---------------------------------------- -------------------------------- ,transcriber's ,note3 ,this version of the text cannot represent certain typographical effects4 ,italics are delimited with the #8' character as italic4 ,superscripted characters are prefixed with #8' and delimited by #8 '4 ,footnotes have been moved to follow the paragraphs in which they are referenced4 ,minor errors1 attributable to the printer1 have been corrected4 ,please see the transcriber's note at the end of this text for details regarding the handling of any textual issues encountered during its preparation4 ---------------------------------------- -------------------------------- ,,science ,,and ,,the ,,modern ,,world ,,lowell ,,lectures1 #aibe ---------------------------------------- -------------------------------- ,illustration ,,the ,,macmillan ,,company ,,new ,,york 4 ,,boston 4 ,,chicago 4 ,,dallas ,,atlanta 4 ,,san ,,francisco ,,cambridge ,,university ,,press ,,london ,,macmillan ,,co41 ,,ltd4 ,,bombay 4 ,,calcutta 4 ,,madras ,,the ,,macmillan ,,company ,,of ,,canada1 ,,ltd4 ,,toronto ---------------------------------------- -------------------------------- ,,science ,,and ,,the ,,modern ,,world ,,lowell ,,lectures1 #aibe ,,by ,,alfred ,,north ,,whitehead ,f4,r4,s41 ,sc4,d4 7,cambridge71 ,hon4 ,d4,sc4 7,manchester71 ,hon4 ,,ll4,d4 7,st4 ,andrews7 ,,fellow ,,of ,,trinity ,,college ,,in ,,the ,,university ,,of ,,cambridge ,,and ,,professor ,,of ,,philosophy ,,in ,,harvard ,,university ,new ,york ,,the ,,macmillan ,,company #aibe ,all rights reserved ---------------------------------------- -------------------------------- ,,copyright1 #aibe4 ,,by ,,the ,,macmillan ,,company4 --- ,set up and printed4 ,published ,october1 #aibe4 ,,printed ,,in ,,the ,,united ,,states ,,of ,,america ,,by ,,the ,,ferris ,,printing ,,company ---------------------------------------- -------------------------------- ,,to ,,my ,,colleagues1 ,,past ,,and ,,present1 ,,whose ,,friendship ,,is ,,inspiration4 ,,table ,,of ,,contents ,,chapter ,,page ,i4 ,,the ,,origins ,,of ,,modern ,,science #a ,,ii4 ,,mathematics ,,as ,,an ,,element ,,in ,,the ,,history ,,of #bh ,,thought ,,iii4 ,,the ,,century ,,of ,,genius #ee ,,iv4 ,,the ,,eighteenth ,,century #hj ,v4 ,,the ,,romantic ,,reaction #aje ,,vi4 ,,the ,,nineteenth ,,century #acd ,,vii4 ,,relativity #afj ,,viii4 ,,the ,,quantum ,,theory #aha ,,ix4 ,,science ,,and ,,philosophy #aic ,x4 ,,abstraction #bai ,,xi4 ,,god #bdb ,,xii4 ,,religion ,,and ,,science #beb ,,xiii4 ,,requisites ,,for ,,social ,,progress #bgj ,,preface ,the present book embodies a study of some aspects of ,western culture during the past three centuries1 in so far as it has been influenced by the development of science4 ,this study has been guided by the conviction that the mentality of an epoch springs from the view of the world which is1 in fact1 dominant in the educated sections of the communities in question4 ,there may be more than one such scheme1 corresponding to cultural divisions4 ,the various human interests which suggest cosmologies1 and also are influenced by them1 are science1 aesthetics1 ethics1 religion4 ,in every age each of these topics suggests a view of the world4 ,in so far as the same set of people are swayed by all1 or more than one1 of these interests1 their effective outlook will be the joint production from these sources4 ,but each age has it dominant preoccupation2 and1 during the three centuries in question1 the cosmology derived from science has been asserting itself at the expense of older points of view with their origins elsewhere4 ,men can be provincial in time1 as well as in place4 ,we may ask ourselves whether the scientific mentality of the modern world in the immediate past is not a successful example of such provincial limitation4 ,philosophy1 in one of its functions1 is the critic of cosmologies4 ,it is its function to harmonise1 refashion1 and justify divergent intuitions as to the nature of things4 ,it has to insist on the scrutiny of the ultimate ideas1 and on the retention of the whole of the evidence in shaping our cosmological scheme4 ,its business is to render explicit1 and--so far as may be--efficient1 a process which otherwise is unconsciously performed without rational tests4 ,bearing this in mind1 ,i have avoided the introduction of a variety of abstruse detail respecting scientific advance4 ,what is wanted1 and what ,i have striven after1 is a sympathetic study of main ideas as seen from the inside4 ,if my view of the function of philosophy is correct1 it is the most effective of all the intellectual pursuits4 ,it builds cathedrals before the workmen have moved a stone1 and it destroys them before the elements have worn down their arches4 ,it is the architect of the buildings of the spirit1 and it is also their solvent3--and the spiritual precedes the material4 ,philosophy works slowly4 ,thoughts lie dormant for ages2 and then1 almost suddenly as it were1 mankind finds that they have embodied themselves in institutions4 ,this book in the main consists of a set of eight ,lowell ,lectures delivered in the ,february of #aibe4 ,these lectures with some slight expansion1 and the subdivision of one lecture into ,chapters ,,vii and ,,viii1 are here printed as delivered4 ,but some additional matter has been added1 so as to complete the thought of the book on a scale which could not be included within that lecture course4 ,of this new matter1 the second chapter--#8,mathematics as an ,element in the ,history of ,thought'--was delivered as a lecture before the ,mathematical ,society of ,brown ,university1 ,providence1 ,r4 ,i42 and the twelfth chapter--#8,religion and ,science'--formed an address delivered in the ,phillips ,brooks ,house at ,harvard1 and is to be published in the ,august number of the ,atlantic ,monthly of this year 7#aibe74 ,the tenth and eleventh chapters--#8,abstraction' and #8,god'--are additions which now appear for the first time4 ,but the book represents one train of thought1 and the antecedent utilisation of some of its contents is a subsidiary point4 ,there has been no occasion in the text to make detailed reference to ,lloyd ,morgan's ,emergent ,evolution or to ,alexander's ,space1 ,time and ,deity4 ,it will be obvious to readers that ,i have found them very suggestive4 ,i am especially indebted to ,alexander's great work4 ,the wide scope of the present book makes it impossible to acknowledge in detail the various sources of information or of ideas4 ,the book is the product of thought and reading in past years1 which were not undertaken with any anticipation of utilisation for the present purpose4 ,accordingly it would now be impossible for me to give reference to my sources for details1 even if it were desirable so to do4 ,but there is no need3 the facts which are relied upon are simple and well known4 ,on the philosophical side1 any consideration of epistemology has been entirely excluded4 ,it would have been impossible to discuss that topic without upsetting the whole balance of the work4 ,the key to the book is the sense of the overwhelming importance of a prevalent philosophy4 ,my most grateful thanks are due to my colleague ,mr4 ,raphael ,demos for reading the proofs and for the suggestion of many improvements in expression4 ,harvard ,university1 ,june #bi1 #aibe4 ---------------------------------------- -------------------------------- ,,science ,,and ,,the ,,modern ,,world ,,chapter ,i ,,the ,,origins ,,of ,,modern ,,science ,the progress of civilisation is not wholly a uniform drift towards better things4 ,it may perhaps wear this aspect if we map it on a scale which is large enough4 ,but such broad views obscure the details on which rest our whole understanding of the process4 ,new epochs emerge with comparative suddenness1 if we have regard to the scores of thousands of years throughout which the complete history extends4 ,secluded races suddenly take their places in the main stream of events3 technological discoveries transform the mechanism of human life3 a primitive art quickly flowers into full satisfaction of some aesthetic craving3 great religions in their crusading youth spread through the nations the peace of ,heaven and the sword of the ,lord4 ,the sixteenth century of our era saw the disruption of ,western ,christianity and the rise of modern science4 ,it was an age of ferment4 ,nothing was settled1 though much was opened--new worlds and new ideas4 ,in science1 ,copernicus and ,vesalius may be chosen as representative figures3 they typify the new cosmology and the scientific emphasis on direct observation4 ,giordano ,bruno was the martyr2 but the cause for which he suffered was not that of science1 but that of free imaginative speculation4 ,his death in the year #afjj ushered in the first century of modern science in the strict sense of the term4 ,in his execution there was an unconscious symbolism3 for the subsequent tone of scientific thought has contained distrust of his type of general speculativeness4 ,the ,reformation1 for all its importance1 may be considered as a domestic affair of the ,european races4 ,even the ,christianity of the ,east viewed it with profound disengagement4 ,furthermore1 such disruptions are no new phenomena in the history of ,christianity or of other religions4 ,when we project this great revolution upon the whole history of the ,christian ,church1 we cannot look upon it as introducing a new principle into human life4 ,for good or for evil1 it was a great transformation of religion2 but it was not the coming of religion4 ,it did not itself claim to be so4 ,reformers maintained that they were only restoring what had been forgotten4 ,it is quite otherwise with the rise of modern science4 ,in every way it contrasts with the contemporary religious movement4 ,the ,reformation was a popular uprising1 and for a century and a half drenched ,europe in blood4 ,the beginnings of the scientific movement were confined to a minority among the intellectual lite4 ,in a generation which saw the ,thirty ,years' ,war and remembered ,alva in the ,netherlands1 the worst that happened to men of science was that ,galileo suffered an honourable detention and a mild reproof1 before dying peacefully in his bed4 ,the way in which the persecution of ,galileo has been remembered is a tribute to the quiet commencement of the most intimate change in outlook which the human race had yet encountered4 ,since a babe was born in a manger1 it may be doubted whether so great a thing has happened with so little stir4 ,the thesis which these lectures will illustrate is that this quiet growth of science has practically recoloured our mentality so that modes of thought which in former times were exceptional1 are now broadly spread through the educated world4 ,this new colouring of ways of thought had been proceeding slowly for many ages in the ,european peoples4 ,at last it issued in the rapid development of science2 and has thereby strengthened itself by its most obvious application4 ,the new mentality is more important even than the new science and the new technology4 ,it has altered the metaphysical presuppositions and the imaginative contents of our minds2 so that now the old stimuli provoke a new response4 ,perhaps my metaphor of a new colour is too strong4 ,what ,i mean is just that slightest change of tone which yet makes all the difference4 ,this is exactly illustrated by a sentence from a published letter of that adorable genius1 ,william ,james4 ,when he was finishing his great treatise on the ,principles of ,psychology1 he wrote to his brother ,henry ,james1 #8,i have to forge every sentence in the teeth of irreducible and stubborn facts4' ,this new tinge to modern minds is a vehement and passionate interest in the relation of general principles to irreducible and stubborn facts4 ,all the world over and at all times there have been practical men1 absorbed in #8irreducible and stubborn facts'3 all the world over and at all times there have been men of philosophic temperament who have been absorbed in the weaving of general principles4 ,it is this union of passionate interest in the detailed facts with equal devotion to abstract generalisation which forms the novelty in our present society4 ,previously it had appeared sporadically and as if by chance4 ,this balance of mind has now become part of the tradition which infects cultivated thought4 ,it is the salt which keeps life sweet4 ,the main business of universities is to transmit this tradition as a widespread inheritance from generation to generation4 ,another contrast which singles out science from among the ,european movements of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries1 is its universality4 ,modern science was born in ,europe1 but its home is the whole world4 ,in the last two centuries there has been a long and confused impact of ,western modes upon the civilisation of ,asia4 ,the wise men of the ,east have been puzzling1 and are puzzling1 as to what may be the regulative secret of life which can be passed from ,west to ,east without the wanton destruction of their own inheritance which they so rightly prize4 ,more and more it is becoming evident that what the ,west can most readily give to the ,east is its science and its scientific outlook4 ,this is transferable from country to country1 and from race to race1 wherever there is a rational society4 ,in this course of lectures ,i shall not discuss the details of scientific discovery4 ,my theme is the energising of a state of mind in the modern world1 its broad generalisations1 and its impact upon other spiritual forces4 ,there are two ways of reading history1 forwards and backwards4 ,in the history of thought1 we require both methods4 ,a climate of opinion--to use the happy phrase of a seventeenth century writer--requires for its understanding the consideration of its antecedents and its issues4 ,accordingly in this lecture ,i shall consider some of the antecedents of our modern approach to the investigation of nature4 ,in the first place1 there can be no living science unless there is a widespread instinctive conviction in the existence of an ,order of ,things1 and1 in particular1 of an ,order of ,nature4 ,i have used the word instinctive advisedly4 ,it does not matter what men say in words1 so long as their activities are controlled by settled instincts4 ,the words may ultimately destroy the instincts4 ,but until this has occurred1 words do not count4 ,this remark is important in respect to the history of scientific thought4 ,for we shall find that since the time of ,hume1 the fashionable scientific philosophy has been such as to deny the rationality of science4 ,this conclusion lies upon the surface of ,hume's philosophy4 ,take1 for example1 the following passage from ,section ,,iv of his ,inquiry ,concerning ,human ,understanding3 8,in a word1 then1 every effect is a distinct event from its cause4 ,it could not1 therefore1 be discovered in the cause2 and the first invention or conception of it1 priori1 must be entirely arbitrary40 ,if the cause in itself discloses no information as to the effect1 so that the first invention of it must be entirely arbitrary1 it follows at once that science is impossible1 except in the sense of establishing entirely arbitrary connections which are not warranted by anything intrinsic to the natures either of causes or effects4 ,some variant of ,hume's philosophy has generally prevailed among men of science4 ,but scientific faith has risen to the occasion1 and has tacitly removed the philosophic mountain4 ,in view of this strange contradiction in scientific thought1 it is of the first importance to consider the antecedents of a faith which is impervious to the demand for a consistent rationality4 ,we have therefore to trace the rise of the instinctive faith that there is an ,order of ,nature which can be traced in every detailed occurrence4 ,of course we all share in this faith1 and we therefore believe that the reason for the faith is our apprehension of its truth4 ,but the formation of a general idea--such as the idea of the ,order of ,nature--1 and the grasp of its importance1 and the observation of its exemplification in a variety of occasions are by no means the necessary consequences of the truth of the idea in question4 ,familiar things happen1 and mankind does not bother about them4 ,it requires a very unusual mind to undertake the analysis of the obvious4 ,accordingly ,i wish to consider the stages in which this analysis became explicit1 and finally became unalterably impressed upon the educated minds of ,western ,europe4 ,obviously1 the main recurrences of life are too insistent to escape the notice of the least rational of humans2 and even before the dawn of rationality1 they have impressed themselves upon the instincts of animals4 ,it is unnecessary to labour the point1 that in broad outline certain general states of nature recur1 and that our very natures have adapted themselves to such repetitions4 ,but there is a complementary fact which is equally true and equally obvious3--nothing ever really recurs in exact detail4 ,no two days are identical1 no two winters4 ,what has gone1 has gone forever4 ,accordingly the practical philosophy of mankind has been to expect the broad recurrences1 and to accept the details as emanating from the inscrutable womb of things1 beyond the ken of rationality4 ,men expected the sun to rise1 but the wind bloweth where it listeth4 ,certainly from the classical ,greek civilisation onwards there have been men1 and indeed groups of men1 who have placed themselves beyond this acceptance of an ultimate irrationality4 ,such men have endeavoured to explain all phenomena as the outcome of an order of things which extends to every detail4 ,geniuses such as ,aristotle1 or ,archimedes1 or ,roger ,bacon1 must have been endowed with the full scientific mentality1 which instinctively holds that all things great and small are conceivable as exemplifications of general principles which reign throughout the natural order4 ,but until the close of the ,middle ,ages the general educated public did not feel that intimate conviction1 and that detailed interest1 in such an idea1 so as to lead to an unceasing supply of men1 with ability and opportunity adequate to maintain a coordinated search for the discovery of these hypothetical principles4 ,either people were doubtful about the existence of such principles1 or were doubtful about any success in finding them1 or took no interest in thinking about them1 or were oblivious to their practical importance when found4 ,for whatever reason1 search was languid1 if we have regard to the opportunities of a high civilisation and the length of time concerned4 ,why did the pace suddenly quicken in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries8 ,at the close of the ,middle ,ages a new mentality discloses itself4 ,invention stimulated thought1 thought quickened physical speculation1 ,greek manuscripts disclosed what the ancients had discovered4 ,finally although in the year #aejj ,europe knew less than ,archimedes who died in the year #bab ,b4 ,c41 yet in the year #agjj1 ,newton's ,principia had been written and the world was well started on the modern epoch4 ,there have been great civilisations in which the peculiar balance of mind required for science has only fitfully appeared and has produced the feeblest result4 ,for example1 the more we know of ,chinese art1 of ,chinese literature1 and of the ,chinese philosophy of life1 the more we admire the heights to which that civilization attained4 ,for thousands of years1 there have been in ,china acute and learned men patiently devoting their lives to study4 ,having regard to the span of time1 and to the population concerned1 ,china forms the largest volume of civilisation which the world has seen4 ,there is no reason to doubt the intrinsic capacity of individual ,chinamen for the pursuit of science4 ,and yet ,chinese science is practically negligible4 ,there is no reason to believe that ,china if left to itself would have ever produced any progress in science4 ,the same may be said of ,india4 ,furthermore1 if the ,persians had enslaved the ,greeks1 there is no definite ground for belief that science would have flourished in ,europe4 ,the ,romans showed no particular originality in that line4 ,even as it was1 the ,greeks1 though they founded the movement1 did not sustain it with the concentrated interest which modern ,europe has shown4 ,i am not alluding to the last few generations of the ,european peoples on both sides of the ocean2 ,i mean the smaller ,europe of the ,reformation period1 distracted as it was with wars and religious disputes4 ,consider the world of the eastern ,mediterranean1 from ,sicily to western ,asia1 during the period of about #adjj years from the death of ,archimedes in #bab ,b4 ,c4 to the irruption of the ,tartars4 ,there were wars and revolutions and large changes of religion3 but nothing much worse than the wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries throughout ,europe4 ,there was a great and wealthy civilisation1 ,pagan1 ,christian1 ,mahometan4 ,in that period a great deal was added to science4 ,but on the whole the progress was slow and wavering2 and1 except in mathematics1 the men of the ,renaissance practically started from the position which ,archimedes had reached4 ,there had been some progress in medicine and some progress in astronomy4 ,but the total advance was very little compared to the marvellous success of the seventeenth century4 ,for example1 compare the progress of scientific knowledge from the year #aefj1 just before the births of ,galileo and of ,kepler1 up to the year #agjj1 when ,newton was in the height of his fame1 with the progress in the ancient period1 already mentioned1 exactly ten times as long4 ,nevertheless1 ,greece was the mother of ,europe2 and it is to ,greece that we must look in order to find the origin of our modern ideas4 ,we all know that on the eastern shores of the ,mediterranean there was a very flourishing school of ,ionian philosophers1 deeply interested in theories concerning nature4 ,their ideas have been transmitted to us1 enriched by the genius of ,plato and ,aristotle4 ,but1 with the exception of ,aristotle1 and it is a large exception1 this school of thought had not attained to the complete scientific mentality4 ,in some ways1 it was better4 ,the ,greek genius was philosophical1 lucid and logical4 ,the men of this group were primarily asking philosophical questions4 ,what is the substratum of nature8 ,is it fire1 or earth1 or water1 or some combination of any two1 or of all three8 ,or is it a mere flux1 not reducible to some static material8 ,mathematics interested them mightily4 ,they invented its generality1 analysed its premises1 and made notable discoveries of theorems by a rigid adherence to deductive reasoning4 ,their minds were infected with an eager generality4 ,they demanded clear1 bold ideas1 and strict reasoning from them4 ,all this was excellent2 it was genius2 it was ideal preparatory work4 ,but it was not science as we understand it4 ,the patience of minute observation was not nearly so prominent4 ,their genius was not so apt for the state of imaginative muddled suspense which precedes successful inductive generalisation4 ,they were lucid thinkers and bold reasoners4 ,of course there were exceptions1 and at the very top3 for example1 ,aristotle and ,archimedes4 ,also for patient observation1 there were the astronomers4 ,there was a mathematical lucidity about the stars1 and a fascination about the small numerable band of run-a-way planets4 ,every philosophy is tinged with the colouring of some secret imaginative background1 which never emerges explicitly into its trains of reasoning4 ,the ,greek view of nature1 at least that cosmology transmitted from them to later ages1 was essentially dramatic4 ,it is not necessarily wrong for this reason3 but it was overwhelmingly dramatic4 ,it thus conceived nature as articulated in the way of a work of dramatic art1 for the exemplification of general ideas converging to an end4 ,nature was differentiated so as to provide its proper end for each thing4 ,there was the centre of the universe as the end of motion for those things which are heavy1 and the celestial spheres as the end of motion for those things whose natures lead them upwards4 ,the celestial spheres were for things which are impassible and ingenerable1 the lower regions for things impassible and generable4 ,nature was a drama in which each thing played its part4 ,i do not say that this is a view to which ,aristotle would have subscribed without severe reservations1 in fact without the sort of reservations which we ourselves would make4 ,but it was the view which subsequent ,greek thought extracted from ,aristotle and passed on to the ,middle ,ages4 ,the effect of such an imaginative setting for nature was to damp down the historical spirit4 ,for it was the end which seemed illuminating1 so why bother about the beginning8 ,the ,reformation and the scientific movement were two aspects of the historical revolt which was the dominant intellectual movement of the later ,renaissance4 ,the appeal to the origins of ,christianity1 and ,francis ,bacon's appeal to efficient causes as against final causes1 were two sides of one movement of thought4 ,also for this reason ,galileo and his adversaries were at hopeless cross purposes1 as can be seen from his ,dialogues on the ,two ,systems of the ,world4 ,galileo keeps harping on how things happen1 whereas his adversaries had a complete theory as to why things happen4 ,unfortunately the two theories did not bring out the same results4 ,galileo insists upon #8irreducible and stubborn facts1' and ,simplicius1 his opponent1 brings forward reasons1 completely satisfactory1 at least to himself4 ,it is a great mistake to conceive this historical revolt as an appeal to reason4 ,on the contrary1 it was through and through an anti-intellectualist movement4 ,it was the return to the contemplation of brute fact2 and it was based on a recoil from the inflexible rationality of medieval thought4 ,in making this statement ,i am merely summarising what at the time the adherents of the old rgime themselves asserted4 ,for example1 in the fourth book of ,father ,paul ,sarpi's ,history of the ,council of ,trent1 you will find that in the year #aeea the ,papal ,legates who presided over the ,council ordered3 #8,that the ,divines ought to confirm their opinions with the holy ,scripture1 ,traditions of the ,apostles1 sacred and approved ,councils1 and by the ,constitutions and ,authorities of the holy ,fathers2 that they ought to use brevity1 and avoid superfluous and unprofitable questions1 and perverse contentions4444 ,this order did not please the ,italian ,divines2 who said it was a novity1 and a condemning of ,school-,divinity1 which1 in all difficulties1 useth reason1 and because it was not lawful i4e41 by this decree to treat as ,st4 ,thomas ,aquinas1 ,st4 ,bonaventure1 and other famous men did4' ,it is impossible not to feel sympathy with these ,italian divines1 maintaining the lost cause of unbridled rationalism4 ,they were deserted on all hands4 ,the ,protestants were in full revolt against them4 ,the ,papacy failed to support them1 and the ,bishops of the ,council could not even understand them4 ,for a few sentences below the foregoing quotation1 we read3 #8,though many complained here-of i4e41 of the ,decree1 yet it prevailed but little1 because generally the ,fathers i4e41 the ,bishops desired to hear men speak with intelligible terms1 not abstrusely1 as in the matter of ,justification1 and others already handled4' ,poor belated medievalists6 ,when they used reason they were not even intelligible to the ruling powers of their epoch4 ,it will take centuries before stubborn facts are reducible by reason1 and meanwhile the pendulum swings slowly and heavily to the extreme of the historical method4 ,forty-three years after the ,italian divines had written this memorial1 ,richard ,hooker in his famous ,laws of ,ecclesiastical ,polity makes exactly the same complaint of his ,puritan adversaries4#a ,hooker's balanced thought--from which the appellation #8,the ,judicious ,hooker' is derived--1 and his diffuse style1 which is the vehicle of such thought1 make his writings singularly unfit for the process of summarising by a short1 pointed quotation4 ,but1 in the section referred to1 he reproaches his opponents with ,their ,disparagement of ,reason2 and in support of his own position definitely refers to #8,the greatest amongst the school-divines1' by which designation ,i presume that he refers to ,st4 ,thomas ,aquinas4 ,footnote #a3 ,cf4 ,book ,,iii1 ,section ,,viii4 ,hooker's ,ecclesiastical ,polity was published just before ,sarpi's ,council of ,trent4 ,accordingly there was complete independence between the two works4 ,but both the ,italian divines of #aeea1 and ,hooker at the end of that century testify to the anti-rationalist trend of thought at that epoch1 and in this respect contrast their own age with the epoch of scholasticism4 ,this reaction was undoubtedly a very necessary corrective to the unguarded rationalism of the ,middle ,ages4 ,but reactions run to extremes4 ,accordingly1 although one outcome of this reaction was the birth of modern science1 yet we must remember that science thereby inherited the bias of thought to which it owes its origin4 ,the effect of ,greek dramatic literature was many-sided so far as concerns the various ways in which it indirectly affected medieval thought4 ,the pilgrim fathers of the scientific imagination as it exists today1 are the great tragedians of ancient ,athens1 ,aeschylus1 ,sophocles1 ,euripides4 ,their vision of fate1 remorseless and indifferent1 urging a tragic incident to its inevitable issue1 is the vision possessed by science4 ,fate in ,greek ,tragedy becomes the order of nature in modern thought4 ,the absorbing interest in the particular heroic incidents1 as an example and a verification of the workings of fate1 reappears in our epoch as concentration of interest on the crucial experiments4 ,it was my good fortune to be present at the meeting of the ,royal ,society in ,london when the ,astronomer ,royal for ,england announced that the photographic plates of the famous eclipse1 as measured by his colleagues in ,greenwich ,observatory1 had verified the prediction of ,einstein that rays of light are bent as they pass in the neighbourhood of the sun4 ,the whole atmosphere of tense interest was exactly that of the ,greek drama3 we were the chorus commenting on the decree of destiny as disclosed in the development of a supreme incident4 ,there was dramatic quality in the very staging3--the traditional ceremonial1 and in the background the picture of ,newton to remind us that the greatest of scientific generalisations was now1 after more than two centuries1 to receive its first modification4 ,nor was the personal interest wanting3 a great adventure in thought had at length come safe to shore4 ,let me here remind you that the essence of dramatic tragedy is not unhappiness4 ,it resides in the solemnity of the remorseless working of things4 ,this inevitableness of destiny can only be illustrated in terms of human life by incidents which in fact involve unhappiness4 ,for it is only by them that the futility of escape can be made evident in the drama4 ,this remorseless inevitableness is what pervades scientific thought4 ,the laws of physics are the decrees of fate4 ,the conception of the moral order in the ,greek plays was certainly not a discovery of the dramatists4 ,it must have passed into the literary tradition from the general serious opinion of the times4 ,but in finding this magnificent expression1 it thereby deepened the stream of thought from which it arose4 ,the spectacle of a moral order was impressed upon the imagination of classical civilisation4 ,the time came when that great society decayed1 and ,europe passed into the ,middle ,ages4 ,the direct influence of ,greek literature vanished4 ,but the concept of the moral order and of the order of nature had enshrined itself in the ,stoic philosophy4 ,for example1 ,lecky in his ,history of ,european ,morals tells us #8,seneca maintains that the ,divinity has determined all things by an inexorable law of destiny1 which ,he has decreed1 but which ,he ,himself obeys4' ,but the most effective way in which the ,stoics influenced the mentality of the ,middle ,ages was by the diffused sense of order which arose from ,roman law4 ,again to quote ,lecky1 #8,the ,roman legislation was in a two-fold manner the child of philosophy4 ,it was in the first place formed upon the philosophical model1 for1 instead of being a mere empirical system adjusted to the existing requirements of society1 it laid down abstract principles of right to which it endeavoured to conform2 and1 in the next place1 these principles were borrowed directly from ,stoicism4' ,in spite of the actual anarchy throughout large regions in ,europe after the collapse of the ,empire1 the sense of legal order always haunted the racial memories of the ,imperial populations4 ,also the ,western ,church was always there as a living embodiment of the traditions of ,imperial rule4 ,it is important to notice that this legal impress upon medieval civilisation was not in the form of a few wise precepts which should permeate conduct4 ,it was the conception of a definite articulated system which defines the legality of the detailed structure of social organism1 and of the detailed way in which it should function4 ,there was nothing vague4 ,it was not a question of admirable maxims1 but of definite procedure to put things right and to keep them there4 ,the ,middle ,ages formed one long training of the intellect of ,western ,europe in the sense of order4 ,there may have been some deficiency in respect to practice4 ,but the idea never for a moment lost its grip4 ,it was preminently an epoch of orderly thought1 rationalist through and through4 ,the very anarchy quickened the sense for coherent system2 just as the modern anarchy of ,europe has stimulated the intellectual vision of a ,league of ,nations4 ,but for science something more is wanted than a general sense of the order in things4 ,it needs but a sentence to point out how the habit of definite exact thought was implanted in the ,european mind by the long dominance of scholastic logic and scholastic divinity4 ,the habit remained after the philosophy had been repudiated1 the priceless habit of looking for an exact point and of sticking to it when found4 ,galileo owes more to ,aristotle than appears on the surface of his ,dialogues3 he owes to him his clear head and his analytic mind4 ,i do not think1 however1 that ,i have even yet brought out the greatest contribution of medievalism to the formation of the scientific movement4 ,i mean the inexpugnable belief that every detailed occurrence can be correlated with its antecedents in a perfectly definite manner1 exemplifying general principles4 ,without this belief the incredible labours of scientists would be without hope4 ,it is this instinctive conviction1 vividly poised before the imagination1 which is the motive power of research3--that there is a secret1 a secret which can be unveiled4 ,how has this conviction been so vividly implanted on the ,european mind8 ,when we compare this tone of thought in ,europe with the attitude of other civilisations when left to themselves1 there seems but one source for its origin4 ,it must come from the medieval insistence on the rationality of ,god1 conceived as with the personal energy of ,jehovah and with the rationality of a ,greek philosopher4 ,every detail was supervised and ordered3 the search into nature could only result in the vindication of the faith in rationality4 ,remember that ,i am not talking of the explicit beliefs of a few individuals4 ,what ,i mean is the impress on the ,european mind arising from the unquestioned faith of centuries4 ,by this ,i mean the instinctive tone of thought and not a mere creed of words4 ,in ,asia1 the conceptions of ,god were of a being who was either too arbitrary or too impersonal for such ideas to have much effect on instinctive habits of mind4 ,any definite occurrence might be due to the fiat of an irrational despot1 or might issue from some impersonal1 inscrutable origin of things4 ,there was not the same confidence as in the intelligible rationality of a personal being4 ,i am not arguing that the ,european trust in the scrutability of nature was logically justified even by its own theology4 ,my only point is to understand how it arose4 ,my explanation is that the faith in the possibility of science1 generated antecedently to the development of modern scientific theory1 is an unconscious derivative from medieval theology4 ,but science is not merely the outcome of instinctive faith4 ,it also requires an active interest in the simple occurrences of life for their own sake4 ,this qualification #8for their own sake' is important4 ,the first phase of the ,middle ,ages was an age of symbolism4 ,it was an age of vast ideas1 and of primitive technique4 ,there was little to be done with nature1 except to coin a hard living from it4 ,but there were realms of thought to be explored1 realms of philosophy and realms of theology4 ,primitive art could symbolise those ideas which filled all thoughtful minds4 ,the first phase of medieval art has a haunting charm beyond compare3 its own intrinsic quality is enhanced by the fact that its message1 which stretched beyond art's own self-justification of aesthetic achievement1 was the symbolism of things lying behind nature itself4 ,in this symbolic phase1 medieval art energised in nature as its medium1 but pointed to another world4 ,in order to understand the contrast between these early ,middle ,ages and the atmosphere required by the scientific mentality1 we should compare the sixth century in ,italy with the sixteenth century4 ,in both centuries the ,italian genius was laying the foundations of a new epoch4 ,the history of the three centuries preceding the earlier period1 despite the promise for the future introduced by the rise of ,christianity1 is overwhelmingly infected by the sense of the decline of civilisation4 ,in each generation something has been lost4 ,as we read the records1 we are haunted by the shadow of the coming barbarism4 ,there are great men1 with fine achievements in action or in thought4 ,but their total effect is merely for some short time to arrest the general decline4 ,in the sixth century we are1 so far as ,italy is concerned1 at the lowest point of the curve4 ,but in that century every action is laying the foundation for the tremendous rise of the new ,european civilisation4 ,in the background the ,byzantine ,empire1 under ,justinian1 in three ways determined the character of the early ,middle ,ages in ,western ,europe4 ,in the first place1 its armies1 under ,belisarius and ,narses1 cleared ,italy from the ,gothic domination4 ,in this way1 the stage was freed for the exercise of the old ,italian genius for creating organisations which shall be protective of ideals of cultural activity4 ,it is impossible not to sympathise with the ,goths3 yet there can be no doubt but that a thousand years of the ,papacy were infinitely more valuable for ,europe than any effects derivable from a well-established ,gothic kingdom of ,italy4 ,in the second place1 the codification of the ,roman law established the ideal of legality which dominated the sociological thought of ,europe in the succeeding centuries4 ,law is both an engine for government1 and a condition restraining government4 ,the canon law of the ,church1 and the civil law of the ,state1 owe to ,justinian's lawyers their influence on the development of ,europe4 ,they established in the ,western mind the ideal that an authority should be at once lawful1 and law-enforcing1 and should in itself exhibit a rationally adjusted system of organisation4 ,the sixth century in ,italy gave the initial exhibition of the way in which the impress of these ideas was fostered by contact with the ,byzantine ,empire4 ,thirdly1 in the non-political spheres of art and learning ,constantinople exhibited a standard of realised achievement which1 partly by the impulse to direct imitation1 and partly by the indirect inspiration arising from the mere knowledge that such things existed1 acted as a perpetual spur to ,western culture4 ,the wisdom of the ,byzantines1 as it stood in the imagination of the first phase of medieval mentality1 and the wisdom of the ,egyptians as it stood in the imagination of the early ,greeks1 played analogous rles4 ,probably the actual knowledge of these respective wisdoms was1 in either case1 about as much as was good for the recipients4 ,they knew enough to know the sort of standards which are attainable1 and not enough to be fettered by static and traditional ways of thought4 ,accordingly1 in both cases men went ahead on their own and did better4 ,no account of the rise of the ,european scientific mentality can omit some notice of this influence of the ,byzantine civilisation in the background4 ,in the sixth century there is a crisis in the history of the relations between the ,byzantines and the ,west2 and this crisis is to be contrasted with the influence of ,greek literature on ,european thought in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries4 ,the two outstanding men1 who in the ,italy of the sixth century laid the foundations of the future1 were ,st4 ,benedict and ,gregory the ,great4 ,by reference to them1 we can at once see how absolutely in ruins was the approach to the scientific mentality which had been attained by the ,greeks4 ,we are at the zero point of scientific temperature4 ,but the life-work of ,gregory and of ,benedict contributed elements to the reconstruction of ,europe which secured that this reconstruction1 when it arrived1 should include a more effective scientific mentality than that of the ancient world4 ,the ,greeks were over-theoretical4 ,for them science was an offshoot of philosophy4 ,gregory and ,benedict were practical men1 with an eye for the importance of ordinary things2 and they combined this practical temperament with their religious and cultural activities4 ,in particular1 we owe it to ,st4 ,benedict that the monasteries were the homes of practical agriculturalists1 as well as of saints and of artists and of men of learning4 ,the alliance of science with technology1 by which learning is kept in contact with irreducible and stubborn facts1 owes much to the practical bent of the early ,benedictines4 ,modern science derives from ,rome as well as from ,greece1 and this ,roman strain explains its gain in an energy of thought kept closely in contact with the world of facts4 ,but the influence of this contact between the monasteries and the facts of nature showed itself first in art4 ,the rise of ,naturalism in the later ,middle ,ages was the entry into the ,european mind of the final ingredient necessary for the rise of science4 ,it was the rise of interest in natural objects1 and in natural occurrences1 for their own sakes4 ,the natural foliage of a district was sculptured in out-of-the-way spots of the later buildings1 merely as exhibiting delight in those familiar objects4 ,the whole atmosphere of every art exhibited a direct joy in the apprehension of the things which lie around us4 ,the craftsmen who executed the late medieval decorative sculpture1 ,giotto1 ,chaucer1 ,wordsworth1 ,walt ,whitman1 and1 at the present day1 the ,new ,england poet ,robert ,frost1 are all akin to each other in this respect4 ,the simple immediate facts are the topics of interest1 and these reappear in the thought of science as the #8irreducible stubborn facts4' ,the mind of ,europe was now prepared for its new venture of thought4 ,it is unnecessary to tell in detail the various incidents which marked the rise of science3 the growth of wealth and leisure2 the expansion of universities2 the invention of printing2 the taking of ,constantinople2 ,copernicus2 ,vasco da ,gama2 ,columbus2 the telescope4 ,the soil1 the climate1 the seeds1 were there1 and the forest grew4 ,science has never shaken off the impress of its origin in the historical revolt of the later ,renaissance4 ,it has remained predominantly an anti-rationalistic movement1 based upon a nave faith4 ,what reasoning it has wanted1 has been borrowed from mathematics which is a surviving relic of ,greek rationalism1 following the deductive method4 ,science repudiates philosophy4 ,in other words1 it has never cared to justify its faith or to explain its meanings2 and has remained blandly indifferent to its refutation by ,hume4 ,of course the historical revolt was fully justified4 ,it was wanted4 ,it was more than wanted3 it was an absolute necessity for healthy progress4 ,the world required centuries of contemplation of irreducible and stubborn facts4 ,it is difficult for men to do more than one thing at a time1 and that was the sort of thing they had to do after the rationalistic orgy of the ,middle ,ages4 ,it was a very sensible reaction2 but it was not a protest on behalf of reason4 ,there is1 however1 a ,nemesis which waits upon those who deliberately avoid avenues of knowledge4 ,oliver ,cromwell's cry echoes down the ages1 #8,my brethren1 by the bowels of ,christ ,i beseech you1 bethink you that you may be mistaken4' ,the progress of science has now reached a turning point4 ,the stable foundations of physics have broken up3 also for the first time physiology is asserting itself as an effective body of knowledge1 as distinct from a scrap-heap4 ,the old foundations of scientific thought are becoming unintelligible4 ,time1 space1 matter1 material1 ether1 electricity1 mechanism1 organism1 configuration1 structure1 pattern1 function1 all require reinterpretation4 ,what is the sense of talking about a mechanical explanation when you do not know what you mean by mechanics8 ,the truth is that science started its modern career by taking over ideas derived from the weakest side of the philosophies of ,aristotle's successors4 ,in some respects it was a happy choice4 ,it enabled the knowledge of the seventeenth century to be formularised so far as physics and chemistry were concerned1 with a completeness which has lasted to the present time4 ,but the progress of biology and psychology has probably been checked by the uncritical assumption of half-truths4 ,if science is not to degenerate into a medley of ad hoc hypotheses1 it must become philosophical and must enter upon a thorough criticism of its own foundations4 ,in the succeeding lectures of this course1 ,i shall trace the successes and the failures of the particular conceptions of cosmology with which the ,european intellect has clothed itself in the last three centuries4 ,general climates of opinion persist for periods of about two to three generations1 that is to say1 for periods of sixty to a hundred years4 ,there are also shorter waves of thought1 which play on the surface of the tidal movement4 ,we shall find1 therefore1 transformations in the ,european outlook1 slowly modifying the successive centuries4 ,there persists1 however1 throughout the whole period the fixed scientific cosmology which presupposes the ultimate fact of an irreducible brute matter1 or material1 spread throughout space in a flux of configurations4 ,in itself such a material is senseless1 valueless1 purposeless4 ,it just does what it does do1 following a fixed routine imposed by external relations which do not spring from the nature of its being4 ,it is this assumption that ,i call #8scientific materialism4' ,also it is an assumption which ,i shall challenge as being entirely unsuited to the scientific situation at which we have now arrived4 ,it is not wrong1 if properly construed4 ,if we confine ourselves to certain types of facts1 abstracted from the complete circumstances in which they occur1 the materialistic assumption expresses these facts to perfection4 ,but when we pass beyond the abstraction1 either by more subtle employment of our senses1 or by the request for meanings and for coherence of thoughts1 the scheme breaks down at once4 ,the narrow efficiency of the scheme was the very cause of its supreme methodological success4 ,for it directed attention to just those groups of facts which1 in the state of knowledge then existing1 required investigation4 ,the success of the scheme has adversely affected the various currents of ,european thought4 ,the historical revolt was anti-rationalistic1 because the rationalism of the scholastics required a sharp correction by contact with brute fact4 ,but the revival of philosophy in the hands of ,descartes and his successors was entirely coloured in its development by the acceptance of the scientific cosmology at its face value4 ,the success of their ultimate ideas confirmed scientists in their refusal to modify them as the result of an enquiry into their rationality4 ,every philosophy was bound in some way or other to swallow them whole4 ,also the example of science affected other regions of thought4 ,the historical revolt has thus been exaggerated into the exclusion of philosophy from its proper rle of harmonising the various abstractions of methodological thought4 ,thought is abstract2 and the intolerant use of abstractions is the major vice of the intellect4 ,this vice is not wholly corrected by the recurrence to concrete experience4 ,for after all1 you need only attend to those aspects of your concrete experience which lie within some limited scheme4 ,there are two methods for the purification of ideas4 ,one of them is dispassionate observation by means of the bodily senses4 ,but observation is selection4 ,accordingly1 it is difficult to transcend a scheme of abstraction whose success is sufficiently wide4 ,the other method is by comparing the various schemes of abstraction which are well founded in our various types of experience4 ,this comparison takes the form of satisfying the demands of the ,italian scholastic divines whom ,paul ,sarpi mentioned4 ,they asked that reason should be used4 ,faith in reason is the trust that the ultimate natures of things lie together in a harmony which excludes mere arbitrariness4 ,it is the faith that at the base of things we shall not find mere arbitrary mystery4 ,the faith in the order of nature which has made possible the growth of science is a particular example of a deeper faith4 ,this faith cannot be justified by any inductive generalisation4 ,it springs from direct inspection of the nature of things as disclosed in our own immediate present experience4 ,there is no parting from your own shadow4 ,to experience this faith is to know that in being ourselves we are more than ourselves3 to know that our experience1 dim and fragmentary as it is1 yet sounds the utmost depths of reality3 to know that detached details merely in order to be themselves demand that they should find themselves in a system of things3 to know that this system includes the harmony of logical rationality1 and the harmony of aesthetic achievement3 to know that1 while the harmony of logic lies upon the universe as an iron necessity1 the aesthetic harmony stands before it as a living ideal moulding the general flux in its broken progress towards finer1 subtler issues4 ,,chapter ,,ii ,,mathematics ,,as ,,an ,,element ,,in ,,the ,,history ,,of ,,thought ,the science of ,pure ,mathematics1 in its modern developments1 may claim to be the most original creation of the human spirit4 ,another claimant for this position is music4 ,but we will put aside all rivals1 and consider the ground on which such a claim can be made for mathematics4 ,the originality of mathematics consists in the fact that in mathematical science connections between things are exhibited which1 apart from the agency of human reason1 are extremely unobvious4 ,thus the ideas1 now in the minds of contemporary mathematicians1 lie very remote from any notions which can be immediately derived by perception through the senses2 unless indeed it be perception stimulated and guided by antecedent mathematical knowledge4 ,this is the thesis which ,i proceed to exemplify4 ,suppose we project our imaginations backwards through many thousands of years1 and endeavour to realise the simple-mindedness of even the greatest intellects in those early societies4 ,abstract ideas which to us are immediately obvious must have been1 for them1 matters only of the most dim apprehension4 ,for example take the question of number4 ,we think of the number #8five' as applying to appropriate groups of any entities whatsoever--to five fishes1 five children1 five apples1 five days4 ,thus in considering the relations of the number #8five' to the number #8three1' we are thinking of two groups of things1 one with five members and the other with three members4 ,but we are entirely abstracting from any consideration of any particular entities1 or even of any particular sorts of entities1 which go to make up the membership of either of the two groups4 ,we are merely thinking of those relationships between those two groups which are entirely independent of the individual essences of any of the members of either group4 ,this is a very remarkable feat of abstraction2 and it must have taken ages for the human race to rise to it4 ,during a long period1 groups of fishes will have been compared to each other in respect to their multiplicity1 and groups of days to each other4 ,but the first man who noticed the analogy between a group of seven fishes and a group of seven days made a notable advance in the history of thought4 ,he was the first man who entertained a concept belonging to the science of pure mathematics4 ,at that moment it must have been impossible for him to divine the complexity and subtlety of these abstract mathematical ideas which were waiting for discovery4 ,nor could he have guessed that these notions would exert a widespread fascination in each succeeding generation4 ,there is an erroneous literary tradition which represents the love of mathematics as a monomania confined to a few eccentrics in each generation4 ,but be this as it may1 it would have been impossible to anticipate the pleasure derivable from a type of abstract thinking which had no counterpart in the then-existing society4 ,thirdly1 the tremendous future effect of mathematical knowledge on the lives of men1 on their daily avocations1 on their habitual thoughts1 on the organization of society1 must have been even more completely shrouded from the foresight of those early thinkers4 ,even now there is a very wavering grasp of the true position of mathematics as an element in the history of thought4 ,i will not go so far as to say that to construct a history of thought without profound study of the mathematical ideas of successive epochs is like omitting ,hamlet from the play which is named after him4 ,that would be claiming too much4 ,but it is certainly analogous to cutting out the part of ,ophelia4 ,this simile is singularly exact4 ,for ,ophelia is quite essential to the play1 she is very charming1--and a little mad4 ,let us grant that the pursuit of mathematics is a divine madness of the human spirit1 a refuge from the goading urgency of contingent happenings4 ,when we think of mathematics1 we have in our mind a science devoted to the exploration of number1 quantity1 geometry1 and in modern times also including investigation into yet more abstract concepts of order1 and into analogous types of purely logical relations4 ,the point of mathematics is that in it we have always got rid of the particular instance1 and even of any particular sorts of entities4 ,so that for example1 no mathematical truths apply merely to fish1 or merely to stones1 or merely to colours4 ,so long as you are dealing with pure mathematics1 you are in the realm of complete and absolute abstraction4 ,all you assert is1 that reason insists on the admission that1 if any entities whatever have any relations which satisfy such-and-such purely abstract conditions1 then they must have other relations which satisfy other purely abstract conditions4 ,mathematics is thought moving in the sphere of complete abstraction from any particular instance of what it is talking about4 ,so far is this view of mathematics from being obvious1 that we can easily assure ourselves that it is not1 even now1 generally understood4 ,for example1 it is habitually thought that the certainty of mathematics is a reason for the certainty of our geometrical knowledge of the space of the physical universe4 ,this is a delusion which has vitiated much philosophy in the past1 and some philosophy in the present4 ,this question of geometry is a test case of some urgency4 ,there are certain alternative sets of purely abstract conditions possible for the relationships of groups of unspecified entities1 which ,i will call geometrical conditions4 ,i give them this name because of their general analogy to those conditions1 which we believe to hold respecting the particular geometrical relations of things observed by us in our direct perception of nature4 ,so far as our observations are concerned1 we are not quite accurate enough to be certain of the exact conditions regulating the things we come across in nature4 ,but we can by a slight stretch of hypothesis identify these observed conditions with some one set of the purely abstract geometrical conditions4 ,in doing so1 we make a particular determination of the group of unspecified entities which are the relata in the abstract science4 ,in the pure mathematics of geometrical relationships1 we say that1 if any group of entities enjoy any relationships among its members satisfying this set of abstract geometrical conditions1 then such-and-such additional abstract conditions must also hold for such relationships4 ,but when we come to physical space1 we say that some definitely observed group of physical entities enjoys some definitely observed relationships among its members which do satisfy this above-mentioned set of abstract geometrical conditions4 ,we thence conclude that the additional relationships which we concluded to hold in any such case1 must therefore hold in this particular case4 ,the certainty of mathematics depends upon its complete abstract generality4 ,but we can have no priori certainty that we are right in believing that the observed entities in the concrete universe form a particular instance of what falls under our general reasoning4 ,to take another example from arithmetic4 ,it is a general abstract truth of pure mathematics that any group of forty entities can be subdivided into two groups of twenty entities4 ,we are therefore justified in concluding that a particular group of apples which we believe to contain forty members can be subdivided into two groups of apples of which each contains twenty members4 ,but there always remains the possibility that we have miscounted the big group2 so that1 when we come in practice to subdivide it1 we shall find that one of the two heaps has an apple too few or an apple too many4 ,accordingly1 in criticising an argument based upon the application of mathematics to particular matters of fact1 there are always three processes to be kept perfectly distinct in our minds4 ,we must first scan the purely mathematical reasoning to make sure that there are no mere slips in it--no casual illogicalities due to mental failure4 ,any mathematician knows from bitter experience that1 in first elaborating a train of reasoning1 it is very easy to commit a slight error which yet makes all the difference4 ,but when a piece of mathematics has been revised1 and has been before the expert world for some time1 the chance of a casual error is almost negligible4 ,the next process is to make quite certain of all the abstract conditions which have been presupposed to hold4 ,this is the determination of the abstract premises from which the mathematical reasoning proceeds4 ,this is a matter of considerable difficulty4 ,in the past quite remarkable oversights have been made1 and have been accepted by generations of the greatest mathematicians4 ,the chief danger is that of oversight1 namely1 tacitly to introduce some condition1 which it is natural for us to presuppose1 but which in fact need not always be holding4 ,there is another opposite oversight in this connection which does not lead to error1 but only to lack of simplification4 ,it is very easy to think that more postulated conditions are required than is in fact the case4 ,in other words1 we may think that some abstract postulate is necessary which is in fact capable of being proved from the other postulates that we have already on hand4 ,the only effects of this excess of abstract postulates are to diminish our aesthetic pleasure in the mathematical reasoning1 and to give us more trouble when we come to the third process of criticism4 ,this third process of criticism is that of verifying that our abstract postulates hold for the particular case in question4 ,it is in respect to this process of verification for the particular case that all the trouble arises4 ,in some simple instances1 such as the counting of forty apples1 we can with a little care arrive at practical certainty4 ,but in general1 with more complex instances1 complete certainty is unattainable4 ,volumes1 libraries of volumes1 have been written on the subject4 ,it is the battle ground of rival philosophers4 ,there are two distinct questions involved4 ,there are particular definite things observed1 and we have to make sure that the relations between these things really do obey certain definite exact abstract conditions4 ,there is great room for error here4 ,the exact observational methods of science are all contrivances for limiting these erroneous conclusions as to direct matters of fact4 ,but another question arises4 ,the things directly observed are1 almost always1 only samples4 ,we want to conclude that the abstract conditions1 which hold for the samples1 also hold for all other entities which1 for some reason or other1 appear to us to be of the same sort4 ,this process of reasoning from the sample to the whole species is ,induction4 ,the theory of ,induction is the despair of philosophy--and yet all our activities are based upon it4 ,anyhow1 in criticising a mathematical conclusion as to a particular matter of fact1 the real difficulties consist in finding out the abstract assumptions involved1 and in estimating the evidence for their applicability to the particular case in hand4 ,it often happens1 therefore1 that in criticising a learned book of applied mathematics1 or a memoir1 one's whole trouble is with the first chapter1 or even with the first page4 ,for it is there1 at the very outset1 where the author will probably be found to slip in his assumptions4 ,farther1 the trouble is not with what the author does say1 but with what he does not say4 ,also it is not with what he knows he has assumed1 but with what he has unconsciously assumed4 ,we do not doubt the author's honesty4 ,it is his perspicacity which we are criticising4 ,each generation criticises the unconscious assumptions made by its parents4 ,it may assent to them1 but it brings them out in the open4 ,the history of the development of language illustrates this point4 ,it is a history of the progressive analysis of ideas4 ,latin and ,greek were inflected languages4 ,this means that they express an unanalyzed complex of ideas by the mere modification of a word2 whereas in ,english1 for example1 we use prepositions and auxiliary verbs to drag into the open the whole bundle of ideas involved4 ,for certain forms of literary art1--though not always--the compact absorption of auxiliary ideas into the main word may be an advantage4 ,but in a language such as ,english there is the overwhelming gain in explicitness4 ,this increased explicitness is a more complete exhibition of the various abstractions involved in the complex idea which is the meaning of the sentence4 ,by comparison with language1 we can now see what is the function in thought which is performed by pure mathematics4 ,it is a resolute attempt to go the whole way in the direction of complete analysis1 so as to separate the elements of mere matter of fact from the purely abstract conditions which they exemplify4 ,the habit of such analysis enlightens every act of the functioning of the human mind4 ,it first 7by isolating it7 emphasizes the direct aesthetic appreciation of the content of experience4 ,this direct appreciation means an apprehension of what this experience is in itself in its own particular essence1 including its immediate concrete values4 ,this is a question of direct experience1 dependent upon sensitive subtlety4 ,there is then the abstraction of the particular entities involved1 viewed in themselves1 and as apart from that particular occasion of experience in which we are then apprehending them4 ,lastly there is the further apprehension of the absolutely general conditions satisfied by the particular relations of those entities as in that experience4 ,these conditions gain their generality from the fact that they are expressible without reference to those particular relations or to those particular relata which occur in that particular occasion of experience4 ,they are conditions which might hold for an indefinite variety of other occasions1 involving other entities and other relations between them4 ,thus these conditions are perfectly general because they refer to no particular occasion1 and to no particular entities 7such as green1 or blue1 or trees7 which enter into a variety of occasions1 and to no particular relationships between such entities4 ,there is1 however1 a limitation to be made to the generality of mathematics2 it is a qualification which applies equally to all general statements4 ,no statement1 except one1 can be made respecting any remote occasion which enters into no relationship with the immediate occasion so as to form a constitutive element of the essence of that immediate occasion4 ,by the #8immediate occasion' ,i mean that occasion which involves as an ingredient the individual act of judgment in question4 ,the one excepted statement is1--,if anything out of relationship1 then complete ignorance as to it4 ,here by #8ignorance1' ,i mean ignorance2 accordingly no advice can be given as to how to expect it1 or to treat it1 in #8practice' or in any other way4 ,either we know something of the remote occasion by the cognition which is itself an element of the immediate occasion1 or we know nothing4 ,accordingly the full universe1 disclosed for every variety of experience1 is a universe in which every detail enters into its proper relationship with the immediate occasion4 ,the generality of mathematics is the most complete generality consistent with the community of occasions which constitutes our metaphysical situation4 ,it is further to be noticed that the particular entities require these general conditions for their ingression into any occasions2 but the same general conditions may be required by many types of particular entities4 ,this fact1 that the general conditions transcend any one set of particular entities1 is the ground for the entry into mathematics1 and into mathematical logic1 of the notion of the #8variable4' ,it is by the employment of this notion that general conditions are investigated without any specification of particular entities4 ,this irrelevance of the particular entities has not been generally understood3 for example1 the shape-iness of shapes1 e4g41 circularity and sphericity and cubicality as in actual experience1 do not enter into the geometrical reasoning4 ,the exercise of logical reason is always concerned with these absolutely general conditions4 ,in its broadest sense1 the discovery of mathematics is the discovery that the totality of these general abstract conditions1 which are concurrently applicable to the relationships among the entities of any one concrete occasion1 are themselves inter-connected in the manner of a pattern with a key to it4 ,this pattern of relationships among general abstract conditions is imposed alike on external reality1 and on our abstract representations of it1 by the general necessity that every thing must be just its own individual self1 with its own individual way of differing from everything else4 ,this is nothing else than the necessity of abstract logic1 which is the presupposition involved in the very fact of interrelated existence as disclosed in each immediate occasion of experience4 ,the key to the pattern means this fact3--that from a select set of those general conditions1 exemplified in any one and the same occasion1 a pattern involving an infinite variety of other such conditions1 also exemplified in the same occasion1 can be developed by the pure exercise of abstract logic4 ,any such select set is called the set of postulates1 or premises1 from which the reasoning proceeds4 ,the reasoning is nothing else than the exhibition of the whole pattern of general conditions involved in the pattern derived from the selected postulates4 ,the harmony of the logical reason1 which divines the complete pattern as involved in the postulates1 is the most general aesthetic property arising from the mere fact of concurrent existence in the unity of one occasion4 ,wherever there is a unity of occasion there is thereby established an aesthetic relationship between the general conditions involved in that occasion4 ,this aesthetic relationship is that which is divined in the exercise of rationality4 ,whatever falls within that relationship is thereby exemplified in that occasion2 whatever falls without that relationship is thereby excluded from exemplification in that occasion4 ,the complete pattern of general conditions1 thus exemplified1 is determined by any one of many select sets of these conditions4 ,these key sets are sets of equivalent postulates4 ,this reasonable harmony of being1 which is required for the unity of a complex occasion1 together with the completeness of the realisation 7in that occasion7 of all that is involved in its logical harmony1 is the primary article of metaphysical doctrine4 ,it means that for things to be together involves that they are reasonably together4 ,this means that thought can penetrate into every occasion of fact1 so that by comprehending its key conditions1 the whole complex of its pattern of conditions lies open before it4 ,it comes to this3--provided we know something which is perfectly general about the elements in any occasion1 we can then know an indefinite number of other equally general concepts which must also be exemplified in that same occasion4 ,the logical harmony involved in the unity of an occasion is both exclusive and inclusive4 ,the occasion must exclude the inharmonious1 and it must include the harmonious4 ,pythagoras was the first man who had any grasp of the full sweep of this general principle4 ,he lived in the sixth century before ,christ4 ,our knowledge of him is fragmentary4 ,but we know some points which establish his greatness in the history of thought4 ,he insisted on the importance of the utmost generality in reasoning1 and he divined the importance of number as an aid to the construction of any representation of the conditions involved in the order of nature4 ,we know also that he studied geometry1 and discovered the general proof of the remarkable theorem about right-angled triangles4 ,the formation of the ,pythagorean ,brotherhood1 and the mysterious rumours as to its rites and its influence1 afford some evidence that ,pythagoras divined1 however dimly1 the possible importance of mathematics in the formation of science4 ,on the side of philosophy he started a discussion which has agitated thinkers ever since4 ,he asked1 #8,what is the status of mathematical entities1 such as numbers for example1 in the realm of things8' ,the number #8two1' for example1 is in some sense exempt from the flux of time and the necessity of position in space4 ,yet it is involved in the real world4 ,the same considerations apply to geometrical notions--to circular shape1 for example4 ,pythagoras is said to have taught that the mathematical entities1 such as numbers and shapes1 were the ultimate stuff out of which the real entities of our perceptual experience are constructed4 ,as thus boldly stated1 the idea seems crude1 and indeed silly4 ,but undoubtedly1 he had hit upon a philosophical notion of considerable importance2 a notion which has a long history1 and which has moved the minds of men1 and has even entered into ,christian theology4 ,about a thousand years separate the ,athanasian ,creed from ,pythagoras1 and about two thousand four hundred years separate ,pythagoras from ,hegel4 ,yet for all these distances in time1 the importance of definite number in the constitution of the ,divine ,nature1 and the concept of the real world as exhibiting the evolution of an idea1 can both be traced back to the train of thought set going by ,pythagoras4 ,the importance of an individual thinker owes something to chance4 ,for it depends upon the fate of his ideas in the minds of his successors4 ,in this respect ,pythagoras was fortunate4 ,his philosophical speculations reach us through the mind of ,plato4 ,the ,platonic world of ideas is the refined1 revised form of the ,pythagorean doctrine that number lies at the base of the real world4 ,owing to the ,greek mode of representing numbers by patterns of dots1 the notions of number and of geometrical configuration are less separated than with us4 ,also ,pythagoras1 without doubt1 included the shape-iness of shape1 which is an impure mathematical entity4 ,so to-day1 when ,einstein and his followers proclaim that physical facts1 such as gravitation1 are to be construed as exhibitions of local peculiarities of spatio-temporal properties1 they are following the pure ,pythagorean tradition4 ,in a sense1 ,plato and ,pythagoras stand nearer to modern physical science than does ,aristotle4 ,the two former were mathematicians1 whereas ,aristotle was the son of a doctor1 though of course he was not thereby ignorant of mathematics4 ,the practical counsel to be derived from ,pythagoras1 is to measure1 and thus to express quality in terms of numerically determined quantity4 ,but the biological sciences1 then and till our own time1 have been overwhelmingly classificatory4 ,accordingly1 ,aristotle by his ,logic throws the emphasis on classification4 ,the popularity of ,aristotelian ,logic retarded the advance of physical science throughout the ,middle ,ages4 ,if only the schoolmen had measured instead of classifying1 how much they might have learnt6 ,classification is a halfway house between the immediate concreteness of the individual thing and the complete abstraction of mathematical notions4 ,the species take account of the specific character1 and the genera of the generic character4 ,but in the procedure of relating mathematical notions to the facts of nature1 by counting1 by measurement1 and by geometrical relations1 and by types of order1 the rational contemplation is lifted from the incomplete abstractions involved in definite species and genera1 to the complete1 abstractions of mathematics4 ,classification is necessary4 ,but unless you can progress from classification to mathematics1 your reasoning will not take you very far4 ,between the epoch which stretches from ,pythagoras to ,plato and the epoch comprised in the seventeenth century of the modern world nearly two thousand years elapsed4 ,in this long interval mathematics had made immense strides4 ,geometry had gained the study of conic sections and trigonometry2 the method of exhaustion had almost anticipated the integral calculus2 and above all the ,arabic arithmetical notation and algebra had been contributed by ,asiatic thought4 ,but the progress was on technical lines4 ,mathematics1 as a formative element in the development of philosophy1 never1 during this long period1 recovered from its deposition at the hands of ,aristotle4 ,some of the old ideas derived from the ,pythagorean-,platonic epoch lingered on1 and can be traced among the ,platonic influences which shaped the first period of evolution of ,christian theology4 ,but philosophy received no fresh inspiration from the steady advance of mathematical science4 ,in the seventeenth century the influence of ,aristotle was at its lowest1 and mathematics recovered the importance of its earlier period4 ,it was an age of great physicists and great philosophers2 and the physicists and philosophers were alike mathematicians4 ,the exception of ,john ,locke should be made2 although he was greatly influenced by the ,newtonian circle of the ,royal ,society4 ,in the age of ,galileo1 ,descartes1 ,spinoza1 ,newton1 and ,leibniz1 mathematics was an influence of the first magnitude in the formation of philosophic ideas4 ,but the mathematics1 which now emerged into prominence1 was a very different science from the mathematics of the earlier epoch4 ,it had gained in generality1 and had started upon its almost incredible modern career of piling subtlety of generalization upon subtlety of generalization2 and of finding1 with each growth of complexity1 some new application1 either to physical science1 or to philosophic thought4 ,the ,arabic notation had equipped the science with almost perfect technical efficiency in the manipulation of numbers4 ,this relief from a struggle with arithmetical details 7as instanced1 for example1 in the ,egyptian arithmetic of ,b4 ,c4 #afjj7 gave room for a development which had already been faintly anticipated in later ,greek mathematics4 ,algebra now came upon the scene1 and algebra is a generalisation of arithmetic4 ,in the same way as the notion of number abstracted from reference to any one particular set of entities1 so in algebra abstraction is made from the notion of any particular numbers4 ,just as the number #8#e' refers impartially to any group of five entities1 so in algebra the letters are used to refer impartially to any number1 with the proviso that each letter is to refer to the same number throughout the same context of its employment4 ,this usage was first employed in equations1 which are methods of asking complicated arithmetical questions4 ,in this connection1 the letters representing numbers were termed #8unknowns4' ,but equations soon suggested a new idea1 that1 namely1 of a function of one or more general symbols1 these symbols being letters representing any numbers4 ,in this employment the algebraic letters are called the #8arguments' of the function1 or sometimes they are called the #8variables4' ,then1 for instance1 if an angle is represented by an algebraical letter1 as standing for its numerical measure in terms of a given unit1 ,trigonometry is absorbed into this new algebra4 ,algebra thus develops into the general science of analysis in which we consider the properties of various functions of undetermined arguments4 ,finally the particular functions1 such as the trigonometrical functions1 and the logarithmic functions1 and the algebraic functions1 are generalised into the idea of #8any function4' ,too large a generalisation leads to mere barrenness4 ,it is the large generalisation1 limited by a happy particularity1 which is the fruitful conception4 ,for instance the idea of any continuous function1 whereby the limitation of continuity is introduced1 is the fruitful idea which has led to most of the important applications4 ,this rise of algebraic analysis was concurrent with ,descartes' discovery of analytical geometry1 and then with the invention of the infinitesimal calculus by ,newton and ,leibniz4 ,truly1 ,pythagoras1 if he could have foreseen the issue of the train of thought which he had set going would have felt himself fully justified in his brotherhood with its excitement of mysterious rites4 ,the point which ,i now want to make is that this dominance of the idea of functionality in the abstract sphere of mathematics found itself reflected in the order of nature under the guise of mathematically expressed laws of nature4 ,apart from this progress of mathematics1 the seventeenth century developments of science would have been impossible4 ,mathematics supplied the background of imaginative thought with which the men of science approached the observation of nature4 ,galileo produced formulae1 ,descartes produced formulae1 ,huyghens produced formulae1 ,newton produced formulae4 ,as a particular example of the effect of the abstract development of mathematics upon the science of those times1 consider the notion of periodicity4 ,the general recurrences of things are very obvious in our ordinary experience4 ,days recur1 lunar phases recur1 the seasons of the year recur1 rotating bodies recur to their old positions1 beats of the heart recur1 breathing recurs4 ,on every side1 we are met by recurrence4 ,apart from recurrence1 knowledge would be impossible2 for nothing could be referred to our past experience4 ,also1 apart from some regularity of recurrence1 measurement would be impossible4 ,in our experience1 as we gain the idea of exactness1 recurrence is fundamental4 ,in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries1 the theory of periodicity took a fundamental place in science4 ,kepler divined a law connecting the major axes of the planetary orbits with the periods in which the planets respectively described their orbits3 ,galileo observed the periodic vibrations of pendulums3 ,newton explained sound as being due to the disturbance of air by the passage through it of periodic waves of condensation and rarefaction3 ,huyghens explained light as being due to the transverse waves of vibration of a subtle ether3 ,mersenne connected the period of the vibration of a violin string with its density1 tension1 and length4 ,the birth of modern physics depended upon the application of the abstract idea of periodicity to a variety of concrete instances4 ,but this would have been impossible1 unless mathematicians had already worked out in the abstract the various abstract ideas which cluster round the notions of periodicity4 ,the science of trigonometry arose from that of the relations of the angles of a right-angled triangle1 to the ratios between the sides and hypotenuse of the triangle4 ,then1 under the influence of the newly discovered mathematical science of the analysis of functions1 it broadened out into the study of the simple abstract periodic functions which these ratios exemplify4 ,thus trigonometry became completely abstract2 and in thus becoming abstract1 it became useful4 ,it illuminated the underlying analogy between sets of utterly diverse physical phenomena2 and at the same time it supplied the weapons by which any one such set could have its various features analysed and related to each other4#b ,nothing is more impressive than the fact that1 as mathematics withdrew increasingly into the upper regions of ever greater extremes of abstract thought1 it returned back to earth with a corresponding growth of importance for the analysis of concrete fact4 ,the history of the seventeenth century science reads as though it were some vivid dream of ,plato or ,pythagoras4 ,in this characteristic the seventeenth century was only the forerunner of its successors4 ,footnote #b3 ,for a more detailed consideration of the nature and function of pure mathematics cf4 my ,introduction to ,mathematics1 ,home ,university ,library1 ,williams and ,norgate1 ,london4 ,the paradox is now fully established that the utmost abstractions are the true weapons with which to control our thought of concrete fact4 ,as the result of the prominence of mathematicians in the seventeenth century1 the eighteenth century was mathematically minded1 more especially where ,french influence predominated4 ,an exception must be made of the ,english empiricism derived from ,locke4 ,outside ,france1 ,newton's direct influence on philosophy is best seen in ,kant1 and not in ,hume4 ,in the nineteenth century1 the general influence of mathematics waned4 ,the romantic movement in literature1 and the idealistic movement in philosophy were not the products of mathematical minds4 ,also1 even in science1 the growth of geology1 of zoology1 and of the biological sciences generally1 was in each case entirely disconnected from any reference to mathematics4 ,the chief scientific excitement of the century was the ,darwinian theory of evolution4 ,accordingly1 mathematicians were in the background1 so far as the general thought of that age was concerned4 ,but this does not mean that mathematics was being neglected1 or even that it was uninfluential4 ,during the nineteenth century pure mathematics made almost as much progress as during all the preceding centuries from ,pythagoras onwards4 ,of course progress was easier1 because the technique had been perfected4 ,but allowing for that1 the change in mathematics between the years #ahjj and #aijj is very remarkable4 ,if we add in the previous hundred years1 and take the two centuries preceding the present time1 one is almost tempted to date the foundation of mathematics somewhere in the last quarter of the seventeenth century4 ,the period of the discovery of the elements stretches from ,pythagoras to ,descartes1 ,newton1 and ,leibniz1 and the developed science has been created during the last two hundred and fifty years4 ,this is not a boast as to the superior genius of the modern world2 for it is harder to discover the elements than to develop the science4 ,throughout the nineteenth century1 the influence of the science was its influence on dynamics and physics1 and thence derivatively on engineering and chemistry4 ,it is difficult to overrate its indirect influence on human life through the medium of these sciences4 ,but there was no direct influence of mathematics upon the general thought of the age4 ,in reviewing this rapid sketch of the influence of mathematics throughout ,european history1 we see that it had two great periods of direct influence upon general thought1 both periods lasting for about two hundred years4 ,the first period was that stretching from ,pythagoras to ,plato1 when the possibility of the science1 and its general character1 first dawned upon the ,grecian thinkers4 ,the second period comprised the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries of our modern epoch4 ,both periods had certain common characteristics4 ,in the earlier1 as in the later period1 the general categories of thought in many spheres of human interest1 were in a state of disintegration4 ,in the age of ,pythagoras1 the unconscious ,paganism1 with its traditional clothing of beautiful ritual and of magical rites1 was passing into a new phase under two influences4 ,there were waves of religious enthusiasm1 seeking direct enlightenment into the secret depths of being2 and at the opposite pole1 there was the awakening of critical analytical thought1 probing with cool dispassionateness into ultimate meanings4 ,in both influences1 so diverse in their outcome1 there was one common element--an awakened curiosity1 and a movement towards the reconstruction of traditional ways4 ,the pagan mysteries may be compared to the ,puritan reaction and to the ,catholic reaction2 critical scientific interest was alike in both epochs1 though with minor differences of substantial importance4 ,in each age1 the earlier stages were placed in periods of rising prosperity1 and of new opportunities4 ,in this respect1 they differed from the period of gradual declension in the second and third centuries when ,christianity was advancing to the conquest of the ,roman world4 ,it is only in a period1 fortunate both in its opportunities for disengagement from the immediate pressure of circumstances1 and in its eager curiosity1 that the ,age-,spirit can undertake any direct revision of those final abstractions which lie hidden in the more concrete concepts from which the serious thought of an age takes its start4 ,in the rare periods when this task can be undertaken1 mathematics becomes relevant to philosophy4 ,for mathematics is the science of the most complete abstractions to which the human mind can attain4 ,the parallel between the two epochs must not be pressed too far4 ,the modern world is larger and more complex than the ancient civilization round the shores of the ,mediterranean1 or even than that of the ,europe which sent ,columbus and the ,pilgrim ,fathers across the ocean4 ,we cannot now explain our age by some simple formula which becomes dominant and will then be laid to rest for a thousand years4 ,thus the temporary submergence of the mathematical mentality from the time of ,rousseau onwards appears already to be at an end4 ,we are entering upon an age of reconstruction1 in religion1 in science1 and in political thought4 ,such ages1 if they are to avoid mere ignorant oscillation between extremes1 must seek truth in its ultimate depths4 ,there can be no vision of this depth of truth apart from a philosophy which takes full account of those ultimate abstractions1 whose interconnections it is the business of mathematics to explore4 ,in order to explain exactly how mathematics is gaining in general importance at the present time1 let us start from a particular scientific perplexity and consider the notions to which we are naturally led by some attempt to unravel its difficulties4 ,at present physics is troubled by the quantum theory4 ,i need not now explain#c what this theory is1 to those who are not already familiar with it4 ,but the point is that one of the most hopeful lines of explanation is to assume that an electron does not continuously traverse its path in space4 ,the alternative notion as to its mode of existence is that it appears at a series of discrete positions in space which it occupies for successive durations of time4 ,it is as though an automobile moving at the average rate of thirty miles an hour along a road1 did not traverse the road continuously2 but appeared successively at the successive milestones1 remaining for two minutes at each milestone4 ,footnote #c3 ,cf4 ,chapter ,,viii4 ,in the first place there is required the purely technical use of mathematics to determine whether this conception does in fact explain the many perplexing characteristics of the quantum theory4 ,if the notion survives this test1 undoubtedly physics will adopt it4 ,so far the question is purely one for mathematics and physical science to settle between them1 on the basis of mathematical calculations and physical observations4 ,but now a problem is handed over to the philosophers4 ,this discontinuous existence in space1 thus assigned to electrons1 is very unlike the continuous existence of material entities which we habitually assume as obvious4 ,the electron seems to be borrowing the character which some people have assigned to the ,mahatmas of ,tibet4 ,these electrons1 with the correlative protons1 are now conceived as being the fundamental entities out of which the material bodies of ordinary experience are composed4 ,accordingly1 if this explanation is allowed1 we have to revise all our notions of the ultimate character of material existence4 ,for when we penetrate to these final entities1 this startling discontinuity of spatial existence discloses itself4 ,there is no difficulty in explaining the paradox1 if we consent to apply to the apparently steady undifferentiated endurance of matter the same principles as those now accepted for sound and light4 ,a steadily sounding note is explained as the outcome of vibrations in the air3 a steady colour is explained as the outcome of vibrations in ether4 ,if we explain the steady endurance of matter on the same principle1 we shall conceive each primordial element as a vibratory ebb and flow of an underlying energy1 or activity4 ,suppose we keep to the physical idea of energy3 then each primordial element will be an organized system of vibratory streaming of energy4 ,accordingly there will be a definite period associated with each element2 and within that period the stream-system will sway from one stationary maximum to another stationary maximum1--or1 taking a metaphor from the ocean tides1 the system will sway from one high tide to another high tide4 ,this system1 forming the primordial element1 is nothing at any instant4 ,it requires its whole period in which to manifest itself4 ,in an analogous way1 a note of music is nothing at an instant1 but it also requires its whole period in which to manifest itself4 ,accordingly1 in asking where the primordial element is1 we must settle on its average position at the centre of each period4 ,if we divide time into smaller elements1 the vibratory system as one electronic entity has no existence4 ,the path in space of such a vibratory entity--where the entity is constituted by the vibrations--must be represented by a series of detached positions in space1 analogously to the automobile which is found at successive milestones and at nowhere between4 ,we first must ask whether there is any evidence to associate the quantum theory with vibration4 ,this question is immediately answered in the affirmative4 ,the whole theory centres round the radiant energy from an atom1 and is intimately associated with the periods of the radiant wave-systems4 ,it seems1 therefore1 that the hypothesis of essentially vibratory existence is the most hopeful way of explaining the paradox of the discontinuous orbit4 ,in the second place1 a new problem is now placed before philosophers and physicists1 if we entertain the hypothesis that the ultimate elements of matter are in their essence vibratory4 ,by this ,i mean that apart from being a periodic system1 such an element would have no existence4 ,with this hypothesis we have to ask1 what are the ingredients which form the vibratory organism4 ,we have already got rid of the matter with its appearance of undifferentiated endurance4 ,apart from some metaphysical compulsion1 there is no reason to provide another more subtle stuff to take the place of the matter which has just been explained away4 ,the field is now open for the introduction of some new doctrine of organism which may take the place of the materialism with which1 since the seventeenth century1 science has saddled philosophy4 ,it must be remembered that the physicists' energy is obviously an abstraction4 ,the concrete fact1 which is the organism1 must be a complete expression of the character of a real occurrence4 ,such a displacement of scientific materialism1 if it ever takes place1 cannot fail to have important consequences in every field of thought4 ,finally1 our last reflection must be1 that we have in the end come back to a version of the doctrine of old ,pythagoras1 from whom mathematics1 and mathematical physics1 took their rise4 ,he discovered the importance of dealing with abstractions2 and in particular directed attention to number as characterizing the periodicities of notes of music4 ,the importance of the abstract idea of periodicity was thus present at the very beginning both of mathematics and of ,european philosophy4 ,in the seventeenth century1 the birth of modern science required a new mathematics1 more fully equipped for the purpose of analysing the characteristics of vibratory existence4 ,and now in the twentieth century we find physicists largely engaged in analysing the periodicities of atoms4 ,truly1 ,pythagoras in founding ,european philosophy and ,european mathematics1 endowed them with the luckiest of lucky guesses--or1 was it a flash of divine genius1 penetrating to the inmost nature of things8 ,,chapter ,,iii ,,the ,,century ,,of ,,genius ,the previous chapters were devoted to the antecedent conditions which prepared the soil for the scientific outburst of the seventeenth century4 ,they traced the various elements of thought and instinctive belief1 from their first efflorescence in the classical civilisation of the ancient world1 through the transformations which they underwent in the ,middle ,ages1 up to the historical revolt of the sixteenth century4 ,three main factors arrested attention1--the rise of mathematics1 the instinctive belief in a detailed order of nature1 and the unbridled rationalism of the thought of the later ,middle ,ages4 ,by this rationalism ,i mean the belief that the avenue to truth was predominantly through a metaphysical analysis of the nature of things1 which would thereby determine how things acted and functioned4 ,the historical revolt was the definite abandonment of this method in favour of the study of the empirical facts of antecedents and consequences4 ,in religion1 it meant the appeal to the origins of ,christianity2 and in science it meant the appeal to experiment and the inductive method of reasoning4 ,a brief1 and sufficiently accurate1 description of the intellectual life of the ,european races during the succeeding two centuries and a quarter up to our own times is that they have been living upon the accumulated capital of ideas provided for them by the genius of the seventeenth century4 ,the men of this epoch inherited a ferment of ideas attendant upon the historical revolt of the sixteenth century1 and they bequeathed formed systems of thought touching every aspect of human life4 ,it is the one century which consistently1 and throughout the whole range of human activities1 provided intellectual genius adequate for the greatness of its occasions4 ,the crowded stage of this hundred years is indicated by the coincidences which mark its literary annals4 ,at its dawn ,bacon's ,advancement of ,learning and ,cervantes' ,don ,quixote were published in the same year 7#afje71 as though the epoch would introduce itself with a forward and a backward glance4 ,the first quarto edition of ,hamlet appeared in the preceding year1 and a slightly variant edition in the same year4 ,finally ,shakespeare and ,cervantes died on the same day1 ,april #bc1 #afaf4 ,in the spring of this same year ,harvey is believed to have first expounded his theory of the circulation of the blood in a course of lectures before the ,college of ,physicians in ,london4 ,newton was born in the year that ,galileo died 7#afdb71 exactly one hundred years after the publication of ,copernicus' ,de ,revolutionibus4 ,one year earlier ,descartes published his ,meditationes and two years later his ,principia ,philosophiae4 ,there simply was not time for the century to space out nicely its notable events concerning men of genius4 ,i cannot now enter upon a chronicle of the various stages of intellectual advance included within this epoch4 ,it is too large a topic for one lecture1 and would obscure the ideas which it is my purpose to develop4 ,a mere rough catalogue of some names will be sufficient1 names of men who published to the world important work within these limits of time3 ,francis ,bacon1 ,harvey1 ,kepler1 ,galileo1 ,descartes1 ,pascal1 ,huyghens1 ,boyle1 ,newton1 ,locke1 ,spinoza1 ,leibniz4 ,i have limited the list to the sacred number of twelve1 a number much too small to be properly representative4 ,for example1 there is only one ,italian there1 whereas ,italy could have filled the list from its own ranks4 ,again ,harvey is the only biologist1 and also there are too many ,englishmen4 ,this latter defect is partly due to the fact that the lecturer is ,english1 and that he is lecturing to an audience which1 equally with him1 owns this ,english century4 ,if he had been ,dutch1 there would have been too many ,dutchmen2 if ,italian1 too many ,italians2 and if ,french1 too many ,frenchmen4 ,the unhappy ,thirty ,years' ,war was devastating ,germany2 but every other country looks back to this century as an epoch which witnessed some culmination of its genius4 ,certainly this was a great period of ,english thought2 as at a later time ,voltaire impressed upon ,france4 ,the omission of physiologists1 other than ,harvey1 also requires explanation4 ,there were1 of course1 great advances in biology within the century1 chiefly associated with ,italy and the ,university of ,padua4 ,but my purpose is to trace the philosophic outlook1 derived from science and presupposed by science1 and to estimate some of its effects on the general climate of each age4 ,now the scientific philosophy of this age was dominated by physics2 so as to be the most obvious rendering1 in terms of general ideas1 of the state of physical knowledge of that age and of the two succeeding centuries4 ,as a matter of fact1 these concepts are very unsuited to biology2 and set for it an insoluble problem of matter and life and organism1 with which biologists are now wrestling4 ,but the science of living organisms is only now coming to a growth adequate to impress its conceptions upon philosophy4 ,the last half century before the present time has witnessed unsuccessful attempts to impress biological notions upon the materialism of the seventeenth century4 ,however this success be estimated1 it is certain that the root ideas of the seventeenth century were derived from the school of thought which produced ,galileo1 ,huyghens and ,newton1 and not from the physiologists of ,padua4 ,one unsolved problem of thought1 so far as it derives from this period1 is to be formulated thus3 ,given configurations of matter with locomotion in space as assigned by physical laws1 to account for living organisms4 ,my discussion of the epoch will be best introduced by a quotation from ,francis ,bacon1 which forms the opening of ,section 7or #8,century'7 ,,ix of his ,natural ,history1 ,i mean his ,silva ,silvarum4 ,we are told in the contemporary memoir by his chaplain1 ,dr4 ,rawley1 that this work was composed in the last five years of his life1 so it must be dated between #afbj and #afbf4 ,the quotation runs thus3 8,it is certain that all bodies whatsoever1 though they have no sense1 yet they have perception2 for when one body is applied to another1 there is a kind of election to embrace that which is agreeable1 and to exclude or expel that which is ingrate2 and whether the body be alterant or altered1 evermore a perception precedeth operation2 for else all bodies would be like one to another4 ,and sometimes this perception1 in some kind of bodies1 is far more subtile than sense2 so that sense is but a dull thing in comparison of it3 we see a weatherglass will find the least difference of the weather in heat or cold1 when we find it not4 ,and this perception is sometimes at a distance1 as well as upon the touch2 as when the loadstone draweth iron2 or flame naphtha of ,babylon1 a great distance off4 ,it is therefore a subject of a very noble enquiry1 to enquire of the more subtile perceptions2 for it is another key to open nature1 as well as the sense2 and sometimes better4 ,and besides1 it is a principal means of natural divination2 for that which in these perceptions appeareth early1 in the great effects cometh long after40 ,there are a great many points of interest about this quotation1 some of which will emerge into importance in succeeding lectures4 ,in the first place1 note the careful way in which ,bacon discriminates between perception1 or taking account of1 on the one hand1 and sense1 or cognitive experience1 on the other hand4 ,in this respect ,bacon is outside the physical line of thought which finally dominated the century4 ,later on1 people thought of passive matter which was operated on externally by forces4 ,i believe ,bacon's line of thought to have expressed a more fundamental truth than do the materialistic concepts which were then being shaped as adequate for physics4 ,we are now so used to the materialistic way of looking at things1 which has been rooted in our literature by the genius of the seventeenth century1 that it is with some difficulty that we understand the possibility of another mode of approach to the problems of nature4 ,in the particular instance of the quotation which ,i have just made1 the whole passage and the context in which it is embedded1 are permeated through and through by the experimental method1 that is to say1 by attention to #8irreducible and stubborn facts'1 and by the inductive method of eliciting general laws4 ,another unsolved problem which has been bequeathed to us by the seventeenth century is the rational justification of this method of ,induction4 ,the explicit realisation of the antithesis between the deductive rationalism of the scholastics and the inductive observational methods of the moderns must chiefly be ascribed to ,bacon2 though1 of course1 it was implicit in the mind of ,galileo and of all the men of science of those times4 ,but ,bacon was one of the earliest of the whole group1 and also had the most direct apprehension of the full extent of the intellectual revolution which was in progress4 ,perhaps the man who most completely anticipated both ,bacon and the whole modern point of view was the artist ,leonardo ,da ,vinci1 who lived almost exactly a century before ,bacon4 ,leonardo also illustrates the theory which ,i was advancing in my last lecture1 that the rise of naturalistic art was an important ingredient in the formation of our scientific mentality4 ,indeed1 ,leonardo was more completely a man of science than was ,bacon4 ,the practice of naturalistic art is more akin to the practice of physics1 chemistry and biology than is the practice of law4 ,we all remember the saying of ,bacon's contemporary1 ,harvey1 the discoverer of the circulation of the blood1 that ,bacon #8wrote of science like a ,lord ,chancellor4' ,but at the beginning of the modern period ,da ,vinci and ,bacon stand together as illustrating the various strains which have combined to form the modern world1 namely1 legal mentality and the patient observational habits of the naturalistic artists4 ,in the passage which ,i have quoted from ,bacon's writings there is no explicit mention of the method of inductive reasoning4 ,it is unnecessary for me to prove to you by any quotations that the enforcement of the importance of this method1 and of the importance1 to the welfare of mankind1 of the secrets of nature to be thus discovered1 was one of the main themes to which ,bacon devoted himself in his writings4 ,induction has proved to be a somewhat more complex process than ,bacon anticipated4 ,he had in his mind the belief that with a sufficient care in the collection of instances the general law would stand out of itself4 ,we know now1 and probably ,harvey knew then1 that this is a very inadequate account of the processes which issue in scientific generalisations4 ,but when you have made all the requisite deductions1 ,bacon remains as one of the great builders who constructed the mind of the modern world4 ,the special difficulties raised by induction emerged in the eighteenth century1 as the result of ,hume's criticism4 ,but ,bacon was one of the prophets of the historical revolt1 which deserted the method of unrelieved rationalism1 and rushed into the other extreme of basing all fruitful knowledge upon inference from particular occasions in the past to particular occasions in the future4 ,i do not wish to throw any doubt upon the validity of induction1 when it has been properly guarded4 ,my point is1 that the very baffling task of applying reason to elicit the general characteristics of the immediate occasion1 as set before us in direct cognition1 is a necessary preliminary1 if we are to justify induction2 unless indeed we are content to base it upon our vague instinct that of course it is all right4 ,either there is something about the immediate occasion which affords knowledge of the past and the future1 or we are reduced to utter scepticism as to memory and induction4 ,it is impossible to over-emphasise the point that the key to the process of induction1 as used either in science or in our ordinary life1 is to be found in the right understanding of the immediate occasion of knowledge in its full concreteness4 ,it is in respect to our grasp of the character of these occasions in their concreteness that the modern developments of physiology and of psychology are of critical importance4 ,i shall illustrate this point in my subsequent lectures4 ,we find ourselves amid insoluble difficulties when we substitute for this concrete occasion a mere abstract in which we only consider material objects in a flux of configurations in time and space4 ,it is quite obvious that such objects can tell us only that they are where they are4 ,accordingly1 we must recur to the method of the school-divinity as explained by the ,italian medievalists whom ,i quoted in the first lecture4 ,we must observe the immediate occasion1 and use reason to elicit a general description of its nature4 ,induction presupposes metaphysics4 ,in other words1 it rests upon an antecedent rationalism4 ,you cannot have a rational justification for your appeal to history till your metaphysics has assured you that there is a history to appeal to2 and likewise your conjectures as to the future presuppose some basis of knowledge that there is a future already subjected to some determinations4 ,the difficulty is to make sense of either of these ideas4 ,but unless you have done so1 you have made nonsense of induction4 ,you will observe that ,i do not hold ,induction to be in its essence the derivation of general laws4 ,it is the divination of some characteristics of a particular future from the known characteristics of a particular past4 ,the wider assumption of general laws holding for all cognisable occasions appears a very unsafe addendum to attach to this limited knowledge4 ,all we can ask of the present occasion is that it shall determine a particular community of occasions1 which are in some respects mutually qualified by reason of their inclusion within that same community4 ,that community of occasions considered in physical science is the set of happenings which fit on to each other--as we say--in a common space-time1 so that we can trace the transitions from one to the other4 ,accordingly1 we refer to the common space-time indicated in our immediate occasion of knowledge4 ,inductive reasoning proceeds from the particular occasion to the particular community of occasions1 and from the particular community to relations between particular occasions within that community4 ,until we have taken into account other scientific concepts1 it is impossible to carry the discussion of induction further than this preliminary conclusion4 ,the third point to notice about this quotation from ,bacon is the purely qualitative character of the statements made in it4 ,in this respect ,bacon completely missed the tonality which lay behind the success of seventeenth century science4 ,science was becoming1 and has remained1 primarily quantitative4 ,search for measurable elements among your phenomena1 and then search for relations between these measures of physical quantities4 ,bacon ignores this rule of science4 ,for example1 in the quotation given he speaks of action at a distance2 but he is thinking qualitatively and not quantitatively4 ,we cannot ask that he should anticipate his younger contemporary ,galileo1 or his distant successor ,newton4 ,but he gives no hint that there should be a search for quantities4 ,perhaps he was misled by the current logical doctrines which had come down from ,aristotle4 ,for1 in effect1 these doctrines said to the physicist #8classify' when they should have said #8measure4' ,by the end of the century physics had been founded on a satisfactory basis of measurement4 ,the final and adequate exposition was given by ,newton4 ,the common measurable element of mass was discerned as characterising all bodies in different amounts4 ,bodies which are apparently identical in substance1 shape1 and size have very approximately the same mass3 the closer the identity1 the nearer the equality4 ,the force acting on a body1 whether by touch or by action at a distance1 was in effect defined as being equal to the mass of the body multiplied by the rate of change of the body's velocity1 so far as this rate of change is produced by that force4 ,in this way the force is discerned by its effect on the motion of the body4 ,the question now arises whether this conception of the magnitude of a force leads to the discovery of simple quantitative laws involving the alternative determination of forces by circumstances of the configuration of substances and of their physical characters4 ,the ,newtonian conception has been brilliantly successful in surviving this test throughout the whole modern period4 ,its first triumph was the law of gravitation4 ,its cumulative triumph has been the whole development of dynamical astronomy1 of engineering1 and of physics4 ,this subject of the formation of the three laws of motion and of the law of gravitation deserves critical attention4 ,the whole development of thought occupied exactly two generations4 ,it commenced with ,galileo and ended with ,newton's ,principia2 and ,newton was born in the year that ,galileo died4 ,also the lives of ,descartes and ,huyghens fall within the period occupied by these great terminal figures4 ,the issue of the combined labours of these four men has some right to be considered as the greatest single intellectual success which mankind has achieved4 ,in estimating its size1 we must consider the completeness of its range4 ,it constructs for us a vision of the material universe1 and it enables us to calculate the minutest detail of a particular occurrence4 ,galileo took the first step in hitting on the right line of thought4 ,he noted that the critical point to attend to was not the motion of bodies but the changes of their motions4 ,galileo's discovery is formularised by ,newton in his first law of motion3--8,every body continues in its state of rest1 or of uniform motion in a straight line1 except so far as it may be compelled by force to change that state40 ,this formula contains the repudiation of a belief which had blocked the progress of physics for two thousand years4 ,it also deals with a fundamental concept which is essential to scientific theory2 ,i mean1 the concept of an ideally isolated system4 ,this conception embodies a fundamental character of things1 without which science1 or indeed any knowledge on the part of finite intellects1 would be impossible4 ,the #8isolated' system is not a solipsist system1 apart from which there would be nonentity4 ,it is isolated as within the universe4 ,this means that there are truths respecting this system which require reference only to the remainder of things by way of a uniform systematic scheme of relationships4 ,thus the conception of an isolated system is not the conception of substantial independence from the remainder of things1 but of freedom from casual contingent dependence upon detailed items within the rest of the universe4 ,further1 this freedom from casual dependence is required only in respect to certain abstract characteristics which attach to the isolated system1 and not in respect to the system in its full concreteness4 ,the first law of motion asks what is to be said of a dynamically isolated system so far as concerns its motion as a whole1 abstracting from its orientation and its internal arrangement of parts4 ,aristotle said that you must conceive such a system to be at rest4 ,galileo added that the state of rest is only a particular case1 and that the general statement is #8either in a state of rest1 or of uniform motion in a straight line4' ,accordingly1 an ,aristotelean would conceive the forces arising from the reaction of alien bodies as being quantitatively measurable in terms of the velocity they sustain1 and as directively determined by the direction of that velocity2 while the ,galilean would direct attention to the magnitude of the acceleration and to its direction4 ,this difference is illustrated by contrasting ,kepler and ,newton4 ,they both speculated as to the forces sustaining the planets in their orbits4 ,kepler looked for tangential forces pushing the planets along1 whereas ,newton looked for radial forces diverting the directions of the planets' motions4 ,instead of dwelling upon the mistake which ,aristotle made1 it is more profitable to emphasise the justification which he had for it1 if we consider the obvious facts of our experience4 ,all the motions which enter into our normal everyday experience cease unless they are evidently sustained from the outside4 ,apparently1 therefore1 the sound empiricist must devote his attention to this question of the sustenance of motion4 ,we here hit upon one of the dangers of unimaginative empiricism4 ,the seventeenth century exhibits another example of this same danger2 and1 of all people in the world1 ,newton fell into it4 ,huyghens had produced the wave theory of light4 ,but this theory failed to account for the most obvious facts about light as in our ordinary experience1 namely1 that shadows cast by obstructing objects are defined by rectilinear rays4 ,accordingly1 ,newton rejected this theory and adopted the corpuscular theory which completely explained shadows4 ,since then both theories have had their periods of triumph4 ,at the present moment the scientific world is seeking for a combination of the two4 ,these examples illustrate the danger of refusing to entertain an idea because of its failure to explain one of the most obvious facts in the subject matter in question4 ,if you have had your attention directed to the novelties in thought in your own lifetime1 you will have observed that almost all really new ideas have a certain aspect of foolishness when they are first produced4 ,returning to the laws of motion1 it is noticeable that no reason was produced in the seventeenth century for the ,galilean as distinct from the ,aristotelian position4 ,it was an ultimate fact4 ,when in the course of these lectures we come to the modern period1 we shall see that the theory of relativity throws complete light on this question2 but only by rearranging our whole ideas as to space and time4 ,it remained for ,newton to direct attention to mass as a physical quantity inherent in the nature of a material body4 ,mass remained permanent during all changes of motion4 ,but the proof of the permanence of mass amid chemical transformations had to wait for ,lavoisier1 a century later4 ,newton's next task was to find some estimate of the magnitude of the alien force in terms of the mass of the body and of its acceleration4 ,he here had a stroke of luck4 ,for1 from the point of view of a mathematician1 the simplest possible law1 namely the product of the two1 proved to be the successful one4 ,again the modern relativity theory modifies this extreme simplicity4 ,but luckily for science the delicate experiments of the physicists of to-day were not then known1 or even possible4 ,accordingly1 the world was given the two centuries which it required in order to digest ,newton's laws of motion4 ,having regard to this triumph1 can we wonder that scientists placed their ultimate principles upon a materialistic basis1 and thereafter ceased to worry about philosophy8 ,we shall grasp the course of thought1 if we understand exactly what this basis is1 and what difficulties it finally involves4 ,when you are criticising the philosophy of an epoch1 do not chiefly direct your attention to those intellectual positions which its exponents feel it necessary explicitly to defend4 ,there will be some fundamental assumptions which adherents of all the variant systems within the epoch unconsciously presuppose4 ,such assumptions appear so obvious that people do not know what they are assuming because no other way of putting things has ever occurred to them4 ,with these assumptions a certain limited number of types of philosophic systems are possible1 and this group of systems constitutes the philosophy of the epoch4 ,one such assumption underlies the whole philosophy of nature during the modern period4 ,it is embodied in the conception which is supposed to express the most concrete aspect of nature4 ,the ,ionian philosophers asked1 ,what is nature made of8 ,the answer is couched in terms of stuff1 or matter1 or material1--the particular name chosen is indifferent--which has the property of simple location in space and time1 or1 if you adopt the more modern ideas1 in space-time4 ,what ,i mean by matter1 or material1 is anything which has this property of simple location4 ,by simple location ,i mean one major characteristic which refers equally both to space and to time1 and other minor characteristics which are diverse as between space and time4 ,the characteristic common both to space and time is that material can be said to be here in space and here in time1 or here in space-time1 in a perfectly definite sense which does not require for its explanation any reference to other regions of space-time4 ,curiously enough this character of simple location holds whether we look on a region of space-time as determined absolutely or relatively4 ,for if a region is merely a way of indicating a certain set of relations to other entities1 then this characteristic1 which ,i call simple location1 is that material can be said to have just these relations of position to the other entities without requiring for its explanation any reference to other regions constituted by analogous relations of position to the same entities4 ,in fact1 as soon as you have settled1 however you do settle1 what you mean by a definite place in space-time1 you can adequately state the relation of a particular material body to space-time by saying that it is just there1 in that place2 and1 so far as simple location is concerned1 there is nothing more to be said on the subject4 ,there are1 however1 some subordinate explanations to be made which bring in the minor characteristics which ,i have already mentioned4 ,first1 as regards time1 if material has existed during any period1 it has equally been in existence during any portion of that period4 ,in other words1 dividing the time does not divide the material4 ,secondly1 in respect to space1 dividing the volume does divide the material4 ,accordingly1 if material exists throughout a volume1 there will be less of that material distributed through any definite half of that volume4 ,it is from this property that there arises our notion of density at a point of space4 ,anyone who talks about density is not assimilating time and space to the extent that some extremists of the modern school of relativists very rashly desire4 ,for the division of time functions1 in respect to material1 quite differently from the division of space4 ,furthermore1 this fact that the material is indifferent to the division of time leads to the conclusion that the lapse of time is an accident1 rather than of the essence1 of the material4 ,the material is fully itself in any sub-period however short4 ,thus the transition of time has nothing to do with the character of the material4 ,the material is equally itself at an instant of time4 ,here an instant of time is conceived as in itself without transition1 since the temporal transition is the succession of instants4 ,the answer1 therefore1 which the seventeenth century gave to the ancient question of the ,ionian thinkers1 #8,what is the world made of8' was that the world is a succession of instantaneous configurations of matter1--or of material1 if you wish to include stuff more subtle than ordinary matter1 the ether for example4 ,we cannot wonder that science rested content with this assumption as to the fundamental elements of nature4 ,the great forces of nature1 such as gravitation1 were entirely determined by the configurations of masses4 ,thus the configurations determined their own changes1 so that the circle of scientific thought was completely closed4 ,this is the famous mechanistic theory of nature1 which has reigned supreme ever since the seventeenth century4 ,it is the orthodox creed of physical science4 ,furthermore1 the creed justified itself by the pragmatic test4 ,it worked4 ,physicists took no more interest in philosophy4 ,they emphasized the anti-rationalism of the ,historical ,revolt4 ,but the difficulties of this theory of materialistic mechanism very soon became apparent4 ,the history of thought in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is governed by the fact that the world had got hold of a general idea which it could neither live with nor live without4 ,this simple location of instantaneous material configurations is what ,bergson has protested against1 so far as it concerns time and so far as it is taken to be the fundamental fact of concrete nature4 ,he calls it a distortion of nature due to the intellectual #8spatialisation' of things4 ,i agree with ,bergson in his protest3 but ,i do not agree that such distortion is a vice necessary to the intellectual apprehension of nature4 ,i shall in subsequent lectures endeavour to show that this spatialisation is the expression of more concrete facts under the guise of very abstract logical constructions4 ,there is an error2 but it is merely the accidental error of mistaking the abstract for the concrete4 ,it is an example of what ,i will call the #8,fallacy of ,misplaced ,concreteness4' ,this fallacy is the occasion of great confusion in philosophy4 ,it is not necessary for the intellect to fall into the trap1 though in this example there has been a very general tendency to do so4 ,it is at once evident that the concept of simple location is going to make great difficulties for induction4 ,for1 if in the location of configurations of matter throughout a stretch of time there is no inherent reference to any other times1 past or future1 it immediately follows that nature within any period does not refer to nature at any other period4 ,accordingly1 induction is not based on anything which can be observed as inherent in nature4 ,thus we cannot look to nature for the justification of our belief in any law such as the law of gravitation4 ,in other words1 the order of nature cannot be justified by the mere observation of nature4 ,for there is nothing in the present fact which inherently refers either to the past or to the future4 ,it looks1 therefore1 as though memory1 as well as induction1 would fail to find any justification within nature itself4 ,i have been anticipating the course of future thought1 and have been repeating ,hume's argument4 ,this train of thought follows so immediately from the consideration of simple location1 that we cannot wait for the eighteenth century before considering it4 ,the only wonder is that the world did in fact wait for ,hume before noting the difficulty4 ,also it illustrates the anti-rationalism of the scientific public that1 when ,hume did appear1 it was only the religious implications of his philosophy which attracted attention4 ,this was because the clergy were in principle rationalists1 whereas the men of science were content with a simple faith in the order of nature4 ,hume himself remarks1 no doubt scoffingly1 #8,our holy religion is founded on faith4' ,this attitude satisfied the ,royal ,society but not the ,church4 ,it also satisfied ,hume and has satisfied subsequent empiricists4 ,there is another presupposition of thought which must be put beside the theory of simple location4 ,i mean the two correlative categories of ,substance and quality4 ,there is1 however this difference4 ,there were different theories as to the adequate description of the status of space4 ,but whatever its status1 no one had any doubt but that the connection with space enjoyed by entities1 which are said to be in space1 is that of simple location4 ,we may put this shortly by saying that it was tacitly assumed that space is the locus of simple locations4 ,whatever is in space is simpliciter in some definite portion of space4 ,but in respect to substance and quality the leading minds of the seventeenth century were definitely perplexed2 though1 with their usual genius1 they at once constructed a theory which was adequate for their immediate purposes4 ,of course1 substance and quality1 as well as simple location1 are the most natural ideas for the human mind4 ,it is the way in which we think of things1 and without these ways of thinking we could not get our ideas straight for daily use4 ,there is no doubt about this4 ,the only question is1 ,how concretely are we thinking when we consider nature under these conceptions8 ,my point will be1 that we are presenting ourselves with simplified editions of immediate matters of fact4 ,when we examine the primary elements of these simplified editions1 we shall find that they are in truth only to be justified as being elaborate logical constructions of a high degree of abstraction4 ,of course1 as a point of individual psychology1 we get at the ideas by the rough and ready method of suppressing what appear to be irrelevant details4 ,but when we attempt to justify this suppression of irrelevance1 we find that1 though there are entities left corresponding to the entities we talk about1 yet these entities are of a high degree of abstraction4 ,thus ,i hold that substance and quality afford another instance of the fallacy of misplaced concreteness4 ,let us consider how the notions of substance and quality arise4 ,we observe an object as an entity with certain characteristics4 ,furthermore1 each individual entity is apprehended through its characteristics4 ,for example1 we observe a body2 there is something about it which we note4 ,perhaps1 it is hard1 and blue1 and round1 and noisy4 ,we observe something which possesses these qualities3 apart from these qualities we do not observe anything at all4 ,accordingly1 the entity is the substratum1 or substance1 of which we predicate qualities4 ,some of the qualities are essential1 so that apart from them the entity would not be itself2 while other qualities are accidental and changeable4 ,in respect to material bodies1 the qualities of having a quantitative mass1 and of simple location somewhere1 were held by ,john ,locke at the close of the seventeenth century to be essential qualities4 ,of course1 the location was changeable1 and the unchangeability of mass was merely an experimental fact except for some extremists4 ,so far1 so good4 ,but when we pass to blueness and noisiness a new situation has to be faced4 ,in the first place1 the body may not be always blue1 or noisy4 ,we have already allowed for this by our theory of accidental qualities1 which for the moment we may accept as adequate4 ,but in the second place1 the seventeenth century exposed a real difficulty4 ,the great physicists elaborated transmission theories of light and sound1 based upon their materialistic views of nature4 ,there were two hypotheses as to light3 either it was transmitted by the vibratory waves of a materialistic ether1 or--according to ,newton--it was transmitted by the motion of incredibly small corpuscles of some subtle matter4 ,we all know that the wave theory of ,huyghens held the field during the nineteenth century1 and that at present physicists are endeavouring to explain some obscure circumstances attending radiation by a combination of both theories4 ,but whatever theory you choose1 there is no light or colour as a fact in external nature4 ,there is merely motion of material4 ,again1 when the light enters your eyes and falls on the retina1 there is merely motion of material4 ,then your nerves are affected and your brain is affected1 and again this is merely motion of material4 ,the same line of argument holds for sound1 substituting waves in the air for waves in the ether1 and ears for eyes4 ,we then ask in what sense are blueness and noisiness qualities of the body4 ,by analogous reasoning1 we also ask in what sense is its scent a quality of the rose4 ,galileo considered this question1 and at once pointed out that1 apart from eyes1 ears1 or noses1 there would be no colours1 sounds1 or smells4 ,descartes and ,locke elaborated a theory of primary and secondary qualities4 ,for example1 ,descartes in his #8,sixth ,meditation' says3#d 8,and indeed1 as ,i perceive different sorts of colours1 sounds1 odours1 tastes1 heat1 hardness1 etc41 ,i safely conclude that there are in the bodies from which the diverse perceptions of the senses proceed1 certain varieties corresponding to them1 although1 perhaps1 not in reality like them244440 ,footnote #d3 ,translation by ,professor ,john ,veitch4 ,also in his ,principles of ,philosophy1 he says3 8,that by our senses we know nothing of external objects beyond their figure or situation1 magnitude1 and motion40 ,locke1 writing with a knowledge of ,newtonian dynamics1 places mass among the primary qualities of bodies4 ,in short1 he elaborates a theory of primary and secondary qualities in accordance with the state of physical science at the close of the seventeenth century4 ,the primary qualities are the essential qualities of substances whose spatio-temporal relationships constitute nature4 ,the orderliness of these relationships constitutes nature4 ,the orderliness of these relationships constitutes the order of nature4 ,the occurrences of nature are in some way apprehended by minds1 which are associated with living bodies4 ,primarily1 the mental apprehension is aroused by the occurrences in certain parts of the correlated body1 the occurrences in the brain1 for instance4 ,but the mind in apprehending also experiences sensations which1 properly speaking1 are qualities of the mind alone4 ,these sensations are projected by the mind so as to clothe appropriate bodies in external nature4 ,thus the bodies are perceived as with qualities which in reality do not belong to them1 qualities which in fact are purely the offspring of the mind4 ,thus nature gets credit which should in truth be reserved for ourselves3 the rose for its scent3 the nightingale for his song3 and the sun for his radiance4 ,the poets are entirely mistaken4 ,they should address their lyrics to themselves1 and should turn them into odes of self-congratulation on the excellency of the human mind4 ,nature is a dull affair1 soundless1 scentless1 colourless2 merely the hurrying of material1 endlessly1 meaninglessly4 ,however you disguise it1 this is the practical outcome of the characteristic scientific philosophy which closed the seventeenth century4 ,in the first place1 we must note its astounding efficiency as a system of concepts for the organisation of scientific research4 ,in this respect1 it is fully worthy of the genius of the century which produced it4 ,it has held its own as the guiding principle of scientific studies ever since4 ,it is still reigning4 ,every university in the world organises itself in accordance with it4 ,no alternative system of organising the pursuit of scientific truth has been suggested4 ,it is not only reigning1 but it is without a rival4 ,and yet--it is quite unbelievable4 ,this conception of the universe is surely framed in terms of high abstractions1 and the paradox only arises because we have mistaken our abstractions for concrete realities4 ,no picture1 however generalised1 of the achievements of scientific thought in this century can omit the advance in mathematics4 ,here as elsewhere the genius of the epoch made itself evident4 ,three great ,frenchmen1 ,descartes1 ,desargues1 ,pascal1 initiated the modern period in geometry4 ,another ,frenchman1 ,fermat1 laid the foundations of modern analysis1 and all but perfected the methods of the differential calculus4 ,newton and ,leibniz1 between them1 actually did create the differential calculus as a practical method of mathematical reasoning4 ,when the century ended1 mathematics as an instrument for application to physical problems was well established in something of its modern proficiency4 ,modern pure mathematics1 if we except geometry1 was in its infancy1 and had given no signs of the astonishing growth it was to make in the nineteenth century4 ,but the mathematical physicist had appeared1 bringing with him the type of mind which was to rule the scientific world in the next century4 ,it was to be the age of #8,victorious ,analysis4' ,the seventeenth century had finally produced a scheme of scientific thought framed by mathematicians1 for the use of mathematicians4 ,the great characteristic of the mathematical mind is its capacity for dealing with abstractions2 and for eliciting from them clear-cut demonstrative trains of reasoning1 entirely satisfactory so long as it is those abstractions which you want to think about4 ,the enormous success of the scientific abstractions1 yielding on the one hand matter with its simple location in space and time1 and on the other hand mind1 perceiving1 suffering1 reasoning1 but not interfering1 has foisted onto philosophy the task of accepting them as the most concrete rendering of fact4 ,thereby1 modern philosophy has been ruined4 ,it has oscillated in a complex manner between three extremes4 ,there are the dualists1 who accept matter and mind as on equal basis1 and the two varieties of monists1 those who put mind inside matter1 and those who put matter inside mind4 ,but this juggling with abstractions can never overcome the inherent confusion introduced by the ascription of misplaced concreteness to the scientific scheme of the seventeenth century4 ,,chapter ,,iv ,,the ,,eighteenth ,,century ,in so far as the intellectual climates of different epochs can be contrasted1 the eighteenth century in ,europe was the complete antithesis to the ,middle ,ages4 ,the contrast is symbolised by the difference between the cathedral of ,chartres and the ,parisian salons1 where ,d',alembert conversed with ,voltaire4 ,the ,middle ,ages were haunted with the desire to rationalise the infinite3 the men of the eighteenth century rationalised the social life of modern communities1 and based their sociological theories on an appeal to the facts of nature4 ,the earlier period was the age of faith1 based upon reason4 ,in the later period1 they let sleeping dogs lie3 it was the age of reason1 based upon faith4 ,to illustrate my meaning3--,st4 ,anselm would have been distressed if he had failed to find a convincing argument for the existence of ,god1 and on this argument he based his edifice of faith1 whereas ,hume based his ,dissertation on the ,natural ,history of ,religion upon his faith in the order of nature4 ,in comparing these epochs it is well to remember that reason can err1 and that faith may be misplaced4 ,in my previous lecture ,i traced the evolution1 during the seventeenth century1 of the scheme of scientific ideas which has dominated thought ever since4 ,it involves a fundamental duality1 with material on the one hand1 and on the other hand mind4 ,in between there lie the concepts of life1 organism1 function1 instantaneous reality1 interaction1 order of nature1 which collectively form the ,achilles heel of the whole system4 ,i also expressed my conviction that if we desired to obtain a more fundamental expression of the concrete character of natural fact1 the element in this scheme which we should first criticise is the concept of simple location4 ,in view therefore of the importance which this idea will assume in these lectures1 ,i will repeat the meaning which ,i have attached to this phrase4 ,to say that a bit of matter has simple location means that1 in expressing its spatio-temporal relations1 it is adequate to state that it is where it is1 in a definite finite region of space1 and throughout a definite finite duration of time1 apart from any essential reference of the relations of that bit of matter to other regions of space and to other durations of time4 ,again1 this concept of simple location is independent of the controversy between the absolutist and the relativist views of space or of time4 ,so long as any theory of space1 or of time1 can give a meaning1 either absolute or relative1 to the idea of a definite region of space1 and of a definite duration of time1 the idea of simple location has a perfectly definite meaning4 ,this idea is the very foundation of the seventeenth century scheme of nature4 ,apart from it1 the scheme is incapable of expression4 ,i shall argue that among the primary elements of nature as apprehended in our immediate experience1 there is no element whatever which possesses this character of simple location4 ,it does not follow1 however1 that the science of the seventeenth century was simply wrong4 ,i hold that by a process of constructive abstraction we can arrive at abstractions which are the simply-located bits of material1 and at other abstractions which are the minds included in the scientific scheme4 ,accordingly1 the real error is an example of what ,i have termed3 ,the ,fallacy of ,misplaced ,concreteness4 ,the advantage of confining attention to a definite group of abstractions1 is that you confine your thoughts to clear-cut definite things1 with clear-cut definite relations4 ,accordingly1 if you have a logical head1 you can deduce a variety of conclusions respecting the relationships between these abstract entities4 ,furthermore1 if the abstractions are well-founded1 that is to say1 if they do not abstract from everything that is important in experience1 the scientific thought which confines itself to these abstractions will arrive at a variety of important truths relating to our experience of nature4 ,we all know those clear-cut trenchant intellects1 immovably encased in a hard shell of abstractions4 ,they hold you to their abstractions by the sheer grip of personality4 ,the disadvantage of exclusive attention to a group of abstractions1 however well-founded1 is that1 by the nature of the case1 you have abstracted from the remainder of things4 ,in so far as the excluded things are important in your experience1 your modes of thought are not fitted to deal with them4 ,you cannot think without abstractions2 accordingly1 it is of the utmost importance to be vigilant in critically revising your modes of abstraction4 ,it is here that philosophy finds its niche as essential to the healthy progress of society4 ,it is the critic of abstractions4 ,a civilisation which cannot burst through its current abstractions is doomed to sterility after a very limited period of progress4 ,an active school of philosophy is quite as important for the locomotion of ideas1 as is an active school of railway engineers for the locomotion of fuel4 ,sometimes it happens that the service rendered by philosophy is entirely obscured by the astonishing success of a scheme of abstractions in expressing the dominant interests of an epoch4 ,this is exactly what happened during the eighteenth century4 ,les philosophes were not philosophers4 ,they were men of genius1 clear-headed and acute1 who applied the seventeenth century group of scientific abstractions to the analysis of the unbounded universe4 ,their triumph1 in respect to the circle of ideas mainly interesting to their contemporaries1 was overwhelming4 ,whatever did not fit into their scheme was ignored1 derided1 disbelieved4 ,their hatred of ,gothic architecture symbolises their lack of sympathy with dim perspectives4 ,it was the age of reason1 healthy1 manly1 upstanding reason2 but1 of one-eyed reason1 deficient in its vision of depth4 ,we cannot overrate the debt of gratitude which we owe to these men4 ,for a thousand years ,europe had been a prey to intolerant1 intolerable visionaries4 ,the common sense of the eighteenth century1 its grasp of the obvious facts of human suffering1 and of the obvious demands of human nature1 acted on the world like a bath of moral cleansing4 ,voltaire must have the credit1 that he hated injustice1 he hated cruelty1 he hated senseless repression1 and he hated hocus-pocus4 ,furthermore1 when he saw them1 he knew them4 ,in these supreme virtues1 he was typical of his century1 on its better side4 ,but if men cannot live on bread alone1 still less can they do so on disinfectants4 ,the age had its limitations2 yet we cannot understand the passion with which some of its main positions are still defended1 especially in the schools of science1 unless we do full justice to its positive achievements4 ,the seventeenth century scheme of concepts was proving a perfect instrument for research4 ,this triumph of materialism was chiefly in the sciences of rational dynamics1 physics1 and chemistry4 ,so far as dynamics and physics were concerned1 progress was in the form of direct developments of the main ideas of the previous epoch4 ,nothing fundamentally new was introduced1 but there was an immense detailed development4 ,special case after special case was unravelled4 ,it was as though the very ,heavens were being opened1 on a set plan4 ,in the second half of the century1 ,lavoisier practically founded chemistry on its present basis4 ,he introduced into it the principle that no material is lost or gained in any chemical transformations4 ,this was the last success of materialistic thought1 which has not ultimately proved to be double-edged4 ,chemical science now only waited for the atomic theory1 in the next century4 ,in this century the notion of the mechanical explanation of all the processes of nature finally hardened into a dogma of science4 ,the notion won through on its merits by reason of an almost miraculous series of triumphs achieved by the mathematical physicists1 culminating in the ,mchanique ,analytique of ,lagrange1 which was published in #aghg4 ,newton's ,principia was published in #afhg1 so that exactly one hundred years separates the two great books4 ,this century contains the first period of mathematical physics of the modern type4 ,the publication of ,clerk ,maxwell's ,electricity and ,magnetism in #ahgc marks the close of the second period4 ,each of these three books introduces new horizons of thought affecting everything which comes after them4 ,in considering the various topics to which mankind has bent its systematic thought1 it is impossible not to be struck with the unequal distribution of ability among the different fields4 ,in almost all subjects there are a few outstanding names4 ,for it requires genius to create a subject as a distinct topic for thought4 ,but in the case of many topics1 after a good beginning very relevant to its immediate occasion1 the subsequent development appears as a weak series of flounderings1 so that the whole subject gradually loses its grip on the evolution of thought4 ,it was far otherwise with mathematical physics4 ,the more you study this subject1 the more you will find yourself astonished by the almost incredible triumphs of intellect which it exhibits4 ,the great mathematical physicists of the eighteenth and first few years of the nineteenth century1 most of them ,french1 are a case in point3 ,maupertuis1 ,clairaut1 ,d',alembert1 ,lagrange1 ,laplace1 ,fourier1 form a series of names1 such that each recalls to mind some achievement of the first rank4 ,when ,carlyle1 as the mouthpiece of the subsequent ,romantic ,age1 scoffingly terms the period the ,age of ,victorious ,analysis1 and mocks at ,maupertuis as a #8sublimish gentleman in a white periwig1' he only exhibits the narrow side of the ,romanticists whom he is then voicing4 ,it is impossible to explain intelligently1 in a short time and without technicalities1 the details of the progress made by this school4 ,i will1 however1 endeavour to explain the main point of a joint achievement of ,maupertuis and ,lagrange4 ,their results1 in conjunction with some subsequent mathematical methods due to two great ,german mathematicians of the first half of the nineteenth century1 ,gauss and ,riemann1 have recently proved themselves to be the preparatory work necessary for the new ideas which ,herz and ,einstein have introduced into mathematical physics4 ,also they inspired some of the best ideas in ,clerk ,maxwell's treatise1 already mentioned in this lecture4 ,they aimed at discovering something more fundamental and more general than ,newton's laws of motion which were discussed in the previous lecture4 ,they wanted to find some wider ideas1 and in the case of ,lagrange some more general means of mathematical exposition4 ,it was an ambitious enterprise1 and they were completely successful4 ,maupertuis lived in the first half of the eighteenth century1 and ,lagrange's active life lay in its second half4 ,we find in ,maupertuis a tinge of the theologic age which preceded his birth4 ,he started with the idea that the whole path of a material particle between any limits of time must achieve some perfection worthy of the providence of ,god4 ,there are two points of interest in this motive principle4 ,in the first place1 it illustrates the thesis which ,i was urging in my first lecture that the way in which the medieval church had impressed on ,europe the notion of the detailed providence of a rational personal ,god was one of the factors by which the trust in the order of nature had been generated4 ,in the second place1 though we are now all convinced that such modes of thought are of no direct use in detailed scientific enquiry1 ,maupertuis' success in this particular case shows that almost any idea which jogs you out of your current abstractions may be better than nothing4 ,in the present case what the idea in question did for ,maupertuis was to lead him to enquire what general property of the path as a whole could be deduced from ,newton's laws of motion4 ,undoubtedly this was a very sensible procedure whatever one's theological notions4 ,also his general idea led him to conceive that the property found would be a quantitative sum1 such that any slight deviation from the path would increase it4 ,in this supposition he was generalising ,newton's first law of motion4 ,for an isolated particle takes the shortest route with uniform velocity4 ,so ,maupertuis conjectured that a particle travelling through a field of force would realise the least possible amount of some quantity4 ,he discovered such a quantity and called it the integral action between the time limits considered4 ,in modern phraseology it is the sum through successive small lapses of time of the difference between the kinetic and potential energies of the particle at each successive instant4 ,this action1 therefore1 has to do with the interchange between the energy arising from motion and the energy arising from position4 ,maupertuis had discovered the famous theorem of least action4 ,maupertuis was not quite of the first rank in comparison with such a man as ,lagrange4 ,in his hands and in those of his immediate successors1 his principle did not assume any dominating importance4 ,lagrange put the same question on a wider basis so as to make its answer relevant to actual procedure in the development of dynamics4 ,his ,principle of ,virtual ,work as applied to systems in motion is in effect ,maupertuis' principle conceived as applying at each instant of the path of the system4 ,but ,lagrange saw further than ,maupertuis4 ,he grasped that he had gained a method of stating dynamical truths in a way which is perfectly indifferent to the particular methods of measurement employed in fixing the positions of the various parts of the system4 ,accordingly1 he went on to deduce equations of motion which are equally applicable whatever quantitative measurements have been made1 provided that they are adequate to fix positions4 ,the beauty and almost divine simplicity of these equations is such that these formulae are worthy to rank with those mysterious symbols which in ancient times were held directly to indicate the ,supreme ,reason at the base of all things4 ,later ,herz--inventor of electromagnetic waves--based mechanics on the idea of every particle traversing the shortest path open to it under the circumstances constraining its motion2 and finally ,einstein1 by the use of the geometrical theories of ,gauss and ,riemann1 showed that these circumstances could be construed as being inherent in the character of space-time itself4 ,such1 in barest outline1 is the story of dynamics from ,galileo to ,einstein4 ,meanwhile ,galvani and ,volta lived and made their electric discoveries2 and the biological sciences slowly gathered their material1 but still waited for dominating ideas4 ,psychology1 also1 was beginning to disengage itself from its dependence on general philosophy4 ,this independent growth of psychology was the ultimate result of its invocation by ,john ,locke as a critic of metaphysical licence4 ,all the sciences dealing with life were still in an elementary observational stage1 in which classification and direct description were dominant4 ,so far the scheme of abstractions was adequate to the occasion4 ,in the realm of practice1 the age which produced enlightened rulers1 such as the ,emperor ,joseph of the ,house of ,hapsburg1 ,frederick the ,great1 ,walpole1 the great ,lord ,chatham1 ,george ,washington1 cannot be said to have failed4 ,especially when to these rulers1 it adds the invention of parliamentary cabinet government in ,england1 of federal presidential government in the ,united ,states1 and of the humanitarian principles of the ,french ,revolution4 ,also in technology it produced the steam-engine1 and thereby ushered in a new era of civilisation4 ,undoubtedly1 as a practical age the eighteenth century was a success4 ,if you had asked one of the wisest and most typical of its ancestors1 who just saw its commencement1 ,i mean ,john ,locke1 what he expected from it1 he would hardly have pitched his hopes higher than its actual achievements4 ,in developing a criticism of the scientific scheme of the eighteenth century1 ,i must first give my main reason for ignoring nineteenth century idealism--,i am speaking of the philosophic idealism which finds the ultimate meaning of reality in mentality that is fully cognitive4 ,this idealistic school1 as hitherto developed1 has been too much divorced from the scientific outlook4 ,it has swallowed the scientific scheme in its entirety as being the only rendering of the facts of nature1 and has then explained it as being an idea in the ultimate mentality4 ,in the case of absolute idealism1 the world of nature is just one of the ideas1 somehow differentiating the unity of the ,absolute3 in the case of pluralistic idealism involving monadic mentalities1 this world is the greatest common measure of the various ideas which differentiate the various mental unities of the various monads4 ,but1 however you take it1 these idealistic schools have conspicuously failed to connect1 in any organic fashion1 the fact of nature with their idealistic philosophies4 ,so far as concerns what will be said in these lectures1 your ultimate outlook may be realistic or idealistic4 ,my point is that a further stage of provisional realism is required in which the scientific scheme is recast1 and founded upon the ultimate concept of organism4 ,in outline1 my procedure is to start from the analysis of the status of space and of time1 or in modern phraseology1 the status of space-time4 ,there are two characters of either4 ,things are separated by space1 and are separated by time3 but they are also together in space1 and together in time1 even if they be not contemporaneous4 ,i will call these characters the #8separative' and the #8prehensive' characters of space-time4 ,there is yet a third character of space-time4 ,everything which is in space receives a definite limitation of some sort1 so that in a sense it has just that shape which it does have and no other1 also in some sense it is just in this place and in no other4 ,analogously for time1 a thing endures during a certain period1 and through no other period4 ,i will call this the #8modal' character of space-time4 ,it is evident that the modal character taken by itself gives rise to the idea of simple location4 ,but it must be conjoined with the separative and prehensive characters4 ,for simplicity of thought1 ,i will first speak of space only1 and will afterwards extend the same treatment to time4 ,the volume is the most concrete element of space4 ,but the separative character of space1 analyses a volume into sub-volumes1 and so on indefinitely4 ,accordingly1 taking the separative character in isolation1 we should infer that a volume is a mere multiplicity of non-voluminous elements1 of points in fact4 ,but it is the unity of volume which is the ultimate fact of experience1 for example1 the voluminous space of this hall4 ,this hall as a mere multiplicity of points is a construction of the logical imagination4 ,accordingly1 the prime fact is the prehensive unity of volume1 and this unity is mitigated or limited by the separated unities of the innumerable contained parts4 ,we have a prehensive unity1 which is yet held apart as an aggregate of contained parts4 ,but the prehensive unity of the volume is not the unity of a mere logical aggregate of parts4 ,the parts form an ordered aggregate1 in the sense that each part is something from the standpoint of every other part1 and also from the same standpoint every other part is something in relation to it4 ,thus if ,a and ,b and ,c are volumes of space1 ,b has an aspect from the standpoint of ,a1 and so has ,c1 and so has the relationship of ,b and ,c4 ,this aspect of ,b from ,a is of the essence of ,a4 ,the volumes of space have no independent existence4 ,they are only entities as within the totality2 you cannot extract them from their environment without destruction of their very essence4 ,accordingly1 ,i will say that the aspect of ,b from ,a is the mode in which ,b enters into the composition of ,a4 ,this is the modal character of space1 that the prehensive unity of ,a is the prehension into unity of the aspects of all other volumes from the standpoint of ,a4 ,the shape of a volume is the formula from which the totality of its aspects can be derived4 ,thus the shape of a volume is more abstract than its aspects4 ,it is evident that ,i can use ,leibniz's language1 and say that every volume mirrors in itself every other volume in space4 ,exactly analogous considerations hold with respect to durations in time4 ,an instant of time1 without duration1 is an imaginative logical construction4 ,also each duration of time mirrors in itself all temporal durations4 ,but in two ways ,i have introduced a false simplicity4 ,in the first place1 ,i should have conjoined space and time1 and conducted my explanation in respect to four-dimensional regions of space-time4 ,i have nothing to add in the way of explanation4 ,in your minds1 substitute such four-dimensional regions for the spatial volumes of the previous explanations4 ,secondly1 my explanation has involved itself in a vicious circle4 ,for ,i have made the prehensive unity of the region ,a to consist of the prehensive unification of the modal presences in ,a of other regions4 ,this difficulty arises because space-time cannot in reality be considered as a self-subsistent entity4 ,it is an abstraction1 and its explanation requires reference to that from which it has been extracted4 ,space-time is the specification of certain general characters of events and of their mutual ordering4 ,this recurrence to concrete fact brings me back to the eighteenth century1 and indeed to ,francis ,bacon in the seventeenth century4 ,we have to consider the development in those epochs1 of the criticism of the reigning scientific scheme4 ,no epoch is homogeneous2 whatever you may have assigned as the dominant note of a considerable period1 it will always be possible to produce men1 and great men1 belonging to the same time1 who exhibit themselves as antagonistic to the tone of their age4 ,this is certainly the case with the eighteenth century4 ,for example1 the names of ,john ,wesley and of ,rousseau must have occurred to you while ,i was drawing the character of that time4 ,but ,i do not want to speak of them1 or of others4 ,the man1 whose ideas ,i must consider at some length1 is ,bishop ,berkeley4 ,quite at the commencement of the epoch1 he made all the right criticisms1 at least in principle4 ,it would be untrue to say that he produced no effect4 ,he was a famous man4 ,the wife of ,george ,,ii was one of the few queens who1 in any country1 have been clever enough1 and wise enough1 to patronise learning judiciously2 accordingly1 ,berkeley was made a bishop1 in days when bishops in ,great ,britain were relatively far greater men than they are now4 ,also1 what was more important than his bishopric1 ,hume studied him1 and developed one side of his philosophy in a way which might have disturbed the ghost of the great ecclesiastic4 ,then ,kant studied ,hume4 ,so1 to say that ,berkeley was uninfluential during the century1 would certainly be absurd4 ,but all the same1 he failed to affect the main stream of scientific thought4 ,it flowed on as if he had never written4 ,its general success made it impervious to criticism1 then and since4 ,the world of science has always remained perfectly satisfied with its peculiar abstractions4 ,they work1 and that is sufficient for it4 ,the point before us is that this scientific field of thought is now1 in the twentieth century1 too narrow for the concrete facts which are before it for analysis4 ,this is true even in physics1 and is more especially urgent in the biological sciences4 ,thus1 in order to understand the difficulties of modern scientific thought and also its reactions on the modern world1 we should have in our minds some conception of a wider field of abstraction1 a more concrete analysis1 which shall stand nearer to the complete concreteness of our intuitive experience4 ,such an analysis should find in itself a niche for the concepts of matter and spirit1 as abstractions in terms of which much of our physical experience can be interpreted4 ,it is in the search for this wider basis for scientific thought that ,berkeley is so important4 ,he launched his criticism shortly after the schools of ,newton and ,locke had completed their work1 and laid his finger exactly on the weak spots which they had left4 ,i do not propose to consider either the subjective idealism which has been derived from him1 or the schools of development which trace their descent from ,hume and ,kant respectively4 ,my point will be that--whatever the final metaphysics you may adopt--there is another line of development embedded in ,berkeley1 pointing to the analysis which we are in search of4 ,berkeley overlooked it1 partly by reason of the over-intellectualism of philosophers1 and partly by his haste to have recourse to an idealism with its objectivity grounded in the mind of ,god4 ,you will remember that ,i have already stated that the key of the problem lies in the notion of simple location4 ,berkeley1 in effect1 criticises this notion4 ,he also raises the question1 ,what do we mean by things being realised in the world of nature8 ,in ,sections #bc and #bd of his ,principles of ,human ,knowledge1 ,berkeley gives his answer to this latter question4 ,i will quote some detached sentences from those ,sections3 8#bc4 ,but1 say you1 surely there is nothing easier than for me to imagine trees1 for instance1 in a park1 or books existing in a closet1 and nobody by to perceive them4 ,i answer1 you may so1 there is no difficulty in it2 but what is all this1 ,i beseech you1 more than framing in your mind certain ideas which you call books and trees1 and at the same time omitting to frame the idea of any one that may perceive them84440 8,when we do our utmost to conceive the existence of external bodies1 we are all the while only contemplating our own ideas4 ,but the mind taking no notice of itself1 is deluded to think it can and does conceive bodies existing unthought of or without the mind1 though at the same time they are apprehended by or exist in itself44440 8#bd4 ,it is very obvious1 upon the least inquiry into our thoughts1 to know whether it be possible for us to understand what is meant by the absolute existence of sensible objects in themselves1 or without the mind4 ,to me it is evident those words mark out either a direct contradiction1 or else nothing at all44440 ,again there is a very remarkable passage in ,section #aj1 of the fourth ,dialogue of ,berkeley's ,alciphron4 ,i have already quoted it1 at greater length1 in my ,principles of ,natural ,knowledge3 8,euphranor4 ,tell me1 ,alciphron1 can you discern the doors1 window and battlements of that same castle8 ,alciphron4 ,i cannot4 ,at this distance it seems only a small round tower4 ,euph4 ,but ,i1 who have been at it1 know that it is no small round tower1 but a large square building with battlements and turrets1 which it seems you do not see4 ,alc4 ,what will you infer from thence8 ,euph4 ,i would infer that the very object which you strictly and properly perceive by sight is not that thing which is several miles distant4 ,alc4 ,why so8 ,euph4 ,because a little round object is one thing1 and a great square object is another4 ,is it not so84440 ,some analogous examples concerning a planet and a cloud are then cited in the dialogue1 and this passage finally concludes with3 8,euphranor4 ,is it not plain1 therefore1 that neither the castle1 the planet1 nor the cloud1 which you see here1 are those real ones which you suppose exist at a distance80 ,it is made explicit in the first passage1 already quoted1 that ,berkeley himself adopts an extreme idealistic interpretation4 ,for him mind is the only absolute reality1 and the unity of nature is the unity of ideas in the mind of ,god4 ,personally1 ,i think that ,berkeley's solution of the metaphysical problem raises difficulties not less than those which he points out as arising from a realistic interpretation of the scientific scheme4 ,there is1 however1 another possible line of thought1 which enables us to adopt anyhow an attitude of provisional realism1 and to widen the scientific scheme in a way which is useful for science itself4 ,i recur to the passage from ,francis ,bacon's ,natural ,history1 already quoted in the previous lecture3 8,it is certain that all bodies whatsoever1 though they have no sense1 yet they have perception3 444 and whether the body be alterant or altered1 evermore a perception precedeth operation2 for else all bodies would be alike one to another44440 ,also in the previous lecture ,i construed perception 7as used by ,bacon7 as meaning taking account of the essential character of the thing perceived1 and ,i construed sense as meaning cognition4 ,we certainly do take account of things of which at the time we have no explicit cognition4 ,we can even have a cognitive memory of the taking account1 without having had a contemporaneous cognition4 ,also1 as ,bacon points out by his statement1 8444 for else all bodies would be alike one to another10 it is evidently some element of the essential character which we take account of1 namely something on which diversity is founded and not mere bare logical diversity4 ,the word #8perceive' is1 in our common usage1 shot through and through with the notion of cognitive apprehension4 ,so is the word #8apprehension'1 even with the adjective cognitive omitted4 ,i will use the word #8prehension' for uncognitive apprehension3 by this ,i mean apprehension which may or or may not be cognitive4 ,now take ,euphranor's last remark3 8,is it not plain1 therefore1 that neither the castle1 the planet1 nor the cloud1 which you see here1 are those real ones which you suppose exist at distance80 ,accordingly1 there is a prehension1 here in this place1 of things which have a reference to other places4 ,now go back to ,berkeley's sentences1 quoted from his ,principles of ,human ,knowledge4 ,he contends that what constitutes the realisation of natural entities is the being perceived within the unity of mind4 ,we can substitute the concept1 that the realisation is a gathering of things into the unity of a prehension2 and that what is thereby realised is the prehension1 and not the things4 ,this unity of a prehension defines itself as a here and a now1 and the things so gathered into the grasped unity have essential reference to other places and other times4 ,for ,berkeley's mind1 ,i substitute a process of prehensive unification4 ,in order to make intelligible this concept of the progressive realisation of natural occurrences1 considerable expansion is required1 and confrontation with its actual implications in terms of concrete experience4 ,this will be the task of the subsequent lectures4 ,in the first place1 note that the idea of simple location has gone4 ,the things which are grasped into a realised unity1 here and now1 are not the castle1 the cloud1 and the planet simply in themselves2 but they are the castle1 the cloud1 and the planet from the standpoint1 in space and time1 of the prehensive unification4 ,in other words1 it is the perspective of the castle over there from the standpoint of the unification here4 ,it is1 therefore1 aspects of the castle1 the cloud1 and the planet which are grasped into unity here4 ,you will remember that the idea of perspectives is quite familiar in philosophy4 ,it was introduced by ,leibniz1 in the notion of his monads mirroring perspectives of the universe4 ,i am using the same notion1 only ,i am toning down his monads into the unified events in space and time4 ,in some ways1 there is a greater analogy with ,spinoza's modes2 that is why ,i use the terms #8mode' and #8modal4' ,in the analogy with ,spinoza1 his one substance is for me the one underlying activity of realisation individualising itself in an interlocked plurality of modes4 ,thus1 concrete fact is process4 ,its primary analysis is into underlying activity of prehension1 and into realised prehensive events4 ,each event is an individual matter of fact issuing from an individualisation of the substrate activity4 ,but individualisation does not mean substantial independence4 ,an entity of which we become aware in sense perception is the terminus of our act of perception4 ,i will call such an entity1 a #8sense-object'4 ,for example1 green of a definite shade is a sense-object2 so is a sound of definite quality and pitch2 and so is a definite scent2 and a definite quality of touch4 ,the way in which such an entity is related to space during a definite lapse of time is complex4 ,i will say that a sense-object has #8ingression' into space-time4 ,the cognitive perception of a sense-object is the awareness of the prehensive unification 7into a standpoint ,a7 of various modes of various sense-objects1 including the sense-object in question4 ,the standpoint ,a is1 of course1 a region of space-time2 that is to say1 it is a volume of space through a duration of time4 ,but as one entity1 this standpoint is a unit of realised experience4 ,a mode of a sense-object at ,a 7as abstracted from the sense-object whose relationship to ,a the mode is conditioning7 is the aspect from ,a of some other region ,b4 ,thus the sense-object is present in ,a with the mode of location in ,b4 ,thus if green be the sense-object in question1 green is not simply at ,a where it is being perceived1 nor is it simply at ,b where it is perceived as located2 but it is present at ,a with the mode of location in ,b4 ,there is no particular mystery about this4 ,you have only got to look into a mirror and to see the image in it of some green leaves behind your back4 ,for you at ,a there will be green2 but not green simply at ,a where you are4 ,the green at ,a will be green with the mode of having location at the image of the leaf behind the mirror4 ,then turn round and look at the leaf4 ,you are now perceiving the green in the same way as you did before1 except that now the green has the mode of being located in the actual leaf4 ,i am merely describing what we do perceive3 we are aware of green as being one element in a prehensive unification of sense-objects2 each sense-object1 and among them green1 having its particular mode1 which is expressible as location elsewhere4 ,there are various types of modal location4 ,for example1 sound is voluminous3 it fills a hall1 and so sometimes does diffused colour4 ,but the modal location of a colour may be that of being the remote boundary of a volume1 as for example the colours on the walls of a room4 ,thus primarily space-time is the locus of the modal ingression of sense-objects4 ,this is the reason why space and time 7if for simplicity we disjoin them7 are given in their entireties4 ,for each volume of space1 or each lapse of time1 includes in its essence aspects of all volumes of space1 or of all lapses of time4 ,the difficulties of philosophy in respect to space and time are founded on the error of considering them as primarily the loci of simple locations4 ,perception is simply the cognition of prehensive unification2 or more shortly1 perception is cognition of prehension4 ,the actual world is a manifold of prehensions2 and a #8prehension' is a #8prehensive occasion'2 and a prehensive occasion is the most concrete finite entity1 conceived as what it is in itself and for itself1 and not as from its aspect in the essence of another such occasion4 ,prehensive unification might be said to have simple location in its volume ,a4 ,but this would be a mere tautology4 ,for space and time are simply abstractions from the totality of prehensive unifications as mutually patterned in each other4 ,thus a prehension has simple location at the volume ,a in the same way as that in which a man's face fits on to the smile which spreads over it4 ,there is1 so far as we have gone1 more sense in saying that an act of perception has simple location2 for it may be conceived as being simply at the cognised prehension4 ,there are more entities involved in nature than the mere sense-objects1 so far considered4 ,but1 allowing for the necessity of revision consequent on a more complete point of view1 we can frame our answer to ,berkeley's question as to the character of the reality to be assigned to nature4 ,he states it to be the reality of ideas in mind4 ,a complete metaphysic which has attained to some notion of mind1 and to some notion of ideas1 may perhaps ultimately adopt that view4 ,it is unnecessary for the purpose of these lectures to ask such a fundamental question4 ,we can be content with a provisional realism in which nature is conceived as a complex of prehensive unifications4 ,space and time exhibit the general scheme of interlocked relations of these prehensions4 ,you cannot tear any one of them out of its context4 ,yet each one of them within its context has all the reality that attaches to the whole complex4 ,conversely1 the totality has the same reality as each prehension2 for each prehension unifies the modalities to be ascribed1 from its standpoint1 to every part of the whole4 ,a prehension is a process of unifying4 ,accordingly1 nature is a process of expansive development1 necessarily transitional from prehension to prehension4 ,what is achieved is thereby passed beyond1 but it is also retained as having aspects of itself present to prehensions which lie beyond it4 ,thus nature is a structure of evolving processes4 ,the reality is the process4 ,it is nonsense to ask if the colour red is real4 ,the colour red is ingredient in the process of realisation4 ,the realities of nature are the prehensions in nature1 that is to say1 the events in nature4 ,now that we have cleared space and time from the taint of simple location1 we may partially abandon the awkward term prehension4 ,this term was introduced to signify the essential unity of an event1 namely1 the event as one entity1 and not as a mere assemblage of parts or of ingredients4 ,it is necessary to understand that space-time is nothing else than a system of pulling together of assemblages into unities4 ,but the word event just means one of these spatio-temporal unities4 ,accordingly1 it may be used instead of the term #8prehension' as meaning the thing prehended4 ,an event has contemporaries4 ,this means that an event mirrors within itself the modes of its contemporaries as a display of immediate achievement4 ,an event has a past4 ,this means that an event mirrors within itself the modes of its predecessors1 as memories which are fused into its own content4 ,an event has a future4 ,this means that an event mirrors within itself such aspects as the future throws back onto the present1 or1 in other words1 as the present has determined concerning the future4 ,thus an event has anticipation3 8,the prophetic soul ,of the wide world dreaming on things to come40 cvii ,these conclusions are essential for any form of realism4 ,for there is in the world for our cognisance1 memory of the past1 immediacy of realisation1 and indication of things to come4 ,in this sketch of an analysis more concrete than that of the scientific scheme of thought1 ,i have started from our own psychological field1 as it stands for our cognition4 ,i take it for what it claims to be3 the self-knowledge of our bodily event4 ,i mean the total event1 and not the inspection of the details of the body4 ,this self-knowledge discloses a prehensive unification of modal presences of entities beyond itself4 ,i generalise by the use of the principle that this total bodily event is on the same level as all other events1 except for an unusual complexity and stability of inherent pattern4 ,the strength of the theory of materialistic mechanism has been the demand1 that no arbitrary breaks be introduced into nature1 to eke out the collapse of an explanation4 ,i accept this principle4 ,but if you start from the immediate facts of our psychological experience1 as surely an empiricist should begin1 you are at once led to the organic conception of nature of which the description has been commenced in this lecture4 ,it is the defect of the eighteenth century scientific scheme that it provides none of the elements which compose the immediate psychological experiences of mankind4 ,nor does it provide any elementary trace of the organic unity of a whole1 from which the organic unities of electrons1 protons1 molecules1 and living bodies can emerge4 ,according to that scheme1 there is no reason in the nature of things why portions of material should have any physical relations to each other4 ,let us grant that we cannot hope to be able to discern the laws of nature to be necessary4 ,but we can hope to see that it is necessary that there should be an order of nature4 ,the concept of the order of nature is bound up with the concept of nature as the locus of organisms in process of development4 ,,note4 ,in connection with the latter portion of this chapter a sentence from ,descartes' #8,reply to ,objections 444 against the ,meditations' is interesting3--8,hence the idea of the sun will be the sun itself existing in the mind1 not indeed formally1 as it exists in the sky1 but objectively1 i4e41 in the way in which objects are wont to exist in the mind2 and this mode of being is truly much less perfect than that in which things exist outside the mind1 but it is not on that account mere nothing1 as ,i have already said40 ,reply to ,objections ,i1 ,translation by ,haldane and ,ross1 vol4 ii1 p4 #aj4 ,i find difficulty in reconciling this theory of ideas 7with which ,i agree7 with other parts of the ,cartesian philosophy4 ,,chapter ,v ,,the ,,romantic ,,reaction ,my last lecture described the influence upon the eighteenth century of the narrow and efficient scheme of scientific concepts which it had inherited from its predecessor4 ,that scheme was the product of a mentality which found the ,augustinian theology extremely congenial4 ,the ,protestant ,calvinism and the ,catholic ,jansenism exhibited man as helpless to co-operate with ,irresistible ,grace3 the contemporary scheme of science exhibited man as helpless to co-operate with the irresistable mechanism of nature4 ,the mechanism of ,god and the mechanism of matter were the monstrous issues of limited metaphysics and clear logical intellect4 ,also the seventeenth century had genius1 and cleared the world of muddled thought4 ,the eighteenth century continued the work of clearance1 with ruthless efficiency4 ,the scientific scheme has lasted longer than the theological scheme4 ,mankind soon lost interest in ,irresistible ,grace2 but it quickly appreciated the competent engineering which was due to science4 ,also in the first quarter of the eighteenth century1 ,george ,berkeley launched his philosophical criticism against the whole basis of the system4 ,he failed to disturb the dominant current of thought4 ,in my last lecture ,i developed a parallel line of argument1 which would lead to a system of thought basing nature upon the concept of organism1 and not upon the concept of matter4 ,in the present lecture1 ,i propose in the first place to consider how the concrete educated thought of men has viewed this opposition of mechanism and organism4 ,it is in literature that the concrete outlook of humanity receives its expression4 ,accordingly it is to literature that we must look1 particularly in its more concrete forms1 namely in poetry and in drama1 if we hope to discover the inward thoughts of a generation4 ,we quickly find that the ,western peoples exhibit on a colossal scale a peculiarity which is popularly supposed to be more especially characteristic of the ,chinese4 ,surprise is often expressed that a ,chinaman can be of two religions1 a ,confucian for some occasions and a ,buddhist for other occasions4 ,whether this is true of ,china ,i do not know2 nor do ,i know whether1 if true1 these two attitudes are really inconsistent4 ,but there can be no doubt that an analogous fact is true of the ,west1 and that the two attitudes involved are inconsistent4 ,a scientific realism1 based on mechanism1 is conjoined with an unwavering belief in the world of men and of the higher animals as being composed of self-determining organisms4 ,this radical inconsistency at the basis of modern thought accounts for much that is half-hearted and wavering in our civilisation4 ,it would be going too far to say that it distracts thought4 ,it enfeebles it1 by reason of the inconsistency lurking in the background4 ,after all1 the men of the ,middle ,ages were in pursuit of an excellency of which we have nearly forgotten the existence4 ,they set before themselves the ideal of the attainment of a harmony of the understanding4 ,we are content with superficial orderings from diverse arbitrary starting points4 ,for instance1 the enterprises produced by the individualistic energy of the ,european peoples presupposes physical actions directed to final causes4 ,but the science which is employed in their development is based on a philosophy which asserts that physical causation is supreme1 and which disjoins the physical cause from the final end4 ,it is not popular to dwell on the absolute contradiction here involved4 ,it is the fact1 however you gloze it over with phrases4 ,of course1 we find in the eighteenth century ,paley's famous argument1 that mechanism presupposes a ,god who is the author of nature4 ,but even before ,paley put the argument into its final form1 ,hume had written the retort1 that the ,god whom you will find will be the sort of ,god who makes that mechanism4 ,in other words1 that mechanism can1 at most1 presuppose a mechanic1 and not merely a mechanic but its mechanic4 ,the only way of mitigating mechanism is by the discovery that it is not mechanism4 ,when we leave apologetic theology1 and come to ordinary literature1 we find1 as we might expect1 that the scientific outlook is in general simply ignored4 ,so far as the mass of literature is concerned1 science might never have been heard of4 ,until recently nearly all writers have been soaked in classical and renaissance literature4 ,for the most part1 neither philosophy nor science interested them1 and their minds were trained to ignore it4 ,there are exceptions to this sweeping statement2 and1 even if we confine ourselves to ,english literature1 they concern some of the greatest names2 also the indirect influence of science has been considerable4 ,a side light on this distracting inconsistency in modern thought is obtained by examining some of those great serious poems in ,english literature1 whose general scale gives them a didactic character4 ,the relevant poems are ,milton's ,paradise ,lost1 ,pope's ,essay on ,man1 ,wordsworth's ,excursion1 ,tennyson's ,in ,memoriam4 ,milton1 though he is writing after the ,restoration1 voices the theological aspect of the earlier portion of his century1 untouched by the influence of the scientific materialism4 ,pope's poem represents the effect on popular thought of the intervening sixty years which includes the first period of assured triumph for the scientific movement4 ,wordsworth in his whole being expresses a conscious reaction against the mentality of the eighteenth century4 ,this mentality means nothing else than the acceptance of the scientific ideas at their full face value4 ,wordsworth was not bothered by any intellectual antagonism4 ,what moved him was a moral repulsion4 ,he felt that something had been left out1 and that what had been left out comprised everything that was most important4 ,tennyson is the mouthpiece of the attempts of the waning romantic movement in the second quarter of the nineteenth century to come to terms with science4 ,by this time the two elements in modern thought had disclosed their fundamental divergence by their jarring interpretations of the course of nature and the life of man4 ,tennyson stands in this poem as the perfect example of the distraction which ,i have already mentioned4 ,there are opposing visions of the world1 and both of them command his assent by appeals to ultimate intuitions from which there seems no escape4 ,tennyson goes to the heart of the difficulty4 ,it is the problem of mechanism which appalls him1 8#8,the stars1' she whispers1 #8blindly run4'0 ,this line states starkly the whole philosophic problem implicit in the poem4 ,each molecule blindly runs4 ,the human body is a collection of molecules4 ,therefore1 the human body blindly runs1 and therefore there can be no individual responsibility for the actions of the body4 ,if you once accept that the molecule is definitely determined to be what it is1 independently of any determination by reason of the total organism of the body1 and if you further admit that the blind run is settled by the general mechanical laws1 there can be no escape from this conclusion4 ,but mental experiences are derivative from the actions of the body1 including of course its internal behaviour4 ,accordingly1 the sole function of the mind is to have at least some of its experiences settled for it1 and to add such others as may be open to it independently of the body's motions1 internal and external4 ,there are then two possible theories as to the mind4 ,you can either deny that it can supply for itself any experiences other than those provided for it by the body1 or you can admit them4 ,if you refuse to admit the additional experiences1 then all individual moral responsibility is swept away4 ,if you do admit them1 then a human being may be responsible for the state of his mind though he has no responsibility for the actions of his body4 ,the enfeeblement of thought in the modern world is illustrated by the way in which this plain issue is avoided in ,tennyson's poem4 ,there is something kept in the background1 a skeleton in the cupboard4 ,he touches on almost every religious and scientific problem1 but carefully avoids more than a passing allusion to this one4 ,this very problem was in full debate at the date of the poem4 ,john ,stuart ,mill was maintaining his doctrine of determinism4 ,in this doctrine volitions are determined by motives1 and motives are expressible in terms of antecedent conditions including states of mind as well as states of the body4 ,it is obvious that this doctrine affords no escape from the dilemma presented by a thoroughgoing mechanism4 ,for if the volition affects the state of the body1 then the molecules in the body do not blindly run4 ,if the volition does not affect the state of the body1 the mind is still left in its uncomfortable position4 ,mill's doctrine is generally accepted1 especially among scientists1 as though in some way it allowed you to accept the extreme doctrine of materialistic mechanism1 and yet mitigated its unbelievable consequences4 ,it does nothing of the sort4 ,either the bodily molecules blindly run1 or they do not4 ,if they do blindly run1 the mental states are irrelevant in discussing the bodily actions4 ,i have stated the arguments concisely1 because in truth the issue is a very simple one4 ,prolonged discussion is merely a source of confusion4 ,the question as to the metaphysical status of molecules does not come in4 ,the statement that they are mere formulae has no bearing on the argument4 ,for presumably the formulae mean something4 ,if they mean nothing1 the whole mechanical doctrine is likewise without meaning1 and the question drops4 ,but if the formulae mean anything1 the argument applies to exactly what they do mean4 ,the traditional way of evading the difficulty--other than the simple way of ignoring it--is to have recourse to some form of what is now termed #8vitalism4' ,this doctrine is really a compromise4 ,it allows a free run to mechanism throughout the whole of inanimate nature1 and holds that the mechanism is partially mitigated within living bodies4 ,i feel that this theory is an unsatisfactory compromise4 ,the gap between living and dead matter is too vague and problematical to bear the weight of such an arbitrary assumption1 which involves an essential dualism somewhere4 ,the doctrine which ,i am maintaining is that the whole concept of materialism only applies to very abstract entities1 the products of logical discernment4 ,the concrete enduring entities are organisms1 so that the plan of the whole influences the very characters of the various subordinate organisms which enter into it4 ,in the case of an animal1 the mental states enter into the plan of the total organism and thus modify the plans of the successive subordinate organisms until the ultimate smallest organisms1 such as electrons1 are reached4 ,thus an electron within a living body is different from an electron outside it1 by reason of the plan of the body4 ,the electron blindly runs either within or without the body2 but it runs within the body in accordance with its character within the body2 that is to say1 in accordance with the general plan of the body1 and this plan includes the mental state4 ,but this principle of modification is perfectly general throughout nature1 and represents no property peculiar to living bodies4 ,in subsequent lectures it will be explained that this doctrine involves the abandonment of the traditional scientific materialism1 and the substitution of an alternative doctrine of organism4 ,i shall not discuss ,mill's determinism1 as it lies outside the scheme of these lectures4 ,the foregoing discussion has been directed to secure that either determinism or free will shall have some relevance1 unhampered by the difficulties introduced by materialistic mechanism1 or by the compromise of vitalism4 ,i would term the doctrine of these lectures1 the theory of organic mechanism4 ,in this theory1 the molecules may blindly run in accordance with the general laws1 but the molecules differ in their intrinsic characters according to the general organic plans of the situations in which they find themselves4 ,the discrepancy between the materialistic mechanism of science and the moral intuitions1 which are presupposed in the concrete affairs of life1 only gradually assumed its true importance as the centuries advanced4 ,the different tones of the successive epochs to which the poems1 already mentioned1 belong are curiously reflected in their opening passages4 ,milton ends his introduction with the prayer1 8,that to the height of this great argument ,i may assert eternal ,providence1 ,and justify the ways of ,god to men40 ,to judge from many modern writers on ,milton1 we might imagine that the ,paradise ,lost and the ,paradise ,regained were written as a series of experiments in blank verse4 ,this was certainly not ,milton's view of his work4 ,to #8justify the ways of ,god to men' was very much his main object4 ,he recurs to the same idea in the ,samson ,agonistes1 8,just are the ways of ,god ,and justifiable to men20 ,we note the assured volume of confidence1 untroubled by the coming scientific avalanche4 ,the actual date of the publication of the ,paradise ,lost lies just beyond the epoch to which it belongs4 ,it is the swansong of a passing world of untroubled certitude4 ,a comparison between ,pope's ,essay on ,man and the ,paradise ,lost exhibits the change of tone in ,english thought in the fifty or sixty years which separate the age of ,milton from the age of ,pope4 ,milton addresses his poem to ,god1 ,pope's poem is addressed to ,lord ,bolingbroke1 8,awake1 my ,st4 ,john6 leave all meaner things ,to low ambition and the pride of kings4 ,let us 7since life can little more supply ,than just to look about us and to die7 ,expatiate free o'er all this scene of man2 ,a mighty maze6 but not without a plan20 ,compare the jaunty assurance of ,pope1 8,a mighty maze6 but not without a plan40 with ,milton's 8,just are the ways of ,god ,and justifiable to men20 ,but the real point to notice is that ,pope as well as ,milton was untroubled by the great perplexity which haunts the modern world4 ,the clue which ,milton followed was to dwell on the ways of ,god in dealings with man4 ,two generations later we find ,pope equally confident that the enlightened methods of modern science provided a plan adequate as a map of the #8mighty maze4' ,wordsworth's ,excursion is the next ,english poem on the same subject4 ,a prose preface tells us that it is a fragment of a larger projected work1 described as #8,a philosophical poem containing views of ,man1 ,nature1 and ,society4' ,very characteristically the poem begins with the line1 8',twas summer1 and the sun had mounted high30 ,thus the romantic reaction started neither with ,god nor with ,lord ,bolingbroke1 but with nature4 ,we are here witnessing a conscious reaction against the whole tone of the eighteenth century4 ,that century approached nature with the abstract analysis of science1 whereas ,wordsworth opposes to the scientific abstractions his full concrete experience4 ,a generation of religious revival and of scientific advance lies between the ,excursion and ,tennyson's ,in ,memoriam4 ,the earlier poets had solved the perplexity by ignoring it4 ,that course was not open to ,tennyson4 ,accordingly his poem begins thus3 8,strong ,son of ,god1 immortal ,love1 ,whom we1 that have not seen ,thy face1 ,by faith1 and faith alone1 embrace1 ,believing where we cannot prove20 ,the note of perplexity is struck at once4 ,the nineteenth century has been a perplexed century1 in a sense which is not true of any of its predecessors of the modern period4 ,in the earlier times there were opposing camps1 bitterly at variance on questions which they deemed fundamental4 ,but1 except for a few stragglers1 either camp was whole-hearted4 ,the importance of ,tennyson's poem lies in the fact that it exactly expressed the character of its period4 ,each individual was divided against himself4 ,in the earlier times1 the deep thinkers were the clear thinkers1--,descartes1 ,spinoza1 ,locke1 ,leibniz4 ,they knew exactly what they meant and said it4 ,in the nineteenth century1 some of the deeper thinkers among theologians and philosophers were muddled thinkers4 ,their assent was claimed by incompatible doctrines2 and their efforts at reconciliation produced inevitable confusion4 ,matthew ,arnold1 even more than ,tennyson1 was the poet who expressed this mood of individual distraction which was so characteristic of this century4 ,compare with ,in ,memoriam the closing lines of ,arnold's ,dover ,beach3 8,and we are here as on a darkling plain ,swept with confused alarms of struggle and flight1 ,where ignorant armies clash by night40 ,cardinal ,newman in his ,apologia pro ,vit ,su mentions it as a peculiarity of ,pusey1 the great ,anglican ecclesiastic1 8,he was haunted by no intellectual perplexities40 ,in this respect ,pusey recalls ,milton1 ,pope1 ,wordsworth1 as in contrast with ,tennyson1 ,clough1 ,matthew ,arnold1 and ,newman himself4 ,so far as concerns ,english literature we find1 as might be anticipated1 the most interesting criticism of the thoughts of science among the leaders of the romantic reaction which accompanied and succeeded the epoch of the ,french ,revolution4 ,in ,english literature1 the deepest thinkers of this school were ,coleridge1 ,wordsworth1 and ,shelley4 ,keats is an example of literature untouched by science4 ,we may neglect ,coleridge's attempt at an explicit philosophical formulation4 ,it was influential in his own generation2 but in these lectures it is my object only to mention those elements of the thought of the past which stand for all time4 ,even with this limitation1 only a selection is possible4 ,for our purposes ,coleridge is only important by his influence on ,wordsworth4 ,thus ,wordsworth and ,shelley remain4 ,wordsworth was passionately absorbed in nature4 ,it has been said of ,spinoza1 that he was drunk with ,god4 ,it is equally true that ,wordsworth was drunk with nature4 ,but he was a thoughtful1 well-read man1 with philosophical interests1 and sane even to the point of prosiness4 ,in addition1 he was a genius4 ,he weakens his evidence by his dislike of science4 ,we all remember his scorn of the poor man whom he somewhat hastily accuses of peeping and botanising on his mother's grave4 ,passage after passage could be quoted from him1 expressing this repulsion4 ,in this respect1 his characteristic thought can be summed up in his phrase1 #8,we murder to dissect4' ,in this latter passage1 he discloses the intellectual basis of his criticism of science4 ,he alleges against science its absorption in abstractions4 ,his consistent theme is that the important facts of nature elude the scientific method4 ,it is important therefore to ask1 what ,wordsworth found in nature that failed to receive expression in science4 ,i ask this question in the interest of science itself2 for one main position in these lectures is a protest against the idea that the abstractions of science are irreformable and unalterable4 ,now it is emphatically not the case that ,wordsworth hands over inorganic matter to the mercy of science1 and concentrates on the faith that in the living organism there is some element that science cannot analyse4 ,of course he recognises1 what no one doubts1 that in some sense living things are different from lifeless things4 ,but that is not his main point4 ,it is the brooding presence of the hills which haunts him4 ,his theme is nature in solido1 that is to say1 he dwells on that mysterious presence of surrounding things1 which imposes itself on any separate element that we set up as an individual for its own sake4 ,he always grasps the whole of nature as involved in the tonality of the particular instance4 ,that is why he laughs with the daffodils1 and finds in the primrose 8thoughts too deep for terms40 ,wordsworth's greatest poem is1 by far1 the first book of ,the ,prelude4 ,it is pervaded by this sense of the haunting presences of nature4 ,a series of magnificent passages1 too long for quotation1 express this idea4 ,of course1 ,wordsworth is a poet writing a poem1 and is not concerned with dry philosophical statements4 ,but it would hardly be possible to express more clearly a feeling for nature1 as exhibiting entwined prehensive unities1 each suffused with modal presences of others3 8,ye ,presences of ,nature in the sky ,and on the earth6 ,ye ,visions of the hills6 ,and ,souls of lonely places6 can ,i think ,a vulgar hope was yours when ye employed ,such ministry1 when ye through many a year ,haunting me thus among my boyish sports1 ,on caves and trees1 upon the woods and hills1 ,impressed upon all forms the characters ,of danger or desire2 and thus did make ,the surface of the universal earth ,with triumph and delight1 with hope and fear1 ,work like a sea84440 ,in thus citing ,wordsworth1 the point which ,i wish to make is that we forget how strained and paradoxical is the view of nature which modern science imposes on our thoughts4 ,wordsworth1 to the height of genius1 expresses the concrete facts of our apprehension1 facts which are distorted in the scientific analysis4 ,is it not possible that the standardised concepts of science are only valid within narrow limitations1 perhaps too narrow for science itself8 ,shelley's attitude to science was at the opposite pole to that of ,wordsworth4 ,he loved it1 and is never tired of expressing in poetry the thoughts which it suggests4 ,it symbolises to him joy1 and peace1 and illumination4 ,what the hills were to the youth of ,wordsworth1 a chemical laboratory was to ,shelley4 ,it is unfortunate that ,shelley's literary critics have1 in this respect1 so little of ,shelley in their own mentality4 ,they tend to treat as a casual oddity of ,shelley's nature what was1 in fact1 part of the main structure of his mind1 permeating his poetry through and through4 ,if ,shelley had been born a hundred years later1 the twentieth century would have seen a ,newton among chemists4 ,for the sake of estimating the value of ,shelley's evidence it is important to realise this absorption of his mind in scientific ideas4 ,it can be illustrated by lyric after lyric4 ,i will choose one poem only1 the fourth act of his ,prometheus ,unbound4 ,the ,earth and the ,moon converse together in the language of accurate science4 ,physical experiments guide his imagery4 ,for example1 the ,earth's exclamation1 8,the vaporous exultation not to be confined60 is the poetic transcript of #8the expansive force of gases1' as it is termed in books on science4 ,again1 take the ,earth's stanza1 8,i spin beneath my pyramid of night1 ,which points into the heavens1--dreaming delight1 ,murmuring victorious joy in my enchanted sleep2 ,as a youth lulled in love-dreams faintly sighing1 ,under the shadow of his beauty lying1 ,which round his rest a watch of light and warmth doth keep40 ,this stanza could only have been written by someone with a definite geometrical diagram before his inward eye--a diagram which it has often been my business to demonstrate to mathematical classes4 ,as evidence1 note especially the last line which gives poetical imagery to the light surrounding night's pyramid4 ,this idea could not occur to anyone without the diagram4 ,but the whole poem and other poems are permeated with touches of this kind4 ,now the poet1 so sympathetic with science1 so absorbed in its ideas1 can simply make nothing of the doctrine of secondary qualities which is fundamental to its concepts4 ,for ,shelley nature retains its beauty and its colour4 ,shelley's nature is in its essence a nature of organisms1 functioning with the full content of our perceptual experience4 ,we are so used to ignoring the implications of orthodox scientific doctrine1 that it is difficult to make evident the criticism upon it which is thereby implied4 ,if anybody could have treated it seriously1 ,shelley would have done so4 ,furthermore ,shelley is entirely at one with ,wordsworth as to the interfusing of the ,presence in nature4 ,here is the opening stanza of his poem entitled ,mont ,blanc3 8,the everlasting universe of ,things ,flows through the ,mind1 and rolls its rapid waves1 ,now dark--now glittering--now reflecting gloom-- ,now lending splendour1 where from secret springs ,the source of human thought its tribute brings ,of waters1--with a sound but half its own1 ,such as a feeble brook will oft assume ,in the wild woods1 among the ,mountains lone1 ,where waterfalls around it leap for ever1 ,where woods and winds contend1 and a vast river ,over its rocks ceaselessly bursts and raves40 ,shelley has written these lines with explicit reference to some form of idealism1 ,kantian or ,berkeleyan or ,platonic4 ,but however you construe him1 he is here an emphatic witness to a prehensive unification as constituting the very being of nature4 ,berkeley1 ,wordsworth1 ,shelley are representative of the intuitive refusal seriously to accept the abstract materialism of science4 ,there is an interesting difference in the treatment of nature by ,wordsworth and by ,shelley1 which brings forward the exact questions we have got to think about4 ,shelley thinks of nature as changing1 dissolving1 transforming as it were at a fairy's touch4 ,the leaves fly before the ,west ,wind 8,like ghosts from an enchanter fleeing40 ,in his poem ,the ,cloud it is the transformations of water which excite his imagination4 ,the subject of the poem is the endless1 eternal1 elusive change of things3 8,i change but ,i cannot die40 ,this is one aspect of nature1 its elusive change3 a change not merely to be expressed by locomotion1 but a change of inward character4 ,this is where ,shelley places his emphasis1 on the change of what cannot die4 ,wordsworth was born among hills2 hills mostly barren of trees1 and thus showing the minimum of change with the seasons4 ,he was haunted by the enormous permanences of nature4 ,for him change is an incident which shoots across a background of endurance1 8,breaking the silence of the seas ,among the farthest ,hebrides40 ,every scheme for the analysis of nature has to face these two facts1 change and endurance4 ,there is yet a third fact to be placed by it1 eternality1 ,i will call it4 ,the mountain endures4 ,but when after ages it has been worn away1 it has gone4 ,if a replica arises1 it is yet a new mountain4 ,a colour is eternal4 ,it haunts time like a spirit4 ,it comes and it goes4 ,but where it comes1 it is the same colour4 ,it neither survives nor does it live4 ,it appears when it is wanted4 ,the mountain has to time and space a different relation from that which colour has4 ,in the previous lecture1 ,i was chiefly considering the relation to space-time of things which1 in my sense of the term1 are eternal4 ,it was necessary to do so before we can pass to the consideration of the things which endure4 ,also we must recollect the basis of our procedure4 ,i hold that philosophy is the critic of abstractions4 ,its function is the double one1 first of harmonising them by assigning to them their right relative status as abstractions1 and secondly of completing them by direct comparison with more concrete intuitions of the universe1 and thereby promoting the formation of more complete schemes of thought4 ,it is in respect to this comparison that the testimony of great poets is of such importance4 ,their survival is evidence that they express deep intuitions of mankind penetrating into what is universal in concrete fact4 ,philosophy is not one among the sciences with its own little scheme of abstractions which it works away at perfecting and improving4 ,it is the survey of sciences1 with the special objects of their harmony1 and of their completion4 ,it brings to this task1 not only the evidence of the separate sciences1 but also its own appeal to concrete experience4 ,it confronts the sciences with concrete fact4 ,the literature of the nineteenth century1 especially its ,english poetic literature1 is a witness to the discord between the aesthetic intuitions of mankind and the mechanism of science4 ,shelley brings vividly before us the elusiveness of the eternal objects of sense as they haunt the change which infects underlying organisms4 ,wordsworth is the poet of nature as being the field of enduring permanences carrying within themselves a message of tremendous significance4 ,the eternal objects are also there for him1 8,the light that never was1 on sea or land40 ,both ,shelley and ,wordsworth emphatically bear witness that nature cannot be divorced from its aesthetic values2 and that these values arise from the cumulation1 in some sense1 of the brooding presence of the whole onto its various parts4 ,thus we gain from the poets the doctrine that a philosophy of nature must concern itself at least with these five notions3 change1 value1 eternal objects1 endurance1 organism1 interfusion4 ,we see that the literary romantic movement at the beginning of the nineteenth century1 just as much as ,berkeley's philosophical idealistic movement a hundred years earlier1 refused to be confined within the materialistic concepts of the orthodox scientific theory4 ,we know also that when in these lectures we come to the twentieth century1 we shall find a movement in science itself to reorganise its concepts1 driven thereto by its own intrinsic development4 ,it is1 however1 impossible to proceed until we have settled whether this refashioning of ideas is to be carried out on an objectivist basis or on a subjectivist basis4 ,by a subjectivist basis ,i mean the belief that the nature of our immediate experience is the outcome of the perceptive peculiarities of the subject enjoying the experience4 ,in other words1 ,i mean that for this theory what is perceived is not a partial vision of a complex of things generally independent of that act of cognition2 but that it merely is the expression of the individual peculiarities of the cognitive act4 ,accordingly what is common to the multiplicity of cognitive acts is the ratiocination connected with them4 ,thus1 though there is a common world of thought associated with our sense-perceptions1 there is no common world to think about4 ,what we do think about is a common conceptual world applying indifferently to our individual experiences which are strictly personal to ourselves4 ,such a conceptual world will ultimately find its complete expression in the equations of applied mathematics4 ,this is the extreme subjectivist position4 ,there is of course the half-way house of those who believe that our perceptual experience does tell us of a common objective world2 but that the things perceived are merely the outcome for us of this world1 and are not in themselves elements in the common world itself4 ,also there is the objectivist position4 ,this creed is that the actual elements perceived by our senses are in themselves the elements of a common world2 and that this world is a complex of things1 including indeed our acts of cognition1 but transcending them4 ,according to this point of view the things experienced are to be distinguished from our knowledge of them4 ,so far as there is dependence1 the things pave the way for the cognition1 rather than vice versa4 ,but the point is that the actual things experienced enter into a common world which transcends knowledge1 though it includes knowledge4 ,the intermediate subjectivists would hold that the things experienced only indirectly enter into the common world by reason of their dependence on the subject who is cognising4 ,the objectivist holds that the things experienced and the cognisant subject enter into the common world on equal terms4 ,in these lectures ,i am giving the outline of what ,i consider to be the essentials of an objectivist philosophy adapted to the requirement of science and to the concrete experience of mankind4 ,apart from the detailed criticism of the difficulties raised by subjectivism in any form1 my broad reasons for distrusting it are three in number4 ,one reason arises from the direct interrogation of our perceptive experience4 ,it appears from this interrogation that we are within a world of colours1 sounds1 and other sense-objects1 related in space and time to enduring objects such as stones1 trees1 and human bodies4 ,we seem to be ourselves elements of this world in the same sense as are the other things which we perceive4 ,but the subjectivist1 even the moderate intermediate subjectivist1 makes this world1 as thus described1 depend on us1 in a way which directly traverses our nave experience4 ,i hold that the ultimate appeal is to nave experience and that is why ,i lay such stress on the evidence of poetry4 ,my point is1 that in our sense-experience we know away from and beyond our own personality2 whereas the subjectivist holds that in such experience we merely know about our own personality4 ,even the intermediate subjectivist places our personality between the world we know of and the common world which he admits4 ,the world we know of is for him the internal strain of our personality under the stress of the common world which lies behind4 ,my second reason for distrusting subjectivism is based on the particular content of experience4 ,our historical knowledge tells us of ages in the past when1 so far as we can see1 no living being existed on earth4 ,again it also tells us of countless star-systems1 whose detailed history remains beyond our ken4 ,consider even the moon and the earth4 ,what is going on within the interior of the earth1 and on the far side of the moon6 ,our perceptions lead us to infer that there is something happening in the stars1 something happening within the earth1 and something happening on the far side of the moon4 ,also they tell us that in remote ages there were things happening4 ,but all these things which it appears certainly happened1 are either unknown in detail1 or else are reconstructed by inferential evidence4 ,in the face of this content of our personal experience1 it is difficult to believe that the experienced world is an attribute of our own personality4 ,my third reason is based upon the instinct for action4 ,just as sense-perception seems to give knowledge of what lies beyond individuality1 so action seems to issue in an instinct for self-transcendence4 ,the activity passes beyond self into the known transcendent world4 ,it is here that final ends are of importance4 ,for it is not activity urged from behind1 which passes out into the veiled world of the intermediate subjectivist4 ,it is activity directed to determinate ends in the known world2 and yet it is activity transcending self and it is activity within the known world4 ,it follows therefore that the world1 as known1 transcends the subject which is cognisant of it4 ,the subjectivist position has been popular among those who have been engaged in giving a philosophical interpretation to the recent theories of relativity in physical science4 ,the dependence of the world of sense on the individual percipient seems an easy mode of expressing the meanings involved4 ,of course1 with the exception of those who are content with themselves as forming the entire universe1 solitary amid nothing1 everyone wants to struggle back to some sort of objectivist position4 ,i do not understand how a common world of thought can be established in the absence of a common world of sense4 ,i will not argue this point in detail2 but in the absence of a transcendence of thought1 or a transcendence of the world of sense1 it is difficult to see how the subjectivist is to divest himself of his solitariness4 ,nor does the intermediate subjectivist appear to get any help from his unknown world in the background4 ,the distinction between realism and idealism does not coincide with that between objectivism and subjectivism4 ,both realists and idealists can start from an objective standpoint4 ,they may both agree that the world disclosed in sense-perception is a common world1 transcending the individual percipient4 ,but the objective idealist1 when he comes to analyse what the reality of this world involves1 finds that cognitive mentality is in some way inextricably concerned in every detail4 ,this position the realist denies4 ,accordingly these two classes of objectivists do not part company till they have arrived at the ultimate problem of metaphysics4 ,there is a great deal which they share in common4 ,this is why1 in my last lecture1 ,i said that ,i adopted a position of provisional realism4 ,in the past1 the objectivist position has been distorted by the supposed necessity of accepting the classical scientific materialism1 with its doctrine of simple location4 ,this has necessitated the doctrine of secondary and primary qualities4 ,thus the secondary qualities1 such as the sense-objects1 are dealt with on subjectivist principles4 ,this is a half-hearted position which falls an easy prey to subjectivist criticism4 ,if we are to include the secondary qualities in the common world1 a very drastic reorganisation of our fundamental concepts is necessary4 ,it is an evident fact of experience that our apprehensions of the external world depend absolutely on the occurrences within the human body4 ,by playing appropriate tricks on the body a man can be got to perceive1 or not to perceive1 almost anything4 ,some people express themselves as though bodies1 brains1 and nerves were the only real things in an entirely imaginary world4 ,in other words1 they treat bodies on objectivist principles1 and the rest of the world on subjectivist principles4 ,this will not do2 especially1 when we remember that it is the experimenter's perception of another person's body which is in question as evidence4 ,but we have to admit that the body is the organism whose states regulate our cognisance of the world4 ,the unity of the perceptual field therefore must be a unity of bodily experience4 ,in being aware of the bodily experience1 we must thereby be aware of aspects of the whole spatio-temporal world as mirrored within the bodily life4 ,this is the solution of the problem which ,i gave in my last lecture4 ,i will not repeat myself now1 except to remind you that my theory involves the entire abandonment of the notion that simple location is the primary way in which things are involved in space-time4 ,in a certain sense1 everything is everywhere at all times4 ,for every location involves an aspect of itself in every other location4 ,thus every spatio-temporal standpoint mirrors the world4 ,if you try to imagine this doctrine in terms of our conventional views of space and time1 which presuppose simple location1 it is a great paradox4 ,but if you think of it in terms of our nave experience1 it is a mere transcript of the obvious facts4 ,you are in a certain place perceiving things4 ,your perception takes place where you are1 and is entirely dependent on how your body is functioning4 ,but this functioning of the body in one place1 exhibits for your cognisance an aspect of the distant environment1 fading away into the general knowledge that there are things beyond4 ,if this cognisance conveys knowledge of a transcendent world1 it must be because the event which is the bodily life unifies in itself aspects of the universe4 ,this is a doctrine extremely consonant with the vivid expression of personal experience which we find in the nature-poetry of imaginative writers such as ,wordsworth or ,shelley4 ,the brooding1 immediate presences of things are an obsession to ,wordsworth4 ,what the theory does do is to edge cognitive mentality away from being the necessary substratum of the unity of experience4 ,that unity is now placed in the unity of an event4 ,accompanying this unity1 there may or there may not be cognition4 ,at this point we come back to the great question which was posed before us by our examination of the evidence afforded by the poetic insight of ,wordsworth and ,shelley4 ,this single question has expanded into a group of questions4 ,what are enduring things1 as distinguished from the eternal objects1 such as colour and shape8 ,how are they possible8 ,what is their status and meaning in the universe8 ,it comes to this3 ,what is the status of the enduring stability of the order of nature8 ,there is the summary answer1 which refers nature to some greater reality standing behind it4 ,this reality occurs in the history of thought under many names1 ,the ,absolute1 ,brahma1 ,the ,order of ,heaven1 ,god4 ,the delineation of final metaphysical truth is no part of this lecture4 ,my point is that any summary conclusion jumping from our conviction of the existence of such an order of nature to the easy assumption that there is an ultimate reality which1 in some unexplained way1 is to be appealed to for the removal of perplexity1 constitutes the great refusal of rationality to assert its rights4 ,we have to search whether nature does not in its very being show itself as self-explanatory4 ,by this ,i mean1 that the sheer statement1 of what things are1 may contain elements explanatory of why things are4 ,such elements may be expected to refer to depths beyond anything which we can grasp with a clear apprehension4 ,in a sense1 all explanation must end in an ultimate arbitrariness4 ,my demand is1 that the ultimate arbitrariness of matter of fact from which our formulation starts should disclose the same general principles of reality1 which we dimly discern as stretching away into regions beyond our explicit powers of discernment4 ,nature exhibits itself as exemplifying a philosophy of the evolution of organisms subject to determinate conditions4 ,examples of such conditions are the dimensions of space1 the laws of nature1 the determinate enduring entities1 such as atoms and electrons1 which exemplify these laws4 ,but the very nature of these entities1 the very nature of their spatiality and temporality1 should exhibit the arbitrariness of these conditions as the outcome of a wider evolution beyond nature itself1 and within which nature is but a limited mode4 ,one all-pervasive fact1 inherent in the very character of what is real is the transition of things1 the passage one to another4 ,this passage is not a mere linear procession of discrete entities4 ,however we fix a determinate entity1 there is always a narrower determination of something which is presupposed in our first choice4 ,also there is always a wider determination into which our first choice fades by transition beyond itself4 ,the general aspect of nature is that of evolutionary expansiveness4 ,these unities1 which ,i call events1 are the emergence into actuality of something4 ,how are we to characterise the something which thus emerges8 ,the name #8event' given to such a unity1 draws attention to the inherent transitoriness1 combined with the actual unity4 ,but this abstract word cannot be sufficient to characterise what the fact of the reality of an event is in itself4 ,a moment's thought shows us that no one idea can in itself be sufficient4 ,for every idea which finds its significance in each event must represent something which contributes to what realisation is in itself4 ,thus no one word can be adequate4 ,but conversely1 nothing must be left out4 ,remembering the poetic rendering of our concrete experience1 we see at once that the element of value1 of being valuable1 of having value1 of being an end in itself1 of being something which is for its own sake1 must not be omitted in any account of an event as the most concrete actual something4 #8,value' is the word ,i use for the intrinsic reality of an event4 ,value is an element which permeates through and through the poetic view of nature4 ,we have only to transfer to the very texture of realisation in itself that value which we recognise so readily in terms of human life4 ,this is the secret of ,wordsworth's worship of nature4 ,realization therefore is in itself the attainment of value4 ,but there is no such thing as mere value4 ,value is the outcome of limitation4 ,the definite finite entity is the selected mode which is the shaping of attainment2 apart from such shaping into individual matter of fact there is no attainment4 ,the mere fusion of all that there is would be the nonentity of indefiniteness4 ,the salvation of reality is its obstinate1 irreducible1 matter-of-fact entities1 which are limited to be no other than themselves4 ,neither science1 nor art1 nor creative action can tear itself away from obstinate1 irreducible1 limited facts4 ,the endurance of things has its significance in the self-retention of that which imposes itself as a definite attainment for its own sake4 ,that which endures is limited1 obstructive1 intolerant1 infecting its environment with its own aspects4 ,but it is not self-sufficient4 ,the aspects of all things enter into its very nature4 ,it is only itself as drawing together into its own limitation the larger whole in which it finds itself4 ,conversely it is only itself by lending its aspects to this same environment in which it finds itself4 ,the problem of evolution is the development of enduring harmonies of enduring shapes of value1 which merge into higher attainments of things beyond themselves4 ,aesthetic attainment is interwoven in the texture of realisation4 ,the endurance of an entity represents the attainment of a limited aesthetic success1 though if we look beyond it to its external effects1 it may represent an aesthetic failure4 ,even within itself1 it may represent the conflict between a lower success and a higher failure4 ,the conflict is the presage of disruption4 ,the further discussion of the nature of enduring objects and of the conditions they require will be relevant to the consideration of the doctrine of evolution which dominated the latter half of the nineteenth century4 ,the point which in this lecture ,i have endeavoured to make clear is that the nature-poetry of the romantic revival was a protest on behalf of the organic view of nature1 and also a protest against the exclusion of value from the essence of matter of fact4 ,in this aspect of it1 the romantic movement may be conceived as a revival of ,berkeley's protest which had been launched a hundred years earlier4 ,the romantic reaction was a protest on behalf of value4 ,,chapter ,,vi ,,the ,,nineteenth ,,century ,my previous lecture was occupied with the comparison of the nature-poetry of the romantic movement in ,england with the materialistic scientific philosophy inherited from the eighteenth century4 ,it noted the entire disagreement of the two movements of thought4 ,the lecture also continued the endeavour to outline an objectivist philosophy1 capable of bridging the gap between science and that fundamental intuition of mankind which finds its expression in poetry and its practical exemplification in the presuppositions of daily life4 ,as the nineteenth century passed on1 the romantic movement died down4 ,it did not die away1 but it lost its clear unity of tidal stream1 and dispersed itself into many estuaries as it coalesced with other human interests4 ,the faith of the century was derived from three sources3 one source was the romantic movement1 showing itself in religious revival1 in art1 and in political aspiration3 another source was the gathering advance of science which opened avenues of thought3 the third source was the advance in technology which completely changed the conditions of human life4 ,each of these springs of faith had its origin in the previous period4 ,the ,french ,revolution itself was the first child of romanticism in the form in which it tinged ,rousseau4 ,james ,watt obtained his patent for his steam-engine in #agfi4 ,the scientific advance was the glory of ,france and of ,french influence1 throughout the same century4 ,also even during this earlier period1 the streams interacted1 coalesced1 and antagonised each other4 ,but it was not until the nineteenth century that the threefold movement came to that full development and peculiar balance characteristic of the sixty years following the battle of ,waterloo4 ,what is peculiar and new to the century1 differentiating it from all its predecessors1 is its technology4 ,it was not merely the introduction of some great isolated inventions4 ,it is impossible not to feel that something more than that was involved4 ,for example1 writing was a greater invention than the steam-engine4 ,but in tracing the continuous history of the growth of writing we find an immense difference from that of the steam-engine4 ,we must1 of course1 put aside minor and sporadic anticipations of both2 and confine attention to the periods of their effective elaboration4 ,the scale of time is so absolutely disparate4 ,for the steam-engine1 we may give about a hundred years2 for writing1 the time period is of the order of a thousand years4 ,further1 when writing was finally popularised1 the world was not then expecting the next step in technology4 ,the process of change was slow1 unconscious1 and unexpected4 ,in the nineteenth century1 the process became quick1 conscious1 and expected4 ,the earlier half of the century was the period in which this new attitude to change was first established and enjoyed4 ,it was a peculiar period of hope1 in the sense in which1 sixty or seventy years later1 we can now detect a note of disillusionment1 or at least of anxiety4 ,the greatest invention of the nineteenth century was the invention of the method of invention4 ,a new method entered into life4 ,in order to understand our epoch1 we can neglect all the details of change1 such as railways1 telegraphs1 radios1 spinning machines1 synthetic dyes4 ,we must concentrate on the method in itself2 that is the real novelty1 which has broken up the foundations of the old civilisation4 ,the prophecy of ,francis ,bacon has now been fulfilled2 and man1 who at times dreamt of himself as a little lower than the angels1 has submitted to become the servant and the minister of nature4 ,it still remains to be seen whether the same actor can play both parts4 ,the whole change has arisen from the new scientific information4 ,science1 conceived not so much in its principles as in its results1 is an obvious storehouse of ideas for utilisation4 ,but1 if we are to understand what happened during the century1 the analogy of a mine is better than that of a storehouse4 ,also1 it is a great mistake to think that the bare scientific idea is the required invention1 so that it has only to be picked up and used4 ,an intense period of imaginative design lies between4 ,one element in the new method is just the discovery of how to set about bridging the gap between the scientific ideas1 and the ultimate product4 ,it is a process of disciplined attack upon one difficulty after another4 ,the possibilities of modern technology were first in practice realised in ,england1 by the energy of a prosperous middle class4 ,accordingly1 the industrial revolution started there4 ,but the ,germans explicitly realised the methods by which the deeper veins in the mine of science could be reached4 ,they abolished haphazard methods of scholarship4 ,in their technological schools and universities progress did not have to wait for the occasional genius1 or the occasional lucky thought4 ,their feats of scholarship during the nineteenth century were the admiration of the world4 ,this discipline of knowledge applies beyond technology to pure science1 and beyond science to general scholarship4 ,it represents the change from amateurs to professionals4 ,there have always been people who devoted their lives to definite regions of thought4 ,in particular1 lawyers and the clergy of the ,christian churches form obvious examples of such specialism4 ,but the full self-conscious realisation of the power of professionalism in knowledge in all its departments1 and of the way to produce the professionals1 and of the importance of knowledge to the advance of technology1 and of the methods by which abstract knowledge can be connected with technology1 and of the boundless possibilities of technological advance1--the realisation of all these things was first completely attained in the nineteenth century2 and among the various countries1 chiefly in ,germany4 ,in the past human life was lived in a bullock cart2 in the future it will be lived in an aeroplane2 and the change of speed amounts to a difference in quality4 ,the transformation of the field of knowledge1 which has been thus effected1 has not been wholly a gain4 ,at least1 there are dangers implicit in it1 although the increase of efficiency is undeniable4 ,the discussion of various effects on social life arising from the new situation is reserved for my last lecture4 ,for the present it is sufficient to note that this novel situation of disciplined progress is the setting within which the thought of the century developed4 ,in the period considered four great novel ideas were introduced into theoretical science4 ,of course1 it is possible to show good cause for increasing my list far beyond the number four4 ,but ,i am keeping to ideas which1 if taken in their broadest signification1 are vital to modern attempts at reconstructing the foundations of physical science4 ,two of these ideas are antithetical1 and ,i will consider them together4 ,we are not concerned with details1 but with ultimate influences on thought4 ,one of the ideas is that of a field of physical activity pervading all space1 even where there is an apparent vacuum4 ,this notion had occurred to many people1 under many forms4 ,we remember the medieval axiom1 nature abhors a vacuum4 ,also1 ,descartes' vortices at one time1 in the seventeenth century1 seemed as if established among scientific assumptions4 ,newton believed that gravitation was caused by something happening in a medium4 ,but1 on the whole1 in the eighteenth century nothing was made of any of these ideas4 ,the passage of light was explained in ,newton's fashion by the flight of minute corpuscles1 which of course left room for a vacuum4 ,mathematical physicists were far too busy deducing the consequences of the theory of gravitation to bother much about the causes2 nor did they know where to look1 if they had troubled themselves over the question4 ,there were speculations1 but their importance was not great4 ,accordingly1 when the nineteenth century opened1 the notion of physical occurrences pervading all space held no effective place in science4 ,it was revived from two sources4 ,the undulatory theory of light triumphed1 thanks to ,thomas ,young and ,fresnel4 ,this demands that there shall be something throughout space which can undulate4 ,accordingly1 the ether was produced1 as a sort of all pervading subtle material4 ,again the theory of electromagnetism finally1 in ,clerk ,maxwell's hands1 assumed a shape in which it demanded that there should be electromagnetic occurrences throughout all space4 ,maxwell's complete theory was not shaped until the eighteen-seventies4 ,but it had been prepared for by many great men1 ,ampre1 ,oersted1 ,faraday4 ,in accordance with the current materialistic outlook1 these electromagnetic occurrences also required a material in which to happen4 ,so again the ether was requisitioned4 ,then ,maxwell1 as the immediate first-fruits of his theory1 demonstrated that the waves of light were merely waves of his electromagnetic occurrences4 ,accordingly1 the theory of electromagnetism swallowed up the theory of light4 ,it was a great simplification1 and no one doubts its truth4 ,but it had one unfortunate effect so far as materialism was concerned4 ,for1 whereas quite a simple sort of elastic ether sufficed for light when taken by itself1 the electromagnetic ether has to be endowed with just those properties necessary for the production of the electromagnetic occurrences4 ,in fact1 it becomes a mere name for the material which is postulated to underlie these occurrences4 ,if you do not happen to hold the metaphysical theory which makes you postulate such an ether1 you can discard it4 ,for it has no independent vitality4 ,thus in the seventies of the last century1 some main physical sciences were established on a basis which presupposed the idea of continuity4 ,on the other hand1 the idea of atomicity had been introduced by ,john ,dalton1 to complete ,lavoisier's work on the foundation of chemistry4 ,this is the second great notion4 ,ordinary matter was conceived as atomic3 electromagnetic effects were conceived as arising from a continuous field4 ,there was no contradiction4 ,in the first place1 the notions are antithetical2 but1 apart from special embodiments1 are not logically contradictory4 ,secondly1 they were applied to different regions of science1 one to chemistry1 and the other to electromagnetism4 ,and1 as yet1 there were but faint signs of coalescence between the two4 ,the notion of matter as atomic has a long history4 ,democritus and ,lucretius will at once occur to your minds4 ,in speaking of these ideas as novel1 ,i merely mean relatively novel1 having regard to the settlement of ideas which formed the efficient basis of science throughout the eighteenth century4 ,in considering the history of thought1 it is necessary to distinguish the real stream1 determining a period1 from ineffectual thoughts casually entertained4 ,in the eighteenth century every well-educated man read ,lucretius1 and entertained ideas about atoms4 ,but ,john ,dalton made them efficient in the stream of science2 and in this function of efficiency atomicity was a new idea4 ,the influence of atomicity was not limited to chemistry4 ,the living cell is to biology what the electron and the proton are to physics4 ,apart from cells and from aggregates of cells there are no biological phenomena4 ,the cell theory was introduced into biology contemporaneously with1 and independently of1 ,dalton's atomic theory4 ,the two theories are independent exemplifications of the same idea of #8atomism4' ,the biological cell theory was a gradual growth1 and a mere list of dates and names illustrates the fact that the biological sciences1 as effective schemes of thought1 are barely one hundred years old4 ,bicht in #ahja elaborated a tissue theory3 ,johannes ,mller in #ahce described #8cells' and demonstrated facts concerning their nature and relations3 ,schleiden in #ahch and ,schwann in #ahci finally established their fundamental character4 ,thus by #ahdj both biology and chemistry were established on an atomic basis4 ,the final triumph of atomism had to wait for the arrival of electrons at the end of the century4 ,the importance of the imaginative background is illustrated by the fact that nearly half a century after ,dalton had done his work1 another chemist1 ,louis ,pasteur1 carried over these same ideas of atomicity still further into the region of biology4 ,the cell theory and ,pasteur's work were in some respects more revolutionary than that of ,dalton4 ,for they introduced the notion of organism into the world of minute beings4 ,there had been a tendency to treat the atom as an ultimate entity1 capable only of external relations4 ,this attitude of mind was breaking down under the influence of ,mendeleef's periodic law4 ,but ,pasteur showed the decisive importance of the idea of organism at the stage of infinitesimal magnitude4 ,the astronomers had shown us how big is the universe4 ,the chemists and biologists teach us how small it is4 ,there is in modern scientific practice a famous standard of length4 ,it is rather small3 to obtain it1 you must divide a centimetre into one hundred million parts1 and take one of them4 ,pasteur's organisms are a good deal bigger than this length4 ,in connection with atoms1 we now know that there are organisms for which such distances are uncomfortably great4 ,the remaining pair of new ideas to be ascribed to this epoch are both of them connected with the notion of transition or change4 ,they are the doctrine of the conservation of energy1 and the doctrine of evolution4 ,the doctrine of energy has to do with the notion of quantitative permanence underlying change4 ,the doctrine of evolution has to do with the emergence of novel organisms as the outcome of change4 ,the theory of energy lies in the province of physics4 ,the theory of evolution lies mainly in the province of biology1 although it had previously been touched upon by ,kant and ,laplace in connection with the formation of suns and planets4 ,the convergent effect of the new power for scientific advance1 which resulted from these four ideas1 transformed the middle period of the century into an orgy of scientific triumph4 ,clear-sighted men1 of the sort who are so clearly wrong1 now proclaimed that the secrets of the physical universe were finally disclosed4 ,if only you ignored everything which refused to come into line1 your powers of explanation were unlimited4 ,on the other side1 muddle-headed men muddled themselves into the most indefensible positions4 ,learned dogmatism1 conjoined with ignorance of the crucial facts1 suffered a heavy defeat from the scientific advocates of new ways4 ,thus to the excitement derived from technological revolution1 there was now added the excitement arising from the vistas disclosed by scientific theory4 ,both the material and the spiritual bases of social life were in process of transformation4 ,when the century entered upon its last quarter1 its three sources of inspiration1 the romantic1 the technological1 and the scientific had done their work4 ,then1 almost suddenly1 a pause occurred2 and in its last twenty years the century closed with one of the dullest stages of thought since the time of the ,first ,crusade4 ,it was an echo of the eighteenth century1 lacking ,voltaire and the reckless grace of the ,french aristocrats4 ,the period was efficient1 dull1 and half-hearted4 ,it celebrated the triumph of the professional man4 ,but looking backwards upon this time of pause1 we can now discern signs of change4 ,in the first place1 the modern conditions of systematic research prevent absolute stagnation4 ,in every branch of science1 there was effective progress1 indeed rapid progress1 although it was confined somewhat strictly within the accepted ideas of each branch4 ,it was an age of successful scientific orthodoxy1 undisturbed by much thought beyond the conventions4 ,in the second place1 we can now see that the adequacy of scientific materialism as a scheme of thought for the use of science was endangered4 ,the conservation of energy provided a new type of quantitative permanence4 ,it is true that energy could be construed as something subsidiary to matter4 ,but1 anyhow1 the notion of mass was losing its unique preeminence as being the one final permanent quantity4 ,later on1 we find the relations of mass and energy inverted2 so that mass now becomes the name for a quantity of energy considered in relation to some of its dynamical effects4 ,this train of thought leads to the notion of energy being fundamental1 thus displacing matter from that position4 ,but energy is merely the name for the quantitative aspect of a structure of happenings2 in short1 it depends on the notion of the functioning of an organism4 ,the question is1 can we define an organism without recurrence to the concept of matter in simple location8 ,we must1 later on1 consider this point in more detail4 ,the same relegation of matter to the background occurs in connection with the electromagnetic fields4 ,the modern theory presupposes happenings in that field which are divorced from immediate dependence upon matter4 ,it is usual to provide an ether as a substratum4 ,but the ether does not really enter into the theory4 ,thus again the notion of material loses its fundamental position4 ,also1 the atom is transforming itself into an organism2 and finally the evolution theory is nothing else than the analysis of the conditions for the formation and survival of various types of organisms4 ,in truth1 one most significant fact of this later period is the advance in biological sciences4 ,these sciences are essentially sciences concerning organisms4 ,during the epoch in question1 and indeed also at the present moment1 the prestige of the more perfect scientific form belongs to the physical sciences4 ,accordingly1 biology apes the manners of physics4 ,it is orthodox to hold1 that there is nothing in biology but what is physical mechanism under somewhat complex circumstances4 ,one difficulty in this position is the present confusion as to the foundational concepts of physical science4 ,this same difficulty also attaches to the opposed doctrine of vitalism4 ,for1 in this later theory1 the fact of mechanism is accepted--,i mean1 mechanism based upon materialism--and an additional vital control is introduced to explain the actions of living bodies4 ,it cannot be too clearly understood that the various physical laws which appear to apply to the behaviour of atoms are not mutually consistent as at present formulated4 ,the appeal to mechanism on behalf of biology was in its origin an appeal to the well-attested self-consistent physical concepts as expressing the basis of all natural phenomena4 ,but at present there is no such system of concepts4 ,science is taking on a new aspect which is neither purely physical1 nor purely biological4 ,it is becoming the study of organisms4 ,biology is the study of the larger organisms2 whereas physics is the study of the smaller organisms4 ,there is another difference between the two divisions of science4 ,the organisms of biology include as ingredients the smaller organisms of physics2 but there is at present no evidence that the smaller of the physical organisms can be analysed into component organisms4 ,it may be so4 ,but anyhow we are faced with the question as to whether there are not primary organisms which are incapable of further analysis4 ,it seems very unlikely that there should be any infinite regress in nature4 ,accordingly1 a theory of science which discards materialism must answer the question as to the character of these primary entities4 ,there can be only one answer on this basis4 ,we must start with the event as the ultimate unit of natural occurrence4 ,an event has to do with all that there is1 and in particular with all other events4 ,this interfusion of events is effected by the aspects of those eternal objects1 such as colours1 sounds1 scents1 geometrical characters1 which are required for nature and are not emergent from it4 ,such an eternal object will be an ingredient of one event under the guise1 or aspect1 of qualifying another event4 ,there is a reciprocity of aspects1 and there are patterns of aspects4 ,each event corresponds to two such patterns2 namely1 the pattern of aspects of other events which it grasps into its own unity1 and the pattern of its aspects which other events severally grasp into their unities4 ,accordingly1 a non-materialistic philosophy of nature will identify a primary organism as being the emergence of some particular pattern as grasped in the unity of a real event4 ,such a pattern will also include the aspects of the event in question as grasped in other events1 whereby those other events receive a modification1 or partial determination4 ,there is thus an intrinsic and an extrinsic reality of an event1 namely1 the event as in its own prehension1 and the event as in the prehension of other events4 ,the concept of an organism includes1 therefore1 the concept of the interaction of organisms4 ,the ordinary scientific ideas of transmission and continuity are1 relatively speaking1 details concerning the empirically observed characters of these patterns throughout space and time4 ,the position here maintained is that the relationships of an event are internal1 so far as concerns the event itself2 that is to say1 that they are constitutive of what the event is in itself4 ,also in the previous lecture1 we arrived at the notion that an actual event is an achievement for its own sake1 a grasping of diverse entities into a value by reason of their real togetherness in that pattern1 to the exclusion of other entities4 ,it is not the mere logical togetherness of merely diverse things4 ,for in that case1 to modify ,bacon's words1 8all eternal objects would be alike one to another40 ,this reality means that each intrinsic essence1 that is to say1 what each eternal object is in itself1 becomes relevant to the one limited value emergent in the guise of the event4 ,but values differ in importance4 ,thus though each event is necessary for the community of events1 the weight of its contribution is determined by something intrinsic in itself4 ,we have now to discuss what that property is4 ,empirical observation shows that it is the property which we may call indifferently retention1 endurance or reiteration4 ,this property amounts to the recovery1 on behalf of value amid the transitoriness of reality1 of the self-identity which is also enjoyed by the primary eternal objects4 ,the reiteration of a particular shape 7or formation7 of value within an event occurs when the event as a whole repeats some shape which is also exhibited by each one of a succession of its parts4 ,thus however you analyse the event according to the flux of its parts through time1 there is the same thing-for-its-own-sake standing before you4 ,thus the event1 in its own intrinsic reality1 mirrors in itself1 as derived from its own parts1 aspects of the same patterned value as it realises in its complete self4 ,it thus realises itself under the guise of an enduring individual entity1 with a life history contained within itself4 ,furthermore1 the extrinsic reality of such an event1 as mirrored in other events1 takes this same form of an enduring individuality2 only in this case1 the individuality is implanted as a reiteration of aspects of itself in the alien events composing the environment4 ,the total temporal duration of such an event bearing an enduring pattern1 constitutes its specious present4 ,within this specious present the event realises itself as a totality1 and also in so doing realises itself as grouping together a number of aspects of its own temporal parts4 ,one and the same pattern is realised in the total event1 and is exhibited by each of these various parts through an aspect of each part grasped into the togetherness of the total event4 ,also1 the earlier life-history of the same pattern is exhibited by its aspects in this total event4 ,there is1 thus1 in this event a memory of the antecedent life-history of its own dominant pattern1 as having formed an element of value in its own antecedent environment4 ,this concrete prehension1 from within1 of the life-history of an enduring fact is analysable into two abstractions1 of which one is the enduring entity which has emerged as a real matter of fact to be taken account of by other things1 and the other is the individualised embodiment of the underlying energy of realisation4 ,the consideration of the general flux of events leads to this analysis into an underlying eternal energy in whose nature there stands an envisagement of the realm of all eternal objects4 ,such an envisagement is the ground of the individualised thoughts which emerge as thought-aspects grasped within the life-history of the subtler and more complex enduring patterns4 ,also in the nature of the eternal activity there must stand an envisagement of all values to be obtained by a real togetherness of eternal objects1 as envisaged in ideal situations4 ,such ideal situations1 apart from any reality1 are devoid of intrinsic value1 but are valuable as elements in purpose4 ,the individualised prehension into individual events of aspects of these ideal situations takes the form of individualised thoughts1 and as such has intrinsic value4 ,thus value arises because there is now a real togetherness of the ideal aspects1 as in thought1 with the actual aspects1 as in process of occurrence4 ,accordingly no value is to be ascribed to the underlying activity as divorced from the matter-of-fact events of the real world4 ,finally1 to sum up this train of thought1 the underlying activity1 as conceived apart from the fact of realisation1 has three types of envisagement4 ,these are3 first1 the envisagement of eternal objects2 secondly1 the envisagement of possibilities of value in respect to the synthesis of eternal objects2 and lastly1 the envisagement of the actual matter of fact which must enter into the total situation which is achievable by the addition of the future4 ,but in abstraction from actuality1 the eternal activity is divorced from value4 ,for the actuality is the value4 ,the individual perception arising from enduring objects will vary in its individual depth and width according to the way in which the pattern dominates its own route4 ,it may represent the faintest ripple differentiating the general substrate energy2 or1 in the other extreme1 it may rise to conscious thought1 which includes poising before self-conscious judgment the abstract possibilities of value inherent in various situations of ideal togetherness4 ,the intermediate cases will group round the individual perception as envisaging 7without self-consciousness7 that one immediate possibility of attainment which represents the closest analogy to its own immediate past1 having regard to the actual aspects which are there for prehension4 ,the laws of physics represent the harmonised adjustment of development which results from this unique principle of determination4 ,thus dynamics is dominated by a principle of least action1 whose detailed character has to be learnt from observation4 ,the atomic material entities which are considered in physical science are merely these individual enduring entities1 conceived in abstraction from everything except what concerns their mutual interplay in determining each other's historical routes of life-history4 ,such entities are partially formed by the inheritance of aspects from their own past4 ,but they are also partially formed by the aspects of other events forming their environments4 ,the laws of physics are the laws declaring how the entities mutually react among themselves4 ,for physics these laws are arbitrary1 because that science has abstracted from what the entities are in themselves4 ,we have seen that this fact of what the entities are in themselves is liable to modification by their environments4 ,accordingly1 the assumption that no modification of these laws is to be looked for in environments1 which have any striking difference from the environments for which the laws have been observed to hold1 is very unsafe4 ,the physical entities may be modified in very essential ways1 so far as these laws are concerned4 ,it is even possible that they may be developed into individualities of more fundamental types1 with wider embodiment of envisagement4 ,such envisagement might reach to the attainment of the poising of alternative values with exercise of choice lying outside the physical laws1 and expressible only in terms of purpose4 ,apart from such remote possibilities1 it remains an immediate deduction that an individual entity1 whose own life-history is a part within the life-history of some larger1 deeper1 more complete pattern1 is liable to have aspects of that larger pattern dominating its own being1 and to experience modifications of that larger pattern reflected in itself as modifications of its own being4 ,this is the theory of organic mechanism4 ,according to this theory the evolution of laws of nature is concurrent with the evolution of enduring pattern4 ,for the general state of the universe1 as it now is1 partly determines the very essences of the entities whose modes of functioning these laws express4 ,the general principle is that in a new environment there is an evolution of the old entities into new forms4 ,this rapid outline of a thoroughgoing organic theory of nature enables us to understand the chief requisites of the doctrine of evolution4 ,the main work1 proceeding during this pause at the end of the nineteenth century1 was the absorption of this doctrine as guiding the methodology of all branches of science4 ,by a blindness which is almost judicial as being a penalty affixed to hasty1 superficial thinking1 many religious thinkers opposed the new doctrine2 although1 in truth1 a thoroughgoing evolutionary philosophy is inconsistent with materialism4 ,the aboriginal stuff1 or material1 from which a materialistic philosophy starts is incapable of evolution4 ,this material is in itself the ultimate substance4 ,evolution1 on the materialistic theory1 is reduced to the rle of being another word for the description of the changes of the external relations between portions of matter4 ,there is nothing to evolve1 because one set of external relations is as good as any other set of external relations4 ,there can merely be change1 purposeless and unprogressive4 ,but the whole point of the modern doctrine is the evolution of the complex organisms from antecedent states of less complex organisms4 ,the doctrine thus cries aloud for a conception of organism as fundamental for nature4 ,it also requires an underlying activity--a substantial activity--expressing itself in individual embodiments1 and evolving in achievements of organism4 ,the organism is a unit of emergent value1 a real fusion of the characters of eternal objects1 emerging for its own sake4 ,thus in the process of analysing the character of nature in itself1 we find that the emergence of organisms depends on a selective activity which is akin to purpose4 ,the point is that the enduring organisms are now the outcome of evolution2 and that1 beyond these organisms1 there is nothing else that endures4 ,on the materialistic theory1 there is material--such as matter or electricity--which endures4 ,on the organic theory1 the only endurances are structures of activity1 and the structures are evolved4 ,enduring things are thus the outcome of a temporal process2 whereas eternal things are the elements required for the very being of the process4 ,we can give a precise definition of endurance in this way3 ,let an event ,a be pervaded by an enduring structural pattern4 ,then ,a can be exhaustively subdivided into a temporal succession of events4 ,let ,b be any part of ,a1 which is obtained by picking out any one of the events belonging to a series which thus subdivides ,a4 ,then the enduring pattern is a pattern of aspects within the complete pattern prehended into the unity of ,a1 and it is also a pattern within the complete pattern prehended into the unity of any temporal slice of ,a1 such as ,b4 ,for example1 a molecule is a pattern exhibited in an event of one minute1 and of any second of that minute4 ,it is obvious that such an enduring pattern may be of more1 or of less1 importance4 ,it may express some slight fact connecting the underlying activities thus individualised2 or it may express some very close connection4 ,if the pattern which endures is merely derived from the direct aspects of the external environment1 mirrored in the standpoints of the various parts1 then the endurance is an extrinsic fact of slight importance4 ,but if the enduring pattern is wholly derived from the direct aspects of the various temporal sections of the event in question1 then the endurance is an important intrinsic fact4 ,it expresses a certain unity of character uniting the underlying individualised activities4 ,there is then an enduring object with a certain unity for itself and for the rest of nature4 ,let us use the term physical endurance to express endurance of this type4 ,then physical endurance is the process of continuously inheriting a certain identity of character transmitted throughout a historical route of events4 ,this character belongs to the whole route1 and to every event of the route4 ,this is the exact property of material4 ,if it has existed for ten minutes1 it has existed during every minute of the ten minutes1 and during every second of every minute4 ,only if you take material to be fundamental1 this property of endurance is an arbitrary fact at the base of the order of nature2 but if you take organism to be fundamental1 this property is the result of evolution4 ,it looks at first sight1 as if a physical object1 with its process of inheritance from itself1 were independent of the environment4 ,but such a conclusion is not justified4 ,for let ,b and ,c be two successive slices in the life of such an object1 such that ,c succeeds ,b4 ,then the enduring pattern in ,c is inherited from ,b1 and from other analogous antecedent parts of its life4 ,it is transmitted through ,b to ,c4 ,but what is transmitted to ,c is the complete pattern of aspects derived from such events as ,b4 ,these complete patterns include the influence of the environment on ,b1 and on the other antecedent parts of the life of the object4 ,thus the complete aspects of the antecedent life are inherited as the partial pattern which endures throughout all the various periods of the life4 ,thus a favourable environment is essential to the maintenance of a physical object4 ,nature1 as we know it1 comprises enormous permanences4 ,there are the permanences of ordinary matter4 ,the molecules within the oldest rocks known to geologists may have existed unchanged for over a thousand million years1 not only unchanged in themselves1 but unchanged in their relative dispositions to each other4 ,in that length of time the number of pulsations of a molecule vibrating with the frequency of yellow sodium light would be about #af4c #ajbb #afc1jjj 7#ajf74 ,until recently1 an atom was apparently indestructible4 ,we know better now4 ,but the indestructible atom has been succeeded by the apparently indestructible electron and the indestructible proton4 ,another fact to be explained is the great similarity of these practically indestructible objects4 ,all electrons are very similar to each other4 ,we need not outrun the evidence1 and say that they are identical2 but our powers of observation cannot detect any differences4 ,analogously1 all hydrogen nuclei are alike4 ,also we note the great numbers of these analogous objects4 ,there are throngs of them4 ,it seems as though a certain similarity were a favourable condition for endurance4 ,common sense also suggests this conclusion4 ,if organisms are to survive1 they must work together4 ,accordingly1 the key to the mechanism of evolution is the necessity for the evolution of a favourable environment1 conjointly with the evolution of any specific type of enduring organisms of great permanence4 ,any physical object which by its influence deteriorates its environment1 commits suicide4 ,one of the simplest ways of evolving a favourable environment concurrently with the development of the individual organism1 is that the influence of each organism on the environment should be favourable to the endurance of other organisms of the same type4 ,further1 if the organism also favours the development of other organisms of the same type1 you have then obtained a mechanism of evolution adapted to produce the observed state of large multitudes of analogous entities1 with high powers of endurance4 ,for the environment automatically develops with the species1 and the species with the environment4 ,the first question to ask is1 whether there is any direct evidence for such a mechanism for the evolution of enduring organisms4 ,in surveying nature1 we must remember that there are not only basic organisms whose ingredients are merely aspects of eternal objects4 ,there are also organisms of organisms4 ,suppose for the moment and for the sake of simplicity1 we assume1 without any evidence1 that electrons and hydrogen nuclei are such basic organisms4 ,then the atoms1 and the molecules1 are organisms of a higher type1 which also represent a compact definite organic unity4 ,but when we come to the larger aggregations of matter1 the organic unity fades into the background4 ,it appears to be but faint and elementary4 ,it is there2 but the pattern is vague and indecisive4 ,it is a mere aggregation of effects4 ,when we come to living beings1 the definiteness of pattern is recovered1 and the organic character again rises into prominence4 ,accordingly1 the characteristic laws of inorganic matter are mainly the statistical averages resulting from confused aggregates4 ,so far are they from throwing light on the ultimate nature of things1 that they blur and obliterate the individual characters of the individual organisms4 ,if we wish to throw light upon the facts relating to organisms1 we must study either the individual molecules and electrons1 or the individual living beings4 ,in between we find comparative confusion4 ,now the difficulty of studying the individual molecule is that we know so little about its life history4 ,we cannot keep an individual under continuous observation4 ,in general1 we deal with them in large aggregates4 ,so far as individuals are concerned1 sometimes with difficulty a great experimenter throws1 so to speak1 a flash light on one of them1 and just observes one type of instantaneous effect4 ,accordingly1 the history of the functioning of individual molecules1 or electrons1 is largely hidden from us4 ,but in the case of living beings1 we can trace the history of individuals4 ,we now find exactly the mechanism which is here demanded4 ,in the first place1 there is the propagation of the species from members of the same species4 ,there is also the careful provision of the favourable environment for the endurance of the family1 the race1 or the seed in the fruit4 ,it is evident1 however1 that ,i have explained the evolutionary mechanism in terms which are far too simple4 ,we find associated species of living things1 providing for each other a favourable environment4 ,thus just as the members of the same species mutually favour each other1 so do members of associated species4 ,we find the rudimentary fact of association in the existence of the two species1 electrons and hydrogen nuclei4 ,the simplicity of the dual association1 and the apparent absence of competition from other antagonistic species accounts for the massive endurance which we find among them4 ,there are thus two sides to the machinery involved in the development of nature4 ,on one side1 there is a given environment with organisms adapting themselves to it4 ,the scientific materialism of the epoch in question emphasised this aspect4 ,from this point of view1 there is a given amount of material1 and only a limited number of organisms can take advantage of it4 ,the givenness of the environment dominates everything4 ,accordingly1 the last words of science appeared to be the ,struggle for ,existence1 and ,natural ,selection4 ,darwin's own writings are for all time a model of refusal to go beyond the direct evidence1 and of careful retention of every possible hypothesis4 ,but those virtues were not so conspicuous in his followers1 and still less in his camp-followers4 ,the imagination of ,european sociologists and publicists was stained by exclusive attention to this aspect of conflicting interests4 ,the idea prevailed that there was a peculiar strong-minded realism in discarding ethical considerations in the determination of the conduct of commercial and national interests4 ,the other side of the evolutionary machinery1 the neglected side1 is expressed by the word creativeness4 ,the organisms can create their own environment4 ,for this purpose1 the single organism is almost helpless4 ,the adequate forces require societies of coperating organisms4 ,but with such coperation and in proportion to the effort put forward1 the environment has a plasticity which alters the whole ethical aspect of evolution4 ,in the immediate past1 and at present1 a muddled state of mind is prevalent4 ,the increased plasticity of the environment for mankind1 resulting from the advances in scientific technology1 is being construed in terms of habits of thought which find their justification in the theory of a fixed environment4 ,the riddle of the universe is not so simple4 ,there is the aspect of permanence in which a given type of attainment is endlessly repeated for its own sake2 and there is the aspect of transition to other things1--it may be of higher worth1 and it may be of lower worth4 ,also there are its aspects of struggle and of friendly help4 ,but romantic ruthlessness is no nearer to real politics1 than is romantic self-abnegation4 ,,chapter ,,vii ,,relativity ,in the previous lectures of this course we have considered the antecedent conditions which led up to the scientific movement1 and have traced the progress of thought from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century4 ,in the nineteenth century this history falls into three parts1 so far as it is to be grouped around science4 ,these divisions are1 the contact between the romantic movement and science1 the development of technology and physics in the earlier part of the century1 and lastly the theory of evolution combined with the general advance of the biological sciences4 ,the dominating note of the whole period of three centuries is that the doctrine of materialism afforded an adequate basis for the concepts of science4 ,it was practically unquestioned4 ,when undulations were wanted1 an ether was supplied1 in order to perform the duties of an undulatory material4 ,to show the full assumption thus involved1 ,i have sketched in outline an alternative doctrine of an organic theory of nature4 ,in the last lecture it was pointed out that the biological developments1 the doctrine of evolution1 the doctrine of energy1 and the molecular theories were rapidly undermining the adequacy of the orthodox materialism4 ,but until the close of the century no one drew that conclusion4 ,materialism reigned supreme4 ,the note of the present epoch is that so many complexities have developed regarding material1 space1 time1 and energy1 that the simple security of the old orthodox assumptions has vanished4 ,it is obvious that they will not do as ,newton left them1 or even as ,clerk ,maxwell left them4 ,there must be a reorganization4 ,the new situation in the thought of to-day arises from the fact that scientific theory is outrunning common sense4 ,the settlement as inherited by the eighteenth century was a triumph of organised common sense4 ,it had got rid of medieval phantasies1 and of ,cartesian vortices4 ,as a result it gave full reign to its anti-rationalistic tendencies derived from the historical revolt of the ,reformation period4 ,it grounded itself upon what every plain man could see with his own eyes1 or with a microscope of moderate power4 ,it measured the obvious things to be measured1 and it generalised the obvious things to be generalised4 ,for example1 it generalised the ordinary notions of weight and massiveness4 ,the eighteenth century opened with the quiet confidence that at last nonsense had been got rid of4 ,to-day we are at the opposite pole of thought4 ,heaven knows what seeming nonsense may not to-morrow be demonstrated truth4 ,we have recaptured some of the tone of the early nineteenth century1 only on a higher imaginative level4 ,the reason why we are on a higher imaginative level is not because we have finer imagination1 but because we have better instruments4 ,in science1 the most important thing that has happened during the last forty years is the advance in instrumental design4 ,this advance is partly due to a few men of genius such as ,michelson and the ,german opticians4 ,it is also due to the progress of technological processes of manufacture1 particularly in the region of metallurgy4 ,the designer has now at his disposal a variety of material of differing physical properties4 ,he can thus depend upon obtaining the material he desires2 and it can be ground to the shapes he desires1 within very narrow limits of tolerance4 ,these instruments have put thought onto a new level4 ,a fresh instrument serves the same purpose as foreign travel2 it shows things in unusual combinations4 ,the gain is more than a mere addition2 it is a transformation4 ,the advance in experimental ingenuity is1 perhaps1 also due to the larger proportion of national ability which now flows into scientific pursuits4 ,anyhow1 whatever be the cause1 subtle and ingenious experiments have abounded within the last generation4 ,the result is1 that a great deal of information has been accumulated in regions of nature very far removed from the ordinary experience of mankind4 ,two famous experiments1 one devised by ,galileo at the outset of the scientific movement1 and the other by ,michelson with the aid of his famous interferometer1 first carried out in #ahha1 and repeated in #ahhg and #aije1 illustrate the assertions ,i have made4 ,galileo dropped heavy bodies from the top of the leaning tower of ,pisa1 and demonstrated that bodies of different weights1 if released simultaneously1 would reach the earth together4 ,so far as experimental skill1 and delicacy of apparatus were concerned1 this experiment could have been made at any time within the preceding five thousand years4 ,the ideas involved merely concerned weight and speed of travel1 ideas which are familiar in ordinary life4 ,the whole set of ideas might have been familiar to the family of ,king ,minos of ,crete1 as they dropped pebbles into the sea from high battlements rising from the shore4 ,we cannot too carefully realise that science started with the organisation of ordinary experiences4 ,it was in this way that it coalesced so readily with the anti-rationalistic bias of the historical revolt4 ,it was not asking for ultimate meanings4 ,it confined itself to investigating the connections regulating the succession of obvious occurrences4 ,michelson's experiment could not have been made earlier than it was4 ,it required the general advance in technology1 and ,michelson's experimental genius4 ,it concerns the determination of the earth's motion through the ether1 and it assumes that light consists of waves of vibration advancing at a fixed rate through the ether in any direction4 ,also1 of course1 the earth is moving through the ether1 and ,michelson's apparatus is moving with the earth4 ,in the centre of the apparatus a ray of light is divided so that one half-ray goes in one direction along the apparatus through a given distance1 and is reflected back to the centre by a mirror in the apparatus4 ,the other half-ray goes the same distance across the apparatus in a direction at right angles to the former ray1 and it also is reflected back to the centre4 ,these reunited rays are then reflected onto a screen in the apparatus4 ,if precautions are taken1 you will see interference bands2 namely bands of blackness where the crests of the waves of one ray have filled up the troughs of the other rays1 owing to a minute difference in the lengths of paths of the two half-rays1 up to certain parts of the screens4 ,these differences in length will be affected by the motion of the earth4 ,for it is the lengths of the paths in the ether which count4 ,thus1 since the apparatus is moving with the earth1 the path of one half-ray will be disturbed by the motion in a different manner from the path of the other half-ray4 ,think of yourself as moving in a railway carriage1 first along the train and then across the train2 and mark out your paths on the railway track which in this analogy corresponds to the ether4 ,now the motion of the earth is very slow compared to that of light4 ,thus in the analogy you must think of the train almost at a standstill1 and of yourself as moving very quickly4 ,in the experiment this effect of the earth's motion would affect the positions on the screen of the interference bands4 ,also if you turn the apparatus round1 through a right-angle1 the effect of the earth's motion on the two half-rays will be interchanged1 and the positions of the interference bands would be shifted4 ,we can calculate the small shift which should result owing to the earth's motion round the sun4 ,also to this effect1 we have to add that due to the sun's motion through the ether4 ,the delicacy of the instrument can be tested1 and it can be proved that these effects of shifting are large enough to be observed by it4 ,now the point is1 that nothing was observed4 ,there was no shifting as you turned the instrument round4 ,the conclusion is either that the earth is always stationary in the ether1 or that there is something wrong with the fundamental principles on which the interpretation of the experiment relies4 ,it is obvious that1 in this experiment1 we are very far away from the thoughts and the games of the children of ,king ,minos4 ,the ideas of an ether1 of waves in it1 of interference1 of the motion of the earth through the ether1 and of ,michelson's interferometer1 are remote from ordinary experience4 ,but remote as they are1 they are simple and obvious compared to the accepted explanation of the nugatory result of the experiment4 ,the ground of the explanation is that the ideas of space and of time employed in science are too simple-minded1 and must be modified4 ,this conclusion is a direct challenge to common sense1 because the earlier science had only refined upon the ordinary notions of ordinary people4 ,such a radical reorganization of ideas would not have been adopted1 unless it had also been supported by many other observations which we need not enter upon4 ,some form of the relativity theory seems to be the simplest way of explaining a large number of facts which otherwise would each require some ad hoc explanation4 ,the theory1 therefore1 does not merely depend upon the experiments which led to its origination4 ,the central point of the explanation is that every instrument1 such as ,michelson's apparatus as used in the experiment1 necessarily records the velocity of light as having one and the same definite speed relatively to it4 ,i mean that an interferometer in a comet and an interferometer on the earth would necessarily bring out the velocity of light1 relatively to themselves1 as at the same value4 ,this is an obvious paradox1 since the light moves with a definite velocity through the ether4 ,accordingly two bodies1 the earth and the comet1 moving with unequal velocities through the ether1 might be expected to have different velocities relatively to rays of light4 ,for example1 consider two cars on a road1 moving at ten and twenty miles an hour respectively1 and being passed by another car at fifty miles an hour4 ,the rapid car will pass one of the two cars at the relative velocity of forty miles per hour1 and the other at the rate of thirty miles per hour4 ,the allegation as to light is that1 if we substituted a ray of light for the rapid car1 the velocity of the light along the roadway would be exactly the same as its velocity relatively to either of the two cars which it overtakes4 ,the velocity of light is immensely large1 being about three hundred thousand kilometres per second4 ,we must have notions as to space and time such that just this velocity has this peculiar character4 ,it follows that all our notions of relative velocity must be recast4 ,but these notions are the immediate outcome of our habitual notions as to space and time4 ,so we come back to the position1 that there has been something overlooked in the current expositions of what we mean by space and of what we mean by time4 ,now our habitual fundamental assumption is that there is a unique meaning to be given to space and a unique meaning to be given to time1 so that whatever meaning is given to spatial relations in respect to the instrument on the earth1 the same meaning must be given to them in respect to the instrument on the comet1 and the same meaning for an instrument at rest in the ether4 ,in the theory of relativity1 this is denied4 ,as far as concerns space1 there is no difficulty in agreeing1 if you think of the obvious facts of relative motion4 ,but even here the change in meaning has to go further than would be sanctioned by common sense4 ,also the same demand is made for time2 so that the relative dating of events and the lapses of time between them are to be reckoned as different for the instrument on the earth1 for the instrument in the comet1 and for the instrument at rest in the ether4 ,this is a greater strain on our credulity4 ,we need not probe the question further than the conclusion that for the earth and for the comet spatiality and temporality are each to have different meanings amid different conditions1 such as those presented by the earth and the comet4 ,accordingly velocity has different meanings for the two bodies4 ,thus the modern scientific assumption is that if anything has the speed of light by reference to any one meaning of space and time1 then it has the same speed according to any other meaning of space and time4 ,this is a heavy blow at the classical scientific materialism1 which presupposes a definite present instant at which all matter is simultaneously real4 ,in the modern theory there is no such unique present instant4 ,you can find a meaning for the notion of the simultaneous instant throughout all nature1 but it will be a different meaning for different notions of temporality4 ,there has been a tendency to give an extreme subjectivist interpretation to this new doctrine4 ,i mean that the relativity of space and time has been construed as though it were dependent on the choice of the observer4 ,it is perfectly legitimate to bring in the observer1 if he facilitates explanations4 ,but it is the observer's body that we want1 and not his mind4 ,even this body is only useful as an example of a very familiar form of apparatus4 ,on the whole1 it is better to concentrate attention on ,michelson's interferometer1 and to leave ,michelson's body and ,michelson's mind out of the picture4 ,the question is1 why did the interferometer have black bands on its screen1 and why did not these bands slightly shift as the instrument turned4 ,the new relativity associates space and time with an intimacy not hitherto contemplated2 and presupposes that their separation in concrete fact can be achieved by alternative modes of abstraction1 yielding alternative meanings4 ,but each mode of abstraction is directing attention to something which is in nature2 and thereby is isolating it for the purpose of contemplation4 ,the fact relevant to experiment1 is the relevance of the interferometer to just one among the many alternative systems of these spatio-temporal relations which hold between natural entities4 ,what we must now ask of philosophy is to give us an interpretation of the status in nature of space and time1 so that the possibility of alternative meanings is preserved4 ,these lectures are not suited for the elaboration of details2 but there is no difficulty in pointing out where to look for the origin of the discrimination between space and time4 ,i am presupposing the organic theory of nature1 which ,i have outlined as a basis for a thoroughgoing objectivism4 ,an event is the grasping into unity of a pattern of aspects4 ,the effectiveness of an event beyond itself arises from the aspects of itself which go to form the prehended unities of other events4 ,except for the systematic aspects of geometrical shape1 this effectiveness is trivial1 if the mirrored pattern attaches merely to the event as one whole4 ,if the pattern endures throughout the successive parts of the event1 and also exhibits itself in the whole1 so that the event is the life history of the pattern1 then in virtue of that enduring pattern the event gains in external effectiveness4 ,for its own effectiveness is renforced by the analogous aspects of all its successive parts4 ,the event constitutes a patterned value with a permanence inherent throughout its own parts2 and by reason of this inherent endurance the event is important for the modification of its environment4 ,it is in this endurance of pattern that time differentiates itself from space4 ,the pattern is spatially now2 and this temporal determination constitutes its relation to each partial event4 ,for it is reproduced in this temporal succession of these spatial parts of its own life4 ,i mean that this particular rule of temporal order allows the pattern to be reproduced in each temporal slice of its history4 ,so to speak1 each enduring object discovers in nature and requires from nature a principle discriminating space from time4 ,apart from the fact of an enduring pattern this principle might be there1 but it would be latent and trivial4 ,thus the importance of space as against time1 and of time as against space1 has developed with the development of enduring organisms4 ,enduring objects are significant of a differentiation of space from time in respect to the patterns ingredient within events2 and conversely the differentiation of space from time in the patterns ingredient within events expresses the patience of the community of events for enduring objects4 ,there might be the community without objects1 but there could not be the enduring objects without the community with its peculiar patience for them4 ,it is very necessary that this point should not be misunderstood4 ,endurance means that a pattern which is exhibited in the prehension of one event is also exhibited in the prehension of those of its parts which are discriminated by a certain rule4 ,it is not true that any part of the whole event will yield the same pattern as does the whole4 ,for example1 consider the total bodily pattern exhibited in the life of a human body during one minute4 ,one of the thumbs during the same minute is part of the whole bodily event4 ,but the pattern of this part is the pattern of the thumb1 and is not the pattern of the whole body4 ,thus endurance requires a definite rule for obtaining the parts4 ,in the above example1 we know at once what the rule is3 ,you must take the life of the whole body during any portion of that same minute2 for example1 during a second or a tenth of a second4 ,in other words1 the meaning of endurance presupposes a meaning for the lapse of time within the spatio-temporal continuum4 ,the question now arises whether all enduring objects discover the same principle of differentiation of space from time2 or even whether at different stages of its own life-history one object may not vary in its spatio-temporal discrimination4 ,up till a few years ago1 everyone unhesitatingly assumed that there was only one such principle to be discovered4 ,accordingly1 in dealing with one object1 time would have exactly the same meaning in reference to endurance as in dealing with the endurance of another object4 ,it would also follow then that spatial relations would have one unique meaning4 ,but now it seems that the observed effectiveness of objects can only be explained by assuming that objects in a state of motion relatively to each other are utilising1 for their endurance1 meanings of space and of time which are not identical from one object to another4 ,every enduring object is to be conceived as at rest in its own proper space1 and in motion throughout any space defined in a way which is not that inherent in its peculiar endurance4 ,if two objects are mutually at rest1 they are utilising the same meanings of space and of time for the purposes of expressing their endurance2 if in relative motion1 the spaces and times differ4 ,it follows that1 if we can conceive a body at one stage of its life history as in motion relatively to itself at another stage1 then the body at these two stages is utilising diverse meanings of space1 and correlatively diverse meanings of time4 ,in an organic philosophy of nature there is nothing to decide between the old hypothesis of the uniqueness of the time discrimination and the new hypothesis of its multiplicity4 ,it is purely a matter for evidence drawn from observations4#e ,footnote #e3 ,cf4 my ,principles of ,natural ,knowledge1 ,sec4 #eb3c4 ,in an earlier lecture1 ,i said that an event had contemporaries4 ,it is an interesting question whether1 on the new hypothesis1 such a statement can be made without the qualification of a reference to a definite space-time system4 ,it is possible to do so1 in the sense that in some time-system or other the two events are simultaneous4 ,in other time-systems the two contemporary events will not be simultaneous1 though they may overlap4 ,analogously one event will precede another without qualification1 if in every time-system this precedence occurs4 ,it is evident that if we start from a given event ,a1 other events in general are divided into two sets1 namely1 those which without qualification are contemporaneous with ,a and those which either precede or succeed ,a4 ,but there will be a set left over1 namely1 those events which bound the two sets4 ,there we have a critical case4 ,you will remember that we have a critical velocity to account for1 namely the theoretical velocity of light in vacuo4#f ,also you will remember that the utilisation of different spatio-temporal systems means the relative motion of objects4 ,when we analyse this critical relation of a special set of events to any given event ,a1 we find the explanation of the critical velocity which we require4 ,i am suppressing all details4 ,it is evident that exactness of statement must be introduced by the introduction of points1 and lines1 and instants4 ,also that the origin of geometry requires discussion2 for example1 the measurement of lengths1 the straightness of lines1 and the flatness of planes1 and perpendicularity4 ,i have endeavoured to carry out these investigations in some earlier books1 under the heading of the theory of extensive abstraction2 but they are too technical for the present occasion4 ,footnote #f3 ,this is not the velocity of light in a gravitational field or in a medium of molecules and electrons4 ,if there be no one definite meaning to the geometrical relations of distance1 it is evident that the law of gravitation needs restatement4 ,for the formula expressing that law is that two particles attract each other in proportion to the product of their masses and the inverse square of their distances4 ,this enunciation tacitly assumes that there is one definite meaning to be ascribed to the instant at which the attraction is considered1 and also one definite meaning to be ascribed to distance4 ,but distance is a purely spatial notion1 so that in the new doctrine1 there are an indefinite number of such meanings according to the space-time system which you adopt4 ,if the two particles are relatively at rest1 then we might be content with the space-time systems which they are both utilising4 ,unfortunately this suggestion gives no hint as to procedure when they are not mutually at rest4 ,it is1 therefore1 necessary to reformulate the law in a way which does not presuppose any particular space-time system4 ,einstein has done this4 ,naturally the result is more complicated4 ,he introduced into mathematical physics certain methods of pure mathematics which render the formulae independent of the particular systems of measurement adopted4 ,the new formula introduces various small effects which are absent in ,newton's law4 ,but for the major effects ,newton's law and ,einstein's law agree4 ,now these extra effects of ,einstein's law serve to explain irregularities of the planet ,mercury's orbit which by ,newton's law were inexplicable4 ,this is a strong confirmation of the new theory4 ,curiously enough1 there is more than one alternative formula1 based on the new theory of multiple space-time systems1 having the property of embodying ,newton's law and in addition of explaining the peculiarities of ,mercury's motion4 ,the only method of selection between them is to wait for experimental evidence respecting those effects on which the formulae differ4 ,nature is probably quite indifferent to the aesthetic preferences of mathematicians4 ,it only remains to add that ,einstein would probably reject the theory of multiple space-time systems which ,i have been expounding to you4 ,he would interpret his formula in terms of contortions in space-time which alter the invariance theory for measure properties1 and of the proper times of each historical route4 ,his mode of statement has the greater mathematical simplicity1 and only allows of one law of gravitation1 excluding the alternatives4 ,but1 for myself1 ,i cannot reconcile it with the given facts of our experience as to simultaneity1 and spatial arrangement4 ,there are also other difficulties of a more abstract character4 ,the theory of the relationship between events at which we have now arrived is based first upon the doctrine that the relatednesses of an event are all internal relations1 so far as concerns that event1 though not necessarily so far as concerns the other relata4 ,for example1 the eternal objects1 thus involved1 are externally related to events4 ,this internal relatedness is the reason why an event can be found only just where it is and how it is1--that is to say1 in just one definite set of relationships4 ,for each relationship enters into the essence of the event2 so that1 apart from that relationship1 the event would not be itself4 ,this is what is meant by the very notion of internal relations4 ,it has been usual1 indeed universal1 to hold that spatio-temporal relationships are external4 ,this doctrine is what is here denied4 ,the conception of internal relatedness involves the analysis of the event into two factors1 one the underlying substantial activity of individualisation1 and the other the complex of aspects--that is to say1 the complex of relatednesses as entering into the essence of the given event--which are unified by this individualised activity4 ,in other words1 the concept of internal relations requires the concept of substance as the activity synthesising the relationships into its emergent character4 ,the event is what it is1 by reason of the unification in itself of a multiplicity of relationships4 ,the general scheme of these mutual relationships is an abstraction which presupposes each event as an independent entity1 which it is not1 and asks what remnant of these formative relationships is then left in the guise of external relationships4 ,the scheme of relationships as thus impartially expressed becomes the scheme of a complex of events variously related as wholes to parts and as joint parts within some one whole4 ,even here1 the internal relationship forces itself on our attention2 for the part evidently is constitutive of the whole4 ,also an isolated event which has lost its status in any complex of events is equally excluded by the very nature of an event4 ,so the whole is evidently constitutive of the part4 ,thus the internal character of the relationship really shows through this impartial scheme of abstract external relations4 ,but this exhibition of the actual universe as extensive and divisible has left out the distinction between space and time4 ,it has in fact left out the process of realisation1 which is the adjustment of the synthetic activities by virtue of which the various events become their realised selves4 ,this adjustment is thus the adjustment of the underlying active substances whereby these substances exhibit themselves as the individualisations or modes of ,spinoza's one substance4 ,this adjustment is what introduces temporal process4 ,thus1 in some sense1 time1 in its character of the adjustment of the process of synthetic realisation1 extends beyond the spatio-temporal continuum of nature4#g ,there is no necessity that temporal process1 in this sense1 should be constituted by one single series of linear succession4 ,accordingly1 in order to satisfy the present demands of scientific hypothesis1 we introduce the metaphysical hypothesis that this is not the case4 ,we do assume 7basing ourselves upon direct observation71 however1 that temporal process of realisation can be analysed into a group of linear serial processes4 ,each of these linear series is a space-time system4 ,in support of this assumption of definite serial processes1 we appeal3 7#a7 to the immediate presentation through the senses of an extended universe beyond ourselves and simultaneous with ourselves1 7#b7 to the intellectual apprehension of a meaning to the question which asks what is now immediately happening in regions beyond the cognisance of our senses1 7#c7 to the analysis of what is involved in the endurance of emergent objects4 ,this endurance of objects involves the display of a pattern as now realised4 ,this display is the display of a pattern as inherent in an event1 but also as exhibiting a temporal slice of nature as lending aspects to eternal objects 7or1 equally1 of eternal objects as lending aspects to events74 ,the pattern is spatialised in a whole duration for the benefit of the event into whose essence the pattern enters4 ,the event is part of the duration1 i4e41 is part of what is exhibited in the aspects inherent in itself2 and conversely the duration is the whole of nature simultaneous with the event1 in that sense of simultaneity4 ,thus an event in realising itself displays a pattern1 and this pattern requires a definite duration determined by a definite meaning of simultaneity4 ,each such meaning of simultaneity relates the pattern as thus displayed to one definite space-time system4 ,the actuality of the space-time systems is constituted by the realisation of pattern2 but it is inherent in the general scheme of events as constituting its patience for the temporal process of realisation4 ,footnote #g3 ,cf4 my ,concept of ,nature1 ,ch4 ,,iii4 ,notice that the pattern requires a duration involving a definite lapse of time1 and not merely an instantaneous moment4 ,such a moment is more abstract1 in that it merely denotes a certain relation of contiguity between the concrete events4 ,thus a duration is spatialised2 and by #8spatialised' is meant that the duration is the field for the realised pattern constituting the character of the event4 ,a duration1 as the field of the pattern realised in the actualisation of one of its contained events1 is an epoch1 i4e41 an arrest4 ,endurance is the repetition of the pattern in successive events4 ,thus endurance requires a succession of durations1 each exhibiting the pattern4 ,in this account #8time' has been separated from #8extension' and from the #8divisibility' which arises from the character of spatio-temporal extension'4 ,accordingly we must not proceed to conceive time as another form of extensiveness4 ,time is sheer succession of epochal durations4 ,but the entities which succeed each other in this account are durations4 ,the duration is that which is required for the realisation of a pattern in the given event4 ,thus the divisibility and extensiveness is within the given duration4 ,the epochal duration is not realised via its successive divisible parts1 but is given with its parts4 ,in this way1 the objection which ,zeno might make to the joint validity of two passages from ,kant's ,critique of ,pure ,reason is met by abandoning the earlier of the two passages4 ,i refer to passages from the section #8,of the ,axioms of ,intuition'2 the earlier from the subsection on ,extensive ,quantity1 and the latter from the subsection on ,intensive ,quantity where considerations respecting quantity in general1 extensive and intensive1 are summed up4 ,the earlier passage runs thus3#h ,footnote #h3 ,max ,mller's translation4 8,i call an extensive quantity that in which the representation of the whole is rendered possible by the representation of its parts1 and therefore necessarily preceded by it4#i ,i cannot represent to myself any line1 however small it may be1 without drawing it in thought1 that is1 without producing all its parts one after the other1 starting from a given point1 and thus1 first of all1 drawing its intuition4 ,the same applies to every1 even the smallest portion of time4 ,i can only think in it the successive progress from one moment to another1 thus producing in the end1 by all the portions of time1 and their addition1 a definite quantity of time40 ,footnote #i3 ,italics mine1 and also in the second passage4 ,the second passage runs thus3 8,this peculiar property of quantities that no part of them is the smallest possible part 7no part indivisible7 is called continuity4 ,time and space are quanta continua1 because there is no part of them that is not enclosed between limits 7points and moments71 no part that is not itself again a space or a time4 ,space consists of spaces only1 time of times4 ,points and moments are only limits1 mere places of limitation1 and as places presupposing always those intuitions which they are meant to limit or to determine4 ,mere places or parts that might be given before space or time1 could never be compounded into space or time40 ,i am in complete agreement with the second extract if #8time and space' is the extensive continuum2 but it is inconsistent with its predecessor4 ,for ,zeno would object that a vicious infinite regress is involved4 ,every part of time involves some smaller part of itself1 and so on4 ,also this series regresses backwards ultimately to nothing2 since the initial moment is without duration and merely marks the relation of contiguity to an earlier time4 ,thus time is impossible1 if the two extracts are both adhered to4 ,i accept the later1 and reject the earlier1 passage4 ,realisation is the becoming of time in the field of extension4 ,extension is the complex of events1 qu their potentialities4 ,in realisation the potentiality becomes actuality4 ,but the potential pattern requires a duration2 and the duration must be exhibited as an epochal whole1 by the realisation of the pattern4 ,thus time is the succession of elements in themselves divisible and contiguous4 ,a duration1 in becoming temporal1 thereby incurs realisation in respect to some enduring object4 ,temporalisation is realisation4 ,temporalisation is not another continuous process4 ,it is an atomic succession4 ,thus time is atomic 7i4e41 epochal71 though what is temporalised is divisible4 ,this doctrine follows from the doctrine of events1 and of the nature of enduring objects4 ,in the next chapter we must consider its relevance to the quantum theory of recent science4 ,it is to be noted that this doctrine of the epochal character of time does not depend on the modern doctrine of relativity1 and holds equally--and indeed1 more simply--if this doctrine be abandoned4 ,it does depend on the analysis of the intrinsic character of an event1 considered as the most concrete finite entity4 ,in reviewing this argument1 note first that the second quotation from ,kant1 on which it is based1 does not depend on any peculiar ,kantian doctrine4 ,the latter of the two is in agreement with ,plato as against ,aristotle4#aj ,in the second place1 the argument assumes that ,zeno understated his argument4 ,he should have urged it against the current notion of time in itself1 and not against motion1 which involves relations between time and space4 ,for1 what becomes has duration4 ,but no duration can become until a smaller duration 7part of the former7 has antecedently come into being ,kant's earlier statement4 ,the same argument applies to this smaller duration1 and so on4 ,also the infinite regress of these durations converges to nothing--and even on the ,aristotelian view there is no first moment4 ,accordingly time would be an irrational notion4 ,thirdly1 in the epochal theory ,zeno's difficulty is met by conceiving temporalisation as the realisation of a complete organism4 ,this organism is an event holding in its essence its spatio-temporal relationships 7both within itself1 and beyond itself7 throughout the spatio-temporal continuum4 ,footnote #aj3 ,cf4 #8,euclid in ,greek1' by ,sir ,t4 ,l4 ,heath1 ,camb4 ,univ4 ,press1 in a note on ,points4 ,,chapter ,,viii ,,the ,,quantum ,,theory ,the theory of relativity has justly excited a great amount of public attention4 ,but1 for all its importance1 it has not been the topic which has chiefly absorbed the recent interest of physicists4 ,without question that position is held by the quantum theory4 ,the point of interest in this theory is that1 according to it1 some effects which appear essentially capable of gradual increase or gradual diminution are in reality to be increased or decreased only by certain definite jumps4 ,it is as though you could walk at three miles per hour or at four miles per hour1 but not at three and a half miles per hour4 ,the effects in question are concerned with the radiation of light from a molecule which has been excited by some collision4 ,light consists of waves of vibration in the electromagnetic field4 ,after a complete wave has passed a given point everything at that point is restored to its original state and is ready for the next wave which follows on4 ,picture to yourselves the waves on the ocean1 and reckon from crest to crest of successive waves4 ,the number of waves which pass a given point in one second is called the frequency of that system of waves4 ,a system of light-waves of definite frequency corresponds to a definite colour in the spectrum4 ,now a molecule1 when excited1 vibrates with a certain number of definite frequencies4 ,in other words1 there are a definite set of modes of vibration of the molecule1 and each mode of vibration has one definite frequency4 ,each mode of vibration can stir up in the electromagnetic field waves of its own frequency4 ,these waves carry away the energy of the vibration2 so that finally 7when such waves are in being7 the molecule loses the energy of its excitement and the waves cease4 ,thus a molecule can radiate light of certain definite colours1 that is to say1 of certain definite frequencies4 ,you would think that each mode of vibration could be excited to any intensity1 so that the energy carried away by light of that frequency could be of any amount4 ,but this is not the case4 ,there appear to be certain minimum amounts of energy which cannot be subdivided4 ,the case is analogous to that of a citizen of the ,united ,states who1 in paying his debts in the currency of his country1 cannot subdivide a cent so as to correspond to some minute subdivision of the goods obtained4 ,the cent corresponds to the minimum quantity of the light energy1 and the goods obtained correspond to the energy of the exciting cause4 ,this exciting cause is either strong enough to procure the emission of one cent of energy1 or fails to procure the emission of any energy whatsoever4 ,in any case the molecule will only emit an integral number of cents of energy4 ,there is a further peculiarity which we can illustrate by bringing an ,englishman onto the scene4 ,he pays his debts in ,english currency1 and his smallest unit is a farthing which differs in value from the cent4 ,the farthing is in fact about half a cent1 to a very rough approximation4 ,in the molecule1 different modes of vibration have different frequencies4 ,compare each mode to a nation4 ,one mode corresponds to the ,united ,states1 and another mode corresponds to ,england4 ,one mode can only radiate its energy in an integral number of cents1 so that a cent of energy is the least it can pay out2 whereas the other mode can only radiate its energy in an integral number of farthings1 so that a farthing of energy is the least that it can pay out4 ,also a rule can be found to tell us the relative value of the cent of energy of one mode to the farthing of energy of another mode4 ,the rule is childishly simple3 ,each smallest coin of energy has a value in strict proportion to the frequency belonging to that mode4 ,by this rule1 and comparing farthings with cents1 the frequency of an ,american would be about twice that of an ,englishman4 ,in other words1 the ,american would do about twice as many things in a second as an ,englishman4 ,i must leave you to judge whether this corresponds to the reputed characters of the two nations4 ,also ,i suggest that there are merits attaching to both ends of the solar spectrum4 ,sometimes you want red light and sometimes violet light4 ,there has been1 ,i hope1 no great difficulty in comprehending what the quantum theory asserts about molecules4 ,the perplexity arises from the effort to fit the theory into the current scientific picture of what is going on in the molecule or atom4 ,it has been the basis of the materialistic theory1 that the happenings of nature are to be explained in terms of the locomotion of material4 ,in accordance with this principle1 the waves of light were explained in terms of the locomotion of a material ether1 and the internal happenings of a molecule are now explained in terms of the locomotion of separate material parts4 ,in respect to waves of light1 the material ether has retreated to an indeterminate position in the background1 and is rarely talked about4 ,but the principle is unquestioned as regards its application to the atom4 ,for example a neutral hydrogen atom is assumed to consist of at least two lumps of material2 one lump is the nucleus consisting of a material called positive electricity1 and the other is a single electron which is negative electricity4 ,the nucleus shows signs of being complex1 and of being subdivisible into smaller lumps1 some of positive electricity and others electronic4 ,the assumption is1 that whatever vibration takes place in the atom is to be attributed to the vibratory locomotion of some bit of material1 detachable from the remainder4 ,the difficulty with the quantum theory is that1 on this hypothesis1 we have to picture the atom as providing a limited number of definite grooves1 which are the sole tracks along which vibration can take place1 whereas the classical scientific picture provides none of these grooves4 ,the quantum theory wants trolley-cars with a limited number of routes1 and the scientific picture provides horses galloping over prairies4 ,the result is that the physical doctrine of the atom has got into a state which is strongly suggestive of the epicycles of astronomy before ,copernicus4 ,on the organic theory of nature there are two sorts of vibrations which radically differ from each other4 ,there is vibratory locomotion1 and there is vibratory organic deformation2 and the conditions for the two types of change are of a different character4 ,in other words1 there is vibratory locomotion of a given pattern as one whole1 and there is vibratory change of pattern4 ,a complete organism in the organic theory is what corresponds to a bit of material on the materialistic theory4 ,there will be a primary genus1 comprising a number of species of organisms1 such that each primary organism1 belonging to a species of the primary genus1 is not decomposable into subordinate organisms4 ,i will call any organism of the primary genus a primate4 ,there may be different species of primates4 ,it must be kept in mind that we are dealing with the abstractions of physics4 ,accordingly1 we are not thinking of what a primate is in itself1 as a pattern arising from the prehension of the concrete aspects2 nor are we thinking of what a primate is for its environment1 in respect to its concrete aspects prehended therein4 ,we are thinking of these various aspects merely in so far as their effects on patterns and on locomotion are expressible in spatio-temporal terms4 ,accordingly1 in the language of physics1 the aspects of a primate are merely its contributions to the electromagnetic field4 ,this is in fact exactly what we know of electrons and protons4 ,an electron for us is merely the pattern of its aspects in its environment1 so far as those aspects are relevant to the electromagnetic field4 ,now in discussing the theory of relativity1 we saw that the relative motion of two primates means simply that their organic patterns are utilising diverse space-time systems4 ,if two primates do not continue either mutually at rest1 or mutually in uniform relative motion1 at least one of them is changing its intrinsic space-time system4 ,the laws of motion express the conditions under which these changes of space-time systems are effected4 ,the conditions for vibratory locomotion are founded upon these general laws of motion4 ,but it is possible that certain species of primates are apt to go to pieces under conditions which lead them to effect changes of space-time systems4 ,such species would only experience a long range of endurance1 if they had succeeded in forming a favourable association among primates of different species1 such that in this association the tendency to collapse is neutralised by the environment of the association4 ,we can imagine the atomic nucleus as composed of a large number of primates of differing species1 and perhaps with many primates of the same species1 the whole association being such as to favour stability4 ,an example of such an association is afforded by the association of a positive nucleus with negative electrons to obtain a neutral atom4 ,the neutral atom is thereby shielded from any electric field which would otherwise produce changes in the space-time system of the atom4 ,the requirements of physics now suggest an idea which is very consonant with the organic philosophical theory4 ,i put it in the form of a question3 ,has our organic theory of endurance been tainted by the materialistic theory in so far as it assumes without question that endurance must mean undifferentiated sameness throughout the life-history concerned8 ,perhaps you noticed that 7in a previous chapter7 ,i used the word #8reiteration' as a synonym of #8endurance4' ,it obviously is not quite synonymous in its meaning2 and now ,i want to suggest that reiteration where it differs from endurance is more nearly what the organic theory requires4 ,the difference is very analogous to that between the ,galileans and the ,aristotelians3 ,aristotle said #8rest' where ,galileo added #8or uniform motion in a straight line4' ,thus in the organic theory1 a pattern need not endure in undifferentiated sameness through time4 ,the pattern may be essentially one of aesthetic contrasts requiring a lapse of time for its unfolding4 ,a tune is an example of such a pattern4 ,thus the endurance of the pattern now means the reiteration of its succession of contrasts4 ,this is obviously the most general notion of endurance on the organic theory1 and #8reiteration' is perhaps the word which expresses it with most directness4 ,but when we translate this notion into the abstractions of physics1 it at once becomes the technical notion of #8vibration4' ,this vibration is not the vibratory locomotion3 it is the vibration of organic deformation4 ,there are certain indications in modern physics that for the rle of corpuscular organisms at the base of the physical field1 we require vibratory entities4 ,such corpuscles would be the corpuscles detected as expelled from the nuclei of atoms1 which then dissolve into waves of light4 ,we may conjecture that such a corpuscular body has no great stability of endurance1 when in isolation4 ,accordingly1 an unfavourable environment leading to rapid changes in its proper space-time system1 that is to say1 an environment jolting it into violent accelerations1 causes the corpuscles to go to pieces and dissolve into light-waves of the same period of vibration4 ,a proton1 and perhaps an electron1 would be an association of such primates1 superposed on each other1 with their frequencies and spatial dimensions so arranged as to promote the stability of the complex organism1 when jolted into accelerations of locomotion4 ,the conditions for stability would give the associations of periods possible for protons4 ,the expulsion of a primate would come from a jolt which leads the proton either to settle down into an alternative association1 or to generate a new primate by the aid of the energy received4 ,a primate must be associated with a definite frequency of vibratory organic deformation so that when it goes to pieces it dissolves into light waves of the same frequency1 which then carry off all its average energy4 ,it is quite easy 7as a particular hypothesis7 to imagine stationary vibrations of the electromagnetic field of definite frequency1 and directed radially to and from a centre1 which1 in accordance with the accepted electromagnetic laws1 would consist of a vibratory spherical nucleus satisfying one set of conditions and a vibratory external field satisfying another set of conditions4 ,this is an example of vibratory organic deformation4 ,further on this particular hypothesis1 there are two ways of determining the subsidiary conditions so as to satisfy the ordinary requirements of mathematical physics4 ,the total energy1 according to one of these ways1 would satisfy the quantum condition2 so that it consists of an integral number of units or cents1 which are such that the cent of energy of any primate is proportional to its frequency4 ,i have not worked out the conditions for stability or for a stable association4 ,i have mentioned the particular hypothesis by way of showing by example that the organic theory of nature affords possibilities for the reconsideration of ultimate physical laws1 which are not open to the opposed materialistic theory4 ,in this particular hypothesis of vibratory primates1 the ,maxwellian equations are supposed to hold throughout all space1 including the interior of a proton4 ,they express the laws governing the vibratory production and absorption of energy4 ,the whole process for each primate issues in a certain average energy characteristic of the primate1 and proportional to its mass4 ,in fact the energy is the mass4 ,there are vibratory radial streams of energy1 both without and within a primate4 ,within the primate1 there are vibratory distributions of electric density4 ,on the materialistic theory such density marks the presence of material3 on the organic theory of vibration1 it marks the vibratory production of energy4 ,such production is restricted to the interior of the primate4 ,all science must start with some assumptions as to the ultimate analysis of the facts with which it deals4 ,these assumptions are justified partly by their adherence to the types of occurrence of which we are directly conscious1 and partly by their success in representing the observed facts with a certain generality1 devoid of ad hoc suppositions4 ,the general theory of the vibration of primates1 which ,i have outlined1 is merely given as an example of the sort of possibilities which the organic theory leaves open for physical science4 ,the point is that it adds the possibility of organic deformation to that of mere locomotion4 ,light waves form one great example of organic deformation4 ,at any epoch the assumptions of a science are giving way1 when they exhibit symptoms of the epicyclic state from which astronomy was rescued in the sixteenth century4 ,physical science is now exhibiting such symptoms4 ,in order to reconsider its foundations1 it must recur to a more concrete view of the character of real things1 and must conceive its fundamental notions as abstractions derived from this direct intuition4 ,it is in this way that it surveys the general possibilities of revision which are open to it4 ,the discontinuities introduced by the quantum theory require revision of physical concepts in order to meet them4 ,in particular1 it has been pointed out that some theory of discontinuous existence is required4 ,what is asked from such a theory1 is that an orbit of an electron can be regarded as a series of detached positions1 and not as a continuous line4 ,the theory of a primate or a vibrating pattern1 given above1 together with the distinction between temporality and extensiveness in the previous chapter1 yields exactly this result4 ,it will be remembered that the continuity of the complex of events arises from the relationships of extensiveness2 whereas the temporality arises from the realisation in a subject-event of a pattern which requires for its display that the whole of a duration be spatialised 7i4e41 arrested71 as given by its aspects in the event4 ,thus realization proceeds vi a succession of epochal durations2 and the continuous transition1 i4e41 the organic deformation1 is within the duration which is already given4 ,the vibratory organic deformation is in fact the reiteration of the pattern4 ,one complete period defines the duration required for the complete pattern4 ,thus the primate is realised atomically in a succession of durations1 each duration to be measured from one maximum to another4 ,accordingly1 so far as the primate as one enduring whole entity is to be taken account of1 it is to be assigned to these durations successively4 ,if it is considered as one thing1 its orbit is to be diagrammatically exhibited by a series of detached dots4 ,thus the locomotion of the primate is discontinuous in space and time4 ,if we go below the quanta of time which are the successive vibratory periods of the primate1 we find a succession of vibratory electromagnetic fields1 each stationary in the space-time of its own duration4 ,each of these fields exhibits a single complete period of the electromagnetic vibration which constitutes the primate4 ,this vibration is not to be thought of as the becoming of reality2 it is what the primate is in one of its discontinuous realisations4 ,also the successive durations in which the primate is realised are contiguous2 it follows that the life history of the primate can be exhibited as being the continuous development of occurrences in the electromagnetic field4 ,but these occurrences enter into realisation as whole atomic blocks1 occupying definite periods of time4 ,there is no need to conceive that time is atomic in the sense that all patterns must be realised in the same successive durations4 ,in the first place1 even if the periods were the same in the case of two primates1 the durations of realisation may not be the same4 ,in other words1 the two primates may be out of phase4 ,also if the periods are different1 the atomism of any one duration of one primate is necessarily subdivided by the boundary moments of durations of the other primate4 ,the laws of the locomotion of primates express under what conditions any primate will change its space-time system4 ,it is unnecessary to pursue this conception further4 ,the justification of the concept of vibratory existence must be purely experimental4 ,the point illustrated by this example is that the cosmological outlook1 which is here adopted1 is perfectly consistent with the demands for discontinuity which have been urged from the side of physics4 ,also if this concept of temporalisation as a successive realisation of epochal durations be adopted1 the difficulty of ,zeno is evaded4 ,the particular form1 which has been given here to this concept1 is purely for that purpose of illustration and must necessarily require recasting before it can be adapted to the results of experimental physics4 ,,chapter ,,ix ,,science ,,and ,,philosophy ,in the present lecture1 it is my object to consider some reactions of science upon the stream of philosophic thought during the modern centuries with which we are concerned4 ,i shall make no attempt to compress a history of modern philosophy within the limits of one lecture4 ,we shall merely consider some contacts between science and philosophy1 in so far as they lie within the scheme of thought which it is the purpose of these lectures to develop4 ,for this reason the whole of the great ,german idealistic movement will be ignored1 as being out of effective touch with its contemporary science so far as reciprocal modification of concepts is concerned4 ,kant1 from whom this movement took its rise1 was saturated with ,newtonian physics1 and with the ideas of the great ,french physicists--such as ,clairaut1#aa for instance--who developed the ,newtonian ideas4 ,but the philosophers who developed the ,kantian school of thought1 or who transformed it into ,hegelianism1 either lacked ,kant's background of scientific knowledge1 or lacked his potentiality of becoming a great physicist if philosophy had not absorbed his main energies4 ,footnote #aa3 ,cf4 the curious evidence of ,kant's scientific reading in the ,critique of ,pure ,reason1 ,transcendental ,analytic1 ,second ,analogy of ,experience1 where he refers to the phenomenon of capillary action4 ,this is an unnecessarily complex illustration2 a book resting on a table would have equally well sufficed4 ,but the subject had just been adequately treated for the first time by ,clairaut in an appendix to his ,figure of the ,earth4 ,kant evidently had read this appendix1 and his mind was full of it4 ,the origin of modern philosophy is analogous to that of science1 and is contemporaneous4 ,the general trend of its development was settled in the seventeenth century1 partly at the hands of the same men who established the scientific principles4 ,this settlement of purpose followed upon a transitional period dating from the fifteenth century4 ,there was in fact a general movement of ,european mentality1 which carried along with its stream1 religion1 science and philosophy4 ,it may shortly be characterised as being the direct recurrence to the original sources of ,greek inspiration on the part of men whose spiritual shape had been derived from inheritance from the ,middle ,ages4 ,there was therefore no revival of ,greek mentality4 ,epochs do not rise from the dead4 ,the principles of aesthetics and of reason1 which animated the ,greek civilisation1 were reclothed in a modern mentality4 ,between the two there lay other religions1 other systems of law1 other anarchies1 and other racial inheritances1 dividing the living from the dead4 ,philosophy is peculiarly sensitive to such differences4 ,for1 whereas you can make a replica of an ancient statue1 there is no possible replica of an ancient state of mind4 ,there can be no nearer approximation than that which a masquerade bears to real life4 ,there may be understanding of the past1 but there is a difference between the modern and the ancient reactions to the same stimuli4 ,in the particular case of philosophy1 the distinction in tonality lies on the surface4 ,modern philosophy is tinged with subjectivism1 as against the objective attitude of the ancients4 ,the same change is to be seen in religion4 ,in the early history of the ,christian ,church1 the theological interest centred in discussions on the nature of ,god1 the meaning of the ,incarnation1 and apocalyptic forecasts of the ultimate fate of the world4 ,at the ,reformation1 the ,church was torn asunder by dissension as to the individual experiences of believers in respect to justification4 ,the individual subject of experience had been substituted for the total drama of all reality4 ,luther asked1 #8,how am ,i justified8'2 modern philosophers have asked1 #8,how do ,i have knowledge8' ,the emphasis lies upon the subject of experience4 ,this change of standpoint is the work of ,christianity in its pastoral aspect of shepherding the company of believers4 ,for century after century it insisted upon the infinite worth of the individual human soul4 ,accordingly1 to the instinctive egotism of physical desires1 it has superadded an instinctive feeling of justification for an egotism of intellectual outlook4 ,every human being is the natural guardian of his own importance4 ,without a doubt1 this modern direction of attention emphasises truths of the highest value4 ,for example1 in the field of practical life1 it has abolished slavery1 and has impressed upon the popular imagination the primary rights of mankind4 ,descartes1 in his ,discourse on ,method1 and in his ,meditations1 discloses with great clearness the general conceptions which have since influenced modern philosophy4 ,there is a subject receiving experience3 in the ,discourse this subject is always mentioned in the first person1 that is to say1 as being ,descartes himself4 ,descartes starts with himself as being a mentality1 which in virtue of its consciousness of its own inherent presentations of sense and of thought1 is thereby conscious of its own existence as a unit entity4 ,the subsequent history of philosophy revolves round the ,cartesian formulation of the primary datum4 ,the ancient world takes its stand upon the drama of the ,universe1 the modern world upon the inward drama of the ,soul4 ,descartes1 in his ,meditations1 expressly grounds the existence of this inward drama upon the possibility of error4 ,there may be no correspondence with objective fact1 and thus there must be a soul with activities whose reality is purely derivative from itself4 ,for example1 here is a quotation#ab from ,meditation ,,ii3 8,but it will be said that these presentations are false1 and that ,i am dreaming4 ,let it be so4 ,at all events it is certain that ,i seem to see light1 hear a noise1 and feel heat2 this cannot be false1 and this is what in me is properly called perceiving 7sentire71 which is nothing else than thinking4 ,from this ,i begin to know what ,i am with somewhat greater clearness and distinctness than heretofore40 ,again in ,meditation ,,iii3 84442 for1 as ,i before remarked1 although the things which ,i perceive or imagine are perhaps nothing at all apart from me1 ,i am nevertheless assured that those modes of consciousness which ,i call perceptions and imaginations1 in as far only as they are modes of consciousness1 exist in me40 ,footnote #ab3 ,quoted from ,veitch's translation4 ,the objectivism of the medieval and the ancient worlds passed over into science4 ,nature is there conceived as for itself1 with its own mutual reactions4 ,under the recent influence of relativity1 there has been a tendency towards subjectivist formulations4 ,but1 apart from this recent exception1 nature1 in scientific thought1 has had its laws formulated without any reference to dependence on individual observers4 ,there is1 however1 this difference between the older and the later attitudes towards science4 ,the anti-rationalism of the moderns has checked any attempt to harmonise the ultimate concepts of science with ideas drawn from a more concrete survey of the whole of reality4 ,the material1 the space1 the time1 the various laws concerning the transition of material configurations1 are taken as ultimate stubborn facts1 not to be tampered with4 ,the effect of this antagonism to philosophy has been equally unfortunate both for philosophy and for science4 ,in this lecture we are concerned with philosophy4 ,philosophers are rationalists4 ,they are seeking to go behind stubborn and irreducible facts3 they wish to explain in the light of universal principles the mutual reference between the various details entering into the flux of things4 ,also1 they seek such principles as will eliminate mere arbitrariness2 so that1 whatever portion of fact is assumed or given1 the existence of the remainder of things shall satisfy some demand of rationality4 ,they demand meaning4 ,in the words of ,henry ,sidgwick#ac--8;,it is the primary aim of philosophy to unify completely1 bring into clear coherence1 all departments of rational thought1 and this aim cannot be realised by any philosophy that leaves out of its view the important body of judgments and reasonings which form the subject matter of ethics40 ,accordingly1 the bias towards history on the part of the physical and social sciences with their refusal to rationalise below some ultimate mechanism1 has pushed philosophy out of the effective currents of modern life4 ,it has lost its proper rle as a constant critic of partial formulations4 ,it has retreated into the subjectivist sphere of mind1 by reason of its expulsion by science from the objectivist sphere of matter4 ,thus the evolution of thought in the seventeenth century coperated with the enhanced sense of individual personality derived from the ,middle ,ages4 ,we see ,descartes taking his stand upon his own ultimate mind1 which his philosophy assures him of2 and asking about its relations to the ultimate matter--exemplified1 in the second ,meditation1 by the human body and a lump of wax--which his science assumes4 ,there is ,aaron's rod1 and the magicians' serpents2 and the only question for philosophy is1 which swallows which2 or whether1 as ,descartes thought1 they all lived happily together4 ,in this stream of thought are to be found ,locke1 ,berkeley1 ,hume1 ,kant4 ,two great names lie outside this list1 ,spinoza and ,leibniz4 ,but there is a certain isolation of both of them in respect to their philosophical influence so far as science is concerned2 as though they had strayed to extremes which lie outside the boundaries of safe philosophy1 ,spinoza by retaining older ways of thought1 and ,leibniz by the novelty of his monads4 ,footnote #ac3 ,cf4 ,henry ,sidgwick3 ,a ,memoir1 ,appendix ,i4 ,the history of philosophy runs curiously parallel to that of science4 ,in the case of both1 the seventeenth century set the stage for its two successors4 ,but with the twentieth century a new act commences4 ,it is an exaggeration to attribute a general change in a climate of thought to any one piece of writing1 or to any one author4 ,no doubt ,descartes only expressed definitely and in decisive form what was already in the air of his period4 ,analogously1 in attributing to ,william ,james the inauguration of a new stage in philosophy1 we should be neglecting other influences of his time4 ,but1 admitting this1 there still remains a certain fitness in contrasting his essay1 ,does ,consciousness ,exist1 published in #aijd1 with ,descartes' ,discourse on ,method1 published in #afcg4 ,james clears the stage of the old paraphernalia2 or rather he entirely alters its lighting4 ,take for example these two sentences from his essay3 8,to deny plumply that #8consciousness' exists seems so absurd on the face of it--for undeniably #8thoughts' do exist--that ,i fear some readers will follow me no farther4 ,let me then immediately explain that ,i mean only to deny that the word stands for an entity1 but to insist most emphatically that it does stand for a function40 ,the scientific materialism and the ,cartesian ,ego were both challenged at the same moment1 one by science and the other by philosophy1 as represented by ,william ,james with his psychological antecedents2 and the double challenge marks the end of a period which lasted for about two hundred and fifty years4 ,of course1 #8matter' and #8consciousness' both express something so evident in ordinary experience that any philosophy must provide some things which answer to their respective meanings4 ,but the point is that1 in respect to both of them1 the seventeenth century settlement was infected with a presupposition which is now challenged4 ,james denies that consciousness is an entity1 but admits that it is a function4 ,the discrimination between an entity and a function is therefore vital to the understanding of the challenge which ,james is advancing against the older modes of thought4 ,in the essay in question1 the character which ,james assigns to consciousness is fully discussed4 ,but he does not unambiguously explain what he means by the notion of an entity1 which he refuses to apply to consciousness4 ,in the sentence which immediately follows the one which ,i have already quoted1 he says3 8,there is1 ,i mean1 no aboriginal stuff or quality of being1 contrasted with that of which material objects are made1 out of which our thoughts of them are made2 but there is a function in experience which thoughts perform1 and for the performance of which this quality of being is invoked4 ,that function is knowing4 #8,consciousness' is supposed necessary to explain the fact that things not only are1 but get reported1 are known40 ,thus ,james is denying that consciousness is a #8stuff4' ,the term #8entity1' or even that of #8stuff1' does not fully tell its own tale4 ,the notion of #8entity' is so general that it may be taken to mean anything that can be thought about4 ,you cannot think of mere nothing2 and the something which is an object of thought may be called an entity4 ,in this sense1 a function is an entity4 ,obviously1 this is not what ,james had in his mind4 ,in agreement with the organic theory of nature which ,i have been tentatively putting forward in these lectures1 ,i shall for my own purposes construe ,james as denying exactly what ,descartes asserts in his ,discourse and his ,meditations4 ,descartes discriminates two species of entities1 matter and soul4 ,the essence of matter is spatial extension2 the essence of soul is its cogitation1 in the full sense which ,descartes assigns to the word #8cogitare4' ,for example1 in ,section ,fifty-three of ,part ,i of his ,principles of ,philosophy1 he enunciates3 8,that of every substance there is one principal attribute1 as thinking of the mind1 extension of the body40 ,in the earlier1 ,fifty-first ,section1 ,descartes states3 8,by substance we can conceive nothing else than a thing which exists in such a way as to stand in need of nothing beyond itself in order to its existence40 ,furthermore1 later on1 ,descartes says3 8,for example1 because any substance which ceases to endure ceases also to exist1 duration is not distinct from substance except in thought244440 ,thus we conclude that1 for ,descartes1 minds and bodies exist in such a way as to stand in need of nothing beyond themselves individually 7,god only excepted1 as being the foundation of all things72 that both minds and bodies endure1 because without endurance they would cease to exist2 that spatial extension is the essential attribute of bodies2 and that cogitation is the essential attribute of minds4 ,it is difficult to praise too highly the genius exhibited by ,descartes in the complete sections of his ,principles which deal with these questions4 ,it is worthy of the century in which he writes1 and of the clearness of the ,french intellect4 ,descartes in his distinction between time and duration1 and in his way of grounding time upon motion1 and in his close relation between matter and extension1 anticipates1 as far as it was possible at his epoch1 modern notions suggested by the doctrine of relativity1 or by some aspects of ,bergson's doctrine of the generation of things4 ,but the fundamental principles are so set out as to presuppose independently existing substances with simple location in a community of temporal durations1 and1 in the case of bodies1 with simple location in the community of spatial extensions4 ,those principles lead straight to the theory of a materialistic1 mechanistic nature1 surveyed by cogitating minds4 ,after the close of the seventeenth century1 science took charge of the materialistic nature1 and philosophy took charge of the cogitating minds4 ,some schools of philosophy admitted an ultimate dualism2 and the various idealistic schools claimed that nature was merely the chief example of the cogitations of minds4 ,but all schools admitted the ,cartesian analysis of the ultimate elements of nature4 ,i am excluding ,spinoza and ,leibniz from these statements as to the main stream of modern philosophy1 as derivative from ,descartes2 though of course they were influenced by him1 and in their turn influenced philosophers4 ,i am thinking mainly of the effective contacts between science and philosophy4 ,this division of territory between science and philosophy was not a simple business2 and in fact it illustrated the weakness of the whole cut-and-dried presupposition upon which it rested4 ,we are aware of nature as an interplay of bodies1 colours1 sounds1 scents1 tastes1 touches and other various bodily feelings1 displayed as in space1 in patterns of mutual separation by intervening volumes1 and of individual shape4 ,also the whole is a flux1 changing with the lapse of time4 ,this systematic totality is disclosed to us as one complex of things4 ,but the seventeenth century dualism cuts straight across it4 ,the objective world of science was confined to mere spatial material with simple location in space and time1 and subjected to definite rules as to its locomotion4 ,the subjective world of philosophy annexed the colours1 sounds1 scents1 tastes1 touches1 bodily feelings1 as forming the subjective content of the cogitations of the individual minds4 ,both worlds shared in the general flux2 but time1 as measured1 is assigned by ,descartes to the cogitations of the observer's mind4 ,there is obviously one fatal weakness to this scheme4 ,the cogitations of mind exhibit themselves as holding up entities1 such as colours for instance1 before the mind as the termini of contemplation4 ,but in this theory these colours are1 after all1 merely the furniture of the mind4 ,accordingly1 the mind seems to be confined to its own private world of cogitations4 ,the subject-object conformation of experience in its entirety lies within the mind as one of its private passions4 ,this conclusion from the ,cartesian data is the starting point from which ,berkeley1 ,hume1 and ,kant developed their respective systems4 ,and1 antecedently to them1 it was the point upon which ,locke concentrated as being the vital question4 ,thus the question as to how any knowledge is obtained of the truly objective world of science becomes a problem of the first magnitude4 ,descartes states that the objective body is perceived by the intellect4 ,he says 7,meditation ,,ii73 8,i must1 therefore1 admit that ,i cannot even comprehend by imagination what the piece of wax is1 and that it is the mind alone which perceives it4 ,i speak of one piece in particular2 for1 as to wax in general1 this is still more evident4 ,but what is the piece of wax that can be perceived only by the mind8444 ,the perception of it is neither an act of sight1 of touch1 nor of imagination1 and never was either of these1 though it might formerly seem so1 but is simply an intuition 7inspectio7 of the mind144440 ,it must be noted that the ,latin word #8inspectio' is associated in its classical use with the notion of theory as opposed to practice4 ,the two great preoccupations of modern philosophy now lie clearly before us4 ,the study of mind divides into psychology1 or the study of mental functionings as considered in themselves and in their mutual relations1 and into epistemology1 or the theory of the knowledge of a common objective world4 ,in other words1 there is the study of the cogitations1 qu passions of the mind1 and their study qu leading to an inspection 7intuition7 of an objective world4 ,this is a very uneasy division1 giving rise to a host of perplexities whose consideration has occupied the intervening centuries4 ,as long as men thought in terms of physical notions for the objective world and of mentality for the subjective world1 the setting out of the problem1 as achieved by ,descartes1 sufficed as a starting point4 ,but the balance has been upset by the rise of physiology4 ,in the seventeenth century men passed from the study of physics to the study of philosophy4 ,towards the end of the nineteenth century1 notably in ,germany1 men passed from the study of physiology to the study of psychology4 ,the change in tone has been decisive4 ,of course1 in the earlier period the intervention of the human body was fully considered1 for example1 by ,descartes in ,part ,v of the #8,discourse on ,method4' ,but the physiological instinct had not been developed4 ,in considering the human body1 ,descartes thought with the outfit of a physicist2 whereas the modern psychologists are clothed with the mentalities of medical physiologists4 ,the career of ,william ,james is an example of this change in standpoint4 ,he also possessed the clear1 incisive genius which could state in a flash the exact point at issue4 ,the reason why ,i have put ,descartes and ,james in close juxtaposition is now evident4 ,neither philosopher finished an epoch by a final solution of a problem4 ,their great merit is of the opposite sort4 ,they each of them open an epoch by their clear formulation of terms in which thought could profitably express itself at particular stages of knowledge1 one for the seventeenth century1 the other for the twentieth century4 ,in this respect1 they are both to be contrasted with ,st4 ,thomas ,aquinas1 who expressed the culmination of ,aristotelian scholasticism4 ,in many ways neither ,descartes nor ,james were the most characteristic philosophers of their respective epochs4 ,i should be disposed to ascribe these positions to ,locke and to ,bergson respectively1 at least so far as concerns their relations to the science of their times4 ,locke developed the lines of thought which kept philosophy on the move2 for example he emphasized the appeal to psychology4 ,he initiated the age of epoch-making enquiries into urgent problems of limited scope4 ,undoubtedly1 in so doing1 he infected philosophy with something of the anti-rationalism of science4 ,but the very groundwork of a fruitful methodology is to start from those clear postulates which must be held to be ultimate so far as concerns the occasion in question4 ,the criticism of such methodological postulates is thus reserved for another opportunity4 ,locke discovered that the philosophical situation bequeathed by ,descartes involved the problems of epistemology and psychology4 ,bergson introduced into philosophy the organic conceptions of physiological science4 ,he has most completely moved away from the static materialism of the seventeenth century4 ,his protest against spatialisation is a protest against taking the ,newtonian conception of nature as being anything except a high abstraction4 ,his so-called anti-intellectualism should be construed in this sense4 ,in some respects he recurs to ,descartes2 but the recurrence is accompanied with an instinctive grasp of modern biology4 ,there is another reason for associating ,locke and ,bergson4 ,the germ of an organic theory of nature is to be found in ,locke4 ,his most recent expositor1 ,professor ,gibson1#ad states that ,locke's way of conceiving the identity of self-consciousness #8like that of a living organism1 involves a genuine transcending of the mechanical view of nature and of mind1 embodied in the composition theory4' ,but it is to be noticed that in the first place ,locke wavers in his grasp of this position2 and in the second place1 what is more important still1 he only applies his idea to self-consciousness4 ,the physiological attitude has not yet established itself4 ,the effect of physiology was to put mind back into nature4 ,the neurologist traces first the effect of stimuli along the bodily nerves1 then integration at nerve centres1 and finally the rise of a projective reference beyond the body with a resulting motor efficacy in renewed nervous excitement4 ,in biochemistry1 the delicate adjustment of the chemical composition of the parts to the preservation of the whole organism is detected4 ,thus the mental cognition is seen as the reflective experience of a totality1 reporting for itself what it is in itself as one unit occurrence4 ,this unit is the integration of the sum of its partial happenings1 but it is not their numerical aggregate4 ,it has its own unity as an event4 ,this total unity1 considered as an entity for its own sake1 is the prehension into unity of the patterned aspects of the universe of events4 ,its knowledge of itself arises from its own relevance to the things of which it prehends the aspects4 ,it knows the world as a system of mutual relevance1 and thus sees itself as mirrored in other things4 ,these other things include more especially the various parts of its own body4 ,footnote #ad3 ,cf4 his book1 ,locke's ,theory of ,knowledge and its ,historical ,relations1 ,camb4 ,univ4 ,press1 #aiag4 ,it is important to discriminate the bodily pattern1 which endures1 from the bodily event1 which is pervaded by the enduring pattern1 and from the parts of the bodily event4 ,the parts of the bodily event are themselves pervaded by their own enduring patterns1 which form elements in the bodily pattern4 ,the parts of the body are really portions of the environment of the total bodily event1 but so related that their mutual aspects1 each in the other1 are peculiarly effective in modifying the pattern of either4 ,this arises from the intimate character of the relation of whole to part4 ,thus the body is a portion of the environment for the part1 and the part is a portion of the environment for the body2 only they are peculiarly sensitive1 each to modifications of the other4 ,this sensitiveness is so arranged that the part adjusts itself to preserve the stability of the pattern of the body4 ,it is a particular example of the favourable environment shielding the organism4 ,the relation of part to whole has the special reciprocity associated with the notion of organism1 in which the part is for the whole2 but this relation reigns throughout nature and does not start with the special case of the higher organisms4 ,further1 viewing the question as a matter of chemistry1 there is no need to construe the actions of each molecule in a living body by its exclusive particular reference to the pattern of the complete living organism4 ,it is true that each molecule is affected by the aspect of this pattern as mirrored in it1 so as to be otherwise than what it would have been if placed elsewhere4 ,in the same way1 under some circumstances an electron may be a sphere1 and under other circumstances an egg-shaped volume4 ,the mode of approach to the problem1 so far as science is concerned1 is merely to ask if molecules exhibit in living bodies properties which are not to be observed amid inorganic surroundings4 ,in the same way1 in a magnetic field soft iron exhibits magnetic properties which are in abeyance elsewhere4 ,the prompt self-preservative actions of living bodies1 and our experience of the physical actions of our bodies following the determinations of will1 suggest the modification of molecules in the body as the result of the total pattern4 ,it seems possible that there may be physical laws expressing the modification of the ultimate basic organisms when they form part of higher organisms with adequate compactness of pattern4 ,it would1 however1 be entirely in consonance with the empirically observed action of environments1 if the direct effects of aspects as between the whole body and its parts were negligible4 ,we should expect transmission4 ,in this way the modification of total pattern would transmit itself by means of a series of modifications of a descending series of parts1 so that finally the modification of the cell changes its aspect in the molecule1 thus effecting a corresponding alteration in the molecule1--or in some subtler entity4 ,thus the question for physiology is the question of the physics of molecules in cells of different characters4 ,we can now see the relation of psychology to physiology and to physics4 ,the private psychological field is merely the event considered from its own standpoint4 ,the unity of this field is the unity of the event4 ,but it is the event as one entity1 and not the event as a sum of parts4 ,the relations of the parts1 to each other and to the whole1 are their aspects1 each in the other4 ,a body for an external observer is the aggregate of the aspects for him of the body as a whole1 and also of the body as a sum of parts4 ,for the external observer the aspects of shape and of sense-objects are dominant1 at least for cognition4 ,but we must also allow for the possibility that we can detect in ourselves direct aspects of the mentalities of higher organisms4 ,the claim that the cognition of alien mentalities must necessarily be by means of indirect inferences from aspects of shape and of sense-objects is wholly unwarranted by this philosophy of organism4 ,the fundamental principle is that whatever merges into actuality1 implants its aspects in every individual event4 ,further1 even for self-cognition1 the aspects of the parts of our own bodies partly take the form of aspects of shape1 and of sense-objects4 ,but that part of the bodily event1 in respect to which the cognitive mentality is associated1 is for itself the unit psychological field4 ,its ingredients are not referent to the event itself2 they are aspects of what lies beyond that event4 ,thus the self-knowledge inherent in the bodily event is the knowledge of itself as a complex unity1 whose ingredients involve all reality beyond itself1 restricted under the limitation of its pattern of aspects4 ,thus we know ourselves as a function of unification of a plurality of things which are other than ourselves4 ,cognition discloses an event as being an activity1 organising a real togetherness of alien things4 ,but this psychological field does not depend on its cognition2 so that this field is still a unit event as abstracted from its self-cognition4 ,accordingly1 consciousness will be the function of knowing4 ,but what is known is already a prehension of aspects of the one real universe4 ,these aspects are aspects of other events as mutually modifying1 each the others4 ,in the pattern of aspects they stand in their pattern of mutual relatedness4 ,the aboriginal data in terms of which the pattern weaves itself are the aspects of shapes1 of sense-objects1 and of other eternal objects whose self-identity is not dependent on the flux of things4 ,wherever such objects have ingression into the general flux1 they interpret events1 each to the other4 ,they are here in the perceiver2 but1 as perceived by him1 they convey for him something of the total flux which is beyond himself4 ,the subject-object relation takes its origin in the double rle of these eternal objects4 ,they are modifications of the subject1 but only in their character of conveying aspects of other subjects in the community of the universe4 ,thus no individual subject can have independent reality1 since it is a prehension of limited aspects of subjects other than itself4 ,the technical phrase #8subject-object' is a bad term for the fundamental situation disclosed in experience4 ,it is really reminiscent of the ,aristotelian #8subject-predicate4' ,it already presupposes the metaphysical doctrine of diverse subjects qualified by their private predicates4 ,this is the doctrine of subjects with private worlds of experience4 ,if this be granted1 there is no escape from solipsism4 ,the point is that the phrase #8subject-object' indicates a fundamental entity underlying the objects4 ,thus the #8objects1' as thus conceived1 are merely the ghosts of ,aristotelian predicates4 ,the primary situation disclosed in cognitive experience is #8ego-object amid objects4' ,by this ,i mean that the primary fact is an impartial world transcending the #8here-now' which marks the ego-object1 and transcending the #8now' which is the spatial world of simultaneous realisation4 ,it is a world also including the actuality of the past1 and the limited potentiality of the future1 together with the complete world of abstract potentiality1 the realm of eternal objects1 which transcends1 and finds exemplification in and comparison with1 the actual course of realisation4 ,the ego-object1 as consciousness here-now1 is conscious of its experient essence as constituted by its internal relatedness to the world of realities1 and to the world of ideas4 ,but the ego-object1 in being thus constituted1 is within the world of realities1 and exhibits itself as an organism requiring the ingression of ideas for the purpose of this status among realities4 ,this question of consciousness must be reserved for treatment on another occasion4 ,the point to be made for the purposes of the present discussion is that a philosophy of nature as organic must start at the opposite end to that requisite for a materialistic philosophy4 ,the materialistic starting point is from independently existing substances1 matter and mind4 ,the matter suffers modifications of its external relations of locomotion1 and the mind suffers modifications of its contemplated objects4 ,there are1 in this materialistic theory1 two sorts of independent substances1 each qualified by their appropriate passions4 ,the organic starting point is from the analysis of process as the realisation of events disposed in an interlocked community4 ,the event is the unit of things real4 ,the emergent enduring pattern is the stabilisation of the emergent achievement so as to become a fact which retains its identity throughout the process4 ,it will be noted that endurance is not primarily the property of enduring beyond itself1 but of enduring within itself4 ,i mean that endurance is the property of finding its pattern reproduced in the temporal parts of the total event4 ,it is in this sense that a total event carries an enduring pattern4 ,there is an intrinsic value identical for the whole and for its succession of parts4 ,cognition is the emergence1 into some measure of individualised reality1 of the general substratum of activity1 poising before itself possibility1 actuality1 and purpose4 ,it is equally possible to arrive at this organic conception of the world if we start from the fundamental notions of modern physics1 instead of1 as above1 from psychology and physiology4 ,in fact by reason of my own studies in mathematics and mathematical physics1 ,i did in fact arrive at my convictions in this way4 ,mathematical physics presumes in the first place an electromagnetic field of activity pervading space and time4 ,the laws which condition this field are nothing else than the conditions observed by the general activity of the flux of the world1 as it individualises itself in the events4 ,in physics1 there is an abstraction4 ,the science ignores what anything is in itself4 ,its entities are merely considered in respect to their extrinsic reality1 that is to say1 in respect to their aspects in other things4 ,but the abstraction reaches even further than that2 for it is only the aspects in other things1 as modifying the spatio-temporal specifications of the life histories of those other things1 which count4 ,the intrinsic reality of the observer comes in3 ,i mean what the observer is for himself is appealed to4 ,for example1 the fact that he will see red or blue enters into scientific statements4 ,but the red which the observer sees does not in truth enter into science4 ,what is relevant is merely the bare diversity of the observer's red experiences from all of his other experiences4 ,accordingly1 the intrinsic character of the observer is merely relevant in order to fix the self-identical individuality of the physical entities4 ,these entities are only considered as agencies in fixing the routes in space and in time of the life histories of enduring entities4 ,the phraseology of physics is derived from the materialistic ideas of the seventeenth century4 ,but we find that1 even in its extreme abstraction1 what it is really presupposing is the organic theory of aspects as explained above4 ,first1 consider any event in empty space where the word #8empty' means devoid of electrons1 or protons1 or of any other form of electric charge4 ,such an event has three rles in physics4 ,in the first place1 it is the actual scene of an adventure of energy1 either as its habitat or as the locus of a particular stream of energy3 anyhow1 in this rle the energy is there1 either as located in space during the time considered1 or as streaming through space4 ,in its second rle1 the event is a necessary link in the pattern of transmission1 by which the character of every event receives some modification from the character of every other event4 ,in its third rle1 the event is the repository of a possibility1 as to what would happen to an electric charge1 either by way of deformation or of locomotion1 if it should have happened to be there4 ,if we modify our assumption by considering an event which includes in itself a portion of the life-history of an electric charge1 then the analysis of its three rles still remains2 except that the possibility embodied in the third rle is now transformed into an actuality4 ,in this replacement of possibility by actuality1 we obtain the distinction between empty and occupied events4 ,recurring to the empty events1 we note the deficiency in them of individuality of intrinsic content4 ,considering the first rle of an empty event1 as being a habitat of energy1 we note that there is no individual discrimination of an individual bit of energy1 either as statically located1 or as an element in the stream4 ,there is simply a quantitative determination of activity1 without individualisation of the activity in itself4 ,this lack of individualisation is still more evident in the second and third rles4 ,an empty event is something in itself1 but it fails to realise a stable individuality of content4 ,so far as its content is concerned1 the empty event is one realised element in a general scheme of organised activity4 ,some qualification is required when the empty event is the scene of the transmission of a definite train of recurrent wave-forms4 ,there is now a definite pattern which remains permanent in the event4 ,we find here the first faint trace of enduring individuality4 ,but it is individuality without the faintest capture of originality3 for it is merely a permanence arising solely from the implication of the event in a larger scheme of patterning4 ,turning now to the examination of an occupied event1 the electron has a determinate individuality4 ,it can be traced throughout its life-history through a variety of events4 ,a collection of electrons1 together with the analogous atomic charges of positive electricity1 forms a body such as we ordinarily perceive4 ,the simplest body of this kind is a molecule1 and a set of molecules forms a lump of ordinary matter1 such as a chair1 or a stone4 ,thus a charge of electricity is the mark of individuality of content1 as additional to the individuality of an event in itself4 ,this individuality of content is the strong point of the materialistic doctrine4 ,it can1 however1 be equally well explained on the theory of organism4 ,when we look into the function of the electric charge1 we note that its rle is to mark the origination of a pattern which is transmitted through space and time4 ,it is the key of some particular pattern4 ,for example1 the field of force in any event is to be constructed by attention to the adventures of electrons and protons1 and so also are the streams and distributions of energy4 ,further1 the electric waves find their origin in the vibratory adventures of these charges4 ,thus the transmitted pattern is to be conceived as the flux of aspects throughout space and time derived from the life history of the atomic charge4 ,the individualisation of the charge arises by a conjunction of two characters1 in the first place by the continued identity of its mode of functioning as a key for the determination of a diffusion of pattern2 and1 in the second place1 by the unity and continuity of its life history4 ,we may conclude1 therefore1 that the organic theory represents directly what physics actually does assume respecting its ultimate entities4 ,we also notice the complete futility of these entities1 if they are conceived as fully concrete individuals4 ,so far as physics is concerned1 they are wholly occupied in moving each other about1 and they have no reality outside this function4 ,in particular for physics1 there is no intrinsic reality4 ,it is obvious that the basing of philosophy upon the presupposition of organism must be traced back to ,leibniz4#ae ,his monads are for him the ultimately real entities4 ,but he retained the ,cartesian substances with their qualifying passions1 as also equally expressing for him the final characterisation of real things4 ,accordingly for him there was no concrete reality of internal relations4 ,he had therefore on his hands two distinct points of view4 ,one was that the final real entity is an organising activity1 fusing ingredients into a unity1 so that this unity is the reality4 ,the other point of view is that the final real entities are substances supporting qualities4 ,the first point of view depends upon the acceptance of internal relations binding together all reality4 ,the latter is inconsistent with the reality of such relations4 ,to combine these two points of view1 his monads were therefore windowless2 and their passions merely mirrored the universe by the divine arrangement of a prestablished harmony4 ,this system thus presupposed an aggregate of independent entities4 ,he did not discriminate the event1 as the unit of experience1 from the enduring organism as its stabilisation into importance1 and from the cognitive organism as expressing an increased completeness of individualisation4 ,nor did he admit the many-termed relations1 relating sense-data to various events in diverse ways4 ,these many-termed relations are in fact the perspectives which ,leibniz does admit1 but only on the condition that they are purely qualities of the organising monads4 ,the difficulty really arises from the unquestioned acceptance of the notion of simple location as fundamental for space and time1 and from the acceptance of the notion of independent individual substance as fundamental for a real entity4 ,the only road open to ,leibniz was thus the same as that later taken by ,berkeley in a prevalent interpretation of his meaning1 namely an appeal to a ,deux ex machin who was capable of rising superior to the difficulties of metaphysics4 ,footnote #ae3 ,cf4 ,bertrand ,russell1 ,the ,philosophy of ,leibniz1 for the suggestion of this line of thought4 ,in the same way as ,descartes introduced the tradition of thought which kept subsequent philosophy in some measure of contact with the scientific movement1 so ,leibniz introduced the alternative tradition that the entities1 which are the ultimate actual things1 are in some sense procedures of organisation4 ,this tradition has been the foundation of the great achievements of ,german philosophy4 ,kant reflected the two traditions1 one upon the other4 ,kant was a scientist1 but the schools derivative from ,kant have had but slight effect on the mentality of the scientific world4 ,it should be the task of the philosophical schools of this century to bring together the two streams into an expression of the world-picture derived from science1 and thereby end the divorce of science from the affirmations of our aesthetic and ethical experiences4 ,,chapter ,x ,,abstraction ,in the previous chapters ,i have been examining the reactions of the scientific movement upon the deeper issues which have occupied modern thinkers4 ,no one man1 no limited society of men1 and no one epoch can think of everything at once4 ,accordingly for the sake of eliciting the various impacts of science upon thought1 the topic has been treated historically4 ,in this retrospect ,i have kept in mind that the ultimate issue of the whole story is the patent dissolution of the comfortable scheme of scientific materialism which has dominated the three centuries under review4 ,accordingly various schools of criticism of the dominant opinions have been stressed2 and ,i have endeavoured to outline an alternative cosmological doctrine1 which shall be wide enough to include what is fundamental both for science and for its critics4 ,in this alternative scheme1 the notion of material1 as fundamental1 has been replaced by that of organic synthesis4 ,but the approach has always been from the consideration of the actual intricacies of scientific thought1 and of the peculiar perplexities which it suggests4 ,in the present chapter1 and in the immediately succeeding chapter1 we will forget the peculiar problems of modern science1 and will put ourselves at the standpoint of a dispassionate consideration of the nature of things1 antecedently to any special investigation into their details4 ,such a standpoint is termed #8metaphysical4' ,accordingly those readers who find metaphysics1 even in two slight chapters1 irksome1 will do well to proceed at once to the ,chapter on #8,religion and ,science1' which resumes the topic of the impact of science on modern thought4 ,these metaphysical chapters are purely descriptive4 ,their justification is to be sought1 7i7 in our direct knowledge of the actual occasions which compose our immediate experience1 and 7ii7 in their success as forming a basis for harmonising our systematised accounts of various types of experience1 and 7iii7 in their success as providing the concepts in terms of which an epistemology can be framed4 ,by 7iii7 ,i mean that an account of the general character of what we know must enable us to frame an account of how knowledge is possible as an adjunct within things known4 ,in any occasion of cognition1 that which is known is an actual occasion of experience1 as diversified#af by reference to a realm of entities which transcend that immediate occasion in that they have analogous or different connections with other occasions of experience4 ,for example a definite shade of red may1 in the immediate occasion1 be implicated with the shape of sphericity in some definite way4 ,but that shade of red1 and that spherical shape1 exhibit themselves as transcending that occasion1 in that either of them has other relationships to other occasions4 ,also1 apart from the actual occurrence of the same things in other occasions1 every actual occasion is set within a realm of alternative interconnected entities4 ,this realm is disclosed by all the untrue propositions which can be predicated significantly of that occasion4 ,it is the realm of alternative suggestions1 whose foothold in actuality transcends each actual occasion4 ,the real relevance of untrue propositions for each actual occasion is disclosed by art1 romance1 and by criticism in reference to ideals4 ,it is the foundation of the metaphysical position which ,i am maintaining that the understanding of actuality requires a reference to ideality4 ,the two realms are intrinsically inherent in the total metaphysical situation4 ,the truth that some proposition respecting an actual occasion is untrue may express the vital truth as to the aesthetic achievement4 ,it expresses the #8great refusal' which is its primary characteristic4 ,an event is decisive in proportion to the importance 7for it7 of its untrue propositions3 their relevance to the event cannot be dissociated from what the event is in itself by way of achievement4 ,these transcendent entities have been termed #8universals4' ,i prefer to use the term #8eternal objects1' in order to disengage myself from presuppositions which cling to the former term owing to its prolonged philosophical history4 ,eternal objects are thus1 in their nature1 abstract4 ,by #8abstract' ,i mean that what an eternal object is in itself--that is to say1 its essence--is comprehensible without reference to some one particular occasion of experience4 ,to be abstract is to transcend particular concrete occasions of actual happening4 ,but to transcend an actual occasion does not mean being disconnected from it4 ,on the contrary1 ,i hold that each eternal object has its own proper connection with each such occasion1 which ,i term its mode of ingression into that occasion4 ,thus an eternal object is to be comprehended by acquaintance with 7i7 its particular individuality1 7ii7 its general relationships to other eternal objects as apt for realisation in actual occasions1 and 7iii7 the general principle which expresses its ingression in particular actual occasions4 ,footnote #af3 ,cf4 my ,principles of ,natural ,knowledge1 ,ch4 ,v1 ,sec4 #ac4 ,these three headings express two principles4 ,the first principle is that each eternal object is an individual which1 in its own peculiar fashion1 is what it is4 ,this particular individuality is the individual essence of the object1 and cannot be described otherwise than as being itself4 ,thus the individual essence is merely the essence considered in respect to its uniqueness4 ,further1 the essence of an eternal object is merely the eternal object considered as adding its own unique contribution to each actual occasion4 ,this unique contribution is identical for all such occasions in respect to the fact that the object in all modes of ingression is just its identical self4 ,but it varies from one occasion to another in respect to the differences of its modes of ingression4 ,thus the metaphysical status of an eternal object is that of a possibility for an actuality4 ,every actual occasion is defined as to its character by how these possibilities are actualised for that occasion4 ,thus actualisation is a selection among possibilities4 ,more accurately1 it is a selection issuing in a gradation of possibilities in respect to their realisation in that occasion4 ,this conclusion brings us to the second metaphysical principle3 ,an eternal object1 considered as an abstract entity1 cannot be divorced from its reference to other eternal objects1 and from its reference to actuality generally2 though it is disconnected from its actual modes of ingression into definitive actual occasions4 ,this principle is expressed by the statement that each eternal object has a #8relational essence4' ,this relational essence determines how it is possible for the object to have ingression into actual occasions4 ,in other words3 ,if ,a be an eternal object1 then what ,a is in itself involves ,a's status in the universe1 and ,a cannot be divorced from this status4 ,in the essence of ,a there stands a determinateness as to the relationships of ,a to other eternal objects1 and an indeterminateness as to the relationships of ,a to actual occasions4 ,since the relationships of ,a to other eternal objects stand determinately in the essence of ,a1 it follows that they are internal relations4 ,i mean by this that these relationships are constitutive of ,a2 for an entity which stands in internal relations has no being as an entity not in these relations4 ,in other words1 once with internal relations1 always with internal relations4 ,the internal relationships of ,a conjointly form its significance4 ,again an entity cannot stand in external relations unless in its essence there stands an indeterminateness which is its patience for such external relations4 ,the meaning of the term #8possibility' as applied to ,a is simply that there stands in the essence of ,a a patience for relationships to actual occasions4 ,the relationships of ,a to an actual occasion are simply how the eternal relationships of ,a to other eternal objects are graded as to their realisation in that occasion4 ,thus the general principle which expresses ,a's ingression in the particular actual occasion is the indeterminateness which stands in the essence of ,a as to its ingression into 1 and is the determinateness which stands in the essence of as to the ingression of into 4 ,thus the synthetic prehension1 which is 1 is the solution of the indeterminateness of into the determinateness of 4 ,accordingly the relationship between and is external as regards 1 and is internal as regards 4 ,every actual occasion is the solution of all modalities into actual categorical ingressions3 truth and falsehood take the place of possibility4 ,the complete ingression of into is expressed by all the true propositions which are about both and 1 and also--it may be--about other things4 ,the determinate relatedness of the eternal object to every other eternal object is how is systematically and by the necessity of its nature related to every other eternal object4 ,such relatedness represents a possibility for realisation4 ,but a relationship is a fact which concerns all the implicated relata1 and cannot be isolated as if involving only one of the relata4 ,accordingly there is a general fact of systematic mutual relatedness which is inherent in the character of possibility4 ,the realm of eternal objects is properly described as a #8realm1' because each eternal object has its status in this general systematic complex of mutual relatedness4 ,in respect to the ingression of into an actual occasion 1 the mutual relationships of to other eternal objects1 as thus graded in realisation1 require for their expression a reference to the status of and of the other eternal objects in the spatio-temporal relationship4 ,also this status is not expressible 7for this purpose7 without a reference to the status of and of other actual occasions in the same spatio-temporal relationship4 ,accordingly the spatio-temporal relationship1 in terms of which the actual course of events is to be expressed1 is nothing else than a selective limitation within the general systematic relationships among eternal objects4 ,by #8limitation1' as applied to the spatio-temporal continuum1 ,i mean those matter-of-fact determinations--such as the three dimensions of space1 and the four dimensions of the spatio-temporal continuum--which are inherent in the actual course of events1 but which present themselves as arbitrary in respect to a more abstract possibility4 ,the consideration of these general limitations at the base of actual things1 as distinct from the limitations peculiar to each actual occasion1 will be more fully resumed in the chapter on #8,god4' ,further1 the status of all possibility in reference to actuality requires a reference to this spatio-temporal continuum4 ,in any particular consideration of a possibility we may conceive this continuum to be transcended4 ,but in so far as there is any definite reference to actuality1 the definite how of transcendence of that spatio-temporal continuum is required4 ,thus primarily the spatio-temporal continuum is a locus of relational possibility1 selected from the more general realm of systematic relationship4 ,this limited locus of relational possibility expresses one limitation of possibility inherent in the general system of the process of realisation4 ,whatever possibility is generally coherent with that system falls within this limitation4 ,also whatever is abstractedly possible in relation to the general course of events--as distinct from the particular limitations introduced by particular occasions--pervades the spatio-temporal continuum in every alternative spatial situation and at all alternative times4 ,fundamentally1 the spatio-temporal continuum is the general system of relatedness of all possibilities1 in so far as that system is limited by its relevance to the general fact of actuality4 ,also it is inherent in the nature of possibility that it should include this relevance to actuality4 ,for possibility is that in which there stands achievability1 abstracted from achievement4 ,it has already been emphasised that an actual occasion is to be conceived as a limitation2 and that this process of limitation can be still further characterised as a gradation4 ,this characteristic of an actual occasion 71 say7 requires further elucidation3 ,an indeterminateness stands in the essence of any eternal object 71 say74 ,the actual occasion synthesises in itself every eternal object2 and1 in so doing1 it includes the complete determinate relatedness of to every other eternal object1 or set of eternal objects4 ,this synthesis is a limitation of realisation but not of content4 ,each relationship preserves its inherent self-identity4 ,but grades of entry into this synthesis are inherent in each actual occasion1 such as 4 ,these grades can be expressed only as relevance of value4 ,this relevance of value varies--as comparing different occasions--in grade from the inclusion of the individual essence of as an element in the aesthetic synthesis 7in some grade of inclusion7 to the lowest grade which is the exclusion of the individual essence of as an element in the aesthetic synthesis4 ,in so far as it stands in this lowest grade1 every determinate relationship of is merely ingredient in the occasion in respect to the determinate how this relationship is an unfulfilled alternative1 not contributing any aesthetic value1 except as forming an element in the systematic substratum of unfulfilled content4 ,in a higher grade1 it may remain unfulfilled1 but be aesthetically relevant4 ,thus ,a1 conceived merely in respect to its relationships to other eternal objects1 is #8,a conceived as not-being'2 where #8not-being' means #8abstracted from the determinate fact of inclusions in1 and exclusions from1 actual events4' ,also #8,a as not-being in respect to a definite occasion ' means that ,a in all its determinate relationships is excluded from 4 ,again #8,a as being in respect to ' means that ,a in some of its determinate relationships is included in 4 ,but there can be no occasion which includes ,a in all its determinate relationships2 for some of these relationships are contraries4 ,thus1 in regard to excluded relationships1 ,a will be not-being in 1 even when in regard to other relationships ,a will be being in 4 ,in this sense1 every occasion is a synthesis of being and not-being4 ,furthermore1 though some eternal objects are synthesised in an occasion merely qu not-being1 each eternal object which is synthesised qu being is also synthesised qu not-being4 #8,being' here means #8individually effective in the aesthetic synthesis4' ,also the #8aesthetic synthesis' is the #8experient synthesis' viewed as self-creative1 under the limitations laid upon it by its internal relatedness to all other actual occasions4 ,we thus conclude--what has already been stated above--that the general fact of the synthetic prehension of all eternal objects into every occasion wears the double aspect of the indeterminate relatedness of each eternal object to occasions generally1 and of its determinate relatedness to each particular occasion4 ,this statement summarises the account of how external relations are possible4 ,but the account depends upon disengaging the spatio-temporal continuum from its mere implication in actual occasions--according to the usual explanation--and upon exhibiting it in its origin from the general nature of abstract possibility1 as limited by the general character of the actual course of events4 ,the difficulty which arises in respect to internal relations is to explain how any particular truth is possible4 ,in so far as there are internal relations1 everything must depend upon everything else4 ,but if this be the case1 we cannot know about anything till we equally know everything else4 ,apparently1 therefore1 we are under the necessity of saying everything at once4 ,this supposed necessity is palpably untrue4 ,accordingly it is incumbent on us to explain how there can be internal relations1 seeing that we admit finite truths4 ,since actual occasions are selections from the realm of possibilities1 the ultimate explanation of how actual occasions have the general character which they do have1 must lie in an analysis of the general character of the realm of possibility4 ,the analytical character of the realm of eternal objects is the primary metaphysical truth concerning it4 ,by this character it is meant that the status of any eternal object ,a in this realm is capable of analysis into an indefinite number of subordinate relationships of limited scope4 ,for example if ,b and ,c are two other eternal objects1 then there is some perfectly definite relationship ,r7,a1 ,b1 ,c7 which involves ,a1 ,b1 ,c only1 as to require the mention of no other definite eternal objects in the capacity of relata4 ,of course1 the relationship ,r7,a1 ,b1 ,c7 may involve subordinate relationships which are themselves eternal objects1 and ,r7,a1 ,b1 ,c7 is also itself an eternal object4 ,also there will be other relationships which in the same sense involve only ,a1 ,b1 ,c4 ,we have now to examine how1 having regard to the internal relatedness of eternal objects1 this limited relationship ,r7,a1 ,b1 ,c7 is possible4 ,the reason for the existence of finite relationships in the realm of eternal objects is that relationships of these objects among themselves are entirely unselective1 and are systematically complete4 ,we are discussing possibility2 so that every relationship which is possible is thereby in the realm of possibility4 ,every such relationship of each eternal object is founded upon the perfectly definite status of that object as a relatum in the general scheme of relationships4 ,this definite status is what ,i have termed the #8relational essence' of the object4 ,this relational essence is determinable by reference to that object alone1 and does not require reference to any other objects1 except those which are specifically involved in its individual essence when that essence is complex 7as will be explained immediately74 ,the meaning of the words #8any' and #8some' springs from this principle--that is to say1 the meaning of the #8variable' in logic4 ,the whole principle is that a particular determination can be made of the how of some definite relationship of a definite eternal object ,a to a definite finite number n of other eternal objects1 without any determination of the other n objects1 ,x#a1 ,x#b1 444 ,xn1 except that they have1 each of them1 the requisite status to play their respective parts in that multiple relationship4 ,this principle depends on the fact that the relational essence of an eternal object is not unique to that object4 ,the mere relational essence of each eternal object determines the complete uniform scheme of relational essences1 since each object stands internally in all its possible relationships4 ,thus the realm of possibility provides a uniform scheme of relationships among finite sets of eternal objects2 and all eternal objects stand in all such relationships1 so far as the status of each permits4 ,accordingly the relationships 7as in possibility7 do not involve the individual essences of the eternal objects2 they involve any eternal objects as relata1 subject to the proviso that these relata have the requisite relational essences4 ,it is this proviso which1 automatically and by the nature of the case1 limits the #8any' of the phrase #8any eternal objects4' ,this principle is the principle of the ,isolation of ,eternal ,objects in the realm of possibility4 ,the eternal objects are isolated1 because their relationships as possibilities are expressible without reference to their respective individual essences4 ,in contrast to the realm of possibility1 the inclusion of eternal objects within an actual occasion means that in respect to some of their possible relationships there is a togetherness of their individual essences4 ,this realised togetherness is the achievement of an emergent value defined--or1 shaped--by the definite eternal relatedness in respect to which the real togetherness is achieved4 ,thus the eternal relatedness is the form--the --2 the emergent actual occasion is the superject of informed value2 value1 as abstracted from any particular superject1 is the abstract matter--the --which is common to all actual occasions2 and the synthetic activity which prehends valueless possibility into superjicient informed value is the substantial activity4 ,this substantial activity is that which is omitted in any analysis of the static factors in the metaphysical situation4 ,the analysed elements of the situation are the attributes of the substantial activity4 ,the difficulty inherent in the concept of finite internal relations among eternal objects is thus evaded by two metaphysical principles1 7i7 that the relationships of any eternal object ,a1 considered as constitutive of ,a1 merely involve other eternal objects as bare relata without reference to their individual essences1 and 7ii7 that the divisibility of the general relationship of ,a into a multiplicity of finite relationships of ,a stands therefore in the essence of that eternal object4 ,the second principle obviously depends upon the first4 ,to understand ,a is to understand the how of a general scheme of relationship4 ,this scheme of relationship does not require the individual uniqueness of the other relata for its comprehension4 ,this scheme also discloses itself as being analysable into a multiplicity of limited relationships which have their own individuality and yet at the same time presupposes the total relationship within possibility4 ,in respect to actuality there is first the general limitation of relationships1 which reduces this general unlimited scheme to the four dimensional spatio-temporal scheme4 ,this spatio-temporal scheme is1 so to speak1 the greatest common measure of the schemes of relationship 7as limited by actuality7 inherent in all the eternal objects4 ,by this it is meant that1 how select relationships of an eternal object 7,a7 are realised in any actual occasion1 is always explicable by expressing the status of ,a in respect to this spatio-temporal scheme1 and by expressing in this scheme the relationship of the actual occasion to other actual occasions4 ,a definite finite relationship involving the definite eternal objects of a limited set of such objects is itself an eternal object3 it is those eternal objects as in that relationship4 ,i will call such an eternal object #8complex4' ,the eternal objects which are the relata in a complex eternal object will be called the #8components' of that eternal object4 ,also if any of these relata are themselves complex1 their components will be called #8derivative components' of the original complex object4 ,also the components of derivative components will also be called derivative components of the original object4 ,thus the complexity of an eternal object means its analysability into a relationship of component eternal objects4 ,also the analysis of the general scheme of relatedness of eternal objects means its exhibition as a multiplicity of complex eternal objects4 ,an eternal object1 such as a definite shade of green1 which cannot be analysed into a relationship of components1 will be called #8simple4' ,we can now explain how the analytical character of the realm of eternal objects allows of an analysis of that realm into grades4 ,in the lowest grade of eternal objects are to be placed those objects whose individual essences are simple4 ,this is the grade of zero complexity4 ,next consider any set of such objects1 finite or infinite as to the number of its members4 ,for example1 consider the set of three eternal objects ,a1 ,b1 ,c1 of which none is complex4 ,let us write ,r7,a1 ,b1 ,c7 for some definite possible relatedness of ,a1 ,b1 ,c4 ,to take a simple example1 ,a1 ,b1 ,c may be three definite colours with the spatio-temporal relatedness to each other of three faces of a regular tetrahedron1 anywhere at any time4 ,then ,r7,a1 ,b1 ,c7 is another eternal object of the lowest complex grade4 ,analogously there are eternal objects of successively higher grades4 ,in respect to any complex eternal object1 ,s7,d#a1 ,d#b1 444 ,dn71 the eternal objects ,d#a1 444 ,dn1 whose individual essences are constitutive of the individual essence of ,s7,d#a1 444 ,dn71 are called the components of ,s7,d#a1 444 ,dn74 ,it is obvious that the grade of complexity to be ascribed to ,s7,d#a1 444 ,dn7 is to be taken as one above the highest grade of complexity to be found among its components4 ,there is thus an analysis of the realm of possibility into simple eternal objects1 and into various grades of complex eternal objects4 ,a complex eternal object is an abstract situation4 ,there is a double sense of #8abstraction1' in regard to the abstraction of definite eternal objects1 i4e41 non-mathematical abstraction4 ,there is abstraction from actuality1 and abstraction from possibility4 ,for example1 ,a and ,r7,a1 ,b1 ,c7 are both abstractions from the realm of possibility4 ,note that ,a must mean ,a in all its possible relationships1 and among them ,r7,a1 ,b1 ,c74 ,also ,r7,a1 ,b1 ,c7 means ,r7,a1 ,b1 ,c7 in all its relationships4 ,but this meaning of ,r7,a1 ,b1 ,c7 excludes other relationships into which ,a can enter4 ,hence ,a as in ,r7,a1 ,b1 ,c7 is more abstract than ,a simpliciter4 ,thus as we pass from the grade of simple eternal objects to higher and higher grades of complexity1 we are indulging in higher grades of abstraction from the realm of possibility4 ,we can now conceive the successive stages of a definite progress towards some assigned mode of abstraction from the realm of possibility1 involving a progress 7in thought7 through successive grades of increasing complexity4 ,i will call any such route of progress #8an abstractive hierarchy4' ,any abstractive hierarchy1 finite or infinite1 is based upon some definite group of simple eternal objects4 ,this group will be called the #8base' of the hierarchy4 ,thus the base of an abstractive hierarchy is a set of objects of zero complexity4 ,the formal definition of an abstractive hierarchy is as follows3 ,an #8abstractive hierarchy based upon g1' where g is a group of simple eternal objects1 is a set of eternal objects which satisfy the following conditions1 7i7 the members of g belong to it1 and are the only simple eternal objects in the hierarchy1 7ii7 the components of any complex eternal object in the hierarchy are also members of the hierarchy1 and 7iii7 any set of eternal objects belonging to the hierarchy1 whether all of the same grade or whether differing among themselves as to grade1 are jointly among the components or derivative components of at least one eternal object which also belongs to the hierarchy4 ,it is to be noticed that the components of an eternal object are necessarily of a lower grade of complexity than itself4 ,accordingly any member of such a hierarchy1 which is of the first grade of complexity1 can have as components only members of the group g2 and any member of the second grade can have as components only members of the first grade1 and members of g2 and so on for the higher grades4 ,the third condition to be satisfied by an abstractive hierarchy will be called the condition of connexity4 ,thus an abstractive hierarchy springs from its base2 it includes every successive grade from its base either indefinitely onwards1 or to its maximum grade2 and it is #8connected' by the reappearance 7in a higher grade7 of any set of its members belonging to lower grades1 in the function of a set of components or derivative components of at least one member of the hierarchy4 ,an abstractive hierarchy is called #8finite' if it stops at a finite grade of complexity4 ,it is called #8infinite' if it includes members belonging respectively to all degrees of complexity4 ,it is to be noted that the base of an abstractive hierarchy may contain any number of members1 finite or infinite4 ,further1 the infinity of the number of the members of the base has nothing to do with the question as to whether the hierarchy be finite or infinite4 ,a finite abstractive hierarchy will1 by definition1 possess a grade of maximum complexity4 ,it is characteristic of this grade that a member of it is a component of no other eternal object belonging to any grade of the hierarchy4 ,also it is evident that this grade of maximum complexity must possess only one member2 for otherwise the condition of connexity would not be satisfied4 ,conversely any complex eternal object defines a finite abstractive hierarchy to be discovered by a process of analysis4 ,this complex eternal object from which we start will be called the #8vertex' of the abstractive hierarchy3 it is the sole member of the grade of maximum complexity4 ,in the first stage of the analysis we obtain the components of the vertex4 ,these components may be of varying complexity2 but there must be among them at least one member whose complexity is of a grade one lower than that of the vertex4 ,a grade which is one lower than that of a given eternal object will be called the #8proximate grade' for that object4 ,we take then those components of the vertex which belong to its proximate grade2 and as the second stage we analyse them into their components4 ,among these components there must be some belonging to the proximate grade for the objects thus analysed4 ,add to them the components of the vertex which also belong to this grade of #8second proximation' from the vertex2 and1 at the third stage analyse as before4 ,we thus find objects belonging to the grade of third proximation from the vertex2 and we add to them the components belonging to this grade1 which have been left over from the preceding stages of the analysis4 ,we proceed in this way through successive stages1 till we reach the grade of simple objects4 ,this grade forms the base of the hierarchy4 ,it is to be noted that in dealing with hierarchies we are entirely within the realm of possibility4 ,accordingly the eternal objects are devoid of real togetherness3 they remain within their #8isolation4' ,the logical instrument which ,aristotle used for the analysis of actual fact into more abstract elements was that of classification into species and genera4 ,this instrument has its overwhelmingly important application for science in its preparatory stages4 ,but its use in metaphysical description distorts the true vision of the metaphysical situation4 ,the use of the term #8universal' is intimately connected with this ,aristotelian analysis3 the term has been broadened of late2 but still it suggests that classificatory analysis4 ,for this reason ,i have avoided it4 ,in any actual occasion 1 there will be a group g of simple eternal objects which are ingredient in that group in the most concrete mode4 ,this complete ingredience in an occasion1 so as to yield the most complete fusion of individual essence with other eternal objects in the formation of the individual emergent occasion1 is evidently of its own kind and cannot be defined in terms of anything else4 ,but it has a peculiar characteristic which necessarily attaches to it4 ,this characteristic is that there is an infinite abstractive hierarchy based upon g which is such that all its members are equally involved in this complete inclusion in 4 ,the existence of such an infinite abstractive hierarchy is what is meant by the statement that it is impossible to complete the description of an actual occasion by means of concepts4 ,i will call this infinite abstractive hierarchy which is associated with #8the associated hierarchy of 4' ,it is also what is meant by the notion of the connectedness of an actual occasion4 ,this connectedness of an occasion is necessary for its synthetic unity and for its intelligibility4 ,there is a connected hierarchy of concepts applicable to the occasion1 including concepts of all degrees of complexity4 ,also in the actual occasion1 the individual essences of the eternal objects involved in these complex concepts achieve an aesthetic synthesis1 productive of the occasion as an experience for its own sake4 ,this associated hierarchy is the shape1 or pattern1 or form1 of the occasion in so far as the occasion is constituted of what enters into its full realisation4 ,some confusion of thought has been caused by the fact that abstraction from possibility runs in the opposite direction to an abstraction from actuality1 so far as degree of abstractness is concerned4 ,for evidently in describing an actual occasion 1 we are nearer to the total concrete fact when we describe by predicating of it some member of its associated hierarchy1 which is of a high grade of complexity4 ,we have then said more about 4 ,thus1 with a high grade of complexity we gain in approach to the full concreteness of 1 and with a low grade we lose in this approach4 ,accordingly the simple eternal objects represent the extreme of abstraction from an actual occasion2 whereas simple eternal objects represent the minimum of abstraction from the realm of possibility4 ,it will1 ,i think1 be found that1 when a high degree of abstraction is spoken of1 abstraction from the realm of possibility is what is usually meant--in other words1 an elaborate logical construction4 ,so far ,i have merely been considering an actual occasion on the side of its full concreteness4 ,it is this side of the occasion in virtue of which it is an event in nature4 ,but a natural event1 in this sense of the term1 is only an abstraction from a complete actual occasion4 ,a complete occasion includes that which in cognitive experience takes the form of memory1 anticipation1 imagination1 and thought4 ,these elements in an experient occasion are also modes of inclusion of complex eternal objects in the synthetic prehension1 as elements in the emergent value4 ,they differ from the concreteness of full inclusion4 ,in a sense this difference is inexplicable2 for each mode of inclusion is of its own kind1 not to be explained in terms of anything else4 ,but there is a common difference which discriminates these modes of inclusion from the full concrete ingression which has been discussed4 ,this differentia is abruptness4 ,by #8abruptness' ,i mean that what is remembered1 or anticipated1 or imagined1 or thought1 is exhausted by a finite complex concept4 ,in each case there is one finite eternal object prehended within the occasion as the vertex of a finite hierarchy4 ,this breaking off from an actual illimitability is what in any occasion marks off that which is termed mental from that which belongs to the physical event to which the mental functioning is referred4 ,in general there seems to be some loss of vividness in the apprehension of the eternal objects concerned3 for example1 ,hume speaks of #8faint copies4' ,but this faintness seems to be a very unsafe ground for differentiation4 ,often things realised in thought are more vivid than the same things in inattentive physical experience4 ,but the things apprehended as mental are always subject to the condition that we come to a stop when we attempt to explore ever higher grades of complexity in their realised relationships4 ,we always find that we have thought of just this--whatever it may be--and of no more4 ,there is a limitation which breaks off the finite concept from the higher grades of illimitable complexity4 ,thus an actual occasion is a prehension of one infinite hierarchy 7its associated hierarchy7 together with various finite hierarchies4 ,the synthesis into the occasion of the infinite hierarchy is according to its specific mode of realisation1 and that of the finite hierarchies is according to various other specific modes of realisation4 ,there is one metaphysical principle which is essential for the rational coherence of this account of the general character of an experient occasion4 ,i call this principle1 #8,the ,translucency of ,realisation4' ,by this ,i mean that any eternal object is just itself in whatever mode of realisation it is involved4 ,there can be no distortion of the individual essence without thereby producing a different eternal object4 ,in the essence of each eternal object there stands an indeterminateness which expresses its indifferent patience for any mode of ingression into any actual occasion4 ,thus in cognitive experience1 there can be the cognition of the same eternal object as in the same occasion having ingression with implication in more than one grade of realisation4 ,thus the translucency of realisation1 and the possible multiplicity of modes of ingression into the same occasion1 together form the foundation for the correspondence theory of truth4 ,in this account of an actual occasion in terms of its connection with the realm of eternal objects1 we have gone back to the train of thought in our second chapter1 where the nature of mathematics was discussed4 ,the idea1 ascribed to ,pythagoras1 has been amplified1 and put forward as the first chapter in metaphysics4 ,the next chapter is concerned with the puzzling fact that there is an actual course of events which is in itself a limited fact1 in that metaphysically speaking it might have been otherwise4 ,but other metaphysical investigations are omitted2 for example1 epistemology1 and the classification of some elements in the unfathomable wealth of the field of possibility4 ,this last topic brings metaphysics in sight of the special topics of the various sciences4 ,,chapter ,,xi ,,god ,aristotle found it necessary to complete his metaphysics by the introduction of a ,prime ,mover--,god4 ,this1 for two reasons1 is an important fact in the history of metaphysics4 ,in the first place if we are to accord to anyone the position of the greatest metaphysician1 having regard to genius of insight1 to general equipment in knowledge1 and to the stimulus of his metaphysical ancestry1 we must choose ,aristotle4 ,secondly1 in his consideration of this metaphysical question he was entirely dispassionate2 and he is the last ,european metaphysician of first rate importance for whom this claim can be made4 ,after ,aristotle1 ethical and religious interests began to influence metaphysical conclusions4 ,the ,jews dispersed1 first willingly and then forcibly1 and the ,judaic-,alexandrian school arose4 ,then ,christianity closely followed by ,mahometanism1 intervened4 ,the ,greek gods who surrounded ,aristotle were subordinate metaphysical entities1 well within nature4 ,accordingly on the subject of his ,prime ,mover1 he would have no motive1 except to follow his metaphysical train of thought whithersoever it led him4 ,it did not lead him very far towards the production of a ,god available for religious purposes4 ,it may be doubted whether any properly general metaphysics can ever1 without the illicit introduction of other considerations1 get much further than ,aristotle4 ,but his conclusion does represent a first step without which no evidence on a narrower experiential basis can be of much avail in shaping the conception4 ,for nothing1 within any limited type of experience1 can give intelligence to shape our ideas of any entity at the base of all actual things1 unless the general character of things requires that there be such an entity4 ,the phrase1 ,prime ,mover1 warns us that ,aristotle's thought was enmeshed in the details of an erroneous physics and an erroneous cosmology4 ,in ,aristotle's physics special causes were required to sustain the motions of material things4 ,these could easily be fitted into his system1 provided that the general cosmic motions could be sustained4 ,for then in relation to the general working system1 each thing could be provided with its true end4 ,hence the necessity for a ,prime ,mover who sustains the motions of the spheres on which depend the adjustment of things4 ,to-day we repudiate the ,aristotelian physics and the ,aristotelian cosmology1 so that the exact form of the above argument manifestly fails4 ,but if our general metaphysics is in any way similar to that outlined in the previous chapter1 an analogous metaphysical problem arises which can be solved only in an analogous fashion4 ,in the place of ,aristotle's ,god as ,prime ,mover1 we require ,god as the ,principle of ,concretion4 ,this position can be substantiated only by the discussion of the general implication of the course of actual occasions1--that is to say1 of the process of realisation4 ,we conceive actuality as in essential relation to an unfathomable possibility4 ,eternal objects inform actual occasions with hierarchic patterns1 included and excluded in every variety of discrimination4 ,another view of the same truth is that every actual occasion is a limitation imposed on possibility1 and that by virtue of this limitation the particular value of that shaped togetherness of things emerges4 ,in this way we express how a single occasion is to be viewed in terms of possibility1 and how possibility is to be viewed in terms of a single actual occasion4 ,but there are no single occasions1 in the sense of isolated occasions4 ,actuality is through and through togetherness--togetherness of otherwise isolated eternal objects1 and togetherness of all actual occasions4 ,it is my task in this chapter to describe the unity of actual occasions4 ,the previous chapter centered its interest in the abstract3 the present chapter deals with the concrete1 i4e41 that which has grown together4 ,consider an occasion 3--we have to enumerate how other actual occasions are in 1 in the sense that their relationships with are constitutive of the essence of 4 ,what is in itself1 is that it is a unit of realised experience2 accordingly we ask how other occasions are in the experience which is 4 ,also for the present ,i am excluding cognitive experience4 ,the complete answer to this question is1 that the relationships among actual occasions are as unfathomable in their variety of type as are those among eternal objects in the realm of abstraction4 ,but there are fundamental types of such relationships in terms of which the whole complex variety can find its description4 ,a preliminary for the understanding of these types of entry 7of one occasion into the essence of another7 is to note that they are involved in the modes of realisation of abstractive hierarchies1 discussed in the previous chapter4 ,the spatio-temporal relationships1 involved in those hierarchies as realised in 1 have all a definition in terms of and of the occasions entrant in 4 ,thus the entrant occasions lend their aspects to the hierarchies1 and thereby convert spatio-temporal modalities into categorical determinations2 and the hierarchies lend their forms to the occasions and thereby limit the entrant occasions to being entrant only under those forms4 ,thus in the same way 7as seen in the previous chapter7 that every occasion is a synthesis of all eternal objects under the limitation of gradations of actuality1 so every occasion is a synthesis of all occasions under the limitation of gradations of types of entry4 ,each occasion synthesises the totality of content under its own limitations of mode4 ,in respect to these types of internal relationship between and other occasions1 these other occasions 7as constitutive of 7 can be classified in many alternative ways4 ,these are all concerned with different definitions of past1 present1 and future4 ,it has been usual in philosophy to assume that these various definitions must necessarily be equivalent4 ,the present state of opinion in physical science conclusively shows that this assumption is without metaphysical justification1 even though any such discrimination may be found to be unnecessary for physical science4 ,this question has already been dealt with in the chapter on ,relativity4 ,but the physical theory of relativity touches only the fringe of the various theories which are metaphysically tenable4 ,it is important for my argument to insist upon the unbounded freedom within which the actual is a unique categorical determination4 ,every actual occasion exhibits itself as a process3 it is a becomingness4 ,in so disclosing itself1 it places itself as one among a multiplicity of other occasions1 without which it could not be itself4 ,it also defines itself as a particular individual achievement1 focussing in its limited way an unbounded realm of eternal objects4 ,any one occasion issues from other occasions which collectively form its past4 ,it displays for itself other occasions which collectively form its present4 ,it is in respect to its associated hierarchy1 as displayed in this immediate present1 that an occasion finds its own originality4 ,it is that display which is its own contribution to the output of actuality4 ,it may be conditioned1 and even completely determined by the past from which it issues4 ,but its display in the present under those conditions is what directly emerges from its prehensive activity4 ,the occasion also holds within itself an indetermination in the form of a future1 which has partial determination by reason of its inclusion in and also has determinate spatio-temporal relatedness to and to actual occasions of the past from and of the present for 4 ,this future is a synthesis in of eternal objects as not-being and as requiring the passage from to other individualisations 7with determinate spatio-temporal relations to 7 in which not-being becomes being4 ,there is also in what1 in the previous chapter1 ,i have termed the #8abrupt' realisation of finite eternal objects4 ,this abrupt realisation requires either a reference of the basic objects of the finite hierarchy to determinate occasions other than 7as their situations71 in past1 present1 future2 or requires a realisation of these eternal objects in determinate relationships1 but under the aspect of exemption from inclusion in the spatio-temporal scheme of relatedness between actual occasions4 ,this abrupt synthesis of eternal objects in each occasion is the inclusion in actuality of the analytical character of the realm of eternality4 ,this inclusion has those limited gradations of actuality which characterise every occasion by reason of its essential limitation4 ,it is this realised extension of eternal relatedness beyond the mutual relatedness of the actual occasions1 which prehends into each occasion the full sweep of eternal relatedness4 ,i term this abrupt realisation the #8graded envisagement' which each occasion prehends into its synthesis4 ,this graded envisagement is how the actual includes what 7in one sense7 is not-being as a positive factor in its own achievement4 ,it is the source of error1 of truth1 of art1 of ethics1 and of religion4 ,by it1 fact is confronted with alternatives4 ,this general concept1 of an event as a process whose outcome is a unit of experience1 points to the analysis of an event into 7i7 substantial activity1 7ii7 conditioned potentialities which are there for synthesis1 and 7iii7 the achieved outcome of the synthesis4 ,the unity of all actual occasions forbids the analysis of substantial activities into independent entities4 ,each individual activity is nothing but the mode in which the general activity is individualised by the imposed conditions4 ,the envisagement which enters into the synthesis is also a character which conditions the synthesising activity4 ,the general activity is not an entity in the sense in which occasions or eternal objects are entities4 ,it is a general metaphysical character which underlies all occasions1 in a particular mode for each occasion4 ,there is nothing with which to compare it3 it is ,spinoza's one infinite substance4 ,its attributes are its character of individualisation into a multiplicity of modes1 and the realm of eternal objects which are variously synthesised in these modes4 ,thus eternal possibility and modal differentiation into individual multiplicity are the attributes of the one substance4 ,in fact each general element of the metaphysical situation is an attribute of the substantial activity4 ,yet another element in the metaphysical situation is disclosed by the consideration that the general attribute of modality is limited4 ,this element must rank as an attribute of the substantial activity4 ,in its nature each mode is limited1 so as not to be other modes4 ,but1 beyond these limitations of particulars1 the general modal individualisation is limited in two ways3 ,in the first place it is an actual course of events1 which might be otherwise so far as concerns eternal possibility1 but is that course4 ,this limitation takes three forms1 7i7 the special logical relations which all events must conform to1 7ii7 the selection of relationships to which the events do conform1 and 7iii7 the particularity which infects the course even within those general relationships of logic and causation4 ,thus this first limitation is a limitation of antecedent selection4 ,so far as the general metaphysical situation is concerned1 there might have been an indiscriminate modal pluralism apart from logical or other limitation4 ,but there could not then have been these modes1 for each mode represents a synthesis of actualities which are limited to conform to a standard4 ,we here come to the second way of limitation4 ,restriction is the price of value4 ,there cannot be value without antecedent standards of value1 to discriminate the acceptance or rejection of what is before the envisaging mode of activity4 ,thus there is an antecedent limitation among values1 introducing contraries1 grades1 and oppositions4 ,according to this argument the fact that there is a process of actual occasions1 and the fact that the occasions are the emergence of values which require such limitation1 both require that the course of events should have developed amid an antecedent limitation composed of conditions1 particularisation1 and standards of value4 ,thus as a further element in the metaphysical situation1 there is required a principle of limitation4 ,some particular how is necessary1 and some particularisation in the what of matter of fact is necessary4 ,the only alternative to this admission1 is to deny the reality of actual occasions4 ,their apparent irrational limitation must be taken as a proof of illusion and we must look for reality behind the scene4 ,if we reject this alternative behind the scene1 we must provide a ground for limitation which stands among the attributes of the substantial activity4 ,this attribute provides the limitation for which no reason can be given3 for all reason flows from it4 ,god is the ultimate limitation1 and ,his existence is the ultimate irrationality4 ,for no reason can be given for just that limitation which it stands in ,his nature to impose4 ,god is not concrete1 but ,he is the ground for concrete actuality4 ,no reason can be given for the nature of ,god1 because that nature is the ground of rationality4 ,in this argument the point to notice is1 that what is metaphysically indeterminate has nevertheless to be categorically determinate4 ,we have come to the limit of rationality4 ,for there is a categorical limitation which does not spring from any metaphysical reason4 ,there is a metaphysical need for a principle of determination1 but there can be no metaphysical reason for what is determined4 ,if there were such a reason1 there would be no need for any further principle3 for metaphysics would already have provided the determination4 ,the general principle of empiricism depends upon the doctrine that there is a principle of concretion which is not discoverable by abstract reason4 ,what further can be known about ,god must be sought in the region of particular experiences1 and therefore rests on an empirical basis4 ,in respect to the interpretation of these experiences1 mankind have differed profoundly4 ,he has been named respectively1 ,jehovah1 ,allah1 ,brahma1 ,father in ,heaven1 ,order of ,heaven1 ,first ,cause1 ,supreme ,being1 ,chance4 ,each name corresponds to a system of thought derived from the experiences of those who have used it4 ,among medieval and modern philosophers1 anxious to establish the religious significance of ,god1 an unfortunate habit has prevailed of paying to ,him metaphysical compliments4 ,he has been conceived as the foundation of the metaphysical situation with its ultimate activity4 ,if this conception be adhered to1 there can be no alternative except to discern in ,him the origin of all evil as well as of all good4 ,he is then the supreme author of the play1 and to ,him must therefore be ascribed its shortcomings as well as its success4 ,if ,he be conceived as the supreme ground for limitation1 it stands in ,his very nature to divide the ,good from the ,evil1 and to establish ,reason #8within her dominions supreme4' ,,chapter ,,xii ,,religion ,,and ,,science ,the difficulty in approaching the question of the relations between ,religion and ,science is1 that its elucidation requires that we have in our minds some clear idea of what we mean by either of the terms1 #8religion' and #8science4' ,also ,i wish to speak in the most general way possible1 and to keep in the background any comparison of particular creeds1 scientific or religious4 ,we have got to understand the type of connection which exists between the two spheres1 and then to draw some definite conclusions respecting the existing situation which at present confronts the world4 ,the conflict between religion and science is what naturally occurs to our minds when we think of this subject4 ,it seems as though1 during the last half-century1 the results of science and the beliefs of religion had come into a position of frank disagreement1 from which there can be no escape1 except by abandoning either the clear teaching of science1 or the clear teaching of religion4 ,this conclusion has been urged by controversialists on either side4 ,not by all controversialists1 of course1 but by those trenchant intellects which every controversy calls out into the open4 ,the distress of sensitive minds1 and the zeal for truth1 and the sense of the importance of the issues1 must command our sincerest sympathy4 ,when we consider what religion is for mankind1 and what science is1 it is no exaggeration to say that the future course of history depends upon the decision of this generation as to the relations between them4 ,we have here the two strongest general forces 7apart from the mere impulse of the various senses7 which influence men1 and they seem to be set one against the other--the force of our religious intuitions1 and the force of our impulse to accurate observation and logical deduction4 ,a great ,english statesman once advised his countrymen to use large-scale maps1 as a preservative against alarms1 panics1 and general misunderstanding of the true relations between nations4 ,in the same way in dealing with the clash between permanent elements of human nature1 it is well to map our history on a large scale1 and to disengage ourselves from our immediate absorption in the present conflicts4 ,when we do this1 we immediately discover two great facts4 ,in the first place1 there has always been a conflict between religion and science2 and in the second place1 both religion and science have always been in a state of continual development4 ,in the early days of ,christianity1 there was a general belief among ,christians that the world was coming to an end in the lifetime of people then living4 ,we can make only indirect inferences as to how far this belief was authoritatively proclaimed2 but it is certain that it was widely held1 and that it formed an impressive part of the popular religious doctrine4 ,the belief proved itself to be mistaken1 and ,christian doctrine adjusted itself to the change4 ,again in the early ,church individual theologians very confidently deduced from the ,bible opinions concerning the nature of the physical universe4 ,in the year ,a4 ,d4 #ece1 a monk named ,cosmas#ag wrote a book which he entitled1 ,christian ,topography4 ,he was a travelled man who had visited ,india and ,ethiopia2 and finally he lived in a monastery at ,alexandria1 which was then a great centre of culture4 ,in this book1 basing himself upon the direct meaning of ,biblical texts as construed by him in a literal fashion1 he denied the existence of the antipodes1 and asserted that the world is a flat parallelogram whose length is double its breadth4 ,footnote #ag3 ,cf4 ,lecky's ,the ,rise and ,influence of ,rationalism in ,europe1 ,ch4 ,,iii4 ,in the seventeenth century the doctrine of the motion of the earth was condemned by a ,catholic tribunal4 ,a hundred years ago the extension of time demanded by geological science distressed religious people1 ,protestant and ,catholic4 ,and to-day the doctrine of evolution is an equal stumbling-block4 ,these are only a few instances illustrating a general fact4 ,but all our ideas will be in a wrong perspective if we think that this recurring perplexity was confined to contradictions between religion and science2 and that in these controversies religion was always wrong1 and that science was always right4 ,the true facts of the case are very much more complex1 and refuse to be summarised in these simple terms4 ,theology itself exhibits exactly the same character of gradual development1 arising from an aspect of conflict between its own proper ideas4 ,this fact is a commonplace to theologians1 but is often obscured in the stress of controversy4 ,i do not wish to overstate my case2 so ,i will confine myself to ,roman ,catholic writers4 ,in the seventeenth century a learned ,jesuit1 ,father ,petavius1 showed that the theologians of the first three centuries of ,christianity made use of phrases and statements which since the fifth century would be condemned as heretical4 ,also ,cardinal ,newman devoted a treatise to the discussion of the development of doctrine4 ,he wrote it before he became a great ,roman ,catholic ecclesiastic2 but throughout his life1 it was never retracted and continually reissued4 ,science is even more changeable than theology4 ,no man of science could subscribe without qualification to ,galileo's beliefs1 or to ,newton's beliefs1 or to all his own scientific beliefs of ten years ago4 ,in both regions of thought1 additions1 distinctions1 and modifications have been introduced4 ,so that now1 even when the same assertion is made to-day as was made a thousand1 or fifteen hundred years ago1 it is made subject to limitations or expansions of meaning1 which were not contemplated at the earlier epoch4 ,we are told by logicians that a proposition must be either true or false1 and that there is no middle term4 ,but in practice1 we may know that a proposition expresses an important truth1 but that it is subject to limitations and qualifications which at present remain undiscovered4 ,it is a general feature of our knowledge1 that we are insistently aware of important truths2 and yet that the only formulations of these truths which we are able to make presuppose a general standpoint of conceptions which may have to be modified4 ,i will give you two illustrations1 both from science3 ,galileo said that the earth moves and that the sun is fixed2 the ,inquisition said that the earth is fixed and the sun moves2 and ,newtonian astronomers1 adopting an absolute theory of space1 said that both the sun and the earth move4 ,but now we say that any one of these three statements is equally true1 provided that you have fixed your sense of #8rest' and #8motion' in the way required by the statement adopted4 ,at the date of ,galileo's controversy with the ,inquisition1 ,galileo's way of stating the facts was1 beyond question1 the fruitful procedure for the sake of scientific research4 ,but in itself it was not more true than the formulation of the ,inquisition4 ,but at that time the modern concepts of relative motion were in nobody's mind2 so that the statements were made in ignorance of the qualifications required for their more perfect truth4 ,yet this question of the motions of the earth and the sun expresses a real fact in the universe2 and all sides had got hold of important truths concerning it4 ,but with the knowledge of those times1 the truths appeared to be inconsistent4 ,again ,i will give you another example taken from the state of modern physical science4 ,since the time of ,newton and ,huyghens in the seventeenth century there have been two theories as to the physical nature of light4 ,newton's theory was that a beam of light consists of a stream of very minute particles1 or corpuscles1 and that we have the sensation of light when these corpuscles strike the retinas of our eyes4 ,huyghens' theory was that light consists of very minute waves of trembling in an all-pervading ether1 and that these waves are travelling along a beam of light4 ,the two theories are contradictory4 ,in the eighteenth century ,newton's theory was believed1 in the nineteenth century ,huyghens' theory was believed4 ,to-day there is one large group of phenomena which can be explained only on the wave theory1 and another large group which can be explained only on the corpuscular theory4 ,scientists have to leave it at that1 and wait for the future1 in the hope of attaining some wider vision which reconciles both4 ,we should apply these same principles to the questions in which there is a variance between science and religion4 ,we would believe nothing in either sphere of thought which does not appear to us to be certified by solid reasons based upon the critical research either of ourselves or of competent authorities4 ,but granting that we have honestly taken this precaution1 a clash between the two on points of detail where they overlap should not lead us hastily to abandon doctrines for which we have solid evidence4 ,it may be that we are more interested in one set of doctrines than in the other4 ,but1 if we have any sense of perspective and of the history of thought1 we shall wait and refrain from mutual anathemas4 ,we should wait3 but we should not wait passively1 or in despair4 ,the clash is a sign that there are wider truths and finer perspectives within which a reconciliation of a deeper religion and a more subtle science will be found4 ,in one sense1 therefore1 the conflict between science and religion is a slight matter which has been unduly emphasised4 ,a mere logical contradiction cannot in itself point to more than the necessity of some readjustments1 possibly of a very minor character on both sides4 ,remember the widely different aspects of events which are dealt with in science and in religion respectively4 ,science is concerned with the general conditions which are observed to regulate physical phenomena2 whereas religion is wholly wrapped up in the contemplation of moral and aesthetic values4 ,on the one side there is the law of gravitation1 and on the other the contemplation of the beauty of holiness4 ,what one side sees1 the other misses2 and vice versa4 ,consider1 for example1 the lives of ,john ,wesley and of ,saint ,francis of ,assisi4 ,for physical science you have in these lives merely ordinary examples of the operation of the principles of physiological chemistry1 and of the dynamics of nervous reactions3 for religion you have lives of the most profound significance in the history of the world4 ,can you be surprised that1 in the absence of a perfect and complete phrasing of the principles of science and of the principles of religion which apply to these specific cases1 the accounts of these lives from these divergent standpoints should involve discrepancies8 ,it would be a miracle if it were not so4 ,it would1 however1 be missing the point to think that we need not trouble ourselves about the conflict between science and religion4 ,in an intellectual age there can be no active interest which puts aside all hope of a vision of the harmony of truth4 ,to acquiesce in discrepancy is destructive of candour1 and of moral cleanliness4 ,it belongs to the self-respect of intellect to pursue every tangle of thought to its final unravelment4 ,if you check that impulse1 you will get no religion and no science from an awakened thoughtfulness4 ,the important question is1 ,in what spirit are we going to face the issue8 ,there we come to something absolutely vital4 ,a clash of doctrines is not a disaster--it is an opportunity4 ,i will explain my meaning by some illustrations from science4 ,the weight of an atom of nitrogen was well known4 ,also it was an established scientific doctrine that the average weight of such atoms in any considerable mass will be always the same4 ,two experimenters1 the late ,lord ,rayleigh and the late ,sir ,william ,ramsay1 found that if they obtained nitrogen by two different methods1 each equally effective for that purpose1 they always observed a persistent slight difference between the average weights of the atoms in the two cases4 ,now ,i ask you1 would it have been rational of these men to have despaired because of this conflict between chemical theory and scientific observation8 ,suppose that for some reason the chemical doctrine had been highly prized throughout some district as the foundation of its social order3--would it have been wise1 would it have been candid1 would it have been moral1 to forbid the disclosure of the fact that the experiments produced discordant results8 ,or1 on the other hand1 should ,sir ,william ,ramsay and ,lord ,rayleigh have proclaimed that chemical theory was now a detected delusion8 ,we see at once that either of these ways would have been a method of facing the issue in an entirely wrong spirit4 ,what ,rayleigh and ,ramsay did do was this3 ,they at once perceived that they had hit upon a line of investigation which would disclose some subtlety of chemical theory that had hitherto eluded observation4 ,the discrepancy was not a disaster3 it was an opportunity to increase the sweep of chemical knowledge4 ,you all know the end of the story3 finally argon was discovered1 a new chemical element which had lurked undetected1 mixed with the nitrogen4 ,but the story has a sequel which forms my second illustration4 ,this discovery drew attention to the importance of observing accurately minute differences in chemical substances as obtained by different methods4 ,further researches of the most careful accuracy were undertaken4 ,finally another physicist1 ,f4 ,w4 ,aston1 working in the ,cavendish ,laboratory at ,cambridge in ,england1 discovered that even the same element might assume two or more distinct forms1 termed isotopes1 and that the law of the constancy of average atomic weight holds for each of these forms1 but as between the different isotopes differs slightly4 ,the research has effected a great stride in the power of chemical theory1 far transcending in importance the discovery of argon from which it originated4 ,the moral of these stories lies on the surface1 and ,i will leave to you their application to the case of religion and science4 ,in formal logic1 a contradiction is the signal of a defeat3 but in the evolution of real knowledge it marks the first step in progress towards a victory4 ,this is one great reason for the utmost toleration of variety of opinion4 ,once and forever1 this duty of toleration has been summed up in the words1 #8,let both grow together until the harvest4' ,the failure of ,christians to act up to this precept1 of the highest authority1 is one of the curiosities of religious history4 ,but we have not yet exhausted the discussion of the moral temper required for the pursuit of truth4 ,there are short cuts leading merely to an illusory success4 ,it is easy enough to find a theory1 logically harmonious and with important applications in the region of fact1 provided that you are content to disregard half your evidence4 ,every age produces people with clear logical intellects1 and with the most praiseworthy grasp of the importance of some sphere of human experience1 who have elaborated1 or inherited1 a scheme of thought which exactly fits those experiences which claim their interest4 ,such people are apt resolutely to ignore1 or to explain away1 all evidence which confuses their scheme with contradictory instances4 ,what they cannot fit in is for them nonsense4 ,an unflinching determination to take the whole evidence into account is the only method of preservation against the fluctuating extremes of fashionable opinion4 ,this advice seems so easy1 and is in fact so difficult to follow4 ,one reason for this difficulty is that we cannot think first and act afterwards4 ,from the moment of birth we are immersed in action1 and can only fitfully guide it by taking thought4 ,we have1 therefore1 in various spheres of experience to adopt those ideas which seem to work within those spheres4 ,it is absolutely necessary to trust to ideas which are generally adequate1 even though we know that there are subtleties and distinctions beyond our ken4 ,also apart from the necessities of action1 we cannot even keep before our minds the whole evidence except under the guise of doctrines which are incompletely harmonised4 ,we cannot think in terms of an indefinite multiplicity of detail2 our evidence can acquire its proper importance only if it comes before us marshalled by general ideas4 ,these ideas we inherit--they form the tradition of our civilisation4 ,such traditional ideas are never static4 ,they are either fading into meaningless formulae1 or are gaining power by the new lights thrown by a more delicate apprehension4 ,they are transformed by the urge of critical reason1 by the vivid evidence of emotional experience1 and by the cold certainties of scientific perception4 ,one fact is certain1 you cannot keep them still4 ,no generation can merely reproduce its ancestors4 ,you may preserve the life in a flux of form1 or preserve the form amid an ebb of life4 ,but you cannot permanently enclose the same life in the same mould4 ,the present state of religion among the ,european races illustrates the statements which ,i have been making4 ,the phenomena are mixed4 ,there have been reactions and revivals4 ,but on the whole1 during many generations1 there has been a gradual decay of religious influence in ,european civilisation4 ,each revival touches a lower peak than its predecessor1 and each period of slackness a lower depth4 ,the average curve marks a steady fall in religious tone4 ,in some countries the interest in religion is higher than in others4 ,but in those countries where the interest is relatively high1 it still falls as the generations pass4 ,religion is tending to degenerate into a decent formula wherewith to embellish a comfortable life4 ,a great historical movement on this scale results from the convergence of many causes4 ,i wish to suggest two of them which lie within the scope of this chapter for consideration4 ,in the first place for over two centuries religion has been on the defensive1 and on a weak defensive4 ,the period has been one of unprecedented intellectual progress4 ,in this way a series of novel situations have been produced for thought4 ,each such occasion has found the religious thinkers unprepared4 ,something1 which has been proclaimed to be vital1 has finally1 after struggle1 distress1 and anathema1 been modified and otherwise interpreted4 ,the next generation of religious apologists then congratulates the religious world on the deeper insight which has been gained4 ,the result of the continued repetition of this undignified retreat1 during many generations1 has at last almost entirely destroyed the intellectual authority of religious thinkers4 ,consider this contrast3 when ,darwin or ,einstein proclaim theories which modify our ideas1 it is a triumph for science4 ,we do not go about saying that there is another defeat for science1 because its old ideas have been abandoned4 ,we know that another step of scientific insight has been gained4 ,religion will not regain its old power until it can face change in the same spirit as does science4 ,its principles may be eternal1 but the expression of those principles requires continual development4 ,this evolution of religion is in the main a disengagement of its own proper ideas from the adventitious notions which have crept into it by reason of the expression of its own ideas in terms of the imaginative picture of the world entertained in previous ages4 ,such a release of religion from the bonds of imperfect science is all to the good4 ,it stresses its own genuine message4 ,the great point to be kept in mind is that normally an advance in science will show that statements of various religious beliefs require some sort of modification4 ,it may be that they have to be expanded or explained1 or indeed entirely restated4 ,if the religion is a sound expression of truth1 this modification will only exhibit more adequately the exact point which is of importance4 ,this process is a gain4 ,in so far1 therefore1 as any religion has any contact with physical facts1 it is to be expected that the point of view of those facts must be continually modified as scientific knowledge advances4 ,in this way1 the exact relevance of these facts for religious thought will grow more and more clear4 ,the progress of science must result in the unceasing modification of religious thought1 to the great advantage of religion4 ,the religious controversies of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries put theologians into a most unfortunate state of mind4 ,they were always attacking and defending4 ,they pictured themselves as the garrison of a fort surrounded by hostile forces4 ,all such pictures express half-truths4 ,that is why they are so popular4 ,but they are dangerous4 ,this particular picture fostered a pugnacious party spirit which really expresses an ultimate lack of faith4 ,they dared not modify1 because they shirked the task of disengaging their spiritual message from the associations of a particular imagery4 ,let me explain myself by an example4 ,in the early medieval times1 ,heaven was in the sky1 and ,hell was underground2 volcanoes were the jaws of ,hell4 ,i do not assert that these beliefs entered into the official formulations3 but they did enter into the popular understanding of the general doctrines of ,heaven and ,hell4 ,these notions were what everyone thought to be implied by the doctrine of the future state4 ,they entered into the explanations of the most influential exponents of ,christian belief4 ,for example1 they occur in the ,dialogues of ,pope ,gregory1#ah the ,great1 a man whose high official position is surpassed only by the magnitude of his services to humanity4 ,i am not saying what we ought to believe about the future state4 ,but whatever be the right doctrine1 in this instance the clash between religion and science1 which has relegated the earth to the position of a second-rate planet attached to a second-rate sun1 has been greatly to the benefit of the spirituality of religion by dispersing these medieval fancies4 ,footnote #ah3 ,cf4 ,gregorovius' ,history of ,rome in the ,middle ,ages1 ,book ,,iii1 ,ch4 ,,iii1 ,vol4 ,,ii1 ,english ,trans4 ,another way of looking at this question of the evolution of religious thought is to note that any verbal form of statement which has been before the world for some time discloses ambiguities2 and that often such ambiguities strike at the very heart of the meaning4 ,the effective sense in which a doctrine has been held in the past cannot be determined by the mere logical analysis of verbal statements1 made in ignorance of the logical trap4 ,you have to take into account the whole reaction of human nature to the scheme of thought4 ,this reaction is of a mixed character1 including elements of emotion derived from our lower natures4 ,it is here that the impersonal criticism of science and of philosophy comes to the aid of religious evolution4 ,example after example can be given of this motive force in development4 ,for example1 the logical difficulties inherent in the doctrine of the moral cleansing of human nature by the power of religion rent ,christianity in the days of ,pelagius and ,augustine--that is to say1 at the beginning of the fifth century4 ,echoes of that controversy still linger in theology4 ,so far1 my point has been this3 that religion is the expression of one type of fundamental experiences of mankind3 that religious thought develops into an increasing accuracy of expression1 disengaged from adventitious imagery3 that the interaction between religion and science is one great factor in promoting this development4 ,i now come to my second reason for the modern fading of interest in religion4 ,this involves the ultimate question which ,i stated in my opening sentences4 ,we have to know what we mean by religion4 ,the churches1 in their presentation of their answers to this query1 have put forward aspects of religion which are expressed in terms either suited to the emotional reactions of bygone times or directed to excite modern emotional interests of a nonreligious character4 ,what ,i mean under the first heading is that religious appeal is directed partly to excite that instinctive fear of the wrath of a tyrant which was inbred in the unhappy populations of the arbitrary empires of the ancient world1 and in particular to excite that fear of an all-powerful arbitrary tyrant behind the unknown forces of nature4 ,this appeal to the ready instinct of brute fear is losing its force4 ,it lacks any directness of response1 because modern science and modern conditions of life have taught us to meet occasions of apprehension by a critical analysis of their causes and conditions4 ,religion is the reaction of human nature to its search for ,god4 ,the presentation of ,god under the aspect of power awakens every modern instinct of critical reaction4 ,this is fatal2 for religion collapses unless its main positions command immediacy of assent4 ,in this respect the old phraseology is at variance with the psychology of modern civilisations4 ,this change in psychology is largely due to science1 and is one of the chief ways in which the advance of science has weakened the hold of the old religious forms of expression4 ,the nonreligious motive which has entered into modern religious thought is the desire for a comfortable organisation of modern society4 ,religion has been presented as valuable for the ordering of life4 ,its claims have been rested upon its function as a sanction to right conduct4 ,also the purpose of right conduct quickly degenerates into the formation of pleasing social relations4 ,we have here a subtle degradation of religious ideas1 following upon their gradual purification under the influence of keener ethical intuitions4 ,conduct is a by-product of religion--an inevitable by-product1 but not the main point4 ,every great religious teacher has revolted against the presentation of religion as a mere sanction of rules of conduct4 ,saint ,paul denounced the ,law1 and ,puritan divines spoke of the filthy rags of righteousness4 ,the insistence upon rules of conduct marks the ebb of religious fervour4 ,above and beyond all things1 the religious life is not a research after comfort4 ,i must now state1 in all diffidence1 what ,i conceive to be the essential character of the religious spirit4 ,religion is the vision of something which stands beyond1 behind1 and within1 the passing flux of immediate things2 something which is real1 and yet waiting to be realised2 something which is a remote possibility1 and yet the greatest of present facts2 something that gives meaning to all that passes1 and yet eludes apprehension2 something whose possession is the final good1 and yet is beyond all reach2 something which is the ultimate ideal1 and the hopeless quest4 ,the immediate reaction of human nature to the religious vision is worship4 ,religion has emerged into human experience mixed with the crudest fancies of barbaric imagination4 ,gradually1 slowly1 steadily the vision recurs in history under nobler form and with clearer expression4 ,it is the one element in human experience which persistently shows an upward trend4 ,it fades and then recurs4 ,but when it renews its force1 it recurs with an added richness and purity of content4 ,the fact of the religious vision1 and its history of persistent expansion1 is our one ground for optimism4 ,apart from it1 human life is a flash of occasional enjoyments lighting up a mass of pain and misery1 a bagatelle of transient experience4 ,the vision claims nothing but worship2 and worship is a surrender to the claim for assimilation1 urged with the motive force of mutual love4 ,the vision never overrules4 ,it is always there1 and it has the power of love presenting the one purpose whose fulfilment is eternal harmony4 ,such order as we find in nature is never force--it presents itself as the one harmonious adjustment of complex detail4 ,evil is the brute motive force of fragmentary purpose1 disregarding the eternal vision4 ,evil is overruling1 retarding1 hurting4 ,the power of ,god is the worship ,he inspires4 ,that religion is strong which in its ritual and its modes of thought evokes an apprehension of the commanding vision4 ,the worship of ,god is not a rule of safety--it is an adventure of the spirit1 a flight after the unattainable4 ,the death of religion comes with the repression of the high hope of adventure4 ,,chapter ,,xiii ,,requisites ,,for ,,social ,,progress ,it has been the purpose of these lectures to analyse the reactions of science in forming that background of instinctive ideas which control the activities of successive generations4 ,such a background takes the form of a certain vague philosophy as to the last word about things1 when all is said4 ,the three centuries1 which form the epoch of modern science1 have revolved round the ideas of ,god1 mind1 matter1 and also of space and time in their characters of expressing simple location for matter4 ,philosophy has on the whole emphasised mind1 and has thus been out of touch with science during the two latter centuries4 ,but it is creeping back into its old importance owing to the rise of psychology and its alliance with physiology4 ,also1 this rehabilitation of philosophy has been facilitated by the recent breakdown of the seventeenth century settlement of the principles of physical science4 ,but1 until that collapse1 science seated itself securely upon the concepts of matter1 space1 time1 and latterly1 of energy4 ,also there were arbitrary laws of nature determining locomotion4 ,they were empirically observed1 but for some obscure reason were known to be universal4 ,anyone who in practice or theory disregarded them was denounced with unsparing vigour4 ,this position on the part of scientists was pure bluff1 if one may credit them with believing their own statements4 ,for their current philosophy completely failed to justify the assumption that the immediate knowledge inherent in any present occasion throws any light either on its past1 or its future4 ,i have also sketched an alternative philosophy of science in which organism takes the place of matter4 ,for this purpose1 the mind involved in the materialist theory dissolves into a function of organism4 ,the psychological field then exhibits what an event is in itself4 ,our bodily event is an unusually complex type of organism and consequently includes cognition4 ,further1 space and time1 in their most concrete signification1 become the locus of events4 ,an organism is the realisation of a definite shape of value4 ,the emergence of some actual value depends on limitation which excludes neutralising cross-lights4 ,thus an event is a matter of fact which by reason of its limitation is a value for itself2 but by reason of its very nature it also requires the whole universe in order to be itself4 ,importance depends on endurance4 ,endurance is the retention through time of an achievement of value4 ,what endures is identity of pattern1 self-inherited4 ,endurance requires the favourable environment4 ,the whole of science revolves round this question of enduring organisms4 ,the general influence of science at the present moment can be analysed under the headings3 ,general ,conceptions ,respecting the ,universe1 ,technological ,applications1 ,professionalism in ,knowledge1 ,influence of ,biological ,doctrines on the ,motives of ,conduct4 ,i have endeavoured in the preceding lectures to give a glimpse of these points4 ,it lies within the scope of this concluding lecture to consider the reaction of science upon some problems confronting civilised societies4 ,the general conceptions introduced by science into modern thought cannot be separated from the philosophical situation as expressed by ,descartes4 ,i mean the assumption of bodies and minds as independent individual substances1 each existing in its own right apart from any necessary reference to each other4 ,such a conception was very concordant with the individualism which had issued from the moral discipline of the ,middle ,ages4 ,but1 though the easy reception of the idea is thus explained1 the derivation in itself rests upon a confusion1 very natural but none the less unfortunate4 ,the moral discipline had emphasized the intrinsic value of the individual entity4 ,this emphasis had put the notions of the individual and of its experiences into the foreground of thought4 ,at this point the confusion commences4 ,the emergent individual value of each entity is transformed into the independent substantial existence of each entity1 which is a very different notion4 ,i do not mean to say that ,descartes made this logical1 or rather illogical1 transition1 in the form of explicit reasoning4 ,far from it4 ,what he did1 was first to concentrate upon his own conscious experiences1 as being facts within the independent world of his own mentality4 ,he was led to speculate in this way by the current emphasis upon the individual value of his total self4 ,he implicitly transformed this emergent individual value1 inherent in the very fact of his own reality1 into a private world of passions1 or modes1 of independent substance4 ,also the independence ascribed to bodily substances carried them away from the realm of values altogether4 ,they degenerated into a mechanism entirely valueless1 except as suggestive of an external ingenuity4 ,the heavens had lost the glory of ,god4 ,this state of mind is illustrated in the recoil of ,protestantism from aesthetic effects dependent upon a material medium4 ,it was taken to lead to an ascription of value to what is in itself valueless4 ,this recoil was already in full strength antecedently to ,descartes4 ,accordingly1 the ,cartesian scientific doctrine of bits of matter1 bare of intrinsic value1 was merely a formulation1 in explicit terms1 of a doctrine which was current before its entrance into scientific thought or ,cartesian philosophy4 ,probably this doctrine was latent in the scholastic philosophy1 but it did not lead to its consequences till it met with the mentality of northern ,europe in the sixteenth century4 ,but science1 as equipped by ,descartes1 gave stability and intellectual status to a point of view which has had very mixed effects upon the moral presuppositions of modern communities4 ,its good effects arose from its efficiency as a method for scientific researches within those limited regions which were then best suited for exploration4 ,the result was a general clearing of the ,european mind away from the stains left upon it by the hysteria of remote barbaric ages4 ,this was all to the good1 and was most completely exemplified in the eighteenth century4 ,but in the nineteenth century1 when society was undergoing transformation into the manufacturing system1 the bad effects of these doctrines have been very fatal4 ,the doctrine of minds1 as independent substances1 leads directly not merely to private worlds of experience1 but also to private worlds of morals4 ,the moral intuitions can be held to apply only to the strictly private world of psychological experience4 ,accordingly1 self-respect1 and the making the most of your own individual opportunities1 together constituted the efficient morality of the leaders among the industrialists of that period4 ,the western world is now suffering from the limited moral outlook of the three previous generations4 ,also the assumption of the bare valuelessness of mere matter led to a lack of reverence in the treatment of natural or artistic beauty4 ,just when the urbanisation of the western world was entering upon its state of rapid development1 and when the most delicate1 anxious consideration of the aesthetic qualities of the new material environment was requisite1 the doctrine of the irrelevance of such ideas was at its height4 ,in the most advanced industrial countries1 art was treated as a frivolity4 ,a striking example of this state of mind in the middle of the nineteenth century is to be seen in ,london where the marvellous beauty of the estuary of the ,thames1 as it curves through the city1 is wantonly defaced by the ,charing ,cross railway bridge1 constructed apart from any reference to aesthetic values4 ,the two evils are3 one1 the ignoration of the true relation of each organism to its environment2 and the other1 the habit of ignoring the intrinsic worth of the environment which must be allowed its weight in any consideration of final ends4 ,another great fact confronting the modern world is the discovery of the method of training professionals1 who specialise in particular regions of thought and thereby progressively add to the sum of knowledge within their respective limitations of subject4 ,in consequence of the success of this professionalising of knowledge1 there are two points to be kept in mind1 which differentiate our present age from the past4 ,in the first place1 the rate of progress is such that an individual human being1 of ordinary length of life1 will be called upon to face novel situations which find no parallel in his past4 ,the fixed person for the fixed duties1 who in older societies was such a godsend1 in the future will be a public danger4 ,in the second place1 the modern professionalism in knowledge works in the opposite direction so far as the intellectual sphere is concerned4 ,the modern chemist is likely to be weak in zoology1 weaker still in his general knowledge of the ,elizabethan drama1 and completely ignorant of the principles of rhythm in ,english versification4 ,it is probably safe to ignore his knowledge of ancient history4 ,of course ,i am speaking of general tendencies2 for chemists are no worse than engineers1 or mathematicians1 or classical scholars4 ,effective knowledge is professionalised knowledge1 supported by a restricted acquaintance with useful subjects subservient to it4 ,this situation has its dangers4 ,it produces minds in a groove4 ,each profession makes progress1 but it is progress in its own groove4 ,now to be mentally in a groove is to live in contemplating a given set of abstractions4 ,the groove prevents straying across country1 and the abstraction abstracts from something to which no further attention is paid4 ,but there is no groove of abstractions which is adequate for the comprehension of human life4 ,thus in the modern world1 the celibacy of the medieval learned class has been replaced by a celibacy of the intellect which is divorced from the concrete contemplation of the complete facts4 ,of course1 no one is merely a mathematician1 or merely a lawyer4 ,people have lives outside their professions or their businesses4 ,but the point is the restraint of serious thought within a groove4 ,the remainder of life is treated superficially1 with the imperfect categories of thought derived from one profession4 ,the dangers arising from this aspect of professionalism are great1 particularly in our democratic societies4 ,the directive force of reason is weakened4 ,the leading intellects lack balance4 ,they see this set of circumstances1 or that set2 but not both sets together4 ,the task of cordination is left to those who lack either the force or the character to succeed in some definite career4 ,in short1 the specialised functions of the community are performed better and more progressively1 but the generalised direction lacks vision4 ,the progressiveness in detail only adds to the danger produced by the feebleness of cordination4 ,this criticism of modern life applies throughout1 in whatever sense you construe the meaning of a community4 ,it holds if you apply it to a nation1 a city1 a district1 an institution1 a family1 or even to an individual4 ,there is a development of particular abstractions1 and a contraction of concrete appreciation4 ,the whole is lost in one of its aspects4 ,it is not necessary for my point that ,i should maintain that our directive wisdom1 either as individuals or as communities1 is less now than in the past4 ,perhaps it has slightly improved4 ,but the novel pace of progress requires a greater force of direction if disasters are to be avoided4 ,the point is that the discoveries of the nineteenth century were in the direction of professionalism1 so that we are left with no expansion of wisdom and with greater need of it4 ,wisdom is the fruit of a balanced development4 ,it is this balanced growth of individuality which it should be the aim of education to secure4 ,the most useful discoveries for the immediate future would concern the furtherance of this aim without detriment to the necessary intellectual professionalism4 ,my own criticism of our traditional educational methods is that they are far too much occupied with intellectual analysis1 and with the acquirement of formularised information4 ,what ,i mean is1 that we neglect to strengthen habits of concrete appreciation of the individual facts in their full interplay of emergent values1 and that we merely emphasise abstract formulations which ignore this aspect of the interplay of diverse values4 ,in every country the problem of the balance of the general and specialist education is under consideration4 ,i cannot speak with first-hand knowledge of any country but my own4 ,i know that there1 among practical educationalists1 there is considerable dissatisfaction with the existing practice4 ,also1 the adaptation of the whole system to the needs of a democratic community is very far from being solved4 ,i do not think that the secret of the solution lies in terms of the antithesis between thoroughness in special knowledge and general knowledge of a slighter character4 ,the make-weight which balances the thoroughness of the specialist intellectual training should be of a radically different kind from purely intellectual analytical knowledge4 ,at present our education combines a thorough study of a few abstractions1 with a slighter study of a larger number of abstractions4 ,we are too exclusively bookish in our scholastic routine4 ,the general training should aim at eliciting our concrete apprehensions1 and should satisfy the itch of youth to be doing something4 ,there should be some analysis even here1 but only just enough to illustrate the ways of thinking in diverse spheres4 ,in the ,garden of ,eden ,adam saw the animals before he named them3 in the traditional system1 children named the animals before they saw them4 ,there is no easy single solution of the practical difficulties of education4 ,we can1 however1 guide ourselves by a certain simplicity in its general theory4 ,the student should concentrate within a limited field4 ,such concentration should include all practical and intellectual acquirements requisite for that concentration4 ,this is the ordinary procedure2 and1 in respect to it1 ,i should be inclined even to increase the facilities for concentration rather than to diminish them4 ,with the concentration there are associated certain subsidiary studies1 such as languages for science4 ,such a scheme of professional training should be directed to a clear end congenial to the student4 ,it is not necessary to elaborate the qualifications of these statements4 ,such a training must1 of course1 have the width requisite for its end4 ,but its design should not be complicated by the consideration of other ends4 ,this professional training can only touch one side of education4 ,its centre of gravity lies in the intellect1 and its chief tool is the printed book4 ,the centre of gravity of the other side of training should lie in intuition without an analytical divorce from the total environment4 ,its object is immediate apprehension with the minimum of eviscerating analysis4 ,the type of generality1 which above all is wanted1 is the appreciation of variety of value4 ,i mean an aesthetic growth4 ,there is something between the gross specialised values of the mere practical man1 and the thin specialised values of the mere scholar4 ,both types have missed something2 and if you add together the two sets of values1 you do not obtain the missing elements4 ,what is wanted is an appreciation of the infinite variety of vivid values achieved by an organism in its proper environment4 ,when you understand all about the sun and all about the atmosphere and all about the rotation of the earth1 you may still miss the radiance of the sunset4 ,there is no substitute for the direct perception of the concrete achievement of a thing in its actuality4 ,we want concrete fact with a high light thrown on what is relevant to its preciousness4 ,what ,i mean is art and aesthetic education4 ,it is1 however1 art in such a general sense of the term that ,i hardly like to call it by that name4 ,art is a special example4 ,what we want is to draw out habits of aesthetic apprehension4 ,according to the metaphysical doctrine which ,i have been developing1 to do so is to increase the depth of individuality4 ,the analysis of reality indicates the two factors1 activity emerging into individualised aesthetic value4 ,also the emergent value is the measure of the individualisation of the activity4 ,we must foster the creative initiative towards the maintenance of objective values4 ,you will not obtain the apprehension without the initiative1 or the initiative without the apprehension4 ,as soon as you get towards the concrete1 you cannot exclude action4 ,sensitiveness without impulse spells decadence1 and impulse without sensitiveness spells brutality4 ,i am using the word 8sensitiveness0 in its most general signification1 so as to include apprehension of what lies beyond oneself2 that is to say1 sensitiveness to all the facts of the case4 ,thus 8art0 in the general sense which ,i require is any selection by which the concrete facts are so arranged as to elicit attention to particular values which are realisable by them4 ,for example1 the mere disposing of the human body and the eyesight so as to get a good view of a sunset is a simple form of artistic selection4 ,the habit of art is the habit of enjoying vivid values4 ,but1 in this sense1 art concerns more than sunsets4 ,a factory1 with its machinery1 its community of operatives1 its social service to the general population1 its dependence upon organising and designing genius1 its potentialities as a source of wealth to the holders of its stock is an organism exhibiting a variety of vivid values4 ,what we want to train is the habit of apprehending such an organism in its completeness4 ,it is very arguable that the science of political economy1 as studied in its first period after the death of ,adam ,smith 7#agij71 did more harm than good4 ,it destroyed many economic fallacies1 and taught how to think about the economic revolution then in progress4 ,but it riveted on men a certain set of abstractions which were disastrous in their influence on modern mentality4 ,it de-humanised industry4 ,this is only one example of a general danger inherent in modern science4 ,its methodological procedure is exclusive and intolerant1 and rightly so4 ,it fixes attention on a definite group of abstractions1 neglects everything else1 and elicits every scrap of information and theory which is relevant to what it has retained4 ,this method is triumphant1 provided that the abstractions are judicious4 ,but1 however triumphant1 the triumph is within limits4 ,the neglect of these limits leads to disastrous oversights4 ,the anti-rationalism of science is partly justified1 as a preservation of its useful methodology2 it is partly mere irrational prejudice4 ,modern professionalism is the training of minds to conform to the methodology4 ,the historical revolt of the seventeenth century1 and the earlier reaction towards naturalism1 were examples of transcending the abstractions which fascinated educated society in the ,middle ,ages4 ,these early ages had an ideal of rationalism1 but they failed in its pursuit4 ,for they neglected to note that the methodology of reasoning requires the limitations involved in the abstract4 ,accordingly1 the true rationalism must always transcend itself by recurrence to the concrete in search of inspiration4 ,a self-satisfied rationalism is in effect a form of anti-rationalism4 ,it means an arbitrary halt at a particular set of abstractions4 ,this was the case with science4 ,there are two principles inherent in the very nature of things1 recurring in some particular embodiments whatever field we explore--the spirit of change1 and the spirit of conservation4 ,there can be nothing real without both4 ,mere change without conservation is a passage from nothing to nothing4 ,its final integration yields mere transient non-entity4 ,mere conservation without change cannot conserve4 ,for after all1 there is a flux of circumstance1 and the freshness of being evaporates under mere repetition4 ,the character of existent reality is composed of organisms enduring through the flux of things4 ,the low type of organisms have achieved a self-identity dominating their whole physical life4 ,electrons1 molecules1 crystals1 belong to this type4 ,they exhibit a massive and complete sameness4 ,in the higher types1 where life appears1 there is greater complexity4 ,thus1 though there is a complex1 enduring pattern1 it has retreated into deeper recesses of the total fact4 ,in a sense1 the self-identity of a human being is more abstract than that of a crystal4 ,it is the life of the spirit4 ,it relates rather to the individualisation of the creative activity2 so that the changing circumstances received from the environment1 are differentiated from the living personality1 and are thought of as forming its perceived field4 ,in truth1 the field of perception and the perceiving mind are abstractions which1 in the concrete1 combine into the successive bodily events4 ,the psychological field1 as restricted to sense-objects and passing emotions1 is the minor permanence1 barely rescued from the nonentity of mere change2 and the mind is the major permanence1 permeating that complete field1 whose endurance is the living soul4 ,but the soul would wither without fertilisation from its transient experiences4 ,the secret of the higher organisms lies in their two grades of permanences4 ,by this means the freshness of the environment is absorbed into the permanence of the soul4 ,the changing environment is no longer1 by reason of its variety1 an enemy to the endurance of the organism4 ,the pattern of the higher organism has retreated into the recesses of the individualised activity4 ,it has become a uniform way of dealing with circumstances2 and this way is only strengthened by having a proper variety of circumstances to deal with4 ,this fertilisation of the soul is the reason for the necessity of art4 ,a static value1 however serious and important1 becomes unendurable by its appalling monotony of endurance4 ,the soul cries aloud for release into change4 ,it suffers the agonies of claustrophobia4 ,the transitions of humour1 wit1 irreverence1 play1 sleep1 and--above all--of art are necessary for it4 ,great art is the arrangement of the environment so as to provide for the soul vivid1 but transient1 values4 ,human beings require something which absorbs them for a time1 something out of the routine which they can stare at4 ,but you cannot subdivide life1 except in the abstract analysis of thought4 ,accordingly1 the great art is more than a transient refreshment4 ,it is something which adds to the permanent richness of the soul's self-attainment4 ,it justifies itself both by its immediate enjoyment1 and also by its discipline of the inmost being4 ,its discipline is not distinct from enjoyment1 but by reason of it4 ,it transforms the soul into the permanent realisation of values extending beyond its former self4 ,this element of transition in art is shown by the restlessness exhibited in its history4 ,an epoch gets saturated by the masterpieces of any one style4 ,something new must be discovered4 ,the human being wanders on4 ,yet there is a balance in things4 ,mere change before the attainment of adequacy of achievement1 either in quality or output1 is destructive of greatness4 ,but the importance of a living art1 which moves on and yet leaves its permanent mark1 can hardly be exaggerated4 ,in regard to the aesthetic needs of civilised society the reactions of science have so far been unfortunate4 ,its materialistic basis has directed attention to things as opposed to values4 ,the antithesis is a false one1 if taken in a concrete sense4 ,but it is valid at the abstract level of ordinary thought4 ,this misplaced emphasis coalesced with the abstractions of political economy1 which are in fact the abstractions in terms of which commercial affairs are carried on4 ,thus all thought concerned with social organisation expressed itself in terms of material things and of capital4 ,ultimate values were excluded4 ,they were politely bowed to1 and then handed over to the clergy to be kept for ,sundays4 ,a creed of competitive business morality was evolved1 in some respects curiously high2 but entirely devoid of consideration for the value of human life4 ,the workmen were conceived as mere hands1 drawn from the pool of labour4 ,to ,god's question1 men gave the answer of ,cain--8,am ,i my brother's keeper802 and they incurred ,cain's guilt4 ,this was the atmosphere in which the industrial revolution was accomplished in ,england1 and to a large extent elsewhere4 ,the internal history of ,england during the last half century has been an endeavour slowly and painfully to undo the evils wrought in the first stage of the new epoch4 ,it may be that civilisation will never recover from the bad climate which enveloped the introduction of machinery4 ,this climate pervaded the whole commercial system of the progressive northern ,european races4 ,it was partly the result of the aesthetic errors of ,protestantism and partly the result of scientific materialism1 and partly the result of the natural greed of mankind1 and partly the result of the abstractions of political economy4 ,an illustration of my point is to be found in ,macaulay's ,essay criticising ,southey's ,colloquies on ,society4 ,it was written in #ahcj4 ,now ,macaulay was a very favourable example of men living at that date1 or at any date4 ,he had genius2 he was kind-hearted1 honourable1 and a reformer4 ,this is the extract3--8,we are told1 that our age has invented atrocities beyond the imagination of our fathers2 that society has been brought into a state compared with which extermination would be a blessing2 and all because the dwellings of cotton-spinners are naked and rectangular4 ,mr4 ,southey has found out a way he tells us1 in which the effects of manufactures and agriculture may be compared4 ,and what is this way8 ,to stand on a hill1 to look at a cottage and a factory1 and to see which is the prettier40 ,southey seems to have said many silly things in his book2 but1 so far as this extract is concerned1 he could make a good case for himself if he returned to earth after the lapse of nearly a century4 ,the evils of the early industrial system are now a commonplace of knowledge4 ,the point which ,i am insisting on is the stone-blind eye with which even the best men of that time regarded the importance of aesthetics in a nation's life4 ,i do not believe that we have as yet nearly achieved the right estimate4 ,a contributory cause1 of substantial efficacy to produce this disastrous error1 was the scientific creed that matter in motion is the one concrete reality in nature2 so that aesthetic values form an adventitious1 irrelevant addition4 ,there is another side to this picture of the possibilities of decadence4 ,at the present moment a discussion is raging as to the future of civilisation in the novel circumstances of rapid scientific and technological advance4 ,the evils of the future have been diagnosed in various ways1 the loss of religious faith1 the malignant use of material power1 the degradation attending a differential birth rate favouring the lower types of humanity1 the suppression of aesthetic creativeness4 ,without doubt1 these are all evils1 dangerous and threatening4 ,but they are not new4 ,from the dawn of history1 mankind has always been losing its religious faith1 has always suffered from the malignant use of material power1 has always suffered from the infertility of its best intellectual types1 has always witnessed the periodical decadence of art4 ,in the reign of the ,egyptian king1 ,tutankhamen1 there was raging a desperate religious struggle between ,modernists and ,fundamentalists2 the cave pictures exhibit a phase of delicate aesthetic achievement as superseded by a period of comparative vulgarity2 the religious leaders1 the great thinkers1 the great poets and authors1 the whole clerical caste in the ,middle ,ages1 have been notably infertile2 finally1 if we attend to what actually has happened in the past1 and disregard romantic visions of democracies1 aristocracies1 kings1 generals1 armies1 and merchants1 material power has generally been wielded with blindness1 obstinacy and selfishness1 often with brutal malignancy4 ,and yet1 mankind has progressed4 ,even if you take a tiny oasis of peculiar excellence1 the type of modern man who would have most chance of happiness in ancient ,greece at its best period is probably 7as now7 an average professional heavy-weight boxer1 and not an average ,greek scholar from ,oxford or ,germany4 ,indeed1 the main use of the ,oxford scholar would have been his capability of writing an ode in glorification of the boxer4 ,nothing does more harm in unnerving men for their duties in the present1 than the attention devoted to the points of excellence in the past as compared with the average failure of the present day4 ,but1 after all1 there have been real periods of decadence2 and at the present time1 as at other epochs1 society is decaying1 and there is need for preservative action4 ,professionals are not new to the world4 ,but in the past1 professionals have formed unprogressive castes4 ,the point is that professionalism has now been mated with progress4 ,the world is now faced with a self-evolving system1 which it cannot stop4 ,there are dangers and advantages in this situation4 ,it is obvious that the gain in material power affords opportunity for social betterment4 ,if mankind can rise to the occasion1 there lies in front a golden age of beneficent creativeness4 ,but material power in itself is ethically neutral4 ,it can equally well work in the wrong direction4 ,the problem is not how to produce great men1 but how to produce great societies4 ,the great society will put up the men for the occasions4 ,the materialistic philosophy emphasised the given quantity of material1 and thence derivatively the given nature of the environment4 ,it thus operated most unfortunately upon the social conscience of mankind4 ,for it directed almost exclusive attention to the aspect of struggle for existence in a fixed environment4 ,to a large extent the environment is fixed1 and to this extent there is a struggle for existence4 ,it is folly to look at the universe through rose-tinted spectacles4 ,we must admit the struggle4 ,the question is1 who is to be eliminated4 ,in so far as we are educators1 we have to have clear ideas upon that point2 for it settles the type to be produced and the practical ethics to be inculcated4 ,but during the last three generations1 the exclusive direction of attention to this aspect of things has been a disaster of the first magnitude4 ,the watchwords of the nineteenth century have been1 struggle for existence1 competition1 class warfare1 commercial antagonism between nations1 military warfare4 ,the struggle for existence has been construed into the gospel of hate4 ,the full conclusion to be drawn from a philosophy of evolution is fortunately of a more balanced character4 ,successful organisms modify their environment4 ,those organisms are successful which modify their environments so as to assist each other4 ,this law is exemplified in nature on a vast scale4 ,for example1 the ,north ,american ,indians accepted their environment1 with the result that a scanty population barely succeeded in maintaining themselves over the whole continent4 ,the ,european races when they arrived in the same continent pursued an opposite policy4 ,they at once coperated in modifying their environment4 ,the result is that a population more than twenty times that of the ,indian population now occupies the same territory1 and the continent is not yet full4 ,again1 there are associations of different species which mutually coperate4 ,this differentiation of species is exhibited in the simplest physical entities1 such as the association between electrons and positive nuclei1 and in the whole realm of animate nature4 ,the trees in a ,brazilian forest depend upon the association of various species of organisms1 each of which is mutually dependent on the other species4 ,a single tree by itself is dependent upon all the adverse chances of shifting circumstances4 ,the wind stunts it3 the variations in temperature check its foliage3 the rains denude its soil3 its leaves are blown away and are lost for the purpose of fertilisation4 ,you may obtain individual specimens of fine trees either in exceptional circumstances1 or where human cultivation has intervened4 ,but in nature the normal way in which trees flourish is by their association in a forest4 ,each tree may lose something of its individual perfection of growth1 but they mutually assist each other in preserving the conditions for survival4 ,the soil is preserved and shaded2 and the microbes necessary for its fertility are neither scorched1 nor frozen1 nor washed away4 ,a forest is the triumph of the organisation of mutually dependent species4 ,further a species of microbes which kills the forest1 also exterminates itself4 ,again the two sexes exhibit the same advantage of differentiation4 ,in the history of the world1 the prize has not gone to those species which specialised in methods of violence1 or even in defensive armour4 ,in fact1 nature began with producing animals encased in hard shells for defence against the ills of life4 ,it also experimented in size4 ,but smaller animals1 without external armour1 warm-blooded1 sensitive1 and alert1 have cleared these monsters off the face of the earth4 ,also1 the lions and tigers are not the successful species4 ,there is something in the ready use of force which defeats its own object4 ,its main defect is that it bars coperation4 ,every organism requires an environment of friends1 partly to shield it from violent changes1 and partly to supply it with its wants4 ,the ,gospel of ,force is incompatible with a social life4 ,by force1 ,i mean antagonism in its most general sense4 ,almost equally dangerous is the ,gospel of ,uniformity4 ,the differences between the nations and races of mankind are required to preserve the conditions under which higher development is possible4 ,one main factor in the upward trend of animal life has been the power of wandering4 ,perhaps this is why the armour-plated monsters fared badly4 ,they could not wander4 ,animals wander into new conditions4 ,they have to adapt themselves or die4 ,mankind has wandered from the trees to the plains1 from the plains to the seacoast1 from climate to climate1 from continent to continent1 and from habit of life to habit of life4 ,when man ceases to wander1 he will cease to ascend in the scale of being4 ,physical wandering is still important1 but greater still is the power of man's spiritual adventures--adventures of thought1 adventures of passionate feeling1 adventures of aesthetic experience4 ,a diversification among human communities is essential for the provision of the incentive and material for the ,odyssey of the human spirit4 ,other nations of different habits are not enemies3 they are godsends4 ,men require of their neighbours something sufficiently akin to be understood1 something sufficiently different to provoke attention1 and something great enough to command admiration4 ,we must not expect1 however1 all the virtues4 ,we should even be satisfied if there is something odd enough to be interesting4 ,modern science has imposed on humanity the necessity for wandering4 ,its progressive thought and its progressive technology make the transition through time1 from generation to generation1 a true migration into uncharted seas of adventure4 ,the very benefit of wandering is that it is dangerous and needs skill to avert evils4 ,we must expect1 therefore1 that the future will disclose dangers4 ,it is the business of the future to be dangerous2 and it is among the merits of science that it equips the future for its duties4 ,the prosperous middle classes1 who ruled the nineteenth century1 placed an excessive value upon placidity of existence4 ,they refused to face the necessities for social reform imposed by the new industrial system1 and they are now refusing to face the necessities for intellectual reform imposed by the new knowledge4 ,the middle class pessimism over the future of the world comes from a confusion between civilisation and security4 ,in the immediate future there will be less security than in the immediate past1 less stability4 ,it must be admitted that there is a degree of instability which is inconsistent with civilisation4 ,but1 on the whole1 the great ages have been unstable ages4 ,i have endeavoured in these lectures to give a record of a great adventure in the region of thought4 ,it was shared in by all the races of western ,europe4 ,it developed with the slowness of a mass movement4 ,half a century is its unit of time4 ,the tale is the epic of an episode in the manifestation of reason4 ,it tells how a particular direction of reason emerges in a race by the long preparation of antecedent epochs1 how after its birth its subject-matter gradually unfolds itself1 how it attains its triumphs1 how its influence moulds the very springs of action of mankind1 and finally how at its moment of supreme success its limitations disclose themselves and call for a renewed exercise of the creative imagination4 ,the moral of the tale is the power of reason1 its decisive influence on the life of humanity4 ,the great conquerors1 from ,alexander to ,caesar1 and from ,caesar to ,napoleon1 influenced profoundly the lives of subsequent generations4 ,but the total effect of this influence shrinks to insignificance1 if compared to the entire transformation of human habits and human mentality produced by the long line of men of thought from ,thales to the present day1 men individually powerless1 but ultimately the rulers of the world4 ,,index ,the numbers refer to pages2 and #8e4s4' stands for #8et seqq4'1 where the reference is to the succeeding pages of the chapter in question4 ,abruptness 7in ,ingression71 #bci4 ,absolute1 ,the1 #abi4 ,abstract1 #bba4 ,abstraction1 #bcc1 e4s4 ,abstraction 7in ,mathematics71 #bh1 e4s4 ,abstractive ,hierarchy1 #bcd1 e4s4 ,acceleration1 #ff4 ,actualisation1 #bbb4 ,adam ,smith1 #bhj4 ,aeschylus1 #ad4 ,alexander1 ,s41 preface4 ,algebra1 #db1 #dd4 ,alva1 #b4 ,ampre1 #aci4 ,analytical ,character 7,eternal ,objects71 #bbh4 ,anselm1 ,st41 #hj4 #8,any1' #bbi4 ,aquinas1 ,thomas1 #ab1 #ac1 #bje4 ,arabic ,arithmetical ,notation1 #db4 ,archimedes1 #g1 #h1 #i1 #aj4 ,arguments 7of functions71 #dd4 ,aristotle1 #g1 e4s42 #da1 #db2 #fd1 e4s42 #ahj1 #ahg2 #bcf1 e4s4 ,arnold1 ,matthew1 #aae4 ,art1 #bgi1 e4s4 ,art1 ,medieval1 #ah1 e4s4 ,aspect1 #ih2 #adf1 e4s4 ,associated ,hierarchy1 #bcg4 ,aston1 ,f4 ,w41 #bfj4 ,atom1 #adj1 #add4 ,augustine1 ,saint1 #bff4 ,bacon1 ,francis1 #aa2 #ef1 e4s42 #ib1 #acf4 ,bacon1 ,roger1 #g4 ,base of ,abstractive ,hierarchy1 #bce4 ,being1 #bbg4 ,belisarius1 #ai4 ,benedict1 ,saint1 #ba4 ,bergson1 #gb2 #bjb1 e4s4 ,berkeley1 ,george1 #ic1 e4s42 #aje1 #abj1 #aih4 ,bicht1 #ada4 ,biology1 #eh1 #hh1 #add4 ,bonaventure1 ,saint1 #ab4 ,boyle1 ,robert1 #eg4 ,brown ,university1 ,preface4 ,bruno1 ,giordano1 #a4 ,byzantine ,empire1 #ai4 ,carlyle1 #he4 ,cervantes1 #ef4 ,change1 #aba4 ,chaucer1 #bb4 ,china1 #h1 #ajf4 ,clairaut1 #he1 #aic4 ,classification1 #da1 e4s4 ,clough1 ,a4 ,h41 #aae4 ,cognition1 #ig4 ,coleridge1 #aae1 #aaf4 ,columbus1 #bb1 #di4 ,complex ,eternal ,objects1 #bcb4 ,components1 #bcb4 ,conic ,sections1 #db4 ,connexity 7of a ,hierarchy71 #bce4 ,connectedness 7of an occasion71 #bcg4 ,conservation of ,energy1 #adb1 e4s4 ,continuity1 #adj4 ,copernicus1 #a1 #bb1 #ef1 #ahd4 ,cosmas1 #bed4 ,cromwell1 ,oliver1 #bc4 ,d',alembert1 #hj1 #he4 ,dalton1 ,john1 #adj1 #ada4 ,da ,vinci1 ,leonardo1 #fj4 ,darwin1 #bfc4 ,democritus1 #adj4 ,demos1 ,r41 ,preface4 ,density1 #gj1 #ahi4 ,desargues1 #gh4 ,descartes1 #be2 #dc1 e4s42 #ef1 #eg2 #ajd2 #aae2 #aie1 e4s42 #bgb4 ,determinism1 #aaj4 ,differential ,calculus1 #gh4 ,discontinuous ,existence1 #ea2 #aij1 e4s4 ,distance1 #agc4 ,divinity1 ,scholastic1 #ag4 ,divisibility1 #agg4 ,education1 #bgg1 e4s4 ,egyptians1 #bj1 #dc4 ,einstein1 #ad1 #da1 #hf1 #hh2 #agc1 e4s42 #bfc4 ,electron1 #ej1 e4s42 #aaa1 e4s42 #ahe1 e4s4 ,empty ,events1 #bad4 ,endurance1 #aba2 #adg1 e4s42 #afi1 e4s42 #ahf1 e4s42 #bab4 ,endurance1 ,vibratory1 #ea4 ,energy1 ,physical1 #ea1 e4s4 ,environment1 #aee1 e4s4 ,envisagement1 #adh1 e4s4 ,epochs1 #agg4 ,epochal ,durations1 #aib4 ,essence1 #age4 ,eternal ,objects1 #aba1 e4s42 #adf1 e4s42 #bba1 e4s4 ,ether1 #ahd4 ,euripides1 #ad4 ,event1 #ajb2 #afh1 e4s4 ,evolution1 #acj2 #adb1 e4s4 ,exhaustion1 ,method of1 #db4 ,extension1 #agg4 ,extensive ,quantity1 #agh4 ,external ,relations1 #bbc1 e4s4 ,extrinsic ,reality1 #adf4 ,fallacy of ,misplaced ,concreteness1 #gb1 e4s42 #hb4 ,faraday1 #aci4 ,fate1 #ad4 ,fermat1 #gh4 ,finite ,abstractive ,hierarchy1 #bce4 ,form1 #bcj4 ,force1 #fd1 e4s4 ,fourier1 #he4 ,francis of ,assisi1 #beh4 ,frederick1 the ,great1 #hi4 ,frequency1 #aha1 e4s4 ,fresnel1 #aci4 ,frost1 ,robert1 #bb4 ,future1 #bde1 e4s4 ,galileo1 #b1 e4s42 #dc1 #de2 #ef1 e4s42 #hh1 #afb1 #ahg2 #bee1 e4s4 ,galvani1 #hh4 ,gauss1 #hf1 #hh4 ,geometry1 #ca1 e4s4 ,george ,,ii1 #ic4 ,germany1 #eg4 ,gibson1 #bjf4 ,god1 #ag1 #hf1 #abi2 #bdb1 e4s4 ,gradation of ,envisagement1 #bdg4 ,gravitation1 #fe1 #agb4 ,greece1 #h1 e4s4 ,gregorovius1 #bfe4 ,giotto1 #bb4 ,gregory1 ,the ,great1 #ba1 #bfe4 ,harvey1 #ef1 #eg4 ,heath1 ,sir ,t4 ,l41 #ahj4 ,hegel1 #dj4 ,herz1 #hf1 #hh4 ,historical ,revolt1 #aa1 e4s42 #ee1 #aej4 ,hooker1 ,richard1 #ac4 ,hume1 #e1 #dg1 #fa1 #gc2 #hj1 e4s42 #ajg1 #aih4 ,huyghens1 #de2 #eg1 e4s42 #bef4 ,idealism1 #hi2 #abg1 e4s4 ,immediate ,occasion1 #cf1 e4s42 #fb4 ,individual ,essence1 #bbb1 e4s4 ,induction1 #cd2 #fj1 e4s4 ,infinite ,abstractive ,hierarchy1 #bce4 ,ingression1 #ii1 e4s42 #bbb4 ,integral ,calculus1 #db4 ,internal ,relations1 #age2 #bbc1 e4s4 ,intrinsic ,reality1 #adf4 ,invention1 #acf1 e4s4 ,ionian ,philosophers1 #i4 ,irresistible ,grace1 #aje4 ,isolated ,systems1 #ff4 ,isolation of ,eternal ,objects1 #bcj4 ,isotopes1 #bfj4 ,italy1 #eg4 ,james1 ,henry1 #c4 ,james1 ,william1 #c2 #aii1 e4s4 ,joseph1 ,hapsburgh ,emperor1 #hi4 ,justinian1 #ai1 #bj4 ,kant1 #dg2 #ic1 e4s42 #aaf1 #adb1 #agh2 #aic1 e4s4 ,kepler1 #i1 #de1 #eg1 #fg4 ,lagrange1 #hd1 e4s4 ,laplace1 #he1 #adb4 ,lavoisier1 #hd1 #adf4 ,law1 ,roman1 #af4 ,laws of ,nature1 #de1 #aej4 ,least ,action1 #hg1 #aej4 ,lecky1 #ae1 #af1 #bed4 ,leibniz1 #dc1 #dd1 #dh1 #eg1 #ib1 #aae2 #aih1 e4s4 ,life1 #eh4 ,limitation1 #bbe1 e4s4 ,lloyd ,morgan1 ,preface4 ,location1 ,simple1 #fi1 e4s42 #ha1 e4s42 #ie4 ,locke1 ,john1 #dc1 #dg2 #eg1 e4s42 #hi1 #id1 #aae1 #aih4 ,locomotion1 ,vibratory1 #ahd1 e4s4 ,logic1 ,abstract1 #cg1 e4s4 ,logic1 ,scholastic1 #ag4 ,lucretius1 #adj4 ,macaulay1 #bhe4 ,milton1 #ajh1 e4s4 ,mind1 #gi4 ,mass1 #fd1 e4s42 #add4 ,mathematics1 #aj1 #bc2 #bh1 e4s4 ,mathematics1 ,applied1 #cd1 e4s4 ,matter1 #bd1 #id1 #eh1 #add4 ,matter 7philosophical71 #bca4 ,maupertuis1 #he1 e4s4 ,max ,mller1 #agh4 ,maxwell1 ,clerk1 #he1 e4s42 #aci1 e4s42 #afa4 ,mechanical ,explanation1 #bc4 ,mechanism1 #ajg1 e4s4 ,mechanistic ,theory1 #ga4 ,memory1 #gc4 ,mersenne1 #df4 ,michelson1 #afb1 e4s4 ,mill1 ,john ,stuart1 #aaj4 ,modal ,character of ,space1 #ij1 e4s4 ,modal ,limitation1 #bdh1 e4s4 ,mode1 #ii4 ,moral ,responsibility1 #aji1 e4s4 ,motion1 ,laws of1 #fe1 e4s4 ,mller1 ,johannes1 #ada4 ,narses1 #ai4 ,natural ,selection1 #aeh4 ,naturalism in ,art1 #bb4 ,newman1 ,john ,henry1 #aae1 #bee4 ,newton1 #h1 #i1 #ae2 #dc1 e4s42 #eh1 e4s42 #hd1 e4s42 #afa2 #bee1 e4s4 ,not-,being1 #bbg4 ,objectivism1 #abd1 e4s4 ,occasions1 ,community of1 #fc4 ,occupied ,events1 #bae4 ,oersted1 #aci4 ,order of ,nature1 #e1 e4s42 #ci1 e4s42 #ee4 ,organic ,mechanism1 #aab1 #aea4 ,organism1 #ea1 e4s42 #eh1 #ij2 #aje1 e4s42 #aaa1 e4s42 #ade2 #ahe1 e4s42 #bji4 ,padua1 ,university of1 #eg1 #eh4 ,paley1 #ajg4 ,papacy1 #ac1 #bj4 ,pascal1 #eg1 #gh4 ,past1 #bde1 e4s4 ,pasteur1 ,louis1 #ada1 e4s4 ,pelagius1 #bff4 ,perception1 #aja4 ,periodic ,law 7,mendelef71 #ada4 ,periodicity1 #de1 e4s4 ,perspective1 #ih4 ,petavius1 #bee4 ,philosophy1 #abb4 ,physical ,field1 #ach4 ,physics1 #eg4 ,plato1 #aj2 #da1 e4s42 #ahj4 ,pope1 ,alexander1 #ajh1 e4s4 ,possibility1 #bbc4 ,prehension1 #ig1 e4s42 #bjg4 ,prehensive ,character of ,space1 #ij1 e4s4 ,present1 #bde1 e4s4 ,primary ,qualities1 #gf4 ,primate1 #ahe1 e4s4 ,prime ,mover1 #bdb1 e4s4 ,primordial ,element1 #ea1 e4s4 ,process1 #ajb4 ,professionalism1 #bga1 e4s4 ,proton1 #ea1 e4s42 #ahe1 e4s4 ,psychology1 #hh1 #ajc4 ,pusey1 #aae4 ,pythagoras1 #ci1 e4s42 #bdj4 ,quality1 #gc1 e4s4 ,quantum ,theory1 #ej2 #aha1 e4s4 ,rationalism1 #ab1 e4s42 #ee4 ,ramsay1 ,sir ,william1 #bei4 ,rawley1 ,dr41 #eh4 ,rayleigh1 ,lord1 #bei4 ,realism1 #abg1 e4s4 ,reformation1 #aa4 ,reiteration1 #adg2 #ahf1 e4s4 ,relational ,essence1 #bbc1 e4s4 ,relativity1 #fh2 #afe1 e4s4 ,retention1 #adg4 ,riemann1 #hf1 #hh4 ,romans1 #h4 ,roman ,law1 #bj4 ,rome1 #ba4 ,rousseau1 #ej1 #ic1 #ace4 ,royal ,society1 #dc1 #gc4 ,russell1 ,bertrand1 #baf4 ,sarpi1 ,paul1 #ab1 #bf4 ,schleiden1 #ada4 ,schwann1 #ada4 ,scientific ,materialism1 #bd1 #be4 ,scientific ,movement1 #aa4 ,secondary ,qualities1 #gf1 #abg4 ,seneca1 #ae4 ,sense-,object1 #ii4 ,separative ,character of ,space1 #ij1 e4s4 ,shakespeare1 #ef4 ,shape1 #ib4 ,shelley1 #aaf1 e4s4 ,sidgwick1 ,henry1 #aig4 ,simple ,eternal ,objects1 #bcb4 ,simple ,location1 #fi1 e4s42 #ha1 e4s42 #ie2 #abg1 e4s42 #bag4 ,simultaneity1 #agd4 #8,some1' #bbi4 ,southey1 #bhe4 ,space1 ,physical1 #cb4 ,spatialisation1 #gb1 #age1 #bjf4 ,specious ,present1 #adh4 ,spinoza1 #dc1 #eg1 #ii1 #aae1 #aaf1 #age1 #aih1 #bdh4 ,sophocles1 #ad4 ,standpoint1 #ii1 e4s4 ,stoicism1 #af4 ,struggle for ,existence1 #aeh4 ,subjectivism1 #abc1 e4s4 ,substance1 #gc1 e4s42 #age4 ,substantial ,activity1 #aeb1 #agd1 #bca4 ,superject1 #bcj4 ,synthetic ,prehension1 #bbd1 e4s4 ,technology1 #ace1 e4s4 ,temporalisation1 #agi4 ,tennyson1 #ajh1 e4s4 ,time1 #afi1 e4s4 ,tragedy1 #ae4 ,translucency of ,realisation1 #bdj4 ,trent1 ,council of1 #ab4 ,trigonometry1 #db4 ,true ,propositions1 #bbd4 ,unknowns 7in ,mathematics71 #dd4 ,universals1 #bba4 ,untrue ,propositions1 #bba4 ,value1 #abc1 e4s42 #bbf1 #bdi4 ,variable1 ,the1 #cg1 e4s42 #bbi4 ,vasco da ,gama1 #bb4 ,velocity1 #fd1 e4s42 #afe1 e4s4 ,vertex of ,abstractive ,hierarchy1 #bcf4 ,vesalius1 #a4 ,vibration1 #ahf1 e4s4 ,vibratory ,organic ,deformation1 #ahd1 e4s4 ,virtual ,work1 #hh4 ,vitalism1 #aaa1 e4s42 #ade4 ,volta1 #hh4 ,voltaire1 #eg2 #hj1 e4s42 #adc4 ,walpole1 #hi4 ,washington1 ,george1 #hi4 ,watt1 ,james1 #ace4 ,wesley1 ,john1 #ic4 ,whitman1 ,walt1 #bb4 ,wordsworth1 #bb2 #ajh1 e4s4 ,young1 ,thomas1 #aci4 ,zeno1 #agh1 #agi1 #aib4 ---------------------------------------- -------------------------------- ,transcriber's ,note ,the printer employed the diaeresis in words like #8cordination' or #8coperation'4 ,on p4 #aeg1 the first syllable of #8coperating' fell on the line break1 and the word was hyphenated as #8co-operating'1 since the diaeresis was not needed4 ,the word has been joined here and the diaeresis employed as #8coperating'4 ,the following words appear both with and without a hyphen3 to-day1 non-entity1 half-way1 inter-connected1 non-entity4 ,errors deemed most likely to be the printer's have been corrected1 and are noted here4 ,the references are to the page and line in the original4 #bj4aj restraining gi_/overnment4 ,replaced4 #ba4ca is kept in contact wti_/ith ,transposed4 #eg4cj ,now the scientific philosophy ,inserted4 #fi4i no other way of puttings things ,removed4 #gg4f these relationships constitutes nature4 ,added4 #aeg4bj societies of co-_/perating organisms4 ,replaced4 #afj4h ,these divisions are ,inserted4 #agf4c extends beyonds the spatio-temporal continuum ,removed4 #agg4f by the realiz_/sation of pattern ,consistency4 #agg4be character of spatio-temporal of extension ,removed4 #ahc4e radiate its energy is_/n an integral number ,replaced4 #aie4d history of the ,christio_/an ,church ,replaced4 #aie4g apocalyptic forecastes ,removed4 #bjb4ba ,this division of territory ,inserted4 #bac4aj what anything is in itself4 ,inserted4 #bde4bg even although any such discrimination ,removed4 #bgd4ad its stak_/te of rapid development ,replaced4 #bgf4ag ,the task of cordination is left ,inserted4 #bgi4bb ,what ,i mean is art 7and aesthetic education4 ,removed4 #bhh4cc mutually cooperate4 ,removed4 #bij4c it bars cooperation4 ,removed4