to suffer1 there being no reason that others should shew greater measure of love to me1 than they have by me shewed unto them3 my desire therefore to be loved of my equals in nature as much as possible may be1 imposeth upon me a natural duty of bearing to them-ward fully the like affection2 from which relation of equality between ourselves and them that are as ourselves1 what several rules and canons natural reason hath drawn1 for direction of life1 no man is ignorant1 ,eccl4 ,pol4 ,lib4 #a4 _/ ,sect4 #f4 ,but though this be a state of liberty1 yet it is not a state of licence3 though man in that state have an uncontroulable liberty to dispose of his person or possessions1 yet he has not liberty to destroy himself1 or so much as any creature in his possession1 but where some nobler use than its bare preservation calls for it4 ,the state of nature has a law of nature to govern it1 which obliges every one3 and reason1 which is that law1 teaches all mankind1 who will but consult it1 that being all equal and independent1 no one ought to harm another in his life1 health1 liberty1 or possessions3 for men being all the workmanship of one omnipotent1 and infinitely wise maker2 all the servants of one sovereign master1 sent into the world by his order1 and about his business2 they are his property1 whose workmanship they are1 made to last during his1 not one another's pleasure3 and being furnished with like faculties1 sharing all in one community of nature1 there cannot be supposed any such subordination among us1 that may authorize us to destroy one another1 as if we were made for one another's uses1 as the inferior ranks of creatures are for our's4 ,every one1 as he is bound to preserve himself1 and not to quit his station wilfully1 so by the like reason1 when his own preservation comes not in competition1 ought he1 as much as he can1 to preserve the rest of mankind1 and may not1 unless it be to do justice on an offender1 take away1 or impair the life1 or what tends to the preservation of the life1 the liberty1 health1 limb1 or goods of another4 ,sect4 #g4 ,and that all men may be restrained from invading others rights1 and from doing hurt to one another1 and the law of nature be observed1 which willeth the peace and preservation of all mankind1 the execution of the law of nature is1 in that state1 put into every man's hands1 whereby every one has a right to punish the transgressors of that law to such a degree1 as may hinder its violation3 for the law of nature would1 as all other laws that concern men in this world be in vain1 if there were no body that in the state of nature had a power to execute that law1 and thereby preserve the innocent and restrain offenders4 ,and if any one in the state of nature may punish another for any evil he has done1 every one may do so3 for in that state of perfect equality1 where naturally there is no superiority or jurisdiction of one over another1 what any may do in prosecution of that law1 every one must needs have a right to do4 ,sect4 #h4 ,and thus1 in the state of nature1 one man comes by a power over another2 but yet no absolute or arbitrary power1 to use a criminal1 when he has got him in his hands1 according to the passionate heats1 or boundless extravagancy of his own will2 but only to retribute to him1 so far as calm reason and conscience dictate1 what is proportionate to his transgression1 which is so much as may serve for reparation and restraint3 for these two are the only reasons1 why one man may lawfully do harm to another1 which is that we call punishment4 ,in transgressing the law of nature1 the offender declares himself to live by another rule than that of reason and common equity1 which is that measure ,god has set to the actions of men1 for their mutual security2 and so he becomes dangerous to mankind1 the tye1 which is to secure them from injury and violence1 being slighted and broken by him4 ,which being a trespass against the whole species1 and the peace and safety of it1 provided for by the law of nature1 every man upon this score1 by the right he hath to preserve mankind in general1 may restrain1 or where it is necessary1 destroy things noxious to them1 and so may bring such evil on any one1 who hath transgressed that law1 as may make him repent the doing of it1 and thereby deter him1 and by his example others1 from doing the like mischief4 ,and in the case1 and upon this ground1 ,,every ,,man ,,hath ,a ,,right ,,to ,,punish ,,the ,,offender1 ,,and ,,be ,,executioner ,,of ,,the ,,law ,,of ,,nature4 ,sect4 #i4 ,i doubt not but this will seem a very strange doctrine to some men3 but before they condemn it1 ,i desire them to resolve me1 by what right any prince or state can put to death1 or punish an alien1 for any crime he commits in their country4 ,it is certain their laws1 by virtue of any sanction they receive from the promulgated will of the legislative1 reach not a stranger3 they speak not to him1 nor1 if they did1 is he bound to hearken to them4 ,the legislative authority1 by which they are in force over the subjects of that commonwealth1 hath no power over him4 ,those who have the supreme power of making laws in ,england1 ,france or ,holland1 are to an ,indian1 but like the rest of the world1 men without authority3 and therefore1 if by the law of nature every man hath not a power to punish offences against it1 as he soberly judges the case to require1 ,i see not how the magistrates of any community can punish an alien of another country2 since1 in reference to him1 they can have no more power than what every man naturally may have over another4 ,sect1 #aj4 ,besides the crime which consists in violating the law1 and varying from the right rule of reason1 whereby a man so far becomes degenerate1 and declares himself to quit the principles of human nature1 and to be a noxious creature1 there is commonly injury done to some person or other1 and some other man receives damage by his transgression3 in which case he who hath received any damage1 has1 besides the right of punishment common to him with other men1 a particular right to seek reparation from him that has done it3 and any other person1 who finds it just1 may also join with him that is injured1 and assist him in recovering from the offender so much as may make satisfaction for the harm he has suffered4 ,sect4 #aa4 ,from these two distinct rights1 the one of punishing the crime for restraint1 and preventing the like offence1 which right of punishing is in every body2 the other of taking reparation1 which belongs only to the injured party1 comes it to pass that the magistrate1 who by being magistrate hath the common right of punishing put into his hands1 can often1 where the public good demands not the execution of the law1 remit the punishment of criminal offences by his own authority1 but yet cannot remit the satisfaction due to any private man for the damage he has received4 ,that1 he who has suffered the damage has a right to demand in his own name1 and he alone can remit3 the damnified person has this power of appropriating to himself the goods or service of the offender1 by right of self-preservation1 as every man has a power to punish the crime1 to prevent its being committed again1 by the right he has of preserving all mankind1 and doing all reasonable things he can in order to that end3 and thus it is1 that every man1 in the state of nature1 has a power to kill a murderer1 both to deter others from doing the like injury1 which no reparation can compensate1 by the example of the punishment that attends it from every body1 and also to secure men from the attempts of a criminal1 who having renounced reason1 the common rule and measure ,god hath given to mankind1 hath1 by the unjust violence and slaughter he hath committed upon one1 declared war against all mankind1 and therefore may be destroyed as a lion or a tyger1 one of those wild savage beasts1 with whom men can have no society nor security3 and upon this is grounded that great law of nature1 ,whoso sheddeth man's blood1 by man shall his blood be shed4 ,and ,cain was so fully convinced1 that every one had a right to destroy such a criminal1 that after the murder of his brother1 he cries out1 ,every one that findeth me1 shall slay me2 so plain was it writ in the hearts of all mankind4 ,sect4 #ab4 ,by the same reason may a man in the state of nature punish the lesser breaches of that law4 ,it will perhaps be demanded1 with death8 ,i answer1 each transgression may be punished to that degree1 and with so much severity1 as will suffice to make it an ill bargain to the offender1 give him cause to repent1 and terrify others from doing the like4 ,every offence1 that can be committed in the state of nature1 may in the state of nature be also punished equally1 and as far forth as it may1 in a commonwealth3 for though it would be besides my present purpose1 to enter here into the particulars of the law of nature1 or its measures of punishment2 yet1 it is certain there is such a law1 and that too1 as intelligible and plain to a rational creature1 and a studier of that law1 as the positive laws of commonwealths2 nay1 possibly plainer2 as much as reason is easier to be understood1 than the fancies and intricate contrivances of men1 following contrary and hidden interests put into words2 for so truly are a great part of the municipal laws of countries1 which are only so far right1 as they are founded on the law of nature1 by which they are to be regulated and interpreted4 ,sect4 #ac4 ,to this strange doctrine1 viz4 ,that in the state of nature every one has the executive power of the law of nature1 ,i doubt not but it will be objected1 that it is unreasonable for men to be judges in their own cases1 that self-love will make men partial to themselves and their friends3 and on the other side1 that ill nature1 passion and revenge will carry them too far in punishing others2 and hence nothing but confusion and disorder will follow1 and that therefore ,god hath certainly appointed government to restrain the partiality and violence of men4 ,i easily grant1 that civil government is the proper remedy for the inconveniencies of the state of nature1 which must certainly be great1 where men may be judges in their own case1 since it is easy to be imagined1 that he who was so unjust as to do his brother an injury1 will scarce be so just as to condemn himself for it3 but ,i shall desire those who make this objection1 to remember1 that absolute monarchs are but men2 and if government is to be the remedy of those evils1 which necessarily follow from men's being judges in their own cases1 and the state of nature is therefore not to be endured1 ,i desire to know what kind of government that is1 and how much better it is than the state of nature1 where one man1 commanding a multitude1 has the liberty to be judge in his own case1 and may do to all his subjects whatever he pleases1 without the least liberty to any one to question or controul those who execute his pleasure8 and in whatsoever he doth1 whether led by reason1 mistake or passion1 must be submitted to8 much better it is in the state of nature1 wherein men are not bound to submit to the unjust will of another3 and if he that judges1 judges amiss in his own1 or any other case1 he is answerable for it to the rest of mankind4 ,sect4 #ad4 ,it is often asked as a mighty objection1 where are1 or ever were there any men in such a state of nature8 ,to which it may suffice as an answer at present1 that since all princes and rulers of independent governments all through the world1 are in a state of nature1 it is plain the world never was1 nor ever will be1 without numbers of men in that state4 ,i have named all governors of independent communities1 whether they are1 or are not1 in league with others3 for it is not every compact that puts an end to the state of nature between men1 but only this one of agreeing together mutually to enter into one community1 and make one body politic2 other promises1 and compacts1 men may make one with another1 and yet still be in the state of nature4 ,the promises and bargains for truck1 c4 between the two men in the desert island1 mentioned by ,garcilasso de la ,vega1 in his history of ,peru2 or between a ,swiss and an ,indian1 in the woods of ,america1 are binding to them1 though they are perfectly in a state of nature1 in reference to one another3 for truth and keeping of faith belongs to men1 as men1 and not as members of society4 ,sect4 #ae4 ,to those that say1 there were never any men in the state of nature1 ,i will not only oppose the authority of the judicious ,hooker1 ,eccl4 ,pol4 lib4 i4 sect4 #aj1 where he says1 _/ ,the laws which have been hitherto mentioned1 i4e4 the laws of nature1 do bind men absolutely1 even as they are men1 although they have never any settled fellowship1 never any solemn agreement amongst themselves what to do1 or not to do3 but forasmuch as we are not by ourselves sufficient to furnish ourselves with competent store of things1 needful for such a life as our nature doth desire1 a life fit for the dignity of man2 therefore to supply those defects and imperfections which are in us1 as living single and solely by ourselves1 we are naturally induced to seek communion and fellowship with others3 this was the cause of men's uniting themselves at first in politic societies4 _/ ,but ,i moreover affirm1 that all men are naturally in that state1 and remain so1 till by their own consents they make themselves members of some politic society2 and ,i doubt not in the sequel of this discourse1 to make it very clear4 ,,chapter4 ,,iii4 ,,of ,,the ,,state ,,of ,,war4 ,sect4 #af4 ,,the state of war is a state of enmity and destruction3 and therefore declaring by word or action1 not a passionate and hasty1 but a sedate settled design upon another man's life1 puts him in a state of war with him against whom he has declared such an intention1 and so has exposed his life to the other's power to be taken away by him1 or any one that joins with him in his defence1 and espouses his quarrel2 it being reasonable and just1 ,i should have a right to destroy that which threatens me with destruction3 for1 by the fundamental law of nature1 man being to be preserved as much as possible1 when all cannot be preserved1 the safety of the innocent is to be preferred3 and one may destroy a man who makes war upon him1 or has discovered an enmity to his being1 for the same reason that he may kill a wolf or a lion2 because such men are not under the ties of the commonlaw of reason1 have no other rule1 but that of force and violence1 and so may be treated as beasts of prey1 those dangerous and noxious creatures1 that will be sure to destroy him whenever he falls into their power4 ,sect4 #ag4 ,and hence it is1 that he who attempts to get another man into his absolute power1 does thereby put himself into a state of war with him2 it being to be understood as a declaration of a design upon his life3 for ,i have reason to conclude1 that he who would get me into his power without my consent1 would use me as he pleased when he had got me there1 and destroy me too when he had a fancy to it2 for no body can desire to have me in his absolute power1 unless it be to compel me by force to that which is against the right of my freedom1 i4e4 make me a slave4 ,to be free from such force is the only security of my preservation2 and reason bids me look on him1 as an enemy to my preservation1 who would take away that freedom which is the fence to it2 so that he who makes an attempt to enslave me1 thereby puts himself into a state of war with me4 ,he that1 in the state of nature1 would take away the freedom that belongs to any one in that state1 must necessarily be supposed to have a design to take away every thing else1 that freedom being the foundation of all the rest2 as he that1 in the state of society1 would take away the freedom belonging to those of that society or commonwealth1 must be supposed to design to take away from them every thing else1 and so be looked on as in a state of war4 ,sect4 #ah4 ,this makes it lawful for a man to kill a thief1 who has not in the least hurt him1 nor declared any design upon his life1 any farther than1 by the use of force1 so to get him in his power1 as to take away his money1 or what he pleases1 from him2 because using force1 where he has no right1 to get me into his power1 let his pretence be what it will1 ,i have no reason to suppose1 that he1 who would take away my liberty1 would not1 when he had me in his power1 take away every thing else4 ,and therefore it is lawful for me to treat him as one who has put himself into a state of war with me1 i4e4 kill him if ,i can2 for to that hazard does he justly expose himself1 whoever introduces a state of war1 and is aggressor in it4 ,sect4 #ai4 ,and here we have the plain difference between the state of nature and the state of war1 which however some men have confounded1 are as far distant1 as a state of peace1 good will1 mutual assistance and preservation1 and a state of enmity1 malice1 violence and mutual destruction1 are one from another4 ,men living together according to reason1 without a common superior on earth1 with authority to judge between them1 is properly the state of nature4 ,but force1 or a declared design of force1 upon the person of another1 where there is no common superior on earth to appeal to for relief1 is the state of war3 and it is the want of such an appeal gives a man the right of war even against an aggressor1 tho' he be in society and a fellow subject4 ,thus a thief1 whom ,i cannot harm1 but by appeal to the law1 for having stolen all that ,i am worth1 ,i may kill1 when he sets on me to rob me but of my horse or coat2 because the law1 which was made for my preservation1 where it cannot interpose to secure my life from present force1 which1 if lost1 is capable of no reparation1 permits me my own defence1 and the right of war1 a liberty to kill the aggressor1 because the aggressor allows not time to appeal to our common judge1 nor the decision of the law1 for remedy in a case where the mischief may be irreparable4 ,want of a common judge with authority1 puts all men in a state of nature3 force without right1 upon a man's person1 makes a state of war1 both where there is1 and is not1 a common judge4 ,sect4 #bj4 ,but when the actual force is over1 the state of war ceases between those that are in society1 and are equally on both sides subjected to the fair determination of the law2 because then there lies open the remedy of appeal for the past injury1 and to prevent future harm3 but where no such appeal is1 as in the state of nature1 for want of positive laws1 and judges with authority to appeal to1 the state of war once begun1 continues1 with a right to the innocent party to destroy the other whenever he can1 until the aggressor offers peace1 and desires reconciliation on such terms as may repair any wrongs he has already done1 and secure the innocent for the future2 nay1 where an appeal to the law1 and constituted judges1 lies open1 but the remedy is denied by a manifest perverting of justice1 and a barefaced wresting of the laws to protect or indemnify the violence or injuries of some men1 or party of men1 there it is hard to imagine any thing but a state of war3 for wherever violence is used1 and injury done1 though by hands appointed to administer justice1 it is still violence and injury1 however coloured with the name1 pretences1 or forms of law1 the end whereof being to protect and redress the innocent1 by an unbiassed application of it1 to all who are under it2 wherever that is not bona fide done1 war is made upon the sufferers1 who having no appeal on earth to right them1 they are left to the only remedy in such cases1 an appeal to heaven4 ,sect4 #ba4 ,to avoid this state of war 7wherein there is no appeal but to heaven1 and wherein every the least difference is apt to end1 where there is no authority to decide between the contenders7 is one great reason of men's putting themselves into society1 and quitting the state of nature3 for where there is an authority1 a power on earth1 from which relief can be had by appeal1 there the continuance of the state of war is excluded1 and the controversy is decided by that power4 ,had there been any such court1 any superior jurisdiction on earth1 to determine the right between ,jephtha and the ,ammonites1 they had never come to a state of war3 but we see he was forced to appeal to heaven4 ,the ,lord the ,judge 7says he7 be judge this day between the children of ,israel and the children of ,ammon1 ,judg4 xi4 #bg4 and then prosecuting1 and relying on his appeal1 he leads out his army to battle3 and therefore in such controversies1 where the question is put1 who shall be judge8 ,it cannot be meant1 who shall decide the controversy2 every one knows what ,jephtha here tells us1 that the ,lord the ,judge shall judge4 ,where there is no judge on earth1 the appeal lies to ,god in heaven4 ,that question then cannot mean1 who shall judge1 whether another hath put himself in a state of war with me1 and whether ,i may1 as ,jephtha did1 appeal to heaven in it8 of that ,i myself can only be judge in my own conscience1 as ,i will answer it1 at the great day1 to the supreme judge of all men4 ,,chapter4 ,,iv4 ,,of ,,slavery4 ,sect4 #bb4 ,,the natural liberty of man is to be free from any superior power on earth1 and not to be under the will or legislative authority of man1 but to have only the law of nature for his rule4 ,the liberty of man1 in society1 is to be under no other legislative power1 but that established1 by consent1 in the commonwealth2 nor under the dominion of any will1 or restraint of any law1 but what that legislative shall enact1 according to the trust put in it4 ,freedom then is not what ,sir ,robert ,filmer tells us1 ,observations1 ,a4 #ee4 a liberty for every one to do what he lists1 to live as he pleases1 and not to be tied by any laws3 but freedom of men under government is1 to have a standing rule to live by1 common to every one of that society1 and made by the legislative power erected in it2 a liberty to follow my own will in all things1 where the rule prescribes not2 and not to be subject to the inconstant1 uncertain1 unknown1 arbitrary will of another man3 as freedom of nature is1 to be under no other restraint but the law of nature4 ,sect4 #bc4 ,this freedom from absolute1 arbitrary power1 is so necessary to1 and closely joined with a man's preservation1 that he cannot part with it1 but by what forfeits his preservation and life together3 for a man1 not having the power of his own life1 cannot1 by compact1 or his own consent1 enslave himself to any one1 nor put himself under the absolute1 arbitrary power of another1 to take away his life1 when he pleases4 ,no body can give more power than he has himself2 and he that cannot take away his own life1 cannot give another power over it4 ,indeed1 having by his fault forfeited his own life1 by some act that deserves death2 he1 to whom he has forfeited it1 may 7when he has him in his power7 delay to take it1 and make use of him to his own service1 and he does him no injury by it3 for1 whenever he finds the hardship of his slavery outweigh the value of his life1 it is in his power1 by resisting the will of his master1 to draw on himself the death he desires4 ,sect4 #bd4 ,this is the perfect condition of slavery1 which is nothing else1 but the state of war continued1 between a lawful conqueror and a captive3 for1 if once compact enter between them1 and make an agreement for a limited power on the one side1 and obedience on the other1 the state of war and slavery ceases1 as long as the compact endures3 for1 as has been said1 no man can1 by agreement1 pass over to another that which he hath not in himself1 a power over his own life4 ,i confess1 we find among the ,jews1 as well as other nations1 that men did sell themselves2 but1 it is plain1 this was only to drudgery1 not to slavery3 for1 it is evident1 the person sold was not under an absolute1 arbitrary1 despotical power3 for the master could not have power to kill him1 at any time1 whom1 at a certain time1 he was obliged to let go free out of his service2 and the master of such a servant was so far from having an arbitrary power over his life1 that he could not1 at pleasure1 so much as maim him1 but the loss of an eye1 or tooth1 set him free1 ,exod4 xxi4 ,,chapter4 ,v4 ,,of ,,property4 ,sect4 #be4 ,whether we consider natural reason1 which tells us1 that men1 being once born1 have a right to their preservation1 and consequently to meat and drink1 and such other things as nature affords for their subsistence3 or revelation1 which gives us an account of those grants ,god made of the world to ,adam1 and to ,noah1 and his sons1 it is very clear1 that ,god1 as king ,david says1 ,psal4 cxv4 #af4 has given the earth to the children of men2 given it to mankind in common4 ,but this being supposed1 it seems to some a very great difficulty1 how any one should ever come to have a property in any thing3 ,i will not content myself to answer1 that if it be difficult to make out property1 upon a supposition that ,god gave the world to ,adam1 and his posterity in common1 it is impossible that any man1 but one universal monarch1 should have any property upon a supposition1 that ,god gave the world to ,adam1 and his heirs in succession1 exclusive of all the rest of his posterity4 ,but ,i shall endeavour to shew1 how men might come to have a property in several parts of that which ,god gave to mankind in common1 and that without any express compact of all the commoners4 ,sect4 #bf4 ,god1 who hath given the world to men in common1 hath also given them reason to make use of it to the best advantage of life1 and convenience4 ,the earth1 and all that is therein1 is given to men for the support and comfort of their being4 ,and tho' all the fruits it naturally produces1 and beasts it feeds1 belong to mankind in common1 as they are produced by the spontaneous hand of nature2 and no body has originally a private dominion1 exclusive of the rest of mankind1 in any of them1 as they are thus in their natural state3 yet being given for the use of men1 there must of necessity be a means to appropriate them some way or other1 before they can be of any use1 or at all beneficial to any particular man4 ,the fruit1 or venison1 which nourishes the wild ,indian1 who knows no enclosure1 and is still a tenant in common1 must be his1 and so his1 i4e4 a part of him1 that another can no longer have any right to it1 before it can do him any good for the support of his life4 ,sect4 #bg4 ,though the earth1 and all inferior creatures1 be common to all men1 yet every man has a property in his own person3 this no body has any right to but himself4 ,the labour of his body1 and the work of his hands1 we may say1 are properly his4 ,whatsoever then he removes out of the state that nature hath provided1 and left it in1 he hath mixed his labour with1 and joined to it something that is his own1 and thereby makes it his property4 ,it being by him removed from the common state nature hath placed it in1 it hath by this labour something annexed to it1 that excludes the common right of other men3 for this labour being the unquestionable property of the labourer1 no man but he can have a right to what that is once joined to1 at least where there is enough1 and as good1 left in common for others4 ,sect4 #bh4 ,he that is nourished by the acorns he picked up under an oak1 or the apples he gathered from the trees in the wood1 has certainly appropriated them to himself4 ,no body can deny but the nourishment is his4 ,i ask then1 when did they begin to be his8 when he digested8 or when he eat8 or when he boiled8 or when he brought them home8 or when he picked them up8 and it is plain1 if the first gathering made them not his1 nothing else could4 ,that labour put a distinction between them and common3 that added something to them more than nature1 the common mother of all1 had done2 and so they became his private right4 ,and will any one say1 he had no right to those acorns or apples1 he thus appropriated1 because he had not the consent of all mankind to make them his8 ,was it a robbery thus to assume to himself what belonged to all in common8 ,if such a consent as that was necessary1 man had starved1 notwithstanding the plenty ,god had given him4 ,we see in commons1 which remain so by compact1 that it is the taking any part of what is common1 and removing it out of the state nature leaves it in1 which begins the property2 without which the common is of no use4 ,and the taking of this or that part1 does not depend on the express consent of all the commoners4 ,thus the grass my horse has bit2 the turfs my servant has cut2 and the ore ,i have digged in any place1 where ,i have a right to them in common with others1 become my property1 without the assignation or consent of any body4 ,the labour that was mine1 removing them out of that common state they were in1 hath fixed my property in them4 ,sect4 #bi4 ,by making an explicit consent of every commoner1 necessary to any one's appropriating to himself any part of what is given in common1 children or servants could not cut the meat1 which their father or master had provided for them in common1 without assigning to every one his peculiar part4 ,though the water running in the fountain be every one's1 yet who can doubt1 but that in the pitcher is his only who drew it out8 ,his labour hath taken it out of the hands of nature1 where it was common1 and belonged equally to all her children1 and hath thereby appropriated it to himself4 ,sect4 #cj4 ,thus this law of reason makes the deer that ,indian's who hath killed it2 it is allowed to be his goods1 who hath bestowed his labour upon it1 though before it was the common right of every one4 ,and amongst those who are counted the civilized part of mankind1 who have made and multiplied positive laws to determine property1 this original law of nature1 for the beginning of property1 in what was before common1 still takes place2 and by virtue thereof1 what fish any one catches in the ocean1 that great and still remaining common of mankind2 or what ambergrise any one takes up here1 is by the labour that removes it out of that common state nature left it in1 made his property1 who takes that pains about it4 ,and even amongst us1 the hare that any one is hunting1 is thought his who pursues her during the chase3 for being a beast that is still looked upon as common1 and no man's private possession2 whoever has employed so much labour about any of that kind1 as to find and pursue her1 has thereby removed her from the state of nature1 wherein she was common1 and hath begun a property4 ,sect4 #ca4 ,it will perhaps be objected to this1 that if gathering the acorns1 or other fruits of the earth1 c4 makes a right to them1 then any one may ingross as much as he will4 ,to which ,i answer1 ,not so4 ,the same law of nature1 that does by this means give us property1 does also bound that property too4 ,god has given us all things richly1 #a ,tim4 vi4 #ab4 is the voice of reason confirmed by inspiration4 ,but how far has he given it us8 ,to enjoy4 ,as much as any one can make use of to any advantage of life before it spoils1 so much he may by his labour fix a property in3 whatever is beyond this1 is more than his share1 and belongs to others4 ,nothing was made by ,god for man to spoil or destroy4 ,and thus1 considering the plenty of natural provisions there was a long time in the world1 and the few spenders2 and to how small a part of that provision the industry of one man could extend itself1 and ingross it to the prejudice of others2 especially keeping within the bounds1 set by reason1 of what might serve for his use2 there could be then little room for quarrels or contentions about property so established4 ,sect4 #cb4 ,but the chief matter of property being now not the fruits of the earth1 and the beasts that subsist on it1 but the earth itself2 as that which takes in and carries with it all the rest2 ,i think it is plain1 that property in that too is acquired as the former4 ,as much land as a man tills1 plants1 improves1 cultivates1 and can use the product of1 so much is his property4 ,he by his labour does1 as it were1 inclose it from the common4 ,nor will it invalidate his right1 to say every body else has an equal title to it2 and therefore he cannot appropriate1 he cannot inclose1 without the consent of all his fellow-commoners1 all mankind4 ,god1 when he gave the world in common to all mankind1 commanded man also to labour1 and the penury of his condition required it of him4 ,god and his reason commanded him to subdue the earth1 i4e4 improve it for the benefit of life1 and therein lay out something upon it that was his own1 his labour4 ,he that in obedience to this command of ,god1 subdued1 tilled and sowed any part of it1 thereby annexed to it something that was his property1 which another had no title to1 nor could without injury take from him4 ,sect4 #cc4 ,nor was this appropriation of any parcel of land1 by improving it1 any prejudice to any other man1 since there was still enough1 and as good left2 and more than the yet unprovided could use4 ,so that1 in effect1 there was never the less left for others because of his enclosure for himself3 for he that leaves as much as another can make use of1 does as good as take nothing at all4 ,no body could think himself injured by the drinking of another man1 though he took a good draught1 who had a whole river of the same water left him to quench his thirst3 and the case of land and water1 where there is enough of both1 is perfectly the same4 ,sect4 #cd4 ,god gave the world to men in common2 but since he gave it them for their benefit1 and the greatest conveniencies of life they were capable to draw from it1 it cannot be supposed he meant it should always remain common and uncultivated4 ,he gave it to the use of the industrious and rational1 7and labour was to be his title to it27 not to the fancy or covetousness of the quarrelsome and contentious4 ,he that had as good left for his improvement1 as was already taken up1 needed not complain1 ought not to meddle with what was already improved by another's labour3 if he did1 it is plain he desired the benefit of another's pains1 which he had no right to1 and not the ground which ,god had given him in common with others to labour on1 and whereof there was as good left1 as that already possessed1 and more than he knew what to do with1 or his industry could reach to4 ,sect4 #ce4 ,it is true1 in land that is common in ,england1 or any other country1 where there is plenty of people under government1 who have money and commerce1 no one can inclose or appropriate any part1 without the consent of all his fellow-commoners2 because this is left common by compact1 i4e4 by the law of the land1 which is not to be violated4 ,and though it be common1 in respect of some men1 it is not so to all mankind2 but is the joint property of this country1 or this parish4 ,besides1 the remainder1 after such enclosure1 would not be as good to the rest of the commoners1 as the whole was when they could all make use of the whole2 whereas in the beginning and first peopling of the great common of the world1 it was quite otherwise4 ,the law man was under1 was rather for appropriating4 ,god commanded1 and his wants forced him to labour4 ,that was his property which could not be taken from him where-ever he had fixed it4 ,and hence subduing or cultivating the earth1 and having dominion1 we see are joined together4 ,the one gave title to the other4 ,so that ,god1 by commanding to subdue1 gave authority so far to appropriate3 and the condition of human life1 which requires labour and materials to work on1 necessarily introduces private possessions4 ,sect4 #cf4 ,the measure of property nature has well set by the extent of men's labour and the conveniencies of life3 no man's labour could subdue1 or appropriate all2 nor could his enjoyment consume more than a small part2 so that it was impossible for any man1 this way1 to intrench upon the right of another1 or acquire to himself a property1 to the prejudice of his neighbour1 who would still have room for as good1 and as large a possession 7after the other had taken out his7 as before it was appropriated4 ,this measure did confine every man's possession to a very moderate proportion1 and such as he might appropriate to himself1 without injury to any body1 in the first ages of the world1 when men were more in danger to be lost1 by wandering from their company1 in the then vast wilderness of the earth1 than to be straitened for want of room to plant in4 ,and the same measure may be allowed still without prejudice to any body1 as full as the world seems3 for supposing a man1 or family1 in the state they were at first peopling of the world by the children of ,adam1 or ,noah2 let him plant in some inland1 vacant places of ,america1 we shall find that the possessions he could make himself1 upon the measures we have given1 would not be very large1 nor1 even to this day1 prejudice the rest of mankind1 or give them reason to complain1 or think themselves injured by this man's incroachment1 though the race of men have now spread themselves to all the corners of the world1 and do infinitely exceed the small number was at the beginning4 ,nay1 the extent of ground is of so little value1 without labour1 that ,i have heard it affirmed1 that in ,spain itself a man may be permitted to plough1 sow and reap1 without being disturbed1 upon land he has no other title to1 but only his making use of it4 ,but1 on the contrary1 the inhabitants think themselves beholden to him1 who1 by his industry on neglected1 and consequently waste land1 has increased the stock of corn1 which they wanted4 ,but be this as it will1 which ,i lay no stress on2 this ,i dare boldly affirm1 that the same rule of propriety1 7viz47 that every man should have as much as he could make use of1 would hold still in the world1 without straitening any body2 since there is land enough in the world to suffice double the inhabitants1 had not the invention of money1 and the tacit agreement of men to put a value on it1 introduced 7by consent7 larger possessions1 and a right to them2 which1 how it has done1 ,i shall by and by shew more at large4 ,sect4 #cg4 ,this is certain1 that in the beginning1 before the desire of having more than man needed had altered the intrinsic value of things1 which depends only on their usefulness to the life of man2 or had agreed1 that a little piece of yellow metal1 which would keep without wasting or decay1 should be worth a great piece of flesh1 or a whole heap of corn2 though men had a right to appropriate1 by their labour1 each one of himself1 as much of the things of nature1 as he could use3 yet this could not be much1 nor to the prejudice of others1 where the same plenty was still left to those who would use the same industry4 ,to which let me add1 that he who appropriates land to himself by his labour1 does not lessen1 but increase the common stock of mankind3 for the provisions serving to the support of human life1 produced by one acre of inclosed and cultivated land1 are 7to speak much within compass7 ten times more than those which are yielded by an acre of land of an equal richness lying waste in common4 ,and therefore he that incloses land1 and has a greater plenty of the conveniencies of life from ten acres1 than he could have from an hundred left to nature1 may truly be said to give ninety acres to mankind3 for his labour now supplies him with provisions out of ten acres1 which were but the product of an hundred lying in common4 ,i have here rated the improved land very low1 in making its product but as ten to one1 when it is much nearer an hundred to one3 for ,i ask1 whether in the wild woods and uncultivated waste of ,america1 left to nature1 without any improvement1 tillage or husbandry1 a thousand acres yield the needy and wretched inhabitants as many conveniencies of life1 as ten acres of equally fertile land do in ,devonshire1 where they are well cultivated8 ,before the appropriation of land1 he who gathered as much of the wild fruit1 killed1 caught1 or tamed1 as many of the beasts1 as he could2 he that so imployed his pains about any of the spontaneous products of nature1 as any way to alter them from the state which nature put them in1 by placing any of his labour on them1 did thereby acquire a propriety in them3 but if they perished1 in his possession1 without their due use2 if the fruits rotted1 or the venison putrified1 before he could spend it1 he offended against the common law of nature1 and was liable to be punished2 he invaded his neighbour's share1 for he had no right1 farther than his use called for any of them1 and they might serve to afford him conveniencies of life4 ,sect4 #ch4 ,the same measures governed the possession of land too3 whatsoever he tilled and reaped1 laid up and made use of1 before it spoiled1 that was his peculiar right2 whatsoever he enclosed1 and could feed1 and make use of1 the cattle and product was also his4 ,but if either the grass of his enclosure rotted on the ground1 or the fruit of his planting perished without gathering1 and laying up1 this part of the earth1 notwithstanding his enclosure1 was still to be looked on as waste1 and might be the possession of any other4 ,thus1 at the beginning1 ,cain might take as much ground as he could till1 and make it his own land1 and yet leave enough to ,abel's sheep to feed on2 a few acres would serve for both their possessions4 ,but as families increased1 and industry inlarged their stocks1 their possessions inlarged with the need of them2 but yet it was commonly without any fixed property in the ground they made use of1 till they incorporated1 settled themselves together1 and built cities2 and then1 by consent1 they came in time1 to set out the bounds of their distinct territories1 and agree on limits between them and their neighbours2 and by laws within themselves1 settled the properties of those of the same society3 for we see1 that in that part of the world which was first inhabited1 and therefore like to be best peopled1 even as low down as ,abraham's time1 they wandered with their flocks1 and their herds1 which was their substance1 freely up and down2 and this ,abraham did1 in a country where he was a stranger4 ,whence it is plain1 that at least a great part of the land lay in common2 that the inhabitants valued it not1 nor claimed property in any more than they made use of4 ,but when there was not room enough in the same place1 for their herds to feed together1 they by consent1 as ,abraham and ,lot did1 ,gen4 xiii4 #e4 separated and inlarged their pasture1 where it best liked them4 ,and for the same reason ,esau went from his father1 and his brother1 and planted in mount ,seir1 ,gen4 xxxvi4 #f4 ,sect4 #ci4 ,and thus1 without supposing any private dominion1 and property in ,adam1 over all the world1 exclusive of all other men1 which can no way be proved1 nor any one's property be made out from it2 but supposing the world given1 as it was1 to the children of men in common1 we see how labour could make men distinct titles to several parcels of it1 for their private uses2 wherein there could be no doubt of right1 no room for quarrel4 ,sect4 #dj4 ,nor is it so strange1 as perhaps before consideration it may appear1 that the property of labour should be able to over-balance the community of land3 for it is labour indeed that puts the difference of value on every thing2 and let any one consider what the difference is between an acre of land planted with tobacco or sugar1 sown with wheat or barley1 and an acre of the same land lying in common1 without any husbandry upon it1 and he will find1 that the improvement of labour makes the far greater part of the value4 ,i think it will be but a very modest computation to say1 that of the products of the earth useful to the life of man nine tenths are the effects of labour3 nay1 if we will rightly estimate things as they come to our use1 and cast up the several expences about them1 what in them is purely owing to nature1 and what to labour1 we shall find1 that in most of them ninety-nine hundredths are wholly to be put on the account of labour4 ,sect4 #da4 ,there cannot be a clearer demonstration of any thing1 than several nations of the ,americans are of this1 who are rich in land1 and poor in all the comforts of life2 whom nature having furnished as liberally as any other people1 with the materials of plenty1 i4e4 a fruitful soil1 apt to produce in abundance1 what might serve for food1 raiment1 and delight2 yet for want of improving it by labour1 have not one hundredth part of the conveniencies we enjoy3 and a king of a large and fruitful territory there1 feeds1 lodges1 and is clad worse than a day-labourer in ,england4 ,sect4 #db4 ,to make this a little clearer1 let us but trace some of the ordinary provisions of life1 through their several progresses1 before they come to our use1 and see how much they receive of their value from human industry4 ,bread1 wine and cloth1 are things of daily use1 and great plenty2 yet notwithstanding1 acorns1 water and leaves1 or skins1 must be our bread1 drink and cloathing1 did not labour furnish us with these more useful commodities3 for whatever bread is more worth than acorns1 wine than water1 and cloth or silk1 than leaves1 skins or moss1 that is wholly owing to labour and industry2 the one of these being the food and raiment which unassisted nature furnishes us with2 the other1 provisions which our industry and pains prepare for us1 which how much they exceed the other in value1 when any one hath computed1 he will then see how much labour makes the far greatest part of the value of things we enjoy in this world3 and the ground which produces the materials1 is scarce to be reckoned in1 as any1 or at most1 but a very small part of it2 so little1 that even amongst us1 land that is left wholly to nature1 that hath no improvement of pasturage1 tillage1 or planting1 is called1 as indeed it is1 waste2 and we shall find the benefit of it amount to little more than nothing4 ,this shews how much numbers of men are to be preferred to largeness of dominions2 and that the increase of lands1 and the right employing of them1 is the great art of government3 and that prince1 who shall be so wise and godlike1 as by established laws of liberty to secure protection and encouragement to the honest industry of mankind1 against the oppression of power and narrowness of party1 will quickly be too hard for his neighbours3 but this by the by4 ,to return to the argument in hand4 ,sect4 #dc4 ,an acre of land1 that bears here twenty bushels of wheat1 and another in ,america1 which1 with the same husbandry1 would do the like1 are1 without doubt1 of the same natural intrinsic value3 but yet the benefit mankind receives from the one in a year1 is worth #el4 and from the other possibly not worth a penny1 if all the profit an ,indian received from it were to be valued1 and sold here2 at least1 ,i may truly say1 not one thousandth4 ,it is labour then which puts the greatest part of value upon land1 without which it would scarcely be worth any thing3 it is to that we owe the greatest part of all its useful products2 for all that the straw1 bran1 bread1 of that acre of wheat1 is more worth than the product of an acre of as good land1 which lies waste1 is all the effect of labour3 for it is not barely the plough-man's pains1 the reaper's and thresher's toil1 and the baker's sweat1 is to be counted into the bread we eat2 the labour of those who broke the oxen1 who digged and wrought the iron and stones1 who felled and framed the timber employed about the plough1 mill1 oven1 or any other utensils1 which are a vast number1 requisite to this corn1 from its being feed to be sown to its being made bread1 must all be charged on the account of labour1 and received as an effect of that3 nature and the earth furnished only the almost worthless materials1 as in themselves4 ,it would be a strange catalogue of things1 that industry provided and made use of1 about every loaf of bread1 before it came to our use1 if we could trace them2 iron1 wood1 leather1 bark1 timber1 stone1 bricks1 coals1 lime1 cloth1 dying drugs1 pitch1 tar1 masts1 ropes1 and all the materials made use of in the ship1 that brought any of the commodities made use of by any of the workmen1 to any part of the work2 all which it would be almost impossible1 at least too long1 to reckon up4 ,sect4 #dd4 ,from all which it is evident1 that though the things of nature are given in common1 yet man1 by being master of himself1 and proprietor of his own person1 and the actions or labour of it1 had still in himself the great foundation of property2 and that1 which made up the great part of what he applied to the support or comfort of his being1 when invention and arts had improved the conveniencies of life1 was perfectly his own1 and did not belong in common to others4 ,sect4 #de4 ,thus labour1 in the beginning1 gave a right of property1 wherever any one was pleased to employ it upon what was common1 which remained a long while the far greater part1 and is yet more than mankind makes use of4 ,men1 at first1 for the most part1 contented themselves with what unassisted nature offered to their necessities3 and though afterwards1 in some parts of the world1 7where the increase of people and stock1 with the use of money1 had made land scarce1 and so of some value7 the several communities settled the bounds of their distinct territories1 and by laws within themselves regulated the properties of the private men of their society1 and so1 by compact and agreement1 settled the property which labour and industry began2 and the leagues that have been made between several states and kingdoms1 either expresly or tacitly disowning all claim and right to the land in the others possession1 have1 by common consent1 given up their pretences to their natural common right1 which originally they had to those countries1 and so have1 by positive agreement1 settled a property amongst themselves1 in distinct parts and parcels of the earth2 yet there are still great tracts of ground to be found1 which 7the inhabitants thereof not having joined with the rest of mankind1 in the consent of the use of their common money7 lie waste1 and are more than the people who dwell on it do1 or can make use of1 and so still lie in common2 tho' this can scarce happen amongst that part of mankind that have consented to the use of money4 ,sect4 #df4 ,the greatest part of things really useful to the life of man1 and such as the necessity of subsisting made the first commoners of the world look after1 as it doth the ,americans now1 are generally things of short duration2 such as1 if they are not consumed by use1 will decay and perish of themselves3 gold1 silver and diamonds1 are things that fancy or agreement hath put the value on1 more than real use1 and the necessary support of life4 ,now of those good things which nature hath provided in common1 every one had a right 7as hath been said7 to as much as he could use1 and property in all that he could effect with his labour2 all that his industry could extend to1 to alter from the state nature had put it in1 was his4 ,he that gathered a hundred bushels of acorns or apples1 had thereby a property in them1 they were his goods as soon as gathered4 ,he was only to look1 that he used them before they spoiled1 else he took more than his share1 and robbed others4 ,and indeed it was a foolish thing1 as well as dishonest1 to hoard up more than he could make use of4 ,if he gave away a part to any body else1 so that it perished not uselesly in his possession1 these he also made use of4 ,and if he also bartered away plums1 that would have rotted in a week1 for nuts that would last good for his eating a whole year1 he did no injury2 he wasted not the common stock2 destroyed no part of the portion of goods that belonged to others1 so long as nothing perished uselesly in his hands4 ,again1 if he would give his nuts for a piece of metal1 pleased with its colour2 or exchange his sheep for shells1 or wool for a sparkling pebble or a diamond1 and keep those by him all his life he invaded not the right of others1 he might heap up as much of these durable things as he pleased2 the exceeding of the bounds of his just property not lying in the largeness of his possession1 but the perishing of any thing uselesly in it4 ,sect4 #dg4 ,and thus came in the use of money1 some lasting thing that men might keep without spoiling1 and that by mutual consent men would take in exchange for the truly useful1 but perishable supports of life4 ,sect4 #dh4 ,and as different degrees of industry were apt to give men possessions in different proportions1 so this invention of money gave them the opportunity to continue and enlarge them3 for supposing an island1 separate from all possible commerce with the rest of the world1 wherein there were but an hundred families1 but there were sheep1 horses and cows1 with other useful animals1 wholsome fruits1 and land enough for corn for a hundred thousand times as many1 but nothing in the island1 either because of its commonness1 or perishableness1 fit to supply the place of money2 what reason could any one have there to enlarge his possessions beyond the use of his family1 and a plentiful supply to its consumption1 either in what their own industry produced1 or they could barter for like perishable1 useful commodities1 with others8 ,where there is not some thing1 both lasting and scarce1 and so valuable to be hoarded up1 there men will not be apt to enlarge their possessions of land1 were it never so rich1 never so free for them to take3 for ,i ask1 what would a man value ten thousand1 or an hundred thousand acres of excellent land1 ready cultivated1 and well stocked too with cattle1 in the middle of the inland parts of ,america1 where he had no hopes of commerce with other parts of the world1 to draw money to him by the sale of the product8 ,it would not be worth the enclosing1 and we should see him give up again to the wild common of nature1 whatever was more than would supply the conveniencies of life to be had there for him and his family4 ,sect4 #di4 ,thus in the beginning all the world was ,america1 and more so than that is now2 for no such thing as money was any where known4 ,find out something that hath the use and value of money amongst his neighbours1 you shall see the same man will begin presently to enlarge his possessions4 ,sect4 #ej4 ,but since gold and silver1 being little useful to the life of man in proportion to food1 raiment1 and carriage1 has its value only from the consent of men1 whereof labour yet makes1 in great part1 the measure1 it is plain1 that men have agreed to a disproportionate and unequal possession of the earth1 they having1 by a tacit and voluntary consent1 found out1 a way how a man may fairly possess more land than he himself can use the product of1 by receiving in exchange for the overplus gold and silver1 which may be hoarded up without injury to any one2 these metals not spoiling or decaying in the hands of the possessor4 ,this partage of things in an inequality of private possessions1 men have made practicable out of the bounds of society1 and without compact1 only by putting a value on gold and silver1 and tacitly agreeing in the use of money3 for in governments1 the laws regulate the right of property1 and the possession of land is determined by positive constitutions4 ,sect4 #ea4 ,and thus1 ,i think1 it is very easy to conceive1 without any difficulty1 how labour could at first begin a title of property in the common things of nature1 and how the spending it upon our uses bounded it4 ,so that there could then be no reason of quarrelling about title1 nor any doubt about the largeness of possession it gave4 ,right and conveniency went together2 for as a man had a right to all he could employ his labour upon1 so he had no temptation to labour for more than he could make use of4 ,this left no room for controversy about the title1 nor for encroachment on the right of others2 what portion a man carved to himself1 was easily seen2 and it was useless1 as well as dishonest1 to carve himself too much1 or take more than he needed4 ,,chapter4 ,,vi4 ,,of ,,paternal ,,power4 ,sect4 #eb4 ,,it may perhaps be censured as an impertinent criticism1 in a discourse of this nature1 to find fault with words and names1 that have obtained in the world3 and yet possibly it may not be amiss to offer new ones1 when the old are apt to lead men into mistakes1 as this of paternal power probably has done1 which seems so to place the power of parents over their children wholly in the father1 as if the mother had no share in it2 whereas1 if we consult reason or revelation1 we shall find1 she hath an equal title4 ,this may give one reason to ask1 whether this might not be more properly called parental power8 for whatever obligation nature and the right of generation lays on children1 it must certainly bind them equal to both the concurrent causes of it4 ,and accordingly we see the positive law of ,god every where joins them together1 without distinction1 when it commands the obedience of children1 ,honour thy father and thy mother1 ,exod4 xx4 #ab4 ,whosoever curseth his father or his mother1 ,lev4 xx4 #i4 ,ye shall fear every man his mother and his father1 ,lev4 xix4 #c4 ,children1 obey your parents1 c4 ,eph4 vi4 #a4 is the stile of the ,old and ,new ,testament4 ,sect4 #ec4 ,had but this one thing been well considered1 without looking any deeper into the matter1 it might perhaps have kept men from running into those gross mistakes1 they have made1 about this power of parents2 which1 however it might1 without any great harshness1 bear the name of absolute dominion1 and regal authority1 when under the title of paternal power it seemed appropriated to the father1 would yet have founded but oddly1 and in the very name shewn the absurdity1 if this supposed absolute power over children had been called parental2 and thereby have discovered1 that it belonged to the mother too3 for it will but very ill serve the turn of those men1 who contend so much for the absolute power and authority of the fatherhood1 as they call it1 that the mother should have any share in it2 and it would have but ill supported the monarchy they contend for1 when by the very name it appeared1 that that fundamental authority1 from whence they would derive their government of a single person only1 was not placed in one1 but two persons jointly4 ,but to let this of names pass4 ,sect4 #ed4 ,though ,i have said above1 ,chap4 ,,ii4 ,that all men by nature are equal1 ,i cannot be supposed to understand all sorts of equality3 age or virtue may give men a just precedency3 excellency of parts and merit may place others above the common level3 birth may subject some1 and alliance or benefits others1 to pay an observance to those to whom nature1 gratitude1 or other respects1 may have made it due3 and yet all this consists with the equality1 which all men are in1 in respect of jurisdiction or dominion one over another2 which was the equality ,i there spoke of1 as proper to the business in hand1 being that equal right1 that every man hath1 to his natural freedom1 without being subjected to the will or authority of any other man4 ,sect4 #ee4 ,children1 ,i confess1 are not born in this full state of equality1 though they are born to it4 ,their parents have a sort of rule and jurisdiction over them1 when they come into the world1 and for some time after2 but it is but a temporary one4 ,the bonds of this subjection are like the swaddling clothes they are wrapt up in1 and supported by1 in the weakness of their infancy3 age and reason as they grow up1 loosen them1 till at length they drop quite off1 and leave a man at his own free disposal4 ,sect4 #ef4 ,adam was created a perfect man1 his body and mind in full possession of their strength and reason1 and so was capable1 from the first instant of his being to provide for his own support and preservation1 and govern his actions according to the dictates of the law of reason which ,god had implanted in him4 ,from him the world is peopled with his descendants1 who are all born infants1 weak and helpless1 without knowledge or understanding3 but to supply the defects of this imperfect state1 till the improvement of growth and age hath removed them1 ,adam and ,eve1 and after them all parents were1 by the law of nature1 under an obligation to preserve1 nourish1 and educate the children they had begotten2 not as their own workmanship1 but the workmanship of their own maker1 the ,almighty1 to whom they were to be accountable for them4 ,sect4 #eg4 ,the law1 that was to govern ,adam1 was the same that was to govern all his posterity1 the law of reason4 ,but his offspring having another way of entrance into the world1 different from him1 by a natural birth1 that produced them ignorant and without the use of reason1 they were not presently under that law2 for no body can be under a law1 which is not promulgated to him2 and this law being promulgated or made known by reason only1 he that is not come to the use of his reason1 cannot be said to be under this law2 and ,adam's children1 being not presently as soon as born under this law of reason1 were not presently free3 for law1 in its true notion1 is not so much the limitation as the direction of a free and intelligent agent to his proper interest1 and prescribes no farther than is for the general good of those under that law3 could they be happier without it1 the law1 as an useless thing1 would of itself vanish2 and that ill deserves the name of confinement which hedges us in only from bogs and precipices4 ,so that1 however it may be mistaken1 the end of law is not to abolish or restrain1 but to preserve and enlarge freedom3 for in all the states of created beings capable of laws1 where there is no law1 there is no freedom3 for liberty is1 to be free from restraint and violence from others2 which cannot be1 where there is no law3 but freedom is not1 as we are told1 a liberty for every man to do what he lists3 7for who could be free1 when every other man's humour might domineer over him87 but a liberty to dispose1 and order as he lists1 his person1 actions1 possessions1 and his whole property1 within the allowance of those laws under which he is1 and therein not to be subject to the arbitrary will of another1 but freely follow his own4 ,sect4 #eh4 ,the power1 then1 that parents have over their children1 arises from that duty which is incumbent on them1 to take care of their off-spring1 during the imperfect state of childhood4 ,to inform the mind1 and govern the actions of their yet ignorant nonage1 till reason shall take its place1 and ease them of that trouble1 is what the children want1 and the parents are bound to3 for ,god having given man an understanding to direct his actions1 has allowed him a freedom of will1 and liberty of acting1 as properly belonging thereunto1 within the bounds of that law he is under4 ,but whilst he is in an estate1 wherein he has not understanding of his own to direct his will1 he is not to have any will of his own to follow3 he that understands for him1 must will for him too2 he must prescribe to his will1 and regulate his actions2 but when he comes to the estate that made his father a freeman1 the son is a freeman too4 ,sect4 #ei4 ,this holds in all the laws a man is under1 whether natural or civil4 ,is a man under the law of nature8 ,what made him free of that law8 what gave him a free disposing of his property1 according to his own will1 within the compass of that law8 ,i answer1 a state of maturity wherein he might be supposed capable to know that law1 that so he might keep his actions within the bounds of it4 ,when he has acquired that state1 he is presumed to know how far that law is to be his guide1 and how far he may make use of his freedom1 and so comes to have it2 till then1 some body else must guide him1 who is presumed to know how far the law allows a liberty4 ,if such a state of reason1 such an age of discretion made him free1 the same shall make his son free too4 ,is a man under the law of ,england8 ,what made him free of that law8 that is1 to have the liberty to dispose of his actions and possessions according to his own will1 within the permission of that law8 ,a capacity of knowing that law2 which is supposed by that law1 at the age of one and twenty years1 and in some cases sooner4 ,if this made the father free1 it shall make the son free too4 ,till then we see the law allows the son to have no will1 but he is to be guided by the will of his father or guardian1 who is to understand for him4 ,and if the father die1 and fail to substitute a deputy in his trust2 if he hath not provided a tutor1 to govern his son1 during his minority1 during his want of understanding1 the law takes care to do it2 some other must govern him1 and be a will to him1 till he hath attained to a state of freedom1 and his understanding be fit to take the government of his will4 ,but after that1 the father and son are equally free as much as tutor and pupil after nonage2 equally subjects of the same law together1 without any dominion left in the father over the life1 liberty1 or estate of his son1 whether they be only in the state and under the law of nature1 or under the positive laws of an established government4 ,sect4 #fj4 ,but if1 through defects that may happen out of the ordinary course of nature1 any one comes not to such a degree of reason1 wherein he might be supposed capable of knowing the law1 and so living within the rules of it1 he is never capable of being a free man1 he is never let loose to the disposure of his own will 7because he knows no bounds to it1 has not understanding1 its proper guide7 but is continued under the tuition and government of others1 all the time his own understanding is uncapable of that charge4 ,and so lunatics and ideots are never set free from the government of their parents2 _/ children1 who are not as yet come unto those years whereat they may have2 and innocents which are excluded by a natural defect from ever having2 thirdly1 madmen1 which for the present cannot possibly have the use of right reason to guide themselves1 have for their guide1 the reason that guideth other men which are tutors over them1 to seek and procure their good for them1 _/ says ,hooker1 ,eccl4 ,pol4 lib4 i4 sec4 #g4 ,all which seems no more than that duty1 which ,god and nature has laid on man1 as well as other creatures1 to preserve their offspring1 till they can be able to shift for themselves1 and will scarce amount to an instance or proof of parents regal authority4 ,sect4 #fa4 ,thus we are born free1 as we are born rational2 not that we have actually the exercise of either3 age1 that brings one1 brings with it the other too4 ,and thus we see how natural freedom and subjection to parents may consist together1 and are both founded on the same principle4 ,a child is free by his father's title1 by his father's understanding1 which is to govern him till he hath it of his own4 ,the freedom of a man at years of discretion1 and the subjection of a child to his parents1 whilst yet short of that age1 are so consistent1 and so distinguishable1 that the most blinded contenders for monarchy1 by right of fatherhood1 cannot miss this difference2 the most obstinate cannot but allow their consistency3 for were their doctrine all true1 were the right heir of ,adam now known1 and by that title settled a monarch in his throne1 invested with all the absolute unlimited power ,sir ,robert ,filmer talks of2 if he should die as soon as his heir were born1 must not the child1 notwithstanding he were never so free1 never so much sovereign1 be in subjection to his mother and nurse1 to tutors and governors1 till age and education brought him reason and ability to govern himself and others8 ,the necessities of his life1 the health of his body1 and the information of his mind1 would require him to be directed by the will of others1 and not his own2 and yet will any one think1 that this restraint and subjection were inconsistent with1 or spoiled him of that liberty or sovereignty he had a right to1 or gave away his empire to those who had the government of his nonage8 ,this government over him only prepared him the better and sooner for it4 ,if any body should ask me1 when my son is of age to be free8 ,i shall answer1 just when his monarch is of age to govern4 ,but at what time1 says the judicious ,hooker1 ,eccl4 ,pol4 l4 i4 sect4 #f4 a man may be said to have attained so far forth the use of reason1 as sufficeth to make him capable of those laws whereby he is then bound to guide his actions3 this is a great deal more easy for sense to discern1 than for any one by skill and learning to determine4 ,sect4 #fb4 ,common-wealths themselves take notice of1 and allow1 that there is a time when men are to begin to act like free men1 and therefore till that time require not oaths of fealty1 or allegiance1 or other public owning of1 or submission to the government of their countries4 ,sect4 #fc4 ,the freedom then of man1 and liberty of acting according to his own will1 is grounded on his having reason1 which is able to instruct him in that law he is to govern himself by1 and make him know how far he is left to the freedom of his own will4 ,to turn him loose to an unrestrained liberty1 before he has reason to guide him1 is not the allowing him the privilege of his nature to be free2 but to thrust him out amongst brutes1 and abandon him to a state as wretched1 and as much beneath that of a man1 as their's4 ,this is that which puts the authority into the parents hands to govern the minority of their children4 ,god hath made it their business to employ this care on their offspring1 and hath placed in them suitable inclinations of tenderness and concern to temper this power1 to apply it1 as his wisdom designed it1 to the children's good1 as long as they should need to be under it4 ,sect4 #fd4 ,but what reason can hence advance this care of the parents due to their off-spring into an absolute arbitrary dominion of the father1 whose power reaches no farther1 than by such a discipline1 as he finds most effectual1 to give such strength and health to their bodies1 such vigour and rectitude to their minds1 as may best fit his children to be most useful to themselves and others2 and1 if it be necessary to his condition1 to make them work1 when they are able1 for their own subsistence4 ,but in this power the mother too has her share with the father4 ,sect4 #fe4 ,nay1 this power so little belongs to the father by any peculiar right of nature1 but only as he is guardian of his children1 that when he quits his care of them1 he loses his power over them1 which goes along with their nourishment and education1 to which it is inseparably annexed2 and it belongs as much to the foster-father of an exposed child1 as to the natural father of another4 ,so little power does the bare act of begetting give a man over his issue2 if all his care ends there1 and this be all the title he hath to the name and authority of a father4 ,and what will become of this paternal power in that part of the world1 where one woman hath more than one husband at a time8 or in those parts of ,america1 where1 when the husband and wife part1 which happens frequently1 the children are all left to the mother1 follow her1 and are wholly under her care and provision8 ,if the father die whilst the children are young1 do they not naturally every where owe the same obedience to their mother1 during their minority1 as to their father were he alive8 and will any one say1 that the mother hath a legislative power over her children8 that she can make standing rules1 which shall be of perpetual obligation1 by which they ought to regulate all the concerns of their property1 and bound their liberty all the course of their lives8 or can she inforce the observation of them with capital punishments8 for this is the proper power of the magistrate1 of which the father hath not so much as the shadow4 ,his command over his children is but temporary1 and reaches not their life or property3 it is but a help to the weakness and imperfection of their nonage1 a discipline necessary to their education3 and though a father may dispose of his own possessions as he pleases1 when his children are out of danger of perishing for want1 yet his power extends not to the lives or goods1 which either their own industry1 or another's bounty has made their's2 nor to their liberty neither1 when they are once arrived to the infranchisement of the years of discretion4 ,the father's empire then ceases1 and he can from thence forwards no more dispose of the liberty of his son1 than that of any other man3 and it must be far from an absolute or perpetual jurisdiction1 from which a man may withdraw himself1 having license from divine authority to leave father and mother1 and cleave to his wife4 ,sect4 #ff4 ,but though there be a time when a child comes to be as free from subjection to the will and command of his father1 as the father himself is free from subjection to the will of any body else1 and they are each under no other restraint1 but that which is common to them both1 whether it be the law of nature1 or municipal law of their country2 yet this freedom exempts not a son from that honour which he ought1 by the law of ,god and nature1 to pay his parents4 ,god having made the parents instruments in his great design of continuing the race of mankind1 and the occasions of life to their children2 as he hath laid on them an obligation to nourish1 preserve1 and bring up their offspring2 so he has laid on the children a perpetual obligation of honouring their parents1 which containing in it an inward esteem and reverence to be shewn by all outward expressions1 ties up the child from any thing that may ever injure or affront1 disturb or endanger1 the happiness or life of those from whom he received his2 and engages him in all actions of defence1 relief1 assistance and comfort of those1 by whose means he entered into being1 and has been made capable of any enjoyments of life3 from this obligation no state1 no freedom can absolve children4 ,but this is very far from giving parents a power of command over their children1 or an authority to make laws and dispose as they please of their lives or liberties4 ,it is one thing to owe honour1 respect1 gratitude and assistance2 another to require an absolute obedience and submission4 ,the honour due to parents1 a monarch in his throne owes his mother2 and yet this lessens not his authority1 nor subjects him to her government4 ,sect4 #fg4 ,the subjection of a minor places in the father a temporary government1 which terminates with the minority of the child3 and the honour due from a child1 places in the parents a perpetual right to respect1 reverence1 support and compliance too1 more or less1 as the father's care1 cost1 and kindness in his education1 has been more or less4 ,this ends not with minority1 but holds in all parts and conditions of a man's life4 ,the want of distinguishing these two powers1 viz4 that which the father hath in the right of tuition1 during minority1 and the right of honour all his life1 may perhaps have caused a great part of the mistakes about this matter3 for to speak properly of them1 the first of these is rather the privilege of children1 and duty of parents1 than any prerogative of paternal power4 ,the nourishment and education of their children is a charge so incumbent on parents for their children's good1 that nothing can absolve them from taking care of it3 and though the power of commanding and chastising them go along with it1 yet ,god hath woven into the principles of human nature such a tenderness for their off-spring1 that there is little fear that parents should use their power with too much rigour2 the excess is seldom on the severe side1 the strong byass of nature drawing the other way4 ,and therefore ,god almighty when he would express his gentle dealing with the ,israelites1 he tells them1 that though he chastened them1 he chastened them as a man chastens his son1 ,deut4 viii4 #e4 i4e4 with tenderness and affection1 and kept them under no severer discipline than what was absolutely best for them1 and had been less kindness to have slackened4 ,this is that power to which children are commanded obedience1 that the pains and care of their parents may not be increased1 or ill rewarded4 ,sect4 #fh4 ,on the other side1 honour and support1 all that which gratitude requires to return for the benefits received by and from them1 is the indispensable duty of the child1 and the proper privilege of the parents4 ,this is intended for the parents advantage1 as the other is for the child's2 though education1 the parents duty1 seems to have most power1 because the ignorance and infirmities of childhood stand in need of restraint and correction2 which is a visible exercise of rule1 and a kind of dominion4 ,and that duty which is comprehended in the word honour1 requires less obedience1 though the obligation be stronger on grown1 than younger children3 for who can think the command1 ,children obey your parents1 requires in a man1 that has children of his own1 the same submission to his father1 as it does in his yet young children to him2 and that by this precept he were bound to obey all his father's commands1 if1 out of a conceit of authority1 he should have the indiscretion to treat him still as a boy8 ,sect4 #fi4 ,the first part then of paternal power1 or rather duty1 which is education1 belongs so to the father1 that it terminates at a certain season2 when the business of education is over1 it ceases of itself1 and is also alienable before3 for a man may put the tuition of his son in other hands2 and he that has made his son an apprentice to another1 has discharged him1 during that time1 of a great part of his obedience both to himself and to his mother4 ,but all the duty of honour1 the other part1 remains never the less entire to them2 nothing can cancel that3 it is so inseparable from them both1 that the father's authority cannot dispossess the mother of this right1 nor can any man discharge his son from honouring her that bore him4 ,but both these are very far from a power to make laws1 and enforcing them with penalties1 that may reach estate1 liberty1 limbs and life4 ,the power of commanding ends with nonage2 and though1 after that1 honour and respect1 support and defence1 and whatsoever gratitude can oblige a man to1 for the highest benefits he is naturally capable of1 be always due from a son to his parents2 yet all this puts no scepter into the father's hand1 no sovereign power of commanding4 ,he has no dominion over his son's property1 or actions2 nor any right1 that his will should prescribe to his son's in all things2 however it may become his son in many things1 not very inconvenient to him and his family1 to pay a deference to it4 ,sect4 #gj4 ,a man may owe honour and respect to an ancient1 or wise man2 defence to his child or friend2 relief and support to the distressed2 and gratitude to a benefactor1 to such a degree1 that all he has1 all he can do1 cannot sufficiently pay it3 but all these give no authority1 no right to any one1 of making laws over him from whom they are owing4 ,and it is plain1 all this is due not only to the bare title of father2 not only because1 as has been said1 it is owing to the mother too2 but because these obligations to parents1 and the degrees of what is required of children1 may be varied by the different care and kindness1 trouble and expence1 which is often employed upon one child more than another4 ,sect4 #ga4 ,this shews the reason how it comes to pass1 that parents in societies1 where they themselves are subjects1 retain a power over their children1 and have as much right to their subjection1 as those who are in the state of nature4 ,which could not possibly be1 if all political power were only paternal1 and that in truth they were one and the same thing3 for then1 all paternal power being in the prince1 the subject could naturally have none of it4 ,but these two powers1 political and paternal1 are so perfectly distinct and separate2 are built upon so different foundations1 and given to so different ends1 that every subject that is a father1 has as much a paternal power over his children1 as the prince has over his3 and every prince1 that has parents1 owes them as much filial duty and obedience1 as the meanest of his subjects do to their's2 and can therefore contain not any part or degree of that kind of dominion1 which a prince or magistrate has over his subject4 ,sect4 #gb4 ,though the obligation on the parents to bring up their children1 and the obligation on children to honour their parents1 contain all the power on the one hand1 and submission on the other1 which are proper to this relation1 yet there is another power ordinarily in the father1 whereby he has a tie on the obedience of his children2 which tho' it be common to him with other men1 yet the occasions of shewing it1 almost constantly happening to fathers in their private families1 and the instances of it elsewhere being rare1 and less taken notice of1 it passes in the world for a part of paternal jurisdiction4 ,and this is the power men generally have to bestow their estates on those who please them best2 the possession of the father being the expectation and inheritance of the children1 ordinarily in certain proportions1 according to the law and custom of each country2 yet it is commonly in the father's power to bestow it with a more sparing or liberal hand1 according as the behaviour of this or that child hath comported with his will and humour4 ,sect4 #gc4 ,this is no small tie on the obedience of children3 and there being always annexed to the enjoyment of land1 a submission to the government of the country1 of which that land is a part2 it has been commonly supposed1 that a father could oblige his posterity to that government1 of which he himself was a subject1 and that his compact held them2 whereas1 it being only a necessary condition annexed to the land1 and the inheritance of an estate which is under that government1 reaches only those who will take it on that condition1 and so is no natural tie or engagement1 but a voluntary submission3 for every man's children being by nature as free as himself1 or any of his ancestors ever were1 may1 whilst they are in that freedom1 choose what society they will join themselves to1 what commonwealth they will put themselves under4 ,but if they will enjoy the inheritance of their ancestors1 they must take it on the same terms their ancestors had it1 and submit to all the conditions annexed to such a possession4 ,by this power indeed fathers oblige their children to obedience to themselves1 even when they are past minority1 and most commonly too subject them to this or that political power3 but neither of these by any peculiar right of fatherhood1 but by the reward they have in their hands to inforce and recompence such a compliance2 and is no more power than what a ,french man has over an ,english man1 who by the hopes of an estate he will leave him1 will certainly have a strong tie on his obedience3 and if1 when it is left him1 he will enjoy it1 he must certainly take it upon the conditions annexed to the possession of land in that country where it lies1 whether it be ,france or ,england4 ,sect4 #gd4 ,to conclude then1 tho' the father's power of commanding extends no farther than the minority of his children1 and to a degree only fit for the discipline and government of that age2 and tho' that honour and respect1 and all that which the ,latins called piety1 which they indispensably owe to their parents all their life-time1 and in all estates1 with all that support and defence is due to them1 gives the father no power of governing1 i4e4 making laws and enacting penalties on his children2 though by all this he has no dominion over the property or actions of his son3 yet it is obvious to conceive how easy it was1 in the first ages of the world1 and in places still1 where the thinness of people gives families leave to separate into unpossessed quarters1 and they have room to remove or plant themselves in yet vacant habitations1 for the father of the family to become the prince of it299 he had been a ruler from the beginning of the infancy of his children3 and since without some government it would be hard for them to live together1 it was likeliest it should1 by the express or tacit consent of the children when they were grown up1 be in the father1 where it seemed without any change barely to continue2 when indeed nothing more was required to it1 than the permitting the father to exercise alone1 in his family1 that executive power of the law of nature1 which every free man naturally hath1 and by that permission resigning up to him a monarchical power1 whilst they remained in it4 ,but that this was not by any paternal right1 but only by the consent of his children1 is evident from hence1 that no body doubts1 but if a stranger1 whom chance or business had brought to his family1 had there killed any of his children1 or committed any other fact1 he might condemn and put him to death1 or other-wise have punished him1 as well as any of his children2 which it was impossible he should do by virtue of any paternal authority over one who was not his child1 but by virtue of that executive power of the law of nature1 which1 as a man1 he had a right to3 and he alone could punish him in his family1 where the respect of his children had laid by the exercise of such a power1 to give way to the dignity and authority they were willing should remain in him1 above the rest of his family4 799,it is no improbable opinion therefore1 which the archphilosopher was of1 that the chief person in every houshold was always1 as it were1 a king3 so when numbers of housholds joined themselves in civil societies together1 kings were the first kind of governors amongst them1 which is also1 as it seemeth1 the reason why the name of fathers continued still in them1 who1 of fathers1 were made rulers2 as also the ancient custom of governors to do as ,melchizedec1 and being kings1 to exercise the office of priests1 which fathers did at the first1 grew perhaps by the same occasion4 ,howbeit1 this is not the only kind of regiment that has been received in the world4 ,the inconveniences of one kind have caused sundry others to be devised2 so that in a word1 all public regiment1 of what kind soever1 seemeth evidently to have risen from the deliberate advice1 consultation and composition between men1 judging it convenient and behoveful2 there being no impossibility in nature considered by itself1 but that man might have lived without any public regiment1 ,hooker's ,eccl4 ,pol4 lib4 i4 sect4 #aj47 ,sect4 #ge4 ,thus it was easy1 and almost natural for children1 by a tacit1 and scarce avoidable consent1 to make way for the father's authority and government4 ,they had been accustomed in their childhood to follow his direction1 and to refer their little differences to him1 and when they were men1 who fitter to rule them8 ,their little properties1 and less covetousness1 seldom afforded greater controversies2 and when any should arise1 where could they have a fitter umpire than he1 by whose care they had every one been sustained and brought up1 and who had a tenderness for them all8 ,it is no wonder that they made no distinction betwixt minority and full age2 nor looked after one and twenty1 or any other age that might make them the free disposers of themselves and fortunes1 when they could have no desire to be out of their pupilage3 the government they had been under1 during it1 continued still to be more their protection than restraint2 and they could no where find a greater security to their peace1 liberties1 and fortunes1 than in the rule of a father4 ,sect4 #gf4 ,thus the natural fathers of families1 by an insensible change1 became the politic monarchs of them too3 and as they chanced to live long1 and leave able and worthy heirs1 for several successions1 or otherwise2 so they laid the foundations of hereditary1 or elective kingdoms1 under several constitutions and manners1 according as chance1 contrivance1 or occasions happened to mould them4 ,but if princes have their titles in their fathers right1 and it be a sufficient proof of the natural right of fathers to political authority1 because they commonly were those in whose hands we find1 de facto1 the exercise of government3 ,i say1 if this argument be good1 it will as strongly prove1 that all princes1 nay princes only1 ought to be priests1 since it is as certain1 that in the beginning1 the father of the family was priest1 as that he was ruler in his own houshold4 ,,chapter4 ,,vii4 ,,of ,,political ,,or ,,civil ,,society4 ,sect4 #gg4 ,,god having made man such a creature1 that in his own judgment1 it was not good for him to be alone1 put him under strong obligations of necessity1 convenience1 and inclination to drive him into society1 as well as fitted him with understanding and language to continue and enjoy it4 ,the first society was between man and wife1 which gave beginning to that between parents and children2 to which1 in time1 that between master and servant came to be added3 and though all these might1 and commonly did meet together1 and make up but one family1 wherein the master or mistress of it had some sort of rule proper to a family2 each of these1 or all together1 came short of political society1 as we shall see1 if we consider the different ends1 ties1 and bounds of each of these4 ,sect4 #gh4 ,conjugal society is made by a voluntary compact between man and woman2 and tho' it consist chiefly in such a communion and right in one another's bodies as is necessary to its chief end1 procreation2 yet it draws with it mutual support and assistance1 and a communion of interests too1 as necessary not only to unite their care and affection1 but also necessary to their common off-spring1 who have a right to be nourished1 and maintained by them1 till they are able to provide for themselves4 ,sect4 #gi4 ,for the end of conjunction1 between male and female1 being not barely procreation1 but the continuation of the species2 thisconjunction betwixt male and female ought to last1 even after procreation1 so long as is necessary to the nourishment and support of the young ones1 who are to be sustained by those that got them1 till they are able to shift and provide for themselves4 ,this rule1 which the infinite wise maker hath set to the works of his hands1 we find the inferior creatures steadily obey4 ,in those viviparous animals which feed on grass1 the conjunction between male and female lasts no longer than the very act of copulation2 because the teat of the dam being sufficient to nourish the young1 till it be able to feed on grass1 the male only begets1 but concerns not himself for the female or young1 to whose sustenance he can contribute nothing4 ,but in beasts of prey the conjunction lasts longer3 because the dam not being able well to subsist herself1 and nourish her numerous off-spring by her own prey alone1 a more laborious1 as well as more dangerous way of living1 than by feeding on grass1 the assistance of the male is necessary to the maintenance of their common family1 which cannot subsist till they are able to prey for themselves1 but by the joint care of male and female4 ,the same is to be observed in all birds1 7except some domestic ones1 where plenty of food excuses the cock from feeding1 and taking care of the young brood7 whose young needing food in the nest1 the cock and hen continue mates1 till the young are able to use their wing1 and provide for themselves4 ,sect4 #hj4 ,and herein ,i think lies the chief1 if not the only reason1 why the male and female in mankind are tied to a longer conjunction than other creatures1 viz4 because the female is capable of conceiving1 and de facto is commonly with child again1 and brings forth too a new birth1 long before the former is out of a dependency for support on his parents help1 and able to shift for himself1 and has all the assistance is due to him from his parents3 whereby the father1 who is bound to take care for those he hath begot1 is under an obligation to continue in conjugal society with the same woman longer than other creatures1 whose young being able to subsist of themselves1 before the time of procreation returns again1 the conjugal bond dissolves of itself1 and they are at liberty1 till ,hymen at his usual anniversary season summons them again to chuse new mates4 ,wherein one cannot but admire the wisdom of the great ,creator1 who having given to man foresight1 and an ability to lay up for the future1 as well as to supply the present necessity1 hath made it necessary1 that society of man and wife should be more lasting1 than of male and female amongst other creatures2 that so their industry might be encouraged1 and their interest better united1 to make provision and lay up goods for their common issue1 which uncertain mixture1 or easy and frequent solutions of conjugal society would mightily disturb4 ,sect4 #ha4 ,but tho' these are ties upon mankind1 which make the conjugal bonds more firm and lasting in man1 than the other species of animals2 yet it would give one reason to enquire1 why this compact1 where procreation and education are secured1 and inheritance taken care for1 may not be made determinable1 either by consent1 or at a certain time1 or upon certain conditions1 as well as any other voluntary compacts1 there being no necessity in the nature of the thing1 nor to the ends of it1 that it should always be for life2 ,i mean1 to such as are under no restraint of any positive law1 which ordains all such contracts to be perpetual4 ,sect4 #hb4 ,but the husband and wife1 though they have but one common concern1 yet having different understandings1 will unavoidably sometimes have different wills too2 it therefore being necessary that the last determination1 i4 e4 the rule1 should be placed somewhere2 it naturally falls to the man's share1 as the abler and the stronger4 ,but this reaching but to the things of their common interest and property1 leaves the wife in the full and free possession of what by contract is her peculiar right1 and gives the husband no more power over her life than she has over his2 the power of the husband being so far from that of an absolute monarch1 that the wife has in many cases a liberty to separate from him1 where natural right1 or their contract allows it2 whether that contract be made by themselves in the state of nature1 or by the customs or laws of the country they live in2 and the children upon such separation fall to the father or mother's lot1 as such contract does determine4 ,sect4 #hc4 ,for all the ends of marriage being to be obtained under politic government1 as well as in the state of nature1 the civil magistrate doth not abridge the right or power of either naturally necessary to those ends1 viz4 procreation and mutual support and assistance whilst they are together2 but only decides any controversy that may arise between man and wife about them4 ,if it were otherwise1 and that absolute sovereignty and power of life and death naturally belonged to the husband1 and were necessary to the society between man and wife1 there could be no matrimony in any of those countries where the husband is allowed no such absolute authority4 ,but the ends of matrimony requiring no such power in the husband1 the condition of conjugal society put it not in him1 it being not at all necessary to that state4 ,conjugal society could subsist and attain its ends without it2 nay1 community of goods1 and the power over them1 mutual assistance and maintenance1 and other things belonging to conjugal society1 might be varied and regulated by that contract which unites man and wife in that society1 as far as may consist with procreation and the bringing up of children till they could shift for themselves2 nothing being necessary to any society1 that is not necessary to the ends for which it is made4 ,sect4 #hd4 ,the society betwixt parents and children1 and the distinct rights and powers belonging respectively to them1 ,i have treated of so largely1 in the foregoing chapter1 that ,i shall not here need to say any thing of it4 ,and ,i think it is plain1 that it is far different from a politic society4 ,sect4 #he4 ,master and servant are names as old as history1 but given to those of far different condition2 for a freeman makes himself a servant to another1 by selling him1 for a certain time1 the service he undertakes to do1 in exchange for wages he is to receive3 and though this commonly puts him into the family of his master1 and under the ordinary discipline thereof2 yet it gives the master but a temporary power over him1 and no greater than what is contained in the contract between them4 ,but there is another sort of servants1 which by a peculiar name we call slaves1 who being captives taken in a just war1 are by the right of nature subjected to the absolute dominion and arbitrary power of their masters4 ,these men having1 as ,i say1 forfeited their lives1 and with it their liberties1 and lost their estates2 and being in the state of slavery1 not capable of any property1 cannot in that state be considered as any part of civil society2 the chief end whereof is the preservation of property4 ,sect4 #hf4 ,let us therefore consider a master of a family with all these subordinate relations of wife1 children1 servants1 and slaves1 united under the domestic rule of a family2 which1 what resemblance soever it may have in its order1 offices1 and number too1 with a little commonwealth1 yet is very far from it1 both in its constitution1 power and end3 or if it must be thought a monarchy1 and the paterfamilias the absolute monarch in it1 absolute monarchy will have but a very shattered and short power1 when it is plain1 by what has been said before1 that the master of the family has a very distinct and differently limited power1 both as to time and extent1 over those several persons that are in it2 for excepting the slave 7and the family is as much a family1 and his power as paterfamilias as great1 whether there be any slaves in his family or no7 he has no legislative power of life and death over any of them1 and none too but what a mistress of a family may have as well as he4 ,and he certainly can have no absolute power over the whole family1 who has but a very limited one over every individual in it4 ,but how a family1 or any other society of men1 differ from that which is properly political society1 we shall best see1 by considering wherein political society itself consists4 ,sect4 #hg4 ,man being born1 as has been proved1 with a title to perfect freedom1 and an uncontrouled enjoyment of all the rights and privileges of the law of nature1 equally with any other man1 or number of men in the world1 hath by nature a power1 not only to preserve his property1 that is1 his life1 liberty and estate1 against the injuries and attempts of other men2 but to judge of1 and punish the breaches of that law in others1 as he is persuaded the offence deserves1 even with death itself1 in crimes where the heinousness of the fact1 in his opinion1 requires it4 ,but because no political society can be1 nor subsist1 without having in itself the power to preserve the property1 and in order thereunto1 punish the offences of all those of that society2 there1 and there only is political society1 where every one of the members hath quitted this natural power1 resigned it up into the hands of the community in all cases that exclude him not from appealing for protection to the law established by it4 ,and thus all private judgment of every particular member being excluded1 the community comes to be umpire1 by settled standing rules1 indifferent1 and the same to all parties2 and by men having authority from the community1 for the execution of those rules1 decides all the differences that may happen between any members of that society concerning any matter of right2 and punishes those offences which any member hath committed against the society1 with such penalties as the law has established3 whereby it is easy to discern1 who are1 and who are not1 in political society together4 ,those who are united into one body1 and have a common established law and judicature to appeal to1 with authority to decide controversies between them1 and punish offenders1 are in civil society one with another3 but those who have no such common appeal1 ,i mean on earth1 are still in the state of nature1 each being1 where there is no other1 judge for himself1 and executioner2 which is1 as ,i have before shewed it1 the perfect state of nature4 ,sect4 #hh4 ,and thus the commonwealth comes by a power to set down what punishment shall belong to the several transgressions which they think worthy of it1 committed amongst the members of that society1 7which is the power of making laws7 as well as it has the power to punish any injury done unto any of its members1 by any one that is not of it1 7which is the power of war and peace27 and all this for the preservation of the property of all the members of that society1 as far as is possible4 ,but though every man who has entered into civil society1 and is become a member of any commonwealth1 has thereby quitted his power to punish offences1 against the law of nature1 in prosecution of his own private judgment1 yet with the judgment of offences1 which he has given up to the legislative in all cases1 where he can appeal to the magistrate1 he has given a right to the commonwealth to employ his force1 for the execution of the judgments of the commonwealth1 whenever he shall be called to it2 which indeed are his own judgments1 they being made by himself1 or his representative4 ,and herein we have the original of the legislative and executive power of civil society1 which is to judge by standing laws1 how far offences are to be punished1 when committed within the commonwealth2 and also to determine1 by occasional judgments founded on the present circumstances of the fact1 how far injuries from without are to be vindicated2 and in both these to employ all the force of all the members1 when there shall be need4 ,sect4 #hi4 ,where-ever therefore any number of men are so united into one society1 as to quit every one his executive power of the law of nature1 and to resign it to the public1 there and there only is a political1 or civil society4 ,and this is done1 where-ever any number of men1 in the state of nature1 enter into society to make one people1 one body politic1 under one supreme government2 or else when any one joins himself to1 and incorporates with any government already made3 for hereby he authorizes the society1 or which is all one1 the legislative thereof1 to make laws for him1 as the public good of the society shall require2 to the execution whereof1 his own assistance 7as to his own decrees7 is due4 ,and this puts men out of a state of nature into that of a commonwealth1 by setting up a judge on earth1 with authority to determine all the controversies1 and redress the injuries that may happen to any member of the commonwealth2 which judge is the legislative1 or magistrates appointed by it4 ,and where-ever there are any number of men1 however associated1 that have no such decisive power to appeal to1 there they are still in the state of nature4 ,sect4 #ij4 ,hence it is evident1 that absolute monarchy1 which by some men is counted the only government in the world1 is indeed inconsistent with civil society1 and so can be no form of civil-government at all3 for the end of civil society1 being to avoid1 and remedy those inconveniencies of the state of nature1 which necessarily follow from every man's being judge in his own case1 by setting up a known authority1 to which every one of that society may appeal upon any injury received1 or controversy that may arise1 and which every one of the society ought to obey299 where-ever any persons are1 who have not such an authority to appeal to1 for the decision of any difference between them1 there those persons are still in the state of nature2 and so is every absolute prince1 in respect of those who are under his dominion4 799,the public power of all society is above every soul contained in the same society2 and the principal use of that power is1 to give laws unto all that are under it1 which laws in such cases we must obey1 unless there be reason shewed which may necessarily inforce1 that the law of reason1 or of ,god1 doth enjoin the contrary1 ,hook4 ,eccl4 ,pol4 l4 i4 sect4 #af47 ,sect4 #ia4 ,for he being supposed to have all1 both legislative and executive power in himself alone1 there is no judge to be found1 no appeal lies open to any one1 who may fairly1 and indifferently1 and with authority decide1 and from whose decision relief and redress may be expected of any injury or inconviency1 that may be suffered from the prince1 or by his order3 so that such a man1 however intitled1 ,czar1 or ,grand ,seignior1 or how you please1 is as much in the state of nature1 with all under his dominion1 as he is with the rest of mankind3 for where-ever any two men are1 who have no standing rule1 and common judge to appeal to on earth1 for the determination of controversies of right betwixt them1 there they are still in the state of99 nature1 and under all the inconveniencies of it1 with only this woful difference to the subject1 or rather slave of an absolute prince3 that whereas1 in the ordinary state of nature1 he has a liberty to judge of his right1 and according to the best of his power1 to maintain it2 now1 whenever his property is invaded by the will and order of his monarch1 he has not only no appeal1 as those in society ought to have1 but as if he were degraded from the common state of rational creatures1 is denied a liberty to judge of1 or to defend his right2 and so is exposed to all the misery and inconveniencies1 that a man can fear from one1 who being in the unrestrained state of nature1 is yet corrupted with flattery1 and armed with power4 799,to take away all such mutual grievances1 injuries and wrongs1 i4e4 such as attend men in the state of nature1 there was no way but only by growing into composition and agreement amongst themselves1 by ordaining some kind of govemment public1 and by yielding themselves subject thereunto1 that unto whom they granted authority to rule and govem1 by them the peace1 tranquillity and happy estate of the rest might be procured4 ,men always knew that where force and injury was offered1 they might be defenders of themselves2 they knew that however men may seek their own commodity1 yet if this were done with injury unto others1 it was not to be suffered1 but by all men1 and all good means to be withstood4 ,finally1 they knew that no man might in reason take upon him to determine his own right1 and according to his own determination proceed in maintenance thereof1 in as much as every man is towards himself1 and them whom he greatly affects1 partial2 and therefore that strifes and troubles would be endless1 except they gave their common consent1 all to be ordered by some1 whom they should agree upon1 without which consent there would be no reason that one man should take upon him to be lord or judge over another1 ,hooker's ,eccl4 ,pol4 l4 i4 sect4 #aj47 ,sect4 #ib4 ,for he that thinks absolute power purifies men's blood1 and corrects the baseness of human nature1 need read but the history of this1 or any other age1 to be convinced of the contrary4 ,he that would have been insolent and injurious in the woods of ,america1 would not probably be much better in a throne2 where perhaps learning and religion shall be found out to justify all that he shall do to his subjects1 and the sword presently silence all those that dare question it3 for what the protection of absolute monarchy is1 what kind of fathers of their countries it makes princes to be and to what a degree of happiness and security it carries civil society1 where this sort of government is grown to perfection1 he that will look into the late relation of ,ceylon1 may easily see4 ,sect4 #ic4 ,in absolute monarchies indeed1 as well as other governments of the world1 the subjects have an appeal to the law1 and judges to decide any controversies1 and restrain any violence that may happen betwixt the subjects themselves1 one amongst another4 ,this every one thinks necessary1 and believes he deserves to be thought a declared enemy to society and mankind1 who should go about to take it away4 ,but whether this be from a true love of mankind and society1 and such a charity as we owe all one to another1 there is reason to doubt3 for this is no more than what every man1 who loves his own power1 profit1 or greatness1 may and naturally must do1 keep those animals from hurting1 or destroying one another1 who labour and drudge only for his pleasure and advantage2 and so are taken care of1 not out of any love the master has for them1 but love of himself1 and the profit they bring him3 for if it be asked1 what security1 what fence is there1 in such a state1 against the violence and oppression of this absolute ruler8 the very question can scarce be borne4 ,they are ready to tell you1 that it deserves death only to ask after safety4 ,betwixt subject and subject1 they will grant1 there must be measures1 laws and judges1 for their mutual peace and security3 but as for the ruler1 he ought to be absolute1 and is above all such circumstances2 because he has power to do more hurt and wrong1 it is right when he does it4 ,to ask how you may be guarded from harm1 or injury1 on that side where the strongest hand is to do it1 is presently the voice of faction and rebellion3 as if when men quitting the state of nature entered into society1 they agreed that all of them but one1 should be under the restraint of laws1 but that he should still retain all the liberty of the state of nature1 increased with power1 and made licentious by impunity4 ,this is to think1 that men are so foolish1 that they take care to avoid what mischiefs may be done them by pole-cats1 or foxes2 but are content1 nay1 think it safety1 to be devoured by lions4 ,sect4 #id4 ,but whatever flatterers may talk to amuse people's understandings1 it hinders not men from feeling2 and when they perceive1 that any man1 in what station soever1 is out of the bounds of the civil society which they are of1 and that they have no appeal on earth against any harm1 they may receive from him1 they are apt to think themselves in the state of nature1 in respect of him whom they find to be so2 and to take care1 as soon as they can1 to have that safety and security in civil society1 for which it was first instituted1 and for which only they entered into it4 ,and therefore1 though perhaps at first1 7as shall be shewed more at large hereafter in the following part of this discourse7 some one good and excellent man having got a pre-eminency amongst the rest1 had this deference paid to his goodness and virtue1 as to a kind of natural authority1 that the chief rule1 with arbitration of their differences1 by a tacit consent devolved into his hands1 without any other caution1 but the assurance they had of his uprightness and wisdom2 yet when time1 giving authority1 and 7as some men would persuade us7 sacredness of customs1 which the negligent1 and unforeseeing innocence of the first ages began1 had brought in successors of another stamp1 the people finding their properties not secure under the government1 as then it was1 7whereas government has no other end but the preservation of99 property7 could never be safe nor at rest1 nor think themselves in civil society1 till the legislature was placed in collective bodies of men1 call them senate1 parliament1 or what you please4 ,by which means every single person became subject1 equally with other the meanest men1 to those laws1 which he himself1 as part of the legislative1 had established2 nor could any one1 by his own authority2 avoid the force of the law1 when once made2 nor by any pretence of superiority plead exemption1 thereby to license his own1 or the miscarriages of any of his dependents49999 ,no man in civil society can be exempted from the laws of it3 for if any man may do what he thinks fit1 and there be no appeal on earth1 for redress or security against any harm he shall do2 ,i ask1 whether he be not perfectly still in the state of nature1 and so can be no part or member of that civil society2 unless any one will say1 the state of nature and civil society are one and the same thing1 which ,i have never yet found any one so great a patron of anarchy as to affirm4 799,at the first1 when some certain kind of regiment was once appointed1 it may be that nothing was then farther thought upon for the manner of goveming1 but all permitted unto their wisdom and discretion1 which were to rule1 till by experience they found this for all parts very inconvenient1 so as the thing which they had devised for a remedy1 did indeed but increase the sore1 which it should have cured4 ,they saw1 that to live by one man's will1 became the cause of all men's misery4 ,this constrained them to come unto laws1 wherein all men might see their duty beforehand1 and know the penalties of transgressing them4 ,hooker's ,eccl4 ,pol4 l4 i4 sect4 #aj47 79999,civil law being the act of the whole body politic1 doth therefore over-rule each several part of the same body4 ,hooker1 ibid47 ,,chapter4 ,,viii4 ,,of ,,the ,,beginning ,,of ,,political ,,societies4 ,sect4 #ie4 ,,men being1 as has been said1 by nature1 all free1 equal1 and independent1 no one can be put out of this estate1 and subjected to the political power of another1 without his own consent4 ,the only way whereby any one divests himself of his natural liberty1 and puts on the bonds of civil society1 is by agreeing with other men to join and unite into a community for their comfortable1 safe1 and peaceable living one amongst another1 in a secure enjoyment of their properties1 and a greater security against any1 that are not of it4 ,this any number of men may do1 because it injures not the freedom of the rest2 they are left as they were in the liberty of the state of nature4 ,when any number of men have so consented to make one community or government1 they are thereby presently incorporated1 and make one body politic1 wherein the majority have a right to act and conclude the rest4 ,sect4 #if4 ,for when any number of men have1 by the consent of every individual1 made a community1 they have thereby made that community one body1 with a power to act as one body1 which is only by the will and determination of the majority3 for that which acts any community1 being only the consent of the individuals of it1 and it being necessary to that which is one body to move one way2 it is necessary the body should move that way whither the greater force carries it1 which is the consent of the majority3 or else it is impossible it should act or continue one body1 one community1 which the consent of every individual that united into it1 agreed that it should2 and so every one is bound by that consent to be concluded by the majority4 ,and therefore we see1 that in assemblies1 impowered to act by positive laws1 where no number is set by that positive law which impowers them1 the act of the majority passes for the act of the whole1 and of course determines1 as having1 by the law of nature and reason1 the power of the whole4 ,sect4 #ig4 ,and thus every man1 by consenting with others to make one body politic under one government1 puts himself under an obligation1 to every one of that society1 to submit to the determination of the majority1 and to be concluded by it2 or else this original compact1 whereby he with others incorporates into one society1 would signify nothing1 and be no compact1 if he be left free1 and under no other ties than he was in before in the state of nature4 ,for what appearance would there be of any compact8 what new engagement if he were no farther tied by any decrees of the society1 than he himself thought fit1 and did actually consent to8 ,this would be still as great a liberty1 as he himself had before his compact1 or any one else in the state of nature hath1 who may submit himself1 and consent to any acts of it if he thinks fit4 ,sect4 #ih4 ,for if the consent of the majority shall not1 in reason1 be received as the act of the whole1 and conclude every individual2 nothing but the consent of every individual can make any thing to be the act of the whole3 but such a consent is next to impossible ever to be had1 if we consider the infirmities of health1 and avocations of business1 which in a number1 though much less than that of a commonwealth1 will necessarily keep many away from the public assembly4 ,to which if we add the variety of opinions1 and contrariety of interests1 which unavoidably happen in all collections of men1 the coming into society upon such terms would be only like ,cato's coming into the theatre1 only to go out again4 ,such a constitution as this would make the mighty ,leviathan of a shorter duration1 than the feeblest creatures1 and not let it outlast the day it was born in3 which cannot be supposed1 till we can think1 that rational creatures should desire and constitute societies only to be dissolved3 for where the majority cannot conclude the rest1 there they cannot act as one body1 and consequently will be immediately dissolved again4 ,sect4 #ii4 ,whosoever therefore out of a state of nature unite into a community1 must be understood to give up all the power1 necessary to the ends for which they unite into society1 to the majority of the community1 unless they expresly agreed in any number greater than the majority4 ,and this is done by barely agreeing to unite into one political society1 which is all the compact that is1 or needs be1 between the individuals1 that enter into1 or make up a commonwealth4 ,and thus that1 which begins and actually constitutes any political society1 is nothing but the consent of any number of freemen capable of a majority to unite and incorporate into such a society4 ,and this is that1 and that only1 which did1 or could give beginning to any lawful government in the world4 ,sect4 #ajj4 ,to this ,i find two objections made4 ,first1 ,that there are no instances to be found in story1 of a company of men independent1 and equal one amongst another1 that met together1 and in this way began and set up a government4 ,secondly1 ,it is impossible of right1 that men should do so1 because all men being born under government1 they are to submit to that1 and are not at liberty to begin a new one4 ,sect4 #aja4 ,to the first there is this to answer1 ,that it is not at all to be wondered1 that history gives us but a very little account of men1 that lived together in the state of nature4 ,the inconveniences of that condition1 and the love and want of society1 no sooner brought any number of them together1 but they presently united and incorporated1 if they designed to continue together4 ,and if we may not suppose men ever to have been in the state of nature1 because we hear not much of them in such a state1 we may as well suppose the armies of ,salmanasser or ,xerxes were never children1 because we hear little of them1 till they were men1 and imbodied in armies4 ,government is every where antecedent to records1 and letters seldom come in amongst a people till a long continuation of civil society has1 by other more necessary arts1 provided for their safety1 ease1 and plenty3 and then they begin to look after the history of their founders1 and search into their original1 when they have outlived the memory of it3 for it is with commonwealths as with particular persons1 they are commonly ignorant of their own births and infancies3 and if they know any thing of their original1 they are beholden for it1 to the accidental records that others have kept of it4 ,and those that we have1 of the beginning of any polities in the world1 excepting that of the ,jews1 where ,god himself immediately interposed1 and which favours not at all paternal dominion1 are all either plain instances of such a beginning as ,i have mentioned1 or at least have manifest footsteps of it4 ,sect4 #ajb4 ,he must shew a strange inclination to deny evident matter of fact1 when it agrees not with his hypothesis1 who will not allow1 that the beginning of ,rome and ,venice were by the uniting together of several men free and independent one of another1 amongst whom there was no natural superiority or subjection4 ,and if ,josephus ,acosta's word may be taken1 he tells us1 that in many parts of ,america there was no government at all4 ,there are great and apparent conjectures1 says he1 that these men1 speaking of those of ,peru1 for a long time had neither kings nor commonwealths1 but lived in troops1 as they do this day in ,florida1 the ,cheriquanas1 those of ,brazil1 and many other nations1 which have no certain kings1 but as occasion is offered1 in peace or war1 they choose their captains as they please1 #a4 i4 c4 #be4 ,if it be said1 that every man there was born subject to his father1 or the head of his family2 that the subjection due from a child to a father took not away his freedom of uniting into what political society he thought fit1 has been already proved4 ,but be that as it will1 these men1 it is evident1 were actually free2 and whatever superiority some politicians now would place in any of them1 they themselves claimed it not1 but by consent were all equal1 till by the same consent they set rulers over themselves4 ,so that their politic societies all began from a voluntary union1 and the mutual agreement of men freely acting in the choice of their governors1 and forms of government4 ,sect4 #ajc4 ,and ,i hope those who went away from ,sparta with ,palantus1 mentioned by ,justin1 #a4 iii4 c4 #d4 will be allowed to have been freemen independent one of another1 and to have set up a government over themselves1 by their own consent4 ,thus ,i have given several examples1 out of history1 of people free and in the state of nature1 that being met together incorporated and began a commonwealth4 ,and if the want of such instances be an argument to prove that government were not1 nor could not be so begun1 ,i suppose the contenders for paternal empire were better let it alone1 than urge it against natural liberty3 for if they can give so many instances1 out of history1 of governments begun upon paternal right1 ,i think 7though at best an argument from what has been1 to what should of right be1 has no great force7 one might1 without any great danger1 yield them the cause4 ,but if ,i might advise them in the case1 they would do well not to search too much into the original of governments1 as they have begun de facto1 lest they should find1 at the foundation of most of them1 something very little favourable to the design they promote1 and such a power as they contend for4 ,sect4 #ajd4 ,but to conclude1 reason being plain on our side1 that men are naturally free1 and the examples of history shewing1 that the governments of the world1 that were begun in peace1 had their beginning laid on that foundation1 and were made by the consent of the people2 there can be little room for doubt1 either where the right is1 or what has been the opinion1 or practice of mankind1 about the first erecting of governments4 ,sect4 #aje4 ,i will not deny1 that if we look back as far as history will direct us1 towards the original of commonwealths1 we shall generally find them under the government and administration of one man4 ,and ,i am also apt to believe1 that where a family was numerous enough to subsist by itself1 and continued entire together1 without mixing with others1 as it often happens1 where there is much land1 and few people1 the government commonly began in the father3 for the father having1 by the law of nature1 the same power with every man else to punish1 as he thought fit1 any offences against that law1 might thereby punish his transgressing children1 even when they were men1 and out of their pupilage2 and they were very likely to submit to his punishment1 and all join with him against the offender1 in their turns1 giving him thereby power to execute his sentence against any transgression1 and so in effect make him the law-maker1 and governor over all that remained in conjunction with his family4 ,he was fittest to be trusted2 paternal affection secured their property and interest under his care2 and the custom of obeying him1 in their childhood1 made it easier to submit to him1 rather than to any other4 ,if therefore they must have one to rule them1 as government is hardly to be avoided amongst men that live together2 who so likely to be the man as he that was their common father2 unless negligence1 cruelty1 or any other defect of mind or body made him unfit for it8 ,but when either the father died1 and left his next heir1 for want of age1 wisdom1 courage1 or any other qualities1 less fit for rule2 or where several families met1 and consented to continue together2 there1 it is not to be doubted1 but they used their natural freedom1 to set up him1 whom they judged the ablest1 and most likely1 to rule well over them4 ,conformable hereunto we find the people of ,america1 who 7living out of the reach of the conquering swords1 and spreading domination of the two great empires of ,peru and ,mexico7 enjoyed their own natural freedom1 though1 caeteris paribus1 they commonly prefer the heir of their deceased king2 yet if they find him any way weak1 or uncapable1 they pass him by1 and set up the stoutest and bravest man for their ruler4 ,sect4 #ajf4 ,thus1 though looking back as far as records give us any account of peopling the world1 and the history of nations1 we commonly find the government to be in one hand2 yet it destroys not that which ,i affirm1 viz4 that the beginning of politic society depends upon the consent of the individuals1 to join into1 and make one society2 who1 when they are thus incorporated1 might set up what form of government they thought fit4 ,but this having given occasion to men to mistake1 and think1 that by nature government was monarchical1 and belonged to the father1 it may not be amiss here to consider1 why people in the beginning generally pitched upon this form1 which though perhaps the father's pre-eminency might1 in the first institution of some commonwealths1 give a rise to1 and place in the beginning1 the power in one hand2 yet it is plain that the reason1 that continued the form of government in a single person1 was not any regard1 or respect to paternal authority2 since all petty monarchies1 that is1 almost all monarchies1 near their original1 have been commonly1 at least upon occasion1 elective4 ,sect4 #ajg4 ,first then1 in the beginning of things1 the father's government of the childhood of those sprung from him1 having accustomed them to the rule of one man1 and taught them that where it was exercised with care and skill1 with affection and love to those under it1 it was sufficient to procure and preserve to men all the political happiness they sought for in society4 ,it was no wonder that they should pitch upon1 and naturally run into that form of government1 which from their infancy they had been all accustomed to2 and which1 by experience1 they had found both easy and safe4 ,to which1 if we add1 that monarchy being simple1 and most obvious to men1 whom neither experience had instructed in forms of government1 nor the ambition or insolence of empire had taught to beware of the encroachments of prerogative1 or the inconveniences of absolute power1 which monarchy in succession was apt to lay claim to1 and bring upon them1 it was not at all strange1 that they should not much trouble themselves to think of methods of restraining any exorbitances of those to whom they had given the authority over them1 and of balancing the power of government1 by placing several parts of it in different hands4 ,they had neither felt the oppression of tyrannical dominion1 nor did the fashion of the age1 nor their possessions1 or way of living1 7which afforded little matter for covetousness or ambition7 give them any reason to apprehend or provide against it2 and therefore it is no wonder they put themselves into such a frame of government1 as was not only1 as ,i said1 most obvious and simple1 but also best suited to their present state and condition2 which stood more in need of defence against foreign invasions and injuries1 than of multiplicity of laws4 ,the equality of a simple poor way of living1 confining their desires within the narrow bounds of each man's small property1 made few controversies1 and so no need of many laws to decide them1 or variety of officers to superintend the process1 or look after the execution of justice1 where there were but few trespasses1 and few offenders4 ,since then those1 who like one another so well as to join into society1 cannot but be supposed to have some acquaintance and friendship together1 and some trust one in another2 they could not but have greater apprehensions of others1 than of one another3 and therefore their first care and thought cannot but be supposed to be1 how to secure themselves against foreign force4 ,it was natural for them to put themselves under a frame of government which might best serve to that end1 and chuse the wisest and bravest man to conduct them in their wars1 and lead them out against their enemies1 and in this chiefly be their ruler4 ,sect4 #ajh4 ,thus we see1 that the kings of the ,indians in ,america1 which is still a pattern of the first ages in ,asia and ,europe1 whilst the inhabitants were too few for the country1 and want of people and money gave men no temptation to enlarge their possessions of land1 or contest for wider extent of ground1 are little more than generals of their armies2 and though they command absolutely in war1 yet at home and in time of peace they exercise very little dominion1 and have but a very moderate sovereignty1 the resolutions of peace and war being ordinarily either in the people1 or in a council4 ,tho' the war itself1 which admits not of plurality of governors1 naturally devolves the command into the king's sole authority4 ,sect4 #aji4 ,and thus in ,israel itself1 the chief business of their judges1 and first kings1 seems to have been to be captains in war1 and leaders of their armies2 which 7besides what is signified by going out and in before the people1 which was1 to march forth to war1 and home again in the heads of their forces7 appears plainly in the story of ,jephtha4 ,the ,ammonites making war upon ,israel1 the ,gileadites in fear send to ,jephtha1 a bastard of their family whom they had cast off1 and article with him1 if he will assist them against the ,ammonites1 to make him their ruler2 which they do in these words1 ,and the people made him head and captain over them1 ,judg4 xi1 #aa4 which was1 as it seems1 all one as to be judge4 ,and he judged ,israel1 judg4 xii4 #g4 that is1 was their captain-general six years4 ,so when ,jotham upbraids the ,shechemites with the obligation they had to ,gideon1 who had been their judge and ruler1 he tells them1 ,he fought for you1 and adventured his life far1 and delivered you out of the hands of ,midian1 ,judg4 ix4 #ag4 ,nothing mentioned of him but what he did as a general3 and indeed that is all is found in his history1 or in any of the rest of the judges4 ,and ,abimelech particularly is called king1 though at most he was but their general4 ,and when1 being weary of the ill conduct of ,samuel's sons1 the children of ,israel desired a king1 like all the nations to judge them1 and to go out before them1 and to fight their battles1 ,i4 ,sam viii4 #bj4 ,god granting their desire1 says to ,samuel1 ,i will send thee a man1 and thou shalt anoint him to be captain over my people ,israel1 that he may save my people out of the hands of the ,philistines1 ix4 #af4 ,as if the only business of a king had been to lead out their armies1 and fight in their defence2 and accordingly at his inauguration pouring a vial of oil upon him1 declares to ,saul1 that the ,lord had anointed him to be captain over his inheritance1 x4 #a4 ,and therefore those1 who after ,saul's being solemnly chosen and saluted king by the tribes at ,mispah1 were unwilling to have him their king1 made no other objection but this1 ,how shall this man save us8 v4 #bg4 as if they should have said1 this man is unfit to be our king1 not having skill and conduct enough in war1 to be able to defend us4 ,and when ,god resolved to transfer the government to ,david1 it is in these words1 ,but now thy kingdom shall not continue3 the ,lord hath sought him a man after his own heart1 and the ,lord hath commanded him to be captain over his people1 xiii4 #ad4 ,as if the whole kingly authority were nothing else but to be their general3 and therefore the tribes who had stuck to ,saul's family1 and opposed ,david's reign1 when they came to ,hebron with terms of submission to him1 they tell him1 amongst other arguments they had to submit to him as to their king1 that he was in effect their king in ,saul's time1 and therefore they had no reason but to receive him as their king now4 ,also 7say they7 in time past1 when ,saul was king over us1 thou wast he that reddest out and broughtest in ,israel1 and the ,lord said unto thee1 ,thou shalt feed my people ,israel1 and thou shalt be a captain over ,israel4 ,sect4 #aaj4 ,thus1 whether a family by degrees grew up into a commonwealth1 and the fatherly authority being continued on to the elder son1 every one in his turn growing up under it1 tacitly submitted to it1 and the easiness and equality of it not offending any one1 every one acquiesced1 till time seemed to have confirmed it1 and settled a right of succession by prescription3 or whether several families1 or the descendants of several families1 whom chance1 neighbourhood1 or business brought together1 uniting into society1 the need of a general1 whose conduct might defend them against their enemies in war1 and the great confidence the innocence and sincerity of that poor but virtuous age1 7such as are almost all those which begin governments1 that ever come to last in the world7 gave men one of another1 made the first beginners of commonwealths generally put the rule into one man's hand1 without any other express limitation or restraint1 but what the nature of the thing1 and the end of government required3 which ever of those it was that at first put the rule into the hands of a single person1 certain it is no body was intrusted with it but for the public good and safety1 and to those ends1 in the infancies of commonwealths1 those who had it commonly used it4 ,and unless they had done so1 young societies could not have subsisted2 without such nursing fathers tender and careful of the public weal1 all governments would have sunk under the weakness and infirmities of their infancy1 and the prince and the people had soon perished together4 ,sect4 #aaa4 ,but though the golden age 7before vain ambition1 and amor sceleratus habendi1 evil concupiscence1 had corrupted men's minds into a mistake of true power and honour7 had more virtue1 and consequently better governors1 as well as less vicious subjects1 and there was then no stretching prerogative on the one side1 to oppress the people2 nor consequently on the other1 any dispute about privilege1 to lessen or restrain the power of the magistrate1 and so no contest betwixt rulers and people about governors or government3 yet1 when ambition and luxury in future ages99 would retain and increase the power1 without doing the business for which it was given2 and aided by flattery1 taught princes to have distinct and separate interests from their people1 men found it necessary to examine more carefully the original and rights of government2 and to find out ways to restrain the exorbitances1 and prevent the abuses of that power1 which they having intrusted in another's hands only for their own good1 they found was made use of to hurt them4 799,at first1 when some certain kind of regiment was once approved1 it may be nothing was then farther thought upon for the manner of governing1 but all permitted unto their wisdom and discretion which were to rule1 till by experience they found this for all parts very inconvenient1 so as the thing which they had devised for a remedy1 did indeed but increase the sore which it should have cured4 ,they saw1 that to live by one man's will1 became the cause of all men's misery4 ,this constrained them to come unto laws wherein all men might see their duty before hand1 and know the penalties of transgressing them4 ,hooker's ,eccl4 ,pol4 l4 i4 sect4 #aj47 ,sect4 #aab4 ,thus we may see how probable it is1 that people that were naturally free1 and by their own consent either submitted to the government of their father1 or united together out of different families to make a government1 should generally put the rule into one man's hands1 and chuse to be under the conduct of a single person1 without so much as by express conditions limiting or regulating his power1 which they thought safe enough in his honesty and prudence2 though they never dreamed of monarchy being lure ,divino1 which we never heard of among mankind1 till it was revealed to us by the divinity of this last age2 nor ever allowed paternal power to have a right to dominion1 or to be the foundation of all government4 ,and thus much may suffice to shew1 that as far as we have any light from history1 we have reason to conclude1 that all peaceful beginnings of government have been laid in the consent of the people4 ,i say peaceful1 because ,i shall have occasion in another place to speak of conquest1 which some esteem a way of beginning of governments4 ,the other objection ,i find urged against the beginning of polities1 in the way ,i have mentioned1 is this1 viz4 ,sect4 #aac4 ,that all men being born under government1 some or other1 it is impossible any of them should ever be free1 and at liberty to unite together1 and begin a new one1 or ever be able to erect a lawful government4 ,if this argument be good2 ,i ask1 how came so many lawful monarchies into the world8 for if any body1 upon this supposition1 can shew me any one man in any age of the world free to begin a lawful monarchy1 ,i will be bound to shew him ten other free men at liberty1 at the same time to unite and begin a new government under a regal1 or any other form2 it being demonstration1 that if any one1 born under the dominion of another1 may be so free as to have a right to command others in a new and distinct empire1 every one that is born under the dominion of another may be so free too1 and may become a ruler1 or subject1 of a distinct separate government4 ,and so by this their own principle1 either all men1 however born1 are free1 or else there is but one lawful prince1 one lawful government in the world4 ,and then they have nothing to do1 but barely to shew us which that is2 which when they have done1 ,i doubt not but all mankind will easily agree to pay obedience to him4 ,sect4 #aad4 ,though it be a sufficient answer to their objection1 to shew that it involves them in the same difficulties that it doth those they use it against2 yet ,i shall endeavour to discover the weakness of this argument a little farther4 ,all men1 say they1 are born under government1 and therefore they cannot be at liberty to begin a new one4 ,every one is born a subject to his father1 or his prince1 and is therefore under the perpetual tie of subjection and allegiance4 ,it is plain mankind never owned nor considered any such natural subjection that they were born in1 to one or to the other that tied them1 without their own consents1 to a subjection to them and their heirs4 ,sect4 #aae4 ,for there are no examples so frequent in history1 both sacred and profane1 as those of men withdrawing themselves1 and their obedience1 from the jurisdiction they were born under1 and the family or community they were bred up in1 and setting up new governments in other places2 from whence sprang all that number of petty commonwealths in the beginning of ages1 and which always multiplied1 as long as there was room enough1 till the stronger1 or more fortunate1 swallowed the weaker2 and those great ones again breaking to pieces1 dissolved into lesser dominions4 ,all which are so many testimonies against paternal sovereignty1 and plainly prove1 that it was not the natural right of the father descending to his heirs1 that made governments in the beginning1 since it was impossible1 upon that ground1 there should have been so many little kingdoms2 all must have been but only one universal monarchy1 if men had not been at liberty to separate themselves from their families1 and the government1 be it what it will1 that was set up in it1 and go and make distinct commonwealths and other governments1 as they thought fit4 ,sect4 #aaf4 ,this has been the practice of the world from its first beginning to this day2 nor is it now any more hindrance to the freedom of mankind1 that they are born under constituted and ancient polities1 that have established laws1 and set forms of government1 than if they were born in the woods1 amongst the unconfined inhabitants1 that run loose in them3 for those1 who would persuade us1 that by being born under any government1 we are naturally subjects to it1 and have no more any title or pretence to the freedom of the state of nature1 have no other reason 7bating that of paternal power1 which we have already answered7 to produce for it1 but only1 because our fathers or progenitors passed away their natural liberty1 and thereby bound up themselves and their posterity to a perpetual subjection to the government1 which they themselves submitted to4 ,it is true1 that whatever engagements or promises any one has made for himself1 he is under the obligation of them1 but cannot1 by any compact whatsoever1 bind his children or posterity3 for his son1 when a man1 being altogether as free as the father1 any act of the father can no more give away the liberty of the son1 than it can of any body else3 he may indeed annex such conditions to the land1 he enjoyed as a subject of any commonwealth1 as may oblige his son to be of that community1 if he will enjoy those possessions which were his father's2 because that estate being his father's property1 he may dispose1 or settle it1 as he pleases4 ,sect4 #aag4 ,and this has generally given the occasion to mistake in this matter2 because commonwealths not permitting any part of their dominions to be dismembered1 nor to be enjoyed by any but those of their community1 the son cannot ordinarily enjoy the possessions of his father1 but under the same terms his father did1 by becoming a member of the society2 whereby he puts himself presently under the government he finds there established1 as much as any other subject of that commonwealth4 ,and thus the consent of freemen1 born under government1 which only makes them members of it1 being given separately in their turns1 as each comes to be of age1 and not in a multitude together2 people take no notice of it1 and thinking it not done at all1 or not necessary1 conclude they are naturally subjects as they are men4 ,sect4 #aah4 ,but1 it is plain1 governments themselves understand it otherwise2 they claim no power over the son1 because of that they had over the father2 nor look on children as being their subjects1 by their fathers being so4 ,if a subject of ,england have a child1 by an ,english woman in ,france1 whose subject is he8 ,not the king of ,england's2 for he must have leave to be admitted to the privileges of it3 nor the king of ,france's2 for how then has his father a liberty to bring him away1 and breed him as he pleases8 and who ever was judged as a traytor or deserter1 if he left1 or warred against a country1 for being barely born in it of parents that were aliens there8 ,it is plain then1 by the practice of governments themselves1 as well as by the law of right reason1 that a child is born a subject of no country or government4 ,he is under his father's tuition and authority1 till he comes to age of discretion2 and then he is a freeman1 at liberty what government he will put himself under1 what body politic he will unite himself to3 for if an ,englishman's son1 born in ,france1 be at liberty1 and may do so1 it is evident there is no tie upon him by his father's being a subject of this kingdom2 nor is he bound up by any compact of his ancestors4 ,and why then hath not his son1 by the same reason1 the same liberty1 though he be born any where else8 ,since the power that a father hath naturally over his children1 is the same1 where-ever they be born1 and the ties of natural obligations1 are not bounded by the positive limits of kingdoms and commonwealths4 ,sect4 #aai4 ,every man being1 as has been shewed1 naturally free1 and nothing being able to put him into subjection to any earthly power1 but only his own consent2 it is to be considered1 what shall be understood to be a sufficient declaration of a man's consent1 to make him subject to the laws of any government4 ,there is a common distinction of an express and a tacit consent1 which will concern our present case4 ,no body doubts but an express consent1 of any man entering into any society1 makes him a perfect member of that society1 a subject of that government4 ,the difficulty is1 what ought to be looked upon as a tacit consent1 and how far it binds1 i4e4 how far any one shall be looked on to have consented1 and thereby submitted to any government1 where he has made no expressions of it at all4 ,and to this ,i say1 that every man1 that hath any possessions1 or enjoyment1 of any part of the dominions of any government1 doth thereby give his tacit consent1 and is as far forth obliged to obedience to the laws of that government1 during such enjoyment1 as any one under it2 whether this his possession be of land1 to him and his heirs for ever1 or a lodging only for a week2 or whether it be barely travelling freely on the highway2 and in effect1 it reaches as far as the very being of any one within the territories of that government4 ,sect4 #abj4 ,to understand this the better1 it is fit to consider1 that every man1 when he at first incorporates himself into any commonwealth1 he1 by his uniting himself thereunto1 annexed also1 and submits to the community1 those possessions1 which he has1 or shall acquire1 that do not already belong to any other government3 for it would be a direct contradiction1 for any one to enter into society with others for the securing and regulating of property2 and yet to suppose his land1 whose property is to be regulated by the laws of the society1 should be exempt from the jurisdiction of that government1 to which he himself1 the proprietor of the land1 is a subject4 ,by the same act therefore1 whereby any one unites his person1 which was before free1 to any commonwealth1 by the same he unites his possessions1 which were before free1 to it also2 and they become1 both of them1 person and possession1 subject to the government and dominion of that commonwealth1 as long as it hath a being4 ,whoever therefore1 from thenceforth1 by inheritance1 purchase1 permission1 or otherways1 enjoys any part of the land1 so annexed to1 and under the government of that commonwealth1 must take it with the condition it is under2 that is1 of submitting to the government of the commonwealth1 under whose jurisdiction it is1 as far forth as any subject of it4 ,sect4 #aba4 ,but since the government has a direct jurisdiction only over the land1 and reaches the possessor of it1 7before he has actually incorporated himself in the society7 only as he dwells upon1 and enjoys that2 the obligation any one is under1 by virtue of such enjoyment1 to submit to the government1 begins and ends with the enjoyment2 so that whenever the owner1 who has given nothing but such a tacit consent to the government1 will1 by donation1 sale1 or otherwise1 quit the said possession1 he is at liberty to go and incorporate himself into any other commonwealth2 or to agree with others to begin a new one1 in vacuis locis1 in any part of the world1 they can find free and unpossessed3 whereas he1 that has once1 by actual agreement1 and any express declaration1 given his consent to be of any commonwealth1 is perpetually and indispensably obliged to be1 and remain unalterably a subject to it1 and can never be again in the liberty of the state of nature2 unless1 by any calamity1 the government he was under comes to be dissolved2 or else by some public act cuts him off from being any longer a member of it4 ,sect4 #abb4 ,but submitting to the laws of any country1 living quietly1 and enjoying privileges and protection under them1 makes not a man a member of that society3 this is only a local protection and homage due to and from all those1 who1 not being in a state of war1 come within the territories belonging to any government1 to all parts whereof the force of its laws extends4 ,but this no more makes a man a member of that society1 a perpetual subject of that commonwealth1 than it would make a man a subject to another1 in whose family he found it convenient to abide for some time2 though1 whilst he continued in it1 he were obliged to comply with the laws1 and submit to the government he found there4 ,and thus we see1 that foreigners1 by living all their lives under another government1 and enjoying the privileges and protection of it1 though they are bound1 even in conscience1 to submit to its administration1 as far forth as any denison2 yet do not thereby come to be subjects or members of that commonwealth4 ,nothing can make any man so1 but his actually entering into it by positive engagement1 and express promise and compact4 ,this is that1 which ,i think1 concerning the beginning of political societies1 and that consent which makes any one a member of any commonwealth4 ,,chapter4 ,,ix4 ,,of ,,the ,,ends ,,of ,,political ,,society ,,and ,,government4 ,sect4 #abc4 ,,if man in the state of nature be so free1 as has been said2 if he be absolute lord of his own person and possessions1 equal to the greatest1 and subject to no body1 why will he part with his freedom8 why will he give up this empire1 and subject himself to the dominion and controul of any other power8 ,to which it is obvious to answer1 that though in the state of nature he hath such a right1 yet the enjoyment of it is very uncertain1 and constantly exposed to the invasion of others3 for all being kings as much as he1 every man his equal1 and the greater part no strict observers of equity and justice1 the enjoyment of the property he has in this state is very unsafe1 very unsecure4 ,this makes him willing to quit a condition1 which1 however free1 is full of fears and continual dangers3 and it is not without reason1 that he seeks out1 and is willing to join in society with others1 who are already united1 or have a mind to unite1 for the mutual preservation of their lives1 liberties and estates1 which ,i call by the general name1 property4 ,sect4 #abd4 ,the great and chief end1 therefore1 of men's uniting into commonwealths1 and putting themselves under government1 is the preservation of their property4 ,to which in the state of nature there are many things wanting4 ,first1 ,there wants an established1 settled1 known law1 received and allowed by common consent to be the standard of right and wrong1 and the common measure to decide all controversies between them3 for though the law of nature be plain and intelligible to all rational creatures2 yet men being biassed by their interest1 as well as ignorant for want of study of it1 are not apt to allow of it as a law binding to them in the application of it to their particular cases4 ,sect4 #abe4 ,secondly1 ,in the state of nature there wants a known and indifferent judge1 with authority to determine all differences according to the established law3 for every one in that state being both judge and executioner of the law of nature1 men being partial to themselves1 passion and revenge is very apt to carry them too far1 and with too much heat1 in their own cases2 as well as negligence1 and unconcernedness1 to make them too remiss in other men's4 ,sect4 #abf4 ,thirdly1 ,in the state of nature there often wants power to back and support the sentence when right1 and to give it due execution1 ,they who by any injustice offended1 will seldom fail1 where they are able1 by force to make good their injustice2 such resistance many times makes the punishment dangerous1 and frequently destructive1 to those who attempt it4 ,sect4 #abg4 ,thus mankind1 notwithstanding all the privileges of the state of nature1 being but in an ill condition1 while they remain in it1 are quickly driven into society4 ,hence it comes to pass1 that we seldom find any number of men live any time together in this state4 ,the inconveniencies that they are therein exposed to1 by the irregular and uncertain exercise of the power every man has of punishing the transgressions of others1 make them take sanctuary under the established laws of government1 and therein seek the preservation of their property4 ,it is this makes them so willingly give up every one his single power of punishing1 to be exercised by such alone1 as shall be appointed to it amongst them2 and by such rules as the community1 or those authorized by them to that purpose1 shall agree on4 ,and in this we have the original right and rise of both the legislative and executive power1 as well as of the governments and societies themselves4 ,sect4 #abh4 ,for in the state of nature1 to omit the liberty he has of innocent delights1 a man has two powers4 ,the first is to do whatsoever he thinks fit for the preservation of himself1 and others within the permission of the law of nature3 by which law1 common to them all1 he and all the rest of mankind are one community1 make up one society1 distinct from all other creatures4 ,and were it not for the corruption and vitiousness of degenerate men1 there would be no need of any other2 no necessity that men should separate from this great and natural community1 and by positive agreements combine into smaller and divided associations4 ,the other power a man has in the state of nature1 is the power to punish the crimes committed against that law4 ,both these he gives up1 when he joins in a private1 if ,i may so call it1 or particular politic society1 and incorporates into any commonwealth1 separate from the rest of mankind4 ,sect4 #abi4 ,the first power1 viz4 of doing whatsoever he thought for the preservation of himself1 and the rest of mankind1 he gives up to be regulated by laws made by the society1 so far forth as the preservation of himself1 and the rest of that society shall require2 which laws of the society in many things confine the liberty he had by the law of nature4 ,sect4 #acj4 ,secondly1 ,the power of punishing he wholly gives up1 and engages his natural force1 7which he might before employ in the execution of the law of nature1 by his own single authority1 as he thought fit7 to assist the executive power of the society1 as the law thereof shall require3 for being now in a new state1 wherein he is to enjoy many conveniencies1 from the labour1 assistance1 and society of others in the same community1 as well as protection from its whole strength2 he is to part also with as much of his natural liberty1 in providing for himself1 as the good1 prosperity1 and safety of the society shall require2 which is not only necessary1 but just1 since the other members of the society do the like4 ,sect4 #aca4 ,but though men1 when they enter into society1 give up the equality1 liberty1 and executive power they had in the state of nature1 into the hands of the society1 to be so far disposed of by the legislative1 as the good of the society shall require2 yet it being only with an intention in every one the better to preserve himself1 his liberty and property2 7for no rational creature can be supposed to change his condition with an intention to be worse7 the power of the society1 or legislative constituted by them1 can never be supposed to extend farther1 than the common good2 but is obliged to secure every one's property1 by providing against those three defects above mentioned1 that made the state of nature so unsafe and uneasy4 ,and so whoever has the legislative or supreme power of any commonwealth1 is bound to govern by established standing laws1 promulgated and known to the people1 and not by extemporary decrees2 by indifferent and upright judges1 who are to decide controversies by those laws2 and to employ the force of the community at home1 only in the execution of such laws1 or abroad to prevent or redress foreign injuries1 and secure the community from inroads and invasion4 ,and all this to be directed to no other end1 but the peace1 safety1 and public good of the people4 ,,chapter4 ,x4 ,,of ,,the ,,forms ,,of ,a ,,common-,,wealth4 ,sect4 #acb4 ,,the majority having1 as has been shewed1 upon men's first uniting into society1 the whole power of the community naturally in them1 may employ all that power in making laws for the community from time to time1 and executing those laws by officers of their own appointing2 and then the form of the government is a perfect democracy3 or else may put the power of making laws into the hands of a few select men1 and their heirs or successors2 and then it is an oligarchy3 or else into the hands of one man1 and then it is a monarchy3 if to him and his heirs1 it is an hereditary monarchy3 if to him only for life1 but upon his death the power only of nominating a successor to return to them2 an elective monarchy4 ,and so accordingly of these the community may make compounded and mixed forms of government1 as they think good4 ,and if the legislative power be at first given by the majority to one or more persons only for their lives1 or any limited time1 and then the supreme power to revert to them again2 when it is so reverted1 the community may dispose of it again anew into what hands they please1 and so constitute a new form of government3 for the form of government depending upon the placing the supreme power1 which is the legislative1 it being impossible to conceive that an inferior power should prescribe to a superior1 or any but the supreme make laws1 according as the power of making laws is placed1 such is the form of the commonwealth4 ,sect4 #acc4 ,by commonwealth1 ,i must be understood all along to mean1 not a democracy1 or any form of government1 but any independent community1 which the ,latines signified by the word civitas1 to which the word which best answers in our language1 is commonwealth1 and most properly expresses such a society of men1 which community or city in ,english does not2 for there may be subordinate communities in a government2 and city amongst us has a quite different notion from commonwealth3 and therefore1 to avoid ambiguity1 ,i crave leave to use the word commonwealth in that sense1 in which ,i find it used by king ,james the first2 and ,i take it to be its genuine signification2 which if any body dislike1 ,i consent with him to change it for a better4 ,,chapter4 ,,xi4 ,,of ,,the ,,extent ,,of ,,the ,,legislative ,,power4 ,sect4 #acd4 ,,the great end of men's entering into society1 being the enjoyment of their properties in peace and safety1 and the great instrument and means of that being the laws established in that society2 the first and fundamental positive law of all commonwealths is the establishing of the legislative power2 as the first and fundamental natural law1 which is to govern even the legislative itself1 is the preservation of the society1 and 7as far as will consist with the public good7 of every person in it4 ,this legislative is not only the supreme power of the commonwealth1 but sacred and unalterable in the hands where the community have once placed it2 nor can any edict of any body else1 in what form soever conceived1 or by what power soever backed1 have the force and obligation of a law1 which has not its sanction from that legislative which the public has chosen and appointed3 for without this the law could not have that1 which is absolutely necessary to its being a law199 the consent of the society1 over whom no body can have a power to make laws1 but by their own consent1 and by authority received from them2 and therefore all the obedience1 which by the most solemn ties any one can be obliged to pay1 ultimately terminates in this supreme power1 and is directed by those laws which it enacts3 nor can any oaths to any foreign power whatsoever1 or any domestic subordinate power1 discharge any member of the society from his obedience to the legislative1 acting pursuant to their trust2 nor oblige him to any obedience contrary to the laws so enacted1 or farther than they do allow2 it being ridiculous to imagine one can be tied ultimately to obey any power in the society1 which is not the supreme4 799,the lawful power of making laws to command whole politic societies of men1 belonging so properly unto the same intire societies1 that for any prince or potentate of what kind soever upon earth1 to exercise the same of himself1 and not by express commission immediately and personally received from ,god1 or else by authority derived at the first from their consent1 upon whose persons they impose laws1 it is no better than mere tyranny4 ,laws they are not therefore which public approbation hath not made so4 ,hooker's ,eccl4 ,pol4 l4 i4 sect4 #aj4 ,of this point therefore we are to note1 that such men naturally have no full and perfect power to command whole politic multitudes of men1 therefore utterly without our consent1 we could in such sort be at no man's commandment living4 ,and to be commanded we do consent1 when that society1 whereof we be a part1 hath at any time before consented1 without revoking the same after by the like universal agreement4 ,laws therefore human1 of what kind so ever1 are available by consent4 ,ibid47 ,sect4 #ace4 ,though the legislative1 whether placed in one or more1 whether it be always in being1 or only by intervals1 though it be the supreme power in every commonwealth2 yet3 ,first1 ,it is not1 nor can possibly be absolutely arbitrary over the lives and fortunes of the people3 for it being but the joint power of every member of the society given up to that person1 or assembly1 which is legislator2 it can be no more than those persons had in a state of nature before they entered into society1 and gave up to the community3 for no body can transfer to another more power than he has in himself2 and no body has an absolute arbitrary power over himself1 or over any other1 to destroy his own life1 or take away the life or property of another4 ,a man1 as has been proved1 cannot subject himself to the arbitrary power of another2 and having in the state of nature no arbitrary power over the life1 liberty1 or possession of another1 but only so much as the law of nature gave him for the preservation of himself1 and the rest of mankind2 this is all he doth1 or can give up to the commonwealth1 and by it to the legislative power1 so that the legislative can have no more than this4 ,their power1 in the utmost bounds of it1 is limited to the public good of the society4 ,it is a power1 that hath no other end but preservation1 and therefore can never have a right to destroy1 enslave1 or designedly to impoverish the subjects499 ,the obligations of the law of nature cease not in society1 but only in many cases are drawn closer1 and have by human laws known penalties annexed to them1 to inforce their observation4 ,thus the law of nature stands as an eternal rule to all men1 legislators as well as others4 ,the rules that they make for other men's actions1 must1 as well as their own and other men's actions1 be conformable to the law of nature1 i4e4 to the will of ,god1 of which that is a declaration1 and the fundamental law of nature being the preservation of mankind1 no human sanction can be good1 or valid against it4 799,two foundations there are which bear up public societies2 the one a natural inclination1 whereby all men desire sociable life and fellowship2 the other an order1 expresly or secretly agreed upon1 touching the manner of their union in living together3 the latter is that which we call the law of a common-weal1 the very soul of a politic body1 the parts whereof are by law animated1 held together1 and set on work in such actions as the common good requireth4 ,laws politic1 ordained for external order and regiment amongst men1 are never framed as they should be1 unless presuming the will of man to be inwardly obstinate1 rebellious1 and averse from all obedience to the sacred laws of his nature2 in a word1 unless presuming man to be1 in regard of his depraved mind1 little better than a wild beast1 they do accordingly provide1 notwithstanding1 so to frame his outward actions1 that they be no hindrance unto the common good1 for which societies are instituted4 ,unless they do this1 they are not perfect4 ,hooker's ,eccl4 ,pol4 l4 i4 sect4 #aj47 ,sect4 #acf4 ,secondly1 ,the legislative1 or supreme authority1 cannot assume to its self a power to rule by extemporary arbitrary decrees1 but is bound to dispense justice1 and decide the rights of the subject by promulgated standing laws1 and known authorized judges399 for the law of nature being unwritten1 and so no where to be found but in the minds of men1 they who through passion or interest shall miscite1 or misapply it1 cannot so easily be convinced of their mistake where there is no established judge3 and so it serves not1 as it ought1 to determine the rights1 and fence the properties of those that live under it1 especially where every one is judge1 interpreter1 and executioner of it too1 and that in his own case3 and he that has right on his side1 having ordinarily but his own single strength1 hath not force enough to defend himself from injuries1 or to punish delinquents4 ,to avoid these inconveniences1 which disorder men's propperties in the state of nature1 men unite into societies1 that they may have the united strength of the whole society to secure and defend their properties1 and may have standing rules to bound it1 by which every one may know what is his4 ,to this end it is that men give up all their natural power to the society which they enter into1 and the community put the legislative power into such hands as they think fit1 with this trust1 that they shall be governed by declared laws1 or else their peace1 quiet1 and property will still be at the same uncertainty1 as it was in the state of nature4 799,human laws are measures in respect of men whose actions they must direct1 howbeit such measures they are as have also their higher rules to be measured by1 which rules are two1 the law of ,god1 and the law of nature2 so that laws human must be made according to the general laws of nature1 and without contradiction to any positive law of scripture1 otherwise they are ill made4 ,hooker's ,eccl4 ,pol4 l4 iii4 sect4 #i4 ,to constrain men to any thing inconvenient doth seem unreasonable4 ,ibid4 l4 i4 sect4 #aj47 ,sect4 #acg4 ,absolute arbitrary power1 or governing without settled standing laws1 can neither of them consist with the ends of society and government1 which men would not quit the freedom of the state of nature for1 and tie themselves up under1 were it not to preserve their lives1 liberties and fortunes1 and by stated rules of right and property to secure their peace and quiet4 ,it cannot be supposed that they should intend1 had they a power so to do1 to give to any one1 or more1 an absolute arbitrary power over their persons and estates1 and put a force into the magistrate's hand to execute his unlimited will arbitrarily upon them4 ,this were to put themselves into a worse condition than the state of nature1 wherein they had a liberty to defend their right against the injuries of others1 and were upon equal terms of force to maintain it1 whether invaded by a single man1 or many in combination4 ,whereas by supposing they have given up themselves to the absolute arbitrary power and will of a legislator1 they have disarmed themselves1 and armed him1 to make a prey of them when he pleases2 he being in a much worse condition1 who is exposed to the arbitrary power of one man1 who has the command of #ajj1jjj1 than he that is exposed to the arbitrary power of #ajj1jjj single men2 no body being secure1 that his will1 who has such a command1 is better than that of other men1 though his force be #ajj1jjj times stronger4 ,and therefore1 whatever form the commonwealth is under1 the ruling power ought to govern by declared and received laws1 and not by extemporary dictates and undetermined resolutions3 for then mankind will be in a far worse condition than in the state of nature1 if they shall have armed one1 or a few men with the joint power of a multitude1 to force them to obey at pleasure the exorbitant and unlimited decrees of their sudden thoughts1 or unrestrained1 and till that moment unknown wills1 without having any measures set down which may guide and justify their actions3 for all the power the government has1 being only for the good of the society1 as it ought not to be arbitrary and at pleasure1 so it ought to be exercised by established and promulgated laws2 that both the people may know their duty1 and be safe and secure within the limits of the law2 and the rulers too kept within their bounds1 and not be tempted1 by the power they have in their hands1 to employ it to such purposes1 and by such measures1 as they would not have known1 and own not willingly4 ,sect4 #ach4 ,thirdly1 ,the supreme power cannot take from any man any part of his property without his own consent3 for the preservation of property being the end of government1 and that for which men enter into society1 it necessarily supposes and requires1 that the people should have property1 without which they must be supposed to lose that1 by entering into society1 which was the end for which they entered into it2 too gross an absurdity for any man to own4 ,men therefore in society having property1 they have such a right to the goods1 which by the law of the community are their's1 that no body hath a right to take their substance or any part of it from them1 without their own consent3 without this they have no property at all2 for ,i have truly no property in that1 which another can by right take from me1 when he pleases1 against my consent4 ,hence it is a mistake to think1 that the supreme or legislative power of any commonwealth1 can do what it will1 and dispose of the estates of the subject arbitrarily1 or take any part of them at pleasure4 ,this is not much to be feared in governments where the legislative consists1 wholly or in part1 in assemblies which are variable1 whose members1 upon the dissolution of the assembly1 are subjects under the common laws of their country1 equally with the rest4 ,but in governments1 where the legislative is in one lasting assembly always in being1 or in one man1 as in absolute monarchies1 there is danger still1 that they will think themselves to have a distinct interest from the rest of the community2 and so will be apt to increase their own riches and power1 by taking what they think fit from the people3 for a man's property is not at all secure1 tho' there be good and equitable laws to set the bounds of it between him and his fellow subjects1 if he who commands those subjects have power to take from any private man1 what part he pleases of his property1 and use and dispose of it as he thinks good4 ,sect4 #aci4 ,but government1 into whatsoever hands it is put1 being1 as ,i have before shewed1 intrusted with this condition1 and for this end1 that men might have and secure their properties2 the prince1 or senate1 however it may have power to make laws1 for the regulating of property between the subjects one amongst another1 yet can never have a power to take to themselves the whole1 or any part of the subjects property1 without their own consent3 for this would be in effect to leave them no property at all4 ,and to let us see1 that even absolute power1 where it is necessary1 is not arbitrary by being absolute1 but is still limited by that reason1 and confined to those ends1 which required it in some cases to be absolute1 we need look no farther than the common practice of martial discipline3 for the preservation of the army1 and in it of the whole commonwealth1 requires an absolute obedience to the command of every superior officer1 and it is justly death to disobey or dispute the most dangerous or unreasonable of them2 but yet we see1 that neither the serjeant1 that could command a soldier to march up to the mouth of a cannon1 or stand in a breach1 where he is almost sure to perish1 can command that soldier to give him one penny of his money2 nor the general1 that can condemn him to death for deserting his post1 or for not obeying the most desperate orders1 can yet1 with all his absolute power of life and death1 dispose of one farthing of that soldier's estate1 or seize one jot of his goods2 whom yet he can command any thing1 and hang for the least disobedience2 because such a blind obedience is necessary to that end1 for which the commander has his power1 viz4 the preservation of the rest2 but the disposing of his goods has nothing to do with it4 ,sect4 #adj4 ,it is true1 governments cannot be supported without great charge1 and it is fit every one who enjoys his share of the protection1 should pay out of his estate his proportion for the maintenance of it4 ,but still it must be with his own consent1 i4e4 the consent of the majority1 giving it either by themselves1 or their representatives chosen by them3 for if any one shall claim a power to lay and levy taxes on the people1 by his own authority1 and without such consent of the people1 he thereby invades the fundamental law of property1 and subverts the end of government3 for what property have ,i in that1 which another may by right take1 when he pleases1 to himself8 ,sect4 #ada4 ,fourthly1 ,the legislative cannot transfer the power of making laws to any other hands3 for it being but a delegated power from the people1 they who have it cannot pass it over to others4 ,the people alone can appoint the form of the commonwealth1 which is by constituting the legislative1 and appointing in whose hands that shall be4 ,and when the people have said1 ,we will submit to rules1 and be governed by laws made by such men1 and in such forms1 no body else can say other men shall make laws for them2 nor can the people be bound by any laws1 but such as are enacted by those whom they have chosen1 and authorized to make laws for them4 ,the power of the legislative1 being derived from the people by a positive voluntary grant and institution1 can be no other than what that positive grant conveyed1 which being only to make laws1 and not to make legislators1 the legislative can have no power to transfer their authority of making laws1 and place it in other hands4 ,sect4 #adb4 ,these are the bounds which the trust1 that is put in them by the society1 and the law of ,god and nature1 have set to the legislative power of every commonwealth1 in all forms of government4 ,first1 ,they are to govern by promulgated established laws1 not to be varied in particular cases1 but to have one rule for rich and poor1 for the favourite at court1 and the country man at plough4 ,secondly1 ,these laws also ought to be designed for no other end ultimately1 but the good of the people4 ,thirdly1 ,they must not raise taxes on the property of the people1 without the consent of the people1 given by themselves1 or their deputies4 ,and this properly concerns only such governments where the legislative is always in being1 or at least where the people have not reserved any part of the legislative to deputies1 to be from time to time chosen by themselves4 ,fourthly1 ,the legislative neither must nor can transfer the power of making laws to any body else1 or place it any where1 but where the people have4 ,,chapter4 ,,xii4 ,,of ,,the ,,legislative1 ,,executive1 ,,and ,,federative ,,power ,,of ,,the ,,common-,,wealth4 ,sect4 #adc4 ,,the legislative power is that1 which has a right to direct how the force of the commonwealth shall be employed for preserving the community and the members of it4 ,but because those laws which are constantly to be executed1 and whose force is always to continue1 may be made in a little time2 therefore there is no need1 that the legislative should be always in being1 not having always business to do4 ,and because it may be too great a temptation to human frailty1 apt to grasp at power1 for the same persons1 who have the power of making laws1 to have also in their hands the power to execute them1 whereby they may exempt themselves from obedience to the laws they make1 and suit the law1 both in its making1 and execution1 to their own private advantage1 and thereby come to have a distinct interest from the rest of the community1 contrary to the end of society and government3 therefore in wellordered commonwealths1 where the good of the whole is so considered1 as it ought1 the legislative power is put into the hands of divers persons1 who duly assembled1 have by themselves1 or jointly with others1 a power to make laws1 which when they have done1 being separated again1 they are themselves subject to the laws they have made2 which is a new and near tie upon them1 to take care1 that they make them for the public good4 ,sect4 #add4 ,but because the laws1 that are at once1 and in a short time made1 have a constant and lasting force1 and need a perpetual execution1 or an attendance thereunto2 therefore it is necessary there should be a power always in being1 which should see to the execution of the laws that are made1 and remain in force4 ,and thus the legislative and executive power come often to be separated4 ,sect4 #ade4 ,there is another power in every commonwealth1 which one may call natural1 because it is that which answers to the power every man naturally had before he entered into society3 for though in a commonwealth the members of it are distinct persons still in reference to one another1 and as such as governed by the laws of the society2 yet in reference to the rest of mankind1 they make one body1 which is1 as every member of it before was1 still in the state of nature with the rest of mankind4 ,hence it is1 that the controversies that happen between any man of the society with those that are out of it1 are managed by the public2 and an injury done to a member of their body1 engages the whole in the reparation of it4 ,so that under this consideration1 the whole community is one body in the state of nature1 in respect of all other states or persons out of its community4 ,sect4 #adf4 ,this therefore contains the power of war and peace1 leagues and alliances1 and all the transactions1 with all persons and communities without the commonwealth1 and may be called federative1 if any one pleases4 ,so the thing be understood1 ,i am indifferent as to the name4 ,sect4 #adg4 ,these two powers1 executive and federative1 though they be really distinct in themselves1 yet one comprehending the execution of the municipal laws of the society within its self1 upon all that are parts of it2 the other the management of the security and interest of the public without1 with all those that it may receive benefit or damage from1 yet they are always almost united4 ,and though this federative power in the well or ill management of it be of great moment to the commonwealth1 yet it is much less capable to be directed by antecedent1 standing1 positive laws1 than the executive2 and so must necessarily be left to the prudence and wisdom of those1 whose hands it is in1 to be managed for the public good3 for the laws that concern subjects one amongst another1 being to direct their actions1 may well enough precede them4 ,but what is to be done in reference to foreigners1 depending much upon their actions1 and the variation of designs and interests1 must be left in great part to the prudence of those1 who have this power committed to them1 to be managed by the best of their skill1 for the advantage of the commonwealth4 ,sect4 #adh4 ,though1 as ,i said1 the executive and federative power of every community be really distinct in themselves1 yet they are hardly to be separated1 and placed at the same time1 in the hands of distinct persons3 for both of them requiring the force of the society for their exercise1 it is almost impracticable to place the force of the commonwealth in distinct1 and not subordinate hands2 or that the executive and federative power should be placed in persons1 that might act separately1 whereby the force of the public would be under different commands3 which would be apt some time or other to cause disorder and ruin4 ,,chapter4 ,,xiii4 ,,of ,,the ,,subordination ,,of ,,the ,,powers ,,of ,,the ,,common-,,wealth4 ,sect4 #adi4 ,,though in a constituted commonwealth1 standing upon its own basis1 and acting according to its own nature1 that is1 acting for the preservation of the community1 there can be but one supreme power1 which is the legislative1 to which all the rest are and must be subordinate1 yet the legislative being only a fiduciary power to act for certain ends1 there remains still in the people a supreme power to remove or alter the legislative1 when they find the legislative act contrary to the trust reposed in them3 for all power given with trust for the attaining an end1 being limited by that end1 whenever that end is manifestly neglected1 or opposed1 the trust must necessarily be forfeited1 and the power devolve into the hands of those that gave it1 who may place it anew where they shall think best for their safety and security4 ,and thus the community perpetually retains a supreme power of saving themselves from the attempts and designs of any body1 even of their legislators1 whenever they shall be so foolish1 or so wicked1 as to lay and carry on designs against the liberties and properties of the subject3 for no man or society of men1 having a power to deliver up their preservation1 or consequently the means of it1 to the absolute will and arbitrary dominion of another2 when ever any one shall go about to bring them into such a slavish condition1 they will always have a right to preserve1 what they have not a power to part with2 and to rid themselves of those1 who invade this fundamental1 sacred1 and unalterable law of self-preservation1 for which they entered into society4 ,and thus the community may be said in this respect to be always the supreme power1 but not as considered under any form of government1 because this power of the people can never take place till the government be dissolved4 ,sect4 #aej4 ,in all cases1 whilst the government subsists1 the legislative is the supreme power3 for what can give laws to another1 must needs be superior to him2 and since the legislative is no otherwise legislative of the society1 but by the right it has to make laws for all the parts1 and for every member of the society1 prescribing rules to their actions1 and giving power of execution1 where they are transgressed1 the legislative must needs be the supreme1 and all other powers1 in any members or parts of the society1 derived from and subordinate to it4 ,sect4 #aea4 ,in some commonwealths1 where the legislative is not always in being1 and the executive is vested in a single person1 who has also a share in the legislative2 there that single person in a very tolerable sense may also be called supreme3 not that he has in himself all the supreme power1 which is that of law-making2 but because he has in him the supreme execution1 from whom all inferior magistrates derive all their several subordinate powers1 or at least the greatest part of them3 having also no legislative superior to him1 there being no law to be made without his consent1 which cannot be expected should ever subject him to the other part of the legislative1 he is properly enough in this sense supreme4 ,but yet it is to be observed1 that tho' oaths of allegiance and fealty are taken to him1 it is not to him as supreme legislator1 but as supreme executor of the law1 made by a joint power of him with others2 allegiance being nothing but an obedience according to law1 which when he violates1 he has no right to obedience1 nor can claim it otherwise than as the public person vested with the power of the law1 and so is to be considered as the image1 phantom1 or representative of the commonwealth1 acted by the will of the society1 declared in its laws2 and thus he has no will1 no power1 but that of the law4 ,but when he quits this representation1 this public will1 and acts by his own private will1 he degrades himself1 and is but a single private person without power1 and without will1 that has any right to obedience2 the members owing no obedience but to the public will of the society4 ,sect4 #aeb4 ,the executive power1 placed any where but in a person that has also a share in the legislative1 is visibly subordinate and accountable to it1 and may be at pleasure changed and displaced2 so that it is not the supreme executive power1 that is exempt from subordination1 but the supreme executive power vested in one1 who having a share in the legislative1 has no distinct superior legislative to be subordinate and accountable to1 farther than he himself shall join and consent2 so that he is no more subordinate than he himself shall think fit1 which one may certainly conclude will be but very little4 ,of other ministerial and subordinate powers in a commonwealth1 we need not speak1 they being so multiplied with infinite variety1 in the different customs and constitutions of distinct commonwealths1 that it is impossible to give a particular account of them all4 ,only thus much1 which is necessary to our present purpose1 we may take notice of concerning them1 that they have no manner of authority1 any of them1 beyond what is by positive grant and commission delegated to them1 and are all of them accountable to some other power in the commonwealth4 ,sect4 #aec4 ,it is not necessary1 no1 nor so much as convenient1 that the legislative should be always in being2 but absolutely necessary that the executive power should1 because there is not always need of new laws to be made1 but always need of execution of the laws that are made4 ,when the legislative hath put the execution of the laws1 they make1 into other hands1 they have a power still to resume it out of those hands1 when they find cause1 and to punish for any maladministration against the laws4 ,the same holds also in regard of the federative power1 that and the executive being both ministerial and subordinate to the legislative1 which1 as has been shewed1 in a constituted commonwealth is the supreme4 ,the legislative also in this case being supposed to consist of several persons1 7for if it be a single person1 it cannot but be always in being1 and so will1 as supreme1 naturally have the supreme executive power1 together with the legislative7 may assemble1 and exercise their legislature1 at the times that either their original constitution1 or their own adjournment1 appoints1 or when they please2 if neither of these hath appointed any time1 or there be no other way prescribed to convoke them3 for the supreme power being placed in them by the people1 it is always in them1 and they may exercise it when they please1 unless by their original constitution they are limited to certain seasons1 or by an act of their supreme power they have adjourned to a certain time2 and when that time comes1 they have a right to assemble and act again4 ,sect4 #aed4 ,if the legislative1 or any part of it1 be made up of representatives chosen for that time by the people1 which afterwards return into the ordinary state of subjects1 and have no share in the legislature but upon a new choice1 this power of chusing must also be exercised by the people1 either at certain appointed seasons1 or else when they are summoned to it2 and in this latter case the power of convoking the legislative is ordinarily placed in the executive1 and has one of these two limitations in respect of time3 that either the original constitution requires their assembling and acting at certain intervals1 and then the executive power does nothing but ministerially issue directions for their electing and assembling1 according to due forms2 or else it is left to his prudence to call them by new elections1 when the occasions or exigencies of the public require the amendment of old1 or making of new laws1 or the redress or prevention of any inconveniencies1 that lie on1 or threaten the people4 ,sect4 #aee4 ,it may be demanded here1 ,what if the executive power1 being possessed of the force of the commonwealth1 shall make use of that force to hinder the meeting and acting of the legislative1 when the original constitution1 or the public exigencies require it8 ,i say1 using force upon the people without authority1 and contrary to the trust put in him that does so1 is a state of war with the people1 who have a right to reinstate their legislative in the exercise of their power3 for having erected a legislative1 with an intent they should exercise the power of making laws1 either at certain set times1 or when there is need of it1 when they are hindered by any force from what is so necessary to the society1 and wherein the safety and preservation of the people consists1 the people have a right to remove it by force4 ,in all states and conditions1 the true remedy of force without authority1 is to oppose force to it4 ,the use of force without authority1 always puts him that uses it into a state of war1 as the aggressor1 and renders him liable to be treated accordingly4 ,sect4 #aef4 ,the power of assembling and dismissing the legislative1 placed in the executive1 gives not the executive a superiority over it1 but is a fiduciary trust placed in him1 for the safety of the people1 in a case where the uncertainty and variableness of human affairs could not bear a steady fixed rule3 for it not being possible1 that the first framers of the government should1 by any foresight1 be so much masters of future events1 as to be able to prefix so just periods of return and duration to the assemblies of the legislative1 in all times to come1 that might exactly answer all the exigencies of the commonwealth2 the best remedy could be found for this defect1 was to trust this to the prudence of one who was always to be present1 and whose business it was to watch over the public good4 ,constant frequent meetings of the legislative1 and long continuations of their assemblies1 without necessary occasion1 could not but be burdensome to the people1 and must necessarily in time produce more dangerous inconveniencies1 and yet the quick turn of affairs might be sometimes such as to need their present help3 any delay of their convening might endanger the public2 and sometimes too their business might be so great1 that the limited time of their sitting might be too short for their work1 and rob the public of that benefit which could be had only from their mature deliberation4 ,what then could be done in this case to prevent the community from being exposed some time or other to eminent hazard1 on one side or the other1 by fixed intervals and periods1 set to the meeting and acting of the legislative1 but to intrust it to the prudence of some1 who being present1 and acquainted with the state of public affairs1 might make use of this prerogative for the public good8 and where else could this be so well placed as in his hands1 who was intrusted with the execution of the laws for the same end8 ,thus supposing the regulation of times for the assembling and sitting of the legislative1 not settled by the original constitution1 it naturally fell into the hands of the executive1 not as an arbitrary power depending on his good pleasure1 but with this trust always to have it exercised only for the public weal1 as the occurrences of times and change of affairs might require4 ,whether settled periods of their convening1 or a liberty left to the prince for convoking the legislative1 or perhaps a mixture of both1 hath the least inconvenience attending it1 it is not my business here to inquire1 but only to shew1 that though the executive power may have the prerogative of convoking and dissolving such conventions of the legislative1 yet it is not thereby superior to it4 ,sect4 #aeg4 ,things of this world are in so constant a flux1 that nothing remains long in the same state4 ,thus people1 riches1 trade1 power1 change their stations1 flourishing mighty cities come to ruin1 and prove in times neglected desolate corners1 whilst other unfrequented places grow into populous countries1 filled with wealth and inhabitants4 ,but things not always changing equally1 and private interest often keeping up customs and privileges1 when the reasons of them are ceased1 it often comes to pass1 that in governments1 where part of the legislative consists of representatives chosen by the people1 that in tract of time this representation becomes very unequal and disproportionate to the reasons it was at first established upon4 ,to what gross absurdities the following of custom1 when reason has left it1 may lead1 we may be satisfied1 when we see the bare name of a town1 of which there remains not so much as the ruins1 where scarce so much housing as a sheepcote1 or more inhabitants than a shepherd is to be found1 sends as many representatives to the grand assembly of law-makers1 as a whole county numerous in people1 and powerful in riches4 ,this strangers stand amazed at1 and every one must confess needs a remedy2 tho' most think it hard to find one1 because the constitution of the legislative being the original and supreme act of the society1 antecedent to all positive laws in it1 and depending wholly on the people1 no inferior power can alter it4 ,and therefore the people1 when the legislative is once constituted1 having1 in such a government as we have been speaking of1 no power to act as long as the government stands2 this inconvenience is thought incapable of a remedy4 ,sect4 #aeh4 ,salus populi suprema lex1 is certainly so just and fundamental a rule1 that he1 who sincerely follows it1 cannot dangerously err4 ,if therefore the executive1 who has the power of convoking the legislative1 observing rather the true proportion1 than fashion of representation1 regulates1 not by old custom1 but true reason1 the number of members1 in all places that have a right to be distinctly represented1 which no part of the people however incorporated can pretend to1 but in proportion to the assistance which it affords to the public1 it cannot be judged to have set up a new legislative1 but to have restored the old and true one1 and to have rectified the disorders which succession of time had insensibly1 as well as inevitably introduced3 ,for it being the interest as well as intention of the people1 to have a fair and equal representative2 whoever brings it nearest to that1 is an undoubted friend to1 and establisher of the government1 and cannot miss the consent and approbation of the community2 prerogative being nothing but a power1 in the hands of the prince1 to provide for the public good1 in such cases1 which depending upon unforeseen and uncertain occurrences1 certain and unalterable laws could not safely direct2 whatsoever shall be done manifestly for the good of the people1 and the establishing the government upon its true foundations1 is1 and always will be1 just prerogative1 ,the power of erecting new corporations1 and therewith new representatives1 carries with it a supposition1 that in time the measures of representation might vary1 and those places have a just right to be represented which before had none2 and by the same reason1 those cease to have a right1 and be too inconsiderable for such a privilege1 which before had it4 ',tis not a change from the present state1 which perhaps corruption or decay has introduced1 that makes an inroad upon the government1 but the tendency of it to injure or oppress the people1 and to set up one part or party1 with a distinction from1 and an unequal subjection of the rest4 ,whatsoever cannot but be acknowledged to be of advantage to the society1 and people in general1 upon just and lasting measures1 will always1 when done1 justify itself2 and whenever the people shall chuse their representatives upon just and undeniably equal measures1 suitable to the original frame of the government1 it cannot be doubted to be the will and act of the society1 whoever permitted or caused them so to do4 ,,chapter4 ,,xiv4 ,,of ,,prerogative4 ,sect4 #aei4 ,,where the legislative and executive power are in distinct hands1 7as they are in all moderated monarchies1 and well-framed governments7 there the good of the society requires1 that several things should be left to the discretion of him that has the executive power3 for the legislators not being able to foresee1 and provide by laws1 for all that may be useful to the community1 the executor of the laws having the power in his hands1 has by the common law of nature a right to make use of it for the good of the society1 in many cases1 where the municipal law has given no direction1 till the legislative can conveniently be assembled to provide for it4 ,many things there are1 which the law can by no means provide for2 and those must necessarily be left to the discretion of him that has the executive power in his hands1 to be ordered by him as the public good and advantage shall require3 nay1 it is fit that the laws themselves should in some cases give way to the executive power1 or rather to this fundamental law of nature and government1 viz4 ,that as much as may be1 all the members of the society are to be preserved3 for since many accidents may happen1 wherein a strict and rigid observation of the laws may do harm2 7as not to pull down an innocent man's house to stop the fire1 when the next to it is burning7 and a man may come sometimes within the reach of the law1 which makes no distinction of persons1 by an action that may deserve reward and pardon2 'tis fit the ruler should have a power1 in many cases1 to mitigate the severity of the law1 and pardon some offenders3 for the end of government being the preservation of all1 as much as may be1 even the guilty are to be spared1 where it can prove no prejudice to the innocent4 ,sect4 #afj4 ,this power to act according to discretion1 for the public good1 without the prescription of the law1 and sometimes even against it1 is that which is called prerogative3 for since in some governments the lawmaking power is not always in being1 and is usually too numerous1 and so too slow1 for the dispatch requisite to execution2 and because also it is impossible to foresee1 and so by laws to provide for1 all accidents and necessities that may concern the public1 or to make such laws as will do no harm1 if they are executed with an inflexible rigour1 on all occasions1 and upon all persons that may come in their way2 therefore there is a latitude left to the executive power1 to do many things of choice which the laws do not prescribe4 ,sect4 #afa4 ,this power1 whilst employed for the benefit of the community1 and suitably to the trust and ends of the government1 is undoubted prerogative1 and never is questioned3 for the people are very seldom or never scrupulous or nice in the point2 they are far from examining prerogative1 whilst it is in any tolerable degree employed for the use it was meant1 that is1 for the good of the people1 and not manifestly against it3 but if there comes to be a question between the executive power and the people1 about a thing claimed as a prerogative2 the tendency of the exercise of such prerogative to the good or hurt of the people1 will easily decide that question4 ,sect4 #afb4 ,it is easy to conceive1 that in the infancy of governments1 when commonwealths differed little from families in number of people1 they differed from them too but little in number of laws3 and the governors1 being as the fathers of them1 watching over them for their good1 the government was almost all prerogative4 ,a few established laws served the turn1 and the discretion and care of the ruler supplied the rest4 ,but when mistake or flattery prevailed with weak princes to make use of this power for private ends of their own1 and not for the public good1 the people were fain by express laws to get prerogative determined in those points wherein they found disadvantage from it3 and thus declared limitations of prerogative were by the people found necessary in cases which they and their ancestors had left1 in the utmost latitude1 to the wisdom of those princes who made no other but a right use of it1 that is1 for the good of their people4 ,sect4 #afc4 ,and therefore they have a very wrong notion of government1 who say1 that the people have encroached upon the prerogative1 when they have got any part of it to be defined by positive laws3 for in so doing they have not pulled from the prince any thing that of right belonged to him1 but only declared1 that that power which they indefinitely left in his or his ancestors hands1 to be exercised for their good1 was not a thing which they intended him when he used it otherwise3 for the end of government being the good of the community1 whatsoever alterations are made in it1 tending to that end1 cannot be an encroachment upon any body1 since no body in government can have a right tending to any other end3 and those only are encroachments which prejudice or hinder the public good4 ,those who say otherwise1 speak as if the prince had a distinct and separate interest from the good of the community1 and was not made for it2 the root and source from which spring almost all those evils and disorders which happen in kingly governments4 ,and indeed1 if that be so1 the people under his government are not a society of rational creatures1 entered into a community for their mutual good2 they are not such as have set rulers over themselves1 to guard1 and promote that good2 but are to be looked on as an herd of inferior creatures under the dominion of a master1 who keeps them and works them for his own pleasure or profit4 ,if men were so void of reason1 and brutish1 as to enter into society upon such terms1 prerogative might indeed be1 what some men would have it1 an arbitrary power to do things hurtful to the people4 ,sect4 #afd4 ,but since a rational creature cannot be supposed1 when free1 to put himself into subjection to another1 for his own harm2 7though1 where he finds a good and wise ruler1 he may not perhaps think it either necessary or useful to set precise bounds to his power in all things7 prerogative can be nothing but the people's permitting their rulers to do several things1 of their own free choice1 where the law was silent1 and sometimes too against the direct letter of the law1 for the public good2 and their acquiescing in it when so done3 for as a good prince1 who is mindful of the trust put into his hands1 and careful of the good of his people1 cannot have too much prerogative1 that is1 power to do good2 so a weak and ill prince1 who would claim that power which his predecessors exercised without the direction of the law1 as a prerogative belonging to him by right of his office1 which he may exercise at his pleasure1 to make or promote an interest distinct from that of the public1 gives the people an occasion to claim their right1 and limit that power1 which1 whilst it was exercised for their good1 they were content should be tacitly allowed4 ,sect4 #afe4 ,and therefore he that will look into the history of ,england1 will find1 that prerogative was always largest in the hands of our wisest and best princes2 because the people1 observing the whole tendency of their actions to be the public good1 contested not what was done without law to that end3 or1 if any human frailty or mistake 7for princes are but men1 made as others7 appeared in some small declinations from that end2 yet 'twas visible1 the main of their conduct tended to nothing but the care of the public4 ,the people therefore1 finding reason to be satisfied with these princes1 whenever they acted without1 or contrary to the letter of the law1 acquiesced in what they did1 and1 without the least complaint1 let them inlarge their prerogative as they pleased1 judging rightly1 that they did nothing herein to the prejudice of their laws1 since they acted conformable to the foundation and end of all laws1 the public good4 ,sect4 #aff4 ,such god-like princes indeed had some title to arbitrary power by that argument1 that would prove absolute monarchy the best government1 as that which ,god himself governs the universe by2 because such kings partake of his wisdom and goodness4 ,upon this is founded that saying1 ,that the reigns of good princes have been always most dangerous to the liberties of their people3 for when their successors1 managing the government with different thoughts1 would draw the actions of those good rulers into precedent1 and make them the standard of their prerogative1 as if what had been done only for the good of the people was a right in them to do1 for the harm of the people1 if they so pleased2 it has often occasioned contest1 and sometimes public disorders1 before the people could recover their original right1 and get that to be declared not to be prerogative1 which truly was never so2 since it is impossible that any body in the society should ever have a right to do the people harm2 though it be very possible1 and reasonable1 that the people should not go about to set any bounds to the prerogative of those kings1 or rulers1 who themselves transgressed not the bounds of the public good3 for prerogative is nothing but the power of doing public good without a rule4 ,sect4 #afg4 ,the power of calling parliaments in ,england1 as to precise time1 place1 and duration1 is certainly a prerogative of the king1 but still with this trust1 that it shall be made use of for the good of the nation1 as the exigencies of the times1 and variety of occasions1 shall require3 for it being impossible to foresee which should always be the fittest place for them to assemble in1 and what the best season2 the choice of these was left with the executive power1 as might be most subservient to the public good1 and best suit the ends of parliaments4 ,sect4 #afh4 ,the old question will be asked in this matter of prerogative1 ,but who shall be judge when this power is made a right use of one answer3 between an executive power in being1 with such a prerogative1 and a legislative that depends upon his will for their convening1 there can be no judge on earth2 as there can be none between the legislative and the people1 should either the executive1 or the legislative1 when they have got the power in their hands1 design1 or go about to enslave or destroy them4 ,the people have no other remedy in this1 as in all other cases where they have no judge on earth1 but to appeal to heaven3 for the rulers1 in such attempts1 exercising a power the people never put into their hands1 7who can never be supposed to consent that any body should rule over them for their harm7 do that which they have not a right to do4 ,and where the body of the people1 or any single man1 is deprived of their right1 or is under the exercise of a power without right1 and have no appeal on earth1 then they have a liberty to appeal to heaven1 whenever they judge the cause of sufficient moment4 ,and therefore1 though the people cannot be judge1 so as to have1 by the constitution of that society1 any superior power1 to determine and give effective sentence in the case2 yet they have1 by a law antecedent and paramount to all positive laws of men1 reserved that ultimate determination to themselves which belongs to all mankind1 where there lies no appeal on earth1 viz4 to judge1 whether they have just cause to make their appeal to heaven4 ,and this judgment they cannot part with1 it being out of a man's power so to submit himself to another1 as to give him a liberty to destroy him2 ,god and nature never allowing a man so to abandon himself1 as to neglect his own preservation3 and since he cannot take away his own life1 neither can he give another power to take it4 ,nor let any one think1 this lays a perpetual foundation for disorder2 for this operates not1 till the inconveniency is so great1 that the majority feel it1 and are weary of it1 and find a necessity to have it amended4 ,but this the executive power1 or wise princes1 never need come in the danger of3 and it is the thing1 of all others1 they have most need to avoid1 as of all others the most perilous4 ,,chapter4 ,,xv4 ,,of ,,paternal1 ,,political1 ,,and ,,despotical ,,power1 ,,considered ,,together4 ,sect4 #afi4 ,,though ,i have had occasion to speak of these separately before1 yet the great mistakes of late about government1 having1 as ,i suppose1 arisen from confounding these distinct powers one with another1 it may not1 perhaps1 be amiss to consider them here together4 ,sect4 #agj4 ,first1 then1 ,paternal or parental power is nothing but that which parents have over their children1 to govern them for the children's good1 till they come to the use of reason1 or a state of knowledge1 wherein they may be supposed capable to understand that rule1 whether it be the law of nature1 or the municipal law of their country1 they are to govern themselves by3 capable1 ,i say1 to know it1 as well as several others1 who live as freemen under that law4 ,the affection and tenderness which ,god hath planted in the breast of parents towards their children1 makes it evident1 that this is not intended to be a severe arbitrary government1 but only for the help1 instruction1 and preservation of their offspring4 ,but happen it as it will1 there is1 as ,i have proved1 no reason why it should be thought to extend to life and death1 at any time1 over their children1 more than over any body else2 neither can there be any pretence why this parental power should keep the child1 when grown to a man1 in subjection to the will of his parents1 any farther than having received life and education from his parents1 obliges him to respect1 honour1 gratitude1 assistance and support1 all his life1 to both father and mother4 ,and thus1 'tis true1 the paternal is a natural government1 but not at all extending itself to the ends and jurisdictions of that which is political4 ,the power of the father doth not reach at all to the property of the child1 which is only in his own disposing4 ,sect4 #aga4 ,secondly1 ,political power is that power1 which every man having in the state of nature1 has given up into the hands of the society1 and therein to the governors1 whom the society hath set over itself1 with this express or tacit trust1 that it shall be employed for their good1 and the preservation of their property3 now this power1 which every man has in the state of nature1 and which he parts with to the society in all such cases where the society can secure him1 is to use such means1 for the preserving of his own property1 as he thinks good1 and nature allows him2 and to punish the breach of the law of nature in others1 so as 7according to the best of his reason7 may most conduce to the preservation of himself1 and the rest of mankind4 ,so that the end and measure of this power1 when in every man's hands in the state of nature1 being the preservation of all of his society1 that is1 all mankind in general1 it can have no other end or measure1 when in the hands of the magistrate1 but to preserve the members of that society in their lives1 liberties1 and possessions2 and so cannot be an absolute1 arbitrary power over their lives and fortunes1 which are as much as possible to be preserved2 but a power to make laws1 and annex such penalties to them1 as may tend to the preservation of the whole1 by cutting off those parts1 and those only1 which are so corrupt1 that they threaten the sound and healthy1 without which no severity is lawful4 ,and this power has its original only from compact and agreement1 and the mutual consent of those who make up the community4 ,sect4 #agb4 ,thirdly1 ,despotical power is an absolute1 arbitrary power one man has over another1 to take away his life1 whenever he pleases4 ,this is a power1 which neither nature gives1 for it has made no such distinction between one man and another2 nor compact can convey3 for man not having such an arbitrary power over his own life1 cannot give another man such a power over it2 but it is the effect only of forfeiture1 which the aggressor makes of his own life1 when he puts himself into the state of war with another3 for having quitted reason1 which ,god hath given to be the rule betwixt man and man1 and the common bond whereby human kind is united into one fellowship and society2 and having renounced the way of peace which that teaches1 and made use of the force of war1 to compass his unjust ends upon another1 where he has no right2 and so revolting from his own kind to that of beasts1 by making force1 which is their's1 to be his rule of right1 he renders himself liable to be destroyed by the injured person1 and the rest of mankind1 that will join with him in the execution of justice1 as any other wild beast1 or noxious brute1 with whom mankind can have neither society nor security994 ,and thus captives1 taken in a just and lawful war1 and such only1 are subject to a despotical power1 which1 as it arises not from compact1 so neither is it capable of any1 but is the state of war continued3 for what compact can be made with a man that is not master of his own life8 what condition can he perform8 and if he be once allowed to be master of his own life1 the despotical1 arbitrary power of his master ceases4 ,he that is master of himself1 and his own life1 has a right too to the means of preserving it2 so that as soon as compact enters1 slavery ceases1 and he so far quits his absolute power1 and puts an end to the state of war1 who enters into conditions with his captive4 799,another copy corrected by ,mr4 ,locke1 has it thus1 ,noxious brute that is destructive to their being47 ,sect4 #agc4 ,nature gives the first of these1 viz4 paternal power to parents for the benefit of their children during their minority1 to supply their want of ability1 and understanding how to manage their property4 7,by property ,i must be understood here1 as in other places1 to mean that property which men have in their persons as well as goods47 ,voluntary agreement gives the second1 viz4 political power to governors for the benefit of their subjects1 to secure them in the possession and use of their properties4 ,and forfeiture gives the third despotical power to lords for their own benefit1 over those who are stripped of all property4 ,sect4 #agd4 ,he1 that shall consider the distinct rise and extent1 and the different ends of these several powers1 will plainly see1 that paternal power comes as far short of that of the magistrate1 as despotical exceeds it2 and that absolute dominion1 however placed1 is so far from being one kind of civil society1 that it is as inconsistent with it1 as slavery is with property4 ,paternal power is only where minority makes the child incapable to manage his property2 political1 where men have property in their own disposal2 and despotical1 over such as have no property at all4 ,,chapter4 ,,xvi4 ,,of ,,conquest4 ,sect4 #age4 ,,though governments can originally have no other rise than that before mentioned1 nor polities be founded on any thing but the consent of the people2 yet such have been the disorders ambition has filled the world with1 that in the noise of war1 which makes so great a part of the history of mankind1 this consent is little taken notice of3 and therefore many have mistaken the force of arms for the consent of the people1 and reckon conquest as one of the originals of government4 ,but conquest is as far from setting up any government1 as demolishing an house is from building a new one in the place4 ,indeed1 it often makes way for a new frame of a commonwealth1 by destroying the former2 but1 without the consent of the people1 can never erect a new one4 ,sect4 #agf4 ,that the aggressor1 who puts himself into the state of war with another1 and unjustly invades another man's right1 can1 by such an unjust war1 never come to have a right over the conquered1 will be easily agreed by all men1 who will not think1 that robbers and pyrates have a right of empire over whomsoever they have force enough to master2 or that men are bound by promises1 which unlawful force extorts from them4 ,should a robber break into my house1 and with a dagger at my throat make me seal deeds to convey my estate to him1 would this give him any title8 ,just such a title1 by his sword1 has an unjust conqueror1 who forces me into submission4 ,the injury and the crime is equal1 whether committed by the wearer of a crown1 or some petty villain4 ,the title of the offender1 and the number of his followers1 make no difference in the offence1 unless it be to aggravate it4 ,the only difference is1 great robbers punish little ones1 to keep them in their obedience2 but the great ones are rewarded with laurels and triumphs1 because they are too big for the weak hands of justice in this world1 and have the power in their own possession1 which should punish offenders4 ,what is my remedy against a robber1 that so broke into my house8 ,appeal to the law for justice4 ,but perhaps justice is denied1 or ,i am crippled and cannot stir1 robbed and have not the means to do it4 ,if ,god has taken away all means of seeking remedy1 there is nothing left but patience4 ,but my son1 when able1 may seek the relief of the law1 which ,i am denied3 he or his son may renew his appeal1 till he recover his right4 ,but the conquered1 or their children1 have no court1 no arbitrator on earth to appeal to4 ,then they may appeal1 as ,jephtha did1 to heaven1 and repeat their appeal till they have recovered the native right of their ancestors1 which was1 to have such a legislative over them1 as the majority should approve1 and freely acquiesce in4 ,if it be objected1 ,this would cause endless trouble2 ,i answer1 no more than justice does1 where she lies open to all that appeal to her4 ,he that troubles his neighbour without a cause1 is punished for it by the justice of the court he appeals to3 and he that appeals to heaven must be sure he has right on his side2 and a right too that is worth the trouble and cost of the appeal1 as he will answer at a tribunal that cannot be deceived1 and will be sure to retribute to every one according to the mischiefs he hath created to his fellow subjects2 that is1 any part of mankind3 from whence it is plain1 that he that conquers in an unjust war can thereby have no title to the subjection and obedience of the conquered4 ,sect4 #agg4 ,but supposing victory favours the right side1 let us consider a conqueror in a lawful war1 and see what power he gets1 and over whom4 ,first1 ,it is plain he gets no power by his conquest over those that conquered with him4 ,they that fought on his side cannot suffer by the conquest1 but must at least be as much freemen as they were before4 ,and most commonly they serve upon terms1 and on condition to share with their leader1 and enjoy a part of the spoil1 and other advantages that attend the conquering sword2 or at least have a part of the subdued country bestowed upon them4 ,and the conquering people are not1 ,i hope1 to be slaves by conquest1 and wear their laurels only to shew they are sacrifices to their leaders triumph4 ,they that found absolute monarchy upon the title of the sword1 make their heroes1 who are the founders of such monarchies1 arrant ,draw-can-sirs1 and forget they had any officers and soldiers that fought on their side in the battles they won1 or assisted them in the subduing1 or shared in possessing1 the countries they mastered4 ,we are told by some1 that the ,english monarchy is founded in the ,norman conquest1 and that our princes have thereby a title to absolute dominion3 which if it were true1 7as by the history it appears otherwise7 and that ,william had a right to make war on this island2 yet his dominion by conquest could reach no farther than to the ,saxons and ,britons1 that were then inhabitants of this country4 ,the ,normans that came with him1 and helped to conquer1 and all descended from them1 are freemen1 and no subjects by conquest2 let that give what dominion it will4 ,and if ,i1 or any body else1 shall claim freedom1 as derived from them1 it will be very hard to prove the contrary3 and it is plain1 the law1 that has made no distinction between the one and the other1 intends not there should be any difference in their freedom or privileges4 ,sect4 #agh4 ,but supposing1 which seldom happens1 that the conquerors and conquered never incorporate into one people1 under the same laws and freedom2 let us see next what power a lawful conqueror has over the subdued3 and that ,i say is purely despotical4 ,he has an absolute power over the lives of those who by an unjust war have forfeited them2 but not over the lives or fortunes of those who engaged not in the war1 nor over the possessions even of those who were actually engaged in it4 ,sect4 #agi4 ,secondly1 ,i say then the conqueror gets no power but only over those who have actually assisted1 concurred1 or consented to that unjust force that is used against him3 for the people having given to their governors no power to do an unjust thing1 such as is to make an unjust war1 7for they never had such a power in themselves7 they ought not to be charged as guilty of the violence and unjustice that is committed in an unjust war1 any farther than they actually abet it2 no more than they are to be thought guilty of any violence or oppression their governors should use upon the people themselves1 or any part of their fellow subjects1 they having empowered them no more to the one than to the other4 ,conquerors1 it is true1 seldom trouble themselves to make the distinction1 but they willingly permit the confusion of war to sweep all together3 but yet this alters not the right2 for the conquerors power over the lives of the conquered1 being only because they have used force to do1 or maintain an injustice1 he can have that power only over those who have concurred in that force2 all the rest are innocent2 and he has no more title over the people of that country1 who have done him no injury1 and so have made no forfeiture of their lives1 than he has over any other1 who1 without any injuries or provocations1 have lived upon fair terms with him4 ,sect4 #ahj4 ,thirdly1 ,the power a conqueror gets over those he overcomes in a just war1 is perfectly despotical3 he has an absolute power over the lives of those1 who1 by putting themselves in a state of war1 have forfeited them2 but he has not thereby a right and title to their possessions4 ,this ,i doubt not1 but at first sight will seem a strange doctrine1 it being so quite contrary to the practice of the world2 there being nothing more familiar in speaking of the dominion of countries1 than to say such an one conquered it2 as if conquest1 without any more ado1 conveyed a right of possession4 ,but when we consider1 that the practice of the strong and powerful1 how universal soever it may be1 is seldom the rule of right1 however it be one part of the subjection of the conquered1 not to argue against the conditions cut out to them by the conquering sword4 ,sect4 #aha4 ,though in all war there be usually a complication of force and damage1 and the aggressor seldom fails to harm the estate1 when he uses force against the persons of those he makes war upon2 yet it is the use of force only that puts a man into the state of war3 for whether by force he begins the injury1 or else having quietly1 and by fraud1 done the injury1 he refuses to make reparation1 and by force maintains it1 7which is the same thing1 as at first to have done it by force7 it is the unjust use of force that makes the war3 for he that breaks open my house1 and violently turns me out of doors2 or having peaceably got in1 by force keeps me out1 does in effect the same thing2 supposing we are in such a state1 that we have no common judge on earth1 whom ,i may appeal to1 and to whom we are both obliged to submit3 for of such ,i am now speaking4 ,it is the unjust use of force then1 that puts a man into the state of war with another2 and thereby he that is guilty of it makes a forfeiture of his life3 for quitting reason1 which is the rule given between man and man1 and using force1 the way of beasts1 he becomes liable to be destroyed by him he uses force against1 as any savage ravenous beast1 that is dangerous to his being4 ,sect4 #ahb4 ,but because the miscarriages of the father are no faults of the children1 and they may be rational and peaceable1 notwithstanding the brutishness and injustice of the father2 the father1 by his miscarriages and violence1 can forfeit but his own life1 but involves not his children in his guilt or destruction4 ,his goods1 which nature1 that willeth the preservation of all mankind as much as is possible1 hath made to belong to the children to keep them from perishing1 do still continue to belong to his children3 for supposing them not to have joined in the war1 either thro' infancy1 absence1 or choice1 they have done nothing to forfeit them3 nor has the conqueror any right to take them away1 by the bare title of having subdued him that by force attempted his destruction2 though perhaps he may have some right to them1 to repair the damages he has sustained by the war1 and the defence of his own right2 which how far it reaches to the possessions of the conquered1 we shall see by and by4 ,so that he that by conquest has a right over a man's person to destroy him if he pleases1 has not thereby a right over his estate to possess and enjoy it3 for it is the brutal force the aggressor has used1 that gives his adversary a right to take away his life1 and destroy him if he pleases1 as a noxious creature2 but it is damage sustained that alone gives him title to another man's goods3 for though ,i may kill a thief that sets on me in the highway1 yet ,i may not 7which seems less7 take away his money1 and let him go3 this would be robbery on my side4 ,his force1 and the state of war he put himself in1 made him forfeit his life1 but gave me no title to his goods4 ,the right then of conquest extends only to the lives of those who joined in the war1 not to their estates1 but only in order to make reparation for the damages received1 and the charges of the war1 and that too with reservation of the right of the innocent wife and children4 ,sect4 #ahc4 ,let the conqueror have as much justice on his side1 as could be supposed1 he has no right to seize more than the vanquished could forfeit3 his life is at the victor's mercy2 and his service and goods he may appropriate1 to make himself reparation2 but he cannot take the goods of his wife and children2 they too had a title to the goods he enjoyed1 and their shares in the estate he possessed3 for example1 ,i in the state of nature 7and all commonwealths are in the state of nature one with another7 have injured another man1 and refusing to give satisfaction1 it comes to a state of war1 wherein my defending by force what ,i had gotten unjustly1 makes me the aggressor4 ,i am conquered3 my life1 it is true1 as forfeit1 is at mercy1 but not my wife's and children's4 ,they made not the war1 nor assisted in it4 ,i could not forfeit their lives2 they were not mine to forfeit4 ,my wife had a share in my estate2 that neither could ,i forfeit4 ,and my children also1 being born of me1 had a right to be maintained out of my labour or substance4 ,here then is the case3 the conqueror has a title to reparation for damages received1 and the children have a title to their father's estate for their subsistence3 for as to the wife's share1 whether her own labour1 or compact1 gave her a title to it1 it is plain1 her husband could not forfeit what was her's4 ,what must be done in the case8 ,i answer2 the fundamental law of nature being1 that all1 as much as may be1 should be preserved1 it follows1 that if there be not enough fully to satisfy both1 viz1 for the conqueror's losses1 and children's maintenance1 he that hath1 and to spare1 must remit something of his full satisfaction1 and give way to the pressing and preferable title of those who are in danger to perish without it4 ,sect4 #ahd4 ,but supposing the charge and damages of the war are to be made up to the conqueror1 to the utmost farthing2 and that the children of the vanquished1 spoiled of all their father's goods1 are to be left to starve and perish2 yet the satisfying of what shall1 on this score1 be due to the conqueror1 will scarce give him a title to any country he shall conquer3 for the damages of war can scarce amount to the value of any considerable tract of land1 in any part of the world1 where all the land is possessed1 and none lies waste4 ,and if ,i have not taken away the conqueror's land1 which1 being vanquished1 it is impossible ,i should2 scarce any other spoil ,i have done him can amount to the value of mine1 supposing it equally cultivated1 and of an extent any way coming near what ,i had overrun of his4 ,the destruction of a year's product or two 7for it seldom reaches four or five7 is the utmost spoil that usually can be done3 for as to money1 and such riches and treasure taken away1 these are none of nature's goods1 they have but a fantastical imaginary value3 nature has put no such upon them3 they are of no more account by her standard1 than the wampompeke of the ,americans to an ,european prince1 or the silver money of ,europe would have been formerly to an ,american4 ,and five years product is not worth the perpetual inheritance of land1 where all is possessed1 and none remains waste1 to be taken up by him that is disseized3 which will be easily granted1 if one do but take away the imaginary value of money1 the disproportion being more than between five and five hundred2 though1 at the same time1 half a year's product is more worth than the inheritance1 where there being more land than the inhabitants possess and make use of1 any one has liberty to make use of the waste3 but there conquerors take little care to possess themselves of the lands of the vanquished1 ,no damage therefore1 that men in the state of nature 7as all princes and governments are in reference to one another7 suffer from one another1 can give a conqueror power to dispossess the posterity of the vanquished1 and turn them out of that inheritance1 which ought to be the possession of them and their descendants to all generations4 ,the conqueror indeed will be apt to think himself master3 and it is the very condition of the subdued not to be able to dispute their right4 ,but if that be all1 it gives no other title than what bare force gives to the stronger over the weaker3 and1 by this reason1 he that is strongest will have a right to whatever he pleases to seize on4 ,sect4 #ahe4 ,over those then that joined with him in the war1 and over those of the subdued country that opposed him not1 and the posterity even of those that did1 the conqueror1 even in a just war1 hath1 by his conquest1 no right of dominion3 they are free from any subjection to him1 and if their former government be dissolved1 they are at liberty to begin and erect another to themselves4 ,sect4 #ahf4 ,the conqueror1 it is true1 usually1 by the force he has over them1 compels them1 with a sword at their breasts1 to stoop to his conditions1 and submit to such a government as he pleases to afford them2 but the enquiry is1 what right he has to do so8 ,if it be said1 they submit by their own consent1 then this allows their own consent to be necessary to give the conqueror a title to rule over them4 ,it remains only to be considered1 whether promises extorted by force1 without right1 can be thought consent1 and how far they bind4 ,to which ,i shall say1 they bind not at all2 because whatsoever another gets from me by force1 ,i still retain the right of1 and he is obliged presently to restore4 ,he that forces my horse from me1 ought presently to restore him1 and ,i have still a right to retake him4 ,by the same reason1 he that forced a promise from me1 ought presently to restore it1 i4e4 quit me of the obligation of it2 or ,i may resume it myself1 i4e4 chuse whether ,i will perform it3 for the law of nature laying an obligation on me only by the rules she prescribes1 cannot oblige me by the violation of her rules3 such is the extorting any thing from me by force4 ,nor does it at all alter the case to say1 ,i gave my promise1 no more than it excuses the force1 and passes the right1 when ,i put my hand in my pocket1 and deliver my purse myself to a thief1 who demands it with a pistol at my breast4 ,sect4 #ahg4 ,from all which it follows1 that the government of a conqueror1 imposed by force on the subdued1 against whom he had no right of war1 or who joined not in the war against him1 where he had right1 has no obligation upon them4 ,sect4 #ahh4 ,but let us suppose1 that all the men of that community1 being all members of the same body politic1 may be taken to have joined in that unjust war wherein they are subdued1 and so their lives are at the mercy of the conqueror4 ,sect4 #ahi4 ,i say this concerns not their children who are in their minority3 for since a father hath not1 in himself1 a power over the life or liberty of his child1 no act of his can possibly forfeit it4 ,so that the children1 whatever may have happened to the fathers1 are freemen1 and the absolute power of the conqueror reaches no farther than the persons of the men that were subdued by him1 and dies with them3 and should he govern them as slaves1 subjected to his absolute arbitrary power1 he has no such right of dominion over their children4 ,he can have no power over them but by their own consent1 whatever he may drive them to say or do2 and he has no lawfull authority1 whilst force1 and not choice1 compels them to submission4 ,sect4 #aij4 ,every man is born with a double right3 first1 a right of freedom to his person1 which no other man has a power over1 but the free disposal of it lies in himself4 ,secondly1 a right1 before any other man1 to inherit with his brethren his father's goods4 ,sect4 #aia4 ,by the first of these1 a man is naturally free from subjection to any government1 tho' he be born in a place under its jurisdiction2 but if he disclaim the lawful government of the country he was born in1 he must also quit the right that belonged to him by the laws of it1 and the possessions there descending to him from his ancestors1 if it were a government made by their consent4 ,sect4 #aib4 ,by the second1 the inhabitants of any country1 who are descended1 and derive a title to their estates from those who are subdued1 and had a government forced upon them against their free consents1 retain a right to the possession of their ancestors1 though they consent not freely to the government1 whose hard conditions were by force imposed on the possessors of that country3 for the first conqueror never having had a title to the land of that country1 the people who are the descendants of1 or claim under those who were forced to submit to the yoke of a government by constraint1 have always a right to shake it off1 and free themselves from the usurpation or tyranny which the sword hath brought in upon them1 till their rulers put them under such a frame of government as they willingly and of choice consent to4 ,who doubts but the ,grecian ,christians1 descendants of the ancient possessors of that country1 may justly cast off the ,turkish yoke1 which they have so long groaned under1 whenever they have an opportunity to do it8 ,for no government can have a right to obedience from a people who have not freely consented to it2 which they can never be supposed to do1 till either they are put in a full state of liberty to chuse their government and governors1 or at least till they have such standing laws1 to which they have by themselves or their representatives given their free consent1 and also till they are allowed their due property1 which is so to be proprietors of what they have1 that no body can take away any part of it without their own consent1 without which1 men under any government are not in the state of freemen1 but are direct slaves under the force of war4 ,sect4 #aic4 ,but granting that the conqueror in a just war has a right to the estates1 as well as power over the persons1 of the conquered2 which1 it is plain1 he hath not3 nothing of absolute power will follow from hence1 in the continuance of the government2 because the descendants of these being all freemen1 if he grants them estates and possessions to inhabit his country1 7without which it would be worth nothing7 whatsoever he grants them1 they have1 so far as it is granted1 property in4 ,the nature whereof is1 that without a man's own consent it cannot be taken from him4 ,sect4 #aid4 ,their persons are free by a native right1 and their properties1 be they more or less1 are their own1 and at their own dispose1 and not at his2 or else it is no property4 ,supposing the conqueror gives to one man a thousand acres1 to him and his heirs for ever2 to another he lets a thousand acres for his life1 under the rent of #ejl4 or #ejjl4 per ann4 has not the one of these a right to his thousand acres for ever1 and the other1 during his life1 paying the said rent8 and hath not the tenant for life a property in all that he gets over and above his rent1 by his labour and industry during the said term1 supposing it be double the rent8 ,can any one say1 the king1 or conqueror1 after his grant1 may by his power of conqueror take away all1 or part of the land from the heirs of one1 or from the other during his life1 he paying the rent8 or can he take away from either the goods or money they have got upon the said land1 at his pleasure8 ,if he can1 then all free and voluntary contracts cease1 and are void in the world2 there needs nothing to dissolve them at any time1 but power enough3 and all the grants and promises of men in power are but mockery and collusion3 for can there be any thing more ridiculous than to say1 ,i give you and your's this for ever1 and that in the surest and most solemn way of conveyance can be devised2 and yet it is to be understood1 that ,i have right1 if ,i please1 to take it away from you again to morrow8 ,sect4 #aie4 ,i will not dispute now whether princes are exempt from the laws of their country2 but this ,i am sure1 they owe subjection to the laws of ,god and nature4 ,no body1 no power1 can exempt them from the obligations of that eternal law4 ,those are so great1 and so strong1 in the case of promises1 that omnipotency itself can be tied by them4 ,grants1 promises1 and oaths1 are bonds that hold the ,almighty3 whatever some flatterers say to princes of the world1 who all together1 with all their people joined to them1 are1 in comparison of the great ,god1 but as a drop of the bucket1 or a dust on the balance1 inconsiderable1 nothing6 ,sect4 #aif4 ,the short of the case in conquest is this3 the conqueror1 if he have a just cause1 has a despotical right over the persons of all1 that actually aided1 and concurred in the war against him1 and a right to make up his damage and cost out of their labour and estates1 so he injure not the right of any other4 ,over the rest of the people1 if there were any that consented not to the war1 and over the children of the captives themselves1 or the possessions of either1 he has no power2 and so can have1 by virtue of conquest1 no lawful title himself to dominion over them1 or derive it to his posterity2 but is an aggressor1 if he attempts upon their properties1 and thereby puts himself in a state of war against them1 and has no better a right of principality1 he1 nor any of his successors1 than ,hingar1 or ,hubba1 the ,danes1 had here in ,england2 or ,spartacus1 had he conquered ,italy1 would have had2 which is to have their yoke cast off1 as soon as ,god shall give those under their subjection courage and opportunity to do it4 ,thus1 notwithstanding whatever title the kings of ,assyria had over ,judah1 by the sword1 ,god assisted ,hezekiah to throw off the dominion of that conquering empire4 ,and the lord was with ,hezekiah1 and he prospered2 wherefore he went forth1 and he rebelled against the king of ,assyria1 and served him not1 #b ,kings xviii4 #g4 ,whence it is plain1 that shaking off a power1 which force1 and not right1 hath set over any one1 though it hath the name of rebellion1 yet is no offence before ,god1 but is that which he allows and countenances1 though even promises and covenants1 when obtained by force1 have intervened3 for it is very probable1 to any one that reads the story of ,ahaz and ,hezekiah attentively1 that the ,assyrians subdued ,ahaz1 and deposed him1 and made ,hezekiah king in his father's lifetime2 and that ,hezekiah by agreement had done him homage1 and paid him tribute all this time4 ,,chapter4 ,,xvii4 ,,of ,,usurpation4 ,sect4 #aig4 ,,as conquest may be called a foreign usurpation1 so usurpation is a kind of domestic conquest1 with this difference1 that an usurper can never have right on his side1 it being no usurpation1 but where one is got into the possession of what another has right to4 ,this1 so far as it is usurpation1 is a change only of persons1 but not of the forms and rules of the government3 for if the usurper extend his power beyond what of right belonged to the lawful princes1 or governors of the commonwealth1 it is tyranny added to usurpation4 ,sect4 #aih4 ,in all lawful governments1 the designation of the persons1 who are to bear rule1 is as natural and necessary a part as the form of the government itself1 and is that which had its establishment originally from the people2 the anarchy being much alike1 to have no form of government at all2 or to agree1 that it shall be monarchical1 but to appoint no way to design the person that shall have the power1 and be the monarch4 ,hence all commonwealths1 with the form of government established1 have rules also of appointing those who are to have any share in the public authority1 and settled methods of conveying the right to them3 for the anarchy is much alike1 to have no form of government at all2 or to agree that it shall be monarchical1 but to appoint no way to know or design the person that shall have the power1 and be the monarch4 ,whoever gets into the exercise of any part of the power1 by other ways than what the laws of the community have prescribed1 hath no right to be obeyed1 though the form of the commonwealth be still preserved2 since he is not the person the laws have appointed1 and consequently not the person the people have consented to4 ,nor can such an usurper1 or any deriving from him1 ever have a title1 till the people are both at liberty to consent1 and have actually consented to allow1 and confirm in him the power he hath till then usurped4 ,,chapter4 ,,xviii4 ,,of ,,tyranny4 ,sect4 #aii4 ,,as usurpation is the exercise of power1 which another hath a right to2 so tyranny is the exercise of power beyond right1 which no body can have a right to4 ,and this is making use of the power any one has in his hands1 not for the good of those who are under it1 but for his own private separate advantage4 ,when the governor1 however intitled1 makes not the law1 but his will1 the rule2 and his commands and actions are not directed to the preservation of the properties of his people1 but the satisfaction of his own ambition1 revenge1 covetousness1 or any other irregular passion4 ,sect4 #bjj4 ,if one can doubt this to be truth1 or reason1 because it comes from the obscure hand of a subject1 ,i hope the authority of a king will make it pass with him4 ,king ,james the first1 in his speech to the parliament1 #afjc1 tells them thus1 _/ ,i will ever prefer the weal of the public1 and of the whole commonwealth1 in making of good laws and constitutions1 to any particular and private ends of mine2 thinking ever the wealth and weal of the commonwealth to be my greatest weal and worldly felicity2 a point wherein a lawful king doth directly differ from a tyrant3 for ,i do acknowledge1 that the special and greatest point of difference that is between a rightful king and an usurping tyrant1 is this1 that whereas the proud and ambitious tyrant doth think his kingdom and people are only ordained for satisfaction of his desires and unreasonable appetites1 the righteous and just king doth by the contrary acknowledge himself to be ordained for the procuring of the wealth and property of his people4 _/ ,and again1 in his speech to the parliament1 #afji1 he hath these words3 _/ ,the king binds himself by a double oath1 to the observation of the fundamental laws of his kingdom2 tacitly1 as by being a king1 and so bound to protect as well the people1 as the laws of his kingdom2 and expressly1 by his oath at his coronation1 so as every just king1 in a settled kingdom1 is bound to observe that paction made to his people1 by his laws1 in framing his government agreeable thereunto1 according to that paction which ,god made with ,noah after the deluge4 ,hereafter1 seed-time and harvest1 and cold and heat1 and summer and winter1 and day and night1 shall not cease while the earth remaineth4 ,and therefore a king governing in a settled kingdom1 leaves to be a king1 and degenerates into a tyrant1 as soon as he leaves off to rule according to his laws4 _/ ,and a little after1 _/ ,therefore all kings that are not tyrants1 or perjured1 will be glad to bound themselves within the limits of their laws2 and they that persuade them the contrary1 are vipers1 and pests both against them and the commonwealth4 _/ ,thus that learned king1 who well understood the notion of things1 makes the difference betwixt a king and a tyrant to consist only in this1 that one makes the laws the bounds of his power1 and the good of the public1 the end of his government2 the other makes all give way to his own will and appetite4 ,sect4 #bja4 ,it is a mistake1 to think this fault is proper only to monarchies2 other forms of government are liable to it1 as well as that3 for wherever the power1 that is put in any hands for the government of the people1 and the preservation of their properties1 is applied to other ends1 and made use of to impoverish1 harass1 or subdue them to the arbitrary and irregular commands of those that have it2 there it presently becomes tyranny1 whether those that thus use it are one or many4 ,thus we read of the thirty tyrants at ,athens1 as well as one at ,syracuse2 and the intolerable dominion of the ,decemviri at ,rome was nothing better4 ,sect4 #bjb4 ,where-ever law ends1 tyranny begins1 if the law be transgressed to another's harm2 and whosoever in authority exceeds the power given him by the law1 and makes use of the force he has under his command1 to compass that upon the subject1 which the law allows not1 ceases in that to be a magistrate2 and1 acting without authority1 may be opposed1 as any other man1 who by force invades the right of another4 ,this is acknowledged in subordinate magistrates4 ,he that hath authority to seize my person in the street1 may be opposed as a thief and a robber1 if he endeavours to break into my house to execute a writ1 notwithstanding that ,i know he has such a warrant1 and such a legal authority1 as will impower him to arrest me abroad4 ,and why this should not hold in the highest1 as well as in the most inferior magistrate1 ,i would gladly be informed4 ,is it reasonable1 that the eldest brother1 because he has the greatest part of his father's estate1 should thereby have a right to take away any of his younger brothers portions8 or that a rich man1 who possessed a whole country1 should from thence have a right to seize1 when he pleased1 the cottage and garden of his poor neighbour8 ,the being rightfully possessed of great power and riches1 exceedingly beyond the greatest part of the sons of ,adam1 is so far from being an excuse1 much less a reason1 for rapine and oppression1 which the endamaging another without authority is1 that it is a great aggravation of it3 for the exceeding the bounds of authority is no more a right in a great1 than in a petty officer2 no more justifiable in a king than a constable2 but is so much the worse in him1 in that he has more trust put in him1 has already a much greater share than the rest of his brethren1 and is supposed1 from the advantages of his education1 employment1 and counsellors1 to be more knowing in the measures of right and wrong4 ,sect4 #bjc4 ,may the commands then of a prince be opposed8 may he be resisted as often as any one shall find himself aggrieved1 and but imagine he has not right done him8 ,this will unhinge and overturn all polities1 and1 instead of government and order1 leave nothing but anarchy and confusion4 ,sect4 #bjd4 ,to this ,i answer1 that force is to be opposed to nothing1 but to unjust and unlawful force2 whoever makes any opposition in any other case1 draws on himself a just condemnation both from ,god and man2 and so no such danger or confusion will follow1 as is often suggested3 for1 ,sect4 #bje4 ,first1 ,as1 in some countries1 the person of the prince by the law is sacred2 and so1 whatever he commands or does1 his person is still free from all question or violence1 not liable to force1 or any judicial censure or condemnation4 ,but yet opposition may be made to the illegal acts of any inferior officer1 or other commissioned by him2 unless he will1 by actually putting himself into a state of war with his people1 dissolve the government1 and leave them to that defence which belongs to every one in the state of nature3 for of such things who can tell what the end will be8 and a neighbour kingdom has shewed the world an odd example4 ,in all other cases the sacredness of the person exempts him from all inconveniencies1 whereby he is secure1 whilst the government stands1 from all violence and harm whatsoever2 than which there cannot be a wiser constitution3 for the harm he can do in his own person not being likely to happen often1 nor to extend itself far2 nor being able by his single strength to subvert the laws1 nor oppress the body of the people1 should any prince have so much weakness1 and ill nature as to be willing to do it1 the inconveniency of some particular mischiefs1 that may happen sometimes1 when a heady prince comes to the throne1 are well recompensed by the peace of the public1 and security of the government1 in the person of the chief magistrate1 thus set out of the reach of danger3 it being safer for the body1 that some few private men should be sometimes in danger to suffer1 than that the head of the republic should be easily1 and upon slight occasions1 exposed4 ,sect4 #bjf4 ,secondly1 ,but this privilege1 belonging only to the king's person1 hinders not1 but they may be questioned1 opposed1 and resisted1 who use unjust force1 though they pretend a commission from him1 which the law authorizes not2 as is plain in the case of him that has the king's writ to arrest a man1 which is a full commission from the king2 and yet he that has it cannot break open a man's house to do it1 nor execute this command of the king upon certain days1 nor in certain places1 though this commission have no such exception in it2 but they are the limitations of the law1 which if any one transgress1 the king's commission excuses him not3 for the king's authority being given him only by the law1 he cannot impower any one to act against the law1 or justify him1 by his commission1 in so doing2 the commission1 or command of any magistrate1 where he has no authority1 being as void and insignificant1 as that of any private man2 the difference between the one and the other1 being that the magistrate has some authority so far1 and to such ends1 and the private man has none at all3 for it is not the commission1 but the authority1 that gives the right of acting2 and against the laws there can be no authority4 ,but1 notwithstanding such resistance1 the king's person and authority are still both secured1 and so no danger to governor or government4 ,sect4 #bjg4 ,thirdly1 ,supposing a government wherein the person of the chief magistrate is not thus sacred2 yet this doctrine of the lawfulness of resisting all unlawful exercises of his power1 will not upon every slight occasion indanger him1 or imbroil the government3 for where the injured party may be relieved1 and his damages repaired by appeal to the law1 there can be no pretence for force1 which is only to be used where a man is intercepted from appealing to the law3 for nothing is to be accounted hostile force1 but where it leaves not the remedy of such an appeal2 and it is such force alone1 that puts him that uses it into a state of war1 and makes it lawful to resist him4 ,a man with a sword in his hand demands my purse in the high-way1 when perhaps ,i have not twelve pence in my pocket3 this man ,i may lawfully kill4 ,to another ,i deliver #ajj pounds to hold only whilst ,i alight1 which he refuses to restore me1 when ,i am got up again1 but draws his sword to defend the possession of it by force1 if ,i endeavour to retake it4 ,the mischief this man does me is a hundred1 or possibly a thousand times more than the other perhaps intended me 7whom ,i killed before he really did me any72 and yet ,i might lawfully kill the one1 and cannot so much as hurt the other lawfully4 ,the reason whereof is plain2 because the one using force1 which threatened my life1 ,i could not have time to appeal to the law to secure it3 and when it was gone1 it was too late to appeal4 ,the law could not restore life to my dead carcass3 the loss was irreparable2 which to prevent1 the law of nature gave me a right to destroy him1 who had put himself into a state of war with me1 and threatened my destruction4 ,but in the other case1 my life not being in danger1 ,i may have the benefit of appealing to the law1 and have reparation for my #ajj pounds that way4 ,sect4 #bjh4 ,fourthly1 ,but if the unlawful acts done by the magistrate be maintained 7by the power he has got71 and the remedy which is due by law1 be by the same power obstructed2 yet the right of resisting1 even in such manifest acts of tyranny1 will not suddenly1 or on slight occasions1 disturb the government3 for if it reach no farther than some private men's cases1 though they have a right to defend themselves1 and to recover by force what by unlawful force is taken from them2 yet the right to do so will not easily engage them in a contest1 wherein they are sure to perish2 it being as impossible for one1 or a few oppressed men to disturb the government1 where the body of the people do not think themselves concerned in it1 as for a raving mad-man1 or heady malcontent to overturn a well settled state2 the people being as little apt to follow the one1 as the other4 ,sect4 #bji4 ,but if either these illegal acts have extended to the majority of the people2 or if the mischief and oppression has lighted only on some few1 but in such cases1 as the precedent1 and consequences seem to threaten all2 and they are persuaded in their consciences1 that their laws1 and with them their estates1 liberties1 and lives are in danger1 and perhaps their religion too2 how they will be hindered from resisting illegal force1 used against them1 ,i cannot tell4 ,this is an inconvenience1 ,i confess1 that attends all governments whatsoever1 when the governors have brought it to this pass1 to be generally suspected of their people2 the most dangerous state which they can possibly put themselves in1 wherein they are the less to be pitied1 because it is so easy to be avoided2 it being as impossible for a governor1 if he really means the good of his people1 and the preservation of them1 and their laws together1 not to make them see and feel it1 as it is for the father of a family1 not to let his children see he loves1 and takes care of them4 ,sect4 #baj4 ,but if all the world shall observe pretences of one kind1 and actions of another2 arts used to elude the law1 and the trust of prerogative 7which is an arbitrary power in some things left in the prince's hand to do good1 not harm to the people7 employed contrary to the end for which it was given3 if the people shall find the ministers and subordinate magistrates chosen suitable to such ends1 and favoured1 or laid by1 proportionably as they promote or oppose them3 if they see several experiments made of arbitrary power1 and that religion underhand favoured1 7tho' publicly proclaimed against7 which is readiest to introduce it2 and the operators in it supported1 as much as may be2 and when that cannot be done1 yet approved still1 and liked the better3 if a long train of actions shew the councils all tending that way2 how can a man any more hinder himself from being persuaded in his own mind1 which way things are going2 or from casting about how to save himself1 than he could from believing the captain of the ship he was in1 was carrying him1 and the rest of the company1 to ,algiers1 when he found him always steering that course1 though cross winds1 leaks in his ship1 and want of men and provisions did often force him to turn his course another way for some time1 which he steadily returned to again1 as soon as the wind1 weather1 and other circumstances would let him8 ,,chapter4 ,,xix4 ,,of ,,the ,,dissolution ,,of ,,government4 ,sect4 #baa4 ,,he that will with any clearness speak of the dissolution of government1 ought in the first place to distinguish between the dissolution of the society and the dissolution of the government4 ,that which makes the community1 and brings men out of the loose state of nature1 into one politic society1 is the agreement which every one has with the rest to incorporate1 and act as one body1 and so be one distinct commonwealth4 ,the usual1 and almost only way whereby this union is dissolved1 is the inroad of foreign force making a conquest upon them3 for in that case1 7not being able to maintain and support themselves1 as one intire and independent body7 the union belonging to that body which consisted therein1 must necessarily cease1 and so every one return to the state he was in before1 with a liberty to shift for himself1 and provide for his own safety1 as he thinks fit1 in some other society4 ,whenever the society is dissolved1 it is certain the government of that society cannot remain4 ,thus conquerors swords often cut up governments by the roots1 and mangle societies to pieces1 separating the subdued or scattered multitude from the protection of1 and dependence on1 that society which ought to have preserved them from violence4 ,the world is too well instructed in1 and too forward to allow of1 this way of dissolving of governments1 to need any more to be said of it2 and there wants not much argument to prove1 that where the society is dissolved1 the government cannot remain2 that being as impossible1 as for the frame of an house to subsist when the materials of it are scattered and dissipated by a whirl-wind1 or jumbled into a confused heap by an earthquake4 ,sect4 #bab4 ,besides this over-turning from without1 governments are dissolved from within4 ,first1 ,when the legislative is altered4 ,civil society being a state of peace1 amongst those who are of it1 from whom the state of war is excluded by the umpirage1 which they have provided in their legislative1 for the ending all differences that may arise amongst any of them1 it is in their legislative1 that the members of a commonwealth are united1 and combined together into one coherent living body4 ,this is the soul that gives form1 life1 and unity1 to the commonwealth3 from hence the several members have their mutual influence1 sympathy1 and connexion3 and therefore1 when the legislative is broken1 or dissolved1 dissolution and death follows3 for the essence and union of the society consisting in having one will1 the legislative1 when once established by the majority1 has the declaring1 and as it were keeping of that will4 ,the constitution of the legislative is the first and fundamental act of society1 whereby provision is made for the continuation of their union1 under the direction of persons1 and bonds of laws1 made by persons authorized thereunto1 by the consent and appointment of the people1 without which no one man1 or number of men1 amongst them1 can have authority of making laws that shall be binding to the rest4 ,when any one1 or more1 shall take upon them to make laws1 whom the people have not appointed so to do1 they make laws without authority1 which the people are not therefore bound to obey2 by which means they come again to be out of subjection1 and may constitute to themselves a new legislative1 as they think best1 being in full liberty to resist the force of those1 who without authority would impose any thing upon them4 ,every one is at the disposure of his own will1 when those who had1 by the delegation of the society1 the declaring of the public will1 are excluded from it1 and others usurp the place1 who have no such authority or delegation4 ,sect4 #bac4 ,this being usually brought about by such in the commonwealth who misuse the power they have2 it is hard to consider it aright1 and know at whose door to lay it1 without knowing the form of government in which it happens4 ,let us suppose then the legislative placed in the concurrence of three distinct persons4 7i#a_/;i74 ,a single hereditary person1 having the constant1 supreme1 executive power1 and with it the power of convoking and dissolving the other two within certain periods of time4 7i#b_/;i74 ,an assembly of hereditary nobility4 7i#c_/;i74 ,an assembly of representatives chosen1 pro tempore1 by the people4 ,such a form of government supposed1 it is evident1 ,sect4 #bad4 ,first1 ,that when such a single person1 or prince1 sets up his own arbitrary will in place of the laws1 which are the will of the society1 declared by the legislative1 then the legislative is changed3 for that being in effect the legislative1 whose rules and laws are put in execution1 and required to be obeyed2 when other laws are set up1 and other rules pretended1 and inforced1 than what the legislative1 constituted by the society1 have enacted1 it is plain that the legislative is changed4 ,whoever introduces new laws1 not being thereunto authorized by the fundamental appointment of the society1 or subverts the old1 disowns and overturns the power by which they were made1 and so sets up a new legislative4 ,sect4 #bae4 ,secondly1 ,when the prince hinders the legislative from assembling in its due time1 or from acting freely1 pursuant to those ends for which it was constituted1 the legislative is altered3 for it is not a certain number of men1 no1 nor their meeting1 unless they have also freedom of debating1 and leisure of perfecting1 what is for the good of the society1 wherein the legislative consists3 when these are taken away or altered1 so as to deprive the society of the due exercise of their power1 the legislative is truly altered2 for it is not names that constitute governments1 but the use and exercise of those powers that were intended to accompany them2 so that he1 who takes away the freedom1 or hinders the acting of the legislative in its due seasons1 in effect takes away the legislative1 and puts an end to the government4 ,sect4 #baf4 ,thirdly1 ,when1 by the arbitrary power of the prince1 the electors1 or ways of election1 are altered1 without the consent1 and contrary to the common interest of the people1 there also the legislative is altered3 for1 if others than those whom the society hath authorized thereunto1 do chuse1 or in another way than what the society hath prescribed1 those chosen are not the legislative appointed by the people4 ,sect4 #bag4 ,fourthly1 ,the delivery also of the people into the subjection of a foreign power1 either by the prince1 or by the legislative1 is certainly a change of the legislative1 and so a dissolution of the government3 for the end why people entered into society being to be preserved one intire1 free1 independent society1 to be governed by its own laws2 this is lost1 whenever they are given up into the power of another4 ,sect4 #bah4 ,why1 in such a constitution as this1 the dissolution of the government in these cases is to be imputed to the prince1 is evident2 because he1 having the force1 treasure and offices of the state to employ1 and often persuading himself1 or being flattered by others1 that as supreme magistrate he is uncapable of controul2 he alone is in a condition to make great advances toward such changes1 under pretence of lawful authority1 and has it in his hands to terrify or suppress opposers1 as factious1 seditious1 and enemies to the government3 whereas no other part of the legislative1 or people1 is capable by themselves to attempt any alteration of the legislative1 without open and visible rebellion1 apt enough to be taken notice of1 which1 when it prevails1 produces effects very little different from foreign conquest4 ,besides1 the prince in such a form of government1 having the power of dissolving the other parts of the legislative1 and thereby rendering them private persons1 they can never in opposition to him1 or without his concurrence1 alter the legislative by a law1 his consent being necessary to give any of their decrees that sanction4 ,but yet1 so far as the other parts of the legislative any way contribute to any attempt upon the government1 and do either promote1 or not1 what lies in them1 hinder such designs1 they are guilty1 and partake in this1 which is certainly the greatest crime which men can partake of one towards another4 ,sec4 #bai4,there is one way more whereby such a government may be dissolved1 and that is3 ,when he who has the supreme executive power1 neglects and abandons that charge1 so that the laws already made can no longer be put in execution4 ,this is demonstratively to reduce all to anarchy1 and so effectually to dissolve the government3 for laws not being made for themselves1 but to be1 by their execution1 the bonds of the society1 to keep every part of the body politic in its due place and function2 when that totally ceases1 the government visibly ceases1 and the people become a confused multitude1 without order or connexion4 ,where there is no longer the administration of justice1 for the securing of men's rights1 nor any remaining power within the community to direct the force1 or provide for the necessities of the public1 there certainly is no government left4 ,where the laws cannot be executed1 it is all one as if there were no laws2 and a government without laws is1 ,i suppose1 a mystery in politics1 unconceivable to human capacity1 and inconsistent with human society4 ,sect4 #bbj4 ,in these and the like cases1 when the government is dissolved1 the people are at liberty to provide for themselves1 by erecting a new legislative1 differing from the other1 by the change of persons1 or form1 or both1 as they shall find it most for their safety and good3 for the society can never1 by the fault of another1 lose the native and original right it has to preserve itself1 which can only be done by a settled legislative1 and a fair and impartial execution of the laws made by it4 ,but the state of mankind is not so miserable that they are not capable of using this remedy1 till it be too late to look for any4 ,to tell people they may provide for themselves1 by erecting a new legislative1 when by oppression1 artifice1 or being delivered over to a foreign power1 their old one is gone1 is only to tell them1 they may expect relief when it is too late1 and the evil is past cure4 ,this is in effect no more than to bid them first be slaves1 and then to take care of their liberty2 and when their chains are on1 tell them1 they may act like freemen4 ,this1 if barely so1 is rather mockery than relief2 and men can never be secure from tyranny1 if there be no means to escape it till they are perfectly under it3 and therefore it is1 that they have not only a right to get out of it1 but to prevent it4 ,sect4 #bba4 ,there is therefore1 secondly1 another way whereby governments are dissolved1 and that is1 when the legislative1 or the prince1 either of them1 act contrary to their trust4 ,first1 ,the legislative acts against the trust reposed in them1 when they endeavour to invade the property of the subject1 and to make themselves1 or any part of the community1 masters1 or arbitrary disposers of the lives1 liberties1 or fortunes of the people4 ,sect4 #bbb4 ,the reason why men enter into society1 is the preservation of their property2 and the end why they chuse and authorize a legislative1 is1 that there may be laws made1 and rules set1 as guards and fences to the properties of all the members of the society1 to limit the power1 and moderate the dominion1 of every part and member of the society3 for since it can never be supposed to be the will of the society1 that the legislative should have a power to destroy that which every one designs to secure1 by entering into society1 and for which the people submitted themselves to legislators of their own making2 whenever the legislators endeavour to take away1 and destroy the property of the people1 or to reduce them to slavery under arbitrary power1 they put themselves into a state of war with the people1 who are thereupon absolved from any farther obedience1 and are left to the common refuge1 which ,god hath provided for all men1 against force and violence4 ,whensoever therefore the legislative shall transgress this fundamental rule of society2 and either by ambition1 fear1 folly or corruption1 endeavour to grasp themselves1 or put into the hands of any other1 an absolute power over the lives1 liberties1 and estates of the people2 by this breach of trust they forfeit the power the people had put into their hands for quite contrary ends1 and it devolves to the people1 who have a right to resume their original liberty1 and1 by the establishment of a new legislative1 7such as they shall think fit7 provide for their own safety and security1 which is the end for which they are in society4 ,what ,i have said here1 concerning the legislative in general1 holds true also concerning the supreme executor1 who having a double trust put in him1 both to have a part in the legislative1 and the supreme execution of the law1 acts against both1 when he goes about to set up his own arbitrary will as the law of the society4 ,he acts also contrary to his trust1 when he either employs the force1 treasure1 and offices of the society1 to corrupt the representatives1 and gain them to his purposes2 or openly preengages the electors1 and prescribes to their choice1 such1 whom he has1 by sollicitations1 threats1 promises1 or otherwise1 won to his designs2 and employs them to bring in such1 who have promised before-hand what to vote1 and what to enact4 ,thus to regulate candidates and electors1 and new-model the ways of election1 what is it but to cut up the government by the roots1 and poison the very fountain of public security8 for the people having reserved to themselves the choice of their representatives1 as the fence to their properties1 could do it for no other end1 but that they might always be freely chosen1 and so chosen1 freely act1 and advise1 as the necessity of the commonwealth1 and the public good should1 upon examination1 and mature debate1 be judged to require4 ,this1 those who give their votes before they hear the debate1 and have weighed the reasons on all sides1 are not capable of doing4 ,to prepare such an assembly as this1 and endeavour to set up the declared abettors of his own will1 for the true representatives of the people1 and the law-makers of the society1 is certainly as great a breach of trust1 and as perfect a declaration of a design to subvert the government1 as is possible to be met with4 ,to which1 if one shall add rewards and punishments visibly employed to the same end1 and all the arts of perverted law made use of1 to take off and destroy all that stand in the way of such a design1 and will not comply and consent to betray the liberties of their country1 it will be past doubt what is doing4 ,what power they ought to have in the society1 who thus employ it contrary to the trust went along with it in its first institution1 is easy to determine2 and one cannot but see1 that he1 who has once attempted any such thing as this1 cannot any longer be trusted4 ,sect4 #bbc4 ,to this perhaps it will be said1 that the people being ignorant1 and always discontented1 to lay the foundation of government in the unsteady opinion and uncertain humour of the people1 is to expose it to certain ruin2 and no government will be able long to subsist1 if the people may set up a new legislative1 whenever they take offence at the old one4 ,to this ,i answer1 ,quite the contrary4 ,people are not so easily got out of their old forms1 as some are apt to suggest4 ,they are hardly to be prevailed with to amend the acknowledged faults in the frame they have been accustomed to4 ,and if there be any original defects1 or adventitious ones introduced by time1 or corruption2 it is not an easy thing to get them changed1 even when all the world sees there is an opportunity for it4 ,this slowness and aversion in the people to quit their old constitutions1 has1 in the many revolutions which have been seen in this kingdom1 in this and former ages1 still kept us to1 or1 after some interval of fruitless attempts1 still brought us back again to our old legislative of king1 lords and commons3 and whatever provocations have made the crown be taken from some of our princes heads1 they never carried the people so far as to place it in another line4 ,sect4 #bbd4 ,but it will be said1 this hypothesis lays a ferment for frequent rebellion4 ,to which ,i answer1 ,first1 ,no more than any other hypothesis3 for when the people are made miserable1 and find themselves exposed to the ill usage of arbitrary power1 cry up their governors1 as much as you will1 for sons of ,jupiter2 let them be sacred and divine1 descended1 or authorized from heaven2 give them out for whom or what you please1 the same will happen4 ,the people generally ill treated1 and contrary to right1 will be ready upon any occasion to ease themselves of a burden that sits heavy upon them4 ,they will wish1 and seek for the opportunity1 which in the change1 weakness and accidents of human affairs1 seldom delays long to offer itself4 ,he must have lived but a little while in the world1 who has not seen examples of this in his time2 and he must have read very little1 who cannot produce examples of it in all sorts of governments in the world4 ,sect4 #bbe4 ,secondly1 ,i answer1 such revolutions happen not upon every little mismanagement in public affairs4 ,great mistakes in the ruling part1 many wrong and inconvenient laws1 and all the slips of human frailty1 will be born by the people without mutiny or murmur4 ,but if a long train of abuses1 prevarications and artifices1 all tending the same way1 make the design visible to the people1 and they cannot but feel what they lie under1 and see whither they are going2 it is not to be wondered1 that they should then rouze themselves1 and endeavour to put the rule into such hands which may secure to them the ends for which government was at first erected2 and without which1 ancient names1 and specious forms1 are so far from being better1 that they are much worse1 than the state of nature1 or pure anarchy2 the inconveniencies being all as great and as near1 but the remedy farther off and more difficult4 ,sect4 #bbf4 ,thirdly1 ,i answer1 that this doctrine of a power in the people of providing for their safety a-new1 by a new legislative1 when their legislators have acted contrary to their trust1 by invading their property1 is the best fence against rebellion1 and the probablest means to hinder it3 for rebellion being an opposition1 not to persons1 but authority1 which is founded only in the constitutions and laws of the government2 those1 whoever they be1 who by force break through1 and by force justify their violation of them1 are truly and properly rebels3 for when men1 by entering into society and civil-government1 have excluded force1 and introduced laws for the preservation of property1 peace1 and unity amongst themselves1 those who set up force again in opposition to the laws1 do rebellare1 that is1 bring back again the state of war1 and are properly rebels3 which they who are in power1 7by the pretence they have to authority1 the temptation of force they have in their hands1 and the flattery of those about them7 being likeliest to do2 the properest way to prevent the evil1 is to shew them the danger and injustice of it1 who are under the greatest temptation to run into it4 ,sect4 #bbg4 ,in both the fore-mentioned cases1 when either the legislative is changed1 or the legislators act contrary to the end for which they were constituted2 those who are guilty are guilty of rebellion3 for if any one by force takes away the established legislative of any society1 and the laws by them made1 pursuant to their trust1 he thereby takes away the umpirage1 which every one had consented to1 for a peaceable decision of all their controversies1 and a bar to the state of war amongst them4 ,they1 who remove1 or change the legislative1 take away this decisive power1 which no body can have1 but by the appointment and consent of the people2 and so destroying the authority which the people did1 and no body else can set up1 and introducing a power which the people hath not authorized1 they actually introduce a state of war1 which is that of force without authority3 and thus1 by removing the legislative established by the society1 7in whose decisions the people acquiesced and united1 as to that of their own will7 they untie the knot1 and expose the people a-new to the state of war1 ,and if those1 who by force take away the legislative1 are rebels1 the legislators themselves1 as has been shewn1 can be no less esteemed so2 when they1 who were set up for the protection1 and preservation of the people1 their liberties and properties1 shall by force invade and endeavour to take them away2 and so they putting themselves into a state of war with those who made them the protectors and guardians of their peace1 are properly1 and with the greatest aggravation1 rebellantes1 rebels4 ,sect4 #bbh4 ,but if they1 who say it lays a foundation for rebellion1 mean that it may occasion civil wars1 or intestine broils1 to tell the people they are absolved from obedience when illegal attempts are made upon their liberties or properties1 and may oppose the unlawful violence of those who were their magistrates1 when they invade their properties contrary to the trust put in them2 and that therefore this doctrine is not to be allowed1 being so destructive to the peace of the world3 they may as well say1 upon the same ground1 that honest men may not oppose robbers or pirates1 because this may occasion disorder or bloodshed4 ,if any mischief come in such cases1 it is not to be charged upon him who defends his own right1 but on him that invades his neighbours4 ,if the innocent honest man must quietly quit all he has1 for peace sake1 to him who will lay violent hands upon it1 ,i desire it may be considered1 what a kind of peace there will be in the world1 which consists only in violence and rapine2 and which is to be maintained only for the benefit of robbers and oppressors4 ,who would not think it an admirable peace betwix the mighty and the mean1 when the lamb1 without resistance1 yielded his throat to be torn by the imperious wolf8 ,polyphemus's den gives us a perfect pattern of such a peace1 and such a government1 wherein ,ulysses and his companions had nothing to do1 but quietly to suffer themselves to be devoured4 ,and no doubt ,ulysses1 who was a prudent man1 preached up passive obedience1 and exhorted them to a quiet submission1 by representing to them of what concernment peace was to mankind2 and by shewing the inconveniences might happen1 if they should offer to resist ,polyphemus1 who had now the power over them4 ,sect4 #bbi4 ,the end of government is the good of mankind2 and which is best for mankind1 that the people should be always exposed to the boundless will of tyranny1 or that the rulers should be sometimes liable to be opposed1 when they grow exorbitant in the use of their power1 and employ it for the destruction1 and not the preservation of the properties of their people8 ,sect4 #bcj4 ,nor let any one say1 that mischief can arise from hence1 as often as it shall please a busy head1 or turbulent spirit1 to desire the alteration of the government4 ,it is true1 such men may stir1 whenever they please2 but it will be only to their own just ruin and perdition3 for till the mischief be grown general1 and the ill designs of the rulers become visible1 or their attempts sensible to the greater part1 the people1 who are more disposed to suffer than right themselves by resistance1 are not apt to stir4 ,the examples of particular injustice1 or oppression of here and there an unfortunate man1 moves them not4 ,but if they universally have a persuation1 grounded upon manifest evidence1 that designs are carrying on against their liberties1 and the general course and tendency of things cannot but give them strong suspicions of the evil intention of their governors1 who is to be blamed for it8 ,who can help it1 if they1 who might avoid it1 bring themselves into this suspicion8 ,are the people to be blamed1 if they have the sense of rational creatures1 and can think of things no otherwise than as they find and feel them8 ,and is it not rather their fault1 who put things into such a posture1 that they would not have them thought to be as they are8 ,i grant1 that the pride1 ambition1 and turbulency of private men have sometimes caused great disorders in commonwealths1 and factions have been fatal to states and kingdoms4 ,but whether the mischief hath oftener begun in the peoples wantonness1 and a desire to cast off the lawful authority of their rulers1 or in the rulers insolence1 and endeavours to get and exercise an arbitrary power over their people2 whether oppression1 or disobedience1 gave the first rise to the disorder1 ,i leave it to impartial history to determine4 ,this ,i am sure1 whoever1 either ruler or subject1 by force goes about to invade the rights of either prince or people1 and lays the foundation for overturning the constitution and frame of any just government1 is highly guilty of the greatest crime1 ,i think1 a man is capable of1 being to answer for all those mischiefs of blood1 rapine1 and desolation1 which the breaking to pieces of governments bring on a country4 ,and he who does it1 is justly to be esteemed the common enemy and pest of mankind1 and is to be treated accordingly4 ,sect4 #bca4 ,that subjects or foreigners1 attempting by force on the properties of any people1 may be resisted with force1 is agreed on all hands4 ,but that magistrates1 doing the same thing1 may be resisted1 hath of late been denied3 as if those who had the greatest privileges and advantages by the law1 had thereby a power to break those laws1 by which alone they were set in a better place than their brethren3 whereas their offence is thereby the greater1 both as being ungrateful for the greater share they have by the law1 and breaking also that trust1 which is put into their hands by their brethren4 ,sect4 #bcb4 ,whosoever uses force without right1 as every one does in society1 who does it without law1 puts himself into a state of war with those against whom he so uses it2 and in that state all former ties are cancelled1 all other rights cease1 and every one has a right to defend himself1 and to resist the aggressor4 ,this is so evident1 that ,barclay himself1 that great assertor of the power and sacredness of kings1 is forced to confess1 ,that it is lawful for the people1 in some cases1 to resist their king2 and that too in a chapter1 wherein he pretends to shew1 that the divine law shuts up the people from all manner of rebellion4 ,whereby it is evident1 even by his own doctrine1 that1 since they may in some cases resist1 all resisting of princes is not rebellion4 ,his words are these4 ,quod siquis dicat1 ,ergone populus tyrannicae crudelitati furori jugulum semper praebebit8 ,ergone multitude civitates suas fame1 ferro1 flamma vastari1 seque1 conjuges1 liberos fortunae ludibrio tyranni libidini exponi1 inque omnia vitae pericula omnesque miserias molestias a rege deduci patientur8 ,num illis quod omni animantium generi est a natura tributum1 denegari debet1 ut sc4 vim vi repellant1 seseq2 ab injuria1 tueantur8 ,huic breviter responsum sit1 ,populo universo negari defensionem1 quae juris naturalis est1 neque ultionem quae praeter naturam est adversus regem concedi debere4 ,quapropter si rex non in singulares tantum personas aliquot privatum odium exerceat1 sed corpus etiam reipublicae1 cujus ipse caput est1 i4e4 totum populum1 vel insignem aliquam ejus partem immani intoleranda saevitia seu tyrannide divexet2 populo1 quidem hoc casu resistendi ac tuendi se ab injuria potestas competit1 sed tuendi se tantum1 non enim in principem invadendi3 restituendae injuriae illatae1 non recedendi a debita reverentia propter acceptam injuriam4 ,praesentem denique impetum propulsandi non vim praeteritam ulciscenti jus habet4 ,horum enim alterum a natura est1 ut vitam scilicet corpusque tueamur4 ,alterum vero contra naturam1 ut inferior de superiori supplicium sumat4 ,quod itaque populus malum1 antequam factum sit1 impedire potest1 ne fiat1 id postquam factum est1 in regem authorem sceleris vindicare non potest3 populus igitur hoc amplius quam privatus quispiam habet3 quod huic1 vel ipsis adversariis judicibus1 excepto ,buchanano1 nullum nisi in patientia remedium superest4 ,cum ille si intolerabilis tyrannus est 7modicum enim ferre omnino debet7 resistere cum reverentia possit1 ,barclay contra ,monarchom4 #a4 iii4 c4 #h4 ,in ,english thus3 ,sect4 #bcc4 ,but if any one should ask1 ,must the people then always lay themselves open to the cruelty and rage of tyranny8 ,must they see their cities pillaged1 and laid in ashes1 their wives and children exposed to the tyrant's lust and fury1 and themselves and families reduced by their king to ruin1 and all the miseries of want and oppression1 and yet sit still8 ,must men alone be debarred the common privilege of opposing force with force1 which nature allows so freely to all other creatures for their preservation from injury8 ,i answer3 ,self-defence is a part of the law of nature2 nor can it be denied the community1 even against the king himself3 but to revenge themselves upon him1 must by no means be allowed them2 it being not agreeable to that law4 ,wherefore if the king shall shew an hatred1 not only to some particular persons1 but sets himself against the body of the commonwealth1 whereof he is the head1 and shall1 with intolerable ill usage1 cruelly tyrannize over the whole1 or a considerable part of the people1 in this case the people have a right to resist and defend themselves from injury3 but it must be with this caution1 that they only defend themselves1 but do not attack their prince3 they may repair the damages received1 but must not for any provocation exceed the bounds of due reverence and respect4 ,they may repulse the present attempt1 but must not revenge past violences3 for it is natural for us to defend life and limb1 but that an inferior should punish a superior1 is against nature4 ,the mischief which is designed them1 the people may prevent before it be done2 but when it is done1 they must not revenge it on the king1 though author of the villany4 ,this therefore is the privilege of the people in general1 above what any private person hath2 that particular men are allowed by our adversaries themselves 7,buchanan only excepted7 to have no other remedy but patience2 but the body of the people may with respect resist intolerable tyranny2 for when it is but moderate1 they ought to endure it4 ,sect4 #bcd4 ,thus far that great advocate of monarchical power allows of resistance4 ,sect4 #bce4 ,it is true1 he has annexed two limitations to it1 to no purpose3 ,first1 ,he says1 it must be with reverence4 ,secondly1 ,it must be without retribution1 or punishment2 and the reason he gives is1 because an inferior cannot punish a superior4 ,first1 ,how to resist force without striking again1 or how to strike with reverence1 will need some skill to make intelligible4 ,he that shall oppose an assault only with a shield to receive the blows1 or in any more respectful posture1 without a sword in his hand1 to abate the confidence and force of the assailant1 will quickly be at an end of his resistance1 and will find such a defence serve only to draw on himself the worse usage4 ,this is as ridiculous a way of resisting1 as juvenal thought it of fighting2 ubi tu pulsas1 ego vapulo tantum4 ,and the success of the combat will be unavoidably the same he there describes it3 _/99#d -----,libertas pauperis haec est3 ,pulsatus rogat1 et pugnis concisus1 adorat1 ,ut liceat paucis cum dentibus inde reverti4 99_/ ,this will always be the event of such an imaginary resistance1 where men may not strike again4 ,he therefore who may resist1 must be allowed to strike4 ,and then let our author1 or any body else1 join a knock on the head1 or a cut on the face1 with as much reverence and respect as he thinks fit4 ,he that can reconcile blows and reverence1 may1 for aught ,i know1 desire for his pains1 a civil1 respectful cudgeling where-ever he can meet with it4 ,secondly1 ,as to his second1 ,an inferior cannot punish a superior2 that is true1 generally speaking1 whilst he is his superior4 ,but to resist force with force1 being the state of war that levels the parties1 cancels all former relation of reverence1 respect1 and superiority3 and then the odds that remains1 is1 that he1 who opposes the unjust agressor1 has this superiority over him1 that he has a right1 when he prevails1 to punish the offender1 both for the breach of the peace1 and all the evils that followed upon it4 ,barclay therefore1 in another place1 more coherently to himself1 denies it to be lawful to resist a king in any case4 ,but he there assigns two cases1 whereby a king may un-king himself4 ,his words are1 ,quid ergo1 nulline casus incidere possunt quibus populo sese erigere atque in regem impotentius dominantem arma capere invadere jure suo suaque authoritate liceat8 ,nulli certe quamdiu rex manet4 ,semper enim ex divinis id obstat1 ,regem honorificato2 qui potestati resistit1 ,dei ordinationi resisit3 non alias igitur in eum populo potestas est quam si id committat propter quod ipso jure rex esse desinat4 ,tunc enim se ipse principatu exuit atque in privatis constituit liber3 hoc modo populus superior efficitur1 reverso ad eum sc4 jure illo quod ante regem inauguratum in interregno habuit4 ,at sunt paucorum generum commissa ejusmodi quae hunc effectum pariunt4 ,at ego cum plurima animo perlustrem1 duo tantum invenio1 duos1 inquam1 casus quibus rex ipso facto ex rege non regem se facit omni honore dignitate regali atque in subditos potestate destituit2 quorum etiam meminit ,winzerus4 ,horum unus est1 ,si regnum disperdat1 quemadmodum de ,nerone fertur1 quod is nempe senatum populumque ,romanum1 atque adeo urbem ipsam ferro flammaque vastare1 ac novas sibi sedes quaerere decrevisset4 ,et de ,caligula1 quod palam denunciarit se neque civem neque principem senatui amplius fore1 inque animo habuerit interempto utriusque ordinis electissimo quoque ,alexandriam commigrare1 ac ut populum uno ictu interimeret1 unam ei cervicem optavit4 ,talia cum rex aliquis meditator molitur serio1 omnem regnandi curam animum ilico abjicit1 ac proinde imperium in subditos amittit1 ut dominus servi pro derelicto habiti dominium4 ,sect4 #bcf4 ,alter casus est1 ,si rex in alicujus clientelam se contulit1 ac regnum quod liberum a majoribus populo traditum accepit1 alienae ditioni mancipavit4 ,nam tunc quamvis forte non ea mente id agit populo plane ut incommodet3 tamen quia quod praecipuum est regiae dignitatis amifit1 ut summus scilicet in regno secundum ,deum sit1 solo ,deo inferior1 atque populum etiam totum ignorantem vel invitum1 cujus libertatem sartam tectam conservare debuit1 in alterius gentis ditionem potestatem dedidit2 hac velut quadam regni ab alienatione effecit1 ut nec quod ipse in regno imperium habuit retineat1 nec in eum cui collatum voluit1 juris quicquam transferat2 atque ita eo facto liberum jam suae potestatis populum relinquit1 cujus rei exemplum unum annales ,scotici suppeditant4 ,barclay contra ,monarchom4 #a4 iii4 c4 #af4 ,which in ,english runs thus3 ,sect4 #bcg4 ,what then1 can there no case happen wherein the people may of right1 and by their own authority1 help themselves1 take arms1 and set upon their king1 imperiously domineering over them8 ,none at all1 whilst he remains a king4 ,honour the king1 and he that resists the power1 resists the ordinance of ,god2 are divine oracles that will never permit it1 ,the people therefore can never come by a power over him1 unless he does something that makes him cease to be a king3 for then he divests himself of his crown and dignity1 and returns to the state of a private man1 and the people become free and superior1 the power which they had in the interregnum1 before they crowned him king1 devolving to them again4 ,but there are but few miscarriages which bring the matter to this state4 ,after considering it well on all sides1 ,i can find but two4 ,two cases there are1 ,i say1 whereby a king1 ipso facto1 becomes no king1 and loses all power and regal authority over his people2 which are also taken notice of by ,winzerus4 ,the first is1 ,if he endeavour to overturn the government1 that is1 if he have a purpose and design to ruin the kingdom and commonwealth1 as it is recorded of ,nero1 that he resolved to cut off the senate and people of ,rome1 lay the city waste with fire and sword1 and then remove to some other place4 ,and of ,caligula1 that he openly declared1 that he would be no longer a head to the people or senate1 and that he had it in his thoughts to cut off the worthiest men of both ranks1 and then retire to ,alexandria3 and he wisht that the people had but one neck1 that he might dispatch them all at a blow1 ,such designs as these1 when any king harbours in his thoughts1 and seriously promotes1 he immediately gives up all care and thought of the commonwealth2 and consequently forfeits the power of governing his subjects1 as a master does the dominion over his slaves whom he hath abandoned4 ,sect4 #bch4 ,the other case is1 ,when a king makes himself the dependent of another1 and subjects his kingdom which his ancestors left him1 and the people put free into his hands1 to the dominion of another3 for however perhaps it may not be his intention to prejudice the people2 yet because he has hereby lost the principal part of regal dignity1 viz4 to be next and immediately under ,god1 supreme in his kingdom2 and also because he betrayed or forced his people1 whose liberty he ought to have carefully preserved1 into the power and dominion of a foreign nation4 ,by this1 as it were1 alienation of his kingdom1 he himself loses the power he had in it before1 without transferring any the least right to those on whom he would have bestowed it2 and so by this act sets the people free1 and leaves them at their own disposal4 ,one example of this is to be found in the ,scotch ,annals4 ,sect4 #bci4 ,in these cases ,barclay1 the great champion of absolute monarchy1 is forced to allow1 that a king may be resisted1 and ceases to be a king4 ,that is1 in short1 not to multiply cases1 in whatsoever he has no authority1 there he is no king1 and may be resisted3 for wheresoever the authority ceases1 the king ceases too1 and becomes like other men who have no authority4 ,and these two cases he instances in1 differ little from those above mentioned1 to be destructive to governments1 only that he has omitted the principle from which his doctrine flows3 and that is1 the breach of trust1 in not preserving the form of government agreed on1 and in not intending the end of government itself1 which is the public good and preservation of property4 ,when a king has dethroned himself1 and put himself in a state of war with his people1 what shall hinder them from prosecuting him who is no king1 as they would any other man1 who has put himself into a state of war with them1 ,barclay1 and those of his opinion1 would do well to tell us4 ,this farther ,i desire may be taken notice of out of ,barclay1 that he says1 ,the mischief that is designed them1 the people may prevent before it be done3 whereby he allows resistance when tyranny is but in design4 ,such designs as these 7says he7 when any king harbours in his thoughts and seriously promotes1 he immediately gives up all care and thought of the commonwealth2 so that1 according to him1 the neglect of the public good is to be taken as an evidence of such design1 or at least for a sufficient cause of resistance4 ,and the reason of all1 he gives in these words1 ,because he betrayed or forced his people1 whose liberty he ought carefully to have preserved4 ,what he adds1 into the power and dominion of a foreign nation1 signifies nothing1 the fault and forfeiture lying in the loss of their liberty1 which he ought to have preserved1 and not in any distinction of the persons to whose dominion they were subjected4 ,the peoples right is equally invaded1 and their liberty lost1 whether they are made slaves to any of their own1 or a foreign nation2 and in this lies the injury1 and against this only have they the right of defence4 ,and there are instances to be found in all countries1 which shew1 that it is not the change of nations in the persons of their governors1 but the change of government1 that gives the offence4 ,bilson1 a bishop of our church1 and a great stickler for the power and prerogative of princes1 does1 if ,i mistake not1 in his treatise of ,christian subjection1 acknowledge1 that princes may forfeit their power1 and their title to the obedience of their subjects2 and if there needed authority in a case where reason is so plain1 ,i could send my reader to ,bracton1 ,fortescue1 and the author of the ,mirrour1 and others1 writers that cannot be suspected to be ignorant of our government1 or enemies to it4 ,but ,i thought ,hooker alone might be enough to satisfy those men1 who relying on him for their ecclesiastical polity1 are by a strange fate carried to deny those principles upon which he builds it4 ,whether they are herein made the tools of cunninger workmen1 to pull down their own fabric1 they were best look4 ,this ,i am sure1 their civil policy is so new1 so dangerous1 and so destructive to both rulers and people1 that as former ages never could bear the broaching of it2 so it may be hoped1 those to come1 redeemed from the impositions of these ,egyptian under-task-masters1 will abhor the memory of such servile flatterers1 who1 whilst it seemed to serve their turn1 resolved all government into absolute tyranny1 and would have all men born to1 what their mean souls fitted them for1 slavery4 ,sect4 #bdj4 ,here1 it is like1 the common question will be made1 ,who shall be judge1 whether the prince or legislative act contrary to their trust8 ,this1 perhaps1 ill-affected and factious men may spread amongst the people1 when the prince only makes use of his due prerogative4 ,to this ,i reply1 ,the people shall be judge2 for who shall be judge whether his trustee or deputy acts well1 and according to the trust reposed in him1 but he who deputes him1 and must1 by having deputed him1 have still a power to discard him1 when he fails in his trust8 ,if this be reasonable in particular cases of private men1 why should it be otherwise in that of the greatest moment1 where the welfare of millions is concerned1 and also where the evil1 if not prevented1 is greater1 and the redress very difficult1 dear1 and dangerous8 ,sect4 #bda4 ,but farther1 this question1 7,who shall be judge87 cannot mean1 that there is no judge at all3 for where there is no judicature on earth1 to decide controversies amongst men1 ,god in heaven is judge4 ,he alone1 it is true1 is judge of the right4 ,but every man is judge for himself1 as in all other cases1 so in this1 whether another hath put himself into a state of war with him1 and whether he should appeal to the ,supreme ,judge1 as ,jeptha did4 ,sect4 #bdb4 ,if a controversy arise betwixt a prince and some of the people1 in a matter where the law is silent1 or doubtful1 and the thing be of great consequence1 ,i should think the proper umpire1 in such a case1 should be the body of the people3 for in cases where the prince hath a trust reposed in him1 and is dispensed from the common ordinary rules of the law2 there1 if any men find themselves aggrieved1 and think the prince acts contrary to1 or beyond that trust1 who so proper to judge as the body of the people1 7who1 at first1 lodged that trust in him7 how far they meant it should extend8 ,but if the prince1 or whoever they be in the administration1 decline that way of determination1 the appeal then lies no where but to heaven2 force between either persons1 who have no known superior on earth1 or which permits no appeal to a judge on earth1 being properly a state of war1 wherein the appeal lies only to heaven2 and in that state the injured party must judge for himself1 when he will think fit to make use of that appeal1 and put himself upon it4 ,sect4 #bdc4 ,to conclude1 ,the power that every individual gave the society1 when he entered into it1 can never revert to the individuals again1 as long as the society lasts1 but will always remain in the community2 because without this there can be no community1 no commonwealth1 which is contrary to the original agreement3 so also when the society hath placed the legislative in any assembly of men1 to continue in them and their successors1 with direction and authority for providing such successors1 the legislative can never revert to the people whilst that government lasts2 because having provided a legislative with power to continue for ever1 they have given up their political power to the legislative1 and cannot resume it4 ,but if they have set limits to the duration of their legislative1 and made this supreme power in any person1 or assembly1 only temporary2 or else1 when by the miscarriages of those in authority1 it is forfeited2 upon the forfeiture1 or at the determination of the time set1 it reverts to the society1 and the people have a right to act as supreme1 and continue the legislative in themselves2 or erect a new form1 or under the old form place it in new hands1 as they think good4 ,,finis4