,,cambridge ,,university ,,press ,,warehouse1 ,c4 ,f4 ,,clay1 ,,manager4 ,london3 ,,fetter ,,lane1 ,e4,c4 ,glasgow3 #ej1 ,,wellington ,,street4 ,illustration ,leipzig3 ,f4 ,a4 ,,brockhaus4 ,new ,york3 ,g4 ,p4 ,,putnam',s ,,sons4 ,bombay and ,calcutta3 ,,macmillan ,,and ,,co41 ,,ltd4 ,all ,rights reserved ,,decadence ,,henry ,,sidgwick ,,memorial ,,lecture by ,,the ,,right ,,hon4 ,,arthur ,,james ,,balfour1 ,m4,p4 ,,delivered ,,at ,,newnham ,,college1 ,,january #be1 #aijh ,,cambridge at the ,university ,press #aijh ,cambridge3 ,,printed ,,by ,,john ,,clay1 ,m4,a4 ,,at ,,the ,,university ,,press4 ,,decadence4 ,i must begin what ,i have to say with a warning and an apology4 ,i must warn you that the present essay makes no pretence to be an adequate treatment of some compact and limited theme2 but rather resembles those wandering trains of thought1 where we allow ourselves the luxury of putting wide-ranging questions1 to which our ignorance forbids any confident reply4 ,i apologise for adopting a course which thus departs in some measure from familiar precedent4 ,i admit its perils4 ,but it is just possible that when a subject1 or group of subjects1 is of great inherent interest1 even a tentative1 and interrogative1 treatment of it may be worth attempting4 ,my subject1 or at least my point of departure1 is ,decadence4 ,i do not mean the sort of decadence often attributed to certain phases of artistic or literary development1 in which an overwrought technique1 straining to express sentiments too subtle or too morbid1 is deemed to have supplanted the direct inspiration of an earlier and a simpler age4 ,whether these autumnal glories1 these splendours touched with death1 are recurring phenomena in the literary cycle3 whether1 if they be1 they are connected with other forms of decadence1 may be questions well worth asking and answering4 ,but they are not the questions with which ,i am at present concerned4 ,the decadence respecting which ,i wish to put questions is not literary or artistic1 it is political and national4 ,it is the decadence which attacks1 or is alleged to attack1 great communities and historic civilisations3 which is to societies of men what senility is to man1 and is often1 like senility1 the precursor and the cause of final dissolution4 ,it is curious how deeply imbedded in ordinary discourse are traces of the conviction that childhood1 maturity1 and old age1 are stages in the corporate1 as they are in the individual1 life4 8,a young and vigorous nation10 8a decrepit and moribund civilisation0--phrases like these1 and scores of others containing the same implication1 come as trippingly from the tongue as if they suggested no difficulty and called for no explanation4 ,to ,macaulay 7unless ,i am pressing his famous metaphor too far7 it seemed natural that ages hence a young country like ,new ,zealand should be flourishing1 but not less natural that an old country like ,england should have decayed4 ,berkeley1 in a well-known stanza1 tells how the drama of civilisation has slowly travelled westwards to find its loftiest development1 but also its final catastrophe1 in the ,new ,world4 ,while every man who is weary1 hopeless1 or disillusioned talks as if he had caught these various diseases from the decadent epoch in which he was born4 ,but why should civilisations thus wear out and great communities decay8 and what evidence is there that in fact they do8 ,these questions1 though ,i cannot give to them any conclusive answers1 are of much more than a merely theoretic interest4 ,for if current modes of speech take decadence more or less for granted1 with still greater confidence do they speak of ,progress as assured4 ,yet if both are real they can hardly be studied apart1 they must evidently limit and qualify each other in actual experience1 and they cannot be isolated in speculation4 ,though antiquity1 ,pagan and ,christian1 took a different view1 it seems easier1 a priori1 to understand ,progress than ,decadence4 ,even if the former be limited1 as presumably it is1 by the limitation of human faculty1 we should expect the ultimate boundary to be capable of indefinite approach1 and we should not expect that any part of the road towards it1 once traversed1 would have to be retraced4 ,even in the organic world1 decay and death1 familiar though they be1 are phenomena that call for scientific explanation4 ,and ,weismann has definitely asked how it comes about that the higher organisms grow old and die1 seeing that old age and death are not inseparable characteristics of living protoplasm1 and that the simplest organisms suffer no natural decay1 perishing1 when they do perish1 by accident1 starvation1 or specific disease4 ,the answer he gives to his own question is that the death of the individual is so useful to the race1 that ,natural ,selection has1 in all but the very lowest species1 exterminated the potentially immortal4 ,one is tempted to enquire1 whether this ingenious explanation could be so modified as to apply not merely to individuals but to communities4 ,is it needful for the cause of civilisation as a whole1 that the organised embodiment of each particular civilisation1 if and when its free development is arrested1 should make room for younger and more vigorous competitors8 ,and if so can we find in ,natural ,selection the mechanism by which the principle of decay and dissolution shall be so implanted in the very nature of human associations that a due succession among them shall always be maintained8 ,to this second question the answer must1 ,i think1 be in the negative4 ,the struggle for existence between different races and different societies has admittedly played a great part in social development4 ,but to extend ,weismann's idea from the organic to the social world1 would imply a prolonged competition between groups of communities in which decadence was the rule1 and groups in which it was not2--ending in the survival of the first1 and the destruction of the second4 ,the groups whose members suffered periodical decadence and dissolution would be the fittest to survive3 just as1 on ,weismann's theory1 those species gain in competitive efficiency whom death has unburdened of the old4 ,few will say that in the petty fragment of human history which alone is open to our inspection1 there is satisfactory evidence of any such long drawn process4 ,some may even be disposed to ask whether there is adequate evidence of such a phenomenon as decadence at all4 ,and it must be acknowledged that the affirmative answer should be given with caution4 ,evidently we must not consider a diminution of national power1 whether relative or absolute1 as constituting by itself a proof of national decadence4 ,holland is not decadent because her place in the hierarchy of ,european ,powers is less exalted than it was two hundred and fifty years ago4 ,spain was not necessarily decadent at the end of the seventeenth century because she had exhausted herself in a contest far beyond her resources either in money or in men4 ,it would1 ,i think1 be rash even to say that ,venice was decadent at the end of the eighteenth century1 though the growth of other ,powers1 and the diversion of the great trade routes1 had shorn her of wealth and international influence4 ,these are misfortunes which in the sphere of sociology correspond to accident or disease in the sphere of biology4 ,and what we are concerned to know is whether in the sphere of sociology there is also anything corresponding to the decay of old age--a decay which may be hastened by accident or disease1 which must be ended by accident or disease1 but is certainly to be distinguished from both4 ,however this question should be answered the cases ,i have cited are sufficient to shew where the chief difficulty of the enquiry lies4 ,decadence1 even if it be a reality1 never acts in isolation4 ,it is always complicated with1 and often acts through1 other more obvious causes4 ,it is always therefore possible to argue that to these causes1 and not to the more subtle and elusive influences collectively described as 'decadence1' the decline and fall of great communities is really due4 ,yet there are historic tragedies which 7as it seems to me7 do most obstinately refuse to be thus simply explained4 ,it is in vain that historians enumerate the public calamities which preceded1 and no doubt contributed to1 the final catastrophe4 ,civil dissensions1 military disasters1 pestilences1 famines1 tyrants1 tax-gatherers1 growing burdens1 and waning wealth--the gloomy catalogue is unrolled before our eyes1 yet somehow it does not in all cases wholly satisfy us3 we feel that some of these diseases are of a kind which a vigorous body politic should easily be able to survive1 that others are secondary symptoms of some obscurer malady1 and that in neither case do they supply us with the full explanations of which we are in search4 ,consider for instance the long agony and final destruction of ,roman ,imperialism in the ,west1 the most momentous catastrophe of which we have historic record4 ,it has deeply stirred the imagination of mankind1 it has been the theme of great historians1 it has been much explained by political philosophers1 yet who feels that either historians or philosophers have laid bare the inner workings of the drama8 ,rome fell1 and great was the fall of it4 ,but why it fell1 by what secret mines its defences were breached1 and what made its garrison so faint-hearted and ineffectual--this is not so clear4 ,in order to measure adequately the difficulty of the problem let us abstract our minds from historical details and compare the position of the ,empire about the middle of the second century1 with its position in the middle of the third1 or again at the end of the fourth1 and ask of what forces history gives us an account1 sufficient in these periods to effect so mighty a transformation4 ,or1 still better1 imagine an observer equipped with our current stock of political wisdom1 transported to ,rome in the reign of ,antoninus ,pius or ,marcus ,aurelius1 and in ignorance of the event1 writing letters to the newspapers on the future destinies of the ,empire4 ,what would his forecast be8 ,we might suppose him to examine1 in the first place1 the military position of the ,state1 its probable enemies1 its capacities for defence4 ,he would note that only on its eastern boundary was there an organised military ,power capable of meeting ,rome on anything like equal terms1 and this only in the regions adjacent to their common frontier4 ,for the rest he would discover no civilised enemy along the southern boundary to the ,atlantic or along its northern boundary from the ,black ,sea to the ,german ,ocean4 ,warlike tribes indeed he would find in plenty3 difficult to crush within the limits of their native forests and morasses1 formidable it may be in a raid1 but without political cohesion1 military unity1 or the means of military concentration2--embarrassing therefore rather than dangerous4 ,if reminded of ,varus and his lost legions1 he would ask of what importance1 in the story of a world-power could be the loss of a few thousand men surprised at a distance from their base amid the entanglements of a difficult and unknown country4 ,never1 it would seem1 was ,empire more fortunately circumstanced for purposes of home defence4 ,but 7it might be thought7 the burden of securing frontiers of such length1 even against merely tribal assaults1 though easy from a strictly military point of view1 might prove too heavy to be long endured4 ,yet the military forces scattered through the ,roman ,empire1 though apparently adequate in the days of her greatness would1 according to modern ideas1 seem hardly sufficient for purposes of police1 let alone defence4 ,an army corps or less was deemed enough to preserve what are now mighty kingdoms1 from internal disorder and external aggression4 ,and if we compare with this the contributions1 either in the way of money or of men1 exacted from the territories subject to ,rome before the ,empire came into being1 or at any period of the world's history since it dissolved away1 the comparison must surely be entirely in favour of the ,empire4 ,but burdens which seem light1 if measured by area1 may be heavy if measured by ability to pay4 ,yet when has ability to pay been greater in the regions bordering the ,southern and ,eastern ,mediterranean than under the ,roman ,empire8 ,travel round it in imagination1 eastward from the ,atlantic coast of ,morocco till returning westward you reach the head of the ,adriatic ,gulf1 and you will have skirted a region1 still of immense natural wealth1 once filled with great cities1 and fertile farms1 better governed during the ,empire than it has ever been governed since 7at least till ,algeria became ,french and ,egypt ,british72 including among its provinces what were great states before the ,roman rule1 and have been great states since that rule decayed1 divided by no international jealousies1 oppressed by no fear of conquest1 enterprising1 cultured4 ,remember that to estimate its area of taxation and recruiting you must add to these regions ,bulgaria1 ,servia1 much of ,austria and ,bavaria1 ,switzerland1 ,belgium1 ,italy1 ,france1 ,spain1 and most of ,britain1 and you have conditions favourable to military strength and economic prosperity rarely equalled in the modern world and never in the ancient4 ,our observer however might1 very rightly1 feel that a far-spreading ,empire like that of ,rome1 including regions profoundly differing in race1 history and religion1 would be liable to other dangers than those which arise from mere external aggression4 ,one of the first questions1 therefore1 which he would be disposed to ask1 is whether so heterogeneous a state was not in perpetual danger of dissolution through the disintegrating influence of national sentiments4 ,he would learn probably1 with a strong feeling of surprise1 that with the single exception of the ,jews1 the constituent nations1 once conquered1 were not merely content to belong to the ,empire1 but could scarcely imagine themselves doing anything else3 that the ,imperial system appealed1 not merely to the material needs of the component populations1 but also to their imagination and their loyalty2 that ,gaul1 ,spain1 and ,britain1 though but recently forced within the pale of civilisation1 were as faithful to the ,imperial ideal as the ,greek of ,athens or the ,hellenised ,orientals of ,syria2 and that neither historic memories1 nor local patriotism1 neither disputed succession1 nor public calamities1 nor administrative divisions1 ever really shook the sentiment in favour of ,imperial ,unity4 ,there might be more than one ,emperor3 but there could only be one ,empire4 ,howsoever our observer might disapprove of the ,imperial system he would therefore have to admit that the ,empire1 with all its shortcomings1 its absolutism and its bureaucracy1 had solved more successfully than any government1 before or since1 the problem of devising a scheme which equally satisfied the sentiments of ,east and ,west2 which respected local feelings1 encouraged local government2 in which the ,celt1 the ,iberian1 the ,berber1 the ,egyptian1 the ,asiatic1 the ,greek1 the ,illyrian1 the ,italian were all at home1 and which1 though based on conquest1 was accepted by the conquered as the natural organisation of the civilised world4 ,rome had thus unique sources of strength4 ,what sources of weakness would our observer be likely to detect behind her imposing exterior8 ,the diminution of population is the one which has 7rightly ,i think7 most impressed historians3 and it is difficult to resist the evidence1 either of the fact1 or of its disastrous consequences4 ,i hesitate indeed to accept without qualification the accounts given us of the progressive decay of the native ,italian stock from the days of the ,gracchi to the disintegration of the ,empire in the ,west3 and when we read how the dearth of men was made good 7in so far as it was made good7 by the increasing inflow of slaves and adventurers from every corner of the known world1 one wonders whose sons they were who1 for three centuries and more1 so brilliantly led the van of modern ,european culture1 as it emerged from the darkness of the early ,middle ,ages4 ,passing by such collateral issues1 however1 and admitting depopulation to have been both real and serious1 we may well ask whether it was not the result of ,roman decadence rather than its cause1 the symptom of some deep-seated social malady1 not its origin4 ,we are not concerned here with the aristocracy of ,rome1 nor even with the people of ,italy4 ,we are concerned with the ,empire4 ,we are not concerned with a passing phase or fashion1 but with a process which seems to have gone on with increasing rapidity1 through good times as well as bad1 till the final cataclysm4 ,a local disease might have a local explanation1 a transient one might be due to a chance coincidence4 ,but what can we say of a disease which was apparently co-extensive with ,imperial civilisation in area1 and which exceeded it in duration8 ,i find it hard to believe that either a selfish aversion to matrimony or a mystical admiration for celibacy1 though at certain periods the one was common in ,pagan and the other in ,christian circles1 were more than elements in the complex of causes by which the result was brought about4 ,like the plagues which devastated ,europe in the second and third centuries1 they must have greatly aggravated the evil1 but they are hardly sufficient to account for it4 ,nor yet can we find an explanation of it in the discouragement1 the sense of impending doom1 by which men's spirits were oppressed long before the ,imperial power began visibly to wane1 for this is one of the things which1 if historically true1 does itself most urgently require explanation4 ,it may be however that our wandering politician would be too well grounded in ,malthusian economics to regard a diminution of population as in itself an overwhelming calamity4 ,and if he were pressed to describe the weak spots in the ,empire of the ,antonines he would be disposed1 ,i think1 to look for them on the ethical rather than on the military1 the economic1 or the strictly political sides of social life4 ,he would be inclined to say1 as in effect ,mr ,lecky does say1 that in the institution of slavery1 in the brutalities of the gladiatorial shows1 in the gratuitous distribution of bread to the urban mobs1 are to be found the corrupting influences which first weakened and then destroyed the vigour of the ,state4 ,i confess that ,i cannot easily accept this analysis of the facts4 ,as regards the gladiatorial shows1 even had they been universal throughout the ,empire1 and had they flourished more rankly as its power declined1 ,i should still have questioned the propriety of attributing too far-reaching effects to such a cause4 ,the ,romans were brutal while they were conquering the world3 its conquest enabled them to be brutal with ostentation2 but we must not measure the ill consequences of their barbaric tastes by the depth of our own disgusts1 nor assume the ,gothic invasions to be the natural and fitting ,nemesis of so much spectacular shedding of innocent blood4 ,as for the public distributions of corn1 one would wish to have more evidence as to its social effects4 ,but even without fully accepting the theory of the latest ,roman historian1 who believes that1 under the then prevailing conditions of transport1 no very large city could exist in ,antiquity1 if the supply of its food were left to private enterprise1 we cannot seriously regard this practice1 strange as it seems to us1 as an important element in the problem4 ,granting for the sake of argument that it demoralised the mob of ,rome1 it must be remembered that ,rome was not the ,empire1 nor did the mob of ,rome govern the ,empire1 as once it had governed the ,republic4 ,slavery is a far more important matter4 ,the magnitude of its effects on ancient societies1 difficult as these are to disentangle1 can hardly be exaggerated4 ,but with what plausibility can we find in it the cause of ,rome's decline1 seeing that it was the concomitant also of its rise8 ,how can that which in ,antiquity was common to every state1 have this exceptional and malign influence upon one8 ,it would not in any case be easy to accept such a theory2 but surely it becomes impossible when we bear in mind the enormous improvement effected under the ,empire both in the law and the practice of slavery4 ,great as were its evils1 they were diminishing evils--less ruinous as time went on to the character of the master1 less painful and degrading to the slave4 ,who can believe that this immemorial custom could1 in its decline1 destroy a civilisation1 which1 in its vigour1 it had helped to create8 ,of course our observer would see much in the social system he was examining which he would rightly regard as morally detestable and politically pernicious4 ,but the real question before him would not be #8are these things good or bad8' but #8are these things getting better or getting worse8' ,and surely in most cases he would be obliged to answer #8getting better4' ,many things moreover would come under his notice fitted to move his admiration in a much less qualified manner4 ,few governments have been more anxious to foster an alien and higher culture1 than was the ,roman ,government to foster ,greek civilisation4 ,in so far as ,rome inherited what ,alexander conquered1 it carried out the ideal which ,alexander had conceived4 ,in few periods have the rich been readier to spend of their private fortunes on public objects4 ,there never was a community in which associations for every purpose of mutual aid or enjoyment sprang more readily into existence4 ,there never was a military monarchy less given to wars of aggression4 ,there never was an age in which there was a more rapid advance in humanitarian ideals1 or a more anxious seeking after spiritual truth4 ,there was much discussion1 there was1 apart from politics1 but little intolerance4 ,education was well endowed1 and its professors held in high esteem4 ,physical culture was cared for4 ,law was becoming scientific4 ,research was not forgotten4 ,what more could be reasonably expected8 ,according to our ordinary methods of analysis it is not easy to say what more could be reasonably expected4 ,but plainly much more was required4 ,in a few generations from the time of which ,i am speaking the ,empire lost its extraordinary power of assimilating alien and barbaric elements4 ,it became too feeble either to absorb or to expel them3 and the immigrants who in happier times might have bestowed renewed vigour on the commonwealth1 became1 in the hour of its decline1 a weakness and a peril4 ,poverty grew as population shrank4 ,municipal office1 once so eagerly desired1 became the most cruel of burdens4 ,associations connected with industry or commerce1 which began by freely exchanging public service for public privilege1 found their members subjected to ever increasing obligations1 for the due performance of which they and their children were liable in person and in property4 ,thus while ,christianity1 and the other forces that made for mercy1 were diminishing the slavery of the slave1 the needs of the ,bureaucracy compelled it to trench ever more and more upon the freedom of the free4 ,it was each man's duty 7so ran the argument7 to serve the commonwealth3 he could best serve the commonwealth by devoting himself to his calling if it were one of public necessity3 this duty he should be required under penalties to perform1 and to devote if necessary to its performance1 labour to the limits of endurance1 fortune to the last shilling1 and family to the remotest generation4 ,through this crude experiment in socialism1 the civilised world seemed to be rapidly moving towards a system of universal caste1 imposed by no immemorial custom1 supported by no religious scruple1 but forced on an unwilling people by the ,emperor's edict and the executioner's lash4 ,these things have severally and collectively been regarded as the causes why in the ,west the ,imperial system so quickly crumbled into chaos4 ,and so no doubt they were4 ,but they obviously require themselves to be explained by causes more general and more remote2 and what were these8 ,if ,i answer as ,i feel disposed to answer--,decadence--you will properly ask how the unknown becomes less unknown merely by receiving a name4 ,i reply that if there be indeed subtle changes in the social tissues of old communities which make them1 as time goes on1 less resistant to the external attacks and the internal disturbances by which all communities are threatened1 overt recognition of the fact is a step in advance4 ,we have not an idea of what #8life' consists in1 but if on that account we were to abstain from using the term1 we should not be better but worse equipped for dealing with the problems of physiology2 while on the other hand if we could translate life into terms of matter and motion to-morrow1 we should still be obliged to use the word in order to distinguish the material movements which constitute life or exhibit it1 from those which do not4 ,in like manner we are ignorant of the inner character of the cell changes which produce senescence4 ,but should we be better fitted to form a correct conception of the life-history of complex organisms if we refused to recognise any cause of death but accident or disease8 ,i admit1 of course1 that the term #8decadence' is less precise than #8old age'3 as sociology deals with organisms far less definite than biology4 ,i admit also that it explains nothing4 ,if its use is to be justified at all1 the justification must depend not on the fact that it supplies an explanation1 but on the fact that it rules out explanations which are obvious but inadequate4 ,and this may be a service of some importance4 ,the facile generalisations with which we so often season the study of dry historic fact2 the habits of political discussion which induce us to catalogue for purposes of debate the outward signs that distinguish 7as we are prone to think7 the standing from the falling state1 hide the obscurer1 but more potent1 forces which silently prepare the fate of empires4 ,national character is subtle and elusive2 not to be expressed in statistics nor measured by the rough methods which suffice the practical moralist or statesman4 ,and when through an ancient and still powerful state there spreads a mood of deep discouragement1 when the reaction against recurring ills grows feebler1 and the ship rises less buoyantly to each succeeding wave1 when learning languishes1 enterprise slackens1 and vigour ebbs away1 then1 as ,i think1 there is present some process of social degeneration1 which we must perforce recognise1 and which1 pending a satisfactory analysis1 may conveniently be distinguished by the name of #8decadence4' ,i am well aware that though the space ,i have just devoted to the illustration of my theme provided by ,roman history is out of all proportion to the general plan of this address1 yet the treatment of it is inadequate and perhaps unconvincing4 ,but those who are most reluctant to admit that decay1 as distinguished from misfortune1 may lower the general level of civilisation1 can hardly deny that in many cases that level may for indefinite periods shew no tendency to rise4 ,if decadence be unknown1 is not progress exceptional8 ,consider the changing politics of the unchanging ,east#a4 ,is it not true that there1 while wars and revolutions1 dynastic and religious1 have shattered ancient states and brought new ones into being1 every community1 as soon as it has risen above the tribal and nomad condition1 adopts with the rarest exceptions a form of government which1 from its very generality in ,eastern lands1 we habitually call an #8oriental despotism'8 ,we may crystallise and re-crystallise a soluble salt as often as we please1 the new crystals will always resemble the old ones4 ,the crystals1 indeed1 may be of different sizes1 their component molecules may occupy different positions within the crystalline structure1 but the structure itself will be of one immutable pattern4 ,so it is1 or seems to be1 with these oriental states4 ,they rise1 in turn1 upon the ruins of their predecessors1 themselves predestined to perish by a like fate4 ,but whatever their origin or history1 they are always either autocracies or aggregations of autocracies2 and no differences of race1 of creed1 or of language seem sufficient to vary the violent monotony of their internal history4 ,in the eighteenth century theorists were content to attribute the political servitude of the ,eastern world to the unscrupulous machinations of tyrants and their tools4 ,and such explanations are good as far as they go4 ,but this1 in truth1 is not very far4 ,intrigue1 assassination1 ruthless repression1 the whole machinery of despotism supply particular explanations of particular incidents4 ,they do not supply the general explanation of the general phenomenon4 ,they tell you how this ruler or that obtained absolute power4 ,they do not tell you why every ruler is absolute4 ,nor can ,i furnish the answer4 ,the fact remains that over large and relatively civilised portions of the world popular government is profoundly unpopular1 in the sense that it is no natural or spontaneous social growth4 ,political absolutism not political freedom is the familiar weed of the country4 ,despots change but despotism remains3 and if through alien influences1 like those exercised by ,greek cities in ,asia1 or by ,british rule in ,india1 the type is modified1 it may well be doubted whether the modification could long survive the moment when its sustaining cause was withdrawn4 ,now it would almost seem as if in lands where this political type was normal a certain level of culture 7not of course the same in each case7 could not permanently be overpassed4 ,if under the excitement of religion or conquest1 or else through causes more complicated and more obscure1 this limit has sometimes been left behind1 reaction has always followed1 and decadence set in4 ,many people indeed1 as ,i have already observed1 take this as a matter of course4 ,it seems to them the most natural thing in the world that the glories of the ,eastern ,khalifate should decay1 and that the ,moors in ,morocco should lose even the memory of the learning and the arts possessed but three centuries ago by the ,moors in ,spain4 ,to me it seems mysterious4 ,but whether it be easy of comprehension or difficult1 if only it be true1 does it not furnish food for disquieting reflexion8 ,if there are whole groups of nations capable on their own initiative of a certain measure of civilisation1 but capable apparently of no more1 and if below them again there are 7as ,i suppose7 other races who seem incapable of either creating a civilisation of their own1 or of preserving unaided a civilisation impressed upon them from without1 by what right do we assume that no impassable limits bar the path of ,western progress8 ,those limits may not yet be in sight4 ,surely they are not4 ,but does not a survey of history suggest that somewhere in the dim future they await our approach8 ,it may be replied that the history of ,rome1 on which ,i dwelt a moment ago1 shews that arrested progress1 and even decadence1 may be but the prelude to a new period of vigorous growth4 ,so that even those races or nations which seem frozen into eternal immobility may base upon experience their hopes of an awakening spring4 ,i am not sure1 however1 that this is the true interpretation of the facts4 ,there is no spectacle indeed in all history more impressive than the thick darkness settling down over ,western ,europe1 blotting out all but a faint and distorted vision of ,graeco-,roman culture1 and then1 as it slowly rises1 unveiling the variety and rich promise of the modern world4 ,but ,i do not think we should make this unique phenomenon support too weighty a load of theory4 ,i should not infer from it that when some wave of civilisation has apparently spent its force1 we have a right to regard its withdrawing sweep as but the prelude to a new advance4 ,i should rather conjecture that in this particular case we should find1 among other subtle causes of decadence1 some obscure disharmony between the ,imperial system and the temperament of the ,west1 undetected even by those who suffered from it4 ,that system1 though accepted with contentment and even with pride1 though in the days of its greatness it brought civilisation1 commerce1 and security in its train1 must surely have lacked some elements which are needed to foster among ,teutons1 ,celts1 and ,iberians the qualities1 whatever these may be1 on which sustained progress depends4 ,it was perhaps too oriental for the occident1 and it certainly became more oriental as time went on4 ,in the ,east it was1 comparatively speaking1 successful4 ,if there was no progress1 decadence was slow2 and but for what ,western ,europe did1 and what it failed to do1 during the long struggle with militant ,mahommedanism1 there might still be an ,empire in the ,east1 largely ,asiatic in population1 ,christian in religion1 ,greek in culture1 ,roman by political descent4 ,had this been the course of events large portions of mankind would doubtless have been much better governed than they are4 ,it is not so clear that they would have been more #8progressive4' ,progress is with the ,west3 with communities of the ,european type4 ,and if their energy of development is some day to be exhausted1 who can believe that there remains any external source from which it can be renewed8 ,where are the untried races competent to construct out of the ruined fragments of our civilisation a new and better habitation for the spirit of man8 ,they do not exist3 and if the world is again to be buried under a barbaric flood1 it will not be like that which fertilised1 though it first destroyed1 the western provinces of ,rome1 but like that which in ,asia submerged for ever the last traces of ,hellenic culture4 ,we are thus brought back to the question ,i put a few moments since4 ,what grounds are there for supposing that we can escape the fate to which other races have had to submit8 ,if for periods which1 measured on the historic scale1 are of great duration1 communities which have advanced to a certain point appear able to advance no further2 if civilisations wear out1 and races become effete1 why should we expect to progress indefinitely1 why for us alone is the doom of man to be reversed8 ,to these questions ,i have no very satisfactory answers to give1 nor do ,i believe that our knowledge of national or social psychology is sufficient to make a satisfactory answer possible4 ,some purely tentative observations on the point may1 however1 furnish a fitting conclusion to an address which has been tentative throughout1 and aims rather at suggesting trains of thought1 than at completing them4 ,i assume that the factors which combine to make each generation what it is at the moment of its entrance into adult life are in the main twofold4 ,the one produces the raw material of society1 the process of manufacture is effected by the other4 ,the first is physiological inheritance1 the second is the inheritance partly of external conditions of life1 partly of beliefs#b1 traditions1 sentiments1 customs1 laws1 and organisation--all that constitute the social surroundings in which men grow up to maturity4 ,i hazard no conjecture as to the share borne respectively by these two kinds of cause in producing their joint result4 ,nor are we likely to obtain satisfactory evidence on the subject till1 in the interests of science1 two communities of different blood and different traditions consent to exchange their children at birth by a universal process of reciprocal adoption4 ,but even in the absence of so heroic an experiment1 it seems safe to say that the mobility which makes possible either progress or decadence1 resides rather in the causes grouped under the second head than in the physiological material on which education1 in the widest sense of that ambiguous term1 has got to work4 ,if1 as ,i suppose1 acquired qualities are not inherited1 the only causes which could fundamentally modify the physiological character of any particular community are its intermixture with alien races through slavery1 conquest1 or immigration2 or else new conditions which varied the relative proportion in which different sections of the population contributed to its total numbers4 ,if1 for example1 the more successful members of the community had smaller families than the less successful2 or if medical administration succeeded in extinguishing maladies to which persons of a particular constitution were specially liable2 or if one strain in a mixed race had a larger birth rate than another--in these cases and in others like them1 there would doubtless be a change in the physiological factor of national character4 ,but such changes are not likely1 ,i suppose1 to be considerable1 except1 perhaps1 those due to the mixture of races2--and that only in new countries whose economic opportunities tempt immigrants widely differing in culture1 and in capacity for culture1 from those whose citizenship they propose to share4 ,the flexible element in any society1 that which is susceptible of progress or decadence1 must therefore be looked for rather in the physical and psychical conditions affecting the life of its component units1 than in their inherited constitution4 ,this last rather supplies a limit to variations than an element which does itself vary3 though from this point of view its importance is capital4 ,i at least find it quite impossible to believe that any attempt to provide widely different races with an identical environment1 political1 religious1 educational1 what you will1 can ever make them alike4 ,they have been different and unequal since history began2 different and unequal they are destined to remain through future periods of comparable duration4 ,but though the advance of each community is thus limited by its inherited aptitudes1 ,i do not suppose that those limits have ever been reached by its unaided efforts4 ,in the cases where a forward movement has died away1 the pause must in part be due to arrested development in the variable1 not to a fixed resistance in the unchanging factor of national character4 ,either external conditions are unfavourable2 or the sentiments1 customs and beliefs which make society possible have hardened into shapes which make its further self-development impossible2 or through mere weariness of spirit the community resigns itself to a contented1 or perhaps a discontented1 stagnation2 or it shatters itself in pursuit of impossible ideals1 or for other and obscurer reasons1 flags in its endeavours1 and falls short of possible achievement4 ,now ,i am quite unable to offer any such general analysis of the causes by which these hindrances to progress are produced or removed as would furnish a reply to my question4 ,but it may be worth noting that a social force has come into being1 new in magnitude if not in kind1 which must favourably modify such hindrances as come under all but the last of the divisions in which ,i have roughly arranged them4 ,this force is the modern alliance between pure science and industry4 ,that on this we must mainly rely for the improvement of the material conditions under which societies live is in my opinion obvious1 although no one would conjecture it from a historic survey of political controversy4 ,its direct moral effects are less obvious2 indeed there are many most excellent people who would altogether deny their existence4 ,to regard it as a force fitted to rouse and sustain the energies of nations would seem to them absurd3 for this would be to rank it with those other forces which have most deeply stirred the emotions of great communities1 have urged them to the greatest exertions1 have released them most effectually from the benumbing fetters of merely personal preoccupations1--with religion1 patriotism1 and politics4 ,industrial expansion under scientific inspiration1 so far from deserving praise like this1 is in their view1 at best1 but a new source of material well-being1 at worst the prolific parent of physical ugliness in many forms1 machine made wares1 smoky cities1 polluted rivers1 and desecrated landscapes1--appropriately associated with materialism and greed4 ,i believe this view to be utterly misleading1 confounding accident with essence1 transient accompaniments with inseparable characteristics4 ,should we dream of thus judging the other great social forces of which ,i have spoken8 ,are we to ignore what religion has done for the world because it has been the fruitful excuse for the narrowest bigotries and the most cruel persecutions8 ,are we to underrate the worth of politics1 because politics may mean no more than the mindless clash of factions1 or the barren exchange of one set of tyrants or jobbers for another8 ,is patriotism to be despised because its manifestations have been sometimes vulgar1 sometimes selfish1 sometimes brutal1 sometimes criminal8 ,estimates like these seem to me worse than useless4 ,all great social forces are not merely capable of perversion1 they are constantly perverted4 ,yet were they eliminated from our social system1 were each man1 acting on the advice1 which ,voltaire gave but never followed1 to disinterest himself of all that goes on beyond the limits of his own cabbage garden1 decadence ,i take it1 would have already far advanced4 ,but if the proposition ,i am defending may be wrongly criticised1 it is still more likely to be wrongly praised4 ,to some it will commend itself as a eulogy on an industrial as distinguished from a military civilisation3 as a suggestion that in the peaceful pursuit of wealth there is that which of itself may constitute a valuable social tonic4 ,this may be true1 but it is not my contention4 ,in talking of the alliance between industry and science my emphasis is at least as much on the word science as on the word industry4 ,i am not concerned now with the proportion of the population devoted to productive labour1 or the esteem in which they are held4 ,it is on the effects which ,i believe are following1 and are going in yet larger measure to follow1 from the intimate relation between scientific discovery and industrial efficiency1 that ,i most desire to insist4 ,do you then1 it will be asked1 so highly rate the utilitarian aspect of research as to regard it as a source1 not merely of material convenience1 but of spiritual elevation8 ,is it seriously to be ranked with religion and patriotism as an important force for raising men's lives above what is small1 personal1 and self-centred8 ,does it not rather pervert pure knowledge into a new contrivance for making money1 and give a fresh triumph to the #8growing materialism of the age'8 ,i do not myself believe that this age is either less spiritual or more sordid than its predecessors4 ,i believe1 indeed1 precisely the reverse4 ,but however this may be1 is it not plain that if a society is to be moved by the remote speculations of isolated thinkers it can only be on condition that their isolation is not complete8 ,some point of contact they must have with the world in which they live1 and if their influence is to be based on widespread sympathy1 the contact must be in a region where there can be1 if not full mutual comprehension1 at least a large measure of practical agreement and willing co-operation4 ,philosophy has never touched the mass of men except through religion4 ,and1 though the parallel is not complete1 it is safe to say that science will never touch them unaided by its practical applications4 ,its wonders may be catalogued for purposes of education1 they may be illustrated by arresting experiments1 by numbers and magnitudes which startle or fatigue the imagination2 but they will form no familiar portion of the intellectual furniture of ordinary men unless they be connected1 however remotely1 with the conduct of ordinary life4 ,critics have made merry over the naive self-importance which represented man as the centre and final cause of the universe1 and conceived the stupendous mechanism of nature as primarily designed to satisfy his wants and minister to his entertainment4 ,but there is another1 and an opposite1 danger into which it is possible to fall4 ,the material world1 howsoever it may have gained in sublimity1 has1 under the touch of science1 lost 7so to speak7 in domestic charm4 ,except where it affects the immediate needs of organic life1 it may seem so remote from the concerns of men that in the majority it will rouse no curiosity1 while of those who are fascinated by its marvels1 not a few will be chilled by its impersonal and indifferent immensity4 ,for this latter mood only religion or religious philosophy can supply a cure4 ,but for the former1 the appropriate remedy is the perpetual stimulus which the influence of science on the business of mankind offers to their sluggish curiosity4 ,and even now ,i believe this influence to be underrated4 ,if in the last hundred years the whole material setting of civilised life has altered1 we owe it neither to politicians nor to political institutions4 ,we owe it to the combined efforts of those who have advanced science and those who have applied it4 ,if our outlook upon the ,universe has suffered modifications in detail so great and so numerous that they amount collectively to a revolution1 it is to men of science we owe it1 not to theologians or philosophers4 ,on these indeed new and weighty responsibilities are being cast4 ,they have to harmonise and to coordinate1 to prevent the new from being one-sided1 to preserve the valuable essence of what is old4 ,but science is the great instrument of social change1 all the greater because its object is not change but knowledge2 and its silent appropriation of this dominant function1 amid the din of political and religious strife1 is the most vital of all the revolutions which have marked the development of modern civilisation4 ,it may seem fanciful to find in a single recent aspect of this revolution an influence which resembles religion or patriotism in its appeals to the higher side of ordinary characters--especially since we are accustomed to regard the appropriation by industry of scientific discoveries merely as a means of multiplying the material conveniences of life4 ,but if it be remembered that this process brings vast sections of every industrial community into admiring relation with the highest intellectual achievement1 and the most disinterested search for truth2 that those who live by ministering to the common wants of average humanity lean for support on those who search among the deepest mysteries of ,nature2 that their dependence is rewarded by growing success2 that success gives in its turn an incentive to individual effort in no wise to be measured by personal expectation of gain2 that the energies thus aroused may affect the whole character of the community1 spreading the beneficent contagion of hope and high endeavour through channels scarcely known1 to workers#c in fields the most remote2 if all this be borne in mind it may perhaps seem not unworthy of the place ,i have assigned to it4 ,but ,i do not offer this speculation1 whatever be its worth1 as an answer to my original question4 ,it is but an aid to optimism1 not a reply to pessimism4 ,such a reply can only be given by a sociology which has arrived at scientific conclusions on the life-history of different types of society1 and has risen above the empirical and merely interrogative point of view which1 for want of a better1 ,i have adopted in this address4 ,no such sociology exists at present1 or seems likely soon to be created4 ,in its absence the conclusions at which ,i provisionally arrive are that we cannot regard decadence and arrested development as less normal in human communities than progress2 though the point at which the energy of advance is exhausted 7if1 and when it is reached7 varies in different races and civilisations3 that the internal causes by which progress is encouraged1 hindered1 or reversed1 lie to a great extent beyond the field of ordinary political discussion1 and are not easily expressed in current political terminology3 that the influence which a superior civilisation1 whether acting by example or imposed by force1 may have in advancing an inferior one1 though often beneficent1 is not likely to be self supporting2 its withdrawal will be followed by decadence1 unless the character of the civilisation be in harmony both with the acquired temperament and the innate capacities of those who have been induced to accept it3 that as regards those nations which still advance in virtue of their own inherent energies1 though time has brought perhaps new causes of disquiet1 it has brought also new grounds of hope2 and that whatever be the perils in front of us1 there are1 so far1 no symptoms either of pause or of regression in the onward movement which for more than a thousand years has been characteristic of ,western civilisation4 ,,notes3 #a ,the #8,east' is a term most loosely used4 ,it does not here include ,china and ,japan and does include parts of ,africa4 ,the observations which follow have no reference either to the ,jews or to the commercial aristocracies of ,phnician origin4 #b ,beliefs include knowledge4 #c ,this remark arises out of a train of thought suggested by two questions which are very pertinent to the subject of the ,address4 7#a7 ,is a due succession of men above the average in original capacity necessary to maintain social progress8 and 7#b7 ,if so1 can we discover any law according to which such men are produced8 ,i entertain no doubt myself that the answer to the first question should be in the affirmative4 ,democracy is an excellent thing2 but1 though quite consistent with progress1 it is not progressive per se4 ,its value is regulative not dynamic2 and if it meant 7as it never does7 substantial uniformity1 instead of legal equality1 we should become fossilised at once4 ,movement may be controlled or checked by the many2 it is initiated and made effective by the few4 ,if 7for the sake of illustration7 we suppose mental capacity in all its many forms to be mensurable and commensurable1 and then imagine two societies possessing the same average capacity--but an average made up in one case of equal units1 in the other of a majority slightly below the average and a minority much above it1 few could doubt that the second1 not the first1 would show the greatest aptitude for movement4 ,it might go wrong1 but it would go4 ,the second question--how is this originality 7in its higher manifestations called genius7 effectively produced8 is not so simple4 ,excluding education in its narrowest sense--which few would regard as having much to do with the matter--the only alternatives seem to be the following3 ,original capacity may be no more than one of the ordinary variations incidental to heredity4 ,a community may breed a minority thus exceptionally gifted1 as it breeds a minority of men over six feet six4 ,there may be an average decennial output of congenital geniuses as there is an average decennial output of congenital idiots--though the number is likely to be smaller4 ,but if this be the sole cause of the phenomenon1 why does the same race apparently produce many men of genius in one generation and few in another8 ,why are years of abundance so often followed by long periods of sterility8 ,the most obvious explanation of this would seem to be that in some periods circumstances give many openings to genius1 in some periods few4 ,the genius is constantly produced2 but it is only occasionally recognised4 ,in this there must be some truth4 ,a mob orator in ,turkey1 a religious reformer in seventeenth century ,spain1 a military leader in the ,sandwich islands1 would hardly get their chance4 ,yet the theory of opportunity can scarcely be reckoned a complete explanation4 ,for it leaves unaccounted for the variety of genius which has in some countries marked epochs of vigorous national development4 ,athens in the fifth and fourth centuries1 ,florence in the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries1 ,holland in the later sixteenth and seventeenth centuries1 are the typical examples4 ,in such periods the opportunities of statesmen1 soldiers1 orators1 and diplomatists1 may have been specially frequent4 ,but whence came the poets1 the sculptors1 the painters1 the philosophers and the men of letters8 ,what peculiar opportunities had they8 ,the only explanation1 if we reject the idea of a mere coincidence1 seems to be1 that quite apart from opportunity1 the exceptional stir and fervour of national life evokes or may evoke qualities which in ordinary times lie dormant1 unknown even to their possessors4 ,the potential ,miltons are #8mute' and #8inglorious' not because they cannot find a publisher1 but because they have nothing they want to publish4 ,they lack the kind of inspiration which1 on this view1 flows from social surroundings where great things1 though of quite another kind1 are being done and thought4 ,if this theory be true 7and it is not without its difficulties7 one would like to know whether these undoubted outbursts of originality in the higher and rarer form of genius1 are symptomatic of a general rise in the number of persons exhibiting original capacity of a more ordinary type4 ,if so1 then the conclusion would seem to be that some kind of widespread exhilaration or excitement is required in order to enable any community to extract the best results from the raw material transmitted to it by natural inheritance4 ,cambridge3 ,printed at the ,university ,press4 ,transcriber's ,note ,in this file1 text in italics is indicated by underscores4 ,on page #da1 8,greek in culture ,roman by political descent0 was corrected to 8,greek in culture1 ,roman by political descent40