,,six                                   
,,metaphysical                          
,,meditations2                          
,wherein it is ,proved                  
,that there is a                        
,,god4                            ,and  
that ,mans ,,mind is                    
really distinct from his ,,body4        
,written ,originally in ,latin          
,by ,,renatus ,,des-,,cartes4           
,hereunto are added the ,,objections    
made against these ,meditations         
,by ,,thomas ,,hobbes                   
,of ,malmesbury4                        
,with the ,,authors ,answers4           
,all ,faithfully ,translated into       
,,english1                              
with a short ,account of                
,des-,cartes's ,life4                   
,by ,,william ,,molyneux4               
,london1 ,printed by ,b4,g4 for ,benj4  
,tooke at                 the ,ship in  
,st4 ,pauls ,church-yard1 #afhj4        
,some ,books sold by ,john ,lawrence1 at
 the ,angel in ,cornhill1 near  the     

,royal ,exchange4      ,a ,collection of
 ,letters for the improvement of        
,husbandry and ,trade1  intended to be  
continued ,monthly1 by ,john ,houghton1 
fellow of the  ,royal ,society1 'tis    
designed that every ,letter shall be    
usefull to  ,mankind1 and by degrees for
 most persons of both ,sexes4    ,the   
,merchant ,royal1 7a very pleasant      
,sermon7 ,preached before the ,king  at 
,white-,hall1 upon the ,nuptials of an  
,honourable ,lord and his ,lady1 in     
,quarto1 price #f;d4    ,humane         
,prudence1 or the ,art by which a man   
may raise himself and  ,fortune to      
,granduer1 by ,a4 ,b41 the second       
,edition1 with the ,addition of  a      
,table2 in ,twelves1 price ,bound1 #as4 
,,the ,,translators ,,preface4    ,,to  
,,the ,,readers4      ,had honor or     
applause and not the publick advantage  
of ,english ,readers  been the design of
 this ,undertaking1 the consideration of
 the common ,fate  of ,translations had 
discouraged ,me from permitting this    

even to have seen  the light2 for meer  
,versions do alwayes carry with them    
this ,property1  that if not well done  
they may much disgrace1 but if well1 not
 much  commend the doers4    ,and       
certainly ,i might well have expected   
the same chance1 had this  been the     
,translation of an ,history1 ,play or   
,romance2 wherein there is  requisite   
not onely a bare version but a          
conformation of ,idiom and  language1   
manner and customary expression2 ,but   
the nature of this  present ,work will  
not admit of the like liberty1 and      
therefore1 ,i hope1  amongst ,judicious 
,readers it may be exempt from the      
common ,fate of  ,translations2 for if  
we look upon it as a ,philosophical or  
,metaphysical  ,tract1 or rather as     
7really it is7 a ,physico-,mathematical 
,argumentation1  we shall find that a   
great strictness of ,expression is      
requisite to be  observed therein4 ,so  
that had a ,translator taken upon him to
 use his own  liberty of ,phrase1 he    

would thereby have endanger'd the sense 
and force  of the ,arguments2 for       
,politeness of language might as well be
 expected in  a ,translation of ,euclide
 as in this4 ,and all that are          
acquainted with  this famous ,authors   
design1 do very well know1 that it was  
his intention  in these ,meditations    
,mathematically to demonstrate1 that    
there is a  ,god1 and that mans mind is 
incorporeal4 ,and it was his opinion1   
that metaphysicks may as clearly be     
demonstrated as mathematicks1 as        
witness his expression in the           
,dedicatory ,epistle of this ,work to   
the  ,sorbone ,doctors1 ,eas 7,rationes 
scilicet7 quibus hic utor certitudine   
evidenti ,geometricas quare1 vel etiam  
superare existimem2 ,that he  reputed   
his ,arguments used in these            
,meditations1 to equal if not excell    
,geometrical certainty4    ,and this1 ,i
 suppose1 is sufficient to make the     
,reader1 not expect herein  any         
smoothness of phrase or quaintness of   

,expression2 what is here  delivered in 
,english is immediately taken1 as it is 
naturally in the  ,original4 ,the words1
 we hope1 may be apposite enough1 and   
fit to express  what is here designed1  
and ,i think it a derogation from the   
,authors skill  to draw the ,picture of 
his mind in any other ,colours1 than    
what his own  ,copy expresses4    ,thus 
far in vindication of the ,philosophical
 plain stile and rough  ,language of the
 following ,translation4 ,i shall add a 
line or two1 first  relating to the     
,readers1 secondly of the ,author1 and  
lastly of the  ,meditations themselves1 
together with the ,motives which excited
 me to  this ,work4    ,as to the       
,readers1 'tis1 ,i suppose1 so evident  
that candour of mind1  and freedome from
 prejudice is requisite to all that     
desire to advantage  themselves by      
reading other mens notions1 that it need
 not be here  insisted on with much     
earnestness2 yet considering the        
,antiquity of this  subject1 and the    

novelty of the ,arguments here produced1
 it seems to be  more than ordinarily   
requisite for an impartial perusal of   
the ensuing  ,tract4 ,neither are the   
following ,meditations to be slightly   
passed over1  but with diligence and    
attention to be read2 for as in         
mathematical  demonstration1 the        
careless missing of any one single      
,position may  render the ,conclusion   
obscure and sometimes inconsequent1 so  
in these  metaphysical ,demonstrations1 
which 7as1 before has been noted from   
the illustrious ,author thereof7 for    
certainty do equal1 if not excel        
,geometrical ,propositions1 the slight  
attention to any one particular         
,argument may frustrate the design of   
the whole discourse4    ,the ,reasoning 
therefore here being close and solid1   
and 7as in  ,mathematicks7 the knowledge
 of the latter depending on the         
knowledge  of what went before1 'tis the
 duty of every ,reader seriously to     
attend  the ,particulars1 as also the   

connexion of the whole4 ,let him weigh  
the  ,arguments and perpend the         
,conclusions1 and after a clear and     
distinct  ,knowledge1 lett him pass his 
judgement4    ,and to this end ,i shall 
make it my request to every ,reader1    
that he  would not be content with a    
single perusal of the following         
,discourses1  but that he would often   
repeat his reading them over2 for by    
this means  the force of those          
,arguments1 which at first may by chance
 escape the  most diligent and attentive
 ,peruser1 by a second or third ,essay  
may  offer themselves more fully to his 
,consideration4 ,this was the desire  of
 our ,author in an other of his pieces1 
,i mean his ,principles of  ,philosophy1
 which ,i am sure do not require so     
strict an attention of  mind1 as these  
abstracted speculations2 and therefore  
if it were his  ,request in that case1  
we may ,reasonably think that 'twas no  
less his  desire in this4    ,when we   
come to speak of the ,incomparable      

,author of these ,meditations1  we have 
reason to lament our own ,ignorance1 and
 to blame the ,ingratitude  of the ,age 
wherein he lived1 for not transmitting  
to ,posterity more  certain and ample   
,records of the ,life and ,conversation 
of this ,excellent  ,philosopher1 all   
that has been ,written in this kind     
gives us only so  much light into the   
,life of this ,prodigious ,man1 as may  
make us wish for  more2 imparting which1
 ,i shall recommend the ,readers to a   
further enquiry  into the inward        
,thoughts1 7largly discover'd in the    
,writings7 of our  ,famous ,author1 of  
whose outward actions and condition we  
have so small  knowledge4    ,renatus   
,des-,cartes was born on the last day of
 ,march in the year #aeif4  at ,tours1  
or at ,castrum ,eraldum a ,town near    
,tours in ,france2  ,he came of an      
,antient and ,noble ,family1 being by   
,descent ,lord of  ,perron1 ,his ,father
 was a ,senator of his ,country1 and a  
,man of no mean  estate1 leaving to this

 his only ,son by a second ,wife between
 six and  seven thousand pounds a year4 
,he was ,educated in his younger years  
according to the manner of his  ,country
 7and as he himself recommends in one of
 his ,epistles1 viz4  ,epist4 #ij4      
partis secund to ,one for the           
,instruction of his ,son7 in the        
,aristotelian principles of ,philosophy1
 a whole course whereof he had  run     
through at the ,age of seventeen in the 
,schools of ,flexia1 or ,la  ,flesche a 
,town in the ,province of ,anjou1 famous
 for the ,colledge of  ,jesuites there  
establish'd by ,henry the #dth4    ,but 
to this he did not ,continue long       
devoted1 giving early testimonies  of   
his dislike to the unsatisfactory       
,notions1 and verbose emptiness of  the 
,peripatetick ,philosophy2 ,he used     
therefore his utmost endeavours 7as  he 
himself testifies in his ,dissertatio de
 ,methodo7 to get loose from  those     
,chains and ,fetters of ,mind to which  
the weakness of his tender  years had   

subjected him4    ,to this end he betook
 himself to a long course of ,travel1   
that by the  variety of ,objects1 which 
he was likely to meet with in his       
journeys1  the memory of his past       
,notions might be blotted out2 ,in his  
travel he  applied himself much to the  
study of the ,art ,military1 and        
,mathematicks2  ,in the latter he has   
left the ,world large testimonies of his
 ,excellence  in his ,book of ,geometry2
 and in the former we have reason to    
believe  him most expert1 for ,he was   
personally present at some ,sieges and  
,battles  both in ,france and ,germany1 
as particularly at the ,siege of        
,rochel1  of ,gava near ,genoa1 of      
,breda1 at the ,battle of ,prague1 c4 so
  that we may conclude that he had a    
,genius fitted 7according to the ,motto 
of the noble ,sir ,w4 ,raliegh7 ,tam    
,marti1 quam ,mercurio1 ,for the ,pike  
as well as ,pen4 ,and as the ,glorious  
,roman ,emperour became a ,csar by  his 
,book as well as ,sword1 by the         

,conquests of his mind as well as those 
of his arm2 so our ,famous ,author was  
,ex ,utroque ,clarus4    ,in his        
,travels he spent many years1 in all    
which time he was not ,idle1  but highly
 improved himself by his converse with  
the ,beaux ,esprits1  which he met with 
in several ,regions he visited2 ,the    
first ,place he  betook himself to1 was 
,italy1 then he went into ,denmark1     
,germany1  ,hungary1 c4 ,and after a    
,long but advantagious ,peregrination he
  return'd to ,amsterdam1 where he      
intended to take up his ,rest1 had he   
not been called by the ,french ,king    
upon very ,honourable terms to ,paris2  
,during his ,continuance there he so    
order'd his annual ,revenue1 that he    
might be supplied by the hands of a     
,friend wherever he was4 ,he staid at   
,paris three years1 and then retired    
,himself to a solitary village in       
,holland called ,egmond1 where he lived 
twenty five years1 during which  time he
 apply'd himself wholly to the          

,restauration of true ,philosophy1      
wherein he gave the ,world such mighty  
testimonies of his ,excellence1  that in
 a short time he became celebrated in   
the mouths of all ,learned  ,men4       
,neither were the ,courts of ,princes   
silent in his deserved ,praises2  for   
after a ,retirement of twenty five years
 he was ,invited by ,christina  ,queen  
of ,sweedland to her ,court2 ,thither   
upon the intreaty of this brave  and    
,learned ,princess he betook himself1   
where he had not continued ,long  before
 he was struck with a ,peripneumonia or 
,inflammation of the ,lungs             
7contracted1 as it is thought by the    
long ,discourses which he used to  hold 
bare headed with the ,queen1 continuing 
them sometimes till far in  the ,night17
 of which unhappy distemper he ,died the
 seventh ,day after he  sicken'd4       
,thus ,expired this ,wonder of his ,own 
and succeeding ,ages1 desired and       
lamented by all men1 qual'd by none4 ,he
 was buried in a costly ,monument       

consisting of four sides1 upon which    
were inscribed ,epitaphs2 bestow'd  upon
 him by many ,renown'd ,persons4        
,what shall we now say sufficient to    
express our ,grief for the untimely     
,decease of this ,worthy ,philosopher8  
,but ,especially what shall we now do   
to recover our ,loss8 ,let us endeavour 
to ,redeem what we have lost by well    
,husbanding and careful improvement of  
what is left2 which may be done  in     
,part by a ,diligent ,perusal of the    
,works written by this ,excellent       
,author2 ,this1 ,this only is the way of
 ,reviving him again1 and of giving  him
 ,immortality in spight of his untimely 
,fate4 ,and so let him for ever  live   
celebrated by the ,deserved ,praises of 
all ingenious ,enquirers after  truth1  
and ,learning4    ,let us therefore cast
 our eye upon the ,present ,work of this
  extroardinary ,philosopher1 and       
therein let us admire his profound      
,judgment and vigorous ,fancy1 for if we
 seriously consider it1 we shall  hardly

 find a more solid close piece of       
,reasoning either in this or  ,foregoing
 ages2 ,here1 what was commonly asserted
 without proof1 is not  only proved but 
,mathematically ,demonstrated1 viz4     
,that ,god is the  ,fountain and        
,original of ,truth2 ,his sharp ,wit1   
like ,hannibals ,vinegar1  hath eaten   
thro the ,mazing and overtowring hills  
of ,errors1 a ,plain and  ,pleasant ,way
 to the ,divine seat of ,knowledge4     
,in fine1 such is the ,excellence of    
these six ,meditations1 that ,i cannot  
resemble his ,performance herein better 
than to the ,six ,days ,work of the     
,supream ,architect2 and certainly next 
to the ,creation of ,all things out  of 
,nothing1 the ,restauration of ,truth   
out of ,errors is the most ,divine      
,work2 so that 7with ,reverence be it   
spoken7 the ,incomparable ,des-,cartes  
does hereby deserve as it were the name 
of a ,creatour4 ,in the first           
,meditation we are ,presented with a    
,rude and ,indigested ,chaos of ,errours

  and ,doubts1 till the ,divine spirit  
of the ,noble ,des-,cartes 7pardon  the 
,boldness of the ,expression7 moves upon
 the confused face of these  ,waters1   
and thereout produces some clear and    
distinct ,light2 by  which ,sun-shine he
 proceeds to bring forth and cherish    
other ,branches  of ,truth2 ,till at    
last by a six ,days ,labour he          
,establishes this ,fair  ,fabrick 7as ,i
 may call it7 of the ,intellectual      
,world on foundations  that shall never 
be shaken4 ,then sitting down with rest 
and satisfaction  he looks upon this his
 ,off-spring and ,pronounces it ,good4  
,these ,things ,consider'd1 ,i need not 
make any long ,apologies for my         
undertaking a translation thereof2 ,the 
excellency of the ,original is          
sufficient to vindicate my endeavours to
 present the ,english ,world with  a    
,copy1 and he that shall blame my       
,intentions of ,communicating the       
,methods of ,truth to those that have   
only the ,english ,tongue1 may as well  

find fault with those ,english that     
propagate the ,christian ,religion      
among savage ,indians1 and translate the
 ,scriptures into their ,language1      
because they have not the ,english      
,tongue4 ,to understand ,latin is no 7or
  at most a very small7 part of         
,learning1 and that which certainly     
every  ,cobler in ,rome was once endow'd
 with2 and therefore must there then  be
 no translations out of ,greek into     
,latin8 ,i doubt not1 but there are     
many ,persons in our ,nations1 who tho  
wanting ,latin1 are notwithstanding     
very capable of the most abstracted     
speculations2 the late disturbances  of 
our ,kingdomes occasion'd many ,youths1 
who were then in a fair way  of         
,instruction1 to forsake their learning1
 and divert their intentions  from      
,literature to ,arms1 and yet many of   
these have afterwards become  ,men of   
extraordinary nary abilities and        
qualifications for learning             
notwithstanding their deficiency in the 

,roman ,tongue4 ,and ,i see no ,reason  
why it should not be the desire1 and    
consequently the endeavour of  every    
true ,english man1 to make his language 
as universal as is now the  ,french1    
into which the best ,books in all sorts 
of ,learning1 both ,poetry  and ,prose1 
are daily translated out of all         
languages1 but especially  out of ,greek
 and ,latine4 ,among which these        
,meditations are to be found1           
entituled1 ,les ,meditations            
,metaphysiques ,de ,rene ,des ,cartes   
touchant  la ,premiere ,philosophie4    
,this was translated out of the ,authors
 ,latine  into ,french by ,monsieur le  
,d4 ,d4 ,l4 ,n4 ,s4 ,the several        
,objections also1  which were made by   
divers learned ,persons against these   
,meditations1 with  the ,authors        
,answers1 were translated into ,french  
by ,m4 ,b4 ,l4 ,r4 ,and1 ,i  hope1 no   
one will assert1 that the ,french are   
more fit to receive those  metaphysical 
,notions delivered herein than the      

,english ,nation4    ,but 'twas none of 
the smallest motives ,i had to this     
undertaking1 that  tho some famous      
,english ,authours have taken notice of 
the ,arguments here  produced 7for the  
proof of a ,deity drawn from the ,idea  
we have of  ,god in our ,mind1 c47      
,particularly the most excellent and    
learned  ,dr4 ,stillingfleet in the     
first ,chapter of the third ,book in his
  ,origines ,sacr1 who refers his       
,readers to a further search into these 
,meditations in the #djj page of that   
,discourse2 as also the ,reverend ,dr4  
,henry ,more in his ,antidote against   
,atheism1 and more fully in his         
,appendix annex'd thereto1 hath treated 
of our ,authors demonstration2  and yet 
nothing of the genuine original from    
whence they have borrowed  all their    
,copies 7tho some of them drawn in a    
larger size1 yet ,i question  whether so
 expressive7 nothing of our ,authors    
proper management hath ever  appear'd in
 ,english4 ,those that assert these     

,arguments to have been long  before    
thought upon by some of the ,fathers1 ,i
 shall refer to our ,authors  just      
vindication of himself in his several   
,answers to ,objections made  against   
these ,discourses4    ,and here ,i shall
 dismiss the ,reader detaining him no   
longer from  that satisfaction which he 
may reasonably expect from the perusal  
of  the following ,meditations2 this    
,translation is dedicated to no one in  
particular1 but is humbly submitted to  
the moderate censure of all candid      
,readers1 by                            
,their humble servant                   
,will4 ,molyneux4    ,dublin ,feb4 #ai4 
#afgi_/hj4          ,the ,contents4     
,meditation #a4 ,of ,things ,doubtful4  
,pag4 #a4      ,meditat4 #b4 ,of the    
,nature of ,mans ,mind1 and that 'tis   
easier      ,proved to ,be then our     
,body4                                  
p4 #aa4      ,meditat4 #c4 ,of ,god1 and
 that there ,is a ,god4                 
p4 #bg4      ,meditat4 #d4 ,of ,truth   

and ,falshood4                          
p4 #ee4      ,meditat4 #e4 ,of the      
,essence of ,things ,material1 and      
herein      again of ,god1 and that ,he 
does ,exist4                          p4
 #gj4      ,meditat4 #f4 ,of ,corporeal 
,beings and their ,existence1 as also   
of the ,real ,difference between ,mind  
and ,body4                  p4 #hc4     
,objections and ,answers4               
p4 #aee4          ,,errata4      ,pag4  
#a4 line #h4 dele off4 p4 #c4 l4 #ba4   
there wants the sign  of ,interrogation4
 p4 #h4 l4 #aj4 r4 ,premeditated4 ib4 l4
 #ad4 r4  falshoods4 p4 #ah4 l4 #ae4 r4 
that it may4 p4 #bj4 l4 #aa4 r4 suffers4
  ,in the two or three first chapters   
there are ,astericks wanting4  p4 #cc4  
l4 #aj4 dele ,i4 p4 #ci4 l4 #be4 r4     
formally4 p4 #di4 l4 #ad r4  ,duration  
and ,continuance4 p4 #ed4 l4 #b for the 
,point put a ,comma4 p4  #fa4 l4 ult4 r4
 ,i enquire4 p4 #ia4 r4 in the margin   
doubted4 p4 #abd4  l4 #f4 r4 have no    
affinity4    ,transcriber's ,note3      

,these errata have been corrected1 along
 with some  obvious typos4 ,the spelling
 in this book is not only of its time1  
but  also wildly variable1 and has been 
left well alone4 ,upright text within   
italic passages is marked like this4    
,,the    ,metaphysical ,meditations     
,,of    ,renatus ,des-,cartes1 c4       
,,meditat4 ,i4    ,of ,things ,doubtful4
      ,some years past ,i perceived how 
many ,falsities ,i admitted as ,truths  
in my ,younger years1 and how ,dubious  
those things were which ,i raised  from 
thence2 and therefore ,i thought it     
requisite 7if ,i had a designe  to      
establish any thing that should prove   
firme and permanent in  sciences7 that  
once in my life ,i should clearly cast  
aside all my former  opinions1 and begin
 a new from some ,first principles4 ,but
 this seemed a  great ,task1 and ,i     
still expected that maturity of years1  
then which none  could be more apt to   
receive ,learning2 upon which ,account  
,i waited so  long1 that at last ,i     

should deservedly be blamed had ,i spent
 that time in  ,deliberation which      
remain'd only for ,action4    ,this day 
therefore ,i conveniently released my   
mind from all cares1 ,i  procured to my 
self a ,time ,quiet1 and free from all  
,business1 ,i retired  my self ,alone2  
and now at length will ,i freely and    
seriously apply my  self to the ,general
 overthrow of all my former ,opinions4  
,to the ,accomplishment of ,which1 it   
will not be necessary for me to prove   
them all false 7for that perhaps ,i     
shall never atcheive7 ,but because my   
reason perswades me1 that ,i must       
withdraw my assent no less from those   
opinions which seem not so very certain 
and undoubted1 then ,i should  from     
those that are ,apparently false1 it    
will be sufficient if ,i reject  all    
those wherein ,i find any ,occasion of  
doubt4    ,neither to effect this is it 
necessary1 that they all should be run  
over particularly 7which would be an    
endles trouble7 but because the         

,foundation being once undermin'd1      
whatever is built thereon will of  its  
own accord come to the ground1 ,i shall 
therefore immediately assault  the very 
principle1 on which whatever ,i have    
believed was grounded4  ,viz4           
,whatever ,i have hitherto admitted as  
most true1 that ,i received either      
from1 or by my ,senses2 but these ,i    
have often found to deceive me1 and     
'tis prudence never certainly to trust  
those that ,i have 7tho but once7       
deceived us4    #a ,doubt4 ,but tho     
sometimes the senses deceive us being   
exercised  about remote or small        
objects1 yet there are many other things
 of  which we cannot doubt tho we know  
them only by the senses8 as that at     
present ,i am in this place1 that ,i am 
sitting by a fire1 that ,i have a       
,winter gown on me1 that ,i feel this   
,paper with my hands2 ,but how can it   
be denied that these hands or this body 
is mine8 ,unless ,i should compare  my  
self to those mad men1 whose brains are 

disturbed by such a disorderly          
melancholick vapour1 that makes them    
continually profess themselves to  be   
,kings1 tho they are very poor1 or fancy
 themselves cloathed in ,purple  ,robes1
 tho they are naked1 or that their heads
 are made of ,clay as a  bottle1 or of  
glass1 c4 ,but these are mad men1 and ,i
 should be as mad  as they in following 
their example by fancying these things  
as they do4    #a ,solution4 ,this truly
 would seem very clear to those that    
never  sleep1 and suffer the same things
 7and sometimes more unlikely7 in  their
 repose1 then these mad men do whilst   
they are awake2 for how often  am ,i    
perswaded in a ,dream of these usual    
occurrences1 that ,i am in this  place1 
that ,i have a ,gown on me1 that ,i am  
sitting by a fire1 c4 ,tho  all the     
while ,i am lying naked between the     
,sheets4    ,but now ,i am certain that 
,i am awake and look upon this ,paper1  
neither  is this head which ,i shake    
asleep1 ,i knowingly and willingly      

stretch out  this hand1 and am sensible 
that things so distinct could not happen
 to  one that sleeps4 ,as if ,i could   
not remember my self to have been       
deceived  formerly in my sleep by the   
like thoughts2 which while ,i consider  
more  attentively ,i am so far convinced
 of the difficulty of distinguishing    
sleep from waking that ,i am amazed1 and
 this very amazement almost  perswades  
me that ,i am asleep4    #b ,doubt4     
,wherefore let us suppose our selves    
asleep1 and that these  things are not  
true1 viz4 that we open our eyes1 move  
our heads1  stretch our hands1 and      
perhaps that we have no such things as  
hands or a  body4 ,yet we must confess1 
that what we see in a ,dream is 7as it  
were7  a painted ,picture1 which cannot 
be devised but after the likeness of    
some real thing2 and that therefore     
these ,generals at least1 viz4  eyes1   
head1 hands1 and the whole body are     
things really existent and  not         
imaginary2 ,for ,painters themselves1   

7even then when they design  ,mermaids  
and ,satyrs in the most unusual shapes7 
do not give them natures  altogether    
new1 but only add the divers ,parts of  
different ,animals  together2 ,and if by
 chance they invent any thing so new    
that nothing  was ever seen like it1 for
 that 'tis wholy fictitious and false1  
yet  the colours at least of which1 they
 make it must be true ,colours2 so  upon
 the same account1 tho these ,general   
things as eyes1 head1 hands1  c4 may be 
imaginary2 yet nevertheless we must of  
necessity confess  the more simple and  
universal things to be ,true1 of which  
7as of  true ,colours7 these ,images of 
things 7whether true or false7 which    
are in our minds are made2 such as are  
the nature of a body in ,general1  and  
its ,extension1 also the shape of things
 extended1 with the quantity  or bigness
 of them2 their number also1 and place  
wherein they are1 the  time in which    
they continue1 and the like1 and        
therefore from hence we  make no bad    

conclusion1 that ,physick1 both         
,natural1 and ,medicinal1  ,astronomy1  
and all other sciences1 which depend on 
the consideration  of compound things1  
are ,doubtful4 ,but that ,arithmetick1  
,geometry1  and the like 7which treat   
only of the most simple1 and ,general   
things  not regarding whether they      
really are or not7 have in them         
something  certain and undoubted2 for   
whether ,i sleep or wake1 two and three 
added make five2 a square has no more   
sides than four c4 neither  seems it    
possible what such plain truths can be  
doubted off4    #b ,solution4 ,but all  
this ,while there is rooted in my mind a
 certain old  opinion of the being of an
 ,omnipotent ,god1 by whom ,i am created
 in  the state ,i am in2 and how know ,i
 but he caused that there should be no  
,earth1 no ,heaven1 no ,body1 no        
,figure1 no ,magnitude1 no ,place1 and  
yet  that all these things should seem  
to me to be as now they are8 ,and as ,i 
very often judge others to ,erre about  

those things which they think they      
,throughly understand1 so why may not ,i
 be deceived1 whenever ,i add  two and  
three1 or count the sides of a ,square1 
or whatever other easy  ,matter can be  
thought of8    #c4 ,doubt4 ,but perhaps 
,god wills not that ,i should be        
deceived1 for  he is said to be         
,infinitely ,good4    #c4 ,solution4    
,yet if it were ,repugnant to his       
,goodness to create  me so that ,i      
should be always deceived1 it seems also
 unagreeable  to his ,goodness to permit
 me to be deceived at any time2 ,which  
last no one will affirme3 ,some there   
are truely who had rather deny  ,gods   
,omnipotence1 then beleive all things   
uncertain2 but there at  present we may 
not contradict4 ,and we will suppose all
 this of ,god to  be false2 yet whether 
they will suppose me to become what ,i  
am by  ,fate1 by ,chance1 by a continued
 chain of causes1 or any other way1     
because to erre is an ,imperfection1 by 
how much the less power they  will      

,assigne to the ,author of my ,being1 so
 much the more ,probable it  will be1   
that ,i am so ,imperfect as to be       
alwayes deceived4    ,to which          
,arguments ,i know not what to answer   
but am forced to confess1  that there is
 nothing of all those things which ,i   
formerly received as  ,truths1 whereof  
at present ,i may not doubt2 and this   
doubt shall not  be grounded on         
inadvertency or ,levity1 but upon strong
 and ,premeditated  reasons2 and        
therefore ,i must hereafter 7if ,i      
designe to discover  any truths7        
withdraw my assent from them no less    
then from apparent  falshoods4    ,but  
'tis not sufficient to think only       
,transiently on these things1 but  ,i   
must take care to remember them2 for    
dayly my old opinions returne  upon me1 
and much against my ,will almost        
possesse my ,beleife tyed to  them1 as  
it were by a continued use and ,right of
 ,familiarity2  neither shall ,i ever   
cease to assent and trust in them1      

whilst ,i  suppose them as in themselves
 they really are1 that is to say1       
something  doubtful 7as now ,i have     
proved7 yet notwithstanding highly      
,probable1  which it is much more       
,reasonable to beleive then disbeleive4 
,wherefore ,i conceive ,i should not do 
amiss1 if 7with my mind bent clearly  to
 the contrary side7 ,i should deceive my
 self1 and suppose them for a  ,while   
altogether false and ,imaginary2 till at
 length the ,weights of  prejudice being
 equal in each scale1 no ill custome may
 any more ,draw my  ,judgement from the 
true ,conception of things1 for ,i know 
from hence  will follow no dangerous    
,error1 and ,i can't too immoderately   
pamper my  own ,incredulity1 seeing     
,what ,i am about1 concernes not        
,practice but  ,speculation4    ,to     
,which end ,i will suppose1 not an      
,infinitely perfect ,god1 the  ,fountain
 of truth1 but that some ,evil ,spirit  
which is very  ,powerful and crafty has 
used all his endeavours to deceive me2  

,i  will conceive1 the ,heavens1 ,air1  
,earth1 ,colours1 ,figures1 ,sounds1 and
 all  outward things are nothing else   
but the delusions of ,dreams1 by which  
he  has laid snares to catch my easy    
beleif2 ,i will consider my self as not 
having hands1 ,eyes1 ,flesh1 ,blood1 or 
,sences1 but that ,i falsely think  that
 ,i have all these2 ,i will continue    
firmly in this ,meditation2 and  tho it 
lyes not in my power to discover any    
truth1 yet this is in my  power1 not to 
assent to ,falsities1 and with a strong 
resolution take  care that the ,mighty  
deceiver 7tho never so powerful or      
cunning7  impose not any thing on my    
beleife4    ,but this is a laborious    
intention1 and a certain sloth reduces  
me to  the usual course of life1 and    
like a ,prisoner who in his sleep       
perhaps  enjoy'd an imaginary liberty1  
and when he begins to suppose that he   
is asleep is afraid to waken1 but is    
willing to be deceived by the  ,pleasant
 delusion2 so ,i willingly fall into my 

opinions1 and am afraid  to be ,roused1 
least a toilsome waking succeeding a    
pleasant rest ,i may  hereafter live not
 in the light1 but in the confused      
darkness of the  doubts now raised4     
,,meditat4 ,,ii4    ,of the nature of   
,mans mind1 and that 'tis easier proved 
to be then  our body4      ,by          
yesterdays ,meditation ,i am cast into  
so great ,doubts1 that ,i shall  never  
forget them1 and yet ,i know not how to 
answer them1 but being  plunged on a    
suddain into a deep ,gulf1 ,i am so     
amazed that ,i can neither  touch the   
bottome1 nor swim at the top4           
,nevertheless1 ,i will endeavour once   
more1 and try the way ,i set on         
yesterday1 by removing from me whatever 
is in the least doubtful1 as if  ,i had 
certainly discover'd it to be altogether
 false1 and will proceed  till ,i find  
out some certainty1 or if nothing else1 
yet at least this  certainty1 ,that     
there is nothing sure4    ,archimedes   
required but a point which was firm1 and

 immoveable  that he might move the     
whole ,earth1 so in the perfect         
undertaking ,great  things may be       
expected1 if ,i can discover but the    
least thing that is  true and           
indisputable4    ,wherefore ,i suppose  
all things ,i see are false1 and believe
 that  nothing of those things are      
really existent1 which my deceitful     
memory  represents to me2 'tis evident  
,i have no senses1 that a ,body1        
,figure1  ,extension1 ,motion1 ,place1  
c4 are meer ,fictions2 what thing       
therefore  is there that is true8       
perhaps only this1 ,that there is       
nothing  certain4    ,sidenote3 ,doubts 
and ,solutions4    ,but how know ,i that
 there is nothing distinct from all     
these things  7which ,i have now        
reckon'd7 of which ,i have no reason to 
doubt8 ,is  there no ,god 7or whatever  
other name ,i may call him7 who has put 
these  thoughts into me8 ,yet why should
 ,i think this8 ,when ,i my self perhaps
  am the ,author of them4 ,upon which   

,account1 therefore must not ,i be      
something8 'tis but just now that ,i    
denied that ,i had any senses1 or  any  
,body4 ,hold a while--,am ,i so tied to 
a ,body and senses that ,i  cannot exist
 without them8 ,but ,i have perswaded my
 self that there is  nothing in the     
,world1 no ,heaven1 no ,earth1 no       
,souls1 no ,bodies2 and then  why not1  
that ,i my self am not8 ,yet surely if  
,i could perswade my  self any thing1 ,i
 was4    ,but there is ,i know not what 
sort of ,deceivour very powerful  and   
very crafty1 who always strives to      
deceive ,me2 without ,doubt  therefore  
,i am1 if he can decieve me2 ,and let   
him ,deceive me as  much as he can1 yet 
he can never make me not to ,be1 whilst 
,i think  that ,i am4 ,wherefore ,i may 
lay this down as a ,principle1 that     
whenever this sentence ,i am1 ,i exist1 
is spoken or thought of by ,me1 'tis    
necessarily ,true4    ,but ,i do not yet
 fully understand who ,i am that now    
necessarily  exist1 and ,i must         

hereafter take care1 least ,i foolishly 
mistake  some other thing for my self1  
and by that means be deceived in that   
thought1 which ,i defend as the most    
certain and evident of all4             
,wherefore ,i will again ,recollect1    
what ,i believed my self to be          
heretofore1 before ,i had set upon these
 ,meditations1 from which ,notion  ,i   
will withdraw whatever may be ,disproved
 by the ,foremention'd  ,reasons1 that  
in the ,end1 ,that only may ,remain     
which is ,true and  indisputable4       
,what therefore have ,i heretofore      
thought my self8 ,a ,man4 ,but what is a
  man8 ,shall ,i answer1 a ,rational    
,animal8 ,by no means2 because          
afterwards  it may be asked1 what an    
,animal is8 and what ,rational is8 ,and 
so from  one question ,i may fall into  
greater ,difficulties2 neither at       
present  have ,i so much time as to     
spend it about such ,niceties4    ,but  
,i shall rather here ,consider1 what    
heretofore represented it self  to my   

thoughts freely1 and naturally1 whenever
 ,i set my self to  understand ,what ,i 
my self was4    ,and the first thing ,i 
find ,representing it self is1 that ,i  
have ,face1  ,hands1 ,arms1 and this    
whole frame of parts which is seen in my
  ,body1 and which ,i call my ,body4    
,the next thing represented to me was1  
that ,i was nourish'd1 could  walk1 had 
senses1 and could ,think2 which         
functions ,i attributed to  my ,soul4   
,yet what this soul of mine was1 ,i did 
not fully conceive2 or  else supposed it
 a small thing like wind1 or fire1 or   
aire1 infused  through my stronger      
parts4    ,as to my ,body truly ,i      
doubted not1 but that ,i rightly        
understood  its ,nature1 which 7if ,i   
should endeavour to describe as ,i      
conceive  it7 ,i should thus ,explain1  
viz4 ,by a ,body ,i mean whatever is    
capable of ,shape1 or can be contained  
in a place1 and so fill's  a space that 
it excludes all other ,bodys out of the 
same1 that which  may be touch'd1 seen1 

heard1 tasted1 or smelt1 and that which 
is capable of various ,motions and      
,modifications1 not from it  self1 but  
from any other thing moving it1 for ,i  
judged it against  7or rather above7 the
 nature of a ,body to move it self1 or  
perceive1 or think1 ,but rather admired 
that ,i should find these  ,operations  
in certain ,bodys4    ,but ,how now     
7since ,i suppose a certain powerful and
 7if it be lawful  to call him so7 evil 
deluder1 who useth all his endeavours to
 deceive  me in all things7 can ,i      
affirme that ,i have any of those       
things1  which ,i have now said belong  
to the nature of a ,body8 ,hold-- ,let  
me  ,consider--1 ,let me think--1 ,let  
me reflect-- ,i can find no ,answer1 and
 ,i am  weary with repeating the same   
things over-again in vain4    ,but      
,which of these ,faculties did ,i       
attribute to my ,soul1 my  ,nutritive1  
or ,motive faculty8 yet now seeing ,i   
have no ,body1 these  also are meer     
delusions4 ,was it my sensitive faculty8

 ,but this also  cannot be perform'd    
without a ,body1 and ,i have seem'd to  
perceive  many things in my sleep1 of   
which ,i afterwards understood my self  
not  to be sensible4 ,was it my         
,cogitative ,faculty8 ,here ,i have     
discovered  it1 'tis my ,thought1 this  
alone cannot be separated from ,me1 ,i  
am1  ,i exist1tis true1 but for what    
time ,am ,i8 ,why ,i am as long as  ,i  
think2 ,for it ,may be that ,when ,i    
cease from thinking1 ,i may cease  from 
being4 ,now ,i admit of nothing but what
 is necessarily true3 ,in  short        
therefore ,i am only a thinking thing   
that is to say1 a mind1  or a soul1 or  
understanding1 or ,reason1 words which  
formerly ,i  understood not2 ,i am a    
,real thing1 and ,really ,existent1 ,but
 what sort  of thing8 ,i have just now  
said it1 ,a thinking thing4             
,sidenote3 99 ,places noted with their  
,asterisk are refer'd to in the         
following ,objections4    ,but am ,i    
nothing besides8 ,i will consider,i am  

not that structure of  parts1 which is  
called a ,mans ,body1 neither am ,i any 
sort of thin  ,air infused into those   
,parts1 nor a ,wind1 nor ,fire1 nor     
,vapour1  nor ,breath1 nor whatever ,i  
my self can feign1 for all these things 
,i  have supposed not to ,be4 ,yet my   
,position stands firm2 ,nevertheless ,i 
am something4 ,yet perhaps it so falls  
out that these very things which  ,i    
suppose not to exist 7because to me     
unknown7 are in reallity nothing        
different from that very ,self1 which ,i
 know4 ,i cannot tell1 ,i  dispute it   
not now1 ,i can only give my opinion of 
those things whereof ,i  have some      
knowledge4 ,i am sure that ,i exist1 ,i 
ask who ,i am whom ,i thus  know1       
certainly1 the knowledge1 of ,me        
7precisely taken7 depends not on  those 
things1 whose existence ,i am yet       
ignorant of2 and therefore not on  any  
other things that ,i can feign by my    
imagination4    ,and this very ,word    
7feign7 puts me in mind of my error1 for

 ,i  should feign in deed1 if ,i should 
imagine my self any thing2 for to       
imagine is nothing else but to think    
upon the shape or image of  a corporeal 
thing2 but now ,i certainly know that ,i
 am1 and ,i know  also that 'tis        
possible that all these images1 and     
generally whatever  belongs to the      
,nature of a ,body are nothing but      
deluding ,dreams4  ,which things        
,consider'd ,i should be no less        
,foolish in saying1 ,i will  imagine    
that ,i may more throughly understand   
what ,i am1 then if ,i should  say1 at  
,present ,i am awake and perceive       
something true1 but because it  appears 
not evidently enough1 ,i shall endeavour
 to sleep1 that in a ,dream  ,i may     
perceive it more evidently and truely4  
,wherefore ,i know that nothing that ,i 
can comprehend by my imagination1  can  
belong to the ,notion ,i have of my     
self1 and that ,i must carefully        
withdraw my mind from those things that 
it may more distinctly perceive  its own

 ,nature4    ,let me ask therefore ,what
 ,i am1 ,a ,thinking ,thing1 but ,what  
is ,that8  ,that is a thing1 doubting1  
understanding1 affirming1 denying1      
willing1 nilling1 imagining also1 and   
sensitive4 ,these truely are  not a few 
,properties1 if they all belong to ,me4 
,and ,why should they ,not  belong to   
me8 ,for am not ,i the very same who at 
present doubt almost of  ,all things2   
yet understand something1 which thing   
onely ,i affirm to  be true1 ,i deny all
 other things1 ,i am willing to know    
more1 ,i would  not be deceived1 ,i     
imagine many things unwillingly1 and    
consider  many things as coming to me by
 my senses4 ,which of all these         
faculties  is it1 which is not as true  
as that ,i ,exist1 tho ,i should sleep1 
or  my ,creatour should as much as in   
him lay1 strive to deceive ,me8 which   
of them is it that is distinct from my  
thought8 which of them is it  that can  
be seperated from me8 ,for that ,i am   
the same that doubt1  understand1 and   

will is so evident1 that ,i know not how
 to explain  it more manifestly1 and    
that ,i also am the same that imagine1  
for tho  perhaps 7as ,i have supposed7  
no thing that can be imagined is true1  
yet the imaginative ,power it self is   
really existent1 and makes  up a part of
 my ,thought2 and last of all that ,i am
 the same that am  sensitive1 or        
perceive corporeal things as by my      
senses1 yet that  ,i now see light1 hear
 a noise1 feel heat1 these things are   
false1  for ,i suppose my self asleep1  
but ,i know that ,i see1 hear1 and am   
heated1 that cannot be false2 and this  
it is that in me is properly  called    
,sense1 and this strictly taken is the  
same with thought4    ,by these         
,considerations ,i begin a little better
 to understand ,my self  what ,i am2    
,but yet it seems1 and ,i cannot but    
think that ,corporeal  ,things 7whose   
,images are formed in my thought1 and   
which by my  senses1 ,i perceive7 are   
much more distinctly known1 then that   

confused ,notion of ,my ,self which     
imagination cannot afford me4 ,and  yet 
'tis strange that things doubtful1      
unknown1 distinct from ,me1  should be  
apprehended more clearly by ,me1 then a 
,thing that is  ,true1 then a thing that
 is known1 or then ,i my self2 ,but the 
,reason  is1 that my ,mind loves to     
wander1 and suffers not it self to be   
bounded  within the strict limits of    
,truth4    ,let it therefore ,wander1   
and once more let me give it the ,free  
,reins1  that hereafter being           
conveniently curbed1 it may suffer it   
self to be  more easily ,govern'd4      
,let me consider those things which of  
all ,things ,i formerly conceived  most 
evident1 that is to say1 ,bodies which  
we touch1 which we see1  not bodies in  
,general 7for those ,general            
,conceptions are usually  ,confused7 but
 some one ,body in particular4    ,let  
us chuse for example this piece of      
,bees-wax1 it was lately taken  from the
 ,comb1 it has not yet lost all the tast

 of the ,honey1  it retains something of
 the smell of the ,flowers from whence  
'twas  gather'd1 its colour1 shape1 and 
bigness are manifest1 'tis hard1  'tis  
cold1 'tis easily felt1 and if you will 
knock it with your  finger1 'twill make 
a noise3 ,in fine1 it hath all things   
requisite to  the most perfect notion of
 a ,body4    ,but behold whilst ,i am   
speaking1 'tis put to the ,fire1 its    
tast is  purged away1 the smell is      
vanish'd1 the colour is changed1 the    
shape is alter'd1 its bulk is increased1
 its become soft1 'tis  hot1 it can     
scarce be felt1 and now 7though you     
strike it7 it makes  no noise4 ,does it 
yet continue the same ,wax8 surely it   
does1 this  all confess1 no one denies  
it1 no one doubts it4 ,what therefore   
was  there in it that was so evidently  
known8 surely none of those things      
which ,i perceived by my senses2 for    
what ,i smelt1 tasted1  have seen1 felt1
 or heard1 are all vanish'd1 and yet the
 ,wax  remains4 ,perhaps 'twas this only

 that ,i now think on1 viz4 that the    
,wax it self was not that tast of       
,honey1 that smell of ,flowers1  that   
whiteness1 that shape1 or that sound1   
but it was a ,body  which awhile before 
appear'd to me so and so modified1 but  
now  otherwise4 ,but what is it strictly
 that ,i thus imagine8 let me  consider3
 ,and having rejected whatever belongs  
not to the ,wax1 let me  see what will  
remain1 viz4 this only1 a thing         
extended1 flexible1  and mutable4 ,but  
what is this flexible1 and mutable8 is  
it that  ,i imagine that this ,wax from 
being round may be made square1 or  from
 being square can be made triangular8   
,no1 this is not it2 for ,i  conceive it
 capable of innumerable such changes1   
and yet ,i cannot by  my imagination run
 over these ,innumerables2 ,wherefore   
this notion  of its mutability proceeds 
not from my imagination4 ,what then is  
extended8 is not its ,extension also    
unknown8 ,for when it melts  'tis       
greater1 when it boils 'tis greater1 and

 yet greater when  the heat is          
increas'd2 and ,i should not rightly    
judge of the ,wax1 did ,i  not think it 
capable of more various ,extensions than
 ,i can imagine4  ,it remains therefore 
for me only to confess1 that ,i cannot  
imagine what  this ,wax is1 but that ,i 
perceive with my ,mind what it is4 ,i   
speak  of this particular ,wax1 for of  
,wax in general the notion is more      
clear4    ,but what ,wax is this that ,i
 only conceive by my mind8 ',tis the    
same  which ,i see1 which ,i touch1     
which ,i imagine1 and in fine1 the same 
which at first ,i judged it to be4 ,but 
this is to be noted1 that the           
perception thereof is not sight1 the    
touch1 or the imagination  thereof2     
neither was it ever so1 though at first 
it seem'd so4 ,but the  perception      
thereof is the inspection or beholding  
of the ,mind only1  which may be either 
imperfect and confused1 as formerly it  
was2 or  clear and distinct1 as now it  
is2 the more or the less ,i consider    

the ,composition of the ,wax4    ,in the
 interim1 ,i cannot but admire how prone
 my mind is to erre2 for  though ,i     
revolve these things with my self       
silently1 and without  speaking1 yet am 
,i intangled in meer words1 and am      
almost deceived  by the usual way of    
expression2 for we commonly say1 that we
 see the  ,wax it self if it be present1
 and not1 that we judge it present by   
its colour or shape2 from whence ,i     
should immediately thus conclude1       
therefore the ,wax is known by the sight
 of the eye1 and not by the  inspection 
of the mind only4 ,thus ,i should have  
concluded1 had not  ,i by chance look'd 
out of my window1 and seen men passing  
by in the  ,street2 which men ,i as     
usually say that ,i see1 as ,i do now1  
that ,i  see this ,wax2 and yet ,i see  
nothing but their ,hair and ,garments1  
which  perhaps may cover only artificial
 ,machines and movements1 but ,i judge  
them to be men2 so that what ,i thought 
,i only saw with my eyes1 ,i  comprehend

 by my ,judicative ,faculty1 which is my
 ,soul4 ,but it becomes  not one1 who   
desires to be wiser than the ,vulgar1 to
 draw matter of  doubt from those ways  
of expression1 which the ,vulgar have   
invented4    ,wherefore let us proceed  
and consider1 whether ,i perceived more 
perfectly and evidently what the ,wax   
was1 when ,i first look'd on't1  and    
believed that ,i knew it by my outward  
senses1 or at least by my  common sense 
7as they call it7 that is to say1 by my 
imagination2 or  whether at present ,i  
better understand it1 after ,i have more
 diligently  enquired both what it is1  
and how it may be known4 ,surely it     
would be  a foolish thing to make it    
matter of doubt to know which of these  
parts  are true2 ,what was there in my  
first perception that was distinct8     
,what was there that seem'd not incident
 to every other ,animal8 ,but now  when 
,i distinguish the ,wax from its outward
 adherents1 and consider it  as if it   
were naked1 with it's coverings pull'd  

off1 then ,i cannot but  really perceive
 it with my mind1 though yet perhaps my 
judgment may erre4    ,but what shall ,i
 now say as to my mind1 or my self8 7for
 as yet  ,i admit nothing as belonging  
to me but a mind47 ,why 7shall ,i say87 
should not ,i1 who seem to perceive this
 ,wax so distinctly1 know my  self not  
only more truly and more certainly1 but 
more distinctly  and evidently8 ,for if 
,i judge that this ,wax exists1 because 
,i see  this ,wax2 surely it will be    
much more evident1 that ,i my self      
exist1  because ,i see this ,wax2 for it
 may be that this that ,i see is not    
really ,wax1 also it may be that ,i have
 no eyes wherewith to see any  thing2   
but it cannot be1 when ,i see1 or 7which
 is the same thing7 when  ,i think that 
,i see1 that ,i who think should not    
exist4 ,the same  thing will follow if  
,i judge that this ,wax exists1 because 
,i touch1  or imagine it1 c4 ,and what  
has been said of ,wax1 may be apply'd to
 all  other outward things4             

,moreover1 if the notion of ,wax seems  
more distinct after it is made  known to
 me1 not only by my sight or touch1 but 
by more and other  causes2 ,how much the
 more distinctly must ,i confess my self
 known  unto my self1 seeing that all   
sort of reasoning which furthers me in  
the perception of ,wax1 or any other    
,body1 does also encrease the  proofs of
 the nature of my ,mind4 ,but there are 
so many more things  in the very ,mind  
it self1 by which the notion of it may  
be made more  distinct1 that those      
things which drawn from ,body conduce to
 its  knowledge are scarce to be        
mention'd4    ,and now behold of my own 
accord am ,i come to the place ,i would 
be in2  for seeing ,i have now          
discover'd that ,bodies themselves are  
not  properly perceived by our senses or
 imagination1 but only by our           
understanding1 and are not therefore    
perceived1 because they are  felt or    
seen1 but because they are understood2  
it plainly appears  to me1 that nothing 

can possibly be perceived by me easier1 
or more  evidently1 than my ,mind4      
,but because ,i cannot so soon shake off
 the ,acquaintance of my former         
,opinion1 ,i am willing to stop here1   
that this my new knowledge may be       
better fixt in my memory the longer ,i  
meditate thereon4          ,,meditat4   
,,iii4    ,of ,,god1 and that there is a
 ,god4      ,now will ,i shut my eyes1  
,i will stop my ears1 and withdraw all  
my senses1  ,i will blot out the ,images
 of corporeal things clearly from my    
mind1  or 7because that can scarce be   
accomplish'd7 ,i will give no heed to   
them1 as being vain and false1 and by   
discoursing with my self1 and  prying   
more rightly into my own ,nature1 will  
endeavour to make my self by  degrees   
more known and familiar to my self4     
,i am a ,thinking ,thing1 that is to    
say1 doubting1 affirming1  denying1     
understanding few things1 ignorant of   
many things1  willing1 nilling1         
imagining also1 and sensitive4 ,for 7as 

before  ,i have noted7 though perhaps   
whatever ,i imagine1 or am sensible of1 
as without me1 ,is not2 yet that manner 
of thinking which ,i  call sense and    
imagination 7as they are only certain   
,modes of  ,thinking7 ,i am certain are 
in ,me4 ,so that in these few ,words ,i 
have  mention'd whatever ,i know1 or at 
least ,whatever as yet ,i perceive my   
self to know4    ,now will ,i look about
 me more carefully to see ,whether there
 ,be not some  other ,thing in ,me1 of  
,which ,i have not yet taken ,notice4 ,i
 am sure ,that  ,i am a ,thinking       
,thing1 and therefore ,do not ,i know   
what is ,required to  make certain of   
any ,thing8 ,i ,answer1 that in this ,my
 first knowledge  'tis ,nothing but a   
clear1 and distinct perception of ,what 
,i affirm1  ,which would not be         
sufficient to make me certain of the    
,truth of  a ,thing1 if it were         
,possible that any thing that ,i so     
clearly and  distinctly ,perceive should
 be false4 ,wherefore ,i may lay this   

,down as  a ,principle4 ,whatever ,i    
,clearly and ,distinctly perceive is    
certainly  ,true4    ,but ,i have       
formerly ,admitted of many ,things as   
very ,certain and  manifest1 ,which ,i  
afterwards found to be doubtful4        
,therefore ,what  sort of ,things were  
they8 ,viz4 ,heaven1 ,earth1 ,stars1 and
 all other  things which ,i perceived by
 my ,senses4 ,but ,what did ,i ,perceive
 of  ,these ,clearly8 ,viz4 ,that ,i had
 the ,ideas or ,thoughts of these       
things in my mind1 and at ,present ,i   
cannot deny that ,i have these ,ideas   
in ,me4 ,but there was some other thing 
,which ,i affirm'd1 and ,which 7by      
,reason of the common ,way of ,belief7  
,i thought that ,i ,clearly ,perceived2 
,which nevertheless1 ,i did not really  
,perceive2 ,and that was1 that there    
were ,certain ,things ,without ,me from 
whence these ,ideas ,proceeded1 and  to 
which they were exactly like4 ,and this 
it was1 ,wherein ,i was either          
,deceived1 or if by ,chance ,i ,judged  

truly1 yet it ,proceeded not from  the  
strength of my ,perception4    ,but     
,when ,i was exercised about any single 
and easie ,proposition in  ,arithmetick 
or ,geometry1 as that two and three     
added make five1 ,did not  ,i ,perceive 
them ,clearly enough to make me affirm  
them ,true8 ,truly  concerning these ,i 
had no other ,reason afterwards to      
,doubt1 but ,that ,i  thought ,perhaps  
there may be a ,god who might have so   
created me1 that  ,i should be ,deceived
 even in those things which seem'd most 
,clear to  me4 ,and as often as this    
,pre-conceived opinion of ,gods great   
,power  comes into my ,mind1 ,i cannot  
but ,confess that he may easily cause me
 to  ,err even in those things which ,i 
,think ,i perceive most ,evidently with 
my ,mind2 yet as often as ,i ,consider  
the ,things themselves1 which ,i ,judge 
my self to perceive so ,clearly1 ,i am  
so fully ,perswaded by them1 that ,i    
easily ,break out into these            
,expressions1 ,let ,who can ,deceive    

,me1 yet he  shall never ,cause me ,not 
to ,be whilst ,i think that ,i ,am1 or  
that it  shall ever be ,true1 that ,i   
never was1 ,whilst at ,present 'tis     
,true that  ,i am1 or ,perhaps1 that    
,two and ,three added make ,more or     
,less then ,five2  for in ,these things 
,i ,percieve a ,manifest ,repugnancy2   
,and truely seeing  ,i have no reason to
 ,think any ,god a ,deceiver1 ,nor as   
yet fully know  ,whether there ,be any  
,god1 or ,not1 ',tis but a slight and   
7as ,i may  say7 ,metaphysical ,reason  
of ,doubt1 which depends only on that   
opinion of  which ,i am not yet         
,perswaded4    ,wherefore ,that this    
,hindrance may be taken away1 ,when ,i  
have time ,i ought  to ,enquire1        
,whether there ,be a ,god1 ,and if there
 be ,one1 ,whether he can  be a         
,deceiver1 ,for whilst ,i am ,ignorant  
of this1 ,i cannot possibly  be fully   
,certain of any ,other thing4    ,but   
now ,method seems to ,require ,me to    
,rank all ,my ,thoughts under certain   

,heads1 and to search in ,which of them 
,truth or ,falshood properly  ,consists4
 ,some of them are 7as it were7 the     
,images of ,things1 and to  these alone 
the ,name of an ,idea properly belongs1 
as ,when ,i think upon  a ,man1 ,a      
,chimera or ,monster1 ,heaven1 an       
,angel1 or ,god4 ,but there are  others 
of them1 that have superadded ,forms to 
them1 as when ,i ,will1  when ,i ,fear1 
when ,i ,affirm1 when ,i ,deny4 ,i know 
,i have alwayes 7when ever  ,i think7   
some certain ,thing as the subject or   
object of my ,thought1  but in this last
 sort of thoughts there is something    
more which ,i ,think  upon then ,barely 
the likeness of the ,thing4 ,and of     
these ,thoughts some  are called ,wills 
and ,affections1 and ,others of them    
,judgments4    ,now as touching ,ideas1 
if they be ,consider'd alone as they are
 in  themselves1 without ,respect to any
 other ,things1 they cannot ,properly   
be false2 for ,whether ,i ,imagine a    
,goat or a ,chimera1 'tis as  ,certain  

that ,i ,imagine one as t'other4 ,also  
in the ,will and  ,affections ,i need   
not ,fear any ,falshood1 ,for tho ,i    
should ,wish for  evil ,things1 or      
,things that are ,not1 it is not        
therefore ,not true  that ,i ,wish for  
them4    ,wherefore there onely ,remains
 my ,judgments of ,things1 in which ,i  
must take ,care that ,i be not deceived4
 ,now the ,chief and most usual  ,error 
that ,i discover in them is1 ,that ,i   
,judge ,those ,ideas that  are within me
 to be ,conformable and like to certain 
things that are  without ,me2 for truely
 if ,i ,consider those ,ideas as certain
 ,modes of  my ,thought1 without        
,respect to any other ,thing1 they will 
scarce afford  me an ,occasion of       
,erring4    ,of these ,ideas some are   
,innate1 some ,adventitious1 and some   
,others  seem to ,me as ,created by my  
self2 ,for that ,i understand what ,a   
,thing  ,is1 ,what is ,truth1 ,what a   
,thought1 seems to ,proceed meerly from 
my  own ,nature4 ,but that ,i now hear a

 ,noise1 see the ,sun1 or feel  heat1 ,i
 have alwayes ,judged to ,proceed from  
,things ,external4 ,but  ,lastly1       
,mermaids1 ,griffins1 and such like     
,monsters1 are made meerly by  ,my self4
 ,and yet ,i may well think all of them 
either ,adventitious1  or all of them   
,innate1 or all of them made by my self1
 for ,i have not  as yet discover'd     
their true ,original4    ,but ,i ought  
cheifly to search after those of them   
which ,i count  ,adventitious1 and which
 ,i consider as coming from outward     
objects1  that ,i may know what reason  
,i have to think them like the things   
themselves1 which they represent4 ,viz4 
,nature so teaches ,me2 and also  ,i    
know that they depend not on my ,will1  
and therefore not on me2  for they are  
often present with me against my        
inclinations1 or 7as they  say7 in spite
 of my teeth1 as now whether ,i will or 
no ,i feel heat1  and therefore ,i think
 that the sense or ,idea of heat is     
propagated  to me by a thing really     

distinct from my self1 and that is by   
the  heat of the ,fire at which ,i sit2 
,and nothing is more obvious then for   
me to judge that ,that thing should     
transmit its own ,likeness into me1     
rather then that any other thing should 
be transmitted by it4 ,which sort  of   
arguments whether firme enough or not ,i
 shall now ,trie4    ,when ,i here say1 
that nature so teaches me1 ,i understand
 only1 that  ,i am as it were willingly 
forced to beleive it1 and not that 'tis 
discover'd to me to be true by any      
natural light2 for these two  differ    
very much4 ,for whatever is discover'd  
to me by the ,light  of nature 7as that 
it necessarily ,follows that ,i am1     
because ,i  think7 cannot possibly be   
doubted2 ,because ,i am endowed with no 
other  ,faculty1 in which ,i may put so 
great confidence1 as ,i can in the      
,light of nature2 or which can possibly 
tell me1 that those things  are false1  
which natural light teaches me to be    
true2 and as to  my natural             

,inclinations1 ,i have heretofore often 
judged my self led  by them to the      
election of the worst part1 when ,i was 
in the choosing  one of two ,goods2 and 
therefore ,i see no reason why ,i should
 ever  trust them in any other thing4   
,and then1 tho these ,ideas depend not  
on my will1 it does not  therefore      
follow that they necessarily proceed    
from things external4  ,for as1 ,altho  
those ,inclinations 7which ,i but now   
mention'd7 are in me1  yet they seem    
distinct and different from my will2 so 
perhaps there  may be in me some other  
faculty 7to me unknown7 which may prove 
the  ,efficient cause of these ,ideas1  
as hitherto ,i have observed them  to be
 formed in me whilst ,i dream1 without  
the help of any ,external  ,object4     
,and last of all1 tho they should       
proceed from things which are  different
 from me1 it does not therefore follow  
that they must be  like those things4   
,for often times ,i have found the thing
 and the  ,idea differing much4 ,as for 

example1 ,i find in my self two divers  
,ideas of the ,sun1 one as received by  
my senses 7and which cheifly  ,i reckon 
among those ,i call adventitious7 by    
which it appears to me very  smal1 99   
another as taken from the arguments of  
,astronomers 7that is  to say1          
consequentially collected1 or some other
 ways made by me from  certain natural  
notions7 by which 'tis rendred something
 bigger then  the ,globe of the ,earth4 
,certainly both of these cannot be like 
that sun  which is without me1 and my   
reason perswades me1 that that ,idea is 
most unlike the ,sun1 which seems to    
proceed ,immediately from it self4      
,all which things sufficiently prove1   
that ,i have hitherto 7not from a  true 
judgement1 but from a blind impulse7    
beleived that there are  certain things 
different from my self1 and which have  
sent their  ,ideas or ,images into me by
 the ,organs of my senses1 or some other
  way4    ,but ,i have yet an other ,way
 of inquiring1 whether any of those     

,things  7whose ,ideas ,i have within   
,me7 are ,really ,existent without ,me2 
,and that is ,thus3 ,as those ,ideas are
 only ,modes of ,thinking1 ,i           
acknowledge no ,inequality between them1
 and they all proceed from me  in the   
same ,manner4 ,but as one ,represents   
one thing1 an other1  an other ,thing1  
'tis ,evident there is a ,great         
difference between  them4 99 ,for       
without doubt1 ,those of them which     
,represent ,substances  are something   
,more1 or 7as ,i may say7 have ,more of 
,objective  ,reallity in them1 then     
those that ,represent only ,modes or    
,accidents2  and again1 ,that by ,which 
,i understand a ,mighty ,god1 ,eternal1 
,infinite1 ,omniscient1 ,omnipotent     
,creatour of all things besides         
himself1 has certainly in it more       
,objective ,reallity1 then ,those       
,ideas by which ,finite ,substances are 
,exhibited4    ,but ,now1 it is evident 
by the ,light of ,nature that there must
 be  as much at least in the ,total     

efficient ,cause1 as there is in the    
,effect of that ,cause2 ,for from       
,whence can the effect have its         
,reallity1 but from the ,cause8 and how 
can the ,cause give it that  ,reallity1 
unless it self have it8    ,and from    
hence it follows1 that neither a ,thing 
can be made out of  ,nothing1 ,neither a
 ,thing which is more ,perfect 7that is1
 ,which has in  it self more ,reallity7 
proceed from ,that ,which is ,less      
,perfect4    ,and this is ,clearly      
,true1 not only in those ,effects whose 
,actual  or ,formal ,reallity is        
,consider'd1 ,but in ,those ,ideas also1
 ,whose  ,objective ,reallity is only   
,respected2 ,that is to say1 for        
,example of  ,illustration1 it is not   
only impossible that a stone1 ,which was
 not1  should now begin to ,be1 unless  
it were produced by something1 in       
,which1 ,whatever goes to the ,making a 
,stone1 is either ,formally or          
,virtually2 neither can heat be         
,produced in any ,thing1 which before   

was not hot1 but by a ,thing which is at
 least of as equal a degree of          
,perfection as heat is2 ,but also 'tis  
,impossible that ,i should have  an     
,idea of ,heat1 or of a ,stone1 unless  
it were put into me by some  ,cause1 in 
which there is at ,least as much        
,reallity1 as ,i ,conceive  there is in 
heat or a ,stone4 ,for tho that ,cause  
transfers none of its  own ,actual or   
,formal ,reality into my ,idea1 ,i must 
not from thence  conclude that 'tis less
 real2 but ,i may think that the nature 
of the  ,idea it self is such1 that of  
it self it requires no other formal     
reality1 but what it has from my        
thought1 of which 'tis a mode4 ,but     
that this ,idea has this or that        
objective reallity1 rather then any     
other1 proceeds clearly from some cause1
 in which there ought to be  at least as
 much formal reallity1 as there is of   
objective reallity  in the ,idea it     
self4 ,for if we suppose any thing in   
the ,idea1 which  was not in its cause1 

it must of necessity have this from     
nothing2  but 7tho it be a most         
,imperfect manner of existing1 by which 
the  thing is objectively in the        
,intellect by an ,idea1 yet7 it is not  
altogether nothing1 and therefore cannot
 proceed from nothing4    ,neither ought
 ,i to doubt1 seeing the reallity which 
,i perceive in  my ,ideas is only an    
objective reallity1 that therefore it   
must of  necessity follow1 that the same
 reallity should be in the causes  of   
these ,ideas formally4 ,but ,i may      
conclude1 that 'tis sufficient  that    
this reallity be in the very causes only
 objectively4 ,for as  that objective   
manner of being appertains to the very  
nature of  an ,idea1 so that formal     
manner of being appertains to the very  
nature of a cause of ,ideas1 at least to
 the first and chiefest  causes of them2
 ,for tho perhaps one ,idea may receive 
its birth from  an other1 yet we cannot 
proceed in ,infinitum1 but at last we   
must  arrive at some first ,idea1 whose 

cause is 7as it were7 an ,original      
copy1 in which all the objective        
reallity of the ,idea is formally       
contain'd4 ,so that ,i plainly discover 
by the light of nature1 that  the       
,ideas1 which are in me1 are 7as it     
were7 ,pictures1 which may  easily come 
short of the perfection of those things 
from whence they  are taken1 but cannot 
contain any thing greater or more       
perfect  then them3 ,and the longer and 
more diligently ,i pry into these       
things1 so much the more clearly and    
distinctly do ,i discover them to  be   
true4    ,but what shall ,i conclude    
from hence8 ,thus1 that if the objective
  reallity of any of my ,ideas be such1 
that it cannot be in me either  formally
 or eminently1 and that therefore ,i    
cannot be the cause  of that ,idea1 from
 hence it necessarily ,follows1 that ,i 
alone do  not only exist1 but that some 
other thing1 which is cause of that     
,idea1 does exist also4    ,but if ,i   
can find no such ,idea in me1 ,i have no

 argument to perswade  me of the        
existence of any thing besides my self  
for ,i have diligently  enquired1 and   
hitherto ,i could discover no other     
perswasive4    ,some of these ,ideas    
there are 7besides that which represents
 my self  to my self1 of which in this  
place ,i cannot doubt7 which represent  
to me1 one of them a ,god1 others of    
them ,corporeal and ,inanimate  things1 
some of them ,angels1 others ,animals1  
and lastly some of them  which exhibite 
to me men like my self4    ,as touching 
those that represent ,men or ,angels or 
,animals1 ,i easily  understand that    
they may be made up of those ,ideas     
which ,i have of  my self1 of ,corporeal
 things1 and of ,god1 tho there were    
neither  man 7but my self7 nor ,angel1  
nor ,animal in being4    ,and as to the 
,ideas of ,corporeal things1 ,i find    
nothing in them of  that perfection1 but
 it may proceed from my self2 for if ,i 
look into  them more narrowly1 and      
examine them more particularly1 as      

yesterday  7in the second ,medit47 ,i   
did the ,idea of ,wax1 ,i find there are
 but  few things which ,i perceive      
clearly and distinctly in them1 viz4    
,magnitude or extension in ,longitude1  
,latitude1 and ,profundity1  the ,figure
 or shape which arises from the         
termination of that  ,extension1 the    
,position or place which divers ,figured
 ,bodies  have in respect of each other1
 their motion or change of place2 to    
which may be added1 their substance1    
continuance1 and number2 as to  the     
other1 such as are1 ,light1 ,colours1   
,sounds1 ,smels1 ,tasts1  ,heat1 and    
,cold1 with the other tactile qualities1
 ,i have but very  obscure and confused 
thoughts of them1 so that ,i know not1  
whether  they are true or false1 that is
 to say1 whether the ,ideas ,i have of  
them are the ,ideas of things which     
really are1 or are not4 ,for  altho     
falshood formally and properly so       
called1 consists only in the  judgement 
7as before ,i have observed7 yet there  

is an other sort of  material falshood  
in ,ideas1 when they represent a thing  
as really  existent1 tho it does not    
exist2 so1 for example1 the ,ideas ,i   
have  of heat and cold are so obscure   
and confused1 that ,i cannot  collect   
from them1 whether cold be a privation  
of heat1 or heat a  privation of cold1  
or whether either of them be a real     
quality1 or  whether neither of them be 
real4 ,and since every ,idea must be    
like  the thing it represents1 if it be 
true that cold is nothing but the       
privation of heat1 that ,idea which     
represents it to me as a thing  real and
 positive may deservedly be called      
false4 ,the same may be  apply'd to     
other ,ideas4    ,and now ,i see no     
necessity why ,i should assigne any     
other ,author of  these ,ideas but my   
self2 for if they are false1 that is1   
represent  things that are not1 ,i know 
by the light of nature that they        
proceed from nothing2 that is to say1 ,i
 harbour them upon no other  account1   

but because my nature is deficient in   
something1 and  imperfect4 ,but if they 
are true1 yet seeing ,i discover so     
little  reality in them1 that that very 
reality scarce seems to be realy1  ,i   
see no reason why ,i my self should not 
be the ,author of them4    ,but also    
some of those very ,ideas of ,corporeal 
things which are  clear and distinct1 ,i
 may seem to have borrow'd from the     
,idea ,i  have of my self1 viz4         
,substance1 duration1 number1 and the   
like2  ,for when ,i conceive a stone to 
be a substance 7that is1 a thing  apt of
 it self to exist7 and also that ,i my  
self am a substance1  tho ,i conceive my
 self a thinking substance and not      
extended1 and  the stone an extended    
substance and not thinking1 by which    
there  is a great diversity between both
 the conceptions1 yet they agree  in    
this1 that they are both substances4 ,so
 when ,i conceive my self as  now in    
being1 and also remember1 that          
heretofore ,i have been2 and  since ,i  

have divers thoughts1 which ,i can      
number or count2 from  hence it is that 
,i come by the notions of duration and  
number2 which  afterwards ,i apply to   
other things4    ,as to those other     
things1 of which the ,idea of a body is 
made up1 as  extension1 figure1 place   
and motion1 they are not formally in    
me1 seeing ,i am only a thinking thing2 
yet seeing they are only certain  modes 
of substance1 and ,i my self also am a  
substance1 they may  seem to be in me   
eminently4    99 ,wherefore there only  
,remains the ,idea of a ,god1 wherein ,i
 must  consider whether there be not    
something included1 which cannot        
possibly  have its original from me4 ,by
 the word ,god1 ,i mean a certain       
,infinite ,substance1 ,independent1     
,omniscient1 ,almighty1 by whom  both ,i
 my self1 and every thing else that is  
7if any thing do  ,actualy exist7 was   
created4 ,all which ,attributes are of  
such an high  nature1 that the more     
attentively ,i consider them1 the less  

,i conceive  my self possible to be the 
,author of these notions4    ,from what 
therefore has been said ,i must conclude
 that there is a ,god2  for tho the     
,idea of substance may arise in me1     
because that ,i my  self am a substance1
 yet ,i could not have the ,idea of an  
,infinite  substance 7seeing ,i my self 
am finite7 unless it proceeded from a   
substance which is really ,infinite4    
,neither ought ,i to think that  ,i have
 no true ,idea of ,infinity1 or that ,i 
perceive it only by the  negation of    
what is finite1 as ,i conceive rest and 
darkness by  the negation or absence of 
motion or light4 ,but on the contrary   
,i plainly understand1 that there is    
more reality in an ,infinite  substance1
 then in a ,finite2 and that therefore  
the perception  of an ,infinite 7as     
,god7 is antecedent to the notion ,i    
have of  a finite 7as my self74 ,for how
 should ,i know that ,i doubt or        
desire1 that is to say1 that ,i want    
something1 and that ,i am not           

altogether perfect1 unless ,i had the   
,idea of a being more perfect  then my  
self1 by comparing my self to which ,i  
may discover my own  ,imperfections4    
,neither can it be said that this ,idea 
of ,god is false ,materialiter1  and    
that therefore it proceeds from nothing1
 as before ,i observed of  the ,ideas of
 heat and cold1 c4 ,for on the contrary1
 seeing this  notion is most clear and  
distinct1 and contains in it self more  
objective reality then any other ,idea1 
none can be more true in  it self1 nor  
in which less suspition of falshood can 
be found4 ,this  ,idea 7,i say7 of a    
being infinitely perfect is most true1  
for tho  it may be supposed that such a 
being does not exist1 yet it cannot  be 
supposed that the ,idea of such a being 
exhibites to me nothing  real1 as before
 ,i have said of the ,idea of cold4     
,this ,idea  also is most clear and     
distinct1 for whatever ,i perceive      
clearly  and distinctly to be real1 and 
true1 and perfect1 is wholy  contain'd  

in this ,idea of ,god4    ,neither can  
it be objected1 that ,i cannot          
comprehend an ,infinite1 or  that there 
are innumerable other things in ,god1   
which ,i can neither  conceive1 nor in  
the least think upon2 for it is of the  
very  nature of an ,infinite not to be  
apprehendable by me who am  finite4 ,and
 'tis sufficient to me to prove this my 
,idea of ,god to  be the most true1 the 
most clear1 and the most distinct ,idea 
of all  those ,ideas ,i have1 upon this 
account1 that ,i understand that ,god   
is not to be understood1 and that ,i    
judge that whatever ,i clearly  perceive
 and know ,implys any perfection1 as    
also perhaps other  innumerable         
perfections1 which ,i am ignorant of1   
are in ,god either  formally or         
eminently4    ,doubt4 ,but perhaps ,i am
 something more then ,i take my self to 
be1 and perhaps all these perfections   
which ,i attribute to ,god1  are        
potentially in me1 tho at present they  
do not shew themselves1 and  break into 

action4 ,for ,i am now fully experienced
 that my ,knowledge may  be encreased1  
and ,i see nothing that hinders why it  
may not encrease  by degrees in         
,infinitum1 nor why by my knowledge so  
encreased ,i  may not attain to the     
other perfections of ,god2 nor lastly1  
why the  power or aptitude of having    
these perfections may not be sufficient 
to produce the ,idea of them in me4     
,solution4 ,but none of these will do2  
for first1 tho it be true that  my      
,knowledge is capable of being          
increased1 and that many things are  in 
me potentially1 which actually are not1 
yet none of these go to  the making an  
,idea of ,god1 in which ,i conceive     
nothing potentially1  for tis a certain 
argument of imperfection that a thing   
may be  encreased ,gradually4 ,moreover1
 tho my knowledge may be more and more  
encreased1 yet ,i know that it can never
 be actually ,infinite1 for it  can     
never arrive to that height of          
perfection1 which admits not of  an     

higher degree4 ,but ,i conceive ,god to 
be actually so ,infinite1  that nothing 
can be added to his perfections4 ,and   
lastly1 ,i perceive  that the objective 
being of an ,idea cannot be produced    
only by the  potential being of a thing 
7which in proper speech is nothing7 but 
requires an actual or formal being to   
its production4    ,of all which        
forementioned things there is nothing   
that is not evident  by the light of    
reason to any one that will diligently  
consider them4  ,yet because that 7when 
,i am careless1 and the ,images of      
sensible  things blind my understanding7
 ,i do not so easily call to mind the   
reasons1 why the ,idea of a being more  
perfect then my self should  of         
necessity proceed from a being which is 
really more perfect2 ,it  will be       
requisite to enquire further1 whether   
,i1 who have this ,idea1  can possibly  
be1 unless such a being did exist4 ,to  
which end  let me aske1 from whence     
should ,i be8 ,from my self8 or from my 

,parents8 or from any other thing less  
perfect then ,god8 for nothing  can be  
thought or supposed more perfect1 or    
equally perfect with  ,god4    ,but     
first1 ,if ,i were from my self1 ,i     
should neither doubt1 nor  desire1 nor  
want any thing1 for ,i should have given
 my self all those  perfections1 of     
which ,i have any ,idea1 and            
consequently ,i my self  should be ,god2
 and ,i cannot think that those things  
,i want1 are to  be acquired with       
greater difficulty then those things ,i 
have2 but on  the contrary1 'tis        
manifest1 that it were much more        
difficult that ,i  7that is1 a substance
 that thinks7 should arise out of       
nothing1  then that ,i should acquire   
the knowledge of many things whereof ,i 
am ,ignorant1 which is only the accident
 of that substance4 ,and  certainly if  
,i had that greater thing 7viz being7   
from my self1 ,i  should not have denyed
 my self 7not only1 those things which  
may be  easier acquired1 but also7 ,all 

those things1 which ,i perceived are    
contain'd in the ,idea of a ,god2 and   
the reason is1 for that no other  things
 seem to me to be more difficultly done1
 and certainly if they  were ,really    
more difficult1 they would seem more    
difficult to me  7if whatever ,i have1  
,i have from my self7 for in those      
things ,i  should find my ,power put to 
a stop4    ,neither can ,i ,evade the   
force of these ,arguments by supposing  
my self to  have alwaies ,been1 what now
 ,i am1 and that therefore ,i need not  
seek  for an ,author of my ,being4 ,for 
the ,duration or ,continuance of my     
life may be divided into ,innumerable   
,parts1 each of which does not  at all  
depend on the ,other ,parts2 ,therefore 
it will not follow1 that  because a     
while ago1 ,i was1 ,i must of necessity 
now ,be4 ,i say1 this  will not follow1 
,unless1 ,i suppose some ,cause to      
,create me 7as it  were7 anew for this  
,moment 7that is1 ,conserve me74 ,for   
'tis evident  to one that ,considers the

 ,nature of ,duration1 that the same    
,power  and ,action is requisite to the 
,conservation of a ,thing each ,moment  
of its ,being1 as there is to the       
,creation of that ,thing anew1 if  it   
did not exist4 ,so that 'tis one of     
those ,principles which are  ,evident by
 the ,light of ,nature3 that the ,act of
 ,conservation  differs only ,ratione   
7as the ,philosophers term it7 from the 
,act of  ,creation4    ,wherefore ,i    
ought to ask my self this ,question1    
whether ,i1 who now  ,am2 have any      
,power to ,cause my self to ,be         
hereafter8 7for had ,i any  such power1 
,i should certainly know of it1 seeing  
,i am nothing but  a ,thinking ,thing1  
or at least at present ,i onely treat of
 that part  of me1 which is a ,thing    
that ,thinks7 to which1 ,i answer1 that 
,i can  discover no such ,power in ,me2 
,and consequently1 ,i evidently know    
that  ,i depend on some ,other being    
distinct from my self4    ,but what if  
,i say that perhaps this ,being is not  

,god1 but that  ,i am produced either by
 my ,parents1 or some other ,causes less
  perfect then ,god8 ,in answer to which
 let me consider 7as ,i have  said      
before7 that 'tis manifest that whatever
 is in the effect1 so  much at least    
ought to be in the cause2 and therefore 
seeing ,i  am a thing that thinks1 and  
have in me an ,idea of ,god1 it will    
confessedly follow1 that whatever sort  
of cause ,i assign of my own  ,being1 it
 also must be a ,thinking ,thing1 and   
must have an ,idea of  all those        
,perfections1 which ,i attribute to     
,god2 ,of which ,cause  it may be again 
,asked1 whether it be from it self1 or  
from any other  ,cause8 ,if from it     
self1 'tis evident 7from what has been  
said7 that  it must be ,god2 ,for seeing
 it has the ,power of ,existing of it   
self1  without doubt it has also the    
power of actually ,possessing all those 
,perfections whereof it has an ,idea in 
it self1 that is1 all those             
,perfections which ,i conceive in ,god4 

,but if it ,be from an other  ,cause1 it
 may again be asked of that ,cause      
whether it be of it self1  or from an   
other2 ,till at length ,we arrive at the
 ,last ,cause of ,all1  ,which will ,be 
,god4 ,for 'tis evident1 that this      
,enquiry will not admit  of ,progressus 
in ,infinitum1 especially when at       
,present ,i treat not  only of that     
,cause which at first made ,me2 ,but    
chiefly of that which  conserves me in  
this ,instant time4    ,neither can it  
be supposed that many partial ,causes   
have concurred  to the making ,me1 and  
that ,i received the ,idea of one of    
,gods  perfections from ,one of them1   
and from an other of them the ,idea  of 
an other2 and that therefore all these  
,perfections are to be  found scattered 
in the ,world1 but not all of them      
,joyn'd in any  one which may ,be ,god4 
,for on the contrary1 ,unity1           
,simplicity1  or the inseparability of  
,all ,gods ,attributes is one of the    
chief  ,perfections which ,i conceive in

 ,him2 and certainly the ,idea of the   
,unity of the ,divine ,perfections could
 not be created in me by any  other     
cause1 then by ,that1 from whence ,i    
have received the ,ideas of  his other  
perfections2 ,for 'tis ,impossible to   
make me conceive these  perfections1    
conjunct and inseparable1 unless he     
should also make  me know what          
perfections these are4    ,lastly as    
touching my having my ,being from my    
,parents4 ,tho whatever  ,thoughts ,i   
have heretofore harbour'd of ,them were 
,true1 yet certainly  they contribute   
nothing to my conservation1 neither     
proceed ,i from  them as ,i am a ,thing 
that ,thinks1 for they have onely       
predisposed  that material ,thing1      
wherein ,i1 that is1 my mind 7which only
  at present ,i take for my self7       
,inhabits4 ,wherefore ,i cannot now     
,question that ,i am sprung from them4  
,but ,i must of necessity conclude  that
 because ,i am1 and because ,i have an  
,idea of a ,being most  perfect1 that   

is1 of ,god1 it evidently follows that  
there is a ,god4    99 ,now it only     
remains for me to examine1 how ,i have  
received this ,idea  of ,god4 ,for ,i   
have neither received it by means of my 
,senses1  neither comes it to me without
 my ,forethought1 as the ,ideas of      
sensible things use to do1 when such    
things ,work on the ,organs of my       
,sense1 or at least seem so to work2    
,neither is this ,idea framed  by my    
self1 for ,i can neither detract from1  
nor add any thing  thereto4 ,wherefore  
,i have only to conclude that it is     
,innate1 even as  the ,idea of me my    
self is ,natural to my self4    ,and    
truly 'tis not to be ,admired that ,god 
in ,creating me should  ,imprint this   
,idea in me1 that it may there remain as
 a stamp  impressed by the ,workman ,god
 on me his ,work1 neither is it         
requisite that this stamp should be a   
,thing different from the ,work  it     
self1 but 'tis very ,credible 7from     
hence only that ,god ,created me7  that 

,i am made as it were according to his  
likeness and ,image1 and  that the same 
likeness1 in which the ,idea of ,god is 
contain'd1 is  perceived by ,me with the
 same faculty1 with which ,i perceive my
  ,self2 ,that is to say1 whilst ,i     
reflect upon my self1 ,i do not only    
perceive that ,i am an ,imperfect thing1
 having my dependance upon  some other  
thing1 and that ,i am a ,thing that     
,desires more and better  things        
,indefinitely2 ,but also at the same    
time ,i understand1 that ,he  on whom ,i
 depend contains in him all those wish'd
 for things 7not  only ,indefinitely and
 ,potentially1 but7 ,really1            
,indefinitely2  and that therefore he is
 ,god4 ,the whole stress of which 99    
,argument  lies thus1 because ,i know it
 ,impossible for ,me to ,be of the same 
,nature  ,i am1 ,viz4 ,having the ,idea 
of a ,god in me1 unless really there    
were a ,god1 a ,god 7,i say7 that very  
same ,god1 whose ,idea ,i have  in my   
,mind 7that is1 ,having all those       

perfections1 which ,i cannot            
comprehend1 but can as it were think    
upon them7 and who is not  subject to   
any ,defects4    ,by which 'tis evident 
that ,god is no ,deceiver2 for 'tis     
manifest by  the ,light of ,nature1 that
 all fraud and deceit depends on some   
defect4 ,but before ,i prosecute this   
any farther1 or pry into other  ,truthes
 which may be deduced from this1 ,i am  
willing here to stop1 and  dwell upon   
the ,contemplation of this ,god1 to     
,consider with my self  ,his ,divine    
,attributes1 to behold1 admire1 and     
adore the ,loveliness of  this ,immense 
light1 as much as possibly ,i am able to
 accomplish with my  dark               
,understanding4 ,for as by ,faith we    
believe that the greatest  happiness of 
the next ,life consists alone in the    
,contemplation of  the ,divine ,majesty1
 so we find by ,experience that now we  
receive  from thence the greatest       
pleasure1 whereof we are capable in this
  ,life2 ,tho it be much more ,imperfect

 then that in the ,next4                
,,meditat4 ,,iv4    ,of ,truth and      
,falshood4      ,of late it has been so 
common with me to withdraw my ,mind from
 my  sences1 and ,i have so throughly   
consider'd how few things there are     
appertaining to ,bodies that are truly  
perceived1 and that there are  more     
,things touching ,mans mind1 and yet    
more concerning ,god1 which  are well   
known2 that now without any difficulty  
,i can turn my  ,thoughts from things   
sensible1 to those which are only       
,intelligible1  and ,abstracted from    
,matter4 ,and truely ,i have a much more
 distinct  ,idea of a ,mans mind 7as it 
is a ,thinking ,thing1 having no        
,corporeal  ,dimensions of ,length1     
,breadth1 and ,thickness1 nor having any
 other  ,corporeal ,quality7 then the   
,idea of any ,corporeal ,thing can be4  
,and  when ,i reflect upon my self1 and 
consider how that ,i doubt1 that is1  am
 an imperfect dependent ,being1 ,i from 
hence ,collect such a clear  and        

distinct ,idea of an ,independent       
perfect ,being1 which is ,god1  and from
 hence only that ,i have such an ,idea1 
that is1 because ,i that  have this     
,idea do my self ,exist2 ,i do so       
clearly conclude that  ,god also        
,exists1 and that on him my ,being      
depends each ,minute2 ,that  ,i am      
,confident nothing can be known more    
,evidently and ,certainly by  ,humane   
,understanding4    ,and now ,i seem to  
perceive a ,method by which1 7from this 
,contemplation of the true ,god1 in whom
 the ,treasures of ,knowledge and       
,wisdome are ,hidden7 ,i may attain the 
,knowledge of other ,things4    ,and    
first1 ,i know 'tis impossible that this
 ,god should deceive  me2 ,for in all   
cheating and deceipt there is something 
of  imperfection2 and tho to be able to 
deceive may seem to be an  ,argument of 
ingenuity and power1 yet without doubt  
to have the  ,will of deceiving is a    
sign of ,malice and ,weakness1 and      
therefore  is not ,incident to ,god4    

,i have also found in my self a         
,judicative faculty1 which certainly 7as
  all other things ,i possess7 ,i have  
received from ,god2 and seeing he  will 
not deceive me1 he has surely given me  
such a ,judgement1 that  ,i can never   
,err1 whilst ,i make a ,right ,use of   
it4 ,of which truth ,i  can make no     
doubt1 unless it seems1 that ,from hence
 it will follow1 ,that  therefore ,i can
 never ,err2 for if whatever ,i have1 ,i
 have from ,god1  and if he gave me no  
,faculty of ,erring1 ,i may seem not to 
be able to  ,err4 ,and truly so it is   
whilst ,i think upon ,god1 and wholly   
convert  my self to the consideration of
 him1 ,i find no occasion of ,error or  
,deceit2 but yet when ,i return to the  
,contemplation of my self1 ,i  find my  
self liable to ,innumerable ,errors4    
,enquiring into the cause  of which1 ,i 
find in my self an ,idea1 not only a    
real and positive  one of a ,god1 that  
is1 of a ,being infinitely perfect1 but 
also  7as ,i may so speak7 a ,negative  

,idea of ,nothing2 that is to say1 ,i   
am so constituted between ,god and      
,nothing or between a perfect ,being    
and ,no-being1 that as ,i am ,created by
 the ,highest ,being1 ,i have  nothing  
in ,me by which ,i may be deceived or   
drawn into ,error2 but as  ,i pertake in
 a manner of ,nothing1 or of a          
,no-,being1 that is1 as ,i my  self am  
not the ,highest ,being1 and as ,i want 
many perfections1  'tis no ,wonder that 
,i should be ,deceived4    ,by which ,i 
understand that ,error 99 7as it is     
,error7 is not any real  ,being         
dependant on ,god1 but it is only a     
,defect2 ,and that therefore  to make me
 ,err there is not requisite a faculty  
of ,erring given  me by ,god1 but only  
it so happens that ,i ,err meerly       
because the  ,judicative faculty1 which 
he has given me1 is not ,infinite4      
,but yet this ,account is not fully     
satisfactory2 for ,error is not  only a 
meer ,negation1 but 'tis a ,privation1  
or a want of a certain  ,knowledge1     

which ought 7as it were7 to be in me4   
,and when ,i consider  the ,nature of   
,god1 it seems impossible that he should
 give me any  faculty which is not      
perfect in its kind1 or which should    
want  any of its due perfections2 for if
 by how much the more skilful the       
,workman is1 by so much the ,perfecter  
,works proceed from him4 ,what can  be  
made by the ,great ,maker of all things 
which is not fully perfect8  ,for ,i    
cannot ,doubt but ,god may ,create me so
 that ,i may never be  deceived1 neither
 can ,i doubt but that he ,wills        
whatever is ,best2  ,is it therefore    
better for me to be deceived1 or not to 
be deceived8    ,these things when ,i   
,consider more heedfully1 it comes into 
my ,mind1  ,first1 that 'tis no cause of
 ,admiration that ,god should do ,things
  whereof ,i can give no account1 nor   
must ,i therefore doubt his ,being1     
because there are many things done by   
him1 and ,i not comprehend ,why  or ,how
 they are done2 for seeing ,i now know  

that my ,nature is very  ,weak and      
,finite1 and that the ,nature of ,god is
 ,immense1  ,incomprehensible1          
,infinite2 from hence ,i must fully1    
understand1 that  he can do numberless  
things1 the ,causes whereof lie hidden  
to ,me4  ,upon which account only ,i    
esteem all those ,causes which are      
,drawn from  the ,end 7viz4 ,final      
,causes7 as of no use in ,natural       
,philosophy1 for ,i  cannot without     
,rashness ,think my self able to        
,discover ,gods ,designes4    ,i        
perceive this also1 that whenever we    
endeavour to know whether the  ,works of
 ,god are perfect1 we must not ,respect 
any one kind of  ,creature singly1 but  
the ,whole ,universe of ,beings2 for    
perhaps what  7if considered alone7 may 
,deservedly seem ,imperfect1 yet 7as it 
is a  part of the ,world7 is most       
perfect2 and tho since ,i have doubted  
of all things1 ,i have discover'd       
nothing certainly to ,exist1 but my     
self1 and ,god1 yet since ,i have       

,consider'd the ,omnipotency of ,god1   
,i cannot deny1 but that many other     
things are made 7or at least1 may  be   
made7 by him1 so that ,i my self may be 
a part of this ,universe4               
,furthermore1 coming nigher to my self1 
and enquiring what these ,errors  of    
mine1 are 7which are the ,only          
,arguments of my ,imperfection7 99 ,i   
find them to depend on two concurring   
,causes1 on my faculty of  ,knowing1 and
 on my faculty of ,choosing or ,freedome
 of my ,will1  that is to say1 from my  
,understanding1 and my ,will together4  
,for  by my ,understanding alone ,i only
 perceive ,ideas1 whereon ,i make       
,judgments1 wherein 7precisely so taken7
 there can be no ,error1  properly so   
called2 for tho perhaps there may be    
numberless things1  whose ,ideas ,i have
 not in ,me1 yet ,i am not properly to  
be said  ,deprived of them1 but only    
negatively wanting them2 and ,i cannot  
prove that ,god ought to have given me a
 greater faculty of ,knowing4  ,and tho 

,i understand him to be a skilful       
,workman1 yet ,i cannot ,think1  that he
 ought to have put all those perfections
 in each ,work of his  singly1 with     
which he might have endowed some of     
them4    ,neither can ,i complain that  
,god has not given me a ,will1 or       
,freedom  of ,choise1 large and perfect 
enough2 for ,i have experienced that    
'tis ,circumscribed by no ,bounds4      
,and 'tis worth our taking notice1 that 
,i have no other thing in me so  perfect
 and so ,great1 but ,i ,understand that 
there may be ,perfecter  and ,greater1  
for if 7for ,example7 ,i consider the   
,faculty of  ,understanding1 ,i         
presently perceive that in me 'tis very 
small and  ,finite1 and also at the same
 time ,i form to my self an ,idea of an 
other ,understanding not only much      
,greater1 but the ,greatest and         
,infinite1 which ,i perceive to belong  
to ,god4 ,in the same manner if ,i      
enquire into memory or imagination or   
any other faculties1 ,i find  them in my

 self ,weak and ,circumscribed1 but in  
,god ,i ,understand  them to be         
,infinite1 there is therefore only my   
,will or ,freedome  of ,choice1 which ,i
 find to be so ,great1 that ,i cannot   
frame to my  self an ,idea of ,one      
,greater1 so that 'tis by this chiefly  
by which  ,i ,understand my self to     
,bear the likeness and ,image of ,god4  
,for  tho the ,will in ,god be without  
comparison ,greater then ,mine1 both  as
 to the ,knowledge and ,power which are 
,joyn'd therewith1 which  make it more  
strong and ,effective1 and also as to   
the ,object  thereof1 for ,god can apply
 himself to more things then ,i can4    
,yet  being taken ,formally and         
,precisely ,gods ,will seems no greater 
then  ,mine4 ,for the ,freedome of ,will
 consists only in this1 that we can     
,do1 or not ,do such a ,thing 7that is1 
affirm or deny1 prosecute  or avoid7 or 
rather in this ,only1 that we are so    
carried to a ,thing  which is proposed  
by ,our ,intellect to ,affirm or ,deny1 

,prosecute  or ,shun1 that we are       
sensible1 that we are not ,determin'd to
 the  ,choice or ,aversion thereof1 by  
any outward ,force4    ,neither is it   
,requisite to make one ,free that he    
should have an  ,inclination to both    
sides4 ,for on the contrary1 by how much
 the more  strongly ,i am inclined to   
one side 7whether it be that ,i         
evidently  perceive therein ,good or    
,evil1 or ,whether it be that ,god has  
so  disposed my ,inward ,thoughts7 ,by  
so much the more ,free am ,i in my      
,choice4    ,neither truly do ,gods     
,grace or ,natural ,knowledge take away 
from  my ,liberty1 but rather encrease  
and strengthen it4 ,for that            
indifference which ,i find in my self1  
when no ,reason inclines me more  to one
 side1 then to the other1 is the meanest
 sort of ,liberty1  and is so far from  
being a sign of perfection1 that it only
 argues a  defect or negation of        
,knowledge2 for if ,i should always     
,clearly  see what were ,true and ,good 

,i should never deliberate in my        
,judgement or ,choice1 and              
,consequently1 tho ,i were perfectly    
,free1  yet ,i should never be          
,indifferent4    ,from all which1 ,i    
perceive that neither the ,power of     
,willing  precisely so taken1 which ,i  
have from ,god1 is the ,cause of my     
,errors1 it being most full and perfect 
in its kind2 ,neither also  the ,power  
of ,understanding1 for whatever ,i      
,understand 7since 'tis  from ,god that 
,i ,understand it7 ,i understand aright1
 nor can ,i be  therein ,deceived4      
,from ,whence therefore proceed all my  
,errors8 ,to which1 ,i answer1  that    
they proceed from hence only1 that      
seeing the ,will expatiates  it self    
farther then the ,understanding1 ,i keep
 it not within the  same bounds with my 
,understanding1 but often extend it to  
those  things which ,i ,understand not1 
to which things it being ,indifferent1  
it easily ,declines from what is ,true  
and ,good2 and consequently  ,i am      

,deceived and ,commit sin4 99 ,thus1 for
 example1 when lately ,i  felt my self  
to enquire1 ,whether any thing doth     
,exist1 and found  that from my setting 
my self to ,examine such a thing1 it    
evidently  follows that ,i my self      
,exist1 ,i could not but ,judge1 what ,i
 so  clearly ,understood1 to be true1   
not that ,i was forced thereto by  any  
outward impulse1 but because a strong   
,propension in my ,will  did follow this
 ,great ,light in my ,understanding1 so 
that ,i believed  it so much the more   
freely and willingly1 by how much the   
less  indifferent ,i was thereto4 ,but  
now ,i understand1 not only1 that ,i    
,exist as ,i am a ,thing that ,thinks1  
but ,i also meet with a certain  ,idea  
of a ,corporeal ,nature1 and it so      
happens that ,i doubt1  whether that    
,thinking ,nature that is in me be      
,different from that  ,corporeal        
,nature1 or ,whether they are both the  
same3 but in this  ,i suppose that ,i   
have found no ,argument to incline me   

either  ways1 and therefore ,i am       
,indifferent to affirm or deny either1  
or to ,judge nothing of either2 ,but    
this indifferency extends it  self not  
only to those things of which ,i am     
clearly ignorant1 but  generally to all 
those things which are not so very      
evidently known  to me at the ,time when
 my ,will ,deliberates of them2 for tho 
never so  probable ,guesses incline me  
to one side1 yet the ,knowing that they 
are only ,conjectures1 and not          
indubitable reasons1 is enough to ,draw 
my ,assent to the ,contrary ,part4      
,which ,lately ,i have sufficiently     
experienced1 when ,i supposed all those 
things 7which formerly ,i  assented to  
as most ,true7 as very ,false1 for this 
,reason only that  ,i found my self able
 to doubt of them in some manner4    ,if
 ,i abstain from passing my ,judgment1  
when ,i do not clearly and  distinctly  
enough perceive what is ,truth1 'tis    
evident that ,i do  well1 and that ,i am
 not deceived3 ,but if ,i affirm or     

deny1 then  'tis that ,i abuse the      
freedome of my will1 and if ,i turn my  
self  to that part which is false1 ,i am
 deceived2 but if ,i embrace the        
contrary ,part1 'tis but by chance that 
,i light on the ,truth1 yet  ,i shall   
not therefore be ,blameless1 for 'tis   
,manifest by the light  of ,nature that 
the ,perception of the ,understanding   
ought to  preceed the ,determination of 
the ,will4 ,and 'tis in this abuse of   
,free-,will that ,that ,privation       
consists1 which ,constitutes ,error2  ,i
 say there is a ,privation in the       
,action as it proceeds from ,me1  but   
not in the ,faculty which ,i have       
received from ,god2 nor in the  ,action 
as it depends on him4    ,neither have  
,i any ,reason to ,complain that ,god   
has not given me a larger  ,intellective
 ,faculty1 or more ,natural ,light1 for 
'tis a necessary  ,incident to a finite 
,understanding that it should not       
,understand ,all  things1 and 'tis      
,incident to a ,created ,understanding  

to be ,finite3  and ,i have more ,reason
 to thank him for what he has bestowed  
upon me  7tho he owed me nothing7 then  
to think my self ,robbed by him of those
  things which he never gave me4    ,nor
 have ,i ,reason to ,complain that he   
has given me a ,will larger then  my    
,understanding3 for seeing the ,will    
,consists in one thing only1  and as it 
were in an ,indivisible 7viz4 to ,will1 
or not to ,will7 it  seems contrary to  
its nature that it should be less then  
'tis2 and  certainly by how much the    
,greater it is1 so much the more        
,thankful ,i  ought to be to him2 that  
,gave it me4    ,neither can ,i         
,complain that ,god concurrs with me in 
the ,production of  those ,voluntary    
,actions or ,judgements in which ,i am  
deceived3 for  those ,acts as they      
depend on ,god are altogether ,true and 
,good2  and ,i am in some measure more  
perfect in that ,i can so ,act1 then if 
,i could not3 for that ,privation1 in   
which the ,ratio ,formalis of  ,falshood

 and ,sin consists1 wants not the       
,concourse of ,god2 ,for  it is not ,a  
,thing1 and having respect to him as its
 ,cause1 ought  not to be called        
,privation1 but ,negation2 for certainly
 'tis no  ,imperfection in ,god1 that he
 has given me a freedome of ,assenting  
or not ,assenting to some things1 the   
clear and distinct ,knowledge  whereof  
he has not ,imparted to my              
,understanding2 but certainly 'tis  an  
,imperfection in me1 that ,i abuse this 
liberty1 and pass my  ,judgement on     
those things which ,i do not ,rightly   
,understand4    ,yet ,i see that 'tis   
,possible with ,god to effect that 7tho 
,i should  remain ,free1 and of a       
,finite ,knowledge7 ,i should never     
,err1 that  is1 if he had endowed my    
,understanding with a clear and distinct
  ,knowledge of all things whereof ,i   
should ever have an ,occasion of        
deliberating2 or if he had only so      
firmly fix'd in my ,mind1 that ,i       
should never forget1 this1 ,that ,i must

 never ,judge of a thing which ,i  do   
not clearly and distinctly ,understand2 
,either of which things had  ,god done1 
,i easily perceive that ,i 7as          
consider'd in my self7 should  be more  
perfect then now ,i am1 yet nevertheless
 ,i cannot deny but that  there may be a
 greater perfection in the whole        
,universe of ,things1  for that some of 
its parts are ,obnoxious to ,errors1 and
 some not1 then  if they were all alike4
 ,and ,i have no ,reason to ,complain1  
that it has  pleased ,god1 that ,i      
should ,act on the ,stage of this ,world
 a ,part  not the chief and most perfect
 of all2 ,or that ,i should not be able 
to abstain from ,error in the first way 
above specifi'd1 which depends  upon the
 ,evident ,knowledge of those things    
whereof ,i deliberate2 ,yet  that ,i may
 abstain from ,error by the other means 
abovemention'd1  which depends only on  
this1 ,that ,i ,judge not of any ,thing1
 the truth  whereof is not ,evident4    
,for tho ,i have experienced in my self 

this  ,infirmity1 that ,i cannot always 
be intent upon one and the same         
,knowledge1 yet ,i may by a continued   
and often repeated ,meditation  bring   
this to pass1 that as often as ,i have  
use of this ,rule ,i may  ,remember it1 
by which means ,i may ,get 7as it were7 
an habit of not  erring4    ,in which   
thing seeing1 the greatest and chief    
perfection of  ,man consists1 ,i repute 
my self to have gain'd much by this days
  ,meditation1 for that therein ,i have 
discover'd the ,cause of  ,error1 and   
,falshood2 which certainly can be no    
other then what ,i  have now ,declared2 
for whenever in ,passing my ,judgement1 
,i bridle  my ,will so that it extend it
 self only to those things which ,i     
clearly and distinctly perceive1 it is  
impossible that ,i can ,err4  ,for      
doubtless ,all clear and distinct       
,perception is something1 and  therefore
 cannot proceed from ,nothing1 but must 
necessarily have  ,god for its ,author  
7,god1 ,i say1 ,who is infinitely       

,perfect1 and  who cannot ,deceive7 and 
therefore it ,must be ,true4    ,nor    
have ,i this ,day learnt only what ,i   
must beware off that ,i be not          
deceived1 but also what ,i must ,do to  
,discover ,truth1 for ,that ,i  shall   
certainly find1 if ,i fully ,apply my   
self to those things only1  which ,i    
perfectly understand2 and if ,i         
distinguish between those and  what ,i  
apprehend but confusedly and obscurely2 
,both which hereafter ,i  shall         
endeavour4          ,,meditat4 ,v4      
,of the ,essence of ,things ,material4  
,and herein ,again of ,god4 ,and  that  
he does ,exist4      ,there are yet     
remaining many ,things concerning ,gods 
,attributes1 and  many things concerning
 the nature of my self or of my ,mind1  
which  ought to be searched into3 but   
these perhaps ,i shall set upon at some 
other ,opportunity4 ,and at ,present    
nothing seems to me more requisite      
7feeling ,i have discover'd what ,i must
 avoid1 and what ,i must ,do for  the   

,attaining of ,truth7 then that ,i      
imploy my ,endeavours to free my  self  
from those doubts into which ,i have    
lately fallen1 and that ,i try  whether 
,i can have any certainty of ,material  
,things4    ,but before ,i enquire      
whether there be any such things ,really
 ,existent  without ,me1 ,i ought to    
consider the ,ideas of those things1 as 
they are  in my ,thoughts and try which 
of them are ,distinct1 which confused4  
,in which search ,i find that ,i        
distinctly imagine ,quantity1 that which
  ,philosophers commonly call continued1
 that is to say1 the ,extension  of that
 ,quantity or thing continued into      
,length1 ,breadth1 and  ,thickness1 ,i  
can count in it divers ,parts1 to which 
parts ,i can  assign ,bigness1 ,figure1 
,position1 and ,local ,motion1 to which 
,local ,motion ,i can assign ,duration4 
,neither are only these ,generals       
plainly discover'd and known by ,me1 but
 also by attentive ,consideration1  ,i  
perceive ,innumerable particulars       

concerning the ,shapes1 ,number1  and   
,motion of ,these ,bodies2 ,the ,truth  
whereof is so evident1 and  agreeable to
 my ,nature1 that when ,i first         
discover'd them1 ,i seemed  not so much 
to have ,learnt any thing that is new1  
as to have only  remembred what ,i have 
known before1 or only to have thought on
 those  things which were in me before1 
tho this be the first time that ,i have 
examin'd them so diligently4    ,one    
thing there is worthy my ,consideration1
 which is1 that ,i find in my  self     
innumerable ,ideas of certain things1   
which tho perhaps they exist  no where  
without ,me1 yet they cannot ,be said to
 be ,nothing2 and tho  they are ,thought
 upon by me at my will and pleasure1 yet
 they are  not made by ,me1 but have    
their own ,true and ,immutable ,natures4
  ,as when1 for example1 99 ,i ,imagine 
a ,triangle1 tho perhaps such a  ,figure
 ,exists no where out of my ,thoughts1  
nor ever will ,exist1  yet the ,nature  
thereof is determinate1 and its ,essence

 or ,form is  ,immutable and ,eternal1  
which is neither made by me1 nor depends
  on my mind1 as appears for that many  
properties may be demonstrated  of this 
,triangle1 viz4 ,that its three ,angles 
are equal to two right  ones1 that to   
its ,greatest ,angle the ,greatest side 
is subtended1 and such  like1 which ,i  
now clearly know whether ,i will or not1
 tho before ,i  never thought on them1  
when ,i imagine a ,triangle1 and        
consequently they  could not be invented
 by ,me4 ,and 'tis nothing to the       
purpose for me to  say1 that perhaps    
this ,idea of a ,triangle came to me by 
the ,organs of  sense1 because ,i have  
sometimes seen bodies of a ,triangular  
,shape2  for ,i can think of            
,innumerable other ,figures1 which ,i   
cannot suspect  to have come in through 
my senses1 and yet ,i can ,demonstrate  
various  properties of them1 as well as 
of a ,triangle1 which certainly are all 
true1 seeing ,i know them clearly1 and  
therefore they are something1  and not a

 meer ,nothing1 for 'tis ,evident that  
what is true is  something4    ,and now 
,i have sufficiently ,demonstrated1 that
 what ,i clearly perceive1  is ,true2   
,and tho ,i had not demonstrated it1 yet
 such is the ,nature  of my ,mind1 that 
,i could not but give my ,assent to what
 ,i so  perceive1 at least1 as long as  
,i so perceive it2 and ,i remember      
7heretofore when ,i most of all relied  
on sensible ,objects7 that ,i held      
those ,truths for the most certain which
 ,i evidently perceived1  such as are   
concerning ,figures1 ,numbers1 with     
other parts of  ,arithmetick1 and       
,geometry1 as also whatever relates to  
pure and  abstracted ,mathematicks4     
,now therefore1 if from this alone1     
,that ,i can frame the ,idea of a ,thing
  in my ,mind1 it follows1 ,that        
whatever ,i clearly and distinctly      
perceive  belonging to a thing1 does    
,really belong to it2 ,cannot ,i from   
hence  draw an ,argument to ,prove the  
,existence of a ,god8 ,certainly ,i find

  the ,idea of a ,god1 or infinitely    
perfect ,being1 as naturally in  me1 as 
the ,idea of any ,figure1 or ,number2   
and ,i as clearly and  distinctly       
understand that it appertains to his    
,nature ,always to ,be1  as ,i know that
 what ,i can demonstrate of a           
,mathematical ,figure or  ,number       
belongs to the ,nature of that ,figure  
or ,number3 so that1  tho all things    
which ,i have ,meditated upon these     
three or four days  were not true1 yet  
,i may well be as certain of the        
,existence of a  ,god1 as ,i have       
hitherto been of ,mathematical ,truths4 
,doubt4 ,yet this ,argument at first    
sight appears not so evident1 but  looks
 rather like a sophism2 for seeing ,i am
 used in all other things  to           
,distinguish ,existence from ,essence1  
,i can easily perswade my self  that the
 ,existence of ,god may be distinguish'd
 from his ,essence1  so that ,i may     
,imagine ,god not to ,exist4            
,solution4 ,but considering it more     

strictly1 'tis manifest1 that the       
,existence of ,god can no more be       
seperated from his ,essence1  then the  
,equality of the ,three ,angles to two  
right ones can be  seperated from the   
,essence of a ,triangle1 or then the    
,idea of a  ,mountain can be without the
 ,idea of a valley2 so that 'tis no     
less a ,repugnancy to think of a ,god   
7that is1 ,a ,being infinitely  perfect7
 who wants ,existence 7that is1 who     
wants a ,perfection7 then  to think of a
 ,mountain1 to which there is no ,valley
 adjoyning4    ,doubt4 ,but what if ,i  
cannot imagine ,god but as ,existing1 or
 a  ,mountain without a ,vally8 yet     
supposing me to think of a ,mountain    
with  a ,vally1 it does not from thence 
follow1 that there ,is a ,mountain  in  
the ,world2 so supposing me to think of 
a ,god as ,existing1 yet  does it not   
follow that ,god ,really ,exists4 ,for  
my ,thought imposes  no necessity on    
,things1 and as ,i may imagine a ,winged
 ,horse1 tho no  ,horse has ,wings1 so  

,i may imagine an existing ,god1 tho no 
,god  exist4    ,solution4 ',tis true   
the ,sophism seems to lie in this1 yet  
tho ,i  cannot conceive a ,mountain but 
with a ,vally1 it does not from hence   
follow1 that a ,mountain or ,vally do   
,exist1 but this will follow1  that     
whether a ,mountain or a ,vally do or do
 not ,exist1 yet they  cannot be        
seperated3 so from hence that ,i cannot 
think of ,god but  as ,existing1 it     
follows that ,existence is ,inseperable 
from ,god1  and therefore that he       
,really ,exists2 ,not because my        
,thought does  all this1 or ,imposes any
 necessity on any ,thing1 but           
contrarily1  because the necessity of   
the thing it self 7viz4 of ,gods        
,existence7  ,determines me to think    
thus2 for 'tis not in my ,power to think
 a  ,god without ,existence 7that is1 ,a
 ,being absolutely perfect without  the 
,cheif ,perfection7 as it is in my      
,power to imagine a ,horse either  with 
or without ,wings4    ,doubt4 ,and here 

it cannot be said1 that ,i am forced to 
suppose ,god  ,existing1 after ,i have  
supposed him endowed with all           
,perfections1  seeing ,existence is one 
of them2 but that my ,first ,position   
7viz4  ,his ,absolute ,perfection7 is   
not necessary4 ,thus1 for example1 'tis 
not necessary for me to think all       
,quadrilateral ,figures inscribed in  a 
,circle2 ,but supposing that ,i think   
so1 ,i am then necessitated to  ,confess
 a ,rhombe ,inscribed therein1 and yet  
this is evidently ,false4    ,solution4 
,for tho ,i am not forced at any time to
 think of a ,god2 yet  as often as ,i   
cast my ,thoughts on a ,first and ,cheif
 ,being1 and as  it were bring forth out
 of the ,treasury of my ,mind an ,idea  
thereof1  ,i must of necessity attribute
 thereto all ,manner of ,perfections1   
tho  ,i do not at that time count them  
over1 or ,remark each single ,one2      
which necessity is sufficient to make me
 hereafter 7when ,i come to  consider   
,existence to be a ,perfection7 conclude

 ,rightly1 ,that the  ,first and ,chief 
,being does ,exist4 ,thus1 for example1 
,i am not obliged at  any time to       
imagine a ,triangle1 yet whenever ,i    
please to ,consider of a  ,right-lined  
,figure having only three ,angles1 ,i am
 then necessitated  to allow it all     
those ,requisites from which ,i may     
argue rightly1 ,that  the ,three ,angles
 thereof are not ,greater then ,two     
,right ,ones1 ,tho  upon the first      
consideration this came not into my     
,thought4 ,but when ,i  enquire what    
,figures may be inscribed within a      
,circle1 ,i am not at  all necessitated 
to think that all ,quadrilateral        
,figures are of that  sort2 neither can 
,i possibly imagine this1 whilst ,i     
admit of nothing1  but what ,i clearly  
and distinctly ,understand3 and         
therefore there  is a great ,difference 
between these ,false suppositions1 and  
,true  natural ,ideas1 the first and    
,chief2 whereof is that of a ,god2  ,for
 by many wayes ,i understand ,that not  

to be a ,fiction depending  on my       
,thought1 but an ,image of a ,true and  
,immutable ,nature2  ,as first1 because 
,i can think of no other thing but ,god 
to ,whose  ,essence ,existence belongs4 
,next because ,i cannot ,imagine ,two or
 ,more  ,gods1 and supposing that he is 
now only ,one1 ,i may plainly perceive  
it necessary for ,him to ,have been from
 ,eternity1 and will ,be to  ,eternity2 
,and ,lastly because ,i perceive many   
,other ,things in ,god1  ,which ,i      
cannot ,change1 and from which ,i cannot
 ,detract4    ,but whatever way of      
,argumentation ,i use1 it comes ,all at 
last to this one  ,thing1 ,that ,i am   
fully perswaded of the ,truth of those  
things only1  which appear to me clearly
 and distinctly4 ,and tho some of those 
things1 which ,i so perceive1 are       
obvious to every ,man1 and some are     
only discover'd by ,those that search   
more nighly1 and enquire more           
carefully1 yet when such truths are     
discover'd1 they are esteem'd  no less  

certain than the ,others4 ,for ,example1
 ,tho it do not so easily  appear1 that 
in a ,rightangled ,triangle1 the square 
of the ,base is equal  to the squares of
 the sides1 as it appears1 that the     
,base is suspended  under its ,largest  
,angle1 yet the first ,proposition is no
 less  certainly believed when once 'tis
 perceived1 then this ,last4    ,thus in
 ,reference to ,god2 certainly1 unless  
,i am overrun with  ,prejudice1 or have 
my thoughts begirt on all sides with    
sensible  ,objects1 ,i should           
acknowledge nothing before or easier    
then him2  ,for what is more            
self-evident then that there is a ,chief
 ,being1 or  then that a ,god 7to whose 
essence alone ,existence appertains7    
does  ,exist8 ,and tho serious          
,consideration is required to perceive  
thus  much1 yet ,now1 ,i am not only    
equally certain of it1 as of what seems 
most certain1 but ,i perceive also that 
the ,truth of other ,things so  depends 
on it1 that without it nothing can ever 

be perfectly known4    ,for tho my      
nature be such1 that during the time of 
my ,clear and  ,distinct ,perception1 ,i
 cannot but believe it true2 yet my     
,nature  is such also1 that ,i cannot   
fix the ,intention of my ,mind upon one 
and the same thing alwayes1 so as to    
perceive it clearly1 and the            
,remembrance of what ,judgement ,i have 
formerly made is often stirred  up1 when
 ,i cease attending to those reasons for
 which ,i passed such a  ,judgment1     
other ,reasons may then be produced1    
which 7if ,i did not know  ,god7 may    
easily move me in my ,opinion2 and by   
this means ,i shall  never attain to the
 true and certain ,knowledge of any     
,thing1 but  ,wandring and ,unstable    
opinions4 ,so1 for example1 when ,i     
consider the  ,nature of a ,triangle1 it
 plainly appears to me 7as understanding
 the  ,principles of ,geometry7 that its
 three ,angles are equal to two right   
ones2 ,and this ,i must of necessity    
think ,true as long as ,i attend to  the

 ,demonstration thereof2 but as soon as 
ever ,i withdraw my ,mind from  the     
,consideration of its ,proof 7altho ,i  
remember that ,i have once  ,clearly    
perceived it7 yet perhaps ,i may doubt  
of ,its ,truth1 being  as yet ,ignorant 
of a ,god2 ,for ,i may perswade my self1
 that ,i am so  framed by ,nature1 as to
 be deceived in those things which ,i   
imagine  my self to perceive most       
evidently1 ,especially when ,i          
recollect1 that  heretofore ,i have     
often accounted many things ,true and   
,certain1 which  afterward upon other   
,reasons ,i have ,judged as ,false4 ,but
 when ,i perceive  that there is a ,god2
 because at the same time ,i also       
,understand  that all things ,depend on 
,him1 and that he is not a ,deceiver2   
and  when from hence ,i ,collect that   
all those ,things which ,i clearly and  
distinctly perceive are necessarily     
,true2 tho ,i have no further  ,respects
 to those ,reasons which induced me to  
believe it ,true1 yet if  ,i do but     

remember1 that ,i have once clearly and 
distinctly perceived  it1 no ,argument  
can be brought on the contrary1 that    
shall make me  doubt1 but that ,i have  
true and certain ,knowledge thereof2 and
 not  onely of that1 but of all other   
,truths also which ,i remember that ,i  
have once ,demonstrated1 such as are    
,geometrical ,propositions and the      
like4    ,what now can be ,objected     
against me8 shall ,i say1 that ,i am so 
made by  ,nature1 as to be often        
deceived8 ,no2 ,for ,i now ,know that ,i
 cannot be  deceived in those ,things1  
which ,i clearly ,understand4 ,shall ,i 
say1  that at other times ,i have       
esteem'd many ,things ,true and         
,certain1  which afterwards ,i found to 
be falsities8 ,no2 for ,i perceived none
  of those things clearly and           
distinctly1 but being ,ignorant of this 
,rule of ,truth1 ,i took them up for    
,reasons1 which ,reasons ,i afterward   
found to be ,weak4 ,what then can be    
said8 ,shall1 ,i say1 7as lately ,i     

objected7 that ,perhaps ,i am asleep1   
and that what ,i now think of is  no    
more ,true1 then the ,dreams of ,people 
asleep8 ,but this it self  moves not my 
,opinion2 for certainly tho ,i were     
asleep1 if any thing  appear'd evident  
to my ,understanding1 'twould be ,true4 
,and ,thus ,i ,plainly see1 that the    
,certainty and ,truth of all ,science   
,depends on the ,knowledge of the ,true 
,god1 so that before ,i had ,known      
,him1 ,i did ,know nothing2 ,but now    
many things both of ,god himself1  and  
of other ,intellectual ,things1 as also 
of ,corporeal nature1 which  is the     
,object of ,mathematicks1 may be        
,plainly ,known and ,certain  to me4    
,,meditat4 ,,vi4    ,of ,corporeal      
,beings1 and ,their ,existence3 ,as     
,also of the ,real  ,difference1        
,between ,mind and ,body4      ,it now  
remains that ,i examine whether any     
,corporeal ,beings do ,exist2  ,and     
already ,i know that 7as they are the   
,object of ,pure ,mathematicks7  they   

,may 7at least7 ,exist1 for ,i clearly  
and distinctly perceive  them2 and      
doubtless ,god is able to make1 whatever
 ,i am able to  perceive1 and ,i never  
,judged any thing to be beyond his      
,power1 but  what was ,repugnant to a   
distinct perception4 ,moreover1 such    
,material  ,beings seem to ,exist from  
the faculty of ,imagination1 which ,i   
find my self make use of1 when ,i am    
conversant about them3 for if ,i        
attentively ,consider what ,imagination 
is1 'twill appear to be only a  certain 
,application of our ,cognoscitive or    
knowing ,faculty to a ,body or  ,object 
that is before it2 and if it be before  
it1 ,it must ,exist4    ,but that this  
may be made more ,plain1 ,i must first  
examine the  difference between         
,imagination1 and pure ,intellection1 or
  ,understanding4 ,so1 for example1 when
 ,i ,imagine a ,triangle1 ,i do not     
only ,understand that it is a figure    
comprehended by three ,lines1  but ,i   
also behold with the eye of my mind     

those three lines as  it were before    
,me1 and this is that which ,i call     
imagination4 ,but  if ,i convert my     
,thoughts to a ,chiliogone1 or ,figure  
consisting of a  ,thousand ,angles1 ,i  
know as well that this ,is a figure     
comprehended by  a ,thousand sides1 as  
,i know that a ,triangle is a ,figure   
,consisting  of three sides2 but ,i do  
not in the same ,manner ,imagine1 or    
behold  as present those thousand sides1
 as ,i do the three sides of a          
,triangle4 ,and tho at the time when ,i 
so think of a ,chiliogone1 ,i may       
confusedly represent to my self some    
,figure 7because whenever ,i ,think  of 
a ,corporeal ,object1 ,i am used to     
,imagine some ,shape or other7  yet 'tis
 evident that this ,representation is   
not a ,chiliogone1  because 'tis in     
nothing different from what ,i should   
,represent to my  self if ,i thought of 
a ,milion-angled figure1 or any other   
,figure of  ,more sides2 ,neither does  
such a ,confused ,representation help me

 in  the least to know those            
,properties1 by which a ,chiliogone     
differs  from other ,polygones or       
,manyangled ,figures4 ,but if a         
,question be  put concerning a          
,pentagone1 ,i know ,i may ,understand  
its ,shape1 as  ,i ,understand the      
,shape1 of a ,chiliogone1 without the   
help of  ,imagination1 but ,i can also  
imagine it1 by applying the ,eye of my  
,mind to its ,five sides1 and to the    
,area or space contained by  ,them2 ,and
 herein ,i manifestly perceive that     
there is required a peculiar  sort of   
,operation in the ,mind to imagine a    
,thing1 which ,i require  not to        
,understand a ,thing2 which ,new        
,operation of the ,mind plainly  shews  
the difference between imagination and  
pure ,intellection4    ,besides this1 ,i
 ,consider that this ,power of          
,imagination which is in  me 7as it     
differs from the ,power of              
,understanding7 does not appertain  to  
the ,essence of ,me1 that is1 of my     

mind1 for tho ,i wanted it1  yet        
certainly ,i should be the same ,he1    
that now ,i am3 from whence it  seems to
 follow1 that it depends on something   
different from my self2  and ,i easily  
perceive that if any ,body whatever did 
,exist1 to which  my ,mind were so      
conjoyn'd1 that it may ,apply it self   
when it pleased  to ,consider1 or 7as it
 were7 ,look into this ,body2 ,from     
hence1 ,i  say1 ,i perceive ,it may so  
be1 that by this very ,body ,i may      
,imagine  ,corporeal ,beings3 ,so that  
this ,manner of ,thinking differs from  
pure  ,intellection only in this1 that  
the ,mind1 when it ,understands1 does   
as it were turn it self1 to it self1 or 
,reflect on it self1 and  beholds some  
or other of those ,ideas which are in it
 self2 ,but when  it ,imagines1 it      
,converts it self upon ,body1 and       
therein beholds  something ,conformable 
to that ,idea1 which it hath understood1
 or  perceived by ,sense4    ,but 'tis  
to be remembred1 that ,i said1 ,i easily

 conceive ,imagination  ,may be so      
performed1 supposing ,body to ,exist4   
,and because no  so convenient manner of
 ,explaining it offers it self1 from    
thence  ,i probably guess1 that ,body   
does ,exist4 ,but this ,i only say      
probably1 for tho ,i should accurately  
search into all the ,arguments  drawn   
from the distinct ,idea of ,body1 which 
,i find in my  ,imagination1 yet ,i find
 none of them1 from whence ,i may       
necessarily  conclude1 that ,body does  
,exist4    ,but ,i have been accustomed 
to ,imagine many other things besides   
that  ,corporeal ,nature which is the   
,object of pure ,mathematicks2 such  as 
are1 ,colours1 ,sounds1 ,tasts1 ,pain1  
c4 but none of these so  distinctly4    
,and because ,i perceive these better by
 ,sense1 from ,which  by the ,help of   
the ,memory they come to the            
,imagination1 that ,i may  with the     
,greater advantage treat of them1 ,i    
ought at the same time to  ,consider    
,sence1 and to try whether from what ,i 

perceive by that way of  ,thought1 which
 ,i call ,sense1 ,i can deduce any      
certain ,argument for  the ,existence of
 ,corporeal ,beings4    ,and first ,i   
will here reflect with my self1 what    
those things were1  which being         
perceived by ,sence ,i have heretofore  
thought ,true1 and  the ,reasons why ,i 
so thought3 ,i will then enquire into   
the ,reasons  for which ,i afterwards   
doubted those things4 ,and last of all  
,i will  consider what ,i ought to think
 of those ,things at ,present4          
,sidenote3 ,the ,reasons why ,i ,trusted
 my ,senses4    ,first therefore ,i have
 always thought that ,i have had an     
,head1  ,hands1 ,feet1 and other        
,members1 of which ,this ,body 7which ,i
 have  look'd upon as a ,part of ,me1 or
 ,perhaps as my ,whole self7 ,consists2 
,and ,i have also thought that this     
,body of ,mine is ,conversant or        
engaged among many ,other ,bodies1 by   
which it is ,liable to be affected  with
 what is advantagious or hurtful2 ,what 

was ,advantagious  ,i judged by a       
certain sense of ,pleasure1 what was    
,hurtful by  a sense of ,pain4          
,furthermore1 besides ,pleasure and     
,pain1 ,i  perceived in my self ,hunger1
 ,thirst1 and other such like           
,appetites1  as also certain ,corporeal 
,propensions to ,mirth1 ,sadness1       
,anger1  and other like ,passions4      
,as to ,what hapned to me from ,bodies  
without1 ,besides the ,extension1       
,figure1 and ,motion of those ,bodies1  
,i also perceived in them  ,hardness1   
,heat1 and other tactile ,qualities1 as 
also ,light1  ,colours1 ,smells1 ,tasts1
 ,sounds1 c4 and by the ,variation of   
these ,i distinguish'd the ,heaven1     
,earth1 and ,seas1 and all other        
,bodies from each other4    ,neither was
 it wholly without ,reason 7upon the    
account of these ,ideas  of ,qualities1 
which offer'd themselves to my          
,thoughts1 and which alone  ,i properly 
and ,immediately perceived7 that ,i     
thought my self to  ,perceive some      

,things ,different from my ,thought1    
viz4 ,the ,bodies or  ,objects from     
whence these ,ideas might ,proceed2 for 
,i often found  these ,ideas come upon  
me without my ,consent or ,will2 so that
 ,i can  neither perceive an ,object    
7tho ,i had a mind to it7 unless it were
  before the ,organs of my ,sense2      
,neither can ,i ,hinder my self from    
perceiving it1 when it is ,present4     
,and seeing that those ,ideas which ,i  
take in by sense are much more  ,lively1
 ,apparent and in their kind more       
distinct1 than any of those  which ,i   
knowingly and ,willingly frame by       
,meditation1 or stir up in  my ,memory2 
it seems to me that they cannot proceed 
from my self4  ,there remains therefore 
no other way for them to come upon me1  
but from  some other ,things ,without   
,me4 ,of ,which ,things seeing ,i have  
no other  ,knowledge but from these     
,ideas1 ,i cannot ,think but that these 
,ideas  are like the ,things4           
,moreover1 ,because ,i remember that ,i 

first made use of my senses  before my  
,reason2 and because ,i did perceive    
that those ,ideas  which ,i my self did 
frame were not so ,manifest as those    
which ,i  received by my senses1 but    
very often made up of their parts1 ,i   
was  easily perswaded to think that ,i  
had no ,idea in my ,understanding1      
which ,i had not ,first in my sense4    
,neither was it without ,reason that ,i 
,judged1 ,that ,body 7which by a        
peculiar right ,i call my ,own7 to be   
more nighly appertaining to  ,me then   
any other ,body4 ,for from ,it1 as from 
other ,bodies1 ,i  can never be         
seperated1 ,i was sensible of all       
,appetites and  ,affections in ,it and  
for ,it1 and lastly ,i perceived        
pleasure and  ,pain in its ,parts1 and  
not in any other ,without it4 ,but why  
from the  sense of ,pain a certain      
,grief1 and from the sense of pleasure a
  certain ,joy of the ,mind should      
arise1 or ,why that ,gnawing of the     
stomach1 ,which ,i call ,hunger1 should 

put me in mind of ,eating1 or  the      
driness of my ,throat of ,drinking1 ,i  
can give no other ,reason  but that ,i  
am taught so by ,nature4 ,for to my     
thinking there is no  ,affinity or      
,likeness between that ,gnawing of the  
,stomach1 and the  desire of ,eating1 or
 between the sense of ,pain1 and the    
sorrowful  thought from thence arising4 
,but in this as in all other judgments  
that ,i made of sensible objects1 ,i    
seem'd to be taught by ,nature1 for  ,i 
first perswaded my self that things were
 so or so1 before ever ,i  enquired into
 a ,reason that may prove it4           
,sidenote3 ,the ,reasons why ,i doubted 
my senses4    ,sidenote3 ,medit4 ,i4    
,but afterwards ,i discover'd many      
experiments1 wherein my senses so       
grosly deceived me1 that ,i would never 
trust them again2 for ,towers  which    
seem'd ,round a far off1 nigh at hand   
appear'd square1 and  large ,statues on 
their tops seem'd small to those that   
stood on the  ground2 and in numberless 

other things1 ,i perceived the          
judgements  of my outward senses were   
deceived3 and not of my outward only1   
but of my inward senses also2 for what  
is more intimate or inward  than ,pain8 
,and yet ,i have heard from those1 whose
 ,arm or ,leg was cut  off1 that they   
have felt pain in that part which they  
wanted1 and  therefore ,i am not        
absolutely certain that any part of me  
is affected  with pain1 tho ,i feel pain
 therein4 ,to these ,i have lately added
  two very general ,reasons of doubt2   
,the first was1 that while ,i was       
awake1 ,i could not believe my self to  
perceive any thing1 which ,i could  not 
think my self sometimes to perceive1 tho
 ,i were a sleep2 ,and seeing  ,i cannot
 believe1 that what ,i seem to perceive 
in my sleep proceeds  from outward      
,objects1 what greater ,reason have ,i  
to think so of what ,i  perceive whilst 
,i am awake8 ,the other ,cause of ,doubt
 was1 that seeing  ,i know not the      
,author of my ,being 7or at least ,i    

then supposed my  self not to know him7 
what reason is there but that ,i may be 
so ordered  by ,nature as to be deceived
 even in those things which appear'd to 
me  most true4 ,and as to the ,reasons1 
which induced me to give credit  to     
sensible ,things1 'twas easie to return 
an answer thereto1 for  finding by      
experience1 that ,i was impelled by     
,nature to many ,things1  which ,reason 
disswaded me from1 ,i thought ,i should 
not far trust what ,i  was taught by    
,nature4 ,and tho the perceptions of my 
senses depended  not on my ,will1 ,i    
thought ,i should not therefore         
conclude1 that they  proceeded from     
,objects different from my self2 for    
perhaps there may  be some other        
,faculty in me 7tho as yet unknown to   
me7 which might  frame those            
perceptions4    ,sidenote3 ,how far the 
senses are now to be trusted4    ,but   
now that ,i begin better to know my self
 and the ,author of my  ,original1 ,i do
 not think1 that all things1 which ,i   

seem to have from my  senses are rashly 
to be admitted1 neither are all things  
so had1  to be doubted4 ,and first      
because ,i know that whatever ,i clearly
  and distinctly perceive1 may be so    
made by ,god as ,i perceive  them2 the  
,power of understanding clearly and     
distinctly one ,thing  without the other
 is sufficient to make ,me certain that 
,one ,thing is  different from the      
,other2 because it may at least be      
placed apart by  ,god1 and that it may  
be esteem'd different1 it matters not by
 what  ,power it may be so sever'd4 ,and
 therefore from the knowledge ,i  have1 
that ,i my self exist1 and because at   
the same time ,i understand  that       
nothing else appertains to my ,nature or
 ,essence1 but that ,i am a  thinking   
,being1 ,i rightly conclude1 that my    
,essence consists in this  alone1 that  
,i am a thinking ,thing4 ,and tho       
perhaps 7or1 as ,i shall  shew          
presently1 'tis certain7 ,i have a ,body
 which is very nighly  conjoyned to me1 

yet because on this side ,i have a clear
 and distinct  ,idea of my self1 as ,i  
am only a thinking ,thing1 not extended2
 and on  the other side because ,i have 
a distinct ,idea of my ,body1 as it is  
onely an extended thing1 not thinking1  
'tis from hence certain1  that ,i am    
really distinct from my ,body1 and that 
,i can exist without  it4    ,moreover  
,i find in my self some ,faculties      
endow'd with certain  peculiar waies of 
thinking1 such as the ,faculty of       
,imagination1  the ,faculty of          
,perception or sense2 without which ,i  
can conceive  my whole self clearly and 
distinctly1 but 7changing the phrase7 ,i
  cannot conceive those ,faculties      
without conceiving ,my self1 that  is1  
an understanding substance in which they
 are2 for none of them  in their formal 
,conception includes understanding2 from
 whence ,i  perceive they are as        
different from me1 as the modus or      
manner of  a ,thing is different from   
the ,thing it self4    ,i acknowledge   

also1 that ,i have several other        
,faculties1 such as  changing of place1 
putting on various shapes1 c4 ,which can
  no more be understood without a       
substance in which they are1 then  the  
foremention'd ,faculties1 and           
consequently they can no more be        
understood to ,exist without that       
substance3 ,but yet 'tis ,manifest1     
that this sort of ,faculties1 to the    
,end they may exist1 ought to be  in a  
,corporeal1 ,extended1 and not in an    
,understanding substance1  because      
,extension1 and not ,intellection or    
,understanding is  included in the      
,clear and ,distinct conception of them4
    ,but there is also in me a certain  
,passive ,faculty of sense1 or of       
,receiving and ,knowing the ,ideas of   
sensible ,things2 of which  ,faculty ,i 
can make no use1 unless there were in my
 self1 or in  something else1 a certain 
,active ,faculty of ,producing and      
,effecting  those ,ideas4 ,but this     
cannot be in my self1 for it            

,pre-supposes no  ,understanding1 and   
those ,ideas are ,produced in me1 tho ,i
 help not1  and often against my ,will4 
,there remains therefore no ,place for  
this  ,active ,faculty1 but that it     
should be in some substance different   
from me4 ,in which because all the      
,reallity1 which is contain'd           
,objectively in the ,ideas ,produced by 
that ,faculty1 ought to be  contain'd   
,formally or ,eminently 7as ,i have     
,formerly taken notice7  this substance 
must be either a ,body 7in which what is
 in the  ,ideas ,objectively is         
contain'd ,formally7 or it ,must ,be    
,god1 or  some ,creature more excellent 
then a ,body 7,in which what is in the  
,ideas ,objectively is contain'd        
,eminently74 ,but seeing that ,god is   
not a ,deceivour1 'tis altogether       
,manifest1 that he does not ,place      
these ,ideas in me either ,immediately  
from himself1 or ,mediately  from any   
other ,creature1 wherein their          
,objective ,reallity is not 99          

contain'd ,formally1 but only           
,eminently4 ,and seeing ,god has given  
me no ,faculty to discern ,whether these
 ,ideas proceed from ,corporeal  or     
,incorporeal ,beings1 but rather a      
strong ,inclination to believe  that    
they are sent from ,corporeal ,beings1  
there is no ,reason ,why ,god  should   
not be counted a ,deceiver1 if these    
,ideas came from any ,where1  but from  
,corporeal ,things4 ,therefore we must  
conclude that there are  ,corporeal     
,beings4 ,which perhaps are not all the 
same as ,i comprehend  them by my sense 
7for ,perception by sense is in many    
,things very  ,obscure and ,confused7   
but those things at least1 which ,i     
clearly  and distinctly ,understand1    
that is to say1 all those things which  
are  comprehended under the ,object of  
,pure ,mathematicks2 those things ,i    
say at least are ,true4    ,as to ,what 
,remains1 ,they are either some         
,particulars1 as that the  ,sun is of   
such a ,bigness or ,shape1 c4 or they   

are ,things less  ,clearly ,understood1 
as ,light1 ,sound1 ,pain1 c4 ,and tho   
these and  such like ,things may be very
 ,doubtful and ,uncertain1 yet because  
,god is not a ,deceiver1 and because    
that 7,therefore7 none of my  ,opinions 
can be false unless ,god has ,given me  
some ,faculty or other  to ,correct my  
,error1 hence 'tis that ,i am incouraged
 with the ,hopes  of attaining ,truth   
even in these very ,things4    ,and     
certainly it cannot be doubted but      
whatever ,i am taught by ,nature  has   
something therein of ,truth4 ,by ,nature
 in ,general ,i understand  either ,god 
himself1 or the ,coordination of        
,creatures ,made by ,god4  ,by my ,own  
,nature in ,particular ,i understand the
 ,complexion or  ,association of all    
those things which are given me by ,god4
    ,now there is nothing that this my  
,nature teaches me more expresly  then  
that ,i have a ,body1 ,which is not     
,well when ,i feel ,pain1 that  this    
,body wants ,meat or ,drink ,when ,i am 

,hungry or ,dry1 c4  ,and therefore ,i  
ought not to ,doubt but that these      
things are ,true4 ,and  by this sense of
 ,pain1 ,hunger1 ,thirst1 c4 ,my ,nature
 tells me  that ,i am not in my ,body1  
as a ,mariner is in his ,ship1 but that 
,i  am most nighly conjoyn'd thereto1   
and as it were ,blended therewith2  so  
that ,i with ,it make up one thing2 ,for
 ,otherwise1 when the ,body  were hurt1 
,i1 who am only a ,thinking ,thing1     
should not therefore  feel ,pain1 but   
should only perceive the ,hurt with the 
,eye of my  ,understanding 7as a        
,mariner perceives by his sight whatever
 is  broken in his ,ship7 and when the  
,body wants either ,meat or ,drink1 ,i  
should only ,understand this want1 but  
should not have the ,confused  sense of 
,hunger or ,thirst2 ,i call them        
,confused1 for certainly  the ,sense of 
,thirst1 ,hunger1 ,pain1 c4 are only    
,confused ,modes  or ,manners of        
,thought arising from the ,union and 7as
 it were7  mixture of the ,mind and     

,body4    ,i am taught also by ,nature1 
that there are many other ,bodies       
,without  and ,about my ,body1 some     
whereof are to be desired1 others are to
  be ,avoided4 ,and because that ,i     
,perceive very ,different ,colours1     
,sounds1 ,smells1 ,tasts1 ,heat1        
,hardness1 and the ,like1 from  thence  
,i ,rightly conclude that there are     
,correspondent ,differences in  ,bodies1
 from which these different perceptions 
of sense proceed1  tho perhaps not      
,alike4 ,and because that some of these 
perceptions  are ,pleasant1 others      
,unpleasant1 'tis evidently certain1    
that my  ,body1 or rather my ,whole self
 7as ,i am compounded of a ,mind and    
,body7 am liable to be ,affected by     
these ,bodies which encompass me  about4
    ,there are many ,other ,things ,also
 which ,nature seems to teach ,me1 but  
,really ,i am not taught by ,it1 but    
have gotten them by an ill use of       
,passing my ,judgement ,inconsiderately1
 and from hence it is that these  things

 happen often to be false2 as that all  
space is ,empty1 in  which ,i find      
nothing that works upon my ,senses2     
,that in a hot  ,body there is something
 like the ,idea of ,heat which is in me2
 ,that  in a ,white or ,green ,body     
there is the same ,whiteness or         
,greenness  which ,i perceive2 ,and the 
same ,taste in a bitter or sweet ,thing1
  c4 ,that ,stars1 ,castles1 and ,other 
,remote ,bodies are of the same         
,bigness and ,shape1 as they are        
,represented to my senses3 and  such    
like4 ,but that ,i may not admit of any 
,thing in this very matter1  which ,i   
cannot ,distinctly perceive1 it behoves 
me here to determine  more ,accurately  
,what ,i mean when ,i say1 ,that ,i am  
taught a ,thing by  ,nature4    ,here ,i
 take ,nature more strictly1 then for   
the ,complication of all  those ,things 
which are ,given me by ,god2 ,for in    
this ,complication  there are many      
things contain'd which relate to the    
,mind alone1 as1  ,that ,i perceive     

,what is done cannot be not ,done1 and  
all ,other things  which are known by   
the ,light of ,nature1 but of these ,i  
speak not at  present4 ,there are also  
many ,other ,things which belong only to
 the  ,body1 as1 ,that it tends         
,downwards and such like1 of these also 
,i  treat not at ,present4 ,but ,i speak
 of those ,things only which ,god hath  
bestowed upon me as ,i am ,compounded of
 a ,mind and ,body together1  and not   
differently ,consider'd4 ',tis ,nature  
therefore thus taken that  teaches me to
 avoid troublesome ,objects1 and seek   
after pleasing  ,ones2 but it appears   
not that this ,nature teaches us to     
conclude any  thing of these            
,perceptions of our senses1 before that 
we make by our  ,understanding a        
diligent examination of outward         
,objects2 for to  ,enquire into the     
,truth of ,things belongs not to the    
,whole ,compositum  of a ,man as he     
,consists of ,mind and ,body1 but to the
 ,mind alone4    ,so that tho a star    

affect my eye no more then a small spark
 of  ,fire1 yet there is in my ,eye no  
,real or ,positive ,inclination to      
believe ,one no bigger then the ,other1 
but thus ,i have been used to  ,judge   
from my ,childhood without any ,reason3 
and tho coming nigh the ,fire  ,i feel  
,heat1 and ,coming too nigh ,i feel     
,pain1 yet there is no ,reason to       
perswade me1 ,that in the ,fire there is
 any thing like either that ,heat  or   
that ,pain1 but only that there is      
something therein1 ,whatever it be1     
that excites in us those sensations of  
,heat or ,pain3 and so tho in some      
space there may be nothing that ,works  
on my senses1 it does not from  thence  
follow1 that there is no ,body there2   
for ,i see that in these  and many other
 things ,i am used to overturn the      
,order of ,nature1 because  ,i use these
 perceptions of sense 7which properly   
are given me by  ,nature to make known  
to the mind what is advantagious or     
hurtful to  the ,compositum1 whereof the

 mind is part1 and so far only they are 
,clear and ,distinct enough7 as certain 
,rules immediately to discover  the     
,essence of ,external ,bodies1 of ,which
 they make known nothing but  very      
,obscurely and ,confusedly4             
,sidenote3 ,medit4 #d4    ,i have 99    
formerly shewn how my ,judgement happens
 to be false  notwithstanding ,gods     
,goodness4 ,but now there arises a new  
,difficulty  concerning those very      
things which ,nature tells me ,i am to  
prosecute  or avoid1 concerning my      
,internal senses1 ,wherein ,i find many 
,errors1 as when a ,man being deceived  
by the ,pleasant ,taste of some sort  of
 ,meat1 devours therein some hidden     
,poyson4 ,but in this very ,instance  it
 cannot be said1 that the ,man is       
impelled by ,nature to desire the       
,poyson1 for of that he is wholly       
,ignorant2 but he is said to ,desire    
the ,meat only as being of a grateful   
,taste2 and from hence nothing can  be  
concluded but1 ,that ,mans-,nature is   

not ,all-knowing2 which is no  ,wonder  
seeing ,man is a ,finite ,being1 and    
therefore nothing but ,finite           
,perfections belong to him4    ,but ,we 
often err even in those things to ,which
 we are ,impelled by  ,nature1 as when  
sick men desire that ,meat or ,drink1   
which will  certainly prove ,hurtful to 
them4 ,to this it may perhaps be        
reply'd1 ,that  they ,err in this       
because their ,nature is ,corrupt4 ,but 
this ,answers  not the ,difficulty1 ,for
 a sick man is no less ,gods ,creature  
then a ,man  in ,health1 and therefore  
'tis as ,absurd to ,imagine a ,deceitful
 ,nature  imposed by ,god on the ,one as
 on the ,other2 ,and as a ,clock that is
 made  up of ,wheels and ,weights does  
no less strictly observe the ,laws of   
its  ,nature1 when it is ill contrived1 
and tells the hours falsly1 as  when it 
answers the ,desire of the ,artificer in
 all performances2 so if  ,i consider   
the body of a ,man as a meer ,machine or
 ,movement1 made up  and compounded of  

,bones1 ,nerves1 ,muscles1 ,veins1      
,blood1 and  ,skin2 so that1 tho there  
were no mind in ,it1 yet ,it would      
perform all  those ,motions which now   
are in it 7those only excepted which    
,proceed from  the ,will1 and           
consequently from the ,mind7 ,i do      
easily acknowledge1  that it would be as
 natural for him 7if for example sake he
 were sick  of a ,dropsie7 to suffer    
that ,driness of his ,throat which uses 
to  bring into his mind the sense of    
,thirst1  that thereby his ,nerves  and 
other ,parts would be so disposed as to 
take ,drink1 by ,which his  disease     
would be encreased2 ,as 7supposing him  
to be troubled with no  such ,distemper7
 by the like ,driness of ,throat he     
would be disposed to  ,drink1 when 'tis 
,requisite4 ,and tho1 if ,i respect the 
,intended use of a  ,clock ,i may say   
that it ,errs from its ,nature1 when it 
tells the ,hours  wrong1 and so         
considering the ,movement of a ,mans    
,body as contrived  for such ,motions as

 are used to be performed thereby1 ,i   
may think ,that  also to ,err from its  
,nature1 if its ,throat is ,dry1 when it
 has  no want of ,drink for its         
,preservation4 ,yet ,i ,plainly         
discover1 that  this last ,acceptation  
of ,nature differs much from that       
whereof we  have been speaking all this 
,while1 for this is only a ,denomination
  extrinsick to the ,things whereof 'tis
 spoken1 and depending on my  ,thought1 
while it ,compares a sick man1 and a    
disorderly ,clock  with the ,idea of an 
healthy man and a ,rectified ,clock4    
,but by  ,nature in its former          
,acceptation ,i ,understand something   
that is  ,really in the ,things         
themselves1 which therefore has         
something of  ,truth in it4    ,but tho 
,respecting only a ,body sick of a      
,dropsie it be an ,extrinsick           
,denomination to say1 that its ,nature  
is ,corrupt1 because it has  a ,dry     
,throat1 and stands in no need of       
,drink2 yet respecting the  ,whole      

,compound or ,mind joyn'd to such a     
,body1 'tis not a meer  ,denomination1  
but a real ,error of ,nature for it to  
thirst when  drink is hurtful to it4 ,it
 remains therefore here to be inquired1 
how  the ,goodness of ,god suffers      
,nature so taken to be deceivable4      
,first therefore ,i understand that a   
chief difference between my ,mind  and  
,body consists in this1 ,that my ,body  
is of its ,nature divisible1  but my    
,mind indivisible2 for while ,i consider
 my ,mind or my self1  as ,i am only a  
thinking ,thing1 ,i can distinguish no  
parts in ,me1  but ,i perceive my self  
to be but one entire ,thing2 and tho the
 whole  ,mind seems to be united to the 
whole ,body1 yet a ,foot1 an ,arm1 or   
any other part of the ,body being cut   
off1 ,i do not therefore conceive  any  
part of my ,mind taken away2 ,neither   
can its ,faculties of  desiring1        
perceiving1 understanding1 c4 be called 
its ,parts1 for  'tis one and the same1 
mind1 that desires1 that perceives1 that

  understands2 ,contrarily1 ,i cannot   
think of any ,corporeal or extended     
,being1 which ,i cannot easily divide   
into ,parts by my thought1 and by  this 
,i understand it to be divisible4 ,and  
this alone 7if ,i had known it  from no 
other ,argument7 is sufficient to inform
 me1 that my mind is  really distinct   
from my ,body4    ,nextly ,i find1 that 
my mind is not immediately affected by  
all parts  of my body1 but only by the  
,brain1 and perhaps only by one small   
part  of it1 ,that1 to wit1 wherein the 
common sense is said to reside2 ,which  
part1 as often as it is disposed in the 
same manner1 will represent to  the mind
 the same thing1 tho at the same time   
the other parts of the  body may be     
differently order'd4 ,and this is proved
 by numberless  ,experiments1 which need
 not here be related4    ,moreover ,i   
discover that the nature of my body is  
such1 that no part  of it can be moved  
by an other remote part thereof1 but it 
may also  be moved in the same manner by

 some of the interjacent parts1 tho  the
 more remote part lay still and acted   
not2 ,as for example in the  ,rope1     
,a,b,c,d    if its end ,d4 were drawn1  
the end ,a4 would be moved no otherwise1
 than  if one of the intermediate parts 
,b4 or ,c4 were drawn1 and the end ,d4  
rest quiet4 ,so when ,i feel pain in my 
,foot1 the consideration of  ,physicks  
instructs me1 that this is performed by 
the help of ,nerves  dispersed through  
the ,foot1 which from thence being      
continued like  ,ropes to the very      
,brain1 whilst they are drawn in the    
,foot1 they also  draw the inward parts 
of the ,brain to which they reach1 and  
therein  excite a certain motion1 which 
is ordain'd by ,nature to affect the    
mind with a sense of ,pain1 as being in 
the ,foot4 ,but because  these ,nerves  
must pass through the ,shin1 the        
,thighs1 the ,loins1 the  ,back1 the    
,neck1 before they can reach the ,brain 
from the ,foot1 it  may so happen1 that 
tho that part of them1 which is in the  

,foot were  not touch'd1 but only some  
of their intermediate parts1 yet the    
same  motion1 would be caused in the    
,brain1 as when the ,foot it self is    
ill affected1 from whence 'twill        
necessarily follow1 that the mind       
should perceive the same ,pain4 ,and    
thus may we think of any other  ,sense4 
,i understand lastly1 that seeing each  
single motion perform'd in that  part of
 the ,brain1 which immediately affects  
the mind1 excites  therein only one sort
 of sense1 nothing could be contrived   
more  conveniently in this case1 than   
that1 of all those ,senses which it  can
 cause1 it should cause that which      
cheifly1 and most frequently  conduces  
to the conservation of an healthful     
,man2 ,and experience  witnesses1 that  
to this very end all our senses are     
given us by  ,nature2 and therefore     
nothing can be found therein1 which does
 not  abundantly testifie the ,power and
 ,goodness of ,god4 ,thus for  ,example1
 when the ,nerves of the ,feet are      

violently and more than  ordinarily     
moved1 that motion of them being        
propagated through the  ,medulla        
,spinalis of the ,back to the inward    
parts of the ,brain1 there it  signifies
 to the mind1 that something or other is
 to be felt1 and what is  this but      
,pain1 as if it were in the ,foot1 by   
which the ,mind is excited  to use its  
indeavours for removing the ,cause1 as  
being hurtful to the  ,foot4 ,but the   
,nature of ,man might have been so      
order'd by ,god1  that ,that same motion
 in the ,brain should represent to the  
mind any other  thing1 viz4 either it   
self as 'tis in the ,brain1 or it self  
as it is  in the ,foot1 or in any of the
 other forementioned intermediate parts1
 or  lastly any other thing whatsoever2 
but none of these would have so much    
conduced to the ,conservation of the    
,body4 ,in the like manner when we  want
 drink1 from thence arises a certain    
dryness in the ,throat1 which  moves the
 ,nerves thereof1 and by their means the

 inward parts of the  ,brain1 and this  
motion affects the mind with the sense  
of thirst2  because that in this case   
nothing is more requisite for us to     
know1 then  that we want drink for the  
,preservation of our ,health4 ,so of the
  ,rest4    ,from all which 'tis        
manifest1 that 7notwithstanding the     
infinite  ,goodness of ,god7 'tis       
impossible but the ,nature of ,man as he
  consists of a mind and body should be 
deceivable4 ,for if any cause  should   
excite 7not in the ,foot but7 in the    
,brain it self1 or in any  other part   
through which the ,nerves are continued 
from the ,foot to the  ,brain1 that self
 same motion1 which uses to arise from  
the ,foot being  troubled1 the ,pain    
would be felt as in the ,foot1 and the  
sense  would be naturally deceived2 for 
'tis consonant to ,reason 7seeing that  
,that same motion of the ,brain alwayes 
represents to the mind that same  sense1
 and it oftner proceeds from a cause    
hurtful to the ,foot1 than  from any    

other7 ,i say 'tis reasonable1 that it  
should make known to the  mind the ,pain
 of the ,foot1 rather than of any other 
part4 ,and so  if a dryness of ,throat  
arises 7not as 'tis used from the       
necessity  of drink for the conservation
 of the ,body1 but7 from an unusual     
,cause1 as it happens in a ,dropsie1    
'tis far better that it should  then    
deceive us2 then that it should alwayes 
deceive us when the  ,body is in        
,health1 and so of the ,rest4    ,and   
this consideration helps me very much1  
not only to understand the  ,errors to  
which my ,nature is subject1 but also to
 correct and  avoid them4 ,for seeing ,i
 know that all my ,senses do oftener    
inform  me falsly than truely in those  
things which conduce to the ,bodies     
advantage2 and seeing ,i can use 7almost
 alwayes7 more of them than one  to     
,examine the same thing1 as also ,i can 
use memory1 which joyns  present and    
past things together1 and my            
understanding also1 which  hath already 

discovered to me all the causes of my   
,errors1 ,i ought  no longer to fear1   
that what my ,senses daily represent to 
me should be  false4 ,but especially    
those extravagant ,doubts of my ,first  
,meditation  are to be turn'd off as    
ridiculous2 and perticularly the chief  
of  them1 viz4 ,that 99 of not          
distinguishing ,sleep from ,waking1 for 
now  ,i plainly discover a great        
difference1 between them1 for my ,dreams
  are never conjoyned by my memory with 
the other actions of my  life1 as       
whatever happens to me awake is2 and    
certainly if 7while  ,i were awake7 any 
person should suddenly appear to me1 and
 presently  disappear 7as in ,dreams7 so
 that ,i could not tell from whence he  
came or where he went1 ,i should rather 
esteem it a ,spectre or  ,apparition    
feign'd in my ,brain1 then a true ,man2 
but when such  things occur1 as ,i      
distinctly know from whence1 where1 and 
when  they come1 and ,i conjoyn the     
perception of them by my memory with    

the other ,accidents of my life1 ,i am  
certain they are represented  to me     
waking and not asleep1 neither ought ,i 
in the least to doubt  of their ,truth1 
if after ,i have called up all my       
senses1 memory1  and understanding to   
their ,examination ,i find nothing in   
any of  them1 that clashes with other   
truths2 ,for ,god not being a ,deceiver1
  it follows1 that ,in such things ,i am
 not deceived4 ,but because the  urgency
 of ,action in the common occurrences of
 ,affairs will not  alwayes allow time  
for such an accurate examination1 ,i    
must confess  that ,mans life is subject
 to many ,errors about perticulars1 so  
that the infirmity of our ,nature must  
be acknowledged by ,us4      ,,finis4   
,,advertisement ,,concerning ,,the      
,,objections4      ,among seven ,parcels
 of ,objections made by ,divers ,learned
 ,persons against  these ,meditations1  
,i have made choise of the ,third in the
 ,latine ,copy1  as being ,penn'd by    
,thomas ,hobbs of ,malmesbury1 a ,man   

famously known  to the ,world abroad1   
but especially to his own the ,english  
,nation2 and  therefore 'tis likely that
 what comes from ,him may be more       
acceptable to  his ,countrymen1 then    
what proceeds from a ,stranger2 and as  
the strength  of a ,fortification is    
never better known then by a ,forcible  
,resistance1  so fares it with these    
,meditations which stand unshaken by the
  ,violent ,opposition of so ,potent an 
,enemy4 ,and yet it must be ,confess'd  
that the ,force of these ,objections and
 ,cogency of the ,arguments cannot  be  
well apprehended by those who are not   
versed in other ,pieces of ,mr4         
,hobbs's ,philosophy1 especially ,his   
,book ,de ,corpore and ,de ,homine1     
,the former whereof ,i am sure is       
,translated into ,english1 and therefore
  not ,impertinently refer'd to ,here in
 a ,discourse to ,english ,readers4 ,and
  this is the ,reason that makes the    
,great ,des-,cartes pass over many of   
these ,objections so slightly1 ,who     

certainly would have ,undermined the    
whole ,fabrick of the ,hobbian          
,philosophy had he but known upon ,what 
,foundations it was ,built4             
,,objections    ,made against the       
,foregoing    ,,meditations1    ,,by    
,,the ,,famous    ,,thomas ,,hobbs      
,of ,,malmesbury1    ,,with             
,,des-,,cartes',s    ,,answers4         
,,object4 ,i4    ,against the ,first    
,meditation3 ,of things ,doubtful4      
',tis evident enough from ,what has been
 said in this ,meditation1 that  there  
is no sign by ,which we may ,distinguish
 our ,dreams from ,true  ,sense and     
,waking1 and therefore that those       
,phantasmes which we  have waking and   
from our ,senses are not accidents      
inhering in ,outward  ,objects1 neither 
do they ,prove that such outward        
,objects do ,exist2 and  therefore if we
 trust our ,senses without any other    
,ground1 we may well  doubt whether any 
,thing ,be or ,not4 ,we therefore       
acknowledge the ,truth  of this         

,meditation4 ,but ,because ,plato and   
other ,antient ,philosophers  argued for
 the same incertainty in sensible       
,things1 and because 'tis  commonly     
,observed by the ,vulgar that 'tis hard 
to ,distinguish ,sleep from  ,waking1 ,i
 would not have the most excellent      
,author of such new ,thoughts  put forth
 so antique ,notions4      ,,answer4    
,those ,reasons of ,doubt which by this 
,philosopher are admitted as true1  were
 proposed by ,me only as ,probable1 and 
,i made use of them not that  ,i may    
vend them as new1 but partly that ,i may
 prepare the ,minds of my  ,readers for 
the ,consideration of ,intellectual     
,things1 wherein they seem'd  to me very
 necessary2 ,and partly that thereby ,i 
may shew how firm those  ,truths are1   
which hereafter ,i lay down1 seeing they
 cannot be ,weaken'd by  these          
,metaphysical ,doubts3 ,so1 that ,i     
never designed to gain any ,honor by    
repeating them1 but ,i think ,i could no
 more omit them1 then a ,writer in      

,physick can pass over the ,description 
of a ,disease1 ,whose ,cure he intends  
to ,teach4          ,,object4 ,,ii4     
,against the ,second ,meditation3 ,of   
the ,nature of ,mans ,mind4      ,i am a
 ,thinking ,thing4 ',tis ,true2 for     
because ,i think or have a  ,phantasme  
7whether ,i am awake or asleep7 it      
follows that ,i am  ,thinking1 for ,i   
,think and ,i am ,thinking signifie the 
same ,thing4  ,because ,i ,think1 it    
follows ,that ,i am1 for whatever       
,thinks cannot  be ,nothing4 ,but when  
he ,adds1 ,that is1 a ,mind1 a ,soul1 an
  ,understanding1 ,reason1 ,i question  
his ,argumentation2 for it does not     
seem a ,right ,consequence to say1 ,i am
 a ,thinking ,thing1 therefore ,i am  a 
,thought1 neither1 ,i am an             
,understanding ,thing1 therefore ,i am  
the  ,understanding4 ,for in the same   
manner ,i may ,conclude1 ,i am a        
,walking  ,thing1 therefore ,i am the   
,walking it self4    ,wherefore         
,d4,cartes ,concludes that an           

,understanding ,thing and  ,intellection
 7which is the ,act of an ,understanding
 ,thing7 are the  same2 or at least that
 an ,understanding ,thing and the       
,intellect  7which is the ,power of an  
,understanding ,thing7 are the same2    
,and yet  all ,philosophers distinguish 
the subject from its ,faculties and     
,acts1 that is1 from its ,properties and
 ,essence1 for the ,thing it  self is   
one thing1 and its ,essence is an other4
 ,it may be therefore  that a ,thinking 
,thing is the ,subject of a ,mind1      
,reason1 or  ,understanding1 and        
therefor it may be a ,corporeal ,thing1 
the ,contrary  ,whereof is here ,assumed
 and not ,proved2 and yet this          
,inference is  the ,foundation of that  
,conclusion which ,d4,cartes would      
,establish4    ,sidenote3 99 ,places    
noted with this ,asterick are the       
,passages of the  foregoing ,meditations
 here ,objected against4    ,in the same
 ,meditation1 on1 99 ,i know that ,i am1
 ,i ask1 ,what ,i am ,whom ,i  ,thus    

,know1 ,certainly the ,knowledge of ,me 
precisely so taken depends not  on those
 ,things of whose ,existence ,i am yet  
,ignorant4    ',tis ,certain the        
,knowledge of this ,proposition ,i am1  
depends on this1  ,i think as he hath   
rightly inform'd us2 but from whence    
have we the  knowledge of this          
,proposition1 ,i think8 certainly from  
hence only1  that we cannot conceive any
 ,act without its subject1 as dancing   
without a ,dancer1 knowledge1 without a 
,knower1 thought without a  thinker4    
,and from hence it seems to follow1 that
 a thinking ,thing is a  ,corporeal     
,thing2 for the ,subjects of all ,acts  
are understood only  in a ,corporeal    
way1 or after the manner of matter1 as  
he himself  shews hereafter by the      
example of a piece of ,wax1 which       
changing its  colour1 consistence1      
shape1 and other ,acts is yet known to  
continue the same thing1 that is1 the   
same matter subject to so many  changes4
 ,but ,i cannot conclude from another   

thought that ,i now  think2 for tho a   
,man may think that he hath thought     
7which consists  only in memory7 yet    
'tis altogether impossible for him to   
think that  he now thinks1 or to know1  
that he knows1 for the question may be  
put infinitely1 how do you know that you
 know1 that you know1  that you know8 c4
    ,wherefore seeing the ,knowledge of 
this ,proposition ,i am1 depends on  the
 knowledge of this ,i think1 and the    
knowledge of this is from hence  only1  
that we cannot separate thought from    
thinking matter1 it seems  rather to    
follow1 that a thinking thing is        
material1 than that 'tis  immaterial4   
,,answer4    ,when ,i said1 ,that is a  
,mind1 a ,soul1 an ,understanding1      
,reason1  c4 ,i did not mean by these   
names the ,faculties only1 but the      
things indow'd with those ,faculties2   
and so 'tis alwayes understood  by the  
two first names 7mind and soul7 and very
 often so understood  by the two last   
,names 7understanding and ,reason7 and  

this ,i have  explain'd so often1 and in
 so many places of these ,meditations1  
that  there is not the least occasion of
 questioning my meaning4    ,neither is 
there any parity between ,walking and   
,thought1 for  walking is used only for 
the ,act it self1 but thought is        
sometimes  used for the ,act1 sometimes 
for the ,faculty1 and sometimes for the 
thing it self1 wherein the ,faculty     
resides4    ,neither do ,i say1 that the
 understanding thing and intellection   
are  the same1 or that the understanding
 thing and the intellect are the  same1 
if the intellect be taken for the       
,faculty1 but only when 'tis  taken for 
the thing it self that understands4 ,yet
 ,i willingly confess1  that ,i have 7as
 much as in me lay7 made use of         
abstracted words to  signifie that thing
 or substance1 which ,i would have      
devested of all  those things that      
belong not to it4 ,whereas contrarily   
this ,philosopher  uses the most        
concrete ,words to signifie this        

thinking thing1 such  as subject1       
matter1 ,body1 c4 that he may not suffer
 it to be  separated from ,body4        
,neither am ,i concern'd that ,his      
manner of joyning many things together  
may seem to some fitter for the         
discovery of ,truth1 than mine1 wherein 
,i  separate as much as possibly each   
particular4 ,but let us omit words and  
speak of things4    ,it may be 7sayes   
he7 that a ,thinking thing is a         
corporeal thing1  the contrary whereof  
is here assumed and not proved4 ,but    
herein he is  mistaken1 for ,i never    
assumed the contrary1 neither have ,i   
used it as  a ,foundation1 for the rest 
of my ,superstructure1 but left it      
wholly  undetermin'd till the sixth     
,meditation1 and in that 'tis proved4   
,then he tells us rightly1 that we      
cannot conceive any ,act without its    
subject1 as thought without a thinking  
thing1 for what thinks  cannot be       
nothing2 but then he subjoyns without   
any ,reason1 and against  the usual     

manner of speaking1 and contrary to all 
,logick1 that hence it  seem to follow1 
that a thinking thing is a corporeal    
,being4 ,truly the  subjects of all     
,acts are understood under the notion of
 substance1  or if you please under the 
notion of matter 7that is to say of     
metaphysical matter7 but not therefore  
under the notion of ,bodies4    ,but    
,logicians and ,commonly all ,men are   
used to say1 that there are some        
,spiritual1 some ,corporeal substances4 
,and by the ,instance of ,wax ,i  only  
proved that ,colour1 ,consistence1      
,shape1 c4 appertain not to  the ,ratio 
,formalis of the ,wax2 ,for in that     
,place ,i treated neither of  the ,ratio
 ,formalis of the ,mind1 neither of     
,body4    ,neither is it pertinent to   
the business1 that the ,philosopher     
asserts1  ,that one ,thought cannot be  
the subject of an other thought1 for    
,who  besides ,himself ever ,imagin'd   
,this8 ,but that ,i may explain the     
matter in  a few words1 ',tis certain   

that ,thought cannot be without a       
,thinking  ,thing1 neither any ,act or  
any ,accident without a substance       
wherein  it resides4 ,but seeing that we
 know not a substance immediately by it 
self1 but by this alone1 that 'tis the  
subject of several ,acts1 it  is very   
consonant to the commands of ,reason and
 ,custome1 that we should  call by      
different names those substances1 which 
we perceive are the  subjects of very   
different ,acts or ,accidents1 and that 
afterwards  we should examine1 whether  
those different names signifie different
  or one and the same thing4 ,now there 
are some ,acts which we call  corporeal1
 as magnitude1 figure1 motion1 and what 
ever else  cannot be thought on without 
local extension1 and the substance      
wherein these reside we call ,body2     
neither can it be imagin'd that  'tis   
one substance which is the subject of   
,figure1 and another  substance which is
 the subject of local motion1 c4        
,because all  these ,acts agree under   

one common notion of ,extension4        
,besides  there are other ,acts1 which  
we call cogitative or thinking1 as      
understanding1 will1 imagination1 sense1
 c4 ,all which agree  under the common  
notion of thought1 perception1 or       
,conscience2  ,and the substance wherein
 they are1 we say1 is a thinking thing1 
or mind1 or call it by whatever other   
name we please1 so we do not  confound  
it with corporeal substance1 because    
cogitative ,acts have  no affinity with 
corporeal ,acts1 and thought1 which is  
the common  ,ratio of those is wholly   
different from ,extension1 which is the 
common ,ratio of ,these4 ,but after we  
have formed two distinct  conceptions of
 these two substances1 from what is said
 in the sixth  ,meditation1 'tis easie  
to know1 whether they be one and the    
same or  different4          ,,object4  
,,iii4      99 ,which of them is it1    
that is distinct from my thought8 which 
of them  is it that can be separated    
from me8    ,some perhaps will answer   

this ,question thus1 ,i my self1 who    
think am  distinct from my thought1 and 
my thought is different from me  7tho'  
not seperated7 as dancing is            
distinguished from the ,dancer  7as     
before is noted47 ,but if ,des-,cartes  
will prove1 that he who  understands is 
the same with his understanding1 we     
shall fall into  the ,scholastick       
expressions1 the understanding          
understands1 the sight  sees1 the ,will 
wills1 and then by an exact analogy1 the
 ,walking 7or  at least the ,faculty of 
walking7 shall walk4 ,all which are     
obscure1  improper1 and unworthy that   
perspicuity which is usual with the     
noble  ,des-,cartes4      ,,answer4     
,i do not deny1 that ,i who think am    
distinct from my thought1  as a thing is
 distinguish'd from its modus or manner2
 ,but when  ,i ask1 which of them is it 
that is distinct from my thought8 this  
,i  understand of those various modes of
 thought there mention'd1 and  not of   
substance2 and when ,i subjoyn1 which of

 them is it that can be  separated from 
me8 ,i only signifie that all those     
modes or manners  of thinking reside in 
me1 neither do ,i herein perceive what  
occasion of  doubt or obscurity can be  
imagined4          ,,object4 ,,iv4      
99 ,it remains therefore for me to      
,confess that ,i cannot ,imagine what   
this  ,wax is1 but that ,i conceive in  
my mind ,what it is4    ,there is a     
great ,difference between ,imagination  
7that is7 having  an ,idea of a ,thing1 
and the ,conception of the ,mind 7that  
is7 a  ,concluding from ,reasoning that 
a thing ,is or ,exists4 ,but            
,des-,cartes has not ,declared to us in 
what they ,differ4 ,besides1  the       
,ancient ,aristotelians have clearly    
deliver'd as a ,doctrine1 that          
substance is not perceived by sense but 
is ,collected by  ,ratiocination4       
,but what shall we now say1 if perhaps  
,ratiocination be nothing ,else but  a  
,copulation or ,concatenation of ,names 
or ,appellations by this  ,word ,is8    

,from whence 'twill follow that we      
,collect by ,reasoning  nothing of or   
concerning the ,nature of ,things1 but  
of the names  of ,things1 that is to    
say1 we only discover whether or no we  
joyn the  ,names of ,things according to
 the ,agreements which at ,pleasure we  
have made concerning their              
significations2 if it be so 7as so it   
may  be7 ,ratiocination will depend on  
,words1 ,words on ,imagination1  and    
perhaps ,imagination as also ,sense on  
the ,motion of ,corporeal  ,parts2 and  
so the ,mind shall be nothing but       
,motions in some ,parts of  an          
,organical ,body4      ,,answer4    ,i  
have here ,explain'd the ,difference    
between ,imagination1 and the ,meer     
,conception of the ,mind1 by reckoning  
up in my ,example of the ,wax1  what it 
is therein which we ,imagine1 and what  
it is that we conceive  in our ,mind    
only3 but besides this1 ,i have         
explained in an other ,place  ,how we   
understand one way1 and ,imagine an     

other way ,one and the same  ,thing1    
suppose a ,pentagone or ,five sided     
,figure4    ,there is in ,ratiocination 
a ,conjunction not of ,words1 but of    
,things signified by ,words2 ,and ,i    
much admire that the ,contrary  could   
,possibly enter any ,mans ,thoughts2    
,for ,who ever doubted but that  a      
,frenchman and a ,german may argue about
 the same ,things1 tho  they use very   
,differing ,words8 and does not the     
,philosopher ,disprove  himself when he 
speaks of the ,agreements which at      
pleasure we have made  about the        
significations of ,words8 for if he     
grants that something is  ,signified by 
,words1 ,why will he not admit that our 
,ratiocinations are  rather about this  
something1 then about ,words only8 and  
by the same  ,right that he concludes   
the ,mind to be a ,motion1 he may       
,conclude ,also  that the ,earth is     
,heaven1 or ,what else he ,pleases4     
,,object4 ,v4    ,against the ,third    
,meditation of ,god4      99 ,some of   

,these 7viz4 ,humane ,thoughts7 are as  
it were the ,images of  ,things1 and to 
these alone belongs properly the ,name  
of an ,idea1 as when  ,i ,think on a    
,man1 a ,chimera1 ,heaven1 an ,angel1 or
 ,god4    ,when ,i ,think on a ,man ,i  
perceive an ,idea made up of ,figure and
  ,colour1 whereof ,i may doubt whether 
it be the ,likeness of a ,man  or not2  
and so when ,i think on ,heaven4 ,but   
when ,i think on a ,chimera1 ,i         
perceive an ,image or ,idea1 of which ,i
 may doubt whether it be the  ,likeness 
of any ,animal not only at present      
,existing1 but possible to  ,exist1 or  
that ever will ,exist hereafter or not4 
,but thinking on an ,angel1 there is    
offer'd to my ,mind sometimes the       
,image of a ,flame1 sometimes the ,image
 of a ,pretty ,little ,boy  with ,wings1
 which ,i am certain has no ,likeness to
 an ,angel1 and  therefore that it is   
not the ,idea of an ,angel2 ,but        
beleiving that  there are some          
,creatures1 ,who do 7as it were7 wait   

upon ,god1 and are  ,invisible1 and     
,immaterial1 upon the ,thing ,believed  
or supposed we  ,impose the ,name of    
,angel2 ,whereas the ,idea1 under which 
,i ,imagine  an ,angel1 is compounded of
 the ,ideas of sensible ,things4    ,in 
the like manner at the ,venerable ,name 
of ,god1 we have no ,image or  ,idea of 
,god1 and therefore we are forbidden to 
,worship ,god under any  ,image1 least  
we should seem to ,conceive ,him that is
 inconceivable4    ,whereby it appears  
that we have no ,idea of ,god2 but like 
one born  blind1 who being brought to   
the ,fire1 and perceiving himself to be 
,warmed1 knows there is something by    
which he is warmed and ,hearing  it     
called ,fire1 he ,concludes that ,fire  
,exists1 but yet knows not of  what     
shape or ,colour the ,fire is1 neither  
has he any ,image or  ,idea thereof in  
his ,mind4    ,so ,man knowing that     
there must be some ,cause of his        
,imaginations  or ,ideas1 as also an    
other cause before ,that1 and so        

onwards1 he  is brought at last to an   
,end1 or to a supposal of some ,eternal 
,cause1 ,which because it never began to
 ,be cannot have any other  ,cause      
before it1 and thence he ,concludes that
 'tis necessary that  some ,eternal     
,thing ,exist3 and yet he has no ,idea  
which ,he can call  the ,idea of this   
,eternal ,thing1 but he names this      
,thing1 which he  believes and          
acknowledges by the ,name ,god4    ,but 
now ,des-,cartes proceeds from this     
,position1 ,that we have an ,idea  of   
,god in our ,mind1 to prove this        
,theoreme1 ,that ,god 7that if an       
,almighty1 ,wise1 ,creatour of the      
,world7 ,exists1 whereas he ought to    
have  explain'd this ,idea of ,god      
better1 and he should have thence       
deduced  not only his ,existence1 but   
also the ,creation of the ,world4       
,,answer4    ,here the ,philosopher will
 have the ,word ,idea be only           
,understood  for the ,images of         
,material ,things represented in a      

,corporeal  ,phantasie1 by which        
,position he may ,easily ,prove1 that   
there can be no  ,proper ,idea of an    
,angel or ,god4 ,whereas as ,i declare  
every ,where1  but especially in this   
,place1 that ,i take the ,name ,idea for
 whatever is  immediately perceived by  
the ,mind1 so that when ,i ,will1 or    
,fear1  because at the same time ,i     
perceive that ,i ,will or ,fear1 this   
very ,will or ,fear are reckon'd by me  
among the number of ,ideas2  ,and ,i    
have purposely made use of that ,word1  
because ,it was usual with  the ,antient
 ,philosophers to signifie the ,manner  
of ,perceptions in the  ,divine ,mind1  
altho neither we nor they acknowledge a 
,phantasie in  ,god3 and besides ,i had 
no fitter ,word to express it by4       
,and ,i think ,i have sufficiently      
explain'd the ,idea of ,god for those   
that will attend my meaning1 but ,i can 
never do it fully enough for those  that
 will ,understand my ,words otherwise   
then ,i intend them4    ,lastly1 what is

 here added concerning the ,creation of 
the ,world is  wholly beside the        
,question in hand4          ,,object4   
,,vi4      99 ,but there are ,other     
7,thoughts7 ,that have ,superadded      
,forms to them1  as when ,i ,will1 when 
,i ,fear1 when ,i ,affirm1 when ,i      
,deny2 ,i know ,i have  alwayes         
7whenever ,i think7 some certain thing  
as the ,subject or ,object  of my       
,thought1 but in this last sort of      
,thoughts there is something  ,more     
which ,i think upon then ,barely the    
,likeness of the ,thing2 and of  these  
,thoughts some are called ,wills and    
,affections1 and others of them         
,judgements4    ,when any one ,fears or 
,wills1 he has certainly the ,image of  
the  ,thing ,fear'd1 or ,action ,will'd1
 but what more a ,willing or  ,fearing  
,man has in his ,thoughts is not        
explain'd2 and tho ,fear be a  ,thought1
 yet ,i see not how it can be any other 
then the ,thought of  the ,thing        
,fear'd2 ,for what is the ,fear of a    

,lion rushing on me1 but  the ,idea of a
 ,lion ,rushing on me1 and the ,effect  
7which that ,idea  produces in the      
,heart7 whereby the ,man ,fearing is    
excited to that  ,animal ,motion which  
is called ,flight8 but now this ,motion 
of ,flying  is not ,thought1 it remains 
therefore that in ,fear there is no     
other  ,thought1 but that which consists
 in the likeness of the thing4 ,and  the
 same may be said of ,will4    ,moreover
 ,affirmation and ,negation are not     
without a voice and  words1 and hence   
'tis that ,brutes can neither affirme or
 deny not  so much as in their ,thought1
 and consequently neither can they      
judge4  ,but yet the same thought may be
 in a beast as in a ,man2 for when we   
affirme that a ,man runs1 we have not a 
thought different from what  a ,dog has 
when he sees his ,master running2       
,affirmation therefore or  ,negation    
superadds nothing to meer thoughts1     
unless perhaps it adds  this thought1   
that the names of which an ,affirmation 

consists are 7to  the ,person affirming7
 the ,names of the same thing2 and this 
is not  to comprehend in the thought    
more then the likeness of the thing1    
but it is only comprehending the same   
likeness twice4      ,,answer4    ',tis 
self evident1 ,that 'tis one thing to   
see a ,lion and at the same  time to    
fear him1 and an other thing only to see
 him4 ,so 'tis one  thing to see a ,man 
,running1 and an other thing to ,affirme
 within my  self 7which may be done     
without a voice7 ,that ,i see him4      
,but in all this objection ,i find      
nothing that requires an ,answer4       
,,object4 ,,vii4      99 ,now it remains
 for me to examine1 how ,i have received
 this ,idea of  ,god1 for ,i have       
neither received it by means of my      
senses1 neither comes  it to me without 
my forethought1 as the ,ideas of        
sensible things use to  do1 when those  
things work on the ,organs of my sense1 
or at least seem so  to work2 ,neither  
is this ,idea framed by my self1 for ,i 

can neither add  to1 nor detract from   
it4 ,wherefore ,i have only to conclude1
 that it is  innate1 even as the ,idea  
of me my self is ,natural to my self4   
,if there be no ,idea of ,god1 as it    
seems there is not 7and here 'tis  not  
proved that there is7 this whole        
discourse falls to the ground4 ,and  as 
to the ,idea of my self 7if ,i respect  
the ,body7 it proceeds from  ,sight1 but
 7if the ,soul7 there is no ,idea of a  
,soul1 but we  collect by               
,ratiocination1 that there is some      
inward thing in a ,mans ,body1  that    
imparts to it ,animal ,motion1 by which 
it perceives and moves1  and this       
7whatever it be7 without any ,idea we   
call a ,soul4      ,,answer4    ,if     
there be an ,idea of ,god 7as 'tis      
manifest that there is7 this  whole     
,objection falls to the ground2 and then
 he subjoyns1 ,that we  have no ,idea of
 the ,soul1 but collect it by           
,ratiocination1 ',tis the same  as if he
 should say1 that there is no ,image    

thereof represented in the  ,phantasie1 
but yet1 that there is such a ,thing1 as
 ,i call an ,idea4          ,,object4   
,,viii4      99 ,an other ,idea of the  
,sun as taken from the ,arguments of    
,astronomers1  that is consequentially  
collected by me from certain natural    
notions4    ,at the same time we can    
certainly have but one ,idea of the     
,sun1 whether  it be look'd at by our   
eyes1 or collected by ,ratiocination to 
be much  bigger than it seems2 for this 
last is not an ,idea of the ,sun1 but a 
proof by ,arguments1 that the ,idea of  
the ,sun would be much larger1 if  it   
were look'd at nigher4 ,but at different
 or several times the ,ideas  of the    
,sun may be diverse1 as if at one time  
we look at it with our bare  eye1 at an 
other time through a ,teloscope2 but    
,astronomical arguments do  not make the
 ,idea of the ,sun greater or less1 but 
they rather tell us  that the sensible  
,idea thereof is false4      ,,answer4  
,here also 7as before7 what he says is  

not the ,idea of the ,sun1 and yet  is  
described1 is that very thing which ,i  
call the ,idea4          ,,object4 ,,ix4
      99 ,for without doubt those ,ideas
 which ,represent substances are        
something  more1 or 7as ,i may say7 have
 more of objective ,reality in them1    
then  those that represent only         
accidents or modes2 and again1 that by  
which  ,i understand a mighty ,god1     
,eternal1 ,infinite1 ,omniscient1       
,omnipotent1  ,creatour of all things   
besides himself1 has certainly in it    
more  objective reality1 then those by  
which ,finite substances are exhibited4 
,i have before often noted that there   
can be no ,idea of ,god or  the ,mind3  
,i will now superadd1 ,that neither can 
there be an ,idea  of ,substance4 ,for  
,substance 7,which is only ,matter      
,subject to  ,accidents and ,changes7 is
 ,collected only by ,reasoning1 but  it 
is not at all ,conceived1 neither does  
it represent to us any  ,idea4 ,and if  
this be true1 ,how can it be said1 ,that

 those ,ideas  which represent to us    
,substances have in them something      
,more1 or ,more  ,objective ,reality1   
then those which represent to us        
,accidents8 ,besides1  ,let ,des-,cartes
 again ,consider what he means by ,more 
,reality8 ,can  ,reality be increas'd or
 diminish'd8 ,or does he think that ,one
 ,thing  can be ,more ,a ,thing then an 
other ,thing8 let him ,consider how this
 can  be ,explain'd to our              
,understandings with that ,perspicuity  
or ,clearness  which is requisite in all
 ,demonstrations1 and ,which ,he        
,himself is used  to present us with    
upon other ,occasions4      ,,answer4   
,i have often noted before1 ,that that  
very ,thing which is evidenc'd  by      
,reason1 as also whatever else is       
perceived by any other ,means1 is       
,called by ,me an ,idea4 ,and ,i have   
sufficiently explain'd ,how ,reality    
may be ,encreas'd or ,diminish'd1 in the
 same manner 7to wit7 as  ,substance is 
,more a ,thing1 then ,a ,mode2 and if   

there be any such  things as ,real      
,qualities1 or ,incomplete ,substances1 
these are ,more  ,things then ,modes1   
and ,less ,things then ,complete        
,substances3  and ,lastly if there be an
 ,infinite ,independent ,substance this 
is  ,more a ,thing1 then a ,finite1     
,dependent ,substance4 ,and all this is 
self-evident4          ,,object4 ,x4    
99 ,wherefore ,there only ,remains the  
,idea of ,god2 ,wherein ,i must consider
  whether there be not something        
,included1 which cannot ,possibly have  
its  ,original from me4 ,by the ,word1  
,god1 ,i mean a certain ,infinite       
,substance1  ,independent1 ,omniscient1 
,almighty1 by whom both ,i my self and  
every  thing ,else ,that ,is 7if any    
thing do actually exist7 was ,created2  
,all  which attributes are of such an   
,high ,nature ,that the more attentively
  ,i consider them1 the ,less ,i        
,conceive my self alone possible to be  
the  ,author of these notions2 from what
 therefore has been said ,i must        

,conclude there is a ,god4              
,considering the ,attributes of ,god1   
that from thence we may gather an  ,idea
 of ,god1 and that we may enquire       
whether there be not something  in that 
,idea which cannot ,possibly ,proceed   
from our selves1 ,i discover  7if ,i am 
not ,deceived7 that what we think off at
 the ,venerable name  of ,god proceeds  
neither from our selves1 neither is it  
,necessary that  they should have any   
other ,original then from ,outward      
,objects4 ,for  by the ,name of ,god ,i 
understand a ,substance1 that is1 ,i    
understand  that ,god ,exists 7not by an
 ,idea1 but by ,reasoning7 ,infinite    
7that  is1 ,i cannot conceive or        
,imagine ,terms or ,parts in him so     
,extream1 but ,i  can ,imagine others   
,farther7 from whence it follows1 that  
not an ,idea of  ,gods ,infinity but of 
my ,own bounds and ,limits presents it  
self at the  ,word ,infinite4           
,independent1 ,that is1 ,i do not       
conceive any ,cause  from which ,god may

 proceed2 from whence 'tis evident that 
,i have no  other ,idea at the word     
,independent1 but the memory of my own  
,ideas  which at ,different ,times have 
,different ,beginnings1 and             
,consequently  they must be ,dependent4 
,wherefore1 to say that ,god is         
,independent1 is only to say ,that ,god 
is  in the ,number of those things1 the 
,original whereof ,i do not ,imagine3   
and so to say that ,god is ,infinite1 is
 the same as if we say ,that ,he  is in 
the ,number of ,those ,things whose     
,bounds we do not ,conceive3 ,and  thus 
any ,idea of ,god is ,exploded1 for     
,what ,idea can we have without         
,beginning or ,ending8    ,omniscient or
 ,understanding all things1 ,here ,i    
desire to know1 by  what ,idea1         
,des-,cartes understands ,gods          
,understanding8 ,almighty1  ,i desire   
also to know by ,what ,idea ,gods ,power
 is understood8 ,for  ,power is in      
,respect of ,future ,things1 that is1   
,things not ,existing4 ,for  my ,part1  

,i understand ,power from the ,image or 
,memory of past ,actions1  arguing with 
my self thus1 ,he did so1 therefore he  
was able 7or had  ,power7 to do so1     
therefore 7continuing the same7 he will 
again have  ,power to do so4 ,but now   
all these are ,ideas that may arise from
  external ,objects4    ,creatour of all
 things1 ,i can frame an ,image of      
,creation from  what ,i see every day1  
as a ,man ,born1 or growing from a      
,punctum to that  shape and size he now 
bears2 an other ,idea then this no man  
can have at  the word ,creatour2 ,but   
the ,possibility of ,imagining a        
,creation is  not sufficient to prove   
that the world was created4 ,and        
therefore tho  it were ,demonstrated    
that some ,infinite ,independent        
,almighty ,being  did exist1 yet it will
 not from thence follow that a ,creatour
 exists2  unless one can think this to  
be a right inference1 we believe that   
there exists something that has created 
all other things1 therefore the  world  

was ,created thereby4    ,moreover when 
he says1 that the ,idea of ,god1 and of 
our ,soul is  ,innate or born in us1 ,i 
would fain know1 whether the ,souls of  
those  that sleep soundly do think      
unless they dream2 ,if not1 then at that
  time they have no ,ideas1 and         
consequently no ,idea is ,innate1 for   
what is ,innate to us is never ,absent  
from us4      ,,answer4    ,none of     
,gods ,attributes can proceed from      
outward objects as from a  ,pattern1    
because there is nothing found in ,god  
like what is found in  ,external1 that  
is1 ,corporeal things2 ,now 'tis        
manifest that whatever  we think of in  
him differing or unlike what we find in 
them proceeds  not from them1 but from a
 cause of that very diversity in our    
,thought4    ,and here ,i desire to     
know1 how this ,philosopher deduces     
,gods  ,understanding from outward      
,things1 and yet ,i can easily explain  
what ,idea ,i have thereof1 by saying1  
that by the ,idea of ,gods              

,understanding ,i conceive whatever is  
the ,form of any ,perception2  ,for who 
is there that does not perceive that he 
understands  something or other1 and    
consequently he must thereby have an    
,idea of  understanding1 and by         
enlarging it ,indefinitely he forms the 
,idea  of ,gods ,understanding4 ,and so 
of his other ,attributes4    ,and seeing
 we have made use of that ,idea of ,god 
which is in us to  demonstrate his      
existence1 and seeing there is contain'd
 in this ,idea  such an ,immense ,power1
 that we conceive it a contradiction for
 ,god to  ,exist1 and yet that any thing
 should ,be besides ,him1 which was not 
,created by ,him1 it plainly follows    
that demonstrating ,his existence  we   
demonstrate also that the whole world1  
or all things different from  ,god1 were
 ,created by ,god4    ,lastly when we   
assert1 that some ,ideas are ,innate or 
natural to us1  we do not mean that they
 are always present with us 7for so no  
,idea  would be ,innate7 but only that  

we have in our selves a ,faculty of     
producing them4          ,,object4 ,,xi4
      99 ,the whole stress of which     
,argument lyes thus2 because ,i know it 
impossible for me to be of the same     
nature ,i am1 viz1 having the ,idea  of 
a ,god in me1 unless really there were a
 ,god1 ,a ,god 7,i say7 that very  same 
,god1 whose ,idea ,i have in my mind4   
,wherefore seeing 'tis not demonstrated 
that we have an ,idea of  ,god1 and the 
,christian ,religion commands us to     
believe that ,god is  ,inconceivable1   
that is1 as ,i suppose1 that we cannot  
have an ,idea of  ,him1 it follows1 that
 the ,existence of ,god is not          
demonstrated1 much  less the ,creation4 
,,answer4    ,when ,god is said to be   
,inconceiveable 'tis understood of an   
,adequate  full conception4 ,but ,i am  
'een tired with often repeating1 how    
notwithstanding we may have an ,idea of 
,god4 ,so that here is nothing  brought 
that makes any thing against my         
demonstration4          ,,object4 ,,xii4

    ,against the ,fourth ,meditation1   
,of ,truth and ,falshood4      99 ,by   
,which ,i understand that ,error 7as it 
is ,error7 is not a ,real ,being1       
,dependent on ,god1 but is only a       
,defect2 and that therefore to make me  
,err  there is not requisite a ,faculty 
of ,erring ,given me by ,god4    ',tis  
,certain that ,ignorance is only a      
,defect1 and that there is no  ,occasion
 of any ,positive ,faculty to make us   
,ignorant4 ,but this  position is not so
 clear in ,relation to ,error1 for      
,stones and ,inanimate  ,creatures      
cannot ,err1 for this ,reason only1     
because they have not the  ,faculties of
 ,reasoning or ,imagination2 from whence
 'tis ,natural  for us to ,conclude1    
,that to ,err there is requisite a      
,faculty of  ,judging1 or at least of   
,imagining1 both which ,faculties are   
,positive1 and given to all ,creatures  
subject to ,error1 and to ,them  only4  
,moreover ,des-,cartes says thus1 ,i    
find 7my ,errors7 to ,depend on two     

concurring ,causes1 viz4 on my ,faculty 
of ,knowing1 and on my ,faculty of      
,choosing1 or ,freedom of my ,will4     
,which seems ,contradictious to what he 
said before2 ,and here also we may note1
 that ,freedom of ,will is assumed      
without any ,proof contrary to the      
,opinion of the ,calvinists4            
,,answer4    ,tho to make us ,err there 
is requisite a ,faculty of ,reasoning   
7or  rather of ,judging1 that is1 of    
,affirming and ,denying7 because  ,error
 is the ,defect thereof1 yet it does not
 follow from thence that  this ,defect  
is any thing ,real1 for neither is      
,blindness a ,real  ,thing1 tho stones  
cannot be said to be ,blind1 for this   
,reason only1  ,that they are incapable 
of sight4 ,and ,i much wonder that in   
all these  ,objections ,i have not found
 one ,right ,inference4    ,i have not  
here assumed any thing concerning the   
,freedom of ,mans  ,will1 unless what   
all ,men do ,experience in themselves1  
and is most  evident by the ,light of   

,nature4 ,neither see ,i any ,reason1   
,why he should  say that this is        
,contradictious to any former ,position4
    ,perhaps there may be ,many1 who    
respecting ,gods predisposal of ,things 
cannot ,comprehend1 ,how their ,freedom 
of ,will ,consists there-with1  but yet 
there is no ,man who1 respecting himself
 only1 does not find by  ,experience1   
,that 'tis one and the same ,thing to be
 ,willing1 and to be  ,free4 ,but 'tis  
no ,place to ,enquire what the ,opinion 
of others may be in  this ,matter4      
,,object4 ,,xiii4      99 ,as for       
,example1 ,when lately ,i set my self to
 examine ,whether any  ,thing ,do       
,exist1 and found1 that from my setting 
my self to examine such a  ,thing1 it   
evidently follows1 ,that ,i my self     
,exist1 ,i could not but ,judge1  what  
,i so clearly understood1 to be true1   
not that ,i was forced thereto  by any  
outward ,impulse1 but because a strong  
,propension in my ,will did  follow this
 ,great ,light in my ,understanding1 so 

that ,i believed it so  much the more   
,freely and ,willingly1 by how much the 
,less indifferent ,i  was thereunto4    
,this expression1 ,great ,light in the  
,understanding1 is ,metaphorical1  and  
therefore not to be used in             
,argumentation2 ,and every one1 that    
,doubts not of his ,opinion1 ,pretends  
such a ,light1 and has no less a        
,propension in his ,will to ,affirm what
 he doubts not1 than ,he that  really   
and truely knows a ,thing4 ,wherefore   
this ,light may be the  cause of        
,defending and ,holding an ,opinion     
,obstinately1 but never of  knowing an  
,opinion ,truly4    ,moreover not only  
the ,knowledge of ,truth1 but ,belief or
 ,giving  ,assent1 are not the ,acts of 
the ,will2 for ,whatever is proved by   
strong ,arguments1 or ,credibly told1 we
 ,believe whether we will or no4        
',tis true1 ,to ,affirm or ,deny        
,propositions1 to ,defend or ,oppose    
,propositions1 are the ,acts of the     
,will2 but it does not from thence      

,follow that the ,internal ,assent      
depends on the ,will4 ,wherefore the    
following ,conclusion 7so that in the   
abuse of our ,freedom of ,will that     
,privation consists which ,constitutes  
,error7 is not fully ,demonstrated4     
,,answer4    ',tis not much matter1     
,whether this expression1 ,great ,light1
 be  ,argumentative or not1 so it be    
explicative1 as really it is1 ,for all  
men know1 that by light in the          
understanding is meant clearness of     
knowledge1 which every one has not1 that
 thinks he has2 and this  hinders not   
but this light in the ,understanding may
 be very different  from an obstinate   
,opinion taken up without clear         
perception4    ,but when 'tis here said1
 ,that we assent to things clearly      
perceived  whether we will or no1 'tis  
the same1 as if it were said1 that      
willing  or nilling1 we desire ,good    
clearly known2 whereas the word         
,nilling1  finds no room in such        
,expressions1 for it implies1 that we   

will and nill  the same thing4          
,,object ,,xiv4    ,against the ,fifth  
,meditation4 ,of the ,essence of        
material things4      99 ,as when for   
,example1 ,i imagine a ,triangle1 tho   
perhaps such a ,figure  exists no where 
out of my thoughts1 nor ever will exist1
 yet the ,nature  thereof is            
determinate1 and its ,essence or ,form  
is immutable and eternal1  which is     
neither made by me nor depends on my    
mind1 as appears from this1  that many  
propositions may be demonstrated of this
 ,triangle4    ,if a ,triangle be no    
where1 ,i understand not how it can have
 any  ,nature1 for what is no where1 is 
not1 and therefore has not a ,being1  or
 any ,nature4    ,a ,triangle in the    
,mind arises from a ,triangle seen1 or  
from one made  up of what has been seen1
 but when once we have given the name of
 a  ,triangle to a thing 7from which we 
think the ,idea of a ,triangle  arises7 
tho the ,triangle it self perish1 yet   
the name continues2 ,in  the like       

manner1 when we have once conceived in  
our thought1 ,that all  the ,angles of a
 ,triangle are equal to two right ones1 
and when we have  given this other name 
7viz4 ,having its three ,angles equal to
 two right  ones7 to a ,triangle1 tho   
afterwards there were no such thing in  
the  ,world1 yet the ,name would still  
continue1 and this ,proposition1 ,a     
,triangle is a ,figure having three     
,angles equal to two right ,ones1 would 
be eternally true4 ,but the ,nature of a
 ,triangle will not be eternal if  all  
,triangles were destroy'd4    ,this     
,proposition likewise1 ,a ,man is an    
,animal1 will be true to  ,eternity1    
because the ,word ,animal will eternally
 signifie what the  ,word ,man          
signifies2 but certainly if ,mankind    
perish1 ,humane ,nature  will be no     
longer4    ,from whence 'tis ,manifest1 
,that ,essence as 'tis distinguish'd    
from  ,existence is nothing more than   
the ,copulation of ,names by this word  
,is1 and therefore ,essence without     

,existence is meerly a ,fiction  of our 
own2 and as the ,image of a ,man in the 
,mind is to a ,man1 so  it seems        
,essence is to ,existence4 ,or as this  
,proposition ,socrates  is a ,man1 is to
 this1 ,socrates ,is or ,exists1 so is  
the ,essence of  ,socrates to his       
,existence4 ,now this ,proposition1     
,socrates is a ,man1  when ,socrates    
does not exist1 signifies only the      
,connection of the  ,names1 and the word
 ,is carries under it the ,image of the 
unity of  the thing1 which is called by 
these ,two ,names4      ,,answer4       
,the ,difference between ,essence and   
,existence is known to all ,men4 ,and   
what is here said of ,eternal ,names    
instead of ,eternal ,truth1 has been    
long ago sufficiently rejected4         
,,object4 ,,xv4    ,against the ,sixth  
,meditation4 ,of the ,existence of      
,material ,beings4      99 ,and seeing  
,god has given me no ,faculty to know   
whether these ,ideas  proceed from      
,bodies or not1 but rather a strong     

inclination to believe1  that these     
,ideas are sent from ,bodies1 ,i see no 
reason1 why ,god should  not be counted 
a ,deceiver1 if these ,ideas came from  
any where1 but from  ,corporeal ,beings1
 and therefore we must conclude that    
,corporeal ,beings  exist4    ',tis a   
received opinion1 that ,physicians who  
deceive their ,patients for  their      
,healths sake1 and ,fathers1 who deceive
 their ,children for their  ,good1 are  
guilty thereby of no ,crimes1 for the   
fault of ,deceit does  not consist in   
the falsity of ,words2 but in the       
,injury done to the  ,person deceived4  
,let ,d4 ,cartes therefore consider     
whether this ,proposition1 ,god can     
upon no account deceive us1 ,universally
 taken be true2 ,for if it be  not true 
so universally taken1 that ,conclusion1 
,therefore ,corporeal  ,beings exist1   
will not follow4      ,,answer4    ',tis
 not requisite for the establishment of 
my ,conclusion1 ,that we  cannot be     
deceived on any account 7for ,i         

willingly granted1 that we  may be often
 deceived7 but that we cannot be        
deceived1 when that our  ,error argues  
that in ,god there is such a ,will to   
,cheat us as  would be contradictious to
 his ,nature4 ,and here again we have a 
wrong inference in this ,objection4     
,the ,last ,objection4      99 ,for now 
,i plainly discover a great difference  
between them 7that is  sleep and waking7
 for my ,dreams are never conjoyn'd by  
my ,memory1 with  the other ,actions of 
my ,life4    ,i desire to ,know1 whether
 it be certain1 that a ,man dreaming1   
that the  doubts whether he dream or    
not1 may not ,dream1 that he joyns his  
,dream to the ,ideas of things past long
 since2 if he may1 than those  ,actions 
of his past life1 may be thought as true
 if he were awake4    ,moreover because 
7as ,d4 ,cartes affirms7 the ,certainty 
and truth of  all knowledge depends only
 on the knowledge of the ,true ,god1    
either  an ,atheist cannot from the     
,memory of his past life conclude that  

he  is awake1 or else 'tis possible for 
a man to know that he is awake  without 
the ,knowledge of the ,true ,god4       
,,answer4    ,a ,man that dreams cannot 
really connect his dreams with the      
,ideas  of past things1 tho1 ,i confess1
 he may dream that he so connects them2 
for whoever deny'd ,that a man when he  
is a sleep may be ,deceived8 ,but  when 
he awakens he may easily discover his   
,error4    ,an ,atheist from the memory 
of his past life may collect that he is 
awake1  but he cannot know1 that this   
,sign is sufficient to make him certain1
  that he is not deceived1 unless he    
know that he is created by a ,god  that 
will not deceive him4      ,,finis4     
,a ,catalogue of some ,books sold by    
,benjamin ,took at the ,ship in ,st4    
,pauls ,church-yard4      ,herodoti     
,halicarnassei ,historiarum libri novem 
ejusdem narratio de  vita ,homeri1 ,gr4 
,lat4  ,h4 ,stephani ,apologia pro      
,herodoto accesserunt  huic ,edition    
,chronologia ,historia1  ,tabula        

,geographica ,herodot1  necnon variantes
 ,lectiones  not ex pluribus ,m4 ,s4 ,s4
 ,cod4  ,antiquis  scriptoribus collect4
 fol4    ,francisci ,suarez4 ,doct4     
,theol4 ,grau4 ,tractatus de ,legibus ac
 ,deo  ,legislatore in decem libros     
distributus4 fol4    ,thorndicius de    
,ratione ac ,jure finiendi              
,controversias ,ecclesi4 fol4    ,the   
,holy ,court in five ,tomes1 written in 
,french by ,n4 ,causin1  translated by  
,sir ,t4 ,h4 the fourth ,edition4 fol4  
,the ,works of the most ,reverend ,john 
,bramhal1 ,d4 ,d4 late ,l4 ,archbishop  
of ,armagh1 some of which never before  
printed1 with the life of the  ,author1 
c4 fol4    ,the ,history and            
,vindication of the ,irish ,remonstrance
 against all  ,calumnies and ,censures  
in several ,treatises4 folio4    ,a     
,collection of all the ,statutes now in 
use in the ,kingdom of ,ireland1  with  
,notes in the ,margin4 ,and likewise the
 ,acts of ,settlement and  ,explanation1
 with the rest of the ,acts1 made in the

 ,reign of his ,majesty  that now is1 to
 the dissolution of the ,parliament1    
,aug4 #g4 #afff4    ,several            
,chyrurgical ,treatises by ,rich4       
,wiseman1 ,serjeant ,chyrurgion4  folio4
    ,the ,primitive ,origination of     
,mankind considered and examined1       
according  to the light of ,nature1     
written by ,sir ,m4 ,hale1 ,kt4 late    
,lord ,chief  ,justice of the ,kings    
,bench4 folio4    ,sir ,rich4 ,baker's  
,chronicle of the ,kings of ,england    
from the ,romans  ,government to this   
time4    ,thirty five ,sermons by the   
,right ,reverend ,r4 ,sanderson late    
,lord ,bishop  of ,lincoln4    ,le ,beau
 ,pledeur1 a ,book of ,entries          
containing ,declarations1               
,informations1 and other select and     
approved ,pleadings2 with special       
,verdicts and ,demurrers in most actions
 real1 personal1 and mixt1 which  have  
been argued and adjudged in the ,courts 
of ,westminster1 with  faithfull        
references to the most authentick ,law  

,books1 by ,sir ,humphry  ,winch1 ,kt4  
sometimes one of the ,justices of the   
,court of ,common ,pleas1  fol4         
,etymologicon ,lingu ,anglican2 seu     
explicatio vocum ,anglicarum            
,etymologica ex propriis fontibus4      
,omnia ,alphabetico ordine in quinque   
distinctas ,classes digesta4 ,authore   
,step4 ,skinner1 ,m4,d4 folio4    ,a    
large ,dictionary in three ,parts by    
,tho4 ,holyoake ,d4,d4 folio4    ,hor   
,hebraic  ,talmudic impens in           
,evangelium ,s4 ,johannis4 p4 ,i4       
,lightfoot4 quarto4    ,doctor ,browns  
,travels in ,hungaria1 ,servia1         
,bulgaria1 ,macedonia1  c4 ,as also     
through a great part of ,germany1 with  
,observations on the  ,mines1 ,baths1   
and mineral ,waters in those ,parts1    
illustrated with the  ,figures of some  
habits and remarkable places4 quarto4   
,a ,representation of the ,state of     
,christianity in ,england1 and of its   
,decay and ,danger from ,sectaries as   
well as ,papists4    ,the ,controversial

 ,letters1 or the grand ,controversie1  
concerning the  pretended authority of  
,popes and true ,soveraign of ,kings1 in
 #af ,letters4  quarto4    ,a ,true     
,widow1 a ,comedy written by ,t4        
,shadwel4 quarto4    ,a ,vindication of 
the sincerity of the ,protestant        
,religion in the point of  ,obedience to
 ,sovereigns1 opposed to the ,doctrine  
of ,rebellion authorised  and practised 
by the ,pope and the ,jesuites1 by      
,peter ,du ,moulin4  quarto4    ,phocna1
 or the ,anatomy of a ,porpess dissected
 at ,gresham ,colledge1  with a         
,preliminary discourse concerning       
,anatomy1 and a ,natural ,history of    
,animals4 quar4    ,dodwells separation 
of ,churches from ,episcopal            
,government1 as practised  by the       
present ,nonconformists proved          
,schismatical from such principles  as  
are least controverted1 and do withal   
most popularly explain the  sinfulness  
and mischief of ,schism4 quarto4        
--,two ,letters of ,advice4 #a4 ,for the

 susception of ,holy ,orders4 #b4 ,for  
,studies ,theological1 especially such  
as are rational2 at the end of the      
former is inserted a ,catalogue of the  
,christian ,writers1 and genuine  works 
of the first three ,centuries4 octavo4  
--,some ,considerations of present      
,concernment2 how far ,romanists may be 
trusted by ,princes of another          
,perswasion4 octavo4    --,two short    
,discourses against the ,romanists #a4  
,an ,account of the  fundamental        
,principle of ,popery4 #b4 ,an ,answer  
to six ,queries4 twelves4    ,navigation
 and ,commerce their ,original and      
,progress1 containing a  succinct       
account of ,traffick in general1 by     
,john ,evelin1 ,esq2 octavo4    ,of     
,gifts and ,offices in the publick      
,worship of ,god1 in three parts1       
endeavouring an impartial account1 what 
was in the inspired ,age of the         
,church1 what succeeded in the more     
ordinary ,state2 what reasonably may  be
 allowed in ,prayer1 singing1 and       

preaching1 by ,edw4 ,wetenhal1 ,d4,d4   
octavo4    ,the ,catechism of the       
,church of ,england with marginal       
,notes1 very  plainly setting forth its 
meaning1 and proving the same out of the
  ,scriptures1 for the use of ,schools  
by ,edw4 ,wetenhal1 ,d4,d4    ,poems and
 ,songs by ,tho4 ,flatman4 octa4        
,poems by ,n4 ,tate4 octavo4    ,the    
,degrees of ,consanguinity affinity     
described and delineated1 by  ,robert   
,dixon1 ,d4,d4 in octavo4    ,the       
,french ,gardiner instructing how to    
cultivate all sorts of ,fruit ,trees    
and ,herbs for the ,garden1 together    
with instructions to dry and conserve   
them1 written in ,french1 and ,englished
 by ,jo4 ,evelin1 ,esq2 in octavo4      
,ataxi ,obstaculum2 being an ,answer to 
several ,queries dispersed in  several  
parts of ,glocestershire in octavo4     
,s4 ,gardinerus ,s4 ,t4 ,p4 de          
,trinitate contra ,sandium1 in octavo4  
,deus ,nobiscum4 ,a ,narrative of a     
great ,deliverance at ,sea1 by ,w4      

,johnson1 ,d4,d4 ,phdri ,augusti ,csaris
 ,liberti ,fabularum ,esopiarum ,libri  
,v4 in usum scholarum ,angl4 octavo4    
,a ,short ,view of the chief points in  
,controversie between the ,reformed     
,churches1 and the ,church of ,rome1 by 
,dr4 ,peter ,du ,moulin4 in octavo4     
,the ,country ,parsons advice to his    
,parishioners in two ,parts4 #a4        
,containing a plain and serious         
,exhortation to a ,religious ,life4 #b4 
,general ,directions how to live        
accordingly4 in octavo4      ,,finis4