,transcriber's ,note ,italic text is enclosed in underscores2 boldface text is enclosed in equals signs2 underlined text is enclosed in tildes4 ,illustration3 7,cover7 ,,combat ,,lessons ,,number #a ,rank and file in combat3 ,what they're doing ,how they do it ,,unclassified ,,xxxxxxxxxxxx ,,dissemination ,,of ,,restricted ,,matter4--,the information contained in restricted documents and the essential characteristics of restricted material may be given to any person known to be in the service of the ,united ,states and to persons of undoubted loyalty and discretion who are cooperating in ,government work1 but will not be communicated to the public or to the press except by authorized military public relations agencies4 7,see also par4 #ah;b1 ,,ar #chj-e1 #bh ,sep #aidb47 ,,introduction ,the purpose of 8,combat ,lessons0 is to give to our officers and enlisted men the benefit of the battle experiences of others4 ,to be of maximum benefit these lessons must be disseminated without delay4 ,they do not necessarily represent the carefully considered views of the ,war ,department2 they do1 however1 reflect the actual experiences of combat and1 therefore1 merit careful reading4 ,for this reason also no single issue can cover many of the phases of combat2 lessons will be drawn from the reports as they are received from the theaters of operation and quickly disseminated so that others may apply them4 ,the suggestions which are made or implied are not intended to change the tactical doctrine by which our ,army has been trained but rather to elaborate thereon4 ,much of the subject matter has been covered in training literature1 but the comments show that shortcomings continue to manifest themselves on the battlefield4 ,the paramount combat lesson learned from every operation is the vital importance of leadership4 ,our equipment1 our supply1 and1 above all1 our men1 are splendid4 ,aggressive and determined leadership is the priceless factor which inspires a command and upon which all success in battle depends4 ,it is responsible for success or failure4 ,illustration3 ,g4 ,c4 ,marshall ,chief of ,staff ,,contents ,,section ,,one--,,infantry ,page ,battle ,leadership #a ,junior ,officer in ,battle #a ,hate ,your ,enemy #b ,leaders in ,front #b ,keep ,them ,moving #c ,,nco ,leadership #c ,keep ,your ,mission in ,mind #c ,team ,up #f ,rally ,point #f ,fear is ,normal #f ,sicily--,italy--,attu #g ,night ,attack #g ,surprise ,saves ,lives #g ,hand-to-,hand ,fighting #h ,small ,arms ,against ,armor #i ,platoon ,action #i ,knocking ,out ,pillboxes #ab ,individual ,initiative #ad ,action on ,attu #af ,the ,south ,pacific #ai ,security in the ,jungle #ai ,in ,bivouac #ai ,on the ,march #bj ,jungle ,notes #bj ,aggressive ,action1 ,flexible ,plans #bj ,feeding the ,troops #bj ,counterintelligence #bj ,scouting and ,patrolling #ba ,patrolling in the ,jungle #ba ,don't ,forget the 8,where06 #ba --or the 8,what06 #ba ,patrol ,tips #bb ,size of ,patrols #bb 8,say ,it ,with ,pictures0 #bb ,infantry ,weapons #bc ,in ,jungle ,warfare #bc ,basic ,weapons #bc #d4b ,chemical ,mortar #bf ,in ,sicily #bg ,advance ,guard #bg ,pyrotechnics #bg ,miscellaneous ,comment #bg ,at ,salerno #bh ,the ,bazooka ,worked #bh ,infantry-,artillery ,team #bi ,artillery 8,close0 ,support #bi --and ,how it ,worked #bi ,massed ,fires #cj ,infantry-,tank ,team #ca ,opportunity ,lost #ca ,lesson ,learned #ca ,infantry-,tank ,attack #cb ,ranger ,training #cc ,buddy ,system #cc ,realism #cc ,recognition #cd ,formations #cd ,cooking #ce ,physical ,conditioning #ce ,discipline #ce ,,section ,,two--,,field ,,artillery ,artillery in the ,jungle #cg ,antipersonnel ,fire #cg ,dealing with ,tree ,snipers #cg ,adjustment of ,fire #ch ,morale ,effect #ch ,ammunition and ,fuzes #dj ,disposition #dj ,liaison #dj ,ideas from ,italy #da ,reinforcing ,fire #da ,transportation #da ,fire ,direction ,center #da ,pack ,boards for ,observers #dc ,,section ,,three--,,miscellaneous ,booby ,traps #de ,timeliness of ,orders #de ,maps #df ,,aa ,fire #df ,security #dg ,strafing ,aircraft #dg 8,gas60 #dg ,counterattack ,foiled #dh ,room for ,improvement #di ,,section ,,four--,,notes ,,on ,,the ,,nips ,japanese ,pillboxes #ea ,superman ,myth ,exploded #ea ,jap ,trap #eb ,defensive ,action #eb ,vine ,entanglements #eb ,,section ,,five--,,hints ,,on ,,the ,,heinie ,reverse ,slope ,tactics #ec ,don't ,gawk6 #ec ,traps and ,mines #ec ,minor ,tactics #ed ,typical ,attack and ,withdrawal #ee ,rearguard ,action #ee ,prepared from ,combat ,reports and published by direction of the ,chief of ,staff by ,operations ,division in collaboration with other ,divisions of the ,war ,department ,general ,staff1 ,army ,ground ,forces1 ,army ,air ,forces1 and ,army ,service ,forces4 ,,section ,i ,,infantry ,,battle ,,leadership ,again and again reports from the battlefields confirm the importance of leadership in every grade1 whether it be ,corporal or ,colonel4 ,other combat lessons are important2 the exercise of leadership in battle is vital4 ,leadership has often been defined in theory4 ,here are some instances of its application or its absence on the battlefield4 ,these are but a few examples2 there are many others4 ,junior ,officer in ,battle ,captain ,william ,t4 ,gordon1 ,infantry1 ,sicily3 8,since ,november #h1 ,i have had seventeen officers in my company1 and ,i am the only one who started out with it who is left in the fight4 ,in ,tunisia1 from troops pinned down in the dark1 ,i have heard enlisted men call out such things as #8,where is an officer to lead us8'--#8,we don't want to lie here--we want to attack--where is an officer8'444 ,in each case an officer or officers have risen to the occasion1 but this nevertheless shows beyond anything else the demand for battle leadership4 8,a company officer must build a legend about himself4 ,he must take calculated risks4 ,he must1 on the other hand1 do what he expects his men to do3 he must always dig in2 always take cover4 ,his men must know that when he ducks they must duck2 on the other hand1 they must not believe that when the officer ducks they must run away4 ,the officer must come through every barrage and bombing with a sheepish grin and a wry remark4 ,masterly understatement of hardship and danger endured plus a grin always pays dividends4 ,hate ,your ,enemy6 8,our men do not ordinarily hate4 ,they must hate4 ,they are better soldiers when they hate4 ,they must not fraternize with prisoners--must not give them cigarettes and food the moment they are taken4 ,hate can be taught men by meticulous example4 ,the ,rangers are so taught40 ,leaders in ,front ,staff ,sergeant ,richard ,e4 ,deland1 ,infantry1 ,sicily3 8,we want our ,captain out front2 we don't care much about the position of our battalion commander40 ,keep ,them ,moving6 ,operation ,report1 ,seventh ,army1 ,sicily3 8,during an attack officers and non-commissioned officers must never allow men to lie prone and passive under enemy fire4 ,they must be required to move forward if this is at all possible4 ,if movement is absolutely impossible1 have the troops at least open fire4 ,the act of firing induces self-confidence in attacking troops4 ,the familiar expression #8,dig or ,die' has been greatly overworked4 ,attacking troops must not be allowed to dig in until they have secured their final objective4 ,if they dig in when momentarily stopped by enemy fire1 it will take dynamite to blast them from their holes and resume the advance40 ,,nco ,leadership ,staff ,sergeant ,robert ,j4 ,kemp1 ,platoon ,sergeant1 ,infantry1 ,sicily3 8,,nco leadership is important4 ,leaders1 ,,nco's1 and officers should be taken to an ,,op for terrain instruction and study before an attack4 ,this has been possible in my outfit about one-fourth of the time4 ,we have what is called an #8,orders ,group1' which consists of that group of officers and ,,nco's that must be assembled for instruction before any tactical move40 ,keep ,your ,mission in ,mind6 ,lieutenant ,colonel ,e4 ,b4 ,thayer1 ,field ,artillery1 ,observer ,with ,fifth ,army1 ,italy3 8,difficulty was experienced in making patrol leaders realize the importance of bringing back information by a specified hour1 in time to be of value4 ,patrols often returned1 after encountering resistance1 without accomplishing their mission4 ,sending them back to accomplish their mission1 despite their fatigue1 seemed to be the most effective solution to the training problem involved1 although the information required often arrived too late40 ,lieutenant ,colonel ,t4 ,f4 ,bogart1 ,infantry1 ,observer ,with ,fifth ,army1 ,italy3 8,greater emphasis must be placed on inculcating in junior officers and ,,nco's the will to accomplish assigned missions despite opposition4 ,a few accounts of patrol actions illustrate this point3 87#a7 ,a reconnaissance patrol consisting of a platoon was sent out at about #aijj one evening to determine the strength if any of the ,germans in two small towns1 the first about two miles away and the second about three miles farther on4 ,the patrol reached the outskirts of the first town and met an ,italian who told them there were no ,germans in the town and then started to lead the patrol into town4 ,a few hundred yards farther a ,german machine gun opened up1 the ,italian disappeared1 three of the patrol were killed1 and the others dispersed4 ,they drifted back to our battalion during the night1 and it was not until nearly daylight that the practically valueless report of the action was received4 ,not the slightest conception of the strength in the first town was obtained and no information of the second town4 ,it was necessary to send out another patrol with the same mission4 87#b7 ,a patrol was sent out with the mission of determining the condition of a road1 especially bridges1 over a three-mile stretch to the front4 ,when this patrol had covered about a mile it ran into a motorized ,german patrol4 ,two of the ,americans were killed1 and the platoon leader claimed six ,germans4 ,the patrol leader forgot his mission1 returned to the battalion ,,cp with the remainder of his patrol1 and had to be sent out again with a great loss in time in getting the information desired4 87#c7 ,on several occasions patrols were sent out on reconnaissance missions with instructions to get certain information by a specific time4 ,the hour would pass and sometimes several others without a word from the patrol4 ,sometimes it was due to difficulties encountered1 sometimes to mistakes in computation of time and space factors1 but in all cases there was no good reason why some information did not get back by the specified time40 ,,comment3 ,the failure of patrols in these instances stems from a lack of appreciation on the part of ,,nco's and junior officers of their missions4 ,in patrol actions1 as in the operations of larger units1 the mission must be kept uppermost in the minds of all ranks1 and no action should be undertaken which does not contribute directly to the accomplishment of that mission4 ,conversely1 no incidental or inadvertent contact with the enemy should deter or divert patrols from the complete accomplishment of their missions1 to include compliance with all instructions given1 where humanly possible4 ,team ,up6 ,captain ,william ,t4 ,gordon1 ,infantry1 ,sicily3 8,i have found that men in position must fight in pairs2 an order that #ej per cent stay awake is thus easily enforced2 it bolsters morale and nerves4 ,rally ,point 8,in every company attack order a reserve force must be prescribed2 ,i always do even though sometimes this force consists only of myself and my ,first ,sergeant4 ,often a soldier who a moment before has run away is converted into a fighter by leadership4 ,a reserve force gives him a rallying point40 ,fear is ,normal ,colonel ,george ,taylor1 ,infantry1 ,sicily3 8,fear of being afraid is the greatest obstacle for the new man in battle to overcome4 ,there is no reason for shame in being afraid4 ,men who have had excellent battle records freely admit they are scared stiff in battle4 ,the important thing is that every soldier must be taught all he needs to know so well that battlefield thinking is reduced to a minimum2 automatic1 disciplined reactions to battlefield problems must be the rule4 8,in battle the worst element is mental and nervous exhaustion4 ,there is no real rest under fire4 ,the ability to withstand fire is more important than all the knowledge in the world40 ,,sicily--,,italy--,,attu ,,night ,,attack ,surprise ,saves ,lives ,major ,john ,r4 ,patterson1 ,infantry1 ,sicily3 8,the mission of our battalion after landing south of ,,gela in ,sicily was to capture the airport at ,,biscari4 ,the battalion used the silent night attack4 ,the three rifle companies were in line with the heavy-weapons company in reserve4 ,to reach its line of departure1 the battalion crossed two precipitous ridges using two control lines1 then climbed the cliff at the airport to the line of departure4 ,all this was done silently under cover of darkness4 ,illustration 8,the attack was started with a hand grenade4 ,we didn't fire until the ,germans counterattacked4 ,we went in with bayonets and hand grenades and caught some of the ,germans undressed and dressing4 ,the ,,mk ,,iv tanks fired their guns but wouldn't close on us4 ,the enemy knew their men were all about1 so fired their machine guns and rifles mainly into the air4 8,the first counterattack came in two hours1 and there was one about each hour thereafter until #afjj4 ,they had all emplacements wired and fixed with trip-wire booby traps4 ,we removed the traps and used the emplacements during counterattacks4 8,we found a line of airplane bombs wired to blow up the area2 we de-activated them4 ,a ,german plane landed just as we were ready to leave the line of departure4 ,later1 one of our men grenaded it4 8,the battalion took no transportation4 ,i had with me the ,s-#c1 one runner1 and one #eaa radio4,a ,the wire came up thirty minutes later1 but was not necessary4 ,a ,a twenty-pound1 battery-operated1 short-range transmitter-receiver4 8,i estimate the enemy had a reinforced battalion4 ,his tanks and self-propelled's came up later4 ,some of the enemy were air personnel1 and there were about eleven ,,aa guns set up for antipersonnel use4 8,our attack lasted thirty minutes4 ,we had no casualties during the attack2 two were killed during the counterattacks40 ,hand-to-,hand ,fighting ,captain ,jarrold1 ,infantry3 8,at ,,biscari ,,airport ,i used my trench knife twice4 ,one of my men got three with his bayonet4 ,he shot one1 then another tried to grab his bayonet4 ,he got this one with the bayonet4 ,that got him started1 so he got three in all before it was over4 ,small ,arms ,against ,armor 8,we found that caliber 4#cj ,,ap pierces enemy armored half-tracks at close ranges40 ,platoon ,action ,lieutenant ,hollerich1 ,infantry3 8,company ,a1 moving forward in darkness to participate in the ,,biscari ,,airport fight1 ran right into the enemy position4 ,before the fight started1 my platoon crossed the road just above a culvert and reached the south edge of the airport1 but ,i was ordered to take it back to a position just east of the culvert4 ,i wish ,i could have stayed where ,i was because it was a perfect place from which to envelop the resistance in front of my company4 8,when the enemy machine guns opened up we threw grenades4 ,the machine guns pulled back out of grenade fire4 ,then ,,nco's and ,browning ,automatic ,riflemen went up over the embankment1 through and beyond the initial enemy positions4 ,eventually we had a base of fire of about twenty men including the ,,bar's4 8,during the enemy counterattacks we did pretty well with other fire1 too4 ,lead was flying fast and furiously at twenty to thirty yards4 ,we fire at flashes4 ,in this kind of firing you learn to fire and roll to one side or they'll soon get you40 8,one of the corporals sneaked up on a dug-in vehicle and got it with an '#jc rifle grenade at #be yards4 ,illustration 8,the #8bazooka' man of my platoon heard #8,tanks to the right1' went around a bend in the road1 and fired at about #ce yards4 ,he got the first of a pair of vehicles4 ,a ,german officer tried to capture him with a pistol1 but he gave the officer an uppercut and then killed him with his helmet4 ,i don't know how the other vehicle was knocked out1 but one of the ,,bar men got its driver4 ,,comment3 ,in these accounts of a successful night attack by a small unit the application of the following principles is worthy of note3 a4 ,close control during the approach by the use of control lines adjusted to difficult terrain features4 b4 ,designation of a ,line of ,departure as close to the objective as possible and after all major terrain obstacles had been passed4 ,this is essential to assure proper organization of the unit immediately prior to the assault4 c4 ,attainment of the vital element of surprise 7,germans caught undressed and dressing1 airplanes landing on the field74 d4 ,use of the bayonet and hand grenades with no weapon firing permitted4 ,it may often be advisable to prohibit the loading of rifles4 e4 ,use of frontal attack only4 ,any attempt at envelopment tends to cause disorder and confusion4 ,note that one platoon which had advanced ahead of the general line was pulled back to conform4 f4 ,a definite and limited objective--capture of an airfield1 in this case--in which the entire front could be covered by manpower rather than fire-power4 ,these are the major elements of a successful night attack brought out in the foregoing account4 ,others not mentioned but which were undoubtedly contributing factors in this operation are3 ,careful planning in minute detail4 ,precise1 specific orders4 ,careful arrangements for maintenance of direction4 ,thorough daylight reconnaissance by as many of the leaders as possible4 ,use of compact columns in the approach formation until the ,line of ,departure is reached4 ,,knocking ,,out ,,pillboxes ,colonel ,rogers1 ,infantry1 ,sicily3 8,the neutralization and reduction of concrete pillboxes played an important part in the ,sicilian campaign4 ,in the initial landing phases alone1 this regiment cleaned out over thirty of these pillboxes4 ,they were located all over the place as we went inland4 8,they were cleverly constructed and elaborately camouflaged4 ,many were covered with brush1 grass1 straw1 or other natural stuff4 ,others had cane houses built over them to represent peasant outbuildings or huts4 ,all those we encountered in and about villages and towns were covered over with some kind of house to conceal them4 ,most of these were cane or wood shacks1 though some were actually covered with plaster or stucco to represent real houses4 ,many had dummy houses built right over the pillbox1 and windows arranged to give full freedom of fire from the embrasures of the pillbox inside the shell of the building4 ,in the open country a number were also built with hay ricks and straw stacks over them1 all very natural and innocent looking4 8,reduction of these often proved very simple1 and in many cases the enemy simply dug his own grave in his efforts at camouflage4 ,when we learned not to be surprised by them and recognized them for what they were1 we developed a very simple method of dealing with the ones concealed by straw1 hay1 cane1 and other inflammable material4 ,we dosed them freely with white phosphorus1 especially from the attached chemical mortars1 and this did the work to perfection4 ,we set the camouflage on fire1 blinded the gunners inside1 and choked them with the phosphorus and the smoke from the burning hay1 straw1 and other material4 ,the fire and heat1 too1 made the interiors untenable1 and the occupants would become terrified and come out and surrender in a bunch4 8,in one place near ,,licata there were several of these straw- and hay-covered pillboxes1 also some concealed with cane huts1 arranged at key positions in country covered with wheat fields and terraced grain plantings4 ,we simply set a first-class prairie fire with our white phosphorus1 and burned out a position over #b1ejj yards long4 ,we waited until the wind was right and let them have it4 ,every pillbox was burned out4 ,the more difficult pillboxes that wouldn't burn we attacked with massed fire from mortars of all types1 ,,at guns1 and heavy machine guns4 ,in the case of very tough ones that were reinforced1 we used #8bazooka' rockets and at times sent men up close under heavy covering fire and knocked them out with bangalore torpedoes40 ,,comment3 ,the use of fire is1 of course1 dependent on favorable weather conditions4 ,careful coordination is also necessary to insure that the resulting smoke does not interfere with the operations and observation of adjacent units4 ,,individual ,,initiative ,the following cases of individual initiative and heroism during the ,,salerno landing were reported by the --th ,infantry3 8,sergeant ,manuel ,gonzales1 upon landing1 discovered the position of a ,german #8#hh' in the sand dunes near the beach4 ,this gun was firing on the assault boats as they landed4 ,the ,sergeant crept around the position under machine-gun fire which set his pack on fire1 and despite the hand grenades being thrown at him4 ,he then calmly tossed several hand grenades into the gun emplacement1 killing the crew and blowing up their ammunition4 8,near ,,paestum ,sergeant ,john ,y4 ,mc,gill jumped on an enemy tank and dropped a hand grenade into the open turret1 killing all the crew4 8,private ,clayton ,i4 ,tallman1 on ,,hill #dbd1 observed that the enemy was attempting an envelopment of the left flank of his company4 ,taking up a better position1 he killed an enemy machine-gun crew with three carefully aimed shots4 ,in a few minutes he repeated the same action when another enemy machine-gun crew appeared4 ,he alone protected the left flank of the company until the rest of the platoon arrived4 8,private ,burrell ,b4 ,reitch discovered that he and a group of five men had been cut off from his company4 ,he immediately organized them in a defensive position on a small knoll4 ,they repulsed three rushes by the enemy1 who were attempting to establish machine-gun positions on the flank4 ,private ,reitch was completely in command of the situation1 giving fire orders and shouting encouragement4 8,staff ,sergeant ,quillian ,h4 ,mc,mitchen was shot in the chest and shoulder before his assault boat reached the shore4 ,when the boat beached1 the landing ramp stuck and would not drop4 ,the ,sergeant1 despite his wounds1 kicked the ramp loose and then led his section ashore1 continuing to direct their operations until he received a fatal shot from enemy gun fire4 8,our men steadily moved ahead in the face of the intense fire and cleared the beach as soon as possible4 ,lieutenant ,carey1 soon after reaching the shore1 was fired upon by three ,germans armed with machine pistols4 ,he returned the fire1 but his carbine jammed after killing one of his adversaries4 ,he then grasped his weapon as a club and advancing in the face of their fire clubbed the second4 ,he then physically tackled1 subdued1 and disarmed the third ,german1 taking him prisoner40 ,,comment3 ,the ability of the individual soldier to grasp the implications of the situation and take the necessary action should be fully exploited4 ,the results of combat are the fruits of the combined efforts of individuals4 ,every soldier should be indoctrinated with the idea that his individual action may be the decisive factor in the final result4 ,,action ,,on ,,attu ,operations report1 ,regimental ,combat ,team3 8,to fight the ,japs in this country our troops must stick to the high ground and not only outflank but #8out-altitude' the enemy4 8,continuous movement is necessary to keep the spark in an attack4 ,if a machine gun covers one point1 then a group not at that point must continue to advance4 ,when fire is shifted1 the original group must move4 ,if even a platoon is entirely halted by the fire of enemy guns1 then the commitment of additional troops results1 whereas by proper coordination some portion of the platoon can be kept moving and the force committed kept to a minimum4 8,the tendency of lower commanders to commit reserves too early must be curbed4 8,security cannot be overemphasized4 ,any movement or group on the battlefield1 even in rear areas1 is subject to enemy action4 ,in this connection1 consideration must be given to the protection of medical installations4 ,at present these are left unprotected1 without even individual arms for their personnel4 ,in the event of any enemy penetration through our front-line positions it is practically certain that these installations will be hit4 8,aggressive patrolling1 particularly to maintain active contact1 is of vital importance and can mean the difference between defeat and victory4 ,however1 mere numbers of patrols will not solve the problem4 ,special training in patrolling and organizing patrols must be initiated4 ,commanders must plan to have reasonably fresh men available for night contact4 ,it is vital to organize patrol activity carefully to insure that all lines are familiar with the routes of returning patrols so that the danger of mistaken identity in the darkness will be minimized40 ,lieutenant ,general ,simon ,b4 ,buckner1 ,commanding ,general1 ,alaskan ,department3 8,it was apparent that the enemy was particularly vulnerable to attack by units of our infantry which pushed forward vigorously while the enemy was held down by artillery fire4 ,those units which had learned to advance closely behind their own artillery supporting fire had the greatest success4 8,the ,japs do not like our coordinated artillery fire nor do they like our attacks with the bayonet4 ,when under fire from small arms they stay down in their holes and are easily approached4 ,when attacking small groups of foxholes1 our troops were able to keep the ,japs down by fire from rifles and the ,browning ,automatic ,rifle while some of our men approached and dropped hand grenades into their holes4 ,this was our favorite mop-up method4 8,when about to be run out of a position1 the ,japs seemed to feel it necessary to counterattack4 ,these attacks were not well coordinated and were welcomed by our troops1 who were able then to shoot down the enemy in great numbers4 ,these ,jap counterattacks were of a suicidal character and were pressed home regardless of losses until practically all of the counterattacking troops were exterminated4 8,the enemy may believe that1 in such terrain1 he can hold up the advance of an entire battalion with three men and a light machine gun4 ,in fact1 however1 he is critically vulnerable to intelligent action by officers and men who understand the necessity for immediate maneuver against small parties of the enemy seeking to hold them up4 ,the fact was that small maneuvering patrols easily disposed of machine-gun positions on reverse slopes behind mountain spurs1 whereas any tendency to lie down and call for artillery support would have resulted only in tremendous wastage of artillery fire in attempting to seek out targets which1 in fact1 were inaccessible to artillery fire4 8,the ,,attu action likewise indicated that standard ,japanese infiltration tactics can be offset by a system of #8anti-termite' patrols organized behind our lines1 protecting our artillery1 command posts1 and supply lines4 ,wherever troops know that these friendly patrols are behind them1 fire in their rear will mean to them simply that our patrols are exterminating the infiltrating ,japs4 ,this feeling was well expressed by ,general ,nathan ,bedford ,forrest ,confederate cavalry commander1 ,civil ,war1 when one of his staff officers approached him in great excitement and said1 #8,general1 the enemy is in our rear4' ,forrest calmly replied3 #8,if they're in our'n1 we must be in their'n4'0 ,,the ,,south ,,pacific ,,security ,,in ,,the ,,jungle ,in ,bivouac ,report of ,commanding ,general1 #dc;d ,division1 ,new ,georgia ,campaign3 8,security in bivouac was a big problem in this ,new ,georgia operation4 ,the ,japs conducted harassing raids against our bivouac areas with some success for a period of about a week4 ,our initial plan had been adopted on the advice of other units experienced in jungle warfare4 ,it called for complete immobility at night1 with grenades and bayonets as the only defense weapons4 ,gun crews were directed to fire only in the event of a major attack4 ,however1 we found that small parties of ,japs were able to filter into the battle areas and cause some casualties without being seriously opposed4 8,this situation was effectively corrected by using a close perimeter defense4 ,men occupying these perimeter lines were ordered to fire at known targets4 ,machine guns were so laid that final protective lines covered the perimeter4 ,the nature of the terrain and the type of night tactics employed by the ,japanese made the establishment of outposts for security purposes inadvisable as visibility was limited to a few feet from any given outpost4 ,two men occupied each foxhole1 one remaining awake and alert to all activity in his vicinity4 ,within the perimeter1 machetes were used from the foxholes against any enemy raiders who were able to penetrate4 ,this system effectively discouraged night raids4 ,on the ,march 8,march security adhered to established doctrine except that distances between the elements of the column were greatly reduced4 ,extremely limited visibility and the difficulty of moving through the jungle off the trails nearly always prevented close-in security detachments40 ,,jungle ,,notes ,aggressive ,action1 ,flexible ,plans ,report of #dc;d ,division1 ,new ,georgia3 8,aggressive action is necessary4 ,never relax the pressure4 ,maneuver of small units at the risk of temporary loss of communications is important4 ,plans and orders must be so flexible as to permit prompt maneuver change4 ,feeding the ,troops 8,the serving of any hot meals in jungle fighting is often impracticable4 ,a hot drink or hot soup serves the same purpose and is much more within the realm of possibility4 8,an issue of two canteens per man relieves the water problem a lot in jungle operations40 ,counterintelligence ,first ,marine ,division1 ,guadalcanal3 8,due to the amount of vital information we had taken from captured ,japanese message centers we decided at once that we wouldn't make the same mistake4 ,command post installations were usually in the foxhole of the unit commander4 ,papers of possible value to the enemy were destroyed or sent to the rear40 ,,scouting ,,and ,,patrolling ,patrolling in the ,jungle ,an officer with considerable experience in jungle patrolling gives this advice3 8,patrols are most likely to give away their presence in an area by their footprints4 8,shine from the smallest metal surface1 such as a belt buckle1 or a watch1 must be avoided4 ,a luminous watch constitutes a real danger4 8,a white skin is most conspicuous1 and the practice of some patrol members marching stripped to the waist is inviting trouble4 8,dark clothing is essential4 8,any noise1 such as talking1 coughing1 spitting1 etc41 has to be treated as the greatest of all dangers4 8,a man on patrol must learn to move silently1 making every possible use of natural cover40 ,don't ,forget the 8,where06 ,colonel ,liversedge1 ,u4 ,s4 ,marine ,corps1 ,new ,georgia3 ,in many cases patrol leaders were able to report what they saw1 but not where it was seen4 ,in general1 such information was valueless as locations could not be plotted on a map or aerial photo4 ,this should be emphasized in training programs and is worth a special directive40 ----or the 8,what06 ,seventh ,army ,report1 ,sicily3 8,men must be taught to recognize what they see when they are scanning the landscape4 ,unless properly trained they will not recognize enemy gun emplacements1 strong points1 and machine-gun nests40 ,patrol ,tips ,staff ,sergeant ,richard ,e4 ,deland1 ,infantry1 ,sicily3 8,i was not taught to observe properly nor how to use the message blank4 8,position and camouflage are more important than ,i learned in the ,states4 ,in training bear down on cover and concealment2 bear down on the avoidance of the blundering approach1 on patrols1 on fire and maneuver--which are equally important4 8,battles move slowly2 patrols can't dash about4 8,my battalion1 instead of using #8,scouts ,out1' used a full squad in wedge formation to do the job40 ,size of ,patrols ,lieutenant ,colonel ,w4 ,a4 ,walker1 ,tank ,destroyer ,battalion ,commander1 ,tunisia3 8,many men were lost in ,tunisia by using squad patrols4 ,the ,germans used stronger patrols and just gobbled them up4 ,a patrol should be either a sneak patrol1 small enough to escape detection1 or a combat patrol1 large enough to fight its way out of difficulty4 ,never allow one man to go out alone4 ,say ,it ,with ,pictures6 8,the value of hasty sketches illustrating reconnaissance reports was proved many times during this campaign1 but it is difficult to get such sketches out of untrained personnel4 ,all reconnaisance personnel should receive sketching training40 ,,infantry ,,weapons ,,in ,,jungle ,,warfare ,the following comments on the use and effectiveness of infantry weapons in jungle warfare appear in the report of the #dc;d ,division on the ,,munda ,campaign--,,new ,,georgia3 ,basic ,weapons 8,the ,m#a rifle is doubtless the best all-around weapon possessed by our troops4 ,its serviceability under existing campaign conditions is excellent4 ,ammunition supply was adequate1 since the rifle was normally fired only at observed targets4 ,the ,japs possessed a number of our ,m#a rifles1 apparently considering them a superior weapon to their own4 8,the fragmentation grenade was used frequently against suspected areas of heavy jungle growth and on some occasions for the destruction of booby traps around perimeter defenses4 ,its effect when used as a booby trap is questionable because of the long fuze time4 ,the ,japs used our grenades extensively in their night harassing raids against our bivouacs4 ,rifle grenades were used on some occasions with success against enemy pillboxes4 8,in spite of its handicap of sounding like a ,jap 4#be-;caliber light machine gun1 the ,thompson sub-machine gun proved very satisfactory for specialized personnel such as linemen1 artillery forward observers1 vehicle drivers1 and reconnaissance personnel4 ,its limited range made it especially useful in combat in rear areas4 8,the ,browning auto rifle gave excellent service4 ,this weapon has high jungle mobility and provides excellent fire power for the short-range targets frequently encountered4 ,it has been used many times to reinforce the final protective lines at night1 to establish trail blocks1 to cover patrol advances1 and to destroy snipers4 8,the light machine gun proved very effective in the night security of bivouacs4 ,at other times1 it was used to cover the advance of attacking echelons by placing heavy fire in the direction of suspected pillboxes4 ,since fields of fire and visibility were so limited the effectiveness of such support was questionable4 8,we did not use the heavy machine gun to any extent in the attack in the jungle4 ,this was mainly due to its weight and to its heavy ammunition supply requirements4 ,it was used primarily for the defense of beachheads and water passageways1 also to some extent in the defense of regimental and battalion command posts4 8,the #fjmm mortar was not effective against enemy pillboxes1 although it unquestionably contributed by its demoralizing effect on the enemy4 ,after we reached the outer taxiways of the airfield1 we had excellent visibility from ideally situated ,,op's1 and the disorganized enemy presented many profitable targets for this weapon4 ,the exceptional accuracy of the weapon made it very valuable in close support1 and its use during the assault on the revetments and shell craters at ,,munda ,,field and ,,kokengolo ,,hill is credited with saving many lives4 8,the #hamm mortar proved to be one of the most important single weapons contributing to the success of this offensive4 ,because of the difficulty of supply only two mortars were taken forward with each heavy-weapons company1 the balance of the personnel being used as ammunition carriers4 ,troops frequently remarked that if given the choice of rations or #hamm mortar ammunition1 they would gladly take the latter4 ,illustration 8,while the #cgmm ,,at gun is admittedly a weapon of opportunity in jungle warfare1 there were two occasions on which it served us handsomely4 ,the ,nips had a field piece located where it could interdict our beachhead at ,,laiana4 ,scouts located the gun1 but our mortar fire couldn't silence it4 ,we disassembled a #cgmm gun and carried it forward under cover of the dense foliage4 ,the gun was then assembled under cover and moved rapidly to a point in the open from where it could command the target4 ,three accurately aimed rounds destroyed the gun and killed its crew4 8,on another occasion we picked up an enemy occupied pillbox about #fjj yards from one of our ,,op's4 ,the #cgmm gun was manhandled to a position on the forward slope in only partial concealment4 ,it placed accurate and intense fire on the pillbox and completely destroyed it4 8,the value of the #cgmm gun was also proved by two episodes when the enemy attempted to make night landings4 ,first1 one enemy barge was fired on as it neared a landing on ,,bomboe ,,peninsula4 ,both ,,he and ,,ap ammunition were used1 and the barge was heard to limp away1 sputtering badly4 ,on another night a group of ,japs approached the north coast of ,,sagekarasas ,,island in an assault boat4 ,antitank gunners held their fire until the boat was nearly ashore1 then fired several rounds of canister4 ,the boat was seen to sink and several bodies floated ashore the next day4 #d4b ,chemical ,mortar 8,the #d4b-;inch chemical mortar company was placed under the control of the ,division ,artillery and the fires of the chemical mortars coordinated with artillery fires4 ,these mortars1 employing a #be-pound high-explosive shell1 were used successfully with the artillery in firing preparations prior to an attack and in firing prearranged fires such as area barrages to block enemy routes and to disrupt barge traffic near ,,western ,,sagekarasas ,,island4 ,one prisoner stated that the mortar barrages were more feared by them than artillery4 ,the only criticism of the weapon is that the shell has no delayed fuze2 consequently1 a great many tree bursts result from its use40 ,,in ,,sicily ,advance ,guard ,captain ,reed1 ,infantry3 8,we have had considerable success in using a platoon of heavy machine guns with each advance or assault company4 ,you need this increase of fire power right up there in front4 ,with the advance guard we put a platoon of machine guns right up in the forward support4 ,we also put a section of #cgmm ,,at guns right behind the advance party4 ,the remaining section of ,,at guns is placed behind the support of the advance guard4 ,we place the #egmm's and the cannon company in the center of the main body40 ,pyrotechnics ,staff ,sergeant ,robert ,j4 ,kemp1 ,infantry3 8,we want lots of pyrotechnics for use in all kinds of situations to include bedeviling the enemy4 ,sometimes ,jerry puts on a pyrotechnic show that just scares hell out of us2 it would work on him too40 ,miscellaneous ,comment ,various ,small ,infantry ,unit ,commanders3 8#hamm mortar3 ,a perfect weapon4 ,i like to use the alternate traversing method4 8#fjmm mortar3 ,we kept them right up in front and used them often4 8,bazooka3 ,we have had no trouble with our bazookas4 ,have gotten several tanks with them4 8#cgmm ,,at gun3 ,very mobile4 ,it's artillery2 good against anything--vehicles1 pillboxes1 personnel1 houses4 ,gets in faster than the mortar4 ,if ,i had to throw away any heavy weapons1 the #8#cg' would be the last to go4 8#gemm self-propelled cannon3 ,excellent for coordinated attack--perfect4 ,too vulnerable to get very close initially40 ,,at ,,salerno ,the 8,bazooka0 ,worked ,operations report1 --th ,infantry3 8,several tank attacks occurred which the ,infantry fought off with their #8bazookas4' ,it became more and more apparent that this was really an effective weapon4 ,during this one day it destroyed seven enemy tanks40 ,,comment3 ,numerous reports indicate the effectiveness of the 8,bazooka0 when used by trained personnel4 ,it has been used successfully against pillboxes1 machine-gun nests1 and personnel4 ,,infantry-,,artillery ,,team ,artillery 8,close0 ,support ,lieutenant ,colonel ,mc,cormick1 ,field ,artillery1 ,new ,georgia3 8,our infantry1 finding themselves with a mobile enemy on three sides and a swamp on the fourth1 called for defensive fires4 ,a horseshoe of concentration fires was laid down around them4 ,infantry commanders stated their willingness to accept responsibility for any casualties resulting from these fires1 which were adjusted so close to the defensive positions that fragments were received within the perimeter4 ,the fires were continued throughout the night with no casualties to friendly troops4 ,this fire was credited with probably saving the force from disaster4 ,for some time #8,concentration #aaj' became a by-word with all infantrymen40 ----and ,how ,it ,worked ,report of ,operations1 ,munda ,campaign1 ,new ,georgia3 8,the best cure for the whistle-blowing1 howling night attack was a closely adjusted system of night fires placed around our troops4 ,the all-night firing of single batteries and sometimes a single gun discouraged these attacks4 ,what few were attempted after this system was inaugurated were quickly stopped by short bursts of fire at maximum rate in the vicinity of the unit being attacked and along the front of adjacent units40 ,illustration ,massed ,fires ,lieutenant ,colonel ,james1 ,infantry1 ,sicily3 8,our division artillery was never out of support for more than five minutes throughout the whole campaign4 ,we've got a wonderful set of battalions in our division artillery1 and we have worked so closely together that they are as much a part of our outfit as our own battalions4 ,they keep right up on our heels all the time1 and that is just what we have got to have4 ,i don't know what we could have done without them4 ,they leapfrogged their batteries continually and went into some of the damndest positions ,i have ever seen1 and delivered the goods4 ,we just can't praise them too much4 ,they were always right there when you needed them4 8,in one place where we just couldn't get forward because the ,heinies were on superior ground and had us pinned down with rifle1 machine-gun1 and mortar fire1 the division artillery massed nine batteries on them and plastered them with #a1ejj rounds in less than thirty minutes4 ,we then walked through that position without a scratch1 and the ,german dead were all over the place40 ,,infantry-,,tank ,,team ,opportunity ,lost ,captain ,putnam1 ,infantry1 ,sicily3 8,the infantry should be given practical training in cooperation with tanks4 ,i don't mean the armored infantry--they're part of the armored division and work with them all the time4 ,i mean ordinary infantry like us4 ,i know our regiment didn't have any training with tanks in preparation for combat4 ,at ,,branieri we just didn't know how to work with the attached tank unit4 ,when our tanks came up to support us after we had broken up the ,german attack1 we did not follow up the tanks properly as they went forward4 ,had we done so we could have cleaned out almost a battalion of ,germans4 ,we had not been trained to work with tanks1 and we remained in position after they went forward4 ,if we had known how to go forward with them we could have done a much better job and could have gotten all of the ,germans' vehicles and matriel4 ,after this experience1 we strongly recommend that all infantry be given practical training in cooperation with tanks in action4 ,get the infantrymen used to tanks and how to fight together with them40 ,lesson ,learned ,first ,marine ,division1 ,guadalcanal3 8,the initial assault by our five tanks across the field east of our #c;d ,battalion lines at the #8,battle of ,bloody ,ridge' on ,,guadalcanal was entirely successful4 ,they caused much havoc among the enemy and returned unharmed4 ,within an hour1 they attacked again over the same terrain4 ,meanwhile1 the ,japs had had time to move #cgmm ,,at guns into position along the edge of the woods at the eastern side of the field4 ,these guns knocked out three of our tanks during the second assault4 ,it thus proved extremely unwise to launch a second attack over the same route and terrain4 ,this is especially true if there is sufficient elapsed time for the enemy to move ,,at guns into position40 ,infantry-,tank ,attack ,lieutenant ,colonel ,perkins1 ,tank ,battalion ,commander1 ,italy3 8,shortly after landing at ,,salerno we attacked a hill south of the town of ,,oliveto4 ,the attack was up a winding road4 ,the medium tanks moved down into the bottoms at the foot of the hill into a covered position and covered the light tanks as they went up4 ,as the light tanks went up the hill both the lights and mediums fired on the enemy infantry4 ,when they spotted enemy soldiers going into buildings the mediums took care of the buildings1 leaving the light tanks to take care of the infantry and the machine guns4 ,both the lights and mediums stayed until the infantry took over4 8,the #8rush-to-battle' idea is wrong4 ,here we creep up4 ,each tank should overwatch another tank2 each section should overwatch another section2 each platoon another platoon40 ,,ranger ,,training ,buddy ,system ,lieutenant ,colonel ,william ,o4 ,darby1 ,commanding ,officer of ,rangers1 ,italy3 8,in our work we use the #8,buddy' system--the men always work in pairs4 ,they live in pairs1 eat in pairs1 do guard in pairs--even do ,,kp in pairs4 ,confidence in each other is developed4 ,they can pick their own buddy from within their platoon4 ,realism 8,in our training we never do anything without battle noises and effects4 ,we always use live ammunition4 ,we use mines1 barbed wire1 and protective bands of machine-gun fire extensively4 ,if the problem is to capture a machine-gun nest1 there is always a machine-gun nest there with a machine gun firing in a fixed direction4 ,the men very quickly get accustomed to having live ammunition flying around them4 8,captured ,italian and ,german machine guns and machine pistols are used by the #8enemy' in our problems4 ,our men quickly learn to distinguish between the fire of our own weapons and that of enemy weapons4 ,also the #8enemy' makes constant use of flares4 8,we always carry our normal load of ammunition with weapons loaded4 ,if a man knows his weapon is loaded he will be more careful in handling it4 ,accidental discharge of a weapon automatically means a fine and immediate reduction to the grade of private4 ,in our work1 we must take drastic measures to guard against accidental discharge of weapons4 ,we learned our lesson in ,tunisia1 where the accidental discharge of a rifle queered a raid and caused a #bd-;hour delay in operations4 ,see comment on this subject following 8,night ,attack40 ,recognition 8,we use colored flashlights with the light dimmed down for recognition purposes in night work4 ,different colors are used1 and we usually have a certain light signal for recognition2 for instance1 #8,a'----which would be a dot1 dash4 ,it gives a man great comfort and confidence when working at night1 especially in towns1 to receive a recognition signal when he needs one4 ,formations 8,we use a column formation for approach and assault movement at night4 ,from experience1 ,i believe it is the best formation to use at night4 ,we do not attempt to use prominent terrain features to keep direction4 ,we use pacing1 compass bearing1 and stars4 ,usually in advancing to attack at night we halt to check position every #a1jjj yards4 ,we start moving again by radio signal over the ,,scr #ecf;,b or by runner4 ,b ,a #e-pound 8,handy-talkie0 transmitter-receiver4 8,it is necessary to arrange for collecting your men together again after the raid is over4 ,to do this ,i have men stationed along a line through which men will pass at intervals in their withdrawal4 ,the sentinels on this line stop and collect the men into groups as they withdraw4 ,cooking ,i prefer to have men cook their own meals with their mess kits4 ,we did not have kitchens in ,sicily1 and we have been here a month without them4 ,even though the kitchens are available ,i always have men individually cook at least one meal a day4 ,physical ,conditioning 8,one of our best means of physical conditioning is speed marching1 finally reaching a point where we march ten miles at a rate of six miles an hour4 ,to keep in condition we use calisthenics and a daily five-mile speed march4 ,discipline 8,disciplinary drills are all important4 ,we have a retreat formation daily1 conditions permitting4 ,at this formation men are inspected and some manual of arms performed1 followed by retreat4 ,every ,sunday morning there is a review1 followed by inspection in ranks1 and then inspection of camp or quarters4 ,we have at least four periods a week of close-order drill and manual of arms1 and one period every week is devoted to military courtesy4 8,infractions of discipline1 military courtesy1 and uniform regulations are dealt with quickly and severely4 ,the officers must bear down on these things4 ,the ,army in general has not stressed strict discipline enough4 ,without it you are lost40 ,illustration3 ,,photograph ,,by ,u4 ,s4 ,,signal ,,corps 8,long ,tom0 in ,action ,,section ,,ii ,,field ,,artillery ,,artillery ,,in ,,the ,,jungle ,antipersonnel ,fire ,report of ,operations1 ,arundel ,island3 8,it was apparent that the ,japs were concentrating their forces on ,,stima ,,peninsula4444 ,the area was divided by coordinates and assigned to various artillery and mortar elements4 ,heavy fires were placed on them throughout the night4 ,during the advance down the peninsula the next day numerous enemy dead were noted1 verifying the effectiveness of the previous night's concentrations40 ,dealing with ,tree ,snipers ,report of ,operations1 #dc;d ,division1 ,new ,georgia3 8,we effectively cured the ,jap of his liking for sniping from trees by the command1 #8,fire ,mission4 ,all ,battalions4 ,fuze ,quick4 ,three ,volleys4' ,the quick fuze resulted in bursts in the tree tops4 ,after a week of this treatment the ,jap sniper moved from the trees to the ground4 ,illustration ,adjustment of ,fire 8,all close support adjustments were made by #8sound and fragment' method until the latter part of the campaign1 when ground observation was obtained4 ,forward observers were always in the most forward position possible--in some cases in advance of the lines4 ,adjustments were time-consuming1 starting at a range surely over friendly troops and working gradually closer to our front lines4 ,some smoke was used but not very successfully in the jungle4 ,tree tops were not used for observation because of the limited view and the fact that our troops were suspicious of all activity in trees4 ,prisoners of war inquired about our #8automatic artillery4' ,morale ,effect 8,the incessant firing of our artillery during the six-week period produced contrasting effects on the nerves of our own troops and on those of the enemy4 ,our infantry often stated that having those rounds continually landing in front of them was one of their best morale builders1 especially at night4 ,in the ,jap1 on the other hand1 it produced severe cases of war neurosis4 ,he couldn't sleep at night because he never knew when or where the next round was going to land4 ,he couldn't sleep in the daytime because when our infantry wasn't attacking him our artillery was giving him hell4 8,the following statements made by prisoners are interesting3 8#8,between ,,bibilo ,,hill and the airport we had many guns of all sizes before this campaign1 but now many of them are gone--knocked out by artillery4 ,it has completely demoralized many units1 reduced many units in strength1 and has made many men go crazy4 ,we were awakened at night by the slightest noise1 because of the bad state of nerves4 ,at night three men stayed in one foxhole2 two smoked while one slept4 ,during the day we also tried to get some sleep by alternating1 but the continual artillery fire kept us on edge and we got no rest4' 8#8,even in the two-story dugouts many men were killed just by concussion4 ,a direct hit would kill all the men inside4' 8#8,the artillery is the one thing that is universally feared by all our ground troops4 ,it continues over such long periods of time and the rounds come so fast4' 8#8,except for the artillery we could continue our defense4'0 ,ammunition and ,fuzes ,first ,marine ,division1 ,guadalcanal3 8,the super-quick fuze is more effective than the delay fuze against troops in wide areas1 particularly in the cocoanut groves of the tropics4 ,a report from prisoners indicated that in one unit of approximately #ajj men1 all but six were casualties as a result of one artillery concentration4 ,the #cgmm canister proved to be a devastating type of ammunition4 ,disposition 8,in jungle warfare the artillery of the defensive set-up should not be placed too close to the infantry line4 ,the added range thus obtained is of no value unless observation of the terrain permits its use1 which will very seldom be the case4 ,artillery too close to the infantry is not only needlessly exposed1 but is actually less effective because of the limits imposed by minimum-range considerations1 and1 in the case of #ajemm howitzers1 because of the impossibility of using high-angle fire at ranges less than #b1jjj yards4 ,liaison 8,the liaison officers with infantry regiment should be officers with as much experience as possible1 preferably of the rank of captain or above4 ,when possible1 either the artillery battalion commander or his executive officer should be sent to the infantry regimental ,,cp at first sign of enemy activity40 ,,ideas ,,from ,,italy ,reinforcing ,fire ,lieutenant ,colonel ,r4 ,d4 ,funk1 ,field ,artillery1 ,battalion ,commander3 8,if ,i can spare the radios ,i am going to send one to the artillery battalion that reinforces me the next time we are in direct support4 ,then when one of our observers calls in a fire mission we can simply tell the radio at the other battalion to take the mission direct from the observer4 ,this will eliminate a relay through our ,fire ,direction ,center and speed things up considerably4 ,transportation 8,we keep only seven #b-ton trucks with each howitzer battery4 ,the three spares stay in the ,service ,battery ready to replace damaged ones in any howitzer battery4 ,this also allows the maintenance section to have vehicles available for #f1jjj-mile checks4 ,when one is finished they send it out to replace another that is due for check4 ,fire ,direction ,center 8,we are using two -ton trucks for the ,,cp section of ,headquarters ,battery4 ,each has a tent and a fire direction group4 ,when we move the ,,cp we send out one truck with the ,s-#c4 ,he takes over the operation of the ,fire ,direction ,center when he gets set up1 and the rear ,,cp can then close down and move40 ,illustration3 ,,photograph ,,by ,u4 ,s4 ,,army ,,signal ,,corps ,uses of the ,pack ,board ,pack ,boards for ,observers 8,we use pack boards,c for forward observers and liaison parties4 ,they are a wonderful help in hilly or mountainous country when these parties have to leave their vehicles and hoof it4 ,two for each party adds up to six per howitzer battery and six in ,battalion ,headquarters ,battery40 ,c ,rectangular frames with canvas centers to which supplies or gear may be lashed and carried as a pack4 ,see illustration4 ,illustration3 ,,photograph ,,by ,u4 ,s4 ,,army ,,signal ,,corps ,patrol of the #beth ,division1 ,new ,georgia ,campaign ,,section ,,iii ,,miscellaneous ,booby ,traps ,seventh ,army ,report1 ,sicily3 8,a ,german ,luger pistol was #8booby trapped' on a table4 ,a new replacement picked it up4 ,two were killed and fourteen wounded in the resulting explosion40 ,first ,division ,report1 ,tunisia3 8,a ,luger pistol was found lying on the ground4 ,an ,american infantry lieutenant carefully tied a long cord to it and then1 getting into a hole1 pulled it to him and put it in his pocket4 ,later in the day while examining the pistol he attempted to remove the magazine4 ,the explosion killed the lieutenant and two other men and wounded six soldiers40 ,timeliness of ,orders ,major ,kinney1 ,infantry1 ,sicily3 8,our chief difficulty throughout the campaign was the lack of time given for the execution of orders4 ,frequently we received operations orders which did not allow enough time for proper preparation and execution4 ,at ,,san ,,fratello1 we received an order after #aa ,,pm to attack at #f ,,am the next morning4 ,the battalions were in assembly areas some five or six miles from the line of departure4 ,the terrain over which they had to move to get in position in the dark was the roughest1 most rugged mountain country you could imagine1 and all the ammunition1 weapons1 and supplies had to be taken by hand and by mule pack4 ,although it might seem that from #aa ,,pm to #f ,,am was sufficient time1 the actual conditions were such that it was less than half enough1 because of the terrain1 darkness1 and transport difficulties4 ,also1 the men had just completed marches over mountain trails of nine to fourteen miles and were not fresh for the new movement40 ,maps ,seventh ,army ,report1 ,sicily3 8,instill in all personnel an appreciation of the value of maps4 ,the supply of maps will never be adequate to the demand4 ,training in the care and preservation of maps is as important as training in the care and preservation of matriel4 ,,aa ,fire 8,it was found necessary to issue instructions that ground troops1 with the exception of ,,aa units1 would not fire at airplanes unless the planes attacked them or were close enough to be identified beyond a possible doubt40 ,security #ast ,division ,g-#b ,report1 ,sicily3 8,interrogation report of a captured ,german pilot includes the following3 #8,about the end of ,june1 #aidc1 ,german air crews were shown a report and given a lecture on the tactical and technical details of the ,p-#dg ,thunderbolt1 alleged to be based upon the statements made by a captured ,u4 ,s4 ,army ,air ,force captain4'0 ,,comment3 ,the moral of this story is obvious4 ,hammer home the necessity for saying absolutely nothing but1 8,my name is 4442 my rank is 4442 my serial number is 44440 ,strafing ,aircraft ,fifth ,army ,report1 ,salerno3 8,during landing operations at ,,salerno1 many members of the --th ,division would stand up to fire their rifles1 carbines1 and even pistols at strafing and bombing ,german aircraft4 ,this resulted in many unnecessary casualties40 ,,comment3 ,personnel not assigned to a definite ,,aa mission should disperse and take cover1 firing their individual weapons from such cover at attacking aircraft only1 and even then only when these come within the effective ranges of their weapons4 8,gas60 ,colonel ,m4 ,e4 ,barker1 ,chemical ,warfare ,service1 ,salerno3 8,on the third day of the operation we had a big gas scare4 ,a ,german airplane came in and released two or three radio-controlled bombs1 which gave off considerable smoke when released and while on the way down4 ,several men on the beaches saw this smoke and concluded that an air gas attack was being started4 ,at the same time some vehicles climbing the sand dunes from the beach to the de-waterproofing area had become so hot that their gas-indicator paint turned red4 ,the two incidents together convinced everybody on the beach that a gas attack was being launched4 ,by this time1 of course1 there were plenty of battlefield smells1 including that always-present smell of rotting animal and human flesh4 ,the gas alarm ran up and down the beaches and the roads inland4 8,there was no panic4 ,everybody simply put on his gas mask and carried on4 ,the ,,mp's stopped all personnel going into the area who didn't have gas masks4 ,those individuals who had #8misplaced' their gas masks were really troubled for a while4 ,both ,colonel ,guild and ,i investigated and then gave the #8all clear' signal4 ,i think we would have carried on in exactly the same way without much loss of time or efficiency if gas had actually been present40 ,counterattack ,foiled ,lieutenant ,colonel ,taylor1 ,infantry1 ,italy3 8,we had just relieved the --th ,infantry after it had had numerous casualties from an enemy tank attack against our beachhead at ,,salerno4 ,we were occupying a defensive1 wired-in position4 ,the ,germans counterattacked with tanks1 but because we were occupying a different position from that used by the preceding unit the enemy first started across our front1 apparently believing that we were in the old position4 ,so it was duck soup4 ,we knocked out eight tanks with our #cg's1 #eg's1 ,,td's1 and tanks40 ,room for ,improvement ,the following comments1 indicating weaknesses which must be corrected1 were made by the ,commanding ,general1 --th ,division1 ,italy3 8,sometimes units failed to dispose themselves properly for all-around defense when halted on an objective or when placed in a position for defense4 8,in the attack1 riflemen frequently failed to provide fire that would cover the movement of adjacent units1 merely because they were not able to #8pin-point' definitely the location of the enemy rifle and machine-gun elements firing on our troops4 8,some small unit commanders selected positions apparently with cover and concealment as the primary objective rather than positions from which effective fire could be brought to bear on the enemy4 8,due to the enormous division frontage in the second phase of the landing at ,,salerno some commanders attempted to stretch their units excessively1 and as a result permitted faulty dispositions40 ,illustration3 ,,photograph ,,by ,u4 ,s4 ,,army ,,signal ,,corps ,japanese ,pillbox ,,section ,,iv ,,notes ,,on ,,the ,,nips ,japanese ,pillboxes ,lieutenant ,colonel ,mc,cormick1 ,field ,artillery1 ,new ,georgia3 8,in most cases pillboxes were built in two decks to permit the occupants to drop through a trap door during heavy shelling4 ,they were used for heavy-weapons firing and had communication trenches which concealed light machine guns protecting the pillboxes4 ,all were mutually supporting and very well concealed40 ,superman ,myth ,exploded ,operations ,report1 #dc;d ,division1 ,new ,georgia3 8,our troops here came to regard the ,superman stories about the ,japanese as ridiculous4 ,the ,jap is tricky but not so tricky as many have been led to believe4 ,he is not nearly so ingenious or adaptable as the average ,american1 and the truth of the matter is he's afraid of us1 of our artillery1 and of our sea and air power4 ,our troops must learn this and never forget it4 ,jap ,trap 8,we soon learned that the ,japanese permitted small leading elements of the column to proceed past their effectively camouflaged fortifications and would not open fire until our main body came along40 ,defensive ,action ,operation ,report1 #dc;d ,division1 ,arundel ,island3 8,our first contact with the enemy was made by patrols1 which encountered small groups of ,japs equipped with automatic weapons4 ,their resistance consisted of a fluid delaying action and1 during the early phases1 could not be effectively fixed4 ,after a short skirmish the ,japs would withdraw several hundred yards and re-establish their temporary defense4 ,the denseness of the jungle made such a defense quite effective in delaying our progress40 ,vine ,entanglements ,colonel ,liversedge1 ,u4 ,s4 ,marine ,corps1 ,new ,georgia3 8,the ,japanese used a prickly native vine for entanglements4 ,the vines were interwoven and used to protect defensive positions in lieu of barbed wire4 ,results were effective and impeded attack4 ,vines had to be cut before progress could be made4 8,our own troops should be instructed in the use of these vines as a means of improvisation when wire is not available40 ,,section ,v ,,hints ,,on ,,the ,,heinie ,reverse ,slope ,tactics ,second ,lieutenant ,s4 ,w4 ,malkin1 ,infantry1 ,platoon ,leader1 ,sicily3 8,enemy machine guns1 mortars1 and automatic rifles were located on the reverse side of the hills so as to catch our advancing infantry as they came over the skyline40 ,don't ,gawk6 ,private ,george ,scott1 ,infantry1 ,sicily3 8,several times ,german planes pretended that they were involved in a dog-fight to secure the attention of the ground troops4 ,then they swooped down in a strafing run40 ,traps and ,mines ,private ,first ,class ,edward ,borycz1 ,infantry1 ,sicily3 8,the enemy abandoned his tanks with motor running4 ,when we tried to stop the motors they blew up4 8,the ,germans would put a mine in a road with another mine a sufficient depth under it so that it would not be seen if the top mine were removed4 ,for a while our sappers did not run the mine detector over the area again where the first mine had been found4 ,but after the dirt became packed down sufficiently by traffic1 the second mine would go off40 ,minor ,tactics ,staff ,sergeants ,richard ,e4 ,deland and ,robert ,j4 ,kemp1 ,infantry1 ,sicily3 8,never let an apparently lone machine gun suck you into a trap4 ,the ,germans will usually not fire on the individual but will wait1 watch where he goes1 and get a whole flock4 8,germans always approach their positions from the end and under cover so as not to give them away4 8,in the counterattack the ,jerry machine gun is always well forward4 ,german weapons are faster but are less accurate than ours2 they scare you more than they hurt you4 ,the ,german #hamm mortar is the worst goat-grabber2 it gives you no notice when it is coming in4 8,germans use tanks to maneuver and fire from a distance in attack4 ,when the going gets hot they pull the tanks in and1 after a minute1 bring them out again40 ,typical ,attack and ,withdrawal ,lieutenant ,colonel ,p4 ,h4 ,perkins1 ,tank ,battalion ,commander1 ,italy3 8,the standard ,german attack here consists of three or four tanks in line in the lead4 ,they are followed by infantry in trucks at four to five hundred yards4 ,the rest of the tanks follow the infantry4 ,when fire is drawn the infantry dismounts4 ,the leading tanks mill about1 fire1 and withdraw4 ,we have never seen the reserve tanks committed4 8,in their withdrawals the ,germans use tanks to good advantage4 ,they do not have to contend with mines and blown bridges4 ,their tanks fire a few shots and withdraw1 then move up again1 fire a few more shots and withdraw1 and so on40 ,rearguard ,action ,lieutenant ,colonel ,taylor1 ,infantry1 ,battalion ,commander1 ,italy3 8,my experience has been that we first meet two armored vehicles which open fire for a few minutes with everything they have on the first man of ours they see2 they then withdraw rapidly down the road4 8,next we hit their outpost1 which1 ,i estimate1 consists of about two squads4 ,this outpost1 protecting the road1 has groups on the sides of the mountains on the flanks4 ,it takes four to six hours to drive this outpost in due to its fine observation over us and the difficulties of maneuver40 ,,comment3 ,it should be remembered that this is the experience of one battalion commander in one theater4 ,u4 ,s4 ,,government ,,printing ,,office3 #aidd ,transcriber's ,notes ,punctuation1 hyphenation1 and spelling were made consistent when a predominant preference was found in the original book2 otherwise they were not changed4 ,simple typographical errors were corrected2 unbalanced quotation marks were remedied when the change was obvious1 and otherwise left unbalanced4 ,illustrations in this e,book have been positioned between paragraphs and outside quotations4 ,in versions of this e,book that support hyperlinks1 the page references in the ,list of ,illustrations lead to the corresponding illustrations4 ,on the ,title page1 8,,xxxxxxxxxxxx0 indicates text that was blotted out4 ,the 8,g4 ,c4 ,marshall0 illustration at the end of the ,introduction is the ,general's signature4