,,the ,,ved,,nt-,s,,tras ,,with ,,the ,,commentary ,,by ,r,m,,nuja ,,translated ,,by ,,george ,,thibaut ,,part ,,iii ,sacred ,books of the ,east1 ,volume #dh #aijd ,scanned in by ,srinivasan ,sriram 7as part of the sripedia4org initiative74 ,o,c,red and proofed at ,distributed ,proofing by other volunteers2 ,juliet ,sutherland1 project manager4 ,formatting and additional proofreading at ,sacred-texts4com by ,j4,b4 ,hare4 ,this text is in the public domain worldwide4 ,this file may be used for any non-commercial purpose provided this notice is left intact4 ,,contents4 ,,ved,,nta-,s,,tras ,,with ,,the ,,commentary ,,of ,r,m,,nuja4 ,,introduction ,,adhy,,ya ,i ,pda ,i ,pda ,,ii ,pda ,,iii ,pda ,,iv ,,adhy,,ya ,,ii ,pda ,i ,pda ,,ii ,pda ,,iii ,pda ,,iv ,,adhy,,ya ,,iii ,pda ,i ,pda ,,ii ,pda ,,iii ,pda ,,iv ,,adhy,,ya ,,iv ,pda ,i ,pda ,,ii ,pda ,,iii ,pda ,,iv ,,indexes ,,by ,,dr4 ,m4 ,,winternitz3-- ,index of ,quotations ,index of ,sanskrit ,words ,index of ,names and ,subjects ,corrigenda ,transliteration of ,oriental ,alphabets adopted for the ,translations of the ,sacred ,books of the ,east ,,introduction4 ,in the ,introduction to the first volume of the translation of the ',vednta-,stras with ,sankara's ,commentary' 7vol4 xxxiv of this ,series7 ,i have dwelt at some length on the interest which ,rmnuja's ,commentary may claim--as being1 on the one hand1 the fullest exposition of what may be called the ,theistic ,vednta1 and as supplying us1 on the other1 with means of penetrating to the true meaning of ,bdaryana's ,aphorisms4 ,i do not wish to enter here into a fuller discussion of ,rmnuja's work in either of these aspects2 an adequate treatment of them would1 moreover1 require considerably more space than is at my disposal4 ,some very useful material for the right understanding of ,rmnuju's work is to be found in the ',analytical ,outline of ,contents' which ,messrs4 ,m4 ,rangkrya and ,m4 ,b4 ,varadarja ,aiyangr have prefixed to the first volume of their scholarly translation of the ,srbhshya 7,madras1 #ahii74 ,the question as to what the ,stras really teach is a critical1 not a philosophical one4 ,this distinction seems to have been imperfectly realised by several of those critics1 writing in ,india1 who have examined the views expressed in my ,introduction to the translation of ,sankara's ,commentary4 ,a writer should not be taxed with 'philosophic incompetency1' 'hopeless theistic bias due to early training1' and the like1 simply because he1 on the basis of a purely critical investigation1 considers himself entitled to maintain that a certain ancient document sets forth one philosophical view rather than another4 ,i have nowhere expressed an opinion as to the comparative philosophical value of the systems of ,sankara and ,rmnuja2 not because ,i have no definite opinions on this point1 but because to introduce them into a critical enquiry would be purposeless if not objectionable4 ,the question as to the true meaning of the ,stras is no doubt of some interest2 although the interest of problems of this kind may easily be over-estimated4 ,among the remarks of critics on my treatment of this problem ,i have found little of solid value4 ,the main arguments which ,i have set forth1 not so much in favour of the adequacy of ,rmnuja's interpretation1 as against the validity of ,sankarkrya's understanding of the ,stras1 appear to me not to have been touched4 ,i do not by any means consider the problem a hopeless one2 but its solution will not be advanced1 in any direction1 but by those who will be at the trouble of submitting the entire body of the ,stras to a new and detailed investigation1 availing themselves to the full of the help that is to be derived from the study of all the existing ,commentaries4 ,the present translation of the ,srbhshya claims to be faithful on the whole1 although ,i must acknowledge that ,i have aimed rather at making it intelligible and1 in a certain sense1 readable than scrupulously accurate4 ,if ,i had to rewrite it1 ,i should feel inclined to go even further in the same direction4 ,indian ,philosophy would1 in my opinion1 be more readily and widely appreciated than it is at present1 if the translators of philosophical works had been somewhat more concerned to throw their versions into a form less strange and repellent to the western reader than literal renderings from technical ,sanskrit must needs be in many passages4 ,i am not unaware of the peculiar dangers of the plan now advocated--among which the most obvious is the temptation it offers to the translator of deviating from the text more widely than regard for clearness would absolutely require4 ,and ,i am conscious of having failed in this respect in more than one instance4 ,in other cases ,i have no doubt gone astray through an imperfect understanding of the author's meaning4 ,the fact is1 that as yet the time has hardly come for fully adequate translations of comprehensive works of the type of the ,srbhshya1 the authors of which wrote with reference--in many cases tacit--to an immense and highly technical philosophical literature which is only just beginning to be studied1 and comprehended in part1 by ,european scholars4 ,it gives me great pleasure to acknowledge the help which ,i have received from various quarters in preparing this translation4 ,pandit ,gangdhara ,sstrin1 ,c4 ,i4 ,e41 of the ,benares ,sanskrit ,college1 has1 with unwearying kindness and patience1 supplied me throughout with comments of his own on difficult sections of the text4 ,pandit ,svmin ,rma ,misra ,sstrin has rendered me frequent assistance in the earlier portion of my task4 ,and to ,mr4 ,a4 ,venis1 the learned ,principal of the ,benares ,sanskrit ,college1 ,i am indebted for most instructive notes on some passages of a peculiarly technical and abstruse character4 ,nor can ,i conclude without expressing my sense of obligation to ,colonel ,g4 ,a4 ,jacob1 whose invaluable ',concordance to the ,principal ,upanishads' lightens to an incalculable degree the task of any scholar who is engaged in work bearing on the ,vednta4 ,,ved,,nta-,s,,tras ,,with ,r,m,,nuja',s ,,sr,,bh,,shya ,,first ,,adhy,,ya4 ,,first ,p,,da4 ,,may my mind be filled with devotion towards the highest ,brahman1 the abode of ,lakshmi who is luminously revealed in the ,upanishads2 who in sport produces1 sustains1 and reabsorbs the entire ,universe2 whose only aim is to foster the manifold classes of beings that humbly worship him4 ,the nectar of the teaching of ,parsara's son 7,vysa71--which was brought up from the middle of the milk-ocean of the ,upanishads--which restores to life the souls whose vital strength had departed owing to the heat of the fire of transmigratory existence--which was well guarded by the teachers of old--which was obscured by the mutual conflict of manifold opinions1--may intelligent men daily enjoy that as it is now presented to them in my words4 ,the lengthy explanation 7vritti7 of the ,brahma-stras which was composed by the ,reverend ,bodhyana has been abridged by former teachers2 according to their views the words of the ,stras will be explained in this present work4 #a4 ,then therefore the enquiry into ,brahman4 ,in this ,stra the word 'then' expresses immediate sequence2 the word 'therefore' intimates that what has taken place 7viz4 the study of the karmaknda of the ,veda7 constitutes the reason 7of the enquiry into ,brahman74 ,for the fact is that the enquiry into 7lit4'the desire to know'7 ,brahman--the fruit of which enquiry is infinite in nature and permanent--follows immediately in the case of him who1 having read the ,veda together with its auxiliary disciplines1 has reached the knowledge that the fruit of mere works is limited and non-permanent1 and hence has conceived the desire of final release4 ,the compound 'brahmajijs' is to be explained as 'the enquiry of ,brahman1' the genitive case 'of ,brahman' being understood to denote the object2 in agreement with the special rule as to the meaning of the genitive case1 ,pnini ,,ii1 #c1 #fe4 ,it might be said that even if we accepted the general meaning of the genitive case--which is that of connexion in general--,brahman's position 7in the above compound7 as an object would be established by the circumstance that the 'enquiry' demands an object2 but in agreement with the principle that the direct denotation of a word is to be preferred to a meaning inferred we take the genitive case 'of ,brahman' as denoting the object4 ,the word ',brahman' denotes the hightest ,person 7purushottama71 who is essentially free from all imperfections and possesses numberless classes of auspicious qualities of unsurpassable excellence4 ,the term ',brahman' is applied to any things which possess the quality of greatness 7brihattva1 from the root 'brih'72 but primarily denotes that which possesses greatness1 of essential nature as well as of qualities1 in unlimited fulness2 and such is only the ,lord of all4 ,hence the word ',brahman' primarily denotes him alone1 and in a secondary derivative sense only those things which possess some small part of the ,lord's qualities2 for it would be improper to assume several meanings for the word 7so that it would denote primarily or directly more than one thing74 ,the case is analogous to that of the term 'bhagavat ,,footnote #d3a4' ,the ,lord only is enquired into1 for the sake of immortality1 by all those who are afflicted with the triad of pain4 ,hence the ,lord of all is that ,brahman which1 according to the ,stra1 constitutes the object of enquiry4 ,the word 'jijs' is a desiderative formation meaning 'desire to know4' ,and as in the case of any desire the desired object is the chief thing1 the ,stra means to enjoin knowledge--which is the object of the desire of knowledge4 ,the purport of the entire ,stra then is as follows3 ',since the fruit of works known through the earlier part of the ,mmms is limited and non-permanent1 and since the fruit of the knowledge of ,brahman--which knowledge is to be reached through the latter part of the ,mmms--is unlimited and permanent2 for this reason ,brahman is to be known1 after the knowledge of works has previously taken place4'--,the same meaning is expressed by the ,vrittikra when saying 'after the comprehension of works has taken place there follows the enquiry into ,brahman4' ,and that the enquiry into works and that into ,brahman constitute one body of doctrine1 he 7the ,vrittikra7 will declare later on 'this ,srraka-doctrine is connected with ,jaimini's doctrine as contained in sixteen adhyyas2 this proves the two to constitute one body of doctrine4' ,hence the earlier and the later ,mmms are separate only in so far as there is a difference of matter to be taught by each2 in the same way as the two halves of the ,prva ,mmms-stras1 consisting of six adhyyas each1 are separate ,,footnote #e3a2 and as each adhyya is separate4 ,the entire ,mmms-stra--which begins with the ,stra ',now therefore the enquiry into religious duty' and concludes with the ,stra '7,from there is7 no return on account of scriptural statement'-- has1 owing to the special character of the contents1 a definite order of internal succession4 ,this is as follows4 ,at first the precept 'one is to learn one's own text 7svdhyya7' enjoins the apprehension of that aggregate of syllables which is called ',veda1' and is here referred to as 'svdhyya4' ,next there arises the desire to know of what nature the ',learning' enjoined is to be1 and how it is to be done4 ,here there come in certain injunctions such as ',let a ,brahnmana be initiated in his eighth year' and ',the teacher is to make him recite the ,veda'2 and certain rules about special observances and restrictions--such as 'having performed the upkarman on the full moon of ,sravana or ,praushthapada according to prescription1 he is to study the sacred verses for four months and a half--which enjoin all the required details4 ,from all these it is understood that the study enjoined has for its result the apprehension of the aggregate of syllables called ,veda1 on the part of a pupil who has been initiated by a teacher sprung from a good family1 leading a virtuous life1 and possessing purity of soul2 who practises certain special observances and restrictions2 and who learns by repeating what is recited by the teacher4 ,and this study of the ,veda is of the nature of a samskra of the text1 since the form of the injunction 'the ,veda is to be studied' shows that the ,veda is the object 7of the action of studying74 ,by a samskra is understood an action whereby something is fitted to produce some other effect2 and that the ,veda should be the object of such a samskara is quite appropriate1 since it gives rise to the knowledge of the four chief ends of human action--viz4 religious duty1 wealth1 pleasure1 and final release--and of the means to effect them2 and since it helps to effect those ends by itself also1 viz4 by mere mechanical repetition 7apart from any knowledge to which it may give rise74 ,the injunction as to the study of the ,veda thus aims only at the apprehension of the aggregate of syllables 7constituting the ,veda7 according to certain rules2 it is in this way analogous to the recital of mantras4 ,it is further observed that the ,veda thus apprehended through reading spontaneously gives rise to the ideas of certain things subserving certain purposes4 ,a person1 therefore1 who has formed notions of those things immediately1 i4e4 on the mere apprehension of the text of the ,veda through reading1 thereupon naturally applies himself to the study of the ,mimmsa1 which consists in a methodical discussion of the sentences constituting the text of the ,veda1 and has for its result the accurate determination of the nature of those things and their different modes4 ,through this study the student ascertains the character of the injunctions of work which form part of the ,veda1 and observes that all work leads only to non-permanent results2 and as1 on the other hand1 he immediately becomes aware that the ,upanishad sections--which form part of the ,veda which he has apprehended through reading--refer to an infinite and permanent result1 viz4 immortality1 he applies himself to the study of the ,srraka-,mmms1 which consists in a systematic discussion of the ,vednta-texts1 and has for its result the accurate determination of their sense4 ,that the fruit of mere works is transitory1 while the result of the knowledge of ,brahman is something permanent1 the ,vedanta-texts declare in many places--',and as here the world acquired by work perishes1 so there the world acquired by merit perishes' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,viii1 #a1f72 ',that work of his has an end' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #h1 #aj72 ',by non-permanent works the ,permanent is not obtained' 7,ka4 ,up4 ,i1 #b1 #aj72 ',frail indeed are those boats1 the sacrifices' 7,mu4 ,up4 ,i1 #b1 #g72 ',let a ,brhmana1 after he has examined all these worlds that are gained by works1 acquire freedom from all desires4 ,what is not made cannot be gained by what is made4 ,to understand this1 let the pupil1 with fuel in his hand1 go to a teacher who is learned and dwells entirely in ,brahman4 ,to that pupil who has approached him respectfully1 whose mind is altogether calm1 the wise teacher truly told that knowledge of ,brahman through which he knows the imperishable true ,person' 7,mu4 ,up4 ,i1 #b1 #ab1 #ac74 ',told' here means 'he is to tell4'--,on the other hand1 ',he who knows ,brahman attains the ,highest' 7,taitt4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #a1 #a72 ',he who sees this does not see death' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vii1 #bf1 #b72 ',he becomes a self-ruler' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vii1 #be1 #b72 ',knowing him he becomes immortal here' 7,taitt4 r4 ,,iii1 #ab1 #g72 ',having known him he passes over death2 there is no other path to go' 7,svet4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #ae72 ',having known as separate his ,self and the ,mover1 pleased thereby he goes to immortality' 7,svet4 ,up4 ,i1 #f74 ,but--an objection here is raised--the mere learning of the ,veda with its auxiliary disciplines gives rise to the knowledge that the heavenly world and the like are the results of works1 and that all such results are transitory1 while immortality is the fruit of meditation on ,brahman4 ,possessing such knowledge1 a person desirous of final release may at once proceed to the enquiry into ,brahman2 and what need is there of a systematic consideration of religious duty 7i4e4 of the study of the ,purva ,mimms78--,if this reasoning were valid1 we reply1 the person desirous of release need not even apply himself to the study of the ,srraka ,mmms1 since ,brahman is known from the mere reading of the ,veda with its auxiliary disciplines4--,true4 ,such knowledge arises indeed immediately 7without deeper enquiry74 ,but a matter apprehended in this immediate way is not raised above doubt and mistake4 ,hence a systematic discussion of the ,vednta-texts must he undertaken in order that their sense may be fully ascertained--,we agree4 ,but you will have to admit that for the very same reason we must undertake a systematic enquiry into religious duty6 ,,footnote #d3a4 ',bhagavat' denotes primarily the ,lord1 the divinity2 secondarily any holy person4 ,,footnote #e3a4 ,the first six books of the ,prva ,mmms-stras give rules for the fundamental forms of the sacrifice2 while the last six books teach how these rules are to be applied to the so-called modified forms4 ,,the ,,small ,p,,rvapaksha4 ,but--a further objection is urged--as that which has to precede the systematic enquiry into ,brahman we should assign something which that enquiry necessarily presupposes4 ,the enquiry into the nature of duty1 however1 does not form such a prerequisite1 since a consideration of the ,vedanta-texts may be undertaken by any one who has read those texts1 even if he is not acquainted with works4--,but in the ,vedanta-texts there are enjoined meditations on the ,udgtha and the like which are matters auxiliary to works2 and such meditations are not possible for him who is not acquainted with those works6--,you who raise this objection clearly are ignorant of what kind of knowledge the ,srraka ,mmms is concerned with6 ,what that sstra aims at is to destroy completely that wrong knowledge which is the root of all pain1 for man1 liable to birth1 old age1 and death1 and all the numberless other evils connected with transmigratory existence--evils that spring from the view1 due to beginningless ,nescience1 that there is plurality of existence2 and to that end the sstra endeavours to establish the knowledge of the unity of the ,self4 ,now to this knowledge1 the knowledge of works--which is based on the assumption of plurality of existence--is not only useless but even opposed4 ,the consideration of the ,udgtha and the like1 which is supplementary to works only1 finds a place in the ,vednta-texts1 only because like them it is of the nature of knowledge2 but it has no direct connexion with the true topic of those texts4 ,hence some prerequisite must be indicated which has reference to the principal topic of the sstra4--,quite so2 and this prerequisite is just the knowledge of works2 for scripture declares that final release results from knowledge with works added4 ,the ,stra-writer himself says further on ',and there is need of all works1 on account of the scriptural statement of sacrifices and the like' 7,ve4 ,s4 ,,iii1 #d1 #bf74 ,and if the required works were not known1 one could not determine which works have to be combined with knowledge and which not4 ,hence the knowledge of works is just the necessary prerequisite4--,not so1 we reply4 ,that which puts an end to ,nescience is exclusively the knowledge of ,brahman1 which is pure intelligence and antagonistic to all plurality4 ,for final release consists just in the cessation of ,nescience2 how then can works--to which there attach endless differences connected with caste1 srama1 object to be accomplished1 means and mode of accomplishment1 c4--ever supply a means for the cessation of ignorance1 which is essentially the cessation of the view that difference exists8 ,that works1 the results of which are transitory1 are contrary to final release1 and that such release can be effected through knowledge only1 scripture declares in many places2 compare all the passages quoted above 7p4 #g74 ,as to the assertion that knowledge requires sacrifices and other works1 we remark that--as follows from the essential contrariety of knowledge and works1 and as further appears from an accurate consideration of the words of scripture--pious works can contribute only towards the rise of the desire of knowledge1 in so far namely as they clear the internal organ 7of knowledge71 but can have no influence on the production of the fruit1 i4e4 knowledge itself4 ,for the scriptural passage concerned runs as follows ,brhmanas desire to know him by the study of the ,veda1 by sacrifice1 by gifts1' c4 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #d1 #bb74 ,according to this passage1 the desire only of knowledge springs up through works2 while another text teaches that calmness1 self-restraint1 and so on1 are the direct means for the origination of knowledge itself4 7,having become tranquil1 calm1 subdued1 satisfied1 patient1 and collected1 he is to see the ,self within the ,self 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #d1 #bc747 ,the process thus is as follows4 ,after the mind of a man has been cleaned of all impurities through works performed in many preceding states of existence1 without a view to special forms of reward1 there arises in him the desire of knowledge1 and thereupon--through knowledge itself originated by certain scriptural texts--',being only1 this was in the beginning1 one only without a second' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vi1 ,i1 #b72 ',truth1 ,knowledge1 the ,infinite1 is ,brahman' 7,taitt4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #a72 ',without parts1 without actions1 calm1 without fault1 without taint' 7,svet4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #ai72 ',this ,self is ,brahman' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #e1 #ai72 ',thou art that' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #i1 #g71 ,nescience comes to an end4 ,now1 ',hearing1' 'reflection1' and 'meditation1' are helpful towards cognising the sense of these ,vedic texts4 ',hearing' 7sravana7 means the apprehension of the sense of scripture1 together with collateral arguments1 from a teacher who possesses the true insight1 viz4 that the ,vednta-texts establish the doctrine of the unity of the ,self4 ',reflection' 7mananam7 means the confirmation within oneself of the sense taught by the teacher1 by means of arguments showing it alone to be suitable4 ',meditation' 7nididhysanam7 finally means the constant holding of thai sense before one's mind1 so as to dispel thereby the antagonistic beginningless imagination of plurality4 ,in the case of him who through 'hearing1' 'reflection1' and meditation1' has dis-dispelled the entire imagination of plurality1 the knowledge of the sense of ,vednta-texts puts an end to ,nescience2 and what we therefore require is a statement of the indispensable prerequisites of such 'hearing1' 'reflection1' and so on4 ,now of such prerequisites there are four1 viz4 discrimination of what is permanent and what is non-permanent2 the full possession of calmness of mind1 self-restraint and similar means2 the renunciation of all enjoyment of fruits here below as well as in the next world2 and the desire of final release4 ,without these the desire of knowledge cannot arise2 and they are therefore known1 from the very nature of the matter1 to be necessary prerequisites4 ,to sum up3 ,the root of bondage is the unreal view of plurality which itself has its root in ,nescience that conceals the true being of ,brahman4 ,bondage itself thus is unreal1 and is on that account cut short1 together with its root1 by mere knowledge4 ,such knowledge is originated by texts such as ',that art thou'2 and work is of no help either towards its nature1 or its origination1 or its fruit 7i4e4 release74 ,it is on the other hand helpful towards the desire of knowledge1 which arises owing to an increase of the element of goodness 7sattva7 in the soul1 due to the destruction of the elements of passion 7rajas7 and darkness 7tamas7 which are the root of all moral evil4 ,this use is referred to in the text quoted above1 ',brhmanas wish to know him1' c4 ,as1 therefore1 the knowledge of works is of no use towards the knowledge of ,brahman1 we must acknowledge as the prerequisite of the latter knowledge the four means mentioned above4 ,,the ,,small ,,siddh,,nta4 ,to this argumentation we make the following reply4 ,we admit that release consists only in the cessation of ,nescience1 and that this cessation results entirely from the knowledge of ,brahman4 ,but a distinction has here to be made regarding the nature of this knowledge which the ,vednta-texts aim at enjoining for the purpose of putting an end to ,nescience4 ,is it merely the knowledge of the sense of sentences which originates from the sentences8 or is it knowledge in the form of meditation 7upsana7 which has the knowledge just referred to as its antecedent8 ,it cannot be knowledge of the former kind3 for such knowledge springs from the mere apprehension of the sentence1 apart from any special injunction1 and moreover we do not observe that the cessation of ,nescience is effected by such knowledge merely4 ,our adversary will perhaps attempt to explain things in the following way4 ,the ,vednta-texts do not1 he will say1 produce that knowledge which makes an end of ,nescience1 so long as the imagination of plurality is not dispelled4 ,and the fact that such knowledge1 even when produced1 does not at once and for every one put a stop to the view of plurality by no means subverts my opinion2 for1 to mention an analogous instance1 the double appearance of the moon--presenting itself to a person affected with a certain weakness of vision--does not come to an end as soon as the oneness of the moon has been apprehended by reason4 ,moreover1 even without having come to an end1 the view of plurality is powerless to effect further bondage1 as soon as the root1 i4e4 ,nescience1 has once been cut ,but this defence we are unable to admit4 ,it is impossible that knowledge should not arise when its means1 i4e4 the texts conveying knowledge1 are once present4 ,and we observe that even when there exists an antagonistic imagination 7interfering with the rise of knowledge71 information given by competent persons1 the presence of characteristic marks 7on which a correct inference may be based71 and the like give rise to knowledge which sublates the erroneous imagination4 ,nor can we admit that even after the sense of texts has been apprehended1 the view of plurality may continue owing to some small remainder of beginningless imagination4 ,for as this imagination which constitutes the means for the view of plurality is itself false1 it is necessarily put an end to by the rise of true knowledge4 ,if this did not take place1 that imagination would never come to an end1 since there is no other means but knowledge to effect its cessation4 ,to say that the view of plurality1 which is the effect of that imagination1 continues even after its root has been cut1 is mere nonsense4 ,the instance of some one seeing the moon double is not analogous4 ,for in his case the non-cessation of wrong knowledge explains itself from the circumstance that the cause of wrong knowledge1 viz4 the real defect of the eye which does not admit of being sublated by knowledge1 is not removed1 although that which would sublate wrong knowledge is near4 ,on the other hand1 effects1 such as fear and the like1 may come to an end because they can be sublated by means of knowledge of superior force4 ,moreover1 if it were true that knowledge arises through the dispelling of the imagination of plurality1 the rise of knowledge would really never be brought about4 ,for the imagination of plurality has through gradual growth in the course of beginningless time acquired an infinite strength1 and does not therefore admit of being dispelled by the comparatively weak conception of non-duality4 ,hence we conclude that the knowledge which the ,vednta-texts aim at inculcating is a knowledge other than the mere knowledge of the sense of sentences1 and denoted by 'dhyna1' 'upsan' 7i4 e4 meditation71 and similar terms4 ,with this agree scriptural texts such as ',having known it1 let him practise meditation' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #d1 #ba72 ',he who1 having searched out the ,self1 knows it' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,viii1 #g1 #a72 ',meditate on the ,self as ,om' 7,mu4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #b1 #f72 ',having known that1 he is freed from the jaws of death' 7,ka4 ,up4 ,i1 #c1 #ae72 ',let a man meditate on the ,self only as his world' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,i1 #d1 #ae72 ',the ,self is to be seen1 to be heard1 to her reflected on1 to be meditated on' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #e1 #f72 ',that we must search out1 that we must try to understand' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,viii1 #g1 #a74 7,according to the principle of the oneness of purport of the different skhs7 all these texts must be viewed as agreeing in meaning with the injunction of meditation contained in the passage quoted from the ,bri4 ,up42 and what they enjoin is therefore meditation4 ,in the first and second passages quoted1 the words 'having known' and 'having searched out' 7vijya2 anuvidya7 contain a mere reference to 7not injunction of7 the apprehension of the meaning of texts1 such apprehension subserving meditation2 while the injunction of meditation 7which is the true purport of the passages7 is conveyed by the clauses 'let him practise meditation' 7prajm kurvta7 and 'he knows it4' ,in the same way the clause 'the ,self is to be heard' is a mere anuvda1 i4e4 a mere reference to what is already established by other means2 for a person who has read the ,veda observes that it contains instruction about matters connected with certain definite purposes1 and then on his own account applies himself to methodical 'hearing1' in order definitely to ascertain these matters2 'hearing' thus is established already4 ,in the same way the clause 'the ,self is to be reflected upon' is a mere anuvda of reflection which is known as a means of confirming what one has 'heard4' ,it is therefore meditation only which all those texts enjoin4 ,in agreement with this a later ,stra also says1 ',repetition more than once1 on account of instruction' 7,ve4 ,s4 ,,iv1 ,i1 ,i74 ,that the knowledge intended to be enjoined as the means of final release is of the nature of meditation1 we conclude from the circumstance that the terms 'knowing' and'meditating' are seen to be used in place of each other in the earlier and later parts of ,vedic texts4 ,compare the following passages3 ',let a man meditate on mind as ,brahman1' and 'he who knows this shines and warms through his celebrity1 fame1 and glory of countenance' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #ah1 #a2 #f74 ,and ',he does not know him1 for he is not complete1' and ',let men meditate on him as the ,self 7,bri4 ,up4 ,i1 #d1 #g74 ,and ',he who knows what he knows1' and ',teach me the deity on which you meditate' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #a1 #f2 #b1 #b74 ',meditation' means steady remembrance1 i4e4 a continuity of steady remembrance1 uninterrupted like the flow of oil2 in agreement with the scriptural passage which declares steady remembrance to be the means of release1 'on the attainment of remembrance all the ties are loosened' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vii1 #bf1 #b74 ,such remembrance is of the same character 7form7 as seeing 7intuition72 for the passage quoted has the same purport as the following one1 ',the fetter of the heart is broken1 all doubts are solved1 and all the works of that man perish when he has been seen who is high and low' 7,mu4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #b1 #h74 ,and this being so1 we conclude that the passage 'the ,self is to be seen' teaches that ',meditation' has the character of 'seeing' or 'intuition4' ,and that remembrance has the character of 'seeing' is due to the element of imagination 7representation7 which prevails in it4 ,all this has been set forth at length by the ,vkyakra4 ',knowledge 7vedana7 means meditation 7upsana71 scripture using the word in that sense'2 i4e4 in all ,upanishads that knowledge which is enjoined as the means of final release is ,meditation4 ,the ,vkyakra then propounds a prvapaksha 7prim facie view71 ',once he is to make the meditation1 the matter enjoined by scripture being accomplished thereby1 as in the case of the prayjas and the like'2 and then sums up against this in the words 'but 7meditation7 is established on account of the term meditation'2 that means--knowledge repeated more than once 7i4e4 meditation7 is determined to be the means of ,release4-- ,the ,vkyakra then goes on ',meditation is steady remembrance1 on the ground of observation and statement4' ,that means--this knowledge1 of the form of meditation1 and repeated more than once1 is of the nature of steady remembrance4 ,such remembrance has been declared to be of the character of 'seeing1' and this character of seeing consists in its possessing the character of immediate presentation 7pratyakshat74 ,with reference to remembrance1 which thus acquires the character of immediate presentation and is the means of final release1 scripture makes a further determination1 viz4 in the passage ,ka4 ,up4 ,i1 #b1 #bc1 ',that ,self cannot be gained by the study of the ,veda 7reflection71 nor by thought 7meditation71 nor by much hearing4 ,whom the ,self chooses1 by him it may be gained2 to him the ,self reveals its being4' ,this text says at first that mere hearing1 reflection1 and meditation do not suffice to gain the ,self1 and then declares1 ',whom the ,self chooses1 by him it may be gained4' ,now a 'chosen' one means a most beloved person2 the relation being that he by whom that ,self is held most dear is most dear to the ,self4 ,that the ,lord 7bhagavn7 himself endeavours that this most beloved person should gain the ,self1 he himself declares in the following words1 ',to those who are constantly devoted and worship with love ,i give that knowledge by which they reach me' 7,bha4 ,g4 ,x1 #aj71 and ',to him who has knowledge ,i am dear above all things1 and he is dear to me' 7,,vii1 #ag74 ,hence1 he who possesses remembrance1 marked by the character of immediate presentation 7skshtkra71 and which itself is dear above all things since the object remembered is such2 he1 we say1 is chosen by the highest ,self1 and by him the highest ,self is gained4 ,steady remembrance of this kind is designated by the word 'devotion' 7bhakti72 for this term has the same meaning as upsan 7meditation74 ,for this reason scripture and smriti agree in making the following declarations1 ',a man knowing him passes over death' 7,svet4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #h72 ',knowing him thus he here becomes immortal' 7,taitt4 r4 ,,iii1 #ab1g72 ',neither by the ,vedas1 nor by austerities1 nor by gifts1 nor by sacrifice can ,i be so seen as thou hast seen me4 ,but by devotion exclusive ,i may in this form be known and seen in truth1 ,o ,arjuna1 and also be entered into' 7,bha4 ,g4 ,,xi1 #ec1 #ed72 ',that highest ,person1 ,o ,prtha1 may be obtained by exclusive devotion' 7,,viii1 #bb74 ,that of such steady remembrance sacrifices and so on are means will be declared later on 7,ve4 ,s4 ,,iii1 #d1 #bf74 ,although sacrifices and the like are enjoined with a view to the origination of knowledge 7in accordance with the passage ',they desire to know1' ,bri4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #d1 #bb71 it is only knowledge in the form of meditation which--being daily practised1 constantly improved by repetition1 and continued up to death--is the means of reaching ,brahman1 and hence all the works connected with the different conditions of life are to be performed throughout life only for the purpose of originating such knowledge4 ,this the ,strakra declares in ,ve4 ,s4 ,,iv1 #a1 #ab2 #af2 ,,iii1 #d1 #cc1 and other places4 ,the ,vkyakra also declares that steady remembrance results only from abstention1 and so on2 his words being ',this 7viz4 steady remembrance meditation7 is obtained through abstention 7viveka71 freeness of mind 7vimoka71 repetition 7abhysa71 works 7kriy71 virtuous conduct 7kalyna71 freedom from dejection 7anavasda71 absence of exultation 7anuddharsha72 according to feasibility and scriptural statement4' ,the ,vkyakra also gives definitions of all these terms4 ,abstention 7viveka7 means keeping the body clean from all food1 impure either owing to species 7such as the flesh of certain animals71 or abode 7such as food belonging to a ,kndla or the like71 or accidental cause 7such as food into which a hair or the like has fallen74 ,the scriptural passage authorising this point is ,ch4 ,up4 ,,vii1 #bf1 ',the food being pure1 the mind becomes pure2 the mind being pure1 there results steady remembrance4' ,freeness of mind 7vimoka7 means absence of attachment to desires4 ,the authoritative passage here is ',let him meditate with a calm mind' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #ad1 #a74 ,repetition means continued practice4 ,for this point the ,bhshya-kra quotes an authoritative text from ,smriti1 viz43 ',having constantly been absorbed in the thought of that being' 7sad tadbhvabhvitah2 ,bha4 ,g4 ,,viii1 #f74--;,by 'works' 7kriy7 is understood the performance1 according to one's ability1 of the five great sacrifices4 ,the authoritative passages here are ',this person who performs works is the best of those who know ,brahman' 7,mu4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #a1 #d72 and ',him ,brhmanas seek to know by recitation of the ,veda1 by sacrifice1 by gifts1 by penance1 by fasting' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #d1 #bb74--;,by virtuous conduct 7kalynni7 are meant truthfulness1 honesty1 kindness1 liberality1 gentleness1 absence of covetousness4 ,confirmatory texts are ',by truth he is to be obtained' 7,mu4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #a1 #e7 and 'to them belongs that pure ,brahman-world' 7,pr4 ,up4 ,i1 #af74--,that lowness of spirit or want of cheerfulness which results from unfavourable conditions of place or time and the remembrance of causes of sorrow1 is denoted by the term 'dejection'2 the contrary of this is 'freedom from dejection4' ,the relevant scriptural passage is ',this ,self cannot be obtained by one lacking in strength' 7,mu4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #b1 #d74--';,exultation' is that satisfaction of mind which springs from circumstances opposite to those just mentioned2 the contrary is 'absence of exultation4' ,overgreat satisfaction also stands in the way 7of meditation74 ,the scriptural passage for this is ',calm1 subdued1' c4 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #d1 #bc74--,what the ,vkyakra means to say is therefore that knowledge is realised only through the performance of the duly prescribed works1 on the part of a person fulfilling all the enumerated conditions4 ,analogously another scriptural passage says ',he who knows both knowledge and non-knowledge together1 overcoming death by non-knowledge reaches the ,immortal through knowledge' 7s4 ,up4 ,,ii74 ,here the term 'non-knowledge' denotes the works enjoined on the different castes and sramas2 and the meaning of the text is that1 having discarded by such works death1 i4e4 the previous works antagonistic to the origination of knowledge1 a man reaches the ,immortal1 i4e4 ,brahman1 through knowledge4 ,the non-knowledge of which this passage speaks as being the means of overcoming death can only mean that which is other than knowledge1 viz4 prescribed works4 ,the word has the same sense in the following passage3 ',firm in traditional knowledge he offered many sacrifices1 leaning on the knowledge of ,brahman1 so as to pass beyond death by non-knowledge' 7,vi4 ,pu4 ,,vi1 #f1 #ab74--;,antagonistic to knowledge 7as said above7 are all good and evil actions1 and hence--as equally giving rise to an undesirable result--they may both be designated as evil4 ,they stand in the way of the origination of knowledge in so far as they strengthen the elements of passion and darkness which are antagonistic to the element of goodness which is the cause of the rise of knowledge4 ,that evil works stand in the way of such origination1 the following scriptural text declares3 ',he makes him whom he wishes to lead down from these worlds do an evil deed' 7,ka4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #h74 ,that passion and darkness veil the knowledge of truth while goodness on the other hand gives rise to it1 the ,divine one has declared himself1 in the passage ',from goodness springs knowledge' 7,bha4 ,g4 ,,xiv1 #ag74 ,hence1 in order that knowledge may arise1 evil works have to be got rid of1 and this is effected by the performance of acts of religious duty not aiming at some immediate result 7such as the heavenly world and the like72 according to the text 'by works of religious duty he discards all evil4' ,knowledge which is the means of reaching ,brahman1 thus requires the works prescribed for the different sramas2 and hence the systematic enquiry into works 7i4 e4 the ,prva ,mmms7--from which we ascertain the nature of the works required and also the transitoriness and limitation of the fruits of mere works--forms a necessary antecedent to the systematic enquiry into ,brahman4 ,moreover the discrimination of permanent and non-permanent things1 c4 7i4e4 the tetrad of 'means' mentioned above1 p4 #aa7 cannot be accomplished without the study of the ,mmms2 for unless we ascertain all the distinctions of fruits of works1 means1 modes of procedure and qualification 7on the part of the agent7 we can hardly understand the true nature of works1 their fruits1 the transitoriness or non-transitoriness of the latter1 the permanence of the ,self1 and similar matters4 ,that those conditions 7viz4 nitynityavastuviveka1 sama1 dama1 c47 are 'means' must be determined on the basis of viniyoga 7'application' which determines the relation of principal and subordinate matters--angin and anga72 and this viniyoga which depends on direct scriptural statement 7sruti71 inferential signs 7linga71 and so on1 is treated of in the third book of the ,prva ,mmms-stras4 ,and further we must1 in this connexion1 consider also the meditations on the ,udgtha and similar things--which1 although aiming at the success of works1 are of the nature of reflections on ,brahman 7which is viewed in them under various forms7--and as such have reference to knowledge of ,brahman4 ,those works also 7with which these meditations are connected7 aim at no special results of their own1 and produce and help to perfect the knowledge of ,brahman3 they are therefore particularly connected with the enquiry into ,brahman4 ,and that these meditations presuppose an understanding of the nature of works is admitted by every one4 ,,the ,,great ,p,,rvapaksha4 ,,the ,,only ,,reality ,,is ,,brahman4 ,brahman1 which is pure intelligence and opposed to all difference1 constitutes the only reality2 and everything else1 i4e4 the plurality of manifold knowing subjects1 objects of knowledge1 and acts of knowledge depending on those two1 is only imagined on 7or 'in'7 that ,brahman1 and is essentially false4 ',in the beginning1 my dear1 there was that only which is1 one only without a second' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #b1 #a72 ',the higher knowledge is that by which the ,indestructible is apprehended' 7,mu4 ,up4 ,i1 #a1 #e72 ',that which cannot be seen nor seized1 which has no eyes nor ears1 no hands nor feet1 the permanent1 the all-pervading1 the most subtle1 the imperishable which the wise regard as the source of all beings' 7,mu4 ,up4 ,i1 #a1 #f72 ',the ,true1 knowledge1 the ,infinite is ,brahman' 7,taitt4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #a72 ',he who is without parts1 without actions1 tranquil1 without fault1 without taint' 7,svet4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #ai72 ',by whom it is not thought1 by him it is thought2 he by whom it is thought knows it not4 ,it is not known by those who know it1 known by those who do not know it' 7,ke4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #c72 ',thou mayest not see the seer of sight2 thou mayest not think the thinker of thought' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #d1 #b72 ',bliss is ,brahman' 7,taitt4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #f1 #a72 ',all this is that ,self' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #e1 #g72 ',there is here no diversity whatever' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #d1 #ai72 ',from death to death goes he who sees any difference here' 7,ka4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #d1 #aj72 ',for where there is duality as it were1 there one sees the other'2 'but where the ,self has become all of him1 by what means1 and whom1 should he see8 by what means1 and whom1 should he know8' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #e1 #ae72 'the effect is a name merely which has its origin in speech2 the truth is that 7the thing made of clay7 is clay merely' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #a1 #d72 'for if he makes but the smallest distinction in it there is fear for him' 7,taitt4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #g72-- the two following ,vednta-stras3 ,,iii1 #b1 #aa2 ,,iii1 #b1 #c--the following passages from the ,vishnu-purna3 ',in which all difference vanishes1 which is pure ,being1 which is not the object of words1 which is known by the ,self only--that knowledge is called ,brahman' 7,,vi1 #g1 #ec72 ',him whose essential nature is knowledge1 who is stainless in reality'2 ',him who1 owing to erroneous view1 abides in the form of things' 7,i1 #b1 #f72 'the ,reality thou art alone1 there is no other1 ,o ,lord of the world6-- whatever matter is seen belongs to thee whose being is knowledge2 but owing to their erroneous opinion the non-devout look on it as the form of the world4 ,this whole world has knowledge for its essential nature1 but the ,unwise viewing it as being of the nature of material things are driven round on the ocean of delusion4 ,those however who possess true knowledge and pure minds see this whole world as having knowledge for its ,self1 as thy form1 ,o highest ,lord6' 7,vi4 ,pu4 ,i1 #d1 #ch ff474--',of that ,self1 although it exists in one's own and in other bodies1 the knowledge is of one kind1 and that is ,reality2 those who maintain duality hold a false view' 7,,ii1 #ad1 #ca72 ',if there is some other one1 different from me1 then it can be said1 ,i am this and that one is another' 7,,ii1 #ac1 #hf72 ',as owing to the difference of the holes of the flute the air equally passing through them all is called by the names of the different notes of the musical scale2 so it is with the universal ,self' 7,,ii1 #ad1 #cb72 ',he is ,i2 he is thou2 he is all3 this ,universe is his form4 ,abandon the error of difference4 ,the king being thus instructed1 abandoned the view of difference1 having gained an intuition of ,reality' 7,,ii1 #af1 #bd74 ',when that view which gives rise to difference is absolutely destroyed1 who then will make the untrue distinction between the individual ,self and ,brahman8' 7,,vi1 #g1 #id74--,the following passages from the ,bhagavad-,gt3 ',i am the ,self dwelling within all beings' 7,x1 #bj72 ',know me to be the soul within all bodies' 7,,xiii1 #b72 ',being there is none1 movable or immovable1 which is without me' 7,x1 #ci74-- ,all these and other texts1 the purport of which clearly is instruction as to the essential nature of things1 declare that ,brahman only1 i4e4 non-differenced pure intelligence is real1 while everything else is false4 ,the appearance of plurality is due to avidy4 ',falsehood' 7mithytva7 belongs to what admits of being terminated by the cognition of the real thing--such cognition being preceded by conscious activity 7not by mere absence of consciousness or knowledge74 ,the snake1 e4g4 which has for its substrate a rope or the like is false2 for it is due to an imperfection 7dosha7 that the snake is imagined in 7or 'on'7 the rope4 ,in the same way this entire world1 with its distinctions of gods1 men1 animals1 inanimate matter1 and so on1 is1 owing to an imperfection1 wrongly imagined in the highest ,brahman whose substance is mere intelligence1 and therefore is false in so far as it may be sublated by the cognition of the nature of the real ,brahman4 ,what constitutes that imperfection is beginningless ,nescience 7avidy71 which1 hiding the truth of things1 gives rise to manifold illusions1 and cannot be defined either as something that is or as something that is not4--',by the ,untrue they are hidden2 of them which are true the ,untrue is the covering' 7,ch1 ,up4 ,,viii1 #c1 #a72 ',know ,mya to be ,prakriti1 and the great ,lord him who is associated with ,mya' 7,svet4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #aj72 ',indra appears manifold through the ,mys' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #e1 #ai72 ',my ,mya is hard to overcome' 7,bha4 ,g4 ,,vii1 #ad72 ',when the soul slumbering in beginningless ,my awakes' 7,gau4 ,k4 ,i1 #af74--,these and similar texts teach that it is through beginningless ,my that to ,brahman which truly is pure non-differenced intelligence its own nature hides itself1 and that it sees diversity within itself4 ,as has been said1 ',because the ,holy ,one is essentially of the nature of intelligence1 the form of all1 but not material2 therefore know that all particular things like rocks1 oceans1 hills and so on1 have proceeded from intelligence ,,footnote #bb3a ,but when1 on the cessation of all work1 everything is only pure intelligence in its own proper form1 without any imperfections2 then no differences-- the fruit of the tree of wishes--any longer exist between things4 ,therefore nothing whatever1 at any place or any time1 exists apart from intelligence3 intelligence1 which is one only1 is viewed as manifold by those whose minds are distracted by the effects of their own works4 ,intelligence pure1 free from stain1 free from grief1 free from all contact with desire and other affections1 everlastingly one is the highest ,lord--,vsudeva apart from whom nothing exists4 ,i have thus declared to you the lasting truth of things--that intelligence only is true and everything else untrue4 ,and that also which is the cause of ordinary worldly existence has been declared to you' 7,vi4 ,pu4 ,,ii1 #ab1 #ci1 #dj1 #dc-de74 ,avidy is put an end to by true ,knowledge4 ,other texts declare that this ,nescience comes to an end through the cognition of the essential unity of the ,self with ,brahman which is nothing but non-differenced intelligence4 ',he does not again go to death2' ',he sees this as one2' ',he who sees this does not see death' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #bg72 ',when he finds freedom from fear and rest in that which is invisible1 incorporeal1 undefined1 unsupported1 then he has obtained the fearless' 7,taitt4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #g72 ',the fetter of the heart is broken1 all doubts are solved and all his works perish when he has been beheld who is high and low' 7,mu4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #b1 #h72 ',he knows ,brahman1 he becomes ,brahman only' 7,mu4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #b1 #i72 ',knowing him only a man passes over death2 there is no other path to go' 7,svet4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #h74 ,in these and similar passages1 the term 'death' denotes ,nescience2 analogously to the use of the term in the following words of ,sanatsujta1 ',delusion ,i call death2 and freedom from delusion ,i call immortality' 7,sanatsuj4 ,,ii1 #e74 ,the knowledge again of the essential unity and non-difference of ,brahman-- which is ascertained from decisive texts such as ',the ,true1 knowledge1 the ,infinite is ,brahman' 7,taitt4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #a72 ',knowledge1 bliss is ,brahman' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #i1 #bh7--;is confirmed by other passages1 such as ',now if a man meditates on another deity1 thinking the deity is one and he another1 he does not know' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,i1 #d1 #aj72 ',let men meditate upon him as the ,self 7,bri4 ,up4 ,i1 #d1 #g72 ',thou art that' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #h1 #g72 ',am ,i thou1 ,o holy deity8 and art thou me1 ,o holy deity8'2 ',what ,i am that is he2 what he is that am ,i4'--,this the ,strakra himself will declare ',but as the ,self 7scriptural texts7 acknowledge and make us apprehend 7the ,lord7' 7,ve4 ,s4 ,,iv1 #a1 #c74 ,thus the ,vkyakra also1 ',it is the ,self--thus one should apprehend 7everything71 for everything is effected by that4' ,and to hold that by such cognition of the oneness of ,brahman essentially false bondage1 together with its cause1 comes to an end1 is only reasonable4 ,scripture is of greater force than ,perception ,but1 an objection is raised--how can knowledge1 springing from the sacred texts1 bring about a cessation of the view of difference1 in manifest opposition to the evidence of ,perception8--,how then1 we rejoin1 can the knowledge that this thing is a rope and not a snake bring about1 in opposition to actual perception1 the cessation of the 7idea of the7 snake8--,you will perhaps reply that in this latter case there is a conflict between two forms of perception1 while in the case under discussion the conflict is between direct perception and ,scripture which is based on perception4 ,but against this we would ask the question how1 in the case of a conflict between two equal cognitions1 we decide as to which of the two is refuted 7sublated7 by the other4 ,if--as is to be expected--you reply that what makes the difference between the two is that one of them is due to a defective cause while the other is not3 we point out that this distinction holds good also in the case of ,scripture and perception being in conflict4 ,it is not considerations as to the equality of conflicting cognitions1 as to their being dependent or independent1 and so on1 that determine which of the two sublates the other2 if that were the case1 the perception which presents to us the flame of the lamp as one only would not be sublated by the cognition arrived at by inference that there is a succession of different flames4 ,wherever there is a conflict between cognitions based on two different means of knowledge we assign the position of the 'sublated one' to that which admits of being accounted for in some other way2 while that cognition which affords no opening for being held unauthoritative and cannot be accounted for in another way1 is the 'sublating one ,,footnote #be3a4' ,this is the principle on which the relation between 'what sublates' and 'what is sublated' is decided everywhere4 ,now apprehension of ,brahman--which is mere intelligence1 eternal1 pure1 free1 self-luminous--is effected by ,scripture which rests on endless unbroken tradition1 cannot therefore be suspected of any1 even the least1 imperfection1 and hence cannot be non-authoritative2 the state of bondage1 on the other hand1 with its manifold distinctions is proved by ,perception1 ,inference1 and so on1 which are capable of imperfections and therefore may be non-authoritative4 ,it is therefore reasonable to conclude that the state of bondage is put an end to by the apprehension of ,brahman4 ,and that imperfection of which ,perception--through which we apprehend a world of manifold distinctions--may be assumed to be capable1 is so-called ,nescience1 which consists in the beginningless wrong imagination of difference4--,well then--a further objection is raised--let us admit that ,scripture is perfect because resting on an endless unbroken tradition2 but must we then not admit that texts evidently presupposing the view of duality1 as e4g4 ',let him who desires the heavenly world offer the ,jyotishtoma-sacrifice'--are liable to refutation8--,true1 we reply4 ,as in the case of the ,udgtri and ,pratihartri breaking the chain 7not at the same time1 but7 in succession ,,footnote #bf3a1 so here also the earlier texts 7which refer to duality and transitory rewards7 are sublated by the later texts which teach final release1 and are not themselves sublated by anything else4 ,the texts which represent ,brahman as devoid of qualities have greater force ,the same reasoning applies to those passages in the ,vednta-texts which inculcate meditation on the qualified ,brahman1 since the highest ,brahman is without any qualities4--,but consider such passages as ',he who cognises all1 who knows all' 7,mu4 ,up4 ,i1 #a1 #i72 ',his high power is revealed as manifold1 as essential1 acting as force and knowledge' 7,svet4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #h72 ',he whose wishes are true1 whose purposes are true' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,viii1 #a1 #e72 how can these passages1 which clearly aim at defining the nature of ,brahman1 be liable to refutation8--,owing to the greater weight1 we reply1 of those texts which set forth ,brahman as devoid of qualities4 ',it is not coarse1 not fine1 not short1 not long' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #h1 #h72 ',the ,true1 knowledge1 infinite is ,brahman' 7,taitt4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #a72 ',that which is free from qualities1' 'that which is free from stain'--these and similar texts convey the notion of ,brahman being changeless1 eternal intelligence devoid of all difference2 while the other texts--quoted before--teach the qualified ,brahman4 ,and there being a conflict between the two sets of passages1 we--according to the ,mmms principle referred to above--decide that the texts referring to ,brahman as devoid of qualities are of greater force1 because they are later in order ,,footnote #bg3a than those which speak of ,brahman as having qualities4 ,thus everything is settled4 ,the text ,taitt4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #a refers to ,brahman as devoid of qualities4 ,but--an objection is raised--even the passage ',the ,true1 knowledge1 infinite is ,brahman' intimates certain qualities of ,brahman1 viz4 true being1 knowledge1 infinity6--,not so1 we reply4 ,from the circumstance that all the terms of the sentence stand in co-ordination1 it follows that they convey the idea of one matter 7sense7 only4 ,if against this you urge that the sentence may convey the idea of one matter only1 even if directly expressing a thing distinguished by several qualities2 we must remark that you display an ignorance of the meaning of language which appears to point to some weakmindedness on your part4 ,a sentence conveys the idea of one matter 7sense7 only when all its constitutive words denote one and the same thing2 if1 on the other hand1 it expresses a thing possessing several attributes1 the difference of these attributes necessarily leads to a difference in meaning on the part of the individual words1 and then the oneness of meaning of the sentence is lost4--,but from your view of the passage it would follow that the several words are mere synonyms6--,give us your attention1 we reply1 and learn that several words may convey one meaning without being idle synonyms4 ,from the determination of the unity of purport of the whole sentence ,,footnote #bg3b we conclude that the several words1 applied to one thing1 aim at expressing what is opposite in nature to whatever is contrary to the meanings of the several words1 and that thus they have meaning and unity of meaning and yet are not mere synonyms4 ,the details are as follows4 ,brahman is to be defined as what is contrary in nature to all other things4 ,now whatever is opposed to ,brahman is virtually set aside by the three words 7constituting the definition of ,brahman in the ,taittiriya-text74 ,the word 'true' 7or 'truly being'7 has the purport of distinguishing ,brahman from whatever things have no truth1 as being the abodes of change2 the word 'knowledge' distinguishes ,brahman from all non-sentient things whose light depends on something else 7which are not self-luminous72 and the word 'infinite' distinguishes it from whatever is limited in time or space or nature4 ,nor is this 'distinction' some positive or negative attribute of ,brahman1 it rather is just ,brahman itself as opposed to everything else2 just as the distinction of white colour from black and other colours is just the true nature of white1 not an attribute of it4 ,the three words constituting the text thus have a meaning1 have one meaning1 and are non-synonymous1 in so far as they convey the essential distinction of one thing1 viz4 ,brahman from everything else4 ,the text thus declares the one ,brahman which is self-luminous and free from all difference4 ,on this interpretation of the text we discern its oneness in purport with other texts1 such as ',being only this was in the beginning1 one only1 without a second4' ,texts such as ',that from whence these beings are born' 7,taitt4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #a72 ',being only this was in the beginning' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #b1 #a72 ',self alone was this in the beginning' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,i1 #d1 #a71 c41 describe ,brahman as the cause of the world2 and of this ,brahman the ,taittirya passage ',the ,true1 knowledge1 infinite is ,brahman' gives the strict definition4 ,in agreement with the principle that all skhs teach the same doctrine we have to understand that1 in all the texts which speak of ,brahman as cause1 ,brahman must be taken as being 'without a second'1 i4e4 without any other being of the same or a different kind2 and the text which aims at defining ,brahman has then to be interpreted in accordance with this characteristic of ,brahman1 viz4 its being without a second4 ,the statement of the ,chndogya as to ,brahman being without a second must also be taken to imply that ,brahman is non-dual as far as qualities are concerned2 otherwise it would conflict with those passages which speak of ,brahman as being without qualities and without stain4 ,we therefore conclude that the defining ,taittirya-text teaches ,brahman to be an absolutely homogeneous substance4 ,but1 the above explanation of the passage being accepted1 it follows that the words 'true being1' 'knowledge1' c41 have to be viewed as abandoning their direct sense1 and merely suggesting a thing distinct in nature from all that is opposite 7to what the three words directly denote71 and this means that we resort to so-called implication 7implied meaning1 lakshan76--,what objection is there to such a proceeding8 we reply4 ,the force of the general purport of a sentence is greater than that of the direct denotative power of the simple terms1 and it is generally admitted that the purport of grammatical co-ordination is oneness 7of the matter denoted by the terms co-ordinated74--,but we never observe that all words of a sentence are to be understood in an implied sense6--,is it then not observed1 we reply1 that one word is to be taken in its implied meaning if otherwise it would contradict the purport of the whole sentence8 ,and if the purport of the sentence1 which is nothing but an aggregate of words employed together1 has once been ascertained1 why should we not take two or three or all words in an implied sense--just as we had taken one--and thus make them fit in with the general purport8 ,in agreement herewith those scholars who explain to us the sense of imperative sentences1 teach that in imperative sentences belonging to ordinary speech all words have an implied meaning only 7not their directly denotative meaning74 ,for1 they maintain1 imperative forms have their primary meaning only in 7,vedic7 sentences which enjoin something not established by other means2 and hence in ordinary speech the effect of the action is conveyed by implication only4 ,the other words also1 which form part of those imperative sentences and denote matters connected with the action1 have their primary meaning only if connected with an action not established by other means2 while if connected with an ordinary action they have a secondary1 implied1 meaning only ,,footnote #cj3a4 ,perception reveals to us non-differenced substance only ,we have so far shown that in the case of a conflict between ,scripture and ,perception and the other instruments of knowledge1 ,scripture is of greater force4 ,the fact1 however1 is that no such conflict is observed to exist1 since ,perception itself gives rise to the apprehension of a non-differenced ,brahman whose nature is pure ,being4--,but how can it be said that ,perception1 which has for its object things of various kinds-- and accordingly expresses itself in judgments such as ',here is a jar1' ',there is a piece of cloth'--causes the apprehension of mere ,being8 ,if there were no apprehension of difference1 all cognitions would have one and the same object1 and therefore would give rise to one judgment only-- as takes place when one unbroken perceptional cognition is continued for some time4--,true4 ,we therefore have to enquire in what way1 in the judgment 'here is a jar1' an assertion is made about being as well as some special form of being4 ,these implied judgments cannot both be founded on perception1 for they are the results of acts of cognition occupying different moments of time1 while the perceptional cognition takes place in one moment 7is instantaneous74 ,we therefore must decide whether it is the essential nature of the jar1 or its difference from other things1 that is the object of perception4 ,and we must adopt the former alternative1 because the apprehension of difference presupposes the apprehension of the essential nature of the thing1 and1 in addition1 the remembrance of its counterentities 7i4e4 the things from which the given thing differs74 ,hence difference is not apprehended by ,perception2 and all judgments and propositions relative to difference are founded on error only4 ,difference--bheda--does not admit of logical definition ,the ,logicians1 moreover1 are unable to give a definition of such a thing as 'difference4' ,difference cannot in the first place be the essential nature 7of that which differs72 for from that it would follow that on the apprehension of the essential nature of a thing there would at once arise not only the judgment as to that essential nature but also judgments as to its difference from everything else4--,but1 it may be objected to this1 even when the essential nature of a thing is apprehended1 the judgment 'this thing is different from other things' depends on the remembrance of its counterentities1 and as long as this remembrance does not take place so long the judgment of difference is not formed6--,such reasoning1 we reply1 is inadmissible4 ,he who maintains that 'difference' is nothing but 'essential nature' has no right to assume a dependence on counterentities since1 according to him1 essential nature and difference are the same1 i4e4 nothing but essential nature3 the judgment of difference can1 on his view1 depend on counterentities no more than the judgment of essential nature does4 ,his view really implies that the two words 'the jar' and 'different' 7in the judgment 'the jar is different'7 are synonymous1 just as the words 'hasta' and 'kara' are 7both of which mean 'hand'74 ,nor1 in the second place1 can 'difference' be held to be an attribute 7dharma74 ,for if it were that1 we should have to assume that 'difference' possesses difference 7i4e4 is different7 from essential nature2 for otherwise it would be the same as the latter4 ,and this latter difference would have to be viewed as an attribute of the first difference1 and this would lead us on to a third difference1 and so in infinitum4 ,and the view of 'difference' being an attribute would further imply that difference is apprehended on the apprehension of a thing distinguished by attributes such as generic character and so on1 and at the same time that the thing thus distinguished is apprehended on the apprehension of difference2 and this would constitute a logical seesaw4-- ',difference' thus showing itself incapable of logical definition1 we are confirmed in our view that perception reveals mere ',being' only4 ,moreover1 it appears that in states of consciousness such as ',here is a jar1' ',there is a piece of cloth1' ',the jar is perceived1' ',the piece of cloth is perceived1' that which constitutes the things is ,being 7existence2 satt7 and perception 7or 'consciousness'2 anubhti74 ,and we observe that it is pure ,being only which persists in all states of cognition3 this pure ,being alone1 therefore1 is real4 ,the differences1 on the other hand1 which do not persist1 are unreal4 ,the case is analogous to that of the snake-rope4 ,the rope which persists as a substrate is real1 while the non-continuous things 7which by wrong imagination are superimposed on the rope7 such as a snake1 a cleft in the ground1 a watercourse1 and so on1 are unreal4 ,but--our adversary objects--the instance is not truly analogous4 ,in the case of the snake-rope the non-reality of the snake results from the snake's being sublated 7bdhita7 by the cognition of the true nature of the substrate ',this is a rope1 not a snake'2 it does not result from the non-continuousness of the snake4 ,in the same way the reality of the rope does not follow from its persistence1 but from the fact of its being not sublated 7by another cognition74 ,but what1 we ask1 establishes the non-reality of jars and pieces of cloth8--,all are agreed1 we reply1 that we observe1 in jars and similar things1 individual difference 7vyvritti1 literally 'separation1' 'distinction'74 ,the point to decide is of what nature such difference is4 ,does it not mean that the judgment ',this is a jar' implies the negation of pieces of cloth and other things8 ,but this means that by this judgment pieces of cloth and other things are sublated 7bdhita74 ,individual difference 7vyvritti7 thus means the cessation 7or absence71 due to sublation1 of certain objects of cognition1 and it proves the non-reality of whatever has non-continuous existence2 while on the other hand1 pure ,being1 like the rope1 persists non-sublated4 ,hence everything that is additional to pure ,being is non-real4--,this admits of being expressed in technical form4 ',being' is real because it persists1 as proved by the case of the rope in the snake-rope2 jars and similar things are non-real because they are non-continuous1 as proved by the case of the snake that has the rope for its substrate4 ,from all this it follows that persisting consciousness only has real being2 it alone is4 ,being and consciousness are one4 ,consciousness is svayampraksa4 ,but1 our adversary objects1 as mere ,being is the object of consciousness1 it is different therefrom 7and thus there exists after all 'difference' or 'plurality'74--,not so1 we reply4 ,that there is no such thing as 'difference1' we have already shown above on the grounds that it is not the object of perception1 and moreover incapable of definition4 ,it cannot therefore be proved that ',being' is the object of consciousness4 ,hence ,consciousness itself is ',being'--that which is4--,this consciousness is self-proved1 just because it is consciousness4 ,were it proved through something else1 it would follow that like jars and similar things it is not consciousness4 ,nor can there be assumed1 for consciousness1 the need of another act of consciousness 7through which its knowledge would be established72 for it shines forth 7praksate7 through its own being4 ,while it exists1 consciousness--differing therein from jars and the like--is never observed not to shine forth1 and it cannot therefore be held to depend1 in its shining forth1 on something else4--,you 7who object to the above reasoning7 perhaps hold the following view3--even when consciousness has arisen1 it is the object only which shines forth--a fact expressed in sentences such as3 the jar is perceived4 ,when a person forms the judgment ',this is a jar1' he is not at the time conscious of a consciousness which is not an object and is not of a definite character4 ,hence the existence of consciousness is the reason which brings about the 'shining forth' of jars and other objects1 and thus has a similar office as the approximation of the object to the eye or the other organs of sense 7which is another condition of perceptive consciousness74 ,after this the existence of consciousness is inferred on the ground that the shining forth of the object is 7not permanent1 but7 occasional only ,,footnote #cd3a4 ,and should this argumentation be objected to on the ground of its implying that consciousness--which is essentially of the nature of intelligence-- is something non-intelligent like material things1 we ask you to define this negation of non-intelligence 7which you declare to be characteristic of consciousness74 ,have we1 perhaps1 to understand by it the invariable concomitance of existence and shining forth8 ,if so1 we point out that this invariable concomitance is also found in the case of pleasure and similar affections2 for when pleasure and so on exist at all1 they never are non-perceived 7i4e4 they exist in so far only as we are conscious of them74 ,it is thus clear that we have no consciousness of consciousness itself--just as the tip of a finger1 although touching other things1 is incapable of touching itself4 ,all this reasoning1 we reply1 is entirely spun out of your own fancy1 without any due consideration of the power of consciousness4 ,the fact is1 that in perceiving colour and other qualities of things1 we are not aware of a 'shining forth' as an attribute of those things1 and as something different from consciousness2 nor can the assumption of an attribute of things called 'light1' or 'shining forth1' be proved in any way1 since the entire empirical world itself can be proved only through consciousness1 the existence of which we both admit4 ,consciousness1 therefore1 is not something which is inferred or proved through some other act of knowledge2 but while proving everything else it is proved by itself4 ,this may be expressed in technical form as follows-- ,consciousness is1 with regard to its attributes and to the empirical judgments concerning it1 independent of any other thing1 because through its connexion with other things it is the cause of their attributes and the empirical judgments concerning them4 ,for it is a general principle that of two things that which through its connexion with the other is the cause of the attributes of--and the empirical judgments about--the latter1 is itself independent of that other as to those two points4 ,we see e4g4 that colour1 through its conjunction with earth and the like1 produces in them the quality of visibility1 but does not itself depend for its visibility on conjunction with colour4 ,hence consciousness is itself the cause of its own 'shining forth1' as well as of the empirically observed shining forth of objects such as jars and the like4 ,consciousness is eternal and incapable of change4 ,this self-luminous consciousness1 further1 is eternal1 for it is not capable of any form of non-existence--whether so--called antecedent non-existence or any other form4 ,this follows from its being self-established4 ,for the antecedent non-existence of self-established consciousness cannot be apprehended either through consciousness or anything else4 ,if consciousness itself gave rise to the apprehension of its own non-existence1 it could not do so in so far as 'being1' for that would contradict its being2 if it is1 i4e4 if its non-existence is not1 how can it give rise to the idea of its non-existence8 ,nor can it do so if not being2 for if consciousness itself is not1 how can it furnish a proof for its own non-existence8 ,nor can the non-existence of consciousness be apprehended through anything else2 for consciousness cannot be the object of anything else4 ,any instrument of knowledge proving the non-existence of consciousness1 could do so only by making consciousness its object--'this is consciousness'2 but consciousness1 as being self-established1 does not admit of that objectivation which is implied in the word 'this1' and hence its previous non-existence cannot be proved by anything lying outside itself4 ,as consciousness thus does not admit of antecedent non-existence1 it further cannot be held to originate1 and hence also all those other states of being which depend on origination cannot be predicated of it4 ,as consciousness is beginningless1 it further does not admit of any plurality within itself2 for we observe in this case the presence of something which is contrary to what invariably accompanies plurality 7this something being 'beginninglessness' which is contrary to the quality of having a beginning--which quality invariably accompanies plurality74 ,for we never observe a thing characterised by plurality to be without a beginning4--,and moreover difference1 origination1 c41 are objects of consciousness1 like colour and other qualities1 and hence cannot be attributes of consciousness4 ,therefore1 consciousness being essentially consciousness only1 nothing else that is an object of consciousness can be its attribute4 ,the conclusion is that consciousness is free from difference of any kind4 ,the apparent difference between ,consciousness and the conscious subject is due to the unreal ahamkra4 ,from this it further follows that there is no substrate of consciousness--different from consciousness itself--such as people ordinarily mean when speaking of a 'knower4' ,it is self-luminous consciousness itself which constitutes the so-called 'knower4' ,this follows therefrom also that consciousness is not non-intelligent 7jada72 for non-intelligence invariably accompanies absence of ,selfhood 7antmatva72 hence1 non-intelligence being absent in consciousness1 consciousness is not non-,self1 that means1 it is the ,self4 ,but1 our adversary again objects1 the consciousness which expresses itself in the judgment ',i know1' proves that the quality of being a 'knower' belongs to consciousness6--,by no means1 we reply4 ,the attribution to consciousness of this quality rests on error1 no less than the attribution1 to the shell1 of the quality of being silver4 ,consciousness cannot stand in the relation of an agent toward itself3 the attribute of being a knowing agent is erroneously imputed to it--an error analogous to that expressed in the judgment ',i am a man1' which identifies the ,self of a person with the outward aggregate of matter that bears the external characteristics of humanity4 ,to be a 'knower' means to be the agent in the action of knowing2 and this is something essentially changeful and non-intelligent 7jada71 having its abode in the ahamkra1 which is itself a thing subject to change4 ,how1 on the other hand1 could such agency possibly belong to the changeless 'witness' 7of all change1 i4e4 consciousness7 whose nature is pure ,being8 ,that agency cannot be an attribute of the ,self follows therefrom also that1 like colour and other qualities1 agency depends1 for its own proof1 on seeing1 i4e4 consciousness4 ,that the ,self does not fall within the sphere 7is not an object of71 the idea of ',i' is proved thereby also that in deep sleep1 swoon1 and similar states1 the idea of the ',i' is absent1 while the consciousness of the ,self persists4 ,moreover1 if the ,self were admitted to be an agent and an object of the idea of ',i1' it would be difficult to avoid the conclusion that like the body it is non-intelligent1 something merely outward 7'being for others only1 not for itself'7 and destitute of ,selfhood4 ,that from the body1 which is the object of the idea of ',i1' and known to be an agent1 there is different that ,self which enjoys the results of the body's actions1 viz4 the heavenly word1 and so on1 is acknowledged by all who admit the validity of the instruments of knowledge2 analogously1 therefore1 we must admit that different from the knower whom we understand by the term ',i1' is the 'witnessing' inward ,self4 ,the non-intelligent ahamkra thus merely serves to manifest the nature of non-changing consciousness1 and it effects this by being its abode2 for it is the proper quality of manifesting agents to manifest the objects manifested1 in so far as the latter abide in them4 ,a mirror1 e4g41 or a sheet of water1 or a certain mass of matter1 manifests a face or the disc of the moon 7reflected in the mirror or water7 or the generic character of a cow 7impressed on the mass of matter7 in so far as all those things abide in them4--,in this way1 then1 there arises the erroneous view that finds expression in the judgment ',i know4'--,nor must you1 in the way of objection1 raise the question how self-luminous consciousness is to be manifested by the non-intelligent ahamkra1 which rather is itself manifested by consciousness2 for we observe that the surface of the hand1 which itself is manifested by the rays of sunlight falling on it1 at the same time manifests those rays4 ,this is clearly seen in the case of rays passing through the interstices of network2 the light of those rays is intensified by the hand on which they fall1 and which at the same time is itself manifested by the rays4 ,it thus appears that the 'knowing agent1' who is denoted by the ',i1' in the judgment ',i know1' constitutes no real attribute of the ,self1 the nature of which is pure intelligence4 ,this is also the reason why the consciousness of ,egoity does not persist in the states of deep sleep and final release3 in those states this special form of consciousness passes away1 and the ,self appears in its true nature1 i4e4 as pure consciousness4 ,hence a person who has risen from deep1 dreamless sleep reflects1 ',just now ,i was unconscious of myself4' ,summing up of the prvapaksha view4 ,as the outcome of all this1 we sum up our view as follows4--,eternal1 absolutely non-changing consciousness1 whose nature is pure non-differenced intelligence1 free from all distinction whatever1 owing to error illusorily manifests itself 7vivarttate7 as broken up into manifold distinctions--knowing subjects1 objects of knowledge1 acts of knowledge4 ,and the purpose for which we enter on the consideration of the ,vednta-texts is utterly to destroy what is the root of that error1 i4e4 ,nescience1 and thus to obtain a firm knowledge of the oneness of ,brahman1 whose nature is mere intelligence--free1 pure1 eternal4 ,,footnote #bb3a4 ,in agreement with the use made of this passage by the ,prvapakshin1 vijna must here be understood in the sense of avidy4 ,vijnasabdena vividham jyate-neneti karanavyutpatty-vidy-bhidhiyate4 ,sru4 ,pra4 ,,footnote #be3a4 ,the distinction is illustrated by the different views ,perception and ,inference cause us to take of the nature of the flame of the lamp4 ,to ,perception the flame1 as long as it burns1 seems one and the same3 but on the ground of the observation that the different particles of the wick and the oil are consumed in succession1 we infer that there are many distinct flames succeeding one another4 ,and we accept the ,inference as valid1 and as sublating or refuting the immediate perception1 because the perceived oneness of the flame admits of being accounted for 'otherwise1' viz4 on the ground of the many distinct flames originating in such rapid succession that the eye mistakes them for one4 ,the inference on the other hand does not admit of being explained in another way4 ,,footnote #bf3a4 ,the reference is to the point discussed ,p4 ,m4 ,s4 ,,vi1 #e1 #ed 7,jaim4 ,ny4 ,ml ,vistara1 p4 #bhe74 ,,footnote #bg3a4 ,the texts which deny all qualities of ,brahman are later in order than the texts which refer to ,brahman as qualified1 because denial presupposes that which is to be denied4 ,,footnote #bg3b4 ,the unity of purport of the sentence is inferred from its constituent words having the same case-ending4 ,,footnote #cj3a4 ,the theory here referred to is held by some of the ,mmmsakas4 ,the imperative forms of the verb have their primary meaning1 i4e4 the power of originating action1 only in ,vedic sentences which enjoin the performance of certain actions for the bringing about of certain ends3 no other means of knowledge but the ,veda informing us that such ends can be accomplished by such actions4 ,nobody1 e4g4 would offer a soma sacrifice in order to obtain the heavenly world1 were he not told by the ,veda to do so4 ,in ordinary life1 on the other hand1 no imperative possesses this entirely unique originative force1 since any action which may be performed in consequence of a command may be prompted by other motives as well3 it is1 in technical ,indian language1 established already1 apart from the command1 by other means of knowledge4 ,the man who1 e4g4 is told to milk a cow might have proceeded to do so1 apart from the command1 for reasons of his own4 ,imperatives in ordinary speech are therefore held not to have their primary meaning1 and this conclusion is extended1 somewhat unwarrantably one should say1 to all the words entering into an imperative clause4 ,,footnote #cd3a4 ,being not permanent but occasional1 it is an effect only1 and as such must have a cause4 ,,the ,,great ,,siddh,,nta4 ,this entire theory rests on a fictitious foundation of altogether hollow and vicious arguments1 incapable of being stated in definite logical alternatives1 and devised by men who are destitute of those particular qualities which cause individuals to be chosen by the ,supreme ,person revealed in the ,upanishads2 whose intellects are darkened by the impression of beginningless evil2 and who thus have no insight into the nature of words and sentences1 into the real purport conveyed by them1 and into the procedure of sound argumentation1 with all its methods depending on perception and the other instruments of right knowledge4 ,the theory therefore must needs be rejected by all those who1 through texts1 perception and the other means of knowledge--assisted by sound reasoning--have an insight into the true nature of things4 ,there is no proof of non-differenced substance4 ,to enter into details4--,those who maintain the doctrine of a substance devoid of all difference have no right to assert that this or that is a proof of such a substance2 for all means of right knowledge have for their object things affected with difference4--,should any one taking his stand on the received views of his sect1 assert that the theory of a substance free from all difference 7does not require any further means of proof but7 is immediately established by one's own consciousness2 we reply that he also is refuted by the fact1 warranted by the witness of the ,self1 that all consciousness implies difference3 all states of consciousness have for their object something that is marked by some difference1 as appears in the case of judgments like ',i saw this4' ,and should a state of consciousness--although directly apprehended as implying difference--be determined by some fallacious reasoning to be devoid of difference1 this determination could be effected only by means of some special attributes additional to the quality of mere ,being2 and owing to these special qualities on which the determination depends1 that state of consciousness would clearly again be characterised by difference4 ,the meaning of the mentioned determination could thus only be that of a thing affected with certain differences some other differences are denied2 but manifestly this would not prove the existence of a thing free from all difference4 ,to thought there at any rate belongs the quality of being thought and self-illuminatedness1 for the knowing principle is observed to have for its essential nature the illumining 7making to shine forth7 of objects4 ,and that also in the states of deep sleep1 swoon1 c41 consciousness is affected with difference we shall prove1 in its proper place1 in greater detail4 ,moreover you yourself admit that to consciousness there actually belong different attributes such as permanency 7oneness1 self-luminousness1 c4 71 and of these it cannot be shown that they are only ,being in general4 ,and even if the latter point were admitted1 we observe that there takes place a discussion of different views1 and you yourself attempt to prove your theory by means of the differences between those views and your own4 ,it therefore must be admitted that reality is affected with difference well established by valid means of proof4 ,sabda proves difference4 ,as to sound 7speech2 sabda7 it is specially apparent that it possesses the power of denoting only such things as are affected with difference4 ,speech operates with words and sentences4 ,now a word 7pada7 originates from the combination of a radical element and a suffix1 and as these two elements have different meanings it necessarily follows that the word itself can convey only a sense affected with difference4 ,and further1 the plurality of words is based on plurality of meanings2 the sentence therefore which is an aggregate of words expresses some special combination of things 7meanings of words71 and hence has no power to denote a thing devoid of all difference4--,the conclusion is that sound cannot be a means of knowledge for a thing devoid of all difference4 ,pratyaksha--even of the nirvikalpaka kind--proves difference4 ,perception in the next place--with its two subdivisions of non-determinate 7nirvikalpaka7 and determinate 7savikalpaka7 perception--also cannot be a means of knowledge for things devoid of difference4 ,determinate perception clearly has for its object things affected with difference2 for it relates to that which is distinguished by generic difference and so on4 ,but also non-determinate perception has for its object only what is marked with difference2 for it is on the basis of non-determinate perception that the object distinguished by generic character and so on is recognised in the act of determinate perception4 ,non-determinate perception is the apprehension of the object in so far as destitute of some differences but not of all difference4 ,apprehension of the latter kind is in the first place not observed ever to take place1 and is in the second place impossible3 for all apprehension by consciousness takes place by means of some distinction ',this is such and such4' ,nothing can be apprehended apart from some special feature of make or structure1 as e4g4 the triangularly shaped dewlap in the case of cows4 ,the true distinction between non-determinate and determinate perception is that the former is the apprehension of the first individual among a number of things belonging to the same class1 while the latter is the apprehension of the second1 third1 and so on1 individuals4 ,on the apprehension of the first individual cow the perceiving person is not conscious of the fact that the special shape which constitutes the generic character of the class 'cows' extends to the present individual also2 while this special consciousness arises in the case of the perception of the second and third cow4 ,the perception of the second individual thus is 'determinate' in so far as it is determined by a special attribute1 viz4 the extension1 to the perception1 of the generic character of a class--manifested in a certain outward shape--which connects this act of perception with the earlier perception 7of the first individual72 such determination being ascertained only on the apprehension of the second individual4 ,such extension or continuance of a certain generic character is1 on the other hand1 not apprehended on the apprehension of the first individual1 and perception of the latter kind thence is 'non-determinate4' ,that it is such is not due to non-apprehension of structure1 colour1 generic character and so on1 for all these attributes are equally objects of sensuous perception 7and hence perceived as belonging to the first individual also74 ,moreover that which possesses structure cannot be perceived apart from the structure1 and hence in the case of the apprehension of the first individual there is already perception of structure1 giving rise to the judgment ',the thing is such and such4' ,in the case of the second1 third1 c41 individuals1 on the other hand1 we apprehend1 in addition to the thing possessing structure and to the structure itself1 the special attribute of the persistence of the generic character1 and hence the perception is 'determinate4' ,from all this it follows that perception never has for its object that which is devoid of all difference4 ,the bhedbheda view is untenable4 ,the same arguments tend to refute the view that there is difference and absence of difference at the same time 7the so-called bhedbheda view74 ,take the judgment ',this is such and such'2 how can we realise here the non-difference of 'being this' and 'being such and such'8 ,the 'such and such' denotes a peculiar make characterised1 e4g4 by a dewlap1 the 'this' denotes the thing distinguished by that peculiar make2 the non-difference of these two is thus contradicted by immediate consciousness4 ,at the outset the thing perceived is perceived as separate from all other things1 and this separation is founded on the fact that the thing is distinguished by a special constitution1 let us say the generic characteristics of a cow1 expressed by the term 'such and such4' ,in general1 wherever we cognise the relation of distinguishing attribute and thing distinguished thereby1 the two clearly present themselves to our mind as absolutely different4 ,somethings--e4g4 staffs and bracelets--appear sometimes as having a separate1 independent existence of their own2 at other times they present themselves as distinguishing attributes of other things or beings 7i4e4 of the persons carrying staffs or wearing bracelets74 ,other entities--e4g4 the generic character of cows--have a being only in so far as they constitute the form of substances1 and thus always present themselves as distinguishing attributes of those substances4 ,in both cases there is the same relation of distinguishing attribute and thing distinguished thereby1 and these two are apprehended as absolutely different4 ,the difference between the two classes of entities is only that staffs1 bracelets1 and similar things are capable of being apprehended in separation from other things1 while the generic characteristics of a species are absolutely incapable thereof4 ,the assertion1 therefore1 that the difference of things is refuted by immediate consciousness1 is based on the plain denial of a certain form of consciousness1 the one namely--admitted by every one--which is expressed in the judgment ',this thing is such and such4'--,this same point is clearly expounded by the ,strakra in ,,ii1 #b1 #cc4 ,inference also teaches difference4 ,perception thus having for its object only what is marked by difference1 inference also is in the same case2 for its object is only what is distinguished by connexion with things known through perception and other means of knowledge4 ,and thus1 even in the case of disagreement as to the number of the different instruments of knowledge1 a thing devoid of difference could not be established by any of them since the instruments of knowledge acknowledged by all have only one and the same object1 viz4 what is marked by difference4 ,and a person who maintains the existence of a thing devoid of difference on the ground of differences affecting that very thing simply contradicts himself without knowing what he does2 he is in fact no better than a man who asserts that his own mother never had any children4 ,perception does not reveal mere being4 ,in reply to the assertion that perception causes the apprehension of pure ,being only1 and therefore cannot have difference for its object2 and that 'difference' cannot be defined because it does not admit of being set forth in definite alternatives2 we point out that these charges are completely refuted by the fact that the only objects of perception are things distinguished by generic character and so on1 and that generic character and so on--as being relative things--give at once rise to the judgment as to the distinction between themselves and the things in which they inhere4 ,you yourself admit that in the case of knowledge and in that of colour and other qualities this relation holds good1 viz4 that something which gives rise to a judgment about another thing at the same time gives rise to a judgment about itself2 the same may therefore be admitted with regard to difference ,,footnote #dd3a4 ,for this reason the charge of a regressus in infinitum and a logical seesaw 7see above1 p4 #cb7 cannot be upheld4 ,for even if perceptive cognition takes place within one moment1 we apprehend within that moment the generic character which constitutes on the one hand the difference of the thing from others1 and on the other hand the peculiar character of the thing itself2 and thus there remains nothing to be apprehended in a second moment4 ,moreover1 if perception made us apprehend only pure ,being judgments clearly referring to different objects--such as ',here is a jar1' ',there is a piece of cloth'--would be devoid of all meaning4 ,and if through perception we did not apprehend difference--as marked by generic character1 c41 constituting the structure or make of a thing1 why should a man searching for a horse not be satisfied with finding a buffalo8 ,and if mere ,being only were the object of all our cognitions1 why should we not remember1 in the case of each particular cognition1 all the words which are connected with all our cognitions8 ,and further1 if the cognition of a horse and that of an elephant had one object only1 the later cognition would cause us to apprehend only what was apprehended before1 and there being thus no difference 7of object of cognition7 there would be nothing to distinguish the later state of cognition from remembrance4 ,if on the other hand a difference is admitted for each state of consciousness1 we admit thereby that perception has for its objects things affected with difference4 ,if all acts of cognition had one and the same object only1 everything would be apprehended by one act of cognition2 and from this it would follow that there are no persons either deaf or blind6 ,nor does1 as a matter of fact1 the eye apprehend mere ,being only2 for what it does apprehend is colour and the coloured thing1 and those other qualities 7viz4 extension1 c471 which inhere in the thing together with colour4 ,nor does feeling do so2 for it has for its objects things palpable4 ,nor have the ear and the other senses mere ,being for their object2 but they relate to what is distinguished by a special sound or taste or smell4 ,hence there is not any source of knowledge causing us to apprehend mere ,being4 ,if moreover the senses had for their object mere ,being free from all difference1 it would follow that ,scripture which has the same object would 7not be originative of knowledge but7 perform the function of a mere anuvda1 i4e4 it would merely make statements about something1 the knowledge of which is already established by some other means4 ,and further1 according to your own doctrine1 mere ,being1 i4e4 ,brahman1 would hold the position of an object with regard to the instruments of knowledge2 and thus there would cling to it all the imperfections indicated by yourself--non-intelligent nature1 perishableness and so on4--,from all this we conclude that perception has for its object only what is distinguished by difference manifesting itself in generic character and so on1 which constitute the make or structure of a thing4 7,that the generic character of a thing is nothing else but its particular structure follows7 from the fact that we do not perceive anything1 different from structure1 which could be claimed as constituting the object of the cognition that several individuals possess one and the same general form4 ,and as our theory sufficiently accounts for the ordinary notions as to generic character1 and as moreover even those who hold generic character to be something different from structure admit that there is such a thing as 7common7 structure1 we adhere to the conclusion that generic character is nothing but structure4 ,by 'structure' we understand special or distinctive form2 and we acknowledge different forms of that kind according to the different classes of things4 ,and as the current judgments as to things being different from one another can be explained on the basis of the apprehension of generic character1 and as no additional entity is observed to exist1 and as even those who maintain the existence of such an additional thing admit the existence of generic character1 we further conclude that difference 7bheda7 is nothing but generic character 7jti74-- ,but if this were so1 the judgment as to difference would immediately follow from the judgment as to generic character1 as soon as the latter is apprehended6 ,quite true1 we reply4 ,as a matter of fact the judgment of difference is immediately formulated on the basis of the judgment as to generic character4 ,for 'the generic character' of a cow1 e4g41 means just the exclusion of everything else3 as soon as that character is apprehended all thought and speech referring to other creatures belonging to the same wider genus 7which includes buffaloes and so on also7 come to an end4 ,it is through the apprehension of difference only that the idea of non-difference comes to an end4 ,,footnote #dd3a4 ,colour reveals itself as well as the thing that has colour2 knowledge reveals itself as well as the object known2 so difference manifests itself as well as the things that differ4 ,plurality is not unreal4 ,next as to the assertion that all difference presented in our cognition--as of jars1 pieces of cloth and the like--is unreal because such difference does not persist4 ,this view1 we maintain1 is altogether erroneous1 springs in fact from the neglect of distinguishing between persistence and non-persistence on the one hand1 and the relation between what sublates and what is sublated on the other hand4 ,where two cognitions are mutually contradictory1 there the latter relation holds good1 and there is non-persistence of what is sublated4 ,but jars1 pieces of cloth and the like1 do not contradict one another1 since they are separate in place and time4 ,if on the other hand the non-existence of a thing is cognised at the same time and the same place where and when its existence is cognised1 we have a mutual contradiction of two cognitions1 and then the stronger one sublates the other cognition which thus comes to an end4 ,but when of a thing that is perceived in connexion with some place and time1 the non-existence is perceived in connexion with some other place and time1 there arises no contradiction2 how then should the one cognition sublate the other8 or how can it be said that of a thing absent at one time and place there is absence at other times and places also8 ,in the case of the snake-rope1 there arises a cognition of non-existence in connexion with the given place and time2 hence there is contradiction1 one judgment sublates the other and the sublated cognition comes to an end4 ,but the circumstance of something which is seen at one time and in one place not persisting at another time and in another place is not observed to be invariably accompanied by falsehood1 and hence mere non-persistence of this kind does not constitute a reason for unreality4 ,to say1 on the other hand1 that what is is real because it persists1 is to prove what is proved already1 and requires no further proof4 ,being and consciousness are not one4 ,hence mere ,being does not alone constitute reality4 ,and as the distinction between consciousness and its objects--which rests just on this relation of object and that for which the object is--is proved by perception1 the assertion that only consciousness has real existence is also disposed of4 ,the true meaning of ,svayampraksatva4 ,we next take up the point as to the self-luminousness of consciousness 7above1 p4 #cc74 ,the contention that consciousness is not an object holds good for the knowing ,self at the time when it illumines 7i4e4 constitutes as its objects7 other things2 but there is no absolute rule as to all consciousness never being anything but self-luminous4 ,for common observation shows that the consciousness of one person may become the object of the cognition of another1 viz4 of an inference founded on the person's friendly or unfriendly appearance and the like1 and again that a person's own past states of consciousness become the object of his own cognition--as appears from judgments such as ',at one time ,i knew4' ,it cannot therefore be said ',if it is consciousness it is self-proved' 7above p4 #cc71 nor that consciousness if becoming an object of consciousness would no longer be consciousness2 for from this it would follow that one's own past states1 and the conscious states of others-- because being objects of consciousness--are not themselves consciousness4 ,moreover1 unless it were admitted that there is inferential knowledge of the thoughts of others1 there would be no apprehension of the connexion of words and meaning1 and this would imply the absolute termination of all human intercourse depending on speech4 ,nor also would it be possible for pupils to attach themselves to a teacher of sacred lore1 for the reason that they had become aware of his wisdom and learning4 ,the general proposition that consciousness does not admit of being an object is in fact quite untenable4 ,the essential 'nature of consciousness or knowledge--consists therein that it shines forth1 or manifests itself1 through its own being to its own substrate at the present moment2 or 7to give another definition7 that it is instrumental in proving its own object by its own being ,,footnote #dh3a4 ,now these two characteristics are established by a person's own state of consciousness and do not vanish when that consciousness becomes the object of another state of consciousness2 consciousness remains also in the latter case what it is4 ,jars and similar things1 on the other hand1 do not possess consciousness1 not because they are objects of consciousness but because they lack the two characteristics stated above4 ,if we made the presence of consciousness dependent on the absence of its being an object of consciousness1 we should arrive at the conclusion that consciousness is not consciousness2 for there are things--e4g4 sky-flowers--which are not objects of consciousness and at the same time are not consciousness4 ,you will perhaps reply to this that a sky-flower's not being consciousness is due not to its not being an object of consciousness1 but to its non-existence6--,well then1 we rejoin1 let us say analogously that the reason of jars and the like not being contradictory to ,nescience 7i4e4 of their being jada71 is their not being of the nature of consciousness1 and let us not have recourse to their being objects of consciousness6--,but if consciousness is an object of consciousness1 we conclude that it also is non-contradictory of ,nescience1 like a jar6--,at this conclusion1 we rejoin1 you may arrive even on the opposite assumption1 reasoning as follows3 ',consciousness is non-contradictory of ,nescience1 because it is not an object of consciousness1 like a sky-flower6 ,all which shows that to maintain as a general principle that something which is an object of consciousness cannot itself be consciousness is simply ridiculous4' ,,footnote #dh3a4 ,the comment of the ,sru4 ,pra4 on the above definitions runs1 with a few additional explanations1 as follows3 ,the term 'anubhti' here denotes knowledge in general1 not only such knowledge as is not remembrance 7which limited meaning the term has sometimes74 ,with reference to the 'shining forth' it might be said that in this way jars also and similar things know or are conscious because they also shine forth' 7viz4 in so far as they are known72 to exclude jars and the like the text therefore adds 'to its own substrate' 7the jar 'shines forth1' not to itself1 but to the knowing person74 ,there are other attributes of the ,self1 such as atomic extension1 eternity1 and so on1 which are revealed 7not through themselves7 but through an act of knowledge different from them2 to exclude those the text adds 'through its own being4' ,in order to exclude past states of consciousness or acts of knowledge1 the text adds 'at the present moment4' ,a past state of consciousness is indeed not revealed without another act of knowledge 7representing it71 and would thus by itself be excluded2 but the text adds this specification 7viz4 'at the present moment'7 on purpose1 in order to intimate that a past state of consciousness can be represented by another state--a point denied by the opponent4 ',at the present moment' means 'the connexion with the object of knowledge belonging to the present time4' ,without the addition of 'to its own substrate' the definition might imply that a state of consciousness is manifest to another person also2 to exclude this the clause is added4 ,this first definition might be objected to as acceptable only to those who maintain the svayampraksatva-theory 7which need not be discussed here72 hence a second definition is given4 ,the two clauses 'to its own substrate' and 'at the present moment' have to be supplied in this second definition also4 ',instrumental in bringing about' would apply to staffs1 wheels1 and such like implements also2 hence the text adds 'its own object4' 7,staffs1 wheels1 c4 have no 'objects4'7 ,knowledge depending on sight does not bring about an object depending on hearing2 to exclude this notion of universal instrumentality the text specifies the object by the words 'its own4' ,the clause 'through its own being' excludes the sense organs1 which reveal objects not by their own being1 but in so far as they give rise to knowledge4 ,the two clauses 'at the present moment' and 'to its own substrate' have the same office in the second definition as in the first4 ,consciousness is not eternal4 ,it was further maintained by the prvapakshin that as consciousness is self-established it has no antecedent non-existence and so on1 and that this disproves its having an origin4 ,but this is an attempt to prove something not proved by something else that is equally unproved2 comparable to a man blind from birth undertaking to guide another blind man6 ,you have no right to maintain the non-existence of the antecedent non-existence of consciousness on the ground that there is nothing to make us apprehend that non-existence2 for there is something to make us apprehend it1 viz4 consciousness itself6--,but how can consciousness at the time when it is1 make us apprehend its own previous non-existence which is contradictorily opposed to it8--,consciousness1 we rejoin1 does not necessarily constitute as its objects only what occupies the same time with itself2 were it so it would follow that neither the past nor the future can be the object of consciousness4 ,or do you mean that there is an absolute rule that the ,antecedent non-existence of consciousness1 if proved1 must be contemporaneous with consciousness8 ,have you then1 we ask1 ever observed this so as to be able to assert an absolute rule8 ,and if it were observed1 that would prove the existence of previous non-existence1 not its negation6--,the fact1 however1 is that no person in his senses will maintain the contemporaneous existence of consciousness and its own antecedent non-existence4 ,in the case of perceptive knowledge originating from sensation1 there is indeed this limitation1 that it causes the apprehension of such things only as are actually present at the same time4 ,but this limitation does not extend to cognitions of all kinds1 nor to all instruments of knowledge2 for we observe that remembrance1 inference1 and the magical perception of ,yogis apprehend such things also as are not present at the time of apprehension4 ,on this very point there rests the relation connecting the means of knowledge with their objects1 viz4 that the former are not without the latter4 ,this does not mean that the instrument of knowledge is connected with its object in that way that it is not without something that is present at the time of cognition2 but rather that the instrument of knowledge is opposed to the falsehood of that special form in which the object presents itself as connected with some place and time4--,this disposes also of the contention that remembrance has no external object2 for it is observed that remembrance is related to such things also as have perished4--,possibly you will now argue as follows4 ,the antecedent non-existence of consciousness cannot be ascertained by perception1 for it is not something present at the time of perception4 ,it further cannot be ascertained by the other means of knowledge1 since there is no characteristic mark 7linga7 on which an inference could be based3 for we do not observe any characteristic mark invariably accompanied by the antecedent non-existence of consciousness4 ,nor do we meet with any scriptural text referring to this antecedent non-existence4 ,hence1 in the absence of any valid instrument of knowledge1 the antecedent non-existence of consciousness cannot be established at all4--,if1 we reply1 you thus1 altogether setting aside the force of self-provedness 7on which you had relied hitherto71 take your stand on the absence of valid means of knowledge1 we again must request you to give in2 for there is a valid means of knowledge whereby to prove the antecedent non-existence of consciousness1 viz4 valid non-perception 7anupalabdhi74 ,moreover1 we observe that perceptional knowledge proves its object1 be it a jar or something else1 to exist only as long as it exists itself1 not at all times2 we do not1 through it1 apprehend the antecedent or subsequent existence of the jar4 ,now this absence of apprehension is due to the fact that consciousness itself is limited in time4 ,if that consciousness which has a jar for its object were itself apprehended as non-limited in time1 the object also--the jar--would be apprehended under the same form1 i4e4 it would be eternal4 ,and if self-established consciousness were eternal1 it would be immediately cognised as eternal2 but this is not the case4 ,analogously1 if inferential consciousness and other forms of consciousness were apprehended as non-limited in time1 they would all of them reveal their objects also as non-limited1 and these objects would thus be eternal2 for the objects are conform in nature to their respective forms of consciousness4 ,there is no consciousness without object4 ,nor is there any consciousness devoid of objects2 for nothing of this kind is ever known4 ,moreover1 the self-luminousness of consciousness has1 by our opponent himself1 been proved on the ground that its essential nature consists in illumining 7revealing7 objects2 the self-luminousness of consciousness not admitting of proof apart from its essential nature which consists in the lighting up of objects4 ,and as moreover1 according to our opponent1 consciousness cannot be the object of another consciousness1 it would follow that 7having neither an object nor itself being an object7 it is something altogether unreal1 imaginary4 ,nor are you justified in maintaining that in deep sleep1 swoon1 senselessness and similar states1 pure consciousness1 devoid of any object1 manifests itself4 ,this view is negatived by 'valid non-perception' 7see above1 p4 #eb74 ,if consciousness were present in those states also1 there would be remembrance of it at the time of waking from sleep or recovery from swoon2 but as a matter of fact there is no such remembrance4--,but it is not an absolute rule that something of which we were conscious must be remembered2 how then can the absence of remembrance prove the absence of previous consciousness8--,unless1 we reply1 there be some cause of overpowering strength which quite obliterates all impressions--as e4g4 the dissolution of the body--the absence of remembrance does necessarily prove the absence of previous consciousness4 ,and1 moreover1 in the present case the absence of consciousness does not only follow from absence of remembrance2 it is also proved by the thought presenting itself to the person risen from sleep1 ',for so long a time ,i was not conscious of anything4'--,nor may it be said that even if there was consciousness1 absence of remembrance would necessarily follow from the absence 7during deep sleep7 of the distinction of objects1 and from the extinction of the consciousness of the ',i'2 for the non-consciousness of some one thing1 and the absence of some one thing cannot be the cause of the non-remembrance of some other thing1 of which there had been consciousness4 ,and that in the states in question the consciousness of the ',i' does persist1 will moreover be shown further on4 ,but1 our opponent urges1 have you not said yourself that even in deep sleep and similar states there is consciousness marked by difference8-- ,true1 we have said so4 ,but that consciousness is consciousness of the ,self1 and that this is affected by difference will be proved further on4 ,at present we are only interested in denying the existence of your pure consciousness1 devoid of all objects and without a substrate4 ,nor can we admit that your pure consciousness could constitute what we call the consciousness of the ,self2 for we shall prove that the latter has a substrate4 ,it thus cannot be maintained that the antecedent non-existence of consciousness does not admit of being proved1 because consciousness itself does not prove it4 ,and as we have shown that consciousness itself may be an object of consciousness1 we have thereby disproved the alleged impossibility of antecedent non-existence being proved by other means4 ,herewith falls the assertion that the non-origination of consciousness can be proved4 ,consciousness is capable of change4 ,against the assertion that the alleged non-origination of consciousness at the same time proves that consciousness is not capable of any other changes 7p4 #cf71 we remark that the general proposition on which this conclusion rests is too wide3 it would extend to antecedent non-existence itself1 of which it is evident that it comes to an end1 although it does not originate4 ,in qualifying the changes as changes of ',being1' you manifest great logical acumen indeed6 ,for according to your own view ,nescience also 7which is not ',being'7 does not originate1 is the substrate of manifold changes1 and comes to an end through the rise of knowledge6 ,perhaps you will say that the changes of ,nescience are all unreal4 ,but1 do you then1 we ask in reply1 admit that any change is real8 ,you do not2 and yet it is only this admission which would give a sense to the distinction expressed by the word ',being' ,,footnote #ed3a4 ,nor is it true that consciousness does not admit of any division within itself1 because it has no beginning 7p4 #cf74 ,for the non-originated ,self is divided from the body1 the senses1 c41 and ,nescience also1 which is avowedly without a beginning1 must needs be admitted to be divided from the ,self4 ,and if you say that the latter division is unreal1 we ask whether you have ever observed a real division invariably connected with origination6 ,moreover1 if the distinction of ,nescience from the ,self is not real1 it follows that ,nescience and the ,self are essentially one4 ,you further have yourself proved the difference of views by means of the difference of the objects of knowledge as established by non-refuted knowledge2 an analogous case being furnished by the difference of acts of cleaving1 which results from the difference of objects to be cleft4 ,and if you assert that of this knowing--which is essentially knowing only--nothing that is an object of knowledge can be an attribute1 and that these objects--just because they are objects of knowledge--cannot be attributes of knowing2 we point out that both these remarks would apply also to eternity1 self-luminousness1 and the other attributes of 'knowing'1 which are acknowledged by yourself1 and established by valid means of proof4 ,nor may you urge against this that all these alleged attributes are in reality mere 'consciousness' or 'knowing'2 for they are essentially distinct4 ,by 'being conscious' or 'knowing'1 we understand the illumining or manifesting of some object to its own substrate 7i4e4 the substrate of knowledge71 by its own existence 7i4e4 the existence of knowledge7 merely2 by self-luminousness 7or 'self-illuminatedness'7 we understand the shining forth or being manifest by its own existence merely to its own substrate2 the terms 'shining forth'1 'illumining'1 'being manifest' in both these definitions meaning the capability of becoming an object of thought and speech which is common to all things1 whether intelligent or non-intelligent4 ,eternity again means 'being present in all time'2 oneness means 'being defined by the number one'4 ,even if you say that these attributes are only negative ones1 i4e4 equal to the absence of non-intelligence and so on1 you still cannot avoid the admission that they are attributes of consciousness4 ,if1 on the other hand1 being of a nature opposite to non-intelligence and so on1 be not admitted as attributes of consciousness--whether of a positive or a negative kind--in addition to its essential nature2 it is an altogether unmeaning proceeding to deny to it such qualities1 as non-intelligence and the like4 ,we moreover must admit the following alternative3 consciousness is either proved 7established7 or not4 ,if it is proved it follows that it possesses attributes2 if it is not1 it is something absolutely nugatory1 like a sky-flower1 and similar purely imaginary things4 ,,footnote #ed3a4 ,the ,snkara is not entitled to refer to a distinction of real and unreal division1 because according to his theory all distinction is unreal4 ,consciousness is the attribute of a permanent ,conscious self4 ,let it then be said that consciousness is proof 7siddhih7 itself4 ,proof of what1 we ask in reply1 and to whom8 ,if no definite answer can be given to these two questions1 consciousness cannot be defined as 'proof'2 for 'proof' is a relative notion1 like 'son4' ,you will perhaps reply ',proof to the ,self'2 and if we go on asking ',but what is that ,self'8 you will say1 ',just consciousness as already said by us before4' ,true1 we reply1 you said so2 but it certainly was not well said4 ,for if it is the nature of consciousness to be 'proof' 7'light1' 'enlightenment'7 on the part of a person with regard to something1 how can this consciousness which is thus connected with the person and the thing be itself conscious of itself8 ,to explain3 the essential character of consciousness or knowledge is that by its very existence it renders things capable of becoming objects1 to its own substrate1 of thought and speech4 ,this consciousness 7anubhti71 which is also termed jna1 avagati1 samvid1 is a particular attribute belonging to a conscious ,self and related to an object3 as such it is known to every one on the testimony of his own ,self--as appears from ordinary judgments such as ',i know the jar1' ',i understand this matter1' ',i am conscious of 7the presence of7 this piece of cloth4' ,that such is the essential nature of consciousness you yourself admit2 for you have proved thereby its self-luminousness4 ,of this consciousness which thus clearly presents itself as the attribute of an agent and as related to an object1 it would be difficult indeed to prove that at the same time it is itself the agent2 as difficult as it would be to prove that the object of action is the agent4 ,for we clearly see that this agent 7the subject of consciousness7 is permanent 7constant71 while its attribute1 i4 e4 consciousness1 not differing herein from joy1 grief1 and the like1 rises1 persists for some time1 and then comes to an end4 ,the permanency of the conscious subject is proved by the fact of recognition1 ',this very same thing was formerly apprehended by me4' ,the non-permanency of consciousness1 on the other hand1 is proved by thought expressing itself in the following forms1 ',i know at present1' ',i knew at a time1' ',i1 the knowing subject1 no longer have knowledge of this thing4' ,how then should consciousness and 7the conscious subject7 be one8 ,if consciousness which changes every moment were admitted to constitute the conscious subject1 it would be impossible for us to recognise the thing seen to-day as the one we saw yesterday2 for what has been perceived by one cannot be recognised by another4 ,and even if consciousness were identified with the conscious subject and acknowledged as permanent1 this would no better account for the fact of recognition4 ,for recognition implies a conscious subject persisting from the earlier to the later moment1 and not merely consciousness4 ,its expression is ',i myself perceived this thing on a former occasion4' ,according to your view the quality of being a conscious agent cannot at all belong to consciousness2 for consciousness1 you say1 is just consciousness and nothing more4 ,and that there exists a pure consciousness devoid of substrate and objects alike1 we have already refuted on the ground that of a thing of this kind we have absolutely no knowledge4 ,and that the consciousness admitted by both of us should be the ,self is refuted by immediate consciousness itself4 ,and we have also refuted the fallacious arguments brought forward to prove that mere consciousness is the only reality4--,but1 another objection is raised1 should the relation of the ,self and the ',i' not rather be conceived as follows3--,in self-consciousness which expresses itself in the judgment ',i know1' that intelligent something which constitutes the absolutely non-objective element1 and is pure homogeneous light1 is the ,self2 the objective element 7yushmad-artha7 on the other hand1 which is established through its being illumined 7revealed7 by the ,self is the ,i--in ',i know'--and this is something different from pure intelligence1 something objective or external8 ,by no means1 we reply2 for this view contradicts the relation of attribute and substrate of attribute of which we are directly conscious1 as implied in the thought ',i know4' ,consider also what follows4--',if the ,i were not the ,self1 the inwardness of the ,self would not exist2 for it is just the consciousness of the ,i which separates the inward from the outward4 ',may ,i1 freeing myself from all pain1 enter on free possession of endless delight8 ,this is the thought which prompts the man desirous of release to apply himself to the study of the sacred texts4 ,were it a settled matter that release consists in the annihilation of the ,i1 the same man would move away as soon as release were only hinted at4 ,when ,i myself have perished1 there still persists some consciousness different from me2 to bring this about nobody truly will exert himself4 ',moreover the very existence of consciousness1 its being a consciousness at all1 and its being self-luminous1 depend on its connexion with a ,self2 when that connexion is dissolved1 consciousness itself cannot be established1 not any more than the act of cutting can take place when there is no person to cut and nothing to be cut4 ,hence it is certain that the ,i1 i4e4 the knowing subject1 is the inward ,self4' ,this scripture confirms when saying ',by what should he know the knower8' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #d1 #ae72 and ,smriti also1 ',him who knows this they call the knower of the body' 7,bha4 ,g4 ,,xiii1 #a74 ,and the ,strakra also1 in the section beginning with ',not the ,self on account of scriptural statement' 7,,ii1 #c1 #ag71 will say ',for this very reason 7it is7 a knower' 7,,ii1 #c1 #ah72 and from this it follows that the ,self is not mere consciousness4 ,what is established by consciousness of the ',i' is the ,i itself1 while the not-,i is given in the consciousness of the not-,i2 hence to say that the knowing subject1 which is established by the state of consciousness1 ',i know1' is the not-,i1 is no better than to maintain that one's own mother is a barren woman4 ,nor can it be said that this ',i1' the knowing subject1 is dependent on its light for something else4 ,it rather is self-luminous2 for to be self-luminous means to have consciousness for one's essential nature4 ,and that which has light for its essential nature does not depend for its light on something else4 ,the case is analogous to that of the flame of a lamp or candle4 ,from the circumstance that the lamp illumines with its light other things1 it does not follow either that it is not luminous1 or that its luminousness depends on something else2 the fact rather is that the lamp being of luminous nature shines itself and illumines with its light other things also4 ,to explain4--,the one substance tejas1 i4e4 fire or heat1 subsists in a double form1 viz4 as light 7prabh71 and as luminous matter4 ,although light is a quality of luminous substantial things1 it is in itself nothing but the substance tejas1 not a mere quality like e4g4 whiteness2 for it exists also apart from its substrates1 and possesses colour 7which is a quality74 ,having thus attributes different from those of qualities such as whiteness and so on1 and possessing illumining power1 it is the substance tejas1 not anything else 7e4g4 a quality74 ,illumining power belongs to it1 because it lights up itself and other things4 ,at the same time it is practically treated as a quality because it always has the substance tejas for its substrate1 and depends on it4 ,this must not be objected to on the ground that what is called light is really nothing but dissolving particles of matter which proceed from the substance tejas2 for if this were so1 shining gems and the sun would in the end consume themselves completely4 ,moreover1 if the flame of a lamp consisted of dissolving particles of matter1 it would never be apprehended as a whole2 for no reason can be stated why those particles should regularly rise in an agglomerated form to the height of four fingers breadth1 and after that simultaneously disperse themselves uniformly in all directions--upwards1 sideways1 and downwards4 ,the fact is that the flame of the lamp together with its light is produced anew every moment and again vanishes every moment2 as we may infer from the successive combination of sufficient causes 7viz4 particles of oil and wick7 and from its coming to an end when those causes are completely consumed4 ,analogously to the lamp1 the ,self is essentially intelligent 7kid-rpa71 and has intelligence 7kaitanya7 for its quality4 ,and to be essentially intelligent means to be self-luminous4 ,there are many scriptural texts declaring this1 compare e4g4 ',as a mass of salt has neither inside nor outside but is altogether a mass of taste1 thus indeed that ,self has neither inside nor outside but is altogether a mass of knowledge' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #e1 #ac72 ',there that person becomes self-luminous1 there is no destruction of the knowing of the knower' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #c1 #ad2 #cj72 ',he who knows1 let me smell this1 he is the ,self 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,viii1 #ab1 #d72 ',who is that ,self8 ,that one who is made of knowledge1 among the prnas1 within the heart1 the light1 the person' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #c1 #g72 ',for it is he who sees1 hears1 smells1 tastes1 thinks1 considers1 acts1 the person whose ,self is knowledge' 7,pr4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #i72 ',whereby should one know the knower' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #e1 #ae74 ',this person knows1' ',the seer does not see death nor illness nor pain' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vii1 #bf1 #b72 ',that highest person not remembering this body into which he was born' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,viii1 #ab1 #c72 ',thus these sixteen parts of the spectator that go towards the person2 when they have readied the person1 sink into him' 7,pr4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #e72 ',from this consisting of mind1 there is different an interior ,self consisting of knowledge' 7,taitt4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #d74 ,and the ,strakra also will refer to the ,self as a 'knower' in ,,ii1 #c1 #ah4 ,all which shows that the self-luminous ,self is a knower1 i4e4 a knowing subject1 and not pure light 7non-personal intelligence74 ,in general we may say that where there is light it must belong to something1 as shown by the light of a lamp4 ,the ,self thus cannot be mere consciousness4 ,the grammarians moreover tell us that words such as 'consciousness1' 'knowledge1' c41 are relative2 neither ordinary nor ,vedic language uses expressions such as 'he knows' without reference to an object known and an agent who knows4 ,with reference to the assertion that consciousness constitutes the ,self1 because it 7consciousness7 is not non-intelligent 7jada71 we ask what you understand by this absence of non-intelligence4' ,if you reply 'luminousness due to the being of the thing itself 7i4e4 of the thing which is ajada7'2 we point out that this definition would wrongly include lamps also1 and similar things2 and it would moreover give rise to a contradiction1 since you do not admit light as an attribute1 different from consciousness itself4 ,nor can we allow you to define ajadatva as 'being of that nature that light is always present1 without any exception1' for this definition would extend also to pleasure1 pain1 and similar states4 ,should you maintain that pleasure and so on1 although being throughout of the nature of light1 are non-intelligent for the reason that1 like jars1 c41 they shine forth 7appear7 to something else and hence belong to the sphere of the not-,self2 we ask in reply3 ,do you mean then to say that knowledge appears to itself8 ,knowledge no less than pleasure appears to some one else1 viz4 the ',i'3 there is1 in that respect1 no difference between the judgment ',i know1' and the judgment ',i am pleased4' ,non-intelligence in the sense of appearingness-to-itself is thus not proved for consciousness2 and hence it follows that what constitutes the ,self is the non-jada ',i' which is proved to itself by its very ,being4 ,that knowledge is of the nature of light depends altogether on its connection with the knowing ',i'3 it is due to the latter1 that knowledge1 like pleasure1 manifests itself to that conscious person who is its substrate1 and not to anybody else4 ,the ,self is thus not mere knowledge1 but is the knowing ',i4' ,the view that the conscious subject is something unreal1 due to the ahamkra1 cannot be maintained4 ,we turn to a further point4 ,you maintain that consciousness which is in reality devoid alike of objects and substrate presents itself1 owing to error1 in the form of a knowing subject1 just as mother o' pearl appears as silver2 7consciousness itself being viewed as a real substrate of an erroneous imputation71 because an erroneous imputation cannot take place apart from a substrate4 ,but this theory is indefensible4 ,if things were as you describe them1 the conscious ',i' would be cognised as co-ordinate with the state of consciousness ',i am consciousness1' just as the shining thing presenting itself to our eyes is judged to be silver4 ,but the fact is that the state of consciousness presents itself as something apart1 constituting a distinguishing attribute of the ,i1 just as the stick is an attribute of ,devadatta who carries it4 ,the judgment ',i am conscious' reveals an ',i' distinguished by consciousness2 and to declare that it refers only to a state of consciousness--which is a mere attribute--is no better than to say that the judgment ',devadatta carries a stick' is about the stick only4 ,nor are you right in saying that the idea of the ,self being a knowing agent1 presents itself to the mind of him only who erroneously identifies the ,self and the body1 an error expressing itself in judgments such as ',i am stout1' and is on that account false2 for from this it would follow that the consciousness which is erroneously imagined as a ,self is also false2 for it presents itself to the mind of the same person4 ,you will perhaps rejoin that consciousness is not false because it 7alone7 is not sublatcd by that cognition which sublates everything else4 ,well1 we reply1 then the knowership of the ,self also is not false2 for that also is not sublatcd4 ,you further maintain that the character of being a knower1 i4e4 the agent in the action of knowing1 does not become the non-changing ,self2 that being a knower is something implying change1 of a non-intelligent kind 7jada71 and residing in the ahamkra which is the abode of change and a mere effect of the ,unevolved 7the ,prakriti72 that being an agent and so on is like colour and other qualities1 an attribute of what is objective2 and that if we admit the ,self to be an agent and the object of the notion of the ',i1' it also follows that the ,self is1 like the body1 not a real ,self but something external and non-intelligent4 ,but all this is unfounded1 since the internal organ is1 like the body1 non-intelligent1 an effect of ,prakriti1 an object of knowledge1 something outward and for the sake of others merely2 while being a knowing subject constitutes the special essential nature of intelligent beings4 ,to explain4 ,just as the body1 through its objectiveness1 outwardness1 and similar causes1 is distinguished from what possesses the opposite attributes of subjectiveness1 inwardness1 and so on2 for the same reason the ahamkra also--which is of the same substantial nature as the body--is similarly distinguished4 ,hence the ahamkra is no more a knower than it is something subjective2 otherwise there would be an evident contradiction4 ,as knowing cannot be attributed to the ahamkra1 which is an object of knowledge1 so knowership also cannot be ascribed to it2 for of that also it is the object4 ,nor can it be maintained that to be a knower is something essentially changing4 ,for to be a knower is to be the substrate of the quality of knowledge1 and as the knowing ,self is eternal1 knowledge which is an essential quality of the ,self is also eternal4 ,that the ,self is eternal will be declared in the ,stra1 ,,ii1 #c1 #ag2 and in ,,ii1 #c1 #ah the term 'ja' 7knower7 will show that it is an essential quality of the ,self to be the abode of knowledge4 ,that a ,self whose essential nature is knowledge should be the substrate of the 7quality of7 knowledge--just as gems and the like are the substrate of light--gives rise to no contradiction whatever4 ,knowledge 7the quality7 which is in itself unlimited1 is capable of contraction and expansion1 as we shall show later on4 ,in the so-called kshetraja--condition of the ,self1 knowledge is1 owing to the influence of work 7karman71 of a contracted nature1 as it more or less adapts itself to work of different kinds1 and is variously determined by the different senses4 ,with reference to this various flow of knowledge as due to the senses1 it is spoken of as rising and setting1 and the ,self possesses the quality of an agent4 ,as this quality is not1 however1 essential1 but originated by action1 the ,self is essentially unchanging4 ,this changeful quality of being a knower can belong only to the ,self whose essential nature is knowledge2 not possibly to the non-intelligent ahamkra4 ,but1 you will perhaps say1 the ahamkra1 although of non- intelligent nature1 may become a knower in so far as by approximation to intelligence it becomes a reflection of the latter4 ,how1 we ask in return1 is this becoming a reflection of intelligence imagined to take place8 ,does consciousness become a reflection of the ahamkra1 or does the ahamkra become a reflection of consciousness8 ,the former alternative is inadmissible1 since you will not allow to consciousness the quality of being a knower2 and so is the latter since1 as explained above1 the non-intelligent ahamkra can never become a knower4 ,moreover1 neither consciousness nor the ahamkra are objects of visual perception4 ,only things seen by the eye have reflections4--,let it then be said that as an iron ball is heated by contact with fire1 so the consciousness of being a knower is imparted to the ahamkra through its contact with ,intelligence4--,this view too is inadmissible2 for as you do not allow real knowership to ,intelligence1 knowership or the consciousness of knowership cannot be imparted to the ahamkra by contact with ,intelligence2 and much less even can knowership or the consciousness of it be imparted to ,intelligence by contact with the essentially non- intelligent ahamkra4 ,nor can we accept what you say about 'manifestation4' ,neither the ahamkra1 you say1 nor ,intelligence is really a knowing subject1 but the ahamkra manifests consciousness abiding within itself 7within the ahamkra71 as the mirror manifests the image abiding within it4 ,but the essentially non-intelligent ahamkra evidently cannot 'manifest' the self-luminous ,self4 ,as has been said ',that the non-intelligent ahamkra should manifest the self-luminous ,self1 has no more sense than to say that a spent coal manifests the ,sun4' ,the truth is that all things depend for their proof on self-luminous consciousness2 and now you maintain that one of these things1 viz4 the non-intelligent ahamkra--which itself depends for its light on consciousness--manifests consciousness1 whose essential light never rises or sets1 and which is the cause that proves everything6 ,whoever knows the nature of the ,self will justly deride such a view6 ,the relation of 'manifestation' cannot hold good between consciousness and the ahamkra for the further reason also that there is a contradiction in nature between the two1 and because it would imply consciousness not to be consciousness4 ,as has been said1 ',one cannot manifest the other1 owing to contradictoriness2 and if the ,self were something to be manifested1 that would imply its being non-intelligent like a jar4' ,nor is the matter improved by your introducing the hand and the sunbeams 7above1 p4 #ch71 and to say that as the sunbeams while manifesting the hand1 are at the same time manifested by the hand1 so consciousness1 while manifesting the ahamkra1 is at the same time itself manifested by the latter4 ,the sunbeams are in reality not manifested by the hand at all4 ,what takes place is that the motion of the sunbeams is reversed 7reflected7 by the opposed hand2 they thus become more numerous1 and hence are perceived more clearly2 but this is due altogether to the multitude of beams1 not to any manifesting power on the part of the hand4 ,what could1 moreover1 be the nature of that 'manifestation' of the ,self consisting of ,intelligence1 which would be effected through the ahamkra8 ,it cannot be origination2 for you acknowledge that what is self- established cannot be originated by anything else4 ,nor can it be 'illumination' 7making to shine forth71 since consciousness cannot-- according to you--be the object of another consciousness4 ,for the same reason it cannot be any action assisting the means of being conscious of consciousness4 ,for such helpful action could be of two kinds only4 ,it would either be such as to cause the connexion of the object to be known with the sense-organs2 as e4g4 any action which1 in the case of the apprehension of a species or of one's own face1 causes connexion between the organ of sight and an individual of the species1 or a looking-glass4 ,or it would be such as to remove some obstructive impurity in the mind of the knowing person2 of this kind is the action of calmness and self- restraint with reference to scripture which is the means of apprehending the highest reality4 ,moreover1 even if it were admitted that consciousness may be an object of consciousness1 it could not be maintained that the ',i' assists the means whereby that consciousness is effected4 ,for if it did so1 it could only be in the way of removing any obstacles impeding the origination of such consciousness2 analogous to the way in which a lamp assists the eye by dispelling the darkness which impedes the origination of the apprehension of colour4 ,but in the case under discussion we are unable to imagine such obstacles4 ,there is nothing pertaining to consciousness which obstructs the origination of the knowledge of consciousness and which could be removed by the ahamkra4--,there is something1 you will perhaps reply1 viz4 ,nescience6 ,not so1 we reply4 ,that ,nescience is removed by the ahamkra cannot be admitted2 knowledge alone can put an end to ,nescience4 ,nor can consciousness be the abode of ,nescience1 because in that case ,nescience would have the same abode and the same object as knowledge4 ,in pure knowledge where there is no knowing subject and no object of knowledge--the so-called 'witnessing' principle 7skshin7--,nescience cannot exist4 ,jars and similar things cannot be the abode of ,nescience because there is no possibility of their being the abode of knowledge1 and for the same reason pure knowledge also cannot be the abode of ,nescience4 ,and even if consciousness were admitted to be the abode of ,nescience1 it could not be the object of knowledge2 for consciousness being viewed as the ,self cannot be the object of knowledge1 and hence knowledge cannot terminate the ,nescience abiding within consciousness4 ,for knowledge puts an end to ,nescience only with regard to its own objects1 as in the case of the snake-rope4 ,and the consequence of this would be that the ,nescience attached to consciousness could never be destroyed by any one4--,if ,nescience1 we further remark1 is viewed as that which can be defined neither as ,being nor non-,being1 we shall show later on that such ,nescience is something quite incomprehensible4--,on the other hand1 ,nescience1 if understood to be the antecedent non- existence of knowledge1 is not opposed in nature to the origination of knowledge1 and hence the dispelling of ,nescience cannot be viewed as promoting the means of the knowledge of the ,self4--,from all this it follows that the ahamkra cannot effect in any way 'manifestation of consciousness4' ,nor 7to finish up this point7 can it be said that it is the essential nature of manifesting agents to manifest things in so far as the latter have their abode in the former2 for such a relation is not observed in the case of lamps and the like 7which manifest what lies outside them74 ,the essential nature of manifesting agents rather lies therein that they promote the knowledge of things as they really are1 and this is also the nature of whatever promotes knowledge and the means thereof4 ,nor is it even true that the mirror manifests the face4 ,the mirror is only the cause of a certain irregularity1 viz4 the reversion of the ocular rays of light1 and to this irregularity there is due the appearance of the face within the mirror2 but the manifesting agent is the light only4 ,and it is evident that the ahamkra is not capable of producing an irregularity 7analogous to that produced by the mirror7 in consciousness which is self-luminous4--,and--with regard to the second analogous instance alleged by you--the fact is that the species is known through the individual because the latter is its substrate 7as expressed in the general principle1 'the species is the form of the individual'71 but not because the individual 'manifests' the species4 ,thus there is no reason1 either real or springing from some imperfection1 why the consciousness of consciousness should be brought about by its abiding in the ahamkra1 and the attribute of being the knowing agent or the consciousness of that cannot therefore belong to the ahamkra4 ,hence1 what constitutes the inward ,self is not pure consciousness but the ',i' which proves itself as the knowing subject4 ,in the absence of egoity1 'inwardness' could not be established for consciousness4 ,the conscious subject persists in deep sleep4 ,we now come to the question as to the nature of deep sleep4 ,in deep sleep the quality of darkness prevails in the mind and there is no consciousness of outward things1 and thus there is no distinct and clear presentation of the ',i'2 but all the same the ,self somehow presents itself up to the time of waking in the one form of the ',i1' and the latter cannot therefore be said to be absent4 ,pure consciousness assumed by you 7to manifest itself in deep sleep7 is really in no better case2 for a person risen from deep sleep never represents to himself his state of consciousness during sleep in the form1 ',i was pure consciousness free from all egoity and opposed in nature to everything else1 witnessing ,nescience'2 what he thinks is only ',i slept well4' ,from this form of reflection it appears that even during sleep the ,self4 i4e4 the ',i1' was a knowing subject and perceptive of pleasure4 ,nor must you urge against this that the reflection has the following form3 ',as now ,i feel pleasure1 so ,i slept then also'2 for the reflection is distinctly not of that kind4 ,,footnote #fh3a ,nor must you say that owing to the non-permanency of the ',i' its perception of pleasure during sleep cannot connect itself with the waking state4 ,for 7the ',i' is permanent as appears from the fact that7 the person who has risen from sleep recalls things of which he was conscious before his sleep1 ',i did such and such a thing1' ',i observed this or that1' ',i said so or so4'--,but1 you will perhaps say1 he also reflects1 ',for such and such a time ,i was conscious of nothing6'--',and what does this imply8' we ask4--',it implies a negation of everything6'--,by no means1 we rejoin4 ,the words ',i was conscious' show that the knowing ',i' persisted1 and that hence what is negated is only the objects of knowledge4 ,if the negation implied in 'of nothing' included everything1 it would also negative the pure consciousness which you hold to persist in deep sleep4 ,in the judgment ',i was conscious of nothing1' the word ',i' clearly refers to the ',i1' i4 e4 the knowing ,self which persists even during deep sleep1 while the words 'was conscious of nothing' negative all knowledge on the part of that ',i'2 if1 now1 in the face of this1 you undertake to prove by means of this very judgment that knowledge--which is expressly denied--existed at the time1 and that the persisting knowing ,self did not exist1 you may address your proof to the patient gods who give no reply6--,but--our opponent goes on to urge--,i form the following judgment also3 ',i then was not conscious of myself1' and from this ,i understand that the ',i' did not persist during deep sleep6--,you do not know1 we rejoin1 that this denial of the persistence of the ',i' flatly contradicts the state of consciousness expressed in the judgment ',i was not conscious of myself' and the verbal form of the judgment itself6--,but what then is denied by the words 'of myself8--,this1 we admit1 is a reasonable question4 ,let us consider the point4 ,what is negatived in that judgment is not the knowing ',i' itself1 but merely the distinctions of caste1 condition of life1 c4 which belong to the ',i' at the time of waking4 ,we must distinguish the objects of the several parts of the judgment under discussion4 ,the object of the '7me7 myself' is the ',i' distinguished by class characteristics as it presents itself in the waking state2 the object of the word ',i' 7in the judgment7 is that ',i' which consists of a uniform flow of self-consciousness which persists in sleep also1 but is then not quite distinct4 ,the judgment ',i did not know myself' therefore means that the sleeper was not conscious of the place where he slept1 of his special characteristics1 and so on4--,it is1 moreover1 your own view that in deep sleep the ,self occupies the position of a witnessing principle with regard to ,nescience4 ,but by a witness 7skshin7 we understand some one who knows about something by personal observation 7sksht72 a person who does not know cannot be a witness4 ,accordingly1 in scripture as well as in ordinary language a knowing subject only1 not mere knowledge1 is spoken of as a witness2 and with this the ,reverend ,pnini also agrees when teaching that the word 'skshin' means one who knows in person 7,p4 ,s4 ,v1 #b1 #ia74 ,now this witness is nothing else but the ',i' which is apprehended in the judgment ',i know'2 and how then should this ',i' not be apprehended in the state of sleep8 ,that which itself appears to the ,self appears as the ',i1' and it thus follows that also in deep sleep and similar states the ,self which then shines forth appears as the ',i4' ,,footnote #fh3a4 ,i4 e4 the reflection as to the perception of pleasure refers to the past state of sleep only1 not to the present moment of reflection4 ,the conscious subject persists in the state of release4 ,to maintain that the consciousness of the ',i' does not persist in the state of final release is again altogether inappropriate4 ,it in fact amounts to the doctrine--only expressed in somewhat different words-- that final release is the annihilation of the ,self4 ,the ',i' is not a mere attribute of the ,self so that even after its destruction the essential nature of the ,self might persist--as it persists on the cessation of ignorance2 but it constitutes the very nature of the ,self4 ,such judgments as ',i know'1 ',knowledge has arisen in me'1 show1 on the other hand1 that we are conscious of knowledge as a mere attribute of the ,self4--,moreover1 a man who suffering pain1 mental or of other kind-- whether such pain be real or due to error only--puts himself in relation to pain--',i am suffering pain'--naturally begins to reflect how he may once for all free himself from all these manifold afflictions and enjoy a state of untroubled ease2 the desire of final release thus having arisen in him he at once sets to work to accomplish it4 ,if1 on the other hand1 he were to realise that the effect of such activity would be the loss of personal existence1 he surely would turn away as soon as somebody began to tell him about 'release'4 ,and the result of this would be that1 in the absence of willing and qualified pupils1 the whole scriptural teaching as to final release would lose its authoritative character4--,nor must you maintain against this that even in the state of release there persists pure consciousness2 for this by no means improves your case4 ,no sensible person exerts himself under the influence of the idea that after he himself has perished there will remain some entity termed 'pure light6'--,what constitutes the 'inward' ,self thus is the ',i'1 the knowing subject4 ,this 'inward' ,self shines forth in the state of final release also as an ',i'2 for it appears to itself4 ,the general principle is that whatever being appears to itself appears as an ',i'2 both parties in the present dispute establish the existence of the transmigrating ,self on such appearance4 ,on the contrary1 whatever does not appear as an ',i'1 does not appear to itself2 as jars and the like4 ,now the emancipated ,self does thus appear to itself1 and therefore it appears as an ',i'4 ,nor does this appearance as an ',i' imply in any way that the released ,self is subject to ,nescience and implicated in the ,samsra2 for this would contradict the nature of final release1 and moreover the consciousness of the ',i' cannot be the cause of ,nescience and so on4 ,nescience 7ignorance7 is either ignorance as to essential nature1 or the cognition of something under an aspect different from the real one 7as when a person suffering from jaundice sees all things yellow72 or cognition of what is altogether opposite in nature 7as when mother o' pearl is mistaken for silver74 ,now the ',i' constitutes the essential nature of the ,self2 how then can the consciousness of the ',i1' i4e4 the consciousness of its own true nature1 implicate the released ,self in ,nescience1 or1 in the ,samsra8 ,the fact rather is that such consciousness destroys ,nescience1 and so on1 because it is essentially opposed to them4 ,in agreement with this we observe that persons like the rishi ,vmadeva1 in whom the intuition of their identity with ,brahman had totally destroyed all ,nescience1 enjoyed the consciousness of the personal ',i'2 for scripture says1 ',seeing this the rishi ,vmadeva understood1,i was ,manu and the ,sun' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,i1 #d1 #aj74 ,and the highest ,brahman also1 which is opposed to all other forms of ,nescience and denoted and conceived as pure ,being1 is spoken of in an analogous way2 cp4 ',let me make each of these three deities1' c4 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #c1 #c72 ',may ,i be many1 may ,i grow forth' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #b1 #c72 ',he thought1 shall ,i send forth worlds8' 7,ait4 r4 ,,ii1 #d1 #a1 #a72 and again1 ',since ,i transcend the ,destructible1 and am higher also than the ,indestructible1 therefore ,i am proclaimed in the world and in the ,veda as the highest ,person' 7,bha4 ,g4 ,,xv1 #ah72 ',i am the ,self1 ,o ,gdkesa4' 7,bha4 ,g4 ,x1 #bj72 ',never was ,i not' 7,bha4 ,g4 ,,ii1 #ab72 ',i am the source and the destruction of the whole world' 7,bha4 ,g4 ,,vii1 #f72 ',i am the source of all2 from me proceeds everything' 7,bha4 ,g4 ,x1 #h72 ',i am he who raises them from the ocean of the world of death' 7,bha4 ,g4 ,,xii1 #g72 ',i am the giver of seed1 the father' 7,bha4 ,g4 ,,xiv1 #d72 ',i know the things past' 7,bha4 ,g4 ,,vii1 #bf74--;,but if the ',i' 7aham7 constitutes the essential nature of the ,self1 how is it that the ,holy ,one teaches the principle of egoity 7ahamkra7 to belong to the sphere of objects1 ',the great elements1 the ahamkra1 the understanding 7buddhi71 and the ,unevolved' 7,bha4 ,g4 ,,xiii1 #e78--;,as in all passages1 we reply1 which give information about the true nature of the ,self it is spoken of as the ',i'1 we conclude that the ',i' constitutes the essential nature of the inward ,self4 ,where1 on the other hand1 the ,holy ,one declares the ahamkra--a special effect of the ,unevolved--to be comprised within the sphere of the ,objective1 he means that principle which is called ahamkra1 because it causes the assumption of ,egoity on the part of the body which belongs to the ,not-self4 ,such egoity constitutes the ahamkra also designated as pride or arrogance1 which causes men to slight persons superior to themselves1 and is referred to by scripture in many places as something evil4 ,such consciousness of the ',i' therefore as is not sublated by anything else has the ,self for its object2 while1 on the other hand1 such consciousness of the ',i' as has the body for its object is mere ,nescience4 ,in agreement with this the ,reverend ,parsara has said1 ',hear from me the essential nature of ,nescience2 it is the attribution of ,selfhood to what is not the ,self4' ,if the ,self were pure consciousness then pure consciousness only1 and not the quality of being a knowing subject1 would present itself in the body also1 which is a ,not-self wrongly imagined to be a ,self4 ,the conclusion therefore remains that the ,self is nothing but the knowing ',i'4 ,thus it has been said1 ',as is proved by perception1 and as also results from reasoning and tradition1 and from its connexion with ignorance1 the ,self presents itself as a knowing ',i'4 ,and again1',that which is different from body1 senses1 mind1 and vital airs2 which does not depend on other means2 which is permanent1 pervading1 divided according to bodies-that is the ,self blessed in itself4' ,here 'not dependent on other means' means 'self-luminous'2 and 'pervading' means 'being of such a nature as to enter1 owing to excessive minuteness1 into all non-sentient things4' ,in cases of ,scripture conflicting with ,perception1 ,scripture is not stronger4 ,the ,true cannot be known through the ,untrue4 ,with reference to the assertion 7p4 #bd ff47 that ,perception1 which depends on the view of plurality1 is based on some defect and hence admits of being otherwise accounted for--whence it follows that it is sublated by ,scripture2 we ask you to point out what defect it is on which ,perception is based and may hence be accounted for otherwise4--' ,the beginningless imagination of difference' we expect you to reply4-- ,but1 we ask in return1 have you then come to know by some other means that this beginningless imagination of difference1 acting in a manner analogous to that of certain defects of vision1 is really the cause of an altogether perverse view of things8--,if you reply that this is known just from the fact that ,perception is in conflict with ,scripture1 we point out that you are reasoning in a circle3 you prove the defectiveness of the imagination of plurality through the fact that ,scripture tells us about a substance devoid of all difference2 and at the same time you prove the latter point through the former4 ,moreover1 if ,perception gives rise to perverse cognition because it is based on the imagination of plurality1 ,scripture also is in no better case--for it is based on the very same view4--,if against this you urge that ,scripture1 although based on a defect1 yet sublates ,perception in so far as it is the cause of a cognition which dispels all plurality apprehended through ,perception1 and thus is later in order than ,perception2 we rejoin that the defectiveness of the foundation of ,scripture having once been recognised1 the circumstance of its being later is of no avail4 ,for if a man is afraid of a rope which he mistakes for a snake his fear does not come to an end because another man1 whom he considers to be in error himself1 tells him ',this is no snake1 do not be afraid4' ,and that ,scripture is founded on something defective is known at the very time of hearing ,scripture1 for the reflection 7which follows on hearing7 consists in repeated attempts to cognise the oneness of ,brahman--a cognition which is destructive of all the plurality apprehended through the first hearing of the ,veda4--,we further ask1 ',by what means do you arrive at the conclusion that ,scripture cannot possibly be assumed to be defective in any way1 while defects may be ascribed to ,perception'8 ,it is certainly not ,consciousness--self-proved and absolutely devoid of all difference--which enlightens you on this point2 for such ,consciousness is unrelated to any objects whatever1 and incapable of partiality to ,scripture4 ,nor can sense-perception be the source of your conviction2 for as it is founded on what is defective it gives perverse information4 ,nor again the other sources of knowledge2 for they are all based on sense-perception4 ,as thus there are no acknowledged means of knowledge to prove your view1 you must give it up4 ,but1 you will perhaps say1 we proceed by means of the ordinary empirical means and objects of knowledge6--,what1 we ask in reply1 do you understand by 'empirical'8--,what rests on immediate unreflective knowledge1 but is found not to hold good when tested by logical reasoning6--,but what is the use1 we ask1 of knowledge of this kind8 ,if logical reasoning refutes something known through some means of knowledge1 that means of knowledge is no longer authoritative6--,now you will possibly argue as follows3 ',scripture as well as ,perception is founded on ,nescience2 but all the same ,perception is sublated by ,scripture4 ,for as the object of ,scripture1 i4e4 ,brahman1 which is one and without a second1 is not seen to be sublated by any ulterior cognition1 ,brahman1 i4e4 pure non-differenced ,consciousness1 remains as the sole ,reality4'--,but here too you are wrong1 since we must decide that something which rests on a defect is unreal1 although it may remain unrefuted4 ,we will illustrate this point by an analogous instance4 ,let us imagine a race of men afflicted with a certain special defect of vision1 without being aware of this their defect1 dwelling in some remote mountain caves inaccessible to all other men provided with sound eyes4 ,as we assume all of these cave dwellers to be afflicted with the same defect of vision1 they1 all of them1 will equally see and judge bright things1 e4g4 the moon1 to be double4 ,now in the case of these people there never arises a subsequent cognition sublating their primitive cognition2 but the latter is false all the same1 and its object1 viz41 the doubleness of the moon1 is false likewise2 the defect of vision being the cause of a cognition not corresponding to reality4-- ,and so it is with the cognition of ,brahman also4 ,this cognition is based on ,nescience1 and therefore is false1 together with its object1 viz4 ,brahman1 although no sublating cognition presents itself4--,this conclusion admits of various expressions in logical form4 ',the ,brahman under dispute is false because it is the object of knowledge which has sprung from what is affected with ,nescience2 as the phenomenal world is4' ',brahman is false because it is the object of knowledge2 as the world is4' ',brahman is false because it is the object of knowledge1 the rise of which has the ,untrue for its cause2 as the world is4' ,you will now perhaps set forth the following analogy4 ,states of dreaming consciousness--such as the perception of elephants and the like in one's dreams--are unreal1 and yet they are the cause of the knowledge of real things1 viz4 good or ill fortune 7portended by those dreams74 ,hence there is no reason why ,scripture--although unreal in so far as based on ,nescience--should not likewise be the cause of the cognition of what is real1 viz4 ,brahman4--,the two cases are not parallel1 we reply4 ,the conscious states experienced in dreams are not unreal2 it is only their objects that are false2 these objects only1 not the conscious states1 are sublated by the waking consciousness4 ,nobody thinks 'the cognitions of which ,i was conscious in my dream are unreal'2 what men actually think is 'the cognitions are real1 but the things are not real4' ,in the same way the illusive state of consciousness which the magician produces in the minds of other men by means of mantras1 drugs1 c41 is true1 and hence the cause of love and fear2 for such states of consciousness also are not sublated4 ,the cognition which1 owing to some defect in the object1 the sense organ1 c41 apprehends a rope as a snake is real1 and hence the cause of fear and other emotions4 ,true also is the imagination which1 owing to the nearness of a snake1 arises in the mind of a man though not actually bitten1 viz4 that he has been bitten2 true also is the representation of the imagined poison1 for it may be the cause of actual death4 ,in the same way the reflection of the face in the water is real1 and hence enables us to ascertain details belonging to the real face4 ,all these states of consciousness are real1 as we conclude from their having a beginning and actual effects4--,nor would it avail you to object that in the absence of real elephants1 and so on1 the ideas of them cannot be real4 ,for ideas require only some substrate in general2 the mere appearance of a thing is a sufficient substrate1 and such an appearance is present in the case in question1 owing to a certain defect4 ,the thing we determine to be unreal because it is sublated2 the idea is non-sublated1 and therefore real4 ,nor can you quote in favour of your view--of the real being known through the unreal--the instance of the stroke and the letter4 ,the letter being apprehended through the stroke 7i4e4 the written character7 does not furnish a case of the real being apprehended through the unreal2 for the stroke itself is real4--,but the stroke causes the idea of the letter only in so far as it is apprehended as being a letter1 and this 'being a letter' is untrue6--,not so1 we rejoin4 ,if this 'being a letter' were unreal it could not be a means of the apprehension of the letter2 for we neither observe nor can prove that what is non-existent and indefinable constitutes a means4--,let then the idea of the letter constitute the means6--,in that case1 we rejoin1 the apprehension of the real does not spring from the unreal2 and besides1 it would follow therefrom that the means and what is to be effected thereby would be one1 i4e4 both would be1 without any distinction1 the idea of the letter only4 ,moreover1 if the means were constituted by the stroke in so far as it is not the letter1 the apprehension of all letters would result from the sight of one stroke2 for one stroke may easily be conceived as not being any letter4--,but1 in the same way as the word ',devadatta' conventionally denotes some particular man1 so some particular stroke apprehended by the eye may conventionally symbolise some particular letter to be apprehended by the ear1 and thus a particular stroke may be the cause of the idea of a particular letter6--,quite so1 we reply1 but on this explanation the real is known through the real2 for both stroke and conventional power of symbolisation are real4 ,the case is analogous to that of the idea of a buffalo being caused by the picture of a buffalo2 that idea rests on the similarity of picture and thing depicted1 and that similarity is something real4 ,nor can it be said 7with a view to proving the prvapaksha by another analogous instance7 that we meet with a cognition of the real by means of the unreal in the case of sound 7sabda7 which is essentially uniform1 but causes the apprehension of different things by means of difference of tone 7nda74 ,for sound is the cause of the apprehension of different things in so far only as we apprehend the connexion of sound manifesting itself in various tones1 with the different things indicated by those various tones ,,footnote #gg3a4 ,and1 moreover1 it is not correct to argue on the ground of the uniformity of sound2 for only particular significant sounds such as 'ga1' which can be apprehended by the ear1 are really 'sound4'--,all this proves that it is difficult indeed to show that the knowledge of a true thing1 viz4 ,brahman1 can be derived from ,scripture1 if ,scripture--as based on ,nescience--is itself untrue4 ,our opponent may finally argue as follows3--,scripture is not unreal in the same sense as a sky-flower is unreal2 for antecedently to the cognition of universal non-duality ,scripture is viewed as something that is1 and only on the rise of that knowledge it is seen to be unreal4 ,at this latter time ,scripture no longer is a means of cognising ,brahman1 devoid of all difference1 consisting of pure ,intelligence2 as long on the other hand as it is such a means1 ,scripture is2 for then we judge ',scripture is4'--,but to this we reply that if ,scripture is not 7true71 the judgment ',scripture is' is false1 and hence the knowledge resting on false ,scripture being false likewise1 the object of that knowledge1 i4e4 ,brahman itself1 is false4 ,if the cognition of fire which rests on mist being mistaken for smoke is false1 it follows that the object of that cognition1 viz4 fire itself1 is likewise unreal4 ,nor can it be shown that 7in the case of ,brahman7 there is no possibility of ulterior sublative cognition2 for there may be such sublative cognition1 viz4 the one expressed in the judgment 'the ,reality is a ,void4' ,and if you say that this latter judgment rests on error1 we point out that according to yourself the knowledge of ,brahman is also based on error4 ,and of our judgment 7viz4 'the ,reality is a ,void'7 it may truly be said that all further negation is impossible4--,but there is no need to continue this demolition of an altogether baseless theory4 ,,footnote #gg3a4 ,and those manifestations of sound by means of various tones are themselves something real4 ,no scriptural texts teach a ,brahman devoid of all difference4 ,we now turn to the assertion that certain scriptural texts1 as e4g4 ',being only was this in the beginning1' are meant to teach that there truly exists only one homogeneous substance1 viz4 ,intelligence free from all difference4--,this we cannot allow4 ,for the section in which the quoted text occurs1 in order to make good the initial declaration that by the knowledge of one thing all things are known1 shows that the highest ,brahman which is denoted by the term ',being' is the substantial and also the operative cause of the world2 that it is all-knowing1 endowed with all powers2 that its purposes come true2 that it is the inward principle1 the support and the ruler of everything2 and that distinguished by these and other good qualities it constitutes the ,self of the entire world2 and then finally proceeds to instruct ,svetaketu that this ,brahman constitutes his ,self also 7',thou art that'74 ,we have fully set forth this point in the ,vedrtha-samgraha and shall establish it in greater detail in the present work also1 in the so-called rambhana-adhikarana4--,in the same way the passage 'the higher knowledge is that by which the ,indestructible is apprehended1 c4' 7,mu4 ,up4 ,i1 #a1 #e7 first denies of ,brahman all the evil qualities connected with ,prakriti1 and then teaches that to it there belong eternity1 all-pervadingness1 subtilty1 omnipresence1 omniscience1 imperishableness1 creativeness with regard to all beings1 and other auspicious qualities4 ,now we maintain that also the text ',true1 knowledge1 infinite is ,brahman'1 does not prove a substance devoid of all difference1 for the reason that the co-ordination of the terms of which it consists explains itself in so far only as denoting one thing distinguished by several attributes4 ,for 'co-ordination' 7smndhikaranya1 lit4'the abiding of several things in a common substrate'7 means the reference 7of several terms7 to one thing1 there being a difference of reason for the application 7of several terms to one thing74 ,now whether we take the several terms1' ,true'1',knowledge'1',infinite'1 in their primary sense1 i4 e4 as denoting qualities1 or as denoting modes of being opposed to whatever is contrary to those qualities2 in either case we must needs admit a plurality of causes for the application of those several terms to one thing4 ,there is however that difference between the two alternatives that in the former case the terms preserve their primary meaning1 while in the latter case their denotative power depends on so-called 'implication' 7lakshan74 ,nor can it be said that the opposition in nature to non-knowledge1 c47which is the purport of the terms on the hypothesis of lakshan71 constitutes nothing more than the essential nature 7of one non-differenced substance2 the three terms thus having one purport only72 for as such essential nature would be sufficiently apprehended through one term1 the employment of further terms would be purposeless4 ,this view would moreover be in conflict with co-ordination1 as it would not allow of difference of motive for several terms applied to one thing4 ,on the other hand it cannot be urged against the former alternative that the distinction of several attributes predicated of one thing implies a distinction in the thing to which the attributes belong1 and that from this it follows that the several terms denote several things--a result which also could not be reconciled with 'co-ordination'2 for what 'co-ordination' aims at is just to convey the idea of one thing being qualified by several attributes4 ,for the grammarians define 'coordination' as the application1 to one thing1 of several words1 for the application of each of which there is a different motive4 ,you have further maintained the following view3--,in the text 'one only without a second'1 the phrase 'without a second' negatives all duality on ,brahman's part even in so far as qualities are concerned4 ,we must therefore1 according to the principle that all ,skhs convey the same doctrine1 assume that all texts which speak of ,brahman as cause1 aim at setting forth an absolutely non-dual substance4 ,of ,brahman thus indirectly defined as a cause1 the text ',the ,true1 knowledge1 infinite is ,brahman1' contains a direct definition2 the ,brahman here meant to be defined must thus be devoid of all qualities4 ,otherwise1 moreover1 the text would be in conflict with those other texts which declare ,brahman to be without qualities and blemish4--,but this also cannot be admitted4 ,what the phrase 'without a second' really aims at intimating is that ,brahman possesses manifold powers1 and this it does by denying the existence of another ruling principle different from ,brahman4 ,that ,brahman actually possesses manifold powers the text shows further on1 ',it thought1 may ,i be many1 may ,i grow forth1' and 'it sent forth fire1' and so on4--,but how are we to know that the mere phrase 'without a second' is meant to negative the existence of all other causes in general8--,as follows1 we reply4 ,the clause ',being only this was in the beginning1 one only1' teaches that ,brahman when about to create constitutes the substantial cause of the world4 ,here the idea of some further operative cause capable of giving rise to the effect naturally presents itself to the mind1 and hence we understand that the added clause 'without a second' is meant to negative such an additional cause4 ,if it were meant absolutely to deny all duality1 it would deny also the eternity and other attributes of ,brahman which you yourself assume4 ,you in this case make just the wrong use of the principle of all the--,skhs containing the same doctrine2 what this principle demands is that the qualities attributed in all--,skhs to ,brahman as cause should be taken over into the passage under discussion also4 ,the same consideration teaches us that also the text ',true1 knowledge'1 c41 teaches ,brahman to possess attributes2 for this passage has to be interpreted in agreement with the texts referring to ,brahman as a cause4 ,nor does this imply a conflict with the texts which declare ,brahman to be without qualities2 for those texts are meant to negative the evil qualities depending on ,prakriti4--,those texts again which refer to mere knowledge declare indeed that knowledge is the essential nature of ,brahman1 but this does not mean that mere knowledge constitutes the fundamental reality4 ,for knowledge constitutes the essential nature of a knowing subject only which is the substrate of knowledge1 in the same way as the sun1 lamps1 and gems are the substrate of ,light4 ,that ,brahman is a knowing subject all scriptural texts declare2 cp4 ',he who is all knowing' 7,mu4 ,up4 ,i1 #a1 #i72 ',it thought' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #b1 #c72 ',this divine being thought' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #c1 #b72 ',he thought1 let me send forth the worlds' 7,ait4 r4 ,,ii1#d1 #a1 #b72 ',he who arranges the wishes--as eternal of those who are not eternal1 as thinker of 7other7 thinkers1 as one of many' 7,ka4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #e1 #ac72 ',there are two unborn ones--one who knows1 one who does not know--one strong1 the other weak' 7,svet4 ,up4 ,i1 #i72 ',let us know ,him1 the highest of ,lords1 the great ,lord1 the highest deity of deities1 the master of masters1 the highest above the god1 the lord of the world1 the adorable one' 7,svet4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #g72 ',of him there is known no effect 7body7 or instrument2 no one is seen like unto him or better2 his high power is revealed as manifold1 forming his essential nature1 as knowledge1 strength1 and action' 7,svet4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #h72 ',that is the ,self1 free from sin1 ageless1 deathless1 griefless1 free from hunger and thirst1 whose wishes are true1 whose purposes are true' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,viii1 #a1 #e74 ,these and other texts declare that to ,brahman1 whose essential nature is knowledge1 there belong many excellent qualities--among which that of being a knowing subject stands first1 and that ,brahman is free from all evil qualities4 ,that the texts referring to ,brahman as free from qualities1 and those which speak of it as possessing qualities1 have really one and the same object may be inferred from the last of the passages quoted above2 the earlier part of which--'free from sin1' up to 'free from thirst'--denies of ,brahman all evil qualities1 while its latter part--'whose wishes are true1' and so on--asserts of its certain excellent qualities4 ,as thus there is no contradiction between the two classes of texts1 there is no reason whatever to assume that either of them has for its object something that is false4--,with regard to the concluding passage of the ,taittiriya-text1 'from whence all speech1 together with the mind1 turns away1 unable to reach it ,,footnote #hb3a1' we point out that with the passage ',from terror of it the wind blows1' there begins a declaration of the qualities of ,brahman1 and that the next section 'one hundred times that human bliss1' c41 makes statements as to the relative bliss enjoyed by the different classes of embodied souls2 the concluding passage ',he who knows the bliss of that ,brahman from whence all speech1 together with the mind1 turns away unable to reach it1' hence must be taken as proclaiming with emphasis the infinite nature of ,brahman's auspicious qualities4 ,moreover1 a clause in the chapter under discussion--viz4 'he obtains all desires1 together with ,brahman the all-wise' 7,,ii1 #a7--which gives information as to the fruit of the knowledge of ,brahman clearly declares the infinite nature of the qualities of the highest all-wise ,brahman4 ,the desires are the auspicious qualities of ,brahman which are the objects of desire2 the man who knows ,brahman obtains1 together with ,brahman1 all qualities of it4 ,the expression 'together with' is meant to bring out the primary importance of the qualities2 as also described in the so-called dahara- vidy 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,viii1 #a74 ,and that fruit and meditation are of the same character 7i4e4 that in meditations on ,brahman its qualities are the chief matter of meditation1 just as these qualities are the principal point in ,brahman reached by the ,devotee7 is proved by the text ',according to what a man's thought is in this world1 so will he be after he has departed this life' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #ad1 #a74 ,if it be said that the passage ',by whom it is not thought by him it is thought'1 'not understood by those who understand' 7,ke4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #c71 declares ,brahman not to be an object of knowledge2 we deny this1 because were it so1 certain other texts would not teach that final ,release results from knowledge2 cp4 ',he who knows ,brahman obtains the ,highest' 7,taitt4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #a1 #a72 ',he knows ,brahman1 he becomes ,brahman4' ,and1 moreover1 the text ',he who knows ,brahman as non-existing becomes himself non-existing2 he who knows ,brahman as existing1 him we know himself as existing' 7,taitt ,up4 ,,ii1 #f1 #a71 makes the existence and non-existence of the ,self dependent on the existence and non-existence of knowledge which has ,brahman for its object4 ,we thus conclude that all scriptural texts enjoin just the knowledge of ,brahman for the sake of final ,release4 ,this knowledge is1 as we already know1 of the nature of meditation1 and what is to be meditated on is ,brahman as possessing qualities4 7,the text from the ,ke4 ,up4 then explains itself as follows3--7 ,we are informed by the passage 'from whence speech together with mind turns away1 being unable to reach it'1 that the infinite ,brahman with its unlimited excellences cannot be defined either by mind or speech as being so or so much1 and from this we conclude the ,kena text to mean that ,brahman is not thought and not understood by those who understand it to be of a definitely limited nature2 ,brahman in truth being unlimited4 ,if the text did not mean this1 it would be self-contradictory1 parts of it saying that ,brahman is not thought and not understood1 and other parts1 that it is thought and is understood4 ,now as regards the assertion that the text ',thou mayest not see the seer of seeing2 thou mayest not think the thinker of thinking' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #e1 #b71 denies the existence of a seeing and thinking subject different from mere seeing and thinking--,this view is refuted by the following interpretation4 ,the text addresses itself to a person who has formed the erroneous opinion that the quality of consciousness or knowledge does not constitute the essential nature of the knower1 but belongs to it only as an adventitious attribute1 and tells him ',do not view or think the ,self to be such1 but consider the seeing and thinking ,self to have seeing and thinking for its essential nature4'--,or else this text may mean that the embodied ,self which is the seer of seeing and the thinker of thinking should be set aside1 and that only the highest ,self--the inner ,self of all beings--should be meditated upon4--,otherwise a conflict would arise with texts declaring the knowership of the ,self1 such as 'whereby should he know the knower8' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #e1 #ae74 ,your assertion that the text ',bliss is ,brahman' 7,taitt4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #f1 #a7 proves pure ,bliss to constitute the essential nature of ,brahman is already disposed of by the refutation of the view that knowledge 7consciousness7 constitutes the essential nature of ,brahman2 ,brahman being in reality the substrate only of knowledge4 ,for by bliss we understand a pleasing state of consciousness4 ,such passages as 'consciousness1 bliss is ,brahman1' therefore mean 'consciousness--the essential character of which is bliss--is ,brahman4' ,on this identity of the two things there rests that homogeneous character of ,brahman1 so much insisted upon by yourself4 ,and in the same way as numerous passages teach that ,brahman1 while having knowledge for its essential nature1 is at the same time a knowing subject2 so other passages1 speaking of ,brahman as something separate from mere bliss1 show it to be not mere bliss but a subject enjoying bliss2 cp4 ',that is one bliss of ,brahman' 7,taitt4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #h1 #d72 'he knowing the bliss of ,brahman' 7,taitt4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #i1 #a74 ,to be a subject enjoying bliss is in fact the same as to be a conscious subject4 ,we now turn to the numerous texts which1 according to the view of our opponent1 negative the existence of plurality4--',where there is duality as it were' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #e1 #ae72 ',there is not any plurality here2 from death to death goes he who sees here any plurality' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #d1 #ai72 ',but when for him the ,self alone has become all1 by what means1 and whom1 should he see8' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #e1 #ae7 c4--,but what all these texts deny is only plurality in so far as contradicting that unity of the world which depends on its being in its entirety an effect of ,brahman1 and having ,brahman for its inward ruling principle and its true ,self4 ,they do not1 on the other hand1 deny that plurality on ,brahman's part which depends on its intention to become manifold--a plurality proved by the text ',may ,i be many1 may ,i grow forth' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #b1 #c74 ,nor can our opponent urge against this that1 owing to the denial of plurality contained in other passages this last text refers to something not real2 for it is an altogether laughable assertion that ,scripture should at first teach the doctrine1 difficult to comprehend1 that plurality as suggested by ,perception and the other means of ,knowledge belongs to ,brahman also1 and should afterwards negative this very doctrine6 ,nor is it true that the text ',if he makes but the smallest antaram 7i4 e4 difference1 interval1 break7 in it there is fear for him' 7,taitt4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #g7 implies that he who sees plurality within ,brahman encounters fear4 ,for the other text ',all this is ,brahman2 let a man meditate with calm mind on all this as beginning1 ending and breathing in it1 i4e4 ,brahman' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #ad1 #a7 teaches directly that reflection on the plurality of ,brahman is the cause of peace of mind4 ,for this passage declares that peace of mind is produced by a reflection on the entire world as springing from1 abiding within1 and being absorbed into ,brahman1 and thus having ,brahman for its ,self2 and as thus the view of ,brahman constituting the ,self of the world with all its manifold distinctions of gods1 men1 animals1 inanimate matter and so on1 is said to be the cause of peace of mind1 and1 consequently1 of absence of fear1 that same view surely cannot be a cause of fear6--,but how then is it that the ,taitt4 text declares that 'there is fear for him'8--,that text1 we reply1 declares in its earlier part that rest in ,brahman is the cause of fearlessness 7'when he finds freedom from fear1 rest1 in that which is invisible1 incorporeal1 undefined1 unsupported2 then he has obtained fearlessness'72 its latter part therefore means that fear takes place when there is an interval1 a break1 in this resting in ,brahman4 ,as the great ,rishi says ',when ,vsudeva is not meditated on for an hour or even a moment only2 that is loss1 that is great calamity1 that is error1 that is change4' ,the ,stra ,,iii1 #b1 ii does not1 as our opponent alleges1 refer to a ,brahman free from all difference1 but to ,brahman as possessing attributes--as we shall show in its place4 ,and the ,stra ,,iv1 #b1 #c declares that the things seen in dreams are mere ',my' because they differ in character from the things perceived in the waking state2 from which it follows that the latter things are real4 ,,footnote #hb3a4 ,which passage appears to refer to a nirguna brahman1 whence it might be inferred that the connected initial passage--',satyam janam1' c4--has a similar purport4 ,nor do ,smriti and ,purna teach such a doctrine4 ,nor is it true that also according to ,smriti and ,purnas only non- differenced consciousness is real and everything else unreal4--',he who knows me as unborn and without a beginning1 the supreme ,lord of the worlds' 7,bha4 ,g4 ,x1 #c72 ',all beings abide in me1 ,i abide not in them4 ,nay1 the beings abide not in me--behold my lordly power4 ,my ,self bringing forth the beings supports them but does not abide in them' 7,bha4 ,g4 ,,ix1 #d1 #e72 ',i am the origin and the dissolution of the entire world2 higher than ,i there is nothing else3 on me all this is strung as pearls on a thread' 7,bha4 ,g4 ,,vii1 #f1 #g72 ',pervading this entire ,universe by a portion 7of mine7 ,i abide' 7,bha4 ,g4 ,x1 #db72 ',but another1 the highest ,person1 is called the highest ,self who1 pervading the three worlds supports them1 the eternal ,lord4 ,because ,i transcend the ,perishable and am higher than the ,imperishable even1 ,i am among the people and in the ,veda celebrated as the supreme ,person' 7,bha4 ,g4 ,,xv1 #ag1 #ah74 ',he transcends the fundamental matter of all beings1 its modifications1 properties and imperfections2 he transcends all investing 7obscuring7 influences1 he who is the ,self of all4 ,whatever 7room7 there is in the interstices of the world is filled by him2 all auspicious qualities constitute his nature4 ,the whole creation of beings is taken out of a small part of his power4 ,assuming at will whatever form he desires he bestows benefits on the whole world effected by him4 ,glory1 strength1 dominion1 wisdom1 energy1 power and other attributes are collected in him1 ,supreme of the supreme in whom no troubles abide1 ruler over high and low1 lord in collective and distributive form1 non-manifest and manifest1 universal lord1 all-seeing1 all-knowing1 all-powerful1 highest ,lord4 ,the knowledge by which that perfect1 pure1 highest1 stainless homogeneous 7,brahman7 is known or perceived or comprehended--that is knowledge3 all else is ignorance' 7,vishnu ,purna ,,vi1 #e1 #hb-hg74--',to that pure one of mighty power1 the highest ,brahman to which no term is applicable1 the cause of all causes1 the name ,bhagavat is suitable4 ,the letter bha implies both the cherisher and supporter2 the letter ga the leader1 mover and creator4 ,the two syllables bhaga indicate the six attributes--dominion1 strength1 glory1 splendour1 wisdom1 dispassion4 ,that in him--the universal ,self1 the ,self of the beings--all beings dwell and that he dwells in all1 this is the meaning of the letter va4 ,wisdom1 might1 strength1 dominion1 glory1 without any evil qualities1 are all denoted by the word bhagavat4 ,this great word bhagavat is the name of ,vsudeva who is the highest ,brahman--and of no one else4 ,this word which denotes persons worthy of reverence in general is used in its primary sense with reference to ,vsudeva only2 in a derived sense with regard to other persons' 7,vi4 ,pu4 ,,vi1 #e1 #gb ff472 ',where all these powers abide1 that is the form of him who is the universal form3 that is the great form of ,hari4 ,that form produces in its sport forms endowed with all powers1 whether of gods or men or animals4 ,for the purpose of benefiting the worlds1 not springing from work 7karman7 is this action of the unfathomable one2 all-pervading1 irresistible' 7,vi4 ,pu4 ,,vi1 #g1 #fi- #ga72 ',him who is of this kind1 stainless1 eternal1 all-pervading1 imperishable1 free from all evil1 named ,vishnu1 the highest abode' 7,vi4 ,pu4 ,i1 #bb1ec72 ',he who is the highest of the high1 the ,person1 the highest ,self1 founded on himself2 who is devoid of all the distinguishing characteristics of colour1 caste and the like2 who is exempt from birth1 change1 increase1 decay and death2 of whom it can only be said that he ever is4 ,he is everywhere and in him everything abides2 hence he is called ,vsudeva by those who know4 ,he is ,brahman1 eternal1 supreme1 imperishable1 undecaying2 of one essential nature and ever pure1 as free from all defects4 ,this whole world is ,brahman1 comprising within its nature the ,evolved and the ,unevolved2 and also existing in the form of the ,person and in that of time' 7,vi4 ,pu4 ,i1 #b1 #aj-ad72 ',the ,prakriti about which ,i told and which is ,evolved as well as ,unevolved1 and the ,person--both these are merged in the highest ,self4 ,the highest ,self is the support of all1 the highest ,lord2 as ,vishnu he is praised in the ,vedas and the ,vednta-texts' 7,vi4 ,pu4 ,,vi1 #d1 #ch1 #ci74 ',two forms are there of that ,brahman1 one material1 the other immaterial4 ,these two forms1 perishable and imperishable1 are within all things3 the imperishable one is the highest ,brahman1 the perishable one this whole world4 ,as the light of a fire burning in one place spreads all around1 so the energy of the highest ,brahman constitutes this entire world' 7,vi4 ,pu4 ,i1 #bc1ec-ee74 ',the energy of ,vishnu is the highest1 that which is called the embodied soul is inferior2 and there is another third energy called karman or ,nescience1 actuated by which the omnipresent energy of the embodied soul perpetually undergoes the afflictions of worldly existence4 ,obscured by ,nescience the energy of the embodied soul is characterised in the different beings by different degrees of perfection' 7,vi4 ,pu4 ,,vi1 #g1 #fa-fc74 ,these and other texts teach that the highest ,brahman is essentially free from all imperfection whatsoever1 comprises within itself all auspicious qualities1 and finds its pastime in originating1 preserving1 reabsorbing1 pervading1 and ruling the universe2 that the entire complex of intelligent and non-intelligent beings 7souls and matter7 in all their different estates is real1 and constitutes the form1 i4e4 the body of the highest ,brahman1 as appears from those passages which co-ordinate it with ,brahman by means of terms such as sarra 7body71 rpa 7form71 tanu 7body71 amsa 7part71 sakti 7power71 vibhti 7manifestation of power71 and so on2--that the souls which are a manifestation of ,brahman's power exist in their own essential nature1 and also1 through their connexion with matter1 in the form of embodied souls 7kshetraja72--and that the embodied souls1 being engrossed by ,nescience in the form of good and evil works1 do not recognise their essential nature1 which is knowledge1 but view themselves as having the character of material things4--,the outcome of all this is that we have to cognise ,brahman as carrying plurality within itself1 and the world1 which is the manifestation of his power1 as something real4 ,when now the text1 in the sloka 'where all difference has vanished' 7,vi4 ,pu4 ,,vi1 #g1 #ec71 declares that the ,self1 although connected with the different effects of ,prakriti1 such as divine1 human bodies1 and so on1 yet is essentially free from all such distinctions1 and therefore not the object of the words denoting those different classes of beings1 but to be defined as mere knowledge and ,being2 to be known by the ,self and not to be reached by the mind of the practitioner of ,yoga 7yogayuj72 this must in no way be understood as denying the reality of the world4-- ,but how is this known8--,as follows1 we reply4 ,the chapter of the ,purna in which that sloka occurs at first declares concentration 7,yoga7 to be the remedy of all the afflictions of the ,samsra2 thereupon explains the different stages of ,yoga up to the so-called pratyhra 7complete restraining of the senses from receiving external impressions72 then1 in order to teach the attainment of the 'perfect object' 7subhsraya7 required for dhran1 declares that the highest ,brahman1 i4 e4 ,vishnu1 possesses two forms1 called powers 7sakti71 viz4 a denned one 7mrta7 and an undefined one 7amrta72 and then teaches that a portion of the 'defined' form1 viz4 the embodied soul 7kshetraja71 which is distinguished by its connexion with matter and involved in ,nescience-- that is termed 'action1' and constitutes a third power--is not perfect4 ,the chapter further teaches that a portion of the undefined form which is free from ,nescience called action1 separated from all matter1 and possessing the character of pure knowledge1 is also not the 'perfect object1' since it is destitute of essential purity2 and1 finally1 declares that the 'perfect object' is to be found in that defined form which is special to ,bhagavat1 and which is the abode of the three powers1 viz4 that non-defined form which is the highest power1 that non-defined form which is termed embodied soul1 and constitutes the secondary 7apara7 power1 and ,nescience in the form of work--which is called the third power1 and is the cause of the ,self1 which is of the essence of the highest power1 passing into the state of embodied soul4 ,this defined form 7which is the 'perfect object'7 is proved by certain ,vednta-texts1 such as 'that great person of sun-like lustre' 7,svet4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #h74 ,we hence must take the sloka1 'in which all differences vanish1' c41 to mean that the pure ,self 7the ,self in so far as knowledge only7 is not capable of constituting the 'perfect object4' ,analogously two other passages declare ',because this cannot be reflected upon by the beginner in ,yoga1 the second 7form7 of ,vishnu is to be meditated upon by ,yogins- the highest abode4' ',that in which all these powers have their abode1 that is the other great form of ,hari1 different from the 7material7 ,visva form4' ,in an analogous manner1 ,parsara declares that ,brahm1 ,katurmukha1 ,sanaka1 and similar mighty beings which dwell within this world1 cannot constitute the 'perfect object' because they are involved in ,nescience2 after that goes on to say that the beings found in the ,samsra are in the same condition--for they are essentially devoid of purity since they reach their true nature1 only later on1 when through ,yoga knowledge has arisen in them--2 and finally teaches that the essential individual nature of the highest ,brahman1 i4e4 ,vishnu1 constitutes the 'perfect object4' ',from ,brahm down to a blade of grass1 all living beings that dwell within this world are in the power of the ,samsra due to works1 and hence no profit can be derived by the devout from making them objects of their meditation4 ,they are all implicated in ,nescience1 and stand within the sphere of the ,samsra2 knowledge arises in them only later on1 and they are thus of no use in meditation4 ,their knowledge does not belong to them by essential nature1 for it comes to them through something else4 ,therefore the stainless ,brahman which possesses essential knowledge1' c4 c4--,all this proves that the passage 'in which all difference vanishes' does not mean to deny the reality of the world4 ,nor1 again1 does the passage 'that which has knowledge for its essential nature' 7,vi4 ,pu4 #a1b1f7 imply that the whole complex of things different from knowledge is false2 for it declares only that the appearance of the ,self--the essential nature of which is knowledge--as gods1 men1 and so on1 is erroneous4 ,a declaration that the appearance of mother o' pearl as silver is founded on error surely does not imply that all the silver in the world is unreal6--,but if1 on the ground of an insight into the oneness of ,brahman and the world--as expressed in texts where the two appear in co-ordination--a text declares that it is an error to view ,brahman1 whose essential nature is knowledge1 under the form of material things1 this after all implies that the whole aggregate of things is false6--,by no means1 we rejoin4 ,as our sstra distinctly teaches that the highest ,brahman1 i4 e4 ,vishnu1 is free from all imperfections whatsoever1 comprises within himself all auspicious qualities1 and reveals his power in mighty manifestations1 the view of the world's reality cannot possibly be erroneous4 ,that information as to the oneness of two things by means of co-ordination does not allow of sublation 7of either of the two71 and is non-contradictory1 we shall prove further on4 ,hence also the sloka last referred to does not sublate the reality of the world4 ',that from whence these beings are born1 by which1 when born1 they live1 into which they enter when they die1 endeavour to know that2 that is ,brahman' 7,taitt4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #a74 ,from this scriptural text we ascertain that ,brahman is the cause of the origination1 and so on1 of the world4 ,after this we learn from a ,purna text 7',he should make the ,veda grow by means of ,itihsa and ,purna2 the ,veda fears that a man of little reading may do it harm'7 that the ,veda should be made to grow by ,itihsa and ,purna4 ,by this 'making to grow' we have to understand the elucidation of the sense of the ,vedic texts studied by means of other texts1 promulgated by men who had mastered the entire ,veda and its contents1 and by the strength of their devotion had gained full intuition of ,vedic truth4 ,such 'making to grow' must needs be undertaken1 since the purport of the entire ,veda with all its ,skhs cannot be fathomed by one who has studied a small part only1 and since without knowing that purport we cannot arrive at any certitude4 ,the ,vishnu ,purna relates how ,maitreya1 wishing to have his knowledge of ,vedic matters strengthened by the holy ,parsara1 who through the favour of ,pulastya and ,vasishtha had obtained an insight into the true nature of the highest divinity1 began to question ,parsara1 ',i am desirous to hear from thee how this world originated1 and how it will again originate in future1 and of what it consists1 and whence proceed animate and inanimate things2 how and into what it has been resolved1 and into what it will in future be resolved8' c4 7,vi4 ,pu4 ,i1 #a74 ,the questions asked refer to the essential nature of ,brahman1 the different modes of the manifestation of its power1 and the different results of propitiating it4 ,among the questions belonging to the first category1 the question 'whence proceed animate and inanimate things8' relates to the efficient and the material cause of the world1 and hence the clause 'of what the world consists' is to be taken as implying a question as to what constitutes the ,self of this world1 which is the object of creation1 sustentation1 and dissolution4 ,the reply to this question is given in the words 'and the world is ,he4' ,now the identity expressed by this clause is founded thereon that he 7i4e4 ,brahman or ,vishnu7 pervades the world as its ,self in the character of its inward ,ruler2 and is not founded on unity of substance of the pervading principle and the world pervaded4 ,the phrase 'consists of' 7-maya7 does not refer to an effect 7so that the question asked would be as to the causal substance of which this world is an effect71 for a separate question on this point would be needless4 ,nor does the--maya express1 as it sometimes does-e4g4 in the case of prana-maya ,,footnote #ib3a1 the own sense of the word to which it is attached2 for in that case the form of the reply 'and the world is ,he' 7which implies a distinction between the world and ,vishnu7 would be inappropriate2 the reply would in that case rather be ',vishnu only4' ,what 'maya' actually denotes here is abundance1 prevailingness1 in agreement with ,pnini1 ,v1 #d1 #ba1 and the meaning is that ,brahman prevails in the world in so far as the entire world constitutes its body4 ,the co-ordination of the two words 'the world' and ',he' thus rests on that relation between the two1 owing to which the world is the body of ,brahman1 and ,brahman the ,self of the world4 ,if1 on the other hand1 we maintained that the sstra aims only at inculcating the doctrine of one substance free from all difference1 there would be no sense in all those questions and answers1 and no sense in an entire nastra devoted to the explanation of that one thing4 ,in that case there would be room for one question only1 viz4 'what is the substrate of the erroneous imagination of a world8' and for one answer to this question1 viz4 'pure consciousness devoid of all distinction6'--,and if the co-ordination expressed in the clause 'and the world is he' was meant to set forth the absolute oneness of the world and ,brahman1 then it could not be held that ,brahman possesses all kinds of auspicious qualities1 and is opposed to all evil2 ,brahman would rather become the abode of all that is impure4 ,all this confirms the conclusion that the co-ordination expressed in that clause is to be understood as directly teaching the relation between a ,self and its body4--,the sloka1 ',from ,vishnu the world has sprung3 in him he exists3 he is the cause of the subsistence and dissolution of this world3 and the world is he' 7,vi4 ,pu4 ,i1 #a1 #ce71 states succinctly what a subsequent passage--beginning with 'the highest of the high' 7,vi4 ,pu4 ,i1 #b1 #aj7--sets forth in detail4 ,now there the sloka1'to the unchangeable one' 7,i1 #b1 #a71 renders homage to the holy ,vishnu1 who is the highest ,brahman in so far as abiding within his own nature1 and then the text proceeds to glorify him in his threefold form as ,hiranyagarbha1 ,hari1 and ,sankara1 as ,pradhna1 ,time1 and as the totality of embodied souls in their combined and distributed form4 ,here the sloka1 ',him whose essential nature is knowledge' 7,i1 #b1 #f71 describes the aspect of the highest ,self in so far as abiding in the state of discrete embodied souls2 the passage cannot therefore be understood as referring to a substance free from all difference4 ,if the sstra aimed at teaching that the erroneous conception of a manifold world has for its substrate a ,brahman consisting of non-differenced intelligence1 there would be room neither for the objection raised in ,i1 #c1 ,i 7',how can we attribute agency creative and otherwise to ,brahman which is without qualities1 unlimited1 pure1 stainless8'7 nor for the refutation of that objection1 ',because the powers of all things are the objects of 7true7 knowledge excluding all 7bad7 reasoning1 therefore there belong to ,brahman also such essential powers as the power of creating1 preserving1 and so on1 the world2 just as heat essentially belongs to fire ,,footnote #id3a4' ,in that case the objection would rather be made in the following form3 ',how can ,brahman1 which is without qualities1 be the agent in the creation1 preservation1 and so on1 of the world8' and the answer would be1 ',creation by ,brahman is not something real1 but something erroneously imagined4'--,the purport of the objection as it stands in the text is as follows3 ',we observe that action creative and otherwise belongs to beings endowed with qualities such as goodness1 and so on1 not perfect1 and subject to the influence of karman2 how then can agency creative1 and so on1 be attributed to ,brahman which is devoid of qualities1 perfect1 not under the influence of karman1 and incapable of any connexion with action8' ,and the reply is1 ',there is nothing unreasonable in holding that ,brahman as being of the nature described above1 and different in kind from all things perceived1 should possess manifold powers2 just as fire1 which is different in kind from water and all other material substances1 possesses the quality of heat and other qualities4' ,the slokas also1 which begin with the words ',thou alone art real' 7,vi4 ,pu4 ,i1 #d1 #ch ff471 do not assert that the whole world is unreal1 but only that1 as ,brahman is the ,self of the world1 the latter viewed apart from ,brahman is not real4 ,this the text proceeds to confirm1 'thy greatness it is by which all movable and immovable things are pervaded4' ,this means--because all things movable and immovable are pervaded by thee1 therefore all this world has thee for its ,self1 and hence 'there is none other than thee' and thus thou being the ,self of all art alone real4 ,such being the doctrine intended to be set forth1 the text rightly says1 'this all-pervasiveness of thine is thy greatness'2 otherwise it would have to say1 'it is thy error4' ,were this latter view intended1 words such as ',lord of the world1' 'thou1' c41 could not1 moreover1 be taken in their direct sense1 and there would arise a contradiction with the subject-matter of the entire chapter1 viz4 the praise of the ,holy one who in the form of a mighty boar had uplifted in play the entire earth4--,because this entire world is thy form in so far as it is pervaded as its ,self by thee whose true nature is knowledge2 therefore those who do not possess that devotion which enables men to view thee as the ,self of all1 erroneously view this world as consisting only of gods1 men1 and other beings2 this is the purport of the next sloka1 'this which is seen4'--,and it is an error not only to view the world which has its real ,self in thee as consisting of gods1 men1 and so on1 but also to consider the ,selfs whose true nature is knowledge as being of the nature of material beings such as gods1 men1 and the like2 this is the meaning of the next sloka1 'this world whose true nature is knowledge4'--,those wise men1 on the other hand1 who have an insight into the essentially intelligent ,self1 and whose minds are cleared by devotion--the means of apprehending the ,holy one as the universal ,self--1 they view this entire world with all its manifold bodies--the effects of primeval matter--as thy body--a body the ,self of which is constituted by knowledge abiding apart from its world-body2 this is the meaning of the following sloka3 ',but those who possess knowledge1' c4--,if the different slokas were not interpreted in this way1 they would be mere unmeaning reiterations2 their constitutive words could not be taken in their primary sense2 and we should come into conflict with the sense of the passages1 the subject-matter of the chapter1 and the purport of the entire sstra4 ,the passage1 further1 ',of that ,self although it exists in one's own and in other bodies1 the knowledge is of one kind' 7,vi4 ,pu4 ,,ii1 #ad1 #ca ff471 refers to that view of duality according to which the different ,selfs--although equal in so far as they are all of the essence of knowledge--are constituted into separate beings1 gods1 men1 c41 by their connexion with different portions of matter all of which are modifications of primary matter1 and declares that view to be false4 ,but this does not imply a denial of the duality which holds good between matter on the one hand and ,self on the other3 what the passage means is that the ,self which dwells in the different material bodies of gods1 men1 and so on1 is of one and the same kind4 ,so the ,holy one himself has said1 ',in the dog and the low man eating dog's flesh the wise see the same'2 ',brahman1 without any imperfection1 is the same' 7,bha4 ,g4 ,v1 #ah1 #ai74 ,and1 moreover1 the clause ',of the ,self although existing in one's own and in other bodies' directly declares that a thing different from the body is distributed among one's own and other bodies4 ,nor does the passage ',if there is some other 7para7 different 7anya7 from me1' c4 7,vi4 ,pu4 ,,ii1 #ac1 #hf7 intimate the oneness of the ,self2 for in that case the two words 'para' and 'anya' would express one meaning only 7viz4 'other' in the sense of 'distinct from'74 ,the word 'para' there denotes a ,self distinct from that of one's own ,self1 and the word 'anya' is introduced to negative a character different from that of pure intelligence3 the sense of the passage thus is ',if there is some ,self distinct from mine1 and of a character different from mine which is pure knowledge1 then it can be said that ,i am of such a character and he of a different character'2 but this is not the case1 because all ,selfs are equal in as far as their nature consists of pure knowledge4--,also the sloka beginning ',owing to the difference of the holes of the flute' 7,vi4 ,pu4 ,,ii1 #ad1 #cb7 only declares that the inequality of the different ,selfs is owing not to their essential nature1 but to their dwelling in different material bodies2 and does not teach the oneness of all ,selfs4 ,the different portions of air1 again1 passing through the different holes of the flute--to which the many ,selfs are compared--are not said to be one but only to be equal in character2 they are one in character in so far as all of them are of the nature of air1 while the different names of the successive notes of the musical scale are applied to them because they pass out by the different holes of the instrument4 ,for an analogous reason the several ,selfs are denominated by different names1 viz4 gods and so on4 ,those material things also which are parts of the substance fire1 or water1 or earth1 are one in so far only as they consist of one kind of substance2 but are not absolutely one2 those different portions of air1 therefore1 which constitute the notes of the scale are likewise not absolutely one4 ,where the ,purna further says ',he 7or that7 ,i am and thou art ,he 7or that72 all this universe that has ,self for its true nature is ,he 7or that72 abandon the error of distinction' 7,vi4 ,pu4 ,,ii1 #af1 #bc72 the word 'that' refers to the intelligent character mentioned previously which is common to all ,selfs1 and the co-ordination stated in the two clauses therefore intimates that intelligence is the character of the beings denoted ',i' and ',thou'2 'abandon therefore1' the text goes on to say1 'the illusion that the difference of outward form1 divine and so on1 causes a corresponding difference in the ,selfs4' ,if this explanation were not accepted 7but absolute non-difference insisted upon7 there would be no room for the references to difference which the passages quoted manifestly contain4 ,accordingly the text goes on to say that the king acted on the instruction he had received1 'he abandoned the view of difference1 having recognised the ,real4'--,but on what ground do we arrive at this decision 7viz4 that the passage under discussion is not meant to teach absolute non-duality78--,on the ground1 we reply1 that the proper topic of the whole section is to teach the distinction of the ,self and the body--for this is evident from what is said in an early part of the section1 'as the body of man1 characterised by hands1 feet1 and the like1' c4 7,vi4 ,pu4 ,,ii1 #ac1 #he74--;,for analogous reasons the sloka ',when that knowledge which gives rise to distinction' c4 7,vi4 ,pu4 ,,vi1 #g1 #id7 teaches neither the essential unity of all ,selfs nor the oneness of the individual ,self and the highest ,self4 ,and that the embodied soul and the highest ,self should be essentially one1 is no more possible than that the body and the ,self should be one4 ,in agreement herewith ,scripture says1 ',two birds1 inseparable friends1 cling to the same tree4 ,one of them eats the sweet fruit1 the other looks on without eating' 7,mu4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #a1 #a74 ',there are two drinking their reward in the world of their own works1 entered into the cave1 dwelling on the highest summit4 ,those who know ,brahman call them shade and light1' c4 7,ka4 ,up4 ,i1 #c1 #a74 ,and in this sstra also 7i4e4 the ,vishnu ,purna7 there are passages of analogous import2 cp4 the stanzas quoted above1 ',he transcends the causal matter1 all effects1 all imperfections such as the gunas' c4 ,the ,stras also maintain the same doctrine1 cp4 ,i1 #a1 #ag2 ,i1 #b1 #ba2 ,,ii1 #a1 #bb2 and others4 ,they therein follow ,scripture1 which in several places refers to the highest and the individual soul as standing over against each other1 cp4 e4g4 ',he who dwells in the ,self and within the ,self1 whom the ,self does not know1 whose body the ,self is1 who rules the ,self from within' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #g1 #bb72 ',embraced by the intelligent ,self 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #c1 #ba72 ',mounted by the intelligent ,self 7,,iv1 #c1 #ce74 ,nor can the individual ,self become one with the highest ,self by freeing itself from ,nescience1 with the help of the means of final ,release2 for that which admits of being the abode of ,nescience can never become quite incapable of it4 ,so the ,purna says1 ',it is false to maintain that the individual ,self and the highest ,self enter into real union2 for one substance cannot pass over into the nature of another substance4' ,accordingly the ,bhagavad ,gt declares that the released soul attains only the same attributes as the highest ,self4 ',abiding by this knowledge1 they1 attaining to an equality of attributes with me1 do neither come forth at the time of creation1 nor are troubled at the time of general destruction' 7,,xiv1 #b74 ,similarly our ,purna says1 ',that ,brahman leads him who meditates on it1 and who is capable of change1 towards its own being 7tmabhva71 in the same way as the magnet attracts the iron' 7,vi4 ,pu4 ,,vi1 #g1 #cj74 ,here the phrase 'leads him towards his own being' means 'imparts to him a nature like his own' 7not 'completely identifies him with itself'72 for the attracted body does not become essentially one with the body attracting4 ,the same view will be set forth by the ,strakra in ,,iv1 #d1 #ag2 #ba1 and ,i1 #c1 #b4 ,the ,vritti also says 7with reference to ,s4 ,,iv1 #d1 #ag7 'with the exception of the business of the world 7the individual soul in the state of release7 is equal 7to the highest ,self7 through light'2 and the author of the ,dramidabhshya says1 ',owing to its equality 7syujya7 with the divinity the disembodied soul effects all things1 like the divinity4' ,the following scriptural texts establish the same view1 ',those who depart from hence1 after having known the ,self and those true desires1 for them there is freedom in all the worlds' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,viii1 #a1 #f72 ',he who knows ,brahman reaches the ,highest' 7,taitt4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #a72 ',he obtains all desires together with the intelligent ,brahman' 7,taitt4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #a1 #a72 ',having reached the ,self which consists of bliss1 he wanders about in these worlds having as much food and assuming as many forms as he likes' 7,taitt4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #aj1 #e72 ',there he moves about' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,viii1 #ab1 #c72 ',for he is flavour2 for only after having perceived a flavour can any one perceive pleasure' 7,taitt4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #g72 ',as the flowing rivers go to their setting in the sea1 losing name and form2 thus he who knows1 freed from name and form1 goes to the divine ,person who is higher than the high' 7,mu4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #b1 #h72 ',he who knows1 shaking off good and evil1 reaches the highest oneness1 free from stain' 7,mu4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #a1 #c74 ,the objects of meditation in all the vidys which refer to the highest ,brahman1 are ,brahman viewed as having qualities1 and the fruit of all those meditations4 ,for this reason the author of the ,stras declares that there is option among the different vidys--cp4 ,ve4 ,s4 ,,iii1 #c1 ,,ii2 ,,iii41 #c1 #ei4 ,in the same way the ,vkyakra teaches that the qualified ,brahman only is the object of meditation1 and that there is option of vidys2 where he says '7,brahman7 connected 7with qualities71 since the meditation refers to its qualities4' ,the same view is expressed by the ,bhshyakra in the passage beginning ',although he who bases himself on the knowledge of ,being4'--,texts such as ',he knows ,brahman1 he becomes ,brahman' 7,mu4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #b1 #i7 have the same purport1 for they must be taken in connexion with the other texts 7referring to the fate of him who knows7 such as ',freed from name and form he goes to the divine ,person who is higher than the high'2 ',free from stain he reaches the highest oneness' 7,mu4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #b1 #h2 ,,iii1 #a1c72 ',having approached the highest light he manifests himself in his own shape' 7,kh4 ,up4 ,,viii1 #c1 #d74 ,of him who has freed himself from his ordinary name and form1 and all the distinctions founded thereon1 and has assumed the uniform character of intelligence1 it may be said that he is of the character of ,brahman4--,our ,purna also propounds the same view4 ,the sloka 7,,vi1 #g1 #ia71 ',knowledge is the means to obtain what is to be obtained1 viz4 the highest ,brahman3 the ,self is to be obtained1 freed from all kinds of imagination1' states that that ,self which through meditation on ,brahman1 is freed from all imagination so as to be like ,brahman1 is the object to be attained4 7,the three forms of imagination to be got rid of are so- called karma-bhvan1 brahma-bhvan and a combination of the two4 ,see ,vi4 ,pu4 ,,vi1 #g47 ,the text then goes on1 ',the embodied ,self is the user of the instrument1 knowledge is its instrument2 having accomplished ,release-- whereby his object is attained--he may leave off4' ,this means that the ,devotee is to practise meditation on the highest ,brahman until it has accomplished its end1 viz4 the attainment of the ,self free from all imagination4--,the text continues1 ',having attained the being of its being1 then he is non-different from the highest ,self2 his difference is founded on ,nescience only4' ,this sloka describes the state of the released soul4 ',its being' is the being1 viz4 the character or nature1 of ,brahman2 but this does not mean absolute oneness of nature2 because in this latter case the second 'being' would be out of place and the sloka would contradict what had been said before4 ,the meaning is3 when the soul has attained the nature of ,brahman1 i4e4 when it has freed itself from all false imagination1 then it is non-different from the highest ,self4 ,this non-difference is due to the soul1 as well as the highest ,self1 having the essential nature of uniform intelligence4 ,the difference of the soul--presenting itself as the soul of a god1 a man1 c4--from the highest ,self is not due to its essential nature1 but rests on the basis of ,nescience in the form of work3 when through meditation on ,brahman this basis is destroyed1 the difference due to it comes to an end1 and the soul no longer differs from the highest ,self4 ,so another text says1 ',the difference of things of one nature is due to the investing agency of outward works2 when the difference of gods1 men1 c41 is destroyed1 it has no longer any investing power' 7,vi4 ,pu4 ,,ii1 #ad1 #cc74--,the text then adds a further explanation1 'when the knowledge which gives rise to manifold difference is completely destroyed1 who then will produce difference that has no real existence8' ,the manifold difference is the distinction of gods1 men1 animals1 and inanimate things3 compare the saying of ,saunaka3'this fourfold distinction is founded on false knowledge4' ,the ,self has knowledge for its essential nature2 when ,nescience called work--which is the cause of the manifold distinctions of gods1 men1 c4--has been completely destroyed through meditation on the highest ,brahman1 who then will bring about the distinction of gods1 c41 from the highest ,self--a distinction which in the absence of a cause cannot truly exist4--,that ,nescience is called karman 7work7 is stated in the same chapter of the ,purna 7st4 #fa--;avidy karmasamja74 ,the passage in the ,bhagavad ,gt1 ',know me to be the kshetraja' 7,,xiii1 #b71 teaches the oneness of all in so far as the highest ,self is the inward ruler of all2 taken in any other sense it would be in conflict with other texts1 such as ',all creatures are the ,perishable1 the unchanging soul is the ,imperishable2 but another is the highest ,person' 7,bha4 ,g4 ,,xv1 #af74 ,in other places the ,divine one declares that as inward ,ruler he is the ,self of all3 ',the ,lord dwells in the heart of all creatures' 7,,xviii1 #fa71 and ',i dwell within the heart of all' 7,,xv1 #ae74 and ',i am the ,self which has its abode within all creatures' 7,x1 #bj74 ,the term 'creature' in these passages denotes the entire aggregate of body1 c41 up to the ,self4--,because he is the ,self of all1 the text expressly denies that among all the things constituting his body there is any one separate from him1',there is not anything which is without me' 7,x1 #ci74 ,the place where this text occurs is the winding up of a glorification of the ,divine one1 and the text has to be understood accordingly4 ,the passage immediately following is ',whatever being there is1 powerful1 beautiful1 or glorious1 even that know thou to have sprung from a portion of my glory2 pervading this entire ,universe by a portion of mine ,i do abide' 7,x1 #da2 #db74 ,all this clearly proves that the authoritative books do not teach the doctrine of one non-differenced substance2 that they do not teach that the universe of things is false2 and that they do not deny the essential distinction of intelligent beings1 non-intelligent things1 and the ,lord4 ,,footnote #ib3a4 ',prnamaya' is explained as meaning 'prana' only4 ,,footnote #id3a4 ,the sense in which this sloka has to be taken is ',as in ordinary life we ascribe to certain things 7e4g4 gems1 mantras7 certain special powers because otherwise the effects they produce could not be accounted for2 so to ,brahman also1' c4 ,the theory of ,nescience cannot be proved4 ,we now proceed to the consideration of ,nescience4--,according to the view of our opponent1 this entire world1 with all its endless distinctions of ,ruler1 creatures ruled1 and so on1 is1 owing to a certain defect1 fictitiously superimposed upon the non-differenced1 self-luminous ,reality2 and what constitutes that defect is beginningless ,nescience1 which invests the ,reality1 gives rise to manifold illusions1 and cannot be denned either as being or non-being4 ,such ,nescience1 he says1 must necessarily be admitted1 firstly on the ground of scriptural texts1 such as ',hidden by what is untrue' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,viii1 #c1 #b71 and secondly because otherwise the oneness of the individual souls with ,brahman--which is taught by texts such as ',thou are that'--cannot be established4 ,this ,nescience is neither 'being1' because in that case it could not be the object of erroneous cognition 7bhrama7 and sublation 7bdha72 nor is it 'non-being1' because in that case it could not be the object of apprehension and sublation ,,footnote #ajb3a4 ,hence orthodox ,philosophers declare that this ,nescience falls under neither of these two opposite categories4 ,now this theory of ,nescience is altogether untenable4 ,in the first place we ask1 ',what is the substrate of this ,nescience which gives rise to the great error of plurality of existence8' ,you cannot reply 'the individual soul'2 for the individual soul itself exists in so far only as it is fictitiously imagined through ,nescience4 ,nor can you say ',brahman'2 for ,brahman is nothing but self-luminous intelligence1 and hence contradictory in nature to ,nescience1 which is avowedly sublated by knowledge4 ',the highest ,brahman has knowledge for its essential nature3 if ,nescience1 which is essentially false and to be terminated by knowledge1 invests ,brahman1 who then will be strong enough to put an end to it8' ',what puts an end to ,nescience is the knowledge that ,brahman is pure knowledge6'--',not so1 for that knowledge also is1 like ,brahman1 of the nature of light1 and hence has no power to put an end to ,nescience4--,and if there exists the knowledge that ,brahman is knowledge1 then ,brahman is an object of knowledge1 and that1 according to your own teaching1 implies that ,brahman is not of the nature of consciousness4' ,to explain the second of these slokas4--,if you maintain that what sublates ,nescience is not that knowledge which constitutes ,brahman's essential nature1 but rather that knowledge which has for its object the truth of ,brahman being of such a nature1 we demur2 for as both these kinds of knowledge are of the same nature1 viz4 the nature of light1 which is just that which constitutes ,brahman's nature1 there is no reason for making a distinction and saying that one knowledge is contradictory of ,nescience1 and the other is not4 ,or1 to put it otherwise--that essential nature of ,brahman which is apprehended through the cognition that ,brahman is knowledge1 itself shines forth in consequence of the self-luminous nature of ,brahman1 and hence we have no right to make a distinction between that knowledge which constitutes ,brahman's nature1 and that of which that nature is the object1 and to maintain that the latter only is antagonistic to ,nescience4--,moreover 7and this explains the third sloka71 according to your own view ,brahman1 which is mere consciousness1 cannot be the object of another consciousness1 and hence there is no knowledge which has ,brahman for its object4 ,if1 therefore1 knowledge is contradictory to non-knowledge 7,nescience71 ,brahman itself must be contradictory to it1 and hence cannot be its substrate4 ,shells 7mistaken for silver7 and the like which by themselves are incapable of throwing light upon their own true nature are not contradictory to non-knowledge of themselves1 and depend1 for the termination of that non-knowledge1 on another knowledge 7viz4 on the knowledge of an intelligent being72 ,brahman1 on the other hand1 whose essential nature is established by its own consciousness1 is contradictorily opposed to non-knowledge of itself1 and hence does not depend1 for the termination of that non-knowledge1 on some other knowledge4--,if our opponent should argue that the knowledge of the falsity of whatever is other than ,brahman is contradictory to non- knowledge1 we ask whether this knowledge of the falsity of what is other than ,brahman is contradictory to the non-knowledge of the true nature of ,brahman1 or to that non-knowledge which consists in the view of the reality of the apparent world4 ,the former alternative is inadmissible2 because the cognition of the falsity of what is other than ,brahman has a different object 7from the non-knowledge of ,brahman's true nature7 and therefore cannot be contradictory to it2 for knowledge and non-knowledge are contradictory in so far only as they refer to one and the same object4 ,and with regard to the latter alternative we point out that the knowledge of the falsity of the world is contradictory to the non- knowledge which consists in the view of the reality of the world2 the former knowledge therefore sublates the latter non-knowledge only1 while the non-knowledge of the true nature of ,brahman is not touched by it4-- ,against this it will perhaps be urged that what is here called the non- knowledge of the true nature of ,brahman1 really is the view of ,brahman being dual in nature1 and that this view is put an end to by the cognition of the falsity of whatever is other than ,brahman2 while the true nature of ,brahman itself is established by its own consciousness4-- ,but this too we refuse to admit4 ,if non-duality constitutes the true nature of ,brahman1 and is proved by ,brahman's own consciousness1 there is room neither for what is contradictory to it1 viz4 that non-knowledge which consists in the view of duality1 nor for the sublation of that non- knowledge4--,let then non-duality be taken for an attribute 7not the essential nature7 of ,brahman6--,this too we refuse to admit2 for you yourself have proved that ,brahman1 which is pure ,consciousness1 is free from attributes which are objects of ,consciousness4--,from all this it follows that ,brahman1 whose essential nature is knowledge1 cannot be the substrate of ,nescience3 the theory1 in fact1 involves a flat contradiction4 ,when1 in the next place1 you maintain that ,brahman1 whose nature is homogeneous intelligence1 is invested and hidden by ,nescience1 you thereby assert the destruction of ,brahman's essential nature4 ,causing light to disappear means either obstructing the origination of light1 or else destroying light that exists4 ,and as you teach that light 7consciousness7 cannot originate1 the 'hiding' or 'making to disappear' of light can only mean its destruction4--,consider the following point also4 ,your theory is that self-luminous consciousness1 which is without object and without substrate1 becomes1 through the influence of an imperfection residing within itself1 conscious of itself as connected with innumerous substrata and innumerous objects4--,is then1 we ask1 that imperfection residing within consciousness something real or something unreal8--,the former alternative is excluded1 as not being admitted by yourself4 ,nor can we accept the latter alternative2 for if we did we should have to view that imperfection as being either a knowing subject1 or an object of knowledge1 or ,knowing itself4 ,now it cannot be ',knowing1' as you deny that there is any distinction in the nature of knowing2 and that ',knowing1' which is the substrate of the imperfection1 cannot be held to be unreal1 because that would involve the acceptance of the ,mdhyamika doctrine1 viz4 of a general void ,,footnote #ajf3a4 ,and if knowers1 objects of knowledge and knowing as determined by those two are fictitious1 i4e4 unreal1 we have to assume another fundamental imperfection1 and are thus driven into a regressuss in infinitum4--,to avoid this difficulty1 it might now be said that real consciousness itself1 which constitutes ,brahman's nature1 is that imperfection4--,but if ,brahman itself constitutes the imperfection1 then ,brahman is the basis of the appearance of a world1 and it is gratuitous to assume an additional avidy to account for the vorld4 ,moreover1 as ,brahman is eternal1 it would follow from this hypothesis that no release could ever take place4 ,unless1 therefore1 you admit a real imperfection apart from ,brahman1 you are unable to account for the great world-error4 ,what1 to come to the next point1 do you understand by the inexplicability 7anirvakaniyat7 of ,nescience8 ,its difference in nature from that which is1 as well as that which is not6 ,a thing of such kind would be inexplicable indeed2 for none of the means of knowledge apply to it4 ,that is to say--the whole world of objects must be ordered according to our states of consciousness1 and every state of consciousness presents itself in the form1 either of something existing or of something non-existing4 ,if1 therefore1 we should assume that of states of consciousness which are limited to this double form1 the object can be something which is neither existing nor non-existing1 then anything whatever might be the object of any state of consciousness whatever4 ,against this our opponent may now argue as follows3--,there is1 after all1 something1 called avidy1 or ajna1 or by some other name1 which is a positive entity 7bhva71 different from the antecedent non-existence of knowledge2 which effects the obscuration of the ,real2 which is the material cause of the erroneous superimposition on the ,real1 of manifold external and internal things2 and which is terminated by the cognition of the true nature of the one substance which constitutes ,reality4 ,for this avidy is apprehended through ,perception as well as ,inference4 ,brahman1 in so far as limited by this avidy1 is the material cause of the erroneous superimposition--upon the inward ,self1 which in itself is changeless pure intelligence1 but has its true nature obscured by this superimposition--of that plurality which comprises the ahamkra1 all acts of knowledge and all objects of knowledge4 ,through special forms of this defect 7i4e4 avidy7 there are produced1 in this world superimposed upon ,reality1 the manifold special superimpositions presenting themselves in the form of things and cognitions of things--such as snakes 7superimposed upon ropes71 silver 7superimposed on shells71 and the like4 ,avidy constitutes the material cause of this entire false world2 since for a false thing we must needs infer a false cause4 ,that this avidy or ajna 7non-knowledge7 is an object of internal ,perception1 follows from the fact that judgments such as ',i do not know'1 ',i do not know either myself or others1' directly present themselves to the mind4 ,a mental state of this kind has for its object not that non- knowledge which is the antecedent non-existence of knowledge--for such absence of knowledge is ascertained by the sixth means of proof 7anupalabdhi72 it rather is a state which presents its object directly1 and thus is of the same kind as the state expressed in the judgment ',i am experiencing pleasure4' ,even if we admit that 'absence of something' 7abhva7 can be the object of perception1 the state of consciousness under discussion cannot have absence of knowledge in the ,self for its object4 ,for at the very moment of such consciousness knowledge exists2 or if it does not exist there can be no consciousness of the absence of knowledge4 ,to explain4 ,when ,i am conscious that ,i am non-knowing1 is there or is there not apprehension of the ,self as having non-existence of knowledge for its attribute1 and of knowledge as the counterentity of non-knowledge8 ,in the former case there can be no consciousness of the absence of knowledge1 for that would imply a contradiction4 ,in the latter case1 such consciousness can all the less exist1 for it presupposes knowledge of that to which absence of knowledge belongs as an attribute 7viz4 the ,self7 and of its own counterentity1 viz4 knowledge4 ,the same difficulty arises if we view the absence of knowledge as either the object of ,inference1 or as the object of the special means of proof called 'abhva' 7i4e4 anupalabdhi74 ,if1 on the other hand1 non-knowledge is viewed 7not as a merely negative1 but7 as a positive entity1 there arises no contradiction even if there is 7as there is in fact7 at the same time knowledge of the ,self as qualified by non-knowledge1 and of knowledge as the counterentity of non-knowledge2 and we therefore must accept the conclusion that the state of consciousness expressed by ',i am non-knowing1' has for its object a non- knowledge which is a positive entity4--,but1 a ,nescience which is a positive entity1 contradicts the witnessing consciousness1 whose nature consists in the lighting up of the truth of things6 ,not so1 we reply4 ,witnessing consciousness has for its object not the true nature of things1 but ,nescience2 for otherwise the lighting up 7i4e4 the consciousness7 of false things could not take place4 ,knowledge which has for its object non-knowledge 7,nescience71 does not put an end to that non-knowledge4 ,hence there is no contradiction 7between kaitanya and ajana74--,but1 a new objection is raised1 this positive entity1 ,nescience1 becomes an object of witnessing ,consciousness1 only in so far as it 7,nescience7 is defined by some particular object 7viz4 the particular thing which is not known71 and such objects depend for their proof on the different means of knowledge4 ,how then can that ,nescience1 which is defined by the ',i' 7as expressed e4 g4 in the judgment1 ',i do not know myself'71 become the object of witnessing ,consciousness8--,there is no difficulty here1 we reply4 ,all things whatsoever are objects of ,consciousness1 either as things known or as things not known4 ,but while the mediation of the means of knowledge is required in the case of all those things which1 as being non-intelligent 7jada71 can be proved only in so far as being objects known 7through some means of knowledge71 such mediation is not required in the case of the intelligent 7ajada7 inner ,self which proves itself4 ,consciousness of ,nescience is thus possible in all cases 7including the case ',i do not know myself'71 since witnessing ,consciousness always gives definition to ,nescience4--,from all this it follows that1 through ,perception confirmed by ,reasoning1 we apprehend ,nescience as a positive entity4 ,this ,nescience1 viewed as a positive entity1 is also proved by ,inference1 viz4 in the following form3 ,all knowledge established by one of the different means of proof is preceded by something else1 which is different from the mere antecedent non- existence of knowledge2 which hides the object of knowledge2 which is terminated by knowledge2 and which exists in the same place as knowledge2 because knowledge possesses the property of illumining things not illumined before2--just as the light of a lamp lit in the dark illumines things4--,nor must you object to this inference on the ground that darkness is not a substance1 but rather the mere absence of light1 or else the absence of visual perception of form and colour1 and that hence darkness cannot be brought forward as a similar instance proving ,nescience to be a positive entity4 ,for that ,darkness must be considered a positive substance follows1 firstly1 from its being more or less dense1 and secondly1 from its being perceived as having colour4 ,to all this we make the following reply4 ,neither ,perception alone1 nor ,perception aided by ,reasoning1 reveals to us a positive entity1 ,nescience1 as implied in judgments such as ',i am non-knowing1' ',i know neither myself nor others4' ,the contradiction which was urged above against the view of non-knowledge being the antecedent non-existence of knowledge1 presents itself equally in connexion with non-knowledge viewed as a positive entity4 ,for here the following alternative presents itself--the inner ,reality is either known or not known as that which gives definition to ,nescience by being either its object or its substrate4 ,if it be thus known1 then there is in it no room for ,nescience which is said to be that which is put an end to by the cognition of the true nature of the ,inner ,reality4 ,if1 on the other hand1 it be not thus known1 how should there be a consciousness of ,nescience in the absence of that which defines it1 viz4 knowledge of the substrate or of the object of ,nescience8--,let it then be said that what is contradictory to non-knowledge is the clear presentation of the nature of the inner ,self1 and that 7while there is consciousness of ajna7 we have only an obscure presentation of the nature of the ,self2 things being thus1 there is no contradiction between the cognition of the substrate and object of ,nescience on the one side1 and the consciousness of ajna on the other4--,well1 we reply1 all this holds good on our side also4 ,even if ajna means antecedent non-existence of knowledge1 we can say that knowledge of the substrate and object of non-knowledge has for its object the ,self presented obscurely only2 and thus there is no difference between our views--unless you choose to be obstinate6 ,whether we view non-knowledge as a positive entity or as the antecedent non-existence of knowledge1 in either case it comes out as what the word indicates1 viz4 non-knowledge4 ,non-knowledge means either absence of knowledge1 or that which is other than knowledge1 or that which is contradictory to knowledge2 and in any of these cases we have to admit that non-knowledge presupposes the cognition of the nature of knowledge4 ,even though the cognition of the nature of darkness should not require the knowledge of the nature of light1 yet when darkness is considered under the aspect of being contrary to light1 this presupposes the cognition of light4 ,and the non-knowledge held by you is never known in its own nature but merely as 'non-knowledge1' and it therefore presupposes the cognition of knowledge no less than our view does1 according to which non-knowledge is simply the negation of knowledge4 ,now antecedent non-existence of knowledge is admitted by you also1 and is an undoubted object of consciousness2 the right conclusion therefore is that what we are conscious of in such judgments as ',i am non-knowing1' c41 is this very antecedent non-existence of knowledge which we both admit4 ,it1 moreover1 is impossible to ascribe to ,brahman1 whose nature is constituted by eternal free self-luminous intelligence1 the consciousness of ,nescience2 for what constitutes its essence is consciousness of itself4 ,if against this you urge that ,brahman1 although having consciousness of ,self for its essential nature1 yet is conscious of non-knowledge in so far as its 7,brahman's7 nature is hidden2 we ask in return what we have to understand by ,brahman's nature being hidden4 ,you will perhaps say 'the fact of its not being illumined4' ,but how1 we ask1 can there be absence of illumination of the nature of that whose very nature consists in consciousness of ,self1 i4e4 self-illumination8 ,if you reply that even that whose nature is consciousness of ,self may be in the state of its nature not being illumined by an outside agency1 we point out that as according to you light cannot be considered us an attribute1 but constitutes the very nature of ,brahman1 it would-- illumination coming from an external agency--follow that the very nature of ,brahman can be destroyed from the outside4 ,this we have already remarked4--,further1 your view implies on the one hand that this non- knowledge which is the cause of the concealment of ,brahman's nature hides ,brahman in so far as ,brahman is conscious of it1 and on the other hand that having hidden ,brahman1 it becomes the object of consciousness on the part of ,brahman2 and this evidently constitutes a logical see-saw4 ,you will perhaps say ,,footnote #aaa3a that it hides ,brahman in so far only as ,brahman is conscious of it4 ,but1 we point out1 if the consciousness of ajna takes place on the part of a ,brahman whose nature is not hidden1 the whole hypothesis of the 'hiding' of ,brahman's nature loses its purport1 and with it the fundamental hypothesis as to the nature of ajnna2 for if ,brahman may be conscious of ajnna 7without a previous obscuration of its nature by ajnna7 it may as well be held to be in the same way conscious of the world1 which1 by you1 is considered to be an effect of ajnna4 ,how1 further1 do you conceive this consciousness of ajnna on ,brahman's part8 ,is it due to ,brahman itself1 or to something else8 ,in the former case this consciousness would result from ,brahman's essential nature1 and hence there would never be any ,release4 ,or else1 consciousness of ajnna constituting the nature of ,brahman1 which is admittedly pure consciousness1 in the same way as the consciousness of false silver is terminated by that cognition which sublates the silver1 so some terminating act of cognition would eventually put an end to ,brahman's essential nature itself4--,on the second alternative we ask what that something else should be4 ,if you reply 'another ajnna1' we are led into a regressus in infinitum4--,let it then be said ,,footnote #aab3a that ajnna having first hidden ,brahman then becomes the object of its consciousness4 ,this1 we rejoin1 would imply that ajnna acting like a defect of the eye by its very essential being hides ,brahman1 and then ajnna could not be sublated by knowledge4 ,let us then put the case as follows3--,ajnna1 which is by itself beginningless1 at the very same time effects ,brahman's witnessing it 7being conscious of it71 and ,brahman's nature being hidden2 in this way the regressus in infinitum and other difficulties will be avoided4--,but this also we cannot admit2 for ,brahman is essentially consciousness of ,self1 and cannot become a witnessing principle unless its nature be previously hidden4--,let then ,brahman be hidden by some other cause6--,this1 we rejoin1 would take away from ajnna its alleged beginninglessness1 and further would also lead to an infinite regress4 ,and if ,brahman were assumed to become a witness1 without its essential nature being hidden1 it could not possess--what yet it is maintained to possess--the uniform character of consciousness of ,self4--,if1 moreover1 ,brahman is hidden by avidy1 does it then not shine forth at all1 or does it shine forth to some extent8 ,on the former alternative the not shining forth of ,brahman--whose nature is mere light-- reduces it to an absolute non-entity4 ,regarding the latter alternative we ask1 'of ,brahman1 which is of an absolutely homogeneous nature1 which part do you consider to be concealed1 and which to shine forth8' ,to that substance which is pure light1 free from all division and distinction1 there cannot belong two modes of being1 and hence obscuration and light cannot abide in it together4--,let us then say that ,brahman1 which is homogeneous being1 intelligence1 bliss1 has its nature obscured by avidy1 and hence is seen indistinctly as it were4--,but how1 we ask1 are we to conceive the distinctness or indistinctness of that whose nature is pure light8 ,when an object of light which has parts and distinguishing attributes appears in its totality1 we say that it appears distinctly2 while we say that its appearance is indistinct when some of its attributes do not appear4 ,now in those aspects of the thing which do not appear1 light 7illumination7 is absent altogether1 and hence we cannot there speak of indistinctness of light2 in those parts on the other hand which do appear1 the light of which they are the object is distinct4 ,indistinctness is thus not possible at all where there is light4 ,in the case of such things as are apprehended as objects1 indistinctness may take place1 viz4 in so far as some of their distinguishing attributes are not apprehended4 ,but in ,brahman1 which is not an object1 without any distinguishing attributes1 pure light1 the essential nature of which it is to shine forth1 indistinctness which consists in the non-apprehension of certain attributes can in no way be conceived1 and hence not be explained as the effect of avidy4 ,we1 moreover1 must ask the following question3 ',is this indistinctness which you consider an effect of avidy put an end to by the rise of true knowledge or not8' ,on the latter alternative there would be no final release4 ,in the former case we have to ask of what nature ,reality is4 ',it is of an essentially clear and distinct nature4' ,does this nature then exist previously 7to the cessation of indistinctness71 or not8 ,if it does1 there is no room whatever either for indistinctness the effect of avidy1 or for its cessation4 ,if it does not previously exist1 then ,release discloses itself as something to be effected1 and therefore non- eternal4--,and that such non-knowledge is impossible because there is no definable substrate for it we have shown above4--,he1 moreover1 who holds the theory of error resting on a non-real defect1 will find it difficult to prove the impossibility of error being without any substrate2 for1 if the cause of error may be unreal1 error may be supposed to take place even in case of its substrate being unreal4 ,and the consequence of this would be the theory of a general ,void4 ,the assertion1 again1 that non-knowledge as a positive entity is proved by ,inference1 also is groundless4 ,but the inference was actually set forth6--,true2 but it was set forth badly4 ,for the reason you employed for proving ajna is a so-called contradictory one 7i4e4 it proves the contrary of what it is meant to prove71 in so far as it proves what is not desired and what is different from ajna 7for what it proves is that there is a certain knowledge1 viz4 that all knowledge resting on valid means of proof has non-knowledge for its antecedent74 7,and with regard to this knowledge again we must ask whether it also has non- knowledge for its antecedent47 ,if the reason 7relied on in all this argumentation7 does not prove1 in this case also1 the antecedent existence of positive non-knowledge1 it is too general 7and hence not to be trusted in any case74 ,if1 on the other hand1 it does prove antecedent non-knowledge1 then this latter non-knowledge stands in the way of the non-knowledge 7which you try to prove by inference7 being an object of consciousness1 and thus the whole supposition of ajna as an entity becomes useless4 ,the proving instance1 moreover1 adduced by our opponent1 has no proving power2 for the light of a lamp does not possess the property of illumining things not illumined before4 ,everywhere illumining power belongs to knowledge only2 there may be light1 but if there is not also ,knowledge there is no lighting up of objects4 ,the senses also are only causes of the origination of knowledge1 and possess no illumining power4 ,the function of the light of the lamp on the other hand is a merely auxiliary one1 in so far as it dispels the darkness antagonistic to the organ of sight which gives rise to knowledge2 and it is only with a view to this auxiliary action that illumining power is conventionally ascribed to the lamp4--,but in using the light of the lamp as a proving instance1 we did not mean to maintain that it possesses illumining power equal to that of light2 we introduced it merely with reference to the illumining power of knowledge1 in so far as preceded by the removal of what obscures its object6--,we refuse to accept this explanation4 ,illumining power does not only mean the dispelling of what is antagonistic to it1 but also the defining of things1 i4e4 the rendering them capable of being objects of empirical thought and speech2 and this belongs to knowledge only 7not to the light of the lamp74 ,if you allow the power of illumining what was not illumined1 to auxiliary factors also1 you must first of all allow it to the senses which are the most eminent factors of that kind2 and as in their case there exists no different thing to be terminated by their activity1 7i4e4 nothing analogous to the ajna to be terminated by knowledge71 this whole argumentation is beside the point4 ,there are also formal inferences1 opposed to the conclusion of the prvapakshin4--,of the ajna under discussion1 ,brahman1 which is mere knowledge1 is not the substrate1 just because it is ajna2 as shown by the case of the non-knowledge of the shell 7mistaken for silver7 and similar cases2 for such non-knowledge abides within the knowing subject4-- ,the ajna under discussion does not obscure knowledge1 just because it is ajna2 as shown by the cases of the shell1 c42 for such non- knowledge hides the object4--,ajna is not terminated by knowledge1 because it does not hide the object of knowledge2 whatever non-knowledge is terminated by knowledge1 is such as to hide the object of knowledge2 as e4g4 the non-knowledge of the shell4--,brahman is not the substrate of ajna1 because it is devoid of the character of knowing subject2 like jars and similar things4--,brahman is not hidden by ajna1 because it is not the object of knowledge2 whatever is hidden by non-knowledge is the object of knowledge2 so e4g4 shells and similar things4--,brahman is not connected with non-knowledge to be terminated by knowledge1 because it is not the object of knowledge2 whatever is connected with non-knowledge to be terminated by knowledge is an object of knowledge2 as e4g4 shells and the like4 ,knowledge based on valid means of proof1 has not for its antecedent1 non-knowledge other than the antecedent non-existence of knowledge2 just because it is knowledge based on valid proof2 like that valid knowledge which proves the ajna maintained by you4--,knowledge does not destroy a real thing1 because it is knowledge in the absence of some specific power strengthening it2 whatever is capable of destroying things is--whether it be knowledge or ajna--strengthened by some specific power2 as e4g4 the knowledge of the ,lord and of ,yogins2 and as the ajna consisting in a pestle 7the blow of which destroys the pot74 ,ajna which has the character of a positive entity cannot be destroyed by knowledge2 just because it is a positive entity1 like jars and similar things4 ,but1 it now may be said1 we observe that fear and other affections1 which are positive entities and produced by previous cognitions1 are destroyed by sublative acts of cognition6--,not so1 we reply4 ,those affections are not destroyed by knowledge2 they rather pass away by themselves1 being of a momentary 7temporary7 nature only1 and on the cessation of their cause they do not arise again4 ,that they are of a momentary nature only1 follows from their being observed only in immediate connexion with the causes of their origination1 and not otherwise4 ,if they were not of a temporary nature1 each element of the stream of cognitions1 which are the cause of fear and the like1 would give rise to a separate feeling of fear1 and the result would be that there would be consciousness of many distinct feelings of fear 7and this we know not to be the case74--,in conclusion we remark that in defining right knowledge as 'that which has for its antecedent another entity1 different from its own antecedent non-existence1' you do not give proof of very eminent logical acuteness2 for what sense has it to predicate of an entity that it is different from nonentity8--,for all these reasons ,inference also does not prove an ajna which is a positive entity4 ,and that it is not proved by ,scripture and arthpatti1 will be shown later on4 ,and the reasoning under ,s4 ,,ii1 #a1 #d4 will dispose of the argument which maintains that of a false thing the substantial cause also must be false4 ,we thus see that there is no cognition of any kind which has for its object a ,nescience of 'inexplicable' nature4--,nor can such an inexplicable entity be admitted on the ground of apprehension1 erroneous apprehension and sublation 7cp4 above1 p4 #ajb74 ,for that only which is actually apprehended1 can be the object of apprehension1 error and sublation1 and we have no right to assume1 as an object of these states of consciousness1 something which is apprehended neither by them nor any other state of consciousness4--',but in the case of the shell1 c41 silver is actually apprehended1 and at the same time there arises the sublating consciousness this silver is not real1 and it is not possible that one thing should appear as another2 we therefore are driven to the hypothesis that owing to some defect1 we actually apprehend silver of an altogether peculiar kind1 viz4 such as can be defined neither as real nor as unreal4'--,this also we cannot allow1 since this very assumption necessarily implies that one thing appears as another4 ,for apprehension1 activity1 sublation1 and erroneous cognition1 all result only from one thing appearing as another1 and it is not reasonable to assume something altogether non-perceived and groundless4 ,the silver1 when apprehended1 is not apprehended as something 'inexplicable1' but as something real2 were it apprehended under the former aspect it could be the object neither of erroneous nor of sublative cognition1 nor would the apprehending person endeavour to seize it4 ,for these reasons you 7the anirva-kaniyatva-vdin7 also must admit that the actual process is that of one thing appearing as another4 ,those also who hold other theories as to the kind of cognition under discussion 7of which the shell1 mistaken for silver1 is an instance7 must--whatsoever effort they may make to avoid it--admit that their theory finally implies the appearing of one thing as another4 ,the so- called asatkhyti-view implies that the non-existing appears as existing2 the tmakhyti-view1 that the ,self--which here means 'cognition'-- appears as a thing2 and the akhyti-view1 that the attribute of one thing appears as that of another1 that two acts of cognition appear as one1 and--on the view of the non-existence of the object--that the non- existing appears as existing ,,footnote #aah3a4 ,moreover1 if you say that there is originated silver of a totally new inexplicable kind1 you are bound to assign the cause of this origination4 ,this cause cannot be the perception of the silver2 for the perception has the silver for its object1 and hence has no existence before the origination of the silver4 ,and should you say that the perception1 having arisen without an object1 produces the silver and thereupon makes it its object1 we truly do not know what to say to such excellent reasoning6--,let it then be said that the cause is some defect in the sense-organ4--,this1 too1 is inadmissible2 for a defect abiding in the percipient person cannot produce an objective effect4--,nor can the organs of sense 7apart from defects7 give rise to the silver2 for they are causes of cognitions only 7not of things cognised74 ,nor1 again1 the sense-organs in so far as modified by some defect2 for they also can only produce modifications in what is effected by them1 i4e4 cognition4 ,and the hypothesis of a beginningless1 false ajna constituting the general material cause of all erroneous cognitions has been refuted above4 ,how is it1 moreover1 that this new and inexplicable thing 7which you assume to account for the silver perceived on the shell7 becomes to us the object of the idea and word 'silver1' and not of some other idea and term1 e4g4 of a jar8--,if you reply that this is due to its similarity to silver1 we point out that in that case the idea and the word presenting themselves to our mind should be that of 'something resembling silver4' ,should you1 on the other hand1 say that we apprehend the thing as silver because it possesses the generic characteristics of silver1 we ask whether these generic characteristics are real or unreal4 ,the former alternative is impossible1 because something real cannot belong to what is unreal2 and the latter is impossible because something unreal cannot belong to what is real4 ,but we need not extend any further this refutation of an altogether ill- founded theory4 ,,footnote #ajb3a4 ',nescience' is sublated 7refuted7 by the cognition of ,brahman1 and thereby shown to have been the object of erroneous cognition3 it thus cannot be 'being1' i4e4 real4 ,nor can it be altogether unreal1 'non-being1' because in that case it could not be the object either of mental apprehension or of sublation4 ,,footnote #ajf3a4 ,if the imperfection inhering in ,consciousness is itself of the nature of consciousness1 and at the same time unreal1 we should have to distinguish two kinds of ,consciousness--which is contrary to the fundamental doctrine of the oneness of ,consciousness4 ,and if1 on the other hand1 we should say that the ,consciousness in which the imperfection inheres is of the same nature as the latter1 i4e4 unreal1 we are landed in the view of universal unreality4 ,,footnote #aaa3a4 ,allowing the former view of the question only4 ,,footnote #aab3a4 ,adopting the latter view only2 see preceding note4 ,,footnote #aah3a4 ,for a full explanation of the nature of these 'khytis1' see ,a4 ,venis' translation of the ,vednta ,siddhnta ,muktvali 7,reprint from the ,pandit1 p4 #acj ff474 ,all knowledge is of the ,real4 ',those who understand the ,veda hold that all cognition has for its object what is real2 for ,sruti and ,smriti alike teach that everything participates in the nature of everything else4 ,in the scriptural account of creation preceded by intention on the part of the ,creator it is said that each of these elements was made tripartite2 and this tripartite constitution of all things is apprehended by ,perception as well4 ,the red colour in burning fire comes from 7primal elementary7 fire1 the white colour from water1 the black colour from earth--in this way ,scripture explains the threefold nature of burning fire4 ,in the same way all things are composed of elements of all things4 ,the ,vishnu ,purna1 in its account of creation1 makes a similar statement3 ,the elements possessing various powers and being unconnected could not1 without combination1 produce living beings1 not having mingled in any way4 ,having combined1 therefore1 with one another1 and entering into mutual associations-- beginning with the principle called ,mahat1 and extending down to the gross elements--they formed an egg1 c4 7,vi4 ,pu4 ,i1 #b1 #ej2 #eb74 ,this tripartiteness of the elements the ,strakra also declares 7,ve4 ,s4 ,,iii1 #a1 #c74 ,for the same reason ,sruti enjoins the use of ,putka sprouts when no ,soma can be procured2 for1 as the ,mmmsakas explain1 there are in the ,putka plant some parts of the ,soma plant 7,p4 ,m4 ,s472 and for the same reason nvra grains may be used as a substitute for rice grains4 ,that thing is similar to another which contains within itself some part of that other thing2 and ,scripture itself has thus stated that in shells1 c41 there is contained some silver1 and so on4 ,that one thing is called silver and another shell has its reason in the relative preponderance of one or the other element4 ,we observe that shells are similar to silver2 thus perception itself informs us that some elements of the latter actually exist in the former4 ,sometimes it happens that owing to a defect of the eye the silver-element only is apprehended1 not the shell-element1 and then the percipient person1 desirous of silver1 moves to pick up the shell4 ,if1 on the other hand1 his eye is free from such defect1 he apprehends the shell-element and then refrains from action4 ,hence the cognition of silver in the shell is a true one4 ,in the same way the relation of one cognition being sublated by another explains itself through the preponderant element1 according as the preponderance of the shell-element is apprehended partially or in its totality1 and does not therefore depend on one cognition having for its object the false thing and another the true thing4 ,the distinctions made in the practical thought and business of life thus explain themselves on the basis of everything participating in the nature of everything else4' ,in dreams1 again1 the divinity creates1 in accordance with the merit or demerit of living beings1 things of a special nature1 subsisting for a certain time only1 and perceived only by the individual soul for which they are meant4 ,in agreement herewith ,scripture says1 with reference to the state of dreaming1 ',there are no chariots in that state1 no horses1 no roads2 then he creates chariots1 horses1 and roads4 ,there are no delights1 no joys1 no bliss2 then he creates delights1 joys1 and bliss4 ,there are no tanks1 no lakes1 no rivers2 then he creates tanks1 lakes1 and rivers4 ,for he is the maker' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #c1 #aj74 ,the meaning of this is1 that although there are then no chariots1 c41 to be perceived by other persons1 the ,lord creates such things to be perceived by the dreaming person only4 ',for he is the maker'2 for such creative agency belongs to him who possesses the wonderful power of making all his wishes and plans to come true4 ,similarly another passage1 ',that person who is awake in those who are asleep1 shaping one lovely sight after another1 that indeed is the ,bright1 that is ,brahman1 that alone is called the ,immortal4 ,all worlds are contained in it1 and no one goes beyond it' 7,ka4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #e1 #h74--,the ,strakra also1 after having in two ,stras 7,,iii1 #b1 #a2 #b7 stated the hypothesis of the individual soul creating the objects appearing in dreams1 finally decides that that wonderful creation is produced by the ,lord for the benefit of the individual dreamer2 for the reason that as long as the individual soul is in the samsra state1 its true nature--comprising the power of making its wishes to come true--is not fully manifested1 and hence it cannot practically exercise that power4 ,the last clause of the ,katha text 7'all worlds are contained in it1' c47 clearly shows that the highest ,self only is the creator meant4 ,that the dreaming person who lies in his chamber should go in his body to other countries and experience various results of his merit or demerit--being at one time crowned a king1 having at another time his head cut off1 and so on--is possible in so far as there is created for him another body in every way resembling the body resting on the bed4 ,the case of the white shell being seen as yellow1 explains itself as follows4 ,the visual rays issuing from the eye are in contact with the bile contained in the eye1 and thereupon enter into conjunction with the shell2 the result is that the whiteness belonging to the shell is overpowered by the yellowness of the bile1 and hence not apprehended2 the shell thus appears yellow1 just as if it were gilt4 ,the bile and its yellowness is1 owing to its exceeding tenuity1 not perceived by the bystanders2 but thin though it be it is apprehended by the person suffering from jaundice1 to whom it is very near1 in so far as it issues from his own eye1 and through the mediation of the visual rays1 aided by the action of the impression produced on the mind by that apprehension1 it is apprehended even in the distant object1 viz4 the shell4--,in an analogous way the crystal which is placed near the rose is apprehended as red1 for it is overpowered by the brilliant colour of the rose2 the brilliancy of the rose is perceived in a more distinct way owing to its close conjunction with the transparent substance of the crystal4--,in the same way the cognition of water in the mirage is true4 ,there always exists water in connexion with light and earth2 but owing to some defect of the eye of the perceiving person1 and to the mysterious influence of merit and demerit1 the light and the earth are not apprehended1 while the water is apprehended4--,in the case again of the firebrand swung round rapidly1 its appearance as a fiery wheel explains itself through the circumstance that moving very rapidly it is in conjunction with all points of the circle described without our being able to apprehend the intervals4 ,the case is analogous to that of the perception of a real wheel2 but there is the difference that in the case of the wheel no intervals are apprehended1 because there are none2 while in the case of the firebrand none are apprehended owing to the rapidity of the movement4 ,but in the latter case also the cognition is true4--,again1 in the case of mirrors and similar reflecting surfaces the perception of one's own face is likewise true4 ,the fact is that the motion of the visual rays 7proceeding from the eye towards the mirror7 is reversed 7reflected7 by the mirror1 and that thus those rays apprehend the person's own face1 subsequently to the apprehension of the surface of the mirror2 and as in this case also1 owing to the rapidity of the process1 there is no apprehension of any interval 7between the mirror and the face71 the face presents itself as being in the mirror4--,in the case of one direction being mistaken for another 7as when a person thinks the south to be where the north is71 the fact is that1 owing to the unseen principle 7i4 e4 merit or demerit71 the direction which actually exists in the other direction 7for a point which is to the north of me is to the south of another point7 is apprehended by itself1 apart from the other elements of direction2 the apprehension which actually takes place is thus likewise true4 ,similar is the case of the double moon4 ,here1 either through pressure of the finger upon the eye1 or owing to some abnormal affection of the eye1 the visual rays are divided 7split71 and the double1 mutually independent apparatus of vision thus originating1 becomes the cause of a double apprehension of the moon4 ,one apparatus apprehends the moon in her proper place2 the other which moves somewhat obliquely1 apprehends at first a place close by the moon1 and then the moon herself1 which thus appears somewhat removed from her proper place4 ,although1 therefore1 what is apprehended is the one moon distinguished by connection with two places at the same time--an apprehension due to the double apparatus of vision--yet1 owing to the difference of apprehensions1 there is a difference in the character of the object apprehended1 and an absence of the apprehension of unity1 and thus a double moon presents itself to perception4 ,that the second spot is viewed as qualifying the moon1 is due to the circumstance that the apprehension of that spot1 and that of the moon which is not apprehended in her proper place1 are simultaneous4 ,now here the doubleness of the apparatus is real1 and hence the apprehension of the moon distinguished by connexion with two places is real also1 and owing to this doubleness of apprehension1 the doubleness of aspect of the object apprehended1 i4e4 the moon1 is likewise real4 ,that there is only one moon constituting the true object of the double apprehension1 this is a matter for which ocular perception by itself does not suffice1 and hence what is actually seen is a double moon4 ,that1 although the two eyes together constitute one visual apparatus only1 the visual rays being divided through some defect of the eyes1 give rise to a double apparatus--this we infer from the effect actually observed4 ,when that defect is removed there takes place only one apprehension of the moon as connected with her proper place1 and thus the idea of one moon only arises4 ,it is at the same time quite clear how the defect of the eye gives rise to a double visual apparatus1 the latter to a double apprehension1 and the latter again to a doubleness of the object of apprehension4 ,we have thus proved that all cognition is true4 ,the shortcomings of other views as to the nature of cognition have been set forth at length by other philosophers1 and we therefore do not enter on that topic4 ,what need is there1 in fact1 of lengthy proofs8 ,those who acknowledge the validity of the different means of knowledge1 perception1 and so on1 and-- what is vouched for by sacred tradition--the existence of a highest ,brahman--free from all shadow of imperfection1 of measureless excellence1 comprising within itself numberless auspicious qualities1 all-knowing1 immediately realising all its purposes--1 what should they not be able to prove8 ,that holy highest ,brahman--while producing the entire world as an object of fruition for the individual souls1 in agreement with their respective good and ill deserts--creates certain things of such a nature as to become common objects of consciousness1 either pleasant or unpleasant1 to all souls together1 while certain other things are created in such a way as to be perceived only by particular persons1 and to persist for a limited time only4 ,and it is this distinction--viz4 of things that are objects of general consciousness1 and of things that are not so--which makes the difference between what is called 'things sublating' and 'things sublated4'--,everything is explained hereby4 ,neither ,scripture nor ,smriti and ,purna teach ,nescience4 ,the assertion that ,nescience--to be defined neither as that which is nor as that which is not--rests on the authority of ,scripture is untrue4 ,in passages such as 'hidden by the untrue' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,viii1 #c1 #b71 the word 'untrue' does not denote the ,undefinable2 it rather means that which is different from 'rita1' and this latter word--as we see from the passage 'enjoying the rita' 7,ka4 ,up4 #a1c1 #a7--;denotes such actions as aim at no worldly end1 but only at the propitiation of the highest ,person1 and thus enable the devotee to reach him4 ,the word 'anrita' therefore denotes actions of a different kind1 i4e4 such as aim at worldly results and thus stand in the way of the soul reaching ,brahman2 in agreement with the passage 'they do not find that ,brahma-world1 for they are carried away by anrita' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,viii1 #c1 #b74 ,again1 in the text ',then there was neither non-,being nor ,being' 7,ri4 ,samh4 ,x1 #abi1 #a71 the terms 'being' and 'non-being' denote intelligent and non-intelligent beings in their distributive state4 ,what that text aims at stating is that intelligent and non-intelligent beings1 which at the time of the origination of the world are called 'sat' and 'tyat' 7,taitt4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #f71 are1 during the period of reabsorption1 merged in the collective totality of non-intelligent matter which the text denotes by the term 'darkness' 7,ri4 ,samh4 ,x1 #abi1 #c74 ,there is thus no reference whatever to something 'not definable either as being or non-being'3 the terms 'being' and 'non-being' are applied to different mode2 of being at different times4 ,that the term 'darkness' denotes the collective totality of non-intelligent matter appears from another scriptural passage1 viz1 ',the ,non-evolved 7avyaktam7 is merged in the ,imperishable 7akshara71 the ,imperishable in darkness 7tamas71 darkness becomes one with the highest divinity4' ,true1 the word 'darkness' denotes the subtle condition of primeval matter 7prakriti71 which forms the totality of non- intelligent things2 but this very ,prakriti is called ,my--in the text ',know ,prakriti to be ,my1' and this proves it be something 'undefinable'3 ,not so1 we reply2 we meet with no passages where the word ',my' denotes that which is undefinable4 ,but the word ',my' is synonymous with 'mithy1' i4e4 falsehood1 and hence denotes the ,undefinable also4 ,this1 too1 we cannot admit2 for the word ',my' does not in all places refer to what is false2 we see it applied e4g4 to such things as the weapons of ,asuras and ,rkshasas1 which are not 'false' but real4 ',my1' in such passages1 really denotes that which produces various wonderful effects1 and it is in this sense that ,prakriti is called ,my4 ,this appears from the passage 7,svet4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #i7 ',from that the myin creates all this1 and in that the other one is bound up by my4' ,for this text declares that ,prakriti--there called ,my--produces manifold wonderful creations1 and the highest ,person is there called 'myin' because he possesses that power of my2 not on account of any ignorance or nescience on his part4 ,the latter part of the text expressly says that 7not the ,lord but7 another one1 i4e4 the individual soul is bound up by my2 and therewith agrees another text1 viz4 ',when the soul slumbering in beginningless ,my awakes' 7,gaud4 ,k474 ,again1 in the text ',indra goes multiform through the ,mys' 7,ri4 ,samh4 ,,vi1 #dg1 #ah71 the manifold powers of ,indra are spoken of1 and with this agrees what the next verse says1 'he shines greatly as ,tvashtri'3 for an unreal being does not shine4 ,and where the text says 'my ,my is hard to overcome' 7,bha4 ,g4 ,,vii1 #ad71 the qualification given there to ,my1 viz4 'consisting of the gunas1' shows that what is meant is ,prakriti consisting of the three gunas4--,all this shows that ,scripture does not teach the existence of a 'principle called ,nescience1 not to be defined either as that which is or that which is not4' ,nor again is such ,nescience to be assumed for the reason that otherwise the scriptural statements of the unity of all being would be unmeaning4 ,for if the text ',thou art that1' be viewed as teaching the unity of the individual soul and the highest ,self1 there is certainly no reason1 founded on unmeaningness1 to ascribe to ,brahman1 intimated by the word 'that'--which is all-knowing1 c4--,nescience1 which is contradictory to ,brahman's nature4--,itihsa and ,purna also do not anywhere teach that to ,brahman there belongs ,nescience4 ,but1 an objection is raised1 the ,vishnu ,purna1 in the sloka1 ',the stars are ,vishnu1' c4 7,,ii1 #ab1 #ch71 first refers to ,brahman as one only1 and comprising all things within itself2 thereupon states in the next sloka that this entire world1 with all its distinctions of hills1 oceans1 c41 is sprung out of the 'ajna' of ,brahman1 which in itself is pure 'jna1' i4e4 knowledge2 thereupon confirms the view of the world having sprung from ajna by referring to the fact that ,brahman1 while abiding in its own nature1 is free from all difference 7sl4 #dj72 proves in the next two slokas the non-reality of plurality by a consideration of the things of this world2 sums up1 in the following sloka1 the unreality of all that is different from ,brahman2 then 7#dc7 explains that action is the root of that ajna which causes us to view the one uniform ,brahman as manifold2 thereupon declares the intelligence constituting ,brahman's nature to be free from all distinction and imperfection 7#dd72 and finally teaches 7#de7 that ,brahman so constituted1 alone is truly real1 while the so- called reality of the world is merely conventional4--,this is not1 we reply1 a true representation of the drift of the passage4 ,the passage at the outset states that1 in addition to the detailed description of the world given before1 there will now be given a succinct account of another aspect of the world not yet touched upon4 ,this account has to be understood as follows4 ,of this universe1 comprising intelligent and non- intelligent beings1 the intelligent part--which is not to be reached by mind and speech1 to be known in its essential nature by the ,self only1 and1 owing to its purely intelligential character1 not touched by the differences due to ,prakriti--is1 owing to its imperishable nature1 denoted as that which is2 while the non-intelligent1 material2 part which1 in consequence of the actions of the intelligent beings undergoes manifold changes1 and thus is perishable1 is denoted as that which is not4 ,both parts1 however1 form the body of ,vsudeva1 i4e4 ,brahman1 and hence have ,brahman for their ,self4 ,the text therefore says 7#cg71 ',from the waters which form the body of ,vishnu was produced the lotus-shaped earth1 with its seas and mountains'3 what is meant is that the entire ,brahma-egg which has arisen from water constitutes the body of which ,vishnu is the soul4 ,this relation of soul and body forms the basis of the statements of co-ordination made in the next sloka 7#ch71 ',the stars are ,vishnu1' c42 the same relation had been already declared in numerous previous passages of the ,purna 7'all this is the body of ,hari1' c474 ,all things in the world1 whether they are or are not1 are ,vishnu's body1 and he is their soul4 ,of the next sloka1 ',because the ,lord has knowledge for his essential nature1' the meaning is ',because of the ,lord who abides as the ,self of all individual souls1 the essential nature is knowledge only--while bodies divine1 human1 c41 have no part in it--1 therefore all non-intelligent things1 bodies human and divine1 hills1 oceans1 c41 spring from his knowledge1 i4e4 have their root in the actions springing from the volitions of men1 gods1 c41 in whose various forms the fundamental intelligence manifests itself4 ,and since non-intelligent matter is subject to changes corresponding to the actions of the individual souls1 it may be called 'non-being1' while the souls are 'being4'--,this the next sloka further explains 'when knowledge is pure1' c4 ,the meaning is 'when the works which are the cause of the distinction of things are destroyed1 then all the distinctions of bodies1 human or divine1 hills1 oceans1 c4--all which are objects of fruition for the different individual souls--pass away4' ,non-intelligent matter1 as entering into various states of a non-permanent nature1 is called 'non-being'2 while souls1 the nature of which consists in permanent knowledge1 are called 'being4' ,on this difference the next sloka insists 7#da74 ,we say 'it is' of that thing which is of a permanently uniform nature1 not connected with the idea of beginning1 middle and end1 and which hence never becomes the object of the notion of non-existence2 while we say 'it is not' of non-intelligent matter which constantly passes over into different states1 each later state being out of connexion with the earlier state4 ,the constant changes to which non- intelligent matter is liable are illustrated in the next sloka1 ',earth is made into a jar1' c4 ,and for this reason1 the subsequent sloka goes on to say that there is nothing but knowledge4 ,this fundamental knowledge or intelligence is1 however1 variously connected with manifold individual forms of being due to karman1 and hence the text adds3 ',the one intelligence is in many ways connected with beings whose minds differ1 owing to the difference of their own acts' 7sl #dc1 second half74 ,intelligence1 pure1 free from stain and grief1 c41 which constitutes the intelligent element of the world1 and unintelligent matter--these two together constitute the world1 and the world is the body of ,vsudeva2 such is the purport of sloka #dd4--,the next sloka sums up the whole doctrine2 the words 'true and untrue' there denote what in the preceding verses had been called 'being' and 'non-being'2 the second half of the sloka refers to the practical plurality of the world as due to karman4 ,now all these slokas do not contain a single word supporting the doctrine of a ,brahman free from all difference2 of a principle called ,nescience abiding within ,brahman and to be defined neither as that which is nor as that which is not2 and of the world being wrongly imagined1 owing to ,nescience4 ,the expressions 'that which is' and 'that which is not' 7sl #ce71 and 'satya' 7true7 and 'asatya' 7untrue2 sl #de71 can in no way denote something not to be defined either as being or non-being4 ,by 'that which is not' or 'which is untrue1' we have to understand not what is undefinable1 but that which has no true being1 in so far as it is changeable and perishable4 ,of this character is all non-intelligent matter4 ,this also appears from the instance adduced in sl #db3 the jar is something perishable1 but not a thing devoid of proof or to be sublated by true knowledge4 ',non-being' we may call it1 in so far as while it is observed at a certain moment in a certain form it is at some other moment observed in a different condition4 ,but there is no contradiction between two different conditions of a thing which are perceived at different times2 and hence there is no reason to call it something futile 7tuchcha7 or false 7mithy71 c4 ,scripture does not teach that ,release is due to the knowledge of a non- qualified ,brahman4--the meaning of 'tat tvam asi4' ,nor can we admit the assertion that ,scripture teaches the cessation of avidy to spring only from the cognition of a ,brahman devoid of all difference4 ,such a view is clearly negatived by passages such as the following3 ',i know that great person of sun-like lustre beyond darkness2 knowing him a man becomes immortal1 there is no other path to go' 7,svet4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #h72 ',all moments sprang from lightning1 the ,person--none is lord over him1 his name is great glory--they who know him become immortal' 7,mahn4 ,up4 ,i1 #h-aa74 ,for the reason that ,brahman is characterised by difference all ,vedic texts declare that final release results from the cognition of a qualified ,brahman4 ,and that even those texts which describe ,brahman by means of negations really aim at setting forth a ,brahman possessing attributes1 we have already shown above4 ,in texts1 again1 such as ',thou art that1' the co-ordination of the constituent parts is not meant to convey the idea of the absolute unity of a non-differenced substance3 on the contrary1 the words 'that' and 'thou' denote a ,brahman distinguished by difference4 ,the word 'that' refers to ,brahman omniscient1 c41 which had been introduced as the general topic of consideration in previous passages of the same section1 such as ',it thought1 may ,i be many'2 the word 'thou1' which stands in co- ordination to 'that1' conveys the idea of ,brahman in so far as having for its body the individual souls connected with non-intelligent matter4 ,this is in accordance with the general principle that co-ordination is meant to express one thing subsisting in a twofold form4 ,if such doubleness of form 7or character7 were abandoned1 there could be no difference of aspects giving rise to the application of different terms1 and the entire principle of co-ordination would thus be given up4 ,and it would further follow that the two words co-ordinated would have to be taken in an implied sense 7instead of their primary direct meaning74 ,nor is there any need of our assuming implication 7lakshan7 in sentences ,,footnote #acj3a such as 'this person is that ,devadatta 7known to me from former occasions7'2 for there is no contradiction in the cognition of the oneness of a thing connected with the past on the one hand1 and the present on the other1 the contradiction that arises from difference of place being removed by the accompanying difference of time4 ,if the text ',thou art that' were meant to express absolute oneness1 it would1 moreover1 conflict with a previous statement in the same section1 viz4 ',it thought1 may ,i be many'2 and1 further1 the promise 7also made in the same section7 that by the knowledge of one thing all things are to be known could not be considered as fulfilled4 ,it1 moreover1 is not possible 7while1 however1 it would result from the absolute oneness of 'tat' and 'tvam'7 that to ,brahman1 whose essential nature is knowledge1 which is free from all imperfections1 omniscient1 comprising within itself all auspicious qualities1 there should belong ,nescience2 and that it should be the substrate of all those defects and afflictions which spring from ,nescience4 ,if1 further1 the statement of co-ordination 7'thou art that'7 were meant to sublate 7the previously existing wrong notion of plurality71 we should have to admit that the two terms 'that' and 'thou' have an implied meaning1 viz4 in so far as denoting1 on the one hand1 one substrate only1 and1 on the other1 the cessation of the different attributes 7directly expressed by the two terms72 and thus implication and the other shortcomings mentioned above would cling to this interpretation as well4 ,and there would be even further difficulties4 ,when we form the sublative judgment 'this is not silver1' the sublation is founded on an independent positive judgment1 viz4 'this is a shell'3 in the case under discussion1 however1 the sublation would not be known 7through an independent positive judgment71 but would be assumed merely on the ground that it cannot be helped4 ,and1 further1 there is really no possibility of sublation1 since the word 'that' does not convey the idea of an attribute in addition to the mere substrate4 ,to this it must not be objected that the substrate was previously concealed1 and that hence it is the special function of the word 'that' to present the substrate in its non-concealed aspect2 for if1 previously to the sublative judgment1 the substrate was not evident 7as an object of consciousness71 there is no possibility of its becoming the object either of an error or its sublation4--,nor can we allow you to say that1 previously to sublation1 the substrate was non-concealed in so far as 7i4 e4 was known as7 the object of error1 for in its 'non-concealed' aspect the substrate is opposed to all error1 and when that aspect shines forth there is no room either for error or sublation4--,the outcome of this is that as long as you do not admit that there is a real attribute in addition to the mere substrate1 and that this attribute is for a time hidden1 you cannot show the possibility either of error or sublation4 ,we add an illustrative instance4 ,that with regard to a man there should arise the error that he is a mere low-caste hunter is only possible on condition of a real additional attribute--e4g4 the man's princely birth--being hidden at the time2 and the cessation of that error is brought about by the declaration of this attribute of princely birth1 not by a mere declaration of the person being a man3 this latter fact being evident need not be declared at all1 and if it is declared it sublates no error4--,if1 on the other hand1 the text is understood to refer to ,brahman as having the individual souls for its body1 both words 7'that' and 'thou'7 keep their primary denotation2 and1 the text thus making a declaration about one substance distinguished by two aspects1 the fundamental principle of 'co-ordination' is preserved1 ,on this interpretation the text further intimates that ,brahman--free from all imperfection and comprising within itself all auspicious qualities--is the internal ruler of the individual souls and possesses lordly power4 ,it moreover satisfies the demand of agreement with the teaching of the previous part of the section1 and it also fulfils the promise as to all things being known through one thing1 viz4 in so far as ,brahman having for its body all intelligent and non-intelligent beings in their gross state is the effect of ,brahman having for its body the same things in their subtle state4 ,and this interpretation finally avoids all conflict with other scriptural passages1 such as ',him the great ,lord1 the highest of ,lords' 7,svet4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #g72 ',his high power is revealed as manifold' 7ibid4 ,,vi1 #h72 ',he that is free from sin1 whose wishes are true1 whose purposes are true' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,viii1 #g1 #a71 and so on4 ,but how1 a question may be asked1 can we decide1 on your interpretation of the text1 which of the two terms is meant to make an original assertion with regard to the other8--,the question does not arise1 we reply2 for the text does not mean to make an original assertion at all1 the truth which it states having already been established by the preceding clause1 ',in that all this world has its ,self4' ,this clause does make an original statement--in agreement with the principle that ',scripture has a purport with regard to what is not established by other means'--that is1 it predicates of 'all this1' i4e4 this entire world together with all individual souls1 that 'that1' i4e4 ,brahman is the ,self of it4 ,the reason of this the text states in a previous passage1 ',all these creatures have their root in that which is1 their dwelling and their rest in that which is'2 a statement which is illustrated by an earlier one 7belonging to a different section71 viz4 ',all this is ,brahman2 let a man meditate with calm mind on this world as beginning1 ending1 and breathing in ,brahman' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,iii4 #ad1 #a74 ,similarly other texts also teach that the world has its ,self in ,brahman1 in so far as the whole aggregate of intelligent and non-intelligent beings constitutes ,brahman's body4 ,compare ',abiding within1 the ruler of beings1 the ,self of all'2 ',he who dwells in the earth1 different from the earth1 whom the earth does not know1 whose body the earth is1 who rules the earth within--he is thy ,self1 the ruler within1 the immortal4 ,he who dwells in the ,self1'c4 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #g1c2 #bb72 ',he who moving within the earth1 and so on--whose body is death1 whom death does not know1 he is the ,self of all beings1 free from sin1 divine1 the one ,god1 ,nryana' 7,subl4 ,up4 ,,vii1 #a72 ',having created that he entered into it2 having entered it he became sat and tyat' 7,taitt4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #f74 ,and also in the section under discussion the passage ',having entered into them with this living ,self let me evolve names and forms1' shows that it is only through the entering into them of the living soul whose ,self is ,brahman1 that all things possess their substantiality and their connexion with the words denoting them4 ,and as this passage must be understood in connexion with ,taitt4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #f 7where the 'sat' denotes the individual soul7 it follows that the individual soul also has ,brahman for its ,self1 owing to the fact of ,brahman having entered into it4--,from all this it follows that the entire aggregate of things1 intelligent and non- intelligent1 has its ,self in ,brahman in so far as it constitutes ,brahman's body4 ,and as1 thus1 the whole world different from ,brahman derives its substantial being only from constituting ,brahman's body1 any term denoting the world or something in it conveys a meaning which has its proper consummation in ,brahman only3 in other words all terms whatsoever denote ,brahman in so far as distinguished by the different things which we associate with those terms on the basis of ordinary use of speech and etymology4--,the text 'that art thou' we therefore understand merely as a special expression of the truth already propounded in the clause 'in that all this has its ,self4' ,this being so1 it appears that those as well who hold the theory of the absolute unity of one non-differenced substance1 as those who teach the doctrine of bhedbheda 7co-existing difference and non-difference71 and those who teach the absolute difference of several substances1 give up all those scriptural texts which teach that ,brahman is the universal ,self4 ,with regard to the first-mentioned doctrine1 we ask 'if there is only one substance2 to what can the doctrine of universal identity refer8'--,the reply will perhaps be 'to that very same substance4'--,but1 we reply1 this point is settled already by the texts defining the nature of ,brahman ,,footnote #acd3a1 and there is nothing left to be determined by the passages declaring the identity of everything with ,brahman4--,but those texts serve to dispel the idea of fictitious difference6--,this1 we reply1 cannot1 as has been shown above1 be effected by texts stating universal identity in the way of co-ordination2 and statements of co- ordination1 moreover1 introduce into ,brahman a doubleness of aspect1 and thus contradict the theory of absolute oneness4--,the bhedbheda view implies that owing to ,brahman's connexion with limiting adjuncts 7updhi7 all the imperfections resulting therefrom--and which avowedly belong to the individual soul--would manifest themselves in ,brahman itself2 and as this contradicts the doctrine that the ,self of all is constituted by a ,brahman free from all imperfection and comprising within itself all auspicious qualities1 the texts conveying that doctrine would have to be disregarded4 ,if1 on the other hand1 the theory be held in that form that 'bhedbheda' belongs to ,brahman by its own nature 7not only owing to an updhi71 the view that ,brahman by its essential nature appears as individual soul1 implies that imperfections no less than perfections are essential to ,brahman1 and this is in conflict with the texts teaching that everything is identical with ,brahman free from all imperfections4--,for those finally who maintain absolute difference1 the doctrine of ,brahman being the ,self of all has no meaning whatsoever--for things absolutely different can in no way be one--and this implies the abandonment of all ,vednta-texts together4 ,those1 on the other hand1 who take their stand on the doctrine1 proclaimed by all ,upanishads1 that the entire world forms the body of ,brahman1 may accept in their fulness all the texts teaching the identity of the world with ,brahman4 ,for as genus 7jti7 and quality 7guna71 so substances 7dravya7 also may occupy the position of determining attributes 7viseshana71 in so far namely as they constitute the body of something else4 ,enunciations such as 'the ,self 7soul7 is1 according to its works1 born either 7as7 a god1 or a man1 or a horse1 or a bull1' show that in ordinary speech as well as in the ,veda co-ordination has to be taken in a real primary 7not implied7 sense4 ,in the same way it is also in the case of generic character and of qualities the relation of 'mode' only 7in which generic character and qualities stand to substances7 which determines statements of co-ordination1 such as 'the ox is broken-horned1' 'the cloth is white4' ,and as material bodies bearing the generic marks of humanity are definite things1 in so far only as they are modes of a ,self or soul1 enunciations of co-ordination such as 'the soul has been born as a man1 or a eunuch1 or a woman1' are in every way appropriate4 ,what determines statements of co-ordination is thus only the relation of 'mode' in which one thing stands to another1 not the relation of generic character1 quality1 and so on1 which are of an exclusive nature 7and cannot therefore be exhibited in co-ordination with substances74 ,such words indeed as denote substances capable of subsisting by themselves occasionally take suffixes1 indicating that those substances form the distinguishing attributes of other substances-- as when from danda1 'staff1' we form dandin1 'staff-bearer'2 in the case1 on the other hand1 of substances not capable of subsisting and being apprehended apart from others1 the fact of their holding the position of attributes is ascertained only from their appearing in grammatical co- ordination4--,but1 an objection is raised1 if it is supposed that in sentences such as 'the ,self is born1 as god1 man1 animal1' c41 the body of a man1 god1 c41 stands towards the ,self in the relation of a mode1 in the same way as in sentences such as 'the ox is broken-horned1' 'the cloth is white1' the generic characteristic and the quality stand in the relation of modes to the substances 7'cow1' 'cloth'7 to which they are grammatically co-ordinated2 then there would necessarily be simultaneous cognition of the mode1 and that to which the mode belongs1 i4e4 of the body and the ,self2 just as there is simultaneous cognition of the generic character and the individual4 ,but as a matter of fact this is not the case2 we do not necessarily observe a human1 divine1 or animal body together with the ,self4 ,the co-ordination expressed in the form 'the ,self is a man1' is therefore an 'implied' one only 7the statement not admitting of being taken in its primary literal sense74--,this is not so1 we reply4 ,the relation of bodies to the ,self is strictly analogous to that of class characteristics and qualities to the substances in which they inhere2 for it is the ,self only which is their substrate and their final cause 7prayojana71 and they are modes of the ,self4 ,that the ,self only is their substrate1 appears from the fact that when the ,self separates itself from the body the latter perishes2 that the ,self alone is their final cause1 appears from the fact that they exist to the end that the fruits of the actions of the ,self may be enjoyed2 and that they are modes of the ,self1 appears from the fact that they are mere attributes of the ,self manifesting itself as god1 man1 or the like4 ,these are just the circumstances on account of which words like 'cow' extend in their meaning 7beyond the class characteristics7 so as to comprise the individual also4 ,where those circumstances are absent1 as in the case of staffs1 earrings1 and the like1 the attributive position is expressed 7not by co-ordination but7 by means of special derivative forms--such as dandin 7staff-bearer71 kundalin 7adorned with earrings74 ,in the case of bodies divine1 human1 c41 on the other hand1 the essential nature of which it is to be mere modes of the ,self which constitutes their substrate and final cause1 both ordinary and ,vedic language express the relation subsisting between the two1 in the form of co-ordination1 ',this ,self is a god1 or a man1' c4 ,that class characteristics and individuals are invariably observed together1 is due to the fact of both being objects of visual perception2 the ,self1 on the other hand1 is not such1 and hence is not apprehended by the eye1 while the body is so apprehended4 ,nor must you raise the objection that it is hard to understand how that which is capable of being apprehended by itself can be a mere mode of something else3 for that the body's essential nature actually consists in being a mere mode of the ,self is proved--just as in the case of class characteristics and so on--by its having the ,self only for its substrate and final cause1 and standing to it in the relation of a distinguishing attribute4 ,that two things are invariably perceived together1 depends1 as already observed1 on their being apprehended by means of the same apparatus1 visual or otherwise4 ,earth is naturally connected with smell1 taste1 and so on1 and yet these qualities are not perceived by the eye2 in the same way the eye which perceives the body does not perceive that essential characteristic of the body which consists in its being a mere mode of the ,self2 the reason of the difference being that the eye has no capacity to apprehend the ,self4 ,but this does not imply that the body does not possess that essential nature3 it rather is just the possession of that essential nature on which the judgment of co-ordination 7'the ,self is a man1 god1' c47 is based4 ,and as words have the power of denoting the relation of something being a mode of the ,self1 they denote things together with this relation4--,but in ordinary speech the word 'body' is understood to mean the mere body2 it does not therefore extend in its denotation up to the ,self6--,not so1 we reply4 ,the body is1 in reality1 nothing but a mode of the ,self2 but1 for the purpose of showing the distinction of things1 the word 'body' is used in a limited sense4 ,analogously words such as 'whiteness1' 'generic character of a cow1' 'species1''quality1' are used in a distinctive sense 7although 'whiteness' is not found apart from a white thing1 of which it is the prakra1 and so on74 ,words such as 'god1' 'man1' c41 therefore do extend in their connotation up to the ,self4 ,and as the individual souls1 distinguished by their connexion with aggregates of matter bearing the characteristic marks of humanity1 divine nature1 and so on1 constitute the body of the highest ,self1 and hence are modes of it1 the words denoting those individual souls extend in their connotation up to the very highest ,self4 ,and as all intelligent and non-intelligent beings are thus mere modes of the highest ,brahman1 and have reality thereby only1 the words denoting them are used in co- ordination with the terms denoting ,brahman4--,this point has been demonstrated by me in the ,vedrthasamgraha4 ,a ,stra also 7,,iv1 #a1 #c7 will declare the identity of the world and ,brahman to consist in the relation of body and ,self2 and the ,vkyakra too says ',it is the ,self--thus everything should be apprehended4' ,,footnote #acj3a4 ,which are alleged to prove that smndhikaranya is to be explained on the basis of lakshan4 ,,footnote #acd3a4 ,such as ',the ,true1 knowledge1' c4 ,summary statement as to the way in which different scriptural texts are to reconciled4 ,the whole matter may be summarily stated as follows4 ,some texts declare a distinction of nature between non-intelligent matter1 intelligent beings1 and ,brahman1 in so far as matter is the object of enjoyment1 the souls the enjoying subjects1 and ,brahman the ruling principle4 ',from that the ,lord of ,my creates all this2 in that the other one is bound up through that ,my' 7,svet4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #i72 ',know ,prakriti to be ,my1 and the great ,lord the ruler of ,my' 7#aj72 ',what is perishable is the ,pradhna1 the immortal and imperishable is ,hara3 the one ,god rules the ,perishable and the ,self' 7,svet ,up4 ,i1 #aj7--;,in this last passage the clause 'the immortal and imperishable is ,hara1' refers to the enjoying individual soul1 which is called ',hara1' because it draws 7harati7 towards itself the pradhna as the object of its enjoyment4--' ,he is the cause1 the lord of the lords of the organs1 and there is of him neither parent nor lord' 7,svet4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #i72 ',the master of the pradhna and of the individual souls' 7,svet4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #af72 ',the ruler of all1 the lord of the ,selfs1 the eternal1 blessed1 undecaying one' 7,mahnr4 ,up4 ,,xi1 #c72 ',there are two unborn ones1 one knowing1 the other not knowing1 one a ruler1 the other not a ruler' 7,svet4 ,up4 #a1 #i72 ',the eternal among the non-eternal1 the intelligent one among the intelligent1 who though one fulfils the desires of many' 7,svet4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #ac72 ',knowing the enjoyer1 the object of enjoyment and the ,mover' 7,svet4 ,up4 ,i1 #ab72 ',one of them eats the sweet fruit1 the other looks on without eating' 7,svet4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #f72 ',thinking that the ,self is different from the ,mover1 blessed by him he reaches ,immortality' 7,svet4 ,up4 ,i1 #f72 ',there is one unborn female being1 red1 white1 and black1 uniform but producing manifold offspring4 ,there is one unborn male being who loves her and lies by her2 there is another who leaves her after he has enjoyed her' 7,svet4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #e74 ',on the same tree man1 immersed1 bewildered1 grieves on account of his impotence2 but when he sees the other ,lord contented and knows his glory1 then his grief passes away' 7,svet4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #i74--,smriti expresses itself similarly4--',thus eightfold is my nature divided4 ,lower is this ,nature2 other than this and higher know that ,nature of mine which constitutes the individual soul1 by which this world is supported' 7,bha4 ,g4 ,,vii1 #d1 #e74 ',all beings at the end of a ,kalpa return into my ,nature1 and again at the beginning of a ,kalpa do ,i send them forth4 ,resting on my own ,nature again and again do ,i send forth this entire body of beings1 which has no power of its own1 being subject to the power of nature' 7,bha4 ,g4 ,,ix1 #g1 #h72 ',with me as supervisor ,nature brings forth the movable and the immovable1 and for this reason the world ever moves round' 7,bha4 ,g4 ,,ix1 #aj72 ',know thou both ,nature and the ,soul to be without beginning' 7,,xiii1 #ai72 ',the great ,brahman is my womb1 in which ,i place the embryo1 and thence there is the origin of all beings' 7,,xiv1 #c74 ,this last passage means--the womb of the world is the great ,brahman1 i4e4 non- intelligent matter in its subtle state1 commonly called ,prakriti2 with this ,i connect the embryo1 i4e4 the intelligent principle4 ,from this contact of the non-intelligent and the intelligent1 due to my will1 there ensues the origination of all beings from gods down to lifeless things4 ,non-intelligent matter and intelligent beings--holding the relative positions of objects of enjoyment and enjoying subjects1 and appearing in multifarious forms--other scriptural texts declare to be permanently connected with the highest ,person in so far as they constitute his body1 and thus are controlled by him2 the highest ,person thus constituting their ,self4 ,compare the following passages3 ',he who dwells in the earth and within the earth1 whom the earth does not know1 whose body the earth is1 and who rules the earth within1 he is thy ,self1 the ruler within1 the immortal1' c4 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #g1 #c-bc72 ',he who moves within the earth1 whose body the earth is1 c42 he who moves within death1 whose body death is1' c47,subla ,up4 ,,vii1 #a74 ,in this latter passage the word 'death' denotes what is also called 'darkness1' viz4 non-intelligent matter in its subtle state2 as appears from another passage in the same ,upanishad1'the ,imperishable is merged in darkness4' ,and compare also ',entered within1 the ruler of creatures1 the ,self of all' 7,taitt4 r4 ,,iii1 #bd74 ,other texts1 again1 aim at teaching that the highest ,self to whom non- intelligent and intelligent beings stand in the relation of body1 and hence of modes1 subsists in the form of the world1 in its causal as well as in its effected aspect1 and hence speak of the world in this its double aspect as that which is 7the ,real72 so e4g4 ',being only this was in the beginning1 one only without a second--it desired1 may ,i be many1 may ,i grow forth--it sent forth fire1' c41 up to 'all these creatures have their root in that which is1' c41 up to 'that art thou1 ,o ,svetaketu' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #b-h72 ',he wished1 may ,i be many1' c41 up to 'it became the true and the untrue' 7,taitt4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #f74 ,these sections also refer to the essential distinction of nature between non-intelligent matter1 intelligent beings1 and the highest ,self which is established by other scriptural texts2 so in the ,chndogya passage1 ',let me enter those three divine beings with this living ,self1 and let me then evolve names and forms'2 and in the ,taitt4 passage1 ',having sent forth that he entered into it2 having entered it he became sat and tyat1 knowledge and 7what is7 without knowledge1 the true and the untrue1' c4 ,these two passages evidently have the same purport1 and hence the soul's having its ,self in ,brahman--which view is implied in the ,ch4 passage--must be understood as resting thereon that the souls 7together1 with matter7 constitute the body of ,brahman as asserted in the ,taitt4 passage 7'it became knowledge and that which is without knowledge1' i4e4 souls and matter74 ,the same process of evolution of names and forms is described elsewhere also1 ',all this was then unevolved2 it became evolved by form and name' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,i1 #d1 #g74 ,the fact is that the highest ,self is in its causal or in its 'effected' condition1 according as it has for its body intelligent and non-intelligent beings either in their subtle or their gross state2 the effect1 then1 being non-different from the cause1 and hence being cognised through the cognition of the cause1 the result is that the desired 'cognition of all things through one' can on our view be well established4 ,in the clause ',i will enter into these three divine beings with this living ,self1' c41 the term 'the three divine beings' denotes the entire aggregate of non-sentient matter1 and as the text declares that the highest ,self evolved names and forms by entering into matter by means of the living souls of which he is the ,self1 it follows that all terms whatsoever denote the highest ,self as qualified by individual ,selfs1 the latter again being qualified by non-sentient matter4 ,a term which denotes the highest ,self in its causal condition may therefore be exhibited in co-ordination with another term denoting the highest ,self in its 'effected' state1 both terms being used in their primary senses4 ,brahman1 having for its modes intelligent and non- intelligent things in their gross and subtle states1 thus constitutes effect and cause1 and the world thus has ,brahman for its material cause 7updna74 ,nor does this give rise to any confusion of the essential constituent elements of the great aggregate of things4 ,of some parti- coloured piece of cloth the material cause is threads white1 red1 black1 c42 all the same1 each definite spot of the cloth is connected with one colour only white e4g41 and thus there is no confusion of colours even in the 'effected' condition of the cloth4 ,analogously the combination of non-sentient matter1 sentient beings1 and the ,lord constitutes the material cause of the world1 but this does not imply any confusion of the essential characteristics of enjoying souls1 objects of enjoyment1 and the universal ruler1 even in the world's 'effected' state4 ,there is indeed a difference between the two cases1 in so far as the threads are capable of existing apart from one another1 and are only occasionally combined according to the volition of men1 so that the web sometimes exists in its causal1 sometimes in its effected state2 while non- sentient matter and sentient beings in all their states form the body of the highest ,self1 and thus have a being only as the modes of that--on which account the highest ,self may1 in all cases1 be denoted by any term whatsoever4 ,but the two cases are analogous1 in so far as there persists a distinction and absence of all confusion1 on the part of the constituent elements of the aggregate4 ,this being thus1 it follows that the highest ,brahman1 although entering into the 'effected' condition1 remains unchanged--for its essential nature does not become different-- and we also understand what constitutes its 'effected' condition1 viz4 its abiding as the ,self of non-intelligent and intelligent beings in their gross condition1 distinguished by name and form4 ,for becoming an effect means entering into another state of being4 ,those texts1 again1 which speak of ,brahman as devoid of qualities1 explain themselves on the ground of ,brahman being free from all touch of evil4 ,for the passage1 ,ch4 ,up4 ,,viii1 #a1 #e--which at first negatives all evil qualities 'free from sin1 from old age1 from death1 from grief1 from hunger and thirst'1 and after that affirms auspicious qualities 'whose wishes and purposes come true'--enables us to decide that in other places also the general denial of qualities really refers to evil qualities only4--,passages which declare knowledge to constitute the essential nature of ,brahman explain themselves on the ground that of ,brahman--which is all-knowing1 all-powerful1 antagonistic to all evil1 a mass of auspicious qualities--the essential nature can be defined as knowledge 7intelligence7 only--which also follows from the 'self- luminousness' predicated of it4 ,texts1 on the other hand1 such as ',he who is all-knowing' 7,mu4 ,up4 ,i1 #a1 #i72 ',his high power is revealed as manifold1 as essential1 acting as force and knowledge' 7,svet4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #h72 ',whereby should he know the knower' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #d1 #ad71 teach the highest ,self to be a knowing subject4 ,other texts1 again1 such as ',the ,true1 knowledge1 infinite is ,brahman' 7,taitt4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #a1 #a71 declare knowledge to constitute its nature1 as it can be denned through knowledge only1 and is self-luminous4 ,and texts such as ',he desired1 may ,i be many' 7,taitt4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #f72 ',it thought1 may ,i be many2 it evolved itself through name and form' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #b71 teach that ,brahman1 through its mere wish1 appears in manifold modes4 ,other texts1 again1 negative the opposite view1 viz4 that there is a plurality of things not having their ,self in ,brahman4 ',from death to death goes he who sees here any plurality'2 ',there is here not any plurality' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #d1 #ai72 ',for where there is duality as it were' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #d1 #ad74 ,but these texts in no way negative that plurality of modes--declared in passages such as ',may ,i be many1 may ,i grow forth'--which springs from ,brahman's will1 and appears in the distinction of names and forms4 ,this is proved by clauses in those 'negativing' texts themselves1 ',whosoever looks for anything elsewhere than in the ,self'1 'from that great ,being there has been breathed forth the ,rig-veda1' c4 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #d1 #f1 #aj74--,on this method of interpretation we find that the texts declaring the essential distinction and separation of non-sentient matter1 sentient beings1 and the ,lord1 and those declaring him to be the cause and the world to be the effect1 and cause and effect to be identical1 do not in any way conflict with other texts declaring that matter and souls form the body of the ,lord1 and that matter and souls in their causal condition are in a subtle state1 not admitting of the distinction of names and forms while in their 'effected' gross state they are subject to that distinction4 ,on the other hand1 we do not see how there is any opening for theories maintaining the connexion of ,brahman with ,nescience1 or distinctions in ,brahman due to limiting adjuncts 7updhi7--such and similar doctrines rest on fallacious reasoning1 and flatly contradict ,scripture4 ,there is nothing contradictory in allowing that certain texts declare the essential distinction of matter1 souls1 and the ,lord1 and their mutual relation as modes and that to which the modes belong1 and that other texts again represent them as standing in the relation of cause and effect1 and teach cause and effect to be one4 ,we may illustrate this by an analogous case from the ,karmaknda4 ,there six separate oblations to ,agni1 and so on1 are enjoined by separate so-called originative injunctions2 these are thereupon combined into two groups 7viz4 the new moon and the full-moon sacrifices7 by a double clause referring to those groups1 and finally a so-called injunction of qualification enjoins the entire sacrifice as something to be performed by persons entertaining a certain wish4 ,in a similar way certain ,vednta-texts give instruction about matter1 souls1 and the ,lord as separate entities 7',perishable is the pradhna1 imperishable and immortal ,hara1' c41 ,svet ,up4 ,i1 #aj2 and others72 then other texts teach that matter and souls in all their different states constitute the body of the highest ,person1 while the latter is their ,self 7',whose body the earth is1' c472 and finally another group of texts teaches--by means of words such as ',being1' ',brahman1' ',self1' denoting the highest ,self to which the body belongs-- that the one highest ,self in its causal and effected states comprises within itself the triad of entities which had been taught in separation 7',being only this was in the beginning'2 ',in that all this has its ,self2 ',all this is ,brahman'74--,that the highest ,self with matter and souls for its body should be simply called the highest ,self1 is no more objectionable than that that particular form of ,self which is invested with a human body should simply be spoken of as ,self or soul--as when we say ',this is a happy soul4' ,nescience cannot be terminated by the simple act of cognising ,brahman as the universal self4 ,the doctrine1 again1 that ,nescience is put an end to by the cognition of ,brahman being the ,self of all can in no way be upheld2 for as bondage is something real it cannot be put an end to by knowledge4 ,how1 we ask1 can any one assert that bondage--which consists in the experience of pleasure and pain caused by the connexion of souls with bodies of various kind1 a connexion springing from good or evil actions--is something false1 unreal8 ,and that the cessation of such bondage is to be obtained only through the grace of the highest ,self pleased by the devout meditation of the worshipper1 we have already explained4 ,as the cognition of universal oneness which you assume rests on a view of things directly contrary to reality1 and therefore is false1 the only effect it can have is to strengthen the ties of bondage4 ,moreover1 texts such as ',but different is the highest ,person' 7,bha4 ,g4 ,,xv1 #ag71 and ',having known the ,self and the ,mover as separate' 7,svet4 ,up4 ,i1 #f71 teach that it is the cognition of ,brahman as the inward ruler different from the individual soul1 that effects the highest aim of man1 i4e4 final release4 ,and1 further1 as that 'bondage-terminating' knowledge which you assume is itself unreal1 we should have to look out for another act of cognition to put an end to it4--,but may it not be said that this terminating cognition1 after having put an end to the whole aggregate of distinctions antagonistic to it1 immediately passes away itself1 because being of a merely instantaneous nature8--,no1 we reply4 ,since its nature1 its origination1 and its destruction are all alike fictitious1 we have clearly to search for another agency capable of destroying that avidy which is the cause of the fiction of its destruction6--,let us then say that the essential nature of ,brahman itself is the destruction of that cognition6--,from this it would follow1 we reply1 that such 'terminating' knowledge would not arise at all2 for that the destruction of what is something permanent can clearly not originate6--,who moreover should1 according to you1 be the cognising subject in a cognition which has for its object the negation of everything that is different from ,brahman8--,that cognising subject is himself something fictitiously superimposed on ,brahman6--,this may not be1 we reply3 he himself would in that case be something to be negatived1 and hence an object of the 'terminating' cognition2 he could not therefore be the subject of cognition6--,well1 then1 let us assume that the essential nature of ,brahman itself is the cognising subject6--,do you mean1 we ask in reply1 that ,brahman's being the knowing subject in that 'terminating' cognition belongs to ,brahman's essential nature1 or that it is something fictitiously superimposed on ,brahman8 ,in the latter case that superimposition and the ,nescience founded on it would persist1 because they would not be objects of the terminating cognition1 and if a further terminating act of knowledge were assumed1 that also would possess a triple aspect 7viz4 knowledge1 object known1 and subject knowing71 and we thus should be led to assume an infinite series of knowing subjects4 ,if1 on the other band1 the essential nature of ,brahman itself constitutes the knowing subject1 your view really coincides with the one held by us4 ,,footnote #adf3a ,and if you should say that the terminating knowledge itself and the knowing subject in it are things separate from ,brahman and themselves contained in the sphere of what is to be terminated by that knowledge1 your statement would be no less absurd than if you were to say 'everything on the surface of the earth has been cut down by ,devadatta with one stroke'--meaning thereby that ,devadatta himself and the action of cutting down are comprised among the things cut down6--,the second alternative1 on the other hand--according to which the knowing subject is not ,brahman itself1 but a knower superimposed upon it--would imply that that subject is the agent in an act of knowledge resulting in his own destruction2 and this is impossible since no person aims at destroying himself4 ,and should it be said that the destruction of the knowing agent belongs to the very nature of ,brahman itself ,,footnote #adg3a1 it would follow that we can assume neither plurality nor the erroneous view of plurality1 nor avidy as the root of that erroneous view4--,all this confirms our theory1 viz4 that since bondage springs from ajnna in the form of an eternal stream of karman1 it can be destroyed only through knowledge of the kind maintained by us4 ,such knowledge is to be attained only through the due daily performance of religious duties as prescribed for a man's caste and srama1 such performance being sanctified by the accompanying thought of the true nature of the ,self1 and having the character of propitiation of the highest ,person4 ,now1 that mere works produce limited and non-permanent results only1 and that on the other hand works not aiming at an immediate result but meant to please the highest ,person1 bring about knowledge of the character of devout meditation1 and thereby the unlimited and permanent result of the intuition of ,brahman being the ,self of all--these are points not to be known without an insight into the nature of works1 and hence1 without this1 the attitude described-- which is preceded by the abandonment of mere works--cannot be reached4 ,for these reasons the enquiry into ,brahman has to be entered upon after the enquiry into the nature of works4 ,,footnote #adf3a4 ,according to which ,brahman is not jnam1 but jtri4 ,,footnote #adg3a4 ,and1 on that account1 belongs to what constitutes man's highest aim4 ,the ,vedntin aiming to ascertain the nature of ,brahman from ,scripture1 need not be disconcerted by the ,mmms-theory of all speech having informing power with regard to actions only4 ,here another prim facie view ,,footnote #adh3a finally presents itself4 ,the power of words to denote things cannot be ascertained in any way but by observing the speech and actions of experienced people4 ,now as such speech and action always implies the idea of something to be done 7krya71 words are means of knowledge only with reference to things to be done2 and hence the matter inculcated by the ,veda also is only things to be done4 ,from this it follows that the ,vednta-texts cannot claim the position of authoritative means of knowledge with regard to ,brahman1 which is 7not a thing to be done but7 an accomplished fact4--,against this view it must not be urged that in the case of sentences expressive of accomplished facts--as e4g4 that a son is born to somebody--the idea of a particular thing may with certainty be inferred as the cause of certain outward signs--such as e4g4 a pleased expression of countenance-- which are generally due to the attainment of a desired object2 for the possible causes of joy1 past1 present1 and future1 are infinite in number1 and in the given case other causes of joy1 as e4g4 the birth having taken place in an auspicious moment1 or having been an easy one1 c41 may easily be imagined4 ,nor1 again1 can it be maintained that the denotative power of words with regard to accomplished things may be ascertained in the way of our inferring either the meaning of one word from the known meaning of other words1 or the meaning of the radical part of a word from the known meaning of a formative element2 for the fact is that we are only able to infer on the basis of a group of words known to denote a certain thing to be done1 what the meaning of some particular constituent of that group may be4--,nor1 again1 when a person1 afraid of what he thinks to be a snake1 is observed to dismiss his fear on being told that the thing is not a snake but only a rope1 can we determine thereby that what terminates his fear is the idea of the non- existence of a snake4 ,for there are many other ideas which may account for the cessation of his fear--he may think1 e4g41 'this is a thing incapable of moving1 devoid of poison1 without consciousness'--the particular idea present to his mind we are therefore not able to determine4--,the truth is that from the fact of all activity being invariably dependent on the idea of something to be done1 we learn that the meaning which words convey is something prompting activity4 ,all words thus denoting something to be done1 the several words of a sentence express only some particular action to be performed1 and hence it is not possible to determine that they possess the power of denoting their own meaning only1 in connexion with the meaning of the other words of the sentence4--7,nor must it be said that what moves to action is not the idea of the thing to be done1 but the idea of the means to do it2 for7 the idea of the means to bring about the desired end causes action only through the idea of the thing to be done1 not through itself2 as is evident from the fact that the idea of means past1 future1 and even present 7when divorced from the idea of an end to be accomplished71 does not prompt to action4 ,as long as a man does not reflect 'the means towards the desired end are not to be accomplished without an effort of mine2 it must therefore be accomplished through my activity'2 so long he does not begin to act4 ,what causes activity is thus only the idea of things to be done2 and as hence words denote such things only1 the ,veda also can tell us only about things to be done1 and is not therefore in a position to give information about the attainment of an infinite and permanent result1 such result being constituted by ,brahman1 which is 7not a thing to be done1 but7 an accomplished entity4 ,the ,veda does1 on the other hand1 actually teach that mere works have a permanent result 7',imperishable is the merit of him who offers the kturmsya-sacrifices1' and so on72 and hence it follows that to enter on an enquiry into ,brahman for the reason that the knowledge of ,brahman has an infinite and permanent result1 while the result of works is limited and non-permanent1 is an altogether unjustified proceeding4 ,to this we make the following reply4--,to set aside the universally known mode of ascertaining the connexion of words and their meanings1 and to assert that all words express only one non-worldly meaning 7viz4 those things to be done which the ,veda inculcates71 is a proceeding for which men paying due attention to the means of proof can have only a slight regard4 ,a child avowedly learns the connexion of words and meanings in the following way4 ,the father and mother and other people about him point with the finger at the child's mother1 father1 uncle1 c1 as well as at various domestic and wild animals1 birds1 snakes1 and so on1 to the end that the child may at the same time pay attention to the terms they use and to the beings denoted thereby1 and thus again and again make him understand that such and such words refer to such and such things4 ,the child thus observing in course of time that these words of themselves give rise to certain ideas in his mind1 and at the same time observing neither any different connexion of words and things1 nor any person arbitrarily establishing such connexion1 comes to the conclusion that the application of such and such words to such and such things is based on the denotative power of the words4 ,and being taught later on by his elders that other words also1 in addition to those learned first1 have their definite meaning1 he in the end becomes acquainted with the meanings of all words1 and freely forms sentences conveying certain meanings for the purpose of imparting those meanings to other persons4 ,and there is another way also in which the connexion of words and things can easily be ascertained4 ,some person orders another1 by means of some expressive gesture1 to go and inform ,devadatta that his father is doing well1 and the man ordered goes and tells ,devadatta ',your father is doing well4' ,a by-stander who is acquainted with the meaning of various gestures1 and thus knows on what errand the messenger is sent1 follows him and hears the words employed by him to deliver his message3 he therefore readily infers that such and such words have such and such a meaning4--,we thus see that the theory of words having a meaning only in relation to things to be done is baseless4 ,the ,vednta-texts tell us about ,brahman1 which is an accomplished entity1 and about meditation on ,brahman as having an unlimited result1 and hence it behoves us to undertake an enquiry into ,brahman so as fully to ascertain its nature4 ,we further maintain that even on the supposition of the ,veda relating only to things to be done1 an enquiry into ,brahman must be undertaken4 ,for ',the ,self is to be seen1 to be heard1 to be reflected on1 to be meditated on' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #d1 #e72 ',he is to be searched out1 him we must try to understand' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,viii1 #g1 #a72 ',let a ,brhmana having known him practise wisdom' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #d1 #ba72 ',what is within that small ether1 that is to be sought for1 that is to be understood' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,viii1 #a1a72 ',what is in that small ether1 that is to be meditated upon' 7,mahnr4 ,up4 ,x1 #g7--these and similar texts enjoin a certain action1 viz4 meditation on ,brahman1 and when we then read ',he who knows ,brahman attains the highest1' we understand that the attainment of ,brahman is meant as a reward for him who is qualified for and enters on such meditation4 ,brahman itself and its attributes are thus established thereby only--that they subserve a certain action1 viz4 meditation4 ,there are analogous instances in the ,karmaknda of the ,veda4 ,when an arthavda-passage describes the heavenly vorld as a place where there is no heat1 no frost1 no grief1 c41 this is done merely with a view to those texts which enjoin certain sacrifices on those who are desirous of the heavenly world4 ,where another arthavda says that 'those who perform certain sattra-sacrifices are firmly established1' such 'firm establishment' is referred to only because it is meant as the reward for those acting on the text which enjoins those sattras1 ',let him perform the rtri-sattras' 7,p4 ,m4 ,s4 ,,iv1 #c1 #ag74 ,and where a text says that a person threatening a ,brhmana is to be punished with a fine of one hundred gold pieces1 this statement is made merely with reference to the prohibitory passage1 ',let him not threaten a ,brhmana'7,p4 ,m4 ,s4 ,,iii1 #d1 #ag74 ,we1 however1 really object to the whole theory of the meaning of words depending on their connexion with 'things to be done1' since this is not even the case in imperative clauses such as 'bring the cow4' ,for you are quite unable to give a satisfactory definition of your 'thing to be done '7krya74 ,you understand by 'krya' that which follows on the existence of action 7kriti7 and is aimed at by action4 ,now to be aimed at by action is to be the object 7karman7 of action1 and to be the object of action is to be that which it is most desired to obtain by action 7according to the grammarian's definition74 ,but what one desires most to obtain is pleasure or the cessation of pain4 ,when a person desirous of some pleasure or cessation of pain is aware that his object is not to be accomplished without effort on his part1 he resolves on effort and begins to act3 in no case we observe an object of desire to be aimed at by action in any other sense than that of its accomplishment depending on activity4 ,the prompting quality 7prerakatva7 also1 which belongs to objects of desire1 is nothing but the attribute of their accomplishment depending on activity2 for it is this which moves to action4--,nor can it be said that 'to be aimed at by action' means to be that which is 'agreeable' 7anukla7 to man2 for it is pleasure only that is agreeable to man4 ,the cessation of pain1 on the other hand1 is not what is 'agreeable' to man4 ,the essential distinction between pleasure and pain is that the former is agreeable to man1 and the latter disagreeable 7pratikla71 and the cessation of pain is desired not because it is agreeable1 but because pain is disagreeable3 absence of pain means that a person is in his normal condition1 affected neither with pain nor pleasure4 ,apart from pleasure1 action cannot possibly be agreeable1 nor does it become so by being subservient to pleasure2 for its essential nature is pain4 ,its being helpful to pleasure merely causes the resolve of undertaking it4--,nor1 again1 can we define that which is aimed at by action as that to which action is auxiliary or supplementary 7sesha71 while itself it holds the position of something principal to be subserved by other things 7seshin72 for of the sesha and seshin also no proper definition can be given4 ,it cannot be said that a sesha is that which is invariably accompanied by an activity proceeding with a view to something else1 and that the correlate of such a sesha is the seshin2 for on this definition the action is not a sesha1 and hence that which is to be effected by the action cannot be the correlative seshin4 ,and moreover a seshin may not be defined as what is correlative to an action proceeding with a view to--i4 e4 aiming at--something else2 for it is just this 'being aimed at' of which we require a definition1 and moreover we observe that also the seshin 7or 'pradhna'7 is capable of action proceeding with a view to the sesha1 as when e4g4 a master does something for--let us say1 keeps or feeds--his servant4 ,this last criticism you must not attempt to ward off by maintaining that the master in keeping his servant acts with a view to himself 7to his own advantage72 for the servant in serving the master likewise acts with a view to himself4--,and as1 further1 we have no adequate definition of 'krya1' it would be inappropriate to define sesha as that which is correlative to krya1 and seshin as that which is correlative to sesha4-- ,nor1 finally1 may we define 'that which is aimed at by action' as that which is the final end 7prayojana7 of action2 for by the final end of an action we could only understand the end for which the agent undertakes the action1 and this end is no other than the desired object4 ,as thus 'what is aimed at by action' cannot be defined otherwise than what is desired1 krya cannot be defined as what is to be effected by action and stands to action in the relation of principal matter 7pradhna or seshin74 7,let it then be said that the 'niyoga1' i4e4 what is commonly called the aprva--the supersensuous result of an action which later on produces the sensible result--constitutes the prayojana--the final purpose--of the action4--,but7 the aprva also can1 as it is something different from the direct objects of desire1 viz4 pleasure and the cessation of pain1 be viewed only as a means of bringing about these direct objects1 and as something itself to be effected by the action2 it is for this very reason that it is something different from the action1 otherwise the action itself would be that which is effected by the action4 ,the thing to be effected by the action-which is expressed by means of optative and imperative verbal forms such as yajeta1 'let him sacrifice'--is1 in accordance with the fact of its being connected with words such as svargakmah1 'he who is desirous of heaven'1 understood to be the means of bringing about 7the enjoyment of7 the heavenly world2 and as the 7sacrificial7 action itself is transitory1 there is assumed an altogether 'new' or 'unprecedented' 7aprva7 effect of it which 7later on7 is to bring about the enjoyment of heaven4 ,this so-called 'aprva' can therefore be understood only with regard to its capability of bringing about the heavenly world4 ,now it certainly is ludicrous to assert that the aprva1 which is assumed to the end of firmly establishing the independent character of the effect of the action first recognised as such 7i4e4 independent71 later on becomes the means of realising the heavenly world2 for as the word expressing the result of the action 7yajta7 appears in syntactical connexion with 'svargakmah' 7desirous of heaven71 it does not1 from the very beginning1 denote an independent object of action1 and moreover it is impossible to recognise an independent result of action other than either pleasure or cessation of pain1 or the means to bring about these two results4--,what1 moreover1 do you understand by the aprva being a final end 7prayojana78-,you will perhaps reply1 'its being agreeable like pleasure4'--,is then the aprva a pleasure8 ,it is pleasure alone which is agreeable6--,well1 let us then define the aprva as a kind of pleasure of a special nature1 called by that name6--,but what proof1 we ask1 have you for this8 ,you will1 in the first place1 admit yourself that you do not directly experience any pleasure springing from consciousness of your aprva1 which could in any way be compared to the pleasure caused by the consciousness of the objects of the senses4--,well1 let us say then that as authoritative doctrine gives us the notion of an aprva as something beneficial to man1 we conclude that it will be enjoyed later on4--,but1 we ask1 what is the authoritative doctrine establishing such an aprva beneficial to man8 ,not1 in the first place1 ordinary1 i4e4 non-,vedic doctrine2 for such has for its object action only which always is essentially painful4 ,nor1 in the next place1 ,vedic texts2 for those also enjoin action only as the means to bring about certain results such as the heavenly world4 ,nor again the ,smriti texts enjoining works of either permanent or occasional obligation2 for those texts always convey the notion of an aprva only on the basis of an antecedent knowledge of the aprva as intimated by ,vedic texts containing terms such as svargakmah4 ,and we1 moreover1 do not observe that in the case of works having a definite result in this life1 there is enjoyment of any special pleasure called aprva1 in addition to those advantages which constitute the special result of the work and are enjoyed here below1 as e4g4 abundance of food or freedom from sickness4 ,thus there is not any proof of the aprva being a pleasure4 ,the arthavda-passages of the ,veda also1 while glorifying certain pleasurable results of works1 as e4g4 the heavenly world1 do not anywhere exhibit a similar glorification of a pleasure called aprva4 ,from all this we conclude that also in injunctory sentences that which is expressed by imperative and similar forms is only the idea that the meaning of the root--as known from grammar--is to be effected by the effort of the agent4 ,and that what constitutes the meaning of roots1 viz4 the action of sacrificing and the like1 possesses the quality of pleasing the highest ,person1 who is the inner ruler of ,agni and other divinities 7to whom the sacrifices are ostensibly offered71 and that through the highest ,person thus pleased the result of the sacrifice is accomplished1 we shall show later on1 under ,s4 ,,iii1 #b1 #cg--;,it is thus finally proved that the ,vednta-texts give information about an accomplished entity1 viz4 ,brahman1 and that the fruit of meditation on ,brahman is something infinite and permanent4 ,where1 on the other hand1 ,scripture refers to the fruit of mere works1 such as the kturmsya- sacrifices1 as something imperishable1 we have to understand this imperishableness in a merely relative sense1 for ,scripture definitely teaches that the fruit of all works is perishable4 ,we thus arrive at the settled conclusion that1 since the fruit of mere works is limited and perishable1 while that of the cognition of ,brahman is infinite and permanent1 there is good reason for entering on an enquiry into ,brahman--the result of which enquiry will be the accurate determination of ,brahman's nature4--,here terminates the adhikarana of ',enquiry4' ,what then is that ,brahman which is here said to be an object that should be enquired into8--,to this question the second ,stra gives a reply4 ,,footnote #adh3a4 ,this view is held by the ,prbhkara ,mmmsakas4 #b4 7,brahman is that7 from which the origin1 c41 of this 7world proceed74 ,the expression 'the origin'1 c41 means 'creation1 subsistence1 and reabsorption'4 ,the 'this' 7in 'of this'7 denotes this entire world with its manifold wonderful arrangements1 not to be fathomed by thought1 and comprising within itself the aggregate of living souls from ,brahm down to blades of grass1 all of which experience the fruits 7of their former actions7 in definite places and at definite times4 ',that from which1' i4 e4 that highest ,person who is the ruler of all2 whose nature is antagonistic to all evil2 whose purposes come true2 who possesses infinite auspicious qualities1 such as knowledge1 blessedness1 and so on2 who is omniscient1 omnipotent1 supremely merciful2 from whom the creation1 subsistence1 and reabsorption of this world proceed--he is ,brahman3 such is the meaning of the ,stra4--,the definition here given of ,brahman is founded on the text ,taitt4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #a1 ',bhrigu ,vruni went to his father ,varuna1 saying1 ,sir1 teach me ,brahman'1 c41 up to ',that from which these beings are born1 that by which when born they live1 that into which they enter at their death1 try to know that3 that is ,brahman4' ,a doubt arises here4 ,is it possible1 or not1 to gain a knowledge of ,brahman from the characteristic marks stated in this passage8--,it is not possible1 the ,prvapakshin contends4 ,the attributes stated in that passage--viz4 being that from which the world originates1 and so on--do not properly indicate ,brahman2 for as the essence of an attribute lies in its separative or distinctive function1 there would result from the plurality of distinctive attributes plurality on the part of ,brahman itself4--,but when we say ',devadatta is of a dark complexion1 is young1 has reddish eyes1' c41 we also make a statement as to several attributes1 and yet we are understood to refer to one ,devadatta only2 similarly we understand in the case under discussion also that there is one ,brahman only6--,not so1 we reply4 ,in ,devadatta's case we connect all attributes with one person1 because we know his unity through other means of knowledge2 otherwise the distinctive power of several attributes would lead us1 in this case also1 to the assumption of several substances to which the several attributes belong4 ,in the case under discussion1 on the other hand1 we do not1 apart from the statement as to attributes1 know anything about the unity of ,brahman1 and the distinctive power of the attributes thus necessarily urges upon us the idea of several ,brahmans4--,but we maintain that the unity of the term ',brahman' intimates the unity of the thing ',brahman'6--,by no means1 we reply4 ,if a man who knows nothing about cows1 but wishes to know about them1 is told 'a cow is that which has either entire horns1 or mutilated horns1 or no horns1' the mutally exclusive ideas of the possession of entire horns1 and so on1 raise in his mind the ideas of several individual cows1 although the term 'cow' is one only2 and in the same way we are led to the idea of several distinct ,brahmans4 ,for this reason1 even the different attributes combined are incapable of defining the thing1 the definition of which is desired4--,nor again are the characteristics enumerated in the ,taitt4 passage 7viz4 creation of the world1 c47 capable of defining ,brahman in the way of secondary marks 7upalakshana71 because the thing to be defined by them is not previously known in a different aspect4 ,so-called secondary marks are the cause of something already known from a certain point of view1 being known in a different aspect--as when it is said ',where that crane is standing1 that is the irrigated field of ,devadatta4'--,but may we not say that from the text ',the ,true1 knowledge1 the ,infinite is ,brahman1' we already have an idea of ,brahman1 and that hence its being the cause of the origin1 c41 of the world may be taken as collateral indications 7pointing to something already known in a certain way78--,not so1 we reply2 either of these two defining texts has a meaning only with reference to an aspect of ,brahman already known from the other one1 and this mutual dependence deprives both of their force4--,brahman cannot therefore be known through the characteristic marks mentioned in the text under discussion4 ,to this prim facie view we make the following reply4 ,brahman can be known on the basis of the origination1 subsistence1 and reabsorption of the world--these characteristics occupying the position of collateral marks4 ,no objection can be raised against this view1 on the ground that1 apart from what these collateral marks point to1 no other aspect of ,brahman is known2 for as a matter of fact they point to that which is known to us as possessing supreme greatness 7brihattva7 and power of growth 7brimhana7--this being the meaning of the root brimh 7from which ',brahman' is derived74 ,of this ,brahman1 thus already known 7on the basis of etymology71 the origination1 sustentation1 and reabsorption of the world are collateral marks4 ,moreover1 in the ,taitt4 text under discussion1 the relative pronoun--which appears in three forms1 7that7 'from whence1' 7that7 'by which1' 7that7 'into which'--refers to something which is already known as the cause of the origin1 and so on1 of the world4 ,this previous knowledge rests on the ,ch4 passage1 ',being only this was in the beginning1' c41 up to 'it sent forth fire'--which declares that the one principle denoted as 'being' is the universal material1 and instrumental cause4 ,there the clause ',being only this was in the beginning1 one only1' establishes that one being as the general material cause2 the word 'without a second' negatives the existence of a second operative cause2 and the clauses 'it thought1 may ,i be many1 may ,i grow forth'1 and 'it sent forth fire'1 establish that one being 7as the cause and substance of everything74 ,if1 then1 it is said that ,brahman is that which is the root of the world's origination1 subsistence1 and reabsorption1 those three processes sufficiently indicate ,brahman as that entity which is their material and operative cause2 and as being the material and the operative cause implies greatness 7brihattva7 manifesting itself in various powers1 such as omniscience1 and so on1 ,brahman thus is something already known2 and as hence origination1 c41 of the world are marks of something already known1 the objection founded above on the absence of knowledge of another aspect of ,brahman is seen to be invalid4--,nor is there really any objection to the origination1 c41 of the world being taken as characteristic marks of ,brahman in so far as they are distinctive attributes4 ,for taken as attributes they indicate ,brahman as something different from what is opposed to those attributes4 ,several attributes which do not contradict each other may serve quite well as characteristic marks defining one thing1 the nature of which is not otherwise known1 without the plurality of the attributes in any way involving plurality of the thing defined2 for as those attributes are at once understood to belong to one substrate1 we naturally combine them within that one substrate4 ,such attributes1 of course1 as the possession of mutilated horns 7mentioned above71 which are contradictorily opposed to each other1 necessarily lead to the assumption of several individual cows to which they severally belong2 but the origination1 c41 of the world are processes separated from each other by difference of time only1 and may therefore1 without contradiction1 be connected with one ,brahman in succession4--,the text 'from whence these beings'1 c41 teaches us that ,brahman is the cause of the origination1 c41 of the world1 and of this ,brahman thus known the other text ',the ,true1 knowledge1 the ,infinite is ,brahman'1 tells us that its essential nature marks it off from everything else4 ,the term ',true' expresses ,brahman in so far as possessing absolutely non-conditioned existence1 and thus distinguishes it from non-intelligent matter1 the abode of change1 and the souls implicated in matter2 for as both of these enter into different states of existence called by different names1 they do not enjoy unconditioned being4 ,the term 'knowledge' expresses the characteristic of permanently non-contracted intelligence1 and thus distinguishes ,brahman from the released souls whose intelligence is sometimes in a contracted state4 ,and the term ',infinite' denotes that1 whose nature is free from all limitation of place1 time1 and particular substantial nature2 and as ,brahman's essential nature possesses attributes1 infinity belongs both to the essential nature and to the attributes4 ,the qualification of ,infinity excludes all those individual souls whose essential nature and attributes are not unsurpassable1 and who are distinct from the two classes of beings already excluded by the two former terms 7viz4 'true being' and 'knowledge'74--,the entire text therefore defines ,brahman-- which is already known to be the cause of the origination1 c41 of the world--as that which is in kind different from all other things2 and it is therefore not true that the two texts under discussion have no force because mutually depending on each other4 ,and from this it follows that a knowledge of ,brahman may be gained on the ground of its characteristic marks--such as its being the cause of the origination1 c41 of the world1 free from all evil1 omniscient1 all-powerful1 and so on4 ,to those1 on the other hand1 who maintain that the object of enquiry is a substance devoid of all difference1 neither the first nor the second ,stra can be acceptable2 for the ,brahman1 the enquiry into which the first ,stra proposes1 is1 according to authoritative etymology1 something of supreme greatness2 and according to the second ,stra it is the cause of the origin1 subsistence1 and final destruction of the world4 ,the same remark holds good with regard to all following ,stras1 and the scriptural texts on which they are based--none of them confirm the theory of a substance devoid of all difference4 ,nor1 again1 does ,reasoning prove such a theory2 for ,reasoning has for its object things possessing a 'proving' attribute which constantly goes together with an attribute 'to be proved4' ,and even if1 in agreement with your view1 we explained the second ,stra as meaning ',brahman is that whence proceeds the error of the origination1 c41 of the world'1 we should not thereby advance your theory of a substance devoid of all difference4 ,for1 as you teach1 the root of all error is ,nescience1 and ,brahman is that which witnesses 7is conscious of7 ,nescience1 and the essence of witnessing consciousness consists in being pure light 7intelligence71 and the essence of pure light or intelligence is that1 distinguishing itself from the ,non-intelligent1 it renders itself1 as well as what is different from it1 capable of becoming the object of empiric thought and speech 7vyavahra74 ,all this implies the presence of difference--if there were no difference1 light or intelligence could not be what it is1 it would be something altogether void1 without any meaning4--,here terminates the adhikarana of 'origination and so on4' ,an objection to the purport of the preceding ,stras here presents itself4-- ,the assertion that ,brahman1 as the cause of the origination1 c41 of the world1 must be known through the ,vednta-texts is unfounded2 for as ,brahman may be inferred as the cause of the world through ordinary reasoning1 it is not something requiring to be taught by authoritative texts4--,to this objection the next ,stra replies4 #c4 ,because ,scripture is the source 7of the knowledge of ,brahman74 ,because ,brahman1 being raised above all contact with the senses1 is not an object of perception and the other means of proof1 but to be known through ,scripture only2 therefore the text ',whence these creatures are born1' c41 has to be accepted as instructing us regarding the true nature of ,brahman4--,but1 our opponent points out1 ,scripture cannot be the source of our knowledge of ,brahman1 because ,brahman is to be known through other means4 ,for it is an acknowledged principle that ,scripture has meaning only with regard to what is not established by other sources of knowledge4--,but what1 to raise a prim facie counter objection1 are those other sources of knowledge8 ,it cannot1 in the first place1 be ,perception4 ,perception is twofold1 being based either on the sense- organs or on extraordinary concentration of mind 7yoga74 ,of ,perception of the former kind there are again two sub-species1 according as ,perception takes place either through the outer sense-organs or the internal organ 7manas74 ,now the outer sense-organs produce knowledge of their respective objects1 in so far as the latter are in actual contact with the organs1 but are quite unable to give rise to the knowledge of the special object constituted by a supreme ,self that is capable of being conscious of and creating the whole aggregate of things4 ,nor can internal perception give rise to such knowledge2 for only purely internal things1 such as pleasure and pain1 fall within its cognisance1 and it is incapable of relating itself to external objects apart from the outer sense-organs4 ,nor1 again1 perception based on ,yoga2 for although such perception--which springs from intense imagination-- implies a vivid presentation of things1 it is1 after all1 nothing more than a reproduction of objects perceived previously1 and does not therefore rank as an instrument of knowledge2 for it has no means of applying itself to objects other than those perceived previously4 ,and if1 after all1 it does so1 it is 7not a means of knowledge but7 a source of error4--,nor also inference either of the kind which proceeds on the observation of special cases or of the kind which rests on generalizations 7cp4 ,nyya ,s4 ,i1 #a1e174 ,not inference of the former kind1 because such inference is not known to relate to anything lying beyond the reach of the senses4 ,nor inference of the latter kind1 because we do not observe any characteristic feature that is invariably accompanied by the presence of a supreme ,self capable of being conscious of1 and constructing1 the universe of things4--,but there is such a feature1 viz4 the world's being an effected thing2 it being a matter of common experience that whatever is an effect or product1 is due to an agent who possesses a knowledge of the material cause1 the instrumental cause1 the final end1 and the person meant to make use of the thing produced4 ,it further is matter of experience that whatever consists of non-sentient matter is dependent on1 or ruled by1 a single intelligent principle4 ,the former generalization is exemplified by the case of jars and similar things1 and the latter by a living body in good health1 which consists of non-intelligent matter dependent on an intelligent principle4 ,and that the body is an effected thing follows from its consisting of parts4--,against this argumentation also objections may be raised4 ,what1 it must be asked1 do you understand by this dependence on an intelligent principle8 ,not1 we suppose1 that the origination and subsistence of the non-intelligent thing should be dependent on the intelligent principle2 for in that case your example would not help to prove your contention4 ,neither the origin nor the subsistence of a person's healthy body depends on the intelligent soul of that person alone2 they rather are brought about by the merit and demerit of all those souls which in any way share the fruition of that body--the wife1 e4g4 of that person1 and others4 ,moreover1 the existence of a body made up of parts means that body's being connected with its parts in the way of so-called intimate relation 7sama-vya71 and this requires a certain combination of the parts but not a presiding intelligent principle4 ,the existence of animated bodies1 moreover1 has for its characteristic mark the process of breathing1 which is absent in the case of the earth1 sea1 mountains1 c4--all of which are included in the class of things concerning which you wish to prove something--1 and we therefore miss a uniform kind of existence common to all those things4--,let us then understand by the dependence of a non-intelligent thing on an intelligent principle1 the fact of the motion of the former depending on the latter6--,this definition1 we rejoin1 would comprehend also those cases in which heavy things1 such as carriages1 masses of stone1 trees1 c41 are set in motion by several intelligent beings 7while what you want to prove is the dependence of a moving thing on one intelligent principle74 ,if1 on the other hand1 you mean to say that all motion depends on intelligence in general1 you only prove what requires no proof4--,another alternative1 moreover1 here presents itself4 ,as we both admit the existence of individual souls1 it will be the more economical hypothesis to ascribe to them the agency implied in the construction of the world4 ,nor must you object to this view on the ground that such agency cannot belong to the individual souls because they do not possess the knowledge of material causes1 c41 as specified above2 for all intelligent beings are capable of direct knowledge of material causes1 such as earth and so on1 and instrumental causes1 such as sacrifices and the like4 ,earth and other material substances1 as well as sacrifices and the like1 are directly perceived by individual intelligent beings at the present time 7and were no doubt equally perceived so at a former time when this world had to be planned and constructed74 ,nor does the fact that intelligent beings are not capable of direct insight into the unseen principle--called 'aprva1' or by similar names--which resides in the form of a power in sacrifices and other instrumental causes1 in any way preclude their being agents in the construction of the world4 ,direct insight into powers is nowhere required for undertaking work3 what is required for that purpose is only direct presentative knowledge of the things endowed with power1 while of power itself it suffices to have some kind of knowledge4 ,potters apply themselves to the task of making pots and jars on the strength of the direct knowledge they possess of the implements of their work--the wheel1 the staff1 c4--without troubling about a similar knowledge of the powers inherent in those implements2 and in the same way intelligent beings may apply themselves to their work 7to be effected by means of sacrifices1 c471 if only they are assured by sacred tradition of the existence of the various powers possessed by sacrifices and the like4--,moreover1 experience teaches that agents having a knowledge of the material and other causes must be inferred only in the case of those effects which can be produced1 and the material and other causes of which can be known3 such things1 on the other hand1 as the earth1 mountains1 and oceans1 can neither be produced1 nor can their material and other causes ever be known2 we therefore have no right to infer for them intelligent producers4 ,hence the quality of being an effected thing can be used as an argument for proving the existence of an intelligent causal agent1 only where that quality is found in things1 the production of which1 and the knowledge of the causes of which1 is possible at all4--,experience further teaches that earthen pots and similar things are produced by intelligent agents possessing material bodies1 using implements1 not endowed with the power of a ,supreme ,lord1 limited in knowledge and so on2 the quality of being an effect therefore supplies a reason for inferring an intelligent agent of the kind described only1 and thus is opposed to the inference of attributes of a contrary nature1 viz4 omniscience1 omnipotence1 and those other attributes that belong--to the highest ,soul1 whose existence you wish to establish4--,nor does this 7as might be objected7 imply an abandonment of all inference4 ,where the thing to be inferred is known through other means of proof also1 any qualities of an opposite nature which maybe suggested by the inferential mark 7linga7 are opposed by those other means of proof1 and therefore must be dropped4 ,in the case under discussion1 however1 the thine2 to be inferred is something not guaranteed by any other means of proof1 viz4 a person capable of constructing the entire universe2 here there is nothing to interfere with the ascription to such a person of all those qualities which1 on the basis of methodical inference1 necessarily belong to it4--,the conclusion from all this is that1 apart from ,scripture1 the existence of a ,lord does not admit of proof4 ,against all this the ,prvapakshin now restates his case as follows3--,it cannot be gainsaid that the world is something effected1 for it is made up of parts4 ,we may state this argument in various technical forms4 ',the earth1 mountains1 c41 are things effected1 because they consist of parts2 in the same way as jars and similar things4' ',the earth1 seas1 mountains1 c41 are effects1 because1 while being big2 7i4e4 non-atomic71 they are capable of motion2 just as jars and the like4' ',bodies1 the world1 c41 are effects1 because1 while being big1 they are solid 7mrtta72 just as jars and the like4'--,but1 an objection is raised1 in the case of things made up of parts we do not1 in addition to this attribute of consisting of parts1 observe any other aspect determining that the thing is an effect--so as to enable us to say 'this thing is effected1 and that thing is not'2 and1 on the other hand1 we do observe it as an indispensable condition of something being an effect1 that there should be the possibility of such an effect being brought about1 and of the existence of such knowledge of material causes1 c4 7as the bringing about of the effect presupposes74--,not so1 we reply4 ,in the case of a cause being inferred on the ground of an effect1 the knowledge and power of the cause must be inferred in accordance with the nature of the effect4 ,from the circumstance of a thing consisting of parts we know it to be an effect and on this basis we judge of the power and knowledge of the cause4 ,a person recognises pots1 jars and the like1 as things produced1 and therefrom infers the constructive skill and knowledge of their maker2 when1 after this1 he sees for the first time a kingly palace with all its various wonderful parts and structures1 he concludes from the special way in which the parts are joined that this also is an effected thing1 and then makes an inference as to the architect's manifold knowledge and skill4 ,analogously1 when a living body and the world have once been recognised to be effects1 we infer--as their maker-- some special intelligent being1 possessing direct insight into their nature and skill to construct them4--,pleasure and pain1 moreover1 by which men are requited for their merit and demerit1 are themselves of a non-intelligent nature1 and hence cannot bring about their results unless they are controlled by an intelligent principle1 and this also compels us to assume a being capable of allotting to each individual soul a fate corresponding to its deserts4 ,for we do not observe that non- intelligent implements1 such as axes and the like1 however much they may be favoured by circumstances of time1 place1 and so on1 are capable of producing posts and pillars unless they be handled by a carpenter4 ,and to quote against the generalization on which we rely the instance of the seed and sprout and the like can only spring from an ignorance and stupidity which may be called truly demoniac4 ,the same remark would apply to pleasure and pain if used as a counter instance4 7,for in all these cases the action which produces an effect must necessarily be guided by an intelligent principle47--,nor may we assume1 as a 'less complicated hypothesis1' that the guiding principle in the construction of the world is the individual souls1 whose existence is acknowledged by both parties4 ,for on the testimony of observation we must deny to those souls the power of seeing what is extremely subtle or remote in time or place 7while such power must necessarily be ascribed to a world- constructing intelligence74 ,on the other hand1 we have no ground for concluding that the ,lord is1 like the individual souls1 destitute of such power2 hence it cannot be said that other means of knowledge make it impossible to infer such a ,lord4 ,the fact rather is that as his existence is proved by the argument that any definite effect presupposes a causal agent competent to produce that effect1 he is proved at the same time as possessing the essential power of intuitively knowing and ruling all things in the universe4--,the contention that from the world being an effect it follows that its maker does not possess lordly power and so on1 so that the proving reason would prove something contrary to the special attributes 7belonging to a supreme agent1 viz4 omnipotence1 omniscience1 c471 is founded on evident ignorance of the nature of the inferential process4 ,for the inference clearly does not prove that there exist in the thing inferred all the attributes belonging to the proving collateral instances1 including even those attributes which stand in no causal relation to the effect4 ,a certain effect which is produced by some agent presupposes just so much power and knowledge on the part of that agent as is requisite for the production of the effect1 but in no way presupposes any incapability or ignorance on the part of that agent with regard to things other than the particular effect2 for such incapability and ignorance do not stand towards that effect in any causal relation4 ,if the origination of the effect can be accounted for on the basis of the agent's capability of bringing it about1 and of his knowledge of the special material and instrumental causes1 it would be unreasonable to ascribe causal agency to his 7altogether irrelevant7 incapabilities and ignorance with regard to other things1 only because those incapabilities1 c41 are observed to exist together with his special capability and knowledge4 ,the question would arise moreover whether such want of capability and knowledge 7with regard to things other than the one actually effected7 would be helpful towards the bringing about of that one effect1 in so far as extending to all other things or to some other things4 ,the former alternative is excluded because no agent1 a potter e4g41 is quite ignorant of all other things but his own special work2 and the second alternative is inadmissible because there is no definite rule indicating that there should be certain definite kinds of want of knowledge and skill in the case of all agents ,,footnote #afh3a1 and hence exceptions would arise with regard to every special case of want of knowledge and skill4 ,from this it follows that the absence of lordly power and similar qualities which 7indeed is observed in the case of ordinary agents but7 in no way contributes towards the production of the effects 7to which such agents give rise7 is not proved in the case of that which we wish to prove 7i4e4 a ,lord1 creator of the world71 and that hence ,inference does not establish qualities contrary 7to the qualities characteristic of a ,lord74 ,a further objection will perhaps be raised1 viz4 that as experience teaches that potters and so on direct their implements through the mediation of their own bodies1 we are not justified in holding that a bodiless ,supreme ,lord directs the material and instrumental causes of the universe4--,but in reply to this we appeal to the fact of experience1 that evil demons possessing men's bodies1 and also venom1 are driven or drawn out of those bodies by mere will power4 ,nor must you ask in what way the volition of a bodiless ,lord can put other bodies in motion2 for volition is not dependent on a body4 ,the cause of volitions is not the body but the internal organ 7manas71 and such an organ we ascribe to the ,lord also1 since what proves the presence of an internal organ endowed with power and knowledge is just the presence of effects4--,but volitions1 even if directly springing from the internal organ1 can belong to embodied beings only1 such only possessing internal organs6--,this objection also is founded on a mistaken generalization3 the fact rather is that the internal organ is permanent1 and exists also in separation from the body4 ,the conclusion1 therefore1 is that--as the individual souls with their limited capacities and knowledge1 and their dependence on merit and demerit1 are incapable of giving rise to things so variously and wonderfully made as worlds and animated bodies are--inference directly leads us to the theory that there is a supreme intelligent agent1 called the ,lord1 who possesses unfathomable1 unlimited powers and wisdom1 is capable of constructing the entire world1 is without a body1 and through his mere volition brings about the infinite expanse of this entire universe so variously and wonderfully planned4 ,as ,brahman may thus be ascertained by means of knowledge other than revelation1 the text quoted under the preceding ,stra cannot be taken to convey instruction as to ,brahman4 ,since1 moreover1 experience demonstrates that material and instrumental causes always are things absolutely distinct from each other1 as e4g4 the clay and the potter with his implements2 and since1 further1 there are substances not made up of parts1 as e4g4 ether1 which therefore cannot be viewed as effects2 we must object on these grounds also to any attempt to represent the one ,brahman as the universal material and instrumental cause of the entire world4 ,against all this we now argue as follows3--,the ,vednta-text declaring the origination1 c41 of the world does teach that there is a ,brahman possessing the characteristics mentioned2 since ,scripture alone is a means for the knowledge of ,brahman4 ,that the world is an effected thing because it consists of parts2 and that1 as all effects are observed to have for their antecedents certain appropriate agents competent to produce them1 we must infer a causal agent competent to plan and construct the universe1 and standing towards it in the relation of material and operative cause--this would be a conclusion altogether unjustified4 ,there is no proof to show that the earth1 oceans1 c41 although things produced1 were created at one time by one creator4 ,nor can it be pleaded in favour of such a conclusion that all those things have one uniform character of being effects1 and thus are analogous to one single jar2 for we observe that various effects are distinguished by difference of time of production1 and difference of producers4 ,nor again may you maintain the oneness of the creator on the ground that individual souls are incapable of the creation of this wonderful universe1 and that if an additional principle be assumed to account for the world--which manifestly is a product--it would be illegitimate to assume more than one such principle4 ,for we observe that individual beings acquire more and more extraordinary powers in consequence of an increase of religious merit2 and as we may assume that through an eventual supreme degree of merit they may in the end qualify themselves for producing quite extraordinary effects1 we have no right to assume a highest soul of infinite merit1 different from all individual souls4 ,nor also can it be proved that all things are destroyed and produced all at once2 for no such thing is observed to take place1 while it is1 on the other hand1 observed that things are produced and destroyed in succession2 and if we infer that all things are produced and destroyed because they are effects1 there is no reason why this production and destruction should not take place in a way agreeing with ordinary experience4 ,if1 therefore1 what it is desired to prove is the agency of one intelligent being1 we are met by the difficulty that the proving reason 7viz4 the circumstance of something being an effect7 is not invariably connected with what it is desired to prove2 there1 further1 is the fault of qualities not met with in experience being attributed to the subject about which something has to be proved2 and lastly there is the fault of the proving collateral instances being destitute of what has to be proved--for experience does not exhibit to us one agent capable of producing everything4 ,if1 on the other hand1 what you wish to prove is merely the existence of an intelligent creative agent1 you prove only what is proved already 7not contested by any one74--,moreover1 if you use the attribute of being an effect 7which belongs to the totality of things7 as a means to prove the existence of one omniscient and omnipotent creator1 do you view this attribute as belonging to all things in so far as produced together1 or in so far as produced in succession8 ,in the former case the attribute of being an effect is not established 7for experience does not show that all things are produced together72 and in the latter case the attribute would really prove what is contrary to the hypothesis of one creator 7for experience shows that things produced in succession have different causes74 ,in attempting to prove the agency of one intelligent creative being only1 we thus enter into conflict with ,perception and ,inference1 and we moreover contradict ,scripture1 which says that 'the potter is born' and 'the cartwright is born' 7and thus declares a plurality of intelligent agents74 ,moreover1 as we observe that all effected things1 such as living bodies and so on1 are connected with pleasure and the like1 which are the effects of sattva 7goodness7 and the other primary constituents of matter1 we must conclude that effected things have sattva and so on for their causes4 ,sattva and so on--which constitute the distinctive elements of the causal substance--are the causes of the various nature of the effects4 ,now those effects can be connected with their causes only in so far as the internal organ of a person possessing sattva and so on undergoes modifications4 ,and that a person possesses those qualities is due to karman4 ,thus1 in order to account for the origination of different effects we must necessarily assume the connexion of an intelligent agent with karman1 whereby alone he can become the cause of effects2 and moreover the various character of knowledge and power 7which the various effects presuppose7 has its reason in karman4 ,and if it be said that it is 7not the various knowledge1 c41 but7 the mere wish of the agent that causes the origination of effects1 we point out that the wish1 as being specialised by its particular object1 must be based on sattva and so on1 and hence is necessarily connected with karman4 ,from all this it follows that individual souls only can be causal agents3 no legitimate inference leads to a ,lord different from them in nature4--,this admits of various expressions in technical form4 ',bodies1 worlds1 c41 are effects due to the causal energy of individual souls1 just as pots are'2 'the ,lord is not a causal agent1 because he has no aims2 just as the released souls have none'2 'the ,lord is not an agent1 because he has no body2 just as the released souls have none4' 7,this last argumentation cannot be objected to on the ground that individual souls take possession of bodies2 for in their case there exists a beginningless subtle body by means of which they enter into gross bodies74--',time is never devoid of created worlds2 because it is time1 just like the present time 7which has its created world74' ,consider the following point also4 ,does the ,lord produce his effects1 with his body or apart from his body8 ,not the latter2 for we do not observe causal agency on the part of any bodiless being3 even the activities of the internal organ are found only in beings having a body1 and although the internal organ be eternal we do not know of its producing any effects in the case of released disembodied souls4 ,nor again is the former alternative admissible2 for in that case the ,lord's body would either be permanent or non-permanent4 ,the former alternative would imply that something made up of parts is eternal2 and if we once admit this we may as well admit that the world itself is eternal1 and then there is no reason to infer a ,lord4 ,and the latter alternative is inadmissible because in that case there would be no cause of the body1 different from it 7which would account for the origination of the body74 ,nor could the ,lord himself be assumed as the cause of the body1 since a bodiless being cannot be the cause of a body4 ,nor could it be maintained that the ,lord can be assumed to be 'embodied' by means of some other body2 for this leads us into a regressus in infinitum4--,should we1 moreover1 represent to ourselves the ,lord 7when productive7 as engaged in effort or not8--,the former is inadmissible1 because he is without a body4 ,and the latter alternative is excluded because a being not making an effort does not produce effects4 ,and if it be said that the effect1 i4 e4 the world1 has for its causal agent one whose activity consists in mere desire1 this would be to ascribe to the subject of the conclusion 7i4e4 the world7 qualities not known from experience2 and moreover the attribute to be proved would be absent in the case of the proving instances 7such as jars1 c41 which are not the work of agents engaged in mere wishing74 ,thus the inference of a creative ,lord which claims to be in agreement with observation is refuted by reasoning which itself is in agreement with observation1 and we hence conclude that ,scripture is the only source of knowledge with regard to a supreme soul that is the ,lord of all and constitutes the highest ,brahman4 ,what ,scripture tells us of is a being which comprehends within itself infinite1 altogether unsurpassable excellences such as omnipotence and so on1 is antagonistic to all evil1 and totally different in character from whatever is cognised by the other means of knowledge3 that to such a being there should attach even the slightest imperfection due to its similarity in nature to the things known by the ordinary means of knowledge1 is thus altogether excluded4--,the ,prvapakshin had remarked that the oneness of the instrumental and the material cause is neither matter of observation nor capable of proof1 and that the same holds good with regard to the theory that certain non-composite substances such as ether are created things2 that these points also are in no way contrary to reason1 we shall show later on under ,s4 ,i1 #d1 #bc1 and ,s4 ,,ii1 #c1 #a4 ,the conclusion meanwhile is that1 since ,brahman does not fall within the sphere of the other means of knowledge1 and is the topic of ,scripture only1 the text 'from whence these creatures1' c41 does give authoritative information as to a ,brahman possessing the characteristic qualities so often enumerated4 ,here terminates the adhikarana of ',scripture being the source4' ,a new objection here presents itself4--,brahman does not indeed fall within the province of the other means of knowledge2 but all the same ,scripture does not give authoritative information regarding it3 for ,brahman is not something that has for its purport activity or cessation from activity1 but is something fully established and accomplished within itself4--,to this objection the following ,stra replies4 ,,footnote #afh3a4 ,a certain potter may not possess the skill and knowledge required to make chairs and beds2 but some other potter may possess both1 and so on4 ,we cannot therefore point to any definite want of skill and knowledge as invariably accompanying the capability of producing effects of some other kind4 #d4 ,but that 7i4e4 the authoritativeness of ,scripture with regard to ,brahman7 exists on account of the connexion 7of ,scripture with the highest aim of man74 ,the word 'but' is meant to rebut the objection raised4 ,that1 i4e4 the authoritativeness of ,scripture with regard to ,brahman1 is possible1 on account of samanvaya1 i4e4 connexion with the highest aim of man--that is to say because the scriptural texts are connected with1 i4e4 have for their subject1 ,brahman1 which constitutes the highest aim of man4 ,for such is the connected meaning of the whole aggregate of words which constitutes the ,upanishads--',that from whence these beings are born'7,taitt4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #a1 #a74 ',being only this was in the beginning1 one1 without a second' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #b71 c4 c4 ,and of aggregates of words which are capable of giving information about accomplished things known through the ordinary means of ascertaining the meaning of words1 and which connectedly refer to a ,brahman which is the cause of the origination1 subsistence1 and destruction of the entire world1 is antagonistic to all imperfection and so on1 we have no right to say that1 owing to the absence of a purport in the form of activity or cessation of activity1 they really refer to something other than ,brahman4 ,for all instruments of knowledge have their end in determining the knowledge of their own special objects3 their action does not adapt itself to a final purpose1 but the latter rather adapts itself to the means of knowledge4 ,nor is it true that where there is no connexion with activity or cessation of activity all aim is absent2 for in such cases we observe connexion with what constitutes the general aim1 i4e4 the benefit of man4 ,statements of accomplished matter of fact--such as 'a son is born to thee4' ',this is no snake'--evidently have an aim1 viz4 in so far as they either give rise to joy or remove pain and fear4 ,against this view the ,prvapakshin now argues as follows4 ,the ,vednta- texts do not impart knowledge of ,brahman2 for unless related to activity or the cessation of activity1 ,scripture would be unmeaning1 devoid of all purpose4 ,perception and the other means of knowledge indeed have their aim and end in supplying knowledge of the nature of accomplished things and facts2 ,scripture1 on the other hand1 must be supposed to aim at some practical purpose4 ,for neither in ordinary speech nor in the ,veda do we ever observe the employment of sentences devoid of a practical purpose3 the employment of sentences not having such a purpose is in fact impossible4 ,and what constitutes such purpose is the attainment of a desired1 or the avoidance of a non-desired object1 to be effected by some action or abstention from action4 ',let a man desirous of wealth attach himself to the court of a prince'2 'a man with a weak digestion must not drink much water'2 'let him who is desirous of the heavenly world offer sacrifices'2 and so on4 ,with regard to the assertion that such sentences also as refer to accomplished things--'a son is born to thee' and so on--are connected with certain aims of man1 viz4 joy or the cessation of fear1 we ask whether in such cases the attainment of man's purpose results from the thing or fact itself1 as e4 g4 the birth of a son1 or from the knowledge of that thing or fact4--,you will reply that as a thing although actually existing is of no use to man as long as it is not known to him1 man's purpose is accomplished by his knowledge of the thing4--,it then appears1 we rejoin1 that man's purpose is effected through mere knowledge1 even if there is no actual thing2 and from this it follows that ,scripture1 although connected with certain aims1 is not a means of knowledge for the actual existence of things4 ,in all cases1 therefore1 sentences have a practical purpose2 they determine either some form of activity or cessation from activity1 or else some form of knowledge4 ,no sentence1 therefore1 can have for its purport an accomplished thing1 and hence the ,vednta-texts do not convey the knowledge of ,brahman as such an accomplished entity4 ,at this point somebody propounds the following view4 ,the ,vednta-texts are an authoritative means for the cognition of ,brahman1 because as a matter of fact they also aim at something to be done4 ,what they really mean to teach is that ,brahman1 which in itself is pure homogeneous knowledge1 without a second1 not connected with a world1 but is1 owing to beginningless ,nescience1 viewed as connected with a world1 should be freed from this connexion4 ,and it is through this process of dissolution of the world that ,brahman becomes the object of an injunction4--,but which texts embody this injunction1 according to which ,brahman in its pure form is to be realised through the dissolution of this apparent world with its distinction of knowing subjects and objects of knowledge8--,texts such as the following3 ',one should not see 7i4 e4 represent to oneself7 the seer of seeing1 one should not think the thinker of thinking' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #d1 #b72 for this means that we should realise ,brahman in the form of pure ,seeing 7knowledge71 free from the distinction of seeing agents and objects of sight4 ,brahman is indeed accomplished through itself1 but all the same it may constitute an object to be accomplished1 viz4 in so far as it is being disengaged from the apparent world4 ,this view 7the ,mmmsaka rejoins7 is unfounded4 ,he who maintains that injunction constitutes the meaning of sentences must be able to assign the injunction itself1 the qualification of the person to whom the injunction is addressed1 the object of the injunction1 the means to carry it out1 the special mode of the procedure1 and the person carrying out the injunction4 ,among these things the qualification of the person to whom the injunction addresses itself is something not to be enjoined 7but existing previously to the injunction71 and is of the nature either of cause 7nimitta7 or a result aimed at 7phala74 ,we then have to decide what1 in the case under discussion 7i4e4 the alleged injunction set forth by the antagonist71 constitutes the qualification of the person to whom the injunction addresses itself1 and whether it be of the nature of a cause or of a result4--,let it then be said that what constitutes the qualification in our case is the intuition of the true nature of ,brahman 7on the part of the person to whom the injunction is addressed74--,this1 we rejoin1 cannot be a cause1 as it is not something previously established2 while in other cases the nimitta is something so established1 as e4g4 'life' is in the case of a person to whom the following injunction is addressed1 ',as long as his life lasts he is to make the ,agnihotra-oblation4' ,and if1 after all1 it were admitted to be a cause1 it would follow that1 as the intuition of the true nature of ,brahman is something permanent1 the object of the injunction would have to be accomplished even subsequently to final release1 in the same way as the ,agnihotra has to be performed permanently as long as life lasts4-- ,nor again can the intuition of ,brahman's true nature be a result2 for then1 being the result of an action enjoined1 it would be something non- permanent1 like the heavenly world4--,what1 in the next place1 would be the 'object to be accomplished' of the injunction8 ,you may not reply ',brahman'2 for as ,brahman is something permanent it is not something that can be realised1 and moreover it is not denoted by a verbal form 7such as denote actions that can be accomplished1 as e4g4 yga1 sacrifice74--,let it then be said that what is to be realised is ,brahman1 in so far as free from the world6--,but1 we rejoin1 even if this be accepted as a thing to be realised1 it is not the object 7vishaya7 of the injunction--that it cannot be for the second reason just stated--but its final result 7phala74 ,what moreover is1 on this last assumption1 the thing to be realised--,brahman1 or the cessation of the apparent world8-- ,not ,brahman2 for ,brahman is something accomplished1 and from your assumption it would follow that it is not eternal4--,well then1 the dissolution of the world6--,not so1 we reply2 for then it would not be ,brahman that is realised4--,let it then be said that the dissolution of the world only is the object of the injunction6--,this1 too1 cannot be1 we rejoin2 that dissolution is the result 7phala7 and cannot therefore be the object of the injunction4 ,for the dissolution of the world means final release2 and that is the result aimed at4 ,moreover1 if the dissolution of the world is taken as the object of the injunction1 that dissolution would follow from the injunction1 and the injunction would be carried out by the dissolution of the world2 and this would be a case of vicious mutual dependence4--,we further ask--is the world1 which is to be put an end to1 false or real8--,if it is false1 it is put an end to by knowledge alone1 and then the injunction is needless4 ,should you reply to this that the injunction puts an end to the world in so far as it gives rise to knowledge1 we reply that knowledge springs of itself from the texts which declare the highest truth3 hence there is no need of additional injunctions4 ,as knowledge of the meaning of those texts sublates the entire false world distinct from ,brahman1 the injunction itself with all its adjuncts is seen to be something baseless4--,if1 on the other hand1 the world is true1 we ask--is the injunction1 which puts an end to the world1 ,brahman itself or something different from ,brahman8 ,if the former1 the world cannot exist at all3 for what terminates it1 viz4 ,brahman1 is something eternal2 and the injunction thus being eternal itself ,cannot be accomplished by means of certa n actions4--,let then the latter alternative be accepted6--,but in that case1 the niyoga being something which is accomplished by a set of performances the function of which it is to put an end to the entire world1 the performing person himself perishes 7with the rest of the world71 and the niyoga thus remains without a substrate4 ,and if everything apart from ,brahman is put an end to by a performance the function of which it is to put an end to the world1 there remains no result to be effected by the niyoga1 consequently there is no release4 ,further1 the dissolution of the world cannot constitute the instrument 7karana7 in the action enjoined1 because no mode of procedure 7itikartavyat7 can be assigned for the instrument of the niyoga1 and unless assisted by a mode of procedure an instrument cannot operate1-- ,but why is there no 'mode of procedure'8--,for the following reasons4 ,a mode of procedure is either of a positive or a negative kind4 ,if positive1 it may be of two kinds1 viz4 either such as to bring about the instrument or to assist it4 ,now in our case there is no room for either of these alternatives4 ,not for the former2 for there exists in our case nothing analogous to the stroke of the pestle 7which has the manifest effect of separating the rice grains from the husks71 whereby the visible effect of the dissolution of the whole world could be brought about4 ,nor1 secondly1 is there the possibility of anything assisting the instrument1 already existing independently1 to bring about its effect2 for owing to the existence of such an assisting factor the instrument itself1 i4e4 the cessation of the apparent world1 cannot be established4 ,nor must you say that it is the cognition of the non-duality of ,brahman that brings about the means for the dissolution of the world2 for1 as we have already explained above1 this cognition directly brings about final ,release1 which is the same as the dissolution of the world1 and thus there is nothing left to be effected by special means4--,and if finally the mode of procedure is something purely negative1 it can1 owing to this its nature1 neither bring about nor in any way assist the instrumental cause4 ,from all this it follows that there is no possibility of injunctions having for their object the realisation of ,brahman1 in so far as free from the world4 ,here another prim facie view of the question is set forth4--,it must be admitted that the ,vednta-texts are not means of authoritative knowledge1 since they refer to ,brahman1 which is an accomplished thing 7not a thing 'to be accomplished'72 nevertheless ,brahman itself is established1 viz4 by means of those passages which enjoin meditation 7as something 'to be done'74 ,this is the purport of texts such as the following3 ',the ,self is to be seen1 to be heard1 to be reflected on1 to be meditated upon' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #d1 #e72 ',the ,self which is free from sin must be searched out' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,viii1 #g1 #a72 ',let a man meditate upon him as the ,self' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,i1 #d1 #g72 ',let a man meditate upon the ,self as his world' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,i1 #d1 #ae74--,these injunctions have meditation for their object1 and meditation again is defined by its own object only1 so that the injunctive word immediately suggests an object of meditation2 and as such an object there presents itself1 the ',self' mentioned in the same sentence4 ,now there arises the question1 ,what are the characteristics of that ,self8 and in reply to it there come in texts such as ',the ,true1 knowledge1 infinite is ,brahman'2 ',being only this was in the beginning1 one without a second4' ,as these texts give the required special information1 they stand in a supplementary relation to the injunctions1 and hence are means of right knowledge2 and in this way the purport of the ,vednta- texts includes ,brahman--as having a definite place in meditation which is the object of injunction4 ,texts such as ',one only without a second' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #b1 #a72 ',that is the true1 that is the ,self 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #h1 #g72 ',there is here not any plurality' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #d1 #ai71 teach that there is one ,reality only1 viz4 ,brahman1 and that everything else is false4 ,and as ,perception and the other means of proof1 as well as that part of ,scripture which refers to action and is based on the view of plurality1 convey the notion of plurality1 and as there is contradiction between plurality and absolute ,unity1 we form the conclusion that the idea of plurality arises through beginningless avidy1 while absolute ,unity alone is real4 ,and thus it is through the injunction of meditation on ,brahman--which has for its result the intuition of ,brahman--that man reaches final release1 i4e4 becomes one with ,brahman1 which consists of non-dual intelligence free of all the manifold distinctions that spring from ,nescience4 ,nor is this becoming one with ,brahman to be accomplished by the mere cognition of the sense of certain ,vednta-texts2 for this is not observed--the fact rather being that the view of plurality persists even after the cognition of the sense of those texts--1 and1 moreover1 if it were so1 the injunction by ,scripture of hearing1 reflecting1 c41 would be purposeless4 ,to this reasoning the following objection might be raised4--,we observe that when a man is told that what he is afraid of is not a snake1 but only a rope1 his fear comes to an end2 and as bondage is as unreal as the snake imagined in the rope it also admits of being sublated by knowledge1 and may therefore1 apart from all injunction1 be put an end to by the simple comprehension of the sense of certain texts4 ,if final release were to be brought about by injunctions1 it would follow that it is not eternal--not any more than the heavenly world and the like2 while yet its eternity is admitted by every one4 ,acts of religious merit1 moreover 7such as are prescribed by injunctions71 can only be the causes of certain results in so far as they give rise to a body capable of experiencing those results1 and thus necessarily produce the so-called samsra-state 7which is opposed to final release1 and7 which consists in the connexion of the soul with some sort of body1 high or low4 ,release1 therefore1 is not something to be brought about by acts of religious merit4 ,in agreement herewith ,scripture says1 ',for the soul as long as it is in the body1 there is no release from pleasure and pain2 when it is free from the body1 then neither pleasure nor pain touch it' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,viii1 #ab1 #a74 ,this passage declares that in the state of release1 when the soul is freed from the body1 it is not touched by either pleasure or pain--the effects of acts of religious merit or demerit2 and from this it follows that the disembodied state is not to be accomplished by acts of religious merit4 ,nor may it be said that1 as other special results are accomplished by special injunctions1 so the disembodied state is to be accomplished by the injunction of meditation2 for that state is essentially something not to be effected4 ,thus scriptural texts say1 ',the wise man who knows the ,self as bodiless among the bodies1 as persisting among non-persisting things1 as great and all-pervading2 he does not grieve' 7,ka4 ,up4 ,i1 #b1 #bb72 ',that person is without breath1 without internal organ1 pure1 without contact' 7,mu4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #a1 #b74-- ,release which is a bodiless state is eternal1 and cannot therefore be accomplished through meritorious acts4 ,in agreement herewith ,scripture says1 ',that which thou seest apart from merit 7dharma7 and non-merit1 from what is done and not done1 from what exists and what has to be accomplished--tell me that' 7,ka4 ,up4 ,i1 #b1 #ad74-- ,consider what follows also4 ,when we speak of something being accomplished 7effected-sdhya7 we mean one of four things1 viz4 its being originated 7utpatti71 or obtained 7prpti71 or modified 7vikriti71 or in some way or other 7often purely ceremonial7 made ready or fit 7samskriti74 ,now in neither of these four senses can final ,release be said to be accomplished4 ,it cannot be originated1 for being ,brahman itself it is eternal4 ,it cannot be attained3 for ,brahman1 being the ,self1 is something eternally attained4 ,it cannot be modified2 for that would imply that like sour milk and similar things 7which are capable of change7 it is non-eternal4 ,nor finally can it be made 'ready' or 'fit4' ,a thing is made ready or fit either by the removal of some imperfection or by the addition of some perfection4 ,now ,brahman cannot be freed from any imperfection1 for it is eternally faultless2 nor can a perfection be added to it1 for it is absolutely perfect4 ,nor can it be improved in the sense in which we speak of improving a mirror1 viz4 by polishing it2 for as it is absolutely changeless it cannot become the object of any action1 either of its own or of an outside agent4 ,and1 again1 actions affecting the body1 such as bathing1 do not 'purify' the ,self 7as might possibly be maintained7 but only the organ of ,egoity 7ahamkartri7 which is the product of avidy1 and connected with the body2 it is this same ahamkartri also that enjoys the fruits springing from any action upon the body4 ,nor must it be said that the ,self is the ahamkartri2 for the ,self rather is that which is conscious of the ahamkartri4 ,this is the teaching of the mantras3 ',one of them eats the sweet fruit1 the other looks on without eating' 7,mu4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #a1 #a72 ',when he is in union with the body1 the senses1 and the mind1 then wise men call him the ,enjoyer' 7,ka4 ,up4 ,i1 #c1d72 ',the one ,god1 hidden in all beings1 all-pervading1 the ,self within all beings1 watching over all works1 dwelling in all beings1 the witness1 the perceiver1 the only one1 free from qualities' 7,svet4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #aa72 ',he encircled all1 bright1 bodiless1 scatheless1 without muscles1 pure1 untouched by evil' 7sa4 ,up4 #h74--;,all these texts distinguish from the ahamkartri due to ,nescience1 the true ,self1 absolutely perfect and pure1 free from all change4 ,release therefore-- which is the ,self--cannot be brought about in any way4--,but1 if this is so1 what then is the use of the comprehension of the texts8--,it is of use1 we reply1 in so far as it puts an end to the obstacles in the way of ,release4 ,thus scriptural texts declare3 ',you indeed are our father1 you who carry us from our ignorance to the other shore' 7,pra4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #h72 ',i have heard from men like you that he who knows the ,self overcomes grief4 ,i am in grief4 ,do1 ,sir1 help me over this grief of mine' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vii1 #a1 #c72 ',to him whose faults had thus been rubbed out ,sanatkumra showed the other bank of ,darkness' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vii1 #bf1 #b74 ,this shows that what is effected by the comprehension of the meaning of texts is merely the cessation of impediments in the way of ,release4 ,this cessation itself1 although something effected1 is of the nature of that kind of nonexistence which results from the destruction of something existent1 and as such does not pass away4--,texts such as ',he knows ,brahman1 he becomes ,brahman' 7,mu4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #b1 #i72 ',having known him he passes beyond death' 7,svet4 ,up4 ,,iii1#h71 declare that ,release follows immediately on the cognition of ,brahman1 and thus negative the intervention of injunctions4--,nor can it be maintained that ,brahman is related to action in so far as constituting the object of the action either of knowledge or of meditation2 for scriptural texts deny its being an object in either of these senses4 ,compare ',different is this from what is known1 and from what is unknown' 7,ke4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #d72 ',by whom he knows all this1 whereby should he know him8' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #e1 #ae72 ',that do thou know as ,brahman1 not that on which they meditate as being this' 7,ke4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #d74 ,nor does this view imply that the sacred texts have no object at all2 for it is their object to put an end to the view of difference springing from avidy4 ,scripture does not objectivise ,brahman in any definite form1 but rather teaches that its true nature is to be non-object1 and thereby puts an end to the distinction1 fictitiously suggested by ,nescience1 of knowing subjects1 acts of knowledge1 and objects of knowledge4 ,compare the text ',you should not see a seer of seeing1 you should not think a thinker of thought1' c4 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #d1 #b74--,nor1 again1 must it be said that1 if knowledge alone puts an end to bondage1 the injunctions of hearing and so on are purposeless2 for their function is to cause the origination of the comprehension of the texts1 in so far as they divert from all other alternatives the student who is naturally inclined to yield to distractions4--,nor1 again1 can it be maintained that a cessation of bondage through mere knowledge is never observed to take place2 for as bondage is something false 7unreal7 it cannot possibly persist after the rise of knowledge4 ,for the same reason it is a mistake to maintain that the cessation of bondage takes place only after the death of the body4 ,in order that the fear inspired by the imagined snake should come to an end1 it is required only that the rope should be recognised as what it is1 not that a snake should be destroyed4 ,if the body were something real1 its destruction would be necessary2 but being apart from ,brahman it is unreal4 ,he whose bondage does not come to an end1 in him true knowledge has not arisen2 this we infer from the effect of such knowledge not being observed in him4 ,whether the body persist or not1 he who has reached true knowledge is released from that very moment4-- ,the general conclusion of all this is that1 as ,release is not something to be accomplished by injunctions of meditation1 ,brahman is not proved to be something standing in a supplementary relation to such injunctions2 but is rather proved by 7non-injunctory7 texts1 such as ',thou art that'2 ',the ,true1 knowledge1 infinite is ,brahman'2 ',this ,self is ,brahman4' ,this view 7the holder of the dhyna-vidhi theory rejoins7 is untenable2 since the cessation of bondage cannot possibly spring from the mere comprehension of the meaning of texts4 ,even if bondage were something unreal1 and therefore capable of sublation by knowledge1 yet being something direct1 immediate1 it could not be sublated by the indirect comprehension of the sense of texts4 ,when a man directly conscious of a snake before him is told by a competent by-stander that it is not a snake but merely a rope1 his fear is not dispelled by a mere cognition contrary to that of a snake1 and due to the information received2 but the information brings about the cessation of his fear in that way that it rouses him to an activity aiming at the direct perception1 by means of his senses1 of what the thing before him really is4 ,having at first started back in fear of the imagined snake1 he now proceeds to ascertain by means of ocular perception the true nature of the thing1 and having accomplished this is freed from fear4 ,it would not be correct to say that in this case words 7viz4 of the person informing7 produce this perceptional knowledge2 for words are not a sense-organ1 and among the means of knowledge it is the sense-organs only that give rise to direct knowledge4 ,nor1 again1 can it be pleaded that in the special case of ,vedic texts sentences may give rise to direct knowledge1 owing to the fact that the person concerned has cleansed himself of all imperfection through the performance of actions not aiming at immediate results1 and has been withdrawn from all outward objects by hearing1 reflection1 and meditation2 for in other cases also1 where special impediments in the way of knowledge are being removed1 we never observe that the special means of knowledge1 such as the sense-organs and so on1 operate outside their proper limited sphere4--,nor1 again1 can it be maintained that meditation acts as a means helpful towards the comprehension of texts2 for this leads to vicious reciprocal dependence--when the meaning of the texts has been comprehended it becomes the object of meditation2 and when meditation has taken place there arises comprehension of the meaning of the texts6--,nor can it be said that meditation and the comprehension of the meaning of texts have different objects2 for if this were so the comprehension of the texts could not be a means helpful towards meditation3 meditation on one thing does not give rise to eagerness with regard to another thing6--,for meditation which consists in uninterrupted remembrance of a thing cognised1 the cognition of the sense of texts1 moreover1 forms an indispensable prerequisite2 for knowledge of ,brahman--the object of meditation--cannot originate from any other source4--,nor can it be said that that knowledge on which meditation is based is produced by one set of texts1 while that knowledge which puts an end to the world is produced by such texts as 'thou art that1' and the like4 ,for1 we ask1 has the former knowledge the same object as the latter1 or a different one8 ,on the former alternative we are led to the same vicious reciprocal dependence which we noted above2 and on the latter alternative it cannot be shown that meditation gives rise to eagerness with regard to the latter kind of knowledge4 ,moreover1 as meditation presupposes plurality comprising an object of meditation1 a meditating subject and so on1 it really cannot in any perceptible way be helpful towards the origination of the comprehension of the sense of texts1 the object of which is the oneness of a ,brahman free from all plurality3 he1 therefore1 who maintains that ,nescience comes to an end through the mere comprehension of the meaning of texts really implies that the injunctions of hearing1 reflection1 and meditation are purposeless4 ,the conclusion that1 since direct knowledge cannot spring from texts1 ,nescience is not terminated by the comprehension of the meaning of texts1 disposes at the same time of the hypothesis of the so-called ',release in this life' 7jvanmukti74 ,for what definition1 we ask1 can be given of this ',release in this life'8--',release of a soul while yet joined to a body'6--,you might as well say1 we reply1 that your mother never had any children6 ,you have yourself proved by scriptural passages that 'bondage' means the being joined to a body1 and 'release' being free from a body6-- ,let us then define jvanmukti as the cessation of embodiedness1 in that sense that a person1 while the appearance of embodiedness persists1 is conscious of the unreality of that appearance4--,but1 we rejoin1 if the consciousness of the unreality of the body puts an end to embodiedness1 how can you say that jvanmukti means release of a soul while joined to a body8 ,on this explanation there remains no difference whatsoever between ',release in this life' and ,release after death2 for the latter also can only be defined as cessation of the false appearance of embodiedness4--,let us then say that a person is 'jvanmukta' when the appearance of embodiedness1 although sublated by true knowledge1 yet persists in the same way as the appearance of the moon being double persists 7even after it has been recognised as false74--,this too we cannot allow4 ,as the sublating act of cognition on which ,release depends extends to everything with the exception of ,brahman1 it sublates the general defect due to causal ,nescience1 inclusive of the particular erroneous appearance of embodiedness3 the latter being sublated in this way cannot persist4 ,in the case of the double moon1 on the other hand1 the defect of vision on which the erroneous appearance depends is not the object of the sublative art of cognition1 i4e4 the cognition of the oneness of the moon1 and it therefore remains non-sublated2 hence the false appearance of a double moon may persist4--,moreover1 the text ',for him there is delay only as long as he is not freed from the body2 then he will be released' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #ad1 #b71 teaches that he who takes his stand on the knowledge of the ,real requires for his ,release the putting off of the body only3 the text thus negatives jivanmukti4 pastamba also rejects the view of jivanmukti1 ',abandoning the ,vedas1 this world and the next1 he 7the ,samnysin7 is to seek the ,self4 7,some say that7 he obtains salvation when he knows 7the ,self74 ,this opinion is contradicted by the sstras4 7,for7 if ,salvation were obtained when the ,self is known1 he should not feel any pain even in this world4 ,hereby that which follows is explained' 7,dh4 ,s4 ,,ii1 #i1 #ac-ag74--,this refutes also the view that ,release is obtained through mere knowledge4--,the conclusion to be drawn from all this is that ,release1 which consists in the cessation of all ,plurality1 cannot take place as long as a man lives4 ,and we therefore adhere to our view that ,bondage is to be terminated only by means of the injunctions of meditation1 the result of which is direct knowledge of ,brahman4 ,nor must this be objected to on the ground that ,release1 if brought about by injunctions1 must therefore be something non-eternal2 for what is effected is not ,release itself1 but only the cessation of what impedes it4 ,moreover1 the injunction does not directly produce the cessation of ,bondage1 but only through the mediation of the direct cognition of ,brahman as consisting of pure knowledge1 and not connected with a world4 ,it is this knowledge only which the injunction produces4--,but how can an injunction cause the origination of knowledge8-- ,how1 we ask in return1 can1 on your view1 works not aiming at some immediate result cause the origination of knowledge8--,you will perhaps reply 'by means of purifying the mind' 7manas72 but this reply may be given by me also4--,but 7the objector resumes7 there is a difference4 ,on my view ,scripture produces knowledge in the mind purified by works2 while on your view we must assume that in the purified mind the means of knowledge are produced by injunction4--,the mind itself1 we reply1 purified by knowledge1 constitutes this means4--,how do you know this8 our opponent questions4--,how1 we ask in return1 do you know that the mind is purified by works1 and that1 in the mind so purified of a person withdrawn from all other objects by hearing1 reflection and meditation1 ,scripture produces that knowledge which destroys bondage8--,through certain texts such as the following3 ',they seek to know him by sacrifice1 by gifts1 by penance1 by fasting' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #d1 #bb72 ',he is to be heard1 to be reflected on1 to be meditated on' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #d1 #e72 ',he knows ,brahman1 he becomes ,brahman' 7,mu4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #b1 #i74--,well1 we reply1 in the same way our view--viz4 that through the injunction of meditation the mind is cleared1 and that a clear mind gives rise to direct knowledge of ,brahman--is confirmed by scriptural texts such as ',he is to be heard1 to be reflected on1 to be meditated on' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #d1 #e72 ',he who knows ,brahman reaches the highest' 7,taitt4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #a1 #a72 ',he is not apprehended by the eye nor by speech' 7,mu4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #a1 #h72 ',but by a pure mind' 7872 ',he is apprehended by the heart1 by wisdom1 by the mind' 7,ka4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #f1 #i74 ,nor can it be said that the text 'not that which they meditate upon as this' 7,ke4 ,up4 ,i1 #d7 negatives meditation2 it does not forbid meditation on ,brahman1 but merely declares that ,brahman is different from the world4 ,the mantra is to be explained as follows3 ',what men meditate upon as this world1 that is not ,brahman2 know ,brahman to be that which is not uttered by speech1 but through which speech is uttered4' ,on a different explanation the clause 'know that to be ,brahman' would be irrational1 and the injunctions of meditation on the ,self would--be meaningless4--,the outcome of all this is that unreal ,bondage which appears in the form of a plurality of knowing subjects1 objects of knowledge1 c41 is put an end to by the injunctions of meditation1 the fruit of which is direct intuitive knowledge of ,brahman4 ,nor can we approve of the doctrine held by some that there is no contradiction between difference and non-difference2 for difference and non-difference cannot co-exist in one thing1 any more than coldness and heat1 or light and darkness4--,let us first hear in detail what the holder of this so-called bhedbheda view has to say4 ,the whole universe of things must be ordered in agreement with our cognitions4 ,now we are conscious of all things as different and non-different at the same time3 they are non-different in their causal and generic aspects1 and different in so far as viewed as effects and individuals4 ,there indeed is a contradiction between light and darkness and so on2 for these cannot possibly exist together1 and they are actually met with in different abodes4 ,such contradictoriness is not1 on the other hand1 observed in the case of cause and effect1 and genus and individual2 on the contrary we here distinctly apprehend one thing as having two aspects--'this jar is clay'1 'this cow is short-horned4' ,the fact is that experience does not show us anything that has one aspect only4 ,nor can it be said that in these cases there is absence of contradiction because as fire consumes grass so non-difference absorbs difference2 for the same thing which exists as clay1 or gold1 or cow1 or horse1 c41 at the same time exists as jar or diadem1 or short-horned cow or mare4 ,there is no command of the ,lord to the effect that one aspect only should belong to each thing1 non-difference to what is non-different1 and difference to what is different4--,but one aspect only belongs to each thing1 because it is thus that things are perceived6--,on the contrary1 we reply1 things have twofold aspects1 just because it is thus that they are perceived4 ,no man1 however wide he may open his eyes1 is able to distinguish in an object--e4g4 a jar or a cow--placed before him which part is the clay and which the jar1 or which part is the generic character of the cow and which the individual cow4 ,on the contrary1 his thought finds its true expression in the following judgments3 'this jar is clay'2 'this cow is short-horned4' ,nor can it be maintained that he makes a distinction between the cause and genus as objects of the idea of persistence1 and the effect and individual as objects of the idea of discontinuance 7difference72 for as a matter of fact there is no perception of these two elements in separation4 ,a man may look ever so close at a thing placed before him1 he--will not be able to perceive a difference of aspect and to point out 'this is the persisting1 general1 element in the thing1 and that the non-persistent1 individual1 element4' ,just as an effect and an individual give rise to the idea of one thing1 so the effect plus cause1 and the individual plus generic character1 also give rise to the idea of one thing only4 ,this very circumstance makes it possible for us to recognise each individual thing1 placed as it is among a multitude of things differing in place1 time1 and character4--,each thing thus being cognised as endowed with a twofold aspect1 the theory of cause and effect1 and generic character and individual1 being absolutely different1 is clearly refuted by perception4 ,but1 an objection is raised1 if on account of grammatical co-ordination and the resulting idea of oneness1 the judgment 'this pot is clay' is taken to express the relation of difference1 plus non-difference1 we shall have analogously to infer from judgments such as ',i am a man'1 ',i am a divine being' that the ,self and the body also stand in the bhedbheda-relation2 the theory of the co-existence of difference and non-difference will thus act like a fire which a man has lit on his hearth1 and which in the end consumes the entire house6--,this1 we reply1 is the baseless idea of a person who has not duly considered the true nature of co-ordination as establishing the bhedbheda-relation4 ,the correct principle is that all reality is determined by states of consciousness not sublated by valid means of proof4 ,the imagination1 however1 of the identity of the ,self and the body is sublated by all the means of proof which apply to the ,self3 it is in fact no more valid than the imagination of the snake in the rope1 and does not therefore prove the non-difference of the two4 ,the co-ordination1 on the other hand1 which is expressed in the judgment 'the cow is short-horned' is never observed to be refuted in any way1 and hence establishes the bhedbheda- relation4 ,for the same reasons the individual soul 7jva7 is not absolutely different from ,brahman1 but stands to it in the bhedbheda-relation in so far as it is a part 7amsa7 of ,brahman4 ,its non-difference from ,brahman is essential 7svbhvika72 its difference is due to limiting adjuncts 7aupdhika74 ,this we know1 in the first place1 from those scriptural texts which declare non-difference--such as ',thou art that' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vi72 ',there is no other seer but he' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #g1 #bc72 ',this ,self is ,brahman' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #e1 #ai72 and the passage from the ,brahmaskta in the ,samhitopanishad of the tharvanas which1 after having said that ,brahman is ,heaven and ,earth1 continues1 ',the fishermen are ,brahman1 the slaves are ,brahman1 ,brahman are these gamblers2 man and woman are born from ,brahman2 women are ,brahman and so are men4' ,and1 in the second place1 from those texts which declare difference3 ',he who1 one1 eternal1 intelligent1 fulfils the desires of many non-eternal intelligent beings' 7,ka4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #e1 #ac72 ',there are two unborn1 one knowing1 the other not-knowing2 one strong1 the other weak' 7,svet4 ,up4 ,i1 #i72 ',being the cause of their connexion with him1 through the qualities of action and the qualities of the ,self1 he is seen as another' 7,svet4 ,up4 ,v1 #ab72 ',the ,lord of nature and the souls1 the ruler of the qualities1 the cause of the bondage1 the existence and the release of the samsra' 7,svet4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #af72 ',he is the cause1 the lord of the lords of the organs' 7,svet4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #i72 ',one of the two eats the sweet fruit1 without eating the other looks on' 7,svet4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #f72 ',he who dwelling in the ,self 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #g1 #bb72 ',embraced by the intelligent ,self he knows nothing that is without1 nothing that is within' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #c1 #ba72 ',mounted by the intelligent ,self he goes groaning' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #c1 #ce72 ',having known him he passes beyond death' 7,svet4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #h74--,on the ground of these two sets of passages the individual and the highest ,self must needs be assumed to stand in the bhedbheda-relation4 ,and texts such as ',he knows ,brahman1 he becomes ,brahman' 7,mu4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #b1 #i71 which teach that in the state of ,release the individual soul enters into ,brahman itself2 and again texts such as ',but when the ,self has become all for him1 whereby should he see another' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #d1 #ac71 which forbid us to view1 in the state of ,release1 the ,lord as something different 7from the individual soul71 show that non-difference is essential 7while difference is merely aupdhika74 ,but1 an objection is raised1 the text ',he reaches all desires together in the wise ,brahman1' in using the word 'together' shows that even in the state of ,release the soul is different from ,brahman1 and the same view is expressed in two of the ,stras1 viz4 ,,iv1 #d1 #ag2 #ba4--,this is not so1 we reply2 for the text1 ',there is no other seer but he' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #g1 #bc71 and many similar texts distinctly negative all plurality in the ,self4 ,the ,taittirya-text quoted by you means that man reaches ,brahman with all desires1 i4e4 ,brahman comprising within itself all objects of desire2 if it were understood differently1 it would follow that ,brahman holds a subordinate position only4 ,and if the ,stra ,,iv1 #d1 #ag meant that the released soul is separate from ,brahman it would follow that it is deficient in lordly power2 and if this were so the ,stra would be in conflict with other ,stras such as ,,iv1 #d1 #a4--;,for these reasons1 non-difference is the essential condition2 while the distinction of the souls from ,brahman and from each other is due to their limiting adjuncts1 i4e4 the internal organ1 the sense-organs1 and the body4 ,brahman indeed is without parts and omnipresent2 but through its adjuncts it becomes capable of division just as ether is divided by jars and the like4 ,nor must it be said that this leads to a reprehensible mutual dependence--,brahman in so far as divided entering into conjunction with its adjuncts1 and again the division in ,brahman being caused by its conjunction with its adjuncts2 for these adjuncts and ,brahman's connexion with them are due to action 7karman71 and the stream of action is without a beginning4 ,the limiting adjuncts to which a soul is joined spring from the soul as connected with previous works1 and work again springs from the soul as joined to its adjuncts3 and as this connexion with works and adjuncts is without a beginning in time1 no fault can be found with our theory4--,the non-difference of the souls from each other and ,brahman is thus essential1 while their difference is due to the ,updhis4 ,these ,updhis1 on the other hand1 are at the same time essentially non-distinct and essentially distinct from each other and ,brahman2 for there are no other ,updhis 7to account for their distinction if non-essential71 and if we admitted such1 we should again have to assume further ,updhis1 and so on in infinitum4 ,we therefore hold that the ,updhis are produced1 in accordance with the actions of the individual souls1 as essentially non-different and different from ,brahman4 ,to this bhedbheda view the ,prvapakshin now objects on the following grounds3--,the whole aggregate of ,vednta-texts aims at enjoining meditation on a non-dual ,brahman whose essence is reality1 intelligence1 and bliss1 and thus sets forth the view of non-difference2 while on the other hand the karma-section of the ,veda1 and likewise perception and the other means of knowledge1 intimate the view of the difference of things4 ,now1 as difference and non-difference are contradictory1 and as the view of difference may be accounted for as resting on beginningless ,nescience1 we conclude that universal non-difference is what is real4-- ,the tenet that difference and non-difference are not contradictory because both are proved by our consciousness1 cannot be upheld4 ,if one thing has different characteristics from another there is distinction 7bheda7 of the two2 the contrary condition of things constitutes non- distinction 7abheda72 who in his senses then would maintain that these two-suchness and non-suchness--can be found together8 ,you have maintained that non-difference belongs to a thing viewed as cause and genus1 and difference to the same viewed as effect and individual2 and that1 owing to this twofold aspect of things1 non-difference and difference are not irreconcileable4 ,but that this view also is untenable1 a presentation of the question in definite alternatives will show4 ,do you mean to say that the difference lies in one aspect of the thing and the non-difference in the other8 or that difference and non-difference belong to the thing possessing two aspects8--,on the former alternative the difference belongs to the individual and the non-difference to the genus2 and this implies that there is no one thing with a double aspect4 ,and should you say that the genus and individual together constitute one thing only1 you abandon the view that it is difference of aspect which takes away the contradictoriness of difference and non-difference4 ,we have moreover remarked already that difference in characteristics and its opposite are absolutely contradictory4--,on the second alternative we have two aspects of different kind and an unknown thing supposed to be the substrate of those aspects2 but this assumption of a triad of entities proves only their mutual difference of character1 not their non- difference4 ,should you say that the non-contradictoriness of two aspects constitutes simultaneous difference and non-difference in the thing which is their substrate1 we ask in return--,how can two aspects which have a thing for their substrate1 and thus are different from the thing1 introduce into that thing a combination of two contradictory attributes 7viz4 difference and non-difference78 ,and much less even are they able to do so if they are viewed as non-different from the thing which is their substrate4 ,if1 moreover1 the two aspects on the one hand1 and the thing in which they inhere on the other1 be admitted to be distinct entities1 there will be required a further factor to bring about their difference and non-difference1 and we shall thus be led into a regressus in infinitum4--,nor is it a fact that the idea of a thing inclusive of its generic character bears the character of unity1 in the same way as the admittedly uniform idea of an individual2 for wherever a state of consciousness expresses itself in the form 'this is such and such' it implies the distinction of an attribute or mode1 and that to which the attribute or mode belongs4 ,in the case under discussion the genus constitutes the mode1 and the individual that to which the mode belongs3 the idea does not therefore possess the character of unity4 ,for these very reasons the individual soul cannot stand to ,brahman in the bhedbheda-relation4 ,and as the view of non-difference is founded on ,scripture1 we assume that the view of difference rests on beginningless ,nescience4--,but on this view want of knowledge and all the imperfections springing therefrom1 such as birth1 death1 c41 would cling to ,brahman itself1 and this would contradict scriptural texts such as ',he who is all-knowing' 7,mu4 ,up4 ,i1 #a1 #i72 ',that ,self free from all evil' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,viii1 #a1 #e74 ,not so1 we reply4 ,for all those imperfections we consider to be unreal4 ,on your view on the other hand1 which admits nothing but ,brahman and its limiting adjuncts1 all the imperfections which spring from contact with those adjuncts must really belong to ,brahman4 ,for as ,brahman is without parts1 indivisible1 the updhis cannot divide or split it so as to connect themselves with a part only2 but necessarily connect themselves with ,brahman itself and produce their effects on it4-- ,here the following explanation may possibly be attempted4 ,brahman determined by an updhi constitutes the individual soul4 ,this soul is of atomic size since what determines it1 viz4 the internal organ1 is itself of atomic size2 and the limitation itself is without beginning4 ,all the imperfections therefore connect themselves only with that special place that is determined by the updhi1 and do not affect the highest ,brahman which is not limited by the updhi4--,in reply to this we ask--,do you mean to say that what constitutes the atomic individual soul is a part of ,brahman which is limited and cut off by the limiting adjunct2 or some particular part of ,brahman which1 without being thereby divided off1 is connected with an atomic updhi2 or ,brahman in its totality as connected with an updhi2 or some other intelligent being connected with an updhi1 or finally the updhi itself8--,the first alternative is not possible1 because ,brahman cannot be divided2 it would moreover imply that the individual soul has a beginning1 for division means the making of one thing into two4--,on the second alternative it would follow that1 as a part of ,brahman would be connected with the updhi1 all the imperfections due to the updhis would adhere to that part4 ,and further1 if the updhi would not possess the power of attracting to itself the particular part of ,brahman with which it is connected1 it would follow that when the updhi moves the part with1 which it is connected would constantly change2 in other words1 bondage and release would take place at every moment4 ,if1 on the contrary1 the updhi possessed the power of attraction1 the whole ,brahman--as not being capable of division--would be attracted and move with the updhi4 ,and should it be said that what is all-pervading and without parts cannot be attracted and move1 well then the updhi only moves1 and we are again met by the difficulties stated above4 ,moreover1 if all the updhis were connected with the parts of ,brahman viewed as one and undivided1 all individual souls1 being nothing but parts of ,brahman1 would be considered as non-distinct4 ,and should it be said that they are not thus cognised as one because they are constituted by different parts of ,brahman1 it would follow that as soon as the updhi of one individual soul is moving1 the identity of that soul would be lost 7for it would1 in successive moments1 be constituted by different parts of ,brahman74--,on the third alternative 7the whole of7 ,brahman itself being connected with the updhi enters into the condition of individual soul1 and there remains no non- conditioned ,brahman4 ,and1 moreover1 the soul in all bodies will then be one only4--,on the fourth alternative the individual soul is something altogether different from ,brahman1 and the difference of the soul from ,brahman thus ceases to depend on the updhis of ,brahman4--,and the fifth alternative means the embracing of the view of the ,krvka 7who makes no distinction between soul and matter74--,the conclusion from all this is that on the strength of the texts declaring non-difference we must admit that all difference is based on ,nescience only4 ,hence1 ,scripture being an authoritative instrument of knowledge in so far only as it has for its end action and the cessation of action1 the ,vednta-texts must be allowed to be a valid means of knowledge with regard to ,brahman's nature1 in so far as they stand in a supplementary relation to the injunctions of meditation4 ,this view is finally combated by the ,mmmsaka4 ,even if1 he says1 we allow the ,vednta-texts to have a purport in so far as they are supplementary to injunctions of meditation1 they cannot be viewed as valid means of knowledge with regard to ,brahman4 ,do the texts referring to ,brahman1 we ask1 occupy the position of valid means of knowledge in so far as they form a syntactic whole with the injunctions of meditation1 or as independent sentences8 ,in the former case the purport of the syntactic whole is simply to enjoin meditation1 and it cannot therefore aim at giving instruction about ,brahman4 ,if1 on the other hand1 the texts about ,brahman are separate independent sentences1 they cannot have the purport of prompting to action and are therefore devoid of instructive power4 ,nor must it be said that meditation is a kind of continued remembrance1 and as such requires to be defined by the object remembered2 and that the demand of the injunction of meditation for something to be remembered is satisfied by texts such as ',all this is that ,self'1 'the ,true1 knowledge1 infinite is ,brahman1' c41 which set forth the nature and attributes of ,brahman and--forming a syntactic whole with the injunctions--are a valid means of knowledge with regard to the existence of the matter they convey4 ,for the fact is that the demand on the part of an injunction of meditation for an object to be remembered may be satisfied even by something unreal 7not true71 as in the case of injunctions such as ',let him meditate upon mind as ,brahman' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #ah1 #a73 the real existence of the object of meditation is therefore not demanded4--,the final conclusion arrived at in this prvapaksha is therefore as follows4 ,as the ,vednta-texts do not aim at prompting to action or the cessation of action2 as1 even on the supposition of their being supplementary to injunctions of meditation1 the only thing they effect is to set forth the nature of the object of meditation2 and as1 even if they are viewed as independent sentences1 they accomplish the end of man 7i4e4 please1 gratify7 by knowledge merely--being thus comparable to tales with which we soothe children or sick persons2 it does not lie within their province to establish the reality of an accomplished thing1 and hence ,scripture cannot be viewed as a valid means for the cognition of ,brahman4 ,to this prim facie view the ,strakra replies1 ',but this on account of connexion4' ',connexion' is here to be taken in an eminent sense1 as 'connexion with the end of man4' ,that ,brahman1 which is measureless bliss and therefore constitutes the highest end of man1 is connected with the texts as the topic set forth by them1 proves ,scripture to be a valid means for the cognition of ,brahman4 ,to maintain that the whole body of ,vednta-texts-which teach us that ,brahman is the highest object to be attained1 since it consists of supreme bliss free of all blemish whatsoever--is devoid of all use and purpose merely because it does not aim at action or the cessation of action2 is no better than to say that a youth of royal descent is of no use because he does not belong to a community of low wretches living on the flesh of dogs6 ,the relation of the different texts is as follows4 ,there are individual souls of numberless kinds-gods1 ,asuras1 ,gandharvas1 ,siddhas1 ,vidydharas1 ,kinnaras1 ,kimpurushas1 ,yakshas1 ,rkshasas1 ,piskas1 men1 beasts1 birds1 creeping animals1 trees1 bushes1 creepers1 grasses and so on-- distinguished as male1 female1 or sexless1 and having different sources of nourishment and support and different objects of enjoyment4 ,now all these souls are deficient in insight into the true nature of the highest reality1 their understandings being obscured by ,nescience operating in the form of beginningless karman2 and hence those texts only are fully useful to them which teach that there exists a highest ,brahman--which the souls in the state of release may cognise as non-different from themselves1 and which then1 through its own essential nature1 qualities1 power and energies1 imparts to those souls bliss infinite and unsurpassable4 ,when now the question arises--as it must arise--1 as to how this ,brahman is to be attained1 there step in certain other ,vednta- texts--such as ,he who knows ,brahman reaches the highest' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #a1 #a71 and ',let a man meditate on the ,self as his world' 7,bri4 ,up4 #a1 #d1 #ae7--;and1 by means of terms denoting 'knowing' and so on1 enjoin meditation as the means of attaining ,brahman4 7,we may illustrate this relation existing between the texts setting forth the nature of ,brahman and those enjoining meditation by two comparisons47 ,the case is like that of a man who has been told ',there is a treasure hidden in your house'4 ,he learns through this sentence the existence of the treasure1 is satisfied1 and then takes active steps to find it and make it his own4-- ,or take the case of a young prince who1 intent on some boyish play1 leaves his father's palace and1 losing his way1 does not return4 ,the king thinks his son is lost2 the boy himself is received by some good ,brahman who brings him up and teaches him without knowing who the boy's father is4 ,when the boy has reached his sixteenth year and is accomplished in every way1 some fully trustworthy person tells him1 ',your father is the ruler of all these lands1 famous for the possession of all noble qualities1 wisdom1 generosity1 kindness1 courage1 valour and so on1 and he stays in his capital1 longing to see you1 his lost child4 ,hearing that his father is alive and a man so high and noble1 the boy's heart is filled with supreme joy2 and the king also1 understanding that his son is alive1 in good health1 handsome and well instructed1 considers himself to have attained all a man can wish for4 ,he then takes steps to recover his son1 and finally the two are reunited4 ,the assertion again that a statement referring to some accomplished thing gratifies men merely by imparting a knowledge of the thing1 without being a means of knowledge with regard to its real existence--so that it would be comparable to the tales we tell to children and sick people--1 can in no way be upheld4 ,when it is ascertained that a thing has no real existence1 the mere knowledge or idea of the thing does not gratify4 ,the pleasure which stories give to children and sick people is due to the fact that they erroneously believe them to be true2 if they were to find out that the matter present to their thought is untrue their pleasure would come to an end that very moment4 ,and thus in the case of the texts of the ,upanishads also4 ,if we thought that these texts do not mean to intimate the real existence of ,brahman1 the mere idea of ,brahman to which they give rise would not satisfy us in any way4 ,the conclusion therefore is that texts such as ',that from whence these beings are born' c4 do convey valid instruction as to the existence of ,brahman1 i4e4 that being which is the sole cause of the world1 is free from all shadow of imperfection1 comprises within itself all auspicious qualities1 such as omniscience and so on1 and is of the nature of supreme bliss4--,here terminates the adhikarana of 'connexion'4 #e4 ,on account of seeing 7i4e4 thinking7 that which is not founded on ,scripture 7i4e4 the ,pradhna7 is not 7what is taught by the texts referring to the origination of the world74 ,we have maintained that what is taught by the texts relative to the origination of the world is ,brahman1 omniscient1 and so on4 ,the present ,stra and the following ,stras now add that those texts can in no way refer to the ,pradhna and similar entities which rest on ,inference only4 ,we read in the ,chndogya1 ',being only was this in the beginning1 one only1 without a second4--,it thought1 may ,i be many1 may ,i grow forth4-- ,it sent forth fire' 7,,vi1 #b1 #a ff47--,here a doubt arises whether the cause of the world denoted by the term ',being' is the ,pradhna4 assumed by others1 which rests on ,inference1 or ,brahman as defined by us4 ,the ,prvapakshin maintains that the ,pradhna is meant4 ,for he says1 the ,chndogya text quoted expresses the causal state of what is denoted by the word 'this'1 viz4 the aggregate of things comprising manifold effects1 such as ether1 c41 consisting of the three elements of ,goodness1 ,passion and ,darkness1 and forming the sphere of fruition of intelligent beings4 ,by the 'effected' state we understand the assuming1 on the part of the causal substance1 of a different condition2 whatever therefore constitutes the essential nature of a thing in its effected state the same constitutes its essential nature in the causal state also4 ,now the effect1 in our case1 is made up of the three elements ,goodness1 ,passion and ,darkness2 hence the cause is the ,pradhna which consists in an equipoise of those three elements4 ,and as in this ,pradhna all distinctions are merged1 so that it is pure ,being1 the ,chndogya text refers to it as ',being1 one only1 without a second4' ,this establishes the non-difference of effect and cause1 and in this way the promise that through the knowledge of one thing all things are to be known admits of being fulfilled4 ,otherwise1 moreover1 there would be no analogy between the instance of the lump of clay and the things made of it1 and the matter to be illustrated thereby4 ,the texts speaking of the origination of the world therefore intimate the ,pradhna taught by the great ,sage ,kapila4 ,and as the ,chndogya passage has1 owing to the presence of an initial statement 7pratij7 and a proving instance1 the form of an inference1 the term ',being' means just that which rests on inference1 viz4 the ,pradhna4 ,this prim facie view is set aside by the words of the ,stra4 ,that which does not rest on ,scripture1 i4e4 the ,pradhna1 which rests on ,inference only1 is not what is intimated by the texts referring to the origination of the world2 for the text exhibits the root 'ksh'--which means 'to think'--as denoting a special activity on the part of what is termed ',being4' ',it thought1 may ,i be many1 may ,i grow forth4' ',thinking' cannot possibly belong to the non-sentient ,pradhna3 the term ',being' can therefore denote only the all-knowing highest ,person who is capable of thought4 ,in agreement with this we find that1 in all sections which refer to creation1 the act of creation is stated to be preceded by thought4 ',he thought1 shall ,i send forth worlds4 ,he sent forth these worlds' 7,ait4 r4 ,,ii1 #d1 #a1 #b72 ',he thought he sent forth ,prna' 7,pr4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #c72 and others4--,but it is a rule that as a cause we must assume only what corresponds to the effect6--,just so2 and what corresponds to the total aggregate of effects is the highest ,person1 all-knowing1 all- powerful1 whose purposes realise themselves1 who has minds and matter in their subtle state for his body4 ,compare the texts ',his high power is revealed as manifold1 as inherent1 acting as force and knowledge' 7,svet4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #h72 ',he who is all-knowing1 all-perceiving' 7,mu4 ,up4 ,i1 #a1 #i72 ',he of whom the ,unevolved is the body1 of whom the ,imperishable is the body1 of whom ,death is the body1 he is the inner ,self of all things' 7,subl4 ,up4 ,,vii74--,this point 7viz4 as to the body of the highest ,person7 will be established under ,s4 ,,ii1 #a1 #d4 ,the present ,stra declares that the texts treating of creation cannot refer to the ,pradhna2 the ,stra just mentioned will dispose of objections4 ,nor is the ,prvapakshin right in maintaining that the ,chndogya passage is of the nature of an ,inference2 for it does not state a reason 7hetu--which is the essential thing in an ,inference74 ,the illustrative instance 7of the lump of clay7 is introduced merely in order to convince him who considers it impossible that all things should be known through one thing--as maintained in the passage 'through which that is heard which was not heard1' c41--that this is possible after all4 ,and the mention made in the text of 'seeing' clearly shows that there is absolutely no intention of setting forth an ,inference4 ,let us assume1 then1 the ,prvapakshin resumes1 that the 'seeing' of the text denotes not 'seeing' in its primary1 direct sense--such as belongs to intelligent beings only2 but 'seeing' in a secondary1 figurative sense which there is ascribed to the ,pradhna in the same way as in passages immediately following it is ascribed to fire and water--'the fire saw'2 'the water saw' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #b1 #c74 ,the transference1 to non- existent things1 of attributes properly belonging to sentient beings is quite common2 as when we say 'the rice-fields look out for rain'2 'the rain delighted the seeds4'--,this view is set aside by the next ,stra4 #f4 ,if it be said that 7the word 'seeing'7 has a secondary 7figurative7 meaning2 we deny this1 on account of the word ',self' 7being applied to the cause of the world74 ,the contention that1 because1 in passages standing close by1 the word 'seeing' is used in a secondary sense1 the 'seeing' predicated of the ,sat 7',being'7 is also to be taken in a secondary sense1 viz4 as denoting 7not real thought but7 a certain condition previous to creation1 cannot be upheld2 for in other texts met with in the same section 7viz4 ',all this has that for its ,self2 that is the ,true1 that is the ,self'1 ,ch4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #h1 #g71 that which first had been spoken of as ,sat is called the ',self'4 ,the designation ',self' which in this passage is applied to the ,sat in its relation to the entire world1 sentient or non-sentient1 is in no way appropriate to the ,pradhna4 ,we therefore conclude that1 as the highest ,self is the ,self of fire1 water1 and earth also1 the words fire1 c4 7in the passages stating that fire1 c4 thought7 denote the highest ,self only4 ,this conclusion agrees with the text ',let me enter into these three beings with this living ,self1 and evolve names and forms'1 for this text implies that fire1 water1 c4 possess substantial being and definite names only through the highest ,self having entered into them4 ,the thought ascribed in the text to fire1 water1 c4 hence is thought in the proper sense1 and the hypothesis that1 owing to its connexion with these latter texts1 the thought predicated of ',being' 7'it thought1' c4 7 should be thought in a figurative sense only thus lapses altogether4 ,the next following ,stra confirms the same view4 #g4 ,because release is taught of him who takes his stand on it4 ,svetaketu1 who is desirous of final release1 is at first--by means of the clause ',thou art that'--instructed to meditate on himself as having his ,self in that which truly is2 and thereupon the passage 'for him there is delay' only as long as ',i shall not be released1 then ,i shall be united' teaches that for a man taking his stand upon that teaching there will be ,release1 i4e4 union with ,brahman--which is delayed only until this mortal body falls away4 ,if1 on the other hand1 the text would teach that the non-intelligent ,pradhna is the general cause1 it could not possibly teach that meditation on this ,pradhna being a man's ,self is the means towards his ,release4 ,a man taking his stand on such meditation rather would on death be united with a non-sentient principle1 according to the scriptural saying1 ',according as his thought is in this world1 so will he be when he has departed this life' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #ad1 #a74 ,and ,scripture1 which is more loving than even a thousand parents1 cannot possibly teach such union with the ,non-sentient1 which is acknowledged to be the cause of all the assaults of suffering in its threefold form4 ,moreover1 those who hold the theory of the ,pradhna being the cause of the world do not themselves maintain that he who takes his stand upon the ,pradhna attains final release4 ,the ,pradhna is not the cause of the world for the following reason also3 #h4 ,and because there is no statement of its having to be set aside4 ,if the word ',sat' denoted the ,pradhna as the cause of the world1 we should expect the text to teach that the idea of having his ,self in that ',sat' should be set aside by ,svetaketu as desirous of ,release2 for that idea would be contrary to ,release4 ,so far from teaching this1 the text1 however1 directly inculcates that notion in the words ',thou art that4'-- ,the next ,stra adds a further reason4 #i4 ,and on account of the contradiction of the initial statement4 ,the ,pradhna's being the cause of the world would imply a contradiction of the initial statement1 viz4 that through the knowledge of one thing all things are to be known4 ,now1 on the principle of the non-difference of cause and effect1 this initial statement can only be fulfilled in that way that through the knowledge of the ',sat'1 which is the cause1 there is known the entire world1 whether sentient or non-sentient1 which constitutes the effect4 ,but if the ,pradhna were the cause1 the aggregate of sentient beings could not be known through it--for sentient beings are not the effect of a non-sentient principle1 and there would thus arise a contradiction4--,the next ,stra supplies a further reason4 #aj4 ,on account of 7the individual soul7 going to the ,self4 ,with reference to the ',sat' the text says1 ',learn from me the true nature of sleep4 ,when a man sleeps here1 he becomes united with the ,sat1 he is gone to his own 7,self74 ,therefore they say he sleeps 7svapiti71 because he is gone to his own 7sva-apta7' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #h1 #a74 ,this text designates the soul in the state of deep sleep as having entered into1 or being merged or reabsorbed in1 the ,self4 ,by reabsorption we understand something being merged in its cause4 ,now the non-intelligent ,pradhna cannot be the cause of the intelligent soul2 hence the soul's going to its ,self can only mean its going to the1 i4e4 the universal1 ,self4 ,the term 'individual soul' 7jva7 denotes ,brahman in so far as having an intelligent substance for its body1 ,brahman itself constituting the ,self2 as we learn from the text referring to the distinction of names and forms4 ,this ,brahman1 thus called jva41 is in the state of deep sleep1 no less than in that of a general pralaya1 free from the investment of names and forms1 and is then designated as mere ',being' 7sat72 as the text says1 'he is then united with the ,sat'4 ,as the soul is in the state of deep sleep free from the investment of name and form1 and invested by the intelligent ,self only1 another text says with reference to the same state1' ,embraced by the intelligent ,self he knows nothing that is without1 nothing that is within' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #c1 #ba74 ,up to the time of final release there arise in the soul invested by name and form the cognitions of objects different from itself4 ,during deep sleep the souls divest themselves of names and forms1 and are embraced by the ',sat' only2 but in the waking state they again invest themselves with names and forms1 and thus bear corresponding distinctive names and forms4 ,this1 other scriptural texts also distinctly declare1 ',when a man lying in deep sleep sees no dream whatever1 he becomes one with that prna alone2--from that ,self the prnas proceed1 each towards its place' 7,kau4 ,up4 #aaa1c72 ',whatever these creatures are here1 whether a lion or a wolf or a boar or a gnat or a mosquito1 that they become again' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #i1 #c74--;,hence the term ',sat' denotes the highest ,brahman1 the all-knowing highest ,lord1 the highest ,person4 ,thus the ,vrittikra also says1 ',then he becomes united with the ,sat--this is proved by 7all creatures7 entering into it and coming back out of it4' ,and ,scripture also says1 ',embraced by the intelligent ,self4'--,the next ,stra gives an additional reason4 #aa4 ,on account of the uniformity of view4 ',in the beginning the ,self was all this2 there was nothing else whatsoever thinking4 ,he thought1 shall ,i send forth worlds8 ,he sent forth these worlds' 7,ait4 r4 ,,ii1 #d1 #a1 #a72 ',from that ,self sprang ether1 from ether air1 from air fire1 from fire water1 from water earth' 7,taitt4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #a72 ',from this great ,being were breathed forth the ,rig-veda1' c4-- ,these and similar texts referring to the creation have all the same purport3 they all teach us that the ,supreme ,lord is the cause of the world4 ,we therefore conclude that in the ,ch4 passage also the ,sat1 which is said to be the cause of the world1 is the ,supreme ,lord4 #ab4 ,and because it is directly stated in ,scripture4 ,the text of the same ,upanishad directly declares that the being denoted by the word ',sat' evolves1 as the universal ,self1 names and forms2 is all-knowing1 all-powerful1 all-embracing2 is free from all evil1 c42 realises all its wishes and purposes4 ',let me1 entering those beings with this living2 ,self1 evolve names and forms' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #c1 #b72 ',all these creatures have their root in the ,sat1 they dwell in the ,sat1 they rest in the ,sat' 7,,vi1 #h1 #d72 ',all this has that for its ,self2 it is the ,true1 it is the ,self 7,,vi1 #h1 #g72 ',whatever there is of him here in the world1 and whatever is not1 all that is contained within it' 7,,viii1 #a1 #c72 ',in it all desires are contained4 ,it is the ,self free from sin1 free from old age1 from death and grief1 from hunger and thirst1 whose wishes come true1 whose purposes come true' 7,,viii1 #a1 #e74--;,and analogously other scriptural texts1 ',of him there is no master in the world1 no ruler2 not even a sign of him4 ,he is the cause1 the lord of the lords of the organs1 and there is of him neither parent nor lord' 7,svet4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #i74 ',the wise one who1 having created all forms and having given them names1 is calling them by those names' 7,taitt4 ,ar4 ,,iii1 #ab1 #g72 ',he who entered within is the ruler of all beings1 the ,self of all' 7,taitt4 ,ar4 ,,iii1 #bd72 ',the ,self of all1 the refuge1 the ruler of all1 the ,lord of the souls' 7,mahnr4 ,up4 ,,xi72 ',whatsoever is seen or heard in this world1 inside or outside1 pervading that all ,nryana abides' 7,mahnr4 ,up4 ,,xi72 ',he is the inner ,self of all beings1 free from all evil1 the divine1 the only god ,nryana4'--,these and other texts which declare the world to have sprung from the highest ,lord1 can in no way be taken as establishing the ,pradhna4 ,hence it remains a settled conclusion that the highest ,person1 ,nryana1 free from all shadow of imperfection1 c41 is the single cause of the whole ,universe1 and is that ,brahman which these ,stras point out as the object of enquiry4 ,for the same reasons the theory of a ,brahman1 which is nothing but non- differenced intelligence1 must also be considered as refuted by the ,strakra1 with the help of the scriptural texts quoted2 for those texts prove that the ,brahman1 which forms the object of enquiry1 possesses attributes such as thinking1 and so on1 in their real literal sense4 ,on the theory1 on the other hand1 of a ,brahman that is nothing but distinctionless intelligence even the witnessing function of consciousness would be unreal4 ,the ,stras propose as the object of enquiry ,brahman as known from the ,vednta-texts1 and thereupon teach that ,brahman is intelligent 7,s4 ,i1 #a1 #e ff47 ,to be intelligent means to possess the quality of intelligence3 a being devoid of the quality of thought would not differ in nature from the ,pradhna4 ,further1 on the theory of ,brahman being mere non-differenced light it would be difficult to prove that ,brahman is self-luminous4 ,for by light we understand that particular thing which renders itself1 as well as other things1 capable of becoming the object of ordinary thought and speech2 but as a thing devoid of all difference does not1 of course1 possess these two characteristics it follows that it is as devoid of intelligence as a pot may be4--,let it then be assumed that although a thing devoid of all distinction does not actually possess these characteristics1 yet it has the potentiality of possessing them6--,but if it possesses the attribute of potentiality1 it is clear that you abandon your entire theory of a substance devoid of all distinction6--,let us then admit1 on the authority of ,scripture1 that the universal substance possesses this one distinguishing attribute of self-luminousness4--,well1 in that case you must of course admit1 on the same authority1 all those other qualities also which ,scripture vouches for1 such as all-knowingness1 the possession of all powers1 and so on4--,moreover1 potentiality means capability to produce certain special effects1 and hence can be determined on the ground of those special effects only4 ,but if there are no means of knowing these particular effects1 there are also no means of cognising potentiality4--,and those who hold the theory of a substance devoid of all difference1 have not even means of proof for their substance2 for as we have shown before1 ,perception1 ,inference1 ,scripture1 and one's own consciousness1 are all alike in so far as having for their objects things marked by difference4--,it therefore remains a settled conclusion that the ,brahman to be known is nothing else but the highest ,person capable of the thought 'of becoming many' by manifesting himself in a world comprising manifold sentient and non-sentient creatures4-- ,here terminates the adhikarana of 'seeing'4 ,so far the ,stras have declared that the ,brahman which forms the object of enquiry is different from the non-intelligent ,pradhna1 which is merely an object of fruition for intelligent beings4 ,they now proceed to show that ,brahman--which is antagonistic to all evil and constituted by supreme bliss--is different from the individual soul1 which is subject to karman1 whether that soul be in its purified state or in the impure state that is due to its immersion in the ocean of manifold and endless sufferings1 springing from the soul's contact with ,prakriti 7,pradhna74 #ac4 ,the ,self consisting of ,bliss 7is the highest ,self7 on account of multiplication4 ,we read in the text of the ,taittiryas1 ',different from this ,self1 which consists of ,understanding1 is the other inner ,self which consists of bliss' 7,taitt4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #e74--;,here the doubt arises whether the ,self consisting of bliss be the highest ,self1 which is different from the inner ,self subject to bondage and release1 and termed 'jva4' 7i4e4 living self or individual soul71 or whether it be that very inner ,self1 i4e4 the jva4--,it is that inner ,self1 the ,prvapakshin contends4 ,for the text says 'of that this1 i4e4 the ,self consisting of bliss1 is the srra ,self'2 and srra means that which is joined to a body1 in other words1 the so-called jva4--,but1 an objection is raised1 the text enumerates the different ,selfs1 beginning with the ,self consisting of bliss1 to the end that man may obtain the bliss of ,brahman1 which was1 at the outset1 stated to be the cause of the world 7,,ii1 #a71 and in the end teaches that the ,self consisting of bliss is the cause of the world 7,,ii1 #f74 ,and that the cause of the world is the all-knowing ,lord1 since ,scripture says of him that 'he thought1' we have already explained4-- ,that cause of the world1 the ,prvapakshin rejoins1 is not different from the jva2 for in the text of the ,chndogyas that ,being which first is described as the creator of the world is exhibited1 in two passages1 in co-ordination with the jva 7'having entered into them with that living ,self' and ',thou art that1 ,o ,svetaketu'74 ,and the purport of co- ordination is to express oneness of being1 as when we say1 ',this person here is that ,devadatta we knew before4' ,and creation preceded by thought can very well be ascribed to an intelligent jva4 ,the connexion of the whole ,taittirya-text then is as follows4 ,in the introductory clause1 ',he who knows ,brahman attains the ,highest1' the true nature of the jva1 free from all connexion with matter1 is referred to as something to be attained2 and of this nature a definition is given in the words1 ',the ,true1 knowledge1 the ,infinite is ,brahman4' ,the attainment of the jva in this form is what constitutes ,release1 in agreement with the text1 ',so long as he is in the body he cannot get free from pleasure and pain2 but when he is free from the body then neither pleasure nor pain touches him' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,viii1 #ab1 #a74 ,this true nature of the ,self1 free from all avidy1 which the text begins by presenting as an object to be attained1 is thereupon declared to be the ,self consisting of bliss4 ,in order to lead up to this--just as a man points out to another the moon by first pointing out the branch of a tree near which the moon is to be seen--the text at first refers to the body 7',man consists of food'72 next to the vital breath with its five modifications which is within the body and supports it2 then to the manas within the vital breath2 then to the buddhi within the manas--'the ,self consisting of breath'2 'the ,self consisting of mind' 7manas72 'the ,self consisting of understanding' 7vijna74 ,having thus gradually led up to the jva1 the text finally points out the latter1 which is the innermost of all 7',different from that is the inner ,self which consists of bliss'71 and thus completes the series of ,selfs one inside the other4 ,we hence conclude that the ,self consisting of bliss is that same jva-self which was at the outset pointed out as the ,brahman to be attained4--,but the clause immediately following1 ',brahman is the tail1 the support 7of the ,self of bliss'71 indicates that ,brahman is something different from the ,self of bliss6-- ,by no means 7the ,prvapakshin rejoins74 ,brahman is1 owing to its different characteristics1 there compared to an animal body1 and head1 wings1 and tail are ascribed to it1 just as in a preceding clause the body consisting of food had also been imagined as having head1 wings1 and tail--these members not being something different from the body1 but the body itself4 ,joy1 satisfaction1 great satisfaction1 bliss1 are imagined as the members1 non-different from it1 of ,brahman consisting of bliss1 and of them all the unmixed bliss-constituted ,brahman is said to be the tail or support4 ,if ,brahman were something different from the ,self consisting of bliss1 the text would have continued1 ',different from this ,self consisting of bliss is the other inner ,self--,brahman4' ,but there is no such continuation4 ,the connexion of the different clauses stands as follows3 ,after ,brahman has been introduced as the topic of the section 7',he who knows ,brahman attains the ,highest'71 and defined as different in nature from everything else 7',the ,true1 knowledge'71 the text designates it by the term ',self1' c4 7',from that ,self sprang ether'71 and then1 in order to make it clear that ,brahman is the innermost ,self of all1 enumerates the pranamaya and so on--designating them in succession as more and more inward ,selfs--1 and finally leads up to the nandamaya as the innermost ,self7',different from this1 c41 is the ,self consisting of bliss'74 ,from all which it appears that the term ',self' up to the end denotes the ,brahman mentioned at the beginning4-- ,but1 in immediate continuation of the clause1 ',brahman is the tail1 the support1' the text exhibits the following sloka3 ',non-existing becomes he who views ,brahman as non-existing2 who knows ,brahman as existing1 him we know as himself existing4' ,here the existence and non-existence of the ,self are declared to depend on the knowledge and non-knowledge of ,brahman1 not of the ,self consisting of bliss4 ,now no doubt can possibly arise as to the existence or non-existence of this latter ,self1 which1 in the form of joy1 satisfaction1 c41 is known to every one4 ,hence the sloka cannot refer to that ,self1 and hence ,brahman is different from that ,self4--,this objection1 the ,prvapakshin rejoins1 is unfounded4 ,in the earlier parts of the chapter we have corresponding slokas1 each of them following on a preceding clause that refers to the tail or support of a particular ,self3 in the case1 e4g4 of the ,self consisting of food1 we read1 ',this is the tail1 the support1' and then comes the sloka1 ',from food are produced all creatures1' c4 ,now it is evident that all these slokas are meant to set forth not only what had been called 'tail1' but the entire ,self concerned 7,self of food1 ,self of breath1 c472 and from this it follows that also the sloka1 ',non-existing becomes he1' does not refer to the 'tail' only as something other than the ,self of bliss1 but to the entire ,self of bliss4 ,and there may very well be a doubt with regard to the knowledge or non-knowledge of the existence of that ,self consisting of unlimited bliss4 ,on your view also the circumstance of ,brahman which forms the tail not being known is due to its being of the nature of limitless bliss4 ,and should it be said that the ,self of bliss cannot be ,brahman because ,brahman does not possess a head and other members2 the answer is that ,brahman also does not possess the quality of being a tail or support1 and that hence ,brahman cannot be a tail4--,let it then be said that the expression1 ',brahman is the tail1' is merely figurative1 in so far as ,brahman is the substrate of all things imagined through avidy6--,but1 the ,prvapakshin rejoins1 we may as well assume that the ascription to ,brahman of joy1 as its head and so on1 is also merely figurative1 meant to illustrate the nature of ,brahman1 i4e4 the ,self of bliss as free from all pain4 ,to speak of ,brahman or the ,self as consisting of bliss has thus the purpose of separating from all pain and grief that which in a preceding clause 7',the ,true1 knowledge1 the ,infinite is ,brahman'7 had already been separated from all changeful material things4 ,as applied to ,brahman 7or the ,self71 whose nature is nothing but absolute bliss1 the term 'nandamaya' therefore has to be interpreted as meaning nothing more than 'nanda'2 just as prnamaya means prna4 ,the outcome of all this is that the term 'nandamaya' denotes the true essential nature--which is nothing but absolute uniform bliss--of the jiva that appears as distinguished by all the manifold individualising forms which are the figments of ,nescience4 ,the ,self of bliss is the jva or pratyag-tman1 i4e4 the individual soul4 ,against this prim facie view the ,strakra contends that the ,self consisting of bliss is the highest ,self 'on account of multiplication4'-- ,the section which begins with the words1',this is an examination of bliss1' and terminates with the sloka1 'from whence all speech turns back' 7,taitt4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #h71 arrives at bliss1 supreme and not to be surpassed1 by successively multiplying inferior stages of bliss by a hundred2 now such supreme bliss cannot possibly belong to the individual soul which enjoys only a small share of very limited happiness1 mixed with endless pain and grief2 and therefore clearly indicates1 as its abode1 the highest ,self1 which differs from all other ,selfs in so far as being radically opposed to all evil and of an unmixed blessed nature4 ,the text says1 ',different from this ,self consisting of understanding 7vijna7 there is the inner ,self consisting of bliss'4 ,now that which consists of understanding 7vijna7 is the individual soul 7jva71 not the internal organ 7buddhi7 only2 for the formative element1 'maya1' 7'consisting of'2 in vijnamaya7 indicates a difference 7between vijna and vijnamaya74 ,the term 'prna-maya' 7'consisting of breath'7 we explain to mean 'prna' only1 because no other explanation is possible2 but as vijnamaya may be explained as1--jva1 we have no right to neglect 'maya' as unmeaning4 ,and this interpretation is quite suitable1 as the soul in the states of bondage and release alike is a 'knowing' subject4 ,that moreover even in 'prnamaya'1 and so on1 the affix 'maya' may be taken as having a meaning will be shown further on4--,but how is it then that in the sloka which refers to the vijnamaya1 ',understanding 7vijna7 performs the sacrifice'1 the term 'vijna' only is used8--,the essential nature1 we reply1 of the knowing subject is suitably called 'knowledge'1 and this term is transferred to the knowing subject itself which is defined as possessing that nature4 ,for we generally see that words which denote attributes defining the essential nature of a thing also convey the notion of the essential nature of the thing itself4 ,this also accounts for the fact that the sloka 7',vijna performs the sacrifice1 it performs all sacred acts'7 speaks of vijna as being the agent in sacrifices and so on2 the buddhi alone could not be called an agent4 ,for this reason the text does not ascribe agency to the other ,selfs 7the prnamaya and so on7 which are mentioned before the vijnamaya2 for they are non-intelligent instruments of intelligence1 and the latter only can be an agent4 ,with the same view the text further on 7,,ii1 #f71 distinguishing the intelligent and the non-intelligent by means of their different characteristic attributes1 says in the end 'knowledge and non-knowledge1' meaning thereby that which possesses the attribute of knowledge and that which does not4 ,an analogous case is met with in the so-called antarymi-brhmana 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iii4 #g74 ,there the ,knvas read1 ',he who dwells in knowledge' 7vijna2 ,,iii1 #g1 #af71 but instead of this the ,mdhyandinas read 'he who dwells in the ,self1' and so make clear that what the ,knvas designate as 'knowledge' really is the knowing ,self4--,that the word vijna1 although denoting the knowing ,self1 yet has a neuter termination1 is meant to denote it as something substantial4 ,we hence conclude that he who is different from the ,self consisting of knowledge1 i4e4 the individual ,self1 is the highest ,self which consists of bliss4 ,it is true indeed that the sloka1 ',knowledge performs the sacrifice1 'directly mentions knowledge only1 not the knowing ,self2 all the same we have to understand that what is meant is the latter1 who is referred to in the clause1 'different from this is the inner ,self which consists of knowledge4' ,this conclusion is supported by the sloka referring to the ,self which consists of food 7,,ii1 #b72 for that sloka refers to food only1 ',from food are produced all creatures1' c41 all the same the preceding clause 'this man consists of the essence of food' does not refer to food1 but to an effect of it which consists of food4 ,considering all this the ,strakra himself in a subsequent ,stra 7,i1 #a1 #ah7 bases his view on the declaration1 in the scriptural text1 of difference4--,we now turn to the assertion1 made by the ,prvapakshin1 that the cause of the world is not different from the individual soul because in two ,chndogya passages it is exhibited in co-ordination with the latter 7'having entered into them with this living ,self1' ',thou art that'72 and that hence the introductory clause of the ,taitt4 passage 7',he who knows ,brahman reaches the ,highest'7 refers to the individual soul--which further on is called 'consisting of bliss1' because it is free from all that is not pleasure4-- ,this view cannot be upheld2 for although the individual soul is intelligent1 it is incapable of producing through its volition this infinite and wonderful ,universe--a process described in texts such as ',it thought1 may ,i be many1 may ,i grow forth4--,it sent forth fire1' c4 ,that even the released soul is unequal to such 'world business' as creation1 two later ,stras will expressly declare4 ,but1 if you deny that ,brahman1 the cause of the world1 is identical with the individual soul1 how then do you account for the co-ordination in which the two appear in the ,chndogya texts8--,how1 we ask in return1 can ,brahman1 the cause of all1 free from all shadow of imperfection1 omniscient1 omnipotent1 c4 c41 be one with the individual soul1 all whose activities--whether it be thinking1 or winking of an eye1 or anything else--depend on karman1 which implies endless suffering of various kind8--,if you reply that this is possible if one of two things is unreal1 we ask--which then do you mean to be unreal8 ,brahman's connexion with what is evil8--or its essential nature1 owing to which it is absolutely good and antagonistic to all evil8--,you will perhaps reply that1 owing to the fact of ,brahman1 which is absolutely good and antagonistic to all evil1 being the substrate of beginningless ,nescience1 there presents itself the false appearance of its being connected with evil4 ,but there you maintain what is contradictory4 ,on the one side there is ,brahman's absolute perfection and antagonism to all evil2 on the other it is the substrate of ,nescience1 and thereby the substrate of a false appearance which is involved in endless pain2 for to be connected with evil means to be the substrate of ,nescience and the appearance of suffering which is produced thereby4 ,now it is a contradiction to say that ,brahman is connected with all this and at the same time antagonistic to it6--,nor can we allow you to say that there is no real contradiction because that appearance is something false4 ,for whatever is false belongs to that group of things contrary to man's true interest1 for the destruction of which the ,vednta-texts are studied4 ,to be connected with what is hurtful to man1 and to be absolutely perfect and antagonistic to all evil is self- contradictory4--,but1 our adversary now rejoins1 what after all are we to do8 ,the holy text at first clearly promises that through the cognition of one thing everything will be known 7'by which that which is not heard is heard1' c41 ,ch4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #a1 #c72 thereupon declares that ,brahman is the sole cause of the world 7',being only this was in the beginning'71 and possesses exalted qualities such as the power of realising its intentions 7'it thought1 may ,i be many'72 and then finally1 by means of the co-ordination1 ',thou art that' intimates that ,brahman is one with the individual soul1 which we know to be subject to endless suffering6 ,nothing therefore is left to us but the hypothesis that ,brahman is the substrate of ,nescience and all that springs from it6--,not even for the purpose1 we reply1 of making sense of ,scripture may we assume what in itself is senseless and contradictory6--,let us then say that ,brahman's connexion with evil is real1 and its absolute perfection unreal6-- ,scripture1 we reply1 aims at comforting the soul afflicted by the assaults of threefold pain1 and now1 according to you1 it teaches that the assaults of suffering are real1 while its essential perfection and happiness are unreal figments1 due to error6 ,this is excellent comfort indeed6--,to avoid these difficulties let us then assume that both aspects of ,brahman--viz4 on the one hand its entering into the distressful condition of individual souls other than non-differenced intelligence1 and on the other its being the cause of the world1 endowed with all perfections1 c4--are alike unreal6--,well1 we reply1 we do not exactly admire the depth of your insight into the connected meaning of texts4 ,the promise that through the knowledge of one thing everything will be known can certainly not be fulfilled if everything is false1 for in that case there exists nothing that could be known4 ,in so far as the cognition of one thing has something real for its object1 and the cognition of all things is of the same kind1 and moreover is comprised in the cognition of one thing2 in so far it can be said that everything is known through one thing being known4 ,through the cognition of the real shell we do not cognise the unreal silver of which the shell is the substrate4--,well1 our adversary resumes1 let it then be said that the meaning of the declaration that through the cognition of one thing everything is to be known is that only non-differenced ,being is real1 while everything else is unreal4--,if this were so1 we rejoin1 the text would not say1 'by which the non-heard is heard1 the non-known is known'2 for the meaning of this is1 'by which when heard and known' 7not 'known as false'7 'the non-heard is heard1' c4 ,moreover1 if the meaning were that only the one non-differenced substance understood to be the cause of the world is real1 the illustrative instance1 ',as by one lump of clay everything made of clay is known1' would not be suitable2 for what is meant there is that through the cognition of the 7real7 lump of clay its 7real7 effects are known4 ,nor must 'you say that in the illustrative instance also the unreality of the effect is set forth2 for as the person to be informed is not in any way convinced at the outset that things made of clay are unreal1 like the snake imagined in the rope1 it is impossible that such unreality should be referred to as if it were something well known 7and the clause1 'as by one lump of clay1' c41 undoubtedly does refer to something well known71 in order to render the initial assertion plausible4 ,and we are not aware of any means of knowledge--assisted or non-assisted by ratiocination--that would prove the non-reality of things effected1 previous to the cognition produced by texts such as ',that art thou'2 a point which will be discussed at length under ,,ii1 #a4--';,being only this was in the beginning1 one1 without a second'2 'it thought1 may ,i be many1 may ,i grow forth2 it sent forth fire'2 ',let me now enter those three beings with this living ,self and evolve names and forms'2 ',all these creatures1 my son1 have their root in the ,true1 they dwell in the ,true1 they rest in the ,true1' c42 these passages declare in succession that that which really is is the ,self of this world2 that previous to creation there is no distinction of names and forms2 that for the creation of the world ,brahman1 termed 'the ,true' 7or ',real'71 requires no other operative cause but itself2 that at the time of creation it forms a resolution1 possible to itself only1 of making itself manifold in the form of endless movable and immovable things2 that in accordance with this resolution there takes place a creation1 proceeding in a particular order1 of an infinite number of manifold beings2 that by ,brahman entering into all non-intelligent beings with the living soul--which has its ,self in ,brahman--there takes place an evolution1 infinite in extent1 of all their particular names and forms2 and that everything different from ,brahman has its root and abode in that1 is moved by that1 lives by that1 rests on that4 ,all the different points--to be learned from ,scripture only--which are here set forth agree with what numerous other scriptural texts teach about ,brahman1 viz4 that it is free from all evil1 devoid of all imperfection1 all-knowing1 all-powerful2 that all its wishes and purposes realise themselves2 that it is the cause of all bliss2 that it enjoys bliss not to be surpassed4 ,to maintain then that the word 'that1' which refers back to the ,brahman mentioned before1 i4e4 a ,brahman possessing infinite attributes1 should aim at conveying instruction about a substance devoid of all attributes1 is as unmeaning as the incoherent talk of a madman4 ,the word 'thou' again denotes the individual soul as distinguished by its implication in the course of transmigratory existence1 and the proper sense of this term also would have to be abandoned if it were meant to suggest a substance devoid of all distinctions4 ,and that1 in the case of a being consisting of non-differenced light1 obscuration by ,nescience would be tantamount to complete destruction1 we have already explained above4--,all this being thus1 your interpretation would involve that the proper meaning of the two words 'that' and 'thou'--which refer to one thing--would have to be abandoned1 and both words would have to be taken in an implied sense only4 ,against this the ,prvapakshin now may argue as follows4 ,several words which are applied to one thing are meant to express one sense1 and as this is not possible in so far as the words connote different attributes1 this part of their connotation becomes inoperative1 and they denote only the unity of one substance2 implication 7lakshan71 therefore1 does not take place4 ,when we say 'blue 7is7 7the7 lotus' we employ two words with the intention of expressing the unity of one thing1 and hence do not aim at expressing a duality of attributes1 viz4 the quality of blueness and the generic character of a lotus4 ,if this latter point was aimed at1 it would follow that the sentence would convey the oneness of the two aspects of the thing1 viz4 its being blue and its being a lotus2 but this is not possible1 for the thing 7denoted by the two terms7 is not characterised by 7the denotation of7 the word 'lotus1' in so far as itself characterised by blueness2 for this would imply a reciprocal inherence 7samavya7 of class-characteristics and quality ,,footnote #bai3a4 ,what the co-ordination of the two words conveys is1 therefore1 only the oneness of a substance characterised by the quality of blueness1 and at the same time by the class attributes of a lotus4 ,in the same way1 when we say 'this 7person is7 that ,devadatta' the co-ordination of the words cannot possibly mean that ,devadatta in so far as distinguished by his connexion with a past time and a distant place is one with ,devadatta in so far as distinguished by his connexion with the present time and a near place2 what it means to express is only that there is oneness on the part of a personal substance--which substance is characterised by connexion with both places and moments of time4 ,it is true indeed that when we at first hear the one word 'blue' we form the idea of the attribute of blueness1 while1 after having apprehended the relation of co-ordination 7expressed in 'blue is the lotus'71 this idea no longer presents itself1 for this would imply a contradiction2 but all the same 'implication' does not take place4 ,the essence of co-ordination consists1 in all cases1 therein that it suppresses the distinguishing elements in the words co-ordinated4 ,and as thus our explanation cannot be charged with 'implication1' it cannot be objected to4 ,all this1 we rejoin1 is unfounded4 ,what the words in all sentences whatsoever aim at conveying is only a particular connexion of the things known to be denoted by those words4 ,words such as 'blue1' standing in co- ordination with others1 express that some matter possessing the attribute of blueness1 c41 as known from the ordinary use of language1 is connected with some other matter4 ,when1 e4g41 somebody says 'bring the blue lotus1' a thing is brought which possesses the attribute of blueness4 ,and when we are told that 'a herd of elephants excited with passion lives in the ,vindhya-forest1' we again understand that what is meant is something possessing several attributes denoted by several words4 ,analogously we have to understand1 as the thing intimated by ,vednta-texts in the form of coordination1 ,brahman as possessing such and such attributes4--,it is an error to assume that1 where a sentence aims at setting forth attributes1 one attribute is to be taken as qualifying the thing in so far as qualified by another attribute2 the case rather is that the thing itself is equally qualified by all attributes4 ,for co-ordination means the application1 to one thing1 of several words having different reasons of application2 and the effect of co-ordination is that one and the same thing1 because being connected-- positively or negatively--with some attribute other than that which is conveyed by one word1 is also known through other words4 ,as e4g4 when it is said that ',devadatta 7is7 dark-complexioned1 young1 reddish-eyed1 not stupid1 not poor1 of irreproachable character4' ,where two co-ordinate words express two attributes which cannot exist combined in one thing1 one of the two words is to be taken in a secondary sense1 while the other retains its primary meaning1 as e4g4 in the case of the sentence1 ',the ,vhka man is an ox4' ,but in the case of the 'blue lotus' and the like1 where there is nothing contradictory in the connexion of the two attributes with one thing1 co-ordination expresses the fact of one thing being characterised by two attributes4--,possibly our opponent will here make the following remark4 ,a thing in so far as defined by its correlation to some one attribute is something different from the thing in so far as defined by its correlation to some second attribute2 hence1 even if there is equality of case affixes 7as in 'nlam utpalam'71 the words co-ordinated are incapable of expressing oneness1 and cannot1 therefore1 express the oneness of a thing qualified by several attributes2 not any more than the juxtaposition of two words such as 'jar' and 'cloth'--both having the same case-ending--can prove that these two things are one4 ,a statement of co-ordination1 therefore1 rather aims at expressing the oneness of a thing in that way that it presents to the mind the essential nature of the thing by means of 7words denoting7 its attributes4--,this would be so1 we reply1 if it were only the fact of a thing's standing in correlation to two attributes that is in the way of its unity4 ,but this is not the case2 for what stands in the way of such unity is the fact of there being several attributes which are not capable of being combined in one thing4 ,such incapability is1 in the case of the generic character of a jar and that of a piece of cloth1 proved by other means of knowledge2 but there is no contradiction between a thing being blue and its being a lotus2 not any more than there is between a man and the stick or the earrings he wears1 or than there is between the colour1 taste1 smell1 c41 of one and the same thing4 ,not only is there no contradiction1 but it is this very fact of one thing possessing two attributes which makes possible co- ordination--the essence of which is that1 owing to a difference of causes of application1 several words express one and the same thing4 ,for if there were nothing but essential unity of being1 what reason would there be for the employment of several words8 ,if the purport of the attributes were1 not to intimate their connexion with the thing1 but merely to suggest the thing itself1 one attribute would suffice for such suggestion1 and anything further would be meaningless4 ,if1 on the other hand1 it were assumed that the use of a further 'suggestive' attribute is to bring out a difference of aspect in the thing suggested1 such difference of aspect would imply differentiation in the thing 7which you maintain to be free from all difference74--,nor is there any shade even of 'implication' in the judgment1 ',this person is that ,devadatta'2 for there is absolutely no contradiction between the past ,devadatta1 who was connected with some distant place1 and the present ,devadatta1 who is connected with the place before us4 ,for this very reason those who maintain the permanency of things prove the oneness of a thing related to two moments of time on the basis of the judgment of recognition 7'this is that'72 if there really were a contradiction between the two representations it would follow that all things are 7not permanent but7 momentary only4 ,the fact is that the contradiction involved in one thing being connected with two places is removed by the difference of the correlative moments of time4 ,we therefore hold to the conclusion that co- ordinated words denote one thing qualified by the possession of several attributes4 ,for this very reason the ,vedic passage1 ',he buys the ,soma by means of a cow one year old1 of a tawny colour1 with reddish-brown eyes' 7arunay1 ekahyany1 pigkshy71 must be understood to enjoin that the purchase is to be effected by means of a cow one year old1 possessing the attributes of tawny colour1 c4 ,this point is discussed ,p4 ,m4 ,s4 ,,iii1 #a1 #ab4--,the ,prvapakshin there argues as follows3 ,we admit that the word 'arunay' 7'by means of a tawny one'7 denotes the quality of tawniness inclusive of the thing possessing that quality2 for qualities as well as generic character exist only in so far as being modes of substances4 ,but it is not possible to restrict tawny colour to connexion with a cow one year old1 for the injunction of two different things 7which would result from such restriction2 and which would necessitate the sentence to be construed as----7 ',he buys by means of a cow one year old1 and that a red one' is not permissible ,,footnote #bbb3a4 ,we must therefore break up the sentence into two1 one of which is constituted by the one word 'arunay'--this word expressing that tawny colour extends equally to all the substances enjoined in that section 7as instrumental towards the end of the sacrifice74 ,and the use of the feminine case-termination of the word is merely meant to suggest a special instance 7viz4 the cow7 of all the things1 of whatever gender1 which are enjoined in that section4 ,tawniness must not therefore be restricted to the cow one year old only4-- ,of this prvapaksha the ,stra disposes in the following words3 ',there being oneness of sense1 and hence connexion of substance and quality with one action1 there is restriction4'--,the fact that the two words 'arunay' and 'ekahyany'--which denote a substance1 viz4 a cow one year old1 distinguished by the quality of possessing tawny colour--stand in co-ordination establishes that they have one sense2 and is the substance1 viz4 the cow1 and the quality1 viz4 tawny colour--which the word 'arunay' denotes as standing in the relation of distinguishing attribute and thing distinguished thereby--can thus1 without any contradiction1 be connected with the one action called 'the buying of the ,soma'1 tawny colour is restricted to the cow one year old which is instrumental with regard to the purchase4 ,if the connexion of tawniness with the action of buying were to be determined from syntactical connexion--in the same way as there is made out the connexion of the cow one year old with that action--then the injunctory sentence would indeed enjoin two matters 7and this would be objectionable74 ,but such is not the case2 for the one word 'aruny' denotes a substance characterised by the quality of tawniness1 and the co-ordination in which 'arunay' stands to 'ekahyany' makes us apprehend merely that the thing characterised by tawniness also is one year old1 but does not make a special statement as to the connexion of that quality with the thing4 ,for the purport of co-ordination is the unity of a thing distinguished by attributes2 according to the definition that the application to one thing of several words possessing different reasons of application1 constitutes co-ordination4 ,for the same reason1 the syntactical unity 7ekavkyatvam7 of sentences such as 'the cloth is red' follows from all the words referring to one thing4 ,the function of the syntactical collocation is to express the connexion of the cloth with the action of being2 the connexion of the red colour 7with the cloth7 on the other hand is denoted by the word 'red' only4 ,and what is ascertained from co- ordination 7smndhikaranya7 is only that the cloth is a substance to which a certain colour belongs4 ,the whole matter may1 without any contradiction1 be conceived as follows4 ,several words--having either the affixes of the oblique cases or that of the nominative case--which denote one or two or several qualities1 present to the mind the idea of that which is characterised by those qualities1 and their co-ordination intimates that the thing characterised by all those attributes is one only2 and the entire sentence finally expresses the connexion in which the thing with its attributes stands to the action denoted by the verb4 ,this may be illustrated by various sentences exhibiting the co- ordination of words possessing different case-endings1 as e4g4 ',there stands ,devadatta1 a young man of a darkish complexion1 with red eyes1 wearing earrings and carrying a stick' 7where all the words standing in apposition to ,devadatta have the nominative termination72 ',let him make a stage curtain by means of a white cloth' 7where 'white' and 'cloth' have instrumental case-endings71 c4 c4 ,we may further illustrate the entire relation of co-ordinated words to the action by means of the following two examples3 ',let him boil rice in the cooking-pot by means of firewood'3 here we take in simultaneously the idea of an action distinguished by its connexion with several things4 ,if we now consider the following amplified sentence1 ',let a skilful cook prepare1 in a vessel of even shape1 boiled rice mixed with milk1 by means of sticks of dry khdira wood1' we find that each thing connected with the action is denoted by an aggregate of co-ordinated words2 but as soon as each thing is apprehended1 it is at one and the same moment conceived as something distinguished by several attributes1 and as such connects itself with the action expressed by the verb4 ,in all this there is no contradiction whatever4--,we must further object to the assertion that a word denoting a quality which stands in a sentence that has already mentioned a substance denotes the quality only 7exclusive of the substance so qualified71 and that hence the word 'arunay' also denotes a quality only4 ,the fact is that neither in ordinary nor in ,vedic language we ever meet with a word which--denoting a quality and at the same time standing in co-ordination with a word denoting a substance--denotes a mere quality4 ,nor is it correct to say that a quality-word occurring in a sentence which has already mentioned a substance denotes a mere quality3 for in a sentence such as 'the cloth 7is7 white1' where a substance is mentioned in the first place1 the quality-word clearly denotes 7not mere whiteness but7 something which possesses the quality of whiteness4 ,when1 on the other hand1 we have a collocation of words such as 'patasya suklah' 7'of the cloth'--gen42 'white' nom471 the idea of a cloth distinguished by whiteness does not arise2 but this is due not to the fact of the substance being mentioned first1 but to the fact of the two words exhibiting different case-terminations4 ,as soon as we add to those two words an appropriate third one1 e4g4 'bhgah' 7so that the whole means ',the white part of a cloth'71 the co-ordination of two words with the same case-termination gives rise to the idea of a thing distinguished by the attribute of whiteness4--,nor can we agree to the contention that1 as the buying of the ,soma is exclusively concluded by the cow one year old 7as instrumental in the purchase71 the quality of tawniness 7denoted by the word 'arunay'7 cannot connect itself with the action expressed by the verb2 for a word that denotes a quality and stands in co-ordination with a word denoting a substance which has no qualities opposed in nature to that quality1 denotes a quality abiding in that substance1 and thus naturally connects itself with the action expressed by the verb4 ,and since1 as shown1 the quality of tawniness connects itself with its substance 7the cow7 on the mere basis of the form of the words1 it is wrong 7on the part of the ,prvapakshin to abandon this natural connexion and7 to establish their connexion on the ground of their being otherwise incapable of serving as means of the purchase4 ,all this confirms our contention1 viz4 that the co-ordination of 'thou' and 'that' must be understood to express oneness1 without1 at the same time1 there being given up the different attributes denoted by the two words4 ,this however is not feasible for those who do not admit a highest ,self free from all imperfection and endowed with all perfections1 and different from that intelligent soul which is conditioned by ,nescience1 involved in endless suffering and undergoing alternate states of purity and impurity4--,but1 an objection is raised1 even if such a highest ,self be acknowledged1 it would have to be admitted that the sentence aims at conveying the oneness of that which is distinguished by the different attributes denoted by the words co-ordinated1 and from this it follows that the highest ,self participates in all the suffering expressed by the word 'thou'6--,this is not so1 we reply2 since the word 'thou' also denotes the highest ,self1 viz4 in so far as it is the inner ,ruler 7antarymin7 of all souls4--,the connected meaning of the text is as follows4 ,that which is denoted as ',being1' i4e4 the highest ,brahman which is the cause of all1 free from all shadow of imperfection1 c41 resolved 'to be many'2 it thereupon sent forth the entire world1 consisting of fire1 water1 c42 introduced1 in this world so sent forth1 the whole mass of individual souls into different bodies divine1 human1 c41 corresponding to the desert of each soul--the souls thus constituting the ,self of the bodies2 and finally1 itself entering according to its wish into these souls--so as to constitute their inner ,self--evolved in all these aggregates1 names and forms1 i4e4 rendered each aggregate something substantial 7vastu7 and capable of being denoted by a word4 ',let me enter into these beings with this living ,self 7jvena tmana7 means 'with this living me1' and this shows the living ,self1 i4e4 the individual soul to have ,brahman for its ,self4 ,and that this having ,brahman for its ,self means ,brahman's being the inner ,self of the soul 7i4e4 the ,self inside the soul1 but not identical with it71 ,scripture declares by saying that ,brahman entered into it4 ,this is clearly stated in the passage ,taitt4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #f1 ',he sent forth all this1 whatever there is4 ,having sent forth he entered into it4 ,having entered it he became sat and tyat4' ,for here 'all this' comprises beings intelligent as well as non-intelligent1 which afterwards are distinguished as sat and tyat1 as knowledge 7vijna7 and non- knowledge4 ,brahman is thus said to enter into intelligent beings also4 ,hence1 owing to this evolution of names and forms1 all words denote the highest ,self distinguished by non-intelligent matter and intelligent souls4--,another text1 viz4 ,ch4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #h1 #g1';,all this has its ,self in that1' denotes by 'all this' the entire world inclusive of intelligent souls1 and says that of this world that 7i4e4 ,brahman7 is the ,self4 ,brahman thus being the ,self with regard to the whole universe of matter and souls1 the universe inclusive of intelligent souls is the body of ,brahman4--,other scriptural texts teach the same doctrine2 cp4 ',entered within1 the ruler of beings1 the ,self of all' 7,taitt4 r4 ,,iii1 #bd72';,he who dwelling in the earth is within the earth--whose body is the earth1' c41 up to 'he who dwelling within the ,self is within the ,self1 whom the ,self does not know1 of whom the ,self is the body1 who rules the ,self from within1 he is thy ,self1 the ,ruler within1 the ,immortal' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #g1 #c-bb2 ,mdhyand4 ,s472 ',he who moves within the earth1 of whom the earth is the body1 c4--who moves within the ,imperishable1 of whom the ,imperishable is the body1 whom the ,imperishable does not know2 he the inward ruler of all beings1 free from evil1 the divine1 the one god1 ,nrayana' 7,sub4 ,up4 ,,vii74 ,all these texts declare that the world inclusive of intelligent souls is the body of the highest ,self1 and the latter the ,self of everything4 ,hence those words also that denote intelligent souls designate the highest ,self as having intelligent souls for his body and constituting the ,self of them2 in the same way as words denoting non-sentient masses of matter1 such as the bodies of gods1 men1 c41 designate the individual souls to which those bodies belong4 ,for the body stands towards the embodied soul in the relation of a mode 7prakra72 and as words denoting a mode accomplish their full function only in denoting the thing to which the mode belongs1 we must admit an analogous comprehensiveness of meaning for those words which denote a body4 ,for1 when a thing is apprehended under the form 'this is such1' the element apprehended as 'such' is what constitutes a mode2 now as this element is relative to the thing1 the idea of it is also relative to the thing1 and finds its accomplishment in the thing only2 hence the word also which expresses the mode finds its accomplishment in the thing4 ,hence words such as 'cow'1 'horse'1 'man'1 which denote a mode1 viz4 a species1 comprise in their meaning also that mass of matter which exhibits the characteristics of the species1 and as that mass of matter constitutes the body and therefore is a mode of a soul1 and as that soul again1 so embodied1 is a mode of the highest ,self2 it follows that all these words extend in their signification up to the highest ,self4 ,the meaning of all words then is the highest ,self1 and hence their co- ordination with words directly denoting that highest ,self is a primary 7not merely 'implied'7 one4 ,but1 an objection is raised1 we indeed observe that words denoting species or qualities stand in co-ordination to words denoting substances1 'the ox is short-horned1' 'the sugar is white'2 but where substances appear as the modes of other substances we find that formative affixes are used1 'the man is dandin1 kundalin' 7bearing a stick2 wearing earrings74--,this is not so1 we reply4 ,there is nothing to single out either species1 or quality1 or substance1 as what determines co- ordination3 co-ordination disregards such limitations4 ,whenever a thing 7whether species1 or quality1 or substance7 has existence as a mode only--owing to its proof1 existence and conception being inseparably connected with something else--the words denoting it1 as they designate a substance characterised by the attribute denoted by them1 appropriately enter into co-ordination with other words denoting the same substance as characterised by other attributes4 ,where1 on the other hand1 a substance which is established in separation from other things and rests on itself1 is assumed to stand occasionally in the relation of mode to another substance1 this is appropriately expressed by the use of derived forms such as 'dandin1 kundalin4' ,hence such words as ',i1' 'thou1' c41 which are different forms of appellation of the individual soul1 at bottom denote the highest ,self only2 for the individual souls together with non-sentient matter are the body--and hence modes--of the highest ,self4 ,this entire view is condensed in the co-ordination ',thou art that4' ,the individual soul being thus connected with the highest ,self as its body1 its attributes do not touch the highest ,self1 not any more than infancy1 youth1 and other attributes of the material body touch the individual soul4 ,hence1 in the co-ordination ',thou art that1' the word 'that' denotes the highest ,brahman which is the cause of the world1 whose purposes come true1 which comprises within itself all blessed qualities1 which is free from all shadow of evil2 while the word 'thou' denotes the same highest ,self in so far as having for its body the individual souls together with their bodies4 ,the terms co-ordinated may thus be taken in their primary senses2 there is no contradiction either with the subject-matter of the section1 or with scripture in general2 and not a shadow of imperfection such as ,nescience1 and so on1 attaches to ,brahman1 the blameless1 the absolutely blessed4 ,the co- ordination with the individual soul thus proves only the difference of ,brahman from the soul1 which is a mere mode of ,brahman2 and hence we hold that different from the ,self consisting of knowledge1 i4e4 the individual soul1 is the ,self consisting of bliss1 i4e4 the highest ,self4 ,nor is there any force in the objection that as the ,self of bliss is said to be 'srira1' i4e4 embodied-viz4 in the clause 'of him the embodied ,self is the same' 7,taitt4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #e1 #f7--;it cannot be different from the individual soul4 ,for throughout this section the recurring clause 'of him the embodied ,self is the same as of the preceding one1' refers to the highest ,self1 calling that the 'embodied' one4 ,the clause ',from that same ,self sprang ether' 7,,ii1 #a7 designates the highest ,brahman-which is different from the individual soul and is introduced as the highest cause of all things created--as the ',self'2 whence we conclude that all things different from it--from ether up to the ,self of food constitute its body4 ,the ,subla-upanishad moreover states quite directly that all beings constitute the body of the highest ,self3 ',he of whom the earth is the body1 of whom water is the body1 of whom fire is the body1 of whom wind is the body1 of whom ether is the body1 of whom the ,imperishable is the body1 of whom ,death is the body1 he the inner ,self of all1 the divine one1 the one god ,nryana4' ,from this it follows that what constitutes the embodied ,self of the ,self of food is nothing else but the highest ,self referred to in the clause ',from that same ,self sprang ether4' ,when1 then1 the text further on says with regard to the ,self of breath1 'of him the embodied ,self is the same as of the preceding one' 7,,ii1 #c71 the meaning can only be that what constitutes the embodied ,self of the 'preceding' ,self of food1 viz4 the highest ,self which is the universal cause1 is also the embodied ,self of the ,self consisting of breath4 ,the same reasoning holds good with regard to the ,self consisting of mind and the ,self consisting of knowledge4 ,in the case1 finally1 of the ,self consisting of bliss1 the expression 'the same' 7esha eva7 is meant to convey that that ,self has its ,self in nothing different from itself4 ,for when1 after having understood that the highest ,self is the embodied ,self of the vijnamaya also1 we are told that the embodied ,self of that vijnamaya is also the embodied ,self of the nandamaya1 we understand that of the nandamaya--which we know to be the highest ,self on the ground of 'multiplication'--its own ,self is the ,self4 ,the final purport of the whole section thus is that everything different from the highest ,self1 whether of intelligent or non-intelligent nature1 constitutes its body1 while that ,self alone is the non-conditioned embodied ,self4 ,for this very reason competent persons designate this doctrine which has the highest ,brahman for its subject-matter as the 'srraka1' i4 e4 the doctrine of the 'embodied' ,self4--,we have thus arrived at the conclusion that the ,self of bliss is something different from the individual ,self1 viz4 the highest ,self4 ,here the ,prvapakshin raises the following objection4--,the ,self consisting of bliss 7nandamaya7 is not something different from the individual soul1 because the formative element--maya denotes something made1 a thing effected4 ,that this is the meaning of--maya in nandamaya we know from ,pnini ,,iv1 #c1 #add4--;,but according to ,p4 ,v1 #d1 #ba1--maya has also the sense of 'abounding in'2 as when we say 'the sacrifice is annamaya1' i4e4 abounds in food4 ,and this may be its sense in 'nandamaya' also6--,not so1 the ,prvapakshin replies4 ,in 'annamaya1' in an earlier part of the chapter1--maya has the sense of 'made of'1 'consisting of'2 and for the sake of consistency1 we must hence ascribe the same sense to it in 'nandamaya4' ,and even if1 in the latter word1 it denoted abundance1 this would not prove that the nandamaya is other than the individual soul4 ,for if we say that a ,self 'abounds' in bliss1 this implies that with all this bliss there is mixed some small part of pain2 and to be 'mixed with pain' is what constitutes the character of the individual soul4 ,it is therefore proper to assume1 in agreement with its previous use1 that 'nandamaya' means 'consisting of bliss4' ,in ordinary speech as well as in ,vedic language 7cp4 common words such as 'mrinmaya1' 'hiranmaya'2 and ,vedic clauses such as 'parnamayijuhh'7 -maya as a rule means 'consisting of1' and this meaning hence presents itself to the mind first4 ,and the individual soul may be denoted as 'made of bliss'2 for in itself it is of the essence of bliss1 and its ,samsra state therefore is something 'made of bliss4' ,the conclusion therefore is that1 owing to the received meaning of -maya1 the nandamaya is none other than the individual soul4--,to this prim facie view the next ,stra refers and refutes it4 ,,footnote #bai3a4 ,i4e4 we should not in that case be able to decide whether the quality 7i4e41 here1 the blueness7 inheres in the class 7i4e41 here1 the lotus71 or vice versa4 ,,footnote #bbb3a4 ,for it would imply so-called vkyabheda1 'split of the sentence1' which arises when one injunctory clause is made to enjoin two different things4 #ad4 ,if1 on account of its being a word denoting an effect1 7nandamaya be said7 not 7to denote the highest ,self72 7we say7 no1 on account of abundance4 ,we deny the conclusion of the ,prvapakshin1 on the ground of there being abundance of bliss in the highest ,brahman1 and 'abundance' being one of the possible meanings of -maya4--,since bliss such as described in the ,taitt4 ,up4--bliss which is reached by successively multiplying by hundred all inferior kinds of bliss--cannot belong to the individual soul1 we conclude that it belongs to ,brahman2 and as ,brahman cannot be an effect1 and as -maya1 may have the sense of 'abounding in1' we conclude that the nandamaya is ,brahman itself2 inner contradiction obliging us to set aside that sense of -maya which is recommended by regard to 'consequence' and frequency of usage4 ,the regard for consistency1 moreover1 already has to be set aside in the case of the 'prnamaya'2 for in that term -maya cannot denote 'made of4' ,the 'prnamaya' ,self can only be called by that name in so far as air with its five modifications has 7among others7 the modification called prna1 i4e4 breathing out1 or because among the five modifications or functions of air prna is the 'abounding1' i4e4 prevailing one4--,nor can it be truly said that -maya is but rarely used in the sense of 'abounding in'3 expressions such as 'a sacrifice abounding in food' 7annamaya71 'a procession with many carriages' 7sakatamay71 are by no means uncommon4-- ,nor can we admit that to call something 'abounding in bliss' implies the presence of some pain4 ,for 'abundance' precludes paucity on the part of that which is said to abound1 but does not imply the presence of what is contrary4 ,the presence or absence of what is contrary has to be ascertained by other means of proof2 and in our case we do ascertain the absence of what is contrary to bliss by such means1 viz4 the clause 'free from evil1' c4 ,abundance of bliss on the part of ,brahman certainly implies a relation to paucity on the part of some other bliss2 and in accordance with this demand the text says ',that is one measure of human bliss1' c4 7,,ii1 #h1 #a74 ,the bliss of ,brahman is of measureless abundance1 compared to the bliss of the individual soul4--,nor can it be maintained that the individual soul may be viewed as being an effect of bliss4 ,for that a soul whose essential nature is knowledge and bliss should in any way be changed into something else1 as a lump of clay is made into a pot1 is an assumption contradicted by all scripture1 sacred tradition1 and reasoning4 ,that in the ,samsra state the soul's bliss and knowledge are contracted owing to karman will be shown later on4--,the ,self of bliss therefore is other than the individual soul2 it is ,brahman itself4 ,a further reason for this conclusion is supplied by the next ,stra4 #ae4 ,and because he is declared to be the cause of thatra4 ',for who could breathe1 who could breathe forth1 if that bliss existed not in the ether8 ,he alone causes bliss' 7,taitt4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #g74 ,this means-- ,he alone is the cause of bliss on the part of the individual souls4-- ,some one is here designated as the cause of bliss enjoyed by the souls2 and we thus conclude that the causer of bliss1 who must be other than the souls to which bliss is imparted1 is the highest ,self abounding in bliss4 ,in the passage quoted the term 'bliss' denotes him who abounds in bliss1 as will be shown later on4--,a further reason is given in the next ,stra4 #af4 ,and because that 7,brahman7 which is referred to in the mantra is declared 7to be the nandamaya74 ,that ,brahman which is described in the mantra1 ',true ,being1 knowledge1 infinite is ,biahman1' is proclaimed as the ,self abounding in bliss4 ,and that ,brahman is the highest ,brahman1 other than the individual soul2 for the passage ',he who knows ,brahman attains the ,highest' refers to ,brahman as something to be obtained by the individual soul1 and the words ',on this the following verse is recorded' show that the verse is related to that same ,brahman4 ,the mantra thus is meant to render clear the meaning of the ,brhmana passage4 ,now the ,brahman to be reached by the meditating ,devotee must be something different from him4 ,the same point is rendered clear by all the following ,brhmana passages and mantras3 'from that same ,self sprang ether1' and so on4 ,the ,self abounding in bliss therefore is other than the individual soul4 ,here an opponent argues as follows3--,we indeed must acknowledge that the object to be reached is something different from the meditating ,devotee2 but the fact is that the ,brahman described in the mantra does not substantially differ from the individual soul2 that ,brahman is nothing but the soul of the ,devotee in its pure state1 consisting of mere non- differenced intelligence1 free from all shade of ,nescience4 ,to this pure condition it is reduced in the mantra describing it as true ,being1 knowledge1 infinite4 ,a subsequent passage1 'that from which all speech1 with the mind1 turns away1 unable to reach it' 7,,ii4 #i71 expresses this same state of non-differentiation1 describing it as lying beyond mind and speech4 ,it is this therefore to which the mantra refers1 and the ,self of bliss is identical with it4--,to this view the next ,stra replies4 #ag4 ,not the other1 on account of impossibility4 ,the other than the highest ,self1 i4e4 the one called jva1 even in the state of release1 is not that ,self which the mantra describes2 for this is not possible4 ,for to a ,self of that kind unconditioned intelligence 7such as is1 in the mantra1 ascribed to ,brahman2 cp4 the term 'vipaskit'7 cannot belong4 ,unconditioned intelligence is illustrated by the power of all one's purposes realising themselves2 as expressed in the text ',he desired1 may ,i be many1 may ,i grow forth4' ,intelligence 7vipaskittvam1 i4e4 power of insight into various things7 does indeed belong to the soul in the state of release2 but as in the ,samsra state the same soul is devoid of such insight1 we cannot ascribe to it non- conditioned intelligence4 ,and if the released soul is viewed as being mere non-differenced intelligence1 it does not possess the capacity of seeing different things1 and hence cannot of course possess vipaskittva in the sense stated above4 ,that1 however1 the existence of a substance devoid of all difference cannot be proved by any means of knowledge1 we have already shown before4 ,again1 if the clause 'from whence speech returns1' c41 were meant to express that speech and mind return from ,brahman1 this could not mean that the ,real is devoid of all difference1 but only that mind and speech are not means for the knowledge of ,brahman4 ,and from this it would follow that ,brahman is something altogether empty1 futile4 ,let us examine the context4 ,the whole section1 beginning with ',he who knows ,brahman reaches ,brahman1' declares that ,brahman is all- knowing1 the cause of the world1 consisting of pure bliss1 the cause of bliss in others2 that through its mere wish it creates the whole universe comprising matter and souls2 that entering into the universe of created things it constitutes their ,self2 that it is the cause of fear and fearlessness2 that it rules ,vyu ditya and other divine beings2 that its bliss is ever so much superior to all other bliss2 and many other points4 ,now1 all at once1 the clause 'from whence speech returns' is said to mean that neither speech nor mind applies to ,brahman1 and that thus there are no means whatever of knowing ,brahman6 ,this is idle talk indeed6 ,in the clause '7that7 from which speech returns1' the relative pronoun 'from which' denotes bliss2 this bliss is again explicitly referred to in the clause 'knowing the bliss of ,brahman'--the genitive 'of ,brahman' intimating that the bliss belongs to ,brahman2 what then could be the meaning of this clause which distinctly speaks of a knowledge of ,brahman1 if ,brahman had at the same time to be conceived as transcending all thought and speech8 ,what the clause really means rather is that if one undertakes to state the definite amount of the bliss of ,brahman--the superabundance of which is illustrated by the successive multiplications with hundred--mind and speech have to turn back powerless1 since no such definite amount can be assigned4 ,he who knows the bliss of ,brahman as not to be defined by any definite amount1 does not fear anything4--,that1 moreover1 the all-wise being referred to in the mantra is other than the individual soul in the state of release1 is rendered perfectly clear by what--in passages such as 'it desired1' c4-- is said about its effecting1 through its mere volition1 the origination and subsistence of the world1 its being the inner ,self of the world1 and so on4 #ah4 ,and on account of the declaration of difference4 ,the part of the chapter--beginning with the words ',from that same ,self there sprang ether'--which sets forth the nature of the ,brahman referred to in the mantra1 declares its difference from the individual soul1 no less than from the ,selfs consisting of food1 breath1 and mind1 viz4 in the clause 'different from this which consists of knowledge1 is the other inner ,self which consists of bliss4'--,through this declaration of difference from the individual soul we know that the ,self of bliss referred to in the mantra is other than the individual soul4 #ai4 ,and on account of desire1 there is no regard to what is inferred 7i4 e4 matter74 ,in order that the individual soul which is enthralled by ,nescience may operate as the cause of the world1 it must needs be connected with non- sentient matter1 called by such names as pradhna1 or numnika 7that which is inferred74 ,for such is the condition for the creative energy of ,brahm and similar beings4 ,our text1 on the other hand1 teaches that the creation of the aggregate of sentient and non-sentient things results from the mere wish of a being free from all connexion with non-sentient matter1 ',he desired1 may ,i be many1 may ,i grow forth2' ',he sent forth all1 whatever there is' 7,taitt4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #f74 ,we thus understand that that ,self of bliss which sends forth the world does not require connexion with non-sentient matter called numnika1 and hence conclude that it is other than the individual soul4--,a further reason is stated in the next ,stra4 #bj4 ,and ,scripture teaches the joining of this 7i4e4 the individual soul7 with that 7i4e4 bliss7 in that 7i4e4 the nandamaya74 ',a flavour he is indeed2 having obtained a flavour this one enjoys bliss' 7,taitt4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #g74 ,this text declares that this one1 i4e4 the so- called individual soul1 enjoys bliss through obtaining the nandamaya1 here called 'flavour4' ,now to say that any one is identical with that by obtaining which he enjoys bliss1 would be madness indeed4--,it being thus ascertained that the ,self of bliss is the highest ,brahman1 we conclude that in passages such as 'if that bliss were not in the ether' 7,taitt4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #g74 and 'knowledge1 bliss is ,brahman' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #i1 #bh71 the word 'nanda' denotes the 'nandamaya'2 just as vijna means the vijnamaya4 ,it is for the same reason 7viz4 of nanda meaning the same as nandamaya7 that the clause 'he who knows the bliss of ,brahman' exhibits ,brahman as being connected with nanda1 and that the further clause 'he who knows this reaches the ,self of bliss1' declares the reaching of the ,self of bliss to be the fruit of the knowledge of bliss4 ,in the subsequent anuvka also1 in the clauses 'he perceived that food is ,brahman1' 'he perceived that breath is ,brahman1' c4 7,,iii1 i2 #b1 c471 the words 'food1' 'breath1' and so on1 are meant to suggest the ,self made of food1 the ,self made of breath1 c41 mentioned in the preceding anuvka2 and hence also in the clause 'he perceived that bliss is ,brahman1' the word 'bliss' must be understood to denote the ,self of bliss4 ,hence1 in the same anuvka1 the account of the fate after death of the man who knows concludes with the words 'having reached the ,self of bliss' 7,,iii1 #aj1e74 ,it is thus finally proved that the highest ,brahman--which in the previous adhikarana had to be shown to be other than the so-called ,pradhna--is also other than the being called individual soul4--,this concludes the topic of the nandamaya4 ,a new doubt here presents itself4--,it must indeed be admitted that such individual souls as possess only a moderate degree of merit are unable to accomplish the creation of the world by their mere wish1 to enjoy supreme bliss1 to be the cause of fearlessness1 and so on2 but why should not beings like ditya and ,prajpati1 whose merit is extraordinarily great1 be capable of all this8--,of this suggestion the next ,stra disposes4 #ba4 ,the one within 7the sun and the eye72 on account of his qualities being declared4 ,it is said in the ,chndogya3 ',now that person bright as gold1 who is seen within the sun1 with beard bright as gold and hair bright as gold1 golden altogether to the very tips of his nails1 whose eyes are like blue lotus2 his name is ,ut1 for he has risen 7udita7 above all evil4 ,he also who knows this rises above all evil4 ,rik and ,sman are his joints4- ,so much with reference to the devas4--,now with reference to the body4-- ,now that person who is seen within the eye1 he is ,rik1 he is ,sman1 ,uktha1 ,yajus1 ,brahman4 ,the form of this person 7in the eye7 is the same as of that person yonder 7in the sun71 the joints of the one are the joints of the other1 the name of the one is the--name of the other' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,i1 #g74--;,here there arises the doubt whether that person dwelling within the eye and the sun be the individual soul called ditya1 who through accumulation of religious merit possesses lordly power1 or the highest ,self other than that soul4 ,that individual soul of high merit1 the ,prvapakshin maintains4 ,for the text states that that person has a body1 and connexion with a body belongs to individual souls only1 for it is meant to bring the soul into contact with pleasure and pain1 according to its deserts4 ,it is for this reason that ,scripture describes final ,release where there is no connexion with works as a state of disembodiedness4 ',so long as he is in the body he cannot get free from pleasure and pain4 ,but when he is free from the body1 then neither pleasure nor pain touches him' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,viii1 #ab1 #a74 ,and a soul of transcendent merit may possess surpassing wisdom and power1 and thus be capable of being lord of the worlds and the wishes 7,i1 #f1 #h74 ,for the same reason such a soul may be the object of devout meditation1 bestow rewards1 and by being instrumental in destroying evil1 be helpful towards final release4 ,even among men some are seen to be of superior knowledge and power1 owing to superior religious merit2 and this holds good with regard to the ,siddhas and ,gandharvas also2 then with regard to the devas2 then with regard to the divine beings1 beginning with ,indra4 ,hence1 also1 one among the divine beings1 beginning with ,brahm1 may in each kalpa reach1 through a particularly high degree of merit1 vast lordly power and thus effect the creation of the world1 and so on4 ,on this supposition the texts about that which constitutes the cause of the world and the inward ,self of the world must also be understood to refer to some such soul which1 owing to superiority of merit1 has become all-knowing and all-powerful4 ,a so- called highest ,self1 different from the individual souls1 does not therefore exist4 ,where the texts speak of that which is neither coarse nor fine nor short1 c41 they only mean to characterise the individual soul2 and those texts also which refer to final ,release aim only at setting forth the essential nature of the individual soul and the means of attaining that essential nature4 ,this prim facie view is set aside by the ,stra4 ,the person who is perceived within the sun and within the eye1 is something different from the individual soul1 viz4 the highest ,self2 because there are declared qualities belonging to that4 ,the text ascribes to him the quality of having risen above1 i4e4 being free from all evil1 and this can belong to the highest ,self only1 not to the individual soul4 ,for to be free from all evil means to be free from all influence of karman1 and this quality can belong to the highest ,self only1 differing from all individual souls which1 as is shown by their experience of pleasure and pain1 are in the bonds of karman4 ,those essential qualities also which presuppose freedom from all evil 7and which are mentioned in other ,vedic passages71 such as mastery over all worlds and wishes1 capability of realising one's purposes1 being the inner ,self of all1 c41 belong to the highest ,self alone4 ,compare passages such as ',it is the ,self free from evil1 free from old age1 from death and grief1 from hunger and thirst1 whose wishes come true1 whose purposes come true' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,viii1 #a1 #e72 and ',he is the inner ,self of all1 free from evil1 the divine one1 the one god ,nryana' 7,sub4 ,up474 ,attributes such as the attribute of being the creator of the whole universe--which presupposes the power of realising one's wishes--7cp4 the passage 'it desired1 may ,i be many'72 the attribute of being the cause of fear and fearlessness2 the attribute of enjoying transcending bliss not limited by the capabilities of thought and speech and the like1 are essential characteristics of that only which is not touched by karman1 and they cannot therefore belong to the individual soul4--,nor is there any truth in the contention that the person within the sun1 c41 cannot be a being different from individual souls because it possesses a body4 ,for since a being which possesses the power of realising all its desires can assume a body through its mere wish1 it is not generally true that embodiedness proves dependence on karman4--,but1 it may be said1 by a body we understand a certain combination of matter which springs from the primal substance 7prakriti7 with its three constituents4 ,now connexion with such a body cannot possibly be brought about by the wish of such souls even as are free from all evil and capable of realising their desires2 for such connexion would not be to the soul's benefit4 ,in the case1 on the other hand1 of a soul subject to karman and not knowing its own essential nature1 such connexion with a body necessarily takes place in order that the soul may enjoy the fruit of its actions--quite apart from the soul's desire4-- ,your objection would be well founded1 we reply1 if the body of the highest ,self were an effect of ,prakriti with its three constituents2 but it is not so1 it rather is a body suitable to the nature and intentions of that ,self4 ,the highest ,brahman1 whose nature is fundamentally antagonistic to all evil and essentially composed of infinite knowledge and bliss--whereby it differs from all other souls--possesses an infinite number of qualities of unimaginable excellence1 and1 analogously1 a divine form suitable to its nature and intentions1 i4e4 adorned with infinite1 supremely excellent and wonderful qualities-- splendour1 beauty1 fragrance1 tenderness1 loveliness1 youthfulness1 and so on4 ,and in order to gratify his devotees he individualises that form so as to render it suitable to their apprehension--he who is a boundless ocean as it were of compassion1 kindness and lordly power1 whom no shadow of evil may touch---he who is the highest ,self1 the highest ,brahman1 the supreme soul1 ,nryana6--,certain texts tell us that the highest ,brahman is the sole cause of the entire world3 ',from which these beings originate' 7,taitt4 ,up472 ',being only was this in the beginning' 7,kh4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #b1 #a72 ',the ,self only was this in the beginning' 7,ai4 ,up4 ,i1 #a72 ',nryana alone existed1 not ,brahm nor ,siva4' ,other texts define his nature3 ',the ,true1 knowledge1 infinite is ,brahman' 7,taitt4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #a1 #a72 ',knowledge1 bliss is ,brahman' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iii4 #i4 #bh72 and others again deny of ,brahman all connexion with evil qualities and inferior bodies sprung from ,prakriti1 and all dependence on karman1 and proclaim his glorious qualities and glorious forms3 ',free from qualities' 7872 ',free from taint' 7,svet4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #ai72 ',free from old age1 from death and grief1 from hunger and thirst1 realising his wishes and purposes' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,viii1 #a1 #e72 ',there is no effect and no cause known of him1 no one is seen like to him or superior3 his high power is revealed as manifold1 as inherent action of force and knowledge' 7,svet4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #h72 ',that highest great lord of lords1 the highest deity of deities' 7,svet4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #g72 ',he is the cause1 the lord of the lords of the organs1 and there is of him neither parent nor lord' 7,svet4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #i72 ',having created all forms and given names to them the wise one goes on calling them by those names' 7,taitt4 r4 ,,iii1 #ab1 #g72 ',i know that great ,person of sunlike lustre beyond the darkness' 7,svet4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #h72 ',all moments originated from the ,person shining like lightning' 7,mahnr4 ,up4 ,i1 #f74--,this essential form of his the most compassionate ,lord by his mere will individualises as a shape human or divine or otherwise1 so as to render it suitable to the apprehension of the devotee and thus satisfy him4 ,this the following scriptural passage declares1 ',unborn he is born in many ways' 7,gau4 ,k4 ,,iii1 #bd72 and likewise ,smriti4 ',though unborn ,i1 the imperishable ,self1 the ,lord of the beings1 presiding over my ,nature1 manifest myself by my ,mya for the protection of the ,good and the destruction of the evil doers '7,bha4 ,g4 ,,iv1 #f4 #h74 ,the ',good' here are the ,devotees2 and by ',mya' is meant the purpose1 the knowledge of the ,divine ,being--2 in agreement with the ,naighantukas who register ',mya' as a synonym of jna 7knowledge74 ,in the ,mahbhrata also the form assumed by the highest ,person in his avatras is said not to consist of ,prakriti1 'the body of the highest ,self does not consist of a combination of material elements4'--,for these reasons the ,person within the ,sun and the eye is the highest ,self which is different from the individual soul of the ,sun1 c4 #bb4 ,and on account of the declaration of difference 7the highest ,self is7 other 7than the individual souls of the sun1 c474 ,there are texts which clearly state that the highest ,self is different from ditya and the other individual souls3 ',he who1 dwelling within ,aditya 7the sun71 is different from ditya1 whom ditya does not know1 of whom ditya is the body1 who rules ditya from within2 who dwelling within the ,self is different from the ,self1' c4 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #g1 #i ff4 72 ',of whom the ,imperishable is the body1 whom the ,imperishable does not know2 who moves within ,death1 of whom ,death is the body1 whom ,death does not know2 he is the inner self of all beings1 free from evil1 divine1 the one ,god ,nryana' 7,sub4 ,up4 ,,vii74 ,these texts declare all individual souls to be the body of the sinless highest ,self which is said to be the inward principle of all of them4--,it is thereby completely proved that the highest ,self is something different from all individual souls such as ditya1 and so on4--,here terminates the adhikarana of the 'one within4' ,the text1 ',that from which these beings are born1' teaches that ,brahman is the cause of the world2 to the question thence arising of what nature that cause of the world is1 certain other texts give a reply in general terms 7' ,being only this was in the beginning'2 ',it sent forth fire'2 ',the ,self only this was in the beginning1' c472 and thereupon it is shown on the basis of the special nature of that cause as proved by the attributes of 'thought' and 'bliss1' that ,brahman is different from the pradhna and the individual souls4 ,the remaining part of this ,pda now is devoted to the task of proving that where such special terms as ,ether and the like are used in sections setting forth the creation and government of the world1 they designate not the thing-sentient or non- sentient--which is known from ordinary experience1 but ,brahman as proved so far4 #bc4 ,ether 7is ,brahman71 on account of the characteristic marks4 ,we read in the ,chndogya 7,i1 #i71 ',what is the origin of this world8' ',ether1' he replied4 ',for all these beings spring from the ether only1 and return into the ether4 ,ether is greater than these2 ether is their rest4' ,here there arises the doubt whether the word 'ether' denotes the well-known element or ,brahman4--,the ,prvapakshin maintains the former alternative4 ,for1 he says1 in the case of things to be apprehended through words we must accept that sense of the word which1 proved by etymology1 is immediately suggested by the word4 ,we therefore conclude from the passage that the well-known ,ether is the cause of the entire aggregate of things1 moving or non-moving1 and that hence ,brahman is the same as ,ether4--,but has it not been shown that ,brahman is something different from non-sentient things because its creative activity is preceded by thought8--,this has been asserted indeed1 but by no means proved4 ,for the proper way to combine the different texts is as follows4 ,having been told that 'that from which these beings are born is ,brahman'1 we desire to know more especially what that source of all beings is1 and this desire is satisfied by the special information given by the text1 ',all these things spring from the ether4' ,it thus being ascertained that the ether only is the cause of the origin1 and so on1 of the world1 we conclude that also such general terms as ',being' 7',being only was this in the beginning'7 denote the particular substance called 'ether4' ,and we further conclude that in passages such as 'the ,self only was all this in the beginning'1 the word ',self 7tman7 also denotes the ether2 for that word is by no means limited to non-sentient things--cp41 e4g41 the phrase1 ',clay constitutes the ,self of the jar'--1 and its etymology also 7tman from p1 to reach7 shows that it may very well be applied to the ether4 ,it having thus been ascertained that the ether is the general cause or ,brahman1 we must interpret such words as 'thinking' 7which we meet with in connexion with the creative activity of the general cause7 in a suitable1 i4e4 secondary1 or metaphorical sense4 ,if the texts denoted the general cause by general terms only1 such as ',being'1 we should1 in agreement with the primary sense of 'thinking'1 and similar terms1 decide that that cause is an intelligent being2 but since1 as a matter of fact1 we ascertain a particular cause on the basis of the word 'ether'1 our decision cannot be formed on general considerations of what would suit the sense4--,but what then about the passage1 ',from the ,self there sprang the ether' 7,taitt4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #a1 #a71 from which it appears that the ether itself is something created8--,all elementary substances1 we reply1 such as ether1 air1 and so on1 have two different states1 a gross material one1 and a subtle one4 ,the ether1 in its subtle state1 is the universal cause2 in its gross state it is an effect of the primal cause2 in its gross state it thus springs from itself1 i4e4 ether in the subtle state4 ,the text1 ',all these beings spring from ether only' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,i1 #i1 #a71 declares that the whole world originates from ether only1 and from this it follows that ether is none other than the general cause of the world1 i4e4 ,brahman4 ,this non-difference of ,brahman from the empirically known ether also gives a satisfactory sense to texts such as the following3 ',if this ether were not bliss' 7,taitt4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #g1 #a72 ',ether1 indeed1 is the evolver of names and forms' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,viii1 #ad1 #a1 and so on74--,it thus appears that ,brahman is none other than the well- known elemental ether4 ,this prim facie view is set aside by the ,stra4 ,the word 'ether' in the text under discussion denotes the highest ,self with its previously established characteristics--which is something quite different from the non-sentient elemental ether4 ,for the qualities which the passage attributes to ether1 viz4 its being the one cause of the entire world1 its being greater than all1 and the rest of all1 clearly indicate the highest ,self4 ,the non-intelligent elemental ether cannot be called the cause of all1 since intelligent beings clearly cannot be its effects2 nor can it be called the 'rest' of intelligent beings1 for non-sentient things are evil and antagonistic to the true aim of man2 nor can it be called 'greater' than all1 for it is impossible that a non-sentient element should possess all excellent qualities whatever and thus be absolutely superior to everything else4--,nor is the ,prvapakshin right when maintaining that1 as the word 'ether' satisfies the demand for a special cause of the world1 all other texts are to be interpreted in accordance herewith4 ,the words1 ',all these beings indeed spring from the ether only1' merely give expression to something generally known1 and statements of this nature presuppose other means of knowledge to prove them4 ,now these other means required are1 in our case1 supplied by such texts as ',being only was this in the beginning1' and these1 as we have shown1 establish the existence of ,brahman4 ,to ,brahman thus established1 the text mentioning the ether merely refers as to something well known4 ,brahman may suitably be called 'ether' 7ksa71 because being of the nature of light it shines 7ksate7 itself1 and makes other things shine forth 7ksayati74 ,moreover1 the word 'ether' is indeed capable of conveying the idea of a special being 7as cause71 but as it denotes a special non-intelligent thing which cannot be admitted as the cause of the intelligent part of the world we must deny all authoritativeness to the attempt to tamper1 in the interest of that one word1 with the sense of other texts which have the power of giving instruction as to an entirely new thing 7viz4 ,brahman71 distinguished by the possession of omniscience1 the power of realising its purposes and similar attributes1 which we ascertain from certain complementary texts-such as 'it thought1 may ,i be many1 may ,i grow forth1' and 'it desired1 may ,i be many1 may ,i grow forth4' ,we also point out that the agreement in purport of a number of texts capable of establishing the existence of a wonderful being possessing infinite wonderful attributes is not lightly to be disregarded in favour of one single text vhich moreover 7has not the power of intimating something not known before1 but7 only makes a reference to what is already established by other texts4--,as to the averment that the word ',self' is not exclusively limited to sentient beings1 we remark that that word is indeed applied occasionally to non- sentient things1 but prevailingly to that which is the correlative of a body1 i4e4 the soul or spirit2 in texts such as 'the ,self only was this in the beginning1' and 'from the ,self there sprang the ether1' we must therefore understand by the ',self1' the universal spirit4 ,the denotative power of the term 'atman1' which is thus proved by itself1 is moreover confirmed by the complementary passages 'it desired1 may ,i send forth the worlds'1 'it desired1 may ,i be many1 may ,i grow forth4'--,we thus arrive at the following conclusion3 ,brahman1 which--by the passage ',being only this was in the beginning'--is established as the sole cause of the world1 possessing all those manifold wonderful attributes which are ascertained from the complementary passages1 is1 in the text under discussion1 referred to as something already known1 by means of the term 'ether4'--,here terminates the adhikarana of' ether4' #bd4 ,for the same reason breath 7is ,brahman74 ,we read in the ,chndogya 7,i1 #aj2 ii71 ',prastotri1 that deity which belongs to the ,prastva1' c42 and further on1 'which then is that deity8 ,he said--,breath4 ,for all these beings merge into breath alone1 and from breath they arise4 ,this is the deity belonging to the ,prastva4 ,if without knowing that deity you had sung forth1 your head would have fallen off4' ,here the word 'breath1' analogously to the word 'ether' denotes the highest ,brahman1 which is different from what is commonly called breath2 we infer this from the fact that special characteristics of ,brahman1 viz4 the whole world's entering into and rising from it1 are in that text referred to as well-known things4 ,there indeed here arises a further doubt2 for as it is a matter of observation that the existence1 activity1 c41 of the whole aggregate of creatures depend on breath1 breath--in its ordinary acceptation--may be called the cause of the world4 ,this doubt is1 however1 disposed of by the consideration that breath is not present in things such as stones and wood1 nor in intelligence itself1 and that hence of breath in the ordinary sense it cannot be said that 'all beings enter into it1' c4 ,we therefore conclude that ,brahman is here called 'breath' in so far as he bestows the breath of life on all beings4 ,and the general result of the discussion carried on in connexion with the last two ,stras thus is that the words 'ether' and 'breath' denote something other than what is ordinarily denoted by those terms1 viz4 the highest ,brahman1 the sole cause of this entire world1 free from all evil1 c4 c4--,here terminates the adhikarana of 'breath4' ,the subsequent ,stras up to the end of the ,pda demonstrate that the being which the texts refer to as ',light' or ',indra'--terms which in ordinary language are applied to certain other well-known beings--1 and which is represented as possessing some one or other supremely exalted quality that is invariably connected with world-creative power1 is no other than the highest ,brahman4 #be4 ,the light 7is ,brahman71 on account of the mention of feet4 ,we read in the ,chndogya4 7,,iii1 #ac1 #g71 ',now that light which shines above this heaven1 higher than everything1 in the highest worlds beyond which there are no other worlds1 that is the same light which is within man4'--,here a doubt arises1 viz4 whether the brightly shining thing here called 'light' is the well-known light of the sun and so on1 viewed as a causal universal principle 7,brahman72 or the all-knowing1 c41 highest ,person of infinite splendour1 who is different in nature from all sentient and non-sentient beings1 and is the highest cause4--,the ,prvapakshin maintains that the reference is to ordinary light4 ,for1 he says1 the passage does not mention a particular characteristic attribute which can belong to the highest ,self only--while such attributes were met with in the texts referring to ,ether and ,breath--1 and as thus there is no opening for a recognition of the highest ,self1 and as at the same time the text identifies 'light' with the intestinal heat of living beings1 we conclude that the text represents the well-known ordinary light as ,brahman1 the cause of the world--which is possible as causal agency is connected with extreme light and heat4--,this prim facie view the ,stra sets aside4 ,the light which the text states to be connected with heaven and possessing supreme splendour can be the highest ,person only1 since a preceding passage in the same section--' ,all the beings are one foot of it1 three feet are the ,immortal in heaven'--refers to all beings as being a foot of that same being which is connected with heaven4 ,although the passage1 ',that light which shines above1' c41 does not mention a special attribute of the highest ,person1 yet the passage previously quoted refers to the highest ,person as connected with heaven1 and we therefore recognise that ,person as the light connected with heaven1 mentioned in the subsequent passage4 ,nor does the identification1 made in a clause of the text1 of light with the intestinal heat give rise to any difficulty2 for that clause is meant to enjoin meditation on the highest ,brahman in the form of intestinal heat1 such meditation having a special result of its own4 ,moreover1 the ,lord himself declares that he constitutes the ,self of the intestinal fire1 ',becoming the ,vaisvnara-fire ,i abide in the body of living creatures' 7,bha4 ,g4 ,,xv1 #ad74 #bf4 ,if it be objected that 7,brahman is7 not 7denoted7 on account of the metre being denoted2 7we reply7 not so1 because thus the direction of the mind 7on ,brahman7 is declared2 for thus it is seen4 ,the previous section at first refers to the metre called ,gyatr1 ',the ,gyatr indeed is everything' 7,,iii1 #ab1 #a71 and then introduces--with the words 'this is also declared by a ,rik verse'--the verse1 ',such is the greatness of it 7viz4 the ,gyatr71' c4 ,now1 as this verse also refers to the metre1 there is not any reference to the highest ,person4-- ,to this objection the second part of the ,stra replies4 ,the word ',gyatr' does not here denote the metre only1 since this cannot possibly be the ,self of all2 but the text declares the application of the idea of ,gyatr to ,brahman1 i4e4 teaches1 to the end of a certain result being obtained1 meditation on ,brahman in so far as similar to ,gyatr4 ,for ,brahman having four feet1 in the sense indicated by the rik1 may be compared to the ,gyatr with its four 7metrical7 feet4 ,the ,gyatr 7indeed has as a rule three feet1 but7 occasionally a ,gyatr with four feet is met with2 so1 e4g41 ',indras sakpatih valena pditah duskyavano vrish samitsu ssahih4' ,we see that in other passages also words primarily denoting metres are employed in other senses2 thus1 e4g41 in the samvargavidy 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #c1 #h71 where ,virj 7the name of a metre of ten syllables7 denotes a group of ten divine beings4 ,for this conclusion the next ,stra supplies a further argument4 #bg4 ,and thus also1 because 7thus only7 the designation of the beings1 and so on1 being the 7four7 feet is possible4 ,the text1 moreover1 designates the ,gyatr as having four feet1 after having referred to the beings1 the earth1 the body1 and the heart2 now this has a sense only if it is ,brahman1 which here is called ,gyatr4 #bh4 ,if it be said that 7,brahman is7 not 7recognised7 on account of the difference of designation2 7we say7 not so1 on account of there being no contradiction in either 7designation74 ,in the former passage1 'three feet of it are what is immortal in heaven1' heaven is referred to as the abode of the being under discussion2 while in the latter passage1 'that light which shines above this heaven1' heaven is mentioned as marking its boundary4 ,owing to this discrepancy1 the ,brahman referred to in the former text is not recognised in the latter4--,this objection the ,stra disposes of by pointing out that owing to the essential agreement of the two statements1 nothing stands in the way of the required recognition4 ,when we say1 ',the hawk is on the top of the tree1' and 'the hawk is above the top of the tree1' we mean one and the same thing4--,the 'light1' therefore1 is nothing else but the most glorious and luminous highest ,person4 ,him who in the former passage is called four-footed1 we know to have an extraordinarily beautiful shape and colour--7cp41 e4g41 ',i know that great ,person of sunlike colour beyond the darkness' 7,svet4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #i77--1 and as hence his brilliancy also must be extraordinary1 he is1 in the text under discussion1 quite appropriately called 'light4'--,here terminates the adhikarana of 'light4' ,it has been shown that the being endowed with supreme brilliance1 called ',light1' which the text mentions as something well known1 is the highest ,person4 ,the ,strakra will now show that the being designated as ,indra and ,prna1 which the text enjoins as an object of meditation1 for the reason that it is the means for attaining immortality--a power which is inseparable from causal power--1 is likewise the highest ,person4 #bi4 ,prna is ,brahman1 on account of connexion4 ,we read in the ,pratardana-vidy in the ,kaushtaki-brhmana that ',pratardana1 the son of ,divodsa1 came1 by fighting and strength1 to the beloved abode of ,indra4' ,being asked by ,indra to choose a boon he requests the ,god to bestow on him that boon which he himself considers most beneficial to man2 whereupon ,indra says1 ',i am prna 7breath71 the intelligent ,self1 meditate on me as ,life1 as ,immortality4' ,here the doubt arises whether the being called ,prna and ,indra1 and designating itself as the object of a meditation most beneficial to man1 is an individual soul1 or the highest ,self4--,an individual soul1 the ,prvapakshin maintains4 ,for1 he says1 the word ',indra' is known to denote an individual ,god1 and the word ',prna1' which stands in grammatical co-ordination with ,indra1 also applies to individual souls4 ,this individual being1 called ,indra1 instructs ,pratardana that meditation on himself is most beneficial to man4 ,but what is most beneficial to man is only the means to attain immortality1 and such a means is found in meditation on the causal principle of the world1 as we know from the text1 ',for him there is delay only so long as he is not delivered2 then he will be perfect' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #ad1 #b74 ,we hence conclude that ,indra1 who is known as an individual soul1 is the causal principle1 ,brahman4 ,this view is rejected by the ,stra4 ,the being called ,indra and ,prna is not a mere individual soul1 but the highest ,brahman1 which is other than all individual souls4 ,for on this supposition only it is appropriate that the being introduced as ,indra and ,prna should1 in the way of grammatical co-ordination1 be connected with such terms as 'blessed1' 'non-ageing1' 'immortal4' 7',that ,prna indeed is the intelligent ,self1 blessed1 non-ageing1 immortal1' ,kau4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #i47 #cj4 ,if it be said that 7,brahman is7 not 7denoted7 on account of the speaker denoting himself2 7we say1 not so71 because the multitude of connexions with the inner ,self 7is possible only7 in that 7speaker if viewed as ,brahman74 ,an objection is raised4--,that the being introduced as ,indra and ,prna should be the highest ,brahman1 for the reason that it is identical with him who1 later on1 is called 'blessed1' 'non-ageing1' 'immortal'--this we cannot admit4 ',know me only1 ,i am prna1 meditate on me as the intelligent ,self1 as life1 as immortality'--the speaker of these words is ,indra1 and this ,indra enjoins on ,pratardana meditation on his own person only1 the individual character of which is brought out by reference to certain deeds of strength such as the slaying of the son of ,tvashtri 7',i slew the three-headed son of ,tvashtri1' c474 ,as thus the initial part of the section clearly refers to an individual being1 the terms occurring in the concluding part 7'blessed1' 'non-ageing1' 'immortal'7 must be interpreted so as to make them agree with what precedes4--,this objection the ,stra disposes of4 ',for the multitude of connexions with the ,self'--i4e4 the multitude of things connected with the ,self as its attributes--is possible only 'in that1' i4e4 in that speaker viewed as the highest ,brahman4 ',for1 as in a car1 the circumference of the wheel is placed on the spokes1 and the spokes on the nave1 thus are these objects placed on the subjects1 and the subjects on the prna4 ,that prna indeed is the intelligent ,self1 blessed1 non-ageing1 immortal4' ,the 'objects' 7bhtamtrh7 here are the aggregate of non-sentient things2 the 'subjects' 7prajmtrh7 are the sentient beings in which the objects are said to abide2 when thereupon the texts says that of these subjects the being called ,indra and ,prna is the abode1 and that he is blessed1 non-ageing1 immortal2 this qualification of being the abode of this ,universe1 with all its non- sentient and sentient beings1 can belong to the highest ,self only1 which is other than all individual souls4 ,the ,stra may also be explained in a somewhat different way1 viz4 'there is a multitude of connexions belonging to the highest ,self1 i4e4 of attributes special to the highest ,self1 in that1 viz4 section4' ,the text at first says1 ',choose thou that boon for me which thou deemest most beneficial to man'--to which the reply is1 ',meditate on me4' ,here ,indra- prna is represented as the object of a meditation which is to bring about ,release2 the object of such meditation can be none but the highest ,self4--',he makes him whom he wishes to lead up from these worlds do a good deed2 and him whom he wishes to lead down from these worlds he makes do a bad deed4' ,the causality with regard to all actions which is here described is again a special attribute of the highest ,self4--,the same has to be said with regard to the attribute of being the abode of all1 in the passage about the wheel and spokes1 quoted above2 and with regard to the attributes of bliss1 absence of old age and immortality1 referred to in another passage quoted before4 ,also the attributes of being 'the ruler of the worlds1 the lord of all1' can belong to the highest ,self only4--,the conclusion therefore is that the being called ,indra and ,prna is none other but the highest ,self4--,but how then can ,indra1 who is known to be an individual person only1 enjoin meditation on himself8--,to this question the next ,stra replies4 #ca4 ,the instruction 7given by ,indra about himself7 7is possible7 through insight based on ,scripture1 as in the case of ,vmadeva4 ,the instruction which1 in the passages quoted1 ,indra gives as to the object of meditation1 i4e4 ,brahman constituting his ,self1 is not based on such an insight into his own nature as is established by other means of proof1 but on an intuition of his own ,self1 mediated by ,scripture4 ',having entered into them with this living ,self let me evolve names and forms' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #c1 #b72 ',in it all that exists has its ,self 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #h1 #g72 ,entered within1 the ruler of creatures1 the ,self of all' 7,taitt4 ,ar4 ,,iii1 #ba72 ',he who dwelling in the ,self is different from the ,self1' c4 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #g1 #bb7--;from these and similar texts ,indra has learned that the highest ,self has the indiviual souls for its body1 and that hence words such as ',i' and 'thou1' which denote individual beings1 extend in their connotation up to the highest ,self2 when1 therefore1 he says1 ',know me only'1 and ',meditate on me'1 he really means to teach that the highest ,self1 of which his own individual person is the body1 is the proper object of meditation4 ',as in the case of ,vmadeva4' ,as the ,rishi ,vmadeva perceiving that ,brahman is the inner ,self of all1 that all things constitute its body1 and that the meaning of words denoting a body extends up to the principle embodied1 denotes with the word ',i' the highest ,brahman to which he himself stands in the relation of a body1 and then predicates of this ',i' ,manu ,srya and other beings--',seeing this the ,rishi4 ,vmadeva understood1 ,i am ,manu1 ,i am ,srya' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,i1 #d1 #aj74 ,similarly ,prahlda says1 ',as the ,infinite one abides within all1 he constitutes my ,i also2 all is from me1 ,i am all1 within me is all4' 7,vi4 ,pu4 ,i1 #ai1 #he47 ,the next ,stra states1 in reply to an objection1 the reason why1 in the section under discussion1 terms denoting the individual soul1 and others denoting non-sentient things are applied to ,brahman4 #cb4 ,if it be said 7that ,brahman is not meant7 on account of characteristic marks of the individual soul and the chief vital air2 we say no1 on account of the threefoldness of meditation2 on account of 7such threefold meditation7 being met 7in other texts also72 and on account of 7such threefold meditation7 being appropriate here 7also74 ,an objection is raised4 ',let none try to find out what speech is1 let him know the speaker'2 ',i slew the three-headed son of ,tvashtri2 ,i delivered the ,arunmukhas1 the devotees1 to the wolves'2 these passages state characteristic marks of an individual soul 7viz4 the god ,indra74-- ',as long as ,prna dwells in this body1 so long there is life'2 ',prna alone is the conscious ,self1 and having laid hold of this body1 it makes it rise up4'--,these passages again mention characteristic attributes of the chief vital air4 ,hence there is here no 'multitude of attributes belonging to the ,self4'--,the latter part of the ,stra refutes this objection4 ,the highest ,self is called by these different terms in order to teach threefoldness of devout meditation2 viz4 meditation on ,brahman in itself as the cause of the entire world2 on ,brahman as having for its body the totality of enjoying 7individual7 souls2 and on ,brahman as having for its body the objects and means of enjoyment4--,this threefold meditation on ,brahman1 moreover1 is met with also in other chapters of the sacred text4 ,passages such as ',the ,true1 knowledge1 infinite is ,brahman1' ',bliss is ,brahman1' dwell on ,brahman in itself4 ,passages again such as ',having created that he entered into it4 ,having entered it he became sat and tyat1 defined and undefined1' c4 7,taitt4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #f71 represent ,brahman as having for its body the individual souls and inanimate nature4 ,hence1 in the chapter under discussion also1 this threefold view of ,brahman is quite appropriate4 ,where to particular individual beings such as ,hiranyagarbha1 and so on1 or to particular inanimate things such as prakriti1 and so on1 there are attributed qualities especially belonging--to the highest ,self2 or where with words denoting such persons and things there are co-ordinated terms denoting the highest ,self1 the intention of the texts is to convey the idea of the highest ,self being the inner ,self of all such persons and things4-- ,the settled conclusion1 therefore1 is that the being designated as ,indra and ,prna is other than an individual soul1 viz4 the highest ,self4 ,,second ,p,,da4 ,,the contents of the first ,pda may be summed up as follows3--,it has been shown that a person who has read the text of the ,veda2 who further1 through the study of the ,karma-,mmmsa1 has acquired a full knowledge of the nature of 7sacrificial and similar7 works1 and has recognised that the fruits of such works are limited and non-permanent2 in whom there has arisen the desire for the highest aim of man1 i4e4 ,release1 which1 as he has come to know in the course of reading the ,vednta portions of scripture1 is effected by meditation on the nature of ,brahman--such meditation having an infinite and permanent result2 who has convinced himself that words are capable of conveying information about accomplished things 7not only about things to be done71 and has arrived at the conclusion that the ,vednta-texts are an authoritative means of knowledge with regard to the highest ,brahman2--that such a person1 we say1 should begin the study of the ,srraka-,mmms which indicates the method how ,brahman is to be known through the ,vednta-texts4 ,we next have shown that the text ',that from which these creatures are born1' c41 conveys the idea of the highest ,brahman as that being which in sport1 as it were1 creates1 sustains1 and finally reabsorbs this entire universe1 comprising within itself infinite numbers of variously constituted animated beings--moving and non-moving--1 of objects of enjoyment for those beings1 of means of enjoyment1 and of abodes of enjoyment2 and which is the sole cause of all bliss4 ,we have established that this highest ,brahman1 which is the sole cause of the world1 cannot be the object of the other means of knowledge1 and hence is to be known through scripture only4 ,we have pointed out that the position of scripture as an authoritative means of knowledge is established by the fact that all the ,vednta-texts connectedly refer to the highest ,brahman1 which1 although not related to any injunctions of action or abstention from action1 by its own essential nature constitutes the highest end of man4 ,we have proved that ,brahman1 which the ,vednta-texts teach to be the sole cause of the world1 must be an intelligent principle other than the non-sentient pradhna1 since ,brahman is said to think4 ,we have declared that this intelligent principle is other than the so-called individual soul1 whether in the state of bondage or that of release2 since the texts describe it as in the enjoyment of supreme bliss1 all- wise1 the cause of fear or fearlessness on the part of intelligent beings1 the inner ,self of all created things1 whether intelligent or non- intelligent1 possessing the power of realising all its purposes1 and so on4--,we have maintained that this highest ,being has a divine form1 peculiar to itself1 not made of the stuff of ,prakriti1 and not due to karman4--,we have explained that the being which some texts refer to as a well-known cause of the world--designating it by terms such as ether or breath1 which generally denote a special non-sentient being--is that same highest ,self which is different from all beings1 sentient or non- sentient4--,we have declared that1 owing to its connexion with heaven1 this same highest ,self is to be recognised in what the text calls a 'light1' said to possess supreme splendour1 such as forms a special characteristic of the highest ,being4 ,we have stated that1 as we recognise through insight derived from scripture1 that same highest ,person is denoted by terms such as ,indra1 and so on2 as the text ascribes to that ',indra' qualities exclusively belonging to the highest ,self1 such1 e4g41 as being the cause of the attainment of immortality4-- ,and the general result arrived at was that the ,vednta-texts help us to the knowledge of one being only1 viz4 ,brahman1 or the highest ,person1 or ,nryana--of whom it is shown that he cannot possibly be the object of the other means of knowledge1 and whom the possession of an unlimited number of glorious qualities proves to differ totally from all other beings whatsoever4 ,now1 although ,brahman is the only object of the teaching of the ,vednta- texts1 yet some of these texts might give rise to the notion that they aim at setting forth 7not ,brahman71 but some particular being comprised within either the pradhna or the aggregate of individual souls4 ,the remaining ,pdas of the first ,adhyya therefore apply themselves to the task of dispelling this notion and proving that what the texts in question aim at is to set forth certain glorious qualities of ,brahman4 ,the second ,pda discusses those texts which contain somewhat obscure references to the individual soul2 the third ,pda those which contain clear references to the same2 and the fourth ,pda finally those texts which appear to contain even clearer intimations of the individual soul1 and so on4 #a4 ,everywhere2 because there is taught what is known4 ,we read in the ,chndogya1 ',man is made of thought2 according to what his thought is in this world1 so will he be when he has departed this life4 ,let him form this thought3 he who consists of mind1 whose body is breath1 whose form is light1' c4 7,,iii1 #ad74 ,we here understand that of the meditation enjoined by the clause 'let him form this thought' the object is the being said to consist of mind1 to have breath for its body1 c4 ,a doubt1 however1 arises whether the being possessing these attributes be the individual soul or the highest ,self4--,the ,prvapakshin maintains the former alternative4 ,for1 he says1 mind and breath are instruments of the individual soul2 while the text 'without breath1 without mind1' distinctly denies them to the highest ,self4 ,nor can the ,brahman mentioned in a previous clause of the same section 7',all this indeed is ,brahman'7 be connected as an object with the meditation enjoined in the passage under discussion2 for ,brahman is there referred to in order to suggest the idea of its being the ,self of all--which idea constitutes a means for bringing about that calmness of mind which is helpful towards the act of meditation enjoined in the clause ',let a man meditate with calm mind1' c4 ,nor1 again1 can it be said that as the meditation conveyed by the clause 'let him form this thought' demands an object1 ,brahman1 although mentioned in another passage1 only admits of being connected with the passage under discussion2 for the demand for an object is fully satisfied by the being made of mind1 c41 which is mentioned in that very passage itself2 in order to supply the object we have merely to change the case-terminations of the words 'manomayah prnasarrah1' c4 ,it having thus been determined that the being made of mind is the individual soul1 we further conclude that the ,brahman mentioned in the concluding passage of the section 7',that is ,brahman'7 is also the individual soul1 there called ,brahman in order to glorify it4 ,this prim facie view is set aside by the ,stra4 ,the being made of mind is the highest ,self2 for the text states certain qualities1 such as being made of mind1 c41 which are well known to denote1 in all ,vednta- texts1 ,brahman only4 ,passages such as ',he who is made of mind1 the guide of the body of breath' 7,mu4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #b1 #g72 ',there is the ether within the heart1 and in it there is the ,person1 consisting of mind1 immortal1 golden' 7,taitt4 ,up4 ,i4 #f1 #a72 ',he is conceived by the heart1 by wisdom1 by the mind4 ,those who know him are immortal' 7,ka4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #f1 #i72 ',he is not apprehended by the eye nor by speech1 but by a purified mind' 7,mu4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #a1 #h72 ',the breath of breath' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #d1 #ahc72 ',breath alone is the conscious ,self1 and having laid hold of this body it makes it rise up' 7,kau4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #c72 ',all these beings merge into breath alone1 and from breath they arise' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,i1 #aa1 #e7--these and similar texts refer to ,brahman as consisting of mind1 to be apprehended by a purified mind1 having breath for its body1 and being the abode and ruler of breath4 ,this being so1 we decide that in the concluding passage1 'my ,self within the heart1 that is ,brahman1' the word ',brahman' has to be taken in its primary sense 7and does not denote the individual soul74 ,the text which declares ,brahman to be without mind and breath1 merely means to deny that the thought of ,brahman depends on a mind 7internal organ71 and that its life depends on breath4 ,or else we may interpret the ,vedic text and the ,stra as follows4 ,the passage ',all this is ,brahman2 let a man meditate with a calm mind on this world as originating1 ending1 and breathing in ,brahman1' conveys the imagination of meditation on ,brahman as the ,self of all4 ,the subsequent clause ',let him form the thought1' c41 forms an additional statement to that injunction1 the purport of which is to suggest certain attributes of ,brahman1 such as being made of mind4 ,so that the meaning of the whole section is ',let a man meditate on ,brahman1 which is made of mind1 has breath for its body1 c41 as the ,self of the whole world4'-- ,here a doubt presents itself4 ,does the term ',brahman' in this section denote the individual soul or the highest ,self8--,the individual soul1 the ,prvapakshin maintains1 for that only admits of being exhibited in co-ordination with the word 'all4' ,for the word 'all' denotes the entire world from ,brahm down to a blade of grass2 and the existence of ,brahm and other individual beings is determined by special forms of karman1 the root of which is the beginningless ,nescience of the individual soul4 ,the highest ,brahman1 on the other hand1 which is all-knowing1 all- powerful1 free from all evil and all shadow of ,nescience and similar imperfections1 cannot possibly exist as the ',all' which comprises within itself everything that is bad4 ,moreover we find that occasionally the term ',brahman' is applied to the individual soul also2 just as the highest ,lord 7paramesvara7 may be called 'the highest ,self' 7paramtman7 or 'the highest ,brahman4' ,that 'greatness' 7brihattva2 which is the essential characteristic of 'brahman'7 belongs to the individual soul when it has freed itself from its limiting conditions1 is moreover attested by scripture3 ',that 7soul7 is fit for infinity' 7,svet4 ,up4 ,v1 #i74 ,and as the soul's ,nescience is due to karman 7only71 the text may very well designate it--as it does by means of the term 'tajjaln'--as the cause of the origin1 subsistence1 and reabsorption of the world4 ,that is to say--the individual soul which1 in its essential nature1 is non-limited1 and therefore of the nature of ,brahman1 owing to the influence of ,nescience enters into the state of a god1 or a man1 or an animal1 or a plant4 ,this view is rejected by the ,stra4 ',everywhere1' i4e4 in the whole world which is referred to in the clause ',all this is ,brahman' we have to understand the highest ,brahman--which the term ',brahman' denotes as the ,self of the world--1 and not the individual soul2 'because there is taught what is known1' i4e4 because the clause ',all this is ,brahman'-- for which clause the term 'tajjaln' supplies the reason--refers to ,brahman as something generally known4 ,since the world springs from ,brahman1 is merged in ,brahman1 and depends on ,brahman for its life1 therefore--as the text says--',all this has its ,self in ,brahman'2 and this shows to us that what the text understands by ,brahman is that being from which1 as generally known from the ,vednta texts1 there proceed the creation1 and so on1 of the world4 ,that the highest ,brahman only1 all- wise and supremely blessed1 is the cause of the origin1 c41 of the world1 is declared in the section which begins4 ',that from which these beings are born1' c41 and which says further on1 'he knew that ,bliss is ,brahman1 for from bliss these beings are born' 7,taitt4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #f72 and analogously the text ',he is the cause1 the lord of lords of the organs1' c4 7,svet4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #i71 declares the highest ,brahman to be the cause of the individual soul4 ,everywhere1 in fact1 the texts proclaim the causality of the highest ,self only4 ,as thus the world which springs from ,brahman1 is merged in it1 and breathes through it1 has its ,self in ,brahman1 the identity of the two may properly be asserted2 and hence the text--the meaning of which is ',let a man meditate with calm mind on the highest ,brahman of which the world is a mode1 which has the world for its body1 and which is the ,self of the world'--first proves ,brahman's being the universal ,self1 and then enjoins meditation on it4 ,the highest ,brahman1 in its causal condition as well as in its so-called 'effected' state1 constitutes the ,self of the world1 for in the former it has for its body all sentient and non-sentient beings in their subtle form1 and in the latter the same beings in their gross condition4 ,nor is there any contradiction between such identity with the world on ,brahman's part1 and the fact that ,brahman treasures within itself glorious qualities antagonistic to all evil2 for the imperfections adhering to the bodies1 which are mere modes of ,brahman1 do not affect ,brahman itself to which the modes belong4 ,such identity rather proves for ,brahman supreme lordly power1 and thus adds to its excellences4 ,nor1 again1 can it rightly be maintained that of the individual soul also identity with the world can be predicated2 for the souls being separate according to the bodies with which they are joined cannot be identical with each other4 ,even in the state of release1 when the individual soul is not in any way limited1 it does not possess that identity with the world on which there depends causality with regard to the world's creation1 sustentation1 and reabsorption2 as will be declared in ,stra ,,iv1 #d1 #ag4 ,nor1 finally1 does the ,prvapakshin improve his case by contending that the individual soul may be the cause of the creation1 c41 of the world because it 7viz4 the soul7 is due to karman2 for although the fact given as reason is true1 all the same the ,lord alone is the cause of the ,universe4--,all this proves that the being to which the text refers as ,brahman is none other than the highest ,self4 ,this second alternative interpretation of the ,stra is preferred by most competent persons4 ,the ,vrittikra1 e4g4 says1 ',that ,brahman which the clause ,all this is ,brahman declares to be the ,self of all is the ,lord4' #b4 ,and because the qualities meant to be stated are possible 7in ,brahman74 ,the qualities about to be stated can belong to the highest ,self only4 ',made of mind1 having breath for its body1' c4 ',made of mind' means to be apprehended by a purified mind only4 ,the highest ,self can be apprehended only by a mind purified by meditation on that ,self1 such meditation being assisted by the seven means1 viz4 abstention1 c4 7see above1 p4 #ag74 ,this intimates that the highest ,self is of pure goodness1 precluding all evil1 and therefore different in nature from everything else2 for by the impure minded impure objects only can be apprehended4-- ',having the vital breath for its body' means--being the supporter of all life in the world4 ,to stand in the relation of a body to something else1 means to abide in that other thing1 to be dependent on it1 and to subserve it in a subordinate capacity1 as we shall fully show later on4 ,and all 'vital breath' or 'life' stands in that relation to the highest ,self4 ',whose form is light'2 i4e4 who is of supreme splendour1 his form being a divine one of supreme excellence peculiar to him1 and not consisting of the stuff of ,prakriti4--',whose purposes are true'2 i4e4 whose purposes realise themselves without any obstruction4 ',who is the 7or of the7 ,self of ether'2 i4e4 who is of a delicate and transparent nature1 like ether2 or who himself is the ,self of ether1 which is the causal substance of everything else2 or who shines forth himself and makes other things shine forth4--',to whom all works belong'2 i4e4 he of whom the whole world is the work2 or he to whom all activities belong4-- ',to whom all wishes belong'2 i4e4 he to whom all pure objects and means of desire and enjoyment belong4 ',he to whom all odours and tastes belong'2 i4e4 he to whom there belong1 as objects of enjoyment1 all kinds of uncommon1 special1 perfect1 supremely excellent odours and tastes2 ordinary smells and tastes being negatived by another text1 viz4 ',that which is without sound1 without touch1 without taste1' c4 7,ka4 ,up4 ,i1 #c1 #ae74--';,he who embraces all this'2 i4e4 he who makes his own the whole group of glorious qualities enumerated4--',he who does not speak1' because1 being in possession of all he could desire1 he 'has no regard for anything'2 i4e4 he who1 in full possession of lordly power1 esteems this whole world with all its creatures no higher than a blade of grass1 and hence abides in silence4--,all these qualities stated in the text can belong to the highest ,self only4 #c4 ,but1 on account of impossibility1 not the embodied soul4 ,those who fully consider this infinite multitude of exalted qualities will recognise that not even a shadow of them can belong to the individual soul--whether in the state of bondage or that of release-- which is a thing as insignificant as a glow-worm and1 through its connexion with a body1 liable to the attacks of endless suffering4 ,it is not possible therefore to hold that the section under discussion should refer to the individual soul4 #d4 ,and because there is 7separate7 denotation of the object and the agent4 ,the clause ',when ,i shall have departed from hence ,i shall obtain him' denotes the highest ,brahman as the object to be obtained1 and the individual soul as that which obtains it4 ,this shows that the soul which obtains is the person meditating1 and the highest ,brahman that is to be obtained1 the object of meditation3 ,brahman1 therefore1 is something different from the attaining soul4 #e4 ,on account of the difference of words4 ,the clause ',that is the ,self of me1 within the heart' designates the embodied soul by means of a genitive form1 while the object of meditation is exhibited in the nominative case4 ,similarly1 a text of the ,vjasaneyins1 which treats of the same topic1 applies different terms to the embodied and the highest ,self1 ',like a rice grain1 or a barley grain1 or a canary seed1 or the kernel of a canary seed1 thus that golden ,person is within the ,self' 7,sat4 ,br4 ,x1 #f1 #c1 #b74 ,here the locative form1 'within the ,self1' denotes the embodied ,self1 and the nominative1 'that golden ,person1' the object to be meditated on4--,all this proves the highest ,self to be the object of meditation4 #f4 ,and on account of ,smriti4 ',i dwell within the hearts of all1 from me come memory and knowledge1 as well as their loss'2 ',he who free from delusion knows me to be the highest ,person'2 ',the ,lord1 ,o ,arjuna1 is seated in the heart of all ,beings1 driving round by his mysterious power all beings as if mounted on a machine2 to him fly for refuge' 7,bha4 ,gi4 ,,xv1 #ae1 #ai2 ,,xviii1 #fa74 ,these ,smriti-texts show the embodied soul to be the meditating subject1 and the highest ,self the object of meditation4 #g4 ,should it be said that 7the passage does7 not 7refer to ,brahman7 on account of the smallness of the abode1 and on account of the denotation of that 7viz4 minuteness of the being meditated on72 we say no1 because 7,brahman7 has thus to be meditated upon1 and because 7in the same passage7 it is said to be like ether4 ,it might be contended that1 as the text 'he is my ,self within the heart' declares the being meditated on to dwell within a minute abode1 viz4 the heart2 and as moreover another text--'smaller than a grain of rice1' c41 declares it to be itself of minute size1 that being cannot be the highest ,self1 but only the embodied soul4 ,for other passages speak of the highest ,self as unlimited1 and of the embodied soul as having the size of the point of a goad 7cp4 e4g4 ,mu4 ,up4 ,i1 #a1 #f1 and ,svet4 ,up4 ,v1 #h74--,this objection the ,stra rebuts by declaring that the highest ,self is spoken of as such1 i4e4 minute1 on account of its having to be meditated upon as such4 ,such minuteness does not1 however1 belong to its true nature2 for in the same section it is distinctly declared to be infinite like ether--'greater than the earth1 greater than the sky1 greater than heaven1 greater than all these worlds' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #ad1 #c74 ,this shows that the designation of the highest ,self as minute is for the purpose of meditation only4--,the connexion of the whole section then is as follows4 ,the clause ',all this is ,brahman2 let a man meditate with calm mind on this world as beginning1 ending1 and breathing in ,brahman1' enjoins meditation on ,brahman as being the ,self of all1 in so far as it is the cause of the origin and destruction of all1 and entering into all beings as their soul gives life to them4 ,the next clause1 ',man is made of thought2 according as his thought is in this world1 so will he be when he has departed this life1' declares the attainment of the desired object to depend on the nature of the meditation2 and the following clause1 ',let him therefore form the following thought1' thereupon repeats the injunction with a view to the declaration of details4 ,the clause ',he who consists of mind1' c41 up to 'who is never surprised1' then states the nature and qualities1 of the being to be meditated upon1 which are to be comprised in the meditation4 ,next1 the clause ',he is my ,self1' up to 'the kernel of a canary seed1' declares that the highest ,person1 for the purpose of meditation1 abides in the heart of the meditating devotee2 representing it as being itself minute1 since the heart is minute4 ,after this the clause ',he also is my ,self1' up to 'who is never surprised1' describes those aspects of the being meditated upon as within the heart1 which are to be attained by the devotee4 ,next1 the words 'this my ,self within the heart is that ,brahman' enjoins the reflection that the highest ,brahman1 as described before1 is1 owing to its supreme kindness1 present in our hearts in order thereby to refresh and inspirit us4 ,then the clause ',when ,i shall have departed from hence ,i shall obtain him' suggests the idea that there is a certainty of obtaining him on the basis of devout meditation2 and finally the clause ',he who has this faith has no doubt' declares that the devotee who is firmly convinced of his aim being attainable in the way described1 will attain it beyond any doubt4--,from all this it appears that the 'limitation of abode1' and the 'minuteness' ascribed to ,brahman1 are merely for the purpose of meditation4 #h4 ,should it be said that there is attainment of fruition 7of pleasure and pain72 we reply1 not so1 on account of difference4 ,but1 if the highest ,brahman is assumed to dwell within bodies1 like the individual soul1 it follows that1 like the latter1 it is subject to the experience of pleasure and pain1 such experience springing from connexion with bodies6--,of this objection the ,stra disposes by remarking 'not so1 on account of difference 7of reason74' ,for what is the cause of experiences1 pleasurable or painful1 is not the mere dwelling within a body1 but rather the subjection to the influence of good and evil deeds2 and such subjection is impossible in the case of the highest ,self to which all evil is foreign4 ,compare the scriptural text ',one of the two eats the sweet fruit1 the other one looks on without eating' 7,mu4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #a1 #a74--;,here finishes the adhikarana of 'what is known everywhere4' ,well then1 if the highest ,self is not an enjoyer1 we must conclude that wherever fruition is referred to1 the embodied soul only is meant6--,of this view the next adhikarana disposes4 #i4 ,the eater 7is the highest ,self7 on account of there being taken all that is movable and immovable4 ,we read in the ,kathavall 7,i1 #c1 #be71 ',who then knows where he is to whom the ,brahmans and ,kshattriyas are but food1 and death itself a condiment8' ,a doubt here arises whether the 'eater'1 suggested by the words 'food' and 'condiment1' is the individual soul or the highest ,self4-- ,the individual soul1 the ,prvapakshin maintains2 for all enjoyment presupposes works1 and works belong to the individual soul only4--,of this view the ,stra disposes4 ,the 'eater' can be the highest ,self only1 because the taking1 i4 e4 eating1 of the whole aggregate of movable and immovable things can be predicated of that ,self only4 ',eating' does not here mean fruition dependent on work1 but rather the act of reabsorption of the world on the part of the highest ,brahman1 i4 e4 ,vishnu1 who is the cause of the origination1 subsistence1 and final destruction of the universe4 ,this appears from the fact that ,vishnu is mentioned in the same section1 ',he reaches the end of his journey1 and that is the highest place of ,vishnu' 7,ka4 ,up4 ,i1 #c1 #i74 ,moreover the clause 'to whom death is a condiment' shows that by the ,brahmans and ,kshattriyas1 mentioned in the text1 we have to understand the whole universe of moving and non-moving things1 viewed as things to be consumed by the highest ,self4 ,for a condiment is a thing which1 while itself being eaten1 causes other things to be eaten2 the meaning of the passage1 therefore1 is that while death itself is consumed1 being a condiment as it were1 there is at the same time eaten whatever is flavoured or made palatable by death1 and that is the entire world of beings in which the ,brahmans and ,kshattriyas hold the foremost place4 ,now such eating of course is destruction or reabsorption1 and hence such enjoyment--meaning general reabsorption--can belong to the highest ,self only4 #aj4 ,and on account of the topic of the whole section4 ,moreover the highest ,brahman constitutes the topic of the entire section4 ,cp4 ',the wise who knows the ,self as great and omnipresent does not grieve' 7,ka4 ,up4 ,i1 #b1 #bb72 ',that ,self cannot be gained by the ,veda1 nor by understanding1 nor by much learning4 ,he whom the ,self chooses1 by him the ,self can be gained2 the ,self chooses him as his own' 7,i1 #b1 #bc74-- ,moreover1 the clause 7forming part of the text under discussion71',who knows him 7i4e4 the being which constitutes the topic of the section7 where he is8' clearly shows that we have to recognise here the ,self of which it had previously been said that it is hard to know unless it assists us with its grace4 ,to this conclusion a new objection presents itself4--,further on in the same ,upanishad 7,i1 #c1 #a7 we meet with the following text3 ',there are two1 drinking their reward in the world of their own works1 entered into the cave1 dwelling on the highest summit2 those who know ,brahman call them shade and light1 likewise those householders who perform the ,trinakiketa- sacrifice4' ,now this text clearly refers to the individual soul which enjoys the reward of its works1 together with an associate coupled to it4 ,and this associate is either the vital breath1 or the organ of knowledge 7buddhi74 ,for the drinking of 'rita' is the enjoyment of the fruit of works1 and such enjoyment does not suit the highest ,self4 ,the buddhi1 or the vital breath1 on the other hand1 which are instruments of the enjoying embodied soul1 may somehow be brought into connexion with the enjoyment of the fruit of works4 ,as the text is thus seen to refer to the embodied soul coupled with some associate1 we infer1 on the ground of the two texts belonging to one section1 that also the 'eater' described in the former text is none other than the individual soul4--,to this objection the next ,stra replies4 #aa4 ,the 'two entered into the cave' are the two ,selfs2 on account of this being seen4 ,the two1 entered into the cave and drinking their reward1 are neither the embodied soul together with the vital breath1 nor the embodied soul together with the buddhi2 it is rather the embodied ,self and the highest ,self which are designated by those terms4 ,for this is seen1 i4e4 it is seen that in that section the individual ,self and the highest ,self only are spoken of as entered into the cave4 ,to the highest ,self there refers ,i1 #b1 #ab1 ',the wise who by meditation on his ,self recognises the ,ancient who is difficult to see1 who has entered into the dark1 who is hidden in the cave1 who dwells in the abyss1 as ,god1 he indeed leaves joy and sorrow far behind4' ,and to the individual soul there refers ,i1 #d1 #g1 ',who is together with the vital breath1 who is ,aditi1 who is made of the deities1 who entering into the cave abides therein1 who was born variously through the elements4' ,aditi here means the individual soul which enjoys 7atti7 the fruits of its works2 which is associated with the vital breath2 which is made of the deities1 i4e4 whose enjoyment is dependent on the different sense-organs2 which abides in the hollow of the heart2 and which1 being connected with the elementary substances1 earth1 and so on1 is born in various forms--human1 divine1 c4--,that the text speaks of the two ,selfs as drinking their reward 7while actually the individual soul only does so7 is to be understood in the same way as the phrase 'there go the umbrella-bearers' 7one of whom only carries the umbrella74 ,or else we may account for this on the ground that both are agents with regard to the drinking1 in so far as the 'drinking' individual soul is caused to drink by the highest ,self4 #ab4 ,and on account of distinctive qualities4 ,everywhere in that section we meet with statements of distinctive attributes of the two ,selfs1 the highest ,self being represented as the object of meditation and attainment1 and the individual ,self as the meditating and attaining subject4 ,the passage ',when he has known and understood that which is born from ,brahman1 the intelligent1 to be divine and venerable1 then he obtains everlasting peace' 7,i1 #a1 #ag7 refers to the meditating individual soul which recognises itself as being of the nature of ,brahman4 ,on the other hand1 ,i1 #c1 #b1 ',that which is a bridge for sacrificers1 the highest imperishable ,brahman for those who wish to cross over to the fearless shore1 the ,nkiketa1 may we be able to know that1' refers to the highest ,self as the object of meditation2 ',nkiketa' here meaning that which is to be reached through the ,nkiketa-rite4 ,again1 the passage ',know the ,self to be sitting in the chariot and the body to be the chariot' 7,i1 #c1 #c7 refers to the meditating individual soul2 and the verse1 ,i1 #c1 #i1 ',but he who has understanding for his charioteer1 and holds the reins of the mind1 he reaches the end of his journey1 and that is the highest place of ,vishnu4' refers to the embodied and the highest ,selfs as that which attains and that which is to be attained4 ,and in the text under discussion also 7,i1 #c1 #a71 the two ,selfs are distinctly designated as light and shade1 the one being all-knowing1 the other devoid of knowledge4 ,but1 a new objection is raised1 the initial passage1 ,i1 #a1 #bj1 ',that doubt which there is when a man is dead--some saying1 he is2 others1 he is not1' clearly asks a question as to the true nature of the individual soul1 and we hence conclude that that soul forms the topic of the whole chapter4--,not so1 we reply4 ,that question does not spring from any doubt as to the existence or non-existence of the soul apart from the body2 for if this were so the two first boons chosen by ,nkiketas would be unsuitable4 ,for the story runs as follows3 ,when the sacrifice offered by the father of ,nkiketas--at which all the possessions of the sacrificer were to be given to the priests--is drawing towards its close1 the boy1 feeling afraid that some deficiency on the part of the gifts might render the sacrifice unavailing1 and dutifully wishing to render his father's sacrifice complete by giving his own person also1 repeatedly asks his father1 ',and to whom will you give me'8 ,the father1 irritated by the boy's persistent questioning1 gives an angry reply1 and in consequence of this the boy goes to the palace of ,yama1 and ,yama being absent1 stays there for three days without eating4 ,yama on his return is alarmed at this neglect of hospitality1 and wishing to make up for it allows him to choose three boons4 ,nkiketas1 thereupon1 full of faith and piety1 chooses as his first boon that his father should forgive him4 ,now it is clear that conduct of this kind would not be possible in the case of one not convinced of the soul having an existence independent of the body4 ,for his second boon1 again1 he chooses the knowledge of a sacrificial fire1 which has a result to be experienced only by a soul that has departed from the body2 and this choice also can clearly be made only by one who knows that the soul is something different from the body4 ,when1 therefore1 he chooses for his third boon the clearing up of his doubt as to the existence of the soul after death 7as stated in v4 #bj71 it is evident that his question is prompted by the desire to acquire knowledge of the true nature of the highest ,self--which knowledge has the form of meditation on the highest ,self--1 and by means thereof1 knowledge of the true nature of final ,release which consists in obtaining the highest ,brahman4 ,the passage1 therefore1 is not concerned merely with the problem as to the separation of the soul from the body1 but rather with the problem of the ,self freeing itself from all bondage whatever--the same problem1 in fact1 with which another scriptural passage also is concerned1 viz4 ',when he has departed there is no more knowledge' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #d1 #ab74 ,the full purport of ,nkiketas' question1 therefore1 is as follows3 ,when a man qualified for ,release has died and thus freed himself from all bondage1 there arises a doubt as to his existence or non-existence--a doubt due to the disagreement of philosophers as to the true nature of ,release2 in order to clear up this doubt ,i wish to learn from thee the true nature of the state of ,release4-- ,philosophers1 indeed1 hold many widely differing opinions as to what constitutes ,release4 ,some hold that the ,self is constituted by consciousness only1 and that ,release consists in the total destruction of this essential nature of the ,self4 ,others1 while holding the same opinion as to the nature of the ,self1 define ,release as the passing away of ,nescience 7avidy74 ,others hold that the ,self is in itself non- sentient1 like a stone1 but possesses1 in the state of bondage1 certain distinctive qualities1 such as knowledge1 and so on4 ,release then consists in the total removal of all these qualities1 the ,self remaining in a state of pure isolation 7kaivalya74 ,others1 again1 who acknowledge a highest ,self free from all imperfection1 maintain that through connexion with limiting adjuncts that ,self enters on the condition of an individual soul2 ,release then means the pure existence of the highest ,self1 consequent on the passing away of the limiting adjuncts4 ,those1 however1 who understand the ,vednta1 teach as follows3 ,there is a highest ,brahman which is the sole cause of the entire universe1 which is antagonistic to all evil1 whose essential nature is infinite knowledge and blessedness1 which comprises within itself numberless auspicious qualities of supreme excellence1 which is different in nature from all other beings1 and which constitutes the inner ,self of all4 ,of this ,brahman1 the individual souls--whose true nature is unlimited knowledge1 and whose only essential attribute is the intuition of the supreme ,self-- are modes1 in so far1 namely1 as they constitute its body4 ,the true nature of these souls is1 however1 obscured by ,nescience1 i4e4 the influence of the beginningless chain of works2 and by ,release then we have to understand that intuition of the highest ,self1 which is the natural state of the individual souls1 and which follows on the destruction of ,nescience4--,when ,nkiketas desires ,yama graciously to teach him the true nature of ,release and the means to attain it1 ,yama at first tests him by dwelling on the difficulty of comprehending ,release1 and by tempting him with various worldly enjoyments4 ,but having in this way recognised the boy's thorough fitness1 he in the end instructs him as to the kind of meditation on the highest ,self which constitutes knowledge of the highest ,reality1 as to the nature of ,release--which consists in reaching the abode of the highest ,self--1 and as to all the required details4 ,this instruction begins1 ,i1 #b1 #ab1 ',the ,ancient one who is difficult to see1' c41 and extends up to ,i1 #c1 #i4 'and that is the highest place of ,vishnu4'--,it thus is an established conclusion that the 'eater' is no other than the highest ,self4--,here terminates the adhikarana of 'the eater4' #ac4 7,the ,person7 within the eye 7is the highest ,self7 on account of suitability4 ,the ,chandogas have the following text3 ',the ,person that is seen within the eye1 that is the ,self4 ,this is the immortal1 the fearless1 this is ,brahman' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #ae1 #a74 ,the doubt here arises whether the person that is here spoken of as abiding within the eye is the reflected ,self1 or some divine being presiding over the sense of sight1 or the embodied ,self1 or the highest ,self4--,it is the reflected ,self1 the ,prvapakshin maintains2 for the text refers to the person seen as something well known1 and the expression1 'is seen1' clearly refers to something directly perceived4 ,or it may be the individual soul1 for that also may be referred to as something well known1 as it is in special connexion with the eye3 people1 by looking into the open eye of a person1 determine whether the living soul remains in him or is departing4 ,or else we may assume that the ,person seen within the eye is some particular divine being1 on the strength of the scriptural text1 ,bri4 ,up4 ,v1 #e1 #b1 ',he 7the person seen within the sun7 rests with his rays in him 7the person within the eye74' ,any of these beings may quite suitably be referred to as something well known4--,of these alternatives the ,stra disposes by declaring that the ,person within the eye is the highest ,self4 ,for the text goes on to say about the ,person seen within the eye1 ',they call him ,samyadvma1 for all blessings go towards him4 ,he is also ,vman1 for he leads all blessings4 ,he is also ,bhman1 for he shines in all worlds4' ,and all these attributes can be reconciled with the highest ,self only4 #ad4 ,and on account of the statement as to abode1 and so on4 ,abiding within the eye1 ruling the eye1 and so on are predicated by scripture of the highest ,self only1 viz4 in ,bri4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #g1 #ah1 ',he who dwells within the eye1 who rules the eye within4' ,we therefore recognise that highest ,self in the text1 ',that ,person which is seen within the eye4' ,the argument founded on reference to 'something well known' thus suits the highest ,self very well2 and also the clause which denotes immediate perception 7'is seen'7 appears quite suitable1 since the highest ,self is directly intuited by persons practising mystic concentration of mind 7,yoga74 #ae4 ,and on account of the text referring only to what is characterised by pleasure4 ,the ,person abiding within the eye is the highest ,person1 for the following reason also4 ,the topic of the whole section is ,brahman characterised by delight1 as indicated in the passage ',ka 7pleasure7 is ,brahman1 ,kha 7ether7 is ,brahman' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,iv1#aj1 #e74 ,to that same ,brahman the passage under discussion 7',the ,person that is seen in the eye'7 refers for the purpose of enjoining first a place with which ,brahman is to be connected in meditation1 and secondly some special qualities--such as comprising and leading all blessings--to be attributed to ,brahman in meditation4--,the word 'only' in the ,stra indicates the independence of the argument set forth4 ,but--an objection is raised--between the ,brahman introduced in the passage ',ka is ,brahman1'c41 and the text under discussion there intervenes the vidy of the ,fires 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #aa-ac71 and hence ,brahman does not readily connect itself with our passage4 ,for the text says that after the ,fires had taught ,upakosala the knowledge of ,brahman 7',breath is ,brahman1 ,ka is ,brahman1' c471 they taught him a meditation on themselves 7',after that the ,grhapatya fire taught him1' c41 ,ch4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #aa1 #a74 ,and this knowledge of the ,fires cannot be considered a mere subordinate part of the knowledge of ,brahman1 for the text declares that it has special fruits of its own--viz4 the attainment of a ripe old age and prosperous descendants1 c4--which are not comprised in the results of the knowledge of ,brahman1 but rather opposed to them in nature4--,to this we make the following reply4 ,as both passages 7viz4 ,,iv1 #aj1 #e1 ',breath is ,brahman1' c42 and ,,iv1 #ae1 #a1 'this is ,brahman'7 contain the word ,brahman1 and as from the words of the ,fires1 'the teacher will tell you the way1' it follows that the knowledge of ,brahman is not complete before that way has been taught1 we determine that the knowledge of the ,fires which stands between the two sections of the knowledge of ,brahman is a mere subordinate member of the latter4 ,this also appears from the fact that the ,grhapatya fire begins to instruct ,upakosala only after he has been introduced into the knowledge of ,brahman4 ,upakosala moreover complains that he is full of sorrows 7,i1 #aj1 #c71 and thus shows himself to be conscious of all the sufferings incidental to human life-birth1 old age1 death1 c4--which result from man being troubled by manifold desires for objects other than the attainment of ,brahman2 when therefore the ,fires conclude their instruction by combining in saying1 ',this1 ,o friend1 is the knowledge of us and the knowledge of the ,self which we impart to thee1' it is evident that the vidy of the ,fires has to be taken as a subordinate member of the knowledge of the ,self whose only fruit is ,release4 ,and from this it follows that the statement of the results of the ,agnividy has to be taken 7not as an injunction of results-phalavidhi--but7 merely as an arthavda 7cp4 ,p4 ,m4 ,s4 ,,iv1 #c1 #a74 ,it1 moreover1 is by no means true that the text mentions such fruits of the ,agnividy as would be opposed to final ,release2 all the fruits mentioned suit very well the case of a person qualified for ,release4 ',he destroys sin' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #aa1 #b2 #ab1 #b2 #ac1 #b71 i4e4 he destroys all evil works standing in the way of the attainment of ,brahman4 ',he obtains the world1' i4 e4 all impeding evil works having been destroyed he obtains the world of ,brahman4 ',he reaches his full age1' i4e4 he fully reaches that age which is required for the completion of meditation on ,brahman4 ',he lives long1' i4e4 he lives unassailed by afflictions until he reaches ,brahman4 ',his descendants do not perish1' i4e4 his pupils1 and their pupils1 as well as his sons1 grandsons1 c41 do not perish2 i4 e4 they are all knowers of ,brahman1 in agreement with what another text declares to be the reward of knowledge of ,brahman--',in his family no one is born ignorant of ,brahman' 7,mu4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #b1 #i74 ',we guard him in this world and the other1' i4e4 we ,fires guard him from all troubles until he reaches ,brahman4--,the ,agnividy thus being a member of the ,brahmavidy1 there is no reason why the ,brahman introduced in the earlier part of the ,brahmavidy should not be connected with the latter part--the function of this latter part being to enjoin a place of meditation 7,brahman being meditated on as the ,person within the eye71 and some special qualities of ,brahman to be included in the meditation4--,but 7an objection is raised7 as the ,fires tell ,upakosala 'the teacher will tell you the way1' we conclude that the teacher has to give information as to the way to ,brahman only2 how then can his teaching refer to the place of meditation and the special qualities of ,brahman8--,we have to consider1 we reply1 in what connexion the ,fires address those words to ,upakosala4 ,his teacher having gone on a journey without having imparted to him the knowledge of ,brahman1 and ,upakosala being dejected on that account1 the sacred fires of his teacher1 well pleased with the way in which ,upakosala had tended them1 and wishing to cheer him up1 impart to him the general knowledge of the nature of ,brahman and the subsidiary knowledge of the ,fires4 ,but remembering that1 as scripture says1 'the knowledge acquired from a teacher is best1' and hence considering it advisable that the teacher himself should instruct ,upakosala as to the attributes of the highest ,brahman1 the place with which it is to be connected in meditation and the way leading to it1 they tell him 'the teacher will tell you the way1' the 'way' connoting everything that remains to be taught by the teacher4 ,in agreement herewith the teacher--having first said1 ',i will tell you this2 and as water does not cling to a lotus leaf1 so no evil clings to one who knows it'--instructs him about ,brahman as possessing certain auspicious attributes1 and to be meditated upon as abiding within the eye1 and about the way leading to ,brahman4--,it is thus a settled conclusion that the text under discussion refers to that ,brahman which was introduced in the passage ',ka is ,brahman1' and that hence the ,person abiding within the eye is the highest ,self4 ,but--an objection is raised--how do you know that the passage ',ka 7pleasure7 is ,brahman1 ,kha 7ether7 is ,brahman' really refers to the highest ,brahman1 so as to be able to interpret on that basis the text about the ,person within the eye8 ,it is a more obvious interpretation to take the passage about ,ka and ,kha as enjoining a meditation on ,brahman viewed under the form of elemental ether and of ordinary worldly pleasure4 ,this interpretation would1 moreover1 be in agreement with other similarly worded texts 7which are generally understood to enjoin meditation on ,brahman in a definite form71 such as ',name is ,brahman'1 ',mind is ,brahman4' #af4 ,for that very reason that 7ether7 is ,brahman4 ,because the clause ',what is ,ka the same is ,kha' speaks of ether as characterised by pleasure1 the ether which is denoted by ',kha' is no other than the highest ,brahman4 ,to explain4 ,on the ,fires declaring ',breath is ,brahman1 ,ka is ,brahman1 ,kha is ,brahman1' ,upakosala says1 ',i understand that breath is ,brahman1 but ,i do not understand ,ka and ,kha4' ,the meaning of this is as follows4 ,the ,fires cannot speak of meditation on ,brahman under the form of breath and so on1 because they are engaged in giving instruction to me1 who am afraid of birth1 old age1 death1 c41 and desirous of final ,release4 ,what they declare to me therefore is meditation on ,brahman itself4 ,now here ,brahman is exhibited in co- ordination with certain well-known things1 breath and so on4 ,that ,brahman should be qualified by co-ordination with breath is suitable1 either from the point of view of ,brahman having the attribute of supporting the world1 or on account of ,brahman being the ruler of breath1 which stands to it in the relation of a body4 ,hence ,upakosala says1 ',i understand that breath is ,brahman4' ,with regard to pleasure and ether1 on the other hand1 there arises the question whether they are exhibited in the relation of qualifying attributes of ,brahman on the ground of their forming the body of ,brahman1 and hence being ruled by it1 or whether the two terms are meant to determine each other1 and thus to convey a notion of the true nature of ,brahman being constituted by supreme delight4 ,on the former alternative the declaration of the ,fires would only state that ,brahman is the ruler of the elemental ether and of all delight depending on the sense-organs1 and this would give no notion of ,brahman's true nature2 on the latter alternative the ,fires would declare that unlimited delight constitutes ,brahman's true nature4 ,in order to ascertain which of the two meanings has to be taken1 ,upakosala therefore says1 ',i do not understand ,ka and ,kha4' ,the ,fires1 comprehending what is in his mind1 thereupon reply1 ',what is ,ka the same is ,kha1 what is ,kha the same is ,ka1' which means that the bliss which constitutes ,brahman's nature is unlimited4 ,the same ,brahman therefore which has breath for its attribute because breath constitutes its body1 is of the nature of unlimited bliss2 the text therefore adds1 ',they taught him that 7viz4 ,brahman7 as breath and as ether4' ,what the text1 ',ka is ,brahman1 ,kha is ,brahman1' teaches thus is ,brahman as consisting of unlimited bliss1 and this ,brahman is resumed in the subsequent text about the ,person seen within the eye4 ,that ,person therefore is the highest ,self4 #ag4 ,and on account of the statement of the way of him who has heard the ,upanishads4 ,other scriptural texts give an account of the way--the first station of which is light--that leads up to the highest ,person1 without any subsequent return1 the soul of him who has read the ,upanishads1 and has thus acquired a knowledge of the true nature of the highest ,self4 ,now this same way is described by the teacher to ,upakosala in connexion with the instruction as to the ,person in the eye1 ',they go to light1 from light to day1' c4 ,this also proves that the ,person within the eye is the highest ,self4 #ah4 ,not any other1 on account of non-permanency of abode1 and of impossibility4 ,as the reflected ,self and the other ,selfs mentioned by the ,prvapakshin do not necessarily abide within the eye1 and as conditionless immortality and the other qualities 7ascribed in the text to the ,person within the eye7 cannot possibly belong to them1 the ,person within the eye cannot be any ,self other than the highest ,self4 ,of the reflected ,self it cannot be said that it permanently abides within the eye1 for its presence there depends on the nearness to the eye of another person4 ,the embodied ,self again has its seat within the heart1 which is the root of all sense-organs1 so as to assist thereby the activities of the different senses2 it cannot therefore abide within the eye4 ,and with regard to the divinity the text says that 'he rests with his rays in him1 i4e4 the eye'3 this implies that the divine being may preside over the organ of sight although itself abiding in another place2 it does not therefore abide in the eye4 ,moreover1 non-conditioned immortality and similar qualities cannot belong to any of these three ,selfs4 ,the ,person seen within the eye therefore is the highest ,self4 ,we have1 under ,s4 ,i1 #b1 #ad1 assumed as proved that the abiding within the eye and ruling the eye1 which is referred to in ,bri4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #g1 #ah 7',he who dwells in the eye1' c471 can belong to the highest ,self only1 and have on that basis proved that the ,self within the eye is the highest ,self4--,here terminates the adhikarana of that 'within4'--,the next ,stra now proceeds to prove that assumption4 #ai4 ,the internal ,ruler 7referred to7 in the clauses with respect to the gods1 with respect to the worlds1 c4 7is the highest ,self71 because the attributes of that are designated4 ,the ,vjasaneyins1 of the ,knwa as well as the ,mdhyandina branch1 have the following text3 ',he who dwelling in the earth is within the earth1 whom the earth does not know1 whose body the earth is1 who rules the earth within1 he is thy ,self1 the ruler within1 the ,immortal4' ,the text thereupon extends this teaching as to a being that dwells in things1 is within them1 is not known by them1 has them for its body and rules them2 in the first place to all divine beings1 viz4 water1 fire1 sky1 air1 sun1 the regions1 moon1 stars1 ether1 darkness1 light2 and next to all material beings1 viz4 breath1 speech1 eye1 ear1 mind1 skin1 knowledge1 seed--closing each section with the words1 ',he is thy ,self1 the ruler within1 the ,immortal4' ,the ,mdhyandinas1 however1 have three additional sections1 viz4 ',he who dwells in all worlds1' c42 'he who dwells in all ,vedas1' c42 ',he who dwells in all sacrifices'2 and1 moreover1 in place of ',he who dwells in knowledge' 7vijna7 they read ',he who dwells in the ,self4'--,a doubt here arises whether the inward ,ruler of these texts be the individual ,self or the highest ,self4 ,the individual ,self1 the ,prvapakshin maintains4 ,for in the supplementary passage 7which follows upon the text considered so far7 the internal ,ruler is called the 'seer' and 'hearer1' i4e4 his knowledge is said to depend on the sense-organs1 and this implies the view that the 'seer' only 7i4e4 the individual soul only7 is the inward ,ruler2 and further the clause ',there is no other seer but he' negatives any other seer4 ,this view is set aside by the ,stra4 ,the ,ruler within1 who is spoken of in the clauses marked in the text by the terms 'with respect of the gods1' 'with respect of the worlds1' c41 is the highest ,self free from all evil1 ,nryana4 ,the ,stra purposely joins the two terms 'with respect to the gods' and 'with respect to the worlds' in order to intimate that1 in addition to the clauses referring to the gods and beings 7bhta7 exhibited by the ,knva-text1 the ,mdhyandina-text contains additional clauses referring to the worlds1 ,vedas1 c4 ,the inward ,ruler spoken of in both these sets of passages is the highest ,self2 for attributes of that ,self are declared in the text4 ,for it is a clear attribute of the highest ,self that being one only it rules all worlds1 all ,vedas1 all divine beings1 and so on4 ,uddlaka asks1 ',dost thou know that ,ruler within who within rules this world and the other world and all beings8 c4--tell now that ,ruler within'2 and ,yjavalkya replies with the long passus1 ',he who dwells in the earth1' c41 describing the ,ruler within as him who1 abiding within all worlds1 all beings1 all divinities1 all ,vedas1 and all sacrifices1 rules them from within and constitutes their ,self1 they in turn constituting his body4 ,now this is a position which can belong to none else but the highest ,person1 who is all-knowing1 and all whose purposes immediately realise themselves4 ,that it is the highest ,self only which rules over all and is the ,self of all1 other ,upanishad-texts also declare2 cp4 e4g4 ',entered within1 the ruler of creatures1 the ,self of all'2 ',having sent forth this he entered into it4 ,having entered it he became sat and tyat1' c4 7,taitt4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #f74 ,similarly the text from the ,subla-,up41 which begins1 'there was not anything here in the beginning1' and extends up to 'the one ,god1 ,nryana1' shows that it is the highest ,brahman only which rules all1 is the ,self of all1 and has all beings for its body4 ,moreover1 essential immortality 7which the text ascribes to the ,ruler within7 is an attribute of the highest ,self only4--,nor must it be thought that the power of seeing and so on that belongs to the highest ,self is dependent on sense-organs2 it rather results immediately from its essential nature1 since its omniscience and power to realise its purposes are due to its own being only4 ,in agreement herewith scripture says1 ',he sees without eyes1 he hears without ears1 without hands and feet he grasps and hastes' 7,svet4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #ai74 ,what terms such as 'seeing' and 'hearing' really denote is not knowledge in so far as produced by the eye and ear1 but the intuitive presentation of colour and sound4 ,in the case of the individual soul1 whose essentially intelligising nature is obscured by karman1 such intuitive knowledge arises only through the mediation of the sense-organs2 in the case of the highest ,self1 on the other hand1 it springs from its own nature4--,again1 the clause 'there is no other seer but he' means that there is no seer other than the seer and ruler described in the preceding clauses4 ,to explain4 ,the clauses 'whom the earth does not know1' c41 up to 'whom the ,self does not know' mean to say that the ,ruler within rules without being perceived by the earth1 ,self1 and the other beings which he rules4 ,this is confirmed by the subsequent clauses1 'unseen but a seer'1 'unheard but a hearer1' c4 ,and the next clauses1 'there is no other seer but he1' c41 then mean to negative that there is any other being which could be viewed as the ruler of that ,ruler4 ,moreover1 the clauses 'that is the ,self of thee1' ',he is the ,self of thee' exhibit the individual ,self in the genitive form 7'of thee'71 and thus distinguish it from the ,ruler within1 who is declared to be their ,self4 #bj4 ,and not that which ,smriti assumes1 on account of the declaration of qualities not belonging to that2 nor the embodied one4 ',that which ,smriti assumes' is the ,pradhna2 the 'embodied one' is the individual soul4 ,neither of these can be the ,ruler within1 since the text states attributes which cannot possibly belong to either4 ,for there is not even the shadow of a possibility that essential capability of seeing and ruling all things1 and being the ,self of all1 and immortality should belong either to the non-sentient ,pradhna or to the individual soul4--,the last two ,stras have declared that the mentioned qualities belong to the highest ,self1 while they do not belong to the individual soul4 ,the next ,stra supplies a new1 independent argument4 #ba4 ,for both also speak of it as something different4 ,both1 i4e4 the ,mdhyandinas as well as the ,knvas1 distinguish in their texts the embodied soul1 together with speech and other non-intelligent things1 from the ,ruler within1 representing it as an object of his rule4 ,the ,mdhyandinas read1 ',he who dwells in the ,self1 whom the ,self does not know1' c42 the ,knvas1 ',he who dwells within understanding'1 c4 ,the declaration of the individual ,self being ruled by the ,ruler within implies of course the declaration of the former being different from the latter4 ,the conclusion from all this is that the ,ruler within is a being different from the individual soul1 viz4 the highest ,self free from all evil1 ,nryana4--,here terminates the adhikarana of 'the internal ,ruler'4 #bb4 ,that which possesses the qualities of invisibility1 c41 on account of the declaration of attributes4 ,the tharvanikas read in their text1 ',the higher knowledge is that by which that ,indestructible is apprehended4 ,that which is invisible1 unseizable1 without origin and qualities1 c41 that it is which the wise regard as the source of all beings'2 and further on1 ',that which is higher than the high ,imperishable' 7,mu4 ,up4 ,i1 #a1 #e1 #f2 ,,ii1 #a1 #b74 ,the doubt here arises whether the ,indestructible1 possessing the qualities of imperceptibility1 c41 and that which is higher than the ,indestructible1 should be taken to denote the ,pradhna and the soul of the ,snkhyas1 or whether both denote the highest ,self4--,the ,prvapakshin maintains the former alternative4 ,for1 he says1 while in the text last discussed there is mentioned a special attribute of an intelligent being1 viz4 in the clause 'unseen but a seer'1 no similar attribute is stated in the former of the two texts under discussion1 and the latter text clearly describes the collective individual soul1 which is higher than the imperishable ,pradhna1 which itself is higher than all its effects4 ,the reasons for this decision are as follows3--,colour and so on reside in the gross forms of non-intelligent matter1 viz4 the elements1 earth1 and so on4 ,when1 therefore1 visibility and so on are expressly negatived1 such negation suggests a non-sentient thing cognate to earth1 c41 but of a subtle kind1 and such a thing is no other than the ,pradhna4 ,and as something higher than this ,pradhna there are known the collective souls only1 under whose guidance the ,pradhna gives birth to all its effects1 from the so-called ,mahat downwards to individual things4 ,this interpretation is confirmed by the comparisons set forth in the next sloka1 ',as the spider sends forth and draws in its threads1 as plants spring from the earth1 as hair grows on the head and body of the living man1 thus does everything arise here from the ,indestructible4' ,the section therefore is concerned only with the ,pradhna and the individual soul4 ,this prim facie view is set aside by the ,stra4 ,that which possesses invisibility and the other qualities stated in the text1 and that which is higher than the high ,indestructible1 is no other than the highest ,self4 ,for the text declares attributes which belong to the highest ,self only1 viz4 in ,i1 #a1 #i1 ',he who knows all1 cognises all1' c4 ,let us shortly consider the connexion of the text4 ,the passage beginning 'the higher knowledge is that by which the ,indestructible is apprehended' declares an indestructible being possessing the attributes of invisibility and so on4 ,the clause 'everything arises here from the ,indestructible' next declares that from that being all things originate4 ,next the sloka1 ',he who knows all and cognises all1' predicates of that ,indestructible which is the source of all beings1 omniscience1 and similar qualities4 ,and finally the text1 ',that which is higher than the high ,indestructible1' characterises that same being--which previously had been called invisible1 the source of beings1 indestructible1 all- knowing1 c4--as the highest of all4 ,hence it is evident that in the text 'higher than the high ,indestructible' the term ',indestructible' does not denote the invisible1 c4 ,indestructible1 which is the chief topic of the entire section2 for there can of course be nothing higher than that which1 as being all-knowing1 the source of all1 c41 is itself higher than anything else4 ,the ',indestructible' in that text therefore denotes the elements in their subtle condition4 #bc4 ,not the two others1 on account of distinction and statement of difference4 ,the section distinguishes the indestructible being1 which is the source of all1 c41 from the ,pradhna as well as the individual soul1 in so far1 namely1 as it undertakes to prove that by the cognition of one thing everything is known2 and it moreover1 in passages such as 'higher than the high ,indestructible1' explicitly states the difference of the indestructible being from those other two4--,the text first relates that ,brahm told the knowledge of ,brahman1 which is the foundation of the knowledge of all1 to his eldest son ,atharvan3 this introduces the knowledge of ,brahman as the topic of the section4 ,then1 the text proceeds1 in order to obtain this knowledge of ,brahman1 which had been handed down through a succession of teachers to ,angiras1 ,saunaka approached ,angiras respectfully and asked him3 ',what is that through which1 if known1 all this is known8' i4e4 since all knowledge is founded on the knowledge of ,brahman1 he enquires after the nature of ,brahman4 ,angiras replies that he who wishes to attain ,brahman must acquire two kinds of knowledge1 both of them having ,brahman for their object3 an indirect one which springs from the study of the sstras1 viz4 the ,veda1 ,siksh1 ,kalpa1 and so on1 and a direct one which springs from concentrated meditation 7yoga74 ,the latter kind of knowledge is the means of obtaining ,brahman1 and it is of the nature of devout meditation 7bhakti71 as characterised in the text ',he whom the ,self chooses1 by him the ,self can be gained' 7,,iii1 #b1 #c74 ,the means again towards this kind of knowledge is such knowledge as is gained from sacred tradition1 assisted by abstention and the other six auxiliary means 7sec above1 p4 #ag72 in agreement with the text1 ',him the ,brahmattas seek to know by the study of the ,veda1 by sacrifice1 by gifts1 by penance1 by fasting' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #d1 #bb74--,thus the ,reverend ,parsara also says1 ',the cause of attaining him is knowledge and work1 and knowledge is twofold1 according as it is based on sacred tradition or springs from discrimination4' ,the ,mundaka-text refers to the inferior kind of knowledge in the passage 'the lower knowledge is the ,rig-veda1' c41 up to 'and the dharma- sstras'2 this knowledge is the means towards the intuition of ,brahman2 while the higher kind of knowledge1 which is called 'upsan1' has the character of devout meditation 7bhakti71 and consists in direct intuition of ,brahman1 is referred to in the clause 'the higher knowledge is that by which the ,indestructible is apprehended4' ,the text next following1 ',that which is invisible1 c41 then sets forth the nature of the highest ,brahman1 which is the object of the two kinds of knowledge previously described4 ,after this the passage ',as the spider sends forth and draws in its thread' declares that from that indestructible highest ,brahman1 as characterised before1 there originates the whole universe of things1 sentient and non-sentient4 ,the next soka 7tapas kyate1 c47 states particulars about this origination of the universe from ,brahman4 ',brahman swells through brooding'2 through brooding1 i4e4 thought--in agreement with a later text1 'brooding consists of thought'--,brahman swells1 i4e4 through thought in the form of an intention1 viz4 'may ,i become many1' ,brahman becomes ready for creation4 ,from it there springs first 'anna1' i4e4 that which is the object of fruition on the part of all enjoying agents1 viz4 the non-evolved subtle principles of all elements4 ,from this 'anna' there spring successively breath1 mind1 and all other effected things up to work1 which is the means of producing reward in the form of the heavenly world1 and ,release4 ,the last sloka of the first chapter thereupon first states the qualities1 such as omniscience and so on1 which capacitate the highest ,brahman for creation1 and then declares that from the indestructible highest ,brahman there springs the effected 7krya7 ,brahman1 distinguished by name and form1 and comprising all enjoying subjects and objects of enjoyment4--,the first sloka of the second chapter declares first that the highest ,brahman is absolutely real 7',that is true'71 and then admonishes those who desire to reach the indestructible highest ,self1 which possesses all the blessed qualities stated before and exists through itself1 to turn away from other rewards and to perform all those sacrificial works depending on the three sacred fires which were seen and revealed by poets in the four ,vedas and are incumbent on men according to caste and srama4 ,the section 'this is your path' 7,i1 #b1 #a7 up to 'this is the holy ,brahma-world gained by your good works' 7,i1 #b1 #f7 next states the particular mode of performing those works1 and declares that an omission of one of the successive works enjoined in ,druti and ,smriti involves fruitlessness of the works actually performed1 and that something not performed in the proper way is as good as not performed at all4 ,stanzas #g and ff4 7',but frail in truth are those boats'7 declare that those who perform this lower class of works have to return again and again into the ,samsra1 because they aim at worldly results and are deficient in true knowledge4 ,stanza #h 7'but those who practise penance and faith'7 then proclaims that works performed by a man possessing true knowledge1 and hence not aiming at worldly rewards1 result in the attainment of ,brahman2 and stanzas #ab a1 #ac 7'having examined all these worlds'7 enjoin knowledge1 strengthened by due works1 on the part of a man who has turned away from mere works1 as the means of reaching ,brahman2 and due recourse to a teacher on the part of him who is desirous of such knowledge4--,the first chapter of the second section of the ,upanishad 7,,ii1 #a7then clearly teaches how the imperishable highest ,brahman1 i4e4 the highest ,self--as constituting the ,self of all things and having all things for its body--has all things for its outward form and emits all things from itself4 ,the remainder of the ,upanishad 7',manifest1 near1' c4 7 teaches how this highest ,brahman1 which is imperishable and higher than the soul1 which itself is higher than the ,unevolved2 which dwells in the highest ,heaven2 and which is of the nature of supreme bliss1 is to be meditated upon as within the hollow of the heart2 how this meditation has the character of devout faith 7bhakti72 and how the devotee1 freeing himself from ,nescience1 obtains for his reward intuition of ,brahman1 which renders him like ,brahman4 ,it thus clearly appears that 'on account of distinction and statement of difference' the ,upanishad does not treat of the ,pradhna and the soul4 ,for that the highest ,brahman is different from those two is declared in passages such as ',that heavenly ,person is without body2 he is both without and within1 not produced1 without breath and without mind1 pure1 higher than what is higher than the ,imperishable' 7,,ii1 #a1 #b72 for the last words mean 'that imperishable highest ,self possessing invisibility and similar qualities1 which is higher than the aggregate of individual souls1 which itself is higher than the non-evolved subtle elements4' ,the term 'akshara' 7imperishable7 is to be etymologically explained either as that which pervades 7asnute7 or that which does not pass away 7a- ksharati71 and is on either of these explanations applicable to the highest ,self1 either because that ,self pervades all its effects or because it is like the so-called ,mahat 7which is also called akshara71 free from all passing away or decaying4--,here terminates the adhikarana of 'invisibility and so on4' #bd4 ,and on account of the description of its form4 ',fire is his head1 his eyes the sun and the moon1 the regions his ears1 his speech the ,vedas disclosed1 the wind his breath1 his heart the universe2 from his feet came the earth2 he is indeed the inner ,self of all things' 7,,ii1 #a1 #d7--the outward form here described can belong to none but the highest ,self2 that is1 the inner ,self of all beings4 ,the section therefore treats of the highest ,self4 #be4 ,vaisvnara 7is the highest ,self71 on account of the distinctions qualifying the common term4 ,the ,chandogas read in their text1 ',you know at present that ,vaisvnara ,self1 tell us that1' c41 and further on1 ',but he who meditates on the ,vaisvnara ,self as a span long1' c4 7,ch4 ,up4 ,v1 #aa1 #f2 #ah1 #a74 ,the doubt here arises whether that ,vaisvnara ,self can be made out to be the highest ,self or not4 ,the ,prvapakshin maintains the latter alternative4 ,for1 he says1 the word ,vaisvnara is used in the sacred texts in four different senses4 ,it denotes in the first place the intestinal fire1 so in ,bri4 ,up1 ,v1 #i1 ',that is the ,vaisvnara fire by which the food that is eaten is cooked1 i4e4 digested4 ,its noise is that which one hears when one covers one's ears4 ,when man is on the point of departing this life he does not hear that noise4'--,it next denotes the third of the elements1 so in ,ri4 ,samh4 ,x1 #hh1 #ab1 ',for the whole world the gods have made the ,agni ,vaisvnara a sign of the days4'--,it also denotes a divinity1 so ,ri4 ,samh4 ,i1 #ih1 #a1 ',may we be in the favour of ,vaisvnara1 for he is the king of the kings1' c4 ,and finally it denotes the highest ,self1 as in the passage1 ',he offered it in the ,self1 in the heart1 in ,agni ,vaisvnara'2 and in ,pra4 ,up4 ,i1 #g1 ',thus he rises as ,vaisvnara1 assuming all forms1 as breath of life1 as fire4'--,and the characteristic marks mentioned in the introductory clauses of the ,chandogya-text under discussion admit of interpretations agreeing with every one of these meanings of the word ,vaisvnara4 ,against this prim facie view the ,stra declares itself4 ,the term ',vaisvnara' in the ,chndogya-text denotes the highest ,self1 because the 'common' term is there qualified by attributes specially belonging to the highest ,self4 ,for the passage tells us how ,aupamanyava and four other great ,rhshis1 having met and discussed the question as to what was their ,self and ,brahman1 come to the conclusion to go to ,uddlaka because he is reputed to know the ,vaisvnara ,self4 ,uddlaka1 recognising their anxiety to know the ,vaisvnara ,self1 and deeming himself not to be fully informed on this point1 refers them to ,asvapati ,kaikeya as thoroughly knowing the ,vaisvnara ,self2 and they thereupon1 together with ,uddlaka1 approach ,asvapati4 ,the king duly honours them with presents1 and as they appear unwilling to receive them1 explains that they may suitably do so1 he himself being engaged in the performance of a religious vow2 and at the same time instructs them that even men knowing ,brahman must avoid what is forbidden and do what is prescribed4 ,when thereupon he adds that he will give them as much wealth as to the priests engaged in his sacrifice1 they1 desirous of ,release and of knowing the ,vaisnara ,self1 request him to explain that ,self to them4 ,now it clearly appears that as the ,rishis are said to be desirous of knowing--that ,brahman which is the ,self of the individual souls 7'what is our ,self1 what is ,brahman'71 and therefore search for some one to instruct them on that point1 the ,vaisvnara ,self--to a person acquainted with which they address themselves--can be the highest ,self only4 ,in the earlier clauses the terms used are ',self' and ',brahman1' in the later ',self' and ',vaisvnara'2 from this it appears also that the term ',vaisvnara1' which takes the place of ',brahman1' denotes none other but the highest ,self4 ,the results1 moreover1 of the knowledge of the ,vaisvnara ,self1 which are stated in subsequent passages1 show that the ,vaisvnara ,self is the highest ,brahman4 ',he eats food in all worlds1 in all beings1 in all ,selfs'2 'as the fibres of the ,ishk reed when thrown into the fire are burnt1 thus all his sins are burned' 7,v1 #ah1 ,i2 #bd1 #c74 ,the next ,stra supplies a further reason for the same conclusion4 #bf4 ,that which the text refers to is an inferential mark--thus4 ,the text describes the shape of ,vaisvnara1 of whom heaven1 c41 down to earth constitute the several limbs2 and it is known from ,scripture and ,smriti that such is the shape of the highest ,self4 ,when1 therefore1 we recognise that shape as referred to in the text1 this supplies an inferential mark of ,vaisvnara being the highest ,self4--,the 'thus' 7iti7 in the ,stra denotes a certain mode1 that is to say1 'a shape of such a kind being recognised in the text enables us to infer that ,vaisvnara is the highest ,self4' ,for in ,scripture and ,smriti alike the highest ,person is declared to have such a shape4 ,cp4 e4g4 the text of the tharvanas4 ',agni is his head1 the sun and moon his eyes1 the regions his cars1 his speech the ,vedas disclosed1 the wind his breath1 his heart the ,universe2 from his feet came the earth2 he is indeed the inner ,self of all things' 7,mu4 ,up4 ,,ii1 ,i1 #d74 ',agni' in this passage denotes the heavenly world1 in agreement with the text 'that world indeed is ,agni4' ,and the following ,smrriti texts3 ',he of whom the wise declare the heavenly world to be the head1 the ether the navel1 sun and moon the eyes1 the regions the ears1 the earth the feet2 he whose ,self is unfathomable is the leader of all beings'2 and 'of whom ,agni is the mouth1 heaven the head1 the ether the navel1 the earth the feet1 the sun the eye1 the regions the ear2 worship to him1 the ,self of the ,universe6'--,now our text declares the heavenly world and so on to constitute the head and the other limbs of ,vaisvnara4 ,for ,kaikeya on being asked by the ,rishis to instruct them as to the ,vasvnara ,self recognises that they all know something about the ,vaisvnara ,self while something they do not know 7for thus only we can explain his special questions71 and then in order to ascertain what each knows and what not1 questions them separately4 ,when thereupon ,aupamanyava replies that he meditates on heaven only as the ,self1 ,kaikeya1 in order to disabuse him from the notion that heaven is the whole ,vaisvnara ,self1 teaches him that heaven is the head of ,vaisvnara1 and that of heaven which thus is a part only of ,vaisvnara1 ,sutejas is the special name4 ,similarly he is thereupon told by the other ,rishis that they meditate only on sun1 air1 ether1 and earth1 and informs them in return that the special names of these beings are 'the omniform1' 'he who moves in various ways1' 'the full one1''wealth and 'firm rest1' and that these all are mere members of the ,vaisvnara ,self1 viz4 its eyes1 breath1 trunk1 bladder1 and feet4 ,the shape thus described in detail can belong to the highest ,self only1 and hence ,vaisvnara is none other but the highest ,self4 ,the next ,stra meets a further doubt as to this decision not yet being well established4 #bg4 ,should it be said that it is not so1 on account of the word1 c41 and on account of the abiding within2 we say1 no2 on account of meditation being taught thus1 on account of impossibility2 and because they read of him as person4 ,an objection is raised4 ,vaisvnara cannot be ascertained to be the highest ,self1 because1 on the account of the text and of the abiding within1 we can understand by the ,vaisvnara in our text the intestinal fire also4 ,the text to which we refer occurs in the ,vaisvnara-vidy of the ,vjasaneyins1 ',this one is the ,agni ,vaisvnara1' where the two words ',agni' and ',vaisvnara' are exhibited in co-ordination4 ,and in the section under discussion the passage1 'the heart is the ,grhapatya fire1 the mind the ,anvhrya-pakana fire1 the mouth the havanya fire' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,v1 #ah1 #b71 represents the ,vaisvnara in so far as abiding within the heart and so on as constituting the triad of sacred fires4 ,moreover the text1 ',the first food which a man may take is in the place of ,soma4 ,and he who offers that first oblation should offer it to ,prna' 7,v1 #ai1 #a71 intimates that ,vaisvnara is the abode of the offering to ,prna4 ,in the same way the ,vjasaneyins declare that ,vaisvnara abides within man1 viz4 in the passage ',he who knows this ,agni ,vaisvnara shaped like a man abiding within man4' ,as thus ,vaisvnara appears in co-ordination with the word ',agni1' is represented as the triad of sacred fires1 is said to be the abode of the oblation to ,breath1 and to abide within man1 he must be viewed as the intestinal fire1 and it is therefore not true that he can be identified with the highest ,self only4 ,this objection is set aside by the ,stra4 ,it is not so 'on account of meditation 7on the highest ,self7 being taught thus1' i4e4 as the text means to teach that the highest ,brahman which1 in the manner described before1 has the three worlds for its body should be meditated upon as qualified by the intestinal fire which 7like other beings7 constitutes ,brahman's body4 ,for the word ',agni' denotes not only the intestinal fire1 but also the highest ,self in so far as qualified by the intestinal fire4-- ,but how is this to be known8--',on account of impossibility2' i4e4 because it is impossible that the mere intestinal fire should have the three worlds for its body4 ,the true state of the case therefore is that the word ,agni1 which is understood to denote the intestinal fire1 when appearing in co-ordination with the term ,vaisvnara represented as having the three worlds for his body1 denotes 7not the intestinal fire1 but7 the highest ,self as qualified by that fire viewed as forming the body of the ,self4 ,thus the ,lord also says1 ',as ,vaisvnara fire ,i abide in the body of living creatures and1 being assisted by breath inspired and expired1 digest the fourfold food' 7,bha ,g4 ,,xiv1 #ae74 ',as ,vaisvnara fire' here means 'embodied in the intestinal fire4'--,the ,chndogya text under discussion enjoins meditation on the highest ,self embodied in the ,vaisvnara fire4--,moreover the ,vjasaneyins read of him1 viz4 the ,vaisvnara1 as man or person1 viz4 in the passage ',that ,agni ,vaisvnara is the person' 7,sa4 ,br4 ,x1 #f1 #a1 #aa74 ,the intestinal fire by itself cannot be called a person2 unconditioned personality belongs to the highest ,self only4 ,compare 'the thousand-headed person' 7,ri4 ,samh471 and 'the ,person is all this' 7,sve4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #ae74 #bh4 ,for the same reasons not the divinity and the element4 ,for the reasons stated ,vaisvnara can be neither the deity ,fire1 nor the elemental fire which holds the third place among the gross elements4 #bi4 ,jaimini thinks that there is no objection to 7the word ',agni'7 directly 7denoting the highest ,self74 ,so far it has been maintained that the word ',agni1' which stands in co- ordination with the term ',vaisvnara1' denotes the highest ,self in so far as qualified by the intestinal fire constituting its body2 and that hence the text under discussion enjoins meditation on the highest ,self4 ,jaimini1 on the other hand1 is of opinion that there is no reasonable objection to the term ',agni1' no less than the term3 ',vaisvnara1' being taken directly to denote the highest ,self4 ,that is to say--in the same way as the term ',vaisvnara1' although a common term1 yet when qualified by attributes especially belonging to the highest ,self is known to denote the latter only as possessing the quality of ruling all men2 so the word ',agni' also when appearing in connexion with special attributes belonging to the highest ,self denotes that ,self only4 ,for any quality on the ground of which ',agni' may be etymologically explained to denote ordinary fire--as when e4g4 we explain 'agni' as he who 'agre nayati'-- may also1 in its highest non-conditioned degree1 be ascribed to the supreme ,self4 ,another difficulty remains4 ,the passage 7,v1 #ah1 #a7 'yas tv etam evam prdesamtram abhivimnam1' c4 declares that the non-limited highest ,brahman is limited by the measure of the pradesas1 i4e4 of the different spaces-heaven1 ether1 earth1 c4--which had previously been said to constitute the limbs of ,vaisvnara4 ,how is this possible8 #cj4 ,on account of definiteness2 thus smarathya opines4 ,the teacher smarathya is of opinion that the text represents the highest ,self as possessing a definite extent1 to the end of rendering the thought of the meditating devotee more definite4 ,that is to say--the limitation due to the limited extent of heaven1 sun1 c4 has the purpose of rendering definite to thought him who pervades 7abhi7 all this ,universe and in reality transcends all measure 7vimna74--,a further difficulty remains4 ,for what purpose is the highest ,brahman here represented like a man1 having a head and limbs8--,this point the next ,stra elucidates4 #ca4 ,on account of meditation1 ,bdari thinks4 ,the teacher ,bdari thinks that the representation in the text of the supreme ,self in the form of a man is for the purpose of devout meditation4 ',he who in this way meditates on that ,vaisvnara ,self as prdesamtra and abhivimna1 he eats food in all worlds1 in all beings1 in all ,selfs4' ,what this text enjoins is devout meditation for the purpose of reaching ,brahman4 ',in this way' means 'as having a human form4' ,and 'the eating' of food in all worlds1 c4 means the gaining of intuitional knowledge of ,brahman which abides everywhere and is in itself of the nature of supreme bliss4 ,the special kind of food1 i4e4 the special objects of enjoyment which belong to the different ,selfs standing under the influence of karman cannot be meant here2 for those limited objects have to be shunned by those who desire final release4 ,a further question arises4 ,if ,vaisvnara is the highest ,self1 how can the text say that the altar is its chest1 the grass on the altar its hairs1 and so on8 7,v1 #ah1 #b47 ,such a statement has a sense only if we understand by ,vaisvnara the intestinal fire4--,this difficulty the next ,stra elucidates4 #cb4 ,on account of imaginative identification1 thus ,jaimini thinks2 for thus the text declares4 ,the teacher ,jaimini is of opinion that the altar is stated to be the chest of ,vaisvnara1 and so on1 in order to effect an imaginative identification of the offering to ,prna which is daily performed by the meditating devotees and is the means of pleasing ,vaisvnara1 having the heaven and so on for his body1 i4e4 the highest ,self1 with the ,agnihotra- offering4 ,for the fruit due to meditation on the highest ,self1 as well as the identity of the offering to breath with the ,agnihotra1 is declared in the following text1 ',he who without knowing this offers the ,agnihotra--that would be as if removing the live coals he were to pour his libation on dead ashes4 ,but he who offers this ,agnihotra with a full knowledge of its purport1 he offers it in all worlds1 in all beings1 in all ,selfs4 ,as the fibres of the ,ishk reed when thrown into the fire are burnt1 thus all his sins are burnt4' 7,v1 #bd1 #a-c47 #cc4 ,moreover1 they record him in that4 ,they 7i4e4 the ,vjasaneyins7 speak of him1 viz4 ,vaisvnara who has heaven for his head1 c4--i4e4 the highest ,self--as within that1 i4e4 the body of the devotee1 so as to form the abode of the oblation to ,prna2 viz4 in the text1',of that ,vaisvnara ,self the head is ,sutejas1' and so on4 ,the context is as follows4 ,the clause ',he who meditates on the ,vaisvnara ,self as prdesamtra1' c4 enjoins meditation on the highest ,self having the three worlds for its body1 i4e4 on ,vaisvnara4 ,the following clause 'he eats food in all worlds' teaches that the attaining of ,brahman is the reward of such meditation4 ,and then the text proceeds to teach the ,agnihotra offered to ,prna1 which is something subsidiary to the meditation taught4 ,the text here establishes an identity between the members--fire1 sun1 c4--of the ,vaisvnara enjoined as object of meditation 7which members are called ,sutejas1 ,visvarpa1 c4 71 and parts--viz4 head1 eye1 breath1 trunk1 bladder1 feet--of the worshipper's body4 ',the head is ,sutejas'--that means3 the head of the devotee is 7identical with7 heaven1 which is the head of the highest ,self2 and so on up to 'the feet1' i4e4 the feet of the devotee are identical with the earth1 which constitutes the feet of the highest ,self1 ,the devotee having thus reflected on the highest ,self1 which has the three worlds for its body1 as present within his own body1 thereupon is told to view his own chest1 hair1 heart1 mind and mouth as identical with the altar1 grass and the other things which are required for the ,agnihotra2 further to identify the oblation to ,prna with the ,agnihotra1 and by means of this ,prna-agnihotra to win the favour of ,vaisvnara1 i4 e4 the highest ,self4 ,the final--conclusion then remains that ,vaisvnara is none other than the highest ,self1 the supreme ,person4--,here terminates the adhikarana of ',vaisvnara4' ,,third ,p,,da4 #a4 ,the abode of heaven1 earth1 c4 7is the highest ,self71 on account of terms which are its own4 ,the followers of the ,atharva-veda have the following text1 ',he in whom the heaven1 the earth and the sky are woven1 the mind also1 with all the vital airs1 know him alone as the ,self1 and leave off other words2 he is the bank 7setu7 of the ,immortal' 7,mu4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #b1 #e74 ,the doubt here arises whether the being spoken of as the abode of heaven1 earth1 and so on1 is the individual soul or the highest ,self4 ,the ,prvapakshin maintains the former alternative4 ,for1 he remarks1 in the next sloka1 'where like spokes in the nave of a wheel the arteries meet1 he moves about within1 becoming manifold1' the word 'where' refers back to the being which in the preceding sloka had been called the abode of heaven1 earth1 and so on1 the clause beginning with 'where' thus declaring that that being is the basis of the arteries2 and the next clause declares that same being to become manifold or to be born in many ways4 ,now1 connexion with the arteries is clearly characteristic of the individual soul2 and so is being born in many forms1 divine and so on4 ,moreover1 in the very sloka under discussion it is said that that being is the abode of the mind and the five vital airs1 and this also is a characteristic attribute of the individual soul4 ,it being1 on these grounds1 ascertained that the text refers to the individual soul we must attempt to reconcile therewith1 as well as we can1 what is said about its being the abode of heaven1 earth1 c4 ,this prim facie view is set aside by the ,stra4 ,that which is described as the abode of heaven1 earth1 c4 is none other than the highest ,brahman1 on account of a term which is 'its own1' i4e4 which specially belongs to it4 ,the clause we have in view is 'he is the bank of the ,immortal4' ,this description applies to the highest ,brahman only1 which alone is1 in all ,upanishads1 termed the cause of the attainment of ,immortality2 cp4 e4g4 ',knowing him thus a man becomes immortal2 there is no other path to go' 7,sve4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #h74 ,the term 'setu' is derived from si1 which means to bind1 and therefore means that which binds1 i4e4 makes one to attain immortality2 or else it may be understood to mean that which leads towards immortality that lies beyond the ocean of samsra1 in the same way as a bank or bridge 7setu7 leads to the further side of a river4--,moreover the word ',self 7tman7 7which1 in the text under discussion1 is also applied to that which is the abode of heaven1 earth1 c471 without any further qualification1 primarily denotes ,brahman only2 for 'tman' comes from p1 to reach1 and means that which 'reaches' all other things in so far as it rules them4 ,and further on 7,,ii1 #b1 #g7 there are other terms1 'all knowing1' 'all cognising1' which also specially belong to the highest ,brahman only4 ,this ,brahman may also be represented as the abode of the arteries2 as proved e4g4 by ,mahnr4 ,up4 7,,xi1 #h-ab71 ',surrounded by the arteries he hangs 444 in the middle of this pointed flame there dwells the highest ,self4' ,of that ,self it may also be said that it is born in many ways2 in accordance with texts such as 'not born1 he is born in many ways2 the wise know the place of his birth4' ,for in order to fit himself to be a refuge for gods1 men1 c4 the supreme ,person1 without however putting aside his true nature1 associates himself with the shape1 make1 qualities and works of the different classes of beings1 and thus is born in many ways4 ,smriti says the same3 ',though being unborn1 of non-perishable nature1 the ,lord of all beings1 yet presiding over my ,prakriti ,i am born by my own mysterious power' 7,bha4 ,g4 ,,iv1 #f74 ,of the mind also and the other organs of the individual soul the highest ,self is strictly the abode2 for it is the abode of everything4--,the next ,stra supplies a further reason4 #b4 ,and on account of its being declared that to which the released have to resort4 ,the ,person who is the abode of heaven1 earth1 and so on1 is also declared by the text to be what is to be reached by those who are released from the bondage of ,samsra existence4 ',when the seer sees the brilliant maker and ,lord as the ,person who has his source in ,brahman1 then possessing true knowledge he shakes off good and evil1 and1 free from passion1 reaches the highest oneness' 7,mu4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #a1 #c74 ',as the flowing rivers disappear in the sea1 losing their name and form1 thus a wise man freed from name and form goes to the divine ,person who is higher than the high' 7,,iii1 #b1 #h74 ,for it is only those freed from the bondage of ,samsra who shake off good and evil1 are free from passion1 and freed from name and form4 ,for the ,samsra state consists in the possession of name and form1 which is due to connexion with non-sentient matter1 such connexion springing from good and evil works4 ,the ,person therefore who is the abode of heaven1 earth1 c41 and whom the text declares to be the aim to be reached by those who1 having freed themselves from good and evil1 and hence from all contact with matter1 attain supreme oneness with the highest ,brahman1 can be none other than this highest ,brahman itself4 ,this conclusion1 based on terms exclusively applicable to the highest ,brahman1 is now confirmed by reference to the absence of terms specially applicable to the individual soul4 #c4 ,not that which is inferred1 on account of the absence of terms denoting it1 and 7so also not7 the bearer of the ,prnas 7i4 e4 the individual soul74 ,as the section under discussion does not treat of the ,pradhna1 there being no terms referring to that1 so it is with regard to the individual soul also4 ,in the text of the ,stra we have to read either anumnam1 i4 e4 'inference1' in the sense of 'object of inference1' or else numnam1 'object of inference'2 what is meant being in both cases the ,pradhana inferred to exist by the ,snkhyas4 #d4 ,on account of the declaration of difference4 ',on the same tree man sits immersed in grief1 bewildered by ans2 but when he sees the other one1 the ,lord1 contented1 and his glory2 then his grief passes away' 7,mu4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #a1 #b74 ,this1 and similar texts1 speak of that one1 i4e4 the one previously described as the abode of heaven1 earth1 c41 as different from the individual soul4--,the text means--the individual soul grieves1 being bewildered by her who is not 'sa1' i4e4 ,prakriti1 the object of fruition4 ,but its grief passes away when it sees him who is other than itself1 i4e4 the beloved ,lord of all1 and his greatness which consists in his ruling the entire world4 #e4 ,on account of the subject-matter4 ,it has been already shown1 viz4 under ,i1 #b1 #ba1 that the highest ,brahman constitutes the initial topic of the ,upanishad4 ,and by the arguments set forth in the previous ,stras of the present ,pda1 we have removed all suspicion as to the topic started being dropped in the body of the ,upanishad4 #f4 ,and on account of abiding and eating4 ',two birds1 inseparable friends1 cling to the same tree4 ,one of them eats the sweet fruit2 without eating1 the other looks on' 7,mu4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #a1 #a74 ,this text declares that one enjoys the fruit of works while the other1 without enjoying1 shining abides within the body4 ,now this shining being which does not enjoy the fruit of works can only be the being previously described as the abode of heaven1 earth1 c41 and characterised as all knowing1 the bridge of immortality1 the ,self of all2 it can in no way be the individual ,self which1 lamenting1 experiences the results of its works4 ,the settled conclusion1 therefore1 is that the abode of heaven1 earth1 and so on1 is none other than the highest ,self4-- ,here terminates the adhikarana of 'heaven1 earth1 and so on4' #g4 ,the bhman 7is the highest ,self71 as the instruction about it is additional to that about serenity4 ,the ,chandogas read as follows3 ',where one sees nothing else1 hears nothing else1 knows nothing else1 that is fulness 7bhman74 ,where one sees something else1 hears something else1 knows something else1 that is the ,little' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vii1 #bc1 #bd74 ,the term 'bhman' is derived from bahu 7much1 many71 and primarily signifies 'muchness4' ,by 'much' in this connexion1 we have however to understand1 not what is numerous1 but what is large1 for the text uses the term in contrast with the ',little' 7alpa71 i4e4 the ',small4' ,and the being qualified as 'large1' we conclude from the context to be the ,self2 for this section of the ,upanishad at the outset states that he who knows the ,self overcomes grief 7,,vii1 #a1 #c71 then teaches the knowledge of the bhman1 and concludes by saying that 'the ,self is all this' 7,,vii1 #be1 #b74 ,the question now arises whether the ,self called bhman is the individual ,self or the highest ,self4--,the ,prvapakshin maintains the former view4 ,for1 he says1 to ,narada who had approached ,sanatkumra with the desire to be instructed about the ,self1 a series of beings1 beginning with 'name' and ending with 'breath1' are enumerated as objects of devout meditation2 ,nrada asks each time whether there be anything greater than name1 and so on1 and each time receives an affirmative reply 7'speech is greater than name1' c472 when1 however1 the series has advanced as far as ,breath1 there is no such question and reply4 ,this shows that the instruction about the ,self terminates with ,breath1 and hence we conclude that breath in this place means the individual soul which is associated with breath1 not a mere modification of air4 ,also the clauses ',breath is father1 breath is mother1' c4 7,,vii1 #ae1 #a71 show that breath here is something intelligent4 ,and this is further proved by the clause ',slayer of thy father1 slayer of thy mother1' c4 7,,vii1 #ae1 #b2 #c71 which declares that he who offends a father1 a mother1 c41 as long as there is breath in them1 really hurts them1 and therefore deserves reproach2 while no blame attaches to him who offers even the grossest violence to them after their breath has departed4 ,for a conscious being only is capable of being hurt1 and hence the word 'breath' here denotes such a being only4 ,moreover1 as it is observed that also in the case of such living beings as have no vital breath 7viz4 plants71 suffering results1 or does not result1 according as injury is inflicted or not1 we must for this reason also decide that the breath spoken of in the text as something susceptible of injury is the individual soul4 ,it consequently would be an error to suppose1 on the ground of the comparison of ,prna to the nave of a wheel in which the spokes are set1 that ,prna here denotes the highest ,self2 for the highest ,self is incapable of being injured4 ,that comparison1 on the other hand1 is quite in its place1 if we understand by ,prna the individual soul1 for the whole aggregate of non-sentient matter which stands to the individual soul in the relation of object or instrument of enjoyment1 has an existence dependent on the individual soul4 ,and this soul1 there called ,prna1 is what the text later on calls ,bhman2 for as there is no question and reply as to something greater than ,prna1 ,prna continues1 without break1 to be the subject-matter up to the mention of bhman4 ,the paragraphs intervening between the section on ,prna 7,,vii1 #ae7 and the section on the bhman 7,,vii1 #bc ff47 are to be understood as follows4 ,the ,prna section closes with the remark that he who fully knows ,prna is an ativdin1 i4e4 one who makes a final supreme declaration4 ,in the next sentence then1 ',but this one in truth is an ativdin who makes a supreme statement by means of the ,true1' the clause ',but this one is an ativdin' refers back to the previously mentioned person who knows the ,prna1 and the relative clause 'who makes1' c41 enjoins on him the speaking of the truth as an auxiliary element in the meditation on ,prna4 ,the next paragraph1 ',when one understands the truth then one declares the truth1' intimates that speaking the truth stands in a supplementary relation towards the cognition of the true nature of the ,prna as described before4 ,for the accomplishment of such cognition the subsequent four paragraphs enjoin reflection1 faith1 attendance on a spiritual guide1 and the due performance of sacred duties4 ,in order that such duties may be undertaken1 the next paragraphs then teach that bliss constitutes the nature of the individual soul1 previously called ,prna1 and finally that the ,bhman1 i4e4 the supreme fulness of such bliss1 is the proper object of inquiry4 ,the final purport of the teaching1 therefore1 is that the true nature of the individual soul1 freed from ,nescience1 is abundant bliss--a conclusion which perfectly agrees with the initial statement that he who knows the ,self passes beyond sorrow4 ,that being1 therefore1 which has the attribute of being 'bhman1' is the individual ,self4 ,this being so1 it is also intelligible why1 further on1 when the text describes the glory and power of the individual ,self1 it uses the term ',i'2 for ',i' denotes just the individual ,self3 ',i am below1 ,i am above1 c41 ,i am all this' 7,,vii1 #be1 #a74 ,this conclusion having been settled1 all remaining clauses must be explained so as to agree with it4 ,this prim facie view is set aside by the ,stra4 ,the being characterised in the text as 'bhman' is not the individual ,self1 but the highest ,self1 since instruction is given about the bhman in addition to 'serenity' 7samprasda74 ',samprasda' denotes the individual soul1 as we know from the following text1 ',now that serenity1 having risen from out this body1 and having reached the highest light1 appears in its true form' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,viii1 #c1 #d74 ,now in the text under discussion instruction is given about a being called 'the ,true1' and possessing the attribute of 'bhman1' as being something additional to the individual soul2 and this being called 'the ,true' is none other than the highest ,brahman4 ,just as in the series of beings beginning with name and ending with breath1 each successive being is mentioned in addition to the preceding one-- wherefrom we conclude that it is something really different from what precedes2 so that being also which is called 'the ,true1' and which is mentioned in addition to the individual ,self called ,prna1 is something different from the individual ,self1 and this being called 'the ,true' is the same as the ,bhman2 in other words1 the text teaches that the ,bhman is the highest ,brahman called 'the ,true4' ,this the ,vrittikra also declares3 ',but the ,bhman only4 ,the ,bhman is ,brahman1 because in the series beginning with name instruction is given about it subsequently to the individual ,self4' ,but how do we know that the instruction as to 'the ,true' is in addition to1 and refers to something different from1 the being called ,prna8--,the text1 after having declared that he who knows the ,prna is an ativdin1 goes on1 ',but really that one is an ativdin who makes a supreme declaration by means of the ,true4' ,the 'but' here clearly separates him who is an ativdin by means of the ,true from the previous ativdin1 and the clause thus does not cause us to recognise him who is ativdin by means of ,prna2 hence 'the ,true' which is the cause of the latter ativdin being what he is must be something different from the ,prna which is the cause of the former ativdin's quality4--,but we have maintained above that the text enjoins the speaking of 'the ,true' merely as an auxiliary duty for him who knows ,prna2 and that hence the ,prna continues to be the general subject-matter6--,this contention is untenable1 we reply4 ,the conjunction 'but' shows that the section gives instruction about a new ativdin1 and does not merely declare that the ativdin previously mentioned has to speak the truth4 ,it is different with texts such as ',but that one indeed is an ,agnihotrin who speaks the truth'2 there we have no knowledge of any further ,agnihotrin1 and therefore must interpret the text as enjoining truthfulness as an obligation incumbent on the ordinary ,agnihotrin4 ,in the text under discussion1 on the other hand1 we have the term 'the ,true'1 which makes us apprehend that there is a further ativdin different from the preceding one2 and we know that that term is used to denote the highest ,brahman1 as e4g4 in the text1 ',the ,true1 knowledge1 the ,infinite is ,brahman4' ,the ativdin who takes his stand on this ,brahman1 therefore1 must be viewed as different from the preceding ativdin2 and a difference thus established on the basis of the meaning and connexion of the different sentences cannot be set aside4 ,an ativdin 7'one who in his declaration goes beyond'7 is one who maintains1 as object of his devotion1 something which1 as being more beneficial to man1 surpasses other objects of devotion4 ,the text at first declares that he who knows ,prna1 i4e4 the individual soul1 is an ativdin1 in so far as the object of his devout meditation surpasses the objects from name up to hope2 and then goes on to say that1 as that object also is not of supreme benefit to man1 an ativdin in the full sense of the term is he only who proclaims as the object of his devotion the highest ,brahman1 which alone is of supreme unsurpassable benefit to man4 ',he who is an ativdin by the ,true1' i4e4 he who is an ativdin characterised by the highest ,brahman as the object of his meditation4 ,for the same reason the pupil entreats1 ',sir1 may ,i be an ativdin with the ,true6' and the teacher replies1 ',but we must desire to know the ,true6'--,moreover1 the text1 ,,vii1 #bf1 ,i1 ',prna springs from the ,self1' declares the origination from the ,self of the being called ,prna2 and from this we infer that the ,self which is introduced as the general subject-matter of the section1 in the clause ',he who knows the ,self passes beyond death1' is different from the being called ,prna4--,the contention that1 because there is no question and answer as to something greater than ,prna1 the instruction about the ,self must be supposed to come to an end with the instruction about ,prna1 is by no means legitimate4 ,for that a new subject is introduced is proved1 not only by those questions and answers2 it may be proved by other means also1 and we have already explained such means4 ,the following is the reason why the pupil does not ask the question whether there is anything greater than ,prna4 ,with regard to the non- sentient objects extending from name to hope--each of which surpasses the preceding one in so far as it is more beneficial to man--the teacher does not declare that he who knows them is an ativdin2 when1 however1 he comes to the individual soul1 there called ,prna1 the knowledge of whose true nature he considers highly beneficial1 he expressly says that 'he who sees this1 notes this1 understands this is an ativdin' 7,,vii1 #ae1 #d74 ,the pupil therefore imagines that the instruction about the ,self is now completed1 and hence asks no further question4 ,the teacher on the other hand1 holding that even that knowledge is not the highest1 spontaneously continues his teaching1 and tells the pupil that truly he only is an ativdin who proclaims the supremely and absolutely beneficial being which is called 'the ,true1' i4e4 the highest ,brahman4 ,on this suggestion of the highest ,brahman the pupil1 desirous to learn its true nature and true worship1 entreats the teacher1 ',sir1 may ,i become an ativdin by the ,true6' ,thereupon the teacher--in order to help the pupil to become an ativdin1--a position which requires previous intuition of ,brahman--enjoins on him meditation on ,brahman which is the means to attain intuition 7',you must desire to know the ,true6'72 next recommends to him reflection 7manana7 which is the means towards meditation 7',you must desire to understand reflection'72 then--taking it for granted that the injunction of reflection implies the injunction of 'hearing' the sacred texts which is the preliminary for reflecting-- advises him to cherish faith in ,brahman which is the preliminary means towards hearing 7',you must desire to understand faith'72 after that tells him to practise1 as a preliminary towards faith1 reliance on ,brahman 7',you must desire to understand reliance'72 next admonishes him1 to apply himself to 'action1' i4e4 to make the effort which is a preliminary requisite for all the activities enumerated 7',you must desire to understand action'74 ,finally1 in order to encourage the pupil to enter on all this1 the teacher tells him to recognise that bliss constitutes the nature of that ,brahman which is the aim of all his effort 7',you must desire to understand bliss'72 and bids him to realise that the bliss which constitutes ,brahman's nature is supremely large and full 7',you must endeavour to understand the bhman1 i4e4 the supreme fulness of bliss'74 ,and of this ,brahman1 whose nature is absolute bliss1 a definition is then given as follows1' ,where one sees nothing else1 hears nothing else1 knows nothing else1 that is bhman4' ,this means-- when the meditating devotee realises the intuition of this ,brahman1 which consists of absolute bliss1 he does not see anything apart from it1 since the whole aggregate of things is contained within the essence and outward manifestation 7vibhti7 of ,brahman4 ,he1 therefore1 who has an intuitive knowledge of ,brahman as qualified by its attributes and its vibhti--which also is called aisvarya1 i4e4 lordly power--and consisting of supreme bliss1 sees nothing else since there is nothing apart from ,brahman2 and sees1 i4e4 feels no pain since all possible objects of perception and feeling are of the nature of bliss or pleasure2 for pleasure is just that which1 being experienced1 is agreeable to man's nature4--,but an objection is raised1 it is an actual fact that this very world is perceived as something different from ,brahman1 and as being of the nature of pain1 or at the best1 limited pleasure2 how then can it be perceived as being a manifestation of ,brahman1 as having ,brahman for its ,self1 and hence consisting of bliss8--,the individual souls1 we reply1 which are under the influence of karman1 are conscious of this world as different from ,brahman1 and1 according to their individual karman1 as either made up of pain or limited pleasure4 ,but as this view depends altogether on karman1 to him who has freed himself from ,nescience in the form of karman1 this same world presents itself as lying within the intuition of ,brahman1 together with its qualities and vibhti1 and hence as essentially blissful4 ,to a man troubled with excess of bile the water he drinks has a taste either downright unpleasant or moderately pleasant1 according to the degree to which his health is affected2 while the same water has an unmixedly pleasant taste for a man in good health4 ,as long as a boy is not aware that some plaything is meant to amuse him1 he does not care for it2 when on the other hand he apprehends it as meant to give him delight1 the thing becomes very dear to him4 ,in the same way the world becomes an object of supreme love to him who recognises it as having ,brahman for its ,self1 and being a mere plaything of ,brahman--of ,brahman1 whose essential nature is supreme bliss1 and which is a treasure-house1 as it were1 of numberless auspicious qualities of supreme excellence4 ,he who has reached such intuition of ,brahman1 sees nothing apart from it and feels no pain4 ,this the concluding passages of the text set forth in detail1 ',he who sees1 perceives and understands this1 loves the ,self1 delights in the ,self1 revels in the ,self1 rejoices in the ,self2 he becomes a ,self ruler1 he moves and rules in all worlds according to his pleasure4 ,but those who have a different knowledge from this1 they are ruled by others1 they live in perishable worlds1 they do not move in all the worlds according to their liking4' ',they are ruled by others1' means 'they are in the power of karman4' ,and further on1 ',he who sees this does not see death1 nor illness1 nor pain2 he who sees this sees everything and obtains everything everywhere4' ,that ,brahman is of the nature of supreme bliss has been shown in detail under ,i1 #a1 #ab ff4--,the conclusion from all this is that1 as the text applies the term 'bhman' to what was previously called the ,real or ,true1 and which is different from the individual soul there called ,prna1 the bhman is the highest ,brahman4 #h4 ,and on account of the suitability of the attributes4 ,the attributes also which the text ascribes to the bhman suit the highest ,self only4 ,so immortality 7',the ,bhman is immortal1' ,,vii1 #bd1 #a72 not being based on something else 7'it rests in its own greatness'72 being the ,self of all 7'the bhman is below1' c41 'it is all this'72 being that which produces all 7'from the ,self there springs breath1' c4 74 ,all these attributes can be reconciled with the highest ,self only4-- ,the ,prvapakshin has pointed to the text which declares the ',i' to be the ,self of all 7,,vii1 #be1 #a72 but what that text really teaches is meditation on ,brahman under the aspect of the ',i4' ,this appears from the introductory clause ',now follows the instruction with regard to the ,i4' ,that of the ',i1' i4e4 the individual ,self1 also the highest ,self is the true ,self1 scripture declares in several places1 so e4g4 in the text about the inward ,ruler 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #g74 ,as therefore the individual soul finds its completion in the highest ,self only1 the word ',i' also extends in its connotation up to the highest ,self2 and the instruction about the ',i' which is given in the text has thus for its object meditation on the highest ,self in so far as having the individual ,self for its body4 ,as the highest ,self has all beings for its body and thus is the ,self of all1 it is the ,self of the individual soul also2 and this the text declares in the passage beginning ',now follows the instruction about the ,self1' and ending ',self is all this4' ,in order to prove this the text declares that everything originates from the highest ,self which forms the ,self of the individual soul also1 viz4 in the passage ',from the ,self of him who sees this1 perceives this1 knows this1 there springs breath1' c4--that means3 breath and all other beings spring from the highest ,self which abides within the ,self of the meditating devotee as its inner ruler4 ,hence1 the text means to intimate1 meditation should be performed on the ',i1' in order thus firmly to establish the cognition that the highest ,self has the ',i1' i4e4 the individual soul for its body4 ,it is thus an established conclusion that the bhman is the highest ,self4 ,here terminates the adhikarana of 'fulness4' #i4 ,the ,imperishable 7is ,brahman71 on account of its supporting that which is the end of ether4 ,the ,vjasaneyins1 in the chapter recording the questions asked by ,grg1 read as follows3 ',he said1 ,o ,grg1 the ,brhmanas call that the ,imperishable4 ,it is neither coarse nor fine1 neither short nor long1 it is not red1 not fluid1 it is without a shadow1' c4 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #h1 #h74 ,a doubt here arises whether that ,imperishable be the ,pradhna1 or the individual soul1 or the highest ,self4--,the ,pradhna1 it may be maintained in the first place4 ,for we see that in passages such as 'higher than that which is higher than the ,imperishable' the term ',imperishable' actually denotes the ,pradhna2 and moreover the qualities enumerated1 viz4 not being either coarse or fine1 c41 are characteristic of the ,pradhna4--,but1 an objection is raised1 in texts such as ',that knowledge by which the ,imperishable is apprehended' 7,mu4 ,up4 ,i1 #a1 #e71 the word ',imperishable' is seen to denote the highest ,brahman6--,in cases1 we reply1 where the meaning of a word may be determined on the basis either of some other means of proof or of ,scripture1 the former meaning presents itself to the mind first1 and hence there is no reason why such meaning should not be accepted4--,but how do you know that the ether of the text is not ether in the ordinary sense8--,from the description1 we reply1 given of it in the text1 ',that above the heavens1' c4 ,there it is said that all created things past1 present and future rest on ether as their basis2 ether cannot therefore be taken as that elementary substance which itself is comprised in the sphere of things created4 ,we therefore must understand by 'ether' matter in its subtle state1 i4e4 the ,pradhna2 and the ,imperishable which thereupon is declared to be the support of that ,pradhna1 hence cannot itself be the ,pradhna4--,nor is there any force in the argument that a sense established by some other means of proof presents itself to the mind more immediately than a sense established by ,scripture2 for as the word 'akshara' 7i4e4 the non-perishable7 intimates its sense directly through the meaning of its constituent elements other means of proof need not be regarded at all4 ,moreover ,yjavalkya had said previously that the ether is the cause and abode of all things past1 present and future1 and when ,grg thereupon asks him in what that ether 'is woven1' i4e4 what is the causal substance and abode of ether1 he replies 'the ,imperishable4' ,now this also proves that by the ',imperishable' we have to understand the ,pradhna which from other sources is known to be the causal substance1 and hence the abode1 of all effected things whatsoever4 ,this prim facie view is set aside by the ,stra4 ,the ',imperishable' is the highest ,brahman1 because the text declares it to support that which is the end1 i4 e4 that which lies beyond ether1 viz4 unevolved matter 7avykritam74 ,the ether referred to in ,grg's question is not ether in the ordinary sense1 but what lies beyond ether1 viz4 unevolved matter1 and hence the ',imperishable' which is said to be the support of that 'unevolved' cannot itself be the 'unevolved1' i4e4 cannot be the ,pradhna4 ,let us1 then1 the ,prvapakshin resumes1 understand by the ',imperishable1' the individual soul2 for this may be viewed as the support of the entire aggregate of non-sentient matter1 inclusive of the elements in their subtle condition2 and the qualities of non-coarseness1 c41 are characteristic of that soul also4 ,moreover there are several texts in which the term ',imperishable' is actually seen to denote the individual soul2 so e4g4 'the non-evolved' is merged in the ',imperishable'2 ',that of which the non-evolved is the body2 that of which the ,imperishable is the body'2 ',all the creatures are the ,perishable1 the non-changing ,self is called the ,imperishable' 7,bha4 ,g4 ,,xv1 #af74 ,to this alternative prim facie view the next ,stra replies4 #aj4 ,and this 7supporting7 7springs7 from command4 ,the text declares that this supporting of ether and all other things proceeds from command4 ',in the command of that ,imperishable sun and moon stand1 held apart2 in the command of that ,imperishable heaven and earth stand1 held apart1' c4 ,now such supreme command1 through which all things in the universe are held apart1 cannot possibly belong to the individual soul in the state either of bondage or of release4 ,the commanding ',imperishable' therefore is none other than the supreme ,person4 #aa4 ,and on account of the exclusion of 7what is of7 another nature 7than ,brahman74 ,another nature1 i4 e4 the nature of the ,pradhna1 and so on4 ,a supplementary passage excludes difference on the part of the ,imperishable from the supreme ,person4 ',that ,imperishable1 ,o ,grg1 is unseen but seeing2 unheard but hearing2 unthought but thinking2 unknown but knowing4 ,there is nothing that sees but it1 nothing that hears but it1 nothing that thinks but it1 nothing that knows but it4 ,in that ,imperishable1 ,o ,grg1 the ether is woven1 warp and woof4' ,here the declaration as to the ,imperishable being what sees1 hears1 c4 excludes the non-intelligent ,pradhna2 and the declaration as to its being all- seeing1 c4 while not seen by any one excludes the individual soul4 ,this exclusion of what has a nature other than that of the highest ,self thus confirms the view of that ,self being meant4--,or else the ,stra may be explained in a different way1 viz4 ',on account of the exclusion of the existence of another4' ,on this alternative the text ',there is nothing that sees but it1' c41 is to be understood as follows3 'while this ,imperishable1 not seen by others but seeing all others1 forms the basis of all things different from itself2 there is no other principle which1 unseen by the ,imperishable but seeing it1 could form its basis1' i4e4 the text would exclude the existence of any other thing but the ,imperishable1 and thus implicitly deny that the ,imperishable is either the ,pradhna or the individual ,self4--,moreover the text ',by the command of that ,imperishable men praise those who give1 the gods follow the ,sacrficer1 the fathers the ,darv-offering1' declares the ,imperishable to be that on the command of which there proceed all works enjoined by ,scripture and ,smriti4 such as sacrificing1 giving1 c41 and this again shows that the ,imperishable must be ,brahman1 the supreme ,person4 ,again1 the subsequent passus1 ',whosoever without knowing that ,imperishable1' c41 declares that ignorance of the ,imperishable leads to the ,samsra1 while knowledge of it helps to reach ,immortality3 this also proves that the ,imperishable is the highest ,brahman4--,here terminates the adhikarana of 'the ,imperishable4' #ab4 ,on account of his being designated as the object of seeing1 he 7i4e4 the highest ,self7 7is that object74 ,the followers of the ,atharva-veda1 in the section containing the question asked by ,satyakma1 read as follows3 ',he again who meditates with this syllable ,aum of three ,mtrs on the highest ,person1 he comes to light and to the sun4 ,as a snake frees itself from its skin1 so he frees himself from evil4 ,he is led up by the ,sman verses to the ,brahma- world2 he sees the person dwelling in the castle who is higher than the individual souls concreted with bodies and higher 7than those7' 7,pra4 ,up4 ,v1 #b74 ,here the terms 'he meditates' and 'he sees' have the same sense1 'seeing' being the result of devout meditation2 for according to the principle expressed in the text 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #ad7 ',according as man's thought is in this world1' what is reached by the devotee is the object of meditation2 and moreover the text exhibits the same object1 viz4 'the highest ,person' in connexion with both verbs4 ,the doubt here presents itself whether the highest ,person in this text be the so-called four-faced ,brahm1 the ,lord of the mundane egg who represents the individual souls in their collective aspect1 or the supreme ,person who is the ,lord of all4--,the ,prvapakshin maintains the former view4 ,for1 he argues1 on the introductory question1 ',he who here among men should meditate until death on the syllable ,om1 what would he obtain by it8' ,the text first declares that he who meditates on that syllable as having one ,mtr1 obtains the world of men2 and next1 that he who meditates on it as having two ,mtrs obtains the world of the atmosphere4 ,hence the ,brahma-world1 which the text after that represents as the object reached by him who meditates on ,om as having three syllables1 must be the world of ,brahm ,katurmukha who is constituted by the aggregate of the individual souls4 ,what the soul having reached that world sees1 therefore is the same ,brahm ,katurmukha2 and thus only the attribute 'etasmj' jvaghant part param' is suitable2 for the collective soul1 i4 e4 ,brahm ,katurmukha1 residing in the ,brahma-world is higher 7para7 than the distributive or discrete soul 7jva7 which is concreted 7ghan-bhta7 with the body and sense-organs1 and at the same time is higher 7para7 than these4 ,the highest ,person mentioned in the text1 therefore1 is ,brahma ,katurmukha2 and the qualities mentioned further on1 such as absence of decay1 c41 must be taken in such a way as to agree with that ,brahm4 ,to this prim facie view the ,stra replies that the object of seeing is ,he1 i4e4 the highest ,self1 on account of designation4 ,the text clearly designates the object of seeing as the highest ,self4 ,for the concluding sloka1 which refers to that object of seeing1 declares that 'by means of the ,omkra he who knows reaches that which is tranquil1 free from decay1 immortal1 fearless1 the highest'--all which attributes properly belong to the highest ,self only1 as we know from texts such as 'that is the ,immortal1 that is the fearless1 that is ,brahman' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #ae1 i74 ,the qualification expressed in the clause 'etasmj jva4--ghant1' c4 may also refer to the highest ,self only1 not to ,brahm ,katurmukha2 for the latter is himself comprehended by the term 'jvaghana4' ,for that term denotes all souls which are embodied owing to karman2 and that ,katurmukha is one of those we know from texts such as ',he who first creates ,brahm' 7,svet4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #ah74 ,nor is there any strength in the argument that1 since the ,brahma-world mentioned in the text is known to be the world of ,katurmukha1 as it follows next on the world of the atmosphere1 the being abiding there must needs be ,katurmukha4 ,we rather argue as follows--as from the concluding clause 'that which is tranquil1 free from decay1' c41 we ascertain that the object of intuition is the highest ,brahman1 the ,brahma-world spoken of as the abode of the seeing devotee cannot be the perishable world of ,brahm ,katurmukha4 ,a further reason for this conclusion is supplied by what the text says about 'him who is freed from all evil being led up by the ,sman verses to the world of ,brahman'2 for the place reached by him who is freed from all evil cannot be the mere abode of ,katurmukha4 ,hence also the concluding sloka says with reference to that ,brahma-world 'that which the wise teach'3 what the wise see and teach is the abode of the highest1 of ,vishnu2 cp4 the text 'the wise ever see that highest abode of ,vishnu4' ,nor is it even strictly true that the world of ,brahm follows on the atmosphere1 for the svarga-world and several others lie between the two4 ,we therefore shortly explain the drift of the whole chapter as follows4 ,at the outset of the reply given to ,satyakma there is mentioned1 in addition to the highest 7para7 ,brahman1 a lower 7apara7 ,brahman4 ,this lower or effected 7krya7 ,brahman is distinguished as twofold1 being connected either with this terrestrial world or yonder1 non-terrestrial1 world4 ,him who meditates on the ,pranava as having one syllable1 the text declares to obtain a reward in this world--he reaches the world of men4 ,he1 on the other hand1 who meditates on the ,pranava as having two syllables is said to obtain his reward in a super-terrestrial sphere--he reaches the world of the atmosphere4 ,and he finally who1 by means of the trisyllabic ,pranava which denotes the highest ,brahman1 meditates on this very highest ,brahman1 is said to reach that ,brahman1 i4 e4 the supreme ,person4--,the object of seeing is thus none other than the highest ,self4-- ,here terminates the adhikarana of the 'object of seeing4' #ac4 ,the small 7ether7 7is ,brahman71 on account of the subsequent 7arguments74 ,the ,chandogas have the following text1 ',now in that city of ,brahman there is the palace1 the small lotus1 and in it that small ether4 ,now what is within that small ether that is to be sought for1 that is to be understood' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,viii1 #a1 #a74--,the question here arises whether that small ether 7space7 within the lotus of the heart be the material clement called ether1 or the individual ,self1 or the highest ,self4--,the first view presenting itself is that the element is meant1 for the reason that the word 'ether' is generally used in that sense2 and because the clause 'what is within that small ether' shows that the ether mentioned constitutes the abode of something else that is to be enquired into4--,this view is set aside by the ,stra4 ,the small ether within the heart is the highest ,brahman1 on account of the subsequent reasons1 contained in clauses of the same section4 ,the passage ',that ,self which is free from evil1 free from old age1 free from death1 free from grief1 free from hunger and thirst1 whose wishes and purposes come true' 7,,viii1 #g1 #a7 ascribes to that small ether qualities--such as unconditioned ,selfhood1 freedom from evil1 c4--which clearly show that ether to be the highest ,brahman4 ,and this conclusion is confirmed by what other texts say about him who knows the small ether attaining the power of realising his own wishes1',those who depart from hence having come to know the ,self and those real wishes1 for them there is freedom in all worlds'2 and 'whatever object he desires1 by his mere will it comes to him2 having obtained it he is happy' 7,ch1 ,up4 ,,viii1 #a1 #f2 #b1 #i74 ,if moreover the ether within the heart were the elemental ether1 the comparison instituted in the passage ',as large as that 7elemental7 ether is1 so large is this ether within the heart' would be wholly inappropriate4 ,nor must it be said that that comparison rests on the limitation of the ether within the heart 7so that the two terms compared would be the limited elemental ether within the heart1 and the universal elemental ether72 for there still would remain the inappropriate assertion that the ether within the heart is the abode of heaven1 earth and all other things4--,but1 an objection is raised1 also on the alternative of the small ether being the highest ,brahman1 the comparison to the universal elemental ether is unsuitable2 for scripture explicitly states that the highest ,self is 7not as large but7 larger than everything else1 'larger than the earth1 larger than the sky1' c4 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #ad1 #c74 ,not so1 we reply2 what the text says as to the ether within the heart being as large as the universal ether is meant 7not to make a conclusive statement as to its extent but only7 to negative that smallness of the ether which is established by its abiding within the heart4 ,similarly we say 'the sun moves with the speed of an arrow'2 the sun indeed moves much faster than an arrow1 but what our assertion means is merely that he does not move slowly4--,but1 a further doubt is started1 the passage ',that ,self which is free from sin1' c4 does not appear to refer back to the small ether within the heart4 ,for the text makes a distinction between that ether and that within that ether which it declares to be the due object of search and enquiry4 ,this latter object therefore is the topic of discussion1 and when the text says later on ',that ,self1 free from sin1 c4 is to be searched out' we must understand it to refer to the same object of search4--,this would be so1 we reply1 if the text did not distinguish the small ether and that which abides within it2 but as a matter of fact it does distinguish the two4 ,the connexion is as follows4 ,the text at first refers to the body of the devotee as the city of ,brahman1 the idea being that ,brahman is present therein as object of meditation2 and then designates an organ of that body1 viz4 the small lotus-shaped heart as the palace of ,brahman4 ,it then further refers to ,brahman--the all knowing1 all powerful1 whose love towards his devotees is boundless like the ocean--as the small ether within the heart1 meaning thereby that ,brahman who for the benefit of his devotees is present within that palace should be meditated upon as of minute size1 and finally--in the clause 'that is to be searched out'--enjoins as the object of meditation that which abides in that ,brahman1 i4e4 on the one hand1 its essential freedom from all evil qualities1 and on the other the whole treasure of its auspicious qualities1 its power of realising its wishes and so on4 ,the 'that' 7in 'that is to be searched out'7 enjoins as objects of search the small ether1 i4e4 ,brahman itself as well as the qualities abiding within it4-- ,but how1 it may be asked1 do you know that the word 'that' really refers to both1 viz4 the highest ,brahman1 there called 'small ether1' and the qualities abiding in it1 and that hence the clause enjoins an enquiry into both these entities8--,listen1 attentively1 we reply1 to our explanation6 ,the clause ',as large as this ether is1 so large is this ether within the heart' declares the exceeding greatness of the small ether2 the clause ',both heaven and earth are contained within it' up to 'lightning and stars' declares that same small ether to be the abode of the entire world2 and the clause ',and whatever there is for him in this world1 and whatever there is not1 all that is contained within it' declares that whatever objects of enjoyment there are for the devotee in this world1 and whatever other objects there are not for him1 i4e4 are merely wishes but not obtained by him1 all those objects are contained within that same small ether4 ,the text next declares that that small ether1 although dwelling within the heart which is a part of the body1 is not affected by the body's old age and decay1 for being extremely minute it is not capable of change2 and adds 'that true being is the ,brahman-city1' i4e4 that ,reality which is the cause of all is the city called ,brahman1 i4e4 the abode of the entire ,universe4 ,the following clause 'in it all desires are contained' again referring to the small ether 7'in it'7 declares that in it all desires1 i4e4 all desirable qualities are contained4 ,the text next proceeds to set forth that the small ether possesses ,selfhood and certain desirable auspicious qualities-this is done in the passage ',it is the ,self free from sin' c4 up to 'whose purposes realise themselves4' ,the following section--',and as here on earth' down to 'for them there is freedom in all the worlds'-- declares that those who do not know those eight qualities and the ,self1 called 'small ether1' which is characterised by them1 and who perform actions aiming at objects of enjoyment different from that ,self1 obtain perishable results only1 and do not attain the power of realising their wishes2 while those on the other hand who know the ,self called 'small ether' and the qualities abiding within it1 through the grace of that very same highest ,self1 obtain all their wishes and the power of realising their purposes4 ,on the ground of this connected consideration of the whole chapter we are able to decide that the text enjoins as the object of search and enquiry both the highest ,brahman and the whole body of auspicious qualities abiding within it4 ,this the ,vkyakra also renders clear in the passage beginning ',in the text what is within that there is designation of wishes 7i4e4 desirable qualities74'--,for all these reasons the small ether is the highest ,brahman4 #ad4 ,on account of the going and of the word2 for thus it is seen2 and 7there is7 an inferential sign4 ',as people who do not know the country walk again and again over a gold treasure' c41 'thus do all these creatures day after day go into that ,brahma-world' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,viii1 #c1 #b74 ,the circumstance1 here stated1 of all individual souls going to a place which the qualification 'that' connects with the subject-matter of the whole chapter1 i4e4 the small ether2 and the further circumstance of the goal of their going being called the ,brahma-world1 also prove that the small ether is none other than the highest ,brahman4--,but in what way do these two points prove what they are claimed to prove8--',for thus it is seen'2 the ,stra adds4 ,for we see it stated in other texts1 that all individual souls go daily to ,brahman1 viz4 in the state of deep sleep1 ',all these creatures having become united with the ,true do not know that they are united with the ,true'2 ',having come back from the ,true they know not that they have come back from the ,true' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #i1 #b2 #aj1 #b74 ,and in the same way we see that the word ',brahma-world' denotes the highest ,brahman2 so e4g4 'this is the ,brahma-world1 ,o ,king' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #c1 #cb74--,the ,stra subjoins a further reason4 ,even if the going of the souls to ,brahman were not seen in other texts1 the fact that the text under discussion declares the individual souls to abide in ,brahman in the state of deep sleep1 enjoying freedom from all pain and trouble just as if they were merged in the pralaya state1 is a sufficient 'inferential sign' to prove that the 'small ether' is the highest ,brahman4 ,and similarly the term ',brahma-world' as exhibited in the text under discussion1 if understood as denoting co-ordination 7i4e4 'that world which is ,brahman'71 is sufficient to prove by itself that the 'small ether'--to which that term is applied--is the highest ,brahman2 it therefore is needless to appeal to other passages4 ,that this explanation of ',brahma-world' is preferable to the one which understands by ,brahma-world 'the world of ,brahman' is proved by considerations similar to those by which the ,p4 ,m4 ,stras prove that ',nishda-sthapati' means a headman who at the same time is a ,nishda4--,another explanation of the passage under discussion may also be given4 ,what is said there about all these creatures daily 'going into the ,brahma-world1' may not refer at all to the state of deep sleep1 but rather mean that although 'daily going into the ,brahman-world1' i4 e4 although at all time moving above the small ether1 i4 e4 ,brahman which as the universal ,self is everywhere1 yet all these creatures not knowing ,brahman do not find1 i4e4 obtain it2 just as men not knowing the place where a treasure is hidden do not find it1 although they constantly pass over it4 ,this constant moving about on the part of ignorant creatures on the surface1 as it were1 of the small ether abiding within as their inward ,ruler1 proves that small ether to be the highest ,brahman4 ,that the highest ,brahman abides within as the inner ,self of creatures which dwell in it and are ruled by it1 we are told in other texts also1 so e4g4 in the ,antarymin-brhmana4 ',he who dwells in the ,self1 within the ,self1 whom the ,self does not know1 of whom the ,self is the body1 who rules the ,self within2 unseen but seeing1 unheard but hearing' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #g1 #bb2 #bc74--,on this interpretation we explain the last part of the ,stra as follows4 ,even if other texts did not refer to it1 this daily moving about on the part of ignorant creatures1 on the ether within the heart-- which the comparison with the treasure of gold shows to be the supreme good of man--1 is in itself a sufficient proof for the small ether being ,brahman4 #ae4 ,and on account of there being observed in that 7small ether71 supporting which is a greatness of that 7i4 e4 ,brahman74 ,in continuation of the passage ',it is the ,self free from ,sin1' c41 which refers to the small ether1 the text says3 'it is a bank1 a limitary support1 that these worlds may not be confounded4' ,what the text here says about the small ether supporting the world proves it to be the highest ,brahman2 for to support the world is the glory of ,brahman4 ,compare ',he is the ,lord of all1 the king of all things1 the protector of all things4 ,he is a bank and a boundary1 so that these worlds may not be confounded' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #d1 #bb72 ',by the command of that ,imperishable1 ,o ,grg1 heaven and earth stand1 held apart' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #h1 #i74 ,now this specific greatness of the highest ,brahman1 which consists in its supporting the world1 is also observed in the small ether--which proves the latter to be none other than ,brahman4 #af4 ,and on account of the settled meaning4 ,the word 'ether1' moreover1 is known to have1 among other meanings1 that of ,brahman4 ,compare ',for who could breathe1 who could breathe forth1 if that ether were not bliss8' 7,taitt4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #g72 ',all these beings take their rise from the ether' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,i1 #i1 #a74 ,it has to be kept in view that in the text under discussion the meaning ',brahman' is supported by what is said about the qualities of the small ether--viz4 freedom from sin1 c4--and hence is stronger than the other meaning--1 according to which ksa signifies the elemental ether4 ,so far the ,stras have refuted the view of the small ether being the element4 ,they now enter on combating the notion that the small ether may possibly be the individual soul4 #ag4 ,if it be said that on account of reference to the other one he is meant2 we say no1 on account of impossibility4 ,an objection is raised to the argumentation that1 on account of complementary passages1 the small ether must be explained to mean the highest ,self4 ,for1 the objector says1 a clear reference to him who is 'other' than the highest ,self1 i4e4 to the individual soul1 is contained in the following passage 7,,viii1 #ab1 #c73 ',thus does that serenity 7samprasda71 having risen from this body and approached the highest light1 appear in its own form4' ',that is the ,self1' he said4 ',that is the immortal1 the fearless1 this is ,brahman' 7,,viii1 #g1 #c874 ,we admit that for the different reasons stated above the ether within the heart cannot be the elemental ether2 but owing to the force of the intimations conveyed by the complementary passages just quoted1 we must adopt the view that what is meant is the individual soul4 ,and as the word 'ksa' may be connected with praksa 7light71 it may be applied to the individual soul also4--,this view is set aside by the ,stra4 ,the small ether cannot be the individual soul because the qualities attributed in the text to the former1 viz4 freedom from sin1 c41 cannot possibly belong to the individual soul4 #ah4 ,should it be said that from a subsequent passage 7it appears that the individual ,soul is meant72 rather 7the soul7 in so far as its true nature has become manifest4 ,the ,prvapakshin now maintains that we ascertain from a subsequent declaration made by ,prajpati that it is just the individual ,soul that possesses freedom from sin and the other qualities enumerated4 ,the whole teaching of ,prajpati1 he says1 refers to the individual ,soul only4 ,indra having heard that ,prajpati had spoken about a ,self free from sin1 old age1 c41 the enquiry into which enables the soul to obtain all worlds and desires1 approaches ,prajpati with the wish to learn the true nature of that ,self which should be enquired into4 ,prajpati thereupon1 wishing to test the capacity of his pupil for receiving true instruction1 gives him successive information about the embodied soul in the state of waking1 dream and dreamless sleep4 ,when he finds that ,indra sees no good in instruction of this kind and thus shows himself fit to receive instruction about the true nature of the disembodied ,self1 he explains to him that the body is a mere abode for a ruling ,self2 that that bodiless ,self is essentially immortal2 and that the soul1 as long as it is joined to a body due to karman1 is compelled to experience pleasure and pain corresponding to its embodied state1 while it rises above all this when it has freed itself from the body 7,,viii1 #ab1 #a74 ,he then continues3 ',thus that serenity having risen from this body and approached the highest light1 appears in its own form'2 thus teaching him the true nature1 free from a body1 of the individual soul4 ,he next informs him that the 'highest light' which the soul reaches is the supreme ,person 7',that is the supreme ,person'71 and that the soul having reached that highest light and freed itself from what obscured its own true nature1 obtains in the world of ,brahman whatever enjoyments it desires1 and is no longer connected with a body springing from karman and inseparable from pain and pleasure1 or with anything else that causes distress4 7',he moves about there laughing1' c474 ,he next illustrates the connexion with a body1 of the soul in the ,samsra state1 by means of a comparison3 ',like as a horse attached to a cart1' c4 ,after that he explains that the eye and the other sense-organs are instruments of knowledge1 colour1 and so on1 the objects of knowledge1 and the individual ,self the knowing subject2 and that hence that ,self is different from the body and the sense-organs 7',now where the sight has entered' up to 'the mind is his divine eye'74 ,next he declares that1 after having divested itself of the body and the senses1 the ,self perceives all the objects of its desire by means of its 'divine eye1' i4 e4 the power of cognition which constitutes its essential nature 7',he by means of the divine eye1' c474 ,he further declares that those who have true knowledge know the ,self as such 7'on that ,self the devas meditate'72 and in conclusion teaches that he who has that true knowledge of the ,self obtains for his reward the intuition of ,brahman--which is suggested by what the text says about the obtaining of all worlds and all desires 7',he obtains all worlds and all desires1' c41 up to the end of the chapter74--,it thus appears that the entire chapter proposes as the object of cognition the individual soul free from sin1 and so on4 ,the qualities1 viz4 freedom from guilt1 c41 may thus belong to the individual ,self1 and on this ground we conclude that the small ether is the individual ,self4 ,this view the second half of the ,stra sets aside4 ,the two sections1 that which treats of the small ether and that which contains the teaching of ,prajpati1 have different topics4 ,prajpati's teaching refers to the individual soul1 whose true nature1 with its qualities such as freedom from evil1 c41 is at first hidden by untruth1 while later on1 when it has freed itself from the bondage of karman1 risen from the body1 and approached the highest light1 it manifests itself in its true form and then is characterised by freedom from all evil and by other auspicious qualities4 ,in the section treating of the small ether1 on the other hand1 we have to do with the small ether1 i4e4 the highest ,brahman1 whose true nature is never hidden1 and which therefore is unconditionally characterised by freedom from evil1 and so on4-- ,moreover1 the daharksa-section ascribes to the small ether other attributes which cannot belong to the individual ,self even 'when its true nature has manifested itself4' ,the small ether is there called a bank and support of all worlds2 and one of its names1'satyam1' is explained to imply that it governs all sentient and non-sentient beings4 ,all this also proves that the small ether is none other than the highest ,self4 ,that the individual soul1 'even when its true nature is manifest1' cannot be viewed as a bank and support of the worlds1 c41 we shall show under ,,iv1 #d4 ,but if this is so1 what then is the meaning of the reference to the individual soul which is made in the section treating of the small ether1 viz4 in the passage1 ',now that serene being1 which after having risen from this body1' c4 7,,viii1 #c1 #d78 ,to this question the next ,stra replies4 #ai4 ,and the reference has a different meaning4 ,the text in question declares that the released individual soul when reaching the highest light1 i4e4 ,brahman1 which is free from all sin1 and so on1 attains its true nature1 which is characterised by similar freedom from sin1 and so on4 ,now this reference to the individual soul1 as described in the teaching of ,prajpati1 has the purpose of giving instruction 7not about the qualities of the individual soul1 but7 about the nature of that which is the cause of the qualities of the individual soul1 i4e4 the qualities specially belonging to the supreme ,person4 ,the reason why1 in the section containing the teaching of ,prajpati1 information is given as to the true nature of the released individual soul is that such knowledge assists the doctrine referring to the small ether4 ,for the individual ,self which wishes to reach ,brahman must know his own true nature also1 so as to realise that he1 as being himself endowed with auspicious qualities1 will finally arrive at an intuition of the highest ,brahman1 which is a mass of auspicious qualities raised to the highest degree of excellence4 ,the cognition of the soul's own true nature is itself comprised in the result of the meditation on ,brahman1 and the results which are proclaimed in the teaching of ,prajpati 7',he obtains all worlds and all wishes'2 ',he moves about there laughing1' c47 thus really are results of the knowledge of the small ether4 #bj4 ,if it be said1 owing to the scriptural declaration of smallness2 that has been explained4 ,the text describes the ether within the heart as being of small compass1 and this agrees indeed with the individual soul which elsewhere is compared to the point of an awl1 but not with ,brahman1 which is greater than everything4--,the reply to this objection has virtually been given before1 viz4 under ,i1 #b1 #g1 where it is said that ,brahman may be viewed as of small size1 for the purpose of devout meditation4 ,it thus remains a settled conclusion that the small ether is none other but the highest ,person who is untouched by even a shadow of imperfection1 and is an ocean of infinite1 supremely exalted1 qualities--knowledge1 strength1 lordly power1 c4 ,the being1 on the other hand1 which in the teaching of ,prajpati is described as first having a body due to karman-- as we see from passages such as 'they strike it as it were1 they cut it as it were'--and as afterwards approaching the highest light1 and then manifesting its essential qualities1 viz4 freedom from sin1 c41 is the individual soul2 not the small ether 7or ,brahman74 ,the next ,stra supplies a further reason for this conclusion4 #ba4 ,and on account of the imitation of that4 ,the individual soul1 free from bondage1 and thus possessing the qualities of freedom from sin1 c41 cannot be the small ether1 i4e4 the highest ,brahman1 because it is stated to 'imitate1' i4e4 to be equal to that ,brahman4 ,the text making that statement is ,mu4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #a1 #c1 ',when the seer 7i4e4 the individual soul7 sees the brilliant maker1 the ,lord1 the ,person who has his source in ,brahman2 then becoming wise and shaking off good and evil1 he reaches the highest equality1 free from passions4' ,the being to which the teaching of ,prajpati refers is the 'imitator1' i4 e4 the individual soul2 the ,brahman which is 'imitated' is the small ether4 #bb4 ,the same is declared by ,smriti also4 ,smriti also declares that the transmigrating soul when reaching the state of ,release 'imitates1' i4e4 attains supreme equality of attributes with the highest ,brahman4 ',abiding by this knowledge they1 attaining to equality of attributes with me1 are not born again at the time of creation1 nor are they affected by the general dissolution of the world' 7,bha4 ,g4 ,,xiv1 #b74 ,some maintain that the last two ,stras constitute a separate adhikarana 7head of discussion71 meant to prove that the text ,mu4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #b1 #aj 7',after him the shining one1 everything shines2 by the light of him all this is lighted'71 refers to the highest ,brahman4 ,this view is1 however1 inadmissible1 for the reason that with regard to the text quoted no prvapaksha can arise1 it having been proved under ,i1 #b1 #ba ff41 and #a1c1 #a1 ff41 that the whole section of which that text forms part is concerned with ,brahman2 and it further having been shown under ,i1 #a1 #bd ff41 that ,brahman is apprehended under the form of light4--,the interpretation moreover does not fit in with the wording of the ,stras4-- ,here terminates the adhikarana of the 'small one4' #bc4 ,on account of the term1 the one measured4 ,we read in the ,kathavall ',the ,person of the size of a thumb stands in the middle of the ,self1 as lord of the past and the future1 and henceforward fears no more'2 ',that ,person of the size of a thumb is like a light without smoke1' c4 7,ka4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #d1 #a2 #ac74 ,and ',the ,person not larger than a thumb1 the inner ,self1 is always settled in the heart of men' 7,ka4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #f1 #ag74 ,a doubt here arises whether the being measured by the extent of a span be the individual soul or the highest ,self4--,the ,prvapakshin maintains the former view2 for1 he says1 another scriptural text also declares the individual soul to have that measure1 'the ruler of the vital airs moves through his own works1 of the size of a thumb1 brilliant like the sun1 endowed with purposes and egoity' 7,svet4 ,up4 ,v1 #g2 #h74 ,moreover1 the highest ,self is not anywhere else1 not even for the purpose of meditation1 represented as having the size of a thumb4 ,it thus being determined that the being of the length of a thumb is the individual ,self1 we understand the term ',lord1' which is applied to it1 as meaning that it is the ,lord of the body1 the sense-organs1 the objects and the instruments of fruition4--,of this view the ,stra disposes1 maintaining that the being a thumb long can be none but the highest ,self1 just on account of that term4 ,for lordship over all things past and future cannot possibly belong to the individual ,self1 which is under the power of karman4--,but how can the highest ,self be said to have the measure of a thumb8--,on this point the next ,stra satisfies us4 #bd4 ,but with reference to the heart1 men being qualified4 ,in so far as the highest ,self abides1 for the purpose of devout meditation1 in the heart of the devotee--which heart is of the measure of a thumb--it may itself be viewed as having the measure of a thumb4 ,the individual soul also can be said to have the measure of a thumb only in so far as dwelling within the heart2 for scripture directly states that its real size is that of the point of a goad1 i4e4 minute4 ,and as men only are capable of devout meditation1 and hence alone have a claim on scripture1 the fact that the hearts of other living creatures also1 such as donkeys1 horses1 snakes1 c41 have the same size1 cannot give rise to any objection4--,the discussion of this matter will be completed later on ,,footnote #cbf3a4 #be4 ,also beings above them 7i4e4 men71 ,bdaryana thinks1 on account of possibility4 ,in order to prove that the highest ,brahman may be viewed as having the size of a thumb1 it has been declared that the scriptural texts enjoining meditation on ,brahman are the concern of men4 ,this offers an opportunity for the discussion of the question whether also other classes of individual souls1 such as devas1 are qualified for knowledge of ,brahman4 ,the ,prvapakshin denies this qualification in the case of gods and other beings1 on the ground of absence of capability4 ,for1 he says1 bodiless beings1 such as gods1 are incapable of the accomplishment of meditation on ,brahman1 which requires as its auxiliaries the seven means enumerated above 7p4 #ag7--,this must not be objected to on the ground of the devas1 and so on1 having bodies2 for there is no means of proof establishing such embodiedness4 ,we have indeed proved above that the ,vednta-texts may intimate accomplished things1 and hence are an authoritative means for the cognition of ,brahman2 but we do not meet with any ,vednta-text1 the purport of which is to teach that the devas1 and so on1 possess bodies4 ,nor can this point be established through mantras and arthavda texts2 for these are merely supplementary to the injunctions of actions 7sacrificial1 and so on71 and therefore have a different aim4 ,and the injunctions themselves prove nothing with regard to the devas1 except that the latter are that with a view to which those actions are performed4 ,in the same way it also cannot be shown that the gods have any desires or wants 7to fulfil or supply which they might enter on meditation of ,brahman74 ,for the two reasons above we therefore conclude that the devas1 and so on1 are not qualified for meditation on ,brahman4--,this view is contradicted by the ,stra4 ,such meditation is possible in the case of higher beings also ,bdaryana thinks2 on account of the possibility of want and capacity on their part also4 ,want and wish exist in their case since they also are liable to suffering1 springing from the assaults1 hard to be endured1 of the different kinds of pain1 and since they also know that supreme enjoyment is to be found in the highest ,brahman1 which is untouched by the shadow even of imperfection1 and is a mass of auspicious qualities in their highest perfection4 ',capability'1 on the other hand1 depends on the possession of a body and sense-organs of whatever degree of tenuity2 and that the devas1 from ,brahma downward1 possess a body and sense-organs1 is declared in all the ,upanishads1 in the chapters treating of creation and the chapters enjoining meditation4 ,in the ,chndogya1 e4g4 it is related how the highest ,being having resolved on creation1 evolved the aggregate of non-sentient matter with its different kinds1 and then produced the fourfold multitude of living creatures1 each having a material body corresponding to its karman1 and a suitable name of its own4 ,similarly1 all the other scriptural accounts of creation declare that there are four classes of creatures--devas1 men1 animals1 and non-moving beings1 such as plants--and the difference of these classes depends on the individual ,selfs being joined to various bodies capacitating them to experience the results of their works1 each in that one of the fourteen worlds--beginning with the world of ,brahm--which is the suitable place for retribution4 ,for in themselves1 apart from bodies1 the individual ,selfs are not distinguished as men1 gods1 and so on4 ,in the same way the story of the devas and ,asuras approaching ,prajpati with fuel in their hands1 staying with him as pupils for thirty-two years1 c4 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,viii1 #g ff471 clearly shows that the devas possess bodies and sense- organs4 ,analogously1 mantras and arthavdas1 which are complementary to injunctions of works1 contain unmistakeable references to the corporeal nature of the gods 7',indra holding in his hand the thunderbolt'2 ',indra lifted the thunderbolt'1 c472 and as the latter is not contradicted by any other means of proof it must be accepted on the authority stated4 ,nor can it be said that those mantras and arthavdas are really meant to express something else 7than those details mentioned above71 in so far1 namely1 as they aim at proclaiming or glorifying the action with which they are connected2 for those very details subserve the purpose of glorification1 and so on1 and without them glorification is not possible4 ,for we praise or glorify a thing by declaring its qualities2 if such qualities do not exist all glorification lapses4 ,it cannot by any means be maintained that anything may be glorified by the proclamation of its qualities1 even if such qualities do not really exist4 ,hence the arthavdas which glorify a certain action1 just thereby intimate the real existence of the qualities and details of the action4 ,the mantras again1 which are prescribed in connexion with the actions1 serve the purpose of throwing light on the use to be derived from the performance of the actions1 and this they accomplish by making statements as to the particular qualities1 such as embodiedness and the like1 which belong to the devas and other classes of beings4 ,otherwise ,indra1 and so on1 would not be remembered at the time of performance2 for the idea of a divinity presents itself to the mind only in connexion with the special attributes of that divinity4 ,in the case of such qualities as are not established by other means of proof1 the primary statement is made by the arthavda or the mantra3 the former thereby glorifies the action1 and the latter proclaims it as possessing certain qualities or details2 and both these ends are accomplished by making statements as to the gods1 c41 possessing certain qualities1 such as embodiedness and the like4 ,in the case1 again1 of certain qualities being already established by other means of proof1 the mantras and arthavdas merely refer to them 7as something already known71 and in this way perform their function of glorification and elucidation4 ,and where1 thirdly1 there is a contradiction between the other means of knowledge and what mantras and arthavdas state 7as when1 e4g4 a text of the latter kind says that 'the sacrificial post is the sun'71 the intention of the text is metaphorically to denote1 by means of those apparently unmeaning terms1 certain other qualities which are not excluded by the other means of knowledge2 and in this way the function of glorification and elucidation is again accomplished4 ,now what the injunction of a sacrificial action demands as its supplement1 is a statement as to the power of the divinity to whom the sacrifice is offered2 for the performance which scripture enjoins on men desirous of certain results1 is itself of a merely transitory nature1 and hence requires some agent capable of bringing about1 at some future time1 the result desired as1 e4g4 the heavenly world4 ',vyu is the swiftest god2 he 7the sacrificer7 approaches ,vyu with his own share2 the god then leads him to prosperity' 7,taitt4 ,samh4 ,i1 #b1 #a72 ',what he seeks by means of that offering1 may he obtain that1 may he prosper therein1 may the gods favourably grant him that' 7,taitt4 ,br4 ,,iii1 #e1 #aj1 #e72 these and similar arthavdas and mantras intimate that the gods when propitiated by certain sacrificial works1 give certain rewards and possess the power to do so2 and they thus connect themselves with the general context of scripture as supplying an evidently required item of information4 ,moreover1 the mere verb 'to sacrifice' 7yaj71 as denoting worship of the gods1 intimates the presence of a deity which is to be propitiated by the action called sacrifice1 and thus constitutes the main element of that action4 ,a careful consideration of the whole context thus reveals that everything which is wanted for the due accomplishment of the action enjoined is to be learned from the text itself1 and that hence we need not have recourse to such entities as the 'unseen principle' 7aprva71 assumed to be denoted by1 or to be imagined in connexion with1 the passages enjoining certain actions4 ,hence the dharmasstras1 itihsas1 and purnas also1 which are founded on the different brhmanas1 mantras and arthavdas1 clearly teach that ,brahma and the other gods1 as well as the ,asuras and other superhuman beings1 have bodies and sense-organs1 constitutions of different kinds1 different abodes1 enjoyments1 and functions4--,owing to their having bodies1 the gods therefore are also qualified for meditation on ,brahman4 ,,footnote #cbf3a4 ,the 'pramitdhikarana' is resumed in ,stra #da4 #bf4 ,if it be said that there results a contradiction to work2 we deny this1 on account of the observation of the assumption of several 7bodies74 ,an objection here presents itself4 ,if we admit the gods to have bodies1 a difficulty arises at the sacrifices1 as it is impossible that one and the same corporeal ,indra--who is at the same time invited by many sacrificers 'come1 ,o ,indra'1 'come1 ,o ,lord of the red horses1' c4-- should be present at all those places4 ,and that the gods1 ,agni and so on1 really do come to the sacrifices is proved by the following scriptural text3 ',to whose sacrifice do the gods go1 and to whose not8 ,he who first receives the gods1 sacrifices to them on the following day' 7,taitt4 ,samh4 ,i1 #f1 #g1 #a74 ,in refutation of this objection the ,sutra points out that there is seen1 i4e4 recorded1 the assumption of several bodies at the same time1 on the part of beings endowed with special powers1 such as ,saubhari4 #bg4 ,if it be said 7that a contradiction will result7 with regard to words2 we say no1 since beings originate from them 7as appears7 from perception and inference4 ,well then let us admit that there is no difficulty as far as sacrifices are concerned1 for the reason stated in the preceding ,stra4 ,but another difficulty presents itself with regard to the words of which the ,veda consists4 ,for if ,indra and the other gods are corporeal beings1 it follows that they are made up of parts and hence non-permanent4 ,this implies either that the ,vedic words denoting them--not differing therein from common worldly words such as ,devadatta--are totally devoid of meaning during all those periods which precede the origination of the beings called ,indra and so on1 or follow on their destruction2 or else that the ,veda itself is non-permanent1 non-eternal4--,this objection is not valid1 the ,stra points out1 for the reason that those beings1 viz4 ,indra and so on1 again and again originate from the ,vedic words4 ,to explain4 ,vedic words1 such as ,indra and so on1 do not1 like the word ,devadatta and the like1 denote1 on the basis of convention1 one particular individual only3 they rather denote by their own power particular species of beings1 just as the word 'cow' denotes a particular species of animals4 ,when therefore a special individual of the class called ,indra has perished1 the creator1 apprehending from the ,vedic word ',indra' which is present to his mind the class characteristics of the beings denoted by that word1 creates another ,indra possessing those very same characteristics2 just as the potter fashions a new jar1 on the basis of the word 'jar' which is stirring in his mind4--,but how is this known8--',through perception and inference1' i4e4 through ,scripture and ,smriti4 ,scripture says1 e4g4 ',by means of the ,veda ,prajpati evolved names and forms1 the being and the non-being'2 and ',saying bhh 7earth7 he created the earth2 saying bhuvah he created the air1' and so on2 which passages teach that the creator at first bethinks himself of the characteristic make of a thing1 in connexion with the word denoting it1 and thereupon creates an individual thing characterised by that make4 ,smriti makes similar statements2 compare1 e4 g4 ',in the beginning there was sent forth by the creator1 divine speech--beginningless and endless--in the form of the ,veda1 and from it there originated all creatures'2 and ',he1 in the beginning1 separately created from the words of the ,veda the names and works and shapes of all things'2 and ',the names and forms of beings1 and all the multiplicity of works ,he in the beginning created from the ,veda4' ,this proves that from the corporeality of the gods1 and so on1 it follows neither that the words of the ,veda are unmeaning nor that the ,veda itself is non-eternal4 #bh4 ,and for this very reason eternity 7of the ,veda74 ,as words such as ,indra and ,vasishtha1 which denote gods and ,rishis1 denote 7not individuals only1 but7 classes1 and as the creation of those beings is preceded by their being suggested to the creative mind through those words2 for this reason the eternity of the ,veda admits of being reconciled with what scripture says about the mantras and kndas 7sections7 of the sacred text having 'makers' and about ,rishis seeing the hymns2 cp4 such passages as ',he chooses the makers of mantras'2 ',reverence to the ,rishis who are the makers of mantras'2 ',that is ,agni2 this is a hymn of ,visvmitra4' ,for by means of these very texts ,prajpati presents to his own mind the characteristics and powers of the different ,rishis who make the different sections1 hymns1 and mantras1 thereupon creates them endowed with those characteristics and powers1 and appoints them to remember the very same sections1 hymns1 c4 ,the ,rishis being thus gifted by ,prajpati with the requisite powers1 undergo suitable preparatory austerities and finally see the mantras1 and so on1 proclaimed by the ,vasishthas and other ,rishis of former ages of the world1 perfect in all their sounds and accents1 without having learned them from the recitation of a teacher4 ,there is thus no conflict between the eternity of the ,veda and the fact that the ,rishis are the makers of its sections1 hymns1 and so on4 ,a further objection is raised4 ,let it be admitted that after each pralaya of the kind called 'contingent' 7naimittika71 ,prajpati may proceed to create new ,indras1 and so on1 in the way of remembering on the basis of the ,veda the ,indras1 and so on1 of preceding periods4 ,in the case1 on the other hand1 of a pralaya of the kind called elemental 7prkritika71 in which the creator1 ,prajpati himself1 and words--which are the effects of the elemental ahankra-- pass away1 what possibility is there of ,prajpati undertaking a new creation on the basis of ,vedic words1 and how can we speak of the permanency of a ,veda which perishes8 ,he who maintains the eternity of the ,veda and the corporeality of gods1 and so on1 is thus really driven to the hypothesis of the course of mundane existence being without a beginning 7i4e4 not preceded by a pralaya74--,of this difficulty the next ,stra disposes4 #bi4 ,and on account of the equality of names and forms there is no contradiction1 even in the renovation 7of the world72 as appears from-- ,sruti and ,smriti4 ,on account of the sameness of names and forms1 as stated before1 there is no difficulty in the way of the origination of the world1 even in the case of total pralayas4 ,for what actually takes place is as follows4 ,when the period of a great pralaya draws towards its close1 the divine supreme ,person1 remembering the constitution of the world previous to the pralaya1 and forming the volition ',may ,i become manifold' separates into its constituent elements the whole mass of enjoying souls and objects of enjoyment which1 during the pralaya state1 had been merged in him so as to possess a separate existence 7not actual but7 potential only1 and then emits the entire world just as it had been before1 from the so-called ,mahat down to the ,brahman-egg1 and ,hiranyagarbha 7,prajpati74 ,having thereupon manifested the ,vedas in exactly the same order and arrangement they had had before1 and having taught them to ,hiranyagarbha1 he entrusts to him the new creation of the different classes of beings1 gods1 and so on1 just as it was before2 and at the same time abides himself within the world so created as its inner ,self and ,ruler4 ,this view of the process removes all difficulties4 ,the superhuman origin and the eternity of the ,veda really mean that intelligent agents having received in their minds an impression due to previous recitations of the ,veda in a fixed order of words1 chapters1 and so on1 remember and again recite it in that very same order of succession4 ,this holds good both with regard to us men and to the highest ,lord of all2 there however is that difference between the two cases that the representations of the ,veda which the supreme ,person forms in his own mind are spontaneous1 not dependent on an impression previously made4 ,to the question whence all this is known1 the ,stra replies 'from ,scripture and ,smriti4' ,the scriptural passage is ',he who first creates ,brahm and delivers the ,vedas to him' 7,svet4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #ah74 ,and as to ,smriti we have the following statement in ,manu1 ',this universe existed in the shape of darkness1 c4--,he desiring to produce beings of many kinds from his own body1 first with a thought created the waters and placed his seed in them4 ,that seed became a golden egg equal to the sun in brilliancy2 in that he himself was born as ,brahm1 the progenitor of the whole world' 7,manu ,i1 #e2 #h-i74 ,to the same effect are the texts of the ,paurnikas1 ',from the navel of the sleeping divinity there sprung up a lotus1 and in that lotus there was born ,brahma fully knowing all ,vedas and ,vedngas4 ,and then ,brahm was told by him 7the highest ,divinity71 ',do thou create all beings1 ,o ,great-minded one'2 and the following passage1 ',from the highest ,nryana there was born the ,four-faced one4'-- ,and in the section which begins ',i will tell the original creation1' we read ',because having created water 7nra7 ,i abide within it1 therefore my name shall be ,nryana4 ,there ,i lie asleep in every ,kalpa1 and as ,i am sleeping there springs from my navel a lotus1 and in that lotus there is born the ,four-faced one1 and ,i tell him ,do thou1 ,great-minded one1 create all beings4'--,here terminates the adhikarana of 'the deities4' #cj4 ,on account of the impossibility 7of qualification for the madhuvidy1 c47 7,jaimini maintains the non-qualification 7of gods1 c4747 ,so far it has been proved that also the gods1 and so on1 are qualified for the knowledge of ,brahman4 ,but a further point here presents itself for consideration1 viz4 whether the gods are qualified or not to undertake those meditations of which they themselves are the objects4 ,the ,stra states as a prvapaksha view held by ,jaimini1 that they are not so qualified1 for the reason that there are no other dityas1 ,vasus1 and so on1 who could be meditated on by the dityas and ,vasus themselves2 and that moreover for the dityas and ,vasus the qualities and position of those classes of deities cannot be objects of desire1 considering that they possess them already4 ,the so-called ,madhuvidy 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,iii7 represents as objects of devout meditation certain parts of the sun which are being enjoyed by the different classes of divine beings1 ,vasus1 dityas1 and so on--the sun being there called 'madhu4' i4e4 honey or nectar1 on account of his being the abode of a certain nectar to be brought about by certain sacrificial works to be known from the ,rig-veda1 and so on2 and as the reward of such meditation the text names the attainment of the position of the ,vasus1 dityas1 and so on4 #ca4 ,and on account of 7meditating on the part of the gods7 being in the ,light4 ',him the devas meditate upon as the light of lights1 as immortal time' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #d1 #af74 ,this text declares that the meditation of the gods has for its object the ,light1 i4e4 the highest ,brahman4 ,now this express declaration as to the gods being meditating devotees with regard to meditations on ,brahman which are common to men and gods1 implies a denial of the gods being qualified for meditations on other objects4 ,the conclusion therefore is that the ,vasus1 and so on1 are not qualified for meditations on the ,vasus and other classes of deities4 #cb4 ,but ,bdaryana 7maintains7 the existence 7of qualification72 for there is 7possibility of such74 ,the ,reverend ,bdaryana thinks that the dityas1 ,vasus1 and so on1 are also qualified for meditations on divinities4 ,for it is in their case also possible that their attainment of ,brahman should be viewed as preceded by their attainment of ,vasu-hood or ditya-hood1 in so far1 namely1 as they meditate on ,brahman as abiding within themselves4 ,they may be ,vasus and dityas in the present age of the world1 but at the same time be desirous of holding the same position in future ages also4 ,in the ,madhuvidy we have to distinguish two sections1 concerned respectively with ,brahman in its causal and its effected state4 ,the former section1 extending from the beginning up to 'when from thence he has risen upwards1' enjoins meditation on ,brahman in its condition as effect1 i4e4 as appearing in the form of creatures such as the ,vasus1 and so on2 while the latter section enjoins meditation on the causal ,brahman viewed as abiding within the sun as its inner ,self4 ,the purport of the whole vidy is that he who meditates on ,brahman in this its twofold form will in a future age of the world enjoy ,vasu-hood1 and will finally attain ,brahman in its causal aspect1 i4e4 the very highest ,brahman4 ,from the fact that the text1 ',and indeed to him who thus knows the ,brahma-upanishad1 the sun does not rise and does not set2 for him there is day once and for all1' calls the whole ,madhuvidy a ',brahma'-- upanishad1 and that the reward declared is the attainment of ,vasu-hood1 and so on1 leading up to the attainment of ,brahman1 we clearly are entitled to infer that the meditations which the text enjoins1 viz4 on the different parts of the sun viewed as objects of enjoyment for the ,vasus1 and so on1 really are meant as meditations on ,brahman as abiding in those different forms4 ,meditation on the ,vasus and similar beings is thus seen to be possible for the ,vasus themselves4 ,and as ,brahman really constitutes the only object of meditation1 we also see the appropriateness of the text discussed above1 ',on him the gods meditate as the light of lights4' ,the ,vrittikra expresses the same opinion1 ',for there is possibility with regard to the ,madhu-vidy1 and so on1 ,brahman only being the object of meditation everywhere4'--,here terminates the adhikarana of 'honey4' ,the ,stras now enter on a discussion of the question whether the ,sdras also are qualified for the knowledge of ,brahman4 ,the ,prvapakshin maintains that they are so qualified2 for qualification1 he says1 depends on want and capacity1 and both these are possible in the case of ,sdras also4 ,the ,sdra is not indeed qualified for any works depending on a knowledge of the sacred fires1 for from such knowledge he is debarred2 but he possesses qualification for meditation on ,brahman1 which after all is nothing but a certain mental energy4 ,the only works prerequisite for meditation are those works which are incumbent on a man as a member of a caste or srama1 and these consist1 in the ,sdra's case1 in obedience to the higher castes4 ,and when we read 'therefore the ,sdra is not qualified for sacrifices1' the purport of this passage is only to make a confirmatory reference to something already settled by reason1 viz4 that the ,sdra is not qualified for the performance of sacrifices which cannot be accomplished by one not acquainted with the sacred fires 7and not to deny the ,sdra's competence for devout meditation74--,but how can meditation on ,brahman be undertaken by a man who has not studied the ,vedas1 inclusive of the ,vednta1 and hence knows nothing about the nature of ,brahman and the proper modes of meditation8--,those also1 we reply1 who do not study ,veda and ,vednta may acquire the requisite knowledge by hearing ,itihsas and ,purnas2 and there are texts which allow ,sdras to become acquainted with texts of that kind2 cp4 e4g4 'one is to make the four castes to hear texts1 the ,brhmana coming first4' ,moreover1 those ,purnas and ,itihsas make mention of ,sdras1 such as ,vidura1 who had a knowledge of ,brahman4 ,and the ,upanishads themselves1 viz4 in the so-called ,samvarga-vidy1 show that a ,sdra is qualified for the knowledge of ,brahman2 for there the teacher ,raikva addresses ,jnasruti1 who wishes to learn from him1 as ,sdra1 and thereupon instructs him in the knowledge of ,brahman 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #b1 #c74 ,all this proves that ,sdras also have a claim to the knowledge of ,brahman4 ,this conclusion we deny1 on the ground of the absence of capability4 ,it is impossible that the capability of performing meditations on ,brahman should belong to a person not knowing the nature of ,brahman and the due modes of meditation1 and not qualified by the knowledge of the requisite preliminaries of such meditation1 viz4 recitation of the ,veda1 sacrifices1 and so on4 ,mere want or desire does not impart qualification to a person destitute of the required capability4 ,and this absence of capability is due1 in the ,sdra's case1 to absence of legitimate study of the ,veda4 ,the injunctions of sacrificial works naturally connect themselves with the knowledge and the means of knowledge 7i4e4 religious ceremonies and the like7 that belong to the three higher castes1 for these castes actually possess the knowledge 7required for the sacrifices71 owing to their studying the ,veda in agreement with the injunction which prescribes such study for the higher castes2 the same injunctions do not1 on the other hand1 connect themselves with the knowledge and means of knowledge belonging to others 7than members of the three higher castes74 ,and the same naturally holds good with regard to the injunctions of meditation on ,brahman4 ,and as thus only such knowledge as is acquired by study prompted by the ,vedic injunction of study supplies a means for meditation on ,brahman1 it follows that the ,sdra for whom that injunction is not meant is incapable of such meditation4 ,itihsas and ,purnas hold the position of being helpful means towards meditation in so far only as they confirm or support the ,veda1 not independently of the ,veda4 ,and that ,sdras are allowed to hear ,itihsas and ,purnas is meant only for the end of destroying their sins1 not to prepare them for meditation on ,brahman4 ,the case of ,vidura and other ,sdras having been 'founded on ,brahman1' explains itself as follows3--,owing to the effect of former actions1 which had not yet worked themselves out1 they were born in a low caste1 while at the same time they possessed wisdom owing to the fact that the knowledge acquired by them in former births had not yet quite vanished4 7,on these general grounds we object to ,sdras being viewed as qualified for meditation on ,brahman47 ,the ,stra now refutes that argument1 which the ,prvapakshin derives from the use of the word ',sdra' in the ,samvarga-vidy4 #cc4 7,that7 grief of him 7arose71 this is intimated by his 7,jnasruti's7 resorting to him 7,raikva7 on hearing a disrespectful speech about himself4 ,from what the text says about ,jnasruti ,pautryana having been taunted by a flamingo for his want of knowledge of ,brahman1 and having thereupon resorted to ,raikva1 who possessed the knowledge of ,brahman1 it appears that sorrow 7suk7 had taken possession of him2 and it is with a view to this that ,raikva addresses him as ,sdra4 ,for the word ,sdra1 etymologically considered1 means one who grieves or sorrows 7sokati74 ,the appellation 'sdra' therefore refers to his sorrow1 not to his being a member of the fourth caste4 ,this clearly appears from a consideration of the whole story4 ,jnasruti ,pautryana was a very liberal and pious king4 ,being much pleased with his virtuous life1 and wishing to rouse in him the desire of knowing ,brahman1 two noble-minded beings1 assuming the shape of flamingoes1 flew past him at night time1 when one of them addressed the other1 ',o ,bhallksha4 the light of ,jnasruti has spread like the sky2 do not go near that it may not burn thee4' ,to this praise of ,jnasruti the other flamingo replied1 ',how can you speak of him1 being what he is1 as if he were ,raikva sayuktvn8' i4e4 'how can you speak of ,jnasruti1 being what he is1 as if he were ,raikva1 who knows ,brahman and is endowed with the most eminent qualities8 ,raikva1 who knows ,brahman1 alone in this world is truly eminent4 ,janasruti may be very pious1 but as he does not know ,brahman what quality of his could produce splendour capable of burning me like the splendour of ,raikva8' ,the former flamingo thereupon asks who that ,raikva is1 and its companion replies1 ',he in whose work and knowledge there are comprised all the works done by good men and all the knowledge belonging to intelligent creatures1 that is ,raikva4' ,jnasruti1 having heard this speech of the flamingo--which implied a reproach to himself as being destitute of the knowledge of ,brahman1 and a glorification of ,raikva as possessing that knowledge--at once sends his door-keeper to look for ,raikva2 and when the door-keeper finds him and brings word1 the king himself repairs to him with six hundred cows1 a golden necklace1 and a carriage yoked with mules1 and asks him to teach him the deity on which he meditates1 i4e4 the highest deity4 ,raikva1 who through the might of his ,yoga-knowledge is acquainted with everything that passes in the three worlds1 at once perceives that ,jnasruti is inwardly grieved at the slighting speech of the flamingo1 which had been provoked by the king's want of knowledge of ,brahman1 and is now making an effort due to the wish of knowing ,brahman2 and thus recognises that the king is fit for the reception of that knowledge4 ,reflecting thereupon that a knowledge of ,brahman may be firmly established in this pupil even without long attendance on the teacher if only he will be liberal to the teacher to the utmost of his capability1 he addresses him3 ',do thou take away 7aphara7 7these things71 ,o ,sdra2 keep 7the chariot7 with the cows for thyself4' ,what he means to say is1 ',by so much only in the way of gifts bestowed on me1 the knowledge of ,brahman cannot be established in thee1 who1 through the desire for such knowledge1 art plunged in grief'--the address ',o ,sdra' intimating that ,raikva knows ,jnasruti to be plunged in grief1 and on that account fit to receive instruction about ,brahman4 ,jnasruti thereupon approaches ,raikva for a second time1 bringing as much wealth as he possibly can1 and moreover his own daughter4 ,raikva again intimates his view of the pupil's fitness for receiving instruction by addressing him a second time as ',sdra1' and says1 ',you have brought these1 ,o ,sdra2 by this mouth only you made me speak1' i4e4 ',you now have brought presents to the utmost of your capability2 by this means only you will induce me1 without lengthy service on your part1 to utter speech containing that instruction about ,brahman which you desire4'-- ,having said this he begins to instruct him4--,we thus see that the appellation 'sdra' is meant to intimate the grief of ,jnasruti--which grief in its turn indicates the king's fitness for receiving instruction2 and is not meant to declare that ,jnasruti belongs to the lowest caste4 #cd4 ,and on account of 7,jnasruti 7 kshattriya-hood being understood4 ,the first section of the vidy tells us that ,jnasruti bestowed much wealth and food2 later on he is represented as sending his door-keeper on an errand2 and in the end1 as bestowing on ,raikva many villages-- which shows him to be a territorial lord4 ,all these circumstances suggest ,jnasruti's being a ,kshattriya1 and hence not a member of the lowest caste4--,the above ,stra having declared that the kshattriya-hood of ,jnasruti is indicated in the introductory legend1 the next ,stra shows that the same circumstance is indicated in the concluding legend4 #ce4 ,on account of the inferential sign further on1 together with ,kaitraratha4 ,the kshattriya-hood of ,jnasruti is further to be accepted on account of the ,kshattriya ,abhipratrin ,kaitraratha1 who is mentioned further on in this very same ,samvargavidy which ,raikva imparts to ,jnasruti4--,but why8-- ,as follows4 ,the section beginning ',once a ,brahmakrin begged of ,saunaka ,kpeya and ,abhipratrin ,kkshaseni while being waited on at their meal1' and ending 'thus do we1 ,o ,brahmakrin1 meditate on that being1' shows ,kpeya1 ,abhipratrin1 and the ,brahmakrin to be connected with the ,samvarga-vidy4 ,now ,abhipratrin is a ,kshattriya1 the other two are ,brhmanas4 ,this shows that there are connected with the vidy1 ,brhmanas1 and from among non-,brhmanas1 a ,kshattriya only1 but not a ,sdra4 ,it therefore appears appropriate to infer that the person1 other than the ,brhmana ,raikva1 who is likewise connected with this vidy1 viz4 ,jnasruti1 is likewise a ,kshattriya1 not a ,sdra4--,but how do we know that ,abhipratrin is a ,kaitraratha and a ,kshattriya8 ,neither of these circumstances is stated in the legend in the ,samvarga-vidy6 ,to this question the ,stra replies1 'on account of the inferential mark4' ,from the inferential mark that ,saunaka ,kpeya and ,abhipratrin ,kkshaseni are said to have been sitting together at a meal we understand that there is some connexion between ,abhipratrin and the ,kpeyas4 ,now another scriptural passage runs as follows3 ',the ,kpeyas made ,kaitraratha perform that sacrifice' 7,tnd ,br4 ,,xx1 #ab1 #e71 and this shows that one connected with the ,kpeyas was a ,kaitraratha2 and a further text shows that a ,kaitraratha is a ,kshattriya4 'from him there was descended a ,kaitraratha who was a prince4' ,all this favours the inference that ,abhipratrin was a ,kaitraratha and a ,kshattriya4 ,so far the ,stras have shown that there is no inferential mark to prove what is contradicted by reasoning1 viz4 the qualification of the ,sdras4 ,the next ,stra declares that the non-qualification of the ,sdra proved by reasoning is confirmed by ,scripture and ,smriti4 #cf4 ,on account of the reference to ceremonial purifications1 and on account of the declaration of their absence4 ,in sections the purport of which is to give instruction about ,brahman the ceremony of initiation is referred to1 ',i will initiate you2 he initiated him' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #d74 ,and at the same time the absence of such ceremonies in the case of ,sdras is stated3 ',in the ,sdra there is not any sin1 and he is not fit for any ceremony' 7,manu ,x1 #abf72 and ',the fourth caste is once born1 and not fit for any ceremony' 7,manu ,x1 #d74 #cg4 ,and on account of the procedure1 on the ascertainment of the non- being of that4 ,that a ,sdra is not qualified for knowledge of ,brahman appears from that fact also that as soon as ,gautama has convinced himself that ,jbla1 who wishes to become his pupil1 is not a ,sdra1 he proceeds to teach him the knowledge of ,brahman4 #ch4 ,and on account of the prohibition of hearing1 studying1 and performance of 7,vedic7 matter4 ,the ,sdra is specially forbidden to hear and study the ,veda and to perform the things enjoined in it4 ',for a ,sdra is like a cemetery1 therefore the ,veda must not be read in the vicinity of a ,sdra2' ',therefore the ,sdra is like a beast1 unfit for sacrifices4' ,and he who does not hear the ,veda recited cannot learn it so as to understand and perform what the ,veda enjoins4 ,the prohibition of hearing thus implies the prohibition of understanding and whatever depends on it4 #ci4 ,and on account of ,smriti4 ,smriti also declares this prohibition of hearing1 and so on4 ',the ears of him who hears the ,veda are to be filled with molten lead and lac2 if he pronounces it his tongue is to be slit2 if he preserves it his body is to be cut through4' ,and ',he is not to teach him sacred duties or vows4 '--,it is thus a settled matter that the ,sdras are not qualified for meditations on ,brahman4 ,we must here point out that the non-qualification of ,sdras for the cognition of ,brahman can in no way be asserted by those who hold that a ,brahman consisting of pure non-differenced intelligence constitutes the sole reality2 that everything else is false2 that all bondage is unreal2 that such bondage may be put an end to by the mere cognition of the true nature of ,reality--such cognition resulting from the hearing of certain texts2 and that the cessation of bondage thus effected constitutes final ,release4 ,for knowledge of the true nature of ,reality1 in the sense indicated1 and the release resulting from it1 may be secured by any one who learns from another person that ,brahman alone is real and that everything else is falsely superimposed on ,brahman4 ,that the cognition of such truth can be arrived at only on the basis of certain ,vedic texts1 such as ',thou art that1' is a restriction which does not admit of proof2 for knowledge of the truth does not depend on man's choice1 and at once springs up in the mind even of an unwilling man as soon as the conditions for such origination are present4 ,nor can it be proved in any way that bondage can be put an end to only through such knowledge of the truth as springs from ,vedic texts2 for error comes to an end through the knowledge of the true nature of things1 whatever agency may give rise to such knowledge4 ,true knowledge1 of the kind described1 will spring up in the mind of a man as soon as he hears the non-scriptural declaration1 ',brahman1 consisting of non-differenced intelligence1 is the sole ,reality2 everything else is false1' and this will suffice to free him from error4 ,when a competent and trustworthy person asserts that what was mistaken for silver is merely a sparkling shell1 the error of a ,sdra no less than of a ,brhmana comes to an end2 in the same way a ,sdra also will free himself from the great cosmic error as soon as the knowledge of the true nature of things has arisen in his mind through a statement resting on the traditional lore of men knowing the ,veda4 ,nor must you object to this on the ground that men knowing the ,veda do not instruct ,sdras1 and so on1 because the text1 'he is not to teach him sacred things1' forbids them to do so2 for men who have once learned-- from texts such as ',thou art that'--that ,brahman is their ,self1 and thus are standing on the very top of the ,veda as it were1 move no longer in the sphere of those to whom injunctions and prohibitions apply1 and the prohibition quoted does not therefore touch them4 ,knowledge of ,brahman may thus spring up in the mind of ,sdras and the like1 owing to instruction received from one of those men who have passed beyond all prohibition4 ,nor must it be said that the instance of the shell and the silver is not analogous1 in so far1 namely1 as the error with regard to silver in the shell comes to an end as soon as the true state of things is declared2 while the great cosmic error that clouds the ,sdra's mind does not come to an end as soon as1 from the teaching of another man1 he learns the truth about ,reality4 ,for the case of the ,sdra does not herein differ from that of the ,brhmana2 the latter also does not at once free himself from the cosmic error4 ,nor again will it avail to plead that the sacred texts originate the demanded final cognition in the mind of the ,brhmana as soon as meditation has dispelled the obstructive imagination of plurality2 for in the same way1 i4e4 helped by meditation1 the non-,vedic instruction given by another person produces the required cognition in the mind of the ,sdra4 ,for meditation means nothing but a steady consideration of the sense which sentences declaratory of the unity of ,brahman and the ,self may convey1 and the effect of such meditation is to destroy all impressions opposed to such unity2 you yourself thus admit that the injunction of meditation aims at something visible 7i4e4 an effect that can be definitely assigned1 whence it follows that the ,sdra also is qualified for it1 while he would not be qualified for an activity having an 'adrishta1' i4e4 supersensuous1 transcendental effect74 ,the recital of the text of the ,veda also and the like 7are not indispensable means for bringing about cognition of ,brahman1 but7 merely subserve the origination of the desire of knowledge4 ,the desire of knowledge may arise in a ,sdra also 7viz4 in some other way71 and thereupon real knowledge may result from non-,vedic instruction1 obstructive imaginations having previously been destroyed by meditation4 ,and thus in his case also non-real bondage will come to an end4--,the same conclusion may also be arrived at by a different road4 ,the mere ordinary instruments of knowledge1 viz4 perception and inference assisted by reasoning1 may suggest to the ,sdra the theory that there is an inward ,reality constituted by non-differenced self- luminous intelligence1 that this inward principle witnesses ,nescience1 and that owing to ,nescience the entire apparent world1 with its manifold distinctions of knowing subjects and objects of knowledge1 is superimposed upon the inner ,reality4 ,he may thereupon1 by uninterrupted meditation on this inner ,reality1 free himself from all imaginations opposed to it1 arrive at the intuitive knowledge of the inner principle1 and thus obtain final release4 ,and this way being open to release1 there is really no use to be discerned in the ,vednta-texts1 suggesting as they clearly do the entirely false view that the real being 7is not absolutely homogeneous intelligence1 but7 possesses infinite transcendent attributes1 being endowed with manifold powers1 connected with manifold creations1 and so on4 ,in this way the qualification of ,sdras for the knowledge of ,brahman is perfectly clear4 ,and as the knowledge of ,brahman may be reached in this way not only by ,sdras but also by ,brhmanas and members of the other higher castes1 the poor ,upanishad is practically defunct4--,to this the following objection will possibly be raised4 ,man being implicated in and confused by the beginningless course of mundane existence1 requires to receive from somewhere a suggestion as to this empirical world being a mere error and the ,reality being something quite different1 and thus only there arises in him a desire to enter on an enquiry1 proceeding by means of perception1 and so on4 ,now that which gives the required suggestion is the ,veda1 and hence we cannot do without it4--,but this objection is not valid4 ,for in the minds of those who are awed by all the dangers and troubles of existence1 the desire to enter on a philosophical investigation of ,reality1 proceeding by means of ,perception and ,inference1 springs up quite apart from the ,veda1 owing to the observation that there are various sects of philosophers4 ,snkhyas1 and so on1 who make it their business to carry on such investigations4 ,and when such desire is once roused1 ,perception and ,inference alone 7in the way allowed by the ,snkaras themselves7 lead on to the theory that the only ,reality is intelligence eternal1 pure1 self-luminous1 non-dual1 non- changing1 and that everything else is fictitiously superimposed thereon4 ,that this self-luminous ,reality possesses no other attribute to be learned from scripture is admitted2 for according to your opinion also scripture sublates everything that is not ,brahman and merely superimposed on it4 ,nor should it be said that we must have recourse to the ,upanishads for the purpose of establishing that the ,real found in the way of perception and inference is at the same time of the nature of bliss2 for the merely and absolutely ,intelligent is seen of itself to be of that nature1 since it is different from everything that is not of that nature4--,there are1 on the other hand1 those who hold that the knowledge which the ,vednta-texts enjoin as the means of ,release is of the nature of devout meditation2 that such meditation has the effect of winning the love of the supreme ,spirit and is to be learned from scripture only2 that the injunctions of meditation refer to such knowledge only as springs from the legitimate study of the ,veda on the part of a man duly purified by initiation and other ceremonies1 and is assisted by the seven means 7see above1 p4 #ag72 and that the supreme ,person pleased by such meditation bestows on the devotee knowledge of his own true nature1 dissolves thereby the ,nescience springing from works1 and thus releases him from bondage4 ,and on this view the proof of the non-qualification of the ,sdra1 as given in the preceding ,stras1 holds good4--,here terminates the adhikarana of 'the exclusion of the ,sdras4' ,having thus completed the investigation of qualification which had suggested itself in connexion with the matter in hand1 the ,stras return to the being measured by a thumb1 and state another reason for its being explained as ,brahman--as already understood on the basis of its being declared the ruler of what is and what will be4 #dj4 ,on account of the trembling4 ,in the part of the ,katha-,upanishad which intervenes between the passage ',the ,person of the size of a thumb stands in the middle of the ,self 7,,ii1 #d1 #ab71 and the passage ',the ,person of the size of a thumb1 the inner ,self' 7,,ii1 #f1 #ag71 we meet with the text 'whatever there is1 the whole world1 when gone forth1 trembles in its breath4 ,a great terror1 a raised thunderbolt2 those who knew it became immortal4 ,from fear of it fire burns1 from fear the sun shines1 from fear ,indra and ,vyu1 and ,death as the fifth run away' 7,,ii1 #f1 #b2 #c74 ,this text declares that the whole world and ,agni1 ,srya1 and so on1 abiding within that ,person of the size of a thumb1 who is here designated by the term 'breath1' and going forth from him1 tremble from their great fear of him4 ',what will happen to us if we transgress his commandments8'--thinking thus the whole world trembles on account of great fear1 as if it were a raised thunderbolt4 ,in this explanation we take the clause ',a great fear1 a raised thunderbolt1' in the sense of '7the world trembles7 from great fear1' c41 as it is clearly connected in meaning with the following clause3 'from fear the fire burns1' c4--,now what is described here is the nature of the highest ,brahman2 for that such power belongs to ,brahman only we know from other texts1 viz43 ',by the command of that ,imperishable1 ,o ,grg1 sun and moon stand apart' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #h1 #i72 and ',from fear of it the wind blows1 from fear the sun rises2 from fear of it ,agni and ,indra1 yea ,death runs as the fifth' 7,taitt4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #h1 #a74--,the next ,stra supplies a further reason4 #da4 ,on account of light being seen 7declared in the text74 ,between the two texts referring to the ,person of the size of a thumb1 there is a text declaring that to that ,person there belongs light that obscures all other light1 and is the cause and assistance of all other light2 and such light is characteristic of ,brahman only4 ',the sun does not shine there1 nor the moon and the stars1 nor these lightnings1 and much less this fire4 ,after him1 the shining one1 everything shines2 by his light all this is lighted' 7,ka4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #e1 #ae7--,this very same sloka is read in the tharvana 7i4e4 ,mundaka7 with reference to ,brahman4 ,everywhere1 in fact1 the texts attribute supreme luminousness to ,brahman only4 ,compare3 ',having approached the highest light he manifests himself in his own shape' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,viii1 #ab1 #c72 ',him the gods meditate on as the light of lights1 as immortal time' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #d1af72 ',now that light which shines above this heaven' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #ac1 #g74--;,it is thus a settled conclusion that the ,person measured by a thumb is the highest ,brahman4--,here terminates the adhikarana of 'him who is measured' 7by a thumb74 #db4 ,the ether1 on account of the designation of something different1 and so on4 ,we read in the ,chndogya4 ',the ether is the evolver of forms and names4 ,that within which these forms and names are 7or that which is within-- or without--these forms and names7 is ,brahman1 the ,immortal1 the ,self' 7,,viii1 #ad74 ,a doubt here arises whether the being here called ether be the released individual soul1 or the highest ,self4--,the ,prvapakshin adopts the former view4 ,for1 he says1 the released soul is introduced as subject-matter in an immediately preceding clause1',shaking off all as a horse shakes his hair1 and as the moon frees himself from the mouth of ,rhu2 having shaken off the body ,i obtain1 satisfied1 the uncreated world of ,brahman' ,moreover1 the clause ',that which is without forms and names' clearly designates the released soul freed from name and form4 ,and 'the evolver of names and forms' is again that same soul characterised with a view to its previous condition2 for the individual soul in its non-released state supported the shapes of gods1 and so on1 and their names4 ,with a view1 finally1 to its present state in which it is free from name and form1 the last clause declares 'that is ,brahman1 the ,immortal'4 ,the term 'ether' may very well be applied to the released soul which is characterised by the possession of non-limited splendour4-- ,but1 as the text under discussion is supplementary to the section dealing with the small ether within the heart 7,,viii1 #a1 #a ff471 we understand that that small ether is referred to here also2 and it has been proved above that that small ether is ,brahman6--,not so1 we reply4 ,the text under discussion is separated from the section treating of the small ether within the heart1 by the teaching of ,prajpati4 and that teaching is concerned with the characteristics of the individual soul in its different conditions up to ,release2 and moreover the earlier part of the section under discussion speaks of the being which shakes off evil1 and this undoubtedly is the released individual soul introduced in the teaching of ,prajpati4 ,all this shows that the ether in our passage denotes the released individual soul4 ,this view is set aside by the ,stra4 ,the ether in our passage is the highest ,brahman1 because the clause ',ether is the evolver of forms and names' designates something other than the individual soul4 ,the ether which evolves names and forms cannot be the individual soul either in the state of bondage or that of release4 ,in the state of bondage the soul is under the influence of karman1 itself participates in name and form1 and hence cannot bring about names and forms4 ,and in its released state it is expressly said not to take part in the world-business 7,ve4 ,s4 ,,iv1 #d1 #ag71 and therefore is all the less qualified to evolve names and forms4 ,the ,lord1 on the other hand1 who is the ruling principle in the construction of the ,universe is expressly declared by scripture to be the evolver of names and forms2 cp4 ',entering into them with this living ,self1 let me evolve names and forms' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #c1 #b72 ',who is all-knowing1 whose brooding consists of knowledge1 from him is born this ,brahman1 name1 form1 and matter' 7,mu4 ,up4 ,i1 #a1 #i71 c4 ,hence the ether which brings about names and forms is something different from the soul for which name and form are brought about2 it is in fact the highest ,brahman4 ,this the next clause of the text confirms1 ',that which is within those forms and names'2 the purport of which is3 because that ether is within names and forms1 not being touched by them but being something apart1 therefore it is the evolver of them2 this also following from his being free from evil and endowed with the power of realising his purposes4 ,the 'and so on' in the ,stra refers to the ,brahma-hood1 ,self-hood1 and immortality mentioned in the text 7',that is the ,brahman1 the ,immortal1 the ,self'74 ,for ,brahma-hood1 i4e4 greatness1 and so on1 in their unconditioned sense1 belong to the highest ,self only4 ,it is thus clear that the ether is the highest ,brahman4--,nor is the ,prvapakshin right in maintaining that a clause immediately preceding 7'shaking off all evil'7 introduces the individual soul as the general topic of the section4 ,for what the part of the text immediately preceding the passage under discussion does introduce as general topic1 is the highest ,brahman1 as shown by the clause ',i obtain the ,brahma- world4' ,brahman is1 it is true1 represented there as the object to be obtained by the released soul2 but as the released soul cannot be the evolver of names and forms1 c41 we must conclude that it is ,brahman 7and not the released soul71 which constitutes the topic of the whole section4 ,moreover 7to take a wider view of the context of our passage7 the term 'ether' prompts us to recognise here the small ether 7mentioned in the first section of the eighth book7 as the general topic of the book2 and as the teaching of ,prajpati is meant to set forth 7not the individual soul by itself but7 the nature of the soul of the meditating devotee1 it is proper to conclude that the text under discussion is meant finally to represent1 as the object to be obtained1 the small ether previously inculcated as object of meditation4 ,in conclusion we remark that the term 'ether' is nowhere seen to denote the individual ,self4--,the ether that evolves names and forms1 therefore1 is the highest ,brahman4 ,but1 an objection is raised1 there is no other ,self different from the individual ,self2 for scripture teaches the unity of all ,selfs and denies duality4 ,terms such as 'the highest ,self1' 'the highest ,brahman1' 'the highest ,lord1' are merely designations of the individual soul in the state of ,release4 ,the ,brahma-world to be attained1 therefore1 is nothing different from the attaining individual soul2 and hence the ether also that evolves names and forms can be that soul only4--,to this objection the next ,stra replies4 #dc4 ,on account of difference in deep sleep and departing4 ,we have to supply 'on account of designation' from the preceding ,stra4 ,because the text designates the highest ,self as something different from the individual ,self in the state of deep sleep as well as at the time of departure1 the highest ,self is thus different4 ,for the ,vjasaneyaka1 after having introduced the individual ,self in the passage ',who is that ,self8--,he who consisting of knowledge is among the prnas1' c4 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #c1 #g71 describes how1 in the state of deep sleep1 being not conscious of anything it is held embraced by the all-knowing highest ,self1 embraced by the intelligent ,self it knows nothing that is without1 nothing that is within' 7,,iv1 #c1 #ba74 ,so also with reference to the time of departure1 i4e4 dying ',mounted by the intelligent ,self it moves along groaning' 7,,iv1 #c1 #ce74 ,now it is impossible that the unconscious individual ,self1 either lying in deep sleep or departing from the body1 should at the same time be embraced or mounted by itself1 being all- knowing4 ,nor can the embracing and mounting ,self be some other individual ,self2 for no such ,self can be all-knowing4--,the next ,stra supplies a further reason4 #dd4 ,and on account of such words as ,lord4 ,that embracing highest ,self is further on designated by terms such as ,lord1 and so on4 ',he is the ,lord of all1 the master of all1 the ruler of all4 ,he does not become greater by good works1 nor smaller by evil works4 ,he is the lord of all1 the king of beings1 the protector of beings4 ,he is a bank and a boundary so that these worlds may not be confounded4 ,brhmanas seek to know him by the study of the ,veda4 ,he who knows him becomes a ,muni4 ,wishing for that world only1 mendicants leave their homes' 7,,iv1 #d1 #bb74 ',this indeed is the great unborn ,self1 the strong1 the giver of wealth1--undecaying1 undying1 immortal1 fearless is ,brahman' 7,,iv1 #d1 #bd2 #be74 ,now all the qualities here declared1 viz4 being the lord of all1 and so on1 cannot possibly belong to the individual ,self even in the state of ,release2 and we thus again arrive at the conclusion that the ether evolving forms and names is something different from the released individual soul4 ,the declarations of general ,unity which we meet with in the texts rest thereon1 that all sentient and non-sentient beings are effects of ,brahman1 and hence have ,brahman for their inner ,self4 ,that this is the meaning of texts such as ',all this is ,brahman1' c41 we have explained before4 ,and the texts denying plurality are to be understood in the same way4--,here terminates the adhikarana of 'the designation of something different1 and so on4' ,,fourth ,p,,da4 #a4 ,if it be said that some 7mention7 that which rests on ,inference2 we deny this because 7the form7 refers to what is contained in the simile of the body2 and 7this the text7 shows4 ,so far the ,stras have given instruction about a ,brahman1 the enquiry into which serves as a means to obtain what is the highest good of man1 viz4 final release2 which is the cause of the origination1 and so on1 of the world2 which differs in nature from all non-sentient things such as the ,pradhna1 and from all intelligent beings whether in the state of bondage or of release2 which is free from all shadow of imperfection2 which is all knowing1 all powerful1 has the power of realising all its purposes1 comprises within itself all blessed qualities1 is the inner ,self of all1 and possesses unbounded power and might4 ,but here a new special objection presents itself4 ,in order to establish the theory maintained by ,kapila1 viz4 of there being a ,pradhna and individual souls which do not have their ,self in ,brahman1 it is pointed out by some that in certain branches of the ,veda there are met with certain passages which appear to adumbrate the doctrine of the ,pradhna being the universal cause4 ,the ,stras now apply themselves to the refutation of this view1 in order thereby to confirm the theory of ,brahman being the only cause of all4 ,we read in the ,katha-,upanishad1 ',beyond the senses there are the objects1 beyond the objects there is the mind1 beyond the mind there is the intellect1 the great ,self is beyond the intellect4 ,beyond the ,great there is the ,unevolved1 beyond the ,unevolved there is the ,person4 ,beyond the ,person there is nothing--this is the goal1 the highest road' 7,ka4 ,up4 ,i1 #c1 #aa74 ,the question here arises whether by the ',unevolved' be or be not meant the ,pradhna1 as established by ,kapila's theory1 of which ,brahman is not the ,self4--,the ,prvapakshin maintains the former alternative4 ,for1 he says1 in the clause 'beyond the ,great is the ,unevolved1 beyond the ,unevolved is the ,person1' we recognise the arrangement of entities as established by the ,snkhya-system1 and hence must take the ',unevolved' to be the ,pradhna4 ,this is further confirmed by the additional clause 'beyond the ,person there is nothing1' which 7in agreement with ,snkhya principles7 denies that there is any being beyond the soul1 which itself is the twenty-fifth and last of the principles recognised by the ,snkhyas4 ,this prim facie view is expressed in the former part of the ,stra1 ',if it be said that in the skhs of some that which rests on ,inference1 i4e4 the ,pradhna1 is stated as the universal cause4' ,the latter part of the ,stra refutes this view4 ,the word ',unevolved' does not denote a ,pradhna independent of ,brahman2 it rather denotes the body represented as a chariot in the simile of the body1 i4e4 in the passage instituting a comparison between the ,self1 body1 intellect1 and so on1 on the one side1 and the charioteer1 chariot1 c4 on the other side4--,the details are as follows4 ,the text at first--in the section beginning ',know the ,self to be the person driving1' c41 and ending 'he reaches the end of the journey1 and that is the highest place of ,vishnu' 7,i1 #c1 #c-i7--;compares the devotee desirous of reaching the goal of his journey through the samsra1 i4e4 the abode of ,vishnu1 to a man driving in a chariot2 and his body1 senses1 and so on1 to the chariot and parts of the chariot2 the meaning of the whole comparison being that he only reaches the goal who has the chariot1 c4 in his control4 ,it thereupon proceeds to declare which of the different beings enumerated and compared to a chariot1 and so on1 occupy a superior position to the others in so far1 namely1 as they are that which requires to be controlled--'higher than the senses are the objects1' and so on4 ,higher than the senses compared to the horses--are the objects--compared to roads1--because even a man who generally controls his senses finds it difficult to master them when they are in contact with their objects2 higher than the objects is the mind-compared to the reins--because when the mind inclines towards the objects even the non-proximity of the latter does not make much difference2 higher than the mind 7manas7 is the intellect 7buddhi7--compared to the charioteer--because in the absence of decision 7which is the characteristic quality of buddhi7 the mind also has little power2 higher than the intellect again is the 7individual7 ,self1 for that ,self is the agent whom the intellect serves4 ,and as all this is subject to the wishes of the ,self1 the text characterises it as the 'great ,self4' ,superior to that ,self again is the body1 compared to the chariot1 for all activity whereby the individual ,self strives to bring about what is of advantage to itself depends on the body4 ,and higher finally than the body is the highest ,person1 the inner ,ruler and ,self of all1 the term and goal of the journey of the individual soul2 for the activities of all the beings enumerated depend on the wishes of that highest ,self4 ,as the universal inner ,ruler that ,self brings about the meditation of the ,devotee also2 for the ,stra 7,,ii1 #c1 #da7 expressly declares that the activity of the individual soul depends on the ,supreme ,person4 ,being the means for bringing about the meditation and the goal of meditation1 that same ,self is the highest object to be attained2 hence the text says ',higher than the ,person there is nothing--that is the goal1 the highest road4' ,analogously scripture1 in the antarymin-,brhmana1 at first declares that the highest ,self within witnesses and rules everything1 and thereupon negatives the existence of any further ruling principle ',there is no other seer but he1' c4 ,similarly1 in the ,bhagavad-gt1 ',the abode1 the agent1 the various senses1 the different and manifold functions1 and fifth the ,divinity 7i4e4 the highest ,person7' 7,,xviii1 #ad72 and ',i dwell within the heart of all2 memory and perception1 as well as their loss1 come from me' 7,,xv1 #ae74 ,and if1 as in the explanation of the text under discussion1 we speak of that highest ,self being 'controlled1' we must understand thereby the soul's taking refuge with it2 compare the passage ,bha4 ,g4 ,,xviii1 #fa-fb1 ',the ,lord dwells in the heart of all creatures1 whirling them round as if mounted on a machine2 to ,him go for refuge4' ,now all the beings1 senses1 and so on1 which had been mentioned in the simile1 are recognised in the passage 'higher than the senses are the objects1' c41 being designated there by their proper names2 but there is no mention made of the body which previously had been compared to the chariot2 we therefore conclude that it is the body which is denoted by the term 'the ,unevolved4' ,hence there is no reason to see here a reference to the ,pradhna as established in the theory of ,kapila4 ,nor do we recognise1 in the text under discussion1 the general system of ,kapila4 ,the text declares the objects1 i4e4 sounds and so on1 to be superior to the senses2 but in ,kapila's system the objects are not viewed as the causes of the senses4 ,for the same reason the statement that the manas is higher than the objects does not agree with ,kapila's doctrine4 ,nor is this the case with regard to the clause 'higher than the buddhi is the great one1 the ,self2 for with ,kapila the 'great one' 7mahat7 is the buddhi1 and it would not do to say 'higher than the great one is the great one4' ,and finally the 'great one1' according to ,kapila1 cannot be called the ',self4' ,the text under discussion thus refers only to those entities which had previously appeared in the simile4 ,the text itself further on proves this1 when saying ',that ,self is hidden in all beings and does not shine forth1 but it is seen by subtle seers through their sharp and subtle intellect4 ,a wise man should keep down speech in the mind1 he should keep that within knowledge 7which is7 within the ,self2 he should keep knowledge within the great ,self1 and that he should keep within the quiet ,self4' ,for this passage1 after having stated that the highest ,self is difficult to see with the inner and outer organs of knowledge1 describes the mode in which the sense-organs1 and so on1 are to be held in control4 ,the wise man should restrain the sense-organs and the organs of activity within the mind2 he should restrain that 7i4e4 the mind7 within knowledge1 i4e4 within the intellect 7buddhi71 which abides within the ,self2 he should further restrain the intellect within the great ,self1 i4e4 the active individual ,self2 and that ,self finally he should restrain within the quiet ,self1 i4e4 the highest ,brahman1 which is the inner ruler of all2 i4e4 he should reach1 with his individual ,self so qualified1 the place of ,vishnu1 i4e4 ,brahman4--,but how can the term 'the ,unevolved' denote the evolved body8--,to this question the next ,stra furnishes a reply4 #b4 ,but the subtle 7body71 on account of its capability4 ,the elements in their fine state are what is called the ',unevolved1' and this entering into a particular condition becomes the body4 ,it is the ',unevolved' in the particular condition of the body1 which in the text under discussion is called the ',unevolved4' ',on account of its capability1' i4e4 because ,unevolved non-sentient matter1 when assuming certain states and forms1 is capable of entering on activities promoting the interest of man4 ,but1 an objection is raised1 if the ',unevolved' is taken to be matter in its subtle state1 what objection is there to our accepting for the explanation of our text that which is established in the ,snkhya-system8 for there also the ',unevolved' means nothing else but matter in its subtle state4 ,to this the next ,stra replies-- #c4 7,matter in its subtle state7 subserves an end1 on account of its dependence on him 7viz4 the ,supreme ,person74 ,matter in its subtle state subserves ends1 in so far only as it is dependent on the ,supreme ,person who is the cause of all4 ,we by no means wish to deny unevolved matter and all its effects in themselves1 but in so far only as they are maintained not to have their ,self in the ,supreme ,person4 ,for the fact is that they constitute his body and ,he thus constitutes their ,self2 and it is only through this their relation to him that the ,pradhna1 and so on1 are capable of accomplishing their several ends4 ,otherwise the different essential natures of them all could never exist1--nor persist1 nor act4 ,it is just on the ground of this dependence on the ,lord not being acknowledged by the ,snkhyas that their system is disproved by us4 ,in ,scripture and ,smriti alike1 wherever the origination and destruction of the world are described1 or the greatness of the ,supreme ,person is glorified1 the ,pradhna and all its effects1 no less than the individual souls1 are declared to have their ,self in that ,supreme ,person4 ,compare1 e4g4 the text which first says that the earth is merged in water1 and further on 'the elements are merged in the ,mahat1 the ,mahat in the ,unevolved1 the ,unevolved in the ,imperishable1 the ,imperishable in ,darkness2 ,darkness becomes one with the highest divinity4' ,and ',he of whom the earth is the body1' c4 up to 'he of whom the ,unevolved is the body2 of whom the ,imperishable is the body2 of whom death is the body2 he the inner ,self of all beings1 free from all evil1 the divine one1 the one ,god ,nryana4' ,and ,earth1 water1 fire1 air1 ether1 mind1 intellect1 egoity--thus eightfold is my nature divided4 ,lower is this nature2 other than this and higher know that nature of mine which has become the individual soul by which this world is supported4 ,remember that all beings spring from this2 ,i am the origin and the dissolution of the whole ,universe4 ,higher than ,i there is none else2 all this is strung on me as pearls on a thread' 7,bha4 ,g ,,vii1 #d-g74 ,and 'the ,evolved is ,vishnu1 and the ,unevolved1 he is the ,person and time4-- ,the nature 7prakriti7 declared by me1 having the double form of the ,evolved and the ,unevolved1 and the soul-both these are merged in the highest ,self4 ,that ,self is the support of all1 the ,supreme ,person who under the name of ,vishnu is glorified in the ,vedas and the ,vednta books4' #d4 ,and on account of there being no statement of its being an object of knowledge4 ,if the text meant the ,non-evolved as understood by the ,snkhyas it would refer to it as something to be known2 for the ,snkhyas1 who hold the theory of ,release resulting from the discriminative knowledge of the ,evolved1 the ,non-evolved1 and the soul1 admit that all these are objects of knowledge4 ,now our text does not refer to the ,un-evolved as an object of knowledge1 and it cannot therefore be the ,pradhna assumed by the ,snkhyas4 #e4 ,should it be said that 7the text7 declares 7it72 we say1 not so2 for the intelligent ,self 7is meant71 on account of subject-matter4 ',he who has meditated on that which is without sound1 without touch1 without form1 without decay1 without taste1 eternal1 without smell1 without beginning1 without end1 beyond the ,great1 unchangeable2 is freed from the jaws of death' 7,ka4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #c1ae71 this scriptural text1 closely following on the text under discussion1 represents the ',unevolved' as the object of knowledge6--,not so1 we reply4 ,what that sloka represents as the object of meditation is 7not the ,unevolved but7 the intelligent ,self1 i4e4 the ,supreme ,person4 ,for it is the latter who forms the general subject-matter1 as we infer from two preceding passages1 viz4 ',he who has knowledge for his charioteer1 and who holds the reins of the mind1 he reaches the end of his journey1 the highest place of ,vishnu'2 and ',that ,self is hidden in all beings and does not shine forth1 but it is seen by subtle seers through their sharp and subtle intellect4' ,for this reason1 also1 the clause ',higher than the person there is nothing' cannot be taken as meant to deny the existence of an entity beyond the 'purusha' in the ,snkhya sense4 ,that the highest ,self possesses the qualities of being without sound1 c41 we moreover know from other scriptural texts1 such as ,mu4 ,up4 ,i1 #a1 #f ',that which is not to be seen1 not to be grasped1' c4 ,and the qualification 'beyond the ,great1 unchangeable' is meant to declare that the highest ,self is beyond the individual ,self which had been called 'the ,great' in a previous passage 'beyond the intellect is the ,great ,self4' #f4 ,and of three only there is this mention and question4 ,in the ,upanishad under discussion there is mention made of three things only as objects of knowledge--the three standing to one another in the relation of means1 end to be realised by those means1 and persons realising1--and questions are asked as to those three only4 ,there is no mention of1 nor question referring to1 the ,unevolved4--,nakiketas desirous of ,release having been allowed by ,death to choose three boons1 chooses for his first boon that his father should be well disposed towards him--without which he could not hope for spiritual welfare4 ,for his second boon he chooses the knowledge of the ,nakiketa-fire1 which is a means towards final ,release4 ',thou knowest1 ,o ,death1 the fire- sacrifice which leads to heaven2 tell it to me1 full of faith4 ,those who live in the heaven-world reach ,immortality--this ,i ask as my second boon4' ,the term 'heaven-world' here denotes the highest aim of man1 i4e4 ,release1 as appears from the declaration that those who live there enjoy freedom from old age and death2 from the fact that further on 7,i1 #a1 #bf7 works leading to perishable results are disparaged2 and from what ,yama says in reply to the second demand ',he who thrice performs this ,nkiketa- rite overcomes birth and death4' ,as his third boon he1 in the form of a question referring to final release1 actually enquires about three things1 viz4 'the nature of the end to be reached1 i4e4 ,release2 the nature of him who wishes to reach that end2 and the nature of the means to reach it1 i4e4 of meditation assisted by certain works4 ,yama1 having tested ,nakiketas' fitness to receive the desired instruction1 thereupon begins to teach him4 ',the ,ancient who is difficult to be seen1 who has entered into the dark1 who is hidden in the cave1 who dwells in the abyss2 having known him as ,god1 by means of meditation on his ,self1 the wise one leaves joy and sorrow behind4' ,here the clause 'having known the ,god1' points to the divine ,being that is to be meditated upon2 the clause 'by means of meditation on his ,self points to the attaining agent1 i4e4 the individual soul as an object of knowledge2 and the clause 'having known him the wise ones leave joy and sorrow behind' points to the meditation through which ,brahman is to be reached4 ,nakiketas1 pleased with the general instruction received1 questions again in order to receive clearer information on those three matters1 ',what thou seest as different from dharma and different from adharma1 as different from that1 from that which is done and not done1 as different from what is past or future1 tell me that'2 a question referring to three things1 viz4 an object to be effected1 a means to effect it1 and an effecting agent-- each of which is to be different from anything else past1 present1 or future ,,footnote #cfb3a4 ,yama thereupon at first instructs him as to the ,pranava1 ',that word which all the ,vedas record1 which all penances proclaim1 desiring which men become religious students2 that word ,i tell thee briefly--it is ,om'--an instruction which implies praise of the ,pranava1 and in a general way sets forth that which the ,pranava expresses1 e4g4 the nature of the object to be reached1 the nature of the person reaching it1 and the means for reaching it1 such means here consisting in the word ',om1' which denotes the object to be reached ,,footnote #cfb3b4 ,he then continues to glorify the ,pranava 7,i1 a1 #af-ag71 and thereupon gives special information in the first place about the nature of the attaining subject1 i4e41 the individual soul1 ',the knowing ,self is not born1 it dies not1' c4 ,next he teaches ,nakiketas as to the true nature of the object to be attained1 viz4 the highest ,brahman or ,vishnu1 in the section beginning ',the ,self smaller than small1' and ending ',who then knows where he is8' 7,i1 #b1 #bj-be74 ,part of this section1 viz4 ',that ,self cannot be gained by the ,veda1' c41 at the same time teaches that the meditation through which ,brahman is attained is of the nature of devotion 7bhakti74 ,next the sloka ,i1 #c1 #a ',there are the two drinking their reward' shows that1 as the object of devout meditation and the devotee abide together1 meditation is easily performed4 ,then the section beginning ',know the ,self to be him who drives in the chariot1' and ending 'the wise say the path is hard' 7,i1 #c1 #c-ad71 teaches the true mode of meditation1 and how the devotee reaches the highest abode of ,vishnu2 and then there is a final reference to the object to be reached in ,i1 #c1ae1 ',that which is without sound1 without touch1' c4 ,it thus appears that there are references and questions regarding those three matters only2 and hence the ',un-evolved' cannot mean the ,pradhna of the ,snkhyas4 ,,footnote #cfb3a4 ,the commentary proposes different ways of finding those three objects of enquiry in the words of ,nakiketas4 ,according to the first explanation1 'that which is different from dharma' is a means differing from all ordinary means2 'adharma' 'not-dharma' is what is not a means1 but the result to be reached3 hence 'that which is different from adharma' is a result differing from all ordinary results4 ',what is different from that' is an agent different from 'that'2 i4e4 an ordinary agent1 and so on4 7,sru4 ,praks4 p4 #abbf47 ,,footnote #cfb3b4 ,the syllable ',om1' which denotes ,brahman1 is a means towards meditation 7,brahman being meditated upon under this form71 and thus indirectly a means towards reaching ,brahman4 #g4 ,and as in the case of the ',great4' ,in the case of the passage ',higher than the intellect is the ,great ,self1' we conclude from the co-ordination of 'the ,great' with the ,self that what the text means is not the ',great' principle of the ,sankhyas2 analogously we conclude that the ',unevolved1' which is said to be higher than the ,self1 cannot be the ,pradhna of ,kapila's system4 #h4 ,on account of there being no special characteristic2 as in the case of the cup4 ,in the discussion of the following passages also we aim only at refuting the system of the ,sankhyas2 not at disproving the existence and nature of ,prakriti1 the 'great' principle1 the ahamra1 and so on1 viewed as dependent on ,brahman4 ,for that they exist in this latter relation is proved by ,scripture as well as ,smriti4--,a text of the followers of the ,atharvan runs as follows3 ',her who produces all effects1 the non-knowing one1 the unborn one1 wearing eight forms1 the firm one--she is known 7by the ,lord7 and ruled by him1 she is spread out and incited and ruled by him1 gives birth to the world for the benefit of the souls4 ,a cow she is without beginning and end1 a mother producing all beings2 white1 black1 and red1 milking all wishes for the ,lord4 ,many babes unknown drink her4 the impartial one2 but one ,god only1 following his own will1 drinks her submitting to him4 ,by his own thought and work the mighty ,god strongly enjoys her1 who is common to all1 the milkgiver1 who is pressed by the sacrifices4 ,the ,non-evolved when being counted by twenty-four is called the ,evolved4' ,this passage evidently describes the nature of ,prakriti1 and so on1 and the same ,upanishad also teaches the ,supreme ,person who constitutes the ,self of ,prakriti1 and so on4 ',him they call the twenty- sixth or also the twenty-seventh2 as the ,person devoid of all qualities of the ,snkhyas he is known by the followers of the ,atharvan ,,footnote #cfd3a4'--,other followers of the ,atharvan read in their text that there are sixteen originating principles 7prakriti7 and eight effected things 7vikra2 ,garbha ,up4 #c74--,the ,svetsvataras again set forth the nature of ,prakriti1 the soul and the ,lord as follows4 ',the ,lord supports all this together1 the ,perishable and the ,imperishable1 the ,evolved and the ,unevolved2 the other one is in bondage1 since he is an enjoyer2 but having known the ,god he is free from all fetters4 ,there are two unborn ones1 the one knowing and a ,lord1 the other without knowledge and lordly power2 there is the one unborn female on whom the enjoyment of all enjoyers depends2 and there is the infinite ,self appearing in all shapes1 but itself inactive4 ,when a man finds out these three1 that is ,brahman4 ,the ,perishable is the ,pradhna1 the ,immortal and ,imperishable is ,hara2 the one ,god rules the ,perishable and the ,self4 ,from meditation on him1 from union with him1 from becoming one with him there is in the end cessation of all ,mya' 7,svet4 ,up4 ,i1 #h-aj74 ,and ',the sacred verses1 the offerings1 the sacrifices1 the vows1 the past1 the future1 and all that the ,vcdas declare--from that the ,ruler of ,mya creates all this2 and in this the other one is bound up through ,mya4 ,know then ,prakriti to be ,mya and the great ,lord the ruler of ,mya2 with his members this whole world is filled' 7,svet4 ,up4 ,v1 #i-aj74 ,and1 further on1 ',the master of ,pradhna and the soul1 the lord of the gunas1 the cause of the bondage1 existence1 and release of worldly existence' 7,,vi1 #af74 ,thus likewise in ,smriti1 ',do thou know both ,nature and the soul to be without beginning1 and know all effects and qualities to have sprung from ,nature4 ,nature is declared to be the cause of the activity of causes and effects1 whilst the soul is the cause of there being enjoyment of pleasure and pain4 ,for the soul abiding in ,nature experiences the qualities derived from ,nature1 the reason being its connexion with the qualities1 in its births in good and evil wombs' 7,bha4 ,g4 ,,xiii1 #ai-ba74 ,and ',goodness1 ,passion1 and ,darkness--these are the qualities which1 issuing from nature1 bind in the body the embodied soul1 the undecaying one' 7,,xiv1 #e74 ,and ',all beings at the end of a kalpa return into my ,nature1 and again1 at the beginning of a kalpa1 do ,i send them forth4 ,presiding over my own nature again and again do ,i send forth this vast body of beings which has no freedom of its own1 being subject to ,nature4--,with me as ruler ,nature brings forth all moving and non-moving things1 and for this reason the world does ever go round' 7,bha4 ,g4 ,,ix1 #g1 #h1 #aj74 ,what we therefore refuse to accept are a ,prakriti1 and so on1 of the kind assumed by ,kapila1 i4e4 not having their ,self in ,brahman4--,we now proceed to explain the ,stra4 ,we read in the ,svetsvatara-,upanishad ',there is one aj1 red1 white1 and black1 producing manifold offspring of the same nature4 ,one aja loves her and lies by her2 another leaves her after having enjoyed her4' ,a doubt arises here whether this mantra declares a mere ,prakriti as assumed in ,kapila's system1 or a ,prakriti having its ,self in ,brahman4 ,the ,prvapakshin maintains the former alternative4 ,for1 he points out1 the text refers to the non-originatedness of ,prakriti1 calling her aj1 i4e4 unborn1 and further says that she by herself independently produces manifold offspring resembling herself4 ,this view is rejected by the ,stra1 on the ground that there is no intimation of a special circumstance determining the acceptance of the ,prakriti as assumed by the ,snkhyas1 i4e4 independent of ,brahman2 for that she is aj1 i4 e4 not born1 is not a sufficiently special characteristic4 ,the case is analogous to that of the 'cup4' ,in the mantra ',there is a cup having its mouth below and its bottom above' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #b1 #c71 the word kamasa conveys to us only the idea of some implement used in eating1 but we are unable to see what special kind of kamasa is meant2 for in the case of words the meaning of which is ascertained on the ground of their derivation 7as 'kamasa' from 'kam1' to eat or drink71 the special sense of the word in any place cannot be ascertained without the help of considerations of general possibility1 general subject-matter1 and so on4 ,now in the case of the cup we are able to ascertain that the cup meant is the head1 because there is a complementary passage ',what is called the cup with its mouth below and its bottom above is the head'2 but if we look out for a similar help to determine the special meaning of aj1 we find nothing to convince us that the aja1 i4 e4 the 'unborn' principle1 is the ,prakriti of the ,snkhyas4 ,nor is there anything in the text to convey the idea of that aj having the power of independent creation2 for the clause 'giving birth to manifold offspring' declares only that she creates1 not that she creates unaided4 ,the mantra does not therefore tell us about an 'unborn' principle independent of ,brahman4-- ,there moreover is a special reason for understanding by the aj something that depends on ,brahman4 ,this the following ,stra states4 ,,footnote #cfd3a4 ,these quotations are from the ,kulik-,upanishad 7transl4 by ,deussen1 ,seventy ,upanishads1 p4 #fch ff47 ,the translation as given above follows the readings adopted by ,rmnuja and explained in the-- ,sruta-,praksik4 #i4 ,but she begins with light2 for thus some read in their text4 ,the 'but' has assertory force4 ',light' in the ,stra means ,brahman1 in accordance with the meaning of the term as known from texts such as ',on him the gods meditate1 the light of lights' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,x1 #d1 #af72 ',that light which shines beyond heaven' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #ac1 #g74 ',she begins with light' thus means 'she has ,brahman for her cause4'--',for thus some read in their text1' i4e4 because the members of one ,skh1 viz the ,taittiriyas read in their text that this 'aj' has ,brahman for her cause4 ,the ,mahnryana-,upanishad 7of the ,taittiryas7 at first refers to ,brahman abiding in the hollow of the heart as the object of meditation4 ',smaller than the small1 greater than the great1 the ,self placed in the hollow of this creature'2 next declares that all the worlds and ,brahma and the other gods originated from that ,self2 and then says that there sprung from it also this aj which is the cause of all ',the one aj 7goat71 red1 white and black1 which gives birth to numerous offspring of the same shape1 one aja 7he-goat7 loves and lies by her2 another one forsakes her after having enjoyed her4' ,the subject-matter of the entire section evidently is to give instruction as to the whole aggregate of things other than ,brahman originating from ,brahman and thus having its ,self in it2 hence we conclude that also the aj which gives birth to manifold creatures like her1 and is enjoyed by the soul controlled by karman1 while she is abandoned by the soul possessing true knowledge is1 no less than vital airs1 seas1 mountains1 c41 a creature of ,brahman1 and hence has its ,self in ,brahman4 ,we then apply to the interpretation of the ,svetsvatara-text the meaning of the analogous ,mahnrayana-text1 as determined by the complementary passages1 and thus arrive at the conclusion that the aj in the former text also is a being having its ,self in ,brahman4 ,that this is so1 moreover1 appears from the ,svetsvatara itself4 ,for in the early part of that ,upanishad1 we have after the introductory question1 ',is ,brahman the cause8' the passage ',the sages devoted to meditation and concentration have seen the person whose ,self is the divinity1 hidden in its own qualities' 7,i1 #a1 #c72 which evidently refers to the aj as being of the nature of a power of the highest ,brahman4 ,and as further on also 7viz4 in the passages ',from that the ,myin creates all this1 and in this the other is bound up through ,mya'2 ',know then ,prakriti to be ,my and the ,great ,lord the ruler of ,my'2 and 'he who rules every place of birth1' ,v1 #i-aa7 the very same being is referred to1 there remains not even a shadow of proof for the assertion that the mantra under discussion refers to an independent ,prakriti as assumed by the ,snkhyas4 ,but a further objection is raised1 if the ,prakriti denoted by aj begins with1 i4e4 is caused by ,brahman1 how can it be called aj1 i4e4 the non- produced one2 or1 if it is non-produced1 how can it be originated by ,brahman8 ,to this the next ,stra replies4 #aj4 ,and on account of the teaching of formation 7i4e4 creation7 there is no contradiction2 as in the case of the honey4 ,the 'and' expresses disposal of a doubt that had arisen4 ,there is no contradiction between the ,prakriti being aj and originating from light4 ,on account of instruction being given about the formation 7kalpana71 i4e4 creation of the world4 ,this interpretation of 'kalpana' is in agreement with the use of the verb klip in the text1 'as formerly the creator made 7akalpayat7 sun and moon4' ,in our text the sloka 'from that the ,lord of ,my creates all this' gives instruction about the creation of the world4 ,from that1 i4e4 from matter in its subtle causal state when it is not yet divided1 the ,lord of all creates the entire ,universe4 ,from this statement about creation we understand that ,prakriti exists in a twofold state according as it is either cause or effect4 ,during a pralaya it unites itself with ,brahman and abides in its subtle state1 without any distinction of names and forms2 it then is called the ',unevolved1' and by other similar names4 ,at the time of creation1 on the other hand1 there reveal themselves in ,prakriti ,goodness and the other gunas1 it divides itself according to names and forms1 and then is called the ',evolved1' and so on1 and1 transforming itself into fire1 water1 and earth1 it appears as red1 white1 and black4 ,in its causal condition it is aj1 i4e4 unborn1 in its effected condition it is 'caused by light1 i4e4 ,brahman'2 hence there is no contradiction4 ,the case is analogous to that of the 'honey4' ,the sun in his causal state is one only1 but in his effected state the ,lord makes him into honey in so far namely as he then1 for the purpose of enjoyment on the part of the ,vasus and other gods1 is the abode of nectar brought about by sacrificial works to be learned from the ,rik and the other ,vedas2 and further makes him to rise and to set4 ,and between these two conditions there is no contradiction4 ,this is declared in the ,madhuvidy 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,iii71 from ',the sun is indeed the honey of the ,devas1' down to 'when from thence he has risen upwards he neither rises nor sets2 being one he stands in the centre'--'one' here means 'of one nature4'--,the conclusion therefore is that the ,svetsvatara mantra under discussion refers to ,prakriti as having her ,self in ,brahman1 not to the ,prakriti assumed by the ,snkhyas4 ,others1 however1 are of opinion that the one aj of which the mantra speaks has for its characteristics light1 water1 and earth4 ,to them we address the following questions4 ,do you mean that by what the text speaks of as an aj1 consisting of fire1 water1 and earth1 we have to understand those three elements only2 or ,brahman in the form of those three elements2 or some power or principle which is the cause of the three elements8 ,the first alternative is in conflict with the circumstance that1 while fire1 water1 and earth are several things1 the text explicitly refers to one ,aj4 ,nor may it be urged that fire1 water1 and earth1 although several1 become one1 by being made tripartite 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #c1 #c72 for this making them tripartite1 does not take away their being several2 the text clearly showing that each several element becomes tripartite1 ',let me make each of these three divine beings tripartite4'--,the second alternative again divides itself into two alternatives4 ,is the one aj ,brahman in so far as having passed over into fire1 water1 and earth2 or ,brahman in so far as abiding within itself and not passing over into effects8 ,the former alternative is excluded by the consideration that it does not remove plurality 7which cannot be reconciled with the one aj74 ,the second alternative is contradicted by the text calling that aj red1 white1 and black2 and moreover ,brahman viewed as abiding within itself cannot be characterised by fire1 water1 and earth4 ,on the third alternative it has to be assumed that the text denotes by the term 'aj' the three elements1 and that on this basis there is imagined a causal condition of these elements2 but better than this assumption it evidently is to accept the term 'aj' as directly denoting the causal state of those three elements as known from scripture4 ,nor can we admit the contention that the term 'aj' is meant to teach that ,prakriti should metaphorically be viewed as a she-goat2 for such a view would be altogether purposeless4 ,where--in the passage ',know the ,self to be him who drives in the chariot'--the body1 and so on1 are compared to a chariot1 and so on1 the object is to set forth the means of attaining ,brahman2 where the sun is compared to honey1 the object is to illustrate the enjoyment of the ,vasus and other gods2 but what similar object could possibly be attained by directing us to view ,prakriti as a goat8 ,such a metaphorical view would in fact be not merely useless2 it would be downright irrational4 ,prakriti is a non-intelligent principle1 the causal substance of the entire material ,universe1 and constituting the means for the experience of pleasure and pain1 and for the final release1 of all intelligent souls which are connected with it from all eternity4 ,now it would be simply contrary to good sense1 metaphorically to transfer to ,prakriti such as described the nature of a she-goat--which is a sentient being that gives birth to very few creatures only1 enters only occasionally into connexion with others1 is of small use only1 is not the cause of herself being abandoned by others1 and is capable of abandoning those connected with her4 ,nor does it recommend itself to take the word aj 7understood to mean 'she-goat'7 in a sense different from that in which we understand the term 'aja' which occurs twice in the same mantra4--,let then all three terms be taken in the same metaphorical sense 7aja meaning he-goat74--,it would be altogether senseless1 we reply1 to compare the soul which absolutely dissociates itself from ,prakriti 7',another aja leaves her after having enjoyed her'7 to a he-goat which is able to enter again into connexion with what he has abandoned1 or with anything else4--,here terminates the adhikarana of 'the cup4' #aa4 ,not from the mention of the number even1 on account of the diversity and of the excess4 ,the ,vjasaneyins read in their text ',he in whom the five five-people and the ether rest1 him alone ,i believe to be the ,self2 ,i1 who know1 believe him to be ,brahman' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #d1 #ag74 ,the doubt here arises whether this text be meant to set forth the categories as established in ,kapila's doctrine1 or not4--,the ,prvapakshin maintains the former view1 on the ground that the word 'five-people1' qualified by the word 'five1' intimates the twenty-five categories of the ,snkhyas4 ,the compound 'five- people' 7pakajanh7 denotes groups of five beings1 just as the term paka-plyah denotes aggregates of five bundles of grass4 ,and as we want to know how many such groups there are1 the additional qualification 'five' intimates that there are five such groups2 just as if it were said 'five five-bundles1 i4 e4 five aggregates consisting of five bundles each4' ,we thus understand that the 'five five-people' are twenty- five things1 and as the mantra in which the term is met with refers to final release1 we recognise the twenty-five categories known from the ,snkhya-smriti which are here referred to as objects to be known by persons desirous of release4 ,for the followers of ,kapila teach that 'there is the fundamental causal substance which is not an effect4 ,there are seven things1 viz4 the ,mahat1 and so on1 which are causal substances as well as effects4 ,there are sixteen effects4 ,the soul is neither a causal substance nor an effect' 7,sn4 ,k4 #c74 ,the mantra therefore is meant to intimate the categories known from the ,snkhya4--,to this the ,stra replies that from the mention of the number twenty-five supposed to be implied in the expression 'the five five-people1' it does not follow that the categories of the ,snkhyas are meant4 ',on account of the diversity1' i4e4 on account of the five-people further qualified by the number five being different from the categories of the ,snkhyas4 ,for in the text 'in whom the five five-people and the ether rest1' the 'in whom' shows the five-people to have their abode1 and hence their ,self1 in ,brahman2 and in the continuation of the text1 'him ,i believe the ,self1' the 'him' connecting itself with the preceding 'in whom' is recognised to be ,brahman4 ,the five five-people must therefore be different from the categories of the ,snkhya-system4 ',and on account of the excess4' ,moreover there is1 in the text under discussion1 an excess over and above the ,snkhya categories1 consisting in the ,self denoted by the relative pronoun 'in whom1' and in the specially mentioned ,ether4 ,what the text designates therefore is the ,supreme ,person who is the ,universal ,lord in whom all things abide--such as he is described in the text quoted above1 ',therefore some call him the twenty-sixth1 and others the twenty-seventh4' ,the 'even' in the ,stra is meant to intimate that the 'five five-people' can in no way mean the twenty-five categories1 since there is no pentad of groups consisting of five each4 ,for in the case of the categories of the ,snkhyas there are no generic characteristics or the like which could determine the arrangement of those categories in fives4 ,nor must it be urged against this that there is a determining reason for such an arrangement in so far as the tattvas of the ,snkhyas form natural groups comprising firstly1 the five organs of action2 secondly1 the five sense-organs2 thirdly1 the five gross elements2 fourthly1 the subtle parts of those elements2 and fifthly1 the five remaining tattvas2 for as the text under discussion mentions the ether by itself1 the possibility of a group consisting of the five gross elements is precluded4 ,we cannot therefore take the compound 'five people' as denoting a group consisting of five constituent members1 but1 in agreement with ,pn4 ,,ii1 #a1 #ej1 as merely being a special name4 ,there are certain beings the special name of which is 'five-people1' and of these beings the additional word 'paka' predicates that they are five in number4 ,the expression is thus analogous to the term 'the seven seven- rishis' 7where the term 'seven-rishis' is to be understood as the name of a certain class of rishis only74--,who then are the beings called 'five- people8'--,to this question the next ,stra replies4 #ab4 ,the breath1 and so on1 on the ground of the complementary passage4 ,we see from a complementary passage1 viz4 ',they who know the breath of breath1 the eye of the eye1 the ear of the ear1 the food of food1 the mind of mind1' that the 'five-people' are the breath1 and eye1 and so on1 all of which have their abode in ,brahman4 ,but1 an objection is raised1 while the mantra 'in whom the five five- people1' c41 is common to the ,knvas and the ,mdhyandinas1 the complementary passage 'they who know the breath of breath1' c41 in the text of the former makes no mention of food1 and hence we have no reason to say that the 'five-people' in their text are the breath1 eye1 and so on4 ,to this objection the next ,stra replies4 #ac4 ,by light1 food not being 7mentioned in the text7 of some4 ,in the text of some1 viz4 the ,knvas1 where food is not mentioned1 the five-people are recognised to be the five senses1 owing to the phrase 'of lights' which is met with in another complementary passage4 ,in the mantra1 'him the gods worship as the light of lights1' which precedes the mantra about the 'five-people1' ,brahman is spoken of as the light of lights1 and this suggests the idea of certain lights the activity of which depends on ,brahman4 ,the mantra leaves it undetermined what these lights are2 but from what follows about the 'five-people1' c41 we learn that what is meant are the senses which light up as it were their respective objects4 ,in 'the breath of breath' the second 'breath' 7in the genitive case7 denotes the sense-organ of touch1 as that organ is connected with air1 and as the vital breath 7which would otherwise suggest itself as the most obvious explanation of prna7 does not harmonise with the metaphorical term 'light4' ',of the eye' refers to the organ of sight2 'of the ear' to the organ of hearing4 ',of food' comprises the senses of smell and taste together3 it denotes the sense of smell on the ground that that sense is connected with earth1 which may be 'food1' and the sense of taste in so far as 'anna' may be also explained as that by means of which eating goes on 7adyate74 ',of mind' denotes mind1 i4 e4 the so-called internal organ4 ,taste and smell thus being taken in combination1 we have the required number of five1 and we thus explain the 'five-people' as the sense-organs which throw light on their objects1 together with the internal organ1 i4e4 mind4 ,the meaning of the clause about the 'five-people' therefore is that the senses-- called 'five-people'--and the elements1 represented by the ,ether1 have their basis in ,brahman2 and as thus all beings are declared to abide in ,brahman1 the five 'five-people' can in no way be the twenty-five categories assumed by the ,snkhyas4--,the general ,conclusion is that the ,vednta-texts1 whether referring to numbers or not1 nowhere set forth the categories established in ,kapila's system4 #ad4 ,and on account of 7,brahman7 as described being declared to be the cause with regard to ,ether1 and so on4 ,here the philosopher who holds the ,pradhna to be the general cause comes forward with another objection4 ,the ,vednta-texts1 he says1 do not teach that creation proceeds from one and the same agent only1 and you therefore have no right to hold that ,brahman is the sole cause of the world4 ,in one place it is said that our world proceeded from ',being'1 ',being only this was in the beginning' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #b1 #a74 ,in other places the world is said to have sprung from ',non-being'1 ',non-being indeed this was in the beginning' 7,taitt4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #g1 i72 and ',non-being only was this in the beginning2 it became ,being' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #ai1 #a74 ,as the ,vednta-texts are thus not consequent in their statements regarding the creator1 we cannot conclude from them that ,brahman is the sole cause of the world4 ,on the other hand1 those texts do enable us to conclude that the ,pradhna only is the universal cause4 ,for the text ',now all this was then undeveloped' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,i1 #d1 #g7 teaches that the world was merged in the undeveloped ,pradhna4 and the subsequent clause1 ',that developed itself by form and name1' that from that ,undeveloped there resulted the creation of the world4 ,for the ,undeveloped is that which is not distinguished by names and forms1 and this is none other than the ,pradhna4 ,and as this ,pradhna is at the same time eternal1 as far as its essential nature is concerned1 and the substrate of all change1 there is nothing contradictory in the different accounts of creation calling it sometimes ',being' and sometimes ',non-being'2 while1 on the other hand1 these terms cannot1 without contradiction1 both be applied to ,brahman4 ,the causality of the ,undeveloped having thus been ascertained1 such expressions as 'it thought1 may ,i be many1' must be interpreted as meaning its being about to proceed to creation4 ,the terms ',self' and ',brahman' also may be applied to the ,pradhna in so far as it is all-pervading 7atman from pnoti71 and preeminently great 7brihat74 ,we therefore conclude that the only cause of the world about which the ,vednta-texts give information is the ,pradhna4 ,this view is set aside by the ,stra4 ,the word and is used in the sense of but4 ,it is possible to ascertain from the ,vednta-texts that the world springs from none other than the highest ,brahman1 which is all- knowing1 lord of all1 free from all shadow of imperfection1 capable of absolutely realising its purposes1 and so on2 since scripture declares ,brahman as described to be the cause of ,ether1 and so on4 ,by ',brahman as described' is meant ',brahman distinguished by omniscience and other qualities1 as described in the ,stra that from which the origination1 and so on1 of the world proceed1 and in other places4' ,that ,brahman only is declared by scripture to be the cause of ,ether1 and so on1 i4e4 the being which is declared to be the cause in passages such as ',from that ,self sprang ,ether' 7,taitt4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #a72 'that sent forth fire'7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #b1 #c71 is none other than ,brahman possessing omniscience and similar qualities4 ,for the former of these texts follows on the passage ',the ,true1 intelligence1 infinite is ,brahman2 he reaches all desires together with the intelligent ,brahman1' which introduces ,brahman as the general subject-matter--that ,brahman being then referred to by means of the connecting words 'from that4' ,in the same way the 'that' 7in 'that sent forth fire'7 refers back to the omniscient ,brahman introduced in the clause 'that thought1 may ,i be many4' ,this view is confirmed by a consideration of all the accounts of creation1 and we hence conclude that ,brahman is the sole cause of the world4--,but the text ',non-being indeed this was in the beginning' calls the general cause 'something that is not'2 how then can you say that we infer from the ,vednta-texts as the general cause of the world a ,brahman that is all-knowing1 absolutely realises its purposes1 and so on8--,to this question the next ,stra replies4 #ae4 ,from connexion4 ,the fact is that ,brahman intelligent1 consisting of bliss1 c41 connects itself also with the passage ',non-being was this in the beginning' 7,taitt4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #g74 ,for the section of the text which precedes that passage 7viz4 ',different from this ,self consisting of understanding is the ,self consisting of ,bliss2--he wished1 may ,i be many2--he created all whatever there is4 ,having created he entered into it2 having entered it he became sat and tyat'7 clearly refers to ,brahman consisting of ,bliss1 which realises its purposes1 creates all beings1 and entering into them is the ,self of all4 ,when1 therefore1 after this we meet with the sloka 7',non-being this was in the beginning'7 introduced by the words ',on this there is also this sloka'--which shows that the sloka is meant to throw light on what precedes2 and when further or we have the passage ',from fear of it the wind blows' c41 which1 referring to the same ,brahman1 predicates of it universal rulership1 bliss of nature1 and so on2 we conclude with certainty that the sloka about ',non-being' also refers to ,brahman4 ,as during a pralaya the distinction of names and forms does not exist1 and ,brahman also then does not exist in so far as connected with names and forms1 the text applies to ,brahman the term ',non-being4' ,the text ',non-being only this was in the beginning' explains itself in the same way4--,nor can we admit the contention that the text ',now all this was then undeveloped 'refers to the ,pradhna as the cause of the world2 for the ,undeveloped there spoken of is nothing else but ,brahman in so far as its body is not yet evolved4 ,for the text continues ',that same being entered thither to the very tips of the finger-nails2' ',when seeing1 eye by name2 when hearing1 ear by name2 when thinking1 mind by name2' ',let men meditate upon him as ,self2' where the introductory words 'that same being' refer back to the ,undeveloped--which thus is said to enter into all things and thereby to become their ruler4 ,and it is known from another text also 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #c1 #b7 that it is the all-creative highest ,brahman which enters into its creation and evolves names and forms4 ,the text ',having entered within1 the ruler of creatures1 the ,self of all' moreover shows that the creative principle enters into its creatures for the purpose of ruling them1 and such entering again cannot be attributed to the non-sentient ,pradhna4 ,the ,undeveloped therefore is ,brahman in that state where its body is not yet developed2 and when the text continues 'it developed itself by names and forms' the meaning is that ,brahman developed itself in so far as names and forms were distinguished in the world that constitutes ,brahman's body4 ,on this explanation of the texts relating to creation we further are enabled to take the thought1 purpose1 c41 attributed to the creative principle1 in their primary literal sense4 ,and1 we finally remark1 neither the term ',brahman' nor the term ',self in any way suits the ,pradhna1 which is neither absolutely great nor pervading in the sense of entering into things created with a view to ruling them4 ,it thus remains a settled conclusion that ,brahman is the sole cause of the world4--,here terminates the adhikarana of '7,brahman's7 causality4' #af4 ,because it denotes the world4 ,the ,snkhya comes forward with a further objection4 ,although the ,vednta-texts teach an intelligent principle to be the cause of the world1 they do not present to us as objects of knowledge anything that could be the cause of the world1 apart from the ,pradhna and the soul as established by the ,snkhya-system4 ,for the ,kaushtakins declare in their text1 in the dialogue of ,blki and ,ajtasatru1 that none but the enjoying 7individual7 soul is to be known as the cause of the world1 ',shall ,i tell you ,brahman8 ,he who is the maker of those persons and of whom this is the work 7or to whom this work belongs7 he indeed is to be known' 7,kau4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #ai74 ,blki at the outset proposes ,brahman as the object of instruction1 and when he is found himself not to know ,brahman1 ,ajtasatru instructs him about it1 'he indeed is to be known4' ,but from the relative clause 'to whom this work belongs1' which connects the being to be known with work1 we infer that by ,brahman we have here to understand the enjoying soul which is the ruler of ,prakriti1 not any other being4 ,for no other being is connected with work2 work1 whether meritorious or the contrary1 belongs to the individual soul only4 ,nor must you contest this conclusion on the ground that 'work' is here to be explained as meaning the object of activity1 so that the sense of the clause would be 'he of whom this entire world1 as presented by perception and the other means of knowledge1 is the work4' ,for in that case the separate statements made in the two clauses1 'who is the maker of those persons' and 'of whom this is the work1' would be devoid of purport 7the latter implying the former74 ,moreover1 the generally accepted meaning of the word 'karman1' both in ,vedic and worldly speech1 is work in the sense of good and evil actions4 ,and as the origination of the world is caused by actions of the various individual souls1 the designation of 'maker of those persons' also suits only the individual soul4 ,the meaning of the whole passage therefore is ',he who is the cause of the different persons that have their abode in the disc of the sun1 and so on1 and are instrumental towards the retributive experiences of the individual souls2 and to whom there belongs karman1 good and evil1 to which there is due his becoming such a cause2 he indeed is to be known1 his essential nature is to be cognised in distinction from ,prakriti4' ,and also in what follows1 ',the two came to a person who was asleep4 ,he pushed him with a stick1' c41 what is said about the sleeping man being pushed1 roused1 c41 all points only to the individual soul being the topic of instruction4 ,further on also the text treats of the individual soul only1 ',as the master feeds with his people1 nay as his people feed on the master1 thus does this conscious ,self feed with the other ,selfs4' ,we must consider also the following passage--which contains the explanation given by ,ajatasatru to ,blki1 who had been unable to say where the soul goes at the time of deep sleep--' ,there are the arteries called ,hitas4 ,in these the person is2 when sleeping he sees no dream1 then he 7or that1 i4e4 the aggregate of the sense-organs7 becomes one with this prna alone4 ,then speech goes to him with all names1 c41 the mind with all thoughts4 ,and when he awakes1 then1 as from a burning fire sparks proceed in all directions1 thus from that ,self the prnas proceed each towards its place1 from the prnas the gods1 from the gods the worlds4' ,the individual soul which passes through the states of dream1 deep sleep and waking1 and is that into which there are merged and from which there proceed speech and all the other organs1 is here declared to be the abode of deep sleep 'then it 7viz4 the aggregate of the organs7 becomes one in that prna4' ,prna here means the individual soul in so far as supporting life2 for the text continues 'when that one awakes' and neither the vital breath nor the ,lord 7both of whom might be proposed as explanations of prna7 can be said to be asleep and to wake4 ,or else 'asmin prne' might be explained as 'in the vital breath 7which abides7 in the individual soul1' the meaning of the clause being 'all the organs1 speech and so on1 become one in the vital breath which itself abides in this soul4' ,the word 'prna' would thus be taken in its primary literal sense2 yet all the same the soul constitutes the topic of the section1 the vital breath being a mere instrument of the soul4 ,the ,brahman mentioned at the outset therefore is none other than the individual soul1 and there is nothing to prove a lord different from it4 ,and as the attributes which the texts ascribe to the general cause1 viz4 thought and so on1 are attributes of intelligent beings only1 we arrive at the conclusion that what constitutes the cause of the world is the non-intelligent ,pradhna guided by the intelligent soul4 ,this prim facie view the ,stra disposes of1 by saying 'because 7the work7 denotes the world4' ,it is not the insignificant individual soul-- which is under the influence of its good and evil works1 and by erroneously imputing to itself the attributes of ,prakriti becomes the cause of the effects of the latter--that is the topic of our text2 but rather the ,supreme ,person who is free from all shadow of imperfection such as ,nescience and the like1 who is a treasure of all possible auspicious qualities in their highest degree of perfection1 who is the sole cause of this entire world4 ,this is proved by the circumstance that the term 'work' connected with 'this' 7in 'of whom this 7is7 the work'7 denotes the ,universe which is an effect of the ,supreme ,person4 ,for the word 'this' must1 on account of its sense1 the general topic of the section and so on1 be taken in a non-limited meaning1 and hence denotes the entire world1 as presented by ,perception and the other means of knowledge1 with all its sentient and non-sentient beings4 ,that the term 'work' does not here denote good and evil actions1 appears from the following consideration of the context4 ,blki at first offers to teach ,brahman 7',shall ,i tell you ,brahman8'7 and thereupon holds forth on various persons abiding in the sun1 and so on1 as being ,brahman4 ,ajatasatru however refuses to accept this instruction as not setting forth ,brahman1 and finally1 in order to enlighten ,blki1 addresses him ',he1 ,o ,blki1 who is the maker of those persons1' c4 ,now as the different personal souls abiding in the sun1 c41 and connected with karman in the form of good and evil actions1 are known already by ,blki1 the term 'karman'--met with in the next clause--is clearly meant to throw light on some ,person so far not known to ,blki1 and therefore must be taken to mean not good and evil deeds or action in general1 but rather the entire ,universe in so far as being the outcome of activity4 ,on this interpretation only the passage gives instruction about something not known before4 ,should it be said that this would be the case also if the subject to which the instruction refers were the true essential nature of the soul1 indicated here by its connexion with karman1 we reply that this would involve the 7objectionable7 assumption of so-called implication 7lakshan71 in so far namely as what the clause would directly intimate is 7not the essential nature of the soul as free from karman but rather7 the connexion of the soul with karman4 ,moreover if the intention of the passage were this1 viz4 to give instruction as to the soul1 the latter being pointed at by means of the reference to karman1 the intention would be fully accomplished by saying 'to whom karman belongs1 he is to be known2' while in the text as it actually stands 'of whom this is the karman' the 'this' would be unmeaning4 ,the meaning of the two separate clauses 'who is the maker of those persons' and 'of whom this is the work' is as follows4 ,he who is the creator of those persons whom you called ,brahman1 and of whom those persons are the creatures2 he of whom this entire world is the effect1 and before whom all things sentient and non-sentient are equal in so far as being produced by him2 he1 the highest and universal cause1 the ,supreme ,person1 is the object to be known4 ,the meaning implied here is--although the origination of the world has for its condition the deeds of individual souls1 yet those souls do not independently originate the means for their own retributive experience1 but experience only what the ,lord has created to that end in agreement with their works4 ,the individual soul1 hence1 cannot stand in creative relation to those persons4--,what the text under discussion inculcates as the object of knowledge therefore is the highest ,brahman which is known from all ,vednta-texts as the universal cause4 #ag4 ,should it be said that this is not so on account of the inferential marks of the individual soul and the chief vital air2 we reply that this has been explained before4 ,with reference to the plea urged by the ,prvapakshin that1 owing to inferential marks pointing to the individual soul1 and the circumstance of mention being made of the chief vital air1 we must decide that the section treats of the enjoying individual soul and not of the highest ,self1 the ,stra remarks that this argumentation has already been disposed of1 viz4 in connexion with the ,pratardana vidy4 ,for there it was shown that when a text is ascertained1 on the ground of a comprehensive survey of initial and concluding clauses1 to refer to ,brahman1 all inferential marks which point to other topics must be interpreted so as to fall in with the principal topic4 ,now in our text ,brahman is introduced at the outset ',shall ,i tell you ,brahman8' it is further mentioned in the middle of the section1 for the clause 'of whom this is the work' does not refer to the soul in general but to the highest ,person who is the cause of the whole world2 and at the end again we hear of a reward which connects itself only with meditations on ,brahman1 viz4 supreme sovereignty preceded by the conquest of all evil4 ',having overcome all evil he obtains pre-eminence among all beings1 sovereignty and supremacy--yea1 he who knows this4' ,the section thus being concerned with ,brahman1 the references to the individual soul and to the chief vital air must also be interpreted so as to fall in with ,brahman4 ,in the same way it was shown above that the references to the individual soul and the chief vital air which are met with in the ,pratardana vidy really explain themselves in connexion with a threefold meditation on ,brahman4 ,as in the passage ',then with this prna alone he becomes one' the two words 'this' and 'prna' may be taken as co- ordinated and it hence would be inappropriate to separate them 7and to explain 'in the prna which abides in this soul'71 and as the word 'prna' is ascertained to mean ,brahman also1 we must understand the mention of prna to be made with a view to meditation on ,brahman in so far as having the prna for its body4 ,but how can the references to the individual soul be put in connexion with ,brahman8--,this point is taken up by the next ,stra4 #ah4 ,but ,jaimini thinks that it has another purport1 on account of the question and answer2 and thus some also4 ,the 'but' is meant to preclude the idea that the mention made of the individual soul enables us to understand the whole section as concerned with that soul4--,the teacher ,jaimini is of opinion that the mention made of the individual soul has another meaning1 i4e4 aims at conveying the idea of what is different from the individual soul1 i4e4 the nature of the highest ,brahman4 ',on account of question and answer4' ,according to the story told in the ,upanishad1 ,ajtasatru leads ,blki to where a sleeping man is resting1 and convinces him that the soul is different from breath1 by addressing the sleeping person1 in whom breath only is awake1 with names belonging to prna ,,footnote #chc3a without the sleeper being awaked thereby1 and after that rousing him by a push of his staff4 ,then1 with a view to teaching ,blki the difference of ,brahman from the individual soul1 he asks him the following questions3 ',where1 ,o ,blki1 did this person here sleep8 ,where was he8 ,whence did he thus come back8' ,to these questions he thereupon himself replies1 ',when sleeping he sees no dream1 then he becomes one in that prna alone4--,from that ,self the organs proceed each towards its place1 from the organs the gods1 from the gods the worlds4' ,now this reply1 no less than the questions1 clearly refers to the highest ,self as something different from the individual ,self4 ,for that entering into which the soul1 in the state of deep sleep1 attains its true nature and enjoys complete serenity1 being free from the disturbing experiences of pleasure and pain that accompany the states of waking and of dream2 and that from which it again returns to the fruition of pleasure and pain2 that is nothing else but the highest ,self4 ,for1 as other scriptural texts testify 7',then he becomes united with the ,true1' ,ch4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #h1 #a2 ',embraced by the intelligent ,self he knows nothing that is without1 nothing that is within1' ,bri1 ,up4 ,,iv1 #c1 #ba71 the abode of deep sleep is the intelligent ,self which is different from the individual ,self1 i4e4 the highest ,self4 ,we thus conclude that the reference1 in question and answer1 to the individual soul subserves the end of instruction being given about what is different from that soul1 i4e4 the highest ,self4 ,we hence also reject the ,prvapakshin's contention that question and answer refer to the individual soul1 that the veins called hita are the abode of deep sleep1 and that the well-known clause as to the prna must be taken to mean that the aggregate of the organs becomes one in the individual soul called prna4 ,for the veins are the abode1 not of deep sleep1 but of dream1 and1 as we have shown above1 ,brahman only is the abode of deep sleep2 and the text declares that the individual soul1 together with all its ministering organs1 becomes one with1 and again proceeds from1 ,brahman only--which the text designates as ,prna4--,moreover some1 viz4 the ,vjasaneyins in this same colloquy of ,blki and ,ajtasatru as recorded in their text1 clearly distinguish from the vijna-maya1 i4e4 the individual soul in the state of deep sleep1 the highest ,self which then is the abode of the individual soul4 ',where was then the person1 consisting of intelligence1 and from whence did he thus come back8--,when he was thus asleep1 then the intelligent person1 having through the intelligence of the senses absorbed within himself all intelligence1 lies in the ether that is within the heart4' ,now the word 'ether' is known to denote the highest ,self2 cf4 the text 'there is within that the small ether'7,ch4 ,up4 ,,viii1 #a1 #a74 ,this shows us that the individual soul is mentioned in the ,vjasaneyin passage to the end of setting forth what is different from it1 viz4 the prja ,self1 i4e4 the highest ,brahman4 ,the general conclusion therefore is that the ,kaushtaki-text under discussion proposes as the object of knowledge something that is different from the individual soul1 viz4 the highest ,brahman which is the cause of the whole world1 and that hence the ,vednta-texts nowhere intimate that general causality belongs either to the individual soul or to the ,pradhna under the soul's guidance4 ,here terminates the adhikarana of 'denotation of the world4' ,,footnote #chc3a4 ,the names with which the king addresses the sleeper are ,great one1 clad in white raiment1 ,soma1 king4 ,the ,sru4 ,pra4 comments as follows3 ,great one2 because according to ,sruti ,prna is the oldest and best4 ,clad in white raiment2 because ,sruti says that water is the raiment of ,prna2 and elsewhere1 that what is white belongs to water4 ,soma2 because scripture says 'of this prna water is the body1 light the form1 viz4 yonder moon4' ,king2 for ,sruti says ',prna indeed is the ruler4' #ai4 ,on account of the connected meaning of the sentences4 ,in spite of the conclusion arrived at there may remain a suspicion that here and there in the ,upanishads texts are to be met with which aim at setting forth the soul as maintained in ,kapila's system1 and that hence there is no room for a being different from the individual soul and called ,lord4 ,this suspicion the ,stra undertakes to remove1 in connexion with the ,maitreyi-brhmana1 in the ,brihadaranyaka4 ,there we read ',verily1 a husband is dear1 not for the love of the husband1 but for the love of the ,self a husband is dear1 and so on4 ,everything is dear1 not for the love of everything1 but for the love of the ,self everything is dear4 ,the ,self should be seen1 should be heard1 should be reflected on1 should be meditated upon4 ,when the ,self has been seen1 heard1 reflected upon1 meditated upon1 then all this is known' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #e1 #f74--;,here the doubt arises whether the ,self enjoined in this passage as the object of seeing1 c41 be the soul as held by the ,snkhyas1 or the ,supreme ,lord1 all-knowing1 capable of realising all his purposes1 and so on4 ,the ,prvapakshin upholds the former alternative4 ,for1 he says1 the beginning no less than the middle and the concluding part of the section conveys the idea of the individual soul only4 ,in the beginning the individual soul only is meant1 as appears from the connexion of the ,self with husband1 wife1 children1 wealth1 cattle1 and so on4 ,this is confirmed by the middle part of the section where the ,self is said to be connected with origination and destruction1 'a mass of knowledge1 he having risen from these elements vanishes again into them4 ,when he has departed there is no more consciousness4' ,and in the end we have 'whereby should he know the knower'2 where we again recognise the knowing subject1 i4e4 the individual soul1 not the ,lord4 ,we thus conclude that the whole text is meant to set forth the soul as held by the ,snkhyas4--,but in the beginning there is a clause1 viz4 ',there is no hope of immortality by wealth1' which shows that the whole section is meant to instruct us as to the means of immortality2 how then can it be meant to set forth the individual soul only8--,you state the very reason proving that the text is concerned with the individual soul only6 ,for according to the ,snkhya- system immortality is obtained through the cognition of the true nature of the soul viewed as free from all erroneous imputation to itself of the attributes of non-sentient matter2 and the text therefore makes it its task to set forth1 for the purpose of immortality1 the essential nature of the soul free from all connexion with ,prakriti1 'the ,self should be heard1' and so on4 ,and as the souls dissociated from ,prakriti are all of a uniform nature1 all souls are known through the knowledge of the soul free from ,prakriti1 and the text therefore rightly says that through the ,self being known everything is known4 ,and as the essential nature of the ,self is of one and the same kind1 viz4 knowledge or intelligence1 in all beings from gods down to plants1 the text rightly asserts the unity of the ,self 'that ,self is all this'2 and denies all otherness from the ,self1 on the ground of the characteristic attributes of gods and so on really being of the nature of the ,not-self1 'he is abandoned by everything1' c4 ,the clause1 ',for where there is duality as it were1' which denies plurality1 intimates that the plurality introduced into the homogeneous ,self by the different forms--such as of gods1 and so on--assumed by ,prakriti1 is false4 ,and there is also no objection to the teaching that 'the ,rig-veda and so on are breathed forth from that great being 7i4e4 ,prakriti72 for the origination of the world is caused by the soul in its quality as ruler of ,prakriti4--,it thus being ascertained that the whole ,maitrey-brhmana is concerned with the soul in the ,snkhya sense1 we1 according to the principle of the unity of purport of all ,vednta-texts1 conclude that they all treat of the ,snkhya soul only1 and that hence the cause of the world is to be found not in a so-called ,lord but in ,prakriti ruled and guided by the soul4 ,this prim facie view is set aside by the ,stra4 ,the whole text refers to the ,supreme ,lord only2 for on this supposition only a satisfactory connexion of the parts of the text can be made out4 ,on being told by ,yjavalkya that there is no hope of immortality through wealth1 ,maitrey expresses her slight regard for wealth and all such things as do not help to immortality1 and asks to be instructed as to the means of immortality only 7',what should ,i do with that by which ,i do not become immortal8 ,what my lord knows tell that clearly to me'74 ,now the ,self which ,yjavalkya1 responding to her requests1 points out to her as the proper object of knowledge1 can be none other than the highest ,self2 for other scriptural texts clearly teach that the only means of reaching immortality is to know the ,supreme ,person--',having known him thus man passes beyond death'2 ',knowing him thus he becomes immortal here1 there is no other path to go' 7,svet4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #h74 ,the knowledge of the true nature of the individual soul which obtains immortality1 and is a mere manifestation of the power of the ,supreme ,person1 must be held to be useful towards the cognition of the ,supreme ,person who brings about ,release1 but is not in itself instrumental towards such ,release2 the being the knowledge of which the text declares to be the means of immortality is therefore the highest ,self only4 ,again1 the causal power with regard to the entire world which is expressed in the passage1 'from that great ,being there were breathed forth the ,rig veda1' c41 cannot possibly belong to the mere individual soul which in its state of bondage is under the influence of karman and in the state of release has nothing to do with the world2 it can in fact belong to the ,supreme ,person only4 ,again1 what the text says as to everything being known by the knowledge of one thing 7',by the seeing indeed of the ,self1' c47 is possible only in the case of a ,supreme ,self which constitutes the ,self of all4 ,what the ,prvapakshin said as to everything being known through the cognition of the one individual soul1 since all individual souls are of the same type--this also cannot be upheld2 for as long as there is a knowledge of the soul only and not also of the world of non-sentient things1 there is no knowledge of everything4 ,and when the text enumerates different things 7'this ,brahman class1 this ,kshatra class1' c471 and then concludes 'all this is that ,self'--where the 'this' denotes the entire ,universe of animate and inanimate beings as known through ,perception1 ,inference1 and so on--universal unity such as declared here is possible only through a highest ,self which is the ,self of all4 ,it is not1 on the other hand1 possible that what the word 'this' denotes1 i4e4 the whole world of intelligent and non-intelligent creatures1 should be one with the personal soul as long as it remains what it is1 whether connected with or disassociated from non-sentient matter4 ,in the same spirit the passage1 ',all things abandon him who views all things elsewhere than in the ,self1' finds fault with him who views anything apart from the universal ,self4 ,the qualities also which in the earlier ,maitrey-brhmana 7,,ii1 #d1 #ab7 are predicated of the being under discussion1 viz4 greatness1 endlessness1 unlimitedness1 cannot belong to any one else but the highest ,self4 ,that ,self therefore is the topic of the ,brhmana4 ,we further demur to our antagonist's maintaining that the entire ,brhmana treats of the individual soul because that soul is at the outset represented as the object of enquiry1 this being inferred from its connexion with husband1 wife1 wealth1 c4 ,for if the clause 'for the love 7literally1 for the desire7 of the ,self refers to the individual ,self1 we cannot help connecting 7as1 in fact1 we must do in any case7 that ,self with the ,self referred to in the subsequent clause1 'the ,self indeed is to be seen1' c42 the connexion having to be conceived in that way that the information given in the former clause somehow subserves the cognition of the ,self enjoined in the latter clause4 ',for the desire of the ,self would then mean 'for the attainment of the objects desired by the ,self4' ,but if it is first said that husband1 wife1 c41 are dear because they fulfil the wishes of the individual ,self1 it could hardly be said further on that the nature of that ,self must be enquired into2 for what1 in the circumstances of the case1 naturally is to be enquired into and searched for are the dear objects but not the true nature of him to whom those objects are dear1 apart from the objects themselves4 ,it would certainly be somewhat senseless to declare that since husband1 wife1 c41 are dear because they fulfil the desires of the individual soul1 therefore1 setting aside those dear objects1 we must enquire into the true nature of that soul apart from all the objects of its desire4 ,on the contrary1 it having been declared that husband1 wife1 c41 are dear not on account of husband1 wife1 c41 but on account of the ,self1 they should not be dropped1 but included in the further investigation1 just because they subserve the ,self4 ,and should our opponent 7in order to avoid the difficulty of establishing a satisfactory connexion between the different clauses7 maintain that the clause1 'but everything is dear for the love of the ,self1' is not connected with the following clause1 'the ,self is to be seen1' c41 we point out that this would break the whole connexion of the ,brahmna4 ,and if we allowed such a break1 we should then be unable to point out what is the use of the earlier part of the ,brahmna4 ,we must therefore attempt to explain the connexion in such a way as to make it clear why all search for dear objects--husband1 wife1 children1 wealth1 c4--should be abandoned and the ,self only should be searched for4 ,this explanation is as follows4 ,after having stated that wealth1 and so on1 are no means to obtain immortality which consists in permanent absolute bliss1 the text declares that the pleasant experiences which we derive from wealth1 husband1 wife1 c44 and which are not of a permanent nature and always alloyed with a great deal of pain1 are caused not by wealth1 husband1 wife1 c41 themselves1 but rather by the highest ,self whose nature is absolute bliss4 ,he therefore who being himself of the nature of perfect bliss causes other beings and things also to be the abodes of partial bliss1 he--the highest ,self--is to be constituted the object of knowledge4 ,the clauses1 'not for the wish of the husband a husband is dear1' c41 therefore must be understood as follows--a husband1 a wife1 a son1 c41 are not dear to us in consequence of a wish or purpose on their part1 'may ,i1 for my own end or advantage be dear to him1' but they are dear to us for the wish of the ,self1 i4e4 to the end that there may be accomplished the desire of the highest ,self--which desire aims at the devotee obtaining what is dear to him4 ,for the highest ,self pleased with the works of his devotees imparts to different things such dearness1 i4e4 joy-giving quality as corresponds to those works1 that 'dearness' being bound in each case to a definite place1 time1 nature and degree4 ,this is in accordance with the scriptural text1 ',for he alone bestows bliss' 7,taitt4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #g74 ,things are not dear1 or the contrary1 to us by themselves1 but only in so far as the highest ,self makes them such4 ,compare the text1 ',the same thing which erst gave us delight later on becomes the source of grief2 and what was the cause of wrath afterwards tends to peace4 ,hence there is nothing that in itself is of the nature either of pleasure or of pain4' ,but1 another view of the meaning of the text is proposed1 even if the ,self in the clause 'for the desire of the ,self' were accepted as denoting the individual ,self1 yet the clause 'the ,self must be seen' would refer to the highest ,self only4 ,for in that case also the sense would be as follows--because the possession of husband1 wife1 and other so-called dear things is aimed at by a person to whom they are dear1 not with a view of bringing about what is desired by them 7viz4 husband1 wife1 c471 but rather to the end of bringing about what is desired by himself2 therefore that being which is1 to the individual soul1 absolutely and unlimitedly dear1 viz4 the highest ,self1 must be constituted the sole object of cognition1 not such objects as husband1 wife1 wealth1 c41 the nature of which depends on various external circumstances and the possession of which gives rise either to limited pleasure alloyed with pain or to mere pain4--,but against this we remark that as1 in the section under discussion1 the words designating the individual ,self denote the highest ,self also1 ,,footnote #cia3a1 the term ',self' in both clauses1 ',for the desire of the ,self' and ',the ,self is to be seen1' really refers to one and the same being 7viz4 the highest ,self71 and the interpretation thus agrees with the one given above4--,in order to prove the tenet that words denoting the individual soul at the same time denote the highest ,self1 by means of arguments made use of by other teachers also1 the ,strakra sets forth the two following ,stras4 #bj4 7,it is7 a mark indicating that the promissory statement is proved2 thus smarathya thinks4 ,according to the teacher smarathya the circumstance that terms denoting the individual soul are used to denote ,brahman is a mark enabling us to infer that the promissory declaration according to which through the knowledge of one thing everything is known is well established4 ,if the individual soul were not identical with ,brahman in so far as it is the effect of ,brahman1 then the knowledge of the soul--being something distinct from ,brahman--would not follow from the knowledge of the highest ,self4 ,there are the texts declaring the oneness of ,brahman previous to creation1 such as 'the ,self only was this in the beginning' 7,ait4 r4 ,,ii1 #d1 #a1 #a71 and on the other hand those texts which declare that the souls spring from and again are merged in ,brahman2 such as ',as from a blazing fire sparks being like unto fire fly forth a thousandfold1 thus are various beings brought forth from the ,imperishable1 and return thither also' 7,mu4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #a1 #a74 ,these two sets of texts together make us apprehend that the souls are one with ,brahman in so far as they are its effects4 ,on this ground a word denoting the individual soul denotes the highest ,self as well4 ,,footnote #cia3a4 ,if it be insisted upon that the ,self in 'for the desire of the ,self' is the individual ,self1 we point out that terms denoting the individual ,self at the same time denote the highest ,self also4 ,this tenet of his ,rmnuja considers to be set forth and legitimately proved in ,stra #bc1 while ,stras #ba and #bb although advocating the right principle fail to assign valid arguments4 #ba4 ,because 7the soul7 when it will depart is such2 thus ,audulomi thinks4 ,it is wrong to maintain that the designation of ,brahman by means of terms denoting the individual soul is intended to prove the truth of the declaration that through the knowledge of one thing everything is known1 in so far namely as the soul is an effect of ,brahman and hence one with it4 ,for scriptural texts such as 'the knowing ,self is not born1 it dies not' 7,ka4 ,up4 ,i1 #b1 #ah71 declare the soul not to have originated1 and it moreover is admitted that the world is each time created to the end of the souls undergoing experiences retributive of their former deeds2 otherwise the inequalities of the different parts of the creation would be inexplicable4 ,if moreover the soul were a mere effect of ,brahman1 its ,release would consist in a mere return into the substance of ,brahman1-- analogous to the refunding into ,brahman of the material elements1 and that would mean that the injunction and performance of acts leading to such ,release would be purportless4 ,release1 understood in that sense1 moreover would not be anything beneficial to man2 for to be refunded into ,brahman as an earthen vessel is refunded into its own causal substance1 i4e4 clay1 means nothing else but complete annihilation4 ,how1 under these circumstances1 certain texts can speak of the origination and reabsorption of the individual soul will be set forth later on4-- ,according to the opinion of the teacher ,audulomi1 the highest ,selfs being denoted by terms directly denoting the individual soul is due to the soul's becoming ,brahman when departing from the body4 ,this is in agreement with texts such as the following1 ',this serene being having risen from this body and approached the highest light appears in its true form' 7,kh4 ,up4 ,,viii1 #c1 #d72 ',as the flowing rivers disappear in the sea1 losing their name and form1 thus a wise man freed from name and form goes to the divine ,person who is higher than the high' 7,mu4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #b1 #h74 #bb4 ,on account of 7,brahman's7 abiding 7within the individual soul72 thus ,ksakritsna 7holds74 ,we must object likewise to the view set forth in the preceding ,stra1 viz4 that ,brahman is denoted by terms denoting the individual soul because that soul when departing becomes one with ,brahman4 ,for that view cannot stand the test of being submitted to definite alternatives4--,is the soul's not being such1 i4e4 not being ,brahman1 previously to its departure from the body1 due to its own essential nature or to a limiting adjunct1 and is it in the latter case real or unreal8 ,in the first case the soul can never become one with ,brahman1 for if its separation from ,brahman is due to its own essential nature1 that separation can never vanish as long as the essential nature persists4 ,and should it be said that its essential nature comes to an end together with its distinction from ,brahman1 we reply that in that case it perishes utterly and does not therefore become ,brahman4 ,the latter view1 moreover1 precludes itself as in no way beneficial to man1 and so on4-- ,if1 in the next place1 the difference of the soul from ,brahman depends on the presence of real limiting adjuncts1 the soul is ,brahman even before its departure from the body1 and we therefore cannot reasonably accept the distinction implied in saying that the soul becomes ,brahman only when it departs4 ,for on this view there exists nothing but ,brahman and its limiting adjuncts1 and as those adjuncts cannot introduce difference into ,brahman which is without parts and hence incapable of difference1 the difference resides altogether in the adjuncts1 and hence the soul is ,brahman even before its departure from the body4--,if1 on the other hand1 the difference due to the adjuncts is not real1 we ask--what is it then that becomes ,brahman on the departure of the soul8--,brahman itself whose true nature had previously been obscured by ,nescience1 its limiting adjunct6--,not so1 we reply4 ,of ,brahman whose true nature consists in eternal1 free1 self-luminous intelligence1 the true nature cannot possibly be hidden by ,nescience4 ,for by 'hiding' or 'obscuring' we understand the cessation of the light that belongs to the essential nature of a thing4 ,where1 therefore1 light itself and alone constitutes the essential nature of a thing1 there can either be no obscuration at all1 or if there is such it means complete annihilation of the thing4 ,hence ,brahman's essential nature being manifest at all times1 there exists no difference on account of which it could be said to become ,brahman at the time of the soul's departure2 and the distinction introduced in the last ,stra 7'when departing'7 thus has no meaning4 ,the text on which ,audulomi relies1 ',having risen from this body1' c41 does not declare that that which previously was not ,brahman becomes such at the time of departure1 but rather that the true nature of the soul which had previously existed already becomes manifest at the time of departure4 ,this will be explained under ,,iv1 #d1 #a4 ,the theories stated in the two preceding ,stras thus having been found untenable1 the teacher ,ksakritsna states his own view1 to the effect that words denoting the jva are applied to ,brahman because ,brahman abides as its ,self within the individual soul which thus constitutes ,brahman's body4 ,this theory rests on a number of well-known texts1 ',entering into them with this living 7individual7 soul let me evolve names and forms' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #c1 #b72 ',he who dwelling within the ,self1 c41 whose body the ,self is1' c4 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #g1 #bb72 ',he who moves within the ,imperishable1 of whom the ,imperishable is the body1' c2 ',entered within1 the ruler of beings1 the ,self of all4' ,that the term 'jva' denotes not only the jva itself1 but extends in its denotation up to the highest ,self1 we have explained before when discussing the text1 ',let me evolve names and forms4' ,on this view of the identity of the individual and the highest ,self consisting in their being related to each other as body and soul1 we can accept in their full and unmutilated meaning all scriptural texts whatever--whether they proclaim the perfection and omniscience of the highest ,brahman1 or teach how the individual soul steeped in ignorance and misery is to be saved through meditation on ,brahman1 or describe the origination and reabsorption of the world1 or aim at showing how the world is identical with ,brahman4 ,for this reason the author of the ,stras1 rejecting other views1 accepts the theory of ,ksakritsna4 ,returning to the ,maitrey-brhmana we proceed to explain the general sense1 from the passage previously discussed onwards4 ,being questioned by ,maitrey as to the means of immortality1 ,yjavalkya teaches her that this means is given in meditation on the highest ,self 7',the ,self is to be seen1' c474 ,he next indicates in a general way the nature of the object of meditation 7',when the ,self is seen1' c471 and--availing himself of the similes of the drum1 c4--of the government over the organs1 mind1 and so on1 which are instrumental towards meditation4 ,he then explains in detail that the object of meditation1 i4e4 the highest ,brahman1 is the sole cause of the entire world2 and the ruler of the aggregate of organs on which there depends all activity with regard to the objects of the senses 7',as clouds of smoke proceed1' c42 ',as the ocean is the home of all the waters'74 ,he1 next1 in order to stimulate the effort which leads to immortality1 shows how the highest ,self abiding in the form of the individual ,self1 is of one uniform character1 viz4 that of limitless intelligence 7',as a lump of salt1' c471 and how that same ,self characterised by homogeneous limitless intelligence connects itself in the ,samsra state with the products of the elements 7'a mass of knowledge1 it rises from those elements and again vanishes into them'74 ,he then adds1 ',when he has departed1 there is no more knowledge'2 meaning that in the state of ,release1 where the soul's unlimited essential intelligence is not contracted in any way1 there is none of those specific cognitions by which the ,self identifying itself with the body1 the sense-organs1 c41 views itself as a man or a god1 and so on4 ,next--in the passage1 ',for where there is duality as it were'--he1 holding that the view of a plurality of things not having their ,self in ,brahman is due to ignorance1 shows that for him who has freed himself from the shackles of ignorance and recognises this whole world as animated by ,brahman1 the view of plurality is dispelled by the recognition of the absence of any existence apart from ,brahman4 ,he then proceeds1 ',he by whom he knows all this1 by what means should he know ,him8' ,this means--,he1 i4e4 the highest ,self1 which abiding within the individual soul as its true ,self bestows on it the power of knowledge so that the soul knows all this through the highest ,self2 by what means should the soul know ,him8 ,in other words1 there is no such means of knowledge3 the highest ,self cannot be fully understood by the individual soul4 ',that ,self1' he continues1 'is to be expressed as--not so1 not so6' ,that means--,he1 the highest ,lord1 different in nature from everything else1 whether sentient or non-sentient1 abides within all beings as their ,self1 and hence is not touched by the imperfections of what constitutes his body merely4 ,he then concludes1 ',whereby should he know the ,knower8 ,thus1 ,o ,maitrey1 thou hast been instructed4 ,thus far goes ,immortality'2 the purport of these words being--,by what means1 apart from the meditation described1 should man know ,him who is different in nature from all other beings1 who is the sole cause of the entire world1 who is the ,knower of all1 ,him the ,supreme ,person8 ,it is meditation on ,him only which shows the road to ,immortality4 ,it thus appears that the ,maitrey-brhmana is concerned with the highest ,brahman only2 and this confirms the conclusion that ,brahman only1 and with it ,prakriti as ruled by ,brahman1 is the cause of the world4--,here terminates the adhikarana of 'the connexion of sentences4' #bc4 7,brahman is7 the material cause on account of this not being in conflict with the promissory statements and the illustrative instances4 ,the claims raised by the atheistic ,snkhya having thus been disposed of1 the theistic ,snkhya comes forward as an opponent4 ,it must indeed be admitted1 he says1 that the ,vednta-texts teach the cause of the world to be an all-knowing ,lord2 for they attribute to that cause thought and similar characteristics4 ,but at the same time we learn from those same texts that the material cause of the world is none other than the ,pradhna2 with an all-knowing1 unchanging superintending ,lord they connect a ,pradhna1 ruled by him1 which is non-intelligent and undergoes changes1 and the two together only they represent as the cause of the world4 ,this view is conveyed by the following texts1 'who is without parts1 without actions1 tranquil1 without fault1 without taint' 7,svet4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #ah72 ',this great unborn ,self1 undecaying1 undying' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #d1 #be72 ',he knows her who produces all effects1 the non-knowing one1 the unborn one1 wearing eight forms1 the firm one4 ,ruled by him she is spread out1 and incited and guided by him gives birth to the world for the benefit of the souls4 ,a cow she is without beginning and end1 a mother producing all beings' 7see above1 p4 #cfc74 ,that the ,lord creates this world in so far only as guiding ,prakriti1 the material cause1 we learn from the following text1 ',from that the ,lord of ,mya creates all this4 ,know ,mya to be ,prakriti and the ,lord of ,mya the great ,lord' 7,svet4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #i1 #aj74 ,and similarly ,smriti1 'with me as supervisor ,prakriti brings forth the ,universe of the movable and the immovable' 7,bha4 ,g4 ,,ix1 #aj74 ,although1 therefore1 the ,pradhna is not expressly stated by ,scripture to be the material cause1 we must assume that there is such a ,pradhna and that1 superintended by the ,lord1 it constitutes the material cause1 because otherwise the texts declaring ,brahman to be the cause of the world would not be fully intelligible4 ,for ordinary experience shows us on all sides that the operative cause and the material cause are quite distinct3 we invariably have on the one side clay1 gold1 and other material substances which form the material causes of pots1 ornaments1 and so on1 and on the other hand1 distinct from them1 potters1 goldsmiths1 and so on1 who act as operative causes4 ,and we further observe that the production of effects invariably requires several instrumental agencies4 ,the ,vednta-texts therefore cannot possess the strength to convince us1 in open defiance of the two invariable rules1 that the one ,brahman is at the same time the material and the operative cause of the world2 and hence we maintain that ,brahman is only the operative but not the material cause1 while the material cause is the ,pradhna guided by ,brahman4 ,this prim facie view the ,stra combats4 ,prakriti1 i4e4 the material cause1 not only the operative cause1 is ,brahman only2 this view being in harmony with the promissory declaration and the illustrative instances4 ,the promissory declaration is the one referring to the knowledge of all things through the knowledge of one1 ',did you ever ask for that instruction by which that which is not heard becomes heard8' c4 7,ch1 ,up4 ,,vi1 #a1 #c74 ,and the illustrative instances are those which set forth the knowledge of the effect as resulting from the knowledge of the cause1 ',as by one lump of clay there is made known all that is made of clay2 as by one nugget of gold1 c42 as by one instrument for paring the nails1' c4 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #a1 #d74 ,if ,brahman were merely the operative cause of the world1 the knowledge of the entire world would not result from the knowledge of ,brahman2 not any more than we know the pot when we know the potter4 ,and thus scriptural declaration and illustrative instances would be stultified4 ,but if ,brahman is the general material cause1 then the knowledge of ,brahman implies the knowledge of its effect1 i4e4 the world1 in the same way as the knowledge of such special material causes as a lump of clay1 a nugget of gold1 an instrument for paring the nails1 implies the knowledge of all things made of clay1 gold or iron--such as pots1 bracelets1 diadems1 hatchets1 and so on4 ,for an effect is not a substance different from its cause1 but the cause itself which has passed into a different state4 ,the initial declaration thus being confirmed by the instances of clay and its products1 c41 which stand in the relation of cause and effect1 we conclude that ,brahman only is the material cause of the world4 ,that ,scripture teaches the operative and the material causes to be separate1 is not true2 it rather teaches the unity of the two4 ,for in the text1 ',have you asked for that desa 7above1 and generally1 understood to mean instruction71 by which that which is not heard becomes heard8' the word 'desa' has to be taken to mean ruler1 in agreement with the text1 'by the command--or rule--of that ,imperishable sun and moon stand apart' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #h1 #i71 so that the passage means1 ',have you asked for that ,ruler by whom1 when heard and known1 even that which is not heard and known1 becomes heard and known8' ,this clearly shows the unity of the operative 7ruling or supervising7 cause and the material cause2 taken in conjunction with the subsequent declaration of the unity of the cause previous to creation1 ',being only1 this was in the beginning1 one only1' and the denial of a further operative cause implied in the further qualification 'advityam1' i4e4 'without a second4'--,but how then have we to understand texts such as the one quoted above 7from the ,klika-,upanishad7 which declare ,prakriti to be eternal and the material cause of the world8--,prakriti1 we reply1 in such passages denotes ,brahman in its causal phase when names and forms are not yet distinguished4 ,for a principle independent of ,brahman does not exist1 as we know from texts such as ',everything abandons him who views anything as apart from the ,self2 and ',but where for him the ,self has become all1 whereby should he see whom8' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #d1 #f2 #ae74 ,consider also the texts1 ',all this is ,brahman' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #ad1 #a72 and ',all this has its ,self in that' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #h1 #g72 which declare that the world whether in its causal or its effected condition has ,brahman for its ,self4 ,the relation of the world to ,brahman has to be conceived in agreement with scriptural texts such as ',he who moves within the earth1' c41 up to ',he who moves within the ,imperishable'2 and ',he who dwells within the earth1' c41 up to ',he who dwells within the ,self 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #g1 #c-bc74 ,the highest ,brahman1 having the whole aggregate of non-sentient and sentient beings for its body1 ever is the ,self of all4 ,sometimes1 however1 names and forms are not evolved1 not distinguished in ,brahman2 at other times they are evolved1 distinct4 ,in the latter state ,brahman is called an effect and manifold2 in the former it is called one1 without a second1 the cause4 ,this causal state of ,brahman is meant where the text quoted above speaks of the cow without beginning and end1 giving birth to effects1 and so on4--,but1 the text1 ',the great one is merged in the ,unevolved1 the ,unevolved is merged in the ,imperishable1' intimates that the ,unevolved originates and again passes away2 and similarly the ,mahbhrata says1 'from that there sprung the ,non-evolved comprising the three gunas2 the ,non-evolved is merged in the indivisible ,person4'--,these texts1 we reply1 present no real difficulty4 ,for ,brahman having non-sentient matter for its body1 that state which consists of the three gunas and is denoted by the term ',unevolved' is something effected4 ,and the text1 ',when there was darkness1 neither day nor night1' states that also in a total pralaya non-sentient matter having ,brahman for its ,self continues to exist in a highly subtle condition4 ,this highly subtle matter stands to ,brahman the cause of the world in the relation of a mode 7prakra71 and it is ,brahman viewed as having such a mode that the text from the ,kl4 ,upanishad refers to4 ,for this reason also the text1 'the ,imperishable is merged in darkness1 darkness becomes one with the highest ,god1' declares not that darkness is completely merged and lost in the ,divinity but only that it becomes one with it2 what the text wants to intimate is that state of ,brahman in which1 having for its mode extremely subtle matter here called ',darkness1' it abides without evolving names and forms4 ,the mantra1 ',there was darkness1 hidden in darkness1' c4 7,ri4 ,samh4 ,x1 #abi1 #c71 sets forth the same view2 and so does ,manu 7,i1 #e71 ',this universe existed in the shape of ,darkness1 unperceived1 destitute of distinctive marks1 unattainable by reasoning1 unknowable1 wholly immersed as it were in deep sleep4' ,and1 as to the text1 'from that the ,lord of ,mya creates everything1' we shall prove later on the unchangeableness of ,brahman1 and explain the scriptural texts asserting it4 ,as to the contention raised by the ,prvapakshin that on the basis of invariable experience it must be held that one and the same principle cannot be both material and operative cause1 and that effects cannot be brought about by one agency1 and that hence the ,vednta-texts can no more establish the view of ,brahman being the sole cause than the command 'sprinkle with fire' will convince us that fire may perform the office of water2 we simply remark that the highest ,brahman which totally differs in nature from all other beings1 which is omnipotent and omniscient1 can by itself accomplish everything4 ,the invariable rule of experience holds good1 on the other hand1 with regard to clay and similar materials which are destitute of intelligence and hence incapable of guiding and supervising2 and with regard to potters and similar agents who do not possess the power of transforming themselves into manifold products1 and cannot directly realise their intentions4-- ,the conclusion therefore remains that ,brahman alone is the material as well as the operative cause of the ,universe4 #bd4 ,and on account of the statement of reflection4 ,brahman must be held to be both causes for that reason also that texts such as ',he desired1 may ,i be many1 may ,i grow forth1' and ',it thought1 may ,i be many1 may ,i grow forth1' declare that the creative ,brahman forms the purpose of its own ,self multiplying itself4 ,the text clearly teaches that creation on ,brahman's part is preceded by the purpose ',may ,i1 and no other than ,i1 become manifold in the shape of various non- sentient and sentient beings4' #be4 ,and on account of both being directly declared4 ,the conclusion arrived at above is based not only on scriptural declaration1 illustrative instances and statements of reflection2 but in addition ,scripture directly states that ,brahman alone is the material as well as operative cause of the world4 ',what was the wood1 what the tree from which they have shaped heaven and earth8 ,you wise ones1 search in your minds1 whereon it stood1 supporting the worlds4--,brahman was the wood1 ,brahman the tree from which they shaped heaven and earth2 you wise ones1 ,i tell you1 it stood on ,brahman1 supporting the worlds4'--,here a question is asked1 suggested by the ordinary worldly view1 as to what was the material and instruments used by ,brahman when creating2 and the answer--based on the insight that there is nothing unreasonable in ascribing all possible powers to ,brahman which differs from all other beings--declares that ,brahman itself is the material and the instruments2-- whereby the ordinary view is disposed of4--,the next ,stra supplies a further reason4 #bf4 ,on account of 7the ,self7 making itself4 ,of ,brahman which the text had introduced as intent on creation1 ',he wished1 may ,i be many' 7,taitt4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #f71 a subsequent text says1 ',that itself made its ,self 7,,ii1 #g71 so that ,brahman is represented as the object as well as the agent in the act of creation4 ,it being the ,self only which here is made many1 we understand that the ,self is material cause as well as operative one4 ,the ,self with names and forms non- evolved is agent 7cause71 the same ,self with names and forms evolved is object 7effect74 ,there is thus nothing contrary to reason in one ,self being object as well as agent4 ,a new doubt here presents itself4--',the ,true1 knowledge1 infinite is ,brahman' 7,taitt4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #a72 ',bliss is ,brahman' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #i1 #bh72 ',free from sin1 free from old age1 free from death and grief1 free from hunger and thirst' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,viii1 #a1e72 ',without parts1 without action1 tranquil1 without fault1 without taint' 7,svet4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #ai72 ',this great unborn ,self1 undecaying1 undying' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #d1 #be7--;from all these texts it appears that ,brahman is essentially free from even a shadow of all the imperfections which afflict all sentient and non-sentient beings1 and has for its only characteristics absolutely supreme bliss and knowledge4 ,how then is it possible that this ,brahman should form the purpose of becoming1 and actually become1 manifold1 by appearing in the form of a world comprising various sentient and non-sentient beings--all of which are the abodes of all kinds of imperfections and afflictions8 ,to this question the next ,stra replies4 #bg4 ,owing to modification4 ,this means--owing to the essential nature of modification 7parinma74 ,the modification taught in our system is not such as to introduce imperfections into the highest ,brahman1 on the contrary it confers on it limitless glory4 ,for our teaching as to ,brahman's modification is as follows4 ,brahman--essentially antagonistic to all evil1 of uniform goodness1 differing in nature from all beings other than itself1 all- knowing1 endowed with the power of immediately realising all its purposes1 in eternal possession of all it wishes for1 supremely blessed-- has for its body the entire universe1 with all its sentient and non- sentient beings--the universe being for it a plaything as it were--and constitutes the ,self of the ,universe4 ,now1 when this world which forms ,brahman's body has been gradually reabsorbed into ,brahman1 each constituent element being refunded into its immediate cause1 so that in the end there remains only the highly subtle1 elementary matter which ,scripture calls ,darkness2 and when this so-called ,darkness itself1 by assuming a form so extremely subtle that it hardly deserves to be called something separate from ,brahman1 of which it constitutes the body1 has become one with ,brahman2 then ,brahman invested with this ultra-subtle body forms the resolve ',may ,i again possess a world-body constituted by all sentient and non-sentient beings1 distinguished by names and forms just as in the previous aeon1' and modifies 7parinmayati7 itself by gradually evolving the world-body in the inverse order in which reabsorption had taken place4 ,all ,vednta-texts teach such modification or change on ,brahman's part4 ,there is1 e4g41 the text in the ,brihad-ranyaka which declares that the whole world constitutes the body of ,brahman and that ,brahman is its ,self4 ,that text teaches that earth1 water1 fire1 sky1 air1 heaven1 sun1 the regions1 moon and stars1 ether1 darkness1 light1 all beings1 breath1 speech1 eye1 ear1 mind1 skin1 knowledge form the body of ,brahman which abides within them as their ,self and ,ruler4 ,thus in the ,knva-text2 the ,mdhyandina-text reads 'the ,self' instead of 'knowledge'2 and adds the worlds1 sacrifices and vedas4 ,the parallel passage in the ,subla- ,upanishad adds to the beings enumerated as constituting ,brahman's body in the ,brihad-ranyaka1 buddhi1 ahamkra1 the mind 7kitta71 the ,un- evolved 7avyakta71 the ,imperishable 7akshara71 and concludes ',he who moves within death1 of whom death is the body1 whom death does not know1 he is the inner ,self of all1 free from all evil1 divine1 the one god ,nryana4 ,the term ',death' here denotes matter in its extremely subtle form1 which in other texts is called ,darkness2 as we infer from the order of enumeration in another passage in the same ,upanishad1 'the ,unevolved is merged in the ,imperishable1 the ,imperishable in ,darkness4' ,that this ,darkness is called ',death' is due to the fact that it obscures the understanding of all souls and thus is harmful to them4 ,the full text in the ,subla-,up4 declaring the successive absorption of all the beings forming ,brahman's body is as follows1 ',the earth is merged in water1 water in fire1 fire in air1 air in the ether1 the ether in the sense-organs1 the sense-organs in the tanmtras1 the tanmtras in the gross elements1 the gross elements in the great principle1 the great principle in the ,unevolved1 the ,unevolved in the ,imperishable2 the ,imperishable is merged in ,darkness2 ,darkness becomes one with the highest ,divinity4' ,that even in the state of non-separation 7to which the texts refer as 'becoming one'7 non-sentient matter as well as sentient beings1 together with the impressions of their former deeds1 persists in an extremely subtle form1 will be shown under ,,ii1 #a1 #ce4 ,we have thus a ,brahman all-knowing1 of the nature of supreme bliss and so on1 one and without a second1 having for its body all sentient and non- sentient beings abiding in an extremely subtle condition and having become 'one' with the ,supreme ,self in so far as they cannot be designated as something separate from him2 and of this ,brahman ,scripture records that it forms the resolve of becoming many--in so far1 namely1 as investing itself with a body consisting of all sentient and non- sentient beings in their gross1 manifest state which admits of distinctions of name and form--and thereupon modifies 7parinma7 itself into the form of the world4 ,this is distinctly indicated in the ,taittirya-,upanishad1 where ,brahman is at first described as ',the ,true1 knowledge1 infinite1' as 'the ,self of bliss which is different from the ,self of ,understanding1' as 'he who bestows bliss'2 and where the text further on says1 ',he desired1 may ,i be many1 may ,i grow forth4 ,he brooded over himself1 and having thus brooded he sent forth all whatever there is4 ,having sent forth he entered it4 ,having entered it he became sat and tyat1 defined and undefined1 supported and non-supported1 knowledge and non-knowledge1 real and unreal4' ,the 'brooding' referred to in this text denotes knowing1 viz4 reflection on the shape and character of the previous world which ,brahman is about to reproduce4 ,compare the text 'whose brooding consists of knowledge' 7,mu4 ,up4 ,i1 #a1 #i74 ,the meaning therefore is that ,brahman1 having an inward intuition of the characteristics of the former world1 creates the new world on the same pattern4 ,that ,brahman in all kalpas again and again creates the same world is generally known from ,sruti and ,smriti4 ,cp4 ',as the creator formerly made sun and moon1 and sky and earth1 and the atmosphere and the heavenly world1' and 'whatever various signs of the seasons are seen in succession1 the same appear again and again in successive yugas and kalpas4' ,the sense of the ,taittirya-text therefore is as follows4 ,the highest ,self1 which in itself is of the nature of unlimited knowledge and bliss1 has for its body all sentient and non-sentient beings--instruments of sport for him as it were--in so subtle a form that they may be called non-existing2 and as they are his body he may be said to consist of them 7tan-maya74 ,then desirous of providing himself with an infinity of playthings of all kinds he1 by a series of steps beginning with ,prakriti and the aggregate of souls and leading down to the elements in their gross state1 so modifies himself as to have those elements for his body-- when he is said to consist of them--and thus appears in the form of our world containing what the text denotes as sat and tyat1 i4e4 all intelligent and non-intelligent things1 from gods down to plants and stones4 ,when the text says that the ,self having entered into it became sat and tyat1 the meaning is that the highest ,self1 which in its causal state had been the universal ,self1 abides1 in its effected state also1 as the ,self of the different substances undergoing changes and thus becomes this and that4 ,while the highest ,self thus undergoes a change-- in the form of a world comprising the whole aggregate of sentient and non-sentient beings--all imperfection and suffering are limited to the sentient beings constituting part of its body1 and all change is restricted to the non-sentient things which constitute another part4 ,the highest ,self is effected in that sense only that it is the ruling principle1 and hence the ,self1 of matter and souls in their gross or evolved state2 but just on account of being this1 viz4 their inner ,ruler and ,self1 it is in no way touched by their imperfections and changes4 ,consisting of unlimited knowledge and bliss he for ever abides in his uniform nature1 engaged in the sport of making this world go round4 ,this is the purport of the clause 'it became the real and the unreal'3 although undergoing a change into the multiplicity of actual sentient and non-sentient things1 ,brahman at the same time was the ,real1 i4e4 that which is free from all shadow of imperfection1 consisting of nothing but pure knowledge and bliss4 ,that all beings1 sentient and non- sentient1 and whether in their non-evolved or evolved states1 are mere playthings of ,brahman1 and that the creation and reabsorption of the world are only his sport1 this has been expressly declared by ,dvaipyana1 ,parsara and other ,rishis1',know that all transitory beings1 from the ,unevolved down to individual things1 are a mere play of ,hari'2 ',view his action like that of a playful child1' c4 ,the ,strakra will distinctly enounce the same view in ,,ii1 #a1 #cc4 ,with a similar view the text 'from that the ,lord of ,mya sends forth all this2 and in that the other is bound by ,my' 7,svet4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #i71 refers to ,prakriti and soul1 which together constitute the body of ,brahman1 as things different from ,brahman1 although then1 i4e4 at the time of a pralaya1 they are one with ,brahman in so far as their extreme subtlety does not admit of their being conceived as separate2 this it does to the end of suggesting that even when ,brahman undergoes the change into the shape of this world1 all changes exclusively belong to non-sentient matter which is a mode of ,brahman1 and all imperfections and sufferings to the individual souls which also are modes of ,brahman4 ,the text has to be viewed as agreeing in meaning with 'that ,self made itself4' ,of a similar purport is the account given in ,manu1 ',he being desirous to send forth from his body beings of many kinds1 first with a thought created the waters and placed his seed in them' 7,i1 #h74 ,it is in this way that room is found for those texts also which proclaim ,brahman to be free from all imperfection and all change4 ,it thus remains a settled conclusion that ,brahman by itself constitutes the material as well as the operative cause of the world4 #bh4 ,and because it is called the womb4 ,brahman is the material as well as the operative cause of the world for that reason also that certain texts call it the womb1 'the maker1 the ,lord1 the ,person1 ,brahman1 the womb' 7,mu4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #a1 #c72 'that which the wise regard as the womb of all beings' 7,i1 #a1 #f74 ,and that 'womb' means as much as material cause1 appears from the complementary passage ',as a spider sends forth and draws in its threads' 7,i1 #a1 #g7-- #bi4 ,herewith all 7texts7 are explained1 explained4 ,hereby1 i4e4 by the whole array of arguments set forth in the four pdas of the first adhyya2 all those particular passages of the ,vednta-texts which give instruction as to the cause of the world1 are explained as meaning to set forth a ,brahman all-wise1 all-powerful1 different in nature from all beings intelligent and non-intelligent4 ,the repetition of the word 'explained' is meant to indicate the termination of the adhyya4 ,,second ,,adhy,,ya ,,first ,p,,da4 #a4 ,if it be said that there would result the fault of there being no room for 7certain7 ,smritis3 7we reply7 'no1' because there would result the fault of want of room for other ,smritis4 ,the first adhyya has established the truth that what the ,vednta-texts teach is a ,supreme ,brahman1 which is something different as well from non-sentient matter known through the ordinary means of proof1 viz4 ,perception and so on1 as from the intelligent souls whether connected with or separated from matter2 which is free from even a shadow of imperfection of any kind2 which is an ocean as it were of auspicious qualities and so on2 which is the sole cause of the entire ,universe2 which constitutes the inner ,self of all things4 ,the second adhyya is now begun for the purpose of proving that the view thus set forth cannot be impugned by whatever arguments may possibly be brought forward4 ,the ,strakra at first turns against those who maintain that the ,vedanta- texts do not establish the view indicated above1 on the ground of that view being contradicted by the ,smriti of ,kapila1 i4 e4 the ,snkhya- system4 ,but how can it be maintained at all that ,scripture does not set forth a certain view because thereby it would enter into conflict with ,smriti8 ,for that ,smriti if contradicted by ,scripture is to be held of no account1 is already settled in the ,prva ,mmms 7',but where there is contradiction ,smriti is not to be regarded1' ,i1 #c1 #c74--,where1 we reply1 a matter can be definitely settled on the basis of ,scripture--as e4g4 in the case of the ,vedic injunction1 'he is to sing1 after having touched the ,udumbara branch' 7which clearly contradicts the ,smriti injunction that the whole branch is to be covered up7--,smriti indeed need not be regarded4 ,but the topic with which the ,vednta-texts are concerned is hard to understand1 and hence1 when a conflict arises between those texts and a ,smriti propounded by some great ,rishi1 the matter does not admit of immediate decisive settlement3 it is not therefore unreasonable to undertake to prove by ,smriti that ,scripture does not set forth a certain doctrine4 ,that is to say--we possess a ,smriti composed with a view to teach men the nature and means of supreme happiness1 by the great ,rishi ,kapila to whom ,scripture1 ,smriti1 ,itihsa and ,purna alike refer as a person worthy of all respect 7compare e4 g4 'the ,rishi ,kapila1' ,svet4 ,up4 ,v1 #b71 and who moreover 7unlike ,brihaspati and other ,smriti-- writers7 fully acknowledges the validity of all the means of earthly happiness which are set forth in the karmaknda of the ,veda1 such as the daily oblations to the sacred fires1 the ,new and ,full ,moon offerings and the great ,soma sacrifices4 ,now1 as men having only an imperfect knowledge of the ,veda1 and moreover naturally slow-minded1 can hardly ascertain the sense of the ,vednta-texts without the assistance of such a ,smriti1 and as to be satisfied with that sense of the ,vednta which discloses itself on a mere superficial study of the text would imply the admission that the whole ,snkhya ,smriti1 although composed by an able and trustworthy person1 really is useless2 we see ourselves driven to acknowledge that the doctrine of the ,vednta-texts cannot differ from the one established by the ,snkhyas4 ,nor must you object that to do so would force on us another unacceptable conclusion1 viz4 that those ,smritis1 that of ,manu e4g41 which maintain ,brahman to be the universal cause1 are destitute of authority2 for ,manu and similar works inculcate practical religious duty and thus have at any rate the uncontested function of supporting the teaching of the karmaknda of the ,veda4 ,the ,snkhya ,smriti1 on the other hand1 is entirely devoted to the setting forth of theoretical truth 7not of practical duty71 and if it is not accepted in that quality1 it is of no use whatsoever4--,on this ground the ,stra sets forth the prim facie view1 ',if it be said that there results the fault of there being no room for certain ,smritis4' ,the same ,stra replies 'no2 because there would result the fault of want of room for other ,smritis4' ,for other ,smritis1 that of ,manu e4g41 teach that ,brahman is the universal cause4 ,thus ,manu says1 ',this 7world7 existed in the shape of darkness1 and so on4 ,then the divine ,self existent1 indiscernible but making discernible all this1 the great elements and the rest1 appeared with irresistible power1 dispelling the darkness4 ,he1 desiring to produce beings of many kinds from his own body1 first with a thought created the waters1 and placed his seed in them' 7,manu ,i1 #e-h74 ,and the ,bhagavad-git1 ',i am the origin and the dissolution of the whole ,universe' 7,,vii1 #f74 ',i am the origin of all2 everything proceeds from me' 7,x1 #h74 ,similarly1 in the ,mahbhrata1 to the question ',whence was created this whole world with its movable and immovable beings8' the answer is given1 ',nryana assumes the form of the world1 he the infinite1 eternal one'2 and 'from him there originates the ,unevolved consisting of the three gunas'2 and 'the ,unevolved is merged in the non-acting ,person4' ,and ,parsara says1 ',from ,vishnu there sprang the world and in him it abides2 he makes this world persist and he rules it--he is the world4' ,thus also pastamba1 ',the living beings are the dwelling of him who lies in all caves1 who is not killed1 who is spotless'2 and ',from him spring all bodies2 he is the primary cause1 he is eternal1 permanent4' 7,dharmas4 ,i1 #h1 #bb1 #d2 #bc1 #b74--;,if the question as to the meaning of the ,vednta-texts were to be settled by means of ,kapila's ,smriti1 we should have to accept the extremely undesirable conclusion that all the ,smritis quoted are of no authority4 ,it is true that the ,vednta-texts are concerned with theoretical truth lying outside the sphere of ,perception and the other means of knowledge1 and that hence students possessing only a limited knowledge of the ,veda require some help in order fully to make out the meaning of the ,vednta4 ,but what must be avoided in this case is to give any opening for the conclusion that the very numerous ,smritis which closely follow the doctrine of the ,vednta1 are composed by the most competent and trustworthy persons and aim at supporting that doctrine1 are irrelevant2 and it is for this reason that ,kapila's ,smriti which contains a doctrine opposed to ,scripture must be disregarded4 ,the support required is elucidation of the sense conveyed by ,scripture1 and this clearly cannot be effected by means of a ,smriti contradicting ,scripture4 ,nor is it of any avail to plead1 as the ,prvapakshin does1 that ,manu and other ,smritis of the same kind fulfil in any case the function of elucidating the acts of religious duty enjoined in the karmaknda4 ,for if they enjoin acts of religious duty as means to win the favour of the ,supreme ,person but do not impress upon us the idea of that ,supreme ,person himself who is to be pleased by those acts1 they are also not capable of impressing upon us the idea of those acts themselves4 ,that it is the character of all religious acts to win the favour of the ,supreme ,spirit1 ,smriti distinctly declares1 ',man attains to perfection by worshipping with his proper action ,him from whom all ,beings proceed2 and by whom all this is stretched out' 7,bha4 ,g4 ,,xviii1 #df72 ',let a man meditate on ,nryana1 the divine one1 at all works1 such as bathing and the like2 he will then reach the world of ,brahman and not return hither' 7,daksha- smriti72 and ',those men with whom1 intent on their duties1 thou art pleased1 ,o ,lord1 they pass beyond all this ,mya and find ,release for their souls' 7,vi4 ,pu474 ,nor can it be said that ,manu and similar ,smritis have a function in so far as setting forth works 7not aiming at final ,release but7 bringing about certain results included in transmigratory existence1 whether here on earth or in a heavenly world2 for the essential character of those works also is to please the highest ,person4 ,as is said in the ,bhagavad-gt 7,,ix1 #bc1 #bd72 ',even they who devoted to other gods worship them with faith1 worship me1 against ordinance4 ,for ,i am the enjoyer and the ,lord of all sacrifices2 but they know me not in truth and hence they fall1' and ',thou art ever worshipped by me with sacrifices2 thou alone1 bearing the form of pitris and of gods1 enjoyest all the offerings made to either4' ,nor finally can we admit the contention that it is rational to interpret the ,vednta-texts in accordance with ,kapila's ,smriti because ,kapila1 in the ,svetsvatara text1 is referred to as a competent person4 ,for from this it would follow that1 as ,brihaspati is1 in ,sruti and ,smriti1 mentioned as a pattern of consummate wisdom1 ,scripture should be interpreted in agreement with the openly materialistic and atheistic ,smriti composed by that authority4 ,but1 it may here be said1 the ,vednta-texts should after all be interpreted in agreement with ,kapila's ,smriti1 for the reason that ,kapila had through the power of his concentrated meditation 7yoga7 arrived at an insight into truth4--,to this objection the next ,stra replies4 #b4 ,and on account of the non-perception 7of truth on the part7 of others4 ,the 'and' in the ,stra has the force of 'but1' being meant to dispel the doubt raised4 ,there are many other authors of ,smritis1 such as ,manu1 who through the power of their meditation had attained insight into the highest truth1 and of whom it is known from ,scripture that the purport of their teaching was a salutary medicine to the whole world 7'whatever ,manu said that was medicine'74 ,now1 as these ,rishis did not see truth in the way of ,kapila1 we conclude that ,kapila's view1 which contradicts ,scripture1 is founded on error1 and cannot therefore be used to modify the sense of the ,vednta-texts4--,here finishes the adhikarana treating of ',smriti4' #c4 ,hereby the ,yoga is refuted4 ,by the above refutation of ,kapila's ,smriti the ,yoga-smriti also is refuted4--,but a question arises1 ,what further doubt arises here with regard to the ,yoga system1 so as to render needful the formal extension to the ,yoga of the arguments previously set forth against the ,snkhya8-- ,it might appear1 we reply1 that the ,vednta should be supported by the ,yoga-smriti1 firstly1 because the latter admits the existence of a ,lord2 secondly1 because the ,vednta-texts mention ,yoga as a means to bring about final ,release2 and thirdly1 because ,hiranyagarbha1 who proclaimed the ,yoga-smriti is qualified for the promulgation of all ,vednta-texts4-- ,but these arguments refute themselves as follows4 ,in the first place the ,yoga holds the ,pradhna1 which is independent of ,brahman1 to be the general material cause1 and hence the ,lord acknowledged by it is a mere operative cause4 ,in the second place the nature of meditation1 in which ,yoga consists1 is determined by the nature of the object of meditation1 and as of its two objects1 viz4 the soul and the ,lord1 the former does not have its ,self in ,brahman1 and the latter is neither the cause of the world nor endowed with the other auspicious qualities 7which belong to ,brahman71 the ,yoga is not of ,vedic character4 ,and as to the third point1 ,hiranyagarbha himself is only an individual soul1 and hence liable to be overpowered by the inferior gunas1 i4e4 passion and darkness2 and hence the ,yoga-smriti is founded on error1 no less than the ,purnas1 promulgated by him1 which are founded on rajas and tamas4 ,the ,yoga cannot1 therefore1 be used for the support of the ,vednta4--,here finishes the adhikarana of 'the refutation of the ,yoga4' #d4 ,not1 on account of the difference of character of that2 and its being such 7appears7 from ,scripture4 ,the same opponent who laid stress on the conflict between ,scripture and ,smriti now again comes forward1 relying this time 7not on ,smriti but7 on simple reasoning4 ,your doctrine1 he says1 as to the world being an effect of ,brahman which you attempted to prove by a refutation of the ,snkhya ,smriti shows itself to be irrational for the following reason4 ,perception and the other means of knowledge show this world with all its sentient and non-sentient beings to be of a non-intelligent and impure nature1 to possess none of the qualities of the ,lord1 and to have pain for its very essence2 and such a world totally differs in nature from the ,brahman1 postulated by you1 which is said to be all-knowing1 of supreme lordly power1 antagonistic to all evil1 enjoying unbroken uniform blessedness4 ,this difference in character of the world from ,brahman is1 moreover1 not only known through ,perception1 and so on1 but is seen to be directly stated in ,scripture itself2 compare ',knowledge and non-knowledge' 7,taitt4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #f1 #a72 ',thus are these objects placed on the subjects1 and the subjects on the prna' 7,kau4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #i72 ',on the same tree man sits grieving1 immersed1 bewildered by his own impotence' 7,svet4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #g72 ',the soul not being a ,lord is bound because he has to enjoy' 7,svet4 ,up4 ,i1 #h72 and so on2 all which texts refer to the effect1 i4e4 the world as being non-intelligent1 of the essence of pain1 and so on4 ,the general rule is that an effect is non- different in character from its cause2 as e4g4 pots and bracelets are non-different in character from their material causes--clay and gold4 ,the world cannot1 therefore1 be the effect of ,brahman from which it differs in character1 and we hence conclude that1 in agreement with the ,snkhya ,smriti1 the ,pradhna which resembles the actual world in character must be assumed to be the general cause4 ,scripture1 although not dependent on anything else and concerned with super-sensuous objects1 must all the same come to terms with ratiocination 7tarka72 for all the different means of knowledge can in many cases help us to arrive at a decisive conclusion1 only if they are supported by ratiocination4 ,for by tarka we understand that kind of knowledge 7intellectual activity7 which in the case of any given matter1 by means of an investigation either into the essential nature of that matter or into collateral 7auxiliary7 factors1 determines what possesses proving power1 and what are the special details of the matter under consideration3 this kind of cognitional activity is also called ha4 ,all means of knowledge equally stand in need of tarka2 ,scripture however1 the authoritative character of which specially depends on expectancy 7knksh71 proximity 7sannidhi71 and compatibility 7yogyat71 throughout requires to be assisted by tarka4 ,in accordance with this ,manu says1',he who investigates by means of reasoning1 he only knows religious duty1 and none other4' ,it is with a view to such confirmation of the sense of ,scripture by means of ,reasoning that the texts declare that certain topics such as the ,self must be 'reflected on' 7mantavya74--,now here it might possibly be said that as ,brahman is ascertained from ,scripture to be the sole cause of the world1 it must be admitted that intelligence exists in the world also1 which is an effect of ,brahman4 ,in the same way as the consciousness of an intelligent being is not perceived when it is in the states of deep sleep1 swoon1 c41 so the intelligent nature of jars and the like also is not observed1 although it really exists2 and it is this very difference of manifestation and non-manifestation of intelligence on which the distinction of intelligent and non-intelligent beings depends4--,but to this we reply that permanent non-perception of intelligence proves its non-existence4 ,this consideration also refutes the hypothesis of things commonly called non-intelligent possessing the power1 or potentiality1 of consciousness4 ,for if you maintain that a thing possesses the power of producing an effect while yet that effect is never and nowhere seen to be produced by it1 you may as well proclaim at a meeting of sons of barren women that their mothers possess eminent procreative power6 ,moreover1 to prove at first from the ,vednta- texts that ,brahman is the material cause of the world1 and from this that pots and the like possess potential consciousness1 and therefrom the existence of non-manifested consciousness2 and then1 on the other hand1 to start from the last principle as proved and to deduce therefrom that the ,vednta-texts prove ,brahman to be the material cause of the world1 is simply to argue in a circle2 for that the relation of cause and effect should exist between things different in character is just what cannot be proved4--,what sameness of character1 again1 of causal substance and effects1 have you in mind when you maintain that from the absence of such sameness it follows that ,brahman cannot be proved to be the material cause of the world8 ,it cannot be complete sameness of all attributes1 because in that case the relation of cause and effect 7which after all requires some difference7 could not be established4 ,for we do not observe that in pots and jars which are fashioned out of a lump of clay there persists the quality of 'being a lump' which belongs to the causal substance4 ,and should you say that it suffices that there should be equality in some or any attribute1 we point out that such is actually the case with regard to ,brahman and the world1 both of which have the attribute of 'existence' and others4 ,the true state of the case rather is as follows4 ,there is equality of nature between an effect and a cause1 in that sense that those essential characteristics by which the causal substance distinguishes itself from other things persist in its effects also3 those characteristic features1 e4g41 which distinguish gold from clay and other materials1 persist also in things made of gold- bracelets and the like4 ,but applying this consideration to ,brahman and the world we find that ,brahman's essential nature is to be antagonistic to all evil1 and to consist of knowledge1 bliss and power1 while the world's essential nature is to be the opposite of all this4 ,brahman cannot1 therefore1 be the material cause of the world4 ,but1 it may be objected1 we observe that even things of different essential characteristics stand to each other in the relation of cause and effect4 ,from man1 e4g41 who is a sentient being1 there spring nails1 teeth1 and hair1 which are non-sentient things2 the sentient scorpion springs from non-sentient dung2 and non-sentient threads proceed from the sentient spider4--,this objection1 we reply1 is not valid2 for in the instances quoted the relation of cause and effect rests on the non- sentient elements only 7i4e4 it is only the non-sentient matter of the body which produces nails1 c474 ,but1 a further objection is raised1 ,scripture itself declares in many places that things generally held to be non-sentient really possess intelligence2 compare 'to him the earth said'2 'the water desired'2 'the prnas quarrelling among themselves as to their relative pre-eminence went to ,brahman4' ,and the writers of the ,purnas ako attribute consciousness to rivers1 hills1 the sea1 and so on4 ,hence there is after all no essential difference in nature between sentient and so-called non- sentient beings4--,to this objection the ,prvapakshin replies in the next ,stra4 #e4 ,but 7there is7 denotation of the superintending 7deities71 on account of distinction and entering4 ,the word 'but' is meant to set aside the objection started4 ,in texts such as 'to him the earth said1' the terms 'earth' and so on1 denote the divinities presiding over earth and the rest4--,how is this known8--' ,through distinction and connexion4' ,for earth and so on are denoted by the distinctive term 'divinities'2 so e4g4 ',let me enter into those three divinities' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #c1 #b71 where fire1 water1 and earth are called divinities2 and ,kau4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #ad1 ',all divinities contending with each other as to pre-eminence1' and 'all these divinities having recognised pre-eminence in prna4' ,the 'entering' of the ,stra refers to ,ait4 ,ar4 ,,ii1 #d1 #b1 #d1 ',agni having become speech entered into the mouth2 ,aditya having become sight entered into the eyes1' c41 where the text declares that ,agni and other divine beings entered into the sense-organs as their superintendents4 ,we therefore adhere to our conclusion that the world1 being non- intelligent and hence essentially different in nature from ,brahman1 cannot be the effect of ,brahman2 and that therefore1 in agreement with ,smriti confirmed by reasoning1 the ,vednta-texts must be held to teach that the ,pradhna is the universal material cause4 ,this prim facie view is met by the following ,stra4 #f4 ,but it is seen4 ,the 'but' indicates the change of view 7introduced in the present ,stra74 ,the assertion that ,brahman cannot be the material cause of the world because the latter differs from it in essential nature1 is unfounded2 since it is a matter of observation that even things of different nature stand to each other in the relation of cause and effect4 ,for it is observed that from honey and similar substances there originate worms and other little animals4--,but it has been said above that in those cases there is sameness of nature1 in so far as the relation of cause and effect holds good only between the non-intelligent elements in both6-- ,this assertion was indeed made1 but it does not suffice to prove that equality of character between cause and effect which you have in view4 ,for1 being apprehensive that from the demand of equality of character in some point or other only it would follow that1 as all things have certain characteristics in common1 anything might originate from anything1 you have declared that the equality of character necessary for the relation of cause and effect is constituted by the persistence1 in the effect1 of those characteristic points which differentiate the cause from other things4 ,but it is evident that this restrictive rule does not hold good in the case of the origination of worms and the like from honey and so on2 and hence it is not unreasonable to assume that the world also1 although differing in character from ,brahman1 may originate from the latter4 ,for in the case of worms originating from honey1 scorpions from dung1 c41 we do not observe--what indeed we do observe in certain other cases1 as of pots made of clay1 ornaments made of gold--that the special characteristics distinguishing the causal substance from other things persist in the effects also4 #g4 ,if it be said that 7the effect is7 non-existing2 we say no1 there being a mere denial4 ,but1 an objection is raised1 if ,brahman1 the cause1 differs in nature from the effect1 viz4 the world1 this means that cause and effect are separate things and that hence the effect does not exist in the cause1 i4 e4 ,brahman2 and this again implies that the world originates from what has no existence6--,not so1 we reply4 ,for what the preceding ,stra has laid down is merely the denial of an absolute rule demanding that cause and effect should be of the same nature2 it was not asserted that the effect is a thing altogether different and separate from the cause4 ,we by no means abandon our tenet that ,brahman the cause modifies itself so as to assume the form of a world differing from it in character4 ,for such is the case with the honey and the worms also4 ,there is difference of characteristics1 but--as in the case of gold and golden bracelets-- there is oneness of substance4--,an objection is raised4 #h4 ,on account of such consequences in reabsorption 7the ,vednta-texts would be7 inappropriate4 ,the term 'reabsorption' here stands as an instance of all the states of ,brahman1 reabsorption1 creation1 and so on--among which it is the first as appears from the texts giving instruction about those several states ',being only was this in the beginning'2 ',the ,self only was this in the beginning4' ,if we accept the doctrine of the oneness of substance of cause and effect1 then1 absorption1 creation1 c4 of the world all being in ,brahman1 the different states of the world would connect themselves with ,brahman1 and the latter would thus be affected by all the imperfections of its effect2 in the same way as all the attributes of the bracelet are present in the gold also4 ,and the undesirable consequence of this would be that contradictory attributes as predicated in different ,vednta-texts would have to be attributed to one and the same substance2 cp4 ',he who is all-knowing' 7,mu4 ,up4 ,i1 #a1 #i72 ',free from sin1 free from old age and death' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,viii1 #a1 #e72 ',of him there is known neither cause nor effect' 7,svet4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #h72 ',of these two one eats the sweet fruit' 7,svet4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #f72 ',the ,self that is not a ,lord is bound because he has to enjoy' 7,svet4 ,up4 ,i1 #h72 ',on account of his impotence he laments1 bewildered' 7,svet4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #g74--,nor can we accept the explanation that1 as ,brahman in its causal as well as its effected state has all sentient and non-sentient beings for its body2 and as all imperfections inhere in that body only1 they do not touch ,brahman in either its causal or effected state4 ,for it is not possible that the world and ,brahman should stand to each other in the relation of effect and cause1 and if it were possible1 the imperfections due to connexion with a body would necessarily cling to ,brahman4 ,it is not1 we say1 possible that the intelligent and non-intelligent beings together should constitute the body of ,brahman4 ,for a body is a particular aggregate of earth and the other elements1 depending for its subsistence on vital breath with its five modifications1 and serving as an abode to the sense-organs which mediate the experiences of pleasure and pain retributive of former works3 such is in ,vedic and worldly speech the sense connected with the term 'body4' ,but numerous ,vedic texts--',free from sin1 from old age and death' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,viii1 #a72 ',without eating the other one looks on' 7,svet4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #f72 ',grasping without hands1 hasting without feet1 he sees without eyes1 he hears without ears' 7,svet4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #ai72 ',without breath1 without mind' 7,mu4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #a1 #b7--;declare that the highest ,self is free from karman and the enjoyment of its fruits1 is not capable of enjoyment dependent on sense-organs1 and has no life dependent on breath3 whence it follows that he cannot have a body constituted by all the non-sentient and sentient beings4 ,nor can either non-sentient beings in their individual forms such as grass1 trees1 c41 or the aggregate of all the elements in their subtle state be viewed as the abode of sense-activity 7without which they cannot constitute a body72 nor are the elements in their subtle state combined into earth and the other gross elements 7which again would be required for a body74 ,and sentient beings which consist of mere intelligence are of course incapable of all this1 and hence even less fit to constitute a body4 ,nor may it be said that to have a body merely means to be the abode of fruition1 and that ,brahman may possess a body in this latter sense2 for there are abodes of fruition1 such as palaces and the like1 which are not considered to be bodies4 ,nor will it avail1 narrowing the last definition1 to say that that only is an abode of enjoyment directly abiding in which a being enjoys pain and pleasure2 for if a soul enters a body other than its own1 that body is indeed the abode in which it enjoys the pains and pleasures due to such entering1 but is not admitted to be in the proper sense of the word the body of the soul thus entered4 ,in the case of the ,lord1 on the other hand1 who is in the enjoyment of self-established supreme bliss1 it can in no way be maintained that he must be joined to a body1 consisting of all sentient and non-sentient beings1 for the purpose of enjoyment4--,that view also according to which a 'body' means no more than a means of enjoyment is refuted hereby4 ,you will now possibly try another definition1 viz4 that the body of a being is constituted by that1 the nature1 subsistence and activity of which depend on the will of that being1 and that hence a body may be ascribed to the ,lord in so far as the essential nature1 subsistence1 and activity of all depend on him4--,but this also is objectionable2 since in the first place it is not a fact that the nature of a body depends on the will of the intelligent soul joined with it2 since1 further1 an injured body does not obey in its movements the will of its possessor2 and since the persistence of a dead body does not depend on the soul that tenanted it4 ,dancing puppets and the like1 on the other hand1 are things the nature1 subsistence1 and motions of which depend on the will of intelligent beings1 but we do not on that account consider them to be the bodies of those beings4 ,as1 moreover1 the nature of an eternal intelligent soul does not depend on the will of the ,lord1 it cannot be its body under the present definition4--,nor again can it be said that the body of a being is constituted by that which is exclusively ruled and supported by that being and stands towards it in an exclusive subservient relation 7sesha72 for this definition would include actions also4 ,and finally it is a fact that several texts definitely declare that the ,lord is without a body1 ',without hands and feet he grasps and hastens' c4 ,as thus the relation of embodied being and body cannot subsist between ,brahman and the world1 and as if it did subsist1 all the imperfections of the world would cling to ,brahman2 the ,vednta--texts are wrong in teaching that ,brahman is the material cause of the world4 ,to this prim facie view the next ,stra replies4 #i4 ,not so2 as there are parallel instances4 ,the teaching of the ,vednta-texts is not inappropriate1 since there are instances of good and bad qualities being separate in the case of one thing connected with two different states4 ,the 'but' in the ,stra indicates the impossibility of ,brahman being connected with even a shadow of what is evil4 ,the meaning is as follows4 ,as ,brahman has all sentient and non-sentient things for its body1 and constitutes the ,self of that body1 there is nothing contrary to reason in ,brahman being connected with two states1 a causal and an effected one1 the essential characteristics of which are expansion on the one hand and contraction on the other2 for this expansion and contraction belong 7not to ,brahman itself1 but7 to the sentient and non-sentient beings4 ,the imperfections adhering to the body do not affect ,brahman1 and the good qualities belonging to the ,self do not extend to the body2 in the same way as youth1 childhood1 and old age1 which are attributes of embodied beings1 such as gods or men1 belong to the body only1 not to the embodied ,self2 while knowledge1 pleasure and so on belong to the conscious ,self only1 not to the body4 ,on this understanding there is no objection to expressions such as 'he is born as a god or as a man' and 'the same person is a child1 and then a youth1 and then an old man' ,that the character of a god or man belongs to the individual soul only in so far as it has a body1 will be shown under ,,iii1 #a1 #a4 ,the assertion made by the ,prvapakshin as to the impossibility of the world1 comprising matter and souls and being either in its subtle or its gross condition1 standing to ,brahman in the relation of a body1 we declare to be the vain outcome of altogether vicious reasoning springing from the idle fancies of persons who have never fully considered the meaning of the whole body of ,vednta-texts as supported by legitimate argumentation4 ,for as a matter of fact all ,vednta-texts distinctly declare that the entire world1 subtle or gross1 material or spiritual1 stands to the highest ,self in the relation of a body4 ,compare e4g4the antarymin-brhmana1 in the ,knva as well as the ,mdhyandina-text1 where it is said first of non-sentient things 7'he who dwells within the earth1 whose body the earth is' c471 and afterwards separately of the intelligent soul 7'he who dwells in understanding1' according to the ,knvas2 'he who dwells within the ,self1' according to the ,mdhyandinas7 that they constitute the body of the highest ,self4 ,similarly the ,subla- ,upanishad declares that matter and souls in all their states constitute the body of the highest ,self 7',he who dwells within the earth' c471 and concludes by saying that that ,self is the soul of all those beings 7',he is the inner ,self of all' c474 ,similarly ,smriti1 ',the whole world is thy body'2 ',water is the body of ,vishnu'2 ',all this is the body of ,hari'2 ',all these things are his body'2 ',he having reflected sent forth from his body'--where the 'body' means the elements in their subtle state4 ,in ordinary language the word 'body' is not1 like words such as jar1 limited in its denotation to things of one definite make or character1 but is observed to be applied directly 7not only secondarily or metaphorically7 to things of altogether different make and characteristics--such as worms1 insects1 moths1 snakes1 men1 four-footed animals1 and so on4 ,we must therefore aim at giving a definition of the word that is in agreement with general use4 ,the definitions given by the ,prvapakshin--'a body is that which causes the enjoyment of the fruit of actions' c4--do not fulfil this requirement2 for they do not take in such things as earth and the like which the texts declare to be the body of the ,lord4 ,and further they do not take in those bodily forms which the ,lord assumes according to his wish1 nor the bodily forms released souls may assume1 according to ',he is one' c4 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vii1 #cf1 #b72 for none of those embodiments subserve the fruition of the results of actions4 ,and further1 the bodily forms which the ,supreme ,person assumes at wish are not special combinations of earth and the other elements2 for ,smriti says1 ',the body of that highest ,self is not made from a combination of the elements4' ,it thus appears that it is also too narrow a definition to say that a body is a combination of the different elements4 ,again1 to say that a body is that1 the life of which depends on the vital breath with its five modifications is also too narrow1 viz in respect of plants2 for although vital air is present in plants1 it does not in them support the body by appearing in five special forms4 ,nor again does it answer to define a body as either the abode of the sense-organs or as the cause of pleasure and pain2 for neither of these definitions takes in the bodies of stone or wood which were bestowed on ,ahaly and other persons in accordance with their deeds4 ,we are thus led to adopt the following definition--,any substance which a sentient soul is capable of completely controlling and supporting for its own purposes1 and which stands to the soul in an entirely subordinate relation1 is the body of that soul4 ,in the case of bodies injured1 paralysed1 c41 control and so on are not actually perceived because the power of control1 although existing1 is obstructed2 in the same way as1 owing to some obstruction1 the powers of fire1 heat1 and so on may not be actually perceived4 ,a dead body again begins to decay at the very moment in which the soul departs from it1 and is actually dissolved shortly after2 it 7thus strictly speaking is not a body at all but7 is spoken of as a body because it is a part of the aggregate of matter which previously constituted a body4 ,in this sense1 then1 all sentient and non-sentient beings together constitute the body of the ,supreme ,person1 for they are completely controlled and supported by him for his own ends1 and are absolutely subordinate to him4 ,texts which speak of the highest ,self as 'bodiless among bodies' 7e4g4 ,ka4 ,up4 ,i4 #b1 #bb71 only mean to deny of the ,self a body due to karman2 for as we have seen1 ,scripture declares that the ,universe is his body4 ,this point will be fully established in subsequent adhikaranas also4 ,the two preceding ,stras 7#h and #i7 merely suggest the matter proved in the adhikarana beginning with ,,ii1 #a1 #ba4 #aj4 ,and on account of the objections to his view4 ,the theory of ,brahman being the universal cause has to be accepted not only because it is itself free from objections1 but also because the pradhna theory is open to objections1 and hence must be abandoned4 ,for on this latter theory the origination of the world cannot be accounted for4 ,the ,snkhyas hold that owing to the soul's approximation to ,prakriti the attributes of the latter are fictitiously superimposed upon the soul which in itself consists entirely of pure intelligence free from all change1 and that thereon depends the origination of the empirical world4 ,now here we must raise the question as to the nature of that approximation or nearness of ,prakriti which causes the superimposition on the changeless soul of the attributes of ,prakriti4 ,does that nearness mean merely the existence of ,prakriti or some change in ,prakriti8 or does it mean some change in the soul8--,not the latter2 for the soul is assumed to be incapable of change4--,nor again a change in ,prakriti2 for changes in ,prakriti are supposed1 in the system1 to be the effects of superimposition1 and cannot therefore be its cause4 ,and if1 finally1 the nearness of ,prakriti means no more than its existence1 it follows that even the released soul would be liable to that superimposition 7for ,prakriti exists always74--,the ,snkhya is thus unable to give a rational account of the origination of the world4 ,this same point will be treated of fully in connexion with the special refutation of the ,snkhya theory4 7,,ii1 #b1 #f47 #aa4 ,also in consequence of the ill-foundedness of reasoning4 ,the theory1 resting on ,scripture1 of ,brahman being the universal cause must be accepted1 and the theory of the ,pradhna must be abandoned1 because all 7mere7 reasoning is ill-founded4 ,this latter point is proved by the fact that the arguments set forth by ,buddha1 ,kanda1 ,akshapda1 ,jina1 ,kapila and ,patajali respectively are all mutually contradictory4 #ab4 ,should it be said that inference is to be carried on in a different way2 7we reply that7 thus also it follows that 7the objection raised7 is not got rid of4 ,let us then view the matter as follows4 ,the arguments actually set forth by ,buddha and others may have to be considered as invalid1 but all the same we may arrive at the ,pradhna theory through other lines of reasoning by which the objections raised against the theory are refuted4-- ,but1 we reply1 this also is of no avail4 ,a theory which rests exclusively on arguments derived from human reason may1 at some other time or place1 be disestablished by arguments devised by people more skilful than you in reasoning2 and thus there is no getting over the objection founded on the invalidity of all mere argumentation4 ,the conclusion from all this is that1 with regard to supersensuous matters1 ,scripture alone is authoritative1 and that reasoning is to be applied only to the support of ,scripture4 ,in agreement herewith ,manu says1 ',he who supports the teaching of the ,rishis and the doctrine as to sacred duty with arguments not conflicting with the ,veda1 he alone truly knows sacred duty' 7,manu ,,xii1 #ajf74 ,the teaching of the ,snkhyas which conflicts with the ,veda cannot therefore be used for the purpose of confirming and elucidating the meaning of the ,veda4--,here finishes the section treating of 'difference of nature4' #ac4 ,thereby also the remaining 7theories7 which are not comprised 7within the ,veda7 are explained4 ,not comprised means those theories which are not known to be comprised within 7countenanced by7 the ,veda4 ,the ,stra means to say that by the demolition given above of the ,snkhya doctrine which is not comprised within the ,veda the remaining theories which are in the same position1 viz4 the theories of ,kanda1 ,akshapda1 ,jina1 and ,buddha1 must likewise be considered as demolished4 ,here1 however1 a new objection may be raised1 on the ground namely that1 since all these theories agree in the view of atoms constituting the general cause1 it cannot be said that their reasoning as to the causal substance is ill-founded4--,they indeed1 we reply1 are agreed to that extent1 but they are all of them equally founded on ,reasoning only1 and they are seen to disagree in many ways as to the nature of the atoms which by different schools are held to be either fundamentally void or non-void1 having either a merely cognitional or an objective existence1 being either momentary or permanent1 either of a definite nature or the reverse1 either real or unreal1 c4 ,this disagreement proves all those theories to be ill-founded1 and the objection is thus disposed of4--,here finishes the section of 'the remaining 7theories7 non-comprised 7within the ,veda74' #ad4 ,if it be said that from 7,brahman7 becoming an enjoyer1 there follows non-distinction 7of ,brahman and the individual soul72 we reply--it may be as in ordinary life4 ,the ,snkhya here comes forward with a new objection4 ,you maintain1 he says1 that the highest ,brahman has the character either of a cause or an effect according as it has for its body sentient and non-sentient beings in either their subtle or gross state2 and that this explains the difference in nature between the individual soul and ,brahman4 ,but such difference is not possible1 since ,brahman1 if embodied1 at once becomes an enjoying subject 7just like the individual soul74 ,for if1 possessing a body1 the ,lord necessarily experiences all pain and pleasure due to embodiedness1 no less than the individual soul does4--,but we have1 under ,i1 #b1 #h1 refuted the view of the ,lord's being liable to experiences of pleasure and pain6--,by no means6 ,there you have shown only that the ,lord's abiding within the heart of a creature so as to constitute the object of its devotion does not imply fruition on his part of pleasure and pain4 ,now1 however1 you maintain that the ,lord is embodied just like an individual soul1 and the unavoidable inference from this is that1 like that soul1 he undergoes pleasurable and painful experiences4 ,for we observe that embodied souls1 although not capable of participating in the changing states of the body such as childhood1 old age1 c41 yet experience pleasures and pains caused by the normal or abnormal condition of the matter constituting the body4 ,in agreement with this ,scripture says1 ',as long as he possesses a body there is for him no escape from pleasure and pain2 but when he is free of the body then neither pleasure nor pain touches him' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,viii1 #ab1 #a74 ,as thus1 the theory of an embodied ,brahman constituting the universal cause does not allow of a distinction in nature between the ,lord and the individual soul2 and as1 further1 the theory of a mere ,brahman 7i4e4 an absolutely homogeneous ,brahman7 leads to the conclusion that ,brahman is the abode of all the imperfections attaching to the world1 in the same way as a lump of clay or gold participates in the imperfections of the thing fashioned out of it2 we maintain that the theory of the ,pradhna being the general cause is the more valid one4 ,to this objection the ,stra replies in the words1 'it may be1 as in ordinary life4' ,the desired distinction in nature between the ,lord and the individual soul may exist all the same4 ,that a soul experiences pleasures and pains caused by the various states of the body is not due to the fact of its being joined to a body1 but to its karman in the form of good and evil deeds4 ,the scriptural text also which you quote refers to that body only which is originated by karman2 for other texts 7',he is onefold1 he is threefold'2 ',if he desires the world of the ,fathers'2 ',he moves about there eating1 playing1 rejoicing'2 ,ch4 ,up4 ,,vii1 #bf1 #b2 ,,viii1 #b1 #a2 #ab1 #c7 show that the person who has freed himself from the bondage of karman and become manifest in his true nature is not touched by a shadow of evil while all the same he has a body4 ,the highest ,self1 which is essentially free from all evil1 thus has the entire world in its gross and its subtle form for its body2 but being in no way connected with karman it is all the less connected with evil of any kind4--',as in ordinary life4' ,we observe in ordinary life that while those who either observe or transgress the ordinances of a ruler experience pleasure or pain according as the ruler shows them favour or restrains them1 it does not follow from the mere fact of the ruler's having a body that he himself also experiences the pleasure and pain due to the observance or transgression of his commands4 ,the author of the ,dramida-bhshya gives expression to the same view1 ',as in ordinary life a prince1 although staying in a very unpleasant place infested with mosquitoes and full of discomforts of all kind is yet not touched by all these troubles1 his body being constantly refreshed by fans and other means of comfort1 rules the countries for which he cares and continues to enjoy all possible pleasures1 such as fragrant odours and the like2 so the ,lord of creation1 to whom his power serves as an ever-moving fan as it were1 is not touched by the evils of that creation1 but rules the world of ,brahman and the other worlds for which he cares1 and continues to enjoy all possible delights4' ,that the nature of ,brahman should undergo changes like a lump of clay or gold we do not admit1 since many texts declare ,brahman to be free from all change and imperfection4--,others give a different explanation of this ,stra4 ,according to them it refutes the prvapaksha that on the view of ,brahman being the general cause the distinction of enjoying subjects and objects of enjoyment cannot be accounted for--proving the possibility of such distinction by means of the analogous instance of the sea and its waves and flakes of foam4 ,but this interpretation is inappropriate1 since for those who hold that creation proceeds from ,brahman connected with some power or ,nescience or a limiting adjunct 7updhi7 no such prim facie view can arise4 ,for on their theory the enjoying subject is that which is conditioned by the power or ,nescience or updhi inhering in the causal substance1 and the power or ,nescience or updhi is the object of enjoyment2 and as the two are of different nature1 they cannot pass over into each other4 ,the view of ,brahman itself undergoing an essential change 7on which that prim facie view might possibly be held to arise7 is not admitted by those philosophers2 for ,stra ,,ii1 #a1 #ce teaches that the individual souls and their deeds form a stream which has no beginning 7so that the distinction of enjoying subjects and objects of enjoyment is eternal74 ,but even if it be held that ,brahman itself undergoes a change1 the doubt as to the non-distinction of subjects and objects of enjoyment does not arise2 for the distinction of the two groups will1 on that view1 be analogous to that of jars and platters which are modifications of the one substance clay1 or to that of bracelets and crowns fashioned out of the one substance gold4 ,and on the view of ,brahman itself undergoing a change there arises a further difficulty1 viz4 in so far as ,brahman 7which is nothing but pure non-conditioned intelligence7 is held to transform itself into 7limited7 enjoying souls and 7non-sentient7 objects of enjoyment4 #ae4 ,the non-difference 7of the world7 from that 7viz4 ,brahman7 follows from what begins with the word rambhana4 ,under ,,ii1 #a1 #g and other ,stras the non-difference of the effect1 i4e4 the world from the cause1 i4e4 ,brahman was assumed1 and it was on this basis that the proof of ,brahman being the cause of the world proceeded4 ,the present ,stra now raises a prim facie objection against that very non-difference1 and then proceeds to refute it4 ,on the point in question the school of ,kanda argues as follows4 ,it is in no way possible that the effect should be non-different from the cause4 ,for cause and effect are the objects of different ideas3 the ideas which have for their respective objects threads and a piece of cloth1 or a lump of clay and a jar1 are distinctly not of one and the same kind4 ,the difference of words supplies a second argument2 nobody applies to mere threads the word 'piece of cloth1' or vice vers4 ,a third argument rests on the difference of effects3 water is not fetched from the well in a lump of clay1 nor is a well built with jars4 ,there1 fourthly1 is the difference of time2 the cause is prior in time1 the effect posterior4 ,there is1 fifthly1 the difference of form3 the cause has the shape of a lump1 the effect 7the jar7 is shaped like a belly with a broad basis2 clay in the latter condition only is meant when we say ',the jar has gone to pieces4' ,there1 sixthly1 is a numerical difference3 the threads are many1 the piece of cloth is one only4 ,in the seventh place1 there is the uselessness of the activity of the producing agent 7which would result from cause and effect being identical72 for if the effect were nothing but the cause1 what could be effected by the activity of the agent8--,let us then say that1 although the effect exists 7at all times71 the activity of the agent must be postulated as helpful towards the effect4--,but in that case the activity of the agent would have to be assumed as taking place perpetually1 and as hence everything would exist always1 there would be no distinction between eternal and non-eternal things6--,let us then say that the effect1 although always existing1 is at first non-manifest and then is manifested through the activity of the agent2 in this way that activity will not be purposeless1 and there will be a distinction between eternal and non-eternal things6-- ,this view also is untenable4 ,for if that manifestation requires another manifestation 7to account for it7 we are driven into a regressus in infinitum4 ,if1 on the other hand1 it is independent of another manifestation 7and hence eternal71 it follows that the effect also is eternally perceived4 ,and if1 as a third alternative1 the manifestation is said to originate1 we lapse into the asatkryavda 7according to which the effect does not exist before its origination74 ,moreover1 if the activity of the agent serves to manifest the effect1 it follows that the activity devoted to a jar will manifest also waterpots and similar things4 ,for things which admittedly possess manifesting power1 such as lamps and the like1 are not observed to be restricted to particular objects to be manifested by them3 we do not see that a lamp lit for showing a jar does not at the same time manifest waterpots and other things4 ,all this proves that the activity of the agent has a purpose in so far only as it is the cause of the origination of an effect which previously did not exist2 and thus the theory of the previous existence of the effect cannot be upheld4 ,nor does the fact of definite causes having to be employed 7in order to produce definite effects2 clay e4g4 to produce a jar7 prove that that only which already exists can become an effect2 for the facts explain themselves also on the hypothesis of the cause having definite potentialities 7determining the definite effect which will result from the cause74 ,but1 an objection is raised1 he also who holds the theory of the previous non-existence of the effect1 can really do nothing with the activity of the agent4 ,for as1 on his view1 the effect has no existence before it is originated1 the activity of the agent must be supposed to operate elsewhere than on the effect2 and as this 'elsewhere' comprises without distinction all other things1 it follows that the agent's activity with reference to threads may give rise to waterpots also 7not only to cloth74--,not so1 the ,vaiseshika replies4 ,activity applied to a certain cause gives rise to those effects only the potentiality of which inheres in that cause4 ,now1 against all this1 the following objection is raised4 ,the effect is non-different from the cause4 ,for in reality there is no such thing as an effect different from the cause1 since all effects1 and all empirical thought and speech about effects1 are based on ,nescience4 ,apart from the causal substance1 clay1 which is seen to be present in effected things such as jars1 the so-called effect1 i4e4 the jar or pot1 rests altogether on ,nescience4 ,all effected things whatever1 such as jars1 waterpots1 c41 viewed as different from their causal substance1 viz4 clay1 which is perceived to exist in these its effects1 rest merely on empirical thought and speech1 and are fundamentally false1 unreal2 while the causal substance1 i4e4 clay1 alone is real4 ,in the same way the entire world in so far as viewed apart from its cause1 i4e4 ,brahman which is nothing but pure non-differenced ,being1 rests exclusively on the empirical assumption of ,egoity and so on1 and is false2 while reality belongs to the causal ,brahman which is mere ,being4 ,it follows that there is no such thing as an effect apart from its cause2 the effect in fact is identical with the cause4 ,nor must you object to our theory on the ground that the corroborative instance of the silver erroneously imagined in the shell is inappropriate because the non- reality of such effected things as jars is by no means well proved while the non-reality of the shell-silver is so proved2 for as a matter of fact it is determined by reasoning that it is the causal substance of jars1 viz4 clay1 only that is real while the reality of everything apart from clay is disproved by reasoning4 ,and if you ask whereupon that reasoning rests1 we reply--on the fact that the clay only is continuous1 permanent1 while everything different from it is discontinuous1 non- permanent4 ,for just as in the case of the snake-rope we observe that the continuously existing rope only--which forms the substrate of the imagined snake--is real1 while the snake or cleft in the ground1 which is non-continuous1 is unreal2 so we conclude that it is the permanently enduring clay-material only which is real1 while the non-continuous effects1 such as jars and pots1 are unreal4 ,and1 further1 since what is real1 i4 e4 the ,self1 does not perish1 and what is altogether unreal1 as e4g4 the horn of a hare1 is not perceived1 we conclude that an effected thing1 which on the one hand is perceived and on the other is liable to destruction1 must be viewed as something to be defined neither as that which is nor as that which is not4 ,and what is thus undefinable1 is false1 no less than the silver imagined in the shell1 the anirvakanyatva of which is proved by perception and sublation 7see above1 p4 #ajb ff474--,we further ask1 ',is a causal substance1 such as clay1 when producing its effect1 in a non-modified state1 or has it passed over into some special modified condition8' ,the former alternative cannot be allowed1 because thence it would follow that the cause originates effects at all times2 and the latter must equally be rejected1 because the passing over of the cause into a special state would oblige us to postulate a previous passing over into a different state 7to account for the latter passing over7 and again a previous one1 c41 so that a regressus in infinitum would result4--,let it then be said that the causal substance when giving rise to the effect is indeed unchanged1 but connected with a special operative cause1 time and place 7this connexion accounting for the origination of the effect74--,but this also we cannot allow2 for such connexion would be with the causal substance either as unchanged or as having entered on a changed condition2 and thus the difficulties stated above would arise again4-- ,nor may you say that the origination of jars1 gold coins1 and sour milk from clay1 gold1 and milk respectively is actually perceived2 that this perception is not sublated with regard to time and place--while1 on the other hand1 the perception of silver in the shell is so sublated--and that hence all those who trust perception must necessarily admit that the effect does originate from the cause4 ,for this argumentation does not stand the test of being set forth in definite alternatives4 ,does the mere gold1 c41 by itself originate the svastika-ornament8 or is it the gold coins 7used for making ornaments7 which originate8 or is it the gold1 as forming the substrate of the coins ,,footnote #dcd3a8 ,the mere gold1 in the first place1 cannot be originative as there exists no effect different from the gold 7to which the originative activity could apply itself72 and a thing cannot possibly display originative activity with regard to itself4--,but1 an objection is raised1 the svastika- ornament is perceived as different from the gold6--,it is not1 we reply1 different from the gold2 for the gold is recognised in it1 and no other thing but gold is perceived4--,but the existence of another thing is proved by the fact of there being a different idea1 a different word1 and so on6--,by no means1 we reply4 ,other ideas1 words1 and so on1 which have reference to an altogether undefined thing are founded on error1 no less than the idea of1 and the word denoting1 shell-silver1 and hence have no power of proving the existence of another thing4 ,nor1 in the second place1 is the gold coin originative of the svastika-ornament2 for we do not perceive the coin in the svastika1 as we do perceive the threads in the cloth4 ,nor1 in the third place1 is the effect originated by the gold in so far as being the substrate of the coin2 for the gold in so far as forming the substrate of the coin is not perceived in the svastika4 ,as it thus appears that all effects viewed apart from their causal substances are unreal1 we arrive at the conclusion that the entire world1 viewed apart from ,brahman1 is also something unreal2 for it also is an effect4 ,in order to facilitate the understanding of the truth that everything apart from ,brahman is false1 we have so far reasoned on the assumption of things such as clay1 gold1 c41 being real1 and have thereby proved the non-reality of all effects4 ,in truth1 however1 all special causal substances are unreal quite as much as jars and golden ornaments are2 for they are all of them equally effects of ,brahman4 ',in that all this has its ,self2 it is the ,true' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #h1 #g72 ',there is here no plurality2 from death to death goes he who sees here plurality as it were' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #d1 #ai72 ',for where there is duality as it were1 there one sees another2 but when for him the ,self only has become all1 whereby then should he see and whom should he see8' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #d1 #ac72 ',indra goes manifold by means of his mys' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #e1 #ai72--these and other similar texts teach that whatever is different from ,brahman is false4 ,nor must it be imagined that the truth intimated by ,scripture can be in conflict with ,perception2 for in the way set forth above we prove that all effects are false1 and moreover ,perception really has for its object pure ,being only 7cp4 above1 p4 #cj74 ,and if there is a conflict between the two1 superior force belongs to ,scripture1 to which no imperfection can be attributed2 which occupies a final position among the means of knowledge2 and which1 although dependent on ,perception1 and so on1 for the apprehension of the form and meaning of words1 yet is independent as far as proving power is concerned4 ,hence it follows that everything different from ,brahman1 the general cause1 is unreal4 ,nor must this conclusion be objected to on the ground that from the falsity of the world it follows that the individual souls also are non- real4 ,for it is ,brahman itself which constitutes the individual souls3 ,brahman alone takes upon itself the condition of individual soul in all living bodies2 as we know from many texts3 ',having entered into them with this living ,self 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #c72 ',the one god hidden within all beings' 7,svet4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #aa72 ',the one god entered in many places'2 ',that ,self hidden in all beings does not shine forth' 7,ka4 ,up4 ,i1 #c1ab72 ',there is no other seer but he' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #c1 #bc72 and others4--,but if you maintain that the one ,brahman constitutes the soul in all living bodies1 it follows that any particular pain or pleasure should affect the consciousness of all embodied beings1 just as an agreeable sensation affecting the foot gives rise to a feeling of pleasure in the head2 and that there would be no distinction of individual soul and ,lord1 released souls and souls in bondage1 pupils and teachers1 men wise and ignorant1 and so on4 ,now1 in reply to this1 some of those who hold the non-duality of ,brahman give the following explanation4 ,the many individual souls are the reflections of the one ,brahman1 and their states of pain1 pleasure1 and so on1 remain distinct owing to the different limiting adjuncts 7on which the existence of each individual soul as such depends71 in the same way as the many reflected images of one and the same face in mirrors1 crystals1 sword-blades1 c41 remain distinct owing to their limiting adjuncts 7viz4 mirrors1 c472 one image being small1 another large1 one being bright1 another dim1 and so on4--,but you have said that scriptural texts such as ',having entered with this living ,self show that the souls are not different from ,brahman6--,they are indeed not different in reality1 but we maintain their distinction on the basis of an imagined difference4--,to whom then does that imagination belong8 ,not to ,brahman surely whose nature1 consisting of pure intelligence1 allows no room for imagination of any kind6 ,nor also to the individual souls2 for this would imply a faulty mutual dependence1 the existence of the soul depending on imagination and that imagination residing in the soul6 ,not so1 the advaita-vdin replies4 ,nescience 7wrong imagination7 and the existence of the souls form an endless retrogressive chain2 their relation is like that of the seed and the sprout4 ,moreover1 mutual dependence and the like1 which are held to constitute defects in the case of real things1 are unable to disestablish ,nescience1 the very nature of which consists in being that which cannot rationally be established1 and which hence may be compared to somebody's swallowing a whole palace and the like 7as seen in a dream or under the influence of a magical illusion74 ,in reality the individual souls are non-different from ,brahman1 and hence essentially free from all impurity2 but as they are liable to impurity caused by their limiting adjuncts--in the same way as the face reflected in a mirror is liable to be dimmed by the dimness of the mirror--they may be the abodes of ,nescience and hence may be viewed as the figments of wrong imagination4 ,like the dimness of the reflected face1 the imperfection adhering to the soul is a mere error2 for otherwise it would follow that the soul can never obtain release4 ,and as this error of the souls has proceeded from all eternity1 the question as to its cause is not to be raised4 ,this1 we reply1 is the view of teachers who have no insight into the true nature of aduality1 and are prompted by the wish of capturing the admiration and applause of those who believe in the doctrine of duality4 ,for if1 as a first alternative1 you should maintain that the abode of ,nescience is constituted by the soul in its essential1 not fictitiously imagined1 form2 this means that ,brahman itself is the abode of ,nescience4 ,if1 in the second place1 you should say that the abode of ,nescience is the soul1 viewed as different from ,brahman and fictitiously imagined in it1 this would mean that the ,non-intelligent 7jada7 is the abode of ,nescience4 ,for those who hold the view of ,non-duality do not acknowledge a third aspect different from these two 7i4e4 from ,brahman which is pure intelligence1 and the ,non-intelligent fictitiously superimposed on ,brahman74 ,and if1 as a third alternative1 it be maintained that the abode of ,nescience is the soul in its essential nature1 this nature being however qualified by the fictitiously imagined aspect2 we must negative this also1 since that which has an absolutely homogeneous nature cannot in any way be shown to be qualified1 apart from ,nescience4 ,the soul is qualified in so far only as it is the abode of ,nescience1 and you therefore define nothing4--,moreover1 the theory of ,nescience abiding within the individual soul is resorted to for the purpose of establishing a basis for the distinction of bondage and release1 but it really is quite unable to effect this4 ,for if by ,release be understood the destruction of ,nescience1 it follows that when one soul attains ,release and ,nescience is thus destroyed1 the other souls also will be released4--,but ,nescience persists because other souls are not released6-- ,well then the one soul also is not released since ,nescience is not destroyed6--,but we assume a different ,nescience for each soul2 that soul whose ,nescience is destroyed will be released1 and that whose ,nescience is not destroyed will remain in ,bondage6--,you now argue on the assumption of a special avidy for each soul4 ,but what about the distinction of souls implied therein8 ,is that distinction essential to the nature of the soul1 or is it the figment of ,nescience8 ,the former alternative is excluded1 as it is admitted that the soul essentially is pure1 non-differenced intelligence2 and because on that alternative the assumption of avidy to account for the distinction of souls would be purposeless4 ,on the latter alternative two subordinate alternatives arise--,does this avidy which gives rise to the fictitious distinction of souls belong to ,brahman8 or to the individual souls8--,if you say 'to ,brahman'1 your view coincides with mine4--,well then1 'to the souls'6-- ,but have you then quite forgotten that ,nescience is assumed for the purpose of accounting for the distinction of souls8--,let us then view the matter as follows--those several avidys which are assumed for the purpose of establishing the distinction of souls bound and released1 to those same avidys the distinction of souls is due4--,but here you reason in a manifest circle3 the avidys are established on the basis of the distinction of souls1 and the distinction of souls is established when the avidys are established4 ,nor does the argument of the seed and sprout apply to the present question4 ,for in the case of seeds and plants each several seed gives rise to a different plant2 while in the case under discussion you adopt the impossible procedure of establishing the several avidys on the basis of the very souls which are assumed to be due to those avidys4 ,and if you attempt to give to the argument a somewhat different turn1 by maintaining that it is the avidys abiding in the earlier souls which fictitiously give rise to the later souls1 we point out that this implies the souls being short-lived only1 and moreover that each soul would have to take upon itself the consequences of deeds not its own and escape the consequences of its own deeds4 ,the same reasoning disposes of the hypothesis that it is ,brahman which effects the fictitious existence of the subsequent souls by means of the avidys abiding within the earlier souls4 ,and if there is assumed a beginningless flow of avidys1 it follows that there is also a beginningless flow of the condition of the souls dependent on those avidys1 and that steady uniformity of the state of the souls which is supposed to hold good up to the moment of ,release could thus not be established4 ,concerning your assertion that1 as ,nescience is something unreal and hence altogether unproved1 it is not disestablished by such defects as mutual dependence which touch real things only2 we remark that in that case ,nescience would cling even to released souls and the highest ,brahman itself4--,but impure ,nescience cannot cling to what has for its essence pure cognition6--,is ,nescience then to be dealt with by rational arguments8 ,if so1 it will follow that1 on account of the arguments set forth 7mutual dependence1 and so on71 it likewise does not cling to the individual souls4 ,we further put the following question-- ,when the ,nescience abiding in the individual soul passes away1 owing to the rise of the knowledge of truth1 does then the soul also perish or does it not perish8 ,in the former case ,release is nothing else but destruction of the essential nature of the soul2 in the latter case the soul does not attain ,release even on the destruction of ,nescience1 since it continues to exist as soul different from ,brahman4--,you have further maintained that the distinction of souls as pure and impure1 c41 admits of being accounted for in the same way as the dimness or clearness1 and so on1 of the different images of a face as seen reflected in mirrors1 crystals1 sword-blades and the like4 ,but here the following point requires consideration4 ,on what occasion do the smallness1 dimness and other imperfections due to the limiting adjuncts 7i4e4 the mirrors1 c47 pass away8--,when the mirrors and other limiting adjuncts themselves pass away6--,does then1 we ask1 the reflected image which is the substrate of those imperfections persist or not8 ,if you say that it persists1 then by analogy the individual soul also must be assumed to persist1 and from this it follows that it does not attain ,release4 ,and if the reflected image is held to perish together with its imperfections1 by analogy the soul also will perish and then ,release will be nothing but annihilation4-- ,consider the following point also4 ,the destruction of a non-advantageous 7apurushrtha7 defect is of advantage to him who is conscious of that disadvantage4 ,is it then1 we ask1 in the given case ,brahman--which corresponds to the thing reflected--that is conscious of the imperfections due to the limiting adjuncts8 or is it the soul which corresponds to the reflected image8 or is it something else8 ,on the two former alternatives it appears that the comparison 7between ,brahman and the soul on the one hand1 and the thing reflected and the reflection on the other--on which comparison your whole theory is founded7 does not hold good2 for neither the face nor the reflection of the face is conscious of the imperfections due to the adjuncts2 for neither of the two is a being capable of consciousness4 ,and1 moreover1 ,brahman's being conscious of imperfections would imply its being the abode of ,nescience4 ,and the third alternative1 again1 is impossible1 since there is no other knowing subject but ,brahman and the soul4--,it would1 moreover1 be necessary to define who is the imaginatively shaping agent 7kalpaka7 with regard to the soul as formed from ,nescience4 ,it cannot be ,nescience itself1 because ,nescience is not an intelligent principle4 ,nor can it be the soul1 because this would imply the defect of what has to be proved being presupposed for the purposes of the proof2 and because the existence of the soul is that which is formed by ,nescience1 just as shell-silver is4 ,and if1 finally1 you should say that ,brahman is the fictitiously forming agent1 we have again arrived at a ,brahman that is the abode of ,nescience4--,if ,brahman is not allowed to be the abode of ,nescience1 we further must ask whether ,brahman sees 7is conscious of7 the individual souls or not4 ,if not1 it is not possible that ,brahman should give rise to this manifold creation which1 as ,scripture declares1 is preceded by 'seeing' on his part1 and to the differentiation of names and forms4 ,if1 on the other hand1 ,brahman which is of an absolutely homogeneous nature sees the souls1 it cannot do so without ,nescience2 and thus we are again led to the view of ,nescience abiding in ,brahman4 ,for similar reasons the theory of the distinction of ,mya and ,nescience must also be abandoned4 ,for even if ,brahman possesses ,my1 i4e4 illusive power1 it cannot1 without ,nescience1 be conscious of souls4 ,and without being conscious of others the lord of ,my is unable to delude them by his ,my2 and ,my herself cannot bring about the consciousness of others on the part of its ,lord1 for it is a mere means to delude others1 after they have 7by other means7 become objects of consciousness4-- ,perhaps you will say that the ,my of ,brahman causes him to be conscious of souls1 and at the same time is the cause of those souls' delusion4 ,but if ,my causes ,brahman--which is nothing but self-illuminated intelligence1 absolutely homogeneous and free from all foreign elements-- to become conscious of other beings1 then ,my is nothing but another name for ,nescience4--,let it then be said that ,nescience is the cause of the cognition of what is contrary to truth2 such being the case1 ,my which presents all false things different from ,brahman as false1 and thus is not the cause of wrong cognition on the part of ,brahman1 is not avidy4--,but this is inadmissible2 for1 when the oneness of the moon is known1 that which causes the idea of the moon being double can be nothing else but avidy4 ,moreover1 if ,brahman recognises all beings apart from himself as false1 he does not delude them2 for surely none but a madman would aim at deluding beings known by him to be unreal6-- ,let us then define avidy as the cause of a disadvantageous cognition of unreal things4 ,my then1 as not being the cause of such a disadvantageous cognition on ,brahman's part1 cannot be of the nature of avidy6--,but this also is inadmissible2 for although the idea of the moon being double is not the cause of any pain1 and hence not disadvantageous to man1 it is all the same caused by avidy2 and if1 on the other hand1 ,my which aims at dispelling that idea 7in so far as it presents the image and idea of one moon7 did not present what is of disadvantage1 it would not be something to be destroyed1 and hence would be permanently connected with ,brahman's nature4--,well1 if it were so1 what harm would there be8--,the harm would be that such a view implies the theory of duality1 and hence would be in conflict with the texts inculcating non-duality such as ',for where there is duality as it were1 c42 but when for him the ,self only has become all1 whereby then should he see1 and whom should he see8'--,but those texts set forth the ,real2 ,my on the other hand is non-real1 and hence the view of its permanency is not in real conflict with the texts6--,brahman1 we reply1 has for its essential nature unlimited bliss1 and hence cannot be conscious of1 or affected with1 unreal ,my1 without avidy4 ,of what use1 we further ask1 should an eternal non-real ,my be to ,brahman8--,brahman by means of it deludes the individual souls6--,but of what use should such delusion be to ,brahman8--,it affords to ,brahman a kind of sport or play6--,but of what use is play to a being whose nature is unlimited bliss8--,do we not then see in ordinary life also that persons in the enjoyment of full happiness and prosperity indulge all the same in play8--,the cases are not parallel1 we reply4 ,for none but persons not in their right mind would take pleasure in an unreal play1 carried on by means of implements unreal and known by them to be unreal1 and in the consciousness1 itself1 unreal of such a play6--,the arguments set forth previously also prove the impossibility of the fictitious existence of an individual soul considered as the abode of avidy1 apart from ,brahman considered as the abode of ,my4 ,we thus arrive at the conclusion that those who hold the non-duality of ,brahman must also admit that it is ,brahman alone which is affected with beginningless avidy1 and owing to this avidy is conscious of plurality within itself4 ,nor must it be urged against him who holds this view of avidy belonging to ,brahman that he is unable to account for the distinction of bondage and release1 for as there is only the one ,brahman affected with ,nescience and to be released by the cessation of that ,nescience1 the distinction of souls bound and released1 c41 has no true existence3 the empirical distinction of souls bound and released1 of teachers and pupils1 c4 is a merely fictitious one1 and all such fiction can be explained by means of the avidy of one intelligent being4 ,the case is analogous to that of a person dreaming3 the teachers and pupils and all the other persons and things he may see in his dream are fictitiously shaped out of the avidy of the one dreaming subject4 ,for the same reason there is no valid foundation for the assumption of many avidys4 ,for those also who hold that avidy belongs to the individual souls do not maintain that the distinction of bondage and release1 of one's own self and other persons1 is real2 and if it is unreal it can be accounted for by the avidy of one subject4 ,this admits of being stated in various technical ways4--,the distinctions of bondage and of one's own self and other persons are fictitiously shaped by one's own avidy2 for they are unreal like the distinctions seen by a dreaming person4--,other bodies also have a ,self through me only2 for they are bodies like this my body4--,other bodies also are fictitiously shaped by my avidy2 for they are bodies or effects1 or non-intelligent or fictitious creations1 as this my body is4--,the whole class of intelligent subjects is nothing but me2 for they are of intelligent nature2 what is not me is seen to be of non-intelligent nature2 as e4g4 jars4--,it thus follows that the distinctions of one's own self and other persons1 of souls bound and released1 of pupils and teachers1 and so on1 are fictitiously created by the avidy of one intelligent subject4 ,the fact is that the upholder of ,duality himself is not able to account for the distinction of souls bound and released4 ,for as there is an infinity of past aeons1 it follows that1 even if one soul only should attain release in each aeon1 all souls would by this time have attained release2 the actual existence of non-released souls cannot thus be rationally accounted for4--,but the souls are 'infinite'2 this accounts for there being souls not yet released6--,what1 pray1 do you understand by this 'infinity' of souls8 ,does it mean that they cannot be counted8 ,this we cannot allow1 for although a being of limited knowledge may not be able to count them1 owing to their large number1 the all-knowing ,lord surely can count them2 if he could not do so it would follow that he is not all-knowing4--,but the souls are really numberless1 and the ,lord's not knowing a definite number which does not exist does not prove that he is not all-knowing6--,not so1 we reply4 ,things which are definitely separate 7bhinna7 from each other cannot be without number4 ,souls have a number1 because they are separate2 just as mustard seeds1 beans1 earthen vessels1 pieces of cloth1 and so on4 ,and from their being separate it moreover follows that souls1 like earthen vessels1 and so on1 are non- intelligent1 not of the nature of ,self1 and perishable2 and it further follows therefrom that ,brahman is not infinite4 ,for by infinity we understand the absence of all limitation4 ,now on the theory which holds that there is a plurality of separate existences1 ,brahman which is considered to differ in character from other existences cannot be said to be free from substantial limitation2 for substantial limitation means nothing else than the existence of other substances4 ,and what is substantially limited cannot be said to be free from temporal and spatial limitation2 for observation shows that it is just those things which differ in nature from other things and thus are substantially limited--such as earthen vessels1 and so on--which are also limited in point of space and time4 ,hence all intelligent existences1 including ,brahman1 being substantially limited1 are also limited in point of space and time4 ,but this conclusion leads to a conflict with those scriptural texts which declare ,brahman to be free from all limitation whatsoever 7',the ,true1 knowledge1 infinite is ,brahman1' and similar texts71 and moreover would imply that the souls as well as ,brahman are liable to origination1 decay1 and so on2 for limitation in time means nothing else but a being's passing through the stages of origination1 decay1 and so on4 ,the dvaita-view thus being found untenable on all sides1 we adhere to our doctrine that this entire world1 from ,brahm down to a blade of grass1 springs from the avidy attached to ,brahman which in itself is absolutely unlimited2 and that the distinctions of consciousness of pleasure and pain1 and all similar distinctions1 explain themselves from the fact of all of them being of the nature of avidya1 just as the distinctions of which a dreaming person is conscious4 ,the one ,brahman1 whose nature is eternal self-illuminedness1 free from all heterogeneous elements1 owing to the influence of avidy illusorily manifests itself 7vivarttate7 in the form of this world2 and as thus in reality there exists nothing whatever different from ,brahman1 we hold that the world is 'non-different' from ,brahman4 ,to this the ,dvaitavdin1 i4e4 the ,vaiseshika1 replies as follows4 ,the doctrine that ,brahman1 which in itself is pure1 non-differenced self- illuminedness1 has its own true nature hidden by avidy and hence sees plurality within itself1 is in conflict with all the valid means of right knowledge2 for as ,brahman is without parts1 obscuration1 i4e4 cessation1 of the light of ,brahman1 would mean complete destruction of ,brahman2 so that the hypothesis of obscuration is altogether excluded4 ,this and other arguments have been already set forth2 as also that the hypothesis of obscuration contradicts other views held by the ,advaitin4 ,nor is there any proof for the assertion that effects apart from their causes are mere error1 like shell-silver1 the separate existence of the effect being refuted by ,reasoning2 for as a matter of fact there is no valid reasoning of the kind4 ,the assertion that the cause only is real because it persists1 while the non-continuous effects--such as jars and waterpots--are unreal1 has also been refuted before1 on the ground that the fact of a thing not existing at one place and one time does not sublate its real existence at another time and place4 ,nor is there any soundness in the argumentation that the effect is false because1 owing to its being perceived and its being perishable1 it cannot be defined either as real or unreal4 ,for a thing's being perceived and its being perishable does not prove the thing's falseness1 but only its non- permanency4 ,to prove a thing's falseness it is required to show that it is sublated 7i4e4 that its non-existence is proved by valid means7 with reference to that very place and time in connexion with which it is perceived2 but that a thing is sublated with reference to a place and time other than those in connexion with which it is perceived1 proves only that the thing does not exist in connexion with that place and time1 but not that it is false4 ,this view also may be put in technical form1 viz4 effects such as jars and the like are real because they are not sublated with regard to their definite place and time2 just as the ,self is4--,nor is there any truth in the assertion that the effect cannot originate from the cause either modified or unmodified2 for the effect may originate from the cause if connected with certain favouring conditions of place1 time1 c4 ,nor can you show any proof for the assertion that the cause1 whether modified or non-modified1 cannot enter into connexion with such favouring conditions2 as a matter of fact the cause may very well1 without being modified1 enter into such connexion4-- ,but from this it follows that the cause must have been previously connected with those conditions1 since previously also it was equally unmodified6--,not so1 we reply4 ,the connexion with favouring conditions of time1 place1 c41 into which the cause enters1 depends on some other cause1 and not therefore on the fact of its not being modified4 ,no fault then can be found with the view of the cause1 when having entered into a special state depending on its connexion with time1 place1 c41 producing the effect4 ,nor can it be denied in any way that the cause possesses originative agency with regard to the effect2 for such agency is actually observed1 and cannot be proved to be irrational4--,further there is no proof for the assertion that originative agency cannot belong either to mere gold or to a 7first7 effect of gold such as coined gold1 or to gold in so far as forming the substrate for coins and the like2 for as a matter of fact mere gold 7gold in general71 if connected with the helpful factors mentioned above1 may very well possess originative capacity4 ,to say that we do not perceive any effect different from gold is futile2 for as a matter of fact we perceive the svastika-ornament which is different from mere gold1 and the existence of different terms and ideas moreover proves the existence of different things4 ,nor have we here to do with a mere error analogous to that of shell-silver4 ,for a real effected thing1 such as a golden ornament1 is perceived during the whole period intervening between its origination and destruction1 and such perception is not sublated with regard to that time and place4 ,nor is there any valid line of reasoning to sublate that perception4 ,that at the same time when the previously non-perceived svastika-ornament is perceived the gold also is recognised1 is due to the fact of the gold persisting as the substrate of the ornament1 and hence such recognition of the causal substance does not disprove the reality of the effect4--,and the attempts to prove the unreality of the world by means of scriptural texts we have already disposed of in a previous part of this work4 ,we further object to the assertion that it is one ,self which bestows on all bodies the property of being connected with the ,self2 as from this it would follow that one person is conscious of all the pains and pleasures caused by all bodies4 ,for1 as seen in the case of ,saubhari and others1 it is owing to the oneness of the ,self that one person is conscious of the pains and pleasures due to several bodies4 ,nor again must you allege that the non-consciousness 7on the part of one ,self of all pleasures and pains whatever71 is due to the plurality of the ,egos1 which are the subjects of cognition1 and not to the plurality of ,selfs2 for the ,self is none other than the subject of cognition and the ,ego4 ,the organ of egoity 7ahamkra71 on the other hand1 which is the same as the internal organ 7antahkarana71 cannot be the knowing subject1 for it is of a non-intelligent nature1 and is a mere instrument like the body and the sense-organs4 ,this also has been proved before4--,nor is there any proof for your assertion that all bodies must be held to spring from the avidy of one subject1 because they are bodies1 non-intelligent1 effects1 fictitious4 ,for that all bodies are the fictitious creations of avidy is not true2 since that which is not sublated by valid means of proof must be held to be real4--,nor again can you uphold the assertion that all intelligent subjects are non-different1 i4e4 one1 because we observe that whatever is other than a subject of cognition is non- intelligent2 for this also is disproved by the fact of the plurality of intelligent subjects as proved by the individual distribution1 among them1 of pleasures and pains4--,you have further maintained ',through me only all bodies are animated by a ,self2 they are the fictitious creations of my avidy2 ,i alone constitute the whole aggregate of intelligent subjects1' and1 on the basis of these averments1 have attempted to prove the oneness of the ,ego4 ,but all this is nothing but the random talk of a person who has not mastered even the principles of his own theory2 for according to your theory the ,self is pure intelligence to which the whole distinction of ',i1' ',thou1' c41 is altogether foreign4 ,moreover1 if it be held that everything different from pure1 non-differenced intelligence is false1 it follows that all effort spent on learning the ,veda with a view to ,release is fruitless1 for the ,veda also is the effect of avidy1 and the effort spent on it therefore is analogous to the effort of taking hold of the silver wrongly imagined in the shell4 ,or1 to put it from a different point of view1 all effort devoted to ,release is purposeless1 since it is the effect of knowledge depending on teachers of merely fictitious existence4 ,knowledge produced by texts such as ',thou art that' does not put an end to bondage1 because it is produced by texts which are the fictitious product of avidy2 or because it is itself of the nature of avidy2 or because it has for its abode knowing subjects1 who are mere creatures of avidy2 or because it is the product of a process of study which depends on teachers who are the mere creatures of avidy2 it is thus no better than knowledge resting on texts teaching how bondage is to be put an end to1 which one might have heard in a dream4 ,or1 to put the matter again from a different point of view1 ,brahman constituted by pure non- differenced intelligence is false1 since it is to be attained by knowledge1 which is the effect of avidy2 or since it is to be attained by knowledge abiding in knowing subjects who are mere figments of avidy2 or because it is attained through knowledge which is the mere figment of avidy4 ,for whatever is attained through knowledge of that kind is false2 as e4g4 the things seen in dreams or a town of the ,gandharvas 7,fata ,morgana74 ,nor does ,brahman1 constituted by pure non-differenced intelligence1 shine forth by itself1 so as not to need--for its cognition--other means of knowledge4 ,and that that self-luminous knowledge which you declare to be borne witness to by itself1 really consists in the knowledge of particular objects of knowledge--such knowledge abiding in particular cognising subjects--this also has been proved previously4 ,and the different arguments which were set forth as proving ,brahman's non- differenced nature1 are sufficiently refuted by what we have said just now as to all such arguments themselves being the products of avidy4 ,nor again is there any sense in the theory that the principle of non- differenced intelligence 'witnesses' avidy1 and implicates itself in the error of the world4 ,for 'witnessing' and error are observed to abide only in definite conscious subjects1 not in consciousness in general4 ,nor can that principle of pure intelligence be proved to possess illumining power or light depending on itself only4 ,for by light 7enlightenment7 we can understand nothing but definite well-established knowledge 7siddhi7 on the part of some knowing subject with regard to some particular object4 ,it is on this basis only that you yourself prove the self-illuminedness of your universal principle2 to an absolutely non- differenced intelligence not implying the distinction of subject and object such 'svayampraksat' could not possibly belong4 ,with regard again to what you so loudly proclaim at your meetings1 viz4 that real effects are seen to spring even from unreal causes1 we point out that although you allow to such effects1 being non-sublatcd as it were1 a kind of existence called 'empirical' 7or 'conventional'--vyvahrika71 you yourself acknowledge that fundamentally they are nothing but products of avidy2 you thus undermine your own position4 ,we have1 on the other hand1 already disposed of this your view above1 when proving that in all cases effects are originated by real causes only4 ,nor may you plead that what perception tells us in such cases is contradicted by ,scripture2 for as1 according to you1 ,scripture itself is an effect1 and hence of the essence of avidy1 it is in no better case than the instances quoted4 ,you have further declared that1 although ,brahman is to be attained only through unreal knowledge1 yet it is real since when once attained it is not sublated by any subsequent cognition4 ,but this reasoning also is not valid2 for when it has once been ascertained that some principle is attained through knowledge resting on a vicious basis1 the fact that we are not aware of a subsequent sublation of that principle is irrelevant4 ,that the principle 'the reality of things is a universal ,void' is false1 we conclude therefrom that the reasoning leading to that principle is ascertained to be ill-founded1 although we are not aware of any subsequent truth sublating that principle4 ,moreover1 for texts such as ',there is here no plurality whatsoever'1 ',knowledge1 bliss is ,brahman1' the absence of subsequent sublation is claimed on the ground that they negative the whole aggregate of things different from mere intelligence1 and hence are later in order than all other texts 7which had established that aggregate of things74 ,but somebody may rise and say 'the ,reality is a ,void'1 and thus negative the existence of the principle of mere ,intelligence also2 and the latter principle is thus sublated by the assertion as to the ,void1 which is later in order than the texts which it negatives4 ,on the other hand the assertion as to the ,void being the universal principle is not liable to subsequent sublation2 for it is impossible for any negation to go beyond it4 ,and as to resting on a vicious basis1 there is in that respect no difference between ,perception and the other means of knowledge1 and the view of general unreality1 founded on the ,vednta4 ,the proper conclusion therefore is that all cognitions whatsoever abide in real subjects of cognition and are themselves real1 consisting in mental certainty with regard to special objects4 ,some of these cognitions rest on defects which themselves are real2 others spring from a combination of causes1 real and free from all defect4 ,unless we admit all this we shall not be able to account in a satisfactory way for the distinction of things true and things false1 and for all empirical thought4 ,for empirical thought1 whether true or of the nature of error1 presupposes inward light 7illumination7 in the form of certainty with regard to a particular object1 and belonging to a real knowing subject2 mere non-differenced ,being1 on the other hand 7not particularised in the form of a knowing subject71 cannot be the cause of states of consciousness1 whether referring to real or ,unreal things1 and cannot therefore form the basis of empirical thought4 ,against our opponent's argument that pure ,being must be held the real substrate of all erroneous superimposition 7adhysa71 for the reason that no error can exist without a substrate1 we remark that an error may take place even when its substrate is unreal1 in the same way as an error may exist even when the defect 7giving rise to the error71 the abode of the defect1 the subject of cognition and the cognition itself are unreal4 ,the argument thus loses its force4 ,possibly he will now argue that as an error is never seen to exist where the substrate is unreal1 the reality of pure ,being 7as furnishing the required basis for error7 must necessarily be admitted4 ,but1 we point out1 it also is a fact that errors are never observed where the defect1 the abode of the defect1 the knowing subject and the act of knowledge are unreal2 and if we pay regard to observation1 we must therefore admit the reality of all these factors as well4 ,there is really no difference between the two cases1 unless our opponent chooses to be obstinate4 ,you further asserted that1 on the theory of many really different ,selfs1 it would follow from the infinity of the past aeons that all souls must have been released before this1 none being left in the state of bondage2 and that hence the actually observed distinction of souls bound and released remains unexplained4 ,but this argumentation is refuted by the fact of the souls also being infinite4 ,you indeed maintained that1 if the souls are really separate1 they must necessarily have a definite number like beans1 mustard-seeds1 earthen vessels1 and so on2 but these instances are beside the point1 as earthen vessels1 and so on1 are also infinite in number4--,but do we not actually see that all these things have definite numbers1 ',here are ten jars2 a thousand beans1' c48--,true1 but those numbers do not belong to the essential nature of jars1 and so on1 but only to jars in so far as connected with time1 place1 and other limiting adjuncts4 ,and that souls also have definite numbers in this sense1 we readily admit4 ,and from this it does not follow that all souls should be released2 for essentially the souls are infinite 7in number74-- ,nor are you entitled to maintain that the real separation of individual souls would imply that1 as earthen vessels and the like1 they are non- intelligent1 not of the nature of ,self1 and perishable4 ,for the circumstance of individuals of one species being distinct from each other1 does in no way imply that they possess the characteristics of things belonging to another species3 the individual separation of jars does not imply their having the characteristics of pieces of cloth4--,you further maintain that from the hypothesis of a real plurality of souls it follows that ,brahman is substantially limited1 and in consequence of this limited with regard to time and space also1 and that hence its infinity is disproved4 ,but this also is a mistaken conclusion4 ,things substantially limited may be limited more or less with regard to time and place3 there is no invariable rule on this point1 and the measure of their connexion with space and time has hence to be determined in dependence on other means of knowledge4 ,now ,brahman's connexion with all space and all time results from such other means of proof1 and hence there is no contradiction 7between this non-limitation with regard to space and time1 and its limitation in point of substance--which is due to the existence of other souls74--,but mere substantial limitation1 as meaning the absence of non-limitation of any kind1 by itself proves that ,brahman is not infinite6--,well1 then you yourself are in no better case2 for you admit that ,brahman is something different from avidy4 ,from this admission it follows that ,brahman also is something 'different'1 and thus all the disadvantages connected with the view of difference cling to your theory as well4 ,if on the other hand it should not be allowed that ,brahman differs in nature from avidy1 then ,brahman's nature itself is constituted by avidy1 and the text defining ,brahman as 'the ,true1 knowledge1 infinite' is contrary to sense4--,if the reality of 'difference' is not admitted1 then there is no longer any distinction between the proofs and the mutual objections set forth by the advocates of different theories1 and we are landed in general confusion4 ,the proof of infinity1 we further remark1 rests altogether on the absence of limitation of space and time1 not on absence of substantial limitation2 absence of such limitation is something very much akin to the 'horn of a hare' and is perceived nowhere4 ,on the view of difference1 on the other hand1 the whole world1 as constituting ,brahman's body1 is its mode1 and ,brahman is thus limited neither through itself nor through other things4-- ,we thus arrive at the conclusion that1 as effects are real in so far as different from their cause1 the effect of ,brahman1 i4e4 the entire world1 is different from ,brahman4 ,against this view the ,stra now declares itself as follows4--,the non- difference of the world from ,brahman1 the highest cause1 follows from 'what begins with the word rambhana'--which proves such non-difference2 'what begins with the word rambhana' means those clauses at the head of which that word is met with1 viz4 'vkrambhanam vikro nmadheyam mrittikety eva satyam'2 ',being only this was in the beginning1 one only1 without a second'2 'it thought1 may ,i be many1 may ,i grow forth2 it sent forth fire'2 'having entered with this living ,self2 ',in the ,true1 my son1 all these creatures have their root1 in the ,true they dwell1 in the ,true they rest'2 ',in that all that exists has its ,self2 it is the ,true1 it is the ,self2 and thou art it1 ,o ,svetaketu' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #a-h7--;it is these clauses and others of similar purport which are met with in other chapters1 that the ,stra refers to4 ,for these texts prove the non- difference from ,brahman of the world consisting of non-sentient and sentient beings4 ,this is as follows4 ,the teacher1 bearing in his mind the idea of ,brahman constituting the sole cause of the entire world and of the non-difference of the effect from the cause1 asks the pupil1 ',have you ever asked for that instruction by which the non-heard is heard1 the non-perceived is perceived1 the not known is known'2 wherein there is implied the promise that1 through the knowledge of ,brahman the general cause1 its effect1 i4e4 the whole ,universe1 will be known8 ,the pupil1 not knowing that ,brahman is the sole cause of the ,universe1 raises a doubt as to the possibility of one thing being known through another1',how then1 ,sir1 is that instruction8' and the teacher thereupon1 in order to convey the notion of ,brahman being the sole universal cause1 quotes an instance showing that the non-difference of the effect from the cause is proved by ordinary experience1 ',as by one clod of clay there is known everything that is made of clay'2 the meaning being 'as jars1 pots1 and the like1 which are fashioned out of one piece of clay1 are known through the cognition of that clay1 since their substance is not different from it4',in order to meet the objection that according to ,kanda's doctrine the effect constitutes a substance different from the cause1 the teacher next proceeds to prove the non-difference of the effect from the cause by reference to ordinary experience1 'vkrambhanam vikro namadheyam mrittikety eva satyam'4 rambhanam must here be explained as that which is taken or touched 7-rabh -labh2 and 'lambhah sparsahimsayoh'72 compare ,pnini ,,iii1 #c1 #aac1 as to the form and meaning of the word4 ',vk1' 'on account of speech1' we take to mean 'on account of activity preceded by speech'2 for activities such as the fetching of water in a pitcher are preceded by speech1',fetch water in the pitcher1' and so on4 ,for the bringing about of such activity1 the material clay 7which had been mentioned just before7 touches 7enters into contact with7 an effect 7vikra71 i4e4 a particular make or configuration1 distinguished by having a broad bottom and resembling the shape of a belly1 and a special name 7nmadheya71 viz4 pitcher1 and so on1 which is applied to that effect2 or1 to put it differently1 to the end that certain activities may be accomplished1 the substance clay receives a new configuration and a new name4 ,,footnote #dee3a ,hence jars and other things of clay are clay 7mrittik71 i4e4 are of the substance of clay1 only2 this only is true 7satyam71 i4e4 known through authoritative means of proof2 only 7eva71 because the effects are not known as different substances4 ,one and the same substance therefore1 such as clay or gold1 gives occasion for different ideas and words only as it assumes different configurations2 just as we observe that one and the same ,devadatta becomes the object of different ideas and terms1 and gives rise to different effects1 according to the different stages of life--youth1 old age1 c4--which he has reached4--,the fact of our saying 'the jar has perished' while yet the clay persists1 was referred to by the ,prvapakshin as proving that the effect is something different from the cause2 but this view is disproved by the view held by us that origination1 destruction1 and so on1 are merely different states of one and the same causal substance4 ,according as one and the same substance is in this or that state1 there belong to it different terms and different activities1 and these different states may rightly be viewed as depending on the activity of an agent4 ,the objections again which are connected with the theory of 'manifestation' are refuted by our not acknowledging such a thing at all as 'manifestation4' ,nor does the admission of origination render the doctrine of the reality of the effect irrational2 for it is only the ,real that originates4--,but it is a contradiction to maintain that that which previously exists is originated6--,this1 we reply1 is the objection of a person who knows nothing about the true nature of origination and destruction4 ,a substance enters into different states in succession2 what passes away is the substance in its previous states1 what originates is the substance in its subsequent states4 ,as thus the substance in all its states has being1 there is nothing irrational in the satkrya theory4-- ,but the admission of the origination of a non-existing state lands us in the asatkrya theory6--,if he1 we retort1 who holds the asatkrya theory is of opinion that the origination of the effect does not itself originate1 he is similarly landed in the satkrya theory2 and if he holds that the origination itself originates1 he is led into a regressus in infinitum4 ,according to us1 on the other hand1 who hold that states are incapable of being apprehended and of acting apart from that of which they are states1 origination1 destruction1 and so on1 belong only to a substance which is in a certain state2 and on this theory no difficulty remains4 ,and in the same way as the state of being a jar results from the clay abandoning the condition of being either two halves of a jar or a lump of clay1 plurality results from a substance giving up the state of oneness1 and oneness from the giving up of plurality2 hence this point also gives rise to no difficulty4 ,we now consider the whole ,chndogya-text in connexion4 ',sad eva somyedam agra sd ekam evdvityam4' ,this means--,that which is ,being1 i4e4 this world which now1 owing to the distinction of names and forms1 bears a manifold shape1 was in the beginning one only1 owing to the absence of the distinction of names and forms4 ,and as1 owing to the ',sat' being endowed with all powers1 a further ruling principle is out of the question1 the world was also 'without a second4' ,this proves the non- difference of the world from ,brahman4 ,in the same way the next clause also1' ,it thought1 may ,i be many1 may ,i grow forth1' which describes the creation of the world as proceeding from a resolve of the ,self to differentiate itself into a world consisting of manifold beings movable and immovable1 viz4 ,fire1 and so on1 enables us to determine that the effect1 i4 e4 the world1 is non-different from the highest cause1 i4e4 the highest ,brahman4 ,and as now a further doubt may arise as to how the highest ,brahman with all its perfections can be designated as one with the world1 and how the world can be designated as one1 without a second1 not dependent on another guiding principle2 and how this thought1 i4e4 the resolution1 on the part of the ,supreme cause1 of differentiating itself into a manifold world1 and the creation corresponding to that resolution are possible2 the text continues1',that deity thought--,let me now enter those three beings with this living ,self 7jva tman7 and distinguish names and forms'--which means1 ',let me make the aggregate of non-sentient things 7for this is meant by the three beings7 to possess various names and forms1 by entering into them by means of the gva1 which is of the nature of my ,self4',the possession of names and forms must thus be understood to be effected by the jva entering into matter as its ,self4 ,there is another scriptural text also which makes it clear that the highest ,brahman enters1 so as to be their ,self1 into the world together with the jvas4 ',having sent forth that he entered into it4 ,having entered into it he became sat and tyat 7i4e4 sentient and non-sentient beings74',and that the entire aggregate of sentient and non-sentient beings1 gross or subtle1 in their effected or their causal state1 constitutes the body of the highest ,brahman1 and that on the other hand the highest ,brahman constitutes their ,self--this is proved by the antarymin-brhmana and similar texts4 ,this disposes of the doubt raised above4 ,since ,brahman abides1 as their ,self1 in all non-sentient matter together with the jvas1 ,brahman is denoted by the term 'world' in so far only as it 7i4e4 ,brahman7 has non-sentient and sentient beings for its body1 and hence utterances such as ',this which is ,being only was in the beginning one only' are unobjectionable in every way4 ,all change and all imperfection belongs only to the beings constituting ,brahman's body1 and ,brahman itself is thus proved to be free from all imperfection1 a treasure as it were of all imaginable holy qualites4 ,this point will be further elucidated under ,,ii1 #a1 #bb4--,the ,chndogya-text then further teaches that all sentient and non-sentient beings have their ,self in ,brahman 'in that all this has its ,self2 and further inculcates this truth in ',thou art that4' ,texts met with in other sections also teach this same non-difference of the general cause and its effect3 ',all this indeed is ,brahman' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #ad1 #a72 ',when the ,self has been seen1 heard1 perceived1 and known1 then all this is known' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #e1 #f72 ',that ,self is all this' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #d1 #f72 ',brahman indeed is all this' 7,mai4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #f72 ',the ,self only is all this' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vii1 #be1 #b74 ,other texts1 too1 negative difference3 ',everything abandons him who looks for anything elsewhere than in the ,self 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #d1 #f72 ',there is not any plurality here' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #d1 #ai72 ',from death to death goes he who sees here any plurality' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #d1 #ai74 ,and in the same spirit the passage ',for where there is duality as it were1 one sees the other2 but when for him the ,self has become all1 whereby then should he sec and whom8'7,bri4 ,up4 #aa1d1 #ac7--;in setting forth that the view of duality belongs to him who does not know and the view of non-duality to him who knows--intimates that non-difference only is real4 ,it is in this way that we prove1 by means of the texts beginning with rambhana1 that the world is non-different from the universal cause1 i4e4 the highest ,brahman4 ,brahman only1 having the aggregate of sentient and non-sentient beings for its body and hence for its modes 7prakra71 is denoted by all words whatsoever4 ,the body of this ,brahman is sometimes constituted by sentient and non-sentient beings in their subtle state1 when--just owing to that subtle state--they are incapable of being 7conceived and7 designated as apart from ,brahman whose body they form3 ,brahman is then in its so-called causal condition4 ,at other times the body of ,brahman is constituted by all sentient and non-sentient beings in their gross1 manifest state1 owing to which they admit of being thought and spoken of as having distinct names and forms3 ,brahman then is in its 'effected' state4 ,the effect1 i4e4 the world1 is thus seen to be non-different from the cause1 i4e4 the highest ,brahman4 ,and that in the effected as well as the causal state of ,brahman's body as constituted by sentient and non-sentient beings1 and of ,brahman embodied therein1 perfections and imperfections are distributed according to the difference of essential nature between ,brahman and its body1 as proved by hundreds of scriptural texts1 we have shown above4 ,those on the other hand who establish the non-difference of cause and effect1 on the basis of the theory of the effect's non-reality1 are unable to prove what they wish to prove2 for the ,true and the ,false cannot possibly be one4 ,if these two were one1 it would follow either that ,brahman is false or that the world is real4--,those again who 7like ,bhskara7 hold the effect also to be real--the difference of the soul and ,brahman being due to limiting conditions1 while their non-difference is essential2 and the difference as well as the non-difference of ,brahman and matter being essential--enter into conflict with all those texts which declare that the soul and ,brahman are distinct in so far as the soul is under the power of karman while ,brahman is free from all evil1 c41 and all those texts which teach that non-sentient matter undergoes changes while ,brahman does not4 ,for as1 according to them1 nothing exists but ,brahman and the limiting adjuncts1 ,brahman--as being indivisible--must be undivided while entering into connexion with the updhis1 and hence itself undergoes a change into inferior forms4 ,and if they say that it is only the power 7sakti71 not ,brahman itself1 which undergoes a change2 this also is of no avail since ,brahman and its power are non-different4 ,others again 7,ydavapraksa7 hold that the general cause1 i4e4 ,brahman1 is pure ,being in which all distinctions and changes such as being an enjoying subject1 and so on1 have vanished1 while however it is endowed with all possible potentialities4 ,during a pralaya this causal substance abides self-luminous1 with all the distinctions of consciousness of pleasure and pain gone to rest1 comparable to the soul of a man held by dreamless sleep1 different however in nature from mere non-sentient matter4 ,during the period of a creation1 on the other hand1 just as the substance called clay assumes the forms of jars1 platters1 and so on1 or as the water of the sea turns itself into foam1 waves1 bubbles1 and so on1 the universal causal substance abides in the form of a triad of constituent parts1 viz4 enjoying subjects1 objects of enjoyment1 and a ruler4 ,the attributes of being a ruler1 or an object of enjoyment1 or an enjoying subject1 and the perfections and imperfections depending on those attributes1 are therefore distributed in the same way as the attributes of being a jar or pitcher or platter2 and the different effects of these attributes are distributed among different parts of the substance1 clay4 ,the objects of enjoyment1 subjects of enjoyment1 and the ruler are one1 on the other hand1 in so far as 'that which is' constitutes their substance2 just as jars1 platters and pitchers are one in so far as their substance is constituted by clay4 ,it is thus one substance only1 viz4 'that which is1' that appears in different conditions1 and it is in this sense that the world is non-different from ,brahman4--,but this theory is really in conflict with all ,scripture1 ,smriti1 ,itihsa1 ,purna and ,reasoning4 ,for ,scripture1 ,smriti1 ,itihsa and ,purna alike teach that there is one supreme cause1 viz4 ,brahman--a being that is the ,lord of all ,lords1 all-knowing1 all-powerful1 instantaneously realising all its purposes1 free of all blemish1 not limited either by place or time1 enjoying supreme unsurpassable bliss4 ,nor can it be held that above the ,lord there is 'pure ,being' of which the ,lord is a part only4 ,for ',this which is being only was in the beginning one only1 without a second2 it thought1 may ,i be many1 may ,i grow forth' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #b1 #c72 ',verily1 in the beginning this was ,brahman1 one only4 ,being one it was not strong enough4 ,it created the most excellent ,kshattra1 viz4 those ,kshattras among the ,devas--,indra1 ,varuna1 ,soma1 ,rudra1 ,parjanya1 ,yama1 ,mrityu1 sna' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,i1 #d1 #aa72 ',in the beginning all this was ,self1 one only2 there was nothing whatsoever else blinking4 ,he thought1 shall ,i send forth worlds' 7,ait4 r4 ,,ii1 #d1 #a1 #a1 #b72 ',there was in truth ,nryana only1 not ,brahm1 not sna1 nor heaven and earth1 nor the nakshatras1 nor the waters1 nor ,agni1 nor ,soma1 nor ,srya4 ,being alone he felt no delight4 ,of him merged in meditation' c4 7,mahn4 ,up4 ,i1 #a7--these and other texts prove that the highest cause is the ,lord of all ,lords1 ,nryana4 ,for as the terms ',being1' ',brahman1' ',self1' which are met with in sections treating of the same topic1 are in one of those parallel sections particularised by the term ',nryana1' it follows that they all mean ,nryana4 ,that the ,lord only is the universal cause is shown by the following text also1 ',he the highest great lord of lords1 the highest deity of deities--he is the cause1 the lord of the lords of the organs1 and there is of him neither parent nor lord' 7,svet4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #g1 #i74 ,similarly the ,manu ,smriti1 ',then the divine ,self-existent 7,brahm7--desirous to produce from his own body beings of many kind--first with a thought created the waters and placed his seed in them' 7,ma4 ,i1 #f-h74 ,itihsas and ,purnas also declare the ,supreme ,person only to be the universal cause1 ',nryana1 of whom the world is the body1 of infinite nature1 eternal1 when desirous to create sent forth from a thousandth part of himself the souls in two divisions4' ',from ,vishnu the world originated and in him it abides4' ,nor is it possible to hold that the ,lord is pure ',being' only1 for such ',being' is admitted to be an element of the ,lord2 and moreover all ',being' has difference4 ,nor can it be maintained that the ,lord's connexion with all his auspicious qualities--knowledge1 bliss1 and so on--is occasional 7adventitious7 merely2 it rather is essential and hence eternal4 ,nor may you avail yourself of certain texts--viz4 ',his high power 7sakti7 is revealed as manifold1 as essential1 and 7so7 his knowledge1 strength and action' 7,svet4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #h72 ',he who is all- knowing1 all-cognising' 7,mu4 ,up4 ,i1 #a1 #i71 and others--to the end of proving that what is essential is only the ,lord's connexion with the potentialities 7sakti7 of knowledge1 bliss1 and so on4 ,for in the ,svetsvatara-text the word 'essential' independently qualifies 'knowledge1 strength1 and action' no less than 'sakti'2 and your explanation would necessitate so-called implication 7lakshan74 ,nor again can it be said that in words such as sarvja 7all-knowing71 the formative suffix expresses potentiality only1 as it admittedly does in other words such as pkaka 7cook72 for grammar does not teach that all these 7krit7 affixes in general express potentiality or capability only4 ,it rather teaches 7cp4 ,pnini ,,iii1 #b1 #ed7 that a few krit-affixes only have this limited meaning2 and in the case of pkaka and similar words we must assume capability to be denoted1 because there is no other explanation open to us4--,if1 moreover1 the ,lord were held to be only a part of the ,sat it would follow that the ,sat1 as the whole1 would be superior to the ,lord just as the ocean is superior to a wave1 and this would be in conflict with ever so many scriptural texts which make statements about the ,lord1 cp4 e4g4 ',him the highest great lord of lords'2 ',there is none seen like to him or superior' 7,svet4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #g1 #h74 ,if1 moreover1 mere ,being is held to be the ,self of all and the general whole1 and the ,lord only a particular part of it1 this would imply the stultification of all those texts which declare the ,lord to be the general ,self and the whole of which all beings are parts2 for jars and platters certainly cannot be held to be parts of1 and to have their being in1 pitchers 7which themselves are only special things made of clay74 ,against this you perhaps will plead that as ,being in general is fully present in all its parts1 and hence also in that part which is the ,lord1 all other things may be viewed as having their ,self in and being parts of1 him4--,but from your principles we might with equal right draw the inference that as ,being in general is fully present in the jar1 the ,lord is a part of the jar and has his ,self in that6 ,from enunciations such as 'the jar is1' 'the cloth is1' it appears that ,being is an attribute of things1 and cannot therefore be a substance and a cause4 ,by the 'being' of a thing we understand the attribute of its being suitable for some definite practical effect2 while its 'non-being' means its suitability for an effect of an opposite nature4--,should it on the other hand be held that substances only have being1 the 7unacceptable7 consequence would be that actions1 and so on1 are non-existent4 ,and if 7to avoid this consequence7 it were said that the being of actions1 and so on1 depends on their connexion with substances1 it would be difficult to show 7what yet should be shown7 that 'being' is everywhere of one and the same nature4 ,moreover1 if everything were non-different in so far as 'being1' there would be a universal consciousness of the nature of everything1 and from this there would follow a general confusion of all good and evil 7i4e4 every one would have conscious experience of everything7 ,this point we have explained before4 ,for all these reasons non-difference can only have the meaning set forth by us4--,here the following doubt may arise4 ,in the case of childhood1 youth1 and so on1 we observe that different ideas and different terms are applied to different states of one and the same being2 in the case of clay1 wood1 gold1 c41 on the other hand1 we observe that different ideas and terms are applied to different things4 ,on what ground then do you determine that in the case of causes and effects1 such as e4g4 clay and jars1 it is mere difference of state on which the difference of ideas and terms is based8--,to this question the next ,stra gives a reply4 ,,footnote #dcd3a4 ,in other words--is the golden ornament originated by the mere formless substance1 gold2 or by the form belonging to that special piece of gold 7a coin1 a bar1 c471 out of which the ornament is fashioned2 or by the substance1 gold1 in so far as possessing that special form8 ,the rukaka of the text has to be taken in the sense of nishka4 ,,footnote #dee3a4 ,the meaning of the four words constituting the clause therefore would be1 ',on account of speech 7i4e4 for the sake of the accomplishment of certain activities such as the bringing of water1 which are preceded by speech71 there is touched 7by the previously mentioned substance clay7 an effect and a name2 i4e4 for the sake of1 c41 clay modifies itself into an effect having a special name4',the ,commentary remarks that' rambhanam 'cannot be taken in the sense of updna2 since1 on the theory of the unreality of effects1 the effect is originated not by speech but by thought 7imagination7 only2 and on the parinma doctrine the effect is likewise not originated by speech but by ,brahman4 #af4 ,and because 7the cause7 is perceived in the existence of the effect4 ,this means--because gold which is the cause is perceived in the existence of its effects1 such as earrings and the like2 i4e4 on account of the recognition of gold which expresses itself in the judgment 'this earring is gold4' ,we do not on the other hand perceive the presence of clay1 and so on1 in gold1 and so on4 ,the case of the cause and the effect is thus analagous to that of the child and the youth3 the word 'effect' denotes nothing else but the causal substance which has passed over into a different condition4 ,he also who holds the effect to be a new thing acknowledges that the effect is connected with a different state1 and as this different state suffices to account for the difference of ideas and words1 we are not entitled to assume a new substance which is not perceived4 ,nor must it be said that the recognition of the gold in the earring is due to generic nature 7the two things being different1 but having the same generic nature72 for we perceive no new substance which could be the abode of the generic character4 ,what we actually perceive is one and the same substance possessing the generic characteristics of gold1 first in the causal state and then in the effected state4 ,nor again can it be said that even on the supposition of difference of substance1 recognition of the cause in the effect results from the continuity of the so-called intimate cause 7samavyi-kraina74 ,for where there is difference of substances we do not observe that mere continuity of the abode gives rise to the recognition 7of one substance7 in the other substance residing in that abode4-,but in the case of certain effects1 as e4g4 scorpions and other vermin which originate from dung1 that recognition of the causal substance1 i4e4 dung 7to which you refer as proving the identity of cause and effect71 is not observed to take place6--,you misstate the case1 we reply2 here also we do recognise in the effect that substance which is the primal cause1 viz4 earth4--,but in smoke1 which is the effect of fire1 we do not recognise fire6--,true6 but this does not disprove our case4 ,fire is only the operative cause of smoke2 for smoke originates from damp fuel joined with fire4 ,that smoke is the effect of damp fuel is proved thereby1 as well as that both have smell 7which shows them to be alike of the substance of earth74--,as thus the identity of the substance is perceived in the effect also1 we are entitled to conclude that the difference of ideas and terms rests on difference of state only4 ,the effect1 therefore1 is non-different from the cause4--,this is so for the following reason also4 #ag4 ,and on account of the existence of that which is posterior4 ,on account of the existence of the posterior1 i4e4 the effect existing in the cause--for this reason also the effect is non-different from the cause4 ,for in ordinary language as well as in the ,veda the effect is spoken of in terms of the cause2 as when we say1 'all these things--jars1 platters1 c4--were clay only this morning'2 or when the ,veda says1 ',being only was this in the beginning4' #ah4 ,if it be said 'not1 on account of the designation of the 7effect as the7 non-existent2 we reply1 not so1 on account 7of such designation being due to7 another attribute1 7as appears7 from the complementary passage1 from ,reasoning1 and from another ,vedic text4 ,the assertion that ordinary speech as well as the ,veda acknowledges the existence of the effect in the cause cannot be upheld 'on account of the designation of 7the effect as7 the non-existent4' ,for the ,veda says1 ',non-being only was this in the beginning' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #ai1 #a72 ',non- being indeed was this in the beginning' 7,taitt4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #f4 #a72 ',in the beginning truly this was not anything whatever4' ,and in ordinary language we say ',in the morning all this--jars1 platters1 and so on1-- was not4'--,this objection the ,stra proceeds to refute4 ',not so1 on account of such designation being due to another attribute4' ,the designation of the effected substance as the non-existent is due to the effect having at an earlier time a different quality1 i4e4 a different constitution2 not to its being1 as you think1 absolutely non-existing4 ,the quality different from the quality of existence is non-existence2 that is to say1 of the world designated as this1 the quality of existence is constituted by name and form1 while the quality of non- existence consists in the subtle state opposed to name and form4--,but how is this known8--',from the complementary passage1 from ,reasoning1 and from another text4' ,the complementary passage is the one following on the last text quoted above1 viz4 'that ,non-existent formed the resolve may ,i be4 ,the resolve referred to in this complementary text serving as an inferential sign to determine that the ,non-existence spoken of is other than absolute ,non-existence1 we1 on the basis of the observation that all the three texts quoted treat of the same matter1 conclude that in the other two texts also the ,non-existent has to be understood in the same sense4 ',from ,reasoning4' ,reasoning shows ,being and ,non-being to be attributes of things4 ,the possession1 on the part of clay1 of a certain shape1 a broad base1 a belly-shaped body1 and so on1 is the cause of our thinking and saying 'the jar exists1' while the connexion1 on the part of the clay1 with a condition opposed to that of a jar is the cause of our thinking and saying 'the jar does not exist4' ,a condition of the latter kind is e4 g4--the clay's existing in the form of two separate halves of a jar1 and it is just this and similar conditions of the clay which account for our saying that the jar does not exist4 ,we do not perceive any non-existence of the jar different from the kind of non- existence described2 and as the latter sufficiently accounts for all current ideas and expressions as to non-existence1 there is no occasion to assume an additional kind of non-existence4--,and also 'from another text4' ,the text meant is that often quoted1 ',being only was this in the beginning4' ,for there the view of the absolute non-being of the effect is objected to1 ',but how could it be thus8' c41 and then the decision is given that from the beginning the world was 'being4' ,this matter is clearly set forth in the text ',this was then undistinguished2 it became distinguished by name and form' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,i1 #d1 #g74 ,the next two ,stras confirm the doctrine of the non-difference of the effect from the cause by two illustrative instances4 #ai4 ,and like a piece of cloth4 ,as threads when joined in a peculiar cross-arrangement are called a piece of cloth1 thus acquiring a new name1 a new form1 and new functions1 so it is with ,brahman also4 #bj4 ,and as the different vital airs4 ,as the one air1 according as it undergoes in the body different modifications1 acquires a new name1 new characteristics1 and new functions1 being then called prna1 apna1 and so on2 thus the one ,brahman becomes the world1 with its manifold moving and non-moving beings4--,the non-difference of the world from ,brahman1 the highest cause1 is thus fully established4 ,here terminates the 'rambhana' adhikarana4 #ba4 ,from the designation of the 'other' 7as non-different from ,brahman7 there result 7,brahman's7 not creating what is beneficial1 and other imperfections4 ',thou art that'2 'this ,self is ,brahman'--these and similar texts which declare the non-difference of the world from ,brahman1 teach1 as has been said before1 at the same time the non-difference from ,brahman of the individual soul also4 ,but an objection here presents itself4 ,if these texts really imply that the 'other one1' i4e4 the soul1 is ,brahman1 there will follow certain imperfections on ,brahman's part1 viz4 that ,brahman1 endowed as it is with omniscience1 the power of realising its purposes1 and so on1 does not create a world of a nature beneficial to itself1 but rather creates a world non-beneficial to itself2 and the like4 ,this world no doubt is a storehouse of numberless pains1 either originating in living beings themselves or due to the action of other natural beings1 or caused by supernatural agencies4 ,no rational independent person endeavours to produce what is clearly non-beneficial to himself4 ,and as you hold the view of the non-difference of the world from ,brahman1 you yourself set aside all those texts which declare ,brahman to be different from the soul2 for were there such difference1 the doctrine of general non-difference could not be established4 ,should it be maintained that the texts declaring difference refer to difference due to limiting adjuncts1 while the texts declaring non-difference mean essential non-difference1 we must ask the following question--does the non-conditioned ,brahman know1 or does it not know1 the soul which is essentially non-different from it8 ,if it does not know it1 ,brahman's omniscience has to be abandoned4 ,if1 on the other hand1 it knows it1 then ,brahman is conscious of the pains of the soul--which is non- different from ,brahman--as its own pains2 and from this there necessarily follows an imperfection1 viz4 that ,brahman does not create what is beneficial and does create what is non-beneficial to itself4 ,if1 again1 it be said that the difference of the soul and ,brahman is due to ,nescience on the part of both1 and that the texts declaring difference refer to difference of this kind1 the assumption of ,nescience belonging to the soul leads us to the very alternatives just stated and to their respective results4 ,should the ajana1 on the other hand1 belong to ,brahman1 we point out that ,brahman1 whose essential nature is self- illuminedness1 cannot possibly be conscious of ajana and the creation of the world effected by it4 ,and if it be said that the light of ,brahman is obscured by ajana1 we point to all the difficulties1 previously set forth1 which follow from this hypothesis--to obscure light means to make it cease1 and to make cease the light of ,brahman1 of whom light is the essential nature1 means no less than to destroy ,brahman itself4 ,the view of ,brahman being the cause of the world thus shows itself to be untenable4--,this prim facie view the next ,stra refutes4 #bb4 ,but 7,brahman is7 additional1 on account of the declaration of difference4 ,the word 'but' sets aside the prim facie view4 ,to the individual soul capable of connexion with the various kinds of pain there is additional1 i4e4 from it there is different1 ,brahman4--,on what ground8--',owing to the declaration of difference4' ,for ,brahman is spoken of as different from the soul in the following texts3--',he who dwells in the ,self and within the ,self1 whom the ,self does not know1 of whom the ,self is the body1 who rules the ,self within1 he is thy ,self1 the ruler within1 the immortal' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #g1 #bb72 ',knowing as separate the ,self and the ,mover1 blessed by him he gains ,immortality' 7,svet4 ,up4 ,i1 #f72 ',he is the cause1 the ,lord of the lords of the organs' 7i4e4 the individual souls7 7,svet ,up4 ,,vi1 #i72 ',one of them eats the sweet fruit2 without eating the other looks on' 7,svet4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #f72 ',there are two1 the one knowing1 the other not knowing1 both unborn1 the one a ruler1 the other not a ruler' 7,svet4 ,up4 ,i1 #i72 ',embraced by the prja4 ,self 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #c1 #ba72 ',mounted by the prja4 ,self' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #c1 #ce72 ',from that the ruler of my sends forth all this1 in that the other is bound up through my 7,svet4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #i72 'the ,master of the ,pradhna and the souls1 the lord of the gunas' 7,svet4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #af72'the eternal among eternals1 the intelligent among the intelligent1 who1 one1 fulfils the desires of many' 7,svet4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #ac72 'who moves within the ,unevolved1 of whom the ,unevolved is the body1 whom the ,unevolved does not know2 who moves within the ,imperishable1 of whom the ,imperishable is the body1 whom the ,imperishable does not know2 who moves within ,death1 of whom ,death is the body1 whom ,death does not know2 he is the inner ,self of all beings1 free from evil1 the divine one1 the one ,god1 ,nryana'2 and other similar texts4 #bc4 ,and as in the analogous case of stones and the like1 there is impossibility of that4 ,in the same way as it is impossible that the different non-sentient things such as stones1 iron1 wood1 herbs1 c41 which are of an extremely low constitution and subject to constant change1 should be one in nature with ,brahman1 which is faultless1 changeless1 fundamentally antagonistic to all that is evil1 c4 c42 so it is also impossible that the individual soul1 which is liable to endless suffering1 and a mere wretched glowworm as it were1 should be one with ,brahman who1 as we know from the texts1 comprises within himself the treasure of all auspicious qualities1 c4 c4 ,those texts1 which exhibit ,brahman and the soul in coordination1 must be understood as conveying the doctrine1 founded on passages such as 'of whom the ,self is the body1' that as the jva constitutes ,brahman's body and ,brahman abides within the jva as its ,self1 ,brahman has the jva for its mode2 and with this doctrine the co- ordination referred to is not only not in conflict but even confirms it-- as we have shown repeatedly1 e4g4 under ,s4 ,i1 #d1 #bb4 ,brahman in all its states has the souls and matter for its body2 when the souls and matter are in their subtle state ,brahman is in its causal condition2 when1 on the other hand1 ,brahman has for its body souls and matter in their gross state1 it is 'effected' and then called world4 ,in this way the co- ordination above referred to fully explains itself4 ,the world is non- different from ,brahman in so far as it is its effect4 ,there is no confusion of the different characteristic qualities2 for liability to change belongs to non-sentient matter1 liability to pain to sentient souls1 and the possession of all excellent qualities to ,brahman3 hence the doctrine is not in conflict with any scriptural text4 ,that even in the state of non-separation-described in texts such as1 ',being only this was in the beginning'--the souls joined to non-sentient matter persist in a subtle condition and thus constitute ,brahman's body must necessarily be admitted2 for that the souls at that time also persist in a subtle form is shown under ,stras ,,ii1 ,i1 #cd2 #ce4 ,non-division1 at that time1 is possible in so far as there is no distinction of names and forms4 ,it follows from all this that ,brahman's causality is not contrary to reason4 ,those1 on the other hand1 who explain the difference1 referred to in ,stra #bb1 as the difference between the jva in its state of bondage and the jva in so far as free from avidy1 i4e4 the unconditioned ,brahman1 implicate themselves in contradictions4 ,for the jiva41 in so far as free from avidy1 is neither all-knowing1 nor the ,lord of all1 nor the cause of all1 nor the ,self of all1 nor the ruler of all--it in fact possesses none of those characteristics on which the scriptural texts found the difference of the released soul2 for according to the view in question all those attributes are the mere figment of ,nescience4 ,nor again can the ,stra under discussion be said to refer to the distinction1 from the individual soul1 of a ,lord fictitiously created by avidy--a distinction analogous to that which a man in the state of avidy makes between the shell and the silver2 for it is the task of the ,vednta to convey a knowledge of that true ,brahman which is introduced as the object of enquiry in the first ,stra 7',now then the enquiry into ,brahman'7 and which is the cause of the origination and so on of the world1 and what they at this point are engaged in is to refute the objections raised against the doctrine of that ,brahman on the basis of ,smriti and ,reasoning4--,the two ,stras ,,ii1 #a1 #h2 #i really form a complementary statement to what is proved in the present adhikarana2 for their purport is to show also that things of different nature can stand to each other in the relation of cause and effect4 ,and the ,stra ,,ii1 #a1 #g has reference to what is contained in the previous adhikarana4 ,here terminates the adhikarana of 'designation of the other4' #bd4 ,should it be said that 7it is7 not1 on account of the observation of employment2 we say1 not so2 for as in the case of milk4 ,we have so far determined that it is in no way unreasonable to hold that the highest ,brahman1 which is all-knowing1 capable of realising its purposes1 c41 has all beings1 sentient and non-sentient1 for its body1 and hence constitutes the ,self of all and differs in nature from everything else4 ,we now proceed to show that it is not unreasonable to hold that1 possessing all those attributes1 it is able to effect by its mere will and wish the creation of this entire manifold ,universe4--,but1 it may here be said1 it is certainly a matter of observation that agents of limited power are obliged to employ a number of instrumental agencies in order to effect their purposes2 but how should it follow therefrom that the view of the all-powerful ,brahman producing the world without such instrumental agencies is in any way irrational8--,as1 we reply1 it is observed in ordinary life that even such agents as possess the capability of producing certain effects stand in need of certain instruments1 some slow-witted person may possibly imagine that ,brahman1 being destitute of all such instruments1 is incapable of creating the world4 ,it is this doubt which we have to dispel4 ,it is seen that potters1 weavers1 c41 who produce jars1 cloth1 and the like1 are incapable of actually producing unless they make use of certain implements1 although they may fully possess the specially required skill4 ,men destitute of such skill are not capable of production1 even with the help of implements2 those having the capacity produce by means of the instruments only4 ,this leads to the conclusion that ,brahman also1 although possessing all imaginable powers1 is not capable of creating the world without employing the required instrumental agencies4 ,but before creation there existed nothing that could have assisted him1 as we know from texts such as ',being only this was in the beginning'2 'there was ,nrayana alone4' ,brahman's creative agency thus cannot be rendered plausible2 and hence the prim facie view set forth in the earlier part of the ,stra1 ',should it be said that 7it is7 not2 on account of the observation of employment 7of instruments74' ,this view is set aside by the latter part of the ,stra1 'not so2 for as in the case of milk4' ,it is by no means a fact that every agent capable of producing a certain effect stands in need of instruments4 ,milk1 e4g4 and water1 which have the power of producing certain effects1 viz4 sour milk and ice respectively1 produce these effects unaided4 ,analogously ,brahman also1 which possesses the capacity of producing everything1 may actually do so without using instrumental aids4 ,the 'for' in the ,stra is meant to point out the fact that the proving instances are generally known1 and thus to indicate the silliness of the objection4 ,whey and similar ingredients are indeed sometimes mixed with milk1 but not to the end of making the milk turn sour1 but merely in order to accelerate the process and give to the sour milk a certain flavour4 #be4 ,and as in the case of the gods and so on1 in 7their7 world4 ,as the gods and similar exalted beings create1 each in his own world1 whatever they require by their mere volition1 so the ,supreme ,person creates by his mere volition the entire world4 ,that the gods about whose powers we know from the ,veda only 7not through perception7 are here quoted as supplying a proving instance1 is done in order to facilitate the comprehension of the creative power of ,brahman1 which is also known through the ,veda4--,here terminates the adhikarana of 'the observation of employment4' #bf4 ,or the consequence of the entire 7,brahman entering into the effect71 and stultification of 7,brahman's7 being devoid of parts4 ',being only was this in the beginning'2 ',this indeed was in the beginning not anything'2 ',the ,self alone indeed was this in the beginning'--these and other texts state that in the beginning ,brahman was one only1 i4e4 without parts--that means3 ,brahman1 in its causal state1 was without parts because then all distinction of matter and souls had disappeared4 ,this one1 non-divided1 ,brahman thereupon having formed the resolution of being many divided itself into the aggregate of material things--ether1 air1 and so on--and the aggregate of souls from ,brahm down to blades of grass4 ,this being so1 it must be held that the entire highest ,brahman entered into the effected state2 that its intelligent part divided itself into the individual souls1 and its non- intelligent part into ether1 air1 and so on4 ,this however stultifies all those often-quoted texts which declare ,brahman in its causal state to be devoid of parts4 ,for although the cause is constituted by ,brahman in so far as having for its body matter and souls in their subtle state1 and the effect by ,brahman invested with matter and souls in their gross state2 the difficulty stated above cannot be avoided1 since also that element in ,brahman which is embodied is held to enter into the effect4 ,if1 on the other hand1 ,brahman is without parts1 it cannot become many1 and it is not possible that there should persist a part not entering into the effected state4 ,on the ground of these unacceptable results we conclude that ,brahman cannot be the cause4--,this objection the next ,stra disposes of4 #bg4 ,but on account of ,scripture2 7,brahman's possession of various powers7 being founded upon the word4 ,the 'but' sets aside the difficulty raised4 ,there is no inappropriateness2 'on account of ,scripture4' ,scripture declares on the one hand that ,brahman is not made up of parts1 and on the other that from it a multiform creation proceeds4 ,and in matters vouched for by ,scripture we must conform our ideas to what ,scripture actually says4-- ,but then ,scripture might be capable of conveying to us ideas of things altogether self-contradictory2 like as if somebody were to tell us ',water with fire'6--,the ,stra therefore adds 'on account of its being founded on the word4' ,as the possession1 on ,brahman's part1 of various powers 7enabling it to emit the world7 rests exclusively on the authority of the word of the ,veda and thus differs altogether from other matters 7which fall within the sphere of the other means of knowledge also71 the admission of such powers is not contrary to reason4 ,brahman cannot be either proved or disproved by means of generalisations from experience4 #bh4 ,and thus in the ,self2 for 7there are7 manifold 7powers74 ,if attributes belonging to one thing were on that account to be ascribed to other things also1 it would follow that attributes observed in non- sentient things1 such as jars and the like1 belong also to the intelligent eternal ,self1 which is of an altogether different kind4 ,but that such attributes do not extend to the ,self is due to the variety of the essential nature of things4 ,this the ,stra expresses in 'for 7there are7 manifold 7powers74' ,we perceive that fire1 water1 and so on1 which are of different kind1 possess different powers1 viz4 heat1 and so on3 there is therefore nothing unreasonable in the view that the highest ,brahman which differs in kind from all things observed in ordinary life should possess innumerous powers not perceived in ordinary things4 ,thus ,parsara also--in reply to a question founded on ordinary observation-- viz4 ',how can creative energy be attributed to ,brahman1 devoid of qualities1 pure1 c48'--declares ',numberless powers1 lying beyond the sphere of all ordinary thought1 belong to ,brahman1 and qualify it for creation1 and so on2 just as heat belongs to fire4' ,similarly1 ,scripture says1 'what was that wood1 what was that tree from which they built heaven and earth8' c4 7,ri4 ,samh4 ,x1 #ha72 and ',brahman was that wood1 ,brahman was that tree'1 and so on4--,objections founded on ordinary generalisations have no force against ,brahman which differs in nature from all other things4 #bi4 ,and on account of the defects of his view also4 ,on his view1 i4e4 on the view of him who holds the theory of the ,pradhna or something similar1 the imperfections observed in ordinary things would attach themselves to the ,pradhna also1 since it does not differ in nature from those things4 ,the legitimate conclusion therefore is that ,brahman only which differs in nature from all other things can be held to be the general cause4 ,the ,pradhna1 moreover1 is without parts2 how then is it possible that it should give rise to a manifold world1 comprising the 'great principle1' and so on8--,but there are parts of the ,pradhna1 viz4 ,goodness1 ,passion1 and ,darkness6--,this we reply necessitates the following distinction4 ,does the aggregate of ,goodness1 ,passion1 and ,darkness constitute the ,pradhna8 or is the ,pradhna the effect of those three8 ,the latter alternative is in conflict with your own doctrine according to which the ,pradhna is cause only4 ,it moreover contradicts the number of tattvas 7viz4 #bd7 admitted by you2 and as those three gunas also have no parts one does not see how they can produce an effect4 ,on the former alternative1 the gunas not being composed of parts must be held to aggregate or join themselves without any reference to difference of space1 and from such conjunction the production of gross effects cannot result4--,the same objection applies to the doctrine of atoms being the general cause4 ,for atoms1 being without parts and spatial distinction of parts1 can join only without any reference to such spatial distinction1 and hence do not possess the power of originating effects4 #cj4 ,and 7the divinity is7 endowed with all powers1 because that is seen4 ,the highest divinity which is different in nature from all other things is endowed with all powers2 for scriptural texts show it to be such1 ',his high power is revealed as manifold1 as essential1 and so his knowledge1 force1 and action' 7,svet4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #h74 ,in the same way another text first declares the highest divinity to differ in nature from everything else1 ',free from sin1 from old age1 from death and grief1 from hunger and thirst'1 and then goes on to represent it as endowed with all powers1 'realising all its wishes1 realising all its intentions'1 c4 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,viii1 #a1 #e74 ,compare also ',he1 consisting of mind1 having prana for his body1 whose form is light1 who realises his wishes1' c4 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #ad1 #b74 #ca4 ,not1 on account of the absence of organs2 this has been explained 7before74 ,although the one ,brahman is different from all other beings and endowed with all powers1 we yet infer from the text ',of him there is known no effect and no instrument1' that as it is destitute of instruments it cannot produce any effect4--,to this objection an answer has already been given in ,,ii1 #a1 #bg2 #bh1 'on account of its being founded on the word1' and 'for there are manifold 7powers74' ,that for which the sacred word is the only means of knowledge1 and which is different from all other things1 is capable of producing those effects also of the instrumental means of which it is destitute4 ,it is in this spirit that ,scripture says ',he sees without eyes1 he hears without ears1 without hands and feet he hastens and grasps' 7,svet4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #ai74--;,here terminates the adhikarana of 'the consequence of the entire 7,brahman74' #cb4 7,brahman is7 not 7the cause72 on account of 7the world7 having the nature of what depends on a motive4 ,although the ,lord1 who before creation is alone1 is endowed with all kinds of powers since he differs in nature from all other beings1 and hence is by himself capable of creating the world2 we all the same cannot ascribe to him actual causality with regard to the world2 for this manifold world displays the nature of a thing depending on a motive1 and the ,lord has no motive to urge him to creation4 ,in the case of all those who enter on some activity after having formed an idea of the effect to be accomplished1 there exists a motive in the form of something beneficial either to themselves or to others4 ,now ,brahman1 to whose essential nature it belongs that all his wishes are eternally fulfilled1 does not attain through the creation of the world any object not attained before4 ,nor again is the second alternative possible4 ,for a being1 all whose wishes are fulfilled1 could concern itself about others only with a view to benefitting them4 ,no merciful divinity would create a world so full1 as ours is1 of evils of all kind--birth1 old age1 death1 hell1 and so on2--if it created at all1 pity would move it to create a world altogether happy4 ,brahman thus having no possible motive cannot be the cause of the world4--,this prim facie view is disposed of in the next ,stra4 #cc4 ,but 7it is7 mere sport1 as in ordinary life4 ,the motive which prompts ,brahman--all whose wishes are fulfilled and who is perfect in himself--to the creation of a world comprising all kinds of sentient and non-sentient beings dependent on his volition1 is nothing else but sport1 play4 ,we see in ordinary life how some great king1 ruling this earth with its seven dvpas1 and possessing perfect strength1 valour1 and so on1 has a game at balls1 or the like1 from no other motive than to amuse himself2 hence there is no objection to the view that sport only is the motive prompting ,brahman to the creation1 sustentation1 and destruction of this world which is easily fashioned by his mere will4 #cd4 ,not inequality and cruelty1 on account of there being regard2 for so 7,scripture7 declares4 ,it must indeed be admitted that the ,lord1 who differs in nature from all other beings1 intelligent and non-intelligent1 and hence possesses powers unfathomable by thought1 is capable of creating this manifold world1 although before creation he is one only and without parts4 ,but the assumption of his having actually created the world would lay him open to the charge of partiality1 in so far as the world contains beings of high1 middle1 and low station--gods1 men1 animals1 immovable beings2 and to that of cruelty1 in so far as he would be instrumental in making his creatures experience pain of the most dreadful kind4--,the reply to this is 'not so1 on account of there being regard'2 i4e4 'on account of the inequality of creation depending on the deeds of the intelligent beings1 gods1 and so on1 about to be created4'--,sruti and ,smriti alike declare that the connexion of the individual souls with bodies of different kinds--divine1 human1 animal1 and so on--depends on the karman of those souls2 compare ',he who performs good works becomes good1 he who performs bad works becomes bad4 ,he becomes pure by pure deeds1 bad by bad deeds' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #d1 #e74 ,in the same way the reverend ,parsara declares that what causes the difference in nature and status between gods1 men1 and so on1 is the power of the former deeds of the souls about to enter into a new creation--',he 7the ,lord7 is the operative cause only in the creation of new beings2 the material cause is constituted by the potentialities of the beings to be created4 ,the being to be embodied requires nothing but an operative cause2 it is its own potentiality which leads its being into that condition of being 7which it is to occupy in the new creation74' ,potentiality here means karman4 #ce4 ,if it be said 'not so1 on account of non-distinction of deeds'2 we say1 'not so1 on account of beginninglessness'2 this is reasonable1 and it is also observed4 ,but before creation the individual souls do not exist2 since ,scripture teaches non-distinction ',being only this was in the beginning4' ,and as then the souls do not exist1 no karman can exist1 and it cannot therefore be said that the inequality of creation depends on karman4--,of this objection the ,stra disposes by saying 'on account of beginninglessness1' i4e4 although the individual souls and their deeds form an eternal stream1 without a beginning1 yet non-distinction of them 'is reasonable' 7i4e4 may reasonably be asserted7 in so far as1 previous to creation1 the substance of the souls abides in a very subtle condition1 destitute of names and forms1 and thus incapable of being designated as something apart from ,brahman1 although in reality then also they constitute ,brahman's body only4 ,if it were not admitted 7that the distinctions in the new creation are due to karman71 it would moreover follow that souls are requited for what they have not done1 and not requited for what they have done4 ,the fact of the souls being without a beginning is observed1 viz41 to be stated in ,scripture1',the intelligent one is not born and dies not' 7,ka4 ,up4 ,i1 #b1 #ah72 so also the fact of the flow of creation going on from all eternity1 ',as the creator formed sun and moon formerly4' ,moreover1 the text1 ',now all this was then undeveloped4 ,it became developed by form and name' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,i1 #d1 #g71 states merely that the names and forms of the souls were developed1 and this shows that the souls themselves existed from the beginning4 ,smriti also says1 ',dost thou know both ,prakriti and the soul to be without beginning8' 7,bha4 ,g4 ,,xiii1 #ai47--;,as ,brahman thus differs in nature from everything else1 possesses all powers1 has no other motive than sport1 and arranges the diversity of the creation in accordance with the different karman of the individual souls1 ,brahman alone can be the universal cause4 #cf4 ,and because all the attributes are proved 7to be present in ,brahman74 ,as all those attributes required to constitute causality which have been or will be shown to be absent in the ,pradhna1 the atoms1 and so on1 can be shown to be present in ,brahman1 it remains a settled conclusion that ,brahman only is the cause of the world4 ,here terminates the adhikarana of 'that which has the nature of depending on a motive4' ,,second ,p,,da4 #a4 ,not that which is inferred1 on account of the impossibility of construction1 and on account of activity4 ,the ,stras have so far set forth the doctrine that the highest ,brahman is the cause of the origination and so on of the world1 and have refuted the objections raised by others4 ,they now1 in order to safeguard their own position1 proceed to demolish the positions held by those very adversaries4 ,for otherwise it might happen that some slow-witted persons1 unaware of those other views resting on mere fallacious arguments1 would imagine them possibly to be authoritative1 and hence might be somewhat shaken in their belief in the ,vedic doctrine4 ,another pda therefore is begun to the express end of refuting the theories of others4 ,the beginning is made with the theory of ,kapila1 because that theory has several features1 such as the view of the existence of the effect in the cause1 which are approved of by the followers of the ,veda1 and hence is more likely1 than others1 to give rise to the erroneous view of its being the true doctrine4 ,the ,stras ,i1 #a1 #e and ff4 have proved only that the ,vedic texts do not set forth the ,snkhya view1 while the task of the present pda is to demolish that view itself3 the ,stras cannot therefore be charged with needless reiteration4 ,the outline of the ,snkhya doctrine is as follows4 ',there is the fundamental ,prakriti1 which is not an effect2 there are the seven effects of ,prakriti1 viz4 the ,mahat and so on1 and the sixteen effects of those effects2 and there is the soul1 which is neither ,prakriti nor effect'--such is the comprehensive statement of the principles4 ,the entity called 'fundamental ,prakriti' is constituted by the three substances called ,sattva1 ,rajas1 and ,tamas1 7when7 in a state of complete equipoise1 none of the three being either in defect or in excess2 the essential nature of those three consists respectively in pleasure1 pain1 and dullness2 they have for their respective effects lightness and illumination1 excitement and mobility1 heaviness and obstruction2 they are absolutely non-perceivable by means of the senses1 and to be defined and distinguished through their effects only4 ,prakriti1 consisting in the equipoise of ,sattva1 ,rajas1 and ,tamas is one1 itself non-sentient but subserving the enjoyment and final release of the many sentient beings1 eternal1 all-pervading1 ever active1 not the effect of anything1 but the one general cause4 ,there are seven ,principles which are the effects of ,prakriti and the causal substances of everything else2 these seven are the ,mahat1 the ahankra1 the subtle matter 7tanmtra7 of sound1 the subtle matter of touch1 the subtle matter of colour1 the subtle matter of taste1 and the subtle matter of smell4 ,the ahankra is threefold1 being either modified 7vaikrika71 or active 7taijasa71 or the originator of the elements 7bhtdi74 ,the vaikrika is of sattva-nature and the originator of the sense-- organs2 the bhtdi is of tamas--nature1 and the cause of those subtle matters 7tanmtra7 which in their turn are the cause of the gross elements2 the taijasa is of the nature of ragas1 and assists the other two4 ,the five gross elements are the ether and so on2 the five intellectual senses are hearing and so on2 the five organs of action are speech and so on4 ,with the addition of the internal organ 7manas7 these are the sixteen entities which are mere effects4--,the soul1 not being capable of any change1 is not either the causal matter or the effect of anything4 ,for the same reason it is without attributes1 consisting of mere intelligence1 eternal1 non-active1 all-pervading1 and different in each body4 ,being incapable of change and non-active1 it can neither be an agent nor an enjoyer2 but although this is so1 men in their confusion of mind1 due to the closeness to each other of ,prakriti and the soul1 erroneously attribute to ,prakriti the intelligence of the soul1 and to the soul the activity of ,prakriti--just as the redness of the rose superimposes itself on the crystal near it1--and thus consider the soul to be an ',i' and an enjoyer4 ,fruition thus results from ignorance1 and release from knowledge of the truth4 ,this their theory the ,snkhyas prove by means of perception1 inference1 and authoritative tradition4 ,now with regard to those matters which are proved by perception1 we ,vedntins have no very special reason for dissenting from the ,snkhyas2 and what they say about their authoritative tradition1 claiming to be founded on the knowledge of all-knowing persons such as ,kapila1 has been pretty well disproved by us in the first adhyya4 ,if1 now1 we further manage to refute the inference which leads them to assume the ,pradhna as the cause of the--world1 we shall have disestablished their whole theory4 ,we therefore proceed to give this refutation4 ,on this point the ,snkhyas reason as follows4 ,it must necessarily be admitted that the entire world has one cause only2 for if effects were assumed to originate from several causes we should never arrive at an ultimate cause4 ,assume that parts such as e4g4 threads produce a whole 7i4e4 in the case of threads1 a piece of cloth7 in the way of their being joined together by means of their six sides1 which are parts of the threads4 ,you must then further assume that the threads themselves are in the same way produced by their parts1 having a similar constitution4 ,and these parts again by their parts1 until you reach the atoms2 these also must be assumed to produce their immediate effects by being joined together with their six sides1 for otherwise solid extension 7prathiman7 could not be brought about4 ,and then the atoms also as being wholes1 consisting of parts ,,footnote #dhb3a1 must be viewed as produced by their parts1 and these again by their parts and so on1 so that we never arrive at an ultimate cause4 ,in order therefore to establish such an ultimate cause we must have recourse to the hypothesis of the general cause being constituted by one substance1 which possesses the power of transforming itself in various different ways1 without at the same time forfeiting its own essential nature1 and which forms the general substrate for an infinity of different effects1 from the ,mahat downwards4 ,this one general cause is the ,pradhna constituted by the equipoise of the three gunas4 ,the reasons for the assumption of this ,pradhna are as follows3--',on account of the limitedness of particular things2 of connexion 7anvaya72 of activity proceeding from special power2 and of the difference and non-difference of cause and effect--the ,non- evolved 7,pradhna7 is the general cause of this many-natured ,universe' 7vaisvarpya7 7,snkhya ,k4 ,i1 #ae2 #af74--,the term 'vaisvarpya' denotes that which possesses all forms1 i4e4 the entire world with its variously constituted parts--bodies1 worlds1 and so on4 ,this world1 which on account of its variegated constitution must be held to be an effect1 has for its cause the ,unevolved 7avyakta ,prakriti71 which is of the same nature as the world4 ,why so8 ,because it is an effect2 for we perceive that every effect is different from its special cause--which has the same nature as the effect--and at the same time is non-different4 ,such effected things as e4g4 a jar and a gold ornament are different from their causes1 i4e4 clay and gold1 which have the same nature as the effects1 and at the same time non-different4 ,hence the manifold-natured world originates from the ,pradhna which has the same nature1 and is again merged in it3 the world thus has the ,pradhna alone for its cause4 ,this ,pradhna is constituted by the equipoise of the three gunas1 and thus is a cause possessing a nature equal to that of its effect1 i4e4 the world2 for the world is of the nature of pleasure1 pain1 and dullness1 which consist of sattva1 rajas1 and tamas respectively4 ,the case is analogous to that of a jar consisting of clay2 of that also the cause is none other than the substance clay4 ,for in every case observation shows that only such causal substances as are of the same nature as the effects possess that power which is called the origination of the effect4 ,that the general cause can be found only in the unevolved ,pradhna1 which consists of the three gunas in a state of equipoise and is unlimited with regard to space as well as time1 follows from the limitedness of the particular things1 viz4 the ,mahat1 the ahankra1 and so on4 ,these latter things are limited like jars and so on1 and hence incapable of originating the entire world4 ,hence it follows that this world1 consisting of the three gunas1 has for its only cause the ,pradhna1 which is constituted by those three gunas in a state of equipoise4 ,against this argumentation the ,stra says1 ',not that which is inferred1 on account of the impossibility of construction1 and on account of activity4'--',inference' means 'that which is inferred1' i4e4 the ,pradhna4 ,the ,pradhna postulated by you is not capable of constructing this manifold-natured world1 because while itself being non-intelligent it is not guided by an intelligent being understanding its nature4 ,whatever is of this latter kind is incapable of producing effects2 as e4 g4 wood and the like by themselves are not capable of constructing a palace or a carriage4 ,as it is matter of observation that non- intelligent wood1 not guided by an intelligent agent understanding its nature1 cannot produce effects2 and as it is observed that if guided by such an agent matter does enter on action so as to produce effects2 the ,pradhna1 which is not ruled by an intelligent agent1 cannot be the general cause4 ,the 'and' in the ,stra is meant to add as a further argument that 'presence' 7anvaya7 has no proving force4 ,for whiteness present in cows and so on is not invariably accompanied by the quality of being the cause of the class characteristics of cows4 ,nor must it be said that qualities such as whiteness1 although present in the effect1 may not indeed be causes1 but that substances such as gold and the like which are present in certain effects are invariably accompanied by the quality of being causes1 and that hence also the substances called sattva1 rajas1 and tamas1 which are found present in all effects1 are proved to be the causes of all those effects4 ,for sattva and so on are attributes of substances1 but not themselves substances4 ,sattva and so on are the causes of the lightness1 light1 c44 belonging to substances such as earth and the like1 and hence distinctive attributes of the essential nature of those substances1 but they are not observed to be present in any effects in a substantial form1 as clay1 gold1 and other substances are4 ,it is for this reason that they are known as 'gunas4' ,you have further said that the world's having one cause only must be postulated in order that an ultimate cause may be reached4 ,but as the sattva1 rajas1 and tamas are not one but three1 you yourself do not assume one cause1 and hence do not manage to arrive at an ultimate cause4 ,for your ,pradhna consists in the equipoise of the three gunas2 there are thus several causes1 and you have no more an ultimate cause than others4 ,nor can you say that this end is accomplished through the three gunas being unlimited4 ,for if the three gunas are all alike unlimited1 and therefore omnipresent1 there is nowhere a plus or minus of any of them1 and as thus no inequality can result1 effects cannot originate4 ,in order to explain the origination of results it is therefore necessary to assume limitation of the gunas4 ,nor is our view confirmed by those cases only in which it is clearly perceived that matter produces effects only when guided by an intelligent principle2 other cases also 7where the fact is not perceived with equal clearness7 are in favour of our view4 ,this the next ,stra declares4 ,,footnote #dhb3a4 ,as follows from their having six sides4 #b4 ,if it be said--like milk or water2 there also 7intelligence guides74 ,what has been said--the ,snkhya rejoins--as to the impossibility of the ,pradhna not guided by an intelligent principle constructing this variously constituted world1 is unfounded2 for the ,pradhna may be supposed to act in the same way as milk and water do4 ,milk1 when turning into sour milk1 is capable of going by itself through a series of changes3 it does not therefore depend on anything else4 ,in the same way we observe that the homogeneous water discharged from the clouds spontaneously proceeds to transform itself into the various saps and juices of different plants1 such as palm trees1 mango trees1 wood-apple trees1 lime trees1 tamarind trees1 and so on4 ,in the same way the ,pradhna1 of whose essential nature it is to change1 may1 without being guided by another agent1 abide in the interval between two creations in a state of homogeneousness1 and then when the time for creation comes modify itself into many various effects due to the loss of equilibrium on the part of the gunas4 ,as has been said '7the ,pradhna acts71 owing to modification1 as water according to the difference of the abodes of the several gunas' 7,snkhya ,k4 ,i1 #af74 ,in this way the ,unevolved acts independently of anything else4 ,to this reasoning the ,stra replies 'there also4' ,also1 in the instances of milk and water1 activity is not possible in the absence of an intelligent principle1 for these very cases have already been referred to as proving our position4 ,the ,stra ,,ii1 #a1 #bd 7where the change of milk into sour milk is instanced7 meant to prove only that a being destitute of other visible instruments of action is able to produce its own special effect1 but not to disprove the view of all agency presupposing an intelligent principle4 ,that even in water and so on an intelligent principle is present is proved by scriptural texts1 'he who dwells in water' and so on4 #c4 ,and because from the independence 7of the ,pradhna7 there would follow the non-existence of what is different 7from creation1 i4e4 of the pralaya condition74 ,that the ,pradhna which is not guided by an intelligent principle is not the universal cause is proved also by the fact that1 if we ascribe to it a power for change independent of the guidance of a ,lord capable of realising all his purposes1 it would follow that the pralaya state1 which is different from the state of creation1 would not exist2 while on the other hand the guidance of the ,pradhna by a ,lord explains the alternating states of creation and pralaya as the effects of his purposes4 ,nor can the ,snkhya retort that our view gives rise to similar difficulties in so far1 namely1 as the ,lord1 all whose wishes are eternally accomplished1 who is free from all imperfection1 c4 c41 cannot be the originator of either creation or pralaya1 and as the creation of an unequal world would lay him open to the charge of mercilessness4 ,for1 as explained before1 even a being perfect and complete may enter on activity for the sake of sport2 and as the reason for a particular creation on the part of an all-knowing ,lord may be his recognition of ,prakriti having reached a certain special state1 it is the deeds of the individual souls which bring about the inequalities in the new creation4--,but if this is so1 all difference of states is caused exclusively by the good and evil deeds of the individual souls2 and what position remains then for a ruling ,lord8 ,prakriti1 impressed by the good and evil deeds of the souls1 will by herself modify herself on such lines as correspond to the deserts of the individual souls2 in the same way as we observe that food and drink1 if either vitiated by poison or reinforced by medicinal herbs and juices1 enter into new states which render them the causes of either pleasure or pain4 ,hence all the differences between states of creation and pralaya1 as also the inequalities among created beings such as gods1 men1 and so on1 and finally the souls reaching the condition of ,release1 may be credited to the ,pradhna1 possessing as it does the capability of modifying itself into all possible forms6--,you do not1 we reply1 appear to know anything about the nature of good and evil works2 for this is a matter to be learned from the ,sastra4 ,the ,sastra is constituted by the aggregate of words called ,veda1 which is handed on by an endless unbroken succession of pupils learning from qualified teachers1 and raised above all suspicion of imperfections such as spring from mistake and the like4 ,it is the ,veda which gives information as to good and evil deeds1 the essence of which consists in their pleasing or displeasing the ,supreme ,person1 and as to their results1 viz4 pleasure and pain1 which depend on the grace or wrath of the ,lord4 ,in agreement herewith the ,dramidkrya says1 ',from the wish of giving rise to fruits they seek to please the ,self with works2 he being pleased is able to bestow fruits1 this is the purport of the ,sstra4' ,thus ,sruti also says1 ',sacrifices and pious works which are performed in many forms1 all that he bears 7i4e4 he takes to himself72 be the navel of the ,universe' 7,mahnr4 ,up4 ,i1 #f74 ,and in the same spirit the ,lord himself declares1',from whom there proceed all beings1 by whom all this is pervaded--worshipping him with the proper works man attains to perfection' 7,bha4 ,g4 ,,xviii1 #df72 and ',these evil and malign haters1 lowest of men1 ,i hurl perpetually into transmigrations and into demoniac wombs' 7,bha4 ,g4 ,,xvi1 #ai74 ,the divine ,supreme ,person1 all whose wishes are eternally fulfilled1 who is all- knowing and the ruler of all1 whose every purpose is immediately realised1 having engaged in sport befitting his might and greatness and having settled that work is of a twofold nature1 such and such works being good and such and such being evil1 and having bestowed on all individual souls bodies and sense-organs capacitating them for entering on such work and the power of ruling those bodies and organs2 and having himself entered into those souls as their inner ,self abides within them1 controlling them as an animating and cheering principle4 ,the souls1 on their side1 endowed with all the powers imparted to them by the ,lord and with bodies and organs bestowed by him1 and forming abodes in which he dwells1 apply themselves on their own part1 and in accordance with their own wishes1 to works either good or evil4 ,the ,lord1 then1 recognising him who performs good actions as one who obeys his commands1 blesses him with piety1 riches1 worldly pleasures1 and final release2 while him who transgresses his commands he causes to experience the opposites of all these4 ,there is thus no room whatever for objections founded on deficiency1 on the ,lord's part1 of independence in his dealings with men1 and the like4 ,nor can he be arraigned with being pitiless or merciless4 ,for by pity we understand the inability1 on somebody's part1 to bear the pain of others1 coupled with a disregard of his own advantage4 ,when pity has the effect of bringing about the transgression of law on the part of the pitying person1 it is in no way to his credit2 it rather implies the charge of unmanliness 7weakness71 and it is creditable to control and subdue it4 ,for otherwise it would follow that to subdue and chastise one's enemies is something to be blamed4 ,what the ,lord himself aims at is ever to increase happiness to the highest degree1 and to this end it is instrumental that he should reprove and reject the infinite and intolerable mass of sins which accumulates in the course of beginning and endless aeons1 and thus check the tendency on the part of individual beings to transgress his laws4 ,for thus he says3 ',to them ever devoted1 worshipping me in love1 ,i give that means of wisdom by which they attain to me4 ,in mercy only to them1 dwelling in their hearts1 do ,i destroy the darkness born of ignorance with the brilliant light of knowledge' 7,bha4 ,g4 ,x1 #aj1 #aa74--;,it thus remains a settled conclusion that the ,pradhna1 which is not guided by an intelligent principle1 cannot be the general cause4--,here a further objection is raised4 ,although ,prakriti1 as not being ruled by an intelligent principle1 is not capable of that kind of activity which springs from effort1 she may yet be capable of that kind of activity which consists in mere transformation4 ,for we observe parallel cases2 the grass and water e4g4 which are consumed by a cow change on their own account into milk4 ,in the same way1 then1 ,prakriti may on her own account transform herself into the world4--,to this the next ,stra replies4 #d4 ,nor like grass and so on2 because 7milk7 does not exist elsewhere4 ,this argumentation does not hold good2 for as grass and the like do not transform themselves without the guidance of an intelligent principle1 your proving instance is not established4--,but why is it not established8-- ',because it does not exist elsewhere4' ,if grass1 water and so on changed into milk even when consumed by a bull or when not consumed at all1 then indeed it might be held that they change without the guidance of an intelligent principle4 ,but nothing of the kind takes place1 and hence we conclude that it is the intelligent principle only which turns the grass eaten by the cow into milk4--,this point has been set forth above under ,stra #c2 the present ,stra is meant to emphasise and particularise it4 #e4 ,and if you say--as the man and the stone2 thus also4 ,here the following view might be urged4 ,although the soul consists of mere intelligence and is inactive1 while the ,pradhna is destitute of all power of thought2 yet the non-sentient ,pradhna may begin to act owing to the mere nearness of the soul4 ,for we observe parallel instances4 ,a man blind but capable of motion may act in some way1 owing to the nearness to him of some lame man who has no power of motion but possesses good eyesight and assists the blind man with his intelligence4 ,and through the nearness of the magnetic stone iron moves4 ,in the same way the creation of the world may result from the connexion of ,prakriti and the soul4 ,as has been said1 ',in order that the soul may know the ,pradhna and become isolated1 the connexion of the two takes place like that of the lame and the blind2 and thence creation springs' 7,snkhya ,k4 #ba74 ,this means--to the end that the soul may experience the ,pradhna1 and for the sake of the soul's emancipation1 the ,pradhna enters on action at the beginning of creation1 owing to the nearness of the soul4 ,to this the ,stra replies 'thus also4' ,this means--the inability of the ,pradhna to act remains the same1 in spite of these instances4 ,the lame man is indeed incapable of walking1 but he possesses various other powers--he can see the road and give instructions regarding it2 and the blind man1 being an intelligent being1 understands those instructions and directs his steps accordingly4 ,the magnet again possesses the attribute of moving towards the iron and so on4 ,the soul on the other hand1 which is absolutely inactive1 is incapable of all such changes4 ,as1 moreover1 the mere nearness of the soul to the ,pradhna is something eternal1 it would follow that the creation also is eternal4 ,if1 on the other hand1 the soul is held to be eternally free1 then there can be no bondage and no release4 #f4 ,and on account of the impossibility of the relation of principal 7and subordinate7 matter4 ,you ,snkhyas maintain that the origination of the world results from a certain relation between principal and subordinate entities which depends on the relative inferiority and superiority of the gunas-- 'according to the difference of the abodes of the several gunas' 7,snkhya ,k4 ,i1 #af74 ,but1 as in the pralaya state the three gunas are in a state of equipoise1 none of them being superior or inferior to the others1 that relation of superiority and subordination cannot then exist1 and hence the world cannot originate4 ,should it1 on the other hand1 be maintained that even in the pralaya state there is a certain inequality1 it would follow therefrom that creation is eternal4 #g4 ,and if another inference be made 7the result remains unchanged71 on account of 7the ,pradhna7 being destitute of the power of a knowing subject4 ,even if the ,pradhna were inferred by some reasoning different from the arguments so far refuted by us1 our objections would remain in force because1 anyhow1 the ,pradhna is devoid of the power of a cognising subject4 ,the ,pradhna thus cannot be established by any mode of inference4 #h4 ,and even if it be admitted2 on account of the absence of a purpose4 ,even if it were admitted that the ,pradhna is established by ,inference1 the ,snkhya theory could not be accepted for the reason that the ,pradhna is without a purpose4 ,for1 according to the view expressed in the passage1 ',in order that the soul may know the ,pradhna and become isolated' 7,snkhya ,k4 ,i1 #ba71 the purpose of the ,pradhna is fruition and final release on the part of the soul2 but both these are impossible4 ,for1 as the soul consists of pure intelligence1 is inactive1 changeless1 and spotless1 and hence eternally emancipated1 it is capable neither of fruition which consists in consciousness of ,prakriti1 nor of ,release which consists in separation from ,prakriti4 ,if1 on the other hand1 it be held that the soul constituted as described is1 owing to the mere nearness of ,prakriti1 capable of fruition1 i4e4 of being conscious of pleasure and pain1 which are special modifications of ,prakriti1 it follows that1 as ,prakriti is ever near1 the soul will never accomplish emancipation4 #i4 ,and 7it is7 objectionable on account of the contradictions4 ,the ,snkhya-system1 moreover1 labours from many internal contradictions4-- ,the ,snkhyas hold that while ,prakriti is for the sake of another and the object of knowledge and fruition1 the soul is independent1 an enjoying and knowing agent1 and conscious of ,prakriti2 that the soul reaches isolation through the instrumentality of ,prakriti only1 and that as its nature is pure1 permanent1 unchanging consciousness1 absence of all activity and isolation belong to that nature2 that for this reason the accomplishing of the means of bondage and release and of release belong to ,prakriti only2 and that1 owing to ,prakriti's proximity to the unchanging non-active soul1 ,prakriti1 by a process of mutual superimposition 7adhysa71 works towards the creation of a world and subserves the purposes of the soul's fruition and emancipation4--',since the aggregate of things is for the sake of another2 since there is an opposite of the three gunas and the rest2 since there is superintendence2 since there is an experiencing subject2 and since there is activity for the sake of isolation2 the soul exists' 7,snkhya ,k4 #ag72 ',and from that contrast the soul is proved to be a witness1 isolated1 neutral1 cognising and inactive' 7#ah74--;,and after having stated that the activity of the ,pradhna is for the purpose of the release of the ,self1 the text says1 'therefore no 7soul7 is either bound or released1 nor does it migrate2 it is ,prakriti which1 abiding in various beings1 is bound and released and migrates' 7#fb74 ,and ',from this connexion therewith 7i4e4 with the soul7 the non-intelligent appears as intelligent2 and although all agency belongs to the gunas1 the indifferent 7soul7 becomes an agent4 ,in order that the soul may know the ,pradhna and become isolated1 the connexion of the two takes place like that of the lame and the blind2 and thence creation springs' 7#bj1 #ba74--,now to that which is eternally unchanging1 non-active and isolated1 the attributes of being a witness and an enjoying and cognising agent can in no way belong4 ,nor also can such a being be subject to error resting on superimposition2 for error and superimposition both are of the nature of change4 ,and1 on the other hand1 they also cannot belong to ,prakriti1 since they are attributes of intelligent beings4 ,for by superimposition we understand the attribution1 on the part of an intelligent being1 of the qualities of one thing to another thing2 and this is the doing of an intelligent being1 and moreover a change4 ,nor is it possible that superimposition and the like should take place in the soul only if it is in approximation to ,prakriti4-- ,they may take place just on account of the non-changing nature of the soul6--,then1 we reply1 they would take place permanently4 ,and that mere proximity has no effective power we have already shown under ,,ii1 #a1 #d4 ,and if it is maintained that it is ,prakriti only that migrates1 is bound and released1 how then can she be said to benefit the soul1 which is eternally released8 ,that she does so the ,snkhyas distinctly assert1 ',by manifold means ,prakriti1 helpful and endowed with the gunas1 without any benefit to herself1 accomplishes the purpose of the soul1 which is thankless and not composed of the gunas' 7,snkhya ,k4 #fj74--,the ,snkhyas further teach that ,prakriti1 on being seen by any soul in her true nature1 at once retires from that soul--',as a dancer having exhibited herself on the stage withdraws from the soul1 so ,prakriti withdraws from the soul when she has manifested herself to it' 7#ei72 ',my opinion is that there exists nothing more sensitive than ,prakriti1 who knowing ,i have been seen does not again show itself to the soul' 7#fa74 ,but this doctrine also is inappropriate4 ,for1 as the soul is eternally released and above all change1 it never sees ,prakriti1 nor does it attribute to itself her qualities2 and ,prakriti herself does not see herself since she is of non-intelligent nature2 nor can she wrongly impute to herself the soul's seeing of itself as her own seeing of herself1 for she herself is non-intelligent and the soul is incapable of that change which consists in seeing or knowing4--,let it then be said that the 'seeing' means nothing more than the proximity of ,prakriti to the soul6-- ,but this also does not help you2 for1 as said above1 from that there would follow eternal seeing1 since the two are in eternal proximity4 ,moreover1 the ever unchanging soul is not capable of an approximation which does not form an element of its unchanging nature4--,moreover1 if you define the seeing as mere proximity and declare this to be the cause of ,release1 we point out that it equally is the cause of bondage--so that bondage and release would both be permanent4--,let it then be said that what causes bondage is wrong seeing--while intuition of the true nature of things is the cause of ,release6--,but as both these kinds of seeing are nothing but proximity1 it would follow that both take place permanently4 ,and if1 on the other hand1 the proximity of ,soul and ,prakriti were held not to be permanent1 then the cause of such proximity would have to be assigned1 and again the cause of that1 and so on ad infinitum4--,let us then1 to escape from these difficulties1 define proximity as nothing more than the true nature of soul and ,prakriti6--,as the true nature is permanent1 we reply1 it would follow therefrom that bondage and release would be alike permanent4--,on account of all these contradictory views the system of the ,snkhyas is untenable4 ,we finally remark that the arguments here set forth by us at the same time prove the untenableness of the view of those who teach that there is an eternally unchanging ,brahman whose nature is pure1 non-differenced intelligence1 and which by being conscious of ,nescience experiences unreal bondage and release4 ,for those philosophers can show no more than the ,snkhyas do how their ,brahman can be conscious of ,nescience1 can be subject to adhysa1 and so on4 ,there is1 however1 the following difference between the two theories4 ,the ,snkhyas1 in order to account for the definite individual distribution of birth1 death1 and so on1 assume a plurality of souls4 ,the ,vedntins1 on the other hand1 do not allow even so much1 and their doctrine is thus all the more irrational4 ,the assertion that there is a difference 7in favour of the ,vedntins7 between the two doctrines1 in so far as the ,vedntins hold ,prakriti to be something unreal1 while the ,snkhyas consider it to be real1 is unfounded2 for pure1 homogeneous intelligence1 eternally non-changing1 cannot possibly be conscious of anything different from itself1 whether it be unreal or real4 ,and if that thing is held to be unreal1 there arise further difficulties1 owing to its having to be viewed as the object of knowledge1 of refutation1 and so on4 ,here terminates the adhikarana of 'the impossibility of construction4' #aj4 ,or in the same way as the big and long from the short and the atomic4 ,we have shown that the theory of the ,pradhna being the universal cause is untenable1 since it rests on fallacious arguments1 and suffers from inner contradictions4 ,we shall now prove that the view of atoms constituting the universal cause is untenable likewise4 ',or in the same way as the big and long from the short and the atomic' ',is untenable' must be supplied from the preceding ,stra2 'or' has to be taken in the sense of 'and4' ,the sense of the ,stra is--in the same way as the big and long1 i4e4 as the theory of ternary compounds originating from the short and the atomic1 i4e4 from binary compounds and simple atoms is untenable1 so everything else which they 7the ,vaiseshikas7 maintain is untenable2 or1 in other words--as the theory of the world originating from atoms through binary compounds is untenable1 so everything else is likewise untenable4--,things consisting of parts1 as e4g4 a piece of cloth1 are produced by their parts1 e4g4 threads1 being joined by means of the six sides which are parts of those parts4 ,analogously the atoms also must be held to originate binary compounds in the way of combining by means of their six sides2 for if the atoms possessed no distinction of parts 7and hence filled no space71 a group of even a thousand atoms would not differ in extension from a single atom1 and the different kinds of extension--minuteness1 shortness1 bigness1 length1 c4--would never emerge4 ,if1 on the other hand1 it is admitted that the atoms also have distinct sides1 they have parts and are made up of those parts1 and those parts again are made up of their parts1 and so on in infinitum4-- ,but1 the ,vaiseshika may object1 the difference between a mustard seed and a mountain is due to the paucity of the constituent parts on the one hand1 and their multitude on the other4 ,if1 now1 it be held that the atom itself contains an infinity of parts1 the mustard seed and the mountain alike will contain an infinity of parts1 and thus their inequality cannot be accounted for4 ,we must therefore assume that there is a limit of subdivision 7i4e4 that there are real atoms which do not themselves consist of parts74--,not so1 we reply4 ,if the atoms did not possess distinct parts1 there could originate no extension greater than the extension of one atom 7as already shown71 and thus neither mustard seed nor mountain would ever be brought about4--,but what1 then1 are we to do to get out of this dilemma8--,you have only to accept the ,vedic doctrine of the origination of the world4 ,others explain the above ,stra as meant to refute an objection against the doctrine of ,brahman being the general cause4 ,but this does not suit the arrangement of the ,stras1 and would imply a meaningless iteration4 ,the objections raised by some against the doctrine of ,brahman have been disposed of in the preceding pda1 and the present pda is devoted to the refutation of other theories4 ,and that the world admits of being viewed as springing from an intelligent principle such as ,brahman was shown at length under ,,ii1 #a1 #d4 ,the sense of the ,stra1 therefore1 is none other than what we stated above4--,but what are those other untenable views to which the ,stra refers8--,to this question the next ,stra replies4 #aa4 ,on both assumptions also there is no motion1 and thence non-being 7of the origination of the world74 ,the atomic theory teaches that the world is produced by the successive formation of compounds1 binary1 ternary1 and so on1 due to the aggregation of atoms--such aggregation resulting from the motion of the atoms4 ,the primary motion of the atoms--which are the cause of the origination of the entire world--is assumed to be brought about by the unseen principle 7adrishta71 ',the upward flickering of fire1 the sideway motion of air1 the primary motion on the part of atoms and of the manas are caused by the unseen principle4'--,is then1 we ask1 this primary motion of the atoms caused by an adrishta residing in them1 or by an adrishta residing in the souls8 ,neither alternative is possible4 ,for the unseen principle which is originated by the good and evil deeds of the individual souls cannot possibly reside in the atoms2 and if it could1 the consequence would be that the atoms would constantly produce the world4 ,nor again can the adrishta residing in the souls be the cause of motion originating in the atoms4--,let it then be assumed that motion originates in the atoms1 owing to their being in contact with the souls in which the adrishta abides6--,if this were so1 we reply1 it would follow that the world would be permanently created1 for the adrishta1 of the souls forms an eternal stream4-,but the adrishta requires to be matured in order to produce results4 ,the adrishtas of some souls come to maturity in the same state of existence in which the deeds were performed2 others become mature in a subsequent state of existence only2 and others again do not become mature before a new ,kalpa has begun4 ,it is owing to this dependence on the maturation of the adrishtas that the origination of the world does not take place at all times4--,but this reasoning also we cannot admit4 ,for there is nothing whatever to establish the conclusion that all the different adrishtas which spring from the manifold actions performed at different times1 without any previous agreement1 by the infinite multitude of individual ,selfs should reach a state of uniform maturation at one and the same moment of time 7so as to give rise to a new creation74 ,nor does this view of yours account for the fact of the entire world being destroyed at the same time1 and remaining in a state of non-maturation for the period of a dviparrdha4--,nor can you say that the motion of the atoms is due to their conjunction with 7souls whose7 adrishta possesses certain specific qualities imparted to them by the will of the ,lord2 for by mere inference the existence of a ,lord cannot be proved1 as we have shown under ,i1 #a4 ,the origin of the world cannot1 therefore1 be due to any action on the part of the atoms4 #ab4 ,and because owing to the acknowledgment of samavya1 there results a regressus in infinitum from equality4 ,the ,vaiseshika doctrine is further untenable on account of the acknowledgment of samavya4--,why so8--,because the samavya also1 like part1 quality1 and generic characteristics1 requires something else to establish it1 and that something else again requires some further thing to establish it--from which there arises an infinite regress4 ,to explain4 ,the ,vaiseshikas assume the so-called samavya relation1 defining it as 'that connexion which is the cause of the idea this is here1 in the case of things permanently and inseparably connected1 and standing to each other in the relation of abode and thing abiding in the abode4' ,now1 if such a samavya relation is assumed in order to account for the fact that things observed to be inseparably connected--as1 e4g41 class characteristics are inseparably connected with the individuals to which they belong--are such1 i4e4 inseparably connected1 a reason has also to be searched for why the samavya1 which is of the same nature as those things 7in so far1 namely1 as it is also inseparably connected with the things connected by it71 is such2 and for that reason1 again1 a further reason has to be postulated1 and so on1 in infinitum4 ,nor can it be said that inseparable connexion must be assumed to constitute the essential nature of samavya 7so that no further reason need be demanded for its inseparable connexion72 for on this reasoning you would have to assume the same essential nature for class characteristics1 qualities1 and so on 7which would render the assumption of a samavya needless for them also74 ,nor is it a legitimate proceeding to postulate an unseen entity such as the samavya is1 and then to assume for it such and such an essential nature4--,these objections apply to the samavya whether it be viewed as eternal or non-eternal4 ,the next ,stra urges a further objection against it if viewed as eternal4 #ac4 ,and because 7the world also7 would thus be eternal4 ,the samavya is a relation1 and if that relation is eternal that to which the relation belongs must also be eternal1 so that we would arrive at the unacceptable conclusion that the world is eternal4 #ad4 ,and on account of 7the atoms7 having colour and so on1 the reverse 7takes place72 as it is observed4 ,from the view that the atoms of four kinds--viz4 of earth or water or fire or air--possess colour1 taste1 smell1 and touch1 it would follow that the atoms are non-eternal1 gross1 and made up of parts--and this is the reverse of what the ,vaiseshikas actually teach as to their atoms1 viz4 that they are eternal1 subtle1 and not made up of parts4 ,for things possessing colour1 e4g4 jars1 are non-eternal1 because it is observed that they are produced from other causes of the same1 i4e4 non-eternal nature1 and so on4 ,to a non-perceived thing which is assumed in accordance with what is actually perceived1 we may not ascribe any attributes that would be convenient to us2 and it is in accordance with actual experience that you ,vaiseshikas assume the atoms to possess colour and other qualities4 ,hence your theory is untenable4--,let it then1 in order to avoid this difficulty1 be assumed that the atoms do not possess colour and other sensible qualities4 ,to this alternative the next ,stra refers4 #ae4 ,and as there are objections in both cases4 ,a difficulty arises not only on the view of the atoms having colour and other sensible qualities1 but also on the view of their being destitute of those qualities4 ,for as the qualities of effected things depend on the qualities of their causes1 earth1 water1 and so on1 would in that case be destitute of qualities4 ,and if to avoid this difficulty1 it be held that the atoms do possess qualities1 we are again met by the difficulty stated in the preceding ,stra4 ,objections thus arising in both cases1 the theory of the atoms is untenable4 #af4 ,and as it is not accepted1 it is altogether disregarded4 ,kapila's doctrine1 although to be rejected on account of it's being in conflict with ,scripture and sound reasoning1 yet recommends itself to the adherents of the ,veda on some accounts--as e4g4 its view of the existence of the effect in the cause4 ,kanda's theory1 on the other hand1 of which no part can be accepted and which is totally destitute of proof1 cannot but be absolutely disregarded by all those who aim at the highest end of man4--,here terminates the adhikarana of 'the big and long'4 #ag4 ,even on the aggregate with its two causes1 there is non- establishment of that4 ,we so far have refuted the ,vaiseshikas1 who hold the doctrine of atoms constituting the general cause4 ,now the followers of ,buddha also teach that the world originates from atoms1 and the ,stras therefore proceed to declare that on their view also the origination1 course1 and so on1 of the world cannot rationally be accounted for4 ,these ,bauddhas belong to four different classes4 ,some of them hold that all outward things1 which are either elements 7bhta7 or elemental 7bhautika71 and all inward things which are either mind 7kitta7 or mental 7kaitta71--all these things consisting of aggregates of the atoms of earth1 water1 fire and air--are proved by means of ,perception as well as ,inference4 ,others hold that all external things1 earth1 and so on1 are only to be inferred from ideas 7vijna74 ,others again teach that the only reality are ideas to which no outward things correspond2 the 7so-called7 outward things are like the things seen in dreams4 ,the three schools mentioned agree in holding that the things admitted by them have a momentary existence only1 and do not allow that1 in addition to the things mentioned1 viz4 elements and elemental things1 mind and mental things1 there are certain further independent entities such as ether1 ,self1 and so on4--,others finally assert a universal void1 i4e4 the non-reality of everything4 ,the ,stras at first dispose of the theory of those who acknowledge the real existence of external things4 ,their opinion is as follows4 ,the atoms of earth which possess the qualities of colour1 taste1 touch and smell2 the atoms of water which possess the qualities of colour1 taste and touch2 the atoms of fire which possess the qualities of colour and touch2 and the atoms of air which possess the quality of touch only1 combine so as to constitute earth1 water1 fire and air2 and out of the latter there originate the aggregates called bodies1 sense-organs1 and objects of sense-organs4 ,and that flow of ideas1 which assumes the form of the imagination of an apprehending agent abiding within the body1 is what constitutes the so-called ,self4 ,on the agencies enumerated there rests the entire empiric world4--,on this view the ,stra remarks1 ',even on the aggregate with its two causes1 there is non-establishment of that'4 ,that aggregate which consists of earth and the other elements and of which the atoms are the cause2 and that further aggregate which consists of bodies1 sense-organs and objects1 and of which the elements are the cause--on neither of these two aggregates with their twofold causes can there be proved establishment of that1 i4e4 can the origination of that aggregate which we call the world be rationally established4 ,if the atoms as well as earth and the other elements are held to have a momentary existence only1 when1 we ask1 do the atoms which perish within a moment1 and the elements1 move towards combination1 and when do they combine8 and when do they become the 'objects of states of consciousness'8 and when do they become the abodes of the activities of appropriation1 avoidance and so on 7on the part of agents78 and what is the cognising ,self8 and with what objects does it enter into contact through the sense-organs8 and which cognising ,self cognises which objects1 and at what time8 and which ,self proceeds to appropriate which objects1 and at what time8 ,for the sentient subject has perished1 and the object of sensation has perished2 and the cognising subject has perished1 and the object cognised has perished4 ,and how can one subject cognise what has been apprehended through the senses of another8 and how is one subject to take to itself what another subject has cognised8 ,and should it be said that each stream of cognitions is one 7whereby a kind of unity of the cognising subject is claimed to be established71 yet this affords no sufficient basis for the ordinary notions and activities of life1 since the stream really is nothing different from the constituent parts of the stream 7all of which are momentary and hence discrete74--,that in reality the ,ego constitutes the ,self and is the knowing subject1 we have proved previously4 #ah4 ,if it be said that 7this7 is to be explained through successive causality2 we say 'no1' on account of their not being the causes of aggregation4 ',if it be said that through the successive causality of ,nescience and so on1 the formation of aggregates and other matters may be satisfactorily accounted for4' ,to explain4 ,although all the entities 7acknowledged by the ,bauddhas7 have a merely momentary existence1 yet all that is accounted for by avidy4 ,avidy means that conception1 contrary to reality1 by which permanency1 and so on1 are ascribed to what is momentary1 and so on4 ,through avidy there are originated desire1 aversion1 c41 which are comprised under the general term 'impression' 7samskra72 and from those there springs cognition 7vijna7 which consists in the 'kindling' of mind2 from that mind 7kitta7 and what is of the nature of mind 7kaitta7 and the substances possessing colour1 and so on1 viz4 earth1 water1 c4 ,from that again the six sense-organs1 called 'the six abodes'2 from that the body1 called 'touch' 7sparsa72 from that sensation 7vedan71 and so on4 ,and from that again avidy1 and the whole series as described2 so that there is an endlessly revolving cycle1 in which avidy1 and so on1 are in turn the causes of the links succeeding them4 ,now all this is not possible without those aggregates of the elements and elemental things which are called earth1 and so on2 and thereby the rationality of the formation of those aggregates is proved4 ,to this the second half of the ,stra replies ',not so1 on account of 7their7 not being the causes of aggregation'4--,this cannot rationally be assumed1 because avidy1 and so on1 cannot be operative causes with regard to the aggregation of earth and the other elements and elemental things4 ,for avidy1 which consists in the view of permanency and so on1 belonging to what is non-permanent1 and desire1 aversion and the rest1 which are originated by avidy cannot constitute the causes of 7other7 momentary things entering into aggregation2 not any more than the mistaken idea of shell-silver is the cause of the aggregation of things such as shells4 ,moreover1 on the ,bauddha doctrine1 he who views a momentary thing as permanent himself perishes at the same moment2 who then is the subject in whom the so-called samskras1 i4e4 desire1 aversion1 and so on1 originate8 ,those who do not acknowledge one permanent substance constituting the abode of the samskras have no right to assume the continuance of the samskras4 #ai4 ,and on account of the cessation of the preceding one on the origination of the subsequent one4 ,for the following reason also the origination of the world cannot be accounted for on the view of the momentariness of all existence4 ,at the time when the subsequent momentary existence originates1 the preceding momentary existence has passed away1 and it cannot therefore stand in a causal relation towards the subsequent one4 ,for if non-existence had causal power1 anything might originate at any time at any place4--,let it then be said that what constitutes a cause is nothing else but existence in a previous moment4--,but1 if this were so1 the previous momentary existence of a jar1 let us say1 would be the cause of all things whatever that would be met with in this threefold world in the subsequent moment-cows1 buffaloes1 horses1 chairs1 stones1 c46--,let us then say that a thing existing in a previous moment is the cause only of those things1 existing in the subsequent moment1 which belong to the same species4--,but from this again it would follow that one jar existing in the previous moment would be the cause of all jars1 to be met with in any place1 existing in the following moment6--,perhaps you mean to say that one thing is the cause of one subsequent thing only4 ,but how then are we to know which thing is the cause of which one subsequent thing8-- ,well then ,i say that the momentarily existing jar which exists in a certain place is the cause of that one subsequent momentary jar only which exists at the very same place6--,very good1 then you hold that a place is something permanent6 7while yet your doctrine is that there is nothing permanent74--,moreover as1 on your theory1 the thing which has entered into contact with the eye or some other sense-organ does no longer exist at the time when the idea originates1 nothing can ever be the object of a cognition4 #bj4 ,there not being 7a cause71 there results contradiction of the admitted principle2 otherwise simultaneousness4 ,if it be said that the effect may originate even when a cause does not exist1 then--as we have pointed out before--anything might originate anywhere and at any time4 ,and not only would the origination of the effect thus remain unexplained1 but an admitted principle would also be contradicted4 ,for you hold the principle that there are four causes bringing about the origination of a cognition1 viz4 the adhipati-cause1 the sahakri-cause1 the lambhana-cause1 and the samanantara-cause4 ,the term adhipati denotes the sense-organs4--,and if1 in order to avoid opposition to an acknowledged principle1 it be assumed that the origination of a further momentary jar takes place at the time when the previous momentary jar still exists1 then it would follow that the two momentary jars1 the causal one and the effected one1 would be perceived together2 but as a matter of fact they are not so perceived4 ,and1 further1 the doctrine of general momentariness would thus be given up4 ,and should it be said that 7this is not so1 but that7 momentariness remains1 it would follow that the connexion of the sense-organ with the object and the cognition are simultaneous4 #ba4 ,there is non-establishment of pratisankhy and apratisankhy destruction1 on account of non-interruption4 ,so far the hypothesis of origination from that which is not has been refuted4 ,the present ,stra now goes on to declare that also the absolute 7niranvaya7 destruction of that which is cannot rationally be demonstrated4 ,those who maintain the momentariness of all things teach that there are two kinds of destruction1 one of a gross kind1 which consists in the termination of a series of similar momentary existences1 and is capable of being perceived as immediately resulting from agencies such as the blow of a hammer 7breaking a jar1 e4g472 and the other of a subtle kind1 not capable of being perceived1 and taking place in a series of similar momentary existences at every moment4 ,the former is called pratisankhy-destruction2 the latter apratisankhy-destruction4-- ,both these kinds of destruction are not possible4--,why8--,on account of the non-interruption1 i4e4 on account of the impossibility of the complete destruction of that which is4 ,the impossibility of such destruction was proved by us under ,,ii1 #a1 #ad1 where we showed that origination and destruction mean only the assumption of new states on the part of one and the same permanent substance1 and therefrom proved the non-difference of the effect from the cause4--,here it may possibly be objected that as we see that a light when extinguished passes away absolutely1 such absolute destruction may be inferred in other cases also4 ,but against this we point out that in the case of a vessel of clay being smashed we perceive that the material1 i4e4 clay1 continues to exist1 and that therefrom destruction is ascertained to be nothing else but the passing over of a real substance into another state4 ,the proper assumption1 therefore1 is that the extinguished light also has passed over into a different state1 and that in that state it is no longer perceptible may be explained by that state being an extremely subtle one4 #bb4 ,and on account of the objections presenting themselves in either case4 ,it has been shown that neither origination from nothing1 as held by the advocates of general momentariness1 is possible2 nor the passing away into nothing on the part of the thing originated4 ,the acknowledgment of either of these views gives rise to difficulties4 ,if the effect originates from nothing1 it is itself of the nature of nothing2 for it is observed that effects share the nature of what they originate from4 ,pitchers and ornaments1 e4g4 which are produced from clay and gold respectively1 possess the nature of their causal substances4 ,but you hold yourself that the world is not seen to be of the nature of nothingness2 and certainly it is not observed to be so4--,again1 if that which is underwent absolute destruction1 it would follow that after one moment the entire world would pass away into nothingness2 and subsequently the world again originating from nothingness1 it would follow that1 as shown above1 it would itself be of the nature of nothingness 7i4e4 there would no longer be a real world74--,there being thus difficulties on both views1 origination and destruction cannot take place as described by you4 #bc4 ,and in the case of space also1 on account of there being no difference4 ,in order to prove the permanency of external and internal things1 we have disproved the view that the two forms of destruction called pratisankhy and apratisankhy mean reduction of an existing thing to nothing4 ,this gives us an opportunity to disprove the view of ,ether 7space7 being likewise a mere irrational non-entity1 as the ,bauddhas hold it to be4 ,ether cannot be held to be a mere irrational non- entity1 because1 like those things which are admitted to be positive existences1 i4e4 earth1 and so on1 it is proved by consciousness not invalidated by any means of proof4 ,for the formation of immediate judgments such as 'here a hawk flies1 and there a vulture1' implies our being conscious of ether as marking the different places of the flight of the different birds4 ,nor is it possible to hold that ,space is nothing else but the non-existence 7abhva7 of earth1 and so on2 for this view collapses as soon as set forth in definite alternatives4 ,for whether we define ,space as the antecedent and subsequent non-existence of earth1 and so on1 or as their mutual non-existence1 or as their absolute non- existence--on none of these alternatives we attain the proper idea of ,space4 ,if1 in the first place1 we define it as the antecedent and subsequent non-existence of earth1 and so on1 it will follow that1 as the idea of ,space can thus not be connected with earth and other things existing at the present moment1 the whole world is without ,space4 ,if1 in the second place1 we define it as the mutual non-existence of earth1 and so on1 it will follow that1 as such mutual non-existence inheres in the things only which stand towards each other in the relation of mutual non-existence1 there is no perception of ,space in the intervals between those things 7while as a matter of fact there is74 ,and1 in the third place1 absolute non-existence of earth1 and so on1 cannot of course be admitted4 ,and as non-existence 7abhva7 is clearly conceived as a special state of something actually existing1 ,space even if admitted to be of the nature of abhva1 would not on that account be a futile non-entity 7something 'tukcha' or 'nirupkhya'74 #bd4 ,and on account of recognition4 ,we return to the proof of the1 previously mooted1 permanence of things4 ,the 'anusmriti' of the ,stra means cognition of what was previously perceived1 i4e4 recognition4 ,it is a fact that all things which were perceived in the past may be recognised1 such recognition expressing itself in the form 'this is just that 7,i knew before74' ,nor must you say that this is a mere erroneous assumption of oneness due to the fact of the thing now perceived being similar to the thing perceived before1 as in the case of the flame 7where a succession of flames continually produced anew is mistaken for one continuous flame72 for you do not admit that there is one permanent knowing subject that could have that erroneous idea4 ,what one person has perceived1 another cannot judge to be the same as1 or similar to1 what he is perceiving himself4 ,if therefore you hold that there is an erroneous idea of oneness due to the perception of similarity residing in different things perceived at different times1 you necessarily must acknowledge oneness on the part of the cognising subject4 ,in the case of the flame there is a valid means of knowledge to prove that there really is a succession of similar flames1 but in the case of the jar1 we are not aware of such a means1 and we therefore have no right to assume that recognition is due to the similarity of many successive jars4---,perhaps you will here argue as follows4 ,the momentariness of jars and the like is proved by ,perception as well as ,inference4 ,perception in the first place presents as its object the present thing which is different from non-present things1 in the same way as it presents the blue thing as different from the yellow2 it is in this way that we know the difference of the present thing from the past and the future4 ,inference again proceeds as follows--jars and the like are momentary because they produce effects and have existence 7sattva72 what is non-momentary1 such as the horn of a hare1 does not produce effects and does not possess existence4 ,we therefore conclude from the existence of the last momentary jar that the preceding jar- existences also are perishable1 just because they are momentary existences like the existence of the last jar4--,but both this perception and this inference have already been disproved by what was said above about the impossibility of momentary existences standing to one another in the relation of cause and effect4 ,moreover1 that difference of the present object from the non-present object which is intimated by ,perception does not prove the present object to be a different thing 7from the past object of ,perception71 but merely its being connected with the present time4 ,this does not prove it to be a different thing1 for the same thing can be connected with different times4 ,the two reasons again which were said to prove the momentariness of jars are invalid because they may be made to prove just the contrary of what they are alleged to prove4 ,for we may argue as follows--,from existence and from their having effects it follows that jars1 and so on1 are permanent2 for whatever is non-permanent1 is non-existent1 and does not produce effects1 as e4g4 the horn of a hare4 ,the capacity of producing effects can in fact be used only to prove non-momentariness on the part of jars1 and so on2 for as things perishing within a moment are not capable of acting1 they are not capable of producing effects4 ,further1 as it is seen in the case of the last momentary existence that its destruction is due to a visible cause 7viz4 the blow of a hammer or the like71 the proper conclusion is that also the other momentary jars 7preceding the last one7 require visible causes for their destruction2 and 7as no such causes are seen1 it follows that7 the jar is permanent and continuous up to the time when a destructive cause1 such as the blow of a hammer1 supervenes4 ,nor can it be said that hammers and the like are not the causes of destruction1 but only the causes of the origination of a new series of momentary existences dissimilar to the former ones--in the case of the jar1 e4g4 of a series of momentary fragments of a jar2 for we have proved before that the destruction of jars1 and so on1 means nothing but their passing over into a different condition1 e4g4 that of fragments4 ,and even if destruction were held to be something different from the origination of fragments1 it would yet be reasonable to infer1 on the ground of immediate succession in time1 that the cause of the destruction is the blow of the hammer4 ,hence it is impossible to deny in any way the permanency of things as proved by the fact of recognition4 ,he who maintains that recognition which has for its object the oneness of a thing connected with successive points of time has for its objects different things1 might as well say that several cognitions of1 let us say1 blue colour have for their object something different from blue colour4 ,moreover1 for him who maintains the momentariness of the cognising subject and of the objects of cognition1 it would be difficult indeed to admit the fact of ,inference which presupposes the ascertainment and remembrance of general propositions4 ,he would in fact not be able to set forth the reason required to prove his assertion that things are momentary2 for the speaker perishes in the very moment when he states the proposition to be proved1 and another person is unable to complete what has been begun by another and about which he himself does not know anything4 #be4 ,not from non-entity1 this not being observed4 ,so far we have set forth the arguments refuting the views of the ,vaibhshikas as well as the ,sautrntikas--both which schools maintain the reality of external things4--,now the ,sautrntika comes forward and opposes one of the arguments set forth by us above1 viz4 that1 on the view of general momentariness1 nothing can ever become an object of cognition1 since the thing which enters into connexion with the sense- organ is no longer in existence when the cognition originates4--,it is not1 he says1 the persistence of the thing up to the time of cognition which is the cause of its becoming an object of cognition4 ,to be an object of cognition means nothing more than to be the cause of the origination of cognition4 ,nor does this definition imply that the sense- organs also are the objects of cognition4 ,for a cause of cognition is held to be an object of cognition only in so far as it imparts to the cognition its own form 7and this the sense-organs do not74 ,now even a thing that has perished may have imparted its form to the cognition1 and on the basis of that form1 blue colour1 and so on1 the thing itself is inferred4 ,nor can it be said 7as the ,yogkras do7 that the form of subsequent cognitions is due to the action of previous cognitions 7and not to the external thing72 for on this hypothesis it could not be explained how in the midst of a series of cognitions of blue colour there all at once arises the cognition of yellow colour4 ,the manifold character of cognitions must therefore be held to be due to the manifold character of real thing4--,to this we reply 'not from non-entity2 this not being observed4' ,the special forms of cognition1 such as blue colour1 and so on1 cannot be the forms of things that have perished1 and therefore are not in ,being1 since this is not observed4 ,for it is not observed that when a substrate of attributes has perished1 its attributes pass over into another thing4 7,nor can it be said that the thing that perished leaves in cognition a reflection of itself1 for7 reflections also are only of persisting things1 not of mere attributes4 ,we therefore conclude that the manifoldness of cognitions can result from the manifoldness of things only on the condition of the thing persisting at the time of cognition4--,the ,stras now set forth a further objection which applies to both schools4 #bf4 ,and thus there would be accomplishment on the part of non-active people also4 ,thus1 i4e4 on the theory of universal momentariness1 origination from the non-existent1 causeless cognition1 and so on1 it would follow that persons also not making any efforts may accomplish all their ends4 ,it is a fact that the attainment of things desired and the warding off of things not desired is effected through effort1 and so on4 ,but if all existences momentarily perish1 a previously existing thing1 or special attributes of it1 such as after-effects 7through which ,svarga and the like are effected7 or knowledge 7through which ,release is effected7 do not persist1 and hence nothing whatever can be accomplished by effort4 ,and as thus all effects would be accomplished without a cause1 even perfectly inert men would accomplish all the ends to be reached in this and in the next life1 including final release4 ,here terminates the adhikarana of 'the aggregates4' #bg4 ,not non-existence1 on account of consciousness4 ,here now come forward the ,yogkras1 who hold that cognitions 7ideas7 only are real4 ,there is no reasonable ground1 they say1 for the view that the manifoldness of ideas is due to the manifoldness of things1 since ideas themselves--no less than the things assumed by others--have their distinct forms1 and hence are manifold4 ,and this manifold nature of ideas is sufficiently explained by so-called vsan4 ,vsan means a flow of ideas 7states of consciousness--pratyaya7 of different character4 ,we observe1 e4g41 that a cognition which has the form of a jar 7i4e4 the idea of a jar7 gives rise to the cognition of the two halves of a jar1 and is itself preceded and produced by the cognition of a jar1 and this again by a similar cognition1 and so on2 this is what we call a stream or flow of ideas4--,but how1 then1 is it that internal cognitions have the forms of external things1 mustard-grains1 mountains1 and so on8-- ,even if real things are admitted1 the ,yogkra replies1 their becoming objects of thought and speech depends altogether on the light of knowledge1 for otherwise it would follow that there is no difference between the objects known by oneself and those known by others4 ,and that cognitions thus shining forth to consciousness have forms 7distinctive characteristics7 must needs be admitted2 for if they were without form they could not shine forth4 ,now we are conscious only of one such form1 viz4 that of the cognition2 that this form at the same time appears to us as something external 7i4e4 as the form of an outward thing7 is due to error4 ,from the general law that we are conscious of ideas and things together only1 it follows that the thing is not something different from the idea4 ,as1 moreover1 the fact of one idea specially representing one particular thing only1 whether it be a jar or a piece of cloth or anything else1 requires for its explanation an equality in character of the idea and the thing1 those also who hold the existence of external things must needs assume that the idea has a form similar to that of the thing2 and as this suffices for rendering possible practical thought and intercourse1 there is nothing authorising us to assume the existence of things in addition to the ideas4 ,hence cognitions only constitute reality2 external things do not exist4 ,to this the ,stra replies1 ',not non-existence1 on account of consciousness4' ,the non-existence of things1 apart from ideas1 cannot be maintained1 because we are conscious of cognitions as what renders the knowing subject capable of thought and intercourse with regard to particular things4 ,for the consciousness of all men taking part in worldly life expresses itself in forms such as ',i know the jar4' ,knowledge of this kind1 as everybody's consciousness will testify1 presents itself directly as belonging to a knowing subject and referring to an object2 those therefore who attempt to prove1 on the basis of this very knowledge1 that ,reality is constituted by mere knowledge1 are fit subjects for general derision4 ,this point has already been set forth in detail in our refutation of those crypto-,bauddhas who take shelter under a pretended ,vedic theory4--,to maintain1 as the ,yogkras do1 that the general rule of idea and thing presenting themselves together proves the non-difference of the thing from the idea1 implies a self-contradiction2 for 'going together' can only be where there are different things4 ,to hold that it is a general rule that of the idea--the essential nature of which is to make the thing to which it refers capable of entering into common thought and intercourse--we are always conscious together with the thing1 and then to prove therefrom that the thing is not different from the idea1 is a laughable proceeding indeed4 ,and as1 according to you1 cognitions perish absolutely1 and do not possess any permanently persisting aspect1 it is rather difficult to prove that such cognitions form a series in which each member colours or affects the next one 7vsan72 for how is the earlier cognition1 which has absolutely perished1 to affect the later one1 which has not yet arisen8 ,we conclude therefore that the manifoldness of cognitions is due solely to the manifoldness of things4 ,we are directly conscious of cognitions 7ideas7 as rendering the things to which they refer capable of being dealt with by ordinary thought and speech1 and the specific character of each cognition thus depends on the relation which connects it with a particular thing4 ,this relation is of the nature of conjunction 7samyoga71 since knowledge 7cognition7 also is a substance4 ,just as light 7prabh71 although a substance1 stands to the lamp in the relation of an attribute 7guna71 so knowledge stands in the relation of an attribute to the ,self1 but1 viewed in itself1 it is a substance4--,from all this it follows that external things are not non-existent4 ,the next ,stra refutes the opinion of those who attempt to prove the baselessness of the cognitions of the waking state by comparing them to the cognitions of a dreaming person4 #bh4 ,and on account of difference of nature 7they are7 not like dreams4 ,owing to the different nature of dream-cognitions1 it cannot be said that1 like them1 the cognitions of the waking state also have no things to correspond to them4 ,for dream-cognitions are originated by organs impaired by certain defects1 such as drowsiness1 and are moreover sublated by the cognitions of the waking state2 while the cognitions of the waking state are of a contrary nature4 ,there is thus no equality between the two sets4--,moreover1 if all cognitions are empty of real content1 you are unable to prove what you wish to prove since your inferential cognition also is devoid of true content4 ,if1 on the other hand1 it be held to have a real content1 then it follows that no cognition is devoid of such content2 for all of them are alike cognitions1 just like the inferential cognition4 #bi4 ,the existence 7is7 not1 on account of the absence of perception4 ,the existence of mere cognitions devoid of corresponding things is not possible1 because such are nowhere perceived4 ,for we nowhere perceive cognitions not inherent in a cognising subject and not referring to objects4 ,that even dream-cognitions are not devoid of real matter we have explained in the discussion of the different khytis 7above1 p4 #aah74--;,here terminates the adhikarana of 'perception4' #cj4 ,and on account of its being unproved in every way4 ,here now come forward the ,mdhyamikas who teach that there is nothing but a universal ,void4 ,this theory of a universal ,nothing is the real purport of ,sugata's doctrine2 the theories of the momentariness of all existence1 c41 which imply the acknowledgment of the reality of things1 were set forth by him merely as suiting the limited intellectual capacities of his pupils4--,neither cognitions nor external objects have real existence2 the ,void 7the ',nothinj'7 only constitutes ,reality1 and final ,release means passing over into ,non-being4 ,this is the real view of ,buddha1 and its truth is proved by the following considerations4 ,as the ,nothing is not to be proved by any argument1 it is self-proved4 ,for a cause has to be assigned for that only which is4 ,but what is does not originate either from that which is or that which is not4 ,we never observe that which is to originate from ,being2 for things such as jars1 and so on1 do not originate as long as the lump of clay1 c41 is non- destroyed4 ,nor can ,being originate from ,non-being2 for if the jar were supposed to originate from ,non-being1 i4e4 that non-being which results from the destruction of the lump of clay1 it would itself be of the nature of ,non-being4 ,similarly it can be shown that nothing can originate either from itself or from anything else4 ,for the former hypothesis would imply the vicious procedure of the explanation presupposing the thing to be explained2 and moreover no motive can be assigned for a thing originating from itself4 ,and on the hypothesis of things originating from other things1 it would follow that anything might originate from anything1 for all things alike are other things4 ,and as thus there is no origination there is also no destruction4 ,hence the ,nothing constitutes ,reality3 origination1 destruction1 ,being1 ,non- being1 and so on1 are mere illusions 7bhrnti74 ,nor must it be said that as even an illusion cannot take place without a substrate we must assume something real to serve as a substrate2 for in the same way as an illusion may arise even when the defect1 the abode of the defect1 and the knowing subject are unreal1 it also may arise even when the substrate of the illusion is unreal4 ,hence the ,nothing is the only reality4--,to this the ,stra replies1 ',and on account of its being in everyway unproved'--the theory of general ,nothingness which you hold cannot stand4 ,do you hold that everything is being or non-being1 or anything else8 ,on none of these views the ,nothingness maintained by you can be established4 ,for the terms being and non-being and the ideas expressed by them are generally understood to refer to particular states of actually existing things only4 ,if therefore you declare 'everything is nothing1' your declaration is equivalent to the declaration1 'everything is being1' for your statement also can only mean that everything that exists is capable of abiding in a certain condition 7which you call ',nothing'74 ,the absolute ,nothingness you have in mind cannot thus be established in any way4 ,moreover1 he who tries to establish the tenet of universal ,nothingness can attempt this in so far only as1--through some means of knowledge1 he has come to know ,nothingness1 and he must therefore acknowledge the truth of that means4 ,for if it were not true it would follow that everything is real4 ,the view of general ,nothingness is thus altogether incapable of proof4--,here terminates the adhikarana of 'unprovedness in every way4' #ca4 ,not so1 on account of the impossibility in one4 ,the ,bauddhas have been refuted4 ,as now the ,jainas also hold the view of the world originating from atoms and similar views1 their theory is reviewed next4--,the ,jainas hold that the world comprises souls 7jva71 and non-souls 7ajva71 and that there is no ,lord4 ,the world further comprises six substances 7dravya71 viz4 souls 7jva71 merit 7dharma71 demerit 7adharma71 bodies 7pudgala71 time 7kla71 and space 7ksa74 ,the souls are of three different kinds-bound 7in the state of bondage71 perfected by ,yoga 7,yogasiddha71 and released 7mukta74 ',merit' is that particular world-pervading substance which is the cause of the motion of all things moving2 'demerit' is that all-pervading substance which is the cause of stationariness1 ',body' is that substance which possesses colour1 smell1 taste1 and touch4 ,it is of two kinds1 atomic or compounded of atoms2 to the latter kind belong wind1 fire1 water1 earth1 the bodies of living creatures1 and so on4 ',time' is a particular atomic substance which is the cause of the current distinction of past1 present1 and future4 ',space' is one1 and of infinite extent4 ,from among these substances those which are not atomic are comprehended under the term 'the five astikyas 7existing bodies7'--the astikya of souls1 the astikya of merit1 the astikya of demerit1 the astikya of matter1 the astikya of space4 ,this term 'astikya' is applied to substances occupying several parts of space4--,they also use another division of categories which subserves the purpose of ,release2 distinguishing souls1 non-souls1 influx 7srava71 bondage1 nijara1 samvara1 and ,release4 ,release comprises the means of ,release also1 viz4 perfect knowledge1 good conduct1 and so on4 ,the soul is that which has knowledge1 seeing1 pleasure1 strength 7vrya7 for its qualities4 ,non-soul is the aggregate of the things enjoyed by the souls4 ',influx' is whatever is instrumental towards the souls having the fruition of objects1 viz4 the sense-organs1 and so on4--,bondage is of eight different kinds1 comprising the four ghtikarman1 and the four aghtikarman4 ,the former term denotes whatever obstructs the essential qualities of the soul1 viz4 knowledge1 intuition1 strength1 pleasure2 the latter whatever causes pleasure1 pain1 and indifference1 which are due to the persistence of the wrong imagination that makes the soul identify itself with its body4--',decay' means the austerities 7tapas71 known from the teaching of the ,arhat1 which are the means of ,release4--,samvara is such deep meditation 7,samdhi7 as stops the action of the sense-organs4--,release1 finally1 is the manifestation of the ,self in its essential nature1 free from all afflictions such as passion1 and so on4--,the atoms which are the causes of earth and the other compounds1 are not1 as the ,vaiseshikas and others hold1 of four different kinds1 but have all the same nature2 the distinctive qualities of earth1 and so on1 are due to a modification 7parinma7 of the atoms4 ,the ,jainas further hold that the whole complex of things is of an ambiguous nature in so far as being existent and non-existent1 permanent and non-permanent1 separate and non-separate4 ,to prove this they apply their so-called sapta-bhang-nyya 7'the system of the seven paralogisms'7--',may be1 it is'2 ',may be1 it is not'2 ',may be1 it is and is not'2 ',may be1 it is not predicable'2 ',may be1 it is and is not predicable'2 ',may be1 it is not1 and is not predicable'2 ',may be1 it is and is not1 and is not predicable4' ,with the help of this they prove that all things--which they declare to consist of substance 7dravya71 and paryya--to be existing1 one and permanent in so far as they are substances1 and the opposite in so far as they are paryyas4 ,by paryya they understand the particular states of substances1 and as those are of the nature of ,being as well as ,non-being1 they manage to prove existence1 non-existence1 and so on4--,with regard to this the ,stra remarks that no such proof is possible1',not so1 on account of the impossibility in one'2 i4e4 because contradictory attributes such as existence and non-existence cannot at the same time belong to one thing1 not any more than light and darkness4 ,as a substance and particular states qualifying it--and 7by the ,jainas71 called paryya--are different things 7padrtha71 one substance cannot be connected with opposite attributes4 ,it is thus not possible that a substance qualified by one particular state1 such as existence1 should at the same time be qualified by the opposite state1 i4 e4 non-existence4 ,the non-permanency1 further1 of a substance consists in its being the abode of those particular states which are called origination and destruction2 how then should permanency1 which is of an opposite nature1 reside in the substance at the same time8 ,difference 7bhinnatva7 again consists in things being the abodes of contradictory attributes2 non-difference1 which is the opposite of this1 cannot hence possibly reside in the same things which are the abode of difference2 not any more than the generic character of a horse and that of a buffalo can belong to one animal4 ,we have explained this matter at length1 when--under ,stra ,i1 #a--refuting the bhedbheda-theory4 ,time we are conscious of only as an attribute of substances 7not as an independent substance71 and the question as to its being and non-being1 and so on1 does not therefore call for a separate discussion4 ,to speak of time as being and non-being in no way differs from generic characteristics 7jti71 and so on1 being spoken of in the same way2 for--as we have explained before--of jti and the like we are conscious only as attributes of substances4--,but 7the ,jaina may here be supposed to ask the ,vedntin71 how can you maintain that ,brahman1 although one only1 yet at the same time is the ,self of all8--,because1 we reply1 the whole aggregate of sentient and non-sentient beings constitutes the body of the ,supreme ,person1 omniscient1 omnipotent1 and so on4 ,and that the body and the person embodied and their respective attributes are of totally different nature 7so that ,brahman is not touched by the defects of his body71 we have explained likewise4--,moreover1 as your six substances1 soul1 and so on1 are not one substance and one paryya1 their being one substance1 and so on1 cannot be used to prove their being one and also not one1 and so on4--,and if it should be said that those six substances are such 7viz4 one and several1 and so on71 each owing to its own paryya and its own nature1 we remark that then you cannot avoid contradicting your own theory of everything being of an ambiguous nature4 ,things which stand to each other in the relation of mutual non-existence cannot after all be identical4--,hence the theory of the ,jainas is not reasonable4 ,moreover it is liable to the same objections which we have above set forth as applying to all theories of atoms constituting the universal cause1 without the guidance of a ,lord4 #cc4 ,and likewise non-entireness of the ,self4 ,on your view there would likewise follow non-entireness of the ,self4 ,for your opinion is that souls abide in numberless places1 each soul having the same size as the body which it animates4 ,when1 therefore1 the soul previously abiding in the body of an elephant or the like has to enter into a body of smaller size1 e4 g4 that of an ant1 it would follow that as the soul then occupies less space1 it would not remain entire1 but would become incomplete4--,let us then avoid this difficulty by assuming that the soul passes over into a different state--which process is called paryya1--which it may manage because it is capable of contraction and dilatation4--,to this the next ,stra replies4 #cd4 ,nor also is there non-contradiction from paryya2 on account of change1 and so on4 ,nor is the difficulty to be evaded by the assumption of the soul assuming a different condition through contraction or dilatation4 ,for this would imply that the soul is subject to change1 and all the imperfections springing from it1 viz4 non-permanence1 and so on1 and hence would not be superior to non-sentient things such as jars and the like4 #ce4 ,and on account of the endurance of the final 7size71 and the 7resulting7 permanency of both2 there is no difference4 ,the final size of the soul1 i4e4 the size it has in the state of ,release1 is enduring since the soul does not subsequently pass into another body2 and both1 i4e4 the soul in the state of ,release and the size of that soul1 are permanent 7nitya74 ,from this it follows that that ultimate size is the true essential size of the soul and also belongs to it previously to ,release4 ,hence there is no difference of sizes1 and the soul cannot therefore have the size of its temporary bodies4 ,the rhata theory is therefore untenable4--,here terminates the adhikarana of 'the impossibility in one4' #cf4 7,the system7 of the ,lord 7must be disregarded71 on account of inappropriateness4 ,so far it has been shown that the doctrines of ,kapila1 ,kanda1 ,sugata1 and the ,arhat must be disregarded by men desirous of final beatitude2 for those doctrines are all alike untenable and foreign to the ,veda4 ,the ,stras now declare that1 for the same reasons1 the doctrine of ,pasupati also has to be disregarded4 ,the adherents of this view belong to four different classes--,kplas1 ,klmukhas1 ,psupatas1 and ,saivas4 ,all of them hold fanciful theories of ,reality which are in conflict with the ,veda1 and invent various means for attaining happiness in this life and the next4 ,they maintain the general material cause and the operative cause to be distinct1 and the latter cause to be constituted by ,pasupati4 ,they further hold the wearing of the six so-called 'mudr' badges and the like to be means to accomplish the highest end of man4 ,thus the ,kplas say1 ',he who knows the true nature of the six mudrs1 who understands the highest mudr1 meditating on himself as in the position called bhagsana1 reaches ,nirvna4 ,the necklace1 the golden ornament1 the earring1 the head-jewel1 ashes1 and the sacred thread are called the six mudrs4 ,he whose body is marked with these is not born here again4'--,similarly the ,klmukhas teach that the means for obtaining all desired results in this world as well as the next are constituted by certain practices--such as using a skull as a drinking vessel1 smearing oneself with the ashes of a dead body1 eating the flesh of such a body1 carrying a heavy stick1 setting up a liquor-jar and using it as a platform for making offerings to the gods1 and the like4 ',a bracelet made of ,rudrksha-seeds on the arm1 matted hair on the head1 a skull1 smearing oneself with ashes1 c4'--all this is well known from the sacred writings of the ,saivas4 ,they also hold that by some special ceremonial performance men of different castes may become ,brhmanas and reach the highest srama3 'by merely entering on the initiatory ceremony 7dksh7 a man becomes a ,brhmana at once2 by undertaking the kpla rite a man becomes at once an ascetic4' ,with regard to these views the ,stra says 'of pati1 on account of inappropriateness4' ,a 'not' has here to be supplied from ,stra #cb4 ,the system of ,pasupati has to be disregarded because it is inappropriate1 i4 e4 because the different views and practices referred to are opposed to one another and in conflict with the ,veda4 ,the different practices enumerated above1 the wearing of the six mudrs and so on1 are opposed to each other2 and moreover the theoretical assumptions of those people1 their forms of devotion and their practices1 are in conflict with the ,veda4 ,for the ,veda declares that ,nryana who is the highest ,brahman is alone the operative and the substantial cause of the world1 ',nryana is the highest ,brahman1 ,nryana is the highest ,reality1 ,nryana is the highest light1 ,nryana is the highest ,self'2 ',that thought1 may ,i be many1 may ,i grow forth' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #b1 #c72 ',he desired1 may ,i be many1 may ,i grow forth' 7,taitt4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #f1 #a71 and so on4 ,in the same way the texts declare meditation on the ,supreme ,person1 who is the highest ,brahman1 to be the only meditation which effects final release2 cp4 ',i know that great ,person of sunlike lustre beyond the darkness4 ,a man who knows him passes over death2 there is no other path to go' 7,svet4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #h74 ,and in the same way all texts agree in declaring that the works subserving the knowledge of ,brahman are only those sacrificial and other works which the ,veda enjoins on men in the different castes and stages of life3 ',him ,brhmanas seek to know by the study of the ,veda1 by sacrifice1 by gifts1 by penance1 by fasting4 ,wishing for that world only1 mendicants wander forth from their homes' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,xi1 #d1 #bb74 ,in some texts enjoining devout meditation1 and so on1 we indeed meet with terms such as ,prajpati1 ,siva1 ,indra1 ksa1 ,prna1 c41 but that these all refer to the supreme ,reality established by the texts concerning ,nryana--the aim of which texts it is to set forth the highest ,reality in its purity--1 we have already proved under ,i1 #a1 #cj4 ,in the same way we have proved under ,s4 ,i1 #a1 #b that in texts treating of the creation of the world1 such as ',being only this was in the beginning1' and the like1 the words ,being1 ,brahman1 and so on1 denote nobody else but ,nryana1 who is set forth as the universal creator in the account of creation given in the text1 ',alone indeed there was ,nryana1 not ,brahm1 not ,isna--he being alone did not rejoice' 7,mahopanishad ,i74--,as the ,pasupati theory thus teaches principles1 meditations and acts conflicting with the ,veda1 it must be disregarded4 #cg4 ,and on account of the impossibility of rulership4 ,those who stand outside the ,veda arrive through inference at the conclusion that the ,lord is a mere operative cause4 ,this being so1 they must prove the ,lord's being the ruler 7of the material cause7 on the basis of observation4 ,but it is impossible to prove that the ,lord is the ruler of the ,pradhna in the same way as the potter e4g4 is the ruler of the clay4 ,for the ,lord is without a body1 while the power of ruling material causes is observed only in the case of embodied beings such as potters4 ,nor may you have recourse to the hypothesis of the ,lord being embodied2 for--as we have shown under ,i1 #a1 #c--there arise difficulties whether that body1 which as body must consist of parts1 be viewed as eternal or as non-eternal4 #ch4 ,if you say1 as in the case of the organs2 we deny this1 on account of enjoyment and so on4 ,it may possibly be said that1 in the same way as the enjoying 7individual7 soul1 although in itself without a body1 is seen to rule the sense-organs1 the body1 and so on1 the great ,lord also1 although without a body1 may rule the ,pradhna4 ,but this analogy cannot be allowed 'on account of enjoyment1' and so on4 ,the body's being ruled by the soul is due to the unseen principle in the form of good and evil works1 and has for its end the requital of those works4 ,your analogy would thus imply that the ,lord also is under the influence of an unseen principle1 and is requited for his good and evil works4--,the ,lord cannot therefore be a ruler4 #ci4 ,finiteness or absence of omniscience4 ',or' here has the sense of 'and4' ,if the ,lord is under the influence of the adrishta1 it follows that1 like the individual soul1 he is subject to creation1 dissolution1 and so on1 and that he is not omniscient4 ,the ,pasupati theory cannot therefore be accepted4--,it is true that the ,stra1 'but in case of conflict 7with ,scripture7 it is not to be regarded' 7,p4 ,m4 ,s4 ,i1 #c1 #c71 has already established the non-acceptability of all views contrary to the ,veda2 the present adhikarana1 however1 raises this question again in order specially to declare that the ,pasupati theory is contrary to the ,veda4 ,although the ,psupata and the ,saiva systems exhibit some features which are not altogether contrary to the ,veda1 yet they are unacceptable because they rest on an assumption contrary to the ,veda1 viz4 of the difference of the general1 instrumental and material causes1 and imply an erroneous interchange of higher and lower entities4-- ,here terminates the adhikarana of ',pasupati4' #dj4 ,on account of the impossibility of origination4 ,the ,stras now proceed to refute a further doubt1 viz4 that the ,pakartra tantra--which sets forth the means of attaining supreme beatitude1 as declared by the ,lord 7,bhagavat7--may also be destitute of authority1 in so far1 namely1 as belonging to the same class as the tantras of ,kapila and others4 ,the above ,stra raises the doubt4 ,the theory of the ,bhgavatas is that from ,vsudeva1 who is the highest ,brahman and the highest cause1 there originates the individual soul called ,sankarshana2 from ,sankarshana the internal organ called ,pradyumna2 and from ,pradyumna the principle of egoity called ,aniruddha4 ,now this theory implies the origination of the individual soul1 and this is contrary to ,scripture4 ,for scriptural texts declare the soul to be without a beginning--cp4 'the intelligent one is not born and does not die' 7,ka4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #ah71 and other texts4 #da4 ,and there is not 7origination7 of the instrument from the agent4 ',the internal organ called ,pradyumna originates from ,sankarshana1' i4 e4 the internal organ originates from the individual soul which is the agent4 ,but this is inadmissible1 since the text 'from him there is produced breath1 mind1 and all sense-organs' 7,mu4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #a1 #c7 declares that the mind also springs from none else but the highest ,brahman4 ,as the ,bhgavata doctrine thus teaches things opposed to ,scripture1 its authoritativeness cannot be admitted4--,against these objections the next ,stra declares itself4 #db4 ,or1 if they are of the nature of that which is knowledge and so on1 there is no contradiction to that 7i4e4 the ,bhgavata doctrine74 ,the 'or' sets aside the view previously maintained4 ,by 'that which is knowledge and so on' ,,footnote #ebd3a we have to understand the highest ,brahman4 ,if ,sankarshana1 ,pradyumna1 and ,aniruddha are of the nature of the highest ,brahman1 then truly there can be no objection to a body of doctrine which sets forth this relation4 ,the criticism that the ,bhgavatas teach an inadmissible origination of the individual soul1 is made by people who do not understand that system4 ,what it teaches is that the highest ,brahman1 there called ,vsudeva1 from kindness to those devoted to it1 voluntarily abides in a fourfold form1 so as to render itself accessible to its devotees4 ,thus it is said in the ,paushkara- samhit1 ',that which enjoins that ,brahmanas have to worship1 under its proper names1 the fourfold nature of the ,self2 that is the authoritative doctrine4' ,that this worship of that which is of a fourfold nature means worship of the highest ,brahman1 called ,vsudeva1 is declared in the ,stvata-samhit1 ',this is the supreme sstra1 the great ,brahmopanishad1 which imparts true discrimination to ,brahmawas worshipping the real ,brahman under the name of ,vsudeva4' ,that highest ,brahman1 called ,vsudeva1 having for its body the complete aggregate of the six qualities1 divides itself in so far as it is either the ',subtle' 7skshma71 or 'division' 7vyha71 or 'manifestation' 7vibhava71 and is attained in its fulness by the devotees who1 according to their qualifications1 do worship to it by means of works guided by knowledge4 ',from the worship of the vibhava-aspect one attains to the vyha1 and from the worship of the vyha one attains to the ,subtile called ,vsudeva1 i4e4 the highest ,brahman'--such is their doctrine4 ,by the 'vibhava' we have to understand the aggregate of beings1 such as ,rama1 ,krishna1 c41 in whom the highest ,being becomes manifest2 by the 'vyha' the fourfold arrangement or division of the highest ,reality1 as ,vsudeva1 ,sankarshana1 ,pradyumna1 and ,aniruddha2 by the ',subtle' the highest ,brahman itself1 in so far as it has for its body the mere aggregate of the six qualities--as which it is called ',vsudeva4' ,compare on this point the ,paushkara1 ',that body of doctrine through which1 by means of works based on knowledge1 one fully attains to the imperishable highest ,brahman1 called ,vsudeva1' and so on1 ,sankarshana1 ,pradyumna1 and ,aniruddha are thus mere bodily forms which the highest ,brahman voluntarily assumes4 ,scripture already declares1 ',not born he is born in many ways1' and it is this birth--consisting in the voluntary assumption of bodily form1 due to tenderness towards its devotees--which the ,bhgavata system teaches2 hence there lies no valid objection to the authoritativeness of that system4 ,and as ,sankarshana4 ,pradyumna1 and ,aniruddha are the beings ruling over the individual souls1 internal organs and organs of egoity1 there can be no objection to their being themselves denoted by those latter terms1 viz4 individual soul1 and so on4 ,the case is analogous to that of ,brahman being designated1 in some texts1 by terms such as ether1 breath1 and the like4 ,,footnote #ebd3a4 ,or 'by that which is knowledge and cause4' #dc4 ,and on account of contradiction4 ,the origination of the jva is1 moreover1 distinctly controverted in the books of the ,bhgavatas also4 ,thus in the ,parama-samhit ',the nature of ,prakriti consists therein that she is non-sentient1 for the sake of another1 eternal1 ever-changing1 comprising within herself the three gunas and constituting the sphere of action and experience for all agents4 ,with her the soul 7purusha7 is connected in the way of inseparable association2 that soul is known to be truly without beginning and without end4' ,and as all ,samhitas make similar statements as to the eternity of the soul1 the ,pakartra doctrine manifestly controverts the view of the essential nature of the jiva being something that originates4 ,how it is possible that in the ,veda as well as in common life the soul is spoken of as being born1 dying1 c41 will be explained under ,s4 ,,ii1 #c1 #ag4 ,the conclusion1 therefore1 is that the ,bhgavata system also denies the origination of the soul1 and that hence the objections raised on this ground against its authoritativeness are without any force4 ,another objection is raised by some4 ,sndilya1 they argue1 is said to have promulgated the ,pakartra doctrine because he did not find a sure basis for the highest welfare of man in the ,veda and its auxiliary disciplines1 and this implies that the ,pakartra is opposed to the ,veda4--his objection1 we reply1 springs from nothing else but the mere unreasoning faith of men who do not possess the faintest knowledge of the teachings of the ,veda1 and have never considered the hosts of arguments which confirm that teaching4 ,when the ,veda says1 ',morning after morning those speak untruth who make the ,agnihotra offering before sunrise1' it is understood that the censure there passed on the offering before sunrise is really meant to glorify the offering after sunrise4 ,we meet with a similar case in the 'bhma-vidy' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vii1 #b74 ,there at the beginning ,nrada says1 ',i know the ,rig-veda1 the ,yajur-veda1 the ,sma-veda1 the tharvana as the fourth1 the ,itihsa- purna as the fifth1' and so on1 enumerating all the various branches of knowledge1 and finally summing up 'with all this ,i know the mantras only1 ,i do not know the ,self4' ,now this declaration of the knowledge of the ,self not being attainable through any branch of knowledge except the knowledge of the ,bhman evidently has no other purpose but to glorify this latter knowledge1 which is about to be expounded4 ,or else ,nrada's words refer to the fact that from the ,veda and its auxiliary disciplines he had not obtained the knowledge of the highest ,reality4 ,analogous to this is the case of ,sndilya's alleged objection to the ,veda4 ,that the ,bhgavata doctrine is meant to facilitate the understanding of the sense of the ,veda which by itself is difficult of comprehension1 is declared in the ,paramasamhita1',i have read the ,vedas at length1 together with all the various auxiliary branches of knowledge4 ,but in all these ,i cannot see a clear indication1 raised above all doubt1 of the way to blessedness1 whereby ,i might reach perfection'2 and ',the wise ,lord ,hari1 animated by kindness for those devoted to him1 extracted the essential meaning of all the ,vednta-texts and condensed it in an easy form4' ,the incontrovertible fact then is as follows4 ,the ,lord who is known from the ,vednta-texts1 i4e4 ,vsudeva1 called there the highest ,brahman--who is antagonistic to all evil1 whose nature is of uniform excellence1 who is an ocean1 as it were1 of unlimited exalted qualities1 such as infinite intelligence1 bliss1 and so on1 all whose purposes come true--perceiving that those devoted to him1 according as they are differently placed in the four castes and the four stages of life1 are intent on the different ends of life1 viz4 religious observances1 wealth1 pleasure1 and final release2 and recognising that the ,vedas--which teach the truth about his own nature1 his glorious manifestations1 the means of rendering him propitious and the fruits of such endeavour--are difficult to fathom by all beings other than himself1 whether gods or men1 since those ,vedas are divided into ,rik1 ,yajus1 ,sman1 and ,atharvan2 and being animated by infinite pity1 tenderness1 and magnanimity2 with a view to enable his devotees to grasp the true meaning of the ,vedas1 himself composed the ,pakartra-sstra4 ,the author of the ,stras 7,vysa7--who first composed the ,stras1 the purport of which it is to set forth the arguments establishing the ,vednta doctrine1 and then the ,bhrata-samhit 7i4e4 the ,mahbhrata7 in a hundred thousand slokas in order to support thereby the teaching of the ,veda--himself says in the chapter called ,mokshadharma1 which treats of knowledge1 ',if a householder1 or a ,brahmakrin1 or a hermit1 or a mendicant wishes to achieve success1 what deity should he worship8' and so on2 explains then at great length the ,pakartra system1 and then says1 ',from the lengthy ,bhrata story1 comprising one hundred thousand slokas1 this body of doctrine has been extracted1 with the churning-staff of mind1 as butter is churned from curds--as butter from milk1 as the ,brahmana from men1 as the ranyaka from the ,vedas1 as ,amrita from medicinal herbs4--,this great ,upanishad1 consistent with the four ,vedas1 in harmony with ,snkhya and ,yoga1 was called by him by the name of ,pakartra4 ,this is excellent1 this is ,brahman1 this is supremely beneficial4 ,fully agreeing with the ,rik1 the ,yajus1 the ,sman1 and the ,atharvn-giras1 this doctrine will be truly authoritative4' ,the terms ,snkhya and ,yoga here denote the concentrated application of knowledge and of works4 ,as has been said1 ',by the application of knowledge on the part of the ,snkhya1 and of works on the part of the ,yogins4' ,and in the ,bhshmaparvan we read1 ',by ,brahmanas1 ,kshattriyas1 ,vaisyas and ,sdras1 ,mdhava is to be honoured1 served and worshipped--he who was proclaimed by ,sankarshana in agreement with the ,stvata law4'--,how then could these utterances of ,bdaryana1 the foremost among all those who understand the teaching of the ,veda1 be reconciled with the view that in the ,stras he maintains the non- authoritativeness of the ,stvata doctrine1 the purport of which is to teach the worship of1 and meditation on1 ,vsudeva1 who is none other than the highest ,brahman known from the ,vednta-texts8 ,but other passages in the ,mahbhrata1 such as ',there is the ,snkhya1 the ,yoga1 the ,pakartra1 the ,vedas1 and the ,pasupata doctrine2 do all these rest on one and the same basis1 or on different ones8' and so on1 declare that the ,snkhya and other doctrines also are worthy of regard1 while yet in the ,srraka ,stras those very same doctrines are formally refuted4 ,why1 therefore1 should not the same hold good in the case of the ,bhgavata doctrine8--,not so1 we reply4 ,in the ,mahbhrata also ,bdarayana applies to the ,snkhya and other doctrines the same style of reasoning as in the ,stras4 ,the question1 asked in the passage quoted1 means ',do the ,snkhya1 the ,yoga1 the ,pasupata1 and the ,pakartra set forth one and the same reality1 or different ones8 ,if the former1 what is that reality8 ,if the latter1 they convey contradictory doctrines1 and1 as reality is not something which may be optionally assumed to be either such or such1 one of those doctrines only can be acknowledged as authoritative1 and the question then arises which is to be so acknowledged8'--,the answer to the question is given in the passage beginning1 ',know1 ,o royal ,sage1 all those different views4 ,the promulgator of the ,snkhya is ,kapila1' c4 ,here the human origin of the ,snkhya1 ,yoga1 and ,psupata is established on the ground of their having been produced by ,kapila1 ,hiranyagarbha1 and ,pasupati4 ,next the clause ',aparntatamas is said to be the teacher of the ,vedas' intimates the non- human character of the ,vedas2 and finally the clause ',of the whole ,pakartra1 ,nryana himself is the promulgator' declares that ,nryana himself revealed the ,pakartra doctrine4 ,the connected purport of these different clauses is as follows4 ,as the systems of human origin set forth doctrines mutually contradictory1 and1 moreover1 teach what is in conflict with the matter known from the ,veda--which1 on account of its non-human character1 is raised above all suspicion of error and other imperfections--they cannot be accepted as authoritative with regard to anything not depending on human action and choice4 ,now the matter to be known from the ,veda is ,nryana1 who is none other than the highest ,brahman4 ,it hence follows that the entities set forth in those different systems--the pradhna1 the soul 7purusha71 ,pasupati1 and so on--have to be viewed as real only in so far as ,nryana1 i4e4 the highest ,brahman1 as known from the ,vednta-texts1 constitutes their ,self4 ,this the text directly declares in the passage1 ',in all those doctrines it is seen1 in accordance with tradition and reasoning1 that the lord ,narayawa is the only basis4' ,this means--',to him who considers the entities set forth in those systems with the help of argumentation1 it is evident that ,nryana alone is the basis of all those entities4' ,in other words1 as the entities set forth in those systems are not ,brahman1 any one who remembers the teaching of texts such as 'all this indeed is ,brahman1' ',nryana is all1' which declare ,brahman to be the ,self of all1 comes to the conclusion that ,nryana alone is the basis of those entities4 ,as thus it is settled that the highest ,brahman1 as known from the ,vednta- texts1 or ,nryana1 himself is the promulgator of the entire ,pakartra1 and that this system teaches the nature of ,nryana and the proper way of worshipping him1 none can disestablish the view that in the ,pakartra all the other doctrines are comprised4 ,for this reason the ,mahbhrata says1 ',thus the ,snkhya-yoga and the ,veda and the ranyaka1 being members of one another1 are called the ,pakartra1' i4e4 the ,snkhya1 the ,yoga1 the ,vedas1 and the ranyakas1 which are members of one another because they are one in so far as aiming at setting forth one ,truth1 together are called the ,pakartra4--,the ,snkhya explains the twenty-five principles1 the ,yoga teaches certain practices and means of mental concentration1 and the ranyakas teach that all the subordinate principles have their true ,self in ,brahman1 that the mental concentration enjoined in the ,yoga is a mode of meditation on ,brahman1 and that the rites and works which are set forth in the ,veda are means to win the favour of ,brahman--thus giving instruction as to ,brahman's nature4 ,now all these elements1 in their inward connexion1 are clearly set forth in the ,pakartra by the highest ,brahman1 i4e4 ,nryana1 himself4 ,the ,srraka ,sstra 7i4e4 the ,vednta7 does not disprove the principles assumed by the ,snkhyas1 but merely the view of their not having ,brahman for their ,self2 and similarly in its criticism on the ,yoga and ,psupata systems1 it merely refutes the view of the ,lord being a mere instrumental cause1 the erroneous assumptions as to the relative position of higher and lower entities1 and certain practices not warranted by the ,veda2 but it does not reject the ,yoga itself1 nor again the lord ,psupati4 ,hence ,smriti says1' ,the ,snkhya1 the ,yoga1 the ,pakartra1 the ,vedas1 and the ,psupata doctrine--all these having their proof in the ,self may not be destroyed by arguments4' ,the essential points in all these doctrines are to be adopted1 not to be rejected absolutely as the teaching of ,jina4 or ,sugata is to be rejected4 ,for1 as said in the ,smriti text quoted above1 in all those doctrines it is seen1 according to tradition and reasoning1 that the lord ,nryana is the only basis4'--,here terminates the adhikarana of 'the impossibility of origination4' ,,third ,p,,da4 #a4 ,not ,ether2 on account of the absence of scriptural statement4 ,we have demonstrated that the ,snkhya-system and other systems standing outside the ,veda are untenable since they rest on fallacious reasoning and are self-contradictory4 ,in order to prove that our own view is altogether free from all objections of this kind1 we shall now explain in detail the mode in which this world1 with all its sentient and non- sentient beings1 is produced by ,brahman1 whom we hold to be the general creator4 ,the first doubt here presenting itself is whether ,ether be something produced or not4--,the ,prvapakshin maintains that it is not produced1 since there is no scriptural statement to that effect4 ,a scriptural statement may be expected with regard to what is possible2 but what is impossible--as e4g4 the origination of a sky-flower or of ,ether--cannot possibly be taught by ,scripture4 ,for the origination of ,ether1 which is not made up of parts and is all pervasive1 cannot be imagined in any way4 ,for this very reason1 i4e4 the impossibility of the thing1 the ,chandogya1 in its account of creation1 mentions the origination of fire1 water1 c4 only 7but not of ,ether7--',it thought1 may ,i be many1 may ,i grow forth1' ',it sent forth fire1' and so on4 ,when therefore the ,taittirya1 the ,atharvana1 and other texts tell us that ,ether did originate--',from that ,self sprang ,ether' 7,taitt4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #a72 ',from him is born breath1 mind1 and all organs of sense1 ,ether1 air1 light1 water1' c4 7,mu4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #a1 #d7--such statements are contrary to sense1 and hence refute themselves4-- ,to this the ,stra replies4 #b4 ,but there is4 ,but there is origination of ,ether4 ,for ,scripture1 which is concerned with matters transcending sense perception1 is able to establish the truth even of the origination of ,ether1 although this be not proved by other means of knowledge4 ,and in a matter known from ,scripture a contradictory inference1 such as that ,ether cannot originate because it is without parts1 is not of sufficient force4 ,that the non- originatedness of the ,self also does not rest on its being without parts will be shown further on4--,here the ,prvapakshin raises an objection4 #c4 ,it has a secondary sense1 on account of impossibility and of the text4 ,it is reasonable to assume that in passages such as ',from that ,self there sprang ,ether4' the origination of ,ether is not to be taken in its literal sense2 for according to the ,chndogya-text 'it sent forth fire4' ,brahman engaged in creation first produces fire1 and fire thus having the first place1 the text cannot possibly mean to say that ,ether also was produced4 ,moreover1 there is another text1 viz4',vyu and antariksha 7i4e4 ,ether71 this is the ,immortal1' according to which ,ether is immortal1 i4 e4 non-produced4--,but how can one and the same word viz4 it 'sprang' 7i4e4 originated71 be taken in a metaphorical sense with reference to ,ether1 and in its literal sense with reference to fire1 and so on8--,to this the next ,stra replies4 #d4 ,there may be 7a double sense7 of the one 7word71 as in the case of the word ',brahman4' ,since in the clause 'from that ,self there sprang ,brahman1' the word 'sprang' cannot be taken in its literal senbe1 it may be used there in a secondary sense2 while the same word as connected with the subsequent clauses 'from ,vyu ,agni1' c41 may have its primary sense4 ,this would be analogous to the use of the word ,brahman in ,mu4 ,up4 ,i1 #a4 ,there in the clause ',from him is born that ,brahman1 name1 form1 and matter' 7#i74 the word ,brahman is used in a secondary sense1 i4e4 denotes the ,pradhna2 while in the same chapter1 in the clause ',brahman swells by means of brooding' 7#h71 the same word denotes ,brahman in its primary sense4 ,it is true indeed that in this latter case the word ',brahman' occurs twice2 while in the ,taitt4 text the word 'sambhta' occurs once only1 and has to be carried over from the first clause into the subsequent ones2 but this makes no difference1 for1 in the case of such carrying over of a word1 no less than in the case of actual repetition1 the general denotation of the word is repeated4--,the next ,stra refutes this objection4 #e4 ,the non-abandonment of the promissory statement 7results7 from non- difference4 ,it is not appropriate to assume1 from deference to the ,chndogya-text1 a secondary meaning for those other texts also which declare ,ether to have originated4 ,for the ,chndogyaitself virtually admits the origination of ,ether2 in so far1 namely1 as the clause 'that by which the non-heard is heard1' c41 declares that through the knowledge of ,brahman everything is known4 ,this declaration is not abandoned1 i4e4 is adhered to1 only if the ,ether also is an effect of ,brahman and thus non-different from it4 #f4 7,as follows also7 from 7other7 texts4 ,that ,ether is an originated thing follows from other clauses also in the ,chndogya3 ',being only this was in the beginning1 one without a second' affirms the oneness of everything before creation1 and ',in that all this has its ,self implies that everything is an effect of1 and hence non- different from1 ,brahman4--,nor does the statement as to the creation of fire1 'it sent forth fire1' exclude the creation of ,ether4 ,for the first place which there is assigned to fire rests only thereon that no mention is made of the creation of ,ether1 and this has no force to negative the creation of ,ether as positively stated in other texts4 #g4 ,but the division 7origination7 extends over all effects2 as in ordinary life4 ,the 'but' has the sense of 'and4' ,as the clause ',in that all this has its ,self' and similar ones directly state that ,ether also is a creation of ,brahman1 the division1 i4e4 the origination of ,ether from ,brahman1 is implicitly declared thereby4 ,as in ordinary life4 ,when in ordinary life somebody has said 'all these men are the sons of ,devadatta1' it is known that any particulars which may afterwards be given about the descent of some of them are meant to apply to all4--,in accordance with this our conclusion we interpret the text ',air and ,ether1 this is the ,immortal1' as asserting only that air and ,ether continue to exist for a long time1 as the ,devas do4 #h4 ,hereby air is explained4 ,the same argumentation explains the origination of air also4 ,that a special ,stra is devoted to the origination of air--instead of disposing in one ,stra of ,ether and air--is for the sake of ,stra #aj1 which states that 'hence 7i4e4 from air7 there originated fire4' #i4 ,but there is non-origination of that which is 7only72 on account of impossibility4 ,the 'but' has an affirmative sense4 ,there is non-origination of that which is1 i4e4 of ,brahman only2 of whatever is different from ,brahman non-origination cannot possibly be established4 ,this means--the origination of ,ether and air has been proved only in order to illustrate a general truth4 ,only that which is1 i4e4 ,brahman1 which is the general cause1 cannot originate4 ,whatever is other than ,brahman1 i4 e4 the entire world comprising the ,unevolved1 the great principle 7mahat71 ahankra1 the tanmtras1 the sense-organs1 the ,ether1 the air1 and so on1 cannot possibly be shown to be non-originated1 since its being an effect is proved by the text declaring that everything is known through one thing1 and in other ways4--,here terminates the adhikarana of 'the ,ether4' #aj4 ,fire 7is produced7 thence1 for thus ,scripture declares4 ,it has been stated that everything different from ,brahman is the effect of ,brahman4 ,the doubt now arises whether the more remote effects of ,brahman originate1 each of them1 only from that substance which is their immediately antecedent cause or from ,brahman in the form of that substance4--,the decision is that they originate from those substances only2 for the text 'from air fire' directly states the origination of fire from air4 #aa4 ,water 7from fire74 ,water also originates 'thence1' i4 e from fire2 for so the texts declare ',from fire water' 7,taitt4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #a1 #a72 'that sent forth water' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #b1 #c74 #ab4 ,earth 7from water74 ,earth originates from water2 for so the texts declare ',from water earth' 7,taitt ,up4 ,,ii4 #a1 #a74 ',it 7water7 sent forth food' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #b1 #c74 ,but how can the word 'food' denote earth8--,to this the next ,stra replies4 #ac4 ,earth on account of the subject-matter1 the colour1 and other texts4 ,that the word 'food' denotes the earth is to be inferred from the fact that the section in which the word occurs has for its subject-matter the creation of the elements2 as everything eatable is a product of the earth1 the term denoting the effect is there applied to denote the cause4 ,in the same chapter1 where the colour of the elements is mentioned 7',the red colour of a flame is the colour of fire1 the white one that of water1 the black one that of food '71 the collocation of words clearly shows that 'food' means something of the same kind as fire and water1 viz4 the elements of earth4 ,and there are other texts also which treat of the same topic and declare the origination of earth from water1 cp4 ,taitt4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #a1 'from fire sprang water1 from water earth4' ,all this proves that the term 'food' denotes earth1 and that hence earth originates from water4 ,fire and the other substances1 the origination of which has been detailed1 are mentioned merely as instances1 and it must be understood that also other entities1 such as the ',mahat1' and so on1 originate only from the immediately preceding cause1 in agreement with scriptural statements4 ,and texts such as ',from him is born breath1 mind1 and all organs of sense1 ether1 air1 light1 water1 and the earth1 the support of all' 7,mu4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #a1 #c72 ',from him is born that ,brahman1 name1 form1 and food' 7,mu4 ,up4 ,i1 #a1 #i72 ',from that ,self there sprang ether' 7,taitt4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #a1 #a72 ',it 7i4e4 that which is7 sent forth fire' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #b1 #c7-- 7which seems to teach the direct origination from ,brahman of the different elements1 and so on7--may be interpreted on the understanding of ,brahman being their mediate cause also4--,this prim facie view the next ,stra disposes of4 #ad4 ,but he2 from the inferential mark supplied by their reflection4 ,the 'but' indicates the setting aside of the prim facie view raised4 ,of all effected things1 the ,mahat1 and so on1 the highest ,person himself1 in so far as embodied in the immediately preceding substance1 is the direct cause4--,how is this known8--',from the inferential mark supplied by the reflection of them4' ,by 'reflection' the ,stra means the resolve expressed in the recurring phrase1 ',may ,i be many'2 ',that fire thought1 may ,i be many'2 ',that water thought1 may ,i be many' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #b1 #c2 #d74 ,as these texts declare that there was thought in the form of a resolve of self-multiplication--which thought can belong to a ,self only1 we conclude that also the ,mahat1 the ahankra1 the ,ether1 and so on1 accomplish the sending forth of their respective effects only after similar thought1 and such thought can belong only to the highest ,brahman embodied in the ,mahat1 ahankra1 and so on4 ,that the highest ,brahman is embodied in all beings and constitutes their ,self1 is directly stated in the antarymin-brhmana1 ',he who abiding in the earth2 abiding in water2 abiding in fire1' c4 c4 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #g1 #c ff472 and likewise in the ,subla-,up1 ',whose body is the earth1' c4 c41 up to ',whose body is the ,unevolved4' ,the ,prvapakshin had maintained that the creation1 from ,brahman1 of breath1 and so on1 which is declared in texts such as ',from him are born breath1 mind1' c41 may be understood as a mediate creation4 ,this point is taken up by the next ,stra4 #ae4 ,but the order of succession 7which is stated7 in reverse order 7of the true one7 is possible1 7only if the origination of all effects is7 thence 7i4e4 from ,brahman74 ,the 'but' has an asseverative sense4 ,the direct origination from ,brahman of all effects--which in passages such as the one quoted by the ,prvapakshin is stated in a form the reverse of the 7true7 order of origination according to which the ,unevolved1 the ,mahat1 the ahankra1 ,ether1 and so on1 succeed each other--is possible only on the supposition of the origination of each effect being really from ,brahman itself in the form of a special causal substance4 ,to understand the causality of ,brahman as a merely mediate one would be to contradict all those statements of immediate origination4 ,texts such as the one quoted thus confirm the conclusion that everything originates from ,brahman directly4 #af4 ,if it be said that knowledge and mind 7which are mentioned7 between 7breath and the elements7 7are stated7 in order of succession1 owing to an inferential mark of this2 we say1 not so1 on account of non- difference4 ',knowledge' in the ,stra denotes the means of knowledge1 i4e4 the sense- organs4--,an objection is raised against the conclusion arrived at under the preceding ,stra4 ,we cannot1 the opponent says1 admit the conclusion that the passage from the ,mundka ,up4 'from him is born breath1 mind1' c41 declares the immediate origination from ,brahman of all things1 and that hence the passage confirms the view1 first suggested by the inferential mark of 'thought' 7see above1 ,s4 #ad71 that everything springs from ,brahman direct4 ,for the purport of the text is to state a certain order of succession1 and we hence conclude that all the beings mentioned were successively created4 ,in the second half of the text we recognise the series of ether1 air1 fire1 c41 which is known to us from other texts1 and from the fact of their being exhibited in one and the same text we conclude that knowledge and mind--which are mentioned between breath on the one side and the elements on the other--must be viewed as created in that order4 ,the text therefore in no way confirms the direct origination of everything from ,brahman4 ,to this the ,stra replies1 ',not so1 on account of non-difference4' ,the first words of the text 'from him is born' connect themselves equally with breath1 and knowledge1 and mind1 and the scries of elements beginning with ether2 and the meaning of the whole therefore is to declare that all the entities spring directly from ,brahman1 not to teach the order of succession in which they are produced4 ,it moreover cannot have the purport of teaching a certain order of succession1 because the order stated contradicts the order established by other scriptural passages2 such as the one beginning 'the earth is merged in water1' and ending 'darkness becomes one4' ,we hence hold to the conclusion that all effects originate from ,brahman only1 in so far as embodied in the ,unevolved1 and so on1 and that the terms 'fire' and so on denote ,brahman1 which is the ,self of all those substances4--,but to interpret all these words as denoting ,brahman is to set aside their special denotative power as established by etymology6--,to this objection the next ,stra replies4 #ag4 ,but that which abides in the things movable and immovable1 i4e4 the terms denoting those things1 are non-secondary 7i4e4 of primary denotative power1 viz4 with regard to ,brahman72 since 7their denotative power7 is effected by the being of that 7i4e4 ,brahman74 ,the 'but' sets aside the objection raised4 7,the prim facie view here is as follows47 ,as ,brahman1 which has all things for its modes1 is not the object of ,perception and the other means of knowledge which give rise to the apprehension of the things only which are ,brahman's modes1 and as hence1 previously to the study of the ,vednta-texts1 the idea of that to which the modes belong 7i4e4 of ,brahman7 does not arise1 and as the knowledge of all words finally denoting ,brahman depends on the existence of the idea of that to which the modes belong 7i4 e4 ,brahman72 all the individual words are used in worldly language only separately to denote special things4 ,in other words1 as the terms 'fire' and so on have denotative power with regard to particular things only1 their denotative power with regard to ,brahman is secondary1 indirect only4--,of this view the ,stra disposes by saying 'that which abides in the moving and the non-moving1' c4 ,the meaning is--the terms which abide in1 i4e4 are connected with1 the different moving and non-moving things1 and hence denote those things1 possess with regard to ,brahman a denotative power which is not 'bhkta1' i4e4 secondary or figurative1 but primary and direct4 ',why so8' ,because the denotative power of all words is dependent on the being of ,brahman4 ,for this we know from the scriptural passage which tells how names and forms were evolved by ,brahman4--,here terminates the adhikarana of 'fire4' #ah4 ,not the ,self1 on account of scriptural statement1 and on account of the eternity 7which results7 from them4 ,the ,stras so far have stated that this entire world1 from ,ether downwards1 originates from the highest ,brahman4 ,it now becomes a matter for discussion whether the individual soul also originates in the same way or not4--,it does so originate1 the ,prvapakshin maintains4 ,for on this assumption only the scriptural statement as to the cognition of all things through the cognition of one thing holds good1 and moreover ,scripture declares that before creation everything was one4 ,moreover1 there are texts directly stating that the soul also was produced in the same way as ,ether and other created things4 ',prajpati sent forth all creatures'2 ',all these creatures have their root in the ,true1 they abide in the ,true1 they rest on the ,true' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #h1 #f72 ',from whence these beings are produced' 7,taitt4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #a1 #a74 ,as these passages declare the origination of the world inclusive of sentient beings1 we conclude that the souls also originate4 ,nor must this be objected to on the ground than from the fact that ,brahman is eternal1 and the other fact that texts such as ',that art them' teach the soul to be of the nature of ,brahman1 it follows that the soul also is eternal4 ,for if we reasoned in this style we should have to admit also that the ,ether and the other elements are eternal1 since texts such as 'in that all this has its ,self' and 'all this indeed is ,brahman 'intimate them also to be of the nature of ,brahman4 ,hence the individual soul also originates no less than ,ether and the rest4--,to this the ,stra replies1 ',not the ,self1 on account of scriptural statement4' ,the ,self is not produced1 since certain texts directly deny its origination2 cp4 'the intelligent one is not born nor does he die' 7,ka4 ,up4 ,i1 #b1 #ah72 ',there are two unborn ones1 one intelligent and strong1 the other non- intelligent and weak' 7,svet4 ,up4 ,i1 #i74 ,and the eternity of the soul is learned from the same texts1 cp4 ',there is one eternal thinker1' c4 7,ka4 ,up4 ,,ii1#e1 #ac72 ',unborn1 eternal1 everlasting is that ancient one2 he is not killed though the body is killed' 7,ka4 ,up4 ,i1 #b1 #ah74--;,for these reasons the soul is not produced4 ,but how then about the declaration that through the cognition of one thing everything is known8-,there is no difficulty here1 since the soul also is an effect1 and since effect and cause are non-different4--,but this implies that the soul is an originated thing just like ,ether and so on6--,not so1 we reply4 ,by a thing being an effect we mean its being due to a substance passing over into some other state2 and from this point of view the soul also is an effect4 ,there is1 however1 the difference1 that the 'other condition' which is represented by the soul is of a different kind from that which constitutes non-sentient things1 such as ,ether and so on4 ,the 'otherness' on which the soul depends consists in the contraction and expansion of intelligence2 while the change on which the origination of ,ether and so on depends is a change of essential nature4 ,and change of the latter kind is what we deny of the soul4 ,we have shown that there are three entities of distinct nature1 viz4 objects of fruition1 enjoying subjects1 and a ,ruler2 that origination and so on which are characteristic of the objects do not belong to the subjects1 and that the latter are eternal2 that the characteristic qualities of the objects and likewise those of the subjects--viz4 liability to pain and suffering--do not belong to the ,ruler2 that the latter is eternal1 free from all imperfections1 omniscient1 immediately realising all his purposes1 the ,lord of the lords of the organs1 the highest ,lord of all2 and that sentient and non-sentient beings in all their states constitute the body of the ,lord while he constitutes their ,self4 ,while ,brahman thus has for its modes 7prakra7 the sentient and non-sentient beings in which it ever is embodied1 during certain periods those beings abide in so subtle a condition as to be incapable of receiving designations different from that of ,brahman itself2 ,brahman then is said to be in its causal state4 ,when1 on the other hand1 its body is constituted by all those beings in their gross state1 when they have separate1 distinct names and forms1 ,brahman is said to be in its effected condition4 ,when1 now1 ,brahman passes over from the causal state into the effected state1 the aggregate of non-sentient things which in the causal state were destitute of name and form undergoes an essential change of nature--implying the possession of distinct names and so on-- so as to become fit to constitute objects of fruition for sentient beings2 the change1 on the other hand1 which the sentient beings 7the souls7 undergo on that occasion is nothing more than a certain expansion of intelligence 7or consciousness71 capacitating them to experience the different rewards or punishments for their previous deeds4 ,the ruling element of the world1 i4e4 the ,lord1 finally1 who has the sentient and non-sentient beings for his modes1 undergoes a change in so far as he is1 at alternating periods1 embodied in all those beings in their alternating states4 ,the two modes1 and he to whom the modes belong1 thus undergo a common change in so far as in the case of all of them the causal condition passes over into a different condition4 ,it is with reference to this change undergone by one substance in passing over into a different state that the ,chandogya says that through the knowledge of one thing everything is known1 and illustrates this by the case of the lump of clay 7knowing which we know all things made of clay74 ,texts such as ',prajpati sent forth the creatures1' which declare the origination of the soul1 really mean only to state that the souls are by turns associated with or dissociated from bodies--the effect of which is that their intelligence is either contracted or expanded4 ,texts again which deny the origination of the soul and affirm its permanency 7',he is not born and does not die1' c47 mean to say that the soul does not1 like the non-sentient element of creation1 undergo changes of essential nature4 ,and finally there are texts the purport of which it is to declare the absence of change of essential nature as well as of alternate expansion and contraction of intelligence--cp4 ',that is the great unborn ,self1 undecaying1 undying1 immortal1 ,brahman' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #d1 #be72 'the eternal thinker1' c4 7,ka4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #e1 #ac72 such texts have for their subject the highest ,lord4--,all this also explains how ,brahman1 which is at all times differentiated by the sentient and non-sentient beings that constitute its body1 can be said to be one only previous to creation2 the statement is possible because at that time the differentiation of names and forms did not exist4 ,that that which makes the difference between plurality and unity is the presence or absence of differentiation through names and forms1 is distinctly declared in the text1 ',now all this was undifferentiated4 ,it became differentiated by form and name' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,i1 #d1 #g74--,those also who hold that the individual soul is due to ,nescience2 and those who hold it to be due to a real limiting adjunct 7updhi72 and those who hold that ,brahman1 whose essential nature is mere ,being1 assumes by itself the threefold form of enjoying subjects1 objects of enjoyment1 and supreme ,ruler2 can all of them explain the unity which ,scripture predicates of ,brahman in the pralaya state1 only on the basis of the absence of differentiation by names and forms2 for according to them also 7there is no absolute unity at any time1 but7 either the potentiality of ,nescience1 or the potentiality of the limiting adjunct1 or the potentialities of enjoying subjects1 objects of enjoyment1 and supreme ,ruler persist in the pralaya condition also4 ,and1 moreover1 it is proved by the two ,stras1 ,,ii1 #a1 #cc2 #ce1 that the distinction of the several individual souls and the stream of their works are eternal4 ,there is1 however1 the following difference between those several views4 ,the first-mentioned view implies that ,brahman itself is under the illusive influence of beginningless ,avidy4 ,according to the second view1 the effect of the real and beginningless limiting adjunct is that ,brahman itself is in the state of bondage2 for there is no other entity but ,brahman and the adjunct4 ,according to the third view1 ,brahman itself assumes different forms1 and itself experiences the various unpleasant consequences of deeds4 ,nor would it avail to say that that part of ,brahman which is the ,ruler is not an experiencing subject2 for as ,brahman is all-knowing it recognises the enjoying subject as non- different from itself1 and thus is itself an enjoying subject4-- ,according to our view1 on the other hand1 ,brahman1 which has for its body all sentient and non-sentient beings1 whether in their subtle or their gross state1 is always--in its effected as well as in its causal condition free from all shadow of imperfection1 and a limitless ocean as it were of all exalted qualities4 ,all imperfections1 and suffering1 and all change belong not to ,brahman1 but only to the sentient and non- sentient beings which are its modes4 ,this view removes all difficulties4-- ,here terminates the adhikarana of 'the ,self4' #ai4 ,for this very reason 7the individual soul is7 a knower4 ,it has been shown that1 different therein from ,ether and the rest1 the soul is not produced4 ,this leads to the consideration of the soul's essential nature4 ,is that essential nature constituted by mere intelligence as ,sugata and ,kapila hold2 or is the soul as ,kanda thinks1 essentially non-intelligent1 comparable to a stone1 while intelligence is merely an adventitious quality of it2 or is it essentially a knowing subject8--,the soul is mere intelligence1 the ,prvapakshin maintains2 for the reason that ,scripture declares it to be so4 ,for in the antarymin- brhmana the clause which in the ,mdhyandina-text runs as follows1 'he who abides in the ,self1' is in the text of the ,knvas represented by the clause 'he who abides in knowledge4' ,similarly the text 'knowledge performs the sacrifice and all sacred acts' 7,taitt4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #e1 ,i7 shows that it is knowledge only which is the true nature of the active ,self4 ,and ,smriti texts convey the same view1 as e4g4 'it in reality is of the nature of absolutely spotless intelligence4' ,a second ,prvapakshin denies the truth of this view4 ,if1 he says1 we assume that the ,self's essential nature consists either in mere knowledge or in its being a knowing subject1 it follows that as the ,self is omnipresent there must be consciousness at all places and at all times4 ,on that doctrine we1 further1 could not account for the use of the instruments of cognition 7i4e4 the sense-organs1 c472 nor for the fact that in the states of deep sleep1 swoon and so on1 the ,self although present is not observed to be conscious1 while on the other hand consciousness is seen to arise as soon as the conditions of the waking state are realised4 ,we therefore conclude that neither intelligence or consciousness1 nor being a knowing agent1 constitutes the essence of the soul1 but that consciousness is a mere adventitious or occasional attribute4 ,and the omnipresence of the ,self must needs be admitted since its effects are perceived everywhere4 ,nor is there any valid reason for holding that the ,self moves to any place2 for as it is assumed to be present everywhere the actual accomplishment of effects 7at certain places only7 may be attributed to the moving of the body only4--,scripture also directly declares that in the state of deep sleep there is no consciousness1 ',i do not indeed at the present moment know myself1 so as to be able to say that am ,i1 nor do ,i know those beings4' ,similarly ,scripture declares the absence of consciousness in the state of final release1 'when he has departed there is no consciousness' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #d1 #ab72 where the ,self is spoken of as having knowledge for its essential nature1 the meaning only is that knowledge constitutes its specific quality1 and the expression is therefore not to be urged in its literal sense4 ,against all this the ,stra declares 'for this very reason a knower4' ,this ,self is essentially a knower1 a knowing subject2 not either mere knowledge or of non-sentient nature4--,why8--',for this very reason1' i4e4 on account of ,scripture itself4 ',for this reason' refers back to the 'on account of ,scripture' in the preceding ,stra4 ,for in the ,chndogya1 where the condition of the released and the non-released soul is described1 the text says ',he who knows1 let me smell this1 he is the ,self--with the mind seeing those pleasures he rejoices-the devas who are in the world of ,brahman--whose desires are true1 whose purposes are true-- not remembering the body into which he was born' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,viii1 #ab1 #d-e2 #a1 #e2 #ab1 #c74 ,and elsewhere ',the seer does not see death' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vii1 #bf1 #b74 ,similarly we read in the ,vjasaneyaka1 in reply to the question ',who is that ,self8'--',he who is within the heart1 surrounded by the ,prnas1 the person of light1 consisting of knowledge' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #c1 #g72 ',by what should one know the knower8' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #e1 #ae72 ',that person knows4' ,and 'for he is the knower1 the hearer1 the smeller1 the taster1 the perceiver1 the thinker1 the agent--he the person whose ,self is knowledge'2 and 'thus these sixteen parts of that seer' 7,pra4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #i2 ,,vi1 #e74 ,to the objection that if being a cognising subject constituted the essential nature of the ,self it would follow that as the ,self is omnipresent1 there would be consciousness always and everywhere1 the next ,stra replies4 #bj4 ,on account of 7its7 passing out1 moving and returning4 ,the ,self is not omnipresent1 but on the contrary1 of atomic size 7anu74-- ,how is this known8--,since ,scripture says that it passes out1 goes and returns4 ,its passing out is described in the following passage 'by that light this ,self departs1 either through the eye1 or through the skull1 or through other parts of the body' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #d1 #b74 ,its going in the following text 'all those who pass away out of this world go to the moon1' and its returning in the text 'from that world he comes again into this world1 for action4' ,all this going1 and so on1 cannot be reconciled with the soul being present everywhere4 #ba4 ,and on account of the latter two 7being effected7 through the ,self4 ,the 'and' has affirming power4 ,the 'passing out' might somehow be reconciled with a non-moving ,self 7such as the omnipresent ,self would be7 if it were taken in the sense of the ,self separating from the body2 but for the going and returning no analogous explanation is possible4 ,they1 therefore1 must be taken as effected by the ,self itself 7which1 then1 cannot be omnipresent and non-moving74 #bb4 ,if it be said that 7the soul7 is not atomic1 on account of scriptural statement of 7what is7 not that2 we say no1 on account of the other one being the topic4 ,the passage ',he who is within the heart1 surrounded by the ,prnas1 the person consisting of knowledge' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #c1 #g7 introduces as the topic of discussion the personal ,self1 and further on in the same chapter we read 'the unborn ,self1 the great one' 7,,iv1 #d1 #bb74 ,the personal ,self1 being expressly called great1 cannot1 therefore1 be atomic6--,not so1 we reply4 ',since the other one is the topic4' ,in the second text quoted that ,self which is other than the personal ,self--i4e4 the highest ,self 7prja7 constitutes the topic4 ,in the beginning of the chapter1 indeed1 the individual ,self is introduced1 but later on1 between the two texts quoted1 the instruction begins to concern itself with the highest ,self1 'he by whom there is known the ,self of intelligence' 7pratibuddha tm2 ,,iv1 #d1 #ac74 ,it is this latter ,self which1 in #bb is called great1 not the individual ,self4 #bc4 ,and on account of the very word1 and of measure4 ,scripture directly applies the word 'anu' to the individual ,self1 ',by thought is to be known that atomic ,self into which ,breath has entered fivefold' 7,mu4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #a1 #i74--;,by the term 'unmna' in the ,stra we have to understand measurement by selection of comparative instances4 ,scripture declares the minuteness of the individual ,self by reference to things which are like atoms in size1 ',the individual soul is to be known as part of the hundredth part of the point of a hair divided a hundred times1 and yet it is to be infinite' 7,svet4 ,up4 ,v1 #i72 'that lower one is seen of the measure of the point of a goad' 7,v1 #h74 ,for these reasons also the individual ,self must be viewed as atomic4--,but this conflicts with the fact that sensation extends over the whole body6--,this objection the next ,stra refutes by means of an analogous instance4 #bd4 ,there is no contradiction1 as in the case of sandal-ointment4 ,as a drop of sandal-ointment1 although applied to one spot of the body only1 yet produces a refreshing sensation extending over the whole body2 thus the ,self also1 although dwelling in one part of the body only1 is conscious of sensations taking place in any part of the body4 #be4 ,should it be said 7that this is not so7 on account of specialisation of abode2 we say no1 on account of the acknowledgment 7of a place of the ,self71 viz4 in the heart4 ,there is a difference4 ,the drop of ointment can produce its effect as at any rate it is in contact with a definite part of the body4 ,but we know of no such part in the case of the soul6--,not so1 we reply4 ,scripture informs us that the ,self abides in a definite part of the body1 viz4 the heart4 ',for that ,self is in the heart1 there are a hundred and one veins4' ,and in reply to the question ',what is that ,self8' the text has ',he who is within the heart1 surrounded by the ,prnas1 the ,person of light1 consisting of knowledge' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #c1 #g74--,the parallel case of the sandal-ointment is referred to in order to point out that the ,self abides in some particular part of the body2 while the ointment is not bound to any special place4--,in the next ,stra the ,strakra proceeds to state how1 according to his own view1 the ,self1 although abiding in one spot only1 gives rise to effects extending over the whole body4 #bf4 ,or on account of its quality as light4 ,the 'or' is meant to set aside the view previously stated4 ,the ,self extends through the whole body by means of its quality1 viz4 knowledge or consciousness4 ',as light4' ,as the light of things abiding in one place--such as gems1 the sun1 and so on--is seen to extend to many places1 so the consciousness of the ,self dwelling in the heart pervades the entire body4 ,that the knowledge of the knowing subject may extend beyond its substrate1 as the light of a luminous body does1 we have already explained under the first ,stra4--,but it has been said that the ,self is mere knowledge2 how then can knowledge be said to be a quality-- which is something different from the essential nature of a thing8--,this the next ,stra explains4 #bg4 ,there is distinction as in the case of smell2 and thus ,scripture declares4 ,just as smell1 which is perceived as a quality of earth1 is distinct from earth2 thus knowledge of which we are conscious as the quality of a knowing subject--which relation expresses itself in judgments such as ',i know'--is different from the knowing subject4 ,scriptural texts also prove this relation1 as e4g4 ',this ,person knows4' #bh4 ,on account of the separate statement4 ,scripture even states quite directly that knowledge is something distinct from the knowing subject1 viz4 in the passage ',for there is not known any intermission of the knowing of the knower' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #c1 #cj74--;,it has been said that in passages such as 'he who abiding in knowledge' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #g1 #bb72 ',knowledge performs the sacrifice' 7,taitt4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #e1 #a72 'having knowledge for its nature1 absolutely free from stain1',scripture speaks of the ,self as being mere knowledge 7not a knower74 ,this point the next ,stra elucidates4 #bi4 ,but 7the ,self7 is designated as that because it has that quality 7viz4 knowledge7 for its essential quality2 as in the case of the intelligent 7prja7 ,self4 ,the 'but' discards the objection4 ,because that quality1 viz4 the quality of knowledge1 is the essential quality1 therefore the ,self is1 in the passages quoted1 designated as knowledge4 ,for knowledge constitutes the essential quality of the ,self4 ,similarly1 the intelligent highest ,self is occasionally called ',bliss1' because bliss is its essential quality4 ,compare ',if that bliss existed not in the ether' 7,taitt4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #g1 #a72 ',he perceived that bliss is ,brahman' 7,taitt4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #f1 #a74 ,that bliss is the essential attribute of ,brahman is proved by texts such as ',that is one bliss of ,brahman'2 ',he who knows the bliss of ,brahman is afraid of nothing' 7,taitt4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #d1 #a74--,or else the analogous case to which the ,stra refers may be that of the intelligent ,brahman being designated by the term 'knowledge1' in texts such as ',truth1 knowledge1 the ,infinite is ,brahman' 7,taitt4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #a74 ,that knowledge is the essential quality of ,brahman is known from passages such as 'together with the intelligent ,brahman' 7,taitt4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #a1 #a72 ',he who is all-knowing' 7,mu4 ,up4 ,i1 #a1 #i74 #cj4 ,and there is no objection1 since 7the quality of knowledge7 exists wherever the ,self is2 this being observed4 ,since knowledge is an attribute which is met with wherever a ,self is1 there is no objection to the ,self being designated by that attribute4 ,similarly we observe that special kinds of cows1 as e4g4 hornless ones1 are designated by the term 'cow1' since the quality of possessing the generic character of cows is met with everywhere in connexion with the essential character of such animals with mutilated horns2 since in fact that quality contributes to define their essential character4 ,the 'and' of the ,stra is meant to suggest a further argument1 viz4 that to apply to the ,self the term 'knowledge' is suitable for that reason also that like knowledge the ,self is self-illuminated4 ,the objection that knowledge or consciousness cannot be an attribute inseparably connected with the essential nature of the ,self as there is no consciousness in deep sleep and similar states is taken up in the next ,stra4 #ca4 ,since there may be manifestation of that which exists2 as in the case of virile power and so on4 ,the 'but' is meant to set the raised objection aside4 ,the case may be that while consciousness is present also in deep sleep1 and so on1 it is manifested in the waking state only2 whence there would be no objection to viewing consciousness as an essential attribute of the ,self4 ',as in the case of virile power and the like4' ,special substances such as the virile element are indeed present in the male child already1 but then are not manifest1 while later on they manifest themselves with advancing youth2 but all the same the possession of those substances is essential to the male being1 not merely adventitious4 ,for to be made up of seven elementary substances 7viz4 blood1 humour1 flesh1 fat1 marrow1 bone1 and semen7 is an essential1 property of the body4 ,that even in deep sleep and similar states the ',i' shines forth we have explained above4 ,consciousness is always there1 but only in the waking state and in dreams it is observed to relate itself to objects4 ,and that to be a subject of cognition1 and so on1 are essential attributes of the ,self1 we have also proved before4 ,the conclusion1 therefore1 is that to be a knowing subject is the essential character of the ,self4 ,and that ,self is of atomic size4 ,the text 'when he has departed there is no consciousness' 7samj2 ,bri4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #d1 #ab7 does not declare that the released ,self has no consciousness2 but only that in the case of that ,self there is absent that knowledge 7experience7 of birth1 death1 and so on1 which in the ,samsra state is caused by the connexion of the ,self with the elements--as described in the preceding passage1 'that great being having risen from out these elements again perishes after them4' ,for the text as to the absence of samj after death must be interpreted in harmony with other texts describing the condition of the released soul1 such as 'the seeing one does not see death nor illness nor pain2 the seeing one sees everything and obtains everything everywhere' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vii1 #be1 #b72 'not remembering that body into which he was born-- seeing these pleasures with the mind he rejoices' 7,,viii1 #ab1 #c2 #e74 ,the ,stras now proceed to refute the doctrine of the ,self being 7not a knower7 but mere knowledge1 and being omnipresent4 #cb4 ,there would result permanent consciousness or non-consciousness1 or else limitative restriction to either4 ,on the other view1 i4e4 on the view of the ,self being omnipresent and mere knowledge1 it would follow either that consciousness and also non- consciousness would permanently take place together everywhere2 or else that there would be definite permanent restriction to either of the two1 i4e4 either permanent consciousness or permanent non-consciousness4--,if the omnipresent ,self1 consisting of mere knowledge only1 were the cause of all that actual consciousness and non-consciousness on the part of ,selfs which takes place in the world1 it might be conceived either as the cause of both--i4e4 consciousness and non-consciousness--and this would mean that there is everywhere and at all times simultaneous consciousness and non-consciousness4 ,if1 on the other hand1 it were the cause of consciousness only1 there would never and nowhere be unconsciousness of anything2 and if it were the cause of non- consciousness only1 there would never and nowhere be consciousness of anything4 ,on our view1 on the other hand1 the actually perceived distribution of consciousness and non-consciousness explains itself1 since we hold the ,self to abide within bodies only1 so that naturally consciousness takes place there only1 not anywhere else4--,the view1 finally 7held by the ,vaiseshikas71 of the consciousness of the ,self depending on its organs 7mind1 senses1 c42 while the omnipresent ,self is1 apart from those organs1 non-sentient1 jada71 results in the same difficulties as the view criticised above2 for as all the ,selfs are omnipresent they are in permanent conjunction with all organs2 and moreover it would follow that the adrishtas 7due to the actions of the different bodies7 could not thus be held apart 7but would cling to all ,selfs1 each of which is in contact with all bodies74 ,here terminates the adhikarana of 'the knower4' #cc4 7,the soul is7 an agent1 on account of ,scripture 7thus7 having a purport4 ,it has been shown that the individual ,self is a knowing subject and atomic4 ,now the question arises whether that ,self is an agent or1 being itself non-active1 erroneously ascribes to itself the activity of the non-sentient gunas4 ,the prim facie answer is that the individual ,self is not an agent1 since the sacred texts concerned with the ,self declare that the ,self does not act1 while the gunas do act4 ,thus1 e4g4 in the ,kathavall1 where the text at first denies of the individual ,self all the attributes of ,prakriti1 such as being born1 ageing and dying 7'he is not born1 he does not die'71 and then also denies that the ,self is the agent in acts such as killing and the like1 ',if the slayer thinks that he slays1 if the slain thinks that he is slain1 they both do not understand2 for this one does not slay1 nor is that one slain' 7,i1 #b1 #ai74 ,this means--if one thinks the ,self to be the slayer one does not know the ,self4 ,and the ,lord himself teaches that non-agency is the essential nature of the individual soul1 and that it is mere delusion on the ,self's part to ascribe to itself agency4 ',by the attributes 7guna7 of ,prakriti1 actions are wrought all round4' ,he who is deluded by self- conceit thinks ',i am the agent'2 'when the seer beholds no other agent than the gunas'2 ',prakriti is said to be the cause of all agency of causes and effects1 whilst the soul is the cause of all enjoyment of pleasure and pain' 7,bha4 ,g4 ,,iii1 #bg2 ,,xiv1 #ai2 ,,xiii1 #bj74--,the soul1 therefore1 is an enjoyer only1 while all agency belongs to ,prakriti--,to this the ,stra replies1 'an agent1 on account of ,scripture thus having a meaning4' ,the ,self only is an agent1 not the gunas1 because thus only ,scripture has a meaning4 ,for the scriptural injunctions1 such as 'he who desires the heavenly world is to sacrifice1' ',he who desires ,release is to meditate on ,brahman1' and similar ones1 enjoin action on him only who will enjoy the fruit of the action--whether the heavenly world1 or ,release1 or anything else4 ,if a non-sentient thing were the agent1 the injunction would not be addressed to another being 7viz4 to an intelligent being--to which it actually is addressed74 ,the term 'sstra' 7scriptural injunction7 moreover comes from ss1 to command1 and commanding means impelling to action4 ,but scriptural injunctions impel to action through giving rise to a certain conception 7in the mind of the being addressed71 and the non-sentient ,pradhna cannot be made to conceive anything4 ,scripture therefore has a sense only1 if we admit that none but the intelligent enjoyer of the fruit of the action is at the same time the agent4 ,thus the ,prva ,mimamsa declares 'the fruit of the injunction belongs to the agent' 7,,iii1 #g1 #ah74 ,the ,prvapakshin had contended that the text 'if the slayer thinks1 c41' proves the ,self not to be the agent in the action of slaying2 but what the text really means is only that the ,self as being eternal cannot be killed4 ,the text1 from ,smriti1 which was alleged as proving that the gunas only possess active power1 refers to the fact that in all activities lying within the sphere of the samsara1 the activity of the ,self is due not to its own nature but to its contact with the different gunas4 ,the activity of the gunas1 therefore1 must be viewed not as permanent1 but occasional only4 ,in the same sense ,smriti says 'the reason is the connexion of the soul with the guwas1 in its births1 in good and evil wombs' 7,bha4 ,g4 ,,xiii1 #ba74 ,similarly it is said there 7,,xviii1 #af7 that 'he who through an untrained understanding looks upon the isolated ,self as an agent1 that man of perverted mind does not see'2 the meaning being that1 since it appears from a previous passage that the activity of the ,self depends on five factors 7as enumerated in sl4 #af71 he who views the isolated ,self to be an agent has no true insight4 #cd4 ,on account of taking and the declaration as to its moving about4 ,the text beginning ',and as a great king1' c41 declares that 'the ,self taking the pranas moves about in its own body1 according to its pleasure' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #a1 #ah71 i4e4 it teaches that the ,self is active in taking to itself the prnas and moving about in the body4 #ce4 ,and on account of the designation 7of the ,self as the agent7 in actions4 ,if not so1 there would be change of grammatical expression4 ,because in the text ',knowledge performs the sacrifice1 it performs all works' 7,taitt4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #e7 the ,self is designated as the agent in all worldly and ,vedic works1 for this reason also the ,self must be held to be an agent4 ,and should it be said that the word 'knowledge' in that text denotes not the ,self1 but the internal organ or buddhi1 we point out that in that case there would be a change of grammatical expression1 that is to say1 as the buddhi is the instrument of action1 the text would exhibit the instrumental case instead of the nominative case 'by knowledge1 and so on' 7vijnena instead of vijnam74 #cf4 7,there would be7 absence of definite rule1 as in the case of consciousness4 ,the ,stra points out a difficulty which arises on the view of the ,self not being an agent4 ,stra #cb has declared that if the ,self were all- pervading it would follow that there would be no definite determination with regard to consciousness4 ,similarly1 if the ,self were not an agent but all activity belonged to ,prakriti it would follow that as ,prakriti is a common possession of all souls1 all actions would result in enjoyment 7experience7 on the part of all souls1 or else on the part of none2 for as each ,self is held to be omnipresent1 they are all of them in equal proximity to all parts of the ,pradhna4 ,for the same reason it could not be maintained that the distribution of results between the different souls depends on the different internal organs which are joined to the souls2 for if the souls are omnipresent1 no soul will be exclusively connected with any particular internal organ4 #cg4 ,on account of the inversion of power4 ,if the internal organ were the agent1 then--since it is impossible that a being other than the agent should be the enjoyer of the fruit of the action--the power of enjoyment also would belong to the internal organ1 and would consequently have to be denied of the ,self4 ,but if this were so1 there would be no longer any proof for the existence of the ,self2 for they expressly teach that 'the person 7i4e4 the soul7 exists1 on account of the fact of enjoyment4' #ch4 ,and on account of the absence of samdhi4 ,if the internal organ were the agent1 it would be such even in that final state of meditation1 called samdhi1 which is the instrument of ,release4 ,but that state consists therein that the meditating being realises its difference from ,prakriti1 and this is a conception which ,prakriti itself 7of which the internal organ is only a modification7 cannot form4 ,the ,self alone1 therefore1 is the agent4 ,but this would imply that the activity of the ,self is never at rest6 ,of this difficulty the next ,stra disposes4 #ci4 ,and as the carpenter1 in both ways4 ,the ,self1 although always provided with the instruments of action1 such as the organ of speech1 and so on1 acts when it wishes to do so1 and does not act when it does not wish to do so4 ,just as a carpenter1 although having his axe and other implements ready at hand1 works or does not work just as he pleases4 ,if the internal organ1 on the contrary1 were essentially active1 it would constantly be acting1 since as a non- intelligent being it could not be influenced by particular reasons for action1 such as the desire for enjoyment4 ,here terminates the adhikarana of 'the agent4' #dj4 ,but from the highest1 this being declared by ,scripture4 ,is the activity of the individual soul independent 7free71 or does it depend on the highest ,self8 ,it is free2 for if it were dependent on the highest ,self1 the whole body of scriptural injunctions and prohibitions would be unmeaning4 ,for commandments can be addressed to such agents only as are capable of entering on action or refraining from action1 according to their own thought and will4 ,this prim facie view is set aside by the ,stra4 ,the activity of the individual soul proceeds from the highest ,self as its cause4 ,for ,scripture teaches this4 ',entered within1 the ruler of creatures1 the ,self of all'2 'who dwelling in the ,self is different from the ,self1 whom the ,self does not know1 whose body the ,self is1 who rules the ,self from within1 he is thy ,self1 the inward ruler1 the immortal one4' ,smriti teaches the same1 ',i dwell within the heart of all2 memory and knowledge as well as their loss come from me'7,bha4 ,g4 ,,xv1 #ae72 ',the ,lord1 ,o ,arjuna1 dwells in the heart of all creatures1 whirling1 by his mysterious power1 all creatures as if mounted on a machine' 7,bha4 ,g4 ,,xviii1 #fa74--;,but this view implies the meaninglessness of all scriptural injunctions and prohibitions6--,to this the next ,stra replies4 #da4 ,but with a view to the efforts made 7the ,lord makes the soul act7 on account of the 7thus resulting7 non-meaninglessness of injunctions and prohibitions and the rest4 ,the inwardly ruling highest ,self promotes action in so far as it regards in the case of any action the volitional effort made by the individual soul1 and then aids that effort by granting its favour or permission 7anumati72 action is not possible without permission on the part of the highest ,self4 ,in this way 7i4e4 since the action primarily depends on the volitional effort of the soul7 injunctions and prohibitions are not devoid of meaning4 ,the 'and the rest' of the ,stra is meant to suggest the grace and punishments awarded by the ,lord4--,the case is analogous to that of property of which two men are joint owners4 ,if one of these wishes to transfer that property to a third person he cannot do so without the permission of his partner1 but that that permission is given is after all his own doing1 and hence the fruit of the action 7reward or anything7 properly belongs to him only4--,that1 in the case of evil actions1 allowance of the action on the part of one able to stop it does not necessarily prove hardheartedness1 we have shown above when explaining the ,snkhya doctrine4--,but there is a scriptural text4--',he 7the ,lord7 makes him whom he wishes to lead up from these worlds do a good deed1 and the same makes him whom he wishes to lead down from these worlds do a bad deed' 7,kau4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #h7--which means that the ,lord himself causes men to do good and evil actions1 and this does not agree with the partial independence claimed above for the soul4--,the text quoted1 we reply1 does not apply to all agents1 but means that the ,lord1 wishing to do a favour to those who are resolved on acting so as fully to please the highest ,person1 engenders in their minds a tendency towards highly virtuous actions1 such as are means to attain to him2 while on the other hand1 in order to punish those who are resolved on lines of action altogether displeasing to him1 he engenders in their minds a delight in such actions as have a downward tendency and are obstacles in the way of the attainment of the ,lord4 ,thus the ,lord himself says1 ',i am the origin of all1 everything proceeds from me2 knowing this the wise worship me with love4 ,to them ever devoted1 worshipping me in love1 ,i give that means of wisdom by which they attain to me4 ,in mercy only to them1 dwelling in their hearts1 do ,i destroy the darkness born of ignorance1 with the brilliant light of knowledge' 7,bha4 ,g4 ,x1 #h2 #aj-aa74 ,and further on the ,lord--after having described 'demoniac' people1 in the passus beginning 'they declare the world to be without a ,truth1 without a resting-place1 without a ,ruler1' and ending 'malignantly hating me who abides in their own bodies and those of others'--declares1 ',these evil and malign haters1 most degraded of men1 ,i hurl perpetually into transmigrations and into demoniac wombs' 7,,xvi1 #h- #ai74 ,here terminates the adhikarana of 'that which depends on the ,highest4' #db4 7,the soul is7 a part1 on account of the declarations of difference and otherwise2 some also record 7that ,brahman is of7 the nature of slaves1 fishermen1 and so on4 ,the ,stras have declared that the individual soul is an agent1 and as such dependent on the highest ,person4 ,the following question now arises-- ,is the individual soul absolutely different from ,brahman8 or is it nothing else than ,brahman itself in so far as under the influence of error8 or is it ,brahman in so far as determined by a limiting adjunct 7updhi78 or is it a part 7amsa7 of ,brahman8--,the doubt on this point is due to the disagreement of the scriptural texts4--,but this whole matter has already been decided under ,s4 ,,ii1 #a1 #bb4--,true4 ,but as a difficulty presents itself on the ground of the conflicting nature of the texts-- some asserting the difference and some the unity of the individual soul and ,brahman--the matter is here more specially decided by its being proved that the soul is a part of ,brahman4 ,as long as this decision remains unsettled1 the conclusions arrived at under the two ,stras referred to1 viz4 that the soul is non-different from ,brahman and that ,brahman is 'additional' to the soul1 are without a proper basis4 ,let it then first be said that the soul is absolutely different from ,brahman1 since texts such as ',there are two1 the one knowing1 the other not knowing1 both unborn1 the one strong1 the other weak' 7,svet4 ,up4 ,i1 #i7 declare their difference4 ,texts which maintain the non-difference of a being which is knowing and another which is not knowing1 if taken literally1 convey a contradiction--as if one were to say1 ',water the ground with fire'6-and must therefore be understood in some secondary metaphorical sense4 ,to hold that the individual soul is a part of ,brahman does not explain matters2 for by a 'part' we understand that which constitutes part of the extension of something4 ,if1 then1 the soul occupied part of the extension of ,brahman1 all its imperfections would belong to ,brahman4 ,nor can the soul be a part of ,brahman if we take 'part' to mean a piece 7khanda72 for ,brahman does not admit of being divided into pieces1 and moreover1 the difficulties connected with the former interpretation would present themselves here also4 ,that something absolutely different from something else should yet be a part of the latter cannot in fact be proved4 ,or else let it be said that the soul is ,brahman affected by error 7bhrama74 ,for this is the teaching of texts such as ',thou art that'2 'this ,self is ,brahman4' ,those texts1 on the other hand1 which declare the difference of the two merely restate what is already established by perception and the other means of knowledge1 and therefore are shown1 by those texts the purport of which it is to teach non-duality not established by other means1 to lie--like perception and the other means of knowledge themselves--within the sphere of ,nescience4 ,or let it be assumed1 in the third place1 that the individual soul is ,brahman as determined by a beginningless limiting adjunct 7updhi74 ,for it is on this ground that ,scripture teaches the ,self to be ,brahman4 ,and that updhi must not be said to be a mere erroneous imagination1 for on that view the distinction of bondage1 release1 and so on1 would be impossible4 ,against all these views the ,stra declares that the soul is a part of ,brahman2 since there are declarations of difference and also 'otherwise1' i4e4 declarations of unity4 ,to the former class belong all those texts which dwell on the distinction of the creator and the creature1 the ruler and the ruled1 the all-knowing and the ignorant1 the independent and the dependent1 the pure and the impure1 that which is endowed with holy qualities and that which possesses qualities of an opposite kind1 the lord and the dependent4 ,to the latter class belong such texts as ',thou art that' and 'this ,self is ,brahman4' ,some persons even record that ,brahman is of the nature of slaves1 fishermen1 and so on4 ,the tharvanikas1 that is to say1 have the following text1' ,brahman are the slaves4 ,brahman are these fishers1' and so on2 and as ,brahman there is said to comprise within itself all individual souls1 the passage teaches general non-difference of the ,self4 ,in order1 then1 that texts of both these classes may be taken in their primary1 literal sense1 we must admit that the individual soul is a part of ,brahman4 ,nor is it a fact that the declarations of difference refer to matters settled by other means of knowledge1 such as perception and so on1 and on that account are mere reiterations of something established otherwise 7in consequence of which they would have no original proving force of their own1 and would be sublated by the texts declaring non-duality74 ,for the fact that the soul is created by ,brahman1 is ruled by it1 constitutes its body1 is subordinate to it1 abides in it1 is preserved by it1 is absorbed by it1 stands to it in the relation of a meditating devotee1 and through its grace attains the different ends of man1 viz4 religious duty1 wealth1 pleasure and final release--all this and what is effected thereby1 viz4 the distinction of the soul and ,brahman1 does not fall within the cognisance of perception and the other means of proof1 and hence is not established by something else4 ,it is therefore not true that the texts declaring the creation of the world1 and so on1 are mere reiterations of differences established by other means of authoritative knowledge1 and hence have for their purport to teach things that are false4--,nor will it do to say that the texts declaring duality teach what indeed is not established by other means of knowledge but is erroneous4 ',brahman conceives the thought of differentiating itself1 forms the resolution of becoming many1 and accordingly creates the ether and the other elements1 enters into them as individual soul1 evolves all the different forms and names1 takes upon himself all the pleasures and pains which spring from experiencing the infinite multitude of objects thus constituted1 abides within and inwardly rules all beings1 recognises itself in its jva- condition to be one with the universal causal ,brahman1 and finally accomplishes its release from the samsra and the body of sacred doctrine by which this release is effected'--all this the ,veda indeed declares1 but its real purport is that all this is only true of a ,brahman under the influence of an illusion1 and therefore is unreal6-- while at the same time ,brahman is defined as that the essential nature of which is absolutely pure intelligence6 ,truly1 if such were the purport of the ,veda1 what more would the ,veda be than the idle talk of a person out of his mind6 ,nor finally is there any good in the theory of the soul being ,brahman in so far as determined by a limiting adjunct4 ,for this view also is in conflict with the texts which distinguish ,brahman as the ruling and the soul as the ruled principle1 and so on4 ,one and the same ,devadatta does not become double as it were--a ruler on the one hand and a ruled subject on the other--because he is determined by the house in which he is1 or by something else4 ,in order to be able to account for the twofold designations of the soul1 we must therefore admit that the soul is a part of ,brahman4 #dc4 ,and on account of the mantra4 ',one part 7quarter7 of it are all beings1 three feet 7quarters7 of it are the ,immortal in heaven' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #ab1 #f7--on account of this mantra also the soul must be held to be a part of ,brahman4 ,for the word 'foot' denotes a part4 ,as the individual souls are many the mantra uses the plural form 'all beings4' ,in the ,stra 7#db7 the word 'part' is in the singular1 with a view to denote the whole class4 ,for the same reason in ,,ii1 #c1 #ah also the word 'atman' is in the singular4 ,for that the individual ,selfs are different from the ,lord1 and are many and eternal1 is declared by texts such as ',he who1 eternal and intelligent1 fulfils the desires of many who likewise are eternal and intelligent' 7,ka4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #e1 #ac74 ,since thus the plurality of the eternal individual ,selfs rests on good authority1 those who have an insight into the true nature of ,selfs will discern without difficulty different characteristics distinguishing the individual ,selfs1 although all ,selfs are alike in so far as having intelligence for their essential nature4 ,moreover the ,stra ,,ii1 #c1 #dh directly states the plurality of the individual ,selfs4 #dd4 ,moreover it is so stated in ,smriti4 ,smriti moreover declares the individual soul to be a part of the highest ,person1 ',an eternal part of myself becomes the individual soul 7jva7 in the world of life' 7,bha4 ,g4 ,,xv1 #g74 ,for this reason also the soul must be held to be a part of ,brahman4 ,but if the soul is a part of ,brahman1 all the imperfections of the soul are ,brahman's also6 ,to this objection the next ,stra replies4 #de4 ,but as in the case of light and so on4 ,not so is the highest4 ,the 'but' discards the objection4 ',like light and so on4' ,the individual soul is a part of the highest ,self2 as the light issuing from a luminous thing such as fire or the sun is a part of that body2 or as the generic characteristics of a cow or horse1 and the white or black colour of things so coloured1 are attributes and hence parts of the things in which those attributes inhere2 or as the body is a part of an embodied being4 ,for by a part we understand that which constitutes one place 7desa7 of some thing1 and hence a distinguishing attribute 7viseshna7 is a part of the thing distinguished by that attribute4 ,hence those analysing a thing of that kind discriminate between the distinguishing clement or part of it1 and the distinguished element or part4 ,now although the distinguishing attribute and the thing distinguished thereby stand to each other in the relation of part and whole1 yet we observe them to differ in essential character4 ,hence there is no contradiction between the individual and the highest ,self--the former of which is a viseshana of the latter--standing to each other in the relation of part and whole1 and their being at the same time of essentially different nature4 ,this the ,stra declares 'not so is the highest1' i4e4 the highest ,self is not of the same nature as the individual soul4 ,for as the luminous body is of a nature different from that of its light1 thus the highest ,self differs from the individual soul which is a part of it4 ,it is this difference of character--due to the individual soul being the distinguishing clement and the highest ,self being the substance distinguished thereby--to which all those texts refer which declare difference4 ,those texts1 on the other hand1 which declare non-difference are based on the circumstance that attributes which are incapable of separate existence are ultimately bound to the substance which they distinguish1 and hence are fundamentally valid4 ,that in declarations such as ',thou art that' and 'this ,self is ,brahman1' the words thou and ,self1 no less than the words that and ,brahman1 denote ,brahman in so far as having the individual souls for its body1 and that thus the two sets of words denote fundamentally one and the same thing1 has been explained previously4 #df4 ,and ,smriti texts declare this4 ,that the world and ,brahman stand to each other in the relation of part and whole1 the former being like the light and the latter like the luminous body1 or the former being like the power and the latter like that in which the power inheres1 or the former being like the body and the latter like the soul2 this ,parsara also and other ,smriti writers declare1 ',as the light of a fire which abides in one place only spreads all around1 thus this whole world is the power 7sakti7 of the highest ,brahman4' ,the 'and' in the ,stra implies that scriptural texts also 7'of whom the ,self is the body' and others7 declare that the individual ,self is a part of ,brahman in so far as it is its body4 ,but if all individual souls are equal in so far as being alike parts of ,brahman1 alike actuated by ,brahman1 and alike knowing subjects1 what is the reason that1 as ,scripture teaches1 some of them are allowed to read the ,veda and act according to its injunctions1 while others are excluded therefrom2 and again that some are to see1 feel1 and so on1 while others are excluded from these privileges8--,this question is answered by the next ,stra4 #dg4 ,permission and exclusion 7result7 from connexion with a body2 as in the case of light and so on4 ,although all souls are essentially of the same nature in so far as they are parts of ,brahman1 knowing subjects and so on1 the permissions and exclusions referred to are possible for the reason that each individual soul is joined to some particular body1 pure or impure1 whether of a ,brhmana or ,kshattriya or ,vaisya or ,sdra1 and so on4 ',as in the case of fire and so on4' ,all fire is of the same kind1 and yet one willingly fetches fire from the house of a ,brhmana1 while one shuns fire from a place where dead bodies are burnt4 ,and from a ,brhmana one accepts food without any objection1 while one refuses food from a low person4 #dh4 ,and on account of non-connectedness there is no confusion4 ,although the souls1 as being parts of ,brahman and so on1 are of essentially the same character1 they are actually separate1 for each of them is of atomic size and resides in a separate body4 ,for this reason there is no confusion or mixing up of the individual spheres of enjoyment and experience4 ,the ,strakra introduces this reference to an advantage of his own view of things1 in order to intimate that the views of the soul being ,brahman deluded or else ,brahman affected by a limiting adjunct are on their part incapable of explaining how it is that the experiences of the individual ,self and the highest ,self1 and of the several individual ,selfs1 are not mixed up4 ,but may not1 on the view of the soul being ,brahman deluded1 the distinction of the several spheres of experience be explained by means of the difference of the limiting adjuncts presented by ,nescience8--,this the next ,stra negatives4 #di4 ,and it is a mere apparent argument4 ,the argumentation by which it is sought to prove that that being whose nature is constituted by absolutely uniform light1 i4e4 intelligence1 is differentiated by limiting adjuncts which presuppose an obscuration of that essential nature1 is a mere apparent 7fallacious7 one4 ,for1 as we have shown before1 obscuration of the light of that which is nothing but light means destruction of that light4--,if we accept as the reading of the ,stra 'bhsh' 7in plural7 the meaning is that the various reasons set forth by the adherents of that doctrine are all of them fallacious4 ,the 'and' of the ,stra is meant to point out that that doctrine1 moreover1 is in conflict with texts such as 'thinking himself to be different from the ,mover'7,svet4 ,up4 ,i1 #f72 'there are two unborn ones1 one a ruler1 the other not a ruler' 7,i1 #i72 'of those two one eats the sweet fruit' 7,v1 #f72 and others4 ,for even if difference is due to updhis which are the figment of ,nescience1 there is no escaping the conclusion that the spheres of experience must be mixed up1 since the theory admits that the thing itself with which all the limiting adjuncts connect themselves is one only4 ,but this cannot be urged against the theory of the individual soul being ,brahman in so far as determined by real limiting adjuncts2 for on that view we may explain the difference of spheres of experience as due to the beginningless adrishtas which are the cause of the difference of the limiting adjuncts6--,to this the next ,stra replies4 #ej4 ,on account of the non-determination of the adrishtas4 ,as the adrishtas also which are the causes of the series of updhis have for their substrate ,brahman itself1 there is no reason for their definite allotment 7to definite individual souls71 and hence again there is no definite separation of the spheres of experience4 ,for the limiting adjuncts as well as the adrishtas cannot by their connexion with ,brahman split up ,brahman itself which is essentially one4 #ea4 ,and it is thus also in the case of purposes and so on4 ,for the same reason there can be no definite restriction in the case of purposes and so on which are the causes of the1 different adrishtas4 7,for they also cannot introduce plurality into ,brahman that is fundamentally one47 #eb4 ,should it be said 7that that is possible7 owing to the difference of place2 we deny this1 on account of 7all updhis7 being within 7all places74 ,although ,brahman is one only and not to be split by the several limiting adjuncts with which it is connected1 yet the separation of the spheres of enjoyment is not impossible since the places of ,brahman which are connected with the updhis are distinct4--,this the ,stra negatives on the ground that1 as the updhis move here and there and hence all places enter into connexion with all updhis1 the mixing up of spheres of enjoyment cannot be avoided4 ,and even if the updhis were connected with different places1 the pain connected with some particular place would affect the whole of ,brahman which is one only4--,the two ,stras ,,ii1 #c1 #cb and #cg have stated an objection against those who1 without taking their stand on the ,veda1 held the view of an all-pervading soul4 ,the ,stras ,,ii1 #c1 #ej and ff41 on the other hand1 combat the view of those who1 while basing their doctrine on the ,veda1 teach the absolute unity of the ,self4-- ,here terminates the adhikarana of 'the part4' ,,fourth ,p,,da4 #a4 ,thus the prnas4 ,after having taught that ,ether and all the other elements are effects1 and hence have originated1 the ,stras had shown that the individual soul1 although likewise an effect1 does not originate in the sense of undergoing a change of essential nature2 and had in connexion therewith clearly set forth wherein the essential nature of the soul consists4 ,they now proceed to elucidate the question as to the origination of the instruments of the individual soul1 viz4 the organs and the vital breath4 ,the point here to be decided is whether the organs are effects as the individual soul is an effect1 or as ether and the other elements are4 ,as the soul is1 thus the prnas are1 the ,prvapakshin maintains4 ,that means-- as the soul is not produced1 thus the organs also are not produced--,for the latter point no less than the former is directly stated in ,scripture2 the wording of the ,stra 'thus the prnas' being meant to extend to the case of the prnas also1 the authority of ,scripture to which recourse was had in the case of the soul4--,but what is the scriptural text you mean8 ',non-being1 truly this was in the beginning4 ,here they say1 what was that8 ,those ,rishis indeed were that ,non-being1 thus they say4 ,and who were those ,rishis8 ,the prnas indeed were those ,rishis4' ,this is the passage which declares that before the origination of the world the ,rishis existed4 ,as 'prnh' is in the plural1 we conclude that what is meant is the organs and the vital air4 ,nor can this text be interpreted to mean only that the prnas exist for a very long time 7but are not uncreated72 as we may interpret the texts declaring ,vyu and the atmosphere 7antariksha7 to be immortal3 ',vyu and the atmosphere are immortal'2 ',vyu is the deity that never sets' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #c1 #c2 ,i1 #e1 #bb74 ,for the clause ',non-being indeed was this in the beginning' declares that the prnas existed even at the time when the entire world was in the pralaya state4 ,those texts1 then1 which speak of an origination of the prnas must be explained somehow1 just as we did with the texts referring to the origination of the individual soul4 ,to this the ,siddhntin replies1 'the prnas also originate in the same way as ether1 and so on4'--,why8--,because we have scriptural texts directly stating that before creation everything was one1 ',being only this was in the beginning1' ',the ,self only was this in the beginning4' ,and moreover1 the text 'from that there is produced the prna and the mind and all organs'7,mu4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #c1 #a7 declares that the organs originated2 they therefore cannot have existed before creation4 ,nor is it permissible to ascribe a different meaning to the texts which declare the origination of the sense-organs--as we may do in the case of the texts declaring the origination of the soul4 ,for we have no texts directly denying the origination of the sense-organs1 or affirming their eternity1 while we have such texts in the case of the individual soul4 ,in the text quoted by the ,prvapakshin1 ',non-being indeed was this in the beginning1' c41 the word prna can denote the highest ,self only2 for from texts such as ',all these beings indeed enter into breath alone1 and from breath they arise'7,ch4 ,up4 ,i1 #aa1 #e71 the word prna is known to be one of the designations of the highest ,self4 ,and as to the clause 'the prnas indeed are those ,rishis1' we remark that the term ,rishi may properly be applied to the all-seeing highest ,self1 but not to the non- intelligent organs4 ,but how then is the plural form 'the ,rishis are the prnas' to be accounted for8 ,this the next ,stra explains4 #b4 7,the scriptural statement of the plural7 is secondary1 on account of impossibility2 and since 7the highest ,self7 is declared before that4 ,the plural form exhibited by the text must be taken 7not in its literal1 but7 in a secondary figurative sense1 since there is no room there for a plurality of things4 ,for ,scripture declares that previous to creation the highest ,self only exists4 #c4 ,on account of speech having for its antecedent that4 ,for the following reason also the word 'prna1' in the text quoted1 can denote ,brahman only4 ,speech1 i4e4 the names which have for their object all things apart from ,brahman1 presupposes the existence of the entire universe of things--ether1 and so on--which is the object of speech4 ,but1 as according to the text 'this was then non-differentiated2 it was thereupon differentiated by names and forms1' then 7i4e4 before the differentiation of individual things71 no things having name and form existed1 there existed also no effects of speech and the other organs of action and sensation1 and hence it cannot be inferred that those organs themselves existed4--,here terminates the adhikarana of 'the origination of the prnas4' #d4 7,they are seven7 on account of the going of the seven and of specification4 ,the question here arises whether those organs are seven only1 or eleven-- the doubt on this point being due to the conflicting nature of scriptural texts4--,the ,prvapakshin maintains the former alternative4-- ,on what grounds8--',on account of going1 and of specification4' ,for the text refers to the 'going1' i4e4 to the moving about in the different worlds1 together with the soul when being born or dying1 of seven prnas only1 'seven are these worlds in which the prnas move which rest in the cave1 being placed there as seven and seven' 7,mu4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #a1 #h7--where the repetition 'seven and seven' intimates the plurality of souls to which the prnas are attached4 ,moreover those moving prnas are distinctly specified in the following text1 'when the five instruments of knowledge stand still1 together with the mind 7manas71 and when the buddhi does not move1 that they call the highest going' 7gati--,ka4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #f1 #aj74 ,the 'highest going' here means the moving towards ,release1 all movement within the body having come to an end4 ,as thus the text declares that at the time of birth and death seven prnas only accompany the soul1 and as1 with regard to the condition of final concentration1 those prnas are distinctly specified as forms of knowledge 7jnni71 we conclude that the prnas are the seven following instruments of the soul--the organs of hearing1 feeling1 seeing1 tasting and smelling1 the buddhi and the manas4 ,in various other passages indeed1 which refer to the prnas1 higher numbers are mentioned1 viz4 up to fourteen1 speech1 the hands1 the feet1 the anus1 the organ of generation1 the ahankra and the kitta being added to those mentioned above2 cp4 e4g4 'there are eight grahas' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #b1 i72 ',seven are the prnas of the head1 two the lower ones '7,taitt4 ,samh4 ,v1 #c1 #b1 #e74 ,but as the text says nothing about those additional organs accompanying the soul1 we assume that they are called prnas in a metaphorical sense only1 since they all1 more or less1 assist the soul4--,this view the next ,stra sets aside4 #e4 ,but the hands and so on also2 7since they assist the soul7 abiding 7in the body74 ,hence 7it is7 not so4 ,the organs are not seven only1 but eleven1 since the hands and the rest also contribute towards the experience and fruition of that which abides in the body1 i4e4 the soul1 and have their separate offices1 such as seizing1 and so on4 ,hence it is not so1 i4e4 it must not be thought that the hands and the rest are not organs4 ,buddhi1 ahankra and kitta1 on the other hand1 are 7not independent organs but7 mere designations of the manas1 according as the latter is engaged in the functions of deciding 7adhyavasya71 or misconception 7abhimna71 or thinking 7kint74 ,the organs therefore are eleven4 ,from this it follows that in the passage ',ten are these prnas in man1 and tman is the eleventh' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #d1 ii71 the word tman denotes the manas4 ,the number eleven is confirmed by scriptural and ,smriti passages1 cp4 'the ten organs and the one' 7,bha4 ,g4 ,,xiii1 #e72 'ten are the vaikrika beings1 the manas is the eleventh1' and others4 ,where more organs are mentioned1 the different functions of the manas are meant2 and references to smaller numbers are connected with special effects of the organs1 such as accompanying the soul1 and the like4--,here terminates the adhikarana of 'the going of the seven4' #f4 ,and 7they are7 minute4 ,as the text 'these are all alike1 all infinite' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,i1 #e1 #ac71 declares speech1 mind1 and breath to be infinite1 we conclude that the prnas are all-pervading4--,to this the ,stra replies1 that they are minute2 for the text 'when the vital breath passes out of the body1 all the prnas pass out after it' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,v1 #d1 #b71 proves those prnas to be of limited size1 and as when passing out they are not perceived by bystanders1 they must be of minute size--,the text which speaks of them as infinite is a text enjoining meditation 7'he who meditates on them as infinite'71 and infinity there means only that abundance of activities which is an attribute of the prna to be meditated on4 #g4 ,and the best4 ,by 'the best' we have to understand the chief vital air 7mukhya prna71 which1 in the colloquy of the prnas1 is determined to be the best because it is the cause of the preservation of the body4 ,this chief vital air the ,prvapakshin maintains to be something non-created1 since ,scripture 7,ri4 ,samh4 ,v1 #abi1 #b71 ',by its own law the ,one was breathing without wind1' shows that an effect of it1 viz4 the act of breathing1 existed even previously to creation1 at the time of a great pralaya2 and because texts declaring it to have been created--such as 'from him is born breath' 7,mu4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #a1 #c7--may be interpreted in the same way as the texts declaring that the soul is something created 7sec p4 #edj ff474-- ,to this the reply is that1 since this view contradicts scriptural statements as to the oneness of all1 previous to creation2 and since the ,mundaka-text declares the prna to have been created in the same way as earth and the other elements2 and since there are no texts plainly denying its createdness1 the chief vital air also must be held to have been created4 ,the words 'the ,one was breathing without wind' by no means refer to the vital breath of living creatures1 but intimate the existence of the highest ,brahman1 alone by itself2 as indeed appears from the qualification 'without wind4'--,that the vital breath1 although really disposed of in the preceding ,stras1 is specially mentioned in the present ,stra1 is with a view to the question next raised for consideration4--,here terminates the adhikarana of 'the minuteness of the prnas4' #h4 ,neither air nor function1 on account of its being stated separately4 ,is this main vital breath nothing else but air1 the second of the elements8 ,or is it a certain motion of the air8 ,or is it air that has assumed some special condition8--,the first alternative may be adopted1 on account of the text 'prna is air4'--,or1 since mere air is not called breath1 while this term is generally applied to that motion of air which consists in inhalation and exhalation1 we may hold that breath is a motion of air4--,of both these views the ,stra disposes by declaring 'not so1 on account of separate statement4' ,for in the passage ',from him there is produced breath1 mind1 and all sense-organs1 ether and air1' c1 breath and air are mentioned as two separate things4 ,for the same reason breath also cannot be a mere motion or function of air2 for the text does not mention any functions of fire and the other elements1 side by side with these elements1 as separate things 7and this shows that breath also cannot1 in that text1 be interpreted to denote a function of air74 ,the text 'prna is air1' on the other hand1 intimates 7not that breath is identical with air1 but7 that breath is air having assumed a special form1 not a thing altogether different from it1 like fire4 ,in ordinary language1 moreover1 the word breath does not mean a mere motion but a substance to which motion belongs2 we say1'the breath moves to and fro in inhalation and exhalation4' ,is breath1 which we thus know to be a modification of air1 to be considered as a kind of elementary substance1 like fire1 earth1 and so on8 ,not so1 the next ,stra replies4 #i4 ,but like the eye and the rest1 on account of being taught with them1 and for other reasons4 ,breath is not an element1 but like sight and the rest1 a special instrument of the soul4 ,this appears from the fact that the texts mention it together with the recognised organs of the soul1 the eye1 and so on2 so e4g4 in the colloquy of the prnas4 ,and such common mention is suitable in the case of such things only as belong to one class4--,the 'and for other reasons' of the ,stra refers to the circumstance of the principal breath being specially mentioned among the organs comprised under the term 'prna'2 cp4 'that principal breath' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,i1 #b1 #g72 'that central breath' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,i1 #e1 #ba74--;,but if the chief breath is1 like the eye and the other organs1 an instrument of the soul1 there must be some special form of activity through which it assists the soul1 as the eye e4g4 assists the soul by seeing4 ,but no such activity is perceived1 and the breath cannot therefore be put in the same category as the organs of sensation and action6--,to this objection the next ,stra replies4 #aj4 ,and there is no objection on account of its not having an activity 7karana72 for 7,scripture7 thus declares4 ,the karana of the ,stra means kriy1 action4 ,the objection raised on the ground that the principal breath does not exercise any form of activity helpful to the soul1 is without force1 since as a matter of fact ,scripture declares that there is such an activity1 in so far as the vital breath supports the body with all its organs4 ,for the text 7,ch4 ,up4 ,v1 #a1 #g ff47 relates how on the successive departure of speech1 and so on1 the body and the other organs maintained their strength1 while on the departure of the vital breath the body and all the organs at once became weak and powerless4--,the conclusion therefore is that the breath1 in its fivefold form of prna1 apna1 and so on1 subserves the purposes of the individual soul1 and thus occupies the position of an instrument1 no less than the eye and the other organs4 ,but as those five forms of breath1 viz4 prna1 udna1 c41 have different names and functions they must be separate principles 7and hence there is not one principal breath76 ,to this the next ,stra replies4 #aa4 ,it is designated as having five functions like mind4 ,as desire1 and so on1 are not principles different from mind1 although they are different functions and produce different effects--according to the text1 ',desire1 purpose1 doubt1 faith1 want of faith1 firmness1 absence of firmness1 shame1 reflection1 fear--all this is mind' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,i1 #e1 #c72 so1 on the ground of the text1 'prna1 apna1 vyna1 udna1 samna--all this is prna' 7ibid471 apna and the rest must be held to be different functions of prna only1 not independent principles4--,here terminates the adhikarana of what is 'a modification of air4' #ab4 ,and 7it is7 minute4 ,this prna also is minute1 since as before 7i4e4 as in the case of the organs7 the text declares it to pass out of the body1 to move1 and so on1 'him when he passes out the prna follows after' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,v1 #d1 #b74 ,a further doubt arises1 in the case of prna1 owing to the fact that in other texts it is spoken of as of large extent1 ',it is equal to these three worlds1 equal to this ,universe' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,i1 #c1 #bb72 ',on prna everything is founded'2 ',for all this is shut up in prna4' ,but as the texts declaring the passing out1 and so on1 of the prna1 prove it to be of limited size1 the all-embracingness ascribed to prna in those other texts must be interpreted to mean only that the life of all living and breathing creatures depends on breath4--,here terminates the adhikarana of 'the minuteness of the best4' #ac4 ,but the rule 7over the prnas7 on the part of ,fire and the rest1 together with him to whom the prna belong 7i4e4 the soul71 is owing to the thinking of that 7viz4 the highest ,self72 on account of scriptural statement4 ,it has been shown that the prnas1 together with the main prna1 originate from ,brahman1 and have a limited size4 ,that the prnas are guided by ,agni and other divine beings has also been explained on a previous occasion1 viz4 under ,s4 ,,ii1 #a1 #e4 ,and it is known from ordinary experience that the organs are ruled by the individual soul1 which uses them as means of experience and fruition4 ,and this is also established by scriptural texts1 such as ',having taken these prnas he 7i4e4 the soul7 moves about in his own body1 according to his pleasure'7,bri4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #a1 #ah74 ,the question now arises whether the rule of the soul and of the presiding divine beings over the prnas depends on them 7i4e4 the soul and the divinities7 only1 or on some other being4-- ,on them only1 since they depend on no one else6--,not so1 the ,stra declares4 ,the rule which light1 and so on1 i4e4 ,agni and the other divinities1 together with him to whom the prnas belong i4e4 the soul1 exercise over the prnas1 proceeds from the thinking of that1 i4e4 from the will of the highest ,self4--,how is this known8--',from scriptural statement4' ,for ,scripture teaches that the organs1 together with their guiding divinities and the individual soul1 depend in all their doings on the thought of the highest ,person4 ',he1 who abiding within ,fire1 rules ,fire from within4--,he1 who abiding within the air--within the ,self-- within the eye1 and so on' 7,bri4 ,up ,,iii1 #g72 ',from fear of it the wind blows1 from fear of it the sun rises1 from fear of it ,agni and ,indra1 yea ,death runs as the fifth' 7,taitt4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #h1 #a72 ',by the command of that ,imperishable one1 sun and moon stand1 held apart'7,bri ,up ,,iii1 #h1 #i74 #ad4 ,and on account of the eternity of this4 ,as the quality1 inhering in all things1 of being ruled by the highest ,self1 is eternal and definitely fixed by being connected with his essential nature1 it is an unavoidable conclusion that the rule of the soul and of the divinities over the organs depends on the will of the highest ,self4 ,the text1 ',having sent forth this he entered into it1 having entered into it he became sat and tyat' 7,taitt4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #f71 shows that the entering on the part of the highest ,person into all things1 so as to be their ruler1 is connected with his essential nature4 ,similarly ,smriti says1 ',pervading this entire ,universe by a portion of mine ,i do abide' 7,bha4 ,g4 ,x1 #db74--;,here terminates the adhikarana of 'the rule of ,fire and the rest4' #ae4 ,they1 with the exception of the best1 are organs1 on account of being so designated4 ,are all principles called prnas to be considered as 'organs' 7indriyni71 or is the 'best1' i4e4 the chief prna1 to be excepted8-- ,all of them1 without exception1 are organs2 for they all are called prnas equally1 and they all are instruments of the soul4--,not so1 the ,stra replies4 ,the 'best' one is to be excepted1 since only the prawas other than the best are designated as organs4 ,texts such as 'the organs are ten and one' 7,bha4 ,g4 ,,xiii1 #e7 apply the term 'organ' only to the senses of sight and the rest1 and the internal organ4 #af4 ,on account of scriptural statement of difference1 and on account of difference of characteristics4 ,texts such as 'from him is born prna1 and the internal organ1 and all organs' 7,mu4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #a1 #c7 mention the vital breath separately from the organs1 and this shows that the breath is not one of the organs4 ,the passage indeed mentions the internal organ 7manas7 also as something separate2 but in other passages the manas is formally included in the organs1 'the 7five7 organs with mind as the sixth' 7,bha4 ,g4 ,,xv1 #g74 ,that the vital breath differs in nature from the organ of sight and the rest1 is a matter of observation4 ,for in the state of deep sleep the function of breath is seen to continue1 while those of the eye1 and so on1 are not perceived4 ,the work of the organs1 inclusive of the manas1 is to act as instruments of cognition and action1 while the work of breath is to maintain the body and the organs4 ,it is for the reason that the subsistence of the organs depends on breath1 that the organs themselves are called prnas4 ,thus ,scripture says1 'they all became the form of that 7breath71 and therefore they are called after him prnas' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,i1 #e1 #ba74 ',they became its form' means--they became its body1 their activity depended on it4--,here terminates the adhikarana of 'the organs4' #ag4 ,but the making of names and forms 7belongs7 to him who renders tripartite1 on account of scriptural teaching4 ,the ,stras have shown that the creation of the elements and organs in their collective aspect 7samashti7 and the activity of the individual souls proceed from the highest ,self2 and they have also further confirmed the view that the rule which the souls exercise over their organs depends on the highest ,self4 ,a question now arises with regard to the creation of the world in its discrete aspect 7vyashti71 which consists in the differentiation of names and forms 7i4e4 of individual beings74 ,is this latter creation the work of ,hiranyagarbha only1 who represents the collective aggregate of all individual souls2 or1 fundamentally1 the work of the highest ,brahman having ,hiranyagarbha for its body--just as the creation of water e4g4 is the work of the highest ,brahman having sire for its body8--,the ,prvapakshin maintains the former alternative4 ,for1 he says1 the text ',having entered with this living- soul-self 7anena jvent-man71 let me differentiate names and forms' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #c1 #b71 declares the jva-soul to be the agent in differentiation4 ,for the resolve of the highest deity is expressed1 not in the form 'let me differentiate names and forms by myself 7svena rpena71 but 'by this soul-self1' i4e4 by a part of the highest ,self1 in the form of the individual soul4--,but on this interpretation the first person in 'vykaravni' 7let me enter71 and the grammatical form of 'having entered1' which indicates the agent1 could not be taken in their literal1 but only in an implied1 sense--as is the case in a sentence such as ',having entered the hostile army by means of a spy1 ,i will estimate its strength' 7where the real agent is not the king1 who is the speaker1 but the spy74--,the cases are not analogous1 the ,prvapakshin replies4 ,for the king and the spy are fundamentally separate1 and hence the king is agent by implication only4 ,but in the case under discussion the soul is a part1 and hence contributes to constitute the essential nature of1 the highest ,self2 hence that highest ,self itself enters and differentiates in the form of the soul4 ,nor can it be said that the instrumental case 7'with this soul-self'7 has the implied meaning of association 7'together with this soul-self'72 for if a case can be taken in its primary sense1 it is not proper to understand it in a sense which has to be expressed by means of a preposition4 ,but the third case1 jvena1 cannot here be understood even in its primary sense1 i4e4 that of the instrument of the action2 for if ,brahman is the agent in the acts of entering and differentiating1 the soul is not that which is most suitable to accomplish the end of action 7while yet grammar defines the instrumental case--karana--on this basis74 ,nor can it be said that the activity of the soul comes to an end with the entering1 while the differentiation of names and forms is ,brahman's work1 for the past participle 7pravisya7 indicates 7according to the rules of grammar7 that the two actions--of entering and differentiating--belong to the same agent4 ,and although the soul as being a part of the highest ,self shares in its nature1 yet in order to distinguish it from the highest ,self1 the text by means of the clause 'with that living ,self refers to it as something outward 7not of the nature of the ,self74 ,the agent in the action of differentiation of names and forms therefore is ,hiranyagarbha4 ,smriti texts also ascribe to him this activity2 cp4'he in the beginning made1 from the words of the ,veda1 the names and forms of beings1 of the gods and the rest1 and of actions4' ,against this view the ,stra declares itself4 ,the differentiation of names and forms belongs to him who renders tripartite1 i4e4 the highest ,brahman2 since it is assigned by ,scripture to the latter only4 ,for the text ',that divinity thought1 let me1 having entered these three beings with this living-soul-self1 differentiate names and forms--let me make each of these three tripartite1' shows that all the activities mentioned have one and the same agent4 ,but the rendering tripartite cannot belong to ,brahma 7,hiranyagarbha71 who abides within the ,brahma-egg1 for that egg itself is produced from fire1 water1 and earth1 only after these elements have been rendered tripartite2 and ,smriti says that ,brahm himself originated in that egg1 'in that egg there originated ,brahm1 the grandfather of all the worlds4' ,as thus the action of rendering tripartite can belong to the highest ,brahman only1 the differentiation of names and forms1 which belongs to the same agent1 also is ,brahman's only4--,but how then does the clause 'with that living-soul-self' fit in8-- ,the co-ordination 'with that soul1 with the ,self1' shows that the term 'soul' here denotes the highest ,brahman as having the soul for its body2 just as in the clauses 'that fire thought'2 'it sent forth water'2 'water thought1' and so on1 what is meant each time is ,brahman having fire1 water1 and so on1 for its body4 ,the work of differentiating names and forms thus belongs to the highest ,brahman which has for its body ,hiranyagarbha1 who represents the soul in its aggregate form4 ,on this view the first person 7in 'let me differentiate'7 and the agency 7conveyed by the form of 'pravisya'7 may1 without any difficulty1 be taken in their primary literal senses2 and the common agency1 implied in the connexion of pravisya and vykaravni1 is accounted for4 ,the view here set forth as to the relation of ,brahman and ,hiranyagarbha also explains how the accounts of ,hiranyagarbha's 7,brahm's7 creative activity can say that he differentiated names and forms4 ,the whole passus beginning 'that divinity thought1' therefore has the following meaning--',having entered into those three beings1 viz4 ,fire1 ,water1 and ,earth1 with my ,self which is qualified by the collective soul 7as constituting its body71 let me differentiate names and forms1 i4e4 let me produce gods and all the other kinds of individual beings1 and give them names2 and to that end1 since fire1 water1 and earth have not yet mutually combined1 and hence are incapable of giving rise to particular things1 let me make each of them tripartite1 and thus fit them for creation4'--,the settled conclusion then is1 that the differentiation of names and forms is the work of the highest ,brahman only4 ,but1 an objection is raised1 the fact that the differentiation of names and forms must be due to the same agent as the rendering tripartite1 does not after all prove that the former is due to the highest ,self4 ,for the rendering tripartite may itself belong to the individual soul4 ,for the text relates how1 after the creation of the cosmic egg1 a process of tripartition was going on among the individual living beings created by ,brahm4 ',learn from me1 my friend1 how those three beings having reached man become tripartite1 each of them4 ,the earth when eaten is disposed of in three ways2 its grossest portion becomes feces1 its middle portion flesh1 its subtlest portion mind1' and so on4 ,similarly1 in the preceding section1 it is described how the process of tripartition goes on in the case of fire1 sun1 moon1 and lightning1 which all belong to the world created by ,brahm1 'the red colour of burning fire is the colour of fire1' c4 ,and the text moreover states the original tripartition to have taken place after the differentiation of names and forms3 ',that divinity having entered into these three beings differentiated names and forms4 ,each of these 7beings7 it rendered tripartite4'--,to this objection the next ,stra replies4 #ah4 ,flesh is of earthy nature2 in the case of the two others also according to the text4 ,the view that the description of tripartition1 given in the passage 'each of these he made tripartite1' refers to a time subsequent to the creation of the mundane egg and to the gods created by ,brahm1 cannot be upheld4 ,for from it there would follow that1 as in the passage 'earth when eaten is disposed of in three ways1' c41 flesh is declared to be more subtle than feces1 and mind yet subtler1 it would have to be assumed--in agreement with the nature of the causal substance--that flesh is made of water and manas of fire ,,footnote #eha3a4 ,and similarly we should have to assume that urine--which is the grossest part of water drunk 7cp4 ,,vi1 #e1 #b7--;is of the nature of earth1 and breath1 which is its subtlest part1 of the nature of fire4 ,but this is not admissible2 for as the text explicitly states that earth when eaten is disposed of in three ways1 flesh and mind also must be assumed to be of an earthy nature4 ,in the same way we must frame our view concerning 'the two others1' i4e4 water and fire1 'according to the text4' ,that means--the three parts into which water divides itself when drunk1 must be taken to be all of them modifications of water1 and the three parts of fire when consumed must be held to be all of them modifications of fire4 ,thus feces1 flesh and mind are alike transformations of earth2 urine1 blood and breath transformations of water2 bones1 marrow and speech transformations of fire4 ,this moreover agrees with the subsequent statement 7,,vi1 #e1 #d71 ',for1 truly1 mind consists of earth1 breath of water1 speech of fire4' ,the process of tripartition referred to in ,,vi1 #c1 #d1 is not therefore the same as the one described in the section that tells us what becomes of food when eaten1 water when drunk1 c4 ,were this 7erroneous7 assumption made1 and were it thence concluded that mind1 breath and speech--as being the subtlest created things--are made of fire1 this would flatly contradict the complementary text quoted above 7'mind consists of earth1' c474 ,when the text describes how earth1 water and fire1 when eaten1 are transformed in a threefold way1 it refers to elements which had already been rendered tripartite2 the process of tripartition must therefore have taken place before the creation of the cosmic egg4 ,without such tripartition the elements would be incapable of giving rise to any effects2 such capability they acquire only by being mutually conjoined1 and that is just the process of tripartition4 ,in agreement herewith ,smriti says1 ',separate from each other1 without connexion1 those elements with their various powers were incapable of producing creatures4 ,bul having combined completely1 entered into mutual conjunction1 abiding one within the other1 the principles--from the highest ,mahat down to individual things--produced the mundane egg4'-- ,when the text therefore says 7,,vi1 #c1 #c7 ',the divinity having entered into those three beings with that soul-self differentiated names and forms2 he made each of these tripartite1' the order in which the text mentions the activities of differentiation and tripartition is refuted by the order demanded by the sense ,,footnote #ehc3a4--,the text then proceeds to exemplify the process of tripartition1 by means of burning fire1 the sun and lightning1 which indeed are things contained within the mundane egg 7while yet the tripartition of elements took place before the egg1 with all its contents1 was created72 but this is done for the information of ,svetaketu1 who himself is a being within the mundane egg1 and has to be taught with reference to things he knows4 ,but1 a final objection is raised1 as on this view of the matter the elements--earth1 water and fire--which are eaten and drunk1 are already tripartite1 each of them containing portions of all1 and thus are of a threefold nature1 how can they be designated each of them by a simple term--earth1 water1 fire8--,to this the next ,stra replies4 ,,footnote #eha3a4 ,i4e4 if the tripartition of earth 7i4 e4 solid food7 when eaten1 which is described in ,,vi1 #e1 #a1 were the same tripartition which is described in ,,vi1 #c1 #c-d1 we should have to conclude that the former tripartition consists1 like the latter1 in an admixture to earth of water and fire4 ,,footnote #ehc3a4 ,that means--in reality the tripartition of the elements came first1 and after that the creation of individual beings4 #ai4 ,but on account of their distinctive nature there is that designation1 that designation4 ,each element indeed is of a threefold nature1 owing to the primary tripartition2 but as in each mixed element one definite element prevails-- so that each element has a distinctive character of its own--a definite designation is given to each4--,the repetition 7of 'that designation'7 in the ,stra indicates the completion of the adhyya4--,here terminates the adhikarana of 'the fashioning of names and forms4' ,,third ,,adhy,,ya4 ,,first ,p,,da4 #a4 ,in obtaining another of that1 it goes enveloped1 7as appears7 from question and explanation4 ,that the ,vednta-texts establish as the proper object of meditation1 on the part of all men desirous of ,release1 the highest ,brahman1 which is the only cause of the entire world1 which is not touched by even a shadow of imperfection1 which is an ocean1 as it were1 of supremely exalted qualities1 and which totally differs in nature from all other beings--this is the point proved in the two previous adhyyas2 there being given at the same time arguments to disprove the objections raised against the ,vednta doctrine on the basis of ,smriti and reasoning1 to refute the views held by other schools1 to show that the different ,vednta-texts do not contradict each other1 and to prove that the ,self is the object of activities 7enjoined in injunctions of meditation1 and so on74 ,in short1 those two adhyyas have set forth the essential nature of ,brahman4 ,the subsequent part of the work now makes it its task to enquire into the mode of attaining to ,brahman1 together with the means of attainment4 ,the third adhyya is concerned with an enquiry into meditation--which is the means of attaining to ,brahman2 and as the motive for entering on such meditation is supplied by the absence of all desire for what is other than the thing to be obtained1 and by the desire for that thing1 the points first to be enquired into are the imperfections of the individual soul--moving about in the different worlds1 whether waking or dreaming or merged in dreamless sleep1 or in the state of swoon2 and those blessed characteristics by which ,brahman is raised above all these imperfections4 ,these are the topics of the first and second pdas of the adhyya4 ,the first question to be considered is whether the soul1 when moving from one body into another1 is enveloped by those subtle rudiments of the elements from which the new body is produced1 or not4 ,the ,prvapakshin maintains the latter alternative2 for1 he says1 wherever the soul goes it can easily provide itself there with those rudiments4 ,other reasons supporting this prim facie view will be mentioned and refuted further on4--,the ,stra states the view finally accepted1 ',in obtaining another of that it goes enveloped4' ,the 'of that' refers back to the form1 i4e4 body1 mentioned in ,,ii1 #d1 #ag4 ,the soul when moving towards another embodiment goes enveloped by the rudiments of the elements4 ,this is known 'from question and explanation1' i4e4 answer4 ,question and answer are recorded in the ',knowledge of the five fires' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,v1 #c-aj71 where ,pravhana1 after having addressed to ,svetaketu several other questions1 finally asks ',do you know why in the fifth libation water is called man8' ,in answer to this last question the text then explains how the ,devas1 i4e4 the prnas attached to the soul1 offer into the heavenly world1 imagined as a sacrificial fire1 the oblation called sraddh2 how this sraddh changes itself into a body con sisting of amrita1 which body is called moon2 how the same prnas offer this body of amrita in ,parjanya1 imagined as a fire1 whereupon the body so offered becomes rain2 how the same prnas throw that rain on to the earth1 also imagined as a sacrificial fire1 whereupon it becomes food2 how this food is then offered into man1 also compared to fire1 where it becomes seed2 and how1 finally1 this seed is offered into woman1 also compared to a fire1 and there becomes an embryo4 ,the text then goes on1 ',thus in the fifth oblation water becomes purushavakas1' i4e4 to be designated by the term man4 ,and this means that the water which1 in a subtle form1 was throughout present in the previous oblations also1 now1 in that fifth oblation1 assumes the form of a man4--,from this question and answer it thus appears that the soul moves towards a new embodiment1 together with the subtle rudiments from which the new body springs4--,but the words1 'water becomes purushavakas1' only intimate that water assumes the form of a man1 whence we conclude that water only invests the soul during its wanderings2 how then can it be held that the soul moves invested by the rudiments of all elements8--,to this question the next ,stra replies4 #b4 ,but on account of 7water7 consisting of the three elements2 on account of predominance4 ,water alone could not produce a new body2 for the text ,ch4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #c1 #d1 ',each of these he made tripartite1' shows that all the elements were' made tripartite to the end of producing bodies4 ,that the text under discussion mentions water only1 is due to the predominance of water2 and that among the elements giving rise to a new body water predominates1 we infer from the fact that blood and the other humours are the predominating element in the body4 #c4 ,and on account of the going of the prnas4 ,that the soul goes embedded in the subtle rudiments of the elements follows therefrom also that when passing out of the old body it is said to be followed by the prnas1 'when he thus passes out1 the chief prna follows after him1' c4 7,bri4 ,up4 ,v1 #d1 #b74 ,compare also ,smriti3 ',it draws to itself the organs of sense1 with the mind for the sixth4 ,when the ,ruler 7soul7 obtains a new body1 and passes out of another1 he takes with him those organs and then moves on1 as the wind takes the odours from their abodes 7the flowers7' 7,bha4 ,g4 ,,xv1 #h74 ,but the prnas cannot move without a substrate1 and hence we must admit that the rudiments of the elements--which are their substrate--are also moving4 #d4 ,if it be said 7that it is not so7 on account of scriptural statement as to going to ,agni and the rest2 we say no1 on account of the secondary nature 7of the statement74 ,but the text1 'when the speech of the dead person enters into fire1' c4 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #b1 #ac74 declares that when a person dies his organs go into fire1 and so on2 they cannot therefore accompany the soul4 ,hence the text which asserts the latter point must be explained in some other way6--,not so1 the ,stra replies4 ,the text stating that the organs go to fire1 and so on1 cannot be taken in its literal sense2 for it continues1 'the hairs of the body enter into herbs1 the hair of the head into trees' 7which manifestly is not true1 in its literal sense74 ,the going of speech1 the eye1 and so on1 must therefore be understood to mean that the different organs approach the divinities 7,agni and the rest7 who preside over them4 #e4 ,should it be said1 on account of absence of mention in the first 7reply72 we say no1 for just that 7is meant71 on the ground of fitness4 ,an objection is raised to the conclusion arrived at under ,,iii1 #a1 #a2 on the ground that in the first oblation1 described in ,ch4 ,up4 ,v1 #d1 #b1 as being made into the heavenly world1 water is not mentioned at all as the thing offered4 ,the text says1 'on that altar the gods offer sraddh'2 and by sraddh 7belief7 everybody understands a certain activity of mind4 ,water therefore is not the thing offered4--,not so1 we reply4 ,it is nothing else but water1 which there is called sraddh4 ,for thus only question and answer have a sense4 ,for the question is1 ',do you know why in the fifth libation water is called man8' and at the outset of the reply sraddh is mentioned as constituting the oblation made into the heavenly world viewed as a fire4 ,if here the word sraddh did not denote water1 question and answer would refer to different topics1 and there would be no connexion4 ,the form in which the final statement is introduced 7iti tu pakamym1 c41 'but thus in the fifth oblation1' c471 moreover1 also intimates that sraddh means water4 ,the word 'iti1' thus1 here intimates that the answer is meant to dispose of the question1 ',do you know how8' c4 ,sraddh becomes moon1 rain1 food1 seed1 embryo in succession1 and thus the water comes to be called man4 ,moreover1 the word sraddh is actually used in the ,veda in the sense of 'water'2 'he carries water1 sraddh indeed is water' 7,taitt4 ,samh4 ,i1 #f1 #h1 #a74 ,aad what the text says as to king ,soma 7the moon7 originating from sraddh when offered1 also shows that sraddh must mean water4 #f4 ',on account of this not being stated by ,scripture'2 not so1 on account of those who perform sacrifices and so on being understood4 ,but1 a further objection is raised1 in the whole section under discussion no mention at all is made of the soul2 the section cannot therefore prove that the soul moves1 enveloped by water4 ,the text speaks only of different forms of water sraddh and the rest4--,this1 the ,stra points out1 is not so1 on account of those who perform sacrifices being understood4 ,for further on in the same chapter it is said1 that those who1 while destitute of the knowledge of ,brahman1 practise sacrifices1 useful works and alms1 reach the heavenly world and become there of the essence of the moon 7somarjnah72 whence1 on the results of their good works being exhausted1 they return again and enter on a new embryonic state 7,ch4 ,up4 ,v1 #aj74 ,now in the preceding section 7,v1 #i7 it is said that they offer sraddh in the heavenly world1 and that from that oblation there arises the king ,soma--an account which clearly refers to the same process as the one described in ,v1 #aj4 ,we herefrom infer that what is meant in ,v1 #i is that that being which was distinguished by a body of sraddh1 becomes a being distinguished by a body of the nature of the moon4 ,the word body denotes that the nature of which it is to be the attribute of a soul1 and thus extends in its connotation up to the soul4 ,the meaning of the section therefore is that it is the soul which moves enveloped by water and the other rudimentary elements4--,but the phrase 'him the gods eat' 7,v1 #aj1 #d7 shows that the king ,soma cannot be the soul1 for that cannot be eaten6--,to this the next ,stra replies4 #g4 ,or it is metaphorical1 on account of their not knowing the ,self4 ,for thus ,scripture declares4 ,he who performs sacrifices1 and so on1 and thus does not know the ,self1 is here below and in yonder world a mere means of enjoyment for the devas4 ,he serves them here1 by propitiating them with sacrifices1 and so on2 and when the gods1 pleased with his service1 have taken him up into yonder world1 he there is a common means of enjoyment for them 7since they are gratified by the presence of a faithful servant74 ,that those not knowing the ,self serve and benefit the gods1 ,scripture explicitly declares1 ',he is like a beast for the devas' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,i1 #d1 #aj74 ,smriti also declares1 that while those who know the ,self attain to ,brahman1 those who do not know it are means of enjoyment for the devas1 ',to the gods go the worshippers of the gods1 and they that are devoted to me go to me' 7,bha4 ,g4 ,,vii1 #bc74 ,when ,scripture speaks of the soul being eaten by the gods1 it therefore only means that the soul is to them a source of enjoyment4 ,that eating the soul means no more than satisfaction with it1 may also be inferred from the following scriptural passage1 ',the gods in truth do not eat nor do they drink2 by the mere sight of that amrita they are satisfied4'--,it thus remains a settled conclusion that the soul moves enveloped by the subtle rudiments of the elements4--,here terminates the adhikarana of 'the obtaining of another body4' #h4 ,on the passing away of the works1 with a remainder1 according to ,scripture and ,smriti2 as it went and not so4 ,the text declares that those who only perform sacrifices and useful works ascend by the road of the fathers1 and again return to the earth when they have fully enjoyed the fruit of their works1 'having dwelt there yvat samptam1 they return by the same way' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,v1 #aj1 #e74 ,the question here arises whether the descending soul carries a certain remainder 7anusaya7 of its works or not4--,it does not1 since it has enjoyed the fruit of all its works4 ,for by 'anusaya' we have to understand that part of the karman which remains over and above the part retributively enjoyed2 but when the fruit of the entire karman has been enjoyed1 there is no such remainder4 ,and that this is so we learn from the phrase 'yvat samptam ushitv1' which means 'having dwelt there as long as the karman lasts' 7sampatanty anena svargalokam iti samptah74 ,analogously another text says1 ',having obtained the end of whatever deed he does on earth1 he again returns from that world to this world to action' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,v1 #d1 #f74--;,against this prim facie view the ,stra declares 'with a remainder he descends1 on account of what is seen1 i4e4 scriptural text1 and ,smriti4' ,the scriptural text is the one ',those whose conduct has been good' 7,v1 #aj1 #g71 which means that among the souls that have returned1 those whose karman is good obtain a good birth as ,brhmanas or the like1 while those whose karman is bad are born again as low creatures-dogs1 pigs1 ,kndlas1 and the like4 ,this shows that the souls which have descended are still connected with good or evil karman4 ,smriti also declares this3 ',men of the several castes and orders1 who always stand firm in the works prescribed for them1 enjoy after death the rewards of their works1 and by virtue of a remnant 7of their works7 they are born again in excellent countries1 castes and families1 endowed with beauty1 long life1 learning in the ,vedas1 wealth1 good conduct1 happiness and wisdom4 ,those who act in a contrary manner perish' 7,gautama ,dha4 ,s4 ,,xi1 #bi72 ',afterwards when a man returns to this world he obtains1 by virtue of a remainder of works1 birth in a good family1 beauty of form1 beauty of complexion1 strength1 aptitude for learning1 wisdom1 wealth1 and capacity for fulfilling his duties4 ,therefore1 rolling like a wheel 7from the one to the other71 in both worlds he dwells in happiness' 7past4 ,dha4 ,s4 ,,ii1 #a1 #b1 #c74 ,the clause 'as long as his works last' 7yvat-samptam7 refers to that part of his works only which was performed with a view to reward 7as promised for those works by the ,veda72 and the same holds true with regard to the passage 'whatever work man does here on earth' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,v1 #d1 #f74 ,nor is it possible that works1 the fruit of which has not yet been enjoyed1 and those the result of which has not been wiped out by expiatory ceremonies1 should be destroyed by the enjoyment of the fruits of other works4 ,hence those who have gone to that world return with a remnant of their works1 'as they went and not so'--i4e4 in the same way as they ascended and also in a different way4 ,for the ascent takes place by the following stages--smoke1 night1 the dark half of the moon1 the six months of the sun's southern progress1 the world of the fathers1 ether1 moon4 ,the descent1 on the other hand1 goes from the place of the moon1 through ether1 wind1 smoke1 mist1 cloud4 ,the two journeys are alike in so far as they pass through ether1 but different in so far as the descent touches wind1 and so on1 and does not touch the world of the fathers1 and other stages of the ascent4 #i4 ',on account of conduct'2 not so1 since 7karana7 connotes works2 thus ,krshnjini thinks4 ,in the phrases 'those whose works were good' 7ramanya-karanh71 and 'those whose works were bad' 7kapy-karanh71 the word karana does not denote good and evil works 7i4e4 not such works as the ,veda on the one hand enjoins as leading to certain rewards1 and on the other prohibits1 threatening punishment71 for1 in ,vedic as well as ordinary language1 the term karana is generally used in the sense of kra1 i4e4 general conduct4 ,in ordinary speech such words as kra1 sla1 vritta are considered synonymous1 and in the ,veda we read 'whatever works 7karmni7 are blameless1 those should be regarded1 not others4 ,whatever our good conduct 7su-karitni7 was1 that should be observed by thee1 nothing else' 7,taitt4 ,up4 ,i1 #aa1 #b7--where 'works' and 'conduct' are distinguished4 ,difference in quality of birth therefore depends on conduct1 not on the remainder of works performed with a view to certain results4--,this prim facie view the ,stra sets aside1 'not so1 because the scriptural term karana connotes works2 thus the teacher ,krshnjini thinks4' ,for mere conduct does not lead to experiences of pleasure and pain2 pleasure and pain are the results of works in the limited sense4 #aj4 ',there is purposelessness'2 not so1 on account of the dependence on that4 ,but if conduct has no result1 it follows that good conduct1 as enjoined in the ,smritis1 is useless6--,not so1 we reply2 for holy works enjoined by the ,veda depend on conduct1 in so far as a man of good conduct only is entitled to perform those works4 ,this appears from passages such as the following3 ',a man who is not pure is unfit for all religious work1' and ',him who is devoid of good conduct the ,vedas do not purify4' ,krshnjini's view thus is1 that the karana of the text implies karman4 #aa4 ,but only good and evil works1 thus ,bdari thinks4 ,as the verb -kar takes karman for its object 7punyam karm karati1 c471 and as the separate denotation 7i4e4 the use of apparently equivalent words1 viz4 kar and karman7 can be accounted for on the ground that one of them refers to works established by manifest texts1 and the other to texts inferred from actually existing rules of good conduct2 and as1 when the primary meaning is possible1 no secondary meaning must be adopted2 nothing else but good and evil works 7in the ,vedic sense7 are denoted by the word karana3 such is the opinion of the teacher ,bdari4 ,this opinion of ,bdari1 the author of the ,stra states as representing his own4 ,on the other hand1 he adopts the view of ,krshnajini in so far as he considers such items of virtuous conduct as the ,sandhy--which are enjoined by scriptural texts1 the existence of which is inferred on the basis of conduct as enjoined by ,smriti--to have the result of qualifying the agent for the performance of other works4--,the conclusion therefore is that the souls descend1 carrying a remnant of their works4-- ,here terminates the adhikarana of 'the passing of works4' #ab4 ,of those also who do not perform sacrifices 7the ascent7 is declared by ,scripture4 ,it has been said that those who perform only sacrifices1 and so on1 go to the moon and thence return with a remainder of their works4 ,the question now arises whether those also who do not perform sacrifices go to the moon4 ,the phrase 'who do not perform sacrifices' denotes evil- doers of two kinds1 viz4 those who do not do what is enjoined1 and those who do what is forbidden4--,these also go to the moon1 the ,prvapakshin maintains2 for the text contains a statement to that effect1 ',all who depart from this world go to the moon' 7,ka4 ,up4 ,i1 #b7--where it is said that all go1 without any distinction4 ,so that those who perform good works and those who perform evil works1 equally go to the moon4--,this the next ,stra negatives4 #ac4 ,but of the others having enjoyed in ,samyamana1 there is ascent and descent2 as such a course is declared4 ,of the others1 i4e4 those who do not perform sacrifices1 and so on1 there is ascent to the moon and descent from there1 only after they have in the kingdom of ,yama suffered the punishments due to their actions4 ,for the text declares that evil-doers fall under the power of ,yama1 and have to go to him1 ',he who thinks1 this is the world there is no other1 falls again and again under my sway' 7,ka4 ,up4 ,i1 #b1 #f72 'the son of ,vivasvat1 the gathering place of men' 7,rik ,samh4 ,x1 #ad1 #a72 ',king ,yama1' and other texts4 #ad4 ,smriti texts also declare this4 ,that all beings are under the sway of ,yama1 ,parsara also and other ,smriti writers declare1 ',and all these pass under the sway of ,yama4' #ae4 ,moreover there are seven4 ,the ,smritis moreover declare that there are seven hells1 called ,raurava1 and so on1 to which evil-doers have to go4--,but how do they1 if moving about in those seven places1 reach the palace of ,yama8 #af4 ,on account of his activity there also1 there is no contradiction4 ,as their going to those seven places also is due to the command of ,yama1 there is no contradiction4--,thus those also who do not perform sacrifices1 and so on1 after having gone to the world of ,yama1 and there undergone punishments according to the nature of their works1 later on ascend to the moon and again descend from there4--,of this conclusion the next ,stra disposes4 #ag4 ,but1 of knowledge and work--as these are the leading topics4 ,the 'but' sets aside the view developed so far4 ,it cannot be admitted that those also who do not perform sacrifices1 and so on1 reach the moon2 because the path of the gods and the path of the fathers are meant for the enjoyment of the fruits 'of knowledge and work4',that is to say--as those who do not perform sacrifices cannot ascend by the path of the gods1 since they are destitute of knowledge2 so they also cannot go by the path of the fathers1 since they are destitute of meritorious works4 ,and that these two paths are dependent respectively on knowledge and works1 we know from the fact that these two are the leading topics4 ,for knowledge forms the leading topic with regard to the path of the gods1 ',those who know this1 and those who in the forest follow faith and austerities1 go to light1' c42 and works have the same position with regard to the path of the fathers1 they who living in a village perform sacrifices1 c4 go to the smoke1 c4 ,the text1 'all those who depart from this world go to the moon1' must therefore be interpreted to mean 'all those who perform sacrifices go to the moon4'--,but if evil-doers do not go to the moon1 the fifth oblation cannot take place1 and no new body can be produced4 ,for the text says1 ',in the fifth oblation water is called man1' and1 as we have shown1 that fifth oblation presupposes the soul's going to the moon4 ,in order1 therefore1 to understand how in their case also a new embodiment is possible1 it must needs be admitted that they also ascend to the moon4--,to this the next ,stra replies4 #ah4 ,not in the case of the third 7place71 as it is thus perceived4 ,the third 'place' does not1 for the origination of a new body1 depend on the fifth oblation4 ,the term1'the third place1' denotes mere evil-doers4 ,that these do not1 for the origination of a new body1 depend on the fifth oblation1 is seen from ,scripture4 ,for1 in answer to the question ',do you know why that world never becomes full8' the text says1 ',on neither of these two ways are those small creatures continually returning1 of whom it may be said1 ,live and die4 ,this is the third place4 ,therefore that world never becomes full4' ,as this passage states that in consequence of 'the third place' 7i4e4 the creatures forming a third class7 not ascending to and descending from the heavenly world that world never becomes full1 it follows that that third place does not1 for the origination of bodies1 depend on the fifth oblation4 ,the clause1 'in the fifth oblation1' moreover1 merely states that the connexion of water with the fifth fire is the cause of the water 'being called man' 7i4 e4 becoming an embryo71 but does not deny the origination of embryos in other ways2 for the text contains no word asserting such a limitation4 #ai4 ,it moreover is recorded1 in the world4 ,smriti1 moreover1 states that the bodies of some specially meritorious persons1 such as ,draupad1 ,dhrishtadyumna and others1 were formed independently of the fifth oblation' 7i4e4 sexual union74 #bj4 ,and on account of its being seen4 ,and it is seen in ,scripture also1 that the bodies of some beings originate independently of the fifth oblation3 ',of all beings there are indeed three origins only1 that which springs from an egg1 that which springs from a living being1 that which springs from a germ' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #c1 #a74 ,it is observed that from among these beings those springing from a germ and those springing from heat originate without that fifth oblation4--,but the text quoted does not refer to the creatures springing from heat2 for it says that there are three origins only6--,to this the next ,stra replies4 #ba4 ,the third term includes that which springs from heat4 ,creatures sprung from heat are included in the third term--viz4 that which springs from a germ--which is exhibited in the text quoted4 ,the settled conclusion therefore is that the evil-doers do not go to the moon4--,here terminates the adhikarana of 'those who do not perform sacrifices4' #bb4 ,there is entering into similarity of being with those1 there being a reason4 ,the text describes the manner in which those who perform sacrifices1 and so on1 descend from the moon as follows3 ',they return again that way as they came1 to the ether1 from the ether to the air4 ,then having become air they become smoke1 having become smoke they become mist1' c4 ,the doubt here arises whether the soul when reaching ether1 and so on1 becomes ether in the same sense as here on earth it becomes a man or other being1 or merely becomes similar to ether1 and so on4--,the former view is the true one2 for as the soul in the sraddh state becomes the moon1 so it must likewise be held to become ether1 and so on1 there being no reason for a difference in the two cases4--,this prim facie view the ,stra sets aside4 ,the descending soul enters into similarity of being with ether1 and so on2 since there is a reason for this4 ,when the soul becomes a man or becomes the moon1 there is a reason for that1 since it thereby becomes capacitated for the enjoyment of pain and pleasure4 ,but there is no similar reason for the soul becoming ether1 and so on1 and hence the statement that the soul becomes ether1 and so on1 can only mean that1 owing to contact with them1 it becomes similar to them4--,here terminates the adhikarana of 'entering into similarity of being4' #bc4 ,not very long2 on account of special statement4 ,does the soul in its descent through ether1 and so on1 stay at each stage for a not very long time1 or is there nothing to define that time8-- ,it stays at each stage for an indefinite time1 there being nothing to define the time4-- ,not so1 the ,stra decides4 ,for there is a special statement1 i4e4 the text says that when the soul has become rice or grain or the like1 the passing out of that stage is beset with difficulties4 ,from this we infer that as there is no such statement concerning the earlier stages1 the soul stays at each of them for a short time only4--,here terminates the adhikarana of 'the not very long time4' #bd4 ,into 7plants7 animated by other souls1 because the statement is as in the previous cases4 ,the text declares that 'he descending souls are born as rice1 corn1' c41 'they are born here as rice1 corn1 herbs1 trees1' c4 ,the question here is whether the souls cling to plants animated by other souls which have those plants for their bodies2 or whether the descending souls themselves are born with those plants for their bodies4--,the latter view is the right one2 for the text says1 'they are born as rice1 grain1' and so on1 and this expression is of the same kind as when we say 'he is born as a man1 as a deva1' and so on4 ,the text therefore means that the souls are embodied in the different plants4--,this view the ,stra rejects4 ,the souls merely cling to those plants which constitute the bodies of other souls2 'since the statement is as in the previous cases1' i4e4 because the text only says that the souls become plants as it had previously been said that they become ether1 and so on4 ,where the text means to say that the soul enters on the condition of an enjoying soul 7i4e4 of a soul assuming a new body for the purpose of retributive enjoyment71 it refers to the deeds which lead to such enjoyment2 so e4 g4 in the passage1 ',those whose works have been good obtain a good birth1' c4 ,but in the text under discussion there is no such reference to karman4 ,for those works--viz4 sacrifices and the like--which were undertaken with a view to reward1 such as enjoyment of the heavenly world1 are1 in the case of the descending souls1 completely wiped out by the enjoyment of the heavenly world 7which precedes the descent of the souls72 and those works on the other hand1 the action of which has not yet begun1 lead to the embodiments mentioned further on 7',those whose works are good'74 ,and in the interval between those two conditions no new karman originates4 ,when1 therefore1 the text says that the souls are born as plants1 the statement cannot be taken in its literal sense4 #be4 ,it is unholy4 ,not so1 on the ground of ,scripture4 ,the conclusion arrived at above cannot be accepted1 since there is a reason why the descending soul should enter on the condition of an enjoying soul4 ,such works as sacrifices1 the fruit of which is the enjoyment of the heavenly world1 are mixed with evil1 for they imply injury to living beings as in the case of the goat offered to ,agnshomau4 ,and such injury is evil as it is forbidden by texts such as 'let him not harm any creature4' ,nor can it be said that the injunctions of sacrificing animals constitute exceptions to the general rule of not harming any creature4--,for the two injunctions refer to different things4 ,the injunction to kill the goat for ,agnshomau intimates that the killing of the animal subserves the accomplishment of the sacrifice1 while the injunction not to 'harm' teaches that such harming has disastrous consequences4 ,should it be said that the prohibition of harming does not refer to such actions as the sacrifice of the goat which proceed on the basis of scriptural injunction1 but only to such actions as spring from natural passion or desire 7rga72 we remark that in the case of sacrifices also the action is equally prompted by natural desire4 ,injunctions such as ',he who desires the heavenly world is to sacrifice'1 teach that sacrifices are to be undertaken by persons desirous of certain pleasant results1 and such persons having thus learned by what means the result is to be accomplished proceed to action from the natural desire of the result4 ,this applies to the killing of the goat also which is offered to ,agnshomau2 man learns from ,scripture that such actions help to accomplish the sacrifice which effects the result1 and then performs those actions from natural desire4 ,the case in no way differs from that of harm done in ordinary life--where the agent always is prompted by natural desire1 having somehow arrived at the conclusion that his action will accomplish something aimed at by himself4 ,the same holds good with regard to works of permanent obligation4 ,men learn from ,scripture that through the performance of the special duties of their caste they attain happiness of the highest kind1 and then apply themselves to their duties from a natural desire of such happiness1 and therefore such works also are mixed with evil4 ,hence the souls of those who have performed sacrifices1 and so on1 which contain an element of evil1 at first experience in the heavenly world that result which is to be enjoyed there1 and then embodying themselves in non-moving things such as plants1 experience the fruit of that part of their actions which is of a harmful nature4 ,that embodiment in non-moving beings is the result of evil deeds ,smriti declares3 ',owing to those defects of work which are due to the body1 a man becomes a non-moving being4' ,from all this it follows that the souls embody themselves in plants to the end of enjoying the fruits of their works4--,to this the ,stra replies--it is not so1 on account of scriptural statement4 ,for ,scripture declares that the killing of sacrificial animals makes them to go up to the heavenly world1 and therefore is not of the nature of harm4 ,this is declared in the text1 ',the animal killed at the sacrifice having assumed a divine body goes to the heavenly world'2 'with a golden body it ascends to the heavenly world4' ,an action which is the means of supreme exaltation is not of the nature of harm1 even if it involves some little pain2 it rather is of beneficial nature4--,with this the mantra also agrees3 ',thou dost not die1 thou goest to the gods on easy paths2 where virtuous men go1 not evil-doers1 there the divine ,savitri may lead thee4' ,an act which has a healing tendency1 although it may cause a transitory pain1 men of insight declare to be preservative and beneficial4 #bf4 ,after that conjunction with him who performs the act of generation4 ,the declaration that the descending souls become rice plants1 and so on1 cannot be taken literally for that reason also1 that the text afterwards declares them to become those who perform the act of generation3 ',whoever the being may be that eats the food and begets offspring1 that being he 7i4e4 the soul that has descended7 becomes4' ,now the meaning of this latter text can only be that the soul enters into conjunction with the creature which eats the grain2 and hence we have to interpret the previous text1 as to the soul's becoming a plant1 in the same way4 #bg4 ,from the yoni the body4 ,only after having reached a yoni the soul1 affected with a remnant of its works1 obtains a new body1 and only in a body there can be the enjoyment of pleasure and pain4 ,when1 therefore1 previous to that the soul is said to reach ether1 wind1 and so on1 this can only mean that it enters into conjunction with them4--,here terminates the adhikarana of 'that animated by another soul4' ,,second ,p,,da4 #a4 ,in the intermediate sphere the creation 7is effected by the soul72 for 7,scripture7 says 7so74 ,so far it has been shown that the soul in the waking state suffers affliction since1 in accordance with its deeds1 it goes1 returns1 is born1 and so on4 ,next an enquiry is instituted into its condition in the state of dream4 ,with reference to the state of dreaming ,scripture says1 ',there are no chariots in that state1 no horses1 no roads2 then he creates chariots1 horses and roads4 ,there are no blessings1 no happiness1 no joys2 then he himself creates blessings1 happiness1 joys1 and so on4 ,for he is the creator' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #c1 #aj74 ,a doubt here arises whether this creation of chariots and the rest is accomplished by the individual soul1 or by the ,lord4--',the creation in the intermediate state' is due to the individual soul only4 ',the intermediate state' means the sphere of dreams1 in agreement with the passage ',there is a third intermediate state1 the place of dreams' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #c1 #a74 ,and that creation is effected by the soul only2 for what is referred to in the passages 'he creates1' ',for he is the maker1' is none other but the dreaming soul4 #b4 ,and some 7state the soul to be7 the shaper2 and sons1 and so on4 ,and the followers of one skh state in their text that the dreaming soul is the shaper of its desires3 ',he1 the person who is awake in those who sleep1 shaping one desired thing 7kma7 after the other4' ,the term 'kma' there denotes not mere desires1 but such things as sons and the like which are objects of desire4 ,for sons and so on are introduced as 'kmas' in previous passages3 ',ask for all kmas according to thy wish'2 ',choose sons and grandsons living a hundred years' 7,ka4 ,up4 ,i1 #a1 #be2 #bc74 ,the individual soul thus creates chariots1 and so on1 in its dreams4 ,that the soul has the power of realising all its wishes is known from the declaration of ,prajpati4 ,it is therefore able to create1 even in the absence of special instruments4--,this view is set aside by the next ,stra4 #c4 ,but it is mere ,my2 on account of the true nature 7of the soul7 not being fully manifested4 ,the things appearing in dreams-chariots1 lotus tanks1 and so on--are absolute ,my1 i4e4 things created by the ,supreme ,person4 ,for the term ',my' denotes wonderful things1 as appears from passages such as ',she was born in the race of ,janaka1 appearing like the wonderful power of the divine being in bodily shape' 7devamy74 ,the sense of the passage 'there are no chariots1' c4 then is--there are no chariots and horses to be perceived by any other person but the dreaming one2 and then 'he creates chariots1' c4--i4 e4 the ,supreme ,person creates things to be perceived by the dreamer and persisting for a certain time only4 ,those things therefore are of a wonderful nature 7but not illusions74 ,and the creation of such wonderful things is possible for the ,supreme ,person who can immediately realise all his wishes2 but not for the individual soul4 ,the latter also1 indeed1 fundamentally possesses that power2 but as in the ,samsra state the true nature of the soul is not fully manifested1 it is then incapable of accomplishing such wonderful creations4 ,the text 'the person shaping one desired thing after the other' declares the ,supreme ,person to be the creator1 for the clauses immediately preceding and following that text 7viz4 ',he who is awake in those who sleep'2 and 'that is the ,bright1 that is ,brahman1 that alone is called the ,immortal2 all worlds are contained in it and no one goes beyond'--,ka4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #e1 #h7 mention attributes distinctively characteristic of the ,supreme ,person4 ,and the ,bri4 ,up4 text1 ',for he is the maker1' must therefore1 in agreement with the ,katha-text1 also be understood as declaring that it is the ,supreme ,person only that creates the things seen in a dream4--,but if it is the true nature of the soul to be free from all imperfections1 and so on1 why then does this not manifest itself8--,to this the next ,stra replies4 #d4 ,but owing to the wish of the highest it is hidden2 for from that are its bondage and the opposite state4 ,the but sets the objection aside4 ,owing to the wish of the highest1 i4 e4 the ,supreme ,person1 the essential nature of the individual soul is hidden4 ,the ,supreme ,person hides the true1 essentially blessed1 nature of the soul which is in a state of sin owing to the endless chain of karman4 ,for this reason we find it stated in ,scripture that the bondage and release of the soul result from the wish of the ,supreme ,person only 'when he finds freedom from fear and rest in that invisible1 incorporeal1 undefined1 unsupported2 then he has gone to fearlessness '2 'for he alone causes blessedness'2 'from fear of it the wind blows' 7,taitt4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #g1 #h74 #e4 ,or that 7results7 also from connexion with the body4 ,the obscuration of the soul's true nature results either from the soul's connexion with the body or from its connexion with the power of matter in a subtle state4 ,as long as the creation lasts1 the soul is obscured by its connexion with matter in the form of a body2 at the time of a pralaya1 on the other hand1 by its connexion with matter of so exceedingly subtle a kind as not to admit of differentiation by means of name and form4 ,as thus its true nature is not manifest1 the soul is unable to create1 in dreams1 chariots1 lotus tanks1 and so on1 by its mere wish4 ,and what the texts say about a being that is awake in those who sleep and is the abode of all worlds 7'in that all the worlds abide1 and no one goes beyond it'--,ka4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #d1 #i7 can apply to the ,supreme ,person only4 ,the things seen by an individual soul in its dreams therefore are specially created by the ,supreme ,person1 and are meant by him to be a retribution--whether reward or punishment--for deeds of minor importance3 they therefore last for the time of the dream only1 and are perceived by that one soul only4 #f4 ,and it is suggestive1 according to ,scripture2 this the experts also declare4 ,the things seen in dreams are not created by the wish of the individual soul for this reason also1 that according to ,scripture dreams are prophetic of future good or ill fortune4 ',when a man engaged in some work undertaken for some special wish sees a woman in his dream1 he may infer success from his dream vision4' ,those also who understand the science of dreams teach that dreams foreshadow good and evil fortune4 ,but that which depends on one's own wish can have no prophetic quality2 and as ill fortune is not desired the dreamer would create for himself only such visions as would indicate good fortune4 ,hence the creation which takes place in dreams can be the ,lord's work only4--,here terminates the adhikarana of 'the intermediate state4' #g4 ,the absence of that takes place in the nds and in the ,self1 according to scriptural statement4 ,next the state of deep dreamless sleep is enquired into4 ,scripture says1 ',when a man is asleep1 reposing and at perfect rest1 so that he sees no dream1 then he lies asleep in those nds' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,viii1 #f1 #c72 ',when he is in profound sleep and is conscious of nothing1 there are seventy- two thousand veins called hita which from the heart spread through the pericardium4 ,through them he moves forth and rests in the pericardium' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #a1 #ai74 ',when a man sleeps here1 he becomes united with the ,true' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #h1 #a74 ,these texts declare the veins1 the pericardium1 and ,brahman to be the place of deep sleep2 and hence there is a doubt whether each of them in turns1 or all of them together1 are that place4 ,there is an option between them1 since they are not in mutual dependence1 and since the sleeping soul cannot at the same time be in several places6--,to this the ,stra replies--the absence of dreams1 i4e4 deep sleep takes place in the veins1 in the pericardium1 and in the highest ,self together2 since these three are declared by ,scripture4 ,when different alternatives may be combined1 on the ground of there being different effects in each case1 it is improper to assume an option which implies sublation of some of the alternatives4 ,and in the present case such combination is possible1 the veins and the pericardium holding the position of a mansion1 as it were1 and a couch within the mansion1 while ,brahman is the pillow1 as it were4 ,thus ,brahman alone is the immediate resting-place of the sleeping soul4 #h4 ,hence the awaking from that4 ,since ,brahman alone directly is the place of deep sleep1 ,scripture is able to declare that the souls awake from that1 i4e4 ,brahman2 compare ',having come back from the ,true they do not know that they come from the ,true' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #aj1 #b71 and other texts4--,here terminates the adhikarana of 'the absence of that4' #i4 ,but the same1 on account of work1 remembrance1 text1 and injunction4 ,does the same person who had gone to sleep rise again at the time of waking1 or a different one8--,since the soul in deep sleep frees itself from all limiting adjuncts1 unites itself with ,brahman1 and thus being in no way different from the released soul1 is no longer in any way connected with its previous body1 organs1 and so on2 the person rising from sleep is a different one4--,this view the ,stra sets aside1 saying 'but the same4' ,for there remains the work1 i4e4 the good and evil deeds previously done by the sleeper1 for which the same person has to undergo retribution before the knowledge of truth arises4 ,there is next remembrance--',i1 the waking person1 am the same as ,i who was asleep4' ,scripture also declares this3 ',whatever these creatures are here1 whether a lion1 or tiger1 or wolf1 c41 that they become again' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #aj1 #b74 ,and1 lastly1 the injunctions which enjoin certain acts for the sake of final ,release would be purportless if the person merged in deep sleep attained ,release4 ,nor can it be said that the sleeping soul is free from all limiting adjuncts and manifests itself in its true nature 7so as not to be different from the released soul74 ,for with regard to the sleeping person the text says1',in truth he thus does not know himself that he is ,i1 nor does he know anything that exists4 ,he is gone to utter annihilation4 ,i see no good in this' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,viii1 ii1 #a72 while1 on the other hand1 the texts1 ',having approached the highest light he manifests himself in his true nature2 he moves about there laughing1 playing1 delighting himself2 ',he becomes a ,self-ruler2 he moves about in all the worlds according to his wish'2 ',the seeing one sees everything1 and attains everything everywhere' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,viii1 #ab1 #c2 ,,vii1 #be1 #b2 #bf1 #b71 declare that the released soul is all-knowing1 and so on4 ,what is true about the sleeping person is that he is still comprised within the ,samsra1 but for the time having put off all instruments of knowledge and action and become incapable of knowledge and enjoyment repairs to the place of utter rest1 i4e4 the highest ,self1 and having there refreshed himself1 again rises to new enjoyment of action4--,here terminates the adhikarana of 'work1 remembrance1 text1 and injunction4' #aj4 ,in the swooning person there is half-combination2 this being the remaining 7hypothesis74 ,with regard to a person lying in a swoon or stunned1 the question arises whether that state of swoon is one of the other states1 viz4 deep sleep and so on1 or whether it is a special condition of its own4--,the former alternative must be accepted4 ,for the term 'swoon' may be explained as denoting either deep sleep or some other acknowledged state1 and there is no authority for assuming an altogether different new state4--,this view the ,stra sets aside4 ,the condition of a swooning person consists in reaching half1 viz4 of what leads to death2 for this is the only hypothesis remaining4 ,a swoon cannot be either dreaming or being awake2 for in a swoon there is no consciousness4 ,and as it is different in character as well as in the occasions giving rise to it from deep sleep and death1 it cannot be either of those two states2 for there are special circumstances occasioning a swoon1 such as a blow on the head4 ,the only possible alternative then is to view a swoon as a state in which there is made a half-way approach to death4 ,for while death consists in the complete cessation of the soul's connexion with the body or organs of any kind1 a swoon consists in the soul's remaining connected with the subtle body and organs only4 ,here terminates the adhikarana of 'the swooning person4' #aa4 ,not on account of place even 7is there any imperfection7 of the ,highest2 for everywhere 7it is described7 as having twofold characteristics4 ,the different states of the individual soul have been discussed1 to the end that an insight into their imperfections may give rise to indifference towards all worldly enjoyments4 ,next now1 in order to give rise to the desire of attaining to ,brahman1 the ,stras proceed to expound how ,brahman's nature is raised above all imperfections and constituted by mere blessed qualities4 ,the following point requires to be considered first4 ,do those imperfections which cling to the individual soul in consequence of its different states--viz4 the waking state1 dreams1 deep sleep1 swoon1 departure from the body--affect also the highest ,brahman which as its inner ,ruler abides within the soul in those different states1 or not8--,they do affect it1 since ,brahman abides within the bodies which are in those different states4--,but ,stras such as ,i1 #b1 #h have already declared that the highest ,brahman1 because not subject to the influence of karman1 is free from all imperfections2 how then can imperfections cling to it for the reason that it is connected with this or that place8--,in the following way4 ,as was shown under ,,iii1 #b1 #f1 works give rise to imperfection and suffering in so far as they cause the connexion of the soul with a body4 ,the efficient cause therein is the imperfection inherent in the connexion with a body2 for otherwise the works themselves would directly give rise to pain1 and what then would be the use of the connexion with a body8 ,hence1 even in the case of a being not subject to karman1 its connexion with various unholy bodies will cause imperfection and suffering4 ,and even when such a being voluntarily enters into such bodies in order to rule them1 connexion with imperfections is unavoidable2 no less than to be immersed in blood and purulent matter1 even if done voluntarily1 will make a man unclean4 ,although therefore ,brahman is the sole cause of the world and a treasure- house of all blessed qualities1 yet it is affected by the imperfections springing therefrom that1 as declared by ,scripture1 it abides within matter1 bodies1 and their parts1 and thus is connected with them 7cp4 'he who abides within earth1 within the soul1 within the eye1 within the seed1' c41 ,bri4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #g1 #c74 ,of this prim facie view the ,stra disposes by saying--',not even from place1 such as earth1 soul1 c41 is there possible for the highest ,self a shadow even of imperfection2 since everywhere in ,scripture as well as ,smriti ,brahman is described as having characteristics of a double kind2 viz4 on the one hand freedom from all imperfections1 and on the other possession of all blessed qualities4 ,for ,scripture says that the ,supreme ,person is free from evil1 free from old age1 free from death1 free from grief1 free from hunger and thirst2 that all his wishes realise themselves1 that all its purposes realise themselves' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,viii1 #a1 #e7--;,and ,smriti says1 ',he comprises within himself all blessed qualities1 by a particle of his power the whole mass of beings is supported4 ,in him there are combined energy1 strength1 might1 wisdom1 valour1 and all other noble qualities4 ,he is the ,highest of the high1 no pain or other imperfections affect him1 the ,lord of all1 high or low4 ,from all evil he is free1 he whose name is ,vishnu1 the highest abode4' ,these and other passages teach that ,brahman possesses the double characteristics stated above4 #ab4 ,should it be said 'on account of difference'2 not so1 because with reference to each the text says what is not that4 ,but1 an objection is raised1 we observe1 that the individual soul also1 although in reality possessing the same twofold attributes1 viz4 freedom from all evil and so on1 as we learn from the teaching of ,prajpati 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,viii1 #g71 yet is affected with imperfections owing to the fact that it is connected with bodies1 divine1 human1 and so on1 and thus undergoes a variety of conditions4 ,analogously we cannot avoid the conclusion that the inner ,ruler also1 although in reality possessing those same twofold attributes1 is also affected by imperfection1 because through its connexion with those different bodies it likewise undergoes a variety of conditions4--,this objection the ,stra sets aside in the words1 'not so1 because with reference to each the text says what is not that1' i4e4 what is contrary4 ,for where the text says that the inner ,ruler dwells within the earth1 within the soul1 within the eye1 and so on1 it concludes each clause by saying1 'that is thy ,self1 the inner ,ruler1 the immortal one1' i4e4 declares the inner ,ruler to be immortal1 and thus denies of him any imperfections due to his connexion with the bodies which he voluntarily enters in order to rule them4 ,the true 7perfect7 nature of the individual soul1 on the other hand1 is obscured as long as it is connected with a body1 as we have explained under ,,iii1 #b1 #e4--;,but1 as the ,prvapakshin has pointed out1 even if the highest ,self voluntarily enters into bodies1 it cannot escape connexion with the imperfections which depend on the essential nature of those bodies4--,not so1 we reply4 ,the fact is1 that not even non-sentient things are1 essentially or intrinsically1 bad2 but in accordance with the nature of the works of those beings which are under the rule of karman1 one thing1 owing to the will of the ,supreme ,person1 causes pain to one man at one time and pleasure at another time1 and causes pleasure or pain to one person and the opposite to another person4 ,if the effects of things depended on their own nature only1 everything would at all times be productive for all persons1 either of pleasure only or of pain only4 ,but this is not observed to be the case4 ,in agreement herewith ,smriti says1 ',because one and the same thing causes pain and pleasure and envy and wrath1 the nature of a thing cannot lie in itself4 ,as the same thing which erst gave rise to love causes pain later on1 and that which once caused anger now causes satisfaction1 nothing is in itself of the nature either of pleasure or of pain4' ,to the soul therefore which is subject to karman the connexion with different things is the source of imperfection and suffering1 in agreement with the nature of its works2 while to the highest ,brahman1 which is subject to itself only1 the same connexion is the source of playful sport1 consisting therein that he in various ways guides and rules those things4 #ac4 ,some also 7teach7 thus4 ,moreover1 the followers of one skh explicitly teach that the connexion with one and the same body is for the individual soul a source of disadvantage1 while for the highest ,brahman it is nothing of the kind1 but constitutes an accession of glory in so far as it manifests him as a ,lord and ,ruler1 ',two birds1 inseparable friends1 cling to the same tree4 ,one of them eats the sweet fruit1 the other looks on without eating' 7,mu4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #a1 #a74--;,but the text1 ',having entered by means of that jva- self ,i will differentiate names and forms1' teaches that the differentiation of names and forms depends on the entering into the elements of the jva-soul whose ,self is ,brahman1 and this implies that ,brahman also1 as the ,self of the individual soul1 possesses definite shapes1 divine1 human1 and so on1 and is to be denominated by the corresponding names4 ,brahman thus falls within the sphere of beings to which injunctions and prohibitions are addressed--such as 'a ,brhmana is to sacrifice'--and hence necessarily is under the power of karman4--,to this the next ,stra replies4 #ad4 ,for 7,brahman is7 without form merely1 since it is the principal agent with regard to that4 ,brahman1 although by entering into bodies1 human1 divine1 and so on1 it becomes connected with various forms1 yet is in itself altogether devoid of form1 and therefore does not share that subjection to karman which in the case of the soul is due to its embodiedness4--,why8--,because as it is that which brings about names and forms it stands to them in the relation of a superior 7pradhna74 ,for the text1 ',the ,ether 7,brahman7 indeed is the accomplisher of names and forms2 that which is without these two is ,brahman1' teaches that ,brahman1 although entering into all beings1 is not touched by name and form1 but is that which brings about name and form4--,but1 an objection is raised1 if ,brahman is the inner ruler of beings in so far as he has them for its body1 how can it be said that it is altogether destitute of form8--,there is a difference1 we reply4 ,the individual soul is connected with the shape of the body in which it dwells because it participates in the pleasures and pains to which the body gives rise2 but as ,brahman does not share those pleasures and pains1 it has no shape or form4 ,and the scriptural injunctions and prohibitions apply to those only who are under the power of karman4 ,the highest ,brahman therefore is like a being without form1 and hence1 although abiding within all things1 free from all imperfection and endowed with all blessed qualities4 ,but1 an objection is raised1 texts such as 'the ,true1 knowledge1 infinite is ,brahman' suggest a ,brahman whose nature is constituted exclusively by non-differentiated light2 while at the same time a ,brahman endowed with qualities--such as omniscience1 being the cause of the world1 being the inner ,self of all1 having the power of immediately realising its wishes and purposes--is expressly negatived by texts such as 'not so1 not so' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #c1 #f71 and therefore must be held to be false4 ,how then can it be maintained that ,brahman possesses the 'twofold characteristics' mentioned under ,stra #aa8--,to this the next ,stra replies4 #ae4 ,and in the same way as 7a ,brahman7 consisting of light2 7the texts thus7 not being devoid of meaning4 ,in order that texts such as 'the ,true1 knowledge1 infinite is ,brahman' may not be devoid of meaning1 we have to admit that light 7intelligence7 constitutes the essential nature of ,brahman4 ,but analogously we have also to admit that ,brahman possesses the 'twofold characteristics'2 for otherwise the texts declaring it to be free from all imperfections1 all- knowing1 the cause of the world1 and so on1 would in their turn be devoid of meaning4 #af4 ,and 7the text7 says so much only4 ,moreover the text 'the ,true1 knowledge1 infinite is ,brahman' only teaches that ,brahman has light for its essential nature1 and does not negative those other attributes of ,brahman--omniscience1 being the cause of the world1 c4--which are intimated by other texts4 ,what is the object of the negation in 'not so1 not so' will be shown further on4 #ag4 7,this ,scripture7 also shows1 and it is also stated in ,smriti4 ,that ,brahman is a treasure as it were of all blessed qualities and free from all imperfections1 the whole body of ,vednta-texts clearly declares3 ',that highest great lord of lords1 that highest deity of deities'2 ',he is the cause1 the lord of the lords of the organs1 and there is of him neither parent nor lord '2 ',there is no effect and no cause known of him1 no one is seen like unto him or higher4 ,his high power is revealed as manifold1 as essential action of knowledge and strength' 7,svet4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #g-i72 ',he who is all-knowing1 whose brooding consists of knowledge' 7,mu4 ,i1 #a1i72 ',from fear of him the wind blows1 from fear of him the sun moves'2 ',that is one bliss of ,brahman' 7,taitt4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #h72 ',that from which all speech with the mind turns away1 not having reached it1 knowing the bliss of that ,brahman man fears nothing' 7,taitt4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #i72 ',he who is without parts1 without action1 tranquil1 without fault1 without taint' 7,svet4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #ai74--;,and ,smriti3 ',he who knows me to be unborn and without a beginning1 the ,supreme ,lord of the worlds'2 ',pervading this entire universe1 by one part of mine ,i do abide'2 ',with me as supervisor ,prakriti brings forth the universe of the movable and the immovable1 and for this reason the world does ever move round'2 ',but another is the ,supreme ,person1 who is called the ,supreme ,spirit1 who pervading the three worlds supports them--the eternal ,lord' 7,bha4 ,g4 ,x1 #c2 #db2 ,,ix1 #aj2 ,,xv1 #ag72 ',the all-working1 all-powerful one1 rich in knowledge and strength1 who becomes neither less nor more1 who is self- dependent1 without beginning1 master of all2 who knows neither weariness nor exhaustion1 nor fear1 wrath and desire2 the blameless one1 raised above all1 without support1 imperishable4'--,as thus ,brahman in whatever place it may abide has the 'twofold characteristics1' the imperfections dependent on those places do not touch it4 #ah4 ,for this very reason comparisons1 such as reflected images of the sun and the like4 ,because ,brahman1 although abiding in manifold places1 ever possesses the twofold characteristics1 and hence does not share the imperfections due to those places1 scriptural texts illustrate its purity in the midst of inferior surroundings by comparing it to the sun reflected in water1 mirrors1 and the like4 ,compare e4g41 ',as the one ether is rendered manifold by jars and the like1 or as the one sun becomes manifold in several sheets of water2 thus the one ,self is rendered manifold by abiding in many places4 ,for the ,self of all beings1 although one1 abides in each separate being and is thus seen as one and many at the same time1 as the moon reflected in water4' #ai4 ,but because it is not apprehended like water1 there is no equality4 ,the 'but' indicates an objection4--,the highest ,self is not apprehended in earth and other places in the same way as the sun or a face is apprehended in water or a mirror4 ,for the sun and a face are erroneously apprehended as abiding in water or a mirror2 they do not really abide there4 ,when1 on the other hand1 ,scripture tells us that the highest ,self dwells in the earth1 in water1 in the soul1 c41 we apprehend it as really dwelling in all those places4 ,that the imperfections caused by water and mirrors do not attach themselves to the sun or a face is due to the fact that the sun and the face do not really abide in the water and the mirror4 ,hence there is no real parallelism between the thing compared 7the highest ,self7 and the thing to which it is compared 7the reflected image74 #bj4 ,the participation 7on ,brahman's part7 in increase and decrease1 due to its abiding within 7is denied72 on account of the appropriateness of both 7comparisons71 and because thus it is seen4 ,the comparison of the highest ,self to the reflected sun and the rest is meant only to deny of the ,self that it participates in the imperfections-- such as increase1 decrease1 and the like--which attach to the earth and the other beings within which the ,self abides4--,how do we know this8-- ,from the circumstance that on this supposition both comparisons are appropriate4 ,in the scriptural text quoted above ,brahman is compared to ether1 which although one becomes manifold through the things--jars and so on--within it2 and to the sun1 which is multiplied by the sheets of water in which he is reflected4 ,now the employment of these comparisons-- with ether which really does abide within the jars and so on1 and with the sun which in reality does not abide in the water--is appropriate only if they are meant to convey the idea that the highest ,self does not participate in the imperfections inherent in earth and so on4 ,just as ether1 although connecting itself separately with jars1 pots1 and so on1 which undergo increase and decrease1 is not itself touched by these imperfections2 and just as the sun1 although seen in sheets of water of unequal extent1 is not touched by their increase and decrease2 thus the highest ,self1 although abiding within variously-shaped beings1 whether non-sentient like earth or sentient1 remains untouched by their various imperfections--increase1 decrease1 and so on--remains one although abiding in all of them1 and ever keeps the treasure of its blessed qualities unsullied by an atom even of impurity4--,the comparison of ,brahman with the reflected sun holds good on the following account4 ,as the sun is not touched by the imperfections belonging to the water1 since he does not really abide in the water and hence there is no reason for his sharing those imperfections1 thus the highest ,self1 which really abides within earth and the rest1 is not affected by their imperfections2 for as the nature of the highest ,self is essentially antagonistic to all imperfection1 there is no reason for its participating in the imperfection of others4--',and as this is seen4' ,this means--,since we observe in ordinary life also that comparisons are instituted between two things for the reason that although they do not possess all attributes in common1 they yet have some attribute in common4 ,we say1 e4 g4 'this man is like a lion4'--,the conclusion from all this is that the highest ,self1 which is essentially free from all imperfections and a treasure as it were of all blessed qualities1 in no way suffers from dwelling within the earth and the rest4 ,an objection is raised4 ,in the ,brihad-ranyaka1 in the chapter beginning ',there are two forms of ,brahman1 the material and the immaterial1' the whole material world1 gross and subtle1 is at first referred to as constituting the form of ,brahman1 and next a special form of ,brahman is mentioned3 ',and what is the form of that ,person8 ,like a saffron-coloured raiment1' c4 ,but thereupon the text proceeds1 ',now follows the teaching-- not so1 not so2 for there is not anything else higher than this not so4 ',this passage1 referring to all the previously mentioned forms of ,brahman by means of the word 'so1' negatives them2 intimating thereby that ,brahman is nothing else than pure ,being1 and that all distinctions are mere imaginations due to ,brahman not knowing its own essential nature4 ,how then can ,brahman possess the twofold characteristics8--,to this the next ,stra replies4 #ba4 ,for the text denies the previously declared so-muchness2 and declares more than that4 ,it is impossible to understand the text 'not so1 not so' as negativing those distinctions of ,brahman which had been stated previously4 ,if the text meant that1 it would be mere idle talk4 ,for none but a person not in his right mind would first teach that all the things mentioned in the earlier part of the section are distinctive attributes of ,brahman--as which they are not known by any other means of proof--and thereupon deliberately negative his own teaching4 ,although among the things mentioned there are some which1 in themselves1 are known through other means of proof1 yet they are not thus known to be modes of ,brahman1 and others again are known neither in themselves nor as modes of ,brahman4 ,the text therefore cannot merely refer to them as things otherwise known1 but gives fundamental instruction about them4 ,hence the later passage cannot be meant as a sheer negation1 but must be taken as denying the previously described 'so-muchness' of ,brahman2 i4e4 the passage denies that limited nature of ,brahman which would result from ,brahman being viewed as distinguished by the previously stated attributes only4 ,the word so refers to that limited nature1 and the phrase not so therefore means that ,brahman is not distinguished by the previously stated modes only4 ,this interpretation is further confirmed by the fact that after that negative phrase further qualities of ,brahman are declared by the text3 ',for there is not anything higher than this not so4 ,then comes the name1 the ,true of the ,true2 for the prnas are the ,true1 and he is the ,true of them4' ,that means3 ,than that ,brahman which is expressed by the phrase 'not so' there is no other thing higher1 i4e4 there is nothing more exalted than ,brahman either in essential nature or in qualities4 ,and of that ,brahman the name is the ',true of the ,true4' ,this name is explained in the next clause1 'for the prnas1' c4 ,the term prnas here denotes the individual souls1 so called because the prnas accompany them4 ,they are the ',true' because they do not1 like the elements1 undergo changes implying an alteration of their essential nature4 ,and the highest ,self is the ',true of the ,true' because while the souls undergo1 in accordance with their karman1 contractions and expansions of intelligence1 the highest ,self which is free from all sin knows of no such alternations4 ,he is therefore more eminently true than they are4 ,as thus the complementary passage declares ,brahman to be connected with certain qualities1 the clause 'not so1 not so' 7to which that passage is complementary7 cannot deny that ,brahman possesses distinctive attributes1 but only that ,brahman's nature is confined to the attributes previously stated4--,brahman therefore possesses the twofold characteristics4 ,that the clause 'not so' negatives ,brahman's being fully described by the attributes previously mentioned1 was above proved on the ground that since ,brahman is not the object of any other means of proof1 those previous statements cannot refer to what is already proved1 and that the final clause cannot therefore be meant to deny what the previous clauses expressly teach4 ,the next ,stra now confirms this circumstance of ,brahman not lying within the sphere of the other means of proof4 #bb4 ,that 7is7 unmanifested2 for 7this ,scripture7 declares4 ,brahman is not manifested by other means of proof2 for ,scripture says1 ',his form is not to be seen1 no one beholds him with the eye' 7,ka4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #f1 #i72 ',he is not apprehended by the eye nor by speech' 7,mu4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #a1 #h74 #bc4 ,also in perfect conciliation1 according to ,scripture and ,smriti4 ,moreover1 it is only in the state of perfect conciliation or endearment1 i4e4 in meditation bearing the character of devotion1 that an intuition of ,brahman takes place1 not in any other state4 ,this ,scripture and ,smriti alike teach4 ',that ,self cannot be gained by the ,veda1 nor by understanding1 nor by much learning4 ,he whom the ,self chooses by him the ,self can be gained4 ,the ,self chooses him as his own' 7,ka4 ,up4 ,i1 #b1 #bc72 ',when a man's nature has become purified by the serene light of knowledge1 then he sees him1 meditating on him as without parts' 7,mu4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #a1 #i74 ,smriti3 ',neither by the ,vedas1 nor austerities1 nor gifts1 nor by sacrifice1 but only by exclusive devotion1 may ,i in this form be known and beheld in truth and also entered into' 7,bha4 ,g4 ,,xi1 #ec1ed74 ,the scriptural text beginning ',two are the forms of ,brahman1' which declares the nature of ,brahman for the purposes of devout meditation1 cannot therefore refer to ,brahman's being characterised by two forms1 a material and an immaterial1 as something already known2 for apart from ,scripture nothing is known about ,brahman4 #bd4 ,and there is non-difference 7of the intention of ,brahman's distinguishing attributes71 as in the case of light2 and the light 7is7 intuited as constituting ,brahman's essential nature by repetition of the practice 7of meditation74 ,that the clause 'not so' negatives not ,brahman's possessing two forms1 a material and an immaterial one1 but only ,brahman's nature being restricted to those determinations1 follows therefrom also that in the vision of ,vmadeva and others who had attained to intuition into ,brahman's nature1 the fact of ,brahman having all material and immaterial beings for its attributes is apprehended in non-difference1 i4e4 in the same way as the fact of light 7i4e4 knowledge7 and bliss constituting ,brahman's essential nature4 ,compare the text ',seeing this the ,rishi ,vmadeva understood1 ,i am ,manu and the sun' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,i1 #d1 #aj74 ,and that light and bliss constitute ,brahman's nature was perceived by ,vmadeva and the rest through repeated performance of the practice of devout meditation4 ,in the same way then1 i4e4 by repeated meditation1 they also became aware that ,brahman has all material and immaterial things for its distinguishing modes4--,the next ,stra sums up the proof of ,brahman's possessing twofold characteristics4 #be4 ,hence 7,brahman is distinguished7 by what is infinite2 for thus the characteristics 7hold good74 ,by the arguments stated it is proved that ,brahman is distinguished by the infinite multitude of blessed qualities4 ,and this being so1 it follows that ,brahman possesses the twofold characteristics4--,here terminates the adhikarana of 'that which has twofold characteristics4' #bf4 ,but on account of twofold designation1 as the snake and its coils4 ,it has been shown in the preceding adhikarana that the entire non- sentient universe is the outward form of ,brahman4 ,for the purpose of proving ,brahman's freedom from all imperfection1 an enquiry is now begun into the particular mode in which the world may be conceived to constitute the form of ,brahman4 ,is the relation of the two like that of the snake and its coils2 or like that of light and the luminous body1 both of which fall under the same genus2 or like that of the individual soul and ,brahman1 the soul being a distinguishing attribute and for that reason a part 7amsa7 of ,brahman8--,on the assumption of this last alternative1 which is about to be established here1 it has been already shown under two preceding ,stras 7,i1 #d1 #bc2 ,,ii1 #a1 #ad71 that from ,brahman1 as distinguished by sentient and non-sentient beings in their subtle form1 there originates ,brahman as distinguished by all those beings in their gross form4 ,which then of the alternatives stated above is the true one8--,the material world is related to ,brahman as the coils to the snake1 'on account of twofold designation4' ,for some texts declare the identity of the two3 ',brahman only is all this'2 ',the ,self only is all this4' ,other texts again refer to the difference of the two3 ',having entered into these three deities with this jva-self1 let me differentiate names and forms4' ,we therefore consider all non-sentient things to be special forms or arrangements of ,brahman1 as the coils are of a coiled-up snake or a coiled-up rope4 #bg4 ,or else like light and its abode1 both being fire4 ,the or sets aside the other two alternatives4 ,if ,brahman itself only appeared in the form of non-sentient things--as the snake itself only constitutes the coils--both sets of texts1 those which declare difference as well as those which declare the unchangeableness of ,brahman1 would be contrary to sense4 ,we therefore1 adopting the second alternative1 hold that the case under discussion is analogous to that of light and that in which it abides1 i4e4 the luminous body4 ,the two are different1 but at the same time they are identical in so far as they both are fire 7tejas74 ,in the same way the non-sentient world constitutes the form of ,brahman4 #bh4 ,or else in the manner stated above4 ,the but sets aside the two preceding alternatives4 ,one substance may indeed connect itself with several states1 but the former of the two alternatives implies that ,brahman itself constitutes the essential nature of non-sentient matter1 and thus there is no escape from the objections already stated under ,stra #bg4 ,let then the second alternative be adopted according to which ,brahma-hood 7brahmatva7 constitutes a genus inhering in ,brahman as well as in non-sentient matter1 just as fire constitutes the common genus for light and luminous bodies4 ,but on this view ,brahman becomes a mere abstract generic character inhering in the ,lord 7isvara71 sentient souls and non-sentient matter1 just as the generic character of horses 7asvatva7 inheres in concrete individual horses2 and this contradicts all the teaching of ,sruti and ,smriti 7according to which ,brahman is the highest concrete entity74 ,we therefore hold that non-sentient matter stands to ,brahman in the same relation as the one previously proved for the individual soul in ,stra ,,ii1 #c1 #dc2 #df2 viz4 that it is an attribute incapable of being realised apart from ,brahman and hence is a part 7amsa7 of the latter4 ,the texts referring to the two as non-different may thus be taken in their primary sense2 for the part is only a limited place of that of which it is a part4 ,and the texts referring to the two as different may also be taken in their primary sense2 for the distinguishing attribute and that to which the attribute belongs are essentially different4 ,thus ,brahman's freedom from all imperfection is preserved4--,lustre is an attribute not to be realised apart from the gem1 and therefore is a part of the gem2 the same relation also holds good between generic character and individuals having that character1 between qualities and things having qualities1 between bodies and souls4 ,in the same way souls as well as non-sentient matter stand to ,brahman in the relation of parts4 #bi4 ,and on account of denial4 ,texts such as ',this is that great unborn ,self1 undecaying1 undying' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #d1 #be71 ',by the old age of the body that does not age' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,viii1 #a1 #e71 deny of ,brahman the properties of non-sentient matter4 ,from this it follows that the relation of the two can only be that of distinguishing attribute and thing distinguished1 and hence of part and whole4 ,brahman distinguished by sentient and non-sentient beings in their subtle state is the cause2 distinguished by the same beings in their gross state is the effect3 the effect thus is non-different from the cause1 and by the knowledge of the causal ,brahman the effect is likewise known4 ,all these tenets are in full mutual agreement4 ,brahman's freedom from defects also is preserved2 and this and ,brahman's being the abode of all blessed qualities prove that ,brahman possesses the 'twofold characteristics4'--,here terminates the adhikarana of 'the coils of the snake4' #cj4 7,there is something7 higher than that2 on account of the designations of bridge1 measure1 connexion1 and difference4 ,the ,stras now proceed to refute an erroneous view based on some fallacious arguments1 viz4 that there is a being higher even than the highest ,brahman1 the supreme cause1 material as well as operative1 of the entire world--a refutation which will confirm the view of ,brahman being free from all imperfections and a treasure as it were of countless transcendentally exalted qualities4--,there is some entity higher than the ,brahman described so far as being the cause of the world and possessing the twofold characteristics4 ,for the text ',that ,self is a bank 7or bridge71 a boundary' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,viii1 #d1 #a7 designates the ,self as a bank or bridge 7setu74 ,and the term 'setu' means in ordinary language that which enables one to reach the other bank of a river2 and from this we conclude that in the ,vedic text also there must be meant something to be reached4 ,the text further says that that bridge is to be crossed3 ',he who has crossed that bridge1 if blind1' c42 this also indicates that there must be something to be reached by crossing4 ,other texts1 again1 speak of the highest ,brahman as something measured1 i4e4 limited4 ',brahman has four feet 7quarters71 sixteen parts4' ,such declarations of ,brahman being something limited suggest the existence of something unlimited to be reached by that bridge4 ,further there are texts which declare a connexion of the bridge as that which is a means towards reaching1 and a thing connected with the bridge as that to be reached3 'the highest bridge of the ,immortal' 7,svet4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #ai72 'he is the bridge of the ,immortal' 7,mu4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #b1 #e74 ,for this reason also there is something higher than the ,highest4--,and other texts again expressly state that being beyond the ,highest to be something different3 'he goes to the divine ,person who is higher than the ,highest' 7,mu4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #b1 #h72 'by this ,person this whole universe is filled2 what is higher than that is without form and without suffering' 7,svet4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #i-aj74 ,all this combined shows that there is something higher than the highest ,brahman4--,the next ,stra disposes of this view4 #ca4 ,but on account of resemblance4 ,the 'but' sets aside the prvapaksha4 ,there is no truth in the assertion that from the designation of the ,highest as a bridge 7or bank7 it follows that there is something beyond the ,highest4 ,for ,brahman in that text is not called a bank with regard to something to be reached thereby2 since the additional clause 'for the non-confounding of these worlds' declares that it is compared to a bridge or bank in so far as it binds to itself 7setu being derived from si1 to bind7 the whole aggregate of sentient and non-sentient things without any confusion4 ,and in the clause 'having passed beyond that bridge' the passing beyond means reaching2 as we say1 'he passes beyond the ,vedanta1' meaning 'he has fully mastered it4' #cb4 ,it subserves the purpose of thought2 as in the case of the feet4 ,where the texts speak of ,brahman as having four quarters1 and sixteen parts1 or say that 'one quarter of him are all these beings' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #ab1 #f71 they do so for the purpose of thought1 i4e4 meditation1 only4 ,for as texts such as 'the ,truth1 knowledge1 infinite is ,brahman' teach ,brahman1 the cause of the world1 to be unlimited1 it cannot in itself be subject to measure4 ,the texts referring to measure therefore aim at meditation only1 in the same way as texts such as ',speech is one foot 7quarter7 of him1 breath another1 the eye another1 the mind another' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #ah1 #b74--;,but how can something that in itself is beyond all measure1 for the purpose of meditation1 be spoken of as measured8 ,to this the next ,stra replies4 #cc4 ,owing to difference of place1 as in the case of light1 and so on4 ,owing to the difference of limiting adjuncts constituted by special places1 such as speech1 and so on1 ,brahman in so far as connected with these adjuncts may be viewed as having measure2 just as light and the like although spread everywhere may be viewed as limited1 owing to its connexion with different places--windows1 jars1 and so on4 #cd4 ,and on account of possibility4 ,nor is there any truth in the assertion that1 because texts such as 'he is the bridge of the ,immortal' intimate a distinction between that which causes to reach and the object reached1 there must be something to be reached different from that which causes to reach2 for the highest ,self may be viewed as being itself a means towards itself being reached2 cp4 ',the ,self cannot be reached by the ,veda1 and so on2 he whom the ,self chooses by him the ,self can be gained' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,i1 #b1 #bc74 #ce4 ,thus1 from the denial of anything else4 ,nor can we allow the assertion that there is something higher than the highest because certain texts 7'the ,person which is higher than the highest'2 'beyond the ,imperishable there is the highest1' c47 refer to such a difference4 ,for the same texts expressly deny that there is anything else higher than the highest--'than whom there is nothing else higher1 than whom there is nothing smaller or larger' 7,svet4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #i74 ,so also other texts3 ',for there is nothing else higher than this not so' 7i4e4 than this ,brahman designated by the phrase 'not so'2 ,bri4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #c1 #f72 ',of him none is the ,lord1 his name is great glory' 7,mahnr4 ,up4 ,i1 #aj74 ,but what then is the entity referred to in the text 'tato yad uttarataram '8 7,svet4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #aj78--,the passage immediately preceding 7#h71 ',i know that great person1 c42 a man who knows him passes over death1' had declared that the knowledge of ,brahman is the only way to immortality2 and the clause 7#i71 ',higher than whom there is nothing else1' had confirmed this by declaring that ,brahman is the ,highest and that there is no other thing higher4 ,in agreement herewith we must explain stanza #aj as giving a reason for what had been said1 ',because that which is the highest 7uttarataram71 viz4 the ,supreme ,person is without form and without suffering1 therefore 7tatah7 those who know him become immortal1' c4 ,on any other explanation stanza #aj would not be in harmony with stanza #h where the subject is introduced1 and with what is declared in stanza #i4--;,analogously in the text ',he goes to the divine ,person who is higher than the highest' 7,mu4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #b1 #h7 'the highest' means the aggregate soul 7samash-purusha71 which in a previous passage had been said to be 'higher than the high ,imperishable' 7,,ii1 #a1 #b72 and the 'higher' refers to the ,supreme ,person1 with all his transcendent qualities1 who is superior to the aggregate soul4 #cf4 ,the omnipresence 7possessed7 by that1 7understood7 from the declaration of extent4 ,that omnipresence which is possessed 'by that1' i4e4 by ,brahman1 and which is known 'from declarations of extent1' and so on1 i4e4 from texts which declare ,brahman to be all-pervading1 is also known from texts such as 'higher than that there is nothing4' ,declarations of extent are e4g4 the following3 ',by this ,person this whole ,universe is filled' 7,svet4 ,up4 ,,iii4 #i72 'whatever is seen or heard in this world1 is pervaded inside and outside by ,nryana' 7,mahnr4 ,up472 ',the eternal1 pervading1 omnipresent1 which the ,wise consider as the source of all beings' 7,mu4 ,up4 ,i1 #a1 #f74 ,the 'and the rest' in the ,stra comprises passages such as ',brahman indeed is all this1' ',the ,self indeed is all this1' and the like4 ,the conclusion is that the highest ,brahman is absolutely supreme4-- ,here terminates the adhikarana of 'the ,highest4' #cg4 ,from thence the reward2 on account of possibility4 ,it has been shown1 for the purpose of giving rise to a desire for devout meditation1 that the soul in all its states is imperfect1 while the ,supreme ,person to be reached by it is free from imperfections1 the owner of blessed qualities and higher than everything else4 ,being about to investigate the nature of meditation1 the ,strakra now declares that the meditating devotee receives the reward of meditation1 i4e4 ,release1 which consists in attaining to the highest ,person1 from that highest ,person only3 and that analogously the rewards for all works prescribed by the ,veda--whether to be enjoyed in this or the next world--come from the highest ,person only4 ,the ,stra therefore says generally1 'from thence the reward4'--',why so8'--',because that only is possible4' ,for it is he only--the all-knowing1 all-powerful1 supremely generous one-- who being pleased by sacrifices1 gifts1 offerings1 and the like1 as well as by pious meditation1 is in a position to bestow the different forms of enjoyment in this and the heavenly world1 and ,release which consists in attaining to a nature like his own4 ,for action which is non- intelligent and transitory is incapable of bringing about a result connected with a future time4 #ch4 ,and on account of scriptural declaration4 ,that he bestows all rewards--whether in the form of enjoyment or ,release-- ,scripture also declares ',this indeed is the great1 the unborn ,self1 the eater of food1 the giver of wealth' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #d1 #bd72 and ',for he alone causes delight' 7,taitt4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #g74--,next a prim facie view is stated4 #ci4 ,for the same reasons ,jaimini 7thinks it to be7 religious action4 ,for the same reasons1 viz4 possibility and scriptural declaration1 the teacher ,jaimini thinks that religious works1 viz4 sacrifices1 gifts1 offerings1 and meditation1 of themselves bring about their rewards4 ,for we observe that in ordinary life actions such as ploughing and the like1 and charitable gifts and so on1 bring about their own reward1 directly or indirectly4 ,and although ,vedic works do not bring about their rewards immediately1 they may do so mediately1 viz4 by means of the so-called aprva4 ,this follows also from the form of the ,vedic injunctions1 such as ',he who is desirous of the heavenly world is to sacrifice4' ,as such injunctions enjoin sacrifices as the means of bringing about the object desired to be realised1 viz4 the heavenly world and the like1 there is no other way left than to assume that the result 7which is seen not to spring directly from the sacrifice7 is accomplished by the mediation of the aprva4 #dj4 ,but the former1 ,bdaryana 7thinks71 on account of the designation 7of deities7 as the cause4 ,the reverend ,bdaryana maintains the previously declared awarding of rewards by the ,supreme ,person since the scriptural texts referring to the different sacrifices declare that the deities only1 ,agni1 ,vyu1 and so on1 who are propitiated by the sacrifices--which are nothing else but means to propitiate deities--are the cause of the rewards attached to the sacrifices4 ,compare texts such as ',let him who is desirous of prosperity offer a white animal to ,vyu4 ,for ,vyu is the swiftest god4 ,the man thus approaches ,vyu with his proper share1 and ,vyu leads him to prosperity4' ,and the whole instruction which the texts give1 as to the means by which men desirous of certain results are to effect those results1 is required on account of the injunctions only1 and hence it cannot be doubted that it has reference to the injunctions4 ,the apparatus of means to bring about the results thus being learnt from the text only1 no person acquainted with the force of the means of proof will assent to that apparatus1 as stated by the text1 being set aside and an aprva about which the text says nothing being fancifully assumed4 ,and that the imperative verbal forms of the injunctions denote as the thing to be effected by the effort of the sacrificer1 only that which on the basis of the usage of language and grammatical science is recognised as the meaning of the root-element of such words as 'yajeta1' viz4 the sacrifice 7yga71 which consists in the propitiation of a divine being1 and not some additional supersensuous thing such as the aprva1 we have already proved above 7p4 #aec ff474 ,texts such as ',vyu is the swiftest god' teach that ,vyu and other deities are the bestowers of rewards4 ,and that it is fundamentally the highest ,self--as constituting the inner ,self of ,vyu and other deities--which is pleased by offerings1 and bestows rewards for them is declared by texts such as ',offerings and pious works1 all this he bears who is the nave of the ,universe4 ,he is ,agni and ,vyu1 he is ,sun and ,moon' 7,mahnr4 ,up4 ,i1 #f1 #g74 ,similarly in the antarymin-brhmana1 ',he who dwells in ,vyu1 of whom ,vyu is the body'2 ',he who dwells in ,agni1' c4 ,smriti expresses itself similarly1 ',whatsoever devotee wishes to worship with faith whatsoever divine form1 of him do ,i make that faith unshakable4 ,endued with such faith he endeavours to propitiate him and obtains from him his desires--those indeed being ordained by me' 7,bha4 ,g4 ,,vii1 #ba-bb72 ',for ,i am the enjoyer and the ,lord of all sacrifices' 7,,ix1 #bd7--where ,lord means him who bestows the reward for the sacrifices4 ',to the gods go the worshippers of the gods1 and those devoted to me go to me' 7,,vii1 #bc74 ,in ordinary life men1 by agriculture and the like1 acquire wealth in various forms1 and by means of this propitiate their king1 either directly or through his officials and servants2 and the king thereupon is seen to reward them in a manner corresponding to the measure of their services and presents4 ,the ,vednta-texts1 on the other hand1 give instruction on a subject which transcends the sphere of all the other means of knowledge1 viz4 the highest ,person who is free from all shadow even of imperfection1 and a treasure-house as it were of all exalted qualities in their highest state of perfection2 on sacrifices1 gifts1 oblations1 which are helpful towards the propitiation of that ,person2 on praise1 worship1 and meditation1 which directly propitiate him2 and on the rewards which he1 thus propitiated1 bestows1 viz4 temporal happiness and final ,release4--,here terminates the adhikarana of 'reward4' ,,third ,p,,da4 #a4 ,what is understood from all the ,vednta-texts 7is one71 on account of the non-difference of injunction and the rest4 ,the ,stras have stated whatever has to be stated to the end of rousing the desire of meditation-concluding with the fact that ,brahman bestows rewards4 ,next the question is introduced whether the vidys 7i4e4 the different forms of meditation on ,brahman which the ,vednta-texts enjoin7 are different or non-different1 on the decision of which question it will depend whether the qualities attributed to ,brahman in those vidys are to be comprised in one act of meditation or not4--,the first subordinate question arising here is whether one and the same meditation-- as e4g4 the vidy of ,vaisvnara--which is met with in the text of several skhs1 constitutes one vidy or several4--,the vidys are separate1 the ,prvapakshin maintains2 for the fact that the same matter is1 without difference1 imparted for a second time1 and moreover stands under a different heading--both which circumstances necessarily attend the text's being met with in different skhs--proves the difference of the two meditations4 ,it is for this reason only that a restrictive injunction1 such as the one conveyed in the text1 ',let a man tell this science of ,brahman to those only who have performed the rite of carrying fire on their head' 7,mu4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #b1 #aj7--which restricts the impaiting of knowledge to the tharvanikas1 to whom that rite is peculiar--has any sense2 for if the vidys were one1 then the rite mentioned1 which is a part of the vidy1 would be valid for the members of other skhs also1 and then the restriction enjoined by the text would have no meaning4-- ,this view is set aside by the ,stra1 ',what is understood from all the ,vednta-texts' is one and the same meditation1 'because there is non- difference of injunction and the rest4' ,by injunction is meant the injunction of special activities denoted by different verbal roots--such as upsta 'he should meditate1' vidyt 'he should know4' ,the and the rest' of the ,stra is meant to comprise as additional reasons the circumstances mentioned in the ,prva ,mmms-stras 7,,ii1 #d1 #i74 ,owing to all these circumstances1 non-difference of injunction and the rest1 the same vidy is recognised in other skhs also4 ,in the ,chandogya 7,v1 #ab1 #b7 as well as in the ,vjasaneyaka we meet with one and the same injunction 7viz4 ',he should meditate on ,vaisvnara'74 ,the form 7character1 rpa7 of the meditations also is the same1 for the form of a cognition solely depends on its object2 and the object is in both cases the same1 viz4 ,vaisvnara4 ,the name of the two vidys also is the same1 viz4 the knowledge of ,vaisvnara4 ,and both vidys are declared to have the same result1 viz4 attaining to ,brahman4 ,all these reasons establish the identity of vidys even in different skhs4--,the next ,stra refers to the reasons set forth for his view by the ,prvapakshin and refutes them4 #b4 ,if it be said 7that the vidys are not one7 on account of difference1 we deny this1 since even in one 7vidy there may be repetition74 ,if it be said that there is no oneness of vidy1 because the fact of the same matter being stated again without difference1 and being met with in a different chapter1 proves the object of injunction to be different2 we reply that even in one and the same vidy some matter may be repeated without any change1 and under a new heading 7in a different chapter72 if1 namely1 there is difference of cognising subjects4 ,where the cognising person is one only1 repetition of the same matter under a new heading can only be explained as meaning difference of object enjoined1 and hence separation of the two vidys4 ,but where the cognising persons are different 7and this of course is eminently so in the case of different skhs71 the double statement of one and the same matter explains itself as subserving the cognition of those different persons1 and hence does not imply difference of matter enjoined4--,the next ,stra refutes the argument founded on a rite enjoined in the ,mundaka4 #c4 ,for 7the sirovrata7 concerns the mode of the study of the ,veda2 also on account of 7that rite7 being a heading in the samkra2 and the restriction is like that of the libations4 ,what the text says as to a restriction connected with the 'vow of the head1' does not intimate a difference of vidys4 ,for that vow does not form part of the vidy4 ,the restriction refers only to a peculiarity of the study of the ,veda on the part of the tharvanikas1 being meant to establish that they should possess that special qualification which the rite produces2 but it does not affect the vidy itself4 ,this is proved by the subsequent clause1 'a man who has not performed that rite may not read the text1' which directly connects the rite with the studying of the text4 ,and it is further proved by the fact that in the book of the tharvanikas1 called 'smkara1' that rite is referred to as a rite connected with the ,veda 7not with the special vidy set forth in the ,mundaka71 viz4 in the passage1 'this is explained already by the ,veda- observance' 7which extends the details of the sirovrata1 there called veda-vrata1 to other observances74 ,by the knowledge of ,brahman 7referred to in the ,mundaka-text 'let a man tell this science of ,brahman to those only1' c471 we have therefore to understand knowledge of the ,veda in general4 ,and that restriction is 'like that of the libations'--i4 e4 it is analogous to the restriction under which the sava-libations1 beginning with the ,saptasrya-libation1 and terminating with the ,sataudana-libation1 are offered in the one fire which is used by the followers of the ,atharvan1 and not in the ordinary three fires4 #d4 ,scripture also declares this4 ,scripture also shows that 7identical7 meditation is what all the ,vednta- texts intimate4 ,the ,chndogya 7,,viii1 #a1 #a ff47 declares that that which is within the small space in the heart is to be enquired into1 and then in reply to the question what the thing to be enquired into is1 says that it is the highest ,self possessing the eight attributes1 freedom from all evil and the rest1 which is to be meditated upon within the heart4 ,and then the ,taittiriya-text1 referring to this declaration in the ,chndogya1 says1 ',therein is a small space1 free from all grief2 what is within that is to be meditated upon' 7,mahnr4 ,up4 ,x1 #bc71 and thus likewise enjoins meditation on the highest ,self possessing the eight qualities4 ,and this is possible only if1 owing to unity of vidya1 the qualities mentioned in the first text are included also in the meditation enjoined in the second text4--,having thus established the unity of meditations1 the ,stras proceed to state the practical effect of such unity4 #e4 7,meditation7 thus being equal1 there is combination 7of gunas72 on account of non-difference of purport in the case of what subserves injunction4 ,the meditation in all ,vednta-texts thus being the same1 the qualities mentioned in one text are to be combined with those mentioned in another2 'on account of non-difference of purport in the case of what subserves injunction4' ,we find that in connexion with certain injunctions of meditation--such as the meditation on ,vaisvnara1 or the small ether within the heart--the text of some individual ,vednta-book mentions certain secondary matters 7qualities1 guna7 which subserve that meditation2 and as these gunas are connected with the meditation they are to be comprised in it1 so that they may accomplish their aim1 i4e4 of subserving the meditation4 ,for the same reason therefore we have to enclose in the meditation gunas mentioned in other ,vednta-texts2 for being also connected with the meditation they subserve it in the same way4--,here terminates the adhikarana of 'what is intimated by all ,vednta-texts4 #f4 ,if it be said that there is difference on account of the text2 we say no2 on account of non-difference4 ,so far it has been shown that the non-difference of injunction1 and so on1 establishes the unity of meditations1 and that owing to the latter the special features of meditation enjoined in different texts have to be combined4 ,next1 an enquiry is entered upon whether in the case of certain particular meditations there actually exists1 or not1 that non- difference of injunction which is the cause of meditations being recognised as identical4 ,a meditation on the ,udgtha is enjoined in the text of the ,chandogas1 as well as in that of the ,vjasaneyins 7,ch4 ,up4 ,i1 #b2 ,bri4 ,up4 ,i1 #c72 and the question arises whether the two are to be viewed as one meditation or not4 ,the ,prvapakshin maintains the former alternative4 ,for1 he says1 there is no difference of injunction1 and so on1 since both texts enjoin as the object of meditation the ,udgtha viewed under the form of ,prna2 since there is the same reward promised in both places1 viz4 mastering of one's enemies2 since the form of meditation is the same1 the ,udgtha being in both cases viewed under the form of ,prna2 since the injunction is the same1 being conveyed in both cases by the same verbal root 7vid1 to know72 and since both meditations have the same technical name1 viz4 udgtha-vidy4 ,the ,stra states this view in the form of the refutation of an objection raised by the advocate of the final view4 ,we do not admit1 the objector says1 the unity maintained by you1 since the texts clearly show a difference of form4 ,the text of the ,vjasaneyins represents as the object of meditation that which is the agent in the act of singing out the ,udgtha2 while the text of the ,chandogas enjoins meditation on what is the object of the action of singing out 7i4 e4 the ,udgtha itself74 ,this discrepancy establishes difference in the character of the meditation1 and as this implies difference of the object enjoined1 the mere non- difference of injunction1 and so on1 is of no force1 and hence the two meditations are separate ones4--,this objection the ,prvapakshin impugns1 'on account of non-difference4' ,for both texts1 at the outset1 declare that the ,udgtha is the means to bring about the conquest of enemies 7,let us overcome the ,asuras at the sacrifices by means of the ,udgtha' 7,bri4 ,up472 ',the gods took the ,udgtha1 thinking they would with that overcome the ,asuras'--,ch4 ,up474 ,in order therefore not to stultify this common beginning1 we must assume that in the clause ',for them that breath sang out' 7,bri4 ,up471 the ,udgtha1 which really is the object of the action of singing1 is spoken of as the agent4 ,otherwise the term udgtha in the introductory passage 7'by means of the ,udgtha'7 would have to be taken as by implication denoting the agent 7while directly it indicates the instrument74--,hence there is oneness of the two vidys4-- ,of this view the next ,stra disposes4 #g4 ,or not1 on account of difference of subject-matter2 as in the case of the attribute of being higher than the high1 and so on4 ,there is no unity of the two vidys1 since the subject-matter of the two differs4 ,for the tale in the ,chndogya-text1 which begins 'when the ,devas and the ,asuras struggled together1' connects itself with the pranava 7the syllable ,om7 which is introduced as the object of meditation in ,chnd4 ,i1 #a1 #a1 ',let a man meditate on the syllable ,om as the ,udgtha'2 and the clause forming part of the tale1'they meditated on that chief breath as ,udgtha4' therefore refers to a meditation on the pranava which is a part only of the ,udgtha4 ,in the text of the ,vja- saneyins2 on the other hand1 there is nothing to correspond to the introductory passage which in the ,chndogya-text determines the subject- matter1 and the text clearly states that the meditation refers to the whole ,udgtha 7not only the pranava74 ,and this difference of leading subject-matter implies difference of matter enjoined1 and this again difference of the character of meditation1 and hence there is no unity of vidys4 ,thus the object of meditation for the ,chandogas is the pranava viewed under the form of ,prna2 while for the ,vjasaneyins it is the ,udgtri 7who sings the ,udgtha71 imaginatively identified with ,prna4 ,nor does there arise1 on this latter account1 a contradiction between the later and the earlier part of the story of the ,vjasaneyins4 ,for as a meditation on the ,udgtri necessarily extends to the ,udgtha1 which is the object of the activity of singing1 the latter also helps to bring about the result1 viz4 the mastering of enemies4--,there is thus no unity of vidy1 although there may be non-difference of injunction1 and so on4-- ',as in the case of the attribute of being higher than the high1' c4 ,in one and the same skh there are two meditations1 in each of which the highest ,self is enjoined to be viewed under the form of the pranava 7,ch4 ,up4 ,i1 #f2 ,i1 #i71 and in so far the two vidys are alike4 ,but while the former text enjoins that the pranava has to be viewed under the form of a golden man1 in the latter he has to be viewed as possessing the attributes of being higher than the high1 and owing to this difference of attributes the two meditations must be held separate 7a fortiori1 then1 those meditations are separate which have different objects of meditation74 #h4 ,if that be declared on account of name2 7we object1 since7 that is also 7where the objects of injunction differ74 ,if the oneness of the vidys be maintained on the ground that both have the same name1 viz4 udgtha-vidy1 we point out that oneness is found also where the objects enjoined are different4 ,the term agnihotra is applied equally to the permanent agnihotra and to that agnihotra which forms part of the sacrifice called ',kundapyinm ayanam'2 and the term udgtha is applied equally to the many different meditations described in the first prapthaka of the ,chndogya4 #i4 ,and 7this is7 appropriate1 on account of the extension4 ,since the pranava1 which is a part of the udgtha1 is introduced as the subject of meditation in the first prapthaka of the ,chndogya1 and extends over the later vidys also1 it is appropriate to assume that also in the clause 'the gods took the udgtha'--which stands in the middle--the term udgtha denotes the pranava4 ,expressions such as 'the cloth is burned' show that frequently the whole denotes the part4--,the conclusion from all this is that in the ,chndogya the object of meditation is constituted by the pranava--there termed udgtha--viewed under the form of prna2 while in the ,vjasaneyaka the term udgtha denotes the whole udgtha1 and the object of meditation is he who produces the udgtha1 i4e4 the udgtri1 viewed under the form of prna4 ,and this proves that the two vidys are separate4--,here terminates the adhikarana of 'difference4' #aj4 ,on account of non-difference of everything1 those elsewhere4 ,the ,chndogya and the ,vajasaneyaka alike record a meditation on ,prana2 the object of meditation being ,prana as possessing the qualities of being the oldest and the best1 and also as possessing certain other qualities such as being the richest1 and so on 7,ch4 ,up4 ,v1 #a2 ,bri4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #a74 ,in the text of the ,kaushtakins1 on the other hand1 there is a meditation on ,prna which mentions the former qualities 7'being the best' and 'being the oldest'71 but not the latter 7'being the richest1' and so on74 ,this1 the ,prvapakshin maintains1 constitutes a difference between the objects of meditation1 and hence between the meditations themselves4--,this view the ,stra sets aside 'on account of non- difference of everything1 those elsewhere4' ,there is no difference of meditation4 ,those qualities1 viz4 being the richest1 and so on1 are to be meditated upon in the other place also1 viz4 in the meditation on ,prna of the ,kaushtakins2 'since there is non-difference of everything1' i4e4 since the text of the ,kaushtakins also exhibits the very same method1 in all its details1 for proving what it is undertaken to prove1 viz4 that ,prna is the oldest and best4 ,and for that proof it is required that ,prna should be viewed as possessing also the quality of being the richest1 and so on1 and these qualities therefore have to be comprised in the meditation of the ,kaushtakins also4 ,hence there is no difference of meditation4--,here terminates the adhikarana of 'non- difference of everything4' ,in the same way as the meditation on ,prna as the oldest and best cannot be accomplished without ,prna being also meditated upon as the richest1 and so on1 and as hence these latter qualities have to be comprised in the meditation on ,prna of the ,kaushtakins1 although they are not expressly mentioned there2 thus those qualities of ,brahman also1 without which the meditation on ,brahman cannot be accomplished1 must be included in all meditations on ,brahman--this is the point to be proved next4 #aa4 ,bliss and other qualities1 as belonging to the subject of the qualities4 ,the point to be decided here is whether1 or not1 the essential qualities of ,brahman are to be included in all meditations on the highest ,brahman4-- ,since there is no valid reason for including in a meditation those qualities which are not expressly mentioned in the section containing that meditation1 only those qualities which are thus expressly mentioned should be included6--,this prim facie view is negatived by the ,stra4 ,the clause1 'on account of non-difference1' has to be carried on from the preceding ,stra4 ,as the 'subject of the qualities1' i4e4 ,brahman is the same in all meditations1 the qualities which do not exist apart from their subject1 viz4 bliss1 and so on1 are to be comprised in all meditations4--,but for the same reason then such qualities as 'having joy for its head' 7,taitt4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #e7 would also have to be included in all meditations on ,brahman6--,this the next ,stra negatives4 #ab4 ,such qualities as having joy for its head1 and so on1 are not established1 for if there were difference 7of members7 there would be increase and decrease4 ,the declaration that the essential qualities of ,brahman are established for all meditations1 does not imply that such attributes as 'having joy for its head' are equally established4 ,for the latter are not qualities of ,brahman1 since they are mere elements in a figurative representation of ,brahman under the form of an animal body4 ,otherwise1 i4e4 if ,brahman really possessed different members1 such as head1 wings1 and so on1 it would be liable to increase and decrease1 and this would be in conflict with texts such as 'the ,true1 knowledge1 infinite is ,brahman4'--,but if this reasoning holds good1 then all the infinite qualities belonging to ,brahman such as lordly power1 generosity1 compassion1 and so on--all of which are incapable of existing apart from the subject to which they belong-would have to be comprehended in all those meditations on ,brahman where they are not expressly mentioned2 and this could not possibly be done1 as those qualities are infinite in number4--,this difficulty the next ,stra removes4 #ac4 ,but the others1 on account of equality with the thing4 ,those other qualities which are 'equal to the thing1' i4 e4 which are attributes determining the essential character of the thing1 and therefore necessarily entering into the idea of the thing1 must be included in all meditations1 no less than the thing itself4 ,to this class belong qualities such as true being1 knowledge1 bliss1 purity1 infinity1 and so on4 ,for of ,brahman--which by texts such as 'that from which all these beings1' c4 had been suggested as the cause of the world--the essential definition is given in texts such as 'the ,true1 knowledge1 infinite is ,brahman'2 'bliss is ,brahman1' and others2 and hence1 in order that a true notion may be formed of ,brahman as the object of meditation1 such qualities as true being1 bliss1 and so on1 have to be included in all meditations on ,brahman4 ,such additional qualities1 on the other hand1 as e4g4 compassion1 which indeed cannot exist apart from the subject to which they belong1 but are not necessary elements of the idea of ,brahman1 are to be included in those meditations only where they are specially mentioned4 ,but1 an objection is raised1 if 'having joy for its head' and the like are not qualities of ,brahman1 but merely serve the purpose of a figurative representation of ,brahman1 for what purpose then is this representation introduced8 ,for if something is represented as something else1 there must be some motive for doing so4 ,where1 e4g4 the sacred text compares the meditating devotee to a charioteer1 its body and organs to a chariot1 and so on1 it does so for the purpose of assisting the subjection to the ,self of the means of meditation1 i4e4 the body1 the senses1 and so on4 ,but in the present case no such purpose is to be discerned1 and hence it must needs be admitted that having joy for its head1 and so on1 are real qualities of ,brahman4--,the next ,stra disposes of this difficulty4 #ad4 ,for meditation1 owing to the absence of purpose4 ,as no other purpose can be assigned1 the text must be supposed to represent ,brahman as having joy for its head1 and so on1 for the purpose of meditation4 ,in order to accomplish the meditation on ,brahman which is enjoined in the text 'he who knows 7i4e4 meditates on7 ,brahman reaches the ,highest1' the text represents the ,brahman consisting of bliss as made up of joy1 satisfaction1 c41 and compares these to the head1 the wings1 and so on4 ,the ,self of bliss1 which is the inmost of all the ,selfs mentioned in the text1 is by this means represented to the mind in a definite shape2 just as in the preceding sections the ,self of food1 the ,self of breath1 and the rest had similarly been represented in definite shapes1 consisting of head1 wings1 and so on4 ,as thus the qualities of having joy for its head1 c4 are merely secondary marks of the ,self of bliss1 they are not necessarily included in each meditation that involves the idea of that ,self4 #ae4 ,and on account of the term ',self4' ,that this is so further follows from the fact that in the clause 'different from this is the inner ,self consisting of bliss' the term ',self is used4 ,for as the ,self cannot really possess a head1 wings1 and tail1 its having joy for its head1 and so on1 can only be meant in a metaphorical sense1 for the sake of easier comprehension4--,but1 in the preceding sections1 the term ,self had been applied to what is not of the nature of ,self--the text speaking of the ,self of breath1 the ,self of mind1 and so on2 how then are we able to determine that in the phrase 'the ,self of bliss' the term ,self denotes a true ,self8--,to this the next ,stra replies4 #af4 ,there is reference to the ,self1 as in other places2 on account of the subsequent passage4 ,in the clause1'different from that is the ,self of bliss1' the term ,self can refer to the highest ,self only2 'as in other cases1' i4e4 as in other passages--'the ,self only was this in the beginning2 it thought1 let me send forth the worlds1' and similar ones--the term ',self denotes the highest ,self only4--,but whereby is this proved8--',by the subsequent passagel1 i4e4 by the passage1 'he desired1 may ,i be many1 may ,i grow forth1'--which refers to the ,self of bliss4 #ag4 ,if it be said 'on account of connexion'2 it may be so1 on account of ascertainment4 ,but as in the preceding sections the term ,self is seen to be connected with what is not of the nature of the ,self1 such as the ,self of breath1 and so on1 it is not possible to draw a valid conclusion from the subsequent passage6--,it is possible1 the ,stra replies1 'on account of ascertainment4' ,for the previous clause1 'from that ,self there originated the ,ether1' settles in the mind the idea of the highest ,self1 and that idea then is transferred in succession to the 7so-called7 ,self of breath1 the ,self of mind1 and so on1 until it finally finds rest in the ,self of bliss1 beyond which there is no other ,self2 while at the same time the subsequent clause 'he desired' confirms the idea of the highest ,self4 ,the term ,self thus connects itself from the beginning with things which are not true ,selfs1 because the highest ,self is as it were viewed in them4--,here terminates the adhikarana of 'bliss and the rest4' #ah4 ,the new 7thing is enjoined72 on account of the statement of what has to be done4 ,the ,stra discusses an additional question connected with the meditation on breath4 ,both texts--the ,chndogya as well as the ,vjasaneyaka-declare that water constitutes a dress for prana1 and refer to the rinsing of the mouth with water4 ,the doubt here arises whether what the texts mean to enjoin is the rinsing of the mouth1 or a meditation on prna as having water for its dress4--,the ,prvapakshin maintains the former view2 for1 he says1 the ,vjasaneyaka uses the injunctive form 'he is to rinse1' while there is no injunctive form referring to the meditation2 and what the text says in praise of the breath thus not being allowed to remain naked may be taken as a mere glorification of the act of rinsing4 ,and as ordinary rinsing of the mouth1 subsequent to eating1 is already established by ,smriti and custom1 we must conclude that the text means to enjoin rinsing of the mouth of a different kind1 viz4 as auxiliary to the meditation on prna4--,to this the ,stra replies that what the text enjoins is the new' thing1 i4e4 the previously non-established meditation on water as forming the dress of prna4 ',on account of the statement of what has to be done1' i4e4 on account of the statement of what is not established--for only on the latter condition ,scripture has a meaning4 ,the beginning as well as the end of the ,vjasaneyaka-text clearly refers to a meditation on the water used for rinsing as forming a dress for prna2 and as rinsing is already established by ,smriti and custom1 we naturally infer that what the text enjoins is a meditation on breath as having the water used in rinsing for its dress4 ,this also explains why the ,chndogya-text does not mention the rinsing at all1 but merely the clothing of breath with water4--,here terminates the adhikarana of 'the statement of what has to be done4' #ai4 ,and 7the qualities7 thus being equal1 on account of non-difference4 ,in the book of the ,vjasaneyaka1 called ,agnirahasya1 we meet with a meditation on ,brahman called ,sndilyavidy2 and there is also a ,sndilya- vidy in the ,brihadranyaka4 ,the ,prvapakshin holds that these two meditations are different since the latter text mentions qualities--such as ,brahman being the lord of all--which are not mentioned in the former2 the objects of meditation thus being different1 the meditations themselves are different4--,this the ,stra negatives4 ,the object of meditation is 'equal1' for both texts state the same qualities1 such as 'consisting of mind1' and so on2 and the additional qualities stated in the ,brihad-ranyaka1 such as the rulership of ,brahman1'do not differ' from those equally stated by both texts1 such as ,brahman realising all its purposes1 and so on4 ,thus the objects of meditation do not differ in character4--,here terminates the adhikarana of 'what is equal4' #bj4 ,on account of connexion1 thus elsewhere also4 ,in the ,brihad-ranyaka 7,v1 #e7 it is said that ,brahman is to be meditated upon as abiding within the orb of the sun and within the right eye2 and then the text mentions two secret names of ,brahman--aham and ahar4 ,here the ,prvapakshin holds that both these names are to be comprehended in each of the two meditations ',on account of connexion1' i4e4 on account of the object of meditation1 i4e4 ,brahman being one only1 although connected with different abodes1 it is 'thus elsewhere also1' i4 e4 the same conclusion which had been arrived at in the case of the ,sndilya-vidys1 has to be accepted with regard to ,brahman abiding in the sun and in the eye4 ,the meditation is one only1 and hence the two secret names apply to ,brahman in both its abodes4--,this view the next ,stra negatives4 #ba4 ,or not so1 on account of difference4 ,this is not so1 for as ,brahman is to be meditated upon in two different abodes1 the meditations are separate4 ,in both the ,sndilya-vidys1 on the other hand1 ,brahman is to be meditated upon as abiding within the heart4 #bb4 ,the text also declares this4 ,that the qualities of that which abides within the sun and that which abides in the eye are not to be combined1 the text itself moreover shows by specially stating that the characteristics of the one are those of the other4 ,for such a special transfer of qualities is needed only where the qualities are not of themselves established1 i4e4 where the two things are naturally different4--,here terminates the adhikarana of 'connexion1' #bc4 ,and for the same reason the holding together and the pervading the sky4 ,in the ,taittiriyaka and in the khilas of the ,rnyanyas we have the following passage3 ',gathered together are the powers among which ,brahman is the oldest2 ,brahman as the oldest in the beginning stretched out the sky4 ,brahman was born as the first of all beings2 who may rival that ,brahman8' which declares that ,brahman gathered together all the most ancient powers1 that it pervades the sky1 and so on4 ,and as these attributes are not stated in connexion with any special meditation1 we must infer that they are to be included in all meditations whatever on ,brahman4--,this prim facie view is controverted by the ,stra4 ,the holding together of all powers1 c41 although not mentioned in connexion with any special meditation1 is not to be included in all meditations whatever1 but to be connected with particular meditations 'on the same ground1' i4e4 according to difference of place4 ,where those qualities have to be included must be decided on the ground of feasibility4 ,the attribute of pervading the whole heaven cannot be included in a meditation on ,brahman as abiding within a small place such as the heart1 and hence the other attributes also which are stated together with the attribute mentioned cannot be included in those meditations4 ,and when we find that in meditations on ,brahman as abiding within a small place it is said that ,brahman is greater than the earth1 or that the ether within the heart is as great as the universal ether1 these attributes cannot be taken in their literal sense and hence included in those meditations1 but must be viewed as merely meant to glorify the object proposed for meditation4--,herewith terminates the adhikarana of 'holding together4' #bd4 ,and although 7they both be7 meditations on man2 on account of others not being recorded4 ,in the ,taittiriyaka as well as the ,chndogya we meet with a meditation on man 7purusha-vidy71 in which parts of the sacrifice are fancifully identified with the parts of the human body4--,here the ,prvapakshin maintains that these two meditations are identical2 for1 he says1 both meditations have the same name 7purusha-vidy71 and the same character as stated above2 and as the ,taittiryaka mentions no fruit of the meditation1 the fruit declared in the ,chndogya holds good for the ,taittiryaka also1 and thus there is no difference of fruit4--,this view the ,stra negatives4 ,although both meditations are meditations on man1 yet they are separate 'on account of the others not being recorded1' i4e4 on account of the qualities recorded in one skh not being recorded in the other4 ,for the ,taittiryaka mentions the three libations1 while the ,chndogya does not1 and so on4 ,the character of the two meditations thus differs4 ,and there is a difference of result also4 ,for an examination of the context in the ,taittiryaka shows that the purusha-vidy is merely a subordinate part of a meditation on ,brahman1 the fruit of which the text declares to be that the devotee reaches the greatness of ,brahman2 while the ,chndogya meditation is an independent one1 and has for its reward the attainment of long life4 ,the two meditations are thus separate1 and hence the details of one must not be included in the other4--,here terminates the adhikarana of 'the meditation on man4' #be4 ,on account of the difference of sense of piercing and so on4 ,the text of the tharvanikas exhibits at the beginning of their ,upanishad some mantras1 ',pierce the sukra1 pierce the heart4' ,the followers of the ,sma-veda read at the beginning of their rahasya- brhmana ',o ,god ,savitri1 promote the sacrifice4' ,the ,kthakas and the ,taittiryakas have ',may ,mitra be propitious to us1 may ,varuna be propitious4' ,the ,styyanins have ',thou art a white horse1 a tawny and a black one6' ,the ,kaushtakins have a ,brhmana referring to the ,mahavrata- ceremony1 ',indra having slain ,vritra became great4' ,the ,kaushtakins also have a ,mahvrata-brhmana4 ',prajpati is the year2 his ,self is that ,mahvrata4' ,the ,vjasaneyins have a ,brhmana referring to the ,pravargya1 ',the gods sat down for a sattra-celebration4' ,with reference to all this a doubt arises whether these mantras and the sacrificial works referred to in the ,brhmana texts form parts of the meditations enjoined in the ,upanishads or not4--,the ,prvapakshin affirms this1 on the ground that as the mantras and works are mentioned in the immediate neighbourhood of the meditations the idea of their forming parts of the latter naturally presents itself4 ,such mantras as 'pierce the heart' and works such as the pravargya may indeed--on the basis of direct statement 7sruti71 inferential mark 7linga71 and syntactical connexion 7vkya71 which are stronger than mere proximity--be understood to be connected with certain actions2 but1 on the other hand1 mantras such as ',may ,varuna be propitious' have no application elsewhere1 and are suitable introductions to meditations4 ,we therefore take them to be parts of the meditations1 and hence hold that those mantras are to be included in all meditations4--,this view the ,stra sets aside 'on account of the difference of sense of piercing1 and so on4' ,the inferential marks contained in texts such as 'pierce the sukra1 pierce the heart'2 ',i shall speak the right1 ,i shall speak the true1' show that the mantras have an application in connexion with certain magical practices1 or else the study of the ,veda1 and the like1 and do not therefore form part of meditations4 ,that is to say--in the same way as the mantra 'pierce the heart' enables us to infer that also the mantra 'pierce the sukra' belongs to some magical rite1 so we infer from the special meaning of mantras such as ',i shall speak the right1' c41 that also mantras such as ',may ,mitra be propitious' are connected with the study of the ,veda1 and do not therefore form part of meditations4 ,that mantras of this kind and ,brhmana passages relative to the ,pravargya and the like are placed at the beginning of ,upanishads is owing to their having1 like the latter1 to be studied in the forest4--,herewith terminates the adhikarana of 'piercing and the like4' #bf4 ,but in the case of the getting rid of 7it has to be combined with the obtaining71 as it is supplementary to statements of obtaining2 as in the case of the kusas1 the metres1 the praise1 and the singing4 ,this has been explained4 ,the ,chandogas read in their text ',shaking off all evil as a horse shakes his hair1 and shaking off the body as the moon frees herself from the mouth of ,rhu1 ,i obtain the world of ,brahman' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,viii1 #ac74 ,the tharvanikas have ',he who knows1 shaking off good and evil1 free from passion1 reaches the highest oneness4' ,the ,styyanins have ',his sons obtain his inheritance1 his friends the good1 his enemies the evil he has done4' ,the ,kaushtakins ',he shakes off his good and his evil deeds4 ,his beloved relatives obtain the good1 his unbeloved relatives the evil he has done4' ,two of these texts mention only the shaking off1 on the part of him who knows1 of his good and evil works2 one mentions only the obtainment of these works1 on the part of friends and enemies2 and one mentions both these occurrences4--,now both the occurrences1 although mentioned in several meditations1 must be considered elements of all meditations3 for whoever1 on the basis of a knowledge of ,brahman1 reaches ,brahman1 necessarily leaves behind all his good and evil works1 and those works unless thus left behind cannot be obtained by others4 ,meditation on those two matters therefore enters as an element into all meditations4 ,the doubtful point1 however1 is whether there is option between the meditation on the abandonment of works1 and that on the obtainment of works by others1 and that on both these events2 or whether in each case all these meditations are to be combined4--,there is option1 the ,prvapakshin holds2 for the reason that the texts make different declarations on this point4 ,for1 if the meditations had to be combined1 there would be in each case meditation on both the matters mentioned2 and as such double meditation is established by the ,kaushitakin text1 it would follow that the statements of the other texts are without meaning4 ,thus the only motive for the declarations made in different places can be to allow option4 ,nor must this conclusion be controverted on the ground that declarations of the same matter1 made in different places1 are made with reference to the difference of students severally reading the several texts2 for this holds good in those cases only where identical statements are made in different texts2 while in the case under discussion two skhs mention the abandonment of works1 and one their passing over to other persons4 ,nor can you account for the difference of statement on the ground of difference of vidys2 for you yourself maintain that the meditations in question form part of all meditations4--,this view the ,stra impugns1 'but where the getting rid of is mentioned1' c4 ,where a text mentions either the abandonment only of works or only their being obtained by others1 both these matters must necessarily be combined1 since the statement as to the works being obtained forms a supplement to the statement of their being abandoned4 ,for the former statement declares the place to which the good and evil works1 got rid of by him who knows ,brahman1 are transferred4--,this supplementary relation of two statements the ,stra illustrates by some parallel cases4 ,a clause in the text of the ,styyanins1 'the kusas are the children of the udumbara tree1' forms a defining supplement to a more general statement in the text of the ,kaushtakins1 'the kusas are the children of the tree4' ,the clause1 'the metres of the gods are prior1' defines the order of the metres which in other texts mentioning 'the metres of the gods and ,asuras' had been left undefined1 and therefore forms a supplement to those texts4 ,analogous is the relation of the clause1 'he assists the stotra of the shodasin when the sun has half risen1' to the less definite statement 'he assists with gold the stotra of the shodasin2' and the relation of the clause1 'the adhvaryu is not to sing1' to the general injunction 'all the priests join in the singing4' ,unless we admit that one statement1 which defines some other more general statement1 may stand to the latter in a supplementary relation1 we are driven to assume an optional proceeding1 and this is objectionable as long as there is any other way open2 according to a principle laid down in the ,prva ,mmms 7,x1 #h1 #ae74 ,as the clauses referring to the abandonment of the works1 and those referring to their being taken up by others1 thus form one connected whole1 there is no such thing as mere abandonment and mere taking up1 and hence there can be no option between the two4 ,that the text of the ,kaushtakins mentions both thus explains itself1 on the ground that the several declarations of what is really only one and the same matter are directed to different hearers4--,here terminates the adhikarana of 'getting rid of4' #bg4 ,at departing2 there being nothing to be reached4 ,for thus others 7also declare74 ,the further question arises whether the putting off of all good and evil deeds takes place only at the time when the soul leaves the body1 or also after it has departed and is on its journey to the world of ,brahman4 ,the ,prvapakshin holds the latter view1 for1 he says1 the texts declare both4 ,the ,kaushtakins say that the soul shakes off its good and evil deeds when it crosses the river ,viraj in the world of ,brahman2 while the ,tndins say ',shaking off all evil1 and shaking off the body1' c41 which shows that the deeds are shaken off at the time when the soul leaves the body4 ,and when the ,styyanaka says that 'his sons obtain his inheritance1 his friends his good deeds1' and so on1 this also intimates that the deeds are shaken off at the time when the soul leaves the body4 ,we therefore must conclude that a part of the deeds is left behind at the moment of death1 and the remainder on the journey to the world of ,brahman4--,this view the ,stra controverts4 ,all the good and evil deeds of the dying man are left behind1 without remainder1 at the time when the soul parts from the body4 ,for after the soul of him who knows has departed from the body1 'there is nothing to be reached1' i4e4 there are no further pleasures and pains to be enjoyed as the result of good and evil deeds1 different from the obtaining of ,brahman1 which is the fruit of knowledge4 ,thus others 'also declare that1 subsequently to the soul's departure from the body1 there is no enjoyment of any pain or pleasure different from the obtaining of ,brahman4 ',but when he is free of the body1 then neither pleasure nor pain touches him'2 ',thus does that serene being1 rising from this body1 appear in its own form as soon as it has approached the highest light' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,viii1 #ab1 #a2 #c72 ',for him there is delay only so long as he is not freed 7from the body72 then he will be perfect' 7,,vi1 #ad1 #b74 #bh4 ,as it is desired2 on account of there being no contradiction of either4 ,the time when good and evil deeds are left behind thus having been determined on the basis of the reason of the thing1 the several words of the passages must be construed as it is desired1 i4e4 so as not to contradict either1 i4e4 either the declaration of scripture or the reason of the thing4 ,thus in the text of the ,kaushtakins the later clause1 'he shakes off his good and evil deeds1' must be taken as coming before the earlier passage 'having entered on that path of the gods4'-- ,here the ,prvapakshin raises a new objection4 #bi4 ,there is meaning of the soul's going 7only7 on the twofold hypothesis2 for otherwise there is contradiction4 ,it is only on the hypothesis of a part of the good and evil works being left behind at the time of the soul's departure from the body1 and another part later on1 and the effacement of works thus taking place in a double way1 that a sense can be found in the scriptural declaration of the soul proceeding on the path of the gods4 ,for otherwise there would be a contradiction4 ,for if all the works perished at the time of the soul's departure from the body1 the subtle body also would perish1 and if this were so1 no going on the part of the mere ,self would be possible4 ,it is not therefore possible that at the time of the soul's departure from the body all works should perish without a remainder4--,to this the next ,stra replies4 #cj4 7,that assumption7 is justified2 on account of the perception of things which are marks of that2 as in ordinary experience4 ,the assumption of all the works perishing at the time of 'departure' involves no contradiction2 since we perceive1 in the sacred texts1 matters which are marks of connexion with a body even on the part of the soul which has divested itself of all its works and become manifest in its true nature4 ,compare ',having approached the highest light he manifests himself in his true form'2 ',he moves about there laughing1 playing1 and rejoicing'2 ',he becomes a self-ruler1 he moves about in all worlds according to his will'2 ',he becomes one1 he becomes three1' c4 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,viii1 #ab1 #c2 ,,vii1 #be1 #b2 #bf1 #b74 ,all these texts refer to the soul's connexion with a body4 ,the soul therefore1 joined to the subtle body1 may proceed on the path of the gods1 even after all its works have passed away4 ,but how can the subtle body persist1 when the works which originate it have passed away8 ,through the power of knowledge1 we reply4 ,knowledge does not indeed by itself originate the subtle body1 but it possesses the power of making that body persist1 even after the gross body--which is the instrument for the experience of all ordinary pains and pleasures--and all works have passed away1 so as thereby to make the soul capable of moving on the path of the gods1 and thus to obtain ,brahman which is the fruit of knowledge4 ',as in ordinary life4' ,as in ordinary life1 a tank1 which may have been made with a view to the irrigation of rice-fields and the like1 is maintained and used for the purpose of drawing drinking-water1 and so on1 even after the intentions which originally led to its being made have passed away4--,here an objection is raised4 ,it may be admitted1 that at the time when a man possessing true knowledge dies1 all his works pass away without a remainder1 and that the subtle body only remains1 enabling him to move towards ,brahman2 but it cannot be held that the soul in that state does not experience pain and pleasure2 for we know from sacred tradition that ,vasishtha1 ,avntara-tamas1 and others1 who had reached intuition of the highest truth1 entered after death on other embodiments1 and experienced pain and pleasure due to the birth of sons1 various calamities1 and so on4--,to this the next ,stra replies4 #ca4 ,of those who have a certain office there is subsistence 7of their works7 as long as the office lasts4 ,we do not maintain that all those who have reached true knowledge divest themselves at the time of death of all their good and evil works2 we limit our view to those who immediately after death attain to moving on the path1 the first stage of which is light4 ,persons like ,vasishtha1 on the other hand1 who are entrusted with certain offices1 do not immediately after death attain to moving on the path beginning with light1 since the duties undertaken by them are not completely accomplished4 ,in the case of beings of this kind1 who owing to particular deeds have been appointed to particular offices1 the effect of the works which gave rise to the office does not pass away before those offices are completely accomplished2 for the effect of a work is exhausted only through the complete enjoyment of its result4 ,in the case of those persons1 therefore1 the effects of the works which gave rise to their office continue to exist as long as the office itself1 and hence they do not after death enter on the path beginning with light4--,here terminates the adhikarana of 'passing away4' #cb4 ,there is no restriction 7since7 all 7have to go on that path74 7,thus7 there is non-contradiction of sacred text and ,smriti4 ,the question here is whether ,brahman is to be reached on the path of the gods by those only who take their stand on those meditations which1 like the ,upakosala-vidy1 describe that path1 or by all who practise any of the meditations on ,brahman4 ,the ,prvapakshin holds the former view1 since there is no proof to show that in other vidys the going on that path is not mentioned1 and since those other vidys-such as the texts 'and those who in the forest meditate on faith and austerities1'and' those who in the forest worship faith1 the ,true' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,v1 #aj1 #a2 ,bri4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #b1 #ae7--suggest to the mind the idea of the knowledge of ,brahman4 ,this the ,stra negatives4 ,there is no restriction to that limited class of devotees1 since all who carry on meditations have to go on that path4 ,for on this latter assumption only text and inference1 i4e4 scripture and authoritative tradition1 are not contradicted4 ,as to scripture1 the ,chndogya and the ,vjasaneyaka alike1 in the ,pakgni-vidy1 declare that all those who practise meditation go on that path4 ,in the ,vjasaneyaka the words 'who know this' refer to those who practise the meditation on the five fires1 while the following words 'those who in the forest meditate on faith and the ,true' refer to those who meditate on ,brahman2 and the text then goes on to say that all those devotees go to ,brahman1 on the path of the gods4 ,texts such as 'the ,true1 knowledge1 infinite is ,brahman1' and 'the ,true must be enquired into1' prove that the term 'the ,true' denotes ,brahman2 and as in the ,chndogya the term 'tapas' occurs in the corresponding place1 we conclude that both these terms1 viz4 the ,true and tapas1 denote nothing else but ,brahman4 ,meditation on ,brahman1 preceded by faith1 is mentioned elsewhere also2 in the text which begins ',the ,true must be enquired into' we read further on ',faith must be enquired into' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vii1 #ah1 #af2 #ai74 ,smriti also declares that all those who know ,brahman proceed on the path of the gods1 ',fire1 the light1 the day1 the bright fortnight1 the six months of the sun's northern progress--proceeding by that road those who know ,brahman go to ,brahman' 7,bha4 ,g4 ,,viii1 #bd74 ,and there are many other ,sruti and ,smriti passages of this kind4 ,the conclusion therefore is that the ,upakosalavidy and similar texts merely refer to that going of the soul which is common to all vidys4--,here terminates the adhikarana of 'non-restriction4' #cc4 ,but the conceptions of the ,imperishable are to be comprised 7in all meditations74 ,there being equality 7of the ,brahman to be meditated on7 and 7those conceptions7 existing 7in ,brahman72 as in the case of what belongs to the upasad4 ,this has been explained4 ,we read in the ,brihad-ranyaka 7,,iii1 #h1 #i71',o ,grg1 the ,brhmanas call that the ,akshara4 ,it is neither coarse nor fine1' and so on4 ,and in the ,atharvana 7,mu4 ,up4 ,i1 #a1 #e7 we have ',the higher knowledge is that by which the ,akshara is apprehended4 ,that which cannot be seen nor seized1' c4 ,the doubt here arises whether all the qualities there predicated of ,brahman--called akshara1 i4e4 the ,imperishable--and constituting something contrary in nature to the apparent world1 are to be included in all meditations on ,brahman1 or only those where the text specially mentions them4 ,the ,prvapakshin advocates the latter view2 for1 he says1 there is no authority for holding that the qualities which characterise one meditation are characteristic of other meditations also2 and such negative attributes as are mentioned in those two texts do not--as positive qualities such as bliss do--contribute to the apprehension of the true nature of ,brahman4 ,what those two texts do is merely to deny of ,brahman1 previously apprehended as having bliss1 and so on1 for its essential qualities1 certain qualities belonging to the empirical world1 such as grossness1 and so on2 for all negation must refer to an established basis4--,this view the ,stra refutes4 ,the ideas of absence of grossness1 and so on1 which are connected with ,brahman viewed as the ,akshara1 are to be included in all meditations on ,brahman4 ,for the imperishable 7akshara7 ,brahman is the same in all meditations1 and qualities such as non-grossness enter into the conception of its essential nature4 ,the apprehension of a thing means the apprehension of its specific character4 ,but mere bliss1 and so on1 does not suggest the specific character of ,brahman1 since those qualities belong also to the individual soul4 ,what is specifically characteristic of ,brahman is bliss1 and so on1 in so far as fundamentally opposed to all evil and imperfection4 ,the individual soul1 on the other hand1 although fundamentally free from evil1 yet is capable of connexion with evil4 ,now being fundamentally opposed to evil implies having a character the opposite of grossness and all similar qualities which belong to the empirical world1 material and mental4 ,he therefore who thinks of ,brahman must think of it as having for its essential nature bliss1 knowledge1 and so on1 in so far as distinguished by absence of grossness and the like1 and those qualities1 being no less essential than bliss1 and so on1 must therefore be included in all meditations on ,brahman4--,the ,stra gives an instance illustrating the principle that qualities 7secondary matters7 follow the principal matter to which they belong4 ,as the mantra ',agnir vai hotram vetu1' although given in the ,sma-veda1 yet has to be recited in the ,yajur-veda style1 with a subdued voice1 because it stands in a subordinate relation to the upasad-offerings prescribed for the four-days 'sacrifice called ,jamadagnya2 those offerings are the principal matter to which the subordinate matter--the mantra--has to conform4 ,this point is explained in the first section1 i4e4 in the ,prva ,mmms-stras ,,iii1 #c1 #i4--;,but this being admitted1 it would follow that as ,brahman is the principal matter in all meditations on ,brahman1 and secondary matters have to follow the principal matter1 also such qualities as 'doing all works1 enjoying all odours and the like1' which are mentioned in connexion with special meditations only1 would indiscriminately have to be included in all meditations4--,with reference to this the next ,stra says4 #cd4 ,so much2 on account of reflection4 ,only so much1 i4e4 only those qualities which have to be included in all meditations on ,brahman1 without which the essential special nature of ,brahman cannot be conceived1 i4e4 bliss1 knowledge1 and so on1 characterised by absence of grossness and the like4 ,other qualities1 such as doing all works and the like1 although indeed following their substrate1 are explicitly to be meditated on in special meditations only4-- ,here terminates the adhikarana of 'the idea of the ,imperishable4' #ce4 ,should it be said that 7the former reply refers7 to that ,self to which the aggregate of material things belongs 7since7 otherwise the difference 7of the two replies7 could not be accounted for2 we say--no2 as in the case of instruction ,in the ,brihad-aranyaka 7,,iii1 #d2 #e7 the same question is asked twice in succession 7',tell me the ,brahman which is visible1 not invisible1 the ,self who is within all'71 while ,yjavalkya gives a different answer to each 7',he who breathes in the upbreathing1' c42 ',he who overcomes hunger and thirst1' c474 ,the question here is whether the two meditations1 suggested by these sections1 are different or not4 ,they are different1 since the difference of reply effects a distinction between the two vidys4 ,the former reply declares him who is the maker of breathing forth1 and so on to be the inner ,self of all2 the latter describes him as free from hunger1 thirst1 and so on4 ,it thence appears that the former passage refers to the inner 7individual7 ,self which is different from body1 sense-organs1 internal organ and vital breath2 while the latter refers to that which again differs from the inner ,self1 viz4 the highest ,self1 free from hunger1 thirst1 and so on4 ,as the individual soul is inside the aggregate of material things1 it may be spoken of as being that inner ,self of all4 ,although this kind of inwardness is indeed only a relative one1 we nevertheless must accept it in this place2 for if1 desirous of taking this 'being the inner ,self of all' in its literal sense1 we assumed the highest ,self to be meant1 the difference of the two replies could not be accounted for4 ,the former reply evidently refers to the individual soul1 since the highest ,self cannot be conceived as breathing forth1 and so on2 and the latter reply1 which declares the ,self to be raised above hunger1 c41 evidently refers to the highest ,self4 ,this is expressed in the earlier part of the ,stra3 ',the former reply refers to the ,self to which there belongs the aggregate of material things1 i4e4 the individual soul as being the inner ,self of all2 otherwise we could not account for the difference of the two replies4'--,the last words of the ,stra negative this--'not so1' i4e4 there is no difference of vidys1 since both assertions and replies refer to the highest ,self4 ,the question says in both places1 'the ,brahman which is visible1 not invisible1 the ,self who is within all1' and this clearly refers to the highest ,self only4 ,we indeed observe that in some places the term ,brahman is1 in a derived sense1 applied to the individual soul also2 but the text under discussion1 for distinction's sake1 adds the qualification 'the ,brahman which is manifest' 7sksht74 ,the quality of 'aparokshatva' 7i4e4 being that which does not transcend the senses but lies openly revealed7 also1 which implies being connected with all space and all time1 suits ,brahman only1 which from texts such as 'the ,true1 knowledge1 infinite is ,brahman' is known to be infinite4 ,in the same way the attribute of being the inner ,self of all can belong to the highest ,self only1 which texts such as ',he who dwelling within the earth1' c41 declare to be the inner ruler of the universe4 ,the replies to the two questions likewise can refer to ,brahman only4 ,the unconditional causal agency with regard to breath1 declared in the clause 'he who breathes in the upbreathing1' c41 can belong to the highest ,self only1 not to the individual soul1 since the latter possesses no such causal power when in the state of deep sleep4 ,ushasta thereupon1 being not fully enlightened1 since causality with regard to breathing may in a sense be attributed to the individual soul also1 again asks a question1 in reply to which ,yjavalkya clearly indicates ,brahman1 ',thou mayest not see the seer of sight1' c41 i4e4 thou must not think that my previous speech has named as the causal agent of breathing the individual soul1 which is the causal agent with regard to those activities which depend on the sense-organs1 viz4 seeing1 hearing1 thinking1 and knowing2 for in the state of deep sleep1 swoon1 and so on1 the soul possesses no such power4 ,and moreover another text also--',who could breathe if that bliss existed not in the ether8' 7,taitt4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #g7--;declares that the highest ,self only is the cause of the breathing of all living beings4 ,in the same way the answer to the second question can refer to the highest ,self only1 which alone can be said to be raised above hunger1 thirst1 and so on4 ,for this reason also both replies wind up with the same phrase1 ',everything else is of evil4' ,the iteration of question and reply serves the purpose of showing that the same highest ,brahman which is the cause of all breathing is beyond all hunger1 thirst1 and so on4--,the ,stra subjoins a parallel instance4 ',as in the case of instruction4' ,as in the vidy of that which truly is 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #a ff471 question and reply are iterated several times1 in order to set forth the various greatness and glory of ,brahman4--,thus the two sections under discussion are of the same nature1 in so far as setting forth that the one ,brahman which is the inner ,self of all is the cause of all life and raised beyond all imperfections2 and hence they constitute one meditation only4--,to this a new objection is raised4 ,the two sections may indeed both refer to the highest ,brahman2 nevertheless there is a difference of meditation1 as according to the one ,brahman is to be meditated upon as the cause of all life1 and according to the other as raised above all defects2 this difference of character distinguishes the two meditations4 ,and further there is a difference of interrogators2 the first question being asked by ,ushasta1 the second by ,kahola4 #cf4 ,there is interchange 7of ideas71 for the texts distinguish2 as in other cases4 ,there is no difference of vidy because both questions and answers have one subject-matter1 and because the one word that possesses enjoining power proves the connexion of the two sections4 ,both questions have for their topic ,brahman viewed as the inner ,self of all2 and in the second question the word 'eva' 7'just1' 'very'7 in ',tell me just that ,brahman1' c41 proves that the question of ,kahola has for its subject the ,brahman1 to the qualities of which the question of ,ushasta had referred4 ,both answers again refer to the one ,brahman1 viewed as the ,self of all4 ,the idea of the injunction of the entire meditation again is suggested in the second section only1 ',therefore a ,brahmana1 after he has done with learning1 is to wish to stand by real strength4' ,the object of meditation being thus ascertained to be one1 there must be effected a mutual interchange of the ideas of ,ushasta and ,kahola1 i4e4 ,ushasta's conception of ,brahman being the cause of all life must be entertained by the interrogating ,kahola also2 and vice versa the conception of ,kahola as to ,brahman being beyond hunger1 thirst1 and so on1 must be entertained by ,ushasta also4 ,this interchange being made1 the difference of ,brahman1 the inner ,self of all1 from the individual soul is determined by both sections4 ,for this is the very object of ,yjavalkya's replies3 in order to intimate that the inner ,self of all is different from the individual soul1 they distinguish that ,self as the cause of all life and as raised above hunger1 thirst1 and so on4 ,hence ,brahman's being the inner ,self of all is the only quality that is the subject of meditation2 that it is the cause of life and so on are only means to prove its being such1 and are not therefore to be meditated on independently4--,but if this is so1 to what end must there be made an interchange1 on the part of the two interrogators1 of their respective ideas8--,brahman having1 on the ground of being the cause of all life1 been ascertained by ,ushasta as the inner ,self of all1 and different from the individual soul1 ,kahola renews the question1 thinking that the inner ,self of all must be viewed as different from the soul1 on the ground of some special attribute which cannot possibly belong to the soul2 and ,yjavalkya divining his thought thereon declares that the inner ,self possesses an attribute which cannot possibly belong to the soul1 viz4 being in essential opposition to all imperfection4 ,the interchange of ideas therefore has to be made for the purpose of establishing the idea of the individual nature of the object of meditation4--',as elsewhere1' i4 e4 as in the case of the knowledge of that which truly is1 the repeated questions and replies only serve to define one and the same ,brahman1 not to convey the idea of the object of meditation having to be meditated on under new aspects4--,but a new objection is raised--,as there is1 in the ,sad-vidy also1 a difference between the several questions and answers1 how is that vidy known to be one8--,to this question the next ,stra replies4 #cg4 ,for one and the same 7highest divinity71 called the 'truly being1' and so on 7is the subject of that meditation74 ,for the highest divinity1 called there that which is--which was introduced in the clause 'that divinity thought1' c4--is intimated by all the following sections of that chapter4 ,this is proved by the fact that the attributes--'that which truly is' and so on--which were mentioned in the first section and confirmed in the subsequent ones1 are finally summed up in the statement1 'in that all this has its ,self1 that is the ,true1 that is the ,self4' ,some interpreters construe the last two ,stras as constituting two adhikaranas4 ,the former ,stra1 they say1 teaches that the text1 ',i am thou1 thou art ,i1' enjoins a meditation on the soul and the highest ,self as interchangeable4 ,but as on the basis of texts such as ',all this is indeed ,brahman1' 'all this has its ,self in ,brahman1' ',thou art that1' the text quoted is as a matter of course understood to mean that there is one universal ,self1 the teaching which it is by those interpreters assumed to convey would be nothing new2 and their interpretation therefore must be rejected4 ,the point as to the oneness of the individual and the highest ,self will moreover be discussed under ,,iv1 ,i1 #c4 ,moreover1 there is no foundation for a special meditation on ,brahman as the individual soul and the individual soul as ,brahman1 apart from the meditation on the ,self of all being one4--,the second ,stra1 they say1 declares the oneness of the meditation on the ,true enjoined in the text1 'whosoever knows this great wonderful first-born as the ,true ,brahman' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,v1 #d71 and of the meditation enjoined in the subsequent passage 7,v1 #e4 #b71 ',now what is true1 that is the ditya1 the person that dwells in yonder orb1 and the person in the right eye4' ,but this also is untenable4 ,for the difference of abode mentioned in the latter passage 7viz4 the abode in the sun and in the eye7 establishes difference of vidy1 as already shown under ,s4 ,,iii1 #c1 #ba4 ,nor is it possible to assume that the two meditations comprised in the latter text which have a character of their own in so far as they view the ,true as embodied in syllables1 and so on1 and which are declared to be connected with a special result 7'he who knows this destroys evil and leaves it'71 should be identical with the one earlier meditation which has an independent character of its own and a result of its own 7'he conquers these worlds'74 ,nor can it be said that the declaration of a fruit in 'he destroys evil and leaves it' refers merely to the fruit 7not of the entire meditation but7 of a subordinate part of the meditation2 for there is nothing to prove this4 ,the proof certainly cannot be said to lie in the fact of the vidys being one2 for this would imply reasoning in a circle1 viz4 as follows--it being settled that the vidys are one1 it follows that the fruit of the former meditation only is the main one1 while the fruits of the two later meditations are subordinate ones2 and-- it being settled that those two later fruits are subordinate ones1 it follows that1 as thus there is no difference depending on connexion with fruits1 the two later meditations are one with the preceding one4--,all this proves that the two ,stras can be interpreted only in the way maintained by us4--,here terminates the adhikarana of 'being within4' #ch4 ,wishes and the rest1 here and there2 7as is known from the abode1 and so on74 ,we read in the ,chndogya 7,,viii1 ,i1 #a71 ',there is that city of ,brahman1 and in it the palace1 the small lotus1 and in it that small ether1' c42 and in the ,vjasaneyaka1 ',he is that great unborn ,self who consists of knowledge1' and so on4 ,a doubt here arises whether the two texts constitute one meditation or not4--,the two meditations are separate1 the ,prvapakshin maintains2 for they have different characters4 ,the ,chndogya represents as the object of meditation the ether as distinguished by eight different attributes1 viz4 freedom from all evil and the rest2 while1 according to the ,vjasaneyaka1 the being to be meditated on is he who dwells within that ether1 and is distinguished by attributes such as lordship1 and so on4--,to this we reply that the meditations are not distinct1 since there is no difference of character4 ,for desires and so on constitute that character 'here and there1' i4e4 in both texts nothing else but ,brahman distinguished by attributes1 such as having true wishes1 and so on1 forms the subject of meditation4 ,this is known 'from the abode and so on1' i4e4 the meditation is recognised as the same because in both texts ,brahman is referred to as abiding in the heart1 being a bridge1 and so on4 ,lordship and the rest1 which are stated in the ,vjasaneyaka1 are special aspects of the quality of being capable to realise all one's purposes1 which is one of the eight qualities declared in the ,chndogya1 and as such prove that all the attributes going together with that quality in the ,chndogya are valid for the ,vjasaneyaka also4 ,the character of the two vidys therefore does not differ4 ,the connexion with a reward also does not differ1 for it consists in both cases in attaining to ,brahman2 cp4 ,ch4 ,up4 ,,viii1 #ab1 #c ',having approached the highest light he is manifested in his own form1' and ,bri4 ,up4 ,v1 #d1 #bd ',he becomes indeed the fearless ,brahman4' ,that1 in the ,chndogya-text1 the term ether denotes the highest ,brahman1 has already been determined under ,i1 #c1 #ad4 ,as in the ,vjasaneyaka1 on the other hand1 he who abides in the ether is recognised as the highest ,self1 we infer that by the ether in which he abides must be understood the ether within the heart1 which in the text 'within there is a little hollow space 7sushira7' 7,mahnr4 ,up4 ,,xi1 #i7 is called sushira4 ,the two meditations are therefore one4 ,here an objection is raised4 ,it cannot be maintained that the attributes mentioned in the ,chndogya have to be combined with those stated in the ,vjasaneyaka 7lordship1 rulership1 c4 71 since even the latter are not truly valid for the meditation4 ,for the immediately preceding passage1 ',by the mind it is to be perceived that there is here no plurality3 from death to death goes he who sees here any plurality2 as one only is to be seen that eternal being1 not to be proved by any means of proof1' as well as the subsequent text1 'that ,self is to be described by ,no1 no1' shows that the ,brahman to be meditated upon is to be viewed as devoid of attributes2 and from this we infer that the attributes of lordship and so on1 no less than the qualities of grossness and the like1 have to be denied of ,brahman4 ,from this again we infer that in the ,chndogya also the attributes of satyakmatva and so on are not meant to be declared as ,brahman's true qualities4 ,all such qualities--as not being real qualities of ,brahman-- have therefore to be omitted in meditations aiming at final release4-- ,this objection the next ,stra disposes of4 #ci4 ,on account of emphasis there is non-omission4 ,attributes1 such as having the power of immediately realising one's purposes1 and so on1 which are not by other means known to constitute attributes of ,brahman1 and are in the two texts under discussion1 as well as in other texts1 emphatically declared to be attributes of ,brahman1 as constituting the object of meditations undertaken with a view to final release1 cannot be omitted from those meditations1 but must be comprised within them4 ,in the ,chndogya4 the passage1 ',those who depart from hence1 after having cognised the ,self and those self- realising desires1 move about at will in all those worlds1' enjoins the knowledge of ,brahman as distinguished by the power of realising its desires and similar qualities1 while the text1 ',those who depart from here not having cognised the ,self1 c41 do not move about at will1' c41 finds fault with the absence of such knowledge1 and in this way emphasises the importance of the possession of it4 ,in the same way the repeated declarations as to ,brahman's ruling power 7'the lord of all1 the king of all beings1' c47 show that stress is to be laid upon the quality indicated4 ,it truly cannot be held that ,scripture1 which in tender regard to man's welfare is superior to a thousand of parents1 should1 deceitfully1 give emphatic instruction as to certain qualities-- not known through any other means of knowledge--which fundamentally would be unreal and hence utterly to be disregarded1 and thus throw men desirous of release1 who as it is are utterly confused by the revolutions of the wheel of ,samsra1 into even deeper confusion and distress4 ,that the text1 'there is not any diversity here2 as one only is to be seen that eternal being1' teaches a unitary view of the world in so far as everything is an effect of ,brahman and thus has ,brahman for its ,self1 and negatives the view of plurality--established antecedently to ,vedic teaching--as excluding ,brahman's being the universal ,self1 we have explained before4 ,in the clause 'not so1 not so' the so refers back to the world as established by other means of proof1 and the clause thus declares that ,brahman who is the ,self of all is different in nature from the world4 ,this is confirmed by the subsequent passage1 ',he is incomprehensible1 for he is not comprehended1 he is undecaying1' c42 which means--as he is different in nature from what is comprehended by the other means of proof he is not grasped by those means2 as he is different from what suffers decay he does not decay1 and so on4 ,and analogously1 in the ,chandogya1 the text 'by the old age of the body he does not age' c4 first establishes ,brahman's being different in nature from everything else1 and then declares it to be satyakma1 and so on4-- ,but1 an objection is raised1 the text1 ',those who depart from hence1 having cognised the ,self and those true desires1 move about at will in all worlds4 ,thus he who desires the world of the fathers1' c41 really declares that the knowledge of ,brahman as possessing the power of immediately realising its wishes has for its fruit something lying within the sphere of transmigratory existence1 and from this we infer that for him who is desirous of release and of reaching ,brahman the object of meditation is not to be found in ,brahman in so far as possessing qualities4 ,the fruit of the highest knowledge is rather indicated in the passage1 ',having approached the highest light it manifests itself in its own form'2 and hence the power of realising its wishes and the rest are not to be included in the meditation of him who wishes to attain to ,brahman4--,to this objection the next ,stra replies4 #dj4 ,in the case of him who has approached 7,brahman72 just on that account1 this being declared by the text4 ,when the soul1 released from all bonds and manifesting itself in its true nature1 has approached1 i4e4 attained to ,brahman2 then just on that account1 i4e4 on account of such approach1 the text declares it to possess the power of moving about at will in all worlds4 ',having approached the highest light he manifests himself in his true form4 ,he is the highest ,person4 ,he moves about there laughing1 playing1' c4 ,this point will be proved in greater detail in the fourth adhyya4 ,meanwhile the conclusion is that such qualities as satyakmatva have to be included in the meditation of him also who is desirous of release2 for the possession of those qualities forms part of the experience of the released soul itself4--,here terminates the adhikarana of 'wishes and the rest' #da4 ,there is non-restriction of determination1 because this is seen2 for there is a separate fruit1 viz4 non-obstruction4 ,there are certain meditations connected with elements of sacrificial actions2 as e4g4 ',let a man meditate on the syllable ,om as udgtha4' ,these meditations are subordinate elements of the sacrificial acts with which they connect themselves through the udgtha and so on1 in the same way as the quality of being made of parna wood connects itself with the sacrifice through the ladle 7made of parna wood71 and are to be undertaken on that very account4 ,moreover the statement referring to these meditations1 viz4 'whatever he does with knowledge1 with faith1 with the ,upanishad1 that becomes more vigorous1' does not allow the assumption of a special fruit for these meditations 7apart from the fruit of the sacrificial performance72 while in the case of the ladle being made of parna wood the text mentions a special fruit 7'he whose ladle is made of parna wood does not hear an evil sound'74 ,the meditations in question are therefore necessarily to be connected with the particular sacrificial performances to which they belong4--,this view the ,stra refutes1 ',there is non-restriction with regard to the determinations4' ,by 'determination' we have here to understand the definite settling of the mind in a certain direction1 in other words1 meditation4 ,the meditations on the udgtha and so on are not definitely connected with the sacrificial performances2 'since that is seen1' i4e4 since the texts themselves declare that there is no such necessary connexion2 cp4 the text1 'therefore both perform the sacrificial work1 he who thus knows it 7i4 e4 who possesses the knowledge implied in the meditations on the sacrifice71 as well as he who does not know'--which declares that he also who does not know the meditations may perform the work4 ,were these meditations auxiliary elements of the works1 there could be no such absence of necessary connexion 7as declared in this text74 ,it thus being determined that they are not auxiliary elements1 a special result must be assigned to the injunction of meditation1 and this we find in the greater strength which is imparted to the sacrifice by the meditation1 and which is a result different from the result of the sacrifice itself4 ,the greater strength of the performance consists herein1 that its result is not impeded1 as it might be impeded1 by the result of some other performance of greater force4 ,this result1 viz4 absence of obstruction1 is something apart from the general result of the action1 such as the reaching of the heavenly world1 and so on4 ,this the ,stra means when saying1 'for separate is non-obstruction4' ,as thus those meditations also which refer to auxiliary members of sacrifices have their own results1 they may or may not be combined with the sacrifices1 according to wish4 ,their case is like that of the godohana vessel which1 with the view of obtaining a certain special result1 may be used instead of the kamasa4--,here terminates the adhikarana of 'non- restriction of determination4' #db4 ,just as in the case of the offerings4 ,this has been explained4 ,in the daharavidy 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,viii1 #a ff47 the text1 'those who depart having known here the ,self1 and those true desires1' declares at first a meditation on the small ether1 i4e4 the highest ,self1 and separately therefrom a meditation on its qualities1 viz4 true desires1 and so on4 ,the doubt here arises whether1 in the meditation on those qualities1 the meditation on the highest ,self--as that to which the qualities belong-- is to be repeated or not4--,it is not to be repeated1 the ,prvapakshin maintains2 for the highest ,self is just that which is constituted by the qualities--freedom from all evil1 and so on--and as that ,self so constituted can be comprised in one meditation1 there is no need of repeating the meditation on account of the qualities4--,this view the ,stra sets aside4 ,the meditation has to be repeated4 ,the highest ,self indeed is that being to which alone freedom from evil and the other qualities belong1 and it forms the object of the first meditation2 yet there is a difference between it as viewed in its essential being and as viewed as possessing those qualities2 and moreover1 the clause 'free from evil1 from old age1' c4 enjoins a meditation on the ,self as possessing those qualities4 ,it is therefore first to be meditated on in its essential nature1 and then there takes place a repetition of the meditation on it in order to bring in those special qualities4 ,the case is analogous to that of 'the offerings4' ,there is a text ',he is to offer a purodsa on eleven potsherds to ,indra the ruler1 to ,indra the supreme ruler1 to ,indra the self-ruler4' ,this injunction refers to one and the same ,indra1 possessing the qualities of rulership and so on2 but as1 through connexion with those several qualities1 the aspects of ,indra differ1 the oblation of the purodsa has to be repeated4 ,this is declared in the ,snkarshana1 ',the divinities are different on account of separation4'--,here terminates the adhikarana of 'offerings4' #dc4 ,on account of the plurality of indicatory marks2 for that 7proof7 is stronger4 ,this also is declared 7in the ,prva ,mmms74 ,the ,taittiryaka contains another daharavidy1 ',the thousand-headed god1 the all-eyed one1' c4 7,mahnr4 ,up4 ,,xi74 ,here the doubt arises whether this vidy1 as being one with the previously introduced vidy1 states qualities to be included in the meditation enjoined in that vidy1 or qualities to be included in the meditations on the highest ,self as enjoined in all the ,vednta-texts4--,the former is the case1 the ,prvapakshin holds1 on account of the leading subject-matter4 ,for in the preceding section 7,x7 the meditation on the small ether is introduced as the subject-matter4 ',there is the small lotus placed in the middle of the town 7of the body71 free from all evil1 the abode of the ,highest2 within that there is a small space1 free from sorrow--what is within that should be meditated upon' 7,mahnr4 ,up4 ,x1 #bc74 ,now1 as the lotus of the heart is mentioned only in section ,x1 the ',nryana-section' 7'the heart resembling the bud of a lotus1 with its point turned downwards1' ,,xi1 #f71 we conclude that that section also is concerned with the object of meditation to which the daharavidy refers4--,against this view the ,stra declares itself1 'on account of the majority of indicatory marks'2 i4e4 there are in the text several marks proving that that section is meant to declare characteristics of that which constitutes the object of meditation in all meditations on the highest being4 ,for that being which in those meditations is denoted as the ,imperishable1 ,siva1 ,sambhu4 the highest ,brahman1 the highest light1 the highest entity1 the highest ,self1 and so on1 is here referred to by the same names1 and then declared to be ,nryana4 ,there are thus several indications to prove that ,nryana is none other than that which is the object of meditation in all meditations on the ,highest1 viz4 ,brahman1 which has bliss and the rest for its qualities4 ,by 'linga' 7inferential mark7 we here understand clauses 7vkya7 which contain a specific indication2 for such clauses have1 according to the ,prva ,mmms1 greater proving power than leading subject-matter 7prakarana74 ,the argumentation that the clause 'the heart resembling the bud of a lotus flower1' c41 proves that section to stand in a dependent relation to the daharavidy1 is without force2 for it being proved by a stronger argument that the section refers to that which is the object of meditation in all meditations1 the clause mentioned may also be taken as declaring that in the daharavidy also the object of meditation is ,nryana4 ,nor must it be thought that the accusatives with which the section begins 7sahasrasirsham1 c47 are to be connected with the 'meditating' enjoined in the previous section2 for the 'meditating' is there enjoined by a gerundive form 7'tasmin yad antas tad upsitavyam'71 and with this the subsequent accusatives cannot be construed4 ,moreover1 the subsequent clause 7'all this is ,nryana1' c41 where the nominative case is used7 shows that those accusatives are to be taken in the sense of nominatives4--,here terminates the adhikarana of 'the plurality of indicatory marks4' #dd4 ,there is option with regard to what precedes 7i4e4 the altar made of bricks7 on account of subject-matter1 and hence there is action2 as in the case of the mnasa cup4 ,in the ,vjasaneyaka1 in the ,agnirahasya chapter1 there are references to certain altars built of mind1 'built of mind1 built of speech1' c4 ,the doubt here arises whether those structures of mind1 and so on1 which metaphorically are called fire-altars1 should be considered as being of the nature of action1 on account of their connexion with a performance which itself is of the nature of action2 or merely of the nature of meditation1 as being connected with an activity of the nature of meditation4 ,the ,stra maintains the former view4 ,since those things 'built of mind1 and so on1' are1 through being built 7or piled up71 constituted as fire-altars1 they demand a performance with which to connect themselves2 and as in immediate proximity to them no performance is enjoined1 and as the general subject-matter of the section is the fire-altar built of bricks--introduced by means of the clause ',non-being this was in the beginning'---which is invariably connected with a performance of the nature of outward action1 viz4 a certain sacrificial performance--we conclude that the altars built of mind1 c41 which the text mentions in connexion with the same subject-matter1 are themselves of the nature of action1 and as such can be used as alternatives for the altar built of bricks4 ,,footnote #ffh3a4 ,an analogous case is presented by the so-called mental cup4 ,on the tenth1 so-called avivkya1 day of the ,soma sacrifice extending over twelve days1 there takes place the mental offering of a ,soma cup1 all the rites connected with which are rehearsed in imagination only2 the offering of that cup is thus really of the nature of thought only1 but as it forms an auxiliary element in an actual outward sacrificial performance it itself assumes the character of an action4 ,,footnote #ffh3a4 ,so that for the actual outward construction of a brick altar there may optionally be substituted the merely mental construction of an imaginary altar4 #de4 ,and on account of the transfer4 ,that the altar built of thought is an optional substitute for the altar built of bricks1 and of the nature of an action1 appears therefrom also that the clause 'of these each one is as great as that previous one1' explicitly transfers to the altars of mind1 and so on1 the powers of the previous altar made of bricks4 ,all those altars thus having equal effects there is choice between them4 ,the altars of mind1 and so on1 therefore are auxiliary members of the sacrificial performance which they help to accomplish1 and hence themselves of the nature of action4-- ,against this view the next ,stra declares itself4 #df4 ,but it is a meditation only1 on account of assertion and what is seen4 ,the altars built of mind1 and so on1 are not of the nature of action1 but of meditation only1 i4e4 they belong to a performance which is of the nature of meditation only4 ,for this is what the text asserts1 viz4 in the clauses 'they are built of knowledge only1' and 'by knowledge they are built for him who thus knows4' ,as the energies of mind1 speech1 sight1 and so on1 cannot be piled up like bricks1 it is indeed a matter of course that the so-called altars constructed of mind1 and so on1 can be mental constructions only2 but the text in addition specially confirms this by declaring that those altars are elements in an activity of purely intellectual character1 and hence themselves mere creatures of the intellect4 ,moreover there is seen in the text a performance consisting of thought only to which those fires stand in a subsidiary relation1 'by the mind they were established on hearths1 by the mind they were built up1 by the mind the ,soma cups were drawn thereat2 by the mind they chanted1 and by the mind they recited2 whatever rite is performed at the sacrifice1 whatever sacrificial rite there is1 that1 as consisting of mind1 was performed by the mind only1 on those 7fire- altars7 composed of mind1 built up of mind4' ,from this declaration1 that whatever sacrificial rite is actually performed in the case of fire- altars built of bricks is performed mentally only in the case of altars built of mind1 it follows that the entire performance is a mental one only1 i4e4 an act of meditation4--,but1 an objection is raised1 as the entire passus regarding the altars of mind does not contain any word of injunctive power1 and as the text states no special result 7from which it appears to follow that the passus does not enjoin a new independent performance71 we must1 on the strength of the fact that the leading subject-matter is an actual sacrificial performance as suggested by the altars built of brick1 give up the idea that the altars built of mind1 c41 are mental only because connected with a performance of merely mental nature4--,this objection the next ,stra refutes4 #dg4 ,and on account of the greater strength of direct statement1 and so on1 there is no refutation4 ,the weaker means of proof1 constituted by so-called leading subject- matter1 cannot refute what is established by three stronger means of proof--direct statement1 inferential mark1 and syntactical connexion-- viz4 that there is an independent purely mental performance1 and that the altars made of mind are parts of the latter4 ,the direct statement is contained in the following passage1 ',those fire-altars indeed are built of knowledge1'--which is further explained in the subsequent passage1 'by knowledge alone these altars are built for him who knows this'--the sense of which is3 the structures of mind1 and so on1 are built in connexion with a performance which consists of knowledge 7i4e4 meditation74--,the inferential mark is contained in the passage1 ',for him all beings at all times build them1 even while he is asleep4' ,and the syntactical connexion 7vkya7 consists in the connexion of the two words evamvide 7for him who knows this71 and kinvanti 7they build7--the sense being3 for him who accomplishes the performance consisting of knowledge all beings at all times build those altars4 ,the proving power of the passage above referred to as containing an indicatory mark 7linga7 lies therein that a construction mentally performed at all times by all beings cannot possibly connect itself with a sacrificial performance through the brick-altar1 which is constructed by certain definite agents and on certain definite occasions only1 and must therefore be an element in a mental performance1 i4e4 a meditation4--,the next ,stra disposes of the objection that the text cannot possibly mean to enjoin a new mental performance1 apart from the actual performance1 because it contains no word of injunctive force and does not mention a special result4 #dh4 ,on account of connexions and the rest1 as in the case of the separateness of other cognitions4 ,and this is seen 7elsewhere also72 as declared 7in the ,prva ,mmms74 ,that the text enjoins a meditative performance different from the actual performance of which the brick-altar is a constituent element1 follows from the reasons proving separation1 viz4 the connexions4 i4e4 the things connected with the sacrifice1 such as the ,soma cups1 the hymns1 the recitations1 and so on4 ,what is meant is that the special mention of the cups1 and so on1 made in the passage 'by the mind the ,soma cups were drawn thereat1' proves the difference of the performance4--,the 'and the rest' of the ,stra comprises the previously stated arguments1 viz4 direct statement1 and so on4 ',as other meditations1' i4e4 the case is analogous to that of other meditations such as the meditation on the small ether within the heart1 which are likewise proved by textual statement1 and so on1 to be different and separate from actual outward sacrificial performances4--,the existence of a separate meditative act having thus been ascertained1 the requisite injunction has to be construed on the basis of the text as it stands4 ,such construction of injunctions on the basis of texts of arthavda character is seen in other places also2 the matter is discussed in ,p4 ,m4 ,stras ,,iii1 #e1 #ba4--,the result of the meditative performance follows from the passage 'of these 7altars made of mind1 and so on7 each is as great as that former one 7i4e4 the altar built of bricks7'--for this implies that the same result which the brick-altar accomplishes through the sacrifice of which it forms an element is also attained through the altars made of mind1 and so on1 through the meditations of which they form parts4--,the next ,stra disposes of the argumentation that1 as this formal transfer of the result of the brick-altar to the altars built of mind1 and so on1 shows the latter to possess the same virtues as the former1 we are bound to conclude that they also form constituent elements of an actual 7not merely meditative7 performance4 #di4 ,not so1 on account of this being observed on account of similarity also2 as in the case of ,death2 for 7the person in yonder orb7 does not occupy the worlds 7of ,death74 ,from a transfer or assimilation of this kind it does not necessarily follow that things of different operation are equal1 and that hence those altars of mind1 and so on1 must connect themselves with an actual outward performance4 ,for it is observed that such assimilation rests sometimes on a special point of resemblance only2 so in the text1 ',the person in yonder orb is ,death indeed1'--where the feature of resemblance is the destroying power of the two2 for the person within yonder orb does certainly not occupy the same worlds1 i4e4 the same place as ,death4 ,analogously1 in the case under discussion1 the fact that the altars made of mind are treated as1 in a certain respect1 equivalent to the altar built of bricks1 does not authorise us to connect those altars with the sacrificial performance to which the altar of bricks belongs4 ,when the text says that the altar made of mind is as great as the altar of bricks1 this only means that the same result which is attained through the brick- altar in connexion with its own sacrificial performance is also attained through the altar of mind in connexion with the meditational performance into which it enters4 #ej4 ,and by a subsequent 7,brhmana7 also the 'being of such a kind' of the word 7is proved74 ,but the connexion is on account of plurality4 ,the subsequent ,brhmana 7,sat4 ,br4 ,x1 #e1 #d7 also proves that the text treating of the altars made of mind1 and so on1 enjoins a meditation only4 ,for that ,brhmana 7which begins ',this brick-built fire-altar is this world2 the waters are its enclosing-stones1' c47 declares further on 'whosoever knows this thus comes to be that whole ,agni who is the space-filler1' and from this it appears that what is enjoined there is a meditation with a special result of its own4 ,and further on 7,x1 #f7 there is another meditation enjoined1 viz4 one on ,vaisvnara4 ,all this shows that the ,agnirahasya book 7,sat4 ,br4 ,x7 is not solely concerned with the injunction of outward sacrificial acts4--,but what then is the reason that such matters as the mental 7meditative7 construction of fire-altars which ought to be included in the ,brihad-ranyaka are included in the ,agnirahasya8--',that connexion is on account of plurality1' i4e4 the altars made of mind1 and so on1 are1 in the sacred text1 dealt with in proximity to the real altar made of bricks1 because so many details of the latter are mentally to be accomplished in the meditation4--,here terminates the adhikarana of 'option with the previous one4' #ea4 ,some1 on account of the existence of a ,self within a body4 ,in all meditations on the highest ,self the nature of the meditating subject has to be ascertained no less than the nature of the object of meditation and of the mode of meditation4 ,the question then arises whether the meditating ,self is to be viewed as the knowing1 doing1 and enjoying ,self1 subject to transmigration2 or as that ,self which ,prajpati describes 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,viii1 #a71 viz4 a ,self free from all sin and imperfection4--,some hold the former view1 on the ground that the meditating ,self is within a body4 ,for as long as the ,self dwells within a body1 it is a knower1 doer1 enjoyer1 and so on1 and it can bring about the result of its meditation only as viewed under that aspect4 ,a person who1 desirous of the heavenly world or a similar result1 enters on some sacrificial action may1 after he has reached that result1 possess characteristics different from those of a knowing1 doing1 and enjoying subject1 but those characteristics cannot be attributed to him as long as he is in the state of having to bring about the means of accomplishing those ends2 in the latter state he must be viewed as an ordinary agent1 and there it would be of no use to view him as something different4 ,and the same holds equally good with regard to a person engaged in meditation4--,but1 an objection is raised1 the text 'as the thought of a man is in this world1 so he will be when he has departed this life' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #ad1 #a7 does declare a difference 7between the agent engaged in sacrificial action1 and the meditating subject71 and from this it follows that the meditating ,self is to be conceived as having a nature free from all evil1 and so on4--,not so1 the ,prvapakshin replies2 for the clause1 'howsoever they meditate on him1' proves that that text refers to the equality of the object meditated upon 7not of the meditating subject74--,to this the next ,stra replies4 #eb4 ,but this is not so1 7but rather7 difference2 since it is of the being of that2 as in the case of intuition4 ,it is not true that the meditating subject must be conceived as having the ordinary characteristics of knowing1 acting1 c42 it rather possesses those characteristic properties--freedom from evil1 and so on-- which distinguish the state of ,release from the ,samsra state4 ,at the time of meditation the ,self of the devotee is of exactly the same nature as the released ,self4 ',for it is of the being of that1' i4e4 it attains the nature of that--as proved by the texts1 'as the thought of a man is in this world1 so he will be when he has departed1' and 'howsoever he meditate on him1 such he becomes himself4' ,nor can it be maintained that these texts refer only to meditation on the highest ,self 7without declaring anything as to the personal ,self of the devotee72 for the personal ,self constitutes the body of ,brahman which is the object of meditation1 and hence itself falls under the category of object of meditation4 ,the character of such meditation1 therefore1 is that it is a meditation on the highest ,self as having for its body the individual ,self1 distinguished by freedom from evil and the other qualities mentioned in the teaching of ,prajpati4 ,and hence the individual ,self is1 in such meditation1 to be conceived 7not as the ordinary ,self1 but7 under that form which it has to attain 7i4e4 the pure form which belongs to it in the state of ,release74 ',as in the case of intuition'--i4e4 as in the case of intuition of ,brahman4 ,as the intuition of ,brahman has for its object the essential nature of ,brahman1 so the intuition of the individual soul also has for its object its permanent essential nature4 ,in the case of sacrificial works the conception of the true nature of the ,self forms an auxiliary factor4 ,an injunction such as ',let him who is desirous of the heavenly world sacrifice1' enjoins the performance of the sacrifice to the end of a certain result being reached2 while the conception of the ,self as possessing characteristics such as being a knowing subject1 and so on--which are separate from the body--has the function of proving its qualification for works meant to effect results which will come about at some future time4 ,so much only 7i4e4 the mere cognition of the ,self as something different from the body7 is required for works 7as distinguished from meditations74--,here terminates the adhikarana of 'being in the body4' #ec4 ,but those 7meditations7 which are connected with members 7of sacrifices7 are not 7restricted7 to 7particular7 skhs1 but rather 7belong7 to all skhs4 ,there are certain meditations connected with certain constituent elements of sacrifices-as e4g4 ',let a man meditate on the syllable ,om 7as7 the ,udgtha '7,ch4 ,up4 ,i1 #a1 #a72 ',let a man meditate on the fivefold ,saman as the five worlds' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #b1 #a71 c4 ,the question here arises whether those meditations are restricted to the members of those skhs in whose texts they are mentioned2 or to be connected with the ,udgtha1 and so on1 in all skhs4 ,there is here a legitimate ground for doubt1 in so far as1 although the general agreement of all ,vednta-texts is established1 the ,udgtha1 and so on1 are different in each ,veda since the accents differ in the different ,vedas--,the ,prvapakshin declares that those meditations are limited each to its particular skh2 for1 he says1 the injunction ',let him meditate on the ,udgtha' does indeed1 verbally1 refer to the ,udgtha in general2 but as what stands nearest to this injunction is the special ,udgtha of the skh1 in whose text this injunction occurs1 and which shares the peculiarities of accent characteristic of that skh1 we decide that the meditation is enjoined on members of that skh only4--,the ,stra sets this opinion aside4 ,the injunction of meditations of this type is valid for all skhs1 since the text expressly connects them with the ,udgtha in general4 ,they therefore hold good wherever there is an ,udgtha4 ,the individual ,udgthas of the several skhs are indeed distinguished by different accentuation2 but the general statement1 ',let him meditate on the ,udgtha4' suggests to the mind not any particular ,udgtha1 but the ,udgtha in general1 and hence there is no reason to restrict the meditation to a particular skh4 ,from the principle moreover that all skhs teach the same doctrine1 it follows that the sacrifice enjoined in the different skhs is one only2 and hence there is no reason to hold that the ,udgtha suggested by the injunction of the meditation is a particular one4 ,for the ,udgtha is only an element in the sacrifice1 and the sacrifice is one and the same4 ,the meditations are not therefore limited to particular skhs4 #ed4 ,or there is no contradiction as in the case of mantras and the rest4 ,the 'or' here has the sense of 'and4' ,the 'and the rest' comprises generic characteristics1 qualities1 number1 similarity1 order of succession1 substances1 and actions4 ,as there is nothing contrary to reason in mantras and the rest1 although mentioned in the text of one skh only1 finding1 on the basis of such means of proof as direct statement1 and so on1 their application in all skhs1 since the sacrifice to which they belong is one and the same in all skhs2 so there is likewise no contradiction in the meditations under discussion being undertaken by members of all skhs4--,here terminates the adhikarana of 'what is connected with constituent elements of the sacrifice4' #ee4 ,there is pre-eminence of plenitude1 as in the case of the sacrifice2 for thus ,scripture shows4 ,the sacred text 7,ch4 ,up4 ,v1 #ab ff47 enjoins a meditation on ,vaisvnara1 the object of which is the highest ,self1 as having for its body the entire threefold world1 and for its limbs the heavenly world1 the sun1 the wind1 and so on4 ,the doubt here arises whether separate meditations have to be performed on the highest ,being in its separate aspects1 or in its aggregate as well as in its distributed aspect1 or in its aggregate aspect only4--,in its separate aspects1 the ,prvapakshin maintains2 since at the outset a meditation of that kind is declared4 ,for on the ,rishis in succession telling ,asvapati the objects of their meditation1 viz4 the sky1 the sun1 and so on1 ,asvapati explains to them that these meditations refer to the head1 eye1 and so on1 of the highest ,being1 and mentions for each of these meditations a special fruit4 ,and the concluding explanation 'he who worships ,vaisvnara as a span long1 c41' is merely meant to gather up into one1 as it were1 the preceding meditations on the parts of ,vaisvnara4--,another ,prvapakshin holds that this very concluding passage enjoins a further meditation on ,vaisvnara in his collective aspect1 in addition to the previously enjoined meditations on his limbs2 for that passage states a separate result1 'he eats food in all worlds1' c4 ,nor does this destroy the unity of the whole section4 ,the case is analogous to that of the meditation on 'plenitude' 7bhman2 ,ch4 ,up4 ,,vii1 #bc74 ,there1 in the beginning1 separate meditations are enjoined on name1 and so on1 with special results of their own2 and after that a meditation is enjoined on bhman1 with a result of its own1 ',he becomes a ,self-ruler1' c4 ,the entire section really refers to the meditation on bhman2 but all the same there are admitted subordinate meditations on name1 and so on1 and a special result for each4--,these views are set aside by the ,stra1 ',there is pre-eminence of plenitude1' i4e4 there is reason to assume that ,vaisvnara in his fulness1 i4e4 in his collective aspect1 is meant2 since we apprehend unity of the entire section4 ,from the beginning of the section it is manifest that what the ,rishis desire to know is the ,vaisnara ,self2 it is that ,self which ,asvapati expounds to them as having the ,universe for his body1 and in agreement therewith the last clause of his teaching intimates that the intuition of ,brahman 7which is none other than the ,vaisvnara ,self7--which is there characterised as the food of all worlds1 all beings1 all ,selfs--is the fruit of the meditation on ,vaisvnara4 ,this summing up proves the whole section to deal with the same subject4 ,and on the basis of this knowledge we determine that what the text says as to meditations on the separate members of the ,vaisnara ,self and their special results is merely of the nature of explanatory comment 7anuvda7 on parts of the meditation on the collective ,self4--,this decision is arrived at as in the case of the sacrifice4 ,for to the injunction of certain sacrifices--such as ',let a man1 on the birth of a son1 offer a cake on twelve potsherds to ,vaisvnara'--the text similarly adds remarks on parts of the oblation1 'there is an oblation on eight potsherds1' and so on4--,the meditation therefore has to be performed on the entire ,vaisvnara ,self only1 not on its parts4 ,this1 moreover1 ,scripture itself intimates1 in so far1 namely1 as declaring the evil consequences of meditation on parts of the ,self only1 'your head would have fallen off if you had not come to me'2 'you would have become blind1' and so on4 ,this also shows that the reference to the text enjoining meditations on name1 c41 proves nothing as to our passage4 ,for there the text says nothing as to disadvantages connected with those special meditations2 it only says that the meditation on plenitude 7bhman7 has a more excellent result4 ,the section1 therefore1 although really concerned with enjoining the meditation on the bhman1 at the same time means to declare that the special meditations also are fruitful2 otherwise the meditation on the bhman could not be recommended1 for the reason that it has a more excellent result than the preceding meditations4--,the conclusion1 therefore1 is that the text enjoins a meditation on the collective ,vaisvnara ,self only4--,here terminates the adhikarana of 'the pre-eminence of plenitude4' #ef4 7,the meditations are7 separate1 on account of the difference of words1 and so on4 ,the instances coming under this head of discussion are all those meditations on ,brahman which have for their only result final ,release1 which consists in attaining to ,brahman--such as the meditation on that which is1 the meditation on the bhman1 the meditation on the small space within the heart1 the ,upakosala meditation1 the ,sndilya meditation1 the meditation on ,vaisvnara1 the meditation on the ,self of bliss1 the meditation on the ,imperishable1 and others--whether they be recorded in one skh only or in several skhs4 ,to a different category belong those meditations which have a special object such as ,prna1 and a special result4--,the doubt here arises whether the meditations of the former class are all to be considered as identical1 or as separate--,the ,prvapakshin holds that they are all one2 for1 he says1 they all have one and the same object of meditation1 viz4 ,brahman4 ,for the nature of all cognition depends on the object cognised2 and the nature of the meditations thus being one1 the meditations themselves are one4--,this view the ,stra controverts4 ,the meditations are different1 on account of the difference of terms and the rest4 ,the 'and the rest' comprises repetition 7abhysa71 number 7samkhy71 quality 7guna71 subject-matter 7prakriy71 and name 7nmadheya2 cp4 ,p4 ,m4 ,s4 ,,ii1 #b1 #a ff474 ,we meet in those meditations with difference of connexion1 expressing itself in difference of words1 and so on2 which causes difference on the part of the meditations enjoined4 ,the terms enjoining meditation1 'he knows1' 'he is to meditate' 7veda2 upsta71 and so on1 do indeed all of them denote a certain continuity of cognition1 and all these cognitions have for their object ,brahman only1 but all the same those cognitions differ in so far as they have for their object ,brahman1 as variously qualified by special characteristics mentioned in the meditation2 in one meditation he is spoken of as the sole cause of the world1 in another as free from all evil1 and so on4 ,we therefore arrive at the decision that clauses which describe special forms of meditation having for their result the attainment to ,brahman1 and are complete in themselves1 convey the idea of separate independent meditations1 and thus effect separation of the vidys4 ,this entire question was indeed already decided in the ,prva ,mimmsa-stras 7,,ii1 #b1 #a71 but it is here argued again to the end of dispelling the mistaken notion that the ,vednta-texts aim at knowledge only1 and not at the injunction of activities such as meditation4 ,the meditations1 therefore1 are separate ones4--,here terminates the adhikarana of 'difference of words and the rest4' #eg4 ,option1 on account of the non-difference of result4 ,it has been proved that the meditation on that which truly is1 the meditation on the small ether within the heart1 and so on--all of which have for their result the attainment to ,brahman--are separate meditations4 ,the question now arises whether all these meditations should be combined by each meditating devotee1 on account of such combination being useful to him2 or whether1 in the absence of any use of such combination1 they should be undertaken optionally4--,they may be combined1 the ,prvapakshin holds2 since it is observed that different scriptural matters are combined even when having one and the same result4 ,the ,agnihotra1 the ,daisaprnamsa oblation1 and other sacrifices1 all of them have one and the same result1 viz4 the possession of the heavenly world2 nevertheless1 one and the same agent performs them all1 with a view to the greater fulness of the heavenly bliss aimed at4 ,so the different meditations on ,brahman also may be cumulated with a view to greater fulness of intuition of ,brahman4--,this view the ,stra rejects4 ,option only between the several meditations is possible1 on account of the non-difference of result4 ,for to all meditations on ,brahman alike ,scripture assigns one and the same result1 viz4 intuitive knowledge of ,brahman1 which is of the nature of supreme1 unsurpassable bliss4 ',he who knows ,brahman attains the ,highest' 7,taitt4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #a1 #a71 c4 ,the intuitive knowledge of ,brahman constitutes supreme1 unsurpassable bliss2 and if such intuition may be reached through one meditation1 of what use could other meditations be8 ,the heavenly world is something limited in respect of place1 time1 and essential nature1 and hence a person desirous of attaining to it may cumulate works in order to take possession of it to a greater extent1 and so on4 ,but an analogous proceeding cannot be resorted to with regard to ,brahman1 which is unlimited in every sense4 ,all meditations on ,brahman tend to dispel ,nescience1 which stands in the way of the intuition of ,brahman1 and thus equally have for their result the attaining to ,brahman2 and hence there is option between them4 ,in the case1 on the other hand1 of those meditations which aim at other results than ,brahman1 there may either be choice between the several meditations1 or they may be cumulated--as one may also do in the case of sacrifices aiming at the attainment of the heavenly world2--for as those results are not of an infinite nature one may aim at realising them in a higher degree4 ,this the next ,stra declares4 #eh4 ,but meditations aiming at objects of desire may1 according to one's liking1 be cumulated or not2 on account of the absence of the former reason4 ,the last clause means--on account of their results not being of an infinite nature4--,here terminates the adhikarana of 'option4' #ei4 ,they belong to the constituent members1 as the bases4 ,a doubt arises whether meditations such as the one enjoined in the text1 ',let him meditate on the syllable ,om as the ,udgtha1' which are connected with constituent elements of the sacrifice such as the ,udgtha1 contribute towards the accomplishment of the sacrifice1 and hence must be performed at the sacrifice as part of it2 or whether they1 like the godohana vessel1 benefit the agent apart from the sacrifice1 and therefore may be undertaken according to desire4--,but has it not been already decided under ,,iii1 #c1 #db that those meditations are generally beneficial to man1 and not therefore restricted to the sacrifices8--,true2 it is just for the purpose of further confirming that conclusion that objections are now raised against it on the ground of some inferential marks 7linga7 and reasoning4 ,for there it was maintained on the strength of the text 'therefore he does both' that those meditations have results independent of the sacrifice4 ,but there are several reasons favouring the view that those meditations must be connected with the sacrifices as subordinate members1 just as the ,udgtha and the rest to which the meditations refer4 ,their case is by no means analogous to that of the godohana vessel1 for1 while in the case of the latter1 the text expressly declares the existence of a special result1 ',for him who is desirous of cattle he is to bring water in a godohana1' the texts enjoining those meditations do not state special results for them4 ,for clauses such as 'he is to meditate on the ,udgtha' intimate only that the ,udgtha is connected with the meditation2 while their connexion with certain results is known from other clauses1 such as 'whatever he does with knowledge1 with faith1 with the ,upanishad1 that is more vigorous' 7according to which the result of such meditations is only to strengthen the result of the sacrifices74 ,and when a meditation of this kind has1 on the ground of its connexion with the ,udgtha or the like--which themselves are invariably connected with sacrifices--been cognised to form an element of a sacrifice1 some other passage which may declare a fruit for that meditation can only be taken as an arthavda2 just as the passage which declares that he whose sacrificial ladle is made of parna wood does not hear an evil sound4 ,in the same way1 therefore1 as the ,udgtha and so on1 which are the bases of those meditations1 are to be employed only as constituent parts of the sacrifices1 so the meditations also connected with those constituent parts are themselves to be employed as constituent parts of the sacrifices only4 #fj4 ,and on account of injunction4 ,the above conclusion is further confirmed by the fact of injunction1 i4e4 thereby that clauses such as 'he is to meditate on the ,udgtha' enjoin the meditation as standing to the ,udgtha in the relation of a subordinate member4 ,injunctions of this kind differ from injunctions such as 'he is to bring water in the godohana vessel for him who desires cattle'2 for the latter state a special qualification on the part of him who performs the action1 while the former do not1 and hence cannot claim independence4 #fa4 ,on account of rectification4 ,the text 'from the seat of the ,hotri he sets right the wrong ,udgha' shows that the meditation is necessarily required for the purpose of correcting whatever mistake may be made in the ,udgtha4 ,this also proves that the meditation is an integral part of the sacrificial performance4 #fb4 ,and on account of the declaration of a quality being common 7to all the ,vedas74 ,the text ',by means of that syllable the threefold knowledge proceeds4 ,with ,om the ,adhvaryu gives orders1 with ,om the ,hotri recites1 with ,om the ,udgtri sings1' which declares the pranava--which is a 'quality' of the meditation1 in so far as it is its basis--to be common to the three ,vedas1 further shows that the meditation has to be employed in connexion with the sacrifice4 ,for the meditation is connected with the ,udgtha1 and the ,udgitha is an integral part of all sacrificial performances whatever4 ,of the prim facie view thus far set forth the next ,stra disposes4 #fc4 ,rather not1 as the text does not declare their going together4 ,it is not true that the meditations on the ,udgtha and the rest are bound to the sacrifices in the same way as the ,udgtha1 and so on1 themselves are2 for ,scripture does not declare that they go together with1 i4e4 are subordinate constituents of the ,udgtha1 and so on4 ,the clause ',let him meditate on the ,udgtha' does not indeed itself state another qualification on the part of the agent 7i4e4 does not state that the agent in entering on the meditation is prompted by a motive other than the one prompting the sacrifice72 but the subsequent clause1 'whatever he does with knowledge1 with faith1 with the ,upanishad1 that becomes more vigorous1' intimates that knowledge is the means to render the sacrificial work more efficacious1 and from this it follows that the meditation is enjoined as a means towards effecting a result other than the result of the sacrifice4 ,and hence the meditation cannot be viewed as a subordinate member of the ,udgtha1 which itself is a subordinate member of the sacrifice4 ,it rather has the ,udgtha for its basis only4 ,he only indeed who is qualified for the sacrifice is qualified for the meditation1 since the latter aims at greater efficaciousness of the sacrifice2 but this does not imply that the meditation necessarily goes with the sacrifice4 ,by the greater vigour of the sacrifice is meant its non-obstruction by some other sacrificial work of greater strength1 its producing its effect without any delay4--,the case of a statement such as 'he whose ladle is of parna wood hears no evil sound' is different4 ,there the text does not declare that the quality of consisting of parna wood is the direct means of bringing about the result of no evil sound being heard2 hence there is no valid reason why that quality should not be subordinate to the ladle1 which itself is subordinate to the sacrifice2 and as it is not legitimate to assume for the mere subordinate constituents of a sacrifice special fruits 7other than the general fruit of the sacrifice71 the declaration as to no evil sound being heard is to be viewed as a mere arthavda 7i4e4 a mere additional statement meant further to glorify the result of the sacrifice--of which the ladle made of parna wood is a subordinate instrument74 #fd4 ,and because 7,scripture7 shows it4 ,a scriptural text1 moreover1 shows that the meditation is necessary for1 and restricted to1 the sacrificial performance4 ,for the text ',a ,brahman priest who knows this saves the sacrifice1 the sacrificer1 and all the officiating priests'--which declares that all priests are saved through the knowledge of the ,brahman--has sense only on the understanding that that knowledge is not restricted to the ,udjtri1 and so on 7i4e4 not to those priests who are engaged in carrying out the details of the sacrifices which are the 'bases' of the meditations74--,the conclusion1 therefore1 is that those meditations are not restricted to the sacrifices1 subordinate members of which serve as their 'bases4'--,this terminates the adhikarana of 'like the bases4' ,,fourth ,p,,da4 #a4 ,the benefit to man results from thence1 on account of scriptural statement2 thus ,bdaryana thinks4 ,we have concluded the investigation into the oneness or diverseness of meditations--the result of which is to indicate in which cases the special points mentioned in several meditations have to be combined1 and in which not4 ,a further point now to be investigated is whether that advantage to the meditating devotee1 which is held to accrue to him from the meditation1 results from the meditation directly1 or from works of which the meditations are subordinate members4--,the ,reverend ,bdaryana holds the former view4 ,the benefit to man results from thence1 i4e4 from the meditation1 because ,scripture declares this to be so4 ',he who knows ,brahman reaches the ,highest' 7,taitt4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #a1 #a72 ',i know that great ,person of sun-like lustre beyond the darkness4 ,a man who knows him truly passes over death2 there is no other path to go' 7,svet4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #h72 ',as the flowing rivers disappear in the sea1 losing their name and their form1 thus a man who possesses knowledge1 freed from name and form1 goes to the divine ,person who is greater than the great' 7,mu4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #b1 #h74-- ,against this view the ,prvapakshin raises an objection4 #b4 ,on account of 7the ,self7 standing in a complementary relation1 they are arthavdas1 as in other cases2 thus ,jaimini opines4 ,what has been said as to ,scripture intimating that a beneficial result is realised through the meditations by themselves is untenable4 ,for texts such as 'he who knows ,brahman reaches the ,highest' do not teach that the highest aim of man is attained through knowledge2 their purport rather is to inculcate knowledge of ,truth on the part of a ,self which is the agent in works prescribed4 ,knowledge1 therefore1 stands in a complementary relation to sacrificial works1 in so far as it imparts to the acting ,self a certain mystic purification2 and the texts which declare special results of knowledge1 therefore1 must be taken as mere arthavdas4 ',as in the case of other things2 so ,jaimini thinks1' i4e4 as ,jaimini holds that in the case of substances1 qualities1 and so on1 the scriptural declaration of results is of the nature of arthavda4--,but it has been shown before that the ,vednta-texts represent as the object to be attained1 by those desirous of ,release1 on the basis of the knowledge imparted by them1 something different from the individual ,self engaged in action2 cp4 on this point ,s4 ,i1 #a1 #ae2 ,i1 #c1 #e2 ,i1 #b1 #c2 ,i1 #c1 #ah4 ,and ,s4 ,,ii1 #a1 #bb and others have refuted the view that ,brahman is to be considered as non-different from the personal soul1 because in texts such as 'thou art that' it is exhibited in co-ordination with the latter4 ,and other ,stras have proved that ,brahman must1 on the basis of numerous scriptural texts1 be recognised as the inner ,self of all things material and immaterial4 ,how then can it be said that the ,vednta-texts merely mean to give instruction as to the true nature of the active individual soul1 and that hence all meditation is merely subservient to sacrificial works8--,on the strength of numerous inferential marks1 the ,prvapakshin replies1 which prove that in the ,vednta-texts all meditation is really viewed as subordinate to knowledge1 and of the declarations of co- ordination of ,brahman and the individual soul 7which must be taken to imply that the two are essentially of the same nature71 we cannot help forming the conclusion that the real purport of the ,vednta-texts is to tell us of the true nature of the individual soul in so far as different from its body4--,but1 again it is objected1 the agent is connected no less with ordinary worldly works than with works enjoined by the ,veda1 and hence is not invariably connected with sacrifices 7i4e4 works of the latter type72 it cannot1 therefore1 be maintained that meditations on the part of the agent necessarily connect themselves with sacrifices in so far as they effect a purification of the sacrificer's mind6--,there is a difference1 the ,prvapakshin rejoins4 ,worldly works can proceed also if the agent is non-different from the body2 while an agent is qualified for sacred works only in so far as he is different from the body1 and of an eternal non-changing nature4 ,meditations1 therefore1 properly connect themselves with sacrifices1 in so far as they teach that the agent really is of that latter nature4 ,we thus adhere to the conclusion that meditations are constituents of sacrificial actions1 and hence are of no advantage by themselves4--,but what then are those inferential marks which1 as you say1 fully prove that the ,vednta-texts aim at setting forth the nature of the individual soul8--,to this the next ,stra replies4 #c4 ,on account of 7such7 conduct being seen4 ,it is seen1 viz in ,scripture1 that those who knew ,brahman busied themselves chiefly with sacrifices4--,asvapati ,kaikeya had a deep knowledge of the ,self2 but when three ,rishis had come to him to receive instruction regarding the ,self1 he told them ',i am about1 to perform a sacrifice1 ,sirs' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,v1 ,,ii74 ,similarly we learn from ,smriti that ,janaka and other princes deeply versed in the knowledge of ,brahman applied themselves to sacrificial works1 ',by works only ,janaka and others attained to perfection'2 ',he also1 well founded in knowledge1 offered many sacrifices4' ,and this fact--that those who know ,brahman apply themselves to works chiefly--shows that knowledge 7or meditation7 has no independent value1 but serves to set forth the true nature of the active ,self1 and thus is subordinate to work4--,an even more direct proof is set forth in the next ,stra4 #d4 ,on account of direct scriptural statement4 ,scripture itself directly declares knowledge to be subordinate to works1 'whatever he does with knowledge1 with faith1 with the ,upanishad1 that is more vigorous'4 ,nor can it be said that this text refers1 on the ground of leading subject-matter 7prakarana71 to the ,udgtha only2 for direct scriptural statement 7suti7 is stronger than subject-matter1 and the words 'whatever he does with knowledge' clearly refer to knowledge in general4 #e4 ,on account of the taking hold together4 ,the text 'then both knowledge and work take hold of him' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #d1 #b7 shows that knowledge and work go together1 and this going together is possible only if1 in the manner stated1 knowledge is subordinate to work4 #f4 ,on account of injunction for such a one4 ,that knowledge is subordinate to works follows therefrom also that works are enjoined on him only who possesses knowledge4 ,for texts such as ',he who has learnt the ,veda from a family of teachers1' c4 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,viii1 #ae71 enjoin works on him only who has mastered the sacred texts so as fully to understand their meaning--for this is the sense of the term 'learning' 7adhyayana74 ,hence the knowledge of ,brahman also is enjoined with a view to works only3 it has no independent result of its own4 #g4 ,on account of definite rule4 ,another argument for our conclusion is that the text ',doing works here let a man desire to live a hundred years1' c4 7,is4 ,up4 ,,ii71 expressly enjoins lifelong works on him who knows the ,self4 ,the general conclusion1 therefore1 is that knowledge 7meditation7 is merely auxiliary to works4 ,of this view the next ,stra finally disposes4 #h4 ,but on account of the teaching of the different one1 ,badaryana's 7view is valid72 as this is seen4 ,knowledge by itself benefits man2 since ,scripture teaches that the object of knowledge is the highest ,brahman which1 as it is of an absolutely faultless and perfect nature1 is other than the active individual soul4 ,badaryana1 therefore1 holds that knowledge has an independent fruit of its own4 ,let the inferential marks 7referred to by the ,prvapakshin7 be2 the direct teaching of the texts certainly refers to a being different from the ,self that acts2 for we clearly see that their object is the highest creative ,brahman with all its perfections and exalted qualities1 which cannot possibly be attributed to the individual ,self whether in the state of ,release or of bondage3 ',free from evil1 free from old age1' c4 c4 ,in all those texts there is not the slightest trace of any reference to the wretched individual soul1 as insignificant and weak as a tiny glow-worm1 implicated in ,nescience and all the other evils of finite existence4 ,and the fruit of that knowledge of the highest ,person the texts expressly declare1 in many places1 to be immortality--which consists in attaining to ,him4 ,the view of knowledge by itself benefitting man therefore is well founded4--,the ,stras proceed to dispose of the so-called inferential marks4 #i4 ,but the declarations are equal4 ,the argument that knowledge must be held subordinate to work because we learn from ,scripture that those who know ,brahman perform sacrificial works1 will not hold good2 since1 on the other hand1 we also see that men knowing ,brahman abandoned all work2 cp4 texts such as ',the ,rishis descended from ,kavasha said3 ,for what purpose should we study the ,veda8 for what purpose should we sacrifice8' ,as it thus appears that those who know ,brahman give up works1 knowledge cannot be a mere auxiliary to works4--,but how can it be accounted for that those who know ,brahman both do and do not perform works8--,works may be performed in so far as sacrifices and the like1 if performed by one not having any special wish1 stand in subordinate relation to the knowledge of ,brahman2 hence there is no objection to texts enjoining works4 ,and as1 on the other hand1 sacrifices and such-like works when aiming at results of their own are opposed to the knowledge of ,brahman which has ,release for its only result1 there is all the less objection to texts which suggest the non- performance of works4 ,if1 on the other hand1 knowledge were subordinate to works1 works could on no account be dispensed with4--,against the assertion that ,scripture directly declares knowledge to be subordinate to works the next ,stra declares itself4 #aj4 7,it is7 non-comprehensive4 ,the scriptural declaration does not refer to all meditations1 but only to the meditation on the ,udgtha4 ,in the clause 'what he does with knowledge1' the 'what' is in itself indefinite1 and therefore must be defined as connecting itself with the ,udgtha mentioned in the previous clause1 ',let him meditate on the ,udgtha4' ,the sentence cannot be construed to mean 'whatever he does is to be done with knowledge1' but means 'that which he does with knowledge becomes more vigorous1' and that which is done with knowledge that is the ,udgtha4 ,the next ,stra refutes the argument set forth in ,stra #e4 #aa4 ,there is distribution1 as in the case of the hundred4 ,as knowledge and work have different results1 the text 'of him knowledge and work lay hold' must be understood in a distributive sense1 i4e4 as meaning that knowledge lays hold of him to the end of bringing about its own particular result1 and that so likewise does work4 ',as in the case of a hundred1' i4e4 as it is understood that1 when a man selling a field and a gem is said to receive two hundred gold pieces1 one hundred are given for the field and one hundred for the gem4 #ab4 ,of him who has merely read the ,veda4 ,nor is there any force in the argument that knowledge is only auxiliary to work because works are enjoined on him who possesses knowledge4 ,for the text which refers to the man 'who has read the ,veda' enjoins works on him who has merely read the texts1 and reading there means nothing more than the apprehension of the aggregate of syllables called ,veda1 without any insight into their meaning4 ,a man who has thus mastered the words of the ,veda apprehends therefrom that it makes statements as to works having certain results1 and then on his own account applies himself to the enquiry into the meaning of those declarations2 he who is desirous of work applies himself to the knowledge of works2 he who is desirous of ,release applies himself to the knowledge of ,brahman4 ,and even if the injunction of reading were understood as prompting to the understanding of the text also1 all the same1 knowledge would not be a subsidiary to works4 ,for knowledge1 in the sense of the ,upanishads1 is something different from mere cognition of sense4 ,in the same way as the performance of such works as the ,jyotishtoma sacrifice is something different from the cognition of the true nature of those works2 so that vidy1 which effects the highest purpose of man1 i4 e4 devout meditation 7dhyna1 upsan71 is something different from the mere cognition of the true nature of ,brahman4 ,knowledge of that kind has not the most remote connexion even with works4 #ac4 ,not so1 on account of non-specification4 ,nor is it true that the text ',doing works here1' c41 is meant to divert him who knows the ,self from knowledge and restrict him to works4 ,for there is no special reason to hold that that text refers to works as independent means of a desirable result3 it may as well be understood to refer to works merely subordinate to knowledge4 ,as he who knows the ,self has to practise meditation as long as he lives1 he may also have to practise1 for the same period1 works that are helpful to meditation4 ,having thus refuted the objection on the ground of the reason of the matter1 the ,strakra proceeds to give his own interpretation of the text4 #ad4 ,or the permission is for the purpose of glorification4 ,the or has assertive force4 ,the introductory words of the ,upanishad1 ',hidden in the ,lord is all this1' show knowledge to be the subject- matter2 hence the permission of works can aim only at the glorification of knowledge4 ,the sense of the text therefore is--owing to the power of knowledge a man although constantly performing works is not stained by them4 #ae4 ,some also1 by proceeding according to their liking4 ,in some skhs1 moreover1 we read that he who possesses the knowledge of ,brahman may1 according to his liking1 give up the state of a householder1 ',what shall we do with offspring1 we who have this ,self and this world8' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,v1 #d1 #bb47 ,this text also proves knowledge not to be subsidiary to works2 for if it were so subsidiary1 it would not be possible for him who knows ,brahman to give up householdership 7with all the works obligatory on that state7 according to his liking4 #af4 ,and destruction4 ,there is moreover a ,vednta-text which declares the knowledge of ,brahman to destroy work-good and evil--which is the root of all the afflictions of transmigratory existence3 ',the knot of the heart is broken1 all doubts are solved1 all his works perish when ,he has been beheld who is high and low' 7,mu4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #b1 #h74 ,this also contradicts the view of knowledge being subordinate to works4 #ag4 ,and of him who is chaste2 for in ,scripture 7this is declared74 ,the knowledge of ,brahman belongs to those who have to observe chastity1 and men living in that state have not to perform the ,agnihotra1 the ,darsaprnamsa1 and similar works4 ,for this reason also knowledge cannot be subsidiary to works4--,but1 it may be objected1 there is no such condition of life2 for texts such as 'he is to perform the ,agnihotra as long as he lives1' declare men to be obliged to perform sacrifices and the like up to the end of their lives1 and ,smriti texts contradicting ,scripture have no authority4--,to meet this the ,stra adds 'for in ,scripture4' ,the three stages of life are recognised in ,scripture only2 cp4 texts such as ',those who in the forest practise penance and faith' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,v1 #aj1 #a72 ',wishing for that world only mendicants wander forth from their homes' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #d1 #bb74 ,the text as to the lifelong obligatoriness of the ,agnihotra is valid for those only who do not retire from worldly life4 #ah4 ,a reference 7only7 ,jaimini 7holds them to be71 on account of absence of injunction2 for 7,scripture7 forbids4 ,the argument for the three stages of life1 founded on their mention in ,vedic texts1 has no force1 since all those references are only of the nature of anuvda4 ,for none of those texts contain injunctive forms4 ,the text ',there are three branches of sacred observance1' c4 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #bc1 #a71 is meant to glorify the previous meditation on ,brahman under the form of the pranava1 as appears from the concluding clause 'he who is firmly grounded in ,brahman obtains immortality'2 it therefore cannot mean to enjoin the three conditions of life as valid states4 ,in the same way the text ',and those who in the forest practise penance and faith' refers to the statements previously made as to the path of the gods1 and cannot therefore be meant to make an original declaration as to another condition of life4 ,scripture moreover expressly forbids that other condition1 'a murderer of men is he who removes the fire1' c4 ,there are therefore no conditions of life in which men are bound to observe chastity4 ,this is the opinion of the teacher ,jaimini4 #ai4 ,it is to be accomplished1 ,bdarayana holds1 on account of scriptural statement of equality4 ,bdaryana is of opinion that1 in the same way as the condition of householdership1 those other conditions of life also are obligatory2 since in the section beginning 'there are three branches of sacred duty' all the three conditions of life are equally referred to1 with a view to glorifying him who is firmly grounded in ,brahman4 ,the reference there made to the condition of the householder necessarily presupposes that condition to be already established and obligatory1 and the same reasoning then holds good with regard to the other conditions mentioned4 ,nor must it be said that the special duties mentioned at the beginning of the section--sacrifice1 study1 charity1 austerity1 ,brahmakarya--all of them belong to the state of the householder 7in which case the text would contain no reference to the other conditions of life72 for on that supposition the definite reference to a threefold division of duties1 ',sacrifice1 c4 are the first1 austerity the second1 ,brahmakarya the third1' would be unmeaning4 ,the proper explanation is to take the words' sacrifice1 study1 and charity' as descriptive of the condition of the householder2 the word 'austerity' as descriptive of the duties of the ,vaikhnasa and the wandering mendicant1 who both practise mortification2 and the word ',brahmakarya' as referring to the duties of the ,brahmakarin4 ,the term ',brahmasamstha' finally1 in the concluding clause1 refers to all the three conditions of life1 as men belonging to all those conditions may be founded on ,brahman4 ,those1 the text means to say1 who are destitute of this foundation on ,brahman and only perform the special duties of their condition of life1 obtain the worlds of the blessed2 while he only who at the same time founds himself on ,brahman attains to immortality4--,in the text 'and those who in the forest1' c4 the mention made of the forest shows that the statement as to the path of the gods has for its presupposition the fact that that stage of life which is especially connected with the forest is one generally recognised4--,so far it has been shown that the other stages of life are no less obligatory than that of the householder1 whether we take the text under discussion as containing merely a reference to those stages 7as established by independent means of proof7 or as directly enjoining them4 ,the next ,stra is meant to show that the latter view is after all the right one4 #bj4 ,or an injunction1 as in the case of the carrying4 ,as the second part of the text ',let him approach carrying the firewood below the ladle2 for above he carries it for the gods' 7which refers to a certain form of the ,agnihotra71 although having the form of an anuvda1 yet must be interpreted as an injunction1 since the carrying of firewood above is not established by any other injunction2 so the text under discussion also must be taken as an injunction of the different stages of life 7which are not formally enjoined elsewhere74 ,no account being taken of the text of the ,jblas1 ',having completed his studentship he is to become a householder1' c41 it is thus a settled conclusion that the texts discussed1 although primarily concerned with other topics1 must at the same time be viewed as proving the validity of the several conditions of life4 ,from this it follows that the text enjoining the performance of the ,agnihotra up to the end of life1 and similar texts1 are not universally binding1 but concern those only who do not retire from worldly life4--,the final conclusion therefore is that as the knowledge of ,brahman is enjoined on those who lead a life of austerity 7which does not require the performance of sacrifices and the like71 it is not subordinate to works1 but is in itself beneficial to man4--,here terminates the adhikarana of 'benefit to man4' #ba4 ,if it be said that they are mere glorification1 on account of their reference2 not so1 on account of the newness4 ,the following point is next enquired into4 ,are texts such as ',that ,udgtha is the best of all essences1 the highest1 holding the supreme place1 the eighth' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,i1 #a1 #c7 meant to glorify the ,udgtha as a constituent element of the sacrifice1 or to enjoin a meditation on the ,udgtha as the best of all essences1 and so on8 ,the ,prvapakshin holds the former view1 on the ground that the text declares the ,udgtha to be the best of all essences in so far as being a constituent element of the sacrifice4 ,the case is analogous to that of texts such as 'the ladle is this earth1 the havanya is the heavenly world1' which are merely meant to glorify the ladle and the rest as constituent members of the sacrifice4--,this view the latter part of the ,stra sets aside 'on account of newness4' ,texts1 as the one referring to the ,udgtha1 cannot be mere glorifications2 for the fact of the ,udgtha being the best of essences is not established by any other means of proof1 and the text under discussion cannot therefore be understood as a mere anuvda1 meant for glorification4 ,nor is there1 in proximity1 any injunction of the ,udgtha on account of connexion with which the clause declaring the ,udgtha to be the best of all essences could naturally be taken as an anuvda 7glorifying the thing previously enjoined in the injunctive text72 while there is such an injunction in connexion with the 7anuvda7 text ',the ladle is this earth1' and so on4 ,we thus cannot but arrive at the conclusion that the text is meant to enjoin a meditation on the ,udgtha as being the best of all essences1 and so on--the fruit of such meditation being an increase of vigour and efficacy on the part of the sacrifice4 #bb4 ,and on account of the words denoting becoming4 ,that the texts under discussion have an injunctive purport also follows from the fact that they contain verbal forms denoting becoming or origination--'he is to meditate' and the like2 for all such forms have injunctive force4 ,all these texts therefore are meant to enjoin special forms of meditation4--,here terminates the adhikarana of mere glorification4' #bc4 ,should it be said that 7the stories told in the ,upanishads7 are for the purpose of the ,priplava2 not so1 since 7certain stories7 are specified4 ,we meet in the ,vednta-texts with certain stories such as ',pratardana the son of ,divodsa came to the beloved abode of ,indra1' c41 and similar ones4 ,the question here arises whether the stories are merely meant to be recited at the ,asvamedha sacrifice or to convey knowledge of a special kind4--,the ,prvapakshin maintains that as the text' they tell the stories' declares the special connexion of those stories with the so- called priplava performance1 they cannot be assumed to be mainly concerned with knowledge4--,this view the ,stra negatives1 on the ground that not all stories of that kind are specially connected with the priplava4 ,the texts rather single out special stories only as suitable for that performance2 on the general injunction quoted above there follows an injunction defining which stories are to be told1 ',king ,manu1 the son of ,vivasvat1' c4 ,the stories told in the ,vednta-texts do not therefore form parts of the priplava performance1 but are connected with injunctions of meditations4 #bd4 ,this follows also from the textual connexion 7of those stories with injunctions74 ,that those stories subserve injunctions of meditation is proved thereby also that they are exhibited in textual connexion with injunctions such as 'the ,self is to be seen1' and so on4 ,their position therefore is analogous to that of other stories told in the texts1 which somehow subserve injunctions of works1 and are not merely meant for purposes of recitation4--,here terminates the adhikarana of 'the priplava4' #be4 ,for this very reason there is no need of the lighting of the fire and so on4 ,the ,stras return1 from their digression into the discussion of two special points1 to the question as to those whose condition of life involves chastity4 ,the above ,stra declares that as persons of that class are referred to by ,scripture as specially concerned with meditation 7',he who is founded on ,brahman reaches immortality2' 'those who in the forest1' c471 their meditation does not presuppose a knowledge of the kindling of fire and so on1 i4e4 a knowledge of the ,agnihotra1 the ,darsaprnamsa1 and all those other sacrifices which require the preliminary establishnlent of the sacred fires1 but a knowledge of those works only which are enjoined for their special condition of life4--,here terminates the adhikarana of 'the kindling of the fire4' #bf4 ,and there is need of all 7works71 on account of the scriptural statement of sacrifices and the rest2 as in the case of the horse4 ,if knowledge 7meditation71 without any reference to sacrifices and the like1 is able to bring about immortality1 it must be capable of accomplishing this in the case of householders also2 and the mention made of sacrifices and the rest in texts such as ',brhmanas seek to know him by the study of the ,veda1 by sacrifice1 by gifts' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #d1 #bb71 does not prove sacrifices and so on to be auxiliary to knowledge1 since the stress there lies 7not on the sacrifices and so on1 but7 on the desire of knowledge4--,of this view the ,stra disposes4 ,in the case of householders1 for whom the ,agnihotra and so on are obligatory1 knowledge presupposes all those works1 since scriptural texts such as the one quoted directly state that sacrifices and the like are auxiliary to knowledge4 ',they seek to know by means of sacrifices' can be said only if sacrifices are understood to be a means through which knowledge is brought about2 just as one can say 'he desires to slay with a sword1' because the sword is admitted to be an instrument wherewith one can kill4 ,what we have to understand by knowledge in this connexion has been repeatedly explained1 viz4 a mental energy different in character from the mere cognition of the sense of texts1 and more specifically denoted by such terms as dhyna or upsana1 i4e4 meditation2 which is of the nature of remembrance 7i4e4 representative thought71 but in intuitive clearness is not inferior to the clearest presentative thought 7pratyaksha72 which by constant daily practice becomes ever more perfect1 and being duly continued up to death secures final ,release4 ,such meditation is originated in the mind through the grace of the ,supreme ,person1 who is pleased and conciliated by the different kinds of acts of sacrifice and worship duly performed by the ,devotee day after day4 ,this is what the text 'they seek to know through the sacrifice' really means4 ,the conclusion therefore is that in the case of householders knowledge has for its pre-requisite all sacrifices and other works of permanent and occasional obligation4 ',as a horse4' ,as the horse1 which is a means of locomotion for man1 requires attendants1 grooming1 c41 so knowledge1 although itself the means of ,release1 demands the co-operation of the different works4 ,thus the ,lord himself says1 ',the work of sacrifice1 giving1 and austerities is not to be relinquished1 but is indeed to be performed2 for sacrifices1 gifts1 and austerities are purifying to the thoughtful4' ',he from whom all beings proceed and by whom all this is pervaded-worshipping ,him with the proper works man attains to perfection' 7,bha4 ,g4 ,,xviii1 #e2 #df74--;,here terminates the adhikarana of 'the need of all4' #bg4 ,but all the same he must be possessed of calmness1 subjection of the senses1 c41 since those are enjoined as auxiliaries to that1 and must necessarily be accomplished4 ,the question is whether the householder also must practise calmness and so on1 or not4 ,the ,prvapakshin says he must not1 since the performance of works implies the activity of the outer and inner organs of action1 and since calmness and so on are of an exactly opposite nature4--,this view the ,stra sets aside4 ,the householder also1 although engaged in outward activity1 must1 in so far as he possesses knowledge1 practise calmness of mind and the rest also2 for these qualities or states are by ,scripture enjoined as auxiliaries to knowledge1 ',therefore he who knows this1 having become calm1 subdued1 satisfied1 patient1 and collected1 should see the ,self in ,self 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #d1 #bc74 ,as calmness of mind and the rest are seen1 in so far as implying composure and concentration of mind1 to promote the origination of knowledge1 they also must necessarily be aimed at and practised4 ,nor can it be said that between works on the one side and calmness and so on on the other1 there is an absolute antagonism2 for the two have different spheres of application4 ,activity of the organs of action is the proper thing in the case of works enjoined2 quiescence in the case of works not enjoined and such as have no definite purpose4 ,nor also can it be objected that in the case of works implying the activity of organs1 calmness of mind and so on are impossible1 the mind then being necessarily engrossed by the impressions of the present work and its surroundings2 for works enjoined by ,scripture have the power of pleasing the ,supreme ,person1 and hence1 through his grace1 to cause the destruction of all mental impressions obstructive of calmness and concentration of mind4 ,hence calmness of mind and the rest are to be aimed at and practised by householders also4-- ,here terminates the adhikarana of 'calmness' and so on4 #bh4 ,and there is permission of all food in the case of danger of life2 on account of this being seen4 ,in the meditation on prna1 according to the ,vjasaneyins and the ,chndogas1 there is a statement as to all food being allowed to him who knows the prna4 ',by him there is nothing eaten that is not food' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #a1 #ad2 and so on74 ,a doubt here arises whether this permission of all food is valid for him who possesses the knowledge of prna1 in all circumstances1 or only in the case of life being in danger4--,the ,prvapakshin holds the former view1 on account of no special conditions being stated in the text4--,this the ,stra sets aside 'in the case of danger to life'2 for the reason that1 as the text shows1 the eating of food of all kinds is permitted even for those who know ,brahman itself-- the knowledge of which of course is higher than that of prna--only when their life is in danger4 ,the text alluded to is the one telling how ,ushasta ,kkryana1 who was well versed in the knowledge of ,brahman1 once1 when in great distress1 ate unlawful food4 ,we therefore conclude that what the text says as to all food being lawful for him who knows prna1 can refer only to occasions when food of any kind must be eaten in order to preserve life4 #bi4 ,and on account of non-sublation4 ,the conclusion above arrived at is confirmed by the consideration that thus only those texts are not stultified which enjoin1 for those who know ,brahman1 purity in matters of food with a view to the origination of knowledge of ,brahman4 ,cp4' when the food is pure the mind becomes pure' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vii1 #bf1 #b74 #cj4 ,this is said in ,smriti also4 ,that for those as well who know ,brahman1 as for others1 the eating of food of any kind is lawful only in case of extreme need1 ,smriti also declares1 ',he who being in danger of his life eats food from anywhere is stained by sin no more than the lotus leaf by water4' #ca4 ,and hence also a scriptural passage as to non-proceeding according to liking4 ,the above conclusion is further confirmed by a scriptural passage prohibiting licence of conduct on the part of any one4 ,the text meant is a passage in the ,samhit of the ,kathas1 ',therefore a ,brahmawa does not drink spirituous liquor1 thinking may ,i not be stained by sin4'--,here terminates the adhikarana of 'the allowance of all food4' #cb4 ,the works of the sramas also1 on account of their being enjoined4 ,it has been said that sacrifices and other works are auxiliary to the knowledge of ,brahman4 ,the doubt now arises whether those works are to be performed by him also who merely wishes to fulfil the duties of his srama1 without aiming at final ,release1 or not4 ,they are not1 the ,prvapakshin holds1 for that things auxiliary to knowledge should stand in subordinate relation to a certain state of life would imply the contradiction of permanent and non-permanent obligation4--,of this view the ,stra disposes1 ',the works of the sramas also4' ,the works belonging to each srama have to be performed by those also who do not aim at more than to live according to the srama2 for they are specifically enjoined by texts such as as long as life lasts he is to offer the ,agnihotra'2 this implies a permanent obligation dependent on life4 ,and that the same works are also to be performed as being auxiliary to knowledge appears from the texts enjoining them in that aspect1 ',him they seek to know by the study of the ,veda' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #d1 #bb72 this the next ,stra declares4 #cc4 ,and on account of co-operativeness4 ,these works are to be performed also on account of their being co- operative towards knowledge in so far1 namely1 as they give rise to the desire of knowledge2 and their thus being enjoined for a double purpose does not imply contradiction any more than the double injunctions of the ,agnihotra1 which one text connects with the life of the sacrificer and another text with his desire to reach the heavenly world4--,nor does this imply a difference of works--this the next ,stra declares4 #cd4 ,in any case they are the same1 on account of twofold inferential signs4 ,there is no radical difference of works2 but in any case1 i4e4 whether they be viewed as duties incumbent on the srama or as auxiliary to knowledge1 sacrifices and other works are one and the same4 ,for ,scripture1 in enjoining them in both these aspects1 makes use of the same terms1 so that we recognise the same acts1 and there is no means of proof to establish difference of works4 #ce4 ,and ,scripture also declares 7knowledge7 not to be overpowered4 ,texts such as ',by works of sacred duty he drives away evil' declare that sacrifices and similar works have the effect of knowledge 'not being overpowered1' i4e4 of the origination of knowledge not being obstructed by evil works4 ,sacrifices and similar works being performed day after day have the effect of purifying the mind1 and owing to this1 knowledge arises in the mind with ever increasing brightness4 ,this proves that the works are the same in either case4--,here terminates the adhikarana of 'the being enjoined' 7of sacrifices1 and so on74 #cf4 ,also in the case of those outside1 as this is seen4 ,it has been declared that the members of the four sramas have a claim to the knowledge of ,brahman1 and that the duties connected with each srarna promote knowledge4 ,a doubt now arises whether those men also who1 on account of poverty and so on1 stand outside the sramas are qualified for the knowledge of ,brahman1 or rtot4--,they are not1 the ,prvapakshin holds1 since such knowledge is to be attained in a way dependent on the special duties of each srama2 while those who do not belong to an srama are not concerned with srama duties4--,this view the ,stra rejects4 ,those also who do not stand within any srama are qualified for knowledge1 'because that is seen1' i4e4 because the texts declare that men such as ,raikva1 ,bhshma1 ,samvarta and others who did not belong to srama were well grounded in the knowledge of ,brahman4 ,it can by no means be maintained that it is srama duties only that promote knowledge2 for the text 'by gifts1 by penance1 by fasting1 and so on' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #d1 #bb7 distinctly declares that charity also and other practices1 which are not confined to the sramas1 are helpful towards knowledge4 ,in the same way as in the case of those bound to chastity--who1 as the texts show1 may possess the knowledge of ,brahman--knowledge is promoted by practices other than the ,agnihotra and the like1 so--it is concluded--in the case of those also who do not belong to any abrama knowledge may be promoted by certain practices not exclusively connected with any srama1 such as prayer1 fasting1 charity1 propitiation of the divinity1 and so on4 #cg4 ,smriti also states this4 ,smriti also declares that men not belonging to an srama grow in knowledge through prayer and the like4 ',through prayer also a ,brhmana may become perfect4 ,may he perform other works or not1 one who befriends all creatures is called a ,brhmana' 7,manu ,smri4 ,,ii1 #ag74 #ch4 ,and there is the promotion 7of knowledge7 through special acts 7of duty74 ,the above conclusion is founded not only on ,reasoning and ,smriti2 but ,scripture even directly states that knowledge is benefited by practices not exclusively prescribed for the sramas1 ',by penance1 abstinence1 faith1 and knowledge he is to seek the ,self 7,pr4 ,up4 ,i1 #aj74 #ci4 ,but better than that is the other also on account of an inferential mark4 ,better than to be outside the sramas is the condition of standing within an srama4 ,the latter state may be due to misfortune2 but he who can should be within an srama1 which state is the more holy and beneficial one4 ,this follows from inference only1 i4e4 ,smriti2 for ,smriti says1 ',a ,brhmana is to remain outside the sramas not even for one day4' ,for one who has passed beyond the stage of ,brahmakarya1 or whose wife has died1 the impossibility to procure a wife constitutes the misfortune 7which prevents him from belonging to an srama74--,here terminates the adhikarana of 'widowers4' #dj4 ,but of him who has become that there is no becoming not that1 according to ,jaimini also1 on account of 7,scripture7 restraining from the absence of the forms of that4 ,the doubt here arises whether those also who have fallen from the state of life of a ,naishthika1 ,vaikhnasa or ,privrjaka are qualified for the knowledge of ,brahman or not4--,they are so1 since in their case1 no less than in that of widowers and the like1 the growth of knowledge may be assisted by charity and other practices not confined to sramas4--,this prim facie view the ,stra sets aside4 ',he who has become that1' i4e4 he who has entered on the condition of a ,naishthika or the like 'cannot become not that1' i4e4 may not live in a non-srama condition2 since scriptural texts restrain men who once have entered the ,naishthika1 c41 state 'from the absence of the forms of that1' i4e4 from the discontinuance of the special duties of their srama4 ,compare texts such as ',he is to go into the forest1 and is not to return from thence'2 ',having renounced the world he is not to return4' ,and hence persons who have lapsed from their srama are not qualified for meditation on ,brahman4 ,this view of his the ,strakra strengthens by a reference to the opinion of ,jaimini4--,but cannot a ,naishthika who1 through some sin1 has lapsed from his duties and position1 make up for his transgression by some expiatory act and thus again become fit for meditation on ,brahman8--,to this point the next ,stra refers4 #da4 ,nor the 7expiatory performance7 described in the chapter treating of qualification2 that being impossible on account of the ,smriti referring to such lapse4 ,those expiatory performances which are described in the chapter treating of qualification 7,p4 ,m4 ,s4 ,,vi7 are not possible in the case of him who has lapsed from the condition of a ,naishthika2 since such expiations do not apply to him1 as is shown by a ,smriti text referring to such lapse1 viz4 ',he who having once entered on the duties of a ,naishthika lapses from them1 for such a slayer of the ,self ,i do not see any expiatory work by which he might become clean4' ,the expiatory ceremony referred to in the ,prva ,mimms therefore applies to the case of other ,brahmakrins only4 #db4 ,a minor one1 thus some2 7and hence they hold7 the existence 7of expiation71 as in the case of eating4 ,this has been explained4 ,some teachers are of opinion that even on the part of ,naishthikas and the rest the lapse from chastity constitutes only a minor offence which can be atoned for by expiatory observances2 in the same way as in the case of the eating of forbidden food the same pryaskitta may be used by the ordinary ,brahmakrin and by ,naishthikas and the rest4 ,this has been stated by the ,smriti writer1 ',for the others also 7i4e4 the ,naishthikas and so on7 the same 7rules and practices as those for the ,upakurvna7 hold good1 in so far as not opposed to their srama4' #dc4 ,but in either case 7such men7 stand outside2 on account of ,smriti and custom4 ,whether the point under discussion constitutes a minor or a major offence1 in any case those who have lapsed stand outside the category of those qualified for the knowledge of ,brahman4 ,for ,smriti1 i4e4 the text quoted above1 ',i see no expiatory performance by which he1 a slayer of ,brahman as he is1 could become pure again1' declares that expiations are powerless to restore purity4 ,and custom confirms the same conclusion2 for good men shun those ,naishthikas who have lapsed1 even after they have performed pryaskittas1 and do not impart to them the knowledge of ,brahman1 ,the conclusion1 therefore1 is that such men are not qualified for knowing ,brahman4--,here terminates the adhikarana of 'him who has become that4' #dd4 ,by the ,lord 7of the sacrifice71 since ,scripture declares a fruit-- thus treya thinks4 ,a doubt arises whether the meditations on such constituent elements of the sacrifice as the ,udgtha1 and so on1 are to be performed by the sacrificer 7for whose benefit the sacrifice is offered71 or by the officiating priests4 treya advocates the former view2 on the ground of ,scripture showing that in the case of such meditations as the one on the small ether within the heart1 fruit and meditation belong to the same person1 and that in the case of such meditations as the one on the ,udgtha the fruit belongs to the sacrificer 7whence we conclude that the meditation also is his74 ,nor can it be said that the sacrificer is not competent for such meditation1 for the reason that like the godohana vessel it is connected with an element of the sacrifice 7which latter the priests only can perform74 ,for the godohana vessel serves to bring water1 and this of course none else can do but the ,adhvaryu2 while a meditation on the ,udgtha as being the essence of all essences can very well be performed by the ,sacrificer--true though it be that the ,udgtha itself can be performed by the ,udgtri priest only4--,against this view the next ,stra declares itself4 #de4 7,they are7 the priest's work1 ,audulomi thinks2 since for that he is engaged4 ,the teacher ,audulomi is of opinion that the meditation on the ,udgtha and the like is the work of the priest1 since it is he who is engaged for the purpose of performing that which gives rise to the fruit1 i4e4 of the entire sacrifice with all its subordinate parts4 ,injunctions referring to the performance of the sacrifices such as 'he chooses the priests2 he gives to the priests their fee' indicate that the entire sacrificial performance is the work of the priests1 and that hence all activities comprised within it--mental as well as bodily--belong to the priests4 ,capability or non-capability does not constitute the criterion in this case4 ,for although the meditations in question aim directly at the benefit of man 7not at the greater perfection of the sacrifice71 yet since they fall within the sphere of qualification of those who are qualified for the sacrifice1 and since the sacrifice with all its subordinate elements has to be performed by the priests1 and since the text 'whatever he does with knowledge that becomes more vigorous' declares knowledge to belong to the same agent as the works which are benefited by such knowledge1 we conclude that those meditations also are the exclusive duty of the priests4 ,in the case of the meditations on the small ether1 c41 on the other hand1 the text says nothing as to their having to be performed by priests1 and we therefore assume in accordance with the general principle that 'the fruit belongs to the performer1' that the agent there is the person to whom ,scripture assigns the fruit4-- ,here terminates the adhikarana of 'the lord 7of the sacrifice74' #df4 ,there is injunction of other auxiliary means for him who is such1 as in the case of injunction and so on2 7the term mauna denoting7 according to an alternative meaning a third something4 ',therefore let a ,brhmana after he has done with learning wish to stand by a childlike state2 and after having done with the childlike state and learning 7he is7 a ,muni' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #e74 ,a doubt arises whether this text enjoins ,muni-hood in the same way as it enjoins learning and the childlike state1 or merely refers to it as something already established4-- ,the ,purvapakshin holds the latter view on the ground that as ',muni-hood' and 'learning' both connote knowledge1 the word ',muni' merely refers back to the knowledge already enjoined in the phrase 'after he has done with learning4' ,for the text presents no word of injunctive force with regard to ,muni-hood4--,this view the ,stra controverts4 ',for him who is such1' i4e4 for those who possess knowledge1 'there is an injunction of a different co-operative factor' 'in the same way as injunctions and the rest4' ,by the injunctions in the last clause we have to understand the special duties of the different sramas1 i4e4 sacrifices and the like1 and also such qualifications as quietness of mind and the like2 and by the 'and the rest' is meant the learning of and pondering on the sacred texts4 ,stated at length1 the meaning of the ,stra then is as follows--in the same way as texts such as 'him ,brhmanas seek to know through the reciting of the ,veda1 through sacrifices and charity1 and so on1' and ',quiet1 subdued1' c4 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #d1 #bc7 enjoin sacrifices and so on1 and quietness of mind and the like1 as helpful towards knowledge2 and as texts such as 'the ,self is to be heard1 to be pondered upon' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #d1 #e7 mention hearing and pondering as helpful towards knowledge2 thus the text under discussion enjoins learning1 a childlike state of mind1 and ,muni-hood as three further different auxiliaries of knowledge4--',muni-hood' does not denote the same thing as 'learning'--this the ,stra intimates by the clause 'alternatively a third1' i4e4 as the word muni is observed alternatively to denote persons such as ,vysa distinguished by their power of profound reflection 7manana71 the abstract term munihood denotes a third thing different from learning and the 'childlike state4' ,hence1 although the phrase 'then a ,muni' does not contain a word of directly injunctive power1 we must all the same understand it in an injunctive sense1 viz4 'then let him be or become a ,muni'2 for ,muni-hood is not something previously established4 ,such munihood is also something different from mere reflection 7manana72 it is the reiterated representation before the mind of the object of meditation1 the idea of that object thus becoming more and more vivid4 ,the meaning of the entire text therefore is as follows4 ,a ,brhmana is at first fully to master knowledge1 i4e4 he is to attain1 by means of hearing and pondering1 to the knowledge of ,brahman in all its fulness and perfection4 ,this is to be effected through the growth of purity of mind and heart1 due to the grace of the ,lord2 for this ,smriti declares1 ',neither by the ,vedas nor by austerities1 and so on1 can ,i be so seen--2 but by devotion exclusive ,i may be known' 7,bha4 ,g4 ,,xi1 #ec-ed72 and ,scripture also says1 ',who has the highest devotion for ,god' 7,svet4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #bc71 and ',that ,self cannot be gained by the study of the ,veda1' c4 ',he whom the ,self chooses by him the ,self is to be attained' 7,ka4 ,up4 ,i1 #b1 #bc74 ,after that 'he is to stand by a childlike state'2 what this means will be explained further on4 ,and after that he is to be a ,muni1 i4e4 he is to fix his thoughts so exclusively and persistently on ,brahman as to attain to the mode of knowledge called meditation4 ,having by the employment of these three means reached true knowledge he--the text goes on to say--having done with amauna and mauna is a ,brhmana4 ,amauna1 i4e4 non-mauna1 denotes all the auxiliaries of knowledge different from mauna3 employing these and mauna as well he reaches the highest goal of knowledge4 ,and1 the text further says1 there is no other means but those stated whereby to become such1 i4e4 a true ,brhmana4 ,the entire text thus evidently means to enjoin on any one standing within any srama learning1 a childlike state1 and mauna as auxiliary means of knowledge1 in addition to sacrifices and the other special duties of the sramas4--,but1 an objection is raised1 if knowledge1 aided by pnditya1 and so on1 and thus being auxiliary to the action of the special duties of the sramas1 is thus declared to be the means of attaining to ,brahman2 how then are we to understand the ,chndogya's declaring that a man1 in order to attain to ,brahman1 is throughout his life to carry on the duties of a householder ,,footnote #gaa3 #a8--,to this the next ,stra replies4 ,,footnote #gaa3a4 ,ch4 ,up4 ,,viii1 #ac4 #dg4 ,but on account of the existence 7of knowledge7 in all1 there is winding up with the householder4 ,as knowledge belongs to the members of all sramas it belongs to the householder also1 and for this reason the ,upanishad winds up with the latter4 ,this winding up therefore is meant to illustrate the duties 7not of the householder only1 but7 of the members of all sramas4 ,analogously in the text under discussion 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #e7 the clause ',a ,brhmana having risen above the desire for sons1 the desire for wealth1 and the desire for worlds1 wanders about as a mendicant1' intimates duties belonging exclusively to the condition of the wandering beggar1 and then the subsequent clause 'therefore let a ,brhmana having done with learning1' c41 enjoins pnditya1 blya1 and mauna 7not as incumbent on the privrjaka only1 but7 as illustrating the duties of all sramas4-- ,this the next ,stra explicitly declares4 #dh4 ,on account of the others also being taught1 in the same way as the condition of the ,muni4 ,the injunction1 on him who has passed beyond all desire1 of mauna preceded by privrjya 7wandering about as a mendicant71 is meant to illustrate the duties of all sramas4 ,for the duties of the other sramas are taught by ,scripture no less than those of the ,muni 7and the householder74 ,similarly it was shown above that in the text ',there are three branches of sacred duty--he who is founded on ,brahman goes to immortality1' the term 'founded on ,brahman' applies equally to members of all sramas4--,it therefore remains a settled conclusion that the text under discussion enjoins pnditya1 blya1 and mauna as being auxiliaries to knowledge in the same way as the other duties of the sramas1 such as sacrifices and the rest4--,here terminates the adhikarana of 'the injunction of other auxiliaries4' #di4 ,not manifesting itself2 on account of the connexion4 ,in the text discussed above we meet with the word 'blya1' which may mean either 'being a child' or 'being and doing like a child4' ,the former meaning is excluded1 as that particular age which is called childhood cannot be assumed at will4 ,with regard to the latter meaning1 however1 a doubt arises1 viz4 whether the text means to say that he who aims at perfect knowledge is to assume all the ways of a child1 as e4g4 its wilful behaviour1 or only its freedom from pride and the like4--,the former1 the ,prvapakshin maintains4 ,for the text gives no specification1 and texts enjoining restraints of different kinds 7on the man desirous of knowledge7 are sublated by this specific text which enjoins him to be in all points like a child4--,this view the ,stra disposes of4 ',not manifesting itself4' ,that aspect of a child's nature which consists in the child not manifesting its nature 7viz4 in pride1 arrogance1 and so on71 the man aiming at true knowledge is to make his own4 ',on account of connexion1' i4e4 because thus only the 'balya' of the text gives a possible sense4 ,the other characteristic features of 'childhood' the texts declare to be opposed to knowledge1 ',he who has not turned away from wicked conduct1 who is not tranquil and attentive1 or whose mind is not at peace1 he can never attain the ,self by knowledge' 7,ka4 ,up4 ,i1 #b1 #bd72 ',when food is pure1 the whole nature becomes pure' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vii1 #bf1 #b71 and so on4--,here terminates the adhikarana of 'non-manifestation4' #ej4 ,what belongs to this world1 there being no obstruction at hand2 as this is seen4 ,knowledge1 as enjoined by ,scripture1 is twofold1 having for its fruit either exaltation within the sphere of the ,samsra1 or final ,release4 ,with regard to the former the question arises whether it springs up only immediately subsequent to the good works which are the means to bring it about2 or1 indefinitely1 either subsequent to such works or at some later time4--,the ,prvapakshin holds the former view4 ,a man reaches knowledge through his good deeds only1 as the ,lord himself declares1 ',four kinds of men doing good works worship me1' c47,bha4 ,g4 ,,vii1 #af72 and when those works have been accomplished there is no reason why the result1 i4e4 knowledge1 should be delayed4--,this view the ,stra disposes of4 ',what is comprised in this world1' i4e4 meditation1 the result of which is worldly exaltation1 springs up immediately after the works to which it is due1 in case of there being no other works of greater strength obstructing the rise of knowledge2 but if there is an obstruction of the latter kind1 knowledge springs up later on only4 ',for this is seen1' i4e4 ,scripture acknowledges the effects of such obstruction2 for a statement such as 'what he does with knowledge1 with faith1 with the ,upanishad that is more vigorous1' means that works joined with the knowledge of the ,udgtha1 and so on1 produce their results without obstruction 7which implies that the action of other works is liable to be obstructed74--,here terminates the adhikarana of 'what belongs to this world4' #ea4 ,in the same way there is non-determination with regard to what has ,release for its result2 that condition being ascertained1 that condition being ascertained4 ,so likewise in the case of the origination1 through works of very great merit1 of such knowledge as has for its result final ,release1 the time is not definitely fixed2 for here also there is ascertained the same condition1 viz4 the termination of the obstruction presented by other works4 ,a further doubt might in this case be raised on the ground that such works as give rise to knowledge leading to final ,release are stronger than all other works1 and therefore not liable to obstruction4 ,but this doubt is disposed of by the reflection that even in the case of a man knowing ,brahman there may exist previous evil deeds of overpowering strength4--,the repetition of the last words of the ,stra indicates the completion of the adhyya4--,here terminates the adhikarana of 'what has ,release for its result4' ,,fourth ,,adhy,,ya ,,first ,p,,da4 #a4 ,repetition1 on account of the text teaching 7what has to be done more than once74 ,the third adhyya was concerned with the consideration of meditation1 together with its means4 ,the ,stras now enter on a consideration of the results of meditation1 after a further preliminary clearing up of the nature of meditation4 ,the question here arises whether the act of knowledge of ,brahman inculcated in ,vednta-texts1 such as ',he who knows ,brahman reaches the ,highest1' ',having known him thus he passes beyond death1' ',he knows ,brahman1 he becomes ,brahman1' is1 in the view of ,scripture1 to be performed once only1 or to be repeated more than once4-- ,once suffices1 the ,prvapakshin maintains2 for as the text enjoins nothing more than knowing there is no authority for a repetition of the act4 ,nor can it be said that the act of knowing1 analogous to the act of beating the rice-grains until they are freed from the husks1 is a visible means towards effecting the intuition of ,brahman1 and hence must1 like the beating1 be repeated until the effect is accomplished2 for knowing is not a visible means towards anything4 ,such acts as the ,jyotishtoma sacrifice and the knowledge inculcated in the ,vednta-texts are alike of the nature of conciliation of the ,supreme ,person2 through whom thus conciliated man obtains all that is beneficial to him1 viz4 religious duty1 wealth1 pleasure1 and final ,release4 ,this has been shown under ,,iii1 #b1 #ch4 ,the meaning of ,scripture therefore is accomplished by performing the act of knowledge once only1 as the ,jyotishtoma is performed once4--,this view the ,stra sets aside4 ,the meaning of ,scripture is fulfilled only by repeated acts of knowledge 'on account of teaching1' i4e4 because the teaching of ,scripture is conveyed by means of the term 'knowing' 7vedana71 which is synonymous with meditating 7dhyna1 upsana74 ,that these terms are so synonymous appears from the fact that the verbs vid1 ups1 dhyi are in one and the same text used with reference to one and the same object of knowledge4 ,a text begins1 e4 g4 ',let him meditate 7upsta7 on mind as ,brahman1' and concludes 'he who knows 7veda7 this shines1 warms1' c4 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #ah74 ,in the same way the knowledge of ,raikva is at first referred to by means of vid1 ',he who knows 7veda7 what he knows is thus spoken of by me1' and further on by means of ups1'teach me the deity on which you meditate' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #a1 #b74 ,similarly texts which have the same meaning as the text ',he who knows ,brahman reaches the ,highest'--viz4 'the ,self should be seen1 be heard1 be reflected on1 be meditated upon 7nididhysitavya7'--',then he sees him meditating 7dhyyamna7 on him as without parts' 7,mu4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #a1 #h71 and others--use the verb dhyi to express the meaning of vid4 ,now dhyi means to think of something not in the way of mere representation 7smriti71 but in the way of continued representation4 ,and ups has the same meaning2 for we see it used in the sense of thinking with uninterrupted concentration of the mind on one object4 ,we therefore conclude that as the verb 'vid' is used interchangeably with dhyi and ups1 the mental activity referred to in texts such as 'he knows ,brahman' and the like is an often-repeated continuous representation4 #b4 ,and on account of an inferential mark4 ,inferential mark here means ,smriti4 ,smriti also declares that that knowledge which effects ,release is of the nature of continued representation4 ,meditation therefore has to be repeated4--,here terminates the adhikarana of 'repetition4' #c4 ,but as the ,self2 this 7the ancient ,devotees7 acknowledge 7since the texts7 make 7them7 apprehend 7in that way74 ,the following point is now taken into consideration4 ,is ,brahman to be meditated upon as something different from the meditating ,devotee1 or as the ,self of the latter8--,the ,prvapakshin holds the former view4 ,for1 he says1 the individual soul is something different from ,brahman2 as has been proved under ,,ii1 #a1 #bb2 ,,iii1 #d1 #h2 ,i1 #a1 #ae4 ,and ,brahman must be meditated upon as it truly is2 for if it is meditated upon under an unreal aspect1 the attaining to ,brahman also will not be real1 according to the principle expressed in the text1 ',according as a man's thought is in this world1 so will he be when he has departed this life' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #ad1 #a74 ,this view the ,stra sets aside4 ,brahman is rather to be meditated upon as being the ,self of the meditating ,devotee4 ,as the meditating individual soul is the ,self of its own body1 so the highest ,brahman is the ,self of the individual soul--this is the proper form of meditation4--,why8 ,because the great ,devotees of olden times acknowledged this to be the true nature of meditation2 compare the text ',then ,i am indeed thou1 holy divinity1 and thou art me4'--,but how can the ,devotees claim that ,brahman which is a different being is their ',ego'8--,because the texts enable them to apprehend this relation as one free from contradiction4 ',he who dwelling within the ,self is different from the ,self1 whom the ,self does not know1 of whom the ,self is the body1 who rules the ,self from within2 he is thy ,self1 the inner ruler1 the immortal one'7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #g1 #c72 ',in the ,true all these beings have their root1 they dwell in the ,true1 they rest in the ,true2--in that all that exists has its ,self' 7,kh4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #h72 ',all this indeed is ,brahman' 7,kh4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #ad1 #a7--;all these texts teach that all sentient and non- sentient beings spring from ,brahman1 are merged in him1 breathe through him1 are ruled by him1 constitute his body2 so that he is the ,self of all of them4 ,in the same way therefore as1 on the basis of the fact that the individual soul occupies with regard to the body the position of a ,self1 we form such judgments of co-ordination as ',i am a god--,i am a man'2 the fact of the individual ,self being of the nature of ,self justifies us in viewing our own ,ego as belonging to the highest ,self4 ,on the presupposition of all ideas being finally based on ,brahman and hence all words also finally denoting ,brahman1 the texts therefore make such statements of mutual implication as ',i am thou1 ,o holy divinity1 and thou art me4' ,on this view of the relation of individual soul and highest ,self there is no real contradiction between two1 apparently contradictory1 sets of texts1 viz4 those on the one hand which negative the view of the soul being different from the highest ,self1 ',now if a man meditates upon another divinity1 thinking the divinity is one and ,i another1 he does not know'2 ',he is incomplete1 let him meditate upon ,him as the ,self'2 ',everything abandons him who views anything apart from the ,self 7,bri4 ,up4 ,i1 #d1 #aj2 #g-;,,ii1 #d1 #f72 and on the other hand those texts which set forth the view of the soul and the highest ,self being different entities1 ',thinking of the 7individual7 ,self and the ,mover as different'7,svet4 ,up4 ,i1 #f74 ,for our view implies a denial of difference in so far as the individual ',i' is of the nature of the ,self2 and it implies an acknowledgment of difference in so far as it allows the highest ,self to differ from the individual soul in the same way as the latter differs from its body4 ,the clause 'he is incomplete' 7in one of the texts quoted above7 refers to the fact that ,brahman which is different from the soul constitutes the ,self of the soul1 while the soul constitutes the body of ,brahman4--,it thus remains a settled conclusion that ,brahman is to be meditated upon as constituting the ,self of the meditating ,devotee4--,here terminates the adhikarana of 'meditation under the aspect of ,self4' #d4 ,not in the symbol2 for 7the symbol7 is not that one 7i4e4 the ,self of the ,devotee74 ',let a man meditate on mind as ,brahman' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #ah1 #a72 ',he who meditates on name as ,brahman' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vii1 #ae7--with regard to these and similar meditations on outward symbols 7pratka7 of ,brahman there arises a doubt1 viz4 whether in them the symbols are to be thought of as of the nature of ,self or not4 ,the ,prvapakshin holds the former view4 ,for1 he says1 in form those injunctions do not differ from other injunctions of meditation on ,brahman1 and ,brahman1 as we have seen1 constitutes the ,self of the meditating ,devotee4--,this view the ,stra sets aside4 ,a pratka cannot be meditated on as being of the nature of ,self2 for the pratka is not the ,self of the meditating ,devotee4 ,what1 in those meditations1 is to be meditated upon is the pratka only1 not ,brahman3 the latter enters into the meditation only as qualifying its aspect4 ,for by a meditation on a pratka we understand a meditation in which something that is not ,brahman is viewed under the aspect of ,brahman1 and as the pratka--the object of meditation--is not the ,self of the ,devotee it cannot be viewed under that form4--,but an objection is raised here also1 it is ,brahman which is the real object of meditation2 for where ,brahman may be viewed as the object of meditation1 it is inappropriate to assume as objects non-sentient things of small power such as the mind1 and so on4 ,the object of meditation therefore is ,brahman viewed under the aspect of mind1 and so on4--,this objection the next ,stra disposes of4 #e4 ,the view of ,brahman1 on account of superiority4 ,the view of ,brahman may appropriately be superimposed on mind and the like2 but not the view of mind1 and so on1 on ,brahman4 ,for ,brahman is something superior to mind1 and so on2 while the latter are inferior to ,brahman4 ,to view a superior person1 a prince e4g41 as a servant would be lowering2 while1 on the other hand1 to view a servant as a prince is exalting4--,here terminates the adhikarana of 'symbols4' #f4 ,and the ideas of ditya and the rest on the member2 on account of this being rational4 ',he who shines up there let a man meditate on him as the ,udgtha' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,i1 #c1 #a74--,with regard to this and similar meditations connected with subordinate parts of sacrificial performances there arises the doubt whether the idea of ditya and so on has to be superimposed on the subordinate part of the sacrifice1 such as the ,udgtha1 or vice vers 7i4 e4 whether ditya should be meditated upon under the aspect of the ,udgtha1 or vice vers74--,the ,prvapakshin holds the former view4 ,for the general principle is that the lower being should be viewed under the aspect of the higher1 and the ,udgtha and so on1 which are parts of the sacrifices through which certain results are effected1 are superior to the divinities who do not accomplish any result4--,of this view the ,stra disposes4 ,the ideas of ditya and so on are to be superimposed on the 'members1' i4e4 the ,udgtha and so on1 which are constituent members of the sacrifices2 because of the gods only superiority can be established4 ,for it is only through the propitiation of the gods that sacrifices are capable of bringing about their results4 ,the ,udgtha and the rest therefore are to be viewed under the aspect of ditya and so on4--,here terminates the adhikarana of 'the ideas of ditya and so on4' #g4 ,sitting2 on account of possibility4 ,it has been shown that that special form of cognitional activity which the ,vednta-texts set forth as the means of accomplishing final ,release and which is called meditation 7dhyna2 upsana7 has to be frequently repeated1 and is of the nature of continued representation4 ,a question now arises as to the way in which it has to be carried on4--,there being no special restrictive rule1 the ,prvapakshin holds that the ,devotee may carry it on either sitting or lying down or standing or walking4--,this view the ,stra sets aside4 ,meditation is to be carried on by the ,devotee in a sitting posture1 since in that posture only the needful concentration of mind can be reached4 ,standing and walking demand effort1 and lying down is conducive to sleep4 ,the proper posture is sitting on some support1 so that no effort may be required for holding the body up4 #h4 ,and on account of meditation4 ,since1 as intimated by the text1'the ,self is to be meditated upon1' the mental activity in question is of the nature of meditation1 it requires as its necessary condition concentration of mind4 ,for by meditation is understood thought directed upon one object and not disturbed by the ideas of other things4 #i4 ,and with reference to immobility4 ,and it is with reference to their immobility that the earth and other inanimate things--the air1 the sky1 the waters1 the mountains--may be spoken of as thinking1 'the earth thinks 7dhyyati7 as it were1' and so on4 ,movelessness hence is characteristic of the intensely meditating person also1 and such movelessness is to be realised in the sitting posture only4 #aj4 ,and ,smriti texts say the same4 ,smriti texts also declare that he only who sits can meditate1 ',having placed his steady seat upon a pure spot1 there seated upon that seat1 concentrating his mind he should practise ,yoga' 7,bha4 ,g4 ,,vi1 #aa-ab74 #aa4 ,where concentration of mind 7is possible71 there2 on account of there being no difference4 ,as the texts do not say anything as to special places and times1 the only requisite of such places and times is that they should favour concentration of mind4 ,this agrees with the declaration ',let a man apply himself to meditation in a level and clean place1 c41 favourable to the mind' 7,svet4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #aj74--;,here terminates the adhikarana of 'the sitting one4' #ab4 ,up to death2 for there also it is seen4 ,the question now arises whether the meditation described which is the means of final ,release is to be accomplished within one day1 or to be continued day after day1 until death4--,the view that it is accomplished within one day1 as this will satisfy the scriptural injunction1 is disposed of by the ,stra4 ,meditation is to be continued until death4 ,for ,scripture declares that meditation has to take place 'there1' i4e4 in the whole period from the first effort after meditation up to death1 ',acting thus as long as life lasts he reaches the world of ,brahman4'-- ,here terminates the adhikarana of 'up to death4' #ac4 ,on the attainment of this1 there result the non-clinging and the destruction of later and earlier sins2 this being declared4 ,having1 so far1 elucidated the nature of meditation1 the ,stras now begin to consider the result of meditation4 ,scripture declares that on the knowledge of ,brahman being attained a man's later and earlier sins do not cling to him but pass away4 ',as water does not cling to a lotus leaf1 so no evil deed clings to him who knows this' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #ad1 #c72 ',having known that he is not sullied by any evil deed' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #d1 #bc72 ',as the fibres of the ,ishk reed when thrown into the fire are burnt1 thus all his sins are burnt' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,v1 #bd1 #c72 ',all his works perish when ,he has been beheld who is high and low' 7,mu4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #b1 #h74-- ,the doubt here arises whether this non-clinging and destruction of all sins is possible as the result of mere meditation1 or not4--,it is not possible1 the ,prvapakshin maintains2 for ,scripture declares1 'no work the fruits of which have not been completely enjoyed perishes even in millions of aeons4' ,what the texts1 quoted above1 say as to the non- clinging and destruction of works occurs in sections complementary to passages inculcating knowledge as the means of final ,release1 and may therefore be understood as somehow meant to eulogize knowledge4 ,nor can it be said that knowledge is enjoined as an expiation of sins1 so that the destruction of sins could be conceived as resulting from such expiation2 for knowledge--as we see from texts such as ',he who knows ,brahman reaches the ,highest1' ',he knows ,brahman and he becomes ,brahman'-- is enjoined as a means to reach ,brahman4 ,the texts as to the non- clinging and destruction of sins therefore can only be viewed as arthavda passages supplementary to the texts enjoining knowledge of ,brahman4--,this view the ,stra sets aside4 ,when a man reaches knowledge1 the non-clinging and destruction of all sins may be effected through the power of knowledge4 ,for ,scripture declares the power of knowledge to be such that 'to him who knows this1 no evil deed clings1' and so on4 ,nor is this in conflict with the text stating that no work not fully enjoyed perishes2 for this latter text aims at confirming the power of works to produce their results2 while the texts under discussion have for their aim to declare that knowledge when once sprung up possesses the power of destroying the capability of previously committed sins to produce their own evil results and the power of obstructing that capability on the part of future evil actions4 ,the two sets of texts thus refer to different matters1 and hence are not mutually contradictory4 ,there is in fact no more contradiction between them than there is between the power of fire to produce heat and the power of water to subdue such heat4 ,by knowledge effecting the non-clinging of sin we have to understand its obstructing the origination of the power1 on the part of sin1 to cause that disastrous disposition on the part of man which consists in unfitness for religious works2 for sins committed tend to render man unfit for religious works and inclined to commit further sinful actions of the same kind4 ,by knowledge effecting the destruction of sin1 on the other hand1 we understand its destroying that power of sin after it has once originated4 ,that power consists1 fundamentally1 in displeasure on the part of the ,lord4 ,knowledge of the ,lord1 which1 owing to the supreme dearness of its object is itself supremely dear1 possesses the characteristic power of propitiating the ,lord--the object of knowledge-- and thus destroys the displeasure of the ,lord due to the previous commission of sins on the part of the knowing ,devotee2 and at the same time obstructs the origination of further displeasure on the ,lord's part1 which otherwise would be caused by sins committed subsequently to the origination of such knowledge4 ,what ,scripture says about sin not clinging to him who knows can however be understood only with regard to such sins as spring from thoughtlessness2 for texts such as 'he who has not turned away from evil conduct' 7,ka4 ,up4 ,i1 #b1 #bd7 teach that meditation1 becoming more perfect day after day1 cannot be accomplished without the ,devotee having previously broken himself off from all evil conduct4--,here terminates the adhikarana of 'the reaching of that4' #ad4 ,of the other also there is thus non-clinging2 but at death4 ,it has been said that1 owing to knowledge1 earlier and subsequent sins do not cling and are destroyed4 ,the same holds good also with regard to the other1 i4e4 to good works--they also1 owing to knowledge1 do not cling and are destroyed2 for there is the same antagonism between knowledge and the fruit of those works1 and ,scripture moreover expressly declares this4 ,thus we read1 ',day and night do not pass that bank-- neither good nor evil deeds4 ,all sins turn back from it' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,viii1 #d1 #a72 ',he shakes off his good and evil deeds' 7,kau4 ,up4 ,i1 #d74 ,in the former of these texts good works are expressly designated as 'sin' because their fruits also are something not desirable for him who aims at ,release2 there is some reason for doing this because after all good works are enjoined by ,scripture and their fruits are desired by men1 and they hence might be thought not to be opposed to knowledge4--,but even to him who possesses the knowledge of ,brahman1 the fruits of good deeds-- such as seasonable rain1 good crops1 c4--are desirable because they enable him to perform his meditations in due form2 how then can it be said that knowledge is antagonistic to them and destroys them8--,of this point the ,stra disposes by means of the clause 'but on death4' ,good works which produce results favourable to knowledge and meditation perish only on the death of the body 7not during the lifetime of the ,devotee74--,here terminates the adhikarana of 'the other4' #ae4 ,but only those former works the effects of which have not yet begun2 on account of that being the term4 ,a new doubt arises here1 viz4 whether all previous good and evil works are destroyed by the origination of knowledge1 or only those the effects of which have not yet begun to operate4--,all works alike1 the ,prvapakshin says2 for the texts-as e4g4 'all sins are burned'--declare the fruits of knowledge to be the same in all cases2 and the fact of the body continuing to exist subsequently to the rise of knowledge may be accounted for by the force of an impulse once imparted1 just as in the case of the revolution of a potter's wheel4--,this view the ,stra sets aside4 ,only those previous works perish the effects of which have not yet begun to operate2 for the text ',for him there is delay as long as he is not delivered from the body' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #ad1 #b7 expressly states when the delay of the body's death will come to an end 7the body meanwhile continuing to exist through the influence of the anrabdhakrya works74 ,there is no proof for the existence of an impetus accounting for the continuance of the body's life1 other than the ,lord's pleasure or displeasure caused by--good or evil deeds4--,here terminates the adhikarana of 'the works the operation of which has not yet begun4' #af4 ,but the ,agnihotra and the rest1 7because they tend7 to that effect only2 this being seen4 ,it might here be said that special works incumbent on the several sramas1 as e4 g4 the ,agnihotra1 need not be undertaken by those who are not desirous of their results1 since these works also fall under the category of good works the result of which does not 'cling4'--,this view the ,stra sets aside4 ,such works as the ,agnihotra must be performed1 since there is no possibility of their results not clinging2 for him who knows1 those works have knowledge for their exclusive effect4 ,this we learn from ,scripture itself3 ',him ,brhmanas seek to know by the study of the ,veda1 by sacrifices1 gifts1 austerities1 and fasting4' ,this passage shows that works such as the ,agnihotra give rise to knowledge1 and as knowledge in order to grow and become more perfect has to be practised day after day until death1 the special duties of the srama also1 which assist the rise of knowledge1 have daily to be performed4 ,otherwise1 those duties being omitted1 the mind would lose its clearness and knowledge would not arise4--,but if good works such as the ,agnihotra only serve the purpose of giving rise to knowledge1 and if good works previous to the rise of knowledge perish1 according to the texts ',having dwelt there till their works are consumed' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,v1 #aj1 #e7 and 'having obtained the end of his deeds' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #d1 #f71 to what then applies the text ',his sons enter upon his inheritance1 his friends upon his good works'8--,this point is taken up by the next ,stra4 #ag4 ,according to some 7a class of good works7 other than these1 of both kinds4 ,the text quoted above from one skh 7',his friends enter upon his good deeds'7 refers to good works other than the ,agnihotra and the rest1 the only object of which is to give rise to knowledge1 viz4 to all those manifold good works1 previous or subsequent to the attaining to knowledge1 the results of which are obstructed by other works of greater strength4 ,those texts also which declare works not to cling or to be destroyed through knowledge refer to this same class of works4--,the next ,stra recalls the fact1 already previously established1 that the results of works actually performed may somehow be obstructed4 #ah4 ,for 7there is the text7 'whatever he does with knowledge4' ,the declaration made in the text 'whatever he does with knowledge that is more vigorous1' viz4 that the knowledge of the ,udgtha has for its result non-obstruction of the result of the sacrifice1 implies that the result of works actually performed may be obstructed4 ,we thus arrive at the conclusion that the text of the ,styyanins1' his friends enter upon his good works1' refers to those good works of the man possessing knowledge the results of which were somehow obstructed 7and hence did not act themselves out during his lifetime1 so that on his death they may be transferred to others74--,here terminates the adhikarana of 'the ,agnihotra and the rest4' #ai4 ,but having destroyed by fruition the other two sets he becomes one with ,brahman4 ,there now arises the doubt whether the good and evil works other than those the non-clinging and destruction of which have been declared1 that is to say those works the results of which have begun to act1 come to an end together with that bodily existence in which knowledge of ,brahman originates1 or with the last body due to the action of the works last mentioned1 or with another body due to the action of the anrabdhakrya4-- ,the second of these alternatives is the one to be accepted1 for there is a text declaring that works come to an end with the deliverance of the ,self from the current bodily existence3 ',for him there is delay so long as he is not delivered 7from the body71 then he will become one with ,brahman' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #ad1 #b74--,this view the ,stra sets aside4 ,having destroyed the other good and evil works the results of which had begun to operate by retributive experience he1 subsequently to the termination of such retributive enjoyment1 becomes one with ,brahman4 ,if those good and evil works are such that their fruits may be fully enjoyed within the term of one bodily existence1 they come to an end together with the current bodily existence2 if they require several bodily existences for the full experience of their results1 they come to an end after several existences only4 ,this being so1 the deliverance spoken of in the text quoted by the ,prvapakshin means deliverance from those works when completely destroyed by retributive enjoyment1 not deliverance from bodily existence about which the text says nothing4 ,all those works1 on the other hand1 good and evil1 which were performed before the rise of knowledge and the results of which have not yet begun to operate--works which have gradually accumulated in the course of infinite time so as to constitute an infinite quantity--are at once destroyed by the might of the rising knowledge of ,brahman4 ,and works performed subsequently to the rise of such knowledge do not 'cling4' ,and1 as ,scripture teaches1 the friends of the man possessing true knowledge take over1 on his death1 his good works1 and his enemies his evil deeds4 ,thus there remains no contradiction4--,here terminates the adhikarana of 'the destruction of the others4' ,,second ,p,,da4 #a4 ,speech with mind1 on account of this being seen and of scriptural statement4 ,the ,stras now begin an enquiry into the mode of the going to ,brahman of him who knows4 ,at first the soul's departure from the body is considered4 ,on this point we have the text1 ',when a man departs from hence his speech is combined 7sampadyate7 with his mind1 his mind with his breath1 his breath with fire1 fire with the highest deity' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #f1 #a74 ,the doubt here arises whether the speech's being combined with the mind1 referred to in the text1 means that the function of speech only is merged in mind1 or the organ of speech itself4--,the ,prvapakshin holds the former view2 for1 he says1 as mind is not the causal substance of speech1 the latter cannot be merged in it2 while the scriptural statement is not altogether irrational in so far as the functions of speech and other organs are controlled by the mind1 and therefore may be conceived as being withdrawn into it4--,this view the ,stra sets aside4 ,speech itself becomes combined with mind2 since that is seen4 ,for the activity of mind is observed to go on even when the organ of speech has ceased to act4--,but is this not sufficiently accounted for by the assumption of the mere function of speech being merged in mind8--,to this the ,stra replies 'and on account of the scriptural word4' ,the text says distinctly that speech itself1 not merely the function of speech1 becomes one with the mind4 ,and when the function of speech comes to an end1 there is no other means of knowledge to assure us that the function only has come to an end and that the organ itself continues to have an independent existence4 ,the objection that speech cannot become one with mind because the latter is not the causal substance of speech1 we meet by pointing out that the purport of the text is not that speech is merged in mind1 but only that it is combined or connected with it4 #b4 ,and for the same reason all follow after4 ,because speech's becoming one with mind means only conjunction with the latter1 not merging within it2 there is also no objection to what ,scripture says as to all other organs that follow speech being united with mind4--,here terminates the adhikarana of 'speech4' #c4 ,that mind in breath1 owing to the subsequent clause4 ,that mind1 i4e4 mind united with all the organs unites itself with breath2 not merely the function of mind4 ,this appears from the clause following upon the text quoted above1 'mind 7unites itself7 with breath4' ,here1 however1 a further doubt suggests itself4 ,the text ',mind is made of earth' declares earth to be the causal substance of mind1 and the text 'that 7viz4 water7 sent forth earth' declares water to be the causal substance of earth2 while the further text 'breath is made of water' shows water to be the causal substance of breath4 ,considering therefore that in the text 'mind becomes united with breath' the term breath is naturally understood to denote the causal substance of breath1 i4e4 water1 the appropriate sense to be given to the statement that mind is united with water is that mind is completely refunded into its own causal substance--so that the 'being united' would throughout be understood 'as being completely merged4'--,the reply to this1 however1 is1 that the clauses ',mind is made of food1 breath is made of water1' only mean that mind and breath are nourished and sustained by food and water1 not that food and water are the causal substances of mind and breath4 ,the latter indeed is impossible2 for mind consists of ahamkra1 and as breath is a modification of ether and other elements1 the word breath may suggest water4--,here terminates the adhikarana of 'mind4' #d4 ,that 7is united7 with the ruler1 on account of the going to it1 and so on4 ,as from the statements that speech becomes united with mind and mind with breath it follows that speech and mind are united with mind and breath only2 so we conclude from the subsequent clause 'breath with fire' that breath becomes united with fire only4--,against this prim facie view the ,stra declares 'that breath becomes united with the ruler of the organs1 i4e4 the individual soul1 on account of the going to it1 and so on4' ,that breath goes to the individual soul1 the following text declares1 ',at the time of death all the prnas go to the ,self of a man about to expire' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #c1 #ch71 ,similarly ,scripture mentions the departure of prna together with the soul1 'after him thus departing the prawa departs'2 and again its staying together with the soul1 ',what is that by whose departure ,i shall depart1 and by whose staying ,i shall stay8' 7,pr4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #c74 ,we therefore conclude that the text 'breath with fire' means that breath joined with the individual soul becomes united with fire4 ,analogously we may say in ordinary life that the ,yamuna is flowing towards the sea1 while in reality it is the ,yamuna joined with the ,gang which flows on4--,here terminates the adhikarana of 'the ruler4' #e4 ,with the elements1 this being stated by ,scripture4 ,there arises the further question whether breath joined with the soul unites itself with fire only or with all the elements combined4--,with fire1 so much only being declared by ,scripture6--,this view the ,stra sets aside4 ,breath and soul unite themselves with all the elements2 for ,scripture declares the soul1 when moving out1 to consist of all the elements--',consisting of earth1 consisting of water1 consisting of fire4 '--,but this latter text explains itself also on the assumption of breath and soul unitrng themselves in succession with fire and the rest1 one at a time6--,this the next ,stra negatives4 #f4 ,not with one2 for both declare this4 ,not with one2 because each element by itself is incapable of producing an effect4 ,such incapability is declared by ,scripture and tradition alike4 ,the text ',having entered these beings with this jva soul let me reveal names and forms--let me make each of these three tripartite' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #c7 teaches that the elements were rendered tripartite in order to be capable of evolving names and forms2 and of similar import is the following ,smriti text1 ',possessing various powers these 7elements71 being separate from one another1 were unable to produce creatures without combining4 ,but having entered into mutual conjunction they1 from the ,mahat down to individual beings1 produce the ,brahma egg4' ,from this it follows that in the clause 'breath is united with fire' the word fire denotes fire mixed with the other elements4 ,breath and soul therefore are united with the aggregate of the elements4--,here terminates the adhikarana of 'the elements4' #g4 ,and it is common up to the beginning of the way2 and the immortality 7is that which is obtained71 without having burned4 ,is this departure of the soul common to him who knows and him who does not know8--,it belongs to him only who does not know1 the ,prvapakshin holds4 ,for ,scripture declares that for him who knows there is no departure1 and that hence he becomes immortal then and there 7irrespective of any departure of the soul to another place71 'when all desires which once dwelt in his heart are undone1 then the mortal becomes immortal1 then he obtains ,brahman' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #d1 #g74 ,this view the ,stra sets aside4 ,for him also who knows there is the same way of passing out up to the beginning of the path1 i4e4 previously to the soul's entering the veins4 ,for another text expressly declares that the soul of him also who knows passes out by way of a particular vein3 'there are a hundred and one veins of the heart2 one of them penetrates the crown of the head2 moving upwards by that a man reaches immortality1 the others serve for departing in different directions' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,viii1 #f1 #e74 ,scripture thus declaring that the soul of him who knows passes out by way of a particular vein1 it must of course be admitted that it does pass out2 and as up to the soul's entering the vein no difference is mentioned1 we must assume that up to that moment the departure of him who knows does not differ from that of him who does not know4 ,a difference however is stated with regard to the stage of the soul's entering the vein1 viz4 ,bri4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #d1 #b1 ',by that light the ,self departs1 either through the eye1 or through the skull1 or through other parts of the body4' ,as this text must be interpreted in agreement with the text relative to the hundred and one veins1 the departure by way of the head must be understood to belong to him who knows1 while the other modes of departing belong to other persons4 ,the last clause of the ,stra 'and the immortality1 without having burned' replies to what the ,prvapakshin said as to the soul of him who knows being declared by ,scripture to attain to immortality then and there4 ,the immortality referred to in the text 'when all desires of his heart are undone' denotes that non-clinging and destruction of earlier and later sins which comes to him who knows1 together with the rise of knowledge1 without the connexion of the soul with the body1 and the sense-organs being burned1 i4e4 dissolved at the time4--',he reaches ,brahman' in the same text means that in the act of devout meditation the devotee has an intuitive knowledge of ,brahman4 #h4 ,since1 up to the union with that 7i4e4 ,brahman7 the texts describe the ,samsra state4 ,the immortality referred to must necessarily be understood as not implying dissolution of the soul's connexion with the body1 since up to the soul's attaining to ,brahman the texts describe the ,samsra state4 ,that attaining to ,brahman takes place1 as will be shown further on1 after the soul--moving on the path the first stage of which is light-- has reached a certain place4 ,up to that the texts denote the ,samsra state of which the connexion with a body is characteristic4 ',for him there is delay so long as he is not delivered 7from the body72 then he will be united' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #ad1 #b72 ',shaking off all evil as a horse shakes his hairs1 and as the moon frees herself from the mouth of ,rhu2 having shaken off the body ,i obtain self1 made and satisfied1 the uncreated world of ,brahman' 7,,viii1 #ac74 #i4 ,and the subtle 7body persists71 on account of a means of knowledge1 it being thus observed 7in ,scripture74 ,the bondage of him who knows is not1 at that stage1 dissolved1 for this reason also that the subtle body continues to persist4--,how is this known8--,through a means of knowledge1 viz4 because it is thus seen in ,scripture4 ,for ,scripture states that he who knows1 when on the path of the gods1 enters into a colloquy with the moon and others1 'he is to reply1' c4 7,kau4 ,up4 ,i1 #c ff474 ,this implies the existence of a body1 and thence it follows that1 at that stage1 the subtle body persists4 ,the state of bondage therefore is not yet dissolved4 #aj4 ,hence not in the way of destruction of bondage4 ,it thus appears that the text 'when all desires which once entered his heart are undone1 then does the mortal become immortal1 then he obtains ,brahman' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #d1 #g71 does not mean such immortality as would imply complete destruction of the state of bondage4 #aa4 ,and to that very 7subtle body7 7there belongs7 the warmth1 this only being reasonable4 ,it is observed that when a man is about to die there is some warmth left in some part or parts of the gross body4 ,now this warmth cannot really belong to the gross body1 for it is not observed in other parts of that body 7while yet there is no reason why it should be limited to some part72 but it may reasonably be attributed to the subtle body which may abide in some part of the gross body 7and into which the warmth of the entire gross body has withdrawn itself74 ,we therefore conclude that this partial perception of warmth is due to the departing subtle body4 ,this confirms the view laid down in ,stra #g4--,the next ,stra disposes of a further doubt raised as to the departure of the soul of him who knows4 #ab4 ,if it be said that on account of the denial 7it is not so72 we deny this4 ,from the embodied soul2 for 7that one is7 clear1 according to some4 ,the contention that the soul of him who knows departs from the body in the same way as other souls do cannot be upheld1 since ,scripture expressly negatives such departure4 ,for ,bri4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #d1 at first describes the mode of departure on the part of him who does not possess true knowledge 7',he taking to himself those elements of light descends into the heart' up to 'after him thus departing the ,prna departs'72 then refers to his assuming another body 7'he makes to himself another1 newer and more beautiful shape'72 then concludes the account of him who does not possess true knowledge 7'having attained the end of these works whatever he does here1 he again returns from that world to this world of action4 ,so much for the man who desires'72 and thereupon proceeds explicitly to deny the departure from the body of him who possesses true knowledge1 ',but he who does not desire1 who is without desire1 free from desire1 who has obtained his desire1 who desires the ,self only1 of him 7tasya7 the prnas do not pass forth1--being ,brahman only he goes into ,brahman4' ,similarly a previous section also1 viz4 the one containing the questions put by rtabhga1 directly negatives the view of the soul of him who knows passing out of the body4 ,there the clause 'he again conquers death' introduces him who knows as the subject-matter1 and after that the text continues3 ',yjavalkya1 he said1 when that person dies1 do the prnas pass out of him 7asmt7 or not8--,no1 said ,yjavalkya1 they are gathered up in him 7atraiva71 he swells1 inflated the dead lies' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #b1 #aj-aa74 ,from these texts it follows that he who knows attains to immortality here 7without his soul passing out of the body and moving to another place74--,this view the ,stra rejects4 ',not so2 from the embodied soul4' ,what those texts deny is the moving away of the prnas from the embodied individual soul1 not from the body4 ',of him 7tasya7 the prnas do not pass forth'--here the 'of him' refers to the subject under discussion1 i4e4 the embodied soul which is introduced by the clause 'he who does not desire1' not to the body which the text had not previously mentioned4 ,the sixth case 7tasya7 here denotes the embodied soul as that which is connected with the prnas 7'the prnas belonging to that1 i4e4 the soul1 do not pass out'71 not as that from which the passing out takes its start4--,but why should the 'tasya' not denote the body as the point of starting 7'the prnas do not pass forth from that 7tasya71 viz4 the body'78--,because1 we reply1 the soul which is actually mentioned in its relation of connexion with the prnas 7as indicated by tasya7 suggests itself to the mind more immediately than the body which is not mentioned at all2 if therefore the question arises as to the starting-point of the passing forth of the prnas the soul is 7on the basis of the text7 apprehended as that starting-point also 7i4e4 the clause 'the prnas of him do not pass forth' implies at the same time 'the prnas do not pass forth from him1 i4e4 from the soul'74 ,moreover1 as the prnas are well known to be connected with the soul and as hence it would serve no purpose to state that connexion1 we conclude that the sixth case which expresses connexion in general is here meant to denote the starting-point in particular4 ,and no dispute on this point is really possible2 since 'according to some' it is 'clear' that what the text means to express is the embodied soul as the starting-point of the prnas4 ,the some are the ,mdhyandinas1 who in their text of the ,brihad-ranyaka read 'na tasmt prna utkrmanti'--'the prnas do not pass forth from him' 7the 'tasya' thus being the reading of the ,knva ,skh only74--,but1 an objection is raised1 there is no motive for explicitly negativing the passing away of the prnas from the soul2 for there is no reason to assume that there should be such a passing away 7and the general rule is that a denial is made of that only for which there is a presumption74-- ,not so1 we reply4 ,the ,chndogya-text ',for him there is delay only as long as he is not delivered 7from the body72 then he will be united' declares that the soul becomes united with ,brahman at the time of its separation from the body1 and this suggests the idea of the soul of him who knows separating itself at that very time 7i4e4 the time of death7 from the prnas also4 ,but this would mean that the soul cannot reach union with ,brahman by means of proceeding on the path of the gods1 and for this reason the ,brihad-ranyaka 7'of him the prnas do not pass forth'7 explicitly declares that the prnas do not depart from the soul of him who knows1 before that soul proceeding on the path of the gods attains to union with ,brahman4 ,the same line of refutation would have to be applied to the arguments founded by our opponent on the question of rtabhga1 if that question be viewed as referring to him who possesses true knowledge4 ,the fact however is that that passage refers to him who does not possess that knowledge2 for none of the questions and answers of which the section consists favours the presumption of the knowledge of ,brahman being under discussion4 ,the matters touched upon in those questions and answers are the nature of the senses and sense objects viewed as graha and atigraha2 water being the food of fire2 the non-separation of the prnas from the soul at the time of death2 the continuance of the fame--there called name--of the dead man2 and the attainment1 on the part of the soul of the departed1 to conditions of existence corresponding to his good or evil deeds4 ,the passage immediately preceding the one referring to the non-departure of the prnas merely means that death is conquered in so far as it is a fire and fire is the food of water2 this has nothing to do with the owner of true knowledge4 ,the statement that the prnas of the ordinary man who does not possess true knowledge do not depart means that at the time of death the prnas do not1 like the gross body1 abandon the jva1 but cling to it like the subtle body and accompany it4 #ac4 ,smriti also declares this4 ,smriti also declares that the soul of him who knows departs by means of an artery of the head4 ',of those1 one is situated above which pierces the disc of the sun and passes beyond the world of ,brahman2 by way of that the soul reaches the highest goal' 7,yj4 ,smri4 ,,iii1 #afg74--;,here terminates the adhikarana of 'up to the beginning of the road4' #ad4 ,with the ,highest2 for thus it says4 ,it has been shown that at the time of departure from the body the soul together with the organs and prnas unites itself with the subtle elements1 fire and the rest2 and the notion that the soul of him who knows forms an exception has been disposed of4 ,the further question now arises whether those subtle elements move on towards producing their appropriate effects1 in accordance with the works or the nature of meditation 7of some other soul with which those elements join themselves71 or unite themselves with the highest ,self4--,the ,prvapakshin holds that1 as in the case of union with the highest ,self1 they could not give rise to their peculiar effects1 i4e4 the experience of pleasure and pain1 they move towards some place where they can give rise to their appropriate effects4--,of this view the ,stra disposes4 ,they unite themselves with the highest ,self2 for ,scripture declares 'warmth in the highest ,being' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #h1 #f74 ,and the doings of those elements must be viewed in such a way as to agree with ,scripture4 ,as in the states of deep sleep and a pralaya1 there is1 owing to union with the highest ,self1 a cessation of all experience of pain and pleasure2 so it is in the case under question also4--,here terminates the adhikarana of 'union with the ,highest4' #ae4 ,non-division1 according to statement4 ,is this union with the highest ,self to be understood as ordinary 'merging1' i4e4 a return on the part of the effected thing into the condition of the cause 7as when the jar is reduced to the condition of a lump of clay71 or as absolute non-division from the highest ,self1 such as is meant in the clauses preceding the text last quoted1 ',speech is merged in mind'8 c4--,the former view is to be adopted2 for as the highest ,self is the causal substance of all1 union with it means the return on the part of individual beings into the condition of that causal substance4--,this view the ,stra rejects4 ,union here means non- division1 i4e4 connexion of such kind that those subtle elements are altogether incapable of being thought and spoken of as separate from ,brahman4 ,this the text itself declares1 since the clause 'warmth in the highest ,being' is connected with and governed by the preceding clause ',speech is merged in mind4' ,this preceding clause intimates a special kind of connexion1 viz4 absolute non-separation1 and there is nothing to prove that the dependent clause means to express something different2 nor is there any reason why at the time of the soul's departure those elements should enter into the causal condition2 nor is there anything said about their again proceeding from the causal substance in a new creation4--,here terminates the adhikarana of 'non-separation4' #af4 ,a lighting up of the point of the abode of that2 having the door illuminated by that 7the soul71 owing to the power of its knowledge and the application of remembrance of the way which is an element of that 7viz4 of knowledge71 being assisted by him who abides within the heart1 7passes out7 by way of the hundred and first artery4 ,so far it has been shown that1 up to the beginning of the journey1 the souls of them as well who possess true knowledge as of those who do not1 pass out of the body in the same way4 ,now a difference is stated in the case of those who have true knowledge4 ,we have on this point the following text3 ',there are a hundred and one arteries of the heart2 one of them penetrates the crown of the head2 moving upwards by that a man reaches immortality2 the others serve for departing in different directions' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,viii1 #f1 #e74 ,the doubt here arises whether he who knows departs by this hundred and first artery in the top of the head1 while those who do not know depart by way of the other arteries2 or whether there is no definite rule on this point4--,there is no definite rule1 the ,prvapakshin holds4 ,for as the arteries are many and exceedingly minute1 they are difficult to distinguish1 and the soul therefore is not able to follow any particular one4 ,the text therefore 7is not meant to make an original authoritative statement as to different arteries being followed by different souls1 but7 merely refers in an informal way to what is already settled 7viz4 by the reason of the thing71 i4e4 the casual departure of any soul by any artery4--,this view the ,stra rejects ',by way of the hundred and first4' ,the soul of him who possesses true knowledge departs only by way of the hundred and first artery in the crown of the head4 ,nor is that soul unable to distinguish that particular artcry4 ,for1 through the power of his supremely clear knowledge which has the effect of pleasing the ,supreme ,person1 and through the application of remembrance of the way--which remembrance is a part of that knowledge--the soul of him who knows wins the favour of the ,supreme ,person who abides within the heart1 and is assisted by him4 ,owing to this the abode of that1 i4e4 the heart which is the abode of the soul1 is illuminated1 lit up at its tip1 and thus1 through the grace of the ,supreme ,soul1 the individual soul has the door 7of egress from the body7 lit up and is able to recognise that artery4 ,there is thus no objection to the view that the soul of him who knows passes out by way of that particular artery only4--,here terminates the adhikarana of 'the abode of that4' #ag4 ,following the rays4 ,scripture teaches that the soul of him who knows1 after having passed forth from the heart by way of the hundred and first artery1 follows the rays of the sun and thus reaches the disc of the sun3 'when he departs from this body he goes upwards by these rays only' 7eva7 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,viii1 #f1 #e74 ,the idea here suggests itself that the going of the soul cannot be exclusively bound' to those rays1 since when a man dies during the night it cannot follow tae rays of the sun4 ,hence the text quoted above can refer only to a part of the actual cases4--,this view the ,stra rejects4 ,the soul moves upwards1 following the rays only2 the text expressly asserting this by means of the 'eva'--which would be out of place were there any alternative4 ,nor is there any strength in the argument that the soul of him who dies at night cannot follow the rays as there are none4 ,for in summer the experience of heat at night-time shows that there are present rays then also2 while in winter1 as generally in bad weather1 that heat is overpowered by cold and hence is not perceived 7although actually present74 ,scripture moreover states that the arteries and rays are at all times mutually connected3 ',as a very long highway goes to two villages1 so the rays of the sun go to both worlds1 to this one and to the other4 ,they stretch themselves forth from the sun and enter into these arteries'2 they stretch themselves forth from these arteries and enter into yonder sun' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,viii1 #f1 #b74--;,as thus there are rays at night also1 the souls of those who know reach ,brahman by way of the rays only4--,here terminates the adhikarana of 'the following up the rays4' #ah4 ,should it be said1 not in the night2 we say1 no2 because the connexion persists as long as the body does4 ,scripture also declares this4 ,it is now enquired into whether the soul of him who1 while having true knowledge1 dies at night reaches ,brahman or not4 ,although1 as solar rays exist at night1 the soul may move on at night also following those rays2 yet1 since dying at night is spoken of in the ,stras as highly objectionable1 we conclude that he who dies at night cannot accomplish the highest end of man1 viz4 attainment to ,brahman4 ,the ,stras eulogize death occurring in daytime and object to death at night-time3 ',day-time1 the bright half of the month and the northern progress of the sun are excellent for those about to die2 the contrary times are unfavourable4' ,according to this1 their different nature1 dying in day-time may be assumed to lead to a superior state of existence1 and dying at night to an inferior state4 ,he who dies at night cannot therefore ascend to ,brahman4--,this view the ,stra refutes3 ',because1 in the case of him who knows1 the connexion with works exists as long as the body does4' ,this is to say--since those works which have not yet begun to produce their results and which are the cause of future inferior states of existence are destroyed by the contact with knowledge1 while at the same time later works do not 'cling' 7also owing to the presence of true knowledge71 and those works which have begun to act come to an end with the existence of the last body2 there is no reason why he who knows should remain in bondage1 and hence he reaches ,brahman even if dying at night-time4 ,scripture also declares this1 'for him there is delay only as long as he is not freed from the body1 then he will be united4' ,the text which praises the advantages of night-time1 the light half of the month1 c41 therefore must be understood as referring to those who do not possess true knowledge4--,here terminates the adhikarana of 'night4' #ai4 ,for the same reason also during the southern progress of the sun4 ,the reasoning stated above also proves that the owner of true knowledge who may happen to die during the southern progress of the sun reaches ,brahman4 ,a further doubt1 however1 arises here4 ,the text ',he who dies during the sun's southern progress reaches the greatness of the ,fathers and union with the moon' 7,mahnr4 ,up4 #be7 declares that he who dies during the southern progress reaches the moon2 and the other text 'when this ceases they return again the same way' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #b1 #af7 states that he returns again to the earth4 ,we further know that ,bhshma and others1 although fully possessing the knowledge of ,brahman1 put off their death until the beginning of the northern progress4 ,all this seems to prove that he who dies during the southern progress does not reach ,brahman4--,this doubt we dispose of as follows4 ,those only who do not possess true knowledge return from the moon2 while he who has such knowledge does not return even after he has gone to the moon4 ,for a complementary clause in the ,mahnryana ,up41 'from there he reaches the greatness of ,brahman1' shows that the abode in the moon forms for him1 who having died during the southern progress wishes to reach ,brahman1 a mere stage of rest4 ,and even if there were no such complementary passage1 it would follow from the previously stated absence of any reason for bondage that the going of the wise man's soul to the moon in no way precludes his reaching ,brahman4 ,bhshma and others who through the power of ,yoga were able to choose the time of their death put it off until the beginning of the northern progress in order to proclaim before the world the excellence of that season and thus to promote pious faith and practice4--,but we also meet with an authoritative statement made with reference to wise men about to die1 as to difference of time of death being the cause of a man either returning or not returning to this world1 ',i will declare at which time the ,yogins departing return not1 and also the time at which they return4 ,the sire1 the light1 the day1 the bright fortnight1 the six months of the sun's northern progress--the knowers of ,brahman departing there go to ,brahman4 ,the smoke1 the night1 the dark fortnight1 the six months of the southern progress--the ,yogin departing there having reached the light of the moon returns again4 ,these are held to be the perpetual paths of the world--the white and the black2 by the one man goes not to return1 by the other he returns again' 7,bha4 ,g4 ,,viii1 #bc-bf74--,to this point the next ,stra refers4 #bj4 ,and those two 7paths7 are1 with a view to the ,yogins1 mentioned as to be remembered4 ,the text quoted does not state an injunction for those about to die1 of a special time of death2 but there are rather mentioned in it those two matters belonging to ,smriti and therefore to be remembered1 viz4 the two paths--the path of the ,gods and the path of the ,fathers--with a view to those who know and practise ,yoga2 the text intimating that ,yogins should daily think of those paths which are included in ,yoga meditation4 ,in agreement herewith the text concludes1 ',knowing these two paths no ,yogin is ever deluded4 ,hence in all times1 ,o ,arjuna1 be engaged in ,yoga' 7,bha4 ,g4 ,,viii1 #bg74 ,through the terms 'the fire1 the light1' 'the smoke1 the night1' c4 the path of the ,gods and the path of the ,fathers are recognised4 ,where1 in the beginning1 the text refers to 'the time when1' the word 'time' must be understood to denote the divine beings ruling time1 since ,fire and the rest cannot be time4 ,what the ,bha4 ,g4 aims at therefore is to enjoin on men possessing true knowledge the remembrance of that path of the ,gods originally enjoined in the text1 'they go to light' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #ae1 #aj72 not to determine the proper time of dying for those about to die4--,here terminates the adhikarana of 'the southern progress4' ,,third ,p,,da4 #a4 ,on the path beginning with light1 that being known4 ,the ,stras now go on to determine the road which the soul of the wise man follows1 after having--assisted by the ,person within the heart-- passed out of the body by way of one particular artery4 ,now of that road various accounts are given in ,scripture4 ,there is a detailed account in the ,chndogya4 7,,iv1 #ae71 'now whether people perform obsequies for him or not1' c4 ,another account is given in the eighth book of the same ,upanishad1 'then he moves upwards by those very rays' 7,,viii1 #f1 #e74 ,the ,kaushtakins again give a different account3 ',he having reached the path of the ,gods comes to the world of ,agni1' c4 7,kau4 ,up4 ,i1 #c74 ,different again in the ,brihad-ranyaka3 ',those who thus know this and those who in the forest meditate on faith and the ,true1' c4 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #b1 #ae74 ,the same ,upanishad1 in another place 7,v1 #aj71 gives a different account3 ',when the person goes away from this world he comes to the wind1' c4--,a doubt here arises whether all these texts mean to give instruction as to one and the same road--the first stage of which is light--having to be followed by the soul of the wise man2 or whether they describe different roads on any of which the soul may proceed4--,the ,prvapakshin holds the latter view2 for he says the roads described differ in nature and are independent one of the other4--,this view the ,stra disposes of4 ,all texts mean one and the same road only1 viz4 the one beginning with light1 and the souls proceed on that road only4 ,for that road is known1 i4e4 is recognised in all the various descriptions1 although it is1 in different texts1 described with more or less fulness4 ,we therefore have to proceed here as in the case of the details 7guna7 which are mentioned in different meditations referring to one and the same object1 i4e4 we have to combine the details mentioned in different places into one whole4 ,the two ,chandogya-texts--the one in the ,upakosalavidy and the one in the ,vidy of the five fires--describe exactly the same road4 ,and in the ,vidy of the five fires as given in the ,brihad-ranyaka the same road1 beginning with light1 is also described1 although there are differences in minor points2 we therefore recognise the road described in the ,chndogya4 ,and in the other texts also we everywhere recognise the divinities of certain stages of the road1 ,agni1 ditya1 and so on4--,here terminates the adhikarana of 'that which begins with light4' #b4 ,from the year to ,vyu2 on account of non-specification and specification4 ,in their description of the path beginning with light the ,chandogas mention the year between the months and the sun1 'from the months to the year1 from the year to the sun' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,v1 #aj1 #a72 while the ,vjasaneyins mention1 in that very place1 the world of the ,gods1'from the months to the world of the ,gods1 from the world of the ,gods to the sun' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #b4 #ae74 ,now1 as the two paths are identical1 we have to supplement each by the additional item given in the other 7and the question then arises whether the order of the stages be #a4 months1 #b4 year1 #c4 world of the ,gods1 #d4 sun2 or #a4 months1 #b4 world of the ,gods1 #c4 year1 #d4 sun74 ,the year and the world of the ,gods are equally entitled--to the place after the months in so far as textual declaration goes2 for both texts say 'from the months4' ,but we observe that the advance is throughout from the shorter periods of time to the longer ones 7'from the day to the bright fortnight1 from the bright fortnight to the six months of the northern progress'71 and as therefore the year naturally presents itself to the mind immediately after the six months1 we decide that the order is--months1 year1 world of the ,gods1 sun4--,in another place 7,bri4 ,up4 ,v1 #aj7 the ,vjasaneyins mention the wind as the stage preceding the sun 7'the wind makes room for him--he mounts upwards2 he comes to the sun'74 ,the ,kaushtakins1 on the other hand1 place the world of the wind subsequent to light1 referred to by them as the world of ,agni 7',having entered on the path of the ,gods he comes to the world of ,agni1 to the world of the wind1' c41 ,kau4 ,up4 ,i1 #c74 ,now in this latter text the fact of the world of the wind following upon light is to be inferred only from the succession of the clauses 7'to the world of ,agni'--'to the world of the wind'71 while the 'upwards' in the text of the ,vjasaneyins is a direct statement of succession given by the text itself2 and as this latter order of succession has greater force than the former1 we have to place1 in the series of stages1 the world of ,vyu directly before the world of the sun4 ,but above we have determined that the same place 7after the year and before the sun7 has to be assigned to the world of the ,gods also2 and hence a doubt arises whether the world of the ,gods and ,vyu are two different things--the soul of the wise man passing by them in optional succession--or one and the same thing--the soul coming1 after the year1 to ,vyu who is the world of the ,gods4--,they are different things1 the ,prvapakshin says2 for they are generally known to be so4 ,and there are definite indications in the text that the world of the ,gods as well as ,vyu is to be placed immediately before the sun--this being indicated for ,vyu by the 'upwards' referred to above1 and for the world of the ,gods by the ablative case 7devalokt7 in the ,chnd4 text1 'from the world of the ,gods he goes to the sun'--and as thus there is no difference between the two1 we conclude that the soul passes by them in either order it may choose4--,this view the ,stra negatives3 ',from the year to ,vyu4' ,the soul1 having departed from the year1 comes to ,vyu4 ,this is proved 'by non-specification and specification4' ,for the term 'the world of the ,gods' is a term of general meaning1 and hence can denote ,vyu in so far as being the world of the ,gods2 while on the other hand the term ,vyu specifically denotes that divine being only4 ,the ,kaushtakins speak of 'the world of ,vyu'2 but this only means ',vyu who at the same time is a world4' ,that ,vyu may be viewed as the world of the ,gods is confirmed by another scriptural passage1 viz4 'he who blows 7,vyu7 is the houses of the ,gods4 '--,here terminates the adhikarana of ',vyu4' #c4 ,beyond lightning there is ,varuna1 on account of connexion4 ,according to the text of the ,kaushtakins the soul goes on to the world of ,vyu1 to the world of ,varuna1 to the world of ,indra1 to the world of ,prajpati1 to the world of ,brahman4 ,the doubt here arises whether ,varuna and the divinities of the following stages are to be inserted in the series after ,vyu1 in agreement with the order of enumeration in the text of the ,kaushtakins2 or at the end of the whole series as stated in the ,chndogya4 ,up4 7,,iv1 #ae1 #e71 ,varuna thus coming after lightning4--,the decision is in favour of the latter view because ,varuna1 the god of waters1 is naturally connected with lightning which dwells within the clouds4--,this terminates the adhikarana of ',varuna4' #d4 ,conductors1 this being indicated4 ,the decision here is that light1 ,vyu1 and the rest mentioned in the texts as connected with the soul's progress on the path of the ,gods are to be interpreted not as mere marks indicating the road1 nor as places of enjoyment for the soul1 but as divinities appointed by the ,supreme ,person to conduct the soul along the stages of the road2 for this is indicated by what the ,chandogya4 says with regard to the last stage1 viz4 lightning1 ',there is a person not human1 he leads them to ,brahman4' ,what here is said as to that person not human1 viz4 that he leads the soul1 is to be extended to the other beings also1 light and the rest4--,but if that not human person leads the souls from lightning to ,brahman1 what then about ,varuna1 ,indra1 and ,prajpati1 who1 as was decided above1 are in charge of stages beyond lightning8 ,do they also lead the soul along their stages8 #e4 ,from thence by him only who belongs to lightning1 the text stating that4 ,the only leader from lightning up to ,brahman is the not-human person connected with lightning2 for the text states this directly4 ,varuna1 ,indra1 and ,prajpati take part in the work in so far only as they may assist the person connected with lightning4--,here terminates the adhikarana of 'the conductors4' #f4 7,him who meditates on7 the effected ,brahman1 7thus opines7 ,bdari2 because for him going is possible4 ,the following question now presents itself for consideration4 ,does the troop of conducting divinities1 ,agni and the rest1 lead on those who meditate on the effected ,brahman1 i4e4 ,hiranyagarbha2 or those only who meditate on the highest ,brahman2 or those who meditate on the highest ,brahman and those who meditate on the individual ,self as having ,brahman for its ,self8--,the teacher ,bdari is of opinion that the divinities lead on those only who meditate on the effected ,brahman4 ,for he only who meditates on ,hiranyagarbha can move2 while a person meditating on the highest ,brahman which is absolutely complete1 all-knowing1 present everywhere1 the ,self of all1 cannot possibly be conceived as moving to some other place in order to reach ,brahman2 for him ,brahman rather is something already reached4 ,for him the effect of true knowledge is only to put an end to that ,nescience which has for its object ,brahman1 which1 in reality1 is eternally reached4 ,he1 on the other hand1 who meditates on ,hiranyagarbha may be conceived as moving in order to reach his object1 which is something abiding within a special limited place4 ,it is he therefore who is conducted on by ,agni and the other escorting deities4 #g4 ,and on account of 7,brahman7 being specified4 ,the text 'a person not human leads them to the worlds of ,brahman' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,vi4 #b1 #ae7 by using the word 'world1' and moreover in the plural1 determines the specification that the not-human person leads those only who meditate on ,hiranyagarbha1 who dwells within some particular world4 ,moreover1 the text ',i enter the hall of ,prajpati1 the house' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,viii1 #ad7 shows that he who goes on the path beginning with light aims at approaching ,hiranyagarbha4 ,but if this is so1 there is a want of appropriate denotation in the clause1 ',there is a person not human1 he leads them to ,brahman'2 if ,hiranyagarbha is meant1 the text should say ',he leads them to ,brahm 7,brahmnam74' #h4 ,but on account of nearness there is that designation4 ,hiranyagarbha is the first created being 7as declared by the text 'he who creates ,brahma'72 he thus stands near to ,brahman1 and therefore may be designated by the same term 7viz4 ,brahman74 ,this explanation is necessitated by the reasons set forth in the preceding ,stras 7which show that the real highest ,brahman cannot be meant74--,but1 if the soul advancing on the path of the ,gods reaches ,hiranyagarbha only1 texts such as ',this is the path of the ,gods1 the path of ,brahman2 those who proceed on that path do not return to the life of man' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #ae1 #f71 and 'moving upwards by that a man reaches immortality' 7,,viii1 #f1 #f71 are wrong in asserting that that soul attains to immortality and does not return2 for the holy books teach that ,hiranyagarbha1 as a created being1 passes away at the end of a dviparrdha-period2 and the text ',up to the world of ,brahman the worlds return again' 7,bha4 ,g4 ,,viii1 #af7 shows that those who have gone to ,hiranyagarbha necessarily return also4 #i4 ,on the passing away of the effected 7world of ,brahma71 together with its ruler1 7the souls go7 to what is higher than that2 on account of scriptural declaration4 ,on the passing away of the effected world of ,brahma1 together with its ruler ,hiranyagarbha1 who then recognises his qualification for higher knowledge1 the soul also which had gone to ,hiranyagarbha attains to true knowledge and thus reaches ,brahman1 which is higher than that1 i4e4 higher than the effected world of ,brahm4 ,this is known from the texts declaring that he who proceeds on the path of light reaches immortality and does not return2 and is further confirmed by the text1 ',they all1 reaching the highest immortality1 become free in the world of ,brahman 7,brahm7 at the time of the great end' 7,mu4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #b1 #f74 #aj4 ,and on account of ,smriti4 ,this follows from ,smriti also1 which declares 'when the pralaya has come and the end of the ,highest1 they all together with ,brahman enter the highest place4'--,for all these reasons ,bdari holds that the troop of the conducting deities1 beginning with ,light1 leads the souls of those only who meditate on the effected ,brahman1 i e4 ,hiranyagarbha4 #aa4 ,the ,highest1 ,jaimini thinks2 on account of primariness of meaning4 ,the teacher ,jaimini is of opinion that those deities lead on the souls of those only who meditate on the highest ,brahman4 ,for in the text 'a person not human leads them to ,brahman' the word ,brahman is naturally taken in its primary sense 7i4e4 the highest ,brahman72 the secondary sense 7i4e4 the effected ,brahman7 can be admitted only if there are other valid reasons to refer the passage to the effected ,brahman4 ,and the alleged impossibility of the soul's going is no such valid reason2 for although ,brahman no doubt is present everywhere1 ,scripture declares that the soul of the wise frees itself from ,nescience only on having gone to some particular place4 ,that the origination of true knowledge depends on certain conditions of caste1 srama1 religious duty1 purity of conduct1 time1 place1 and so on1 follows from certain scriptural texts1 as e4g4 ',brhmanas desire to know him through the study of the ,veda' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #d1 #bb72 in the same way it follows from the text declaring the soul's going to ,brahman that the final realisation of that highest knowledge which implies the cessation of all ,nescience depends on the soul's going to some particular place4 ,the arguments founded on texts alleged to declare that the soul of the wise does not pass out of the body at all we have refuted above4 ,the argument that the specification implied in the text which mentions ,brahman-worlds clearly points to the effected ,brahman1 i4e4 ,hiranyagarbha1 is equally invalid4 ,for the compound 'the ,brahman-world' is to be explained as'the world which is ,brahman'2 just as according to the ,prva ,mmms the compound ',nishda-sthapati' denotes a sthapati who is a ,nishda 7not a sthapati of the ,nishdas74 ,a thing even which is known as one only may be designated by a plural form1 as in a mantra one girdle is spoken of as 'the fetters of ,aditi4' ,and as to the case under discussion1 we know on the authority of ,scripture1 ,smriti1 ,itihsa1 and ,purna1 that the wonderful worlds springing from the mere will of a perfect and omnipresent being cannot be but infinite4 #ab4 ,and because ,scripture declares it4 ,and ,scripture moreover directly declares that the soul which has departed by way of the artery in the upper part of the head and passed along the path of the ,gods reaches the highest ,brahman3 ',this serene being having risen from the body1 having reached the highest light manifests itself in its own shape' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,viii1 #ab1 #c74--;,against the contention that the text ',i enter the hall of ,prajpati1 the house' shows that he who proceeds on the path beginning with light aims at the effected ,brahman1 the next ,stra argues4 #ac4 ,and there is no aiming at the effected 7,brahman74 ,the aim of the soul is not at ,hiranyagarbha1 but at the highest ,brahman itself4 ,for the complementary sentence ',i am the glorious among ,brhmanas' shows that what the soul aims at is the condition of the universal ,self1 which has for its antecedent the putting off of all ,nescience4 ,for this appears from the preceding text1 ',as a horse shakes his hairs and as the moon frees herself from the mouth of ,rhu2 having shaken off the body may ,i obtain--the uncreated ,brahman-world' declares that the ,brahman-world1 which is the thing to be reached1 is something non-created1 and explicitly states that reaching that world implies freedom from all bondage whatsoever4--,it is for these reasons that ,jaimini holds that the deities speeding the soul on its way lead on him only who has the highest ,brahman for the object of his meditation4 ,now the ,reverend ,bdaryana declares his own view1 which constitutes the final conclusion in this matter4 #ad4 ,those not depending on symbols he leads1 thus ,bdaryana thinks2 there being a defect in both cases2 and he whose thought is that4 ,bdaryana is of opinion that the deities lead those not depending on symbols1 i4e4 all meditating devotees other than those depending on symbols4 ,that is to say1 the view that those are led who meditate on the effected ,brahman cannot be upheld2 nor is there an exclusive rule that those only should be led on who meditate on the highest ,brahman4 ,the truth is that those are led who meditate on the highest ,brahman1 and also those who meditate on the ,self 7soul7 as different from matter 7,prakriti7 and having ,brahman for its true ,self4 ,souls of both these kinds are led on to ,brahman4 ,those on the other hand whose object of meditation is such things as name and so on1 which fall within what is a mere effect of ,brahman--such things being viewed either under the aspect of ,brahman1 just as some valiant man may be viewed under the aspect of a lion 7which view expresses itself in the judgment ',devadatta is a lion '72 or by themselves 7without reference to ,brahman7--all those are not led on to ,brahman4 ,why so8' ,because there is a defect in both cases1' i4 e4 in both the views rejected by ,bdaryana4 ,the view that those are led who meditate on the effected ,brahman is in conflict with texts such as 'having risen from this body and reached the highest light' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,viii1 #ab1 #c7--;for the nature of the fruit depends on the nature of the meditation2 and the view that those only are led to the highest ,brahman who meditate on the highest ,brahman1 would stultify texts such as the one which expressly declares ,agni and the rest of the deities to lead on those who possess the knowledge of the five fires 7',those who know this1 viz4 the ,vidy of the five fires1 and those who in the forest meditate on faith and austerity go to light--there is a person not human1 he leads them to ,brahman1' ,ch4 ,up4 ,v1 #aj74 ,both these views thus being defective1 we adhere to the conclusion that the deities lead on to ,brahman the two classes of souls mentioned above4--,this the ,stra further declares in the words 'he whose thought is that' 7tatkratuh71 the sense of which is that he whose thought is that reaches that1 i4e4 that the nature of what is reached depends on the nature of the meditation4 ,this argument is founded on the text1 ',according to what his thought is 7yath-kratuh7 in this world1 so will he be when he has departed this life' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #ad71 which implies the principle that what a soul after death attains is according to its thought and meditation in this life2 and moreover we have direct scriptural statements to the effect that those who possess the knowledge of the five fires proceed on the path of the ,gods1 and that those who proceed on that path reach ,brahman and do not return4 ,analogous reasoning proves that meditation on the soul as free from matter and having ,brahman for its true ,self also leads to the highest ,brahman4 ,in the case of those1 on the other hand1 who rely on the symbols 7in which they meditatively contemplate ,brahman71 beginning with name and terminating with prna4 7',he who meditates on name as ,brahman1' ,ch4 ,up4 ,,vii1 #a ff471 the meditation is not proved by texts of the two kinds previously mentioned to lead to ,brahman2 it rather is contaminated by an element not of the nature of intelligence1 and hence--according to the principle that the result of a meditation is the same in nature as the meditation itself-- the soul of the inferior devotee practising such meditation does not proceed by the path of light and does not reach ,brahman4--,that this distinction is declared by ,scripture itself1 the next ,stra shows4 #ae4 ,and ,scripture declares the difference4 ,the text1 ',he who meditates on name as ,brahman1 for him there is movement as he wishes as far as name extends1' c4 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vii1 #a ff471 declares that those who meditate on the series of symbols beginning with name and ending with prna attain to a result of limited nature and not depending on any particular path4 ,those therefore who meditate on the ,intelligent either as mixed with the ,non-intelligent or by itself1 viewing it either under the aspect of ,brahman or as separated from ,brahman1 are not led on by the conducting deities4 ,on the other hand1 it remains a settled conclusion that the deities speed on their way those who meditate on the highest ,brahman and on the soul as separated from ,prakriti and having ,brahman for its true ,self4--,here terminates the adhikarana of 'the effected4' ,,fourth ,p,,da4 #a4 7,on the soul's7 having approached 7the highest light7 there is manifestation2 7as we infer7 from the word 'own4' ,the ,sras now proceed to consider the kind of superior existence 7aisvarya7 which the released souls enjoy4--,the text says1 ',thus does that serene being1 having risen from the body and having approached the highest light1 manifest itself in its own form' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,viii1 #ab1 #c74 ,does this passage mean that the soul having approached the highest light assumes a new body1 to be brought about then1 as e4g4 the body of a deva2 or that it only manifests its own natural character8--,the text must be understood in the former sense1 the ,prvapakshin holds4 ,for otherwise the scriptural texts referring to ,release would declare what is of no advantage to man4 ,we do not observe that its own nature is of any advantage to the soul4 ,in the state of dreamless sleep the body and the sense-organs cease to act1 and you may say the pure soul then abides by itself1 but in what way does this benefit man8 ,nor can it be said that mere cessation of pain constitutes the well-being of the soul which has approached the highest light1 and that in this sense manifestation of its own nature may be called ,release2 for ,scripture clearly teaches that the released soul enjoys an infinity of positive bliss1 ',one hundred times the bliss of ,prajpati is one bliss of ,brahman and of a sage free from desires'2 'for having tasted a flavour he experiences bliss' 7,taitt4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #g74 ,nor can it be said that the true nature of the soul is consciousness of the nature of unlimited bliss which1 in the ,samsra condition1 is hidden by ,nescience and manifests itself only when the soul reaches ,brahman4 ,for1 as explained previously1 intelligence which is of the nature of light cannot be hidden2 hiding in that case would be neither more nor less than destruction4 ,nor can that which is mere light be of the nature of bliss2 for bliss is pleasure1 and to be of the nature of pleasure is to be such as to agree with the ,self4 ,but1 if the ,self is mere light1 where is the being by which light is to be apprehended as agreeable to its own nature8 7i4e4 where is the knowing subject conscious of bliss87 ,he1 therefore1 who holds the ,self to be mere light1 can in no way prove that it is of the nature of bliss4 ,if1 moreover1 that which the soul effects on approaching the highest light is merely to attain to its own true nature1 we point out that that nature is something eternally accomplished1 and that hence the declaration that 'it manifests 7accomplishes7 itself in its own nature' would be purportless4 ,we hence conclude that on approaching the highest light the soul connects itself with a new form only then brought about4 ,on this view the term 'accomplishes itself is taken in its direct sense1 and the expression 'in its own shape' also is suitable in so far as the soul accomplishes itself in a nature specially belonging to it and characterised by absolute bliss4--,this view the ,stra rejects4 ,that special condition into which the soul passes on having1 on the path of the ,gods1 approached the highest light is a manifestation of its own true nature1 not an origination of a new character4 ,for this is proved-- by the specification implied in the term 'own1' in the phrase 'in its own nature4' ,if the soul assumed a new body1 this specification would be without meaning2 for1 even without that1 it would be clear that the new body belongs to the soul4--,against the assertion that the soul's own true nature is something eternally accomplished1 and that hence a declaration of that nature 'accomplishing itself would be unmeaning1 the next ,stra declares itself4 #b4 ,the released one2 on account of the promise4 ,what the text says about the soul accomplishing itself in its own form refers to the released soul which1 freed from its connexion with works and what depends thereon1 i4e4 the body and the rest1 abides in its true essential nature4--,that essential nature no doubt is something eternally accomplished1 but as in the ,samsra state it is obscured by ,nescience in the form of ,karman2 the text refers to the cessation of such obscuration as 'accomplishment4'--,how is this known8--',from the promise1'i4e4 from the fact that the text promises to set forth such cessation4 ,for ,prajpati when saying again and again1 ',i will explain that further to you1' does so with a view to throw light on the individual soul--first introduced in the clause 'that ,self which is free from sin1 c4' 7,,viii1 #g1 #a7--;in so far as freed from all connexion with the three empirical conditions of waking1 dreaming and dreamless sleep1 and released from the body which is due to ,karman and the cause of joy and sorrow4 ,when1 therefore1 he concludes 'that serene being1 i4e4 the soul1 having risen from this body and having approached the highest light accomplishes itself in its true form1' we understand that such 'accomplishment' means the final release1 i4e4 the cessation of all bondage1 which is gained by the soul1 previously connected with ,karman1 as soon as it approaches the highest light4--,the ,prvapakshin had said that as in the state of deep sleep the manifestation of the true nature of the soul is seen in no way to benefit man1 ,scripture1 if declaring that ,release consists in a manifestation of the true nature of the soul1 would clearly teach something likewise not beneficial to man2 and that hence the 'accomplishment in its own form' must mean the soul's entering on such a new condition of existence as would be a cause of pleasure1 viz4 the condition of a deva or the like4 ,to this the next ,stra replies4 #c4 ,the ,self1 on account of subject-matter4 ,the subject-matter of the whole section shows that by the ,self manifesting itself in its own form there is meant the ,self as possessing the attributes of freedom from all evil and sin and so on4 ,for the teaching of ,prajpati begins as follows3 'the ,self which is free from sin1 free from old age1 from death and grief1 from hunger and thirst1 whose desires and thoughts spontaneously realise themselves4' ,and that this ,self which forms the subject-matter of the entire section is the individual ,self we have shown under ,i1 #c1 #ai4 ,the manifestation of the true nature of the soul when reaching the highest light therefore means the manifestation of that ,self which has freedom from sin and so on for its essential attributes-that nature being in the ,samsra state obscured through ,nescience4 ,when therefore at the moment of ,release those essential qualities assert themselves1 the case is one of manifestation of what already exists1 not one of origination4 ,thus the reverend ,saunaka says1 ',as the lustre of the gem is not created by the act of polishing1 so the essential intelligence of the ,self is not created by the putting off of imperfections4 ,as the well is not the cause of the production of rain water1 but only serves to manifest water which already exists--for whence should that originate which is not8--thus knowledge and the other attributes of the ,self are only manifested through the putting off of evil qualities2 they are not produced1 for they are eternal4' ,intelligence1 therefore1 bliss1 and the other essential qualities of the soul which were obscured and contracted by ,karman1 expand and thus manifest themselves when the bondage due to ,karman passes away and the soul approaches the highest light4 ,on this view of 'manifestation' there remains no difficulty4--,here terminates the adhikarana of 'on approaching manifestation4' #d4 ,in non-division2 because that is seen4 ,is the soul1 when it has reached the highest light and freed itself from all bondage1 conscious of itself as separate from the highest ,self or as non-separate in so far as being a mere 'mode' 7prakra7 of that ,self8-- ,the former view is the right one4 ,for ,scriptural and ,smriti texts alike declare that the released soul stands to the highest ,self in the relation of fellowship1 equality1 equality of attributes1 and all this implies consciousness of separation4 ,compare ',he attains all desires together with the all-knowing ,brahman' 7,taitt4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #a1 #a72 ',when the seer sees the shining maker1 the ,lord1 the ,person who has his source in ,brahman2 then1 possessing perfect knowledge1 and shaking off good and evil1 free from all passions he reaches the highest equality' 7,mu4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #a1 #c72 ',taking their stand upon this knowledge they1 attaining to an equality of attributes with me1 are neither born at the time of a creation nor are they agitated when a pralaya takes place' 7,bha4 ,g4 ,,xiv1 #b74--;,against this view the ,stra declares itself 'in non-division4' ,the released soul is conscious of itself as non-divided from the highest ,brahman4 ',for this is seen1' i4e4 for the soul having reached ,brahman and freed itself from the investment of ,nescience sees itself in its true nature4 ,and this true nature consists herein that the souls have for their inner ,self the highest ,self while they constitute the body of that ,self and hence are modes 7prakra7 of it4 ,this is proved by all those texts which exhibit the soul and ,brahman in co-ordination--',thou art that' 'this ,self is ,brahman'2 ',in that all this has its ,self'2 ',all this in truth is ,brahman'2 and by other texts1 such as ',he who dwells within the ,self1 whom the ,self does not know1 of whom the ,self is the body1' c42 and ',he who abides within1 the ruler of creatures1 he is thy ,self2 as explained by us under ,stra ,i1 #d1 #bb4 ,the consciousness of the released soul therefore expresses itself in the following form3 ',i am ,brahman1 without any division4' ,where the texts speak of the soul's becoming equal to1 or having equal attributes with1 ,brahman1 the meaning is that the nature of the individual soul--which is a mere mode of ,brahman--is equal to that of ,brahman1 i4e4 that on putting off its body it becomes equal to ,brahman in purity4 ,the text declaring that the soul 'attains all its desires together with ,brahman' intimates that the soul1 together with ,brahman of which it is a mode1 is conscious of the attributes of ,brahman4 ,the different texts are thus in no conflict4 ,nor1 on this view of the soul being non-divided from ,brahman in so far as being its mode1 is there any difficulty on account of what is said about the soul under ,s4 ,,iv1 #d1 #h2 or on account of the doctrines conveyed in ,,ii1 #a1 #bb2 ,,iii1 #d1 #h4--;,here terminates the adhikarana of 'non-division1 on account of its being seen4' #e4 ,in 7a nature like7 that of ,brahman1 thus ,jaimini thinks2 on account of suggestion and the rest4 ,owing to the fact that different texts give different accounts1 the question now arises of what character that essential nature of the ,self is in which it manifests itself on reaching ,brahman4 ,is that nature constituted by freedom from evil and sin and the rest 7i4e4 the attributes enumerated ,ch4 ,up4 ,,viii1 #g1 #a72 or by mere intelligence 7vijna72 or by both1 there being no opposition between intelligence and those other attributes8--,the teacher ,jaimini holds that the soul manifests itself in its ,brahman character1 i4e4 in a character constituted by freedom from sin1 and so on4 ,these latter attributes are1 in the text of the 'small lotus1' mentioned as belonging to ,brahman 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,viii1 #a1 #e71 and may hence be referred to as the ',brahman' character4 ,and that this ,brahman character is the character of the released soul also follows from 'suggestion and the rest4' ,for freedom from all evil and the rest are1 in the teaching of ,prajpati1 referred to as attributes of the soul 7,,viii1 #g1 #a74 ,the 'and the rest' of the ,stra refers to the activities of the released soul--laughing1 playing1 rejoicing1 and so on 7mentioned in ,,viii1 #ab1 #c7--which depend on the power belonging to the soul in that state to realise all its ideas and wishes4 ,it is for these reasons that ,jaimini holds that mere intelligence does not constitute the true nature of the released soul4 #f4 ,in the sole nature of intelligence2 as that is its ,self4 ,thus ,audulomi thinks4 ,intelligence 7consciousness2 kaitanya7 alone is the true nature of the soul1 and hence it is in that character only that the released soul manifests itself2 this is the view of the teacher ,audulomi4 ,that intelligence only constitutes the true being of the soul1 we learn from the express statement ',as a lump of salt has neither inside nor outside1 but is altogether a mass of taste2 so this ,self has neither inside nor outside1 but is altogether a mass of knowledge' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #e1 #ac74 ,when1 therefore1 the text attributes to the soul freedom from evil and the rest1 it does not mean to predicate of it further positive qualities1 but only to exclude all the qualities depending on avidy--change1 pleasure1 pain1 and so on--,for these reasons ,audulomi holds that the released soul manifests itself as mere intelligence4--,next the teacher ,bdaryana determines the question by propounding his own view4 #g4 ,thus also1 on account of existence of the former qualities 7as proved7 by suggestion1 ,bdarayana holds absence of contradiction4 ,the teacher ,bdaryana is of opinion that even thus1 i4e4 although the text declares the soul to have mere intelligence for its essential nature1 all the same the previously stated attributes1 viz4 freedom from all sin1 and so on1 are not to be excluded4 ,for the authority of a definite statement in the ,upanishads proves them to exist 7',that ,self which is free from sin1' c472 and of authorities of equal strength one cannot refute the other4 ,nor must you say that the case is one of essential contradiction1 and that hence we necessarily must conclude that freedom from sin1 and so on 7do not belong to the true nature of the soul1 but7 are the mere figments of ,nescience 7from which the released soul is free74 ,for as there is equal authority for both sides1 why should the contrary view not be held8 7viz4 that the soul is essentially free from sin1 c41 and that the kaitanya is non-essential47 ,for the principle is that where two statements rest on equal authority1 that only which suffers from an intrinsic impossibility is to be interpreted in a different way 7i4e4 different from what it means on the face of it71 so as not to conflict with the other4 ,but while admitting this we deny that the text which describes the ,self as a mass of mere knowledge implies that the nature of the ,self comprises nothing whatever but knowledge4--,but what then is the purport of that text8--,the meaning is clear1 we reply2 the text teaches that the entire ,self1 different from all that is non-sentient1 is self-illumined1 i4e4 not even a small part of it depends for its illumination on something else4 ,the fact1 vouched for in this text1 of the soul in its entirety being a mere mass of knowledge in no way conflicts with the fact1 vouched for by other texts1 of its possessing qualities such as freedom from sin and so on1 which inhere in it as the subject of those qualities2 not any more than the fact of the lump of salt being taste through and through--which fact is known through the sense of taste--conflicts with the fact of its possessing such other qualities as colour1 hardness1 and so on1 which are known through the eye and the other sense-organs4 ,the meaning of the entire text is as follows--just as the lump of salt has throughout one and the same taste1 while other sapid things such as mangoes and other fruit have different tastes in their different parts1 rind and so on2 so the soul is throughout of the nature of knowledge or self-illuminedness4-- ,here terminates the adhikarana of 'that which is like ,brahman4' #h4 ,by the mere will2 ,scripture stating that4 ,concerning the released soul ,scripture states1 ',he moves about there1 laughing1 playing1 rejoicing1 be it with women1 or chariots1 or relatives' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,viii1 #ab1 #c74 ,the doubt here arises whether the soul's meeting with relatives and the rest presupposes an effort on its part or follows on its mere will--as things spring from the mere will of the highest ,person4--,an effort is required2 for we observe in ordinary life that even such persons as kings and the like who are capable of realising all their wishes do not accomplish the effects desired without some effort4--,against this view the ,stra says 'by the mere will4' ,for1 in a previous passage1 ,scripture expressly says1 ',he who desires the world of the ,fathers1 by his mere will the ,fathers rise to receive him1' c4 7,,viii1 #b1 #a74 ,and there is no other text declaring the need of effort which would oblige us to define and limit the meaning of the text last quoted4 #i4 ,and for this very reason without another ruler4 ,since the released soul realises all its wishes1 it does not stand under another ruler4 ,for to be under a ruler means to be subject to injunction and prohibition1 and to be such is opposed to being free in the realisation of all one's wishes4 ,hence ,scripture says1 'he is a ,self- ruler' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vii1 #be74--;,here terminates the adhikarana of 'wishes4' #aj4 ,the absence1 ,bdari holds2 for thus ,scripture says4 ,a doubt arises whether the ,released has a body and sense-organs1 or not2 or whether he has them or not just as he pleases4 ,the teacher ,bdari holds that body and sense-organs are absent2 since the text declares this4 ,the text--'as long as he is embodied there is no freedom from pleasure and pain2 but when he is free from the body then neither pleasure nor pain touches him' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,viii1 #ab1 #a7--;declares that pleasure and pain are necessarily connected with embodiedness2 and the text--'having risen from this body and reached the highest light he manifests himself in his own shape' 7,,viii1 #ab1 #c7--;declares that the ,released one is without a body4 #aa4 ,the presence1 ,jaimini holds2 because the text declares manifoldness4 ,the teacher ,jaimini holds that the ,released one has a body and senses2 because the text declares manifoldness--',he is onefold1 he is threefold1 he is fivefold1 he is sevenfold' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vii1 #bf1 #b74 ,the ,self which is one and indivisible cannot be manifold1 and the various forms of manifoldness of which the text speaks therefore must depend on the body4 ,the text which speaks of the absence of a body refers to the absence of that body only which is due to ,karman2 for this latter body only is the cause of pleasure and pain4 ,next the ,reverend ,bdaryana decides this point by the declaration of his own view4 #ab4 ,for this reason ,bdaryana 7holds him to be7 of both kinds2 as in the case of the twelve days' sacrifice4 ',for this reason1' i4e4 for the reason that the text refers to the wish of the ,released1 the ,reverend ,bdaryana is of opinion that the ,released may1 at his liking1 be with or without a body4 ,this satisfies both kinds of texts4 ,the case is analogous to that of the twelve days' sacrifice which1 on the basis of twofold texts--',those desirous of prosperity are to celebrate the dvdasha1' and ',the priest is to offer the dvdasha for him who desires offspring'--belongs1 according to difference of wish1 either to the sattra or the ahna class of sacrifices4--,the next ,stra declares that the body and the sense-organs of the ,released are not necessarily created by the ,released himself4 #ac4 ,in the absence of a body1 as in the state of dream2 that being possible4 ,as in the absence of a body and other instruments of enjoyment created by himself1 the ,released may undergo experiences of pleasure by means of instruments created by the highest ,person1 the ,released1 although capable of realising all his wishes1 may not himself be creative4 ,as in the state of dream the individual soul has experiences depending on chariots and other implements created by the ,lord 7',he creates chariots1 horses1' c41 ,bri4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #c1 #aj72 thus the released soul also may have experience of different worlds created by the ,lord engaged in playful sport4 #ad4 ,when there is a body1 as in the waking state4 ,when1 on the other hand1 the released soul possesses a body created by its own will1 then it enjoys its various delights in the same way as a waking man does4--,in the same way as the highest ,person creates out of himself1 for his own delight1 the world of the ,fathers and so on2 so he sometimes creates such worlds for the enjoyment of the released souls4 ,but sometimes1 again1 the souls using their own creative will-power themselves create their own worlds1 which however are included within the sphere of sport of the highest ,person 7so that the souls in enjoying them do not pass beyond the intuition of ,brahman74 ,but it has been taught that the soul is of atomic size2 how then can it connect itself with many bodies8--,to this question the next ,stra replies4 #ae4 ,the entering is as in the case of a lamp2 for thus ,scripture declares4 ,just as a lamp1 although abiding in one place only1 enters through the light proceeding from it into connexion with many places2 so the soul also1 although limited to one place1 may through its light-like consciousness enter into several bodies4 ,it may do this as well as in this life the soul1 although abiding in one spot of the body only1 viz4 the heart1 pervades the whole body by means of its consciousness and thus makes it its own4 ,there is however the following difference between the two cases4 ,the non-released soul has its intellectual power contracted by the influence of ,karman1 and hence is incapable of that expansive pervasion without which it cannot identify itself with other bodies4 ,the released soul1 on the other hand1 whose intellectual power is non-contracted is capable of extending as far as it likes1 and thus to make many bodies its own4 ,for ,scripture declares1 ',that living soul is to be known as part of the hundredth part of the point of a hair divided a hundred times1 and yet it is capable of infinity' 7,svet4 ,up4 ,v1 #i74 ,the non-released soul is ruled by ,karman1 the released one only by its will--this is the difference4--,but1 a new difficulty is raised1 ,scripture declares that when the soul reaches ,brahman all its inner and outer knowledge is stopped3 ',embraced by the highest ,self the soul knows nothing that is without1 nothing that is within' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #c1 #ba74 ,how then can it be said to know all things8--,to this the next ,stra replies4 #af4 ,it refers either to dreamless sleep or to union 7sampatti72 for this is manifested4 ,texts as the one last quoted do not refer to the released soul1 but either to deep sleep or to 'union' 7sampatti71 i4e4 the time of dying2 the latter in accordance with the text 'then his speech is united 7sampadyate7 with his mind1--heat with the highest divinity' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #ae1 #a74 ,in both those states the soul attains to the highest ,self and is unconscious4 ,that in the states of deep sleep and dying the soul is unconscious and that the released soul is all-knowing1 ,scripture reveals4 ,the text ',in truth he thus does not know himself that he is ,i1 nor does he know anything that exists4 ,he is gone to utter annihilation4 ,i see no good in this' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,viii1 #aa1 #a7 declares that the soul is unconscious in the state of deep sleep2 and a subsequent text in the same section declares the released soul to be all-knowing1 ',he seeing these pleasures with the divine eye1 i4e4 the mind1 rejoices' 7,,viii1 #ab1 #e74 ,the same is clearly stated in the text1',he who sees this sees everything1 and obtains everything everywhere' 7,,vii1 #b1 #f1 #b74 ,that at death there is unconsciousness appears from the text1 'having risen from these elements he vanishes again in them4 ,when he has departed there is no more knowledge' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #e1 #ac74 ,from all this it follows that the text as to the soul being held in embrace by the prja ,self refers either to deep sleep or death4--,here terminates the adhikarana of 'non- being4' #ag4 ,with the exception of world-energy2 on account of leading subject- matter and of non-proximity4 ,the doubt here presents itself whether the power of the released soul is a universal power such as belongs to the ,supreme ,person1 extending to the creation1 sustentation1 and so on1 of the worlds2 or is limited to the intuition of the ,supreme ,person4--,the ,prvapakshin maintains the former view4 ,for he says ,scripture declares that the soul reaches equality with the ,supreme ,person3 ',free from stain he reaches the highest equality' 7,mu4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #a1 #c72 and moreover ,scripture ascribes to the released soul the power of realising all its thoughts4 ,and these two conditions are not fulfilled unless the soul possess the special powers of the ,lord with regard to the government1 c41 of the world4--,to this the ,stra replies1 'with the exception of world-energy4' ,the released soul1 freed from all that hides its true nature1 possesses the power of intuitively beholding the pure ,brahman1 but does not possess the power of ruling and guiding the different forms of motion and rest belonging to animate and inanimate nature4--,how is this known8--',from subject-matter4' ,for it is with special reference to the highest ,brahman only that the text mentions ruling and controlling power over the entire world4 ',that from whence these beings are born1 that through which they live when born1 that into which they enter at death1 endeavour to know that2 that is ,brahman' 7,taitt4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #a1 #a74 ,if such universal ruling and controlling power belonged to the released soul as well1 it would not be used--as the text actually uses it--for defining ,brahman2 for all definition rests on special individual attributes4 ,analogously many other texts speak of universal ruling and controlling power with exclusive reference to the ,supreme ,person--',being only this was in the beginning1 c4--it thought1 may ,i be many' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vi1 #b72 ',in the beginning this was ,brahman1 one only--it created the most excellent ,kshattra1' c4 7,bri4 ,up4 ,i1 #d1 #aa72 ',in the beginning all this was ,self1 one only--it thought1 let me send forth these worlds' 7,ait4 r4 ,,ii1 #d1 #a1 #a72 ',there was ,narayana alone1 not ,brahm1 and so on4' ',he who dwelling within the earth1' c4 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #g1 #c74--,this also follows 'from non-proximity'2 for in all those places which speak of world-controlling power the context in no way suggests the idea of the released soul1 and hence there is no reason to ascribe such power to the latter4 #ah4 ,if it be said that this is not so1 on account of direct teaching2 we reply not so1 on account of the texts declaring that which abides within the spheres of those entrusted with special functions4 ,but1 an objection is raised1 certain texts directly declare that the released soul also possesses 'world-energy4' ,compare ',he becomes a self- ruler2 he moves in all worlds according to his wishes' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vii1 #be1 #b72 ',he moves through these worlds1 enjoying any food he wishes1 and assuming any shape he wishes' 7,taitt4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #aj1 #e74 ,we cannot therefore accept the restriction laid down in the last ,stra4--,not so1 the latter half of the present ,stra declares1 'on account of the texts declaring that which abides in the spheres of those entrusted with special functions4' ,the meaning of the texts quoted is that the released soul participates in the enjoyments connected with the spheres of ,hiranyagarbha and other beings which are entrusted with special functions4 ,the soul whose knowledge is no longer obstructed by ,karman freely enjoys all the different worlds in which the power of ,brahman manifests itself and thus is fully satisfied4--,but if the released soul1 no less than the soul implicated in the ,samsra1 experiences enjoyments belonging to the sphere of change1 it follows that the sum of its enjoyments is finite and limited1 and that hence the released soul is no better off than the soul in the state of bondage6--,of this doubt the next ,stra disposes4 #ai4 ,that which is not within change2 for thus ,scripture declares the abiding 7of the soul74 ,that which is not within change1 i4e4 the highest ,brahman which is free from all change and of an absolutely perfect and blessed nature--this1 together with the manifestations of its glory1 is what forms the object of consciousness for the released soul4 ,the worlds which are subject to change thus form objects for that soul's experience1 in so far as they form part of ,brahman's manifestation4 ,for ,scripture declares that the released soul thus abides within1 i4e4 is conscious of the changeless highest ,brahman1 'when he finds freedom from fear and an abode in that which is invisible1 incorporeal1 undefined1 unsupported1 then he obtains the fearless' 7,taitt4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #g74 ,and that the world is contained within ,brahman as its manifestation is declared in the text1 ',in that all the worlds abide1 and no one goes beyond' 7,ka4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #e1 #h74 ,the meaning of the text stating that the ,released freely move in all worlds1 and similar texts1 therefore is only that the released soul while conscious of ,brahman with its manifestations experiences also the enjoyments1 lying within the sphere of change1 which abide in the world of ,hiranyagarbha and similar beings2 not that it possesses the world- energies--creative1 ruling1 and so on--which are the distinctive attribute of the highest ,lord4 #bj4 ,and thus ,perception and ,inference show4 ,that the energies connected with the rule of the entire world are exclusive attributes of the highest ,person1 ,scripture and ,smriti alike declare4 ,compare scriptural texts such as ',from fear of him the wind blows1' c4 7,taitt4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #h1 #a72 ',by the command of that ,imperishable one sun and moon stand1 held apart' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iii1 #i72 ',he is the lord of all1 the king of all beings1 the protector of all beings' 7,bri4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #d1 #bb74 ,and ,smriti texts such as ',with me as ,supervisor1 ,prakriti brings forth the ,universe of the movable and the immovable1 and for this reason the world ever moves round'2 ',pervading this entire ,universe by a portion of mine ,i do abide' 7,bha4 ,g4 ,,ix1 #aj2 ,x1 #db74 ,scripture and ,smriti likewise declare that of the bliss which is enjoyed by the released soul the highest ,person alone is the cause--',for he alone causes blessedness' 7,taitt4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #g72 ',he who serves me with unswerving devotion1 surpasses these qualities and is fitted for becoming one with ,brahman4 ,for ,i am the abode of ,brahman1 of infinite immortality1 of everlasting virtue1 and of absolute bliss' 7,bha4 ,g4 ,,xiv1 #bf-bg74 ,the exalted qualities of the soul--freedom from evil and sin and so on--which manifest themselves in the state of ,release no doubt belong to the soul's essential nature2 but that the soul is of such a nature fundamentally depends on the ,supreme ,person1 and on him also depends the permanency of those qualities2 they are permanent in so far as the ,lord himself on whom they depend is permanent4 ,it is in the same way that all the things which constitute the means of enjoyment and sport on the part of the ,lord are permanent in so far as the ,lord himself is permanent4 ,it thus appears that the equality to the ,lord which the released soul may claim does not extend to the world-ruling energies4 #ba4 ,and on account of the indication of the equality of enjoyment only4 ,the previous conclusion is confirmed by the further fact that the text directly teaches the released soul to be equal to ,brahman in so far only as enjoying direct insight into the true nature of ,brahman4 ',he reaches all objects of desire1 together with the all-knowing ,brahman' 7,taitt4 ,up4 ,,ii1 #a1 #a74--,the conclusion thus is that we have to shape our ideas as to the powers of the released soul in accordance with what the texts say as to the ,lord only possessing the power of ruling and controlling the entire world1 and that hence the latter power cannot be attributed to the soul4--,but if the powers of the released soul altogether depend on the ,lord1 it may happen that ,he1 being independent in all his doings1 may will the released soul to return into the ,sawsara4--,of this doubt the next ,stra disposes4 #bb4 ,non-return1 according to ,scripture2 non-return1 according to ,scripture4 ,we know from ,scripture that there is a ,supreme ,person whose nature is absolute bliss and goodness2 who is fundamentally antagonistic to all evil2 who is the cause of the origination1 sustentation1 and dissolution of the world2 who differs in nature from all other beings1 who is all- knowing1 who by his mere thought and will accomplishes all his purposes2 who is an ocean of kindness as it were for all who depend on him2 who is all-merciful2 who is immeasurably raised above all possibility of any one being equal or superior to him2 whose name is the highest ,brahman4 ,and with equal certainty we know from ,scripture that this ,supreme ,lord1 when pleased by the faithful worship of his ,devotees--which worship consists in daily repeated meditation on ,him1 assisted by the performance of all the practices prescribed for each caste and srama-- frees them from the influence of ,nescience which consists of karman accumulated in the infinite progress of time and hence hard to overcome2 allows them to attain to that supreme bliss which consists in the direct intuition of ,his own true nature3 and after that does not turn them back into the miseries of ,samsra4 ,the text distinctly teaching this is ',he who behaves thus all his life through reaches the world of ,brahman and does not return' 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,viii1 #ae74 ,and the ,lord himself declares ',having obtained me great-souled men do not come into rebirth1 the fleeting abode of misery2 for they have reached the highest perfection4 ,up to the world of ,brahma the worlds return again1 ,o ,arjuna2 but having attained to me1 ,o son of ,kunti1 there is no rebirth' 7,bha4 ,gi4 ,,viii1 #a1 #e-af74 ,as1 moreover1 the released soul has freed itself from the bondage of karman1 has its powers of knowledge fully developed1 and has all its being in the supremely blissful intuition of the highest ,brahman1 it evidently cannot desire anything else nor enter on any other form of activity1 and the idea of its returning into the ,samsra therefore is altogether excluded4 ,nor indeed need we fear that the ,supreme ,lord when once having taken to himself the ,devotee whom he greatly loves will turn him back into the ,samsra4 ,for ,he himself has said1 ',to the wise man ,i am very dear1 and dear he is to me4 ,noble indeed are all these1 but the wise man ,i regard as my very ,self4 ,for he1 with soul devoted1 seeks me only as his highest goal4 ,at the end of many births the wise man goes to me1 thinking all is ,vsudeva4 ,such great-souled men are rarely met with' 7,bha4 ,g4 ,,vii1 #ag-ai74--,the repetition of the words of the ,stra indicates the conclusion of this body of doctrine4 ,thus everything is settled to satisfaction4--,here terminates the adhikarana of 'with the exception of the world-energies4' ,here terminates the fourth pda of the fourth adhyya of the commentary on the ,srraka ,mmms1 composed by the reverend teacher ,rmnuja4 ,this completes the fourth adhyya1 and the whole work2 and the entire body of doctrine is thus brought to a conclusion4 ,,index ,,of ,,sanskrit ,,words amsa1 part1 akshara1 the ,imperishable1 akhyti1 the view that the attribute of one thing appears as that of another1 ,agnirahasya1 chapter in the ,vjasaneyaka 7,sat4 ,bra4 ,x71 ,agnividy1 knowledge of the ,fires 7i4e4 ,ch4 ,up4 ,,iv1 #aa-ac71 agnihotra1 aghtikarman1 anga1 subordinate matter1 angin1 principal matter1 ajada1 intelligent1 ajadatva1 intelligence1 aj1'the unborn' principle1 goat1 ajna1 non-knowledge1 ,nescience1 ajiva1 non-soul1 anu1 of atomic size1 atigraha1 ativdin1 one who makes a final supreme declaration1 ,aditi1 the individual soul1 adrishta1 supersensuous1 transcendental1 the unseen principle advitya1 without a second1 advaita-vdin1 advaitin1 he who holds the view of non-duality1 adharma1 demerit1 adhikarana1 chapter1 passim4 adhipati1 sense-organ1 adhyayana1 learning1 adhyavasya1 the deciding1 adhysa1 superimposition1 anavasda1 freedom from dejection1 antmatva1 absence of selfhood1 anrabdhakrya1 7works7 the effects of which have not yet begun1 aniruddha1 principle of egoity1 anirvakaniyat1 inexplicability1 anirvakaniyatv1 anirvakaniyat-vadin1 ans1 anukla1 agreeable1 anuddharsha1 absence of exultation1 anupalabdhi1 non-perception1 anubhti1 consciousness1 anumati1 favour1 permission1 anumna1 inference1 anuvda1 reference to what is established by other means1 explanatory comment1 anusaya1 remainder1 anusmriti1 recognition1 anrita1 untrue1 antahkarana1 internal organ1 antaram1 difference1 interval1 break1 antariksha1 ether1 atmosphere1 antarymin1 the inner ,ruler1 antaryami-brhmana1 anna1 food1 anvaya1 connexion1 presence1 apara1 secondary1 lowest1 aparokshatva1 being that which does not transcend the senses1 apna1 apurushrtha1 non-advantageous1 aprva1 unprecedented1 new1 the supersensuous result of an action which later on produces the sensible result1 apratisahkhy1 abhva1 absence of something1 non-existence1 abhimna1 misconception1 abhivimna1 abheda1 non-distinction1 amrta1 undefined1 amrita1 amauna1 non-mauna 7see mauna71 arthavda1 an additional statement1 arthpatti1 avagati1 consciousness1 avatra1 incarnation1 avidy1 ,nescience1 avivkya1 7day of ,soma sacrifice71 avyakta1 the ,unevolved1 avykritam1 unevolved matter1 asvatva1 generic character of horses1 asatkrya1 asatkryavda1 the theory that the effect does not exist before its origination1 asatkhyti1 the view that the non-existing appears as existing1 asatya1 untrue1 astikya1 existing body1 ahamkartri1 organ of ,egoity1 ahamkra1 the ',i1' egoity1 aham1 ',i1' a secret name of ,brahman1 ahar1 a secret name of ,brahman1 ahna1 class of sacrifices1 knksh1 expectancy1 ksa1 ether1 kra1 conduct1 tmakhyti1 the view that the ,self appears as a thing1 atman1 ,self1 tmabhva1 own being1 ditya1 ,sun1 desa1 instruction1 nanda1 bliss1 nandamaya1 consisting of bliss1 numna1 object of inference1 numnika1 to be inferred1 bhsa1 appearance1 rambhana that which is taken or touched1 rambhana-adhikarana1 rhata1 a ,jaina1 lambhana1 srama1 stage of life1 srava1 influx1 itikartavyat1 mode of procedure1 indriya1 sense-organ1 ksh1 to think1 svara1 the ,lord1 utpatti1 being originated1 udna1 udgtri1 udgtha1 udgtha-vidy1 unmana1 measure1 upakurvna1 a ,brahmakrin who has completed his course of study and becomes a householder1 ,upakosala-vidy1 upalakshana1 secondary mark1 upasad1 certain offerings1 updna1 material cause1 updhi1 limiting adjunct1 ups1 to meditate1 upsana1 meditation1 upsana1 meditation1 ha1 a kind of cognitional activity1 rita1 ekavkyatva1 syntactical unity1 aisvarya1 lordly power1 superior existence1 om1 omkra1 the syllable ,om1 aupdhika1 limiting adjuncts1 karana1 instrument1 activity1 action1 the instrumental case1 karmaknda1 karman1 action1 works1 good and evil deeds1 karma-bhvan1 karma-mmms1 kalpa1 world period1 kalpaka1 the shaping agent1 kalpana1 formation1 i4e4creation1 kalyna1 virtuous conduct1 kpla1 skull1 kma1 desired thing1 krya1 thing to be done1 kla1 time1 ,kundapyinm ayanam1 kriti1 action1 kaivalya1 isolation1 kriy1 action1 works1 kshetraja1 embodied soul1 khanda1 a piece1 khyti1 gati1 the going1 guna1 quality1 attribute1 secondary matter1 details1 godohana1 a sacrificial vessel1 graha1 ghan-bhta1 concreted1 ghtikarman1 kfaturmukha1 four-faced1 kamasa1 cup1 karana1 conduct1 works1 kitta1 mind1 kid-rpa1 essentially intelligent1 kinta1 thinking1 kaitanya1 intelligence1 kaitta1 mental1 gada1 non-intelligent1 gti1 generic character1 giva1 individual soul1 gva tm1 living ,self1 givaghana1 givanmukta1 released in this life1 gvanmukti1 release in this life1 ga41 knower1 gtri1 knower1 gna41 knowledge1 consciousness1 pl4 forms of knowledge1 tajjalan1 tatkratuh1 according to what his thought is1 tattva of the ,snkhyas1 tat tvam asi1 tanu1 body1 tan-maya1 consisting of that1 tanmtra1 the subtle matter1 tapas1 austerity1 tamas1 darkness1 tarka1 ratiocination1 tukch1 futile1 tejas1 fire or heat1 taijasa1 active1 tyat1 that1 dama1 dahara-vidy1 daharksa1 small ether1 dksh1 initiatory ceremony1 devamy1 desa1 place1 dosha1 imperfection1 a4 dravya1 substance1 dvdasha1 the twelve days' sacrifice1 dviparrdha1 dvpa1 island1 dvaita1 duality1 dvaitavdin1 7the ,vaiseshika7 who holds the view of duality1 dharma1 attribute1 dhyna1 devout meditation1 dhyana-vidhi1 dhyai1 to meditate or to know1 nd1 vein1 nda1 tone1 nmadheya1 name1 nitya1 permanent1 nitynityavastuviveka1 nididhysana1 meditation1 nididhysitavya1 to be meditated upon1 nimitta1 cause1 niyoga1 i4e4 aprva1 supersensuous result of an action which later on products the sensible result1 niranvaya1 absolute1 nirupkhya1 non-entity1 nirjara1 decay1 nirvikalpaka1 non-determinate1 ,nishda-sthapati1 nivra1 wild rice1 naimittika1 contingent1 naishhthika1 a perpetual religious student observing the vow of chastity1 pakaganah1 'five-people1' pakgni-vidy1 pada1 word1 padrtha1 a thing1 para1 highest1 paramtman1 higher ,self1 paramesara1 highest ,lord1 parinama1 modification1 paryya1 particular states of substances pditya1 learning1 priplava1 a performance of the ,asvamedha sacrifice1 privrajaka1 an ascetic1 privrjya1 the wandering about as a mendicant1 putika1 a plant1 pudgala1 body1 purusha soul1 purushavakas1 to he designated by the term 'man1' purusha-vidy1 purushottama1 the highest ,person1 prvapaksha1 prim facie view1 prvapakshin1 he who holds the prim facie view1 passim4 prakarana1 leading subject-matter1 prakra1 mode1 praks1 to shine forth1 praksa1 light1 prakriti1 primeval matter1 originating principle1 nature1 prakriy1 subject-matter1 prajamatrah1 subjects1 pranava1 the syllable ,om1 ,pratardana-vidy 7i4e4 ,kau4 ,up ,,iii71 pratikla1 disagreeable1 pratj1 initial statement1 pratlbuddha atma1 the ,self of intelligence1 pratisankhya1 pratka1 symbol1 pratyaksha1 perception1 presentative thought1 pratyakshat1 immediate presentation1 pratyag-tman1 the individual soul1 pratyaa1 consciousness1 pratyhra1 complete restraining of the senses from receiving external impressions1 prathiman1 solid extension1 pradesa1 space1 pradyumna1 the internal organ1 pradhna1 principal matter1 non-sentient principle1 pradhna1 a superior1 prabh1 light1 prayojana1 final cause1 pralaya1 destruction of the world1 prga1 knowing1 conscious1 intelligent1 the personal ,self1 the highest ,self1 prna1 breath1 breathing out2 soul2 ,breath1 a name of ,brahman1 prna1 pl4 organs and vital breath1 prnamaya1 consisting of breath1 prngnihotra1 prdesamtra1 prpti1 the being obtained1 pryaskitta1 expiatory rite1 prerakatva1 prompting quality1 phala1 result1 phalavidhi1 injunction of results1 bdha1 sublation1 bdhita1 sublated1 blya1 childlike state1 buddhi1 internal organ1 intellect1 brimh1 root from which ',brahman' is derived1 brimhana1 growth1 brihat1 great1 brihattva1 greatness1 brahmakarya1 chastity1 brahmagigns1 enquiry into ,brahman1 brahmatva1 ,brahma-hood1 brahman1 brahma-bhvan1 brahmavidy1 knowledge of ,brahman1 brahmasamstha1 founded on ,brahman1 bhakti1 devotion1 devout meditation1 bhagavat1 the ,lord1 then a holy person1 bhagsana1 bhkta1 secondary or figurative1 bhva1 entity1 bhinna1 separate1 bhinnatva1 difference1 bhta1 beings1 bhta1 element1 bhtamtrh1 objects1 bhtdi1 originator of the elements1 bhman1'muchness1' fulness of bliss1 bhma-vidy 7,ch4 ,up4 ,,vii1 #b71 bheda1 difference1 bhedbheda1 view that there is difference and absence of difference at the same time1 bhautika1 elemental1 bhrama1 erroneous cognition1 error1 bhrnti1 illusion1 madhu1 'honey1' the sun1 madhuividy1 manana1 reflection1 manas1 internal organ1 mind1 mantavya1 to be reflected on1 mantra1 -maya1 consisting of1 made of1 ,mahat1 the ,great ,principle 7of the ,snkhya71 mahvrata-brhmana1 mtr1 mora 7metrical unit71 mnasa1 mental 7offering of a ,soma cup71 my1 myin1 possessing my1 mithy1 false1 mithytva1 falsehood1 mukta1 released1 mukhya prna1 chief vital air1 mudr1 a badge1 muni1 mrta1 defined1 mauna1 ,muni-hood1 state of a ,muni1 yathkratub1 according as his thought is1 yushmad-artha1 the objective element1 yoga1 mystic concentration of mind1 yogayug1 practitioner of ,yoga1 yogasiddha1 perfected by ,yoga1 yogyat1 compatibility1 yoni1 female organ of generation1 rajas1 passion1 rahasya-brhmana1 rga1 passion1 rukaka nishka1 rpa1 form1 character1 lakshan1 implied meaning1 implication1 linga1 inferential mark1 vastu1 substance1 vkya1 syntactical connexion1 vkyabheda1 split of a sentence1 vyu1 wind1 vasan1 a flow of ideas1 states of consciousness1 vikra1 effected thing1 effect1 vikriti1 being ,modified1 vijna1 understanding1 knowledge1 idea1 vijnamaya1 consisting of understanding1 7the soul in deep sleep74 vid1 to know or to meditate1 vidy1 form of meditation on ,brahman1 viniyoga1 application1 vipaskit1 intelligent1 vipaskittva1 intelligence1 vibhava1 manifestation1 vibhti1 manifestation of power1 vimoka1 freeness of mind1 vivrit1 to manifest itself1 viveka1 abstention1 viseshana1 determining attribute1 vishaya1 object1 virya1 strength1 vritta1 conduct1 vedana1 knowledge1 vedan1 sensation1 veda-vrata1 vaikrika1 modified1 vaikhnasa1 hermit1 vaisvarpya1 many-natured universe1 vaisvnara-vidy vyavahra1 speech1 vyashti1 discrete aspect 7of the world71 vyna1 vyvahrika1 conventional1 vyvritti1 individual difference1 vyha1 division1 sakti1 power1 potentiality1 sabda1 sound1 sama1 sarira1 body1 skh1 ,sndilya-vidy1 srira1 joined to a body1 sriraka 7doctrine7 of the embodied 7self71 sstra1 science1 scriptural injunction1 sirovrata1 vow of 7carrying fire on the7 head1 sila1 conduct1 subhsraya1 perfect object1 sudra 7etymology71 sesha1 supplementary1 seshin1 principal matter to be subserved by other things1 sraddhi1 faith1 belief1 sravana1 hearing1 sruti1 scriptural statement1 rg1 samyamana1 samyoga1 conjunction1 samvara1 a kind of deep meditation1 samvargavidy samvid1 consciousness1 samsra1 samskra1 impression1 samskriti1 the being made ready1 samkarshana1 the individual soul1 samrkhy1 number1 samj1 consciousness1 sat1 ,being1 satkrya1 sattra class of sacrifices1 sattva1 goodness1 satya1 true1 satyakma1 realising its desire1 satyakmatva1 power of realising one's desire1 sad-vidy1 meditation on that which truly is 7,kb4 ,up4 ,,vi1 i ff471 sanniclhi1 proximity1 sapta-bhangi-nyya1 the system of the seven paralogisms1 samanantara1 samanvaya1 connexion1 samavya1 intimate relation1 reciprocal inherence1 samavyi-karana1 intimate cause1 samashti1 collective aspect 7of the world71 samashti-purusha1 the aggregate soul1 samkra1 a book of the tharvanikas1 samdhi1 meditation1 samna1 sarnpatti1 union1 sampad1 to be combined1 sampta1 yvat samptam1 samprasda1 serenity1 sambhta1 sayuktvn1 sarvaja1 all-knowing1 savikalpaka1 determinate1 sahakrin1 sksht1 manifest1 skshtkra1 immediate presentation1 skshin1 the witnessing principle1 sdhya1 effected1 smndhikaranya1 co-ordination1 syugya1 equality1 siddhi1 proof1 definite well-established knowledge1 sukarita1 good conduct1 sushira1 a hollow place1 skshma1 the ,subtle1 setu1 bank or bridge1 somarjan1 sparsa1 touch1 smriti1 representation1 svayampraksa1 self-proved1 svayampraksatva1 self-luminousness1 svayampraksat1 svarga1 heaven1 svastika1 svaclhyaya1 one's own text1 svdhyya1 essential1 rgr4 ,hara1 hita1 arteries so called1 hetu1 reason1