---------------------------------------- -------------------------------- ,transcriber's ,note3 ,this version of the text cannot represent certain typographical effects4 ,italics are delimited with the #8' character as italic4 ,superscripted characters are prefix with #8'4 ,footnotes have been moved to follow the paragraphs in which they are referenced4 ,minor errors1 attributable to the printer1 have been corrected4 ,please see the transcriber's note at the end of this text for details regarding the handling of any textual issues encountered during its preparation4 ,elements of ,metaphysics ,a4 ,e4 ,,taylor ,late ,professor of ,moral ,philosophy in the ,university of ,edinburgh ,,university ,,paperbacks ------------------------------------ ,,methuen 3 ,,london ,first published by ,methuen ,co ,ltd in #aijc ,printed in ,great ,britain by ,morrison ,gibb ,ltd1 ,edinburgh ,catalogue ,no #b_/fgge_/bg ,university ,paperbacks are published by ,,methuen ,,co ,,ltd #cf ,essex ,street1 ,strand1 ,london ,,wc#b and ,,barnes ,,noble ,,inc #aje ,fifth ,avenue1 ,new ,york #c ,,to ,f4 ,h4 ,,bradley ,in heartfelt acknowledgment of all that his example and his writings have been to the men of my generation ,ante ,ararim ,parthus bibet1 aut ,germania ,tigrim1 ,quam nostro illius labatur pectore vultus4 ---------------------------------------- -------------------------------- ,,elements ,,of ,,metaphysics ,,preface ,in acknowledging my indebtedness to recent writers for many of the ideas contained in the following pages1 ,i have in the first place to express my deep and constant obligations to the various works of ,mr4 ,f4 ,h4 ,bradley4 ,my chief debt to other recent ,english-speaking philosophers is to ,professor ,royce and ,professor ,ward1 and ,i am perhaps scarcely less indebted to ,professor ,stout4 ,my chief obligations to ,continental writers are to ,avenarius and to ,professor ,mnsterberg4 ,i trust1 however1 that there is not one of the authors with whose views ,i have dealt in the course of my work from whom ,i have not learned something4 ,at the same time ,i ought perhaps to say here once for all that ,i make no claim to represent the views of any one author or school1 and ,i shall not be surprised if the thinkers to whom ,i owe most find themselves unable to endorse all that ,i have written4 ,with respect to the references given at the end of the several chapters1 ,i may note that their aim is simply to afford the reader some preliminary guidance in the further prosecution of his studies4 ,they make no pretence to completeness1 and are by no means exclusively drawn from writers who support my own conclusions4 ,one or two important works of which ,i should have otherwise been glad to make extended use have appeared too recently for me to avail myself of them4 ,i may mention especially the late ,professor ,adamson's ,lectures on the ,development of ,modern ,philosophy1 ,professor ,ostwald's ,vorlesungen ber ,naturphilosophie1 and ,mr4 ,b4 ,russell's ,principles of ,mathematics1 vol4 #a4 ,finally1 ,i have to express my gratitude to my friends ,professor ,s4 ,alexander and ,mr4 ,p4 ,j4 ,hartog for their kindness in reading large portions of my proofs and offering many valuable corrections and suggestions4 #aijc -------------- ,the sudden demand for a re-issue of this volume prevents my making any alterations beyond the correction of a number of misprints4 ,had the opportunity offered1 ,i should have been glad1 while leaving the main argument essentially as it stands1 to have attempted certain improvements in details4 ,i may mention in particular1 as the most important of the changes ,i could have wished to make1 that the treatment of the problem of infinite regress and of the ,kantian antinomies would have been remodelled1 and ,i trust improved1 as a consequence of study of the works of ,mr4 ,bertrand ,russell and ,m4 ,couturat4 ,i should like to take this opportunity of thanking all those who have been kind enough to favour me with criticisms of the book4 ,,contents ,,book ,i ,,general ,,notions ,,chapter ,i ,,the ,,problem ,,of ,,the ,,metaphysician ,,page #a4 ,the generality and simplicity of the metaphysical problem make it difficult to define the study4 #b4 ,problem is suggested by the presence of contradictions in ordinary experience4 #c44 ,by making a distinction between reality and appearance the sciences remove some of these contradictions1 but themselves lead to further difficulties of the same sort2 hence the need for systematic inquiry into the meaning of the distinction between the real and the apparent1 and the general character of reality as such4 #d44 ,metaphysics1 as an inquiry into the ultimate meaning of 8reality10 is akin to poetry and religion1 but differs from them in its scientific character1 from the mathematical and experimental sciences in its method1 from common scepticism in the critical nature of its methods as well as in its positive purpose4 #e44 ,the study is difficult 7a7 because of the generality of its problems1 7b7 and because we cannot employ diagrams or physical experiments4 #f44 ,the objection that ,metaphysics is an impossibility may be shown in all its forms to rest upon self-contradictory assumptions of a metaphysical kind4 #g44 ,the minor objections that1 if possible1 the science is superfluous1 or at least stationary1 may be met with equal ease4 #h4 ,metaphysics is partly akin to the mystical tendency1 but differs from mysticism in virtue of its positive interest in the world of appearances1 as well as by its scientific method4 #i44 ,it agrees with logic in the generality of its scope1 but differs in being concerned with the real1 whereas logic is primarily concerned with the inferrible4 #aj4 ,the problems of the so-called ,theory of ,knowledge are really metaphysical4 #a ,,chapter ,,ii ,,the ,,metaphysical ,,criterion ,,and ,,the ,,metaphysical ,,method #a4 ,in the principle that 8,reality is not self-contradictory0 we have a universal and certain criterion of reality which is not merely negative1 but implies the positive assertion that reality is a consistent system4 #b4 ,the validity of this criterion is not affected by the suggestion that it may be merely a ,logical ,law2 #c4 ,nor by the raising of doubt whether all our knowledge is not merely 8relative10 a doubt which is itself meaningless4 #d4 ,as to the material of the system1 it is experience or immediate psychical fact4 #e4 ,it must be actual experience1 not mere 8possibilities0 of experience2 but actual experience must not be identified with 8sensation40 #f4 ,nor must we assume that experience consists of subjects and their states2 nor again1 that it is a mere succession of 8states of consciousness40 #g4 ,the differentia of matter of experience is its immediacy1 i4e4 its combination in a single whole of the two aspects of existence and content4 #h4 ,this union of existence and content is broken up in reflective knowledge or thought1 but may be restored at a higher level4 #i4 ,experience further always appears to be implicitly complex in respect of its content4 #aj4 ,an adequate apprehension of reality would only be possible in the form of a complete or 8pure0 experience1 at once all-inclusive1 systematic1 and direct4 ,the problem of ,metaphysics is to ascertain what would be the general or formal character of such an experience1 and how far the various provinces of our human experience and knowledge approximate to it4 ,the knowledge ,metaphysics can give us of the ultimate nature of reality as it would be present in a complete experience1 though imperfect1 is final as far as it goes4 #aa4 ,as to the method of ,metaphysics1 it must be analytical1 critical1 non-empirical1 and non-inductive4 ,it may also be called a priori if we carefully avoid confusing the a priori with the psychologically primitive4 ,why our method cannot be the ,hegelian ,dialectic #ah ,,chapter ,,iii ,,the ,,sub-,,divisions ,,of ,,metaphysics #a4 ,the traditional sub-division of ,metaphysics into ,ontology1 ,cosmology1 ,rational ,psychology1 common to all the great modern constructive systems4 #b4 ,precise sense in which we adopt these divisions for the purposes of our own treatment of the subject4 #c4 ,relation of ,cosmology and ,rational ,psychology to the empirical sciences #db ,,book ,,ii ,,ontology--,,the ,,general ,,structure ,,of ,,reality ,,chapter ,i ,,reality ,,and ,,experience #a4 ,in a sense 8reality0 for each of us means that of which he must take account if his special purposes are to find fulfilment4 #b4 ,but ultimately the world must possess a structure of which all purposes1 each in its own way1 must take account4 ,this is the 8,ultimate ,reality0 or 8,absolute0 of ,metaphysics4 ,in ,metaphysics we regard it from the special standpoint of the scientific intellect4 ,there are other legitimate attitudes towards it1 e4g41 that of practical religion4 #c4 ,the inseparability of reality from immediate experience involves the recognition of it as teleological and as uniquely individual4 #d4 ,the experience within which all reality falls cannot be my own1 nor yet the 8collective0 experience of the aggregate of conscious beings4 ,it must be an individual experience which apprehends the totality of existence as the harmonious embodiment of a single 8purpose40 ,the nearest analogue our own life presents to such a type of experience is to be found in the satisfied insight of personal love4 #e4 ,the experience of such an 8,absolute0 must not be thought of as a mere reduplication of our own1 or of the scientific hypotheses by which we co-ordinate facts for the purposes of inference4 #f4 ,our conception is closely connected with that of ,berkeley1 from which it differs by the stress it lays on the purposive and selective aspect of experience4 #g4 ,realism1 both of the ,agnostic and of the ,dogmatic type1 is incompatible with the meaning we have been led to attach to 8reality40 ,but ,agnosticism is justified in insisting on the limitations of our knowledge of ,reality1 and ,dogmatic ,realism in rejecting the identification of ,reality with experience as a merely cognitive function of finite percipients4 #h4 ,subjectivism1 according to which all that ,i know is states of my own 8consciousness10 is irreconcilable with the admitted facts of life1 and arises from the psychological fallacy of 8introjection0 #ej ,,chapter ,,ii ,,the ,,systematic ,,unity ,,of ,,reality #a4 ,the problem whether ,reality is ultimately ,one or ,many is inevitably suggested to us by the diverse aspects of our own direct experience of the world4 ,the different theories may be classed1 according to their solution of this problem1 as ,monistic1 ,pluralistic1 and ,monadistic4 #b4 ,pluralism starts from the presumed fact of the mutual independence of human selves1 and teaches that this independence of each other belongs to all real beings4 ,but 7a7 the independence with which experience presents us is never complete1 nor the unity of the 8selves0 perfect4 7b7 ,the theory is inconsistent with the systematic character of all reality as presupposed in both knowledge and action4 #c4 ,monadism again makes the systematic unity of the real either an illusion or an inexplicable accident4 #d4 ,reality1 because systematic1 must be the expression of a single principle in and through a multiplicity4 ,the unity and multiplicity must both be real1 and each must necessarily involve the other4 #e4 ,if both are to be equally real1 the whole system must be a single experience1 and its constituents must also be experiences4 ,a perfect systematic whole can be neither an aggregate1 nor a mechanical whole of parts1 nor an organism4 ,the whole must exist for the parts1 and they for it4 #f4 ,this may also be expressed by saying that ,reality is a subject which is the unity of subordinate subjects1 or an individual of which the constituents are lesser individuals4 #g4 ,the nearest familiar analogue to such a systematic whole would be the relation between our whole 8self0 and the partial mental systems or lesser 8selves40 #h4 ,the nearest historic parallel to this view is to be found in ,spinoza's theory of the relation of the human mind to the 8infinite intellect of ,god0 #hd ,,chapter ,,iii ,,reality ,,and ,,its ,,appearances--,,the ,,degrees ,,of ,,reality #a4 ,reality being a single systematic whole1 the nature of its constituent elements is only finally intelligible in the light of the whole system4 ,hence each of its 8appearances10 if considered as a whole in itself1 must be more or less contradictory4 #b4 ,but some 8appearances0 exhibit the structure of the whole more adequately than others1 and have therefore a higher degree of reality4 #c4 ,this conception of degree of reality may be illustrated by comparison with the successive orders of infinites and infinitesimals in ,mathematics4 ,it would be the task of a complete ,philosophy to assign the contents of the world to their proper place in the series of 8orders0 of reality4 #d4 ,in general any subordinate whole is real in proportion as it is a self-contained whole4 ,and it is a self-contained whole in proportion as it is 7a7 comprehensive1 7b7 systematic2 that is1 a thing is real just so far as it is truly individual4 #e4 ,the two criteria of individuality1 though ultimately coincident1 tend in particular cases to fall apart for our insight1 owing to the limitation of human knowledge4 #f4 ,ultimately only the whole system of experience is completely individual1 all other individuality is approximate4 #g4 ,in other words1 the whole system of experience is an infinite individual1 all subordinate individuality is finite4 ,comparison of t8his position with the doctrines of ,leibnitz4 #h4 ,recapitulatory statement of the relation of ,reality to its ,appearances #ajd ,,chapter ,,iv ,,the ,,world ,,of ,,things--7#a7 ,,substance1 ,,quality1 ,,and ,,relation #a4 ,the natural or pre-scientific view of the world regards it as a plurality of 8things10 each possessing qualities1 standing in relation to others1 and interacting with them4 #b4 ,hence arise four problems3 those of the ,unity of the ,thing1 of ,substance and ,quality1 of ,relation1 of ,causality4 #c4 ,no simple answer can be given to the question1 ,what is one thing8 ,the ,unity of the ,thing is one of teleological structure1 and this is a matter of degree1 and also largely of our own subjective point of view4 #d4 ,substance and ,quality4 ,the identification of the substance of things with their primary qualities1 though useful in physical science1 is metaphysically unjustifiable4 #e4 ,substance as an 8unknowable substratum of qualities0 adds nothing to our understanding of their connection4 #f4 ,the thing cannot be a mere collection of qualities without internal unity4 #g4 ,the conception of a thing as the law or mode of relation of its states useful but metaphysically unsatisfactory4 ,ultimately the many can be contained in the one only by 8representation02 the unity in things must be that of an individual experience4 #h4 ,relation4 ,we can neither reduce qualities to relations nor relations to qualities4 #i4 ,again1 the attempt to conceive ,reality as qualities in relation leads to the indefinite regress4 #aj4 ,we cannot escape this difficulty by taking all relations as 8external40 ,and ,professor ,royce's vindication of the indefinite regress seems to depend on the uncriticised application of the inadequate category of whole and part to ultimate ,reality4 ,the union of the one and the many in concrete experience is ultra-relational4 ,,supplementary ,,note3 ,dr4 ,stout's reply to ,mr4 ,bradley #abj ,,chapter ,v ,,the ,,world ,,of ,,things--7#b7 ,,change ,,and ,,causality #a4 ,the conception of things as interacting leads to the two problems of ,change and ,causality4 ,the paradoxical character of change due to the fact that only what is permanent can change4 #b4 ,change is succession within an identity2 this identity1 like that of ,substance1 must be teleological1 i4e4 must be an identity of plan or end pervading the process of change4 #c4 ,thus all change falls under the logical category of ,ground and ,consequence1 which becomes in its application to succession in time the ,principle of ,sufficient ,reason4 #d4 ,causality4 ,cause--in the modern popular and scientific sense--means the ground of a change when taken to be completely contained in preceding changes4 ,that every change has its complete ground in preceding changes is neither an axiom nor an empirically ascertained truth1 but a postulate suggested by our practical needs4 #e4 ,in the last resort the postulate cannot be true2 the dependence between events cannot be one-sided4 ,the real justification for our use of the postulate is its practical success4 #f4 ,origin of the conception of ,cause anthropomorphic4 #g4 ,puzzles about ,causation4 7#a7 ,continuity4 ,causation must be continuous1 and yet in a continuous process there can be no distinction of cause from effect4 ,cause must be and yet cannot be prior in time to effect4 #h4 7#b7 ,the indefinite regress in causation4 #i4 7#c7 ,plurality of ,causes4 ,plurality of ,causes is ultimately a logical contradiction1 but in any form in which the causal postulate is of practical use it must recognise plurality4 #aj4 ,the 8necessity0 of the causal relation psychological and subjective4 #aa4 ,immanent and ,transeunt ,causality3 ,consistent ,pluralism must deny transeunt ,causation2 but cannot do so successfully4 #ab4 ,both transeunt and immanent ,causality are ultimately appearance #aeh ,,book ,,iii ,,cosmology--,,the ,,interpretation ,,of ,,nature ,,chapter ,i ,,introductory #a4 ,distinction between the experimental sciences and a ,philosophy of ,nature and ,mind4 ,the former concerned with the description1 the latter with the interpretation of facts4 #b4 ,cosmology is the critical examination of the special characteristics of the physical order4 ,its main problems are3 7#a7 ,the problem of the nature of ,material ,existence2 7#b7 problem of the justification of the concept of the ,mechanical ,uniformity of ,nature2 7#c7 problems of ,space and ,time2 7#d7 problem of the ,significance of ,evolution2 7#e7 problem of the ,place of descriptive ,physical ,science in the system of ,human ,knowledge #aia ,,chapter ,,ii ,,the ,,problem ,,of ,,matter #a4 ,the physical order1 because dependent for its perceived qualities on the sense-organs of the percipient1 must be the appearance of a more ultimate reality which is non-physical4 #b4 ,berkeley's criticism is fatal to the identification of this reality with 8material substance40 ,the logical consequence of ,berkeley's doctrine that the esse of sensible things is percipi1 would be the subjectivist view that the physical order is only a complex of presentations4 #c4 ,but this is clearly not the case with that part of the physical order which consists of the bodies of my fellow-men4 ,these have an existence1 as centres of feeling1 over and above their existence as presentations to my senses4 #d4 ,as the bodies of my fellows are connected in one system with the rest of the physical order1 that order as a whole must have the same kind of reality which belongs to them4 ,it must be the presentation to our sense of a system or complex of systems of experiencing subjects2 the apparent absence of life and purpose from inorganic nature must be due to our inability to enter into a direct communion of interest with its members4 #e4 ,some consequences of this view #aih ,,chapter ,,iii ,,the ,,meaning ,,of ,,law #a4 ,the popular conception of the physical order as exhibiting a rigid mechanical conformity to general laws1 conflicts with our metaphysical interpretation4 #b4 ,our interpretation would1 however1 admit of the establishment of averages or approximately realised uniformities by the statistical method1 which deals with occurrence en bloc to the neglect of their individual detail4 #c4 8,uniformity0 in nature is neither an axiom nor an empirically verifiable fact1 but a postulate4 ,a consideration of the methods actually employed for the establishment of such uniformities or 8laws0 of nature shows that we have no guarantee that actual concrete cases exhibit exact conformity to law4 #d4 ,uniformity is a postulate arising from our need of practical rules for the control of nature4 ,it need not for this purpose be exact1 and in point of fact our scientific formul are only exact so long as they remain abstract and hypothetical4 ,they do not enable us to determine the actual course of an individual process with certainty4 #e4 ,the concept of the physical order as mechanical is the abstract expression of the postulate1 and is therefore essential to the empirical sciences which deal with the physical order4 #f4 ,consideration of the character of genuine machines suggests that the mechanical only exists as a subordinate aspect of processes which1 in their full nature1 are intelligent and purposive #baf ,,chapter ,,iv ,,space ,,and ,,time #a4 ,are time and space ultimately real or only phenomenal8 #b4 ,the space and time of perception are limited1 sensibly continuous1 and consist of a quantitative element together with a qualitative character dependent on relation to the here and now of immediate individual feeling4 #c4 ,conceptual space and time are created from the perceptual data by a combined process of synthesis1 analysis1 and abstraction4 #d4 ,they are unlimited1 infinitely divisible1 and there is valid positive ground for regarding them as mathematically continuous4 ,thus they form infinite continuous series of positions4 ,they involve abstraction from all reference to the here and now of immediate feeling1 and are thus homogeneous1 i4e4 the positions in them are indistinguishable4 ,they are also commonly taken to be unities4 #e4 ,perceptual space and time cannot be ultimately real1 because they involve reference to the here and now of a finite experience2 conceptual space and time cannot be ultimately real1 because they contain no principle of internal distinction1 and are thus not individual4 #f4 ,the attempt to take space and time as real leads to the difficulty about qualities and relations1 and so to the indefinite regress4 #g4 ,space and time contain no principle of unity2 there may be many space and time orders in the ,absolute which have no spatial or temporal connection with each other4 #h4 ,the antinomies of the infinite divisibility and extent of space and time arise from the indefinite regress involved in the scheme of qualities and relations1 and are insoluble so long as the space and time construction is taken for ,reality4 #i4 ,the space and time order is an imperfect phenomenal manifestation of the logical relation between the inner purposive lives of finite individuals4 ,time is an inevitable aspect of finite experience4 ,how space and time are transcended in the ,absolute experience we cannot say #bda ,,chapter ,v ,,some ,,conditions ,,of ,,evolution #a4 ,the concept of evolution an attempt to interpret natural processes in terms of individual growth4 #b4 ,evolution means change culminating in an end which is the result of the process and is qualitatively new4 ,the concept is thus teleological4 #c4 ,evolution1 being teleological1 is essentially either progress or degeneration4 ,if it is more than illusion1 there must be real ends in the physical order4 ,and ends can only be real as subjective interests of sentient beings which are actualised by the process of change4 #d4 ,thus all evolution must take place within an individual subject4 #e4 ,further1 the subject of evolution must be a finite individual4 ,all attempts to make 8evolution0 a property of the whole of ,reality lead to the infinite regress4 #f4 ,the distinction between progressive evolution and degeneration has an 8objective0 basis in the metaphysical distinction between higher and lower degrees of individuality4 #g4 ,in the evolutionary process1 old individuals disappear and fresh ones originate4 ,hence evolution is incompatible with the view that ,reality consists of a plurality of ultimately independent finite individuals #bfe ,,chapter ,,vi ,,the ,,logical ,,character ,,of ,,descriptive ,,science #a4 ,scientific description may be contrasted with philosophical or teleological interpretation1 but the contrast is not absolute4 #b4 ,the primary end of all scientific description is intercommunication with a view to active co-operation4 ,hence all such description is necessarily restricted to objects capable of being experienced in the same way by a plurality of individuals4 #c4 ,a second end of scientific description is the economising of intellectual labour by the creation of general rules for dealing with typical situations in the environment4 ,in the course of evolution this object becomes partially independent of the former4 #d4 ,from the interest in formulating general rules arise the three fundamental postulates of physical science1 the postulates of ,uniformity1 ,mechanical ,law1 and ,causal ,determination4 #e4 ,the mechanical view of physical ,nature determined by these three postulates is systematically carried out only in the abstract science of ,mechanics2 hence the logical completion of the descriptive process would mean the reduction of all descriptive science to ,mechanics4 ,that the chemical1 biological1 and psychological sciences contain elements which cannot be reduced to mechanical terms1 is due to the fact that their descriptions are inspired by sthetic and historical as well as by primarily 8scientific0 interests4 #f4 ,the analysis of such leading concepts of mechanical ,physics as the ,conservation of ,mass and of ,energy shows them to have only relative validity #bgi ,,book ,,iv ,,rational ,,psychology--,,the ,,interpretation ,,of ,,life ,,chapter ,i ,,the ,,logical ,,character ,,of ,,psychological ,,science #a4 ,the various sciences which deal with the interpretation of human life all avail themselves of the fundamental categories of ,psychology4 ,hence we must ask how the concepts of ,psychology are related to actual experience4 #b4 ,psychology is a body of abstract descriptive formul1 not a direct transcript of the individual processes of real life4 ,it presupposes the previous construction of the physical order4 #c4 ,the psychological conception of conscious life as a succession of 8mental states0 or 8images0 is a transformation of actual experience devised primarily to account for the experience of other subjects1 and subsequently extended to my own4 ,the transformation is effected by the hypothesis of 8introjection40 #d1 #e4 ,the logical justification of the psychological transformation of facts is twofold4 ,the psychological scheme serves partly to fill up the gaps in our theories of physiological ,mechanism1 and also1 in respect of the teleological categories of ,psychology1 to describe the course of human conduct in a form capable of ethical and historical appreciation4 ,psychology may legitimately employ both mechanical and teleological categories4 #f4 ,the objections sometimes brought against the possibility of 7a7 psychological1 7b7 teleological description are untenable #bid ,,chapter ,,ii ,,the ,,problem ,,of ,,soul ,,and ,,body #a4 ,the problem of psychophysical connection has to do with the correlation of scientific abstractions1 not of given facts of experience4 #b4 ,the 8consciousness0 of ,psychology is thus not the same thing as the finite individual subject of experience1 and ,reality must not be said to consist of 8minds0 in the psychologist's sense4 ,again1 we must not assume a priori that there can be only one working hypothesis of psychophysical connection4 #c4 ,the possible hypotheses may be reduced to three1 ,epiphenomenalism1 ,parallelism1 and ,interaction4 #d4 ,epiphenomenalism is legitimate as a methodological principle in ,physiology2 it is untenable as a basis for ,psychology because it implies the reduction of psychical facts to mechanical law4 #e4 ,parallelism4 ,the arguments for ,parallelism as necessarily valid to ,psychophysics because of its congruity with the postulates of mechanical ,physics1 are fallacious4 ,we cannot assume that ,psychology must necessarily conform to these postulates4 #f4 ,as a working hypothesis ,parallelism is available for many purposes1 but breaks down when we attempt to apply it to the case of the initiation of fresh purposive reactions4 ,a teleological and a mechanical series cannot ultimately be 8parallel40 #g4 ,we are thus thrown back on the hypothesis of ,interaction as the only one which affords a consistent scheme for the correlation of ,physiology and ,psychology4 ,we have1 however1 to remember that what the hypothesis correlates is scientific symbols1 not actual facts4 ,the actuality represented by both sets of symbols is the same thing1 though the psychological symbolism affords a wider and more adequate representation of it than the physiological #cac ,,chapter ,,iii ,,the ,,place ,,of ,,the 8,,self0 ,,in ,,reality #a4 ,the 8self0 is 7#a7 a teleological concept1 7#b7 implies a contrasted not-self 7where this contrast is absent from an experience there is no genuine sense of self72 7#c7 but the limits which divide self and not-self are not fixed but fluctuating4 ,the not-self is not a merely external limit1 but consists of discordant elements within the individual1 which are extruded from it by a mental construction4 7#d7 ,the self is a product of development1 and has its being in the time-series4 7#e7 ,the self is never given complete in a moment of actual experience1 but is an ideal construction2 probably self-hood implies some degree of intellectual development4 #b4 ,the ,absolute or ,infinite ,individual1 being free from all internal discord1 can have no not-self1 and therefore cannot properly be called a self4 #c4 ,still less can it be a person4 #d4 ,in a society of selves we have a more genuinely self-determined individual than in the single self4 ,hence it would be nearer the truth to think of the ,absolute as a ,society1 though no finite whole adequately expresses the ,absolute's full nature4 ,we must remember1 however1 7a7 that probably the individuals in the ,absolute are not all in direct relation1 and 7b7 that in thinking of it as a ,society we are not denying its real individuality4 #e4 ,the self is not in its own nature imperishable2 as to the particular problem of its continuance after death1 no decision can be arrived at on grounds of ,metaphysics4 ,neither the negative presumption drawn from our inability to understand the conditions of continuance1 nor the lack of empirical evidence1 is conclusive2 on the other hand1 there is not sufficient metaphysical reason for taking immortality as certain #ccd ,,chapter ,,iv ,,the ,,problem ,,of ,,moral ,,freedom #a4 ,the metaphysical problem of free will has been historically created by extra-ethical difficulties1 especially by theological considerations in the early ,christian era1 and by the influence of mechanical scientific conceptions in the modern world4 #b1 #c4 ,the analysis of our moral experience shows that true 8freedom0 means teleological determination4 ,hence to be 8free0 and to 8will0 are ultimately the same thing4 ,freedom or 8self-determination0 is genuine but limited1 and is capable of variations of degree4 #d4 ,determinism and ,indeterminism both arise from the false assumption that the mechanical postulate of causal determination by antecedents is an ultimate fact4 ,the question then arises whether mental events are an exception to the supposed principle4 #e4 ,determinism4 ,the determinist arguments stated4 #f4 ,they rest partly upon the false assumption that mechanical determination is the one and only principle of rational connection between facts2 #g4 ,partly upon fallacious theories of the actual procedure of the mental sciences4 ,fallacious nature of the argument that complete knowledge of character and circumstances would enable us to predict human conduct4 ,the assumed data are such as1 from their own nature1 could not be known before the event4 #h4 ,indeterminism4 ,the psychical facts to which the indeterminist appeals do not warrant his conclusion1 which is1 moreover1 metaphysically absurd1 as involving the denial of rational connection4 #i4 ,both doctrines agree in the initial error of confounding teleological unity with causal determination #cei ,,chapter ,v ,,some ,,metaphysical ,,implications ,,of ,,ethics ,,and ,,religion #a4 ,if ,reality is a harmonious system1 it must somehow make provision for the gratification of our ethical1 religious1 and sthetic interests4 #b4 ,but we cannot assume that ethical and religious postulates are necessarily true in the forms in which our practical interests lead us to make them4 #c4 ,thus1 while morality would become impossible unless on the whole there is coincidence between virtue and happiness1 and unless social progress is a genuine fact1 8perfect virtue10 8perfect happiness10 8infinite progress0 are logically self-contradictory concepts4 #d4 ,but this does not impair the practical usefulness of our ethical ideals4 #e4 ,in religion we conceive of the ideal of perfection as already existing in individual form4 ,hence ultimately no part of the temporal order can be an adequate object of religious devotion4 #f4 ,this leads to the ,problem of ,evil4 8,god0 cannot be a finite being within the ,absolute1 because1 if so1 ,god must contain evil and imperfection as part of ,his nature1 and is thus not the already existing realisation of the ideal4 #g4 ,this difficulty disappears when we identify 8,god0 with the ,absolute1 because in the ,absolute evil can be seen to be mere illusory appearance4 ,it may1 however1 be true that religious feeling1 to be practically efficient1 may need to imagine its object in an ultimately incorrect anthropomorphic form4 #h4 ,the existence1 within the ,absolute1 of finite 8divine0 personalities1 can neither be affirmed nor denied on grounds of general ,metaphysics4 #i4 ,proofs of the 8being of ,god40 ,the principle of the 8ontological0 and 8cosmological0 proofs can be defended against the criticism of ,hume and ,kant only if we identify ,god with the ,absolute4 ,the 8physicotheological proof0 could only establish the reality of finite superhuman intelligences1 and its force depends purely upon empirical considerations of evidence #cha ,,chapter ,,vi ,,conclusion #a4 ,can our ,absolute ,experience be properly called the 8union of ,thought and ,will08 ,the ,absolute is certainly the final realisation of our intellectual and our practical ideals4 ,but 7#a7 it includes aspects1 such as1 e4g41 sthetic feeling1 pleasure1 and pain1 which are neither ,thought nor ,will4 7#b7 ,and it cannot possess either ,thought or ,will as such4 ,both ,thought and ,will1 in their own nature1 presuppose a ,reality which transcends mere ,thought and mere ,will4 #b4 ,our conclusion may in a sense be said to involve an element of ,agnosticism1 and again of ,mysticism4 ,but it is only agnostic in holding that we do not know the precise nature of the ,absolute ,experience4 ,it implies no distrust of the validity of knowledge1 so far as it goes1 and bases its apparently agnostic result on the witness of knowledge itself4 ,similarly1 it is mystical in transcending1 not in refusing to recognise1 the constructions of understanding and will4 #c4 ,metaphysics adds nothing to our information1 and yields no fresh springs of action4 ,it is finally only justified by the persistency of the impulse to speculate on the nature of things as a whole #djh ,,index #dag ,,elements ,,of ,,metaphysics ,,book ,i ,,general ,,notions ,,chapter ,i ,,the ,,problem ,,of ,,the ,,metaphysician #a4 ,the generality and simplicity of the metaphysical problem make it difficult to define the study4 #b4 ,problem is suggested by the presence of contradictions in ordinary experience4 #c4 ,by making a distinction between reality and appearance the sciences remove some of these contradictions1 but themselves lead to further difficulties of the same sort2 hence the need for systematic inquiry into the meaning of the distinction between the real and the apparent1 and the general character of reality as such4 #d4 ,metaphysics1 as an inquiry into the ultimate meaning of 8reality10 is akin to poetry and religion1 but differs from them in its scientific character1 from the mathematical and experimental sciences in its method1 from common scepticism in the critical nature of its methods as well as in its positive purpose4 #e4 ,the study is difficult 7a7 because of the generality of its problems1 7b7 and because we cannot employ diagrams or physical experiments4 #f4 ,the objection that ,metaphysics is an impossibility may be shown in all its forms to rest upon self-contradictory assumptions of a metaphysical kind4 #g4 ,the minor objections that1 if possible1 the science is superfluous1 or at least stationary1 may be met with equal ease4 #h4 ,metaphysics is partly akin to the mystical tendency1 but differs from mysticism in virtue of its positive interest in the world of appearances1 as well as by its scientific method4 #i4 ,it agrees with logic in the generality of its scope1 but differs in being concerned with the real1 whereas logic is primarily concerned with the inferrible4 #aj4 ,the problems of the so-called ,theory of ,knowledge are really metaphysical4 #a4 ,it is always difficult1 in treating of any branch of knowledge1 to put before the beginner a correct preliminary notion of the nature and scope of the study to which he is to be introduced1 but the difficulty is exceptionally great in the case of the body of investigations traditionally known as ,metaphysics4#a ,the questions which the science seeks to answer are1 indeed1 in principle of the simplest and most familiar kind1 but it is their very simplicity and familiarity which constitute the chief difficulty of the subject4 ,we are naturally slow to admit that there is anything we do not understand in terms and ideas which we are constantly using1 not only in the special sciences1 but in our non-systematised everyday thought and language about the course of the world4 ,hence1 when the metaphysician begins to ask troublesome questions about the meaning and validity of these common and familiar notions1 ordinary practical men1 and even intelligent students of the special sciences1 are apt to complain that he is wasting his time by raising idle and uncalled-for difficulties about the self-evident4 ,consequently the writer on ,metaphysics is almost inevitably compelled to begin by rebutting the natural and current prejudice which regards his science as non-existent and its problems as illusory4 ,the full vindication of metaphysical inquiry from this charge of futility can only be furnished by such a systematic examination of the actual problems of the study as will be attempted1 in outline1 in the succeeding chapters of this work4 ,all that can be done in an ,introduction is to present such a general description of the kind of questions to be subsequently discussed1 and their relation to the more special problems of the various sciences1 as may incline the reader to give an impartial hearing to what is to follow4 #b4 ,the course of our ordinary experience1 as well as our education in the rudiments of the sciences1 has made us all familiar with the distinction between what really is or exists and what merely appears to be4 ,there is no opposition more thoroughly enshrined in the language and literature of civilised races than the contrast of seeming with reality1 of substance with show4 ,we come upon it alike in our study of the processes of nature and our experience of human character and purpose4 ,thus we contrast the seeming stability of the earth with its real motion1 the seeming continuity and sameness of a lump of solid matter with the real discontinuity and variety of its chemical constituents1 the seeming friendliness of the hypocritical self-seeker with his real indifference to our welfare4 ,in all these cases the motive which leads us to make the distinction is the same1 namely1 the necessity to escape from the admission of a contradiction in experience4 ,so long as our various direct perceptions are not felt to conflict with one another1 we readily accept them all as equally real and valid1 and no question arises as to their relative truth or falsehood4 ,were all our perceptions of this kind1 there would be no need for the correction1 by subsequent reflection1 of our first immediate impressions about the nature of ourselves and the world2 error would be a term of no meaning for us1 and science would have no existence4 ,but when two immediate perceptions1 both apparently equally authenticated by our senses1 stand in direct conflict with one another1#b we cannot1 without doing violence to the fundamental law of rational thinking1 regard both as equally and in the same sense true4 ,unless we abandon once for all the attempt to reconcile the course of our experience with the demand of our intellect for consistency in thinking1 we are driven to make a momentous distinction4 ,we have to recognise that things are not always what they seem to be2 what appears to us is1 sometimes at any rate1 not real1 and what really is does not always appear4 ,of our two conflicting perceptions1 only one at best can be a correct representation of the real course of things2 one of them at least1 and possibly both1 must be mere seeming or appearance1 and we are thus cast upon the problem which every science tries1 in its own sphere and its own way1 to solve3 what part of our conceptions about the world gives us reality and what part only appearance8#c ,it is because of the importance of these puzzles of immediate perception as stimulating to such scientific reflection that ,plato and ,aristotle called philosophy the child of ,wonder1 and it is because the processes of change present them in a peculiarly striking form that the problem of change has always been a central one in ,metaphysics4 #c4 ,the attempt to harmonise by reflection the contradictions which beset immediate perception in all its forms is one which is not confined to a single science2 the common task of all sciences is to say what1 in some special department and for special purposes1 must be taken as reality and what as mere appearance1 and1 by degrading the contradictory to the level of appearance1 to satisfy the instinctive demand of our intellect for coherency and consistency of thought4 ,but the development of scientific reflection itself in its turn1 while it solves some of our difficulties1 is constantly giving rise to fresh perplexities of a higher order4 ,our scientific principles themselves frequently seem to present us with contradictions of a peculiarly distressing kind4 ,thus we find ourselves forced in some of our geometrical reasonings to treat a curve as absolutely continuous1 in others to regard it as made up of a number of points4 ,or1 again1 we are alternately compelled to regard the particles of matter as inert and only capable of being moved by impact from without1 and yet again as endowed with indwelling 8central forces40 ,both the opposing views1 in such a case1 clearly cannot be ultimately true1 and we are therefore compelled either to give up the effort to think consistently1 or to face the question1 ,is either view ultimately true1 and if so1 which8 ,again1 the principles of one branch of study may appear to contradict those of another4 ,for instance1 the absolute determination of every movement by a series of antecedent movements which we assume as a principle in our mechanical science1 appears1 at least1 to conflict with the freedom of human choice and reality of human purpose which are fundamental facts for the moralist and the historian2 and we have thus once more to ask1 which of the two1 mechanical necessity or intelligent freedom1 is the reality and which the mere appearance8 ,finally1 the results of our scientific reflection sometimes seem to be in violent disagreement with our deepest and most characteristic aspirations and purposes1 and we cannot avoid the question1 which of the two have the better title to credit as witnesses to the inmost nature of reality8 ,in all these cases of perplexity there are1 short of the refusal to think about our difficulties at all1 only two courses open to us4 ,we may answer the question at haphazard and as it suits our momentary caprice1 or we may try to answer it on an intelligible principle4 ,if we choose the second course1 then clearly before we formulate our principle we must undertake a systematic and impartial inquiry as to what we really mean by the familiar distinction between 8seems0 and 8is10 that is to say1 a scientific inquiry into the general characteristics by which reality or real being is distinguished from mere appearance1 not in some one special sphere of study1 but universally4 ,now1 such an inquiry into the general character of reality1 as opposed to more or less unreal appearance1 is precisely what is meant by ,metaphysics4 ,metaphysics sets itself1 more systematically and universally than any other science1 to ask what1 after all1 is meant by being real1 and to what degree our various scientific and non-scientific theories about the world are in harmony with the universal characteristics of real existence4 ,hence ,metaphysics has been called 8an attempt to become aware of and to doubt all preconceptions02 and again1 8an unusually resolute effort to think consistently40 ,as we cannot1 so long as we allow ourselves to think at all1 avoid asking these questions as to what 8is0 and what only 8seems10 it is clear that the attempt to dispense with metaphysical speculation altogether would be futile4 ,we have really no choice whether we shall form metaphysical hypotheses or not1 only the choice whether we shall do so consciously and in accord with some intelligible principle1 or unconsciously and at random4 #d4 ,our preliminary account of the general character of the metaphysician's problem will enable us to distinguish ,metaphysics from some other closely related forms of human thought1 and to give it at least a provisional place in the general scheme of knowledge4 7a7 ,clearly1 ,metaphysics1 as an inquiry into the meaning of reality1 will have some affinity with religion as well as with imaginative literature1 both of which aim at getting behind mere appearances and interpreting the reality which lies beneath them4 ,in one important respect its relation to both is closer than that of any other department of knowledge1--inasmuch as it1 like them1 is directly concerned with ultimate reality1 whereas the special sciences deal each with some one particular aspect of things1 and avowedly leave all ultimate questions on one side4 ,where it differs from both is in its spirit and method4 ,unlike religion and imaginative literature1 ,metaphysics deals with the ultimate problems of existence in a purely scientific spirit2 its object is intellectual satisfaction1 and its method is not one of appeal to immediate intuition or unanalysed feeling1 but of the critical and systematic analysis of our conceptions4 ,thus it clearly belongs1 in virtue of its spirit and method1 to the realm of science4 7b7 ,yet it differs widely in method from the other types of science with which most of us are more familiar4 ,it differs from the mathematical sciences in being non-quantitative and non-numerical in its methods4 ,for we cannot employ the numerical and quantitative methods of ,mathematics except on things and processes which admit of measurement1 or1 at least1 of enumeration1 and it is for ,metaphysics itself1 in the course of its investigations1 to decide whether what is ultimately real1 or any part of it1 is numerical or quantitative1 and if so1 in what sense4 ,it differs1 again1 from the experimental sciences in that1 like ,logic and ,ethics1 it does nothing to increase the stock of our knowledge of particular facts or events1 but merely discusses the way in which facts or events are to be interpreted if we wish to think consistently4 ,its question is not what in detail we must regard as the reality of any special set of processes1 but what are the general conditions to which all reality1 as such1 conforms4 7,just in the same way1 it will be remembered1 ,logic does not discuss the worth of the evidence for particular scientific theories1 but the general conditions to which evidence must conform if it is to prove its conclusion47 ,hence ,aristotle correctly called ,metaphysics a science of being qu being1 1 7as opposed1 for instance1 to ,mathematics1 which only studies existence in so far as it is quantitative or numerical74 ,again1 as an attempt to discover and get rid of baseless preconceptions about reality1 ,metaphysics may1 in a sense1 be said to be 8sceptical40 ,but it differs profoundly from vulgar scepticism both in its method and in its moral purpose4 ,the method of vulgar scepticism is dogmatic1--it takes it for granted without inquiry that two perceptions or two speculative principles which conflict with one another must be equally false4 ,because such contradictions can be detected in all fields of knowledge and speculation1 the sceptic dogmatically assumes that there is no means of getting behind these contradictory appearances to a coherent reality4 ,for the metaphysician1 on the contrary1 the assumption that the puzzles of experience are insoluble and the contradictions in our knowledge irreconcilable is itself just one of those preconceptions which it is the business of his study to investigate and test4 ,until after critical examination1 he refuses to pronounce which of the conflicting views is true1 or1 supposing both false1 whether one may not be nearer the truth than the other4 ,if he does not assume that truth can be got and reality known by our human faculties1 he does at any rate assume that it is worth our while to make the attempt1 and that nothing but the issue can decide as to its chances of success4 ,again1 the metaphysician differs from the sceptic in respect of moral purpose4 ,both in a sense preach the duty of a 8suspense of judgment0 in the face of ultimate problems4 ,the difference is that the sceptic treats 8suspense10 and the accompanying mental indolence1 as an end in itself2 the metaphysician regards it as a mere preliminary to his final object1 the attainment of determinate truth4 #e4 ,we can now see some of the reasons which make the science of ,metaphysics a peculiarly difficult branch of study4 ,it is difficult1 in the first place1 from the very simplicity and generality of its problems4 ,there is a general conviction that every science1 if it is to be anything more than a body of disputes about mere words1 must deal with some definite subject-matter1 and it is not easy to say precisely what is the subject dealt with by the metaphysician4 ,in a certain sense this difficulty can only be met by admitting it2 it is true1 as we have already seen1 that ,metaphysics deals in some way with everything2 thus it is quite right to say that you cannot specify any particular class of objects as its exclusive subject-matter4 ,this must not1 however1 be understood to mean that ,metaphysics is another name for the whole body of the sciences4 ,what it does mean is that precisely because the distinction between the real and the apparent affects every department of our knowledge and enters into every one of the special sciences1 the general problem as to the meaning of this distinction and the principle on which it rests cannot be dealt with by any one special science1 but must form the subject of an independent inquiry4 ,the parallel with ,logic may perhaps help to make this point clearer4 ,it is just because the principles of reasoning and the rules of evidence are1 in the last resort1 the same for all the sciences1 that they have to be made themselves the subject of a separate investigation4 ,logic1 like ,metaphysics1 deals with everything1 not in the sense of being another name for the whole of our knowledge1 but in the sense that it1 unlike the special sciences1 attacks a problem which confronts us in every exercise of our thought4 ,the question of the difference between the two sciences will be discussed in a later section of this chapter4 ,there are two other minor sources of difficulty1 arising out of the universality of the metaphysical problem1 which ought perhaps to be mentioned1 as they present a serious obstacle to the study of ,metaphysics by minds of a certain stamp4 ,in ,metaphysics we have no such helps to the imagination as the figures and diagrams which are so useful in many branches of ,mathematics2 and again1 we are1 by the nature of the problem1 entirely cut off from the aid of physical experiment4 ,all our results have to be reached by the unassisted efforts of thought in the strictest sense of the word1 that is1 by the rigid and systematic mental analysis of conceptions4 ,thus ,metaphysics stands alone among the sciences1 or alone with ,logic1 in the demand it makes on the student's capacity for sheer hard continuous thought ,this may help to explain why men who are capable of excellent work in the domain of mathematical or experimental science sometimes prove incompetent in ,metaphysics2 and again1 why eminent metaphysical ability does not always make its possessor a sound judge of the results and methods of the other sciences4 #f4 ,it is now time to consider one or two objections which are very commonly urged against the prosecution of metaphysical studies4 ,it is often asserted1 either that 7#a7 such a science is1 in its very nature1 an impossibility2 or 7#b7 that1 if possible1 it is useless and superfluous1 since the other sciences together with the body of our practical experience give us all the truth we need2 or1 again1 7#c7 that at any rate the science is essentially unprogressive1 and that all that can be said about its problems has been said long ago4 ,now1 if any of these popular objections are really sound1 it must clearly be a waste of time to study ,metaphysics1 and we are therefore bound to discuss their force before we proceed any further4 7#a7 ,to the objection that a science of ,metaphysics is1 from the nature of the case1 impossible1 it would be in principle correct to reply that1 as the proverb says1 8,you never can tell till you try10 and that few1 if any1 of those who urge this objection most loudly have ever seriously made the trial4 ,if any one thinks the task not worth his while1 he is not called on to attempt it2 but his opinion gives him no special claim to sit in judgment on those who think differently of the matter4 ,still1 the anti-metaphysical prejudice is so common1 and appears in so many different forms1 that it is necessary to exhibit its groundlessness rather more in detail4 7a7 ,it is sometimes maintained that ,metaphysics is an impossibility because the metaphysician's problems1 in their own nature1 admit of no solution4 ,to a meaningless question1 of course1 there can be no intelligible answer1 and it is occasionally asserted1 and often insinuated1 that the questions of ,metaphysics are of this kind4 ,but to call the metaphysician's question a senseless one is as much as to say that there is no meaning in the distinction1 which we are all constantly making1 between the real and the apparent4 ,if there is any meaning at all in the distinction1 it is clearly a necessary as well as a proper question precisely by what marks the one may be distinguished from the other4 ,our right to raise this question can in fairness only be challenged by an opponent who is prepared to maintain that the contradictions which lead us to make the distinction may themselves be the ultimate truth about things4 ,now1 whether this view is defensible or not1 it is clearly not one which we have the right to assume without examination as self-evident2 it is itself a metaphysical theory of first principles1 and would have to be defended1 if at all1 by an elaborate metaphysical analysis of the meaning of the concepts 8truth0 and 8reality40 ,again1 the objection1 if valid1 would tell as much against experimental and mathematical science as against ,metaphysics4 ,if the self-contradictory can be true1 there is no rational ground for preferring a coherent scientific theory of the world to the wildest dreams of superstition or insanity4 ,thus we have no escape from the following dilemma4 ,either there is no rational foundation at all for the distinction between reality and appearance1 and then all science is an illusion1 or there is a rational foundation for it1 and then we are logically bound to inquire into the principle of the distinction1 and thus to face the problems of ,metaphysics4#d 7b7 ,what is essentially the same objection is sometimes put in the following form4 ,metaphysics1 it is said1 can have no place in the scheme of human knowledge1 because all intelligible questions which we can ask about reality must fall within the province of one or other of the 8sciences40 ,there are no facts with which some one or other of the sciences does not deal1 and there is therefore no room for a series of 8metaphysical0 inquiries over and above those inquiries which constitute the various sciences4 ,where there are facts to investigate and intelligible questions to be put1 we are1 it is contended1 in the domain of 8science02 where there are none1 there can be no knowledge4 ,plausible as this argument can be made to appear1 it is easy to see that it is fallacious4 ,from the point of view of pure ,logic it manifestly contains a flagrant fallacy of petitio principii4 ,for it simply assumes that there is no 8science10 in the most universal acceptation of the term--i4e4 no body of reasoned truth--besides those experimental sciences which have for their object the accumulation and systematisation of facts1 and this is the very point at issue between the metaphysician and his critics4 ,what the metaphysician asserts is not that there are facts with which the various special branches of experimental science cannot deal1 but that there are questions which can be and ought to be raised about the facts with which they do deal other than those which experimental inquiry can solve4 ,leaving it entirely to the special sciences to tell us what in particular are the true facts about any given part of the world's course1 he contends that we still have to ask the more general question1 what we mean by 8real0 and 8fact10 and how in general the 8real0 is to be distinguished from the unreal4 ,to denounce the raising of this question as an attempt to exclude certain events and processes from the 8province of science10 is simply to misrepresent the issue at stake4 ,incidentally it may be added1 the objection reveals a serious misunderstanding of the true principle of distinction between different sciences4 ,the various sciences differ primarily1 not as dealing with different parts of the world of reality1 but as dealing with the whole of it so far as it can be brought under different aspects4 ,they are different1 not because they deal with different sets of facts1 but because they look at the facts from different points of view4 ,thus it would be quite wrong to suppose that the difference between1 e4g41 ,physics1 ,physiology1 and ,psychology1 is primarily that each studies a different group of facts4 ,the facts studied may in great part be the same2 it is the point of view from which they are regarded by which each of the three sciences is distinguished from the others4 ,thus every voluntary movement may be looked at either as a link in a series of displacements of mass-particles 7,physics71 as a combination of muscular contractions initiated from a centre in the cortex of the brain 7,physiology71 or as a step to the satisfaction of a felt want 7,psychology74 ,so ,metaphysics does not profess to deal with a certain group of facts lying outside the province of the 8sciences10 but to deal with the same facts which form that province from a point of view which is not that of the experimental sciences4 ,its claim to do so can only be overthrown by proving what the criticism we are considering assumes1 that there is no intelligible way of looking at the facts besides that of experimental science4 7c7 ,more commonly still the intrinsic intelligibility of the metaphysician's problem is admitted1 but our power to solve it denied4 ,there may be1 it is said1 realities which are more than mere appearance1 but at any rate with our human faculties we can know nothing of them4 ,all our knowledge is strictly limited to appearances1 or1 as they are often called1 phenomena4#e ,what lies behind them is completely inaccessible to us1 and it is loss of time to speculate about its nature4 ,we must therefore content ourselves with the discovery of general laws or uniformities of the interconnection of phenomena1 and dismiss the problem of their real ground as insoluble4 ,this doctrine1 technically known as ,phenomenalism1 enjoys at the present time a widespread popularity1 which is historically very largely due to an imperfect assimilation of the negative element in the philosophy of ,kant4 ,its merits as a philosophical theory we may leave for later consideration2 at present we are only concerned with it as the alleged ground of objection against the possibility of a science of ,metaphysics4 ,as such it has really no cogency whatever4 ,not only do the supporters of the doctrine constantly contradict their own cardinal assumption 7as1 for instance1 when they combine with the assertion that we can know nothing about ultimate reality1 such assertions as that it is a certain and ultimate truth that all 8phenomena0 are connected by general laws1 or that 8the course of nature is1 without exception1 uniform071 but the assumption itself is self-contradictory4 ,the very statement that 8we know only phenomena0 has no meaning unless we know at least enough about ultimate realities to be sure that they are unknowable4 ,the phenomenalist is committed to the recognition of at least one proposition as an absolute and ultimate truth1 namely1 the proposition1 8,i know that whatever ,i know is mere appearance40 ,and this proposition itself1 whatever we may think of its value as a contribution to ,philosophy1 is a positive theory as to first principles the truth or falsity of which is a proper subject for metaphysical investigation4 ,thus the arguments by which it has been sought to demonstrate the impossibility of ,metaphysics themselves afford unimpeachable evidence of the necessity for the scientific examination of the metaphysical problem4#f #g4 ,with the other two anti-metaphysical contentions referred to at the beginning of the last section we may deal much more briefly4 7#b7 ,to the objector who maintains that ,metaphysics1 if possible1 still is useless1 because the sciences and the practical experience of life between them already supply us with a coherent theory of the world1 devoid of contradictions1 we may reply3 7a7 ,the fact is doubtful4 ,for1 whatever may be said by the popularisers of science when they are engaged in composing metaphysical theories for the multitude1 the best representatives of every special branch of mathematical and experimental science seem absolutely agreed that ultimate questions as to first principles are outside the scope of their sciences4 ,the scope of every science1 they are careful to remind us1 is defined by certain initial assumptions1 and what does not fall under those assumptions must be treated by the science in question as non-existent4 ,thus ,mathematics is in principle restricted to dealing with the problems of number and quantity2 whether there are realities which are in their own nature non-numerical and non-quantitative#g or not1 the mathematician1 as mathematician1 is not called upon to pronounce2 if there are such realities1 his science is by its initial assumptions debarred from knowing anything of them4 ,so again with ,physics2 even if reduced to pure ,kinematics1 it deals only with displacements involving the dimensions of length and time1 and has no means of ascertaining whether or not these dimensions are exhibited by all realities4 ,the notion that the various sciences of themselves supply us with a body of information about ultimate reality is thus1 for good reasons1 rejected by their soundest exponents1 who indeed are usually so impressed with the opposite conviction as to be prejudiced in favour of the belief that the ultimately real is unknowable4 7b7 ,again1 as we have already seen1 the results of physical science1 and the beliefs and aspirations which arise in the course of practical experience and take shape in the teachings of poetry and religion1 often appear to be in sharp antagonism4 8,science0 frequently seems to point in one direction1 our deepest ethical and religious experience in another4 ,we cannot avoid asking whether the contradiction is only apparent or1 supposing it real1 what degree of authority belongs to each of the conflicting influences4 ,and1 apart from a serious study of ,metaphysics1 this question cannot be answered4 7c7 ,even on the most favourable supposition1 that there is no such contradiction1 but that science and practical experience together afford a single ultimately coherent theory of the world1 it is only after we have ascertained the general characteristics of ultimate reality1 and satisfied ourselves by careful analysis that reality1 as conceived in our sciences1 possesses those characteristics1 that we have the right to pronounce our theory finally true4 ,if ,metaphysics should tum out in the end to present no fresh view as to the nature of the real1 but only to confirm an old one1 we should still1 as metaphysicians1 have the advantage of knowing where we were previously only entitled to conjecture4 7#c7 ,the charge of unprogressiveness often brought against our science is easily disproved by careful study of the ,history of ,philosophy4 ,the problems of the metaphysician are no doubt1 in a sense1 always the same2 but this is equally true of the problems of any other science4 ,the methods by which the problems are attacked and the adequacy of the solutions they receive vary1 from age to age1 in close correspondence with the general development of science4 ,every great metaphysical conception has exercised its influence on the general history of science1 and1 in return1 every important movement in science has affected the development of ,metaphysics4 ,thus the revived interest in mechanical science1 and the great progress made in that branch of knowledge which is so characteristic of the seventeenth century1 more than anything else determined the philosophical method and results of ,descartes2 the ,metaphysics of ,leibnitz were profoundly affected by such scientific influences as the invention of the calculus1 the recognition of the importance of vis viva in dynamics1 the contemporary discoveries of ,leuwenhoeck in embryology2 while1 to come to our own time1 the metaphysical speculation of the last half-century has constantly been revolving round the two great scientific ideas of the conservation of energy and the origin of species by gradual differentiation4 ,the metaphysician could not if he would1 and would not if he could1 escape the duty of estimating the bearing of the great scientific theories of his time upon our ultimate conceptions of the nature of the world as a whole4 ,every fundamental advance in science thus calls for a restatement and reconsideration of the old metaphysical problems in the light of the new discovery4#h #h4 ,this introductory chapter is perhaps the proper place for a word on the relation of ,metaphysics to the widely diffused mental tendency known as ,mysticism4#i ,inasmuch as the fundamental aim of the mystic is to penetrate behind the veil of appearance to some ultimate and abiding reality1 there is manifestly a close community of purpose between him and the metaphysician4 ,but their diversity of method is no less marked than their partial community of purpose4 ,once in touch with his reality1 wherever he may find it1 the mere mystic has no longer any interest in the world of appearance4 ,appearance as such is for him merely the untrue and ultimately non-existent1 and the peculiar emotion which he derives from his contemplation of the real depends for its special quality on an ever-present sense of the contrast between the abiding being of the reality and the non-entity of the appearances4 ,thus the merely mystical attitude towards appearance is purely negative4 ,the metaphysician1 on the contrary1 has only half completed his task when he has1 by whatever method1 ascertained the general character of the real as opposed to the merely apparent4 ,it still remains for him to re-examine the realm of appearance itself in the light of his theory of reality1 to ascertain the relative truth which partial and imperfect conceptions of the world's nature contain1 and to arrange the various appearances in the order of their varying approximation to truth4 ,he must show not only what are the marks of reality1 and why certain things which are popularly accepted as real must1 for ,philosophy be degraded to the rank of appearance1 but also how far each appearance succeeds in revealing the character of the reality which is its ground4 ,equally marked is the difference between the mystic's and the metaphysician's attitude towards ultimate reality itself4 ,the mystic's object is primarily emotional rather than intellectual4 ,what he wants is a feeling of satisfaction which he can only get from immediate contact with something taken to be finally and abidingly real4 ,hence1 when he comes to put his emotions into words1 he is always prone to use the language of vague imaginative symbolism1 the only language suitable to suggest feelings which1 because immediate and unanalysed1 cannot be the subject of logical description in general terms4 ,for the metaphysician1 whose object is the attainment of intellectual consistency1 such a method of symbolism is radically unsuitable4 ,a symbol is always a source of danger to the intellect4 ,if you employ it for what you already understand1 and might1 if you chose1 describe in scientific language1 it is a mere substitution of the obscure for the clear4 ,if you use it1 as the mystic commonly does1 for what you do not understand1 its apparent precision1 by blinding you to the vagueness of its interpretation1 is positively mischievous4 ,hence1 though some of the greatest metaphysicians1 such as ,plotinus and ,spinoza1 and to a certain extent ,hegel1 have been personally mystics1 their philosophical method has invariably been scientific and rationalistic4 ,at the same time1 it is probably true that1 apart from the mystic's need for the satisfaction of emotion by the contemplation of the eternal and abiding1 the intellect would be prone to exercise itself in less arid and more attractive fields than those of abstract ,metaphysics4 ,the philosopher seeks1 in the end1 the same goal as the mystic2 his peculiarity is that he is so constituted as to reach his goal only by the route of intellectual speculation4 #i4 ,we have compared ,metaphysics more than once with ,logic in respect of the universality of its scope and the analytical character of its methods4 ,it remains briefly to indicate the difference between the two sciences4 ,there is1 indeed1 a theory1 famous in the history of ,philosophy1 and not even yet quite obsolete1 according to which no distinction can be drawn4 ,hegel held that the successive steps by which the human mind gradually passes from less adequate to more adequate1 and ultimately to a fully adequate1 conception of the nature of reality necessarily correspond1 step for step1 with the stages of a process by which the reality itself is manifested with ever-increasing adequacy in an ascending order of phenomena4 ,hence in his system the discussion of the general characteristics of reality and the general forms of inference constitutes a single department of ,philosophy under the name of ,logic4 ,our motive in dissenting from this view cannot be made fully intelligible at the present stage of our inquiry1 but we may at least follow ,lotze in giving a preliminary reason for the separation of the two sciences4 ,logic is clearly in a sense a more general inquiry than ,metaphysics4 ,for in ,logic we are concerned with the universal conditions under which thinking1 or1 to speak more accurately1 inference1 is possible4 ,now these conditions may be fulfilled by a combination of propositions which are materially false4 ,the same relations which give rise to an inference materially true from true premisses may yield a false inference where the premisses are materially false4 ,valid reasoning thus does not always lead to true conclusions4 ,hence we may say that1 whereas ,metaphysics deals exclusively with the characteristics of reality1 ,logic deals with the characteristics of the validly inferrible1 whether real or unreal4 ,the distinction thus established1 however1 though real as far as it goes1 is not necessarily absolute4 ,for it may very well be that in the end the conditions upon which the possibility of inference depends are identical with or consequent upon the structure of reality4 ,even the fact that1 under certain conditions1 we can imagine an unreal state of things and then proceed to reason validly as to the results which would follow if this imaginary state were actual1 may itself be a consequence of the actual nature of things4 ,and1 as a matter of fact1 logicians have always found it impossible to inquire very deeply into the foundations and first principles of their own science without being led to face fundamental issues of ,metaphysics4 ,the distinction between the two studies must thus1 according to the well-known simile of ,bacon1 be compared rather with a vein in a continuous block of marble than with an actual line of cleavage4 ,still it is at least so far effectual1 that while many metaphysical questions have no direct bearing on ,logic1 the details of the theory of evidence are likewise best studied as an independent branch of knowledge4 #aj4 ,in recent years considerable prominence has been attained by a branch of study known as ,epistemology1 or the ,theory of ,knowledge4 ,the ,theory of ,knowledge1 like ,logic1 is primarily concerned with the question of the conditions upon which the validity of our thinking1 as a body of knowledge about reality1 depends4 ,it differs from ordinary ,logic in not inquiring into the details of the various processes of proof1 but confining its attention to the most general and ultimate conditions under which valid thinking is possible1 and discussing these general principles more thoroughly and systematically than common ,logic usually does4 ,since the conditions under which truth is obtainable depend1 in the last resort1 on the character of that reality which knowledge apprehends1 it is clear that the problems of the ,theory of ,knowledge1 so far as they do not come under the scope of ordinary ,logic 7the theory of the estimation of evidence71 are metaphysical in their nature4 ,as actually treated by the writers who give this name to their discussions1 the study appears to consist of a mixture of ,metaphysics and ,logic1 the metaphysical element predominating4 ,there is perhaps no serious harm in our giving1 if we choose1 the name ,epistemology or ,theory of ,knowledge to our discussions of ultimate principles1 but the older title ,metaphysics seems on the whole preferable for two reasons4 ,the discussion of the implications of knowledge is only one part of the metaphysician's task4 ,the truly real is not only the knowable1 it is also that which1 if we can obtain it1 realises our aspirations and satisfies our emotions4 ,hence the theory of the real must deal with the ultimate implications of practical conduct and sthetic feeling as well as those of knowledge4 ,the ,good and the ,beautiful1 no less than the ,true1 are the objects of our study4 ,again1 if the name ,theory of ,knowledge is understood1 as it sometimes has been1 to suggest that it is possible to study the nature and capabilities of the knowing faculty apart from the study of the contents of knowledge1 it becomes a source of positive and dangerous mistake4 ,the capabilities and limitations of the knowing faculty can only be ascertained by inquiring into the truth of its knowledge1 regarded as an apprehension of reality2 there is no possible way of severing the faculty1 as it were1 by abstraction from the results of its exercise1 and examining its structure1 as we might that of a mechanical appliance1 before investigating the value of its achievements4 ,the instrument can only be studied in its work1 and we have to judge of its possibilities by the nature of its products4 ,it is therefore advisable to indicate1 by our choice of a name for our subject1 that the theory of ,knowing is necessarily also a theory of ,being4 ,consult further3--,f4 ,h4 ,bradley1 ,appearance and ,reality1 ,introduction2 ,l4 ,t4 ,hobhouse1 ,the ,theory of ,knowledge1 ,introduction2 ,h4 ,lotze1 ,metaphysic1 ,introduction 7,eng4 trans41 vol4 i4 pp4 #a-cj7 ----- ,footnote #a3 ,the name simply means 8what comes after ,physics10 and probably owes its origin to the fact that early editors of ,aristotle placed his writings on ultimate philosophical questions immediately after his physical treatises4 ,footnote #b3 ,for an example of these puzzles1 compare the passage 7,republic1 #ebd7 where ,plato refers to cases in which an apparent contradiction in our sensations is corrected by counting4 ,footnote #c3 ,of course we must not assume that 8every appearance is only appearance10 or that 8nothing is both reality and appearance40 ,this is just the uncritical kind of preconception which it is the business of ,metaphysics to test4 ,whether 8every appearance is only appearance0 is a point we shall have to discuss later4 ,footnote #d3 ,cf4 ,f4 ,h4 ,bradley1 ,appearance and ,reality1 pp4 #a-d4 ,footnote #e3 ,i may be pardoned for reminding the reader who may be new to our subject1 that 8facts0 and 8processes0 are only properly called phenomena when it is intended to imply that as they stand they are not genuine realities but only the partially misleading appearance of reality which is non-phenomenal or ultra-phenomenal4 7,we shall do well to avoid the pretentious error of calling the ultra-phenomenal1 as such1 8noumenal407 ,footnote #f3 ,appearance and ,reality1 chap4 #ab1 p4 #abi 7ed4 #a74 ,footnote #g3 ,as1 for instance1 all mental states are1 according to certain psychologists1 non-quantitative4 ,footnote #h3 ,the student will find ,hffding's ,history of ,modern ,philosophy 7,english translation in #b vols41 ,macmillan7 particularly valuable for the way in which the author brings out the intimate historical connection between the development of ,metaphysics and the general progress of science4 ,footnote #i3 ,for further discussion the reader may be referred to ,royce1 ,the ,world and the ,individual1 ,first ,series1 ,lects4 #b and #d4 ,see also infra1 ,bk4 ,,iv4 chap4 #f1 #b4 ----- ,,chapter ,,ii ,,the ,,metaphysical ,,criterion ,,and ,,the ,,metaphysical ,,method #a4 ,in the principle that 8,reality is not self-contradictory0 we have a universal and certain criterion of reality which is not merely negative1 but implies the positive assertion that reality is a consistent system4 #b4 ,the validity of this criterion is not affected by the suggestion that it may be merely a ,logical ,law4 #c4 ,nor by the raising of doubt whether all our knowledge is not merely 8relative10 a doubt which is itself meaningless4 #d4 ,as to the material of the system1 it is experience or immediate psychical fact4 #e4 ,it must be actual experience1 not mere 8possibilities0 of experience2 but actual experience must not be identified with 8sensation40 #f4 ,nor must we assume that experience consists of subjects and their states2 nor1 again1 that it is a mere succession of 8states of consciousness40 #g4 ,the differentia of matter of experience is its immediacy1 i4e1 its combination in a single whole of the two aspects of existence and content4 #h4 ,this union of existence and content is broken up in reflective knowledge or thought1 but may be restored at a higher level4 #i4 ,experience further always appears to be implicitly complex in respect of its content4 #aj4 ,an adequate apprehension of reality would only be possible in the form of a complete or 8pure0 experience1 at once all-inclusive1 systematic1 and direct4 ,the problem of ,metaphysics is to ascertain what would be the general or formal character of such an experience1 and how far the various provinces of our human experience and knowledge approximate to it4 ,the knowledge ,metaphysics can give us of the ultimate nature of reality as it would be present in a complete experience1 though imperfect1 is final as far as it goes4 #aa4 ,as to the method of ,metaphysics1 it must be analytical1 critical1 non-empirical1 and non-inductive4 ,it may also be called a priori if we carefully avoid confusing the a priori with the psychologically primitive4 ,why our method cannot be the ,hegelian ,dialectic4 #a4 ,if we are1 in the end1 to attach any definite intelligible meaning to the distinction between things as they really are and things as they merely appear to be1 we must clearly have some universal criterion or test by which the distinction may be made4 ,this criterion must be1 in the first place1 infallible2 that is1 must be such that we cannot doubt its validity without falling into a contradiction in our thought2 and1 in the next1 it must be a characteristic belonging to all reality1 as such1 and to nothing else4 ,thus our criterion must1 in the technical language of ,logic1 be the predicate of an exclusive proposition of which reality is the subject2 we must be able to say1 8,only the real possesses the quality or mark ,x40 ,the argument of our last chapter should already have suggested that we have such a criterion in the principle that 8what is real is not self-contradictory1 and what is self-contradictory is not real40 ,freedom from contradiction is a characteristic which belongs to everything that is real and ultimately to nothing else1 and we may therefore use it as our test or criterion of reality4 ,for1 as we have seen in the last chapter1 it is precisely our inability1 without doing violence to the fundamental structure of our intellect1 to accept the self-contradictory as real which first leads to the drawing of a distinction between the real and the merely apparent2 on the other hand1 where we find no contradiction in thought or experience1 we have no valid ground for doubting that the contents of our experience and thinking are truly real4 ,in every application1 even the most simple and rudimentary1 of the distinction between what really is and what only seems1 we are proceeding upon the assumption that1 if things as we find them are self-contradictory1 we are not yet in possession of the truth about them2 while1 on the other hand1 we may legitimately treat the results of our thinking and experience as fully true until they are shown to involve contradiction4 ,thus1 in setting up the proposition 8,what is real is never self-contradictory0 as a universal criterion1 we are only putting into explicit form1 and proposing to apply universally1 a principle involved in all rational reflection on the course of things4 ,audacious as the attempt to make such a general statement about the whole universe of being appears1 it is an audacity to which we are fully committed from the first moment of our refusing to accept both sides of a contradiction as true4 ,the principle that 8,reality is not self-contradictory0 at first sight might appear to be merely negative2 we might object that it only tells us what reality is not1 and still leaves us quite in the dark as to what it is4 ,this would1 however1 be a serious misconception4 ,as we learn from modern scientific ,logic1 no true and significant negative judgment is merely negative2 all significant negation is really exclusion resting upon a positive basis4 ,i can never1 that is1 truly declare that ,a is not ,b1 except on the strength of some piece of positive knowledge which is inconsistent with1 or excludes1 the possibility of ,a being ,b4#aj ,my own ignorance or failure to find sufficient ground for the assertion ,a is ,b is never of itself logical warrant for the judgment ,a is not ,b2 that ,a is not ,b ,i can never truly assert1 except on the ground of some other truth which would be contradicted if ,a were affirmed to be ,b4 ,hence to say 8,reality is not self-contradictory0 is as much as to say that we have true and certain knowledge that reality is positively self-consistent or coherent2 that is to say that1 whatever else it may be1 it is at least a systematic whole of some kind or other4 ,how much further our knowledge about reality goes1 what kind of a whole we can certainly know it to be1 it will be the business of succeeding portions of this work to discuss2 but even at the present stage of the inquiry we can confidently say that unless the distinction between the real and the apparent is purely meaningless1 it is positively certain that ,reality1#aa or the universe1 is a self-consistent systematic whole4 #b4 ,our declaration that the principle of the self-consistency of the real affords a certain and infallible criterion of reality1 may probably provoke a sceptical doubt which is of such importance that we must give it full consideration before making any further advance4 ,i state the difficulty in what appears to me its most reasonable and telling form4 8,your alleged criterion10 it will be said1 8is simply the logical ,law of ,contradiction expressed in a novel and misleading way4 ,now1 the ,law of ,contradiction1 like all purely logical laws1 is concerned not with real things1 but exclusively with the concepts by which we think of them4 ,when the logician lays it down as a fundamental truth of his science that ,a cannot be both ,b and not ,b1 his ,a and ,b stand not for things 8in the real world to which our thoughts have reference10 but for concepts which we frame about the things4 ,his law is thus purely what he calls it1 a ,law of ,thought2 he says1 and says truly1 8you cannot1 at the same time1 and in the same sense1 think both that ,a is ,b1 and that it is not ,b02 as to whether such a state of things1 though unthinkable to us1 may be real 8as a fact10 he makes no assertion4 ,you take this law of our thinking1 silently assume that it is also a law of the things about which we think1 and go on to set it up as an infallible criterion of their reality4 ,your procedure is thus illegitimate1 and your pretended criterion a thing of nought40#ab ,our reply to this common sceptical objection will incidentally throw an interesting light on what was said in the last chapter of the close connection between the problems of ,logic and those of ,metaphysics4 ,in the first place1 we may at least meet the sceptic with an effective tu quoque4 ,it is you yourself1 we may say1 who are most open to the charge of illegitimate assumption4 ,your whole contention rests upon the assumption1 for which you offer no justification1 that because the ,law of ,contradiction is admittedly a law of thought1 it is therefore only a law of thought2 if you wish us to accept such a momentous conclusion1 you ought at least to offer us something in the nature of a reason for it4 ,nor shall we stop here2 we shall go on to argue that the sceptic's interpretation of the ,law of ,contradiction rests on a positive confusion4 ,by a ,law of ,thought may be meant either 7a7 a psychological law1 a true general statement as to the way in which we actually do think1 or 7b7 a logical law1 a true general statement as to the conditions under which our thinking is valid2 the plausibility of the sceptical argument arises from an unconscious confusion between these two very different senses of the term4 ,now1 in the first place1 it seems doubtful whether the principle of contradiction is even true1 if it is put forward as a psychological law4 ,it would be1 at least1 very hard to say whether a human being is capable or not of holding at once and with equal conviction the truth of two contradictory propositions4 ,certainly it is not uncommon to meet persons who do fervently profess equal belief in propositions which we can see to be inconsistent2 on the other hand1 they are usually themselves unaware of the inconsistency4 ,whether1 in all cases1 they would1 if made aware of the inconsistency1 revise their belief1 is a question which it is easier to ask than to answer4 ,but it is at any rate certain that the logician does not intend his ,law of ,contradiction to be taken as a psychological proposition as to what ,i can or cannot succeed in believing4 ,he means it to be understood in a purely logical sense1 as a statement about the conditions under which any thought is valid4 ,what he says is not that ,i cannot at once think that ,a is ,b and that it is not ,b1 but that1 if ,i think so1 my thinking cannot be true4 ,now1 to think truly about things is to think in accord with their real nature1 to think of them as they really are1 not as they merely appear to an imperfect apprehension to be2 hence to say that non-contradiction is a fundamental condition of true thinking is as much as to say that it is a fundamental characteristic of real existence4 ,just because the ,law of ,contradiction is a logical law1 it cannot be only a logical law1 but must be a metaphysical law as well4 ,if the sceptic is to retain his sceptical position1 he must include ,logic along with ,metaphysics in the compass of his doubts1 as the thorough-going sceptics of antiquity had the courage to do4 #c4 ,but now suppose the sceptic takes this line4 ,all our truth1 he may say1 is only relatively truth1 and even the fundamental conditions of true thought are only valid relatively and for us4 ,what right have you to assume their absolute validity1 and to argue from it to the real constitution of things8 ,now1 what does such a doubt mean1 and is it rational8 ,the answer to this question follows easily from what we have already learnt about the logical character of denial4 ,doubt1 which is tentative denial1 like negation1 which is completed denial1 logically presupposes positive knowledge of some kind or other4 ,it is never rational to doubt the truth of a specific proposition except on the strength of your possession of positive truth with which the suggested judgment appears to be in conflict4 ,this is1 of course1 obvious in cases where we hesitate to accept a statement as true on the ground that we do not see how to reconcile it with another specific statement already known1 or believed1 to be true4 ,it is less obvious1 but equally clear on reflection1 in the cases where we suspend our judgment on the plea of insufficient evidence4 ,apart from positive knowledge1 however defective1 as to the kind and amount of evidence which would1 if forthcoming1 be sufficient to prove the proposition1 expressions of doubt and of belief are equally impertinent2 unless ,i know1 to some extent at least1 what evidence is wanted1 how indeed am ,i to judge whether the evidence produced is sufficient or not8#ac ,thus we see that the paradox of ,mr4 ,bradley1 that rational doubt itself logically implies infallibility in respect of some part of our knowledge1 is no more than the simple truth4 ,we see also that the doubt whether the ultimate presuppositions of valid thinking may not be merely 8relatively0 valid1 has no meaning4 ,if the sceptic's doubt whether ,reality is ultimately the self-consistent system that it must be if any of our thinking can be true is to lay any claim to rationality1 it must take the form of the assertion1 8,i positively know something about the nature of ,reality which makes it reasonable to think that ,reality is incoherent10 or 8,self-consistency is inconsistent with what ,i positively know of the nature of ,reality40 ,thus the sceptic is forced1 not merely to lay claim to absolute and certain knowledge1 but to use the test of consistency itself for the purpose of disproving or questioning its own validity4 ,our criterion of ,reality1 then1 has been proved infallible by the surest of methods2 we have shown that its truth has to be assumed in the very process of calling it in question4 #d4 ,reality1 then1 in spite of the sceptic's objections1 is truly known to be a connected and self-consistent1 or internally coherent1 system2 can we with equal confidence say anything of the data of which the system is composed8 ,reflection should convince us that we can at least say as much as this3 all the materials or data of reality consist of experience1 experience being provisionally taken to mean psychical matter of fact1 what is given in immediate feeling4 ,in other words1 whatever forms part of presentation1 will1 or emotion1 must in some sense and to some degree possess reality and be a part of the material of which reality1 as a systematic whole1 is composed2 whatever does not include1 as part of its nature1 this indissoluble relation to immediate feeling1 and therefore does not enter into the presentation1 will1 and emotion of which psychical life is composed1 is not real4 ,the real is experience1 and nothing but experience1 and experience consists of 8psychical matter of fact40#ad ,proof of this proposition can only be given in the same way as of any other ultimate truth1 by making trial of it2 if you doubt it you may be challenged to perform the experiment of thinking of anything whatever1 no matter what1 as real1 and then explaining what you mean by its reality4 ,thus suppose you say 8,i can think of ,a as real10 ,a being any thing in the universe2 now think1 as you always can1 of an imaginary or unreal ,a1 and then try to state the difference between the ,a which is thought of as real and the ,a which is thought of as merely imaginary4 ,as ,kant proved1 in the famous case of the real and the imagined hundred dollars1 the difference does not lie in any of the qualities or properties of the two ,a's2 the qualities of the imagined hundred dollars are precisely the same as those of the real sum1 only that they are 8imaginary40 ,like the real dollars1 the imagined dollars are thought of as possessing such and such a size1 shape1 and weight2 stamped with such and such an effigy and inscription2 containing such and such a proportion of silver to alloy2 having such and such a purchasing power in the present condition of the market1 and so forth4 ,the only difference is that the real dollars are1 or under specified and known conditions may be1 the objects of direct perception1 while the imaginary ones1 because imaginary1 cannot be given in direct perception4 ,you cannot see or handle them2 you can only imagine yourself doing so4 ,it is in this connection with immediate psychical fact that the reality of the real coins lies4 ,so with any other instance of the same experiment4 ,show me1 we might say1 anything which you regard as real1--no matter what it is1 a stone wall1 an sthetic effect1 a moral virtue1--and ,i will ask you to think of an unreal and imaginary counterpart of that same thing1 and will undertake to prove to you that what makes the difference between the reality and the imagination is always that the real thing is indissolubly connected with the psychical life of a sentient subject1 and1 as so connected1 is psychical matter of fact4 #e4 ,two points should be carefully noted if we wish to avoid serious misapprehension4 ,it might be objected1 by a disciple of ,kant or of ,mill1 that a thing may be real without ever being given as actual psychical fact in immediate apprehension1 so long as its nature is such that it would be psychical fact under known and specified conditions4 ,many1 if not most1 of the objects of scientific knowledge1 it may be said1 are of this kind2 they have never entered1 possibly never will enter1 into the contents of any man's direct apprehension1 yet we rightly call them real1 in the sense that they would be apprehended under certain known conditions4 ,thus ,i have never seen1 and do not expect that any one ever will see1 the centre of the earth1 or1 to take a still stronger case1 no one has ever seen his own brain4 ,yet ,i call the centre of the earth or my own brain real1 in the sense that if ,i could1 without ceasing to live1 penetrate to a certain depth below the soil1 ,i should find the centre of the earth2 if an opening were made in my skull1 and a suitable arrangement of mirrors devised1 ,i should see the reflection of my own brain4 ,a comet may be rushing through unpeopled space entirely unbeheld2 yet it does not cease for all that to be real1 for if ,i were there ,i should see it1 and so forth4 ,hence the ,kantian will tell us that reality is constituted by relation to possible experience2 the follower of ,mill1 that it means 8a permanent possibility of sensation40 ,now1 there is1 of course1 an element of truth in these arguments4 ,it is true that what immediately enters into the course of my own direct perception is but a fragment of the full reality of the universe4 ,it is true1 again1 that there is much which in its own nature is capable of being perceived by human beings1 but will1 as far as we can judge1 never be perceived1 owing to the physical impossibility of placing ourselves under the conditions requisite for perception2 there are other things which could only be perceived if some modification could be effected in the structure of our perceptive organs4 ,and it may therefore be quite sufficient for the purposes of some sciences to define these unperceived realities as 8possibilities of sensation10 processes which we do not perceive but might perceive under known or knowable conditions4 ,but the definition1 it will be seen1 is a purely negative one2 it takes note of the fact that we do not actually perceive certain things1 without telling us anything positive as to their nature4 ,in ,metaphysics1 where we are concerned to discover the very meaning of reality1 we cannot avoid asking whether such a purely negative account of the reality of the greater part of the universe is finally satisfactory4 ,and we can easily see that it is not4 ,for what do we mean when we talk of the 8possible08 ,not simply 8that which is not actual10 for this includes the merely imaginary and the demonstrably impossible4 ,the events of next week1 the constitution of ,utopia1 and the squaring of the circle are all alike in not being actual4 ,shall we say1 then1 that the possible differs from the imaginary in being what would1 under known conditions1 be actual8 ,but again1 we may make correct inferences as to what would be actual under conditions suspected1 or even known1 to be merely imaginary1 and no one will maintain that such consequences are realities4 ,if ,i were at the ,south ,pole ,i should see the ,polar ice1 and it is therefore real1 you say1 though no one actually sees it2 but if wishes were horses1 beggars would ride1 yet you do not say that the riding of beggars is real4 ,considerations of this kind lead us to modify our first definition of the 8possible0 which is to be also real4 ,we are driven to say that1 in the case of the unperceived real thing1 all the conditions of perception except the presence of a percipient with suitable perceptive organs1 really exist4 ,thus the ice at the ,south ,pole really exists1 because the only unfulfilled condition for its perception is the presence at the ,pole of a being with sense-organs of a certain type4 ,but once more1 what do we mean by the distinction between conditions of perception which are imaginary and conditions which really exist8 ,we come back once more to our original experiment1 and once more1 try as we will1 we shall find that by the real condition as distinguished from the imaginary we can mean nothing but a state of things which is1 in the last resort1 guaranteed by the evidence of immediate apprehension4 ,if we take the term 8actual0 to denote that which is thus indissoluble from immediate apprehension1 or is psychical matter of fact1 we may sum up our result by saying we have found that the real is also actual1 or that there is no reality which is not at the same time an actuality4 ,we shall thus be standing on the same ground as the modern logicians who tell us that there is no possibility outside actual existence1 and that statements about the possible1 when they have any meaning at all1 are always an indirect way of imparting information about actualities4#ae ,thus 8,there really exists ice at the ,south ,pole1 though no human eye beholds it10 if it is to mean anything1 must mean either that the ice itself1 as we should perceive it if we were there1 or that certain unknown conditions which1 combined with the presence of a human spectator1 would yield the perception of the ice1 actually exist as part of the contents of an experience which is not our own4#af ,the second point to which we must be careful to attend may be dismissed more briefly4 ,in defining experience as 8immediate feeling0 or 8the content of immediate feeling0 or 8apprehension10#ag we must not be understood to mean that it is in particular sensation4 ,sensation is only one feature of immediate feeling or apprehension1 a feature which we only distinguish from others by means of a laborious psychological analysis4 ,a pleasure or pain1 an emotion of any kind1 the satisfaction of a craving while actually present1 are felt or apprehended no less immediately than a sense-perception4 ,i am aware of the difference between actually feeling pleasure or pain1 actually being moved by love or anger1 actually getting the satisfaction of a want1 and merely thinking of these processes1 in precisely the same way in which ,i am aware of the difference between actually seeing a blue expanse and merely thinking of seeing it4 ,a real emotion or wish differs from an imagined one precisely as a real sensation differs from an imaginary sensation4 ,how exactly the difference is to be described is a question1 and unfortunately at present an unduly neglected question1 for ,psychology2 for our present purpose we must be content to indicate it as one which can be experienced at will by any reader who will take the trouble to compare an actual state of mind with the mere thought of the same state4 ,of the epistemological or metaphysical interpretation of the distinction more will be said in the course of the next few paragraphs4 ,as an instance of its applicability to other aspects of mind than the purely sensational1 we may take ,kant's own example of the hundred dollars4 ,the real hundred dollars may be distinguished from the imaginary1 if we please1 by the fact that they can be actually touched and seen2 but we might equally make the distinction turn on the fact that the real coins will enable us to satisfy our desires1 while the imaginary will not4#ah #f4 ,in the present state of philosophical opinion1 the proposition that 8whatever is real consists of experience10 or again1 8of psychical matter of fact10 is in danger not so much of being rejected1 as of being accepted in a fundamentally false sense4 ,if we are to avoid the danger of such misunderstanding1 we must be careful to insist that our principle does not assert that mere actuality is a complete and sufficient account of the nature of reality4 ,when we say that there is nothing real outside the world of psychical fact1 we are not saying that reality is merely psychical fact as such4 ,what we do say is that1 however much more it may be1 it is at least that4 ,how much more we can say of reality1 beyond the bare statement that it is made up of experiences or psychical matters of fact1 it is the task of our metaphysical science to determine2 at present our problem1 though given to us in its general elements1 still awaits solution4 ,in particular1 we must take care not to fall into the error of so-called 8,subjective ,idealism40 ,we must not say that reality consists of 8the states of consciousness of sentient subjects0 or of 8subjects1 and their states40 ,we must not falsify our data as metaphysicians by starting with the assumption that the psychical facts of which reality is made up are directly experienced as 8states0 or 8modifications0 of 8subjects0 which are their possessors4 ,such a theory would in fact contradict itself1 for the 8subject0 or 8,i10 who am by the hypothesis the owner of the 8states10 is never itself given as a 8state of consciousness40 ,hence ,hume was perfectly correct when he argued from the principle that nothing exists but states of consciousness1 to the conclusion that the thinker or 8subject10 not being himself a state of consciousness1 is an illusion4 ,yet1 on the other hand1 if there is no thinker or subject to 8own0 the passing states1 they are not properly 8states0 or 8modifications0 of anything4 ,apart from this explicit contradiction in the formulation of the theory that all things are 8states of consciousness10 we must also object that the theory itself is not a statement of the data of experience1 but a hypothesis about their connection4 ,the division of experience into the self or the subject on the one side and its states on the other is not given in our immediate apprehension1 but made in the progress of reflection on the contents of apprehension4 ,sensible things and their properties never appear to us in our direct apprehension of them to be states or modifications of ourselves2 that they really are this and nothing more is simply one hypothesis among others which we devise to meet certain difficulties in our thought4 ,reality comes to us from the first in the guise of pieces of psychical fact2 we feel certain1 again1 that these pieces must somehow form part of a coherent whole or system4 ,we try to understand and account for this systematic character of the real on the supposition that the matters of fact of which it consists are connected with one another through the permanent character of the 8subjects0 to which they belong as temporary 8states0 or 8modifications40 ,but this special interpretation of the way in which the facts of experience form a system is no part of our initial postulate as to the general nature of the real2 it is simply one among other theories of the concrete character of the universe1 and it is for ,metaphysics itself to test its merits4 ,similarly1 we should be making an unwarranted addition to our initial postulate about ,reality if we identified it with the doctrine of ,hume and his followers1 according to whom what really exists is merely a series of 8impressions and ideas0 connected by certain psychological laws of succession1 any profounder structural unity of experience being dismissed as a 8fiction of the mind40 ,the secret of the fallacy here lies in the petitio principii committed by the introduction of the word 8merely0 into our statement4 ,from the identification of reality with psychical facts which somehow form a systematic unity1 it does not in the least follow that the only unity possessed by the facts is that of conformity to a certain law or laws of sequence4 ,that all reality consists of psychical facts1 and that these facts must form a system1 we are1 as we have already seen1 entitled to assert as a fundamental metaphysical principle which cannot be doubted without falling into contradiction2 how they do so we have yet to discover1 if we can4 ,the merits of the ,humian solution of the problem will come before us for consideration at a later stage2 the impossibility of assuming it without inquiry as a principle1 may perhaps be brought home to the mind of the reader by a simple illustration4 ,take the case of any sthetic whole1 such as1 for instance1 the play of ,hamlet4 ,the play of ,hamlet consists1 for the student who reads it in his closet1 of a succession of printed words4 ,these words form the whole material of the play2 it is composed of them all and of nothing else4 ,again1 the words which are the material of the play are connected by the grammatical and euphonic laws which regulate the construction of ,english sentences1 and the metrical laws of ,english dramatic versification4 ,thus it would be a true description of the play1 as far as it goes1 to say that it is a series of words put together in accordance with grammatical and metrical laws4 ,it would1 however1 be positively false to say that ,hamlet is nothing more than such a succession of words2 its character as a work of art depends entirely on the fact that it possesses1 as a whole1 a further unity of structure and aim1 that the words and sentences which are its material embody an internally coherent representation of human character and purpose4 ,apart from this inner unity of meaning1 mere uniformity of grammatical and metrical construction would not of themselves constitute a work of art4 ,it will be one object of our later discussions to show that what is thus obviously true of an sthetic whole is universally true of every genuine system or totality4 #g4 ,the data or material of reality1 then1 are facts of experience1 and nothing but facts of experience4#ai ,and experience1 we have said1 means for our purposes immediate feeling or apprehension4 ,what immediacy means1 as we have already seen1 we cannot further explain in psychological terms1 except by saying that it is what distinguishes an actual mental state from the mere thought of that state4 ,the reason why1 in ,psychology1 we have to be content with such an account is manifest4 ,to characterise immediate feeling further1 we should have to identify the qualities by which it is universally marked off from what is not immediate4 ,we should1 in fact1 have to describe it in general terms1 and before we can do this we must cease to feel or apprehend directly1 and go on to reflect upon and analyse the contents of our apprehension4 ,what our psychological description depicts is never the experience as it actually was while we were having it1 but the experience as it appears from the point of view of subsequent reflection1 interpreted in the light of all sorts of conscious or unconscious hypotheses about its conditions and its constituents4 ,thus our psychological descriptions depend for their very possibility upon the recognition of distinctions which are not present1 as such1 in the experience itself as directly presented to us but created by later reflection about it ,from the point of view of ,metaphysics1 however1 it is possible to specify one universal characteristic of immediate feeling1 which is of the utmost importance for our theories of reality and of knowledge4 ,when we reflect upon any psychical fact whatever1 we may distinguish within it two very different aspects4 ,there is1 in the first place1 the fact that it does happen1 that it is a genuine psychical occurrence1--the existence or that1 as we may call it1 of the piece of psychical fact in question2 and there is also the peculiar character or quality which gives this mental occurrence its unique nature as distinguished from any other which might conceivably have been presented in its stead1--the content or what of the psychical fact4 ,thus a simple colour-sensation1 say that of green1 has its that1--it is actually present1 and is thus distinguished from a merely remembered or anticipated sensation2 it has also its what1--the peculiar quality by which it is distinguished1 for example1 from a sensation of blue4 ,so again with an imagined sensation2 it is actually imagined1 the imagining of it is an actual occurrence with its particular place in the course of the occurrences which together make up my mental life2 and again1 it is the imagination of some content with qualities of its own by which it is distinguished from any other content4 ,the most striking illustration of the presence of these distinguishable aspects in all psychical occurrences is1 of course1 afforded by the case of error or illusion1 the essence of which is the false apprehension of the what4 ,thus1 when an ignorant villager sees a ghost1 or a hypochondriac is tormented by 8imaginary0 symptoms of disease1 the ghost or the malady is not simply non-existent2 something is actually seen or felt1 but the error consists in a mistake as to the nature of what is seen or felt4 ,now1 the peculiarity by which direct and immediate apprehension is distinguished1 for the metaphysician1 from subsequent reflection about the contents of apprehension1 is that in immediate apprehension itself we are not conscious of the distinction between these two aspects of psychical fact4 ,the immediately experienced is always a this-what or process-content#bj in which the distinction of the this from the what does not enter into consciousness4 ,in any act of reflection1 on the other hand1 the what is explicitly distinguished from the that1 and then ascribed to it as something which can be truly said about it4 ,the judgment or proposition1 which is the characteristic form in which the result of reflection finds its expression1 consists1 in its most rudimentary shape1 of the embodiment of this distinction in the separation of predicate from subject1 and the subsequent affirmation of the first about the second4 ,the work of thought or knowledge in making our world more intelligible to us essentially consists in the progressive analysis of a content or what1 considered in abstraction from the this to which it belongs4 ,the this may1 as in the singular judgment or the particular judgment of perception1 actually appear in our propositions as the subject to which the what is explicitly ascribed2 or again1 as in the true universals of science1 both the predicate and the ostensible subject of the proposition may belong to the content analysed1 and the this1 or directly apprehended reality of which the content forms an attribute1 may not appear in the proposition at all4 ,this is why the true universal judgment has long been seen by logicians to be essentially hypothetical1 and why1 again1 thought or knowledge always appears to the common-sense man to be dealing with realities which have previously been given independently of the 8work of the mind40 ,he is only wrong in this view because he forgets that what is given in this way is merely the that or existence of the world of real being1 not its what or content in its true character as ultimately ascertained by scientific thought4#ba #h4 ,the fundamental characteristic of experience1 then1 for the metaphysician1 is its immediacy3 the fact that in experience as such the existence and the content of what is apprehended are not mentally separated4 ,this immediacy may be due1 as in the case of mere uninterpreted sensation1 to the absence of reflective analysis of the given into its constituent aspects or elements4 ,but it may also be due1 as we shall have opportunities to see more fully later on1 to the fusion at a higher level into a single directly apprehended whole of results originally won by the process of abstraction and reflection4 ,there is an immediacy of experience which is below mediate reflective knowledge but there is also a higher immediacy which is above it4 ,to explain and justify this statement will be the work of subsequent chapters2 for the present we may be content to illustrate it by a simple example4 ,a work of art with an intricate internal structure1 such1 for instance1 as a musical composition or a chess problem1 as directly presented to the artistically uncultivated man1 is little more than a mere succession of immediately given data in which the aspects of existence and content are as yet hardly separated2 it has no significance or meaning1 but merely is4 ,as education in the perception of artistic form proceeds1 the separation becomes at first more and more prominent4 ,each subordinate part of the structure now acquires a meaning or significance in virtue of its place in the whole1 and this meaning is at first something over and above the directly presented character of the part1 something which has to be grasped by reflective analysis and comparison of part with part4 ,the individual part has now1 through analysis of its content1 come to mean or stand for something outside itself1 namely1 its relation to all the other parts4 ,but with the completion of our sthetic education the immediacy thus destroyed is once more restored4 ,to the fully trained perception the meaning of the composition or the problem1 its structure as an artistic whole1 is no longer something which has to be pieced together and inferred by reflective comparison3 it is now directly apprehended as a structural unity4 ,the composition has a meaning1 and thus the results of the intermediate stage of reflection and comparison are not lost1 but taken up into the completed experience4 ,but the meaning is no longer external to the existence of the composition2 it is what it means1 and it means what it is4#bb ,we may subsequently see that what is thus strikingly illustrated by the case of artistic perception holds good1 to a greater or less degree1 of all advance in the understanding of reality4 ,it is perhaps the fundamental philosophical defect of what is popularly called ,mysticism that it ignores this difference between a higher and a lower immediacy1 and thus attempts to restore the direct contact with felt reality which scientific reflection inevitably loosens by simply undoing the work of analytic thought and reverting to the standpoint of mere uninterpreted feeling4#bc #i4 ,we may perhaps specify one further characteristic which seems1 at least1 to belong to every datum of immediate experience4 ,every experience seems to be implicitly complex1 that is1 its aspect of content appears never to be absolutely simple1 but always to contain a plurality of aspects1 which1 as directly felt1 are not distinct1 but are at the same time distinguishable as soon as we begin by reflection to describe and analyse it4 ,from the nature of the case this complexity cannot be directly ascertained by inspection1 for the inspection itself presupposes that we are dealing with the experience not as immediately felt1 but as already sufficiently analysed and reflected upon to be described in general terms4 ,indirectly1 however1 our result seems to be established by the consideration that1 as soon as we reflect upon the given at all1 we find these distinguishable aspects within its content1 and that1 unless they were there implicitly from the first1 it is hard to see how the mere process of reflection could have given birth to them4 ,thus1 for instance1 in even the most rudimentary experience there would appear to be something answering to the distinction between the presentational quality of a sensation and its accompanying tone of pleasure or pain4 ,it is difficult1 again1 not to think that in any sentient experience there must be some difference between elements which correspond to more or less stable conditions of the sentient organism itself 78organic sensation07 and those which correspond to relatively novel and infrequent features of the environment4 ,some philosophers would indeed be prepared to go further1 and to maintain that a more or less explicit consciousness of distinction between self and not-self1 or again between subject and object1 is logically involved in the very possibility of an experience4 ,the question1 as a psychological one1 need not be raised here2 it must1 however1 be carefully remarked that whatever view we may adopt as to the number and character of the aspects which analysis reveals within the contents of the simplest experience1 those aspects1 as directly apprehended1 originally constitute an unanalysed whole4 ,our various subsequent analyses all presuppose theories as to the ultimate what of experience which it is the business of ,metaphysics to test4 #aj4 ,our foregoing discussion of the metaphysical criterion will suggest a fairly definite ideal of what a completely adequate apprehension of the whole of reality would be4 ,a completely adequate apprehension of reality would be one which contained all reality and nothing but reality1 and thus involved no element whatever of deceptive appearance4 ,as such it would1 in the first place1 be all-embracing2 it would include in itself every datum of direct experience1 and1 since nothing but data of experience1 or1 as we have also called them1 matters of psychical fact1 are the materials of reality1 it would contain nothing else4 ,in the second place1 it would contain all its data without contradiction or discrepancy as part of a single system with a harmonious internal structure of its own4 ,for wherever there is discrepancy1 as we have already seen1 there is imperfect and therefore partially false appearance4 ,and1 in the third place1 such an all-embracing harmonious apprehension of the whole data of experience would clearly transcend that separation of existence from content which is temporarily effected by our own efforts to restate our experience in a consistent form4 ,it would1 because complete in itself1 involve at a higher level that immediacy which1 at a lower level1 we know as characteristic of feeling4 ,it would thus experience the whole of real existence directly as a system with internal consistency and structure1 but without any reference to anything beyond itself4 ,as we said of the artistic whole1 so we may say of the whole of existence as it might be apprehended by a completed insight1 it would be what it meant1 and mean what it was4 ,to such an ideally complete experience of reality as a single system1 by way of marking its exclusively experiential nature1 we may give the name1 introduced into ,philosophy by ,avenarius1 of a 8pure0 experience1 that is1 an experience which is in all its parts experience and nothing else4 ,of course1 in adopting the name1 we are not necessarily identifying ourselves with the further views of ,avenarius as to what in particular the structure of such an experience would be4 ,our own human experience clearly falls far short of such an ideal1 and that for two reasons4 ,to begin with1 our experience is incomplete in respect of its data3 there is much in reality which never directly enters into the structure of our experience at all4 ,of much of what falls within the scope of our knowledge we can only say1 in a general way1 how it would appear to ourselves supposing certain conditions of its perceptibility to be realised1 and even these conditions are usually only most imperfectly known4 ,what the actual matters of psychical fact corresponding to these conditions and to the appearance which they would determine for us are1 we are totally unable to say4 ,again1 there may well be much in the real world which never1 even in this indirect way1 enters into the structure of human knowledge at all4 ,hence our human experience and the intellectual constructions by which we seek to interpret it have always the character of being piecemeal and fragmentary4 ,perfect apprehension of systematic reality as a whole would be able to deduce from any one fact in the universe the nature of every other fact4 ,or rather1 as the whole would be presented at once in its entirety1 there would be no need for the deduction2 every fact would be directly seen as linked with every other by the directly intuited nature of the system to which all facts belong4 ,but in our imperfect human apprehension of the world our facts appear to be largely given us in isolation and independence of one another as bare 8casual conjunctions0 or 8collocations10 and the hypotheses by which we seek to weld them into a system1 however largely determined by the character of our data1 never quite get rid of an element of arbitrary 8free0 construction4 ,they are never fully necessitated as to their entirety by the nature of the facts they serve to connect4 ,hence we can never be certain that our hypothetical constructions themselves are true in the sense of consisting of statements of what for a completed experience would be matters of fact4 ,our ideal is to connect our presented facts by constructions in which each link is itself matter of fact1 or experience1 in the sense that it would under known conditions form the content of a direct apprehension4 ,but it is an ideal which1 owing to the fragmentary character of our own experience1 we are never able adequately to realise4 ,in all our sciences we are constantly compelled to use hypothetical constructions1 which often are1 and for all we know always may be1 merely 8symbolic10 in the sense that1 though useful in the co-ordination of experienced data1 they could never themselves become objects of direct experience1 because they conflict either with the general nature of experience as such1 or with the special nature of the particular experiences in which they would have to be presented4 ,our scientific hypotheses thus present a close analogy with the uninterpretable stages in the application of an algebraical calculus to a numerical or geometrical subject-matter4 ,their usefulness in enabling us to co-ordinate and predict facts of direct experience need no more guarantee their own reality1 than the usefulness of such a calculus guarantees our ability to find an intelligible interpretation for all the symbolic operations it involves4#bd ,in a pure or completed experience1 at once all-comprehending and systematic1 where existence and content1 fact and construction1 were no longer separated1 there could of course be no place for such ultimately uninterpretable symbolism4 ,our fundamental metaphysical problem1 then1 is that of discovering1 if we can1 the general or formal characteristics of such a complete or 8pure0 experience1 i4e4 those characteristics which belong to it simply in virtue of its all-containing and completely systematic nature4 ,further1 it would be the work of a completed ,metaphysic to ascertain which among the universal characteristics of our own human experience of the world are such as must belong to any coherent experience in virtue of its nature1 and are thus identifiable with the formal characteristics of a 8pure0 experience4 ,also1 our science would have to decide what features of human experience1 among those which do not possess this character1 approximate most nearly to it1 and would thus require least modification in order to enable them to take their place in an absolutely complete and harmonious experience of reality4 ,if we could completely carry out our programme1 we should1 in the first place1 have a general conception of what in outline the constitution of experienced reality as a systematic whole is2 and1 in the second1 we should be able to arrange the various concepts and categories by which we seek1 alike in everyday thinking and in the various sciences1 to interpret the world of our experience1 in an ascending order of degrees of truth and reality1 according to the extent to which they would require to be modified before they could become adequate to express the nature of a systematic experienced reality4 ,the knowledge conveyed by such a science would1 of course1 not be itself the pure or all-embracing experience of ,reality1 but merely mediate knowledge about the general nature of such an experience1 and would therefore1 so far1 be like all mere knowledge about an object1 abstract and imperfect4 ,it would still refer to something beyond itself1 and thus have a meaning other than its own existence4 ,but1 unlike all other knowledge1 our metaphysical knowledge of the formal character of an all-inclusive experienced whole would be final1 in the sense that no addition of fresh knowledge could modify it in principle4 ,fresh knowledge1 which in all other cases involves at least the possibility of a transformation of existing theories1 would here do no more than fill in and make more concrete our conception of the system of ,reality1 without affecting our insight into its general structure4 ,we may perhaps illustrate this conception of a knowledge which1 though imperfect1 is yet final1 by an instance borrowed from elementary ,mathematics4 ,we know absolutely and precisely1 e4 g41 what the symbol stands for4 is completely determined for us by the definition that it is the ratio of the circumference of a circle to its diameter4 ,and again1 we can define unequivocally both the terms1 circumference and diameter of the circle1 which we have employed in our definition of 4 ,thus our knowledge of the meaning of the symbol is clearly final2 no fresh accretion to our knowledge will make any modification in it4 ,at the same time1 our knowledge of 1 though final1 is imperfect4 ,for the quantity is incommensurable1 and thus we can never precisely evaluate it4 ,all we can do is to assign its value correctly within any desired degree of approximation4 ,again1 while no approximation gives an absolutely correct value for the quantity1 one approximation is1 of course1 closer than another4 ,because no approximation is more than approximately the truth1 it by no means follows that all are equally wide of the mark4 ,similarly1 it may well be that1 though we can say with finality what the general nature of experience and experienced ,reality as a systematic whole is1 yet1 when we come to ask after the character of the system in detail1 we have to depend on sciences which are merely approximate in their results2 it will not follow1 as is sometimes assumed1 that the categories of one science do not present us with a nearer approximation to the absolute truth than those of another4#be #aa4 ,we may end this chapter with some general reflections on the method required for such a science of ,metaphysics as we have described in the preceding paragraphs4 ,the true character of any scientific method can1 of course1 only be discovered by the actual use of it2 a preliminary disquisition on the nature of a method not previously exhibited in actual use is apt to be at best sterile1 and at worst a positive source of prejudices which may subsequently seriously hamper the process of investigation4 ,still1 there are certain general characteristics of the method imposed on us by our conception of the problems to be solved which may conveniently be pointed out at this stage of our inquiry4 ,our method will1 in the first place1 clearly be analytical and critical in its character4 ,we analyse experience with a view to discovering its implications1 and we analyse our various scientific and unscientific theories of the contents of the world-system for the same purpose4 ,also1 once having determined what are the formal characteristics of an all-embracing1 systematic whole of experienced fact1 we criticise our various concepts and theories by reference to these characteristics as an ultimate standard of reality and truth4 ,negatively1 we may add that our method is non-empirical1 and also non-inductive1 in the same sense in which pure ,mathematics1 for instance1 may be called non-inductive4 ,it is non-empirical inasmuch as we are called upon to analyse all our data and criticise all our pre-conceived theories4 ,we are not allowed to accept any fact without analysis1 or any concept without criticism1 as an unchallenged datum upon which we may build without preliminary justification4 ,hence our method is non-empirical4 ,also1 as our analysis is concerned entirely with the internal character and self-consistency of the data analysed1 it is1 like the reasonings of pure ,mathematics1 independent of external confirmation outside the analysed data themselves1 and is therefore non-inductive4#bf ,in precisely the same sense our method and its results may be called1 if we please1 a priori2 that is to say1 we proceed entirely by internal analysis of certain data1 and are1 alike in procedure and result1 independent of experience outside the experience we are concerned with analysing4 ,we can1 of course1 add that our method is constructive1 that is1 if successfully carried out it would culminate in an intellectual attitude towards the world which1 as an intellectual attitude1 we did not possess before entering on our study of ,metaphysics2 but as construction1 in this sense1 is characteristic of all scientific method1 it does not seem necessary to specify it as a peculiarity of metaphysical procedure in particular4 ,historically1 our conception of metaphysical method as fundamentally analytical and directed to the detection and removal of internal contradictions in the categories of ordinary thought1 is perhaps nearer to the view of ,herbart than to that of any other great philosopher of the past4 ,in our insistence upon the non-empirical and1 in a sense1 a priori character of ,metaphysics1 we are again1 of course1 largely in agreement with the position of ,kant4 ,there is1 however1 a most important difference between our own and the ,kantian conception of the a priori upon which it is essential to insist4 ,a-priority1 as we have used the term1 stands merely for a peculiarity of the method of ,metaphysics2 by an a priori method we understood one which is confined to the internal analysis of a datum and independent of external reference to outside facts4 ,with ,kant the a priori is a name for certain forms of perception and thought which1 because revealed by analysis as present in every experience1 are supposed to be given independently of all experience whatsoever1 and so come to be identified by him as 8the work of the mind10 in opposition to the empirical factor in experience1 which is held to be the product of an external system of 8things-in-themselves40 ,hence ,kant's whole discussion of the a priori is vitiated by a constant confusion between what is metaphysically necessary 7i4e4 implied in the existence of knowledge7 and what is psychologically primitive4 ,this confusion1 perplexing enough in ,kant1 reaches a climax in the works of writers like ,mr4 ,spencer1 who appear to think that the whole question of the presence of a non-empirical factor in knowledge can be decided by an appeal to genetic ,psychology4 ,it is clear that1 from our point of view1 the identification of the a priori with the 8work of the mind0 would involve a metaphysical theory as to the constitution of experience which we are not entitled to adopt without proof4#bg ,a word ought perhaps to be said about our attitude towards the 8dialectical0 method as employed by ,hegel and his followers4 ,it was ,hegel's conviction that the whole series of concepts or categories by which the mind attempts to grasp the nature of experienced ,reality as a whole1 from the most rudimentary to the most adequate1 can be exhibited in a fixed order which arises from the very nature of thought itself4 ,we begin1 he held1 by the affirmation of some rude and one-sided conception of the character of what is2 the very imperfection of our concept then forces us on to affirm its opposite as equally true4 ,but the opposite1 in its turn1 is no less one-sided and inadequate to express the full character of concrete reality4 ,hence we are driven to negate our first negation by affirming a concept which includes both the original affirmation and its opposite as subordinate aspects4 ,the same process repeats itself again at a higher stage with our new category1 and thus we gradually pass by a series of successive triads of categories1 each consisting of the three stages of affirmation1 negation1 and negation of the negation1 from the beginning of an intellectual interpretation of the world of experience1 the thought of it as mere a 8,being10 not further defined1 to the apprehension of it as the 8,absolute ,idea10 or concrete system of spiritual experience4 ,it was the task of abstract ,metaphysics 7called by ,hegel1 ,logic7 to exhibit the successive stages of this process as a systematic orderly advance1 in which the nature of each stage is determined by its place in the whole4 ,as ,hegel also held that this 8dialectic0 process is somehow not confined to the 8subjective0 or private intelligence of the student of ,philosophy1 but also realised in the structure of the 8objective0 universe1 it followed that its successive stages could be detected in physical nature and in ,history in the same order in which they occur in 8,logic10 and many of ,hegel's best-known works are devoted to exhibiting the facts of ,physics1 ,ethics1 ,religion1 and ,history in the light of this doctrine4 ,the subsequent advances of the various sciences have so completely proved the arbitrariness and untrustworthiness of the results obtained by these 8deductions0 that some of the best exponents of the ,hegelian type of ,philosophy are now agreed to abandon the claim of the ,dialectic to be more than a systematisation of the stages through which the individual mind must pass in its advance towards a finally satisfactory conception of ,reality4 ,but even within these limits its pretensions are probably exaggerated4 ,no satisfactory proof can be produced that1 even in abstract ,metaphysics1 the succession of categories must be precisely that adopted by ,hegel4 ,there are some categories of the first importance1 e4g41 that of order in ,mathematics1 which hardly get any recognition at all in his system1 and others1 such as those of 8,mechanism0 and 8,chemism10 which play a prominent part1 are obviously largely dependent for their position upon the actual development of the various sciences in ,hegel's own time4 ,hence the method seems unsuitable for the original attainment of philosophical truth4 ,at best it might serve1 as ,lotze has remarked1 as a convenient method for the arrangement of truth already obtained by other means1 and even for this purpose it seems clear that the succession of categories actually adopted by ,hegel would require constant modification to adapt the general scheme to later developments of the various special sciences4 ,consult further3--,f4 ,h4 ,bradley1 ,appearance and ,reality1 chaps4 #ac1 #ad2 ,b4 ,bosanquet1 ,essentials of ,logic1 ,lect4 #b2 ,shadworth ,hodgson1 ,metaphysic of ,experience1 bk4 i4 chap4 #a2 ,j4 ,s4 ,mackenzie1 ,outlines of ,metaphysics1 bk4 i4 chaps4 #b and #d4 ,and for criticism of the ,hegelian dialectic3 ,j4 ,e4 ,m#8,taggart1 ,studies in ,hegelian ,dialectic1 chaps4 #a-c2 ,j4 ,b4 ,baillie1 ,the ,origin and ,significance of ,hegel's ,logic1 chaps4 #h-ab1 especially chap4 #ab2 and also ,adamson1 ,development of ,modern ,philosophy1 bk4 i4 pp4 #bga ff4 ----- ,footnote #aj3 ,see ,bosanquet1 ,essentials of ,logic1 ,lect4 #h4 ,as an illustration we may take an extreme case3 8,the ,jabberwock was not killed yesterday40 ,what is the ground of this denial8 ,at first sight it appears to be merely negative1 8there are no such things as ,jabberwocks to kill40 ,but before ,i can say 8there are no such things as ,jabberwocks0 with confidence1 ,i must have enough positive information about the structure and habits of animals to be aware that the qualities ascribed to the ,jabberwock conflict with the laws of animal life4 ,or1 if ,i deny the existence of ,jabberwocks simply on the ground that ,i have never come across a specimen1 this involves a positive judgment as to the relation between the animal world and the part of it ,i have examined1 such as1 8if there were ,jabberwocks1 ,i should have come across one02 or1 8my acquaintance with the varieties of animals is sufficiently exhaustive to afford ground for a valid generalisation40 ,the fact that symbolic ,logic finds it convenient to treat the universal affirmative as a double negative must not mislead us as to its actual priority in thought4 ,footnote #aa3 ,to meet the kind of criticism which finds it humorous to jest at the expense of those who 8take consolation from spelling ,reality with a big ,r10 may ,i once for all say that when ,i spell ,reality thus it is simply as a convenient way of distinguishing the ultimately from the merely relatively real8 ,footnote #ab3 ,we shall meet this same difficulty again later on as the principle of the famous ,kantian objection to the 8ontological proof0 of ,god's existence4 ,infra1 ,bk4 ,,iv4 chap4 #e4 #h4 ,footnote #ac3 ,take a concrete example4 ,a theory as to the early religious history of the ,hebrews1 let us say1 is put forward upon grounds derived from ,semitic philology4 ,though unacquainted with ,semitic philology in particular1 ,i may be able to form some sort of estimate of the cogency of the professed reasoning if ,i already have an adequate acquaintance with the use and value of philological evidence in parallel cases1 say1 in the study of ,greek antiquities4 ,but if ,i have no positive acquaintance at all with the use of philology in antiquarian research1 it would be the merest impertinence for me to offer any opinion whatever4 ,footnote #ad3 ,what follows must be regarded as a mere outline which awaits subsequent filling up by the more concrete results of ,bk ,,ii4 chap4 #a4 ,footnote #ae3 ,for the modern logical doctrine of possibility consult ,bradley1 ,principles of ,logic1 #aib-bja2 ,bosanquet1 ,logic1 i4 chap4 #i4 ,footnote #af3 ,this is--apart from non-essential theological accretions--the principle of ,berkeley's argument for the existence of ,god 7,principles of ,human ,knowledge1 #adf1 #adg74 ,footnote #ag3 ,i should explain that ,i use 8feeling0 and 8apprehension0 indifferently for immediate and non-reflective awareness of any psychical content4 ,the exclusive restriction of the term to awareness of pleasure and pain seems to me to rest on a serious mistake in psychology1 and ,i therefore avoid it4 ,footnote #ah3 ,in fact1 we shall see in ,bk4 ,,ii4 chap4 #a that in virtue of its unity with immediate feeling1 all experience is essentially connected with purpose4 ,footnote #ai3 ,i take 8fact0 as equivalent to 8what is directly apprehended in a single moment of consciousness40 ,in a previous work 7,the ,problem of ,conduct1 chap4 #a7 ,i used the word in a different sense for 8the contents of a true description of experience40 ,this employment of the word1 however1 seems at variance with established philosophical usage1 and ,i therefore abandon it as likely to lead to misapprehension4 ,footnote #bj3 ,of course1 the apprehended 8content0 may itself be a 8process10 as is the case in all instances of the apprehension of change2 but the apprehended process is always distinguishable from the process of apprehension4 ,footnote #ba3 ,we shall see in ,bk4 ,,ii4 chap4 #a that the 8that0 of an experience implies relation to a unique individual interest or purpose4 ,footnote #bb3 ,of course this is only partly true4 ,as we shall see in the sequel1 to 8be what it means and mean what it is0 is an ideal never fully realised in the structure of any finite piece of reality1 precisely because the finite1 as its name implies1 is never a completely systematic whole4 ,footnote #bc3 ,on the psychological processes by which meaning is acquired1 see ,stout1 ,manual of ,psychology#c1 bk4 i4 chap4 #c2 and on the apprehension of form1 the same author's ,analytic ,psychology1 bk4 i4 chap4 #c4 ,much interesting discussion of the difference between 8external0 and 8internal0 meaning will be found in ,royce1 ,the ,world and the ,individual1 ,first ,series4 ,footnote #bd3 ,for some good observations on the fallacy of assuming that mathematical symbolism must always be interpretable1 see ,b4 ,russell1 ,foundations of ,geometry1 p4 #de-df2 or ,whitehead1 ,universal ,algebra1 vol4 i p4 #aj ff4 ,for a further elaboration of the argument of the foregoing section ,i may refer to my ,problem of ,conduct1 pp4 #ad-ba4 ,i need hardly warn the reader against confusing a 8symbolic0 concept in my sense of the word1 i4e4 one which cannot be fully interpreted in terms of direct experience1 with a 8symbolic0 idea in ,mr4 ,spencer's sense1 i4e4 one which is not1 psychologically1 a copy of the presentations for which it stands4 ,our use of the word is1 of course1 purely logical1 and has nothing to do with the psychological character of mental images1 but only with their meaning4 ,footnote #be3 ,compare my ,problem of ,conduct1 pp4 #bb-ci4 ,footnote #bf3 ,the fundamental peculiarity of 8inductive0 procedure1 in fact1 is that1 while its object is the internal analysis of its data1 which1 if completed1 would permit of a universal conclusion being drawn from the single case1 it is never able to effect the analysis1 and is driven to reinforce it by external comparison with 8similar0 cases4 ,footnote #bg3 ,on the confusion between the metaphysical and psychological standpoint in ,kant's own treatment of the a priori1 see ,b4 ,russell1 ,foundations of ,geometry1 pp4 #a-d1 and ,adamson1 ,development of ,modern ,philosophy1 bk4 i4 pp4 #bdd-bdg4 ----- ,,chapter ,,iii ,,the ,,sub-,,divisions ,,of ,,metaphysics #a4 ,the traditional sub-division of ,metaphysics into ,ontology1 ,cosmology1 ,rational ,psychology1 common to all the great modern constructive systems4 #b4 ,precise sense in which we adopt these divisions for the purposes of our own treatment of the subject4 #c4 ,relation of ,cosmology and ,rational ,psychology to the empirical sciences4 #a4 ,english philosophers1 who have usually been imbued with a wholesome distrust of deliberate system-making1 have commonly paid comparatively little attention to the question of the number and character of the sub-divisions of metaphysical philosophy4 ,they have been content to raise the questions which interested them in the order of their occurrence to their own minds1 and have gladly left it to the systematic historians of ,philosophy1 who have rarely been ,englishmen1 to discuss the proper arrangement of the parts of the subject4 ,continental thinkers1 who are naturally more prone to conscious systematisation1 have bestowed more thought on the problem of method and order1 with the result that each great independent philosopher has tended to make his own special arrangement of the parts of his subject4 ,the different arrangements1 however1 seem all to agree in conforming to a general type1 which was most clearly exhibited by the otherwise rather arid ,wolffian dogmatism of the eighteenth century4 ,all the constructive systems 7those1 e4g41 of ,hegel1 ,herbart1 ,lotze17 feel the necessity of giving the first place to a general discussion of the most universal characteristics which we find ourselves constrained to ascribe in thought to any reality which is to be an intelligible and coherent system and not a mere chaos4 ,this division of the subject is commonly known by the title it bears alike in the ,wolffian ,metaphysic and the systems of ,herbart and ,lotze1 as ,ontology1#bh or the general doctrine of ,being2 with ,hegel it constitutes1 as a whole1 the contents of the science of ,logic1 as distinguished from the other two great departments of speculative thought1 the ,philosophies of ,nature and ,mind2 and its most formal and general parts1 again1 compose1 within the ,hegelian ,logic itself1 the special first section entitled 8,doctrine of ,being40 ,further1 every system of metaphysical philosophy is bound to deal with more special problems1 which readily fall into two principal classes4 ,it has to consider the meaning and validity of the most universal conceptions of which we seek to understand the nature of the individual objects which make up the experienced physical world1 8extension10 8succession10 8space10 8time10 8number10 8magnitude10 8motion10 8change10 8quality10 and the more complex categories of 8matter10 8force10 8causality10 8interaction10 8thinghood10 and so forth4 ,again1 ,metaphysics has to deal with the meaning and validity of the universal predicates by which we seek to interpret the nature of the experiencing mind itself1 and its relation both to other minds and to the objects of the physical world1 8the soul10 8the self10 8the subject10 8self-consciousness10 8ethical purpose10 and so forth4 ,hence it has been customary to recognise a second and third part of ,metaphysics1 dealing respectively with the most general characteristics of external ,nature and of conscious ,mind4 ,these sections of the subject are commonly known as ,cosmology and ,rational ,psychology4 ,in ,hegel's system they appear in a double form3 in their most abstract generality they constitute the 8,doctrine of ,essence10 and the 8,doctrine of the ,notion0 in the ,hegelian ,logic2 in their more concrete detail they form the second and third parts of his complete system or 8,encyclopdia0 of the philosophical sciences1 the previously mentioned ,philosophies of ,nature and ,mind4 ,in the pre-,kantian eighteenth century it was not unusual to add yet a fourth division to ,metaphysics1 ,rational ,theology1 the doctrine of the existence and attributes of ,god1 so far as they can be deduced from general philosophical principles apart from the appeal to specific revelation4 ,kant's onslaught on the whole ,wolffian scheme in the 8,dialectic of ,pure ,reason10 while profoundly modifying for the future the view taken by metaphysicians of ,cosmology and ,rational ,psychology1 proved annihilating so far as eighteenth-century ,deism and its philosophical offspring1 ,rational ,theology1 were concerned1 and that sub-division may fairly be said to have disappeared from subsequent philosophical systems4#bi #b4 ,there are good and obvious reasons why we should adhere1 in the form of our inquiry1 to the main outlines of this traditional scheme4 ,it is true that it is largely a question of simple convenience what order we adopt in a systematic metaphysical investigation4 ,a genuinely philosophical survey of the general character of knowledge and experience would exhibit so complete a systematic unity1 that you might start from any point in it and reach the same results1 much as you may go round a circle equally well from any point of the periphery4 ,but for the beginner1 at any rate1 it is advantageous to start with the general question what we mean by ,being or ,reality1 and what character is to be ascribed to the whole of ,being as such1 before attacking the problem of the particular kind of ,being which belongs to the various 8realities0 of common life and the special sciences4 ,thus we have to discuss in the first part of our programme such questions as the relation of ,being in general to experience1 the sense in which ,being may be said to be inseparable from1 and yet again to transcend1 experience2 the problem of the existence of different kinds or degrees of ,being2 the question whether ,being is ultimately one or many2 the relation between ,real ,being and its appearances4 ,all these problems correspond with reasonable closeness to the contents of what was traditionally known as ,ontology4 ,it is only when we have reached some definite conclusion on these most fundamental questions that we shall be in a position to deal with the more special problems suggested by the various departments of science and common life2 hence we shall do well to acquiesce in the arrangement by which ,ontology was made to precede the other divisions of the subject4 ,again1 in dealing with the more complex special problems of ,metaphysics1 it is natural to recognise a distinction corresponding to the separation of ,cosmology from ,rational ,psychology4 ,common language shows that for most of the purposes of human thought and action the contents of the world of experience tend to fall into the two groups of mere things and things which are sentient and purposive--,physical ,nature on the one hand1 and ,minds or ,spirits on the other4 ,we must1 of course1 be careful not to confuse this division of the objects of experience with the distinction between an experienced object as such and the subject of experience4 ,we are to start1 in our critical investigation1 not with the artificial point of view of ,psychology1 which sets the 8subject0 of presentations over-against the presentations considered as conveying information about 8objects of knowledge10 but with the standpoint of practical life1 in which the individual agent is opposed to an environment itself consisting largely of similar individual agents4 ,it is not 8,nature0 on the one side and a 8perceiving mind0 on the other1 but an environment composed partly of physical things1 partly of other human and animal minds1 that furnishes the antithesis on which the distinction of ,cosmology from ,rational ,psychology is founded4 ,there is no confusion against which we shall need to be more on our guard than this fallacious identification of ,mind or ,spirit with the abstract subject of psychological states1 and of the 8environment0 of the individual with ,physical ,nature4 ,of course1 it is true that we necessarily interpret the inner life of other minds in terms of our own incommunicably individual experience1 but it is equally true that our own direct experience of ourselves is throughout determined by interaction with other agents of the same type as ourselves4 ,it is a pure delusion to suppose that we begin by finding ourselves in a world of mere physical things to some of which we afterwards come by an after-thought1 based on 8analogy10 to ascribe 8consciousness0 akin to our own4 ,hence1 to avoid possible misunderstandings1 it would be better to drop the traditional appellations 8,cosmology0 and 8,rational ,psychology10 and to call the divisions of applied ,metaphysics1 as ,hegel does1 the ,philosophy of ,nature and of ,spirit or ,mind respectively4#cj ,in recognising this sub-division of applied ,metaphysics into two sections1 dealing respectively with ,physical ,nature and with ,mind or ,spirit1 we do not mean to suggest that there is an absolute disparity between these two classes of things4 ,it is1 of course1 a matter for philosophical criticism itself to decide whether this difference may not in the end turn out to be merely apparent4 ,this will clearly be the case if either minds can be shown1 as the materialist holds1 to be simply a peculiar class of highly complex physical things1 or physical things to be1 as the idealist contends1 really minds of an unfamiliar and non-human type4 ,it is sufficient for us that the difference1 whether ultimate or not1 is marked enough to give rise to distinct classes of problems1 which have to be treated separately and on their own merits4 ,we may feel convinced on general philosophical grounds that minds and physical things are ultimately existences of the same general type1 whether we conceive that type after the fashion of the materialist or of the idealist1 but this conviction does not in the least affect the fact that the special metaphysical problems suggested by our experience of physical things are largely different from those which are forced on us by our interest in the minds of our fellows4 ,in the one connection we have1 for instance1 to discuss the questions connected with such categories as those of uniform spatial extension1 uniform obedience to general law1 the constitution of a whole which is an aggregate of parts2 in the other1 those connected with the meaning and value of ethical1 artistic1 and religious aspiration1 the concept of moral freedom1 the nature of personal identity4 ,even the categories which seem at first sight most readily applicable both to physical things and to minds1 such as those of quality and number1 lead to special difficulties in the two contrasted cases4 ,this consideration seems to justify us in separating the metaphysics of ,mind from the metaphysics of ,nature1 and the superior difficulty of many of the problems which belong to the former is a further reason for following the traditional order of the two sub-divisions1 and placing ,rational ,psychology after ,cosmology4 ,in so far as the problems of ,rational ,theology can be separated from those of general ,ontology1 the proper place for them seems to be that section of ,rational ,psychology which deals with the meaning and worth of our religious experiences4 #c4 ,it remains1 in concluding the present chapter1 to utter a word of caution as to the relation between the two divisions of applied ,metaphysics and the body of the empirical sciences4 ,it is perhaps hardly necessary to warn the student that ,rational ,cosmology and ,psychology would become worse than useless if conceived of as furnishing in any sense a substitute for the experimental study of the physical1 psychological1 and social sciences4 ,they are essentially departments of ,metaphysics1 and for that very reason are incapable of adding a single fact to the sum of our knowledge of ascertained fact4 ,no doubt the discredit into which ,metaphysics--except in the form of tacit and unconscious assumption--has fallen among students of positive science1 is largely due to the unfortunate presumption with which ,schelling1 and to a less degree ,hegel1 attempted to put metaphysical discussion in the place of the experimental investigation of the facts of nature and of mind4 ,at the present day this mistake is less likely to be committed2 the danger is rather that applied ,metaphysics may be declared purely valueless because it is incapable of adding to our store of facts4 ,the truth is1 that it has a real value1 but a value of a different kind from that which has sometimes been ascribed to it4 ,it is concerned not with the accumulation of facts1 but with the interpretation of previously ascertained facts1 looked at broadly and as a whole4 ,when the facts of physical ,nature and of ,mind and the special laws of their connection have been discovered and systematised by the most adequate methods of experiment1 observation1 and mathematical calculation at our disposal1 the question still remains1 how we are to conceive of the whole realm of such facts consistently with the general conditions of logical and coherent thought4 ,if we choose to define positive science as the systematic establishment of the special laws of connection between facts1 we may say that over and above the scientific problem of the systematisation of facts there is the further philosophical problem of their interpretation4 ,this latter problem does not cease to be legitimate because it has been illegitimately confounded by certain thinkers with the former4 ,or we may put the case in another way4 ,the whole process of scientific systematisation involves certain assumptions as to the ultimate nature of the facts which are systematised4 ,thus the very performance of an experiment for the purpose of verifying a suggested hypothesis involves the assumption that the facts with which the hypothesis is concerned conform to general laws1 and that these laws are such as to be capable of formulation by human intelligence4 ,if 8nature0 is not in some sense 8uniform10 the conclusive force of a successful experiment is logically nil4 ,hence the necessity for an inquiry into the character of the presuppositions involved in scientific procedure1 and the amount of justification which can be found for them4 ,for practical purposes1 no doubt1 the presuppositions of inductive science are sufficiently justified by its actual successes4 ,but the question for us as metaphysicians1 as we have already seen1 is that not of their usefulness but of their truth4 ,it may be said that the inquiry ought in any case to be left to the special student of the physical and psychological sciences themselves4 ,this1 however1 would involve serious neglect of the great principle of division of labour4 ,it is true1 of course1 that1 other things being equal1 the better stored the mind of the philosopher with scientific facts1 the sounder will be his judgment on the interpretation and implications of the whole body of facts4 ,but1 at the same time1 the gifts which make a successful experimentalist and investigator of facts are not altogether the same which are required for the philosophical analysis of the implications of facts1 nor are both always conjoined in the same man4 ,there is no reason1 on the one hand1 why the able experimenter should be compelled to desist from the discovery of facts of nature until he can solve the philosophical problems presented by the very existence of a world of physical facts1 nor1 on the other1 why the thinker endowed by nature with powers of philosophical analysis should be forbidden to exercise them until he has mastered all the facts which are known by the specialists4 ,what the philosopher needs to know1 as the starting-point for his investigation1 is not the specialist's facts as such1 but the general principles which the specialist uses for their discovery and correlation4 ,his study is a 8science of sciences10 not in the sense that it is a sort of universal encyclopdia of instructive and entertaining knowledge1 but in the more modest sense of being a systematised reflection upon the concepts and methods with which the sciences1 and the less methodical thought of everyday practical life work1 and an attempt to try them by the standard of ultimate coherence and intelligibility4 ,note4--,if we retain ,psychology1 as is done1 e4g41 by ,lotze1 as the title of our ,metaphysic of ,mind1 we ought in consistency to give the word a greatly extended sense4 ,the facts which the ,metaphysic of ,mind attempt to interpret1 comprise not only those of ,psychology in the stricter sense 7the abstract study of the laws of mental process71 but those of all the various sciences which deal with the concrete manifestation of mind in human life 7,ethics1 sthetics1 ,sociology1 the study of ,religion1 etc474 ,this is one reason for preferring the ,hegelian designation 8,philosophy of ,mind0 to the traditional one of ,rational ,psychology4 ,the associations of the word ,philosophy in ,english are1 however1 so vague that the adoption of the ,hegelian title might perhaps be understood as identifying this division of ,metaphysics with the whole content of the mental sciences4 ,but for the unfamiliarity of the expression1 ,i should recommend some such phrase as ,metaphysics of ,human ,society as the most adequate description of this branch of our science4 ----- ,footnote #bh3 ,the name is ultimately derived from ,aristotle's definition of 8,first ,philosophy0--which along with ,mathematics and ,physics constitutes according to his system1 the whole of ,theoretical ,science--as the knowledge of 1 i4e4 of the general character of the real as real1 as distinguished from the knowledge of the mathematician and the physicist1 who only deal with the real in so far as it exhibits number and magnitude1 and sensible change respectively4 ,footnote #bi3 ,less effective in immediate results1 but no less thorough and acute than the ,kantian 8,critique of ,speculative ,theology10 were ,hume's posthumous ,dialogues on ,natural ,religion1 a work which has hardly received its full meed of consideration from the professional historians of ,philosophy4 ,footnote #cj3 ,the fallacy of the assumption that our environment is directly given in experience as merely physical is best brought out by ,avenarius in his masterly little work ,der ,menschliche ,weltbegriff1 which should be familiar to all students of ,philosophy who are able to read ,german4 ,the purely ,english reader will find many fruitful suggestions in ,ward1 ,naturalism and ,agnosticism1 pt4 iv41 8,refutation of ,dualism40 ,much confusion is caused in philosophical discussion by the unscholarly use of the epistemological term 8object0 7which properly signifies 8object of cognition07 instead of the more familiar 8thing0 to denote the constituent elements of our environment as it is actually experienced in practical life4 ,in strictness the elements of the environment are 8objects0 only for an imaginary consciousness which is thought of as merely cognisant of presented fact1 a point which ,prof4 ,mnsterberg has emphasised4 ,for practical life the essential character of the environment is not merely that it is 8presented10 but that it interacts with our own purposive activity2 it thus consists not of 8objects10 but of 8things40 ,in including the minds of our fellows among the things which constitute our environment1 we must not commit the mistake of supposing 8minds0 as factors in immediate experience to be 8incorporeal realities10 or 8complexes of states of consciousness40 ,the distinction between mind and body1 and the concept of mind as 8within the body10 or again as a 8function0 of the body1 are psychological hypotheses which only arise in the course of subsequent reflective analysis of experience4 ,of the worth of these hypotheses we shall have to speak later4 ,at present it is enough to note that for direct experience a 8mind0 means simply a thing with individual purpose4 ,what for my direct experience distinguishes my fellow-man from a stock or stone1 is not the presence within him of an incorporeal 8soul0 or 8consciousness10 but the fact that ,i must take account of his individual purposes and adapt myself to them if ,i wish to achieve my own4 ,here again the reader of ,german will do well to consult ,prof4 ,mnsterberg 7,grundzge der ,psychologie1 vol4 i4 chaps4 #a-c74 ,see also a paper on 8,mind and ,nature0 by the present writer in ,international ,journal of ,ethics for ,october #aijb4 ----- ,,book ,,ii ,,ontology--,,the ,,general ,,structure ,,of ,,reality ,,chapter ,i ,,reality ,,and ,,experience #a4 ,in a sense 8reality0 for each of us means that of which he must take account if his special purposes are to find fulfilment4 #b4 ,but ultimately the world must possess a structure of which all purposes1 each in its own way1 must take account4 ,this is the 8,ultimate ,reality0 or 8,absolute0 of ,metaphysics4 ,in ,metaphysics we regard it from the special standpoint of the scientific intellect4 ,there are other legitimate attitudes towards it1 e4g41 that of practical religion4 #c4 ,the inseparability of reality from immediate experience involves the recognition of it as teleological and as uniquely individual4 #d4 ,the experience within which all reality falls cannot be my own1 nor yet the 8collective0 experience of the aggregate of conscious beings4 ,it must be an individual experience which apprehends the totality of existence as the harmonious embodiment of a single 8purpose40 ,the nearest analogue our own life presents to such a type of experience is to be found in the satisfied insight of personal love4 #e4 ,the experience of such an 8,absolute0 must not be thought of as a mere reduplication of our own1 or of the scientific hypotheses by which we co-ordinate facts for the purposes of inference4 #f4 ,our conception is closely connected with that of ,berkeley1 from which it differs by the stress it lays on the purposive and selective aspect of experience4 #g4 ,realism1 both of the ,agnostic and of the ,dogmatic type1 is incompatible with the meaning we have been led to attach to 8,reality40 ,but ,agnosticism is justified in insisting on the limitations of our knowledge of ,reality1 and ,dogmatic ,realism in rejecting the identification of ,reality with experience as a merely cognitive function of finite percipients4 #h4 ,subjectivism1 according to which all that ,i know is states of my own 8consciousness10 is irreconcilable with the admitted facts of life1 and arises from the psychological fallacy of 8introjection40 #a4 ,in the preceding book we have seen that the very nature of the metaphysical problem predetermines the general character of the answer we are to give to it4 ,what our intellect can accept as finally real1 we saw1 must be indissolubly one with actual experience1 and it must be an internally coherent system4 ,in the present book we have to discuss more in detail the structure which must belong to any reality possessing these general characteristics4 ,the present chapter1 then1 will be devoted to an examination of the implications of the experiential character of real ,being2 in the next1 we shall deal with the nature of its unity as a single system4 ,we may perhaps most conveniently begin our discussion with a re-definition of some of our principal terms4 ,we have hitherto spoken of the object of metaphysical knowledge indifferently as 8,being10 8,what is10 8,what truly exists10 and as 8,reality10 8the ultimately real40 ,so far as it is possible to draw a distinction between these two sets of names for the same thing1 we may say that each series lays special stress on a somewhat different aspect of our object4 ,when we say that a thing 8is0 or 8has ,being10 we seem primarily to mean that it is an object for the knowing consciousness1 that it has its place in the system of objects which coherent thought recognises4 ,when we call the same object 8real0 or a 8reality10 we lay the emphasis rather on the consideration that it is something of which we categorically must take account1 whether we like it or not1 if some purpose of our own is to get its fulfilment4#ca ,thus again the 8non-existent0 primarily means that which finds no place in the scheme of objects contemplated by consistent scientific thought2 the 8unreal10 that with which we have not1 for any human purpose1 to reckon4 ,this is what is often expressed by saying that reality means what is independent of our own will1 what exercises resistance1 what constrains or compels our recognition1 whether we like it or not4 ,philosophers have pointed out that this way of putting the case is only half the truth4 ,the 8stubborn0 facts or realities which1 as we commonly say1 force us to recognise them1 only do so in consequence of the presence in us of definite interests and purposes which we cannot effect without adapting ourselves to the situation expressed by our statement of the 8facts40 ,what lies entirely outside my interests and plans gets no kind of recognition from me2 it is 8unreal0 for me precisely because ,i have no need to take account of it as a factor to be reckoned with in the pursuit of my special ends4 ,thus1 so long as we use the term in a relative sense and with reference to the special ends of this or that particular agent1 there may be as many different orders of 8reality0 as there are special purposes1 and what is 8real0 for the agent inspired by one purpose may be unreal for his fellows whose purposes are different4 ,thus1 for example1 to an ,english ,christian living at home in ,england the rules of 8caste0 in ,india are usually for all practical purposes unreal2 he has no need to take their existence into account as a condition of the successful prosecution of any of his aims and interests2 for him they have no more significance than the rules of legal procedure adopted in ,wonderland4 ,but for the historian of ,indian society1 the native ,hindu ,christian1 and the devout worshipper of ,shiva1 the rules of caste are a true reality4 ,not one of the three can execute his special purposes without taking them into account and allowing them to operate in determining his way of proceeding to his goal4 ,again1 the kind of reality which the rules of caste possess for each of our three men is different1 in accord with the differences in their characteristic purposes4 ,for the historian1 they are real as a system of ideas which have influenced and do influence the conduct of the society of which he is writing the history1 in such a way that without understanding them he cannot get a clear insight into the social structure of ,hinduism4 ,to the native ,christian1 they are real as a standing source of difficulty and a standing temptation to be false to his highest ideals of conduct4 ,to the ,shivaite1 they are real as the divinely appointed means to bodily and spiritual purification from the evil that is in the world4 #b4 ,so far1 then1 it might seem that 8reality0 is a purely relative term1 and that our previous choice of ultimate freedom from contradiction as our standard of reality was an arbitrary one1 due to the mere accident that our special purpose in sitting down to study ,metaphysics is to think consistently4 ,of course1 it might be said1 whatever game you choose to play at1 the rules of that particular game must be your supreme reality1 so long as you are engaged in it4 ,but it depends on your own choice what game you will play and how long you will keep at it4 ,there is no game at which we all1 irrespective of personal choice1 have to play1 and there is therefore no such thing as an ultimate reality which we must all recognise as such2 there are only the special realities which correspond to our special individual purposes4 ,you have no right to set up the particular rules of the game of scientific thought as a reality unconditionally demanding recognition from those who do not choose to play that particular game4#cb ,such an argument would1 however1 be beside the point4 ,it is true that the special nature of the facts which any one of us recognises as real depends on the special nature of his individual purposes4 ,and it is true that1 precisely because we are1 to some extent1 genuine individuals1 no two men's abiding purposes are identically the same4 ,it is therefore true1 so far as it goes1 that ,reality wears a different and an individual aspect for each of us4 ,but it is emphatically not true that there is no identical character at all about the purposes and interests of different individuals4 ,the very recognition of the fact that any one individual purpose or interest can only get expression by accommodating itself to a definite set of conditions1 which constitute the reality corresponding to that purpose1 carries with it the implication that the world is ultimately a system and not a chaos1 or1 in other words1 that there is ultimately a certain constitution of things which1 under one aspect or another1 is of moment for all individuals1 and must be taken into account by every kind of purpose that is to get fulfilment4 ,if the world is systematic at all1--and unless it is so there is no place in it for definite purpose of any kind1--it must finally have a structure of such a kind that any purpose which ignores it will be defeated4 ,all coherent pursuit of purpose1 of whatever type1 must therefore in the end rest on the recognition of some characteristics of the world-order which are unconditionally and absolutely to be taken into account by all individual agents1 no matter what the special nature of their particular purposes4 ,this is all that is meant when it is said that the reality investigated by ,metaphysics is absolute1 or when the object of metaphysical study is spoken of as the ,absolute4 ,we may1 in fact1 conveniently define the ,absolute as that structure of the world-system which any and every internally consistent purpose must recognise as the condition of its own fulfilment ,to deny the existence of an ,absolute1 thus defined1 is in principle to reduce the world and life to a mere chaos4 ,it is important1 however1 to bear in mind that in ,metaphysics1 though we are certainly concerned with the ultimate or absolute ,reality1 we are concerned with it from a special point of view4 ,our special purpose is to know1 or to think coherently1 about the conditions which all intelligent purpose has to recognise4 ,now this attitude of scientific investigation is clearly not the only one which we can take up towards the ultimately real4 ,we may1 for instance1 seek to gain emotional harmony and peace of mind by yielding up the conduct of our practical life to the unquestioned guidance of what we directly feel to be the deepest and most abiding elements in the structure of the universe4 ,this is the well-known attitude of practical religion4 ,prim facie1 while it seems to be just as permissible as the purely scientific attitude of the seeker after truth1 the perennial 8conflict of religion and science0 is sufficient to show that the two are not identical4 ,how they are related is a problem which we shall have1 in outline1 to consider towards the end of our inquiry2 at present it is enough for our purpose to recognise them as divergent but prim facie equally justified attitudes towards what must in the end be thought of as the same ultimate reality4 ,as ,mr4 ,bradley well says1 there is no sin which is metaphysically less justifiable than the metaphysician's own besetting sin of treating his special way of regarding the 8,absolute0 as the only legitimate one4 #c4 ,to return to our detailed investigation of the connection between ,reality as now defined for the metaphysician1 and ,experience4 ,we can now see more completely than before why it is only in immediate experience that reality is to be found4 ,our reason for identifying reality with immediate experience has nothing to do with the theory according to which 8sensations10 being the product of a something 8without the mind10 are supposed to carry with them a direct certificate of the independent existence of their 8external0 cause4 ,for we have seen3 7#a7 that immediacy means simply indissoluble union with a whole of feeling1 and that this immediacy belongs to every mental state as actually lived through2 7#b7 that the dependence of sensations in particular on an 8external0 cause1 is in no sense an immediate datum of experience1 but a reflective hypothesis which1 like all such hypotheses1 demands examination and justification before it can be pronounced legitimate2 7#c7 that it is a philosophical blunder to identify the real with the merely 8independent0 of ourselves4 ,what is merely independent1 as we have now seen1 would for us be the merely unreal4 ,presence in immediate experience is a universal character of all that is real1 because it is only in so far as anything is thus presented in immediate unity with the concrete life of feeling that it can be given as a condition or fact of which an individual interest must take account1 on pain of not reaching accomplishment4 ,actual life1 as we have already learned1 is always a concrete unity of feeling in which the two distinguishable aspects of a psychical fact1 its existence and its content1 the that and the what1 though distinguishable1 are inseparable4 ,scientific reflection on the given we found to be always abstract1 in the sense that its very essence is the mental separation of the content from the process4 ,by such separation we mediately get to know the character of the separated content better1 but our knowledge1 with all its fulness1 still remains abstract2 it is still knowledge referring to and about an object outside itself4 ,it is only when1 as a result of the reflective process1 we find fresh meaning in the individual process-content on its recurrence that we return once more to the concrete actuality of real existence4 ,now1 we may express this same result in another and an even more significant way4 ,to say that reality is essentially one with immediate feeling1 is only another way of saying that the real is essentially that which is of significance for the attainment of purpose4 ,for feeling is essentially teleological1 as we may see even in the case of simple pleasure and pain4 ,amid all the confusion and complexity of the psychological problems which can be raised about these most simple forms of feeling1 one thing seems clear1 that pleasure is essentially connected with unimpeded1 pain with impeded1 discharge of nervous activity4 ,pleasure seems to be inseparable from successful1 pain from thwarted or baffled1 tendency4#cc ,and if we consider not so much the abstractions 8pleasure in general10 8pain in general10 as a specific pleasure or pain1 or again a complex emotional state1 the case seems even clearer4 ,only a being whose behaviour is consciously or unconsciously determined by ends or purposes seems capable of finding existence1 according as those purposes are advanced or hindered1 pleasant or painful1 glad or wretched1 good or bad4 ,hence our original decision that reality is to be found in what is immediately experienced1 as opposed to what is severed by subsequent reflective analysis from its union with feeling1 and our later statement that that is real of which we are constrained to take account for the fulfilment of our purposes1 fully coincide4 ,this point may perhaps be made clearer by a concrete example4 ,suppose that some purpose of more or less importance requires my immediate presence in the next town4 ,then the various routes by which ,i may reach that town become at once circumstances of which ,i have to take note and to which ,i must adapt my conduct1 if my important purpose is not to be frustrated4 ,it may be that there are alternative routes1 or it may be that there is only one4 ,in any case1 and this is fundamental for us1 the number of alternatives which my purpose leaves open to me will be strictly limited4 ,i can1 as a matter of mere mathematical possibility1 go from ,a to ,b in an indefinite number of ways4 ,if ,i have to make the journey in actual fact on a given day1 and with existing means of transit1 the theoretical infinity of possible ways is speedily reduced to1 at the outside1 two or three4 ,for simplicity's sake we will consider the case in which there happens to be only one available way4 ,this one available way is 8real0 to me1 as contrasted with the infinity of mathematically possible routes1 precisely because the execution of my purpose restricts me to it and no other4 ,the mathematically possible infinity of routes remain unreal just because they are thought of as all alike mere possibilities2 no actual purpose limits me to some one or some definite number out of the infinity1 and compels me to adapt myself to their peculiarities or fail of my end4 ,they are 8imaginary0 or 8merely possible0 just for want of specific relation to an experience which is the expression of a definite purpose4 ,this illustration may lead us on to a further point of the utmost importance1 for it illustrates the principle that the real as opposed to the merely 8possible0 or 8merely thought of0 is always individual4 ,there was an indefinite number of mathematically conceivable ways from ,a to ,b2 there was only one1 or at least a precisely determinate number1 by which ,i could fulfil a concrete individual purpose4 7,thus1 if ,i have to make the journey to ,b in a given time1 ,i must take the route followed by the railway47 ,so universally it is a current common-place that while thought is general1 the reality about which we think and of which we predicate the results of our thought is always individual4 ,now1 what is the source or principle of this individuality of the real as opposed to the generality of the merely conceivable8 ,it is precisely that connection of reality with actual purpose of which we have spoken4 ,the results of thought are general because for the purposes of scientific thinking we isolate the what of experience from its that2 we consider the character of what is presented to us apart from the unique purpose expressed in the experience in which it comes to us4 ,in other words1 the problems of scientific thought are all of the form1 8,how must our general purpose to make our thought and action coherent be carried out under such and such typical conditions80 never of the form1 8,of what must ,i take account for the execution of this one definite purpose80 ,the reason for this difference is at once apparent4 ,in making 8this definite purpose0 a topic for reflection1 ,i have ipso facto abstracted its what from its that and converted it into a mere instance or example of a certain type4 ,it was only while it remained this purpose as actually immanent in and determining the immediate experience of actual life that it was a completely determinate unique this2 as reflected on it becomes a type of an indefinite number of similar possibilities4 ,now1 it is necessary here to observe very carefully that it is from the unique individuality of the purpose expressed in an actual experience that the objects or facts of immediate experience derive the individuality in virtue of which we contrast them with the generalities or abstract possibilities of science4 ,it is the more necessary to dwell explicitly on this point1 because there is a common but erroneous doctrine that the individuality of actual existence is derived from its occupying a particular place in the space and time orders4 ,scientific truth is general1 it is often said1 because it refers alike to all places and times2 actual 8fact0 is individual because it is what is here and now4 ,but we should be able to see that such an account directly inverts the real order of logical dependence4 ,mere position in space and time can never be a true 8principle of individuation10 for the simple reason that one point in space and one moment in time1 considered apart from the things and events which fill them1 are1 at any rate for our perception1#cd indistinguishable from all other points and moments4 ,it is1 on the other hand1 precisely by their correlation with unique stages in lives which are the embodiment of unique and individual purpose1 that places and times and the things and events which occupy them become for us themselves unique and individual4 ,here1 for me1 means where ,i now am1 and now1 this unique and determinate stage in the execution of the purposes which1 by their uniqueness1 make me unique in the world4 ,thus we seem to have reached the significant conclusion that to say 8,reality is experience0 involves the further propositions1 8,reality is through and through purposive0 and 8,reality is uniquely individual40 #d4 ,we have already seen that to identify reality with experience does not mean identifying it with my own experience just as it comes to me in actual life1 still less with my own experience as ,i mentally reconstruct it in the light of some conscious or unconscious philosophical theory4 ,my own experience1 in fact1 is very far from satisfying the conditions of completeness and harmony which we found in our last book to be essential to a 8pure0 or perfect experience4 ,its defectiveness is principally manifested in three ways4 7#a7 ,as we have already seen1 its contents are always fragmentary4 ,it never contains more than the poorest fragment of the whole wealth of existence4 ,the purposes or interests which make up my conscious life are narrowly limited4 ,the major portion of the facts of the universe1 i4e4 of the conditions of which note has to be taken by its inhabitants if their aims are to be fulfilled1 lie outside the range of my individual interests--at least1 of those which ,i ever become explicitly aware4 ,hence1 being without significance for my individual purposes1 they do not directly enter into my special experience4 ,i either know nothing of them at all1 or know of them only indirectly and through the testimony of others for whose lives they have real and direct significance4 ,and these others again are1 in virtue of the individual interests which differentiate them from me1 only partially cognisant of the same factual reality as ,i am4 7#b7 ,again1 my insight even into my own aims and interests is of a very limited kind4 ,for one thing1 it is only a fragment of them which is ever given in the form of what is immediately felt in an actual moment of experience4 ,i have largely to interpret the actually felt by theoretical intellectual constructions which reach1 in the form of memory1 into the past1 and1 in the form of anticipation1 into the future4 ,and both these types of intellectual construction1 though indispensable1 are notoriously vitiated by fallacies4 ,for another1 even with the fullest aid of such intellectual construction1 ,i never succeed in completely grasping the whole meaning of my life as the embodiment of a single coherent purpose4 ,many of my purposes never rise sufficiently into clear consciousness to be distinctly realised1 and those that do often wear the appearance of having no systematic connection with one another4 ,small wonder1 then1 that the realities or 8facts0 of which ,i learn to take note for the execution of my aims more often than not appear to belong to a chaos rather than to the orderly system which we cannot help believing the world to be1 could we see it as it truly is4 7#c7 ,finally1 ,i have the gravest grounds for the conviction that even of the realities of which ,i do take note ,i never perceive more than just those aspects which attract my attention just because they happen to be significant for my special interests4 ,what startling experiences teach us in the case of our fellow-men may be true everywhere1 namely1 that everything that is has an infinity of sides to it1 over and above those of which we become aware because of their special importance for our own purposes2 there may be an infinite wealth of character in the most familiar things1 to which we are blind only because1 so to speak1 it has no 8economic value0 for the human market4 ,for all these reasons we are absolutely forbidden to identify our own limited experience with the experience of which we have said1 that to be real is to be bound up with it1 and to be bound up with it is to be real4 ,neither1 again1 can we identify this experience with the 8collective experience0 of the aggregate of human or other finite sentient beings in the universe4 ,this is obvious for more reasons than one4 ,to begin with1 8collective experience10 if it has any meaning at all1 is a contradictory expression4 ,for experience1 as we have seen1 is essentially characterised by unique individuality of aim and interest2 in this sense at least1 a true experience must be that of an individual subject1 and no collection or aggregate can be an individual subject4 ,the so-called 8collective experience0 is not one experience at all1 but simply an indefinite multiplicity of experience1 thrown together under a single designation4 ,and even if we could get over this difficulty1 there remains a still more formidable one4 ,the various experiences of finite individuals are all1 we have said1 fragmentary and more or less incoherent4 ,you cannot1 therefore1 get an experience which is all-comprehensive and all-harmonious by adding them together4 ,if their defect were merely their fragmentariness1 it would be conceivable that1 given an outside observer who could see all the fragments at once1 they might constitute a whole by merely supplementing one another's deficiencies4 ,but our finite experiences are not only fragmentary1 but also largely contradictory and internally chaotic4 ,we may indeed believe that the contradictions are only apparent1 and that if we could become fully conscious of our own inmost aims and purposes we should at the same moment be aware of all ,reality as a harmonious system2 but we never do1 and we shall see later that just because of our finitude we never can1 attain this completed insight into the significance of our own lives4 ,hence the experience for which all reality is present as a harmonious whole cannot be any mere duplicate of the partial and imperfect experiences which we possess4 ,we thus seem driven to assert the necessary existence of a superhuman experience to which the whole universe of being is directly present as a complete and harmonious system4 ,for 8reality0 has been seen to have no meaning apart from presence in a sentient experience or whole of feeling1 while it has also been seen infinitely to transcend all that can be given as directly present to any limited experience4 ,if this conclusion is sound1 our 8,absolute0 can now be said to be a conscious life which embraces the totality of existence1 all at once1 and in a perfect systematic unity1 as the contents of its experience4 ,such a conception clearly has its difficulties2 how such an all-containing experience must be thought to be related to the realm of physical nature1 and again to our own finite experiences1 are problems which we shall have to take up in our two succeeding books4 ,we shall find them far from simple1 and it is as well for us from the first to face the possibility that our knowledge of the character of the absolute experience may prove to be very limited and very tentative4 ,that it is we seem compelled to assert by the very effort to give a coherent meaning to our notion of reality1 but of what it is we may have to confess ourselves largely ignorant4 ,but we may at least go so far as this1 at the present stage of our argument4 ,however different an all-containing coherent experience may be in its detailed structure from our own piecemeal and largely incoherent experience1 if it is to be experience at all1 it must apprehend its contents in the general way which is characteristic of direct experience as such4 ,it must take note or be aware of them1 and it must--if it is to be a direct experience at all--be aware of them as exhibiting a structural unity which is the embodiment of a consistent plan or purpose4 ,we have to think of it as containing in a systematic unity not only all the 8facts0 of which our various experiences have to take note1 but all the purposes which they express4 ,hence it is natural for us1 when we attempt to form some approximate concept of such an ultimate experience in terms of our own conscious life1 to conceive it as the union of perfected knowledge in an indivisible whole with supreme will4 ,we must1 however1 remember that1 for such an experience1 precisely because of its all-comprising character1 the what and the that are inseparable4 ,hence its knowledge must be of the nature of direct insight into the individual structure of the world of fact1 not of generalisation about possibilities1 and its will must have the form of a purpose which1 unlike our own1 is always consciously expressed with perfect harmony and completeness in the 8facts0 of which it is aware4#ce ,hence knowledge and will1 involving as they do for us discrepancy between the what and the that of experience1 are not wholly satisfactory terms by which to characterise the life of the ,absolute4#cf ,the most adequate analogue to such a life will probably be found in the combination of direct insight with satisfied feeling which we experience in the relation of intimate and intelligent love between persons4 ,the insight of love may be called 8knowledge10 but it is knowledge of a quite other type than the hypothetical universals of science4 ,i know my friend1 not as one case of this or that general class about which certain propositions in ,physiology1 ,psychology1 or ,ethics can be made1 but as--for me at least--a unique individual centre of personal interest4 ,again1 in my relations with my friend1 so far as they remain those of satisfied love1 my individual interests find their fullest embodiment4 ,but the will to love is not first there in an unsatisfied form1 and the embodiment afterwards added as the result of a process through means to an end4 ,the purpose and its embodiment are throughout present together in an unbroken unity1 and where this is not so1 true mutual friendship does not as yet exist4#cg ,after some such general fashion we shall best represent to ourselves the kind of consciousness which we must attribute to an all-embracing world-experience4 ,only1 we must bear in mind that1 owing to the fragmentariness of our own lives1 the identity of purpose on which human friendship rests can never be close and intimate enough to be an adequate representative of the ultimate unity of all experience in the ,absolute4#ch #e4 ,it may be well to add a word of caution against a plausible fallacy here4 ,if there is such an ,absolute ,experience as we have demanded1 all the realities that we know as the contents of our environment must be present to it1 and present to it as they really are in their completeness4 ,but we must be careful not to suppose that 8our0 environment1 as it appears to an experience which apprehends it as it really is1 is a mere replica or reduplication of the way in which it appears to us4 ,for example1 ,i must not assume that what ,i perceive as a physical thing1 made up of separable parts external to one another and apparently combined in a mechanical way into a whole which is a mere collection or aggregate of parts1 is necessarily apprehended by the ,absolute ,experience as an aggregate of similar or corresponding parts4 ,the thing as it appears to my limited insight may be no less different from the thing as apprehended in its true nature by such an experience1 than your body1 as it exists for my perception from your body as you apprehend it in organic sensation4 ,in particular1 we must not assume that things exist for the ,absolute ,experience in the form into which we analyse them for the purpose of general scientific theory1 for instance1 that physical things are for it assemblages of atoms or individual minds successions of 8mental states40 ,in fact1 without anticipating the results of succeeding books1 we may safely say at once that this would be in principle impossible4 ,for all scientific analysis is in its very nature general and hypothetical4 ,it deals solely with types and abstract possibilities1 never with the actual constitution of individual things4 ,but all real existence is individual4 ,to put the same thing in a different way1 scientific theory deals always with those features of the what of things of which we take note because of their significance for our human purposes4 ,and in dealing with these features of things1 it seeks to establish general laws of linkage between them of which we may avail ourselves1 for the practical purpose of realising our various human interests4 ,this practical motive1 though often not apparent1 implicitly controls our whole scientific procedure from first to last4 ,hence the one test of a scientific hypothesis is its success in enabling us to infer one set of facts from another set1 ,whether the intermediate links by which we pass from the one set to the other have any counterpart in the world of real experience or are mere creations of theory1 like the 8uninterpretable0 symbols in a mathematical calculus1 is from this point of view a matter of indifference4 ,all we require of our hypothesis is that when you start with facts capable of experimental verification1 the application of it shall lead to other facts capable of experimental verification4 ,for this reason we may justifiably conclude that to any experience which is aware of things in their concrete individuality they must present aspects which are not represented in our scientific hypotheses1 and again cannot appear to it as the precise counterpart of the schemes according to which we quite legitimately reconstruct them for the purpose of scientific investigation4 ,we shall need to bear this in mind in future when we come to discuss the real character of what appears to us as the world of physical nature4#ci #f4 ,the conclusion we have reached so far is largely identical with that of the anti-materialistic argument of ,berkeley's well-known ,principles of ,human ,knowledge and ,three ,dialogues between ,hylas and ,philonous4 ,but there is one important difference between the two results which will lead to momentous consequences4 ,berkeley's argument against the independent existence of unperceived matter proceeds throughout on the principle that to be means to be present in an experience1 and his exhibition of the contradictions into which the denial of this principle leads the supporter of scientific materialism remains the classic demonstration of the truth of the opposing or 8idealistic0 view4 ,but it is to be noted that he works throughout with an inadequate conception of 8experience0 and 8presence in experience40 ,he treats experience as equivalent to mere passive 8awareness0 of a quality presented to perception4 ,to experience with him means simply to be conscious of a presented quality2 experience is treated as having1 in psychological terminology1 a merely presentational character4 ,hence he is led to infer that the things with which experience confronts us are nothing more than complexes of presented qualities1 or1 as he phrases it1 that their whole being consists in being perceived4 ,the full extent of the paradox which this identification of the esse of material things with percipi involves1 will be more apparent when we come to deal in our next book with the problem of matter4 ,at present ,i merely wish to call attention to one of its many aspects4 ,on the theory that experience is purely passive and presentational1 consisting merely in the reception of certain sensations1 the question at once arises1 ,what determines what in particular the sensations we at any given moment receive shall be8 ,on the ,berkeleian view1 their order must be determined altogether from without by a principle foreign to the experience which1 he assumes1 has nothing to do but to cognise the qualities put before it4 ,hence he is led to appeal to the agency of ,god1 whom he supposes directly and immediately to cause perceptions to succeed one another in my experience in a certain definite order4 ,now1 apart from further difficulties of detail1 this doctrine at once leads to the result that the attitude of ,god to the world of things is totally different from that of us who experience it4 ,experience is to me a purely passive receptivity of presentations2 ,god's relation to the presented objects1 on the other hand1 is one of active production4 ,there is no common element in these fundamentally contrasted relations2 hence it is really a paralogism when ,berkeley allows himself to bring ,god under the same categories which he applies to the interpretation of human experience1 and to attribute to ,him a consciousness of the things which have been declared to be only the presentations ,his agency raises in the human mind4#dj ,berkeley is1 in fact1 inconsistently combining two conflicting lines of thought4 ,he argues1 on the one hand1 that since there must be some reason for the order in which presentations succeed one another in my mental life1 that reason is to be found in a source independent of myself4 ,this source he identifies with ,god1 but1 as far as the argument goes1 it might equally well have been found1 as by ,locke1 in the original constitution of matter2 all that the argument requires is that it shall be placed in something outside the succession of presentations themselves4 ,on the other hand1 he also argues that since the existence of the physical world means simply the fact of its being presented to consciousness1 when its contents cease to be present to my consciousness they must be present to that of ,god4 ,and here again the objection might be suggested1 that if presence to my own experience1 while it lasts1 is an adequate account of the esse of a thing1 it does not appear why ,i should recognise the reality of any other experience4 ,if ,i am to hold that disappearance from my experience does not destroy the reality of anything1 ,i must logically also hold that its being1 while ,i perceive it1 is not exhausted by my awareness of it4 ,its esse cannot be merely percipi4 ,the complete solution of ,berkeley's difficulty would be premature at this point of our discussion4 ,but we may at once point out its principal source4 ,it arises from his failure to take adequate account of the purposive aspect of experience4 ,experience1 as we have seen1 is not mere awareness of a succession of presented objects1 it is awareness of a succession determined by a controlling interest or purpose4 ,the order of my experiences is not something simply given me from without1 it is controlled and determined by subjective interest from within4 ,berkeley1 in fact1 omits selective attention from his psychological estimate of the contents of the human mind4 ,he forgets that it is the interests for which ,i take note of facts that in the main determine which facts ,i shall take note of1 an oversight which is the more remarkable1 since he expressly lays stress on 8activity0 as the distinguishing property of 8spirits40#da ,when we make good the omission by emphasising the teleological aspect of experience1 we see at once that the radical disparity between the relation of the supreme and the subordinate mind to the world of facts disappears4 ,i do not simply receive my presented facts passively in an order determined for me from without by the supreme mind2 in virtue of my power of selective attention1 on a limited scale1 and very imperfectly1 ,i recreate the order of their succession for myself4 ,again1 recognition of the teleological aspect of all experience goes far to remove the dissatisfaction which we may reasonably feel with the other half of ,berkeley's argument4 ,when ,i conceive of the 8facts0 of experience as merely objects presented to my apprehension1 there seems no sufficient reason for holding that they exist except as so presented4 ,but the moment ,i think of the succession of presented facts as itself determined by the subjective interests expressed in selective attention1 the case becomes different4 ,the very expression 8selective attention0 itself carries with it a reminder that the facts which respond to my interests are but a selection out of a larger whole4 ,and my practical experience of the way in which my own most clearly defined and conscious purposes depend for their fulfilment upon connection with the interests and purposes of a wider social whole possessed of an organic unity1 should help me to understand how the totality of interests and purposes determining the selective attention of different percipients can form1 as we have held that it must1 the harmonious and systematic unity of the absolute experience4 ,the fuller working out of this line of thought must be left for later chapters1 but it is hardly too much to say that the teleological character which experience possesses in virtue of its unity with feeling is the key to the idealistic interpretation of the universe4#db ,idealism1 i4e4 the doctrine that all reality is mental1 as we shall have repeated opportunities of learning1 becomes unintelligible when mental life is conceived of as a mere awareness of 8given0 presentations4 #g4 ,we may now1 before attempting to carry out in detail our general view of what is involved in being real1 enumerate one or two philosophical doctrines about the nature of real existence which our conclusion as to the connection of reality with experience justifies us in setting aside4 ,and1 first of all1 we can at once see that our previous result1 if sound1 proves fatal to all forms of what is commonly known as ,realism4 ,by ,realism is meant the doctrine that the fundamental character of that which really is1 as distinguished from that which is only imagined to be1 is to be found in its independence of all relation to the experience of a subject4 ,what exists at all1 the realist holds1 exists equally whether it is experienced or not4 ,neither the fact of its existence nor the kind of existence it possesses depends in any way upon its presence to an experience4 ,before it was experienced at all it had just the same kind of being that it has now you are experiencing it1 and it will still be the same when it has passed out of experience4 ,in a word1 the circumstance that a mind--whether yours or mine or ,god's is indifferent to the argument--is aware of it as one of the constituents of its experience1 makes no difference to the reality of the real thing2 experience is what is technically called a relation of one-sided dependence4 ,that there may be experience at all1 and that it may have this or that character1 there must be real things of determinate character1 but that there may be real things1 it is not necessary that there should be experience4 ,this is1 in brief1 the essence of the realist contention1 and any philosophy which accepts it as valid is in its spirit a realist philosophy4 ,as to the number and nature of the supposed independent real things1 very different views may be held and have been held by different representatives of ,realism4 ,thus some realists have maintained the existence of a single ultimate reality1 others of an indefinite plurality of independent 8reals40 ,parmenides1 with his doctrine that the real world is a single uniform unchanging material sphere1 is an instance in the ancient1 and ,mr4 ,herbert ,spencer1 with his ,unknowable1 an instance in the modern world of a realist of the former or 8monistic0 type4 ,the ancient atomists1 and in more recent times ,leibnitz with his infinite plurality of independent and disconnected monads1 and ,herbart with his world of simple 8reals10 afford the best known instances of a doctrine of pluralistic ,realism4 ,so again1 the most diverse theories have been propounded as to the nature of the 8reals40 ,ancient and modern atomists have thought of them as material1 and this is perhaps the form of realistic doctrine which appeals most readily to the ordinary imagination4 ,but though a materialistic metaphysician is necessarily a realist1 a realist need not be a materialist4 ,herbart thought of the independent 8reals0 as qualitatively simple beings of a nature not capable of further definition1 ,leibnitz as minds1 while ,agnostic philosophers of the type of ,spencer conceive their ultimate reality as a sort of neutral tertium quid1 neither mental nor material4 ,the only point on which all the theories agree is that the reality of that which they recognise as true ,being consists in its not depending for its existence or its character on relation to an experience4 ,the differences of detail as to the number and nature of independent 8reals10 though of great importance for our complete estimate of an individual realist's philosophical position1 do not affect our general verdict on the tenability of the first principle of ,realism4 ,the one point of divergence among realists which may be considered as of more than secondary importance for our present purpose1 is the difference between what we may call ,agnostic and ,dogmatic ,realism4 ,agnostic ,realism1 while asserting the ultimate dependence of our experience upon a reality which exists independently of experience1 denies that we can have any knowledge of the nature of this independent reality4 ,the independent reality by which all experience is conditioned is1 on this view1 an ,unknowable or ,thing-in-itself1#dc of which we are only logically entitled to say that it certainly is1 but that we do not in the least know what it is4 ,the doctrine of ,agnostic ,realism has probably never been carried out by any thinker with rigid consistency1 but it forms a leading feature of the philosophy of ,kant as expounded in his ,first ,critique1 and through ,kant has passed into ,english thought as the foundation of the systems of ,sir ,william ,hamilton and ,mr4 ,herbert ,spencer4#dd ,dogmatic ,realism1 of which ,leibnitz and1 at a later date1 ,herbart are the most important representatives in modern philosophy1 on the contrary1 while maintaining that real being is independent of experience1 at the same time holds that it is possible to have positive knowledge not only of its existence but of its nature4 ,in principle1 both these forms of ,realism have been already excluded by the argument of ,book ,i4 chap4 #b1 #d4 ,the supreme importance of the principle on which the argument rests may perhaps warrant us in once more briefly recurring to it4 ,our reasoning1 it will be remembered1 took the form of a challenge4 ,produce any instance you please1 we said to the realist1 whom we had not then learned to know by that name1 of what you personally regard as reality1 and we will undertake to show that it derives its reality for you from the very fact that it is not ultimately separable from the experience of a subject4 ,a thing is real for you1 and not merely imaginary1 precisely because in some aspect of its character it enters into and affects your own experience4 ,or1 what is the same thing in other words1 it is real for you because it affects favourably or otherwise some subjective interest of your own4 ,to be sure1 the thing as it enters into your experience1 as it affects your own subjective interests1 is not the thing as it is in its fulness2 it only touches your life through some one of its many sides4 ,and this may lead you to argue that the real thing is the unexperienced 8condition0 of a modification of your experience4 ,but then we had again to ask what you mean by saying that facts which you do not experience are real as 8conditions0 of what you do experience4 ,and we saw that the only meaning we could attach to the reality of the 8condition0 was presence to an experience which transcends your own4 ,to this general argument we may add two corollaries or supplementary considerations1 which1 without introducing anything fresh1 may help to make its full force more apparent4 7#a7 ,the argument1 as originally presented1 was concerned directly with the that of reality1 the mere fact of its existence4 ,but we may also state it1 if we please1 from the side of the what1 the nature possessed by the real4 ,you cannot affirm any doctrine about the real existence of anything without at the same time implying a doctrine about its nature4 ,even if you say 8,reality is unknowable10 you are attributing something beyond mere independence of experience to your reality2 you are asserting that what is thus independent possesses the further positive quality of transcending cognition4 ,now what1 in logic1 must be your ground for attributing this rather than any other quality to your independent reality8 ,it can only be the fact or supposed fact--which is indeed regularly appealed to by the ,agnostic as the foundation of his belief--that our experiences themselves are all found to be self-contradictory4 ,there is no ground for taking the unknowability of ,reality to be true unless you mean by it a character which belongs not to something which stands outside all experience1 but to experience itself4 ,the same contention applies to any other predicate which the realist affirms as true of his ultimate reality4 7#b7 ,again1 we may with effect present our argument in a negative form4 ,try1 we may say1 to think of the utterly unreal1 and see how you will have to conceive it4 ,can you think of sheer unreality otherwise than as that of which no mind is ever aware1 of which no purpose has ever to take account as a condition of its fulfilment8 ,but to think of it thus is to attribute to it1 as its definition1 precisely that independence in which the realist finds the mark of ultimate reality4 ,and if 8independence0 constitutes unreality1 presence to and union with experience must be what constitutes reality4 ,yet1 however fatal this line of argument may be to the principle of the realistic contention1 we ought not to be satisfied with such a mere general refutation4 ,we must try to see what is the element of truth in the realistic views to which they owe the plausibility they have always possessed for minds of a certain type4 ,in ,philosophy we are never really rid of an error until we have learned how it arises and what modicum of truth it contains4 7#a7 ,agnostic ,realism4 ,we may begin with ,agnosticism1 with which we ought now to have no serious difficulty4 ,agnostic ,realism1 as we have seen1 is in principle a doubly self-contradictory theory4 ,for it combines in one breath the irreconcilable declarations that the reality of things is unknowable and that it knows it to be so4#de ,further1 as we have just said1 it makes alleged contradictions which only exist in and for experience1 its sole ground for affirming that something1 of which we can only specify that it is outside all experience1 transcends cognition4 ,to have grasped these two points is to have disposed of ,agnosticism as a metaphysical theory4 ,yet with all its defects ,agnosticism still enshrines one piece of truth which the metaphysician is peculiarly prone to forget4 ,of all men the metaphysician1 just because his special interest is to know something final and certain about ,reality1 is the most apt to exaggerate the amount of his certain knowledge4 ,it is well to be reminded that the certainty with which we may say that ,reality is experience is compatible with a very imperfect and limited theoretical insight into experience itself4 ,in actual life this is a far from unfamiliar fact2 the literature of common sense is full of observations to the effect that we never really know our own hearts1 that the most difficult task of the sage is to understand himself1 and so forth1--complaints which all turn on the point that even our own limited direct experience of our own meanings and purposes goes far beyond what we can at any moment express in the form of reflective knowledge4 ,yet it is easy1 when we come to deal in ,metaphysics with the nature of ultimate ,reality1 to forget this1 and to suppose that the certainty with which we can say that the ultimately ,real is an experience justifies us in wholesale dogmatising about the special character of that experience4 ,as a protest against such exaggerated estimates of the extent of our theoretical knowledge of the nature of ,reality1 ,agnosticism thus contains a germ of genuine and important truth1 and arises from a justifiable reaction against the undue emphasising of the merely intellectual side of our experience1 of which we have already seen1 and shall hereafter still more fully see1 ground to complain as a besetting weakness of the metaphysically minded4 7#b7 ,dogmatic ,realism1 that is1 ,realism with admittedly knowable independent 8reals10 is a much more workable doctrine1 and in one of its forms1 that of the so-called 8nave realism0 which supposes the world of experienced things with all its perceived qualities to exist independently of any relation to an experiencing subject in precisely the same form in which we experience it1 fairly represents the ordinary views of unphilosophical 8common-sense0 men4 ,nothing seems more obvious to 8common sense0 than that my perception of a thing does not bring it out of nothing into existence1 and again does not create for it new qualities which it had not before4 ,it is because the thing is already there1 and has already such and such a nature1 says 8common sense10 that ,i perceive it as ,i do4 ,therefore the whole world of perceived things must exist independently in the same form in which they are perceived1 as a condition of my perception of them4 ,when this view comes to be worked out as a philosophical theory1 it usually undergoes some transformation4 ,the fact of illusion1 and the experimentally ascertained subjective differences between individual percipients1#df or between different states of the same percipient1 make it hard for the realist who wishes to be scientific to maintain that all the perceived qualities of experienced things are equally independent of the experiencing subject4 ,reflection usually substitutes for the 8nave0 realism of everyday life1 a theory of 8scientific0 realism according to which the existence and some of the known properties of the experienced world are independent of the experiencing subject1 while others are regarded as mere secondary effects arising from the action of an independent reality on the subject's consciousness4 ,with the further differences between the various types of scientific realism1 according to the special properties which are held to belong to things independently of the percipient subject1 we are not at present concerned4#dg ,it is1 of course1 clear that our general argument against the existence of any reality except as in an experience tells just as much against 8nave0 realism and its more reflective outgrowth 8scientific0 realism as against ,agnosticism4 ,but the very plausibility and wide diffusion of realistic views of this type make it all the more necessary to reinforce our contention by showing what the truth ,realism contains is1 and just where it diverges from truth into fallacy4 ,nor is it specially difficult to do this4 ,the important elements of truth contained in ,realism seem to be in the main two4 7i7 ,it is certain that a thing may be real without being consciously present as a distinguishable aspect in my experience4 ,things do not begin to exist when ,i begin to be aware of them1 or cease to exist when ,i cease to be aware of them4 ,and again1 the fact that ,i make mistakes and am subject to illusion shows that the qualities of things are not necessarily in reality what ,i take them to be4 7#b7 ,further1 as is shown by the fact of my imperfect understanding of my own feelings and purposes1 something may actually be an integral part of my own life as an experiencing subject without my clearly and consciously recognising it as such when ,i reflect on the contents of my experience4 ,but precisely how much do these two considerations prove8 ,all that is established by the first is the point on which we have already insisted1 that it is not my experience which constitutes ,reality2 and all that is established by the second1 that experience1 as we have already repeatedly seen1 is not merely cognitive4 ,but the admission of both these positions brings us not one step nearer the conclusion which the realist draws from them1 that real existence is independent of all experience4 ,because it is easy to show that the reality of a thing does not depend on its being explicitly recognised by any one finite percipient or any aggregate of finite percipients1 and again1 that there is more in any experience of finite percipients than those percipients know1 the realist thinks he may infer that there are realities which would still be real though they entered into no experience at all4 ,but there is really no logical connection whatever between the premisses of this inference and the conclusion which is drawn from them4 ,this may be made clearer by a couple of examples4 ,take1 to begin with1 the case of the mental life of my fellow human beings4 ,and1 to state the case in the form in which it appears most favourable to the realist conclusion1 let us imagine an ,alexander ,selkirk stranded on a barren rock in the midst of the ocean4 ,the hopes and fears of our ,selkirk are independent of my knowledge of them just as completely and in just the same sense in which the existence and conformation of the rock on which he is stranded are so4 ,i and all other inhabitants of the earth may be just as ignorant of ,selkirk's existence and of what is passing in his mind as we are of the existence and geological structure of his rock4 ,and again1 what ,selkirk explicitly cognises of his own inner life may bear as small a proportion to the whole as what he explicitly cognises of the properties of his rock to the whole nature of the rock4 ,yet all this in no wise shows that ,selkirk's hopes and fears and the rest of his mental life are not experience or have a reality 8independent of experience40 ,hopes and fears which are not experience1 not psychical matter of fact1 would indeed be a contradiction in set terms4 ,and what the argument fails to prove of ,selkirk's mental life1 it fails1 for the same reason1 to prove of ,selkirk's rock4 ,we may pass from the case of the mental life of a fellow-man to the case of unperceived physical reality4 ,a recent realist philosopher1 ,mr4 ,l4 ,t4 ,hobhouse1 has brought forward as a clear instance of an independent physical reality1 the case of a railway train just emerging from a tunnel4 ,i do not perceive the train1 he says1 until it issues from the tunnel1 but it was just as real while it was running through the tunnel4 ,its reality is therefore independent of the question whether it is perceived or not4 ,but1 in the first place1 the argument requires that the train shall be empty2 it must be a runaway train without driver1 guard1 or passengers1 if the conditions presumed in the premisses are to be fulfilled4 ,and1 in the second place1 we may retort that even an empty runaway train must have been despatched from somewhere by somebody4 ,it must stand in some relation to the general scheme of purposes and interests expressed in our system of railway traffic1 and it is precisely this connection1 with a scheme of purposes and interests1 which makes the runaway train a reality and not a mere fiction of an ingenious philosopher's imagination4 ,if ,mr4 ,hobhouse's argument proves the independent reality of the train in the tunnel1 it ought equally to prove1 and does equally prove1 the independent existence of ,selkirk's fluctuations from hope to despair and back again on his isolated rock4 ,and precisely because it proves both conclusions equally1 the sort of independence it establishes cannot be independence of experience4 ,like all realist arguments1 it turns on the identification of experience with the cognitive aspect of experience1 an identification too often suggested by the language of the 8idealists0 themselves4#dh #h4 ,the persistent vitality of ,realism is due to its protest against the fallacies of an opposing theory which has of late especially found favour with some distinguished students of natural science1 and which we may conveniently call ,subjectivism4#di ,realism1 as we saw1 started from the true premisses1 that there are real facts of which my experience does not make me explicitly aware1 and that my cognition even of my own experience is incomplete1 and argued to the false conclusion that there are therefore realities independent of any experience4 ,subjectivism reasons in the opposite way4 ,it asserts truly that there is no reality outside experience1 and then falsely concludes that ,i can know of no reality except my own cognitive states4 ,its favourite formula are expressions such as1 8,we know only the modifications of our own consciousness10 8,all we know is our own perceptions10 8,nothing exists but states of consciousness40 ,these formul are not all obviously identical in meaning1 but the exponents of ,subjectivism seem to use them without any conscious distinction1 and we shall probably do the theory no injustice if we criticise it on the assumption that the expressions are meant to be of identical signification4 ,now it is clear that the logical consequences of the subjectivist doctrine are so subversive of all the practical assumptions upon which daily life is based1 that they should require the most stringent proof before we give our assent to them4 ,if ,subjectivism is true1 it follows immediately that not merely the 8whole choir of heaven and furniture of earth10 but the whole of humanity1 so far as ,i have any knowledge of its existence1 is a mere subjective affection of my own 8consciousness10 or1 as the scientific subjectivist usually1 for some not very obvious reason1 prefers to say1 of my own brain4 ,every argument which the subjectivist can produce to show that 8things0 are1 for my knowledge at any rate1 8modifications of my own consciousness10 applies to the case of my fellow-men with as much force as to the case of the inorganic world4 ,the logical inference from the subjectivist's premisses1 an inference which he is rarely or never willing to draw1 would be that he is himself the sole real being in a world of phantoms1 not one of which can with any certainty be said to correspond to a real object4 ,and conversely1 any valid ground for recognising the existence of my fellow-men as more than 8states of my own consciousness10 must equally afford ground for admitting the reality1 in the same general sense1 of the rest of the world of things familiar to us from the experiences of everyday life4#ej ,for if any one of the things composing the world of practical life has a reality which is not dependent upon its presence to my particular experience1 then there is the same reason for believing that every other such thing has a like reality1 unless there happen to be special grounds for regarding the perception to which it is present as an hallucination4 ,we must not1 however1 simply dismiss the subjectivist theory in this summary way4 ,we must examine the doctrine in detail sufficiently to discover where the fallacy comes in1 how it arises1 and what modicum of sound philosophic insight it may possibly contain4 ,to take these three points in logical order-- 7a7 ,the current arguments for ,subjectivism are often so stated as to confuse together two quite distinct positions4 ,when it is said that what we perceive is 8our own subjective states10 the meaning intended may be either that there is1 at least so far as ,i am able to know1 no real existence in the universe except that of my 8states of consciousness02 or again1 that there are such realities1 but that the properties which ,i perceive do not belong to them in their own nature but are only subjective effects of their action upon my 8consciousness10 or1 if you prefer to speak in physiological language upon my nervous system4 ,now1 many of the arguments commonly urged by the subjectivist would at most only prove the second conclusion1 in which the subjectivist agrees to a large extent with the scientific realist4 ,thus it is an ignoratio elenchi to reason as if the facts of hallucination1 illusion1 and discrepancy between the reports of different percipients or different sense-organs of the same percipient gave any support to the special doctrine of ,subjectivism4 ,these facts1 which1 as we have seen1 are equally appealed to by scientific realists1 prove no more than that we do not always perceive the world of things as it is1 and as it must be thought of if we would think truly1--in other words1 that there is such a thing as error4 ,now the problem 8,how is it possible for us to think or perceive falsely80 is1 as the student of ,greek philosophy knows1 both difficult and important4 ,but the existence of error in no way shows that the things which ,i perceive are 8states of my own consciousness02 on the contrary1 error is harder to explain on the subjectivist theory than on any other4 ,for if what ,i perceive has some kind of existence distinct from the mere fact of my perceiving it1 there is at least a possibility of understanding how the reality and my perception of it may be discrepant2 but if the existence of a thing is only another name for the fact that ,i perceive it1 it seems impossible that ,i should perceive anything except as it is4 ,on the subjectivist theory1 as ,plato showed in the ,theaetetus1 every percipient being ought1 at every moment of his existence1 to be infallible4 ,we may confine our attention1 then1 to the grounds which the subjectivist alleges for the former conclusion1 that nothing can be known to exist except my own 8states of consciousness10 and may dismiss the whole problem of erroneous perception as irrelevant to the question4 ,now the general argument for ,subjectivism1 however differently it may be stated by different writers1 consists1 in principle1 of a single allegation4 ,it is alleged as a fact in the ,psychology of cognition1 that things are immediately perceived by us as modifications of our own sensibility1 or 8states of our own consciousness10 and that it is therefore impossible to get behind this ultimate condition of all perception4 ,against this psychological doctrine we have to urge 7#a7 that it is in flagrant contradiction with the certain facts of actual life2 and 7#b7 that1 as a doctrine in ,psychology1 it is demonstrably false4 7#a7 ,there are certain realities1 admitted by the subjectivist himself1 which are manifestly not 8states of my consciousness10 and of which ,i yet1 as the subjectivist himself admits1 have a genuine though imperfect knowledge2 such realities are1 e4g41 the ends and purposes of my fellow-men1 and again many of my own ends and purposes4 ,it is allowed on all hands that ,i can know not only the fact of the existence of other men1 but also1 to some extent at least1 the character of their various purposes and interests4 ,this is involved1 for instance1 in the simple fact that when ,i read a letter it is normally possible for me to understand the writer's meaning4 ,it is equally involved in the fact that ,i can know the truth of any ordinary historical matter of fact1 e4g41 the date of the great fire of ,london4 ,neither the date of the fire of ,london nor the meaning of my correspondent's sentences is a 8state of my consciousness0 in any intelligible sense of the words1 yet both are typical instances of the kind of facts of which our ordinary knowledge of the world of everyday life and practice wholly consists4 ,and what is true of facts relating to the deeds and purposes of others is equally true of my own deeds and purposes4 ,the facts which make up my own life cannot1 without violence to language1 be reduced to 8states of my consciousness40 ,for instance1 ,i may know that ,i have a certain temperament or disposition1 e4g41 that ,i am irascible by temperament or of a sentimental disposition2 but though my knowing these truths about myself may in a sense be called a state of my consciousness1 the truths themselves cannot be called 8states of my consciousness0 without a serious logical fallacy of equivocal middle term4 7#b7 ,this will be made clearer by a consideration of the psychological principle invoked by the subjectivist4 ,what the subjectivist means when he says that in perception ,i am aware only of the states1 or subjective modifications1 of my own consciousness1 is that the object of which each perceptive state is aware is simply itself as a perceptive state2 the perception perceives itself and nothing else4 ,e4g41 when ,i say ,i see red1 what ,i am really aware of is that ,i am in a state of perceiving red2 when ,i say ,i hear a noise1 what ,i am aware of is that ,i am in a state of hearing a noise1 and so universally4 ,now this is so far from being a truth1 that it is absolutely and demonstrably false4 ,we may1 in fact1 definitely lay it down that the one thing of which no one1 except the introspective psychologist1 is ever aware is his own perceptive state in the act of perceiving1 and that1 even in the case of the psychologist who sets himself purposely to study his own states1 no perceptive state ever perceives itself4 ,what ,i am aware of when ,i look at a red surface is not 8myself-as-perceiving-red10 but the splash of red colour itself4 ,when ,i see a man1 ,i do not perceive 8myself-as-seeing-a-man10 but ,i perceive the other man4 ,so when ,i take a resolution to act in a certain way or realise that ,i am in a certain mood1 what ,i am directly aware of is not 8myself-as-forming-the-resolution0 or 8myself-as-in-the-mood10 but the resolution or the mood4 ,even when1 as an introspective psychologist1 ,i sit down to study the formation of resolutions or the peculiarities of emotional moods by reflection on my own experience1 the state in which ,i study the formation of a resolution or the nature of a mood is not itself the state of resolving or of experiencing the mood in question4 ,we cannot too strongly insist that1 if by 8self-consciousness0 is meant a cognitive state which is its own object1 there is no such thing1 and it is a psychological impossibility that there should be any such thing1 as self-consciousness4 ,no cognitive state ever has itself for its own object4 ,every cognitive state has for its object something other than itself4#ea ,even where ,i make an assertion about my subjective condition1 as when ,i say 8,i know ,i am very angry10 the state of knowing about my feeling is as distinct from the feeling itself as the state of knowing that ,i see red is from the red colour that ,i see4 ,what the subjectivist does is to confuse the two4 ,because the act of knowing is itself a state of the knowing subject1 and because in some cases the knowledge may again have reference to some other state of the same subject1 he infers that what ,i know at any moment is my own subjective condition in the act of knowing4 ,in other and more technical words1 he confuses the cognitive act or state with its own object4 ,to what absurd results this confusion would lead him1 if he were logical in the inferences he makes from it1 we have already seen4 ,we can now see that psychologically the confusion is a double one4 7#a7 ,the subjectivist confuses experience with mere awareness of a presented content4 ,he ignores the presence of the true 8subjective0 factor of selective attention throughout experience1 and is thus led to forget that all experiences imply an element which is in the experiencing mind but not presented to it4 7#b7 ,and in confining his attention to the presentational aspect of experience1 he goes on to confound the presented content with the fact of its presentation4 ,as against this second confusion it is essential to a true theory of knowledge to emphasise three points of distinction between the presented content or object of a cognitive state and the state itself1 considered as a process in the history of an experiencing subject4 7#a7 ,the cognitive state is never its own object1 it refers to or cognises an object distinct from its own existence as a psychical occurrence4 ,this is the truth which ,realism distorts into the doctrine that the object of knowledge must have a reality of 8independent of0 experience4 7#b7 ,the object of knowledge is never created by the occurrence of the psychical state in which a particular percipient becomes aware of its existence4 ,this is just as true of so-called 8merely ideal0 objects as of physical things4 ,the properties of the natural logarithms or of the circular functions in trigonometry are just as independent of my knowledge of them as the qualities of the trees and animals ,i should see if ,i turned from my writing desk and looked out at the window4 7#c7 ,the object of knowledge has always a character of which only a fragment is ever presented to my perception or reflection in any cognitive state4 ,every cognitive state refers to or stands for a great deal more than it directly means to me4 7#c7 ,the origin of the subjectivist fallacy1 as has been brilliantly shown by ,avenarius1#eb is to be found in the 8intrasubjective intercourse0 of a plurality of percipients capable of communicating their experience to each other4 ,so long as ,i am dealing solely with myself as an experiencing being and my relation to my own environment1 there is no possibility of a subjectivist interpretation4 ,in my own direct experience ,i have to do neither with 8mental states0 nor with mere 8objects of cognition10 but with things which in various ways by their interference assist or hinder the accomplishment of my various purposes1 and of which ,i have therefore to take note1 so as to adapt my ways of reaching my ends to their ways of behaviour4 ,hence the 8natural0 view of the world1 for a single experiencing being1 would be that of 8nave realism10 to which the things forming my environment are real in precisely the same sense in which ,i am real myself4 ,but as soon as ,i have to take account of the experiences of other percipients1 there arises an inevitable fallacy which leads to philosophical consequences of the gravest kind4 ,starting with the assumption that the things ,i perceive are the real things1 ,i feel a difficulty as to how the same things can be perceived by the other percipients around me4 ,e4g41 if the sun ,i see is the real sun1 what about the sun seen by some one else8 ,instead of finding the true explanation1 that all the percipients are in relation to a common environment which is independent of its presence to any one percipient's experience1 ,i very naturally fall into the mistake of thinking the things perceived by other men to be 8ideas0 or 8percepts0 of the real things perceived by me4 ,these perceptual copies of the real things ,i1 for obvious reasons1 locate somewhere 8in0 the organisms of my fellow-percipients4 ,then ,i go on to interpret my own experience in terms of the theory ,i originally devised to meet the case of my fellow-men1 and infer that what ,i myself perceive is a set of 8percepts0 or 8ideas0 produced 8in0 my organism by a reality 8outside0 all experience4 ,and it is then an easy step to the final conclusion that1 inasmuch as all known and knowable things are mere 8ideas in some one's head10 nothing else exists4 ,subjectivism is thus the last step in the development of the fallacy which begins with what ,avenarius calls 8introjection40 ,just as we learned that the existence of our fellow-men is the cardinal fact of experience which affords the most immediate refutation of the subjectivist theory1 so the original source of the subjectivist fallacy is failure to recognise their experience as being on the same level of reality as our own4 7#d7 ,we need not say much on the element of truth which ,subjectivism preserves in a distorted form4 ,we have seen that1 as against ,realism1 ,subjectivism is right in maintaining the indissoluble unity of real being with experience1 though it twists this truth into an absurdity by first identifying experience with my own limited and imperfect experience and then giving a false psychological interpretation of the nature of that experience itself4 ,how a reality can be independent of presentation in my experience and yet be in its very nature dependent upon experience for its existence and character1 has already been sufficiently illustrated4 ,but we may perhaps say that even in the identification of experience with my own experience there is an underlying substratum of genuine philosophic truth4 ,for1 as we have more than once insisted1 there is manifestly a great deal more in my own experience than what is at any time present as the object of conscious cognition4 ,or1 as ,mr4 ,bradley is fond of putting it1 there is always more in my mind than before it4 ,i am never fully aware at any moment even of the full nature of my own purposes and feelings4 ,this is why the deceitfulness of my own heart has become a common-place of religious self-examination as well as of worldly wisdom4 ,again1 every increase of insight into our own real feelings and purposes involves increased insight into the feelings and purposes of the other feeling beings with whom we stand in the various relations of social intercourse4#ec ,hence it might fairly be contended that fully to know your own meaning1 fully to understand what you want1 would imply complete insight into the structure of the whole world of reality1--in fact1 that self-knowledge and knowledge of the universe must ultimately be the same thing4 ,the systematic unity of the whole world of experience may be so complete that there is nothing in it anywhere which does not correspond to some element in the experience of every one of its members4 ,each member may1 like the monads of ,leibnitz1 represent the whole system though at very different levels of coherency and from very different points of view4 ,but such a conception1 though it would concede to ,subjectivism that whatever forms a part of the system of real being somehow falls within my individual experience1 would take as the foundation of its assertion that very distinction between what is implicitly present in my experience and what is explicitly before it which ,subjectivism consistently ignores4 ,whether the doctrine as thus re-stated can be affirmed as more than a fascinating possibility1 we shall be better able to judge when we have discussed in our next chapter the systematic unity of ,reality4 ,consult further3--,f4 ,h4 ,bradley1 ,appearance and ,reality1 chaps4 #ac1 #ad2 ,t4 ,case1 ,physical ,realism1 pt4 #a2 ,l4 ,t4 ,hobhouse1 ,the ,theory of ,knowledge1 pt4 #c1 chap4 #c1 ,the ,conception of ,external ,reality2 ,h4 ,lotze1 ,metaphysic1 bk4 i4 chap4 #g 7pp4 #bjg-bca of vol4 i4 in ,eng4 trans472 ,j4 ,s4 ,mackenzie1 ,outlines of ,metaphysics1 bk4 i4 chap4 #c1 ,theories of ,metaphysics2 ,j4 ,royce1 ,the ,world and the ,individual1 ,first ,series 7,lecture on the ,first ,conception of ,being74 ----- ,footnote #ca3 ,see1 in particular1 ,royce1 ,the ,world and the ,individual1 ,second ,series1 ,lecture #a1 for a telling elaboration of this thought4 ,i should note that ,i do not myself use the term 8existence10 as is sometimes done1 with special restriction to the sense of presence as a sensible event at a particular point of space and time4 ,when so used1 it is1 of course1 much narrower in scope than the term 8,being40 ,footnote #cb3 ,compare the brilliant but not altogether convincing argument of ,professor ,james1 in ,the ,will to ,believe4 ,footnote #cc3 ,see the whole treatment of question of feeling in ,dr4 ,stout's ,manual of ,psychology4 ,i do not1 of course1 mean that 8consciousness of activity0 successful or thwarted as a fact precedes and conditions pleasure-pain4 ,on the contrary1 it is a familiar fact of experience that we often learn what our purposes are for the first time by the pain which attends their defeat4 ,e4g41 a man may first realise that he is1 and has been1 in love by his pain at his mistress's preference of a rival suitor4 ,and nothing seems more certain than that many pleasures are quite independent of 8actual conation10 as ,plato long ago recognised4 ,i must take this opportunity to guard once for all against some plausible misconceptions4 7a7 ,when ,i speak of feeling as 8purposive0 or 8teleological10 ,i do not mean to make what1 to my own mind1 would be the monstrous assumption1 that it necessarily presupposes conscious anticipation of its guiding end or purpose4 ,all that ,i mean is that the processes of conscious life are as a matter of fact only intelligible with reference to the results in which they culminate and which they serve to maintain2 or again1 that they all involve the kind of continuity of interest which belong to attention4 7b7 ,if attentive interest is not necessarily actual conation1 actual conscious effort1 still less is it necessarily actual will4 ,for me1 as for ,mr4 ,bradley 7see his article in ,mind for ,october #aijb71 where there is no ideal anticipation of the result of a process there is neither actual desire nor actual will4 ,and since ,i cannot see that all attention implies ideal anticpation1 ,i certainly could not agree with ,prof4 ,royce that ultimate ,reality is simply the 8internal meaning of an idea40 ,my own meaning will be made clearer by reference to the illustration given at the beginning of this note4 ,a man first realises that he has been in love because he feels pained at a rival's success4 ,so far as this is so1 ,i should say1 there has been no actual conation1 and a fortiori1 no actual will or desire4 ,but--and this is my point--he would not feel the pain unless the success of the rival thwarted the successful issue of a specific psychophysical tendency of an essentially forward-reaching or teleological kind4 ,the failure may for the first time make him aware of the presence of the tendency1 but it must previously have been there as a condition of its own failure4 ,footnote #cd3 ,this qualification has to be added to avoid prejudging the very difficult question whether 8position0 itself is 8relative0 or 8absolute40 ,fortunately our argument is independent of the determination of the problem4 ,even if there should be differences between points as 8absolute0 as the difference between red and blue1 our contention would retain its force4 ,footnote #ce3 ,for otherwise the facts which lay outside the purposes or interests of the ,absolute would be 8foreign0 facts 8given0 from without and not in systematic harmony with its experience as a whole4 ,the complete systematic unity of all facts would thus fall outside what was to be1 ex hypothesi1 an all-containing experience4 ,q4,e4,a4 ,footnote #cf3 ,for further reflections upon the unsatisfactoriness of such a conception of the ,absolute as the 8union of ,thought and ,will10 see ,bk4 ,,iv4 chap4 #f1 #a1 where it is shown that knowledge and will alike1 as actual knowledge and actual will1 belong only to finite beings4 ,footnote #cg3 ,i4e4 if will be taken strictly to mean an actual volition1 love and a 8will to love0 cannot co-exist2 if we take will improperly to mean a 8standing0 interest of purpose1 the case is different4 ,footnote #ch3 ,the student of the history of ,philosophy will be reminded of the grounds on which ,spinoza objects to ascribe 8intellect0 and 8will0 in the proper sense of the terms to his ,god1 as well as of the 8knowledge of the third or intuitive kind0 and the 8infinite intellectual love0 of ,god for ,himself which are so prominent in the fifth part of the ,ethics4 ,similar considerations have sometimes led to a preference for the term 8organic0 rather than 8purposive0 or 8teleological10 as expressive of the ultimate unity of experience4 ,the word 8organic10 however1 might suggest biological conceptions of growth1 dependence on an external environment1 etc41 which would be out of place4 ,but the student may compare with what has been said of the 8purposive0 character of individuality ,spinoza's conception of the being of a thing as a conatus in suo esse perseverandi4 ,footnote #ci3 ,for a full examination of the relation between reality and scientific symbolism1 consult ,ward1 ,naturalism and ,agnosticism1 part #a4 ,the more clearly it is realised that scientific hypotheses are essentially a system of mathematical symbolism1 the more impossible it becomes to suppose that they deal directly with the concrete nature of things4 ,footnote #dj3 ,in ,principles of ,human ,knowledge1 #gj-ge1 ,berkeley indeed seems on the very verge of denying that ,god ,himself 8perceives0 the 8ideas0 which by ,his action ,he excites in us4 ,but at #aci we find that a 8spirit0 means 8that which perceives ideas1 and wills and reasons about them10 and in the third ,dialogue it is expressly stated that sensible things are 8perceived by ,god0 ,works1 ,edit4 in ,bohn's ,libraries1 vol4 i4 p4 #cfh4 ,in fact1 from the psychological standpoint of ,berkeleian sensationalism1 to deny ,god's possession of 8ideas0 7i4e4 sense-contents7 would have been tantamount to denying ,his spirituality4 ,footnote #da3 ,unfortunately ,berkeley1 like so many philosophers1 thought of 8activity0 as primarily an external relation between a 8cause0 and the material on which it 8works40 ,this is probably why he failed to realise the 8active0 character of the perceptual process4 ,footnote #db3 ,the reader will do well to compare with the whole of the foregoing section the treatment of perception as essentially teleological in ,dr4 ,stout's ,manual of ,psychology1#c bk4 iii4 pt4 #a1 chap4 #b4 ,i need hardly observe that recognition of the fundamental significance of purpose and selection for mental life does not of itself entail the adoption of 8voluntarist0 views in ,psychology4 ,what is fundamental for real mental life may perfectly well admit of analysis into hypothetical simpler elements for the purpose of the psychologist4 ,thus the admission that all mental life is teleological and selective need not involve the adoption of such metaphysical theories of activity as are adversely criticised by ,mr4 ,bradley in his ,appearance and ,reality1 chap4 #g1 or the introduction of a peculiar 8consciousness of activity0 as an unanalysable datum into ,psychology4 ,the antithesis between the actualities of life and the data of ,psychology maintained by ,prof4 ,mnsterberg in his ,psychology and ,life1 and ,grundzge der ,psychologie1 if untenable in the extreme form in which he states it1 is important as a corrective of the opposite tendency to treat as ultimate for psychological analysis whatever is of supreme importance for life4 ,footnote #dc3 ,thing-in-itself1 i4e4 not affected by the--according to this doctrine--extraneous conditions imposed upon it by relation to an experiencing mind4 ,footnote #dd3 ,the inconsistencies of both ,kant and ,spencer will illustrate the reluctance of the human mind to acquiesce in a genuine ,agnosticism4 ,in the ,critique of ,pure ,reason itself ,kant so far contradicts himself as to treat the ,thing-in-itself as the cause of sensation1 though it is a fundamental doctrine of his system that the concept of causal relation can only be legitimately applied to connect facts inside experience2 and in a later work1 the ,critique of ,judgment1 he tentatively suggests its identity with ,will4 ,of ,mr4 ,spencer it has been truly said 7,i believe by ,mr4 ,f4 ,c4 ,s4 ,schiller in ,riddles of the ,sphinx7 that in the course of his ten volumes of ,synthetic ,philosophy he speaks much more positively about the nature of the ,unknowable than dogmatic theology ventures to speak about the nature of ,god4 ,footnote #de3 ,the sceptics of antiquity1 who were more alive to this contradiction than most of our modern ,agnostics1 tried to evade the difficulty by saying that they maintained the unknowability of things not as a demonstrated certainty1 but as a 8probable opinion40 ,but this distinction is itself illogical1 for unless some propositions are certain there is no ground for considering any one proposition more probable than another4 ,e4g4 if ,i know that a die with six faces has four pips on each of two faces1 and five pips on only one1 ,i can logically say 8it is probable that with this die four will be thrown oftener than five40 ,if ,i am totally uncertain what number of pips is marked on the various faces1 ,i cannot regard one throw as more probable than another4 ,footnote #df3 ,e4g41 peculiarities of the individual's colour-spectrum1 total and partial colour-blindness1 variations in sensibility to musical pitch1 etc41 etc4 ,footnote #dg3 ,the best known and most popular version of the theory is that of ,locke and of a great deal of our popular science1 according to which the 8primary0 qualities of matter1 i4e4 those which have to be treated as fundamental in the physical sciences1 are independently real1 while the rest are mere effects produced by their action on our sense-organs4 ,the more thorough-going metaphysical doctrines of realists like ,leibnitz and ,herbart1 being much further removed from the 8nave realism0 of unreflective common sense1 have never enjoyed the same currency4 ,footnote #dh3 ,compare ,ward1 ,naturalism and ,agnosticism1 vol4 ii4 p4 #agh ff41 and ,royce1 ,world and ,individual1 ,first ,series1 ,lect4 #c4 ,prof4 ,royce's treatment of ,realism1 though interesting and suggestive1 is perhaps a little too much of a 8short and easy way0 with the antagonist to be quite convincing4 ,mr4 ,hobhouse's anti-idealistic argument 7,theory of ,knowledge1 #eag-eci7 seems to me only to hold good against the 8,subjectivism0 discussed in our next section1 but the reader will do well to examine it thoroughly for himself4 ,footnote #di3 ,we might also suitably call it ,presentationism1 if the name were not already appropriated in a different sense as distinctive of certain psychological theories4 ,the ,english reader will find a confused but typical exposition of ,subjectivism in the opening chapters of ,prof4 ,karl ,pearson's ,grammar of ,science4 ,subjectivist writers usually call themselves 8idealists10 and regard themselves as disciples of ,berkeley and ,hume4 ,berkeley was1 however1 a subjectivist1 if at all1 only in respect to the physical world1 while ,hume's conclusions are purely sceptical4 ,the reader of ,prof4 ,pearson must carefully observe that the 8descriptive0 theory of physical science has no special connection with ,subjectivism1 and is1 in fact1 held by philosophers like ,profs4 ,ward and ,royce1 who are not subjectivists4 ,footnote #ej3 ,on the existence of my fellow-men as the one real proof of the objective existence of the physical world1 see ,royce1 ,studies in ,good and ,evil1 essay on 8,nature1 ,consciousness1 and ,self-,consciousness10 and 8,mind and ,nature10 by the present writer1 in ,international ,journal of ,ethics for ,october #aijb4 ,in the latter essay ,i have1 ,i think1 sufficiently exposed the flimsy reasoning by which subjectivists attempt to justify belief in the existence of other human beings from the subjectivist point of view4 ,footnote #ea3 ,the self-knowledge which is a fact in real life1 as distinguished from the fictitious self-consciousness of some psychologists1 is quite a different thing and involves two distinct acts of cognition3 7#a7 the awareness of certain objects of cognition1 and 7#b7 the recognition of those objects as in some way qualifying my 8self40 ,and the 8self0 which ,i recognise as thus qualified is again no immediate datum of experience1 but a largely hypothetical intellectual construction1 as we shall have opportunity to see later on4 ,this is perhaps the place to add the further remark1 that if we would be rigidly accurate in psychological terminology1 we ought to banish the very expression 8consciousness0 or 8state of consciousness0 from our language4 ,what are really given in experience are attentive processes with a certain common character4 ,we abstract this character and give it the name of 8consciousness10 and then fall into the blunder of calling the concrete processes 8states0 or 8modifications0 of this abstraction1 just as in dealing with physical things we first make abstraction of their common properties1 under the name of 8matter10 and then talk as if the things themselves were 8forms0 of 8matter04 ,properly speaking1 there are physical things and there are minds1 but there are no such things in the actual world as 8matter0 and 8consciousness10 and we do well to avoid using the words where we can help it4 ,footnote #eb3 ,see ,der ,menschliche ,weltbegriff1 pp4 #ba-fb2 and1 for the merely ,english reader1 ,ward1 ,naturalism and ,agnosticism1 vol4 ii p4 #afh ff4 ,footnote #ec3 ,this is true even in what seems at first the the exceptional case of advance in mere theoretical insight4 ,the more clearly you realise the character of the problems which your own intellectual pursuits lead up to and the nature of their solution1 the clearer becomes your insight into the problems and purposes of other workers in the same field4 ----- ,,chapter ,,ii ,,the ,,systematic ,,unity ,,of ,,reality #a4 ,the problem whether ,reality is ultimately ,one or ,many is inevitably suggested to us by the diverse aspects of our own direct experience of the world4 ,the different theories may be classed1 according to their solution of this problem1 as ,monistic1 ,pluralistic1 and ,monadistic4 #b4 ,pluralism starts from the presumed fact of the mutual independence of human selves1 and teaches that this independence of each other belongs to all real beings4 ,but 7a7 the independence with which experience presents us is never complete1 nor the unity of the 8selves0 perfect4 7b7 ,the theory is inconsistent with the systematic character of all reality as presupposed in both knowledge and action4 #c4 ,monadism again makes the systematic unity of the real either an illusion or an inexplicable accident4 #d4 ,reality1 because systematic1 must be the expression of a single principle in and through a multiplicity4 ,the unity and multiplicity must both be real1 and each must necessarily involve the other4 #e4 ,if both are to be equally real1 the whole system must be a single experience1 and its constituents must also be experiences4 ,a perfect systematic whole can be neither an aggregate1 nor a mechanical whole of parts1 nor an organism4 ,the whole must exist for the parts1 and they for it4 #f4 ,this may also be expressed by saying that ,reality is a subject which is the unity of subordinate subjects1 or an individual of which the constituents are lesser individuals4 #g4 ,the nearest familiar analogue to such a systematic whole would be the relation between our whole 8self0 and the partial mental systems or lesser 8selves40 #h4 ,the nearest historic parallel to this view is to be found in ,spinoza's theory of the relation of the human mind to the 8infinite intellect of ,god40 #a4 ,the problem of the ,one and the ,many is as old as ,philosophy itself1 and inevitably arises from the earliest and simplest attempts to think in a consistent way about the nature of the world in which we play our part4 ,on the one hand1 our experience1 in the piecemeal shape in which it first appears as we begin to reflect on it1 seems to exhibit an indefinite plurality of more or less independent things1 each pursuing its own course and behaving in its own way1 and connected at best with only a few of the other members of our environment4 ,there is1 for instance1 no obvious connection between one man's career and those of most of his contemporaries1 to say nothing of the innumerable host of his predecessors and successors in the race of life4 ,and1 similarly1 the behaviour of one inanimate thing seems at first sight to be unaffected by that of most of the other things around it4 ,the world seems to us at times to be made up of an indefinite multiplicity of beings who merely happen to be actors on the same stage1 but have1 in the majority of cases1 no influence upon each other's parts4 ,yet1 on the other hand1 there are equally strong prim facie reasons for regarding the world as a single unity4 ,every addition to our theoretical insight into the structure of things adds to our recognition of the intimate connection between things and processes which previously seemed merely disconnected4 ,physical science1 as it grows1 learns more and more to look upon nature as a realm of interconnected events where no one fact is ultimately entirely independent of any other fact2 political experience and social science alike reveal the intimate interdependence of human lives and purposes4 ,and1 over and above the ascertained empirical facts which point to the ultimate unity of the world1 there is another potent influence which we might call the 8instinctive0 basis for the belief in unity4 ,however discontinuous my environment may appear1 it is never a mere disconnected multiplicity4 ,the very circumstance that it is throughout my environment1 and thus relative to the ends by which my attention is determined1 gives it to a certain degree the character of a coherent system4 ,at the lowest level of philosophic reflection1 we cannot permanently fail to apprehend our world as in principle one1 precisely because it is our world1 and we ourselves are all in some degree beings of steady systematic purpose1 not mere bundles of disconnected and conflicting impulses4 ,while yet again1 it is the very limitation of our own interests and our lack of clear insight into their full import which leads us at other times to find apparent disconnected multiplicity and lack of cohesion in our world4 ,the problem of ,philosophy in dealing with these rival aspects of the world of experience then becomes that of deciding whether either of them can be adopted as the truth in isolation from the other4 ,or if neither is the whole truth1 we must ask ourselves in what way the world can be at once ,one and ,many1 how the characters of systematic unity and of indefinite variety can be consistently thought of as belonging to the same ,reality4 ,is ,reality1 we have to ask1 ,one or is it ,many1 and if it is both1 how are the unity and multiplicity connected8 ,the answers which different philosophical systems have given to this question may conveniently be classified under three general denominations4 ,there are 7#a7 the ,monistic views1 which lay the principal stress upon the unity of the real1 and tend to treat the aspect of plurality and variety as illusory1 or at least as of secondary importance2 7#b7 the various forms of ,pluralism1 according to which the variety and multiplicity of real beings is the primary fact1 and their systematic unity either an illusion1 or at any rate a subordinate aspect of their nature2 7#c7 ,monadism1 which aims at harmonising the positions of the monist and pluralist1 by treating the world as a multiplicity of really independent things or 8monads10 which are somehow combined from without into a system4 ,from this last point of view the plurality and the systematic unity are alike real and alike important for the understanding of the world1 but are of different origin1 the plurality being inherent in the things themselves1 the unity external to them and coming from a foreign source4 ,within each of the three main types of theory there is1 of course1 room for the greatest divergence of view as to the special nature of the real4 ,a monistic system may be purely materialistic1 like that of ,parmenides1 who taught that the world is a single homogeneous solid sphere1 or idealistic like that1 e4g41 of ,schopenhauer2 or again1 it may treat mind and 8matter0 as 8aspects0 of a common reality4 ,a pluralist or monadist1 again1 may conceive of each of his independent real things as a physical atom1 as a soul of any degree of organisation1 or even1 in the fashion of some contemporary thought1 as a person4 ,with regard to the relation between this classification of philosophical theories and that of the last chapter1 ,i may just observe that1 while a monist is not necessarily an idealist1 a consistent pluralist or monadist ought logically to be a realist4 ,for the mutual independence of the various real things cannot exist without involving in itself their independence of experience4 ,if ,a and ,b are two completely independent things1 then the existence and character of ,a must be independent of presence to the experience of ,b1 and similarly ,a must be equally independent of presence to the experience of ,c1 or of anything in the world but itself4 ,and we have already seen that there is always more in the nature of any finite percipient than can be present to his own experience4 ,thus ultimately the existence and qualities of ,a must be independent of all experience1 including ,a's own4#ed ,for this reason ,i cannot but think that the various attempts to combine ,pluralism with ,idealism by maintaining that the universe consists of a number of independent 8souls0 or 8persons10 rest on confusion of thought4 ,these doctrines appear to be essentially realist in their spirit4 #b4 ,we may conveniently attempt to construct our own theory of the ,one and the ,many by first excluding views which appear mistaken in principle1 and thus gradually narrowing the issues4 ,among these mistaken views ,i am forced to reckon all forms of consistent and thorough-going ,pluralism4 ,pluralism1 so far at least as ,i am able to see1 begins by misapprehending the facts upon which it professes to base itself1 and ends by giving an interpretation of them which is essentially irrational4 ,the fundamental fact from which ,pluralism starts as an ultimate datum of all experiences is the familiar one that there are other men in the world besides myself4 ,my world is not simply a theatre for the execution of my own aims and the satisfaction of my own wants4 ,there are interests in it which are not mine1 and to which ,i must adapt myself if ,i mean to achieve my own purposes4 ,the world thus contains minds other than my own1 and what makes them other is that the interests and purposes by which their lives are determined are1 like my own1 unique and incommunicable4 ,now1 ,pluralism bids us take the facts1 as thus stated1 as the model for our conception of the universe4 ,the pattern upon which the pluralist views of ,reality are constructed is that of a community consisting of a great number of selves or persons1 each with its own unique interests1 and each therefore at once internally simple and indivisible and exclusive of all the rest4 ,in whatever special form the pluralist thinks of his ultimate realities1 whether as physically indivisible particles1 as mathematical points1 or as sentient beings1 it is always from the facts of human social life conceived in this ultra-individualist way that he in the last resort derives his concept of their simplicity and mutual repulsion4 ,but 7a7 the facts themselves are not correctly stated4 ,the human experiences upon which the pluralist relies for his conclusion present at once too much and too little unity for the purposes of his theory4 ,on the one hand1 the selves or persons composing society are not themselves simple1 undifferentiated unities4 ,just as your interests and mine may often collide1 so within what the pluralist assumes as the indivisible unit of my own personality there may be a similar collision4 ,what ,i call my 8own interests0 or my own 8apperceptive systems0 or 8trains of thought0 may exhibit the same kind of incompatibility and the same sort of conflict for superiority as is found where your ideas and mine clash4 ,thus ,ethics and ,psychology are led to distinguish between my 8true0 self and the false selves by which it may on occasion be dominated1 between my 8higher0 self and the 8lower0 selves which1 in morality1 have to be repressed by the higher1 my 8permanent0 self1 and the temporary interests by which it is often overpowered1 to say nothing of 8subliminal0 consciousness and 8dual0 or 8alternating personality40 ,the 8self0 is so far from being a mere unit1 that the variety and1 what is more1 the incompatibility of its contents is a matter of everyday experience4#ee ,pluralism may1 of course1 and often does1 verbally admit this4 ,the units of the pluralist1 we are often told1 are not mere units devoid of variety1 but wholes which are the union of differences4 ,but to concede this is to cut away the ground from under the pluralist's feet4 ,if the variety and the mutual struggle between the elements of the self are not enough to destroy its unity1 by parity of reasoning the multiplicity of selves in the world and their mutual repulsions are not enough to prove that the whole of ,reality is not1 in spite of its multiplicity of detail1 a unity more complete than any of the partial unities to be met with in our experience4 ,in fact1 the pluralist has to meet the following dilemma4 ,either his units are mere units without internal variety1 and then it is easy to show that they are the merest nothings1 or they have internal variety of their own1 and therefore simply repeat within themselves the problem they are supposed to solve4 ,on the other hand1 just as the facts of experience show us internal struggle and repulsion within the supposed units1 so they also exhibit other relations than that of mutual exclusion between the different units4 ,human personal interests1 for instance1 are never merely mutually exclusive4 ,no society consists of individuals whose purposes and interests are simply reciprocally repellent4 ,my aims and purposes may never completely coincide with those of other members of the same community1 yet they have no meaning and could get no realisation but for the fact that they are1 partially at any rate1 comprised in the wider whole of social interests and purposes which makes up the life of the social organisations to which ,i belong4 ,as the very etymology of such words as 8society0 and 8community0 shows--to say nothing of the results of psychological inquiry into the process of learning by imitation--the conception of human selves as independent units which somehow happen to stand in merely accidental or external relations is in flagrant conflict with the most fundamental facts of our social experience4 ,it is only by the systematic suppression of fact that personal and social life can be made to support the hypothesis of ,pluralism4 7b7 ,again1 even if we could accept the pluralist account of the facts1 the theory which ,pluralism puts forward to account for them is in the end unintelligible4 ,what ,pluralism does1 consciously or unconsciously1 is to separate the unity of the world from its multiplicity4 ,the multiplicity is supposed to be grounded in the ultimate nature of the real things themselves1 their unity as a system1 if they really are a system1 to be imposed upon them from without4 ,we are1 in fact1 left to choose between two alternatives4 ,either the world is not a systematic whole at all1 but a mere chaos of purely independent atoms1 in which case the whole of our thought1 with its indispensable presupposition of the systematic unity of the object of knowledge1 is an illusion1 or else the world really is a system1 but a system1 so to say1 by accident4 ,the things of which the system is composed are real as detached separate units1 but by a fortunate chance they happen all to possess some common relation to an external tertium quid 7for instance1 to ,god71 by which they are combined into a system and thus become knowable as a connected whole4 ,now we cannot1 if we are intellectually conscientious1 rest finally content with a statement of this kind1 which leaves the plurality and the systematic unity of the real world side by side as two independent unconnected facts4 ,if the contents of the world really form a system at all1 in any way whatever1 that is itself one fact among others which a sound metaphysical theory must recognise1 and of which it must offer some intelligible account4 ,e4g41 suppose you say1 with some recent pluralists1 that the world consists of a number of independent persons or spirits1 who nevertheless form a connected system or 8moral kingdom10 in virtue of the fact that they all find their moral ideal in ,god1 the most perfect among them4 ,you have now not one ultimate fact before you1 the multiplicity of independent selves1 but two1 this multiplicity and the relation of each element in it to ,god4 ,unless you are going to treat this second fact as an 8ultimate inexplicability10 i4e4 a fortunate accident1 you are now bound to treat the systematic relation of the selves to ,god and through ,god to each other as no less a part of their ultimate nature than their distinction from each other4 ,their separateness and independence is thus no longer for you the ultimate truth2 they are just as truly one by your account as they are many4 ,their union in a system is no longer an external relation foreign to their own nature1 but the deepest truth about that nature itself4 ,i will repeat the essence of this argument in another form4 ,any genuine ,pluralism must be resolute enough to dismiss the idea of a systematic interconnection between its independent realities as an illusion of the human mind4 ,but in doing so it must1 to be consistent1 deny the possibility of their mutual knowledge of each other's states4 ,each real thing must be a little world to itself1 shut up within the closed circle of its own internal content4 ,and thus1 supposing ,pluralism to be true1 and supposing myself to be one of the real things of the pluralist scheme1 ,i should have no means of knowing it to be true4 ,pluralism is unable to stand the question propounded by ,mr4 ,bradley as the test of a philosophical doctrine1 8,is the truth of this theory consistent with the fact that ,i know it to be true80 ,the persistent popularity of ,pluralism in many quarters is in fact due to the intrusion into ,metaphysics of other than genuinely philosophical interests4 ,it is maintained1 not on its philosophical merits as a consistent theory1 but because it is believed by its adherents to safeguard certain interests of morality and religion4 ,it gives us1 we are told1 a 8real ,god0 and 8real moral freedom40 ,but1 apart from the question whether these claims are justified by candid examination of the doctrine1#ef we must protest against their being allowed any place at all in a metaphysical discussion4 ,metaphysics is1 from first to last1 a purely speculative activity2 its one concern is to think logically about the constitution of ,reality1 and the only interests it has a right to consider are those of consistent logical thought4 ,if consistent logical thought about ethical and religious problems involves the recognition of a 8real ,god0 and 8real freedom10 and if these again are only possible on the pluralistic theory1 then the mere process of consistent thought is bound in the end to lead us to a pluralistic result1 and it is superfluous to appeal to extra-logical interests in the matter4 ,but if those who defend ,pluralism on the ground that it gives us a 8real ,god0 and 8real freedom0 mean that1 apart from the question of their intellectual justification1 these beliefs ought to be maintained in ,metaphysics because certain persons will be less moral or less happy without them1 we must answer that ,metaphysics has nothing to do with making us moral or happy4 ,it is no proof of the truth of a belief that it increases my personal virtue or happiness1 nor of its falsity that it diminishes them4 ,and if the study of ,metaphysics could be shown to make certain persons less virtuous or less happy1 ,metaphysics would still be in no worse case than ,ethics or ,medicine4 ,there may be persons for whom it is undesirable1 on grounds of happiness or morality1 to devote themselves to the pursuit of speculative truth1 but it is none the less a lapse from intellectual single-mindedness for the man who has elected to play the game of speculation to violate its rules by indulging in constant appeals to speculatively irrelevant issues4#eg #c4 ,the ,monadism of ,leibnitz was an attempt to effect a compromise between ,pluralism and ,monism4 ,according to this view1 the universe consists of an infinite plurality of fundamentally separate beings4 ,these beings are at once simple and indivisible1 and at the same time each of them contains an infinite variety of internal states4 ,being mutually independent1 the monads have no genuine relations with each other2 each is conscious only of the succession of its own states4 ,as ,leibnitz expressed it in a metaphor which has become classic1 the monad has no windows4 ,so far the system is pure ,pluralism4 ,but at the same time the unity of the whole system of monads1 though 8ideal0 and not 8real10 is to be genuine4 ,they form a system 8ideally10--i4e4 for the understanding of an omniscient spectator1--inasmuch as the internal states of each monad are adjusted to those of all the rest1 or1 as ,leibnitz also puts it1 inasmuch as each monad 8represents0 the same systematic structure from its own special point of view4 ,hence1 though no monad really perceives or acts upon any other1 every monad behaves as it would if there were mutual perception and interaction between all4 ,when we ask after the source of this 8pre-established harmony10 we meet with a double answer4 ,on the one hand1 its actual existence as a fact is due to the creative will of ,god4 ,on the other1 it was precisely the complete adjustment of the internal states of its various monads which determined ,god to will the existence of the actual world-order in preference to that of any other of the indefinitely numerous logically possible arrangements which ,he foresaw and might have chosen4 ,this relation between ,god and the world-order is further complicated by the fact that on occasion ,leibnitz treats ,god as simply one1 though the supreme one1 among the monads4 ,now a system of this kind seems to exhibit all the defects of ,pluralism with certain superadded difficulties of its own4 ,we might reasonably object that experience presents us with no example of a genuine system in which all the elements are actually independent4 ,the nearest approach to such a case seems to be found in the classes of an 8artificial classification10 in which things standing in no relation of interaction among themselves are put together by us because it is convenient for some extraneous purpose of our own to comprehend them under a single point of view4 ,but1 apart from the impossibility of constructing a classification which shall be more than relatively artificial1 such a mere aggregate or collection is not a real system4 ,in a true system1 as distinct from a mere collection1 the principle of unity has always some sort of significance for the members of the system themselves4 ,it represents1 at the least1 the way in which the members interact with each other4 7,thus1 to take an extreme case1 the serial arrangement of cutting implements in a museum1 from the flaked stone of the ,palolithic age to the latest specimen of ,sheffield cutlery1 is more than a merely 8artificial0 classification1 precisely because it is more than a mere grouping of separate objects according to their likeness and unlikeness2 it represents the stages of a continuous historical evolution47 ,now1 it is essential to ,monadism that the monads1 because ultimately independent1 shall only seem to interact4 ,they appear to form a single world with a history in which each distinct state of each monad is a stage4 ,but really1 while the successive states of the individual monad are1 what they seem to be1 a connected process of development1 the various processes do not make up a single-world history at all4 ,they only seem to do so by an inevitable illusion4 ,hence the unity of the whole system must after all be not only ideal1 but1 strictly speaking1 imaginary4 ,similar difficulties arise from the ambiguous position accorded to ,god in the scheme4 ,if the 8pre-established harmony0 between the states of the individual monads were simply due to a creative fiat of ,god1 we should be thrown back upon mere arbitrary chance as the reason1 if it can be called a reason1 why existence is not a chaos4 ,but if ,god's choice to create this scheme of things rather than another was due to the superior attraction which a world with at least the appearance of connected system had for the divine intellect1 then it is ultimately in the constitution of the divine mind that we have to find the reason why the alternative possibilities before creation were what they were2#eh and again1 why just this one was preferred to all the rest4 ,and thus the monads cease to be any longer ultimate and independent1 and the nature of ,god becomes the single determinate ground of all reality4 ,it is scarcely necessary to add that ,monadism suffers besides from all the defects which we found in ,pluralism4 ,if the monad be made into a mere unit without internal variety1 it ceases to be a thing with a definite nature at all2 and if its unity is compatible with the variety of its states1 there seems to be no special reason why the wealth of varied existence in the world should lead us to assume a plurality of independent principles as its ground4 ,it has been pointed out that ,leibnitz was apparently determined in favour of ,monadism against ,monism by the assumption that individual human selves are internally simple units and externally entirely exclusive of each other1 an assumption we have already seen reason to reject4 #d4 ,we seem driven1 then1 to reject the view that the ordered world of experience can be the expression of a plurality of ultimately distinct and heterogeneous principles4 ,because the world as known1 or again as providing for the coherent realisation of practical purposes1 is an orderly system1 and on any other supposition coherent knowledge and consistent action are alike impossible1 the world must for ,metaphysics be regarded as the complete embodiment and expression of a single ultimate principle4 ,we are thus committed to some form of theory of the type generally known as ,monism4 ,the name ,monism we may perhaps be allowed to avoid1 as it has gathered about it associations which are apt to mislead4 ,among the doctrines most frequently spoken of as monistic are some which treat the apparent variety and multiplicity of existence as purely illusory4 ,again1 the name has of late been widely used as the self-chosen designation of the doctrine according to which 8mind0 and 8matter0 are alike 8aspects0 or 8manifestations0 of a third principle which is neither material nor mental4 ,it should already be clear that the doctrine indicated by our previous discussions differs widely from both these types of ,monism4 ,we have insisted that the source of fallacy in ,pluralism and ,monadism was one-sided emphasis upon one term in the antithesis of the ,many and the ,one to neglect of the other1 and we have no intention of repeating the mistake for ourselves4 ,also1 we have already come to the conclusion that ,reality1 whatever its detailed structure1 is mental in its general character2 we can have nothing therefore to do with a 8neutral0 or 8agnostic0 ,monism4 ,our detailed theory of the relation between the unity of the world and its multiplicity must do equal justice to both1 and it must be consistent with our previous recognition of the experiential nature of the real4 ,we may perhaps work out our theory in detail as follows4 ,the world for knowledge must1 we have seen1 be an orderly whole or system4 ,to be a system at all1 it must be the development or expression in detail of a single principle4 ,therefore it must most certainly be one2 it cannot be a medley of independent elements which somehow luckily happen to form a coherent collection4 ,but again1 because it is a system1 it cannot be a mere unit2 it must be the expression of a single principle in and through a multiplicity of terms or constituents4 ,not only must it be both one and many1 but it must be many precisely because it is truly one1 and one because it is truly many4#ei ,further1 we must add that because the world-system is a perfectly systematic whole1 not only is multiplicity in general necessary to its unity1 but each particular element in the multiplicity is necessitated or logically implied by the character of the unity4 ,in a complete system no single member can be missing or be other than it is without the fundamental law of construction of the whole being changed4 ,also1 we may incidentally observe that in a complete system the number of distinct terms may be actually endless1 while the law of construction is perfectly determinate4 ,to think of the world as a single systematic unity1 then1 means to think of it as the manifestation in a possibly infinite multiplicity of detail of one perfectly determinate principle4 ,and1 of course1 what we have called the individual elements of the multiplicity may on inspection themselves turn out to be systems of infinite complexity determined by a law of construction derived in a determinate way from that of the complete system1 and so on literally ad infinitum4 ,thus the unity of ultimate principle we demand for ,reality in no way excludes its possession of a wealth of detail infinitely infinite4 #e4 ,we may take a further most important step forward4 ,in the all-embracing systematic whole the unity and the multiplicity must be equally real and each must be real through the other4 ,how is this possible8 ,only on condition that the whole system forms a single experience1 and that the constituent factors again are single experiences4 ,this will perhaps be best brought out by examining some typical case of the kind of unity in multiplicity which is insufficient for our purpose4 7a7 ,the unity of the world cannot be that of a mere collection or aggregate4 ,in a mere aggregate the elements are real independently of their relation to one another as elements in this aggregate4 ,so long as we keep strictly to the case of what is no more than an aggregate1 the quality of the elements is entirely unaffected by their inclusion in the aggregate4 ,the aggregate has no unitary character of its own which reveals itself in and through the behaviour of its elements4 ,its unity consists in nothing more than the fact that we have found it convenient to think of its elements together4 ,an aggregate of ten bricks1 for instance1 has no character as a whole beyond the mere fact of being thought of in one mental act4 ,it has not even a collective weight until you put your ten bricks into the same cart1 or on the same scale-pan1 and then they have ceased to be a mere aggregate in the very moment of exerting pressure upon the same surface1 and have become a true material system4 7b7 ,nor can the world of ,reality be satisfactorily thought of as a mere whole of parts4 ,a whole of parts approaches indeed more nearly to the ideal of a true systematic unity than a mere aggregate1 inasmuch as it has a determinate single character as a whole1 which manifests itself in the structure of the various parts4 ,for this reason a geometrical figure or a machine is much more than a mere aggregate2 it has a character as a whole1 and this character is differently expressed by the construction of the different parts4 ,the figure or machine is thus a true unity of differences4 ,yet in this case we cannot really say that the unity and the variety are equally real4 ,for the whole cannot exist without the parts1 whereas the parts may continue to exist1 though not1 of course1 as parts of this whole1 without the whole4 ,the whole is constituted by the successive generation or construction of the parts1 and thus may be said to be formed out of pre-existing parts1 and the parts again may survive the destruction of the whole4 ,there is not that equal reality and complete mutual implication of the two sides which we have deemed necessary to a genuine systematic unity4 7c7 ,an organism is in some respects a truer systematic unity than a mere whole of parts4 ,it has a systematic character of its own which manifests itself in and through the difference of its various members4 ,and here1 the whole is not historically subsequent to and generated by the members4 ,it is not their resultant but their living unity4 ,the members only come into being along with the whole1 and in the course of its growth as a whole2 and though they may1 in a sense1 continue to exist after severance from the whole1 it is not with the same kind of existence which belonged to them as members4#fj ,but an organism1 like a machine1 fails to exhibit the perfect systematic unity of the ,one and the ,many of which we are in quest4 ,in the machine the aspect of multiplicity was relatively more real than that of unity2 in the fully evolved organism the unity seems more completely real than the multiplicity4 ,for the unity is a conscious one2 in some degree at least it exists for itself1 and its members again for it4 ,whereas it must be very doubtful whether the member exists for itself1 and still more doubtful whether the whole exists in any sense for the members4 ,and though the member cannot retain its peculiar form of existence except as a member in the whole1 yet in even the highest organism the unity is so far relatively independent that it is unaffected by the removal of some of the members4 ,not every member is of vital significance for the life of the whole4 ,but in a complete systematic unity1 as we saw1 the unity and the multiplicity of the system must be equally real and equally interdependent4 ,this can only be the case if the whole is for its members as well as the members for the whole4 ,and that this may be so1 just as the all-embracing whole of reality must1 as we have learned1 be an experience1 so each of its members must be itself an experience4 ,and because the members form a single system1 just as there can be nothing in the experience of any member which is not contained in the experience which is the whole1 so1 on the other side1 there can be nothing in the whole which does not in some way affect the experience of every member4 ,only in this way can we conceive of a systematic ,reality in which the unity and the multiplicity of the system are alike real and equally real4 ,such a view is1 strictly speaking1 hardly to be called either ,pluralism or ,monism4 ,it is not ,pluralism1 for it does not make the unity of the system an illusion or an inexplicable accident2 it is not ,monism1 in the current sense of the word1 because it does not make the multiplicity deceptive4 ,if a name is wanted1 we might perhaps agree to call it ,systematic ,idealism4 #f4 ,we may say1 then1 that ,reality is a systematic ,experience of which the components are likewise experiences4 ,it would be much the same thing if we called it a subject which is the unity of subordinate subjects4 ,it is tempting again1 at first sight1 to say it is a self of selves4 ,but the extreme ambiguity of the term 8self0 as used in contemporary ,psychology makes it desirable to avoid an expression which is capable of the gravest misuse4#fa ,it is scarcely possible to say with any precision what we mean by one 8self10 whereas it is possible in a general way to say what we mean by one experience4 ,an experience may be called one and the same in so far as it is the systematised expression of a single coherent purpose or interest1 in so far1 in fact1 as it has a teleological unity4 ,in practice it may be impossible to say precisely when this condition is fulfilled1 but the slightest acquaintance with the psychological facts of the struggle between competing systems of ideas in normal1 and of 8dual0 and 8multiple0 personality in abnormal1 mental life is sufficient to show that the limits thus set by our definition to the single experience do not coincide with those ascribed to my 8self0 or 8personality0 in any of the shifting senses of the terms4 ,the limits within which experience remains one experience according to our definition are1 as the facts just alluded to show1 often narrower1 but again1 the definition suggests that they may also be wider1 than any which would currently be given to the 8self40 ,moreover1 what we have already said as to the possibility of each 8member0 of our system being itself a system of lesser systems1 forbids us to identify our view with any doctrine which asserts merely atomic and simple 8selves0 as the elements of ,reality4 ,another way of expressing the same thought would be to say that ,reality is an ,individual of which the elements are lesser individuals4 ,the advantage of this form of expression is that it emphasises the fundamentally teleological character of the unity of the real1 and also of each and all of its constituents4 ,a thing1 as we have already seen1 is individual just so far as it is unique1 and only that which is the embodiment of a single purpose or interest can be unique4 ,a single whole of experience1 owing its unity as a whole precisely to the completeness and harmony with which it expresses a single purpose or interest1 is necessarily an individual4 ,the all-embracing experience which constitutes ,reality is thus in its inmost nature a complete individual4 ,and the lesser experiences which form the elements or material content of ,reality are each1 just so far as each is truly one experience1 individual in the same sense as the whole4 ,we may thus call ,reality a complete or perfect individual of minor or incomplete individuals4 ,what the fundamental distinction between the supreme individual whole and the lesser individuals must be taken to consist in we shall discuss in our next chapter4 ,meanwhile we may note two points3--7#a7 ,the important thing about an individual is not its mere numerical unity1 but its qualitative uniqueness4 ,any experience which we can pronounce to be individual must be called so1 not merely because it is numerically one and not many1 but because it is the consistent and harmonious embodiment of a coherent purpose4 ,numerically considered1 every such individual is necessarily many as well as one1 precisely because it is a system4 ,this applies especially to the supreme or absolute individual1 the complete system of experience4 ,it is individual primarily not because it is numerically one1 but because it is the complete expression of a coherent idea or purpose4 ,it has been the defect of too many monistic theories to overlook this1 and to lay the main stress on the numerical oneness of the real4 7#b7 ,an experience individual in the sense already explained is what we mean by a 8spirit40 ,spirit cannot be properly defined by contradistinction from a supposed non-spiritual reality1 such as 8matter10 for such a definition would only amount to the assertion that spirit is what is not other than spirit2 and would tell us nothing of the term to be defined4 ,nor1 again1 is spirit properly defined as a series of states or modifications of the abstraction 8consciousness40 ,the positive characteristic by which spiritual existence may be recognised is that in it the what and the that are combined in the unity of immediate feeling4 ,and immediate feeling1 as we have seen1 is essentially teleological4 ,where you have a connected system of factors which can only be understood as a whole by reference to an explicit or implicit end1 which constitutes their unity1 you have spirit1 and where you have spirit you have such a system4 ,so that to call reality an individual of individuals is the same thing as to say that it is a spiritual system of which the elements1 constituents1 or terms1 are in their turn spiritual systems4#fb ,our doctrine may thus be seen to be fairly entitled to the name ,idealism1 which current usage has appropriated to the view that all existence is ultimately mental4 #g4 ,such a relation as we have asserted between the individual whole of ,reality and the elements or terms within the whole is necessarily unique1 and cannot be adequately illustrated from any less perfect type of systematic unity recognised by everyday or by scientific thought4 ,in particular1 we must carefully avoid the mistake of conceiving the relation of the elements to the totality in a mechanical way as that of 8parts0 to a 8whole of parts02 or1 again1 in a merely biological way1 as that of 8members0 to an organism4 ,all such analogies lose sight of the intimate character of a union in which the elements and the totality exist not merely in and through1 but also for each other4 ,the individual experiences which compose the supreme experience have a genuine1 if an imperfect and partial1 individuality of their own4 ,they are not in it merely 8ideally0 or implicitly1 as the points on a curve may be said to be in the periphery4 ,and the whole1 again1 is a real individual1 not a mere aggregate in which the parts are real but their unity merely imaginary4 ,we may1 if we like1 say that it is made up of experiences or minds1 but we must not say that it is a collection of minds4 ,for a mere collection1 as we have seen1 in so far as it is a collection and nothing more1 cannot be said to have any genuine individuality1 precisely because it has no teleological unity of structure beyond that which we arbitrarily1 and with reference to ends lying outside its own nature1 impose upon it in the very act of counting its members1 i4e4 arranging them in serial order4 ,whether we could properly speak of the absolute whole as a society of minds is a further and a more difficult question4 ,a society is much more than a mere collection3 it has a purposive unity of structure which exists not merely for the sociological observer from without1 but for its own members as active in assigning to each of them his own special place in relation to all the rest4 ,how far society can be said to have such a unity for itself is a question which we cannot answer until we have dealt more fully with the problem of the relation between selfhood and individuality4 ,and until we have answered it1 we must defer the decision as to whether the systematic individuality of the ,absolute would be adequately recognised if we thought of it as a society4 7,see infra1 ,bk4 ,,iv4 chap4 #c47 ,if we are to look at this stage for some analogue within our partial experience for the kind of unity of individuals in a single supreme individual which we have demanded for the system of ,reality1 we shall probably do best to turn to what is after all the most familiar thing in the world1--our own personal experience4 ,if we consider the nature of any coherent purpose or 8mental system10 we shall find that1 as the coherent embodiment of a purpose1 it possesses a degree of individuality of its own4 ,in proportion to the comprehensiveness1 and again to the inner harmony or systematic structure of the interest it embodies1 it constitutes a genuine self-existing individual whole of the kind which psychologists recognise as a 8self40 ,and again1 in so far as my life exhibits determinate character1 so far do these systematic purposes or minor 8selves0 form a larger system1 also individual1 which may be called my 8total self40 ,and both the many lesser 8selves0 and the larger 8self0 are real in the same sense of the word4 ,neither exists merely in or for the other2 the wider or whole 8self0 is no mere collection or resultant or product of the more special 8selves10 nor are they again mere results of a theoretical process of analysis and abstraction4 ,in so far as they are genuine systems at all1 they are not mere 8parts0 of a whole1 but each is the expression1 in a concrete conscious life1 of the nature of a larger whole from a special 8point of view40 ,the whole1 if not equally in every part1 is yet as a whole present in every part1 and precisely for that reason the category of part and whole is inadequate to express their relation4 ,somewhat after this fashion we must conceive the structure of any individual whole of lesser individuals4 ,why1 in spite of the analogy1 it is desirable not to speak of the whole of ,reality as a 8,self10 will be made clearer as we proceed4#fc #h4 ,the view we have formulated is perhaps more closely akin to ,spinoza's conception of the relation of the human mind to the 8infinite intellect of ,god10 than to any other historically famous theory4 ,according to ,spinoza1 the individual human mind is an 8eternal mode of consciousness which1 taken together with all other such #8modes1' makes up the infinite intellect of ,god40 ,the meaning of the epithet 8eternal0 we cannot1 of course1 enter into until we have discussed the relation of the time-process to experience4 ,the rest of the definition pretty clearly coincides in its general sense with the view we have tried to expound of the nature of the relation between the supreme experience and its constituent experiences4 ,for the 8modes0 of ,spinoza are definitely thought of as genuinely individual manifestations of the nature of his ultimate reality1 8substance0 or 8,god40 ,their individuality and their infinite multiplicity is no result of illusion or illegitimate abstraction4 ,and1 on the other hand1 8substance0 itself is genuinely individual2 it is no mere abstract name for the common properties of a number of ultimately independent things4 ,most of the adverse criticism which ,spinozism has met with1 as far at least as regards its doctrine of the nature of the human mind1 seems to be based on misapprehension about the first of these points4 ,from his use of the numerical category of whole and part to express the relation between substance and its modes1 ,spinoza has incorrectly been taken to be denying the fact of the genuine individuality of the finite experience1 and therefore to be declaring the very existence of the finite to be mere baseless illusion4 ,with his doctrine as thus misinterpreted1 ours has1 of course1 no similarity4 ,nothing is explained away by calling it 8illusion02 the 8illusory0 fact is there in spite of the hard names you choose to bestow on it1 and demands explanation no less than any other fact4 ,our theory aims not at dismissing finite individuality as illusion1 but at ascertaining what it means1 what are its limits1 and how it stands related to the complete individual whole of experience which ,spinoza calls the infinitus intellectus ,dei4#fd ,the mention of ,spinoza will no doubt suggest to the reader the famous doctrine1 which has played so large a part in the subsequent development of philosophical ,monism1 of the double 8aspects0 or 8attributes0 of ,reality4 ,it is from ,spinoza that modern ,monism has learned the view that the mental and physical orders are related as two parallel but distinct manifestations of a common underlying reality1 so that to every member of one order there corresponds a determinate member of the other4 ,the two are thus everywhere inseparable and everywhere irreducible 8parallel0 expressions of a nature which is neither mental nor physical4 ,on this fundamental point our theory1 as will have been seen already1 completely parts company with ,spinozism4 ,that the nature of one and the same common whole should be equally manifested in two entirely irreducible forms1 is a patent impossibility4 ,either the unity of the whole or the absolute disparateness of its twin manifestations must be surrendered if we are to think consistently4 ,hence we cannot avoid asking in which of the two series the assumed common nature is more adequately expressed4 ,according as we answer this question we shall find ourselves led in the end either to thorough-going ,materialism or to thorough-going ,idealism4 ,for our own part1 the perception that ,reality is experience and nothing else has already committed us to the view that both of the seemingly disparate series must in the end be mental4 ,thus our doctrine may be said to be much what ,spinoza's would be if the attribute of 8extension0 were removed from his scheme1 and the whole of ,reality identified with the 8infinite intellect of ,god40#fe ,consult further3--,b4 ,bosanquet1 ,essentials of ,logic1 lect4 #b2 ,logic1 vol4 ii4 chap4 #g2 ,f4 ,h4 ,bradley1 ,appearance and ,reality1 chaps4 #ac1 #ad1 #bj2 ,l4 ,t4 ,hobhouse1 ,theory of ,knowledge1 pt4 #c1 chap4 #f1 8,reality as a ,system02 ,h4 ,lotze1 ,metaphysic1 bk4 i4 chap4 #f 7,eng4 trans41 vol4 i4 pp4 #afc-aia72 ,j4 ,s4 ,mackenzie1 ,outlines of ,metaphysic1 bk4 i4 chaps4 #b1 #c2 bk4 iii4 chap4 #f2 ,j4 ,e4 ,m#8,taggart1 ,studies in ,hegelian ,cosmology1 chap4 #b4 ----- ,footnote #ed3 ,this consideration obviously influenced ,leibnitz4 ,it is a much-decried doctrine in his system that every 8monad10 or simple real thing1 perceives nothing but its own internal states2 there are no 8windows0 through which one monad can behold the states of another4 ,it is easy to show that this doctrine leads to extremely far-fetched and fantastic hypotheses to account for the apparent communication between different monads1 but not so easy to show that ,pluralism can afford to dispense with it4 ,see in particular ,leibnitz's ,new ,system of the ,nature of ,substances 7,works1 ed4 ,erdmann1 #abd ff42 ed4 ,gerhardt1 iv4 #dgg ff42 ,eng4 trans4 in ,latta's ,leibnis3 the ,monadology1 etc41 p4 #big ff471 especially #ac-ag and ,monadology1 #g-i1 #ea4 ,footnote #ee3 ,see for a recent treatment of this point in its bearing upon the theory of volition and moral accountability1 ,mr4 ,bradley's article on 8,mental ,conflict and ,imputation0 in ,mind for ,july #aijb4 ,there is probably no part of ,psychology which suffers more from an improper over-simplification of awkward facts4 ,footnote #ef3 ,as the reader will readily collect from the preceding discussion1 ,i do not myself admit that they are justified4 ,on the contrary1 ,i should hold that any consistent ,pluralism must issue in what1 if ,i held it myself1 ,i should feel compelled to describe as ,atheism1 and the doctrine of blind chance as the arbiter of all things4 ,in this matter ,i should like to associate myself entirely with the emphatic protest of ,mr4 ,bradley1 in ,mind ,july #aijb1 p4 #cac1 and with the remarks of ,mr4 ,b4 ,russell in his work on ,the ,philosophy of ,leibniz1 p4 #agb4 ,i need not say that ,i do not make these remarks for the purpose of disparagement4 ,by all means1 if ,atheism is the logical outcome of consistent thinking1 let us say so2 what ,i object to is the constant appeal to theistic beliefs on the part of metaphysicians who1 so far as ,i can see1 ought to be atheists if they were in earnest with their own position4 ,footnote #eg3 ,for a popular exemplification of the kind of appeal to religious and ethical interests here objected to1 see the first essay in ,prof4 ,james's ,will to ,believe4 ,i have never been able to understand why these appeals1 if legitimate1 should not be allowed in ,psychology or any other science as readily as in ,metaphysics4 ,would ,prof4 ,james regard it as a valid argument for the 8timeless self0 or the ,innervationsgefhle1 that some men may be better or happier for believing in them8 ,or again1 is it in itself an objection to the study of ,ethics that certain persons may become both less moral and less happy as a consequence of studying it8 ,footnote #eh3 ,n4,b4--,these possibilities1 it must be remembered1 though numerically infinite1 are assumed to be qualitatively determinate1 being constituted of the condition of conformity to the logical principle of non-contradiction4 ,now there is no reason in the nature of a plurality of independent things why this principle should be recognised rather than not4 ,footnote #ei3 ,a medley of independent things would not even be really 8many40 ,for until you can count 8first1 second1 third44440 you have not your ,many4 ,and nothing but the terms of a coherent connected series can be counted4 ,what you can count as many is shown by the very fact of your ability to count it to have a common nature or ground which permits of its orderly arrangement1 and thus to be part of one system4 ,compare ,plato1 ,parmenides1 #afd1 #afe4 ,footnote #fj3 ,as ,aristotle more than once says1 a human hand1 for instance1 is not when severed from the rest of the body a 8hand0 at all1 except 8equivocally10 any more than the 8hand0 of a statue is a true hand4 7,i4e4 it is only a 8true hand0 so long as it does the work of a hand4 ,captain ,cuttle's hook probably deserved the name of 8hand0 better than the severed member it replaced74 ,footnote #fa3 ,i shall attempt to show in a later chapter 7,bk4 ,,iv4 chap4 #c7 that1 in any useful signification of the term 8self10 ,reality is not a 8self0 nor yet a mere community of 8selves40 ,footnote #fb3 ,again1 ,i must remind the reader that this recognition of the teleological character of mind does not in the least preclude the necessity for psychological analysis of mental states4 ,still less does it require us to include in our analysis a volitional element as one distinguishable aspect or component of the isolated mental state by the side of others1 such as the presentational and emotional aspects4 ,it might even be contended that a 8tripartite0 or three-aspect ,psychology commits the mistake of counting in the whole psychical fact as one of its own components4 ,footnote #fc3 ,see infra1 ,bk4 ,,iv4 chap4 #c1 where we shall find that the relation of the individual self to a social whole probably furnishes a still better1 though not altogether satisfactory1 illustration of our principle4 ,footnote #fd3 ,for ,spinoza's doctrine see especially ,ethics1 ,i4 #ae1 #be2 ,,ii4 #aa1 #dj2 ,,iii4 #f-i2 ,v4 #bb1 #bc1 with the explanations of any good exposition of his system1 such as that of ,pollock or ,joachim4 ,footnote #fe3 ,see further on the 8,parallelistic0 doctrine1 ,bk4 ,,iv4 chap4 #b4 ,,chapter ,,iii ,,reality ,,and ,,its ,,appearances--,,the ,,degrees ,,of ,,reality #a4 ,reality being a single systematic whole1 the nature of its constituent elements is only finally intelligible in the light of the whole system4 ,hence each of its 8appearances10 if considered as a whole in itself1 must be more or less contradictory4 #b4 ,but some 8appearances0 exhibit the structure of the whole more adequately than others1 and have therefore a higher degree of reality4 #c4 ,this conception of degree of reality may be illustrated by comparison with the successive orders of infinites and infinitesimals in ,mathematics4 ,it would be the task of a complete ,philosophy to assign the contents of the world to their proper place in the series of 8orders0 of reality4 #d4 ,in general any subordinate whole is real in proportion as it is a self-contained whole4 ,and it is a self-contained whole in proportion as it is 7a7 comprehensive1 7b7 systematic2 that is1 a thing is real just so far as it is truly individual4 #e4 ,the two criteria of individuality1 though ultimately coincident1 tend in particular cases to fall apart for our insight1 owing to the limitation of human knowledge4 #f4 ,ultimately only the whole system of experience is completely individual1 all other individuality is approximate4 #g4 ,in other words1 the whole system of experience is an infinite individual1 all subordinate individuality is finite4 ,comparison of this position with the doctrines of ,leibnitz4 #h4 ,recapitulatory statement of the relation of ,reality to its ,appearances4 #a4 ,reality1 we have seen1 is to be thought of as a systematic whole forming a single individual experience1 which is composed of elements or constituents which are in their turn individual experiences4 ,in each of these constituents the nature of the whole system manifests itself in a special way4 ,each of them contributes its own peculiar content to the whole system1 and as the suppression or change of any one of them would alter the character of the whole1 so it is the nature of the whole which determines the character of each of its constituents4 ,in this way the whole and its constituent members are in complete interpenetration and form a perfect systematic unity4 ,in the happy phrase of ,leibnitz1 we may say that each of the partial experiences reflects the whole system from its own peculiar 8point of view40 ,if we call the completed system1 as it is for itself1 ,reality par excellence1 we may appropriately speak of the partial experiences in which its nature is diversely manifested as its ,appearances4 ,we must remember1 however1 that to call them appearances is not to stamp them as illusory or unreal4 ,they will only be illusory or unreal when we forget that they are one and all partial aspects or manifestations of a whole of which none of them adequately exhausts the contents4 ,when we forget this and treat any partial experience as though it were the complete and adequate expression of the whole nature of ,reality1--in other words1 when we try to apply to existence or the universe as a whole conceptions which are only valid for special aspects of existence1--we shall inevitably find ourselves led to contradictory and absurd results4 ,each partial aspect of a total system can only be ultimately understood by reference to the whole to which it belongs1 and hence any attempt to treat the part in abstraction as itself a self-contained whole1--or1 in other words1 to treat the concepts with which we have to work in dealing with some special aspect of the world of experience as ultimately valid in their application to the whole system1--is bound to issue in contradiction4 ,again1 just because our knowledge of the structure of the system as a whole is so imperfect as it is1 our insight into the structure of its constituents is also necessarily limited4 ,hence it will commonly happen that1 even within the limits of their applicability1 the special concepts of our various sciences are not1 when thought out1 free from internal contradiction4 ,for instance1 we are led to absurd results when we try1 as ,materialism does1 to interpret the whole system of experience in terms of the concepts used in the purely physical sciences2 and again1 even in their restricted use as physical categories1 these concepts seem incapable of being so defined as to involve no element of contradiction4 ,in both these senses all ,appearance implies an element of contradiction2 only for an insight which could take in at once the whole system of existence would its details be completely coherent and harmonious4 ,but this does not alter the fact that1 so far as our insight into any part of the whole and its connection with other parts is self-consistent1 it does convey genuine1 though imperfect1 knowledge of the whole4 ,though our detailed insight into the structure of the whole may never reach the ideal of perfect self-consistency1 yet it may approximate to that ideal in different degrees1 at different stages1 or with reference to different aspects4 ,and the closer the approximation the less the modification which our knowledge would require to bring it into complete harmony with itself1 and the greater therefore the element of truth about ,reality which it contains4 ,in particular1 we must carefully avoid falling into the mistake of thinking of the ,reality and the world of its appearances as though they formed two distinct realms4 ,in a systematic unity1 we must remember1 the whole can exist only in so far as it expresses its nature in the system of its parts1 and again the parts can have no being except as the whole expresses itself through them4 ,to the degree to which this condition is departed from by any of the types of system familiar to us1 those systems fall short of being perfectly systematic4 ,reality1 then1 being a systematic whole1 can have no being apart from its appearance1 though neither any of them taken singly1 nor yet the sum of them thought of collectively1#ff can exhaust its contents4 ,and though no appearance is the whole of ,reality1 in none of them all does the whole ,reality fail to manifest itself as a whole4 ,the whole is truly1 as a whole1 present in each and every part1 while yet no part is the whole4#fg ,we may once more illustrate by an appeal to our own direct experience4 ,consider the way in which we set to work to execute any systematic scheme or purpose1 e4g4 the mastery of a particular science or a particular business4 ,we have in such a case a central aim or purpose1 which in the process of execution spreads out into a connected system of subordinate ideas and interests welded into one by the reference to a common end which pervades the whole4 ,the supreme or central aim is only realised in the successive realisation of the subordinate stages2 at the same time1 while it is what sustains all the members of the system1 it has no existence apart from them1 though it is identical neither with any one of them nor yet with their sum collectively considered4 #b4 ,if our conviction that ,reality is a single systematic unity pervading and manifesting itself in lesser systematic unities is correct1 we shall expect to find that some of the lesser systematic unities with which we have to deal in practical life and in the various sciences exhibit more of the full character of the whole to which they belong than others4 ,the 8points of view0 from which each minor system reflects the whole1 though all true1 need not be all equally true4 ,though the whole1 in a genuine system1 must be present as a whole in every part1 it need not be equally present in all2 it may well not be 8as full1 as perfect in a hair as heart40 ,to take a concrete example1 a cluster of mass-particles1 a machine1 a living organism1 and a human mind engaged in the conscious systematic pursuit of truth1 are all to some degree or other systematic unities1 and all to some degree1 therefore1 repeat the structure of the universal whole to which they all belong4 ,but it does not follow that all manifest the structure of that whole with equal adequacy and fulness4 ,indeed1 any philosophy which admits development as a genuine feature of the world-process must maintain that they do not1 that the nature of the whole system of ,reality is exhibited with infinitely greater adequacy and clearness in the working of the conscious mind than in the changes of configuration of the system of mass-particles or even the vital processes of the physical organism4 ,in practical life1 too1 one of our most ineradicable convictions is that there are degrees of worth which coincide with degrees of the adequacy with which partial systems exhibit the nature of the larger wholes to which they belong4 ,for instance1 among the different mental systems which may be called my partial 8selves10 there are some which ,i call 8truer0 than others1 on the ground that they more fully reveal my whole character as an individual human being4 ,my whole character undoubtedly appears in and determines all the subordinate systems which make up my mental life4 ,each of them is the whole character in a special aspect1 or as reacting upon a special system of suggestions1 but some of them contain the whole in a more developed and explicit form than others4 ,i am in one sense myself wherever ,i may be and whatever ,i may be doing1 and yet ,i am 8more myself0 in health than in sickness1 in the free pursuit of self-chosen studies than in the forced discharge of uncongenial tasks imposed on me by the necessity of earning an income4 ,we ought1 then1 to be prepared to find the same state of things universally in the relation of ,reality to its ,appearances4 ,in a world where 8higher0 and 8lower10 8more0 and 8less0 true have a meaning1 some of the lesser systems in which the nature of the whole is expressed must be fuller and more adequate representations of that nature than others4 ,this is as much as to say that it would require comparatively little transformation of some of the partial systems recognised by our knowledge to show how the common nature of the whole system of ,reality is expressed in them2 in other cases the amount of transformation required to show how the whole repeats itself in the part would be much more extensive4 ,to take a single instance1 if our preceding analysis of the general nature of ,reality is sound1 we can see much more clearly how that nature reappears in the structure of a human mind than how it is exhibited in what we call a physical thing1 and we may therefore say the human mind expresses the fundamental character of the whole system much more fully and adequately than physical nature1 as it exists for our apprehension4 ,more briefly1 the same thought may be expressed by saying that ,reality has degrees1 and that the forms of ,appearance in which its common nature is most fully and clearly manifested have the highest degrees of reality4 #c4 ,this conception of ,reality as capable of degrees may at first seem paradoxical4 ,how can anything1 it will be asked1 be more or less 8real0 than anything else8 ,must not anything either be entirely real or not real at all8 ,but the same difficulty might be raised about the recognition of degree in other cases where its validity is now universally admitted4 ,thus to some minds it has appeared that there can be no degrees of the infinite or the infinitesimal2 all infinites1 and again all zeros1 have been declared to be manifestly equal4 ,yet it hardly seems possible to escape the conclusion that the concept of successive orders of infinitely great1 and again of infinitely small1 magnitudes is not only intelligible but absolutely necessary if our thought on quantitative subjects is to be consistent 7,when the sides of a rectangle1 for instance1 become infinitely great or infinitely small relatively to whatever is our standard of comparison1 it still remains a rectangle1 and its area therefore is still determined by the product of its sides1 and is therefore infinitely great or small1 as the case may be1 in relation not only to our original standard but to the sides themselves4#fh7 ,what is in one sense not a matter of degree1 may yet in another not only admit but positively require the distinction of degrees of more and less4 ,and this is precisely the case with ,reality as it manifests itself in its various appearances4 ,in the sense that it is the same single experience-system which appears as a whole and in its whole nature in every one of the subordinate experience-systems1 they are all alike real1 and each is as indispensable as every other to the existence of the whole4 ,in the sense that the whole is more explicitly present in one than in another1 there is an infinity of possible degrees of reality and unreality4 ,we should be justified in borrowing a term from mathematical science to mark this double relation of the appearances to their ,reality1 and speaking of them as successive orders of ,reality4 ,and we might then say that it is one of the principal problems of a complete ,philosophy to ascertain and arrange in their proper sequence1 as far as the limitations of our knowledge permit1 the orders of ,reality4 #d4 ,such a task as this could only be carried out by an intelligence equally at home in metaphysical analysis and in the results of the special sciences1 and would form the proper work of applied ,metaphysics4 ,in a discussion of general metaphysical principles it is sufficient to indicate the general nature of the criteria by which the degree of reality exhibited by any special partial system must be determined4 ,now1 this general nature has been already made fairly clear by the foregoing inquiry into the unity of ,reality4 ,reality1 we have seen1 is one in the sense of being an individual self-contained whole of experience4 ,and its individuality means that it is the systematic embodiment of a single coherent structure in a plurality of elements or parts1 which depend for their whole character upon the fact that they are the embodiment of precisely this structure4 ,if this is so1 we may say that degrees of reality mean the same thing as degrees of individuality1 and that a thing is real precisely to the same extent to which it is truly individual4 ,a thing1 that is1 no matter of what kind1 is really what it appears to be1 just in so far as the thing1 as it appears for our knowledge1 is itself a self-contained and therefore unique systematic whole4 ,or1 in other words1 just in so far as what we recognise as one thing shows itself1 in the face of philosophical criticism and analysis1 to be a self-contained systematic whole1 so far are we truly apprehending that thing as a manifestation of the fundamental character of ,reality1 of seeing it as it really is1 and so far does our knowledge give us genuine ,reality4 ,on the other hand1 just so far as what at first seemed a self-contained whole is discovered by subsequent analysis not to be so1 so far have we failed to see the facts in their true place in the single whole of ,reality1 and so far is our knowledge affected with error and unreality4 ,or1 again1 the more truly anything is a self-contained individual whole1 the higher its place in the scale of ,reality4 ,when we ask what are the marks by which one thing may be shown to be more of a true individual whole than another1 we shall find that they may be reduced to two1 both of which we can easily see to be in principle the same1 though1 owing to the limitations of our insight1 they do not always appear to coincide in a given case4 ,one thing is ceteris paribus more truly an individual whole than another3 7#a7 when the wealth of detailed content it embraces is greater2 7#b7 when the completeness of the unity with which it embraces that detail is greater4 ,or1 the degree of individuality possessed by any system depends3 7#a7 on its comprehensiveness2 7#b7 on its internal systematisation4 ,the more a thing includes of existence and the more harmoniously it includes it1 the more individual it is4 ,it is manifest1 of course1 that these two characteristics of a systematic whole are mutually interdependent4 ,for1 precisely because all ,reality is ultimately a single coherent system1 the more there is outside any partial system the greater must be the dependence of its constituents for their character upon their connection with reality outside1 and the less capable must the system be of complete explanation from within itself4 ,the more the partial system embraces1 the less will its constituents be determined by relation to anything outside itself1 and the more completely will its organisation be explicable by reference to its own internal principle of structure4 ,that is1 the greater the comprehensiveness of the system1 the completer in general will be its internal coherence4 ,and1 conversely1 the more completely the working of the whole system in its details is explicable from within as the expression of a single principle of internal structure1 the less must be the dependence of its contents on any external reality2 and therefore1 seeing that all reality is ultimately interconnected1 the less must be the extent of what lies outside the system in question4 ,that is1 the greater the internal unity1 the greater in general the comprehensiveness of the system4 ,thus ultimately the two criteria of individuality coincide4 #e4 ,in practice1 however1 it constantly happens1 as a consequence of the fragmentary way in which our experiences come to us1 that comprehensiveness and thorough-going systematic unity seem to be opposed to one another4 ,thus we can see1 as a general principle1 that the systematic organisation of knowledge depends upon its extent4 ,the wider our knowledge1 the greater on the whole the degree to which it exhibits organic structure2 the systematisation of science and its extension ultimately go together4 ,yet at any one moment in the development of knowledge the recognition of fresh truths may necessitate a temporary introduction of disorganisation and discrepancy among the accepted principles of science4 ,thus in the history of geometry the recognised principles of the science were temporarily disorganised by the admission of incommensurable magnitudes which was forced upon the early ,greek mathematicians by the discovery that the side and diagonal of a square have no common measure1 and the discrepancy was only removed when it became possible to revise the principles of the theory of numbers itself4 ,so again at the present day there is a real danger that premature anxiety to give the study of ,psychology precise systematic character by an exact definition of its subject and its relation to the various physical and mental sciences1 may stand in the way of the extension of our knowledge of the facts of psychical life4 ,we have often to purchase an important extension of knowledge at the cost of temporary confusion of principles1 and to be content to wait for the future readjustment of facts to principles in the course of subsequent progress4 ,so in our moral life we judge one man's character more individual than another's1 either on the ground of the superior breadth of his interests1 or of the superior consistency with which his interests are wrought into a self-consistent whole4 ,the man of many interests has so far a truer individuality than the man of few1 and again the man of steady purpose than the man whose energies are dissipated in seemingly conflicting pursuits4 ,but the two criteria do not always1 for our insight1 coincide4 ,an increase in variety and breadth of interests may be accompanied by a diminution in coherency of aim1 and a gain in coherency of aim appears often to be bought by concentration upon a few special objects4 ,and we should find it hard or impossible to decide1 where the two aspects of individuality appear to fall thus apart1 whether the man of many interests and relatively dissipated energies1 or the man of few interests and intense concentration upon them1 exhibits the higher individuality4 ,for what looked like self-dissipation in the pursuit of disconnected objects might really be the systematic pursuit of a consistent purpose too wide to be clearly apprehended in its unity either by contemporary observers or by the actor himself1 yet apparent enough to the reflective historian reading the significance of a life by its whole effect upon society1 and what seemed at the time the single object of the man of one idea might similarly be found in the light of the sequel to be the hasty combination of radically inconsistent aims4#fi ,such reflections1 however1 only show that our limited insight is insufficient to assign to every appearance with certainty its own place in the ordered system of appearances through which the single ,reality expresses itself4 ,they do not touch our general position1 that where comprehensiveness and harmony can be seen to go together1 we are justified in using them as the measure of the individuality and therefore of the reality of the partial system in which we discover them4 ,it is on such grounds1 for instance1 that we may safely pronounce that an organism1 which is the living unity of its members1 is more individual and therefore a higher reality that a mere aggregate of pre-existing units1 in which the nature of the parts is wholly or mainly independent of the structure of the whole2 and again1 that a mind consciously and systematically pursuing a coherent self-chosen system of ends is more individual1 and therefore again a higher reality1 than an organism reacting according to the temporary character of its environment or its momentary internal condition in ways which form no systematic execution of a connected scheme of ends4 ,and it is clear that1 if only on this ground1 we should have to say that we are nearer the truth in thinking of the individual whole of complete ,reality as an organism than in thinking of it as an aggregate1 and nearer the truth still in thinking of it as a mind4 ,similarly in our judgments upon our own lives and character4 ,so far as one life possesses more breadth and again more conscious unity of aim than another1 so far it is more truly individual1 and therefore a more adequate type of complete reality4 ,just so far as ,i am individual1 ,i am truly real4 ,and just so far as ,i fall short of systematic individuality1 whether from the poverty of my interests or their mutual incompatibility1 the appearance of unity in my life is illusory1 and ,i must be pronounced an unreal appearance4 ,at this point we may observe our metaphysical criterion of reality coincides with our ethical criterion of moral worth4 ,for in morality too we esteem one life worthier than another1 either for the superior comprehensiveness of its ideals or for the thoroughness with which they are wrought into a harmonious whole of coherent purpose4 ,the better man is either the man of the wider ideal1 or again the man of completer and purer self-devotion to his ideal4 ,and thus for ,morality the measure of our worth1 as for ,metaphysics the measure of our reality1 lies in our individuality4 ,and for ,morality no less than for ,metaphysics individuality is pre-eminently a thing of degrees4 ,in both cases1 again1 the same difficulty besets us as soon as we attempt to use our criterion for application to particular cases4 ,its two aspects fall apart2 it is not always the more comprehensive ideal which is served with the higher fidelity of purpose4 ,and so our actual moral judgments on the worth of particular men1 like our metaphysical judgments on the order of reality to which particular things belong1 are often necessarily uncertain and fluctuating4 ,we rate one man morally high for the comprehensive rationality of his ideals1 though he suffers from a lack of concentrated energy1 another for the steady and earnest purpose with which he follows what we perhaps deplore as a contracted ideal4 #f4 ,one more point of supreme importance concerning the relation of the lesser individuals to the perfect individual which is the absolute whole of ,reality4 ,now that we have learned what is meant by degrees of individuality1 we can see that there can1 in the last resort1 be only one perfect and complete individual1 the whole of ,reality itself1 and that the subordinate individuals can never be wholly and entirely individual in themselves4 ,for to be a complete individual would be1 as we have seen1 to be a whole system absolutely self-contained and explicable solely by reference to internal structure4 ,whatever requires1 for the full understanding of its systematic character1 reference to existence outside itself1 we have seen1 must also1 so long as it is considered apart from the rest of existence1 be internally wanting in complete systematic harmony1 and thus must fall doubly short of the ideal of individuality4 ,and precisely because the whole of experience is a single system1 no lesser system within the whole is entirely explicable in terms of its own internal structure4 ,for a full understanding of the nature of the lesser system1 and of the way in which it manifests a common character through the variety of its elements1 you have always1 in the last resort1 to go outside the system itself1 and take into account its relation to the rest of the whole system of existence4 ,and for that very reason no subordinate individual1 considered in itself1 is a completely coherent self-determined whole4 ,for a limited knowledge like our own1 which has in the main to deal with subordinate systems as we find them1 and without that complete understanding of the whole structure of ,reality which would enable us to see their precise place in the whole1 the subordinate systems themselves1 when closely scanned by a resolute philosophical analysis1 will inevitably exhibit some degree of discrepancy and want of systematic unity4 ,consider1 for instance1 such a system as is formed by the life-work of a man of marked 8individuality40 ,on the whole1 the life of such a man may fairly be said to be the systematic working out of a consistent scheme of purposes4 ,but this is1 after all1 only approximately the truth4 ,it is not the case that the nature of the central or dominant purpose of the scheme is of itself enough to determine the nature and order of the successive stages by which it finds expression4 ,we have to take into account factors in the man's 8heredity10 and again in his social and physical environment which form no part of the nature of his central dominant ideal and yet influence the manner of its fulfilment4 ,we are thus thrown back for our full understanding of the 8individual0 system in question upon circumstances which are1 so far as that system is concerned1 8accidental10 i4e4 which are equally with itself part of the whole system of experienced fact1 without our being able to see how it and they form a wider coherent whole4 ,the subordinate individual1 because incapable of explication solely from within1 is in the end only approximately 8individual10 and we therefore fall into contradictions whenever we isolate it from the rest of ,reality and treat it as absolutely individual and self-contained4 ,in dealing with subordinate wholes1 we always1 if we go far enough1 come to a point where we have to recognise their dependence upon a realm of external fact which our knowledge fails to see in its systematic relation with them1 and has therefore to treat as accidental or as an ultimate 8collocation40 ,this is why1 as has already been said1 full knowledge of our own aims and interests as a genuine systematic whole would coincide with complete insight into the structure of the whole universe4 ,we may invert the sentiment of a hackneyed verse1 and say with equal truth that until you know what ,god and man is1 you cannot really know what the 8flower in the crannied wall0 is4 ,this is as much as to say that every appearance must involve some element of contradiction for our philosophical analysis precisely because we cannot in the end see fully how any appearance is related to the whole of ,reality4 ,but we must carefully remember that if appearances1 taken by themselves1 are contradictory1 this is not because they are appearances1 but because1 as so taken1 they are all to some extent mere appearance4 ,the conclusion of the whole matter is1 that the individuality of anything less than the ultimate whole of being is a matter of degree and approximation4 ,we shall be equally in error if we assume that because no subordinate system is fully individual1 some are not more individual and therefore more real than others or if we declare that1 because whatever is real at all must be in its degree individual1 therefore every element of ,reality is completely real in its isolation4 ,the first error is that of a one-sided ,monism1 the second that of an equally one-sided ,pluralism4 ,once more we may note a point of coincidence between our general metaphysical theory of individuality and our personal experience as moral agents4 ,in so far as each of us is truly an individual1 his aims and ends form a system with an internal unity pervading its structure1 and therefore capable of progressive realisation as a system4 ,yet again1 because each of us is less than the whole of ,reality1 or1 what is the same thing1 because the systematic unity of our inner life is never complete1 and our totality of interests relations1 and aspirations never a completely self-contained ordered whole1 our ideals will always be found to contain aspects which will not fully harmonise1 elements which fall outside such a unity of structure as it is possible to effect within the limit of our single personality4 ,and thus all our victories contain an inseparable element of defeat4 ,the defeated aspects of the self may no doubt1 and in general do1 in proportion to the degree of our individuality1 belong to the 8lower0 and relatively more 8untrue0 self1 yet they are elements in the whole self1 and their suppression is a genuine if necessary self-suppression4 ,there is a sense in which an aspect of failure is an inevitable feature in the life of every subordinate and therefore imperfect individual4 ,human life1 even in the millennium1 as we rightly feel1 would not be human life if the note of sadness were altogether absent from it4 ,only in the single experience of the absolute whole can the discordant notes be finally resolved into a faultless harmony4 #g4 ,technically1 we may mark the distinction between complete and approximate individuality by saying that the absolute whole is an infinite individual1 whereas all lesser wholes are but finite individuals4 ,and here it is important to note carefully the true meaning of these often much-abused terms4 ,the infinite must not be confounded with the indefinite or unfinished4 ,its fundamental property is not the merely negative one of having no end or 8last term10 but the positive one of having an internal structure which is the harmonious and complete expression of a single self-consistent principle4 ,the finite1 again1 is finite not primarily merely because it has a 8last term10 i4e4 because there is something else outside it1 but because its 8last term0 is arbitrarily determined1 i4e4 determined by something other than the principles of its internal structure4 ,in other words1 the essential defect of the finite is that it is not solely determined by its own structural principle4 ,we can see this even in the simple case of the familiar 8infinite series0 of arithmetic and algebra4 ,such a series as #a1 #a_/b1 #a_/d 444 is 8infinite0 not merely because you never come to the last term1 but because its character is determined from within1 solely by the principle according to which each term is derived from the one before it2 that the series has no end is a simple consequence of this positive property of self-determination4 ,but suppose ,i take n terms of this series and no more1 where n is a specified number1 the resulting series is now finite1 not primarily because there are more terms of the same kind outside it1 but because the number of terms to be taken is not prescribed by the law of formation of the series1 but fixed with reference to some object independent of the principle of the series itself4 ,in other words1 only the infinite is in the full sense of the words a completely self-determined whole4 ,the finite is the imperfect1 not primarily because there is something outside it1 but because its contents are not solely prescribed by the principle of structure which they embody4 ,i1 for instance1 am a finite being1 not principally or merely because there are other men in the world1 but because my ideas and purposes are not a fully coherent systematic whole in themselves4#gj ,the view we have taken of individuality and the distinction between finite and infinite individuality is closely akin to some of the most fundamental ideas in the philosophy of ,leibnitz4 ,it was the doctrine of ,leibnitz that each of his monads 8represented0 the nature of the whole system of existence1 i4e4 repeated the structure of the whole in its own special structure1 from a particular 8point of view40 ,according to the fulness and clearness of the 8representation10 i4e4 the adequacy with which the structure of the monad repeated the structure of the whole system1 the monads were classed as higher or lower in the scale of existence4 ,the clearer a monad's representation of the whole within itself1 the greater the monad's 8activity02 the more confused the representation1 the greater its 8passivity40 ,it followed that1 inasmuch as no created monad fully exhibits the systematic structure of the whole of ,reality within itself1 every one contains some element of 8passivity10 and that to be 8passive0 primarily means not to be affected by extraneous influences1 but to contain internal 8confusion40 ,thus the 8activity0 of ,leibnitz exactly corresponds to what we have called individuality1 and his 8passivity0 to that want of complete internal systematisation which we have found inseparable from finite existence4 ,the immense significance of this definition of activity and passivity in terms of internal systematisation will be more apparent when we come1 in our concluding book1 to discuss the meaning of human freedom1 and its connection with determination and 8causality40 ,for the present it is enough to note that our own doctrine is substantially that of ,leibnitz freed from the inconsistency which is introduced into it by the monadistic assumption of the complete independence of the various finite individuals4 ,it is1 of course1 impossible to unite1 as ,leibnitz tried to do1 the two thoughts4 ,either there is ultimately only one independent individual1 the infinite individual whole1 or there is no meaning in speaking of higher and lower degrees of individuality4 ,leibnitz's inconsistency on this point seems due entirely to his desire to maintain the absolute individuality of the particular human 8soul10 a desire which is explained1 partly at least1 by his anxiety not to come into collision1 as ,spinoza and others had done1 with the official theology of the period4 #h4 ,the definition of infinite and finite individuality completes the general outline of our conception of ,reality as a whole1 and its relation to its constituent elements4 ,recapitulating that doctrine1 we may now say that the real is a single all-embracing whole of experience or psychical matter of fact1 determined entirely from within by a principle of internal structure1 and therefore completely individual4 ,because the matter of the system is in all its parts experience1 the principle of its structure must be teleological in character4#ga ,that is1 the system must be the embodiment1 in a harmonious unity of conscious feeling1 of a consistent interest or mental attitude4 ,as such we may call it the realisation indifferently of a purpose or idea1 and we may speak of the absolute experience as the completed expression of an absolute knowledge or an absolute will4 ,but if we do so1 we must bear in mind that there can be here no question of a thought which works upon and reconstructs into systematic harmony a body of data originally supplied to it in a relatively unintelligible and disconnected form from some foreign source1 or of a volition which gradually translates into reality an end or purpose originally present to it as an unrealised idea4 ,the processes of thought and volition can clearly have no place in an experience for which the what and the that are never disjoined2 as we shall by and by see more fully1 they involve existence in time1 and existence in time can belong only to the finite and imperfect4 ,hence it is best1 in the interest of intellectual clarity and candour1 to avoid the use of such expressions as knowledge and will in speaking of the absolute experience2 at best they are in large part metaphorical1 and at worst potent weapons of intellectual dishonesty4#gb ,the constituents of the system1 again1 are lesser experience systems of the same general type1 in each of which the nature of the whole manifests itself1 though to different degrees4 ,they are thus all finite individuals of varying degrees of individuality4 ,the more comprehensive and the more internally unified by an immanent principle of teleological structure such a system1 the more fully individual it is1 and the more adequately does it reveal the structure of the all-pervading whole4 ,this is the intellectual justification for our instinctive belief that what is for our human experience highest and best is ultimately in the constitution of the universe most completely real4 ,consult further3--,f4 ,h4 ,bradley1 ,appearance and ,reality1 chap4 #bd1 8,degrees of ,truth and ,reality02 ,plato1 ,republic1 vi4 #eji ff41 with the commentary in ,r4 ,l4 ,nettleship's ,lectures on ,plato's ,republic1 or ,bosanquet's ,companion to the ,republic4 ----- ,footnote #ff3 ,not the sum of them1 because the systematic whole of ,reality is not a sum but a single experience4 ,to identify it with the sum of its appearances would be the same error which occurs in ,ethics as the identification of happiness 7a qualitative whole7 with the sum of pleasures 7a quantitative collection74 ,footnote #fg3 ,the reader will find it instructive to observe how ,prof4 ,sidgwick unconsciously assumes that the distinction between ,reality and ,appearance means a distinction between two more or less independent 8worlds0 or 8things0 7,philosophy3 its ,scope and ,relations1 ,lectures #a and #d71 and thus deprives his own criticism of the antithesis of all validity as against a view like our own4 ,footnote #fh3 ,so1 again1 a velocity which is already infinitesimal may receive an acceleration which is infinitesimal in relation to the velocity itself4 ,the reader's own studies will no doubt furnish him with numerous other illustrations of the same kind4 ,footnote #fi3 ,see for illustrations of the impossibility of carrying out a single principle in our actual judgments of particular cases1 ,mr4 ,bradley's already quoted article in ,mind for ,july #aijb4 ,footnote #gj3 ,for a fuller exposition of the conception of infinity here adopted ,i may refer the reader to the famous essay of ,dedekind1 ,was sind und was sollen die ,zahlen1 especially pp4 #ag-bj4 ,the ,english reader will find an account of ,dedekind's work1 with an acute discussion of its metaphysical significance1 in ,royce1 ,the ,world and the ,individual1 ,first ,series1 ,supplementary ,essay4 ,it does not seem necessary for the purpose of this chapter to specify the points in which ,i find myself unable to follow ,professor ,royce in his use of the theory4 ,see infra1 chap4 #d1 #aj4 ,footnote #ga3 ,it would not be hard to show that in the end all systematic structure is teleological4 ,for all such structure in the last resort is a form of order1 and depends on the possibility of saying 8here this is first1 that is second40 ,and wherever we predicate order we are asserting the embodiment in detail of some dominant purpose4 ,footnote #gb3 ,in fact1 it is clear that if we speak of 8idea0 or 8volition0 in connection with the absolute individual1 we cannot mean actual 8ideas0 or actual 8volitions40 ,we must be using the psychological terms improperly in something of the same sense in which we speak of a man's 8guiding ideas0 or 8settled will0 to denote what clearly1 whatever it may be1 is not actual ideational or volitional process4 ,see further1 ,bk4 ,,iv4 chap4 #f1 #a4 ----- ,,chapter ,,iv ,,the ,,world ,,of ,,things--7#a7 ,,substance1 ,,quality1 ,,and ,,relation #a4 ,the natural or pre-scientific view of the world regards it as a plurality of 8things10 each possessing qualities1 standing in relation to others1 and interacting with them4 #b4 ,hence arise four problems3 those of the ,unity of the ,thing1 of ,substance and ,quality1 of ,relation1 of ,causality4 #c4 ,no simple answer can be given to the question1 ,what is one thing8 ,the ,unity of the ,thing is one of teleological structure1 and this is a matter of degree1 and also largely of our own subjective point of view4 #d4 ,substance and ,quality4 ,the identification of the substance of things with their primary qualities1 though useful in physical science1 is metaphysically unjustifiable4 #e4 ,substance as an 8unknowable substratum of qualities0 adds nothing to our understanding of their connection4 #f4 ,the thing cannot be a mere collection of qualities without internal unity4 #g4 ,the conception of a thing as the law or mode of relation of its states useful but metaphysically unsatisfactory4 ,ultimately the many can be contained in the one only by 8representation20 the unity in things must be that of an individual experience4 #h4 ,relation4 ,we can neither reduce qualities to relations nor relations to qualities4 #i4 ,again1 the attempt to conceive ,reality as qualities in relation leads to the indefinite regress4 #aj4 ,we cannot escape this difficulty by taking all relations as 8external40 ,and ,professor ,royce's vindication of the indefinite regress seems to depend on the uncriticised application of the inadequate category of whole and part to ultimate ,reality4 ,the union of the one and the many in concrete experience is ultra-relational4 ,,supplementary ,,note3 ,dr4 ,stout's reply to ,mr4 ,bradley4 #a4 ,when we turn from the inquiry into the structure of ,reality as it must be conceived by a consistent ,philosophy1 to consider the aspect in which it appears to ordinary non-philosophical thought1 the systematic unity which has demanded our attention in the two preceding chapters seems to be replaced by a bewildering and almost incalculable variety4 ,according to the nave pre-scientific theory of existence to which the experiences of practical life naturally give rise1 and which serves as the point of departure for all the more scientific and systematic theories of the physicist1 the psychologist1 and the metaphysician1 the world is composed of a multitude of apparently independent things1 partly animated1 like ourselves1 partly inanimate4 ,each of these things1 while in some sense a unit1 is thought of as possessing an indefinite multiplicity of qualities or properties1 as capable of standing in a variety of relations to other things1 and as acting upon other things and being influenced by them in a variety of ways4 ,in all these respects1 it should be observed1 the navely realistic thought of the pre-scientific mind treats what from a more developed point of view would be distinguished as mental and physical existences alike4 ,human persons1 like the other things of which my environment is composed1 are thought of as being at once units and the possessors of diverse properties1 as capable of a variety of relations to one another and to other things1 and as interacting with each other and the rest of the environment4 ,the recognition of the psychical as an order distinct from the physical1 with its momentous consequences for general metaphysical theory1 belongs to a later and much more sophisticated stage of intellectual development4 ,also1 it must be noted1 for the navely realistic intelligence1 ,i am myself thought of as simply one object or thing in an environment of things of a similar nature1 and my relations to that environment are conceived as being of the same type as the relations between its various component parts4 ,i too am1 for my own thought1 so long as it remains at this primitive level1 simply a thing with numerous properties1 in various relations to other things1 and interacting with them in diverse ways4#gc ,we have called this exceedingly primitive way of conceiving the nature of existence 8pre-scientific10 on the ground that both in the mental development of the individual and in that of a community of individuals it precedes even the most tentative conscious efforts to organise thought about the world into a coherent whole4 ,all scientific and philosophical constructions may be regarded as so many artificial modifications of this earlier point of view1 instituted and carried out for the purpose of rendering it more coherent and systematic4 ,at the same time1 our use of the epithet 8pre-scientific0 must not be allowed to mislead4 ,the 8pre-scientific0 view may and does co-exist in the same mind with the various modifications of it which arise in the effort to think consistently4 ,we are all of us habitually 8nave realists0 in respect of those aspects of the world of experience which lie outside the limits of our personal scientific studies2 and even as regards those aspects of existence in respect of which our theoretical views may be of a much more developed type1 we habitually relapse into the 8pre-scientific0 attitude when our immediate object is practical#gd success in action rather than logical consistency in thinking4 ,for the purposes of everyday life1 the most 8advanced0 man of science is content to be a nave realist outside his laboratory4 ,again1 pre-scientific as the primitive attitude towards existence is1 in the sense of being unaffected by the deliberate effort after system and coherency of thought1 it is so far scientific as to be a real though rudimentary and unconscious product of our intellectual need for order and system of some kind in our thought about things4 ,it is a genuine though an unconscious result of our earliest reflection on the course of experience1 and thus a true thought-construction1 not a passive reproduction of a merely 8given0 material4 ,it performs in rudimentary fashion1 and without explicit purpose1 the same task of systematising experience which the various scientific and philosophical theories of the more developed mind undertake more elaborately and with conscious intent4 ,it is thus pre-scientific1 but not properly speaking unscientific4 ,as the mass of ascertained fact accumulates and reflection upon it becomes more systematic and deliberate1 our primitive conception of the systematic nature of the real inevitably proves unsatisfactory for two reasons4 ,new facts are discovered which we cannot fit into the old scheme without modification of its structure1 and1 again1 the concepts in terms of which the scheme was originally constructed prove on examination to be themselves obscure and ambiguous in their meaning4 ,there is thus a double motive perpetually operative in bringing about reconstruction of the original scheme4 ,to the various sciences it falls in the main to devise such alteration of the old schematism as is necessary for the inclusion of fresh facts2 it is the special province of metaphysical criticism to examine the various terms both of the original scheme and its subsequent modifications1 with a view to determining how far they form an ultimately intelligible and coherent system4 #b4 ,when we scrutinise the original 8pre-scientific0 theory of the world from this point of view1 we shall find that its four leading features give rise to four metaphysical problems of great generality and considerable difficulty4 ,the conception of the world as made up of a multiplicity of things1 each of which is one1 gives rise to the problem of the unity of the thing2 the plurality of the qualities1 and again of the relations ascribed to the single thing1 gives rise to the problems of ,substance and ,quality and of ,relation2 the belief in the interaction between different things finally gives rise to the exceptionally important and difficult problem of ,causality4 ,the four problems are not altogether disconnected2 in particular1 it is hard to discuss the sense in which a thing can be spoken of as 8one10 without at the same time raising the question how the 8one0 thing stands to its many properties1 and again discussing the general meaning of relation4 ,and the problem of ,causality may be raised in so general a form as to include the other three4 ,still1 for the sake of having a definite order of discussion1 it will be well to take them as far as may be separately1 and to proceed from the simpler to the more complex4 ,when we have indicated in outline our solution of these problems1 we shall have to ask what is the general conception of a thing which our results establish1 and whether and on what grounds we are warranted in believing in the actual existence of things answering to our conception4 ,the present chapter will be devoted to the examination of the first three problems2 in the succeeding chapter we shall discuss the meaning of ,causality1 and indicate our general conclusion as to the existence of 8things40 ,with this result our survey of the general structure of ,reality will be completed1 and we shall then proceed in our third and fourth books to examine the most important of the special problems suggested by the existence of physical nature and conscious mind respectively4 #c4 ,the ,unity of the ,thing4--,the problem we have to face is as follows3 in what sense do we call any thing 8one thing10 and what gives it its character as a unity8 ,it is obvious that we may attack this question from either of two rather different points of view4 ,we may ask either1 why do we mark off just this portion of our environment from all the rest as a single thing among many things2 or1 again1 how is the oneness which we predicate of any part of the environment so marked off compatible with the multiplicity of its properties8 ,the question we propose to deal with in this section is the former of the two just propounded2 the latter shall be dealt with next as the problem of substance and its qualities4 ,what1 then1 do we mean by the unity which we ascribe to whatever we recognise as one thing among a multiplicity of others8 ,we have1 in a way1 implicitly answered this question already by the result arrived at in our discussion of the character of the elements or constituents of the system of ,reality4 ,but whereas1 in our former investigation1 we started from the general notion of ,reality as a systematic whole of experience1 and went on to ask what character is imposed on the elements of such a system by their presence in it as its elements1 we have now to raise the same question from the other side2 starting with our everyday recognition of our environment as divided into things1 we have to ask how far these things possess the character which must belong to the genuinely individual members of an individual whole of subordinate individuals4 ,for the purpose of the inquiry we must begin by taking the term thing in the same wide and ambiguous sense in which everyday thought and discourse use it4 ,we must reckon among the things which are the topic of discussion1 human persons1 animals1 plants1 greater and smaller inorganic masses1 in a word1 whatever the most matter-of-fact common-sense thinking recognises as possessed of a character in virtue of which it can as a whole determine the course of experience at a given moment4 ,the character or aspect in virtue of which such a whole determines the course of experience in this one special way rather than another1 is by this definition excluded from our conception of a thing2 it is not the thing itself but its quality or property or relation to some other thing1 and forms the subject of our second and third problems4 ,thus we may say of a thing1 in the sense in which we are using the term1 that it is what has existence as a whole here and now in the series of experiences1 though in saying so we must be careful to bear in mind that the here and now of the thing's existence are not indivisible points of space or time1 but continuous stretches of extension and duration4 ,now1 when we ask in what sense such a thing is one1 and why we mark off the limits which separate the one thing from the other things just where we do1 it at once becomes apparent that the oneness is a matter of degree4 ,we seem at first sight able with comparatively little difficulty to decide that the organism of a human being or of one of the higher animals is one thing2 when we come to deal with the lower organisms which consist of loosely aggregated colonies of largely independently functioning cells1 we begin to feel more diffidence in pronouncing what is one organism1 though we still think we can say what is one cell4 ,so1 in dealing with inanimate masses1 while we might be ready to say without much misgiving that a machine of our own construction is one1 we should find it much harder to decide whether what we perceive as a mere inorganic mass is one or many1 and harder still to give reasons for our decision in a particular case4 ,and even in the cases where our decision is most unhesitatingly pronounced1 subsequent reflection will show that the matter may not be so obvious as it seems4 ,for instance1 a pair of separated ,siamese twins would undoubtedly be generally held to be two organisms and not one2 but whether they were one or two before the severance is a question we should find it easier to ask than to answer4 ,when we try to detect some common principle in our various judgments as to whether a thing is one thing or several1 the following results seem to emerge3--7#a7 ,a thing is clearly not made one1 as is sometimes assumed1 by the possession of an unbroken contour or an uninterrupted temporal existence4 ,the succession of my mental states may make up one mental life1 and again my organism from the cradle to the grave may be pronounced in some sense one1 though no one can prove that there are no gaps in their temporal existence4 ,again1 even if we leave out of account the corpuscular theories of body according to which every thing that looks to us like a spatially continuous whole with an unbroken contour is really composed of discrete particles with interstices between them1 it is abundantly clear that common sense regards as one thing the parts of a system which works as a connected whole1 quite independently of the existence or non-existence of immediate contact between them4 7#b7 ,again1 the unity of the one thing does not depend upon identity of material1 whatever that phrase may mean4 ,my organism still remains one thing1 though its material is constantly changing by the loss of some elements and the acquisition of others4 7#c7 ,on the positive side1 it is clear that the unity we attribute to one thing is that of teleological structure4 ,a thing is one or many according to the point of view from which you look at it1 i4e4 according to the idea or purpose in the light of which you study it4 ,that is one thing which functions as one1 in other words1 which is the systematic embodiment of a coherent scheme of structure4 ,thus1 when we are considering the whole of an organism as subservient to the realisation of a unique individual aim or interest1 the organism is necessarily judged to be one1 because in respect of that interest it behaves as a whole2 when we are studying the specific mode of reaction of a particular nerve1 for instance1 the same organism just as naturally appears to us a multiplicity of distinct but interconnected things4 ,similarly1 a system of material particles appears one thing to us so long as our interest in the system is directed to those ways in which it behaves as one1 e4g41 the exchanges of energy between it and other systems external to it4 ,generally we may say that whatever is called one is called so because it is the systematic expression of a single aim or interest4 ,a thing1 in fact1 is one just in so far as it has the character we ascribed1 in our last chapter1 to a finite individual4 ,its unity is never merely numerical1 but always qualitative1 the unity of coherent structure4 ,even in our rough-and-ready way of treating continuity of contour as evidence of oneness in inanimate and apparently structureless masses1 we may detect the influence of this principle4 ,we judge the sensibly continuous mass to be one rather than many things1 because in many obvious respects it functions as one 7e4g41 in respect of its weight1 the simultaneous displacement of its parts in rotation or translation through space74 ,also1 no doubt1 our judgment is influenced by the analogy of our own bodies1 which are sensibly continuous4 ,we project in imagination into the sensibly continuous inanimate mass the same kind of teleological unity which we find in our own mental life4 ,the sensibly discontinuous1 on the other hand 7e4g41 two inorganic masses separated by an apparently empty interval71 is judged to be many things rather than one1 because1 in imagination1 we project such an inner mental life into each of the discontinuous parts4 ,if all this is so1 it would follow that the line of demarcation between one thing and another can never be drawn with hard and fast precision4 ,for if one thing ultimately means one individual1 the embodiment of a unique self-consistent idea1 the only thing which is fully and absolutely one will be the infinite individual ,reality itself4 ,the extent to which any lesser portion of the whole can be pronounced one thing will depend on the extent to which it exhibits self-contained systematic individuality1 and thus will be a matter of degree4 ,the highest kind of finite unity we can conceive will be that of a life which is the conscious progressive realisation of coherent purpose4 ,such a life is one not merely for the outside observer who detects its underlying unity of aim1 but for itself4 ,its oneness may thus be said to be both objective and subjective4 ,thus the more completely our own inner life is the systematic expression of consistent purpose1 the greater the right with which we may regard ourselves as being each truly 8one thing0 and as such truly individual4 ,but when we remember how far what any one of us calls 8his0 inner life is from exhibiting such complete internal coherency of structure1 we shall realise that even in the highest case the unity is still a matter of degree4 ,this is still more palpably the case with the lower forms of organic life4 ,not to speak of the well-known puzzles which arise when we seek to determine whether a creature which is a colony of largely independent cells is one animal or many1 our difficulties begin as soon as we have to deal with any type of life below the most fully self-conscious4 ,we can say1 to some extent1 that a human character is one so long as it is the conscious expression of systematic purpose1 but it is less easy to say in what sense we call an animal's conscious life one4 ,the absence of anything like systematic unity of aim and interest from the life of animal impulse makes it appear1 at least at first sight1 more reasonable to speak of it as a bundle or collection of distinct impulses and instincts rather than as one4#ge ,if1 in spite of this1 we still habitually speak and think of the particular higher animal as one rather than many1 the reason no doubt is that we tacitly ascribe to it something like the conscious unity of interest which we find in our own mental life1 though with a diminished clearness4 ,when we come to the inanimate world1 it seems to become purely a matter of our own subjective interest what we shall call one thing and what we shall call many4 ,that is one which may be regarded as acting as one whole in respect of its bearing upon any interest of ours2 that many which1 in respect of our interests1 does not behave as a whole4 ,thus1 except where we are dealing with forms of life to which we can with more or less plausibility ascribe some degree of conscious unity of aim and interest1 there seems no valid reason for drawing the line between different things in one place rather than in another1 except reasons of convenience4 ,it is important to bear this in mind in applying our idealistic theory of existence to the case of the inanimate world4 ,if the foundations of the idealistic theory are sound1 every real existence must be a finite individual experience of some order of individuality1 and this must of course hold good of that part of existence which appears to us as the inanimate world4 ,the inanimate world must be--as we shall see more fully in the succeeding book--a system of individual experiences1 which appears to us lifeless and purposeless merely because the kind of life it possesses is too far removed from our own for us to recognise it4 ,but we must most carefully observe that the line of demarcation between the different individual experiences which constitute the reality of that world need not in the least coincide everywhere with the line which we1 for purposes of our own1 draw between different things4 #d4 ,the ,problem of ,substance and ,quality4--,more important1 in the history of metaphysical theory1 has been the other aspect of the problem of the unity of things4 ,what we call one thing is said1 in spite of its unity1 to have many qualities4 ,it is1 e4g41 at once round1 white1 shiny1 and hard1 or at once green1 soft1 and rough4 ,now1 what do we understand by the it to which these numerous attributes are alike ascribed1 and how does it possess them8 ,to use the traditional technical names1 what is the substance to which the several qualities belong or in which they inhere1 and what is the manner of their inherence8 ,the full difficulty of this problem may be most easily exhibited by considering the ways in which popular thought commonly tries to solve it4 7#a7 ,one of the commonest and most obvious solutions is to identify the 8substance0 which has the qualities 7or1 to use the more general scholastic expression1 the accidents7 with some one group of the thing's properties which we regard as specially important or permanent4 ,the 8substance0 is then taken to be just this group of 8primary0 qualities1 and is said to have or possess the less permanent 8secondary qualities40 ,for obvious reasons1 the 8primary0 qualities have in modern ,philosophy usually been identified1 as by ,galileo1 ,descartes1 and ,locke1 with those mathematical properties of body which are of fundamental importance for the science of mechanical ,physics4#gf ,and usually1 though not always1 the way in which the substance1 as thus defined1 has the secondary qualities1 has been further explained by saying that these latter are subjective changes in our sensibility produced by the action of the primary qualities upon our various sense-organs4 ,neither of these special views is1 however1 necessarily involved in the identification of the substance of things with their fundamental qualities4 ,the essential principle of the theory consists simply in the recognition of some groups of qualities as of primary importance1 and the identification of the one 8substance0 which has the many properties with this group4 ,now1 it would be impertinent for us to raise any objection to the use of such a theory as a working hypothesis in the physical sciences1 so long as it does in those sciences the work for which it is required4 ,the object of the physical sciences as a body is simply to enable us to describe and calculate the course of events in nature with the highest degree of accuracy and the least complicated set of formul4 ,if this end is most successfully attained by treating a certain group of the properties of sensible things as of primary importance and all the rest as mere derivatives of them1 this fact of itself affords sufficient justification for the scientific use of the distinction4 ,for the special objects of physical science any group of properties which thus lends itself to the purposes of description and calculation is of primary importance4 ,but it is no less true that its importance for physical purposes does not afford the least ground for regarding it as equally valuable as a solution of the metaphysical problem of the meaning of substance4 ,for instance1 one reason why the mathematical properties of body are of such supreme importance for ,physics is that in respect of them bodies can be treated as differing not in kind but only in number4 ,this is why they are of such inestimable service as the basis of our calculations as to the behaviour of things4 ,but it might very well be that the true nature of things is most fully manifested just in those points in which they are different in kind2 from the standpoint of the metaphysician1 a view of non-human nature1 however serviceable1 which rests entirely upon the aspects in which things are most alike1 may be as superficial as the statistical sociologist's view of human nature4 ,the true being of a concrete thing may be as inadequately expressed by its mathematical properties as the true character of an individual man by a list of anthropometrical results4#gg ,in point of fact1 we can readily see that the distinction between 8primary0 and 8secondary0 qualities1 when propounded as an answer to the problem about substance1 leaves us just where we were before4 ,for 7#a7 we ascribe the primary qualities to the 8substance0 of the thing in just the same fashion as the secondary4 ,the thing is of such and such a configuration1 is of such and such a mass1 is solid1 etc42 just as it is rough1 or heavy1 or green4 ,or1 again1 it has configuration1 mass1 solidity2 just as it has weight1 taste1 colour4 ,hence the old problem breaks out again with respect to the primary qualities themselves1 however the list of them may be constructed4 ,again we have to ask1 what is the it which possesses shape1 mass1 velocity1 etc48 7#b7 ,moreover1 the theory fails to explain the nature of that 8possession0 of the secondary qualities which it ascribes to the group of primary qualities4 ,in what way1 we ask1 do the primary qualities have or possess the secondary8 ,the only serious attempt to answer this question seems to be that of the numerous philosophers 7,descartes1 ,galileo1 ,locke1 etc47 who treat the secondary qualities as 8subjective0 effects of the primary qualities upon our sense-organs4 ,now1 this familiar solution of the problem seems deficient in logic4 ,for the one solid argument which has been advanced in favour of the subjectivity of secondary qualities seems to be the contention that they cannot be perceived without sense-organs of a special type4 ,colours1 it is said1 exist only for an eye1 sounds for an ear1 taste for a tongue1 and so forth4 ,and differences of structure or temporary condition in the sense-organ lead to the perception of different secondary qualities1 as when1 to take the stock examples1 everything looks yellow to the jaundiced eye1 the same water feels warm to one hand and cold to the other1 and so forth4 ,but these considerations seem just as applicable to the supposed 8primary0 as to the 8secondary0 qualities of things4 ,geometrical form1 for instance1 is imperceptible apart from sight or touch2 motion1 again1 and consequently change of configuration1 and similarly mass1 which is a ratio of accelerations1 require either sight or touch for their perception4 ,of course1 we can think of motions and masses which we are not actually perceiving1 just as we can think of an absent colour or smell1 and in both cases we can in reasoning about motions or masses or colours or smells abstract altogether from the presence of a percipient4 ,but this does not affect the fact that the mathematical qualities of body are just as dependent for perception upon the presence of a percipient with suitable sense-organs as anything else4 ,configurations1 extensions1 and motions which no one perceives by sight or touch or any other sense are exactly in the same case as a colour which no one sees or a sound which no one hears4 ,the argument from the indispensability of a perceiving organ ought logically to tell just as much in the one case as the other4#gh ,again1 and this is a point of the first importance1 experience never gives us the 8primary quality0 by itself4 ,what we get in actual experience is always the conjunction of primary and secondary qualities in a concrete perception4 ,thus we never perceive extension apart from some special visual or tactual filling of the 8secondary0 kind4 ,the extended has always some quality of colour1 or texture1 or resistance4 ,an extension which is totally devoid of colour1 tactual quality1 and everything which belongs to the so-called sensible1 non-mathematical1 or 8secondary0 properties of body1 is an unreal abstraction1 got by leaving out an aspect which in actual experience appears inseparable from it1 and therefore presumably illegitimate4 ,illegitimate1 that is1 when offered as an account of the fundamental reality of body1 however useful for the special purposes of natural science4 ,thus the attempt to take the so-called primary qualities as the unitary 8substance0 which has or 8possesses0 the secondary qualities1 and to dispose of these latter as 8subjective10 leads to no satisfactory result4 ,the former1 too1 must be merely qualities possessed by a more ultimate substance4 #e4 ,hence it constantly happens that the same writers who treat substance as identical with the primary qualities of things1 alternate this view with another according to which substance is an unknowable unit of which we can say no more than that it1 whatever it may be1 is what is presupposed in all propositions about the behaviour of things as the 8unknown substratum0 of their various qualities4 ,according to this view1 the many qualities of the thing in some inexplicable manner 8flow0 either from the nature of its own unknown substratum or substance1 or from the relations in which this substratum stands with that of other things4#gi ,our knowledge is then held to be confined to these consequences of the unknown ultimate character of real things2 we are ignorant1 it is said1 of the substance both of physical and of mental existence1 we know only its attributes or manifestations4 ,or it is otherwise phrased thus3 we do not know what things really are1 we know only their effects on one another and on our own senses4 ,this is1 for instance1 the view represented by those portions of ,locke's ,essay in which emphasis is laid upon our inability in the last resort to know the true substance of things4 ,now1 such a general doctrine as this is manifestly open to grave objections4 7#a7 ,if we are serious in maintaining the unknowable character of the substratum of a thing's qualities1 it is hard to see how the assertion of its existence can be any addition to our knowledge of the thing4 ,to say that we are entirely ignorant of the nature of this substratum only amounts to saying in other words1 that we have really no idea how the many qualities can be qualities of a single thing4 ,if this is so1 it does not appear what we gain by talking of the single thing at all as the owner or possessor of its qualities4 ,it would1 we might think1 be better to abandon the confessedly unintelligible notion of a single substratum in which the qualities 8inhere10 and say that the thing1 for our intellect1 is simply the many qualities themselves4 ,how this view would have to be reconciled with the tacit assumption of the thing's unity as a substance1 which underlies all the judgments in which its attributes are predicated of it1 we shall have to discuss more fully in the next section4 7#b7 ,a still more serious difficulty remains behind4 ,not only is an 8unknowable substratum of qualities0 a superfluous luxury in metaphysical theory1 but the nature of the supposed relation between such a substratum and the attributes which 8flow0 from it is unintelligible4 ,we can understand neither what a substance or substratum totally devoid of qualities could possibly be1 nor yet how the various qualities of the world of things presented to our experience could 8flow0 as secondary consequences from one or more such substrata4 ,we cannot conceive how things could first 8be0 without this being of theirs possessing any definite character1 and then subsequently1 in virtue of their relations among themselves1 give rise to their qualities or characteristic modes of being4 ,nothing can be at all without being in some determinate way1 and this 8being in some determinate way0 is precisely what we mean by the qualities of a thing4 ,a thing cannot be without behaving in special ways towards its environment1 and these special ways of behaving are the thing's qualities4 ,we cannot1 therefore1 divorce the being or that of a thing from its determinate mode of being or what1 and regard the latter as something which supervenes on or is derived from the former1 or the former as something which can exist without and apart from the latter4 ,things are not first there and afterwards in some mysterious way clothed with qualities2 their qualities are simply their special way of being there4 ,as ,lotze well puts it1 all such attempts to formulate a theory of the way in which the what of things flows from a mere that1 are attempts to answer the absurd question how ,being is made4#hj ,the notion that things have a that or substance prior to their what or quality1 and consisting simply in 8being0 which is not this or that determinate mode of being1 is thus unmeaning as well as superfluous4 #f4 ,accordingly the whole notion of a substantial unity in things behind the multiplicity of their states or qualities has been regarded with disfavour by many students of positive science4 ,the qualities being all that interests us in things1 and the notion of an indeterminate substratum contradictory1 we ought1 it is argued1 to identify the thing and the series of its states and qualities without more ado4 ,from this point of view the thing ceases to be an unknown somewhat1 which in some mysterious way has properties2 it becomes the properties themselves thought of as a collection4 ,it is no longer the unperceived this which has warmth1 redness1 etc41 it is the warmth1 the redness1 and the rest of the sensible qualities taken collectively4 ,for phenomenalist ,metaphysics1 as for associationist ,psychology1 the thing is a 8bundle of attributes0 and nothing more4 ,when we ask how1 if a 8thing0 is merely the series or sum of its attributes1 and possesses no underlying unity to which the attributes belong1 the whole of our ordinary language about things comes to be constructed on the contrary assumption1 how it is that we always talk and think as if every 8bundle0 of attributes were owned by something of which we can say that it has the quality1 we are met by the phenomenalist with a reference to ,psychology4 ,owing to the fact1 which ,phenomenalism and ,associationism are content to accept as ultimate1 that sensible qualities are always presented to our perception in definite groups1 it is argued that the thought of any one member of such a group is enough to revive by association the thought of the other qualities which have regularly been presented simultaneously with itself or in immediate succession to it4 ,hence1 because thus associated in our perception1 the group comes naturally1 though illegitimately1 by one of those mental fictions of which ,hume treats so fully1 to be thought of as one1 though it is actually a discrete multiplicity4 ,the unity of the thing thus lies not in itself1 but solely in our way of perceiving and thinking4 ,a more recent version of the same doctrine1 which avoids the old associationist mistake of treating perception as a merely passive reception of a given material1 is that the unity of the one subject of many predicates is ultimately derived from the unity of our own acts of attention4 ,the qualities appear to belong to 8one0 thing because we attend to them together as one in a single moment of attention4 ,thus the unity of substance which common sense believes itself to find in its objects has really been put into them by the perceiving mind itself4 ,what is 8given0 to it is a disconnected plurality of qualities2 by attending to groups of them as one it makes those groups into the attributes of a single reality4 ,this is the essence of the doctrine of ,kant1 according to which the concept of 8substance0 is simply one form of the 8synthetic unity of apperception0 i4e4 the process by which we project the unity of our own acts of attention into their objects1 and thus create an orderly world for our own thought out of sensations which as they are given to us are a chaos4 ,in principle1 ,kant's doctrine1 though intended as a refutation of ,hume's ,associationism1 only differs from ,hume's in the stress it rightly lays on the element of subjective interest in perception2 the two theories agree on the main point1 that the bond which unites the many qualities of sense perception into one thing is a subjective one1--in ,hume's expressive phrase1 a 8fiction of the mind40#ha ,with the psychological aspects of this doctrine we are not directly concerned in the present inquiry4 ,for us the problem is not by what precise steps the mind comes to 8feign0 a unity in its objects which is not really there1 but whether this conception of a feigned or subjective unity imposed by the mind upon a number of actually disconnected qualities is itself ultimately intelligible4 ,thus the metaphysical issue may be narrowed down to the following question3 ,can we intelligibly hold that a thing is in reality simply a number of qualities1 not in their own nature connected1 which we arbitrarily regard for our own purposes as one8#hb ,in other words1 can we say the thing is simply identical with its qualities considered as a mere sum or collection1 and any further unity of the kind the old ,metaphysics denotes by 8substance0 a mental addition of our own to the facts8 ,now there are two considerations--both ultimately reducible in principle to one--which seem fatal to the identification of a thing with its qualities1 considered as merely discrete4 7#a7 ,there can be no doubt that it is largely true to say that a given group of qualities appear to us to be the qualities of one thing because we attend to them as one4 ,and again1 attention is undoubtedly determined by1 or1 to put it in a better way1 is an expression of1 our own subjective interests4 ,but these considerations do not in the least show that attention is purely arbitrary4 ,if we take any group of qualities to form one thing because we attend to it as one1 it is equally true that we attend to it as one because it affects our subjective purposes or interests as one4 ,that group of qualities is 8one thing0 for us which functions as one in its bearing upon our subjective interests4 ,what particular interest we consider in pronouncing such a group one1 in what interest we attend to it1 may be largely independent of the qualities of the group1 but the fact that the group does function as one in respect to this interest is no 8fiction0 or creation of our own thought2 it is the expression of the nature of the group itself1 and is independent of 8our mind0 in precisely the same sense in which the existence and character of any single member of the group of qualities is independent4 ,there is no sense in assigning the single quality to 8the given10 and the union of the qualities into a single group to 8the work of the mind02 in one sense both are the 8work of the mind10 in another both are the expression of the nature of the 8given40#hc 7#b7 ,again1 the insufficiency of the simple identification of the thing with its qualities considered as a mere collection1 may be illustrated by considering what the group of qualities must contain4 ,the group of qualities is obviously never present in its entirety at any moment of experience4 ,for the majority of what we call the qualities of a thing are simply the ways in which the 8thing0 behaves in the presence of various other things1 its modes of reaction upon a number of stimuli4 ,now1 at any moment of the 8thing's0 existence it is only actually reacting upon a few of the possible stimuli1 and thus only exhibiting a few of its qualities4 ,the vast majority of its qualities are at any moment what ,locke calls 8powers10 i4e4 ways in which it would behave if certain absent conditions were fulfilled4 ,thus the thing to which we ascribe a number of predicates as its qualities is never the actual group of predicates themselves4 ,grass is green1 but its greenness is not a fact in the dark2 the sun is capable of melting the wax1 and this capacity qualifies it permanently1 but it does not actually melt the wax unless the wax is there1 and various other conditions are also given2 a man is temperamently choleric1 but he is not actually at every moment of his existence in a passion4 ,he is only predisposed to fly into a passion readily on the occurrence of provocation4 ,most of a thing's qualities thus are mere possibilities2 the nature of the thing is to act in this or that way under certain definite conditions which may or may not be realised in actual existence4 ,thus the collection of qualities with which ,phenomenalism identifies a thing has itself no real existence as a collection4 ,the collection is just as much a 8fiction of the mind0 as the unity which we attribute to it4 ,yet the fact that the thing's qualities are mainly mere possibilities does not destroy the existence of the thing4 ,it actually is1 and is somehow qualified by these possibilities4 ,and for that very reason its existence cannot be identified with the actual realisation of these possibilities in a group or collection of events4 ,we might add as a further consideration1 that the number of such possibilities is indefinite1 including not only the ways in which the thing has behaved or will behave on the occurrence of conditions at present non-existent1 but also all the ways in which it would behave on the occurrence of conditions which are never realised in actual existence4 ,but the previous argument is already in itself sufficient1 the moment its significance is fairly grasped1 to dispose of the notion that anything can be merely identical with a group of actually existing sensible qualities4 ,the being of the things must be sought not in the actual existence of the group of sensible qualities1 but in the law or laws stating the qualities which would be exhibited in response to varying sets of conditions4#hd #g4 ,considerations of this kind compel us to forego the attempt to find the substance or being of a thing in the mere sequence of its different states considered as an aggregate4 ,to make ,phenomenalism workable1 we are forced to say at least that the thing or substance to which the various attributes are assigned is the 8law of its states10 or again is 8the mode of relation of its various qualities40 ,such a definition has obviously a great advantage over either of the two we have just rejected4 ,it is superior to the conception of the thing as an unknown substratum of qualities1 since it explicitly excludes the absurd notion of a world of things which first are1 without being in any determinate way1 and then subsequently set up determinate ways of existing among themselves4 ,for a law1 while not the same thing as the mere collection of occurrences in which it is realised1 has no existence of its own apart from the series of occurrences which conform to it4 ,again1 every law is a statement of possibilities1 a formula describing the lines which the course of events will follow if certain conditions are operative2 no law is a mere register of actually observed sequences4#he ,hence1 in defining the thing as the 8law of its states10 we avoid the difficulty dealt with in the last paragraph1 that the collection of the thing's states never actually exists as a 8given0 collection4 ,thus for ordinary practical purposes the definition is probably a satisfactory one4 ,yet it should be evident that in calling the thing the 8law0 of its states1 we merely repeat the metaphysical problem of the unity of substance without offering any solution of it4 ,for1 not to dwell on the minor difficulty that we might find it impossible to formulate a single law connecting all the ways in which one thing reacts upon others1 and thus ought more properly to speak in the plural of the laws of the states1 we are now left with two distinct elements or aspects of the being of the thing1 namely1 the successive states and the law of their succession1 and how these two aspects are united the theory fails to explain4 ,we have the variety and multiplicity on the one hand in the states or qualities of the thing1 its unity on the other in the form of the law connecting these states1 but how the variety belongs to or is possessed by the unity we know no better than before4 ,thus the old problem of substance returns upon us2 the many qualities must somehow be the qualities of a single thing1 but precisely how are we to conceive this union of the one and the many8#hf ,at this point light seems to be thrown on the puzzle by the doctrine of ,leibnitz1#hg that the only way in which a unity can1 without ceasing to be such1 contain an indefinite multiplicity is by 8representation40 ,experience1 in fact1 presents us with only one example of a unity which remains indubitably one while embracing an indefinite multiplicity of detail1 namely1 the structure of our experience itself4 ,for the single experience regularly consists of a multiplicity of mental states1 both 8focal0 and 8marginal10 simultaneous and successive1 which are nevertheless felt as one single whole because they form the expression of a coherent purpose or interest4 ,and this conscious unity of feeling1 determined by reference to a unique interest1 is the only instance to which we can point when we desire to show by an actual illustration how what is many can at the same time be one4 ,if we can think of the thing's qualities and the law of their connection as standing to one another in the same way as the detailed series of acts embodying a subjective interest of our own1 and the interest itself which by its unity confers a felt unity on the series1 we can in principle comprehend how the many qualities belong to the one thing4 ,in that case the thing will be one 8substance0 as the embodiment of an individual experience1 determined by a unique subjective interest1 and therefore possessing the unity of immediate feeling4 ,its many qualities will 8belong0 to it in the same sense in which the various constituents of an experience thus unified by immediate feeling are said to 8belong0 to the single experience they constitute4 ,and thus our idealistic interpretation of the general nature of ,reality will be found to contain the solution of the problem of ,substance and ,quality4 ,now it is fairly clear that some such idealistic solution is already contained in germ in the pre-scientific view of the world of things4 ,there can be little doubt that our original notion of the unity of the thing as contrasted with the multiplicity of its qualities has been obtained by 8introjectively0 ascribing to whatever groups of qualities act upon us as one in respect of some interest of our own1 the same conscious unity of feeling which we know in ourselves and our fellows4 ,we shall have frequent opportunities1 as we proceed1 of discovering the enormous extent to which the whole pre-scientific view of the world is based upon the interpretation of all existence in terms of our own4 ,systematic ,idealism will thus gradually be found to be no more than the consistent and deliberate carrying through of that anthropomorphic interpretation of ,reality which lies at the bottom of all man's attempts to make his surroundings intelligible to himself4 ,it will follow1 if our general attitude towards the problem of substance is tenable1 that only what we have already defined as an individual experience can truly be called a 8substance10 and that such experiences are 8substances10 if the word is to be retained in our philosophical vocabulary1 to the same degree to which they are truly individual4 ,and thus we should be led in the end to the distinction between the one infinite substance which forms the whole of ,reality and the finite and imperfect substances which are its components4 ,again1 we should have once more to remember that since1 in general1 we call that group of qualities one which acts on our interests as one1 and our insight into those interests themselves is limited and confused1 the boundaries assigned by us to the group of qualities we ascribe to a single substance as 8its0 states will be more or less arbitrary1 and dependent upon the degree of our actual insight4 ,it is possible for us to group together as states of the same thing qualities which a profounder insight would have disjoined1 and vice vers4 ,and in the end1 if all that is is contained in a single coherent self-determined system1 it is clear that1 speaking rigorously1 there will ultimately be only one 8substance0--the central nature or principle of the system itself--of which all subordinate aspects or parts of existence will be the attributes4 #h4 ,the ,problem of ,relation4--,more perplexing than the problem of ,substance and its ,qualities is the question to which the pre-scientific assumption that the world consists of a number of interrelated things gives rise4 ,this problem of ,relation becomes still more prominent when reflection upon the problem of ,substance and ,quality has made it manifest that what we call the qualities of things are one and all dependent upon their relations either to our perceptive organs or to other things4 ,put quite simply the problem is as follows3 ,things stand in a variety of relations to one another1 and what we commonly call the qualities of each are dependent on 7a7 its modes of relation to other things1 7b7 its relation to our percipient organism4 ,again1 the various qualities of one thing stand in relation among themselves4 ,to begin with1 they all exhibit the relations of identity and difference4 ,they all so far possess a common nature as to be capable of being compared in respect of the special ways in which they manifest that nature1 and are thus so far identical2 again1 they can be discriminated and distinguished1 and are so far in the relation of difference4 ,further1 the qualities of one thing are interconnected1 as we have already seen1 by various special laws or modes of relation1 which exhibit the changes in the behaviour of the thing corresponding to changes in the surrounding circumstances4 ,thus ,phenomenalism1 when it has banished the notion of a substantial unity in things1 has to identify the world of things1 as we have already seen1 with qualities in relation to one another4 ,but now the question arises1 ,how are we to understand the conception of qualities in relation8 ,can we1 on the one hand1 reduce all qualities to relations or all relations to qualities1 or1 on the other1 can we form an intelligible idea of the way in which a single whole or system can be formed by the union of the two8 ,there are1 of course1 other questions of great though relatively secondary importance connected with the problem of relation1 e4g41 the question as to the number of ultimately irreducible kinds of relation1 but the scope of the present work will permit of nothing beyond a brief discussion of the central difficulty4 ,we will take the various alternatives in order4 7#a7 ,philosophers have often been tempted to evade the difficulty of showing how qualities and relations together can make up a system by suppressing one member of the antithesis altogether4 ,thus it has been maintained1 on the one hand1 that the world of real things consists entirely of simple unrelated qualities1 and that what we call relations between these qualities are merely our own subjective ways of apprehending them4 ,on the other hand1 it has been suggested that there may be nothing in the real world except relations1 and that what we call qualities of various kinds are nothing but forms of relation4 ,but neither of these views seems seriously tenable4 ,for 7a7 reality cannot consist of mere relations4 ,every relation implies two or more terms which are related4 ,and these terms cannot be created by the relation itself4 ,in every relation the terms have some character of their own over and beyond the mere property of being terms in that relation4 ,thus1 to take a simple example1 the successive terms of the series of ordinal numbers express in themselves nothing beyond determinate position in an ordered series1 but when they are applied to the actual arrangement of any content in serial order1 that content is 7c7 not created by the arrangement of it in an ordered series of terms1 and 7b7 is dependent for the actual order of its terms upon some positive character of its own4 ,in other words1 whenever you actually count you count something other than the names of the numbers you employ1 and you count it in an order which depends on the character of the particular things counted4#hh ,and so generally of all relations4 ,a question has been raised which presents considerable difficulty and cannot be discussed here1 whether there are or are not merely external relations 7i4e4 relations which are independent of the special qualities of their terms74 ,but even if we admit that there may be such merely external relations1 which do not depend upon the nature of the terms between which they subsist1 it is at least clear that there cannot be relations without any terms1 and that the terms are not created out of nothing by the relation between them4#hi ,perhaps it might be rejoined that what ,i call the terms of a certain relation1 though no doubt not created by that particular relation1 may be themselves analysed into other relations1 and those again into others ad indefinitum4 ,thus it might be said that the term ,a of the relation ,a-,b may no doubt have a quality of its own which is not created by this relation4 ,but this quality1 call it ,a#a1 is found on analysis to be resoluble into the relation ,c-,d1 and the quality ,c#a of ,c again into the relation ,e-,f1 and so on without end4 ,this would not1 however1 amount to a reduction of qualities to mere relations4 ,for it would give us1 as the unit of our scheme of things1 a pair of terms or qualities in relation2 and however often we repeated the process of analysis1 we should still always be left with the same type of triad1 two terms and a relation1 as the result of analysis4 ,whatever its worth1 this particular solution falls under our second alternative1 and must be considered in connection with it4 7#b7 ,but again1 it is even more manifest that we cannot reduce all reality to qualities1 and dismiss the relations between them as simply our subjective mode of apprehension4 ,this line of thought is capable of being worked out in two slightly different ways4 ,we might hold that what really exists is disconnected simple qualities1 each distinct from all others as red is from sweet1 or loud from hot1 and that the whole network of relations by which everyday and scientific thought bring these 8reals0 into connection is a mere intellectual scaffolding to which nothing in the real world corresponds4 ,something like this would be the logical outcome of the ,humian doctrine that all relations are 8the work of the mind10 and that reality is the residuum left after we have removed from our conception of the world everything which is of our own mental fabrication4 ,the grounds upon which this doctrine was advanced by ,hume and his followers have already been destroyed by the progress of ,psychology and the consequent abandonment of the old hard-and-fast distinction between sensation and mental construction4 ,it was the belief of ,hume1 and apparently of ,kant1 that what is given in 8sensation0 is single uncompounded qualities1 and that all relations between these psychical atoms are produced by a subsequent process of subjective synthesis4 ,but the advance of ,psychology1 by leading to the recognition that sensation itself is a continuous process containing a multiplicity of 8marginal0 elements which in all sorts of ways modify the character of its central or 8focal0 element1 has made it impossible any longer to maintain an absolute distinction between the sensory and the intellectual factor in cognition4 ,and apart from the illusory nature of the distinction on which the theory was based1 it is sufficiently condemned for ,metaphysics by its own inherent absurdity4 ,for the fundamental presupposition of ,metaphysics1 as of all serious science1 is that ,reality is a coherent system4 ,but1 according to the view which regards relations as pure 8fictions of the mind10 just that element in our thought which gives it its systematic character is an unwarranted addition of our own to the real4 ,order and system are in fact1 on this view1 mere illusion4 ,and1 as has often been pointed out by the critics of ,hume1 it is quite inconceivable how1 in a world where nothing but disconnected simple qualities exist1 the illusion should ever have arisen4 ,if even our own inner life is simply incoherent1 it is quite impossible to see how we can ever have come1 even by a fiction1 to read system into the world of fact4 ,a more plausible attempt to reduce all relations to qualities proceeds on the following lines4 ,relations1 it is said1 are of subjective manufacture1 but they are1 for all that1 not mere fictions4 ,for every relation between two terms1 say ,a and ,b1 is based upon the presence in ,a and ,b of certain qualities1 which are called the fundamenta relationis or basis of the relation4 ,these qualities may be the same in both the terms1 in which case the relation is called symmetrical2 such a case is that1 e4g41 of the equality of ,a and ,b1 a relation having for its fundamentum the fact that ,a and ,b have both the same magnitude4 ,here the real fact is taken to be that ,a has this magnitude1 and again that ,b has it4 ,the subjective addition to the facts is thought to come in in the voluntary comparison of ,a and ,b in respect of this property and the consequent assertion of their equality4 ,or the qualities which are the foundation of the relation may be different in each of the terms1 in which case the relation is technically called asymmetrical4 ,examples of such asymmetrical relations are1 e4g41 ,a greater than ,b1 ,b less than ,a1 or again1 ,a father to ,b1 ,b son to ,a4 ,here the actual facts would be taken to be ,a possessed of magnitude x1 ,b of magnitude x-y1 ,a qualified by the circumstance of begetting ,b1 ,b by the circumstance of being begotten by ,a4 ,the subjective addition would come in1 as before1 when we brought ,a and ,b under one joint of view by comparing them in respect of these properties4 ,the inherent difficulties of the reduction of relations to qualities are1 however1 only thinly disguised in this version of the doctrine4 ,to argue that the establishment of judgments of relation presupposes subjective comparison of the related terms from a more or less arbitrarily chosen point of view1 is metaphysically irrelevant4 ,the whole question is as to whether the result of the process is to make things more intelligible as a systematic whole2 if it is1 the subjectivity of the process is no ground for discrediting the result as truth about the real4 ,if it is not1 the philosophers who insist on the subjectivity of relations should explain how we can coherently think of a systematic whole of reality in terms of quality apart from relation4 ,this they have never been able to do1 and that for obvious reasons4 ,it is manifestly impossible to give any intelligible account of the qualities which we recognise as fundamenta of relations without introducing previous relations4 ,thus the possession of the common magnitude x may be assigned as the foundation of the relation of equality between ,a and ,b2 but when we ask what is meant by predicating of ,a and ,b possession of the magnitude x1 we find that we are thrown back upon a relation between ,a1 ,b1 and some third term ,s1 which we take as our unit of measurement4 ,a and ,b are both of magnitude x because each contains ,s1 let us say1 x times exactly4 ,so again the fact 8,a begetter of ,b0 was assigned as the fundamentum of the asymmetrical relation of paternity between ,a and ,b1 and the same fact under another name as the fundamentum of the asymmetrical relation of filiation between ,b and ,a4 ,but now what is meant by saying that the same fact qualifies ,a and ,b in different ways8 ,any answer to this question plunges us back at once into a perfect network of relations4 ,for first1 that a fact x may be known to qualify ,a and ,b differently1 ,a and ,b must themselves be discriminated1 i4e4 they must be compared and found different1 and without relation difference is unmeaning4 ,for ultimately two terms are different only when they also possess a common character which admits of their comparison with reference to a common standard4 ,thus only things which are like can be different1 and the problem of the relation of their likeness to their difference is inevitably forced upon us by the very existence of the difference4 ,and similarly1 the common fact x qualifies either term in a definite way1 which can be discriminated from the ways in which other facts qualify the same term1 and this discrimination leads in precisely the same manner to the assertion of various relations among the different qualities of ,a and again of ,b4#ij ,it is not difficult to see the common source of the difficulties which beset both the attempt to reduce all reality to qualities1 and the attempt to identify it with mere relations4 ,in actual experience our world always comes to us as at once many and one1 never as merely single nor as merely discrete4 ,if you pay exclusive regard to the aspect of unity and interconnection1 you will naturally be tempted to dwell on the relations between your elements to the exclusion of the various elements themselves2 if you think solely of the aspect of variety1 it is equally natural to treat the elements as real and their relations as fictions4 ,but in either case you arbitrarily concentrate your attention on a single aspect of the experienced fact taken in isolation from the other1 and are thus led to results which are bound to collide with the whole facts4 ,a true view1 if possible at all1 can only be got by impartial adherence to the whole of the facts4 #i4 ,we are thus brought to the second of our alternatives4 ,can we conceive of ,reality as qualities in relation or qualities and their relations8 ,this is really1 in a somewhat more developed form1 the same problem as that suggested by the definition of a thing as the 8law of its states40 ,we are now to take the qualities as fixed terms with a character of their own which stand in or support further relations1 and we have to ask if the view of the world thus formulated is entirely intelligible4 ,and it speedily becomes clear that such a view is confronted by a formidable difficulty4 ,for suppose that ,a and ,b are two qualities which stand in any relation ,c4 7,for simplicity's sake we might suppose this relation ,c to be1 e4g41 that of being discriminated1 and we might take as instances of ,a and ,b1 say1 two definitely discriminated shades of the same colour47 ,then ,a and ,b1 standing in the relation ,c1 are not identical with ,a and ,b as they would be apart from this relation4 7,a1 for instance1 as qualified by contradistinction from ,b1 is not the same thing as mere ,a not in any way affected by ,b1 a fact which is frequently brought home to us with startling force by the effects of contrast47 ,at the same time the relation ,c cannot create its own terms2 ,a1 which is qualified in some special way by its standing to ,b in the relation ,c1 may also exist out of this relation1 and the mere fact of our recognising it as ,a shows that1 both in the relation ,c and outside it1 it has a recognisable identical character4 7,e4g41 ,a as discriminated from ,b is not precisely the same thing as ,a before discrimination1 but the difference of ,a from ,b has not been created by the act of discrimination2 it must previously have been different in order to be discriminated47 ,thus we seem forced to split up the quality ,a1 which we took as one of the terms of our relation1 into two aspects1 ,a 7,a#a7 the quality as it was before the establishment of the relation1 and ,a 7,a#b7 the quality as it is after the establishment of the relation4 ,and the two aspects thus discovered in what we took for the single quality ,a must again be somehow in relation to one another4 ,hence within ,a 7,a#a7 and ,a 7,a#b7 itself the same process will be repeated1 and what we began by regarding as the fixed terms of the relation will turn out to be themselves systems of qualities in relation1 and this process will have no limit4 ,the classification of the contents of experience into fixed terms with relations between them1 it is contended1 is no solution of the problem how the experienced world can be both one and many but a mere restatement of it4 8,we have to take reality as many and to take it as one1 and to avoid contradiction4444 ,and we succeed1 but succeed merely by shutting the eye which if left open would condemn us40 ,hence the conclusion is drawn that 8a relational way of thought 444 must give appearance and not truth4 ,it is a makeshift1 a device1 a mere practical compromise1 most necessary but in the end most indefensible40#ia #aj4 ,the foregoing reasoning1 which has been condensed from the fuller exposition in ,mr4 ,f4 ,h4 ,bradley's ,appearance and ,reality1 demands most careful examination1 as the consequence to which it leads is of supreme importance for our whole metaphysical view of the nature of ultimate ,reality4 ,if the conclusion of ,mr4 ,bradley is sound1 it is clear that our discursive thought with its scheme of predication1 which is from first to last relational1 can never give us adequate insight into the nature of the union of the one and the many4 ,we shall then have to conclude that it is not in thought about ,reality1 but in some mode of experience1 if such there is1 which enables us to transcend the separation of subject from predicate1 and is therefore suprarelational1 that we come nearest to experiencing the real as it really is4 ,we should thus be more or less in sympathy with the traditional ,mysticism which has always made the transcending of the distinction of subject from predicate the keynote of its special way of experiencing the ,divine4 ,on the other hand1 if the relational scheme of ordinary knowledge could be defended as a self-consistent way of regarding the facts1 we should have the advantage of being able to construe the absolute ,experience in terms of our own intellectual life much more completely than ,mysticism allows4 ,how1 then1 might the interpretation of the world as a system of qualities in relation be defended against ,mr4 ,bradley's powerful formulation of the mystic's objection1 and what is the worth of the defence8 ,two possible lines of argument suggest themselves as sufficiently plausible to call for examination4 7#a7 ,the edge of the objection would be turned1 as far as it rests upon the unsatisfactoriness of the indefinite regress1 if we could regard all relations as 8external10 that is1 as making no difference in the qualities they relate4 ,now1 some relations1 it has been asserted1 are merely external1 e4g41 relations of position and again of sense in the geometrical meaning of the word 7like the difference between a right-hand and a left-hand glove74 ,why1 then1 may this not ultimately be the case with all relations8 ,but if all relations are external1 we can no longer argue that the related terms must contain a further relation between themselves as the basis and themselves as the result of the first relation1 and so the whole anti-relational case falls to the ground4 ,such a view seems1 however1 to suffer from fatal deficiencies4 ,for 7a7 it is at least hard to see how any relation can be ultimately external to its terms4 ,for you cannot hold two terms in a relation of any sort without discriminating them2 until they are at least discriminated as two they cannot be terms with a relation between them4 ,thus discrimination1 and therefore the relation of distinction1 is fundamental in all relation4 ,but where we can distinguish there must already be in the discriminated terms some difference to afford a basis for discrimination4 ,only what is already different can be distinguished4 ,and with this admission the door is once more opened for the indefinite regress4 7b7 ,and even if this were not so1 it seems unthinkable that all relations should be in the end external to their terms4 ,if no relation in the end makes any difference to its terms1 and thus has no foundation in their nature1 it becomes a standing miracle how or why the terms should enter into relations to which they are all the time absolutely indifferent4 ,the logical consequence of such a view would surely be the dismissal of all relations as pure illusion1 and the reduction of real existence to a chaos of disconnected reals which we by some inexplicable intellectual perversity persist in taking for a system4 ,the now universally recognised failure of ,herbart's attempt to work out a theory of ,realism on these lines seems ominous for the success of any future doctrine of the same kind4 7#b7 ,much more subtle is the line of thought suggested by ,professor ,royce in the ,supplementary ,essay appended to his book1 ,the ,world and the ,individual1 ,first ,series4 ,professor ,royce admits the indefinite regress as an inevitable consequence of the reduction of the world to terms in relation1 but denies that it affects the soundness of the reduction4 ,on the contrary1 he regards it rather as a proof of the positive correctness of the interpretation of existence which gives rise to it4 ,his argument1 which is based upon the modern doctrine of infinite series1 may be briefly summarised as follows3--,it is a recognised characteristic of an infinite series 7and of no others7 that it can be adequately 8represented0 by a part of itself4 ,that is to say1 if you take any infinite series you please1 you can always construct a second series such that it consists of a selection1 and only of a selection1 from the terms of the first series1 and that every term is derived from and answers to the corresponding term of the first series according to a definite law4 ,and this second series1 as it is easy to prove1 is itself infinite1 and therefore capable of being itself represented adequately in a third series derived from it in the same manner as it was derived from the first1 and so on indefinitely4 ,for instance1 let the first series be the infinite series of the natural integers #a1 #b1 #c1 #d1 444 then if1 e4g41 we construct a second series1 #ab1 #bb1 #cb 444 of the second powers of these integers1 the terms of this second series are derived by a definite law from those of the first to which they correspond1 and again they constitute a selection out of the terms of the first series4 ,every one of them is a term of the first series1 but there are also terms of the first series which are not repeated in the second4 ,again1 if we make a third series from the second in the same way as the second was made from the first1 by taking the terms 7#ab7b1 7#bb7b1 7#cb7b1 and so on1 the terms of this third series fulfil the same conditions2 they correspond according to a fixed law with the terms of the second1 and are also themselves a selection from those terms4 ,and thus we may go on without end to construct successive infinite series each of which 8adequately represents0 the preceding one4 ,and we are led into this indefinite regress by the very attempt to carry out consistently a single definite principle of correspondence between our original infinite series and its first derivative4 ,in constructing the first derived series in our illustration #ab1 #bb1 #cb 444 we necessarily also construct the series 7#ab7b1 7#bb7b1 7#cb7b1 444 and the other successive derivatives4 ,therefore ,prof4 ,royce claims that any consistent attempt to make an orderly arrangement of the terms of an infinite whole must lead to the indefinite repetition of itself4 ,hence that each term of every relation on analysis turns out itself to consist of terms in relation1 is no valid objection to the soundness of our principle of interpretation1 but a necessary consequence of the infinity of ,reality4#ib ,any consistent attempt to exhibit an infinite whole as an orderly system of terms must lead to the indefinite regress4 ,now it strikes one at once that ,professor ,royce's conclusion is in danger of proving too much4 ,you certainly do not show a method of dealing with facts to be sound by showing that it leads to the indefinite regress4 ,it is a common experience that the liar who tells his first lie must tell a second to back it1 and a third to support the second1 and so on indefinitely4 ,and you cannot put a quart of liquor into a pint pot without first putting half the quart into half the space1 and so forth ad indefinitum4 ,yet these considerations do not prove that lying or putting quarts of liquor into pint pots is a consistent way of dealing with reality4 ,a purpose may lead in execution to the indefinite regress because it is self-contradictory and therefore self-defeating1 as these familiar illustrations suggest4 ,and this raises the question whether the purpose to arrange an infinite whole in an ordered system of terms may not lead to the indefinite regress for the same reason1 namely1 that the treatment of a true whole as a sequence of terms is incompatible with its real nature4 ,it is at least worth while to ask whether ,professor ,royce's own treatment of the subject does not contain indications that this is actually the case4#ic ,to begin with1 we may note one point of some importance in reference to which ,prof4 ,royce's language is at least ambiguous4 ,he speaks of the indefinite succession of infinite series which arise from the single purpose of 8representing0 the series of natural integers adequately by a selection out of itself as if they could be actually constructed in pursuance of this purpose4 ,but this is clearly not the case4 ,all that you can actually do is to construct the various series implicitly by giving a rule for their formation4 ,the actual construction of the series would be a typical instance of a self-defeating and therefore internally contradictory purpose1 inasmuch as it would involve the actual completion of an unending process4 ,hence we seem forced to make a distinction which ,prof4 ,royce has perhaps unduly neglected4 ,if your purpose of ordering the number series on a definite plan means no more than the formulation of a rule for obtaining any required number of terms of the successive series1 it can be executed1 but does not involve the indefinite regress2 if it means the actual completion of the process of formation of the series1 it does involve the indefinite regress1 but is therefore self-contradictory and cannot be realised in act4 ,similarly1 we may say of the scheme of qualities in relation1 that if it is taken for no more than a rule for the systematic arrangement and organisation of a finite material1 it does not involve the completion of an infinite process1 and is both workable and useful2 but if presented as an account of the way in which a completed all-embracing and perfectly harmonious experience of the whole of ,reality is internally organised1 it involves the completion of the infinite process1 and is therefore self-contradictory and finally inadequate4#id ,this reflection may serve to lead up to another which seems to take us into the heart of the matter4 ,the researches upon which ,prof4 ,royce's defence of the relational scheme is based were in the first instance investigations into the significance of the number-series4 ,as such they start with the conception of a system which is a whole of parts external to one another#ie as the object of inquiry4 ,consequently1 while such investigations are of the highest philosophical importance as bringing out the implications of this concept1 they are only valid as an analysis of ultimate ,reality1 provided that the concept of whole and part is an adequate expression of the way in which the whole ,reality is present in its constituents and they in it4 ,but if1 as we ourselves urged in a previous chapter1 the conception of a whole of parts is entirely inadequate to express the intimate union between the absolute experience and finite experiences1#if the proof that the indefinite process is logically implied in the relation of whole and part does not show it to belong to the structure of ultimate ,reality4 ,rather1 we should be inclined to urge1 the fact that the relational scheme leads to the indefinite process proves that the conception of whole and part upon which it is based does not truly represent the mode of union between a completed experience and its components4 ,and therefore the attempt to interpret this union in terms of the number-series cannot stand the test of criticism4 ,at the same time1 ,professor ,royce's argument in any case throws considerable light upon the problem of relation4 ,for it shows why the attempt to construct the world as a system of qualities in relation leads to the indefinite regress4 ,for a complete experience embodying at one stroke the whole of existence1 such a construction would1 as we have seen1 because essentially incomplete1 be impossible4 ,but when we try to piece together the data of our fragmentary experience into a connected whole1 we inevitably have to start with more or less isolated facts as fixed terms and weld them together by a relation4 ,in doing so we unavoidably put ourselves at the point of view from which the numerical series arises2 we unavoidably treat existence as if it were a whole of mutually external parts4 ,and so the indefinite regress involved in the nature of the number-system inevitably parades the whole of our discursive and relational thinking about existence4 ,but its presence is due to the inadequacy of the conception of ,reality with which discursive thought has to work4 ,on the whole1 then1 it seems that ,prof4 ,royce's investigations only make it more apparent than before that the relational scheme which discursive thought uses does not adequately express the true nature of the real1 and that the mystics of all ages have been so far justified in their contention that the form of our experience which presents the truest analogy to the experience of the ,absolute must be supra-relational1 or1 in other words1 that the most real type of finite experience must be one which transcends the distinction of subject and predicate4 ,to admit this is1 however1 not to admit that we are altogether ignorant how the one and the many are united in ,reality4 ,for there are many other types of human experience besides that which is dominated by the discursive and relational intellect4 ,in immediate simple feeling we have obviously a type of conscious experience in which distinction and relation have as yet not emerged4 ,and ,i have tried in ,bk4 ,i4 chap4 #b to show how in the direct intuition of an sthetic whole by trained artistic perception we have at a higher level an experience which contains the results of an elaborate process of distinction and relation1 but contains them in a way which transcends the relational form and reverts in its directness to the unity of immediate feeling4 ,while again we have in the personal love which is one with mutual insight a form of experience that1 if translated into the language of the intellect1 would require for its description a whole world of relations and predicates1 and is yet1 as experienced1 an intimate unity no relational scheme can more than faintly adumbrate4 ,and it is worthy of consideration that religious emotion in all ages has borrowed from these forms of experience its favourite expressions for the highest modes of communion between the finite and the infinite1 the 8beatific vision10 the 8love of ,god10 etc4 ,it seems indeed as if the function of the mere intellect were always that of a necessary and valuable intermediary between a lower and a higher level of immediate apprehension4 ,it breaks up1 by the relations and distinctions it introduces1 the original union of the what and the that of simple feeling1 and proceeds to make the what1 which it deals with in its isolation1 ever more and more complex4 ,but the ultimate issue of the process is only reached and its ultimate aim only satisfied so far as it conducts us at a higher stage of mental development to the direct intuition of a richer and more comprehensive whole in the immediate unity of its that and its what4 ,the besetting philosophical sin of the mere mystic is not so much his refusal to accept the work of the mere intellect as the highest and truest type of human experience1 as his tendency to satisfy his demand for the fuller union of the what with the that by reverting to the lower forms of immediacy upon which intellectual reflection has not done its work1 instead of pressing on to the higher in which the effect of that work is preserved though its form is transcended4 ,these reflections may serve to obviate the objection that to reject the relational scheme when it is offered as the ultimate truth is to deny the value and significance of the scientific work we accomplish by means of it4 ,though the scheme of relations cannot adequately express the mode of union between the finite and the infinite1 there is no fresh addition to the system of relations into which scientific analysis translates the real world of experience that does not increase our knowledge of what the real world must contain1 though it may fail to explain how it contains it4 ,and1 in conclusion1 let it be remembered that it is true not only of the religious mystic's special experience of union with deity1 but of all direct experience1 that the relational scheme is quite inadequate to explain how it holds its double aspects1 its unity and its multiplicity1 its that and its what1 in complete interpenetration4 ,for no living experience is a mere whole of parts1 and none1 therefore1 can be fully represented by a scheme based upon the concept of whole and part4#ig ,consult further3--,f4 ,h4 ,bradley1 ,appearance and ,reality1 chaps4 #a-c1 #ae1 #bg2 ,l4 ,t4 ,hobhouse1 ,theory of ,knowledge1 pp4 #agb-aha 7,qualities and ,relations71 #edj-eeg 7,substance72 ,h4 ,lotze1 ,metaphysic1 bk4 i4 chap4 #a 7,the ,being of ,things71 chap4 #b 7,the ,quality of ,things71 chap4 #c 7,the ,real and ,reality72 ,j4 ,royce1 ,the ,world and the ,individual1 ,first ,series1 ,supplementary ,essay2 ,b4 ,russell1 8,the ,concept of ,order0 7,mind1 ,january #aija71 and article on 8,position in ,space and ,time0 7,mind1 ,july #aija72 ,g4 ,f4 ,stout1 8,alleged ,self-contradictions in the ,concept of ,relation0 7,proceedings of the ,aristotelian ,society1 ,new ,series1 vol4 ii4 pp4 #a-ad1 with the accompanying discussion1 pp4 #ae-bd74 ----------------------- ,,supplementary ,,note ,,to ,,chapter ,,iv4 ,,dr4 ,,stout',s ,,reply ,,to ,,mr4 ,,bradley',s ,,criticism ,,of ,,the ,,concept ,,of ,,relation4 ,since the preceding chapter was written1 ,i have had the opportunity of studying ,dr4 ,stout's paper in the current volume of ,proceedings of the ,aristotelian ,society4 ,i have not thought it necessary to make any alterations in the text of ,chapter #d1 in consequence of ,dr4 ,stout's criticism1 but ,i may perhaps be permitted to add the following remarks1 which must not be regarded as a systematic appreciation or examination of ,dr4 ,stout's views4 ,the latter1 as he himself pleads1 cannot indeed be finally judged until he has worked out the theory of ,predication for which his present paper merely prepares the way4 #a4 ,dr4 ,stout begins by admitting what to my own mind is the essence of the anti-relational argument4 8,no relation or system of relations can ever constitute a self-subsistent and self-contained ,reality4 ,the all-inclusive universe cannot ultimately consist in 78 of7 a collection of interrelated terms0 7op4 cit41 p4 #b74 ,this being once conceded1 ,i should have thought it an inevitable consequence that a 8collection of interrelated terms0 cannot give us the final truth about the nature of anything4 ,for the whole idealist contention1 as ,i understand it and have tried to sustain it in the present work1 is that the structure of the whole is so repeated in any and every one of its members that what is not the truth about the whole is never the ultimate truth about anything4 precisely because there is ultimately nothing apart from the whole1 and the whole again is nothing apart from its members4 ,so much1 ,i had thought1 we have all learned from ,hegel1 and therefore ,dr4 ,stout's dilemma that any proposition asserting relation 7p4 #e7 must be false1 unless the relational scheme1 so long as it is not affirmed of the ultimate whole itself1 gives us truth1 does not seem to me to possess any real cogency4 ,with ,mr4 ,bradley himself1 as quoted by ,dr4 ,stout1 ,i should urge that if the relational scheme is not itself internally discrepant1 there remains no valid ground for disputing its applicability to the whole4 #b4 ,dr4 ,stout's introduction into a 8relational unity0 of the third term1--relatedness does not seem to me to remove the difficulties inherent in our problem4 ,and the illustration by which he supports it appears to be unsound4 ,he argues that when my hat is on my head this state of things implies 7#a7 the two related terms1 the hat and the head17#b7 a relation of on and under4 7#c7 the fact that the terms stand in this relation--their relatedness4 ,for 7#a7 and 7#b7 by themselves would be compatible with my hat being on the peg and my head bare4 ,but surely there is here a confusion between the relation of above and below1 and the very different relation of on and under4 ,the latter relation includes1 as the former does not1 immediate contact as part of its meaning4 ,if there are 7#a7 a hat and a head1 and 7#b7 the relation on and under--in this sense--between the two1 there is surely no need of a third factor to complete the concrete actuality of 8hat on head40 ,if the hat is not actually on the head1 then 7#b71 the supposed relation1 is not there at all4 ,and if 7#b7 is there the whole fact is already there4 ,in a word1 ,dr4 ,stout seems to me to count in the concrete fact of 8thing exhibiting related aspects0 as a third constituent in itself1 precisely as popular ,logic sometimes counts in the actual judgment1 under the name of ,copula1 as one factor of itself4#ih ,then to ,dr4 ,stout's use of his distinction between the relation and the fact of relatedness1 ,i think it may be replied that it leaves us precisely where we were before4 ,the hat is qualified by being on the head1 the head by being in or under the hat1 and hat and head together by the relation of on and under between them4 ,but how these various aspects of the fact are to be combined in a single consistent view we are no nearer knowing4 #c4 ,the endless regress4 ,i think it will be seen from the preceding chapter that in my own view a genuine endless regress is evidence of the falsity of the conception which gives rise to it1 and that ,i hold this on the ground that the endless regress always presupposes the self-contradictory purpose to sum an admittedly infinite series4 ,hence ,i could not concur1 so far as ,i can see at present1 in ,dr4 ,stout's distinction between the endless regress which does and that which does not involve self-contradiction4 ,as to his illustration of endless regress of the second kind1 the infinite divisibility of space 7p4 #aa71 ,i should have thought that there is no actual endless regress in question until you substitute for infinite divisibility infinite actual subdivision1 and that when you make this substitution it commits you at once to the self-contradictory completion of an unending task4 7,cf4 what was said above1 #aj1 with reference to infinite numerical series47 #d4 ,dr4 ,stout goes on to deny that there is any endless regress1 self-contradictory or not1 involved in the relational scheme4 ,according to him1 what connects the relation with its terms is not another relation 7which would of course give rise to an endless regress71 but their relatedness1 which is 8a common adjective both of the relation and the terms0 7p4 #aa74 ,i have already explained why this solution appears to me merely to repeat the problem4 ,the relatedness1 so far as ,i can see1 is a name for the concrete fact with its double aspect of quality and relation1 and ,i cannot understand how mere insistence upon the concrete unity of the fact makes the conjunction of its aspects more intelligible4 #e4 ,dr4 ,stout further supports his contention by a theory of the nature of continuous connection which ,i have perhaps failed to understand4 ,replying in anticipation to the possible objection of an opponent1 that if the 8relatedness0 connects the terms with their relation there must be a second link to connect the term with its relatedness1 he says 8there is no intermediate link and there is need for none4 ,for the connection is continuous1 and has its ground in that ultimate continuity which is presupposed by all relational unity0 7p4 #ab1 cf4 pp4 #b-d74 ,and1 as he has previously told us1 8so far as there is continuous connection there is nothing between i4e4 between the connected terms1 and there is therefore no relation40 ,now there seems to me to be a contradiction latent here4 ,continuous connection1 of course1 implies distinct but connected terms which form a series4 ,where there are no such distinct terms there is nothing to connect4 ,now it is1 as ,i understand it1 part of the very nature of a continuous series that any two terms of the series have always a number of possible intermediate terms between them4 ,and therefore1 in a continuous series1 there are no immediately adjacent terms4 ,dr4 ,stout's own illustration brings this out-- a b ,m ,in a diagram like the accompanying b and are1 he argues1 8mediately conjoined10 but a and are 8immediately co-adjacent40 ,surely ,dr4 ,stout forgets here that what can be intelligibly called 8co-adjacent0 are not lines but points or positions on the lines4 ,and between any point in and any point in a there are a plurality of intermediate positions1 except for the special case of the extreme left point of a and the extreme right point of 4 ,these1 of course1 coalesce in the single point ,m1 and there is therefore no connection1 mediate or immediate1 left in this case4#ii ,the illustration1 ,i think1 may serve to reveal a serious discrepancy in ,dr4 ,stout's theory4 ,he sees that relations presuppose a unity which is supra-relational1 and which he calls 8continuous10 on the ground of its supra-relational character4 ,at the same time1 to save the relational scheme from condemnation as leading to the endless regress1 he has to turn this supra-relational unity itself into a sort of relation by calling it an immediate connection between adjacent terms1 and thus ascribing to it the fundamental character of a discontinuous series4 ,and ,i cannot help regarding this procedure as unconscious evidence to the truth of the principle1 that what is not the truth about the whole of ,reality is not ultimately the truth about any reality4 ----- ,footnote #gc3 ,see the admirable account of the 8natural conception0 of the world in the final chapter of ,avenarius1 ,der ,menschliche ,weltbegriff4 ,footnote #gd3 ,may ,i say here once for all1 that when ,i oppose practice to intellectual speculation1 ,i must be understood to mean by practice the alteration by myself of some datum of given existence4 ,the activity of thought is thus for me not practical1 precisely because the 8truths0 which ,i know or contemplate are not qu truths given existences operated upon and altered by the act of thinking4 ,footnote #ge3 ,such a view of the mental life of the animal seems to have been actually held1 for instance1 by the late ,professor ,t4 ,h4 ,green4 ,yet see ,green1 ,works1 ii4 #bag4 ,footnote #gf3 ,strictly speaking1 the 8solidity0 or 8impenetrability0 of the ultimate particles of matter1 which is with ,locke and ,newton one of the most prominent 8primary0 qualities1 is not a 8mathematical0 property1 but it still owes its inclusion in the list to the conviction of these philosophers that it is1 like extension and form1 fundamentally important for mathematical ,physics4 ,the explanation of the 8secondary0 qualities as subjective appears to go back to ,democritus4 ,footnote #gg3 ,see the further elaboration of this analogy in ,bk4 ,,iii4 chap4 #c1 #b ff4 ,footnote #gh3 ,professor ,sidgwick's defence of the ,lockian view 7,philosophy3 its ,scope and ,relations1 p4 #fc ff47 seems to me to ignore the point at issue4 namely1 that in any sense in which 8secondary0 qualities get their meaning from the content of sensation1 primary qualities do the same4 ,the whole point is that the sensation is not merely 7as process7 the occasion of our cognition of1 e4g41 hardness or softness1 but also 7as content7 furnishes the very meaning of 8hard0 or 8soft40 ,cf4 with what follows1 ,appearance and ,reality1 chap4 #a4 ,footnote #gi3 ,the former alternative is that of scholasticism2 in modern science the latter has been more or less consciously adopted by those thinkers who retain the notion of substances4 ,the various qualities are on this view consequences of the relations in which each substance stands 7a7 to other interacting substances1 and 7b7 in particular to the unknown substratum of our 8consciousness40 ,footnote #hj3 ,see chaps4 #a and #b of bk4 i4 of his ,metaphysic4 ,footnote #ha3 ,the reader who desires to study ,kant's doctrine in detail may begin by taking up ,kant's own ,prolegomena to the ,study of any future ,metaphysic1 which may be profitably consulted even by those who find the ,critique of ,pure ,reason too diffuse and technical4 ,the latest and cheapest translation is that included in the ,open ,court ,publishing ,co4's series of ,philosophical ,classics4 ,footnote #hb3 8,arbitrarily0 because it is1 as all recent psychology insists1 the direction of our attention which determines what qualities shall be presented together1 and thus become 8associated40 ,footnote #hc3 ,in ,psychology this comes out in the rejection by the best recent writers of the whole associationist account of the process of perception1 according to which the perception of a thing as a whole was taken to mean the actual presence in sensation of one of its qualities plus the reinstatement by association of the 8ideas0 of the others4 ,for the modern doctrine of the perception of a whole1 as distinct from the mere perception of its constituent parts1 consult ,stout1 ,analytic ,psychology1 bk4 i4 chap4 #c1 or ,manual of ,psychology1#c bk4 i4 chap4 #c4 ,footnote #hd3 ,this is just as true of the so-called primary qualities of things as of any others4 ,thus the mass and again the kinetic energy of a conservative material system are properly names for the way in which the system will behave under determinate conditions1 not of modes of behaviour which are necessarily actually exhibited throughout its existence4 ,the laws of motion1 again1 are statements of the same hypothetical kind about the way in which1 as we believe1 particles move if certain conditions are fulfilled4 ,the doctrine according to which all events in the physical world are actual motions1 rests on no more than a metaphysical blunder of a peculiarly barbarous kind4 ,cf4 ,stallo1 ,concepts and ,theories of ,modern ,physics1 chaps4 #aj-ab4 ,footnote #he3 ,thus1 e4g41 so fundamental a proposition in our current mechanical science as the 8first law of motion0 is avowedly a statement as to what would be the behaviour of things under a condition which1 so far as we know1 is never actually realised4 ,on the thing as the 8law of its states10 see ,lotze1 ,metaphysic1 ,i4 #c4 #cb ff4 7,eng4 trans41 vol4 i4 p4 #hh ff471 and ,l4 ,t4 ,hobhouse1 ,the ,theory of ,knowledge1 pp4 #ede-eeg4 ,footnote #hf3 ,mr4 ,hobhouse 7op4 cit41 p4 #eda ff47 thinks that the solution is simply that those qualities belong to one 8substance10 which are apprehended together as occupying one space4 ,as a working criterion of what we mean by one bodily thing1 this account seems satisfactory1 and has probably suggested itself spontaneously to most of us4 ,but it leaves untouched the more fundamental question how the identification of a certain sight-space with a certain touch-space is effected1 and what are the motives which lead to it4 ,mr4 ,hobhouse is content to take the identification as 8given in adult perception10 but it seems to me to emerge from his own good account of the matter that it is the still more primitive apprehension of my own body as a felt unity upon which the synthesis between sight and touch spaces is based4 ,if so1 the ultimate source of the 8unity of substance0 must be sought deeper than ,mr4 ,hobhouse is willing to go for it4 ,and quaere1 whether his account1 if accepted as ultimate1 would not lead to the identification of substance with space8 ,for the difficulties which arise when you say the substance is the space and its filling of qualities1 see ,appearance and ,reality1 chap4 #b1 pp4 #ai1 #bj 7#ast ed474 ,footnote #hg3 ,monadology1 #h-af1 #eg-fb4 ,footnote #hh3 ,this is true even where we merely count a number of qualitatively equivalent units in order to ascertain their sum4 ,it is their positive character of being qualitatively equivalent which makes it permissible in this case to take any one of them indifferently as first1 any other as second1 etc4 ,whenever you apply the numerical series to the arrangement in order of the qualitatively dissimilar1 the nature of your material as related to the character of your special interest in it decides for you what you shall call first1 second1 third1 etc4 ,footnote #hi3 ,as to the possibility of relations which are in this sense external to their terms1 see ,b4 ,russell1 ,the ,philosophy of ,leibniz1 p4 #acj1 and the articles by the same writer in ,mind for ,january and ,july #aija4 ,footnote #ij3 ,see the elaborate discussion of the relational scheme implied in any assertion of difference in ,royce1 ,the ,world and the ,individual1 ,second ,series1 lect #b4 ,footnote #ia3 ,bradley1 ,appearance and ,reality1 chap4 #c4 ,compare also chap4 #ae1 8,thought and ,reality40 ,footnote #ib3 ,the reader who desires further knowledge of the researches in the theory of ,numbers upon which ,prof4 ,royce's doctrine is based1 may profitably consult ,dedekind1 ,was sind und was sollen die ,zahlen1 and ,couturat1 ,l',infini ,mathmatique4 ,footnote #ic3 ,professor ,royce's own illustration of the map of ,england executed upon a portion of the surface of the country is really a typical instance of a self-contradictory purpose4 ,he argues that such a map1 to be theoretically perfect1 must contain a reduced facsimile of itself as part of the country mapped1 and this again another1 and so on indefinitely4 ,but the whole force of the reasoning depends on overlooking the distinction between the surface of ,england as it is before the map is made1 and the surface of ,england as altered by the presence of the map4 ,prof4 ,royce assumes that you set out to represent in the map a state of things which can in fact have no existence until after the map is made4 ,the previous existence of the map at a certain spot is falsely taken to be one of the conditions to which the map-maker is to conform in executing it4 ,every one of the supposed 8maps within the map0 will thus involve distortion and misrepresentation of the district it proposes to map4 ,it is as if ,hamlet had chosen 8,hamlet0 as the subject of the 8play within the play40 ,the professor's illustration thus does less than justice to his theory4 ,footnote #id3 ,the fundamental defect in ,professor ,royce's reasoning seems to me to lie in the tacit transition from the notion of an infinite series to that of an infinite completed sum4 ,thus he speaks of the series of prime numbers as a 8whole0 being present at once to the mind of ,god4 ,but are the prime numbers1 or any other infinite series1 an actual sum at all8 ,they are surely not proved to be so by the existence of general truths about any prime number4 ,footnote #ie3 ,see1 e4g41 ,dedekind1 op4 cit41 #b3 8,it frequently happens that different things a1 b1 c 444 are apprehended upon whatsoever occasion under a common point of view1 mentally put together1 and it is then said that they form a system2 the things a1 b1 c 444 are named the elements of the system02 and #c 7definitions of whole and part74 ,footnote #if3 ,ante1 ,bk4 ,,ii4 chap4 #b1 #e4 ,footnote #ig3 ,it is no answer to this view to urge that as soon as the intellect undertakes to reflect upon and describe ,reality it unavoidably does so in relational terms4 ,for it is our contention that the same intellect which uses these relational methods sees why they are inadequate1 and to some extent at least how they are ultimately merged in a higher type of experience4 ,thus the systematic use of the intellect in ,metaphysics itself leads to the conviction that the mere intellect is not the whole of ,reality4 ,or1 in still more paradoxical language1 the highest truth for the mere intellect is the thought of ,reality as an ordered system4 ,but all such order is based in the end on the number-series with its category of whole and part1 and cannot1 therefore1 be a perfectly adequate representation of a supra-relational ,reality4 ,hence ,truth1 from its own nature1 can never be quite the same thing as ,reality4 ,footnote #ih3 ,or does ,dr4 ,stout merely mean that there may be a hat and a head1 and also a relation of on and under 7e4g41 between the hat and the peg71 and yet my hat not be on my head8 ,if this is his meaning1 ,i reply we have not really got the relation and its terms2 if the hat is not on the head1 hat and head are not terms in the relation at all4 ,i do not see why1 on his own principles1 ,dr4 ,stout should not add a fourth factor to his analysis1 namely1 qualifiedness1 or the fact that the qualities are there1 and so on indefinitely4 ,footnote #ii3 ,if you consider the lines a and 1 as ,dr4 ,stout prefers to do1 ,i should have thought two views possible4 7a7 ,there are not two lines at all1 but one1 the 8junction0 at ,m being merely ideal4 ,then there remains nothing to connect and there is no relation of 8immediate connection40 ,or 7b71 the junction may be taken as real1 and then you have a perfectly ordinary case of relation1 the terms being the terminated lines a and 1 and the relation being one of contact at ,m4 ,on every ground 7a7 seems to me the right view1 but it is incompatible with the reduction of continuity to 8immediate connection40 ,thus the source of the difficulty is that 7#a7 immediate connection can only hold between the immediately successive terms of a discontinuous series1 and yet 7#b7 cannot hold between them precisely because they are discontinuous4 ----- ,,chapter ,v ,,the ,,world ,,of ,,things--7#b7 ,,change ,,and ,,causality #a4 ,the conception of things as interacting leads to the two problems of ,change and ,causality4 ,the paradoxical character of change due to the fact that only what is permanent can change4 #b4 ,change is succession within an identity2 this identity1 like that of ,substance1 must be teleological1 i4e4 must be an identity of plan or end pervading the process of change4 #c4 ,thus all change falls under the logical category of ,ground and ,consequence1 which becomes in its application to succession in time the ,principle of ,sufficient ,reason4 #d4 ,causality4 ,cause--in the modern popular and scientific sense--means the ground of a change when taken to be completely contained in preceding changes4 ,that every change has its complete ground in preceding changes is neither an axiom nor an empirically ascertained truth1 but a postulate suggested by our practical needs4 #e4 ,in the last resort the postulate cannot be true2 the dependence between events cannot be one-sided4 ,the real justification for our use of the postulate is its practical success4 #f4 ,origin of the conception of ,cause anthropomorphic #g4 ,puzzles about ,causation4 7#a7 ,continuity4 ,causation must be continuous1 and yet in a continuous process there can be no distinction of cause from effect4 ,cause must be and yet cannot be prior in time to effect4 #h4 7#b7 ,the indefinite regress in causation4 #i4 7#c7 ,plurality of ,causes4 ,plurality of ,causes is ultimately a logical contradiction1 but in any form in which the causal postulate is of practical use it must recognise plurality4 #aj4 ,the 8necessity0 of the causal relation psychological and subjective4 #aa4 ,immanent and ,transeunt ,causality3 ,consistent ,pluralism must deny transeunt ,causation2 but cannot do so successfully1 #ab4 ,both transeunt and immanent ,causality are ultimately appearance4 #a4 ,the fourth of the features which characterise the pre-scientific view of the world we found to be the belief that things act and are acted upon by one another4 ,the problems to which this belief gives rise are so vast1 and have been historically of such significance for ,metaphysics1 that they will require a separate chapter for their discussion4 ,in the conception of the interaction of things as it exists for the nave pre-scientific mind1 we may distinguish at least two aspects4 ,there is 7#a7 the belief that things change1 that within the unity of the one thing there is a succession of different states2 and 7#b7 the belief that the changes of state of various things are so inter-connected that the changes in one thing serve as occasions for definite changes in other things4 ,we thus have to discuss1 first1 the general notion of change as an inseparable aspect of the being of things1 and next the concept of systematic inter-connection between the changes of state of different things4 7a7 ,change4 ,the problem presented by the apparently unceasing mutability of existence is one of the earliest as well as one of the most persistent in the whole range of ,philosophy4 ,in itself it might seem that the successive presentation in time of various states is neither more nor less noteworthy a feature of the world of experience than the simultaneous presentation of a like variety1 but the problem of mutability has always appealed with special force to the human imagination from its intimate connection with our personal hopes and fears1 ambitions and disappointments4 ,tempora mutantur1 nos et mutamur in illis2 there is the secret of the persistence with which our philosophic thought has from the first revolved round this special problem4 ,there1 too1 we may find a pregnant hint of the central paradox implied in all mutability--namely1 that only the identical and permanent can change4 ,it is because the self which changes with the flux of time and circumstance is still in some measure the same old self that we feel its changes to be so replete with matter for exultation and despair4 ,were we completely new-made with each successive change in our self1 there would no longer be ground for joy in transition to the better or grief at alteration for the worse4 ,the thought that only what is permanent can change has affected ,philosophy in different ways at different periods of its history4 ,at the very dawn of ,greek ,philosophy it was the guiding principle of the ,ionian physicists who sought to comprehend the apparent variety of successive phenomena as the transformations of a single bodily reality4 ,as the difficulties inherent in such a materialistic ,monism became more apparent1 the felt necessity of ascribing unity of some kind to existence led ,parmenides and his ,eleatic successors to the extreme view that change1 being impossible in a permanent homogeneous bodily reality1 must be a mere illusion of our deceptive senses4 ,while yet again the later ,ionian physicists1 and their ,sicilian counterpart ,empedocles1 sought to reconcile the apparent mutability of things with the criticism of ,parmenides by the theory that what appears to the senses as qualitative change is in reality the mere regrouping in space of qualitatively unalterable 8elements0 or 8atoms0-- 4 ,at a more developed stage of ,hellenic thought1 the necessity of taking some account of the mutability as well as of the permanence of existence impelled ,plato to draw the momentous distinction between two worlds or orders of being--the real1 with its eternal unvarying self-identity1 and the merely apparent1 where all is change1 confusion1 and instability4 ,in spite of ,plato's manifest failure to make it intelligible how these two orders1 the eternal and the temporal1 are ultimately connected1 this distinction in one form or another has continued ever since to haunt all subsequent metaphysical construction4 ,even our modern scientific ,materialism1 with its loudly avowed scorn for all merely metaphysical questions1 shows by its constant endeavour to reduce all material existence to a succession of changes in a homogeneous medium1 both the persistence with which the intellect demands a permanent background for change1 and the difficulty of finding logical satisfaction for the demand4 ,yet there have not been wanting attempts to get rid of the paradox by denying its truth4 ,as the ,eleatics sought to escape it by reducing change itself to a baseless illusion1 so some at least of the disciples of ,heracleitus seem to have evaded it by refusing to admit any permanent identity in the changeable1 and they have not been entirely without imitators in the modern world4 ,incessant change without underlying unity has had its defenders in the history of ,metaphysics1 though they have not been numerous1 and we must therefore briefly consider what can be urged for and against such a concept4 ,apart from the general difficulty of seeing how what changes can at the same time be permanently identical with itself1 the only special argument in favour of the doctrine that only incessant change is real seems to be the appeal to direct experience4 ,in any actual experience1 it is contended1 however contracted its limits1 we are always presented with the fact of change and transition2 we never apprehend an absolutely unchanging content4 ,even where the object before us exhibits no succession1 self-examination will always detect at least alternating tension and relaxation of attention with the accompanying fluctuations of bodily sensation4 ,now there can1 of course1 be no gainsaying these facts of experience1 but the conclusion based on them evidently goes much further than the premisses warrant4 ,if experience never gives us mere persistence of an unchanging content1 neither does it ever give us mere change without persistence4 ,what we actually experience always exhibits the two aspects of identity and transition together4 ,usually there will be1 side by side with the elements which sensibly change in the course of the experience1 others which remain sensibly constant throughout it4 ,and even when1 through inattention1 we fail to detect these constant elements1 the successive states of the changing content itself are not merely momentary2 each has its own sensible duration through which it retains its character without perceptible changes4 ,experience thus entirely fails to substantiate the notion of mere change apart from a background of permanent identity4 ,the positive disproof of the notion must1 however1 be found in its own inherent absurdity4 ,change by itself1 apart from a background of identity1 is impossible for the reason that where there is no underlying identity there is nothing to change4 ,all change must be change of and in some thing4 ,a mere succession of entirely disconnected contents held together by no common permanent nature persisting in spite of the transition1 would not be change at all4 ,if ,i simply have before me first ,a and then ,b1 ,a and ,b being absolutely devoid of any point of community1 there is no sense in saying that ,i have apprehended a process of change4 ,the change has been at most a change in myself as ,i passed from the state of perceiving ,a to the state of perceiving ,b1 and this subjective transition again can only be called change on the assumption that the ,i who am qualified first by the perception of ,a and its various emotional and other accompaniments1 and then by that of ,b and its accompaniments1 am the same4 ,and where you have not merely a change of perception but an actual perception of change1 the case is even clearer4 ,what we perceive in such a case is 8,a changing into ,b10 the two successive states ,a and ,b being held together by the fact that they are successive states of some more permanent unity gamma4 ,apart from the presence of this identical gamma in both the earlier and later stages of the process1 there would be no meaning in speaking of it as one of change4 #b4 ,change1 then1 may be defined as succession within an identity1 the identity being as essential to the character of the process as the succession4 ,in what way1 then1 must we think of this identity or common nature which is present throughout the whole succession of changes8 ,it should be clear that this question--how that which changes can be permanent8--is simply our old problem of quality and substance1 how the many states can belong to one thing1 considered with special reference to the case of states which form a succession in time4 ,thus1 whatever is the true nature of the unity to which the many states of one thing belong1 will also be the true nature of the identity which connects the successive stages of a process of change4 ,now we have already seen in what the unity to which the many states belong must be taken to consist4 ,we found that this unity is essentially teleological2 that group of states1 we saw1 is one thing which functions as one in regard to an end or interest1 or1 as we may also say1 is the embodiment of coherent structure4 ,the same is true of the process of change4 ,the earlier and later stages of the process are differences in an identity precisely because they constitute one process4 ,and a process is one when it is the systematic realisation of a single coherent end4 ,to be one process means to be the systematic expression in a succession of stages of a single coherent plan or law4 ,the succession of stages is thus welded into a unity by the singleness of the plan or law which they embody1 and it is this systematic connection of each stage with all the rest which we express by saying that whatever changes possesses an underlying permanent identity of character4 ,it would amount to precisely the same thing if we said the successive states of anything that changes form a connected system4 ,we must be careful here1 as we were in dealing with the problem of ,substance1 not to be misled by taking symbolic aids to imagination for philosophical truths4 ,just as it is easy to imagine the 8substance0 of things as a sort of material substratum1 it is easy to imagine the identity which pervades all changes as that of a number of pieces of matter1 and to think of the changes as constituted by their motion through space4 ,but such a representation must not be taken for anything more than an aid to imagination4 ,it helps us to make a mental diagram1 but it throws absolutely no light upon the real nature of the connection between the identity and the succession4 ,for the same problem breaks out within each of the 8self-identical0 pieces of matter2 we have to say what we mean by calling it one and the same throughout the series of its changing positions1 and the necessity of answering this question shows us at once that the identity of a material particle throughout its motion is only one case of that identity pervading succession which belongs to all change1 and in no sense affords any explanation of the principle it illustrates4#ajj ,as a recent writer puts it1 8it seems to be a deeply rooted infirmity of the human mind 444 that it can hardly conceive activities of any sort apart from material bases1 444 through habitually seeking to represent all phenomena in mechanical terms1 in terms of the motion of little bits of matter1 many of us have come to believe that in so doing we describe the actual events underlying phenomena40#aja ,this 8disease of the intellect10 as the same writer aptly calls it1 is nowhere more insidious than where we are dealing with the problem of ,change4 ,change1 then1 involves two aspects4 ,it is a succession of events in time1 and these events are connected by a systematic unity in such a way that they form the expression of a plan or law of structure4 ,the series of successive states which make up the history of a thing are the expression of the thing's nature or structure4 ,to understand the thing's structure is to possess the key to the succession of its states1 to know on what principle each gives way to its successor4 ,and similarly1 to have complete insight into the nature or structure of ,reality as a whole would be to understand the principles according to which every transitory event in the history of the ,universe1 regarded as a series of events in time1 is followed by its own special successor4 ,it is evident that1 in proportion as our knowledge of any thing or system of things approaches this insight into the laws of its structure1 the processes of change acquire a new character for us4 ,they lose their appearance of paradox1 and tend to become the self-evident expression of the identity which is their underlying principle4 ,change1 once reduced to law and apprehended as the embodiment in succession of a principle we understand1 is no longer change as an unintelligible mystery4 ,we should bear this in mind when we reflect on the doctrine of ,plato that the physical world must be unreal because the scene of incessant change4 ,such a view is only to be understood by remembering that before the invention of the mathematical methods which have enabled us with such conspicuous success to reduce physical phenomena to orderly sequence according to law1 the physical world necessarily appeared to the philosopher a scene of arbitrary change following no recognisable principle4 ,change1 so far as understood in the light of its principle1 has already ceased to be mere change4#ajb #c4 ,ground and ,consequence4 ,in the technical language of ,logic1 the underlying principle of any system is called its ,ground1 the detail in which the principle finds systematic expression is called its ,consequence4 ,ground and ,consequence are thus one and the same systematic whole1 only considered from two different points of view4 ,the ,ground is the pervading common nature of the system1 thought of as an identity pervading and determining the character of its detail2 the ,consequence is the same system1 looked at from the point of view of the detail1 as a plurality of differences pervaded and determined by an identical principle4 ,the understanding of a process of change thus clearly consists in bringing it under the principle of ,ground and ,consequence4 ,in so far as we are successful in detecting a principle in the apparently arbitrary succession of events1 these events become for us a system with a common principle of structure for its ,ground1 and a plurality of successive states as its ,consequence4 ,change is not1 however1 the only instance of the principle of ,ground and ,consequence4 ,these two aspects may also be found in systematic wholes which contain no element of succession in time1 e4g4 in a body of logical deductions from a few fundamental premisses4 ,the special peculiarity of the case of ,change is that it is the principle of ,ground and ,consequence as applied to a material which is successive in time4 ,as thus applied1 the principle has received the special name of the ,principle of ,sufficient ,reason1 and may be formulated thus3 ,nothing takes place unless there is a sufficient reason why it should occur rather than not4 ,it is clear that such a proposition is a mere result of the application of the conception of ,reality as a systematic whole to the special case of the existence of the successive in time4 ,it is therefore simply one case of the fundamental axiom of all knowledge1 the axiom that what truly exists is a coherent whole4#ajc ,we must of course observe that the principle does nothing to solve the perhaps insoluble problem why succession in time should be a feature of experience4 ,this is a question which could only be answered if we could show that succession in time is a logical consequence of the existence of any multiplicity forming a systematic whole4 ,until we are able to establish this result1 we have simply to accept succession as a datum of our experience4 7,yet for some light upon the problem1 see infra1 ,bk4 ,,iii chap4 #d1 #i7 #d4 ,causality4 ,so far we have said nothing of a concept which is much more familiar in the popular treatment of the problem of ,change than that of ,ground and ,consequence1 the concept of ,cause4 ,in proceeding to discuss this concept1 it is necessary in the first place to explain which of the numerous senses of the word we are taking for examination4 ,there was an old scholastic distinction1 which still reappears occasionally in philosophical writings1 between the ,causa cognoscendi1 or reason for affirming a truth1 and the ,causa existendi or fiendi1 the cause of the occurrence of an event4 ,it is this latter meaning of the word 8cause10 the meaning which is predominant wherever the term is used in modern scientific language1 that we shall have in view in the following sections4 ,the ,causa cognoscendi1 or logical reason for the affirmation of a truth1 as distinguished from the psychological factors which lead a particular individual to affirm it1 is clearly identical with what modern logicians call the ,ground4 ,a given proposition must logically be affirmed as true in the last resort1 because it fills a place in a wider system of truths which no other proposition would fill4 ,thus1 e4g41 a special proposition about the relation between the sides and angles of a triangle is logically necessitated1 because it is an integral element in the development of a system of geometrical ideas which repose as a whole upon certain fundamental assumptions as to the character of spatial order4 ,the original presuppositions cannot be worked out to their logical consequence in a body of internally coherent geometrical notions unless the proposition in question is included in that body4 ,and reciprocally1 the logical justification for regarding these presuppositions rather than any others as sound1 lies in the fact that they yield a body of internally consistent consequences4 ,incidentally1 we see by means of this illustration that ,ground and ,consequence are mutually convertible1 which is what we might have inferred from the way in which we defined them as mutually complementary aspects of a single systematic whole4 ,what we are concerned with in the everyday and scientific treatment of ,causation1 is not this purely logical relation of ,ground and ,consequence1 but something partly identical with it1 partly different4 ,the ,causa fiendi has no significance except in connection with occurrences or events in time1 and may roughly be said to correspond with what ,aristotle denotes the 8,source of ,change0-- or --and his medival followers named the ,efficient ,cause4 ,cause1 in the popular sense of the word1 denotes the attempt to carry out the principle of the interconnection of events in a system along special lines by regarding every event as completely determined by conditions which are themselves previous events4 ,widely as the popular and the scientific uses of the term 8cause0 diverge in minor respects1 they agree in the essential point4 ,that every event has its cause is understood1 both in everyday life and in the sciences which use the concept of causation1 to mean that the occurrence and the character of every event in the time-series is completely determined by preceding events4 ,in more technical language1 causation for everyday thought and for the sciences means one-sided dependence of the present on the past1 and the future on the present4 ,it is1 of course1 obvious that the principle of ,causation as thus understood is not a necessary logical deduction from the principle of ,ground and ,consequence4 ,it might be the case that all occurrences form a coherent plan or system1 such that if you once grasped the principle of the system you could infer from it what precise occurrence must take place at any one moment1 and yet it might be impossible to discover this principle by an examination of the course of events up to the present moment4 ,in other words1 the principle of the systematic interconnection of events might be valid1 and yet the events of the present might depend on those which will succeed them in the future no less than on those which have preceded them in the past4 ,in that case it would be impossible with absolute logical certainty to infer what will occur at a given moment from the mere examination of what has preceded1 i4e4 the principle of ,causation as used in the sciences would not be logically valid4#ajd ,cause1 as currently understood1 is thus identical not with the whole true logical ground1 but with the ground so far as it can be discovered in the train of temporally antecedent circumstances1 i4e4 cause is incomplete ground4 ,this point is important1 as it shows that the principle of ,causation is not1 like the principle of ,sufficient ,reason1 axiomatic4 ,it is no necessary logical consequence of the knowability or systematic character of the ,real that an event should be completely determined by temporally antecedent events2 for anything that is implied in the systematic character of the ,real1 the event may be equally dependent on subsequent occurrences4 ,again1 the principle of ,causation cannot be empirically established by an appeal to the actual course of experience4 ,actual experience is certainly not sufficient to show that every event is absolutely determined by its antecedent conditions2 at most the success of our scientific hypotheses based upon the assumption of causality only avails to show that events may be inferred from their antecedents with sufficient accuracy to make the causal assumption practically useful4 ,regarded as a universal principle of scientific procedure1 the causal assumption must be pronounced to be neither an axiom nor an empirical truth but a postulate1 in the strict sense of the word1 i4e4 an assumption which cannot be logically justified1 but is made because of its practical value1 and depends upon the success with which it can be applied for confirmation4 ,in the sense that it is a postulate which experience may confirm but cannot prove1 it may properly be said to be a priori1 but it is manifestly not a priori in the more familiar ,kantian sense of the word4 ,that is1 it is not a necessary and indispensable axiom without which systematic knowledge would be impossible4 ,for1 as we have already seen and shall see more fully in the immediate sequel1 it may not be1 and indeed in the last resort cannot be1 true4 #e4 ,this last statement will possibly appear startling to the reader who is unacquainted with the history of metaphysical investigations into ,causality4 ,but it is easy to show that it is really the expression of an obvious truth4 ,for the causal principle1 as we have just seen1 is an imperfect expression of the really axiomatic principle of ,sufficient ,reason or ,ground and ,consequence4 ,and it is readily seen that the expression it gives to that principle1 because imperfect1 must be partially false4 ,what the principle of ,ground and ,consequence says is1 that the whole of existence is a single coherent system in which every part is determined by the nature of the whole as revealed in the complete system4 ,but if this is true1 each constituent of the system can only be completely determined by its connections with all the rest4 ,no constituent can be entirely determined by its relations to a lesser part of the whole system1 in the way presupposed by the notion of one-sided causal dependence4 ,the 8cause0 must1 if the principle of ,ground and ,consequence be valid1 be determined by the 8effect0 no less than the 8effect0 by the 8cause40 ,and therefore the causal postulate cannot be the whole truth4 ,how this fatal logical defect in the principle of ,causation makes itself felt in the logic of the inductive sciences1 and how logicians have sought without success to avoid it1 we shall incidentally see as our discussion proceeds4 ,at present we must be content to note that1 owing to this flaw1 ,causation1 wherever it is asserted1 can only be ,appearance and never complete ,reality1 and that no science which works with the concepts of cause and effect can give us the highest truth4 ,of course1 the logical defects of the concept need not impair its practical usefulness4 ,though it can never1 for the reason given already1 be ultimately true that any event is absolutely determined by antecedent events1 the assumption may be sufficiently near the truth to yield useful deductions as to the course of occurrences1 precisely as a mathematical approximation to the value of a surd quantity may1 without being the exact truth1 be close enough for practical use4 ,also1 it might well be the case that the causal postulate approximates more nearly to the truth in some spheres of investigation than in others1 a consideration which is not without its bearing on the ethical problems of freedom and responsibility4 ,if we ask how the causal postulate1 being as it must be only imperfectly true1 comes to be made1 the answer is obvious4 ,the whole conception is anthropomorphic in origin1 and owes its existence to our practical needs4 ,to take the latter point first1 logically there is no better reason for treating an event as determined solely by antecedents1 than for treating it as solely determined by subsequent events4 ,yet when the latter supposition is made1 as it is by all believers in omens and presages1 we all agree to condemn it as superstitious4 ,why is this8 ,two reasons may be assigned4 7a7 ,even granting that an event may be determined by subsequent events1 yet1 as we do not know what these events are until after their occurrence1 we should have no means of inferring by what particular events yet to come any present event was conditioned1 and thus should be thrown back upon mere unprincipled guess-work if we attempted to assign its1 as yet future1 conditions4 7b7 ,a more important consideration is that our search for causes is ultimately derived from the search for means to the practical realisation of results in which we are interested4 ,we desire to know the conditions of occurrences primarily1 in order to produce those occurrences for ourselves by setting up their conditions4 ,it is therefore essential to us for our practical purposes to seek the conditions of an occurrence exclusively among its antecedents1 and the causal postulate which asserts that the complete conditions of the event are comprised somewhere in the series of antecedent events is thus the intellectual expression of the demand made by our practical needs upon ,reality4 ,we postulate it because1 unless the postulate is approximately realised1 we cannot intervene with success in the course of events4 ,we refuse1 except as a pure speculation1 to entertain the notion that an event may be determined by subsequent as well as by antecedent events1 because that notion leads to no practical rules for operation upon our environment4 #f4 ,as might be expected of a postulate so obviously originated by our practical needs1 the concept of cause on examination reveals its anthropomorphic character4 ,this is particularly obvious when we consider the concept of ,causation as it figures in everyday unscientific thought4 ,the various scientific substitutes for the popular notion of cause all exhibit traces of the endeavour to purge the conception of its more anthropomorphic elements4 ,in the popular use of the concept this anthropomorphism comes out most strikingly in two ways4 7a7 ,a cause1 as popularly conceived1 is always a person or thing1 i4e4 something we can imagine as a whole1 and into which we can mentally project a conscious life akin to our own4 ,to the scientific mind it seems obvious that causes and effects are alike events and events only1 but for popular thought1 while the effect is always a quality or state 7e4g41 death1 fever1 etc471 the cause is regularly a thing or person 7the bullet1 the poison1 the tropical sun1 etc474 7b7 ,closely connected with this is the emphasis popular thought lays upon what it calls the activity of the cause4 ,the cause is never thought of as merely preceding the effect as an 8inseparable antecedent02 it is supposed to make the effect occur1 to bring it about by an exercise of activity4 ,according to the most coherent expositions of this type of thought1 in causation one thing is always active in producing a change in another thing which is passive4 ,the origin of this notion is sufficiently obvious4 ,as all philosophers since ,hume have recognised1 the 8activity0 of the cause results from the ascription to it of the characteristic feeling of self-assertion and self-expansion which accompanies our own voluntary interference in the course of events4 ,similarly1 the 8passivity0 of the thing in which the effect is produced is only another name for the feeling of coercion and thwarted self-assertion which arises in us when the course of nature or the behaviour of our fellows represses our voluntary execution of our designs4 ,science1 in its attempt to extend the concept of causal determination over the whole domain of existence1 has naturally felt these anthropomorphic implications as obstacles4 ,from the effort to expel them arises what we may call the common scientific view of causation1 as ordinarily adopted for the purposes of experimental investigation and formulated in the works of inductive logicians4 ,the concept of a thing1 except as the mode of interconnection of states1 being unnecessary for the sciences which aim simply at the reduction of the sequence of occurrences to order1 the notion of causation as a transaction between two things is replaced in the experimental sciences by the conception of it as merely the determination of an event by antecedent events4 ,similarly1 with the disappearance of things as the vehicles of causal processes falls the whole distinction between an active and a passive factor4 ,as it becomes more and more apparent that the antecedent events which condition an occurrence are a complex plurality and include states of what is popularly called the thing acted upon as well as processes in the so-called agent1 science substitutes for the distinction between agent and patient the concept of a system of reciprocally dependent interacting factors4 ,these two substitutions give us the current scientific conception of a cause as the 8totality of the conditions0 in the presence of which an event occurs1 and in the absence of any member of which it does not occur4 ,more briefly1 causation in the current scientific sense means sequence under definitely known conditions4 ,indispensable as this notion of the determination of every event by a definite collection of antecedents and by nothing else is for practice1 regarded as a logical formulation of the principle of the systematic unity of existence1 it is open to grave objections1 most of which will be found to have made themselves felt in the logic of the inductive sciences quite independently of conscious metaphysical analysis4 ,in dealing with these difficulties1 we shall find that their general effect is to place us in the following dilemma4 ,if we wish to state the causal principle in such a way as to avoid manifest speculative falsehood1 we find that it has to be modified until it becomes identical with the principle of ,ground and ,consequence in its most universal form1 but as thus modified it is no longer of any service for the purposes of the experimental sciences4 ,you seem driven to take it either in a form in which it is true but practically useless1 or in one in which it is useful but not true4 ,to illustrate the way in which this dilemma arises1 we may examine three of the main problems which have actually been created by the scientific use of the principle1--7a7 the puzzle of continuity2 7b7 the puzzle of the indefinite regress1 7c7 the puzzle of the plurality of causes4 #g4 7a7 ,the ,puzzle of ,continuity4 ,continuity is1 strictly speaking1 a property of certain series1 and may be defined for purposes of reference much as follows4 ,a series is continuous when any term divides the whole series unambiguously into two mutually exclusive parts which between them comprise all the terms of the series1 and when every term which so divides the series is itself a term of the series4 ,from this second condition it obviously follows that a number of intermediate terms can always be inserted between any two terms whatever of a continuous series2 no term of the series has a next term4 ,this is the peculiarity of the continuous with which we shall be specially concerned4 ,thus the series of points on a straight line is continuous because 7#a7 any point ,p on the line divides it into two collections of points in such a way that every point of the one is to the left of every point of the other1 and every point of the second to the right of every point of the former2 and 7#b7 every point which divides the line in this way is a point on the line4 ,again1 the whole series of real numbers is continuous for the same reason4 ,every member of the number-series divides it into two classes1 so that every number of one is less than every number of the other1 and every number which thus divides the series is itself a term of the number-series4 ,but the series of rational real numbers is not continuous1 because it can be divided into mutually exclusive classes by terms which are not themselves members of the series4 7,e4g4 #b is not a member of the series of rational numbers1 but we can exhaustively divide all rational numbers into the two mutually exclusive classes1 rational numbers less than #b and rational numbers not less than #b47aje ,from the continuity of the series of real numbers it follows that any other series which corresponds point for point with the terms of the number-series will be continuous4 ,now one such series is that of the successive parts of time4 ,every moment of time divides the whole series of moments into two mutually exclusive classes1 the moments before itself and the moments which are not before itself4 ,and whatever thus divides the time-series is itself a moment in that series4 ,hence from the continuity of the time-series it follows that any puzzles created by this property of continuousness will apply to the case of ,causation4 ,in what follows ,i shall not discuss the general problem of the continuous1 a problem which requires special mathematical equipment for its efficient handling1 but shall confine myself to the difficulties introduced by continuity into the scientific concept of causal relation4 ,we may conveniently attack the problem by taking it up in the form in which ,hume bequeathed it to modern science4 ,as any careful reader of ,hume must perceive1 ,hume's whole doctrine of ,causation is based on the assumption that the causal process is not continuous4 ,experience is supposed by him to come to us not in an unbroken stream1 but in isolated separate pieces which we subsequently proceed to link together artificially by the notion of ,causation4 ,we are supposed to begin by observing the sequence of an event ,b on a previous distinct event ,a1 and the problem of ,causation thus becomes that of discovering the nature of the link by which the originally distinct ,a and ,b are connected in our scientific thought4 ,in more technical language1 ,hume thought of the series of events as one in which every member has a next term1 and this way of conceiving it has coloured the whole subsequent treatment of ,causation by the inductive logicians who have commonly got their metaphysical doctrines from ,hume4 ,now1 recent ,psychology1 in deserting the old notion of the atomic sensation for that of the 8stream of consciousness10 has completely destroyed the supposed empirical foundation for this ,humian theory of the discontinuity of the course of events4 ,the real problem for the inductive logician we can now see to be not to discover the link by which an originally separate ,a and ,b have got joined together in thought1 but to find the source of the distinction we habitually draw within what comes to us as one continuous process between an earlier stage ,a which we call cause1 and a later stage ,b which we call effect4 ,we are not1 however1 concerned here with the psychological weakness of ,hume's doctrine1 but with the logical difficulty to which it gives rise4 ,we may state the difficulty thus3 7#a7 ,causation cannot possibly be thought of as discontinuous1 i4e4 as the sequence of one distinct event upon an assemblage of other events without gross contradiction4 ,to think of it as discontinuous1 we must conceive the cause ,a to exist first in its completeness1 and then to be suddenly followed by the effect ,b4 7,that the cause ,a consists of a number of conditions1 a1 b1 c 444 which themselves come into existence successively1 and that ,a is not there until the last of these conditions has been realised1 makes no difference to the principle47 ,now this seems to be what is actually implied by the language of those inductive logicians who insist that in all ,causation the cause must precede the effect4 ,but what can such precedence mean8 ,it can only mean that after the complete realisation of the conditions included in the cause ,a1 there must intervene a space of empty time before the effect ,b enters on the scene4 ,however brief and 8momentary0 you take this gap in the stream of events to be1 the gap must be there if your language about the cause as being before the effect is to have any meaning4 ,for if there is no such gap1 and the entrance of ,b is simultaneous with the complete realisation of its conditions ,a1 it is no longer true to say that the cause ,a is before the effect ,b4 ,a does not exist as ,a until a1 b1 c 444 are all present1 and as soon as they are present ,b is present too4 ,and thus the relation between ,a and ,b is not that of the sequence of a later event on an earlier4 ,they are actually together4 ,in fact1 the doctrine that the cause precedes the effect rests upon the notion that the time-series is one in which each member has a next term4 ,and this seems inconceivable4 ,for not only can you subdivide any finite time1 however small1 into two mutually exclusive parts1 but the point at which the division is effected is itself a moment in the time-series lying between the beginning and the end of the original interval4 ,time therefore must be continuous1 and if causation is not equally continuous1 we must suppose that gaps of empty time are what separate the first event1 the cause1 from the subsequent event1 the effect4 ,yet if this could be regarded as a defensible doctrine on other grounds1 it would then follow that the assemblage of events ,a is not the totality of conditions requisite for the occurrence of ,b4 ,the 8totality of conditions10 i4e4 the cause as previously defined1 would be the events ,a plus a certain lapse of empty time4#ajf ,and so the cause would once more turn out not to precede the effect1 or we should have to suppose the end of the interval of empty time included in it as separated from the beginning of ,b by a second lapse1 and so on indefinitely4 7#b7 ,these difficulties1 in a more or less clearly apprehended form1 have led many recent writers on inductive ,logic to modify the definition which was still satisfactory to ,mill4 ,cause and effect1 we are now told1 are not distinct events1 but earlier and later stages in a continuous process4 ,the real business of science is not to discover 8laws of connection0 between distinct events or 8phenomena10 but to invent general mathematical formulae by the aid of which we may trace the course of continuous processes4 ,the discovery of causes1 from this point of view1 is reduced to the construction of formul which exhibit some quantity as a function of a time-variable4 ,fully worked out1 this view of the nature of experimental science leads to the so-called 8descriptive0 ideal of scientific explanation1 advocated by such eminent thinkers as ,kirchhoff1 ,mach1 and ,ostwald among physicists1 and1 with various modifications1 ,avenarius1 ,mnsterberg1 ,royce1 and ,james ,ward among recent philosophers4 ,according to this doctrine1 the ultimate ideal of science1 or at any rate of physical science1 is simply the description of the course of events by the aid of the fewest and simplest general formul4 ,why things happen as they do1 it is now said1 is no proper question for science2 its sole business is to enable us to calculate how they will happen4 ,with the general epistemological questions raised by this doctrine we must deal later in our third and fourth books4 ,at present we are concerned only with its bearing on the notion of ,causal ,relation4#ajg ,the important point for our immediate purpose is that the reduction of all events to continuous processes really does away with ,causation altogether1 as is recognised by those adherents of the theory who openly propose to expel the word 8cause0 from the language of science4#ajh ,for in a continuous process it is purely arbitrary where we shall mentally draw the dividing line which is to mark the boundary between the 8earlier0 and the 8later0 stage4 ,what the descriptive formula1 with the aid of which we trace the course of the process by giving a series of successive values to our time-variable presents1 is not the 8cause0 of the process but the 8law0 of it4 ,instead of looking upon the later stages of the process as determined by the earlier1 we are now looking upon the process as a whole as the expression in detail of a single principle4 ,we have1 in fact1 abandoned the category of cause and effect for that of ,ground and ,consequence4 ,we are seeking the ground of the whole process not in a set of temporally preceding events1 but in its own pervading principle4 ,from this point of view the one-sided dependence of effect on cause1 characteristic of the causal relation1 disappears4 ,whether we shall infer the later stages of the process from the earlier1 or the earlier from the later1 depends simply upon our choice of positive or negative values for our time-variable4 ,for 8descriptive0 science1 what we suggested at first as a paradoxical possibility is the actual fact4 ,the past is determined by the future in precisely the same sense in which the future is determined by the past1 namely1 that as both are stages of the same continuous process1 if once you know the principle of the process you can start equally well with either and reason to the other4#aji ,thus1 within the limits of experimental science itself1 the conception of causal relation has given way to the conception of events as logically connected into a system in virtue of their underlying ground or principle4 ,for practical purposes experimental science has1 in its application of this conception1 to be guided by two postulates1 neither of which can be metaphysically justified4 ,it has to assume 7a7 that the course of events is composed of a plurality of more or less independent continuous processes1 each of which has its own ground within itself1 at least to such an extent as to be capable of being treated for our purpose as independent of others2 7b7 that the underlying ground or grounds of all events can be adequately expressed in terms of mathematical symbolism4 ,as to the first of these points1 our discussion of the unity of ,reality convinced us that there must in the end be a single ground of all existence1 and therefore the complete reason of any partial process cannot be entirely within itself4 ,the independence of the various processes must be relative1 and even the belief that it is sufficient to enable us to treat them for our own special purposes as self-contained and independent1 must be a postulate prompted by our practical needs1 and justified in the end by its success4 ,the second point will engage our attention more fully in subsequent chapters4 ,at present one remark upon it must suffice4 ,the calculability of the laws of continuous processes depends upon our ability to reduce them to numerical and quantitative forms4 ,wherever we have the appearance1 at any stage in a process1 of a new quality1 we have in fact an apparent breach of continuity1 and it ceases to be in our power to exhibit the new stage of the process as a mere transformation of what was already expressed in former stages4 ,hence the success of natural science in reducing all sequences of events to continuous processes depends upon the assumption that we can establish equations between qualitatively different magnitudes4 ,now this assumption is even more evidently than the preceding a postulate4 ,we have to make it1 if we are to calculate the course of events1 but we have no guarantee that it will succeed beyond the fact of its actual success4 ,if it fails anywhere1 as we shall hereafter contend that it does in the critical case of the sequence of psychical on physical events1 and vice vers1 two results will follow1 one practical1 the other speculative4 ,the practical consequence of the failure is that in such cases we cannot apply the concept of continuous process1 and have to fall back upon the cruder notion of causal sequence4 ,thus1 in attempting to create a science of ,psychophysics we cannot hope to exhibit the whole of a psychophysical process as the continuous realisation of a single principle2 we must be content to establish laws of causal connection between the physical and the psychical sides of the process4 ,the speculative consequence is that the principle of ,ground and ,consequence is only imperfectly represented by the conception of a continuous process1 inasmuch as that conception is only applicable where qualitative differences within the consequences of a single ground can be disregarded4 ,this hint will prepare us for subsequent criticism of the concept of continuity when we come to deal with the metaphysics of the time-process4#aaj #h 7b74 ,the ,indefinite ,regress4 ,the defects of the causal postulate as a principle of explanation may also be exhibited by showing the double way in which it leads to the indefinite regress4 ,the indefinite regress in the causal series is an inevitable consequence of the structure of time1 and1 as we please1 may be detected both outside and inside any causal relation of two events1 or two stages of a continuous process4 ,for it follows from the structure of the time-series 7a7 that there are an indefinite number of terms of the series between any two members1 between which there is a finite interval1 and 7b7 that there is also an indefinite number of terms before or after any given member of the series4 ,like the series of real numbers1 the time-series1 because it satisfies the definition of a continuous infinite series1 can have neither a first nor a last term1 nor can any member of it have a next term4#aaa ,applying this to the case of ,causation1 we may reason as follows3-- 7#a7 ,the same reasons which lead us to demand a cause ,a for any event ,b1 and to find that cause in an assemblage of antecedent events1 require that ,a should be similarly determined by another assemblage of antecedent events1 and that this cause of ,a should itself have its own antecedent cause1 and so on indefinitely4 ,thus the causal principle1 logically applied1 never yields an intelligible explanation of any event4 ,instead of exhibiting the transition ,a-,b as the logical expression of a coherent principle1 it refers us for the explanation of this transition to a previous instance of the same kind of transition1 and then to another1 and so forth without end4 ,but it is impossible that what is not intelligible in one instance should become intelligible by the mere multiplication of similar unintelligibilities4 7#b7 ,similarly if we look within the transition ,a-,b4 ,this transition being continuous must have its intermediate stages4 ,a becomes ,b because it has already become ,c1 and the transition ,a-,c-,b is again 8explained0 by showing that ,a became ,d which became ,c which became ,e which became ,b4 ,and each of the stages ,a-,d1 ,d-,c1 ,c-,e1 ,e-,b can be once more submitted to the same sort of analysis4 ,but in all this interpolation of intermediate stages there is nothing to show the nature of the common principle in virtue of which the stages form a single process4 ,we are1 in fact1 trying to do what we try to do wherever we establish a relation between terms1 to answer a question by repeating it4 ,and we decided at the end of our last chapter that this kind of repetition is never an answer to any question4 ,how entirely it fails to answer the question we ask whenever we look for a cause is obvious4 ,we want to know why ,b exists1 and we are told that ,b exists because it is determined by the previous existence of ,a4 ,but why does ,a exist8 ,because of the previous existence of ,c4 ,and so ultimately the existence of everything depends on the existence of something else1 and this again on the existence of still something else4 ,if this is so1 since nothing can exist until its cause has existed1 and the cause again not until its cause has existed1 then1 as this unending series has no first term1 nothing can ever come into existence at all4 ,this inevitable introduction of the indefinite regress whenever we try to think out the causal principle to its logical consequences1 has sometimes been treated as proving the inherent defectiveness of the human mind4 ,what it proves rather is that ,causality is not a proper formulation of the real principle of the unity of all experience4 ,a word may be said about the attempts which philosophers have made to extricate themselves from the difficulty without giving up ,causality as an ultimate principle of explanation4 ,the least philosophical method of escape is that of arbitrarily postulating a first cause with no preceding cause1 which amounts to the same thing as a beginning of existence or a first moment of time4 ,this way out of the difficulty obviously amounts to an arbitrary desertion of the causal principle at the point where it becomes inconvenient to remain faithful to it4 ,whatever the nature of the event you pitch upon as your 8first cause10 the causal principle1 if logically valid at all1 is just as applicable here as anywhere else ,your 8first cause0 must have had a previous cause1 or else the whole causal scheme must be1 as we have contended that it is1 the illogical and imperfect perversion of a genuine principle of systematic connection1 useful and indeed indispensable in practice1 but quite indefensible in theory4 ,it would not help you out of the difficulty to distinguish between a first event and a first moment of time1 by postulating a first cause with an indefinite lapse of empty time before it4 ,for the causal principle would then require you to look for the determining conditions of the first event in the preceding lapse of empty time4 ,but this lapse1 because merely empty1 cannot contain the determining conditions for any special occurrence in preference to others4 ,this is why the conception of a beginning of the causal series in time1 with an empty lapse before it1 has always led to the insoluble riddle1 8,why did ,god create the world when ,he did1 rather than at some other point of time80 ,nor can the difficulty be escaped by taking refuge in the continuity of the stream of events4 ,for 7#a7 as we have seen1 the recognition of events as continuous processes necessarily leads to the surrender of the causal principle as inadequate to express the real connection of facts4 ,causality1 as a special form of the category of ,ground and ,consequence1 must stand or fall with the view of occurrences as sequences of discontinuous events4 ,and 7#b7 even apart from this consideration1 the appeal to continuity can at best only be worked as a rejoinder to the internal analysis of a sequence into an infinite process4 ,when it is urged that1 on the causal principle1 there must be an infinite number of intermediate stages between the cause and the effect in any given case1 it is possible to retort that the stages are not 8really0 distinct1 but only distinguished by an artificial abstraction1 that the process is actually one and continuous1 and therefore does not involve an infinite regress1 except for the logician who erroneously construes it as discontinuous4 ,but with the external regress in indefinitum you cannot deal in this way4 ,the absence of a beginning follows as necessarily from the principle of explaining the later stages of a continuous process as conditioned by the earlier1 as it does when the stages are taken to be distinct events4 7,this is easily seen from the simple consideration that the time-variable in your formula for the successive stages of the process may have an unlimited range of possible values from -infinity to infinity47 ,in short1 whether the succession of events be taken as continuous or not1 the attempt to translate the axiom that whatever happens has its ground in the nature of the whole system to which it belongs1 into the doctrine that the posterior in time is completely determined by and dependent on the prior1 leads straight to the infinite regress4 ,and1 as we said in our last chapter1 the occurrence of the infinite regress is always a sign that there is imperfection somewhere in the thought which sets it up4 ,for it always implies the formal contradiction of the actual summation by successive increments of an infinite series4 ,further considerations on this point may be deferred till we come to treat of the continuity of time4#aab #i 7c74 ,the ,plurality of ,causes4 ,the indefinite regress may be shown to be inherent in ,causation by a different line of argument1 without appealing to the principle of the continuity of time4 ,as the reader is doubtless aware1 it was a favourite doctrine of ,john ,stuart ,mill1 that whereas the same cause is always followed by the same effect--in the absence of counteracting circumstances--the same effect need not be preceded by the same cause4 ,an effect may be 8produced0 on different occasions by entirely different sets of antecedents4 ,thus death may be due either to disease or to violence1 and both the disease and the violence may have very different forms1 yet the result is the same1 namely1 death4 ,heat may ensue from friction1 percussion1 chemical combination1 and so forth4 ,this doctrine of the ,plurality of ,causes is an obvious result of generalisation from the important practical consideration that different means will often lead us to the same end1 so that where we cannot employ one we can often fall back on another4 ,mill's critics have not failed to point out that his doctrine is based on the rather illogical combination of a concrete cause with an abstract effect4 ,he considers the 8effect0 in its utmost generality simply as a state or quality1 e4g41 8heat10 8death10 and rightly contends that this general state or quality may issue on different occasions from different combinations of conditions4 ,but he fails to observe that in any concrete case this effect exists in a special form1 and with special modifications corresponding to the special character of the antecedents4 ,death1 for instance1 may result from a thousand circumstances1 but the total effect in each case is never mere death1 but death in some one special shape4 ,a man who is shot and a man who is drowned are both dead1 but one is dead with the special symptoms of death by drowning1 the other with those of death by shooting4 ,the water will kill you and a bullet will kill you1 but death with a bullet-hole does not come from drowning1 nor death with one's lungs filled with water from a gunshot4 ,if you take cause and effect at the same level of concreteness1 they are always strictly correlative4 ,any variation in the one must have a corresponding variation in the other1 for circumstances which vary without affecting a result are by definition no part of its conditions4 ,so far ,mill's critics among the inductive logicians4 ,but we can push the argument a step further1 and show that it leads logically to a dilemma4 7#a7 ,there cannot really be more than one 8cause0 for one 8effect02 yet 7#b7 in any sense in which we can single out one 8effect0 from the rest of the contents of the universe1 and assign it its 8cause10 there is always a possibility of the ,plurality of ,causes4 ,we will consider the alternative of this dilemma separately4 7#a7 ,cause and effect must be strictly correlative4 ,for to say that there may be variations in the cause not followed by corresponding variations in the effect1 is to say that there can be conditions which condition nothing2 and to admit variation in the effect without variation in the cause1 is to allow that there are occurrences which are at once1 as effects1 determined1 and yet again are not determined1 by the assemblage of their antecedents4 ,thus ,plurality of ,causes is excluded by the very conception of a cause as the totality of conditions4 ,following up this line of thought further1 we see that it leads to a perplexing result4 ,the 8totality of conditions0 is never a real totality4 ,for there are no such things as isolated effects and causes in the world of events4 ,the whole fact which we call an effect is never complete until we have taken into account its entire connection with everything else in the universe4 ,and similarly1 the whole assemblage of conditions includes everything which goes to make up the universe4 ,but when we have thus widened our conception of the cause and the effect1 both cause and effect have become identical with one another and with the whole contents of the universe4 ,and thus ,causation itself has disappeared as a form of interconnection between the elements of ,reality in our attempt to work out its logical implications4 ,this is an inevitable consequence of the continuous interconnection of all ,reality established by our examination of the problem of the ,one and the ,many in ,chapter ,,ii4 ,in other words1 you never have reached the full cause of any event until you have taken into account the totality of its conditions1 i4e4 the totality of its connections with all the rest of existence4 ,but this totality cannot be obtained in the form presupposed by the phrase 8totality of conditions0 as a plurality of events4 ,for to obtain it in this fashion would mean to sum an infinite series4 ,but when you abandon the form of the infinite series1 cause and effect alike become identical with the systematic whole of ,reality4 7#b7 ,on the other hand1 the usefulness of the causal postulate depends entirely upon our ability to establish single threads of ,causality within the stream of events1 i4e4 on our ability to assign particular assemblages of events1 less than the 8totality10 to particular subsequent events as their necessary and sufficient condition4 ,unless we can do this we can formulate no rules for the practical employment of means for the production of a desired result1 and1 as we have already seen1 it is the necessity of knowing the means to our ends which is the primary1 and indeed the sole1 motive for the establishment of the causal postulate4 ,now1 to effect this assignation of particular causes to particular effects1 we have to make use of a distinction which is more practically necessary than theoretically defensible4 ,we distinguish between indispensable conditions and accessory circumstances1 which may or may not be present without affecting the nature of the special result in question4 ,now it is clear that the making of this distinction depends upon the separation of a certain part of the 8total0 stream of events from the rest1 and its isolation as 8the special result in question40 ,and this isolation1 as we have seen1 must always rest upon arbitrary abstraction4 ,when once this arbitrary abstraction of some one part or aspect of the stream of events from its context has been made1 we are compelled to recognise the existence of the context from which we have abstracted by saying that any effect may enter into or form part of a variety of different larger effects1 according to the nature of the context in which it occurs4 ,and1 from the very principle of the complete correlation of condition and conditioned1 it follows that what we call the special or partial effect will be preceded by varying conditions1 according as it enters into different larger wholes or contexts4 ,thus any form of the causal postulate of which we can make effective use necessitates the recognition of that very ,plurality of ,causes which we have seen to be logically excluded by the conception of cause with which science works4 ,as we contended above1 any form of the principle in which it is true is useless1 and any form in which it is useful is untrue4 ,the final result of our discussion1 then1 is that the causal postulate according to which events are completely determined by antecedent events leads to the belief that the stream of events is discontinuous4 ,this belief is inherently self-contradictory1 and therefore ultimately untrue4 ,the principle of ,ground and ,consequence cannot therefore be adequately represented by the causal postulate1 however indispensable that postulate may be in practice4 ,whether the conception of a continuous stream of events affords any better formulation of the principle of the systematic interconnection of all ,reality1 we shall be better able to judge after the discussions of our third book4 ,if it does not1 we shall have to recognise that the conception of temporal succession itself is not adequate to express the way in which the ,many and the ,one of real existence are united1 i4e4 that time is not real1 but only phenomenal4 #aj4 ,a word may be said here as to the nature of the 8necessity0 which we ascribe to the connection of cause and effect4 ,there can be little doubt that the origin of this 8necessity0 must be found in our own feelings of constraint when our action is dictated from without4 ,it is clear1 however1 that we have no right to ascribe this feeling of constraint to the event which is determined by its connection with the rest of the system of ,reality4 ,all that is meant in science by the 8necessity0 of the causal relation is that given the conditions the result follows1 and not otherwise4 ,in other words1 if you assert the existence of the conditions1 you are logically bound to assert the existence of the result4 ,the constraint thus falls within ourselves1 and is of a hypothetical kind4 ,so long as your purpose is to think logically1 you feel constraint or compulsion when1 after asserting the condition1 you seek for any reason to escape asserting the result4 ,it is one of the conspicuous services of ,hume to philosophy1 that he for the first time brought out clearly this subjective character of the 8necessity0 of the causal relation1 though it must be admitted that he went on to complicate his argument by an admixture of error when he sought to base the necessity of the logical inference from ,ground to ,consequence on the psychological principle of ,association4 #aa4 ,before closing our discussion of ,causality1 we must briefly take note of certain special difficulties by which the problem has been complicated in the systems of some eminent philosophers4 ,a distinction has often been drawn between ,transeunt and ,immanent ,causality4 ,in so far as the changes of state of one thing are regarded as occasions of change of state in others1 the relation has been technically called one of ,transeunt ,causality2 the determination of a thing's change of state by its own previous changes has1 on the other hand1 been named ,immanent ,causality4 ,as a consequence of this distinction1 grave difficulties have arisen in connection with the notion of ,transeunt ,causality4 ,such ,causality1 i4e4 the determination of the changes of one thing by the changes of others1 is of course an essential feature in the pre-scientific view of the world of experience as a multiplicity of interacting things4 ,for systematic ,pluralism this conception inevitably presents insoluble difficulties4 ,for it is impossible to reconcile the ultimate absolute independence of the various real things with the admission that the sequence of states in any one depends upon sequences of states in any of the others4 ,if a plurality of things are ultimately independent of each other1 it is manifest that each must form a complete whole1 self-determined and containing the ground of its details entirely within itself4 ,conversely1 if a thing cannot be explained by a principle of purely internal systematic connection1 but requires for its complete explanation reference to an outside reality with which it stands in interconnection1 its independence can be only partial4 ,hence ,pluralism1 in its more consistent forms1 has always sought to deny the reality of ,transeunt ,causality1 and to reduce all causal relations to the internal determination of the states of a thing by its own previous states4 ,historically1 the principal devices which have been adopted for this purpose are 7a7 ,occasionalism1 and 7b7 the theory of a ,pre-established ,harmony4 7a7 ,occasionalism4 ,occasionalism has appeared in the history of ,philosophy as a professed solution of the special problem of the apparent interaction between body and mind1 taken as two entirely disparate and independent realities1 though it is equally applicable in a wider sense to the more general problem of the apparent connection of any two independent real things4 ,the doctrine is most closely associated with the names of the ,cartesians1 ,arnold ,geulincx and ,n4 ,malebranche1 but was in part also adopted by ,berkeley as a consequence of his belief in the pure passivity of non-mental things4 ,starting from the ,cartesian conception of mind and body as two entirely independent and disparate kinds of reality1 ,geulincx and ,malebranche were confronted by the apparent fact that mental states lead to modifications of bodily state in voluntary motion1 and vice vers1 bodily states determine the occurrence of mental states whenever a sensation follows upon a stimulus4 ,the 8natural view of the world0 unhesitatingly accepts these cases as instances of interaction or ,transeunt ,causality on exactly the same level as the origination of change of state in one body by change in another1 and ,descartes himself had acquiesced in this interpretation4 ,but such a view1 as his successors saw1 is quite incompatible with the alleged disparateness and independence of the two orders of existence1 the bodily and the mental4 ,geulincx and ,malebranche accordingly took refuge in the doctrine that the interaction is only apparent4 ,in reality there is a complete solution of continuity wherever the series of changes in the one order terminates and that in the other begins4 ,what really happens1 they taught1 is that ,god adapts the one series to the other4 ,on the occurrence of the bodily stimulus1 ,god intervenes to produce the sensation or emotion which is required to harmonise our action with our environment4 ,similarly1 on the occurrence of a volition1 ,god interferes to set the corresponding movement going in our bodily organism4 ,thus the change in the one order is merely an occasion for the intervention of ,god1 who is the actual cause of the corresponding change in the other4 ,within each order the series of changes once initiated are then supposed to be causally connected4 ,the divine interference only comes in where the two orders come into contact4 ,berkeley adopted half of this doctrine without the complementary half4 ,inasmuch as1 according to him1 physical or non-mental things are mere complexes of presentations1 or1 in his own terminology1 8ideas10 and ideas are purely inert1 the real cause of every sensation must be ,god1 who thus directly intervenes to give us an indication of the further sensations we shall receive according to the action we take on the present presentation4 ,transeunt ,causality in the reverse direction1 the immediate origination of bodily movement by volition1 ,berkeley seems to have admitted without criticism as a self-evident fact4#aac ,it will not be necessary here to discuss the half-hearted version of ,occasionalism adopted by ,berkeley4 ,it is clear that the admission of direct origination of bodily change by mental cannot be consistently combined with the denial of all ,transeunt ,causality in the reverse direction4 ,if all physical existence1 my own body included1 is nothing more than an inert complex of presentations1 it is just as hard to see how it can be the recipient of mentally originated change as to see how it can originate mental change4 ,what is not in any sense active cannot be passive1 for passivity is simply repressed and thwarted activity4 ,we confine ourselves1 then1 to ,occasionalism of the thorough-going type4 ,now1 against such ,occasionalism there is the obvious objection that it transforms the whole course of our existence into one long succession of miracles1 a point upon which ,leibnitz is fond of insisting in his criticisms of ,malebranche4 ,and the doctrine is not really consistent with itself for two reasons4 7#a7 ,it is clear that1 according to any possible definition of ,causation1 the doctrine of ,occasionalism involves causal interaction between ,god on the one hand and both the supposedly disparate orders of reality on the other4 ,changes in either order definitely determine the intervention of ,god to originate definitely determined changes in the other order4 ,thus ,god's internal determinations are at once causes and effects of changes in either order4 ,but if1 e4g41 a material change of state can be the cause of a determination in ,god1 the whole basis of the denial that a change in the material order can originate change in another order of reality1 is swept away4 ,the net result of the theory is simply to re-establish the transeunt action of the two orders on each other by means of a roundabout circuit through the mind of ,god4 ,what ,geulincx and ,malebranche really had in mind was the simple reflection that we cannot tell how a physical change can bring about a mental change1 or vice vers4#aad ,but this problem is not advanced in the least by introducing ,god as a third factor4 ,how a change in the one order can bring about a determination in the mind of ,god1 and how again ,god brings about the corresponding change in the other order1 are simply two insoluble problems of the same kind as that they were intended to explain4 ,after the introduction of ,god as third factor in the causal process1 the fact still remains as before1 that certain definite changes in the one order ensue upon definite changes in the other1 and this is precisely the fact which is denoted by the name of ,transeunt ,causality4 ,of course the problem would alter its character if ,god were conceived as another expression for the total system of ,reality4 ,the doctrine of ,occasionalism would then become simply a statement of the view that no two things are really independent1 and that it is in virtue of their inclusion in a larger systematic whole that what we call separate things can influence each other4 ,but1 in spite of numerous passing utterances which point to this view1 it is quite certain that ,occasionalism was seriously intended by its authors as a solution of the problem of ,causality on strictly traditional theistic lines4 7#b7 ,a second defect of the doctrine lies in the failure of its originators to extend it to all cases of causal relation4 ,it is a mere prejudice when ,geulincx and ,malebranche allow themselves to assume that the sequence of physical change on preceding physical change1 or mental change on preceding mental change1 is more self-explanatory than the sequence of a mental change on a physical4 ,in both cases we can ascertain that one state definitely follows a previous one2 in neither can we answer the ultimately unmeaning question1 by what machinery this sequence is brought about4 ,for any answer must obviously consist in the interpolation of an intermediate link1 and with regard to the production of this intermediate link the same question arises1 and thus we come to the indefinite regress1 the invariable indication that we have been asking an unmeaning question4 7b7 ,the ,pre-established ,harmony4 ,more philosophical was the attempt of ,leibnitz to reconcile ,pluralism with the apparent interaction of things4 ,according to ,leibnitz1 every ultimately real thing or monad is a self-contained whole2 it contains1 therefore1 in itself the ground of the sequence of its own states4 ,hence there can be no real origination of change in one monad by the occurrence of change in another4 ,the life of every monad must consist purely in the development of its own internal nature4 ,as ,leibnitz phrases it1 there are no windows in the monads through which states and qualities can fly from one to another4 ,yet some account must be taken of the apparent fact that1 since the world of experience is not a chaos1 the changes in one thing seem to be connected by definite law with the changes in others4 ,now1 according to ,leibnitz1 this apparent interaction can only be accounted for1 if we decline to tolerate the perpetual miracle of ,occasionalism1 by the theory of a ,pre-established ,harmony between monads4 ,if the whole of the independent monads are of such a nature that each1 while actually following the law of its own development1 behaves in the way required by the internal development of all the rest1 then1 though each is really self-contained1 there will be the appearance of interaction4 ,leibnitz illustrates the possibility of such a harmony by the case of two clocks which keep time with each other1 without either the actual regulation of the one by the other1 or the maintenance of a connection between them1 simply because each is properly constructed2 and again1 by the case of a number of musicians playing from the same music but concealed from each other's observation1 who keep time and tune simply because each is playing his own score correctly4 ,probably this is the most satisfactory hypothesis which can be devised for the conciliation of apparent interaction with a radical ,pluralism4 ,but its logical defects are apparent on the face of it4 ,when we ask to what the harmony between the internal states of the several monads is ultimately due1 ,leibnitz hesitates between two answers4 ,it is due1 according to one account1 to the choice of ,god1 who in ,his wisdom saw fit to establish the best of all the possible worlds4 ,but at the same time it was ,god's recognition of the harmony between the monads of this special world-system which led ,him to give it the preference over other antecedently possible systems1 and to bring it rather than any other from mere possibility into actual existence4 ,now it seems clear that1 if the creative activity of ,god is to be taken seriously1 the relation of ,god to the system must be one of ,transeunt ,causality4 ,but if ,transeunt ,causality is admitted in the single case of ,god's attitude towards the monads1 it no longer seems obvious why it should be denied as regards the attitudes of the monads among themselves4 ,for there is now at least one property of each monad of which the ground lies not in itself but in ,god1 namely1 its actual existence2#aae and the principle that every monad is the ground of all its own properties once being deserted1 there remains no further reason for denying interaction4 ,if1 on the other hand1 we lay stress on the view that the harmony is no mere result of an arbitrary creative act1 but is a property contained in the concept of the world of monads1 thought of as merely possible1 why may we not equally well think of a world of interacting and interconnected and therefore not ultimately independent things as possessing equal claims to realisation8 ,the ,pluralism of ,leibnitz1 from which his denial of ,transeunt ,causality logically follows1 seems to rest upon nothing better than uncriticised prejudices4#aaf #ab4 ,we may briefly indicate the view as to the problem of ,transeunt ,causality which is involved in our discussion of the causal postulate4 ,for any purpose for which it is possible and desirable to think of the world as a plurality of things1 ,transeunt ,causality must be maintained4 ,for precisely because the things in the world in the end form a connected system1 the complete ground of the states of a thing cannot lie in itself but only in the whole system4 ,in any sense in which there are a plurality of things1 and in which the principle of ground and consequence can be approximately represented by the causal determination of subsequent occurrences by anterior occurrences1 we must be prepared to find that the states of one thing appear among the conditions of the subsequent states of other things4 ,but again1 since the apparently separate things are not entirely independent1 but are the detailed self-expression of a single system1 ,transeunt ,causality must in the end be appearance4 ,inasmuch as all interconnection between things depends upon their inclusion in the single system of ,reality1 it may be said that1 when you take the whole into account1 all ,causality is ultimately immanent4 ,but again1 as we have already seen1 ,immanent ,causality is an imperfect way of expressing the systematic connection of all existence according to the principle of ,ground and ,consequence4 ,fully thought out1 ,immanent ,causality1 as the determination of one state of the whole by a preceding state1 is transformed into the concept of the interconnection of the various states by the purely logical principle that they form together the detailed expression of a single coherent principle of structure4 ,and thus all ,causality is finally imperfect appearance4 ,a point of some interest is the following4 ,as we have seen1 only individual experiences can in the end possess the kind of relative independence and internal unity which thought seeks to express in the notion of a thing4 ,we may add that just in the degree to which any existence has this individuality1 and thus forms a self-contained whole1 will its behaviour have its ground within the thing itself4 ,hence the more completely individual a thing is1 the more will the conditions upon which its states depend appear when we apply the postulate of ,causality1 to be included in other states of the same thing4 ,thus the more individuality a thing has1 the more fully will it appear to exhibit ,immanent as distinguished from ,transeunt ,causality in its internal structure1 that is1 the less will be the modifications that structure undergoes in its intercourse with other things4 ,if we like to denote the maintenance of unchanged internal structure against instigations to change from without by the term 8empirical activity10 we may express our result by saying that the more individual a thing is1 the more empirically active it is4 ,when we come to deal with the special problems of moral and social life1 we shall have to face further questions as to the connection of causal determination with moral freedom and responsibility1 and again with conscious purposive action for ends4 ,our previous discussion will then be found to have cleared the way for these more complex questions1 by removing the difficulties which arise when the causal postulate is mistaken for an axiomatic principle of the interpretation of the systematic nature of ,reality4 ,consult further3--,b4 ,bosanquet1 ,essentials of ,logic1 pp4 #afd1 #afe2 ,logic1 vol4 i p4 #bec ff41 vol4 ii4 p4 #bab ff42 ,f4 ,h4 ,bradley1 ,appearance and ,reality1 chaps4 #e 7,motion and ,change71 #f 7,causation71 #g 7,activity71 #h 7,things72 ,h4 ,lotze1 ,metaphysic1 bk4 i4 chaps4 #d 7,becoming and ,change71 #e 7,nature of ,physical ,action72 ,l4 ,t4 ,hobhouse1 ,theory of ,knowledge1 pt4 #b1 chaps4 #h1 #ae 7for discussion of 8,plurality0 of ,causes72 ,karl ,pearson1 ,grammar of ,science1 chaps4 #c and #d2 ,b4 ,russell1 ,philosophy of ,leibniz1 chaps4 #d1 #aa 7,pre-established ,harmony72 ,james ,ward1 ,naturalism and ,agnosticism1 pt4 #a1 lectures #b-f2 ,hume's famous discussion of ,causation 7,treatise of ,human ,nature1 bk4 i4 pt4 #c1 #c-ae7 seems to me to have lost little of its value1 and to be still perhaps the most important single contribution of modern ,philosophy to the systematic discussion of ,causality4 ----- ,footnote #ajj3 ,for a discussion of the same point in dealing with energy1 see ,professor ,schuster1 ,british ,association ,report1 #ahib1 p4 #fca4 ,footnote #aja3 ,w4 ,m#8,dougall in ,mind for ,july #aijb1 p4 #cej4 ,footnote #ajb3 ,see the admirable remarks of ,bosanquet in ,companion to ,plato's ,republic1 pp4 #bge1 #bgf4 ,footnote #ajc3 ,on the category of ,ground and ,consequent and the principle of ,sufficient ,reason1 consult ,bosanquet1 ,logic1 bk4 i4 chap4 #f1 and bk4 ii4 chap4 #g4 ,footnote #ajd3 ,it is no answer to this suggestion to urge that the present1 being real1 cannot be conditioned by the future1 which is unreal4 ,such a rejoinder commits the metaphysical petitio principii of taking for granted that only the present is real4 ,it is obvious that one might say with equal cogency that the past1 being over and gone1 is now unreal and therefore cannot influence the real present4 ,footnote #aje3 ,for a fuller explanation of what is meant by continuity1 consult ,dedekind1 ,stetigkeit und irrationale ,zahlen1 specially #c-e1 or ,lamb's ,infinitesimal ,calculus1 chap4 #a4 ,readers who have been accustomed to the treatment of continuity by the older philosophical writers should specially remark 7#a7 that continuity is properly a characteristic of series1 and 7#b7 that though continuity implies indefinite divisibility1 the reverse is not1 as was sometimes assumed by earlier writers1 true4 ,the series of rational numbers is a familiar illustration of endless divisibility without continuity4 ,footnote #ajf3 ,there would arise further difficulties as to whether the magnitude of this lapse is a function of ,a1 or whether it is the same in all cases of causal sequence4 ,but until some one can be found to defend such a general theory of causal sequence it is premature to discuss difficulties of detail4 ,footnote #ajg3 ,for the ,english reader the best sources of information as to the 8descriptive0 theory of science are probably volume i4 of ,professor ,ward's ,naturalism and ,agnosticism2 and ,mach1 the ,science of ,mechanics 7,eng4 trans474 ,students who read ,gennan may advantageously add ,avenarius1 ,philosophie als ,denken der ,welt gemss dem ,princip des kleinsten ,kraftmasses4 ,professor ,j4 ,a4 ,stewart is surely mistaken 7,mind1 ,july #aijb7 in treating the doctrine as a discovery of 8idealist0 metaphysicians4 ,whatever may be thought of some of the uses to which 8idealists0 put the theory1 they cannot claim the credit of its invention4 ,footnote #ajh3 ,cf4 ,mach1 op4 cit41 p4 #dhc ff42 ,pearson1 ,grammar of ,science1 chap4 #d4 ,footnote #aji3 ,e4g41 eclipses can be calculated equally well for the future or the past4 ,footnote #aaj3 ,infra1 ,bk4 ,,iii4 chap4 #d4 ,it will be enough to refer in passing to the curious blunder which is committed when the principle of ,causality is confounded with the doctrines of the ,conservation of ,mass and ,energy4 ,that the principle of ,causality has nothing to do with these special physical theories is manifest from the considerations3 7#a7 ,that it is at least not self-evident that all causal relation is physical4 ,philosophers have indeed denied that one mental state directly causes another1 but no one has based his denial on the assertion that there can be no causality without mass and energy4 7#b7 ,the principle of ,causality1 as we have seen1 is a postulate4 ,if we are ever to intervene successfully in the course of events1 it must be possible with at least approximate accuracy to regard events as determined by their antecedents4 ,the doctrines of conservation of mass and energy are1 on the contrary1 empirical generalisations from the observed behaviour of material systems4 ,neither science nor practical life in the least requires them as an indispensable condition of success4 ,in practical life they are never appealed to1 and the ablest exponents of science are most ready to admit that we have no proof of their validity except so far as it can be established by actual observation4 ,in short1 they are largely a posteriori1 while the principle of ,causality is1 as already explained1 a priori4 ,see infra1 ,bk4 ,,iii4 chap4 #f1 #f4 ,footnote #aaa3 ,neither can have a first term1 because each has two opposite senses1 positive and negative in the one case1 before and after in the other4 ,footnote #aab3 ,i suppose ,i need not remind my reader that when a number is spoken of as the actual sum of an infinite series 7as when #b is called the sum of the series #a #a_/b #a_/d #a_/h 444 to infinity71 the word sum is used in a derivative and improper sense for the limiting value assumed by the sum of n terms as n increases indefinitely4 ,see ,lamb1 ,infinitesimal ,calculus1 p4 #aa4 ,footnote #aac3 ,for the various views here summarised1 see as original sources1 ,geulincx1 ,metaphysica ,vera1 ,pars ,prima1 #e-h2 ,malebranche1 ,entretiens sur la ,metaphysique et sur la ,religion1 #gth dialogue2 ,berkeley1 ,new ,theory of ,vision1 pp4 #adg1 #adh2 ,principles of ,human ,knowledge1 #be-cc1 #ea-ec1 #eg1 #aej2 ,second ,dialogue between ,hylas and ,philonous4 ,footnote #aad3 ,geulincx expresses the principle in the following formula 7op4 cit41 pt4 #a1 #e73 quod nescis quomodo fiat1 id non facis4 ,footnote #aae3 ,not that existence can intelligibly be treated as a property2 on this point ,kant's famous criticism of the 8ontological proof0 seems conclusive4 ,but from the point of view of ,leibnitz it must be imagined as an additional predicate1 somehow added by the creative act of ,god to those already contained in the concept of the world as 8possible40 ,footnote #aaf3 ,for ,leibnitz's doctrine consult further1 ,the ,monadology etc41 of ,leibniz1 edit4 by ,r4 ,latta1 ,introduction1 pts4 #b and #c1 and translations of ,monadology1 ,new ,system of the ,communication of ,substances1 with the ,first and ,third ,explanations of the ,new ,system4 ,also see the elaborate criticisms of ,b4 ,russell1 ,the ,philosophy of ,leibniz1 chap4 #d and following chapters4 ----- ,,book ,,iii ,,cosmology--,,the ,,interpretation ,,of ,,nature ,,chapter ,i ,,introductory #a4 ,distinction between the experimental sciences and a ,philosophy of ,nature and ,mind4 ,the former concerned with the description1 the latter with the interpretation1 of facts4 #b4 ,cosmology is the critical examination of the special characteristics of the physical order4 ,its main problems are3 7#a7 the problem of the nature of ,material ,existence2 7#b7 problem of the justification of the concept of the ,mechanical ,uniformity of ,nature2 7#c7 problems of ,space and ,time2 7#d7 problem of the ,significance of ,evolution2 7#e7 problem of the ,place of descriptive ,physical ,science in the ,system of ,human ,knowledge4 #a4 ,in our two remaining ,books we shall have to deal with the more elementary of the problems created by the apparent existence of two orders of ,reality1 a physical and a psychical1 which again at least seem to stand in reciprocal interaction4 ,in the present ,book we shall discuss some of the leading characteristics which everyday thought and scientific thought respectively assign to the physical order1 and shall ask how these characteristics compare with those we have seen ground to ascribe to ,reality1 i4e4 we shall attempt to form a theory of the place of physical existence in the whole system of ,reality4 ,in the ,fourth ,book we shall discuss in the same way some of the leading characteristics of the psychical order as currently conceived1 and the nature of its connection with the physical order4 ,our treatment of these topics will necessarily be imperfect and elementary for more reasons than one3 not only are the facts of which some account must be taken so numerous and complicated that they would require for their mastery something like an encyclopdic acquaintance with the whole range of the experimental sciences1 physical and psychological1 but their adequate interpretation1 especially on the cosmological side1 would demand a familiarity with the ultimate foundations of mathematical theory which is rarely possessed either by the experimentalist or by the metaphysician4 ,the utmost we can hope to accomplish in this part of our work is to establish one or two broad results as regards general principles3 any suggestions we may make as to the details of interpretation must be avowedly tentative4 ,we must be careful to distinguish the task of a ,philosophy of ,nature and a ,philosophy of ,mind from those of the experimental sciences which deal directly with the fact of the physical and psychical orders4 ,the fundamental business of the latter is1 as we have already seen1 the discovery of descriptive formul by the aid of which the various processes which make up the physical and psychical orders may be depicted and calculated4 ,the fewer and simpler these formul1 the more they economise the labour of calculation1 the more completely do the experimental sciences perform the work for which we look to them4 ,and so long as our formul adequately accomplish this work of calculation1 it is indifferent for the experimental sciences whether the language in which they are couched represents a 8reality0 or not4 ,the 8atoms10 8forces10 and 8ethers0 of our physical1 the 8sensations0 of our psychological formul1 might be as purely symbolic creations of our own imagination as the 8imaginary quantities0 of mathematics1 without their unreality in any way interfering with their scientific usefulness4 ,in the words of an eminent physicist1 8the atomic theory plays a part in physics similar to that of certain auxiliary concepts in mathematics1 444 although we represent vibrations by the harmonic formula1 the phenomena of cooling by exponentials1 falls by squares of times1 etc41 no one will fancy that vibrations in themselves have anything to do with the circular functions1 or the motion of falling bodies with squares0 7,mach1 ,science of ,mechanics1 p4 #dib74 ,when it is asserted that the usefulness of a scientific hypothesis1 such as1 e4g41 the atomic theory or the hypothesis of the existence of an etherial undulating medium1 of itself proves the real existence of things corresponding to the concepts employed by the hypothesis1 the same fallacy is committed as when it is contended that if an algebraical calculus is generally capable of geometrical interpretation1 every step in its operations must be interpretable4 ,the work of the ,philosophy of ,nature and of ,mind only begins where that of the experimental sciences leaves off4 ,its data are not particular facts1 as directly amassed by experiment and observation1 but the hypotheses used by experimental science for the co-ordination and description of those facts4 ,and it examines these hypotheses1 not with the object of modifying their structure so as to include new facts1 or to include the old facts in a simpler form1 but purely for the purpose of estimating their value as an account of ultimately real existence4 ,whether the hypotheses are adequate as implements for the calculation of natural processes is a question which ,philosophy1 when it understands its place1 leaves entirely to the special sciences2 whether they can claim to be more than useful formul for calculation1 i4e4 whether they give us knowledge of ultimate ,reality1 is a problem which can only be dealt with by the science which systematically analyses the meaning of reality1 i4e4 by ,metaphysics4 ,we may perhaps follow the usage of some recent writers in marking this difference of object by a difference in terminology1 and say that the goal of experimental science is the ,description of facts1 the goal of ,metaphysics their ,interpretation4 ,the difference of aim is1 however1 not ultimate4 ,description of facts1 when once we cease to be content with such description as will subserve the purpose of calculation and call for description of the fact as it really is1 of itself becomes metaphysical interpretation4 ,the chief danger against which we must guard in this part of our metaphysical studies is that of expecting too much from our science4 ,we could never1 of course1 hope for such a complete interpretation of facts as might be possible to omniscience4 ,at most we can only expect to see in a general way how the physical and again how the psychical order must be thought of if our view as to the ultimate structure of ,reality is sound4 ,for an exact understanding of the way in which the details of physical and psychical existence are woven into the all-embracing pattern of the real1 we must not look4 ,and the value of even a general interpretation will of course depend largely upon our familiarity with the actual use the various sciences make of their hypotheses4 ,with the best goodwill in the world we cannot hope to avoid all misapprehensions in dealing with the concepts of sciences with which we have no practical familiarity4 ,though this general caution is at least equally applicable to the amateur excursions of the student whose mental training has been confined to some special group of experimental sciences into the field of metaphysical criticism1 it would be a good rule for practice if every student of ,metaphysics would consider it part of his duty to make himself something more than an amateur in at least one branch of empirical science2 probably ,psychology1 from its historical connection with philosophical studies1 presents unique advantages for this purpose4 ,and conversely1 no specialist in experimental science should venture on ultimate metaphysical construction without at least a respectable acquaintance with the principles of ,logic1 an acquaintance hardly to be gained by the perusal of ,jevons's ,elementary ,lessons with a supplement of ,mill4 #b4 ,cosmology1 then1 means the critical examination of the assumptions involved in the recognition of the physical as a distinct order of existence1 and of the most general hypotheses employed by popular thought and scientific reflection respectively for the description of specially physical existence4 ,it is clear that this very recognition of a distinction between the physical and other conceivable forms of existence implies a degree of reflective analysis more advanced than that embodied in the nave pre-scientific view with which we started in our last two chapters4 ,in the simple conception of the world of existence as consisting of the changing states of a plurality of interacting things1 there was not as yet any ground for a distinction between the psychical and the purely physical4 ,that there really exists a widespread type of thought for which this distinction has never arisen1 is put beyond doubt by the study of the psychology of the child and the savage4 ,both1 as we know1 draw no hard-and-fast line between the animated and the inanimate1 and the savage1 in his attempts to account for the phenomena of life1 does so habitually by supposing the physical organism to be tenanted by one or more lesser organisms of the same order of existence4 ,the 8soul0 he ascribes to things is simply a smaller and consequently less readily perceptible body within the body4 ,for civilised men this conception of all existence as being of the same order1 an order which we might describe from our own more developed standpoint as at once animated and physical1 has become so remote and inadequate1 that we find it hard to realise how it can ever have been universally accepted as self-evident truth4 ,physical science1 and under its guidance the current thought of civilised men1 has come to draw a marked distinction between the great majority of sensible things1 which it regards as purely physical1 and a minority which exhibit the presence of 8consciousness40 ,thus has arisen a theory of the division of existence into two great orders1 the physical and the psychical1 which so dominates our ordinary thought about the world1 that all the efforts of philosophers1 both spiritualist and materialist1 to reduce the two orders once more to one seem powerless to make any impression on the great majority of minds4 ,when we ask what are the distinguishing marks of the physical order as currently conceived1 the precise answer we obtain will depend on the degree of scientific attainments possessed by the person to whom our question is addressed4 ,but in the main both current science and everyday thought1 so far as it has reflected on the problem1 would probably agree as to the following points4 7a7 ,physical existence is purely material or non-mental1 or again is unconscious4 ,the exact significance of these predicates is probably rarely clear even to those who make the freest use of them4 ,on the face of it1 such epithets convey only the information that existence of the physical kind differs in some important respect from existence of a mental kind2 the nature of the difference they leave obscure4 ,reflection1 however1 may throw some light on the matter4 ,the distinction between persons and animals on the one side and mere things on the other seems to rest in the last resort on an important practical consideration4 ,among the things which1 according to the nave ,realism of the pre-scientific theory1 form my environment1 there are some which regularly behave in much the same general way in response to very different types of behaviour on my own part4 ,there are others again which behave differently towards me according to the differences in my behaviour towards them4 ,in other words1 some things exhibit special individual purposes1 dependent in various ways on the nature of my own individual purposes1 others do not4 ,hence for practice it becomes very important to know what things can be counted on always to exhibit the same general type of behaviour1 and what cannot1 but require individual study before ,i can tell how they will respond to different purposive behaviour of my own4 ,it is on this practical difference that the distinction of mental and conscious from purely physical and unconscious existence seems to be based4 ,we shall probably not be far wrong in interpreting the unconsciousness of purely material existence to mean that it exhibits no traces of purposive individuality1 or at least none that we can recognise as such4 ,more briefly1 the physical order consists of the things which do not manifest recognisable individuality4 7b7 ,closely connected with this peculiarity is a second4 ,the physical order is made up of events which conform rigidly to certain universal ,laws4 ,this is an obvious consequence of its lack of purposive individuality4 ,the elements of which it is composed1 being devoid of all purposive character of their own1 always behave in the same surroundings in the same regular uniform way4 ,hence we can formulate precise general ,laws of their behaviour4 ,originally1 no doubt1 this uniformity of the physical order is thought of as a point of contrast with the irregular behaviour of purposive beings1 who respond differently to the same external surroundings according as their own internal purposes vary4 ,with the growth of ,psychology as an experimental science of mental processes there inevitably arises the tendency to extend this concept of uniform conformity with general ,law to the processes of the psychical order1 and we are then confronted by the famous problem how to reconcile scientific law with human 8freedom40 ,the same antithesis between the apparently regular and purposeless behaviour of the elements of the physical order and the apparently irregular and purposive behaviour of the members of the psychical order is also expressed by saying that the sequence of events in the physical order is mechanically determined by the principle of ,causality1 whereas that of the psychical order is teleological1 i4e4 determined by reference to end or purpose4 7c7 ,every element of the physical order fills a position in space and in time4 ,hence any metaphysical problems about the nature of space and time are bound to affect our view of the nature of the physical order4 ,here1 again1 there is a point of at least possible contrast between the physical and the psychical4 ,as the accumulation of experience makes it increasingly clearer that the bodies of my fellow-men and my own body1 in so far as it is an object perceived like others by the organs of the special senses1 exhibit in many respects the same conformity to certain general laws1 and are composed of the same constituent parts as the rest of the sensible world1 such animated bodies of purposive agents have to be included along with the rest of sensible existence in the physical order4 ,the individual's purposive individuality has now to be thought of as residing in a distinct factor in his composition of a kind foreign to the physical order1 and therefore imperceptible by the senses1 i4e4 as a mind or soul or stream of consciousness in the current psychological sense4 ,such a mind or soul or stream of consciousness is then usually regarded as not filling a series of positions in space1 and sometimes as not filling a series of positions in time4 7d7 ,the physical order1 as thus finally constituted by the introduction of the concept of an imperceptible soul or mind1 now comprises all sensible existence#aag as an aggregate of events in time and space1 linked together by the principle of ,causality1 and exhibiting conformity with general law4 ,to this conception recent science has made an important addition in the notion of a continuous evolution or development as manifesting itself throughout the series4 ,so that we may ultimately define the physical order as a body of events occupying position in time and space1 conforming to general laws with rigid and undeviating uniformity1 and exhibiting continuous evolution4#aah ,from these general characteristics of the physical order1 as conceived by current science and current popular thought1 arise the fundamental problems of ,cosmology4 ,we have to discuss--7#a7 the real nature of material existence1 i4e4 the ultimate significance of the distinction between the two orders1 and the possibility of reducing them to one2 7#b7 the justification for the distinction between mechanical and teleological processes1 and for the conception of the physical order as rigidly conformable to uniform law2 7#c7 the leading difficulties of the conceptions of time and space1 and their bearing on the degree of reality to be ascribed to the physical order2 7#d7 the philosophical implications of the application of the notion of evolution or development to the events of the physical order2 7#e7 finally1 we ought perhaps to deal very briefly and in a very elementary fashion with the problem of the real position of descriptive physical science as a whole in its relation to the rest of human knowledge4 ,consult further3--,f4 ,h4 ,bradley1 ,appearance and ,reality1 chap4 #bf 7pp4 #dif-dig1 #ast ed472 ,h4 ,lotze1 ,outlines of ,metaphysic1 pp4 #gg-gi2 ,j4 ,s4 ,mackenzie1 ,outlines of ,metaphysics1 bk4 iii4 chap4 #b2 ,j4 ,ward1 ,naturalism and ,agnosticism4 lect4 #a4 ----- ,footnote #aag3 ,i4e4 existence of the same kind as that perceived by the senses1 whether actually so perceived or not4 ,in this sense the solid impenetrable extended atoms of ,newton or ,locke are 8sensible0 existence1 inasmuch as their properties are the same in kind as certain perceptible properties of larger masses1 though they are not themselves actually perceptible4 ,footnote #aah3 ,of course the evolution must be mere subjective appearance if1 as is sometimes assumed1 the processes of the physical order are one and all purely mechanical4 ,but this only shows that the current concept of the physical order is not free from inconsistencies4 ----- ,,chapter ,,ii ,,the ,,problem ,,of ,,matter #a4 ,the physical order1 because dependent for its perceived qualities on the sense-organs of the percipient1 must be the appearance of a more ultimate reality which is non-physical4 #b4 ,berkeley's criticism is fatal to the identification of this reality with 8material substance40 ,the logical consequence of ,berkeley's doctrine that the esse of sensible things is percipi would be the subjectivist view that the physical order is only a complex of presentations4 #c4 ,but this is clearly not the case with that part of the physical order which consists of the bodies of my fellow-men4 ,these have an existence1 as centres of feeling1 over and above their existence as presentations to my senses4 #d4 ,as the bodies of my fellows are connected in one system with the rest of the physical order1 that order as a whole must have the same kind of reality which belongs to them4 ,it must be the presentation to our sense of a system or complex of systems of experiencing subjects2 the apparent absence of life and purpose from inorganic nature must be due to our inability to enter into a direct communion of interest with its members4 #e4 ,some consequences of this view4 #a4 ,in the preceding chapter we have very briefly indicated the nature of the steps by which reflective thought comes to distinguish sharply between a physical and a psychical order of existence4 ,the physical order1 when the concept has been brought into its complete shape by the inclusion of my own body and all its parts1 is thought of as a system comprising all the bodies in the universe1 that is1 all the existences which are of the same kind as those which ,i directly perceive by means of the special senses4#aai ,now1 with regard to the whole physical order thus conceived two things seem fairly obvious upon the least reflection1 that it does not depend for its existence upon the fact of my actually perceiving it1 and that it does depend upon my perception for all the qualities and relations which ,i find in it4 ,its that appears independent of the percipient1 but its what1 on the other hand1 essentially dependent on and relative to the structure of the perceiving organ4 ,as we have already seen1 the familiar experience of the variations in perception which accompany differences in the permanent structure or temporary functioning of the organs of sense led1 very early in the history of ,philosophy1 to the recognition of this relativity1 so far as the so-called 8secondary0 qualities1 i4e4 those which can only be perceived by one special sense-organ1 are concerned4 ,we have also seen sufficiently 7in ,bk4 ,,ii4 chap4 #d7 that the same consideration holds equally good of those 8primary0 qualities which are perceptible by more senses than one1 and have probably for that reason been so often supposed to be unaffected by this relativity to a perceiving organ4 ,without wasting the reader's time by unnecessary repetition of our former reasoning1 it may be worth while to point out here how this thorough-going relativity of the qualities of the physical order to a percipient organ leads directly to the indefinite regress1 the apparently invariable consequence of all contradictions in ,metaphysics1 when we try to take those qualities as independently real4 ,i perceive the properties of physical existence by special sense-organs1 and the properties as perceived are conditioned by the structure of those organs4 ,but each sense-organ is itself a member of the physical order1 and as such is perceived by and dependent for its perceived qualities upon another organ4 ,this second sense-organ in its turn is also a member of the physical order1 and is perceived by a third1 or by the first organ again4 ,and there is no end to this mutual dependence4 ,the physical order1 as a whole1 must be a 8state0 of my nervous system1 which is itself a part of that order4 ,we shall see more fully in our final ,book1 when we come to discuss the problem of ,mind and ,body1 that this contradiction is an inevitable result of the inconsistency involved in the inclusion of my own body in the physical order1 an inconsistency which is1 in its turn1 a necessary consequence of the hard-and-fast separation of the two orders of existence4#abj ,considerations of this kind have led to the general recognition that the physical order must be regarded as phenomenal1 as the manifestation to sense-perception of a reality which is in its own nature inaccessible to sense-perception1 and therefore1 in the strictest sense of the words1 not physical4 ,when we ask1 however1 how this non-physical reality of which the physical order is the phenomenal manifestation to our senses1 is to be thought of1 we find ourselves at once plunged into the same difficulties which we have already met1 in a more general form1 in discussing the concept of ,substance4 ,popular thought1 and science so far as it is content to accept the notions of popular thought without criticism1 have commonly fallen back on the idea of the non-phenomenal ground of the physical order as an unperceived 8substratum40 ,to this substratum it has given the name of matter1 and has thus interpreted the physical order as the effect produced by the causal action of an unperceived matter upon our sense-organs1 or rather1 to speak with more precision1 upon their unknown material substratum4 ,frequently1 as might have been expected1 the attempt has been made to identify this substratum with those of the known qualities of the physical order which appear least liable to modification with the varying states of the percipient organs1 and lend themselves most readily to measurement and calculation1 the so-called 8primary0 qualities of mechanical science4 ,this is the standpoint adopted by ,newton and1 in the main1 by ,locke1 and largely through the influence of their work still remains the most familiar to the ordinary ,english mind4 ,but the inconsistencies we have already found inherent in such a conception of ,substance as is here presupposed1 so inevitably make themselves felt upon any serious examination1 that the doctrine regularly appears in the history of thought as a mere temporary halting-place in the advance to the more radical notion of matter as the entirely unknown non-phenomenal substratum of the sensible properties of bodies4 #b4 ,this latter notion is again manifestly open to all the objections previously brought against the more general concept of substance as an unknown substratum or support of properties4 ,it is from these objections that ,berkeley's famous criticism of the concept of matter1 the most original attempt at a constructive theory of the real nature of the physical order in the history of ,english ,philosophy1 starts4 ,berkeley first takes the identification of material substance with the primary qualities of body1 which ,locke had made current in ,english speculation1 and shows1 by insisting upon the relativity of perceived quality to percipient organ1 that it is untenable4 ,having thus driven his opponent to surrender this identification1 and to define matter as the unknown substratum of the physical order1 he proceeds to argue that this notion of an unknown substratum is both useless and unintelligible4 ,it is useless1 because our knowledge of the actual properties and processes of the physical order can neither be extended nor made clearer by the addition of an unknowable2 it is unintelligible1 because we can give no account to ourselves of the nature of the 8support0 supposed to be bestowed by the substratum or the properties4 ,material substance being thus dismissed as an unmeaning fiction1 what is left as the reality of the physical order8 ,according to ,berkeley1 nothing but the actual presentations1 or 8ideas10 in which the percipient subject is aware of the properties of bodies4 ,a body is simply such a complex of presentations to a percipient2 except as so presented it has no existence4 ,as ,berkeley is fond of putting it1 the esse of the material thing is simply percipi1 the fact of its being presented4 ,but just when we expect ,berkeley to accept the complete subjectivist contention that bodies are simply 8states of the percipients' consciousness0 and nothing more1 he remembers that he has to account both for the fact that we cannot perceive what we please and where we please1 but that our perceptions form an order largely independent of our own choice1 and for the deep-seated conviction of the common-sense mind that things do not cease to exist when my perception of them is interrupted4 ,to reconcile his theory with these apparently conflicting facts1 he has recourse1 as is the custom of philosophers and others in a difficulty1 to divine assistance4 ,the continued existence of the physical world in the intervals of perception1 and its systematic character and partial independence of our volition1 he explains by the hypotheses that ,god produces perceptions in us in a fixed order1 and that ,god continues to be aware of the system of presentations which ,i call the physical world1 when my perception of it is suspended4 ,the same explanation would1 of course1 have to be invoked to account for the existence of physical realities which no human subject perceives4#aba ,it is fairly obvious that the two halves of ,berkeley's theory will not fit together into a coherent whole4 ,if the whole esse of physical things is merely percipi1 there can be no reason why ,i should suppose them to exist at all except in so far as and so long as they are presented to my perception4 ,the whole hypothesis of an omnipresent divine perception which remains aware of the contents that have vanished from my own perception1 thus becomes purely gratuitous4 ,it also labours under the disadvantage of being1 on ,berkeley's theory1 internally inconsistent4 ,for if it is necessary to invoke the agency of ,god to account for the occurrence of presentations to my experience1 it is not clear why we have not to suppose a second deity who causes the series of presentations in the experience of ,god1 and so on indefinitely4 ,on the other hand1 if ,god's experience may be taken as uncaused1 it is not clear why my own experience might not have been taken so in the first instance1 and the introduction of ,god into the theory avoided4 ,thus the logical outcome of the doctrine that the esse of physical things is merely percipi1 would have been either ,solipsism1 the doctrine according to which ,i have no certain knowledge of any existence except my own1 everything else being a mere state or modification of myself2 or the ,humian scepticism1 which resolves my own existence1 as well as that of the external world1 into a mere sequence of fleeting mental processes4 ,conversely1 if ,i have adequate reason to believe that any member of the physical order whatever is more than a presentation1 and has an existence in some sense independent of my perception1 ,i have no right to declare of any member of that order1 unless for special reasons1 that its being consists merely in being perceived4 #c4 ,why1 then1 did ,berkeley1 as a matter of fact1 accept neither the solipsist nor the sceptical conclusion8 ,why does he1 after all1 credit the members of the physical order with an existence independent of the fact of my perceiving them1 and thus introduce a patent contradiction into his system8 ,it is not hard to see the reasons by which he must have been influenced4 ,the whole physical order cannot be dismissed as a mere subjective illusion1 because there are some members of it which undoubtedly have an existence independent of the fact of being perceived by my sense-organs4 ,such members are my own body and the bodies of my fellow-men4 ,both my own body and those of my fellow-men1 as they are perceived by the various special senses1 belong to the physical order1 and share its qualities4 ,but over and above its existence as a member of the perceived physical order1 my own body has further another quite different kind of existence4 ,it is1 in so far as ,i perceive its parts1 as ,i do other bodily existence1 by the sensations of the various special sense-organs1 a complex of presentations1 like everything else in the physical world4 ,but my body is not merely an object presented to me by the organs of the special senses2 it is also something which ,i feel as a whole in common or organic sensation1 and in the changing organic thrills of my various emotional moods4 ,this unique feeling of my body as a whole accompanies every moment of my conscious life and gives each its peculiar tone1 and there seems to be no doubt that it forms the foundation of the sense of personal identity4 ,if we recollect the essentially teleological character of feeling1 we shall be inclined to say that my body as thus apprehended is nothing other than myself as a striving purposive individual1 and that my experience of it is the same thing as the experience of my purposive attitudes towards my environment4 ,it is1 in fact1 this experience of my body as apprehended by immediate feeling1 that ,psychology describes as the 8subject0 of the various 8mental states0 of which it formulates the laws4 ,for ,metaphysics1 it does not seem too much to say1 this double existence of my own body1 as a presented object about which ,i have knowledge in the same way as about everything else1 and as an immediately felt unity1 affords the key to the whole problem of the 8independent0 existence of a reality beyond my own presentations4 ,to see how this comes about1 we must first consider the influence it has on our conception of one very special part of the physical order1 the bodies of our fellows4 ,the bodies of our fellow-men are1 of course1 from one point of view complexes of presentations which we receive through our sense-organs2 so far their esse1 as ,berkeley would have said1 is percipi4 ,but all practical communion with my fellows through the various institutions of society is based upon the conviction that1 over and above their existence as presentation-complexes1 or contents of my perceptive states1 the bodies of my fellows have the same kind of existence as directly apprehended in immediate feeling which ,i ascribe to my own4 ,in other words1 all practical life is a mere illusion1 unless my fellow-men are1 like myself1 centres of purposive experience4 ,by the existence independent of my own perception which ,i ascribe to them1 ,i mean precisely existence as feeling purposive beings4 ,hence1 unless all social life is an illusion1 there is at least one part of the physical order1 external to myself1 of which the esse is not mere percipi1 but percipere1 or rather sentire4 ,if my fellow-men are more than complexes of presentations or 8ideas in my head10 then the subjectivist reduction of all reality to states of my 8consciousness0 breaks down1 at least for this part of the physical order4 ,hence the acceptance or rejection of the subjectivist theory will ultimately depend on the nature of the evidence for the independent existence of human feelings and purposes beyond my own4 ,on what grounds1 then1 do we attribute such 8independent0 existence as experiencing subjects to our fellows8 ,according to the current subjectivist explanation1 we have here a conclusion based on the argument from the analogy between the structure of my own body1 as presented in sense-perception1 and those of others4 ,i infer that other men have a mental life like my own1 because of the visible resemblances between their physical structure and my own1 and this inference receives additional support from every fresh increase in our anatomical and physiological knowledge of the human frame4 ,but1 being an argument from analogy1 it can never amount to a true scientific induction1 and the existence of human experience1 not my own1 must always remain for the subjectivist a probability and can never become a certainty4 ,i am convinced that this popular and superficially plausible view is radically false1 and that its logical consequence1 the belief that the real existence of our fellows is less certain than our own1 is a grave philosophical error4 ,that the argument from analogy is no sufficient basis for the belief in human experience beyond my own1 can easily be seen from the following considerations3--7#a7 ,as ordinarily stated1 the data of the supposed inference do not actually exist4 ,for what ,i perceive is not1 as the subjectivist assumes1 three terms--my own mental life1 my own anatomical structure1 and the anatomy of my neighbour1 but two1 my own mental life and my neighbour's anatomy4 ,if ,i cannot be sure of the reality of my neighbour's experience until ,i have compared the anatomy and physiology of his organism with that of my own1 ,i shall have to remain in doubt at least until science can devise a mechanism by which ,i can see my own nervous system4 ,at present one of the terms on which the analogical argument is said to be based1 namely1 my own internal physical structure1 has to be mostly taken on trust4 ,it would be little less than the truth to invert the subjectivist's position1 and say that1 until science can devise means for seeing our own brains1 we infer the resemblance of our own anatomy to our neighbour's from the previously known resemblance of his inner experience and ours4 7#b7 ,and even supposing this difficulty already surmounted1 as it conceivably will be in the future1 there is a still more serious flaw in the presumed analogical inference4 ,if ,i once have good ground for the conviction that similarity of inner experience is attended by similarity of physical structure1 then of course ,i can in any special case treat the degree of structural resemblance between one organism and another as a sufficient reason for inferring a like degree of resemblance between the corresponding inner experiences4 ,but upon what grounds is the general principle itself based8 ,obviously1 if my own inner experience is the only one known to me originally1 ,i have absolutely no means of judging whether the external resemblances between my own organism and yours afford reason for crediting you with an inner experience like my own or not4 ,if the inference by analogy is to have any force whatever in a particular case1 ,i must already know independently that likeness of outward form and likeness of inner experience at least in some cases go together4 ,the plausibility of the usual subjectivist account of the way in which we come to ascribe real existence to our fellows1 is simply due to its tacitly ignoring this vital point4 ,how1 then1 do we actually learn the existence of feeling purposive experience outside our own8 ,the answer is obvious4 ,we learn it by the very same process by which we come to the clear consciousness of ourselves4 ,it is a pure blunder in the subjectivist psychology to assume that somehow the fact of my own existence as a centre of experience is a primitive revelation4 ,it is by the process of putting our purposes into act that we come to be aware of them as our purposes1 as the meaning of our lives1 the secrets of what we want of the world4 ,and1 from the very fact of our existence in a society1 every step in the execution of a purpose or the satisfaction of a want involves the adjustment of our own purposive acts to those of the other members of our social whole4 ,to realise your own ends1 you have to take note of the partly coincident1 partly conflicting1 ends of your social fellows1 precisely as you have to take note of your own4 ,you cannot come to the knowledge of the one without coming by the same route and in the same degree to the knowledge of the other4 ,precisely because our lives and purposes are not self-contained1 self-explaining wholes1 we cannot possibly know our own meaning except in so far as we know the meaning of our immediate fellows4 ,self-knowledge1 apart from the knowledge of myself as a being with aims and purposes conditioned by those of like beings in social relations with myself1 is an empty and senseless word4 ,the recent psychological studies of the part which imitation plays in all learning make this result still more palpably manifest4 ,for they reveal the fact that1 to an enormous extent1 it is by first repeating without conscious aim of its own the significant purposive acts of others that a child first comes to behave with conscious significance itself4 ,it is largely by learning what others mean when they utter a word or execute a movement that the child comes to know his own meaning in using the same word or performing the same movement4 ,thus we may confidently say that the reality of purposive significant experience which is not my own is as directly certain as the reality of my own experience1 and that the knowledge of both realities is inevitably gained together in the process of coming to clear insight into my own practical aims and interests4 ,the inner experience of my fellows is indubitably real to the same degree as my own1 because the very existence of my own purposive life is meaningless apart from the equal existence of theirs4#abb #d4 ,we may now apply the results obtained in the previous section to the general question as to the 8independent0 existence of the physical order4 ,in doing so we observe two consequences of the highest importance4 7#a7 ,now that we have found that at least a part of that order1 namely1 the bodies of our fellow-men1 are not mere complexes of presentations in our own experience1 but have a further existence as themselves experiencing subjects1 and are so far 8independent0 of their actual presentation in our own experience1 we can no longer conclude1 from the dependence of the physical order for its sensible properties upon presentation to ourselves1 that it has no further existence of its own4 ,if one part of that order1 which as presented stands on the same footing with the rest1 and is1 like it1 dependent on presentation for its sensible properties1 is certainly known to be more than a mere presentation-complex1 the same may at least be true of other parts4 ,we can no longer assert of any part of the physical order1 without special proof1 that its esse is merely percipi4 ,we may go a step further4 ,not only may other parts of the physical order possess a reality beyond the mere fact of being presented to our sense-perception1 but they must4 ,for 7a7 we have to take note1 for the obtaining of our own practical ends1 of the factors in our material environment precisely as we have to take note of the purposive behaviour not our own which forms our social environment4 ,just as our own inner life has no coherent significance except as part of a wider whole of purposive human life1 so human society as a system of significant conduct directed to the attainment of ends1 cannot be understood without reference to its non-human surroundings and conditions4 ,to understand my own experience1 reference must be made to the aims1 ideals1 beliefs1 etc4 of the social whole in which ,i am a member2 and to understand these1 reference has again to be made to geographical1 climatic1 economical1 and other conditions4 ,thus of the physical order at large1 no less than of that special part of it which consists of the bodies of my fellows1 it is true to say that its existence means a great deal more than the fact of its presentation4 ,unperceived physical existence must be real if ,i am myself real1 because my own inner life is unintelligible without reference to it4 7b7 ,this conclusion is further strengthened by the evidence supplied by the various sciences1 that human life forms part of a great system characterised by evolution or development4 ,if one part of a connected historical development is more than a complex of presentations1 the other stages of that development cannot possibly be mere presentation-complexes4 ,against any 8,idealism0 which is mere ,subjectivism or ,presentationism calling itself by a less suspicious name1 it would be a sound and fair argument to contend that it reduces evolution to a dream1 and must therefore be false4#abc ,it cannot1 then1 be true of the physical order as a whole1 that it has no reality beyond the fact of its presentation to my senses4 ,elements in it not so presented must yet have reality1 inasmuch as my own inner life requires the recognition of their reality as a fundamental condition of the realisation of my own 8subjective0 ends4 ,as the facts of hallucination1 8suggestion10 and subjective sensation show1 what appears to us as an element in the physical order may sometimes have no reality beyond the fact of its appearance2 there may be presented contents of which it would be true to say that their esse is percipi4 ,but the very possibility of distinguishing such hallucinatory presentations from others as illusory1 is enough to prove that this cannot be true of the whole physical order4 ,it is precisely because physical existence in general is something more than a collective hallucination1 that we are able in ,psychology to recognise the occurrence of such hallucinations4 ,as has been already observed1 you are never justified in dismissing an apparent fact of the physical order as mere presentation without any further reality behind it1 unless you can produce special grounds for making this inference based upon the circumstances of the special case4 7#b7 ,the second important consequence of our previous conclusion is this1--,we have now seen what was really meant1 in the crucial case of our fellow-men1 by maintaining an existence 8independent0 of the fact of presentation to our sense-organs4 ,their 8independent0 existence meant existence as centres of experience1 as feeling1 purposive beings4 ,the whole concept of 8independent0 existence was thus social in its origin4 ,we have also seen that the grounds on which an 8independent0 existence must be ascribed to the rest of the physical order are essentially of the same kind as those on which we asserted the 8independent0 existence of our fellow-men4 ,it appears patent1 then1 that 8independent0 existence must have the same general sense in both cases4 ,it can and must mean the existence of centres of sentient purposive experience4 ,if we are serious in holding that the esse of the physical order1 like that of ourselves and our fellows1 is not mere percipi1 we must hold that it is percipere or sentire4 ,what appears to us in sense-perception as physical nature must be a community1 or a complex of communities of sentient experiencing beings3 behind the appearance the reality#abd must be of the same general type as that which we1 for the same reasons1 assert to be behind the appearances we call the bodies of our fellows4 ,this conclusion is not in the least invalidated by our own inability to say what in particular are the special types of sentient experience which correspond to that part of the physical order which lies outside the narrow circle of our own immediate human and animal congeners4 ,our failure to detect specific forms of sentience and purpose in what we commonly call 8inorganic0 nature1 need mean no more than that we are here dealing with types of experience too remote from our own for detection4 ,the apparent deadness and purposelessness of so much of nature may easily be illustrated by comparison with the apparent senselessness of a composition in a language of which we are personally ignorant4 ,much of nature presumably appears lifeless and purposeless to us for the same reason that the speech of a foreigner seems senseless jargon to a rustic who knows no language but his own4 ,it would be easy1 but superfluous1 to develop these ideas more in detail by the free use of imaginative conjecture4 ,the one point of vital principle involved is that on which we have already insisted1 that existence 8independent0 of sense-perception has only one intelligible meaning4 ,hence it must have this same meaning whenever we are compelled to ascribe to any part of the perceived physical order a reality which goes beyond the mere fact of its being perceived4 ,the assertion that the physical order1 though dependent for its perceived qualities upon the presence of a percipient with sense-organs of a particular type1 is not dependent on any such relation for its existence1 if it is to have any definite meaning at all1 must mean for us that that order is phenomenal of1 or is the appearance to our special human sense-organs of1 a system or complex of systems of beings possessing the same general kind of sentient purposive experience as ourselves1 though conceivably infinitely various in the degree of clearness with which they are aware of their own subjective aims and interests1 and in the special nature of those interests4 #e4 ,we may end this chapter by drawing certain conclusions which follow naturally from the acceptance of this doctrine4 7#a7 ,it is clear that the result we have reached by analysis of what is implied in the 8independent0 existence of the physical order agrees with our previous conclusions as to the general structure of ,reality4 ,for we saw in our last ,book that it seemed necessary to hold not only that ,reality as a whole forms a single individual experience1 but also that it is composed of members or elements which are themselves sentient experiences of varying degrees of individuality4 ,and in our discussion of the unity of the thing we saw reason to hold that nothing but a sentient experience can be individual2 thus we had already convinced ourselves that if there are things which are more than complexes of presentations arbitrarily thrown together for the convenience of human percipients in dealing with them as unities1 those things must be sentient experiences on subjects of some kind4 ,we have now inferred from the actual consideration of the physical order that it does1 in point of fact1 consist of things of this kind4 ,our result may thus be said to amount in principle to the logical application to physical existence of the previously ascertained conclusion1 that only what is to some degree truly individual can be real4 ,it is interesting to contrast with this consequence of our metaphysical attempt to interpret the course of physical nature1 the result which inevitably follows from consistent adherence to the procedure of descriptive science4 ,the whole procedure of descriptive science depends upon our willingness to shelve1 for certain purposes1 the problem wherein consists the reality of the physical order1 and to concentrate our interest upon the task of adequately and with the greatest possible economy of hypothesis describing the system of presented contents in which it reveals itself to our senses4 ,for purely descriptive purposes1 our sole interest in the physical order is to know according to what laws of sequence one presented content follows upon another4 ,hence1 so long as we can establish such laws of connection between presented contents1 it is for purely scientific purposes indifferent how we imagine the ,reality in which the sequence of presentation has its ground4 ,whether we think of it as a system of finite subjects1 the will of a personal ,deity1 a complex of primary qualities1 or an unknown substratum1 or whether we decline to raise any question whatever about the matter1 the results are the same1 so long as our sole object is to exhibit the sequence of presented sense-contents as regulated by laws which admit of calculation4 ,science can go its way in entire indifference to all these alternative metaphysical interpretations of the ,reality which is behind the phenomenal order4 ,the logical consequence of this absorption in the problem of describing the phenomenal sequence of events1 apart from inquiry into their ground1 is that the more thoroughly the task is carried out the more completely does individuality disappear from the physical order as scientifically described4 ,everyday thought looks on the physical order as composed of interacting things1 each of which is a unique individual2 current science1 with its insistence on the uniform behaviour of the different elements of the material world1 inevitably dissolves this appearance of individuality4 ,in the more familiar atomic theories1 though the differences between the behaviour of the atoms of different elements are still retained as ultimate1 the atoms of the same element are commonly thought of as exact replicas of each other1 devoid of all individual uniqueness of behaviour4 ,and in the attempts of contemporary science to get behind atomism1 and to reduce all material existence to motions in a homogeneous medium1 we see a still more radical consequence of the exclusive adoption of an attitude of description4 ,individuality has here disappeared entirely1 except in so far as the origination of differential motion in a perfectly homogeneous medium remains an ultimate inexplicability which has to be accepted as a fact1 but cannot be reconciled with the theoretical assumptions which have led to the insistence upon the homogeneity of the supposed medium4 ,the logical reason for this progressive elimination of individuality from scientific descriptions of the processes of the physical order should now be manifest4 ,if all individuality is that of individual subjects of experience1 it is clear that in disregarding the question of the metaphysical ground of the physical order we have already in principle excluded all that gives it individuality from our purview2 the more rigorously logical our procedure in dealing exclusively with the phenomenal contents of the physical order1 the less room is left for any recognition of an element of individuality within it4 ,our purpose to describe the phenomenal logically involves description in purely general terms4 ,it is only when1 in ,metaphysics1 we seek to convert description of the phenomenal into interpretation of it as the appearance to sense of a more ultimate ,reality1 that the principle of the individuality of all real existence can come once more to its rights4 7#b7 ,it is perhaps necessary at this point to repeat1 with special reference to the interpretation of the physical order1 what has already been said of all interpretation of the detail of existence by reference to its ground4 ,we must be careful not to assume that lines of division which we find it convenient for practical or scientific purposes to draw between things1 correspond to the more vital distinctions between the different individual subjects of experience which we have seen reason to regard as the more real existences of which the physical order is phenomenal4 ,this is1 e4g41 an error which is committed by confident theories of the animation of matter which attribute a 8soul0 to each chemical atom4 ,we must remember that many of the divisions between things which we adopt in our descriptive science may be merely subjective demarcations1 convenient for our own special purposes but possibly not answering to any more fundamental distinctions founded on the nature of the realities of the physical order themselves4 ,it does not in the least follow from our view of nature as the manifestation to our senses of a system of sentient individuals1 that the relations between those individuals are adequately represented by the relations between the different factors of the material world as it is constructed in our various scientific hypotheses4 ,thus1 e4g41 our own self-knowledge and knowledge of our fellows show that in some sense there is a single experience corresponding to what1 for physical science1 is the enormous complex of elements forming the dominant centres of the human nervous system4 ,but apart from our direct insight into human experience1 if we only knew the human nervous system as we know a part of inorganic nature1 we should be quite unable to determine that this particular complex was thus connected with an individual experience4 ,in general we have to admit that1 except for that small portion of physical nature in which we can directly read purposive experience of a type specially akin to our own1 we are quite unable to say with any confidence how nature is organised1 and what portions of it are 8organic0 to an individual experience4 ,this caution must be constantly borne in mind if we are to avoid the abuse of our general theory of the meaning of the physical order in the interests of 8spiritualistic0 and other superstitions4 ,it may also serve to guard against over-hasty 8,philosophies of ,nature10 like those of ,schelling and ,hegel1 which start with the unproved assumption that approximation to the human external form of organisation is a trustworthy indication of the degree in which intelligent experience is present in physical nature4 7#c7 ,one more point may receive passing notice4 ,it is clear that if physical nature is really a society or a number of societies#abe of experiencing subjects1 we must admit that1 from the special character of our human experience with its peculiar interests and purposes1 we are normally debarred from social communion with any members of the system except those who are most akin in their special type of purposive life to ourselves4 ,of the vast majority of the constituents of the physical order it must always be true that1 while we may be convinced1 on grounds of general metaphysical theory1 that they possess the character we have ascribed to them1 we have no means of verifying this conclusion in specific cases by the actual direct recognition of the individual life to which they belong1 and consequent establishment of actual social relations with them4 ,yet it does not follow that we are always absolutely debarred from such direct social relations with extra-human sentient life4 ,the 8threshold of intercommunicability0 between physical nature and human intelligence may conceivably be liable to fluctuations under conditions at present almost entirely unknown4 ,conceivably the type of experience represented in literature by the great poets to whom the sentient purposive character of physical nature has appealed with the force of a direct revelation of truth1 and known in some degree to most men in certain moods1 may depend upon a psychological lowering of this threshold4 ,it is thus at least a possibility that the poet's 8communion with nature0 may be more than a metaphor1 and may represent some degree of a social relation as real as our more normal relations with our human fellows and the higher animals4 ,it may be true that in the relations of man with nature1 as in his relations with man1 it is the identity of purpose and interest we call love which is the great remover of barriers4 7#d7 ,it should hardly be needful to point out that such a view of the meaning of nature as has been defended in this chapter is in no way opposed to1 or designed to set artificial restrictions on1 the unfettered development of descriptive physical science4 ,whatever our view of the ultimate nature of the physical order1 it is equally necessary on any theory for the practical control of natural processes in the service of man to formulate laws of connection between these processes4 ,and the work of formulating those laws can only be satisfactorily done when the analysis of the physical order as a system of sense-contents is carried on with complete disregard of all metaphysical problems as to its non-phenomenal ground4 ,it would not even be correct to say that1 if our metaphysical interpretation is valid1 the view of nature presented in descriptive physical science is untrue4 ,for a proposition is never untrue simply because it is not the whole truth1 but only when1 not being the whole truth1 it is mistakenly taken to be so4 ,if we sometimes speak in ,philosophy as though whatever is less than the whole truth must be untrue1 that is because we mean it is untrue for our special purposes as metaphysicians1 whose business is not to stop short of the whole truth4 ,for purposes of another kind it may be not only true1 but the truth4#abf ,our metaphysical interpretation of the physical order is no more incompatible with full belief in the value and validity for their own purposes of the results of abstract descriptive science1 than the recognition of the singleness and purposiveness of a human experience with the equal recognition of the value of physiological and anatomical investigation into the functions and mechanism of the human body4 ,of course a man1 as he really exists1 is something quite different from the physiologist's or anatomist's object of study4 ,no man is a mere walking specimen of the 8human organism02 every man is really first and foremost a purposive sentient agent4 ,but this consideration in no way affects the practical value of anatomical and physiological research into the structure of the man as he appears in another man's system of sense-presentations4 ,what is true in this case is1 of course1 equally applicable in all others4 ,we have yet to discuss the most serious stumbling-block in the way of the idealist interpretation of nature1 the apparent conformity of its processes to rigid laws of sequence1 which at first sight might seem to exclude the possibility of their being really the acts of purposive subjects4 ,this difficulty will form the topic of our succeeding chapter4 ,consult further3--,f4 ,h4 ,bradley1 ,appearance and ,reality1 chap4 #bb2 ,l4 ,t4 ,hobhouse1 ,theory of ,knowledge1 pt4 #c1 chap4 #c2 ,h4 ,lotze1 ,metaphysic1 bk4 ii4 chaps4 #e1 #f2 ,h4 ,mnsterberg1 ,grundzge der ,psychologie1 i4 pp4 #fe-ib2 ,k4 ,pearson1 ,grammar of ,science1 chap4 #b 7,the ,facts of ,science71 #h 7,matter7 mainly written from the 8phenomenalist0 standpoint1 but with unconscious lapses into a more materialistic view2 ,j4 ,royce1 ,nature1 ,consciousness1 and ,self-,consciousness0 7in ,studies of ,good and ,evil72 ,the ,world and the ,individual1 ,second ,series1 ,lect4 #d2 ,j4 ,ward1 ,naturalism and ,agnosticism1 ,lects4 #a-e1 #ad1 #ai4 ,of the older philosophical literature1 ,descartes1 ,meditation #f2 ,leibnitz1 ,monadology and ,new ,system2 ,locke1 ,essays1 bk4 iv4 chap4 #aa2 ,kant's 8,refutation of ,idealism10 in the second edition of the ,critique of ,pure ,reason1 in addition to the already cited works of ,berkeley will probably be found most important4 ----- ,footnote #aai3 ,this definition of the physical order approximates very closely to that adopted by ,prof4 ,mnsterberg in his ,grundzge der ,psychologie1 vol4 i4 pp4 #fe-gg4 ,prof4 ,mnsterberg defines a physical fact as one which is directly accessible to the perception of a plurality of sentient individuals1 as opposed to the psychical fact which can be directly experienced only by one individual4 ,it must be remembered1 of course1 that my body as directly experienced in 8common sensation0 and 8emotional mood0 belongs to the psychical order4 ,it is only my body as perceptible by other men that is a member of the physical order4 ,footnote #abj3 ,cf4 ,bradley1 ,appearance and ,reality1 chap4 #bb1 pp4 #bfj-bfg 7#ast ed474 ,the attempts which have been made to exempt 8primary0 qualities from this relativity do not seem to demand serious criticism4 ,the argument in the text applies as directly to extension and shape as to colour or smell4 ,it is not defensible to contend1 as ,mr4 ,hobhouse does1 that qualities1 whether primary or secondary1 depend on the percipient organ only for their perception1 not for their existence4 ,the contention rests upon taking two aspects of experience which are always given together1 the that and the what of a sense-content1 and arguing that because these two aspects of a single whole can be distinguished1 therefore the one can exist in actual separation from the other4 ,it would be quite as logical to infer by the same method and from the same premisses that there can be a perceptive state without any content1 as that the contents can exist as we know them1 apart from the state4 ,footnote #aba3 ,see particularly the detailed statement of his contention and the elaborate examination of objections in the ,three ,dialogues between ,hylas and ,philonous1 which form a commentary on the briefer exposition of ,principles of ,human ,knowledge1 #a-acd4 ,footnote #abb3 ,see the fuller exposition of this line of argument in ,royce1 ,studies in ,good and ,evil1 essay on 8,nature1 ,consciousness and ,self-,consciousness10 to which ,i am largely indebted throughout the present chapter1 and for a detailed criticism of the alleged 8analogical0 inference the closely related reasoning of my own essay on 8,mind and ,nature0 in ,international ,journal of ,ethics1 ,october #aijb4 ,the similar but briefer criticism in ,royce1 ,the ,world and the ,individual1 ,second ,series1 lecture #d1 8,physical and ,social ,reality10 p4 #agj1 ,i had not had the opportunity to study when the above was written4 ,for the whole subject of imitation1 see in particular ,professor ,baldwin's ,mental ,development in the ,child and the ,race4 ,footnote #abc3 ,for a study of the significance of the 8partial independence0 of the physical world on my will as a factor in producing belief in its 8external reality10 see ,stout1 ,manual of ,psychology1#c bk4 iii4 pt4 #b1 chaps4 #a-b1 8,the ,perception of ,external ,reality40 ,footnote #abd3 ,the doctrine of degrees of reality must be borne in mind throughout this discussion4 ,the reality of which the physical order is phenomenal may itself be phenomenal of a higher reality4 ,footnote #abe3 ,societies would be the more natural supposition4 ,we have no reason to deny that the various types of non-human intelligence may be cut off from social intercourse with each other1 as they are from intercourse with ourselves4 ,footnote #abf3 ,that is1 there are degrees of truth as well as of reality1 and the two do not necessarily coincide4 ,the degree of truth a doctrine contains cannot be determined apart from consideration of the purpose it is meant to fulfil4 ,for the special purposes of ,metaphysics1 the purpose of thinking of the world in a finally consistent way1 whatever is not the whole truth is untrue4 ,but what the metaphysician regards as the lesser truth may be the higher truth relatively to other purposes than his own4 ,compare the doctrine of ,dr4 ,stout's essay on 8,error0 in ,personal ,idealism4 ----- ,,chapter ,,iii ,,the ,,meaning ,,of ,,law #a4 ,the popular conception of the physical order as exhibiting a rigid mechanical conformity to general laws1 conflicts with our metaphysical interpretation4 #b4 ,our interpretation would1 however1 admit of the establishment of averages or approximately realised uniformities by the statistical method1 which deals with occurrence en bloc to the neglect of their individual detail4 #c4 8,uniformity0 in nature is neither an axiom nor an empirically verifiable fact1 but a postulate4 ,a consideration of the methods actually employed for the establishment of such uniformities or 8laws0 of nature shows that we have no guarantee that actual concrete cases exhibit exact conformity to law4 #d4 ,uniformity is a postulate arising from our need of practical rules for the control of nature4 ,it need not for this purpose be exact1 and in point of fact our scientific formulae are only exact so long as they remain abstract and hypothetical4 ,they do not enable us to determine the actual course of an individual process with certainty4 #e4 ,the concept of the physical order as mechanical is the abstract expression of the postulate1 and is therefore essential to the empirical sciences which deal with the physical order4 #f4 ,consideration of the character of genuine machines suggests that the mechanical only exists as a subordinate aspect of processes which1 in their full nature1 are intelligent and purposive4 #a4 ,in our view of the underlying reality of the physical order1 as explained in the last chapter1 we have scarcely gone further1 except in the explicitness of our phraseology1 than we should be followed by many who profess a complete disbelief in metaphysical construction and an exclusive devotion to positive natural science4 ,from the side of positive science we have often been reminded that no hard-and-fast line can logically be drawn between the organic and the inorganic1 that we are not entitled to assume that the continuity of evolution ceases when we are no longer able to follow it with our microscopes1 that we are1 with the eye of scientific faith1 to discern in the meanest particle of matter the 8promise and potency0 of all life1 and so forth4 ,all which statements seem to be confused ways of suggesting some such conception of the physical order as we have attempted to put into more precise and logical form4 ,it is not until we come to deal with the problem indicated by the title of this chapter that our most serious difficulties begin4 ,we have to face the objections which may be urged against our view of the physical order on the strength of the principle known in inductive ,logic as the 8,uniformity of ,nature40 ,the events of the physical order1 it may be urged1 cannot be expressions of the more or less conscious purposes and interests of individual centres of experience1 and that for a simple reason4 ,how a purposive agent will behave is always a mystery1 except to those who actually understand his purposes4 ,it is impossible1 apart from actual insight into those purposes1 to infer from the mere examination of his past behaviour what his behaviour in the future will be4 ,for the special characteristic of purposive action is its power to find new ways of response to stimulus4 ,hence it is that we rightly regard the power to learn by experience1 that is1 to acquire more and more appropriate reactions to stimulus1 as the test of a creature's intelligence4 ,where there is no progressive adaptability there is no ground to assume intelligence and purpose4 ,hence again the impossibility of calculating beforehand with any certainty what course the behaviour of an intelligent being will take1 unless you are actually aware of the purposes he is seeking to realise4 ,now1 except in the case of the organic world1 it may be urged1 we do not find progressive adaptability in ,nature4 ,the inorganic constituents of the physical order always react with absolute uniformity in the same way upon the same environment4 ,their behaviour exhibits absolutely undeviating conformity to general routine laws of sequence1 and can therefore be calculated beforehand1 provided that the resources of our mathematics are adequate to deal with the problems it presents1 with absolute exactitude and certainty4 ,that this routine uniformity exists in physical nature is1 in fact1 a fundamental principle in the logic of inductive science4 ,every indication of sentience and purpose is thus absent from physical nature1 outside the world of living organisms2 it is a realm of rigid conformity to laws of sequence4 ,and these sequences1 because absolutely without exception and incapable of modification1 are purely mechanical1 i4e4 non-purposive and non-intelligent4 ,nature is1 in fact1 a complicated mechanism1 in which every event follows from its conditions with undeviating necessity4 ,views of this kind are often supposed to be logically necessitated by the principles of physical science4 ,it is manifest that if they are sound our whole preceding interpretation of the physical order is invalidated4 ,for this reason1 as well as because of the far-reaching consequences often drawn from them as to human freedom and moral responsibility1 it will be necessary to examine their foundation in some detail4 #b4 ,the main problems confronting us in this examination will then be--7#a7 ,how far is calculable uniformity of sequence really incompatible with the presence of purpose and intelligence8 7#b7 ,have we any real ground for ascribing such uniformity to the actual sequences of physical nature8 7#c7 if not1 ,what is the real logical character of the principle of the so-called uniformity of nature8 7#d7 and ,what amount of truth is contained in the conception of the physical order as a mechanism8 ,into the problem suggested by the popular contrast between the necessity of mechanical sequence and the freedom of purposive action1 it will be needless to enter at any length4 ,for1 as we saw in dealing with the popular view of necessary causal relation1 the necessity of a mechanical sequence is a purely subjective and logical one4 ,the sequence is necessary only in the sense that we are constrained1 so long as we adhere to the purpose of thinking logically1 to affirm the consequent when we affirm the antecedent4 ,true necessity is always compulsion1 and therefore1 so far from being opposed to purposive action1 can only exist where an actual purpose is overruled or thwarted4#abg ,so long as we are dealing solely with phenomenal sequence in the physical order1 necessity is a mere anthropomorphic name for routine undeviating uniformity of sequence4 7#a7 ,calculable ,uniformity and ,intelligent ,purpose4 ,it is sometimes assumed that all successful prediction of a thing's behaviour is incompatible with the ascription of intelligence or purpose to the thing4 ,thus it has been argued1 and continues to be argued in moral philosophy of a popular type1 that if we are intelligent beings with purposes of our own1 it must always be impossible for an onlooker to predict how we shall behave in circumstances which have not yet arisen4 ,this extreme view of the incompatibility of calculability with intelligent purpose1 however1 manifestly rests on a double confusion4 ,to begin with1 those who assert this view commonly make the mistake of supposing that prediction of the future stands somehow on a different logical level from calculation of the past from present data4 ,prediction of my future behaviour is supposed somehow to conflict with my character as a purposive being in a way in which inference as to my past behaviour does not4 ,this is1 of course1 an elementary fallacy in ,logic4 ,the conditions required for the successful inference of the absent from the present are identical in the two cases1 as we have already seen in dealing with the problems of ,causality4 ,precisely the same kind of insight is requisite to judge how a given man must have behaved in a certain situation in his past history as are needed to determine how he will behave in a situation which is yet to arise4 ,we may thus dismiss from consideration the special case of prediction1 and confine ourselves to the general question1 how far the general calculability of the course of a process is incompatible with its purposive and intelligent character4 ,an answer to this question is at once suggested by reflection upon our ordinary attitude towards such attempts to calculate the course of our own behaviour4#abh ,it is by no means every such calculation that we resent4 ,so far from being affronted by the assumption that our conduct exhibits sufficient uniformity to admit of calculation1 we expect our personal friends to have sufficient reliance on its uniformity to assume with confidence that we shall certainly do some things and refuse to do others1 that we must have acted in certain ways and cannot have acted in others4 8,you ought to know me better than to suppose me capable of that0 is between friends a tolerably keen expression of reproach1 8,i know ,i can count on you to do it10 a common expression of confidence4 ,on the other hand1 we should certainly resent the assumption on the part of a comparative stranger of such a knowledge of our character as would warrant confident calculation of our conduct1 and if the calculation was avowedly drawn not from personal knowledge at all1 but from general propositions of ,psychology or ,anthropology1 we should pretty certainly feel that a more than accidental success threatened our moral individuality4 ,now1 what is the explanation of this difference of feeling8 ,manifestly it must be sought in the great difference between the grounds on which the calculation is based in the two cases4 ,in the first case we expected and welcomed the calculation1 because we felt it to be founded upon our friend's personal acquaintance with the guiding interests and purposes of our life2 it was an inference based upon insight into our individual character4 ,in the other case we resented the success of the calculation1 because we assumed it to be made in the absence of any such personal insight into our individual purposes and interests1 on the basis of mere general propositions about human nature4 ,we rightly feel that the regular success of calculation of this second sort is inconsistent with the ascription of any reality to our individual character4 ,if all our actions can be calculated from general theorems in a science of human nature1 without taking individual purpose into account1 then the apparent efficacy of individual interests and purposes in determining the course of our history must be an empty illusion2 we cannot be truly intelligent agents1 seeing that we never really do anything at all4 ,thus we see that it seems necessary to draw a marked distinction between two types of calculability4 ,calculation based on insight into individual character and purpose is so far from being inconsistent with purposiveness and intelligence1 that the more coherent and systematic the purposes by which a life is controlled1 the more confident does such calculation become4 ,calculation without such special knowledge1 and based upon mere general propositions1 on the other hand1 cannot be regularly successful where one has to deal with the behaviour of individual purposive beings4#abi ,now1 the difficulty as to our interpretation of the physical order as the presentation to our sense of a system of intelligent purposive beings1 is that the successes of physical science seem at first sight to show that just this 8mechanical0 calculation of the course of events from observed sequence1 without insight into underlying individual purpose1 is possible when we are dealing with physical nature4 ,for1 on the one hand1 we ourselves admitted that if physical nature is permeated by individual purposes1 we do not know what those purposes in detail are2 and1 on the other1 it is undeniable that physical science1 which systematically disregards their presence1 has been signally successful in the past1 and may be expected to be even more successful in the future1 in detecting uniformities in physical nature1 and so submitting it to exact calculation4 ,hence it might be thought that the actual success of the empirical sciences cannot be reconciled with the principles of our metaphysical interpretation of the course of nature4 ,we must1 however1 draw a very important distinction4 ,there is one method by which uniformities of a certain kind can be detected in the behaviour of purposive intelligent beings1 without insight into the nature of their individual purposes--the method of statistical averages4 ,thus1 though it would be quite impossible to say with certainty of any individual man that he will shoot himself or will get married1 except on the strength of insight into his individual character and interests1 we find by experience that it is possible to say1 within a certain narrow range of error1 what percentage of ,englishmen will shoot themselves or will get married in the year4 ,the percentage is1 of course1 rarely or never precisely realised in any one year1 but the longer the period of years we take for examination1 the more exactly do the deviations from the average in individual years compensate one another4 ,the explanation is1 of course1 that on the whole the incentives to marriage or suicide1 in a reasonably stable state of society1 remain constant from year to year1 so that by taking an average of several years we can eliminate results which are due to individual peculiarities of temperament and situation1 and obtain something like a measure of the degree in which the general conditions of social existence impose a certain common trend or character on the interests and purposes of individuals4 ,two things are at once noticeable in connection with all uniformities obtained by the method of averages4 ,one is that the result formulated in the statistical law is always one to which the actual course of events may reasonably be expected to conform within certain limits of deviation1 never one to which we have a right to expect absolute conformity4 ,not only is the actual number of marriages1 e4g41 in any one year1 usually slightly above or below the average percentage computed1 e4g41 for a ten years' period1 but as we compare one longer period with others1 the average percentage for the longer period itself fluctuates4 ,it is only in the 8long run10 that is1 in the impossible case of the actual completion of an interminable series1 that the computed average would be exactly realised4 ,as every one who has to deal with averages in any form knows1 precise realisation of the computed average within a finite series of cases would at once awaken suspicions of an error somewhere in our calculations4 ,thus the uniformities of this kind are never absolutely rigid2 they are ideal limits to which the actual course of events is found to approximate within certain limits of divergence4 ,the second point is that the existence of such a uniformity never affords logical ground for confident affirmation as to the actual event in a particular concrete case4 ,to revert to our illustration1 just as we have no right to infer from the approximately constant percentage of marriages per year in a given society1 that this precise percentage will be realised in any one special year1 so we have still less right to infer that a particular member of that society will or will not marry4 ,nothing but insight into the character1 situation1 and interests of this special member of society can give me the right to judge with confidence how he will actually behave4 ,similarly1 it is possible to say within certain limits of error how many persons over sixty years of age may be expected to die in the next twelve months1 but it would be the height of logical presumption to infer that a particular man will die during the year1 except on the strength of special information about his pursuits1 habits1 and general state of health4#acj ,thus our general conclusion must be1 that calculation and the establishment of uniformities is possible1 without insight into individual purpose1 but that the uniformities thus obtained are always variable and approximate1 and afford no safe ground for inference as to special concrete cases4 #c4 7#b7 ,uniformity in ,physical ,nature4 ,the existence of ascertainable uniformities in physical nature1 then1 will not conflict with our general interpretation of the physical order1 provided that these uniformities are of the type just illustrated by reference to ordinary social statistics4 ,on the other hand1 the exact and rigid conformity of the actual course of concrete events with such uniform general 8laws10 would certainly be inconsistent with the presence of teleological adaptation to ends4 ,a reign of rigid routine conformity to general law cannot co-exist with individual purposive life4 ,now1 it is commonly assumed1 and we shall shortly see that the assumption is both necessary and justified as a practical methodological postulate1 that the 8reign of law0 in physical nature is absolute4 ,but are there any grounds for recognising this assumption as more than a possibly unrealised postulate made for human practical purposes8 ,i think it is easy to show that there are none whatever1 and that the conception of a nature devoid of purpose and sentience1 and swayed absolutely by mechanical 8laws10 is simply a metaphysical nightmare of our own invention4 ,to begin with1 it is clear that the undeviating conformity of the actual course of any concrete process to scientific 8law0 cannot be verified as an empirical fact by observation or experiment4 ,for in no observation or experiment can we ever deal with the whole of any concrete actual event or process4 ,we have always1 for the purposes of our observation1 to select certain of the general aspects of the process1 to which we attend as the 8relevant factors0 or 8conditions0 of the result1 while we disregard other aspects as 8immaterial0 or 8accidental0 circumstances4 ,and this artificial abstraction1 as we saw in discussing ,causality1 though indispensable for our practical purposes1 is logically indefensible4 ,again1 within the aspects selected for attention1 all that experiment can establish is that the deviation from uniform law1 if there is any deviation1 is not sufficiently great to affect our measurements and calculations4 ,but how far our standards of measurement are from rigid precision may be readily learned from the chapter on physical standards in any good work on the logic of the inductive sciences4#aca ,our failure to detect deviation from law is absolutely worthless as evidence that no deviation has taken place4 ,thus1 if the absolute uniformity of natural processes is more than a practical postulate1 it must be an axiom1 that is1 it must be implied in the very notion of those processes as elements in a systematic whole4 ,but it should at once be clear that we have no more ground for asserting such uniformity as an axiom1 than we had for treating the causal postulate as axiomatic4 ,it is by no means implied in the concept of a systematic whole that its parts shall be connected by uniform law4 ,for the unity of the system may be teleological1 that is1 the parts may be connected by the fact that they work together to realise the same end1 to execute the same function4 ,in that case the behaviour of any one part will depend on the demands laid upon it by the plan which the working of the system fulfils4 ,as these demands vary from time to time1 the behaviour of the part under consideration will then vary correspondingly1 though to all appearance its surroundings may1 for a spectator who fails to grasp the end or purpose realised by the system1 be identical4#acb ,this is actually the case with those systematic wholes in which human insight can directly detect unity of purpose or aim4 ,a man with definite purposes before him does not react in a uniformly identical way upon situations which1 apart from their relation to his purpose1 would be pronounced identical4 ,he learns1 for instance1 from previous failure in the same circumstances1 and so acquires the power to react on them in a way better adapted to the obtaining of his end4 ,or his progressive execution of his purpose1 where there has been no failure1 may require different conduct on the two occasions4 ,to speak with strict logical accuracy1 the situations1 relatively to his special purpose1 are never identical1 though it may be no difference could be detected in them apart from that relation to this peculiar purpose4 ,relatively to the system of intelligent purposes which realises itself through the circumstances1 every situation is1 properly speaking1 unique4 ,now1 if we consider the methods by which the uniformities called 8laws0 of nature are actually formulated1 we may see ground to conclude that they may one and all be uniformities of the approximate non-exact type4 ,in many cases1 if not all1 these uniformities have manifestly been obtained by statistical methods4 ,thus1 for example1 when it is said that all the atoms of a given chemical element are absolutely alike1 e4g41 that every atom of oxygen has the atomic weight #af1 there is absolutely no valid ground for regarding this uniformity as actually realised without deviation in individual cases4 ,if the atom should prove1 as it may1 to be no more than a convenient device of our own1 useful for computing the behaviour of sensible masses but with no real existence of its own1 it is of course evident that there can be no question of the real conformity of individual cases to the law4 ,but even if there really are indivisible bodies answering to our conception of atoms1 still we have to remember that we have no means of dealing with the individual atom directly4 ,we infer its properties indirectly from the behaviour of the sensible masses with which we can deal more directly4 ,hence1 at most1 the statement that the atom of oxygen has a certain weight means no more than that we can for our practical purposes disregard any possible individual divergences from this value4 ,the oxygen atoms1 if they really exist1 might actually fluctuate in individual atomic weight about an average2 yet1 so long as we cannot deal with them individually but only in bulk1 these fluctuations1 if only sufficiently small1 would produce no appreciable effect on our results1 and would therefore properly be treated in our science as non-existent4 ,conceivably1 then1 such chemical uniformities may afford no safer ground for precise statements about the weight of the individual atom1 than anthropological statistics do for precise statement about the actual height1 weight1 or expectation of life of an individual man4 ,and we can readily see that a non-human observer with senses incapable of perceiving the individual differences between one man and another1 might be led from the apparent uniformity of behaviour exhibited by large collections of human beings to the same sort of conclusions which we are tempted to make about atoms4#acc ,similarly with other cases of apparently rigid uniformity4 ,as any one who has worked in a laboratory knows1#acd such results are in actual practice obtained by taking the mean of a long series of particular results and treating the minor divergences from this mean as non-existent because they are negligible for all practical purposes4 ,in other words1 the apparently rigid conformity of natural processes to uniform law is an inevitable consequence of the fact that we are debarred by various limitations of a subjective kind from following the course of any process in its individual detail1 and have therefore to make all our inferences from the observation and comparison of series of processes sufficiently extended for individual differences to neutralise each other4 ,but in all this there is absolutely no warrant for the conclusion that the course of any one individual process is absolutely uniform with that of any other4 ,there is room within the uniformity got by these methods of comparison for an infinite variety of individual detail1 of which our scientific constructions take no account1 either because our means of observation are insufficient to detect it1 or because1 when detected1 it is of no significance for the original object of our science--practical success in interference with the course of events4 ,it is easy to point out some of the conditions upon which failure to detect actually existing individual deviations from uniformity may depend4 ,professor ,royce has1 in this connection1 laid special stress upon one such condition1 the limitation of what he calls the time-span of our attention4 ,we are unable1 as the student of ,psychology knows1 to attend to a process as a whole if its duration exceeds or falls short of certain narrow limits4 ,now1 there seems no foundation in the nature of the attentive process for the special temporal limitations to which it is subject in our own experience1 and we have no means of denying the possibility that there may be intelligent beings whose attention-span is much wider1 or again1 much more contracted1 than our own4 ,one can even conceive the possibility of a being with a power of varying the span of attention at will4 ,now1 it is clear that if we could so vary our attention-span as to be able to take in as single wholes processes which are at present too rapid or too slow to be perceived by us in their individual detail1 such a purely subjective change in the conditions of our own attention might reveal individuality and purpose where at present we see nothing but routine uniformity4 ,in the same way1 we can readily understand that a being with a much wider attention-span than our own might fail to see anything but purposeless routine in the course of human history4 ,supposing that we are placed in the midst of a universe of intelligent purposive action1 it is clear that we can only hope to recognise the nature of that action in the case of beings who live1 so to say1 at the same rate as ourselves4 ,a purposive adaptation to environment with consequent deviation from uniformity in reaction would necessarily escape our notice if it took place with the rapidity of the beat of a gnat's wing1 or again1 if it required centuries for its establishment4#ace ,other similar subjective conditions which would necessarily cut us off from the recognition of purposive fresh adaptations widely different from those which occur in our own life1 are the limitations of our power of attending to more than a certain number of presentations simultaneously2 and again1 the restriction of our sense-perception to a few types1 and the impossibility of perceiving contents belonging to those types when they fall below or above the lower and upper 8thresholds0 of sensibility4 ,these considerations do not1 of course1 positively prove that the routine uniformity of natural processes is only subjective appearance1 but they are sufficient to show that there is no valid reason for taking it to be more1 and in conjunction with our previous positive argument for the sentient individuality of all real existence1 they suffice to bring our general interpretation of the physical order under ,mr4 ,bradley's canon that 8,what must be and can be1 that is40 #d4 7#c7 ,what1 then1 are we to make of the principle of the 8,uniformity of ,nature08 ,any principle which does actual work in science must somehow be capable of justification1 and if our interpretation of the physical order really conflicts with a fundamental scientific principle1 it must contain fallacy somewhere4 ,fortunately1 there is no real conflict4 ,in dealing with the principle of ,uniformity1 we must distinguish very carefully between the sense in which it is actually required for the purposes of science and the sense which has been put upon it in the set of metaphysical doctrines popularly but illogically deduced from the actual procedure of the sciences4 ,as we have seen already1 it is impossible to affirm the principle of ,uniformity as an axiom of systematic thought4 ,it is also not capable of verification as an empirical truth4 ,its logical character must therefore be that of a postulate1 an assumption defensible on the ground of practical usefulness1 but only so far as it actually succeeds4 ,now1 this is precisely the place which the principle fills in the actual procedure of the sciences4 ,we have absolutely no means of showing that the concrete course of ,nature is strictly uniform1 as has already been seen4 ,but also1 we have no need1 for our scientific ends1 that it should be uniform4 ,all that we require is that natural processes1 when dealt with in the bulk1 should exhibit no divergence from uniform routine except such as we may neglect for the purposes of practical calculation and control of the course of events4 ,the actual success of the empirical sciences shows that this demand for approximate uniformity is actually fulfilled with sufficient closeness for all our practical purposes4 ,that it would be so fulfilled we could have had no theoretical means of divining before putting it to the actual test4 ,in this sense the principle1 like that of ,causality may be said to be a postulate made a priori and in advance of experience4 ,but1 once more like the principle of ,causality1 it could not be presumed to be trustworthy unless the subsequent results of its employment vindicated it2 it cannot1 therefore1 be a priori in the ,kantian sense of being known to be true independent of empirical verification4#acf ,this result is confirmed by consideration of the way in which the principle of uniform law is actually applied to concrete cases4 ,scientific laws1 as we all know1 are purely general and abstract4 ,they state not what will happen1 but what would happen providing that certain specified conditions and no others were operative in determining the result4 ,in this abstract form they are1 of course1 statements of exact and absolute uniformities4 ,but in this abstract form they cannot be directly applied to the calculation of the actual course of any process4 ,to take1 for instance1 an example which has been used by ,professor ,ward4#acg ,we learn in ,mechanics that equilibrium is maintained on the lever when the moments of the weights about the fulcrum are equal and opposite4 ,as an abstract generalisation this is a statement of a rigid uniformity4 ,but in order that it may be universally true1 we must suppose the conditions implied in the formulation of the proposition to be fulfilled4 ,the lever itself must be absolutely rigid1 and must be weightless2 it must be of absolutely uniform structure1 the fulcrum must be a mathematical point1 in order that friction may be excluded1 and so forth4 ,similarly1 the weights must be thought of as mere masses without any further difference of quality1 and thus only capable of affecting the lever through the one property of their weight2 their attachments1 again1 must be of ideal tenuity1 or fresh complications will be introduced4 ,but when all these conditions have been taken into account1 the principle has become so abstract as to amount to the tautology that what only operates by its mass and its distance from the fulcrum will not operate by any other property4 ,in any actual case1 the course of events will be liable to be affected by all the conditions which had to be excluded from the abstract formulation of the principle4 ,no actual lever will be weightless or incapable of being bent or broken2 its construction will never be uniform4 ,actual loads1 again1 may influence the behaviour of a lever differently according to their bulk1 their chemical composition1 the nature of their attachments4 ,at an actual fulcrum there will be some degree of friction between the lever-bar and its support1 and so on4 ,in actual fact1 any or all of these circumstances may affect the behaviour of the lever bar when the loads are suspended from it4 ,consequently1 it is quite impossible to apply the mechanical generalisation with certainty to determine the course of events in a concrete case4 ,what holds good in this instance holds good in all similar cases of the 8laws0 of nature4 ,in so far as these laws are really exact they are all hypothetical1 and deal only with the problem4 ,what would be the course of a physical sequence1 assuming its complete ground to be contained in the conditions enumerated in the enunciation of the law8 ,that is1 they all1 in so far as they are absolute1 are different forms of the tautological proposition1 that where there is nothing to make any difference between two cases1 there will be no difference4 ,but the moment we apply our laws to the calculation of the actual course of an individual process1 we have to recognise that the condition for their rigid exactness is absent2 in the individual process there are always aspects not comprised in the conditions for which the law was enunciated1 and nothing but actual experience can inform us whether the presence of these aspects will perceptibly affect the result in which we are interested4 ,as applied to the study of an individual process1 the principle of ,uniformity is thus a postulate1 like the principle of ,causality1 which can only be justified by its actual success4 ,again1 like the principle of ,causality1 the principle of ,uniformity may be successful to different degrees1 according to the special nature of the processes for which it is assumed4 ,as the causal postulate rested on the assumption that a selection from the antecedents of an event may for practical purposes be treated as equivalent to its complete ground1 so the more general postulate of ,uniformity rests on the assumption that individual purpose may be left out of account in assigning the ground of a process4 ,it does not follow that these postulates will receive the same amount of empirical justification for all departments of the physical order4 ,there may well be certain processes in which the individual purposive character is so prominent that1 even for our practical purposes1 we cannot safely calculate their course without taking their end or purpose into consideration4 ,in that case the principle of ,uniformity and that of ,causality would1 for this part of the physical order1 lose their practical value4 ,it is a popular belief that such a failure of these practical postulates actually takes place where we come to deal with the conscious volitions of human agents4 ,the problem is one which must be kept for fuller consideration in our next ,book1 but we can at present make two general statements4 7#a7 ,such a failure of the postulates of ,causality and ,uniformity in application to a particular sphere would not involve a breach of the fundamental logical principle of ,ground and ,consequence1 since1 as we have seen sufficiently already1 both postulates impose special restrictions on that principle for which the nature of the principle itself affords no warrant4 ,it would thus not be an unthinkable or logically untenable position to hold that no general laws of human action can be formulated4 7#b7 ,while this extreme denial of the possibility of laws of human action is logically possible1 the actual success of those sciences which deal with human behaviour in the statistical way forbids us to accept it4 ,the success of these sciences shows that human behaviour1 considered in the gross1 does exhibit certain approximate uniformities4 ,but there seems to be no means of proving that all aspects of human behaviour would show such uniformity if considered in gross in the same fashion4 ,it is at least conceivable that some social activities would fail to exhibit approximation to an average value1 no matter how extended the area and period taken as the basis of investigation4 ,we might conceivably have to admit that there are departments of social life for which no 8laws0 can be formulated4 ,if we disregard this possibility in practice1 the reason is a methodological one4 ,it is our interest to discover such uniformities1 and therefore1 as failure may only mean a temporary check to the success of our investigations1 we properly make it a rule of method to assume that it is no more than this4 ,we treat all sequences as capable1 by proper methods1 of reduction to uniformity1 for the same reason that we treat all offenders as possibly reclaimable4 ,we desire that they should be so1 and we cannot prove they are not so1 and we therefore behave as if we knew they were so4 ,a word may be said as to the nature of the practical need upon which the postulate of ,uniformity is based4 ,as we have previously seen1 the allied postulate of ,causality arose from the practical need of devising means for the control of natural processes4 ,but the causal postulate alone is not enough to satisfy this need4 ,for even if we can assume that every event is determined1 sufficiently for practical purposes1 by its antecedents1 and thus that the knowledge of those antecedents1 when obtained1 is a knowledge of the means to its production1 our practical command over the production of the event is not yet assured4 ,for we can have no general confidence in our power to produce the event by employing the ascertained means1 so long as it is possible that the result may on each occasion be affected by variations too minute for our detection1 or for other reasons not accessible to our perception4 ,we need to be assured that what seems the same to us is1 for practical purposes1 the same1 and so that the employment of the same means may be trusted to lead to the same result4 ,this is the condition which is expressed in an abstract form by the principle of ,uniformity1 which states that the course of natural processes conforms to general laws2 in their actual application to the concrete processes of actual nature these laws are properly practical rules for the production of effects1 and their inviolability means no more than that we may successfully treat as the same1 in their bearing on the results in which we are interested1 things which appear the same in relation to certain standards of comparison4 ,as we have seen1 the validity of this assumption could never have been known a priori2 it can only be said to be actually valid where actual use has justified it4 ,at the same time1 it is clearly a principle of method to assume the universal applicability of our practical postulates wherever it is to our interest that they should be applicable1 as explained in the last paragraph4 ,this is why we rightly assume the applicability of the postulates in spheres where the successful establishment of general uniformities has not hitherto been effected1 so long as no positive reason can be shown why they should not apply4 ,we shall find this last reflection suggestive when we come to deal with the ethical difficulties which have been felt about the application of the postulates of ,uniformity and ,causality to voluntary action4 ,it is of course clear that our reduction of ,uniformity to a mere practical postulate does not introduce any element of pure 8chance0 into the actual order of existing things4 8,chance0 is a term with more than one meaning1 and its ambiguity may easily lead to misapprehensions4 ,chance may mean 7a7 any sequence for which our actual knowledge cannot assign the ground4 ,in this sense chance1 as another name for our own mere ignorance1 must of course be recognised by any theory which does not lose sight of the fact of human ignorance and fallibility4 ,or again1 chance may mean 7b7 a sequence of which the ground is partially understood4 ,we may know enough of the ground of the sequence to be able to limit the possibilities to a definite number of alternatives1 without knowing enough to say which alternative completely satisfies the conditions in a special case4 ,it is in this sense that we speak of the 8chances0 of any one of the alternative events as capable of computation1 and make the rules for their computation the object of special mathematical elaboration in the so-called 8,theory of ,probability40 7c7 ,finally1 chance may mean 8pure0 chance1 the existence of something for which there is no 8ground0 whatever1 as it stands in no organic interconnection with a wider system of real existence4 ,chance in this last sense is1 of course1 absolutely excluded by our conception of the systematic unity of the real as expressed in the principle of ,ground and ,consequence1 as an ultimate axiom of all consistent thought4 ,our denial of the absolute validity of the principles of ,causality and ,uniformity would only amount to the admission of 8pure0 chance into things if we accepted those principles as necessary consequences of the axiom of ,ground and ,consequence4 ,if they are mere practical postulates1 which present the axiom of ,ground under artificial restrictions for which there is no logical justification in the axiom itself1 the admission that they are not ultimately true in no way conflicts with full recognition of the thorough systematic unity of existence2 it merely means that the view of the nature of that unity assumed by our practical postulates1 though eminently useful1 is inadequate4 ,we may here conveniently recapitulate our results4 ,on metaphysical grounds1 we felt compelled to regard the physical order as the manifestation to our special sensibility of a system of interconnected beings with sentient and purposive experiences like ourselves4 ,the apparent purposelessness and deadness of the greater part of that order we explained as intelligible on the supposition that the subjective purposes and interests of many of its members are too unlike our own for our recognition4 ,we then saw that if nature consists of such sentient experiences1 the apparent domination of it by absolute law and uniformity cannot be the final truth4 ,such uniformity as there is must be approximate1 and must result from our having to deal in bulk with collections of facts which we cannot follow in their individual detail1 and will thus be of the same type as the statistical uniformities established by the anthropological sciences in various departments of human conduct4 ,next1 we saw that the uniformities we call the 8laws0 of nature are1 in fact1 of this type2 that they represent average results computed from a comparison of large collections of instances with which we cannot1 or cannot so long as we adhere to our scientific purpose1 deal individually1 are only absolute while they remain hypothetical1 and never afford ground for absolute assertion as to the course of concrete events4 ,we further saw that the only uniformity science requires of the actual course of nature is uniformity sufficiently close to enable us1 for our special purposes1 to neglect the individual deviations1 and that the principle of ,uniformity itself is not a logical axiom but a practical postulate1 expressing the condition necessary for the successful formulation of rules for practical intervention in the course of events4 ,finally1 while we saw that we have no a priori logical warrant for the assumption that such rules can be formulated for all departments of the physical order1 we are bound on methodological grounds to assume that they can1 unless we have special positive reasons for believing the contrary4 ,thus the universality of a postulate of uniformity does not mean that it is universally true1 but that it has universally to be made wherever we have an interest in attempting the formulation of general rules4 #e4 7#d7 ,the ,conception of the ,physical ,order as a ,mechanism4 ,the conception of nature as rigidly conformable to general laws1 finds its completest expression in the view of the whole physical order as a complicated mechanism4 ,it is not easy to say just how much is always implied when we hear of a 8purely mechanical0 theory of the world or of physical processes4 ,sometimes all that is meant is that the theory in question treats the principle of rigid uniformity according to general laws as an ultimate axiom4 ,sometimes1 again1 a 8mechanical view0 of the world is taken to mean1 in a narrower sense1 one which regards all the chemical1 electrical1 and other processes of the physical order as merely complicated cases of change of configuration in a system of mass particles4 ,in this narrower sense the 8mechanical0 theory of the physical world is another name for the somewhat crude form of realist ,metaphysics according to which nothing exists but moving masses1 everything in the form of secondary qualities being a subjective illusion4 ,both the wider and the narrower form of the mechanical view agree in treating the processes of physical nature as unintelligent and unconscious1 and regarding them as completely determined by antecedent conditions1 without reference to any end or purpose which they effect4 ,the theory owes the epithet 8mechanical0 to the analogy which is then supposed to subsist between the physical order and the various machines of human construction1 in which the various constituent parts similarly execute movements determined by relation to the remaining parts1 and not by any consciousness of an end to be attained4#ach ,it is of course manifest that1 so understood1 the mechanical view of physical processes is forced upon us by our practical needs wherever it is requisite to formulate rules for successful intervention in the course of nature4 ,if we are to intervene with success in the course of events1 that course must1 as we have already seen1 be capable of being regarded as approximately uniform1 otherwise we can have no security that our intervention according to rule and precedent will have a uniform and unambiguous result4 ,hence1 if we are to formulate general rules for practical intervention1 we must be able to treat the course of things as--to all intents and purposes--mechanical4 ,and1 on the contrary1 if there are processes which cannot be even approximately regarded as mechanical1 our power of framing general rules for the practical manipulation of events cannot extend to those processes4 ,the limits of the mechanical view of events are likewise the limits of empirical science and of the general precepts of the practical arts4 ,we see this admirably exemplified in the study of human natures4 ,the behaviour of large aggregates of human beings1 as we have already learned1 exhibits approximate uniformity1 at least in many respects1 and may thus be treated as to all intents and purposes mechanical in those respects4 ,hence it is possible to have a number of empirical sciences of human nature1 such as ,ethnology and ,sociology1 in which those uniformities are collected and codified1 and to base on these sciences a number of general prudential maxims for the regulation of our behaviour towards our fellow-men considered in the abstract4 ,but when we come to deal with the actual conduct of concrete human individuals1 the mechanical view1 as we have seen1 fails us4 ,what a concrete individual will do can only be inferred with certainty from the knowledge of his interests and purposes2 there can thus be no general science of individual character1 and consequently no general rules of prudence for behaviour towards an individual fellow-man4 ,it is not to the so-called sciences of human nature1 but to personal experience of the individual himself1 we have to go for the knowledge how to regulate our conduct towards the actual individuals with whom life brings us into direct and intimate personal relation4 ,philosophical reflection upon the nature and limits of scientific knowledge fully confirms the verdict passed by the practical sense of mankind on the doctrinaire pedantry which seeks to deduce rules for dealing with actual individuals from anything but concrete understanding of individual character and purpose4 ,the mechanical view of physical processes is thus an indispensable postulate of the various empirical sciences which seek to describe those processes by the aid of general formul4 ,hence the protests which are sometimes urged against the use of mechanical interpretations in descriptive science are really in spirit no more than the expression of a personal distaste for the whole business of scientific generalisation and description4 ,if there are to be sciences of physical processes at all1 these sciences must be mechanical1 in the wider acceptation of the term4 ,it does not1 however1 follow because the mechanical view of physical processes is a necessity for our empirical sciences1 that this view is consequently ultimately true4 ,as we have learned already1 when we pass from the statement that the processes of the physical order may1 for the purpose of description by general formul1 and the invention of practical methods for their production1 be treated as to all intents mechanical1 to the very different assertion that the physical order really is rigidly mechanical1 we have deserted empirical science for dogmatic ,metaphysics1 and our metaphysical dogma must stand or fall by its own ultimate coherency and intelligibility as a way of thinking about ,reality4 ,the usefulness of the mechanical interpretation for other purposes is no evidence whatever of its value for the special purpose of the metaphysician4#aci #f4 ,our previous discussion has already satisfied us that1 as ,metaphysics1 the postulate of ,uniformity upon which the mechanical view of the physical order rests1 is unintelligible and therefore indefensible4 ,but we may supplement the discussion by one or two reflections which throw into striking relief the inadequacy of that concept of the physical order as a huge self-acting machine which is so often offered us to-day as the last word of scientific thought4 ,in the mechanical metaphysical theories two points always receive special emphasis4 ,the physical order1 according to the thorough-going exponents of the doctrine1 is a mechanism which is 7a7 self-contained and self-acting1 and 7b7 entirely devoid of internal purpose4 ,now1 in both these respects the supposed world-machine differs absolutely from the real machines upon analogy with which the mechanical theory is in the last resort based4 ,every real machine is1 to begin with1 the incarnation of the internal purpose of a sentient being4 ,it is something which has been fashioned for the express object of attaining a certain result1 and the more perfect its structure the greater is the impossibility of understanding the principle of construction without comprehension of the result it is devised to effect4 ,why the various parts have precisely the shape1 size1 strength1 and other qualities they have1 you can only tell when you know what is the work the maker of the machine intended it to do4 ,in so far as this is not the case1 and the structure of the machine can be explained1 apart from its specific purpose1 by consideration of the properties of the material1 the patterns of construction consecrated by tradition1 and so forth1 it must be regarded as an imperfect realisation of its type4 ,in a perfect machine the character and behaviour of every part would be absolutely determined by the demands made on that part by the purpose to be fulfilled by the working of the whole2 our inability ever to produce such a perfect mechanical structure causes all our actual machines to be imperfect and inadequate representations of the ideal we have before us in their construction4 ,thus a true machine1 so far from being purposeless1 is a typical embodiment of conscious purpose4 ,it is true that the machine1 once set going1 will continue to work according to the lines embodied in its construction irrespective of the adequacy with which they effect the realisation of the maker's purpose4 ,a watch1 once wound up1 will continue to go1 though the indication of the lapse of time may1 under fresh circumstances1 cease to meet the interests of its maker or owner2 and again1 if the construction of the watch was faulty1 it will not properly execute the purpose for which it was made4 ,the machine has in itself no power of fresh purposive adaptability by which to modify the purpose it reflects1 or to remedy an initial defect in its execution4 ,but this merely shows that the purpose exhibited in the machine's construction originated outside the machine itself1 and that the originator had not the power to carry out his purpose with complete consistency4 ,it does not in the least detract from the essentially teleological and purposive character of the machine qu machine4 ,this brings us to our second point4 ,just as no true machine is purposeless1 so no true machine is self-acting4 ,not only are all machines in the end the product of designing intelligence1 but all machines are dependent upon external purposive intelligence for control4 ,they require intelligence to set them going1 and they require it equally1 in one form or another1 to regulate and supervise their working4 ,however complicated a piece of machinery may be1 however intricate its provisions for self-regulation1 self-adjustment1 self-feeding1 and so forth1 there is always1 if you look carefully enough1 a man somewhere to work it4 ,the obvious character of this reflection has unfortunately not prevented metaphysicians from drawing strange inferences from their own neglect of it4 ,closer reflection upon the true character of machinery would thus suggest a very different interpretation of the analogy between the uniformities of the physical order and the regular working of our machines from that adopted by the 8mechanical0 view of nature1 as elaborated into a metaphysical doctrine4 ,it would lead us to conceive of the apparently mechanical as playing everywhere the same part which it fulfils in our own system of social life4 ,we should think of the mechanical as filling an indispensable but subordinate place in processes which1 in their complete character1 are essentially teleological and purposive4 ,teleological action obviously depends for its success upon two fundamental conditions4 ,it requires the establishment of types of reaction which remain uniform so long as their maintenance satisfies the attainment of the end towards which they are directed1 and at the same time the power of modifying those types of reaction from time to time so as to meet fresh situations encountered or created in the progressive attainment of that end4 ,in our own individual physical life these two conditions are found as the power to form habits1 and the power to initiate spontaneously fresh response to variation in the environment4 ,in so far as our dominant interests can be best followed by the uniform repetition of one type of reaction1 attention is diverted from the execution of the reaction which becomes habitual1 semi-conscious1 and1 as we correctly say1 8mechanical10 the attention being thus set free for the work of initiating the necessary fresh modifications of habitual action4 ,our various industrial and other machines are devices for facilitating this same division of labour4 ,the machine1 once properly constructed and set in action1 executes the habitual reaction1 leaving the attention of its supervisor free to introduce the requisite relatively novel variations of response according to new situations in the environment4 ,there is nothing to prevent our interpreting the mechanical uniformities exhibited by the physical order in terms of this analogy4 ,we should then have to think of the 8laws0 or 8uniformities0 in physical nature as corresponding to the habitual modes of reaction of the sentient beings of whose inner life the physical order is phenomenal2 these uniformities would thus be essentially teleological in their own nature1 and would also stand in intimate interrelation with the spontaneous initiation of fresh responses to variations in the environment on the part of the same sentient beings4 ,habit and spontaneity would mutually imply each other in nature at large as they do in our own psychical life1 and the 8mechanical0 would in both cases be simply the lower level to which teleological action approximates in proportion as attention ceases to be necessary to its execution4 ,this conception would harmonise admirably with the result of our previous inquiry into the kind of evidence by which the existence of uniform 8laws of nature0 is established4 ,for it would be an inevitable consequence of those subjective limitations which compel us to deal in bulk with processes we are unable to follow in their individual detail1 that our observation of the physical order should reveal the broad general types of habitual response to typical external conditions1 while failing to detect the subtler modifications in those responses answering to special variations in those conditions4 ,just so the uniformities ascertained by the statistical study of human nature are simply the exhibition on a large scale of the leading habitual reactions of human beings upon typical external situations1 as disentangled from the non-habitual spontaneous responses to fresh elements in the external situation with which they are inseparably united in any concrete life of individual intelligent purpose4 ,there seems no objection to this conception of 8laws of nature0 as being the formul descriptive of the habitual behaviour of a complex system of sentient beings1 beyond that based on the allegation that these 8laws0 are absolute1 exact1 and without exception4 ,we have seen already that physical science has no means of proving this allegation1 and no need whatever to make it1 the whole doctrine of 8rigid10 8unvarying0 conformity to law being a mere practical postulate falsely taken by a certain school of thinkers for an axiom4 ,we have also seen that the notion of rigid unvarying law is fundamentally irreconcilable with the only intelligible interpretation we were able to give to the conception of the real existence of the physical order4 ,thus we have no reason to accept it as true1 and the fullest ground for dismissing it as false4 ,but for the unintelligent superstition with which the 8laws of nature0 are worshipped in certain quarters1 it would indeed have been unnecessary to deal at such length and with such reiteration with so simple a matter4 ,one suggestion1 already made in slightly different words1 may be once more emphasised in conclusion4 ,even among human beings the relative prominence of fresh spontaneous adaptations and habitual reactions in the life of the individual fluctuates greatly with the different individuals4 ,the 8intelligence0 of different men1 as gauged by their power of fresh adaptive modification of established habits of reaction1 ranges over a great variety of different values4 ,if we could acquire the same kind of insight into the individual purposes of non-human agents that we have into those of our immediate fellows1 we should presumably find an even wider range of differences in this respect4 ,in principle we have no means of setting any definite limits to the range in either direction4 ,we can conceive a degree of attentive control of reaction so complete that every reaction represents a fresh stage in the realisation of an underlying idea1 so that intelligence is everything and habit nothing2 and again1 we can conceive a state of things in which mere habit is everything and intelligent spontaneity nothing4 ,somewhere between these ideal limits all cases of finite purposive intelligence must be comprised1 and it would be easy to show that neither limit can be actually reached by finite intelligence1 though there may be indefinite approximation to either4#adj ,consult further3--,h4 ,lotze1 ,metaphysic1 bk4 i4 ,introduction ,x4 7,eng4 trans41 vol4 i4 p4 #ah71 bk4 ii4 chaps4 #g1 #h 7,eng4 trans41 vol4 ii4 pp4 #ff-afb72 ,e4 ,mach1 ,the ,science of ,mechanics1 pp4 #dha-ejd 7,eng4 trans472 ,k4 ,pearson1 ,grammar of ,science1 chaps4 #c 7,the ,scientific ,law71 #i 7,the ,laws of ,motion72 ,j4 ,royce1 8,nature1 ,consciousness1 and ,self-consciousness0 7in ,studies of ,good and ,evil72 ,j4 ,stallo1 ,concepts and ,theories of ,modern ,physics1 chaps4 #a1 #aj-ab 7metaphysical standpoint1 8,phenomenalist072 ,j4 ,ward1 ,naturalism and ,agnosticism1 part #a1 lects4 #b-e4 ----- ,footnote #abg3 ,speaking strictly1 all necessity would appear to arise from the presence of conflicting purposes or interests in the same experience4 ,e4g41 the logical necessity of affirming the conclusion when the premisses are affirmed1 implies 7#a7 the presence of the general purpose to think logically2 7#b7 the presence of some purpose or interest which1 if gratified1 would demand the affirmation of a result inconsistent with the previously affirmed premisses2 7#c7 the repression of this affirmation by the dominant purpose 7#a74 ,i believe that careful analysis will reveal these same elements in every genuine case of necessitation4 ,i4e4 the mere defeat of my purpose is not true necessitation unless it is defeated by a second interest or purpose which ,i also identify with myself4 ,thus all necessity would ultimately be self-imposed4 ,this is not without its bearing on ,ethics1 as we shall see4 ,footnote #abh3 ,compare with what follows1 ,f4 ,h4 ,bradley1 ,ethical ,studies1 ,essay #a1 and infra1 ,bk4 ,,iv4 chap4 #d4 ,footnote #abi3 ,our ordinary calculations as to the behaviour of our fellow-men1 beyond the circle of our own intimates1 seem to involve a mixture of the two types4 ,we base our conclusions partly on conjectures drawn from the observed past acts of our fellows as to their special interests and purposes1 partly on generalisations as to the purposes and interests which are most widely operative in human life4 ,practical men never allow themselves to forget that the conclusions thus obtained are problematical in the highest degree4 ,the whole course of our investigation will go to show that the notion of a deductive science of human nature1 by which the concrete conduct of an individual man might be inferred with certainty from physiological and psychological generalities1 is a ridiculous chimera4 ,see infra1 ,bk4 ,,iv4 chap4 #d4 ,footnote #acj3 ,it will be recollected that the approximate constancy of such social statistics has been1 foolishly enough1 brought forward as an alleged disproof of moral freedom4 ,the more vulgar forms of the necessitarian argument have even been pushed to the inference that1 if the number of suicides up to ,december #ca has been one less than the average in some given year1 some one must kill himself before the day is out to make up the percentage4 ,what must happen if the number has been one more than the average we are never told4 ,footnote #aca3 ,compare ,mach1 ,science of ,mechanics1 p4 #bhj ff4 7,eng4 trans472 ,jevons1 ,principles of ,science1 chaps4 #ac1 #ad4 ,footnote #acb3 ,compare ,lotze1 ,metaphysic1 bk4 i4 ,introduction ,x41 chap4 #c1 #cc 7,eng4 trans41 vol4 i4 pp4 #ah1 #ij-ic72 bk4 i4 chap4 #g1 #bjh ff4 7,eng4 trans41 vol ii4 pp4 #hh-ia74 ,footnote #acc3 ,see the full exposition of this view in ,ward1 ,naturalism and ,agnosticism1 vol4 i4 lecture #d1 on which the present paragraph is founded4 ,cf4 ,j4 ,t4 ,merz1 ,history of ,european ,thought1 vol4 i4 pp4 #dcg-dda4 ,footnote #acd3 ,my remark is founded more particularly upon the methods by which quantitative uniformities are obtained in the investigations of ,psychophysics4 ,i have no direct acquaintance with first-hand experimentation in other spheres1 but the method by which it is made to yield general uniformities seems to be of the same kind4 ,footnote #ace3 ,cf4 ,mr4 ,h4 ,g4 ,wells's tale1 ,the ,new ,accumulator4 ,footnote #acf3 ,compare once more the passage already quoted from ,lotze1 ,metaphysic1 i4 #c4 #cc4 ,footnote #acg3 ,see ,naturalism and ,agnosticism1 vol4 i4 lecture #b1 and compare the elaborate proof given by ,mach1 ,science of ,mechanics1 pp4 #i-bc1 that all the so-called demonstrations of the general theory of the lever are mere reductions of the more complicated to the simplest cases of a relation which ultimately depends for its recognition on nothing more cogent than the evidence of the senses4 ,footnote #ach3 ,for some comments upon the 8mechanical view0 in the narrower and more special sense1 see ,chapter ,,vi4 of the present ,book4 ,it may be convenient1 for the sake of precision1 to call this more special form of the mechanical view the 8mechanistic0 theory of nature4 ,footnote #aci3 ,psychology ought probably to be excluded from the sciences for which the mechanical view is fundamental4 ,but ,psychology does not deal with any part of the physical order4 ,see the present writers review of ,mnsterberg's 8,grundzge der ,psychologie0 in ,mind for ,april #aijb2 and cf4 infra1 ,bk4 ,,iv4 chaps4 #a1 #b4 ,footnote #adj3 ,compare with the argument of this chapter1 ,royce1 8,nature1 ,consciousness1 and ,self-consciousness10 in ,studies of ,good and ,evil2 and 8,mind and ,nature10 by the present writer in ,international ,journal of ,ethics1 ,october #aijb4 ,the inveterate prejudice that 8laws of nature10 to be of scientific use1 must be rigidly exact uniformities is so strong1 that it may be worth while1 even after the preceding discussion of general principles1 to assist the reader by reminding him of the elementary fact that the most familiar quantities involved in our scientific formul 71 e1 the vast majority of second and third roots1 of logarithms of the natural numbers1 of circular functions of angles1 etc47 are incapable of exact evaluation4 ,this of itself renders a scientific law1 in the form in which it can be applied to the determination of actual occurrences1 merely approximate1 and thus shows that exact uniformity is unnecessary for the practical objects of the empirical sciences4 ----- ,,chapter ,,iv ,,space ,,and ,,time #a4 ,are time and space ultimately real or only phenomenal8 #b4 ,the space and time of perception are limited1 sensibly continuous1 and consist of a quantitative element together with a qualitative character dependent on relation to the here and now of immediate individual feeling4 #c4 ,conceptual space and time are created from the perceptual data by a combined process of synthesis1 analysis1 and abstraction4 #d4 ,they are unlimited1 infinitely divisible1 and there is valid positive ground for regarding them as mathematically continuous4 ,thus they form infinite continuous series of positions4 ,they involve abstraction from all reference to the here and now of immediate feeling1 and are thus homogeneous1 i4e4 the positions in them are indistinguishable4 ,they are also commonly taken to be unities4 #e4 ,perceptual space and time cannot be ultimately real1 because they involve reference to the here and now of a finite experience2 conceptual space and time cannot be ultimately real1 because they contain no principle of internal distinction1 and are thus not individual4 #f4 ,the attempt to take space and time as real leads to the difficulty about qualities and relations1 and so to the indefinite regress4 #g4 ,space and time contain no principle of unity2 there may be many space and time orders in the ,absolute which have no spatial or temporal connection with each other4 #h4 ,the antinomies of the infinite divisibility and extent of space and time arise from the indefinite regress involved in the scheme of qualities and relations1 and are insoluble so long as the space and time construction is taken for ,reality4 #i4 ,the space and time order is an imperfect phenomenal manifestation of the logical relation between the inner purposive lives of finite individuals4 ,time is an inevitable aspect of finite experience4 ,how space and time are transcended in the ,absolute experience we cannot say4 #a4 ,the problems which arise for the metaphysician from the fact that the physical order1 as it is presented to our senses1 consists of elements having position in space and time1 are among the oldest and most perplexing of all the riddles suggested by the course of our experience4 ,adequate discussion of them would demand not only far more space than we are at liberty to bestow on the topic1 but such a familiarity with the mathematical theory of order and series as is scarcely possible to any one but an original mathematician4 ,all that we can do in the present chapter is to deal very superficially with one or two of the leading problems1 more with a view to indicating the nature of the questions which ,metaphysics has to face1 than of providing definite answers to them4 ,the fundamental problem for ,metaphysics is1 of course1 whether space and time are ultimate ,realities or only appearances2 that is1 would the whole system of ,reality1 as directly apprehended by an absolute all-containing experience1 wear the forms of extension and succession in time1 or is it merely a consequence of the limitations of our own finite experience that things come to us in this guise8 ,it may indeed be urged that the contents of the universe must form an order of some sort for the absolute experience1 in virtue of their systematic unity1 but even so it is not clear that order as such is necessarily spatial or temporal4 ,indeed1 most of the forms of order with which we are acquainted1 both in everyday life and in our mathematical studies1 appear to be1 properly speaking1 both non-spatial and non-temporal4 ,thus1 e4g41 it is seemingly by a mere metaphor that we speak of the 8successive0 integers of the natural number-series1 the 8successive0 powers of an algebraical symbol1 the 8successive0 approximations to the value of a continued fraction1 in language borrowed from the temporal flow of events1 the true relation involved being in the first two cases the non-temporal one of logical derivation1 and in the third the equally non-temporal one of resemblance to an ideal standard4 ,the full solution of the metaphysical problem of space and time would thus involve 7#a7 the discrimination of spatial and temporal order from other allied forms of order1 and 7#b7 a decision as to the claim of this special form of order to be ultimately coherent and intelligible4 ,the problem thus presented for solution is often1 and usually with special reference to the ,kantian treatment of space and time in the ,transcendental sthetic1 put in the form of the question whether space and time are subjective or objective4 ,this is1 however1 at best a misleading and unfortunate mode of expression which we shall do well to avoid4 ,the whole distinction between a subjective and an objective factor in experience loses most of its significance with the abolition1 now effected by ,psychology1 of the vicious ,kantian distinction between the 8given0 in perception and the 8work of the mind40 ,when once we have recognised that the 8given0 itself is constituted by the movement of selective attention1 it becomes impossible any longer to distinguish it as an objective factor in knowledge from the subjective structure subsequently raised upon it4 ,kant's adherence to this false psychological antithesis so completely distorts his whole treatment of the 8forms of intuition10 that it will be absolutely necessary in a brief discussion like our own to deal with the subject in entire independence of the doctrines of the sthetic1 which unfortunately continue to exercise a disproportionate influence on the current metaphysical presentment of the problem4#ada ,it should scarcely be necessary to point out that the metaphysical questions have still less to do with the psychological problems1 so prominent in recent science1 of the precise way in which we come by our perception of extension and succession4 ,for ,metaphysics the sole question is one not of the origin but of the logical value of these ideas4 ,it is of fundamental importance for the whole metaphysical treatment of the subject1 to begin by distinguishing clearly between space and time as forms of perception1 and space and time as conceptual forms in which we construct our scientific notion of the physical order4 ,one chief source of the confusions which beset the ,kantian view is the neglect of ,kant and most of his followers to make this distinction with sufficient clearness4 ,we cannot insist too strongly upon the point that the space and the time of which we think in our science as containing the entire physical order1 are not space and time as directly known to us in sense-perception1 but are concepts elaborated out of the space and time of direct perception by a complicated process of synthesis and analysis1 and involving abstraction from some of the most essential features of the space and time of actual experience4 ,the following brief discussion may serve to illustrate the general nature of the relation between the two forms of space and time1 and to exhibit the leading differences between them4 #b4 ,perceptual ,space and ,time4 ,both space and time1 as we are aware of them in immediate perception1 are 7#a7 limited4 ,the space we actually behold as we look out before us with a resting eye is always terminated by a horizon which has a more or less well-defined outline2 the 8specious present10 or portion of duration of which we can be at any time aware at once as an immediately presented content1 has been shown by elaborate psychological experimentation to have a fairly well-defined span4 ,whatever lies outside this 8span of attention0 belongs either to the no longer presented past or to the not yet presented future1 and stands to the sensible present much as the space behind my back to the actually beheld space before my eyes4 ,of course1 in either case the limits of the actually presented space or time are not absolutely defined4 ,to right and left of the line of vision the visible horizon gradually fades off into the indistinctly presented 8margin of consciousness02 the 8sensible present0 shades away gradually at either end into the past and the future4 ,yet1 though thus not absolutely defined1 sensible space and time are never boundless4 7#b7 ,perceptual space and time are both internally sensibly continuous or unbroken4 ,concentrate your attention on any lesser part of the actually seen expanse1 and you at once find that it is itself an expanse with all the characteristics of the wider expanse in which it forms a part4 ,space as actually seen is not an aggregate of minima visibilia or perceptual points in which no lesser parts can be discriminated2 so long as space is visually or tactually perceived at all1 it is perceived as containing lesser parts which1 on attending to them1 are found to repeat the characteristics of the larger space4 ,so any part of the 8specious present0 to which special attention can be directed1 turns out itself to be a sensible duration4 ,perceived space is made of lesser spaces1 perceived time of lesser times2 the 8parts0 not being1 of course1 actually distinguished from each other in the original percept1 but being capable of being so distinguished in consequence of varying movements of attention4 7#c7 ,on investigating the character of our actual perception of space and time1 it appears to contain two aspects1 which we may call the quantitative and the qualitative4 ,on the one hand1 whenever we perceive space we perceive a certain magnitude of extension1 whenever we perceive time we perceive a longer or shorter lapse of duration4 ,different spaces and different times can be quantitatively compared in respect of the bigness of the extension or the duration comprised in them4 ,on the other hand1 the percept of space or time is not one of mere extension or duration4 ,it has a very different qualitative aspect4 ,we perceive along with the magnitude of the extension the form of its outline4 ,this perception of spatial form depends in the last resort upon perception of the direction assumed by the bounding line or lines4 ,similarly1 in dealing with only one dimension of perceived space1 we never perceive length 7a spatial magnitude7 apart from the perception of direction 7a spatial quality74 ,the same is true of the perception of time4 ,the lapses of duration we immediately perceive have all their special direction-quality2 the 8specious present0 is essentially a simultaneously presented succession1 i4e4 a transition from before to after4 ,it must be added that1 in perceptual space and time1 the directions thus perceived have a unique relation to the perceiving subject1 and are thus all qualitatively distinct and irreversible4 ,direction in space is estimated as right1 left1 up1 down1 etc41 by reference to axes through the centre of the percipient's body at right angles to each other1 and is thus for any given moment of experience uniquely and unambiguously determined4 ,direction in time is similarly estimated with reference to the actual content of the 8focus of consciousness40 ,what is actually focal is 8now10 what is ceasing to be focal is 8past10 what is just coming to be focal is 8future0 in its direction4#adb ,this is perhaps the most fundamental and important peculiarity of the space and time of actual perception4 ,all directions in them are unambiguously determined by reference to the here and now of the immediate experience of an individual subject4 ,as a consequence1 every individual subject has his own special perceptual space and time2 ,geometry and ,mechanics depend1 to be sure1 on the possibility of the establishment of correspondences between these spatial and temporal systems1 but it is essential to remember that1 properly speaking1 the space and time system of each individual's perception is composed of directions radiating out from his unique here and now1 and is therefore individual to himself4#adc #c4 ,the ,construction of the ,conceptual ,space and ,time ,order of ,science4 ,for the purposes of practical life1 no less than for the subsequent object of scientific description of the physical order1 it is indispensably necessary to establish equations or correspondences between the individual space and time systems of different percipients4 ,apart from such correspondences1 it would be impossible for one subject to translate the spatial and temporal system of any other into terms of his own experience1 and thus all practical intercourse for the purpose of communicating directions for action would come to an end4 ,for the communication of such practical directions it is imperative that we should be able mentally to reconstruct the spatial and temporal aspects of our experience in a form independent of reference to the special here and now of this or that individual moment of experience4 ,thus1 like the rest of our scientific constructions1 the establishment of a single conceptual space and time system for the whole of the physical order is ultimately a postulate required by our practical needs1 and we must therefore be prepared to face the possibility that1 like other postulates of the same kind1 it involves assumptions which are not logically defensible4 ,the construction is valuable1 so far as it does its work of rendering intercommunication between individuals possible2 that it should correspond to the ultimate structure of ,reality any further than the requirements of practical life demand is superfluous4 ,the main processes involved in the construction of the conceptual space and time of descriptive science are three1--synthesis1 analysis1 abstraction4 7a7 ,synthesis4 ,psychologically speaking1 it is ultimately by the active movements of individual percipients that the synthesis of the individual's various perceptual spaces into one is effected4 ,as attention is successively directed1 even while the body as a whole remains stationary1 to different parts of the whole expanse before the eye1 the visual space which was originally 8focal0 in presentation becomes 8marginal10 and the 8marginal0 focal by a sensibly gradual transition4 ,when to the movements of head and eyes which accompany such changes in attention there are added movements of locomotion of the whole body1 this process is carried further1 and we have the gradual disappearance of originally presented spaces from presentation1 accompanied by the gradual emergence of spaces previously not presented at all4 ,this leads to the mental construction of a wider space containing all the individual's different presentation-spaces1 the order in which it contains them being determined by the felt direction of the movements required for the transition from one to another4 ,as we learn1 through intercommunication with our fellows1 of the existence for their perception of perceptual extension never directly presented to our own senses1 the process of synthesis is extended further1 so as to comprise in a single spatial system all the presentation-spaces of all the individual percipients in an order once again determined by the direction of the movements of transition from each to the others4 ,finally1 as there is nothing in the principle of such a synthesis to impose limits upon its repetition1 we think of the process as capable of indefinite continuance1 and thus arrive at the concept of a space stretching out in all directions without definite bounds4 ,this unending repetition of the synthesis of perceived spaces seems to be the foundation of what appears in theory as the ,infinity of ,space4 ,precisely similar is the synthesis by which we mentally construct a single time system for the events of the physical order4 ,now means for me the content which occupies the centre of attentive interest4 ,as attention is concentrated on the different stages in the realisation of an interest1 this centre shifts2 what was central becomes first marginal and then evanescent1 what was marginal becomes central4 ,hence arises the conception of the events of my own inner life as forming a succession of moments1 with a determinate order1 each of which has been a now1 or point of departure for directions in perceptual time1 in its turn4 ,as with space so with time1 the intrasubjective intercourse of man with man makes it possible for me mentally to extend this conceptual synthesis of moments of time so as to include nows belonging to the experience of others which were already past before the first now of their experiences which ,i can synchronise with a now of my own1 and again nows of their experiences relatively to which the last now which synchronises with one of my own is past4 ,the indefinite repetition of such a synthesis leads1 as before with space1 to the thought of a duration reaching out endlessly into past and future1 and thus gives us the familiar concept of the ,infinity of ,time4#add 7b7 ,analysis4 ,equally important is the part played by mental analysis in the formation of the conceptual space and time system4 ,as we have already seen1 successive attention to lesser parts of a presented extension1 or a presented lapse1 reveals within each lesser part the same structure which belongs to the whole1 and thus establishes the sensible continuity of space and time4 ,in actual fact1 the process of attending successively to smaller and yet smaller portions of space and time cannot1 of course1 be carried on indefinitely1 but we can conceptually frame to ourselves the thought of the indefinite repetition of the process beyond the limits arbitrarily imposed on it by the span of our own attention4 ,thus1 by an act of mental analysis1 we arrive at the concept of space and time as indefinitely divisible1 or possessed of no ultimately unanalysable last parts1 which is an indispensable pre-requisite of ,geometry and ,dynamics4 ,this indefinite divisibility of conceptual space and time is not of itself enough1 as is often supposed1 to establish their continuity in the strict mathematical sense of the word2 their continuity depends upon the further assumption that whatever divides a series of positions in space or events in time unambiguously into two mutually exclusive classes1 is itself a position in the space or event in the time series4 ,this assumption does not seem to be absolutely requisite for all scientific treatment of the problems of space and time1#ade but is demanded for the systematic establishment of the correspondence between the spatial and temporal series and the continuous series of the real numbers4 ,moreover1 it seems impossible to assign any positive content to the notion of a something which should bisect the spatial or temporal order without occupying a position in that order4 ,hence we seem inevitably led by the same analytical process which conducts us to the conception of the spatial and temporal orders as infinite series to think of them also as continuous series in the strict sense of the term4 ,the alternative conception of them as discontinuous1 if not absolutely excluded1 does not seem to be called for by any positive motive1 and is incompatible with the complete execution of the purposes which demand application of the number-series to a spatial or temporal content4 7c7 ,abstraction4 ,the part played by abstraction in the formation of the conceptual space and time order out of the data of perception is often overlooked by theorists1 but is of fundamental importance1 as we shall see immediately4 ,we have already learned that the most significant fact about the time and space order of individual experience is that its directions are unique1 because they radiate out from the unique here and now of immediate feeling4 ,in the construction of the conceptual space and time order we make entire abstraction from this dependence on the immediate feeling of a subject4 ,conceptual space contains an infinity of positions1 but none of them is a here2 conceptual time an infinity of moments1 but none of them is a now4 ,as the time and space of the conceptual order are taken in abstraction from the differences between individual points of view1 no one point in either can be regarded as having more claim than any other to be the natural 8origin of co-ordinates0 with reference to which directions are estimated4 ,we shall have repeated opportunity in the remainder of this chapter to observe how important are the consequences of this abstraction4 ,abstraction also enters in another way into the construction by which conceptual space and time are created4 ,actual perceived space and time are indeed never empty1 but always filled with a content of 8secondary0 qualities4 ,in other words1 they are always one aspect of a larger whole of fact4 ,extension is never perceived apart from some further visual or tactual quality of the extended1 temporal lapse never perceived without some change in presented content1 however slight4 ,but in constructing the conceptual space and time system1 we abstract altogether from this qualitative aspect2 we think solely of the variety of positions and directions in time and space without taking any account of the further qualitative differences with which they are accompanied in concrete experience4 ,thus we come by the notion of an empty space and an empty time as mere systems of positions into which various contents may subsequently be put4 ,strictly speaking1 the notion of an empty space or an empty time is unmeaning1 as the simple experiment of thinking of their existence is sufficient to show4 ,we cannot in thought successfully separate the spatial and temporal aspects of experience from the rest of the whole to which they belong and take them as subsisting by themselves1 any more than we can take timbre as subsisting apart from musical pitch or colour-tone from saturation4 ,we can1 however1 confine our attention to the spatial-temporal system of positions without taking into account the special secondary properties of the extended and successive4 ,it is from this logical abstraction that the illusion arises when we imagine an empty set of spatial and temporal positions as having first to exist in order that they may be subsequently 8filled0 with a variety of contents4#adf #d4 ,characteristics of the ,conceptual ,time and ,space ,order4 ,the following characteristics of the conceptual space and time created by the construction we have just examined1 call for special notice4 ,conceptual space and time are necessarily taken1 for reasons already explained1 to be unlimited1 and indefinitely divisible4 ,though it does not seem inevitable that they should be continuous1 we appear to be unable to attach any positive meaning to the notion of their discontinuity1 and1 in the practical need for the application to them of the complete number-series1 we have a valid positive ground for taking them as continuous4 ,but space and time are thus resolved1 in the process of their conceptual construction1 into continuous infinite series of which the terms are spatial and temporal positions or points4 ,unlike the parts of perceptual space and time1 these conceptual terms are not themselves spaces or times1 as they contain no internal multiplicity of structure4 ,conceptual space and time are thus not wholes or aggregates of parts1 but systems of relations between terms which possess no quantitative character4 ,between any two terms of the spatial1 or again of the temporal1 series there is one unique relation1 which is completely determined by the assignment of the terms1 their distance4 ,in the temporal series1 which has only one dimension1 you can only pass from any one given term to any other through a series of intermediate terms which is once and for all determined when the initial and final terms are given1 hence nothing is required beyond the terms themselves to fix their distance4 ,the spatial series is multi-dimensional1 i4e4 you can pass from any one term in it to any second by an indefinite variety of routes through intermediate terms1 but it is still true that there is one and only one such route which is completely determined when the terms in question are known1 namely1 the straight line passing through both4 ,this straight line constitutes the unique distance of the two points from each other4#adg ,thus the genuine concept of which those of space and time are species is not that of magnitude or quantity1 but of serial order4 ,further1 and this is a point of fundamental difference between conceptual space and time1 and the spaces and times of immediate perception1 any one position in either order1 taken by itself1 is qualitatively indistinguishable from any other4 ,all points of space1 all moments of time1 are alike1 or1 as it is also phrased1 conceptual space and time are homogeneous throughout4 ,it is not until you take at least two terms of the spatial or temporal series and consider the relation they determine1 that distinction becomes possible4 ,this homogeneity of conceptual space and time is an inevitable consequence of the abstraction from the immediate feelings of the individual subject of experience involved1 as we saw1 in the process of their construction4 ,in our actual perception of spatial and temporal extension1 that part of perceived space and time which stands in direct unity with immediate feeling is qualitatively distinguished as the here and now from all the rest1 and thus does not depend upon the specification of a second spatial or temporal position for its recognisability4 ,here is where ,i am1 now is this felt present4 ,and similarly1 every other part of the actually presented space and time gets a unique qualitative character from its special relation to this here and now2 it is right or left1 behind or in front1 before or after4 ,when we abstract altogether from the unique relation with individual experience which thus makes the here and now of perception1 as we do in constructing our conceptual space and time order1 every position alike becomes the mere possibility of a here or a now1 and as such mere possibilities the various positions are indistinguishable4 ,practically1 this homogeneity is important as the indispensable condition for the quantitative comparison of different portions of extension or duration4 ,an apparently inevitable consequence of the homogeneity of conceptual space and time is the relativity of spatial and temporal position4 ,as we have seen1 positions in conceptual space and time are not distinguishable until you take them in pairs4 ,in other words1 to fix one position in space or one date you have to give its relation to another position or date1 and similarly to fix this you must specify a third1 and so on indefinitely4 ,to say where ,a is means to say how you get to it from ,b1 and ,b again is only known by the way it is reached from ,c1 and so on without end4 ,logically1 this is a simple consequence of the nature of space and time as conceptually analysed into endless series4 ,to specify any term in the series you must give the unique relation it bears to some other term1 its logical distance4 ,and1 in a series which has neither first nor last term1 this second term cannot be defined except by its logical distance from a third4 ,in actual perception this difficulty is avoided1 owing to the fact that immediate feeling gives us the here and now from which all our directions are measured4 ,but in conceptual space or time there is nothing to distinguish any one here which we may take as our 8origin of co-ordinates10 or any one now which we take as our present from any other1 and hence the endless regress seems inevitable4 ,it follows1 of course1 that in conceptual space and time there is no principle by which to distinguish different directions4 ,in perception they can be distinguished as right and left1 up and down1 and so forth4 ,but since what is right to one percipient is left to another1 in conceptual space1 where complete abstraction is made from the presence of an individual percipient1 there is neither right nor left1 up nor down1 nor any other qualitative difference between one direction and another1 all such differences being relative to the individual percipient4 ,when we wish to introduce into conceptual space distinctions between directions1 we always have to begin by arbitrarily assigning some standard direction as our point of departure4 ,thus we take1 e4g41 an arbitrarily selected line ,a----------,b as such a standard for a given plane1 and proceed to distinguish all other directions by the angle they make with ,a ,b and the sense in which they are estimated 7whether as from ,b to ,a or from ,a to ,b74 ,but both the line ,a ,b and the difference of sense between ,a ,b and ,b ,a can only be defined by similar reference to some other standard direction1 and so on through the endless regress4 ,similarly with conceptual time4 ,here1 as there is only one dimension1 the difficulty is less obvious1 but it is no less real4 ,in conceptual time there is absolutely no means of distinguishing before from after1 past from future4 ,for the past means the direction of our memories1 the direction qualified by the feeling of 8no longer02 the future is the direction of anticipation and purposive adaptation1 the direction of 8not yet40 ,and1 apart from the reference given by immediate feeling to the purposive life of an individual subject1 these directions cannot be discriminated4 ,in short1 conceptual time and space are essentially relative1 because they are systems of relations which have no meaning apart from qualitative differences in the terms which they relate2 while yet again1 for the purpose of the conceptual construction which yields them1 the terms have to be taken as having no character but that which they possess in right of the relations4#adh ,one other feature of the space and time construction is sufficiently important to call for special mention4 ,space and time are commonly thought of as unities of some kind4 ,all spatial positions1 it is usually assumed1 fall within one system of space-relations2 all dates have their place in one all-inclusive time4 ,this character of unity completes the current conception of the spatial and temporal order4 ,each of those orders is a unity1 including all possible spatial or temporal positions2 each is an endless1 infinite1 continuous series of positions1 which all are purely relative4 ,there are other peculiarities1 especially of the current concepts of space1 with which it is not necessary to deal here1 as they are of an accidental kind1 not arising out of the essential nature of the process by which the conception is constructed4 ,thus it is probably a current assumption that the number of dimensions in space is three and no more1 and again that the ,euclidean postulate about parallels is verified by its constitution4 ,as far as perceptual space is concerned1 those assumptions depend1 ,i presume1 upon empirical verification2 there seems to be no reason why they should be made for the conceptual space-order1 since it is quite certain that a coherent science of spatial relations can be constructed without recourse to them4#adi #e4 ,the question now is1 whether the whole of this spatial and temporal construction is more than imperfect1 and therefore contradictory1 appearance4 ,i will first state in a general form the arguments for regarding it as appearance1 and then proceed to reinforce this conclusion by dealing with some special difficulties4 ,finally1 ,i propose to ask whether we can form some positive conception of the higher order of ,reality of which the spatial and temporal series are phenomenal4 ,that the space and time order is phenomenal and not ultimate1 can1 ,i think1 be conclusively shown by a general argument which ,i will first enunciate in principle and then develop somewhat more in detail4 ,an all-comprehensive experience cannot apprehend the detail of existence under the forms of space and time for the following reason4 ,such an experience could be neither of space and time as we perceive them1 nor of space and time as we conceptually reconstruct them4 ,it would not be of perceptual space and time1 because the whole character of our perceptual space and time depends upon the very imperfections and limitations which make our experience fragmentary and imperfect4 ,perceptual space and time are for me what they are1 because ,i see them1 so to say1 in perspective from the special standpoint of my own particular here and now4 ,if that standpoint were altered1 so that what are actually for me there and then became my here and now1 my whole outlook on the space and time order would suffer change4 ,but the ,absolute cannot look at the space and time order from the standpoint of my here and now4 ,for it is the finitude of my interests and purposes which confine me in my outlook to this here and now4 ,if my interests were not bound up in the special way in which they are with just this special part or aspect of the life of a wider whole1 if they were co-extensive with the life of that whole1 every place and every time would be my here and now4 ,as it is1 here is where my body is1 now is this particular stage in the development of ,european social life1 because these are the things in which ,i am primarily interested4 ,and so with all the other finite experiences in which the detail of the absolute experience finds expression4 ,hence the absolute experience1 being free from the limitations of interest which condition the finite experiences1 cannot see the order of existence from the special standpoint of any of them1 and therefore cannot apprehend it under the guise of the perceptual space and time system4 ,again1 it cannot apprehend existence under the forms of space and time as we conceptually reconstruct them4 ,for ,reality1 for the absolute experience1 must be a complete individual whole1 with the ground of all its differentiations within itself4 ,but conceptual space and time are constructed by deliberate abstraction from the relation to immediate experience implied in all individuality1 and consequently1 as we have just seen1 they contain no real principle of internal distinction1 their constituent terms being all exactly alike and indistinguishable4 ,in short1 if the perceptual time and space systems of our concrete experience represent individual but imperfect and finite points of view1 the conceptual space and time of our scientific construction represents the mere abstract possibility of a finite point of view2 neither gives a point of view both individual and infinite1 and neither1 therefore1 can be the point of view of an absolute experience4 ,an absolute experience must be out of time and out of space1 in the sense that its contents are not apprehended in the form of the spatial and temporal series1 but in some other way4 ,space and time1 then1 must be the phenomenal appearance of a higher reality which is spaceless and timeless4 #f4 ,in principle1 the foregoing argument appears to me to be complete1 but1 for the sake of readers who care to have its leading thought more fully developed1 it may be re-stated thus4 ,perceptual space and time cannot be ultimately real as they stand4 ,they are condemned already by the old difficulty which we found in the notion of reality as made up of qualities in relation4 ,perceptual space and time are aggregates of lesser parts1 which are themselves spaces and times2 thus they are relations between terms1 each of which contains the same relation once more in itself1 and so imply the now familiar indefinite regress4#aej ,again1 when we try in our conceptual space and time construction to remedy this defect by reducing space and time altogether to mere systems of relations1 the difficulty turns out to have been merely evaded by such a process of abstraction4 ,for1 so long as we keep rigidly to our conceptual construction1 the terms of our relations are indistinguishable4 ,in purely conceptual space and time1 as we have seen1 there is no possibility of distinguishing any one direction from any other1 since all are qualitatively identical4 ,indeed1 it is obvious from first principles that when the sets of terms between which a number of relations of the same type holds are indistinguishable1 the relations cannot be discriminated4 ,to distinguish directions at all1 we must1 in the end1 take at least our starting-point and one or more standard directions reckoned from it--according to the number of dimensions with which we are dealing--as independently given1 that is1 as having recognisable qualitative differences from other possible starting-points and standard directions4 7,thus1 to distinguish before and after in conceptual time1 you must at least assume some moment of time1 qualitatively recognisable from others1 as the epoch from which you reckon1 and must also have some recognisable qualitative distinction between the direction 8past0 and the direction 8future407 ,and with this reference to qualitative differences we are at once thrown back1 as in the case of perceptual time and space1 on the insoluble old problem of ,quality and ,relation4 ,the assumed starting-point and standard directions must have qualitative individuality1 or they could not be independently recognised and made the basis for discrimination between the remaining directions and positions3 yet1 because of the necessary homogeneity of the space and time of conceptual construction1 they cannot have any such qualitative individuality1 but must be arbitrarily assumed4 ,they will therefore themselves be capable of determination only by reference to some other equally arbitrary standard1 and thus we are once more committed to the indefinite regress4 ,the practical usefulness of these constructions thus depends on the very fact that we are not consistent in our use of them4 ,in all practical applications we use them to map out the spatial and temporal order of events as seen in perspective from a standpoint which is1 as regards the conceptual time and space order itself1 arbitrary and indistinguishable from others4 #g4 ,instead of further elaborating this general argument1 a task which would be superfluous if its principle is grasped1 and unconvincing if it is missed1 ,i will proceed to point out one or two special ways in which the essential arbitrariness of the spatial and temporal construction is strikingly exemplified4 ,to begin with1 a word may be said about the alleged unity of space and time4 ,it is constantly taken for granted1 by philosophers as well as by practical men1 that there can be only one spatial and one temporal order1 so that all spatial relations1 and again all temporal relations1 belong to the same system4 ,thus1 if ,a has a spatial relation to ,b and ,c to ,d1 it is assumed that there must be spatial relations between ,a and ,c1 ,a and ,d1 and ,b and ,c1 ,b and ,d4 ,similarly if ,a is temporally related with ,b1 and ,c with ,d4 ,this view is manifestly presupposed in the current conception of ,nature1 the 8physical universe10 the 8physical order10 as the aggregate of all processes in space and time4 ,but there seems to be no real logical warrant for it4 ,in principle the alleged unity of all spatial and temporal relations might be dismissed1 on the strength of the one consideration that space and time are not individual wholes1 and therefore can contain no principle of internal structural unity4 ,this is manifest from the method by which the space and time of our conceptual scheme have been constructed4 ,they arose1 as we saw1 from the indefinite repetition of a single type of relation between terms in which we were unable to find any ultimately intelligible principle of internal structure4 ,but unity of structure cannot be brought into that which does not already possess it by such mere endless repetition4 ,the result of such a process will be as internally incoherent and devoid of structure as the original data4 ,hence space and time1 being mere repetitions of the scheme of qualities in relation1 cannot be true unities4 ,this becomes clearer if we reflect on the grounds which actually warrant us in assigning position in the same space and the same time to a number of events4 ,for me ,a and ,b are ultimately in the same space when there is a way of travelling from ,a to ,b2 they are in the same time when they belong to different stages in the accomplishment of the same systematic purposes4 ,thus in both cases it is ultimately from relation to an identical system of purposes and interests that different sets of positions or events belong to one space or one time4 ,the unity of such a space or time is a pale reflection in abstract form of the unity of a life of systematic purpose1 which is one because it has unique individual structure4 ,it is in this way1 from the individual unity of the purpose and interests of my ordinary waking life1 that ,i derive the right to refer its experiences to a single space and time system4 ,similarly1 it is in virtue of the inclusion of my own and my fellow-men's purposes in a wider whole of social systematic purpose that ,i can bring the space and time relations of their experience into one system with my own4 ,and again1 the sensible occurrences of the physical order belong to one space and time with the space and time relations of human experience1 because of the varying ways in which they condition the development of our own inner purposive life4 ,but there are cases1 even within our own conscious life1 where this condition appears to be absent1 and in these cases we do not seem to be able to make intelligible use of the conception of a single time or a single space4 ,take the case of our dreams4 ,the events of my dreams stand in spatial and temporal relations within the dream itself1 but there would be no sense in asking what are the spatial relations between the places seen in my dreams and the places marked on the map of ,england2 or what are again the temporal relations between the events of last night's dream and those of this morning1 or those of the dreams of last week4 ,precisely because there is usually no systematic identity of purpose connecting the dream with the waking life or with other dreams1 the time and space of the dream have no position with respect to the time and space system of waking life1 nor those of one dream with relation to those of another4#aea ,of course1 it may be said that the dream-space and dream-time are 8imaginary10 but the problem cannot be got rid of by the use of an epithet4 ,to call them imaginary is merely to say that they are not systematically connected with the time and space of waking life1 not to disprove their genuineness as actual space and time constructions4 ,similarly1 if there are intelligent purposes of which our human purposive life is debarred from taking account as such1 as we urged that there must be behind the phenomenal physical order1 the time and space within which those purposes are conceived and executed would have no place in our spatial and temporal system4 ,the phenomenal events of the physical order would fall within our system1 but not the life of inner purpose of which that order is the manifestation to our senses4 ,ultimately1 in fact1 all spaces and all times could only form one spatial and temporal system on condition that the infinite absolute experience views all its contents in spatial and temporal form2 then the various space and time systems corresponding to the purposes of the various groups of finite individuals would finally1 for the infinite individual1 form one great system of time and space relations4 ,but we have already seen that the infinite experience cannot comprehend its contents in spatial or temporal forms4 ,we infer1 then1 that there may be--indeed1 if our interpretation of the physical order is valid1 there must be--a plurality of spaces and times within the ,real4 ,within any one such space or time all its members are spatially and temporally interrelated1 but the various spaces are not themselves related in space1 nor the various times before or after one another in time4 ,their relation is the purely logical one of being varying modes of the expression in a finite detail of the underlying nature of the ultimate ,reality4#aeb ,for the absolute experience they must be all at once and together1 not in the sense of being in 8one space and time10 but in the sense of forming together the systematic embodiment of one coherent ground or principle4 #h4 ,similar consequences1 as to the phenomenal character of space and time1 follow from the consideration of the familiar ,kantian antinomies founded upon the concept of spatial and temporal infinity4 ,space and time must be externally boundless and internally indefinitely divisible1 and yet again cannot be either4 ,freed from unessential accessories1 the argument for either side of the antinomy may be stated thus4 ,space and time must be boundless because all spatial and temporal existence means spatial and temporal relation to a second term1 itself similarly related to a third term4 ,for precisely the same reason both must be indefinitely divisible4 ,yet again1 they can be neither1 since only the individual exists1 and within such an interminable network of relations between terms which are nothing but the supporters of these relations there is no principle of individual structure4#aec ,thus the ,kantian antinomies are a simple consequence of the old difficulty about quality and relation4 ,space and time must be mere relations1 and the terms of those relations therefore qualitatively indistinguishable2 again1 since they are relations they cannot be relations between nothings or1 what is the same thing1 between terms with no individual character4 ,as in all cases where the problem of relation and quality arises1 it then conducts us to the indefinite regress4 ,so long as we continue to look upon space and time as real1 we have therefore to choose between two equally illogical alternatives4 ,we must either arbitrarily refuse to continue the indefinite regress beyond the point at which its difficulties become apparent1 as is done by the assertion that space and time have finite bounds or indivisible parts1 or we must hold that the absolute experience actually achieves the summation of an unending series4 ,with the recognition that space and time are phenomenal1 the result of a process of construction forced on us by our practical needs1 but not adequately corresponding to the real nature of individual existence1 the difficulty disappears4 ,both sides of the antinomy become relatively true1 in the sense that for our practical purposes we must be content to adopt now the one and again the other2 both become ultimately untrue in the sense that space and time1 being constructions of our own1 are really neither finite nor infinite series1 but are the one or the other according to the purposes for which we use our construction4 #i4 ,if spatial and temporal position and direction must thus in the end be appearance1 phenomenal of some more individual reality1 we have finally to ask1 ,of what are they the appearance8 ,it is not enough to say 8of ultimate ,reality10 or 8of the ,absolute40 ,ultimately this is1 no doubt1 true of space and time1 as it is of everything else1 but we desire further to know if they are not proximately the appearance of some special features of the inner physical life of the lesser individuals which compose the ,absolute4 ,we naturally look for some third term1 in the nature of finite individuality1 to mediate between the structureless abstract generality of space and time relation1 and the perfect individual structure of the spaceless and timeless ,absolute ,individual4 ,we want1 in fact1 to connect the spatial and temporal form which our experience wears1 with some fundamental aspect of our nature1 as beings at once individual and finite4 ,nor is it particularly difficult to make the connection4 ,when we remember that space and time1 as they actually condition our perception and movement1 are the space and time which radiate out from an unique here and now of immediate feeling1 it is fairly evident that the spatial and temporal aspect of our experience is1 as already suggested1 a consequence of that limitation of our attentive interests which constitutes our finitude4 ,it is the narrowness of my interests1 or at least of those which are sufficiently explicit to rise into the 8focus0 of consciousness1 that is reflected in the distinction of my here from all the theres which are around me4 ,here is where my body is1 because of the specially intimate connection of the realisation of my interests and purposes with those events in the phenomenal physical order which ,i call the state of my body4 ,were my interests widened so as to embrace the whole scheme of the universe1 ,i should no longer perceive the contents of that universe as dispersed through space1 because ,i should no longer have as my special standpoint a here to which other existence would be there4 ,my special standpoint in space may thus be said to be phenomenal of my special and peculiar interests in life1 the special logical standpoint from which my experience reflects the ultimate structure of the ,absolute4 ,and so1 generally1 though the conclusion can for various reasons not be pressed in respect of every detail of spatial appearance1 the spatial grouping of intelligent purposive beings is phenomenal of their inner logical affinity of interest and purpose4 ,groups of such beings1 closely associated together in space1 are commonly also associated in their peculiar interests1 their special purposes1 their characteristic attitude towards the universe4 ,the local contiguity of the members of the group is but an 8outward and visible sign0 of an 8inward and spiritual0 community of social aspiration4 ,this is1 of course1 only approximately the case2 the less the extent to which any section of mankind have succeeded in actively controlling the physical order for the realisation of their own purposes1 the more nearly is it the truth that spatial remoteness and inner dissimilarity of social purposes coincide4 ,in proportion as man's conquest over his non-human environment becomes complete1 he devises for himself means to retain the inner unity of social aims and interests in spite of spatial separation4 ,but this only shows once more how completely the spatial order is a mere imperfect appearance which only confusedly adumbrates the nature of the higher ,reality behind it4 ,thus we may say that the 8abolition of distance0 effected by science and civilisation is1 as it were1 a practical vindication of our metaphysical doctrine of the comparative unreality of space4 ,similarly with time1 though the temporal series may1 in a sense1 be said to be less of an unreality than the spatial4 ,for it does not seem possible to show that spatial appearance is an inevitable form of finite experience4 ,we can at least conceive of a finite experience composed entirely of successive arrangements of secondary qualities1 such as sounds or smells1 and the accompanying feeling-tones1 though we have no positive ground for affirming the existence of such a type of experience4 ,but the temporal form seems inseparable from finite intelligence4 ,for the limitation of my existence to a certain portion of time is clearly simply the abstract and external aspect of the fact that my interests and purposes1 so far as ,i can apprehend the meaning of my own life1 occupy just this special place in the logical development of the larger whole of social life and purpose of which my own life is a member4 ,so the position of a particular purposive act in the temporal series of acts which ,i call the history of my own life1 is the outward indication of the logical place filled by this particular act in the connected scheme of interests which form my life on its inner side4 ,but it is an inevitable consequence of the want of complete internal harmony we call finitude1 that the aims and interests of the finite subject cannot be in the same degree present to its apprehension all at once and together4 ,in being aware of its own internal purpose or meaning1 it must1 because it is finite and therefore not ultimately a completely harmonious systematic whole1 be aware of that purpose as only partially fulfilled4 ,and in this sense of one's own purposes as only partially fulfilled1 we have the foundation of the time-experience1 with its contrast between the 8now0 of fulfilment and the 8no longer0 and 8not yet0 of dissatisfied aspiration4 ,for this reason1 dissatisfaction1 unfulfilled craving1 and the time-experience seem to be bound up together1 and time to be merely the abstract expression of the yearning of the finite individual for a systematic realisation of its own purpose which lies for ever beyond its reach as finite4 ,if this is so1 only the absolute and infinite individual whose experience is throughout that of perfectly harmonious systematic realisation of meaning1 can be outside the time-process2 to it1 8vanished and present are the same10 because its whole nature is once for all perfectly expressed in the detail of existence4 ,but the finite1 just because its very nature as finite is to aspire to a perfection which is out of reach1 must have its experience marked with the distinction of now from by and by1 of desire from performance4 ,in this temporal character of all finite experience we may perhaps afterwards discern the ultimate ground of morality1 as we can already discern in the unresting struggle of the finite to overcome its finitude1 practical evidence that time is not a form which adequately expresses the nature of ,reality1 and must therefore be imperfect appearance4#aed ,thus we seem finally to have reached the conclusion that time and space are the imperfect phenomenal manifestation of the logical relations between the purposes of finite individuals standing in social relations to each other2 the inner purposive life of each of these individuals being itself in its turn1 as we have previously seen1 the imperfect expression1 from a special logical 8point of view10 of the structure and life of the ultimate infinite individual4 ,for the infinite individual itself the whole of the purposes and interests of the finite individuals must form a single harmonious system4 ,this system cannot itself be in the spatial and temporal form2 space and time must thus in some way cease to exist1 as space and time1 for the absolute experience4 ,they must1 in that experience1 be taken up1 rearranged1 and transcended1 so as to lose their character of an endless chain of relations between other relations4 ,precisely how this is effected1 we1 from our finite standpoint1 cannot presume to say4 ,it is natural to draw illustrations from the 8specious present0 of perception1 in which we appear to have a succession that is also simultaneous2 or again1 from the timeless and purely logical character science seeks to ascribe to its 8laws of nature40 ,but in the 8specious present0 we seem obliged to attend to one aspect1 succession or simultaneity1 to the exclusion of the other2 probably we never succeed in equally fixing both aspects at once4 ,it thus presents us rather with the problem than with its solution4 ,and again1 after our discussion of the meaning of law1 we cannot affirm that ,nature is1 for the absolute experience1 a system of general laws4 ,hence it seems well not to take these illustrations for more than they are actually worth as indications of the merely phenomenal character of time4 ,metaphysics1 like the old scholastic theology1 needs sometimes to be reminded that ,god's thoughts are not as ours1 and ,his ways1 in a very real sense when ,philosophy has done its best1 still past finding out4#aee ,consult further3--,f4 ,h4 ,bradley1 ,appearance and ,reality1 chaps4 #d 7,space and ,time71 #ah 7,temporal and ,spatial ,appearance72 ,l4 ,couturat1 ,l',infini ,mathmatique1 pt4 #b1 bk4 iv4 chap4 #d 7against the ,kantian antinomies72 ,h4 ,poincar1 ,la ,science et ,l',hypothse1 pp4 #fh-aji2 ,h4 ,lotze1 ,metaphysic1 bk4 ii4 chaps4 #a-c2 ,w4 ,ostwald1 ,vorlesungen ber ,naturphilosophie1 lects4 #e1 #h2 ,j4 ,royce1 ,the ,world and the ,individual1 ,second ,series1 lect4 #c2 ,b4 ,russell1 ,foundations of ,geometry3 ,is ,position in ,space and ,time ,absolute or ,relative 7,mind1 ,july #aija71 ,principles of ,mathematics1 pt4 #f1 vol4 i42 ,h4 ,spencer1 ,first ,principles1 pt4 #b1 chap4 #c4 ----- ,footnote #ada3 ,the student who desires to think out the problems for himself would probably do well to take the discussions of ,locke 7,essay1 bk4 ii4 chaps4 #ac-ae7 and ,hume 7,treatise of ,human ,nature1 bk4 i4 pt4 #b7 rather than that of ,kant as his starting-point1 as they are less vitiated by psychological superstitions4 ,in recent metaphysical work the chapters on the subject in ,mr4 ,bradley's ,appearance and ,reality will probably be found most useful4 ,much may be learned from ,mr4 ,russell's work1 ,foundations of ,geometry1 with which should1 however1 be compared the largely discrepant results of his later article1 8,is ,position in ,space and ,time ,relative or ,absolute80 7,mind1 ,july #aija74 ,footnote #adb3 ,we are not called upon to enter into such specially psychological questions as1 e4g41 whether both directions1 past and future1 can be detected within the 8specious present0 of direct perception1 or whether the specious present only contains the elements 8now0 and 8no longer10 the 8not yet0 being a subsequent intellectual construction1 as is held1 e4g41 by ,mr4 ,bradley and ,mr4 ,shadworth ,hodgson4 ,footnote #adc3 ,we may indeed go still further1 and say that every unique moment or experience has its own unique spatial and temporal system4 ,the method by which ,i weave the perceived space-time systems of different experiences within my own mental life into a single conceptual system1 is in principle the same by which the spaces and times of myself and other men are made into one system for the purpose of practical intercourse4 ,footnote #add3 ,for an account of the psychological processes involved in all this1 see1 e4g41 ,stout1 ,manual of ,psychology1#c bk4 iii4 pt4 #b1 chaps4 #c-e2 bk4 iv4 chap4 #f4 ,footnote #ade3 ,thus ,dedekind 7,was sind und was sollen die ,zahlen8 p4 xii47 maintains that none of the constructions of ,euclid involve the continuity of space4 ,footnote #adf3 ,of course1 a physical vacuum is not the same thing as empty space4 ,for the purposes of any special science a vacuum means a space not occupied by contents of the special kind in which that special science is interested4 ,thus1 in the ordinary parlance of ,physics1 a vacuum means simply a space in which there is no mass4 ,whether it is desirable1 for the purposes of physical science1 to assume the existence of vacuum1 is altogether a question for ,physics itself1 and to decide it in the affirmative is not to maintain the existence of that unmeaning abstraction1 absolutely empty space4 ,in any case1 it may be observed that the widespread notion that motion is only possible in a physical vacuum is a mistake1 motion being perfectly possible in a fluid plenum4 ,footnote #adg3 ,it must be carefully noted that distance as thus defined is not properly a quantitative relation1 and involves no notion of magnitude1 but only of relative place in a series4 ,it should also be observed that in assuming the existence of such a unique relation between every pair of points1 it is tacitly taken for granted that the number of dimensions of the spatial order is finite4 ,in a space of an infinite number of dimensions1 such unique relation would be impossible4 7,see ,russell1 ,foundations of ,geometry1 p4 #afa ff47 ,our justification for making this assumption1 as also for taking time to be of one dimension only1 seems to be that it is indispensable for all those practical purposes which depend on our ability to create a science of ,geometry1 and that we have no positive ground for assuming the opposite4 ,thus ultimately the assumption appears to be of the nature of a postulate4 ,footnote #adh3 ,the ablest detailed account of the relativity of spatial position readily accessible to the ,english reader1 will be found in ,mr4 ,russell's ,foundations of ,geometry1 chaps4 iii,a1 iv4 ,mr4 ,russell has since1 in ,mind for ,july #aija1 attempted to prove the opposite view1 that positions in space and time are inherently distinct1 but without discussing his own previous arguments for relativity4 ,into the purely mathematical part of ,mr4 ,russell's later contentions ,i am not competent to enter4 ,i may1 however1 suggest that the question of ,metaphysics cannot be decided merely by urging1 as ,mr4 ,russell does1 that fewer assumptions are required to construct a geometry on the hypothesis of absolute than on that of relative position4 ,the superior convenience of an assumption for certain special purposes is no proof of its ultimate intelligibility4 ,and when ,mr4 ,russell goes on to admit that points in space are indistinguishable for us1 he seems to me to give up his case4 ,for is not this to admit that1 after all1 the space with which we deal in our geometrical science is relative from beginning to end8 ,how differences of quality of which we1 by hypothesis1 can know nothing1 can help or hinder our scientific constructions1 it is indeed hard to see4 ,footnote #adi3 ,this may be brought home even to those who1 like myself1 are not mathematicians1 by the perusal of such a work as ,lobatchevsky's ,untersuchungen zur ,theorie der ,parallel-,linien1 where a consistent geometry of triangles is constructed in entire independence of the postulate of parallelism4 ,of course1 in the end it must be a mere question of nomenclature whether a form of serial order independent of these quasi-empirical restrictions is to be called 8space0 or not4 ,footnote #aej3 ,it must be carefully remembered that the essential defect of the indefinite regress is not its interminableness1 but its monotony4 ,we ourselves held that ,reality is an individual composed of lesser individuals which repeat the structure of the whole1 and that the number of these individuals need not be finite4 ,but1 in our view1 the higher the order of individuality the more self-explanatory was its structure1 whereas in the indefinite regress an incomprehensible construction is endlessly repeated in the same form4 ,footnote #aea3 ,normally1 that is2 for brevity's sake ,i omit to note the possible case of a coherent dream-life continued from night to night4 ,in principle there would be a difference between the case of the space and time of such a dream-life and those of our waking hours4 ,footnote #aeb3 ,so the events of my dreams1 though not occupying any place in the temporal series of the events of waking life1 are so far logically connected with that series as both sets of events stand in relation to certain identical elements of psychical temperament and disposition4 ,another interesting case is that of so-called 8dual personality40 ,the experience of both the two alternating personalities can be arranged in a single temporal series only because of the way in which both sets are inwoven with the systematic interests of other men1 whose personality does not alternate1 or alternates with a different rhythm4 ,if all mankind were subject to simultaneous alternations of personality1 the construction of a single time-series for all our experiences would be impossible4 ,in this discussion ,i have throughout followed the full and thorough treatment of the problem by ,mr4 ,bradley1 ,appearance and ,reality1 chap4 #ah4 ,footnote #aec3 ,otherwise1 conceptual space and time are1 as we have seen1 derivatives of the number-series1 and we have already learned that the number-series leads to the problem of summing an endless series1 and is therefore not an adequate way of representing ultimate ,reality4 7,bk4 ,,ii4 chap4 #d1 #aj74 ,another form of the same difficulty would be that conceptual space and time are applications of the numerical series1--but application to what8 ,to a material which is already spatial and temporal4 ,all these puzzles are only different ways of expressing the essential relativity of space and time4 ,but see the anti-,kantian view in1 e4g41 ,couturat1 ,l',infini ,mathmatique1 pt4 #b4 ,footnote #aed3 ,compare ,prof4 ,royce's remarks1 ,the ,world and the ,individual1 ,second ,series1 lect4 #c1 8,the ,temporal and the ,eternal10 p4 #acd4 ,i should certainly have had to acknowledge considerable obligation to ,prof4 ,royce's discussion had not the present chapter been written before ,i had an opportunity of studying it4 ,footnote #aee3 ,against the plausible attempt to solve the problem by simply thinking of the whole physical order as forming a 8specious present0 to the ,absolute ,experience1 we may urge that the 8specious present0 itself regularly consists for us of a multiplicity of detail1 which we apprehend as simultaneous without insight into its inner unity as the embodiment of coherent system4 ,hence the direct insight of the ,absolute ,experience into its own internal meaning or structure cannot be adequately thought of as mere simultaneous awareness of the detail of existence4 ,so long as a succession is merely apprehended as simultaneous1 its meaning is not yet grasped4 ----- ,,chapter ,v ,,some ,,conditions ,,of ,,evolution #a4 ,the concept of evolution an attempt to interpret natural processes in terms of individual growth4 #b4 ,evolution means change culminating in an end which is the result of the process and is qualitatively new4 ,the concept is thus teleological4 #c4 ,evolution1 being teleological1 is essentially either progress or degeneration4 ,if it is more than illusion1 there must be real ends in the physical order4 ,and ends can only be real as subjective interests of sentient beings which are actualised by the process of change4 #d4 ,thus all evolution must take place within an individual subject4 #e4 ,further1 the subject of evolution must be a finite individual4 ,all attempts to make 8evolution0 a property of the whole of ,reality lead to the infinite regress4 #f4 ,the distinction between progressive evolution and degeneration has an 8objective0 basis in the metaphysical distinction between higher and lower degrees of individuality4 #g4 ,in the evolutionary process1 old individuals disappear and fresh ones originate4 ,hence evolution is incompatible with the view that ,reality consists of a plurality of ultimately independent finite individuals4 #a4 ,we saw1 in the first chapter of the present ,book1 that evolution or orderly development is a fundamental characteristic of the processes which compose the physical order as apprehended by the various empirical sciences4 ,for the purposes of ,mechanics and ,mechanical ,physics1 indeed1 we have no need to look upon ,nature as the scene of development2 for these sciences it is enough to conceive of it as a vast complex of changes of configuration and transformations of energy1 connected by regular uniformities of sequence4 ,as soon1 however1 as we come to regard ,nature from the standpoint of those sciences which explicitly recognise differences of quality1 as well as differences in position and quantity1 among the objects with which they deal1 this narrowly mechanistic conception of natural processes becomes inadequate4 ,with the notion of physical processes as productive of changes of quality we are inevitably led to think of the physical order as a world in which the qualitatively new is derived from1 or developed out of1 the previously familiar by fixed lines of deviation and under determinate conditions4 ,naturally enough1 it is from the biological sciences1 in which the study of organic growth plays so prominent a part1 that the impulse to conceive of physical change as development originally comes4 ,as long ago as the fourth century ,b4,c41 ,aristotle had taken the concept of growth or development as the foundation of the most influential scheme of metaphysical construction yet produced in the whole history of speculation4 ,in ,aristotle's view1 however1 the process of development was regarded as strictly confined within the limits of the individual life4 ,the individual organism1 beginning its existence as an undeveloped germ or potentiality1 gradually unfolds itself in a series of successive stages of growth1 which culminates at the period of complete maturity4 ,but the individual germ itself is a product or secretion derived from a pre-existing mature individual of the same type as that into which this germ will ultimately grow4 ,the number of distinct typical processes of growth is thus strictly determined1 and each such process implies the previous existence of its completed result4 ,in other words1 the boundaries between species are fixed and ultimate2 there can be no beginning in time of the existence of a new species1 and therefore no origination of new species by development from other types4 ,as ,aristotle epigrammatically puts it1 8,it takes a man to beget a man40 ,a further point of weakness in the ,aristotelian theory is the absence of any definite account of the machinery by which the process of growth is effected4 ,we learn1 indeed1 that the latent capacity of the organic germ to develop according to a certain specific type is stimulated into activity by influences contained in the environment1 but the precise nature of this process of stimulation was necessarily left in obscurity1 in consequence of the imperfect knowledge possessed by ,aristotle of the minute character of natural processes in general4 ,in the evolutionary theories of modern biology1 it is precisely the problems of the origination of new species1 and of the special character of the relations between the species and its environment by which this process is conditioned1 that have attracted almost exclusive attention4 ,and1 with the steadily increasing success of evolutionary hypotheses in dealing with biological problems1 there has naturally arisen a tendency to extend the application of the general concept of evolution far beyond the sphere in which it first originated4 ,we have now not only more or less well-accredited hypotheses of the production by evolution of our chemical elements1 but even ambitious philosophical constructions which treat the concept of evolution as the one and only key to all the problems of existence4 ,in the presence of these far-reaching applications of evolutionary ideas1 it becomes all the more necessary to bear in mind1 in our estimate of the worth of the evolution concept1 that its logical character remains unaltered by the extension of its sphere of applicability2 it is still1 in spite of all minor modifications1 essentially an attempt to interpret natural processes in general in terms of individual growth4 ,we are not1 of course1 in the present chapter in any way concerned with the details of any one particular theory as to the special conditions which determine the course of organic or other evolution4 ,what those conditions in any special case are1 is a question1 in the first instance1 for that particular branch of empirical science which deals with the description of the particular aspect of the processes of the physical order under investigation4 ,and though it would be a proper question for a complete ,philosophy of ,nature how the details of a well-established scientific theory must be interpreted so as to harmonise with the general metaphysical implications of the physical order1 it is for many reasons premature to raise such a question in the present state of our actual knowledge of the details of evolutionary processes4 ,all that can be done here is to ask what in general are the logical implications involved in thinking of a process as an evolution at all1 and how those implications are related to our general interpretation of the physical order4 #b4 ,evolution obviously involves the two concepts1 already criticised at length1 of change and the dependence of the order and direction of change upon determinate conditions4 ,but an evolutionary process is never a mere orderly sequence of changes4 ,for instance1 the changes of configuration and exchanges of energy which take place when work is done in a material system1 conceived as composed of moving masses without any element of secondary quality1 are not properly to be called a process of evolution4 ,they are not an evolution or development1 because1 so long as we keep to the strictly kinetic view of natural processes as consisting solely in the varying configuration of systems of mass-particles1 the end of the process is qualitatively undistinguishable from its beginning2 nothing qualitatively new has emerged as its result4 ,or rather1 to speak with more accuracy1 the process has really no end and no unity of its own4 ,it is only by an entirely arbitrary limitation of view1 due to purely subjective interests of our own1 that we isolate just this collection of mass-particles from the larger aggregate of such particles which form the physical order as regarded from the strictly kinetic standpoint1 and call it one system2 and again1 it is with equal arbitrariness that we determine the point of time beyond which we shall cease to follow the system's changes of configuration4 ,in the indefinitely prolonged series of successive configurations there is no stage which can properly be called final4 ,hence from the rigidly mechanistic point of view of ,kinetics and ,kinematics there are no evolutions or developments in the universe1 there is only continuous change4 ,development or evolution1 then1 definitely implies the culmination of a process of change in the establishment of a state of things which is relatively new1 and implies1 further1 that the relatively new state of things may truly be regarded as the end or completion of this special process of change4 ,thus the fundamental peculiarity of all evolutionary ideas is that they are essentially teleological2 the changes which are evolutions are all changes thought of as throughout relative to an end or result4 ,except in so far as a process of change is thus essentially relative to the result in which it culminates1 there is no sense in calling it a development4 ,we may see this even by considering the way in which the concepts of evolution and development are used in the various departments of ,physics4 ,we sometimes speak of a chemical process as marked by the 8evolution0 of heat1 or again we say that1 if the second law of ,thermo-dynamics is rigidly and universally true1 the physical universe must be in a process of evolution towards a stage in which none of its energy will be available for work4 ,but we can only attach a meaning to such language so long as we allow ourselves to retain the common-sense point of view according to which there are real qualitative differences between what abstract ,mechanics treats as equivalent forms of 8energy40 ,we can speak of the evolution of heat1 just because we1 consciously or unconsciously1 think of heat as being really1 what it is for our senses1 something qualitatively new and distinct from the other kinds of energy which are converted into it by the chemical process4 ,so we can intelligibly talk of the gradual conversion of one form of energy into another as an evolution only so long as we regard the various forms of energy as qualitatively different1 and are therefore entitled to look upon the complete conversion of the one into another as the qualitatively new result of a process which is therefore terminated by its complete establishment4 ,from the standpoint of the physical theories which regard the distinction between the forms of energy as only 8subjective10 there would be no sense in regarding that particular stage in the course of events at which one form of energy disappeared as the end or result of a process which terminates in it1 and thus such terms as evolution and development would lose their meaning4 ,only the establishment of the qualitatively new can form a real end or result1 and so afford a logical basis for the recognition of the changes in the physical order as distinct processes of development4 #c4 ,this essentially teleological character of development is emphasised in the language of the biological sciences by the constant use of the concepts of progress and degeneration4 ,for biology an evolution is essentially a process either in the progressive or in the regressive direction4 ,every evolution is an advance to a 8higher0 or a decline to a 8lower0 state of development4 ,now progress and regress are only possible where the process of change is regarded as throughout relative to the end to be attained by the process4 ,exactly how we conceive this end1 which serves us as a standard for distinguishing progress from degeneration1 is a secondary question2 the point of fundamental importance is that1 except in reference to such an end1 there can be no distinction at all between progressive and retrogressive change4 ,thus1 unless there are really ends in the physical order which determine the processes of change that culminate in their actual establishment1 evolution cannot be real4 ,if the ends1 by the establishment of which we estimate progress in development1 are merely arbitrary standards of our own to which nothing in external reality corresponds1 then the physical order must really be a mere succession of changes which are in no true sense developments1 and the whole concept of nature as marked by development will be a mere human delusion4 ,and1 on the contrary1 if there is any truth in the great scientific conceptions of evolution1 there must be real ends in the physical order4 ,now1 there is only one intelligible way in which we can think of a process of change as really relative to an end4 ,the resultant state which we call the end of the process1 as being the final stage which completes this special process1 and enables us to mark off all that succeeds it as belonging to a fresh process of development1 must also be its end in the sense of being the conscious attainment of an interest or purpose underlying the whole process4 ,it is only in so far as any state of things is1 for some sentient being1 the realisation of a subjective interest previously manifested in an earlier stage of experience1 that that state of things forms the real culmination of a process which is distinguished from all other processes1 and stamped with an individuality of its own1 by the fact that it does culminate in precisely this result4 ,the conceptions of end or result and of subjective interest are logically inseparable4 ,hence we seem forced to infer that1 since evolution is an unmeaning word1 unless there are genuine1 and not merely arbitrarily assigned1 ends underlying the processes of physical nature1 the concept of evolution as characteristic of the physical order involves the metaphysical interpretation of that order as consisting of the teleological acts of sentient beings1 which we had previously accepted on more general grounds4 ,it would be useless to attempt an escape from this conclusion by drawing a distinction between two meanings of 8end0--8a last state0 and 8the achievement of a purpose40 ,for the whole point of the preceding argument was that nothing can be an 8end0 in the former sense without also being an end in the latter4 ,unless processes have ends which are their subjective fulfilment1 it is only by an arbitrary convention of our own that we assign to them ends which are their last states4 ,and if it is only an arbitrary convention that physical processes have ends in this sense1 evolution itself is just such a convention and nothing more4#aef #d4 ,what is in principle the same argument may be put in another form1 and the equivalence of the two forms is itself very suggestive from the metaphysical point of view4 ,evolution or development1 like all change1 implies the presence throughout successive stages in a process of something which is permanent and unchanging4 ,but it implies something more definite still4 ,whatever develops must therefore have a permanent individual character of its own of which the successive stages in the development process are the gradual unfolding4 ,unless the earlier and the later stages in a connected series of changes belong alike to the gradual unfolding1 under the influence of surroundings1 of a single individual nature1 there is no meaning in speaking of them as belonging to a process of development4 ,only the individual can develop1 if we are to attribute precise meaning to our words4 ,we speak of the evolution of a society or a species1 but if our words are not to be empty we must mean by such phrases one of two things4 ,either we must mean that the species and the society which develop are themselves individuals of a higher order1 no less real than the members which compose them1 or our language must be merely a way of saying that the life of each member of the social or biological group exhibits development4 ,when we reflect on what is really involved in our ordinary loose expressions about the 8inheritance0 of this or the other physical or social trait1 we shall see that the former alternative is far less removed from ordinary ways of thought than might at first seem to be the case4 ,if any kind of reality corresponds to our current metaphor of the 8inheritance0 of qualities1 the groups within which such 8inheritance0 takes place must be something much more than mere aggregates of mutually exclusive individuals4 ,a group within which qualities can be thus inherited must1 as a whole1 possess a marked individual nature of its own4 ,now we have already seen that all individuality is in the end teleological4 ,a group of processes forms an individual life in the degree to which it is the expression of a unique and coherent interest or aim1 and no further4 ,hence1 once more1 only what is truly individual can develop or evolve4 ,and we readily see that it is precisely in so far as a set of processes form the expression of individual interest1 that the demarcation of the group as a connected whole from all previous and subsequent processes possesses more than a conventional significance4 ,hence only processes which are the expression of individual interest possess 8ends0 or 8last states10 and thus the two forms of our argument are in principle identical4 ,once more1 then1 the significance of evolutionary ideas1 if they are to be more than a purely conventional scheme devised for the furtherance of our own practical purposes1 and as an artificial aid to classification1 is bound up with the doctrine that the events of the physical order are really the expression of the subjective interests of sentient subjects of experience4#aeg #e4 ,to proceed to a further point of the utmost importance4 ,not only does evolution imply the presence of individuality in the subject of the evolutionary process2 it implies its possession of finite individuality4 ,an infinite individual cannot have development or evolution ascribed to it without contradiction4 ,hence the ,absolute1 the ,universe1 or whatever other name we prefer to give to the infinite individual whole of existence1 cannot develop1 cannot progress1 cannot degenerate4 ,this conclusion might be derived at once from reflecting upon the single consideration that temporal succession is involved in all evolution1 whether progressive or retrogressive4 ,for temporal succession is1 as we have seen1 an inseparable consequence of finite individuality4 ,but it will be as well to reach our result in a different way1 by considering certain further implications of the concept of evolution which are manifestly only present in the case of finite individuality4 ,in every process of development or evolution there are involved a pair of interrelated factors1 the individual nature which develops1 and the environment which contains the conditions under which and the stimuli in response to which it develops4 ,the undeveloped germ is as yet a mere possibility1 something which will yet exhibit qualities not as yet possessed by it4 ,in its undeveloped state1 what it possesses is not the qualities characteristic of its later stages1 but only 8tendencies0 or 8dispositions0 to manifest those qualities1 provided that the environment provides the suitable stimulus4 ,hence1 if either of the two interrelated factors of development1 the individual or the environment1 is missing1 there can be no evolution4 ,now1 the infinite individual whole of existence has no environment outside itself to supply conditions of development and incentives to change4 ,or1 what is the same thing1 since the 8possible0 means simply that which will follow if certain conditions are realised1 there is no region of unrealised possibility outside the realised existence of the infinite whole4 ,hence in the infinite whole there can be no development3 it cannot progressively adapt itself to new conditions of existence2 it must once and for all be in its reality all that it is in 8idea40 ,the infinite whole therefore evolves neither forward nor backward4 ,this impossibility of ascribing development to the whole of ,reality is strikingly illustrated by a consideration of the impasse into which we are led when we try in practice to think of the whole universe as in process of evolution4 ,so long as you are still in the presence of the fundamental distinction between the developing subject and its environment1 you are logically driven1 if everything is to be taken as a product of evolution1 to supplement every evolutionary theory by a fresh evolutionary problem4 ,to account for this special evolution 7e4g41 the evolution of the vertebrata7 you have to assume an environment with determinate qualities of its own1 influencing the evolution in question in a determinate way in consequence of these qualities4 ,but if everything has been evolved1 you have again to ask by what process of evolution this special environment came to be what it is4 ,to solve this problem you have once more to postulate a second 8environment0 determining1 by interaction1 the course of the evolution of the former4 ,and thus you are thrown back upon the indefinite regress4 ,unless1 indeed1 you are prepared boldly to assert that1 as all determinate character is the product of evolution1 the universe as a whole must have evolved out of nothing4 7,you would not escape this dilemma by an appeal to the very ancient notion of a 8cycle0 or 8periodic rhythm0 of evolution1 in virtue of which the product of a process of evolution serves in its turn as the environment for the reiterated evolution of its own antecedent conditions1 ,a thus passing by evolution into ,b and ,b back again into ,a4 ,for you would at least have to accept this tendency to periodic rhythm itself as an ultimate property of all existence1 not itself resulting by evolution from something else47 ,the dilemma thus created by the attempt to apply the concept of evolution to the whole of ,reality1 is sufficient to show that evolution itself is only thinkable as a characteristic of processes which fall within the nature of a system which1 as a whole1 does not evolve4 ,we may restate the same contention in the following form3--,all development means advance towards an end4 ,but only that which is as yet in imperfect possession of its end can advance towards it4 ,for that which already is all that it has it in its nature to be there can be no advance1 and hence no progressive development4 ,neither can such a complete individual degenerate4 ,for even in degenerating1 that which degenerates is gradually realising some feature of its own nature which was previously only an unrealised potentiality4 ,thus even degeneration implies the realisation of an end or interest1 and is itself a kind of advance4 ,as the biologists tell us1 the atrophy of an organ1 which we call degeneration1 is itself a step in the progressive adaptation of the organisation to new conditions of life1 and1 as the moralists remind us1 in the ethical sphere a 8fall0 is1 in its way1 an upward step4 ,hence what cannot rise higher in the scale of existence also cannot sink lower4 #f4 ,evolution is thus an inseparable characteristic of the life of finite individuals1 and of finite individuals only4 ,and this consideration gives us the clue to the metaphysical interpretation of the distinction1 so significant for all evolutionary theory1 between the progressive and retrogressive directions of the evolution process4 ,to a large extent it is1 of course1 a matter of convention what we shall regard as progress and what as degeneration4 ,so long as we are specially interested in the attainment of any end or culminating result1 we call the line of development which leads up to that result progressive1 and the line which leads to its subsequent destruction degeneration4 ,and thus the same development may be viewed as progress or as degeneration1 according to the special character of the interests with which we study it4 ,thus1 for instance1 the successive modifications of the vertebrate structure which have resulted in the production of the human skeleton are naturally thought of as progressive1 because our special interest in human intelligent life and character leads us to regard the human type as superior to its predecessors in the line of development4 ,at the same time1 many of these modifications consist in the gradual loss of characteristics previously evolved1 and are therefore degenerative from the point of view of the anatomical student1 who is specially interested in the production of organs of increasing complexity of structure1 and therefore takes the complexity of those structures as his standard in distinguishing progress from retrogression4 ,but the distinction is not a purely conventional one4 ,as we have seen1 degrees of individuality are also degrees of reality2 what is more completely individual is also a completer representative of the ultimate structure of the infinite individual whole1 and therefore more completely real4 ,hence we may say that advance in individuality is really1 and not in a merely conventional sense1 progress in development2 loss of individuality is real degeneration4 ,thus we get at least the possibility of a true 8objective0 basis for distinction between the directions of evolutionary progress4 ,but we must remember that it is only where we are able to know something of the actual interests of finite experiencing beings that we have safe grounds for judging whether those interests receive more adequate embodiment in consequence of the changes of structure and habit produced by evolution or not4 ,hence1 while our insight into the inner lives of ourselves and our animal congeners theoretically warrants us in pronouncing the various developments in human social life to be genuinely progressive or retrogressive1 and again in regarding the series of organic types which leads directly up to man as a true 8ascent10 our ignorance of the special character of the individual experiences of which the inorganic physical order at large is the phenomenal manifestation1 makes it impossible for us to determine whether an 8evolution0 outside these limits is really progressive or not4 ,we have to treat 8cosmic evolution0 in general1 outside the special line of animal development which leads up to man1 as indifferently a 8progress0 or a 8degeneration0 according to our own arbitrary point of view1 not because it is not 8objectively0 definitely the one or the other1 but because our insight is not sufficient to discern which it is4 #g4 ,one more point may be noted1 which is of some importance in view of certain metaphysical problems connected with the nature of finite individuality4 ,if evolution is more than an illusion1 it seems necessary to hold that it is a process in the course of which finite individuals may disappear and new finite individuals originate4 ,this point is metaphysically significant1 because it means that the fact of evolution is irreconcilable with any of the philosophical theories of ancient and modern times1 which regard ,reality as composed of a plurality of ultimately independent finite individuals or 8personalities40#aeh ,if these philosophical theories are sound1 the course of the world's history must be made up of the successive transformations of finite individuals1 who somehow remain unaffected and unaltered in their character by the various external disguises they assume4 ,the individuals of such a philosophy would1 in fact1 be as little modified by these changes as the actors on a stage by their changes of costume1 or the souls of the 8transmigration0 hypothesis by the bodies into which they successively enter4 ,and thus development would not be even a relatively genuine feature of the life of finite individuals2 it would be a mere illusion1 inevitable indeed in the present condition of our acquaintance with the detailed contents of existence1 but corresponding to no actual fact of inner experience4 ,on the other hand1 if evolution is not a pure illusion1 these metaphysical constructions cannot be valid4 ,for the whole essence of the modern doctrine of evolution is contained in the principle that radical differences in kind result from the accumulation of successive modifications of individual structure1 and once established continue to be perpetuated as differences in kind4 ,now1 such differences in kind can only be interpreted metaphysically as radical differences in the determining aims and interests of the experiencing subjects constituting the physical order1 and we have already seen that it is precisely the character of these dominant unique interests which forms the individuality of the individual4 ,thus the metaphysical interpretation of the evolution process seems inevitably to resolve it into a process of the development of fresh and disappearance of old individual interests1 and thus into a process of the origination and disappearance of finite individuals within the one infinite individual whole4 ,a conclusion of the same sort would be suggested by consideration of those facts of our own individual development from which the wider evolutionary theories have1 in the last resort1 borrowed their ideas and their terminology4 ,the mental growth of the individual human being is essentially a process of the formation of interests in things4 ,both our formal education1 and our informal intellectual and moral training effected by the influence of social tradition and mutual intercourse1 are processes consisting of an accumulation of minor modifications which ultimately culminate in the establishment of more or less unique personal interests in different aspects of existence4 ,and inasmuch as this process is never terminated1 it is always possible for our previously acquired interests to undergo such modification as renders them obsolete1 and substitutes novel interests in their places4 ,so far as this is effected1 we rightly say that we are no longer our 8old selves40 ,a new 8self0 or centre of unique individual interests has then developed within the former self4 ,usually the process stops short of the point at which all sensible continuity seems suspended1 but that this point can be actually reached1 under exceptional conditions1 is shown to superfluity by such facts as those of 8conversion10 to say nothing of the more pathological phenomena of 8multiple personality40 ,the same phenomena illustrate the fact that a new individuality1 once evolved1 may stand in various relations to the old individual interests it displaces4 ,it may permanently replace them1 or1 as in so many cases of 8conversion10 may prove only temporary and pass back again into the old individuality1 or the two may alternate periodically4#aei ,the one important point in which all these cases agree is simply the general one of the production in the course of development of a new individuality within the first individuality4 ,it may perhaps be suggested that we have in these features of individual growth a hint as to the true nature of the process we call the origination of new species by evolution4#afj ,to recapitulate3 evolution implies change determined by reference to an end1 and thus constituted into an individual process4 ,such 8ends0 have no meaning1 except in so far as the processes of change are viewed as the progressive attainment of individual interests1 and thus evolution is only possible where there is finite individuality4 ,this is the philosophical justification for our previous assertion that evidence of structural evolution1 where it can be had1 affords reasonable presumption that what appears to us one thing is really a true individual of some degree1 and not a mere arbitrary grouping together on our part of states which possess no inner unity4 ,further1 evolution is a process in which new individuals arise and old ones disappear4 ,hence its significance for ,metaphysics as excluding all theories which make ,reality consist of a mere plurality of unchanging finite individuals4 ,it is significant also from another point of view4 ,implying1 as it so manifestly does1 the presence of individual subjects of experience throughout the physical order1 the concept of ,nature as a realm of evolutionary processes is infinitely nearer to the full truth for ,metaphysics than the purely mechanistic view of it as a mere succession of connected changes4 ,consult further3--,f4 ,h4 ,bradley1 ,appearance and ,reality1 chaps4 #bg1 #bh 7pp4 #dig1 #dii1 #ejh of ed4 i4 for criticism of concept of ,progress72 ,h4 ,lotze1 ,metaphysic1 bk4 ii4 chap4 #h 78,forms of the ,course of ,nature10 ,eng4 trans41 vol4 ii4 pp4 #aji1 #afb72 ,j4 ,royce1 ,the ,world and the ,individual1 ,second ,series1 lect4 #e2 ,h4 ,sidgwick1 ,philosophy3 its ,scope and ,relations1 lects4 #f and #g 7for some general consideration of the bearing of evolution on ,metaphysics72 ,g4 ,e4 ,underhill1 8,the ,limits of ,evolution0 7in ,personal ,idealism72 ,j4 ,ward1 ,naturalism and ,agnosticism1 vol4 i4 lects4 #g-i 7criticism of ,spencer's evolutionary philosophy71 #aj 7on biological evolution74 ----- ,footnote #aef3 ,it might be objected that1 e4g41 death is the end of life in the sense of being its last stage1 without being the attainment of the interests which compose our inner life4 ,but the illustration will not bear examination4 ,the processes of change within the organism1 when viewed simply as connected changes1 do not cease with death2 in fact1 they have no end or last state4 ,to call a man's death his end only means that the purposes for which we are interested in the study of his behaviour get complete fulfilment when we have followed him from the cradle to the grave4 ,he is 8done with0 at death1 because we have done with him4 ,only teleological processes can have a last stage4 ,note as a consequence of the significance of the concept of 8ends0 for evolution1 that whereas the purely mechanistic interpretation of the processes of ,nature logically leads to the thought of them as a continuous series1 the series of successive organic or social types is essentially discontinuous1 a point well brought out by ,professor ,royce1 ,the ,world and the ,individual1 ,second ,series1 lects4 #e1 #g4 ,footnote #aeg3 ,i need hardly remind the reader of the vast difference between the view inculcated above and the doctrine of 8ends in nature0 as it figures in the old-fashioned 8argument from design40 ,the old-fashioned teleology assumed 7#a7 that the 8subjective interests0 manifested in the evolutionary process are fundamentally human4 ,we1 it held1 can recognise what these ends are1 and further1 they are for the most part summed up in the 8design0 of furthering our human convenience4 7#b7 ,that these interests exist as the reflective designs of an anthropomorphic ,ruler of ,nature4 ,our doctrine is consistent with neither assumption4 ,it follows from our whole interpretation of the physical order1 that we do not and cannot know what kind of subjective interest of finite individuals is realised by any portion of it beyond that constituted by our own bodies and those of our near congeners1 and therefore are absolutely without any right to fancy ourselves the culminating end of all evolution4 ,again1 a subjective interest need not exist in the form of a definitely preconceived design2 most of our own interests exist as unreflective cravings and impulses4 ,whether any part of the evolutionary process is due to deliberate reflective design on the part of superhuman intelligences1 ,metaphysics1 ,i take it1 has no means of deciding4 ,this would be a question for solution by the same empirical methods which we employ in detecting the presence of design in the products of human art4 ,in any case1 reflective design is bound up with the time-process1 and cannot therefore be ascribed to the infinite individual4 ,footnote #aeh3 ,compare1 e4g41 the first of the arguments for immortality in ,plato's ,phdo1 p4 #gj ff41 and the remark in the ,republic1 with obvious reference to this argument1 that the 8number of souls is always the same0 7#faa;,a74 ,in ,plato the doctrine is pretty certainly of ,orphic provenance4 ,compare also the cyclic alternation of death and life in ,heracleitus1 the 7,orphic7 cycle of births of ,empedocles1 that of the ,stoics1 and in the modern world1 to take only one instance1 the 8eternal recurrence0 of ,nietzsche4 ,footnote #aei3 ,the same phenomenon of the formation of a new individuality within the limits of an already existing one1 is illustrated by the familiar facts of the moral conflict between the 8higher0 and 8lower0 self4 ,footnote #afj3 ,compare ,royce1 ,the ,world and the ,individual1 ,second ,series1 p4 #cje ff41 where a view of this kind is worked out in some detail4 ,prof4 ,royce's second volume unfortunately came into my hands too late to enable me to make all the use of it ,i could have wished2 the same is the case with ,mr4 ,underhill's essay on 8,the ,limits of ,evolution0 in ,personal ,idealism4 ----- ,,chapter ,,vi ,,the ,,logical ,,character ,,of ,,descriptive ,,science #a4 ,scientific description may be contrasted with philosophical or teleological interpretation1 but the contrast is not absolute4 #b4 ,the primary end of all scientific description is intercommunication with a view to active co-operation4 ,hence all such description is necessarily restricted to objects capable of being experienced in the same way by a plurality of individuals4 #c4 ,a second end of scientific description is the economising of intellectual labour by the creation of general rules for dealing with typical situations in the environment4 ,in the course of evolution this object becomes partially independent of the former4 #d4 ,from the interest in formulating general rules arise the three fundamental postulates of physical science1 the postulates of ,uniformity1 ,mechanical ,law1 and ,causal ,determination4 #e4 ,the mechanical view of physical ,nature determined by these three postulates is systematically carried out only in the abstract science of ,mechanics2 hence the logical completion of the descriptive process would mean the reduction of all descriptive science to ,mechanics4 ,that the chemical1 biological1 and psychological sciences contain elements which cannot be reduced to mechanical terms1 is due to the fact that their descriptions are inspired by sthetic and historical as well as by primarily 8scientific0 interests4 #f4 ,the analysis of such leading concepts of mechanical ,physics as the ,conservation of ,mass and of ,energy shows them to have only relative validity4 #a4 ,in its general outlines our interpretation of the significance of the physical order is now complete4 ,we have seen reason to hold that in that order we have the appearance to our human senses of a great system or complex of systems composed of purposive sentient beings1 whose interests are for the most part so widely removed from our own as to preclude all direct intercourse1 but who are nevertheless historically connected with ourselves by that unceasing process of the development of new forms of individual interest which we know empirically as the evolution of life and intelligence on our planet4 ,as we have tried throughout the four preceding chapters to show in detail1 there is no real inconsistency between this general interpretation of the meaning of the physical order and the working assumptions of our various empirical sciences4 ,at the same time it is obvious that in executing the task of the detailed description and calculation of the phenomenal course of events1 the empirical sciences1 while not rejecting such a metaphysical interpretation1 ignore it2 and the more conscientiously they exclude from their programme all amateur excursions into extraneous metaphysical speculation1 the more thoroughly is the work of description and mathematical formulation done4 ,it seems advisable1 therefore1 to conclude our brief sketch of the principles of ,cosmology with a short discussion of the nature of the limitations imposed on empirical science1 by the special character of the objects it sets before it1 and of the way in which the existence of these limitations is revealed by analysis of the most general concepts of the empirical sciences themselves4 ,it is important1 in the first place1 to be quite clear as to the sense in which we speak of description as the work of the empirical sciences1 and as to the meaning of the contrast between such description and a philosophical interpretation of existence4 ,in this connection there are two points which seem to call for special and repeated emphasis4 7#a7 ,the contrast between interpretation and description is not an absolute one4 ,complete description would of itself be something more than mere description1 and would pass into philosophical interpretation4 ,thus a significant purposive movement is not adequately described when1 e4g41 its direction1 velocity1 momentum1 and duration have been assigned4 ,the complete description of such a movement would require the recognition of its meaning for the being executing it as a step in the realisation of a craving or a design1 and would thus merge in what we have called philosophical interpretation4 ,so generally1 if all existence is ultimately experience and all experience essentially teleological1 such description as can be distinguished from interpretation must always be incomplete from the logical standpoint1 though adequate to fulfil certain special purposes4 7#b7 ,the descriptions of science1 again1 must be carefully distinguished from such descriptions as can be effected by the mere multiplication of unanalysed sensible detail4 ,scientific description1 it must be remembered1 is always description undertaken with a view to the calculation and prediction of the course of events4 ,this implies that it must be description in general terms1 and1 wherever possible1 by the aid of mathematical analysis4 ,natural processes are described by the empirical sciences which deal with them1 not in their concrete individual detail1 but only in so far as they exhibit certain uniform aspects permitting of reduction to formul suitable for calculation4 ,such description is frequently spoken of as explanation1 and is expressly contrasted by this difference in nomenclature with the mere accumulation of sensible detail4 ,we must not1 however1 allow the difference in question to blind us to the essentially descriptive character of all scientific hypotheses4 ,it is sometimes urged that scientific explanation must differ in its logical character from description1 because the 8substance10 8agencies10 and 8media10 in terms of which explanation is couched1 are largely of a kind inaccessible to sense-perception4 ,it must be remembered1 however1 that hypotheses as to such imperceptible objects are only valuable so far as they serve as connecting-links by which we may calculate sensible events from sensible data4 ,whatever intermediate links empirical science may find it useful to assume1 it invariably takes the sensible occurrences of the phenomenal physical order as the starting-point1 and again as the goal of its inferences4#afa ,all its hypothetical constructions are thus subservient to the main interest of the accurate description of the course of sensible events4 ,the only kind of 8explanation0 which can be reasonably contrasted1 in respect of its logical character1 with description is teleological interpretation1 and even here the contrast1 as we have seen1 is not final4 #b4 ,we have to ask1 then1 what is the object at which scientific descriptions aim8 ,what purpose do they seek to fulfil1 and how does the essential character of this purpose determine the logical character of the descriptive process8 ,now1 it is at once evident that all description has for its immediate object one or other of two practical ends1 which are so closely connected as to be ultimately coincident4 ,historically1 it is beyond a doubt that the original purpose of all description of physical events was intercommunication with a view to social co-operation4 ,i have already referred to this function of description with special reference to the use of causal descriptions in science1 but may conveniently deal with the same point rather more fully and in a more general way here4 ,in a society of finite individuals with interrelated aims and objects1 each of the individuals can only attain satisfaction for his own subjective interests by some degree of concerted action along with the rest4 ,and concerted action is only possible where the co-operating individuals can reduce their various views of their common external environment to common terms1 equally intelligible to all1 and similarly indicate to each other their respective special contributions to the common task4 ,there must be a common understanding of the difficulty to be met1 and of the precise part each is to play in meeting it4 ,thus intercommunication between individuals is an indispensable requisite of all effective practical co-operation4 ,but again1 intercommunication is only possible by means of description in general terms4 ,only in so far as there are identical elements in the experiences of the various individuals can one communicate the contents of his experience to another4 ,immediate feeling1 precisely because of its unique individual character1 is essentially incommunicable4 ,thus in communicating information about my own body to another1 ,i am of necessity forced to speak of my body in terms not of the immediate experience ,i have of it in organic sensation1 but of those complexes of sense-presentations which he and ,i alike get through our organs of special perception4 ,and so the whole physical order can only serve as a basis of co-operation between individuals so far as it is describable in the last resort as a complex of sense-presentations equally accessible to the observation of all the individuals4 ,any kind of experience of nature which is uniquely peculiar to myself1 and therefore incapable of being got under assignable conditions by any other individual endowed with the same organs of perception1 is necessarily incommunicable1 and therefore useless as a basis for concerted action4 ,hence science is restricted by its very purpose to describe the physical order in such a way that its descriptions may be available for the objects of practical art1 to the description of it in its phenomenal aspect as a mere complex of related presentations or possibilities of presentation4 ,it is no accident1 but a logical consequence of the conditions of intercommunication1 that all scientific description must start from and end with occurrences of the phenomenal order which any individual may experience by conforming to the prescribed conditions of perception4 ,thus we see that it is an epistemological characteristic of the physical order as investigated by science1 that it consists exclusively of those objects which are1 in principle1 perceptible by more than one individual4 ,if there are objects in their own nature incapable of being experienced by more than one individual1 such as1 e4g41 my own inner life1 those objects cannot belong to the physical order of science4#afb #c4 ,there is a second purpose of description which arises out of the first as human experiences become more reflective4 ,description not only enables me to communicate the particular situation of the moment to others1 and devise in concert with them means for coping with it2 it also enables me to formulate beforehand general rules for my own behaviour in recurrent situations of the same type4 ,the need for the possession of such general views originates1 of course1 while description is still confined to its original function in assisting social co-operation4 ,from the practical point of view of those industrial arts out of which our various physical sciences have arisen1 it is an economical advantage of the first magnitude to be able once and for all to formulate a general rule for dealing with the indefinitely numerous occurrences of typical situations1 instead of having to deal with each occurrence separately as it arises4 ,the advantages of such general rules speedily make themselves felt in the increased power and importance enjoyed by the section of society which is in possession of them1 a consideration which may help us to understand why1 in early stages of civilisation1 such rules are commonly jealously guarded as the hereditary secrets of close corporations4#afc ,thus it comes to be the special aim of scientific description to assist the formulation of general rules for the practical manipulation of the objects of the physical order4 ,and1 with the progress of reflection1 this originally secondary object of the descriptive process becomes to a large extent independent of the primary object of intercommunication4 ,even where ,i have no need or no desire for intercommunication and co-operation with my fellows1 it becomes my interest to seek generalised descriptions of typical situations in the physical order as the basis of practical rules for my own voluntary intervention in that order4 #d4 ,the interest in the formulation of general rules for practical interference with nature1 again1 necessarily dictates the form which our scientific descriptions will take1 and is thus the source of those practical postulates of empirical science with which we have already made some acquaintance4 ,it compels us to assume1 in the first place1 as an indispensable condition of success in our descriptions1 that there are situations in the physical order which may be treated with sufficient accuracy for our practical purposes1 as recurring identically2 in the second place1 that1 so long as we abstain from intentional intervention in the course of events1 they succeed one another in a fixed routine order1 or1 in other words1 that there are no departures in nature from established routine of such a kind as to interfere with our calculations2 in the third place1 that every event in the physical order is1 within the limits requisite for our successful devising of means to our ends1 determined by antecedent events4 ,it is thus our interest in obtaining general rules for the production of effects in the physical order by intentional interference with it which is the source of the three fundamental postulates of empirical physical science1 the postulates of uniformity1 of the omnipresence of routine or mechanical 8law10 and of the causal determination of subsequent by antecedent events4 ,the dependence of physical science upon these three fundamental postulates thus does not prove their ultimate truth1 as we have already shown at length in preceding chapters3 it proves only that where they cannot be treated as approximately true1 within the limits in which their falsity could be detected by sensible experiment1 our special interest in devising rules for the manipulation of events cannot be gratified4 ,conversely1 wherever that interest can be successfully gratified1 these postulates must be for all practical purposes equivalent to the truth4 ,hence1 if we remember that the ultimate object of all physical science is the successful formulation of such practical rules for action1 we can see that it is a logical consequence of the character of the interests which dominate our scientific descriptions1 that the physical sciences should adopt a rigidly mechanical view of the physical order4 ,only1 in proportion as any one branch of physical science succeeds in carrying out in detail this conception of the physical order as an interconnected mechanism of sequences rigidly determined by laws of sequence1 does it succeed in effecting the purposes by which all physical science has been called into existence4 ,we may thus call the mechanical conception of the physical order the most general postulate of physical science4 ,only1 we must once more take care to recollect that a fundamental postulate of physical science need not in the least be an ultimate truth2 such a postulate is in the end nothing more than a way of stating the nature of the interest which physical science subserves1 and1 as we have sufficiently seen1 that interest is not the purely logical one of consistent thinking1 but the practical one of successful interference with nature4 #e4 ,it does not1 of course1 follow that all the sciences which deal in any way with the events of the physical order can as a matter of fact carry out this mechanical view of their objects with equal success4 ,it is only in the various branches of abstract ,mechanics that we get anything like complete systematic adherence to the postulates of the mechanical theory of physical nature as previously enumerated4 ,for the physical1 chemical1 and still more for the biological sciences1 it remains an unrealised ideal--and one we have no right to think ever completely realisable--that all the facts of electrical and chemical1 and again of physiological process should be ultimately capable of reduction to routine uniformities upon which confident calculation and prediction can be based4 ,thus1 even in ,chemistry1 limits are set to the successful adoption of the purely mechanical point of view1 by the fact that chemical combination is regularly productive of new qualities in the compound which could not have been predicted from a knowledge of the properties of its constituents1 but have to be ascertained a posteriori by actual experiment4 ,it is true1 no doubt1 that we seem to be increasingly able1 as our chemical knowledge advances1 to say in general what properties may be expected to result from the combination of given elements1 but there is no logical ground for supposing that we shall ever be able to foretell all the properties of an as yet unexamined compound1 and in any case such knowledge could only be of a general sort4 ,however much we might know1 in advance of the results of the combination of certain elements in certain proportions1 it would still be impossible to predict with absolute certainty the precise result of trying the combination in a particular concrete case4 ,still less realisable would be the ideal of the reduction of ,biology to applied ,mechanics4 ,it is not merely that the isolated physiological process regularly exhibits qualitative aspects of a chemical or electrical kind1 which we have no right to reduce to mere quantitative changes4 ,beyond this1 as the very terminology of our evolutionary hypotheses is enough to show1 it is impossible to state the facts of biological evolution without introducing1 under such names as 8sexual selection10 continual reference to a subjective factor1 in the form of the likes and dislikes1 habits and cravings of sentient beings1 and this selective factor1 being in its own nature incapable of direct presentation in identical form to a plurality of experiences1 is not even a member of the physical order4 ,with the case of ,psychology we shall be better able to deal in connection with the special discussions of the following ,book4 7,see especially ,bk4 ,,iv4 chap4 #a47 ,considerations of this kind seem to necessitate the following general view of the logical character of descriptive physical science4 ,the only science in which the postulates of description are rigidly carried out to their logical consequences is the science of abstract ,mechanics in its various branches 7,statics1 ,kinetics1 etc474 ,mechanics owes its power to follow out these postulates to its abstract character4 ,precisely because it regards only those aspects of the actual physical order which are consistent with the fundamental postulate of describability by general formul1 ,mechanics is constrained to be a purely abstract and hypothetical science4 ,for since every actual process involves the appearance of the qualitatively novel1 and since all concrete quality is in its essence unique1 no actual process can be merely mechanical4 ,thus the only way of conceiving the physical order which is logically consistent with the postulates of descriptive science in their rigidity1 is one which treats all natural changes as reducible to equations4 ,and it is only in abstract ,mechanics that this view is systematically carried out4#afd ,consequently1 it is only in so far as all physical science can be reduced to abstract ,mechanics that we can attain the ultimate purpose of our scientific constructions1 the calculation and prediction of the course of occurrences by means of general formul4 ,this conclusion1 derived in the first instance from reflection on the logical nature of scientific description1 is fully borne out by our actual experience of the results of our scientific theories4 ,just because we cannot ultimately reduce all chemical and biological processes to mere quantitative changes in a material of uniform quality1 we are unable to predict with absolute confidence the precise result of a concrete chemical experiment1 and still more unable to foretell the precise behaviour of a living organism4 ,hence follow two very important results4 7#a7 ,there is a real practical justification for the attempt1 as far as possible1 to treat the chemical and biological phenomena as if they were simply more complicated instances of the relations familiar to us in ,mechanics4 ,for though they are not really purely mechanical1 it is only in so far as we can treat them without appreciable error as exactly measurable that they admit in principle of calculation4 7#b7 ,at the same time1 there is also ample justification for the use of qualitative and teleological categories in ,chemistry and ,biology4 ,for the interests which chemical and biological knowledge subserve are not limited by our need for practical rules for intervention in the course of nature4 ,over and above this original scientific interest1 which can only be gratified by a mechanical treatment of the subject1 we have an sthetic interest in the serial grouping of processes according to their qualitative affinities1 and an historical interest in tracing the successive modifications which have led to the establishment of a relatively stable form of human social existence4 ,in so far as the chemical and biological sciences involve the recognition of qualitative distinctions and the consequent use of categories which are non-mechanical1 it is these sthetic and historical interests1 and not the primary scientific interest in the control of natural phenomena1 which are subserved by their elaboration4 ,hence1 while ,chemistry and ,biology1 even apart from the possibility of their conversion into branches of applied ,mechanics1 are essentially descriptive sciences1 the task fulfilled by them1 so far as they use qualitative and teleological categories1 is one of sthetic and historical rather than of properly scientific description4 ,and sthetic and historical description1 having another object than that of purely scientific description1 are under no necessity to conform to the postulates imposed on the latter by the special character of the interests it aims at satisfying4 ,thus we can see how the right of ,chemistry and ,biology to be regarded as something more than mere applied ,mechanics1 can be reconciled with ,kant's profoundly true assertion that any branch of knowledge contains just so much science as it contains of ,mathematics4 ,when we come1 in connection with the special problems of the following ,book1 to discuss the aims and methods of ,psychology1 we shall find in that study a still more striking example of the way in which the narrowly 8scientific0 interest may play a markedly subordinate part in determining the procedure of a branch of knowledge which must1 because of its systematic character1 be called a 8science0 in the wider acceptation of the term4#afe #f4 ,since it is only complete and all-embracing knowledge which can be in the last resort a completely self-contained and self-explaining system1 we must expect to find that the concepts employed in the mechanical interpretation of the physical order lead us into contradiction the moment we try to treat them as a complete account of the concrete nature of the whole of ,reality4 ,this is shown more particularly in two ways4 ,on the one hand1 the application of the categories of ,mechanics to the whole of ,reality leads inevitably to the indefinite regress4 ,on the other1 in their legitimate application to a lesser part of existence they are all demonstrably relative1 that is1 they always appear as one aspect of a fact which has other aspects1 and without these other aspects would have no meaning4 ,it is worth our while to consider both these points in some detail4 ,for the successful application of the mechanical view to the physical order1 we need to treat that order as consisting of the changing configurations of a whole of qualitatively homogeneous related parts4 ,any departure from this point of view would involve the recognition of differences which cannot be treated as merely quantitative1 as mere subjects for calculation and prediction1 and would thus necessitate the introduction of a non-mechanical factor into our interpretation of the universe4 ,the mechanical view1 fully carried out1 thus involves the conception of the universe as a system extended and ordered in space and time1 and capable of spatial and temporal change1 but manifesting a quantitative identity throughout its changes4 ,in the actual constructions of physical science this quantitative identity is represented principally by the principles of the ,conservation of ,mass and the ,conservation of ,energy4 ,both these latter principles are thus1 in their general form1 neither axioms of knowledge nor verifiable empirical facts1 but a part of the general mechanical postulate4 ,there is no ultimate logical principle in virtue of which we are constrained to think of the particular quantities we denote as mass and energy as incapable of increase or diminution1 nor again have we any experimental means of proving that those quantities are more than approximately constant4#aff ,it is1 however1 a necessary condition of success in calculating the course of events1 that there should be some quantitative identity which remains unaffected in the various processes of physical change1 and it is chiefly in the special forms of the quantitative constancy of ,mass and ,energy that we seem at present able to give definite expression to this a priori postulate of mechanical construction4 ,now1 with regard to spatial and temporal direction and position1 we have seen already both that they are always relative1 position and direction being only definable with respect to other positions and directions arbitrarily selected to serve as standards of reference1 and that1 when taken as ultimate realities1 they involve the indefinite regress4 ,it only remains to show that the same is true of the other fundamental concepts of the mechanical scheme1 mass and energy4 ,taking the two separately1 we may deal first of all with the notion of mass4 ,the mass of a material system is often loosely spoken of as its 8quantity of matter10 but requires1 for the purposes of logical analysis1 a more precise definition4 ,such a definition may be given in the following way4 ,in order to explain what is meant by the constancy of the mass of a body1 it is necessary to consider the mutual relations of at least three different bodies1 which we will call ,a1 ,b1 and ,c4 ,it is found that1 at a given distance1 in the presence of ,a1 ,c receives an acceleration m1 and in the presence of ,b a second acceleration n2 then the mass of ,a is said to stand to that of ,b in the ratio m_/n1 which is the ratio of the accelerations which they respectively produce on ,c1 and this ratio is constant1 whatever body we choose for ,c4 ,hence1 if we arbitrarily take ,b as our unit for the measurement of mass1 the mass of ,a as determined by the foregoing experiment will be represented by the number m4 ,by the principle of the ,conservation of ,mass is meant the doctrine that the ratio m_/n as above determined does not alter with the lapse of time4#afg ,that is1 the ratio between the accelerations produced by any pair of bodies or a third body is constant and independent of this third body itself4 ,this proposition is verifiable approximately by direct experiment for a particular pair of bodies1 but when affirmed as universally true becomes a part of the general mechanical postulate4 ,now1 it is obvious from the foregoing explanation of the meaning of mass 7#a7 that mass is a relative term4 ,it is a name for a certain constant ratio which requires no less than three distinct terms for its complete definition4 ,hence there would be no meaning in ascribing mass to the whole physical order or 8universe40 ,the 8universe0 could only have a mass as a whole if there were some body outside the universe1 but capable of interaction with it1 so that we could compare the relative accelerations1 in the presence of this body1 of the whole 8physical universe10 and of our arbitrarily selected unit of mass4 ,but the 8universe10 by supposition1 contains all physical existence1 and there is therefore no such accelerating body outside it4 ,hence we cannot say1 without an implicit contradiction1 that the whole of existence possesses the property of mass1 nor a fortiori that its mass is constant4 ,it is only subordinate parts of the universe to which the principle of the ,conservation of ,mass can be intelligibly applied4 7#b7 ,it is also clear that the mass of a body is only one aspect of a whole of existence which possesses other aspects1 not regarded in our mechanical constructions4 ,the bodies which actually exhibit a constant ratio in their accelerations have other properties over and above the fact of this constant ratio4 ,they have always1 in actual fact1 qualitative differences from one another and from other things1 which we disregard in our mechanical treatment of them because they make no difference to this special property1 in which for purposes of calculation we are peculiarly interested4 ,it is by the barest and most palpable of abstractions that1 in ,mechanics1 we treat bodies as if they were masses and nothing more4 ,thus the facts taken into account by the mechanical interpretation of nature are1 so far as its reduction of bodies to masses is concerned1 a mere aspect of a fuller reality which we treat as equivalent to the whole for no better reason than the practical one that it suits a special object of our own that it should be so equivalent1 and that this object is empirically found to be attained by regarding it as equivalent4 ,precisely the same is the case with the complementary concept of ,energy4 ,the kinetic energy1 or capacity of a body for doing work against resistance1 is found experimentally to be measured by half the square of its velocity multiplied by its mass4 ,it is further found by experiment that1 so far as we can measure1 the energy of a material system not acted upon from without remains constant4 ,that the constancy is absolute is1 of course1 once more not a matter for direct empirical proof1 but a part of the postulate that the physical order shall be capable of a mechanical interpretation4 ,now we can see at once1 from what has been previously said of the concept of ,mass1 that the physical order or 8universe0 as a whole cannot be intelligibly said to possess kinetic energy1 whether constant or otherwise4 ,what cannot be said to have mass clearly cannot have a property only explicable in terms of mass4 ,we might indeed have inferred the same consequence directly from the definition of energy as capacity for doing 8work0 in overcoming resistance4 ,the 8universe10 having nothing outside itself1 can have no source of possible resistance to overcome1 and therefore cannot be thought of as doing 8work40 ,hence1 once more1 it is only the parts of the physical order1 considered as parts1 to which energy can be ascribed4 7#c7 ,again1 it is even more evident in the case of energy than in the case of mass1 that we are dealing with one aspect singled out by abstraction from a whole possessed of other aspects not regarded in a purely mechanical construction4 ,for 7a7 the capacity for work of an actual body does not always exist in the 8kinetic0 form of actual motion4 ,there are various forms of non-kinetic energy1 such as1 e4g41 the energy of 8position0 of a resting body1 the heat of a body of higher temperature than its surroundings1 which ,mechanics treats as equivalent to 8kinetic0 energy1 because they are theoretically capable of being converted into it4 ,and these forms of non-kinetic energy are qualitatively different both from energy of actual motion and from each other4 ,it is by a mere abstraction that we treat them as identical because they are1 for certain special purposes1 equivalent4 ,the qualitative differences may make no difference with respect to a particular purpose of our own1 but they are none the less really there4 ,again1 the mechanical scheme itself is quite insufficient to explain why or when these different forms of energy are replaced by one another4 ,as has been well said by ,professor ,ward1 the doctrine of the ,conservation of ,energy asserts no more than that a certain quantitative identity is maintained in all exchanges of energy4 ,but when or in what direction these exchanges shall take place1 the principle itself does not enable us to say4 ,thus1 to take a simple example3 if ,i know the mass of a stone lodged on a roof1 the height of the roof from the ground1 and the acceleration produced by gravity at the spot in question1 ,i can determine the 8potential energy0 of the stone4 ,but my data tell me nothing as to whether this potential energy will remain for ever in its potential form1 or whether the stone will yet be dislodged and its energy converted into kinetic shape1 and if so1 when4 ,the principles of the mechanical interpretation of nature are thus inadequate to describe the concrete course of events in so simple a case as that of the fall of a stone4 ,if the stone falls1 then by the aid of the mechanical postulate ,i can describe one aspect of the process1 namely1 the amount of kinetic energy which will be evolved2 and again1 if certain previous conditions are fulfilled1 e4g41 if the support gives way1 and if the descent of the stone is not previously arrested1 the mechanical postulate enables me to infer that the stone will fall and will reach the ground with just this kinetic energy4 ,but ,i can never escape1 so long as ,i keep within the mechanical scheme1 from this necessity of hypothetically assuming as given data which the mechanical scheme itself cannot fully determine4 ,all these considerations show how the very nature of the mechanical scheme itself justifies our previous conclusion1 that it is in all its details simply the expression of a postulate created by our practical need that the course of nature shall admit of calculation with sufficient exactitude for the devising of successful rules for intervention in it1 but logically incapable of being without contradiction regarded as the real truth about any concrete natural process4 ,the internal evidence1 derived from examination of the fundamental concepts of scientific ,mechanism1 thus confirms the view we have already adopted on different grounds1 that the whole physical order is merely the appearance of a more ultimate reality of a kind akin to our own sentient and purposive life4 ,at the same time1 our examination of mechanism may serve to throw some useful light on the often misconceived antithesis between ,reality and ,appearance4 ,we call the physical order1 as conceived by mechanical science1 8appearance10 not because we regard it as illusory or deceptive in itself1 or because it is not the manifestation of a true reality1 but because it takes account only of those particular aspects of ,reality which are important and significant for certain very special purposes4 ,what appears to us as the physical order is1 indeed1 true ,reality1 and is1 in fact1 an integral part of the only ,reality there is1 but it appears to us in this special form and under these special restrictions because we have arbitrarily excluded every other aspect of the concrete facts from our purview by the choice of our initial postulates of descriptive science4 ,by the nature of the special questions we put to our world1 in our physical science1 we determine in advance for ourselves the general character of the answer we are to receive4 ,rigidly scientific investigation1 for instance1 finds mechanical determination everywhere in the world1 and purposive spontaneity nowhere1 just because it has previously resolved that it will accept 8mechanical explanation0 and nothing else as the answer to its questions4 ,so far as we bear in mind the presence of these self-imposed logical limitations throughout our mechanical science1 their existence need lead to no illusion or deception4 ,the success of our mechanical postulates shows that1 within the sphere of their logical applicability1 the course of the world does really conform to them1 and thus the results won by their application are genuine truth1 so far as they go4 ,it is only when we forget the limits set to the logical applicability of the mechanical postulates1 by the special nature of the interests they subserve1 and proceed to treat them as logically indispensable conditions of all existence and all knowledge1 that the truths of mechanical science are perverted into the illusions and falsehoods of a mechanical philosophy4 ,consult further3--,f4 ,h4 ,bradley1 ,appearance and ,reality1 chaps4 #aa 7,phenomenalism71 #bb 7,nature72 ,h4 ,lotze1 ,metaphysic1 bk4 ii4 chaps4 #g1 #h2 ,e4 ,mach1 ,science of ,mechanics1 chap4 #b1 #e1 p4 #baf ff42 ,k4 ,pearson1 ,grammar of ,science1 chaps4 #g1 #h2 ,h4 ,poincar1 ,la ,science et ,l',hypothse1 parts #c and #d1 chaps4 #f-aj2 ,j4 ,b4 ,stalle1 ,concepts and ,theories of ,modern ,physics1 chaps4 #b-f1 #aj-ab2 ,j4 ,ward1 ,naturalism and ,agnosticism1 vol4 i4 lects4 #b-f4 ----- ,footnote #afa3 ,and1 again1 the intermediate links themselves1 however imperceptible1 have always to be thought of as exhibiting properties identical in kind with those of objects given in direct presentation4 ,as ,mill said1 a hypothesis which assumes at once an entirely unfamiliar agent and an equally unfamiliar mode or law of operation1 would be useless4 ,thus the imperceptibles of scientific hypothesis belong essentially to the physical order4 ,footnote #afb3 ,this is the characteristic selected by ,prof4 ,mnsterberg as the basis of his own distinction between 8physical0 or 8superindividual0 and 8psychical0 or 8individual0 objects4 ,see ,grundzge der ,psychologie1 i4 #ae-gg4 ,footnote #afc3 ,cf4 ,mach1 ,science of ,mechanics1 p4 #d4 ,mach1 however1 erroneously as ,i think1 makes the intercommunication a secondary consequence of the rise of specialised industrial classes4 ,footnote #afd3 ,i4e41 the mechanical view of ,nature1 to be thoroughly self-consistent1 must be purely mechanistic4 ,footnote #afe3 ,to put the matter more succinctly1 as regards the position of ,chemistry and ,biology1 we may say that while chemical and biological facts are never merely mechanical1 chemical and biological science1 so far as they subserve the strictly scientific interest of calculation and the formulation of general rules1 must always be so4 ,the facts only lend themselves to this special purpose in so far as they admit of being1 without sensible error1 treated as if they conformed to the postulates of universal ,mechanism4 ,the special and more difficult case of psychological facts ,i reserve for separate discussion in the following ,book 7infra1 ,bk4 ,,iv4 chap4 #a74 ,i am glad to be able to refer the reader1 for a view of the logical worth of the mechanical postulates which appears in principle identical with my own1 to the interesting discussion of ,mr4 ,w4 ,r4 ,b4 ,gibson in ,personal ,idealism1 p4 #add ff4 ,footnote #aff3 ,compare ,bradley1 ,appearance and ,reality1 chap4 #bc1 note #b to p4 #cca 7#ast ed472 ,lotze1 ,metaphysic1 bk4 ii4 chap4 #g1 pp4 #bji1 #baj 7,eng4 trans41 vol4 ii4 p4 #hi ff472 ,ward1 ,naturalism and ,agnosticism1 vol4 i4 pp4 #hd-ia 7,conservation of ,mass71 #agj-aha 7,conservation of ,energy74 ,footnote #afg3 ,if we merely desired to fix the sense of the term mass without introducing the concept of constant mass1 we might of course consider two bodies only1 ,a and ,b4 ,then the ratio mass of ,b acceleration of ,a in presence of ,b --------- ---------------------------------- mass of ,a acceleration of ,b in presence of ,a4 ,see ,mach1 ,science of ,mechanics1 p4 #baf ff42 and ,pearson1 ,grammar of ,science1 p4 #cjb 7#bnd ed471 on which the above account is based4 ----- ,,book ,,iv ,,rational ,,psychology3 ,,the ,,interpretation ,,of ,,life ,,chapter ,i ,,the ,,logical ,,character ,,of ,,psychological ,,science #a4 ,the various sciences which deal with the interpretation of human life all avail themselves of the fundamental categories of ,psychology4 ,hence we must ask how the concepts of ,psychology are related to actual experience4 #b4 ,psychology is a body of abstract descriptive formul1 not a direct transcript of the individual processes of real life4 ,it presupposes the previous construction of the physical order4 #c4 ,the psychological conception of conscious life as a succession of 8mental states0 or 8images0 is a transformation of actual experience devised primarily to account for the experience of other subjects1 and subsequently extended to my own4 ,the transformation is effected by the hypothesis of 8introjection40 #d1 #e4 ,the logical justification of the psychological transformation of facts is twofold4 ,the psychological scheme serves partly to fill up the gaps in our theories of physiological ,mechanism1 and also1 in respect of the teleological categories of ,psychology1 to describe the course of human conduct in a form capable of ethical and historical appreciation4 ,psychology may legitimately employ both mechanical and teleological categories4 #f4 ,the objections sometimes brought against the possibility of 7a7 psychological1 7b7 teleological description are untenable4 #a4 ,the net result of our brief examination of some of the most important cosmological concepts has been to confirm us in the 8idealistic0 or 8spiritualistic0 interpretation of existence to which our first two books in principle committed us4 ,the reader who has followed us so far with acquiescence will now be fully prepared to admit that we shall at least be nearer the truth in conceiving the universe as composed of sentient and purposive subjects of experience1 akin in principle to the members of human society1 than as constituted1 entirely or in part1 of mechanically interacting and interdependent elements4 ,the acceptance of an idealist interpretation of the universe1 however1 still leaves us face to face with a number of problems of the gravest philosophical import4 ,we have still to ask how in particular we can most truly conceive the systematic unity which is formed by the whole multiplicity of apparently more or less independent subjects of experience1 what degree of permanence and individuality1 so far as we can judge1 belongs to ourselves as members of that system1 and what light is thrown by our ethical1 religious1 and sthetic aspirations and ideals on the concrete character of the whole system and on our own place in it4 ,again1 before we can attack these momentous problems with any reasonable hope of success1 we shall need to know which among the categories employed by the various sciences dealing with mental life are of fundamental significance1 and what is the logical relation of those sciences to the concrete realities of immediate experience1 and to the constructions of physical science4 ,only on the basis of a rational theory as to the purposes subserved by the various mental sciences1 and the possible limitations imposed by those purposes on the use of the corresponding categories1 can we decide how far the interpretation of existence as a whole in terms of ,psychology1 ,sociology1 or ,ethics1 is legitimate4 ,it is clear that the complete execution of the programme indicated in the previous paragraph would involve a systematic philosophical interpretation of the significance of human life for which some such name as the ,metaphysics of ,society or ,metaphysics of ,history would be a more adequate designation than the traditional title of ,rational ,psychology4 ,i have1 however1 retained the ancient name for this subdivision of our task1 mainly on the ground that our own elementary discussion will be primarily concerned with those most simple and universal psychological concepts of which the various more concrete social and historical sciences make the same constant use as chemistry and the other physical sciences do of the mechanical concepts of mass1 energy1 velocity1 etc4 ,whatever view we adopt of the precise degree of connection between ,psychology on the one side and the various social and historical sciences on the other1 it is at least manifest that ,ethics1 ,sociology1 ,history1 and the rest all involve the constant use of such psychological categories as those of self1 will1 thought1 freedom1 and that thus any sound metaphysical interpretation of history and society must begin with investigation into the logical character of the science to which these concepts belong1 just as a sound ,metaphysic of nature had to start by an examination of the postulates of ,mechanics4 ,i suppose that there is no need to utter more than a passing word by way of reminder to the reader1 that such an investigation presupposes the previous creation of a purely empirical science of ,psychology4 ,the business of ,metaphysics with ,psychology is not to dictate in advance how it must construct its view of the world1 but to ascertain the logical character of the completed construction1 and its relation to the general system of human knowledge4 #b4 ,the ,place of ,psychology among the ,sciences4--,from the metaphysician's point of view1 it is of the utmost importance to recognise clearly and constantly that ,psychology1 like the other sciences1 deals throughout not with the actual experiences of real subjects1 but with 8data0 obtained by the artificial manipulation and transformation of actual experience into a shape dictated by certain special interests and purposes4 ,this is a point upon which the idealist metaphysician1 in particular1 is peculiarly liable to go wrong when left to himself4 ,starting with the conviction that the key to the nature of existence as a whole is to be found in our own direct experience of our sentient and purposive life1 he almost inevitably tends1 unless he has given particular attention to the methodology of psychological science1 to take it for granted that the concepts and hypotheses of the psychologist afford a description of this experience in its concrete directness1 and may therefore be treated without misgiving as a fruitful source of certain knowledge about the inmost structure of the absolute or infinite individual itself4 ,and even the reiterated demonstration that one or another of the current categories of ,psychology cannot be predicated of the absolute whole of reality without flagrant contradiction1 frequently fails to produce conviction where it is not accompanied by direct proof of the artificiality and remoteness from concrete actuality of the psychologist's data4 ,hence it would be worse than useless to discuss such questions as1 whether the infinite individual can properly be thought of as a 8self0 or an 8ethical person10 or again as a 8society of ethical persons10 or again whether finite 8selves0 are 8eternal0 or only transitory constituents of the world-system1 without first arriving at some definite view as to the way in which these psychological concepts are derived from the concrete actualities of experience1 the special interests which lead to their formulation1 and the restrictions imposed by those interests on the sphere of their valid application4 ,that ,psychology1 like all descriptive science1 deals throughout with data which are not concrete experience-realities1 but artificial products of a process of abstraction and reconstruction1 should be sufficiently clear from the very consideration that1 like the other sciences1 it is a body of general descriptions of typical situations4 ,an actual process of knowing or acting1 like every actual event1 is always individual1 and because of its individuality defies adequate description4 ,it is only in so far as a situation admits of being generalised by the selection of certain of its aspects or qualities as representative of its whole reality1 that it is capable of being described at all4 ,even ,history and ,biography1 in which the teleological interpretation of a series of events as internally united by the singleness of the purpose underlying them takes the place of external connection in accord with mechanical laws of sequence as the ideal of explanation1 are only possible on the condition that such transformation of the concrete realities of life as is implied in such a degree of abstraction and reconstruction can be carried out without detriment to the special interests of the historian and the biographer4 ,and ,psychology is unreal and abstract even as compared with history4 ,it provides us with general formul which are1 or should be1 valuable as affording a means of describing certain universal features of the processes of willing and knowing which it is desirable to study in isolation1 but it is of itself as incapable of adequately tracing the actual course of a real process of willing or thinking1 as ,mechanics is of following the actual course of a real individual process in 8external0 nature4 ,in this respect the concepts and formul of scientific ,psychology stand on precisely the same footing1 as regards their relation to the individual and actual1 as do those of scientific ,physics4 ,their truth and validity means simply that by substituting them for concrete actualities we can get answers to certain special questions which we have an interest in solving1 not that they are unaltered transcripts of the actualities themselves4 ,this is perhaps most strikingly shown by observing that the very existence of ,psychology as a distinct branch of science presupposes that artificial severance of the unity of direct experience into a physical order and a non-physical realm external to that order1 of which we have already investigated the origin4 ,psychology has no subject-matter at all until we have first1 for the practical reasons already discussed1 constructed the physical order by the inclusion in it of all those experience-contents which are equally accessible under specified conditions to the observation of a plurality of subjects1 and then gone on to assign to the realm of 8psychical0 or 8mental0 existence whatever experience-contents fall outside the system so defined4 ,and this whole separation of the physical and the psychical or mental1 as we have already seen1 has no place in the direct experience of actual life4 ,in actual life1 until we come to reconstruct it in thought for the purposes of description and calculation1 there are neither material bodies nor 8immaterial minds0 or 8consciousnesses0 which are 8in0 them or 8animate0 them2 there are simply sentient and purposive beings and the environment of things to which they have to adjust themselves in the execution of their purposes4 ,how and for what reasons this navely realistic view of existence comes to give place to the dualistic conception of a physical world and a plurality of non-physical beings in relation with it1 we have already seen in our study of the methodology of the physical sciences4 ,we have now to follow the development of the dualistic line of thought somewhat further1 before we can see precisely what is the character of the logical reconstruction of actual experience presupposed by the existence of a science of ,psychology4 #c4 ,as we have already learned1 our recognition of the actuality of our own and our fellow-men's life of unique and incommunicable feeling compelled us to admit the existence of much that1 from its incommunicable nature1 falls outside the sphere of physical reality4 ,we have now to see how ,psychology1 in taking this non-physical existence as its subject-matter1 conceives of its mode of existence and its relation to the subject-matter of the physical sciences4 ,in recent years1 much light has been thrown upon the methodological problem in question by the labours of ,avenarius and his followers1 from whom the substance of our account will be largely drawn4 ,what ,avenarius has for the first time made perfectly clear is1 that the psychological interpretation of our own experience is throughout based upon reading into that experience a theory originally devised to meet a difficulty suggested by the existence of our fellow-men4 ,we have already seen1 in dealing with the subjectivist's fallacy1 what this difficulty is4 ,so long as ,i am concerned only with the analysis of my own experience1 there is nothing to suggest the distinction between a physical and a psychical aspect of existence4 ,all that ,i require1 or rather all that ,i should require had ,i any interest in analysing my own experience independent of the need for intercommunication1 is the simpler and more primitive distinction between myself as one thing in the world and the other things which form my environment4 ,but the case is altered when ,i come1 after the creation of the concept of a physical order1 to analyse the experience of my fellow-men4 ,my fellow-men1 on the one hand1 belong to the physical order1 and1 as belonging to it1 are known to me as objects cognisable through my senses4 ,on the other hand1 it is necessary for all the purposes of practical intercourse to credit them with the same kind of sentience and feeling which ,i directly know in myself4 ,this sentience and feeling are1 of course1 inaccessible to the perception of my own senses2 ,i can see my fellow's eye and can hear his voice1 but ,i cannot see that he sees or hear that he hears4 ,my fellow thus comes to be thought of as having a double existence2 besides that aspect of him in which he is simply one among other things perceived1 or in principle perceptible1 by my senses1 he has another aspect1 not directly perceptible but necessarily presupposed in all social relation with him4 ,on the side of his body he belongs entirely to the physical order2 but there is1 associated with this bodily existence1 another side to him which ,i call his psychical aspect4 ,now1 how must this 8psychical aspect0 be supposed to be constituted when once it has come to be thus artificially separated in thought from the physical side of my fellow's existence8 ,it is here that the theory of 8introjection10 as worked out by ,avenarius1 comes to our aid4 ,when ,i perceive any object directly1 without sophisticating myself by devising psychological hypotheses about the process1 what ,i am aware of is1 on the one side1 the thing as a constituent of my environment1 and1 on the other1 a variety of movements or impulses to movement in myself1 marked by a peculiar tone of satisfied or dissatisfied feeling1 and determined by the relation in which the thing in question stands to my various interests4 ,but when ,i come to explain to myself what is meant by my fellow-man's assertion that he also perceives the same object1 a difficulty seems to arise which renders this simple analysis inadequate4 ,the perceived object1 the sun for example1 appears to belong to my world of sensible things1 for ,i too see the sun4 ,not so my fellow-man's perception of it2 as ,i cannot 8see him seeing the sun10 so to say1 ,i find it hard to understand how the sun1 which is a thing in my sensible world1 can be an object for his perception1 which is not in my sensible world4 ,hence ,i draw the inference that while ,i see the actual sun1 the content of my fellow's perception is an image or idea of the sun 7cf4 p4 #ha74 ,by the extension of this process of inference ,i come to think of the non-physical aspect of my fellow's existence as consisting1 as a whole1 of a vast complex of successive ideas or images1 attended with their characteristic tone of satisfied and dissatisfied feeling2 as this series of 8mental states0 or 8ideas0 has now to be represented as in some way related to the sensible physical reality ,i call my fellow's body1 ,i imagine it as going on 8within0 his skin somewhere1 and thus arrive at the conception of my fellow as a dualistic compound of a physical factor1 perceptible by my senses1 his body1 and a non-physical factor1 composed of a stream of 8mental images10 and imperceptible to sense1 his mind4 ,one further step remains to be taken and the work of 8introjection0 is complete4 ,that step is the artificial re-interpretation of my own experience in terms of the distinction ,i have been led to establish for the case of my fellow4 ,i come to think of my own conscious life in terms of the distinction between body and mind1 and to analyse what as originally experienced was the direct reaction of a unitary self upon the things which formed its environment into a succession of 8mental states0 or 8images0 going on 8within0 a body1 their relation to which will yet form a prominent scientific problem4 ,now1 it is only when this process of 8introjection0 has reached its final issue1 and the actual life of sentient purposive intercourse with the other actual things of our environment has been replaced in thought by the conception of a mental succession of 8images0 or 8contents of consciousness10 taken to 8refer0 to 8things0 which are themselves 8outside consciousness10 while the felt unity of experience has given way to the radical sundering of human existence into a physical and a psychical aspect1 that we have reached the point of view from which psychological science takes its departure4 ,only when the actualities of experience have been artificially transformed into 8mental states0 or 8images0 of actualities by the hypothesis of 8introjection10 and thus definitely constituted into a non-physical order1 have we the materials for the construction of a special science of the 8psychical side0 of our nature4 ,psychology1 in fact1 presupposes 8psychical states0 as the material of its studies1 and 8psychical states0 are not data of immediate experience1 but symbols derived from and substituted for the actual data of experience by an elaborately artificial method of transformation4 ,hence we should be committing a grave fallacy in ,logic if we were to argue that since subjects of experience are the sole real things1 the hypotheses of ,psychology must be the final metaphysical truth about the world4 ,when we attempt to criticise the logical validity of the process of 8introjection10 and the scientific constructions of a ,psychology built up on an introjectionist foundation1 we cannot fail to observe certain apparent gross breaches of logic which affect it4 ,in the first place1 the fundamental assumption that my fellow's 8mental life0 is composed of 8images0 of the actual things of my own experience1 is clearly at variance with the principle previously implied in the construction1 for purposes of co-operation1 of the physical order as composed of things equally accessible to the perception of a plurality of individuals4 ,this discrepancy is once more done away with1 when the process of introjection has been completed1 by the reduction of my own mental life to a succession of images or states of consciousness1 but only at the cost of forgetting that the original motive to 8introjection0 was a supposed disparity between my own and my fellow's relation to the physical things of my environment4 ,hence it is not strange that ,avenarius should apparently hold the whole introjectionist transformation of the 8navely realistic0 standpoint to be essentially fallacious1 and should close his discussion of the subject with the proposition that all attempts to vary the 8natural view of the world0 lead to superfluities or contradictions4#afh ,it does not1 however1 seem necessary to follow him in this unfavourable judgment4 ,indeed1 if we reflect that such a thorough-going rejection of all the results of introjection must involve as a consequence the repudiation of the whole science of ,psychology1 a science which may fairly be said to be at present about as fully justified by its successful growth as most of the physical sciences1 we shall probably be inclined to hold that a process so fruitful in results must have its logical justification1 however artificial the assumptions upon which it rests4 #d4 ,what1 then1 is the logical justification for that elaborate transformation of experience which is necessary to bring it into the form presupposed by psychological science8 ,in principle the question is not hard to answer4 ,the 8ideas10 8mental states10 and so forth1 of ,psychology are1 as we have seen1 symbols which we substitute for certain concrete actualities1 and1 like all symbols1#afi they only partially correspond to the material they symbolise4 ,but1 like other symbols1 they are admissible as substitutes for the things symbolised on two conditions3 7#a7 that the individual symbol corresponds to that which it symbolises according to a definite and unambiguous scheme1 and 7#b7 that the substitution of the symbol for the thing symbolised is required in order to make the latter amenable to such manipulation as is necessary for the solution of some particular class of problem4 ,now1 there can be no doubt that the first of these conditions is fulfilled by the translation of our actual experience into the introjectionist symbols of ,psychology4 ,for in the external or 8physical0 events which correspond to a 8mental state10 ,i possess an unambiguous means of recognising the actual experience for which the mental state in question stands in the symbolism of ,psychology4 ,if the various physical 8conditions0 and forms of 8expression0 of the mental state are indicated with sufficient fulness and accuracy1 they enable me to identify the corresponding actual experience when it occurs in my own life1 or even to produce it experimentally for the express purpose of interpreting the ,psychologist's symbolism4 ,the only question1 then1 that can reasonably be raised as to the legitimacy of psychological symbolism1 is the question whether such a transformation of the actualities of immediate experience is demanded for the attainment of some specific purpose or interest4 ,it seems1 ,i think1 that the transformation is really required for more purposes than one4 ,in the first place1 one obvious use of psychological hypotheses is that1 like the hypotheses of physical science1 they assist us to calculate the course of events1 in so far as it is independent of purposive interference of our own1 and thus to form prudential rules for our own guidance in so interfering4 ,this seems to be the principal use of those parts of ,psychology which deal with the more mechanical aspects of mental life1 e4g41 the laws of the formation of fixed habits and associations by repetition1 the gradual passing of voluntary into involuntary attention1 and so forth4 ,we are interested in studying the laws of habit and association1 just as we are in formulating mechanical laws of physical nature1 because we require to guide ourselves by such knowledge whenever we directly and intentionally interfere in the life of our fellows for educational1 punitive1 or general social purposes4 ,unless we can forecast the way in which our fellow will continue to act1 so far as his behaviour is not modified by fresh purposive initiative1 we shall be helpless to decide how we must intervene in his life to produce a given desired effect4 ,similarly1 the direct moulding of our own future in a desired direction would be impossible apart from such knowledge of what that future is likely to be without intentional direction4 ,it may be said1 of course1 with justice1 that1 so far as ,psychology presents us with such routine uniformities of succession1 it is a mere supplementary device for making good the defects in our anatomical and physiological knowledge4 ,if our physiological science were only sufficiently extensive and minute1 we might reasonably expect to be able to describe the whole course of human action1 so far as it is amenable to mechanical law1 and exhibits routine uniformity in purely physiological terms4 ,instead of talking about the 8association0 of 8ideas0 or the production of a 8habit0 by repetition1 we should then1 for instance1 be able to describe in physiological terminology the changes effected in a cerebral tract by the simultaneous excitement of two nervous centres1 and to write the complete history of the process by which a permanent 8conduction-path0 arises from the reiteration of the excitement4 ,such a definite substitution of physiological for psychological hypotheses is pretty evidently the goal which the modern 8experimental ,psychology0 has set before itself1 and which it is constantly trying to persuade itself it has reached1 in respect of some parts at least of its subject4 ,nor does there seem any reason to doubt that1 since the physiological counterpart of a routine uniformity of mental sequence must itself clearly be a routine uniformity1 all psychological laws of uniform mechanical sequence might be ultimately replaced by their physiological equivalents1 if only our knowledge of the structure and functions of the nervous system were sufficiently advanced4 ,hence ,professor ,mnsterberg is perfectly self-consistent in arguing from the premisses that the sole function of psychological science is to provide us with mechanical uniformities of sequence by the aid whereof to calculate the future behaviour of our fellows1 in so far as it is not modified by fresh purposive initiative1 to the conclusion that the whole of ,psychology is a temporary stop-gap by which we eke out our defective ,physiology1 but which must sooner or later cease to be of use1 and therefore cease to exist as ,physiology advances4#agj ,it would1 of course1 remain true1 even if we were to accept this view of the case without reservation1 that ,psychology is1 in the present state of our knowledge1 an indispensable adjunct to ,physiology4 ,for1 while our knowledge of the physiology of the nervous system is at present too fragmentary and vague to be of much practical use in enabling us to forecast even the simplest sequences in the behaviour of our fellows1 ,psychology is1 temporarily at least1 in many respects in a more advanced condition4 ,thus1 if it were necessary1 before we could infer the probable effects of exposure to a particular stimulus on a man's behaviour1 to frame a workable hypothesis as to the physiological occurrences in the nervous system between the first reception of the stimulus and the issuing of the ultimate bodily reaction1 we should still be waiting helplessly for the means of framing the simplest general judgments as to the probable effects of our actions on our social circle4 ,this is because the nervous changes intervening between the reception of the stimulus and the reaction can only be rendered accessible to observation by devices which postulate for their invention an extremely advanced condition of physical science in general and of ,physiology in particular4 ,there is no direct method of translating the actual processes which we experience into an unambiguous physiological symbolism1 or1 vice vers1 of testing a physiological hypothesis by retranslating it into facts of direct living experience4 ,on the other hand1 when we have given the assumed conditions of the occurrence of the stimulus1 it is comparatively easy to observe what follows on them in actual life1 and to translate it into the introjectionist ,psychology1 or1 vice vers1 to test a theory couched in terms of that ,psychology by comparison with the actualities of experience4 ,for this reason psychological hypotheses are1 in the present state of knowledge1 an indispensable mediating link between actual experience and physiological theory1 and if ever they should come to be finally superseded by purely physiological descriptions of human conduct1 we may be sure that the triumphant physiological theories will themselves first have been won by the process of establishing psychological formul and then seeking their physiological analogues4 ,this is illustrated in the actual history of contemporary science by the extent to which the cerebral physiologists are dependent for their conception of the structure of the nervous system on the previous results of purely psychological investigation4 ,we might present the mutual relations of concrete experience1 ,psychology and nervous ,physiology1 in an epigrammatic form1 by saying that the connecting link between the subject of experience and the brain of ,physiology is the 8mind0 or 8consciousness0 of ,psychology4 #e4 ,it is1 ,i think1 questionable whether such a view as ,professor ,mnsterberg's does full justice to the interests which prompt us to the construction of the psychological symbolism4 ,on his theory1 ,psychology1 it will be seen1 is essentially a science of routine or mechanical uniformities of sequence1 just like the various branches of mechanical ,physics4 ,according to him1 teleology must be ruthlessly banished from scientific ,psychology4 ,in other words1 though all the actual processes of direct experience are pervaded by teleological unity of interest or purpose1 yet in substituting our psychological symbols for the actualities we must deprive them of every vestige of this teleological character4 ,nor is this demand that ,psychology shall translate experience into a series of non-purposive routine sequences an arbitrary one on ,professor ,mnsterberg's part4 ,if the sole function of ,psychology is to facilitate calculation and prediction of the course of events1 so far as it is not controlled by purposive interference1 ,psychology must1 of course1 either follow rigidly mechanical lines in its descriptions1 or fail of its object4 ,but ,i would suggest that over and above this function of facilitating calculation and prediction at present fulfilled by ,psychology as locum tenens for a perfected ,physiology1 ,psychology has another and an entirely distinct function1 in which it would be impossible for it to be replaced by ,physiology or by any other branch of study4 ,this function is that of affording a set of symbols suitable for the description1 in abstract general terms1 of the teleological processes of real life1 and thus providing ,ethics and ,history and their kindred studies with an appropriate terminology4 ,it is manifest enough that neither the ethical appreciation of human conduct by comparison with an ideal standard1 nor the historical interpretation of it in the light of the actual ends and ideals which pervade it and give it its individuality1 would be possible unless we could first of all describe the events with which ,ethics and ,history are conceived in teleological language4 ,apart from the presence throughout those events of more or less conscious striving towards an ideal end1 there would be nothing in them for the moralist to applaud or blame1 or for the historian to interpret4 ,thus1 if ,ethics and ,history are to have their subject-matter1 there must be some science which describes the processes of human life and conduct in terms of teleological relation to an end4 ,now1 to what science can we go for such descriptions8 ,from our previous examination of the postulates of physical science1 it is clear that the requisite material cannot be afforded by any branch of physical science which remains rigidly consistent with its own postulates4 ,the nature of the interests in response to which the concept of the physical order was constructed1 as we saw1 required that the physical order should be thought of and described in terms of rigid mechanism4 ,hence no science which describes the processes of human life in purely physical terminology can indicate their purposive or teleological character in its descriptions4 ,the purposive character of human conduct1 if recognised at all in our descriptions1 must find its recognition in that science which describes the aspect of human experience that is in principle excluded from the physical order4 ,in other words1 it is ,psychology to which we have to go for such a general abstract conception of teleological unity as is necessary for the purposes of the more concrete sciences of ,ethics and ,history4 ,this function of ,psychology is indeed quite familiar to the student of the moral and historical sciences4 ,in ,ethics1 as ,professor ,sidgwick has observed1 the whole vocabulary used to characterise human conduct1 apart from the specially ethical predicates of worth1 is purely psychological4 ,all the material which ,ethics pronounces 8good0 or 8bad10 8right0 or 8wrong0--8acts10 8feelings10 8tempers10 8desire10 etc41--it has taken over bodily from ,psychology4 ,and so1 too1 ,history would have nothing left to appreciate if a record of merely physical movements were substituted for accounts of events which imply at every turn the psychological categories of 8desire10 8purpose10 8intention10 8temptation10 and the rest4 ,universally1 we may say all the teleological categories of human thought on examination prove to be either avowedly the property of ,psychology1 or1 as is the case with the concepts of biological evolutionism1 thinly disguised borrowings from it4 ,if this is so1 we seem to be justified in drawing certain important inferences4 7#a7 ,it will follow that of the two distinct offices which ,psychology at present fulfils1 one belongs to it1 so to say1 in its own right and inalienably1 while the other is exercised by it temporarily1 pending the majority of ,cerebral ,physiology4 ,while1 as we have seen1 those parts of psychological doctrine which are concerned with the more mechanical aspects of conduct may ultimately be replaced by ,physiology1 the parts which deal with the initiation of fresh purposive adjustments1 such as the psychology of attention and of feeling1 are in principle irreducible to ,physiology1 and must retain a permanent value so long as mankind continues to be interested in the ethical and historical appreciation of human life4#aga 7#b7 ,it will also follow that1 at present and for long enough to come1 ,psychology is bound1 pace ,professor ,mnsterberg1 to use both mechanical and teleological hypotheses and categories4 ,such a mixture of two different logical standpoints would no doubt be intolerable in a science which owed its existence to the need of satisfying a single interest of our nature4 ,for the kind of interest which is met by mechanical hypotheses is baffled by the introduction of teleological modes of thought1 and vice vers4 ,but1 according to our view1 the interest to which ,psychology owes its creation is not single but double4 ,we have an interest in the mechanical forecasting of human action1 and an interest in its ethical and historical interpretation1 and ,psychology1 as at present constituted1 has to satisfy both these conflicting interests at once4 ,hence the impossibility of confining it either to purely mechanical or to purely teleological categories4 ,if1 indeed1 our ,physiology had reached the point of ideal completeness1 so that every routine uniformity at present expressed in psychological terminology as the establishment of an 8association0 or 8habit0 could be translated into its physiological correlate1 we should be able to dispense altogether with psychological hypotheses as aids to the calculation of the course of events1 and to restore logical unity to ,psychology by confining it entirely to the task of providing ,ethics and ,history with the teleological categories they require for the description of their subject-matter4 ,but such a reform of method would be most premature in the present condition of our physiological knowledge4#agb #f4 ,there are two points of difficulty which our discussion has so far failed to deal with1 but must not leave entirely unnoticed4 ,we have allowed ourselves to assume 7a7 that description in psychological terms1 and 7b7 that description in teleological terms1 are possible4 ,both these assumptions have been questioned1 and it is clear that if the first is unsound there can be no science of ,psychology at all1 while1 if the second is unsound1 ,psychology cannot use teleological conceptions4 ,hence it is absolutely necessary to attempt some justification of our position on both questions4 ,as to 7a71 it has been argued that since only that which is accessible on equal terms to the perception of a plurality of subjects can be described by one subject to another1 and since all objects so accessible to the perception of a plurality of subjects were included in our construction of the physical order1 description can only be of physical objects4 ,a 8mental state0 must be in principle incapable of description1 because it can only be experienced by one subject4 ,now1 if ,psychology claimed to be the direct description of immediate experience1 as it is experienced1 this contention would certainly be fatal to its very existence4 ,but1 as we have seen1 ,psychology makes no such claim4 ,its data are not the actualities of immediate experience themselves1 but symbols derived from those actualities by a certain process of transformation4 ,and though what ,psychology calls its 8facts0 cannot1 of course1 like physical facts1 be directly exhibited to the sense-perception of a plurality of subjects1 we have in the physical conditions and concomitants of a 8mental state0 assignable marks by which we may recognise when it occurs in our own life1 the actual experience of which the psychologist's 8mental state0 is the symbol4 ,thus1 though ,i cannot directly produce for inspection a sample of what in ,psychology ,i call 8the sensation of red10 ,i can indirectly1 by assigning the upper and lower limits of the wave-length corresponding to the sensation1 make every one understand what actual experience ,i am thinking of when ,i use the term4 7b7 ,the second difficulty need not detain us long4 ,the view that all description must be exclusively mechanical1 rests upon the assumption that no other kind of description will answer the purpose for the sake of which we set out to describe things4 ,now1 so far as description is undertaken for the purpose of establishing practical rules for intervention in the course of occurrences1 this assumption is perfectly justified4 ,if we are to lay down general rules for meddling in the course of events1 we must of course assume that1 apart from our meddling1 it goes on with routine regularity4 ,and we have already seen that for this very reason the mechanical interpretation of ,nature is a fundamental postulate of physical science1 so long as it confines itself strictly to the work of formulating 8laws of ,nature10 and does not attempt the task of historical appreciation4 ,but1 as we have also seen1 the historical appreciation of a series of events as marked by the progressive execution of an underlying plan or purpose1 is only possible when the events themselves have been described in essentially teleological terms as processes relative to ends4#agc ,hence we have no right to contend that all scientific descriptions shall be of the mechanical type1 unless we are also prepared to maintain that the only purpose they subserve is that of the formulation of general rules for practice4 ,if the historical appreciation of events is a legitimate human interest1 the description of events in terms of end and purpose must also be a legitimate form of description4 ,now1 in point of fact1 even the 8physical sciences0 themselves1 when they come to deal with the facts of organic life1 largely desert the primary scientific ideal of the formation of general laws for the historical ideal of the detection of lines of individual development1 and if our previous conclusions are correct1 it is much more for the latter than for the former purpose that we are interested in the construction of a science of ,psychology4 ,what a human being wants ,psychology for1 in the main1 is not so much to help him to forecast the behaviour of other men1 as to assist him to understand how the successive stages of his own individual development and that of his 8social environment0 are knit into a unity by the presence of all-pervading permanent interests and ends4 ,the contention that psychological description must1 on grounds of logical method1 be of the mechanical type1 seems therefore to repose on misconception as to the uses of ,psychology4 ,the preceding discussion may perhaps appear somewhat arid and wearisome1 but it was indispensable that our subsequent examination of the metaphysical problems suggested by the recognition of the psychical realm of existence should be based upon a definite view as to the connection between psychological conceptions and the actualities of experience1 and such a view1 in its turn1 presupposes a positive theory of the interests to which psychological construction ministers and the logical procedure by which it is affected4 ,the general result of our investigation has gone to show negatively that ,psychology is not a direct transcript of real experience1 but an intellectual reconstruction involving systematic abstraction from and transformation of experience1 and positively that the reconstruction depends for its legitimacy upon its serviceableness for the special purposes1 partly of the practical anticipation of events1 but principally of their historical and ethical appreciation4 ,the significance of those conclusions will be more apparent in the course of the two following chapters4 ,consult further3--,r4 ,avenarius1 ,der ,menschliche ,weltbegriff2 ,f4 ,h4 ,bradley1 8,a ,defence of ,phenomenalism in ,psychology0 7,mind1 ,january #aijj72 ,h4 ,mnsterberg1 ,grundzge der ,psychologie1 vol4 i4 chap4 #b 7,the ,epistemological ,basis of ,psychology71 #aa 7,connection through the ,body72 ,j4 ,ward1 ,art4 8,psychology0 in ,encyclopdia ,britannica1 ad init4 78,the ,standpoint of ,psychology072 ,naturalism and ,agnosticism1 vol4 ii4 lect4 #af4 ----- ,footnote #afh3 ,see ,avenarius1 ,der ,menschliche ,weltbegriff1 p4 #aae ad fin4 ,footnote #afi3 ,or rather1 like all symbols which are not identical with the things they represent4 ,in the latter case1 as when1 e4g41 for any purpose ,i count the numbers of the natural number series themselves1 beginning with #a1 there may appear to be complete correspondence4 ,but the usefulness of the process depends on the fact that the #a which ,i count and the #a by which ,i count it are at least numerically distinct--how much more distinction this implies ,i do not stay to discuss here--and hence1 ,i take it1 it is by an abuse of language that the process is called 8representation of a thing by itself40 ,footnote #agj3 ,see ,grundzge der ,psychologie1 vol4 i4 chap4 #aa1 pp4 #dae-dcf4 ,footnote #aga3 ,this is strikingly illustrated by the procedure of ,professor ,mnsterberg himself4 ,he expels selective interest from his psychological account of attention1 in obedience to the principle that teleological ideas must be kept out of a descriptive science1 and then1 when confronted with the problem what it is that does decide what presentations shall actually be attended to1 makes the selection a function of the sub-cortical motor-centres in the brain1 thus reintroducing into biology the teleological categories previously declared inadmissible4 ,see ,grundzge der ,psychologie1 vol4 i4 chap4 #ae1 pp4 #ebe-efb4 ,i may once more note1 for the benefit of the reader who is interested in methodology1 that whereas the processes of the mechanical sciences are essentially continuous1 the teleological processes of finite life as conceived by ethical and historical science appear1 as ,professor ,royce has insisted1 to be of the nature of discontinuous series1 i4e4 to consist of terms between which intermediate links cannot be interpolated4 ,why ,i cannot accept what appears to be ,professor ,royce's view1 that ultimate ,reality itself is a discontinuous series1 will perhaps be clear from ,chap4 #c and the following chapter of the present ,book4 ,but see also the ,supplementary ,note at the end of the present chapter4 ,footnote #agb3 ,psychology is1 of course1 far from being the only branch of study which1 in its present state1 employs categories of both types4 ,compare the constant use made in biological evolutionary theories of the teleological ideas of1 e4g41 the 8struggle for existence10 the 8survival of the fittest10 8sexual selection10 etc41 ideas bodily conveyed from ,sociology and ,psychology4 ,as we have just seen1 the precisians who object to this mixture of higher and lower categories in ,psychology are in the awkward predicament of only being able to get rid of it there by accentuating its presence in ,physiology and ,biology4 ,where they go wrong is in exaggerating the amount of logical unity attributable to any body of inquiries which happens1 in virtue of being pursued by the same men and with the same accessories1 to be called by a common name4 ,it would require only a slight further exaggeration to argue that since all branches of knowledge are alike knowledge1 they must be all either exclusively mechanical or exclusively teleological4 ,there is no reason in the nature of things why 8,psychology0 should not at a particular period in the growth of knowledge cover as wide a range of inquiries1 with as much internal variety of aim and method1 as1 say 8,mathematics40 ,footnote #agc3 ,and they cannot be so described without the introduction of psychological ideas4 ,thus1 e4g41 in classifying a series of implements dating from different periods in the history of civilisation1 so as to throw light on the evolution of some particular type of tool or machine1 we have to take as our fundamentum divisionis the adequacy with which the different varieties accomplish the kind of work they were designed to perform1 and are thus committed at once to the use of the psychological concepts of purpose and satisfaction4 ----- ,,supplementary ,,note ,,to ,,chapter ,i4 ,,on ,,the ,,discontinuity ,,of ,,the ,,teleological ,,series ,,of ,,ethics ,,and ,,history4 ,we have previously seen that every continuous series is indefinitely divisible1 and that consequently no two terms of such a series are immediately coadjacent4 ,on the other hand1 any series which consists of terms which are immediately coadjacent1 and between which intermediate terms of the same series cannot be inserted1 is not indefinitely divisible1 and a fortiori not continuous4 ,applying this to the case of a series of psychical processes1 we can see that where the sequence is of a mechanical routine type it is continuous1 since it can be indefinitely divided into smaller fragments1 each exhibiting the same law of sequence as the whole4 7,strictly1 it ought to be added that the other condition of continuity is also fulfilled1 since whatever point of time thus divides the sequence falls within the series itself47 ,but where you have new teleological adaptation there is a manifest solution of this continuity4 ,the new purpose emerges at a definite point in the sequence3 what has gone before up to this point belongs to the working out of a different interest or purpose1 what comes after to the working out of the now freshly emerged interest4 ,each may form a continuous process within itself1 but the transition from the one to the other is not continuous4 ,there is where the old purposive series ends and the new one begins1 a genuine case of immediate coadjacency of terms between which intermediate members cannot be interposed4 ,in another connection1 it would1 ,i think1 be easy to show how this consideration is of itself fatal to the reality of ,time4 ,my point here is simply to maintain that the facts just referred to do not warrant the inference that 8ultimate ,reality0 or 8the ,absolute0 is for itself a discontinuous series4 ,my objection to this view is that the 8emergence of new selective interest0 is itself essentially a feature of the finite experience which1 because finite1 appears in a temporal form4 ,the distinction between the 8new0 and the 8habitual0 has no meaning for a completed and infinite experience1 which embraces all existence in a perfectly harmonious form4 ,or1 to put it in another way1 the serial form of arrangement itself has no significance except for an experience which has to advance progressively from one stage to another of partial insight and comprehension4 ,this seems as true of 8logical0 order or ethical order of valuation according to moral worth as of merely numerical order4 ,in fact1 we said in ,book ,,ii4 chap4 #d1 #aj1 that the serial arrangement is the simplest and most general expression of that relational mode of apprehension which we decided to be at once inevitable for finite knowledge and inadequate to express ,reality4 ,it is on this ground that ,i feel obliged1 as ,i understand the problem at present1 to hold that ultimate ,reality is neither a continuous nor a discontinuous series1 for the reason that it is not for itself a series at all4 ,,chapter ,,ii ,,the ,,problem ,,of ,,soul ,,and ,,body #a4 ,the problem of psychophysical connection has to do with the correlation of scientific abstractions1 not of given facts of experience4 #b4 ,the 8consciousness0 of ,psychology is thus not the same thing as the finite individual subject of experience1 and ,reality must not be said to consist of 8minds0 in the psychologist's sense4 ,again1 we must not assume a priori that there can be only one working hypothesis of psychophysical connection4 #c4 ,the possible hypotheses may be reduced to three1 ,epiphenomenalism1 ,parallelism1 and ,interaction4 #d4 ,epiphenomenalism is legitimate as a methodological principle in ,physiology2 it is untenable as a basis for ,psychology because it implies the reduction of psychical facts to mechanical law4 #e4 ,parallelism4 ,the arguments for ,parallelism as necessarily valid to ,psychophysics because of its congruity with the postulates of mechanical ,physics1 are fallacious4 ,we cannot assume that ,psychology must necessarily conform to these postulates4 #f4 ,as a working hypothesis ,parallelism is available for many purposes1 but breaks down when we attempt to apply it to the case of the initiation of fresh purposive reactions4 ,a teleological and a mechanical series cannot ultimately be 8parallel40 #g4 ,we are thus thrown back on the hypothesis of ,interaction as the only one which affords a consistent scheme for the correlation of ,physiology and ,psychology4 ,we have1 however1 to remember that what the hypothesis correlates is scientific symbols1 not actual facts4 ,the actuality represented by both sets of symbols is the same thing1 though the psychological symbolism affords a wider and more adequate representation of it than the physiological4 #a4 ,few questions have more constantly attracted the attention of philosophers1 especially perhaps of those philosophers who have lived since the establishment of ,christianity as the religion of the ,western world1 than that of the relation between the soul or mind and the body2 and perhaps no question has given rise to graver misconceptions for want of a correct insight into the true logical character of the problem under discussion4 ,both in the half-scientific speculations of ordinary persons and in the more systematic theories of metaphysicians and psychologists1 the subject is constantly approached under the totally erroneous preconception that the dualistic separation of human life into a bodily and a mental part or aspect is a datum of immediate experience which we can directly verify in ourselves1 and that the task of philosophy is by ingenious but unverifiable hypothesis to transcend this chasm between given realities4 ,from the standpoint of our previous chapter we can easily see that such a view fundamentally misrepresents the real philosophical problem4 ,so long as we are concerned with human existence as we directly find it in our immediate experience1 or assume it in our practical social relations with our fellows1 no question of the relation between body and mind can arise1 because neither term of the relation is as yet before us4 ,for my own immediate experience ,i am neither a body nor a soul1 nor yet a composite of the two1 but simply an individual subject of experiences in direct intercommunion with other individuals4 ,under the influence of conscious or unconscious dualistic prepossessions1 we often speak as if it were a directly experienced fact that ,i can communicate with my fellow-subjects only indirectly through the medium of an alien 8material0 body1 and we sometimes contrast this supposed restriction with an imagined higher state of existence1 in which 8disembodied spirits0 may conceivably have direct intercourse with each other4 ,but the truth is1 that this direct intercourse and influence of one intelligent and purposive individual on another is no privilege reserved for our enjoyment in 8a better world than this02 it is1 as we can see if we will only forget our dualistic prepossessions1 the very truth about our actual life4 ,in actual life1 before we have contaminated our direct enjoyment of it with psychological prejudices1 we know nothing of the interposition of an inert 8material0 organisation between ourselves and the members of our social environment4 ,the severance of the original unity of experience into a physical and a psychical aspect is entirely a product of our own abstraction-making intellect4 8,body0 and 8soul0 are not given actualities of experience1 but artificial mental constructions of our own derived from the actual 8facts0 of life by the elaborate processes which we have just been studying4 ,as we have seen in constructing our concept of a mechanical physical order1 we abstract certain elements of our direct experience from the whole1 and consider them under the name of our 8bodies0 as if they had a separate existence2 we then1 by the aid of the hypothesis of 8introjection10 represent those elements of direct self-experience which were omitted from the physical order as forming by themselves a second distinct whole or system called the 8soul40 ,when we have reached this point1 we are1 of course1 compelled to raise the question how these two systems1 the bodily and the mental1 must be supposed to be connected4 ,but the important fact to remember is that the two systems are not facts of experience1 but products of abstraction4 ,our task in discussing their relation is not to transcend a given dualism1 but to get rid of one which we have manufactured for ourselves by the manipulation of experience in the interests of certain special scientific problems4 ,hence1 as ,mnsterberg well puts it1 we have not to find the connection which subsists1 as an actual fact1 between body and soul1 but to invent a connection in keeping with the general scheme of our artificial physical and psychological hypotheses4#agd #b4 ,as far as the interests of ,metaphysics are concerned1 this recognition that the problem of soul and body has to do solely with highly artificial products of scientific abstraction1 and not with anything which can be called a 8given0 actuality1 is the one principle of supreme importance which emerges from the discussion of the subject4 ,two very significant inferences may at once be drawn from it4 7#a7 ,we clearly must not call the finite subjects of experience1 of whom we saw reason to hold that ultimate ,reality is exclusively constituted1 8minds0 or 8souls0 in the psychologist's sense4#age ,to call them so would inevitably be to imply that exclusion from the physical order of 8bodies0 apart from which the psychological concept of the 8soul0 or 8mind0 has no significance4 ,or1 in other words1 it would identify them not with what they are for their own direct experience1 but with what they become for one another's theoretical reflection under the influence of 8introjection40 ,as we have seen1 it is legitimate and necessary for special scientific purposes to treat ourselves and other individuals as if we were such series of 8mental states10 but it is never legitimate to forget that1 when we do this1 we are substituting a highly unreal symbolism for directly experienced facts4 ,one consequence of confusing the symbolism with the fact may be noted in passing3 when we have substituted the series of mental states for the felt unity of actual conscious life1 we go on to ask ourselves how the fact and its symbol--the symbolic nature of which we have forgotten--are related4 ,and thus arise all the unanswerable1 because fundamentally unmeaning1 questions as to the way in which the 8self0 has or owns the succession of 8states40 ,failing to see that the succession of states is simply the unitary subject itself1 as it appears from the point of view of the 8introjection0 hypothesis1 we then find ourselves confronted by the alternatives of foisting upon our ,psychology the useless and unthinkable fiction of a changeless 8substratum0 of mental states--the soul-substance of the pre-,kantian psychologists--or resolving real life into a succession of discontinuous 8mental images40 ,with the recognition that ,psychology never deals directly with experienced reality1 but always with the hypothetical products of an abstraction which is only justified by its usefulness for the special purposes of the psychologist1 all these difficulties disappear4 7#b7 ,another important consequence of our principle is that we cannot dogmatically assert that there can be only one legitimate theory of the 8connection between mind and body40 ,if 8mind0 and 8body0 were really given as distinct but connected in direct experience1 it might well be that there could only be one account of their connection answering to experienced fact4 ,but since the separation is itself of our own intellectual manufacture1 as we are dealing throughout with artificial creations of our own abstraction1 any theory of their connection which is desirable for the solution of a special problem or class of problems will be legitimate for that particular class of problems4 ,thus the physiologist may legitimately1 if it answers his special purposes1 adopt a working hypothesis which the psychologist may find untenable1 and again different types of psychological problem may legitimately assume different working hypotheses4#agf ,i shall aim at showing in the immediately following paragraphs that there is one typical psychophysical hypothesis which1 on the whole1 lends itself better than its rivals to the general purposes of both ,physiology and ,psychology1 but we shall see1 as we proceed1 that the hypotheses we reject are also legitimate for the solution of important special problems4 ,in fact1 our chief interest1 as students of ,metaphysics1 in the further discussion of psychophysical connection will be to point out the fallaciousness of the metaphysical arguments which are commonly used to establish some one hypothesis as necessarily and exclusively true4 #c4 ,turning now to consider the chief types of hypothesis which have been1 or are at present1 actually put forward by metaphysicians and psychologists1 we may perhaps group them under the five main heads of 7#a7 ,pre-established ,harmony1 7#b7 ,occasionalism1 7#c7 ,epiphenomenalism1 7#d7 ,psychophysical ,parallelism1 7#e7 ,interaction4 ,for our purpose in the present chapter the number of alternatives may be further reduced by the omission of the first two4 ,neither the ,pre-established ,harmony of ,leibnitz nor the ,occasionalism advocated by ,geulincx and ,malebranche1 and in a one-sided form by ,berkeley1 is likely to find much support from the philosophy of the present day4 ,both doctrines are1 moreover1--that of ,leibnitz avowedly and that of the ,occasionalists by implication1--much more than special psychophysical hypotheses4 ,they are in principle attempts to get rid of all transeunt causality1 and have been discussed in their general bearings in our chapter on the ,causal ,postulate1 where we satisfied ourselves that any science which recognises1 as ,psychology has to do1 the existence of finite things must also admit the principle of transeunt causality1 at any rate as a working hypothesis4 ,each of the three remaining types of view has its supporters among contemporary students of science and philosophy4 ,the epiphenomenalist theory is largely adopted by the workers in the physical sciences1 and though not much countenanced by psychologists and metaphysicians1 has the explicit support of ,dr4 ,shadworth ,hodgson1 while some versions of the parallelist doctrine1 notably that of ,mnsterberg1 approach it very closely4 ,the parallelist hypothesis is perhaps at present the most popular among the psychological specialists1 and is represented by writers of such eminence as ,wundt1 ,mnsterberg1 ,ebbinghaus1 ,hffding and ,stout4 ,finally1 ,interaction has powerful champions in ,bradley1 ,ward1 and ,james2 to say nothing of its adoption by so sound a physiologist as ,mr4 ,mc,dougall4 ,both the latter doctrines1 again1 have historical connections with the great philosophical systems of the past1 ,parallelism with that of ,spinoza1 and ,interaction with those1 to mention no other names1 of ,descartes and ,locke4 ,in the philosophy of the ancient world the psychophysical issue can hardly be said to appear in a well-defined form1 but we may perhaps state that ,plato's psychological doctrine is decidedly one of ,interaction1 while the view of ,aristotle1 though too complex to admit of very precise formulation1 inclines rather towards ,parallelism4 #d4 ,epiphenomenalism4 ,of the three hypotheses which remain for discussion1 the theory of ,epiphenomenalism has the least to recommend it1 and is open to the most serious objections4 ,according to this view1 all causal connections are exclusively between physical states4 ,bodily changes succeed one another in accord with uniform laws of sequence1 which it is the province of the physiologist to discover1 and every bodily change is completely determined by bodily antecedents4 ,certain bodily conditions are further attended by corresponding 8states of consciousness10 but those states stand in no causal connection with subsequent bodily states1 nor yet with one another4 ,they are thus consequences or effects1 but are never causes4 ,the whole series of physical changes1 from birth to death1 which makes up the history of the human body1 goes on precisely as it would if 8consciousness0 were entirely absent4 ,this is what is meant by the assertion that all mental states are epiphenomena1 superfluous accessories1 which arise in the course of the connected series of bodily changes1 but are entirely without any determining influence upon it4 ,the doctrine may be diagrammatically represented thus a---- b---- c----1 where the italic letters symbolise physical and the ,greek letters psychical states1 the vertical lines indicating the course of causal sequence4 ,if a psychophysical hypothesis were ever directly applicable to the actualities of experience1 we might1 of course1 dismiss ,epiphenomenalism at once as inherently absurd4 ,for nothing is more certain than that in the actual life of direct experience our knowledge and our interests do determine the course of our actions4 ,that what we believe and desire does make all the difference in the world to the way in which we behave1 is one of those elementary verities out of which no scientific hypothesis can claim to reason us4 ,hence1 when the defenders of the theory attempt to draw practical moral and juristic consequences from their doctrines1 we are within our rights in simply declining to concern ourselves with so absurd a travesty of the simplest facts of experience4 ,so long1 however1 as the hypothesis is put forward simply as a working hypothesis for the correlation of our physiological and psychological theories1 the case is different4 ,its validity as a psychophysical theory must be estimated solely by the degree in which it renders this systematic correlation feasible1 and is not necessarily impaired by the manifest absurdities which result from mistaking the doctrine for a description of actual life4 ,now1 if we look at the hypothesis from this point of view1 we can at once see that it is really legitimate for some purposes4 ,for the purpose of physiological science it is obviously to our interest that we should be able to deduce the later from the earlier stages of a physiological process4 ,we have thus an interest in treating physiological changes1 if we can1 as unconditioned by any but physiological antecedents4 ,and every actual success in establishing a uniformity or 8law0 of ,cerebral ,physiology is proof that the assumption that1 for the process in question1 the only determining conditions which count are physiological1 is equivalent to the truth4 ,the physiologist1 then1 is clearly justified in treating the psychical series as epiphenomenal1 if he means no more by this than that he intends to deal1 as a physiologist1 only with processes which can be successfully resolved into uniform sequences on the assumption that they involve only physiological terms4 ,though whether any processes in the nervous system can be successfully treated as purely physiological sequences1 nothing but the physiologist's actual success in obtaining results from his initial postulate can decide4 ,if1 however1 the physiologist should go on1 as he sometimes does1 to make the assertion that not only can some nervous processes be treated as if their psychical accompaniments made no difference1 but that they really are what they would be without those accompaniments1 or even that all nervous process is what it would be without 8consciousness10 he commits a gross logical fallacy4 ,it is a mere blunder in logic to argue that because the presence of certain circumstances makes no difference to the special result which follows on a given antecedent1 the result would equally follow in their absence4 ,for it might be that in their removal the very antecedents in which we are interested would disappear4 ,we are not at liberty to infer that1 because the course of certain physiological processes can be computed without taking their mental correlates into account1 they could occur apart from those correlates4 ,even more serious are the consequences which follow when it is assumed that all mental processes without exception may be regarded as epiphenomenal1 i4e4 that all human action1 if only our ,physiology were sufficiently advanced1 might be brought under laws of purely physiological sequence4 ,such an assumption would lead at once to the following dilemma3 ,either our ,physiology must remain rigidly faithful to the fundamental postulates of mechanical science1 or not4 ,if it is faithful to them1 its descriptions of human action must rigidly exclude all reference to teleological determination by reference to conceived and desired ends4 ,i4e4 we must treat human conduct as if it were fatally determined apart from any possible influence of human choice and intention1 and thus stultify that whole work of historical and ethical appreciation which we have already seen to be the principal raison d'tre of ,psychology as a science4 ,we must revert1 in fact1 to a theory of life which is identical with the extremest forms of ,pagan or ,mohammedan fatalism in everything except the name it gives to its ineluctabile fatum4 ,or1 if we are not prepared to do this1 we must allow ,physiology itself to use the psychological categories of desire1 selection1 and choice1 and thus covertly admit that human action1 after all1 cannot be described without the introduction of factors not included in the physical order4 ,it is no doubt due to their realisation of this dilemma that psychologists are all but universally agreed to reject the epiphenomenalist hypothesis1 while its popularity with physiologists may be explained by observing that physiological uniformities can manifestly only be successfully established for those processes which can be treated as if they were only physiologically conditioned4 #e4 ,parallelism4 ,the hypothesis of ,parallelism attempts1 while preserving some of the characteristic features of the cruder view just described1 to avoid its unsatisfactory consequences4 ,agreeing with ,epiphenomenalism in the doctrine that physiological changes must be treated as determined only by physiological antecedents1 ,parallelism denies that the events of the psychical series are mere 8secondary0 effects of their physiological correlates4 ,according to it1 the series of physical and that of psychical events are strictly 8parallel10 but not causally connected4 ,each event in either series has its precise counterpart in the other1 but the physical events do not cause the psychical events1 nor vice vers4 ,the successive members of the physical series form a connected causal sequence1 independent of their psychical concomitants1 while these latter1 it is generally assumed1#agg form a similar chain of causally connected psychical states4 ,thus every nervous change is determined solely by precedent nervous changes1 and the corresponding psychical change by the corresponding antecedent psychical changes4 ,in diagrammatic shape our hypothesis now takes the form a b c ,usually it is further added that the ultimate metaphysical explanation of this parallelism without mutual dependence must be found in the 7,spinozistic7 doctrine of ,identity1 i4e4 the doctrine that the physical and psychical series are two different 8sides0 or 8aspects0 of a single reality4 ,some supporters of ,parallelism 7e4g41 ,ebbinghaus7 conceive this single reality as a tertium quid1 equally adequately expressed by both the series1 others 7e4g41 ,stout7 hold that its real nature is more adequately revealed in the mental than in the physical series4 ,the grounds commonly adduced in favour of the parallelistic view as the most satisfactory psychophysical theory1 are of two kinds4 ,as a positive argument it is urged that cerebral anatomy has already to some extent confirmed the doctrine of correspondence between definite physical and psychical processes by its successful 8localisation0 of specific sensory and motor processes in various cortical 8centres10 and may reasonably be expected to accomplish further such 8localisations0 in the future4 ,stress is also laid upon the formal analogy between the psychological laws of retentiveness1 association1 and habit1 and the physiological theories of the formation of 8conduction-paths0 in the brain4 ,these positive contentions do not1 however1 take us far4 ,the correspondences upon which they rest1 so far as they are ascertained experimentally and are not mere deductions from the principle of ,parallelism itself1 would be equally natural on a theory of ,interaction1 or of one-sided dependence of either series on the other4 ,the real strength of the case for ,parallelism rests upon certain negative assumptions which are widely believed to exclude the hypothesis of causal dependence of either series on the other4 ,these negative assumptions appear to be in the main three4 7#a7 ,it is said that1 while we can without difficulty conceive how the later stages of a continuous physical or psychical process can be connected by causal law with its earlier stages1 we are entirely unable to conceive how psychical events can arise from physical antecedents1 or vice vers1 because of the utter disparateness of the physical and the psychical4 ,the physical process1 it is urged1 is continuous1 and so1 on the other side1 is the psychical1 but when we attempt to think of a cerebral change conditioning a mental change1 or vice vers1 there is a complete solution of continuity which we cannot bridge by any causal formula4 7#b7 ,the doctrine of ,conservation of ,energy is sometimes supposed to be incompatible with the admission of psychical states among the antecedents or consequents of physical states4 ,it is said that if psychical states can influence the course of nervous change1 there will be 8work0 done in the organism without the expenditure of energy1 and if the total effect of nervous change is not exclusively physical there will be loss of energy without 8work0 being done by the organism1 and in either case the principle of ,conservation will be contravened4 7#c7 ,finally1 it is maintained that it is a fundamental postulate of the physical sciences1 that every change of configuration in a material system such as the living organism is assumed to be1 is due to exclusively physical antecedents1 and that this postulate must therefore be respected in ,psychophysics4 ,these are1 so far as ,i can gather them from the works of the psychologists who adopt the parallelist view1 the principal arguments by which their case is supported4 ,it is clear that if all--or any--of these contentions are valid1 it must follow that ,parallelism is not only a legitimate but the only legitimate hypothesis for the co-ordination of physical and psychical science4 ,i believe1 however1 that every one of them is fallacious1 and that for the following reasons3-- 7#a7 ,the argument from the inconceivability of causal relation between the physical and the psychical is perhaps the most effective of the alleged grounds for denying interaction between the psychical and the physical4 ,yet its force is not really so great as it might appear4 ,it is not denied that we can1 in simple cases1 assign the conditions under which a mental state follows on a physical state 7e4g41 we can assign the physical conditions of the emergence of a given sensation74 ,but1 it is argued1 we cannot show why those conditions 7e4g41 the stimulation of the retina1 and indirectly of the 8optical centres0 in the brain by light of a given wave length7 should be followed by this particular sensation 7e4g41 green1 and not some other colour74 ,this means that we cannot construct a mathematical equation connecting the character of the sensation with that of the stimulus1 as we can to connect the earlier with the later stages of a purely physical process4 ,this is1 of course1 obvious enough4 ,it is only by making complete abstraction from the appearance of new qualities in the course of a process1 and by treating it as a purely geometrical and quantitative transformation1 that we can render it amenable to our equations4 ,as we saw in our discussion of ,causality1 mathematical ,physics only succeeds in its constructions on the condition of excluding all qualitative change1 as 8subjective10 from its purview4 ,but we also saw there that the origination of the qualitatively new is an essential part of the idea of ,causality1 and that in reducing all change in the physical world to quantitative transformation1 mathematical ,physics really does away with the causal concept4 ,we are1 in fact1 in precisely the same logical position if we speak of physiological changes as causing sensation1 as when we speak of a quantitative change in the proportions of a chemical compound as the cause of alteration in its qualities4 ,the objection that the psychical effect cannot be connected by an equation with its alleged cause1 would hold equally in any case of the production of the qualitatively new1 i4e4 in every case where we use the category of causality at all4 ,and for that very reason it has no force when urged as an objection to psychophysical causality in particular4#agh 7#b7 ,the argument from the ,conservation of ,energy may be more briefly dismissed1 as its fallacious character has been fully recognised by the ablest recent exponents of the parallelistic view1 such as ,dr4 ,stout and ,professor ,mnsterberg4 ,as ,dr4 ,stout points out1 the argument involves a formal petitio principii4 ,the principle of ,conservation of ,energy has only been established for what are technically known as conservative material systems1 and no absolute proof has been given1 or seems likely to be given1 that the human organism is such a conservative system4 ,further1 as has been urged by many critics1 and notably by ,professor ,ward1 the principle of conservation1 taken by itself1 is simply a law of exchanges4 ,it asserts that the quantity of the energy of a conservative system remains constant under all the transformations through which it passes1 but1 apart from the rest of the postulates of mechanical science1 it affords no means of deciding what transformations of energy shall occur in the system1 or when they shall occur4 ,hence there would be no breach with the special principle of ,conservation of ,energy if we were to assume that psychical conditions can determine the moment at which energy in the organism is transformed e4g41 from the kinetic to the potential state1 without affecting its quantity4 7#c7 ,it is1 however1 true that it is inconsistent with the postulates of mechanical ,physics1 taken as a whole1 to admit the determination of physical sequences by non-physical conditions4 ,to admit such determination would be to stultify the whole procedure of the mechanical sciences4 ,for1 as we have seen in our ,third ,book1 the primary object of mechanical science is to reduce the course of events to rigid laws of uniform sequence1 and thus to facilitate the formulation of practical rules for our own interference with it4 ,it is therefore a legitimate postulate of mechanical science that--for its special object--desire and will shall be excluded from our conception of the conditions which determine events1 and the whole course of nature treated as if conditioned only by physical antecedents4 ,if there is any department of experienced reality which cannot be successfully dealt with according to these postulates1 then the formulation of rigid laws of uniform sequence is1 in principle1 impossible for that department1 and it must be excluded from the 8world0 which mechanical science investigates4 ,but the fact that mechanical science can only attain its end by treating all physical events as independent of non-physical conditions1 does not afford the slightest presumption that they must be treated in the same way for all purposes and by every branch of inquiry4 ,whether ,psychology1 in particular1 is under the logical necessity of conforming to the mechanical postulates1 will depend upon our view as to whether the object subserved by ,psychology is the same as that of the mechanical sciences1 or different4 ,if our purpose in psychological investigation is not identical with the purposes of mechanical science1 there is no sense in demanding that we shall hamper our procedure as psychologists by adherence to postulates based upon the special nature of the interests to which mechanical science has to minister4 ,now1 we have already contended that the aims of ,psychology only partially and temporarily coincide with those of the mechanical sciences4 ,if we were right in holding that the principal object of ,psychology is to provide a general terminology of which ,history and ,ethics can avail themselves in their appreciations of life1 it follows at once that ,psychology imperatively needs the recognition of that very teleological aspect of human action which is excluded on principle1 and rightly so for the special purpose of mechanical ,physics1 by the fundamental mechanical postulates4 ,thus the argument that the parallelistic hypothesis must be the most suitable for the psychologist1 because it conforms to the mechanical postulates of sciences which deal with experience from a different standpoint and in a different interest1 loses all its cogency4#agi ,now that we have1 as ,i trust1 sufficiently disposed of the a priori arguments for the parallelistic view1 we are in a position to estimate it1 as a psychological hypothesis1 purely on its merits as evinced by its actual success4 ,but first we must point out once more that the whole question is not one as to actualities1 but purely as to the most satisfactory way of bringing two sets of abstractions1 originally devised for divergent purposes1 into touch with one another2 and further1 that if the hypothesis were put forward as a final metaphysical truth about the constitution of the real world1 it would be manifestly self-contradictory4 ,in the first place1 ,parallelism1 taken for anything more than a convenient working hypothesis1 would involve a flagrant breach of logic4 ,it is obvious that1 as ,mr4 ,bradley has urged1 you cannot infer from the premisses that one total state1 containing both a physical and a psychical element1 causes another complex state of the same kind1 the conclusion that the physical aspect of the first1 by itself1 has caused the physical1 and the psychical the psychical aspect of the second4 ,to get this conclusion you need a 8negative instance10 in which either the physical or the psychical state is found apart from its correlate1 but followed by the same consequent as before1 and ,parallelism itself denies the possibility of such an instance4 ,from the premisses that a is always followed by b 1 it attempts to infer1 without any 8dissection of nature10 that a by itself was the necessary and sufficient condition of b1 and of 4 ,and this is1 of course1 logically fallacious4 ,dr4 ,ward expresses the same point differently when he urges that unvarying and precise concomitance without causal connection is a logical absurdity4 ,that the supporters of the hypothesis themselves are conscious of the difficulty1 is shown by their unanimous assertion that the psychical and physical series are ultimately manifestations of one and the same reality4 ,what they do not explain is how1 if this is so1 the two series can be phenomenally so utterly disparate as to exclude mutual influence on one another4 ,the difficulty becomes insuperable when we reflect that on the parallelistic view the physical series must be rigidly mechanical1 as otherwise we shall have a breach with those mechanical postulates which are supposed to require the exclusion of psychical states from the determining conditions of physical occurrences4 ,thus1 if teleology is to be recognised anywhere in our scientific constructions1 it must be in our conception of the psychical series4 ,and on the whole the supporters of ,parallelism admit this in practice by the free use of teleological categories in their ,psychology4 ,but it ought by now to be clear to us that the nature of the identical reality cannot be expressed with equal adequacy in a teleological series1 and in one which is1 by the principles of its construction1 purely mechanical4 ,here1 again1 most of the parallelists are really in agreement with us1 for they usually in the end call themselves 8,idealists10 and assert that the 8mental0 series is a more faithful representation of ,reality than the physical4 ,but if the two series are not on the same level in respect of their nearness to ,reality1 it is hard to see how there can be exact correspondence between them4 ,this is a point to which we shall immediately have to return4#ahj #f4 ,when we ask1 however1 whether ,parallelism1 apart from these questions of ultimate philosophy1 is legitimate as a working hypothesis in ,psychology1 the answer must be that1 in certain departments of psychological investigation1 it certainly is so4 ,in practice1 the doctrine of the parallel but independent series amounts1 for the most part1 to little more than a methodological device for the division of labour between the physiologist and the psychologist1 the physiologist restricting himself to the formulation of such uniformities as can be established between nervous processes1 considered as if independent of external influence1 and the psychologist doing the same for their psychical accompaniments4 ,as a principle of methodical procedure1 therefore1 in those parts of ,psychology which deal with the more passive and1 as we may say1 routine-like aspects of mental life1 ,parallelism is a useful and therefore a legitimate working hypothesis4 ,the question by which its claim to be the best hypothesis must be decided is1 to my mind1 that of its applicability to the case of the fresh initiation of new purposive adaptations to changes in the organism's environment4#aha ,for it is just in dealing with these cases that ,psychology1 if it is to fulfil the purpose we have ascribed to it1 must most obviously discard mechanical for teleological categories4 ,hence it is here1 if anywhere1 that a difficulty of principle must make itself felt when we attempt to treat the psychical and the physical series as exactly parallel and corresponding4 ,it seems to follow necessarily from the conception of physical science as based upon the mechanical postulate1 that a teleological and a mechanical series cannot possibly run 8parallel0 in all their details in the fashion presupposed by the hypothesis under consideration4 ,if ,psychology is to be of any use in supplying ,ethics and ,history with the subject-matter of their appreciations1 it is manifest that it must make the assumption that desire and choice are operative in determining the course of human action1 and thus must--at certain points at least--explicitly employ the categories of teleology4 ,these categories1 again1 cannot possibly be translated into the rigidly non-teleological symbolism of a physical science1 based upon the mechanical postulates1 as every science of 8general laws0 must be4 ,it follows that 8exact parallelism without mutual interference0 cannot1 consistently with the purpose which ,psychology subserves1 be employed1 even as a working hypothesis throughout the whole field of psychological investigation itself4 ,when the attempt to extend its employment to the whole sphere of psychical processes is seriously made1 it leads inevitably to the crude fatalism of the doctrine that there is no such thing as choice or action 7free or otherwise7 in the universe4 ,in actual practice1 the supporters of ,parallelism1 who reject this doctrine when it is explicitly avowed under the name of ,epiphenomenalism1 only succeed in doing so because they do not really insist on carrying out the parallelistic hypothesis in their ,psychology4 ,they commonly make their hypothesis prominent1 while they are dealing with the comparatively passive and routine-like aspects of mental life1 association1 habituation1 etc41 but allow themselves to lose sight of it as soon as they come to treat of such explicitly teleological concepts as attention and choice4 ,their procedure is also rendered easier for them by the liberal use which evolutionary biologists1 even while professing with their lips fidelity to the mechanical postulates1 allow themselves to make of teleological categories which are really purely psychological4 ,it would be an easy task1 if space permitted1 to show in detail how the fundamentally different principles underlying the construction of the mechanical and the teleological series involve the presence1 in the individual members of each series1 of characters to which nothing corresponds in those of the other4 ,thus we might ask1 with ,dr4 ,ward1 what corresponds in the psychical scheme to the composition of the units of the physiological scheme out of their various chemical components1 and of these1 again1 out of more elementary physical 8prime atoms08#ahb or1 from the opposite side1 we might ask1 what is the cerebral equivalent1 in terms of a rigidly mechanical ,physiology1 of the psychological character of 8meaning0 or 8significance08 ,but the multiplication of these problems becomes superfluous if the reader has once grasped our principle1 that exact correspondence is only possible between series which are either both mechanical or both--and both in the same degree--teleological4 ,between a genuinely teleological and an honestly mechanical series such correspondence is logically impossible1 because of the fundamental difference between their types of construction4 #g4 ,for the reasons just produced1 it is1 ,i think1 necessary to hold that the oldest and simplest hypothesis of the connection between body and mind1 that of ,interaction1 is after all the most satisfactory4 ,according to this view1 the two series cannot be thought of as presenting an exact correspondence1 and must be thought of as causally influencing each other at different points1 precisely as any two sets of physical events do4 ,if we adopt it we shall recognise in sensation a psychical state which has physical processes among its immediate antecedents1 and in motor reaction similarly a physical process with psychical antecedents4 ,it is scarcely to be denied that this conception of body and mind1 as two things which stand in causal relation1 is the hypothesis which most naturally presents itself1 when once we have artificially broken up the unity of immediate experience into a physical and a psychical side1 and so created the problem of psychophysical connection4 ,so natural is it1 that even psychologists who accept one of the other hypotheses are to be found constantly speaking of voluntary movement in terms which1 if they mean anything1 imply causal determination of bodily by mental process1 while no psychologist of any school has ever succeeded in expressing the relation of sensation to stimulus in any other phraseology than that of ,interaction4 ,probably the hypothesis would never have been exposed to hostile criticism at all1 but for the metaphysical objections1 already dismissed by us as fallacious1 founded upon the notion that the mechanical postulates with which ,interaction conflicts are ascertained truths about the actual structure of the reality with which we are in touch in immediate experience4 ,it is clear that1 from the nature of the problem to be solved1 we cannot be called upon to prove the actual occurrence of psychophysical interaction4 ,as a working hypothesis for the interrelation of two sets of scientific abstractions1 the theory is in principle incapable of direct establishment by the 8appeal to facts40 ,all that is requisite for its justification is to show that it is 7a7 not in principle at variance with any fundamental axiom of scientific procedure1 and 7b7 enables us to co-ordinate our scientific results in the manner most suitable for the uses to which we propose to put them4 ,both these conditions are fulfilled by the hypothesis of ,interaction1 if our foregoing arguments are sound4 ,we have seen the fallacious nature of the objections brought against it on a priori grounds of logical method1 and have also seen that it is positively demanded if we are at once to be faithful to the mechanical postulates upon which physical science depends for its successes1 and to recognise in our psychological constructions that teleological character of human action which is all-essential for ,history and ,ethics4 ,in substance this is the whole case for the ,interaction hypothesis1 and no further accession of strength would result from its elaboration in detail4 ,it may be added that it is one great recommendation of the hypothesis of ,interaction1 that it is quite consistent with the full recognition of the relative usefulness of the alternative theories1 though they1 as we have seen1 are unable to do justice to those aspects of fact which can only be expressed in terms of ,interaction4 ,thus the hypothesis of ,interaction can readily afford to admit that1 for certain purposes and up to a certain point1 it is possible to treat physical or psychical processes as if they were determined solely by physical or psychical conditions respectively1 and even to treat some physical processes as if the presence of their psychical concomitants made no difference at all to their occurrence4 ,the reason of this is1 that whereas a mechanical hypothesis can give no intelligible account of a purposive process at all1 a teleological hypothesis can quite easily account for the apparently mechanical character of some of the processes which fall under it4 ,as we have seen 7,book ,,iii4 chap4 #c1 #f71 a purposive reaction1 once established1 approximates to mechanical uniformity in the regularity with which it continues to be repeated1 while the conditions are unchanged1 and the end of the reaction is therefore still secured by its repetition4 ,thus we can readily see that1 even if we contented ourselves with the attempt to translate into the language of psychological science the processes which make up the life of an individual subject1 many of them would appear to be going on with routine uniformity4 ,and when we deliberately set ourselves to obtain uniformities by taking an average result1 derived from comparison of a multitude of subjects1 our results are1 of course1 always mechanical in appearance1 because the element of individual purpose and initiative has been excluded by ourselves from our data in the very process of taking the average4 ,hence we can understand how1 on the hypothesis of ,interaction itself1 all those mental processes which consist in the repetition of an already established type of reaction should come to appear mechanical1 and thus to suggest that mechanical conception of psychical processes which is common to the epiphenomenalist and the parallelist view4 ,interaction1 and ,interaction alone1 is thus a hypothesis capable of being applied to the whole field of psychological investigation4 ,i will conclude this chapter with some considerations on the bearing of our result upon the special problems of ,metaphysics4 ,we have explicitly defended ,interaction as being no statement of actual experienced fact1 but a working hypothesis for the convenient correlation of two scientific constructions1 neither of which directly corresponds to the actualities of experience4 ,this means1 of course1 that ,interaction cannot possibly be the final truth for ,metaphysics4 ,it cannot ultimately be the 8fact0 that 8mind0 and 8body0 are things which react upon each other1 because1 as we have seen1 neither 8mind0 nor 8body0 is an actual datum of experience2 for direct experience and its social relations1 the duality subsequently created by the construction of a physical order simply has no existence4 ,nor can it be maintained that this duality1 though not directly given as a datum1 is a concept which has to be assumed in order to make experience consistent with itself1 and is therefore the truth4 ,for the concept of ,interaction manifestly reposes upon the logically prior conception of the physical as a rigidly mechanical system4 ,it is because we have first constructed the notion of the 8body0 on rigidly mechanical lines that we have subsequently to devise the concept of 8mind0 or 8soul0 as a means of recognising and symbolising in our science the non-mechanical character of actual human life4 ,and since we have already seen that the mechanical1 as such1 cannot be real1 this whole scheme of a mechanical and a non-mechanical system in causal relation with one another can only be an imperfect substitute for the ,reality it is intended to symbolise4 ,in fact1 we might have drawn the same conclusion from the very fact that the psychophysical hypothesis we have adopted is couched in terms of ,transeunt ,causality1 since we have already satisfied ourselves that all forms of the causal postulate are more or less defective appearance4 ,the proposition that the psychophysical theory of the 8connection0 of 8body0 and 8mind0 is an artificial transformation1 due to the needs of empirical science1 of the actual teleological unity of human experience1 is sometimes expressed by the statement that mind and body are really one and the same thing4 ,in its insistence upon the absence of the psychophysical duality from actual experience1 this saying is correct enough1 but it perhaps fails to express the truth with sufficient precision4 ,for1 as it stands1 the saying conveys no hint of the very different levels on which the two concepts stand in respect to the degree of truth with which they reproduce the purposive teleological character of real human experience4 ,it would perhaps be nearer the mark to say that1 while the physiologist's object1 the 8body10 and the psychologist's object1 the 8mind10 are alike conceptual symbols1 substituted1 from special causes1 for the single subject of actual life1 and may both be therefore said to 8mean0 or 8stand for0 the same thing1 their actual content is different4 ,for what in the language of physiology ,i call my 8body0 includes only those processes of actual life which approximate to the mechanical ideal sufficiently closely to be capable of being successfully treated as merely mechanical1 and therefore brought under a scheme of general 8laws0 of nature4 ,whereas what1 as a psychologist1 ,i call my 8mind0 or 8soul10 though it includes processes of an approximately mechanical type1 includes them only as subordinate to the initiation of fresh individual reactions against environment which can only be adequately expressed by teleological categories4 ,thus1 though 8mind0 and 8body0 in a sense mean the same actual thing1 the one stands for a fuller and clearer view of its true nature than the other4 ,in ,dr4 ,stout's terminology their intent may be the same1 but their content is different4#ahc ,consult further3--,r4 ,avenarius1 ,der ,menschliche ,weltbegriff2 ,b4 ,bosanquet1 ,psychology of the ,moral ,self1 lect4 #aj2 ,f4 ,h4 ,bradley1 ,appearance and ,reality1 chap4 #bc2 ,shadworth ,hodgson1 ,metaphysic of ,experience1 vol4 ii4 pp4 #bgf-djc2 ,william ,james1 ,principles of ,psychology1 vol4 i4 chaps4 #e and #f2 ,h4 ,lotze1 ,metaphysic1 bk4 iii4 chaps4 #a and #e 7,eng4 trans41 vol4 ii4 pp4 #afc-aih1 #bhc-eag72 ,h4 ,mnsterberg1 ,grundzge der ,psychologie1 i4 chaps4 #aa4 7pp4 #djb-dcf71 #ae 7pp4 #ebe-efb72 ,g4 ,f4 ,stout1 ,manual of ,psychology1#c ,introduction1 chap4 #c2 ,james ,ward1 ,naturalism and ,agnosticism1 vol4 ii4 lects4 #aa and #ab 7art4 8,psychology0 in ,supplement to ,encyclopdia ,britannica1 p4 #ff ff474 ----- ,footnote #agd3 ,compare the following striking passage from ,avenarius1 ,menschliche ,weltbegriff1 p4 #ge3 8,let an individual ,m denote a definite whole of #8perceived things' 7trunk1 arms and hands1 legs and feet1 speech1 movements1 etc47 and of #8presented thoughts' as ,i1 444 then when ,m says #8,i have a brain1' this means that a brain belongs as part to the whole of perceived things and presented thoughts denoted as ,i4 ,and when ,m says #8,i have thoughts1' this means that the thoughts themselves belong as a part to the whole of perceived things and presented thoughts denoted as ,i4 ,but though thorough analysis of the denotation of ,i thus leads to the result that we have a brain and thought1 it never leads to the result that the brain has the thoughts4 ,the thought is1 no doubt1 a thought of #8my ,ego1' but not a thought of #8my brain' any more than my brain is the brain of #8my thought4' ,i4e4 the brain is no habitation1 seat1 generator1 instrument or organ1 no support or substratum of thought4 ,thought is no indweller or commander1 no other half or side1 and also no product1 indeed not even a physiological function or so much as a state of the brain40 ,footnote #age3 ,as elsewhere in this work1 ,i am using the terms 8mind0 and 8soul0 as virtually interchangeable names for the object studied by the psychologist4 ,so far as there is any definite distinction of meaning between the terms as currently used by ,english writers1 8soul0 seems to carry with it more of the implication of substantiality and relative independence than 8mind40 ,it might not be amiss to adopt the term 8soul0 as a name for the finite subject of experience as he is for himself in actual social life1 and to confine the name 8mind0 to the construction which symbolises this subject for psychological purposes4 ,but the popular antithesis between soul and body is perhaps too strongly rooted to admit of this suggestion4 ,in earlier passages1 e4g41 ,book ,,ii4 chap4 #b1 #f1 ,i have used the term 8spirit0 in the sense here suggested for 8soul40 ,footnote #agf3 ,so1 in dealing with astronomical problems1 we are free to adopt either the ,copernican or the ,ptolemaic scheme1 whichever happens to be the more convenient for our special purpose4 ,the superior truth of the ,copernican system seems to mean no more than that the range of its utility is the wider of the two4 ,i may observe that ,i do not here employ the term 8utility0 in the narrowly practical sense of those philosophers who1 e4g41 condemn all speculation about the 8,absolute0 on the ground of inutility4 ,whatever satisfies any human aspiration is for me1 so far1 8useful40 ,it follows that there is1 for me1 no such thing as the 8useless knowledge0 which 8,pragmatism0 denounces4 ,thus1 if a man's peace of mind depends upon speculation about the 8,absolute0--on the habits of angels1 or any other topic you like 7and this is a matter in which every man must in the end decide for himself7--,pragmatism would appear to be false to its own principle in forbidding him to speculate4 ,footnote #agg3 ,the assumption is not always made1 however4 ,professor ,mnsterberg1 who classes himself as a supporter of ,parallelism1 holds on metaphysical grounds that all causal connection must be between physical states4 ,hence he denies that psychical states can be causally connected with one another1 except indirectly through the causal relations of their physical correlates4 ,his doctrine is thus hardly to be distinguished from ,epiphenomenalism1 except in terminology1 though he avoids the consequence of practical ,fatalism by his insistence upon the purely artificial nature of both the physical and the psychical series4 7,his reason for refusing to admit causal relation between psychical states is that causal connection can only be established between universals1 whereas every psychical state is unique4 ,does not this argument imply a confusion between the actual experience and its psychological symbol87 ,footnote #agh3 ,most supporters of ,parallelism1 it may be noted1 stultify their own case1 so far as it rests on this special contention1 by admitting the causal determination of psychical states by one another1 though1 as psychical states are essentially qualitative1 the reduction of causation to quantitative identity is particularly inadmissible here4 ,professor ,mnsterberg is quite consistent1 therefore1 in denying psychical causality and reducing ,parallelism to ,epiphenomenalism4 ,footnote #agi3 ,the reader who has followed the argument of our ,third ,book will not need to be reminded that the world of purely mechanical processes is simply an ideal construction based on postulates which we make for their practical convenience1 and in no sense a direct transcript of the world of actual experience4 ,footnote #ahj3 ,the 8neutral ,monism0 to which the doctrine of rigid ,parallelism logically leads1 when put forward as more than a working hypothesis1 will1 one may hope1 in ,england at least1 fail to survive the exposure of its illogicalities in the second volume of ,professor ,ward's ,naturalism and ,agnosticism4 ,footnote #aha3 ,this case includes1 as will be apparent on a little reflection1 not only the initiation of new motor reactions upon a sensation or percept1 but also that of sensation itself as a qualitatively novel reaction upon physiological stimulation1 and thus includes both the processes in which supporters of ,interaction have always recognised the causal interconnection of the physical and the psychical4 ,footnote #ahb3 ,it is with great pleasure that ,i note the coincidence of my own view on the impossibility of reconciling ,parallelism with the recognition of the psychological importance of 8meaning0 with that of ,mr4 ,gibson 7essay on 8,the ,problem of ,freedom10 in ,personal ,idealism1 p4 #aej ff474 ,professor ,mnsterberg's declaration1 that the consciousness investigated by ,psychology 8knows nothing by its knowledge and wills nothing by its will10 seems to me a confession of the bankruptcy of ,parallelism as a basal psychological hypothesis4 ,still more so his elaborate and brilliant demonstration that the 8brain0 with which my 8mind0 may be regarded as 8parallel0 is not the brain as studied and charted by the anatomist1 i4e4 not the brain as a physical object at all4 ,see ,psychologie1 i4 #dae-dbh4 ,footnote #ahc3 ,see his essay on 8,error0 in ,personal ,idealism4 ----- ,,chapter ,,iii ,,the ,,place ,,of ,,the 8,,self0 ,,in ,,reality #a4 ,the 8self0 is 7#a7 a teleological concept1 7#b7 implies a contrasted not-self 7where this contrast is absent from an experience there is no genuine sense of self72 7#c7 but the limits which divide self and not-self are not fixed but fluctuating4 ,the not-self is not a merely external limit1 but consists of discordant elements within the individual1 which are extruded from it by a mental construction4 7#d7 ,the self is a product of development1 and has its being in the time-series4 7#e7 ,the self is never given complete in a moment of actual experience1 but is an ideal construction2 probably selfhood implies some degree of intellectual development4 #b4 ,the ,absolute or ,infinite ,individual1 being free from all internal discord1 can have no not-self1 and therefore cannot properly be called a self4 #c4 ,still less can it be a person4 #d4 ,in a society of selves we have a more genuinely self-determined individual than in the single self4 ,hence it would be nearer the truth to think of the ,absolute as a ,society1 though no finite whole adequately expresses the ,absolute's full nature4 ,we must remember1 however1 7a7 that probably the individuals in the ,absolute are not all in direct relation1 and 7b7 that in thinking of it as a ,society we are not denying its real individuality4 #e4 ,the self is not in its own nature imperishable2 as to the particular problem of its continuance after death1 no decision can be arrived at on grounds of ,metaphysics4 ,neither the negative presumption drawn from our inability to understand the conditions of continuance1 nor the lack of empirical evidence1 is conclusive2 on the other hand1 there is not sufficient metaphysical reason for taking immortality as certain4 #a4 ,we have already1 in ,book ,,ii4 chap4 #a1 #e1 incidentally raised the question whether the whole spiritual system which we found ground to regard as the reality of the universe1 can properly be spoken of as a 8self40 ,we decided that to apply such a predicate to it was at least misleading1 and might prepare the way for serious intellectual sophistication4 ,our discussion of the general character of psychological conceptions has now made it possible for us to return to the problem with reasonable hopes of being able to treat it more fully1 and to arrive at some definite conclusion as to the amount of truth embodied by the notion of 8self40 ,first of all1 then1 let us attempt to fix the general meaning of the concept1 and to single out some of its more prominent characteristics4 ,it would clearly require much more space than we can spare to enumerate all the senses in which the notion of 8self0 has been used in ,psychology1 and the work1 when done1 would not be entirely germane to our metaphysical purpose4 ,what ,i propose to attempt here will be simply to consider certain aspects of the concept of 8self0 which are manifestly indispensable for the purpose of ethical and historical appreciation1 and to ask what their value is for the metaphysical interpretation of existence4 7#a7 ,it is manifest1 to begin with1 that 8self0 is a teleological concept4 ,the self whose quality is revealed in ,biography and ,history1 and judged in ,ethics1 has for its exclusive material our emotional interests and purposive attitudes towards the various constituents of our surroundings2 of these1 and of nothing else1 our self is made4 ,and the self1 again1 is one and individual1 just in so far as these interests and purposes can be thought of as forming the expression1 in the detail of succession1 of a central coherent interest or purpose4 ,where this central interest appears not to exist at all1 we have no logical right to speak of a succession of purposive acts as the expression of a single self4 ,thus1 though it may be necessary for some of the practical purposes of police administration to take bodily identity as evidence of identity of self1 we all recognise that what a man does in a state of mental alienation complete enough to abolish continuity of purpose1 is not material for his biographer except in so far as the knowledge of it may modify his interests and purposes on his return to sanity4 ,and even in cases where we may acquiesce in the necessity for assuming responsibility before the law for 8deeds done in the body10 conscience acquits us of moral guilt if we honestly feel we can say1 8,i was not myself when it was done40#ahd ,the teleological character of the unity we ascribe to the self is further illustrated by the puzzles suggested by the 8alternate0 and 8multiple0 personalities occasionally brought to light in the study of hypnotism and of mental pathology4 ,finally1 in the fairly numerous cases of 8conversion10 where a man1 as we say1 becomes a 8new being0 or parts with his 8old self10 we only recognise him as identical with his past self in so far as we succeed in thinking of his 8new life0 as being the expression of aims and interests which were1 at least implicitly and as 8tendencies10 already present1 though concealed1 in the 8old40 7#b7 ,the self implies1 and has no existence apart from1 a not-self1 and it is only in the contrast with the not-self that it is aware of itself as a self4 ,this seems to me clear1 as a matter of principle1 though the consequences of the principle are in much current speculation partly misconceived1 partly neglected4 ,the most important among them1 for our purposes1 are the following4 ,the feeling of self is certainly not an inseparable concomitant of all our experience4 ,for it only arises--and here nothing but direct experimentation can be appealed to as evidence--as a contrast-effect in connection with our awareness of a not-self1 whether as imposing restraints upon the expression of the self1 or as undergoing modification by the self4 ,hence experiences from which this contrast is absent seem to exhibit no trace of genuine 8self-consciousness40#ahe ,feeling1 where you can get it in its simple form1 seems to be universally allowed to be an instance in point4 ,much of our perception appears to me1 though ,i know the view is not widely current among psychologists1 to be in the same position4 ,e4g41 normally when ,i am looking at an object1 say for instance1 a white-washed wall1 ,i do not find that ,i am in any real sense 8conscious of self40 ,the content of my awareness seems1 to me at least1 to be just the wall in a setting of a mass of unanalysed feeling1 organic and other1 which you may1 if you please1 from your standpoint as an external observer1 call my perceiving self1 but of which ,i am only aware as the setting of the perceived wall4 ,it is only when attention to the content of the perception becomes difficult 7as1 e4g41 through fatigue of the organs of sense1 or conflict with some incompatible purpose7 that ,i am normally aware of the perceived object as a not-self opposed to and restricting my self4 ,the same is1 ,i think1 true of much of our life of conscious purposive action4 ,i do not find that in my intellectual pursuit of a chosen study1 or again in my social relations to the other members of my community1 ,i have explicit awareness of the 8facts0 of science1 or the interests and purposes of others as a not-self with which my own interests are contrasted as those of the self1 except in so far as ,i either find these facts and interests in actual collision with some aim of my own1 or experience the removal of such a collision4 ,in ordinary social life1 for instance1 ,i have a strong feeling of self as opposed to not-self when the plans of some member of my immediate circle clash with my own1 and again when ,i succeed in winning such a recalcitrant over to my own side2 my self in the one case feels repression1 in the other expansion4 ,but ,i do not think it can be said that the self-feeling arises in actual life where there is temporarily no consciousness of opposition or its removal4 ,for instance1 while we are harmoniously working with other men for a previously concerted end1 the consciousness of self and its contrasted not-self scarcely appears to enter into our experience4#ahf ,this is1 ,i presume1 why practical worldly wisdom has always regarded 8self-consciousness0 as a source of weakness and moral failure4 ,while we are steadily engaged in the progressive execution of a purpose1 we 8lose ourselves0 in the work2 it is only upon a check that we become 8self-conscious40 7#c7 ,the next point to be noted is that there is no definite line of demarcation between self and not-self4 ,in particular1 we must not fall into the error of supposing that the whole content of the relation between self and not-self is social1--the self on its side consisting of me1 and the not-self of other men4 ,it is true1 no doubt1 that the origin of the distinction is mainly social1 since it is in the main through experience of what it is to have my execution of a desired act repressed by others1 and again to have the stumbling-blocks which have previously restricted my action removed by their co-operation1 that ,i come to be definitely aware of what ,i want1 and of the fact that it is ,i who want it4 ,but it would be hard to show that the distinction between the self and the not-self could not originate at all except in a social medium1 and it is clear that the range of its applicability1 when originated1 is not limited to the social relation4 ,there seems1 on the one hand1 to be no feature in our experience whatever which is entirely excluded from entering into the constitution of what is felt as the self4 ,my social intimates1 my professional colleagues1 my regular occupations1 even my clothes or articles of furniture1 to which ,i have grown accustomed1 may be so essential to the continuity of my characteristic interests in life that their removal would make my character unrecognisable1 or possibly even lead to insanity or death4 ,and as thus indispensable to the teleological unity or my existence1 all these 8external0 objects seem to be capable of passing into and becoming part of the self4 ,we see an extreme instance of this in the case of the savage transplanted into civilised surroundings1 who fails in body and mind and finally dies1 without recognisable disease1 simply from the disappearance of the interests connected with his old surroundings2 or that of the clinging affectionate persons who1 in the same way1 fade away upon the loss of a beloved relative or friend4 ,in a minor degree we see the same thing in those changes of character which common speech happily describe by such phrases as 8he has never been himself since--his wife died1 since he lost that money10 and so forth4 ,in principle there seems to be no factor of what we should currently call the self's environment which may not in this way come to be part of the content of the self4#ahg ,on the other side1 it seems difficult to say whether there is anything which ordinarily forms part of the 8self0 which may not1 under special conditions1 become a part of what we recognise as the 8not-self40 ,thus our bodily feelings and sensations1 our thoughts and desires1 and in particular our virtuous and vicious habits1 are usually reckoned as definitely belonging to our self4 ,yet in so far as we can think of any desire or habit as an element which is discordant with the rest of our self1 and ought not to be there1--and the whole business of moral progress depends on our being able to take up this attitude1--we1 so far1 relegate that element to the not-self4 ,to will the habit or desire to be otherwise is already1 in principle1 to expel it from the teleological unity which makes up our inner life4 ,so again with our thoughts3 in so far as we can suspend our assent to a judgment1 and balance reasons for or against accepting it into the general system of our beliefs1 the judgment clearly belongs to the external not-self4 ,yet it is at least conceivable that there may be intellectual as well as moral habits so deeply engrained in our constitution that we cannot thus set them over-against the self for judgment and sentence4 ,we must not deny that there are cases in which we could not will or think differently1 or even mentally entertain the possibility of thinking or willing differently1 without the destruction of our life's continuity of purpose4 ,again1 our bodily sensations seem to belong in a very special way to our self4 ,yet in so far as we can acquire the power of voluntarily observing them1 or again of withdrawing attention from them1 they are in principle reduced to the position of elements in the not-self4 ,even pleasure and pain do not seem to belong inalienably to the self's side of the contrast4 ,e4g41 to adapt a ,platonic illustration1 if ,i feel pleasure in contemplating the vulgar or obscene1 and at the same time feel disgusted with myself for being so pleased1 the pleasure seems in the act of condemnation to be recognised as no part of my 8true0 self1 but an alien element obtruded on the self against its nature4 ,pain1 by reason of that urgency and insistency which give it its biological importance1 is much harder to banish from the self2 but experience1 ,i think1 will convince any one who cares to make the experiment1 that bodily pains1 when not too intense 7e4g41 a moderately severe toothache71 can1 by directing attention to their sensational quality1 be sometimes made to appear as definitely foreign to the experiencing self4 ,and the history of asceticism1 ancient and modern1 as well as the practice of 8mind-curers10 suggests that this process of extrusion can be carried further than we commonly suspect4 ,organic or 8common0 sensations of general bodily condition probably form the element in experience which most obstinately resists all attempts to sever it from the whole self and treat it as a foreign object1 though in some cases we certainly seem able to extrude the organic sensation from the felt self by analysis of its quality and 8localisation40 ,still1 it must be admitted that if there are any elements in experience which are absolutely incapable of transference to the not-self1 they are probably in the main masses of unanalysed and unanalysable organic sensation4#ahh ,all these considerations make two points very clear4 7a7 ,the self in which we are interested in ,ethics and ,history is not anything with definitely fixed boundaries4 ,the line dividing it from its complement1 the not-self1 is one which we cannot draw according to any precise logical rule2 and again1 what is at one time on one side of the boundary is at another on the other4 ,if there is any part of our experience at all which must be regarded as always and essentially belonging to the self's side of the dividing line1 it will in all probability be merely masses of bodily feeling which are manifestly not the whole of what ,ethics and ,history contemplate when they appraise the worth of a self4#ahi ,further1 a conclusion follows as to the nature of the opposition of self to not-self4 ,the not-self1 as the readiness with which most of the contents of experience can pass from one side of the antithesis to the other shows1 is in a sense included in at the very time that it is excluded from the self4 ,the various factors of which the not-self can1 at different times1 be composed1 our fellows1 the physical world1 thoughts1 habits1 feelings1 all agree in possessing one common characteristic2 when referred to the self1 they are all elements of discord within the whole of present experience1 and it is on account of this discordancy that we treat them as foreign to our real nature1 and therefore as belonging to the not-self4 ,we may thus say with accuracy that what is ascribed to the not-self is so ascribed because previously found to be discrepant1 and therefore excluded from the self2 in other words1 the not-self is not an external limit which we somehow find in experience side by side with the self1 but is constructed out of experience-data by the extrusion of those data which1 if admitted into the self1 would destroy its harmony4 ,thus we finite beings are confronted by a not-self ultimately because in our very finitude1 as we have seen in earlier chapters1 we contain in ourselves a principle of strife and disharmony4 ,the not-self is no merely external environment1 but an inevitable consequence of the imperfection of internal structure which belongs to all finitude4 7#d7 ,the self is essentially a thing of development1 and as such has its being in the time-process4 ,this is a point upon which it seems for many reasons necessary to insist4 ,its truth seems manifest from our previous consideration of the nature of the experiences upon which the concept of the self is based4 ,as we have seen1 it is primarily to our experience of internal disharmony and the collision of purpose that we owe our distinction between self and not-self4 ,and such experience seems only possible to beings who can oppose an ideal of what ought to be1 however dimly that ideal may be apprehended1 to what is4 ,a being who either was already all that it was its nature to become1 or was incapable of in some way apprehending the fact that it was not so1 would thus not have in its experience any material for the distinction between the self and the foreign and hostile elements in experience4 ,and1 as we have already seen in our ,third ,book1 time is the expression in abstract form of the fundamental nature of an experience which has as yet attained only the partial fulfilment of its purpose and aspirations1 and is therefore internally subject to that want of perfect harmony in which we have now sought the origin of the distinction between self and not-self4 ,hence we may1 ,i think1 take it as certain1 at least for us who accept this account of the origin of the self concept1 that selves are necessarily in time and as such are necessarily products of development4 ,this conclusion seems in accord with positive facts which are too well established to permit of question4 ,it is probable that there is not a single element in what ,i call my present self which is not demonstrably the product of my past development1 physical and mental4 ,nor does it appear reasonable to contend that though the material of my existing self is a result of development1 its form of selfhood is underived4 ,it is not merely that my present self is not as my past self1 but we cannot avoid the admission that my mental life is the result of a process of development by which it is continuously connected with that of the embryo and even the spermatozoon4 ,and thus it seems to have its beginnings in experiences which are probably so little removed from simple feeling as to afford no opportunity for the sense of self as contrasted with not-self4 ,or if we maintain that the contrast cannot be altogether absent from even the crudest forms of experience1 we still have to reckon with the fact that1 one stage further back in my personal history1 ,i had no existence even as an animalcule4 ,an embryonic self is at least not positively inconceivable1 but where was ,levi's selfhood while he was yet in the loins of his father8 ,if we will consider what we mean when we say we have all had parents1 it will1 ,i think1 be confessed that our self must be admitted to have been actually originated in the course of development1 impossible as we find it to imagine the stage of such a process4#aij 7#e7 ,finally1 we must deal briefly with one more point of some importance4 ,the self1 as we can now see1 is never identical with anything that could be found completely existing at any one moment in my mental life4 ,for one thing1 it is thought of as having a temporal continuity which goes far beyond anything that can be immediately experienced at any given moment4 ,it stretches out both into the past and the future beyond the narrow limits of the 8sensible present40 ,again1 this temporal continuity is only an abstract expression of the inner sameness and continuity of aims and interests we ascribe to the self4 ,my experiences are1 as we have seen1 thought of as being the life of one self ultimately because ,i look on them as the harmonious expression of a consistent attitude of interest in the world4 ,and any elements in experience which will not coalesce in such a harmony are1 by one device or another1 extruded from the true self and declared to be alien intruders from elsewhere4 ,now1 in real life we never find this complete and absolute harmony of the contents of experience2 there are always1 if we look for them1 elements in our actual experience which are discordant1 and conflict with the system of interests which1 on the whole1 dominates it4 ,hence self1 in the last resort1 is seen to be an ideal which actual experience only imperfectly realises1--the ideal of a system of purposes and interests absolutely in harmony with itself4 ,and there must be1 at least1 grave doubt as to the logical self-consistency of this ideal1 doubts which we must shortly face4 ,for the present the point to which ,i want to call attention is this4 ,must we say that any degree of felt continuity of existence is enough to constitute rudimentary selfhood1 or ought we to hold that there is no true self where there is not at least as much intellectual development as is implied in the power to remember the past and anticipate the future1 as one's own8 ,in other words1 are we to make selfhood as wide in its range as sentient life1 or to limit it to life sufficiently rational to involve some distinct and explicit recognition of the contrast between self and not-self8 ,this is perhaps1 in the main1 a question as to terminology2 for my own part1 ,i confess ,i find the second alternative the more satisfactory4 ,i do not see that such a degree of teleological continuity as is implied in the mere feeling of pain1 for instance1 deserves to be recognised as genuine selfhood2 and there is1 ,i think1 in the unrestricted use of the term self1 selfhood1 as applied to merely feeling consciousness1 a danger of ambiguity4 ,when we have once applied the terms in such a case1 we are inevitably tempted to over-interpret the facts of such simple mental life in order to bring them into fuller accord with what we know of selfhood in our own life4#aia ,at the same time1 it is clear that we have no right dogmatically to deny the presence of the intellectual processes involved in the recognition of self where our methods of observation fail to detect them4 #b4 ,we may now approach the problem of the degree of reality which belongs to the self4 ,we have to ask1 how far is the conception of self applicable to the individual experiences which in our ,second ,book we identified as the contents of the system of real existence8 ,is the infinite individual experience properly to be called a self8 ,again1 is every finite experience a self8 ,and how must we take finite selves1 if they are real1 to be related to each other8 ,lastly1 perhaps1 we might be called on in this connection to face the question how far an individual finite self is more than a temporary feature in the system of existence4 ,our conclusions on all these points were no doubt in principle decided by the discussions of our ,second ,book1 but it is desirable to make some of them more explicit than was possible there4 ,first1 then1 ,i think it is clear that the infinite experience or 8,absolute0 cannot properly be called a self4 ,this is immediately apparent if our view as to the essential implications of self-feeling be accepted4 ,we have urged that self is only apprehended as such in contrast to a simultaneously apprehended not-self4 ,and the not-self1 we have seen1 is composed of all the discordant elements of experience1 so far as their discord has not been overcome4 ,it was for this reason that we held the self to be indissolubly bound up with that experience of the world as a process in time1 with a 8no longer0 and 8not yet10 which is the universal characteristic of finitude4 ,it must follow that an experience which contains no discordant elements1 in their character as unresolved discords1 is not characterised by the contrast-effect which is the foundation of selfhood4 ,an experience which contains the whole of ,reality as a perfectly harmonious whole can apprehend nothing as outside or opposed to itself1 and for that very reason cannot be qualified by what we know as the sense of self4 ,to put the same thing in another way1 8self0 as we have seen1 is essentially an ideal1 and an ideal which is apprehended as contrasted with the present actuality4 ,hence only beings who are aware of themselves as in process of becoming more fully harmonious in their life of feeling and purpose than they at present are1 can be aware of themselves as selves4 ,self and imperfection are inseparable1 and any being which knows nothing of the opposition between the ideal and the actual1 the ought and the is1 must also know nothing of the feeling of self4 ,or in yet a third form of words1 only creatures whose life is in time--and therefore only finite creatures--can be selves1 since the time-experience is an integral constituent of selfhood4 ,one objection which might be brought against this inference is sufficiently ingenious to deserve special examination4 ,it may be urged that though the experience of imperfection and thwarted purpose are conditions without which we in particular could not come to the apprehension of self1 they do not remain as ingredients in the experience of selfhood when once it has been developed4 ,hence1 it might be said1 the 8,absolute0 may conceivably have the experience without having to acquire it through these conditions4 ,in general principle1 no doubt this line of argument is sound enough4 ,it is perfectly true that the special conditions through which we come to have experience of a certain quality cannot1 without investigation1 be taken as everywhere indispensable for that experience4 ,e4g41 even if it were proved that the pessimists are right in saying that we never experience pleasure except as a contrast with previous pain1 it would still not follow that the pleasure1 as felt1 is the mere rebound from the pain1 and has no further positive quality of its own1 and it would then still be an open question whether other beings might not experience the pleasure without the antecedent pain4 ,but the principle does not seem applicable to the case now under consideration1 since it is our contention that the contrast of the discordant factor with the rest of the experience to which it belongs is not simply an antecedent condition1 but is in fact the central core of the actual apprehension of self4 ,it is not simply that we do not1 if our previous analysis has been correct1 have the feeling of self except in cases where such a contrast is present1 but that the feeling of self is the feeling of the contrast4 ,hence our result seems untouched by the undoubtedly sound general principle to which we have referred4 ,that our conclusion is so frequently opposed by philosophers who adopt a generally idealistic position1 is1 ,i believe1 to be accounted for by the prevalence of the belief that experience1 as such1 is essentially characterised by consciousness of self4 ,to experience at all1 it is commonly thought1 is to be aware of one's self as in relation to an environment of the not-self4 ,hence to deny that the absolute ,reality is a self is often thought to be equivalent to denying that it is an experience at all and this1 from the idealistic point of view1 would mean to deny that it is real4 ,but if our previous analysis was sound1 it is not even true of human experience as such that it is everywhere conditioned by the felt contrast of self with not-self4 ,from the point of view of that analysis1 the contrast only exists where there is felt discord between experience as a whole and some of its constituents4 ,the conception of our experience as essentially marked by a sense of self1 must therefore rest upon our intellectual reconstruction effected by the transparent fiction of ascribing to every experience features which analysis detects only in special cases and under special conditions4 ,hence it is quite possible for us to unite the affirmation that all real existence ultimately forms a single experience-system1 with the denial that that system is qualified by the contrast-effect we know as the sense of self4 ,how1 indeed1 should that outside which there is nothing to afford the contrast1 so distinguish itself from a purely imaginary other8#aib #c4 ,if the ,absolute is not a self1 a fortiori it is manifest that it cannot be a 8,person40 ,exactly how much is intended when the 8personality0 of the ,absolute1 or indeed of anything else1 is affirmed1 it would not be easy to determine4 ,a 8self0 does not seem to be necessarily a 8person10 since those philosophers who hold that there is no reality but that of selves1 while admitting that the lower animals are selves1 do not usually call them persons4 ,but it is hard to say how much more is included in personality than in selfhood4 ,if we bear in mind that personality is1 in its origin1 a legal conception1 and that it is usually ascribed only to human beings1 or to such superhuman intelligences as are held capable of associating on terms of mutual obligation with human beings1 we may perhaps suggest the following definition4 ,a person is a being capable of being the subject of the specific obligations attaching to a specific position in human society4 ,and it becomes manifest that1 if this is so1 personality is1 as ,mr4 ,bradley has said1 finite or meaningless4 ,for a society of persons is essentially one of 1 social peers1 with purposes mutually complementary though not identical1 and standing in need of each other's aid for the realisation of those purposes4 ,only those beings are personal for me whose aims and purposes are included along with mine in some wider and more harmonious system1 and to whom ,i therefore am bound by ties of reciprocal obligation4 ,but it is clear that1 to ask whether the wider system which is thus the foundation of our mutual rights and duties as persons1 is itself a person1 would be ridiculous4 ,thus1 e4g41 there would be no sense in asking whether 8human society0--the foundation of our moral personality--is itself a person4 ,you might1 in fact1 as reasonably ask whether it can be sued for trespass or assessed under schedule ,d for ,income ,tax4 ,still more manifestly is this true of the ,absolute which includes within it all the 7conceivably infinitely numerous7 groups of mutually recognising persons1 and all those other forms of experience which we cannot properly call personal4 ,between the whole system and its component elements there can be no such relation of mutual supplementation and completion as is the essence of genuine personality4 ,if the system1 as a whole1 may be said to supplement and correct our defects and shortcomings1 we cannot be said1 in any way1 to supplement it2 the ,absolute and ,i are emphatically not1 in any true sense1 1 and the relation between us cannot therefore be thought of as personal4 ,all this is so obvious1 that1 as ,i take it1 the personality of the ,absolute or whole of existence would find no defenders but for the gratuitous assumption that whatever is an individual experience or spiritual unity must be personal4 ,this1 as far as ,i can see1 is to assume that such an individual must have an external environment of other experience-subjects of the same degree of harmonious and comprehensive individuality4 ,and for this assumption ,i can1 speaking for myself1 see no ground whatever4#aic #d4 ,if we cannot1 then1 properly say that the ,absolute1 or the ,universe1--or whatever may be our chosen name for the infinite individual which is the whole of existence1--is a self or person1 can we say that the finite individuals which compose it are one and all selves1 and that the ,absolute is therefore a society of selves8 ,our answer to this question must depend1 ,i think1 upon two considerations1--7a7 the amount of continuity we regard as essential to a self1 and 7b7 the kind of unity we attribute to a society4 7a7 ,if we regard any and every degree of felt teleological continuity as sufficient to constitute a self1 it is clear that we shall be compelled to say that selves1 and selves only1 are the material of which reality is composed4 ,for we have already agreed that ,reality is exclusively composed of psychical fact1 and that all psychical facts are satisfactions of some form of subjective interest or craving1 and consequently that every psychical fact comprised in the whole system of existence must form part of the experience of a finite individual subject4 ,hence1 if every such subject1 whatever its degree of individuality1 is to be called a self1 there will be no facts which are not included somewhere in the life of one or more selves4 ,on the other hand1 if we prefer1 as ,i have done myself1 to regard some degree of intellectual development1 sufficient for the recognition of certain permanent interests as those of the self1 as essential to selfhood1 we shall probably conclude that the self is an individual of a relatively high type1 and that there are consequently experiences of so imperfect a degree of teleological continuity as not to merit the title of selves4 ,and this conclusion seems borne out by all the empirically ascertained facts of1 e4g41 the life of the lower animals1 of human infants1 and again of adults of abnormally defective intellectual and moral development4 ,few persons1 unless committed to the defence of a theory through thick and thin1 would be prepared to call a worm a self1 and most of us would probably feel some hesitation about a new-born baby or a congenital idiot4 ,again1 finite societies are clearly components of ,reality1 yet1 as we have seen1 it is probably an error to speak of a society as a self1 though every true society is clearly an individual with a community and continuity of purpose which enable us rightly to regard it as a unity capable of development1 and to appreciate its ethical worth4 ,hence it is1 perhaps1 less likely to lead to misunderstandings if we say simply that the constituents of reality are finite individual experiences1 than if we say that they are selves4 ,the self1 as we have seen1 is a psychological category which only imperfectly represents the facts of experience it is employed to correlate4 7b7 ,again1 if we speak of the ,absolute as a society of finite individuals1 we ought at least to be careful in guarding ourselves against misunderstanding4 ,such an expression has certainly some manifest advantages4 ,it brings out both the spiritual character of the system of existence and the fact that1 though it contains a plurality of finite selves and contains them without discord1 it is not properly thought of as a self1 but as a community of many selves4 ,at the same time1 such language is open to misconstructions1 some of which it may be well to enumerate4 ,we must not1 for instance1 assume that all the individuals in the ,absolute are necessarily in direct social interrelation4 ,for social relation1 properly speaking1 is only possible between beings who are at least in the sense of having interests of a sufficiently identical kind to permit of intercommunication and concerted cooperation for the realisation of a common interest4 ,and our own experience teaches us that the range of existence with which we ourselves stand in this kind of relation is limited4 ,even within the bounds of the human race the social relations of each of us with the majority of our fellows are of an indirect kind1 and though with the advance of civilisation the range of those relations is constantly being enlarged1 it still remains to be seen whether a 8cosmopolitan0 society is a realisable ideal or not4 ,with the non-human animal world our social relations1 in consequence of the greater divergence of subjective interest1 are only of a rudimentary kind1 and with what appears to us as inanimate nature1 as we have already seen1 direct social relation seems to be all but absolutely precluded4 ,among the non-human animals1 again1 we certainly find traces of relations of a rudimentarily social kind1 but once more only within relatively narrow limits2 the different species and groups seem in the main to be indifferent to one another4 ,and we have no means of disproving the possibility that there may be in the universe an indefinite plurality of social groups1 of an organisation equal or superior to that of our human communities1 but of a type so alien to our own that no direct communication1 not even of the elementary kind which would suffice to establish their existence1 is possible4 ,we must be prepared to entertain the possibility1 then1 that the individuals composing the ,absolute fall into a number of groups1 each consisting of members which have direct social relations of some kind with each other1 but not with the members of other groups4 ,and also1 of course1 we must remember that there may very well be varieties of degree of structural complexity in the social groups themselves4 ,in some the amount of intelligent recognition on the part of the individuals of their own and their fellows' common scheme of interests and purposes is probably less articulate1 in others1 again1 it may be more articulate than is the case in those groups of co-operating human beings which form the only societies of which we know anything by direct experience4 ,on the other hand1 we must1 if we speak of the ,absolute as a society1 be careful to avoid the implication1 which may readily arise from a false conception of human societies1 that the unity of the ,absolute is a mere conceptual fiction or 8point of view0 of our own1 from which to regard what is really a mere plurality of separate units4 ,in spite of the now fairly complete abandonment in words of the old atomistic theories1 which treated society as if it were a mere collective name for a multitude of really independent 8individuals10 it may be doubted whether we always realise what the rejection of this view implies4 ,we still tend too much to treat the selves which compose a society1 at least in our ,metaphysics1 as if they were given to us in direct experience as merely exclusive of one another1 rather than as complementary to one another4 ,in other words1 of the two typical forms of experience from which the concept of self appears to be derived1 the experience of conflict between our subjective interests and our environment1 and that of the removal of the discord1 we too often pay attention in our ,metaphysics to the former to the neglect of the latter4 ,but in actual life it is oftener the latter that is prominent in our relations with our fellow-men4 ,we--the category of co-operation--is at least as fundamental in all human thought and language as ,i and thou1 the categories of mutual exclusion4 ,that you and ,i are mutually complementary factors in a wider whole of common interests1 is at least as early a discovery of mankind as that our private interests and standpoints collide4 ,if we speak of existence as a society1 then we must be careful to remember that the individual unity of a society is just as real a fact of experience as the individual unity of the members which compose it1 and that1 when we call the ,absolute a society rather than a self1 we do not do so with any intention of casting doubt upon its complete spiritual unity as an individual experience4 ,with these restrictions1 it would1 ,i think1 be fair to say that if the ,absolute cannot be called a society without qualification1 at any rate human society affords the best analogy by which we can attempt to represent its systematic unity in a concrete conceptual form4 ,to put it otherwise1 a genuine human society is an individual of a higher type of structure than any one of the selves which compose it1 and therefore more adequately represents the structure of the one ultimately complete system of the ,absolute4 ,we see this more particularly in the superior independence of ,society as compared with one of its own members4 ,it is true1 of course1 that no human society could exist apart from an external environment1 but it does not appear to be as necessary to the existence of society as to that of a single self1 that it should be sensible of the contrast between itself and its rivals4 ,as we have already sufficiently seen1 it is in the main from the experience of contrast with other human selves that ,i come by the sense of my own selfhood4 ,though the contents of my concept of self are not purely social1 it does at least seem clear that ,i could neither acquire it1 nor retain it long1 except for the presence of other like selves which form the complement to it4 ,but though history teaches how closely similar is the part played by war and other relations between different societies in developing the sense of a common national heritage and purpose1 yet a society1 once started on its course of development1 does appear to be able to a large extent to flourish without the constant stimulus afforded by rivalry or co-operation with other societies4 ,one man on a desert land1 if left long enough to himself1 would probably become insane or brutish2 there seems no sufficient reason to hold that a single civilised community1 devoid of relations with others1 could not1 if its internal organisation were sufficiently rich1 flourish in a purely 8natural0 environment4 ,on the strength of this higher self-sufficiency1 itself a consequence of superior internal wealth and harmony1 a true society may reasonably be held to be a finite individual of a higher type than a single human self4 ,the general result of this discussion1 then1 seems to be1 that neither in the self nor in society--at any rate in the only forms of it we know to exist--do we find the complete harmony of structure and independence of external conditions which are characteristic of ultimate reality4 ,both the self and society must therefore be pronounced to be finite appearance1 but of the two1 society exhibits the fuller and higher individuality1 and is therefore the more truly real4 ,we found it quite impossible to regard the universe as a single self2 but1 with certain important qualifications1 we said that it might be thought of as a society without very serious error4#aid ,it will1 of course1 follow from what has been said1 that we cannot frame any finally adequate conception of the way in which all the finite individual experiences form the unity of the infinite experiences4 ,that they must form such a perfect unity we have seen in our ,second ,book2 that the unity of a society is1 perhaps1 the nearest analogy by which we can represent it1 has been shown in the present paragraph4 ,that we have no higher categories which can adequately indicate the precise way in which all existence ultimately forms an even more perfect unity1 is an inevitable consequence of the fact of our own finitude4 ,we cannot frame the categories1 because we1 as finite beings1 have not the corresponding experience4 ,to this extent1 at least1 it seems to me that any sound philosophy must end with a modest confession of ignorance4 8,there is in ,god1 men say1 ,a deep but dazzling darkness10 is a truth which the metaphysician's natural desire to know as much as possible of the final truth1 should not lead him to forget4 #e4 ,this is probably the place to make some reference to the question whether the self is a permanent or only a temporary form in which ,reality appears4 ,in popular thought this question commonly appears as that of the immortality 7sometimes1 too1 of the pre-existence7 of the soul4 ,the real issue is1 however1 a wider one1 and the problem of immortality only one of its subsidiary aspects4 ,i propose to say something briefly on the general question1 and also on the special one1 though in this latter case rather with a view to indicating the line along which discussion ought to proceed1 than with the aim of suggesting a result4 ,it would not1 ,i think1 be possible to deny the temporary character of the self after the investigations of the earlier part of this chapter4 ,a self1 we said1 is one and the same only in virtue of teleological continuity of interest and purpose4 ,but exactly how much variation is enough to destroy this continuity1 and how much again may exist without abolishing it1 we found it impossible to determine by any general principle4 ,yet the facts of individual development seemed to make it clear that new selves--i4e4 new unique forms of interest in the world--come into being in the time-process1 and that old ones disappear4 ,and again1 both from mental ,pathology and from normal ,psychology1 we found it easy to cite examples of the formation and disappearance1 within the life-history of a single man1 of selves which it seemed impossible to regard as connected by any felt continuity of interest with the rest of life4 ,in the case of multiple personality1 and alternating personality1 we seemed to find evidence that a plurality of such selves might alternate regularly1 or even co-exist in connection with the same body4 ,the less striking1 but more familiar1 cases of the passing selves of our dreams1 and of temporary periods in waking life where our interest and characters are modified1 but not in a permanent way by exceptional excitements1 belong in principle to the same category4 ,in short1 unless you are to be content with a beggarly modicum of continuity of purpose too meagre to be more than an empty name1 you seem forced to conclude that the origination and again the disappearance of selves in the course of psychical events is a fact of constant occurrence4 ,no doubt1 the higher the internal organisation of our interests and purposes1 the more fixed and the less liable to serious modification in the flux of circumstance our self becomes2 but a self absolutely fixed and unalterable was1 as we saw1 an unrealised and1 on the strength of our metaphysical certainty that only the absolute whole is entirely self-determined1 we may add1 an unrealisable ideal4 ,we seem driven1 then1 to conclude that the permanent identity of the self is a matter of degree1 and that we are not entitled to assert that the self corresponding to a single organism need be either single or persistent4 ,it is possible for me1 even in the period between birth and death1 to lose my old self and acquire a new one1 and even to have more selves than one1 and those of different degrees of individual structure1 at the same time4 ,nor can we assign any certain criterion by which to decide in all cases whether the self has been one and identical through a series of psychical events4 ,beyond the general assertion that the more completely occupied our various interests and purposes are1 the more permanent is our selfhood1 we are unable to go4#aie ,these considerations have an important bearing on the vexed question of a future life4 ,if they are justified1 we clearly cannot have any positive demonstration from the nature of the self of its indestructibility1 and it would therefore be in vain to demand that philosophy shall prove the permanence of all selves4 ,on the other hand1 if the permanence of a self is ultimately a function of its inner unity of aim and purpose1 there is no a priori ground for holding that the physical event of death must necessarily destroy this unity1 and so that the self must be perishable at death4 ,for ,metaphysics1 the problem thus seems to resolve itself into a balancing of probabilities1 and1 as an illustration of the kind of consideration which has to be taken into account1 it may be worth while to inquire what probable arguments may fairly be allowed to count on either side4 ,on the negative side1 if we dismiss1 as we fairly may1 the unproved assertions of dogmatic ,materialism1 we have to take account of the possibility that a body may1 for all we know1 be a necessary condition for the existence of an individual experience continuous in interest and purpose with that of our present life1 and also of the alleged absence of any positive empirical evidence for existence after death4 ,these considerations1 however1 scarcely seem decisive4 ,as to the first1 ,i do not see how it can be shown that a body is indispensable1 at least in the sense of the term 8body0 required by the argument4 ,it is no doubt true that in the experience of any individual there must be the two aspects of fresh teleological initiative and of already systematised habitual and quasi-mechanical repetition of useful reactions already established1 and further1 that intercourse between different individuals is only possible through the medium of such a system of established habits4 ,as we have already seen1 what we call our body is simply a name for such a set of habitual reactions through which intercommunication between members of human societies is rendered possible4 ,hence1 if we generalise the term 8body0 to stand for any system of habitual reactions discharging this function of serving as a medium of communication between individuals forming a society1 we may fairly say that a body is indispensable to the existence of a self4 ,but it seems impossible to show that the possibility of such a medium of communication is removed by the dissolution of the particular system of reactions which constitutes our present medium of intercourse4 ,the dissolution of the present body might mean no more than the individual acquisition of changed types of habitual reaction1 types which no longer serve the purpose of communication with the members of our society1 but yet may be an initial condition of communication with other groups of intelligent beings4 ,as to the absence of empirical evidence1 it is1 of course1 notorious that some persons at least claim to possess such evidence of the continued existence of the departed4 ,until the alleged facts have been made the subject of serious and unbiassed collection and examination1 it is1 ,i think1 premature to pronounce an opinion as to their evidential value4 ,i will therefore make only one observation with respect to some of the alleged evidence from 8necromancy40 ,it is manifest that the only kind of continuance which could fairly be called a survival of the self1 and certainly the only kind in which we need feel any interest1 would be the persistence after death of our characteristic interests and purposes4 ,unless the 8soul0 continued to live for aims and interests teleologically continuous with those of its earthly life1 there would be no genuine extension of our selfhood beyond the grave4 ,hence any kind of evidence for continued existence which is not at the same time evidence for continuity of interests and purposes1 is really worthless when offered as testimony to 8immortality40 ,the reader will be able to apply this reflection for himself if he knows anything of the 8phenomena0 of the vulgar ,spiritualism4#aif ,when we turn to the positive side of the question1 it seems necessary to remark that though the negative considerations we have just referred to are not of themselves enough to disprove 8immortality10 provided there is any strong ground for taking it as a fact1 they would be quite sufficient to decide against it1 unless there is positive reason for accepting it4 ,that we have no direct evidence of such a state of things1 and cannot see precisely how in detail it could come about1 would not be good logical ground for denying its existence if it were demanded by sound philosophical principles4 ,on the other hand1 if there were no reasons for believing in it1 and good1 though not conclusive1 probable reasons against it1 we should be bound to come provisionally to a negative conclusion4 ,have we then any positive grounds at all to set against the negative considerations just discussed8 ,pending the result of inquiries which have recently been set on foot1 it is hard to speak with absolute confidence2 still1 the study of literature does1 ,i think1 warrant us in provisionally saying that there seems to be a strong and widely diffused feeling1 at least in the ,western world1 that life without any hope of continuance after death would be an unsatisfactory thing4 ,this feeling expresses itself in many forms1 but ,i think they can all be traced to one root4 ,normally1 as we know1 the extinction of a particular teleological interest is effected by its realisation2 our purposes die out1 and our self so far suffers change1 when their result has been achieved4 7,and incidentally this may help us to see once more that dissatisfaction and imperfection are of the essence of the finite self4 ,the finite self lives on the division of idea from reality1 of intent from execution4 ,if the two could become identical1 the self would have lost the atmosphere from which it draws its life-breath47 ,hence1 if death1 in our experience1 always took the form of the dissolution of a self which had already seen its purposes fulfilled and its aims achieved1 there would probably be no incentive to desire or believe in future continuance4 ,but it is a familiar fact that death is constantly coming as a violent and irrational interrupter of unrealised plans and inchoate work4 ,the self seems to disappear not because it has played its part and finished its work1 but as the victim of external accident4 ,i think that analysis would show1 under the various special forms which the desire for immortality takes1 such as the yearning to renew interrupted friendships or the longing to continue unfinished work1 as their common principle1 the feeling of resentment against this apparent defeat of intelligent purpose by brute external accident4#aig ,now1 what is the logical value of this feeling as a basis for argument8 ,we may fairly say1 on the one hand1 that it rests on a sound principle4 ,for it embodies the conviction1 of which all ,philosophy is the elaboration1 that the real world is a harmonious system in which irrational accident plays no part1 and that1 if we could only see the whole truth1 we should realise that there is no final and irremediable defeat for any of our aspirations1 but all are somehow made good4 ,on the other side1 we must remember that the argument from the desire for continuance to its reality also goes on to assert not only that our aspirations are somehow fulfilled and our unfinished work somehow perfected1 but that this fulfilment takes place in the particular way which we1 with our present lights1 would wish4 ,and in maintaining this1 the argument goes beyond the conclusion which philosophical first principles warrant4 ,for it might be that1 if our insight into the scheme of the world were less defective1 we should cease to desire this special form of fulfilment1 just as in growing into manhood we cease to desire the kind of life which appeared to us as children the ideal of happiness4 ,the man's life-work may be the realisation of the child's dreams1 but it does not realise them in the form imagined by childhood4 ,and conceivably it might be so with our desire for a future life4 ,further1 of course1 the logical value of the argument from feeling must to some extent depend upon the universality and persistence of the feeling itself4 ,we must not mistake for a fundamental aspiration of humanity what may be largely the effect of special traditions and training4 ,hence we cannot truly estimate the worth of the inference from feeling until we know both how far the feeling itself is really permanent in our own society1 and how far1 again1 it exists in societies with different beliefs and traditions4 ,in itself the sentiment1 e4g41 of ,christian civilisation1 cannot be taken as evidence of the universal feeling of mankind1 in the face of the apparently opposite feelings1 e4g41 of ,brahmins and ,buddhists4 ,i should conclude1 then1 that the question of a future life must remain an open one for ,metaphysics4 ,we seem unable to give any valid metaphysical arguments for a future life1 but then1 on the other hand1 the negative presumptions seem to be equally devoid of cogency4 ,philosophy1 in this matter1 to use the fine phrase of ,dr4 ,mc,taggart1 8gives us hope10#aih and ,i cannot1 for my own part1 see that it can do more4 ,possibly1 as ,browning suggests in ,la ,saisiaz1 it is not desirable1 in the interests of practical life1 that it should do more4 ,and here ,i must leave the question with the reader1 only throwing out one tentative suggestion for his approval or rejection as he pleases4 ,since we have seen that the permanence of the self depends upon its degree of internal harmony of structure1 it is at least conceivable that its continuance as a self1 beyond the limits of earthly life1 may depend on the same condition4 ,conceivably the self may survive death1 as it survives lesser changes in the course of physical events1 if its unity and harmony of purpose are strong enough1 and not otherwise4 ,if so1 a future existence would not be a heritage into which we are safe to step when the time comes1 but a conquest to be won by the strenuous devotion of life to the acquisition of a rich1 and at the same time orderly and harmonious1 moral selfhood4 ,and thus the belief in a future life1 in so far as it acts in any given case as a spur to such strenuous living1 might be itself a factor in bringing about its own fulfilment4 ,it is impossible to affirm with certainty that this is so1 but1 again1 we cannot deny that it may be the case4 ,and here1 as ,i say1 ,i must be content to leave the problem4#aii ,consult further3--,b4 ,bosanquet1 ,psychology of the ,moral ,self1 lect4 #e2 ,f4 ,h4 ,bradley1 ,appearance and ,reality1 chaps4 #i 7,the ,meanings of ,self71 #aj 7,the ,reality of ,self71 #bf 7,the ,absolute and its ,appearances1--especially the end of the chapter1 pp4 #dii-eaa of #ast ed471 #bg 7,ultimate ,doubts72 ,l4 ,t4 ,hobhouse1 ,theory of ,knowledge1 part #c1 chap4 #e2 ,s4 ,hodgson1 ,metaphysic of ,experience1 bk4 iv4 chap4 #d2 ,hume1 ,treatise of ,human ,nature1 bk4 i part #d1 #e1 #f2 ,w4 ,james1 ,principles of ,psychology1 vol4 i4 chap4 #aj2 ,h4 ,lotze1 ,metaphysic1 bk4 iii chaps4 #a 7especially #bde71 #e2 ,microcosmus1 bk4 iii4 c4 #e2 ,j4 ,m4 ,e4 ,mc,taggart1 ,studies in ,hegelian ,cosmology1 chap4 #b 7for a detailed hostile examination of ,dr4 ,mc,taggart's argument1 which ,i would not be understood to endorse except on special points1 see ,g4 ,e4 ,moore in ,proceedings of ,aristotelian ,society1 ,n4,s4 vol4 ii4 pp4 #ahh-baa72 ,j4 ,royce1 ,the ,world and the ,individual1 ,second ,series1 lects4 #f1 #g4 ----- ,footnote #ahd3 8,bodily identity0 itself1 of course1 might give rise to difficult problems if we had space to go into them4 ,here ,i can merely suggest certain points for the reader's reflection4 7#a7 ,all identity appears in the end to be teleological and therefore psychical4 ,i believe this to be the same human body which ,i have seen before1 because ,i believe that the interests expressed in its actions will be continuous1 experience having taught me that a certain amount of physical resemblance is a rough-and-ready criterion of psychical continuity4 7#b7 ,as to the ethical problem of responsibility referred to in the text1 it is obviously entirely one of less and more4 ,our moral verdicts upon our own acts and those of others are in practice habitually influenced by the conviction that there are degrees of moral responsibility within what the immediate necessities of administration compel us to treat as absolute4 ,we do not1 e4g41 think a man free from all moral blame for what he does when drunk1 or undeserving of all credit for what he performs when 8taken out of himself10 i4e4 out of the rut of his habitual interests by excitement1 but we certainly do1 when not under the influence of a theory1 regard him as deserving of less blame or credit1 as the case may be1 for his behaviour than if he had performed the acts when he was 8more himself40 ,on all these topics see ,mr4 ,bradley's article in ,mind for ,july #aijb4 ,footnote #ahe3 ,so 8self-consciousness10 in the bad sense1 always arises from a sense of an incongruity between the self and some contrasted object or environment4 ,footnote #ahf3 ,though1 of course1 it does appear in the process of framing and initiating the scheme of concerted action2 the other self is here contrasted with my own1 precisely because the removal of the collision between my purpose and my environment is felt as coming from without4 ,footnote #ahg3 ,it might be said that it is not these features of the environment themselves1 but my 8ideas0 of them1 which thus belong to the self4 ,this sounds plausible at first1 but only because we are habitually accustomed to the 8introjectionist0 substitution of psychological symbols for the actualities of life4 ,on the question of fact1 see ,bradley1 ,appearance and ,reality1 chap4 #h1 p4 #hh ff4 7#ast ed474 ,footnote #ahh3 ,a colleague of my own tells me that in his case movements of the eyes appear to be inseparable from the consciousness of self1 and are incapable of being extruded into the not-self in the sense above described4 ,i do not doubt that there are1 in each of us1 bodily feelings of this kind which refuse to be relegated to the not-self and that it would be well worth while to institute systematic inquiries over as wide an area as possible about their precise character in individual cases4 ,it appears to me1 however1 as ,i have stated above1 that in ordinary perception these bodily feelings often are apprehended simply as qualifying the perceived content without any opposition of self and not-self4 ,at any rate1 the problem is one of those fundamental questions in the theory of cognition which are too readily passed over in current ,psychology4 ,footnote #ahi3 ,of course1 you can frame the concept of a 8self0 from which even these bodily feelings have been extruded1 and which is thus a mere 8cognitive subject0 without concrete psychical quality4 ,but as such a mere logical subject is certainly not the self of which we are aware in any concrete experience1 and still more emphatically not the self in which the historical and ethical sciences are interested1 ,i have not thought it necessary to deal with it in the text4 ,footnote #aij3 ,that we cannot imagine it does not appear to be any ground for denying its actuality4 ,it is never a valid argument against a conclusion required to bring our knowledge into harmony with itself1 that we do not happen to possess the means of envisaging it in sensuous imagery4 ,footnote #aia3 ,i venture to think that some of the rather gratuitous hypotheses as to the rational selfhood of animal species qu species put forward by ,professor ,royce in the second volume of ,the ,world and the ,individual1 are illustrations of this tendency to unnecessary over-interpretation4 ,footnote #aib3 ,is it necessary to refer in particular to the suggestion that for the ,absolute the contrast-effect in question may be between itself and its component manifestations or appearances8 ,this would only be possible if the finite appearances were contained in the whole in some way which allowed them to remain at discord with one another1 i4e4 in some way incompatible with the systematic character which is the fundamental quality of the ,absolute4 ,i am glad to find myself in accord1 on the general principle at least1 with ,dr4 ,mc,taggart4 ,see the ,third ,essay in his recent ,studies in ,hegelian ,cosmology4 ,footnote #aic3 ,it would be fruitless to object that 8societies0 can1 in fact1 have a legal corporate personality1 and so can--to revert to the illustration used above--be sued and taxed4 ,what can be thus dealt with is always a mere association of definite individual human beings1 who may or may not form a genuine spiritual unity4 ,e4g41 you might proceed against the ,commissioners of ,income ,tax1 but this does not prove that the ,commissioners of ,income ,tax are a genuine society4 ,on the other hand1 the ,liberal-,unionist ,party probably possesses enough community of purpose to enable it to be regarded as a true society1 but has no legal personality1 and consequently no legal rights or obligations1 as a party4 ,similarly1 the corporation known as the ,simeon ,trustees has a legal personality with corresponding rights and duties1 and it also stands in close relation with the evangelical party in the ,established ,church4 ,and this party is no doubt a true ethical society4 ,but the corporation is not the evangelical party1 and the latter1 in the sense in which it is a true society1 is not a legal person4 ,i may just observe that the question whether the ,absolute is a self or a person must not be confounded with the question of the 8personality of ,god40 ,we must not assume off-hand that 8,god0 and the ,absolute are identical4 ,only special examination of the phenomena of the religious life can decide for us whether 8,god0 is necessarily the whole of ,reality4 ,if ,he is not1 it would clearly be possible to unite a belief in 8,god's0 personality with a denial of the personality of the ,absolute1 as is done1 e4g41 by ,mr4 ,rashdall in his essay in ,personal ,idealism4 ,for some further remarks on the problem1 see below1 ,chapter ,v4 ,footnote #aid3 ,i suppose that any doctrine which denies the ultimate reality of the finite self must expect to be confronted by the appeal to the alleged revelation of immediate experience4 ,cogito1 ergo sum1 is often taken as an immediately certain truth in the sense that the existence of myself is something of which ,i am directly aware in every moment of consciousness4 ,this is1 however1 an entire perversion of the facts4 ,undoubtedly the fact of there being experience is one which can be verified by the very experiment of trying to deny it4 ,denial itself is a felt experience4 ,but it is 7a7 probably not true that we cannot have experience at all without an accompanying perception of self1 and 7b7 certainly not true that the mere feeling of self as in contrast with a not-self1 when we do get it1 is what is meant by the self of ,ethics and ,history4 ,the self of these sciences always embraces more than can be given in any single moment of experience1 it is an ideal construction by which we connect moments of experience according to a general scheme4 ,the value of that scheme for any science can only be tested by the success with which it does its work1 and its truth is certainly not established by the mere consideration that the facts it aims at connecting are actual4 ,metaphysics would be the easiest of sciences if you could thus take it for granted that any construction which is based upon some aspect of experienced fact must be valid4 ,footnote #aie3 ,this is why ,plato seems justified in laying stress upon the dreams of the wise man as evidence of his superiority 7,republic1 bk4 ix4 p4 #ega74 ,his ideal wise man is one whose inner life is so completely unified that there is genuine continuity of purpose between his waking and sleeping state4 ,plato might perhaps have replied to ,locke's query1 that ,socrates waking and ,socrates asleep are the same person1 and their identity is testimony to the exceptional wisdom and virtue of ,socrates4 ,if it be thought that at least the simultaneous co-existence within one of two selves is inconceivable1 ,i would ask the reader to bear in mind that the self always includes more than is at any moment given as actual matter of psychical fact4 ,at any moment the self must be taken to consist for the most part of unrealised tendencies1 and in so far as such ultimately incompatible tendencies are part of my whole nature1 at the same time it seems reasonable to say that ,i have simultaneously more than one self4 ,ultimately1 no doubt1 this line of thought would lead to the conclusion that 8my whole nature0 itself is only relatively a whole4 ,footnote #aif3 ,compare the valuable essay by ,mr4 ,bradley on the 8,evidence of ,spiritualism0 in ,fortnightly ,review for ,december #ahhe4 ,footnote #aig3 ,death1 however1 though the most striking1 is not the only illustration of this apparently irrational interference of accident with intelligent purpose4 ,mental and bodily disablement1 or even adverse external fortune1 may have the same effect upon the self4 ,this must be taken into account in any attempt to deal with the general problem4 ,footnote #aih3 ,dr4 ,mc,taggart's phrase is more exactly adequate to describe my view than his own1 according to which 8immortality0 is capable of philosophical proof4 7,see the second chapter of his ,studies in ,hegelian ,cosmology47 ,i have already explained why ,i cannot accept this position4 ,i believe ,dr4 ,mc,taggart's satisfaction with it must be partly due to failure to raise the question what it is that he declares to be a 8fundamental differentiation0 of the ,absolute4 ,footnote #aii3 ,i ought perhaps to say a word--more ,i do not think necessary--upon the doctrine that immortality is a fundamental 8moral postulate40 ,if this statement means no more than that it would be inconsistent with the rationality of the universe that our work as moral agents should be simply wasted1 and that therefore it must somehow have its accomplishment whether we see it in our human society or not1 ,i should certainly agree with the general proposition4 ,but ,i cannot see that we know enough of the structure of the universe to assert that this accomplishment is only possible in the special form of immortality4 ,to revert to the illustration of the text1 7#a7 our judgment that the world must be a worthless place without immortality might be on a level with the child's notion that 8grown-up0 life1 to be worth having1 must be a life of continual play and no work4 7#b7 ,if it is meant1 however1 that it is not 8worth while0 to be virtuous unless you can look forward to remuneration--what ,hegel1 according to ,heine1 called a ,trinkgeld--hereafter for not having lived like a beast1 the proposition appears to me a piece of immoral nonsense which it would be waste of time to discuss4 ----- ,,chapter ,,iv ,,the ,,problem ,,of ,,moral ,,freedom #a4 ,the metaphysical problem of free will has been historically created by extra ethical difficulties1 especially by theological considerations in the early ,christian era1 and by the influence of mechanical scientific conceptions in the modern world4 #b-c4 ,the analysis of our moral experience shows that true 8freedom0 means teleological determination4 ,hence to be 8free0 and to 8will0 are ultimately the same thing4 ,freedom or 8self-determination0 is genuine but limited1 and is capable of variations of degree4 #d4 ,determinism and ,indeterminism both arise from the false assumption that the mechanical postulate of causal determination by antecedents is an ultimate fact4 ,the question then arises whether mental events are an exception to the supposed principle4 #e4 ,determinism4 ,the determinist arguments stated4 #f4 ,they rest partly upon the false assumption that mechanical determination is the one and only principle of rational connection between facts4 #g4 ,partly upon fallacious theories of the actual procedure of the mental sciences4 ,fallacious nature of the argument that complete knowledge of character and circumstances would enable us to predict human conduct4 ,the assumed data are such as1 from their own nature1 could not be known before the event4 #h4 ,indeterminism4 ,the psychical facts to which the indeterminist appeals do not warrant his conclusion1 which is1 moreover1 metaphysically absurd1 as involving the denial of rational connection4 #i4 ,both doctrines agree in the initial error of confounding teleological unity with causal determination4 #a4 ,the problem of the meaning and reality of moral freedom is popularly supposed to be one of the principal issues1 if not the principal issue1 of ,metaphysics as applied to the facts of human life4 ,kant1 as the reader will no doubt know1 included freedom with immortality and the existence of ,god in his list of unprovable but indispensable 8postulates0 of ,ethics1 and the conviction is still widespread among students of moral philosophy that ethical science cannot begin its work without some preliminary metaphysical justification of freedom1 as a postulate at least1 if not as a proved truth4 ,for my own part1 ,i own ,i cannot rate the practical importance of the metaphysical inquiry into human freedom so high1 and am rather of ,professor ,sidgwick's opinion as to its superfluousness in strictly ethical investigations4#bjj ,at the same time1 it is impossible to pass over the subject without discussion1 if only for the excellent illustrations it affords of the mischief which results from the forcing of false metaphysical theories upon ,ethics1 and for the confirmation it yields of our view as to the postulatory character of the mechanico-causal scheme of the natural sciences4 ,in discussing freedom from this point of view as a metaphysical issue1 ,i would have it clearly understood that there are two important inquiries into which ,i do not intend to enter1 except perhaps incidentally4 ,one is the psychological question as to the precise elements into which a voluntary act may be analysed for the purpose of psychological description2 the other the ethical and juridical problem as to the limits of moral responsibility4 ,for our present purpose both these questions may be left on one side4 ,we need neither ask how a voluntary act is performed--in other words1 by what set of symbols it is best represented in ,psychology--nor where in a complicated case the conditions requisite for accountability1 and therefore for freedom of action1 may be pronounced wanting4 ,our task is the simpler one of deciding1 in the first place1 what we mean by the freedom which we all regard as morally desirable1 and next1 what general view as to the nature of existence is implied in the assertion or denial of its actuality4 ,that the examination of the metaphysical implications of freedom is not an indispensable preliminary to ethical study1 is fortunately sufficiently established by the actual history of the moral sciences4 ,the greatest achievements of ,ethics1 up to the present time1 are undoubtedly contained in the systems of the great ,greek moralists1 ,plato and ,aristotle4 ,it would not be too much to say that subsequent ethical speculation has accomplished1 in the department of ,ethics proper as distinguished from metaphysical reflection upon the ontological problems suggested by ethical results1 little more than the development in detail of general principles already recognised and formulated by these great observers and critics of human life4 ,yet the metaphysical problem of freedom1 as is well known1 is entirely absent from the ,platonic-,aristotelian philosophy4 ,with ,plato1 as the reader of the ,gorgias and the eighth and ninth books of the ,republic will be aware1 freedom means just what it does to the ordinary plain man1 the power to 8do what one wills10 and the only speculative interest taken by the philosopher in the subject is that of showing that the chief practical obstacle to the attainment of freedom arises from infirmity and inconsistency in the will itself2 that1 in fact1 the unfree man is just the criminal or 8tyrant0 who wills the incompatible1 and1 in a less degree1 the 8democratic0 creature of moods and impulses1 who1 in popular phrase1 8doesn't know what he wants0 of life4 ,similarly1 ,aristotle1 with less of spiritual insight but more attention to matters of practical detail1 discusses the 1 in the third book of his ,ethics1 purely from the standpoint of an ideally perfect jurisprudence4 ,with him the problem is to know for what acts an ideally perfect system of law could hold a man non-responsible1 and his answer may be said to be that a man is not responsible in case of 7#a7 physical compulsion1 in the strict sense1 where his limits are actually set in motion by some external agent or cause2 and 7#b7 of ignorance of the material circumstances4 ,in both these cases there is no responsibility1 because there has been no real act1 the outward movements of the man's limbs not corresponding to any purpose of his own4 ,an act which does translate into physical movement a purpose of the agent1 ,aristotle1 like practical morality and jurisprudence1 recognises as ipso facto free1 without raising any metaphysical question as to the ontological implications of the recognition4 ,historically1 it appears that the metaphysical problem has been created for us by purely non-ethical considerations4 8,freedom of indifference0 was maintained in the ancient world by the ,epicureans1 but not on ethical grounds4 ,as readers of the second book of ,lucretius know1 they denied the validity of the postulate of rigidly mechanical causality simply to extricate themselves from the position into which their arbitrary physical hypotheses had led them4 ,if mechanical causality were recognised as absolute in the physical world1 and if1 again1 as ,epicurus held1 the physical world was composed of atoms all falling with constant velocities in the same direction1 the system of things1 as we know it1 could never have arisen4 ,hence1 rather than give up their initial hypothesis about the atoms1 the ,epicureans credited the individual atom with a power of occasional uncaused and arbitrary deviation from its path1 as a means of bringing atoms into collision and combination4 ,thus with them 8freedom of indifference0 was the result of physical difficulties4 ,in the ,christian ,church the doctrine seems to have owed its wide--though not universal--acceptance to equally non-ethical difficulties of a theological kind4 ,if ,god 8foreknew from all eternity0 the transgression of ,adam and all its consequences1 how could it be compatible with ,his justice to punish ,adam and all his posterity for faults foreseen by ,adam's ,creator8#bja ,the difficulty of reconciling the divine omniscience with the divine justice was supposed to be avoided--in truth1 it was only evaded#bjb--;by assuming that man was created with a 8free will of indifference10 so that obedience would have been just as easy as transgression if man had chosen to obey4 ,in our own time the problem has assumed a rather different complexion1 owing to the enormous developments of mechanical physical science1 which began with ,galileo and ,descartes4 ,rigid causal determination being assumed as a first principle of physical science1 the question arose whether the assumption should not also be extended to the psychical sphere4 ,if so extended1 it seemed to strike at the roots of moral responsibility1 by making all human acts the inevitable 8consequences of circumstances over which we have no control02 if not admitted1 the rejection of the principle of rigid causal determination has often been thought to amount to the denial that there is any principle of rational connection in the psychical sphere4 ,hence1 while persons specially interested in the facts of the moral life have frequently inclined to the more or less radical denial of rational connection between the events of the psychical series1 others1 whose special interests have lain in the direction of the unification of knowledge1 have still more commonly thought it necessary to hold that human action is determined by antecedents in the same sense and to the same degree as the occurrences of the purely physical order4 ,it will be our object to show that these rival doctrines of ,indeterminism and ,determinism1 or ,necessitarianism1 are alike irrational1 alike incompatible with what in practice we understand as moral freedom of action1 and alike based upon the false assumption that rigid mechanical determination is itself an actual fact1 and not a mere postulate of the special physical sciences1 valid only so far as it is useful4 ,but before we enter upon our task1 it is necessary to begin with a statement as to the real meaning of ethical freedom itself4 ,until we know what we mean by the kind of freedom we1 as moral beings1 desire and think we ought to have1 it will be useless to ask whether we are or are not free4 #b4 8,free0 and 8freedom0 are manifestly what are called by the logicians 8privative0 terms2 they denote the absence of certain restrictions4 ,to be 8free10 in whatever special sense you may use the word1 means to be free from something4 ,what1 then1 are the typical limitations which1 in practice1 we resent as making us unfree8 ,they seem to be1 in the main1 the following3--7#a7 ,we are not free when our limbs are actually set in motion by an external physical agency1 human or non-human4 ,and the reason why we are then unfree is that the resulting movements of our bodies do not express a purpose of our own4 ,they either express the purpose of some other being who moves our limbs as seems good to him1 or1 as in the case where we are set in motion by the 8forces0 of the inanimate world1 express no purpose at all that is recognisable to us as such4 ,and in either case we have expressed no purpose of our own by our movements2 they do not truly belong to us at all1 and there is therefore no freedom4 ,it is not necessary that the result of the movement should be one which1 if it had been suggested1 we should have declined to entertain as a purpose of our own4 ,we might perhaps1 if left to ourselves1 have done just what another man or the system of physical forces has done for us4 ,still1 so long as the deed1 whatever it was1 was done for us and not by us1 so long as it corresponded to no actual purpose of ours1 it was not a free act4 7#b7 ,again1 we are not truly free when we act in ignorance 7not due to previous free action of our own7#bjc of the special circumstances4 ,here there is1 as there was not in the former case1 a genuine act4 ,we actually purpose to do something1 but what we purpose to do is not the deed which results from our movements4 ,e4g41 if ,i shoot a comrade by mistake for one of the enemy1 it is true that ,i purpose to shoot1 and so far the shooting is an act1 and a free act1 of my own4 ,but ,i did not purpose to shoot my comrade1 and so the result1 in its concreteness1 is not the expression of my purpose1 and ,i consequently regard myself as not fully free in doing it1 and therefore not morally accountable for it4 ,so far our analysis coincides with that of ,aristotle1 previously referred to4 7#c7 ,again1 ,i am not acting freely where the circumstances are not such as to admit of the formation of purpose at all4 ,for this reason1 merely automatic action--if there is such a thing--is not genuine action1 and therefore not free4#bjd ,impulsive action without reflection1 again1 comes under this category4 ,it is1 of course1 accompanied by feelings of satisfaction1 and if impeded gives rise to craving1 and so cannot be called simply non-purposive4 ,but in genuinely impulsive reaction1 where the possibility of reflection is excluded1 there can be little clear awareness of the concrete character of the purpose that is being put into execution1 and hence such action is not truly free4 ,and in practical life1 though we are certainly held morally responsible for impulsive action1 in so far as it is thought we might have modified it by previous habitual practice of reflection or by avoiding a situation which we had reason to think would deprive us of the power to reflect1 we are never held as fully accountable for the deed of impulse as for the reflectively thought out and deliberately adopted purpose4#bje ,further1 we feel ourselves unfree when we fail to execute our purposes1 either from sheer inability to attend to a consistent scheme of action1 or because we attend equally to purposes which are internally incompatible4 ,this is why the 8democratic0 man1 whose interests are an incoherent medley without logical unity1 and the 8tyrannical man10 or1 as we should now say1 the 8criminal type10 whose passions are constantly at war with one another and with his judgment1 are regarded by ,plato as the typically unfree beings4 ,to be really free1 in the last resort1 we must have purposes which are coherent and abiding4 ,and it is thus no paradox to say that unfreedom in the end means1 in the main1 not knowing your own mind1 while to be free is to know what you mean4 #c4 ,we may now draw some important consequences from this review of the facts upon which every valid interpretation of freedom has to be based4 7#a7 ,freedom1 as ,locke said in that famous chapter 8,on ,power0 which is still the classic discussion of the whole subject as far as ,english philosophy is concerned1 8belongs to the man1 not to the will40 ,the proper question to ask is1 8,am ,i free80 not 8,is my will free80 or 8,have ,i a free will80 ,for 8freedom0 and 8will10 as the facts enumerated above show1 are but the negative and the positive name for the same property1 the property of acting so as to put what we first possessed as our private purpose into execution in the world of sensible fact4 ,i 8will0 when my outward deed is thus the expression of my purpose2 in the same case1 and in no other1 ,i am 8free40 ,thus to 8will0 and to be 8free0 are one and the same thing2 a will which was not free would be a will which was not the translation into sensible fact of any one's purpose1 and thus no will at all4 ,thus the question1 8,are we free80 might be also put in the equivalent form1 8,can we ever will anything80 and to the question1 as thus put1 experience gives a ready answer4 ,for we certainly do conceive purposes1 and we certainly1 in some of our movements1 do translate those purposes in act4 ,and therefore we may say that freedom is undoubtedly1 in the only sense in which it is desired1 a fact of immediate experience4#bjf 7#b7 ,if we retain the expression 8freedom to will0 by the side of the phrase 8freedom to act10 it can only be in a very special sense4 ,it is clear that not only may my outward deed be a translation into fact of my present purpose1 but my present purpose itself1 as a psychical event1 may also be a translation into fact of a former purpose4 ,this is largely the case with all results of deliberate self-training and discipline1 and to a less degree with all acquired habits4 ,thus1 e4g41 the movements by which ,i write these lines are the expression of my preconceived purpose to write the present paragraph1 but that purpose itself1 as an event in my history1 is similarly the expression of a former purpose to compose a work on ,metaphysics4 ,thus there is a real sense in which we can agree with ,leibnitz in criticising ,locke's dictum that we are free to act1 but not free to will4 ,for the mental conception of a purpose is itself an act1 and in so far as it translates into existing thoughts and feelings a previous purpose it may be said itself to be 8freely willed40#bjg 7#c7 ,freedom1 in actual experience1 is always limited1 and1 moreover1 admits of the most various degrees4 ,as to the first point1 it follows immediately from our consideration of the circumstances which make us unfree4 ,if to be fully free means that your outward deed is the full expression of an inward consistent purpose1 then we can see at once that complete freedom is1 for all finite beings1 an infinitely distant ideal4 ,for it means 7a7 that ,i am not hampered in the execution of my purpose by vacillation of interest or conflict of incompatible interests within myself2 7b7 nor by the establishment of 8habitual0 reactions so nearly mechanical as to repeat themselves out of season unless checked by special reflection2 7c7 nor by the limits set to my power to 8act or to forbear0 in the physical world by the action of my fellows and of 8brute0 nature4#bjh ,hence only an experience which is absolutely devoid of internal conflict and external1 partly discrepant environment1 in other words1 only the experience which is the infinite whole1 can be in all its detail entirely and absolutely free4 ,from the possibilities of internal lack of unity of purpose and external collision with rival purpose which are inseparable from our position as finite beings1 it must follow that we are never more than partially or relatively free4 ,and that the degree to which we are free varies with the nature of our purposes and their relation to the environment1 is also manifest4 ,there is an indefinite plurality of such degrees1 ranging up from the total or all but total absence of freedom in the case of directly constrained motion up to the case of cordial co-operation with the other members of a relatively self-supporting social group in the conscious and systematic execution of an elaborate and coherent scheme of action4 ,to indicate the principal distinctions among such grades of freedom which are of practical importance for law and morality is the task of systematic ,ethics1 and need not be attempted by us here4 ,we may add that our investigation has made it apparent that true moral freedom1 of whatever degree1 is no inalienable heritage into which men step by the 8accident of birth10 but--in the main and as an actual possession--a prize which has to be won by the double discipline of self-knowledge and self-mastery1 and of social comradeship1 and may be1 and is1 forfeited by the neglect of the arts by which it was first gained4 ,no doubt one man's inherited disposition may make the practice of self-control1 or again of social fellowship1 easier to him than to another1 and to this extent we may say that we are born with a greater or lesser 8capacity for freedom10 but of its actual possession we have all to say1 8with a great price purchased ,i this freedom40 7#d7 ,finally1 our examination of the facts of morality enables us to define true freedom4 ,we are free1 as we have seen1 just so far as our experience is the embodiment of coherent and permanent interest or purpose1 and freedom is1 like 8will10 simply an abstract expression for the teleological unity which1 in varying degrees1 is an essential feature of all experience4 ,hence we can at once see that freedom does not mean 8absence of rational connection0 or 8absence of determination10 but does mean1 as so many recent philosophers have told us1 for us finite beings1 self-determination4 ,i am most free when acting for the realisation of a coherent rational purpose1 not because my conduct is 8undetermined02 in other words1 because there is 8no telling0 what ,i shall do next1 but because it is1 at such times1 most fully determined teleologically by the character of my inner purposes or interests1--in other words1 by the constitution of my self4 ,the more abiding and logically coherent my various purposes in action1 the freer ,i am1 because it is my whole self or system of rationally connected interests1 and not the insistence of others1 or some passing whim or impulse which ,i may forthwith disown as no part of my 8true self10 which is getting expression in my outward deeds4 ,and if it were possible for a finite being to become absolutely free1 as we have seen that it is not1 such a being would1 in the very moment of its entire deliverance1 become also absolutely determined from within2 its whole life1 as manifested to the outsider in the series of its deeds1 would become the perfect and systematic expression of a single scheme of coherent purposes4 #d4 ,we see1 then1 that such a genuine but limited freedom as is really implied in the existence of morality is not only compatible with1 but actually demanded by1 the principles of a sound ,metaphysics4 ,from the side of morality we meet with the demand that human beings shall be1 in part at least1 creatures whose outward acts shall be the genuine expression of individual purpose2 from the side of ,metaphysics we have already learned that just this teleological unity1 genuine though imperfect1 is the essential nature of every finite experience4 ,we are now to see how a problem in itself quite simple leads to insoluble difficulties and to the rival absurdities of ,indeterminism and ,determinism when it is perverted by an initial metaphysical blunder4 ,the initial mistake of both the rival theories consists simply in taking rigid mechanical determination of events by their antecedents in accord with the principle of ,causality as an actual fact1 the divergence between them only concerning the extent of the sphere of existence for which such determination prevails4 ,according to the indeterminist1 the action of conscious beings forms a solitary exception to a principle of determination which is absolutely valid for all purely physical processes4 ,according to the determinist1 there are no exceptions to the principle1 and our confessed inability to predict the course of an individual life or a period of history from general laws in the same way in which we predict an eclipse or a display of leonids1 is due merely to the greater complexity of the necessary data1 and the temporary imperfections of our mathematical methods4 ,it should be noted that there is no substantial disagreement between the more sober representatives of the two views as to the actual facts of life4 ,the indeterminist usually admits that in practice1 when you know enough of a man's character and of the influences brought to bear upon him1 you can tell with some confidence how he will conduct himself1 and that social intercourse1 education1 and penal legislation would be impossible if you could not4 ,similarly1 the determinist admits that it would be very rash to treat your predictions of human behaviour in practice with absolute confidence1 and that the unexpected does frequently happen in human life4 ,the dispute is solely about the philosophical interpretation of facts as to which there is virtually universal agreement4 ,according to the determinist interpretation1 if you were put in possession of the knowledge of a man's 8character0 and of his 8circumstances0 7and it is assumed that it is theoretically possible to have this knowledge71 and had sufficient skill to grapple with the mathematical problems involved1 you could calculate his whole behaviour in advance1 from the cradle to the grave1 with infallible precision4 ,according to the indeterminist1 you could not do so1 and your failure would arise not from any theoretical impossibility of obtaining the supposed data1 but from their insufficiency4 ,our behaviour1 he alleges1 is not exclusively determined by the interaction of 8character0 and circumstances2 even with the complete knowledge of both these elements1 human action is incalculable1 because of our possession of a 8free will of indifference0 or power to act indifferently according to or in violation of our 8character40 ,you can never say beforehand what a man will do1 because of this capacity for acting1 under any conditions1 with equal facility in either of two alternative ways4 ,i propose to show briefly that the determinist is right in saying that conduct is completely determined by 8character0--if the term be understood widely enough--and circumstances1 but wrong in holding that this makes infallible prediction possible2 on the other hand1 that the indeterminist is right in denying the possibility of such prediction1 but wrong in the reason he gives for his denial4 ,infallible prediction is impossible1 not because of the existence of 8free will of indifference10 but because the assumed data of the prediction are such that you could not possibly have them until after the event4 ,finally1 it will be pointed out that the two errors both arise from the same false metaphysical theory that the causal principle is a statement of real fact4#bji #e4 ,determinism4 ,to begin with the view of the determinist4 ,human conduct1 he says1 must be1 like other processes1 unequivocally determined by antecedents1 and these antecedents must consist of 7a7 character and 7b7 external circumstance4 ,for 7#a7 to deny the causal determination of our acts by antecedents is to deny the presence of rational connection in the psychical sphere1 and thus to pronounce not only ,psychology1 but all the sciences which take psychical events as their material and attempt to discover rational connections between them1 in principle impossible4 ,thus the very existence of ,psychology1 ,ethics1 and ,history proves the applicability of the principle of causal determinism to 8mental states40 7#b7 ,this is still more evident if we reflect that all science consists in the formulation of 8laws0 or 8uniformities10 and that the formulation of 8laws0 rests upon the principle that 8same result follows under same conditions0--i4e4 upon the principle of causal determination4 7#c7 ,further1 if psychical events are not so determined1 then ,psychology and the mental sciences generally are inconsistent with the general principles of the mechanical physical sciences4 7#d7 ,and1 as a matter of fact1 we do all assume that psychical events are causally determined by their antecedents4 ,in ,psychology we assume that our choices are determined by the strength of the motives between which we choose4 ,hence1 if you know what are the 8motives0 present to a man's choice1 and the relative strength of each1 the determinist thinks the prediction of his conduct is reduced to the purely mathematical problem of the solution of an equation or set of equations4 ,that our present mathematical resources will not avail for the unequivocal solution of such equations is1 on this view1 a mere temporary defect incidental to the present condition of mathematical science4 ,in principle the equations must be soluble1 or 8there is no science of human action40 7#e7 ,and in practical life we do all assume that it is possible to predict with considerable confidence the effect of typical conditions upon the aggregate of mankind1 and also1 when you have the requisite data1 the effect of a definite set of conditions upon an individual man4 ,thus we count upon the deterrent effects of punishment1 the persuasive influence of advertisement1 etc42 and again1 in proportion as we really know our friends1 we believe ourselves able to answer for their conduct in situations which have not as yet arisen4 ,why1 then1 should we suppose it theoretically impossible1 if adequate data were furnished1 to calculate the whole career of a man or a society in advance1 as the astronomer calculates the path of a planet from its elements8 ,these are1 ,i think1 the chief of the stock arguments by which ,determinism has been defended4 7,with the purely theological argument from the absoluteness of the divine foreknowledge ,i have already dealt in passing1 and do not propose to refer to it again47 #f4 ,it is not difficult to see that the logical value of all these arguments is nothing at all4 ,they fall of themselves into two groups1 one based upon the general view that all rational connection1 or at least all such rational connection as is significant for our knowledge1 is mechanical causal sequence1 the other upon an appeal to the supposed actual practice of the mental sciences4 ,we may deal with the first group 7arguments #a to #c7 first4 ,it is certainly not true that causal determination by antecedents is the only form of rational connection4 ,for there is manifestly another type of connection1 which we have already seen to be fundamental for the mental sciences1 namely1 teleological coherence4 ,and we have learned in our preceding books that no truly teleological or purposive series can really be mechanically determined by uniform causal laws of sequence1 though it is often convenient for special purposes1 as in the physical sciences1 to treat such a series as if it were mechanically determined4 ,whether this type of procedure will be valid in the mental sciences1 depends upon the further question whether our interest in the study of mental processes is of the kind which would be satisfied by the formulation of a number of abstract uniformities or laws of sequence1 and the neglect of all those features of real mental life of which such laws take no account4 ,in the physical sciences1 as we saw1 this mechanical scheme was valid only because we have an interest--that of devising general rules for dealing with typical physical situations--which is met by neglecting all those aspects of concrete fact which the mechanical scheme excludes4 ,but we also saw that the nature of our interest in psychological investigation was predominantly 7and1 in the case of the study of voluntary action1 exclusively7 of a different kind4 ,our interest in these investigations was to obtain such a teleological representation of psychical processes as might be made available for the appreciative judgments of ,ethics and ,history and their kindred studies4 ,thus1 even admitting the possibility of treating psychical life for some purposes1 by abstraction from its teleological character1 as if it were a mechanical sequence1 the abstraction would be fatal for the purposes of the concrete mental sciences1 and is therefore inadmissible in them4 ,a teleological unity in which we are interested as a teleological unity cannot1 without the stultification of our whole scientific procedure1 be treated in abstraction from its teleological character4 ,this rejoinder to the first of the determinist's arguments is at the same time a refutation of the second4 ,it is true that any science which aims exclusively at the discovery of 8laws0 or 8uniformities0 must adopt the causal principle1 and must resolutely shut its eyes to all aspects of concrete fact which cannot be resolved into mechanical sequence of 8same result0 on 8same conditions40 ,but1 as we saw in the first chapter of this book1 the characteristic task of ,psychology1 except in those parts of it which appear to be mere temporary substitutes for the ,physiology of the future1 is not the discovery of 8laws of mental process10 but the representation in abstract and general form of the teleological unity of processes which are the expression of subjective interests4 ,psychology1 then1 in its most characteristic parts1 is not based upon the causal postulate of mechanical science1 but on the conception of teleological continuity4 ,our answer to the determinist's third argument is therefore that we admit the truth of the allegation that ,psychology and all the more concrete mental sciences which make use of the symbolism of ,psychology1 because essentially teleological in their view of mental process1 would be inconsistent with the mechanical postulates1 if those postulates had any claim to admission into mental science as its ruling principles4 ,we deny1 however1 that they have any such claim to recognition4 ,being1 as we now know that they are1 mere methodological rules for the elimination from our data of everything which is teleological1 the mechanical postulates are only legitimate in ,psychology so far as ,psychology desires mechanical results4 ,how far that is1 we have learned in the first two chapters of the present ,book1 and we have found that the initiation of purposive action is not a process which ,psychology can fruitfully treat as mechanical4 #g4 ,turning now to the determinist's allegations as to the factual procedure of the mental sciences1 we may make the following observations3--7#a7 ,as to the argument from the psychological treatment of 8motives0 as the determining antecedents of choice1 we say that it is either an empty tautology or a fallacy1 according to the sense you please to put on the much-abused term 8motive40 ,choice is causally determined by the 8strongest motive02 what does this mean8 ,if the 8strongest motive0 simply means the line of action we do in fact choose1 the argument amounts to the true but irrelevant observation that we choose what we do choose1 and not something else4 ,but if 8motives0 are to be regarded as antecedents causally determining choice in proportion to their strength1 as mechanical 8forces0 determine the path of a particle in abstract ,mechanics1 we must suppose the 8strength0 of the various 8motives10 like the mass of an attracting body1 to be previously fixed1 independent of the choice they determine4 ,in other words1 the determinist argument requires us to hold that alternative possibilities of action are already 8motives0 apart from their relation to the purpose of the agent who has to choose between them1 and moreover have1 also in independence of the purpose or 8character0 of the chooser1 a 8strength0 which is in some unintelligible way a function of--it would not be easy to say of what1 though it is incumbent on the determinist to know4 ,and this seems no better than rank nonsense4 ,an alternative is not a 8motive0 at all1 except in relation to the already existing1 but not fully defined1 purpose of some agent1 and whether it is a 8strong0 or a 8weak0 motive depends likewise on the character of the agent's purpose4 ,the attempt to conceive of 8motives0 as somehow acting on a mind with an inherent 8strength0 of their own1 as material particles attract other material particles proportionately to their masses1 is so palpable an absurdity1 that nothing more than the candid statement of it is needed for its complete exposure4 ,and 7#b7 there is an equal absurdity inherent in the determinist view as to the kind of prediction of conduct which is possible in concrete cases4 ,we have seen already in our ,third ,book that no infallible prediction of the course of events in an individual case is ever possible4 ,mechanical calculation and prediction we found to be possible in the physical sciences simply because they deal with the average character of a vast aggregate of processes which they never attempt to follow in their concrete individual detail4 ,and trustworthy prediction of human conduct by the aid of 8causal laws0 was seen to be of the same kind4 ,your uniformities might hold good1 so long as they professed to be nothing more than statistical averages got by neglecting the individual peculiarities of the special cases composing them1 but nothing but acquaintance with individual character and purpose would justify you in making confident predictions as to the behaviour of an individual man4 ,now1 when the determinist says1 8if you knew a man's character and his circumstances you could predict his conduct with certainty10 it is not this kind of individual acquaintance which he has in view4 ,he means that the 8character0 of an individual man could be reduced to a number of general formul or 8laws of mental action10 and that from these 8laws10 by simply putting them together1 you could logically deduce the man's behaviour4 ,to see how irrational this assumption is1 we need only ask what is meant exactly by the 8character0 which we suppose given as one of the elements for our supposed calculation4 ,if it means the sum-total of the congenital 8dispositions0 with which we are born1 then--apart from the difficulty of saying precisely what you mean by such a 8disposition0--the determinist statement is not even approximately true4 ,for 7a7 though it may be true that a man's behaviour in a given situation is an expression of his 8character10 yet the 8character0 is not the same thing as 8congenital disposition40 ,disposition is the mere raw material of the 8character10 which is formed out of it by the influence of circumstance1 the educational activity of our social circle1 and deliberate self-discipline on our own part4 ,and the 8character0 thus formed is not a fixed and unvarying quantity1 given once and for all at some period in the individual's development1 and thenceforward constant2 it is itself1 theoretically at least1 8in the making0 throughout life1 and though you may1 from personal intimate acquaintance with an individual man1 feel strongly convinced that his 8character0 is not likely to undergo serious changes after a certain time of life1 this conviction can never amount to more than what we properly call 8moral0 certainty1 and is never justified except on the strength of individual familiarity4 7b7 ,this leads us to our second point4 ,if--to suppose the practically impossible--you did know a man's 8character0 with the knowledge of omniscience1 you would clearly also know every act of his life4 ,for his 8character0 is nothing but the system of purposes and interests to which his outward deeds give expression1 and thus to know it completely would be to know them completely too4 ,but--and this is what the determinist regularly overlooks--you could not possibly have this knowledge of the man's 8character0 until you were already acquainted with the whole of his life4 ,you could not possibly thus know 8character0 as a datum given in advance1 from which to calculate1 with mathematical precision1 the as yet unknown future acts of the man in question1 because1 as we have seen1 the 8character0 is1 in fact1 not there as a given fact before the acts through which it is formed4 ,your data could at best be no more than a number of 8dispositions0 or 8tendencies10 and from such data there can be no infallible prediction1 because1 in the first place1 8dispositions0 are not always developed into actual fixed habits2 and1 in the second1 your data1 such as they are1 are incomplete1 seeing that 8dispositions0 may1 and often do1 remain latent and escape detection until the emergence of a situation adapted to call them out4 ,so that1 even if it were true that complete knowledge of a man's original stock of 8dispositions0 would enable you to calculate his career from its elements1 it would still be impossible to be sure that your knowledge of his 8dispositions0 was complete4 ,thus1 if a 8science of human nature0 really means a power to calculate human conduct in advance from its elements1 we must admit that there is not and can be no such science4 ,as a fact1 however1 what we really mean by a 8science of human nature10 when we speak of it as possible or as partly existent already1 is something quite different4 ,we mean either ,psychology1 individual and social1 which is simply an abstract symbolism for the representation of teleological process in its general nature1 or ,history1 which is the detection of coherent purpose in human action1 after the event2 or1 again1 ,ethics and ,politics1 which are appreciations of such purpose by an ideal standard of worth4 ,not one of these sciences has ever attempted the calculation of human action in advance by general laws2 such forecasts of the future as we do make1 with rational confidence1 are palpably based1 wherever they are of value1 on concrete experience1 our own or that of others1 and not upon the principles of an imaginary mechanics of the human mind4 #h4 ,indeterminism4 ,with the fallacies of the indeterminist we must now deal more briefly4 ,this is the more possible as ,indeterminism1 though common enough in popular moralising1 has never won anything like the position of the rival doctrine as the professed creed of scientific investigators4 ,the essence of the indeterminist position is the denial of the principle affirmed alike by the doctrine of self-determination and1 in an unintelligent travesty1 by the determinist theory that conduct results from the reaction of 8character0 upon circumstances4 ,seeing that1 if all human action is mechanically determined in advance by its 8antecedents10 and is thus theoretically capable of being deduced from its 8elements10 there can be no true moral freedom1 and1 not seeing that the essence of true freedom is teleological as opposed to mechanical determination1 the indeterminist thinks himself compelled to assert that human action is1 in the last resort1 not 8determined0 even by human character4 ,there is a 8free will of indifference0 inherent in human nature1 in virtue of which a man's acts1 or at least those of them in respect of which he is morally 8accountable10 are free1 in the sense of being independent of his character4 ,freedom1 according to this view1 consists in the ability indifferently to adopt either of two alternative courses2 so long as one alternative is closed to you 7whether by your 8character0 or by external circumstances makes no difference according to the indeterminist71 you are not 8free0 and not acting as a moral and accountable being4 ,you are only acting freely in following your purpose when you could equally well follow its direct opposite4 ,the arguments by which this doctrine is supported1 over and above the general contention that determination by antecedents is incompatible with moral responsibility1 are chiefly of the nature of appeals to immediate feeling4 ,thus we are told 7#a7 that when we act from choice and not under compulsion we always have the immediate feeling that we could equally well act in the opposite sense2 and 7#b7 that it is a matter of direct experience that1 in resisting temptation1 we can and do act 8in the line of greatest resistance10 and that the 8will0 is therefore independent of determination by 8motives40 ,the detailed discussion of the actuality of the alleged facts belongs1 of course1 to ,psychology1 and ,i do not propose to enter into it here4 ,but it should be manifest that1 even admitting the facts to be as the indeterminist states them1 they do not warrant the inference he bases on them4 ,thus 7#a7 it is no doubt true that ,i often am aware1 in resolving on a certain course of action1 that ,i could1 if ,i pleased1 act differently4 ,but the conditional clause by its presence makes all the difference between teleological determination and no determination at all4 ,it is1 e4g41 no genuine fact of experience that ,i am aware that ,i could violate all the habits of a lifetime1 practise all the crimes ,i most abhor1 and neglect all the interests to which ,i am most devoted4 ,i could do all this 8if ,i pleased10 but before ,i could 8please0 ,i should have to become a different man2 while ,i am the man ,i am1 it is a manifest absurdity to hold that ,i can indifferently express in my behaviour the purposes which constitute my individuality or their opposites4 7#b7 ,the argument from the successful resistance of temptations is equally fallacious4 ,we have seen already that the determinist assumption against which it is directed1 namely1 that conduct is mechanically determined by the inherent 8strength0 of 8motives10 is itself unmeaning4 8,motives0 are1 if they are anything1 another name for the interests which constitute our character1 not external influences which 8work upon0 that character1 and thus their relative 8strength0 is nothing independent of character1 but a new expression for the structure of the individual character itself4 ,but the counter-argument of ,indeterminism is just as unmeaning4 ,to talk of the 8conquest0 of temptation as the 8line of greatest resistance0 is to use the very same unintelligible mechanical analogy as the determinist uses in talking of the antecedent 8strength0 of a 8motive40 ,there are1 in fact1 only two possible interpretations of the indeterminist's contention1 and neither of them supports his conclusion4 ,either the 8resistance0 of which he speaks must be measured by our actual success in resisting the suggestion to act1 and in that case the very fact that we do not yield to the temptation shows that for us yielding would have been the 8line of greatest resistance02 or else 8resistance0 must be measured by the extent to which the rejected alternative still persists as a psychical fact after its rejection4 ,then the alleged experience simply amounts to this1 that we can and sometimes do1 in obedience to training or conviction1 refuse to act upon suggestions which as psychical facts have sufficient intensity to remain before the mind even after our refusal4 ,and this1 interesting and suggestive as it is1 seems no particular reason for denying the teleological determination of our conduct4#baj ,the real metaphysical objection to ,indeterminism however1 is not that it is an unprovable and unnecessary hypothesis1 but that it involves the denial of rational connection between human actions4 ,by declaring that conduct is not determined by character1 it virtually asserts that it is chance which ultimately decides how we shall actually behave in a concrete case4 ,and chance is simply another name for the absence of rational connection4 ,this is illustrated1 e4g41 by the use we make of the conception of chance in the various empirical sciences4 ,thus1 when ,i say that it is a matter of chance what card ,i shall draw from the pack1 what ,i mean is that the result depends in part upon conditions which ,i do not know1 and therefore cannot use as data for a conclusion in favour of one result rather than another4 ,i do not1 of course1 mean that the result is not conditioned at all1 or that1 with a sufficient knowledge of the conditions it might not have been calculated in advance1 but merely that ,i in particular have not this sufficient knowledge4 ,hence the admission of chance in the relative sense of 8conditions not at present accurately known0 does not conflict with the fundamental axiom of all thinking1 the principle that all existence is a rational unity or scheme of some sort4 ,in fact1 since we never can know the 8totality of the conditions0 of anything1 it would be true to say that there is an element of chance1 in this relative sense1 in all concrete actualities4 ,but absolute chance1 such as the doctrine of an indeterminate free will maintains1 would amount to the simple absence of any rational connection whatever between the facts which are alleged to issue from such a will4 ,this is why the indeterminist view leads in the end1 if consistently carried out1 to the same metaphysical absurdity as the determinist4 ,from failure to see that rational connection1 such as is presupposed when we impute praise or blame to an agent on the score of his conduct1 means teleological determination1 both the rival theories in the end deny the rational interconnection of human acts1 the one replacing it by the fiction of a purposeless mechanical 8necessity10 the other by the equal fiction of a 8blind chance40 ,and the two fictions are really the same thing under different names4 ,for the only piece of definite information that could be extracted either from the assertion that human conduct is mechanically determined1 or that it is the result of chance1 is the conclusion that in either case it is not the expression of coherent purpose4 #i4 ,it is thus obvious that ,indeterminism fails1 in precisely the same way as the opposing theory1 to afford any theoretical basis for moral responsibility4 ,true1 ,i cannot be 8responsible0 for deeds which are the outcome of a purely mechanical system of antecedents1 because such deeds1 not issuing from the purposes of my self1 are in no true sense mine2 but the same would be equally true of the results of an indeterminate free will4 ,as not owing their existence to my purpose1 those results are in no real sense 8my0 acts1 and the choice of the name 8free will0 for their unknown source only serves to disguise this consequence without removing it4 ,only as issuing from my character1 and as the expression of my individual interests1 can acts be ascribed to me as 8mine0 and made the basis of moral approbation in censure of my 8self40 ,thus we see that the determinist and the indeterminist are led alike to impossible results because of the common error involved in their point of departure4 ,both start with the false assumption that the causal determination of an event by its 8antecedents0--which we have in our earlier books seen to be a postulate ultimately not in accord with reality1 but permissible in so far as it permits us to obtain useful results by treating events as if they were thus determined--is ultimately real as a feature of concrete existence4 ,having thus at the outset excluded genuine teleological determination from their conception of the world of change1 both theorists are alike debarred from the correct understanding of those psychical processes for the comprehension of which teleological categories are indispensable4 ,in the terms of theories which treat determination as purely mechanical1 the factors which manifestly are the determining conditions of conduct1 namely1 character and the alternative possibilities of action1 inevitably come to be conceived of as the temporal 8antecedents0 of the act which issues from them4 ,and when once this notion of character as a sort of pre-existing material upon which 8motives0 from without operate has been framed1 it matters little in principle whether you take 8character0 and 8motive0 by themselves as the complete antecedents by which action is determined1 or add a third 8antecedent0 in the form of an inexplicable arbitrary 8free will40 ,in either case all possibility of a truthful representation of the freedom actually implied in moral accountability was surrendered when the 8character0 which expresses itself through an act1 and the 8motive0 which is another name for that character as particularised by reference to circumstances1 were falsely separated in thought from each other1 and then further treated as the temporal antecedents of the act in which they are expressed4 ,in our own treatment of the problem of freedom we were able to escape both sides of the dilemma1 because we recognised from the first that the categories of mechanical determination are not the expression of real fact1 but limitations artificially imposed upon facts for special purposes of a kind which have nothing in common with the ethical and historical appreciation of human conduct1 and therefore irrelevant and misleading when applied out of their rightful sphere4 ,consult further3--,h4 ,bergson1 ,sur les donnes immdiates de la conscience2 ,f4 ,h4 ,bradley1 ,ethical ,studies1 ,essay #a2 ,w4 ,r4 ,b4 ,gibson1 8,the ,problem of ,freedom0 7in ,personal ,idealism72 ,t4 ,h4 ,green1 ,prolegomena to ,ethics1 bk4 i4 chap4 #c1 bk4 ii4 chap4 #a2 ,w4 ,james1 ,principles of ,psychology1 vol4 ii4 chap4 #bf2 ,will to ,believe 7,the ,dilemma of ,determinism72 ,j4 ,locke1 ,essay concerning ,human ,understanding1 bk4 ii4 chap4 #ba 7on ,power72 ,j4 ,martineau1 ,types of ,ethical ,theory1 vol4 ii4 bk4 i4 chap4 #a2 ,j4 ,s4 ,mill1 ,logic1 bk4 vi4 chap4 #b ff42 ,j4 ,royce1 ,the ,world and the ,individual1 ,second ,series1 lect4 #h2 ,h4 ,sidgwick1 ,methods of ,ethics1 bk4 i4 chap4 #e2 ,lectures on the ,ethics of ,green1 etc41 pp4 #ae-bi4 ----- ,footnote #bjj3 ,see ,methods of ,ethics1 bk4 i4 chap4 #d1 #f 7pp4 #gb-gf of #eth ed474 ,footnote #bja3 ,so ,omar ,khayym-- 8,oh ,thou1 who didst with pitfall and with gin ,beset the ,road ,i was to wander in1 ,thou wilt not with ,predestined ,evil round ,emmesh1 and then impute my ,fall to ,sin40 7,,fitzgerald1 ed4 #d1 stanza #hj47 ,and our own poet-- 8,thou madest man in the garden2 thou temptedst man1 and he fell10 etc4 7,for the original of the stanzas on ,predestination in ,fitzgerald's ,omar1 see1 e4g41 the ,persian text of ,whinfield1 quatrains #ajj1 #abf1 #aig47 ,footnote #bjb3 ,evaded1 because1 even granting the satisfactoriness of the solution for the special case of ,adam1 there would still be the problem of reconciling the alleged 8free will0 of his descendants with their inheritance of 8original sin40 ,the more rigid ,calvinism1 with its insistence on the natural corruption of man's heart and the absoluteness of predestination1 seems to secure logical consistency at the expense of outraging our moral convictions4 ,like so many popular theological problems1 this of the conflict between ,god's omniscience and justice arises from a misconception of the issue4 ,it is only when the category of time is illogically applied to the ex hypothesi perfect1 and therefore timeless1 nature of ,god that ,god's knowledge comes to be thought by as fore knowledge before the event1 and thus occasions the difficulty which the 8free-will0 theory was intended to remove4 ,see on this point1 ,royce1 ,the ,world and the ,individual1 vol4 ii4 lect4 #h1 and compare ,bradley1 ,ethical ,studies1 p4 #ai4 ,of course1 the case would be altered if we thought of ,god as finite and imperfect1 and therefore in time4 ,but there would then be no longer any reason for believing either in ,his omniscience or ,his omnipotence1 and so no problem would arise4 ,footnote #bjc3 ,remember that abstention from acting is itself action1 just as in ,logic every significant denial is really an assertion4 ,hence our proviso meets the case of wilful neglect to inform myself of the material circumstances4 ,footnote #bjd3 ,the only automatic acts of which we really know the psychical character are our own 8secondarily automatic0 or 8habitual0 acts4 ,it is1 of course1 a problem for the casuist how far any particular reaction has become so completely automatic as to be no longer an occasion for the imputation of merit or guilt4 ,footnote #bje3 ,for purposes of law it may often be impossible to draw the distinction1 and we may have to acquiesce in the rough-and-ready alternative between entire accountability and complete non-accountability4 ,but in passing moral judgment on ourselves or others in foro conscienti1 we always recognise that accountability is a thing of degrees4 ,on this point see ,mr4 ,bradley's previously quoted article in ,mind for ,july #aijb4 ,footnote #bjf3 ,it must1 however1 be carefully noted that will in the sense in which it is equivalent to freedom must be taken to include what some writers1 e4g41 ,bradley1 call a 8standing0 will--i4e4 any series of acts originally initiated by an idea of the resultant changes1 which is approved of by us unconditionally4 ,in the actual execution of such a series of acts many of the stages are habitual reactions which1 as such1 are not accompanied by the 8idea0 of their specific result as a determining condition of their occurrence4 ,the sphere of moral freedom is arbitrarily restricted when it is assumed that an actual volition is indispensable for every stage of the 8free0 action4 ,footnote #bjg3 ,the reader should study for himself ,locke's famous chapter 7,essay1 bk4 ii4 chap4 #ba74 ,locke's treatment1 hampered as it is by his unfortunate retention of the discussion of his first edition side by side with a somewhat modified re-statement1 compares favourably for clearness and sound sense with that of most subsequent philosophers1 notably with ,kant's unintelligible attempt to reconcile the absolute freedom of man as 8noumenon0 7a fictitious quality of a fictitious being7 with his equally absolute unfreedom as 8phenomenon0 7another equally palpable fiction74 ,for ,leibnitz's criticism of ,locke1 see ,nouveaux ,essais1 ,,ii4 xxi41 particularly #h-be4 7,the ,english translation by ,langley can only be used with extreme caution47 ,on the whole question the reader should also consult ,green1 ,prolegomena to ,ethics1 bk4 ii chap4 #a2 ,bradley1 ,ethical ,studies1 ,essay #a1 and article in ,mind for ,july #aijb2 ,w4 ,r4 ,b4 ,gibson1 8,the ,problem of ,freedom0 7in ,personal ,idealism74 ,footnote #bjh3 ,then1 are 8animals0 free8 ,i see no reason to deny that1 since their life1 in as its degree1 must have teleological continuity to be a life at all1 they too must possess a rudimentary degree of freedom1 though a degree not sufficient to fit them for a place as in human society1 and therefore1 for the special purposes of human ethical systems1 negligible4 ,similarly1 a human imbecile may possess a degree of freedom which is important for the educator who is interested in the 8care of the feeble minded10 and yet may rightly be treated for the different purposes of a penal code as simply unfree4 ,footnote #bji3 ,compare with what follows1 ,bradley1 ,ethical ,studies1 ,essay #a1 and the notes appended to it4 ,for a typical statement of the determinist case in its more sober form1 see ,mill1 ,system of ,logic1 bk4 vi4 chap4 #b4 ,it is harder to find a reasonable statement of the opposite view1 as most capable moral philosophers have adopted the doctrine of self-determination4 ,for a defence of thoroughgoing ,indeterminism1 see ,james1 ,the ,will to ,believe 7,essay on ,the ,dilemma of ,determinism74 ,in ,professor ,sidgwick's statement of the indeterminist view 7see1 e4g41 his posthumous lecture on ,t4 ,h4 ,green's doctrine of freedom in ,lectures on the ,ethics of ,green1 ,spencer1 and ,martineau1 pp4 #ae-bh71 ,indeterminism seems to me to be qualified to the point of being in principle surrendered4 ,footnote #baj3 ,see the admirable discussion of this experience in ,dr4 ,stout's ,manual of ,psychology1#c bk4 iv4 chap4 #aj1 #g4 ----- ,,chapter ,v ,,some ,,metaphysical ,,implications ,,of ,,ethics ,,and ,,religion #a4 ,if ,reality is a harmonious system1 it must somehow make provision for the gratification of our ethical1 religious1 and sthetic interests4 #b4 ,but we cannot assume that ethical and religious postulates are necessarily true in the forms in which our practical interests lead us to make them4 #c4 ,thus1 while morality would become impossible unless on the whole there is coincidence between virtue and happiness1 and unless social progress is a genuine fact1 8perfect virtue10 8perfect happiness10 8infinite progress0 are logically self-contradictory concepts4 #d4 ,but this does not impair the practical usefulness of our ethical ideals4 #e4 ,in religion we conceive of the ideal of perfection as already existing in individual form4 ,hence ultimately no part of the temporal order can be an adequate object of religious devotion4 #f4 ,this leads to the ,problem of ,evil4 8,god0 cannot be a finite being within the ,absolute1 because1 if so1 ,god must contain evil and imperfection as part of ,his nature1 and is thus not the already existing realisation of the ideal4 #g4 ,this difficulty disappears when we identify 8,god0 with the ,absolute1 because in the ,absolute evil can be seen to be mere illusory appearance4 ,it may1 however1 be true that religious feeling1 to be practically efficient1 may need to imagine its object in an ultimately incorrect anthropomorphic form4 #h4 ,the existence1 within the ,absolute1 of finite 8divine0 personalities1 can neither be affirmed nor denied on grounds of general ,metaphysics4 #i4 ,proofs of the 8being of ,god40 ,the principle of the 8ontological0 and 8cosmological0 proofs can be defended against the criticism of ,hume and ,kant only if we identify ,god with the ,absolute4 ,the 8physicotheological proof0 could only establish the reality of finite superhuman intelligences1 and its force depends purely upon empirical considerations of evidence4 #a4 ,the metaphysician is perhaps at times too ready to treat experience as though it were constituted solely by intellectual interests2 as though our one concern in dealing with its deliverances1 as they come to us1 were to construct out of them a system of knowledge satisfactory to our demand for coherent thinking4 ,this is1 of course1 a one-sided1 and therefore1 from the standpoint of ,metaphysics itself1 an imperfect expression of the nature of our attitude as intelligences towards the world of our experience4 ,our moral1 religious1 and artistic1 no less than our logical1 ideals represent typical forms of our general interest as intelligent beings in bringing harmony and order into the apparently discordant material of experience4 ,hence no study of metaphysical principles1 however elementary1 would be complete without some discussion of the light thrown by these various ideals upon the ultimate structure of the system of ,reality in which we and our manifold interests form a part4 ,if it is the fundamental principle of a sound philosophy that all existence forms a harmonious unity1 then1 if we can discover what are the essential and permanent features in the demands made by art1 morality1 and religion upon the world1 we may be sure that these demands are somehow met and made good in the scheme of things4 ,for a world which met our ethical1 religious1 and aesthetic demands upon life with a mere negative would inevitably contain aspects of violent and irreconcilable discord1 and would thus be no true world or systematic unity at all4 ,in what follows ,i propose to discuss the double question1 ,what appears to be the 8irreducible minimum0 of the demands which morality and religion make of the world1 and how far the general conception of existence defended in our earlier chapters provides for their liquidation4 ,the consideration of our aesthetic ideals and their metaphysical significance ,i propose to decline1 on the ground both of its inferior practical interest for mankind at large1 and of the very special and thorough training in the psychological analysis of sthetic feeling which is1 in my own judgment at least1 essential for the satisfactory treatment of the question4 #b4 ,in dealing with the subject thus marked out1 it will be necessary to begin with a word1 partly of caution1 partly of recapitulation of previous results1 as to the attitude towards the practical ideals of morality and religion imposed upon the metaphysician by the special character of his interests as a metaphysician4 ,it will thus be apparent why ,i have spoken in the last paragraph of an 8irreducible minimum0 of ethical and religious postulation4 ,there is a marked tendency among recent writers on philosophical topics1 encouraged more specially by ,professor ,james and his followers1 to urge that any and every ideal which we think valuable for the purposes of morality and religion has no less claim to be accepted in ,metaphysics as of value for our conception of ,reality than the fundamental principles of logical thought themselves4 ,logical thinking1 it is contended1 is after all only one of the functions of our nature1 by the side of others such as moral endeavour towards the harmonising of practice with an ideal of the right or the good1 aesthetic creation of the beautiful1 and religious co-operation with a 8power not ourselves that makes for righteousness40 ,why1 then1 should the metaphysician assume that the universe is more specially bound to satisfy the demands of the logical intellect than those of the 8practical reason0 of morality and religion or the 8creative reason0 of art8 ,must we not say that the demand of the logician that the world shall be intelligible stands precisely on the same footing as the moralist's demand that it shall be righteous1 or the artist's that it shall be beautiful1 and that all three are no more than 8postulates0 which we make1 in the last resort1 simply because it satisfies our deepest feelings to make them8 ,must we not1 in fact1 say alike to the followers of ,logic1 of ,ethics1 of ,religion1 and of ,art1 8,your claims on the world are ultimately all of the same kind2 they are made with equal right1 and so long as any one of you is content to advance his postulate as a postulate1 and at his own personal risk1 no one of you has any pretension to criticise or reject the postulates of the others08 ,the doctrine ,i have attempted to summarise thus briefly1 ,i believe to be partly irrelevant in ,metaphysics1 partly mistaken1 and therefore1 so far as mistaken1 mischievous4 ,i pass lightly over the curious mental reservation suggested by the claim to believe as you list 8at your own risk40 ,as ,george ,eliot has reminded us in ,adam ,bede1 it is a fundamental fact of our position as members of a social order1 that nothing in the world can be done exclusively at the risk of the doer4 ,your beliefs1 so far as they receive expression at all1 like all the rest of your conduct1 inevitably affect the lives of others as well as your own1 and hence it is useless to urge in extenuation of a false and mischievous belief to which expression has been given--and a belief which gets no kind of expression is no genuine belief at all--that it was entertained at your 8personal risk40 ,that no man liveth to himself is just as true of the metaphysician as of any other man1 and he has no more claim than another to disregard the truth in practice4 ,to pass to a more important point4 ,it is no doubt true that the attainment of satisfaction for our intellectual need for a coherent way of thinking about existence is only one of a number of human interests4 ,and thus we may readily grant that morality1 religion1 and art have a right to existence no less than ,logic4 ,further1 the question whether any one of the four has a better right to existence than the others seems to be really unmeaning4 ,there seems to be no sense in asking whether any typical and essential human aspiration has a superior claim to recognition and fulfilment rather than another4 ,but it does not seem to follow that for all purposes our divergent interests and attitudes are of equal value1 and that therefore they may not legitimately be used as bases for mutual criticism4 ,in particular1 it does not seem to follow that because ,logic and morality1 say1 have an equal right to exist1 there must be an equal amount of truth in the principles of ,logic and the postulates of ,ethics4 ,truth1 after all1 is perhaps not the 8one thing needful0 for human life1 and it is not self-evident even that truth is the supreme interest of morality and religion4 ,on the face of things1 indeed1 it seems not to be so4 ,prim facie1 it looks as if the logician's ideal of truth and the moralist's ideal of goodness were1 in part at any rate1 divergent4 ,for it is by no means clear that the widest possible diffusion of true thinking and the general attainment of the highest standard of moral goodness must necessarily go together4 ,it may even be conducive to the moral goodness of a community that many members of it should not think on certain topics at all1 or even should think erroneously about them4#baa ,and the ideals of goodness and beauty1 we may remind ourselves1 seem to be similarly divergent4 ,it is by no means self-evident1 and might even be said to be1 so far as history enables us to judge1 probably untrue1 that the society in which the appreciation of beauty is most highly developed is also the society with the highest standard of goodness4 ,now1 if truth and goodness are not simply identical1 we cannot conclude that the ultimate truth of a belief is proportionate to its moral usefulness in promoting practical goodness4 ,and therefore the metaphysician1 who takes ultimate truth as his standard of worth1 would appear to be quite within his right in refusing to admit moral usefulness as sufficient justification for a belief1 just as the moralist1 from the point of view of his special standard of worth1 may rightly decline to take the aesthetic harmoniousness of a life as sufficient evidence of its moral excellence4 ,until you have shown1 what the view ,i am here opposing appears tacitly to assume1 that truth1 moral goodness1 and beauty are one thing1 you cannot rationally refuse the metaphysician's claim to criticise1 and if necessary to condemn as not finally true1 the 8postulates0 of which ,ethics is entitled to assent1 not that they are 8true10 but that they are practically useful4 ,and1 of course1 the same liberty must be granted to ,ethics itself4 ,the moralist1 ,i would not only admit but insist1 has a perfect right to criticise1 from his special standpoint1 the doctrines of the metaphysician4 ,it may perfectly well be that certain 8truths0 are better not generally known1 in the interests of practical goodness1 and the moralist is fully justified in dwelling upon the fact4 ,but when the metaphysician asserts the truth of a proposition solely on the strength of its value for the promotion of morality1 he is deserting the criterion of value which he is bound in his capacity of metaphysician to respect4 ,it is quite true that logic is not the only game at which it interests mankind to play1 and that no one need play this special game unless he prefers it2 but when you have once sat down to the game you must play it according to its own rules1 and not those of some other4 ,if you neglect this caution1 you will most likely produce something which is neither good ,metaphysics nor sound ,ethics4 ,there is every reason for ,metaphysics to beware of a 8will to believe0 which in practice must mean that licence to indulge in uncriticised assertion which ,socrates in the ,phdo calls by the appropriate name of 8misology10 and identifies as the psychological source of the worst forms of practical 8disillusionment with life40#bab ,it follows1 if these reflections are sound1 that we must not1 as metaphysicians1 allow ourselves to assume the truth of any and every conviction about the nature of the world which we find personally inspiring and attractive1 or even which we believe to have an invigorating effect upon the moral practice of mankind in general4 ,we cannot1 on a priori grounds1 dismiss the suggestion that it may make for practical goodness that all of us to some extent1 and many of us to a very great extent1 should be dwellers in the imperfectly illuminated regions on the 8mid way boundary of light and dark40#bac ,on the other hand1 it would manifestly be incompatible with the presence of any rational unity of structure in the experience-world that there should be a final and absolute lack of harmony between that world1 as it must be conceived by true thinking1 and as it must be if our ethical aspirations are to be satisfied4 ,somehow and somewhere1 if the world is a teleological unity at all1 these aspirations must be provided for and made good by its real structure1 though possibly not in the form in which1 with our present limited insight1 we desire that they should be met1 and though1 again1 we may be unable ever to say precisely in what form they are met4 ,what is simply inconceivable in a rational world is that our abiding aspirations should meet with blank defeat4 #c4 ,what1 then1 appears to be the 8indispensable minimum0 of accord between known truth and our 8ethical postulates10 without which the moral life itself would become irrational8 ,on the whole1 ,i think we may say that morality cannot maintain itself except upon two suppositions--7#a7 that in the main and on the whole the world is so ordered that our moral struggle for fuller and stronger individuality of life is successful2 that by living the moral life our individual character does become richer in coherent interest and more completely unified2 and 7#b7 that the gain thus won by our private struggles does not perish with our disappearance from this mortal scene1 but is handed on to the successors who replace us in the life of the social order to which we belong4 ,speaking roughly1 this means that unless morality is a delusion1 the moral life is1 on the whole1 the happy life1 and that there is such a thing as social progress4 ,now1 both these conditions1 ,i would contend1 are shown by the actual experience of mankind to be met by the constitution of the real world4 ,it was by the analysis of actual social life1 and not by an appeal to postulates of a transcendental kind1 that ,plato and ,aristotle showed that the good man is1 in the main1 even in the present state of society1 the 8happy0 man4 ,and it is by a similar analysis that the modern thinker must convince himself1 if he convinces himself at all1 that human societies are progressive4 ,so far1 then1 no question of ultimate metaphysical issues seems to be involved in the practical demand of the moral life4 ,the case would1 of course1 be different if we were with ,kant to regard it as a necessary demand of ,ethics that the world shall be so constituted that1 in the end1 and for every individual agent1 happiness shall be exactly proportioned to virtue4 ,still more so if we went on to assert that morality is a delusion unless every individual is predestined1 by the nature of things1 to the ultimate attainment of complete virtue and complete happiness4 ,views of this kind would manifestly have to be defended by an appeal to metaphysical principles which do not find their complete justification in the empirically known structure of human society4 ,so too the demand that human society itself shall be progressive beyond all limits1 cannot be shown to be justified by what is empirically known of the structure and the non-human environment of our society4 ,and if ,ethics really does postulate either the complete coincidence of virtue with happiness for the individual1 or the infinite progress of society1 it is clearly committed to the postulation of very far-reaching metaphysical doctrines4 ,further1 it must be frankly owned that these postulates1 as they stand1 are inconsistent with the scheme of metaphysical doctrine expounded and defended in the present work4 ,for both moral goodness and moral progress are bound up with finite individuality and its characteristic form of existence1 the time-process4 ,of 8progress0 this is manifest3 all progress is advance in time1 and is advance from a relatively worse to a relatively better4 ,and with 8virtue0 it stands no otherwise4 ,for to be virtuous is not simply to have an individuality which is at once harmonious and rich in contents1 but to make such an individuality for ourselves out of the raw material of disposition and environment4 ,only in the progress towards fuller individuality are we moral agents1 and1 just because we are finite1 the complete attainment of an absolutely harmonious individuality is for ever beyond us4 ,hence absolutely perfect virtue--and consequently absolutely perfect happiness--are incompatible with our nature as genuine but finite individuals4 ,in all finite individuality there is inevitably some aspect of imperfection and consequently of sadness1 though sin and sadness ought to fill1 and can be empirically seen to fill1 an increasingly subordinate place in proportion to the degree of individuality attained4 ,the same reasoning is equally applicable to the case of any finite society4 ,nor does this seem any ground for regarding the constitution of the universe as ethically unsatisfactory4 ,to repeat the previously quoted remark of ,mr4 ,bradley1 no one has a right to call the universe morally unsatisfactory on the ground that it does not precisely apportion happiness to virtue1 unless he is prepared to show that more goodness would be produced by making the correspondence exact1 and to show this is impossible4 ,still more absurd would it be to censure the universe because neither perfect virtue nor perfect happiness is attainable4 ,for morality itself has no existence except as the creation of finite individuals1 and hence we cannot without absurdity censure the universe on moral grounds for containing finite individuals1 and so providing for the existence of morality4 #d4 ,would the case be altered if we had1 or thought we had1 grounds for holding that the progress of human society has fixed and knowable bounds set to it by the nature of things8 ,if we could know1 for instance1 that the physical environment of humanity is so constituted that human life must ultimately disappear from the earth8 ,i cannot see that it would4 ,no doubt the widespread acceptance of a belief that the end of things was at hand within a calculable period1 might tend to lessen our moral earnestness1 and if the period were taken to be sufficiently short1 might lead to downright licence and wickedness4 ,but so does a belief in the approaching dissolution of any historic and wide-reaching social order2 and yet the fact that societies suffer dissolution is not commonly regarded as reasonable ground for an indictment against the universe4 ,nor is there any logical connection between such beliefs and their consequences4 ,we cannot say that because human society is perishable1 if it is perishable1 its achievements must have been wasted and therefore its progress useless4 ,the result of our achievements might1 in some way unknown to us1 survive our extinction as a race1 even as we can partly see that the results of the individual life are preserved after our death4 ,and1 in any case1 it is beyond the power of ,metaphysics to set any fixed limits to the existence and progress of human society4 ,as we have seen1 ,metaphysics gives us no reason to deny1 though it does not enable us to affirm1 that the social life begun under present conditions may be continued under unknown conditions beyond the grave4 ,and even the disappearance of physical human life within a calculable period cannot be shown to follow from any principle of ,metaphysics4 ,at most we can say that if certain assumed physical laws1 especially that of the dissipation of energy1 are valid for all physical processes1 and if again1 the psychical factor in living organisms is incapable of reversing the 8down-grade0 tendency of energy to pass into forms unavailable for work1 then the human society we know must come to an end within a calculable time4 ,but whether the assumptions upon which this conclusion is based are or are not true1 ,metaphysics by itself cannot determine4 ,we are thus left in the following position4 ,that on the whole the virtuous life is also the happy life1 and that there is genuine social progress1#bad seem to be empirically known certainties4 8,absolute perfection0 of the finite as finite1 and 8infinite progress0 seem alike excluded as metaphysical impossibilities4 ,but no definite limits can be set by ,metaphysics to the possibilities of individual and social advance towards greater virtue and greater happiness4 ,as for the theories in ,physics which appear to threaten humanity with extinction within a measurable time1 their truth is1 to say the least of it1 not assured1 and we have1 in our metaphysical conception of ,reality as an individual whole1 the certainty that1 whatever becomes of the human species1 nothing of all our aspirations and achievements can be finally lost to the universe1 though we may be quite unable to imagine the manner of their preservation4 ,and for the purposes of the moral struggle from a worse to a better1 this seems to be quite as much conformity to our aspirations as we need ask of the world4 ,for the suggestion that our ideals are not worth living for unless we enjoy the fruit of our labours in the form we in particular should like1 seems nothing better than an appeal to the baser ,egoism4 #e4 ,when we consider the specially religious attitude of mind1 we shall find that its demands upon the world go further than those of mere ,ethics1 and are1 in part1 of a rather different character4 ,it would be impossible in a work like this to discuss at length the nature of the religious attitude1 but this much at least would probably be admitted as beyond doubt4 ,the religious attitude towards the world of experience is distinguished from all others partly by the specific character of the emotions in which it finds its expression1 partly by the intellectual beliefs to which those emotions give rise4 ,specifically religious emotion1 as we can detect it both in our own experience1 if we happen to possess the religious 8temperament01#bae and in the devotional literature of the world1 appears to be essentially a mingled condition of exaltation and humility arising from an immediate sense of communion and co-operation with a power greater and better than ourselves in which our ideals of good find completer realisation than they ever obtain in the empirically known time-order4 ,in the various religious creeds of the world we have a number of attempts to express the nature of such a power and of our relation to it in more or less logically satisfactory conceptual terms4 ,but it is important to remember that1 though a theological belief when sincerely held may react powerfully upon religious feeling1 the beliefs are in the last resort based upon immediate feeling1 and not immediate feeling upon beliefs4 ,in this sense1 at any rate1 it is true that all genuine religious life implies the practical influencing of feeling and action by convictions which go beyond proved and known truth1 and may therefore be said to be matters of faith4 ,what the convictions to which we thus surrender the practical guidance of life are1 in any individual case1 seems to be largely a question of individual constitution and social tradition4 ,not only are the convictions as to the nature of the higher power represented by the great typical historical religions very various1 but what we may call the individual religion of different persons exhibits even greater variety4 ,there is hardly any important object of human interest which may not acquire for some man the significance which belongs to the completed realisation of his highest ideals4 ,it is no more than the truth to say that a mother1 a mistress1 a country1 or a movement1 social or political1 may be1 as we often phrase it1 a man's 8religion40 ,amid all this variety two general principles may be detected which are of primary importance to the metaphysical critic of religious experience4 7#a7 ,it is essential to the religious experience that its object should be accepted as the really existing embodiment of an ideal4 ,this is the point in which the religious attitude of mind differs most strikingly from that of mere morality4 ,in the ethical experience the ideal is apprehended as something which does not yet exist1 but has to be brought into existence by human exertion4 ,hence for the purely ethical attitude of mind the world has to be thought of as essentially imperfect1 essentially out of accord with what it ought to be in order to correspond to our demands on it4 ,thus there is not for morality1 as we shall directly see there must be for religion1 such a thing as the 8,problem of ,evil40 ,that the world1 as it comes to us in the temporal order1 contains imperfection and evil which must be done away with1 is a practical presupposition without which morality itself would have no raison d'tre4 ,but in religion the case is otherwise4 ,it is only in so far as the object of our adoration1 whatever it may be1 is taken to be the really existing embodiment of our highest ideals1 that it can produce1 in our spiritual communion with it1 that combined emotion of exaltation and abasement1 that feeling of being at once ourselves already perfect so far as our will is one in its contact with our ideal1 and absolutely condemned and 8subject to wrath0 so far as it is not1 which distinguishes the religious from all other states of mind4 ,but all real existence1 as we saw in our ,second ,book1 is essentially individual4 ,hence it is of the essence of religion that it looks upon the ideal as already existing in individual form4 ,this is why devotion to an abstract principle1 such as nationality1 socialism1 democracy1 humanity1 proves so much inferior as a permanent expression of religious life1 to devotion to a person1 however imperfect4#baf 7#b7 ,it follows that mere appearance in the time-order cannot be the ultimate object of religious devotion4 ,for the time-order itself1 as we have seen1 is essentially unfinished and incomplete1 and no part of it1 therefore1 can be perfectly individual4 ,the completely individual1 if it exists at all1 must have an existence which is not temporal4 ,hence no part of the temporal order of events1 as such1 can be finally satisfactory as an object of religious adoration4 ,so far as it is possible to succeed in worshipping anything which forms part of that order1 such as a man or a cause1 this can only be done by regarding the temporal facts as an imperfect appearance of a reality which1 because completely and perfectly individual1 is in its true nature timeless4 ,and it further follows that1 since all finite individuality is1 as we have already seen1 only imperfectly individual1 and because imperfect is temporal1 the only finally adequate object of religious devotion must be the infinite individual or timeless ,absolute itself4 ,that the great philosophical religions of the world have felt the force of this1 is shown in history by the way in which they have inevitably tended to credit their various 8gods0 with omnipotence4 ,thus the god of the ,hebrew religion1 as at first presented to us in its earlier records1 is represented as limited in power by the existence of other divine beings1 and temporally changeable and mutable4 ,but in the later ,old ,testament writings1 the ,new ,testament1 and the subsequent constructions of ecclesiastical theology1 we see the gradual development from these ,hebrew beginnings of an idea of a ,god who is 8all in all10 and limited neither by the existence of other divine beings with opposing aims and interests1 nor by the inherent resistance of 8matter10 to ,his purposes4 ,so the ,zoroastrian religion1 in which the limitation of the power of the good being ,ahura ,mazda by the existence of a co-ordinate bad being1 ,angro ,mainyus1 was originally a fundamental tenet1 is said to have become among the modern ,parsis a pure monotheism4 #f4 ,now1 it should be noted that this inevitable tendency of ,religion itself to identify its object with ultimate ,reality1 conceived in its timeless perfection as a complete and infinite individual whole1 leads to the difficult metaphysical 8problem of evil40 ,for if ,god is the same thing as the ,absolute1 it would appear that evil itself must be1 like everything else1 a manifestation of ,his nature4 ,and if so1 can we say that ,god is strictly speaking 8good10 or is the complete realisation of our ideals8 ,it is this difficulty about evil1 more than anything else1 which has led many philosophers in both ancient and modern times to distinguish between the ,absolute and ,god1 and to regard ,god as simply one1 though the highest and most perfect1 among the finite individuals contained in the ,absolute4#bag ,in the following paragraphs ,i propose not so much to offer a solution of this time-honoured puzzle1 as to make some suggestions which may help to put the issue at stake clearly before the reader's mind4 ,the doctrine of the finitude of ,god does not appear in any way to remove the difficulty about evil2 in fact1 it renders it1 if anything1 more acute4 ,for evil must now appear in the universe in a double form4 ,on the one hand1 it admittedly is taken to exist outside ,god1 as a hostile factor limiting ,his power of shaping the world to ,his purpose4 ,but again1 as we have seen1 every finite individual1 because finite1 falls short of complete internal harmony of structure1 and thus contains an element of defect and evil within itself4 ,thus evil will be inherent in the nature of a finite ,god1 as well as in that of the existence supposed to be outside ,him4 ,we have1 in fact1 one more illustration of the principle that all limitation involves self-limitation from within4 ,it is only by forgetting this fundamental truth that we can conceive the possibility of a being who is 8perfectly good0 and yet is less than the ,absolute4 ,and even when we overlook this1 our difficulties are not removed4 ,for a 8finite0 ,god with a further reality outside and in some way opposed to ,his own nature1 even when illogically thought of as perfectly good1 must be at best only such another being as ourselves1 though on a larger scale4 ,he1 like us1 must be simply a partly successful1 partly unsuccessful1 actor in a universe of which the constitution and ultimate upshot are either unknown or known not to satisfy our religious demand for the complete individual reality of our ideal4#bah ,this is the view which has in history been actually adopted by religions like those of the ,hellenes and the ,norsemen1 in which the gods are regarded as ultimately subject to an inscrutable and unethical ,fate4 ,but a finite being struggling1 however successfully1 against such an alien ,fate is1 after all1 a fit object only for moral respect and sympathy1 not for religious adoration4 ,such a being1 however exalted1 is still not that complete and harmonious individual realisation of all human aspiration for which ,religion yearns1 and is therefore not1 in the full and true sense1 ,god4 ,if1 then1 a finite ethical individual1 however exalted1 cannot be an adequate object of religious devotion1 how does the case stand with the infinite individual whole of ,reality8 ,can we worship the ,absolute8#bai ,this is a question which needs some careful examination before we can venture on a positive answer4 #g4 ,the problem1 let it be observed1 is not strictly psychological4 ,experience shows that individual men can derive religious support from belief in the most varied and most defective conceptions of the nature of the ,deity4 ,beliefs which bring one man 8peace in believing0 might1 if seriously entertained1 blight another man's life2 one man's ,god may be another's devil4 ,this is1 however1 not the point4 ,the real question is1 whether the ,absolute can be made into an object of religious worship1 as we have seen that finite individuals cannot1 without a breach of logic4 ,has it the character which1 as we have seen1 anything which is to correspond to our ideal of 8,god0 must logically possess8 ,at first sight it certainly would seem that it has4 ,for1 as we have seen1 the ,absolute contains all finite existence1 and contains it as a perfectly harmonious system4 ,and therefore all finite aspiration must somehow be realised in the structure of the ,absolute whole1 though not necessarily in the way in which we1 as beings of limited knowledge and goodness1 actually wish it to be realised4 ,the ,absolute whole is thus1 as nothing else can be1 the concrete individual reality in which our ideals have actual existence4 ,as all our ideals themselves are but so many expressions of our place in the system and our relation to the rest of it1 so the system itself is their concrete harmonious embodiment4 ,it is true1 as we have already seen1 that our ideals may not be realised in the whole just in the form in which we conceive them1 but it must be remembered that in so far as we set up our private judgment and wishes as standards to which the whole is bound to conform on pain of condemnation1 we are adopting an attitude which is at once illogical and irreligious4 ,it is illogical1 because it implies the assumption that with fuller knowledge of the system of ,reality as a whole we should still desire the fulfilment of our aspirations in the special way which at present recommends itself to our imperfect insight4 ,it is irreligious1 because the demand that human desires shall be fulfilled in our way and not in 8,god's way0 involves the setting up of human wisdom against ,god's1 and is thus irreconcilable with genuine union of heart and will with the divine order4#bbj ,what then becomes1 from this point of view1 of the problem of evil8 ,how can the presence of moral evil in the temporal order be reconciled with the thought of the ,absolute whole as the complete and harmonious realisation of human ideals8 ,i need not say that the detailed solution of the problem is out of the question4 ,as beings whose insight is necessarily limited by our own finitude1 we cannot hope to see how in detail everything that appears to us as evil might1 with larger knowledge1 be known as an integral constituent of a whole which1 as a whole1 is the realisation of human aspiration1 and therefore free from evil4 ,but it is at least possible to make suggestions which may show that the problem is a mere consequence of the inevitable defects of our insight1 and that it would disappear with fuller knowledge4 ,it is not hard to see that there are two main reasons why the structure of the universe seems to finite insight partly evil4 ,our insight into the nature and connection of our purposes themselves is never complete2 we are all1 in part1 ignorant of exactly what it is to which we aspire4 ,hence our purposes in part appear to be met by existence with a negative just because we are only imperfectly aware of what they mean and whither they tend4 ,there is no more familiar fact than this1 that even within the limits of our human life growing experience is constantly teaching us how confused and defective our judgment at any moment as to what we really want1 can be4 ,largely1 then1 our ideals seem to be at variance with actual existence1 because we never fully know what they are4 ,again1 our knowledge of the effects of our acts is always imperfect in the extreme4 ,we seem to fail because we cannot see far enough to understand fully what it is we have effected4 ,and both these causes of the apparent discrepancy between the real and the ideal may be traced to a single root4 ,existence appears to be in part evil1 because we cannot take it in at once and as a whole in its individual structure4 ,we have to make acquaintance with it by piecemeal1 and as a succession of fragmentary events in the time-series4 ,and imperfection1 we have seen1 belongs to the time-series4 ,hence we can see that evil is at once a mere appearance1 and an appearance which is inevitable to the finite experience conditioned by the temporal form4 ,the so-called 8problem0 is thus in principle insoluble only so long as we falsely think of the time-order itself as a characteristic of the ,absolute whole in its real individuality4#bba ,may we say1 then1 that the ,absolute or whole is known in ,metaphysics to be 8good08 ,the answer depends upon the precise meaning we attach to the statement4 ,in the sense that it is the really existing embodiment of the ideals we are trying amid our ignorance and confusion to realise1 we clearly must say 8yes40 ,but if we use the word 8good0 in a narrower sense1 to mean 8ethically good10 we can hardly say without qualification that the whole is good4 ,for 8ethical goodness0 belongs essentially to the time-order1 and means the process of the gradual assertion of the ideal against apparent evil4 ,to be morally good is to have an ideal that is not realised in the events of the time-order as they come to us in our finite experience1 and to mould those events into conformity with the ideal4 ,the moral life is from first to last a struggle1 and where the struggle is absent it is misleading to speak of morality4 ,hence it is better not to call the ,absolute 8moral40 ,but we must remember that the ,absolute is only not moral1 because it is something very much more than moral1 only not ethical because there is in it no divorce of ideal from actuality1 as there is in the imperfect experience of its finite members4 ,or1 as we might say1 it is something more than 8good0 precisely because it is already good4 ,in morality1 let it be remembered1 we have1 as in all the experience of finite beings1 a process which is throughout directed upon a result that1 once attained1 would transcend the process itself4 ,morality would not be content with anything less than the total abolition of the evil in the world2 and with the disappearance of evil1 the struggle against it would itself disappear in some higher form of experience4 ,similarly1 knowledge is constantly striving to exhaust the object of knowledge4 ,so long as the object is in any respect unknown1 the task of knowing is incomplete2 yet if once we could so know any object that nothing further remained to be known about it1 there would be no aspect of not-self in the object which could distinguish it from the subject by which it is known1 and knowledge itself would thus be done away4 ,thus we may see from the side alike of cognition and of will how the whole life of the finite being forms a constant endeavour to widen experience into the complete apprehension of a content which1 because infinite1 could not be apprehended without the disappearance of finitude itself4 ,thus does experience witness to the truth of our fundamental doctrine1 that the finite individual repeats in itself1 in an imperfect and inadequate form1 the structure of the infinite individual of which it is an appearance4 ,i do not know whether it is necessary to say more than a word with reference to the thoughtless objection so often urged against all philosophical and religious doctrines which deny the ultimate reality of evil1 or1 what is the same thing1 the existence of an independent devil4 ,if existence is already perfect1 it is said1 why should we seek to make it better at great trouble and inconvenience to ourselves by moral and political endeavour8 ,ought we not rather to sit with folded hands acquiescing lazily in 8things as they are08 ,the doubt might even be carried further than this4 ,for to 8take things as they are0 is just as much a course of self-chosen action as any other line of conduct1 and it might hence be argued that abstention and moral effort are alike out of place and absurd in a world where everything is 8perfect40 ,the objection1 of course1 turns upon a mere confusion of existence as it is in its individual reality1 and existence as it appears to us in the time-series4 ,the argument for ,quietism is based purely upon attributing to the essentially imperfect and incomplete series of temporal events the perfection which only belongs to the timeless whole4 ,in that perfect whole our moral ideals and moral effort1 as finite beings belonging to the temporal order1 are of course included along with everything else1 and its perfection is therefore no ground for treating them as nugatory4 ,our own moral struggle with the apparent evil of the time-series is itself an integral part of the ,reality which1 in its complete individual character1 is already perfect1 if we could but win to a point of view from which to behold it as it is4 ,as ,plotinus expresses it1 8our striving is after good and our turning away is from evil1 and thought with a purpose is of good and evil1 and this is a good40#bbb ,if we may not say without qualification that the ,absolute is good1 and certainly must not say that it is in the proper sense 8ethical10 still less may we say that the ,absolute is 8morally indifferent40 ,for the ,absolute is only not ethical because it is already all that ethical life consists in striving to become4 ,hence the higher a finite being stands in the ethical scale1 as judged by the double criterion of the wealth of its interests in the world and the degree of harmony between them1 the more adequately does its structure repeat that of the whole1 and the higher is its degree of reality4 ,and this means that the good man's ideals are realised in the world-order with less of modification and reconstruction than the bad man's4 ,in a sense1 as ,professor ,royce maintains1 even the bad man's confused and warring ideals get their fulfilment1 since he too is aiming1 however blindly1 at a complete individuality as the goal of all his striving4 ,but he is seeking it where it is not to be found1 in the gratification of desires which cannot be allowed the supreme place in the direction of life without leading to the distraction and mutilation of the self4 ,as ,plato puts it1 the bad man 8does as he pleases10 and for that very reason never 8does what he wills40 ,hence the place of the good man in the economy of the universe is very different from that of the bad1 and the world-order itself is the very reverse of 8indifferent0 to the distinction between them4#bbc ,my own conclusion1 then1 which ,i offer to the reader simply as my own1 is that anything less than the ,absolute is an inadequate object of religious devotion1 and that the ,absolute itself has the structure which such an object requires4 ,if it should be further suggested that at any rate1 when we come to actual experience1 we find that we cannot represent the object of our worship to ourselves in an individual form of sufficient concreteness to stir effectual emotion and prompt to genuine action without clothing it in imagination with anthropomorphic qualities which metaphysical criticism proves inapplicable to the infinite individual1 ,i should be inclined to reply that ,i admit the fact4 ,and ,i do not think we need shrink from the conclusion that practical religion involves a certain element of intellectual contradiction4 ,thus1 though ,god is not truly ,god until we deny the existence of any independent 8evil0 by which ,his nature is limited1 it seems probable that the thought of ourselves as 8fellow-workers with ,god0 would hardly lead to practical good works unless we also inconsistently allowed ourselves to imagine ,god as struggling against a hostile power and standing in need of our assistance4 ,but this only shows that the practical value of religion in guiding action is not necessarily dependent upon its scientific truth4 #h4 ,of course1 it would be quite open to us to hold that there may be1 within the ,absolute1 finite beings of superhuman power and goodness with whom humanity is capable of co-operating for ethical ends4 ,only such beings1 if they exist1 would not be ,god in the same sense in which the ,absolute may be called ,god4 ,they might deserve and win our reverence and our co-operation1 but because themselves finite and therefore only imperfectly real and individual1 they could not logically take the place which belongs only to the completely and perfectly individual realisation of the ideal4 ,that would still fall partly outside them in the nature1 as a whole1 of the system which harmoniously includes both ourselves and them4 ,thus such beings would be 8gods0 in the sense of polytheism rather than ,god in that of monotheism4 ,further1 ,i can see no means of deciding a priori that there could be only one such being in the universe4 ,even supposing the series of finite beings to be itself finite1 it is not evident that it could contain only one 8best0 member4 ,and supposing it infinite1 could there be a 8best0 member at all8#bbd ,also it appears quite beyond the power of ,metaphysics to find either proof or disproof of the existence and agency of such finite but exalted beings4 ,we cannot say that our general conception of ,reality is such as to negative the suggestion1 and yet again that general conception gives us no positive evidence in favour of taking it as true4 ,it would certainly be the grossest presumption to maintain that the ,absolute can contain no higher types of finite individuality than those presented by human society2 on the other hand1 it would be equally presumptuous to assert that we have reasoned knowledge of their existence and their direct social relation with ourselves4 ,hence we must1 ,i think1 be content to say that the hypothesis1 so far as it seems to be suggested to any one of us by the concrete facts of his own individual experience1 is a matter for the legitimate exercise of ,faith4 #i4 ,these reflections may naturally lead to some remarks1 which shall be made as brief as possible1 about the so-called philosophical 8arguments for the existence of ,god10 which played a prominent part in ,metaphysics before their discrediting at the hands of ,kant and ,hume4#bbe ,kant's great achievement lies in having demonstrated that the whole force of the 8proofs0 depends upon the famous ontological argument1 best known in modern ,philosophy in the form adopted by ,descartes in the fifth ,meditation4 ,descartes there argues thus3--,by 8,god0 ,i mean a completely perfect being4 ,now1 existence is a perfection1 and non-existence an imperfection4 ,hence ,i cannot think of a non-existing perfect being without self-contradiction4 ,hence ,god1 because by hypothesis perfect1 must exist1 and is the only being whose existence logically follows from its definition4 ,kant's even more famous criticism of this famous inference turns upon the principle which he had learned from his study of ,hume1 that logical necessity is 8subjective40 ,if ,i think of a logical subject as defined by certain properties1 he argues in effect1 ,i am necessitated to ascribe to it all the predicates implied in that definition4 ,that is1 ,i must affirm them or contradict myself4 ,hence1 if 8existence0 is originally included among the perfections by which the subject 8,god0 is defined1 the proposition ,god exists is certainly necessary1 but is also tautological1 and amounts1 in fact1 to the mere assertion that 8an existing perfect being is an existing perfect being40 ,but if the 8existence0 spoken of in the predicate is something not included in the definition of the subject1 then you cannot infer it from that definition4 ,now 8real existence0 is not a predicate which can be included in the definition of a concept4 ,the predicates by which an imaginary hundred dollars are defined are the same as those of a real hundred dollars4 ,it is not by the possession of a new predicate1 but by being actually given in a concrete experience1 that the real coins differ from the imaginary4 ,hence all propositions asserting real existence are synthetic1 7i4e4 assert of their subject something which is not contained in the concept of it71 and the real existence of ,god or any other object can never be deduced from its definition4#bbf ,this ,kantian criticism has itself been subjected to much criticism1 principally at the hands of ,hegel and those subsequent philosophers who have been specially affected by the ,hegelian influence4 ,what appears to be the general principle of the ,hegelian criticism has been most clearly expressed in ,english philosophy by ,mr4 ,bradley1#bbg upon whose discussion the following remarks are chiefly founded4 ,in estimating the worth of the ontological proof1 we must distinguish between the general principle implied in it and the particular form in which it presents that principle4 ,it is manifest that ,kant is perfectly right when he contends that1 taking existence to mean presence in the space and time-order1 you cannot reason from my possession of any idea to the existence of a corresponding object4 ,you cannot say whatever ,i conceive must exist as ,i conceive it4 ,but the principle of the ontological proof is perhaps not necessarily condemned by its failure to be thus universally applicable4 ,the principle involved appears to be simply this4 ,the idea and the reality outside its own existence as a fact in the time-order which it 8means0 or 8stands for0 are mutually complementary aspects of a whole ,reality which include them both4 ,for there is1 on the one side1 no 8idea0 so poor and untrue as not to have some meaning or objective reference beyond its own present existence4#bbh ,and1 on the other1 what has no significance for any subject of experience is nothing4 ,hence in its most general form the ontological argument is simply a statement that reality and meaning for a subject mutually imply one another4 ,but it does not follow that all thoughts are equally true and significant4 ,in other words1 though every thought means something beyond its own existence1 different thoughts may represent the structure of that which they mean with very different grades of adequacy4 ,that which my thought means may be far from being real in the form in which ,i think it4 ,now1 we may surely say that the more internally harmonious and systematic my thought is1 the more adequately it represents the true nature of that which it means4 ,if thoroughly systematic coherent thought may be mere misrepresentation1 our whole criterion of scientific truth is worthless4 ,how freely we use this ontological argument in practice will be readily seen by considering the way in which1 e4g41 in the interpretation and reconstruction of historical facts1 the internal coherency of a systematic and comprehensive interpretation is taken as itself the evidence of its truth4#bbi ,hence it may be argued that if there is a systematic way of thinking about ,reality which is absolutely and entirely internally coherent1 and from its own nature must remain so1 however the detailed content of our ideas should grow in complexity1 we may confidently say that such a scheme of thought faithfully represents the ,reality for which it stands1 so far as any thought can represent ,reality4 ,that is1 while the thought would not be the ,reality because it still remains thought1 which means something beyond its own existence1 it would require no modification of structure but only supplementation in detail to make it the truth4 ,but if we have anywhere thought which is thus internally coherent1 and from its own nature must remain so1 however knowledge may extend1 we have it surely in our metaphysical conception of the real as the absolutely individual4 ,thus the ontological proof appears1 in any sense in which it is not fallacious1 to amount merely to the principle that significant thought gives us genuine knowledge2 and therefore1 since the thoroughgoing individuality of structure of its object is presupposed in all significant thought1 ,reality must be a perfect individual4 ,that this perfect individual must further be 8,god10 i4e4 must have the special character ascribed to it by beliefs based upon specifically religious emotions1 does not follow4 ,how far the 8,god0 of religion is a correct conception of the metaphysical ,absolute1 we can only learn from the analysis of typical expressions of the religious experience itself4 ,and it is obvious that if by 8,god0 we mean anything less than the ,absolute whole1 the ontological proof ceases to have any cogency4 ,it is impossible to show that the possibility of significant thought implies the presence of a special finite being1 not empirically known to us1 within the ,absolute4 ,the 8cosmological0 proof1 or 8argument from the contingency of the world10 unlike the ontological1 has the appearance1 at first sight1 of starting with given empirical fact4 ,as summarised by ,kant for purposes of criticism1 it runs thus3--8,if anything at all exists1 there must be also an absolutely necessary being4 ,now1 ,i exist myself2 ergo1 the absolutely necessary being exists40 ,to make the proof quite complete1 it would be necessary to show that the being whose existence is affirmed in the minor premisses1 to wit1 myself1 is not itself the 8absolutely necessary being10 and the argument thus completed would become in principle identical with the second of the 8proofs0 given by ,descartes in the third ,meditation1 where it is inferred that if ,i1 a dependent being1 exist1 there must be a ,god on whom ,i and all things depend4#bcj ,as ,kant has pointed out1 the whole force of this inference rests upon the previous admission of the ontological argument4 ,by itself the cosmological proof only establishes the conclusion that if any dependent existence is real1 independent existence of some kind must be real also4 ,to convert this into a 8proof of the existence of ,god0 you must further go on to identify the 8independent existence0 thus reached with the 8most real0 or 8most perfect0 being of the ontological proof4 ,for otherwise it might be suggested1 as is done by one of the speakers in ,hume's dialogue1 that the series of phenomenal events itself1 taken as an aggregate1 is the 8necessary existence0 upon which the 8contingent existence0 of each several event depends4 8,did ,i show you the particular causes of each individual in a collection of twenty particles of matter1 ,i should think it very unreasonable should you afterwards ask me what was the cause of the whole twenty4 ,this is sufficiently explained in explaining the cause of the parts40 ,to avoid this objection1 we must go on to maintain that only the 8most perfect being0 can be an ultimately necessary being1 and that its 8necessary existence0 is a consequence of its character4 ,this1 as we have seen1 is the very assertion made in the ontological proof4 ,hence our criticisms of the ontological proof will be equally applicable to the cosmological4 ,if we combine the two1 restating them in accord with our previous remodelling of the former1 the argument will take the following form4 ,all propositions directly or indirectly refer to real existence4 ,hence it would be self-contradictory to assert that nothing exists4 ,but existence itself is only conceivable as individual4 ,hence the absolutely individual must be really existent4 ,and this is identical with the general principle of our own reasoning in ,book ,,ii4 of the present work4 ,clearly1 if valid1 it is valid simply as an argument for a metaphysical ,absolute2 it neither proves that ,absolute itself to be what we mean in religion by ,god1 nor affords any ground for asserting the existence of ,god as a finite individual within the ,absolute4#bca ,the physico-theological argument1 also known as the argument from design1 or the teleological proof1 differs from the preceding two in being in its current forms honestly empirical4 ,in the shape of an inference from the apparent presence of order and a regard for human good in the structure of nature to the existence of a wise and benevolent being or beings as the author or authors of nature1 it has been the most popular of all theistic arguments both in the ancient world1 where1 according to ,xenophon1 it was specially insisted upon by ,socrates1 and in the modern defences of theological beliefs against rationalistic criticism4 ,it must1 however1 be observed that the criticisms of ,hume and ,kant are absolutely fatal to the 8argument from design10 when it is put forward as a proof of the existence of a ,god of infinite goodness and wisdom4 ,at best1 as ,kant says1 the observed order and harmony of ,nature would enable us to infer a finite degree of wisdom and goodness in its author4 ,the assertion of the absolute harmoniousness and goodness of ,nature1 which we require to justify the inference to infinite wisdom and goodness in its author1 goes far beyond the limits of the empirically verifiable1 and can itself only be upheld by some form of the 8ontological proof40 ,hence the 8argument from design0 could at best prove a ,god whose wisdom and goodness are1 so far as knowable1 limited4 ,as ,hume forcibly puts the same point1 if the empirically known facts of the partial adaptation of ,nature to human purposes are valid1 as they stand1 to prove a wise and good intelligence1 are not the equally well-ascertained facts of the partial want of adaptation equally valid to prove defective goodness or defective wisdom8#bcb ,there is a deeper metaphysical reason for this difference between the results of the physico-theological and of the other 8proofs10 which may be briefly pointed out4 ,the whole conception of the order and systematic unity of the world as due to preconceived 8design0 is only intelligible if we suppose the author of that 8design0 to be finite1 and subject1 like ourselves1 to temporal mutability4 ,for in the notion of design itself are implied the severance of the mentally conceived ideal from the actuality which waits to be brought into accord with it1 and consequently also the time-process1 which we have already found to be characteristic of all finitude4 ,hence the physico-theological proof1 by itself1 can at best be used to establish the reality of finite 8gods10 not of 8,god10 because it works throughout with the categories of finitude4 ,upon the logical force of the argument1 as thus limited by its initial assumptions1 only one observation need be made4 ,what the reasoning asserts is not merely that 8,nature0 is in reality a system exhibiting individuality and purposive interest1 or even 8design10 but that it reveals the particular design of assisting and fostering human progress4 ,now1 whether this is so or not would appear to be a question of empirical fact only capable of determination by the methods applicable to other problems of the same empirical kind4 ,probably the lines along which it will have to be decided in the future are of the following general kind4 ,evolutionary science seems clearly to have shown that in the influences it knows1 e4g41 as 8natural0 and again as 8sexual selection10 we have processes which lead to beneficial results without being1 so far as we can see1 in the least directed by the conscious 8design0 of establishing those results4#bcc ,we should have to ask1 then1 whether there is actual ground for holding that such influences are not of themselves sufficient to account for the development of human civilisation1 so far as it is due to factors belonging to the 8environment40 ,if they are so sufficient1 the 8physico-theological0 argument for benevolent super-human agency in moulding the course of human development1 becomes superfluous2 if they are not1 their failure is1 so far1 good ground for the recognition of finite 8designing0 intelligences of a non-human kind as forming a factor in our environment4 ,in either case the question appears to be one of empirical fact1 and to be incapable of determination in advance on general metaphysical grounds4#bcd ,nor are we justified in assuming that 8design in nature10 supposing it to exist1 must always be directed to securing ends which are either intelligible to us1 or1 if intelligible1 8benevolent10 in the sense of furthering our own special human interests4 ,and here ,i must be content to leave the subject4 ,consult further3--,f4 ,h4 ,bradley1 ,appearance and ,reality1 chaps4 #be1 #bf2 ,j4 ,e4 ,mc,taggart1 ,studies in ,hegelian ,cosmology1 chaps4 #f1 #h2 ,j4 ,royce1 ,the ,world and the ,individual1 ,second ,series1 lects4 #i1 #aj4 ----- ,footnote #baa3 ,to take a couple of concrete illustrations4 ,it may be--,i do not say it is--conducive to moral goodness that there should be a general conviction that in the long run our individual happiness is strictly proportionate to our degree of virtue4 ,but there is no means whatever of showing that this belief is true1 and1 as ,mr4 ,bradley once pertinently argued against ,professor ,sidgwick1 no philosopher is entitled to assert its truth on moral grounds unless he is prepared to maintain that he could produce more goodness and less badness by such an exact proportioning of happiness to merit than without it4 ,again1 most of us would probably admit that ordinary moral rules1 such as that against wilful lying1 have exceptions4 ,but we are not bound to hold it conducive to moral goodness that every one should be aware of this4 ,footnote #bab3 ,i have not taken into account the argument from origins1 because it does not appear relevant4 ,that our intellectual interest in 8truth0 is historically a derivative from an interest in the 8useful10 8science0 an offshoot of the arts1 is1 as we have seen for ourselves1 true enough1 but it does not follow that the truth which is the ideal of the developed intellect is the same thing as the 8useful0 from which it has arisen4 ,we rejected the claims of the mechanical postulate to be final truth1 not because of their origin in the needs of industrial science1 but because1 as tested by the standard of final self-consistency1 they were unsatisfactory to the intellect4 ,footnote #bac3 1 to use the poet's phrase4 ,footnote #bad3 ,not1 of course1 pure progress4 ,it does not require profound insight to discover that moral progress1 like everything else1 has its price1 and that all 8progressive evolution0 implies 8degeneration0 as one of its aspects4 ,but the moral progress of society will be genuine if1 on the whole1 our gain is--from the moralist's special standpoint--more than our loss4 ,we have no reason to despair of our kind if the impartial historian1 comparing the facts--not the self-complacent fictions of popular optimism--about our current social life with the facts--not the fancies of ,apologetics--about social life1 say1 in the first century of the ,roman ,empire1 can pronounce that there has been advance on the whole4 ,footnote #bae3 ,the 8religious0 temperament is apparently shown by experience to be1 in its intenser manifestations1 quite as much an idiosyncrasy of congenital endowment as the 8sthetic40 ,there are persons1 not otherwise mentally defective1 who seem to be almost devoid of it1 just as there are others who have little or no sense of humour or feeling for beauty4 ,as many of these persons are ethically excellent1 some of them exceptionally so1 and as again the religious temperament is often found strongly developed in persons of quite inferior ethical development1 there seems to be no direct connection between religious sensibility and moral excellence1 though1 of course1 religious feeling is the most powerful of moral influences when it is conjoined in the same person with ethical fervour4 ,for a masterly description of some typical forms of religious feeling and belief the reader should consult ,professor ,james's ,varieties of ,religious ,experience4 ,he will find my own views as to the philosophical interpretation of religion1 if he cares to know them1 in the final chapter of my ,problem of ,conduct4 ,footnote #baf3 ,so ,hegel insisted that the fundamental significance of the ,christian religion lies neither in the historical career nor in the moral teaching of ,jesus 7which indeed contained little that had not already been uttered in the form of precept or principle71 but in the recognition by the ,christian community of the union of ,god and ,man as a fact already realised in individual form in the person of ,christ4 ,see ,dr4 ,mc,taggart's essay on 8,hegelianism and ,christianity0 in ,studies in ,hegelian ,cosmology4 ,footnote #bag3 ,so ,plato suggested in the second book of the ,republic1 that ,god is not the cause of all that happens to us1 but only of the good things that befall us4 ,perhaps1 however1 ,plato is here consciously adapting his expression to current theological doctrine of which he did not fully approve4 ,for a modern defence of the same conception of a finite ,god1 see ,dr4 ,rashdall's essay in ,personal ,idealism4 ,other reasons which have often led to the same view1 such as the desire to think of ,god as a mutable being like ourselves1 capable of being influenced in ,his attitude toward us by our attitude towards ,him1 seem to rest too much upon idiosyncrasies of private feeling to be of serious philosophical weight4 ,if private feeling is to count at all1 one does not see why that of those who would feel outraged by such a conception of a finite changeable ,god should not be allowed an equal significance with that of their opponents4 ,it is a palpable mistake to treat private feeling1 whatever its worth may be1 as all on one side in this matter4 ,footnote #bah3 ,for if we once suppose that we know the universe1 in which 8,god0 is only one finite being among others1 to be so constituted as to correspond to this demand1 it will be the whole of which 8,god0 is one factor1 and not 8,god0 by ,himself1 which will become the supreme object of religious emotion4 ,thus we may say1 until ,god is thought of as the individual whole1 ,he is not fully ,god4 ,footnote #bai3 ,it should be scarcely necessary to point out that the ,absolute1 if it can be worshipped at all1 can be worshipped only as conceived as fully individual4 ,when it is falsely thought of as a 8collection0 or 8aggregate0 or 8totality0 of independent things1 it is no more divine than any other collection4 ,this is the fatal objection to vulgar 8,pantheism40 ,how far any of the serious thinkers who are popularly charged with 8,pantheism0 have countenanced this view of the ,absolute as a mere collection1 is another matter4 ,footnote #bbj3 ,i am afraid that this essentially irreligious feeling has a great deal to do with the complaints sometimes urged against the ,absolute as a poor substitute for a 8living ,god40 ,partly these complaints spring1 no doubt1 from the mistaken notion that the ,absolute is not a concrete individual but a mere 8collective concept40 ,but they seem also to be motived by a suspicion that a finite ,deity might be more amenable than the ,absolute to our wish to have our ideals gratified in our own fashion4 ,and so far as this is the motive of them1 such complaints are essentially impious4 ,footnote #bba3 ,the reader will naturally think of the famous ,socratic paradox1 that 8wrong doing is error10 8vice is ignorance40 ,if we interpret this to mean that the fundamental advantage of the good man over the bad lies in his truer insight into what he seriously wants1 it seems to be true4 ,footnote #bbb3 ,enneads1 ,i4 #h1 #ae 7quoted and translated in ,whittaker1 the ,neoplatonists1 p4 #hc74 ,plotinus had just previously made the correct observation that to deny the existence of evil in any and every sense means to deny the existence of good4 7 1 47 ,we might thus say1 if good is to be at all1 evil must have some kind of relative or phenomenal existence as its antecedent condition4 ,but1 as thus serving as a condition for the realisation of good1 evil is itself1 from a more universal point of view1 good1 and therefore its existence as evil only apparent4 ,on the whole question of the position of evil in the world-order1 see the admirable essay on 8,sin0 in ,dr4 ,mc,taggart's ,studies in ,hegelian ,cosmology4 ,footnote #bbc3 ,when it is said that the ,absolute1 if it exists1 must be morally indifferent1 there is often a conscious or unconscious confusion of thought4 ,the ,absolute must certainly be 8indifferent0 in the sense that it does not feel the internal discord of hatred and animosity against any of its constituents4 ,deus1 as ,spinoza says1 neminem potest odio habere4 ,for the ,absolute is not one of the two combatants2 it is at once both combatants and the field of combat4 ,but to infer that the ,absolute1 because devoid of the feelings of hatred and private partisanship1 must be indifferent in the sense that our goodness and badness make no difference to our place in it1 is a fallacy of equivocation for which unconsciousness and bona fides are scarcely sufficient excuse4 ,footnote #bbd3 ,thus ,i do not understand why1 apart from respect for the traditions of ,christianity1 ,dr4 ,rashdall should hold that ,god1 in his sense of the word1 is one and not many4 ,his argument appears to me to identify ,god with the ,absolute1 where it is required to maintain ,god's unity1 and to distinguish them as soon as it becomes a question of proving ,god's 8,personality0 7see his essay in ,personal ,idealism74 ,professor ,james appears more logical in his obvious readiness to reckon with polytheism as a possible consequence of his denial of ,god's infinity 7,varieties of ,religious ,experience1 p4 #ebd ff474 ,footnote #bbe3 ,kant's famous onslaught will be found in the ,kritik der ,reinen ,vernunft1 ,transcendental ,dialectic1 bk4 ii4 div4 #c 78,the ,ideal of ,pure ,reason071 #c-g4 ,hume's criticisms are contained in his posthumous ,dialogues concerning ,natural ,religion4 ,footnote #bbf3 ,kant's criticism had been in part anticipated on the first circulation of the ,meditations by both ,mersenne and ,gassendi4 ,see particularly ,gassendi's strictures on ,descartes' confusion of existence with properties in the 8,fifth ,objections10 with ,descartes' unsatisfactory reply4 ,leibnitz repeated the same objection1 and proposed to amend the ,cartesian proof by a formal demonstration that ,god's existence is possible1 i4e4 does not imply a formal contradiction4 ,he then argues--,if ,god's existence is possible1 ,he exists 7by the ,cartesian proof74 ,but ,god's existence is possible1 therefore ,god exists4 ,see1 e4g41 ,leibnitz1 ,works1 ed4 ,erdmann1 p4 #agg2 and ,latta1 ,monadology of ,leibniz1 p4 #bgd4 ,hume's comments are even more akin to ,kant's4 8,whatever we conceive as existent we can also conceive as non-existent4 ,there is no being1 therefore1 whose non-existence implies a contradiction4 ,consequently there is no being whose existence is demonstrable40 7,dialogues concerning ,natural ,religion1 part #i47 ,footnote #bbg3 ,appearance and ,reality1 chap4 #bd4 ,footnote #bbh3 ,no thought can be merely and absolutely false1 any more than any act can be merely and without qualification bad4 ,though words may be entirely meaningless1 thoughts cannot be4 ,footnote #bbi3 ,the appeal to experiment is no objection to the principle4 ,for in making the experiment we do not1 of course1 get out of the circle of our thoughts1 and the experiment only affords a criterion of truth in so far as it leaves us with a new thought which can only be brought into systematic harmony with our old ideas in one determinate way4 ,except as interpreted by thought1 the experiment has no bearing on our knowledge4 ,footnote #bcj3 ,this was also a favourite argument with ,leibnitz1 as ,kant notes4 ,for an acute examination of ,leibnitz's use of it and the other 8proofs10 see ,b4 ,russell's ,philosophy of ,leibniz chap4 #ae4 ,for ,hume's objections to it1 see the already quoted part #i of the ,dialogue concerning ,natural ,religion4 ,the other 8proof0 of the ,third ,meditation1 namely1 that my possession of an idea of ,god1 which ,i could not have derived from empirical sources1 proves the reality of the idea's object1 is only a special form of the ontological argument from idea to existence4 ,footnote #bca3 ,as thus remodelled1 the double ontologico-cosmological argument might be attacked on two grounds--7#a7 ,that it only proves1 once more1 that if we admit that all propositions are concerned with real existence1 either directly or remotely1 we must admit the existence of the ,absolute1 but does not demonstrate that all propositions are so concerned4 7#b7 ,that in saying that existence is only conceivable as individual we fall back into the ,cartesian misconception of existence as a predicate4 ,i should reply1 7#a7 that the validity of the premiss in question cannot be denied without being confirmed in the act of denial4 ,i4e4 unless the suggested proposition that 8some propositions at least have no reference to a reality beyond their own presence as psychical facts in my mind10 itself has the very objective reference in question1 it has no meaning1 and is therefore no genuine proposition2 7#b7 that we must distinguish between the what and the that of existence4 ,the 8that0 of existence is not conceivable at all1 but our position is that this inconceivable that is only logically1 not really1 separable from a what1 and that it is precisely this inseparability of the that and the what which we mean by 8individuality40 ,footnote #bcb3 ,dialogues concerning ,natural ,religion1 part #aa4 ,footnote #bcc3 ,this is quite consistent with our own view1 that all real processes are teleological in the sense of being marked by subjective interest4 ,for 7a7 not by any means all teleological process is actual 8design0 or 8volition0 7impulse1 organic craving1 habit1 etc41 are all cases in point72 and 7b7 actual volition need not always be volition for the result it actually produces4 ,sexual selection in man would be an instance of a process which may take the form of actual volition1 but in that case is rarely1 if ever1 volition for that improvement of the stock which de facto issues from it4 ,footnote #bcd3 ,cf4 ,bradley1 ,appearance and ,reality1 pp4 #bjj1 #dif-dig 7#ast ed474 ,professor ,flint's attempted reply to the ,humian and ,kantian criticism of the theistic 8proofs0 7,agnosticism1 chap4 #d7 has not induced me to modify any of the opinions expressed in this chapter4 ----- ,,chapter ,,vi ,,conclusion #a4 ,can our ,absolute ,experience be properly called the 8union of ,thought and ,will08 ,the ,absolute is certainly the final realisation of our intellectual and our practical ideals4 ,but 7#a7 it includes aspects1 such as1 e4g4 sthetic feeling1 pleasure1 and pain1 which are neither ,thought nor ,will4 7#b7 ,and it cannot possess either ,thought or ,will as such4 ,both ,thought and ,will1 in their own nature1 presuppose a ,reality which transcends mere ,thought and mere ,will4 #b4 ,our conclusion may in a sense be said to involve an element of ,agnosticism1 and again of ,mysticism4 ,but it is only agnostic in holding that we do not know the precise nature of the ,absolute ,experience4 ,it implies no distrust of the validity of knowledge1 so far as it goes1 and bases its apparently agnostic result on the witness of knowledge itself4 ,similarly1 it is mystical in transcending1 not in refusing to recognise1 the constructions of understanding and will4 #c4 ,metaphysics adds nothing to our information1 and yields no fresh springs of action4 ,it is finally only justified by the persistency of the impulse to speculate on the nature of things as a whole4 #a4 ,it seems advisable1 in bringing this work to a conclusion1 to bring together by way of recapitulation a few important consequences of our general principle which could not receive all the notice they deserve in the course of our previous exposition4 ,our main contention1 which it may be hoped our discussion of special problems has now confirmed1 was that the whole of ,reality ultimately forms a single infinite individual system1 of which the material is psychical matter of fact1 and that the individuality of this system lies ultimately in a teleological unity of subjective interest4 ,further1 we saw that all subordinate reality is again in its degree individual1 and that the contents of the ,absolute thus form a hierarchy of ascending orders of reality and individuality1 and that in this way1 while all finite individual existence is1 as finite1 appearance and not ultimate ,reality1 appearances1 themselves are of varied degrees of worth1 and that1 apart from the appearances1 there is no reality at all4 ,and finally1 we learned that all the aspirations of finite individuals must be somehow met and made good in the ultimate ,reality1 though not necessarily in the form in which they are consciously entertained by the finite aspirant4 ,this last conclusion naturally suggests the question1 whether it would be a correct description of the ultimate ,reality to call it the 8union of ,thought and ,will40 ,i will briefly indicate the reasons why such a description appears to be misleading4 7#a7 ,the ,absolute may no doubt be called the 8union of ,thought and ,will10 in the sense that its complete individual structure corresponds at once to our logical ideal of systematic interconnection1 and our ethico-religious ideal of realised individual purpose4 ,but it must be added that the ,absolute appears to possess aspects which cannot fairly be brought under either of these heads4 sthetic feeling1 for instance1 and the sthetic judgments based upon it1 must somehow be included as an integral aspect in the absolute whole of experience2 yet sthetic feeling cannot properly be regarded either as thought or as will4 ,and the same objection might be raised in the case of pleasure4 ,however closely pleasure may be connected with conative efforts towards the retention or renewal of the pleasant experience1 it seems quite clear that the 8pure0 pleasures#bce are not forms of conscious 8conation10 and that even in those 8mixed0 pleasures1 which depend in part for their pleasantness upon relief from the tension of precedent craving or desire1 analysis enables us to distinguish two elements1 that of direct pleasure in the new experience1 and that of the feeling of relief from the craving4 ,hence1 if it be admitted that the ,absolute contains pleasure1 it must also be admitted that it contains something which is neither thought nor will4 ,the same argument would hold good1 ,i think1 even if we held with the pessimists1 that the ,absolute contains a balance of pain over pleasure4 ,for1 intimate as the connection is between pain and thwarted conation1 it seems a psychological monstrosity to maintain that felt pain is always and everywhere an experience of the frustration of actual conscious effort2 and unless this monstrosity can be maintained1 we must recognise in pain too a fundamental experience-quality irreducible to thought or will4 ,thus1 at best1 the description of the ,absolute1 as the union of thought and will1 would be incomplete4 7#b7 ,but1 further1 the description1 if taken to mean that the ,absolute itself has thought and will1 as such1 would be not only incomplete but false4 ,for actual thought and actual will can easily be shown to be essentially finite functions1 neither of which could ever reach its goal and become finally self-consistent1 without ceasing to be mere thought or mere will4 ,thus actual thought always involves an aspect of discrepancy between its content and reference4 ,it is always thought about a reality which falls1 in part1 outside the thought itself1 is only imperfectly represented by the thought's content1 and for that very reason is a not-self to the thought for which it is an object4 ,and the whole process of thinking may be described as a series of attempts on the part of thought to transcend this limitation4 ,so long as the content of the thought is not adequate to the reality which it thinks1 so long1 that is1 as there is anything left to know about the reality1 thought restlessly presses forward towards an unreached consummation4 ,but if the correspondence ideae cum ideato ever became perfect1 thought's object would cease to contain anything which went beyond thought's own content4 ,it would no longer be an 8other0 or 8not-self0 to the thought which knew it1 and thus thought and its object would have become a single thing4 ,but in this consummation thought would have lost its special character as an actual process1 just as the object would have lost its character of a something1 partly at least1 8given0 from without4 ,both mere thought and mere existence1 in becoming one1 would cease to have the character which belongs to them in finite experience precisely in virtue of our failure completely to transcend the chasm between them4 ,the same is the case with will4 ,if1 indeed1 by will we mean a genuine actual process of volition1 this result is already included in our criticism of the claim of thought as such to persist unchanged in the ,absolute4 ,for all genuine will implies possession of and actuation by an idea which is entertained explicitly as an unrealised idea1 and is thus inseparable from thought4 7,this1 ,i may incidentally observe once more1 is why we carefully avoided speaking of the 8subjective interest0 we found in all experience-processes as 8will407 ,but even if we improperly widen the interpretation of the term 8will0 to include all conative process1 the general conclusion will remain the same4 ,for all such processes imply the contrast between existence as it comes to us in the here and now of actual feeling1 and existence as it should be1 and as we seek to make it1 for the satisfaction of our various impulses1 cravings1 and desires4 ,it is the felt1 even when not explicitly understood1 discrepancy between these two aspects of a reality1 which is ultimately one and harmonious under the discrepancy1 that supplies all actual conative process with its motive force4 ,and hence we seem driven to hold that conation as such1 i4e4 as actual striving or effort1 can find no place in an experience in which the aspects of ideality and real existence are once for all finally united4 ,if we cannot avoid speaking of such an experience in terms of our own intellectual1 and again of our own volitional processes1 we must at least remember that while such language is true in the sense that the all-embracing harmonious experience of the ,absolute is the unattainable goal towards which finite intellect and finite volition are alike striving1 yet each in attaining its consummation1 if it ever could attain it1 would cease to be itself as we know it1 and pass into a higher and directer form of apprehension1 in which it could no longer be distinguished from the other4 ,in the old medival terminology1 the ,absolute must be said to contain actual intellect and actual volition1 not formaliter but eminenter4#bcf #b4 ,it follows from all this that1 just because the absolute whole is neither mere thought nor mere will1 nor an artificial synthesis of the two1 mere truth for the intellect can never be quite the same thing as ultimate ,reality4 ,for in mere truth we get ,reality only in its intellectual aspect as that which affords the highest satisfaction to thought's demand for consistency and systematic unity in its object4 ,and1 as we have seen1 this demand can never be quite satisfied by thought itself4 ,for thought1 to remain thought1 must always be something less than the whole reality which it knows4 ,the reality must always contain a further aspect which is not itself thought1 and is not capable of being apprehended in the form of a thought-content4 ,or1 what is the same thing1 while all reality is individual1 all the thought-constructions through which we know its character must remain general4 ,we are always trying in our thought to grasp the individual as such1 and always failing4 ,as individual1 the reality never becomes the actual content of our thought1 but remains a 8transcendent0 object to which thought refers1 or which it means4 ,and hence our truest thought can at best give us but an imperfect satisfaction for its own demand of congruence1 between thought's content and its object4 ,the reality can never be ultimately merely what it is for our thought4 ,and this conclusion obviously lends a certain justification both to the agnostic and to the mystic4 ,it is important to understand how far that justification extends4 ,first1 then1 a word as to the limits of justifiable ,agnosticism4 ,our conclusion warranted us in asserting that ,reality must contain aspects which are not thought1 and again must combine thought with these other aspects in a unity which is not itself merely intellectual4 ,in other words1 we had to confess that we cannot understand the concrete character of the ,infinite ,experience1 or1 to put it in a more homely way1 we do not know how it would feel to be 8,god40 ,and if this is ,agnosticism1 we clearly shall have to own that we too are agnostics4 ,but our result gave us no ground for doubting our own general conviction as to the place which intellect and truth hold in the ,absolute4 ,on the other hand1 it left us with every reason for trusting that conviction4 ,for our conclusion that mere truth cannot be the same thing as ultimate ,reality was itself based upon the principle that only harmonious individuality is finally real1 and this is the very principle employed by the intellect itself whenever it judges one thought-construction relatively higher and truer than another4 ,thus our ,agnosticism1 if it is to be called so1 neither discredits our human estimate of the relative truth of different theories about the real1 nor lends any support to the notion that 8,knowledge is relative0 in the sense that there may conceivably be no correspondence between ,reality and the scheme of human knowledge as a whole4 ,it is based not on the distrust of human reason1 but upon the determination to trust that reason implicitly1 and it claims1 in declaring mere truth to fall short of ,reality1 to be expressing reason's own verdict upon itself4 ,hence it does not1 like vulgar ,agnosticism1 leave us in the end in pure uncertainty as to the ultimate structure and upshot1 so to say1 of the world1 but definitely holds that we have genuine and trustworthy knowledge of the type of that structure and the nature of its materials4 ,and it is upon this positive knowledge1 and not upon an uncritical appeal to unknown possibilities1 that it rests its denial of the simple identity of ,reality with thought itself4 ,for all we know1 says the common ,agnosticism1 our thought is sheer illusion1 and therefore we must confess that we have in the end no notion what the reality of the world may be4 ,thought is not illusory1 says our systematic ,idealism1 and therefore its own witness that ,reality is an individual whole of experience which is more than thought is a positive contribution to our knowledge4 ,between these two positions there may be a superficial resemblance1 but there is an essential difference in principle4 ,so again with the mystical element in our result4 ,in holding that all genuine individuality1 finite or infinite1#bcg involves a type of immediate felt unity which transcends reduction to the relational categories of thought and will1 we may fairly be said to have reached a conclusion which1 in a sense1 is mystical4 ,but our result is not ,mysticism1 if by ,mysticism is meant a doctrine which seeks ultimate ,reality in mere unanalysed immediate feeling as such4 ,the results of intellectual and volitional construction have not been treated by us as illusory and as a sort of intellectual and moral mistake4 ,on the other hand1 we urged that the ultimate unity of the real must transcend1 and not merely fall short of1 the rational scheme of thought and will4 ,and we consequently insisted that our result1 so far as it is a mystical one1 can only be justified by following out the constructions of the logical intellect and the ethical will to their final consequence1 and showing that each of them itself demands completion in an individual ,reality which includes and transcends both4 ,to quote the admirable words of ,dr4 ,mc,taggart3 8,a ,mysticism which ignored the claims of the understanding would no doubt be doomed4 ,none ever went about to break logic1 but in the end logic broke him4 ,but there is a ,mysticism which starts from the standpoint of the understanding1 and only departs from it in so far as that standpoint shows itself not to be ultimate1 but to postulate something beyond itself4 ,to transcend the lower is not to ignore it40 ,and it is only in this sense that philosophy is justified in asserting 8above all knowledge and volition one all-embracing unity1 which is only not true1 only not good1 because all truth and all goodness are but shadows of its absolute perfection40#bch #c4 ,the reader who has persevered to the conclusion of this volume may perhaps1 on laying it down1 experience a certain feeling of dissatisfaction4 ,our investigations1 it might be complained1 have added nothing to our stock of scientific information about the contents of the world1 and have supplied no fresh practical incentives towards the strenuous pursuit of an elevated moral or religious ideal4 ,i must at once admit the justice of this hypothetical criticism1 and dispute its relevancy4 ,quite apart from the defects due to personal shortcomings and confusions1 it is inherent in the nature of metaphysical study that it can make no positive addition to our information1 and can of itself supply no motives for practical endeavour4 ,and the student who turns to our science as a substitute for empirical ,physics or ,psychology1 or for practical morality1 is bound to go away disappointed4 ,the reason of this we have already had occasion to see4 ,metaphysics has to presuppose the general principles of the various sciences and the general forms of practical experience as the materials upon which it works4 ,its object as a study is not to add to or to modify these materials1 but to afford some coherent and systematic satisfaction for the intellectual curiosity which we all feel at times as to the general nature of the whole to which these various materials belong1 and the relative truth and clearness with which that general nature is expressed in the different departments of experience4 ,its aim is the organisation1 not the enlargement of knowledge4 ,hence for the student whose interests lie more in the enlargement of human knowledge by the discovery of new facts and laws1 than in its organisation into a coherent whole1 ,metaphysics is probably undesirable1 or desirable only as a protection against the intrusion of unrecognised and uncriticised metaphysical assumptions into the domain of empirical service4 ,and similarly for the practical man whose interests in life are predominantly ethical1 the main1 if not the sole1 value of metaphysical study lies in its critical function of exposing false metaphysical assumptions1 which1 if acted upon1 might impair the vigour of spontaneous moral effort4 ,but for those in whom the speculative desire to form some coherent conception of the scheme of things to which we belong as a whole is strong1 ,metaphysics has a higher importance4 ,in such minds the impulse to reflect on the nature of existence as a whole1 if debarred from systematic and thorough gratification1 is certain to find its outlet in unsystematic and uncriticised imaginative construction4 ,metaphysics they will certainly have1 and if not conscious and coherent1 then unconscious and incoherent ,metaphysics4 ,the soul that is not at rest in itself without some 8sight of that immortal sea which brought it hither10 if hindered from beholding the object of its quest through the clear glass of rational reflection1 will none the less seek to discern it amid the distorting hazes and mists of superstition4 ,it is in such seekers after the ,infinite that ,metaphysics has its natural and proper followers1 and for them the study is its own justification and its own reward4 ,if a work like the present should prove of any help to such students1 whether by offering positive suggestions which they can accept1 or by assisting them to know definitely why they reject its conclusions1 it will perhaps have achieved as much as its writer could reasonably expect4 ,consult further3--,f4 ,h4 ,bradley1 ,appearance and ,reality1 chap4 #bg2 ,j4 ,e4 ,mc,taggart1 ,studies m ,hegelian ,cosmology1 chap4 #i4 ----- ----- ,footnote #bce3 ,i use the epithet in its familiar ,platonic sense4 ,the 8pure0 pleasure is that which is not dependent1 in whole or in part1 for its pleasantness upon a previous 1 or actual experience of craving or desire4 ,i do not mean1 as ,plato possibly did1 that a 8mixed0 pleasure1 preceded by such 1 is a contrast-effect without positive quality of its own4 ,footnote #bcf3 ,compare the argument of ,appearance and ,reality1 chap4 #bf1 pp4 #dfi-dhe 7#ast ed471 and the famous scholium to ,prop4 #ag of part #a of ,spinoza's ,ethics1 where it is contended that 8if intellect and volition belong to the eternal essence of ,god1 each of these attributes must at least be understood in a different sense from the current40 ,footnote #bcg3 ,i say 8finite or infinite0 advisedly4 ,the mystic's condemnation of the relational scheme as inadequate to express the full nature of the real1 holds good just as much in application to actual finite experience as in application to the ultimate whole4 ,we may say not only of 8,god10 but of human persons1 that they are much more than the 8union of thought and will0 as such4 ,and in personal human love1 no less than in the saint's 8beatific vision0 or the philosopher's 8intellectual love of ,god10 we have a type of experience which may for some psychological purposes be analysed into a combination of ideational and volitional processes1 but emphatically does not1 in its concrete existence1 consist of a synthesis of actual ideas and actual volitions4 ,see ante1 p4 #aeb4 ,footnote #bch3 ,studies in ,hegelian ,cosmology1 p4 #bib4 ----- ---------------------------------------- -------------------------------- ,,index ,absolute1 meaning of1 #ec ff42 general character of1 #fj ff42 not unknowable1 #ga ff42 not a 8self10 #cdc ff42 is it a society8 #ajj1 #cdg ff42 a spiritual individual1 #ih ff42 not necessarily the same as 8,god10 #cii ff42 not 8union of thought and will10 #dji ff4 ,activity not identical with conation1 #ee2 and causation1 #afi2 empirical nature of1 #ahi4 ,agnosticism1 #fh1 #fi1 #ga1 #gb2 how far justifiable1 #dab4 ,appearance and ,reality1 connection between1 #aje ff4 ,aristotle1 #f1 #db1 #ig1 #bff1 #cfa1 #chf4 ,attention1 selective1 #ee1 #ff1 #hj2 8span0 of1 #bbf1 #bdd4 ,avenarius1 #ce1 #de1 #hj1 #aba1 #agd1 #bih ff4 #cae4 ,baldwin1 ,j4 ,m41 #bjf4 ,berkeley1 #bf1 #fd ff41 #ge1 #ahd1 #ahe1 #bja ff4 ,body1 my own1 as describable object1 #bhb4 ,body1 my own1 and others1 #bjc ff4 ,body and ,soul1 theories of1 #cac ff42 in what sense the same1 #ccb4 ,bosanquet1 ,b41 #ai1 #bf1 #afd4 ,bradley1 ,f4 ,h41 #i1 #aa1 #bc1 #bf1 #ee1 #fg1 #hh1 #ij1 #aca1 #adf1 #aii1 #bbg1 #bdc1 #bei1 #bhi1 #cah1 #cbf1 #cce1 #cch1 #cee1 #cfd1 #cgj1 #chd1 #daa4 ,causation1 #afe ff42 cause not identical with ground1 #aff2 causation a postulate1 #afg ff42 popular as distinguished from scientific sense1 #afi2 causation and the indefinite regress1 #agg ff42 continuity of causation1 #aga ff42 ,immanent and ,transeunt ,causality1 #ahc ff42 psychophysical causation1 #cbb ff4 ,causes1 ,plurality of1 #ahj ff4 ,chance1 8pure10 meaning of1 #bca1 #bcb2 chance and 8free-will10 #cgh4 ,change1 #aeh-afd4 ,character and freedom1 #cgd4 ,choice and motives1 #cgc4 ,consciousness1 a misleading term1 #gi4 ,consequence 7see ,ground74 ,continuity1 nature of1 #aga 7see ,causation72 continuity of space and time1 #bdd1 #bej4 ,contradiction1 principle of1 #ai ff4 ,cosmology ,rational1 nature of1 #dc-di1 #aib-aig4 ,couturat1 ,l41 #adi1 #bfj4 ,dedekind1 #aaf1 #adi1 #aga4 ,degrees of ,reality1 #ajh ff4 ,descartes1 #abh1 #ahe1 #cah1 #djj ff4 ,description1 as scientific ideal1 #agd2 in physical ,science1 #bhj ff42 in ,psychology1 #cjh ff4 ,determinism1 #cgj-cgf4 ,discontinuity of teleological series1 #caa4 ,distance in space and time1 #bej4 ,ends in ,nature1 #bgb1 #dje1 #djf4 ,energy1 conservation of1 #bib2 kinetic and non-kinetic1 #bia2 doctrine of1 and psychophysical interaction1 #cbb ff4 ,epiphenomenalism1 #cag1 #cah-cbj4 ,epistemology and ,metaphysics1 #af4 ,evil1 problem of1 #cia ff41 #cie ff4 ,evolution1 not identical with mere change1 #bfg2 implies real ends1 #bfh ff42 is of finite beings only1 #bgd ff42 implies real progress and degeneration1 #bge2 originates new individuals1 #bgf4 ,experience1 what1 #bc ff41 #cc ff42 8pure10 #ce1 #ed4 ,feeling1 #bc ff41 #ee2 in the ,absolute1 #dfg ff4 ,freedom1 meaning of1 #cei ff4 ,free-will1 origins of belief in1 #cfa ff4 ,geulincx1 #ahd1 #ahe1 #ahf1 #cag4 ,gibson1 ,w4 ,r4 ,b41 #bhh1 #cbi1 #cff4 ,god1 proofs of being of1 #djj ff4 ,ground and ,consequence1 meaning of principle of1 #afd1 #afe4 ,harmony1 ,pre-established1 #ahg1 #cag4 ,hegel1 #dj ff41 #db ff41 #cia1 #dja4 ,herbart1 #ci1 #db1 #fh4 ,hobhouse1 ,l4 ,t41 #gd1 #acg1 #ach1 #aii4 ,hume1 #bi1 #g1 #acc1 #afi1 #agb1 #ahc1 #djj ff4 ,identity1 ,psychophysical1 doctrine of1 #ajb1 #cba1 #cca1 #ccb4 ,identity1 a teleological concept1 #cce4 7,see also ,unity of ,thing74 ,imitation1 significance of1 for personality1 #bjf4 ,immanent ,causality1 #ahc ff4 ,immediacy1 #cb4 8,immortality10 #ced ff4 ,indeterminism1 #cgf-cgi4 ,individuality1 nature of1 #eg1 #ih ff42 degrees of1 #aji ff42 infinite and finite1 #aae ff4 ,infinite ,regress1 #adh ff41 #aef2 in space and time1 #bee ff41 #bei2 in causal relation1 #agg4 ,infinity1 meaning of1 #aaf4 ,interaction1 ,psychophysical1 #cag1 #cbi-cca4 ,introjection1 meaning of1 #ha2 origin of1 #ha1 #bii ff42 justification of1 #cja ff4 ,james1 ,w41 #ec1 #ia1 #cah1 #cgj1 #chc1 #cij1 #djj4 ,kant1 #aa1 #bd1 #ci1 #dc1 #fi1 #acd1 #ahh1 #bdb ff41 #bei1 #cei1 #cff1 #chg1 #djj ff4 ,law1 meaning of1 #bah ff4 ,laws in ,nature1 #aif1 #bbi4 ,leibnitz1 #fh1 #hb1 #hf1 #ia ff41 #aag1 #ahg ff41 #cag1 #cff1 #dja1 #djd4 ,locke1 #abh1 #acf1 #bjj1 #cah1 #cec1 #cfe1 #cff4 ,lotze1 #da1 #db1 #acc1 #bbd1 #bhi4 ,mach1 ,e41 #agd1 #age1 #aib1 #bbc1 #bbh1 #bhc1 #bij4 ,machine1 nature of a1 #bcf1 #bcg4 ,mc,taggart1 ,j4 ,e41 #cde1 #ceg1 #cia1 #cih1 #dac4 ,malebranche1 #ahd1 #ahe1 #cag4 ,mass1 definition of1 #bhi2 conservation of1 #bij2 a relative concept1 #bij1 #bia4 ,matter1 meaning of1 #aih ff4 ,mechanical view of ,nature1 #bcc ff41 #bcg ff41 #bhc ff42 postulates of1 #bhd1 #bib ff4 ,mechanism1 meaning of1 #aif1 #bcg ff4 ,method of ,metaphysics1 #ch ff4 ,mill1 ,j4 ,s41 #bd1 #ahj ff41 #cgj4 ,monadism1 #hf1 #ia1 #id4 ,monism1 #he4 ,mnsterberg1 ,h41 #de1 #fg1 #aih1 #bhc1 #cjc ff41 #cae1 #cah1 #cba1 #cbd1 #cbi4 ,mysticism1 #ad1 #cc1 #aec2 in what sense justifiable1 #dac4 ,necessity and causal relation1 #ahc4 ,newton1 #abh1 #bjj4 ,nietzsche1 #bgf4 ,number-series1 #aea ff41 #bdh-bej1 #bei4 ,occasionalism1 #ahd1 #cag4 ,ontology1 character of1 #db4 ,order1 a teleological concept1 #aah2 order in space and time1 #bea4 ,organism1 nature of a1 #if4 ,parallelism1 ,psychophysical1 #cag1 #cbj-cbi4 ,pearson1 ,k41 #ge1 #bij4 ,phenomenalism1 #aj1 #acf4 ,physical order1 nature of the1 #aid ff41 #aih1 #bjh1 #bhb4 ,plato1 #c1 #ee1 #gg1 #ie1 #bgf1 #cff1 #chf1 #cic1 #cih1 #dji4 ,pleasure-pain1 #ee1 #cdd4 ,plotinus1 #cih4 ,pluralism1 #hf ff4 ,position not a principle of individuation1 #eh2 relativity of1 #bec4 ,pragmatism1 #cag4 ,prediction in science1 #bai ff4 ,progress not infinite1 #chg-chi4 ,psychical order1 nature of the1 #bih ff4 ,psychology1 character of1 as a science1 #bif ff4 ,psychology and ,physiology1 #cjc ff4 ,psychology1 ,rational1 nature of1 #dc ff4 ,purpose1 nature of1 #ee ff4 ,qualities1 primary and secondary1 #abh ff4 ,quality and relation1 #adj ff4 ,quality and substance1 #abh ff4 ,quality1 spatial and temporal1 #bdd4 ,rashdall1 ,h41 #cdg1 #cic1 #djj4 ,realism1 ,agnostic1 #fh1 #ga1 #gb2 ,dogmatic1 #fi1 #gb-ge4 ,relation and quality1 #adj ff4 ,relations and relatedness1 #aee4 ,religion1 metaphysical presuppositions of1 #chi ff4 ,responsibility and the self1 #cce4 ,royce1 ,j41 #ac1 #cc1 #ea1 #ef1 #gf1 #aaf1 #ade1 #adh ff41 #bjf1 #bbf1 #bci1 #bfc1 #bgj1 #bgg1 #cjg1 #cih4 ,russell1 ,b41 #cf1 #eh1 #ia1 #adb1 #ahi1 #bdc1 #bej1 #bec1 #djd4 ,self1 #ih1 #ajg2 nature of1 #ccd-cdj2 a teleological concept1 #cce2 temporal character of1 #cda1 #cdb4 ,self-consciousness1 genuine and fictitious1 #gi4 ,sidgwick1 ,h41 #acj1 #cei1 #cgj4 ,space1 perceptual1 #bdc-bde2 conceptual genesis of1 #bde-bdi2 infinity of1 #bdg2 divisibility of1 #bdh2 continuity of1 #bdh1 #bej2 homogeneity of1 #bea2 relativity of1 #bea2 is it one or many8 #bec1 #beg2 is not ultimate1 #bed-beg2 antinomies of1 #bei ff42 of what is it phenomenal8 #bfj4 ,spencer1 ,h41 #dj1 #fh4 ,spinoza1 #fb1 #aja ff41 #cah1 #cii1 #daa4 ,stout1 ,g4 ,f41 #cc1 #fg1 #ace1 #aed ff41 #bjh1 #bdg1 #cah1 #cbd1 #ccb1 #cgh4 ,subjectivism1 what1 #ge2 fallacy of1 #gf-ha1 #bjd ff4 ,substance1 concept of1 #abh ff42 and quality1 #abh-adj4 ,sufficient ,reason1 principle of1 #afd4 ,teleological description not impossible1 #cji4 ,teleological series1 discontinuity of1 #caa4 ,teleology1 nature of1 #ee1 #ii1 #abe1 #bhg1 #cga ff42 in ,psychology1 #cje ff42 in ,biology1 #cjh2 and ,psychophysical ,parallelism1 #cbf ff4 ,thought and the ,absolute1 #fa2 not ultimate1 #dji4 ,time1 perceptual1 #bdc-bde2 conceptual1 genesis of1 #bde-bdi2 infinity of1 #bdg2 divisibility of1 #bdh2 continuity of1 #bdh1 #bej2 homogeneity of1 #bea2 relativity of1 #bea2 is it one or many8 #bec1 #beg2 not ultimate1 #bed-beg2 antinomies of1 #bei ff42 of what is it phenomenal8 #bfb2 time and the self1 #cda1 #cdd4 ,truth1 degrees of1 #bad4 ,uniformities1 statistical1 #bbj ff4 ,uniformity in physical nature1 #bbb1 #bbg4 ,unity of things teleological1 #abc-abh4 ,ward1 ,j41 #de1 #fd1 #agd1 #bbe1 #bbh1 #bhi #cah1 #cbd1 #cbf-cbh4 ,whole and ,part1 category of1 #if4 ,will1 nature of1 #fa1 #aah2 not ultimate1 #daj4 ---------------------------------------- -------------------------------- ,transcriber's ,note ,two words on the first line of p4 #gj of this edition 7noted below7 were missing 7blank74 ,they have been supplied from the #eth edition1 published in #aibj4 ,on p4 #bbf1 a footnote at 7#bbf4db7 refers to ,mr4 ,h4 ,g4 ,wells's tale1 ,the ,new ,accumulator1 which is certainly a reference to his #aija tale 8,the ,new ,accelerator04 ,on p4 #cdj1 the first paragraph refers to #8two points'1 and prefaces the first with #87a7'4 ,but there is no #87b7' to denote the second point4 ,it seems likely that #87b7' should precede the next paragraph1 or perhaps following the introductory #8,further'4 ,the ,index reference to p4 #dfg for #8,feeling in the ,absolute' cannot be verified4 ,the page does not exist1 and no other page can be identified with certainty4 ,errors deemed most likely to be the printer's have been corrected1 and are noted here4 ,the references are to the page and line in the original4 ,the most common error is missing punctuation3 #f4ad purpose41 #ch4bi inquiry41 #dd4ab periphery41 #dd4da other41 #ef4dg failure41 #eh4bg theory41 #fb4ci 8purposive01 #fg4ag life41 #fg4ai subject41 #gi4df 8matter01 #hb4ac it41 #hh4dj exclusive41 #hi4da facts41 #ii4ac purpose41 #ajh4bd admitted41 #abh4bc 8substance01 #adc4ai arisen41 #bae4aj 8,nature1 #bbd4bb purpose41 #bcf4ad based41 #bea4de series41 #bgd4af advance41 #cbj4cb fatum41 #cfa4bb considerations41 #cij4e 8temperament01 #daj4bb thing4 ,the name of ,professor ,hugo ,mnsterberg is spelled variably as ,mnsterberg1 ,munsterberg1 and occasionally with a partial umlaut4 ,the spelling has been rendered as ,mnsterberg to facilitate text searches at #bae4e1 #cje4ae1 #cae4h1 #cbi4dj1 #dah4c4 ,other corrected errors are3 xviii4#aa to ascertain ,inserted4 xxiii4#ab ,the concept of evolution ,restored4 #cg4i carry out out_/r programme ,replaced4 #df4df ,grundzu_/ge der ,psychologie ,replaced4 #ff4dd on which it 8works4'_/0 ,replaced4 #gj4a4a a modification of your experience4 ,restored4 #gj4a4b to ask what you mean ,restored4 #hb4bb to know your own meaning4_/1 ,replaced4 #acd4db too diffuse and technical1_/4 ,replaced4 #acf4bd does not destroy ,restored4 #adi4ab in our illustration #ab1 #bc_/bb1 #cb 444 ,replaced4 #ahj4df increases indefinitely74 ,removed4 #bae4f ,grundzu_/ge der ,psychologie ,replaced4 #bae4ab 8,j4 ,ward ,removed4 #bbi4af deal only with the problem1_/4 ,replaced4 #cjf4d the physical order was constructed ,inserted4 #cah4h ,ho_/ffding ,replaced4