,transcriber's ,note3 ,italics are enclosed in underscores4 ,additional notes will be found near the end of this ebook4 ,,pragmatism ,,and ,,idealism ,,agents ,,america ,,the ,,macmillan ,,company #fd #ff ,,fifth ,,avenue1 ,,new ,,york ,,australasia ,,the ,,oxford ,,university ,,press #bje ,,flinders ,,lane1 ,,melbourne ,,canada ,,the ,,macmillan ,,company ,,of ,,canada1 ,,ltd4 ,,st ,,martin',s ,,house1 #gj ,,bond ,,street1 ,,toronto ,,india ,,macmillan ,,company1 ,,ltd4 ,,macmillan ,,building1 ,,bombay #cji ,,bow ,,bazaar ,,street1 ,,calcutta ,,pragmatism ,,and ,,idealism ,,by ,,william ,,caldwell1 ,m4,a41 ,d4,,sc4,,edinr4 ,,sir ,,william ,,macdonald ,,professor ,,of ,,moral ,,philosophy1 ,mc,g,i,l,l ,,university1 ,,montreal ,,london ,,adam ,,and ,,charles ,,black #aiac ,,preface ,what is attempted in this book is an examination of the ,pragmatist philosophy in its relations to older and newer tendencies in the thought and practice of mankind4 ,while a good deal has been written within the last ten years upon ,pragmatism1 the issue that it represents is still an open one--to judge at least from recent books and reviews1 and from recent official discussions4 ,and there seems to be a favourable opportunity for a general account of the whole subject and for an estimate of its significance4 ,in the opening chapter and elsewhere1 both in the text and in the footnotes1 ,i have put together some things about the development and the affiliations of ,pragmatism1 and of pragmatist tendencies1 that may not be altogether new to the professional student4 ,such a presentation1 or general conspectus1 ,i have found to be a necessity in the way of a basis both for discussion and for rational comprehension4 ,taken along with the original pronouncements of ,james and his confrres it affords an indication of the philosophy to which the pragmatists would fain attain1 and of the modification of rationalistic philosophy they would fain effect4 ,the chapter upon ,pragmatism as ,americanism is put forth in the most tentative spirit possible1 and ,i have thought more than once of withholding it4 ,something in this connexion1 however1 is1 in my opinion1 needed to cause us to regard the pragmatist philosophy as resting upon a very real tendency of the civilized world of to-day--a tendency that is affecting us all whether we like it or not4 ,the chapter upon ,pragmatism and ,anglo-,hegelian ,rationalism is also offered with some degree of reservation and misgiving1 for1 like many of my contemporaries1 ,i owe nearly everything in the way of my introduction to philosophy to the great ,neo-,kantian and ,neo-,hegelian movement4 ,in its place1 ,i had some months ago a more general chapter upon ,pragmatism and ,rationalism1 containing the results of material that ,i had been elaborating upon the development of ,english ,neo-,hegelianism4 ,at the last moment ,i substituted what is here offered upon the significant high-water output of ,hegelianism represented in ,dr4 ,bosanquet's ,edinburgh ,gifford ,lectures4 ,in regard to the note upon the ,pragmatist elements in the philosophy of ,bergson ,i ought1 perhaps1 to say that ,i kept away from ,bergson's last two books until ,i had written out what had been growing up in my own mind about the activism of ,pragmatism and its relations to ,idealism4 ,i have found confirmation for much of my own thought in the teaching of this remarkable and significant thinker1 and ,i regret the partial representation of it that is here submitted4 ,having crossed the ocean for the printing of my book1 ,i have in some cases lost or misplaced references that ,i intended to use or to verify4 ,for this ,i crave the indulgence of readers and critics4 ,i am indebted to the following gentlemen for much kind help and criticism in the revision of my manuscript and proof-sheets for the press3 my brother1 the ,rev4 ,victor ,caldwell1 ,m4,a41 of ,patna1 ,ayrshire2 ,professor ,john ,laird of ,queen's ,university1 ,belfast2 ,professor ,james ,seth of the ,university of ,edinburgh2 ,professor ,p4 ,t4 ,lafleur of ,m',gill ,university4 ,i also owe much in this same connexion to recent conversations with ,professors ,a4 ,lalande and ,d4 ,parodi of ,paris1 upon ,pragmatism and contemporary philosophy generally4 ,,london1 ,september #aiac4 ,,contents ,,chap4 ,,page ,i4 ,,introductory #a ,,note ,,on ,,the ,,meaning ,,of 8,,pragmatism0 #ba ,,ii4 ,,pragmatism ,,and ,,the ,,pragmatist ,,movement #bc ,,iii4 ,,some ,,fundamental ,,characteristics #eh ,,iv4 ,,pragmatism ,,and ,,human ,,activity #ic ,,appendix ,,to ,,chapter ,,iv4--,,philosophy ,,and ,,the ,,activity-,,experience #aji ,v4 ,,critical #aaf ,,vi4 ,,pragmatism ,,as ,,humanism #ada ,,vii4 ,,pragmatism ,,as ,,americanism #afh ,,viii4 ,,pragmatism ,,and ,,anglo-,,hegelian ,,rationalism #aif ,,ix4 ,,pragmatism ,,and ,,idealism ,,in ,,the ,,philosophy ,,of ,,bergson #bcd ,,concluding ,,remarks #bfb ,,index #bfg ,,pragmatism ,,and ,,idealism ,,chapter ,i ,,introductory ,pragmatism has by this time received so much attention in the reflective literature of the day that any writer upon the subject may now fairly presume upon a general acquaintance with its main principles and contentions4 ,indeed1 it is probable that most thinking people may be credited with the ability to have formed some sort of judgment of their own about a philosophy whose main contention is that true ideas are working ideas1 and that truth itself1 like a creed or a belief1 is simply a working valuation of reality4 ,there are still1 however1 some things to be said1 at least in ,english1 upon the place and the meaning of ,pragmatism in the philosophical reconstruction that is generally felt to be so necessary to-day4 ,as far as the external signs of any such vital relation between ,pragmatism and our recent academic philosophy are concerned1 the reader may be aware1 to begin with1 that there have been many important concessions#a made to pragmatists by such representative rationalists as ,mr4 ,bradley and ,professor ,taylor1 not to speak of others1#b and ,pragmatism has certainly had a very powerful effect upon the professional philosophy of both ,england and ,germany1 judging at least from the extent to which many of the more prominent representatives of philosophy in these countries have apparently been compelled to accord to it at least an official recognition4#c ,pragmatism1 again1 in consequence of the different receptions that it has met with at the hands of its friends and its foes1 has undergone various phases of exposition and of modification1 although it has not yet1 nor is it on the whole likely to have1 a philosophical output comparable to that of ,idealism4 ,it has become more and more conscious of its own affiliations and relations to older1 and to broader doctrines1 declaring itself1 in the hands of ,professor ,james and his friends1 to be but a new name for older ways of thinking4 ,and it has succeeded1 in a measure1 in clearing itself from liability to the superficial interpretation that it met with a few years ago1 when it was scoffed at for teaching that you may believe 8what you like10 for speaking1 for example1 as if the 8theoretical0 consequences of truth were not to be considered as well as the 8practical40 ,although still resting in the main upon an outspoken declaration of war against ,rationalism1 it is no longer blind to the place and the value of thought or the 8concept10 in the matter of the interpretation of our experience4 ,pragmatism1 as the theory is generally understood1 rests in the main upon the work of three men1 ,professors ,james and ,dewey of ,america1 and ,dr4 ,schiller of ,oxford4 ,the fact1 along doubtless with other things1 that these men have ere now been spoken of as occupying a right1 a left1 and a centre in the new movement1 is presumably an indication that it has already received its highest theoretical expression--presumably in the ,california pamphlet of ,professor ,james1 or in the famous ,popular ,science ,monthly article of ,peirce1 canonized as the patron saint of the movement by ,james4 ,whether this be so or not1 it has been in the main the work of ,james to set forth the meaning of ,pragmatism as a philosophy of everyday life1 as the theory of the attitude of man as man to the world in which he finds himself4 ,dr4 ,schiller1 again1 it is claimed1 has done much to set forth ,pragmatism to the world as an essentially humanistic philosophy1 recognizing and providing for the rights of faith and of feeling in determining our beliefs and our theories about things4 ,this philosophy has 8much in common with what in other quarters is called ,personalism40 ,it cannot1 however1 be differentiated so sharply as ,dr4 ,schiller apparently would have us believe from the many manifestations of this philosophy that abound in modern times1 from ,fichte1 and from ,lotze1 down to men who are still living--,eucken and others4 ,the ingenious ,professor ,dewey1 moreover1 is the champion of the scientific1 or the empirical1 or the 8instrumental0 method in philosophy1 and has worked hard and successfully at the reform which he thinks must take place in logical and philosophical conceptions when interpreted as simply tools or devices for the economy of our thought4 ,when1 in pragmatist fashion1 we seek to judge of ,pragmatism by this last-mentioned matter of its results1 by the things it has enabled its advocates to accomplish1 we find that we may1 to begin with1 speak in the following terms of the work of ,professor ,james4 ,he has certainly indicated how the pragmatist method may be applied to the solution of some of the ordinary difficulties of reflective thought2 about1 for example1 the nature of matter or the nature of the soul1 or about the old opposition between the 8one0 and the 8many10 about such concepts as 8thing10 8kinds10 8time10 8space10 the 8fancied10 the 8real10 and so on4 ,in all such cases an answer1 he holds1 is obtained by putting1 say1 the initial difficulty in the following form3 8,what practical difference can it make now that the world should be run by matter or by spirit80 ,a fair illustration of his meaning here would be his own characteristic attitude1 so far as the philosophy of religion is concerned1 to the so-called 8theistic0 proofs that have been part of the stock in trade of rational theology4 ,a 8necessary being0 and a 8whole of truth0 and the 8,absolute0#d are not1 he would hold1 what the average man understands by ,god2 they have hardly any perceptible effect upon life and conduct--the all-important matter in the thought of ,god as he conceives it4 ,only those notions1 he would have it1 which can be interpreted by the thought of the 8difference0 they make to our practical conduct are real notions at all--8,providence10 say1 or 8,god0 as the guarantor of the reality and the permanence of the moral order1 and so on4 ,the 8soul10 again1 he would hold1 8is good for just so much and no more40 ,and a similar thing1 too1 would be true about ,berkeley's 8matter10 or about the 8matter0 of the materialists4#e ,this latter1 for instance1 cannot possibly do all it is claimed to be able to do in the way of an explanation of the order of the world and the phenomena of life4 ,then again1 ,james has written a great many pages upon the so-called deeper view of human nature 7as inclusive of will and 8emotion0 in addition to mere thought7 taken by ,pragmatism in comparison with that entertained by ,rationalism4 ,we shall have occasion to return to this point4 ,he has made it clear1 too1 that it was an unfair interpretation of ,pragmatism to take it as a plea for believing what you like1 as was said above4 ,our experience1 he puts it1 must be consistent1 the 8parts with the parts10 and the 8parts with the whole40 ,beliefs must not clash with other beliefs1 the mind being wedged tightly between the coercion of the sensible order and that of the ideal order4 ,by 8consequences10 too1 he contends we may mean intellectual or theoretical consequences as well as practical consequences4 ,he has also1 along with his brother-pragmatists1 raised the question of the nature of ,truth1 attaining to such important results as the following3 7#a7 there is no such thing as pure truth1 or ready-made truth2 7#b7 the 8copy-theory0 of truth is unintelligible4#f ,we shall later be obliged to examine the more controversial positions that 7#c7 truth is not an end in itself1 but a means towards vital satisfaction2 7#d7 truth is the 8expedient0 in the way of thinking1 as the right is the expedient#g in the way of acting1 and so on4 ,further1 ,professor ,james finds that ,pragmatism leaves us with the main body of our common-sense beliefs ,peirce holds practically the same thing1 such as the belief in 8freedom0--as a 8promise and a relief10 he adds2 and the belief in the religious outlook upon life1 in so far as it 8works40 ,this is the attitude and the tenor of the well-known books on ,the ,will to ,believe and ,the ,varieties of ,religious ,experience4#h 8,our acts1 our turning-places1 where we seem to ourselves to make ourselves and grow1 are the parts of the world to which we are closest1 the parts of which our knowledge is the most intimate and complete4 ,why should we not take them at their face-value80 ,and yet1 as against this attitude1 ,professor ,james elsewhere finds himself unable to believe 8that our human experience is the highest form of experience extant in the universe40 ,it is the emergence of many such incoherences in his writings that gives to his pragmatist philosophy of religion a subjective and temperamental character1 and makes it seem to be lacking in any objective basis4 8,if radically tough1 the hurly-burly of the sensible facts of nature will be enough for you1 and you will need no religion at all4 ,if radically tender1 you will take up with the more monistic form of religion3 the pluralistic form--that is1 reliance on possibilities that are not necessities--will not seem to offer you security enough40#i ,he 8inclines10 on the whole1 to 8,meliorism10 treating satisfaction as neither necessary nor impossible2 the pragmatist lives in 8the world of possibilities40 ,these words show clearly how difficult it is to pin down ,professor ,james to any single intelligible philosophy of belief1 if belief be interpreted as in any sense a 8commerce0 of the soul with objective realities1 as something more than a merely generous faith in the gradual perfection or betterment of human society4 8,religious experience10 as he puts it in his ,pluralistic ,universe1 8peculiarly so called1 needs1 in my opinion1 to be carefully considered and interpreted by every one who aspires to reason out a more complete philosophy40 ,in this same book1 it is declared1 however1 on the one hand1 that 8we have outgrown the old theistic orthodoxy1 the ,god of our popular ,christianity being simply one member of a pluralistic system02 and yet1 on the other hand1 and with equal emphasis1 that 8we finite minds may simultaneously be conscious with one another in a supernatural intelligence40#aj ,the book on ,the ,meaning of ,truth seems to return1 in the main1 to the ,american doctrine of the strenuous life as the only courageous1 and therefore true1 attitude to beliefs1 as the life that contains1 in the plenitude of its energizing1 the answer to all questions4 8,pluralism affords us10 it openly confesses1 8no moral holidays1 and it is unable to let loose quietistic raptures1 and this is a serious deficiency in the pluralistic philosophy which we have professed40 ,professor ,james here again attacks ,absolutism in the old familiar manner1 as somehow unequal to the complexity of things1 or the pulsating process of the world1 casting himself upon the philosophy of experience1 and upon the evident reality of the 8many0 and of the endless variety of the relations of things1 in opposition to the abstract simplicity of the 8one10 and the limited range of a merely logical1 or mathematical1 manner of conceiving of reality4 8,the essential service of ,humanism1 as ,i conceive the situation1 is to have seen that1 though one part of experience may lean upon another part to make it what it is in any one of several aspects in which it may be considered1 experience as a whole is self-sustaining and leans on nothing4444 8,it gets rid of the standing problems of ,monism and of other metaphysical systems and paradoxes40#aa ,professor ,james exhibits1 however1 at the same time a very imperfect conception of philosophy1 holding that it gives us1 in general1 8no new range of practical power10 ignoring1 as it were1 the difference between philosophy and poetry and religion and mere personal enthusiasm4 ,and he leaves the whole question of the first principles of both knowledge and conduct practically unsettled4 ,these things are to him but conceptual tools1#ab and 8working0 points of departure for our efforts1 and there seems in his books to be no way of reducing them to any kind of system4 ,and he makes1 lastly1 a most unsuccessful attempt at a theory of reality4 ,reality is to him sometimes simply a moving equilibrium of experience1 the 8flux0 we have already referred to2 sometimes the fleeting generations of men who have thought out for us all our philosophies and sciences and cults and varied experiences1 and sometimes the 8common-sense world in which we find things partly joined and partly disjoined40 ,it is sometimes1 too1 other things even than these4 ,in a chapter of the book upon ,pragmatism#ac it is stated in italics that 8reality is1 in general1 what truths have to take account of10 and that it has three parts3 7#a7 8the flux of our sensations10 and 7#b7 the 8relations that obtain between our sensations1 or between their copies in our minds10 and 7#c7 8the previous truths of which every new inquiry takes account40 ,then again1 in ,a ,pluralistic ,universe1#ad it is declared that 8there may ultimately never be an ,all-form at all1 that the substance of reality may never get totally collected 444 and that a distributive form of reality1 the ,each-form1 is logically as acceptable and empirical and probable as the ,all-form40 ,this is the theory of the outspoken 8radical empiricism0#ae which is the contention of the volume upon ,the ,meaning of ,truth1 the main effort of which seems to be to show again that the world is still in the process of making4 ,it has the additional drawback of bringing ,pragmatism down not only to the level of radical empiricism1 but to that of common-sense realism or dualism the belief in the two independent realities of matter and mind1 and to that of the 8copy-theory0#af of truth1 from which both ,pragmatism and ,radical ,empiricism are especially supposed to deliver us4 8,i will say here again1 for the sake of emphasis1 that the existence of the object 444 is the only reason1 in innumerable cases1 why the idea does work successfully4444 ,both ,dewey and ,i hold firmly 444 to objects independent of our own judgments40#ag ,much of all this is1 no doubt1 like surrendering philosophy altogether4 ,in the case of ,dr4 ,schiller1 we may notice first his frequent and successful exhibition of the extent to which human activity enters into the constitution not only of 8truth10 but of 8reality10 of what we mean by reality4 ,this is interwoven in his books with his whole philosophy of truth as something merely human1 as 8dependent upon human purposes10 as a 8valuation0 expressive of the satisfactory1 or the unsatisfactory1 nature of the contents of 8primary reality40 ,it is interwoven1 too1 with his doctrine that reality is essentially a 1 something that is still in the making1 something that human beings can somehow re-make and make perfect4 ,then this position about truth and reality is used by him1 as by ,james1 as a ground of attack against ,absolutism1 with its notion of a 8pre-existing ideal0 of knowledge and reality1 as already existing in a super-sensible world1 that descends magically into the passively recipient soul of man4 ,there is no such thing1 he claims1 as absolute truth1 and the conception of an 8absolute reality0 is both futile and pernicious4 ,absolutism1 too1 has an affinity to ,solipsism1#ah the difficulties of which it can escape only by self-elimination4 ,then ,absolutism is1 ,schiller continues1 8essentially irreligious10#ai although it was fostered at first in ,england for essentially religious purposes4#bj ,it has developed there now at last1 he reminds us1 a powerful left#ba wing which1 as formerly in ,germany1 has opened a quarrel with theology4 ,in ,absolutism1 the two phases of ,deity--,god as moral principle1 and ,god as an intellectual principle--8fall apart10 and absolutist metaphysic has really no connexion with genuine religion4 ,humanism can 8renew ,hegelianism0 by treating the making of truth as also the making of reality4 ,freedom is real1 and may possibly 8pervade the universe40#bb ,all truth implies belief1 and it is obviously one of the merits of ,pragmatism to bring truth and reason together4 ,beliefs and ideas and wishes are really essential and integral features in real knowing1 and if knowing1 as above1 really transforms our experience1 they must be treated as 8real forces10 which cannot be ignored by philosophy4#bc ,against all this would-be positive1 or constructive1 philosophy we must1 however1 record the fact that the pragmatism of ,dr4 ,schiller breaks down altogether in the matter of the recognition of a distinction between the 8discovering0 of reality and the 8making0 of reality4 ,and despite the ingenuity of his essay in the first edition of ,humanism upon 8,activity and ,substance10#bd there is not in his writings1 any more than in those of ,james1 any coherent or adequate theory of reality4 ,and this is the case whether we think of the 8primary reality0 upon which we human beings are said to 8react10 in our knowledge and in our action1 or of the supreme reality of ,god's existence1 of which such an interesting speculative account is given in the essay referred to4 ,nor is there in ,dr4 ,schiller1 any more than in ,james1 any adequate conception1 either of philosophy as a whole1 or of the theory of knowledge1 or of the relation of ,pragmatism as a 8method0 7it is modestly claimed to be only such1 but the position is not adhered to7 to philosophy as such4#be 8,for the pragmatic theory of knowledge initial principles are literally 1 mere starting-points variously1 arbitrarily1 casually selected1 from which we hope to try to advance to something better4 ,little we care what their credentials may be4444 ,and as far as the future is concerned1 systems of philosophy will abound as before1 and will be as various as ever1 but they will probably be more brilliant in colouring and more attractive in their form1 for they will certainly have to be put forward and acknowledged as works of art that bear the impress of a unique and individual soul40#bf ,the main result of pragmatist considerations in the case of ,professor ,dewey is perhaps that reconsideration of the problems of logic and knowledge in the light of the facts of genetic and functional psychology which has now become fairly general on the part of ,english and ,american students of philosophy4 ,it is through his influence generally that pragmatists seem always to be talking about the way in which we 8arrive at0 our beliefs1 about ideas as 8instruments0 for the interpretation and arrangement of our experience1 about the 8passage0 from cognitive expectation to 8fulfilment10 about ideas as 8plans of action0 and mental habits1 about the growth and the utility of the truth1 about the 8instrumental0 character of all our thinking1 about beliefs as more fundamental than knowledge1 and so on4 ,professor ,dewey has also written many more or less popular1 but none the less highly valuable1 short studies upon the application of an instrumentalist conception of philosophy to education and to social questions4 ,one of his last pieces of service in this connection is a volume in which he associates ,pragmatism with the general revolution effected in the entire range of the mental and moral sciences by ,darwinism1 with the present tendency in philosophy to turn away from ultimate questions to specific problems1 and with the reform which1 in his opinion1 is necessary in our educational ideals#bg generally4 ,these three leading exponents of ,pragmatism may be regarded as meeting the objections to philosophy urged respectively by the 8man of affairs10 by the 8mystical1 religious0 man1 and by the 8man of science40#bh ,by this it is meant that the man of affairs will find in ,james an exposition of philosophy as the study of different ways of looking at the world2 the mystical1 religious man will find in ,schiller a treatment of philosophy as the justification of an essentially spiritual philosophy of life2 and that the scientific man will find in the writings of ,dewey and his associates a treatment of philosophy as nothing else than an extension into the higher regions of thought of the same experimental and hypothetical method with which he is already familiar in the physical sciences4 ,in this version of the work of the three leading pragmatists it is assumed1 of course1 that the pragmatist philosophy is the only philosophy that can show to the average man that philosophy can really do something useful--can 8bake bread10 if you will1 can give to a man the food of a man4 ,it is assumed1 too1 that it is the only philosophy which proceeds scientifically1 that is to say1 by means of observation and of hypotheses that 8work10 and by subsequent deduction and by 8verification40 ,and again1 that it is the only philosophy that gives to man the realities upon which he can base his aspirations or his faith in distinction1 that is to say1 from the mere abstractions of ,rationalism in any form4 ,by way of a few quotations illustrative of the fundamental contentions of the pragmatists1 we may select the following3 8,ideas become true just in so far as they help us to get into satisfactory relation with other parts of our experience1 to summarise them and get about among them by conceptional short-cuts instead of following the interminable succession of particular phenomena4 ,any idea upon which we can ride1 so to speak2 any idea that will carry us prosperously from any one part of our experience to any other part1 linking things satisfactorily1 working securely1 simplifying1 saving labour--is true for just so much1 true in so far forth1 true instrumentally40#bi 8,the true is the name of whatever proves itself to be good in the way of belief1 and good for definite and assignable reasons40#cj ,from ,professor ,dewey3 8,thinking is a kind of activity which we perform at specific need1 just as at other times we engage in other sorts of activity1 as converse with a friend1 draw a plan for a house1 take a walk1 eat a dinner1 purchase a suit of clothes1 etc4 etc4 ,the measure of its success1 the standard of its validity is precisely the degree in which thinking disposes of the difficulty and allows us to proceed with the more direct modes of experiencing1 that are henceforth possessed of more assured and deepened value40#ca ,from ,dr4 ,schiller's book1 ,studies in ,humanism3 8,pragmatism is the doctrine that when an assertion claims truth1 its consequences are always used to test its claims2 that 7#b7 the truth of an assertion depends on its application2 that 7#c7 the meaning of a rule lies in its application2 that 7#d7 all meaning depends on purpose2 that 7#e7 all mental life is purposive4 ,it ,pragmatism must constitute itself into 7#f7 a systematic protest against all ignoring of the purposiveness of actual knowing1 alike whether it is abstracted from for the sake of the imaginary1 pure1 or absolute reason of the rationalists1 or eliminated for the sake of an equally imaginary or pure mechanism of the naturalists4 ,so conceived1 we may describe it as 7#g7 a conscious application to logic of a teleological psychology which implies ultimately a voluntaristic metaphysics40 ,from these citations1 and from the descriptive remarks of the preceding two paragraphs1 we may perhaps be enabled to infer that our ,anglo-,american ,pragmatism has progressed from the stage of 7#a7 a mere method of discussing truth and thinking in relation to the problem of philosophy as a whole1 7#b7 that of a more or less definite and detailed criticism of the rationalism that overlooks the practical1 or purposive1 character of most of our knowledge1 to that of 7#c7 a humanistic or 8voluntaristic0 or 8personalistic0 philosophy1 with its many different associations and affiliations4#cb ,one of the last developments1 for example1 of this pragmatist humanism is ,dr4 ,schiller's association of philosophy with the metaphysics of evolution1 with the attempt to find the goal of the world-process and of human history in a changeless society of perfected individuals4 ,we shall immediately see1 however1 that this summary description of the growth of ,pragmatism has to be supplemented by a recognition of 7#a7 some of the different phases ,pragmatism has assumed on the continent of ,europe1 7#b7 the different phases that may be detected in the reception or criticism accorded to it in different countries1 and 7#c7 some of the results of the pragmatist movement upon contemporary philosophy4 ,all these things have to do with the making of the complex thing that we think of as ,pragmatism and the pragmatist movement4 ,a ,,note ,,on ,,the ,,meaning ,,of 8,,pragmatism0 7#a7 8,the opinion that metaphysics is to be largely cleared up by the application of the following maxim for obtaining clearness of apprehension3 #8,consider what effects that might conceivably have practical bearings1 we conceive the object of our conception to have4 ,then1 our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object'0 7,baldwin's ,philosophical ,dictionary1 vol4 ii4 p4 #cba74 ,we can see from this citation that the application of its formul about 8consequences0 to metaphysics1 or philosophy generally1 must be considered as a part1 or aspect1 of the pragmatist philosophy4 7#b7 8,the doctrine that the whole meaning of a conception expresses itself in practical consequences2 consequences either in the shape of conduct to be recommended1 or in that of experiences to be expected1 if the conception be true2 which consequences would be different1 if it were untrue1 and must be different from the consequences by which the meaning of other conceptions is in turn expressed4 ,if a second conception should not appear to have other consequence1 then it must be really only the first conception under a different name4 ,in methodology1 it is certain that to trace and compare their respective consequences is an admirable way of establishing the different meanings of different conceptions0 7ibid41 from ,professor ,james74 7#c7 8,a widely current opinion during the last quarter of a century has been that #8reasonableness' is not a good in itself1 but only for the sake of something4 ,whether it be so or not seems to be a synthetical question i4e4 a question that is not merely a verbal question1 a question of words1 not to be settled by an appeal to the ,principle of ,contradiction the principle hitherto relied upon by ,rationalism or ,intellectualism4444 ,almost everybody will now agree that the ultimate good lies in the evolutionary process in some way4 ,if so1 it is not in individual reactions in their segregation1 but in something general or continuous4 ,synechism is founded on the notion that the coalescence1 the becoming continuous1 the becoming governed by laws1 the becoming instinct with general ideas1 are but phases of one and the same process of the growth of reasonableness0 7ibid4 p4 #cbb4 ,from ,dr4 ,peirce1 the bracket clauses being the author's74 7#d7 8,it is the belief that ideas invariably strive after practical expression1 and that our whole life is teleological4 ,putting the matter logically1 logic formulates theoretically what is of regulative importance for life--for our #8experience' in view of practical ends4 ,its philosophical meaning is the conviction that all facts of nature1 physically and spiritually1 find their expressions in #8will'2 will and energy are identical4 ,this tendency is in agreement with the practical tendencies of ,american thought and ,american life in so far as they both set a definite end before ,idealism0 7,ueberweg-,heinze1 ,geschichte der ,philosophie1 vol4 iv41 written and contributed by ,professor ,matoon ,monroe ,curtis1 ,professor of ,philosophy in ,western ,reserve ,university1 ,cleveland1 ,u4,s4,a474 7#e7 ,see also an article in ,mind for ,october #aijj1 vol4 ix4 ,n4,s41 upon 8,pragmatism0 by the author of this book on ,pragmatism and ,idealism1 referred to as one of the early sources in ,baldwin's ,philosophical ,dictionary 7,new ,york and ,london7 and in ,ueberweg-,heinze's ,geschichte1 ,vierter ,teil 7,berlin1 #aijf74 ,the conclusion that ,i am inclined to draw from the foregoing official statements 7and also1 say1 from another official article like that of ,m4 ,lalande in the ,revue ,philosophique1 #aijf1 on 8,pragmatisme et ,pragmaticisme07 is that the term 8,pragmatism0 is not of itself a matter of great importance1 and that there is no separate1 intelligible1 independent1 self-consistent system of philosophy that may be called ,pragmatism4 ,it is a general name for the ,practicalism or ,voluntarism or ,humanism or the ,philosophy of the ,practical ,reason1 or the ,activism1 or the ,instrumentalism1 or the ,philosophy of ,hypotheses1 or the ,dynamic ,philosophy of life and things that is discussed in different ways in this book upon ,pragmatism and ,idealism4 ,and it is not and cannot be independent of the traditional body of philosophical truth in relation to which it can alone be defined4 ,,chapter ,,ii ,,pragmatism ,,and ,,the ,,pragmatist ,,movement ,in considering some of the results of pragmatist and voluntarist doctrines in the case of ,european writers1 to whom the ,american-,english triumvirate used to look somewhat sympathetically1 we may begin with ,italy1 which boasted1 according to ,dr4 ,schiller 7writing in #aijg71 of a youthful band of avowed pragmatists with a militant organ1 the ,leonardo4 8,fundamentally10 declares ,papini1#cc the leader of this movement1 8,pragmatism means an unstiffening of all our theories and beliefs1 by attending to their instrumental value4 ,it incorporates and harmonizes various ancient tendencies1 such as ,nominalism1 with its protest against the use of general terms1 ,utilitarianism1 with its emphasis upon particular aspects and problems1 ,positivism1 with its disdain of verbal and useless questions1 ,kantism1 with its doctrine of the primacy of practical reason1 ,voluntarism1 with its treatment of the intellect as the tool of the will1 and ,freedom1 and a positive attitude towards religious questions4 ,it is the tendency of taking all these1 and other theories1 for what they are worth1 being chiefly a corridor-theory1 with doors and avenues into various theories1 and a central rallying-ground for them all40 ,these words are valuable as one of the many confessions of the affiliations of ,pragmatism to several other more or less experiential1 or practical1 views of philosophy4 ,it is perfectly obvious from them that ,pragmatism stands1 in the main1 for the apprehension of all truth as subservient to practice1 as but a device for the 8economy0 of thought1 for the grasping of the multiplicity and the complexity of phenomena4 ,it looks upon man as made1 in the main1 for action1 and not for speculation--a doctrine which even ,mr4 ,peirce1 by the way1 now speaks of as 8a stoical maxim which to me1 at the age of sixty1 does not recommend itself so forcibly as it did at thirty40#cd 8,the various ideal worlds are here10 continues ,papini1 according to the version of ,james1#ce 8because the real world fails to satisfy us4 ,all our ideal instruments are certainly imperfect4 ,but philosophy can be regenerated 444 it can become pragmatic in the general sense of the word1 a general theory of human action 444 so that philosophic thought will resolve itself into a comparative discussion of all the possible programmes for man's life1 when man is once for all regarded as a creative being4444 ,as such1 man becomes a kind of god1 and where are we to draw the limits80 ,in an article called 8,from ,man to ,god10 ,papini1 in the ,leonardo1 lets his imagination work in stretching the limits of this way of thinking4 ,these prophetic1 or ,promethean1 utterances--and we must never forget that even to the ,greeks philosophy was always something of a religion or a life--may be paralleled by some of the more enthusiastic and unguarded1 early utterances of ,dr4 ,schiller about 8voluntarism0 or 8metaphysical personalism0 as the one 8courageous10 and the only potent1 philosophy2 or about the 8storming of the ,jericho of rationalism0 by the 8jeers0 and the 8trumpetings0 of the confident humanists and their pragmatic confrres4 ,the underlying element of truth in them1 and1 for that part of it1 in many of the similar utterances of many of our modern humanists1 from ,rabelais to ,voltaire and from ,shelley to ,marx and ,nietzsche1 is1 as we may see1 that a true metaphysic must serve1 not only as a rational system for the intellect1 but as a 8dynamic0#cf or motive for action and achievement1 for the conscious activity of rational1 self-conscious beings4 ,as for the matter of any further developments#cg of the free1 creative religion hinted by ,papini1 we had1 in #aijc1 the solemn declaration of ,professor ,james that 8the programme of the man-god is one of the great type programmes of philosophy10 and that he himself had been 8slow0 in coming to a perception of the full inwardness of the idea4 ,then it led evidently in ,italy itself to a new doctrine which was trumpeted there a year or two ago in the public press as 8,futurism10#ch in which 8courage1 audacity and rebellion0 were the essential elements1 and which could not 8abide0 the mere mention of such things as 8priests0 and 8ideals0 and 8professors0 and 8moralism40 ,the extravagances of ,prezzolini1 who thinks of man as a 8sentimental gorilla10 were apparently the latest outcome of this anarchical individualism and practicalism4 ,pragmatism was converted by him into a sophisticated opportunism and a modern ,machiavellism1 a method of attaining contentment in one's life and of dominating one's fellow-creatures by playing upon their fancies and prejudices as does the religious charlatan or the quack doctor or the rhetorician4 ,the reader who may care to contemplate all this radical1 pragmatist enthusiasm for the ,new ,reformation in a more accessible1 and a less exaggerated1 form had better perhaps consult the recent work of ,mr4 ,sturt of ,oxford on the ,idea of a ,free ,church4 ,in this work the principles of ,pragmatism are applied1 first1 critically and in the main negatively1 to the moral dogmas of traditional ,christianity1 and then positively to the new conception of religion he would substitute for all this--the development of personality in accordance with the claims of family and of national life4 ,a fair-minded criticism of this book would1 ,i think1 lead to the conclusion that the changes contemplated by ,mr4 ,sturt are already part and parcel of the programme of liberal ,christianity1 whether we study this in the form of the many more or less philosophical presentations of the same in modern ,german theology1 or in the form of the free1 moral and social efforts of the voluntary religion of ,america and ,england4 ,in ,america many of the younger thinkers in theology and philosophy are already writing in a more or less popular manner upon ,pragmatism as a philosophy that bids fair to harmonize 8traditional0 and 8radical0 conceptions of religion4 ,one of these writers1 for example1 in a recent important commemorative volume1#ci tries to show how this may be done by interpreting the 8supernatural10 not as the 8trans-experimental10 but as the 8ethical0 in experience1 and by turning 8dogmatic0 into 8historical theology40 ,and it would not be difficult to find many books and addresses in which the same idea is expressed4 ,the more practical wing of this same party endeavours to connect ,pragmatism with the whole philosophy and psychology of religious conversion1 as this has been worked over by recent investigators like ,stanley ,hall1#dj ,starbuck1#da and others1 and1 above all1 by ,james in his striking volume ,the ,varieties of ,religious ,experience4#db ,the fact1 of course--and ,i shall immediately refer to it--that ,pragmatism has been hailed in ,france as a salutary doctrine1 not merely by ,liberals and ,evangelicals1 but by devout ,catholics and ,anti-modernists1 is perhaps enough to give us some pause in the matter of its application in the sphere of theoretical and practical religion4 ,it is useful1 it would seem1 sometimes to 8liberate0 the spirit of man1 and useful1 too1 at other times to connect the strivings of the individual with the more or less organized experiences of past ages4 ,turning1 then1 to ,france1 it is1 judging from the claims of the pragmatists1 and from some of the literature bearing upon this entire subject1#dc fairly evident that there has been a kind of association or relationship between ,pragmatism and the following tendencies in recent ,french philosophy3 7#a7 the 8freedom0 and 8indeterminism0 philosophy of ,renouvier#dd and other members of the ,neo-,critical school1 and of ,boutroux and ,bergson1 who1 8although differing from each other in many important respects10 all 8belong to the same movement of thought1 the reaction against ,hegelianism and the cult of science which has dominated ,france since the decline of the metaphysics of the school of ,cousin02#de 7#b7 the philosophy of science and scientific hypotheses represented by writers like ,poincar1#df ,brunschvicg1 ,le ,roy1#dg ,milhaud1 ,abel ,rey1#dh and others2 7#c7 the religious philosophy and the fideism of the followers of the spiritualistic metaphysic of ,bergson1 many of whom go further than he does1 and 8make every effort to bring him to the confessional faith02#di and 7#d7 the ,french philosophy of to-day that definitely bears the name of ,pragmatism1 that of ,m4 ,blondel1#ej who in #ahic wrote a suggestive work entitled ,l',action1 and who claims to have coined the word ,pragmatism1 after much careful consideration and discrimination1 as early as #ahhh--many years before the ,california pamphlet of ,james4 ,the first of these points of correspondence or relationship we can pass over with the remark that we shall have a good deal to say about the advantage enjoyed by ,pragmatism over ,rationalism in the treatment of 8freedom0 and the 8volitional0 side of human nature1 and also about the general pragmatist reaction against ,rationalism4 ,and as for the philosophy of science1 it has been shown that our ,english-speaking pragmatists cannot exactly pride themselves in the somewhat indiscriminate manner of ,james and ,schiller upon the supposed support for their 8hypothetical0 conception of science and philosophy to be found in the work of their ,french associates upon the logic of science4 8,the men of great learning who were named as sponsors of this new philosophy have more and more testified what reservations they make1 and how greatly their conclusions differ from those which are currently attributed to them40#ea ,both ,brunschvicg and ,poincar1 in fact1 take the greatest pains in their books to dissociate themselves from anything like the appearance of an acceptance of the doctrine of the relativity of knowledge1 from the signs of any lack of faith in the idea that science1 as far as it goes1 gives us a true revelation of the nature of reality4 ,then in regard to 7#c7 the ,french pragmatist philosophy or religion we have only to read the reports and the quotations of ,m4 ,lalande to see in this philosophy the operation of an uncritical dogmatism or a blind 8fideism0 to which very few other philosophers1 either in ,france or in any other country1 would care to subscribe4 8,la ,revue de ,philosophie1 which is directed by ecclesiastics1 recently extolled pragmatism as a means of proving orthodox beliefs40 444 8,this system solves a great many difficulties in philosophy2 it explains the necessity of principles marvellously40 444 8,the existence of ,god1 ,providence and ,immortality are demonstrated by their happy effects upon our terrestrial life40 444 8,if we can consider the matter carefully1 it will be seen that the ,good is the useful2 for not to be good in anything is synonymous with being bad1 and everywhere the true is the useful4 ,it is in this assertion that ,pragmatism consists40#eb ,and as to the fourth tendency1 there is1 at its outset1 according to ,m4 ,lalande1 a more rational or ethical basis for the fideism of ,m4 ,blondel's book upon action1 which starts off with a criticism of philosophic dilettantism quite analogous with that which ,mr4 ,peirce follows in ,how to ,make ,our ,ideas ,clear4 ,but ,m4 ,blondel 8does not continue in the same manner1 and his conclusion is very different4 ,rejecting all philosophical formalism1 he puts his trust in moral experience1 and consults it directly4 ,he thinks that moral experience shows that action is not wholly self-contained1 but that it presupposes a reality which transcends the world in which we participate40#ec ,finally1 maintains ,m4 ,blondel1 8we are unable1 as ,pascal already said1 either to live1 or to understand ourselves1 by ourselves alone4 ,so that1 unless we mutilate our nature by renouncing all earnestness of life1 we are necessarily led to recognize in ourselves the presence of ,god4 ,our problem1 therefore1 can only be solved by an act of absolute faith in a positive religion ,catholicism in his case4 ,this completes the series of acts of faith1 without which no action1 not even our daily acts1 could be accomplished1 and without which we should fall into absolute barrenness1 both practical and intellectual40#ed ,now again these words about our being unable to understand ourselves 8by ourselves alone0 contain an element of truth which we may associate with the pragmatist tendency to believe in a socialized 7as distinguished from an individualistic7 interpretation#ee of our common moral life1 to believe1 that is to say1 in a society of persons as the truth 7or the reality7 of the universe1 rather than in an interpretation of the universe as the thinking experience of a single absolute intelligence4 ,this1 however1 is also a point which we are obliged to defer#ef until we take up the general subject of the relations between ,pragmatism and ,rationalism4 ,the other words of the paragraph1 in respect of our absolute need of faith in some positive religion1 are1 of course1 expressive again of the uncritical fideism to which reference has already been made4 ,as an offset or alternative to the 8free0 religion of ,papini and ,james and to the experimental or practical religion of different ,protestant bodies1 it is enough of itself to give us pause in estimating the real drift#eg of ,pragmatism in regard to religious faith and the philosophy of religion4#eh ,we shall meantime take leave of ,french ,pragmatism#ei with the reflection that it is thus obviously as complex and as confusing and confused a thing as is the ,pragmatism of other countries4 ,it is now almost a generation since we began to hear of a renascence of spiritualism#fj and idealism in ,france in connexion not merely with the work of philosophers like ,renouvier and ,lachelier and ,fouille#fa and ,boutroux1 but with men of letters like ,de ,vogu1 ,lavisse1 ,faguet1 ,desjardins#fb and the rest1 and some of the ,french ,pragmatism of to-day is but one of the more specialized phases of the broader movement4 ,and as for the special question of the influence of ,james and his philosophy upon ,bergson1 and of that of the possible return influence of ,bergson upon ,james1#fc the evidence produced by ,lalande from ,bergson himself is certainly all to the effect that both men have worked very largely independently of each other1 although perfectly cognisant now and then of each other's publications4 ,both men1 along with their followers 7and this is all that needs interest us71 have obviously been under the influence of ideas that have long been in the air about the need of a philosophy that is 8more truly empirical0#fd than the traditional philosophy1 and more truly inclined to 8discover what is involved in our actions in the ultimate recess1 when1 unconsciously and in spite of ourselves1 we support existence and cling to it whether we completely understand it or not40#fe ,as for ,pragmatism and pragmatist achievements in ,germany1 there is1 as might well be supposed1 little need of saying much4 ,the genius of the country is against both2 and if there is any ,pragmatism in ,germany1 it must have contrived somehow to have been 8born again0 of the 8spirit0 before obtaining official recognition4#ff ,so much even might be inferred from the otherwise generous recognition accorded to the work of ,james by scholars and thinkers like ,eucken and ,stein#fg and the rest4 ,those men cannot see ,pragmatism save in the broad light of the 8humanism0 that has always characterised philosophy1 when properly appreciated1 and understood in the light of its true genesis4 ,pragmatism has in fact been long known in ,germany under the older names of 8,voluntarism0 and 8,humanism10 although it may doubtless be associated there with some of the more pronounced tendencies of the hour1 such as the recent insistence of the 8,gttingen ,fries ,school0 upon the importance of the 8genetic0 and the 8descriptive0 point of view in regard even to the matter of the supposed first principles of knowledge1 the hypothetical and methodological conception of philosophy taken by philosophical scientists like ,mach and ,ostwald#fh and their followers1 the 8empiricism0 and 8realism0 of thinkers like the late ,dr4 ,avenarius#fi of ,zurich4 ,then the so-called 8teleological10 or 8practical10 character of our human thinking has also been recognized in modern ,german thought long before the days of ,peirce and ,dewey1 even by such strictly academic thinkers as ,lotze and ,sigwart4 ,the work of the latter thinker upon ,logic1 by the way1 was translated into ,english under distinctly ,neo-,hegelian influences4 ,in the second portion of this work the universal presuppositions of knowledge are considered1 not merely as a priori truths1 but as akin in some important respects 8to the ethical principles by which we are wont to determine and guide our free conscious activity40#gj ,but even apart from this matter of the natural association of ,pragmatism with the ,voluntarism that has long existed in ,german philosophy1#ga we may undoubtedly pass to the following things in contemporary and recent ,german thought as sympathetic1 in the main1 to the pragmatist tendencies of ,james and ,dewey and ,schiller3 7#a7 the practical conception of science and philosophy1 as both of them a kind of 8economy of the attention10 a sort of 8conceptual shorthand0#gb 7for the purposes of the 8description0 of our environment7 that we have referred to in the case of ,mach and ,ostwald2 7#b7 the close association between the 8metaphysical0 and the 8cultural0 in books like those of ,jerusalem#gc and ,eleutheropulos2#gd 7#c7 the sharp criticism of the ,rationalism of the ,critical ,idealism by the two last-mentioned thinkers1 and by some of the members of the new ,fichte#ge ,school like ,schellwien2 and last but not least1 7#d7 the tendency to take a psychological#gf and a sociological#gg 7instead of a merely logical7 view of the functions of thought and philosophy1 that is just as accentuated in ,germany at the present time as it is elsewhere4 ,james and ,schiller have both been fond of referring to the work of many of these last-mentioned men as favourable to a conception of philosophy less as a 8theory of knowledge0 7or a 8theory of being07 in the old sense than as a ,weltanschauungslehre 7a view of the world as whole71 a 8discussion of the various possible programmes for man's life0 to which reference has already been made in the case of ,papini and others4 ,and we might associate with their predilections and persuasions in this regard the apparent ,pragmatism also of a great scholar like ,harnack#gh in reference to the subordination of religious dogma to the realities of the religious life1 or the ,pragmatism of ,ritschl#gi himself1 in regard to the subordinate place in living religion of mere intellectual theory1 or even some of the tendencies of the celebrated value-philosophy of ,rickert and ,windelband#hj and ,mnsterberg#ha and the rest4 ,but again the main trouble about all this quasi-,german support for the pragmatists is that most of these contemporary thinkers have taken pains to trace the roots of their teaching back into the great systems of the past4 ,the pragmatists1 on the other hand1 have been notoriously careless about the matter of the various affiliations of their 8corridor-like0 and eclectic theory4 ,there are many reasons1 however1 against regarding even the philosophical expression of many of the practical and scientific tendencies of ,germany as at all favourable to the acceptance of ,pragmatism as a satisfactory philosophy from the ,german point of view4 ,among these reasons are3 7#a7 ,the fact that it is naturally impossible to find any real support in past or present ,german philosophy for the impossible breach that exists in ,pragmatism between the 8theoretical0 and the 8practical10 and 7#b7 the fact that ,germany has only recently passed through a period of sharp conflict between the psychological 7or the 8genetic07 and the logical point of view regarding knowledge1 resulting in a confessed victory for the latter4 ,and then again 7#c7 even if there is a partial correspondence between ,pragmatism and the quasi economic 7or 8practical07 conception taken of philosophy by some of the younger men in ,germany who have not altogether outlived their reaction against ,rationalism1 there are other tendencies there that are far more characteristic of the spirit and of the traditions of the country4 ,among these are the ,new ,idealism generally1 the strong ,neo-,kantian movement of the ,marburg school#hb and their followers in different places1 the revived interest in ,hegel#hc and in ,schelling1 the ,neo-,romanticism of ,jena1 with its booklets upon such topics as ,the ,culture of the ,soul1 ,life with ,nature1 ,german ,idealism1 and so on4#hd ,and then 7#d7 there are just as many difficulties in the way of regarding the psychological and sociological philosophy of men like ,jerusalem and ,eleutheropulos as anything like a final philosophy of knowledge1 as there is in attempting to do the same thing with the merely preliminary and tentative philosophy of ,james and his associates4 ,returning now to ,america and ,england1 although ,pragmatism is eminently an ,american#he doctrine1 it would1 of course1 be absurd to imagine that ,pragmatism has carried the entire thought of the ,united ,states with it4#hf ,it encountered there1 even at the outset1 at least something of the contempt and the incredulity and the hostility that it met with elsewhere1 and also much of the ,american shrewd indifference to a much-advertised new article4 ,the message of ,james as a philosopher1 too1 was doubtless discounted 7at least by the well-informed7 in the light of his previous brilliant work as a descriptive psychologist1 and also1 perhaps1 in the light of his wonderfully suggestive personality4#hg ,what actually happened in ,america in respect of the pragmatist movement was1 first of all1 the sudden emergence of a magazine literature#hh in connexion with the ,will-to-,believe philosophy of ,james and the ,california address1 and in connexion 7according to the generous testimony of ,james7 with ,deweyism or 8,instrumentalism40 ,much of this tiresome and hair-splitting magazine discussion of 8ideas as instruments of thought10 and of the 8consequences0 78theoretical0 or 8practical0 or what not7 by which ideas were to be 8tested10 was pronounced by ,james1 in #aijf1 to be largely crude and superficial4 ,it had the indirect merit1 however1 of yielding one or two valuable estimates of the many inconsistencies in ,pragmatism1 and of the many different kinds of ,pragmatism or instrumentalism that there seemed to be1 and of the value of ,pragmatism as a 8theory of knowledge10 and as a 8philosophical generalization40 ,the upshot of the whole preliminary discussion was 7#a7 the discovery that1 ,pragmatism having arisen 7as ,dewey himself put it7 out of a multitude of conflicting tendencies in regard to what we might call the 8approach0 to philosophy1 would probably soon 8dissolve itself0 back again into some of the streams out of which it had arisen1#hi and 7#b7 the discovery that all that this early 8methodological0 pragmatism amounted to was the harmless doctrine that the meaning of any conception expressed itself in the past or future conduct or experience of actual1 or possible1 sentient creatures4 ,we shall again take occasion#ij to refer to this comparative failure of ,pragmatism to give any systematic or unified account of the consequences by which it would seek to test the truth of propositions4 ,its failure1 however1 in this connexion is a matter of secondary importance in comparison with the great lesson#ia to be drawn from its idea that there can be for man no objective truth about the universe1 apart from the idea of its meaning#ib or significance to his experience and to his conscious activity4 ,what is now taking place in ,america in this second decade i4e4 in the years after #aijh of the pragmatist movement is apparently 7#a7 the sharpest kind of official rationalist condemnation of ,pragmatism as an imperfectly proved and a merely 8subjective0 and a highly unsystematic philosophy2 7#b7 the appearance of a number of instructive booklets#ic upon ,pragmatism and the pragmatist movement1 some of them expository and critical1 some of them in the main sympathetic1 some of them condemnatory and even contemptuous1 and some of them attempts at further constructive work along pragmatist lines2 7#c7 indications here and there of the acceptance and the promulgation of older and newer doctrines antithetic and hostile to ,pragmatism--some of them possibly as typically ,american as ,pragmatism itself4 ,as a single illustration of the partly constructive work that is being attempted in the name and the spirit of pragmatism1 we may instance the line of reflection entered upon by ,professor ,moore#id in consequence of his claim that to ,pragmatism the fundamental thing in any judgment or proposition is not so much its consequences1 but its 8value40 ,this claim may1 no doubt1 be supported by the many declarations of ,james and ,schiller that the 8true10 like the 8good0 and the 8beautiful10 is simply a 8valuation10 and not the fetish that the rationalists make it out to be4 ,it is doubtful1 however1 as we may try to indicate1 whether this 8value0 interpretation of ,pragmatism can be carried out independently of the more systematic attempts at a general philosophy of value that are being made to-day in ,germany and ,america and elsewhere4 ,and then it would be a matter of no ordinary difficulty to clear up the inconsistency that doubtless exists between ,pragmatism as a value philosophy and ,pragmatism as a mere philosophy of 8consequences40 ,it is 8immediate10 and 8verifiable10 and 8definitely appreciated0 consequences1 rather than the higher values of our experience that 7up to the present time7 seem to have bulked largely in the argumentations of the pragmatists4 ,and as an illustration of a doctrine that is both ,american and hostile to pragmatism1 we may instance the ,new ,realism#ie that was recently launched in a collective manifesto in ,the ,journal of ,philosophy and ,scientific ,methods4 ,this realism is1 to be sure1 hostile to every form of 8subjectivism0 or personalism1 and may in a certain sense be regarded as the emergence into full daylight of the realism or dualism that we found to be lurking#if in ,james's 8radical empiricism40 ,it is1 therefore1 as it were1 one of the signs that ,pragmatism is perhaps breaking up in ,america into some of the more elemental tendencies out of which it developed--in this case the ,american desire for operative 7or effective7 realism and for a 8direct0#ig contact with reality instead of the indirect contact of so many metaphysical systems4 ,it is only necessary to add here that it is to the credit of ,american rationalism of the ,neo-,hegelian type that it has shown itself1 notably in the writings of ,professor ,royce1#ih capable1 not only of criticising ,pragmatism1 but of seeking to incorporate1 in a constructive philosophy of the present1 some of the features of the pragmatist emphasis upon 8will0 and 8achievement0 and 8purpose40 ,it is1 therefore1 in this respect at least in line with some of the best tendencies in contemporary ,european philosophy4 ,lastly1 there are certain tendencies of recent ,english philosophy with which ,pragmatism has special affinities4 ,among these may be mentioned3 7#a7 the various general and specific criticisms#ii that have been made there for at least two generations on the more or less formal and abstract character of the metaphysic of our ,neo-,kantians and our ,neo-,hegelians2 7#b7 the concessions that have recently been made by prominent rationalists to the undoubtedly purposive1 or 8teleological10 character of our human thinking1 and to the connexion of our mental life with our entire practical and spiritual activity4 ,many of these concessions are now regarded as the merest commonplaces of speculation1 and we shall probably refer to them in our next chapter4 ,then there is 7#c7 the well-known insistence of some of our foremost psychologists1 like ,ward and ,stout1#ajj upon the reality of activity and 8purpose0 in mental process1 and upon the part played by them in the evolution of our intellectual life1 and of our adjustment to the world in which we find ourselves4 ,and 7#d7 the ethical and social idealism of such well-known members of our ,neo-,hegelian school as ,professors ,jones1 ,mackenzie1 and ,muirhead4 ,these scholars and thinkers are just as insistent as the pragmatists upon the idea that philosophy and thought are1 and should be1 a practical social 8dynamic0--that is to say1 8forces0 and 8motives0 making for the perfection of the common life4 7#e7 ,a great deal of the philosophy of science and of the philosophy of axioms and postulates to be found in ,british writers1 from ,mill and ,jevons to ,karl ,pearson and ,mr4 ,a4 ,sidgwick#aja and many others4 ,apart from all this1 however1 or rather1 in addition to it1 it may be truly said that one of the striking things about recent ,british philosophical literature#ajb is the stir and the activity that have been excited in the rationalist camp by the writings of the pragmatists and the 8personal idealists10 and by the critics of these newer modes of thought4 ,all this has led to many such re-statements of the problems of philosophy as are to be found in the books of men like ,joachim1#ajc ,henry ,jones1#ajd ,a4 ,e4 ,taylor1#aje ,boyce-,gibson1#ajf ,henry ,h4 ,sturt1#ajg ,s4 ,h4 ,mellone1#ajh ,j4 ,h4 ,b4 ,joseph1#aji and others1 and even1 say1 in such a representative book as that of ,professor ,stewart upon the classical theme of ,plato's ,theory of ,ideas4 ,in this work an attempt is made to interpret ,plato's 8,ideas0 in the light of pragmatist considerations as but 8categories0 or 8points of view0 which we find it convenient to use in dealing with our sense experience4 ,,chapter ,,iii ,,some ,,fundamental ,,characteristics ,we shall now attempt a somewhat detailed treatment of a few of the more characteristic tendencies of ,pragmatism4 ,the following have already been mentioned in our general sketch of its development and of the appearance of the pragmatist philosophy in ,europe and ,america3 7#a7 the attempted modification by ,pragmatism of the extremes of ,rationalism1 and its dissatisfaction with the rationalism of both science and philosophy2 7#b7 its progress from the stage of a mere practical and experimental theory of truth to a broad humanism in which philosophy itself becomes 7like art1 say7 merely an important 8dynamic0 element in human culture2 7#c7 its preference in the matter of first principles for 8faith0 and 8experience0 and a trust in our instinctive 8beliefs02 7#d7 its readiness to affiliate itself with the various liberal and humanistic tendencies in human thought1 such as the philosophy of 8freedom10 and the 8hypothetical method0 of science1 modern ethical and social idealism1 the religious reaction of recent years1 the voluntaristic trend in ,german post-,kantian philosophy1 and so on4 ,our subject in this chapter1 however1 is rather that of the three or four more or less characteristic assumptions and contentions upon which all these and the many other pragmatist tendencies may be said to rest4 ,the first and foremost of these assumptions is the position that all truth is 8made0 truth1 8human0 truth1 truth related to human attitudes and purposes1 and that there is no 8objective0 or 8independent0 truth1 no truth 8in whose establishment the function of giving human satisfaction1 in marrying previous parts of experience with newer parts1 has played no rle40 ,truths were 8nothing10 as it were1 before they were 8discovered10 and the most ancient truths were once 8plastic10 or merely susceptible of proof or disproof4 ,truth is 8made0 just like 8health10 or 8wealth10 or 8value10 and so on4 ,insistence1 we might say1 upon this one note1 along with the entire line of reflection that it awakens in him1 is really1 as ,dewey reminds us1 the main burden of ,james's book upon ,pragmatism4 ,equally characteristic is it too of ,dewey himself who is for ever reverting to his doctrine of the factitious character of truth4 ,there is no 8fixed distinction10 he tells us1 8between the empirical values of the unreflective life and the most abstract process of rational thought40 ,and to ,schiller1 again1 this same thought is the beginning of everything in philosophy1 for with an outspoken acceptance of this doctrine of the 8formation0 of all truth1 ,pragmatism1 he thinks1 can do at least two things that ,rationalism is for ever debarred from doing3 7#a7 distinguish adequately 8truth0 from 8fact10 and 7#b7 distinguish adequately truth from error4 ,whether these two things be1 or be not1 the consequences of the doctrine in question and we shall return#aaj to the point we may perhaps accept it as1 on the whole1 harmonious with the teaching of psychology about the nature of our ideas as mental habits1 or about thinking as a restrained1 or a guided1 activity4 ,it is in harmony1 too1 with the palpable truism that all 8truth0 must be truth that some beings or other who have once 8sought0 truth 7for some reasons or other7 have at last come to regard as satisfying their search and their purposes4 ,and this truism1 it would seem1 must remain such in spite of1 or even along with1 any meaning that there may be in the idea of what we call 8,god's truth40 ,by this expression men understand1 it would seem1 merely ,god's knowledge of truths or facts of which we as men may happen to be ignorant4 ,but then there can have been no time in which ,god can be imagined to have been ignorant of these or any other matters4 ,it is therefore not for ,him truth as opposed to falsehood4 ,and then1 again1 this pragmatist position about all truth being 8made0 truth would seem to be valid in view of the difficulty 7,plato#aaa spoke of it7 of reconciling ,god's supposed absolute knowledge of reality with our finite and limited apprehension of the same4#aab ,the main interest1 however1 of pragmatists in their somewhat tiresome insistence upon the truism that all truth is made truth is their hostility 7,locke had it in his day7 to the supposed rationalist position that there is an 8a priori0 and 8objective0 truth independent altogether of human activities and human purposes4#aac ,the particular object of their aversion is what ,dewey#aad talks of as 8that dishonesty1 that insincerity1 characteristic of philosophical discussion1 that is manifested in speaking and writing as if certain ultimate abstractions or concepts could be more real than human purposes and human beings1 and as if there could be any contradiction between truth and purpose40 ,as we shall reflect at a later stage#aae upon the rationalist theory of truth1 we may1 meantime1 pass over this hostility with the remark that it is1 after all1 only owing to certain peculiar circumstances 7those1 say1 of its conflict with religion and science and custom7 in the development of philosophy that its first principles have been regarded by its votaries as the most real of all realities4 ,these devotees tend to forget in their zeal that the pragmatist way of looking upon all supposed first principles--that of the consideration of their utility in and necessity as explanations of our common experience and its realities--is the only way of explaining their reality1 even as conceptions4 ,it requires to be added--so much may1 indeed1 have already been inferred from the preceding chapter--that1 apart from their hint about the highest truth being necessarily inclusive of the highest human purposes1 it is by no means easy to find out from the pragmatists what they mean by truth1 or how they would define it4 ,when the matter is pressed home1 they generally confess that their attitude is in the main 8psychological0 rather than philosophical1 that it is the 8making0 of truth rather than its 8nature0 or its 8contents0 or its systematic character that interests them4 ,it is the 8dynamical0 point of view1 as they put it1 that is essential to them4 ,and out of the sphere and the associations of this contention they do not really travel4 ,they will tell you what it means to hit upon this particular way of looking upon truth1 and how stimulating it is to attempt to do so4 ,and they will give you many more or less artificial and tentative1 external1 descriptions of their philosophy by saying that ideas are 8made for man10 and 8not man for ideas10 and so on4 ,but1 although they deny both the common-sense view that truth is a 8correspondence0 with external reality1 and the rationalist view that truth is a 8coherent system0 on its own account1 they never define truth any more than do their opponents the rationalists4 ,it is a 8commerce0 and not a 8correspondence10 they contend1 a commerce#aaf between certain parts of our experience and certain other parts1 or a commerce between our ideas and our purposes1 but not a commerce with reality1 for the making of truth is itself1 in their eyes1 the making of reality4 ,secondly1 it is another familiar characteristic of ,pragmatism that1 although it fails to give a satisfying account either of truth or reality1 the one thing of which it is for ever talking of1 as fundamental to our entire life as men1 is belief4#aag ,this is the one thing upon which it makes everything else to hang--all knowledge and all action and all theory4 ,and it is1 of course1 its manifest acceptance of belief as a fundamental principle of our human life1 and as a true measure of reality1 that has given to ,pragmatism its religious atmosphere4#aah ,it is this that has made it such a welcome and such a credible creed to so many disillusioned and free-thinking people to-day1 as well as to so many of the faithful and the orthodox4 8,for1 in principle1 ,pragmatism overcomes the old antithesis of ,faith and ,reason4 ,it shows1 on the one hand1 that faith must underlie all reason and pervade it1 nay1 that at bottom rationality itself is the supremest postulate of ,faith40#aai 8,truth10 again1 as ,james reminds us1 8lives in fact for the most part on a credit system4 ,our thoughts and beliefs how literally true this is6 pass so long as nobody challenges them1 just as bank-notes pass so long as nobody refuses them40#abj ,now it requires but the reflection of a moment to see that the various facts and considerations upon which the two last quotations1 and the general devotion of ,pragmatism to 8belief10 both repose1 are all distinctly in favour of the acceptability of ,pragmatism at the present time4 ,there is nothing in which people in general are more interested at the beginning of this twentieth century than in belief4 ,it is this1 for example1 that explains such a thing as the great success to-day in our ,english-speaking world of such an enterprise as the ,hibbert ,journal of ,philosophy and ,religion1 or the still greater phenomenon of the world-wide interest of the hour in the subject of comparative religion4 ,most modern men1 the writer is inclined to think1 believe#aba a great deal more than they know1 the chief difficulty about this fact being that there is no recognized way of expressing it in our science or in our philosophy1 or of acting upon it in our behaviour in society4 ,it is1 however1 only the undue prominence of mathematical and physical science since the time of ,descartes#abb that has made evidence and demonstration the main consideration of philosophy instead of belief1 man's true and fundamental estimate of reality4 ,we have already#abc pointed out that one of the main results of ,pragmatism is the acceptance on the part of its leading upholders of our fundamental beliefs about the ultimately real and about the realization of our most deeply cherished purposes4 ,in fact1 reality in general is for them1 we may say--in the absence from their writings of any better description1--simply that which we can 8will10 or 8believe in10 as the basis for action and for conscious 8creative0 effort1 or constructive effort4 ,as ,james himself puts it in his book on ,the ,meaning of ,truth3 8,since the only realities we can talk about are objects believed in1 the pragmatist1 whenever he says #8reality1' means in the first instance what may count for the man himself as a reality1 what he believes at the moment to be such4 ,sometimes the reality is a concrete sensible presence4444 ,or his idea may be that of an abstract relation1 say of that between the sides and the hypotenuse of a triangle4444 ,each reality verifies and validates its own idea exclusively2 and in each case the verification consists in the satisfactorily-ending consequences1 mental or physical1 which the idea was to set up40 ,we shall later have to refer to the absence from ,pragmatism of a criterion for achievement and for 8consequences40 ,and1 as far as philosophical theories are concerned1 these are all1 to the pragmatists1 true or false simply in so far as they are practically credible or not4 ,james is quite explicit1 for example1 about ,pragmatism itself in this regard4 8,no pragmatist10 he holds1 8can warrant the objective truth of what he says about the universe2 he can only believe it40#abd ,there is faith1 in short1 for the pragmatist1 in every act1 in every phase of thought1 the faith that is implied in the realization of the purposes that underlie our attempted acts and thoughts4 ,they eagerly accept1 for example1 the important doctrine of the modern logician1 and the modern psychologist1 as to the presence of volition in all 8affirmation0 and 8judgment10 seeing that in every case of affirmation there is a more or less active readjustment of our minds 7or our bodies7 to what either stimulates or impedes our activity4 ,a third outstanding characteristic of ,pragmatism is the 8deeper0 view of human nature upon which1 in contrast to ,rationalism1 it supposes itself to rest1 and which it seeks to vindicate4 ,it is this supposedly deeper view of human nature for which it is confessedly pleading when it insists1 as it is fond of doing1 upon the connexion of philosophy with the various theoretical and practical pursuits of mankind1 with sciences like biology and psychology1 and with social reform1#abe and so on4 ,we have1 it may be remembered1 already intimated that even in practical ,america men have had their doubts about the depth of a philosophy that looks upon man as made in the main for action and achievement instead of1 let us say1 the realization of his higher nature4 ,still1 few of the readers of ,james can have altogether failed to appreciate the significance of some of the many eloquent and suggestive paragraphs he has written upon the limitations of the rationalistic 8temperament0 and of its unblushing sacrifice of the entire wealth of human nature and of the various pulsating interests of men to the imaginary exigencies of abstract logic and 8system40#abf ,to him and to his colleagues 7as to ,socrates1 for that part of it7 man is firstly a being who has habits and purposes1 and who can1 to some extent1 control the various forces of his nature through true knowledge1 and in this very discrepancy between the real and the ideal does there lie for the pragmatists the entire problem of philosophy--the problem of ,plato1 that of the attainment of true virtue through true knowledge4 ,deferring1 however1 the question of the success of the pragmatists in this matter of the unfolding of the true relation between philosophy and human nature1 let us think of a few of the teachings of experience upon this truly important and inevitable relation1 which no philosophy indeed can for one moment afford to neglect4 ,insistence upon these facts or teachings and upon the reflections and criticisms to which they naturally give rise is certainly a deeply marked characteristic of ,pragmatism4 ,man1 as has often been pointed out1 is endowed with the power of reflection1 not so much to enable him to understand the world either as a whole or in its detailed workings as to assist him in the further evolution of his life4 ,his beliefs and choices and his spiritual culture are all1 as it were1 forces and influences in this direction4 ,indeed1 it is always the soul or the life principle that is the important thing in any individual or any people1 so far as a place in the world 7or in 8history07 is concerned4 ,philosophers1 as well as other men1 often exchange 7in the words of ,lecky7 the 8love of truth0 as such for the love of 8the truth10 that is to say1 for the love of the system and the social arrangements that best suit their interests as thinkers4 ,and they too are just as eager as other men for discipleship and influence and honour4 ,knowledge with them1 in other words1 means1 as ,bacon put it1 8control02 and even with them it does not1 and cannot1 remain at the stage of mere cognition4 ,it becomes in the end a conviction or a belief4 ,and thus the philosopher with his system 7even a ,plato1 or a ,hegel7 is after all but a part of the universe1 to be judged as such1 along with other lives and other systems--a circumstance hit off early in the nineteenth century by ,german students when they used to talk of one's being able 7in ,berlin7 to see the ,welt-,geist 7,hegel7 8taking a walk0 in the ,thiergarten4 ,reality again1 so far as either life or science is concerned1 means for every man that in which he is most fundamentally interested--ions and radium to the physicist of the hour1 life to the biologist1 ,god to the theologian1 progress to the philanthropist1 and so on4 ,further1 mankind in general is not likely to abandon its habit of estimating all systems of thought and philosophy from the point of view of their value as keys1 or aids1 to the problem of the meaning and the development of life as a whole4 ,there is no abstract 8truth0 or 8good0 or 8beauty0 apart from the lives of beings who contemplate1 and who seek to create1 such things as truth and goodness and beauty4 ,to understand knowledge and intellect1 again1 we must indeed look at them in their actual development in connexion with the total vital or personal activity either of the average or even of the exceptional individual4 ,and instead of regarding the affections and the emotions as inimical to knowledge1 or as secondary and inferior to it1 we ought to remember that they rest in general upon a broader and deeper attitude to reality than does either the perception of the senses#abg or the critical analysis of the understanding4 ,in both of these cases is the knowledge that we attain to limited in the main either to what is before us under the conditions of time and space1 or to particular aspects of things that we mark off1 or separate1 from the totality of things4 ,as ,bergson reminds us1 we 8desire0 and 8will0 with the 8whole0 of our past1 but 8think0 only with 8part0 of it4 ,small wonder then that ,james seeks to connect such a broad phenomenon as religion with many of the unconscious factors 7they are not all merely 8biological07 in the depth of our personality4 ,some of the instincts and the phenomena that we encounter there are things that transcend altogether the world that is within the scope of our senses or the reasoning faculties4 ,truth1 too1 grows from age to age1 and is simply the formulated knowledge humanity has of itself and its environment4 ,and errors disappear1 not so much in consequence of their logical refutation1 as in consequence of their inutility and of their inability to control the life and thought of the free man4 ,readers of ,schopenhauer will remember his frequent insistence upon this point of the gradual dissidence and disappearance of error1 in place of its summary refutation4 ,our 8reactions0 upon reality are certainly part of what we mean by 8reality10 and our philosophy is only too truly 8the history of our heart and life0 as well as that of our intellectual activity4 ,the historian of philosophy invariably acts upon a recognition of the personal and the national and the epochal influence in the evolution of every philosophical system4 ,and even the new1 or the fuller conception of life to which a given genius may attain at some stage or other of human civilization will still inevitably1 in its turn1 give place to a newer or a more perfect system4 ,now ,pragmatism is doubtless at fault in seeking to create the impression that ,rationalism would seek to deny any1 or all1 of those characteristic facts of human nature4 ,still1 it is to some extent justified in insisting upon their importance in view of the sharp conflict 7we shall later refer to it7 that is often supposed to exist between the theoretical and the practical interests of mankind1 and that ,rationalism sometimes seems to accept with comparative equanimity4#abh ,what ,pragmatism is itself most of all seeking after is a view of human nature1 and of things generally1 in which the fullest justice is done to the facts upon which this very real conflict#abi of modern times may be said to rest4 ,a fourth characteristic of ,pragmatism is its notorious 8anti-intellectualism10#acj its hostility to the merely dialectical use of terms and concepts and categories1#aca to argumentation that is unduly detached from the facts and the needs of our concrete human experience4 ,this anti-intellectualism we prefer meantime to consider not so much in itself and on its own account 7if this be possible with a negative creed7 as in the light of the results it has had upon philosophy4 ,there is1 for example1 the general clearing of the ground that has undoubtedly taken place as to the actual or the possible meaning of many terms or conceptions that have long been current with the transcendentalists1 such as 8pure thought10 the 8,absolute10 8truth0 in and for itself1 philosophy as the 8completely rational0 interpretation of experience1 and so on4 ,and along with this clearing of the ground there are 7and also in consequence of the pragmatist movement7 a great many recent1 striking concessions of ,rationalism to practical1 and to common-sense1 ways of looking at things1 the very existence of which cannot but have an important effect upon the philosophy of the near future4 ,among some of the more typical of these are the following3 ,from ,mr4 ,f4 ,h4 ,bradley we have the emphatic declarations that the principle of dialectical opposition or the principle of 8,non-,contradiction0 7formerly1 to himself and his followers1 the 8rule of the game0 in philosophy7 8does not settle anything about the nature of reality02 that 8truth0 is an 8hypothesis10 and that 8except as a means to a foreign end it is useless and impossible02 and 8when we judge truth by its own standard it is defective because it fails to include all the facts10#acb and because its contents 8cannot be made intelligible throughout and entirely02 that 8no truth is idle10 and that 8all truth0 has 8practical0 and sthetic 8consequences02 that there is 8no such existing thing as pure thought02#acc that we cannot separate truth and practice2 that 8absolute certainty is not requisite for working purposes02 that it is a 8superstition#acd to think that the intellect is the highest part of us10 and that it is well to attack a one-sided 8intellectualism02 that both 8intellectualism0 and 8voluntarism0 are 8one-sided10 and that he has no 8objection to identifying reality with goodness or satisfaction1 so long as this does not mean merely practical satisfaction40#ace ,then from this same author comes the following familiar statement about philosophy as a whole3 8,philosophy always will be hard1 and what it promises in the end is no clear vision nor any complete understanding or vision1 but its certain reward is a continual and a heightened appreciation this is the result of science as well as of philosophy of the ineffable mystery of life1 of life in all its complexities and all its unity and all its worth40#acf ,equally typical and equally important is the following concession from ,professor ,taylor1 although1 of course1 to many people it would seem no concession at all1 but rather the mere statement of a fact1 which our ,neo-,hegelians have only made themselves ridiculous by seeming to have so long overlooked3 8,mere truth for the intellect can never be quite the same as ultimate reality4 ,for in mere truth we get reality only in its intellectual aspect1 as that which affords a higher satisfaction to thought's demand for consistency and systematic unity in its object4 ,and as we have seen1 this demand can never be quite satisfied by thought itself4#acg ,for thought1 to remain thought1 must always be something less than the whole reality which it knows40#ach ,and we may add also from ,professor ,taylor the following declaration in respect of the notorious inability of ,neo-,hegelian ,rationalism to furnish the average man with a theory of reality in the contemplation of which he can find at least an adequate motive to conscious effort and achievement3 8,quite apart from the facts1 due to personal shortcomings and confusions1 it is inherent in the nature of metaphysical study that it can make no positive addition to our information1 and can itself supply no motive for practical endeavour40#aci ,many of those findings are obviously so harmonious with some of the more familiar formulas of the pragmatists that there would seem to be ample warrant for associating them with the results of the pragmatist movement4 ,this is particularly the case1 it would seem1 with the concession of ,mr4 ,bradley with respect of the 8practical0 or 8hypothetical0 conception that we ought to entertain of 8truth0 and 8thinking10 and also with the strictures passed by him upon 8mere truth0 and 8mere intellectualism10 and with ,professor ,taylor's position in respect of the inadequacy of the rationalist theory of reality1 as in no sense a 8dynamic0 or an 8incentive0 for action4 ,and we might well regard ,professor ,taylor's finding in respect of mere systematic truth or the 8,absolute0 7for they are the same thing to him7 as confirmatory of ,dr4 ,schiller's important contention that 8in ,absolutism0 the two 8poles0 of the 8moral0 and the 8intellectual0 character of the ,deity 8fall apart40 ,this means1 we will remember1 that the truth of abstract intellectualism is not the truth for action1#adj that absolutism is not able to effect or harmonize between the truth of systematic knowledge and moral truth--if1 indeed1 there be any such thing as moral truth on the basis of a pure ,rationalism4 ,to be sure1 both the extent and even the reality of all this supposed cession of ground in philosophy to the pragmatists has been doubted and denied by the representatives of ,rationalism4 ,they would be questioned1 too1 by many sober thinkers and scholars who have long regarded ,hegelian intellectualism and pragmatist 8voluntarism0 as extremes in philosophy1 as inimical1 both of them1 to the interests of a true and catholic conception of philosophy4 ,the latter1 as we know from ,aristotle1 should be inclusive of the realities both of the intellectual and the practical life4 ,pragmatist criticisms of ,rationalism1 again1 may fairly be claimed to have been to a large extent anticipated by the independent findings of living idealist thinkers like ,professors ,pringle-,pattison1 ,baillie1 ,jones1 and others1 in respect of the supposed extreme claims of ,hegelianism1 as well as by similar findings and independent constructive efforts on the part of the recent group of the ,oxford ,personal ,idealists4#ada ,that there is still a place for pragmatist anti-intellectualism is evidently the conclusion to be drawn from such things as the present wide acceptance of the philosophy of ,bergson1 or the recent declarations of ,mr4 ,bradley that we are justified 8in the intelligent refusal to accept as final an theoretical criterion which actually so far exists10 and that the 8action of narrow consistency must be definitely given up40 ,the reflection ought1 moreover1 to be inserted here that even if ,pragmatism has been of some possible service in bringing forth from rationalists some of their many recent confessions of the limitations of an abstract intellectualism1 it is not at all unlikely that ,rationalism in its turn may succeed in convicting ,pragmatism of an undue emphasis#adb upon volition and action and upon merely practical truth4 ,we shall now terminate the foregoing characterization of ,pragmatism by a reference to two or three other specific things for which it may1 with more or less justice1 be supposed to stand in philosophy4 ,these are 7#a7 the repudiation of the 8correspondence view0#adc of the relation of truth to reality1 7#b7 the rejection of the idea of there being any ultimate or rigid distinction between 8appearance0 and 8reality10 and 7#c7 the reaffirmation of the 8teleological0 point of view as characteristic of philosophy in distinction from science4 ,as for 7#a7 it has already been pointed out that this idea of the misleading character of the ordinary 8correspondence notion0 of truth is claimed by pragmatists as an important result of their proposal to test truth by the standard of the consequences involved in its acceptance4#add ,the ordinary reader may not1 to be sure1 be aware of the many difficulties that are apt to arise in philosophy from an apparent acceptance of the common-sense notion of truth as somehow simply a duplicate or a 8copy0 of external reality4 ,there is the difficulty1 say1 of our ever being able to prove such a correspondence without being 7or 8going07 somehow beyond both the truth and the reality in question1 so as to be able to detect either coincidence or discrepancy4 ,or1 we might again require some bridge between the ideas in our minds and the supposed reality outside them--8sensations0 say1 or 8experiences10 something1 in other words1 that would be accepted as 8given0 and indubitable both by idealists and realists4 ,and there would be the difficulty1 too1 of saying whether we have to begin for the purposes of all reflective study with what is within consciousness or with what is outside it--in matter say1 or in things4 ,and if the former1 how we can ever get to the latter1 and vice versa4 ,and so on with the many kindred subtleties that have divided thinkers into idealists and realists and conceptualists1 monists1 dualists1 parallelists1 and so on4 ,now ,pragmatism certainly does well in proposing to steer clear of all such difficulties and pitfalls of the ordinary 8correspondence notion40 ,and as we shall immediately refer to its own working philosophy in the matter1 we shall meantime pass over this mere point of its rejection of the 8correspondence notion0 with one or two remarks of a critical nature1 7#a7 ,unfortunately for the pragmatists the rejection of the correspondence notion is just as important a feature of ,idealism#ade as it is of ,pragmatism4 ,the latter system therefore can lay no claim to any uniqueness or superiority in this connexion4 7#b7 ,pragmatism1 as we may perhaps see1 cannot maintain its position that the distinction between 8idea0 and 8object0 is one 8within experience itself0 7rather than a distinction between experience and something supposedly outside it7 without travelling further in the direction of ,idealism#adf than it has hitherto been prepared to do4 ,by such a travelling in the direction of ,idealism we mean a far more thorough-going recognition of the part played in the making of reality by the 8personal0 factor1 than it has as yet contemplated either in its 8instrumentalism0 or in its 8radical empiricism40 7#c7 ,there is1 after all1 an element of truth in the correspondence notion to which ,pragmatism fails to do justice4 ,we shall refer to this failure in a subsequent chapter#adg when again looking into its theory of truth and reality4 ,despite these objections there is1 however1 at least one particular respect in regard to which ,pragmatism may legitimately claim some credit for its rejection of the correspondence notion4 ,this is its insistence that the truth is not 7as it must be on the correspondence theory7 a 8datum0 or a 8presentation10 not something given to us by the various objects and things without us1 or by their supposed effects upon our senses and our memory and our understanding4 ,it rather1 on the contrary1 maintains ,pragmatism1 a 8construction0 on the part of the mind1 an attitude of our 8expectant0 7or 8believing07 consciousness1 into which our own reactions upon things enter at least as much as do their supposed effects and impressions upon us4 ,of course the many difficulties of this thorny subject are by no means cleared up by this mere indication of the attitude of ,pragmatism1 and we shall return in a later chapter#adh to this idea of truth as a construction of the mind instead of a datum1 taking care at the same time1 however1 to refer to the failure of which we have spoken on the part of ,pragmatism to recognize the element of truth that is still contained in the correspondence notion4 7#b7 ,the rejection of the idea of any rigid1 or ultimate distinction between 8appearance0 and 8reality40 ,this is a still broader rejection than the one to which we have just referred1 and may1 therefore1 be thought of as another more or less fundamental reason for the rejection either of the copy or of the correspondence theory of truth4 ,the reality of things1 as ,pragmatism conceives it1 is not something already 8fixed0 and 8determined10 but rather1 something that is 8plastic0 and 8modifiable10 something that is1 in fact1 undergoing a continuous process of modification1 or development1 of one kind or another4 ,it must always1 therefore1 the pragmatist would hold1 be defined in terms of the experiences and the activities through which it is known and revealed and through which it is1 to some extent1 even modified4#adi ,pragmatism1 as we may remember1 has been called by ,james 8immediate0 or 8radical0 empiricism1 although in one of his last books he seeks to give an independent development to these two doctrines4 ,the cardinal principle of this philosophy is that 8things are what they are experienced as being1 or that to give a just account of anything is to tell what that thing is experienced to be40#aej ,and it is perhaps this aspect of the new philosophy of ,pragmatism that is most amply and most attractively exhibited in the books of ,james4 ,it is presented1 too1 with much freshness and skill in ,professor ,bawden's#aea book upon ,pragmatism1 which is an attempt1 he says1 8to set forth the necessary assumptions of a philosophy in which experience becomes self-conscious as a method40#aeb 8,the new philosophy10 proceeds ,bawden1#aec 8is a pragmatic idealism4 ,its method is at once intrinsic and immanent and organic or functional4 ,by saying that its method is functional1 we mean that its experience must be interpreted from within4 ,we cannot jump out of our skins 444 we cannot pull ourselves up by our own bootstraps4 ,we find ourselves in mid-stream of the ,niagara of experience1 and may define what it is by working back and forth within the current40 8,we do not know where we are going1 but we are on the way0 the contradiction is surely apparent4 ,then1 like ,james1 ,bawden goes on to interpret ,pragmatism by showing what things like self-consciousness1 experience1 science1 social consciousness1 space1 time1 and causation are by showing how they 8appear10 and how they 8function0--8experience0 itself being simply1 to him and to his friends1 a 8dynamic system10 8self-sustaining10 a 8whole leaning on nothing40 ,the extremes of this 8immediate0 or 8radical0 philosophy appear to non-pragmatists to be reached when we read words like those just quoted about the ,niagara stream of our experience1 and about our life as simply movement and acceleration1 or about the celebrated 8,i think0 of ,descartes as equally well 6 set forth under the form 8,it thinks10 or 8thinking is going on10 or about the 8being0 of the individual person as consisting simply in a 8doing40 8,all this we hold10 says ,bawden1 8to be not materialism but simply energism40 8,there is no #8truth1' only #8truths'--this is another way of putting it--and the only criterion of truth is the changing one of the image or the idea which comes out of our impulses or of the conflict of our habits40 ,the end of all this modern flowing philosophy is1 of course1 the 8,pluralism0 of ,james1 the universe as a society of functioning selves in which reality 8may exist in a distributive form1 or in the shape1 not of an ,all1 but of a set of eaches40 8,the essence of life10 as he puts it in his famous essay on ,bergson1#aed 8is its continually changing character10 and we only call it a 8confusion0 sometimes because we have grown accustomed in our sciences and philosophies to isolate 8elements0 and 8differents0 which in reality are 8all dissolved in one another40#aee 8,relations of every sort1 of time1 space1 difference1 likeness1 change1 rate1 cause1 or what not1 are just as integral members of the sensational flux as terms are40 8,pluralism lets things really exist in the each form1 or distributively4 ,its type of union 444 is different from the monistic type of all-einheit4 ,it is what ,i call the strung-along type1 the type of continuity1 contiguity1 or concatenation40 ,and so on4 7#c7 ,the reaffirmation of the teleological point of view4 ,after the many illustrations and references that have already been given in respect of the tendencies of ,pragmatism1 it is perhaps hardly necessary to point out that an insistence upon the necessity to philosophy of the 8teleological0 point of view1 of the consideration of both thoughts and things from the point of view of their purpose or utility1 is a deeply-marked characteristic of ,pragmatism4 ,in itself this demand can hardly be thought of as altogether new1 for the idea of considering the nature of anything in the light of its final purpose or end is really as old in our ,european thought as the philosophy of ,aristotle or ,anaxagoras4 ,almost equally familiar is the kindred idea upon which ,pragmatism is inclined to felicitate itself1 of finding the roots of metaphysic 8in ethics10 in the facts of conduct1 in the facts of the 8ideal0 or the 8personal0 order which we tend#aef in human civilization to impose upon what is otherwise thought of by science as the natural order4 ,the form1 however1 of the teleological argument to which ,pragmatism may legitimately be thought to have directed our attention is that of the possible place in the world of reality1 and in the world of thought1 of the effort and the free initiative of the individual4 ,this place1 unfortunately 7the case is quite different with ,bergson#aeg71 ,pragmatism has been able1 up to the present time1 to define1 in the main1 only negatively--by means of its polemic against the completed and the self-completing 8,absolute0 of the ,neo-,hegelian ,rationalists4 ,what this polemic is we can best indicate by quoting from ,hegel himself a passage or a line of the reflection against which it is seeking to enter an emphatic and a reasoned protest1 and then after this a passage or two from some of our ,anglo-,hegelians in the same connexion4 8,the consummation10 says ,hegel1 in a familiar and often-quoted passage1 8of the ,infinite aim 7i4e4 of the purpose of ,god as omniscient and almighty7 consists merely in removing the illusion which makes it seem unaccomplished40#aeh ,now although there is a sense in which this great saying must for ever be maintained to contain an element of profound truth1#aei the attitude of ,pragmatism in regard to it would be1 firstly1 that of a rooted objection to its outspoken intellectualism4 ,how can the chief work of the ,almighty be conceived to be merely that of getting rid somehow from our minds1 or from his1 of our mental confusions8 ,and then1 secondly1 an equally rooted objection is taken to the implication that the individual human being should allow himself to entertain1 as possibly true1 a view of the general trend of things that renders any notion of his playing an appreciable part therein a theoretical and a practical absurdity4#afj ,this notion 7or 8conceit10 if you will7 he can surrender only by ceasing to think of his own consciousness of 8effort0 and of the part played by 8effort0#afa and 8invention0 in the entire animal and human world1 and also of his consciousness of duty and of the ideal in general4 ,this latter consciousness of itself bids him to realize certain 8norms0 or regulative prescripts simply because they are consonant with that higher will which is to him the very truth of his own nature4 ,he cannot1 in other words1 believe that he is consciously obliged to work and to realize his higher nature for nothing4 ,the accomplishment of ends and of the right must1 in other words1 be rationally believed by him to be part of the nature of things4 ,it is this conviction1 we feel sure1 that animates ,pragmatism in the opposition it shares both with common sense and with the radical thought of our time against the meaninglessness to ,hegelianism1 or to ,absolutism1#afb many of the hopes and many of the convictions that we feel to be so necessary and so real in the life of mankind generally4 ,and there are other lines of reflection among ,neo-,hegelians against which ,pragmatism is equally determined to make a more or less definite protest1 in the interest1 as before1 of our practical and of our moral activity4 ,we may recall1 to begin with1 the memorable words of ,mr4 ,bradley1 in his would-be refutation of the charge that the ideals of ,absolutism 8to some people0 fail to 8satisfy our nature's demands40 8,am ,i10 he indignantly asks1 8to understand that we are to have all we want1 and have it just as we want it80 adding 7almost in the next line7 that he 8understands10 of course1 that the 8views0 of ,absolutism1 or those of any other philosophy1 are to be compared 8only with views0 that aim at 8theoretical consistency0 and not with mere practical beliefs4#afc ,now1 speaking for the moment for ,pragmatism1 can it be truly philosophical to contemplate with equanimity the idea of any such ultimate conflict as is implied in these words between the demands of the intellect#afd and the demands of emotion--to use the term most definitely expressive of a personal1 as distinct from a merely intellectual satisfaction8 ,then again there is1 for example1 the dictum of ,dr4 ,mc,taggart1 that there is 8no reason to trust ,god's goodness without a demonstration which removes the matter from the sphere of faith40#afe ,may there not1 we would ask1 be a view of things according to the truth of which the confidence of the dying ,socrates in the reasonableness and the goodness of ,god are at least as reasonable as his confession1 at the same time1 of his ignorance of the precise1 or the particular1 fate both of the just and of the unjust8 ,and is not1 too1 such a position as that expressed in these words of ,dr4 ,mc,taggart's about a logically complete reason for believing in the essential righteousness of things now ruled out of court by some of the concessions of his brother rationalists to ,pragmatism1 to which reference has already been made8 ,it is so ruled out1 for example1 even by ,mr4 ,bradley's condemnation as a 8pernicious prejudice0 of the idea that 8what is wanted for working purpose is the last theoretical certainty about things40#aff ,,chapter ,,iv ,,pragmatism ,,and ,,human ,,activity ,it requires now but a slight degree of penetration to see that beneath this entire matter of an apparent opposition between our 8theoretical0 and our 8practical0 satisfaction1 and beneath much of the pragmatist insistence upon the 8consequences0 of ideas and of systems of thought1 there is the great question of the simple fact of human action and of its significance for philosophy4 ,and it might truly be said that the raising of this question is not merely another of the more or less definitely marked features of ,pragmatism1 but in some respects it is one outstanding characteristic4 ,for some reason or other1 or for some strange combination of reasons1 the phenomenon that we call 8action0#afg 7the activity of man as an agent7 and the apparently simple facts of the reality and the intelligibility of action have long been regarded as matters of altogether secondary or subordinate importance by the rationalism of philosophy and by the mechanical philosophy of science4 ,this ,rationalism and this ostensibly certain and demonstrable mechanical philosophy of science suppose that the one problem of human thought is simply that of the nature of truth or of the nature of reality 7the reality of the 8physical0 world7 as if either 7or each7 of these things were an entity on its own account1 an absolutely final finding or consideration4 ,that this has really been the case so far as philosophy is concerned is proved by the fact even of the existence of the many characteristic deliverances and concessions of ,rationalism in respect of ,pragmatism to which reference has already been made in the preceding chapter4 ,and that it has also been the case so far as science is concerned is proved by the existence of the many dogmatic attempts of many natural philosophers from ,holbach to ,haeckel to apply the 8iron laws0 of matter and motion to the reality of everything else under heaven1#afh and of everything in the heavens in spite of the frequent confessions of their own colleagues with regard to the actual and the necessary limits and limitations of science and of the scientific outlook4 ,only slowly and gradually1 as it were1 has the consideration come into the very forefront of our speculative horizon that there is for man as a thinking being no rigid separation between theory and practice1 between intellect and volition1 between action and thought1 between fact and act1 between truth and reality4#afi ,there is clearly volition or aim1 for example1 in the search after truth4 ,and there is certainly purpose in the attention#agj that is involved even in the simplest piece of perception1 the selection of what interests and affects us out of the total field of vision or experience4 ,and it is equally certain that there is thought in action--so long1 that is to say1 as action is regarded as action and not as impulse4 ,again1 the man who wills the truth submits himself to an imperative just as surely as does the man who explicitly obeys the law of duty4 ,it is thus impossible1 as it were1 even in the so-called intellectual life1 to distinguish absolutely between theoretical and practical considerations--8truth0 meaning invariably the relations obtaining in some 8sphere10 or order1 of fact which we separate off for some purpose or other from the infinite whole of reality4 ,equally impossible is it to distinguish absolutely between the theoretical and the practical in the case of the highest theoretical activity1 in the case1 say1 of the 8contemplation0 that ,aristotle talks of as the most 8godlike0 activity of man4 ,this very contemplation1 as our ,neo-,hegelian#aga friends are always reminding us1 is an activity that is just as much a characteristic of man1 as is his power of setting his limbs in motion4 ,we have referred to the desire of the pragmatists to represent1 and to discover1 a supposedly deeper or more comprehensive view of human nature than that implicitly acted upon by ,intellectualism--a view that should provide1 as they think1 for the organic unity of our active and our so-called reflective tendencies4 ,this desire is surely eminently typical of what we would like to think of as the rediscovery by ,pragmatism for philosophy1 of the active1 or the volitional1 aspects of the conscious life of man1 and along with this important side of our human nature1 the reality also of the activities and the purposes that are revealed in what we sometimes speak of as unconscious nature4 ,the world we know1 it would hold1 in the spirit and almost in the letter of ,bergson1 lives and grows by experiment1#agb and by activities and processes and adjustments4 ,pragmatism has doubtless1 as we pointed out1 been prone to think of itself as the only philosophy that can bake bread1 that can speak to man in terms of the actual life of effort and struggle that he seems called upon to live in the environment in which he finds himself4 ,and1 as we have just been insisting1 the main ground of its hostility to ,rationalism is the apparent tendency of the latter to treat the various concepts and hypotheses that have been devised to explain the world1 and to render it intelligible1 as if they were themselves of more importance than the real persons and the real happenings that constitute the world of our experience4#agc ,if it were at all desirable to recapitulate to any extent those phenomena connected with ,pragmatism that seem to indicate its rediscovery of the fact of action1 and of the fact of its meaning for philosophy1 as its one outstanding characteristic1 we may point to such considerations as the following3 7#a7 ,the fact of its having sought to advance from the stage of a mere 8instrumentalist0 view of human thought to that of an outspoken 8humanism0 or a socialized utilitarianism4 7#b7 ,the fact of its seeking to leave us 7as the outcome of philosophy7 with all our more important 8beliefs10 with a general 8working0 view of the world in which such things as religion and ideals and enthusiasm are adequately recognized4 ,pragmatism is really1 as we have put it1 more interested in belief than in knowledge1 the former being to it the characteristic1 the conquering attitude of man to the world in which he finds himself4 7#c7 ,its main object is to establish a dynamical view of reality1 as that which is 8everywhere in the making10 as that which signifies to every person firstly that aspect of the life of things in which he is for the time being most vitally interested4#agd 7#d7 ,in the spirit of the empirical philosophy generally its main anxiety is to do the fullest justice to all the aspects of our so-called human experience1 looking upon theories and systems as but points of view for the interpretation of this experience1 and of the great universal life that transcends it4 ,and proceeding upon the theory that a true metaphysic must become a true 8dynamic0 or a true incentive to human motive1 it seeks the relationships and affiliations that have been pointed out with all the different liberating and progressive tendencies in the history of human thought4 7#e7 ,it would 8consult moral experience directly10 finding in the world of our ordinary moral and social effort a spiritual reality#age that raises the individual out of and above and beyond himself4 ,and it bears testimony in its own more or less imperfect manner to the autonomous element#agf in our human personality that1 in the moral life1 and in such things as religious aspiration and creative effort and social service1 transcends the merely theoretical descriptions of the world with which we are familiar in the generalizations of science and of history4 ,without attempting meanwhile to probe at all deeply into this pragmatist glorification of 8action0 and its importance to philosophy1 let us think of a few of the considerations that may be urged in support of this idea from sources outside those of the mere practical tendencies and the affiliations of ,pragmatism itself4 ,there is first of all the consideration that it is the fact of action that unites or brings together what we call 8desire0 and what we call 8thought10 the world of our desires and emotions and the world of our thoughts and our knowledge4 ,this is really a consideration of the utmost importance to us when we think of what we have allowed ourselves to call the characteristic dualism#agg of modern times1 the discrepancy that seems to exist between the world of our desires and the impersonal world of science--which latter world educated people are apt to think of as the world before which everything else must bend and break1 or at least bow4 ,our point here is not merely that of the humiliating truth of the wisdom of the wiseacres who used to tell us in our youth that we will anyhow have to act in spite of all our unanswered questions about things1 but the plain statement of the fact that 7say or think what we will7 it is in conscious action that our desires and our thoughts do come together1 and that it is there that they are both seen to be but partial expressions of the one reality--the life that is in things and in ourselves1 and that engenders in us both emotions and thoughts1 even if the latter do sometimes seem to lie 8too deep for tears40 ,it is with this life and with the objects and aims and ends and realities that develop and sustain it that all our thoughts1 as well as all our desires1 are concerned4 ,if action1 therefore1 could only be properly understood1 if it can somehow be seen in its universal or its cosmic significance1 there would be no discrepancy and no gap between the world of our ideals and the world of our thoughts4 ,we would know what we want1#agh and we would want and desire what we know we can get--the complete development of our personality4 ,again there is the evidence that exists in the sciences of biology and anthropology in support of the important role played in both animal and human evolution by effort and choice and volition and experimentation4 8,already in the contractibility of protoplasm and in the activities of typical protozoons do we find #8activities' that imply#agi volition of some sort or degree1 for there appears to be some selection of food and some spontaneity of movement3 changes of direction1 the taking of a circuitous course in avoidance of an obstruction1 etc41 indicate this40 ,then again1 8there are such things as the diversities in secondary sexual characters 7the #8after-thoughts of reproduction' as they are called71 the endless shift of parasites1 the power of animals to alter their coloration to suit environment1 and the complex #8internal stimuli' of the higher animals in their breeding periods and activities1 which make us see only too clearly what the so-called struggle for life has been in the animal world40444 ,coming up to man let us think of what scientists point out as the effects of man's disturbing influence in nature1 and then pass from these on to the facts of anthropology in respect of the conquest of environment by what we call invention and inheritance and free initiative4 8,in placing invention10 says a writer of to-day in a recent brilliant book1 8at the bottom of the scale of conditions i4e4 of the conditions of social development1 ,i definitely break with the opinion that human evolution is throughout a purely natural process4444 ,it is pre-eminently an artificial construction40#ahj ,now it requires but the reflection of a moment or two upon considerations such as the foregoing1 and upon the attested facts of history as to the breaking up of the tyranny of habit and custom by the force of reflection and free action and free initiative1 to grasp how really great should be the significance to philosophy of the active and the volitional nature of man that is thus demonstrably at the root not only of our progress1 but of civilization itself4 ,if it be objected that while there cannot1 indeed1 from the point of view of the general culture and civilization of mankind1 be any question of the importance to philosophy of the active effort and of the active thought that underlie this stupendous achievement1 the case is perhaps somewhat different when we try to think of the pragmatist glorification of our human action from the point of view of the 7physical87 universe as a whole4#aha ,to this reflection it is possible here to say but one or two things4 ,firstly1 there is apparently at present no warrant in science for seeking to separate off this human life of ours from the evolution of animal life in general4#ahb ,equally little is there any warrant for separating the evolution of living matter from the evolution of what we call inanimate matter1 not to speak of the initial difficulty of accounting for things like energy and radio-active matter1 and the evolution and the devolution that are calmly claimed by science to be involved in the various 8systems0 within the universe--apart from an ordering and intelligent mind and will4 ,there is therefore1 so far1 no necessary presumption against the idea of regarding human evolution as at least in some sense a continuation or development of the life that seems to pervade the universe in general4 ,and then1 secondly1 there is the familiar reflection that nearly all that we think we know about the universe as a whole is but an interpretation of it in terms of the life and the energy that we experience in ourselves and in terms of some of the apparent conditions of this life and this energy4 ,for as ,bergson reminds us1 8,as thinking beings we may apply the laws of our physics to our world1 and extend them to each of the worlds taken separately1 but nothing tells us that they apply to the entire universe nor even that such affirmation has any meaning2 for the universe is not made but is being made continually4 ,it is growing perhaps indefinitely by the addition of new worlds40#ahc ,on the ground1 then1 both of science and of philosophy#ahd may it be definitely said that this human action of ours1 as apparently the highest outcome of the forces of nature1 becomes only too naturally and only too inevitably the highest object of our reflective consideration4 ,as ,schopenhauer put it long ago1 the human body is the only object in nature that we know 8on the inside40 ,and do or think what we will1 it is this human life of ours and this mind of ours that have peopled the world of science and the world of philosophy with all the categories and all the distinctions that obtain there1 with concepts like the 87,platonic7 ,ideas10 8form10 8matter10 8energy10 8ether10 8atom10 8substance10 8the individual10 8the universal10 8empty space10 8eternity10 8the ,absolute10 8value10 8final end10 and so on4 ,there is much doubtless in this action philosophy1 and much too in the matter of the reasons that may be brought forward in its support1 that can become credible and intelligible only as we proceed4 ,but it must all count1 it would seem1 in support of the idea of the pragmatist rediscovery1 for philosophy1 of the importance of our creative action and of our creative thought4 ,and then there are one or two additional general considerations of which we may well think in the same connexion4 ,pragmatism boasts1 as we know1 of being a highly democratic#ahe doctrine1 of contending for the emancipation of the individual and his interests from the tyranny of all kinds of absolutism1 and all kinds of dogmatism 7whether philosophical1 or scientific1 or social74 ,no system either of thought or of practice1 no supposed 8world-view0 of things1 no body of scientific laws or abstract truths shall1 as long as it holds the field of our attention1 entirely crush out of existence the concrete interests and the free self-development of the individual human being4 ,a tendency in this direction exists1 it must be admitted1 in the 8determinism0 both of natural science and of ,hegelianism1 and of the social philosophy that has emanated from the one or from the other4 ,pragmatism1 on the contrary1 in all matters of the supposed determination1 or the attempted limitation1 of the individual by what has been accomplished either in ,nature or in human history1 would incline to what we generally speak of to-day as a 8modernistic10 or a 8liberalistic10 or even a 8revolutionary10 attitude4 ,it would reinterpret and reconstruct1 in the light of the present and its needs1 not only the concepts and the methods of science and philosophy1 but also the various institutions and the various social practices of mankind4#ahf ,similarily ,pragmatism would protest1 as does the newer education and the newer sociology1 against any merely doctrinaire 7or 8intellectualistic07 conception of education and culture1 substituting in its place the 8efficiency0 or the 8social service0#ahg conception4 ,and even if we must admit that this more or less practical ideal of education has been over-emphasized in our time1 it is still true1 as with ,goethe1 that it is only the 8actively-free0 man1 the man who can work out in service and true accomplishment the ideal of human life1 whose production should be regarded as the aim of a sound educational or social policy4 ,we shall later attempt to assign some definite reasons for the failure of ,pragmatism to make the most of all this apparently justifiable insistence upon action and upon the creative activity of the individual1 along with all this sympathy that it seems to evince for a progressive and a liberationist view of human policy4 ,meantime1 in view of all these considerations1 we cannot avoid making the reflection that it is surely something of an anomaly in philosophy that a thinker's 8study0 doubts about his actions and about some of the main instinctive beliefs of mankind 7in which he himself shares7 should have come to be regarded--as they have been by ,rationalism--as considerations of a greater importance than the actions1 and the beliefs1 and the realities1 of which they are the expression4 ,far be it from the writer to suggest that the suspension of judgment and the refraining from activity1#ahh in the absence of adequate reason and motive1 are not1 and have not been of the greatest value to mankind in the matter of the development of the higher faculties and the higher ideals of the mind4 ,there may well be1 however1 for ,pragmatism1 or for any philosophy that can work it out satisfactorily1 in the free1 creative1 activity of man1 in the duty that lies upon us all of carrying on our lives to the highest expression1 a reason and a truth that must be estimated at their logical worth along with the many other reasons and truths of which we are pleased to think as the truth of things4 ,short1 however1 of a more genuine attempt on the part of ,pragmatism than anything it has as yet given us in this connexion to justify this higher reason and truth that are embodied in our consciousness of ourselves as persons1 as rational agents1 all its mere 8practicalism0 and all its 8instrumentalism0 are but the workaday and the utilitarian philosophy of which we have already complained in its earlier and cruder professions4#ahi ,after some attention1 then1 to the matter of the outstanding critical defects of ,pragmatism1 in its preliminary and cruder forms1 we shall again return to our topic of the relatively new subject-matter it has been endeavouring to place before philosophy in its insistence upon the importance of action1 and upon the need of a 8dynamic10 instead of an intellectualistic and 8spectator-like0 theory of human personality4 ,,appendix ,,to ,,chapter ,,iv ,,philosophy ,,and ,,the ,,activity-,,experience ,in an article upon the above title in the ,international ,journal of ,ethics1 p4 #ahih1 ,i attempted to deal with some aspects of the problem that ,i have just raised in the preceding chapter4 ,i venture to append here some of the statements that ,i made then upon the importance of action and the 8activity-experience0 to the philosophy of to-day4 ,i am inclined to regard them 7although ,i have not looked at them until the present moment of passing this book through the press7 as a kind of anticipation and confirmation of many of my present pages4 ,part of my excuse1 however1 for inserting them here is a hope that these references and suggestions may possibly be of service to the general reader4 ,the extracts follow as they were printed4 ,i4 ,it requires no very profound acquaintance with the trend of the literature of general and specialized philosophy of the last twenty-five years to detect a decidedly practical turn in the recent speculative tendencies of philosophy and philosophers4 ,the older conception of philosophy or metaphysics as an attempt to state 7more or less systematically7 the value of the world for thought is being slowly modified1 if not altogether disappearing1 into the attempt to explain or to grasp the significance of the world from the stand-point of the moral and social activity of man4 ,the philosophical student must be to some extent conscious of the difference in respect of both tone and subject-matter between such books as ,stirling's ,secret of ,hegel1 ,e4 ,caird's ,critical ,philosophy of ,kant 7the first editions of both works71 ,green's ,prolegomena to ,ethics1 and the most recent essays and books of ,professors ,a4 ,seth#aij and ,james#aia and ,ward#aib and ,sidgwick#aic and ,baldwin1#aid and of ,mr4 ,bosanquet#aie and the late ,mr4 ,nettleship1#aif and between--to turn to ,germany--the writings of ,erdmann and ,kuno ,fischer and ,zeller and ,f4 ,a4 ,lange1 and those of ,gizycki1 ,paulsen1 ,windelband1 ,eucken1 ,hartmann1 ,deussen1 ,simmel1 and--in ,france--between the writings of ,renouvier and ,pillon and ,ravaisson1 the 8,neo-,kantianism0 of the ,critique ,philosophique 7#ahgb-ahgg71 and those of ,fouille1 ,weber 7of ,strassburg71 ,sailles1 ,dunan1 and others1 and of general writers like de ,vog1 ,desjardins1 and ,brunetire1 and of social philosophers like ,bougl1 ,tarde1 ,izoulet1 and so on4 ,the change of venue in these writers alone1 not to speak of the change of the interest of the educated world from such books as ,huxley's ,hume and ,renan's ,l',avenir de la ,science and ,du ,bois ,reymond's ,die ,sieben ,weltrthsel1 and ,tyndall's ,belfast ,address1 to the writings of ,herbert ,spencer 7the ,sociology and the general essays on social evolution71 ,kidd1 ,nordau1 ,nietzsche1 ,mr4 ,crozier 7his important ,history of ,civilization71 and ,demolins1#aig and the predominance of investigations into general biology and comparative psychology and sociology over merely logical and conceptual philosophy seem to afford us some warrant for trying to think of what might be called a newer or ethical idealism1 an idealism of the will1 an idealism of life1 in contradistinction to the older or intellectual 7epistemological1 ,neo-,kantian7 idealism1 the idealism of the intellect4 ,professor ,a4 ,seth1#aih in his recent volume on ,man's ,place in the ,cosmos1 suggests that ,mr4 ,bradley's treatise on ,appearance and ,reality has closed the period of the absorption or assimilation of ,kanto-,hegelian principles by the ,english mind4 ,and there is ample evidence in contemporary philosophical literature to show that even the very men who have1 with the help of ,stirling and ,green and ,caird and ,bradley and ,wallace1 8absorbed and assimilated0 the principles of critical idealism are now bent upon applying these principles to the solution of concrete problems of art and life and conduct4 ,two things alone would constitute a difference between the philosophy of the last few years and that of the preceding generation3 ,an attempt 7strongly#aii accentuated at the present moment7 to include elements of feeling and will in our final consciousness of reality1 and a tendency 7inevitable since ,comte and ,hegel's ,philosophy of ,history7 to extend the philosophical synthesis of the merely 8external10 or physical1 universe so as to make it include the world of man's action and the world that is now glibly called the 8social organism40#bjj ,a good deal of the epistemological and metaphysical philosophy of this century has been merely cosmological1 and at best psychological and individualistic4 ,the philosophy of the present is1 necessarily1 to a large extent1 sociological and collectivistic and historical4 ,renan once prophesied that this would be so4 ,and many other men perceived the same fact and acted upon their perception of it--,goethe and ,victor ,hugo and ,carlyle1 for example4 ,to be sure1 any attempt to draw lines of novel and absolute separation between writers of to-day and their immediate predecessors would be absurd and impossible1 just as would be the attempt to force men who are still living and thinking and developing1 into ,procrustean beds of system and nomenclature4 ,the history of the philosophy of the last half of this century constitutes a development as continuous and as logical as the philosophy of any similar period of years wherein men have thought persistently and truly upon the problems of life and mind4 ,there were in the 'sixties men like ,ulrici and ,lotze 7,renouvier1 too1 to some extent7 who divined the limitations of a merely intellectual philosophy1 and who saw clearly that the only way to effect a reconciliation between philosophy and science would be to apply philosophy itself to the problems of the life and thought of the time1 just as we find1 in #ahic1 ,dr4 ,edward ,caird writing1 in his ,essays on ,literature and ,philosophy1 that 8philosophy1 in face of the increasing complexity of modern life1 has a harder task laid upon it than ever was laid upon it before4 ,it must emerge from the region of abstract principles and show itself able to deal with the manifold results of empirical science1 giving to each of them its proper place and value40 ,professor ,campbell ,fraser1 while welcoming and sympathetically referring to 7in his books upon ,berkeley and ,locke7 the elements of positive value in ,english and ,german idealism1 has throughout his life contended for the idea 7expressed with greatest definiteness in his ,gifford ,lectures on ,the ,philosophy of ,theism7 that 8in man1 as a self-conscious and self-determining agent10 is to be found the 8best key we possess to the solution of the ultimate problem of the universe02 while ,professor ,sidgwick1 by virtue of his captivating and ingenious pertinacity in confining philosophical speculation to the lines of the traditional ,english empiricism1 and in keeping it free from the ensnaring subtleties of system and methodology1 has exercised a healthful and corrective influence against the extremes alike of transcendentalism and naturalism4 ,and it would be rash to maintain that all the younger men in philosophy show an intention to act upon the idea 7expressed by ,wundt1 for instance1 in his ,ethik7 that a metaphysic should build upon the facts of the moral life of man2 although we find a 8,neo-,hegelian0 like ,professor ,mackenzie#bja saying that 8even the wealth of our inner life depends rather on the width of our objective interests than on the intensity of our self-contemplation02 and an expounder of the ethics of dialectic evolution like ,professor ,muirhead quoting#bjb with approval the thought expressed by ,george ,eliot in the words1 8,the great world-struggle of developing thought is continually foreshadowed in the struggle of the affections seeking a justification for love and hope02 and a careful psychologist like ,mr4 ,stout#bjc deliberately penning the words1#bjd 8,our existence as conscious beings is essentially an activity1 and activity is a process which1 by its very nature1 is directed towards an end1 and can neither exist nor be conceived apart from this end40 ,there are1 doubtless1 many philosophers of to-day who are convinced that philosophy is purely an intellectual matter1 and can never be anything else than an attempt to analyze the world for thought--an attempt to state its value in the terms of thought4 ,against all these and many similar considerations it would be idle to set up a hard and fast codification or characterization of the work of the philosophy or philosophers of to-day4 ,still1 the world will accord the name of philosopher to any man--,renan1 for example1 or ,spencer or ,huxley or ,nordau or ,nietzsche--who comes before it with views upon the universe and humanity that may1 for any conceivable reason1 be regarded as fundamental4 ,and on this showing of things1 as well as from many indications in the work of those who are philosophers by profession1 it may be said that the predominating note of the newer philosophy is its openness to the facts of the volitional and emotional and moral and social aspects of man's life1 as things that take us further along the path of truth than the mere categories of thought and their manipulation by metaphysic and epistemology4 ,,ii4 ,the ,newer ,idealism does not dream of questioning the positive work of the ,kantian and ,neo-,kantian and ,neo-,hegelian idealists4 ,it knows only too well that even scientific men like ,helmholtz and ,du ,bois ,reymond1 that 8positive0 philosophers like ,riehl and ,laas and ,feuerbach and others have1 through the influence of the ,kantian philosophy1 learned and accepted the fact of there being 8ideal0 or psychical or 8mind-supplied0 factors in so-called external reality4 ,there are among the educated men of to-day very few ,dr4 ,johnsons who ridicule the psycho-physical1 or the metaphysical1 analysis of external reality1 who believe in a crass and crude and self-sufficient 8matter0 utterly devoid of psychical attributes or characteristics4 ,true1 ,herbert ,spencer has written words to the effect that 8,if the ,idealist 7,berkeley7 is right1 then the doctrine of ,evolution is a dream02 but then everything in ,spencer's philosophy about an 8actuality lying behind appearances0 and about our being compelled 8to regard every phenomenon as a manifestation of some ,power by which we are acted upon10 is against the possibility of our believing that1 according to that philosophy1 an unconscious and non-spiritual 8matter0 could evolve itself into conscious life and moral experience4 ,the philosophers of to-day have indeed rejoiced to see ,kant's lesson popularized by such various phases and movements of human thought as psychophysical research1 art and sthetic theory1 the interest in ,buddhism 7with its idealistic theory of the knowledge of the senses71 and the speculative biology of ,weismann and others4 ,that people generally should see that matter is1 for many reasons1 something more than mere matter1 is to the student of ,kant a piece of fulfilled prophecy4 ,and by a plea for a return to reality and life and sociability from conceptualism and criticism and speculative individualism no philosophical scholar for one moment contemplates1 as even conceivable1 an overlooking of the idealistic interpretation of the data of the senses supplied by ,locke and ,berkeley and ,hume1 or of the idealistic interpretation of the data of science and understanding supplied by ,kant's 8,copernican0 discovery4 ,any real view of the universe must now presuppose the melting down of crass external reality into the phenomena of sense and experience and the transformation of inorganic and organic nature into so many planes or grades of being expressive of the different forms 7gravitation1 cohesion1 vital force1 psychic force7 in which cosmic energy manifests itself4 ,equally little does the ,newer ,idealism question the legitimacy or the actual positive service of the 8dialectic0 of ,hegel 7as ,archimedean a leverage to humanity as was the 8concept0 of ,socrates or the 8apperception0 of ,kant7 that has shown the world to be a system in which everything is related to everything else1 and shown1 too1 that all ways of looking at reality that stop short of the truths of personality and moral relationship are untrue and inadequate4 ,to use the words of ,professor ,howison1 of ,california1 in the preface to the first edition of ,professor ,watson's#bje latest volume 7a book that connects the idealism of ,glasgow and ,oxford with the convictions of the youth of the 8,pacific ,coast071 the 8dominant tone0 of the militant and representative philosophy of to-day1 is 8affirmative and idealistic4 ,the decided majority 444 are animated by the conviction that human thought is able to solve the riddle of life positively2 to solve it in accord with the ideal hopes and interests of human nature40 ,,chapter ,v ,,critical ,enough has perhaps now been said by way of an indication of some of the main characteristics of ,pragmatism1 and of the matter of its relations to ordinary and to philosophical thinking4 ,its complexity and some of its confusions and some of its difficulties have also been referred to4 ,as for the affiliations and the associations of ,pragmatism1 it would seem that it rests not so much upon its own mere instrumentalism and practicalism as upon some of the many broader and deeper tendencies in ancient and modern thought that have aimed at a dynamic1 instead of a static1 interpretation of reality4 ,we have suggested1 too1 that there are evidently things in traditional philosophy and in ,rationalism of which it fails to take cognizance1 although it has evidently many things to give to ,rationalism in the way of a constructive philosophy of human life4 ,now it would be easily possible to continue our study of ,pragmatism along some or all of those different lines and points of view4 ,in the matter1 for example1 of the affiliations and associations of ,pragmatism1 we could show that1 in addition to such things as the 8nominalism0 and the utilitarianism1 and the positivism1 and the 8voluntarism0 and the philosophy of hypotheses1 and the 8anti-intellectualism0 already referred to1 ,pragmatism has an affinity with things as far apart and as different as the ,scottish ,philosophy of ,common-sense1 the sociological philosophy of ,comte and his followers1 the philosophy of ,fichte with its great idea of the world as the 8sensualized sphere0 of our duty1 the 8experience0 philosophy of ,bacon and of the entire modern era1 and so on4 ,there is even a 8romantic0 element in ,pragmatism1 and it has1 in fact1 been called 8romantic utilitarianism40#bjf ,we can understand this if we think of ,m4 ,berthelot's#bjg association of it not only with ,poincar1 but with ,nietzsche1 or of ,dr4 ,schiller's famous declaration that the genius of a man's logical method should be loved and reverenced by him as is 8his bride40 ,and there is always in it1 to be sure1 the important element of sympathy with the religious instincts of mankind4 ,and this is the case1 too1 whether these instincts are contemplated in some of the forms to which reference has already been made1 or in the form1 say1 expressed by such a typical modern thinker as the late ,henry ,sidgwick1 in his conviction that 8,humanity will not1 and cannot1 acquiesce in a ,godless world40#bjh ,then again we might take up the point of the relations of ,pragmatism to doctrines new and old in the history of philosophy1 to the main points of departure of different schools of thought1 or to fundamental and important positions in many of the great philosophers4 ,the writer finds that he has noticed in this connexion the doctrines of ,stoicism and ,epicureanism1#bji the 8probability0 philosophy of ,locke#baj and ,butler1 and ,pascal1 the ethics and the natural theology of ,cicero1 the 8voluntarism0 of ,schopenhauer1#baa ,aristotle's philosophy of the ,practical ,reason1#bab ,kant's philosophy of the same1 the religious philosophy of theologians like ,tertullian1 ,augustine1 ,duns ,scotus1 and so on--to take only a few instances4#bac ,the view of man and his nature represented by all these names is1 in the main1 an essentially practical1 a concrete1 and a moral view as opposed to an abstract and a rationalistic view4 ,and of course even to ,plato knowledge was only an element in the total spiritual philosophy of man1 while his master1 ,socrates1 never really seemed to make any separation between moral and intellectual inquiries4 ,and as for positions in the great philosophers between which and some of the tendencies of ,pragmatism there is more than a merely superficial agreement1 we might instance1 for example1 the tendency of ,hume#bad to reduce many of the leading categories of our thought to mere habits of mind1 to be explained on an instinctive rather than a rationalistic basis2 or ,comte's idea of the error of separating reason from instinct2#bae or the idea of de ,maistre and ,bain1 and many others that 8will0 is implied in the notion of 8exteriority02 or the idea of ,descartes#baf that the senses teach us not so much 8what is in reality in things10 as 8what is beneficial#bag or hurtful to the composite whole of mind and body02 or the declaration of ,kant that the chief end of metaphysic is ,god and immortality2 or the idea of ,spencer#bah that the belief in the unqualified supremacy of reason is a superstition of philosophers2 or the idea of ,plato in the ,sophist#bai that reality is the capacity for acting or of being acted upon2 and so on4 ,as for such further confirmation of pragmatist teaching as is to be found in typical modern thinking and scholars1 thought of almost at random1 it would be easy to quote in this connexion from writers as diverse as ,hffding1 ,fouille1 ,simmel1 ,wundt1 ,mach1 ,huxley1 ,hobhouse1 and many others4 ,it might be called a typically pragmatist idea1 for example1 on the part of ,mr4 ,l4 ,t4 ,hobhouse to hold that 8,the higher conceptions by which idealism has so firmly held are not to be #8scientifically' treated in the sense of being explained away4 ,what is genuinely higher we have 444 good reason to think must also be truest10 and we 8cannot permanently acquiesce in a way of thinking what would resolve it into what is lowest40#bbj ,these last words represent almost a commonplace of the thought of the day4 ,it is held1 for example1 by men as different and as far apart in their work1 and yet as typical of phases of our modern life1 as ,robert ,browning and ,sir ,oliver ,lodge4 ,the close dependence again of the doctrines of any science upon the social life and the prevalent thought of the generation is also essentially a pragmatist idea4 ,its truth is recognized and insisted upon in the most explicit manner in the recent serviceable manifesto of ,professors ,geddes and ,thomson upon 8,evolution10#bba and it obviously affects their whole philosophy of life and mind4 ,it figures too quite prominently in the valuable short ,introduction to ,science by ,professor ,thomson in the same series of manuals4 ,another typical book of to-day1 again 7that of ,professor ,duncan on the ,new ,knowledge of the new physical science71 definitely gives up1 for example1 the 8correspondence0#bbb notion of truth1 holding that it is meaningless to think of reality as something outside our thought and our experience of which our ideas might be a possible duplicate4 ,this again we readily recognize as an essentially pragmatist contention4 ,so also is the same writer's rejection of the notion of 8absolute truth10#bbc and his confession of the 8faith0 that is always involved in the thought of completeness or system in our scientific knowledge4 8,we believe purely as an act of faith and not at all of logic10 he says1 8that the universe is essentially determinable thousands of years hence1 into some one system which will account for everything and which will be the truth40#bbd ,nor would it be at all difficult to find confirmation for the pragmatist philosophy of ideas and thoughts in what we may well think of as the general reflective literature of our time1 outside the sphere1 as it were1 of strictly rational or academic philosophy--in writers like ,f4 ,d4 ,maurice1 ,w4 ,pater1 ,a4 ,w4 ,benn 7who otherwise depreciates what he calls 8ophelism071 ,j4 ,h4 ,newman1 ,karl ,pearson1 ,carlyle1 and others4#bbe ,take the following1 for example1 quoted with approval from ,herschel by ,karl ,pearson3 8,the grand and indeed the only character of truth is its capability of enduring the test of universal experience1 and coming unchanged out of every possible form of fair discussion40#bbf ,the idea again1 for example1 recently expressed in a public article by such a widely read and cleverly perverse writer as ,mr4 ,bernard ,shaw1#bbg that 8the will that moves us is dogmatic3 our brain is only the very imperfect instrument by which we devise practical means for satisfying the will10 might only too naturally be associated with the pragmatist-like anti-intellectualism#bbh of ,bergson1 or1 for that part of it1 with the deeper 8voluntarism0 of ,schopenhauer4 ,the following quotation taken from ,mr4 ,pater reveals how great may be correspondence between the independent findings of a finely sensitive mind like his1 and the positions to which the pragmatists are inclined in respect of the psychology of religious belief4 8,the supposed facts on which ,christianity rests1 utterly incapable as they have become of any ordinary test1 seem to me matter of very much the same sort of assent as we give to any assumption in the strict and ultimate sense1 moral4 ,the question whether these facts were real will1 ,i think1 always continue to be what ,i should call one of those natural questions of the human mind40#bbi ,readers of ,carlyle will easily recognize what we might call a more generalized statement of this same truth of ,pater's in the often-quoted words from ,heroes and ,hero-,worship3#bcj 8,by religion ,i do not mean the church creed which a man professes1 the articles of faith which4444 ,but the thing a man does practically believe 7and this often enough without asserting it even to himself1 much less to others72 the thing a man does practically lay to heart and know for certain concerning his vital relations to the mysterious universe1 and his duty and destiny there40 ,it has long seemed to the writer that a similar thing to this might be written 7and ,james has certainly written it7 about a man's 8philosophy0 as necessarily inclusive of his working beliefs as well as of his mere reasoned opinions1 although it is the latter that are generally 7by what right87 taken to be properly the subject-matter of philosophy4#bca ,and it is this phase of the pragmatist philosophy that could1 ,i am inclined to think1 be most readily illustrated from the opinions of various living and dead writers upon the general working philosophy of human nature as we find this revealed in human history4 ,we are told1 for example1 by ,mr4 ,hobhouse1 in his monumental work upon ,morals in ,evolution1 that in 8,taoism the supreme principle of things may be left undefined as something that we experience in ourselves if we throw ourselves upon it1 but which we know rather by following or living it than by any process of ratiocination40#bcb ,and 8this mystical interpretation10 he adds1 8is not confined to ,taoism1 but in one form or another lies near to hand to all spiritual religions1 and expresses one mode of religious consciousness1 its aspiration to reach the heart of things and the confidence that it has done so1 and found rest there40 ,we are reminded1 of course1 by all such considerations of the philosophy of ,bergson1 and of its brilliant attempt to make a synthesis of intuition or instinct with reflection or thought1 and indeed it may well be that the past difficulties of philosophy with intuition and instinct are due to the fact of its error in unduly separating the intellect from the 8will to live10 and from the 8creative0 evolution that have been such integral factors in the evolution of the life of humanity4 ,this entire matter1 however1 of the comparison of pragmatist doctrines to typical tendencies in the thought of the past and the present must be treated by us as subordinate to our main purpose1 that of the estimation of the place of ,pragmatism in the constructive thought of the present time4 ,with a view to this it will be necessary to revert to the criticism of ,pragmatism4 ,the criticism that has already been made is that in the main ,pragmatism is unsystematic and complex and confusing1 that it has no adequate theory of 8reality10 and no unified theory of philosophy1 that it has no satisfactory criterion of the 8consequences0 by which it proposes to test truth1 and that it has not worked out its philosophy of the contribution of the individual with his 8activity0 and his 8purposes0 to 8reality0 generally1 and that it is in danger of being a failure in the realm of ethics4#bcc ,to all this we shall now seek to add a few words more upon 7#a7 the pragmatist criterion of truth1 7#b7 the weakness of ,pragmatism in the realms of logic and theory of knowledge1 7#c7 its failure to give consistent account of the nature of reality1 and 7#d7 its unsatisfactoriness in the realm of ethics4 7#a7 ,we have already expressed our agreement with the finding of ,professor ,pratt#bcd that the pragmatist theory of truth amounts to no more than the harmless doctrine that the meaning of any conception expresses itself in the past1 present1 or future conduct or experiences of actual1 or possible1 sentient creatures4 ,taken literally1 however1 the doctrine that truth should be tested by consequences is not only harmless but also useless1 seeing that ,omniscience alone could bring together in thought or in imagination all the consequences of an assertion4 ,again1 it is literally false for the reason that the proof of truth is not in the first instance any kind of 8consequences10 not even the 8verification0 of which pragmatists are so fond4 ,if the truth of which we may happen to be thinking is truth of 8fact10 its proof lies in its correspondence 7despite the difficulties#bce of the idea7 with the results of observation or perception4#bcf ,and if it be inferential truth1 its proof is that of its deduction from previously established truths1 or facts1 upon a certain plane of knowledge or experience4 ,in short1 ,pragmatists forget altogether the logical doctrine of the existence 7in the world of our human experience1 of course7 of different established planes of reality1 or planes of ascertained knowledge in which all propositions that are not nonsensical or trivial1 are1 from their very inception1 regarded as necessarily true or false4 ,the existence of these various planes of experience or of thought is in fact implied in the pragmatist doctrine of the fundamental character of belief4#bcg ,according to this perfectly correct doctrine1 the objectivity of truth 7i4e4 its reality or non-reality in the world of fact or in the world of rational discourse7 is the essential thing about it1 while the idea of its 8consequences0 is not4 ,a truth is a proposition whose validity has already been established by evidence or by demonstration4 ,it has then afterwards the immediate 8utility0 of expressing in an intelligible and convenient manner the fact of certain connexions among things or events4 ,and its ultimate utility to mankind is also at the same time assured1 humanity being by its very nature a society of persons who must act1 and who act1 upon what they believe to be the truth or the reality of things4 ,but a proposition is by no means true because it is useful4 ,constantine believed eminently in the concord-producing utility of certain confessions enunciated at the ,council of ,nice1 but his belief in this does not prove their truth or reality outside the convictions of the faithful4 ,nor does the pragmatist or utilitarian character of certain portions of the writings of the ,old ,testament or of the ,koran prove the matter of their literal and factual truth in the ordinary sense of these terms4 ,as ,hume said1 8,when any opinion leads us into absurdities 'tis certainly false1 but 'tis not certain that an opinion is false because it has dangerous consequences40 ,and then1 apart from this conspicuous absence of logic in the views of pragmatists upon 8truth10 the expression of their doctrine is so confusing that it is almost impossible to extract any consistent meaning out of it4 ,they are continually confounding conceptions and ideas and propositions1 forgetful of the fact that truth resides not in concepts and ideas but only in propositions4 ,while it may be indeed true1 as against ,rationalism1 that all human conceptions whatsoever and it is only in connexion with 8conceptions0 that ,pragmatism is defined even in such an official place as ,baldwin's ,dictionary of ,philosophy#bch have1 and must have1 reference to actual or possible human experience or consequences1 it is by no means true that the test of a proposition is anything other than the evidence of which we have already spoken4 ,then the pragmatists have never adequately defined terms that are so essential to their purposes as 8practical10 8truth10 8fact10 8reality10 8consequences10 and they confound1 too1 8theories0 with 8truths0 and 8concepts0 just as they confound concepts and propositions4 7#b7 ,that logic and the theory of proof is thus one of the weak spots of ,pragmatism has perhaps then been sufficiently indicated4 ,we have seen1 in fact1 the readiness of ,pragmatism to confess its inability#bci to prove its own philosophy--that is1 to prove it in the ordinary sense of the term4#bdj ,that it should have made this confession is1 of course1 only in keeping with the fact that its interest in logic is confined to such subordinate topics as the framing and verification of hypotheses1 the development of concepts and judgments in the 8thought-process10 and so on4 ,of complete proof1 as involving both deduction and induction1 it takes but the scantiest recognition4 ,and it has made almost no effort to connect its discoveries in 8genetic logic0 and in the theory of hypotheses with the traditional body of logical doctrine4#bda ,nor1 as may perhaps be inferred from the preceding paragraph1 has it made any serious attempt to consider the question of the discovery of new truth in relation to the more or less perfectly formulated systems and schemes of truth already in the possession of mankind4 ,the case is similar in regard to the 8theory of knowledge0 of the pragmatists4 ,while they have made many important suggestions regarding the relation of all the main categories and principles of our human thought to the theoretical and practical needs of mankind1 there is in their teachings little that is satisfactory and explicit in the matter of the systematization of first principles1#bdb and little too that is satisfactory in respect of the relation of knowledge to reality4 ,they sometimes admit 7with ,james7 the importance of general points of view like the 8causal10 the 8temporal10 8end10 and 8purpose10 and so on4 ,at other times they confess with ,schiller that questions about ultimate truth and ultimate reality cannot be allowed to weigh upon our spirits1 seeing that 8actual knowing0 always starts from the 8existing situation40 ,now of course actual knowing certainly does start from the particular case of the existing situation1 but1 as all thinkers from ,aristotle to ,hume have seen1 it is by no means explained by this existing situation4 ,in real knowledge this is always made intelligible by references to points of view and to experiences that altogether transcend it4 ,the true theory of knowledge1 in short1 involves the familiar ,kantian distinction between the 8origin0 and the 8validity0 of knowledge--a thing that the pragmatists seem continually and deliberately to ignore4 ,schiller1 to be sure1 reminds us with justice that we must endeavour to 8connect10 rather than invariably 8contrast10 the two terms of this distinction4 ,but this again is by no means what the pragmatists themselves have done4 ,they fail1 in fact1 to connect their hints about the practical or experimental origin of most of our points of view about reality with the problem of the validity of first principles generally4 ,there is a suggestion here and there in their writings that1 as ,schiller#bdc puts it1 there can be no coherent system of postulates except as rooted in personality1 and that there are postulates at every stage of our development4 ,what this statement means is that there are 8points of view0 about reality that are incidental to the stage of our natural life 7as beings among other beings71 others to the stage of conscious sensations and feelings1 still others to that of our desires and thoughts1 to our aesthetic appreciation1 to our moral life1 and so on4 ,but1 as ,i have already said1 there is little attempt on the part of the pragmatists to distinguish these different stages or planes of experience adequately from one another4 7#c7 ,references have already been made to the failures of our ,anglo-,american pragmatists to attain to any intelligible and consistent kind of reality1 whether they conceive of this latter as the sum-total of the efforts of aspiring and achieving human beings1 or with ,schiller as an 8original1 plastic sub-stratum10 or as the reality 7whatever it is7 that is gradually being brought into being by the creative efforts of ourselves and of beings higher or lower than ourselves in the scale of existence4 ,their deepest thought in the matter seems to be that the universe 7our universe87 is essentially 8incomplete10 and that the truth of ,god1 as ,james puts it1 8has to run the gauntlet of other truths40 ,one student of this topic1 ,professor ,leighton1 has arrived at the conclusion that pragmatism is essentially 8acosmistic10#bdd meaning1 no doubt1 and with good reason1 that ,pragmatism has no place of any kind for objective order or system4 ,now it is just this palpable lack of an 8objective10 or rational1 order that renders the whole pragmatist philosophy liable to the charges of 7#a7 8subjectivism10 and 7#b7 irrationality4 ,there are in it1 as we have tried to point out1 abundant hints of what reality must be construed to be on the principles of any workable or credible philosophy1 namely something that stimulates both our thought and our endeavour4 ,and there is in it the great truth that in action we are not only in contact with reality as such1 but with a reality1 moreover1 that transcends the imperfect reality of our lives as finite individuals and the imperfect character of our limited effort and struggle4 ,but beyond the vague hints that our efforts must somehow count in the final tale of reality1 and that what the world of experience seems to be1 it must somehow be conceived ultimately to be1 there is no standing-ground in the entire pragmatist philosophy for want of what1 in plain ,english1 must be termed an intelligible theory of reality4 8,you see10 says ,james1 8how differently people take things4 ,the world we live in exists diffused and distributed in the form of an indefinitely numerous lot of eaches1 coherent in all sorts of ways and degrees2 and the tough-minded are perfectly willing to take them at that valuation4 ,they can stand the world1 their temper being well adapted to its insecurity40#bde ,the present writer1 some years ago1 in an article in ,mind1#bdf ventured to point out the absurdity of expecting the public to believe in a philosophy which sometimes speaks as if we could now1 to-day1 by our efforts begin to make the world something different from what it is or what it has been4 8,as far as the past facts go10 so ,james put it in #ahii1 8there is indeed no difference4 ,these facts are bagged 7is not the phraseology too recklessly sporting871 are captured1 and the good that's in them is gained1 be the atoms1 be the ,god their cause40 ,and again1 8,theism and materialism1 so indifferent when taken retrospectively 81 point1 when we take them prospectively1 to wholly different1 practical consequences1 to opposite outlooks of experience40 ,and again1 8,but ,i say that such an alternation of feelings1 reasonable enough in a consciousness that is prospective1 as ours now is1 and whose world is partly yet to come1 would be absolutely senseless 767 and irrational in a purely retrospective consciousness summing up a world already past40 ,now on what theory of things is it that the future of the world and our future may be affected by ideal elements and factors 7,god1 ,freedom1 ,recompense1 ,justice7 without having been so affected or determined in the past8#bdg 7#d7 ,the unsatisfactoriness of ,pragmatism in the realm of ethics4 ,crucial and hopeless as is the failure of ,pragmatism in the realm of ethics1 a word or two had better be said of the right of the critic to judge of it in this connexion4 ,in the first place1 the thinking public has already expressed its distrust of a doctrine that scruples not to avow its affinity with utilitarianism1 with the idea of testing truth and value by mere consequences and by the idea of the useful4 8,the word #8expedient1'0 wrote a correspondent to ,professor ,james1 8has no other meaning than that of self-interest4 ,the pursuit of this has ended by landing a number of officers of national banks in penitentiaries4 ,a philosophy that leads to such results must be unsound40 ,then again1 ,professor ,dewey 7now doubtless the foremost living pragmatist7 is the joint author of a book upon ethics1 the most prominent feature of which is the application of pragmatist-like methods and principles to moral philosophy4 ,this book sums up1 too1 a great many previous illuminating discussions of his own upon ethical and educational problems1 for all of which1 and for its general application of the principles of ,humanism to the realm of morals he has deservedly won the praise of ,professor ,james himself4 ,so we have thus the warrant both of the public and of ,dewey and ,james for seeking to judge ,pragmatism from the point of view of moral philosophy4 ,another justification for seeking to judge of ,pragmatism from the point of view of moral philosophy is that the whole weight of its 8humanism0 and of its 8valuation0 philosophy must inevitably fall upon its view of the moral judgment4 ,dr4 ,schiller1 we have seen1 is quite explicit in his opinion that for ,humanism the roots of metaphysics 8lie1 and must lie10 in ethics4 ,and this is all the more the case1 as it were1 on account of the proclamation#bdh by ,pragmatism of the inability of ,intellectualism to understand morality1 and also on account of its recurring contention in respect of the merely hypothetical character of all intellectual truth4 ,now1 unfortunately for ,pragmatism1 the one thing that the otherwise illuminating book of ,dewey and ,tufts almost completely fails to do1 as the writer has already sought to indicate1 is to provide a theory of the ordinary distinction between right and wrong4#bdi ,the only theme that is really successfully pursued in this typically ,american book is the 8constant discovery1 formation1 and re-formation of the #8self' in the #8ends' which an individual is called upon to sustain and develop in virtue of his membership of a #8social whole4'0 ,but this is obviously a study in 8genetic psychology10 or in the psychology of ethics1 but by no means a study in the theory of ethics4 8,the controlling principle10 it characteristically tells us1 8of the deliberation which renders possible the formation of a voluntary or socialized self out of our original instinctive impulses is the love of the objects which make this transformation possible40 ,but what is it1 we wish to know1 that distinguished the objects that make this transformation possible from the objects that do not do so8 ,the only answer that we can see in the book is that anything is 8moral0 which makes possible a 8transition from individualism to efficient social personality0---obviously again a purely sociological point of view1 leaving the question of the standard of efficiency quite open4 ,the whole tendency1 in short1 of the pragmatist treatment of ethical principles is to the effect that standards and theories of conduct are valuable only in so far as they are1 to a certain extent1 8fruitful0 in giving us a certain 8surveying power0 in the perplexities and uncertainties of 8direct personal behaviour40 ,they are all1 in other words1 merely relative or useful1 and none of them is absolute and authoritative4 ,it is this last thing1 however1 that is the real desideratum of ethical theory4 ,and so far as practice is concerned1 all that this ,pragmatism or 8,relativism0 in morals inevitably leads to is the conclusion that whatever brings about a change1 or a result1 or a 8new formation10 or a new 8development0 of the moral situation1 is necessarily moral1 that 8growth0 and 8liberation0 and 8fruitfulness10 and 8experimentation0 are everything1 and moral scruples and conscience simply nothing4 ,in the celebrated phrase of ,nietzsche1 8,everything is permissible and nothing is true or binding40 ,is not1 then1 this would-be ethical phase of ,pragmatism just too modernistic1 too merely practical1 too merely illuminative and enlightening8 ,and would it not be better for the youth of ,america 7for ,dewey's book is in the ,american ,science ,series7 and other countries to learn that not everything 8practical0 and 8formative0 and 8liberative0 and 8socializing0 is moral in the strict sense of the term8#bej ,in saying this ,i am1 of course1 giving but a very imperfect idea of the contents of a book which is1 in many respects1 both epoch-marking and epoch-making4 ,it is1 however1 unfortunately1 in some respects1 only too much in touch with 8present facts and tendencies10 with the regrettable tendency of the hour1 for example1 to justify as right any conduct that momentarily 8improves the situation10 or that 8liberates the activities0 of the parties concerned in it4 ,it is not enough1 in other words 7and this is all1 ,i am inclined to think1 that ,pragmatism can do in morals71 to set up a somewhat suggestive picture of the 8life of the moral man in our present transitional0 and would-be 8constructive0 age4 ,a moral man does not merely1 in common parlance1 8keep up with the procession10 going in for its endless 8formations0 and 8re-formations40 ,he seeks to 8lead0 it1 and this leading of men1 this setting up of a standard of the legitimacy or of the illegitimacy of certain social experiments is just what ,pragmatism cannot do in morals4 ,it is otherwise1 doubtless1 with a true humanism1 or with the humanism that ,pragmatism is endeavouring to become4 ,,chapter ,,vi ,,pragmatism ,,as ,,humanism ,in spite of the objections that have been brought in the preceding chapters against ,pragmatism as ,instrumentalism and ,practicalism1 the great thing about ,pragmatism as the ,humanism that it is tending to become is the position that it virtually occupies in respect of the ethical and the personal factors that enter into all our notions about final truth4 ,to ,pragmatism the importance of these factors in this connexion is apparent from the outset1 it being to it the merest truism that by final truth we cannot mean 8truth0 existing on its own account1 but rather the truth of the world as inclusive of man and his purposes4 ,for so much it stands by its very letter as well as by its spirit4 ,and if we can find any confirmation for this attitude in some of the concessions of the rationalists that have been previously mentioned1 so much the better1 as it were1 for ,pragmatism4 ,now it might well seem as if ,pragmatism by the denial of an absolute or impersonal truth is so far simply another version of modern agnosticism1 or of the older doctrine of the 8relativity0 of human knowledge4 ,there is a great difference1 however1 between these two things and ,pragmatism4 ,a mere agnostical1 or relativity1 philosophy generally carries with it the belief that the inmost reality of things is both unknowable and out of all relation alike to human purpose and to human knowledge4 ,pragmatism1 on the contrary1 would like to maintain---if it could do so logically---that in human volition1 we do know something about the inward meaning of things1 that the 8developmental0 view of things is1 when properly interpreted1 the real view1 that reality is at least what it comes to be in our 8purposes0 and in our ideals1 and not something different from this4 ,the main reason1 however1 of the inability of ,pragmatism to do what it would like to do in this connexion is what we have already complained of as its failure either to recognize1 or to use1 the help that could be afforded to it by 7#a7 ,idealism1 and by 7#b7 the 8normative0#bea view of ethical science4 ,in respect of the first point1 we have already suggested1 for example1 that ,pragmatism is inclined in various ways to make much of its 8radical empiricism10 its contention that reality must1 to begin with1 be construed to be what it seems to be in our actual dealings with it and in our actual experience of it4#beb ,to the biologist1 as we put it in our fourth chapter1 reality is life2 to the physicist it is energy2 to the theologian it is the unfolding of the dealings of ,god with ,his creatures2 to the sociologist it is the sphere of the evolution of the social life of humanity2 to the lover of truth it is a 8partly intelligible system40 ,the only rational basis1 however1 for all this constructive interpretation of reality is the familiar idealist position of the necessary implication of the 8subject0 in the 8object10 the fact that 8things0 or 8existences0 are invariably thought of as the elements or component parts in some working system or sphere of reality that is contemplated by some being or beings in reference to some purpose or end4 ,on its so-called lowest plane1 indeed1 reality is conceived as the play of all the particles of matter1 or of all the elemental forces of nature1 upon each other4 ,and on this construction of things the susceptibility of everything to the influence of everything else is no less certainly assumed than in the case of the world of life itself4 ,but1 as the idealist realizes in a moment1 there is no possibility of separating1 either in thought or experimentally1 this supposed physical world from the so-called experiences and relations and laws through which it is interpreted and described1 even as a world of objects or of forces4 ,this is what ,parmenides saw ages ago when he said that 8thought0 and 8being0 are the same thing1 that 8being0 belongs to 8thought10 that 8being0 is the true object of thought1 and that being is the 8rational0 and the 8thinkable0 and not something outside thought4 ,it is what a scientist1 an expounder of science1 like ,professor ,j4 ,a4 ,thompson means and partly states when he says1 speaking of the work of many of his fellow-scientists of the day1 8,the matter of physical science is an abstraction1 whereas the matter of our direct experience is in certain conditions the physical basis of life and the home of the soul40#bec ,to the objector who again retorts that this line of reflection seems to rest upon a very large assumption as to the nature of the apparently illimitable physical universe1 the idealist can but reply1 firstly1 that we know nothing of the so-called natural world save through the so-called spiritual or psychical world1#bed and secondly1 that even the most complete description of the world from the point of view of science would1 of course1 still leave the world of our mental experiences entirely unexplained4 ,it is surely1 therefore1 so far1 much more logical to use this last world as at least the partial explanation of the former rather than vice versa4 ,and as for the 8normative0 view of ethics and the help it affords to ,pragmatism in its contention in respect of final truth1 it may be said1 to begin with1 that it is in the ethical life that what we call the truth of things becomes the basis of an ideal of personal achievement4 ,it is not merely of man's well-known transformation and utilization of the forces of nature that we are at present thinking1 but of the fact that in the moral life man 8superposes10 as has been said1 an order of his own upon the so-called natural order of things1 transforming it into a spiritual order4 ,this superposition1 if we will1 this transformation1 is revealed unmistakably in the history of the facts of conduct4 ,in the recent elaborate researches in sociological ethics of ,hobhouse and ,westermarck#bee we read1 for example1 of facts like the gradual 8blunting of the edges of barbarian ideas10 and the recognition of the 8principal moral obligations0 in the early oriental civilizations1 the existence of the 8doctrine of forgiveness10 and of 8disinterested retributive kindly emotion10 the acceptance and redistribution by ,confucius of the traditional standards of ,chinese ethics1 the 8transformation0 by the ,hebrew prophets of the 8law of a barbarous people into the spiritual worship of one ,god10 of a ,god of 8social justice10 of 8mercy10 and finally of 8love40 ,both these writers1 in view of such facts and of other facts of a kindred nature1 arrive at the conclusion that the supreme authority assigned to the moral law is not altogether an illusion1 that there is after all the 8great permanent fact of the moral consciousness persisting through all stages of development1 that whether we believe or disbelieve in ,god1 or religion1 or nature1 or what not1 there remain for all of us certain things to do which affect us with a greater or less degree of mental discomfort40 ,now as we think of it1 there is something that ,pragmatism fails to see in respect of this undoubted transformation of the merely physical basis of our life that takes place1 or that has taken place1 in the moral life of humanity4 ,while firmly holding in its moral philosophy 7we can see this in the typical work of ,dewey and ,tufts#bef7 to its far-reaching principle that our entire intellectual life has been worked out in the closest kind of relation to our practical needs1 ,pragmatism has nevertheless failed to see that in the highest reaches of our active life the controlling ideas 78justice10 8humanity10 8courage10 and so on7 have a value independently of any consequences other than those of their realization in the purposes and in the dispositions of men4 ,or1 more definitely1 it is just because moral ideas1 like any ideas1 cannot fail to work themselves out into our actions and into our very dispositions and character1 that it becomes of the utmost importance to conceive of the truth they embody as having a value above all consequences and above all ordinary utility4 ,if sought ever and always for its own sake1 the highest kind of truth and insight1 the truth that we apprehend in our highest intuitions and in our highest efforts1 will inevitably tend to the creation of a realm of 8value10 a realm of personal worth and activity that we cannot but regard as the highest reality1#beg or the highest plane of experience of which we are conscious4 ,in this thought1 then1 in the thought of the reality of the life and work of human beings who have given all for truth and goodness and love1 there is surely at least a partial clue to the value of the great idea after which ,pragmatism is blindly groping in its contention of the importance even to metaphysics of the notion of our human1 8purposive0 activity4 ,indeed1 when we think of the matter carefully it is doubtful whether the human mind would ever even have attained to the notion of ideal truth1 with the correlative thought of the shortcomings or the limits of our ordinary knowledge1 if it had not been for the moral life and the serious problem it sets before us as men--that of the complete satisfaction or the complete assertion of our human personality4 ,we seek truth in the first instance because we wish to act upon certainty or upon adequate certainty1 and because we feel that we must be determined by what appeals to our own convictions and motives1 by what has become part of our own life and consciousness4 ,it is only in fact because we will it1 and because we want it1 that the 8ideal0 exists--the ideal of anything1 more certain knowledge about something1 for example1 or gratified curiosity1 or satisfied desire1 and so on4 ,in every case1 say1 of the pursuit of an ideal we desire something or some state of things that does not yet exist4 ,the actual1 if indeed 7which is doubtful7 we can think of the actual merely as such1 does not engender the notion of the ideal1 although there is possibly a suggestion of the 8ideal0 in the 8meaning0 that we cannot1 even in sense perception1#beh attach to the actual4 ,even science1 as we call it1 is very far from being a mere description of the actual1 it is an ideal 8construction0 or 8interpretation0 of the same in the interest1 not of mere utility1 but of the wonder and the curiosity and the intellectual and aesthetical satisfaction of our entire personality1 of our disinterested love of the highest truth4#bei ,a striking example of the part played by moral and personal factors in the evolution of truth may easily be found1 as has already been suggested1 in some of the circumstances connected with the evolution of the ,platonic philosophy in the mind of its creator4 ,plato's constant use of the dialogue form of exposition is of itself an expression of the fact that philosophy was always to him a living and a personal thing1 the outcome of an intellectual emotion of the soul in its efforts after true knowledge and spiritual perfection4 ,it speaks also of ,plato's essentially social conception of philosophy1 as a creation arising out of the contact of mind with mind1 in the search after wisdom and virtue and justice4 ,and there is little doubt that his own discontent with the social conditions of his time and with the false wisdom of the sophists was a powerful impulse in his mind in the development of that body of intellectual and ethical truth for all time that is to be found in his works4 ,the determining consideration1 again1 in the arguments for immortality in the ,phaedo is not so much the imperfect physical and theoretical philosophy on which they are partly made to repose as the tremendous conviction of ,plato of the supreme importance of right conduct1 of his belief in the principle of the 8best40 ,plato has a way1 too1 of talking of truth as a kind of 8addition0#bfj to being and science1 as a 8being0 that 8shares0 somehow in the 8idea of the ,good0--a tendency that1 despite the imperfect hold of the ,greek mind upon the fact and the conception of personality1 we may also look upon as a confirmation of the pragmatist notion of the necessity of ethical and personal factors in a complete theory of truth4 ,a still more important instance of the importance of moral and practical factors to a final philosophy of things is to be found in the lasting influence of the great ,hebrew teachers upon both the ancient and the modern world1 although the mere mention of this topic is apt to give offence to some of our ,neo-,hellenists#bfa and to thinkers like ,schopenhauer and ,nietzsche4 ,the remarkable thing about the ,hebrew seers is their intuition of ,god as 8the living source of their life and strength and joy10 not as a mere first principle of thought1 not as the substance of things1 not as the mere 8end of patient search and striving10 but as the 8first principle of life and feeling40#bfb ,and their work for the world lay in the bringing to an end of the entire mythology and cosmology of the age of fable and fancy1 and the substitution for all this of the worship of one ,god1 as something distinct and different from all the cults of polytheism1 as a great social and ethical achievement1 as a true religion that loved justice and social order because it loved ,god4 8,in ,hebrew poetry10#bfc says a recent authority upon this subject1 8all things appear in action4 ,the verb is the predominating element in the sentence4 ,and though the shades of time distinctions are blurred1 the richness of the language throws the precise complexion of the act into clear1 strong light40 ,if this be so1 there is1 of course1 no wonder that this people elaborated for mankind a living and practical1 a 8pragmatist0 7if we will7 view of the world1 which is so rich by way of its very contrast both to ,greek and to modern scientific conceptions4 ,with the enumeration of two specific instances from this same writer of the ,hebrew perception of the importance of practical and personal factors to a true grasp of certain fundamental ideas1 we may safely leave this great source of some of the leading ideas of our western world to take care of itself4 8,the ,hebrew counterpart to the ,greek ideal of 1 #8the finely-polished gentleman1' is hsd1 the adjective derived from hesed1 that is #8the man of love4' ,as ,god is love1 the good man is likewise a lover both of ,god and of his fellow-men4 ,his love is indeed the pure reflection of ,god's--tender and true and active as ,his is4 ,for in no other ancient religion are the fear and love of ,god so indissolubly wedded to moral conduct40#bfd ,and secondly1 speaking of immortality1 ,professor ,gordon says1 8,the glad hope of immortality rests1 not on speculative arguments from the nature of the soul1 but on the sure ground of religious experience4 ,immortality is1 in fact1 a necessary implicate of personal religion4 ,the man that lives with ,god is immortal as ,he is40#bfe ,if the reader be inclined to interject here that all that this pragmatist talk about the importance of action obviously amounts to is simply the position that the highest truth must somehow take recognition of our beliefs as well as of our knowledge1 we can but reply that he is literally so far in the right4 ,our point1 however1 for ,pragmatism would here be that belief rests not merely upon the intellect1 but upon the intellect in conjunction with the active and the ethical nature of man4 ,it is mainly because we feel ourselves to be active and legislative and creative1 mainly because we partly are and partly hope to be1 as the phrase has it1 that we believe as well as seek continually to know4 ,hence the rightness and the soundness of ,pragmatism in its contention2 the truth is not so much a datum 7something given7 as a construction1#bff or a thing that is made and invented by way of an approximation to an ideal4 ,that it is this almost in the literal sense of these words is evident from the fact of the slow and gradual accumulation of truth and knowledge about themselves and their environment by the fleeting generations of men4 ,and even to-day the truth is not something that exists in nature or in history or in some privileged institution1 or in the teaching of some guild of masters1 but rather only in the attitude of mind and heart of the human beings who continue to seek it and to will it and to live it when and where they may4 ,truth includes1 too1 the truth of the social order1 of civilization#bfg--this last costly work being just as much the creation of the mind and the behaviour of men as is knowledge itself4 ,and there can1 it would seem1 be but slight objection to an admission of the fact that it is only in so far as the truth has been conceived as inclusive of the truth of human life as well as of that of the world of things that humanity as a whole seems to have any abiding interest in its existence1 even where1 as in ,omar ,khayym and in other writings1 the idea of its discovery is given up as impossible4 ,only1 in other words1 as the working out of the implications of desire does thought live1 and the completest thought is at bottom but the working out of the deepest desire4#bfh ,these two elements of our life1 thought and desire1 have had indeed a parallel development in the life of mankind4 ,what we call the predicate of thought bespeaks invariably an underlying 7or personal7 reaction or attitude towards the so-called object of thought4#bfi ,when desire ceases1 as it does sometimes in the case of a disappointed man1 or the pessimist1 or the agnostic1 or the mystic1 thought too ceases4 ,even the philosophical mood1 as likewise the expression of a desire1 is as such comparable to other motives or desires1 such as the scientific or the practical or the emotional1 and subject1 too1 like them1 to the various 8conflicts0 of personality4#bgj ,the free speculative thought or activity that1 with the ,greeks1 we sometimes think of as the highest attribute of our human nature1 is itself but the highest phase of that free creative#bga activity which we have found to underlie the moral life and all the various constructions of mankind1 inclusive of the work of civilization itself4 ,lastly1 there is1 as we know1 ample warrant in the past and the present reflections of men of science upon the apparent limits#bgb and limitations of our knowledge of our environment to justify the correctness of the pragmatist insistence upon the ethical and the personal factors that enter into truth4 ,reference having already been made to these limits1 there is perhaps little need of pursuing this topic any further1 either so far as the facts themselves are concerned or so far as their admission by scientists and others is concerned4 ,how any supposed mere physical order can ever come to know itself as such1 either in the minds of men or in the minds of beings other than men1 is of course the crowning difficulty of what we call a physical philosophy--a difficulty that transcends altogether the many familiar and universally admitted difficulties in respect of topics like the origin of motion and the origin of life1 and the infinite number of adjustments and adaptations involved in the development of the world of things and men with which we are acquainted4 ,obviously1 to say the very least1 only when some explanation of consciousness and feeling and thought is added on to our knowledge of ,nature 7fragmentary as is the latter at best7 will the demands of thought and of desire for unity in our knowledge be satisfied or set at rest4 ,now1 of course1 to religious thought all this costly explanation1 all this completion and systematization of our knowledge are revealed1 in the main1 only to a faith in ,god and to a consequent faith in the final 8perfection0 of our human life as the gradual evolution of a divine kingdom4 ,and while ,pragmatism cannot1 especially in its cruder or more popular form1 be credited with anything like a rational justification of the religious point of view about reality and of the vision it opens up1 it may1 nevertheless1 in virtue of its insistence upon such things as 7#a7 the rationality of the belief that accompanies all knowledge1 7#b7 the supposedly deeper phenomena of the science of human nature to which reference has already been made1 and 7#c7 the great spiritual reality that is present to the individual in the moral life1 and that lifts him 8out of himself10 and that makes it impossible for him to 8understand himself by himself alone10#bgc justifiably lay claim to the possession of a thorough working sympathy with the religious view of the world4 ,with the direction of the attention of the reader to two important corollaries or consequences of the 8pluralism0 and the 8dynamic idealism0 of ,pragmatism this chapter may well be brought to a termination4 ,one of the most obvious corollaries of nearly everything that has been put forward by us in the foregoing chapters as pragmatist doctrine or pragmatist tendency1 is the marked distance at which#bgd it all seems to stand from the various entanglements of the false philosophy of 8subjective10 or 8solipsistic0 idealism4 ,in other words1 while we have ventured to censure ,pragmatism for its inability to recognize the elemental truth#bge in ,idealism1 we must now record it as a merit of ,pragmatism that it does not1 like so much modern philosophy1 take its start with the 8contents0 of the consciousness of the individual as the one indubitable beginning1 the one inconcussum quid for all speculation4 ,this starting-point has often1 as we know1 been taken 7even by students of philosophy7 to be the very essence of ,idealism1 but it is not so4 ,although there is indeed no 8object0 without a 8subject10 no 8matter0 without 8mind10 neither mind nor matter is limited to my experience of the same4#bgf ,it is impossible for me to interpret1 or even to express1 to myself the contents of my experience without using the terms and the conceptions that have been invented by minds and by personalities other than my own without whom ,i could not1 and do not1 grow up into what ,i call my 8self-consciousness40#bgg ,we have all talked of ourselves 7as we know from experience and from psychology7 in the third person as objects for a common social experience long before we learn to use the first personal pronoun4 ,and as for the adult1 his 8ego0 or self has a meaning and a reality only in relation to1 and in comparison with1 the other selves of whom he thinks as his associates4 ,an 8ego0 implies invariably also an 8alter0 an 8other10 and thus our deepest thought about the universe is always1 actually and necessarily1 both personal and social4 ,even in art1 and in religion1 and in philosophy1 it is the communion of mind with mind1 of soul with soul1 that is at once our deepest experience and our deepest desire4 ,i do not suggest for one moment that ,pragmatism is the only philosophy 7if indeed we may call it a philosophy at all7 that is necessarily committed to ,pluralism1#bgh nor am ,i1 of course1 blind to the difficulties that ,pluralism1 as over against ,monism1 presents to many thinking minds4 ,but ,i do here say that if ,pragmatism be true1 as it is in the main 7at least as an 8approach0 to philosophy71 it follows that the reality with which we are in contact in all our thoughts and in all our theorizing is not any or all of the 8contents0 of the consciousness of the individual thinker1 but rather the common1 personal life of activity and experience and knowledge and emotion that we as individuals share with other individuals4 ,this life is that of an entire 8world of intersubjective intercourse10#bgi of a communion of thought1 and feeling1 and effort in which1 as persons1 we share the common life of persons1 and are members one of another4#bhj ,truth itself1 in fact1 as may be seen1 of course1 from the very connexion of the word truth with other words like 8try0#bha and 8utter0 7and in its root with words like 8ware0 and 8verihood071 is a social possession1 implying both seekers and finders1 listeners and verifiers as well as speakers and thinkers4 ,its existence implies a universe of discourse1 as the logicians put it1 in which thoughts and conceptions are elaborated and corrected1 not merely by a kind of self-analysis#bhb and internal development1 but by the test of the action to which they lead and of the 8responses0 they awaken in the lives and thoughts of other persons4 ,and it is this very sociological#bhc and 8pluralistic0 character of ,pragmatism that1 along with its tendency to 8affirmation0 in the matter of the reality of the religious life1 has helped to render it 7as far as it goes7 such a living and such a credible philosophy to-day4 ,another consequence of the dynamic idealism and the 8radical empiricism0 of ,pragmatism is the 8immediacy0 of our contact with reality1 for which it is naturally inclined to stand in the matter of what we may call the philosophy of perception4 ,what this new 8immediacy0 and this new directness of our contact with reality would mean to philosophical and scientific thought can be fully appreciated only by those who have made the effort of years to live in a 8thought world10 in which the first reality is what the logicians term 8mediation0#bhd or inference1 a world of thoughts without the reality of a really effective thinker1 or the reality of a world of real action--a world from which it is somehow impossible to escape either honestly or logically4 ,it would be a return1 of course1 on the part of the thinker to the direct sense of life with which we are familiar in instinct and in all true living and in all real thought1#bhe in all honest effort and accomplishment1 and yet not a 8return0 in any of the impossible senses in which men have often 7and with a tragic earnestness7 sought to return to ,nature#bhf and to the uncorrupted reality of things4 ,and we have not indeed done justice to the 8instrumentalism0 and the 8hypothetical0 treatment of ideas and of systems of thought for which ,pragmatism and ,humanism both stand until we see that so far from its being 7almost in any sense7 the duty of the thinker to justify1 to his philosophy1 this direct contact with the infinite life of the world1 that has been the common possession of countless mortals who have lived their life1 it is1 on the contrary1 his duty to justify 7to himself and to his public7 the various thought-systems of metaphysic1 by setting forth the various points of departure and the various points of contact they have in the reality of the life of things4#bhg ,we spoke at the close of our fourth chapter of the strange irony that may be discovered in the fate of philosophers who have come to attach a greater importance to their own speculations and theories than to the great reality 7whatever it may be1 or whatever it may prove itself to be7 of which all philosophy is but an imperfect 7although a necessary7 explanation4 ,and the reader has doubtless come across the cynical ,french definition of metaphysics as the 8art of losing one's way systematically0#bhh 7l'art de s'garer avec mthode74 ,in view of all this1 and in view of all the inevitable pain and difficulty of the solitary thinkers of all time1 it is indeed not the least part of the service of ,pragmatism and ,humanism1 and of the 8vitalistic0 and 8voluntaristic0 philosophy with which it may be naturally associated to-day1 to have compelled even metaphysicians to feel that it is the living reality of the world that we know and that we experience1 that is first1 last1 and foremost the real subject-matter of philosophy4 ,with the real sceptic1 then1 with ,david ,hume1 we may indeed be 8diffident0 of our 8doubts0 and at the same time absolutely 8free0 and unprejudiced in our hold upon1 and in our treatment of1 metaphysical systems as1 all of them1 but so many more or less successful attempts to state and explain1 in terms appreciable by the understanding and the reason1 the character and the reality of the infinite life with which we are in contact in our acts and in our thoughts and in our aspirations4 ,of the reality of that life we can never be sceptical1 for it is the life that we know in that 8world of inter-subjective0 intercourse that1 according to ,pragmatism and ,humanism1 is implied even in sense-perception and in our daily experience4 ,,chapter ,,vii ,,pragmatism ,,as ,,americanism ,in adopting the title he has chosen for the heading of this chapter the writer feels that he has laid himself open to criticism from several different points of view4 ,what has philosophy as the universal science to do with nationalism or with any form of national characteristics8 ,then even if ,pragmatism be discovered to be to some extent 8,americanism0 in the realm of thought1 is this finding1 or criticism1 a piece of appreciation or a piece of depreciation8 ,and again1 is it possible for any individual to grasp1 and to understand1 and to describe such a living and such a far-reaching force as the ,americanism of to-day8 ,the following things may be said by way of a partial answer to these reflections3 7#a7 ,there are ,american characteristics in ,pragmatism1 and some of them may profitably be studied by way of an attempt to get all the light we can upon its essential nature4 ,their presence therein has been detected and recognized by critics1 both ,american and foreign1 and reference has already been made to some of them in this book4 7#b7 ,there is no universal reason in philosophy apart from its manifestation in the thoughts and the activities of peoples who have made or who are making their mark upon human history4 ,it may well be that the common reason of mankind has as much to learn from ,americanism in the department of theory as it has already been obliged to learn from this same quarter in the realm of practice4 7#c7 ,one of the most important phases of our entire subject is precisely this very matter of the application of philosophy to 8practice10 of the inseparability1 to put it directly1 of 8theory0 and 8practice40 ,it would surely1 therefore1 be the strangest kind of conceit 7although signs of it still exist here and there7#bhi to debar philosophy from the study of such a practical thing as the ,americanism of to-day4 ,to connect the two with any degree of success would certainly not be to depreciate ,pragmatism1 but to strengthen it by relating it to a spirit that is affecting the entire life and thought of mankind4 ,one or two other important considerations should also be borne in mind4 ,it goes without saying that there are in the ,united ,states and elsewhere any number of ,americans who see beyond both contemporary ,pragmatism and contemporary ,americanism1 and to whom it would be1 therefore1 but a partial estimate of ,pragmatism to characterize it as 8,americanism40 ,so much1 to be sure1 might be inferred from some things that have already been said in respect of the reception and the fate of ,pragmatism in its own country4 ,again1 it is one of the errors of the day to think of ,americanism as in the main merely a belief in 8practicality0 and 8efficiency40 ,to those who know it1 ,americanism is practical idealism1 and its aims1 instead of being merely materialistic and mechanical1 are idealistic to the point of being ,utopian4 ,the ,american belief in work is not really a belief in work for its own sake1 but rather a faith in the endless possibilities open to intelligent energy with resources at its command4 ,lastly1 it will here certainly not be necessary either to think or to speak 7even if it were possible to do so7 of all ,american characteristics4#bij ,among the ,american-like characteristics in ,pragmatism that have already made themselves apparent in the foregoing chapters are its insistence upon 8action0 and upon the free creative effort of the individual1 its insistence upon the man-made 7or the merely human7 character of most of our vaunted truths1 its instrumentalism1 its radicalism1#bia its empiricism 7that is to say1 its endless faith in experience71 its democratic character1 and its insistence upon the necessity to philosophy of a broad1 tolerant1 all-inclusive view of human nature4 ,so1 too1 are its insistence upon the basal character of belief1#bib and upon the importance of a creed or a philosophy that really 8works0 in the lives of intelligent men1 its feeling of the inadequacy of a merely scholastic or dialectical philosophy1 and even its quasi 8practical0 interpretation of itself in the realms of philosophy and religion and ethics--its confession of itself as a 8corridor-theory10 as a point of approach to all the different systems in the history of thought4 ,in addition to these characteristics we shall attempt now to speak1 in the most tentative spirit1 firstly1 of some of the characteristics of ,american university life of which ,pragmatism may perhaps be regarded as a partial expression or reflex1 and then after this1 of such broadly-marked and such well-known ,american characteristics as the love of the concrete 7in preference to the abstract71 the love of experiment and experimentation1 an intolerance of doctrinairism and of mere book-learning1 the general democratic outlook on life and thought1 the composite or amalgam-like character of the present culture of the ,united ,states1 the sociological interest that characterizes its people1 and so on4 ,all these things are clearly to be seen in ,pragmatism as a would-be philosophical system1 or as a preliminary step in the evolution of such a system4 ,owing very largely to the 8elective0 system that still prevails in the universities of the ,united ,states1 ,philosophy is there 7to an extent somewhat inconceivable to the student of the ,european continent7 in the most active competition with other studies1 and the success of a professor of philosophy is dependent on the success of his method of presenting his subject to students who all elect studies believed by them to be useful or interesting or practically important4 ,it has long seemed to the writer that there is abundant evidence in the writings of the pragmatists of this inevitable attempt to make philosophy a 8live0 subject in competition1 say1 with the other two most popular subjects in ,american colleges1 viz4 economics and biology4 ,the importance to the thought of to-day of biological and economic considerations is one of the things most emphatically insisted upon by ,professor ,dewey in nearly all his recent writings4#bic ,and both he and ,james--the fact is only too evident--have always written under the pressure of the economic and sociological interest of the ,american continent4 ,and even ,schiller's ,humanism has become1 as we have seen1 very largely the metaphysics of the 8evolutionary process10 a characterization which we make below#bid as a kind of criticism of the philosophy of ,bergson4 ,our present point1 however1 is merely that1 owing to the generally competitive character of the intellectual life there1 this biological influence is felt more acutely in ,america than elsewhere4 ,the one outstanding characteristic again of every approved academic teacher in the ,united ,states is his method of handling his subject1 just as the one thing that is claimed for ,pragmatism by its upholders is that it is particularly a 8methodology0 of thought rather than a complete philosophy4 ,to the university constituency of the ,united ,states a professor without an approved and successful method is as good as dead1 for no one would listen to him4 ,the most manifest sign1 to be sure1 of the possession of such an effective method on the part of the university lecturer is the demonstration of skill in the treatment of his subject1 in the 8approach0 that he makes to it for the beginner1 in his power of setting the advanced student to work upon fruitful problems1 and of giving him a complete 8orientation0 in the entire field under consideration4 ,and then in addition to this he must be able to indicate the practical and the educational value of what he is teaching4 ,in his review of ,james's classical work upon ,pragmatism1 ,dewey1 while indicating a number of debatable points in the pragmatist philosophy1 declares emphatically his belief in that philosophy as a method of 8orientation40 ,the title again of ,peirce's famous pamphlet was ,how to make ,ideas ,clear--a phrase of itself suggestive enough of the inquiring mind of the young student when oppressed by apparently conflicting and competing points of view4 8,we are acquainted with a thing10 says ,james1 8as soon as we have learned how to behave towards it1 or how to meet the behaviour we accept from it40 ,in one of his books he talks about physics1 for example1 as giving us not so much a theory about things as a 8practical acquaintance0 with bodies2 8the power to take hold of them and handle them10 indicating at the same time his opinion that this way of regarding knowledge should be extended to philosophy itself4 ,all of this will serve as a proof or illustration of the essentially 8practical0 and 8methodological0 conception of philosophy taken by the pragmatists4 ,papini refers1 we remember1 to the pragmatist philosophy as a power of 8commanding our material10 of 8manipulating0 for practical purposes the different 8thought-constructions0 of the history of philosophy4 ,and those who have any familiarity with the early pragmatist magazine literature know that the pragmatists used to be fond of asking themselves such preliminary and 8laboratory-like0 inquiries as the following3 8,what is truth known as80 8,what is philosophy known as80 8,what are the different #8thought-levels' upon which we seem to move in our ordinary experience80 ,they never exactly seem to 8define0 philosophy for you1 preferring to indicate what it can do for you1 and so on4 ,turning now to the matter of ,american characteristics that are broader and deeper than the merely academic1 we may find an illustration1 for example1 of the ,american practicality and the love of the concrete 7instead of the abstract or the merely general7 in the following declaration of ,professor ,james that 8the whole originality of ,pragmatism1 the whole point in it1 is its use of the concrete way of seeing4 ,it begins with concreteness and returns and ends with it40 ,of the ,american love of novelty and of interest we may find an illustration in the determination of ,pragmatism 8never to discuss a question that has absolutely no interest and no meaning to any one40 ,of ,pragmatism as an exemplification of the ,american love of experiment1 and of experimentation1 with a view to definite and appreciable 8returns10 we may give the following3 8,if you fully believe the pragmatic method you cannot look on any such word1 i4e4 #8,god1' #8,matter1' #8,reason1' #8,the ,absolute1' #8,energy1' and such #8solving' names1 as closing your quest4 ,you must bring out in each word its practical cash value1 set it at work within the stream of your experience4 ,it appears less as a solution then than as a programme for more work and more particularly as an indication of the ways in which existing realities may be changed40 ,of the ,american intolerance for mere scholarship and book-learning1 and of the ,american inability to leave any discovery or any finished product alone without some attempt to 8improve0 upon it or to put it to some new use1 we may cite the following3 8,when may a truth go into cold storage in the encyclopaedias1 and when shall it come out for battle80 ,another very strongly marked characteristic of ,american life is the thoroughly eclectic and composite character of its general culture and of the general tone of its public life4 ,american daily life has become1 as it were1 a kind of social solvent1 a huge melting-pot for the culture and the habits and the customs of peoples from all over the earth4 ,this also may be thought of as reflected in the confessedly complex and amalgam-like character of ,pragmatism1 in its boast and profession of being a synthesis and a fusion of so many different tendencies of human thought4 ,as a juxtaposition1 or kind of compound solution1 of such a variety of things as the affirmations of religion1 the hypothetical method of science1 realism1 romanticism1 idealism1 utilitarianism1 and so on1 it reminds us only too forcibly of the endless number of social groups and traditions1 the endless number of interests and activities and projects to be seen and felt in any large ,american city4 ,still another general characteristic of ,american life of which we may well think in connexion with ,pragmatism is the sociological interest of the country1 the pressure of which upon the pragmatists and their writings has already been referred to4 ,the social problem in ,america has now become#bie the one problem that is present with everybody1 and present most of all1 perhaps1 with the ,european immigrant1 who has for various reasons hoped that he had left this problem behind him4 ,the effect of this upon ,pragmatism is to be seen1 not merely in the very living hold that it is inclined to take of philosophy and philosophical problems1#bif but in the fact of its boast of being a 8way of living0 as well as a 8way of thinking40 ,we have examined this idea in our remarks upon the ethics of ,pragmatism4 ,of course the outstanding temperamental ,american characteristic that is most clearly seen in ,pragmatism is the great fact of the inevitable bent of the ,american mind to action and to accomplishment1--its positive inability to entertain any idea1 or any set of ideas upon any subject whatsoever1 without experiencing at the same time the inclination to use these ideas for invention and contrivance1#big for organization and exploitation4 ,any one who has lived in the ,united ,states must in fact have become so habituated and so accustomed to think of his thought and his knowledge and his capacities in terms of their possible social utility1 that he simply cannot refrain from judging of any scheme of thought or of any set of ideas in the same light4 ,anywhere1 to be sure1 in the ,united ,states will they allow a man to think all he pleases about anything whatsoever--even pre-,socratic philosophy1 say1 or esoteric ,buddhism4 ,and there is nothing indeed of which the country is said1 by those who know it best1 to stand so much in need as the most persistent and the most profound thought about all important matters4 ,but such thought1 it is always added1 must prove to be constructive and positive in character1 to be directed not merely to the solution of useless questions or of questions which have long ago been settled by others4 ,we shall now endeavour to think of the value#bih to philosophy and to the thought and practice of the world 7the two things are inseparable7 of some or all of these general and special characteristics which we have sought to illustrate in ,pragmatism4 ,we might begin by suggesting the importance to the world of the production and development of a man of genius like ,james1#bii whose fresh and living presentation of the problems of philosophy 7as seen by a psychologist7 has brought the sense of a lasting and far-reaching obligation upon his fellow-students everywhere4 ,in no more favourable soil could ,james have grown up into the range and plenitude of his influence than in that of ,america and of ,harvard ,university1#cjj that great nursing-ground of the finest kind of ,american imperialism4 ,the great thing1 of course1 about ,james was his invasion1 through the activities of his own personality1#cja of the realm of philosophical rationalism by the fact and the principle of active personality4 ,his whole general activity was a living embodiment of the principle of all humanism1 that personality and the various phases of personal experience are of more importance to philosophy in the way of theory than any number of supposedly self-coherent1 rational or abstract systems1 than any amount of reasoning that is determined solely by the ideal of conceptual consistency4 ,then again1 it might be held that the entire academic world of to-day has a great deal to learn from the conditions under which all subjects 7philosophy included7 are taught and investigated in the typical ,american university of the day4 ,we have referred to the fact that the ,american professor or investigator faces the work of instruction and research in an environment replete with all modern facilities and conveniences4#cjb ,the very existence of this environment along with the presence throughout his country of university men and workers from all over the world with all their obvious merits and defects as 8social types0 prevent him in a hundred ways from that slavery to some one school of thought1 to some one method of research that is so often a characteristic of the scholar of the old world4 ,the entire information and scholarship in any one science 7say1 philosophy7 is worth to him what he can make of it1 here and now1 for himself and for his age and for his immediate environment4 ,he simply cannot think of any idea or any line of reflection1 in his own or in any other field1 without thinking at the same time of its 8consequences10 immediate1 secondary1 and remote4 ,this inability is an instance of the working of the pragmatist element in scholarship and in thought with all its advantages and disadvantages4#cjc ,and it is true too1 it might be held1 even upon the principles of ,idealism that the mere facts of knowledge 7for they are as endless in number as are the different points of view from which we may perceive and analyse phenomena7 are 8worth0#cjd to-day very largely only what they have meant and what they may yet mean to human life1 to human thought1 to civilization4 ,while there is certainly no useless truth and no utterly unimportant fact1 it is quite possible to burden and hamper the mind of youth with supposed truths and facts that have little or no relevancy to any coherent or any real point of view about human knowledge and human interests either of the past or the present4 ,it is merely1 for example1 in the light of the effects that they have had upon the life and thought of humanity#cje that the great philosophical systems of the past ought 7after the necessary period of preliminary study on the part of the pupil7 to be presented to students in university lectures4 ,a teacher who cannot set them forth in this spirit is really not a teacher at all--a man who can make his subject live again in the thought of the present4#cjf ,if the limits of our space and our subject permitted of the attempt1 we might easily continue the study of the pragmatist element in ,american scholarship from the point of view of the whole general economy of a university as a social institution1 and from that of the benefit that has accrued to the modern world from the many successful attempts at the organization of knowledge from an international point of view1 that have come into being under ,american initiative4#cjg ,lastly it is surely impossible to exaggerate the value to philosophy of the so-called 8democratic10#cjh open-minded attitude of ,pragmatism that is seen in its unprejudiced recognition of such things as the ordinary facts of life1 the struggle that constitutes the life of the average man1 the fragmentary and partial#cji character of most of our knowledge1 and so on4 ,all this contrasts in the most favourable way with the scholastic and the ,procrustean attitude to facts that has so long characterized philosophical rationalism from ,leibniz and ,wolff to the ,kantians and to the ,neo-,kantians and the ,neo-,hegelians of our own time4 ,thanks partly to this direct and democratic attitude of mind on the part of the pragmatists and humanists1 and thanks too to the entire psychological and sociological movement of modern times1 the points of view of the different leading thinkers of different countries are beginning to receive their fitting recognition in the general economy of human thought to be compared with each other1 and with still other possible points of view4 ,no one1 it seems to me1 can read the books of ,james without feeling that philosophy can again1 as the universal science indeed1 8begin anywhere0 in a far less restricted sense than that in which ,hegel interpreted this ingenious saying of his in respect of the freedom of human thinking4#caj ,as for the inevitable drawbacks and limitations of the very ,americanism which we have been endeavouring to discover in ,pragmatism1 it cannot1 to begin with1 be entirely without an element of risk to philosophy1 and to the real welfare of a country1 that the highest kind of insight should be brought too ruthlessly into competition with the various specialized studies1 and the various utilitarian#caa pursuits of modern times1 and with popular tendencies generally4 ,the public1 for many reasons1 should not be too readily encouraged to think of philosophy as merely 8a0 study like other studies and pursuits1 to be baited with the idea of its utility and its profitable consequences4 ,philosophy1 on the contrary1 is the universal study that gives to all other studies and pursuits their relative place and value4 ,if left too much to be a mere matter of choice on the part of the young and the unthinking1 it will soon find itself in the neglected position of the wisdom that utters her voice at the street corners4 ,it must be secured an integral1 and even a necessary place in the world of instruction--a condition that is still the case1 it is to be remembered1 in ,catholic#cab as distinguished from many so-called 8liberal0 and 8,protestant0 seats of learning4 ,it is possible indeed1 as we have already suggested1 that the recognition of an aristocratic or a ,catholic element in learning would1 in some respects1 be of more true use in the schools of ,america than a mere pragmatist philosophy of life and education4 ,and it is therefore not to be wondered at that ,americans themselves should already have expressed something of a distrust for a philosophy and an educational policy that are too akin to the practical commercialism of the hour4#cac ,then again1 despite the large element of truth that there is in the idea of philosophy 8discovering0 7rather than itself 8being07 the true 8dynamic0 or 8motive-awakening0 view of the system of things in which we live1 philosophy itself was never intended to bear the entire weight and strain that are put upon it by the pragmatists4 ,in their enthusiasm they would make out of it1 as we have seen1 a religion 7and a new one at that67 and a social philosophy1 as well as the theory of knowledge and the 8approach0 to reality that we are accustomed to look for in a system of philosophy4 ,it is only in periods of transition and reconstruction1 like the present age1 when men have become acutely sensible of the limitations of traditional views of things1 that they are inclined in their disappointment to look to scientific and professional thinkers for creeds that shall take the place of what they seem for the moment to be losing4 ,it is in such times chiefly that philosophy flourishes1 and that it is apt to acquire an undue importance by being called upon to do things that of itself it cannot do4 ,among the latter impossibilities is to be placed1 for example1 the idea of its being able to offer 7almost in any sense7 a substitute for the direct experience#cad of the common life1 or for the realities of our affections and our emotions1 or for the ideals engendered by the common life4 ,owing partly to the limitations of the ,intellectualism that has hitherto characterized so much of the culture and the educational policy of the last century there are still everywhere scores of people under the illusion that the truth of life will be revealed to them in the theory of some book1 in the new views or the new gospel of some emancipated and original thinker4 ,in this vain hope of theirs they are obviously forgetful of even the pragmatist truth that all theories are but a kind of transformation1 or abstract expression1 of the experiences of real life and of real living4 ,and part of the trouble with the pragmatists is that they themselves have unwittingly ministered to this mistaken attitude of mind by creating the impression that their theory of taking the kingdom of ,heaven by storm1 by the violence of their postulations and of their plea for a 8working view0 of things1 is indeed the new gospel of which men have long been in search4 ,the race1 however1 is not always to the swift and the eager1 nor the kingdom to those who are loudest in their cryings of 8,lord1 ,lord40 ,and as a friend of mine aptly applied it as against all practicalism and ,pragmatism1 8there remaineth a rest to the people of ,god40#cae ,the ordinary man1 it should be borne in mind1 does not in a certain sense really need philosophy4 ,its audience is with the few1 and it is to do it but scant service to think of making it attractive to the many by the obliteration of most of its distinctive characteristics and difficulties1 and by the failure to point out its inherent limitations4 ,it is not by any means1 as we have been indicating1 a substitute either for life1 or for positive religion4 ,nor can it ever have much of a message1 even for the few1 if they imagine themselves1 on account of their wisdom1 to be elevated above the needs of the ordinary discipline of life4 ,then again1 there is surely an element of considerable danger in the ,american-like depreciation of doctrine and theory which we have noticed in two or three different connexions on the part of ,pragmatism4 ,in the busy1 necessitous life of the ,united ,states this depreciation#caf is sometimes said to be visible in the great sacrifice of life#cag and energy that is continually taking place there owing to an unduly literal acceptance on the part of every one of the idea that each individual has a sort of divine right to seek and to interpret his experience for himself4 ,in ,pragmatism it might be said to be illustrated in the comparative weakness in the essentials of logic and ethics to which we have already referred1 in the matter of a sound theory of first principles4 ,and also in its failure to take any really critical recognition#cah of the question of its theoretical and practical affiliations to tendencies new and old1 many or most of which have long ago been estimated at their true worth and value4 ,then there is its comparatively superficial interpretation#cai of what is known in the thought of the day as 8,darwinism0 and 8,evolutionism0 and the endless belief of the unthinking in 8progress10 and its failure to see that its very ,americanism#cbj and its very popularity are things that are deserving of the most careful study and criticism4 ,what have the pragmatists left in their hands of their theory1 if its mere 8methodology0 and its 8efficiency-philosophy0 and its would-be enthusiasm were eliminated from it8 ,like ,americanism in general 7which began1 of course1 as a revolutionary and a 8liberationist0 policy71 ,pragmatism is inclined in some ways to make too much of peoples' rights and interests1 and too little of their duties and privileges and of their real needs and their fundamental1 human instincts4 ,it is in the understanding alone of these latter things that true wisdom and true satisfaction#cba are to be found4 ,and like the ,american demand for pleasure and for a good time generally1 ,pragmatism is in many respects too much a mere philosophy of 8postulations0 and 8demands10 too much a mere formulation of the eager and impetuous demands of the emancipated man and woman of the time---as forgetful as they of many of the deeper#cbb facts of life and of the economy of our human civilization4 ,in demanding that the 8consequences0 of all pursuits 7even those of study and philosophy7 shall be 8satisfying10 and that philosophy shall satisfy our active nature1 it forgets the sense of disillusionment that comes to all rash and mistaken effort4 ,it certainly does not follow that a man is going to get certain things from the world and from philosophy merely because he demands them any more than does the discovery and the possession of happiness follow from the 8right0#cbc of the individual to seek it in his own best way4 ,nor is it even true that man is called upon to 8act0 to anything like the extent contemplated by an unduly enthusiastic ,americanism and an unduly enthusiastic ,pragmatism4 ,the writer is glad to be able to append in this connexion a quotation taken by an ,american critic of ,pragmatism from ,forberg in his criticism of the action-philosophy of ,fichte3 8,action1 action1 is the vocation of man6 ,strictly speaking1 this principle is false4 ,man is not called upon to act1 but to act justly4 ,if he cannot act without acting unjustly he had better remain inactive40 ,it would not be difficult to match this quotation1 or perhaps to surpass it1 with something from ,carlyle in respect of the littleness of man's claims1 not merely for enjoyment1 but even for existence2 but we will pass on4 ,pragmatism1 as we have suggested1 certainly falls too readily into line with the tendency of the age to demand means and instruments and utilities and working satisfactions1 instead of ends and purposes and values1 to demand pleasure and enjoyment instead of happiness and blessedness4 ,instead of allowing itself to do this it should have undertaken a criticism both of the so-called 8wants0 of the age1 and of the soundness of its own views in respect of the truth and the happiness that are proper to man as man4 ,there is a fine epigram of ,goethe's in respect of the limitations of the revolutionary and the liberationist attitude of those who would seek to 8free0 men without first trying to understand them1 and to help them to their true inward development4 ,aile ,freiheits-,apostel1 sie waren mir immer zuwider4 ,willkur suchte doch nur jeder am ,ende fr sich4 ,willst du viele befrein1 so wag' es vielen zu dienen4 ,wie gefhrlich das sey1 willst du es wissen8 ,versuch's4#cbd ,until ,pragmatism then makes it clear that it is the free rational activity1 and the higher spiritual nature of man that is to it the norm of all our thought1 and all our activity1 and the true test of all 8consequences10 it has not risen to the height of the distinctive message that it is capable of giving to the thought of the present time4 ,unqualified by some of the ideal considerations to which we have attempted1 in its name1 and in its interest1 to give an expression1 it would not be1 for example1 a philosophy that could be looked upon by the great ,east as the last word of our ,western wisdom or our ,western experience4 ,it will be well1 however1 to say nothing more in this connexion until we have looked at the considerations that follow 7in our next chapter7 upon the lofty1 but impersonal1 idealisation of the life and thought of man attempted by our ,anglo-,hegelian ,rationalism1 and until we have reflected1 too1 upon the more feasible form of ,idealism attempted in the remarkable philosophy of ,bergson1#cbe the greatest of all the pragmatists4 ,,chapter ,,viii ,,pragmatism ,,and ,,anglo-,,hegelian ,,rationalism ,the form of ,anglo-,german ,rationalism or ,intellectualism which ,i shall venture to select for the purposes of consideration from the point of view of ,pragmatism and ,humanism is the first volume of the recent ,gifford ,lectures of ,dr4 ,bernard ,bosanquet1 who has long been regarded by the philosophical public of ,great ,britain as one of the most characteristic members of a certain section of our ,neo-,hegelian school4 ,i shall first give the barest outline of the argument and contentions of 8,the ,principle of ,individuality and ,value10 and then venture upon some paragraphs of what shall seem to me to be relevant criticism4 ,dr4 ,bosanquet's initial position is a conception of philosophy1 and its task which is for him and his book final and all-determining4 ,to him ,philosophy is 7as it is to some extent to ,hegel7 8logic0 or 8the spirit of totality40 ,it is 8essentially of the concrete and the whole10 as ,science is of the 8abstract and the part40 ,although the best thing in life is not necessarily 8philosophy10 philosophy in this sense of 8logic0 is the clue to 8reality and value and freedom10 the key to everything1 in short1 that we can1 or that we should1 or that we actually do desire and need4 ,it philosophy is 8a rendering in coherent thought of what lies at the heart of actual life and love40 ,his next step is to indicate 8the sort of things10 or the sort of 8experiences10 or the sort of 8facts0 that philosophy needs as its material1 if it would accomplish its task as 8universal logic40 ,this he does 7#a7 negatively1 by the rejection of any form of 8immediateness10 or 8simple apprehension10 such as the 8solid fact10 the 8sense of being10 or the 8unshareable self0 of which we sometimes seem to hear1 or such as the 8nave ideas0 of 8compensating justice10#cbf 8ethics#cbg which treats the individual as isolated0 and 8teleology0#cbh as 8guidance by finite minds10 as the data 7or as part of the data7 of philosophy2 and 7#b7 positively1 by declaring that his subject-matter throughout will be 8the principle of #8individuality1' of #8self-completeness1' as the clue to reality40 ,this 8individuality0 or 8self-completeness0 is then set forth in a quasi-,platonic manner as the 8universal10 the real 8universal0 being 7he insists7 the 8concrete universal10 the 8whole10 that is to say1 8the logical system of connected members10 that is to him the 8ideal of all thought40 ,we must think of this 8individuality10 therefore1 either as 8a living world1 complete and acting out of itself1 a positive1 self-moulding cosmos10 or 8as a definite striving of the universe06#cbi ,the next question 7so far as our partial purposes are concerned7 that ,dr4 ,bosanquet asks is1 8,what help do we get from the notion of a #8mind' which #8purposes' or #8desires' things in appreciating the work of factors in the universe1 or of the universe as ex-hypothesi self-directing and self-experiencing whole80 ,the answer is spread over several chapters1 and is practically this1 that although there is undoubtedly a 8teleology0 in the universe 7in the shape of the 8conjunctions and results of the co-operation of men10 or of 8the harmony of geological and biological evolution071 and although 8minds such as ours play a part in the work of direction1 we cannot judge of this work in question in any human manner40 ,the real test of teleology or value is 8wholeness10 8completeness10 8individuality0 the topic of the book1 and it is made quite clear that it is the 8,absolute0 who is 8real0 and 8individual0 and not we4 ,we are1 indeed1 in our lives 8carried to the ,absolute without a break10#ccj and our nature 8is only in process of being communicated to us40#cca 8,we should not think of ourselves after the pattern of separate things or personalities in the legal sense1 nor even as selves in the sense of isolation and exclusion of others40 8,individuality0 being this 8logical self-completeness10 there can be only one 8,individual10 and this one ,individual is the one criterion of 8value10 or 8reality10 or 8existence10 8importance0 and 8reality 60 being sides of the one 8characteristic0 i4e4 8thinkableness0 as a whole4 ,dr4 ,bosanquet confesses in his seventh chapter that this idea of his of 8individuality10 or 8reality10 is essentially the ,greek idea that it is only the 8whole nature0 of things that gives them their reality or value4 ,we are then assured1 towards the close of this remarkable book1 that 8freedom0 7the one thing that we mortals value as the greatest of all 8goods07 is 8the inherent effort of mind considered as a 6 world1 and that the 0,absolute8 the 0universal0 of logic1 ,plato's 8,idea0 is the 8high-water mark of our effort10 and that each 8self0 is 8more like a rising and a falling tide than an isolated pillar with a fixed circumference40 ,the great fact of the book1 the fact upon which its accomplished author rests when he talks in his ,preface of his belief1 8that in the main the work of philosophy has been done10 is the daily 8transmutation of experience according to the level of the mind's energy and self-completeness10 the continued and the continuous 8self-interpretation of #8experience' through the fundamental principle of individuality40 ,now it is quite obvious that according to many of the considerations that have been put forward as true in the foregoing chapters1 this philosophy of ,dr4 ,bosanquet's which treats the 8concept10 or the 8universal0 as an end in itself 7as the one answer to all possible demands for a 8teleology07 and as an 8individual10 8a perfected and self-perfecting 6 individual10 can be regarded as but another instance of the abstract ,rationalism against which ,pragmatism and ,humanism have entered their protests4 ,it is untrue1 therefore1 to the real facts of knowledge and the real facts of human nature4 ,it will be sufficient to state that the considerations of which we are thinking are 7in the main7 the positions that have been taken in respect of such things as3 7#a7 the claim that a true metaphysic must serve not merely as an intellectual 8system0 but as a 8dynamic10 and as a 8motive0 for action and achievement2 7#b7 the fact of the 8instrumental0 character of thought and of ideas1 and of all systems 7of science or of philosophy or of politics7 that fail to include as part of their data the various ideals of mankind2 7#c7 the idea that all truth and all thought imply a belief in the existence of objects and persons independent of the mere mental states or activities of the thinking individual1 and that belief rather than knowledge is1 and always has been1 man's fundamental and working estimate of reality2 7#d7 the fact that our human actions and re-actions upon reality are a part of what we mean by 8reality10 and that these actions and re-actions of ours are real and not imaginary2 7#e7 the attitude in general of ,pragmatism to ,rationalism2 7#f7 the various concessions that have been made by representative rationalists to the pragmatist movement4 ,dr4 ,bosanquet's theory of reality has already impressed some of his most competent critics as utterly inadequate as a motive or an incentive to the efforts and endeavours of men as we know them in history and in actual life1 and we shall immediately return to this topic4 ,and although there are many signs in his ,lectures that he is himself quite aware of the probability of such an impression1 his book proceeds upon the even tenor of its way1 following wherever his argument may lead him1 irrespective entirely of the truth contained in the facts and the positions we have just recounted and reaffirmed4 ,it lends itself1 therefore1 only too naturally to our present use of it as a highly instructive presentation of many1 or most1 of the tendencies of ,rationalism and ,intellectualism1 against which ,pragmatism and ,humanism would fain protest4 ,at the same time there is in it1 as we hope to show1 a fundamental element#ccb of truth and of fact without which there could be no ,pragmatism and no ,humanism1 and indeed no philosophy at all4 ,a broad1 pervading inconsistency#ccc in 8,individuality and ,value0 which militates somewhat seriously against the idea of its being regarded as a tenable philosophy1 is the obvious one between the position 7#a7 that true reality is necessarily individual1 and the position 7#b7 that reality is to be found in the 8universal0 7or the 8concept07 of logic4#ccd ,it would1 however1 perhaps be unfair to expect ,dr4 ,bosanquet to effect a harmony between these two positions that ,aristotle 7who held them both7 was himself very largely unable to do4 ,there is1 in other words1 a standing and a lasting contradiction between any and all philosophy which holds that it is reason or logic alone that attains to truth and reality1 and the apparently natural and inevitable tendency of the human mind it is represented in ,dr4 ,bosanquet's own procedure to seek after 8reality0 in the 8individual0 thing1 or person1 or being1 and in the perfecting of 8individuality0 in ,god 7or in a kingdom of perfected individuals74 ,the positive errors1 however1 which we would venture to refer to as even more fatal to ,dr4 ,bosanquet's book than any of its incidental inconsistencies are those connected with the following pieces of procedure on his part3 7#a7 his manifest tendency to treat the 8universal0 as if it were an entity on its own account with a sort of development and 8value0 and 8culmination0 of its own2#cce 7#b7 his tendency to talk and think as if a 8characteristic0 or a 8predicate0 7i4e4 the 8characteristic0 or 8quality0 that some experiencing being or some thinker attributes to reality7 could be treated as anything at all apart from the action and the reaction of this 8experient0 7or 8thinker07 conceived as an agent2 7#c7 the tendency to talk of 8minds0#ccf rather than persons1 as 8purposing0 and 8desiring0 things2 7#d7 his tendency to talk as if 8teleology0 were 8wholeness02 7#e7 his tendency to regard 7somewhat in the manner of ,spinoza7 8selves0 and 8persons0 as like 8rising and falling tides10 and of the self as a 8world of content0#ccg engaged in certain 8transformations02 and 7#f7 his tendency to think and speak as if demonstration 8mediation0 is perhaps his favourite way of thinking of the logical process were an end in itself1 as if we lived to think1 instead of thinking to live4 ,in opposition to all this it may be affirmed firstly that every 8conception0 of the human mind is but the more or less clear consciousness of a disposition to activity1 and is representative1 not so much of the 8features0 of objects which might appear to be their 8characteristics0 from a purely theoretical point of view1 as of the different ways in which objects have seemed to men to subserve the needs of their souls and bodies4 ,the study of the development of the 8concept0 in connexion with the facts of memory and with the slow evolution of language1 and with the 8socialized percepts0 of daily life will all tend to confirm this position4 ,the phenomena of religion1 for example1 and all the main concepts of all the religions are to be studied not merely as intellectual phenomena1 as solutions of some of the many difficulties of modern ,agnosticism1 or of modern ,rationalism1 or of modern ,criticism1 but as an expressive of the modes of behaviour of human beings 7with all their needs and all their ideals7 towards the universe in which they find themselves1 and towards the various beings1 seen and unseen1 which this universe symbolises to them4 ,these phenomena and these conceptions are unintelligible1 in short1 apart from the various activities and cults and social practices and social experiences and what not1 with which they have dealt from first to last4 ,then it is literally impossible to separate in the manner of ,dr4 ,bosanquet the 8predicate0 of thought from the active relations sustained by things towards each other1 or towards the human beings who seek to interpret these active relations for any or for all 8purposes10 ,dr4 ,bosanquet's idea1 however1 of the relation of 8mind0 to 8matter10 to use these symbols for the nonce 7for they are but such71 is in the main purely 8representational0#cch or intellectualistic4#cci ,to him 8mind0 seems to reflect either a 8bodily content0 or some other kind of 8content0#cdj that seems to exist for a 8spectator0 of the world1 or for the 8,absolute10 rather than for the man himself as an agent1 who of course uses his memories of himself1 or his 8ideal0 of himself1 for renewed effort and activity4 ,one of the most important consequences of this unduly intellectualistic view of mind is that ,dr4 ,bosanquet seems 7both theoretically and practically7 unable to see the place of 8mind10 as 8purpose10 in ordinary life1#cda or of the place of mind in evolution1#cdb giving us in his difficult but important chapter on the 8relation of mind and body0 a version of things that approaches only too perilously close to ,parallelism or ,dualism1 or even to ,materialism4#cdc ,and along with this quasi-8representational0 or 8copy-like0 theory of mind there are to be associated his representational and intellectualistic views of the 8self0#cdd and the 8universal0#cde and 8spirit40#cdf ,there are1 doubtless1 hints in ,dr4 ,bosanquet's pages of a more 8dynamic0 view of mind or of a deeper view#cdg than this merely 8representational0 view1 but they are not developed or worked into the main portion of his argument1 which they would doubtless very largely transform4 ,this is greatly to be regretted1 for we remember that even ,hegel seemed to notice the splitting-up of the real for our human purposes which takes place in the ordinary judgment4 ,and of course1 as we have noticed1 all 8purpose0 is practical and theoretical at one and the same time4 ,then1 thirdly1 it is persons1 and not 8minds10 who desire and purpose things1 8mind0 being a concept invented by the spectator of activity in a person other than himself1 which 7from the analogy of his own conscious activity and experience7 he believes to be purposive4#cdh ,dr4 ,bosanquet's use1 too1 of the expression 8mind0 invariably leaves out of the range of consideration the phenomena of desire and volition--intelligible1 both of them1 only by reference to an end that is to be understood from within1 and not from outside of the personality1 from the point of view of the mere spectator4 ,the phenomena of desire and volition are just as integral ingredients of our lives as persons as are our cognitive states4 ,fourthly1 it is doubtful whether the treatment of teleology as 8wholeness0 7or its sublimation in 8,individuality and ,value0 into 8wholeness07 is much of an explanation of this difficult topic1 or indeed whether it is any explanation at all4 ,dr4 ,bosanquet1 in fact1 confesses that teleology is a conception which 8loses its distinctive meaning as we deepen its philosophical interpretation1 and that it has very little meaning when applied to the universe as a whole0 a thing that is apparent to any ,kantian student4 8,it is impossible seriously10 he says1 8to treat a mind which is the universe6 as a workman of limited resources1 aiming at some things and obliged to accept others as means to these40 ,and it is equally impossible1 he holds1 to apply 8to the universe0 the distinction of 8what is purpose for its own sake and what is not so40 ,in fact1 ,dr4 ,bosanquet's treatment of teleology is thus mainly negative1 as including not only this rejection#cdi of the notion in reference to the 8universe as a whole10 but its rejection1 too1 in reference to the purposes of our human life2#cej although he admits 7as of course he must7 that the conception of end or purpose is drawn from some of the features 78the simplest features10 he says7 of our 8finite life10 or 8finite consciousness40 ,if the notion were 8to be retained at all10 he says1 8it could only be a name for some principle which would help to tell us what has value quite independent of being or not being1 the purpose of some mind40#cea ,now1 of course1 according to the ,pragmatism and ,humanism that we have been considering in this book1 no intelligent person could take any conceivable interest in such a useless fancy as a teleology of this kind4 ,thus teleology is really blotted out altogether of existence in this volume1 and with its disappearance there must go also the notion of any value that might be intelligibly associated with the idea of the attainment of purposes or ends by the human beings with whom we are acquainted in our ordinary daily life4 ,we shall below#ceb refer to the fact that this rejection of teleology and value is one that must be regarded as fatal to ethics or to ,absolutism in the realm of ethics4 ,it requires1 too1 to be added here that even the most unprejudiced reading of ,dr4 ,bosanquet's work must create in the mind of the reader the conviction that its author is altogether unfair to the views of those who believe in the existence of definite manifestations of purpose in human life4#cec ,he talks as if those who uphold this idea or this fact are committed either to the absurd notion that man is 8the end of the universe10 or to the equally absurd notion that 8art1 thought1 society1 history1 in which mind begins to transcend its finiteness should be ascribed to the directive abilities of units in a plurality1 precisely apart from the world content and the underlying solidarity of spirits1 the medium through which all great things are done40 ,with a view of bringing our discussion of these striking ,gifford ,lectures within the scope of the general subject of this book the following might be regarded as their leading1 fundamental characteristics to which the most serious kind of exception might well be taken3 7#a7 its 8abstractionism0#ced and its general injustice to fact due to its initial and persistent 8conviction0#cee strange to say1 this is the very word used by ,bosanquet that the real movement in things is a 8logical0 movement2 7#b7 its fallacious conception of the task of philosophy as mainly the obligation to think the world 8without contradiction02 7#c7 its obvious tendency in the direction of the 8subjective idealism0#cef that has been the bane of so much modern philosophy and that is discarded altogether#ceg by ,pragmatism and ,humanism2 7#d7 its retention of many of the characteristic polemical#ceh faults of ,neo-,hegelianism and its manifestation of a similar spirit of polemical unfairness#cei on the part of their accomplished author2 7#e7 its implication in several really hopeless contradictions in addition to the broad contradiction already referred to2 7#f7 its failure a common ,neo-,hegelian failing to do justice to the spirit and 7in certain important regards7 the letter of ,kant2 7#g7 its essential non-moralism or its apparently anti-ethical character4 ,as for the first of these charges1 the 8abstractionism0 of 8,individuality and ,value10 coming as it does on the top of the general perversity of the book1 is really a very disastrous thing for philosophy4 ,while we may pardon an enthusiastic literary ,frenchman#cfj for saying that1 8,the fact is1 you see1 that a fine book is the end for which the world was made10 there is hardly any excuse for a philosopher like ,dr4 ,bosanquet coming before the world with the appearance of believing that the richly differentiated universe that we know only in part1 exists for the benefit of the science that he represents1 for the dialectic of the metaphysician1 to enable the 8universal0 to 8become more differentiated0 and 8more individualized10 to become 8more representative0 of the 8whole40#cfa ,we might compare1 says ,dr4 ,bosanquet1 in a striking and an enthralling#cfb passage1 8the ,absolute to ,dante's mind as uttered in the ,divine ,comedy 444 as including in a single1 whole poetic experience a world of space and persons1 444 things that1 to any ordinary mind1 fall apart40 ,now even apart from the highly interesting question of the manifestly great and far-reaching influence of ,dante over ,dr4 ,bosanquet1 and apart1 too1 from the notable modesty of ,dr4 ,bosanquet's confession as to the 8imperfect0 character of the simile just reproduced1 no one to-day can think of attaching any ultimate importance to 8,dante's mind0 without thinking of the extent to which this truly great man#cfc was under the influence1 not only of his own passions and of the general 8problem0 of his own life1 but of such specialized influences as1 for example 7#a7 the mediaeval dualism between the ,city of ,god and the ,empire of the ,world1 7#b7 ,aristotle's unfortunate separation of the 8intellectual0 and the 8practical0 virtues1 7#c7 the evil as well as the good of the dogmatic theology of the fathers of the ,church4 ,goethe is of infinitely more value to us men of the twentieth century than ,dante4 ,and one of the very things ,goethe is most calculated to teach us is precisely this very matter of the limitations of the cultural ideal of the ,middle ,ages and of the entire ,renaissance period that succeeded it4#cfd ,we should never1 therefore1 think for a moment of taking ,dr4 ,bosanquet's intellectual abstractionism about the 8universal0 literally without thinking at the same time of its limitations1 and of its sources in ,plato and in ,hegel and in ,neo-,hegelian rationalism1 and of remembering with ,hegel himself1 8after all1 the movement of the notion is a sort of illusion40 ,then1 secondly1 to attempt to think in philosophy or any other science merely in accordance with the ,principle of 8,non-,contradiction0 will never#cfe take us beyond the few initial positions of fact or of principle 7,god1 8substance10 pure being1 matter1 identity1 final cause1 freedom1 force1 the will1 the idea a perfect being1 or what not7 with which we happen for one reason or another to start in our reflections4 ,nor will this procedure account1 of course1 for these initial assumptions or facts4 ,thirdly1 in virtue of its implication in the 8solipsism0 and the 8representationalism0 of ,subjective ,idealism1 ,dr4 ,bosanquet's 8,absolute0 is inferior 7both so far as fact and theory are concerned7 to the ,pluralism and the possible ,theism of ,pragmatism and ,humanism to which we have already made partial references4#cff ,fourthly1 it is only natural that1 on account of these1 its many polemical mannerisms1 8,individuality and ,value0 has already made upon some of its critics the impression of being a book that refuses to see things as they are--in the interests of their forced adaptation to the purposes of a preconceived philosophical theory4 ,fifthly1 there is certainly a sufficient number of contradictions in 8,individuality and ,value0 to prevent it from being regarded as a consistent and a workable 7i4e4 really explanatory7 account of our experience as we actually know it4 ,of these contradictions we think the following may well be enumerated here3 7#a7 ,that between ,dr4 ,bosanquet's professed principle of accepting as real only that which is 8mediated0 or established by proof1 and the arbitrariness he displays in announcing convictions like the following3 8,that what really matters is not the preservation of separate minds as such1 but the qualities and achievement which1 as trustees of the universe1 they elicit from the resources assigned them40 7#b7 ,the contradiction between his belief in the conservation of 8values0 without the conservation of the existence of the individuals who 8elicit0 these 8values10 or who are1 as he puts it1 the 8trustees0 for the 8universe40 7#c7 ,that between what he logically wants 7his 8concrete individual07 and what he gives us 7an impersonal 8system074 7#d7 ,the contradiction between the completed personal life in ,god 7or in a perfected society of individuals7 that most of us 7judging from the great religions of the world7 want as human beings1 and the impersonal 8conceptual0 experience of his book4 7#e7 ,the contradiction that exists between his intellectualism and his commendable belief in 8great convictions0 and 8really satisfying emotions and experiences40 7#f7 ,the standing contradiction between his 8solipsistic0 view of reality 7his reduction of the universe to the conceptual experience of a single self-perfecting individual71 and the facts of history in support of the idea of the 8new10 or the 8creative0 character of the contributions of countless individuals and groups of individuals1 to the evolution of the life of the world1 or the life of the infinite number of worlds that make up what we think of as the universe4 7#g7 ,the remarkable contradiction between ,dr4 ,bosanquet's calm rejection in his argumentation of all 8nave ideas0 and his own nave or ,greek-like faith in reason1 in the substantial existence of the concept or the idea over and above the phenomena and the phenomenal experiences which it is used to intepret4 ,lastly1 as for the matter of the non-moralism or the essentially anti-ethical character of 8,individuality and ,value10 this is a characteristic of the book that should1 as such1 be partly apparent from what has already been said1 in respect of its main argument and its main contentions1 and in respect of the apparent contributions of ,pragmatism and ,humanism to philosophy generally4 ,the abstractionism of the book1 and the absence in it of any real provision for the realities of purpose and of accomplishment 7and even of 8movement0 and 8process0 in any real sense of these words71 are all obviously against the interests of ethics and of conduct1 as purposive1 human action4 ,so1 too1 are the findings of the critics that ,dr4 ,bosanquet's 8,absolute0 is not a reality 7for1 with ,professor ,taylor and others1 man must#cfg have an ,absolute1 or a ,god1 in whom he can believe as real7 that inspires to action and to motive on the part of ordinary human beings4 ,and it is also fatal to the ethical interests of his book that he does not see with the pragmatists that our human actions and reactions must be regarded as part of what we mean by 8reality40 ,and so on4 ,apart1 however1 from these and other hostile pre-suppositions the following would seem to be the chief reasons for pronouncing1 as unsatisfactory1 the merely incidental treatment that is accorded in 8,individuality and ,value0 to ethics and to the ethical life4 7#a7 ,it is not 8conduct0 or the normative#cfh voluntary actions of human beings 7in a world or society of real human beings7 requiring 8justice0 and 8guidance0 and 8help0 that is discussed in these ,lectures1 but abstractions like 8desire10 or 8ordinary desire10 or 8the selective conations of finite minds10 or 8the active form of a totality of striving0 or worst of all the 8self as it happens to be10 that are discussed there4 7#b7 ,even if conduct1 as of course an 8organic totality0 in its way1 be faced for the nonce in 8,individuality and ,value10 it is invariably branded and thought of by ,dr4 ,bosanquet as 8nave morality10#cfi and it is forthwith promptly transformed and transmuted1 in the most open and unabashed manner in the interests and exigencies of 7#a7 logical theory1 7#b7 aesthetics and aesthetic products perhaps ,dr4 ,bosanquet's deepest or most emotional interest1 and 7#c7 metaphysical theory of a highly abstract character4 7#c7 ,the conception of ethics as a 8normative science0 and of conduct as free and autonomous1#cgj and as the voluntary affirmation of a norm or standard or type or ideal1 is conspicuous by its absence4 7#d7 ,there is really no place either in ,dr4 ,bosanquet's 8concrete universal0 or in his fugitive pages upon ethics for the reality of the distinction between good and evil 7as 8willed0 in actions or as present in dispositions and tendencies74 ,good and evil#cga are for him1 8contents0 either for himself as a spectator of man's actions1 or for the 8concrete universal10 or the 8whole10 or the completed 8individual0 of his too consummate book4 7#e7 ,like nearly all forms of ,absolutism 7,hegelianism1 ,neo-,hegelianism1 ,spinozism1 ,hobbism7 ,dr4 ,bosanquet's ethics 7or the vestigial ethics with which he leaves us7 comes perilously near to what is known as ,determinism#cgb or ,fatalism or even ,materialism4 ,as for the first of the preceding five points1 it is perfectly evident that any discussion of the various psychological phenomena that are doubtless involved in conduct can be regarded as but a preliminary step to the discussion of the real problems of ethics--that of the actions and habits and standards of persons who are the subjects of rights and duties and who affirm certain actions to be right1 and certain other actions to be wrong4 ,the point1 however1 about ,dr4 ,bosanquet's psychological abstractionism1 especially when it rises to the height of writing as if the 8self0 as the 8active form of a totality of striving10 or the 8self as it happens to be10 were the same thing as the 8personal self0 with which we alone are mainly concerned in ethics1 is that it is but another instance of the old 8spectator0#cgc fallacy that we have already found to underlie his whole treatment of the 8self0 and of 8purpose0 and of 8striving40 ,such a philosophy1 or point of view1 is quite foreign to ethics1 because it is only in the ethical life that we think of ourselves as 8persons10 as beings playing a part1 as actors or players upon the great stage of life4 ,by not facing the ethical life directly1 from within1 instead of from without1 ,dr4 ,bosanquet has entirely failed to understand it4 ,and if he had attempted this internal consideration of 8personality10 his whole metaphysic of 8individuality0 and of the great society of beings who inhabit 7or who may be thought of as inhabiting7 this universe1 would have been very different from what it is4 ,then as for the second and third points1 it is surely evident from the footnotes that have been appended in connexion with the matter of his transformation of the facts of ethics in the interests of other things like logic1 and aesthetics1 and metaphysics1 that there is indeed1 in ,bosanquet1 no recognition of what must be called the genuine1 or independent reality of the moral life1 or of the moral ideal as a force in human nature4 ,and as for the fourth point1 students of modern ethics are naturally by this time perfectly familiar with the tendency of ,rationalism to make evil action and the 8evil self0 simply the affirmation of a 8logically incoherent0 point of view4 ,it exists in an ,english writer like ,wollaston#cgd as well as in a ,german philosopher like ,hegel4 ,this tendency is indeed a piece of sophistry and illusion because the distinction between good and evil1 and the distinction between right and wrong 7perhaps the better and the more crucial formulation of the two--for us moderns at least7 is unintelligible apart from the fact or the idea of the existence of moral agents1 who make 7in their volition1 and in the judgments that accompany or precede their volitions7 a 8norm10 or rule1 or line between the ethically permissible and the ethically unpermissible4 ,the rationalism that makes these distinctions merely a matter of 8logic10 overlooks the fact that in actual life men must be warded off from wrong-doing 7and they are in many cases actually so warded off by their consciences and by other things1 like the love of home1 or the love of honour1 or the love of ,god7 by something stronger than the mere idea of a possible theoretical mistake4 ,as for the fifth point of the ,determinism or the ,necessitarianism that hangs like a sword of ,damocles over the entire ethic of ,dr4 ,bosanquet1 the nature of this should be perfectly apparent from many of the statements and considerations that have been brought forward as typical of his entire line of thought4 ,he teaches a 8passivism0#cge and an 8intellectualism0 that are just as pronounced and just as essential to his thought as they are to the great system of his master1 ,hegel1 in whose ambitious philosophy of spirit man's whole destiny is unfolded without the possibility of his playing himself any appreciable part in the impersonal1 dialectic movement in which it is made to consist4 ,it is now necessary to speak definitely and outspokenly of the element of supreme truth and value in ,dr4 ,bosanquet's unique book1 of the positive contribution it makes to philosophy and to natural theology4#cgf ,this is1 in a word1 its tribute to the permanent element of truth and reality in the idealistic philosophy4 ,and he testifies to this in his 8belief0 that in the main the work of philosophy has been done1 and 8that what is now needed is to recall and concentrate the modern mind from its distraction rather than to invent wholly new theoretic conceptions40 ,this declaration is of itself a position of considerable importance1 however widely one is obliged to differ from its author as to what exactly it is that has already been demonstrated and accomplished 8in philosophy40 ,if there has really been 8nothing done0 in philosophy since the time of ,socrates1 if philosophy is to-day no true antithesis of1 and corrective to science1 then there is possible neither ,pragmatism1 nor ,humanism1 nor any other1 possibly more fundamental1 philosophy4 ,there can1 as ,dr4 ,bosanquet puts it1 8indeed be no progress if no definite ground is ever to be recognized as gained40 ,this then is the first thing of transcendent importance in 8,individuality and ,value10 its insistance upon the fundamentally different estimate of reality given by philosophy in distinction from science and its merely hypothetical treatment of reality4 ,this 8difference0 is1 of course1 but natural1 seeing that to philosophy there are no things or phenomena without minds1 or persons or beings to whom they appear as things and phenomena4 ,the second great thing of 8,individuality and ,value0 is its insistence upon the need to all philosophy of a recognized grasp of the principle of 8,meaning40#cgg ,what this instance implies to ,dr4 ,bosanquet is1 that 8at no point in our lives either as agents or thinkers are we to accept any supposed element of fact or circumstance as having any significance0 apart from the great 8whole0 or the great 8reality10 with which we believe ourselves to be in contact in our daily experience1 when interpreted in the light of our consciousness of ourselves as persons4 ,in the letter of the book his interpretation of the great 8whole10 or the great reality1 of life is by no means as broad and as deep as the one at which we have just hinted in attempting to describe his position4 ,but overriding altogether the mere intellectualism of ,dr4 ,bosanquet's interpretation1 is the fact of the dynamic idealism for which he virtually stands1#cgh in virtue of the great and the simple effort of his lectures#cgi to find 8value0 in 8our daily experience with its huge obstinate plurality of independent facts40 ,he would start1 as we mentioned 7at the beginning of this chapter71 with what he believes to be 8the daily transformation of our experience as verified within what we uncritically take as our private consciousness1 so far as its weakness may permit10 and 8as verified on a larger scale when we think of such splendid creations as the ,state and fine art and religion10 and when we think1 too1 of 8the mode of our participation in them40 ,now again nothing could indeed be more nobly true 7in idea7 of the great work of the philosopher than the proper theory and description of this 8daily transformation0 of our lives1 out of the life of 8sense0 and the life of selfishness1 into the spiritual communion#chj that is the essence of all right thinking and all right living4 ,but we may go further than all this and signalize one or two things in ,dr4 ,bosanquet that we venture to construe as a kind of unconscious testimony1 on his part1 to the very humanism for which we have been contending throughout4 ,the things to which we refer are1 firstly1 his use of the word 8belief0#cha in speaking of his opinion that the work of philosophy has in the main been accomplished1 and1 second1 his fine and really praiseworthy#chb confession that his lectures1 whatever they may have done or may not have done1 at least 8contain the record of a very strong conviction40 ,dr4 ,bosanquet's departure1 in the letter of his argumentation1 from the spirit of these declarations only accentuates what we regard as the regrettable failure and abstractionism of his whole official 7or professed7 philosophy4 ,his use of the word belief#chc shows that it is1 after all his professional homage to 8mediation0 and to the necessary abstractions of logic and system1 belief and not knowledge that is to him the final and 8working0 estimate of truth and of reality4 ,and the same conclusion follows from the second matter of the confession of which we have spoken1 that his entire argumentation is but the expression of a strong conviction4#chd ,it is again1 therefore1 we would insist a spiritual conviction1 and not a conceptual system that is actually and necessarily the moving force of his entire intellectual activity4 ,and1 we would add to his own face1 it is a conviction moreover that 8works10 and not a 8logical whole0 or a mere conceptual ideal1 that he must 7as a philosopher7 engender in the mind of his average reader about reality4 ,his 8logical whole0 and his 8individuality as logical completeness10 8work0 with him ,professor ,bosanquet for the reason that he is primarily an intellectual worker1 a worker in the realm of mind4 ,but reality 7as the whole world of human work and human effort is there to tell us7 is more than an intellectual system4 ,and what is a conviction to him is not necessarily a conviction that works with the ordinary man1 who knows reality better than he does1 or who knows it 7like himself7 in his desires and in his beliefs rather than in the terms and conceptions that are the mere tools of the intellect and the specialist4 ,for1 taking his book as a whole1 we may say about it that the dissolution of reality into a conceptual system that is effected there is at best but another convincing proof of the truth of the words of the great ,david ,hume1#che that the understanding1 8when it acts alone1 and according to its most general principles1 entirely subverts itself1 and leaves not the slightest degree of evidence in any proposition1 either in philosophy or common life40 ,,note ,it is necessary for me to append a few words as to the possible connexion between the foregoing criticism of the first volume of ,dr4 ,bosanquet's ,gifford ,lectures and the subject-matter of the second volume1 which appeared while ,i was preparing the manuscript of this book for the press4 ,i have been able only to inspect its contents and to inform myself about the ways in which it has impressed some of its representative critics4 ,what ,i have thus learned does not1 in my opinion1 make it necessary for me to unsay or to rewrite what ,i have said in this chapter4 ,my desire was to indicate the kind of criticism that the pragmatists and the humanists1 as far as ,i understand them1 would be inclined to make of ,absolutism as represented in the ,principle of ,individuality and ,value as the last significant ,anglo-,hegelian output4 ,this1 ,i think1 ,i have done1 and the reader may be desirably left to himself to settle the question of the relation of the first of ,dr4 ,bosanquet's books to its companion volume that appeared in the following calendar year4 ,i cannot1 however1 be so wilfully blind to the existence of this second great 8,gifford0 book of his as to appear to ignore the fact1 that on its very face and surface it seems to do many of the things that ,i have allowed myself to signalize as things that ,absolutism and ,anglo-,hegelianism have not done1 or have done but imperfectly4 ,its very title1 ,the ,value and ,destiny of the ,individual1 and the titles of many of its chapters1 and the reception accorded to it in such instructive reviews as those of ,professor ,sir ,henry ,jones and ,professor ,muirhead 7in the ,july numbers of the ,hibbert ,journal and ,mind respectively71 are to my mind convincing proof that it is by far the most serious ,anglo-,hegelian attempt of the passing generation to deal with many of the objections that have been brought against ,rationalistic ,idealism by the pragmatists and the voluntarists1 by the defenders of faith and feeling and experience1 and 7before all these recent people7 by many independent idealist writers of our time in ,england and elsewhere4 ,in the interest of truth and of the thinking public generally1 ,i append the mere titles of some of the chapters and divisions of ,dr4 ,bosanquet's second volume3 8,the ,value of ,personal ,feeling1 and the ,grounds of the ,distinctness of ,persons10 8,the ,moulding of ,souls10 8,the ,miracle of ,will10 the 8,hazards and ,hardships of ,finite ,selfhood10 the 8,stability and ,security of ,finite ,selfhood10 8,the ,religious ,consciousness10 8,the ,destiny of the ,finite ,self10 8,the ,gates of the ,future40 ,there is in all the rich content that is thus indicated1 and in all the high and deep discussion of 8the ideas of a lifetime0 that it includes1 a veritable mine of philosophical reflection for the reader who desires to think in a connected1 or ,hegelian1 manner about things--a mine1 too1 that is at least indicative of the wide territory both of fact and of principle upon which pragmatist philosophy must enter before it can become a true philosophy4 ,i cannot find1 however--this was surely not to be expected in a thinker of ,dr4 ,bosanquet's power--that the principles of argumentation that determined the nature and contents of the earlier volume have undergone any modification in its success or successor2 indeed1 what is here offered1 and discovered by the reader and the critics1 is but a continuation and application of the same dialectic principles to 8finite beings1 that is1 in effect to human souls40 ,if any one will take upon himself the task of estimating the success or the non-success of the enterprise he will travel through a piece of philosophical writing that is as comprehensive and as coherent1 and as elevating in its tone1 as anything that has appeared from the ,neo-,hegelian camp4 ,the things that ,i chiefly feel and believe about it are1 firstly1 that its account of the facts of life and thought are1 again1 all determined by certain presuppositions about conceivability and about the principles of contradiction and negation2 secondly1 that it is still the same 8whole0 of logic that is to it the test of all reality and individuality2 and1 thirdly1 that it is1 again1 a great pity that ,dr4 ,bosanquet should not have acted upon some sort of recognition of the relation of his own dialectical principles to those of his master ,hegel1 or to those of some of his ,neo-,hegelian predecessors in ,england and ,america4 ,although it is almost an impertinence on the part of one who has just made the acquaintance of this outstanding volume to speak in any detail of its contents1 ,i can indicate part of my meaning by pointing out that it is throughout such things as 8finite mind10 the 8finite mind0 that is 8best understood by approaching it from the side of the continuum0 the 8whole01 the 8finite mind0 that is 8shaped by the universe10 that is 8torn between existence and self-transcendence10 8appearance10 an 8externality which is the object of mind10 the 8positive principle of totality or individuality manifesting itself in a number of forms10 8good0 and 8evil as attitudes concerning a creature's whole being10 8volition0 in terms of the 8principle that there is for every situation a larger and more effective point of view than the given0--that are discussed1 and not the real persons who have what they call 8minds0 and 8volitions0 and 8attitudes10 and who invent all these principles and distinctions to describe the world of their experience and the world of their thoughts4 ,as against him ,pragmatism and ,humanism would1 ,i think1 both insist that the first reality for all thought and speculation is not the 8logical whole0 that underlies1 in the mind of the thinker1 the greater number of all his categories and distinctions1 but the life and the lives of the persons in a world of inter-subjective intercourse1 wherein these points of view are used for different purposes4 ,and ,i cannot see how ,dr4 ,bosanquet is entitled to scorn all those who hold to the idea of the reality of the lives of the persons who are agents and thinkers in this personal realm1 which is for us the highest reality of the universe1 as believers in the 8exclusiveness of personality10 although ,i would certainly agree with him that our experience1 when properly interpreted1 carries us beyond the subjectivism and the individualism of some forms of ,pragmatism or ,pluralism4 ,the reader who is anxious to know about the real value of the ,hegelianism upon which ,dr4 ,bosanquet's philosophy reposes should consult the work of ,croce upon the 8living0 and the 8dead0 elements in ,hegel's ,system4 ,it has recently been translated into ,english4 ,dr4 ,bosanquet1 like many ,hegelians1 seems to me to overlook almost entirely the important elements in the philosophy of ,kant--of some of which ,i speak of in the next chapter as developed in the spiritualistic philosophy of ,bergson4 ,,chapter ,,ix ,,pragmatism ,,and ,,idealism ,,in ,,the ,,philosophy ,,of ,,bergson#chf ,the pragmatist elements in the philosophy of ,bergson of which it is1 perhaps1 legitimate for us to speak here are 7#a7 his 8,anti-,intellectualism10 and 7#b7 his 8,activism0 or 8,actionism40 ,the latter culminates in his freedom-philosophy and his spiritualism4 ,i shall comment shortly upon these two things1 and then suggest one or two general criticisms of his philosophy as a whole4 ,bergson's anti-intellectualism rests ultimately upon his contention that the human intellect is related in the main to the needs of action1 that the brain is an organ of action rather than an organ of thought1 that our intelligence is at home only in the realm of the physical and the mathematical sciences1#chg that contrivance and invention and the practical comprehension of the 8material0 are its proper activities1 and that for these latter purposes it splits up the world of the senses and the understanding into a discontinuous aggregate of physical units1 which it then proceeds to reconstruct in a spatial and temporal order4 ,we perceive in ,nature1 he holds1 what interests#chh us in the way of our vital needs2 our intellect is adapted1 not for the understanding or the purely rational 78abstract07 comprehension of 8causality0 and the 8life of things10 but for the maintenance and furtherance of our own lives1 and for the creation of the instruments and agencies 7signs1 language1 tools1 imagined sequences and laws1 essences1 causes1 the 8descriptions0 of science1 the special senses1 the convolutions of the brain1 etc47 that minister to this4 ,science is to-day still penetrated through and through with primitive metaphysics1 with the metaphysics of animism1 with a belief in separate things like forces1 atoms1 elements1 or what not--indicative all of them of its attempt to 8divide up0 the real that it may command it for theoretical and practical purposes4 ,we can see this in the 8structural psychology0#chi of the day and its analysis of our mental life into 8elements10 in respect of the number and character of which there are lasting differences of opinion among the masters of the science--into 8impressions10 and 8affections10 and sensations1 images1 memories1 ideas1 and so on4 ,and we can see it1 too1 in the erroneous attempts sometimes made by psychologists to treat these entities as if they had clearly defined temporal and spatial characteristics or qualities4 ,the supreme mistake of philosophy1 according to ,bergson1 has been to import into the domain of speculation a method of thinking that was originally destined for action4 ,it has forgotten that nearly all the leading conceptions of common sense and of science and of 8analysis0 have been invented1 not for final and general1 but for relative and particular purposes4 ,and it has fallen too readily under the influence of a certain traditional view of the relations between metaphysics and science--the view1 namely1 that philosophy should just take the findings of science and of common-sense about the world as its initial material1 subjecting them1 of course1 to a certain preliminary reinterpretation1 but finally reconstructing them1 almost as they were1 into a system4#cij ,the one thing1 in short1 that philosophy has failed to understand is the life and the movement and the process of the world1 as an infinitely more important fact than the endless terms and conceptions and entities 78will10 8reason10 8,ideas10 etc47 into which it has been analysed4 ,we might sum up the whole by saying that ,bergson's anti-intellectualism is simply a protest1 not against the use1 but only against the 8systematic misuse0#cia of general conceptions that have been current in science and philosophy 8since the time of ,socrates10 a protest1 however1 that in his case is not merely general and negative1 but particularised and positive4#cib ,like any and all anti-intellectualism1 ,bergson's anti-intellectualism is liable to serious misinterpretation1 and it is currently misinterpreted and misrepresented as 8irrationalism40 ,his intention1 however1 is not to destroy and to condemn philosophy and reasoning1 and to exalt mere intuition and faith1 but rather to 8liberate0#cic our human consciousness of ourselves and of the world from the dogmatism of what he regards to be the utilitarian intellect1 from the many hopeless contradictions and antinomies and puzzles of the mere analytic understanding4 ,philosophy1 in particular1 he would free from the last traces and symptoms of scientific rationalism1 although fully aware of the fact that our modern philosophy had its very departure from the rationalism of the great founders of modern science like ,kepler and ,galileo and the rest4 ,he would strike at the roots of all this confident rationalism or scientific philosophy by opening up a broader and a deeper view of truth than that afforded to the merely piece-meal and utilitarian view4 ,as for the ,actionism and the action philosophy of ,bergson1 this is perhaps more in line than any other tendency of the day with the new life and the new thought of the twentieth century1 although 7like ,pragmatism7 it stands in need of correction or revision by the principles of a sound ethical philosophy1 by the ,idealism that is not1 and cannot be1 the mere creation of to-day or yesterday4 ,in essence it is1 to begin with1 but an extension to the mind as a whole and to all its so-called special faculties 78sensation10 8perception10 8memory10 8ideation10 8judgment10 8thinking10 8emotion10 and the rest7 of the 8dynamic10#cid instead of the older1 static point of view that the recent science of our time has applied to matter and to life1 and that ,pragmatism and the 8hypothetical method0 have sought to apply to all the ordinary conceptions and constructions that exist in the different domains of the different sciences4#cie ,it is also1 from our point of view1 as we may see1 an attempt at the expression1 in the terms of a comparatively simple philosophy1 of many of the considerations in respect of knowledge and conduct that have been brought forward in the preceding pages of this book4 ,we have already dwelt in different ways1 for example1 upon the fact that there is no perception or sensation without an organic reaction on the part of the percipient or the sentient being1 that an idea is in a sense a motor attitude 7a way of comprehending particulars or particular facts in relation to our purposes and our ends71 that a logical judgment represents a 8division0 of the real1 or of the processes of ,nature1 for some purpose or other1 that our whole mental life is purposive1 that there is no 8pure0 cognition without attendant emotion and#cif volition1 that it is in action that desire and thought come together1 that our whole knowledge of the world is necessarily a knowledge of it in terms of our purposes and our highest attitudes1 and so on4 ,all of this is1 as it were1 an indication of the psychological and the logical considerations upon which ,bergson bases his positive1#cig activistic1 philosophy of mind4 ,it is to be remembered in ,bergson's interest that when we speak of his ,actionism#cih we do not mean a narrowing down#cii on his part of the activities of the soul to physical labour and to mere utilitarian effort1 but its capacity1 also1 for that creative activity which he takes to be the very keynote of personal life and the evolutionary process4 ,as for the freedom-philosophy with which ,bergson's ,actionism is to be associated1 this is worked out by him1 firstly1 in the most perfect correspondence with what he believes to be the facts of life and mind2 and1 secondly1 in terms of that anti-rationalism 7or hostility to the merely scientific intellect7 which is his working theory of knowledge4 ,his views upon this subject have also been depreciated and misunderstood by some of his opponents who attack what they call his 8intuitional0 treatment of the freedom-question--his insistence upon the direct intuition of our life that we have when we act consciously1 and when we are 8most ourselves0--when we act out 8freely0 our own nature4 ,to him the primary fact for any human being is the life-impulse that is both instinctive and reflective1 that is certainly far more of a fundamental reality than any of those entities or concepts 78cells10 8atoms10 8forces10 8laws10 or what not7 which1 with ,kant1 he clearly sees to be the creation of the intellect for its descriptive and practical purposes4 ,this life is 8free0 in the sense that we are not 8determined0 by any or all of those forces and laws to which our intellect subjects everything else1 but which it cannot apply to the life that is more than mere matter1 that is a real becoming and a real process1 a real creation and development4 ,the 8spiritualism10 again1 of his interpretation of this life and activity rests1 to begin with1 upon his opinion that the very inception of the activity1 and the adjustment1 and the selection in which the simplest life-effort1 and the simplest perception of a living being consist1 indicate the presence and the operation of a controlling agency1#djj or mind1 or principle of spiritual 8choice0 that is not1 and cannot be1 explained on the principles of a mechanical science or philosophy4 ,this principle is1 in a word1 the life-force1 or the creative activity1 the lan vital of which we read so much in his books1 that has 8seized upon matter10 vitalizing it into force and energy1 into the 8play0 upon each other of all the varied activities and grades and forms of the will to live1 and into the various forms of socialized and co-operative living on the part of animals and men4 ,we shall immediately remark upon the matter of the apparent limitations of this spiritual philosophy of life1 or reality1 that is here but indicated or stated4 ,one of its essential features1 so far as we are at present concerned1 is his claim that his introduction of a spiritual principle into the life-force1 or the creative activity that has expressed itself in the various grades and forms of life1 both animal and human1 is not a phase of the old philosophy#dja or theology of 8final causes0 or of a predetermined#djb 8teleology40 ,to this old finalism or teleology#djc the life of organic nature 7the 8organs0 and 8cells10 the 8instinctive0 actions1 and the 8adjustments0 of animals1 and so on7 were all due to the work of a pre-existing1 calculating intelligence operating upon matter2 whereas to him they are but different expressions or creations of the life-force that is as little predetermined in organic evolution1 as it is in the realm of the activities interpreted for us 7in part7 by the newer physics and the newer chemistry--in the processes1 for example1 that are exemplified in the generation of a star out of a nebula4 ,this entire treatment1 however1 of the notion of purpose in nature is a matter of great difficulty in the philosophy of ,bergson1 and his own thought 7as ,i shall presently state7 is apt to strike us as just as hypothetical as some of the views he attempts to combat4 ,it raises1 too1 the question of the valuation of his philosophy as a whole1 and of its relation to the great thinker who still stands in the very centre of the entire modern movement from ,copernicus to ,comte and ,darwin--,immanuel ,kant4#djd ,we shall best get at the matter of the fuller developments of the philosophy of ,bergson that are of interest to us at present1 by indicating some of the results that would accrue from it to the constructive philosophy in which we are interested as the outcome of ,pragmatism and ,idealism4 ,among these would be1 firstly1 a new and a fresh1 and yet a perfectly rational apprehension of the fact of the necessarily abstract and hypothetical#dje character of the analyses to which our world is subjected by the science and by the technic and the supposed 8economy0 of our present culture4#djf ,then an equally new and equally rational 7or 8rationally grounded07 conviction of the inadequacy of the physical and the scientific categories to the comprehension and the explanation of life and of the life of the spirit4 ,thirdly1 a confirmation of many of the tendencies to which the ,pragmatism and the ,voluntarism and the ,humanism of the last century have given a more or less one-sided and imperfect formulation4 ,among such confirmed tendencies are 77 the attempt they have all made to attain to a deeper#djg view of human nature than the view hitherto taken by rationalism and intellectualism1 77 their emphasis upon the freedom and the initiative#djh of the individual and upon the necessity1 on the part of philosophy1 of a 8dynamic0 or 8motive-awakening0#dji theory of reality1 77 their insistence#daj similarly upon the necessity to our thought of a direct contact with reality1 and upon the impossibility of our beginning in philosophy without assumptions of one kind or another1 77 their refusal to make any ultimate separation#daa between the intellect and the will1 between the highest thought and the highest emotion1 77 their tendency to regard belief#dab rather than knowledge as our fundamental estimate of truth and reality4 ,a fourth constructive result1 however1 of the philosophy of ,bergson would be not the mere confirmation of any number of pragmatist and humanist tendencies1 but their integration1 and their transformation into the evidences and the manifestation of a new spiritual philosophy of life and of the universe generally4 ,it is this possible quasi integration and transformation of so many of the tendencies of ,pragmatism and ,voluntarism and of the ,philosophy of ,science of the day1 that makes ,bergson the greatest of all the pragmatists--although the term hardly occurs in his main writings1 and although he breathes from first to last the air of an idealism#dac and a spiritualism that is above and beyond all the mere instrumentalism1 and the mere empiricism and the ethical opportunism of ,pragmatism4 99 99 99 99 99 ,the following are some of the difficulties and counter-considerations that stand in the way of the intelligibility and the supposed novelty of the philosophy of ,bergson4 7#a7 ,it is in some respects but a biological philosophy after all1 a would-be philosophical interpretation of the 8evolutionary process0 which takes many things for granted and ignores many difficulties4 ,some of these things are the life-force itself1 the lan de vie1 the vital aspects that he sees in the forces of nature1 the 8eternal movement0 of which he is always speaking as the only reality and as the very life of the universe1 the whole 8adaptation0 philosophy that characterises his own teleology despite his attacks on 8mechanism0 and on 8finalism10 and so on4 ,one is tempted1 indeed1 to think that in much of all this he forgets his own doctrine of the hypothetical character of science and philosophy1 and that1 in his very anxiety to escape from mechanism and from rationalism1 and ,paleyism1 he credits ,nature with a contingency and a 8freedom0#dad that corresponds in their way to the chaos1 of which the ,greeks thought as a necessary background to the cosmos4 ,he seems1 in other words1 to deify into a kind of eternal 8becoming0 and a quasi free and creative 8duration10 his own 7necessary7 inability to grasp the system of things4 ,then1 secondly1 there is a veritable crop of difficulties that arise out of his contention that our intellect is adapted 8only to matter40 ,what1 for example1 of the various non-utilitarian#dae intuitions of art and morality and religion1 that are as undoubtedly facts of our conscious experience as is our comprehension and utilisation of 8matter0 for the various purposes of civilisation8#daf ,if it be literally true that our understanding is 8incapacitated0 for the comprehension of life and of the creative activities of the soul1 a new set of categories and a higher form of intelligence 7than the merely material7 must be elaborated for this special purpose4 ,and if this higher form of intelligence be the 8intuition0 of which ,bergson undoubtedly makes so much1 then he must be more careful than he often is in suggesting that intuition and a philosophy of our intuitions 8must go counter to the intellect40#dag ,his theory of art reduces itself1 for example1 in the main to the negative contention that spiritual perception is always simply 8anti-mechanical10#dah simply the power of seeing things in another way than that of the engineer or the craftsman1 the homo faber4 ,thirdly1 there are many dualisms or oppositions in his doctrine or expressed teaching1 reducible all of them to the one great ,cartesian dualism between the mind and the matter that are said by him to intersect in memory1 and in perception1 and in the life of the spirit generally--the opposition1 for example1 between instinct and intelligence1 that between intelligence and intuition1#dai between the 8mechanical0 and the 8organic10 between the 8upward0 and the 8downward0 movements that he attributes to the life-force4 ,and there is a striking inconsistency between his apparent acceptance of the teaching of ,kant in respect of the limitations of the physical and the temporal way of looking at things 7ourselves included and our actions7 and his belief in an eternal 8duration10#dbj or movement1 or process of which he is always speaking as the very life and texture of everything4 ,this 8real0 or 8pure0 8duration0 is a thing that troubles all students of his philosophy2 it seems to make ,bergson believe in what ,james talked of as a 8strung-along0 universe4 ,and there is an inconsistency between the supremacy that he seems willing to accord to mind and spirit in the case of the new individuals who are always being born into the world1 and the absence of a similar supremacy 7or determining rle7 in the case of the mind or spirit without whose existence and operation the universe is unthinkable4#dba ,as for the latter contradiction1 we may note in his favour that he talks1 at least once or twice1 of 8,god0 as 8unceasing life0#dbb and 8active freedom10 and ,i am inclined to take this master thought as possibly a kind of foundation for his rich and suggestive philosophy of life and reality4 ,but there is in his writings nothing like the thorough-going attempt that we find in the philosophy of ,aristotle#dbc to ground the motion and the life of the world in ,god as its final cause and its ultimate explanation4 ,equally little is there in ,bergson a thorough-going attempt to work out the ,idealism#dbd upon which his whole system reposes--his initial conception of objects as 8images10 or 8ideas0 for a consciousness1 or for the life-force1 or for the different 8centres of activity0 with which he peoples the worlds4 ,fourthly1 there is the drawback from the point of view of social philosophy about the thought of ,bergson to which we have already made reference--that it lacks somehow the ethical and the social idealism that would warrant us in thinking of it as a worthy rival or substitute for the philosophy of history of the great idealists of the past and the present4 ,it is necessary to speak here with the utmost caution if we would avoid doing injustice#dbe to ,bergson4 ,we cannot mean1 for example1 that he does not do justice#dbf to the social factor in human development of which we have heard so much1 perhaps too much1 from the sociologists4#dbg ,we might mean1 however1 and we do in a sense mean that he has not made as much as he might have done of this factor1 by developing for the thought of to-day the reality of that world of 8spiritual communion0 and 8inter-subjective intercourse0 of which we have spoken more than once4 ,then we might also contend that ,bergson has not as yet1 in his philosophy of human life1 taken much cognizance of the deeper#dbh experiences of life1 of the specifically ethical and religious feelings and thoughts of men4 ,with the pragmatists he is unduly optimistic about the free expansive development of the individual4 ,against this objection it may be replied1 that he has so thoroughly assimilated into the very texture of his thought and feeling some of the finest things in the spiritualism and the idealism of the reflective thought of ,france#dbi that we would not1 if we could1 wish the germinal or fructifying elements in his system to be different from what they are4 ,his 8social0 message is perhaps after all the best thing that it can be--the need of the inward spiritualization of the life and thought of the individual4 ,lastly1 in addition to the fine traditional spiritualism and libertarianism of ,french philosophy1 we may think of the voluntarism of ,kant and ,schopenhauer as also militating somewhat against the idea of ,bergson's originality#dcj in philosophy4 ,despite this it is still possible to regard him as one of important1 modern1 exponents of just that development of the ,kantian philosophy that became imperative after ,darwinism4 ,he has indeed inaugurated for us that reading of the 8theory of knowledge0 in terms of the 8theory of life0#dca which is his true and real continuation of the critical work of ,kant4 ,hypothetical although it may be in many respects1 it moves 7owing to his thorough absorption in the many facts and theories of the biology of recent years7 in an atmosphere that is altogether above the confines of the physical and the mathematical#dcb sciences with which alone ,kant was 7in the main7 directly acquainted4 ,it is time that1 with the help he affords in his free handling of the facts of life and of the supposed facts and theories of science1 we should transform the exiguous 8epistemology0#dcc of the past generation into the more perfect hold upon 8criticism0 and upon the life of things that is represented in his thought4 ,,concluding ,,remarks ,enough has now been said in the foregoing pages about ,pragmatism and the philosophy of ,actionism in relation to ,rationalism1 and to the ,personalism and the ,humanism that they would substitute for it and for ,absolutism4 ,indications have been given too of the shortcomings and the defects of this very ,personalism or ,humanism1 and of some of the different lines along which it would require to be reconsidered and developed to constitute a satisfactory philosophy4 ,in addition to some of the greater names in the history of philosophy1 ,i have referred--in the footnotes and elsewhere--to the thoughts and the works of living writers who might be profitably studied by the reader in this connexion4 ,pragmatism is in some respects but a sociological or an anthropological doctrine significant of the rediscovery by our age of the doctrine of man1 and of its desire to accord to this doctrine the importance that is its due4 ,it represented1 to begin with 7in its ,instrumentalism chiefly71 the discontent of a dying century with the weight of its own creations in the realm of science and theory along with a newer and fresher consciousness of the fact that there can be no rigid separation of philosophy from the general thought and practice of mankind4 ,and even if we accept this idea of the supremacy of the doctrine of man over both philosophy and science1 this does not mean that we exalt the worker and the prophet over all knowledge1 but simply that philosophy must have a theory of reality that provides for their existence and function alongside of those of the thinker or the student as such4 ,the true philosophy is in fact the true doctrine of man4 ,another lesson that we may learn from ,pragmatism and ,humanism is the truth of the contention that there can be no philosophy without assumptions of one kind or another1 without facts and intuitions and immediate experiences4 ,a philosophy itself is an act or a creation1 representative of the attention of the thinker to certain aspects of his experience and of the experience of the world which he shares with other thinkers and with other agents4 ,and1 as ,bergson has reminded us1 it is often the great intuition underlying the attention and the thought of a philosopher that is of more worth to the world than the dialectic1 or the logic1 through the aid of which it is set forth and elaborated4 ,this latter he may frequently have inherited or absorbed from the schools of his time4 ,the reason why the idealists and the dialecticians of our time have so often fought shy of beginning with the immediate or the 8given10 is partly that they are not yet in their thoughts perfectly free of some taint or tincture of the supposed realism or dualism of the common-sense philosophy or the correspondence view of truth4 ,they seem to have the fear that if they admit a given element of fact in speculation they will unconsciously be admitting that there is something outside thought and immediate experience in the true sense of these terms4 ,in this fear they are forgetful of the great lesson of ,idealism that there is nothing 8outside0 thought and consciousness1 no 8object0 without a 8subject10 that the world is 8phenomenal0 of a great experience1 which they and other men are engaged in interpreting1 and of which we may all become directly conscious4 ,and while to ,god the end of all experiences and processes is known from the beginning1 or apart from the mere time and space limitations that affect us as finite beings1 it is still true that for us as men and as thinkers the reality of things is not 8given0 apart from the contribution to it that we ourselves make in our responsive and in our creative activity4 ,in contending1 therefore1 for the reality1 in every philosophy1 of this assumption of ourselves and of the working value of our thought and of our activity1 ,pragmatism has been contending in its own fashion for the great doctrine of the sovereignty of the spirit which 7when properly interpreted7 is the one thing that can indeed recall the modern mind out of its endless dispersion and distraction1 and out of its reputed present indifference4 ,it is in the placing of this great reality before the world1 or1 rather1 of the view of human nature that makes it a possibility1 and in intelligibility1 that 7in my opinion7 the significance of ,pragmatism consists1 along with that of the various doctrines with which it may be naturally associated4 ,there are many indications in the best thought and practice of our time that humanity is again awakening to a creative and a self-determinative view of itself1 of its experience1 and of its powers4 ,of the presuppositions and the conditions under which this idea may be regarded as true and intelligible ,i have already spoken4 ,its proper interpretation1 however1 along with the exposition of the metaphysic upon which it must be made to repose1 is at least part of the work of the philosophy of the future--if philosophy is true to its task of leading and guiding the thought of mankind4 ,,footnotes #a ,see1 for example1 the concessions and the fresh statements of the problem of philosophy1 and the 8clearing of the ground10 etc41 referred to on p4 #gf and p4 #gd4 ,also p4 #bg in reference to the stir and the activity that have been excited by the pragmatist controversy4 ,see also p4 #bcj1 in the eighth chapter1 in reference to some things in such a typical intellectualist as ,professor ,bosanquet that may be construed as a concession to ,pragmatism and ,humanism4 #b ,dr4 ,edward ,caird affirmed in his memoir of his brother 7,principal ,john ,caird7 that idealists admit some pragmatist charges4 #c ,professor ,stein1 a contemporary ,european authority1 to whom we shall again refer below1 says1 for example1 in his well-known articles in the ,archiv fr ,philosophie 7#aijh71 in reference to ,pragmatism1 that we have had nothing like it as a #8movement' 8since ,nietzsche0 78,der ,pragmatismus10 p4 #i74 #d ,see ,chapter ,,viii41 where ,i discuss the natural theology that bases itself upon these supposed principles of a 8whole of truth0 and the 8,absolute40 #e ,this statement ,i think would be warranted by the fact of the tendency of the newer physical science of the day to substitute an electrical1 for the old material1 or corpuscular1 conception of matter1 or by the admission1 for example1 of a contemporary biologist of importance 7,verworn1 ,general ,physiology1 p4 #ci7 that 8all attempts to explain the psychical by the physical must fail4 ,the actual problem is 444 not in explaining psychical by physical phenomena but rather in reducing to its psychical elements physical1 like all other psychical phenomena40 #f ,see p4 #ha1 and p4 #aej4 #g ,see ,chapter ,v4 pp4 #acf1 #ach1 where we examine1 or reflect upon1 the ethics of ,pragmatism4 #h ,the importance of these volumes in the matter of the development1 in the minds of thinking people everywhere1 of a dynamic and an organic 7instead of the older rationalistic and intellectualistic7 conception of religion and of the religious life cannot possibly be overestimated4 ,of course it is only right to add here that such a dynamic and organic view of religion is the property not only of ,professor ,james and his associates1 but also of the army of workers of to-day in the realms of comparative religion and anthropology4 #i ,pragmatism1 p4 #cjj4 #aj ,or an admission like the following in the ,meaning of ,truth 7p4 #bdc73 8,it may be that the truest of all beliefs shall be that in transsubjective realities40 #aa ,meaning of ,truth1 p4 #abd1 #e4 #ab ,see p4 #dj and p4 #adi4 #ac ,pragmatism1 pp4 #bdd-bde4 #ad ,a ,pluralistic ,universe1 p4 #cd4 #ae ,in respect of ,james' later doctrine of 8radical empiricism0 we may quote1 for the sake of intelligibility1 from ,professor ,perry 7his friend and literary executor7 the following3 8,james' empiricism means1 then1 first1 that ideas are to be tested by direct knowledge1 and1 second1 that knowledge is limited to what can be presented4 ,there is1 however1 a third consideration which is an application of these1 and the means of avoiding a difficulty which is supposed to be fatal to them4 ,this is what ,james calls #8radical empiricism1' the discovery that #8the relations between things1 conjunctive as well as disjunctive1 are just as much matters of direct particular experience1 neither more nor less so1 than the things themselves4' #8,adjacent minima of experience' are united by the #8persistent identity of certain units1 or emphases1 or points1 or objects1 or members 444 of the experience-continuum4' ,owing to the fact that the connexions of things are thus found along with them1 it is unnecessary to introduce any substance below them1 or any subject above them1 to hold things together0 7,present ,philosophical ,tendencies1 p4 #cfe74 ,in regard to this radical empiricism1 ,i am obliged1 as a ,kantian1 to say that1 to my mind1 it represents the reduction of all ,pragmatism and ,empiricism to an impossibility--to the fatuous attempt 7exploded for ever by ,hume7 to attempt to explain knowledge and experience without first principles of some kind or another4 ,it is a 8new ,humism10 a thing which no one who has penetrated into the meaning of ,hume's ,treatise can possibly advocate4 ,a philosophy without first principles1 or a philosophy that reduces the relations between experiences to mere 8bits0 of experience1 is indeed no philosophy at all4 #af ,see p4 #hb and p4 #aed4 #ag ,the ,preface1 pp4 xv41 xix4 #ah ,see p4 #aei and p4 #bab4 #ai ,as for ,dr4 ,schiller's charge that ,absolutism is essentially 8irreligious0 in spite of the fact of its having been 7in ,england7 religious at the outset1 the best way of meeting this is to insist that it is mainly in its form1 rather than its content1 that ,absolutism is 7or was7 irreligious in both ,germany and ,england4 #bj ,british students of philosophy are quite well aware that it was the religious and the spiritual motive that seemed to weigh most with ,hutchison ,stirling and ,john ,caird and ,green in their attempts 7thirty years ago7 to introduce ,german transcendental philosophy to their fellow-countrymen4 ,stirling was impressed with the idea of a working correspondence between ,hegelianism and ,calvinism4 ,john ,caird's animus was against the agnosticism of ,herbert ,spencer and of ,mansel1 and he found inspiration in this connexion in ,hegel's treatment of ,kant's theory of the limitations of the understanding4 ,and to ,green the attractive thing about ,kant was his vindication of a 8spiritual principle0 in 8nature10 and in 8knowledge10 and in 8conduct10 a principle which rendered absurd the naturalism of the evolutionary philosophy4 ,friends of this spiritualistic interpretation of ,german ,critical ,rationalism find its richest and fullest expression in the books of ,edward ,caird upon the ,evolution of ,religion and the ,evolution of ,theology in the ,greek ,philosophers4 #ba ,the idea of a left wing is generally associated in the minds of ,british students with the destructive criticism of ,mr4 ,bradley in ,appearance and ,reality1 in which many1 or most1 of our ordinary ways of regarding reality 7our beliefs in 8primary0 and 8secondary0 qualities of matter1 in 8space0 and 8time10 in 8causation10 8activity10 a 8self10 in 8things in themselves10 etc47 are convicted of 8fatal inconsistencies40 ,see1 however1 ,professor ,pringle-,pattison's instructive account of his book in ,man's ,place in the ,cosmos1 bringing out the positive side4 ,the 8left0 is represented too1 now1 in ,dr4 ,bosanquet's ,individuality and ,value1 which we examine below as the last striking output of ,british transcendentalism or absolutism4 ,see in this entire connexion ,professor ,james ,seth's recent account of the 8,idealist ,answers to ,hume0 in his ,english ,philosophy and ,schools of ,philosophy4 #bb ,see p4 #bdd4 ,i find a confirmation of this idea in what a biologist like ,professor ,needham treats of as the 8autogenetic nature of responses0 7,general ,biology1 p4 #dgd7 in animals4 #bc ,see the ,studies in ,humanism for all the positions referred to1 or quoted1 or paraphrased1 in these two paragraphs4 #bd ,this is an important essay4 ,it reminds the modern reader1 for one thing1 of the importance of the natural theology of ,aristotle4 ,it is an anticipation1 too1 in its way1 of the tendency of modern physics to substitute a dynamic for a static conception of matter1 or atoms1 or substance4 ,in it ,dr4 ,schiller points out how ,aristotle's doctrine of a perfect and self-perfecting ,activity an that is not mere change or motion1 but a perfect 8life0 involving the disappearance of 8time0 and imperfection is in a sense the solution of the old ,greek and the modern demand for the substance or essence of things4 ,we shall take occasion 7in speaking of the importance to ,philosophy of the concept of activity1 and in speaking of the ,philosophy of ,bergson7 to use the same idea1 to which ,dr4 ,schiller has given an expression in this essay1 of ,god as the eternal or the perfect life of the world4 #be ,for a favourable estimate of the services of ,dr4 ,schiller in regard to ,pragmatism and ,humanism the reader may consult the articles of ,captain ,knox in the ,quarterly ,review1 #aiji4 #bf ,studies in ,humanism1 p4 #ai4 ,the remarks made in this paragraph will have to be modified1 to some extent1 in view of the recent 7#aiaa7 appearance of the third edition of ,dr4 ,schiller's ,riddles of the ,sphinx4 ,this noteworthy book contains1 to say the very least1 a great deal in the way of a positive ontology1 or theory of being1 and also many quite different rulings in respect of the nature of metaphysic and of the matter of its relation to science and to common sense4 ,it rests1 in the main1 upon the idea of a perfect society of perfected individuals as at once the true reality and the end of the world-process--an idea which exists also1 at least in germ1 in the pluralistic philosophy of ,professor ,james2 and we shall indeed return to this practical1 or sociological1 philosophy as the outcome1 not only of ,pragmatism1 but also of ,idealism1 as conceived by representative living thinkers4 ,despite1 however1 these many positive and constructive merits of this work of ,dr4 ,schiller's1 it is for many reasons not altogether unfair to its spirit to contend that his philosophy is still1 in the main1 that of a humanistic pragmatism in which both 8theory0 and 8practice0 are conceived as experimentally and as hypothetically as they are by ,professor ,dewey4 #bg ,see p4 #ajf4 #bh ,see ,professor ,bawden's book upon ,pragmatism4 #bi ,pragmatism1 p4 #eh4 #cj ,ibid4 #gf4 #ca ,studies in ,logical ,theory1 p4 #b4 #cb ,i endeavour to indicate what this ,humanism and ,personalism may be in my sixth chapter4 #cc ,journ4 of ,phil4 ,psychol41 #aijf1 p4 #cch4 #cd ,from vol4 ii4 7p4 #cbb7 of ,baldwin's ,dictionary of ,philosophy4 ,dr4 ,c4 ,s4 ,peirce1 formerly a teacher of mathematics and philosophy at ,johns ,hopkins ,university1 was made by ,james into the father or patron saint of ,pragmatism4 ,james confesses to have been stimulated into ,pragmatism by the teachings of ,peirce4 #ce ,journ4 of ,phil4 ,psy41 #aijf1 p4 #cdj4 #cf ,see pp4 #gh1 #adh2 and in reference to the last striking presentation of ,absolutism1 p4 #bcj4 #cg ,see ,bourdeau1 ,pragmatisme et ,modernisme1 and ,w4 ,riley in the ,journ4 of ,phil4 ,psy41 ,april and ,may #aiaa2 the ,james article1 ,journ4 of ,phil41 #aijf2 ,journ4 of ,phil41 #aijg1 pp4 #bf-cg1 on ,papini's 8,introduction to ,pragmatism02 ,the ,nation 7,n4,y471 ,november #aijg1 on 8,papini's view of the #8daily tragedy' of life40 #ch ,reported to have been inaugurated by a ,franco-,italian poet1 ,martinetti4 ,of the question of any possible connexion between this 8,futurism0 with the present ,art movement bearing the same name ,i know nothing definite4 #ci ,i refer to the recent volume dedicated by some of his old pupils to ,professor ,garman--a celebrated teacher of philosophy in one of the older colleges of the ,united ,states4 #dj ,the two large volumes on the ,psychology of ,adolescence4 #da ,the ,psychology of ,religion4 #db ,even such a book--and it is no doubt in its way a genuine and a noteworthy book--as ,harold ,h4 ,begbie's ,twice-born ,men is pointed to by this wing as another instance of the truth of pragmatist principles in the sphere of experimental religion4 ,schopenhauer1 by the way1 was inclined to estimate the efficacy of a religion by its power of affecting the will1 of converting men so that they were able to overcome the selfish will to live4 ,see my ,schopenhauer's ,system in its ,philosophical ,significance4 #dc ,see1 for example1 the declaration of ,james and ,schiller 7in the prefaces to their books and elsewhere7 in respect of their attitudes to the work of men like ,renouvier1 ,poincar1 ,milhaud1 ,wilbois1 ,le ,roy1 ,blondel1 ,pradines1 the valuable reports of ,m4 ,lalande to the ,philosophical ,review 7#aijf-g-h71 the articles of ,woodbridge ,riley in the ,journal of ,philosophy 7#aiaa7 upon the continental critics of ,pragmatism1 the books of ,bourdeau1 ,hebert1 ,rey1 ,tonquedoc1 ,armand ,sabatier1 ,schinz1 ,picard1 ,berthelot1 those of ,poincar1 ,renouvier1 ,pradines1 and the rest1 the older books upon nineteenth-century ,french philosophy by men like ,fouille1 ,levy-,bruhl1 etc4 ,there are also valuable references upon the ,french pragmatists in ,father ,walker's ,theories of ,knowledge 7in the ,stoneyhurst ,series71 and in ,professor ,inge's valuable little book upon ,faith and its ,psychology4 #dd ,the outstanding representative in ,france during the entire second half of the nineteenth century of 8,neo-,criticism0 or 8,neo-,kantianism10 a remarkable and comprehensive thinker1 to whose influence1 for example1 ,james attributed a part of his mental development4 ,his review1 the ,critique ,philosophique1 was a worthy 7idealist7 rival of the more positivistically inclined1 and merely psychological1 review of ,ribot1 the ,revue ,philosophique4 ,french ,neo-,kantianism1 holding1 as ,renouvier does1 that ,kant's ethics is the keystone of his system1 is not in general inclined to the 8positivism0 or the 8scientific0 philosophy of some of the ,german ,neo-,kantians4 ,the critical work of ,renouvier proposes some very ingenious and systematic rearrangements of ,kant's philosophy of the categories1 and his freedom-philosophy must certainly have done a good deal 7along with the work of others7 to create the atmosphere in which ,bergson lives and moves to-day4 ,with ,renouvier1 ,neo-,kantianism merges itself too in the newer philosophy of 8,personalism10 and he wrote1 indeed1 an important book upon this very subject 7,le ,personnalisme1 #aijb74 ,in this work1 we find a criticism of rationalism that anticipates ,pragmatism1 the author explicitly contending for a substitution of the principle of 8rational belief0 instead of the 8false principle0 of demonstrable or a priori 8evidence40 ,consciousness1 he teaches1 is the foundation of existence1 and 8personality0 the first 8causal principle0 of the world 7although admitting 8creation0 to be beyond our comprehension74 ,he examines critically1 too1 the notions of the 8,absolute0 and of the 8,unconditioned10 holding that they should not be substantiated into entities4 8,belief0 is involved in 8every act10 he teaches--also another pragmatist doctrine4 ,and like his great predecessor ,malebranche1 and like our ,english ,berkeley1 he teaches that ,god is our 8natural object10 the true 8other0 of our life4 ,the philosophy of ,personalism1 the foundations of which are laid in this work1 is further developed by ,renouvier in a comprehensive work which he published in #ahii1 in conjunction with ,m4 ,prat1 on ,the ,new ,monadology 7,la ,nouvelle ,monadologie74 ,this is one of the most complete presentations of a philosophy of 8,pluralism0 that is at the same time a 8,theism0--to be associated1 in my opinion1 say1 with the recent work of ,dr4 ,james ,ward upon the ,realm of ,ends1 referred to on p4 #afb4 #de ,philos4 ,rev4 7#aijf71 article by ,lalande4 #df ,h4 ,poincar 7talked of in recent scientific circles as one of the greatest mathematicians of history7 is 7he died about a year ago71 so far as our present purpose is concerned1 one of the important scientific writers of the day upon the subject of the 8logic of hypotheses10 and of the 8hypothetical method0 in science--the method which the pragmatists are so anxious to apply to philosophy4 ,he seems 7see his ,la ,science et l',hypothse1 as well as the later book1 ,la ,valeur de la ,science1 referred to by ,lalande in his professional reports to the ,philosophical ,review7 to accept to some extent the idea of the 8hypothetical0 character of the constructions of both the mathematical and the physical sciences1 believing1 however1 at the same time that we must not be 8unduly sceptical0 about their conclusions1 revealing as they do something of the 8nature of reality40 ,he discusses among other topics the theory of 8energetics0 of which we speak below in the case of ,ostwald4 ,he insists1 too1 upon the idea that the real is known only by 8experience10 and that this 8experience0 includes the comparison of the thoughts of many minds4 ,and yet he believes to some extent in the ,kantian theory of the a priori element in knowledge 7see ,la ,science1 etc41 p4 #fd74 ,it is1 however1 quite unnecessary for me to presume to enter into the large subject of the precise nature of 8hypotheses0 in the mathematical and the physical sciences4 #dg ,a professor of mathematics in ,paris and an ardent ,bergsonian1 and along with ,laberthonnire one of the prominent ,catholic defenders of ,pragmatism and ,modernism1 author of a book on ,dogmatism and ,criticism 7,dogme et ,critique74 ,not having had the time to examine this book1 as somewhat removed from my immediate subject1 ,i append for the benefit of the reader the following statements and quotations from the useful book ,faith and its ,psychology1 by ,professor ,inge of ,cambridge4 ,it is easy to see that the positions represented therein would give rise to controversy as to the historicity or fact of ,christianity4 8,le ,roy gives us some examples of this ,catholic ,pragmatism4 ,when we say #8,god is personal1' we mean #8behave in our relations with ,god as you do in your relations with a human person4' ,when we say1 #8,jesus is risen from the dead1' we mean #8treat him as if he were your contemporary4'444 ,his main theses may be summed up in his own words4 #8,the current intellectualist conception renders insoluble most of the objections which are now raised against the idea of dogma4 ,a doctrine of the primacy of action1 on the contrary1 permits us to solve the problem without abandoning anything of the rights of thought or of the exigencies of dogma4'0 ,le ,roy1 by the way1 has published a book upon the philosophy of ,bergson1 which is said to be the best book upon the subject4 ,it has been translated into ,english4 #dh ,m4 ,abel ,rey1 author of a work on the ,theory of ,physical ,science in the hands of ,contemporary ,scientists 7,la ,thorie de la physique chez les physiciens contemporains74 ,in this book 7,i have not had the time to examine it carefully7 ,m4 ,rey examines the theories and methods of ,newton1 and also of modern thinkers like ,mach and ,ostwald1 reaching the conclusion that the philosophy with which physical science is most compatible is a 8modified form of ,positivism10 which bears a striking resemblance to 8,pragmatism0 and the 8philosophy of experience40 ,the ,english reader will find many useful references to ,rey in the pages of ,father ,leslie ,j4 ,walker's ,theories of ,knowledge1 in the 8,stoneyhurst ,philosophical ,series40 #di ,ibidem4 #ej ,it was impossible to procure a copy of this work of ,m4 ,blondel4 ,i have tried to do so twice in ,paris4 #ea ,m4 ,lalande in the ,philosophical ,review 7#aijf71 p4 #bdf4 #eb ,ibid4 pp4 #bde-bdf4 #ec ,i am inclined to attach a great importance to this idea 7,kant obviously had it7 of 8consulting moral experience directly10 provided only that the 8moral0 in our experience is not too rigidly separated from the intellectual4 ,and it would so far1 therefore1 be only to the credit of ,pragmatism if we could associate it with a rational effort to do justice to our moral experience1 as indeed possibly presupposing a 8reality0 that transcends the limits of our mere individuality1 a reality that transcends1 too1 the subjective idealism that figures but too prominently in modern philosophy4 ,see my eighth chapter1 p4 #bbc1 where ,i criticize ,dr4 ,bosanquet for not consulting moral experience directly4 #ed ,phil4 ,rev41 #aijf1 p4 #bdc4 #ee ,see p4 #afj4 #ef ,see p4 #bjj et4 ff4 #eg ,see p4 #fd4 #eh ,for a later statement upon the philosophy of religion in ,france see a report for the ,phil4 ,rev4 7vol4 xvi4 p4 #cjd71 by ,le ,roy4 ,this whole matter is1 of course1 a subject in itself of the greatest theoretical and practical importance4 ,it is enough for our purpose to have indicated the different ways in which ,pragmatism and the 8,will-to-,believe0 philosophy have been received in ,france1 and the different issues raised by this reception4 ,the reader who would care to look at a constructive1 philosophical view 7by the doyen of ,french philosophy professors7 of the whole issue between the pragmatist or 8voluntarist0 point of view in religion and the older 8intellectual0 view1 cannot do better than consult ,science and ,religion in ,contemporary ,philosophy1 by ,e4 ,boutroux1 a book that is apparently studied everywhere at present in ,france4 ,its spirit and substance may be indicated by the following quotations1 which follow after some pages in which ,m4 ,boutroux exposes the error of 8the radical distinction between theory and practice40 8,the starting point of science is an abstraction1 i4e4 an element extracted from the given fact and considered separately4 ,we cannot expect man to be satisfied with the abstract when the concrete is at his disposal4 ,that would be #8something like offering a printed bill of fare as the equivalent for a solid meal4' ,man uses science but he lives religion4 ,the part cannot replace the whole2 the symbol cannot suppress reality40444 8,not only is science unable to replace religion1 but she cannot dispense with the subjective reality upon which the latter is grounded4 ,it is pure ,scholastic realism to imagine that the objective and the impersonal suffice apart from the subjective in our experience4 ,between the subjective and the objective no demarcation is given which justifies from the philosophical standpoint the divisions which science imagines for her own convenience40 7p4 #cbi74 #ei ,since writing these words1 ,i have made 7thanks firstly to ,dr4 ,schiller's review in ,mind1 ,july #aiaa7 the acquaintance of the important work of ,m4 ,pradines upon the ,conditions of ,action4 ,in the central conception of this work1 that action is 8all-including0 and that all knowledge is a form of action1 ,i find an important development of much that the pragmatists have long been endeavouring to express1 and also in particular a development of the celebrated action philosophy of ,m4 ,blondel4 ,i am inclined1 with ,dr4 ,schiller1 to regard the volumes of ,m4 ,pradines as apparently the high-water mark of ,french pragmatist philosophy in the general sense of the term1 although ,i cannot but at the same time hail with approval their occasional sharp criticism of ,pragmatism as to some extent 8scepticism and irrationalism40 ,i am inclined to think1 too1 that the ethical philosophy of ,m4 ,pradines has some of the same defects that ,i shall venture to discuss later in dealing with the application 7mainly by ,dewey7 of ,pragmatism to moral theory4 ,of course his ,conditions of ,action is by no means as original a production as ,blondel's book upon ,action4 #fj ,fouille speaks in his book upon the ,idealist ,movement and the ,reaction against ,positive ,science of the year #ahea1 as the time of the triumph of 8force10 of 8,naturalism0 7,zola1 ,goncourt1 etc471 and of the revival of ,idealism by ,lachelier1 ,renouvier1 and ,boutroux4 #fa ,see the celebrated work of ,a4 ,fouille1 ,la ,psychologie des ides-forces 7,paris1 #ahij74 ,i confess to having been greatly impressed by this book when ,i first made its acquaintance4 ,in particular1 ,i can think of an idea in ,fouille's book that anticipates even ,bergson1 namely the fact that every idea or sensation is an effort that is furthered or impeded4 ,but ,fouille's works out in this book the active of the volitional side of nearly every mental power and of the mental life itself1 refusing to separate 8mind0 and 8bodily activity40 ,it really anticipates a great deal of the whole ,french philosophy and psychology of action1 including the work of ,blondel and ,bergson4 #fb ,m4 ,paul ,desjardins 7at present a professor of 8letters0 at ,svres7 was influential in ,paris about #ahib-ic as the founder of a ,union pour l',action morale1 which published a monthly bulletin4 ,this society still exists1 but under the name 7and the change is indeed highly significant of what ,pragmatism in general really needs7 ,l',union pour la vrit morale et sociale4 ,i append a few words from one of the bulletins ,i received from ,m4 ,desjardins4 ,they are indicative of the spiritualizations of thought and action for which the old society stood4 8,il ne s'agit de rien moins que de renverser entirement l'chelle de nos jugements1 de nos attaches1 de mettre en haut ce qui tait en bas1 et en bas ce qui tait en haut4 ,il s'agit d'une conversion totale1 en somme44440 8,la rgle commune c'est la mdiocrit d'me1 ou mme ce qu'on pourrait appeler l'athisme pratique4 ,en effet1 ,dieu tant1 par rapport notre conscience1 la ,volont que le bien se ralise1 ou la ,rgle vivante1 on devient pratiquement1 athe1 ft-on d'ailleurs trs persuad par les preuves philosophiques de l'existence de ,dieu1 lorsqu'on perd la notion de cette ,volont immuable avec laquelle la ntre se confond activement ds qu'elle mrite le nom de volont libre1 etc40 ,in this last sentence there is a distinctly pragmatist note in the sense of the action philosophy of ,blondel and ,bergson and the rest4 #fc ,see also the recent book by ,flournoy on the ,philosophy of ,james 7,paris1 #aiaa71 in which this interesting special subject is discussed as well as the important difference between ,james and ,bergson4 #fd ,rey in his ,philosophie ,moderne1 #aijh1 speaks of the 8gleaning of the practical factors of rationalistic systems0 as the 8new line0 in ,french philosophy 7,journ4 of ,phil41 #aiaa1 p4 #bbf74 #fe ,from the ,lalande article already mentioned4 #ff ,this can be seen1 for example1 in the ,preface to ,die ,philosophie des ,als ,ob1 the quasi-,pragmatist book recently edited by ,vaihinger1 the famous commentator on ,kant4 8,we must distinguish in ,pragmatism10 it is there stated1 8what is valuable from the uncritical exaggerations4 ,uncritical ,pragmatism is an epistemological ,utilitarianism of the worst sort2 what helps us to make life tolerable is true1 etc4444 ,thus ,philosophy becomes again an ancilla theologiae2 nay1 the state of matters is even worse than this2 it becomes a meretrix theologorum40 ,this1 by the way1 is a strange and a striking book1 and is perhaps the last conspicuous instance from ,germany of the vitality1 and of the depths of the roots of some of the principles of the pragmatists4 ,the very appearance of the name of ,vaihinger in connexion with it 7as the editor7 must be a considerable shock to rationalists and to ,kantians1 who have long looked upon ,vaihinger as one of the authoritative names in ,german ,transcendentalism4 ,here1 however1 he seems to agree with those who treat ,kant's ethical philosophy of postulates as the real ,kant1 making him out1 further1 as the author of a far-reaching philosophy of the 8hypotheses0 and the 8fictions0 that we must use in the interpretation of the universe4 ,with ,dr4 ,schiller1 who reviews this work in ,mind 7#aiab71 ,i am inclined to think that it travels too far in the direction of an entirely hypothetical conception of knowledge1 out-pragmatising the pragmatists apparently4 ,the student who reads ,german will find it a veritable magazine of information about nearly all the thinkers of the time who have pragmatist or quasi-pragmatist leanings4 ,all the names1 for example1 of the ,german and ,french writers to whom ,i refer in this second chapter are mentioned there ,i had1 of course1 written my book before ,i saw ,vaihinger1 along with many others4 ,it is as serious an arraignment of abstract rationalism as is to be found in contemporary literature1 and edited1 as ,i say1 by the ,nestor of the ,kant students of our time4 #fg ,especially in the open-minded and learned articles in the ,archiv fr ,philosophie1 #aijg1 ,band xiv41 ,professor ,stein 7of ,bern7 is known as one of the most enthusiastic and voluminous writers upon ,social ,philosophy in ,germany4 ,his best-known work is an encyclopedic book upon the social question in the light of philosophy 7,die soziale ,frage im ,lichte der ,philosophie1 #aijc74 ,his tendency here is realistic and naturalistic and evolutionistic1 and he thinks 7for a philosopher7 far too much of men like ,herbert ,spencer and ,mach and ,ostwald4 ,what one misses in ,stein is a discussion of the social question in relation to some of the deeper problems of philosophy1 such as we find in men of our own country like ,mackenzie and ,bosanquet1 and ,ritchie1 and ,jones1 and others4 ,his work1 however 7it has been translated into ,russian and ,french71 is a complete literary presentation of the subject1 and a valuable source of information4 ,see my review notices of it in the ,phil4 ,rev4 vol4 xiv4 #fh ,mach and ,ostwald both represent 7for the purposes of our study7 the association that undoubtedly exists between ,pragmatism and the tendency of all the physical and natural sciences to form 8hypotheses0 or conceptions1 that are to them the best means of 8describing0 or 8explaining0 7for any purpose7 either facts1 or the connexions between facts4 ,mach 7professor of the history and theory of the sciences in ,vienna7 is a 8phenomenalist0 and 8methodologist0 who attacks all a priorism1 treating the matter of the arrangement of the 8material0 of a science under the idea of the 8most economic expenditure0 of our 8mental energy40 ,one of the best known of his books is his ,analysis of the ,sensations 7translated1 along with his ,popular ,science ,lectures1 in the 8,open ,court ,library0 of ,chicago74 ,in this work he carries out the idea of his theory of knowledge as a question of the proper relation of 8facts0 to 8symbols40 8,thing1 body1 matter10 he says 7p4 #f71 8are all nothing apart from their so-called attributes40 8,man possesses in its highest form the power of consciously and arbitrarily determining his point of view40 ,in his ,introduction1 he attempts to show how 8the ego and the relation of bodies to the ego give rise0 to 8problems0 in the relations simply of 8certain complexes0 of 8sensation to each other40 ,while it is undoubtedly to the credit of ,mach that he sees the 8subjective10 or the 8mental10 factor in facts and things and objects1 it must be said that he ignores altogether the philosophical problems of the ego1 or the 8self10 as something more than a mere object among objects4 ,ostwald is one of the founders of the theory of 8,energetics10 the theory of the school that believes in substituting a dynamical philosophy1 for the older1 atomic1 or mechanical philosophy of matter and motion4 ,he put this philosophy forward in #ahie as the last gift of the nineteenth to the twentieth century4 ,he suggests how this idea of energetics may be applied also to psychical processes1 in so far as these may be understood by conceptions that have proved to be useful in our interpretation of the physical world4 ,our 8consciousness would thus come to be looked upon as a property of a peculiar kind of energy of the nerves40 ,the whole idea is a piece of phenomenalistic positivism1 and although ,ostwald makes an attempt 7somewhat in the manner of ,herbert ,spencer7 to explain the 8forms10 or the categories1 of experience as simply 8norms0 or 8rules0 that have been handed on from one generation to another1 he does not occupy himself with ultimate philosophical questions about the nature either of matter or of energy4 ,his ,natural ,philosophy has recently been translated into ,english 7,holt ,co41 #aiaj74 ,its ,pragmatism lies in the fact of his looking upon concepts and classification as 8not questions0 of the so-called 8essence0 of the thing1 8but rather as pertaining to purely practical arrangements for an easier and more successful mastery of scientific problems0 7p4 #fg74 ,he also takes a pragmatist1 or 8functional10 conception of the mental life towards the close of this book4 ,professor ,ostwald lectured some years ago in the ,united ,states1 and his lectures were attended by students of philosophy and students of science4 ,professor 7now ,president7 ,hibben has written an interesting account of his theory in its philosophical bearings in the ,philosophical ,review1 vol4 xii4 #fi ,the philosophy of ,avenarius 7born in ,paris1 but died as ,professor of ,inductive ,philosophy in ,zurich7 is called 8,empirical ,criticism10 which differs from ,idealism by taking a more realistic attitude to ordinary human experience4 ,there is an excellent elementary account of ,avenarius in ,mind for #ahig by ,carstanjen of ,zurich4 ,avenarius goes back in some respects to the teaching of ,comte as to the need of interpreting all philosophical theories in the terms of the social environment out of which they come4 #gj ,logic1 vol4 ii4 p4 #ag4 ,english translation by ,miss ,dendy4 ,in this same section of his work1 ,lotze talks of the demands of our thought as 8postulates0 whose claims rest in the end upon our will--auf unserm ,wollen4 #ga ,to be traced to ,fichte's well-known initial interpretation of ,kant from the standpoint of the ,practical ,reason of the second 8,critique10 and to ,schelling's late 8positive0 philosophy1 and to ,schopenhauer1 the will philosopher par excellence4 ,see my ,schopenhauer's ,system in its ,philosophical ,significance4 #gb ,as an illustration of this 8conceptual shorthand10 ,i take the following lines from ,professor ,needham's book upon ,general ,biology 7p4 #bbb7 in respect of 8classification0 and its relative and changing character4 8,whatever our views of relationship1 the series in which we arrange organisms are based upon the likenesses and differences we find to exist among them4 ,this is classification4 ,we associate organisms together under group names because1 being so numerous and so diverse1 it is only thus that our minds can deal with them4 ,classification furnishes the handles by which we move all our intellectual luggage4 ,we base our groupings on what we know of the organisms4 ,our system of classification is therefore liable to change with every advance of knowledge40 #gc ,professor ,jerusalem 7the translator of ,james's ,pragmatism into ,german7 is known as one of the ,german discoverers of ,pragmatism4 ,his ,introduction to ,philosophy 7translated by ,professor ,sanders1 ,macmillan ,co41 ,n4,y41 #aiaj7 is an admirable1 easy1 and instructive introduction to philosophy from a pragmatist point of view4 ,it has gone through four editions in ,germany4 ,it is quite free from any taint of irrationalism and has sections upon the 8theory of knowledge0 and the 8theory of being40 ,its spirit may be inferred from the following quotations4 8,my philosophy is characterized by the empirical view point1 the genetic method1 and the biological and the social methods of interpreting the human mind0 7the ,preface74 8,philosophy is the intellectual effort which is undertaken with a view to combining the common experiences of life and the results of scientific investigation into a harmonious and consistent world theory2 a world theory1 moreover1 which is adapted to satisfy the requirements of the understanding and the demands of the heart4 ,there was a time when men believed that such a theory could be constructed from the pure forms of thought1 without much concern for the results of detailed investigation4 ,but that time is for ever past0 7pp4 #a and #b74 #gd ,author of a work on ,philosophy and ,social ,economy 7,philosophie und ,wirthschaft71 in which the fundamental idea is that philosophy is essentially nothing more or less than a 8conception of life0 or a view of the world in general1 and that the older rationalistic philosophy will therefore have to be modified in view of modern discoveries and modern ways of looking at things4 ,it has1 of course1 the limitations of such a point of view1 in so far as its author seems to forget that philosophy must lead human life and not merely follow it4 ,my present point is merely to mention of the existence and work of this man as one of the continental thinkers who have anticipated the essentially social conception of philosophy taken by the pragmatists4 #ge ,it is easy to see the influence of ,fichte's will philosophy and practical idealism in ,schellwien's books 7,philosophie und ,leben1 ,wille und ,erkenntniss1 ,der ,geist der neuern ,philosophie74 ,he speaks of the primacy of the will 7in point of time only1 of course71 or of the 8unconscious0 in the life of man1 allowing1 however1 that man gradually transforms this natural life in the life of 8creative activity0 that is his proper life4 ,he states 7in the ,spirit of the ,new ,philosophy7 the pragmatist idea that 8belief0 7p4 #cb7 or the 8feeling0 that we have of the ultimate 8unity0 of 8subject and object10 precedes 7also in point of 8time07 knowledge1 pointing out1 however1 in the same place the limitations of belief4 ,these latter1 he supposes1 to be overcome in the higher knowledge that we have in creative activity--an idea which1 ,i think1 may be associated to some extent with the position of ,blondel4 #gf ,in the ,phil4 ,rev4 7xvi4 p4 #bej7 ,dr4 ,ewald speaks of this work of this psychologizing school as existing alongside of the renewed interest in ,fichte and ,schelling and ,hegel4 ,it is an attempt to revive the teaching of ,fries1 a ,kantian 7at ,jena7 who attempted to establish the ,critique of ,pure ,reason upon a psychological basis1 believing that psychology1 8based on internal experience10 must form the basis of all philosophy4 ,it stands squarely upon the fact that all logical laws and 8categories10 even the highest and most abstract1 in order to 8come to consciousness in man10 must be given to him as 8psychological processes0--a position which is certainly true as far as it goes1 and which supports1 say1 the genetic psychological attitude of ,professor ,dewey4 ,its attitude has been sharply criticized in some of his books by ,dr4 ,ernst ,cassirer of ,berlin1 a well-known upholder of a more rationalistic form of ,neo-,kantianism4 #gg ,dr4 ,simmel of ,berlin 7like ,stein7 is a prominent representative of this school 7even in a recent striking book that he wrote upon the philosophy of ,kant74 ,he has written1 for example1 a most erudite work upon the ,philosophy of ,money1 and this at the same time with all his university work as a fascinating and learned lecturer upon both ancient and modern philosophy4 #gh ,without attempting to enter upon the matter of ,harnack's philosophy as a ,neo-,kantian of the school of ,ritschl1 ,i am thinking simply of things like the following from his book on the ,essence of ,christianity4 8,it is to man that religion pertains1 to man1 as one who in the midst of all change and progress himself never changes0 7p4 #h74 8,the point of view of the philosophical theorists in the strict sense of the word will find no place in these lectures4 ,had they been delivered sixty years ago it would have been our endeavour to try to arrive by speculative reasoning at some general conception of religion1 and then to define the ,christian religion accordingly4 ,but we have rightly become sceptical about the value of this procedure4 ,latet dolus in generalibus4 ,we know to-day that life cannot be spanned by general conceptions0 7p4 #i74 ,see also his protest 7on p4 #bbj7 against the substitution of a 8,hellenistic0 view of religion for religion itself--a protest that is1 according to ,pfleiderer in his ,development of ,theology 7p4 #bih71 a marked characteristic of ,harnack's whole ,history of ,dogma4 #gi ,i am thinking of ,ritschl's sharp distinction between 8theoretical knowledge0 and 8religious faith0 7which rises to judgments of value about the world that transcend even moral values71 and of his idea that the 8truth0 of faith is practical1 and must be 8lived40 ,pfleiderer says 7in his ,development of ,theology1 p4 #ahd7 that ,ritschl's 8conception of religion is occupied with judgments of value ,werturtheile1 i4e4 with conceptions of our relation to the world which are of moment solely according to their value in awakening feelings of pleasure and pain1 as our dominion over the world is furthered or checked40 ,his 8acceptance of the idea of ,god as with ,kant a practical #8belief1' and not an act of speculative cognition10 is also to some extent a pragmatist idea in the sense in which1 in this book1 ,i reject pragmatist ideas4 ,ritschl seems to have in the main only a strongly practical interest in dogmatics holding that 8only the things vital are to be made vital in the actual service of the church40 ,he goes the length of holding that 8a merely philosophical view of the world has no place in ,christian theology10 holding that 8metaphysical inquiry0 applied to 8nature0 and to 8spirit10 as 8things to be analysed1 for the purpose of finding out what they are in themselves1 can from the nature of the case have no great value for ,christian theology40 ,of course he is right in holding that the 8proofs for the existence of ,god1 conducted by the purely metaphysical method1 do not lead to the forces whose representation is given in ,christianity1 but merely to conceptions of a world-unity1 which conceptions are neutral as regards all religion0 7,the ,theology of ,albrecht ,ritschl1 ,swing4 ,longmans1 ,green ,co41 #aija74 ,i think this last quotation from ,ritschl may be used as an expression of the idea of the pragmatists1 that a true and complete philosophy must serve as a 8dynamic0 to human endeavour and to human motive4 #hj ,see the reference to ,windelband in the footnote upon p4 #aej4 #ha ,i am thinking of ,mnsterberg's contention in his ,grundzge and his other books1 that the life of actual persons can never be adequately described by the objective sciences1 by psycho-physics1 and so on1 and of his apparent acceptance of the distinction of ,rickert between the 8descriptive0 and the 8normative0 sciences 7logic1 ethics1 aesthetics1 and so on74 #hb ,the leaders of this school are the two influential thinkers and teachers ,cohen and ,natorp1 the former the author of a well-known book upon ,kant's ,theory of ,experience 7#ahga71 formerly much used by ,english and ,american students1 and the latter the author of an equally famous book upon ,plato's ,theory of ,ideas1 which makes an interesting attempt to connect ,plato's 8,ideas0 with the modern notion of the law of a phenomenon4 ,cohen has given forth recently an important development of the ,kantian philosophy in his two remarkable books upon the ,logic of ,pure ,knowledge and the ,ethic of the ,pure ,will4 ,these works exercise a great influence upon the entire liberal 7,protestant and ,jewish7 thought of the time in ,germany4 ,they teach a lofty spiritualism and idealism in the realm of ethics1 which transcends altogether anything as yet attempted in this direction by ,pragmatism4 #hc ,see the instructive reports to the ,philosophical ,review by ,dr4 ,ewald of ,vienna upon ,contemporary ,philosophy in ,germany4 ,in the #aijg volume he speaks of this renewed interest1 8on a new basis10 in the work of the great founders of transcendentalism as an 8important movement partly within and partly outside of ,neo-,kantianism10 as 8a movement heralded by some and derided by others as a reaction10 as the 8fulfilment of a prophecy by von ,hartmann that after ,kant we should have ,fichte1 and after ,fichte1 ,schelling and ,hegel40 ,the renewed interest in ,schelling1 and with it the revival of an interest in university courses in the subject of the ,philosophy of ,nature 7see the recent work of ,driesch upon the ,science and ,philosophy of the ,organism7 is all part of the recent reaction in ,germany against ,positivism4 #hd ,we may associate1 ,i suppose1 the new ,german journal ,logos1 an international periodical for the 8,philosophie der ,kultur10 with the same movement4 #he ,see ,chapter ,,vii4 upon 8,pragmatism as ,americanism40 #hf ,see an article in the ,critical ,review 7edited by the late ,professor ,salmond1 of ,aberdeen71 by the author upon 8,recent ,tendencies in ,american ,philosophy40 ,the year1 ,i think1 was either #aijd or #aije4 #hg ,see p4 #ahj4 #hh ,without pretending to anything like a representative or an exhaustive statement in the case of this magazine literature1 ,i may mention the following3 ,professor ,perry of ,harvard1 in his valuable articles for the ,journal of ,philosophy and ,psychology1 #aijg1 vol4 iv41 upon 8,a ,review of ,pragmatism as a ,philosophical ,generalization10 and a 8,review of ,pragmatism as a ,theory of ,knowledge02 ,professor ,armstrong in vol4 v4 of the same journal upon the 8,evolution of ,pragmatism02 and ,professor ,lovejoy in the #aijh vol4 upon the 8,thirteen ,pragmatisms40 ,these are but a few out of the many that might be mentioned4 ,the reader who is interested in looking for more such must simply consult for himself the ,philosophical ,review1 and ,mind1 and the ,journal of ,philosophy and ,psychology1 for some years after1 say1 #aijc4 ,there is a good list of such articles in a ,german ,doctor ,thesis by ,professor ,mac,eachran of the ,university of ,alberta1 entitled ,pragmatismus eine neue ,richtung der ,philosophie1 ,leipzig1 #aiaj4 ,there is also a history of pragmatist articles in the #aijg 7,january7 number of the ,revue des ,sciences1 ,philosophiques et ,theologiques4 #hi ,that this has really taken place can be clearly seen1 ,i think1 if we inspect the official programmes of the ,proceedings of the ,american ,philosophical ,association for the last year or two4 #ij ,p4 #add4 #ia ,see p4 #adi4 #ib ,see ,chapter ,,vi41 p4 #adi1 upon the doctrine and the fact of 8,meaning40 #ic ,professor ,pratt1 ,what is ,pragmatism8 7,macmillan ,co41 #aiji72 ,h4 ,h4 ,bawden1 ,the ,principles of ,pragmatism1 a ,philosophical ,interpretation of ,experience1 ,boston1 #aiaj 7a useful book presenting what may be called a 8phenomenological0 account of ,pragmatism72 ,moore1 ,pragmatism and ,its ,critics4 #id ,in ,pragmatism and ,its ,critics 7,univ4 of ,chicago ,press74 #ie ,the manifesto has now become a book4 ,the ,new ,realism 7,macmillan74 ,for a useful account of the ,new ,realism and the ,old see ,professor ,perry1 ,present ,philosophical ,tendencies1 ,part ,v4 #if ,the following are my reasons for saying that the 8,new ,realism0 was already to some extent lurking in the 8radical empiricism0 of ,james4 7#a7 ,although teaching unmistakably the 8activity0 of mind1 ,james seemed to think this activity 8selective0 rather than 8creative0 7falling in this idea behind his much-admired ,bergson74 7#b7 ,despite this belief in the activity of the mind1 he had the way of regarding consciousness as 7to some extent7 the mind's 8content0--an attitude common to all empirical psychologists since ,hume and the ,english associationists4 ,and from this position 7legitimate so far from the psychological point of view7 he went on to the idea 7expressed in a troublesome form in the article1 8,does ,consciousness exist807 that consciousness is not an entity or substance--of course it is not in the ordinary sense of 8entity40 7#c7 ,then from this he seemed to develop the idea that the various 8elements0 that enter into consciousness to be transformed into various 8relationships0 do not suffer any substantial change in this quasi-subjective 8activity40 ,therefore1 as ,professor ,perry puts it 7,present ,tendencies1 p4 #cec71 8the elements or terms which enter into consciousness and become its content may now be regarded as the same elements which1 in so far as otherwise related1 compose physical nature italics mine4 ,the elements themselves1 the #8materia prima1' or stuff of pure experience1 are neither psychical nor physical40 ,it is in this last absurd sentence simply a piece of quasi-scientific analysis1 the error of which ,critical ,idealism would expose in a moment that the roots1 ,i think1 of 8new realism0 are to be found--a doctrine whose unmitigated externalism is the negation of all philosophy4 #ig ,see p4 #afd and p4 #bcj4 #ih ,i refer to his ,aberdeen 8,gifford ,lectures0 on 8,the ,world and ,the ,individual10 and to a well-known address of his upon 8,the ,eternal and the ,practical0 in the ,proceedings of the ,american ,philosophical ,association4 ,in this latter pamphlet he shows that ,pragmatism and the philosophy of ,consequences are impossible without 8the ,eternal0 and without ,idealism4 #ii ,the criticisms of which ,i am thinking are 7to select but a few from memory7 ,green's well-known admission in respect of ,hegelianism1 that it would have 8to be done all over again02 ,mr4 ,bradley's admission that he is 8not a ,hegelian0 and 7recently7 that he has 8seen too much of metaphysics0 to place any serious weight upon its reasonings2 ,jowett's complaint 7in the 8life0 by ,campbell7 that the ,oxford ,hegelianism of his day was teaching students to place an undue reliance upon 8words0 and 8concepts0 in the place of facts and things2 ,dr4 ,bosanquet's admission 7many years ago7 that1 of course1 8gods and men0 were more than 8bloodless categories02 ,professor ,pringle ,pattison's criticism of ,hegel in his ,hegelianism and ,personality2 ,professor ,baillie's criticisms at the end of his ,logic of ,hegel2 ,mr4 ,sturt's criticism of ,neo-,hegelianism in his ,idola ,theatri1 etc4 #ajj ,see the following1 for example1 from ,professor ,stout3 8,every agreeable or disagreeable sensation has a conative or quasi-conative aspect0 7,manual of ,psychology1 p4 #bcc74 ,also3 8,perception is never merely cognitive0 7ibid4 p4 #bdb72 it has a 8conative character and a feeling tone10 etc4 #aja ,a4 ,sidgwick's 8,applied ,axioms0 7,mind1 ,n4,s4 xiv4 p4 #db74 ,this is extremely useful1 connecting the recent pragmatist movement with the work of the ,english logicians4 ,see in the same connexion the articles of ,captain ,knox in the ,quarterly ,review 7,april #aiji7 on 8,pragmatism40 #ajb ,during the last ten years ,mind has contained articles on the pragmatist controversy by nearly all our prominent academic authorities3 ,dr4 ,bradley1 ,dr4 ,mc,taggart1 ,professor ,taylor1 ,professor ,hoernle1 ,dr4 ,schiller1 ,dr4 ,mellone1 ,dr4 ,boyce-,gibson1 ,mr4 ,hobhouse1 and so on4 #ajc ,particularly in his valuable book on ,truth in which the weakness of the ,hegelian conception of truth is set forth along with that of other views4 #ajd ,in ,idealism as a ,practical ,creed1 in his ,browning as a ,religious and ,philosophical ,teacher1 and elsewhere4 #aje ,in his ,elements of ,metaphysic1 and in many of his recent reviews2 in his review1 for example1 of ,professor ,bosanquet's ,individuality and ,value1 in the ,review of ,theology and ,philosophy1 and in his ,mind 7,july #aiab7 review of ,professor ,ward's ,realm of ,ends4 #ajf ,in his book upon the ,philosophy of ,eucken1 in ,god ,with ,us1 and elsewhere4 #ajg ,in ,idola ,theatri 7an important criticism of ,neo-,hegelian writers71 and elsewhere4 #ajh ,in ,essays in ,philosophical ,construction1 and in his book upon ,logic4 #aji ,in his ,introduction to ,logic4 #aaj ,see p4 #aed4 #aaa 8,if ,god has this perfect authority and perfect knowledge1 ,his authority cannot rule us1 nor ,his knowledge know us1 or any human thing2 just as our authority does not extend to the gods1 nor our knowledge know anything which is divine2 so by parity of reason they1 being gods1 are not our masters1 neither do they know the things of men0 7,parmenides1 #acd1 ,jowett's ,plato1 vol4 iv474 #aab ,this is1 of course1 a very old difficulty1 involved in the problem of the supposed pre-knowledge of ,god4 ,bradley deals with it in the ,mind 7,july #aiaa7 article upon 8,some ,aspects of ,truth40 ,his solution 7as ,professor ,dawes ,hicks notices in the ,hibbert ,journal1 ,january #aiab7 is the familiar ,neo-,hegelian finding1 that as a 8particular judgment0 with a 8unique context0 my truth is 8new10 but 8as an element in an eternal reality0 it was 8waiting for me40 ,readers of ,green's ,prolegomena are quite ready for this finding4 ,pragmatists1 of course1 while insisting on the man-made character of truth1 have not as yet come in sight of the difficulties of the divine foreknowledge--in relation to the free purposes and the free discoveries of mortals4 #aac ,there is1 it seems to me1 a suggestion of this rationalist position in the fact1 for example1 that ,mr4 ,bertrana ,russell begins his recent booklet upon ,the ,problems of ,philosophy with the following inquiry about knowledge3 8,is there any knowledge in the world which is so certain that no reasonable man could doubt it80 ,i mean that the initial and paramount importance attached here to this question conveys the impression that the supreme reality for philosophy is still some independently certain piece of knowledge4 ,i prefer1 with the pragmatists and the humanists1 to think of knowledge as concerned with the purposes of persons as intelligent beings1 or with the realities revealed in the knowing process4 ,although there are passages in his book that show ,mr4 ,russell to be aware of the selves and the psychical elements and processes that enter into knowing1 they do not affect his prevailingly rationalistic and impersonal conception of knowledge and philosophy4 #aad ,in his sympathetic and characteristic review of ,james's 8,pragmatism0 in the ,journ4 of ,philos41 #aijh4 #aae ,see p4 #bjc 7the note71 and p4 #bfc1 where ,i suggest that no philosophy can exist1 or can possibly begin1 without some direct contact with reality1 without the experience of some person or persons1 without assumptions of one kind or another4 #aaf ,see p4 #afb4 #aag ,in this attitude ,pragmatism is manifestly in a state of rebellion against 8,platonism10 if we allow ourselves to think of ,pragmatism as capable of confronting ,plato4 ,plato1 as we know1 definitely subordinates 8belief0 to 8knowledge0 and 8truth40 8,as being is to becoming10 he says1 8so is truth to belief0 7,timaeus1 ,jowett's translation74 ,to ,plato belief is a conjectural1 or imaginative1 estimate of reality2 it deals rather with 8appearance0 or 8becoming0 than with 8reality40 8,true being0 he thinks of as revealed in the ,ideas1 or the rational entities that are his development and transformation of the 8definition0 of ,socrates4 ,against all this rationalism ,pragmatism 7it is enough meantime merely to indicate the fact7 would have us return to the common-sense1 or the religious1 position that it is invariably what we believe in that determines our notion of reality4 #aah ,cf4 p4 #aei4 #aai ,from ,dr4 ,schiller's ,humanism4 #abj ,pragmatism1 p4 #bjg4 #aba ,it is this dissatisfaction at once with the abstractions of science and of rationalism and with the contradictions that seem to exist between them all and the facts of life and experience as we feel them that constitutes the great dualism1 or the great opposition of modern times4 ,i do not wish to emphasize this dualism1 nor do ,i wish to set forth faith or belief in opposition to reason when ,i extract from both ,pragmatism and ,idealism the position that it is belief rather than knowledge that is our fundamental estimate of reality4 ,i do not believe1 as ,i indicate in the text above1 that this dualism is ultimate4 ,it has come about only from an unfortunate setting of some parts of our nature1 or of our experience in opposition to the whole of our nature1 or the whole of our experience4 ,that the opposition1 however1 between reason and faith still exists in many quarters1 and that it is and has been the opposition of modern times1 and that the great want of our times is a rational faith that shall recall the world of to-day out of its endless 8distraction0 7the word is ,dr4 ,bosanquet's71 ,i am certainly inclined to maintain4 ,in proof of this statement it is enough to recall things like the words of ,goethe about the conflict of belief and unbelief as the unique theme of the history of the world1 or the 8ethical headache which was literally a splitting headache10 that ,mr4 ,chesterton finds in the minds of many of our great ,victorian writers4 ,i shall take leave of it here with three references to its existence taken from the words or the work of living writers4 ,the first shall be the opposition which ,mr4 ,bertrand ,russell finds in his ,philosophical ,essays 7in the 8,free ,man's ,worship07 between the 8world which science presents for our belief0 and the 8lofty thoughts that ennoble his little day40 ,the second shall be the inconsistency that exists in ,mr4 ,hugh ,s4 ,r4 ,elliot's book upon ,modern ,science and the ,illusions of ,professor ,bergson1 between his initial acceptance of the mechanical1 evolutionary system of modern science and his closing acceptance of feeling and poetry and love as the 8deepest forms of happiness40 ,the third shall be the declaration of ,professor ,sir ,henry ,jones of ,glasgow 7in the ,hibbert ,journal1 #aijc7 that 8one of the characteristics of our time is the contradiction that exists between its practical faith in morality and its theoretical distrust of the conceptions on which they rest40 #abb ,see p4 #bjc 7note74 #abc ,see p4 #g4 #abd ,from ,pragmatism and its ,misunderstanders4 #abe ,see p4 #agc4 #abf 8,you will be surprised to learn1 then1 that ,messrs4 ,schiller's and ,dewey's theories have suffered a hailstorm of contempt and ridicule4 ,all rationalism has risen up against them4 ,in influential quarters1 ,mr4 ,schiller in particular has been treated like an impudent school-boy who deserves a spanking4 ,i should not mention this but for the fact that it throws so much light upon that rationalist temper to which ,i have opposed the temper of pragmatism4 ,pragmatism is uncomfortable away from facts4 ,rationalism is comfortable only in the presence of abstractions4 ,this pragmatist talk about truths in the plural1 about their utility and satisfactoriness1 about the success with which they #8work1' etc41 suggests to the typical intellectualist mind a sort of coarse1 lame1 second-rate makeshift article of truth0 7,james1 ,pragmatism1 pp4 #ff-fg2 italics mine74 ,the words about ,rationalism being comfortable only in the world of abstractions are substantiated by the procedure of ,bosanquet1 to whom ,i refer in ,chapter ,,viii41 or by the procedure of ,mr4 ,bertrand ,russell1 referred to on p4 #afi4 #abg ,see p4 #bce in the ,bergson chapter where it is suggested that perception is limited to what interests us for vital or for practical purposes4 #abh ,cf4 p4 #ib4 #abi ,see p4 #fe4 #acj ,see p4 #bcd upon the 8anti-intellectualism0 in the philosophy of ,bergson4 #aca ,see p4 #d and p4 #bcg4 #acb ,from 8,truth and ,copying10 ,mind1 ,no4 #fb4 #acc ,from 8,truth and ,practice10 in ,mind4 ,cf4 8,this denial of transcendence1 this insistence that all ideas1 and more especially such ideas as those of ,god1 are true and real just so far as they work1 is to myself most welcome0 7,bradley1 in ,mind1 #aijh1 p4 #bbg1 8,ambiguity of ,pragmatism074 ,mr4 ,bradley has of recent years made so many such concessions1 and has philosophized with such an admirable degree of independence1 and has 7also admirably7 attached so much weight to his own experience of 8metaphysics10 and of other things besides1 that many thinkers like ,knox and ,dewey and ,schiller have been discussing whether he can any longer be regarded as a rationalist4 ,one could certainly study1 profitably1 the whole evolution of philosophy in ,england during the last forty years by studying ,mr4 ,bradley's development4 ,he never was1 of course1 a ,hegelian in the complete sense 7who ever was871 and he has now certainly abandoned an abstract1 formalistic ,rationalism4 ,by way of an additional quotation or two from ,mr4 ,bradley1 typical of his advance in the direction of the practical philosophy for which ,pragmatism stands1 we may append the following3 8,i long ago pointed out that theory takes its origin from practical collision the main contention of ,professor ,dewey and his associates4 ,if ,pragmatism means this1 ,i am a pragmatist0 7from an article in ,mind on the 8,ambiguity of ,pragmatism0--italics mine74 8,we may reject the limitation of knowledge to the mere world of events which happen1 and may deny the claim of this world to be taken as an ultimate foundation4 ,reality or the ,good will be the satisfaction of all the wants of our nature1 and theoretical truth will be the perception of ideas which directly satisfy one of those wants1 and so invariably make part of the general satisfaction4 ,this is a doctrine which1 to my mind1 commends itself as true1 though it naturally would call for a great deal of explanation0 7from ,mind1 ,july #aijd1 p4 #cbe74 ,and1 as typical of the kind of final philosophy to which the philosophical reconstruction of the future must somehow attain out of the present quarrel between ,pragmatism and ,rationalism1 the following3 8,if there were no force in the world but the vested love of ,god1 if the wills in the past were one in effort and in substance with the one ,will1 if in that ,will they are living still and still are so loving1 and if again by faith1 suffering1 and love my will is made really one with theirs1 here indeed we should have found at once our answer and our refuge4 ,but with this we should pass surely beyond the limits of any personal individualism0 7from ,mind1 ,july #aijd1 p4 #caf74 ,dr4 ,schiller1 by the way1 has a list of such concessions to ,pragmatism on the part of ,mr4 ,bradley in ,mind1 #aiaj1 p4 #ce4 #acd ,cf4 the saying of ,herbert ,spencer 7,autobiography1 i4 #bec7 that a 8belief in the unqualified supremacy of reason is the superstition of philosophers40 #ace ,see p4 #adg4 #acf 8,truth and ,practice10 ,mind1 ,no4 #ea4 #acg ,it would be easy to quote to the same effect from other ,hegelian students1 or1 for that part of it1 from ,hegel himself4 #ach ,elements of ,metaphysics1 p4 #daa4 #aci ,ibid4 p4 #dad4 #adj ,cf4 p4 #ad4 #ada ,see the well-known volume ,personal ,idealism1 edited by ,mr4 ,sturt4 #adb ,cf4 pp4 #adg and #aic4 #adc ,by this notion is meant the common-sense idea that truth in all cases 8corresponds0 to fact1 my perception of the sunset to the real sunset1 my 8idea0 of a 8true0 friend to a real person whose outward acts 8correspond to0 or 8faithfully reflect0 his inner feelings4 ,see the first chapter of ,mr4 ,joachim's book upon ,the ,nature of ,truth1 where this notion is examined and found wanting4 ,it is probably the oldest notion of truth1 and yet one that takes us readily into philosophy from whatever point of view we examine it4 ,it was held by nearly all the ,greek philosophers before the time of the ,sophists1 who first began to teach that truth is what it 8appears to be0--the 8relativity0 position that is upheld1 for example1 by ,goethe1 who said that 8,when ,i know my relation to myself and to the outer world ,i call this truth4 ,and thus every man can have his own truth1 and yet truth is always the same40 ,the common-sense view was held also by ,st4 ,augustine in the words1 8,that is true what is really what it seems to be 7verum est quod ita est1 ut videtur710 by ,thomas ,aquinas as the 8adequacy of the intellect to the thing10 in so far as the intellect says that that is which really is1 or that that is not which is not 7adaequatio intellectus et rei71 by ,suarez1 by ,goclen1 who made it a conformity of the judgment with the thing4 ,its technical difficulties begin to appear1 say in ,hobbes1 who held that truth consists in the fact of the subject and the predicate being a name of the same thing1 or even in ,locke1 who says3 8,truth then seems to me in the proper import of the word to signify nothing but the joining or separating of signs1 as the things signified by them1 do agree1 or disagree1 one with another0 7,essay1 iv4 #e4 #b74 ,how can things 8agree0 or 8disagree0 with one another8 ,and an 8idea0 of course is1 anyhow1 not a 8thing0 with a shape and with dimensions that 8correspond0 to 8things10 any more than is a 8judgment0 a relation of two 8ideas0 8corresponding0 to the 8relations0 of two 8things40 #add 8,the mind is not a #8mirror' which passively reflects what it chances to come upon4 ,it initiates and tries2 and its correspondence with the #8outer world' means that its effort successfully meets the environment in behalf of the organic interest from which it sprang4 ,the mind1 like an antenna1 feels the way for the organism4 ,it gropes about1 advances and recoils1 making many random efforts and many failures2 but it is always urged into taking the initiative by the pressure of interest1 and doomed to success or failure in some hour of trial when it meets and engages the environment4 ,such is mind1 and such1 according to ,james1 are all its operations0 7,perry1 ,present ,philosophical ,tendencies1 p4 #cea74 ,or the following3 8,i hope that10 said ,james in the 8lectures0 embodied in ,pragmatism 7,new ,york1 #aijh7 444 8the concreteness and closeness to facts of pragmatism 444 may be what approves itself to you as its most satisfactory peculiarity4 ,it only follows here the example of the sister sciences1 interpreting the unobserved by the observed4 ,it brings old and new harmoniously together4 ,it converts the absolutely empty notion of a static relation of #8correspondence' between our minds and reality1 into that of a rich and active commerce 7that any one may follow in detail and understand7 between particular thoughts of ours and the great universe of other experiences in which they play their parts and have their uses0 7p4 #fh2 italics mine74 #ade 8,on any view like mine to speak of truth as in the end copying reality1 would be senseless0 7,bradley in ,mind1 ,july #aiaa1 8,on some ,aspects of ,truth074 #adf ,see p4 #adc and p4 #bfe4 #adg ,see p4 #abg and p4 #acc4 #adh ,see pp4 #adh-i4 #adi ,see p4 #afb4 #aej ,what is ,pragmatism8 7,pratt71 p4 #ba4 #aea ,principles of ,pragmatism1 ,houghton ,mifflin1 #aiaj4 #aeb ,ibid41 ,preface4 ,this last sentence1 by the way1 may be taken as one of the many illustrations that may be given of the crudities and difficulties of some of the literature of ,pragmatism4 ,it shows that ,pragmatism may sometimes be as guilty of abstractionism as is ,rationalism itself4 ,it is not 8experience0 that becomes 8self-conscious10 but only 8persons40 ,and1 similarly1 it is only 8persons0 who pursue 8ends0 and 8satisfy0 desires1 and who may be said to have a 8method40 ,professor ,bawden1 of course1 means that it is to the credit of ,pragmatism that it approaches experience just as it finds it1 and that its chief method is the interpretation of the same experience--an easy thing1 doubtless1 to profess1 but somewhat difficult to carry out4 #aec ,principles of ,pragmatism1 ,houghton ,mifflin1 #aiaj1 pp4 #dd-de4 #aed ,p4 #bec4 #aee ,p4 #bef4 #aef ,see p4 #adf4 #aeg ,see p4 #bdj et ff4 #aeh ,wallace's ,logic of ,hegel1 p4 #cjd4 #aei ,there is a sentence in one of ,hawthorne's stories to the effect that man's work is always illusory to some extent1 while ,god is the only worker of realities4 ,i would not go as far as this1 believing1 as ,i do1 with the pragmatists1 that man is at least a fellow-worker with ,god4 ,but ,i do find ,pragmatism lacking1 as #a indicate elsewhere1 in any adequate recognition of the work of ,god1 or the ,absolute in the universe4 #afj ,i am thinking of such considerations as are suggested in the following sentences from ,maeterlinck3 8,as we advance through life1 it is more and more brought home to us that nothing takes place that is not in accord with some curious1 preconceived design2 and of this we never breathe a word1 we scarcely let our minds dwell upon it1 but of its existence1 somewhere above our heads1 we are absolutely convinced0 7,the ,treasure of the ,humble1 p4 #ag74 8,but this much at least is abundantly proved to us1 that in the work-a-day lives of the very humblest of men spiritual phenomena manifest themselves--mysterious1 direct workings1 that bring soul nearer to soul0 7ibid4 #cc74 8,is it to-day or to-morrow that moulds us8 ,do we not all spend the greater part of our lives under the shadow of an event that has not yet come to pass80 7ibid4 #ea74 ,i do not of course for one moment imply that the facts of experience referred to in such sentences as these should be received at any higher value than their face value1 for there are indeed many considerations to be thought of in connexion with this matter of the realization of our plans and our destiny as individuals4 ,but ,i do mean that the beliefs to which men cling in this respect are just as much part of the subject-matter of philosophy as other beliefs1 say the belief in truth as a whole1 or the beliefs investigated by the ,society for ,psychical ,research4 ,and there may conceivably be a view of human nature upon which the beliefs in question are both natural and rational4 #afa ,see p4 #aja4 #afb ,see p4 #aih on ,dr4 ,bosanquet's dismissal of the problem of teleology from the sphere of reasoned philosophy4 #afc ,appearance and ,reality1 p4 #efa4 #afd ,see p4 #aee4 #afe ,i think that ,i have taken this phrase from ,some ,dogmas of ,religion4 #aff ,from 8,truth and ,copying10 ,mind1 ,no4 #fb4 #afg ,by action in this chapter and elsewhere in this book1 ,i do not mean the mere exhibition or expenditure of physical energy4 ,i mean human activity in general1 inclusive of the highest manifestations of this activity1 such as the search for truth1 contemplation1 belief1 creative activity of one kind or another1 and so on4 ,there is no belief and no contemplation that is not practical as well as theoretical1 no truth that fails to shape and to mould the life of the person who entertains it4 ,i quite agree with ,maeterlinck1 and with ,bergson and others1 that the soul is to some extent limited by the demands of action and speech1 and by the duties and the conventions of social life1 but ,i still believe in the action test for contemplations and thoughts and beliefs and ideas1 however lofty4 ,it is only the thoughts that we can act out1 that we can consciously act upon in our present human life1 and that we can persuade others to act upon1 that are valuable to ourselves and to humanity4 ,it is to their discredit that so many men and so many thinkers entertain1 and give expression to1 views about the universe which renders their activities as agents and as thinkers and as seekers quite inexplicable4 #afh ,there are1 of course1 no heavens in the old mediaeval and ,aristotelian sense after the work of ,copernicus and ,galileo in the physical sciences1 and of ,kant in the realm of mind4 #afi ,professor ,moore well points out 7,pragmatism and its ,critics1 p4 #ac7 that the 8challenge0 of the idea that our thinking has 8two foundations3 one1 as the method of purposing--its #8practical' function2 the other as merely the expression of the specific and independent instinct to know--its #8intellectual' function10 marks the 8beginnings of the pragmatic movement40 ,the idea of two kinds of thought goes back to ,aristotle and is one of the most famous distinctions of thought4 ,it dominated the entire ,middle ,ages1 and it is still at the root of the false idea that 8culture0 can be separated from work and service for the common good4 ,i am glad1 as ,i indicate in the text1 a few lines further on1 that the idealists are doing their share with the pragmatists in breaking it up4 ,in ,america there is no practical distinction between culture and work4 ,see my chapter on ,pragmatism as ,americanism4 #agj ,the importance of this consideration about the 8attention0 that is 7as a matter of fact and a matter of necessity7 involved in all 8perception10 cannot possibly be exaggerated4 ,we perceive in childhood and throughout life in the main what interests us1 and what affects our total and organic activity4 ,it is1 that is to say1 our motor activity1 and its direction1 that determine what we see and perceive and experience4 ,and in the higher reaches of our life1 on the levels of art and religion and philosophy1 this determining power becomes what we call our reason and our will and our selective attention4 ,perception1 in other words1 is a kind of selective activity1 involving what we call impulse and effort and will4 ,modern philosophy has forgotten this in its treatment of our supposed perception of the world1 taking this to be something given instead of something that is constructed by our activity4 ,hence its long struggle to overcome both the apparent materialism of the world of the senses1 and the gap1 or hiatus1 that has been created by ,rationalism between the world as we think it1 and the world as it really is4 #aga ,e4g4 ,professor ,bosanquet1 in his #aijh inaugural lecture at ,st4 ,andrews upon ,the ,practical ,value of ,moral ,philosophy4 8,theory does indeed belong to ,practice4 ,it is a form of conation0 7p4 #i74 ,it 8should no doubt be understood as ,theoria1 or the entire unimpeded life of the soul0 7p4 #aa2 italics mine74 #agb ,this is surely the teaching of the new physics in respect of the radio-active view of matter4 ,i take up this point again in the ,bergson chapter4 #agc ,see p4 #bch4 #agd ,see p4 #adc or p4 #bbi 7note74 #age ,see p4 #cd in ,chapter ,,ii4 in reference to the idea of ,m4 ,blondel4 #agf ,see p4 #adg and p4 #bfe4 #agg ,see p4 #fe1 note #c4 #agh ,see p4 #aib1 note #c4 #agi ,needham1 ,general ,biology1 #aiaa4 ,for the mention of this book as a reliable recent manual ,i am indebted to my colleague1 ,professor ,willey of ,mc,gill ,university4 #ahj ,marett1 ,anthropology1 p4 #aee4 #aha ,cf4 supra1 p4 #aja4 #ahb ,so much may1 ,i suppose1 be inferred from the contentions 7explicit and implicit7 of all biologists and evolutionists4 ,human life they all seem to regard as a kind of continuity or development of the life of universal nature1 whether their theory of the origin of life be that of 7#a7 8spontaneous generation10 7#b7 8cosmozoa0 7germs capable of life scattered throughout space71 7#c7 8,preyer's theory of the continuity of life10 7#d7 8,pflger's theory of the chemical characteristics of proteid10 or 7#e7 the conclusion of ,verworn himself1 8that existing organisms are derived in uninterrupted descent from the first living substance that originated from lifeless substance0 7,general ,physiology1 p4 #cae74 #ahc ,creative ,evolution1 pp4 #bde-e4 #ahd ,it is1 ,i think1 an important reflection that it is precisely in this very reality of 8action0 that science and philosophy come together4 ,that all the sciences meet in the concept1 or the fact1 of action is1 of course1 quite evident from the new knowledge of the new physics4 ,professor ,m',dougall has recently brought psychology into line with the natural sciences by defining its subject-matter as the actions or the 8behaviour0 of human beings and animals4 ,and it is surely not difficult to see that--as ,i try to indicate--it is in human behaviour that philosophy and science come together4 ,another consideration in respect of the philosophy of action that has long impressed me is this4 ,if there is one realm in which1 more than anywhere else1 our traditional rationalism and our traditional empiricism really came together in ,england1 it is the realm of social philosophy1 the realm of human activity4 ,it was the breaking down of the entire philosophy of sensations in the matter of the proof of utilitarianism that caused ,john ,stuart ,mill to take up the 8social philosophy0 in respect to which the followers of positivism joined hands with the idealists4 #ahe ,see p4 #ahe4 #ahf ,see p4 #bg4 #ahg ,see ,chapter ,,vii4 p4 #agi4 #ahh ,i am thinking of ,pyrrho and ,arcesilaus and some of the ,greek sceptics and of their and 4 #ahi ,see p4 #bf4 #aij ,man's ,place in the ,cosmos1 a book consisting of essays and reviews published by the author during the last four or five years4 ,they all advocate 8humanism in opposition to naturalism10 or 8ethicism in opposition to a too narrow intellectualism40 #aia ,the ,will to ,believe1 #ahig4 #aib 8,progress in ,philosophy10 art4 ,mind1 #ae1 p4 #bac4 #aic ,practical ,ethics2 ,essays4 #aid ,mental ,development--,social and ,ethical ,interpretations 7a work crowned by the ,royal ,academy of ,denmark74 ,we can see in this book how a psychologist has been led into a far-reaching study of social and ethical development in order to gain an understanding of the growth of even the individual mind4 ,we may indeed say that the individualistic intellectualism of the older psychology is now no more4 ,it was too 8abstract0 a way of looking at mind4 ,professor ,royce1 it is well known1 has given1 from the stand-point of a professed metaphysician1 a cordial welcome to the work of ,professor ,baldwin4 ,in an important review of ,mr4 ,stout's two admirable volumes on ,analytic ,psychology 7,mind1 ,july1 #ahig71 ,professor ,royce has insisted strongly upon the need of supplementing introspection by the 8interpretation of the reports and the conduct of other people0 if we would know much about 8dynamic0 psychology4 ,it is this 8dynamic0 psychology--the 8dynamics0 of the will and of the 8feelings0--that ,i think constitutes such an important advance upon the traditional 8intellectual0 and 8individualistic0 psychology4 #aie ,the ,psychology of the ,moral ,self4 ,macmillan1 #ahig4 ,i have tried1 in a short notice of this book in the ,philosophical ,review 7,march1 #ahih71 to indicate the importance of some of its chief contentions4 #aif ,philosophical ,lectures and ,remains1 edited by ,professor ,bradley4 #aig ,editor of ,la ,science ,sociale4 ,his recent work on the ,superiority of the ,anglo-,saxons 7 quoi tient la supriorit des ,anglo-,saxons87--a chapter in the study of the conditions of race survival--ran through seventeen editions in a few months1 and set the whole press of ,france and ,germany 7other countries following suit7 into commotion1 as well as calling forth pronunciamientos from most of the prominent editors and critics of ,france1--men like ,jules ,lematre1 ,paul ,bourget1 ,marcel ,prevost1 ,franois ,coppe1 douard ,rod1 ,g4 ,valbert1 etc4 #aih ,now ,professor ,a4 ,seth ,pringle-,pattison4 #aii ,in different ways by all of the following ,english writers3 ,professor ,a4 ,seth 78,it is not in knowledge1 then1 as such1 but in feeling and action that reality is given10 ,man's ,place1 etc41 p4 #abb1 etc4 etc471 by ,mr4 ,bradley 7,appearance and ,reality71 by ,mr4 ,balfour 7in his ,foundations of ,belief71 and by ,professor ,james4 ,professor ,eucken1 of ,jena1 in his different books1 also insists strongly upon the idea that it is not in knowledge as such1 but in the totality of our psychical experience that the principles of philosophy must be sought4 ,paulsen1 in his ,einleitung in die ,philosophie1 and ,weber1 in his ,history of ,philosophy 7books in general use to-day71 both advocate a kind of philosophy of the will1 the idea that the world is to be regarded as a striving on the part of wills after a partly unconscious ideal4 ,simmel1 in an important article in the ,revue de ,mtaphysique et de ,morale1 ,,iv4 #b1 expresses the idea 7which it would be well to recognize generally at the present time7 that truth is not something objectively apart from us1 but rather the name we give to conceptions that have proved to be the guides to useful actions1 and so become part of the psychical heritage of human beings4 ,professor ,ribot1 of ,paris1 has written more extensively upon the will and the feelings than upon the intellect1--a fact in keeping with the scientific demands of our day4 #bjj ,see1 e4g41 an article by ,fouille in the ,revue ,philosophique1 ,,xxi4 #e1 with the very title 8,ncessit d'une interprtation psychologique et sociologique du monde40 ,fouille finds there1 as he does elsewhere1 that will is the principle that enables us to unify the physical with the psychical world1--an illustration of the fact that the two characteristics ,i am referring to are really one4 ,a present instance of the introduction of the element of will 7the will of man1 even7 is to be seen in the contention of such a book as ,m4 ,lucien ,arrat's ,les ,croyances de ,demain 7#ahih74 ,according to ,mind1 ,m4 ,arrat proposes to substitute the idea that man can by his efforts bring about the supremacy of justice for the traditional idea that justice reigns in the universe4 #bja ,manual of ,ethics1 according to ,mr4 ,stout1 ,international ,journal of ,ethics1 ,october #ahid4 ,there are many similar sentences and ideas in the book4 #bjb ,elements of ,ethics1 p4 #bcb4 #bjc ,now ,professor of ,logic in ,st4 ,andrews4 #bjd ,international ,journal of ,ethics1 ,october #ahid1 p4 #aai4 #bje ,i think that ,i must here have meant ,professor ,watson's ,christianity and ,idealism4 #bjf ,and apart from the idealism and the ethical philosophy of which ,i speak1 in the next chapter1 as necessary to convert ,pragmatism into the ,humanism it would like to become1 ,pragmatism is really a kind of romanticism1 the reaction of a personal enthusiasm against the abstractions of a classical rationalism in philosophy4 ,there is an element of this romanticism in ,james's heroic philosophy of life1 although ,i would prefer to be the last man in the world to talk against this heroic romanticism in any one4 ,it is the great want of our time1 and it is the thing that is prized most in some of the men whom this ephemeral age of ours still delights to honour4 ,it was exhibited both in ,browning and in ,george ,meredith1 for example4 ,of the former ,mr4 ,chesterton writes in his trenchant1 clean-sweeping little book on ,the ,victorian ,age in ,literature1 p4 #age3 8,what he really was was a romantic4 ,he offered the cosmos as an adventure rather than a scheme40 ,the same thing could be said about ,james's 8,will to ,believe0 ,philosophy4 ,meredith1 although far less of an idealist than ,browning1 was also an optimist by temperament rather than by knowledge or by conviction--hence the elevation of his tone and style in spite of his belated naturalism4 #bjg ,in ,un ,romantisme utilitaire 7,paris1 ,alcan1 #aiaa71 chiefly a study of the ,pragmatism of ,nietzsche and ,poincar4 #bjh ,i am indebted for this saying of one of my old teachers to ,mr4 ,c4 ,f4 ,g4 ,masterman1 in his essay upon ,sidgwick in that judicious and interesting book upon the transition from the nineteenth to the twentieth century1 ,in ,peril of ,change4 #bji ,stoicism and ,epicureanism1 as the matter is generally put1 both substitute the practical good of man as an individual for the wisdom or the theoretical perfection that were contemplated by ,plato and ,aristotle as the highest objects of human pursuit4 ,for ,cicero1 too1 the chief problems of philosophy were in the main practical1 the question whether virtue alone is sufficient for happiness1 the problem of practical certainty as opposed to scepticism1 the general belief in ,providence and in immortality1 and so on4 ,and ,lucretius thinks of the main service of philosophy as consisting in its power of emancipating the human mind from superstition4 ,all this is quite typical of the essentially practical nature of the ,roman character1 of its conception of education as in the main discipline and duty1 of its distrust of ,greek intellectualism1 and of its preoccupation with the necessities of the struggle for existence and for government1 of its lack of leisure1 and so on4 ,i do not think that the very first thing about ,pragmatism is its desire to return to a practical conception of life1 although a tendency in this direction doubtless exists in it4 #baj ,the idea that our 8demonstrable knowledge is very short1 if indeed we have any at all1 although our certainty is as great as our happiness1 beyond which we have no concernment to know or to be0 7,essay1 iv4 #b-ad72 or ,locke's words3 8,i have always thought the actions of men the best interpreters of their thoughts40 #baa ,schopenhauer1 for example1 used to be fond of repeating that his own philosophy 7which took will to be the fundamental reality7 was on its very face necessarily more of an ethic than a system like that of ,spinoza1 for example1 which could only be called an ethic by a sort of lucus a non lucendo4 #bab ,the ,practical ,reason to ,aristotle is the reason that has to do with the pursuit of aims and ends1 in distinction from the reason that has to do with knowledge1 and the 8universal0 and science4 ,this twofold distinction has given many problems to his students and to his commentators1 and to succeeding generations4 ,it is responsible for the entire medival and ,renaissance separation of the intellectual life and the intellectual virtues from the practical life and the practical virtues4 #bac ,it might be added here that ,logic has always recognized the validity1 to some extent1 of the argument 8from consequences0 of which ,pragmatism makes so much4 ,the form of argumentation that it calls the ,dilemma is a proof of this statement4 ,a chain of reasoning that leads to impossible consequences1 or that leads to consequences inconsistent with previously admitted truths1 is necessarily unsound4 ,that this test of tenable or untenable consequences has often been used in philosophy in the large sense of the term must be known only too well to the well-informed reader4 ,as ,sidgwick says in his ,method of ,ethics3 8,the truth of a philosopher's premises will always be tested by the acceptability of his conclusions2 if in any important point he is found in flagrant conflict with common opinion1 his method will be declared invalid40 ,reid used the argument from consequences in his examination of the sceptical philosophy of ,hume4 ,it is used with effect in ,mr4 ,arthur ,balfour's ,foundations of ,belief in regard to the supposed naturalism of physical science4 ,edmund ,burke applied it to some extent to political theories1 or to the abstract philosophical theories upon which some of them were supposedly based4 #bad ,pragmatism has been called by some critics a 8new-,humism0 on the ground of its tendency to do this very thing that is mentioned here in respect of ,hume4 ,but the justice or the injustice of this appellation is a very large question1 into which it is needless for us to enter here4 #bae ,cf4 8,intelligence is the aptitude to modify conduct in conformity to the circumstances of each case0 7,the ,positive ,philosophy1 ,martineau1 i4 #dfe74 #baf ,principles of ,philosophy1 ,part ,,ii4 iii4 ,it is also an eminently pragmatist idea on the part of ,descartes to hold that 8,i should find much more truth in the reasoning of each individual with reference to the affairs in which he is personally interested1 and the issue of which must presently punish him if he has judged amiss1 than in those conducted by a man of letters in his study1 regarding speculative matters that are of no practical moment0 7,method1 ,veitch's edition1 p4 #aj74 #bag ,principles of ,philosophy1 ,part ,,ii4 iii4 p4 #bcc4 #bah ,see ,principles of ,psychology1 ch4 ii41 8,assumption of ,metaphysicians10 and also elsewhere in his ,essays4 #bai 8,any power of doing or suffering in a degree however slight was held by us to be the definition of existence0 7,sophist1 ,jowett's ,plato1 iv4 p4 #dfe74 #bbj ,the ,theory of ,knowledge1 ,preface1 p4 ix4 #bba 8,the independence of the doctrines of any science from the social life1 the prevalent thought of the generation in which they arise1 is indeed a fiction1 a superstition of the scientist which we would fain shatter beyond all repair2 but the science becomes all the sounder for recognizing its origins and its resources1 its present limitations and its need of fresh light from other minds1 from different social moulds0 7pp4 #bae-baf74 #bbb ,see p4 #ha4 #bbc ,cf4 p4 #ac4 #bbd ,the ,new ,knowledge1 p4 #bee4 #bbe ,it would indeed be easy to quote from popular writers of the day1 like ,mr4 ,chesterton or ,mr4 ,a4 ,c4 ,benson or ,mr4 ,h4 ,g4 ,wells1 to show that a knowledge of the existence of ,pragmatism as a newer experimental or 8sociological0 philosophy is now a commonplace of the day4 ,take the following1 for example1 from ,mr4 ,wells's ,marriage 7p4 #eba73 8,it was to be a pragmatist essay1 a sustained attempt to undermine the confidence of all that scholastic logic-chopping which still lingers like the sequelae of a disease in our ,university philosophy 444 a huge criticism and cleaning up of the existing methods of formulation as a preliminary to the wider and freer discussion of those religious and social issues our generation still shrinks from40 8,it is grotesque10 he said1 8and utterly true that the sanity and happiness of all the world lies in its habits of generalization40 #bbf ,i cannot meantime trace1 or place1 this quotation1 although ,i remember copying it out of something by ,karl ,pearson4 #bbg ,in the ,literary ,digest for #aiaa4 #bbh ,see p4 #bcd4 #bbi ,from a letter to ,mrs4 ,humphry ,ward1 quoted in ,a4 ,c4 ,benson's ,walter ,pater1 p4 #bjj4 #bcj ,lecture ,i4 towards the beginning4 #bca ,see p4 #fb and p4 #aig4 ,it should be remembered that our reasoned opinions rest upon our working beliefs4 #bcb ,vol4 ii4 p4 #hf4 #bcc ,see the reference in ,chapter ,,ii4 p4 #bf to the opportunistic ethic of ,prezzolini4 #bcd ,in ,what is ,pragmatism8 ,macmillan ,co4 #bce ,cf4 p4 #ha4 #bcf ,professor ,pratt makes an attempt in his book on ,what is ,pragmatism8 7pp4 #ge-f-g7 to show that the true meaning of the 8correspondence theory0 is not inconsistent with ,pragmatism or that ,pragmatism is not inconsistent with this truth4 #bcg ,cf4 supra1 p4 #fd4 #bch ,see the ,note on p4 #ba4 #bci ,cf4 supra1 p4 #fg4 #bdj ,papini1 in fact 7in #aijg71 went the length of saying that you cannot even define ,pragmatism1 admitting that it appeals only to certain kinds of persons4 #bda ,for a serviceable account1 in ,english1 of the differences between the pragmatist philosophy of hypotheses and the more fully developed philosophy of science of the day1 see ,father ,walker's ,theories of ,knowledge1 chapter xiii41 upon 8,pragmatism and ,physical ,science40 #bdb ,cf4 supra1 p4 #aj and p4 #ae4 ,and this failure to systematize becomes1 it should be remembered1 all the more exasperating1 in view of the prominence given by the pragmatists to the supreme principles of 8end0 and 8consequences40 #bdc ,in the 8,axioms as ,postulates0 essay in ,personal ,idealism4 #bdd ,bourdeau makes the same charge1 saying that all pragmatists have the illusion that 8reality is unstable40 ,professor ,stout has something similar in view in referring to ,dr4 ,schiller's 8primary reality0 in the ,mind review of ,studies in ,humanism4 ,it is only the reality with which we have to do 7reality as an ,aristotelian might say7 that is 8in the making03 for ,god there can be no such distinction between process and product4 ,but it is quite evident that ,pragmatism does not go far enough to solve1 or even to see1 such difficulties4 ,it confines itself in the main to the contention that man must think of himself as a maker of reality to some extent--a contention that ,i hold to be both true and useful1 as far as it goes4 #bde ,pragmatism1 p4 #bfd4 #bdf 8,pragmatism10 ,october #aijj4 #bdg ,the same line of reflection will be found in ,james's ,pragmatism1 p4 #if4 #bdh ,professor ,moore has a chapter in his book 7,pragmatism and its ,critics7 devoted to the purpose of showing the necessary failure of ,absolutism 7or of an ,intellectualism of the absolutist order7 in the realm of ethics1 finding in the experimentalism and the quasi-,darwinism of ,pragmatism an atmosphere that is1 to say the least1 more favourable to the realities of our moral experience4 ,while ,i cannot find so much as he does in the hit-and-miss ethical philosophy of ,pragmatism1 ,i quite sympathize with him in his rejection of ,absolutism or ,rationalism as a basis for ethics4 ,the following are some of his reasons for this rejection3 7#a7 ,the 8purpose0 that is involved in the ethical life must1 according to ,absolutism1 be an all-inclusive and a fixed purpose1 allowing of no 8advance0 and no 8retreat0---things that are imperative to the idea of the reality of our efforts4 7#b7 ,absolutism does not provide for human responsibility2 to it all actions and purposes are those of the ,absolute4 7#c7 ,the ethical ideal of ,absolutism is too 8static40 7#d7 ,absolutism does not provide any material for 8new goals and new ideals40 ,see pp4 #bah-bbe in my eighth chapter1 where ,i censure1 in the interest of ,pragmatism and ,humanism1 the ethical philosophy of ,professor ,bosanquet4 #bdi ,see p4 #bbd1 where ,i arrive at the conclusion that the same thing may be said of the ,absolutism of ,dr4 ,bosanquet4 #bej ,students of that important nineteenth-century book upon ,ethics1 the ,methods of ,ethics1 by ,henry ,sidgwick1 will remember that ,sidgwick expressly states it as a grave argument against ,utilitarianism that it is by no means confirmed by the study of the actual origin of moral distinctions4 ,as we go back in history we do not find that moral prescriptions have merely a utilitarian value4 #bea ,what ,i understand by the 8normative idea of ethical science0 will become more apparent as ,i proceed4 ,i may as well state1 however1 that ,i look upon the distinction between the 8descriptive0 ideals of science and the 8normative0 character of the ideals of the ethical and the socio-political sciences as both fundamental and far-reaching4 ,there are two things1 as it were1 that constitute what we might call the subject-matter of philosophy---8facts0 and 8ideals02 or1 rather1 it is the synthesis and reconciliation of these two orders of reality that constitute the supreme problem of philosophy4 ,it is with the description of facts and of the laws of the sequences of things that the 8methodology0 of science and of ,pragmatism is in the main concerned4 ,and it is because ,pragmatism has hitherto shown itself unable to rise above the descriptive and hypothetical science of the day to the ideals of the normative sciences 7ethics1 aesthetics1 etc47 that it is an imperfect philosophy of reality as we know it1 or of the different orders of reality4 #beb ,cf4 ,professor ,ward in ,naturalism and ,agnosticism 7vol4 ii4 p4 #aee73 8,what each one immediately deals with in his own experience is1 ,i repeat1 objective reality in the most fundamental sense40 #bec ,introduction to ,science1 p4 #acg4 #bed 8,but if the primitive ,amoebae gave rise #8in the natural course of events' to higher organisms and these to higher1 until there emerged the supreme ,mammal1 who by and by had a theory of it all1 then the primitive ,amoebae which had in them the promise and the potency of all this were very wonderful ,amoebae indeed4 ,there must have been more in them than met the eye6 ,we must stock them1 with initiatives at least4 ,we are taking a good deal as #8given4'0 ,italics mine4--,j4 ,h4 ,thomson1 ,introduction to ,science1 p4 #acg4 #bee ,see ,westermarck1 vol4 i4 pp4 #gd1 #ic1 #aag1 and chapter iii4 generally4 ,the sentence further down in respect of the permanent fact of the moral consciousness is from ,hobhouse1 vol4 ii4 p4 #ed4 ,as instances of the latter1 ,hobhouse talks of things like the 8purity of the home1 truthfulness1 hospitality1 help01 etc41 in ,iran1 of the doctrine of ,non-,resistance in ,lao ,tsze1 of the high conception of personal righteousness revealed in the ,book of the ,dead1 of the contributions of monotheism to ethics1 etc4 etc4 #bef ,cf4 p4 #afg4 #beg ,it may1 ,i suppose1 be possible to exaggerate here and to fall to some extent into what ,mr4 ,bradley and ,nietzsche and others have thought of as the 8radical vice of all goodness0--its tendency to forget that other things1 like beauty and truth1 may also be thought of as absolute 8values10 as revelations of the divine4 ,what ,i am thinking of here is simply the realm of fact that is implied1 say1 in the idea of ,horace1 when he speaks of the upright man being undismayed even by the fall of the heavens 7impavidum ferient ruinae7 or by the idea of the ,stoic sage that the virtuous man was as necessary to ,jupiter as ,jupiter could be to him1 or by the idea 7attributed to ,socrates7 that if the rulers of the universe do not prefer the just man to the unjust it is better to die than to live4 ,if against all this sort of thing one is reminded by realism of the 8splendid immoralism0 of ,nature1 of its apparent indifference to all good and ill desert1 ,i can but reply1 as ,i have done elsewhere in this book1 that the ,nature of which physical science speaks is an 8abstraction0 and an unreality1 and that it matters1 therefore1 very little whether such a ,nature is1 or is not1 indifferent to morality4 ,we know1 however1 of no ,nature apart from life1 and mind1 and consciousness1 and thought1 and will4 ,it is ,god1 and not ,nature1 who makes the sun to shine on the just and the unjust4 #beh ,by this 8meaning0 is to be understood firstly the effects upon our appetitive and conative tendencies of the various specific items 7whether sensation1 or affections1 or emotions1 or what not7 of our experience1 the significance1 that is to say1 to our total general activity of all the particular happenings and incidents of our experience4 ,psychologists all tell us of the vast system of 8dispositions0 with which our psychophysical organism is equipped at birth1 and through the help of which we interpret the sensations and occurrences of our experience4 ,and in addition to these dispositions we have1 in the case of the adult1 the coming into play of the many associations and memories that are acquired during the experiences of a single lifetime4 ,it is these various associations that interpret to us the present and give it meaning4 ,in a higher sense we might interpret 8meaning0 as expressive of the higher predicates1 like the good and the beautiful and the true1 that we apply to some things in the world of our socialized experience4 ,and in the highest sense we might interpret it as the significance that we attach to human history as distinguished from the mere course of events--the significance upon which the philosophy of history reposes4 ,see ,eucken in the article upon the ,philosophy of ,history in the 8systematic0 volume of ,hinneberg's ,kultur der ,gegenwart4 #bei ,see our second chapter upon the different continental and ,british representatives of the hypothetical treatment of scientific laws and conceptions that is such a well-marked tendency of the present time4 ,by no one perhaps was this theory put more emphatically than by ,windelband 7of ,strassburg7 in his ,prludien 7#ahhd7 and in his ,geschichte und ,naturwissenschaft 7#ahid74 ,in the latter he contrasts the real individuals and personalities with which the historians deal with the impersonal abstractions of natural science4 ,i fully subscribe to this distinction1 and think that it underlies a great deal of the thought of recent times4 #bfj ,see 8truth and real existence0 in the ,republic1 #ejh ,d--,jowett's rendering of 78over which truth and real existence are shining074 ,also further in the same place1 8,the cause of science and of truth10 ' 4 ,in #chi ,e we read that a 8high value must be set on truth40 ,of course to ,plato 8truth0 is also1 and perhaps even primarily1 real existence1 as when he says 7,rep4 #ehe71 8that which has less of truth will also have less of essence40 ,but in any case truth always means more for him than 8mere being10 or existence1 or 8appearance10 it is the highest form of being1 the object of 8science10 the great discovery of the higher reason4 #bfa ,to ,professor ,bosanquet1 for example2 see below1 p4 #bac1 note #b4 #bfb ,the ,poetry of the ,old ,testament1 ,professor ,a4 ,r4 ,gordon4 #bfc ,ibid4 p4 #d4 #bfd ,the ,poetry of the ,old ,testament1 p4 #afj4 #bfe ,ibid4 pp4 #ahc-ahd4 #bff ,it is this false conception of truth as a 8datum0 or 8content0 that wrecks the whole of ,mr4 ,bradley's argument in ,appearance and ,reality4 ,see on the contrary the following quotation from ,professor ,boyce ,gibson 7,eucken's ,philosophy of ,life1 p4 #aji7 in respect of the attitude of ,eucken towards the idea of truth as a personal ideal4 8,the ultimate criterion of truth is not the clearness and the distinctness of our thinking1 nor its correspondence with a reality external to it1 nor any other intellectualistic principle4 ,it is spiritual fruitfulness as invariably realized by the personal experient1 invariably realized as springing freshly and freely from the inexhaustible resources which our freedom gains from its dependence upon ,god40 #bfg ,it is part of the greatness of ,hegel1 ,i think1 to have sought to include the truth of history and of the social order in the truth of philosophy1 or in spiritual truth generally4 ,his error consists in not allowing for the fresh revelations of truth that have come to the world through the insight of individuals and through the actions and the creations of original men4 #bfh ,there is a sentence in the ,metaphysics of which ,i cannot but think at this point1 and which so far at least as the rationalist-pragmatist issue is concerned is really one of the deepest and most instructive ideas in the whole history of philosophy4 ,it is one of ,aristotle's troublesome additional statements in reference to something that he has just been discussing--in this case the 8object of desire0 and the 8object of thought40 ,and what he adds in the present instance is this 7,bk4 xii4 #g73 8,the primary objects of these two things are the same0-- --rendered by ,smith and ,ross 8the primary objects of thought and desire are the same40 ,the translation1 of course1 is a matter of some slight difficulty1 turning upon the proper interpretation of 1 8the first things10 although1 of course1 the student soon becomes familiar with what ,aristotle means by 8first things10 and 8first philosophy10 and 8first in nature10 and 8first for us10 and so on4 ,themistius in his commentary on this passage 7,commentaria in ,aristotelem ,graeca1 vol4 v4 i-vi2 ,themistius in ,metaphysica1 #ajgb and #ag-cj7 puts it that 8in the case of immaterial existences the desirable and the intelligible are the same--in primis vero principiis materiae non immixtis idem est desiderabile atque intelligibile40 ,i am inclined to use this great idea of the identity of the desirable and the intelligible--for conscious1 intelligent beings as the fundamental principle of the true ,humanism of which ,pragmatism is in search4 ,it is evidently in this identity that ,professor ,bosanquet also believes in when he says3 8,i am persuaded that if we critically understand what we really want and need1 we shall find it established by a straightforward argument0 7,preface to ,individuality and ,value4 ,see the eighth chapter of this book74 ,it is certainly true that the constructive philosophy of which we are in search to-day must leave no gap between thought and desire4 #bfi ,i find an illustration or a confirmation of this thought in the following piece of insight of ,mr4 ,chesterton in regard to the 8good10 which is no doubt a 8predicate0 of our total thought and feeling and volition4 8,or1 in other words1 man cannot escape from ,god1 because good is ,god in man2 and insists on omniscience0 7,victorian ,age in ,literature1 p4 #bdf--;italics mine74 ,a belief in goodness is certainly a belief in an active goodness greater than our own2 and it does raise a desire for a comprehension of things4 #bgj ,the reader will find a good deal in ,professor ,baldwin's ,social and ,ethical ,interpretations of ,mental ,development upon the relation of truth and thought to desire1 and also upon the social1 or the pragmatist or the experimental test of beliefs4 #bga ,see ,chapter ,,ix41 in reference to ,bergson's 8creative activity40 #bgb ,the reader who is anxious to obtain a working idea of the limits of knowledge from a scientific point of view had better consult such pieces of literature as ,sir ,oliver ,lodge's recent examination of ,haeckel's ,riddle of the ,universe1 ,professor ,ward's ,naturalism and ,agnosticism1 ,merz's ,history of ,european ,thought during the ,nineteenth ,century1 or ,verworn's ,general ,physiology 7with its interesting account of the different theories of the origin of life1 and its admission that after all we know matter only through mind and sensation74 ,perusal of the most recent accessible literature upon this whole subject will reveal the fact that these old questions about the origin of life and motion1 and about the nature of evolution1 are still as unsettled as they were in the last half of the last century4 ,it is not merely1 however1 of the actual limits of science at any one time that we are obliged1 as human beings1 to think1 but of the limits of science in view of the fact that our knowledge comes to us in part1 under the conditions of space and time1 and under the conditions of the limits of our senses and of our understanding4 ,knowledge is certainly limited in the light of what beings other than ourselves may know1 and in the light of what we would like to know about the universe of life and mind4 ,i do not think that this whole question of the limits of our knowledge is such a burning question to-day as it was some years ago1 there being several reasons for this4 ,one is that we live in an age of specialization and discursiveness and 8technic40 ,it is quite difficult to meet with people who think that they may know1 some day1 everything1 from even some single point of view4 ,and then the wide acceptance of the hypothetical or the pragmatist conception of knowledge has caused us to look upon the matter of the limits of science and knowledge as a relative one1 as always related to1 and conditioned by1 certain points of view and certain assumptions4 ,we are not even warranted1 for example1 in thinking of mind and matter as separate in the old way1 nor can we separate the life of the individual from the life of the race1 nor the world from ,god1 nor man from ,god1 and so on4 ,see an article by the writer 7in #ahih in the ,psy4 ,rev47 upon 8,professor ,titchener's ,view of the ,self10 dealing with the actual1 and the necessary limits1 of the point of view of ,structural ,psychology in regard to the 8self40 ,also ,professor ,titchener's reply to this article in a subsequent number of the same review1 and my own rejoinder4 #bgc ,see ,chapter ,,ii4 p4 #ce4 #bgd ,despite what we spoke of in ,chapter ,v4 as its 8subjectivism10 p4 #acd4 #bge ,that is to say1 the simple truth that there is no 8object0 without a 8subject10 no 8physical0 world without a world of 8psychical0 experiences on the part of some beings or some being4 ,if our earth existed before animated beings appeared upon it1 it was only as a part of some other 8system0 which we must think of as the object of some mind or intelligence4 #bgf ,see p4 #bce1 note #b1 in the ,bergson chapter1 where it is suggested that to ,bergson human perceptions do not1 of course1 exhaust matter4 #bgg ,among the many other good things in ,mr4 ,marett's admirable ,anthropology 7one of the freshest works upon the subject1 suggestive of the need1 evidently felt in ,oxford as well as elsewhere1 of studying philosophy and letters1 and nearly everything else in the mental and moral sciences1 from the point of view of social anthropology7 are the clearness and the relevancy of illustration in his insistence upon the importance of the 8social factor0 over all our thoughts of ourselves as agents and students in the universe of things40 ,payne shows us 7p4 #adf7 8reason for believing that the collective #8we' precedes #8,i' in the order of linguistic evolution4 ,to begin with1 in ,america and elsewhere1 #8we' may be inclusive and mean #8all of us1' or selective1 meaning #8some of us only4' ,hence a missionary must be very careful1 and if he is preaching1 must use the inclusive #8we' in saying #8we have sinned1' whereas1 in praying1 he must use the selective #8we1' or ,god would be included in the list of sinners4 ,similarly #8,i' has a collective form amongst some ,american languages2 and this is ordinarily employed1 whereas the corresponding selective form is used only in special cases4 ,thus1 if the question be #8,who will help8' the ,apache will reply1 #8,i-amongst-others1' #8,i-for-one'2 but if he were recounting his personal exploits1 he says sheedah1 #8,i-by-myself1' to show they were wholly his own4 ,here we seem to have group-consciousness holding its own against individual self-consciousness1 as being for primitive folk on the whole the more normal attitude of mind40 ,it is indeed to be hoped that1 in the future1 philosophy1 by discarding its abstractionism and its 7closely allied7 solipsism1 will do its share in making this 8group consciousness10 this consciousness of our being indeed 8fellow-workers0 with all men1 once again a property of our minds and our thoughts4 #bgh ,one of ,professor ,james's last books is called ,a ,pluralistic ,universe1 and both he and ,professor ,dewey have always written under the pressure of the sociological interest of modern times4 ,in short1 it is obvious that the 8reality0 underlying the entire pragmatist polemic against the hypothetical character of the reading of the world afforded us by the sciences1 is the social and personal life that is the deepest thing in our experience4 #bgi ,this idea of a 8world of inter-subjective intercourse10 although now a commonplace of sociology1 was first expressed for the writer in the first series of the ,gifford ,lectures of ,professor ,james ,ward upon 8,naturalism and ,agnosticism10 in chapters xv4 and xvi4 ,the first of these chapters deals with 8,experience and ,life10 and the second with the 8inter-subjective intercourse0 that is really presupposed in the so-called individual experience of which the old psychology used to make so much4 ,the reader who wishes to follow out a development of this idea of a 8world of inter-subjective intercourse0 cannot do better than follow the argument of ,professor ,ward's second series of ,gifford ,lectures 78,the ,realm of ,ends10 or 8,pluralism and ,theism071 in which he will find a ,humanism and ,theism that is at least akin to the theodicy1 or the natural theology1 of which we might suppose ,pragmatism to be enamoured4 ,the double series of these ,lectures might well be referred to as an instance of the kind of classical ,english work in philosophy of which we have spoken as not falling into the extremes either of ,pragmatism or of ,rationalism4 ,the strong point of the 8,realm of ,ends10 from the point of view of this book upon ,pragmatism and ,idealism1 is that it moves from first to last in the reality of that world to which the science and the philosophy of the day both seem to point the way4 ,in opposition to 8subjectivism0 it teaches a ,humanism and a ,pluralism that we recognise as an expression of the realities of the world of our common life and our common efforts1 and from this ,humanism it proceeds to a ,theism which its author seeks to defend from many of the familiar difficulties of ,naturalism4 ,were the writer concerned with the matter of the development and the elaboration of the philosophy that seems to have precipitated itself into his mind after some years of reflection on the issues between the realists and the idealists1 between the rationalists and the pragmatists1 he would have to begin by saying that its outlines are at least represented for him in the theistic and pluralistic philosophy of ,professor ,ward4 #bhj ,according to ,professor ,dawes ,hicks in the ,hibbert ,journal for ,april #aiac1 there is a great deal in the articles of ,professor ,alexander on 8,collective ,willing and ,truth0 that supports some of the positions ,i am here attempting to indicate1 as part of the outcome of the pragmatist-rationalist controversy4 8,both goodness and truth depend1 in the first place1 on the recognition by one man of consciousness in others1 and1 secondly1 upon intersubjective intercourse0 7p4 #feh74 #bha ,i owe this reference 7which ,i have attempted to verify7 to a suggestive and ingenious book 7,the ,new ,word1 by ,mr4 ,allen ,upward7 lent to me by a ,montreal friend4 ,skeat1 in his ,dictionary1 gives as the meaning of truth1 8firm1 established1 certain1 honest1 faithful10 connecting it with ,a4,s4 trou1 tryw 78preservation of a compact071 ,teut4 trewa1 saying that the 8root0 is 8unknown40 ,i suppose that similar things might be said about the ,greek word in its different forms1 which ,liddel and ,scott connect with 8,sans41 satyas 7verus71 ,o4 ,nor4 ,sannr1 ,a4,s4 sth 7sooth740 ,all this seems to justify the idea of the social confirmation of truth for which ,i am inclined to stand1 and the connexion of intellectual truth with ethical truth1 with the truth of human life4 ,i agree with ,lotze that truths do not float above1 or over1 or between1 things1 but that they exist only in the thought of a thinker1 in so far as he thinks1 or in the action of a living being in the moment of his action--the ,microcosmos as quoted in ,eisler1 article 8,wahrheit0 in the ,wrterbuch4 ,the ,truth for man would be the coherence of his knowledge and his beliefs1 and there is no abstract truth1 or truth in and for itself1 no impersonal 8whole0 of truth4 #bhb ,as in the ,hegelian dialectic4 #bhc ,there is another important thing to think of in connexion with this sociological character of ,pragmatism4 ,it is a characteristic that may be used to overcome what we have elsewhere talked of as its 8subjectivism0 and its 8individualism10 and its revolutionary tendencies4 ,it is1 we might urge1 a social and a collective standard of truth that ,pragmatism has in view when it thinks of 8consequences0 and of the test of truth4 ,lalande takes up this idea in an article in the ,revue ,philosophique 7#aijf7 on 8,pragmatisme et ,pragmaticisme10 pointing out that ,dr4 ,peirce would apparently tend to base his pragmatism on the subordination of individual to collective thought4 ,dr4 ,schiller too1 ,i think1 contemplates this social test of truth in his would-be revival of the philosophy of ,protagoras--that man is the measure of reality--for man4 #bhd ,see below1 p4 #aig1 where we speak of this 8mediation0 as the first fact for ,professor ,bosanquet as a prominent 8,neo-,hegelian0 rationalist4 #bhe ,i have been asked by a friendly critic if ,i would include 8inference0 in this 8real thought40 ,i certainly would1 because in all real inference we are1 or ought to be1 concerned with a real subject-matter1 a set of relations among realities of one kind or another4 ,possibly all students in all subjects 7especially in philosophy7 have lost time in following out a set of inferences in and for themselves4 ,but such a procedure is justified by the increased power that we get over the real subject-matter of our thought4 ,when thought cannot be thus checked by the idea of such increased power1 it is idle thought4 #bhf ,i am thinking1 of course1 of the entire revolutionary and radical social philosophy that harks back 7in theory at least7 to the 8,social ,contract0 and to the ,state of ,nature philosophy of ,rousseau and his associates and predecessors4 #bhg ,see p4 #ahd of ,chapter ,,vii41 where ,i speak of the ability to do this as the invariable possession of the successful ,american teacher of philosophy4 #bhh ,an equivalent of it1 of course1 exists in many sayings1 in many countries1 in the conception of the task of the metaphysician as that of 8a blind man in a dark room hunting for a black cat which--is not there10 reproduced by ,sir ,ray ,lankester in the recent book of ,h4 ,s4 ,r4 ,eliot1 ,modern ,science and the ,illusions of ,bergson4 ,there is generally an error or a fallacy in such descriptions of philosophy--in this ,lankester story the error that the secret of the world is a kind of 8thing in itself0 out of all relation to everything we know and experience--the very error against which the pragmatists are protesting4 #bhi ,mr4 ,bertrand ,russell1 for example1 seems to me to have the prejudice that philosophy is at its best only when occupied with studies which 7like the mathematics of his affections7 are as remote as possible from human life4 8,real life is10 he says1 8to most men a long second-best1 a perpetual compromise between the ideal and the possible2 but the world of pure reason knows no compromise1 no practical limitations1 no barrier to the creative activity embodying in splendid edifices the passionate aspiration after the perfect form from which all great work springs4 ,remote from human passions1 remote even from the pitiful facts of nature1 the generations have gradually created an ordered cosmos where pure thought can dwell as in its natural home1 and where one1 at least1 of our nobler impulses can escape from the dreary exile of the actual world40 ,i cannot--as ,i have indicated elsewhere in regard to ,mr4 ,russell--see for one moment how there is any justification for looking upon this 8ordered cosmos0 of mathematical physics as anything other than an abstraction from the real world with which we are acquainted4 ,it is the creation of only one of our many human interests4 ,and ,i cannot see that the thought that occupies itself with this world is any nobler than the thought that occupies itself with the more complex worlds of life1 and of birth and death1 and of knowledge and feeling and conduct4 ,mr4 ,russell might remember1 for one thing1 that there have been men 7,spinoza among them7 who have attempted to treat of human passions under the light of ascertainable laws1 and that it is 7to say the very least7 as legitimate for philosophy to seek for reason and law in human life1 and in the evolution of human history1 as in the abstract world of physical and mathematical science4 ,can1 too1 a mathematical philosophy afford any final haven for the spirit of man1 without an examination of the mind of the mathematician and of the nature of the concepts and symbols that he uses in his researches8 ,there is a whole world of dispute and discussion about all these things4 #bij ,i have in view in fact only 7or mainly7 such ,american characteristics as may be thought of in connexion with the newer intellectual and social atmosphere of the present time1 the atmosphere that impresses the visitor and the resident from the old world1 the atmosphere to the creation of which he himself and his fellow-immigrants have contributed1 as well as the native-born ,american of two generations ago--to go no further back4 ,i mean that anything like a far-reaching analysis or consideration of the great qualities that go to make up the 8soul0 of the ,united ,states is1 of course1 altogether beyond the sphere of my attention for the present4 ,i fully subscribe1 in short1 to the truth of the following words of ,professor ,santayana1 one of the most scholarly and competent ,american students 7both of philosophy and of life7 of the passing generation3 8,america is not simply a young country with an old mentality2 it is a country with two mentalities1 one a survival of the beliefs and standards of the fathers1 the other an expression of the instincts1 practice1 and discoveries of the younger generation4 ,in all the higher things of the mind--in religion1 literature1 in the moral emotions1 it is the hereditary spirit that still prevails1 so much so1 that ,mr4 ,bernard ,shaw finds that ,america is a hundred years behind the times40--8,the ,genteel ,tradition in ,american ,philosophy10 in ,winds of ,doctrine 7p4 #ahg74 #bia ,a contemporary ,american authority1 ,professor ,bliss ,perry1 in his book upon ,the ,american ,mind naturally singles out radicalism as one of the well-marked characteristics of ,americans4 ,among the other characteristics of which he speaks are those of the 8love of exaggeration10 8idealism10 8optimism10 8individualism10 8public spirit40 ,i refer1 ,i think1 to nearly all these things in my pages1 although of course ,i had not the benefit of ,professor ,perry's book in writing the present chapter4 #bib ,i am certainly one of those who insist that we must think of ,america as 7despite some appearances to the contrary--appearances to be seen also1 for example1 in the ,west of ,canada7 fundamentally a religious country4 ,it was founded upon certain great religious ideas that were a highly important counterpart to some of the eighteenth-century fallacies about liberty and equality that exercised their influence upon the fathers of the republic4 #bic ,he has recently published a volume dealing especially with the contributions of ,biology and ,darwinism to philosophy4 #bid ,see p4 #beb4 #bie ,the crucial characteristics of the ,presidential campaign of #aiab clearly showed this4 #bif ,we can see this in the many valuable studies and addresses of ,professor ,dewey upon educational and social problems4 #big ,it is this fact1 or the body of fact and tendency upon which it rests1 that causes ,americans and all who know them or observe them1 to think and speak of the apparently purely 8economic0 or 8business-like0 character of the greater part of their activities4 ,let me quote ,professor ,bliss ,perry here 444 8the overwhelming preponderance of the unmitigated business-man face italics mine1 the consummate monotonous commonness of the pushing male crowd0 7p4 #aeh74 8,there exists1 in other words1 in all classes of ,american society to-day1 just as there existed during the ,revolution1 during the #8transcendental' movement1 in the ,civil ,war1 an immense mass of unspiritualised1 unvitalised ,american manhood and womanhood0 7p4 #afj74 #bih ,and this despite of what ,i have called elsewhere the comparative failure of ,pragmatism to give a rational1 and tenable account of 8personality0 and of the 8self40 #bii ,at the moment of his death 7scribens est mortuus7 ,james was undoubtedly throughout the world the most talked-about ,english-speaking philosopher1 and nowhere more so than in ,germany1 the home of the transcendentalism that he so doughtily and brilliantly attacked4 ,stein says1 for example1 in his article upon 8,pragmatism0 7,archiv fr ,philosophie1 #ad1 #aijg1 ,,ii4 ,ab471 that we 8have had nothing like it since ,schopenhauer40 ,i have often thought that ,james and his work1 along with the life and work of other notable ,american thinkers 7and along with the 8lead0 that ,america now certainly has over at least ,england in some departments of study1 like political and economic science1 experimental psychology1 and so on71 are part of the debt ,america owed1 some decades ago1 to the ,old ,world in the matter of the training of many of her best professors--a debt she has long since cancelled and overpaid4 ,readers1 by the way1 who desire more authentic information about ,james and his work than the present writer is either capable1 or desirous1 of giving in this book1 may peruse either the recent work of ,professor ,perry of ,harvard upon ,present ,philosophical ,tendencies1 or the work of ,m4 ,flournoy already spoken of4 ,boutroux has a fine appreciation of the value of ,james's philosophical work in the work to which ,i have already referred4 ,and there was naturally a crop of invaluable articles upon ,james in the ,american reviews shortly after his death4 #cjj ,think alone1 for example1 of what ,james says he learnt there from a teacher like ,agassiz3 8,the hours ,i spent with ,agassiz so taught me the difference between all possible abstractionists and all livers in the light of the world's concrete fulness that ,i have never been able to forget it40--,from an article upon ,james in the ,journal of ,philosophy1 ix4 p4 #ebg4 #cja ,while this book was passing through the press my eye fell upon the following words of ,professor ,santayana in respect of this very personality of ,james3 8,it was his personal spontaneity1 similar to that of ,emerson1 and his personal vitality similar to that of nobody else4 ,conviction and ideas came to him1 so to speak1 from the subsoil4 ,he had a prophetic sympathy with the dawning sentiments of the age1 with the moods of the dumb majority4 ,his way of thinking and feeling represents the true ,america1 and represented in a measure the whole ultra-modern radical world0 7,winds of ,doctrine1 p4 #bje74 #cjb ,including1 say1 the facilities of a completely indexed and authenticated estimate of the work that has been done in different countries upon his particular subject4 ,it is easy to see that the habit and the possibility of work in an environment such as this and again and again its system and its facilities simply stagger the ,european is a thing of the greatest value to the ,american professor so far as the idea of his own best possible contribution to his age is concerned4 ,should he merely do over again what others have done8 ,or shall he try to work in a really new field8 ,or shall he give himself to the work of real teaching1 to the training of competent men1 or to the 8organization0 of his subject with his public8 ,it must be admitted1 ,i think1 that the average ,american professor is a better teacher and guide in his subject than his average colleague in many places in ,europe4 ,hence the justifiable discontent of many ,american students with what they occasionally find abroad in the way of academic facilities for investigation and advanced study4 #cjc ,the latter 7it is perhaps needless to state7 have long been perfectly evident to all ,american teachers of the first rank in the shape1 say1 of the worthless 8research0 that is often represented in theses and studies handed in for the degree of ,doctor of ,philosophy1 or for other purposes4 ,anything that seems to be 8work done10 anything that has attained to some 8consequences0 or other1 has often been published as studies and researches1 and this despite the valuable things that are to be associated with the idea of the pragmatist element in ,american scholarship4 ,the faults1 too1 of the undue specialization that still obtains in many ,american institutions is also1 as ,i have indicated1 becoming more and more apparent to ,american authorities4 #cjd ,i cannot see why idealists should have been so slow to accord to ,pragmatism the element of truth in this idea1 and to admit that it connects the pragmatist philosophy of 8consequences0 with the idealist 8value-philosophy40 #cje ,the greater part1 for example1 of our ,british teaching and writing about ,kant and ,hegel has taken little or no recognition of the peculiar intellectual and social atmosphere under which ,criticism and ,transcendentalism became intelligible and influential in ,germany and elsewhere1 or of the equally important matter of the very different ways in which the ,kantian and the ,hegelian philosophies were interpreted by different schools and different tendencies of thought4 ,a similar thing might1 ,i think1 too1 be said of the unduly 8intellectualistic0 manner in which the teachings of ,plato and ,aristotle have often been presented to our ,british students--under the influence partly of ,hegelianism and partly of the doctrinairism and the intellectualism of our academic ,humanism since the time of the ,renaissance4 ,hence the great importance in ,greek philosophy of such a recent work as that of ,f4 ,m4 ,cornford upon the relation of ,religion to ,philosophy 7,from ,religion to ,philosophy1 ,arnold1 #aiab71 or of ,professor ,burnet's well-known ,early ,greek ,philosophy4 #cjf ,as suggestive of the scant respect for authorities felt by the active-minded ,american student1 ,i may refer to the boast of ,papini that ,pragmatism appeals to the virile and the proud-spirited who do not wish to accept their thought from the past4 #cjg ,i am thinking of such events as the 8,world's ,parliament of ,religions0 7in ,chicago in #ahic71 the recent international conferences upon 8ethical instruction in different countries10 upon 8racial problems10 upon 8missions10 etc4 ,it would be idle to think that such attempts at the organisation of the knowledge and the effort of the thinking people in the world are quite devoid of philosophical importance4 ,one has only to study1 say1 von ,hartmann1 or modern social reform1 to be convinced of the contrary4 #cjh ,i trust ,i may be pardoned if ,i venture to suggest that in opposition to the democratic attitude of ,pragmatism to the ordinary facts of life1 and to the ordinary 7but often heroic7 life of ordinary men1 the view of man and the universe that is taken in such an important idealistic book as ,dr4 ,bosanquet's ,individuality and ,value is doubtless unduly aristocratic or intellectualistic4 ,it speaks rather of the ,greek view of life than of the modern democratic view4 ,as an expression of the quasi democratic attitude of ,james even in philosophy1 we may cite the following3 8,in this real world of sweat and dirt1 it seems to me that when a view of things is noble1 that ought to count as a presumption its truth1 as a philosophical disqualification4 ,the ,prince of ,darkness may be a gentleman1 as we are told he is1 but whatever the ,god of earth and heaven is1 he can surely be no gentleman4 ,his menial services are needed in the dust of our human trials40 ,having rewritten this quotation two or three times1 ,i have lost the reference to its place in ,james's writings4 ,it is one of the three books upon ,pragmatism and ,pluralism4 #cji ,we may quote1 ,i think1 the following passage from ,professor ,perry to show that the open-mindedness of ,james was not merely a temperamental and an ,american characteristic in his case1 but a quality or attitude that rested upon an intellectual conviction in respect of the function of ideas4 8,since it is their office i4e4 the office of ideas to pave the way for direct knowledge1 or to be temporarily substituted for it1 then efficiency is conditioned by their unobtrusiveness1 by the readiness with which they subordinate themselves4 ,the commonest case of an idea in ,james's sense is the word1 and the most notable example of his pragmatic or empirical method is his own scrupulous avoidance of verbalism4 ,it follows that since ideas are in and of themselves of no cognitive value1 since they are essentially instrumental1 they are always on trial1 and #8liable to modification in the course of future experience4'0--,present ,philosophical ,tendencies1 p4 #cfd 7italics mine74 #caj ,it is known to all students that some of the more important writings of this prince of thinkers cannot be intelligibly approached without a long preliminary study of the peculiar 8dressing up10 or transformation1 to which he subjects the various facts of life and existence4 ,and the same thing is true 7to a more modified extent7 of the writings of ,kant4 #caa ,see the wise remark1 in this very connexion1 of the possible service of philosophy to-day1 of ,dr4 ,bosanquet1 reproduced upon p4 #bbf4 ,and then1 again1 we must remember that an unduly pragmatist view of life would tend to make people impervious to ideas that transcend the range and the level of their ordinary interests and activities4 #cab ,cf4 the following from ,professor ,pace's ,preface to ,introduction to ,philosophy1 by ,charles ,a4 ,dubray4 8,in ,catholic colleges1 importance has always been attached to the study of philosophy both as a means of culture and as a source of information regarding the great truths which are influential in supporting ,christian belief and in shaping character40 ,of course these same words might be used as descriptive of what ,professor ,santayana calls the 8older tradition0 in all ,american colleges4 ,it is interesting1 by the way1 to note also the pragmatist touch in the same ,preface to this ,catholic manual4 8,but if this training is to be successful1 philosophy must be presented1 not as a complex of abstruse speculations on far-off inaccessible topics1 but as a system of truths that enter with vital consequence into our ordinary thinking and our everyday conduct40 #cac ,see p4 #acf4 #cad ,see above1 p4 #cd and p4 #afe4 #cae ,it is not1 however1 8rest0 that the pragmatists want1 even in heaven1 but renewed opportunities for achievement4 8#8,there shall be news1' ,w4 ,james was fond of saying with rapture1 quoting from the unpublished poem of a new friend1 #8there shall be news in heaven4'0--,professor ,santayana in ,winds of ,doctrine1 p4 #bji4 #caf ,in using this expression ,i am acutely conscious of its limitations and of its misleading character4 ,there is nothing in which ,americans so thoroughly believe as knowledge and instruction and information4 ,a belief in education is in fact the one prevailing religion of the country--the one thing in which all classes1 without any exception1 unfeignedly believe1 and for which the entire country makes enormous sacrifices4 #cag ,in using this expression ,i am not blind to such outstanding characteristics of ,american life as 7#a7 the enormous amount of preventive philanthropy that exists in the ,united ,states2 7#b7 the well-known system of checks in the governmental machinery of the country2 7#c7 the readiness with which ,americans fly to legislation for the cure of evils2 7#d7 the ,american sensitiveness to pain and their hesitation about the infliction of suffering or punishment1 etc4 ,nor do ,i forget the sacrifice of life entailed by modern necessities and modern inventions in countries other than ,america4 ,i simply mean that owing to the constant stream of immigration1 and to the spirit of youthfulness that pervades the country1 the willingness of people to make experiments with themselves and their lives is one of the many remarkable things about the ,united ,states4 #cah ,see p4 #aag4 #cai ,and this despite the enormous amount of work that has been done by ,american biologists upon the 8factors0 of evolution1 and upon a true interpretation of ,darwinism and of ,weismannism and of the evolutionary theory generally4 #cbj ,even ,professor ,james1 for example1 dismissed 7far too readily1 in my opinion7 as a 8sociological romance0 a well-known book 7published both in ,french and in ,english7 by ,professor ,schinz entitled ,anti-,pragmatism4 ,although in some respects a superficial and exaggerated piece of work1 this book did discover certain important things about ,pragmatism and about its relation to ,american life4 #cba ,it is probably a perception of this truth that has led ,dr4 ,bosanquet to express the opinion that the whole pragmatist issue may be settled by an examination of the notion of 8satisfaction40 ,he must mean1 ,i think1 that satisfaction is impossible to man without a recognition of many of the ideal factors that are almost entirely neglected by the pragmatists--except by ,bergson1 if it be fair to call him a pragmatist4 #cbb ,bourdeau1 for example1 has suggested that its ,god is not really ,god1 but merely an old domestic servant destined to do us personal services---help us to carry our trunk and our cross in the midst of sweat and dirt4 ,he is not a gentleman even4 8,no wonder10 he adds1 8it was condemned at ,rome40 ,see his ,pragmatisme et ,modernisme1 p4 #hb4 #cbc ,i am thinking here of the words in the ,constitution of the ,state of ,california 7they are printed in ,mr4 ,bryce's ,american ,commonwealth--at least in the earlier editions7 to the effect that it is the natural right of all men to seek and to 8obtain 60 happiness4 #cbd 8,epigramme10 ,venice1 #agij4 8,i could never abide any of those freedom-gospellers4 ,all that they ever wanted was to get things running so as to suit themselves4 ,if you are anxious to set people free1 just make a beginning by trying to serve them4 ,the simplest attempt will teach you how dangerous this effort may be40 #cbe ,see ,chapter ,,ix4 #cbf ,on what grounds does ,professor ,bosanquet think of 8compensating justice0 as a nave idea8 ,it is on the contrary one of the highest and deepest1 and one of the most comprehensive to which the human mind has ever attained--giving rise to the various theogonies and theodicies and religious systems of mankind4 ,it is at the bottom1 for example1 of the theodicy and the philosophy of ,leibniz1 the founder of the ,rationalism of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in ,europe4 #cbg ,could any system of ethics which took such an impossible and such a belated conception of the individual be regarded as ethics at all8 #cbh ,i do not think that this is a fair preliminary description of the problem of teleology4 ,a person who believes in the realization of purpose in some experiences with which he thinks himself to be acquainted does not plead for the guidance of the universe by finite minds1 but simply for a view of it that shall include the truth of human purposes4 ,and of course there may be in the universe beings other than ourselves who also realize purposes4 #cbi ,italics and exclamation mine4 #ccj ,italics mine4 ,there is a large element of truth in this great idea of ,professor ,bosanquet's1 connecting for our purposes his philosophy with the theism and the personalism for which we are contending as the only true and real basis for ,humanism4 #cca ,readers who remember ,green's ,prolegomena to ,ethics will remember that it is one of the difficulties of that remarkable1 but one-sided1 production 7exposed1 ,i think1 with many other defects in ,professor ,taylor's brilliant1 but unduly intellectualistic ,problem of ,conduct7 that it also seems to teach a kind of 8,determinism0 in ethics1 in what our nature is unduly communicated to us by the ,absolute1 or the 8,eternal ,consciousness40 ,this whole way of looking at things must largely be abandoned to-day4 #ccb ,see below1 p4 #bbf4 #ccc ,it is1 ,i am inclined to think1 the existence of this contradiction in ,dr4 ,bosanquet's ,lectures that will cause the average intelligent person to turn away from them as not affording an adequate account of the reality of the world of persons and things with which he knows himself to be directly and indirectly acquainted4 ,another way of stating the same thing would be to say that ,absolutism fails to take any adequate recognition of that most serious contradiction 7or 8defect07 in our experience of which we have already spoken as the great dualism of modern times1 the opposition between reason and faith an opposition that is not relieved either by the greatest of the continually increasing discoveries of science1 or by any1 or all1 of the systems of all the thinkers4 ,hegelianism in general assures us that from the point of view of a 8higher synthesis0 this opposition does not exist or that it is somehow 8transcended40 ,and its method of effecting this synthesis is to convert the opposition between faith and reason into the opposition between what it calls 8,understanding0 and what it calls 8,reason0 an opposition that is to some extent a fictitious one1 8reason0 being1 to begin with1 but another name for our power of framing general conceptions or notions1 and not therefore different from 8understanding04 ,it removes1 that is to say1 the opposition between two different phases or aspects of our experience by denying the existence of one of them altogether4 ,it changes the opposition between knowledge and faith into an opposition between an alleged lower and an alleged higher way of knowing4 ,this alleged higher way of knowing1 however1 is1 when we look into it1 but the old ideal of the perfect demonstration of all the supposed contents of our knowledge 7principles and facts alike7 that has haunted modern philosophy from the time of ,descartes4 ,it is an unattainable ideal because no philosophy in the world can begin without some assumption 7either of 8fact0 or of principle71 and because our knowledge of the world comes to us in a piecemeal fashion--under the conditions of time and space4 ,a fact prior to all the issues of the demand of ,rationalism for a supposedly perfect demonstration is the existence of the conscious beings 7,dr4 ,bosanquet himself1 for example7 who seek this supposed certainty in order that they may act better--in ignorance of the fact that complete initial certainty on our part as to all the issues and aspects of our actions would tend to destroy the personal character of our choice as moral agents1 as beings who may occasionally act beyond the given and the calculable1 and set up precedents and ideals for ourselves and for others--for humanity4 ,it is this underlying faith then in the reality of our moral and spiritual nature that we would alone oppose 7and only in a relative sense7 to the supposed certainties of a completely rational1 or a priori1 demonstration1 the whole contention of humanism being that it is in the interests of the former reality that the latter certainties exist4 ,the apparent opposition between faith and reason would be surmounted by a philosophy that should make consciousness of ourselves as persons the primal certainty1 and all other forms of consciousness or of knowledge secondary and tributary1 as it were1 to this4 #ccd ,i am aware that there is a difference between the 8universal0 of ordinary formal logic and ,dr4 ,bosanquet's 7or ,hegel's7 8concrete universal10 but it is needless for me to think of it here4 ,dr4 ,bosanquet uses in his ,lectures the phrase 8logical universal0 for his 8concrete universal0 or his principle of positive coherence4 ,it is always logical coherence that he has in view4 #cce 8,for everywhere it is creative ,logic1 the nature of the whole working in the detail1 which constitutes experience1 and is appreciable in so far as experience has value40 ,now ,logic of itself does not thus 8work0 or 8do0 anything4 ,it is men or persons who do things by the help of logic and reasoning and other things--realities and forces1 etc4 #ccf ,cf4 p4 #ca4 8,we are minds10 he says1 8i4e4 living microcosms1 not with hard and fast limits1 but determined by our range and powers which fluctuate very greatly40 ,my point simply is that this is too intellectualistic a conception of man's personality4 ,we have minds1 but we are not minds4 #ccg ,see p4 #aib4 8,but as the self is essentially a world of content engaged in certain transformations02 and p4 #aic1 8a conscious being 444 is a world 444 in which the ,absolute begins to reveal its proper nature40 ,how can a 8world of content0 that is to say1 the 8sphere of discourse0 of what some person is thinking for some purpose or other be 8engaged0 in certain transformations8 ,it is the person1 or the thinker1 who is transforming the various data of his experience for his purposes as a man among men4 ,it is time that philosophy ceased to make itself ridiculous by calmly writing down such abstractions as if they were facts4 #cch ,cf4 8,mind as the significance and interpretation of reality10 p4 #bg4 #cci 8,mind has nothing of its own but the active form of totality1 everything positive it draws from ,nature40 #cdj ,this again is an abstraction1 and how on earth can it be said that 8mind0 and conscious life 8reflect0 merely certain abstractions 7or creations7 of their own8 ,they have invented such terms as 8content0 for certain purposes1 and their own being and nature is therefore more than these terms4 ,mind is not a 8content02 it makes all other things 8contents0 for itself4 #cda ,it has even there1 according to ,dr4 ,bosanquet1 only its purely theoretic function of working after its own perfection in the way of attaining to a logical 8universal40 8,the peculiarity of mind for us1 is to be a world of experience working itself out towards harmony and completeness40 ,this is simply not true4 #cdb 8,finite consciousness1 whether animal or human1 did not make its body40 #cdc 8,thus there is nothing in mind which the physical counterpart cannot represent40 7,italics mine47 #cdd 8,what we call the individual1 then1 is not a fixed essence1 but a living world of content representing a certain range of externality40 ,p4 #bhi4 #cde 8,the system of the universe1 as was said in an earlier ,lecture1 might be described as a representative system4 ,nature1 or externality6 lives in the lives of conscious beings4 7,italics mine47 #cdf 8,spirit is a light1 a focus1 a significance6 which can only be by contact with a #8nature' an external world40 #cdg 8,for1 on the other hand1 it has been urged and we feel1 that it is thought which constructs and sustains the fabric of experience1 and that it is thought-determinations which invest even sense-experience with its value and its meaning4 4 4 4 ,the ultimate tendency of thought1 we have seen1 is not to generalise1 but to constitute a world10 p4 #ee4 ,again1 8the true office of thought1 we begin to see1 is to build up1 to inspire with meaning1 to intensify1 to vivify4 ,the object which thought1 in the true sense1 has worked upon1 is not a relic of decaying sense1 but is a living world1 analogous to a perception of the beautiful1 in which every thought-determination adds fresh point and deeper bearing to every element of the whole10 p4 #eh4 ,and on p4 #agh he says that he sees no objection to an idealist recognising the 8use made of0 8laws0 and 8dispositions0 in recent psychology4 ,how one wishes that ,dr4 ,bosanquet had really worked into his philosophy the idea that every mental 8element0 is in a sense a 8disposition0 to activity6 ,some of these statements of ,dr4 ,bosanquet's have almost a pragmatist ring about them1 a suggestion of a living and dynamic 7rather than a merely intellectualistic7 conception of thought4 ,they may therefore be associated by the reader with the concessions to ,pragmatism by other rationalists of which we spoke in an early chapter 7see p4 #gd74 #cdh ,see ,chapter ,,iii4 p4 #ij4 #cdi ,i must say that apart from any questions in detail about this rejection of teleology by ,dr4 ,bosanquet1 there is something inexplicable about it to me4 ,he cannot retain his own great notion of 8wholeness0 without the idea of 8end10 because 8wholeness0 is a demand of thought that is guided by some idea of purpose or end4 #cej ,see p4 #ij4 #cea ,italics mine4 #ceb ,p4 #bbe4 #cec ,see p4 #ij4 #ced ,having already given instances of this abstractionism in the case of such things as the 8self0 and the 8universal0 and 8spirit10 it will suffice to point out here in addition 7#a7 its tendency to talk of 8experience0 and 8experiences0 as if there could be such things apart from the prior real existence of the experients or the experiencing persons with whom we are acquainted in our daily life1 and 7#b7 its tendency to talk of getting at 8the heart of actual life and love0 in a 8system0 which leaves no place for the real existence of either gods or men who live and love4 ,and then ,i trust that it may not be regarded as an impertinence to allege as another puzzling piece of abstractionism on the part of ,dr4 ,bosanquet1 that he has allowed himself to speak and think in his book as if his theory of the 8concrete universal0 were practically a new thing in the thought of our time--apart altogether1 that is to say1 from the important work in this same direction of other ,neo-,hegelian writers1 and apart1 too1 from the unique work of ,hegel in the same connexion4 #cee ,see below1 p4 #bcj4 #cef ,this is revealed in the main in its exposition of the world as the logical system of a single complete individual experience--a tendency that students of philosophy know to exist in ,neo-,hegelianism generally from ,green to ,bradley4 ,i admit that this tendency is literally a different thing from solipsism in the ordinary sense1 as the inability of a particular finite person to prove to himself that any person or thing exists except himself4 ,it is still1 however1 it seems to me1 possible to regard as solipsistic the tendency to set forth the universe as the experience1 or the thought1 of a single experient or a single thinker1 even although the impersonalism of ,dr4 ,bosanquet's logical 8whole0 conflicts somewhat with the individuality of his ,absolute4 #ceg ,cf4 p4 #afj4 #ceh ,the well-known inability of ,mr4 ,bradley1 for example1 to be content with the reality of any portion or any phase of reality that falls short of what he regards as absolute reality1 and with the merely relative meaning that he attaches to any category of the 8finite40 ,also the well-known ,neo-,hegelian tendency to make an opponent forge the weapon by which he is to be dislodged from any particular point of view4 ,in the case of ,dr4 ,bosanquet this tendency takes the form of making out any one who holds to a belief in the real existence of finite conscious persons to hold the absurd position of believing in 8an impervious and isolated self10 a thing1 of course1 that no one who knows anything about biology or ethics1 or social psychology1 really does4 #cei ,as another instance of ,dr4 ,bosanquet's unintentional unfairness to his opponents1 ,i would note his positive injustice to ,theism as such4 ,what many of us think of 7however imperfectly7 and believe in as ,god is invariably to him 8a theistic ,demiurge in his blankness and isolation40 ,i do not believe in such an abstract ,demiurge any more than ,i believe in the separate1 isolated self that he conjures up to his mind when he thinks of personality4 ,the problem of the twentieth century may well be what ,dr4 ,ward has signalised as the relation of ,god to the 8,absolute0 of the ,hegelian metaphysicians1 but this suggestion simply means to me the discovery on the part of philosophers of terms and concepts more adequate to the ,supreme ,being than either the ,absolute1 or the external deity rejected by ,dr4 ,bosanquet4 #cfj ,stphane ,mallarm1 according to ,nordau in ,degeneration1 p4 #ajc4 #cfa ,and the general reader must remember that the 8whole0 is always 7with all due respect to his high dialectic ability and his high temper of mind and his scholarship7 a kind of ignis fatuus in ,dr4 ,bosanquet's book1 a kind of shadow thrown by the lamps and the tools of his own choosing in his ,quixotic search4 ,the 8whole0 is the 8perfected individuality0 of the individual who sets out to find truth in this great world of ours with all its real possibilities of gain and loss4 ,it is the completion of the 8system0 of truth to which the truth-seeker would fain reduce the entire universe1 that becomes for him 7for the time being7 the mere 8subject-matter0 of his thought4 ,it is1 that is to say1 in both cases1 a purely formal conception--an abstraction1 although to ,dr4 ,bosanquet it is the reality implied in the very existence and activity of the individual thinker4 ,but the latter is the case to him only because he looks upon man as existing to think instead of as thinking to exist4 #cfb ,that is to say1 for the scholar and the lover of ,dante and ,dante's world4 #cfc ,for he was not merely a 8mind10 reflecting 8,italy0 and 8minds0 and 8experiences40 #cfd ,and that1 we might add1 is still kept alive by some of our humanists and educators of to-day as the ideal for both primary and secondary education4 #cfe ,this is a thing that the beginner is taught in lectures introductory to the study of the philosophy of ,kant--in regard to ,kant's relation to the barren1 dogmatic formalism of ,wolff--a one-sided interpreter of the philosophy of ,leibniz4 ,i am quite aware that ,dr4 ,bosanquet does not merely use the ,principle of ,non-,contradiction in the aggressive1 or polemical1 manner of ,mr4 ,bradley in ,appearance and ,reality4 ,the principle of positive coherence at which he aims1 begins1 to some extent1 where ,mr4 ,bradley stopped4 ,but it is still the idea of consistency or inconsistency1 with certain presuppositions of his own1 that rules his thinking2 it determines1 from the very outset of his ,lectures1 what he accepts and what he rejects4 #cff ,see p4 #aeb and p4 #aef1 note #b4 #cfg ,i use this word 8must0 in a logical as well as in an ethical sense1 seeing that all judgment implies a belief in the reality of a world of persons independent of the mere fact of 8judgment0 as a piece of mental process4 #cfh ,see p4 #ade4 #cfi ,on p4 #cde the words are3 8,when we consider the nave or elementary life of morality and religion02 and on p4 #cdf3 8,the nave1 or simple self of every-day morality and religion10 and the marginal heading of the page upon which these words occur is 8,the nave good self compared to grasp of a fundamental principle alone40 ,could anything more clearly indicate what the ,kantians call a confusion of categories in the case in point the categories of 8goodness0 and the categories of 8truth0 or what ,aristotle calls a 1 the unconscious treatment of one order of facts by the terms and conceptions of another order of facts4 ,to ,dr4 ,bosanquet as the ,neo-,hellenist that he is in his professed creed1 badness is practically stupidity1 and 8lack of unification of life10 and 8failure of theoretical grasp40 ,this confusion between goodness and wisdom is again indicated on p4 #cdg in the words3 8,a man is good in so far as his being is #8unified at' all in any sphere of wisdom or activity40 ,this is simply not true1 and its falsity is a more unforgivable thing in the case of ,dr4 ,bosanquet than it is in the case of the pragmatists who also tend to make the #8moral' a kind of #8unification' or #8effectiveness' in #8purpose4' ,as a proof of ,dr4 ,bosanquet's transformation of the facts of the ethical life in the interest of logical theory1 we can point to p4 #ccd3 8,our actions and ideas issue from our world as a conclusion from its premises1 or as a poem from its author's spirit10 or to p4 #ec1 where it is definitely stated that the 8self1 as it happens to be10 cannot1 in any of its 8three aspects10 8serve as a test of reality40 ,to do the latter1 it must1 in his opinion1 follow the law of the 8universal10 i4e4 become a logical conception4 ,now of course 7#a7 it is not the self 8as it happens to be0 that is chiefly dealt with in ethics1 but rather the self as it ought to be4 ,and 7#b7 the ethical self1 or the 8person10 does not follow the 8law of the universal0 a logical law but the law of right and wrong an ethical law4 ,as a proof of the subordination of the facts of conduct to the facts of aesthetics1 we may take the words on p4 #cdh where aesthetic excellence is said to be 8goodness in the wider or 7#8shall we say'7 in the narrower sense40 ,now the distinction between ethics and aesthetics is not one of degree1 but one of kind4 ,and as another illustration of his tendency to transform ethical facts in the light of a metaphysical1 or a logical1 theory they are the same thing to him we may quote the emphatic declaration on p4 #cef3 8,our effort has been to bring the conception of moral and individual initiative nearer to the idea of logical determination10 or the equally outspoken declaration on p4 #cec3 8,but metaphysical theory1 viewing the self in its essential basis of moral solidarity with the natural and social world 444 cannot admit that the independence of the self1 though a fact1 is more than a partial fact40 ,or the words at the top of this same page3 8,the primary principle that should govern the whole discussion is this1 that the attitude of moral judgment and responsibility for decisions is only one among other attitudes and spheres of experience40 ,these last words alone would prove definitely the non-ethical character of 8,individuality and ,value40 ,the ethical life is to its author only a 8quatenus consideratur10 only a possible point of view1 only an aspect of reality1 only an aspect1 therefore1 of a 8logical system40 ,now if the ethical life of the world is to count for anything at all1 it may be said that the ethical life is no mere aspect of the life of the self1 and no mere aspect of the life of the world1 seeing that 8nature0 in the sense of mere 8physical nature0 does not come into the sphere of morality at all4 ,it is rather the activity of the 8whole self10 or the 8normative0 reflection of the self as a whole upon all the merely partial or subordinate aspects of its activity1 upon bodily life1 economic life1 intellectual activity1 and so on that constitutes the world of morality4 #cgj ,see p4 #adg1 and p4 #bdd4 #cga ,good and evil to ,dr4 ,bosanquet are two quasi-rational systems in active antagonism as claiming to attach different 8principles and predicates0 to identical data4 ,the essence of their antagonism to ,dr4 ,bosanquet is not1 however1 that evil is contemplated1 as it must be sooner or later1 in repentance for example as wrong1 but rather that the 8evil0 is an imperfect 8logical striving 7p4 #cea7 of the self after unity0 which is in 8contradiction with a fuller and sounder striving0 after the same4 ,the evil self is to him merely the vehicle of a logical contradiction in the self4 #cgb ,this is seen in his admission 7on p4 #cea7 that the 8bad will0 no less than the 8good will0 is a logical necessity1 when taken along with his doctrine about mind and body1 his doctrine of the 8dependence0 7p4 #cah7 of the finite individual upon the external mechanical world4 ,dr4 ,bosanquet1 of course1 thinks that even in this apparent ,determinism he is justifiably supplementing the ordinary ideas about the 8self0 as 8creative0 and 8originative0 7p4 #ced71 by the wider recognition that ,i am more or less completely doing the work of the 8universe0 as a 8member0 in a 8greater self40 ,and he adds in the same sentence the words that 8,i am in a large measure continuous with the greater 7p4 #cee7 self10 and 8dyed with its colours0--a further step in ,determinism1 as it were1 and a step which1 with the preceding one to which we have just referred1 no critic can fail to connect with the ,determinism that we have already found to be implicated in his doctrine of the 8self10 and in his general doctrine that the 8external0 must be frankly accepted as a factor in the universe4 #cgc ,by the 8spectator0 fallacy we mean his tendency to talk and think of the self as it is for a spectator or student1 looking at matters from the outside1 and not as the self is for the man himself4 #cgd ,wollaston is the ,english ethical philosopher who1 according to ,leslie ,stephen's account1 thought1 after thirty years of meditation1 that the only reason he had for not breaking his wife's head with a stick was1 that this would be tantamount to a denial that his wife was his wife4 #cge ,see ,idola ,theatri by ,henry ,sturt 7the editor of the well-known 8,personal ,idealism0 volume7 of ,oxford--a book that enumerates and examines many of the fallacies of the ,neo-,hegelian school4 ,mr4 ,sturt's first chapter is entitled the 8,passive ,fallacy10 which he calls1 with some degree of justice1 the prime mistake of the idealistic philosophy1 meaning by this the 8ignoring0 of the 8kinetic0 and the 8dynamic0 character of our experience4 #cgf ,it is ,natural ,theology that is the subject proper of the ,gifford ,lectures4 #cgg ,see p4 #adi of ,chapter ,,vi4 #cgh ,with1 we might almost say1 the pragmatists and the humanists4 #cgi ,this is really their main distinguishing characteristic and merit4 #chj ,see p4 #afb4 #cha 8,indeed1 ,i do not conceal my belief that in the main the work has been done40--,preface4 #chb ,i think that the confession is a praiseworthy one in view of the fact of the prejudice of ,rationalism1 that philosophy has nothing to do with convictions but only with knowledge4 #chc ,by belief ,i have understood throughout this book simply man's working sense for reality1 and ,i am inclined to think that this is almost the best definition that could be given of it--our working sense for reality4 ,it is at least1 despite its apparent evasiveness1 most in harmony with the pragmatist-humanist inclusion of will elements and feeling elements in our knowledge and in our apprehension of reality4 ,it is also in harmony with the conception of reality which may1 in my opinion1 be extracted from both ,pragmatism and ,idealism--that reality is what it proves itself to be in the daily transformation of our experience4 ,by the retention of the term 8working0 in this attempted definition ,i express my agreement with the idea that action1 and the willingness to act1 is an essential element in belief4 ,the outstanding positions in the definitions of belief that are generally given in philosophical dictionaries are1 firstly1 that belief is a conviction or subjective apprehension of truth or reality in distinction from demonstrable knowledge or direct evidence2 and1 secondly1 that feeling elements and action elements enter into it4 ,i am inclined to think that the sharp antithesis between belief and knowledge1 or the tendency of philosophical books to emphasise the difference between belief and knowledge1 is a characteristic1 or consequence1 of our modern way of looking at things1 of our break with the unfortunate1 medieval conception of faith and of the higher reason4 ,the study of the facts either of the history of religion or of the history of science1 will convince us1 ,i think1 that it is always belief1 and that it still is belief 7as the working sense for reality71 that is man's measure of reality1 our knowledge about the universe being at all times but a more or less perfect working out of our beliefs and of their implications--of our sense of the different ways in which the world affects us1 and of the ways in which we are affected towards it4 ,nor do ,i think1 as ,i have indicated in different places1 that 8reality0 can be defined apart from belief1 reality being that in which we believe for all purposes1 theoretical and practical and emotional4 ,in the conception of reality as a world of intersubjective intercourse in which beings1 or persons at different stages of development1 share in a common spiritual life1 we have attained so far 7and only so far7 to the truth that is common to an idealism of the type of ,dr4 ,bosanquet's1 and to pragmatist-humanism when properly developed and interpreted4 ,there are1 ,i find1 upon thinking of the matter1 any number of philosophers and thinkers who interpret belief1 in the larger sense of the term1 as our complete and final estimate of reality1 and as therefore not exclusive of1 but inclusive of knowledge in the ordinary sense of the term4 #chd ,he even says in the ,abstract of his first lecture upon the 8,central ,experiences10 that ,lord ,gifford's desire that his lecturers should 8try to communicate0 a 8grave experience0 is the demand that 8introduces us to the double task of philosophy4 ,it philosophy needs the best of logic1 but also the best of life1 and neither can be had in philosophy without the other40 #che ,treatise upon ,human ,nature1 sect4 vii4 7,green and ,grose1 i4 #edg74 #chf ,i had originally the idea of calling this chapter by the more modest title of a note upon 8pragmatist elements0 in the teaching of ,bergson4 ,i have allowed myself to call it a chapter partly for the sake of symmetry1 and partly because the footnotes and the criticism 7of his ,idealism7 have carried it beyond the limits of a note4 ,i find1 too1 7as ,i have partly indicated in my preface7 in the teaching of ,bergson so many things that make up almost the very body of truth and fact upon which ,pragmatism1 and ,humanism1 and ,idealism all repose 7or ought to repose7 that ,i quote them directly in my footnotes4 ,they indicate to me the scope and the territory of my entire subject4 ,and they are a confirmation to me of much that ,i had myself arrived at before ,i read a line of ,bergson4 #chg 8,our intelligence1 as it leaves the hands of nature1 has for its chief object the unorganised solid0 7,creative ,evolution1 p4 #afb72 8of immobility alone does the intellect form a clear idea0 7ibid4 #afd74 8,the aspect of life that is accessible to the intellect--as indeed to our senses1 of which our intellect is the extension--is that which offers a hold to action0 7ibid4 #agj74 8,we see that the intellect1 so skilful in dealing with the inert1 is awkward the moment it touches the living4 ,whether it wants to treat the life of the body or the life of the mind1 it proceeds with the rigour1 the stiffness1 and the brutality of the instrument not designed for such use4 ,the history of hygiene or of pedagogy teaches us much in this matter4 ,when we think of the cardinal1 urgent1 and constant need we have to preserve our bodies and to raise our souls1 of the special facilities given to each of us in this field to experiment continually on ourselves and on others1 of the palpable injury by which the wrongness of a medical or a pedagogical practice is made manifest and punished at once1 we are amazed at the stupidity and especially at the persistence of errors4 ,we may easily find their origin in the natural obstinacy with which we treat the living like the lifeless1 and think all reality1 however fluid1 under the form of the sharply-defined solid4 ,we are at ease only in the discontinuous1 in the immobile1 in the dead4 ,the intellect is characterised by a natural inability to comprehend life0 7,creative ,evolution1 p4 #agd74 7,italics mine47 #chh 8,i look and ,i think ,i see1 ,i listen and ,i think ,i hear1 ,i examine myself and ,i think ,i am reading the very depths of my heart4 ,but what ,i see and hear of the outer world is purely and simply a selection made by my senses to serve as a light to my conduct2 what ,i know of myself is what comes to the surface1 what participates in my actions4 ,my senses and my consciousness1 therefore1 give me no more than a practical simplification of reality in the vision they furnish me of myself and of things1 the differences that are useless to man are obliterated1 the resemblances that are useful to him are emphasised2 ways are traced out for me in advance along which my activity is to travel4 ,these ways are the ways which all mankind has trod before me4 ,things have been classified with a view to the use ,i can derive from them0 7,laughter1 p4 #aea74 8,life implies the acceptance of the utilitarian side of things in order to respond to them by appropriate reactions2 all other impressions must be dimmed or else reach us vague and blurred0 7ibid4 p4 #aca74 ,these last words give us a glimpse of a very important part of ,bergson's teaching--his idea1 namely 7,voltaire has it in his ,micromgas71 that 8matter0 is greater than our perceptions1 that our perceptions reveal to us only those aspects of the physical universe with which we are practically concerned4 #chi ,some years ago psychologists began to distinguish a 8structural0 from a 8functional0 psychology1 meaning by the former what is otherwise called ,psycho-,physics or 7to some extent7 ,experimental ,psychology4 #cij ,cf4 8,at first sight it may seem prudent to leave the consideration of facts to positive science1 to let physics and chemistry busy themselves with matter1 the biological and psychological sciences with life4 ,the task of the philosopher is then clearly defined4 ,he takes facts and laws from the scientist's hand1 and whether he tries to go beyond them in order to reach their deeper causes1 or whether he thinks it impossible to go further1 and even proves it by the analysis of scientific knowledge1 in both cases he has for the facts and relations1 handed over by science1 the sort of respect that is due to a final verdict4 ,to this knowledge he adds a critique of the faculty of knowing1 and also1 if he thinks proper1 a metaphysic2 but the matter of knowledge he regards as the affair of science1 and not of philosophy0 7,creative ,evolution1 pp4 #bjd-e74 ,all this represents only too faithfully what even some of our ,neo-,kantians have been saying1 and teaching1 although there is an error in their whole procedure here4 #cia ,schopenhauer's phrase4 ,see my book upon ,schopenhauer's ,system4 #cib ,it is chiefly in ,matter and ,memory 7in which1 by the way1 there are pages and pages of criticism of the rationalism of philosophy that are as valuable as anything we have in philosophy since the time of ,descartes--,kant not excepted7 that we are to look for the detailed philosophy of sensation and of perception1 and the detailed philosophy of science upon which this protest of ,bergson's against the excesses of 8conceptualism0 rests4 ,i indicate1 too1 at different places in this chapter some of the other special considerations upon which it rests4 ,the gist of the whole is to be found1 perhaps1 in his contention that our science and our philosophy of the past centuries have both regarded 8perception0 as teaching us 7somehow7 what things are independently of their effect upon us1 and of their place in the moving equilibrium of things--the truth being on the contrary 7with ,pragmatism and ,humanism7 that our knowledge has throughout a necessary relation to ourselves and to our place in the universe1 and to our liberation from matter in the life of the spirit4 #cic ,he expresses this idea in the following way in the ,introduction to ,matter and ,memory3 8,psychology has for its object the study of the human mind for practical utility10 whereas in 8metaphysics0 we see 8this same mind striving 7the idea1 as we say elsewhere1 is not free from difficulty7 to transcend the conditions of useful action and to come back to itself as to a pure creative energy40 ,or in the following sentences from his ,creative ,evolution3 8,we must remember that philosophy1 as we define it1 has not yet become completely conscious of itself4 ,physics understands its role when it pushes matter into the direction of spatiality2 but has metaphysics understood its role when it has simply trodden the steps of physics1 in the chimerical hope of going farther in the same direction8 ,should not its own task be1 on the contrary1 to remount the incline that physics descends1 to bring matters back to its origins1 and to build up progressively a cosmology which would be1 so to speak1 a reversed psychology4 ,all that which seems positive to the physicist and to the geometrician would become1 from this new point of view1 an interruption or inversion of the true positivity which would have to be defined in psychological terms0 7pp4 #bai-bj1 italics mine74 #cid ,as an indication of what the acceptance of the dynamic instead of the static view of matter on the part of ,bergson means1 ,i cite the phrase 7or the conception7 on p4 #hb of ,matter and ,memory1 the effect that 8matter is here as elsewhere the vehicle of an action10 or the even more emphatic declaration on p4 #bfa of ,creative ,evolution1 8,there are no things1 there are only actions40 ,it is impossible1 of course1 that these mere extracts can convey to the mind of the casual reader the same significance that they obtain in their setting in the pages of ,bergson1 although it is surely almost a matter of common knowledge about his teaching1 that one of the first things it does is to begin with the same activistic or 8actionistic0 view of nature and matter that seems to be the stock in trade of the physics of our time since the discoveries pertaining to radio-activity1 etc4 ,being only a layman in such matters1 ,i may be excused for quoting from a recent booklet 7whose very presence in the series in which it appears is to people like myself a guarantee of its scientific reliability7 in which ,i find this same activistic view of matter that ,i find in ,bergson4 8,what are the processes by which the primary rock material is shifted8 ,there is the wind that1 etc4 etc4444 ,there are the streams and rivers that1 etc4444 ,there is the sea constantly wearing away1 etc4444 ,then there are #8subtle' physical and #8chemical' forces4 ,and the action of plants4444 ,hence by various mechanical1 organic1 and chemical processes the materials originally scattered through the rocks of the earth's crust1 and floating in the air or water1 are collected into layers and form beds of sand1 clay1 limestone1 salt1 and the various mineral fuels1 including peat and coal0 7,the ,making of the ,earth1 by ,professor ,gregory1 ,f4,r4,s41 of ,glasgow ,university3 ,williams and ,norgate74 ,it is only right to state here1 or to remind the reader in this matter of a 8dynamic0 view of matter1 that ,bergson not only dissipates matter into force or energy or activity 7as do the physicists of to-day71 but also actually credits the world of matter and life with a kind of consciousness 7and why not be courageous about it87 in which what ,i have already called the 8susceptibility of everything to everything else10 or the action of everything upon everything else1 becomes credible and intelligible4 8,no doubt1 also1 the material universe itself1 defined as the totality of images1 is a kind of consciousness in which everything compensates and neutralises everything else1 a consciousness of which all the potential parts1 balancing each other by a reaction which is always equal to the action1 reciprocally hinder each from standing out0 7,matter and ,memory1 p4 #cac74 #cie ,see ,chapter ,,iii41 and also the references to ,mach1 ,ostwald1 ,poincar1 and others1 in the second chapter and elsewhere4 #cif 8,there is no intelligence in which some traces of instinct are not to be discovered1 more1 no instinct that is not surrounded with a fringe of intelligence0 7,creative ,evolution1 p4 #adc74 #cig 8,we will not dwell here upon a point we have dealt with in former works4 ,let us merely recall that a theory the theory of contemporary physiological psychology such as that according to which consciousness is attached to certain neurons1 and is thrown off from their work like a phosphorescence1 may be accepted by the scientist for the detail of analysis2 it is a convenient mode of expression4 ,but it is nothing else4 ,in reality1 a living being is a centre of action4 ,it represents a certain sum of contingency entering into the world1 that is to say1 a certain quantity of possible action--a quantity variable with individuals and especially with species4 ,the nervous system of an animal marks out the flexible lines on which its action will run 7although the potential energy is accumulated in the muscles rather than in the nervous system itself72 its nervous centres indicate1 by their development and their configuration1 the more or less extended choice it will have among more or less numerous and complicated actions4 ,now1 since the awakening of consciousness in a living creature is the more complete1 the greater the latitude of choice allowed to it and the larger the amount of action bestowed upon it1 it is clear that the development of consciousness will appear to be dependent on that of the nervous centres4 ,on the other hand1 every state of consciousness being1 in one aspect of it1 a question put to the motor activity and even the beginning of a reply1 there is no psychical event that does not imply the entry into play of the cortical mechanisms4 ,everything seems1 therefore1 to happen as if consciousness sprang from the brain1 and as if the detail of conscious activity were modelled on that of the cerebral activity4 ,in reality consciousness does not spring from the brain1 but brain and consciousness correspond because equally they measure 444 the quantity of choice that the living being has at its disposal0 7,creative ,evolution1 pp4 #bff-g74 #cih 8,instead of starting from affection or #8sensation' in the old sense of the haphazard sensation of which we can say nothing1 since there is no reason why it should be what it is rather than anything else1 we start from action1 that is to say1 from our power of effecting changes in things1 a faculty attested by consciousness1 and towards which all the powers of the organised body are seen to converge4 ,so we place ourselves at once in the midst of extended images to ,bergson as an idealist things are at the same time images or ideas for a consciousness in other things1 or in us1 or in beings other than ourselves1 and in this material universe we perceive centres of indetermination characteristic of life0 7,matter and ,memory1 p4 #fg74 #cii ,cf4 the words in the ,preface to ,matter and ,memory3 8,the whole personality1 which1 normally narrowed down by action1 expands with the unscrewing of the vice in which it has allowed itself to be squeezed10 or the words in the same place about the task of metaphysics being the attempt of the 8mind striving to transcend the conditions of useful action40 #djj ,we refer elsewhere in this chapter to ,bergson's idea that living beings are 8centres of indetermination10 that is to say1 creatures who hold their place in nature and that of their species by 8persisting in their own being0 7the language of ,spinoza7 by acting and reacting upon some of the many forces of nature that act upon them1 and by avoiding the action of other forces and other animals4 8,they allow to pass through them10 he says1 8so to speak1 those external influences which are indifferent to them2 the others isolated become #8perceptions' by their very isolation0 7,matter and ,memory1 pp4 #bh1 #bi74 ,we also refer to ,bergson's idea that the life-force has expressed itself along different grades of being 7mineral1 animal1 and so on74 ,both these ideas are a partial explanation of what we mean by the presence of a spiritual activity in both inanimate and animate nature4 ,so also is ,bergson's idea that the purely mechanical explanation either of nature or of life is but a device of the intellect for the purposes of description4 ,more specifically it is expressed1 too1 in his idea that 8,our representation of matter is the measure of our possible action upon bodies2 it results from the discarding of what has no interest for our needs1 or more generally for our functions0 7,matter and ,memory1 p4 #cj71 or that 8,consciousness0 is just this choice of 8attaining to0 or attending to 8certain parts and certain aspects of those parts0 of the 8material universe0 7ibid4 p4 #ca71 or that 8sense-perception0 is an 8elementary question to my motor activity40 8,the truth is that my nervous system1 interposed between the objects which affect my body and those which ,i can influence1 is a mere conductor1 transmitting1 sending back1 or inhibiting movement4 ,this conductor is composed of an enormous number of threads which stretch from the periphery to the centre1 and from the centre to the periphery4 ,as many threads pass from the periphery to the centre1 so many points of space are there able to make an appeal to my will1 and to put1 so to speak1 an elementary question to my motor activity4 ,every such question is what is termed a perception0 7ibid4 #dj1 #da2 italics mine74 ,or1 as he puts it1 on p4 #cac1 8,no doubt the choice of perception from among images in general is the effect of a discernment which foreshadows spirit4444 ,but to touch the reality of spirit we must place ourselves at the point where an individual consciousness1 continuing and retaining the past in a present enriched by it1 thus escapes the law of necessity1 the law which ordains that the past shall ever follow itself in a present which merely repeats it in another form1 and that all things shall ever be flowing away4 ,when we pass from pure perception to memory1 we definitely abandon matter for spirit40 #dja ,bergson is always able to detect the relapses even of 8mechanism0 and of the mechanical philosophy of science into 8finalism10 as when he says on p4 #gb of his ,creative ,evolution1 8,to sum up1 if the accidental variations that bring about evolution are insensible variations1 some good genius must be appealed to--the genius of the future species--in order to preserve and accumulate these variations1 for 8selection0 will not look after this4 ,if1 on the other hand1 the accidental variations are sudden1 then1 for the previous function to go on1 or for a new function to take its place1 all the changes that have happened together must be complementary4 ,so we have to fall back on the good genius again to obtain the convergence of simultaneous changes1 as before to be assured of the continuity of direction of successive variations40 #djb ,we must remember that to ,bergson evolution has taken place along different lines--those of ,automatism 7in plant-life71 ,instinct 7in animal life71 and ,intelligence 7in human life and the higher animals71 and that along none of those lines are we to fall into the errors either of materialism1 or of 8,darwinism0 7the belief in 8accidental variations071 or of the 8design-philosophy10 or even of theories like 8neo-,lamarckianism0 or neo-vitalism4 ,to him all these philosophies are but imperfect and hypothetical attempts to grasp 8movement0 and 8life0 which both 8transcend finality1 if we understand by finality the realisation of an idea conceived or conceivable in advance0 7,creative ,evolution1 p4 #bcf74 #djc 8,paleyism0 or 8,miltonism0 are still good names for the thing1 ,i have read in some competent book upon ,evolution4 #djd ,see below1 p4 #bfa4 #dje ,to ,bergson concepts are just as hypothetical in the realm of science1 as they are to thinkers like ,mach and ,poincar1 and ,professor ,ward of ,cambridge4 ,see the following1 for example1 from ,matter and ,memory 7p4 #bfc73 8,we shall never explain by means of particles1 whatever these may be1 the simple properties of matter2 at most we can thus follow out into corpuscles as artificial as the corpus1 the body itself--the actions and reactions of this body with regard to all the others4 ,this is precisely the object of chemistry4 ,it studies bodies rather than matter2 and so we understand why it stops at the atom1 which is still endowed with the general properties of matter4 ,but the materiality of the atom dissolves more and more under the eyes of the physicist4 ,we have no reason1 for instance1 for representing the atom to ourselves as a solid1 rather than as a liquid or gaseous1 nor for picturing the reciprocal action of atoms by shocks rather than in any other way40 ,or1 the following characteristic passage from the same book 7p4 #bhj7 in respect of the hypothetical character of the concepts of 8pure time0 and 8pure space03 8,homogeneous space and homogeneous time are then neither properties of things nor essential conditions of our faculty of knowing them2 they express1 in an abstract form1 the double work of solidification and of division1 which we effect on the moving continuity of the real in order to obtain there a fulcrum for our action1 in order to fix within it starting-points for our operation1 in short1 to introduce into it real changes4 ,they are the diagrammatic designs of our eventual action upon matter40 #djf ,like his celebrated contemporary ,eucken1 and like many other thinkers of their time1 ,bergson is profoundly convinced of the one-sidedness of the so-called scientific culture of our day1 and of the error of any and all conceptions of education and of social policy that are based upon it4 ,although ,i refer below to the limitations of his view that the intellect is adapted only to matter and to mechanical construction1 ,i append the following quotation as symptomatic of his value as a spiritual teacher in our scientific age3 8,as regards human intelligence 7,creative ,evolution1 pp4 #ade-f7 it has not been sufficiently noted that mechanical invention has been from the first its essential feature1 that even to-day our social life gravitates around the manufacture and use of artificial instruments4444 ,this we hardly realise1 because it takes longer to change ourselves than to change our tools4444 ,in thousands of years1 when seen from the distance1 only the broad lines of our present age will be visible1 our wars and our revolutions will count for little1 even supposing they are remembered at all1 but the steam-engine1 and the procession of inventions of every kind that accompanied it1 will perhaps be spoken of as we speak of the bronze or of the chipped stone of prehistoric times2 it will serve to define an age40 #djg ,i find this in ,bergson's whole attribution of much of our 8perceptual0 and 8scientific0 knowledge of things to the 8needs of action10 and in the detailed reasons that we attempt on pp4 #bcf-bch to indicate for his polemic against rationalism4 #djh ,this confirmation ,i find in ,bergson's whole philosophy of perception and sensation referred to on p4 #bcf1 and in his idea of a living being as a 8centre of action0 or 8a centre of indetermination40 ,in fact it is obvious that he is one of the very greatest of the upholders of the 8freedom0 of the life of the individual1 and of the fact that each new individual contributes something new of its own to the sum-total of existence1 to the life of its species1 and to the life of the world4 ,of course there is no more an explanation in his teaching of the causes of 8variation0 or the differences at birth between the off-spring of men and of animals1 than there is in the philosophy of ,darwin4 #dji ,the idea of this necessity is confirmed in ,bergson's whole philosophy of man's life as a life of action1 as a constant surmounting of obstacles1 as a life that reacts in its own way upon the life of nature1 upon the life of the human species as such1 upon the infinite life and energy and 8love0 of ,god--if we may soar to this great thought4 ,see1 for example1 what he writes in explanation of the 8discordance0 of which he speaks thus3 8,our freedom1 in the very movements by which it is affirmed1 creates the growing habits that will stifle it if it fails to renew itself by a constant effort3 it is dogged by automatism4 ,the letter kills the spirit4 ,and our most ardent enthusiasm1 as soon as it is externalised into action1 is so naturally congealed into the cold calculation of interest or vanity1 the one takes so easily the shape of the other1 that we might confuse them together1 doubt our sincerity1 deny goodness and love40 ,the explanatory words are the following4 ,they are quite typical of the kind of philosophy of life that ,bergson thinks of as alone worthy of the name of a philosophy of the living4 ,and the reference to 8love10 as the highest 8dynamic0 force in this world of ours1 occurs at their close4 8,the profound cause of this discordance lies in an irremediable difference of rhythm4 ,life is general1 is mobility itself2 particular manifestations of life accept this mobility reluctantly1 and constantly lag behind4 ,it is always going ahead2 they want to mark time4 ,evolution in general would fain go on in a straight line2 each special evolution is a kind of circle4 ,like eddies of dust raised by the wind as it passes1 the living turn on themselves1 borne up by the great blast of life4 ,they are therefore relatively stable1 and counterfeit immobility so well that we treat each of them as a thing rather than as a progress1 forgetting that the very permanence of their form is only the outline of a movement4 ,at times1 however1 in a fleeting vision1 the invisible breath that bears them is materialised before our eyes4 ,we have this sudden illumination before certain forms of maternal love1 so striking and in most animals so touching1 observable even in the solicitude of the plant for its seed4 ,this love1 in which some have seen the great mystery of life1 may possibly deliver us life's secret4 ,it shows us each generation leaning over the generation that shall follow4 ,it allows us a glimpse of the fact that the living being is above all a thoroughfare1 and that the essence of life is in the movement by which life is transmitted0 7,creative ,evolution1 pp4 #acd-e2 italics mine74 ,it is surely needless to point out how much truer to human nature1 truer therefore to an important part of reality1 this life-philosophy is than the abstractionism of ,professor ,bosanquet in the preceding chapter4 #daj ,this insistence is1 ,i think1 amply confirmed by the very fact of the immediate contact with life and reality indicated in the quotation that is given in the preceding note upon the 8motive-awakening10 or the 8dynamic0 character of the philosophy of ,bergson4 ,it is also confirmed in his manifest insistence upon the one fact that all philosophy must assume 7and has for ever assumed7 the fact of life1 the fact of the life and thought of ,god that underlies all our life and all our thought4 #daa ,this position of the pragmatists is certainly confirmed by ,bergson's entire doctrine of the brain and of the intellect--that their main service is1 in the first instance1 to interpret the 8life0 of things1 its relation to our own will and to our practical activity4 ,i have suggested1 too1 in this chapter that it is obviously a characteristic1 or a consequence1 of the philosophy of ,bergson that our highest thought about ourselves and about the world should be relative to1 and provocative1 of our highest emotion4 #dab ,it is only with some degree of care and reservation that ,i wish to refer to any apparent confirmation of this idea by ,bergson4 ,and1 as always1 ,i object to the idea of any ultimate separation or 8dualism0 between faith and knowledge--faith being implied in all 8knowledge40 ,there is no opposition in ,bergson1 or in the principles of his philosophy1 between faith and knowledge2 it is rather his idea that 8the faculty of seeing should be made one with the act of willing0 7,creative ,evolution1 #bej2 his italics71 and that 8philosophy0 should 8proceed1 with the powers of conceptual thought alone1 to the ideal reconstruction of all things1 even of life0 7,c4,e4 xi42 italics mine74 ,my reasons for finding in his writings a confirmation of the idea that it is indeed our rational and spiritual faith1 rather than our demonstrable knowledge1 that is to us the measure of truth and reality1 are such considerations as the following 7in addition to those of the clauses just quoted71 his close association between the intellectual and the 8volitional10 his general faith in 8creative evolution10 in the idea that our 8consciousness0 means for us 8new choices0 and 7real7 8new possibilities10 his faith in the higher intuitions of the mind1 in the spiritual nature of man1 his belief that the building up of the true philosophy of the future will involve 8the collective and progressive effort of many thinkers1 of many observers also1 completing1 correcting1 and improving one another0 7,c4,e4 xiv471 etc4 etc4 #dac ,see below1 p4 #beg1 note #a4 #dad ,see p4 #ad in reference to ,dr4 ,schiller's suggestion that 8freedom0 may 8pervade the universe40 #dae 8,from time to time1 however1 in a fit of absent-mindedness1 nature raises up souls that are more detached from life4444 ,were this detachment complete1 did the soul no longer cleave to action by any of its perceptions1 it would be the soul of an artist such as the world has never yet seen0 7,laughter1 p4 #aed74 #daf ,cf4 p4 #bce4 #dag ,cf4 8,we must break with scientific habits which are adapted to the fundamental requirements of thought1 we must do violence to the mind1 go counter to the natural bent of the intellect4 ,but that is just the function of philosophy0 7,creative ,evolution1 p4 #ca74 #dah 8,so art1 whether it be painting or sculpture1 poetry or music1 has no other object than to brush aside the utilitarian symbols1 the conventional and socially accepted generalities1 in short1 everything that veils reality from us1 in order to bring us face to face with reality itself0 7,laughter1 p4 #aeg74 ,it is true that if we read further on this page1 and elsewhere in ,bergson1 we will be able to see that there is for him in art and in the spiritual life a kind of intelligence and knowledge4 ,but it is difficult to work out an expression or a characterisation of this intelligence and this knowledge4 8,art10 he says1 8is only a more direct vision of reality40 ,and again3 8,realism is in the work when idealism is in the soul1 and it is only through ideality that we can resume contact with reality0 7ibid474 #dai ,it is only fair to ,bergson to remember that he is himself aware of the appearances of this dualism in his writings1 that he apologises as it were for them1 intending the distinction to be1 not absolute1 but relative4 8,let us say at the outset that the distinctions we are going to make will be too sharply drawn1 just because we wish to define in instinct what is instinctive1 and in intelligence what is intelligent1 whereas all concrete instinct is mingled with intelligence1 as all real intelligence is penetrated by instinct4 ,moreover this is quite an important expression of ,bergson's objection to the old 8faculty0 psychology1 neither intelligence nor instinct lends itself to rigid definition2 they are tendencies and not things4 ,also it must not be forgotten that 444 we are considering intelligence and instinct as going out of life which deposits them along its course0 7,creative ,evolution1 p4 #adc74 #dbj ,he talks in the ,creative ,evolution of a 8real time0 and a 8pure duration0 of a real duration that 8bites0 into things and leaves on them the mark of its tooth1 of a 8ceaseless upspringing of something new10 of 8our progress in pure duration10 or a 8movement which creates at once the intellectuality of mind and the materiality of things0 7p4 #bag74 ,i have no hesitation in saying that all this is unthinkable to me1 and that it might indeed be criticised by ,rationalism as inconsistent with our highest and most real view of things4 #dba ,he admits himself that 8,if our analysis is correct1 it is consciousness1 or rather supra-consciousness that is at the origin of life0 7,creative ,evolution1 p4 #bge74 #dbb 8,now1 if the same kind of action is going on everywhere1 whether it is that which is striving to remake itself1 ,i simply express this probable similitude when ,i speak of a centre from which worlds shoot out as rockets in a fireworks display--provided1 however1 that ,i do not present there is a great idea here1 a true piece of #8,kantianism' this centre as a thing1 but as a continuity of shooting out4 ,god thus defined has nothing of the already made4 ,he is unceasing life1 action1 freedom4 ,creation so conceived is not a mystery2 we experience it in ourselves when we act freely0 7,creative ,evolution1 p4 #bfb74 #dbc ,see p4 #aee1 note #a4 #dbd ,it is somewhat difficult1 and it is not necessary for our purposes1 to explain what might be meant by the 8,idealism0 of ,bergson--at least in the sense of a cosmology1 a theory of the 8real40 ,it is claimed for him1 and he claims for himself that he is in a sense both an 8idealist0 and a 8realist10 believing at once 7#a7 that matter is an 8abstraction0 7an unreality71 and 7#b7 that there is more in matter than the qualities revealed by our perceptions4 ,we must remember that he objects to the idea of qualities in things in the old static sense4 8,there are no things2 there are only actions40 ,what we might mean by his initial idealism is the following3 8,matter1 in our view1 is an aggregate of images4 ,and by #8image' we mean ,matter and ,memory1 the ,introduction a certain existence which is more than that which the idealist calls a representation1 but less than that which the realist calls a thing--an existence placed half-way between the #8thing' and the #8representation4' ,this conception of matter is simply that of common sense40 444 8,for common sense1 then1 the object exists in itself1 and1 on the other hand1 the object is in itself pictorial1 as we perceive it3 image it is1 but a self-existing image40 ,now1 this very idea of a 8self-existing image0 implies to me the whole idealism of philosophy1 and ,bergson is not free of it4 ,and1 of course1 as we have surely seen1 his 8creative-evolution0 philosophy is a stupendous piece of idealism1 but an idealism moreover to which the science of the day is also inclining4 #dbe ,there is so much that is positive and valuable in his teaching1 that he is but little affected by formal criticism4 #dbf ,cf4 8,we have now enumerated a few of the essential features of human intelligence4 ,but we have hitherto considered the individual in isolation1 without taking account of social life4 ,in reality man is a being who lives in society4 ,if it be true even that the human intellect aims at fabrication1 we must add that1 for that as well as other purposes1 it is associated with other intellects4 ,now it is difficult to imagine a society whose members do not communicate by signs10 etc4 etc4 7,creative ,evolution1 p4 #aff74 ,indeed all readers of ,bergson know that he is constantly making use of the social factor and of 8co-operation0 by way of accounting for the general advance of mankind4 ,it may be appropriate in this same connexion to cite the magnificent passage towards the close of ,creative ,evolution in which he rises to the very heights of the idea ,schopenhauer and ,hartmann had it before him1 and also before the socialists and the collectivists of humanity's being possibly able to surmount even the greatest of the obstacles that beset it in its onward path3 8,as the smallest grain of dust ,creative ,evolution1 pp4 #bhe-f is bound up with our entire solar system1 drawn along with it in that undivided movement of descent which is materiality itself1 so all organised beings1 from the humblest to the highest1 444 do but evidence a single impulsion1 the inverse of the movement of matter1 and in itself indivisible4 ,all the living hold together1 and all yield to the same tremendous push4 ,the animal takes its stand on the plant1 man bestrides animality1 and the whole of humanity1 in space and in time1 is one immense army galloping beside and before and behind each of us in an overwhelming charge to beat down every resistance and clear the most formidable obstacles1 perhaps even death40 #dbg ,cf4 p4 #afj and p4 #bfb4 #dbh ,he comes in sight of some of them1 as he often does of so many things4 8,it is as if a vague and formless being1 whom we may call1 as we will ,c4,e41 p4 #bha1 man or superman1 had sought to realise himself1 and had succeeded only by abandoning a part of himself on the way4 ,the losses are represented by the rest of the animal world1 and even by the vegetable world1 at least in what these have that is positive and above the accidents of evolution40 #dbi ,from what has been said in this chapter about ,bergson1 and from the remarks that were made in the second chapter about ,renouvier and the ,french ,critical ,philosophy1 the reader may perhaps be willing to admit that our ,anglo-,american ,transcendental philosophy would perhaps not have been so abstract and so rationalistic had it devoted more attention1 than it has evidently given1 to some of the more representative ,french thinkers of the nineteenth century4 #dcj ,we must remember that nowhere in his writings does ,bergson claim any great originality for his many illuminative points of view4 ,he is at once far too much of a catholic scholar 7in the matter of the history of philosophy1 say71 and far too much of a scientist 7a man in living touch with the realities and the theories of the science of the day7 for this4 ,his findings about life and mind are the outcome of a broad study of the considerations of science and of history and of criticism4 ,by way1 for example1 of a quotation from a scientific work upon biology that seems to me to reveal some apparent basis in fact 7as seen by naturalists7 for the 8creative evolution0 upon which ,bergson bases his philosophy1 ,i append the following3 8,we have gone far enough to see that the development of an organism from an egg is a truly wonderful process4 ,we need but go back again and look at the marvellous simplicity of the egg to be convinced of it4 ,not only do cells differentiate1 but cell-groups act together like well-drilled battalions1 cleaving apart here1 fusing together there1 forming protective coverings or communicating channels1 apparently creating out of nothing1 a whole set of nutritive and reproductive organs1 all in orderly and progressive sequence1 producing in the end that orderly disposed cell aggregate1 that individual life unit which we know as an earthworm4 ,although the forces involved are beyond our ken1 the grosser processes are evident0 7,needham1 ,general ,biology1 p4 #age2 italics mine74 ,of course it is evident from his books that ,bergson does not take much account of such difficult facts and topics as the mistakes of instinct1 etc4 ,and ,i have just spoken of his optimistic avoidance of some of the deeper problems of the moral and spiritual life of man4 #dca 8,this amounts to saying that the theory of knowledge and theory of life seem to us inseparable ,creative ,evolution1 p4 xiii42 italics ,bergson's4 ,a theory of life that is not accompanied by a criticism of knowledge is obliged to accept1 as they stand1 the concepts which the understanding puts at its disposal3 it can but enclose the facts1 willing or not1 in pre-existing frames which it regards as ultimate4 ,it thus obtains a symbolism which is convenient1 perhaps even necessary to positive science1 but not a direct vision of its object40 #dcb ,i more than agree with ,bergson that our whole modern philosophy since ,descartes has been unduly influenced by physics and mathematics4 ,and ,i deplore the fact that the 8,new ,realism0 which has come upon us by way of a reaction 7see p4 #ec7 from the subjectivism of ,pragmatism1 should be travelling apparently in this backward direction--away1 to say the very least1 from some of the things clearly seen even by biologists and psychologists4 ,see p4 #add4 #dcc ,as ,i have indicated in my ,preface1 ,i am certainly the last person in the world to affect to disparage the importance of the thin end of the wedge of ,critical ,idealism introduced into the ,english-speaking world by ,green and the ,cairds1 and their first followers 7like the writers in the old ,seth-,haldane1 ,essays on ,philosophical ,criticism74 ,their theory of knowledge1 or 8epistemology10 was simply everything to the impoverished condition of our philosophy at the time1 but1 as ,bergson points out1 it still left many of us the fault perhaps was our own1 to some extent in the position of 8taking0 the scientific reading of the world as so far true1 and of thinking that we had done well in philosophy when we simply partly 8transformed0 it4 ,the really important thing was to see with this epistemology that the scientific reading of the world is not in any sense initial 8fact0 for philosophy4 ,,index ,absolutism1 #ac1 chap4 viii4 ,action1 #ia n41 #aje1 chap4 iv4 ,activity-,experience1 #aje1 #aji ,alexander1 ,s41 #afc ,anti-,intellectualism1 #gc1 #bci ,appearance and ,reality1 #hd ,arcesilaus1 #aee ,aristotle1 #aee ,armstrong 7,prof471 #di n4 ,attention1 #aai ,augustine1 #ajg ,avenarius1 #da ,bain1 #abj ,baldwin1 ,j4 ,m41 #aef1 #aaj n4 ,bawden 7,prof471 #ag1 #he ,belief1 #fd1 #fe1 #bbi n41 #bea ,bergson1 #gb1 #ajd1 #abf ,berthelot1 #aag ,blondel1 #cb1 #cd ,bosanquet1 ,b41 #aaj1 #ahe1 chap4 viii4 ,bourdeau1 #bf1 #acc n41 #aic ,boyce-,gibson 7,prof471 #aed ,bradley1 ,f4 ,h41 #gd1 #ge1 #ia ,browning1 ,r41 #aag ,brunschvig1 #cj ,bryce1 ,james1 #aic ,butler1 #aai ,caird1 ,e41 #aab ,carlyle1 #abe ,chesterton1 ,w4 ,k41 #aag1 #aef ,cohen1 #dh n4 ,common-sense ,beliefs1 #g ,common-sense ,philosophy1 #aag ,comte1 #abj ,contemplation1 #if ,cornford1 #ahd ,curtis 7,prof4 ,m4 ,m471 #bb ,dawes-,hicks 7,prof471 #afc ,de ,maistre1 #agj ,descartes1 #ff1 #aba ,desjardins1 ,p41 #cg ,dewey1 ,j41 #af1 #ag1 #cg1 #fb1 #adg1 #agc1 #age ,du ,bois ,reymond1 #aaj ,duncan 7,prof471 #abb ,duns ,scotus1 #aai ,eleutheropulos1 #dc ,elliot1 ,h4 ,s4 ,r41 #ff ,epicureanism1 #aah ,eucken1 #ci1 #aed ,ewald 7,dr471 #dd1 #dh ,flournoy1 #ahj ,fouille1 #cg n4 ,fraser1 ,a4 ,c41 #aab ,futurism1 #bf ,geddes1 ,p41 #abc ,goethe1 #aie1 #bae ,gordon1 ,a41 #aeb-c ,green1 ,t4 ,h41 #aii ,gregory 7,prof471 #bd ,inge 7,dean71 #bi1 #ca ,invention1 #aib ,james1 ,w41 #c1 #d1 #bd1 #ce1 #ci1 #de1 #ej1 #fe1 #ace1 #ahb1 #aib n4 ,jerusalem1 ,w41 #dc ,joachim1 #ef ,jones1 ,sir ,h41 #ef ,joseph1 #eg ,kant1 #aai1 #aba1 #bdg ,kant and ,hegel1 #ahc ,knox 7,capt471 #ae ,lalande1 ,a41 #bi1 #cc1 #afd ,lankester 7,sir ,r471 #afg ,lecky1 #gj ,leighton 7,prof471 #acc ,le ,roy1 #ca ,locke1 #fa1 #aai ,lovejoy 7,prof471 #di ,mac,eachran 7,prof471 #di n4 ,mach1 #dj ,mackenzie1 ,j4 ,s41 #aab ,maeterlinck1 #ij ,mallarm1 #bad ,marett1 #afj ,mastermann1 ,g4 ,f4 ,g41 #aah ,m',dougall1 #ajd ,mc,taggart1 ,j4 ,m4 ,e41 #ib ,meaning1 #ba1 #ea1 #adi ,mellone1 #eg ,merz1 #aeg ,mnsterberg1 #df ,natorp1 #dh ,needham 7,prof471 #aja1 #bfj ,new ,realism1 #ec ,nietzsche1 #aah1 #aci1 #aea ,ostwald1 #dj1 #da ,pace 7,prof471 #ahg ,paleyism1 #bdg ,papini1 #bd1 #ace ,pascal1 #aai ,pater1 ,w41 #abd ,peirce1 #c1 #bb ,perry 7,prof471 #ec1 #ahe ,perry1 ,bliss1 #aga1 #agi ,plato1 #eg1 #fa1 #aba1 #aej1 #aea ,pluralism1 #hg ,poincar1 #cj ,pradines1 #cf n4 ,pragmatism1 and ,american philosophy1 #di1 chap4 vii42 and ,british thought1 #ed2 and ,french thought1 #bh2 and ,german thought1 #ch2 and ,italian thought1 #bc2 a democratic doctrine1 #aje2 its ethics1 #acf2 its pluralism1 #afb2 its sociological character1 #afd1 #bfb2 its theory of knowledge1 #aca2 its theory of truth1 #abg2 its theory of reality1 #ace ,pratt 7,prof471 #ea1 #abg ,radical ,empiricism1 #he ,renan1 #aaj ,renouvier1 #bi ,rey1 #ca ,riley1 ,w41 #bf n4 ,ritzsche1 #de ,royce1 ,j41 #ed ,russell1 ,b41 #fa1 #ff n41 #afi ,santayana1 #aga1 #aha1 #aij ,schellwien1 #dd ,schiller1 ,f4 ,c4 ,s41 #ab1 #ad1 #af1 #acb1 #acc ,schinz1 #aib n4 ,schopenhauer1 #bh1 #aai1 #aea1 #bfj ,seth1 ,james1 #ad n4 ,seth-,haldane1 #bfj ,shaw1 ,bernard1 #abd ,sidgwick1 ,h41 #ef1 #aah1 #aai n41 #adj ,sigwart1 #db ,simmel1 #dd ,spencer1 #da n4 ,starbuck1 #bh ,stoicism1 #aah ,stout1 ,g4 ,f41 #ee ,subjective ,idealism1 #bei ,taylor1 ,a4 ,e41 #eg1 #gg1 #gh1 #aii n41 #bai ,teleology1 #hh1 #aih ,tertullian1 #aai ,theism1 #bae n4 ,themistius1 #aee ,thompson1 ,j4 ,h41 #add ,titchener1 #aeg ,truth1 #ei1 #ha1 #afc ,tufts1 #adg ,tyndall1 #aaj ,vaihinger1 #ci ,walker1 ,l4 ,j41 #ca ,ward1 ,james1 #cj1 #ee1 #adc1 #afb ,wells1 ,h4 ,g41 #abc ,westermarck1 #ade ,windelband1 #df1 #aej ,wollaston1 #bbd ,printed by ,r4 ,r4 ,,clark1 ,,limited1 ,edinburgh4 ,transcriber's ,notes ,inconsistent punctuation1 hyphenation1 and spelling were not changed4 ,simple typographical errors were corrected2 unbalanced quotation marks were remedied when the change was obvious1 and otherwise left unbalanced4 ,the index was not checked for proper alphabetization or correct page references4