,a ,,treatise ,,on ,,government  ,by    
,aristotle   ,translated ,from ,the     
,greek ,of ,aristotle ,by ,william      
,ellis1 ,a4,m4  ,london  ,toronto       
,published ,by ,j ,m ,dent  ,sons ,ltd4 
,in ,new ,york ,by ,e4 ,p4 ,dutton 4 ,co
  ,first ,issue ,of ,this ,edition #aiab
 ,reprinted #aiai1 #aibc1 #aibh         
,,introduction   ,the ,politics of      
,aristotle is the second part of a      
treatise of which the ,ethics is the    
first part4 ,it looks back to the       
,ethics as the ,ethics looks forward to 
the ,politics4 ,for ,aristotle did not  
separate1 as we are inclined to do1 the 
spheres of the statesman and the        
moralist4 ,in the ,ethics he has        
described the character necessary for   
the good life1 but that life is for him 
essentially to be lived in society1 and 
when in the last chapters of the ,ethics
 he comes to the practical application  
of his inquiries1 that finds expression 
not in moral exhortations addressed to  
the individual but in a description of  

the legislative opportunities of the    
statesman4 ,it is the legislator's task 
to frame a society which shall make the 
good life possible4 ,politics for       
,aristotle is not a struggle between    
individuals or classes for power1 nor a 
device for getting done such elementary 
tasks as the maintenance of order and   
security without too great encroachments
 on individual liberty4 ,the state is a 
community of well-being in families and 
aggregations of families for the sake of
 a perfect and self-sufficing life4 ,the
 legislator is a craftsman whose        
material is society and whose aim is the
 good life4  ,in an early dialogue of   
,plato's1 the ,protagoras1 ,socrates    
asks ,protagoras why it is not as easy  
to find teachers of virtue as it is to  
find teachers of swordsmanship1 riding1 
or any other art4 ,protagoras' answer is
 that there are no special teachers of  
virtue1 because virtue is taught by the 
whole community4 ,plato and ,aristotle  
both accept the view of moral education 

implied in this answer4 ,in a passage of
 the ,republic 7#dib b7 ,plato          
repudiates the notion that the sophists 
have a corrupting moral influence upon  
young men4 ,the public themselves1 he   
says1 are the real sophists and the most
 complete and thorough educators4 ,no   
private education can hold out against  
the irresistible force of public opinion
 and the ordinary moral standards of    
society4 ,but that makes it all the more
 essential that public opinion and      
social environment should not be left to
 grow up at haphazard as they ordinarily
 do1 but should be made by the wise     
legislator the expression of the good   
and be informed in all their details by 
his knowledge4 ,the legislator is the   
only possible teacher of virtue4  ,such 
a programme for a treatise on government
 might lead us to expect in the         
,politics mainly a description of a     
,utopia or ideal state which might      
inspire poets or philosophers but have  
little direct effect upon political     

institutions4 ,plato's ,republic is     
obviously impracticable1 for its author 
had turned away in despair from existing
 politics4 ,he has no proposals1 in that
 dialogue at least1 for making the best 
of things as they are4 ,the first lesson
 his philosopher has to learn is to turn
 away from this world of becoming and   
decay1 and to look upon the unchanging  
eternal world of ideas4 ,thus his ideal 
city is1 as he says1 a pattern laid up  
in heaven by which the just man may rule
 his life1 a pattern therefore in the   
meantime for the individual and not for 
the statesman4 ,it is a city1 he admits 
in the ,laws1 for gods or the children  
of gods1 not for men as they are4       
,aristotle has none of the high         
enthusiasm or poetic imagination of     
,plato4 ,he is even unduly impatient of 
,plato's idealism1 as is shown by the   
criticisms in the second book4 ,but he  
has a power to see the possibilities of 
good in things that are imperfect1 and  
the patience of the true politician who 

has learned that if he would make men   
what they ought to be1 he must take them
 as he finds them4 ,his ideal is        
constructed not of pure reason or       
poetry1 but from careful and sympathetic
 study of a wide range of facts4 ,his   
criticism of ,plato in the light of     
history1 in ,book ,,ii4 chap1 v41 though
 as a criticism it is curiously inept1  
reveals his own attitude admirably3 ,let
 us remember that we should not         
disregard the experience of ages2 in the
 multitude of years1 these things1 if   
they were good1 would certainly not have
 been unknown2 for almost everything has
 been found out1 although sometimes they
 are not put together2 in other cases   
men do not use the knowledge which they 
have4 ,aristotle in his ,constitutions  
had made a study of one hundred and     
fifty-eight constitutions of the states 
of his day1 and the fruits of that study
 are seen in the continual reference to 
concrete political experience1 which    
makes the ,politics in some respects a  

critical history of the workings of the 
institutions of the ,greek city state4  
,in ,books ,,iv41 ,v41 and ,,vi4 the    
ideal state seems far away1 and we find 
a dispassionate survey of imperfect     
states1 the best ways of preserving     
them1 and an analysis of the causes of  
their instability4 ,it is as though     
,aristotle were saying3 ,i have shown   
you the proper and normal type of       
constitution1 but if you will not have  
it and insist on living under a         
perverted form1 you may as well know how
 to make the best of it4 ,in this way   
the ,politics1 though it defines the    
state in the light of its ideal1        
discusses states and institutions as    
they are4 ,ostensibly it is merely a    
continuation of the ,ethics1 but it     
comes to treat political questions from 
a purely political standpoint4  ,this   
combination of idealism and respect for 
the teachings of experience constitutes 
in some ways the strength and value of  
the ,politics1 but it also makes it     

harder to follow4 ,the large nation     
states to which we are accustomed make  
it difficult for us to think that the   
state could be constructed and modelled 
to express the good life4 ,we can       
appreciate ,aristotle's critical        
analysis of constitutions1 but find it  
hard to take seriously his advice to the
 legislator4 ,moreover1 the idealism and
 the empiricism of the ,politics are    
never really reconciled by ,aristotle   
himself4  ,it may help to an            
understanding of the ,politics if       
something is said on those two points4  
,we are accustomed since the growth of  
the historical method to the belief that
 states are not made but grow1 and are  
apt to be impatient with the belief     
which ,aristotle and ,plato show in the 
powers of the lawgiver4 ,but however    
true the maxim may be of the modern     
nation state1 it was not true of the    
much smaller and more self-conscious    
,greek city4 ,when ,aristotle talks of  
the legislator1 he is not talking in the

 air4 ,students of the ,academy had been
 actually called on to give new         
constitutions to ,greek states4 ,for the
 ,greeks the constitution was not merely
 as it is so often with us1 a matter of 
political machinery4 ,it was regarded as
 a way of life4 ,further1 the           
constitution within the framework of    
which the ordinary process of           
administration and passing of decrees   
went on1 was always regarded as the work
 of a special man or body of men1 the   
lawgivers4 ,if we study ,greek history1 
we find that the position of the        
legislator corresponds to that assigned 
to him by ,plato and ,aristotle4 ,all   
,greek states1 except those perversions 
which ,aristotle criticises as being    
above law1 worked under rigid           
constitutions1 and the constitution was 
only changed when the whole people gave 
a commission to a lawgiver to draw up a 
new one4 ,such was the position of the  
,a,esumnetes1 whom ,aristotle describes 
in ,book ,,iii4 chap1 xiv41 in earlier  

times1 and of the pupils of the ,academy
 in the fourth century4 ,the lawgiver   
was not an ordinary politician4 ,he was 
a state doctor1 called in to prescribe  
for an ailing constitution4 ,so         
,herodotus recounts that when the people
 of ,cyrene asked the oracle of ,delphi 
to help them in their dissensions1 the  
oracle told them to go to ,mantinea1 and
 the ,mantineans lent them ,demonax1 who
 acted as a setter straight and drew up 
a new constitution for ,cyrene4 ,so     
again the ,milesians1 ,herodotus tells  
us1 were long troubled by civil discord1
 till they asked help from ,paros1 and  
the ,parians sent ten commissioners who 
gave ,miletus a new constitution4 ,so   
the ,athenians1 when they were founding 
their model new colony at ,thurii1      
employed ,hippodamus of ,miletus1 whom  
,aristotle mentions in ,book ,,ii1 as   
the best expert in town-planning1 to    
plan the streets of the city1 and       
,protagoras as the best expert in       
law-making1 to give the city its laws4  

,in the ,laws ,plato represents one of  
the persons of the dialogue as having   
been asked by the people of ,gortyna to 
draw up laws for a colony which they    
were founding4 ,the situation described 
must have occurred frequently in actual 
life4 ,the ,greeks thought              
administration should be democratic and 
law-making the work of experts4 ,we     
think more naturally of law-making as   
the special right of the people and     
administration as necessarily confined  
to experts4  ,aristotle's ,politics1    
then1 is a handbook for the legislator1 
the expert who is to be called in when a
 state wants help4 ,we have called him a
 state doctor4 ,it is one of the most   
marked characteristics of ,greek        
political theory that ,plato and        
,aristotle think of the statesman as one
 who has knowledge of what ought to be  
done1 and can help those who call him in
 to prescribe for them1 rather than one 
who has power to control the forces of  
society4 ,the desire of society for the 

statesman's advice is taken for granted1
 ,plato in the ,republic says that a    
good constitution is only possible when 
the ruler does not want to rule2 where  
men contend for power1 where they have  
not learnt to distinguish between the   
art of getting hold of the helm of state
 and the art of steering1 which alone is
 statesmanship1 true politics is        
impossible4  ,with this position much   
that ,aristotle has to say about        
government is in agreement4 ,he assumes 
the characteristic ,platonic view that  
all men seek the good1 and go wrong     
through ignorance1 not through evil     
will1 and so he naturally regards the   
state as a community which exists for   
the sake of the good life4 ,it is in the
 state that that common seeking after   
the good which is the profoundest truth 
about men and nature becomes explicit   
and knows itself4 ,the state is for     
,aristotle prior to the family and the  
village1 although it succeeds them in   
time1 for only when the state with its  

conscious organisation is reached can   
man understand the secret of his past   
struggles after something he knew not   
what4 ,if primitive society is          
understood in the light of the state1   
the state is understood in the light of 
its most perfect form1 when the good    
after which all societies are seeking is
 realised in its perfection4 ,hence for 
,aristotle as for ,plato1 the natural   
state or the state as such is the ideal 
state1 and the ideal state is the       
starting-point of political inquiry4    
,in accordance with the same line of    
thought1 imperfect states1 although     
called perversions1 are regarded by     
,aristotle as the result rather of      
misconception and ignorance than of     
perverse will4 ,they all represent1 he  
says1 some kind of justice4 ,oligarchs  
and democrats go wrong in their         
conception of the good4 ,they have come 
short of the perfect state through      
misunderstanding of the end or through  
ignorance of the proper means to the    

end4 ,but if they are states at all1    
they embody some common conception of   
the good1 some common aspirations of all
 their members4  ,the ,greek doctrine   
that the essence of the state consists  
in community of purpose is the          
counterpart of the notion often held in 
modern times that the essence of the    
state is force4 ,the existence of force 
is for ,plato and ,aristotle a sign not 
of the state but of the state's failure4
 ,it comes from the struggle between    
conflicting misconceptions of the good4 
,in so far as men conceive the good     
rightly they are united4 ,the state     
represents their common agreement1 force
 their failure to make that agreement   
complete4 ,the cure1 therefore1 of      
political ills is knowledge of the good 
life1 and the statesman is he who has   
such knowledge1 for that alone can give 
men what they are always seeking4  ,if  
the state is the organisation of men    
seeking a common good1 power and        
political position must be given to     

those who can forward this end4 ,this is
 the principle expressed in ,aristotle's
 account of political justice1 the      
principle of tools to those who can use 
them4 ,as the aim of the state is       
differently conceived1 the              
qualifications for government will vary4
 ,in the ideal state power will be given
 to the man with most knowledge of the  
good2 in other states to the men who are
 most truly capable of achieving that   
end which the citizens have set         
themselves to pursue4 ,the justest      
distribution of political power is that 
in which there is least waste of        
political ability4  ,further1 the belief
 that the constitution of a state is    
only the outward expression of the      
common aspirations and beliefs of its   
members1 explains the paramount         
political importance which ,aristotle   
assigns to education4 ,it is the great  
instrument by which the legislator can  
ensure that the future citizens of his  
state will share those common beliefs   

which make the state possible4 ,the     
,greeks with their small states had a   
far clearer apprehension than we can    
have of the dependence of a constitution
 upon the people who have to work it4   
,such is in brief the attitude in which 
,aristotle approaches political         
problems1 but in working out its        
application to men and institutions as  
they are1 ,aristotle admits certain     
compromises which are not really        
consistent with it4  #a4 ,aristotle     
thinks of membership of a state as      
community in pursuit of the good4 ,he   
wishes to confine membership in it to   
those who are capable of that pursuit in
 the highest and most explicit manner4  
,his citizens1 therefore1 must be men of
 leisure1 capable of rational thought   
upon the end of life4 ,he does not      
recognise the significance of that less 
conscious but deep-seated membership of 
the state which finds its expression in 
loyalty and patriotism4 ,his definition 
of citizen includes only a small part of

 the population of any ,greek city4 ,he 
is forced to admit that the state is not
 possible without the co-operation of   
men whom he will not admit to membership
 in it1 either because they are not     
capable of sufficient rational          
appreciation of political ends1 like the
 barbarians whom he thought were natural
 slaves1 or because the leisure         
necessary for citizenship can only be   
gained by the work of the artisans who  
by that very work make themselves       
incapable of the life which they make   
possible for others4 ,the artisan only  
attains excellence in proportion as he  
becomes a slave1 and the slave is only a
 living instrument of the good life4 ,he
 exists for the state1 but the state    
does not exist for him4  #b4 ,aristotle 
in his account of the ideal state seems 
to waver between two ideals4 ,there is  
the ideal of an aristocracy and the     
ideal of what he calls constitutional   
government1 a mixed constitution4 ,the  
principle of tools to those who can use 

them ought to lead him1 as it does      
,plato1 to an aristocracy4 ,those who   
have complete knowledge of the good must
 be few1 and therefore ,plato gave      
entire power in his state into the hands
 of the small minority of philosopher   
guardians4 ,it is in accordance with    
this principle that ,aristotle holds    
that kingship is the proper form of     
government when there is in the state   
one man of transcendent virtue4 ,at the 
same time1 ,aristotle always holds that 
absolute government is not properly     
political1 that government is not like  
the rule of a shepherd over his sheep1  
but the rule of equals over equals4 ,he 
admits that the democrats are right in  
insisting that equality is a necessary  
element in the state1 though he thinks  
they do not admit the importance of     
other equally necessary elements4 ,hence
 he comes to say that ruling and being  
ruled over by turns is an essential     
feature of constitutional government1   
which he admits as an alternative to    

aristocracy4 ,the end of the state1     
which is to be the standard of the      
distribution of political power1 is     
conceived sometimes as a good for the   
apprehension and attainment of which    
virtue is necessary and sufficient 7this
 is the principle of aristocracy71 and  
sometimes as a more complex good1 which 
needs for its attainment not only virtue
 but wealth and equality4 ,this latter  
conception is the principle on which the
 mixed constitution is based4 ,this in  
its distribution of political power     
gives some weight to virtue1 some to    
wealth1 and some to mere number4 ,but   
the principle of ruling and being ruled 
by turns is not really compatible with  
an unmodified principle of tools to     
those who can use them4 ,aristotle is   
right in seeing that political          
government demands equality1 not in the 
sense that all members of the state     
should be equal in ability or should    
have equal power1 but in the sense that 
none of them can properly be regarded   

simply as tools with which the          
legislator works1 that each has a right 
to say what will be made of his own     
life4 ,the analogy between the          
legislator and the craftsman on which   
,plato insists1 breaks down because the 
legislator is dealing with men like     
himself1 men who can to some extent     
conceive their own end in life and      
cannot be treated merely as means to the
 end of the legislator4 ,the sense of   
the value of ruling and being ruled in  
turn is derived from the experience that
 the ruler may use his power to         
subordinate the lives of the citizens of
 the state not to the common good but to
 his own private purposes4 ,in modern   
terms1 it is a simple1 rough-and-ready  
attempt to solve that constant problem  
of politics1 how efficient government is
 to be combined with popular control4   
,this problem arises from the           
imperfection of human nature1 apparent  
in rulers as well as in ruled1 and if   
the principle which attempts to solve it

 be admitted as a principle of          
importance in the formation of the best 
constitution1 then the starting-point of
 politics will be man's actual          
imperfection1 not his ideal nature4     
,instead1 then1 of beginning with a     
state which would express man's ideal   
nature1 and adapting it as well as may  
be to man's actual shortcomings from    
that ideal1 we must recognise that the  
state and all political machinery are as
 much the expression of man's weakness  
as of his ideal possibilities4 ,the     
state is possible only because men have 
common aspirations1 but government1 and 
political power1 the existence of       
officials who are given authority to act
 in the name of the whole state1 are    
necessary because men's community is    
imperfect1 because man's social nature  
expresses itself in conflicting ways1 in
 the clash of interests1 the rivalry of 
parties1 and the struggle of classes1   
instead of in the united seeking after a
 common good4 ,plato and ,aristotle were

 familiar with the legislator who was   
called in by the whole people1 and they 
tended therefore to take the general    
will or common consent of the people for
 granted4 ,most political questions are 
concerned with the construction and     
expression of the general will1 and with
 attempts to ensure that the political  
machinery made to express the general   
will shall not be exploited for private 
or sectional ends4  ,aristotle's mixed  
constitution springs from a recognition 
of sectional interests in the state4    
,for the proper relation between the    
claims of virtue1 wealth1 and numbers is
 to be based not upon their relative    
importance in the good life1 but upon   
the strength of the parties which they  
represent4 ,the mixed constitution is   
practicable in a state where the middle 
class is strong1 as only the middle     
class can mediate between the rich and  
the poor4 ,the mixed constitution will  
be stable if it represents the actual   
balance of power between different      

classes in the state4 ,when we come to  
,aristotle's analysis of existing       
constitutions1 we find that while he    
regards them as imperfect approximations
 to the ideal1 he also thinks of them as
 the result of the struggle between     
classes4 ,democracy1 he explains1 is the
 government not of the many but of the  
poor2 oligarchy a government not of the 
few but of the rich4 ,and each class is 
thought of1 not as trying to express an 
ideal1 but as struggling to acquire     
power or maintain its position4 ,if ever
 the class existed in unredeemed        
nakedness1 it was in the ,greek cities  
of the fourth century1 and its existence
 is abundantly recognised by ,aristotle4
 ,his account of the causes of          
revolutions in ,book ,v4 shows how far  
were the existing states of ,greece from
 the ideal with which he starts4 ,his   
analysis of the facts forces him to look
 upon them as the scene of struggling   
factions4 ,the causes of revolutions are
 not described as primarily changes in  

the conception of the common good1 but  
changes in the military or economic     
power of the several classes in the     
state4 ,the aim which he sets before    
oligarchs or democracies is not the good
 life1 but simple stability or          
permanence of the existing constitution4
  ,with this spirit of realism which    
pervades ,books ,,iv41 ,v41 and ,,vi4   
the idealism of ,books ,i41 ,,ii41      
,,vii41 and ,,viii4 is never reconciled4
 ,aristotle is content to call existing 
constitutions perversions of the true   
form4 ,but we cannot read the ,politics 
without recognising and profiting from  
the insight into the nature of the state
 which is revealed throughout4          
,aristotle's failure does not lie in    
this1 that he is both idealist and      
realist1 but that he keeps these two    
tendencies too far apart4 ,he thinks too
 much of his ideal state1 as something  
to be reached once for all by knowledge1
 as a fixed type to which actual states 
approximate or from which they are      

perversions4 ,but if we are to think of 
actual politics as intelligible in the  
light of the ideal1 we must think of    
that ideal as progressively revealed in 
history1 not as something to be         
discovered by turning our back on       
experience and having recourse to       
abstract reasoning4 ,if we stretch      
forward from what exists to an ideal1 it
 is to a better which may be in its turn
 transcended1 not to a single immutable 
best4 ,aristotle found in the society of
 his time men who were not capable of   
political reflection1 and who1 as he    
thought1 did their best work under      
superintendence4 ,he therefore called   
them natural slaves4 ,for1 according to 
,aristotle1 that is a man's natural     
condition in which he does his best     
work4 ,but ,aristotle also thinks of    
nature as something fixed and immutable2
 and therefore sanctions the institution
 of slavery1 which assumes that what men
 are that they will always be1 and sets 
up an artificial barrier to their ever  

becoming anything else4 ,we see in      
,aristotle's defence of slavery how the 
conception of nature as the ideal can   
have a debasing influence upon views of 
practical politics4 ,his high ideal of  
citizenship offers to those who can     
satisfy its claims the prospect of a    
fair life2 those who fall short are     
deemed to be different in nature and    
shut out entirely from approach to the  
ideal4   ,a4 ,d4 ,,lindsay4             
,,bibliography  ,first edition of works 
7with omission of ,rhetorica1 ,poetica1 
and second book of ,o,economica71 #e    
vols4 by ,aldus ,manutius1 ,venice1     
#adie-h2 re-impression supervised by    
,erasmus and with certain corrections by
 ,grynaeus 7including ,rhetorica and    
,poetica71 #aeca1 #aeci1 revised #aeej2 
later editions were followed by that of 
,immanuel ,bekker and ,brandis 7,greek  
and ,latin71 #e vols4 ,the #eth vol4    
contains the ,index by ,bonitz1         
#ahca-gj2 ,didot edition 7,greek and    
,latin71 #e vols4 #ahdh-gd4  ,,english  

,,translations3 ,edited by ,t4 ,taylor1 
with ,porphyry's ,introduction1 #i      
vols41 #ahab2 under editorship of ,j4   
,a4 ,smith and ,w4 ,d4 ,ross1 #aijh4    
,later editions of separate works3  ,de 
,anima3 ,torstrik1 #ahfb2               
,trendelenburg1 #bnd edition1 #ahgg1    
with ,english translation1 ,e4 ,wallace1
 #ahhb2 ,biehl1 #ahhd1 #ahif2 with      
,english1 ,r4 ,d4 ,hicks1 #aijg4        
,ethica3 ,j4 ,s4 ,brewer 7,nicomachean71
 #ahcf2 ,w4 ,e4 ,jelf1 #ahef2 ,j4 ,e4   
,t4 ,rogers1 #ahfe2 ,a4 ,grant1 #aheg-h1
 #ahff1 #ahgd1 #ahhe2 ,e4 ,moore1 #ahga1
 #ahgh1 #dth edition1 #ahij2 ,ramsauer  
7,nicomachean71 #ahgh1 ,susemihl1 #ahgh1
 #ahhj1 revised by ,o4 ,apelt1 #aijc2   
,a4 ,grant1 #ahhe2 ,i4 ,bywater         
7,nicomachean71 #ahij2 ,j4 ,burnet1     
#aijj4  ,historia ,animalium3           
,schneider1 #ahab2 ,aubert and ,wimmer1 
#ahfj1 ,dittmeyer1 #aijg4  ,metaphysica3
 ,schwegler1 #ahdh2 ,w4 ,christ1 #ahii4 
,organon3 ,waitz1 #ahdd-f4  ,poetica3   
,vahlen1 #ahfg1 #ahgd1 with ,notes by   

,e4 ,moore1 #ahge2 with ,english        
translation by ,e4 ,r4 ,wharton1 #ahhc1 
#ahhe2 ,uberweg1 #ahgj1 #ahge2 with     
,german translation1 ,susemihl1 #ahgd2  
,schmidt1 #ahge2 ,christ1 #ahgh2 ,i4    
,bywater1 #ahih2 ,t4 ,g4 ,tucker1 #ahii4
  ,de ,republics1 ,atheniensium3 ,text  
and facsimile of ,papyrus1 ,f4 ,g4      
,kenyon1 #ahia1 #crd edition1 #ahib2    
,kaibel and ,wilamowitz--,moel-lendorf1 
#ahia1 #crd edition1 #ahih2 ,van        
,herwerden and ,leeuwen 7from ,kenyon's 
text71 #ahia2 ,blass1 #ahib1 #ahie1     
#ahih1 #aijc2 ,j4 ,e4 ,sandys1 #ahic4   
,politica3 ,susemihl1 #ahgb2 with       
,german1 #ahgh1 #crd edition1 #ahhb2    
,susemihl and ,hicks1 #ahid1 etc42 ,o4  
,immisch1 #aiji4  ,physica3 ,c4 ,prantl1
 #ahgi4  ,rhetorica3 ,stahr1 #ahfb2     
,sprengel 7with ,latin text71 #ahfg2    
,cope and ,sandys1 #ahgg2 ,roemer1      
#ahhe1 #ahih4  ,,english ,,translations 
,,of ,,one ,,or ,,more ,,works3 ,de     
,anima 7with ,parva ,naturalia71 by ,w4 
,a4 ,hammond1 #aijb4 ,ethica3 ,of       

,morals to ,nicomachus1 by ,e4          
,pargiter1 #agde2 with ,politica1 by ,j4
 ,gillies1 #agig1 #ahjd1 #ahac2 with    
,rhetorica and ,poetica1 by ,t4 ,taylor1
 #ahah1 and later editions4 ,nicomachean
 ,ethics1 #ahai2 mainly from text of    
,bekker1 by ,d4 ,p4 ,chase1 #ahdg2      
revised #ahfa1 and later editions with  
an introductory essay by ,g4 ,h4 ,lewes 
7,camelot ,classics71 #ahij2 re-edited  
by ,j4 ,m4 ,mitchell 7,new ,universal   
,library71 #aijf1 #aiaj2 with an        
introductory essay by ,prof4 ,j4,h4     
,smith 7,everyman's ,library71 #aiaa2 by
 ,r4,w4,browne 7,bohn's ,classical      
,library71 #ahdh1 etc42 by ,r4          
,williams1 #ahfi1 #ahgf2 by ,w4 ,m4     
,hatch and others 7with translation of  
paraphrase attributed to ,andronicus of 
,rhodes71 edited by ,e4 ,hatch1 #ahgi2  
by ,f1 ,h4 ,peters1 #ahha2 ,j4 ,e4 ,c4  
,welldon1 #ahib2 ,j4 ,gillies           
7,lubbock's ,hundred ,books71 #ahic4    
,historia ,animalium1 by ,r4 ,creswell  
7,bohn's ,classical ,library71 #ahdh2   

with ,treatise on ,physiognomy1 by ,t4  
,taylor1 #ahji4 ,metaphysica1 by ,t4    
,taylor1 #ahja2 by ,j4 ,h4 ,m',mahon    
7,bohn's ,classical ,library71 #ahdh4   
,organon1 with ,porphyry's              
,introduction1 by ,o4 ,f4 ,owen 7,bohn's
 ,classical ,library71 #ahdh4 ,posterior
 ,analytics1 ,e4 ,poste1 #ahej2 ,e4 ,s4 
,bourchier1 #aija2 ,on ,fallacies1 ,e4  
,poste1 #ahff4 ,parva ,naturalia 7,greek
 and ,english71 by ,g4 ,r4 ,t4 ,ross1   
#aijf2 with ,de ,anima1 by ,w4 ,a4      
,hammond1 #aijb4 ,youth and ,old ,age1  
,life and ,death and ,respiration1 ,w4  
,ogle1 #ahig4 ,poetica1 with ,notes from
 the ,french of ,d',acier1 #agje2 by ,h4
 ,j4 ,pye1 #aghh1 #agib2 ,t4 ,twining1  
#aghi1ahab1 with ,preface and ,notes by 
,h4 ,hamilton1 #ahea2 ,treatise on      
,rhetorica and ,poetica1 by ,t4 ,hobbes 
7,bohn's ,classical ,library71 #ahej2 by
 ,wharton1 #ahhc 7see ,greek version71  
,s4 ,h4 ,butcher1 #ahie1 #ahih1 #crd    
edition1 #aijb2 ,e4 ,s4 ,bourchier1     
#aijg2 by ,ingram ,bywater1 #aiji4 ,de  

,partibus ,animalium1 ,w4 ,ogle1 #ahhb4 
,de ,republica ,athenientium1 by ,e4    
,poste1 #ahia2 ,f4 ,g4 ,kenyon1 #ahia2  
,t4 ,j4 ,dymes1 #ahia4 ,de ,virtutibus  
et ,vitiis1 by ,w4 ,bridgman1 #ahjd4    
,politica1 from the ,french of ,regius1 
#aeih2 by ,w4 ,ellis1 #aggf1 #aggh1     
#ahhh 7,morley's ,universal ,library71  
#ahic 7,lubbock's ,hundred ,books72 by  
,e4 ,walford 7with ,a,economics1 and    
,life by ,dr4 ,gillies7 7,bohn's        
,classical ,library71 #ahdh2 ,j4 ,e4 ,c4
 ,welldon1 #ahhc2 ,b4 ,jowett1 #ahhe2   
with ,introduction and ,index by ,h4 ,w4
 ,c4 ,davis1 #aije2 ,books i4 iii4 iv4  
7vii47 from ,bekker's text by ,w4 ,e4   
,bolland1 with ,introduction by ,a4     
,lang1 #ahgg4 ,problemata 7with writings
 of other philosophers71 #aeig1 #afjg1  
#afhj1 #afhd1 etc4 ,rhetorica3 ,a       
summary by ,t4 ,hobbes1 #afee 7871 new  
edition1 #agei2 by the translators of   
the ,art of ,thinking1 #afhf1 #ahaf2 by 
,d4 ,m4 ,crimmin1 #ahab2 ,j4 ,gillies1  
#ahbc2 ,anon4 #ahdg2 ,j4 ,e4 ,c4        

,welldon1 #ahhf2 ,r4 ,c4 ,jebb1 with    
,introduction and ,supplementary ,notes 
by ,j4 ,e4 ,sandys1 #aiji 7see under    
,poetica and ,ethica74 ,secreta         
,secretorum 7supposititious work71      
,anon4 #agjb2 from the ,hebrew version  
by ,m4 ,gaster1 #aijg1 #aijh4 ,version  
by ,lydgate and ,burgh1 edited by ,r4   
,steele 7,e4,e4,t4,s471 #ahid1 #ahih4   
,,life1 ,,etc43 ,j4 ,w4 ,blakesley1     
#ahci2 ,a ,crichton 7,jardine's         
,naturalist's ,library71 #ahdc2 ,j4 ,s4 
,blackie1 ,four ,phases of ,morals1     
,socrates1 ,aristotle1 etc41 #ahga2 ,g4 
,grote1 ,aristotle1 edited by ,a4 ,bain 
and ,g4 ,c4 ,robertson1 #ahgb1 #ahhj2   
,e4 ,wallace1 ,outlines of the          
,philosophy of ,aristotle1 #ahge1 #ahhj2
 ,a4 ,grant 7,ancient ,classics for     
,english readers71 #ahgg2 ,t4 ,davidson1
 ,aristotle and ,ancient ,educational   
,ideals 7,great ,educators71 #ahib4     
,a ,,treatise ,,on ,,government         
,,book ,i     ,,chapter ,i   ,as we see 
that every city is a society1 and every 

society ,ed4 is established for some    
good purpose2 for an apparent ,bekker   
#abeb;a good is the spring of all human 
actions2 it is evident that this is the 
principle upon which they are every one 
founded1 and this is more especially    
true of that which has for its object   
the best possible1 and is itself the    
most excellent1 and comprehends all the 
rest4 ,now this is called a city1 and   
the society thereof a political society2
 for those who think that the principles
 of a political1 a regal1 a family1 and 
a herile government are the same are    
mistaken1 while they suppose that each  
of these differ in the numbers to whom  
their power extends1 but not in their   
constitution3 so that with them a herile
 government is one composed of a very   
few1 a domestic of more1 a civil and a  
regal of still more1 as if there was no 
difference between a large family and a 
small city1 or that a regal government  
and a political one are the same1 only  
that in the one a single person is      

continually at the head of public       
affairs2 in the other1 that each member 
of the state has in his turn a share in 
the government1 and is at one time a    
magistrate1 at another a private person1
 according to the rules of political    
science4 ,but now this is not true1 as  
will be evident to any one who will     
consider this question in the most      
approved method4 ,as1 in an inquiry into
 every other subject1 it is necessary to
 separate the different parts of which  
it is compounded1 till we arrive at     
their first elements1 which are the most
 minute parts thereof2 so by the same   
proceeding we shall acquire a knowledge 
of the primary parts of a city and see  
wherein they differ from each other1 and
 whether the rules of art will give us  
any assistance in examining into each of
 these things which are mentioned4      
,,chapter ,,ii   ,now if in this        
particular science any one would attend 
to its original seeds1 and their first  
shoot1 he would then as in others have  

the subject perfectly before him2 and   
perceive1 in the first place1 that it is
 requisite that those should be joined  
together whose species cannot exist     
without each other1 as the male and the 
female1 for the business of propagation2
 and this not through choice1 but by    
that natural impulse which acts both    
upon plants and animals also1 for the   
purpose of their leaving behind them    
others like themselves4 ,it is also from
 natural causes that some beings command
 and others obey1 that each may obtain  
their mutual safety2 for a being who is 
endowed with a mind capable of          
reflection and forethought is by nature 
the superior and governor1 whereas he   
whose excellence is merely corporeal is 
formect to be a slave2 whence it follows
 that the different state of master     
#abeb;b and slave is equally            
advantageous to both4 ,but there is a   
natural difference between a female and 
a slave3 for nature is not like the     
artists who make the ,delphic swords for

 the use of the poor1 but for every     
particular purpose she has her separate 
instruments1 and thus her ends are most 
complete1 for whatsoever is employed on 
one subject only1 brings that one to    
much greater perfection than when       
employed on many2 and yet among the     
barbarians1 a female and a slave are    
upon a level in the community1 the      
reason for which is1 that amongst them  
there are none qualified by nature to   
govern1 therefore their society can be  
nothing but between slaves of different 
sexes4 ,for which reason the poets say1 
it is proper for the ,greeks to govern  
the barbarians1 as if a barbarian and a 
slave were by nature one4 ,now of these 
two societies the domestic is the first1
 and ,hesiod is right when he says1     
,first a house1 then a wife1 then an ox 
for the plough1 for the poor man has    
always an ox before a household slave4  
,that society then which nature has     
established for daily support is the    
domestic1 and those who compose it are  

called by ,charondas homosipuoi1 and by 
,epimenides the ,cretan homokapnoi2 but 
the society of many families1 which was 
first instituted for their lasting1     
mutual advantage1 is called a village1  
and a village is most naturally composed
 of the descendants of one family1 whom 
some persons call homogalaktes1 the     
children and the children's children    
thereof3 for which reason cities were   
originally governed by kings1 as the    
barbarian states now are1 which are     
composed of those who had before        
submitted to kingly government2 for     
every family is governed by the elder1  
as are the branches thereof1 on account 
of their relationship thereunto1 which  
is what ,homer says1 ,each one ruled his
 wife and child2 and in this scattered  
manner they formerly lived4 ,and the    
opinion which universally prevails1 that
 the gods themselves are subject to     
kingly government1 arises from hence1   
that all men formerly were1 and many are
 so now2 and as they imagined themselves

 to be made in the likeness of the gods1
 so they supposed their manner of life  
must needs be the same4 ,and when many  
villages so entirely join themselves    
together as in every respect to form but
 one society1 that society is a city1   
and contains in itself1 if ,i may so    
speak1 the end and perfection of        
government3 first founded that we might 
live1 but continued that we may live    
happily4 ,for which reason every city   
must be allowed to be the work of       
nature1 if we admit that the original   
society between male and female is2 for 
to this as their end all subordinate    
societies tend1 and the end of          
everything is the nature of it4 ,for    
what every being is in its most perfect 
state1 that certainly is the nature of  
that being1 whether it be a man1 a      
horse1 or a house3 besides1 whatsoever  
produces the final cause and the end    
which we #abec;a desire1 must be best2  
but a government complete in itself is  
that final cause and what is best4      

,hence it is evident that a city is a   
natural production1 and that man is     
naturally a political animal1 and that  
whosoever is naturally and not          
accidentally unfit for society1 must be 
either inferior or superior to man3 thus
 the man in ,homer1 who is reviled for  
being without society1 without law1     
without family4 ,such a one must        
naturally be of a quarrelsome           
disposition1 and as solitary as the     
birds4 ,the gift of speech also         
evidently proves that man is a more     
social animal than the bees1 or any of  
the herding cattle3 for nature1 as we   
say1 does nothing in vain1 and man is   
the only animal who enjoys it4 ,voice   
indeed1 as being the token of pleasure  
and pain1 is imparted to others also1   
and thus much their nature is capable   
of1 to perceive pleasure and pain1 and  
to impart these sensations to others2   
but it is by speech that we are enabled 
to express what is useful for us1 and   
what is hurtful1 and of course what is  

just and what is unjust3 for in this    
particular man differs from other       
animals1 that he alone has a perception 
of good and evil1 of just and unjust1   
and it is a participation of these      
common sentiments which forms a family  
and a city4 ,besides1 the notion of a   
city naturally precedes that of a family
 or an individual1 for the whole must   
necessarily be prior to the parts1 for  
if you take away the whole man1 you     
cannot say a foot or a hand remains1    
unless by equivocation1 as supposing a  
hand of stone to be made1 but that would
 only be a dead one2 but everything is  
understood to be this or that by its    
energic qualities and powers1 so that   
when these no longer remain1 neither can
 that be said to be the same1 but       
something of the same name4 ,that a city
 then precedes an individual is plain1  
for if an individual is not in himself  
sufficient to compose a perfect         
government1 he is to a city as other    
parts are to a whole2 but he that is    

incapable of society1 or so complete in 
himself as not to want it1 makes no part
 of a city1 as a beast or a god4 ,there 
is then in all persons a natural impetus
 to associate with each other in this   
manner1 and he who first founded civil  
society was the cause of the greatest   
good2 for as by the completion of it man
 is the most excellent of all living    
beings1 so without law and justice he   
would be the worst of all1 for nothing  
is so difficult to subdue as injustice  
in arms3 but these arms man is born     
with1 namely1 prudence and valour1 which
 he may apply to the most opposite      
purposes1 for he who abuses them will be
 the most wicked1 the most cruel1 the   
most lustful1 and most gluttonous being 
imaginable2 for justice is a political  
virtue1 by the rules of it the state is 
regulated1 and these rules are the      
criterion of what is right4             
,,chapter ,,iii   ,,since it is now     
evident of what parts a city is         
composed1 it will be necessary to treat 

first of family government1 for every   
city is made up of families1 and every  
family #abec;b has again its separate   
parts of which it is composed4 ,when a  
family is complete1 it consists of      
freemen and slaves2 but as in every     
subject we should begin with examining  
into the smallest parts of which it     
consists1 and as the first and smallest 
parts of a family are the master and    
slave1 the husband and wife1 the father 
and child1 let us first inquire into    
these three1 what each of them may be1  
and what they ought to be2 that is to   
say1 the herile1 the nuptial1 and the   
paternal4 ,let these then be considered 
as the three distinct parts of a family3
 some think that the providing what is  
necessary for the family is something   
different from the government of it1    
others that this is the greatest part of
 it2 it shall be considered separately2 
but we will first speak of a master and 
a slave1 that we may both understand the
 nature of those things which are       

absolutely necessary1 and also try if we
 can learn anything better on this      
subject than what is already known4     
,some persons have thought that the     
power of the master over his slave      
originates from his superior knowledge1 
and that this knowledge is the same in  
the master1 the magistrate1 and the     
king1 as we have already said2 but      
others think that herile government is  
contrary to nature1 and that it is the  
law which makes one man a slave and     
another free1 but that in nature there  
is no difference2 for which reason that 
power cannot be founded in justice1 but 
in force4     ,,chapter ,,iv   ,since   
then a subsistence is necessary in every
 family1 the means of procuring it      
certainly makes up part of the          
management of a family1 for without     
necessaries it is impossible to live1   
and to live well4 ,as in all arts which 
are brought to perfection it is         
necessary that they should have their   
proper instruments if they would        

complete their works1 so is it in the   
art of managing a family3 now of        
instruments some of them are alive1     
others inanimate2 thus with respect to  
the pilot of the ship1 the tiller is    
without life1 the sailor is alive2 for a
 servant is as an instrument in many    
arts4 ,thus property is as an instrument
 to living2 an estate is a multitude of 
instruments2 so a slave is an animated  
instrument1 but every one that can      
minister of himself is more valuable    
than any other instrument2 for if every 
instrument1 at command1 or from a       
preconception of its master's will1     
could accomplish its work 7as the story 
goes of the statues of ,daedalus2 or    
what the poet tells us of the tripods of
 ,vulcan1 that they moved of their own  
accord into the assembly of the gods 71 
the shuttle would then weave1 and the   
lyre play of itself2 nor would the      
architect want servants1 or the #abed;a 
master slaves4 ,now what are generally  
called instruments are the efficients of

 something else1 but possessions are    
what we simply use3 thus with a shuttle 
we make something else for our use2 but 
we only use a coat1 or a bed3 since then
 making and using differ from each other
 in species1 and they both require their
 instruments1 it is necessary that these
 should be different from each other4   
,now life is itself what we use1 and not
 what we employ as the efficient of     
something else2 for which reason the    
services of a slave are for use4 ,a     
possession may be considered in the same
 nature as a part of anything2 now a    
part is not only a part of something1   
but also is nothing else2 so is a       
possession2 therefore a master is only  
the master of the slave1 but no part of 
him2 but the slave is not only the slave
 of the master1 but nothing else but    
that4 ,this fully explains what is the  
nature of a slave1 and what are his     
capacities2 for that being who by nature
 is nothing of himself1 but totally     
another's1 and is a man1 is a slave by  

nature2 and that man who is the property
 of another1 is his mere chattel1 though
 he continues a man2 but a chattel is an
 instrument for use1 separate from the  
body4     ,,chapter ,v   ,but whether   
any person is such by nature1 and       
whether it is advantageous and just for 
any one to be a slave or no1 or whether 
all slavery is contrary to nature1 shall
 be considered hereafter2 not that it is
 difficult to determine it upon general 
principles1 or to understand it from    
matters of fact2 for that some should   
govern1 and others be governed1 is not  
only necessary but useful1 and from the 
hour of their birth some are marked out 
for those purposes1 and others for the  
other1 and there are many species of    
both sorts4 ,and the better those are   
who are governed the better also is the 
government1 as for instance of man1     
rather than the brute creation3 for the 
more excellent the materials are with   
which the work is finished1 the more    
excellent certainly is the work2 and    

wherever there is a governor and a      
governed1 there certainly is some work  
produced2 for whatsoever is composed of 
many parts1 which jointly become one1   
whether conjunct or separate1 evidently 
show the marks of governing and         
governed2 and this is true of every     
living thing in all nature2 nay1 even in
 some things which partake not of life1 
as in music2 but this probably would be 
a disquisition too foreign to our       
present purpose4 ,every living thing in 
the first place is composed of soul and 
body1 of these the one is by nature the 
governor1 the other the governed2 now if
 we would know what is natural1 we ought
 to search for it in those subjects in  
which nature appears most perfect1 and  
not in those which are corrupted2 we    
should therefore examine into a man who 
is most perfectly formed both in soul   
and body1 in whom this is evident1 for  
in the depraved and vicious the body    
seems #abed;b to rule rather than the   
soul1 on account of their being corrupt 

and contrary to nature4 ,we may then1 as
 we affirm1 perceive in an animal the   
first principles of herile and political
 government2 for the soul governs the   
body as the master governs his slave2   
the mind governs the appetite with a    
political or a kingly power1 which shows
 that it is both natural and            
advantageous that the body should be    
governed by the soul1 and the pathetic  
part by the mind1 and that part which is
 possessed of reason2 but to have no    
ruling power1 or an improper one1 is    
hurtful to all2 and this holds true not 
only of man1 but of other animals also1 
for tame animals are naturally better   
than wild ones1 and it is advantageous  
that both should be under subjection to 
man2 for this is productive of their    
common safety3 so is it naturally with  
the male and the female2 the one is     
superior1 the other inferior2 the one   
governs1 the other is governed2 and the 
same rule must necessarily hold good    
with respect to all mankind4 ,those men 

therefore who are as much inferior to   
others as the body is to the soul1 are  
to be thus disposed of1 as the proper   
use of them is their bodies1 in which   
their excellence consists2 and if what  
,i have said be true1 they are slaves by
 nature1 and it is advantageous to them 
to be always under government4 ,he then 
is by nature formed a slave who is      
qualified to become the chattel of      
another person1 and on that account is  
so1 and who has just reason enough to   
know that there is such a faculty1      
without being indued with the use of it2
 for other animals have no perception of
 reason1 but are entirely guided by     
appetite1 and indeed they vary very     
little in their use from each other2 for
 the advantage which we receive1 both   
from slaves and tame animals1 arises    
from their bodily strength administering
 to our necessities2 for it is the      
intention of nature to make the bodies  
of slaves and freemen different from    
each other1 that the one should be      

robust for their necessary purposes1 the
 others erect1 useless indeed for what  
slaves are employed in1 but fit for     
civil life1 which is divided into the   
duties of war and peace2 though these   
rules do not always take place1 for     
slaves have sometimes the bodies of     
freemen1 sometimes the souls2 if then it
 is evident that if some bodies are as  
much more excellent than others as the  
statues of the gods excel the human     
form1 every one will allow that the     
inferior ought to be slaves to the      
superior2 and if this is true with      
respect to the body1 it is still juster 
to determine in the same manner1 when we
 consider the soul2 though it is not so 
easy to perceive the beauty of #abee;a  
the soul as it is of the body4 ,since   
then some men are slaves by nature1 and 
others are freemen1 it is clear that    
where slavery is advantageous to any    
one1 then it is just to make him a      
slave4     ,,chapter ,,vi   ,but it is  
not difficult to perceive that those who

 maintain the contrary opinion have some
 reason on their side2 for a man may    
become a slave two different ways2 for  
he may be so by law also1 and this law  
is a certain compact1 by which          
whatsoever is taken in battle is        
adjudged to be the property of the      
conquerors3 but many persons who are    
conversant in law call in question this 
pretended right1 and say that it would  
be hard that a man should be compelled  
by violence to be the slave and subject 
of another who had the power to compel  
him1 and was his superior in strength2  
and upon this subject1 even of those who
 are wise1 some think one way and some  
another2 but the cause of this doubt and
 variety of opinions arises from hence1 
that great abilities1 when accompanied  
with proper means1 are generally able to
 succeed by force3 for victory is always
 owing to a superiority in some         
advantageous circumstances2 so that it  
seems that force never prevails but in  
consequence of great abilities4 ,but    

still the dispute concerning the justice
 of it remains2 for some persons think1 
that justice consists in benevolence1   
others think it just that the powerful  
should govern3 in the midst of these    
contrary opinions1 there are no reasons 
sufficient to convince us1 that the     
right of being master and governor ought
 not to be placed with those who have   
the greatest abilities4 ,some persons1  
entirely resting upon the right which   
the law gives 7for that which is legal  
is in some respects just71 insist upon  
it that slavery occasioned by war is    
just1 not that they say it is wholly so1
 for it may happen that the principle   
upon which the wars were commenced is   
unjust2 moreover no one will say that a 
man who is unworthily in slavery is     
therefore a slave2 for if so1 men of the
 noblest families might happen to be    
slaves1 and the descendants of slaves1  
if they should chance to be taken       
prisoners in war and sold3 to avoid this
 difficulty they say that such persons  

should not be called slaves1 but        
barbarians only should2 but when they   
say this1 they do nothing more than     
inquire who is a slave by nature1 which 
was what we at first said2 for we must  
acknowledge that there are some persons 
who1 wherever they are1 must necessarily
 be slaves1 but others in no situation2 
thus also it is with those of noble     
descent3 it is not only in their own    
country that they are ,esteemed as such1
 but everywhere1 but the barbarians are 
respected on this account at home only2 
as if nobility and freedom were of two  
sorts1 the one universal1 the other not 
so4 ,thus says the ,helen of            
,theodectes3    ,who dares reproach me  
with the name of slave8 ,when from the  
immortal gods1 on either side1 ,i draw  
my lineage4  ,those who express         
sentiments like these1 shew only that   
they distinguish the slave and the      
freeman1 the noble and the ignoble from 
each other by their virtues and their   
#abee;b vices2 for they think it        

reasonable1 that as a man begets a man1 
and a beast a beast1 so from a good man1
 a good man should be descended2 and    
this is what nature desires to do1 but  
frequently cannot accomplish it4 ,it is 
evident then that this doubt has some   
reason in it1 and that these persons are
 not slaves1 and those freemen1 by the  
appointment of nature2 and also that in 
some instances it is sufficiently clear1
 that it is advantageous to both parties
 for this man to be a slave1 and that to
 be a master1 and that it is right and  
just1 that some should be governed1 and 
others govern1 in the manner that nature
 intended2 of which sort of government  
is that which a master exercises over a 
slave4 ,but to govern ill is            
disadvantageous to both2 for the same   
thing is useful to the part and to the  
whole1 to the body and to the soul2 but 
the slave is as it were a part of the   
master1 as if he were an animated part  
of his body1 though separate4 ,for which
 reason a mutual utility and friendship 

may subsist between the master and the  
slave1 ,i mean when they are placed by  
nature in that relation to each other1  
for the contrary takes place amongst    
those who are reduced to slavery by the 
law1 or by conquest4     ,,chapter ,,vii
   ,it is evident from what has been    
said1 that a herile and a political     
government are not the same1 or that all
 governments are alike to each other1 as
 some affirm2 for one is adapted to the 
nature of freemen1 the other to that of 
slaves4 ,domestic government is a       
monarchy1 for that is what prevails in  
every house2 but a political state is   
the government of free men and equals4  
,the master is not so called from his   
knowing how to manage his slave1 but    
because he is so2 for the same reason a 
slave and a freeman have their          
respective appellations4 ,there is also 
one sort of knowledge proper for a      
master1 another for a slave2 the slave's
 is of the nature of that which was     
taught by a slave at ,syracuse2 for he  

for a stipulated sum instructed the boys
 in all the business of a household     
slave1 of which there are various sorts 
to be learnt1 as the art of cookery1 and
 other such-like services1 of which some
 are allotted to some1 and others to    
others2 some employments being more     
honourable1 others more necessary2      
according to the proverb1 ,one slave    
excels another1 one master excels       
another3 in such-like things the        
knowledge of a slave consists4 ,the     
knowledge of the master is to be able   
properly to employ his slaves1 for the  
mastership of slaves is the employment1 
not the mere possession of them2 not    
that this knowledge contains anything   
great or respectable2 for what a slave  
ought to know how to do1 that a master  
ought to know how to order2 for which   
reason1 those who have it in their power
 to be free from these low attentions1  
employ a steward for this business1 and 
apply themselves either to public       
affairs or philosophy3 the knowledge of 

procuring what is necessary for a family
 is different from that which belongs   
either to the master or the slave3 and  
to do this justly must be either by war 
or hunting4 ,and thus much of the       
difference between a master and a slave4
     ,,chapter ,,viii   #abef;a ,as a   
slave is a particular species of        
property1 let us by all means inquire   
into the nature of property in general1 
and the acquisition of money1 according 
to the manner we have proposed4 ,in the 
first place then1 some one may doubt    
whether the getting of money is the same
 thing as economy1 or whether it is a   
part of it1 or something subservient to 
it2 and if so1 whether it is as the art 
of making shuttles is to the art of     
weaving1 or the art of making brass to  
that of statue founding1 for they are   
not of the same service2 for the one    
supplies the tools1 the other the       
matter3 by the matter ,i mean the       
subject out of which the work is        
finished1 as wool for the cloth and     

brass for the statue4 ,it is evident    
then that the getting of money is not   
the same thing as economy1 for the      
business of the one is to furnish the   
means of the other to use them2 and what
 art is there employed in the management
 of a family but economy1 but whether   
this is a part of it1 or something of a 
different species1 is a doubt2 for if it
 is the business of him who is to get   
money to find out how riches and        
possessions may be procured1 and both   
these arise from various causes1 we must
 first inquire whether the art of       
husbandry is part of money-getting or   
something different1 and in general1    
whether the same is not true of every   
acquisition and every attention which   
relates to provision4 ,but as there are 
many sorts of provision1 so are the     
methods of living both of man and the   
brute creation very various2 and as it  
is impossible to live without food1 the 
difference in that particular makes the 
lives of animals so different from each 

other4 ,of beasts1 some live in herds1  
others separate1 as is most convenient  
for procuring themselves food2 as some  
of them live upon flesh1 others on      
fruit1 and others on whatsoever they    
light on1 nature having so distinguished
 their course of life1 that they can    
very easily procure themselves          
subsistence2 and as the same things are 
not agreeable to all1 but one animal    
likes one thing and another another1 it 
follows that the lives of those beasts  
who live upon flesh must be different   
from the lives of those who live on     
fruits2 so is it with men1 their lives  
differ greatly from each other2 and of  
all these the shepherd's is the idlest1 
for they live upon the flesh of tame    
animals1 without any trouble1 while they
 are obliged to change their habitations
 on account of their flocks1 which they 
are compelled to follow1 cultivating1 as
 it were1 a living farm4 ,others live   
exercising violence over living         
creatures1 one pursuing this thing1     

another that1 these preying upon men2   
those who live near lakes and marshes   
and rivers1 or the sea itself1 on       
fishing1 while others are fowlers1 or   
hunters of wild beasts2 but the greater 
part of mankind live upon the produce of
 the earth and its cultivated fruits2   
and the manner in which all those live  
who follow the direction of nature1 and 
labour for their own subsistence1 is    
nearly the same1 without ever thinking  
to procure any provision by way of      
exchange or merchandise1 such are       
shepherds1 husband-men1 #abef;b robbers1
 fishermen1 and hunters3 some join      
different employments together1 and thus
 live very agreeably2 supplying those   
deficiencies which were wanting to make 
their subsistence depend upon themselves
 only3 thus1 for instance1 the same     
person shall be a shepherd and a robber1
 or a husbandman and a hunter2 and so   
with respect to the rest1 they pursue   
that mode of life which necessity points
 out4 ,this provision then nature       

herself seems to have furnished all     
animals with1 as well immediately upon  
their first origin as also when they are
 arrived at a state of maturity2 for at 
the first of these periods some of them 
are provided in the womb with proper    
nourishment1 which continues till that  
which is born can get food for itself1  
as is the case with worms and birds2 and
 as to those which bring forth their    
young alive1 they have the means for    
their subsistence for a certain time    
within themselves1 namely milk4 ,it is  
evident then that we may conclude of    
those things that are1 that plants are  
created for the sake of animals1 and    
animals for the sake of men2 the tame   
for our use and provision2 the wild1 at 
least the greater part1 for our         
provision also1 or for some other       
advantageous purpose1 as furnishing us  
with clothes1 and the like4 ,as nature  
therefore makes nothing either imperfect
 or in vain1 it necessarily follows that
 she has made all these things for men3 

for which reason what we gain in war is 
in a certain degree a natural           
acquisition2 for hunting is a part of   
it1 which it is necessary for us to     
employ against wild beasts2 and those   
men who being intended by nature for    
slavery are unwilling to submit to it1  
on which occasion such a4 war is by     
nature just3 that species of acquisition
 then only which is according to nature 
is part of economy2 and this ought to be
 at hand1 or if not1 immediately        
procured1 namely1 what is necessary to  
be kept in store to live upon1 and which
 are useful as well for the state as the
 family4 ,and true riches seem to       
consist in these2 and the acquisition of
 those possessions which are necessary  
for a happy life is not infinite2 though
 ,solon says otherwise in this verse3   
,no bounds to riches can be fixed for   
man2  for they may be fixed as in other 
arts2 for the instruments of no art     
whatsoever are infinite1 either in their
 number or their magnitude2 but riches  

are a number of instruments in domestic 
and civil economy2 it is therefore      
evident that the acquisition of certain 
things according to nature is a part    
both of domestic and civil economy1 and 
for what reason4     ,,chapter ,,ix     
,there is also another species of       
acquisition which they #abeg;a          
particularly call pecuniary1 and with   
great propriety2 and by this indeed it  
seems that there are no bounds to riches
 and wealth4 ,now many persons suppose1 
from their near relation to each other1 
that this is one and the same with that 
we have just mentioned1 but it is not   
the same as that1 though not very       
different2 one of these is natural1 the 
other is not1 but rather owing to some  
art and skill2 we will enter into a     
particular examination of this subject4 
,the uses of every possession are two1  
both dependent upon the thing itself1   
but not in the same manner1 the one     
supposing an inseparable connection with
 it1 the other not2 as a shoe1 for      

instance1 which may be either worn1 or  
exchanged for something else1 both these
 are the uses of the shoe2 for he who   
exchanges a shoe with some man who wants
 one1 for money or provisions1 uses the 
shoe as a shoe1 but not according to the
 original intention1 for shoes were not 
at first made to be exchanged4 ,the same
 thing holds true of all other          
possessions2 for barter1 in general1 had
 its original beginning in nature1 some 
men having a surplus1 others too little 
of what was necessary for them3 hence it
 is evident1 that the selling provisions
 for money is not according to the      
natural use of things2 for they were    
obliged to use barter for those things  
which they wanted2 but it is plain that 
barter could have no place in the first1
 that is to say1 in family society2 but 
must have begun when the number of those
 who composed the community was         
enlarged3 for the first of these had all
 things in common2 but when they came to
 be separated they were obliged to      

exchange with each other many different 
things which both parties wanted4 ,which
 custom of barter is still preserved    
amongst many barbarous nations1 who     
procure one necessary with another1 but 
never sell anything2 as giving and      
receiving wine for corn and the like4   
,this sort of barter is not             
contradictory to nature1 nor is it any  
species of money-getting2 but is        
necessary in procuring that subsistence 
which is so consonant thereunto4 ,but   
this barter introduced the use of money1
 as might be expected2 for a convenient 
place from whence to import what you    
wanted1 or to export what you had a     
surplus of1 being often at a great      
distance1 money necessarily made its way
 into commerce2 for it is not everything
 which is naturally most useful that is 
easiest of carriage2 for which reason   
they invented something to exchange with
 each other which they should mutually  
give and take1 that being really        
valuable itself1 should have the        

additional advantage of being of easy   
conveyance1 for the purposes of life1 as
 iron and silver1 or anything else of   
the same nature3 and this at first      
passed in value simply according to its 
weight or size2 but in process of time  
it had a certain stamp1 to save the     
trouble of weighing1 which stamp        
expressed its value4 #abeg;b  ,money    
then being established as the necessary 
medium of exchange1 another species of  
money-getting soon took place1 namely1  
by buying and selling1 at probably first
 in a simple manner1 afterwards with    
more skill and experience1 where and how
 the greatest profits might be made4    
,for which reason the art of            
money-getting seems to be chiefly       
conversant about trade1 and the business
 of it to be able to tell where the     
greatest profits can be made1 being the 
means of procuring abundance of wealth  
and possessions3 and thus wealth is very
 often supposed to consist in the       
quantity of money which any one         

possesses1 as this is the medium by     
which all trade is conducted and a      
fortune made1 others again regard it as 
of no value1 as being of none by nature1
 but arbitrarily made so by compact2 so 
that if those who use it should alter   
their sentiments1 it would be worth     
nothing1 as being of no service for any 
necessary purpose4 ,besides1 he who     
abounds in money often wants necessary  
food2 and it is impossible to say that  
any person is in good circumstances when
 with all his possessions he may perish 
with hunger4  ,like ,midas in the fable1
 who from his insatiable wish had       
everything he touched turned into gold4 
,for which reason others endeavour to   
procure other riches and other property1
 and rightly1 for there are other riches
 and property in nature2 and these are  
the proper objects of economy3 while    
trade only procures money1 not by all   
means1 but by the exchange of it1 and   
for that purpose it is this which it is 
chiefly employed about1 for money is the

 first principle and the end of trade2  
nor are there any bounds to be set to   
what is thereby acquired4 ,thus also    
there are no limits to the art of       
medicine1 with respect to the health    
which it attempts to procure2 the same  
also is true of all other arts2 no line 
can be drawn to terminate their bounds1 
the several professors of them being    
desirous to extend them as far as       
possible4 7,but still the means to be   
employed for that purpose are limited2  
and these are the limits beyond which   
the art cannot proceed47 ,thus in the   
art of acquiring riches there are no    
limits1 for the object of that is money 
and possessions2 but economy has a      
boundary1 though this has not3 for      
acquiring riches is not the business of 
that1 for which reason it should seem   
that some boundary should be set to     
riches1 though we see the contrary to   
this is what is practised2 for all those
 who get riches add to their money      
without end2 the cause of which is the  

near connection of these two arts with  
each other1 which sometimes occasions   
the one to change employments with the  
other1 as getting of money is their     
common object3 for economy requires the 
possession of wealth1 but not on its own
 account but with another view1 to      
purchase things necessary therewith2 but
 the other procures it merely to        
increase it3 so that some persons are   
confirmed in their belief1 that this is 
the proper object of economy1 and think 
that for this purpose money should be   
saved and hoarded up without end2 the   
reason for which disposition is1 that   
they are intent upon living1 but not    
upon living well2 and this desire being 
boundless in its extent1 the means which
 they aim at for that purpose are       
boundless also2 and those who propose to
 live well1 often confine that to the   
enjoyment of the pleasures of sense2 so 
that as this also seems to depend upon  
what a man has1 all their care is to get
 money1 and hence arises the other cause

 for this art2 for as this enjoyment is 
excessive in its degree1 they endeavour 
to procure means proportionate to supply
 it2 and if they cannot do this merely  
by the art of dealing in money1 they    
will endeavour to do it by other ways1  
and apply all their powers to a purpose 
they were not by nature intended for4   
,thus1 for instance1 courage was        
intended to inspire fortitude1 not to   
get money by2 neither is this the end of
 the soldier's or the physician's art1  
but victory and health4 ,but such       
persons make everything subservient to  
money-getting1 as if this was the only  
end2 and to the end everything ought to 
refer4  ,we have now considered that art
 of money-getting which is not          
necessary1 and have seen in what manner 
we became in want of it2 and also that  
which is necessary1 which is different  
from it2 for that economy which is      
natural1 and whose object is to provide 
food1 is not like this unlimited in its 
extent1 but has its bounds4             

,,chapter ,x   ,we have now determined  
what was before doubtful1 whether or no 
the art of getting money is his business
 who is at the head of a family or a    
state1 and though not strictly so1 it is
 however very necessary2 for as a       
politician does not make men1 but       
receiving them from the hand of nature  
employs them to proper purposes2 thus   
the earth1 or the sea1 or something else
 ought to supply them with provisions1  
and this it is the business of the      
master of the family to manage properly2
 for it is not the weaver's business to 
make yarn1 but to use it1 and to        
distinguish what is good and useful from
 what is bad and of no service2 and     
indeed some one may inquire why getting 
money should be a part of economy when  
the art of healing is not1 as it is as  
requisite that the family should be in  
health as that they should eat1 or have 
anything else which is necessary2 and as
 it is indeed in some particulars the   
business both of the master of the      

family1 and he to whom the government of
 the state is entrusted1 to see after   
the health of those under their care1   
but in others not1 but the physician's2 
so also as to money2 in some respects it
 is the business of the master of the   
family1 in others not1 but of the       
servant2 but as we have already said1 it
 is chiefly nature's1 for it is her part
 to supply her offspring with food2 for 
everything finds nourishment left for it
 in what produced it2 for which reason  
the natural riches of all men arise from
 fruits and animals4 ,now money-making1 
as we say1 being twofold1 it may be     
applied to two purposes1 the service of 
the house or retail trade2 of which the 
first is necessary and commendable1 the 
other justly censurable2 for it has not 
its origin in #abeh;b nature1 but by it 
men gain from each other2 for usury is  
most reasonably detested1 as it is      
increasing our fortune by money itself1 
and not employing it for the purpose it 
was originally intended1 namely         

exchange4  ,and this is the explanation 
of the name 7,,tokos71 which means the  
breeding of money4 ,for as offspring    
resemble their parents1 so usury is     
money bred of money4 ,whence of all     
forms of money-making it is most against
 nature4     ,,chapter ,,xi   ,having   
already sufficiently considered the     
general principles of this subject1 let 
us now go into the practical part       
thereof2 the one is a liberal employment
 for the mind1 the other necessary4     
,these things are useful in the         
management of one's affairs2 to be      
skilful in the nature of cattle1 which  
are most profitable1 and where1 and how2
 as for instance1 what advantage will   
arise from keeping horses1 or oxen1 or  
sheep1 or any other live stock2 it is   
also necessary to be acquainted with the
 comparative value of these things1 and 
which of them in particular places are  
worth most2 for some do better in one   
place1 some in another4 ,agriculture    
also should be understood1 and the      

management of arable grounds and        
orchards2 and also the care of bees1 and
 fish1 and birds1 from whence any profit
 may arise2 these are the first and most
 proper parts of domestic management4   
,with respect to gaining money by       
exchange1 the principal method of doing 
this is by merchandise1 which is carried
 on in three different ways1 either by  
sending the commodity for sale by sea or
 by land1 or else selling it on the     
place where it grows2 and these differ  
from each other in this1 that the one is
 more profitable1 the other safer4 ,the 
second method is by usury4 ,the third by
 receiving wages for work done1 and this
 either by being employed in some mean  
art1 or else in mere bodily labour4     
,there is also a third species of       
improving a fortune1 that is something  
between this and the first2 for it      
partly depends upon nature1 partly upon 
exchange2 the subject of which is1      
things that are immediately from the    
earth1 or their produce1 which1 though  

they bear no fruit1 are yet useful1 such
 as selling of timber and the whole art 
of metallurgy1 which includes many      
different species1 for there are various
 sorts of things dug out of the earth4  
,these we have now mentioned in general1
 but to enter into particulars          
concerning each of them1 though it might
 be useful to the artist1 would be      
tiresome to dwell on4 ,now of all the   
works of art1 those are the most        
excellent wherein chance has the least  
to do1 and those are the meanest which  
deprave the body1 those the most servile
 in which bodily strength alone is      
chiefly wanted1 those most illiberal    
which require least skill2 but as there 
are books written on these subjects by  
some persons1 as by ,chares the ,panian1
 and ,apollodorus the ,lemnian1 upon    
husbandry and planting2 and by others on
 other matters1 #abei;b let those who   
have occasion consult them thereon2     
besides1 every person should collect    
together whatsoever he hears            

occasionally mentioned1 by means of     
which many of those who aimed at making 
a fortune have succeeded in their       
intentions2 for all these are useful to 
those who make a point of getting money1
 as in the contrivance of ,thales the   
,milesian 7which was certainly a gainful
 one1 but as it was his it was          
attributed to his wisdom1 though the    
method he used was a general one1 and   
would universally succeed71 when they   
reviled him for his poverty1 as if the  
study of philosophy was useless3 for    
they say that he1 perceiving by his     
skill in astrology that there would be  
great plenty of olives that year1 while 
it was yet winter1 having got a little  
money1 he gave earnest for all the oil  
works that were in ,miletus and ,chios1 
which he hired at a low price1 there    
being no one to bid against him2 but    
when the season came for making oil1    
many persons wanting them1 he all at    
once let them upon what terms he        
pleased2 and raising a large sum of     

money by that means1 convinced them that
 it was easy for philosophers to be rich
 if they chose it1 but that that was not
 what they aimed at2 in this manner is  
,thales said to have shown his wisdom4  
,it indeed is1 as we have said1         
generally gainful for a person to       
contrive to make a monopoly of anything2
 for which reason some cities also take 
this method when they want money1 and   
monopolise their commodities4 ,there was
 a certain person in ,sicily who laid   
out a sum of money which was deposited  
in his hand in buying up all the iron   
from the iron merchants2 so that when   
the dealers came from the markets to    
purchase1 there was no one had any to   
sell but himself2 and though he put no  
great advance upon it1 yet by laying out
 fifty talents he made an hundred4 ,when
 ,dionysius heard this he permitted him 
to take his money with him1 but forbid  
him to continue any longer in ,sicily1  
as being one who contrived means for    
getting money inconsistent with his     

affairs4 ,this man's view and ,thales's 
was exactly the same2 both of them      
contrived to procure a monopoly for     
themselves3 it is useful also for       
politicians to understand these things1 
for many states want to raise money and 
by such means1 as well as private       
families1 nay more so2 for which reason 
some persons who are employed in the    
management of public affairs confine    
themselves to this province only4       
,,chapter ,,xii   ,there are then three 
parts of domestic government1 the       
masters1 of which we have already       
treated1 the fathers1 and the husbands2 
now the government of the wife and      
children should both be that of free    
persons1 but not the ,i#bei;b same2 for 
the wife should be treated as a citizen 
of a free state1 the children should be 
under kingly power2 for the male is by  
nature superior to the female1 except   
when something happens contrary to the  
usual course of nature1 as is the elder 
and perfect to the younger and          

imperfect4 ,now in the generality of    
free states1 the governors and the      
governed alternately change place2 for  
an equality without any preference is   
what nature chooses2 however1 when one  
governs and another is governed1 she    
endeavours that there should be a       
distinction between them in forms1      
expressions1 and honours2 according to  
what ,amasis said of his laver4 ,this   
then should be the established rule     
between the man and the woman4 ,the     
government of children should be kingly2
 for the power of the father over the   
child is founded in affection and       
seniority1 which is a species of kingly 
government2 for which reason ,homer very
 properly calls ,jupiter the father of  
gods and men1 who was king of both      
these2 for nature requires that a king  
should be of the same species with those
 whom he governs1 though superior in    
some particulars1 as is the case between
 the elder and the younger1 the father  
and the son4     ,,chapter ,,xiii   ,it 

is evident then that in the due         
government of a family1 greater         
attention should be paid to the several 
members of it and their virtues than to 
the possessions or riches of it2 and    
greater to the freemen than the slaves3 
but here some one may doubt whether     
there is any other virtue in a slave    
than his organic services1 and of higher
 estimation than these1 as temperance1  
fortitude1 justice1 and such-like       
habits1 or whether they possess only    
bodily qualities3 each side of the      
question has its difficulties2 for if   
they possess these virtues1 wherein do  
they differ from freemen8 and that they 
do not1 since they are men1 and         
partakers of reason1 is absurd4 ,nearly 
the same inquiry may be made concerning 
a woman and a child1 whether these also 
have their proper virtues2 whether a    
woman ought to be temperate1 brave1 and 
just1 and whether a child is temperate  
or no2 and indeed this inquiry ought to 
be general1 whether the virtues of those

 who1 by nature1 either govern or are   
governed1 are the same or different2 for
 if it is necessary that both of them   
should partake of the fair and good1 why
 is it also necessary that1 without     
exception1 the one should govern1 the   
other always be governed8 for this      
cannot arise from their possessing these
 qualities in different degrees2 for to 
govern1 and to be governed1 are things  
different in species1 but more or less  
are not4 ,and yet it is wonderful that  
one party ought to have them1 and the   
other not2 for if he who is to govern   
should not be temperate and just1 how   
can he govern well8 or if he is to be   
governed1 how can he be governed well8  
for he who is intemperate #abfj;a and a 
coward will never do what he ought3 it  
is evident then that both parties ought 
to be virtuous2 but there is a          
difference between them1 as there is    
between those who by nature command and 
who by nature obey1 and this originates 
in the soul2 for in this nature has     

planted the governing and submitting    
principle1 the virtues of which we say  
are different1 as are those of a        
rational and an irrational being4 ,it is
 plain then that the same principle may 
be extended farther1 and that there are 
in nature a variety of things which     
govern and are governed2 for a freeman  
is governed in a different manner from a
 slave1 a male from a female1 and a man 
from a child3 and all these have parts  
of mind within them1 but in a different 
manner4 ,thus a slave can have no power 
of determination1 a woman but a weak    
one1 a child an imperfect one4 ,thus    
also must it necessarily be with respect
 to moral virtues2 all must be supposed 
to possess them1 but not in the same    
manner1 but as is best suited to every  
one's employment2 on which account he   
who is to govern ought to be perfect in 
moral virtue1 for his business is       
entirely that of an architect1 and      
reason is the architect2 while others   
want only that portion of it which may  

be sufficient for their station2 from   
whence it is evident1 that although     
moral virtue is common to all those we  
have spoken of1 yet the temperance of a 
man and a woman are not the same1 nor   
their courage1 nor their justice1 though
 ,socrates thought otherwise2 for the   
courage of the man consists in          
commanding1 the woman's in obeying2 and 
the same is true in other particulars3  
and this will be evident to those who   
will examine different virtues          
separately2 for those who use general   
terms deceive themselves when they say1 
that virtue consists in a good          
disposition of mind1 or doing what is   
right1 or something of this sort4 ,they 
do much better who enumerate the        
different virtues as ,georgias did1 than
 those who thus define them2 and as     
,sophocles speaks of a woman1 we think  
of all persons1 that their 'virtues     
should be applicable to their           
characters1 for says he1    ,silence is 
a woman's ornament1  but it is not a    

man's2 and as a child is incomplete1 it 
is evident that his virtue is not to be 
referred to himself in his present      
situation1 but to that in which he will 
be complete1 and his preceptor4 ,in like
 manner the virtue of a slave is to be  
referred to his master2 for we laid it  
down as a maxim1 that the use of a slave
 was to employ him in what you wanted2  
so that it is clear enough that few     
virtues are wanted in his station1 only 
that he may not neglect his work through
 idleness or fear3 some person may      
question if what ,i have said is true1  
whether virtue is not necessary for     
artificers in their calling1 for they   
often through idleness neglect their    
work1 but the difference between them is
 very great2 for a slave is connected   
with you for life1 but the artificer not
 so nearly3 as near therefore as the    
artificer approaches to the situation of
 a slave1 just so much ought he to have 
of the virtues of one2 for a mean       
artificer is to a certain point a slave2

 but then a slave is one of those things
 which are by nature what they are1 but 
this is not true #abfj;b of a shoemaker1
 or any other artist4 ,it is evident    
then that a slave ought to be trained to
 those virtues which are proper for his 
situation by his master2 and not by him 
who has the power of a master1 to teach 
him any particular art4 ,those therefore
 are in the wrong who would deprive     
slaves of reason1 and say that they have
 only to follow their orders2 for slaves
 want more instruction than children1   
and thus we determine this matter4 ,it  
is necessary1 ,i am sensible1 for every 
one who treats upon government1 to enter
 particularly into the relations of     
husband and wife1 and of parent and     
child1 and to show what are the virtues 
of each and their respective connections
 with each other2 what is right and what
 is wrong2 and how the one ought to be  
followed1 and the other avoided4 ,since 
then every family is part of a city1 and
 each of those individuals is part of a 

family1 and the virtue of the parts     
ought to correspond to the virtue of the
 whole2 it is necessary1 that both the  
wives and children of the community     
should be instructed correspondent to   
the nature thereof1 if it is of         
consequence to the virtue of the state1 
that the wives and children therein     
should be virtuous1 and of consequence  
it certainly is1 for the wives are one  
half of the free persons2 and of the    
children the succeeding citizens are to 
be formed4 ,as then we have determined  
these points1 we will leave the rest to 
be spoken to in another place1 as if the
 subject was now finished2 and beginning
 again anew1 first consider the         
sentiments of those who have treated of 
the most perfect forms of government4   
,,book ,,ii     ,,chapter ,i   ,since   
then we propose to inquire what civil   
society is of all others best for those 
who have it in their power to live      
entirely as they wish1 it is necessary  
to examine into the polity of those     

states which are allowed to be well     
governed2 and if there should be any    
others which some persons have          
described1 and which appear properly    
regulated1 to note what is right and    
useful in them2 and when we point out   
wherein they have failed1 let not this  
be imputed to an affectation of wisdom1 
for it is because there are great       
defects in all those which are already  
established1 that ,i have been induced  
to undertake this work4 ,we will begin  
with that part of the subject which     
naturally presents itself first to our  
consideration4 ,the members of every    
state must of necessity have all things 
in common1 or some things common1 and   
not others1 or nothing at all common4   
,to have nothing in common is evidently 
impossible1 for society itself is one   
species of #abfa;a community2 and the   
first thing necessary thereunto is a    
common place of habitation1 namely the  
city1 which must be one1 and this every 
citizen must have a share in4 ,but in a 

government which is to be well founded1 
will it be best to admit of a community 
in everything which is capable thereof1 
or only in some particulars1 but in     
others not8 for it is possible that the 
citizens may have their wives1 and      
children1 and goods in common1 as in    
,plato's ,commonwealth2 for in that     
,socrates affirms that all these        
particulars ought to be so4 ,which then 
shall we prefer8 the custom which is    
already established1 or the laws which  
are proposed in that treatise8          
,,chapter ,,ii   ,now as a community of 
wives is attended with many other       
difficulties1 so neither does the cause 
for which he would frame his government 
in this manner seem agreeable to reason1
 nor is it capable of producing that end
 which he has proposed1 and for which he
 says it ought to take place2 nor has he
 given any particular directions for    
putting it in practice4 ,now ,i also am 
willing to agree with ,socrates in the  
principle which he proceeds upon1 and   

admit that the city ought to be one as  
much as possible2 and yet it is evident 
that if it is contracted too much1 it   
will be no longer a city1 for that      
necessarily supposes a multitude2 so    
that if we proceed in this manner1 we   
shall reduce a city to a family1 and a  
family to a single person3 for we admit 
that a family is one in a greater degree
 than a city1 and a single person than a
 family2 so that if this end could be   
obtained1 it should never be put in     
practice1 as it would annihilate the    
city2 for a city does not only consist  
of a large number of inhabitants1 but   
there must also be different sorts2 for 
were they all alike1 there could be no  
city2 for a confederacy and a city are  
two different things2 for a confederacy 
is valuable from its numbers1 although  
all those who compose it are men of the 
same calling2 for this is entered into  
for the sake of mutual defence1 as we   
add an additional weight to make the    
scale go down4 ,the same distinction    

prevails between a city and a nation    
when the people are not collected into  
separate villages1 but live as the      
,arcadians4 ,now those things in which a
 city should be one are of different    
sorts1 and in preserving an alternate   
reciprocation of power between these1   
the safety thereof consists 7as ,i have 
already mentioned in my treatise on     
,morals71 for amongst freemen and equals
 this is absolutely necessary2 for all  
cannot govern at the same time1 but     
either by the year1 or according to some
 other regulation or time1 by which     
means every one in his turn will be in  
office2 as if the shoemakers and        
carpenters should exchange occupations1 
and not always be employed in the same  
calling4 ,but as it is evidently better1
 that these should continue to exercise 
their respective trades2 so also in     
civil society1 where it is possible1 it 
would be better that the government     
should continue in the same hands2 but  
where it #abfa;b is not 7as nature has  

made all men equal1 and therefore it is 
just1 be the administration good or bad1
 that all should partake of it71 there  
it is best to observe a rotation1 and   
let those who are their equals by turns 
submit to those who are at that time    
magistrates1 as they will1 in their     
turns1 alternately be governors and     
governed1 as if they were different men3
 by the same method different persons   
will execute different offices4 ,from   
hence it is evident1 that a city cannot 
be one in the manner that some persons  
propose2 and that what has been said to 
be the greatest good which it could     
enjoy1 is absolutely its destruction1   
which cannot be3 for the good of        
anything is that which preserves it4    
,for another reason also it is clear1   
that it is not for the best to endeavour
 to make a city too much one1 because a 
family is more sufficient in itself than
 a single person1 a city than a family2 
and indeed ,plato supposes that a city  
owes its existence to that sufficiency  

in themselves which the members of it   
enjoy4 ,if then this sufficiency is so  
desirable1 the less the city is one the 
better4     ,,chapter ,,iii   ,but      
admitting that it is most advantageous  
for a city to be one as much as         
possible1 it does not seem to follow    
that this will take place by permitting 
all at once to say this is mine1 and    
this is not mine 7though this is what   
,socrates regards as a proof that a city
 is entirely one71 for the word ,all is 
used in two senses2 if it means each    
individual1 what ,socrates proposes will
 nearly take place2 for each person will
 say1 this is his own son1 and his own  
wife1 and his own property1 and of      
everything else that may happen to      
belong to him1 that it is his own4 ,but 
those who have their wives and children 
in common will not say so1 but all will 
say so1 though not as individuals2      
therefore1 to use the word all is       
evidently a fallacious mode of speech2  
for this word is sometimes used         

distributively1 and sometimes           
collectively1 on account of its double  
meaning1 and is the cause of            
inconclusive syllogisms in reasoning4   
,therefore for all persons to say the   
same thing was their own1 using the word
 all in its distributive sense1 would be
 well1 but is impossible3 in its        
collective sense it would by no means   
contribute to the concord of the state4 
,besides1 there would be another        
inconvenience attending this proposal1  
for what is common to many is taken     
least care of2 for all men regard more  
what is their own than what others share
 with them in1 to which they pay less   
attention than is incumbent on every    
one3 let me add also1 that every one is 
more negligent of what another is to see
 to1 as well as himself1 than of his own
 private business2 as in a family one is
 often worse served by many servants    
than by a few4 ,let each citizen then in
 the state have a thousand children1 but
 let none of them be considered as the  

children of that individual1 but let the
 relation of father and child be common 
to them all1 and they will all be       
neglected4 ,besides1 in consequence of  
this1 #abfb;a whenever any citizen      
behaved well or ill1 every person1 be   
the number what it would1 might say1    
this is my son1 or this man's or that2  
and in this manner would they speak1 and
 thus would they doubt of the whole     
thousand1 or of whatever number the city
 consisted2 and it would be uncertain to
 whom each child belonged1 and when it  
was born1 who was to take care of it3   
and which do you think is better1 for   
every one to say this is mine1 while    
they may apply it equally to two        
thousand or ten thousand2 or as we say1 
this is mine in our present forms of    
government1 where one man calls another 
his son1 another calls that same person 
his brother1 another nephew1 or some    
other relation1 either by blood or      
marriage1 and first extends his care to 
him and his1 while another regards him  

as one of the same parish and the same  
tribe2 and it is better for any one to  
be a nephew in his private capacity than
 a son after that manner4 ,besides1 it  
will be impossible to prevent some      
persons from suspecting that they are   
brothers and sisters1 fathers and       
mothers to each other2 for1 from the    
mutual likeness there is between the    
sire and the offspring1 they will       
necessarily conclude in what relation   
they stand to each other1 which         
circumstance1 we are informed by those  
writers who describe different parts of 
the world1 does sometimes happen2 for in
 ,upper ,africa there are wives in      
common who yet deliver their children to
 their respective fathers1 being guided 
by their likeness to them4 ,there are   
also some mares and cows which naturally
 bring forth their young so like the    
male1 that we can easily distinguish by 
which of them they were impregnated3    
such was the mare called ,just1 in      
,pharsalia4     ,,chapter ,,iv          

,besides1 those who contrive this plan  
of community cannot easily avoid the    
following evils2 namely1 blows1 murders 
involuntary or voluntary1 quarrels1 and 
reproaches1 all which it would be       
impious indeed to be guilty of towards  
our fathers and mothers1 or those who   
are nearly related to us2 though not to 
those who are not connected to us by any
 tie of affinity3 and certainly these   
mischiefs must necessarily happen       
oftener amongst those who do not know   
how they are connected to each other    
than those who do2 and when they do     
happen1 if it is among the first of     
these1 they admit of a legal expiation1 
but amongst the latter that cannot be   
done4 ,it is also absurd for those who  
promote a community of children to      
forbid those who love each other from   
indulging themselves in the last        
excesses of that passion1 while they do 
not restrain them from the passion      
itself1 or those intercourses which are 
of all things most improper1 between a  

,father and a son1 a brother and a      
brother1 and indeed the thing itself is 
most absurd4 ,it is also ridiculous to  
prevent this intercourse between the    
nearest relations1 for no other reason  
than the violence of the pleasure1 while
 they think that the relation of father 
and daughter1 the brother and sister1 is
 of no consequence at all4 ,it seems    
also more advantageous for the state1   
that the husbandmen should have their   
wives and children in common than the   
military1 for there will be less        
affection #abfb;b among them in that    
case than when otherwise2 for such      
persons ought to be under subjection1   
that they may obey the laws1 and not    
seek after innovations4 ,upon the whole1
 the consequences of such a law as this 
would be directly contrary to those     
things which good laws ought to         
establish1 and which ,socrates          
endeavoured to establish by his         
regulations concerning women and        
children3 for we think that friendship  

is the greatest good which can happen to
 any city1 as nothing so much prevents  
seditions3 and amity in a city is what  
,socrates commends above all things1    
which appears to be1 as indeed he says1 
the effect of friendship2 as we learn   
from ,aristophanes in the ,erotics1 who 
says1 that those who love one another   
from the excess of that passion1 desire 
to breathe the same soul1 and from being
 two to be blended into one3 from whence
 it would necessarily follow1 that both 
or one of them must be destroyed4 ,but  
now in a city which admits of this      
community1 the tie of friendship must1  
from that very cause1 be extremely weak1
 when no father can say1 this is my son2
 or son1 this is my father2 for as a    
very little of what is sweet1 being     
mixed with a great deal of water is     
imperceptible after the mixture1 so must
 all family connections1 and the names  
they go by1 be necessarily disregarded  
in such a community1 it being then by no
 means necessary that the father should 

have any regard for him he called a son1
 or the brothers for those they call    
brothers4 ,there are two things which   
principally inspire mankind with care   
and love of their offspring1 knowing it 
is their own1 and what ought to be the  
object of their affection1 neither of   
which can take place in this sort of    
community4 ,as for exchanging the       
children of the artificers and          
husbandmen with those of the military1  
and theirs reciprocally with these1 it  
will occasion great confusion in        
whatever manner it shall be done2 for of
 necessity1 those who carry the children
 must know from whom they took and to   
whom they gave them2 and by this means  
those evils which ,i have already       
mentioned will necessarily be the more  
likely to happen1 as blows1 incestuous  
love1 murders1 and the like2 for those  
who are given from their own parents to 
other citizens1 the military1 for       
instance1 will not call them brothers1  
sons1 fathers1 or mothers4 ,the same    

thing would happen to those of the      
military who were placed among the other
 citizens2 so that by this means every  
one would be in fear how to act in      
consequence of consanguinity4 ,and thus 
let us determine concerning a community 
of wives and children4     ,,chapter ,v 
,we proceed next to consider in what    
manner property should be regulated in a
 state which is formed after the most   
perfect mode of government1 whether it  
should be common or not2 for this may be
 considered as a separate question from 
what had been determined concerning     
#abfc;a wives and children2 ,i mean1    
whether it is better that these should  
be held separate1 as they now everywhere
 are1 or that not only possessions but  
also the usufruct of them should be in  
common2 or that the soil should have a  
particular owner1 but that the produce  
should be brought together and used as  
one common stock1 as some nations at    
present do2 or on the contrary1 should  
the soil be common1 and should it also  

be cultivated in common1 while the      
produce is divided amongst the          
individuals for their particular use1   
which is said to be practised by some   
barbarians2 or shall both the soil and  
the fruit be common8 ,when the business 
of the husbandman devolves not on the   
citizen1 the matter is much easier      
settled2 but when those labour together 
who have a common right of possession1  
this may occasion several difficulties2 
for there may not be an equal proportion
 between their labour and what they     
consume2 and those who labour hard and  
have but a small proportion of the      
produce1 will certainly complain of     
those who take a large share of it and  
do but little for that4 ,upon the whole1
 as a community between man and man so  
entire as to include everything         
possible1 and thus to have all things   
that man can possess in common1 is very 
difficult1 so is it particularly so with
 respect to property2 and this is       
evident from that community which takes 

place between those who go out to settle
 a colony2 for they frequently have     
disputes with each other upon the most  
common occasions1 and come to blows upon
 trifles3 we find1 too1 that we oftenest
 correct those slaves who are generally 
employed in the common offices of the   
family3 a community of property then has
 these and other inconveniences         
attending it4  ,but the manner of life  
which is now established1 more          
particularly when embellished with good 
morals and a system of equal laws1 is   
far superior to it1 for it will have the
 advantage of both2 by both ,i mean     
properties being common1 and divided    
also2 for in some respects it ought to  
be in a manner common1 but upon the     
whole private3 for every man's attention
 being employed on his own particular   
concerns1 will prevent mutual complaints
 against each other2 nay1 by this means 
industry will be increased1 as each     
person will labour to improve his own   
private property2 and it will then be1  

that from a principle of virtue they    
will mutually perform good offices to   
each other1 according to the proverb1   
,all things are common amongst friends2 
and in some cities there are traces of  
this custom to be seen1 so that it is   
not impracticable1 and particularly in  
those which are best governed2 some     
things are by this means in a manner    
common1 and others might be so2 for     
there1 every person enjoying his own    
private property1 some things he assists
 his friend with1 others are considered 
as in common2 as in ,lacedaemon1 where  
they use each other's slaves1 as if they
 were1 so to speak1 their own1 as they  
do their horses and dogs1 or even any   
provision they may want in a journey4   
,it is evident then that it is best to  
have property private1 but to make the  
use of it common2 but how the citizens  
are to be brought to it is the          
particular #abfc;b business of the      
legislator4 ,and also with respect to   
pleasure1 it is unspeakable how         

advantageous it is1 that a man should   
think he has something which he may call
 his own2 for it is by no means to no   
purpose1 that each person should have an
 affection for himself1 for that is     
natural1 and yet to be a self-lover is  
justly censured2 for we mean by that1   
not one that simply loves himself1 but  
one that loves himself more than he     
ought2 in like manner we blame a        
money-lover1 and yet both money and self
 is what all men love4 ,besides1 it is  
very pleasing to us to oblige and assist
 our friends and companions1 as well as 
those whom we are connected with by the 
rights of hospitality2 and this cannot  
be done without the establishment of    
private property1 which cannot take     
place with those who make a city too    
much one2 besides1 they prevent every   
opportunity of exercising two principal 
virtues1 modesty and liberality4        
,modesty with respect to the female sex1
 for this virtue requires you to abstain
 from her who is another's2 liberality1 

which depends upon private property1 for
 without that no one can appear liberal1
 or do any generous action2 for         
liberality consists in imparting to     
others what is our own4  ,this system of
 polity does indeed recommend itself by 
its good appearance and specious        
pretences to humanity2 and when first   
proposed to any one1 must give him great
 pleasure1 as he will conclude it to be 
a wonderful bond of friendship1         
connecting all to all2 particularly when
 any one censures the evils which are   
now to be found in society1 as arising  
from properties not being common1 ,i    
mean the disputes which happen between  
man and man1 upon their different       
contracts with each other2 those        
judgments which are passed in court in  
consequence of fraud1 and perjury1 and  
flattering the rich1 none of which arise
 from properties being private1 but from
 the vices of mankind4 ,besides1 those  
who live in one general community1 and  
have all things in common1 oftener      

dispute with each other than those who  
have their property separate2 from the  
very small number indeed of those who   
have their property in common1 compared 
with those where it is appropriated1 the
 instances of their quarrels are but    
few4 ,it is also but right to mention1  
not only the inconveniences they are    
preserved from who live in a communion  
of goods1 but also the advantages they  
are deprived of2 for when the whole     
comes to be considered1 this manner of  
life will be found impracticable4  ,we  
must suppose1 then1 that ,socrates's    
mistake arose from the principle he set 
out with being false2 we admit1 indeed1 
that both a family and a city ought to  
be one in some particulars1 but not     
entirely2 for there is a point beyond   
which if a city proceeds in reducing    
itself to one1 it will be no longer a   
city4  ,there is also another point at  
which it will still continue to be a    
city1 but it will approach so near to   
not being one1 that it will be worse    

than none2 as if any one should reduce  
the voices of those who sing in concert 
to one1 or a verse to a foot4 ,but the  
people ought to be made one1 and a      
community1 as ,i have already said1 by  
education2 as property at ,lacedaemon1  
and their public tables at ,crete1 were 
made common by their legislators4 ,but  
yet1 whosoever shall introduce any      
education1 and think thereby to make his
 city excellent and respectable1 will be
 absurd1 while he expects to form it by 
such regulations1 and not by manners1   
philosophy1 and laws4 ,and whoever      
#abfd;a would establish a government    
upon a community of goods1 ought to know
 that he should consult the experience  
of many years1 which would plainly      
enough inform him whether such a scheme 
is useful2 for almost all things have   
already been found out1 but some have   
been neglected1 and others which have   
been known have not been put in         
practice4 ,but this would be most       
evident1 if any one could see such a    

government really established3 for it   
would be impossible to frame such a city
 without dividing and separating it into
 its distinct parts1 as public tables1  
wards1 and tribes2 so that here the laws
 will do nothing more than forbid the   
military to engage in agriculture1 which
 is what the ,lacedaemonians are at     
present endeavouring to do4  ,nor has   
,socrates told us 7nor is it easy to    
say7 what plan of government should be  
pursued with respect to the individuals 
in the state where there is a community 
of goods established2 for though the    
majority of his citizens will in general
 consist of a multitude of persons of   
different occupations1 of those he has  
determined nothing2 whether the property
 of the husbandman ought to be in       
common1 or whether each person should   
have his share to himself2 and also1    
whether their wives and children ought  
to be in common3 for if all things are  
to be alike common to all1 where will be
 the difference between them and the    

military1 or what would they get by     
submitting to their government8 and upon
 what principles would they do it1      
unless they should establish the wise   
practice of the ,cretans8 for they1     
allowing everything else to their       
slaves1 forbid them only gymnastic      
exercises and the use of arms4 ,and if  
they are not1 but these should be in the
 same situation with respect to their   
property which they are in other cities1
 what sort of a community will there be8
 in one city there must of necessity be 
two1 and those contrary to each other2  
for he makes the military the guardians 
of the state1 and the husbandman1       
artisans1 and others1 citizens2 and all 
those quarrels1 accusations1 and things 
of the like sort1 which he says are the 
bane of other cities1 will be found in  
his also3 notwithstanding ,socrates says
 they will not want many laws in        
consequence of their education1 but such
 only as may be necessary for regulating
 the streets1 the markets1 and the like1

 while at the same time it is the       
education of the military only that he  
has taken any care of4 ,besides1 he     
makes the husbandmen masters of property
 upon paying a tribute2 but this would  
be likely to make them far more         
troublesome and high-spirited than the  
,helots1 the ,penestise1 or the slaves  
which others employ2 nor has he ever    
determined whether it is necessary to   
give any attention to them in these     
particulars1 nor thought of what is     
connected therewith1 their polity1 their
 education1 their laws2 besides1 it is  
of no little consequence1 nor is it easy
 to determine1 how these should be      
framed so as to preserve the community  
of the military4  ,besides1 if he makes 
the wives common1 while the property    
#abfd;b continues separate1 who shall   
manage the domestic concerns with the   
same care which the man bestows upon his
 fields8 nor will the inconvenience be  
remedied by making property as well as  
wives common2 and it is absurd to draw a

 comparison from the brute creation1 and
 say1 that the same principle should    
regulate the connection of a man and a  
woman which regulates theirs amongst    
whom there is no family association4    
,it is also very hazardous to settle the
 magistracy as ,socrates has done2 for  
he would have persons of the same rank  
always in office1 which becomes the     
cause of sedition even amongst those who
 are of no account1 but more            
particularly amongst those who are of a 
courageous and warlike disposition2 it  
is indeed evidently necessary that he   
should frame his community in this      
manner2 for that golden particle which  
,god has mixed up in the soul of man    
flies not from one to the other1 but    
always continues with the same2 for he  
says1 that some of our species have     
gold1 and others silver1 blended in     
their composition from the moment of    
their birth3 but those who are to be    
husbandmen and artists1 brass and iron2 
besides1 though he deprives the military

 of happiness1 he says1 that the        
legislator ought to make all the        
citizens happy2 but it is impossible    
that the whole city can be happy1       
without all1 or the greater1 or some    
part of it be happy4 ,for happiness is  
not like that numerical equality which  
arises from certain numbers when added  
together1 although neither of them may  
separately contain it2 for happiness    
cannot be thus added together1 but must 
exist in every individual1 as some      
properties belong to every integral2 and
 if the military are not happy1 who else
 are so8 for the artisans are not1 nor  
the multitude of those who are employed 
in inferior offices4 ,the state which   
,socrates has described has all these   
defects1 and others which are not of    
less consequence4     ,,chapter ,,vi    
,it is also nearly the same in the      
treatise upon ,laws which was writ      
afterwards1 for which reason it will be 
proper in this place to consider briefly
 what he has there said upon government1

 for ,socrates has thoroughly settled   
but very few parts of it2 as for        
instance1 in what manner the community  
of wives and children ought to be       
regulated1 how property should be       
established1 and government conducted4  
,now he divides the inhabitants into two
 parts1 husbandmen and soldiers1 and    
from these he select a third part who   
are to be senators and govern the city2 
but he has not said whether or no the   
husbandman and artificer shall have any 
or what share in the government1 or     
whether they shall have arms1 and join  
with the others in war1 or not4 ,he     
thinks also that the women ought to go  
to war1 and have the same education as  
the soldiers2 as to other particulars1  
he has filled his treatise with matter  
foreign to the purpose2 and with respect
 to education1 he has only said what    
that of the guards ought to be4  #abfe;a
 ,as to his book of ,laws1 laws are the 
principal thing which that contains1 for
 he has there said but little concerning

 government2 and this government1 which 
he was so desirous of framing in such a 
manner as to impart to its members a    
more entire community of goods than is  
to be found in other cities1 he almost  
brings round again to be the same as    
that other government which he had first
 proposed2 for except the community of  
wives and goods1 he has framed both his 
governments alike1 for the education of 
the citizens is to be the same in both2 
they are in both to live without any    
servile employ1 and their common tables 
are to be the same1 excepting that in   
that he says the women should have      
common tables1 and that there should be 
a thousand men-at-arms1 in this1 that   
there should be five thousand4  ,all the
 discourses of ,socrates are masterly1  
noble1 new1 and inquisitive2 but that   
they are all true it may probably be too
 much to say4 ,for now with respect to  
the number just spoken of1 it must be   
acknowledged that he would want the     
country of ,babylonia for them1 or some 

one like it1 of an immeasurable extent1 
to support five thousand idle persons1  
besides a much greater number of women  
and servants4 ,every one1 it is true1   
may frame an hypothesis as he pleases1  
but yet it ought to be possible4 ,it has
 been said1 that a legislator should    
have two things in view when he frames  
his laws1 the country and the people4   
,he will also do well1 if he has some   
regard to the neighbouring states1 if he
 intends that his community should      
maintain any political intercourse with 
them1 for it is not only necessary that 
they should understand that practice of 
war which is adapted to their own       
country1 but to others also2 for        
admitting that any one chooses not this 
life either in public or private1 yet   
there is not the less occasion for their
 being formidable to their enemies1 not 
only when they invade their country1 but
 also when they retire out of it4  ,it  
may also be considered whether the      
quantity of each person's property may  

not be settled in a different manner    
from what he has done it in1 by making  
it more determinate2 for he says1 that  
every one ought to have enough whereon  
to live moderately1 as if any one had   
said to live well1 which is the most    
comprehensive expression4 ,besides1 a   
man may live moderately and miserably at
 the same time2 he had therefore better 
have proposed1 that they should live    
both moderately and liberally2 for      
unless these two conspire1 luxury will  
come in on the one hand1 or wretchedness
 on the other1 since these two modes of 
living are the only ones applicable to  
the employment of our substance2 for we 
cannot say with respect to a man's      
fortune1 that he is mild or courageous1 
but we may say that he is prudent and   
liberal1 which are the only qualities   
connected therewith4  ,it is also absurd
 to render property equal1 and not to   
provide for the increasing number of the
 citizens2 but to leave that            
circumstance uncertain1 as if it would  

regulate itself according to the number 
of women who #abfe;b should happen to be
 childless1 let that be what it would   
because this seems to take place in     
other cities2 but the case would not be 
the same in such a state which he       
proposes and those which now actually   
unite2 for in these no one actually     
wants1 as the property is divided       
amongst the whole community1 be their   
numbers what they will2 but as it could 
not then be divided1 the                
supernumeraries1 whether they were many 
or few1 would have nothing at all4 ,but 
it is more necessary than even to       
regulate property1 to take care that the
 increase of the people should not      
exceed a certain number2 and in         
determining that1 to take into          
consideration those children who will   
die1 and also those women who will be   
barren2 and to neglect this1 as is done 
in several cities1 is to bring certain  
poverty on the citizens2 and poverty is 
the cause of sedition and evil4 ,now    

,phidon the ,corinthian1 one of the     
oldest legislators1 thought the families
 and the number of the citizens should  
continue the same2 although it should   
happen that all should have allotments  
at the first1 disproportionate to their 
numbers4  ,in ,plato's ,laws it is      
however different2 we shall mention     
hereafter what we think would be best in
 these particulars4 ,he has also        
neglected in that treatise to point out 
how the governors are to be             
distinguished from the governed2 for he 
says1 that as of one sort of wool the   
warp ought to be made1 and of another   
the woof1 so ought some to govern1 and  
others to be governed4 ,but since he    
admits1 that all their property may be  
increased fivefold1 why should he not   
allow the same increase to the country8 
he ought also to consider whether his   
allotment of the houses will be useful  
to the community1 for he appoints two   
houses to each person1 separate from    
each other2 but it is inconvenient for a

 person to inhabit two houses4 ,now he  
is desirous to have his whole plan of   
government neither a democracy nor an   
oligarchy1 but something between both1  
which he calls a polity1 for it is to be
 composed of men-at-arms4 ,if ,plato    
intended to frame a state in which more 
than in any other everything should be  
common1 he has certainly given it a     
right name2 but if he intended it to be 
the next in perfection to that which he 
had already framed1 it is not so2 for   
perhaps some persons will give the      
preference to the ,lacedaemonian form of
 government1 or some other which may    
more completely have attained to the    
aristocratic form4  ,some persons say1  
that the most perfect government should 
be composed of all others blended       
together1 for which reason they commend 
that of ,lacedaemon2 for they say1 that 
this is composed of an oligarchy1 a     
monarchy1 and a democracy1 their kings  
representing the monarchical part1 the  
senate the oligarchical2 and1 that in   

the ephori may be found the             
democratical1 as these are taken from   
the people4 ,but some say1 that in the  
ephori is absolute power1 and that it is
 their common meal and daily course of  
life1 in which the democratical form is 
represented4 ,it is also said in this   
treatise of #abff;a ,laws1 that the best
 form of government must1 be one        
composed of a democracy and a tyranny2  
though such a mixture no one else would 
ever allow to be any government at all1 
or if it is1 the worst possible2 those  
propose what is much better who blend   
many governments together2 for the most 
perfect is that which is formed of many 
parts4 ,but now in this government of   
,plato's there are no traces of a       
monarchy1 only of an oligarchy and      
democracy2 though he seems to choose    
that it should rather incline to an     
oligarchy1 as is evident from the       
appointment of the magistrates2 for to  
choose them by lot is common to both2   
but that a man of fortune must          

necessarily be a member of the assembly1
 or to elect the magistrates1 or take   
part in the management of public        
affairs1 while others are passed over1  
makes the state incline to an oligarchy2
 as does the endeavouring that the      
greater part of the rich may be in      
office1 and that the rank of their      
appointments may correspond with their  
fortunes4  ,the same principle prevails 
also in the choice of their senate2 the 
manner of electing which is favourable  
also to an oligarchy2 for all are       
obliged to vote for those who are       
senators of the first class1 afterwards 
they vote for the same number out of the
 second1 and then out of the third2 but 
this compulsion to vote at the election 
of senators does not extend to the third
 and fourth classes and the first and   
second class only are obliged to vote   
for the fourth4 ,by this means he says  
he shall necessarily have an equal      
number of each rank1 but he is          
mistaken--for the majority will always  

consist of those of the first rank1 and 
the most considerable people2 and for   
this reason1 that many of the commonalty
 not being obliged to it1 will not      
attend the elections4 ,from hence it is 
evident1 that such a state will not     
consist of a democracy and a monarchy1  
and this will be further proved by what 
we shall say when we come particularly  
to consider this form of government4    
,there will also great danger arise from
 the manner of electing the senate1 when
 those who are elected themselves are   
afterwards to elect others2 for by this 
means1 if a certain number choose to    
combine together1 though not very       
considerable1 the election will always  
fall according to their pleasure4 ,such 
are the things which ,plato proposes    
concerning government in his book of    
,laws4     ,,chapter ,,vii   ,there are 
also some other forms of government1    
which have been proposed either by      
private persons1 or philosophers1 or    
politicians1 all of which come much     

nearer to those which have been really  
established1 or now exist1 than these   
two of ,plato's2 for neither have they  
introduced the innovation of a community
 of wives and children1 and public      
tables for the women1 but have been     
contented to set out with establishing  
such rules as are absolutely necessary4 
,there are some persons who think1 that 
the first object of government should be
 to regulate well everything relating to
 private property2 for they say1 that a 
neglect herein is the source of all     
seditions whatsoever4 ,for this reason1 
,phaleas the ,chalcedonian first        
proposed1 that the fortunes of the      
citizens should be equal1 which he      
thought was not difficult to accomplish 
when a community was first settled1 but 
that it was a work of greater difficulty
 in one that had been long established2 
but yet that it might be effected1 and  
an equality of circumstances introduced 
by these means1 that the rich should    
give marriage portions1 but never       

receive any1 while the poor should      
always receive1 but never give4  ,but   
,plato1 in his treatise of ,laws1 thinks
 that a difference in circumstances     
should be permitted to a certain degree2
 but that no citizen should be allowed  
to possess more than five times as much 
as the lowest census1 as we have already
 mentioned4 ,but legislators who would  
establish this principle are apt to     
overlook what they ought to consider2   
that while they regulate the quantity of
 provisions which each individual shall 
possess1 they ought also to regulate the
 number of his children2 for if these   
exceed the allotted quantity of         
provision1 the law must necessarily be  
repealed2 and yet1 in spite of the      
repeal1 it will have the bad effect of  
reducing many from wealth to poverty1 so
 difficult is it for innovators not to  
fall into such mistakes4 ,that an       
equality of goods was in some degree    
serviceable to strengthen the bands of  
society1 seems to have been known to    

some of the ancients2 for ,solon made a 
law1 as did some others also1 to        
restrain persons from possessing as much
 land as they pleased4 ,and upon the    
same principle there are laws which     
forbid men to sell their property1 as   
among the ,locrians1 unless they can    
prove that some notorious misfortune has
 befallen them4 ,they were also to      
preserve their ancient patrimony1 which 
custom being broken through by the      
,leucadians1 made their government too  
democratic2 for by that means it was no 
longer necessary to be possessed of a   
certain fortune to be qualified to be a 
magistrate4 ,but if an equality of goods
 is established1 this may be either too 
much1 when it enables the people to live
 luxuriously1 or too little1 when it    
obliges them to live hard4 ,hence it is 
evident1 that it is not proper for the  
legislator to establish an equality of  
circumstances1 but to fix a proper      
medium4 ,besides1 if any one should     
regulate the division of property in    

such a manner that there should be a    
moderate sufficiency for all1 it would  
be of no use2 for it is of more         
consequence that the citizen should     
entertain a similarity of sentiments    
than an equality of circumstances2 but  
this can never be attained unless they  
are properly educated under the         
direction of the law4 ,but probably     
,phaleas may say1 that this in what he  
himself mentions2 for he both proposes a
 equality of property and one plan of   
education in his city4 ,but he should   
have said particularly what education he
 intended1 nor is it of any service to  
have this to much one2 for this         
education may be one1 and yet such as   
will make the citizens over-greedy1 to  
grasp after honours1 or riches1 or both4
 ,besides1 not only an inequality of    
possessions1 but also of honours1 will  
occasion #abfg;a seditions1 but this    
upon contrary grounds2 for the vulgar   
will be seditious if there be an        
inequality of goods1 by those of more   

elevated sentiments1 if there is an     
equality of honours4    ,when good and  
bad do equal honours share4  ,for men   
are not guilty of crimes for necessaries
 only 7for which he thinks an equality  
of goods would be a sufficient remedy1  
as they would then have no occasion to  
steal cold or hunger71 but that they may
 enjoy what they desire1 and not wish   
for it in vain2 for if their desire     
extend beyond the common necessaries of 
life1 they were be wicked to gratify    
them2 and not only so1 but if their     
wishes point that way1 they will do the 
same to enjoy those pleasures which are 
free from the alloy of pain4 ,what      
remedy then shall we find for these     
three disorders8 ,and first1 to prevent 
stealing from necessity1 let every one  
be supplied with a moderate subsistence1
 which may make the addition of his own 
industry necessary2 second to prevent   
stealing to procure the luxuries of     
life1 temperance be enjoined2 and       
thirdly1 let those who wish for pleasure

 in itself seek for it only in          
philosophy1 all others want the         
assistance of men4  ,since then men are 
guilty of the greatest crimes from      
ambition1 and not from necessity1 no    
one1 for instance aims at being a tyrant
 to keep him from the cold1 hence great 
honour is due to him who kills not a    
thief1 but tyrant2 so that polity which 
,phaleas establishes would only be      
salutary to prevent little crimes4 ,he  
has also been very desirous to establish
 such rules as will conduce to perfect  
the internal policy of his state1 and he
 ought also to have done the same with  
respect to its neighbours and all       
foreign nations2 for the considerations 
of the military establishment should    
take place in planning every government1
 that it may not be unprovided in case  
of a war1 of which he has said nothing2 
so also with respect to property1 it    
ought not only to be adapted to the     
exigencies of the state1 but also to    
such dangers as may arise from without4 

,thus it should not be so much as to    
tempt those who are near1 and more      
powerful to invade it1 while those who  
possess it are not able to drive out the
 invaders1 nor so little as that the    
state should not be able to go to war   
with those who are quite equal to       
itself1 and of this he has determined   
nothing2 it must indeed be allowed that 
it is advantageous to a community to be 
rather rich than poor2 probably the     
proper boundary is this1 not to possess 
enough to make it worth while for a more
 powerful neighbour to attack you1 any  
more than he would those who had not so 
much as yourself2 thus when             
,autophradatus proposed to besiege      
,atarneus1 ,eubulus advised him to      
consider what time it would require to  
take the city1 and then would have him  
determine whether it would answer1 for  
that he should choose1 if it would even 
take less than he proposed1 to quit the 
place2 his saying this made             
,autophradatus reflect upon the business

 and give over the siege4 ,there is1    
indeed1 some advantage in an equality of
 goods amongst the citizens to prevent  
seditions2 and yet1 to say truth1 no    
very great one2 for men of great        
abilities will stomach their being put  
upon a level with the rest of the       
community4 ,for which reason they will  
very often appear ready for every       
commotion and sedition2 for the         
wickedness of mankind is insatiable4    
,for though at first two oboli might be 
sufficient1 yet when once it is become  
customary1 they continually want        
something more1 until they set no limits
 to their expectations2 for it is the   
nature of our desires to be boundless1  
and many live only to gratify them4 ,but
 for this purpose the first object is1  
not so much to establish an equality of 
fortune1 as to prevent those who are of 
a good disposition from desiring more   
than their own1 and those who are of a  
bad one from being able to acquire it2  
and this may be done if they are kept in

 an inferior station1 and not exposed to
 injustice4 ,nor has he treated well the
 equality of goods1 for he has extended 
his regulation only to land2 whereas a  
man's substance consists not only in    
this1 but also in slaves1 cattle1 money1
 and all that variety of things which   
fall under the name of chattels2 now    
there must be either an equality        
established in all these1 or some       
certain rule1 or they must be left      
entirely at large4 ,it appears too by   
his laws1 that he intends to establish  
only a small state1 as all the          
artificers are to belong to the public1 
and add nothing to the complement of    
citizens2 but if all those who are to be
 employed in public works are to be the 
slaves of the public1 it should be done 
in the same manner as it is at          
,epidamnum1 and as ,diophantus formerly 
regulated it at ,athens4 ,from these    
particulars any one may nearly judge    
whether ,phaleas's community is well or 
ill established4     ,,chapter ,,viii   

,hippodamus1 the son of ,euruphon a     
,milesian1 contrived the art of laying  
out towns1 and separated the ,pireus4   
,this man was in other respects too     
eager after notice1 and seemed to many  
to live in a very affected manner1 with 
his flowing locks and his expensive     
ornaments1 and a coarse warm vest which 
he wore1 not only in the winter1 but    
also in the hot weather4 ,as he was very
 desirous of the character of a         
universal scholar1 he was the first who1
 not being actually engaged in the      
management of public affairs1 sat       
himself to inquire what sort of         
government was best2 and he planned a   
state1 consisting of ten thousand       
persons1 divided into three parts1 one  
consisting of artisans1 another of      
husbandmen1 and the third of soldiers2  
he also divided the lands into three    
parts1 and allotted one to sacred       
purposes1 another to the public1 and the
 third to individuals4 ,the first of    
these was to supply what was necessary  

for the established worship of the gods2
 the second was to be allotted to the   
support of the soldiery2 and the third  
was to be the property of the           
husbandman4 ,he thought also that there 
need only be three sorts of laws1       
corresponding to the three sorts of     
actions which can be brought1 namely1   
for assault1 trespasses1 or death4 ,he  
ordered also that there should be a     
particular court of appeal1 into which  
all causes might be removed which were  
supposed to have been unjustly          
determined elsewhere2 which court should
 be composed of old men chosen for that 
purpose4 ,he thought also #abfh;a that  
they should not pass sentence by votes2 
but that every one should bring with him
 a tablet1 on which he should write1    
that he found the party guilty1 if it   
was so1 but if not1 he should bring a   
plain tablet2 but if he acquitted him of
 one part of the indictment but not of  
the other1 he should express that also  
on the tablet2 for he disapproved of    

that general custom already established1
 as it obliges the judges to be guilty  
of perjury if they determined positively
 either on the one side or the other4   
,he also made a law1 that those should  
be rewarded who found out anything for  
the good of the city1 and that the      
children of those who fell in battle    
should be educated at the public        
expense2 which law had never been       
proposed by any other legislator1 though
 it is at present in use at ,athens as  
well as in other cities1 he would have  
the magistrates chosen out of the people
 in general1 by whom he meant the three 
parts before spoken of2 and that those  
who were so elected should be the       
particular guardians of what belonged to
 the public1 to strangers1 and to       
orphans4  ,these are the principal parts
 and most worthy of notice in           
,hippodamus's plan4 ,but some persons   
might doubt the propriety of his        
division of the citizens into three     
parts2 for the artisans1 the husbandmen1

 and the soldiers are to compose one    
community1 where the husbandmen are to  
have no arms1 and the artisans neither  
arms nor land1 which would in a manner  
render them slaves to the soldiery4 ,it 
is also impossible that the whole       
community should partake of all the     
honourable employments in it--for the   
generals and the guardians of the state 
must necessarily be appointed out of the
 soldiery1 and indeed the most          
honourable magistrates2 but as the two  
other parts will not have their share in
 the government1 how can they be        
expected to have any affection for it8  
,but it is necessary that the soldiery  
should be superior to the other two     
parts1 and this superiority will not be 
easily gained without they are very     
numerous2 and if they are so1 why should
 the community consist of any other     
members8 why should any others have a   
right to elect the magistrates8         
,besides1 of what use are the husbandmen
 to this community8 ,artisans1 'tis     

true1 are necessary1 for these every    
city wants1 and they can live upon their
 business4 ,if the husbandmen indeed    
furnished the soldiers with provisions1 
they would be properly part of the      
community2 but these are supposed to    
have their private property1 and to     
cultivate it for their own use4         
,moreover1 if the soldiers themselves   
are to cultivate that common land which 
is appropriated for their support1 there
 will be no distinction between the     
soldier and the husbandman1 which the   
legislator intended there should be2 and
 if there should be any others who are  
to cultivate the private property of the
 husbandman and the common lands of the 
military1 there will be a fourth order  
in the state which will have no share in
 it1 and always entertain hostile       
sentiments towards it4 ,if any one      
should propose that the same persons    
should cultivate their own lands and the
 public ones also1 then there would be a
 deficiency #abfh;b of provisions to    

supply two families1 as the lands would 
not immediately yield enough for        
themselves and the soldiers also2 and   
all these things would occasion great   
confusion4  ,nor do ,i approve of his   
method of determining causes1 when he   
would have the judge split the case     
which comes simply before him2 and thus1
 instead of being a judge1 become an    
arbitrator4 ,now when any matter is     
brought to arbitration1 it is customary 
for many persons to confer together upon
 the business that is before them2 but  
when a cause is brought before judges it
 is not so2 and many legislators take   
care that the judges shall not have it  
in their power to communicate their     
sentiments to each other4 ,besides1 what
 can prevent confusion on the bench when
 one judge thinks a fine should be      
different from what another has set it  
at2 one proposing twenty minae1 another 
ten1 or be it more or less1 another     
four1 and another five2 and it is       
evident1 that in this manner they will  

differ from each other1 while some will 
give the whole damages sued for1 and    
others nothing2 in this situation1 how  
shall their determinations be settled8  
,besides1 a judge cannot be obliged to  
perjure himself who simply acquits or   
condemns1 if the action is fairly and   
justly brought2 for he who acquits the  
party does not say that he ought not to 
pay any fine at all1 but that he ought  
not to pay a fine of twenty minae4 ,but 
he that condemns him is guilty of       
perjury if he sentences him to pay      
twenty minae while he believes the      
damages ought not to be so much4  ,now  
with respect to these honours which he  
proposes to bestow on those who can give
 any information useful to the          
community1 this1 though very pleasing in
 speculation1 is what the legislator    
should not settle1 for it would         
encourage informers1 and probably       
occasion commotions in the state4 ,and  
this proposal of his gives rise also to 
further conjectures and inquiries2 for  

some persons have doubted whether it is 
useful or hurtful to alter the          
established law of any country1 if even 
for the better2 for which reason one    
cannot immediately determine upon what  
he here says1 whether it is advantageous
 to alter the law or not4 ,we know1     
indeed1 that it is possible to propose  
to new model both the laws and          
government as a common good2 and since  
we have mentioned this subject1 it may  
be very proper to enter into a few      
particulars concerning it1 for it       
contains some difficulties1 as ,i have  
already said1 and it may appear better  
to alter them1 since it has been found  
useful in other sciences4  ,thus the    
science of physic is extended beyond its
 ancient bounds2 so is the gymnastic1   
and indeed all other arts and powers2 so
 that one may lay it down for certain   
that the same thing will necessarily    
hold good in the art of government4 ,and
 it may also be affirmed1 that          
experience itself gives a proof of this2

 for the ancient laws are too simple and
 barbarous2 which allowed the ,greeks to
 wear swords in the city1 and to buy    
their wives of each #abfi;a4 other4 ,and
 indeed all the remains of old laws     
which we have are very simple2 for      
instance1 a law in ,cuma relative to    
murder4 ,if any person who prosecutes   
another for murder can produce a certain
 number of witnesses to it of his own   
relations1 the accused person shall be  
held guilty4 ,upon the whole1 all       
persons ought to endeavour to follow    
what is right1 and not what is          
established2 and it is probable that the
 first men1 whether they sprung out of  
the earth1 or were saved from some      
general calamity1 had very little       
understanding or knowledge1 as is       
affirmed of these aborigines2 so that it
 would be absurd to continue in the     
practice of their rules4 ,nor is it1    
moreover1 right to permit written laws  
always to remain without alteration2 for
 as in all other sciences1 so in        

politics1 it is impossible to express   
everything in writing with perfect      
exactness2 for when we commit anything  
to writing we must use general terms1   
but in every action there is something  
particular to itself1 which these may   
not comprehend2 from whence it is       
evident1 that certain laws will at      
certain times admit of alterations4 ,but
 if we consider this matter in another  
point of view1 it will appear to require
 great caution2 for when the advantage  
proposed is trifling1 as the accustoming
 the people easily to abolish their laws
 is of bad consequence1 it is evidently 
better to pass over some faults which   
either the legislator or the magistrates
 may have committed2 for the alterations
 will not be of so much service as a    
habit of disobeying the magistrates will
 be of disservice4 ,besides1 the        
instance brought from the arts is       
fallacious2 for it is not the same thing
 to alter the one as the other4 ,for a  
law derives all its strength from       

custom1 and this requires long time to  
establish2 so that1 to make it an easy  
matter to pass from the established laws
 to other new ones1 is to weaken the    
power of laws4 ,besides1 here is another
 question2 if the laws are to be        
altered1 are they all to be altered1 and
 in every government or not1 and whether
 at the pleasure of one person or many8 
all which particulars will make a great 
difference2 for which reason we will at 
present drop the inquiry1 to pursue it  
at some other time4     ,,chapter ,,ix  
,there are two considerations which     
offer themselves with respect to the    
government established at ,lacedaemon   
and ,crete1 and indeed in almost all    
other states whatsoever2 one is whether 
their laws do or do not promote the best
 establishment possible8 the other is   
whether there is anything1 if we        
consider either the principles upon     
which it is founded or the executive    
part of it1 which prevents the form of  
government that they had proposed to    

follow from being observed2 now it is   
allowed that in every well-regulated    
state the members of it should be free  
from servile labour2 but in what manner 
this shall be effected is not so easy to
 determine2 for the ,penestse have very 
often attacked the ,thessalians1 and the
 ,helots the ,lacedaemonians1 for they  
in a manner continually watch an        
opportunity for some misfortune         
befalling them4 ,but no such thing has  
ever happened to the ,cretans2 the      
#abfi;b reason for which probably is1   
that although they are engaged in       
frequent wars with the neighbouring     
cities1 yet none of these would enter   
into an alliance with the revolters1 as 
it would be disadvantageous for them1   
who themselves also have their villains4
 ,but now there is perpetual enmity     
between the ,lacedaemonians and all     
their neighbours1 the ,argives1 the     
,messenians1 and the ,arcadians4 ,their 
slaves also first revolted from the     
,thessalians while they were engaged in 

wars with their neighbours the ,acheans1
 the ,perrabeans1 and the ,magnesians4  
,it seems to me indeed1 if nothing else1
 yet something very troublesome to keep 
upon proper terms with them2 for if you 
are remiss in your discipline they grow 
insolent1 and think themselves upon an  
equality with their masters2 and if they
 are hardly used they are continually   
plotting against you and hate you4 ,it  
is evident1 then1 that those who employ 
slaves have not as yet hit upon the     
right way of managing them4  ,as to the 
indulging of women in any particular    
liberties1 it is hurtful to the end of  
government and the prosperity of the    
city2 for as a man and his wife are the 
two parts of a family1 if we suppose a  
city to be divided into two parts1 we   
must allow that the number of men and   
women will be equal4  ,in whatever city 
then the women are not under good       
regulations1 we must look upon one half 
of it as not under the restraint of law1
 as it there happened2 for the          

legislator1 desiring to make his whole  
city a collection of warriors with      
respect to the men1 he most evidently   
accomplished his design2 but in the     
meantime the women were quite neglected1
 for they live without restraint in     
every improper indulgence and luxury4   
,so that in such a state riches will    
necessarily be in general esteem1       
particularly if the men are governed by 
their wives1 which has been the case    
with many a brave and warlike people    
except the ,celts1 and those other      
nations1 if there are any such1 who     
openly practise pederasty4 ,and the     
first mythologists seem not improperly  
to have joined ,mars and ,venus         
together2 for all nations of this       
character are greatly addicted either to
 the love of women or of boys1 for which
 reason it was thus at ,lacedaemon2 and 
many things in their state were done by 
the authority of the women4 ,for what is
 the difference1 if the power is in the 
hands of the women1 or in the hands of  

those whom they themselves govern8 it   
must turn to the same account4 ,as this 
boldness of the women can be of no use  
in any common occurrences1 if it was    
ever so1 it must be in war2 but even    
here we find that the ,lacedaemonian    
women were of the greatest disservice1  
as was proved at the time of the ,theban
 invasion1 when they were of no use at  
all1 as they are in other cities1 but   
made more disturbance than even the     
enemy4  ,the origin of this indulgence  
which the ,lacedaemonian women enjoy is 
easily accounted for1 from the long time
 the men were absent from home upon     
foreign expeditions #abgj;a against the 
,argives1 and afterwards the ,arcadians 
and ,messenians1 so that1 when these    
wars were at an end1 their military     
life1 in which there is no little       
virtue1 prepared them to obey the       
precepts of their law-giver2 but we are 
told1 that when ,lycurgus endeavoured   
also to reduce the women to an obedience
 to his laws1 upon their refusal he     

declined it4 ,it may indeed be said that
 the women were the causes of these     
things1 and of course all the fault was 
theirs4 ,but we are not now considering 
where the fault lies1 or where it does  
not lie1 but what is right and what is  
wrong2 and when the manners of the women
 are not well regulated1 as ,i have     
already said1 it must not only occasion 
faults which are disgraceful to the     
state1 but also increase the love of    
money4 ,in the next place1 fault may be 
found with his unequal division of      
property1 for some will have far too    
much1 others too little2 by which means 
the land will come into few hands1 which
 business is badly regulated by his     
laws4 ,for he made it infamous for any  
one either to buy or sell their         
possessions1 in which he did right2 but 
he permitted any one that chose it to   
give them away1 or bequeath them1       
although nearly the same consequences   
will arise from one practice as from the
 other4 ,it is supposed that near two   

parts in five of the whole country is   
the property of women1 owing to their   
being so often sole heirs1 and having   
such large fortunes in marriage2 though 
it would be better to allow them none1  
or a little1 or a certain regulated     
proportion4 ,now every one is permitted 
to make a woman his heir if he pleases2 
and if he dies intestate1 he who        
succeeds as heir at law gives it to whom
 he pleases4 ,from whence it happens    
that although the country is able to    
support fifteen hundred horse and thirty
 thousand foot1 the number does not     
amount to one thousand4  ,and from these
 facts it is evident1 that this         
particular is badly regulated2 for the  
city could not support one shock1 but   
was ruined for want of men4 ,they say1  
that during the reigns of their ancient 
kings they used to present foreigners   
with the freedom of their city1 to      
prevent there being a want of men while 
they carried on long wars2 it is also   
affirmed that the number of ,spartans   

was formerly ten thousand2 but be that  
as it will1 an equality of property     
conduces much to increase the number of 
the people4 ,the law1 too1 which he made
 to encourage population was by no means
 calculated to correct this inequality2 
for being willing that the ,spartans    
should be as numerous as #abgj;b        
possible1 to make them desirous of      
having large families he ordered that he
 who had three children should be       
excused the night-watch1 and that he who
 had four should pay no taxes3 though it
 is very evident1 that while the land   
was divided in this manner1 that if the 
people increased there must many of them
 be very poor4  ,nor was he less        
blamable for the manner in which he     
constituted the ephori2 for these       
magistrates take cognisance of things of
 the last importance1 and yet they are  
chosen out of the people in general2 so 
that it often happens that a very poor  
person is elected to that office1 who1  
from that circumstance1 is easily       

bought4 ,there have been many instances 
of this formerly1 as well as in the late
 affair at ,andros4 ,and these men1     
being corrupted with money1 went as far 
as they could to ruin the city3 and1    
because their power was too great and   
nearly tyrannical1 their kings were     
obliged to natter them1 which           
contributed greatly to hurt the state2  
so that it altered from an aristocracy  
to a democracy4 ,this magistracy is     
indeed the great support of the state2  
for the people are easy1 knowing that   
they are eligible to the first office in
 it2 so that1 whether it took place by  
the intention of the legislator1 or     
whether it happened by chance1 this is  
of great service to their affairs2 for  
it is necessary that every member of the
 state should endeavour that each part  
of the government should be preserved1  
and continue the same4 ,and upon this   
principle their kings have always acted1
 out of regard to their honour2 the wise
 and good from their attachment to the  

senate1 a seat wherein they consider as 
the reward of virtue2 and the common    
people1 that they may support the       
ephori1 of whom they consist4 ,and it is
 proper that these magistrates should be
 chosen out of the whole community1 not 
as the custom is at present1 which is   
very ridiculous4 ,the ephori are the    
supreme judges in causes of the last    
consequence2 but as it is quite         
accidental what sort of persons they may
 be1 it is not right that they should   
determine according to their own        
opinion1 but by a written law or        
established custom4 ,their way of life  
also is not consistent with the manners 
of the city1 for it is too indulgent2   
whereas that of others is too severe2 so
 that they cannot support it1 but are   
obliged privately to act contrary to    
law1 that they may enjoy some of the    
pleasures of sense4 ,there are also     
great defects in the institution of     
their senators4 ,if indeed they were    
fitly trained to the practice of every  

human virtue1 every one would readily   
admit that they would be useful to the  
government2 but still it might be       
debated whether they should be continued
 judges for life1 to determine points of
 the greatest moment1 since the mind has
 its old age as well as the body2 but as
 they are so brought up1 #abga;a that   
even the legislator could not depend    
upon them as good men1 their power must 
be inconsistent with the safety of the  
state3 for it is known that the members 
of that body have been guilty both of   
bribery and partiality in many public   
affairs2 for which reason it had been   
much better if they had been made       
answerable for their conduct1 which they
 are not4 ,but it may be said the ephori
 seem to have a check upon all the      
magistrates4 ,they have indeed in this  
particular very great power2 but ,i     
affirm that they should not be entrusted
 with this control in the manner they   
are4 ,moreover1 the mode of choice which
 they make use of at the election of    

their senators is very childish4 ,nor is
 it right for any one to solicit for a  
place he is desirous of2 for every      
person1 whether he chooses it or not1   
ought to execute any office he is fit   
for4 ,but his intention was evidently   
the same in this as in the other parts  
of his government4 ,for making his      
citizens ambitious after honours1 with  
men of that disposition he has filled   
his senate1 since no others will solicit
 for that office2 and yet the principal 
part of those crimes which men are      
deliberately guilty of arise from       
ambition and avarice4  ,we will inquire 
at another time whether the office of a 
king is useful to the state3 thus much  
is certain1 that they should be chosen  
from a consideration of their conduct   
and not as they are now4 ,but that the  
legislator himself did not expect to    
make all his citizens honourable and    
completely virtuous is evident from     
this1 that he distrusts them as not     
being good men2 for he sent those upon  

the same embassy that were at variance  
with each other2 and thought1 that in   
the dispute of the kings the safety of  
the state consisted4 ,neither were their
 common meals at first well established3
 for these should rather have been      
provided at the public expense1 as at   
,crete1 where1 as at ,lacedaemon1 every 
one was obliged to buy his portion1     
although he might be very poor1 and     
could by no means bear the expense1 by  
which means the contrary happened to    
what the legislator desired3 for he     
intended that those public meals should 
strengthen the democratic part of his   
government3 but this regulation had     
quite the contrary effect1 for those who
 were very poor could not take part in  
them2 and it was an observation of their
 forefathers1 that the not allowing     
those who could not contribute their    
proportion to the common tables to      
partake of them1 would be the ruin of   
the state4 ,other persons have censured 
his laws concerning naval affairs1 and  

not without reason1 as it gave rise to  
disputes4 ,for the commander of the     
fleet is in a manner set up in          
opposition to the kings1 who are        
generals of the army for life4  #abga;b 
,there is also another defect in his    
laws worthy of censure1 which ,plato has
 given in his book of ,laws2 that the   
whole constitution was calculated only  
for the business of war3 it is indeed   
excellent to make them conquerors2 for  
which reason the preservation of the    
state depended thereon4 ,the destruction
 of it commenced with their victories3  
for they knew not how to be idle1 or    
engage in any other employment than war4
 ,in this particular also they were     
mistaken1 that though they rightly      
thought1 that those things which are the
 objects of contention amongst mankind  
are better procured by virtue than vice1
 yet they wrongfully preferred the      
things themselves to virtue4 ,nor was   
the public revenue well managed at      
,sparta1 for the state was worth nothing

 while they were obliged to carry on the
 most extensive wars1 and the subsidies 
were very badly raised2 for as the      
,spartans possessed a large extent of   
country1 they were not exact upon each  
other as to what they paid in4 ,and thus
 an event contrary to the legislator's  
intention took place2 for the state was 
poor1 the individuals avaricious4       
,enough of the ,lacedaemonian           
government2 for these seem the chief    
defects in it4     ,,chapter ,x   ,the  
government of ,crete bears a near       
resemblance to this1 in some few        
particulars it is not worse1 but in     
general it is far inferior in its       
contrivance4 ,for it appears and is     
allowed in many particulars the         
constitution of ,lacedaemon was formed  
in imitation of that of ,crete2 and in  
general most new things are an          
improvement upon the old4 ,for they say1
 that when ,lycurgus ceased to be       
guardian to ,king ,charilles he went    
abroad and spent a long time with his   

relations in ,crete1 for the ,lycians   
are a colony of the ,lacedaemonians2 and
 those who first settled there adopted  
that body of laws which they found      
already established by the inhabitants2 
in like manner also those who now live  
near them have the very laws which      
,minos first drew up4  ,this island     
seems formed by nature to be the        
mistress of ,greece1 for it is entirely 
surrounded by a navigable ocean which   
washes almost all the maritime parts of 
that country1 and is not far distant on 
the one side from ,peloponnesus1 on the 
other1 which looks towards ,asia1 from  
,triopium and ,rhodes4 ,by means of this
 situation ,minos acquired the empire of
 the sea and the islands2 some of which 
he subdued1 in others planted colonies3 
at last he died at ,camicus while he was
 attacking ,sicily4 ,there is this      
analogy between the customs of the      
,lacedaemonians and the ,cretans1 the   
,helots cultivate the grounds #abgb;a   
for the one1 the domestic slaves for the

 other4 ,both states have their common  
meals1 and the ,lacedaemonians called   
these formerly not psiditia but andpia1 
as the ,cretans do2 which proves from   
whence the custom arose4 ,in this       
particular their governments are also   
alike3 the ephori have the same power   
with those of ,crete1 who are called    
kosmoi2 with this difference only1 that 
the number of the one is five1 of the   
other ten4 ,the senators are the same as
 those whom the ,cretans call the       
council4 ,there was formerly also a     
kingly power in ,crete2 but it was      
afterwards dissolved1 and the command of
 their armies was given to the kosmoi4  
,every one also has a vote in their     
public assembly2 but this has only the  
power of confirming what has already    
passed the council and the kosmoi4  ,the
 ,cretans conducted their public meals  
better than the ,lacedaemonians1 for at 
,lacedaemon each individual was obliged 
to furnish what was assessed upon him2  
which if he could not do1 there was a   

law which deprived him of the rights of 
a citizen1 as has been already          
mentioned3 but in ,crete they were      
furnished by the community2 for all the 
corn and cattle1 taxes and              
contributions1 which the domestic slaves
 were obliged to furnish1 were divided  
into parts and allotted to the gods1 the
 exigencies of the state1 and these     
public meals2 so that all the men1      
women1 and children were maintained from
 a common stock4 ,the legislator gave   
great attention to encourage a habit of 
eating sparingly1 as very useful to the 
citizens4 ,he also endeavoured1 that his
 community might not be too populous1 to
 lessen the connection with women1 by   
introducing the love of boys3 whether in
 this he did well or ill we shall have  
some other opportunity of considering4  
,but that the public meals were better  
ordered at ,crete than at ,lacedaemon is
 very evident4  ,the institution of the 
kosmoi1 was still worse than that of the
 ephori3 for it contained all the faults

 incident to that magistracy and some   
peculiar to itself2 for in both cases it
 is uncertain who will be elected3 but  
the ,lacedaemonians have this advantage 
which the others have not1 that as all  
are eligible1 the whole community have a
 share in the highest honours1 and      
therefore all desire to preserve the    
state3 whereas among the ,cretans the   
kosmoi are not chosen out of the people 
in general1 but out of some certain     
families1 and the senate out of the     
kosmoi4 ,and the same observations which
 may be made on the senate at           
,lacedaemon may be applied to these2 for
 their being under no control1 and their
 continuing for life1 is an honour      
greater than they merit2 and to have    
their proceedings not regulated by a    
written law1 but left to their own      
discretion1 is dangerous4 7,as to there 
being no insurrections1 although the    
people share not in the management of   
public affairs1 this is no proof of a   
well-constituted government1 as the     

kosmoi have no opportunity of being     
bribed like the ephori1 as they live in 
an #abgb;b island far from those who    
would corrupt them47 ,but the method    
they take to correct that fault is      
absurd1 impolitic1 and tyrannical3 for  
very often either their                 
fellow-magistrates or some private      
persons conspire together and turn out  
the kosmoi4 ,they are also permitted to 
resign their office before their time is
 elapsed1 and if all this was done by   
law it would be well1 and not at the    
pleasure of the individuals1 which is a 
bad rule to follow4 ,but what is worst  
of all is1 that general confusion which 
those who are in power introduce to     
impede the ordinary course of justice2  
which sufficiently shows what is the    
nature of the government1 or rather     
lawless force3 for it is usual with the 
principal persons amongst them to       
collect together some of the common     
people and their friends1 and then      
revolt and set up for themselves1 and   

come to blows with each other4 ,and what
 is the difference1 if a state is       
dissolved at once by such violent means1
 or if it gradually so alters in process
 of time as to be no longer the same    
constitution8 ,a state like this would  
ever be exposed to the invasions of     
those who were powerful and inclined to 
attack it2 but1 as has been already     
mentioned1 its situation preserves it1  
as it is free from the inroads of       
foreigners2 and for this reason the     
family slaves still remain quiet at     
,crete1 while the ,helots are           
perpetually revolting3 for the ,cretans 
take no part in foreign affairs1 and it 
is but lately that any foreign troops   
have made an attack upon the island2 and
 their ravages soon proved the          
ineffectualness of their laws4 ,and thus
 much for the government of ,crete4     
,,chapter ,,xi   ,the government of     
,carthage seems well established1 and in
 many respects superior to others2 in   
some particulars it bears a near        

resemblance to the ,lacedaemonians2 and 
indeed these three states1 the ,cretans1
 the ,lacedaemonians and the            
,carthaginians are in some things very  
like each other1 in others they differ  
greatly4 ,amongst many excellent        
constitutions this may show how well    
their government is framed1 that        
although the people are admitted to a   
share in the administration1 the form of
 it remains unaltered1 without any      
popular insurrections1 worth notice1 on 
the one hand1 or degenerating into a    
tyranny on the other4 ,now the          
,carthaginians have these things in     
common with the ,lacedaemonians3 public 
tables for those who are connected      
together by the tie of mutual           
friendship1 after the manner of their   
,phiditia2 they have also a magistracy1 
consisting of an hundred and four       
persons1 similar to the ephori1 or      
rather selected with more judgment2 for 
amongst the ,lacedaemonians1 all the    
citizens are eligible1 but amongst the  

,carthaginians1 they are chosen out of  
those of the better sort3 there is also 
some analogy between the king and the   
senate in both these governments1 though
 the ,carthaginian method of appointing 
their kings is best1 for they do not    
confine themselves to one family2 nor do
 they permit the election to be at      
large1 nor have they any regard to      
seniority2 for if amongst the candidates
 there are any of greater merit than the
 rest1 these they prefer to those who   
may be older2 for as their power is very
 extensive1 if they are #abgc;a persons 
of no account1 they may be very hurtful 
to the state1 as they have always been  
to the ,lacedaemonians2 also the greater
 part of those things which become      
reprehensible by their excess are common
 to all those governments which we have 
described4  ,now of those principles on 
which the ,carthaginians have           
established their mixed form of         
government1 composed of an aristocracy  
and democracy1 some incline to produce a

 democracy1 others an oligarchy3 for    
instance1 if the kings and the senate   
are unanimous upon any point in debate1 
they can choose whether they will bring 
it before the people or no2 but if they 
disagree1 it is to these they must      
appeal1 who are not only to hear what   
has been approved of by the senate1 but 
are finally to determine upon it2 and   
whosoever chooses it1 has a right to    
speak against any matter whatsoever that
 may be proposed1 which is not permitted
 in other cases4 ,the five1 who elect   
each other1 have very great and         
extensive powers2 and these choose the  
hundred1 who are magistrates of the     
highest rank3 their power also continues
 longer than any other magistrates1 for 
it commences before they come into      
office1 and is prolonged after they are 
out of it2 and in this particular the   
state inclines to an oligarchy3 but as  
they are not elected by lot1 but by     
suffrage1 and are not permitted to take 
money1 they are the greatest supporters 

imaginable of an aristocracy4  ,the     
determining all causes by the same      
magistrates1 and not orae in one court  
and another in another1 as at           
,lacedaemon1 has the same influence4    
,the constitution of ,carthage is now   
shifting from an aristocracy to an      
oligarchy1 in consequence of an opinion 
which is favourably entertained by many1
 who think that the magistrates in the  
community ought not to be persons of    
family only1 but of fortune also2 as it 
is impossible for those who are in bad  
circumstances to support the dignity of 
their office1 or to be at leisure to    
apply to public business4 ,as choosing  
men of fortune to be magistrates make a 
state incline to an oligarchy1 and men  
of abilities to an aristocracy1 so is   
there a third method of proceeding which
 took place in the polity of ,carthage2 
for they have an eye to these two       
particulars when they elect their       
officers1 particularly those of the     
highest rank1 their kings and their     

generals4 ,it must be admitted1 that it 
was a great fault in their legislator   
not to guard against the constitution's 
degenerating from an aristocracy2 for   
this is a most necessary thing to       
provide for at first1 that those        
citizens who have the best abilities    
should never be obliged to do anything  
unworthy their character1 but be always 
at leisure to serve the public1 not only
 when in office1 but also when private  
persons2 for if once you are obliged to 
look among the wealthy1 that you may    
have men at leisure to serve you1 your  
greatest offices1 of king and general1  
will soon become venal2 in consequence  
of which1 riches will be more honourable
 than virtue and a love of money be the 
ruling principle in the city-for what   
those who have the chief power regard as
 honourable will necessarily be the     
object which the #abgc;b citizens in    
general will aim at2 and where the first
 honours are not paid to virtue1 there  
the aristocratic form of government     

cannot flourish3 for it is reasonable to
 conclude1 that those who bought their  
places should generally make an         
advantage of what they laid out their   
money for2 as it is absurd to suppose1  
that if a man of probity who is poor    
should be desirous of gaining something1
 a bad man should not endeavour to do   
the same1 especially to reimburse       
himself2 for which reason the magistracy
 should be formed of those who are most 
able to support an aristocracy4 ,it     
would have been better for the          
legislature to have passed over the     
poverty of men of merit1 and only to    
have taken care to have ensured them    
sufficient leisure1 when in office1 to  
attend to public affairs4  ,it seems    
also improper1 that one person should   
execute several offices1 which was      
approved of at ,carthage2 for one       
business is best done by one person2 and
 it is the duty of the legislator to    
look to this1 and not make the same     
person a musician and a shoemaker3 so   

that where the state is not small it is 
more politic and more popular to admit  
many persons to have a share in the     
government2 for1 as ,i just now said1 it
 is not only more usual1 but everything 
is better and sooner done1 when one     
thing only is allotted to one person3   
and this is evident both in the army and
 navy1 where almost every one1 in his   
turn1 both commands and is under        
command4 ,but as their government       
inclines to an oligarchy1 they avoid the
 ill effects of it by always appointing 
some of the popular party to the        
government of cities to make their      
fortunes4 ,thus they consult this fault 
in their constitution and render it     
stable2 but this is depending on chance2
 whereas the legislator ought to frame  
his government1 that there the no room  
for insurrections4 ,but now1 if there   
should be any general calamity1 and the 
people should revolt from their rulers1 
there is no remedy for reducing them to 
obedience by the laws4 ,and these are   

the particulars of the ,lacedaemonian1  
the ,cretan1 and the ,carthaginian      
governments which seem worthy of        
commendation4     ,,chapter ,,xii       
,some of those persons who have written 
upon government had never any share in  
public affairs1 but always led a private
 life4 ,everything worthy of notice in  
their works we have already spoke to4   
,others were legislators1 some in their 
own cities1 others were employed in     
regulating the governments of foreign   
states4 ,some of them only composed a   
body of laws2 others formed the         
constitution also1 as ,lycurgus2 and    
,solon1 who did both4 ,the              
,lacedaemonians have been already       
mentioned4 ,some persons think that     
,solon was an excellent legislator1 who 
could dissolve a pure oligarchy1 and    
save the people from that slavery which 
hung over them1 and establish the       
ancient democratic form of government in
 his country2 wherein every part of it  
was so framed as to be well adapted to  

the whole4 ,in the senate of ,areopagus 
an oligarchy was preserved2 by the      
manner of electing their #abgd;a        
magistrates1 an aristocracy2 and in     
their courts of justice1 a democracy4   
,solon seems not to have altered the    
established form of government1 either  
with respect to the senate or the mode  
of electing their magistrates2 but to   
have raised the people to great         
consideration in the state by allotting 
the supreme judicial department to them2
 and for this some persons blame him1 as
 having done what would soon overturn   
that balance of power he intended to    
establish2 for by trying all causes     
whatsoever before the people1 who were  
chosen by lot to determine them1 it was 
necessary to flatter a tyrannical       
populace who had got this power2 which  
contributed to bring the government to  
that pure democracy it now is4  ,both   
,ephialtes and ,pericles abridged the   
power of the ,areopagites1 the latter of
 whom introduced the method of paying   

those who attended the courts of        
justice3 and thus every one who aimed at
 being popular proceeded increasing the 
power of the people to what we now see  
it4 ,but it is evident that this was not
 ,solon's intention1 but that it arose  
from accident2 for the people being the 
cause of the naval victory over the     
,medes1 assumed greatly upon it1 and    
enlisted themselves under factious      
demagogues1 although opposed by the     
better part of the citizens4 ,he thought
 it indeed most necessary to entrust the
 people with the choice of their        
magistrates and the power of calling    
them to account2 for without that they  
must have been slaves and enemies to the
 other citizens3 but he ordered them to 
elect those only who were persons of    
good account and property1 either out of
 those who were worth five hundred      
medimns1 or those who were called       
xeugitai1 or those of the third census1 
who were called horsemen4  ,as for those
 of the fourth1 which consisted of      

mechanics1 they were incapable of any   
office4 ,zaleucus was the legislator of 
the ,western ,locrians1 as was          
,charondas1 the ,catanean1 of his own   
cities1 and those also in ,italy and    
,sicily which belonged to the           
,calcidians4 ,some persons endeavour to 
prove that ,onomacritus1 the ,locrian1  
was the first person of note who drew up
 laws2 and that he employed himself in  
that business while he was at ,crete1   
where he continued some time to learn   
the prophetic art3 and they say1 that   
,thales was his companion2 and that     
,lycurgus and ,zaleucus were the        
scholars of ,thales1 and ,charondas of  
,zaleucus2 but those who advance this1  
advance what is repugnant to chronology4
 ,philolaus also1 of the family of the  
,bacchiades1 was a ,theban legislator4  
,this man was very fond of ,diocles1 a  
victor in the ,olympic games1 and when  
he left his country from a disgust at an
 improper passion which his mother      
,alithoe had entertained for him1 and   

settled at ,thebes1 ,philolaus followed 
him1 where they both died1 and where    
they still show their tombs placed in   
view of each other1 but so disposed1    
that one of them looks towards ,corinth1
 the other does not2 the reason they    
give for this is1 that ,diodes1 from his
 detestation of his mother's passion1   
would have his tomb so placed that no   
one could see ,corinth from it2 but     
,philolaus chose that it might be seen  
from his3 and this was the cause of     
their living at ,thebes4 #abgd;b  ,as   
,philolaus gave them laws concerning    
many other things1 so did he upon       
adoption1 which they call adoptive laws2
 and this he in particular did to       
preserve the number of families4        
,charondas did nothing new1 except in   
actions for perjury1 which he was the   
first person who took into particular   
consideration4 ,he also drew up his laws
 with greater elegance and accuracy than
 even any of our present legislators4   
,philolaus introduced the law for the   

equal distribution of goods2 ,plato that
 for the community of women1 children1  
and goods1 and also for public tables   
for the women2 and one concerning       
drunkenness1 that they might observe    
sobriety in their symposiums4 ,he also  
made a law concerning their warlike     
exercises2 that they should acquire a   
habit of using both hands alike1 as it  
was necessary that one hand should be as
 useful as the other4  ,as for ,draco's 
laws1 they were published when the      
government was already established1 and 
they have nothing particular in them    
worth mentioning1 except their severity 
on account of the enormity of their     
punishments4 ,pittacus was the author of
 some laws1 but never drew up any form  
of government2 one of which was this1   
that if a drunken man beat any person he
 should be punished more than if he did 
it when sober2 for as people are more   
apt to be abusive when drunk than sober1
 he paid no consideration to the excuse 
which drunkenness might claim1 but      

regarded only the common benefit4       
,andromadas ,regmus was also a lawgiver 
to the ,thracian talcidians4 ,there are 
some laws of his concerning murders and 
heiresses extant1 but these contain     
nothing that any one can say is new and 
his own4 ,and thus much for different   
sorts of governments1 as well those     
which really exist as those which       
different persons have proposed4        
,,book ,,iii     ,,chapter ,i   ,every  
one who inquires into the nature of     
government1 and what are its different  
forms1 should make this almost his first
 question1 ,what is a city8 ,for upon   
this there is a dispute3 for some       
persons say the city did this or that1  
while others say1 not the city1 but the 
oligarchy1 or the tyranny4 ,we see that 
the city is the only object which both  
the politician and legislator have in   
view in all they do3 but government is a
 certain ordering of those who inhabit a
 city4 ,as a city is a collective body1 
and1 like other wholes1 composed of many

 parts1 it is evident our first inquiry 
must be1 what a citizen is3 for a city  
is a certain number of citizens4 ,so    
that we must consider whom we ought to  
call citizen1 and who is one2 for this  
is often doubtful3 for every one will   
not allow that this character is        
applicable to the same person2 for that 
man who would be a citizen in a republic
 would very often not be one in an      
oligarchy4 ,we do not include in this   
inquiry many of those who acquire this  
appellation out of the ordinary way1 as 
honorary persons1 for instance1 but     
those only who have a natural right to  
it4  ,now it is not residence which     
constitutes a man a citizen2 for in this
 sojourners and slaves are upon an      
equality with him2 nor will it be       
sufficient for this purpose1 that you   
have the privilege of the laws1 and may 
plead or be impleaded1 for this all     
those of different nations1 between whom
 there is a mutual agreement for that   
purpose1 are allowed2 although it very  

often happens1 that sojourners have not 
a perfect right therein without the     
protection of a patron1 to whom they are
 obliged to apply1 which shows that     
their share in the community is         
incomplete4 ,in like manner1 with       
respect to boys who are not yet         
enrolled1 or old men who are past war1  
we admit that they are in some respects 
citizens1 but not completely so1 but    
with some exceptions1 for these are not 
yet arrived to years of maturity1 and   
those are past service2 nor is there any
 difference between them4 ,but what we  
mean is sufficiently intelligible and   
clear1 we want a complete citizen1 one  
in whom there is no deficiency to be    
corrected to make him so4 ,as to those  
who are banished1 or infamous1 there may
 be the same objections made and the    
same answer given4 ,there is nothing    
that more characterises a complete      
citizen than having a share in the      
judicial and executive part of the      
government4  ,with respect to offices1  

some are fixed to a particular time1 so 
that no person is1 on any account1      
permitted to fill them twice2 or else   
not till some certain period has        
intervened2 others are not fixed1 as a  
juryman's1 and a member of the general  
assembly3 but probably some one may say 
these are not offices1 nor have the     
citizens in these capacities any share  
in the government2 though surely it is  
ridiculous to say that those who have   
the principal power in the state bear no
 office in it4 ,but this objection is of
 no weight1 for it is only a dispute    
about words2 as there is no general term
 which can be applied both to the office
 of a juryman and a member of the       
assembly4 ,for the sake of distinction1 
suppose we call it an indeterminate     
office3 but ,i lay it down as a maxim1  
that those are citizens who could       
exercise it4 ,such then is the          
description of a citizen who comes      
nearest to what all those who are called
 citizens are4 ,every one also should   

know1 that of the component parts of    
those things which differ from each     
other in species1 after the first or    
second remove1 those which follow have  
either nothing at all or very little    
common to each4  ,now we see that       
governments differ from each other in   
their form1 and that some of them are   
defective1 others #abge;b as excellent  
as possible3 for it is evident1 that    
those which have many deficiencies and  
degeneracies in them must be far        
inferior to those which are without such
 faults4 ,what ,i mean by degeneracies  
will be hereafter explained4 ,hence it  
is clear that the office of a citizen   
must differ as governments do from each 
other3 for which reason he who is called
 a citizen has1 in a democracy1 every   
privilege which that station supposes4  
,in other forms of government he may    
enjoy them2 but not necessarily3 for in 
some states the people have no power2   
nor have they any general assembly1 but 
a few select men4  ,the trial also of   

different causes is allotted to         
different persons2 as at ,lacedaemon all
 disputes concerning contracts are      
brought before some of the ephori3 the  
senate are the judges in cases of       
murder1 and so on2 some being to be     
heard by one magistrate1 others by      
another3 and thus at ,carthage certain  
magistrates determine all causes4 ,but  
our former description of a citizen will
 admit of correction2 for in some       
governments the office of a juryman and 
a member of the general assembly is not 
an indeterminate one2 but there are     
particular persons appointed for these  
purposes1 some or all of the citizens   
being appointed jurymen or members of   
the general assembly1 and this either   
for all causes and all public business  
whatsoever1 or else for some particular 
one3 and this may be sufficient to show 
what a citizen is2 for he who has a     
right to a share in the judicial and    
executive part of government in any     
city1 him we call a citizen of that     

place2 and a city1 in one word1 is a    
collective body of such persons         
sufficient in themselves to all the     
purposes of life4     ,,chapter ,,ii    
,in common use they define a citizen to 
be one who is sprung from citizens on   
both sides1 not on the father's or the  
mother's only4 ,others carry the matter 
still further1 and inquire how many of  
his ancestors have been citizens1 as his
 grandfather1 great-grandfather1 etc41  
but some persons have questioned how the
 first of the family could prove        
themselves citizens1 according to this  
popular and careless definition4        
,gorgias of ,leontium1 partly           
entertaining the same doubt1 and partly 
in jest1 says1 that as a mortar is made 
by a mortar-maker1 so a citizen is made 
by a citizen-maker1 and a ,larisssean by
 a ,larisssean-maker4 ,this is indeed a 
very simple account of the matter2 for  
if citizens are so1 according to this   
definition1 it will be impossible to    
apply it to the first founders or first 

inhabitants of states1 who cannot       
possibly claim in right either of their 
father or mother4 ,it is probably a     
matter of still more difficulty to      
determine their rights as citizens who  
are admitted to their freedom after any 
revolution in the state4 ,as1 for       
instance1 at ,athens1 after the         
expulsion of the tyrants1 when          
,clisthenes enrolled many foreigners and
 city-slaves amongst the tribes2 and the
 doubt with respect to them was1 not    
whether they were citizens or no1 but   
whether they were legally so or not4    
,though indeed some persons may have    
this further #abgf;a doubt1 whether a   
citizen can be a citizen when he is     
illegally made2 as if an illegal        
citizen1 and one who is no citizen at   
all1 were in the same predicament3 but  
since we see some persons govern        
unjustly1 whom yet we admit to govern1  
though not justly1 and the definition of
 a citizen is one who exercises certain 
offices1 for such a one we have defined 

a citizen to be1 it is evident1 that a  
citizen illegally created yet continues 
to be a citizen1 but whether justly or  
unjustly so belongs to the former       
inquiry4     ,,chapter ,,iii   ,it has  
also been doubted what was and what was 
not the act of the city2 as1 for        
instance1 when a democracy arises out of
 an aristocracy or a tyranny2 for some  
persons then refuse to fulfil their     
contracts2 as if the right to receive   
the money was in the tyrant and not in  
the state1 and many other things of the 
same nature2 as if any covenant was     
founded for violence and not for the    
common good4 ,so in like manner1 if     
anything is done by those who have the  
management of public affairs where a    
democracy is established1 their actions 
are to be considered as the actions of  
the state1 as well as in the oligarchy  
or tyranny4  ,and here it seems very    
proper to consider this question1 ,when 
shall we say that a city is the same1   
and when shall we say that it is        

different8  ,it is but a superficial    
mode of examining into this question to 
begin with the place and the people2 for
 it may happen that these may be divided
 from that1 or that some one of them may
 live in one place1 and some in another 
7but this question may be regarded as no
 very knotty one2 for1 as a city may    
acquire that appellation on many        
accounts1 it may be solved many ways72  
and in like manner1 when men inhabit one
 common place1 when shall we say that   
they inhabit the same city1 or that the 
city is the same8 for it does not depend
 upon the walls2 for ,i can suppose     
,peloponnesus itself surrounded with a  
wall1 as ,babylon was1 and every other  
place1 which rather encircles many      
nations than one city1 and that they say
 was taken three days when some of the  
inhabitants knew nothing of it3 but we  
shall find a proper time to determine   
this question2 for the extent of a city1
 how large it should be1 and whether it 
should consist of more than one people1 

these are particulars that the          
politician should by no means be        
unacquainted with4 ,this1 too1 is a     
matter of inquiry1 whether we shall say 
that a city is the same while it is     
inhabited by the same race of men1      
though some of them are perpetually     
dying1 others coming into the world1 as 
we say that a river or a fountain is the
 same1 though the waters are continually
 changing2 or when a revolution takes   
place shall we #abgf;b say the men are  
the same1 but the city is different3 for
 if a city is a community1 it is a      
community of citizens2 but if the mode  
of government should alter1 and become  
of another sort1 it would seem a        
necessary consequence that the city is  
not the same2 as we regard the tragic   
chorus as different from the comic1     
though it may probably consist of the   
same performers3 thus every other       
community or composition is said to be  
different if the species of composition 
is different2 as in music the same hands

 produce different harmony1 as the      
,doric and ,phrygian4 ,if this is true1 
it is evident1 that when we speak of a  
city as being the same we refer to the  
government there established2 and this1 
whether it is called by the same name or
 any other1 or inhabited by the same men
 or different4 ,but whether or no it is 
right to dissolve the community when the
 constitution is altered is another     
question4     ,,chapter ,,iv   ,what has
 been said1 it follows that we should   
consider whether the same virtues which 
constitute a good man make a valuable   
citizen1 or different2 and if a         
particular inquiry is necessary for this
 matter we must first give a general    
description of the virtues of a good    
citizen2 for as a sailor is one of those
 who make up a community1 so is a       
citizen1 although the province of one   
sailor may be different from another's  
7for one is a rower1 another a          
steersman1 a third a boatswain1 and so  
on1 each having their several           

appointments71 it is evident that the   
most accurate description of any one    
good sailor must refer to his peculiar  
abilities1 yet there are some things in 
which the same description may be       
applied to the whole crew1 as the safety
 of the ship is the common business of  
all of them1 for this is the general    
centre of all their cares3 so also with 
respect to citizens1 although they may  
in a few particulars be very different1 
yet there is one care common to them    
all1 the safety of the community1 for   
the community of the citizens composes  
the state2 for which reason the virtue  
of a citizen has necessarily a reference
 to the state4 ,but if there are        
different sorts of governments1 it is   
evident that those actions which        
constitute the virtue of an excellent   
citizen in one community will not       
constitute it in another2 wherefore the 
virtue of such a one cannot be perfect3 
but we say1 a man is good when his      
virtues are perfect2 from whence it     

follows1 that an excellent citizen does 
not possess that virtue which           
constitutes a good man4 ,those who are  
any ways doubtful concerning this       
question may be convinced of the truth  
of it by examining into the best formed 
states3 for1 if it is impossible that a 
city should consist entirely of         
excellent citizens 7while it is         
necessary that every one should do well 
in his calling1 in which consists his   
excellence1 as it is impossible that all
 the citizens should have the same      
#abgg;a qualifications7 it is impossible
 that the virtue of a citizen and a good
 man should be the same2 for all should 
possess the virtue of an excellent      
citizen3 for from hence necessarily     
arise the perfection of the city3 but   
that every one should possess the virtue
 of a good man is impossible without all
 the citizens in a well-regulated state 
were necessarily virtuous4 ,besides1 as 
a city is composed of dissimilar parts1 
as an animal is of life and body2 the   

soul of reason and appetite2 a family of
 a man and his wife--property of a      
master and a slave2 in the same manner1 
as a city is composed of all these and  
many other very different parts1 it     
necessarily follows that the virtue of  
all the citizens cannot be the same2 as 
the business of him who leads the band  
is different from the other dancers4    
,from all which proofs it is evident    
that the virtues of a citizen cannot be 
one and the same4 ,but do we never find 
those virtues united which constitute a 
good man and excellent citizen8 for we  
say1 such a one is an excellent         
magistrate and a prudent and good man2  
but prudence is a necessary             
qualification for all those who engage  
in public affairs4 ,nay1 some persons   
affirm that the education of those who  
are intended to command should1 from the
 beginning1 be different from other     
citizens1 as the children of kings are  
generally instructed in riding and      
warlike exercises2 and thus ,euripides  

says3    444 ,no showy arts ,be mine1   
but teach me what the state requires4   
,as if those who are to rule were to    
have an education peculiar to           
themselves4 ,but if we allow1 that the  
virtues of a good man and a good        
magistrate may be the same1 and a       
citizen is one who obeys the magistrate1
 it follows that the virtue of the one  
cannot in general be the same as the    
virtue of the other1 although it may be 
true of some particular citizen2 for the
 virtue of the magistrate must be       
different from the virtue of the        
citizen4 ,for which reason ,jason       
declared that was he deprived of his    
kingdom he should pine away with regret1
 as not knowing how to live a private   
man4 ,but it is a great recommendation  
to know how to command as well as to    
obey2 and to do both these things well  
is the virtue of an accomplished        
citizen4 ,if then the virtue of a good  
man consists only in being able to      
command1 but the virtue of a good       

citizen renders him equally fit for the 
one as well as the other1 the           
commendation of both of them is not the 
same4 ,it appears1 then1 that both he   
who commands and he who obeys should    
each of them learn their separate       
business3 but that the citizen should be
 master of and take part in both these1 
as any one may easily perceive2 in a    
family government there is no occasion  
for the master to know how to perform   
the necessary offices1 but rather to    
enjoy the labour of others2 for to do   
the other is a servile part4 ,i mean by 
the other1 the common family business of
 the slave4  ,there are many sorts of   
slaves2 for their employments are       
various3 of these the handicraftsmen are
 one1 who1 as their name imports1 get   
their living by the labour of their     
hands1 and amongst these all mechanics  
are included2 #abgg;b for which reasons 
such workmen1 in some states1 were not  
formerly admitted into any share in the 
government2 till at length democracies  

were established3 it is not therefore   
proper for any man of honour1 or any    
citizen1 or any one who engages in      
public affairs1 to learn these servile  
employments without they have occasion  
for them for their own use2 for without 
this was observed the distinction       
between a master and a slave would be   
lost4 ,but there is a government of     
another sort1 in which men govern those 
who are their equals in rank1 and       
freemen1 which we call a political      
government1 in which men learn to       
command by first submitting to obey1 as 
a good general of horse1 or a           
commander-in-chief1 must acquire a      
knowledge of their duty by having been  
long under the command of another1 and  
the like in every appointment in the    
army3 for well is it said1 no one knows 
how to command who has not himself been 
under command of another4 ,the virtues  
of those are indeed different1 but a    
good citizen must necessarily be endowed
 with them2 he ought also to know in    

what manner freemen ought to govern1 as 
well as be governed3 and this1 too1 is  
the duty of a good man4 ,and if the     
temperance and justice of him who       
commands is different from his who1     
though a freeman1 is under command1 it  
is evident that the virtues of a good   
citizen cannot be the same as justice1  
for instance but must be of a different 
species in these two different          
situations1 as the temperance and       
courage of a man and a woman are        
different from each other2 for a man    
would appear a coward who had only that 
courage which would be graceful in a    
woman1 and a woman would be thought a   
talker who should take as large a part  
in the conversation as would become a   
man of consequence4  ,the domestic      
employments of each of them are also    
different2 it is the man's business to  
acquire subsistence1 the woman's to take
 care of it4 ,but direction and         
knowledge of public affairs is a virtue 
peculiar to those who govern1 while all 

others seem to be equally requisite for 
both parties2 but with this the governed
 have no concern1 it is theirs to       
entertain just notions3 they indeed are 
like flute-makers1 while those who      
govern are the musicians who play on    
them4 ,and thus much to show whether the
 virtue of a good man and an excellent  
citizen is the same1 or if it is        
different1 and also how far it is the   
same1 and how far different4            
,,chapter ,v   ,but with respect to     
citizens there is a doubt remaining1    
whether those only are truly so who are 
allowed to share in the government1 or  
whether the mechanics also are to be    
considered as such8 for if those who are
 not permitted to rule are to be        
reckoned among them1 it is impossible   
that the virtue of all the citizens     
should be the same1 for these also are  
citizens2 and if none of them are       
admitted to be citizens1 where shall    
they be ranked8 for they are neither    
#abgh;a sojourners nor foreigners8 or   

shall we say that there will no         
inconvenience arise from their not being
 citizens1 as they are neither slaves   
nor freedmen3 for this is certainly     
true1 that all those are not citizens   
who are necessary to the existence of a 
city1 as boys are not citizens in the   
same manner that men are1 for those are 
perfectly so1 the others under some     
conditions2 for they are citizens1      
though imperfect ones3 for in former    
times among some people the mechanics   
were either slaves or foreigners1 for   
which reason many of them are so now3   
and indeed the best regulated states    
will not permit a mechanic to be a      
citizen2 but if it be allowed them1 we  
cannot then attribute the virtue we have
 described to every citizen or freeman1 
but to those only who are disengaged    
from servile offices4 ,now those who are
 employed by one person in them are     
slaves2 those who do them for money are 
mechanics and hired servants3 hence it  
is evident on the least reflection what 

is their situation1 for what ,i have    
said is fully explained by appearances4 
,since the number of communities is very
 great1 it follows necessarily that     
there will be many different sorts of   
citizens1 particularly of those who are 
governed by others1 so that in one state
 it may be necessary to admit mechanics 
and hired servants to be citizens1 but  
in others it may be impossible2 as      
particularly in an aristocracy1 where   
honours are bestowed on virtue and      
dignity3 for it is impossible for one   
who lives the life of a mechanic or     
hired servant to acquire the practice of
 virtue4 ,in an oligarchy also hired    
servants are not admitted to be         
citizens2 because there a man's right to
 bear any office is regulated by his    
fortune2 but mechanics are1 for many    
citizens are very rich4  ,there was a   
law at ,thebes that no one could have a 
share in the government till he had been
 ten years out of trade4 ,in many states
 the law invites strangers to accept the

 freedom of the city2 and in some       
democracies the son of a free-woman is  
himself free4 ,the same is also observed
 in many others with respect to natural 
children2 but it is through want of     
citizens regularly born that they admit 
such3 for these laws are always made in 
consequence of a scarcity of            
inhabitants2 so1 as their numbers       
increase1 they first deprive the        
children of a male or female slave of   
this privilege1 next the child of a     
free-woman1 and last of all they will   
admit none but those whose fathers and  
mothers were both free4  ,that there are
 many sorts of citizens1 and that he may
 be said to be as completely who shares 
the honours of the state1 is evident    
from what has been already said4 ,thus  
,achilles1 in ,homer1 complains of      
,agamemnon's treating him like an       
unhonoured stranger2 for a stranger or  
sojourner is one who does not partake of
 the honours of the state3 and whenever 
the right to the freedom of the city is 

kept obscure1 it is for the sake of the 
inhabitants4 #abgh;b ,from what has been
 said it is plain whether the virtue of 
a good man and an excellent citizen is  
the same or different3 and we find that 
in some states it is the same1 in others
 not2 and also that this is not true of 
each citizen1 but of those only who take
 the lead1 or are capable of taking the 
lead1 in public affairs1 either alone or
 in conjunction with others4            
,,chapter ,,vi   ,having established    
these points1 we proceed next to        
consider whether one form of government 
only should be established1 or more than
 one2 and if more1 how many1 and of what
 sort1 and what are the differences     
between them4 ,the form of government is
 the ordering and regulating of the     
city1 and all the offices in it1        
particularly those wherein the supreme  
power is lodged2 and this power is      
always possessed by the administration2 
but the administration itself is that   
particular form of government which is  

established in any state3 thus in a     
democracy the supreme power is lodged in
 the whole people2 on the contrary1 in  
an oligarchy it is in the hands of a    
few4 ,we say then1 that the form of     
government in these states is different1
 and we shall find the same thing hold  
good in others4 ,let us first determine 
for whose sake a city is established2   
and point out the different species of  
rule which man may submit to in social  
life4  ,i have already mentioned in my  
treatise on the management of a family1 
and the power of the master1 that man is
 an animal naturally formed for society1
 and that therefore1 when he does not   
want any foreign assistance1 he will of 
his own accord desire to live with      
others2 not but that mutual advantage   
induces them to it1 as far as it enables
 each person to live more agreeably2 and
 this is indeed the great object not    
only to all in general1 but also to each
 individual3 but it is not merely matter
 of choice1 but they join in society    

also1 even that they may be able to     
live1 which probably is not without some
 share of merit1 and they also support  
civil society1 even for the sake of     
preserving life1 without they are       
grievously overwhelmed with the miseries
 of it3 for it is very evident that men 
will endure many calamities for the sake
 of living1 as being something naturally
 sweet and desirable4 ,it is easy to    
point out the different modes of        
government1 and we have already settled 
them in our exoteric discourses4 ,the   
power of the master1 though by nature   
equally serviceable1 both to the master 
and to the slave1 yet nevertheless has  
for its object the benefit of the       
master1 while the benefit of the slave  
arises accidentally2 for if the slave is
 destroyed1 the power of the master is  
at an end3 but the authority which a man
 has over his wife1 and children1 and   
his family1 which we call domestic      
government1 is either for the benefit of
 those who are under subjection1 or else

 for the common benefit of the whole3   
but its particular object is the benefit
 of the governed1 as we see in other    
arts2 in physic1 for instance1 and the  
gymnastic exercises1 wherein1 if any    
benefit #abgi;a arise to the master1 it 
is accidental2 for nothing forbids the  
master of the exercises from sometimes  
being himself one of those who          
exercises1 as the steersman is always   
one of the sailors2 but both the master 
of the exercises and the steersman      
consider the good of those who are under
 their government4 ,whatever good may   
happen to the steersman when he is a    
sailor1 or to the master of the         
exercises when he himself makes one at  
the games1 is not intentional1 or the   
object of their power2 thus in all      
political governments which are         
established to preserve and defend the  
equality of the citizens it is held     
right to rule by turns4 ,formerly1 as   
was natural1 every one expected that    
each of his fellow-citizens should in   

his turn serve the public1 and thus     
administer to his private good1 as he   
himself when in office had done for     
others2 but now every one is desirous of
 being continually in power1 that he may
 enjoy the advantage which he makes of  
public business and being in office2 as 
if places were a never-failing remedy   
for every complaint1 and were on that   
account so eagerly sought after4  ,it is
 evident1 then1 that all those          
governments which have a common good in 
view are rightly established and        
strictly just1 but those who have in    
view only the good of the rulers are all
 founded on wrong principles1 and are   
widely different from what a government 
ought to be1 for they are tyranny over  
slaves1 whereas a city is a community of
 freemen4     ,,chapter ,,vii   ,having 
established these particulars1 we come  
to consider next the different number of
 governments which there are1 and what  
they are2 and first1 what are their     
excellencies3 for when we have          

determined this1 their defects will be  
evident enough4  ,it is evident that    
every form of government or             
administration1 for the words are of the
 same import1 must contain a supreme    
power over the whole state1 and this    
supreme power must necessarily be in the
 hands of one person1 or a few1 or many2
 and when either of these apply their   
power for the common good1 such states  
are well governed2 but when the interest
 of the one1 the few1 or the many who   
enjoy this power is alone consulted1    
then ill2 for you must either affirm    
that those who make up the community are
 not citizens1 or else let these share  
in the advantages of government4 ,we    
usually call a state which is governed  
by one person for the common good1 a    
kingdom2 one that is governed by more   
than one1 but by a few only1 an         
aristocracy2 either because the         
government is in the hands of the most  
worthy citizens1 or because it is the   
best form for the city and its          

inhabitants4 ,when the citizens at large
 govern for the public good1 it is      
called a state2 which is also a common  
name for all other governments1 and     
these distinctions are consonant to     
reason2 for it will not be difficult to 
find one person1 or a very few1 of very 
distinguished abilities1 but almost     
impossible to meet with the majority    
#abgi;b of a people eminent for every   
virtue2 but if there is one common to a 
whole nation it is valour2 for this is  
created and supported by numbers3 for   
which reason in such a state the        
profession of arms will always have the 
greatest share in the government4  ,now 
the corruptions attending each of these 
governments are these2 a kingdom may    
degenerate into a tyranny1 an           
aristocracy into an oligarchy1 and a    
state into a democracy4 ,now a tyranny  
is a monarchy where the good of one man 
only is the object of government1 an    
oligarchy considers only the rich1 and a
 democracy only the poor2 but neither of

 them have a common good in view4       
,,chapter ,,viii   ,it will be necessary
 to enlarge a little more upon the      
nature of each of these states1 which is
 not without some difficulty1 for he who
 would enter into a philosophical       
inquiry into the principles of them1 and
 not content himself with a superficial 
view of their outward conduct1 must pass
 over and omit nothing1 but explain the 
true spirit of each of them4 ,a tyranny 
then is1 as has been said1 a monarchy1  
where one person has an absolute and    
despotic power over the whole community 
and every member therein3 an oligarchy1 
where the supreme power of the state is 
lodged with the rich3 a democracy1 on   
the contrary1 is where those have it who
 are worth little or nothing4 ,but the  
first difficulty that arises from the   
distinctions which we have laid down is 
this1 should it happen that the majority
 of the inhabitants who possess the     
power of the state 7for this is a       
democracy7 should be rich1 the question 

is1 how does this agree with what we    
have said8 ,the same difficulty occurs1 
should it ever happen that the poor     
compose a smaller part of the people    
than the rich1 but from their superior  
abilities acquire the supreme power2 for
 this is what they call an oligarchy2 it
 should seem then that our definition of
 the different states was not correct3  
nay1 moreover1 could any one suppose    
that the majority of the people were    
poor1 and the minority rich1 and then   
describe the state in this manner1 that 
an oligarchy was a government in which  
the rich1 being few in number1 possessed
 the supreme power1 and that a democracy
 was a state in which the poor1 being   
many in number1 possessed it1 still     
there will be another difficulty2 for   
what name shall we give to those states 
we have been describing8 ,i mean1 that  
in which the greater number are rich1   
and that in which the lesser number are 
poor 7where each of these possess the   
supreme power71 if there are no other   

states than those we have described4 ,it
 seems therefore evident to reason1 that
 whether the supreme power is vested in 
the hands of many or few may be a matter
 of accident2 but that it is clear      
enough1 that when it is in the hands of 
the few1 it will be a government of the 
rich2 when in the hands of the many1 it 
will be a government of the poor2 since 
in all countries there are many poor and
 few rich3 it is not therefore the cause
 that has been already assigned 7namely1
 the number of people in power7 that    
makes the difference between the two    
governments2 but an oligarchy and       
democracy differ in this from each      
other1 in the poverty of those who      
govern in the one1 and the riches       
,i#bhoa of those who govern in the      
other2 for when the government is in the
 hands of the rich1 be they few or be   
they more1 it is an oligarchy2 when it  
is in the hands of the poor1 it is a    
democracy3 but1 as we have already said1
 the one will be always few1 the other  

numerous1 but both will enjoy liberty2  
and from the claims of wealth and       
liberty will arise continual disputes   
with each other for the lead in public  
affairs4     ,,chapter ,,ix   ,let us   
first determine what are the proper     
limits of an oligarchy and a democracy1 
and what is just in each of these       
states2 for all men have some natural   
inclination to justice2 but they proceed
 therein only to a certain degree2 nor  
can they universally point out what is  
absolutely just2 as1 for instance1 what 
is equal appears just1 and is so2 but   
not to all2 only among those who are    
equals3 and what is unequal appears     
just1 and is so2 but not to all1 only   
amongst those who are unequals2 which   
circumstance some people neglect1 and   
therefore judge ill2 the reason for     
which is1 they judge for themselves1 and
 every one almost is the worst judge in 
his own cause4 ,since then justice has  
reference to persons1 the same          
distinctions must be made with respect  

to persons which are made with respect  
to things1 in the manner that ,i have   
already described in my ,ethics4  ,as to
 the equality of the things1 these they 
agree in2 but their dispute is          
concerning the equality of the persons1 
and chiefly for the reason above        
assigned2 because they judge ill in     
their own cause2 and also because each  
party thinks1 that if they admit what is
 right in some particulars1 they have   
done justice on the whole3 thus1 for    
instance1 if some persons are unequal in
 riches1 they suppose them unequal in   
the whole2 or1 on the contrary1 if they 
are equal in liberty1 they suppose them 
equal in the whole3 but what is         
absolutely just they omit2 for if civil 
society was founded for the sake of     
preserving and increasing property1     
every one's right in the city would be  
equal to his fortune2 and then the      
reasoning of those who insist upon an   
oligarchy would be valid2 for it would  
not be right that he who contributed one

 mina should have an equal share in the 
hundred along with him who brought in   
all the rest1 either of the original    
money or what was afterwards acquired4  
,nor was civil society founded merely to
 preserve the lives of its members2 but 
that they might live well3 for otherwise
 a state might be composed of slaves1 or
 the animal creation3 but this is not   
so2 for these have no share in the      
happiness of it2 nor do they live after 
their own choice2 nor is it an alliance 
mutually to defend each other from      
injuries1 or for a commercial           
intercourse3 for then the ,tyrrhenians  
and ,carthaginians1 and all other       
nations between whom treaties of        
commerce subsist1 would be citizens of  
one city2 for they have articles to     
regulate their exports and imports1 and 
engagements for mutual protection1 and  
alliances for mutual defence2 but       
#abhj;b yet they have not all the same  
magistrates established among them1 but 
they are different among the different  

people2 nor does the one take any care1 
that the morals of the other should be  
as they ought1 or that none of those who
 have entered into the common agreements
 should be unjust1 or in any degree     
vicious1 only that they do not injure   
any member of the confederacy4 ,but     
whosoever endeavours to establish       
wholesome laws in a state1 attends to   
the virtues and the vices of each       
individual who composes it2 from whence 
it is evident1 that the first care of   
him who would found a city1 truly       
deserving that name1 and not nominally  
so1 must be to have his citizens        
virtuous2 for otherwise it is merely an 
alliance for self-defence2 differing    
from those of the same cast which are   
made between different people only in   
place3 for law is an agreement and a    
pledge1 as the sophist ,lycophron says1 
between the citizens of their intending 
to do justice to each other1 though not 
sufficient to make all the citizens just
 and good3 and that this is fact is     

evident1 for could any one bring        
different places together1 as1 for      
instance1 enclose ,megara and ,corinth  
in a wall1 yet they would not be one    
city1 not even if the inhabitants       
intermarried with each other1 though    
this inter-community contributes much to
 make a place one city4 ,besides1 could 
we suppose a set of people to live      
separate from each other1 but within    
such a distance as would admit of an    
intercourse1 and that there were laws   
subsisting between each party1 to       
prevent their injuring one another in   
their mutual dealings1 supposing one a  
carpenter1 another a husbandman1        
shoemaker1 and the like1 and that their 
numbers were ten thousand1 still all    
that they would have together in common 
would be a tariff for trade1 or an      
alliance for mutual defence1 but not the
 same city4 ,and why8 not because their 
mutual intercourse is not near enough1  
for even if persons so situated should  
come to one place1 and every one should 

live in his own house as in his native  
city1 and there should be alliances     
subsisting between each party to        
mutually assist and prevent any injury  
being done to the other1 still they     
would not be admitted to be a city by   
those who think correctly1 if they      
preserved the same customs when they    
were together as when they were         
separate4  ,it is evident1 then1 that a 
city is not a community of place2 nor   
established for the sake of mutual      
safety or traffic with each other2 but  
that these things are the necessary     
consequences of a city1 although they   
may all exist where there is no city3   
but a city is a society of people       
joining together with their families and
 their children to live agreeably for   
the sake of having their lives as happy 
and as independent as possible3 and for 
this purpose it is necessary that they  
should live in one place and intermarry 
with each other3 hence in all cities    
there are family-meetings1 clubs1       

sacrifices1 and public entertainments to
 promote friendship2 for a love of      
sociability is friendship itself2 so    
that the end then for which a city is   
established is1 that the inhabitants of 
it may live happy1 and these things are 
conducive to that end3 for it is a      
community of families and villages for  
the sake of a perfect independent life2 
that is1 as we have already said1 for   
the sake of living well and happily4 ,it
 is not therefore founded for the       
purpose of men's merely #abha;a living  
together1 but for their living as men   
ought2 for which reason those who       
contribute most to this end deserve to  
have greater power in the city than     
those who are their equals in family and
 freedom1 but their inferiors in civil  
virtue1 or those who excel them in      
wealth but are below them in worth4 ,it 
is evident from what has been said1 that
 in all disputes upon government each   
party says something that is just4      
,,chapter ,x   ,it may also be a doubt  

where the supreme power ought to be     
lodged4 ,shall it be with the majority1 
or the wealthy1 with a number of proper 
persons1 or one better than the rest1 or
 with a tyrant8 ,but whichever of these 
we prefer some difficulty will arise4   
,for what8 shall the poor have it       
because they are the majority8 they may 
then divide among themselves1 what      
belongs to the rich3 nor is this unjust2
 because truly it has been so judged by 
the supreme power4 ,but what avails it  
to point out what is the height of      
injustice if this is not8 ,again1 if the
 many seize into their own hands        
everything which belongs to the few1 it 
is evident that the city will be at an  
end4 ,but virtue will never destroy what
 is virtuous2 nor can what is right be  
the ruin of the state3 therefore such a 
law can never be right1 nor can the acts
 of a tyrant ever be wrong1 for of      
necessity they must all be just2 for he1
 from his unlimited power1 compels every
 one to obey his command1 as the        

multitude oppress the rich4 ,is it right
 then that the rich1 the few1 should    
have the supreme power8 and what if they
 be guilty of the same rapine and       
plunder the possessions of the majority1
 that will be as right as the other3 but
 that all things of this sort are wrong 
and unjust is evident4 ,well then1 these
 of the better sort shall have it3 but  
must not then all the other citizens    
live unhonoured1 without sharing the    
offices of the city2 for the offices of 
a city are its honours1 and if one set  
of men are always in power1 it is       
evident that the rest must be without   
honour4 ,well then1 let it be with one  
person of all others the fittest for it3
 but by this means the power will be    
still more contracted1 and a greater    
number than before continue unhonoured4 
,but some one may say1 that it is wrong 
to let man have the supreme power and   
not the law1 as his soul is subject to  
so many passions4 ,but if this law      
appoints an aristocracy1 or a democracy1

 how will it help us in our present     
doubts8 for those things will happen    
which we have already mentioned4        
,,chapter ,,xi   ,other particulars we  
will consider separately2 but it seems  
proper to prove1 that the supreme power 
ought to be lodged with the many1 rather
 than with those of the better sort1 who
 are few2 and also to explain what      
doubts 7and probably just ones7 may     
arise3 now1 though not one individual of
 the many may himself be fit for the    
supreme power1 yet when these many are  
joined together1 it does not follow but 
they may be better qualified for it than
 those2 and this not separately1 but as 
a collective body2 as the public suppers
 exceed those which are given at one    
person's private expense3 for1 as they  
are many1 each person brings in his     
share of virtue and wisdom2 and thus1   
coming together1 they are like one man  
made up of a multitude1 with many feet1 
many hands1 and many intelligences3 thus
 is it with respect to the manners and  

understandings of the multitude taken   
together2 for which reason the public   
are the best judges of music and poetry2
 for some understand one part1 some     
another1 and all collectively the whole2
 and in this particular men of          
consequence differ from each of the     
many2 as they say those who are         
beautiful do from those who are not so1 
and as fine pictures excel any natural  
objects1 by collecting the several      
beautiful parts which were dispersed    
among different originals into one1     
although the separate parts1 as the eye 
or any other1 might be handsomer than in
 the picture4  ,but if this distinction 
is to be made between every people and  
every general assembly1 and some few men
 of consequence1 it may be doubtful     
whether it is true2 nay1 it is clear    
enough that1 with respect to a few1 it  
is not2 since the same conclusion might 
be applied even to brutes3 and indeed   
wherein do some men differ from brutes8 
,not but that nothing prevents what ,i  

have said being true of the people in   
some states4 ,the doubt then which we   
have lately proposed1 with all its      
consequences1 may be settled in this    
manner2 it is necessary that the freemen
 who compose the bulk of the people     
should have absolute power in some      
things2 but as they are neither men of  
property1 nor act uniformly upon        
principles of virtue1 it is not safe to 
trust them with the first offices in the
 state1 both on account of their        
iniquity and their ignorance2 from the  
one of which they will do what is wrong1
 from the other they will mistake3 and  
yet it is dangerous to allow them no    
power or share in the government2 for   
when there are many poor people who are 
incapable of acquiring the honours of   
their country1 the state must           
necessarily have many enemies in it2 let
 them then be permitted to vote in the  
public assemblies and to determine      
causes2 for which reason ,socrates1 and 
some other legislators1 gave them the   

power of electing the officers of the   
state1 and also of inquiring into their 
conduct when they came out of office1   
and only prevented their being          
magistrates by themselves2 for the      
multitude when they are collected       
together have all of them sufficient    
understanding for these purposes1 and1  
mixing among those of higher rank1 are  
serviceable to the city1 as some things1
 which alone are improper for food1 when
 mixed with others make the whole more  
wholesome than a few of them would be4  
,but there is a difficulty attending    
this form of government1 for it seems1  
that the person who himself was capable 
of curing any one who was then sick1    
must be the best judge whom to employ as
 a physician2 but such a one must be    
himself a physician2 and the same holds 
true in every other practice and art3   
and as a physician ought #abhb;a to give
 an account of his practice to a        
physician1 so ought it to be in other   
arts3 those whose business is physic may

 be divided into three sorts1 the first 
of these is he who makes up the         
medicines2 the second prescribes1 and is
 to the other as the architect is to the
 mason2 the third is he who understands 
the science1 but never practises it3 now
 these three distinctions may be found  
in those who understand all other arts2 
nor have we less opinion of their       
judgment who are only instructed in the 
principles of the art than of those who 
practise it3 and with respect to        
elections the same method of proceeding 
seems right2 for to elect a proper      
person in any science is the business of
 those who are skilful therein2 as in   
geometry1 of geometricians2 in steering1
 of steersmen3 but if some individuals  
should know something of particular arts
 and works1 they do not know more than  
the professors of them3 so that even    
upon this principle neither the election
 of magistrates1 nor the censure of     
their conduct1 should be entrusted to   
the many4  ,but probably all that has   

been here said may not be right2 for1 to
 resume the argument ,i lately used1 if 
the people are not very brutal indeed1  
although we allow that each individual  
knows less of these affairs than those  
who have given particular attention to  
them1 yet when they come together they  
will know them better1 or at least not  
worse2 besides1 in some particular arts 
it is not the workman only who is the   
best judge2 namely1 in those the works  
of which are understood by those who do 
not profess them3 thus he who builds a  
house is not the only judge of it1 for  
the master of the family who inhabits it
 is a better2 thus also a steersman is a
 better judge of a tiller than he who   
made it2 and he who gives an            
entertainment than the cook4 ,what has  
been said seems a sufficient solution of
 this difficulty2 but there is another  
that follows3 for it seems absurd that  
the power of the state should be lodged 
with those who are but of indifferent   
morals1 instead of those who are of     

excellent characters4 ,now the power of 
election and censure are of the utmost  
consequence1 and this1 as has been said1
 in some states they entrust to the     
people2 for the general assembly is the 
supreme court of all1 and they have a   
voice in this1 and deliberate in all    
public affairs1 and try all causes1     
without any objection to the meanness of
 their circumstances1 and at any age3   
but their treasurers1 generals1 and     
other great officers of state are taken 
from men of great fortune and worth4    
,this difficulty also may be solved upon
 the same principle2 and here too they  
may be right1 for the power is not in   
the man who is member of the assembly1  
or council1 but the assembly itself1 and
 the council1 and the people1 of which  
each individual of the whole community  
are the parts1 ,i mean as senator1      
adviser1 or judge2 for which reason it  
is very right1 that the many should have
 the greatest powers in their own hands2
 for the people1 the council1 and the   

judges are composed of them1 and the    
property of all these collectively is   
more than the property of any person or 
a few who fill the great offices of the 
state3 and thus ,i determine these      
points4  ,the first question that we    
stated shows plainly1 that the supreme  
power should be lodged in laws duly made
 and that the magistrate or magistrates1
 either one or more1 should be          
authorised to determine those cases     
which the laws cannot particularly speak
 to1 as it is impossible for them1 in   
general language1 to explain themselves 
upon everything that may arise3 but what
 these laws are which are established   
upon the best foundations has not been  
yet explained1 but still remains a      
matter of some question3 but the laws of
 every state will necessarily be like   
every state1 either trifling or         
excellent1 just or unjust2 for it is    
evident1 that the laws must be framed   
correspondent to the constitution of the
 government2 and1 if so1 it is plain1   

that a well-formed government will have 
good laws1 a bad one1 bad ones4         
,,chapter ,,xii   ,since in every art   
and science the end aimed at is always  
good1 so particularly in this1 which is 
the most excellent of all1 the founding 
of civil society1 the good wherein aimed
 at is justice2 for it is this which is 
for the benefit of all4 ,now1 it is the 
common opinion1 that justice is a       
certain equality2 and in this point all 
the philosophers are agreed when they   
treat of morals3 for they say what is   
just1 and to whom2 and that equals ought
 to receive equal3 but we should know   
how we are to determine what things are 
equal and what unequal2 and in this     
there is some difficulty1 which calls   
for the philosophy of the politician4   
,some persons will probably say1 that   
the employments of the state ought to be
 given according to every particular    
excellence of each citizen1 if there is 
no other difference between them and the
 rest of the community1 but they are in 

every respect else alike3 for justice   
attributes different things to persons  
differing from each other in their      
character1 according to their respective
 merits4 ,but if this is admitted to be 
true1 complexion1 or height1 or any such
 advantage will be a claim for a greater
 share of the public rights4 ,but that  
this is evidently absurd is clear from  
other arts and sciences2 for with       
respect to musicians who play on the    
flute together1 the best flute is not   
given to him who is of the best family1 
for he will play never the better for   
that1 but the best instrument ought to  
be given to him who is the best artist4 
,if what is now said does not make this 
clear1 we will explain it still further3
 if there should be any one1 a very     
excellent player on the flute1 but very 
deficient in family and beauty1 though  
each of them are more valuable          
endowments than a skill in music1 and   
excel this art in a higher degree than  
that player excels others1 yet the best 

flutes ought to be given to him2 for the
 superiority #abhc;a in beauty and      
fortune should have a reference to the  
business in hand2 but these have none4  
,moreover1 according to this reasoning1 
every possible excellence might come in 
comparison with every other2 for if     
bodily strength might dispute the point 
with riches or liberty1 even any bodily 
strength might do it2 so that if one    
person excelled in size more than       
another did in virtue1 and his size was 
to qualify him to take place of the     
other's virtue1 everything must then    
admit of a comparison with each other2  
for if such a size is greater than      
virtue by so much1 it is evident another
 must be equal to it3 but1 since this is
 impossible1 it is plain that it would  
be contrary to common sense to dispute a
 right to any office in the state from  
every superiority whatsoever3 for if one
 person is slow and the other swift1    
neither is the one better qualified nor 
the other worse on that account1 though 

in the gymnastic races a difference in  
these particulars would gain the prize2 
but a pretension to the offices of the  
state should be founded on a superiority
 in those qualifications which are      
useful to it3 for which reason those of 
family1 independency1 and fortune1 with 
great propriety1 contend with each other
 for them2 for these are the fit persons
 to fill them3 for a city can no more   
consist of all poor men than it can of  
all slaves ,but if such persons are     
requisite1 it is evident that those also
 who are just and valiant are equally   
so2 for without justice and valour no   
state can be supported1 the former being
 necessary for its existence1 the latter
 for its happiness4     ,,chapter ,,xiii
   ,it seems1 then1 requisite for the   
establishment of a state1 that all1 or  
at least many of these particulars      
should be well canvassed and inquired   
into2 and that virtue and education may 
most justly claim the right of being    
considered as the necessary means of    

making the citizens happy1 as we have   
already said4 ,as those who are equal in
 one particular are not therefore equal 
in all1 and those who are unequal in one
 particular are not therefore unequal in
 all1 it follows that all those         
governments which are established upon a
 principle which supposes they are1 are 
erroneous4  ,we have already said1 that 
all the members of the community will   
dispute with each other for the offices 
of the state2 and in some particulars   
justly1 but not so in general2 the rich1
 for instance1 because they have the    
greatest landed property1 and the       
ultimate right to the soil is vested in 
the community2 and also because their   
fidelity is in general most to be       
depended on4 ,the freemen and men of    
family will dispute the point with each 
other1 as nearly on an equality2 for    
these latter have a right to a higher   
regard as citizens than obscure persons1
 for honourable descent is everywhere of
 great esteem3 nor is it an improper    

conclusion1 that the descendants of men 
of worth will be men of worth           
themselves2 for noble birth is the      
fountain of virtue to men of family3 for
 the same reason also we justly say1    
that virtue has a right to put in her   
pretensions4 ,justice1 for instance1 is 
a virtue1 and so necessary to society1  
that all others must yield her the      
precedence4  ,let us now see what the   
many have to urge on their side against 
the few2 and they may say1 that if1 when
 collectively taken1 they are compared  
with them1 they are stronger1 richer1   
and better than they are4 ,but should it
 ever happen that all these should      
inhabit the #abhc;b same city1 ,i mean  
the good1 the rich1 the noble1 as well  
as the many1 such as usually make up the
 community1 ,i ask1 will there then be  
any reason to dispute concerning who    
shall govern1 or will there not8 for in 
every community which we have mentioned 
there is no dispute where the supreme   
power should be placed2 for as these    

differ from each other1 so do those in  
whom that is placed2 for in one state   
the rich enjoy it1 in others the        
meritorious1 and thus each according to 
their separate manners4 ,let us however 
consider what is to be done when all    
these happen at the same time to inhabit
 the same city4 ,if the virtuous should 
be very few in number1 how then shall we
 act8 shall we prefer the virtuous on   
account of their abilities1 if they are 
capable of governing the city8 or should
 they be so many as almost entirely to  
compose the state8  ,there is also a    
doubt concerning the pretensions of all 
those who claim the honours of          
government3 for those who found them    
either on fortune or family have nothing
 which they can justly say in their     
defence2 since it is evident upon their 
principle1 that if any one person can be
 found richer than all the rest1 the    
right of governing all these will be    
justly vested in this one person4 ,in   
the same manner1 one man who is of the  

best family will claim it from those who
 dispute the point upon family merit3   
and probably in an aristocracy the same 
dispute might arise on the score of     
virtue1 if there is one man better than 
all the other men of worth who are in   
the same community2 it seems just1 by   
the same reasoning1 that he should enjoy
 the supreme power4 ,and upon this      
principle also1 while the many suppose  
they ought to have the supreme command1 
as being more powerful than the few1 if 
one or more than one1 though a small    
number should be found stronger than    
themselves1 these ought rather to have  
it than they4  ,all these things seem to
 make it plain1 that none of these      
principles are justly founded on which  
these persons would establish their     
right to the supreme power2 and that all
 men whatsoever ought to obey them3 for 
with respect to those who claim it as   
due to their virtue or their fortune1   
they might have justly some objection to
 make2 for nothing hinders but that it  

may sometimes happen1 that the many may 
be better or richer than the few1 not as
 individuals1 but in their collective   
capacity4  ,as to the doubt which some  
persons have proposed and objected1 we  
may answer it in this manner2 it is     
this1 whether a legislator1 who would   
establish the most perfect system of    
laws1 should calculate them for the use 
of the better part of the citizens1 or  
the many1 in the circumstances we have  
already mentioned8 ,the rectitude of    
anything consists in its equality2 that 
therefore which is equally right will be
 advantageous to the whole state1 and to
 every member of it in common4  ,now1 in
 general1 a citizen is one who both     
shares in the government and also in his
 turn submits to be governed2 #abhd;a   
their condition1 it is true1 is         
different in different states3 the best 
is that in which a man is enabled to    
choose and to persevere in a course of  
virtue during his whole life1 both in   
his public and private state4 ,but      

should there be one person1 or a very   
few1 eminent for an uncommon degree of  
virtue1 though not enough to make up a  
civil state1 so that the virtue of the  
many1 or their political abilities1     
should be too inferior to come in       
comparison with theirs1 if more than    
one2 or if but one1 with his only2 such 
are not to be considered as part of the 
city2 for it would be doing them        
injustice to rate them on a level with  
those who are so far their inferiors in 
virtue and political abilities1 that    
they appear to them like a god amongst  
men4 ,from whence it is evident1 that a 
system of laws must be calculated for   
those who are equal to each other in    
nature and power4 ,such men1 therefore1 
are not the object of law2 for they are 
themselves a law3 and it would be       
ridiculous in any one to endeavour to   
include them in the penalties of a law3 
for probably they might say what        
,antisthenes tells us the lions did to  
the hares when they demanded to be      

admitted to an equal share with them in 
the government4 ,and it is on this      
account that democratic states have     
established the ostracism2 for an       
equality seems the principal object of  
their government4 ,for which reason they
 compel all those who are very eminent  
for their power1 their fortune1 their   
friendships1 or any other cause which   
may give them too great weight in the   
government1 to submit to the ostracism1 
and leave the city for a stated time2 as
 the fabulous histories relate the      
,argonauts served ,hercules1 for they   
refused to take him with them in the    
ship ,argo on account of his superior   
valour4 ,for which reason those who hate
 a tyranny and find fault with the      
advice which ,periander gave to         
,thrasybulus1 must not think there was  
nothing to be said in its defence2 for  
the story goes1 that ,periander said    
nothing to the messenger in answer to   
the business he was consulted about1 but
 striking off those ears of corn which  

were higher than the rest1 reduced the  
whole crop to a level2 so that the      
messenger1 without knowing the cause of 
what was done1 related the fact to      
,thrasybulus1 who understood by it that 
he must take off all the principal men  
in the city4 ,nor is this serviceable to
 tyrants only2 nor is it tyrants only   
who do it2 for the same thing is        
practised both in oligarchies and       
democracies3 for the ostracism has in a 
manner nearly the same power1 by        
restraining and banishing those who are 
too great2 and what is done in one city 
is done also by those who have the      
supreme power in separate states2 as the
 ,athenians with respect to the         
,samians1 the ,chians1 and the          
,lesbians2 for when they suddenly       
acquired the superiority over all       
,greece1 they brought the other states  
into subjection1 contrary to the        
treaties which subsisted between them4  
,the ,king of ,persia also very often   
reduces the ,medes and ,babylonians when

 they assume upon their former power3   
#abhd;b and this is a principle which   
all governments whatsoever keep in their
 eye2 even those which are best         
administered1 as well as those which are
 not1 do it2 these for the sake of      
private utility1 the others for the     
public good4  ,the same thing is to be  
perceived in the other arts and         
sciences2 for a painter would not       
represent an animal with a foot         
disproportionally large1 though he had  
drawn it remarkably beautiful2 nor would
 the shipwright make the prow or any    
other part of the vessel larger than it 
ought to be2 nor will the master of the 
band permit any who sings louder and    
better than the rest to sing in concert 
with them4 ,there is therefore no reason
 that a monarch should not act in       
agreement with free states1 to support  
his own power1 if they do the same thing
 for the benefit of their respective    
communities2 upon which account when    
there is any acknowledged difference in 

the power of the citizens1 the reason   
upon which the ostracism is founded will
 be politically just2 but it is better  
for the legislator so to establish his  
state at the beginning as not to want   
this remedy3 but if in course of time   
such an inconvenience should arise1 to  
endeavour to amend it by some such      
correction4 ,not that this was the use  
it was put to3 for many did not regard  
the benefit of their respective         
communities1 but made the ostracism a   
weapon in the hand of sedition4  ,it is 
evident1 then1 that in corrupt          
governments it is partly just and useful
 to the individual1 though probably it  
is as clear that it is not entirely     
just3 for in a well-governed state there
 may be great doubts about the use of   
it1 not on account of the pre-eminence  
which one may have in strength1 riches1 
or connection3 but when the pre-eminence
 is virtue1 what then is to be done8 for
 it seems not right to turn out and     
banish such a one2 neither does it seem 

right to govern him1 for that would be  
like desiring to share the power with   
,jupiter and to govern him3 nothing then
 remains but what indeed seems natural1 
and that is for all persons quietly to  
submit to the government of those who   
are thus eminently virtuous1 and let    
them be perpetually kings in the        
separate states4     ,,chapter ,,xiv    
,what has been now said1 it seems proper
 to change our subject and to inquire   
into the nature of monarchies2 for we   
have already admitted them to be one of 
those species of government which are   
properly founded4 ,and here let us      
consider whether a kingly government is 
proper for a city or a country whose    
principal object is the happiness of the
 inhabitants1 or rather some other4 ,but
 let us first determine whether this is 
of one kind only1 or more2 #abhe;a and  
it is easy to know that it consists of  
many different species1 and that the    
forms of government are not the same in 
all3 for at ,sparta the kingly power    

seems chiefly regulated by the laws2 for
 it is not supreme in all circumstances2
 but when the king quits the territories
 of the state he is their general in    
war2 and all religious affairs are      
entrusted to him3 indeed the kingly     
power with them is chiefly that of a    
general who cannot be called to an      
account for his conduct1 and whose      
command is for life3 for he has not the 
power of life and death1 except as a    
general2 as they frequently had in their
 expeditions by martial law1 which we   
learn from ,homer2 for when ,agamemnon  
is affronted in council1 he restrains   
his resentment1 but when he is in the   
field and armed with this power1 he     
tells the ,greeks3    ,whoe'er ,i know  
shall shun th' impending fight1    ,to  
dogs and vultures soon shall be a prey2 
,for death is mine4444  ,this1 then1 is 
one species of monarchical government in
 which the kingly power is in a general 
for life2 and is sometimes hereditary1  
sometimes elective3 besides1 there is   

also another1 which is to be met with   
among some of the barbarians1 in which  
the kings are invested with powers      
nearly equal to a tyranny1 yet are1 in  
some respects1 bound by the laws and the
 customs of their country2 for as the   
barbarians are by nature more prone to  
slavery than the ,greeks1 and those in  
,asia more than those in ,europe1 they  
endure without murmuring a despotic     
government2 for this reason their       
governments are tyrannies2 but yet not  
liable to be overthrown1 as being       
customary and according to law4 ,their  
guards also are such as are used in a   
kingly government1 not a despotic one2  
for the guards of their kings are his   
citizens1 but a tyrant's are foreigners4
 ,the one commands1 in the manner the   
law directs1 those who willingly obey2  
the other1 arbitrarily1 those who       
consent not4 ,the one1 therefore1 is    
guarded by the citizens1 the other      
against them4  ,these1 then1 are the two
 different sorts of these monarchies1   

and another is that which in ancient    
,greece they called aesumnetes2 which is
 nothing more than an elective tyranny2 
and its difference from that which is to
 be found amongst the barbarians        
consists not in its not being according 
to law1 but only in its not being       
according to the ancient customs of the 
country4 ,some persons possessed this   
power for life1 others only for a       
particular time or particular purpose1  
as the people of ,mitylene elected      
,pittacus to oppose the exiles1 who were
 headed by ,antimenides and ,alcaeus the
 poet1 as we learn from a poem of his2  
for he upbraids the ,mitylenians for    
having chosen ,pittacus for their       
tyrant1 and with one #abhe;b voice      
extolling him to the skies who was the  
ruin of a rash and devoted people4      
,these sorts of government then are1 and
 ever were1 despotic1 on account of     
their being tyrannies2 but inasmuch as  
they are elective1 and over a free      
people1 they are also kingly4  ,a fourth

 species of kingly government is that   
which was in use in the heroic times1   
when a free people submitted to a kingly
 government1 according to the laws and  
customs of their country4 ,for those who
 were at first of benefit to mankind1   
either in arts or arms1 or by collecting
 them into civil society1 or procuring  
them an establishment1 became the kings 
of a willing people1 and established an 
hereditary monarchy4 ,they were         
particularly their generals in war1 and 
presided over their sacrifices1         
excepting such only as belonged to the  
priests3 they were also the supreme     
judges over the people2 and in this case
 some of them took an oath1 others did  
not2 they did1 the form of swearing was 
by their sceptre held out4  ,in ancient 
times the power of the kings extended to
 everything whatsoever1 both civil1     
domestic1 and foreign2 but in           
after-times they relinquished some of   
their privileges1 and others the people 
assumed1 so that1 in some states1 they  

left their kings only the right of      
presiding over the sacrifices2 and even 
those whom it were worth while to call  
by that name had only the right of being
 commander-in-chief in their foreign    
wars4  ,these1 then1 are the four sorts 
of kingdoms3 the first is that of the   
heroic times2 which was a government    
over a free people1 with its rights in  
some particulars marked out2 for the    
king was their general1 their judge1 and
 their high priest4 ,the second1 that of
 the barbarians2 which is an hereditary 
despotic government regulated by laws3  
the third is that which they call       
aesumnetic1 which is an elective        
tyranny4 ,the fourth is the             
,lacedaemonian2 and this1 in few words1 
is nothing more than an hereditary      
generalship3 and in these particulars   
they differ from each other4 ,there is a
 fifth species of kingly government1    
which is when one person has a supreme  
power over all things whatsoever1 in the
 manner that every state and every city 

has over those things which belong to   
the public3 for as the master of a      
family is king in his own house1 so such
 a king is master of a family in his own
 city or state4     ,,chapter ,,xv      
,but the different sorts of kingly      
governments may1 if ,i may so say1 be   
reduced to two2 which we will consider  
more particularly4 ,the last spoken of1 
and the ,lacedaemonian1 for the chief of
 the others are placed between these1   
which are as it were at the extremities1
 they having less power than an absolute
 government1 and yet more than the      
,lacedaemonians2 so that the whole      
matter in question may be reduced to    
these two points2 the one is1 whether it
 is advantageous to the citizens to have
 the office of general continue in one  
person for life1 and whether it should  
be confined to any particular families  
or whether every one should be eligible3
 the other1 whether #abhf;a it is       
advantageous for one person to have the 
supreme power over everything or not4   

,but to enter into the particulars      
concerning the office of a              
,lacedaemonian general would be rather  
to frame laws for a state than to       
consider the nature and utility of its  
constitution1 since we know that the    
appointing of a general is what is done 
in every state4 ,passing over this      
question then1 we will proceed to       
consider the other part of their        
government1 which is the polity of the  
state2 and this it will be necessary to 
examine particularly into1 and to go    
through such questions as may arise4    
,now the first thing which presents     
itself to our consideration is this1    
whether it is best to be governed by a  
good man1 or by good laws8 ,those who   
prefer a kingly government think that   
laws can only speak a general language1 
but cannot adapt themselves to          
particular circumstances2 for which     
reason it is absurd in any science to   
follow written rule2 and even in ,egypt 
the physician was allowed to alter the  

mode of cure which the law prescribed to
 him1 after the fourth day2 but if he   
did it sooner it was at his own peril3  
from whence it is evident1 on the very  
same account1 that a government of      
written laws is not the best2 and yet   
general reasoning is necessary to all   
those who are to govern1 and it will be 
much more perfect in those who are      
entirely free from passions than in     
those to whom they are natural4 ,but now
 this is a quality which laws possess2  
while the other is natural to the human 
soul4 ,but some one will say in answer  
to this1 that man will be a better judge
 of particulars4 ,it will be necessary1 
then1 for a king to be a lawgiver1 and  
that his laws should be published1 but  
that those should have no authority     
which are absurd1 as those which are    
not1 should4 ,but whether is it better  
for the community that those things     
which cannot possibly come under the    
cognisance of the law either at all or  
properly should be under the government 

of every worthy citizen1 as the present 
method is1 when the public community1 in
 their general assemblies1 act as judges
 and counsellors1 where all their       
determinations are upon particular      
cases1 for one individual1 be he who he 
will1 will be found1 upon comparison1   
inferior to a whole people taken        
collectively3 but this is what a city   
is1 as a public entertainment is better 
than one man's portion3 for this reason 
the multitude judge of many things      
better than any one single person4 ,they
 are also less liable to corruption from
 their numbers1 as water is from its    
quantity3 besides1 the judgment of an   
individual must necessarily be perverted
 if he is overcome by anger or any other
 passion2 but it would be hard indeed if
 the whole community should be misled by
 anger4 ,moreover1 let the people be    
free1 and they will do nothing but in   
conformity to the law1 except only in   
those cases which the law cannot speak  
to4 ,but though what ,i am going to     

propose may not easily be met with1 yet 
if the majority of the state should     
happen to be good men1 should they      
prefer one uncorrupt governor or many   
equally good1 is it not evident that    
they should choose the many8 ,but there 
may be divisions among #abhf;b these    
which cannot happen when there is but   
one4 ,in answer to this it may be       
replied that all their souls will be as 
much animated with virtue as this one   
man's4  ,if then a government of many1  
and all of them good men1 compose an    
aristocracy1 and the government of one a
 kingly power1 it is evident that the   
people should rather choose the first   
than the last2 and this whether the     
state is powerful or not1 if many such  
persons so alike can be met with3 and   
for this reason probable it was1 that   
the first governments were generally    
monarchies2 because it was difficult to 
find a number of persons eminently      
virtuous1 more particularly as the world
 was then divided into small            

communities2 besides1 kings were        
appointed in return for the benefits    
they had conferred on mankind2 but such 
actions are peculiar to good men3 but   
when many persons equal in virtue       
appeared at the time1 they brooked not a
 superiority1 but sought after an       
equality and established a free state2  
but after this1 when they degenerated1  
they made a property of the public2     
which probably gave rise to oligarchies2
 for they made wealth meritorious1 and  
the honours of government were reserved 
for the rich3 and these afterwards      
turned to tyrannies and these in their  
turn gave rise to democracies2 for the  
power of the tyrants continually        
decreasing1 on account of their         
rapacious avarice1 the people grew      
powerful enough to frame and establish  
democracies3 and as cities after that   
happened to increase1 probably it was   
not easy for them to be under any other 
government than a democracy4 ,but if any
 person prefers a kingly government in a

 state1 what is to be done with the     
king's children8 ,is the family also to 
reign8 ,but should they have such       
children as some persons usually have1  
it will be very detrimental4 ,it may be 
said1 that then the king who has it in  
his power will never permit such        
children to succeed to his kingdom4 ,but
 it is not easy to trust to that2 for it
 is very hard and requires greater      
virtue than is to be met with in human  
nature4 ,there is also a doubt          
concerning the power with which a king  
should be entrusted3 whether he should  
be allowed force sufficient to compel   
those who do not choose to be obedient  
to the laws1 and how he is to support   
his government8 for if he is to govern  
according to law and do nothing of his  
own will which is contrary thereunto1 at
 the same time it will be necessary to  
protect that power with which he guards 
the law1 ,this matter however may not be
 very difficult to determine2 for he    
ought to have a proper power1 and such a

 one is that which will be sufficient to
 make the king superior to any one      
person or even a large part of the      
community1 but inferior to the whole1 as
 the ancients always appointed guards   
for that person whom they created       
aesumnetes or tyrant2 and some one      
advised the ,syracusians1 when          
,dionysius asked for guards1 to allow   
him such4     ,,chapter ,,xvi   #abhg;a 
,we will next consider the absolute     
monarch that we have just mentioned1 who
 does everything according to his own   
will3 for a king governing under the    
direction of laws which he is obliged to
 follow does not of himself create any  
particular species of government1 as we 
have already said3 for in every state   
whatsoever1 either aristocracy or       
democracy1 it is easy to appoint a      
general for life2 and there are many who
 entrust the administration of affairs  
to one person only2 such is the         
government at ,dyrrachium1 and nearly   
the same at ,opus4 ,as for an absolute  

monarchy as it is called1 that is to    
say1 when the whole state is wholly     
subject to the will of one person1      
namely the king1 it seems to many that  
it is unnatural that one man should have
 the entire rule over his               
fellow-citizens when the state consists 
of equals3 for nature requires that the 
same right and the same rank should     
necessarily take place amongst all those
 who are equal by nature3 for as it     
would be hurtful to the body for those  
who are of different constitutions to   
observe the same regimen1 either of diet
 or clothing1 so is it with respect to  
the honours of the state as hurtful1    
that those who are equal in merit should
 be unequal in rank2 for which reason it
 is as much a man's duty to submit to   
command as to assume it1 and this also  
by rotation2 for this is law1 for order 
is law2 and it is more proper that law  
should govern than any one of the       
citizens3 upon the same principle1 if it
 is advantageous to place the supreme   

power in some particular persons1 they  
should be appointed to be only          
guardians1 and the servants of the laws1
 for the supreme power must be placed   
somewhere2 but they say1 that it is     
unjust that where all are equal one     
person should continually enjoy it4 ,but
 it seems unlikely that man should be   
able to adjust that which the law cannot
 determine2 it may be replied1 that the 
law having laid down the best rules     
possible1 leaves the adjustment and     
application of particulars to the       
discretion of the magistrate2 besides1  
it allows anything to be altered which  
experience proves may be better         
established4 ,moreover1 he who would    
place the supreme power in mind1 would  
place it in ,god and the laws2 but he   
who entrusts man with it1 gives it to a 
wild beast1 for such his appetites      
sometimes make him2 for passion         
influences those who are in power1 even 
the very best of men3 for which reason  
law is reason without desire4  ,the     

instance taken from the arts seems      
fallacious3 wherein it is said to be    
wrong for a sick person to apply for a  
remedy to books1 but that it would be   
far more eligible to employ those who   
are skilful in physic2 for these do     
nothing contrary to reason from motives 
of friendship but earn their money by   
curing the sick1 whereas those who have 
the management of public affairs do many
 things through hatred or favour4 ,and1 
as a proof of what we have advanced1 it 
may be observed1 that whenever a sick   
person suspects that his physician has  
been persuaded by his enemies to be     
guilty of any foul practice to him in   
his profession1 he then rather chooses  
to apply to books for his cure3 and not 
only this #abhg;b but even physicians   
themselves when they are ill call in    
other physicians3 and those who teach   
others the gymnastic exercises1 exercise
 with those of the same profession1 as  
being incapable from self-partiality to 
form a proper judgment of what concerns 

themselves4 ,from whence it is evident1 
that those who seek for what is just1   
seek for a mean2 now law is a mean4     
,moreover2 the moral law is far superior
 and conversant with far superior       
objects than the written law2 for the   
supreme magistrate is safer to be       
trusted to than the one1 though he is   
inferior to the other4 ,but as it is    
impossible that one person should have  
an eye to everything himself1 it will be
 necessary that the supreme magistrate  
should employ several subordinate ones  
under him2 why then should not this be  
done at first1 instead of appointing one
 person in this manner8 ,besides1 if1   
according to what has been already said1
 the man of worth is on that account fit
 to govern1 two men of worth are        
certainly better than one3 as1 for      
instance1 in ,homer1 ,let two together  
go3 and also ,agamemnon's wish2 ,were   
ten such faithful counsel mine6 ,not but
 that there are even now some particular
 magistrates invested with supreme power

 to decide1 as judges1 those things     
which the law cannot1 as being one of   
those cases which comes not properly    
under its jurisdiction2 for of those    
which can there is no doubt3 since then 
laws comprehend some things1 but not    
all1 it is necessary to enquire and     
consider which of the two is preferable1
 that the best man or the best law      
should govern2 for to reduce every      
subject which can come under the        
deliberation of man into a law is       
impossible4  ,no one then denies1 that  
it is necessary that there should be    
some person to decide those cases which 
cannot come under the cognisance of a   
written law3 but we say1 that it is     
better to have many than one2 for though
 every one who decides according to the 
principles of the law decides justly2   
yet surely it seems absurd to suppose1  
that one person can see better with two 
eyes1 and hear better with two ears1 or 
do better with two hands and two feet1  
than many can do with many3 for we see  

that absolute monarchs now furnish      
themselves with many eyes and ears and  
hands and feet2 for they entrust those  
who are friends to them and their       
government with part of their power2 for
 if they are not friends to the monarch1
 they will not do what he chooses2 but  
if they are friends to him1 they are    
friends also to his government3 but a   
friend is an equal and like his friend3 
if then he thinks that such should      
govern1 he thinks that his equal also   
should govern4 ,these are nearly the    
objections which are usually made to a  
kingly power4     ,,chapter ,,xvii      
,probably what we have said may be true 
of some persons1 but not of others2 for 
some men are by nature formed to be     
under the government of a master2       
others1 of a king2 others1 to be the    
citizens of a free state1 just and      
useful2 but a tyranny is not according  
to nature1 nor the other perverted forms
 of government2 for they are contrary to
 it4 ,but it is evident from what has   

been said1 that among equals it is      
neither advantageous nor #abhh;a right  
that one person should be lord over all 
where there are no established laws1 but
 his will is the law2 or where there    
are2 nor is it right that one who is    
good should have it over those who are  
good2 or one who is not good over those 
who are not good2 nor one who is        
superior to the rest in worth1 except in
 a particular manner1 which shall be    
described1 though indeed it has been    
already mentioned4 ,but let us next     
determine what people are best qualified
 for a kingly government1 what for an   
aristocratic1 and what for a democratic4
 ,and1 first1 for a kingly2 and it      
should be those who are accustomed by   
nature to submit the civil government of
 themselves to a family eminent for     
virtue3 for an aristocracy1 those who   
are naturally framed to bear the rule of
 free men1 whose superior virtue makes  
them worthy of the management of others3
 for a free state1 a war-like people1   

formed by nature both to govern and be  
governed by laws which admit the poorest
 citizen to share the honours of the    
commonwealth according to his worth4    
,but whenever a whole family or any one 
of another shall happen so far to excel 
in virtue as to exceed all other persons
 in the community1 then it is right that
 the kingly power should be in them1 or 
if it is an individual who does so1 that
 he should be king and lord of all2 for 
this1 as we have just mentioned1 is not 
only correspondent to that principle of 
right which all founders of all states1 
whether aristocracies1 oligarchies1 or  
democracies1 have a regard to 7for in   
placing the supreme power they all think
 it right to fix it to excellence1      
though not the same72 but it is also    
agreeable to what has been already said2
 as it would not be right to kill1 or   
banish1 or ostracise such a one for his 
superior merit4 ,nor would it be proper 
to let him have the supreme power only  
in turn2 for it is contrary to nature   

that what is highest should ever be     
lowest3 but this would be the case      
should such a one ever be governed by   
others4 ,so that there can nothing else 
be done but to submit1 and permit him   
continually to enjoy the supreme power4 
,and thus much with respect to kingly   
power in different states1 and whether  
it is or is not advantageous to them1   
and to what1 and in what manner4        
,,chapter ,,xviii   ,since then we have 
said that there are three sorts of      
regular governments1 and of these the   
best must necessarily be that which is  
administered by the best men 7and this  
must be that which happens to have one  
man1 or one family1 or a number of      
persons excelling all the rest in       
virtue1 who are able to govern and be   
governed in such a manner as will make  
life most agreeable1 and we have already
 shown that the virtue of a good man and
 of a citizen in the most perfect       
government will be the same71 it is     
evident1 that in the same manner1 and   

for those very qualities which would    
procure a man the character of good1 any
 one would say1 that the government of a
 state was a well-established           
aristocracy or kingdom2 so that it will 
be found to be education and #abhh;b    
morals that are almost the whole which  
go to make a good man1 and the same     
qualities will make a good citizen or   
good king4  ,these particulars being    
treated of1 we will now proceed to      
consider what sort of government is     
best1 how it naturally arises1 and how  
it is established2 for it is necessary  
to make a proper inquiry concerning     
this4     ,,book ,,iv     ,,chapter ,i  
,in every art and science which is not  
conversant in parts but in some one     
genus in which it is complete1 it is the
 business of that art alone to determine
 what is fitted to its particular genus2
 as what particular exercise is fitted  
to a certain particular body1 and suits 
it best3 for that body which is formed  
by nature the most perfect and superior 

to others necessarily requires the best 
exercise-and also of what one kind that 
must be which will suit the generality2 
and this is the business of the         
gymnastic arts3 and although any one    
should not desire to acquire an exact   
knowledge and skill in these exercises1 
yet it is not1 on that account1 the less
 necessary that he who professes to be a
 master and instruct the youth in them  
should be perfect therein3 and we see   
that this is what equally befalls the   
healing1 shipbuilding1 cloth-making1 and
 indeed all other arts2 so that it      
evidently belongs to the same art to    
find out what kind of government is     
best1 and would of all others be most   
correspondent to our wish1 while it     
received no molestation from without3   
and what particular species of it is    
adapted to particular persons2 for there
 are many who probably are incapable of 
enjoying the best form3 so that the     
legislator1 and he who is truly a       
politician1 ought to be acquainted not  

only with that which is most perfect    
imaginable1 but also that which is the  
best suited to any given circumstances4 
,there is1 moreover1 a third sort1 an   
imaginary one1 and he ought1 if such a  
one should be presented to his          
consideration1 to be able to discern    
what sort of one it would be at the     
beginning2 and1 when once established1  
what would be the proper means to       
preserve it a long time4 ,i mean1 for   
instance1 if a state should happen not  
to have the best form of government1 or 
be deficient in what was necessary1 or  
not receive every advantage possible1   
but something less4 ,and1 besides all   
this1 it is necessary to know what sort 
of government is best fitting for all   
cities3 for most of those writers who   
have treated this subject1 however      
speciously they may handle other parts  
of it1 have failed in describing the    
practical parts3 for it is not enough to
 be able to perceive what is best       
without it is what can be put in        

practice4 ,it should also be simple1 and
 easy for all to attain to4 ,but some   
seek only the most subtile forms of     
government4 ,others again1 choosing     
#abhi;a rather to treat of what is      
common1 censure those under which they  
live1 and extol the excellence of a     
particular state1 as the ,lacedaemonian1
 or some other3 but every legislator    
ought to establish such a form of       
government as from the present state and
 disposition of the people who are to   
receive it they will most readily submit
 to and persuade the community to       
partake of3 for it is not a business of 
less trouble to correct the mistakes of 
an established government than to form a
 new one2 as it is as difficult to      
recover what we have forgot as to learn 
anything afresh4 ,he1 therefore1 who    
aspires to the character of a           
legislator1 ought1 besides all we have  
already said1 to be able to correct the 
mistakes of a government already        
established1 as we have before          

mentioned4 ,but this is impossible to be
 done by him who does not know how many 
different forms of government there are3
 some persons think that there is only  
one species both of democracy and       
oligarchy2 but this is not true3 so that
 every one should be acquainted with the
 difference of these governments1 how   
great they are1 and whence they arise2  
and should have equal knowledge to      
perceive what laws are best1 and what   
are most suitable to each particular    
government3 for all laws are1 and ought 
to be1 framed agreeable to the state    
that is to be governed by them1 and not 
the state to the laws3 for government is
 a certain ordering in a state which    
particularly respects the magistrates in
 what manner they shall be regulated1   
and where the supreme power shall be    
placed2 and what shall be the final     
object which each community shall have  
in view2 but the laws are something     
different from what regulates and       
expresses the form of the               

constitution-it is their office to      
direct the conduct of the magistrate in 
the execution of his office and the     
punishment of offenders4 ,from whence it
 is evident1 that the founders of laws  
should attend both to the number and the
 different sorts of government2 for it  
is impossible that the same laws should 
be calculated for all sorts of          
oligarchies and all sorts of            
democracies1 for of both these          
governments there are many species1 not 
one only4     ,,chapter ,,ii   ,since1  
then1 according to our first method in  
treating of the different forms of      
government1 we have divided those which 
are regular into three sorts1 the       
kingly1 the aristocratical1 the free    
states1 and shown the three excesses    
which these are liable to3 the kingly1  
of becoming tyrannical2 the             
aristocratical1 oligarchical2 and the   
free state1 democratical3 and as we have
 already treated of the aristocratical  
and kingly2 for to enter into an inquiry

 what sort of government is best is the 
same thing as to treat of these two     
expressly2 for each of them desires to  
be established upon the principles of   
virtue3 and as1 moreover1 we have       
already determined wherein a kingly     
power and an aristocracy differ from    
each other1 and when a state may be said
 to be governed by a king1 it now       
remains that we examine into a free     
state1 and also these other governments1
 an oligarchy1 a democracy1 and a       
#abhi;b tyranny2 and it is evident of   
these three excesses which must be the  
worst of all1 and which next to it2 for1
 of course1 the excesses of the best and
 most holy must be the worst2 for it    
must necessarily happen either that the 
name of king only will remain1 or else  
that the king will assume more power    
than belongs to him1 from whence tyranny
 will arise1 the worst excess           
imaginable1 a government the most       
contrary possible to a free state4 ,the 
excess next hurtful is an oligarchy2 for

 an aristocracy differs much from this  
sort of government3 that which is least 
so is a democracy4 ,this subject has    
been already treated of by one of those 
writers who have gone before me1 though 
his sentiments are not the same as mine3
 for he thought1 that of all excellent  
constitutions1 as a good oligarchy or   
the like1 a democracy was the worst1 but
 of all bad ones1 the best4  ,now ,i    
affirm1 that all these states have1     
without exception1 fallen into excess2  
and also that he should not have said   
that one oligarchy was better than      
another1 but that it was not quite so   
bad4 ,but this question we shall not    
enter into at present4 ,we shall first  
inquire how many different sorts of free
 states there are2 since there are many 
species of democracies and oligarchies2 
and which of them is the most           
comprehensive1 and most desirable after 
the best form of government2 or if there
 is any other like an aristocracy1 well 
established2 and also which of these is 

best adapted to most cities1 and which  
of them is preferable for particular    
persons3 for1 probably1 some may suit   
better with an oligarchy than a         
democracy1 and others better with a     
democracy than an oligarchy2 and        
afterwards in what manner any one ought 
to proceed who desires to establish     
either of these states1 ,i mean every   
species of democracy1 and also of       
oligarchy4 ,and to conclude1 when we    
shall have briefly gone through         
everything that is necessary1 we will   
endeavour to point out the sources of   
corruption1 and stability1 in           
government1 as well those which are     
common to all as those which are        
peculiar to each state1 and from what   
causes they chiefly arise4     ,,chapter
 ,,iii   ,the reason for there being    
many different sorts of governments is  
this1 that each state consists of a     
great number of parts2 for1 in the first
 place1 we see that all cities are made 
up of families3 and again1 of the       

multitude of these some must be rich1   
some poor1 and others in the middle     
station2 and that1 both of the rich and 
poor1 some will be used to arms1 others 
not4 ,we see also1 that some of the     
common people are husbandmen1 others    
attend the market1 and others are       
artificers4 ,there is also a difference 
between the nobles in their wealth1 and 
the dignity in which they live3 for     
instance1 in the number of horses they  
breed2 for this cannot be supported     
without a large fortune3 for which      
reason1 in former times1 those cities   
whose strength consisted in horse became
 by that means oligarchies2 and they    
used horse in their expeditions against 
the neighbouring cities2 as the         
,eretrians the ,chalcidians1 the        
,magnetians1 who lived near the river   
,meander1 and many others in ,asia4     
,moreover1 besides the difference of    
fortune1 there is that which arises from
 family and merit2 or1 if there are any 
other distinctions #abij;a which make   

part of the city1 they have been already
 mentioned in treating of an            
aristocracy1 for there we considered how
 many parts each city must necessarily  
be composed of2 and sometimes each of   
these have a share in the government1   
sometimes a few1 sometimes more4  ,it is
 evident then1 that there must be many  
forms of government1 differing from each
 other in their particular constitution3
 for the parts of which they are        
composed each differ from the other4    
,for government is the ordering of the  
magistracies of the state2 and these the
 community share between themselves1    
either as they can attain them by force1
 or according to some common equality   
which there is amongst them1 as poverty1
 wealth1 or something which they both   
partake of4 ,there must therefore       
necessarily be as many different forms  
of governments as there are different   
ranks in the society1 arising from the  
superiority of some over others1 and    
their different situations4 ,and these  

seem chiefly to be two1 as they say1 of 
the winds3 namely1 the north and the    
south2 and all the others are           
declinations from these4 ,and thus in   
politics1 there is the government of the
 many and the government of the few2 or 
a democracy and an oligarchy3 for an    
aristocracy may be considered as a      
species of oligarchy1 as being also a   
government of the few2 and what we call 
a free state may be considered as a     
democracy3 as in the winds they consider
 the west as part of the north1 and the 
east as part of the south3 and thus it  
is in music1 according to some1 who say 
there are only two species of it1 the   
,doric and the ,phrygian1 and all other 
species of composition they call after  
one of these names2 and many people are 
accustomed to consider the nature of    
government in the same light2 but it is 
both more convenient and more           
correspondent to truth to distinguish   
governments as ,i have done1 into two   
species3 one1 of those which are        

established upon proper principles2 of  
which there may be one or two sorts3 the
 other1 which includes all the different
 excesses of these2 so that we may      
compare the best form of government to  
the most harmonious piece of music2 the 
oligarchic and despotic to the more     
violent tunes2 and the democratic to the
 soft and gentle airs4     ,,chapter    
,,iv   ,we ought not to define a        
democracy as some do1 who say simply1   
that it is a government where the       
supreme power is lodged in the people2  
for even in oligarchies the supreme     
power is in the majority4 ,nor should   
they define an oligarchy a government   
where the supreme power is in the hands 
of a few3 for let us suppose the number 
of a people to be thirteen hundred1 and 
that of these one thousand were rich1   
who would not permit the three hundred  
poor to have any share in the           
government1 although they were free1 and
 their equal in everything else2 no one 
would say1 that this government was a   

democracy4 ,in like manner1 if the poor1
 when few in number1 should acquire the 
power over the rich1 though more than   
themselves1 no one would say1 that this 
was an oligarchy2 nor this1 when the    
rest who are rich have no share in the  
administration4 ,we should rather say1  
that a democracy is when the supreme    
power is in the #abij;b hands of the    
freemen2 an oligarchy1 when it is in the
 hands of the rich3 it happens indeed   
that in the one case the many will      
possess it1 in the other the few2       
because there are many poor and few     
rich4 ,and if the power of the state was
 to be distributed according to the size
 of the citizens1 as they say it is in  
,ethiopia1 or according to their beauty1
 it would be an oligarchy3 for the      
number of those who are large and       
beautiful is small4  ,nor are those     
things which we have already mentioned  
alone sufficient to describe these      
states2 for since there are many species
 both of a democracy and an oligarchy1  

the matter requires further             
consideration2 as we cannot admit1 that 
if a few persons who are free possess   
the supreme power over the many who are 
not free1 that this government is a     
democracy3 as in ,apollonia1 in ,ionia1 
and in ,thera3 for in each of these     
cities the honours of the state belong  
to some few particular families1 who    
first founded the colonies4 ,nor would  
the rich1 because they are superior in  
numbers1 form a democracy1 as formerly  
at ,colophon2 for there the majority had
 large possessions before the ,lydian   
war3 but a democracy is a state where   
the freemen and the poor1 being the     
majority1 are invested with the power of
 the state4 ,an oligarchy is a state    
where the rich and those of noble       
families1 being few1 possess it4  ,we   
have now proved that there are various  
forms of government and have assigned a 
reason for it2 and shall proceed to show
 that there are even more than these1   
and what they are1 and why2 setting out 

with the principle we have already laid 
down4 ,we admit that every city consists
 not of one1 but many parts3 thus1 if we
 should endeavour to comprehend the     
different species of animals we should  
first of all note those parts which     
every animal must have1 as a certain    
sensorium1 and also what is necessary to
 acquire and retain food1 as a mouth and
 a belly2 besides certain parts to      
enable it to move from place to place4  
,if1 then1 these are the only parts of  
an animal and there are differences     
between them2 namely1 in their various  
sorts of stomachs1 bellies1 and         
sensoriums3 to which we must add their  
motive powers2 the number of the        
combinations of all these must          
necessarily make up the different       
species of animals4 ,for it is not      
possible that the same kind of animal   
should have any very great difference in
 its mouth or ears2 so that when all    
these are collected1 who happen to have 
these things similar in all1 they make  

up a species of animals of which there  
are as many as there are of these       
general combinations of necessary parts4
  ,the same thing is true of what are   
called states2 for a city is not made of
 one but many parts1 as has already been
 often said2 one of which is those who  
supply it with provisions1 called       
husbandmen1 another called mechanics1   
#abia;a whose employment is in the      
manual arts1 without which the city     
could not be inhabited2 of these some   
are busied about what is absolutely     
necessary1 others in what contribute to 
the elegancies and pleasures of life2   
the third sort are your exchange-men1 ,i
 mean by these your buyers1 sellers1    
merchants1 and victuallers2 the fourth  
are your hired labourers or workmen2 the
 fifth are the men-at-arms1 a rank not  
less useful than the other1 without you 
would have the community slaves to every
 invader2 but what cannot defend itself 
is unworthy of the name of a city2 for a
 city is self-sufficient1 a slave not4  

,so that when ,socrates1 in ,plato's    
,republic1 says that a city is          
necessarily composed of four sorts of   
people1 he speaks elegantly but not     
correctly1 and these are1 according to  
him1 weavers1 husbandmen1 shoe-makers1  
and builders2 he then adds1 as if these 
were not sufficient1 smiths1 herdsmen   
for what cattle are necessary1 and also 
merchants and victuallers1 and these are
 by way of appendix to his first list2  
as if a city was established for        
necessity1 and not happiness1 or as if a
 shoe-maker and a husbandman were       
equally useful4 ,he reckons not the     
military a part before the increase of  
territory and joining to the borders of 
the neighbouring powers will make war   
necessary3 and even amongst them who    
compose his four divisions1 or whoever  
have any connection with each other1 it 
will be necessary to have some one to   
distribute justice1 and determine       
between man and man4 ,if1 then1 the mind
 is a more valuable part of man than the

 body1 every one would wish to have     
those things more regarded in his city  
which tend to the advantage of these    
than common matters1 such are war and   
justice2 to which may be added council1 
which is the business of civil wisdom   
7nor is it of any consequence whether   
these different employments are filled  
by different persons or one1 as the same
 man is oftentimes both a soldier and a 
husbandman73 so that if both the judge  
and the senator are parts of the city1  
it necessarily follows that the soldier 
must be so also4 ,the seventh sort are  
those who serve the public in expensive 
employments at their own charge3 these  
are called the rich4 ,the eighth are    
those who execute the different offices 
of the state1 and without these it could
 not possibly subsist3 it is therefore  
necessary that there should be some     
persons capable of governing and filling
 the places in the city2 and this either
 for life or in rotation3 the office of 
senator1 and judge1 of which we have    

already sufficiently treated1 are the   
only ones remaining4 ,if1 then1 these   
things are necessary for a state1 that  
it may be happy and just1 it follows    
that the citizens who engage in public  
affairs should be men of abilities      
therein4 #abia;b ,several persons think1
 that different employments may be      
allotted to the same person2 as a       
soldier's1 a husbandman's1 and an       
artificer's2 as also that others may be 
both senators and judges4  ,besides1    
every one supposes himself a man of     
political abilities1 and that he is     
qualified for almost every department in
 the state4 ,but the same person cannot 
at once be poor and rich3 for which     
reason the most obvious division of the 
city is into two parts1 the poor and    
rich2 moreover1 since for the generality
 the one are few1 the other many1 they  
seem of all the parts of a city most    
contrary to each other2 so that as the  
one or the other prevail they form      
different states2 and these are the     

democracy and the oligarchy4  ,but that 
there are many different states1 and    
from what causes they arise1 has been   
already mentioned3 and that there are   
also different species both of          
democracies and oligarchies we will now 
show4 ,though this indeed is evident    
from what we have already said3 there   
are also many different sorts of common 
people1 and also of those who are called
 gentlemen4 ,of the different sorts of  
the first are husbandmen1 artificers1   
exchange-men1 who are employed in buying
 and selling1 seamen1 of which some are 
engaged in war1 some in traffic1 some in
 carrying goods and passengers from     
place to place1 others in fishing1 and  
of each of these there are often many1  
as fishermen at ,tarentum and           
,byzantium1 masters of galleys at       
,athens1 merchants at ,a,egina and      
,chios1 those who let ships on freight  
at ,tenedos2 we may add to these those  
who live by their manual labour and have
 but little property2 so that they      

cannot live without some employ3 and    
also those who are not free-born on both
 sides1 and whatever other sort of      
common people there may be4 ,as for     
gentlemen1 they are such as are         
distinguished either by their fortune1  
their birth1 their abilities1 or their  
education1 or any such-like excellence  
which is attributed to them4  ,the most 
pure democracy is that which is so      
called principally from that equality   
which prevails in it3 for this is what  
the law in that state directs2 that the 
poor shall be in no greater subjection  
than the rich2 nor that the supreme     
power shall be lodged with either of    
these1 but that both shall share it4    
,for if liberty and equality1 as some   
persons suppose1 are chiefly to be found
 in a democracy1 it must be most so by  
every department of government being    
alike open to all2 but as the people are
 the majority1 and what they vote is    
law1 it follows that such a state must  
be a democracy4 ,this1 then1 is one     

species thereof4 ,another is1 when the  
magistrates are elected by a certain    
census2 but this should be but small1   
and every one who was included in it    
should be eligible1 but as soon as he   
was below it should lose that right4    
#abib;a ,another sort is1 in which every
 citizen who is not infamous has a share
 in the government1 but where the       
government is in the laws4 ,another1    
where every citizen without exception   
has this right4 ,another is like these  
in other particulars1 but there the     
people govern1 and not the law3 and this
 takes place when everything is         
determined by a majority of votes1 and  
not by a law2 which happens when the    
people are influenced by the demagogues3
 for where a democracy is governed by   
stated laws there is no room for them1  
but men of worth fill the first offices 
in the state3 but where the power is not
 vested in the laws1 there demagogues   
abound3 for there the people rule with  
kingly power3 the whole composing one   

body2 for they are supreme1 not as      
individuals but in their collective     
capacity4  ,homer also discommends the  
government of many2 but whether he means
 this we are speaking of1 or where each 
person exercises his power separately1  
is uncertain4 ,when the people possess  
this power they desire to be altogether 
absolute1 that they may not be under the
 control of the law1 and this is the    
time when flatterers are held in repute4
 ,nor is there any difference between   
such a people and monarchs in a tyranny3
 for their manners are the same1 and    
they both hold a despotic power over    
better persons than themselves4 ,for    
their decrees are like the others'      
edicts2 their demagogues like the       
others' flatterers3 but their greatest  
resemblance consists in the mutual      
support they give to each other1 the    
flatterer to the tyrant1 the demagogue  
to the people3 and to them it is owing  
that the supreme power is lodged in the 
votes of the people1 and not in the     

laws2 for they bring everything before  
them1 as their influence is owing to    
their being supreme whose opinions they 
entirely direct2 for these are they whom
 the multitude obey4 ,besides1 those who
 accuse the magistrates insist upon it1 
that the right of determining on their  
conduct lies in the people1 who gladly  
receive their complaints as the means of
 destroying all their offices4  ,any    
one1 therefore1 may with great justice  
blame such a government as being a      
democracy1 and not a free state2 for    
where the government is not in the laws1
 then there is no free state1 for the   
law ought to be supreme over all things2
 and particular incidents which arise   
should be determined by the magistrates 
or the state4 ,if1 therefore1 a         
democracy is to be reckoned a free      
state1 it is evident that any such      
establishment which centres all power in
 the votes of the people cannot1        
properly speaking1 be a democracy3 for  
their decrees cannot be general in their

 extent4 ,thus1 then1 we may describe   
the several species of democracies4     
,,chapter ,v   ,of the different species
 of oligarchies one is1 when the right  
to the offices is regulated by a certain
 census2 so that the poor1 although the 
majority1 have no share in it2 while all
 those who are included therein take    
part in the management of public        
affairs4 ,another sort is1 when #abib;b 
the magistrates are men of very small   
fortune1 who upon any vacancy do        
themselves fill it up3 and if they do   
this out of the community at large1 the 
state approaches to an aristocracy2 if  
out of any particular class of people1  
it will be an oligarchy4 ,another sort  
of oligarchy is1 when the power is an   
hereditary nobility4 ,the fourth is1    
when the power is in the same hands as  
the other1 but not under the control of 
law2 and this sort of oligarchy exactly 
corresponds to a tyranny in monarchies1 
and to that particular species of       
democracies which ,i last mentioned in  

treating of that state3 this has the    
particular name of a dynasty4 ,these are
 the different sorts of oligarchies and 
democracies4  ,it should also be known1 
that it often happens that a free state1
 where the supreme power is in the laws1
 may not be democratic1 and yet in      
consequence of the established manners  
and customs of the people1 may be       
governed as if it was2 so1 on the other 
hand1 where the laws may countenance a  
more democratic form of government1     
these may make the state inclining to an
 oligarchy2 and this chiefly happens    
when there has been any alteration in   
the government2 for the people do not   
easily change1 but love their own       
ancient customs2 and it is by small     
degrees only that one thing takes place 
of another2 so that the ancient laws    
will remain1 while the power will be in 
the hands of those who have brought     
about a revolution in the state4        
,,chapter ,,vi   ,it is evident from    
what has been said1 that there are as   

many different sorts of democracies and 
oligarchies as ,i have reckoned up3 for1
 of necessity1 either all ranks of the  
people which ,i have enumerated must    
have a share in the government1 or some 
only1 and others not2 for when the      
husbandmen1 and those only who possess  
moderate fortunes1 have the supreme     
power1 they will govern according to    
law2 for as they must get their livings 
by their employs1 they have but little  
leisure for public business3 they will  
therefore establish proper laws1 and    
never call public assemblies but when   
there is a necessity for them2 and they 
will readily let every one partake with 
them in the administration of public    
affairs as soon as they possess that    
fortune which the law requires for their
 qualification3 every one1 therefore1   
who is qualified will have his share in 
the government3 for to exclude any would
 be to make the government an oligarchy1
 and for all to have leisure to attend  
without they had a subsistence would be 

impossible3 for these reasons1          
therefore1 this government is a species 
of democracy4 ,another species is       
distinguished by the mode of electing   
their magistrates1 in which every one is
 eligible1 to whose birth there are no  
objections1 provided he is supposed to  
have leisure to attend3 for which reason
 in such a democracy the supreme power  
will be vested in the laws1 as there    
will be nothing paid to those who go to 
the public assemblies4 ,a third species 
is where every freeman has a right to a 
share in the government1 which he will  
not accept for the cause already        
assigned2 for which reason here also the
 supreme power will be in the law4 ,the 
fourth species #abic;a of democracy1 the
 last which was established in order of 
time1 arose when cities were greatly    
enlarged to what they were at first1 and
 when the public revenue became         
something considerable2 for then the    
populace1 on account of their numbers1  
were admitted to share in the management

 of public affairs1 for then even the   
poorest people were at leisure to attend
 to them1 as they received wages for so 
doing2 nay1 they were more so than      
others1 as they were not hindered by    
having anything of their own to mind1 as
 the rich had2 for which reason these   
last very often did not frequent the    
public assemblies and the courts of     
justice3 thus the supreme power was     
lodged in the poor1 and not in the laws4
 ,these are the different sorts of      
democracies1 and such are the causes    
which necessarily gave birth to them4   
,the first species of oligarchy is1 when
 the generality of the state are men of 
moderate and not too large property2 for
 this gives them leisure for the        
management of public affairs3 and1 as   
they are a numerous body1 it necessarily
 follows that the supreme power must be 
in the laws1 and not in men2 for as they
 are far removed from a monarchical     
government1 and have not sufficient     
fortune to neglect their private        

affairs1 while they are too many to be  
supported by the public1 they will of   
course determine to be governed by the  
laws1 and not by each other4 ,but if the
 men of property in the state are but   
few1 and their property is large1 then  
an oligarchy of the second sort will    
take place2 for those who have most     
power will think that they have a right 
to lord it over the others2 and1 to     
accomplish this1 they will associate to 
themselves some who have an inclination 
for public affairs1 and as they are not 
powerful enough to govern without law1  
they will make a law for that purpose4  
,and if those few who have large        
fortunes should acquire still greater   
power1 the oligarchy will then alter    
into one of the third sort2 for they    
will get all the offices of the state   
into their own hands by a law which     
directs the son to succeed upon the     
death of his father2 and1 after that1   
when1 by means of their increasing      
wealth and powerful connections1 they   

extend still further their oppression1 a
 monarchical dynasty will directly      
succeed wherein men will be supreme1 and
 not the law2 and this is the fourth    
species of an oligarchy correspondent to
 the last-mentioned class of            
democracies4     ,,chapter ,,vii        
,there are besides two other states1 a  
democracy and an oligarchy1 one of which
 all speak of1 and it is always esteemed
 a species of the four sorts2 and thus  
they reckon them up2 a monarchy1 an     
oligarchy1 a democracy1 and this fourth 
which they call an aristocracy4 ,there  
is also a fifth1 which bears a name that
 is also common to the other four1      
namely1 a state3 but as this is seldom  
to be met with1 it has escaped those who
 have endeavoured to enumerate the      
different sorts of governments1 which   
#abic;b they fix at four only1 as does  
,plato in his ,republic4  ,an           
aristocracy1 of which ,i have already   
treated in the first book1 is rightly   
called so2 for a state governed by the  

best men1 upon the most virtuous        
principles1 and not upon any hypothesis1
 which even good men may propose1 has   
alone a right to be called an           
aristocracy1 for it is there only that a
 man is at once a good man and a good   
citizen2 while in other states men are  
good only relative to those states4     
,moreover1 there are some other states  
which are called by the same name1 that 
differ both from oligarchies and free   
states1 wherein not only the rich but   
also the virtuous have a share in the   
administration2 and have therefore      
acquired the name of aristocracies2 for 
in those governments wherein virtue is  
not their common care1 there are still  
men of worth and approved goodness4     
,whatever state1 then1 like the         
,carthaginians1 favours the rich1 the   
virtuous1 and the citizens at large1 is 
a sort of aristocracy3 when only the two
 latter are held in esteem1 as at       
,lacedaemon1 and the state is jointly   
composed of these1 it is a virtuous     

democracy4 ,these are the two species of
 aristocracies after the first1 which is
 the best of all governments4 ,there is 
also a third1 which is1 whenever a free 
state inclines to the dominion of a few4
     ,,chapter ,,viii   ,it now remains 
for us to treat of that government which
 is particularly called a free state1   
and also of a tyranny2 and the reason   
for my choosing to place that free state
 here is1 because this1 as well as those
 aristocracies already mentioned1       
although they do not seem excesses1 yet1
 to speak true1 they have all departed  
from what a perfect government is4 ,nay1
 they are deviations both of them       
equally from other forms1 as ,i said at 
the beginning4 ,it is proper to mention 
a tyranny the last of all governments1  
for it is of all others the least like  
one3 but as my intention is to treat of 
all governments in general1 for this    
reason that also1 as ,i have said1 will 
be taken into consideration in its      
proper place4  ,i shall now inquire into

 a free state and show what it is2 and  
we shall the better understand its      
positive nature as we have already      
described an oligarchy and a democracy2 
for a free state is indeed nothing more 
than a mixture of them1 and it has been 
usual to call those which incline most  
to a democracy1 a free state2 those     
which incline most to an oligarchy1 an  
aristocracy1 because those who are rich 
are generally men of family and         
education2 besides1 they enjoy those    
things which others are often guilty of 
crimes to procure3 for which reason they
 are regarded as men of worth and honour
 and note4  ,since1 then1 it is the     
genius of an aristocracy to allot the   
larger part of the government to the    
best citizens1 they therefore say1 that 
an oligarchy is chiefly composed of     
those men who are worthy and honourable3
 now it #abid;a seems impossible that   
where the government is in the hands of 
the good1 there the laws should not be  
good1 but bad2 or1 on the contrary1 that

 where the government is in the hands of
 the bad1 there the laws should be good2
 nor is a government well constituted   
because the laws are1 without at the    
same time care is taken that they are   
observed2 for to enforce obedience to   
the laws which it makes is one proof of 
a good constitution in the state-another
 is1 to have laws well calculated for   
those who are to abide by them2 for if  
they are improper they must be obeyed3  
and this may be done two ways1 either by
 their being the best relative to the   
particular state1 or the best           
absolutely4 ,an aristocracy seems most  
likely to confer the honours of the     
state on the virtuous2 for virtue is the
 object of an aristocracy1 riches of an 
oligarchy1 and liberty of a democracy2  
for what is approved of by the majority 
will prevail in all or in each of these 
three different states2 and that which  
seems good to most of those who compose 
the community will prevail3 for what is 
called a state prevails in many         

communities1 which aim at a mixture of  
rich and poor1 riches and liberty3 as   
for the rich1 they are usually supposed 
to take the place of the worthy and     
honourable4 ,as there are three things  
which claim an equal rank in the state1 
freedom1 riches1 and virtue 7for as for 
the fourth1 rank1 it is an attendant on 
two of the others1 for virtue and riches
 are the origin of family71 it is       
evident1 that the conjuncture of the    
rich and the poor make up a free state2 
but that all three tend to an           
aristocracy more than any other1 except 
that which is truly so1 which holds the 
first rank4  ,we have already seen that 
there are governments different from a  
monarchy1 a democracy1 and an oligarchy2
 and what they are1 and wherein they    
differ from each other2 and also        
aristocracies and states properly so    
called1 which are derived from them2 and
 it is evident that these are not much  
unlike each other4     ,,chapter ,,ix   
,we shall next proceed to show how that 

government which is peculiarly called a 
state arises alongside of democracy and 
oligarchy1 and how it ought to be       
established2 and this will at the same  
time show what are the proper boundaries
 of both these governments1 for we must 
mark out wherein they differ from one   
another1 and then from both these       
compose a state of such parts of each of
 them as will show from whence they were
 taken4  ,there are three different ways
 in which two states may be blended and 
joined together2 for1 in the first      
place1 all those rules may be adopted   
which the laws of each of them have     
ordered2 as for instance in the judicial
 department1 for in an oligarchy the    
rich are fined if they do not come to   
the court as jurymen1 but the poor are  
not paid for their attendance2 but in   
democracies they are1 while the rich are
 not fined for their neglect4 ,now these
 things1 as being common to both1 are   
fit to be observed in a free #abid;b    
state which is composed of both4 ,this1 

then1 is one way in which they may be   
joined together4 ,in the second place1 a
 medium may be taken between the        
different methods which each state      
observes2 for instance1 in a democracy  
the right to vote in the public assembly
 is either confined by no census at all1
 or limited by a very small one2 in an  
oligarchy none enjoy it but those whose 
census is high3 therefore1 as these two 
practices are contrary to each other1 a 
census between each may be established  
in such a state4 ,in the third place1   
different laws of each community may be 
adopted2 as1 for instance1 as it seems  
correspondent to the nature of a        
democracy1 that the magistrates should  
be chosen by lot1 but an aristocracy by 
vote1 and in the one state according to 
a census1 but not in the other3 let1    
then1 an aristocracy and a free state   
copy something from each of them2 let   
them follow an oligarchy in choosing    
their magistrates by vote1 but a        
democracy in not admitting of any       

census1 and thus blend together the     
different customs of the two            
governments4 ,but the best proof of a   
happy mixture of a democracy and an     
oligarchy is this1 when a person may    
properly call the same state a democracy
 and an oligarchy4 ,it is evident that  
those who speak of it in this manner are
 induced to it because both these       
governments are there well blended      
together3 and indeed this is common to  
all mediums1 that the extremes of each  
side should be discerned therein1 as at 
,lacedaemon2 for many affirm that it is 
a democracy from the many particulars in
 which it follows that form of          
government2 as for instance1 in the     
first place1 in the bringing up of their
 children1 for the rich and poor are    
brought up in the same manner2 and their
 education is such that the children of 
the poor may partake of it2 and the same
 rules are observed when they are youths
 and men1 there is no distinction       
between a rich person and a poor one2   

and in their public tables the same     
provision is served to all4 ,the rich   
also wear only such clothes as the      
poorest man is able to purchase4        
,moreover1 with respect to two          
magistracies of the highest rank1 one   
they have a right to elect to1 the other
 to fill2 namely1 the senate and the    
ephori4 ,others consider it as an       
oligarchy1 the principles of which it   
follows in many things1 as in choosing  
all their officers by vote1 and not by  
lot2 in there being but a few who have a
 right to sit in judgment on capital    
causes and the like4 ,indeed1 a state   
which is well composed of two others    
ought to resemble them both1 and        
neither1 ,such a state ought to have its
 means of preservation in itself1 and   
not without2 and when ,i say in itself1 
,i do not mean that it should owe this  
to the forbearance of their neighbours1 
for this may happen to a bad government1
 but to every member of the community's 
not being willing that there should be  

the least alteration in their           
constitution4 ,such is the method in    
which a free state or aristocracy ought 
to be established4     ,,chapter ,x     
,it now remains to treat of a tyranny2  
not that there is #abie;a much to be    
said on that subject1 but as it makes   
part of our plan1 since we enumerated it
 amongst our different sorts of         
governments4 ,in the beginning of this  
work we inquired into the nature of     
kingly government1 and entered into a   
particular examination of what was most 
properly called so1 and whether it was  
advantageous to a state or not1 and what
 it should be1 and how established2 and 
we divided a tyranny into two pieces    
when we were upon this subject1 because 
there is something analogous between    
this and a kingly government1 for they  
are both of them established by law2 for
 among some of the barbarians they elect
 a monarch with absolute power1 and     
formerly among the ,greeks there were   
some such1 whom they called sesumnetes4 

,now these differ from each other2 for  
some possess only kingly power regulated
 by law1 and rule those who voluntarily 
submit to their government2 others rule 
despotically according to their own     
will4 ,there is a third species of      
tyranny1 most properly so called1 which 
is the very opposite to kingly power2   
for this is the government of one who   
rules over his equals and superiors     
without being accountable for his       
conduct1 and whose object is his own    
advantage1 and not the advantage of     
those he governs2 for which reason he   
rules by compulsion1 for no freemen will
 ever willingly submit to such a        
government4 ,these are the different    
species of tyrannies1 their principles1 
and their causes4     ,,chapter ,,xi    
,we proceed now to inquire what form of 
government and what manner of life is   
best for communities in general1 not    
adapting it to that superior virtue     
which is above the reach of the vulgar1 
or that education which every advantage 

of nature and fortune only can furnish1 
nor to those imaginary plans which may  
be formed at pleasure2 but to that mode 
of life which the greater part of       
mankind can attain to1 and that         
government which most cities may        
establish3 for as to those aristocracies
 which we have now mentioned1 they are  
either too perfect for a state to       
support1 or one so nearly alike to that 
state we now going to inquire into1 that
 we shall treat of them both as one4    
,the opinions which we form upon these  
subjects must depend upon one common    
principle3 for if what ,i have said in  
my treatise on ,morals is true1 a happy 
life must arise from an uninterrupted   
course of virtue2 and if virtue consists
 in a certain medium1 the middle life   
must certainly be the happiest2 which   
medium is attainable #abie;b by every   
one4 ,the boundaries of virtue and vice 
in the state must also necessarily be   
the same as in a private person2 for the
 form of government is the life of the  

city4 ,in every city the people are     
divided into three sorts2 the very rich1
 the very poor1 and those who are       
between them4 ,if this is universally   
admitted1 that the mean is best1 it is  
evident that even in point of fortune   
mediocrity is to be preferred2 for that 
state is most submissive to reason2 for 
those who are very handsome1 or very    
strong1 or very noble1 or very rich2 or1
 on the contrary2 those who are very    
poor1 or very weak1 or very mean1 with  
difficulty obey it2 for the one are     
capricious and greatly flagitious1 the  
other rascally and mean1 the crimes of  
each arising from their different       
excesses3 nor will they go through the  
different offices of the state2 which is
 detrimental to it3 besides1 those who  
excel in strength1 in riches1 or        
friends1 or the like1 neither know how  
nor are willing to submit to command3   
and this begins at home when they are   
boys2 for there they are brought up too 
delicately to be accustomed to obey     

their preceptors3 as for the very poor1 
their general and excessive want of what
 the rich enjoy reduces them to a state 
too mean3 so that the one know not how  
to command1 but to be commanded as      
slaves1 the others know not how to      
submit to any command1 nor to command   
themselves but with despotic power4  ,a 
city composed of such men must therefore
 consist of slaves and masters1 not     
freemen2 where one party must hate1 and 
the other despise1 where there could be 
no possibility of friendship or         
political community3 for community      
supposes affection2 for we do not even  
on the road associate with our enemies4 
,it is also the genius of a city to be  
composed as much as possible of equals2 
which will be most so when the          
inhabitants are in the middle state3    
from whence it follows1 that that city  
must be best framed which is composed of
 those whom we say are naturally its    
proper members4 ,it is men of this      
station also who will be best assured of

 safety and protection2 for they will   
neither covet what belongs to others1 as
 the poor do2 nor will others covet what
 is theirs1 as the poor do what belongs 
to the rich2 and thus1 without plotting 
against any one1 or having any one plot 
against them1 they will live free from  
danger3 for which reason ,phocylides    
wisely wishes for the middle state1 as  
being most productive of happiness4 ,it 
is plain1 then1 that the most perfect   
political community must be amongst     
those who are in the middle rank1 and   
those states are best instituted wherein
 these are a larger and more respectable
 part1 if possible1 than both the other2
 or1 if that cannot be1 at least than   
either of them separate2 so that being  
thrown into the balance it may prevent  
either scale from preponderating4  ,it  
is therefore the greatest happiness     
which the citizens can enjoy to possess 
a moderate and convenient fortune2 for  
when some possess too much1 and others  
nothing at #abif;a all1 the government  

must either be in the hands of the      
meanest rabble or else a pure oligarchy2
 or1 from the excesses of both1 a       
tyranny2 for this arises from a         
headstrong democracy or an oligarchy1   
but very seldom when the members of the 
community are nearly on an equality with
 each other4 ,we will assign a reason   
for this when we come to treat of the   
alterations which different states are  
likely to undergo4 ,the middle state is 
therefore best1 as being least liable to
 those seditions and insurrections which
 disturb the community2 and for the same
 reason extensive governments are least 
liable to these inconveniences2 for     
there those in a middle state are very  
numerous1 whereas in small ones it is   
easy to pass to the two extremes1 so as 
hardly to have any in a medium          
remaining1 but the one half rich1 the   
other poor3 and from the same principle 
it is that democracies are more firmly  
established and of longer continuance   
than oligarchies2 but even in those when

 there is a want of a proper number of  
men of middling fortune1 the poor extend
 their power too far1 abuses arise1 and 
the government is soon at an end4  ,we  
ought to consider as a proof of what ,i 
now advance1 that the best lawgivers    
themselves were those in the middle rank
 of life1 amongst whom was ,solon1 as is
 evident from his poems1 and ,lycurgus1 
for he was not a king1 and ,charondas1  
and indeed most others4 ,what has been  
said will show us why of so many free   
states some have changed to democracies1
 others to oligarchies3 for whenever the
 number of those in the middle state has
 been too small1 those who were the more
 numerous1 whether the rich or the poor1
 always overpowered them and assumed to 
themselves the administration of public 
affairs2 from hence arose either a      
democracy or an oligarchy4 ,moreover1   
when in consequence of their disputes   
and quarrels with each other1 either the
 rich get the better of the poor1 or the
 poor of the rich1 neither of them will 

establish a free state2 but1 as the     
record of their victory1 one which      
inclines to their own principles1 and   
form either a democracy or an oligarchy4
  ,those who made conquests in ,greece1 
having all of them an eye to the        
respective forms of government in their 
own cities1 established either          
democracies or oligarchies1 not         
considering what was serviceable to the 
state1 but what was similar to their    
own2 for which reason a government has  
never been established where the supreme
 power has been placed amongst those of 
the middling rank1 or very seldom2 and1 
amongst a few1 one man only of those who
 have yet been conquerors has been      
persuaded to give the preference to this
 order of #abif;b men3 it is indeed an  
established custom with the inhabitants 
of most cities not to desire an         
equality1 but either to aspire to       
govern1 or when they are conquered1 to  
submit4  ,thus we have shown what the   
best state is1 and why4 ,it will not be 

difficult to perceive of the many states
 which there are1 for we have seen that 
there are various forms both of         
democracies and oligarchies1 to which we
 should give the first place1 to which  
the second1 and in the same manner the  
next also2 and to observe what are the  
particular excellences and defects of   
each1 after we have first described the 
best possible2 for that must be the best
 which is nearest to this1 that worst   
which is most distant from the medium1  
without any one has a particular plan of
 his own which he judges by4 ,i mean by 
this1 that it may happen1 that although 
one form of government may be better    
than another1 yet there is no reason to 
prevent another from being preferable   
thereunto in particular circumstances   
and for particular purposes4            
,,chapter ,,xii   ,after what has been  
said1 it follows that we should now show
 what particular form of government is  
most suitable for particular persons2   
first laying this down as a general     

maxim1 that that party which desires to 
support the actual administration of the
 state ought always to be superior to   
that which would alter it4 ,every city  
is made up of quality and quantity3 by  
quality ,i mean liberty1 riches1        
education1 and family1 and by quantity  
its relative populousness3 now it may   
happen that quality may exist in one of 
those parts of which the city is        
composed1 and quantity in another2 thus 
the number of the ignoble may be greater
 than the number of those of family1 the
 number of the poor than that of the    
rich2 but not so that the quantity of   
the one shall overbalance the quality of
 the other2 those must be properly      
adjusted to each other2 for where the   
number of the poor exceeds the          
proportion we have mentioned1 there a   
democracy will rise up1 and if the      
husbandry should have more power than   
others1 it will be a democracy of       
husbandmen2 and the democracy will be a 
particular species according to that    

class of men which may happen to be most
 numerous3 thus1 should these be the    
husbandmen1 it will be of these1 and the
 best2 if of mechanics and those who    
hire themselves out1 the worst possible3
 in the same manner it may be of any    
other set between these two4 ,but when  
the rich and the noble prevail more by  
their quality than they are deficient in
 quantity1 there an oligarchy ensues2   
and this oligarchy may be of different  
species1 according to the nature of the 
prevailing party4 ,every legislator in  
framing his constitution ought to have a
 particular regard to those in the      
middle rank of life2 and if he intends  
an oligarchy1 these should be the object
 of his laws2 if a democracy1 to these  
they should be entrusted2 and whenever  
their number exceeds that of the two    
others1 or at least one of them1 they   
give #abig;a stability to the           
constitution2 for there is no fear that 
the rich and the poor should agree to   
conspire together against them1 for     

neither of these will choose to serve   
the other4 ,if any one would choose to  
fix the administration on the widest    
basis1 he will find none preferable to  
this2 for to rule by turns is what the  
rich and the poor will not submit to1 on
 account of their hatred to each other4 
,it is1 moreover1 allowed that an       
arbitrator is the most proper person for
 both parties to trust to2 now this     
arbitrator is the middle rank4  ,those  
who would establish aristocratical      
governments are mistaken not only in    
giving too much power to the rich1 but  
also in deceiving the common people2 for
 at last1 instead of an imaginary good1 
they must feel a real evil1 for the     
encroachments of the rich are more      
destructive to the state than those of  
the poor4     ,,chapter ,,xiii   ,there 
are five particulars in which1 under    
fair pretences1 the rich craftily       
endeavour to undermine the rights of the
 people1 these are their public         
assemblies1 their offices of state1     

their courts of justice1 their military 
power1 and their gymnastic exercises4   
,with respect to their public           
assemblies1 in having them open to all1 
but in fining the rich only1 or others  
very little1 for not attending2 with    
respect to offices1 in permitting the   
poor to swear off1 but not granting this
 indulgence to those who are within the 
census2 with respect to their courts of 
justice1 in fining the rich for         
non-attendance1 but the poor not at all1
 or those a great deal1 and these very  
little1 as was done by the laws of      
,charondas4 ,in some places every       
citizen who was enrolled had a right to 
attend the public assemblies and to try 
causes2 which if they did not do1 a very
 heavy fine was laid upon them2 that    
through fear of the fine they might     
avoid being enrolled1 as they were then 
obliged to do neither the one nor the   
other4 ,the same spirit of legislation  
prevailed with respect to their bearing 
arms and their gymnastic exercises2 for 

the poor are excused if they have no    
arms1 but the rich are fined2 the same  
method takes place if they do not attend
 their gymnastic exercises1 there is no 
penalty on one1 but there is on the     
other3 the consequence of which is1 that
 the fear of this penalty induces the   
rich to keep the one and attend the     
other1 while the poor do neither4 ,these
 are the deceitful contrivances of      
oligarchical legislators4  ,the contrary
 prevails in a democracy2 for there they
 make the poor a proper allowance for   
attending the assemblies and the courts1
 but give the rich nothing for doing it3
 whence it is evident1 that if any one  
would properly blend these customs      
together1 they must extend both the pay 
and the fine to every member of the     
community1 and then every one would     
share in it1 whereas part only now do4  
,the citizens of a free state ought to  
#abig;b consist of those only who bear  
arms3 with respect to their census it is
 not easy to determine exactly what it  

ought to be1 but the rule that should   
direct upon this subject should be to   
make it as extensive as possible1 so    
that those who are enrolled in it make  
up a greater part of the people than    
those who are not2 for those who are    
poor1 although they partake not of the  
offices of the state1 are willing to    
live quiet1 provided that no one        
disturbs them in their property3 but    
this is not an easy matter2 for it may  
not always happen1 that those who are at
 the head of public affairs are of a    
humane behaviour4 ,in time of war the   
poor are accustomed to show no alacrity 
without they have provisions found them2
 when they have1 then indeed they are   
willing to fight4  ,in some governments 
the power is vested not only in those   
who bear arms1 but also in those who    
have borne them4 ,among the ,malienses  
the state was composed of these latter  
only1 for all the officers were soldiers
 who had served their time4 ,and the    
first states in ,greece which succeeded 

those where kingly power was            
established1 were governed by the       
military4 ,first of all the horse1 for  
at that time the strength and excellence
 of the army depended on the horse1 for 
as to the heavy-armed foot they were    
useless without proper discipline2 but  
the art of tactics was not known to the 
ancients1 for which reason their        
strength lay in their horse3 but when   
cities grew larger1 and they depended   
more on their foot1 greater numbers     
partook of the freedom of the city2 for 
which reason what we call republics were
 formerly called democracies4 ,the      
ancient governments were properly       
oligarchies or kingdoms2 for on account 
of the few persons in each state1 it    
would have been impossible to have found
 a sufficient number of the middle rank2
 so these being but few1 and those used 
to subordination1 they more easily      
submitted to be governed4  ,we have now 
shown why there are many sorts of       
governments1 and others different from  

those we have treated of3 for there are 
more species of democracies than one1   
and the like is true of other forms1 and
 what are their differences1 and whence 
they arise2 and also of all others which
 is the best1 at least in general2 and  
which is best suited for particular     
people4     ,,chapter ,,xiv   ,we will  
now proceed to make some general        
reflections upon the governments next in
 order1 and also to consider each of    
them in particular2 beginning with those
 principles which appertain to each3 now
 there are three things in all states   
which a careful legislator ought well to
 consider1 which are of great           
consequence to all1 and which properly  
attended to the state must necessarily  
be happy2 and according to the variation
 of which the one will differ from the  
other4 ,the first of these is the       
#abih;a public assembly2 the second the 
officers of the state1 that is1 who they
 ought to be1 and with what power they  
should be entrusted1 and in what manner 

they should be appointed2 the third1 the
 judicial department4  ,now it is the   
proper business of the public assembly  
to determine concerning war and peace1  
making or breaking off alliances1 to    
enact laws1 to sentence to death1       
banishment1 or confiscation of goods1   
and to call the magistrates to account  
for their behaviour when in office4 ,now
 these powers must necessarily be       
entrusted to the citizens in general1 or
 all of them to some2 either to one     
magistrate or more2 or some to one1 and 
some to another1 or some to all1 but    
others to some3 to entrust all to all is
 in the spirit of a democracy1 for the  
people aim at equality4 ,there are many 
methods of delegating these powers to   
the citizens at large1 one of which is  
to let them execute them by turn1 and   
not altogether1 as was done by          
,tellecles1 the ,milesian1 in his state4
 ,in others the supreme council is      
composed of the different magistrates1  
and they succeed to the offices of the  

community by proper divisions of tribes1
 wards1 and other very small            
proportions1 till every one in his turn 
goes through them3 nor does the whole   
community ever meet together1 without it
 is when new laws are enacted1 or some  
national affair is debated1 or to hear  
what the magistrates have to propose to 
them4 ,another method is for the people 
to meet in a collective body1 but only  
for the purpose of holding the comitia1 
making laws1 determining concerning war 
or peace1 and inquiring into the conduct
 of their magistrates1 while the        
remaining part of the public business is
 conducted by the magistrates1 who have 
their separate departments1 and are     
chosen out of the whole community either
 by vote or ballot4 ,another method is  
for the people in general to meet for   
the choice of the magistrates1 and to   
examine into their conduct2 and also to 
deliberate concerning war and alliances1
 and to leave other things to the       
magistrates1 whoever happen to be       

chosen1 whose particular employments are
 such as necessarily require persons    
well skilled therein4 ,a fourth method  
is for every person to deliberate upon  
every subject in public assembly1 where 
the magistrates can determine nothing of
 themselves1 and have only the privilege
 of giving their opinions first2 and    
this is the method of the most pure     
democracy1 which is analogous to the    
proceedings in a dynastic oligarchy and 
a tyrannic monarchy4  ,these1 then1 are 
the methods in which public business is 
conducted in a democracy4 ,when the     
power is in the hands of part of the    
community only1 it is an oligarchy and  
this also admits of different customs2  
for whenever the officers of the state  
are chosen out of those who have a      
moderate fortune1 and these from that   
circumstance are many1 and when they    
depart not from that line which the law 
has laid down1 but carefully follow it1 
and when all within the census are      
eligible1 certainly it is then an       

oligarchy1 but founded on true          
principles of government #abih;b from   
its moderation4 ,when the people in     
general do not partake of the           
deliberative power1 but certain persons 
chosen for that purpose1 who govern     
according to law2 this also1 like the   
first1 is an oligarchy4 ,when those who 
have the deliberative power elect each  
other1 and the son succeeds to the      
father1 and when they can supersede the 
laws1 such a government is of necessity 
a strict oligarchy4 ,when some persons  
determine on one thing1 and others on   
another1 as war and peace1 and when all 
inquire into the conduct of their       
magistrates1 and other things are left  
to different officers1 elected either by
 vote or lot1 then the government is an 
aristocracy or a free state4 ,when some 
are chosen by vote and others by lot1   
and these either from the people in     
general1 or from a certain number       
elected for that purpose1 or if both the
 votes and the lots are open to all1    

such a state is partly an aristocracy1  
partly a free government itself4 ,these 
are the different methods in which the  
deliberative power is vested in         
different states1 all of whom follow    
some regulation here laid down4 ,it is  
advantageous to a democracy1 in the     
present sense of the word1 by which ,i  
mean a state wherein the people at large
 have a supreme power1 even over the    
laws1 to hold frequent public           
assemblies2 and it will be best in this 
particular to imitate the example of    
oligarchies in their courts of justice2 
for they fine those who are appointed to
 try causes if they do not attend1 so   
should they reward the poor for coming  
to the public assemblies3 and their     
counsels will be best when all advise   
with each other1 the citizens with the  
nobles1 the nobles with the citizens4   
,it is also advisable when the council  
is to be composed of part of the        
citizens1 to elect1 either by vote or   
lot1 an equal number of both ranks4 ,it 

is also proper1 if the common people in 
the state are very numerous1 either not 
to pay every one for his attendance1 but
 such a number only as will make them   
equal to the nobles1 or to reject many  
of them by lot4  ,in an oligarchy they  
should either call up some of the common
 people to the council1 or else         
establish a court1 as is done in some   
other states1 whom they call            
pre-advisers or guardians of the laws1  
whose business should be to propose     
first what they should afterwards enact4
 ,by this means the people would have a 
place in the administration of public   
affairs1 without having it in their     
power to occasion any disorder in the   
government4 ,moreover1 the people may be
 allowed to have a vote in whatever bill
 is proposed1 but may not themselves    
propose anything contrary thereto2 or   
they may give their advice1 while the   
power of determining may be with the    
magistrates only4 ,it is also necessary 
to follow a contrary practice to what is

 established in democracies1 for the    
people should be allowed the power of   
pardoning1 but not of condemning1 for   
the cause should be referred back again 
to the magistrates3 whereas the contrary
 takes place in republics2 for the power
 of pardoning is with the few1 but not  
of condemning1 which is always referred 
#abii;a to the people at large4 ,and    
thus we determine concerning the        
deliberative power in any state1 and in 
whose hands it shall be4     ,,chapter  
,,xv   ,we now proceed to consider the  
choice of magistrates2 for this branch  
of public business contains many        
different ,parts1 as how many there     
shall be1 what shall be their particular
 office1 and with respect to time how   
long each of them shall continue in     
place2 for some make it six months1     
others shorter1 others for a year1      
others for a much longer time2 or       
whether they should be perpetual or for 
a long time1 or neither2 for the same   
person may fill the same office several 

times1 or he may not be allowed to enjoy
 it even twice1 but only once3 and also 
with respect to the appointment of      
magistrates1 who are to be eligible1 who
 is to choose them1 and in what manner2 
for in all these particulars we ought   
properly to distinguish the different   
ways which may be followed2 and then to 
show which of these is best suited to   
such and such governments4  ,now it is  
not easy to determine to whom we ought  
properly to give the name of magistrate1
 for a government requires many persons 
in office2 but every one of those who is
 either chosen by vote or lot is not to 
be reckoned a magistrate4 ,the priests1 
for instance1 in the first place2 for   
these are to be considered as very      
different from civil magistrates3 to    
these we may add the choregi and        
heralds2 nay1 even ambassadors are      
elected3 there are some civil           
employments which belong to the         
citizens2 and these are either when they
 are all engaged in one thing1 as when  

as soldiers they obey their general1 or 
when part of them only are1 as in       
governing the women or educating the    
youth2 and also some economic1 for they 
often elect corn-meters3 others are     
servile1 and in which1 if they are rich1
 they employ slaves4 ,but indeed they   
are most properly called magistrates1   
who are members of the deliberative     
council1 or decide causes1 or are in    
some command1 the last more especially1 
for to command is peculiar to           
magistrates4 ,but to speak truth1 this  
question is of no great consequence1 nor
 is it the province of the judges to    
decide between those who dispute about  
words2 it may indeed be an object of    
speculative inquiry2 but to inquire what
 officers are necessary in a state1 and 
how many1 and what1 though not most     
necessary1 may yet be advantageous in a 
well-established government1 is a much  
more useful employment1 and this with   
respect to all states in general1 as    
well as to small cities4  ,in extensive 

governments it is proper to allot one   
employment to one person1 as there are  
many to serve the public in so numerous 
a society1 where some may be passed over
 for a long time1 and others never be in
 office but once2 and indeed everything 
is better done which has the whole      
attention of one person1 than when that 
#abii;b attention is divided amongst    
many2 but in small states it is         
necessary that a few of the citizens    
should execute many employments2 for    
their numbers are so small it will not  
be convenient to have many of them in   
office at the same time2 for where shall
 we find others to succeed them in turn8
 ,small states will sometimes want the  
same magistrates and the same laws as   
large ones2 but the one will not want to
 employ them so often as the other2 so  
that different charges may be intrusted 
to the same person without any          
inconvenience1 for they will not        
interfere with each other1 and for want 
of sufficient members in the community  

it will be necessary4 ,if we could tell 
how many magistrates are necessary in   
every city1 and how many1 though not    
necessary1 it is yet proper to have1 we 
could then the better know how many     
different offices one might assign to   
one magistrate4 ,it is also necessary to
 know what tribunals in different places
 should have different things under     
their jurisdiction1 and also what things
 should always come under the cognisance
 of the same magistrate2 as1 for        
instance1 decency of manners1 shall the 
clerk of the market take cognisance of  
that if the cause arises in the market1 
and another magistrate in another place1
 or the same magistrate everywhere3 or  
shall there be a distinction made of the
 fact1 or the parties8 as1 for instance1
 in decency of manners1 shall it be one 
cause when it relates to a man1 another 
when it relates to a woman8  ,in        
different states shall the magistrates  
be different or the same8 ,i mean1      
whether in a democracy1 an oligarchy1 an

 aristocracy1 and a monarchy1 the same  
persons shall have the same power8 or   
shall it vary according to the different
 formation of the government8 as in an  
aristocracy the offices of the state are
 allotted to those who are well         
educated2 in an oligarchy to those who  
are rich2 in a democracy to the freemen8
 ,or shall the magistrates differ as the
 communities differ8 ,for it may happen 
that the very same may be sometimes     
proper1 sometimes otherwise3 in this    
state it may be necessary that the      
magistrate have great powers1 in that   
but small4 ,there are also certain      
magistrates peculiar to certain         
states--as the pre-advisers are not     
proper in a democracy1 but a senate is2 
for one such order is necessary1 whose  
business shall be to consider beforehand
 and prepare those bills which shall be 
brought before the people that they may 
have leisure to attend to their own     
affairs2 and when these are few in      
number the state inclines to an         

oligarchy4 ,the pre-advisers indeed must
 always be few for they are peculiar to 
an oligarchy3 and where there are both  
these offices in the same state1 the    
pre-adviser's is superior to the        
senator's1 the one having only a        
democratical power1 the other an        
oligarchical3 and indeed the #acjj;a    
power of the senate is lost in those    
democracies1 in which the people1       
meeting in one public assembly1 take all
 the business into their own hands2 and 
this is likely to happen either when the
 community in general are in easy       
circumstances1 or when they are paid for
 their attendance2 for they are then at 
leisure often to meet together and      
determine everything for themselves4 ,a 
magistrate whose business is to control 
the manners of the boys1 or women1 or   
who takes any department similar to     
this1 is to be found in an aristocracy1 
not in a democracy2 for who can forbid  
the wives of the poor from appearing in 
public8 neither is such a one to be met 

with in an oligarchy2 for the women     
there are too delicate to bear control4 
,and thus much for this subject4 ,let us
 endeavour to treat at large of the     
establishment of magistrates1 beginning 
from first principles4 ,now1 they differ
 from each other in three ways1 from    
which1 blended together1 all the        
varieties which can be imagined arise4  
,the first of these differences is in   
those who appoint the magistrates1 the  
second consists in those who are        
appointed1 the third in the mode of     
appointment2 and each of these three    
differ in three manners2 for either all 
the citizens may appoint collectively1  
or some out of their whole body1 or some
 out of a particular order in it1       
according to fortune1 family1 or virtue1
 or some other rule 7as at ,megara1     
where the right of election was amongst 
those who had returned together to their
 country1 and had reinstated themselves 
by force of arms7 and this either by    
vote or lot4 ,again1 these several modes

 may be differently formed together1 as 
some magistrates may be chosen by part  
of the community1 others by the whole2  
some out of part1 others out of the     
whole2 some by vote1 others by lot3 and 
each of these different modes admit of a
 four-fold subdivision2 for either all  
may elect all by vote or by lot2 and    
when all elect1 they may either proceed 
without any distinction1 or they may    
elect by a certain division of tribes1  
wards1 or companies1 till they have gone
 through the whole community3 and some  
magistrates may be elected one way1 and 
others another4 ,again1 if some         
magistrates are elected either by vote  
or lot of all the citizens1 or by the   
vote of some and the lot of some1 or    
some one way and some another2 that is  
to say1 some by the vote of all1 others 
by the lot of all1 there will then be   
twelve different methods of electing the
 magistrates1 without blending the two  
together4 ,of these there are two       
adapted to a democracy2 namely1 to have 

all the magistrates chosen out of all   
the people1 either by vote or lot1 or   
both2 that is to say1 some of them by   
lot1 some by vote4 ,in a free state the 
whole community should not elect at the 
same time1 but some out of the whole1 or
 out of some particular rank2 and this  
either by lot1 or vote1 or both3 and    
they should elect either out of the     
whole community1 or out of some         
particular persons in it1 and this both 
by lot and vote4 ,in an oligarchy it is 
proper to choose some magistrates out of
 the whole body of the citizens1 some by
 vote1 some by lot1 others by both3 by  
lot is most correspondent to that form  
of government4 ,in a free aristocracy1  
some magistrates #acjj;b should be      
chosen out of the community in general1 
others out of a particular rank1 or     
these by choice1 those by lot4 ,in a    
pure oligarchy1 the magistrates should  
be chosen out of certain ranks1 and by  
certain persons1 and some of those by   
lot1 others by both methods2 but to     

choose them out of the whole community  
is not correspondent to the nature of   
this government4 ,it is proper in an    
aristocracy for the whole community to  
elect their magistrates out of          
particular persons1 and this by vote4   
,these then are all the different ways  
of electing of magistrates2 and they    
have been allotted according to the     
nature of the different communities2 but
 what mode of proceeding is proper for  
different communities1 or how the       
offices ought to be established1 or with
 what powers shall be particularly      
explained4 ,i mean by the powers of a   
magistrate1 what should be his          
particular province1 as the management  
of the finances or the laws of the      
state2 for different magistrates have   
different powers1 as that of the general
 of the army differs from the clerk of  
the market4     ,,chapter ,,xvi   ,of   
the three parts of which a government is
 formed1 we now come to consider the    
judicial2 and this also we shall divide 

in the same manner as we did the        
magisterial1 into three parts4 ,of whom 
the judges shall consist1 and for what  
causes1 and how4 ,when ,i say of whom1  
,i mean whether they shall be the whole 
people1 or some particulars2 by for what
 causes ,i mean1 how many different     
courts shall be appointed2 by how1      
whether they shall be elected by vote or
 lot4 ,let us first determine how many  
different courts there ought to be4 ,now
 these are eight4 ,the first of these is
 the court of inspection over the       
behaviour of the magistrates when they  
have quitted their office2 the second is
 to punish those who have injured the   
public2 the third is to take cognisance 
of those causes in which the state is a 
party2 the fourth is to decide between  
magistrates and private persons1 who    
appeal from a fine laid upon them2 the  
fifth is to determine disputes which may
 arise concerning contracts of great    
value2 the sixth is to judge between    
foreigners1 and of murders1 of which    

there are different species2 and these  
may all be tried by the same judges or  
by different ones2 for there are murders
 of malice prepense and of              
chance-medley2 there is also justifiable
 homicide1 where the fact is admitted1  
and the legality of it disputed4  ,there
 is also another court called at ,athens
 the ,court of ,phreattae1 which        
determines points relating to a murder  
committed by one who has run away1 to   
decide whether he shall return2 though  
such an affair happens but seldom1 and  
in very large cities2 the seventh1 to   
determine causes wherein strangers are  
concerned1 and this whether they are    
between stranger and stranger or between
 a stranger and a citizen4 ,the eighth  
and last is for small actions1 from one 
to five drachma's1 or a little more2 for
 these ought also to be legally         
determined1 but not to be brought before
 the whole body of the judges4 ,but     
without entering into any particulars   
concerning actions for murder1 and those

 wherein strangers are the parties1 let 
us particularly treat of those courts   
which have the jurisdiction of those    
matters which more particularly relate  
to the affairs of the community and     
which if not well conducted occasion    
seditions and commotions in the state4  
,now1 of necessity1 either all persons  
must have a right to judge of all these 
different causes1 appointed for that    
purpose1 either by vote or lot1 or all  
of all1 some of them by vote1 and others
 by lot1 or in some causes by vote1 in  
others by lot4 ,thus there will be four 
sorts of judges4 ,there #acja;a will be 
just the same number also if they are   
chosen out of part of the people only2  
for either all the judges must be chosen
 out of that part either by vote or lot1
 or some by lot and some by vote1 or the
 judges in particular causes must be    
chosen some by vote1 others by lot2 by  
which means there will be the same      
number of them also as was mentioned4   
,besides1 different judges may be joined

 together2 ,i mean those who are chosen 
out of the whole people or part of them 
or both2 so that all three may sit      
together in the same court1 and this    
either by vote1 lot1 or both4 ,and thus 
much for the different sorts of judges4 
,of these appointments that which admits
 all the community to be judges in all  
causes is most suitable to a democracy2 
the second1 which appoints that certain 
persons shall judge all causes1 to an   
oligarchy2 the third1 which appoints the
 whole community to be judges in some   
causes1 but particular persons in       
others1 to an aristocracy or free state4
     ,,book ,v     ,,chapter ,i   ,we   
have now gone through those particulars 
we proposed to speak of2 it remains that
 we next consider from what causes and  
how alterations in government arise1 and
 of what nature they are1 and to what   
the destruction of each state is owing2 
and also to what form any form of polity
 is most likely to shift into1 and what 
are the means to be used for the general

 preservation of governments1 as well as
 what are applicable to any particular  
state2 and also of the remedies which   
are to be applied either to all in      
general1 or to any one considered       
separately1 when they are in a state of 
corruption3 and here we ought first to  
lay down this principle1 that there are 
many governments1 all of which approve  
of what is just and what is analogically
 equal2 and yet have failed from        
attaining thereunto1 as we have already 
mentioned2 thus democracies have arisen 
from supposing that those who are equal 
in one thing are so in every other      
circumstance2 as1 because they are equal
 in liberty1 they are equal in          
everything else2 and oligarchies1 from  
supposing that those who are unequal in 
one thing are unequal in all2 that when 
men are so in point of fortune1 that    
inequality extends to everything else4  
,hence it follows1 that those who in    
some respects are equal with others     
think it right to endeavour to partake  

of an equality with them in everything2 
and those who are superior to others    
endeavour to get still more2 and it is  
this more which is the inequality3 thus 
most states1 though they have some      
notion of what is just1 yet are almost  
totally wrong2 and1 upon this account1  
when either party has not that share in 
the administration which answers to his 
expectations1 he becomes seditious3 but 
those who of all others have the        
greatest right to be so are the last    
that are2 namely1 those who excel in    
virtue2 for they alone can be called    
generally superior4 ,there are1 too1    
some persons of distinguished families  
who1 because they are so1 disdain to be 
on an equality with others1 for those   
esteem themselves noble who boast of    
their ancestors' merit and fortune3     
these1 to speak truth1 are the origin   
and fountain from whence seditions      
arise4 ,the alterations which men may   
propose to make in governments are two2 
for either they may change the state    

already established into some other1 as 
when they propose to erect an oligarchy 
where there is a democracy2 or a        
democracy1 or free state1 where there is
 an oligarchy1 or an aristocracy from   
these1 or those from that2 or else1 when
 they have no objection to the          
established government1 which they like 
very well1 but choose to have the sole  
management in it themselves2 either in  
the hands of a few or one only4 ,they   
will also raise commotions concerning   
the degree in which they would have the 
established power2 as if1 for instance1 
the government is an oligarchy1 to have 
it more purely so1 and in the same      
manner if it is a democracy1 or else to 
have it less so2 and1 in like manner1   
whatever may be the nature of the       
government1 either to extend or contract
 its powers2 or else to make some       
alterations in some parts of it2 as to  
establish or abolish a particular       
magistracy1 as some persons say         
,lysander endeavoured to abolish the    

kingly power in ,sparta2 and ,pausanias 
that of the ephori4 ,thus in ,epidamnus 
there was an alteration in one part of  
the constitution1 for instead of the    
philarchi they established a senate4 ,it
 is also necessary for all the          
magistrates at ,athens2 to attend in the
 court of the ,helisea when any new     
magistrate is created3 the power of the 
archon also in that state partakes of   
the nature of an oligarchy3 inequality  
is always the occasion of sedition1 but 
not when those who are unequal are      
treated in a different manner           
correspondent to that inequality4 ,thus 
kingly power is unequal when exercised  
over equals4 ,upon the whole1 those who 
aim after an equality are the cause of  
seditions4 ,equality is twofold1 either 
in number or value4 ,equality in number 
is when two things contain the same     
parts or the same quantity2 equality in 
value is by proportion as two exceeds   
one1 and three two by the same          
number-thus by proportion four exceeds  

two1 and two one in the same degree1 for
 two is the same part of four that one  
is of two2 that is to say1 half4 ,now1  
all agree in what is absolutely and     
simply just2 but1 as we have already    
said they dispute concerning            
proportionate value2 for some persons1  
if they are equal in one respect1 think 
themselves equal in all2 others1 if they
 are superior in one thing1 think they  
may claim the superiority in all2 from  
whence chiefly arise two sorts of       
governments1 a democracy and an         
oligarchy2 for nobility and virtue are  
to be found only #acjb;a amongst a few2 
the contrary amongst the many2 there    
being in no place a hundred of the first
 to be met with1 but enough of the last 
everywhere4 ,but to establish a         
government entirely upon either of these
 equalities is wrong1 and this the      
example of those so established makes   
evident1 for none of them have been     
stable2 and for this reason1 that it is 
impossible that whatever is wrong at the

 first and in its principles should not 
at last meet with a bad end3 for which  
reason in some things an equality of    
numbers ought to take place1 in others  
an equality in value4 ,however1 a       
democracy is safer and less liable to   
sedition than an oligarchy2 for in this 
latter it may arise from two causes1 for
 either the few in power may conspire   
against each other or against the       
people2 but in a democracy only one2    
namely1 against the few who aim at      
exclusive power2 but there is no        
instance worth speaking of1 of a        
sedition of the people against          
themselves4 ,moreover1 a government     
composed of men of moderate fortunes    
comes much nearer to a democracy than an
 oligarchy1 and is the safest of all    
such states4     ,,chapter ,,ii   ,since
 we are inquiring into the causes of    
seditions and revolutions in            
governments1 we must begin entirely with
 the first principles from whence they  
arise4 ,now these1 so to speak1 are     

nearly three in number2 which we must   
first distinguish in general from each  
other1 and endeavour to show in what    
situation people are who begin a        
sedition2 and for what causes2 and      
thirdly1 what are the beginnings of     
political troubles and mutual quarrels  
with each other4 ,now that cause which  
of all others most universally inclines 
men to desire to bring about a change in
 government is that which ,i have       
already mentioned2 for those who aim at 
equality will be ever ready for         
sedition1 if they see those whom they   
esteem their equals possess more than   
they do1 as well as those also who are  
not content with equality but aim at    
superiority1 if they think that while   
they deserve more than1 they have only  
equal with1 or less than1 their         
inferiors4 ,now1 what they aim at may be
 either just or unjust2 just1 when those
 who are inferior are seditious1 that   
they may be equal2 unjust1 when those   
who are equal are so1 that they may be  

superior4 ,these1 then1 are the         
situations in which men will be         
seditious3 the causes for which they    
will be so are profit and honour2 and   
their contrary3 for1 to avoid dishonour 
or loss of fortune by mulcts1 either on 
their own account or their friends1 they
 will raise a commotion in the state4   
,the original causes which dispose men  
to the things which ,i have mentioned   
are1 taken in one manner1 seven in      
number1 in another they are more2 two of
 which are the same with those that have
 been already mentioned3 but influencing
 in a different manner2 for profit and  
honour sharpen men against each other2  
not to get the possession of them for   
themselves 7which was what ,i just now  
supposed71 but when they see others1    
some justly1 others #acjb;b unjustly1   
engrossing them4 ,the other causes are  
haughtiness1 fear1 eminence1 contempt1  
disproportionate increase in some part  
of the state4 ,there are also other     
things which in a different manner will 

occasion revolutions in governments2 as 
election intrigues1 neglect1 want of    
numbers1 a too great dissimilarity of   
circumstances4     ,,chapter ,,iii      
,what influence ill-treatment and profit
 have for this purpose1 and how they may
 be the causes of sedition1 is almost   
self-evident2 for when the magistrates  
are haughty and endeavour to make       
greater profits than their office gives 
them1 they not only occasion seditions  
amongst each other1 but against the     
state also who gave them their power2   
and this their avarice has two objects1 
either private property or the property 
of the state4 ,what influence honours   
have1 and how they may occasion         
sedition1 is evident enough2 for those  
who are themselves unhonoured while they
 see others honoured1 will be ready for 
any disturbance3 and these things are   
done unjustly when any one is either    
honoured or discarded contrary to their 
deserts1 justly when they are according 
to them4 ,excessive honours are also a  

cause of sedition when one person or    
more are greater than the state and the 
power of the government can permit2 for 
then a monarchy or a dynasty is usually 
established3 on which account the       
ostracism was introduced in some places1
 as at ,argos and ,athens3 though it is 
better to guard against such excesses in
 the founding of a state1 than when they
 have been permitted to take place1 to  
correct them afterward4 ,those who have 
been guilty of crimes will be the cause 
of sedition1 through fear of punishment2
 as will those also who expect an       
injury1 that they may prevent it2 as was
 the case at ,rhodes1 when the nobles   
conspired against the people on account 
of the decrees they expected would pass 
against them4 ,contempt also is a cause 
of sedition and conspiracies2 as in     
oligarchies1 where there are many who   
have no share in the administration4    
,the rich also even in democracies1     
despising the disorder and anarchy which
 will arise1 hope to better themselves  

by the same means which happened at     
,thebes after the battle of ,oenophyta1 
where1 in consequence of bad            
administration1 the democracy was       
destroyed2 as it was at ,megara1 where  
the power of the people was lost through
 anarchy and disorder2 the same thing   
happened at ,syracuse before the tyranny
 of ,gelon2 and at ,rhodes there was the
 same sedition before the popular       
government was overthrown4 ,revolutions 
in state will also arise from a         
disproportionate increase2 for as the   
body consists of many parts1 it ought to
 increase proportion-ably to preserve   
its symmetry1 which would otherwise be  
destroyed2 as if the foot was to be four
 cubits long1 and the rest of the body  
but two palms2 it might otherwise       
#acjc;a be changed into an animal of a  
different form1 if it increase beyond   
proportion not only in quantity1 but    
also in disposition of parts2 so also a 
city consists of parts1 some of which   
may often increase without notice1 as   

the number of poor in democracies and   
free states4 ,they will also sometimes  
happen by accident1 as at ,tarentum1 a  
little after the ,median war1 where so  
many of the nobles were killed in a     
battle by the lapygi1 that from a free  
state the government was turned into a  
democracy2 and at ,argos1 where so many 
of the citizens were killed by          
,cleomenes the ,spartan1 that they were 
obliged to admit several husbandmen to  
the freedom of the state3 and at        
,athens1 through the unfortunate event  
of the infantry battles1 the number of  
the nobles was reduced by the soldiers  
being chosen from the list of citizens  
in the ,lacedaemonian wars4 ,revolutions
 also sometimes take place in a         
democracy1 though seldomer2 for where   
the rich grow numerous or properties    
increase1 they become oligarchies or    
dynasties4 ,governments also sometimes  
alter without seditions by a combination
 of the meaner people2 as at ,hersea3   
for which purpose they changed the mode 

of election from votes to lots1 and thus
 got themselves chosen3 and by          
negligence1 as when the citizens admit  
those who are not friends to the        
constitution into the chief offices of  
the state1 which happened at ,orus1 when
 the oligarchy of the archons was put an
 end to at the election of              
,heracleodorus1 who changed that form of
 government into a democratic free      
state4 ,by little and little1 ,i mean by
 this1 that very often great alterations
 silently take place in the form of     
government from people's overlooking    
small matters2 as at ,ambracia1 where   
the census was originally small1 but at 
last became nothing at all1 as if a     
little and nothing at all were nearly or
 entirely alike4 ,that state also is    
liable to seditions which is composed of
 different nations1 till their          
differences are blended together and    
undistinguishable2 for as a city cannot 
be composed of every multitude1 so      
neither can it in every given time2 for 

which reason all those republics which  
have hitherto been originally composed  
of different people or afterwards       
admitted their neighbours to the freedom
 of their city1 have been most liable to
 revolutions2 as when the ,achaeans     
joined with the ,traezenians in founding
 ,sybaris2 for soon after1 growing more 
powerful than the ,traezenians1 they    
expelled them from the city2 from whence
 came the proverb of ,sybarite          
wickedness3 and again1 disputes from a  
like cause happened at ,thurium between 
the ,sybarites and those who had joined 
with them in building the city2 for they
 assuming upon these1 on account of the 
country being their own1 were driven    
out4 ,and at ,byzantium the new         
citizens1 being detected in plots       
against the state1 were driven out of   
the city by force of arms4 ,the         
,antisseans also1 having taken in those 
who were banished from ,chios1          
afterwards did the same thing2 and also 
the ,zancleans1 after having taken in   

the people of ,samos4 ,the              
,appolloniats1 in the ,euxine ,sea1     
having admitted their sojourners to the 
freedom of their city1 were troubled    
with seditions3 and the ,syracusians1   
after the expulsion of their tyrants1   
having enrolled #acjc;b strangers and   
mercenaries amongst their citizens1     
quarrelled with each other and came to  
an open rupture3 and the people of      
,amphipolis1 having taken in a colony of
 ,chalcidians1 were the greater part of 
them driven out of the city by them4    
,many persons occasion seditions in     
oligarchies because they think          
themselves ill-used in not sharing the  
honours of the state with their equals1 
as ,i have already mentioned2 but in    
democracies the principal people do the 
same because they have not more than an 
equal share with others who are not     
equal to them4 ,the situation of the    
place will also sometimes occasion      
disturbances in the state when the      
ground is not well adapted for one city2

 as at ,clazomene1 where the people who 
lived in that part of the town called   
,chytrum quarrelled with them who lived 
in the island1 and the ,colophonians    
with the ,notians4 ,at ,athens too the  
disposition of the citizens is not the  
same1 for those who live in the ,piraeus
 are more attached to a popular         
government than those who live in the   
city properly so called2 for as the     
interposition of a rivulet1 however     
small1 will occasion the line of the    
phalanx to fluctuate1 so any trifling   
disagreement will be the cause of       
seditions2 but they will not so soon    
flow from anything else as from the     
disagreement between virtue and vice1   
and next to that between poverty and    
riches1 and so on in order1 one cause   
having more influence than another2 one 
of which that ,i last mentioned4        
,,chapter ,,iv   ,but seditions in      
government do not arise for little      
things1 but from them2 for their        
immediate cause is something of moment4 

,now1 trifling quarrels are attended    
with the greatest consequences when they
 arise between persons of the first     
distinction in the state1 as was the    
case with the ,syracusians in a remote  
period2 for a revolution in the         
government was brought about by a       
quarrel between two young men who were  
in office1 upon a love affair2 for one  
of them being absent1 the other seduced 
his mistress2 he in his turn1 offended  
with this1 persuaded his friend's wife  
to come and live with him2 and upon this
 the whole city took part either with   
the one or the other1 and the government
 was overturned3 therefore every one at 
the beginning of such disputes ought to 
take care to avoid the consequences2 and
 to smother up all quarrels which may   
happen to arise amongst those in power1 
for the mischief lies in the beginning2 
for the beginning is said to be half of 
the business1 so that what was then but 
a little fault will be found afterwards 
to bear its full proportion to what     

follows4 ,moreover1 disputes between men
 of note involve the whole city in their
 consequences2 in ,hestiaea1 after the  
,median war3 two brothers having a      
dispute about their paternal estate2 he 
who was the poorer1 from the other's    
having concealed part of the effects1   
and some money which his father had     
found1 engaged the popular party on his 
side1 while the other1 who was rich1 the
 men of fashion4 ,and at ,delphos1      
#acjd;a a quarrel about a wedding was   
the beginning of all the seditions that 
afterwards arose amongst them2 for the  
bridegroom1 being terrified by some     
unlucky omen upon waiting upon the      
bride1 went away without marrying her2  
which her relations resenting1 contrived
 secretly to convey some sacred money   
into his pocket while he was            
sacrificing1 and then killed him as an  
impious person4 ,at ,mitylene also1 a   
dispute1 which arose concerning a right 
of heritage1 was the beginning of great 
evils1 and a war with the ,athenians1 in

 which ,paches took their city1 for     
,timophanes1 a man of fortune1 leaving  
two daughters1 ,doxander1 who was       
circumvented in procuring them in       
marriage for his two sons1 began a      
sedition1 and excited the ,athenians to 
attack them1 being the host of that     
state4 ,there was also a dispute at     
,phocea1 concerning a right of          
inheritance1 between ,mnasis1 the father
 of ,mnasis1 and ,euthucrates1 the      
father of ,onomarchus1 which brought on 
the ,phoceans the sacred war4 ,the      
government too of ,epidamnus was changed
 from a quarrel that arose from an      
intended marriage2 for a certain man    
having contracted his daughter in       
marriage1 the father of the young person
 to whom she was contracted1 being      
archon1 punishes him1 upon which account
 he1 resenting the affront1 associated  
himself with those who were excluded    
from any share in the government1 and   
brought about a revolution4 ,a          
government may be changed either into an

 oligarchy1 democracy1 or a free state2 
when the magistrates1 or any part of the
 city acquire great credit1 or are      
increased in power1 as the court of     
,areopagus at ,athens1 having procured  
great credit during the ,median war1    
added firmness to their administration2 
and1 on the other hand1 the maritime    
force1 composed of the commonalty1      
having gained the victory at ,salamis1  
by their power at sea1 got the lead in  
the state1 and strengthened the popular 
party3 and at ,argos1 the nobles1 having
 gained great credit by the battle of   
,mantinea against the ,lacedaemonians1  
endeavoured to dissolve the democracy4  
,and at ,syracuse1 the victory in their 
war with the ,athenians being owing to  
the common people1 they changed their   
free state into a democracy3 and at     
,chalcis1 the people having taken off   
the tyrant ,phocis1 together with the   
nobles1 immediately seized the          
government3 and at ,ambracia also the   
people1 having expelled the tyrant      

,periander1 with his party1 placed the  
supreme power in themselves4 ,and this  
in general ought to be known1 that      
whosoever has been the occasion of a    
state being powerful1 whether private   
persons1 or magistrates1 a certain      
tribe1 or any particular part of the    
citizens1 or the multitude1 be they who 
they will1 will be the cause of disputes
 in the state4 ,for either some persons1
 who envy them the honours they have    
acquired1 will begin to be seditious1 or
 they1 on account of the dignity they   
have acquired1 will not be content with 
their former equality4 ,a state is also 
liable to commotions when those parts of
 it which seem to be opposite to each   
other approach to an #acjd;b equality1  
as the rich and the common people2 so   
that the part which is between them both
 is either nothing at all1 or too little
 to be noticed2 for if one party is so  
much more powerful than the other1 as to
 be evidently stronger1 that other will 
not be willing to hazard the danger3 for

 which reason those who are superior in 
excellence and virtue will never be the 
cause of seditions2 for they will be too
 few for that purpose when compared to  
the many4 ,in general1 the beginning and
 the causes of seditions in all states  
are such as ,i have now described1 and  
revolutions therein are brought about in
 two ways1 either by violence or fraud3 
if by violence1 either at first by      
compelling them to submit to the change 
when it is made4 ,it may also be brought
 about by fraud in two different ways1  
either when the people1 being at first  
deceived1 willingly consent to an       
alteration in their government1 and are 
afterwards obliged by force to abide by 
it3 as1 for instance1 when the four     
hundred imposed upon the people by      
telling them that the king of ,persia   
would supply them with money for the war
 against the ,lacedaemonians2 and after 
they had been guilty of this falsity1   
they endeavoured to keep possession of  
the supreme power2 or when they are at  

first persuaded and afterwards consent  
to be governed3 and by one of these     
methods which ,i have mentioned are all 
revolutions in governments brought      
about4     ,,chapter ,v   ,we ought now 
to inquire into those events which will 
arise from these causes in every species
 of government4 ,democracies will be    
most subject to revolutions from the    
dishonesty of their demagogues2 for     
partly1 by informing against men of     
property1 they induce them to join      
together through self-defence1 for a    
common fear will make the greatest      
enemies unite2 and partly by setting the
 common people against them3 and this is
 what any one may continually see       
practised in many states4 ,in the island
 of ,cos1 for instance1 the democracy   
was subverted by the wickedness of the  
demagogues1 for the nobles entered into 
a combination with each other4 ,and at  
,rhodes the demagogues1 by distributing 
of bribes1 prevented the people from    
paying the trierarchs what was owing to 

them1 who were obliged by the number of 
actions they were harassed with to      
conspire together and destroy the       
popular state4 ,the same thing was      
brought about at ,heraclea1 soon after  
the settlement of the city1 by the same 
persons2 for the citizens of note1 being
 ill treated by them1 quitted the city1 
but afterwards joining together they    
returned and overthrew the popular      
state4 ,just in the same manner the     
democracy was destroyed in ,megara2 for 
there the demagogues1 to procure money  
by confiscations1 drove out the nobles1 
till the number of those who were       
banished was considerable1 who1 #acje;a 
returning1 got the better of the people 
in a battle1 and established an         
oligarchy4 ,the like happened at ,cume1 
during the time of the democracy1 which 
,thrasymachus destroyed2 and whoever    
considers what has happened in other    
states may perceive the same revolutions
 to have arisen from the same causes4   
,the demagogues1 to curry favour with   

the people1 drive the nobles to conspire
 together1 either by dividing their     
estates1 or obliging them to spend them 
on public services1 or by banishing     
them1 that they may confiscate the      
fortunes of the wealthy4 ,in former     
times1 when the same person was both    
demagogue and general1 the democracies  
were changed into tyrannies2 and indeed 
most of the ancient tyrannies arose from
 those states3 a reason for which then  
subsisted1 but not now2 for at that time
 the demagogues were of the soldiery2   
for they were not then powerful by their
 eloquence2 but1 now the art of oratory 
is cultivated1 the able speakers are at 
present the demagogues2 but1 as they are
 unqualified to act in a military       
capacity1 they cannot impose themselves 
on the people as tyrants1 if we except  
in one or two trifling instances4       
,formerly1 too1 tyrannies were more     
common than now1 on account of the very 
extensive powers with which some        
magistrates were entrusted3 as the      

prytanes at ,miletus2 for they were     
supreme in many things of the last      
consequence2 and also because at that   
time the cities were not of that very   
great extent1 the people in general     
living in the country1 and being        
employed in husbandry1 which gave them1 
who took the lead in public affairs1 an 
opportunity1 if they had a turn for war1
 to make themselves tyrants2 which they 
all did when they had gained the        
confidence of the people2 and this      
confidence was their hatred to the rich4
 ,this was the case of ,pisistratus at  
,athens1 when he opposed the ,pediaci3  
and of ,theagenes in ,megara1 who       
slaughtered the cattle belonging to the 
rich1 after he had seized those who kept
 them by the riverside4 ,dionysius also1
 for accusing ,daphnseus and the rich1  
was thought worthy of being raised to a 
tyranny1 from the confidence which the  
people had of his being a popular man in
 consequence of these enmities4 ,a      
government shall also alter from its    

ancient and approved democratic form    
into one entirely new1 if there is no   
census to regulate the election of      
magistrates2 for1 as the election is    
with the people1 the demagogues who are 
desirous of being in office1 to flatter 
them1 will endeavour with all their     
power to make the people superior even  
to the laws4 ,to prevent this entirely1 
or at least in a great measure1 the     
magistrates should be elected by the    
tribes1 and not by the people at large4 
,these are nearly the revolutions to    
which democracies are liable1 and also  
the causes from whence they arise4      
,,chapter ,,vi   ,there are two things  
which of all others most evidently      
occasion a revolution in an oligarchy2  
one is1 when the people are ill used1   
for then every individual is ripe for   
#acje;b sedition2 more particularly if  
one of the oligarchy should happen to be
 their leader2 as ,lygdamis1 at ,naxus1 
who was afterwards tyrant of that       
island4 ,seditions also which arise from

 different causes will differ from each 
other2 for sometimes a revolution is    
brought about by the rich who have no   
share in the administration1 which is in
 the hands of a very few indeed3 and    
this happened at ,massilia1 ,ister1     
,heraclea1 and other cities2 for those  
who had no share in the government      
ceased not to raise disputes till they  
were admitted to it3 first the elder    
brothers1 and then the younger also3 for
 in some places the father and son are  
never in office at the same time2 in    
others the elder and younger brother3   
and where this is observed the oligarchy
 partakes something of a free state4 ,at
 ,ister it was changed into a democracy2
 in ,heraclea1 instead of being in the  
hands of a few1 it consisted of six     
hundred4 ,at ,cnidus the oligarchy was  
destroyed by the nobles quarrelling with
 each other1 because the government was 
in the hands of so few3 for there1 as we
 have just mentioned1 if the father was 
in office1 the son could not2 or1 if    

there were many brothers1 the eldest    
only2 for the people1 taking advantage  
of their disputes1 elected one of the   
nobles for their general1 and got the   
victory3 for where there are seditions  
government is weak4 ,and formerly at    
,erithria1 during the oligarchy of the  
,basilides1 although the state          
flourished greatly under their excellent
 management1 yet because the people were
 displeased that the power should be in 
the hands of so few1 they changed the   
government4 ,oligarchies also are       
subject to revolutions1 from those who  
are in office therein1 from the quarrels
 of the demagogues with each other4 ,the
 demagogues are of two sorts2 one who   
flatter the few when they are in power3 
for even these have their demagogues2   
such was ,charicles at ,athens1 who had 
great influence over the thirty2 and1 in
 the same manner1 ,phrynichus over the  
four hundred4 ,the others are those     
demagogues who have a share in the      
oligarchy1 and flatter the people3 such 

were the state-guardians at ,larissa1   
who flattered the people because they   
were elected by them4 ,and this will    
always happen in every oligarchy where  
the magistrates do not elect themselves1
 but are chosen out of men either of    
great fortune or certain ranks1 by the  
soldiers or by the people2 as was the   
custom at ,abydos4 ,and when the        
judicial department is not in the hands 
of the supreme power1 the demagogues1   
favouring the people in their causes1   
overturn the government2 which happened 
at ,heraclea in ,pontus3 and also when  
some desire to contract the power of the
 oligarchy into fewer hands2 for those  
who endeavour to support an equality are
 obliged to apply to the people for     
assistance4 ,an oligarchy is also       
subject to revolutions when the nobility
 spend their fortunes by luxury2 for    
such persons are desirous of            
innovations1 and either endeavour to be 
tyrants themselves or to support others 
in being so1 as #acjf;a ,hypparinus     

supported ,dionysius of ,syracuse4 ,and 
at ,amphipolis one ,cleotimus collected 
a colony of ,chalcidians1 and when they 
came set them to quarrel with the rich3 
and at ,a,egina a certain person who    
brought an action against ,chares       
attempted on that account to alter the  
government4 ,sometimes they will try to 
raise commotions1 sometimes they will   
rob the public1 and then quarrel with   
each other1 or else fight with those who
 endeavour to detect them2 which was the
 case at ,apollonia in ,pontus4 ,but if 
the members of an oligarchy agree among 
themselves the state is not very easily 
destroyed without some external force4  
,pharsalus is a proof of this1 where1   
though the place is small1 yet the      
citizens have great power1 from the     
prudent use they make of it4 ,an        
oligarchy also will be destroyed when   
they create another oligarchy under it2 
that is1 when the management of public  
affairs is in the hands of a few1 and   
not equally1 but when all of them do not

 partake of the supreme power1 as       
happened once at ,elis1 where the       
supreme power in general was in the     
hands of a very few out of whom a senate
 was chosen1 consisting but of ninety1  
who held their places for life2 and     
their mode of election was calculated to
 preserve the power amongst each other's
 families1 like the senators at         
,lacedaemon4 ,an oligarchy is liable to 
a revolution both in time of war and    
peace2 in war1 because through a        
distrust in the citizens the government 
is obliged to employ mercenary troops1  
and he to whom they give the command of 
the army will very often assume the     
tyranny1 as ,timophanes did at ,corinth2
 and if they appoint more than one      
general1 they will very probably        
establish a dynasty3 and sometimes1     
through fear of this1 they are forced to
 let the people in general have some    
share in the government1 because they   
are obliged to employ them4 ,in peace1  
from their want of confidence in each   

other1 they will entrust the            
guardianship of the state to mercenaries
 and their general1 who will be an      
arbiter between them1 and sometimes     
become master of both1 which happened at
 ,larissa1 when ,simos and the ,aleuadae
 had the chief power4 ,the same thing   
happened at ,abydos1 during the time of 
the political clubs1 of which ,iphiades'
 was one4 ,commotions also will happen  
in an oligarchy from one party's        
overbearing and insulting another1 or   
from their quarrelling about their      
law-suits or marriages4 ,how their      
marriages1 for instance1 will have that 
effect has been already shown3 and in   
,eretria1 ,diagoras destroyed the       
oligarchy of the knights upon the same  
account4 ,a sedition also arose at      
,heraclea1 from a certain person being  
condemned by the court2 and at ,thebes1 
in consequence of a man's being guilty  
of adultery2 #acjf;b the punishment     
indeed which ,eurytion suffered at      
,heraclea was just1 yet it was illegally

 executed3 as was that at ,thebes upon  
,archias2 for their enemies endeavoured 
to have them publicly bound in the      
pillory4 ,many revolutions also have    
been brought about in oligarchies by    
those who could not brook the despotism 
which those persons assumed who were in 
power1 as at ,cnidus and ,chios4        
,changes also may happen by accident in 
what we call a free state and in an     
oligarchy2 wheresoever the senators1    
judges1 and magistrates are chosen      
according to a certain census2 for it   
often happens that the highest census is
 fixed at first2 so that a few only     
could have a share in the government1 in
 an oligarchy1 or in a free state those 
of moderate fortunes only2 when the city
 grows rich1 through peace or some other
 happy cause1 it becomes so little that 
every one's fortune is equal to the     
census1 so that the whole community may 
partake of all the honours of           
government2 and this change sometimes   
happens by little and little1 and       

insensible approaches1 sometimes        
quicker4 ,these are the revolutions and 
seditions that arise in oligarchies1 and
 the causes to which they are owing3 and
 indeed both democracies and oligarchies
 sometimes alter1 not into governments  
of a contrary form1 but into those of   
the same government2 as1 for instance1  
from having the supreme power in the law
 to vest it in the ruling party1 or the 
contrariwise4     ,,chapter ,,vii       
,commotions also arise in aristocracies1
 from there being so few persons in     
power 7as we have already observed they 
do in oligarchies1 for in this          
particular an aristocracy is most near  
an oligarchy1 for in both these states  
the administration of public affairs is 
in the hands of a few2 not that this    
arises from the same cause in both1     
though herein they chiefly seem alike73 
and these will necessarily be most      
likely to happen when the generality of 
the people are high-spirited and think  
themselves equal to each other in merit2

 such were those at ,lacedasmon1 called 
the ,partheniae 7for these were1 as well
 as others1 descendants of citizens71   
who being detected in a conspiracy      
against the state1 were sent to found   
,tarentum4 ,they will happen also when  
some great men are disgraced by those   
who have received higher honours than   
themselves1 to whom they are no ways    
inferior in abilities1 as ,lysander by  
the kings3 or when an ambitious man     
cannot get into power1 as ,cinadon1 who1
 in the reign of ,agesilaus1 was chief  
in a conspiracy against the ,spartans3  
and also when some are too poor and     
others too rich1 which will most        
frequently happen in time of war2 as at 
,lacedaemon during the ,messenian war1  
which is proved by a poem of ,tyrtaeus1 
#acjg;a called ,eunomia2 for some       
persons being reduced thereby1 desired  
that the lands might be divided3 and    
also when some person of very high rank 
might still be higher if he could rule  
alone1 which seemed to be ,pausanias's  

intention at ,lacedaemon1 when he was   
their general in the ,median war1 and   
,anno's at ,carthage4 ,but free states  
and aristocracies are mostly destroyed  
from want of a fixed administration of  
public affairs2 the cause of which evil 
arises at first from want of a due      
mixture of the democratic and the       
oligarchic parts in a free state2 and in
 an aristocracy from the same causes1   
and also from virtue not being properly 
joined to power2 but chiefly from the   
two first1 ,i mean the undue mixture of 
the democratic and oligarchic parts2 for
 these two are what all free states     
endeavour to blend together1 and many of
 those which we call aristocracies1 in  
this particular these states differ from
 each other1 and on this account the one
 of them is less stable than the other1 
for that state which inclines most to an
 oligarchy is called an aristocracy1 and
 that which inclines most to a democracy
 is called a free state2 on which       
account this latter is more secure than 

the former1 for the wider the foundation
 the securer the building1 and it is    
ever best to live where equality        
prevails4 ,but the rich1 if the         
community gives them rank1 very often   
endeavour to insult and tyrannise over  
others4 ,on the whole1 whichever way a  
government inclines1 in that it will    
settle1 each party supporting their own4
 ,thus a free state will become a       
democracy2 an aristocracy an oligarchy2 
or the contrary1 an aristocracy may     
change into a democracy 7for the poor1  
if they think themselves injured1       
directly take part with the contrary    
side7 and a free state into an          
oligarchy4 ,the only firm state is that 
where every one enjoys that equality he 
has a right to and fully possesses what 
is his own4 ,and what ,i have been      
speaking of happened to the ,thurians2  
for the magistrates being elected       
according to a very high census1 it was 
altered to a lower1 and they were       
subdivided into more courts1 but in     

consequence of the nobles possessing all
 the land1 contrary to law2 the state   
was too much of an oligarchy1 which gave
 them an opportunity of encroaching     
greatly on the rest of the people2 but  
these1 after they had been well inured  
to war1 so far got the better of their  
guards as to expel every one out of the 
country who possessed more than he      
ought4 ,moreover1 as all aristocracies  
are free oligarchies1 the nobles therein
 endeavour to have rather too much      
power1 as at ,lacedaemon1 where property
 is now in the hands of a few1 and the  
nobles have too much liberty to do as   
they please and make such alliances as  
they please4 ,thus the city of the      
,locrians was ruined from an alliance   
with ,dionysius2 which state was neither
 a democracy nor well-tempered          
aristocracy4 ,but an aristocracy chiefly
 approaches to a secret change by its   
being destroyed by degrees1 as we       
#acjg;b have already said of all        
governments in general2 and this happens

 from the cause of the alteration being 
trifling2 for whenever anything which in
 the least regards the state is treated 
with contempt1 after that something     
else1 and this of a little more         
consequence1 will be more easily        
altered1 until the whole fabric of      
government is entirely subverted1 which 
happened in the government of ,thurium2 
for the law being that they should      
continue soldiers for five years1 some  
young men of a martial disposition1 who 
were in great esteem amongst their      
officers1 despising those who had the   
management of public affairs1 and       
imagining they could easily accomplish  
their intention1 first endeavoured to   
abolish this law1 with a view of having 
it lawful to continue the same person   
perpetually in the military1 perceiving 
that the people would readily appoint   
them4 ,upon this1 the magistrates who   
are called counselors first joined      
together with an intention to oppose it 
but were afterwards induced to agree to 

it1 from a belief that if that law was  
not repealed they would permit the      
management of all other public affairs  
to remain in their hands2 but           
afterwards1 when they endeavoured to    
restrain some fresh alterations that    
were making1 they found that they could 
do nothing1 for the whole form of       
government was altered into a dynasty of
 those who first introduced the         
innovations4 ,in short1 all governments 
are liable to be destroyed either from  
within or from without2 from without    
when they have for their neighbour a    
state whose policy is contrary to       
theirs1 and indeed if it has great power
 the same thing will happen if it is not
 their neighbour2 of which both the     
,athenians and the ,lacedaemonians are a
 proof2 for the one1 when conquerors    
everywhere destroyed the oligarchies2   
the other the democracies4 ,these are   
the chief causes of revolutions and     
dissensions in governments4             
,,chapter ,,viii   ,we are now to       

consider upon what the preservation of  
governments in general and of each state
 in particular depends2 and1 in the     
first place1 it is evident that if we   
are right in the causes we have assigned
 for their destruction1 we know also the
 means of their preservation2 for things
 contrary produce contraries3 but       
destruction and preservation are        
contrary to each other4 ,in             
well-tempered governments it requires as
 much care as anything whatsoever1 that 
nothing be done contrary to law3 and    
this ought chiefly to be attended to in 
matters of small consequence2 for an    
illegality that approaches insensibly1  
approaches secretly1 as in a family     
small expenses continually repeated     
consume a man's income2 for the         
understanding is deceived thereby1 as by
 this false argument2 if every part is  
little1 then the whole is little3 now1  
this in one sense is true1 in another is
 false1 for the whole and all the parts 
together are large1 though made up of   

small parts4 ,the first therefore of    
anything is what the state ought to     
guard against4 ,in the next place1 no   
credit ought to be given to those who   
endeavour to deceive the people with    
false pretences2 for they will be       
#acjh;a confuted by facts4 ,the         
different ways in which they will       
attempt to do this have been already    
mentioned4 ,you may often perceive both 
aristocracies and oligarchies continuing
 firm1 not from the stability of their  
forms of government1 but from the wise  
conduct of the magistrates1 both towards
 those who have a part in the management
 of public affairs1 and those also who  
have not3 towards those who have not1 by
 never injuring them2 and also          
introducing those who are of most       
consequence amongst them into office2   
nor disgracing those who are desirous of
 honour2 or encroaching on the property 
of individuals2 towards those who have1 
by behaving to each other upon an       
equality2 for that equality which the   

favourers of a democracy desire to have 
established in the state is not only    
just1 but convenient also1 amongst those
 who are of the same rank3 for which    
reason1 if the administration is in the 
hands of many1 those rules which are    
established in democracies will be very 
useful2 as to let no one continue in    
office longer than six months3 that all 
those who are of the same rank may have 
their turn2 for between these there is a
 sort of democracy3 for which reason    
demagogues are most likely to arise up  
amongst them1 as we have already        
mentioned3 besides1 by this means both  
aristocracies and democracies will be   
the less liable to be corrupted into    
dynasties1 because it will not be so    
easy for those who are magistrates for a
 little to do as much mischief as they  
could in a long time3 for it is from    
hence that tyrannies arise in           
democracies and oligarchies2 for either 
those who are most powerful in each     
state establish a tyranny1 as the       

demagogues in the one1 the dynasties in 
the other1 or the chief magistrates who 
have been long in power4 ,governments   
are sometimes preserved not only by     
having the means of their corruption at 
a great distance1 but also by its being 
very near them2 for those who are       
alarmed at some impending evil keep a   
stricter hand over the state2 for which 
reason it is necessary for those who    
have the guardianship of the            
constitution to be able to awaken the   
fears of the people1 that they may      
preserve it1 and not like a night-guard 
to be remiss in protecting the state1   
but to make the distant danger appear at
 hand4 ,great care ought also to be used
 to endeavour to restrain the quarrels  
and disputes of the nobles by laws1 as  
well as to prevent those who are not    
already engaged in them from taking a   
part therein2 for to perceive an evil at
 its very first approach is not the lot 
of every one1 but of the politician4 ,to
 prevent any alteration taking place in 

an oligarchy or free state on account of
 the census1 if that happens to continue
 the same while the quantity of money is
 increased1 it will be useful to take a 
general account of the whole amount of  
it in former times1 to compare it with  
the present1 and to do this every year  
in those cities where the census is     
yearly1 #acjh;b in larger communities   
once in three or five years2 and if the 
whole should be found much larger or    
much less than it was at the time when  
the census was first established in the 
state1 let there be a law either to     
extend or contract it1 doing both these 
according to its increase or decrease2  
if it increases making the census       
larger1 if it decreases smaller3 and if 
this latter is not done in oligarchies  
and free states1 you will have a dynasty
 arise in the one1 an oligarchy in the  
other3 if the former is not1 free states
 will be changed into democracies1 and  
oligarchies into free states or         
democracies4 ,it is a general maxim in  

democracies1 oligarchies1 monarchies1   
and indeed in all governments1 not to   
let any one acquire a rank far superior 
to the rest of the community1 but rather
 to endeavour to confer moderate honours
 for a continuance than great ones for a
 short time2 for these latter spoil men1
 for it is not every one who can bear   
prosperity3 but if this rule is not     
observed1 let not those honours which   
were conferred all at once be all at    
once taken away1 but rather by degrees4 
,but1 above all things1 let this        
regulation be made by the law1 that no  
one shall have too much power1 either by
 means of his fortune or friends2 but if
 he has1 for his excess therein1 let it 
be contrived that he shall quit the     
country4 ,now1 as many persons promote  
innovations1 that they may enjoy their  
own particular manner of living1 there  
ought to be a particular officer to     
inspect the manners of every one1 and   
see that these are not contrary to the  
genius of the state in which he lives1  

whether it may be an oligarchy1 a       
democracy1 or any other form of         
government2 and1 for the same reason1   
those should be guarded against who are 
most prosperous in the city3 the means  
of doing which is by appointing those   
who are otherwise to the business and   
the offices of the state4 ,i mean1 to   
oppose men of account to the common     
people1 the poor to the rich1 and to    
blend both these into one body1 and to  
increase the numbers of those who are in
 the middle rank2 and this will prevent 
those seditions which arise from an     
inequality of condition4 ,but above all1
 in every state it is necessary1 both by
 the laws and every other method        
possible1 to prevent those who are      
employed by the public from being venal1
 and this particularly in an oligarchy2 
for then the people will not be so much 
displeased from seeing themselves       
excluded from a share in the government 
7nay1 they will rather be glad to have  
leisure to attend their private affairs7

 as at suspecting that the officers of  
the state steal the public money1 then  
indeed they are afflicted with double   
concern1 both because they are deprived 
of the honours of the state1 and        
pillaged by those who enjoy them4 ,there
 is one method of blending together a   
democracy and an aristocracy1 #acji;a if
 office brought no profit2 by which     
means both the rich and the poor will   
enjoy what they desire2 for to admit all
 to a share in the government is        
democratical2 that the rich should be in
 office is aristocratical4 ,this must be
 done by letting no public employment   
whatsoever be attended with any         
emolument2 for the poor will not desire 
to be in office when they can get       
nothing by it1 but had rather attend to 
their own affairs3 but the rich will    
choose it1 as they want nothing of the  
community4 ,thus the poor will increase 
their fortunes by being wholly employed 
in their own concerns2 and the principal
 part of the people will not be governed

 by the lower sort4 ,to prevent the     
exchequer from being defrauded1 let all 
public money be delivered out openly in 
the face of the whole city1 and let     
copies of the accounts be deposited in  
the different wards tribes1 and         
divisions4 ,but1 as the magistrates are 
to execute their offices without any    
advantages1 the law ought to provide    
proper honours for those who execute    
them well4 ,in democracies also it is   
necessary that the rich should be       
protected1 by not permitting their lands
 to be divided1 nor even the produce of 
them1 which in some states is done      
unperceivably4 ,it would be also better 
if the people would prevent them when   
they offer to exhibit a number of       
unnecessary and yet expensive public    
entertainments of plays1 music1         
processions1 and the like4 ,in an       
oligarchy it is necessary to take great 
care of the poor1 and allot them public 
employments which are gainful2 and1 if  
any of the rich insult them1 to let     

their punishment be severer than if they
 insulted one of their own rank2 and to 
let estates pass by affinity1 and not   
gift3 nor to permit any person to have  
more than one2 for by this means        
property will be more equally divided1  
and the greater part of the poor get    
into better circumstances4 ,it is also  
serviceable in a democracy and an       
oligarchy to allot those who take no    
part in public affairs an equality or a 
preference in other things2 the rich in 
a democracy1 to the poor in an          
oligarchy3 but still all the principal  
offices in the state to be filled only  
by those who are best qualified to      
discharge them4     ,,chapter ,,ix      
,there are three qualifications         
necessary for those who fill the first  
departments in government2 first of all1
 an affection for the established       
constitution2 second place1 abilities   
every way completely equal to the       
business of their office2 in the third1 
virtue and justice correspondent to the 

nature of that particular state they are
 placed in2 for if justice is not the   
same in all states1 it is evident that  
there must be different species thereof4
 ,there may be some doubt1 when all     
these qualifications do not in the same 
persons1 in what manner the choice shall
 be made2 as for instance1 suppose that 
one person is an accomplished general1  
but a bad man and no friend to the      
#acji;b constitution2 another is just   
and a friend to it1 which shall one     
prefer8 we should then consider of two  
qualities1 which of them the generality 
possess in a greater degree1 which in a 
less2 for which reason in the choice of 
a general we should regard his courage  
more than his virtue as the more        
uncommon quality2 as there are fewer    
capable of conducting an army than there
 are good men3 but1 to protect the state
 or manage the finances1 the contrary   
rule should be followed2 for these      
require greater virtue than the         
generality are possessed of1 but only   

that knowledge which is common to all4  
,it may be asked1 if a man has abilities
 equal to his appointment in the state1 
and is affectionate to the constitution1
 what occasion is there for being       
virtuous1 since these two things alone  
are sufficient to enable him to be      
useful to the public8 it is1 because    
those who possess those qualities are   
often deficient in prudence2 for1 as    
they often neglect their own affairs1   
though they know them and love          
themselves1 so nothing will prevent     
their serving the public in the same    
manner4 ,in short1 whatsoever the laws  
contain which we allow to be useful to  
the state contributes to its            
preservation3 but its first and         
principal support is 7as has been often 
insisted upon7 to have the number of    
those who desire to preserve it greater 
than those who wish to destroy it4      
,above all things that ought not to be  
forgotten which many governments now    
corrupted neglect2 namely1 to preserve a

 mean4 ,for many things seemingly       
favourable to a democracy destroy a     
democracy1 and many things seemingly    
favourable to an oligarchy destroy an   
oligarchy4 ,those who think this the    
only virtue extend it to excess1 not    
considering that as a nose which varies 
a little from perfect straightness1     
either towards a hook nose or a flat    
one1 may yet be beautiful and agreeable 
to look at2 but if this particularity is
 extended beyond measure1 first of all  
the properties of the part is lost1 but 
at last it can hardly be admitted to be 
a nose at all1 on account of the excess 
of the rise or sinking3 thus it is with 
other parts of the human body2 so also  
the same thing is true with respect to  
states2 for both an oligarchy and a     
democracy may something vary from their 
most perfect form and yet be well       
constituted2 but if any one endeavours  
to extend either of them too far1 at    
first he will make the government the   
worse for it1 but at last there will be 

no government at all remaining4 ,the    
lawgiver and the politician therefore   
should know well what preserves and what
 destroys a democracy or an oligarchy1  
for neither the one nor the other can   
possibly continue without rich and poor3
 but that whenever an entire equality of
 circumstances #acaj;a prevails1 the    
state must necessarily become of another
 form2 so that those who destroy these  
laws1 which authorise an inequality in  
property1 destroy the government4 ,it is
 also an error in democracies for the   
demagogues to endeavour to make the     
common people superior to the laws2 and 
thus by setting them at variance with   
the rich1 dividing one city into two2   
whereas they ought rather to speak in   
favour of the rich4 ,in oligarchies1 on 
the contrary1 it is wrong to support    
those who are in administration against 
the people4 ,the oaths also which they  
take in an oligarchy ought to be        
contrary to what they now are2 for1 at  
present1 in some places they swear1 ,i  

will be adverse to the common people1   
and contrive all ,i can against them2   
whereas they ought rather to suppose and
 pretend the contrary2 expressing in    
their oaths1 that they will not injure  
the people4 ,but of all things which ,i 
have mentioned1 that which contributes  
most to preserve the state is1 what is  
now most despised1 to educate your      
children for the state2 for the most    
useful laws1 and most approved by every 
statesman1 will be of no service if the 
citizens are not accustomed to and      
brought up in the principles of the     
constitution2 of a democracy1 if that is
 by law established2 of an oligarchy1 if
 that is2 for if there are bad morals in
 one man1 there are in the city4 ,but to
 educate a child fit for the state1 it  
must not be done in the manner which    
would please either those who have the  
power in an oligarchy or those who      
desire a democracy1 but so as they may  
be able to conduct either of these forms
 of governments4 ,but now the children  

of the magistrates in an oligarchy are  
brought up too delicately1 and the      
children of the poor hardy with exercise
 and labour2 so that they are both      
desirous of and able to promote         
innovations4 ,in democracies of the     
purest form they pursue a method which  
is contrary to their welfare2 the reason
 of which is1 that they define liberty  
wrong3 now1 there are two things which  
seem to be the objects of a democracy1  
that the people in general should       
possess the supreme power1 and all enjoy
 freedom2 for that which is just seems  
to be equal1 and what the people think  
equal1 that is a law3 now1 their freedom
 and equality consists in every one's   
doing what they please3 that is in such 
a democracy every one may live as he    
likes2 as his inclination guides1 in the
 words of ,euripides3 but this is wrong1
 for no one ought to think it slavery to
 live in subjection to government1 but  
protection4 ,thus ,i have mentioned the 
causes of corruption in different       

states1 and the means of their          
preservation4     ,,chapter ,x   ,it now
 remains that we speak of monarchies1   
their causes of corruption1 and means of
 preservation2 and indeed almost the    
same things which have been said of     
other governments happen to kingdoms and
 tyrannies2 for a kingdom partakes of an
 aristocracy1 a tyranny of the worst    
species of an oligarchy and democracy2  
for which reason it is the worst that   
man can submit to1 as being composed of 
two1 both of which are bad1 and         
collectively retains all the corruptions
 and all the defects of both these      
states4 ,these two species of monarchies
 arise from principles contrary to each 
other3 a kingdom is formed to protect   
the better sort of people against the   
multitude1 and kings are appointed out  
of those1 who are chosen either for     
their superior virtue and actions       
flowing from virtuous principles1 or    
else from their noble descent2 but a    
tyrant is chosen out of the meanest     

populace2 an enemy to the better sort1  
that the common people may not be       
oppressed by them4 ,that this is true   
experience convinces us2 for the        
generality of tyrants were indeed mere  
demagogues1 who gained credit with the  
people by oppressing the nobles4 ,some  
tyrannies were established in this      
manner after the cities were            
considerably enlarged--others before    
that time1 by kings who exceeded the    
power which their country allowed them1 
from a desire of governing despotically3
 others were founded by those who were  
elected to the superior offices in the  
state2 for formerly the people appointed
 officers for life1 who came to be at   
the head of civil and religious affairs1
 and these chose one out of their body  
in whom the supreme power over all the  
magistrates was placed4 ,by all these   
means it was easy to establish a        
tyranny1 if they chose it2 for their    
power was ready at hand1 either by their
 being kings1 or else by enjoying the   

honours of the state2 thus ,phidon at   
,argos and other tyrants enjoyed        
originally the kingly power2 ,phalaris  
and others in ,ionia1 the honours of the
 state4 ,pansetius at ,leontium1        
,cypselus at ,corinth1 ,pisistratus at  
,athens1 ,dionysius at ,syracuse1 and   
others1 acquired theirs by having been  
demagogues4 ,a kingdom1 as we have said1
 partakes much of the nature of an      
aristocracy1 and is bestowed according  
to worth1 as either virtue1 family1     
beneficent actions1 or these joined with
 power2 for those who have been         
benefactors to cities and states1 or    
have it in their powers to be so1 have  
acquired this honour1 and those who have
 prevented a people from falling into   
slavery by war1 as ,codrus1 or those who
 have freed them from it1 as ,cyrus1 or 
the founders of cities1 or settlers of  
colonies1 as the kings of ,sparta1      
,macedon1 and ,molossus4 ,a king desires
 to be the guardian of his people1 that 
those who have property may be secure in

 the possession of it1 and that the     
people in general meet with no injury2  
but a tyrant1 as has been often said1   
has no regard to the common good1 except
 for his own advantage2 his only object 
is pleasure1 but a king's is virtue3    
what a tyrant therefore is ambitious of 
engrossing is wealth1 but a king rather 
honour4 ,the guards too of a king are   
citizens1 a tyrant's foreigners4  ,that 
a tyranny contains all that is bad both 
in a democracy and an oligarchy is      
evident2 with an oligarchy it has for   
its end gain1 as the only means of      
providing the tyrant with guards and the
 luxuries of life2 like that it places  
no confidence in the people2 and        
therefore deprives them of the use of   
arms3 it is also common to them both to 
persecute the populace1 to drive them   
out of the city and their own           
habitations4 ,with a democracy it       
quarrels with the nobles1 and destroys  
them both publicly and privately1 or    
drives them into banishment1 as rivals  

and an impediment to the government2    
hence naturally arise conspiracies both 
amongst those who desire to govern and  
those who desire not to be slaves2 hence
 arose ,periander's advice to           
,thrasybulus to take off the tallest    
stalks1 hinting thereby1 that it was    
necessary to make away with the eminent 
citizens4 ,we ought then in reason1 as  
has been already said1 to account for   
the changes which arise in a monarchy   
from the same causes which produce them 
in other states3 for1 through injustice 
received1 fear1 and contempt1 many of   
those who are under a monarchical       
government conspire against it2 but of  
all species of injustice1 injurious     
contempt has most influence on them for 
that purpose3 sometimes it is owing to  
their being deprived of their private   
fortunes4 ,the dissolution too of a     
kingdom and a tyranny are generally the 
same2 for monarchs abound in wealth and 
honour1 which all are desirous to       
obtain4 ,of plots3 some aim at the life 

of those who govern1 others at their    
government2 the first arises from hatred
 to their persons2 which hatred may be  
owing to many causes1 either of which   
will be sufficient to excite their      
anger1 and the generality of those who  
are under the influence of that passion 
will join in a conspiracy1 not for the  
sake of their own advancement1 but for  
revenge4 ,thus the plot against the     
children of ,pisistratus arose from     
their injurious treatment of            
,harmodius's sister1 and insulting him  
also2 for ,harmodius resenting the      
injury done to his sister1 and          
,aristogiton the injury done to         
,harmodius4 ,periander the tyrant of    
,ambracia also lost his life by a       
conspiracy1 for some improper liberties 
he took with a boy in his cups3 and     
,philip was slain by ,pausanias for     
neglecting to revenge him of the affront
 he had received from ,attains2 as was  
,amintas the ,little by ,darda1 for     
insulting him on account of his age2 and

 the eunuch by ,evagoras the ,cyprian in
 revenge for having taken his son's wife
 away from him4444  ,many also who have 
had their bodies scourged with stripes  
have1 through resentment1 either killed 
those who caused them to be inflicted or
 conspired against them1 even when they 
had kingly power1 as at ,mitylene       
,megacles1 joining with his friends1    
killed the ,penthelidee1 who used to go 
about striking those they met with      
clubs4 ,thus1 in later times1 ,smendes  
killed ,penthilus for whipping him and  
dragging him away from his wife4        
,decamnichus also was the chief cause of
 the conspiracy against ,archelaus1 for 
he urged others on3 the occasion of his 
resentment was his having delivered him 
to ,euripides the poet to be scourged2  
for ,euripides was greatly offended with
 him for having said something of the   
foulness of his breath4 ,and many others
 have been killed or conspired against  
on the same account4 ,fear too is a     
cause which produces the same effects1  

as well in monarchies as in other       
states3 thus ,artabanes conspired       
against ,xerxes through fear of         
punishment for having hanged ,darius    
according to his orders1 whom he        
supposed he intended to pardon1 as the  
order was given at supper-time4 ,some   
kings also have been #acab;a dethroned  
and killed in consequence of the        
contempt they were held in by the       
people2 as some one conspired against   
,sardanapalus1 having seen him spinning 
with his wife1 if what is related of him
 is true1 or if not of him1 it may very 
probably be true of some one else4 ,dion
 also conspired against ,dionysius the  
,younger1 seeing his subjects desirous  
of a conspiracy1 and that he himself was
 always drunk3 and even a man's friends 
will do this if they despise him2 for   
from the confidence he places in them1  
they think that they shall not be found 
out4 ,those also who think they shall   
gain his throne will conspire against a 
king through contempt2 for as they are  

powerful themselves1 and despise the    
danger1 on account of their own         
strength1 they will readily attempt it4 
,thus a general at the head of his army 
will endeavour to dethrone the monarch1 
as ,cyrus did ,astyages1 despising both 
his manner of life and his forces2 his  
forces for want of action1 his life for 
its effeminacy3 thus ,suthes1 the       
,thracian1 who was general to ,amadocus1
 conspired against him4 ,sometimes more 
than one of these causes will excite men
 to enter into conspiracies1 as contempt
 and desire of gain2 as in the instance 
of ,mithridates against ,ariobarzanes4  
,those also who are of a bold           
disposition1 and have gained military   
honours amongst kings1 will of all      
others be most like to engage in        
sedition2 for strength and courage      
united inspire great bravery3 whenever1 
therefore1 these join in one person1 he 
will be very ready for conspiracies1 as 
he will easily conquer4 ,those who      
conspire against a tyrant through love  

of glory and honour have a different    
motive in view from what ,i have already
 mentioned2 for1 like all others who    
embrace danger1 they have only glory and
 honour in view1 and think1 not as some 
do1 of the wealth and pomp they may     
acquire1 but engage in this as they     
would in any other noble action1 that   
they may be illustrious and             
distinguished1 and destroy a tyrant1 not
 to succeed in his tyranny1 but to      
acquire renown4 ,no doubt but the number
 of those who act upon this principle is
 small1 for we must suppose they regard 
their own safety as nothing in case they
 should not succeed1 and must embrace   
the opinion of ,dion 7which few can do7 
when he made war upon ,dionysius with a 
very few troops2 for he said1 that let  
the advantage he made be ever so little 
it would satisfy him to have gained it2 
and that1 should it be his lot to die   
the moment he had gained footing in his 
country1 he should think his death      
sufficiently glorious4 ,a tyranny also  

is exposed to the same destruction as   
all other states are1 from too powerful 
neighbours3 for it is evident1 that an  
opposition of principles will make them 
desirous of subverting it2 and what they
 desire1 all who can1 do3 and there is a
 principle of opposition in one state to
 another1 as a democracy against a      
tyranny1 as says ,hesiod1 a potter      
against a potter2 for the extreme of a  
democracy is a tyranny2 a kingly power  
against an aristocracy1 from their      
different forms of government--for which
 reason the ,lacedaemonians destroyed   
many tyrannies2 as did the ,syracusians 
during the prosperity of their state4   
,nor are they only destroyed from       
without1 but also from within1 when     
those who have no share in the power    
bring about a revolution1 as happened to
 ,gelon1 and lately to ,dionysius2 to   
the first1 by means of ,thrasybulus1 the
 brother of ,hiero1 who nattered        
,gelon's son1 and induced him to lead a 
life of pleasure1 that he himself might 

govern2 but the family joined together  
and endeavoured to support the tyranny  
and expel ,thrasybulus2 but those whom  
they made of their party seized the     
opportunity and expelled the whole      
family4 ,dion made war against his      
relation ,dionysius1 and being assisted 
by the people1 first expelled and then  
killed him4 ,as there are two causes    
which chiefly induce men to conspire    
against tyrants1 hatred and contempt1   
one of these1 namely hatred1 seems      
inseparable from them4 ,contempt also is
 often the cause of their destruction3  
for though1 for instance1 those who     
raised themselves to the supreme power  
generally preserved it2 but those who   
received it from them have1 to speak    
truth1 almost immediately all of them   
lost it2 for1 falling into an effeminate
 way of life1 they soon grew despicable1
 and generally fell victims to          
conspiracies4 ,part of their hatred may 
be very fitly ascribed to anger2 for in 
some cases this is their motive to      

action3 for it is often a cause which   
impels them to act more powerfully than 
hatred1 and they proceed with greater   
obstinacy against those whom they       
attack1 as this passion is not under the
 direction of reason4 ,many persons also
 indulge this passion through contempt2 
which occasioned the fall of the        
,pisistratidae and many others4 ,but    
hatred is more powerful than anger2 for 
anger is accompanied with grief1 which  
prevents the entrance of reason2 but    
hatred is free from it4 ,in short1      
whatever causes may be assigned as the  
destruction of a pure oligarchy unmixed 
with any other government and an extreme
 democracy1 the same may be applied to a
 tyranny2 for these are divided         
tyrannies4  ,kingdoms are seldom        
destroyed by any outward attack2 for    
which reason they are generally very    
stable2 but they have many causes of    
subversion within2 of which two are the 
principal2 one is when those who are in 
power #acac;a excite a sedition1 the    

other when they endeavour to establish a
 tyranny by assuming greater power than 
the law gives them4 ,a kingdom1 indeed1 
is not what we ever see erected in our  
times1 but rather monarchies and        
tyrannies2 for a kingly government is   
one that is voluntarily submitted to1   
and its supreme power admitted upon     
great occasions3 but where many are     
equal1 and there are none in any respect
 so much better than another as to be   
qualified for the greatness and dignity 
of government over them1 then these     
equals will not willingly submit to be  
commanded2 but if any one assumes the   
government1 either by force or fraud1   
this is a tyranny4 ,to what we have     
already said we shall add1 the causes of
 revolutions in an hereditary kingdom4  
,one of these is1 that many of those who
 enjoy it are naturally proper objects  
of contempt only3 another is1 that they 
are insolent while their power is not   
despotic2 but they possess kingly       
honours only4 ,such a state is soon     

destroyed2 for a king exists but while  
the people are willing to obey1 as their
 submission to him is voluntary1 but to 
a tyrant involuntary4 ,these and        
such-like are the causes of the         
destruction of monarchies4     ,,chapter
 ,,xi   ,monarchies1 in a word1 are     
preserved by means contrary to what ,i  
have already mentioned as the cause of  
their destruction2 but to speak to each 
separately3 the stability of a kingdom  
will depend upon the power of the king's
 being kept within moderate bounds2 for 
by how much the less extensive his power
 is1 by so much the longer will his     
government continue2 for he will be less
 despotic and more upon an equality of  
condition with those he governs2 who1 on
 that account1 will envy him the less4  
,it was on this account that the kingdom
 of the ,molossi continued so long2 and 
the ,lacedaemonians from their          
government's being from the beginning   
divided into two parts1 and also by the 
moderation introduced into the other    

parts of it by ,theopompus1 and his     
establishment of the ephori2 for by     
taking something from the power he      
increased the duration of the kingdom1  
so that in some measure he made it not  
less1 but bigger2 as they say he replied
 to his wife1 who asked him if he was   
not ashamed to deliver down his kingdom 
to his children reduced from what he    
received it from his ancestors8 ,no1    
says he1 ,i give it him more lasting4   
,tyrannies are preserved two ways most  
opposite to each other1 one of which is 
when the power is delegated from one to 
the other1 and in this manner many      
tyrants govern in their states4 ,report 
says that ,periander founded many of    
these4 ,there are also many of them to  
be met with amongst the ,persians4 ,what
 has been already mentioned is as       
conducive as anything can be to preserve
 a tyranny2 namely1 to keep down those  
who are of an aspiring disposition1 to  
take off those who will not submit1 to  
allow no public meals1 no clubs1 no     

education1 nothing at all1 but to guard 
against everything that gives rise to   
high spirits or mutual confidence2 nor  
to suffer the learned meetings of those 
who are at leisure to hold conversation 
with each other2 and to endeavour by    
every means possible to keep all the    
people strangers to each other2 for     
knowledge increases mutual confidence2  
and to oblige all strangers to appear in
 public1 and to live near the city-gate1
 that all their actions may be          
sufficiently seen2 for those who are    
kept like slaves seldom entertain any   
noble thoughts3 in short1 to imitate    
everything which the ,persians and      
barbarians do1 for they all contribute  
to support slavery2 and to endeavour to 
know what every one who is under their  
power does and says2 and for this       
purpose to employ spies3 such were those
 women whom the ,syracusians called     
potagogides ,hiero also used to send out
 listeners wherever there was any       
meeting or conversation2 for the people 

dare not speak with freedom for fear of 
such persons2 and if any one does1 there
 is the less chance of its being        
concealed2 and to endeavour that the    
whole community should mutually accuse  
and come to blows with each other1      
friend with friend1 the commons with the
 nobles1 and the rich with each other4  
,it is also advantageous for a tyranny  
that all those who are under it should  
be oppressed with poverty1 that they may
 not be able to compose a guard2 and    
that1 being employed in procuring their 
daily bread1 they may have no leisure to
 conspire against their tyrants4 ,the   
,pyramids of ,egypt are a proof of this1
 and the votive edifices of the         
,cyposelidse1 and the temple of ,jupiter
 ,olympus1 built by the ,pisistratidae1 
and the works of ,polycrates at ,samos2 
for all these produced one end1 the     
keeping the people poor4 ,it is         
necessary also to multiply taxes1 as at 
,syracuse2 where ,dionysius in the space
 of five years collected all the private

 property of his subjects into his own  
coffers4 ,a tyrant also should endeavour
 to engage his subjects in a war1 that  
they may have employment and continually
 depend upon their general4 ,a king is  
preserved by his friends1 but a tyrant  
is of all persons the man who can place 
no confidence in friends1 as every one  
has it in his desire and these chiefly  
in their power to destroy him4 ,all     
these things also which are done in an  
extreme democracy should be done in a   
tyranny1 as permitting great            
licentiousness to the women in the      
house1 that they may reveal their       
husbands' secrets2 and showing great    
indulgence to slaves also for the same  
reason2 for slaves and women conspire   
not against tyrants3 but when they are  
treated with kindness1 both of them are 
abettors of tyrants1 and extreme        
democracies also2 and the people too in 
such a state desire to be despotic4 ,for
 which reason flatterers are in repute  
in both these3 the demagogue in the     

democracy1 for he is the proper         
flatterer of the people2 among tyrants1 
he who will servilely adapt himself to  
their humours2 for this is the business 
of #acad;a flatterers4 ,and for this    
reason tyrants always love the worst of 
wretches1 for they rejoice in being     
flattered1 which no man of a liberal    
spirit will submit to2 for they love the
 virtuous1 but flatter none4 ,bad men   
too are fit for bad purposes2 like to   
like1 as the proverb says4 ,a tyrant    
also should show no favour to a man of  
worth or a freeman2 for he should think1
 that no one deserved to be thought     
these but himself2 for he who supports  
his dignity1 and is a friend to freedom1
 encroaches upon the superiority and the
 despotism of the tyrant3 such men1     
therefore1 they naturally hate1 as      
destructive to their government4 ,a     
tyrant also should rather admit         
strangers to his table and familiarity  
than citizens1 as these are his enemies1
 but the others have no design against  

him4 ,these and such-like are the       
supports of a tyranny1 for it           
comprehends whatsoever is wicked4 ,but  
all these things may be comprehended in 
three divisions1 for there are three    
objects which a tyranny has in view2 one
 of which is1 that the citizens should  
be of poor abject dispositions2 for such
 men never propose to conspire against  
any one4 ,the second is1 that they      
should have no confidence in each other2
 for while they have not this1 the      
tyrant is safe enough from destruction4 
,for which reason they are always at    
enmity with those of merit1 as hurtful  
to their government2 not only as they   
scorn to be governed despotically1 but  
also because they can rely upon each    
other's fidelity1 and others can rely   
upon theirs1 and because they will not  
inform against their associates1 nor any
 one else4 ,the third is1 that they     
shall be totally without the means of   
doing anything2 for no one undertakes   
what is impossible for him to perform3  

so that without power a tyranny can     
never be destroyed4 ,these1 then1 are   
the three objects which the inclinations
 of tyrants desire to see accomplished2 
for all their tyrannical plans tend to  
promote one of these three ends1 that   
their people may neither have mutual    
confidence1 power1 nor spirit4 ,this1   
then1 is one of the two methods of      
preserving tyrannies3 the other proceeds
 in a way quite contrary to what has    
been already described1 and which may be
 discerned from considering to what the 
destruction of a kingdom is owing2 for  
as one cause of that is1 making the     
government approach near to a tyranny1  
so the safety of a tyranny consists in  
making the government nearly kingly2    
preserving only one thing1 namely power1
 that not only the willing1 but the     
unwilling also1 must be obliged to      
submit2 for if this is once lost1 the   
tyranny is at an end4 ,this1 then1 as   
the foundation1 must be preserved3 in   
other particulars carefully do and      

affect to seem like a king2 first1      
appear to pay a great attention #acad;b 
to what belongs to the public2 nor make 
such profuse presents as will offend the
 people2 while they are to supply the   
money out of the hard labour of their   
own hands1 and see it given in profusion
 to mistresses1 foreigners1 and         
fiddlers2 keeping an exact account both 
of what you receive and pay2 which is a 
practice some tyrants do actually       
follow1 by which means they seem rather 
fathers of families than tyrants3 nor   
need you ever fear the want of money    
while you have the supreme power of the 
state in your own hands4 ,it is also    
much better for those tyrants who quit  
their kingdom to do this than to leave  
behind them money they have hoarded up2 
for their regents will be much less     
desirous of making innovations1 and they
 are more to be dreaded by absent       
tyrants than the citizens2 for such of  
them as he suspects he takes with him1  
but these regents must be left behind4  

,he should also endeavour to appear to  
collect such taxes and require such     
services as the exigencies of the state 
demand1 that whenever they are wanted   
they may be ready in time of war2 and   
particularly to take care that he appear
 to collect and keep them not as his own
 property1 but the public's4 ,his       
appearance also should not be severe1   
but respectable1 so that he should      
inspire those who approach him with     
veneration and not fear2 but this will  
not be easily accomplished if he is     
despised4 ,if1 therefore1 he will not   
take the pains to acquire any other1 he 
ought to endeavour to be a man of       
political abilities1 and to fix that    
opinion of himself in the judgment of   
his subjects4 ,he should also take care 
not to appear to be guilty of the least 
offence against modesty1 nor to suffer  
it in those under him3 nor to permit the
 women of his family to treat others    
haughtily2 for the haughtiness of women 
has been the ruin of many tyrants4 ,with

 respect to the pleasures of sense1 he  
ought to do directly contrary to the    
practice of some tyrants at present2 for
 they do not only continually indulge   
themselves in them for many days        
together1 but they seem also to desire  
to have other witnesses of it1 that they
 may wonder at their happiness2 whereas 
he ought really to be moderate in these1
 and1 if not1 to appear to others to    
avoid them-for it is not the sober man  
who is exposed either to plots or       
contempt1 but the drunkard2 not the     
early riser1 but the sluggard4 ,his     
conduct in general should also be       
contrary to what is reported of former  
tyrants2 for he ought to improve and    
adorn his city1 so as to seem a guardian
 and not a tyrant2 and1 moreover41      
always to #acae;a seem particularly     
attentive to the worship of the gods2   
for from persons of such a character men
 entertain less fears of suffering      
anything illegal while they suppose that
 he who governs them is religious and   

reverences the gods2 and they will be   
less inclined to raise insinuations     
against such a one1 as being peculiarly 
under their protection3 but this must be
 so done as to give no occasion for any 
suspicion of hypocrisy4 ,he should also 
take care to show such respect to men of
 merit in every particular1 that they   
should not think they could be treated  
with greater distinction by their       
fellow-citizens in a free state4 ,he    
should also let all honours flow        
immediately from himself1 but every     
censure from his subordinate officers   
and judges4 ,it is also a common        
protection of all monarchies not to make
 one person too great1 or1 certainly1   
not many2 for they will support each    
other3 but1 if it is necessary to       
entrust any large powers to one person1 
to take care that it is not one of an   
ardent spirit2 for this disposition is  
upon every opportunity most ready for a 
revolution3 and1 if it should seem      
necessary to deprive any one of his     

power1 to do it by degrees1 and not     
reduce him all at once4 ,it is also     
necessary to abstain from all kinds of  
insolence2 more particularly from       
corporal punishment2 which you must be  
most cautious never to exercise over    
those who have a delicate sense of      
honour2 for1 as those who love money are
 touched to the quick when anything     
affects their property1 so are men of   
honour and principle when they receive  
any disgrace3 therefore1 either never   
employ personal punishment1 or1 if you  
do1 let it be only in the manner in     
which a father would correct his son1   
and not with contempt2 and1 upon the    
whole1 make amends for any seeming      
disgrace by bestowing greater honours4  
,but of all persons who are most likely 
to entertain designs against the person 
of a tyrant1 those are chiefly to be    
feared and guarded against who regard as
 nothing the loss of their own lives1 so
 that they can but accomplish their     
purpose3 be very careful therefore of   

those who either think themselves       
affronted1 or those who are dear to     
them2 for those who are excited by anger
 to revenge regard as nothing their own 
persons3 for1 as ,heraclitus says1 it is
 dangerous to fight with an angry man   
who will purchase with his life the     
thing he aims at4 ,as all cities are    
composed of two sorts of persons1 the   
rich and the poor1 it is necessary that 
both these should find equal protection 
from him who governs them1 and that the 
one party should not have it in their   
power to injure the other2 but that the 
tyrant should attach to himself that    
party which is the most powerful2 which1
 if he does1 he will have no occasion   
either to make his slaves free1 or to   
deprive citizens of their arms2 for the 
strength of either of the parties added 
to his own forces will render him       
superior to any conspiracy4 ,it would be
 superfluous to go through all          
particulars2 for the rule of conduct    
which the tyrant ought to pursue is     

evident enough1 and that is1 to affect  
to appear not the tyrant1 but the king2 
the guardian of those he governs1 not   
their plunderer1 #acae;b but their      
protector1 and to affect the middle rank
 in life1 not one superior to all       
others3 he should1 therefore1 associate 
his nobles with him and soothe his      
people2 for his government will not only
 be necessarily more honourable and     
worthy of imitation1 as it will be over 
men of worth1 and not abject wretches   
who perpetually both hate and fear him2 
but it will be also more durable4 ,let  
him also frame his life so that his     
manners may be consentaneous to virtue1 
or at least let half of them be so1 that
 he may not be altogether wicked1 but   
only so in part4     ,,chapter ,,xii    
,indeed an oligarchy and a tyranny are  
of all governments of the shortest      
duration4 ,the tyranny of ,orthagoras   
and his family at ,sicyon1 it is true1  
continued longer than any other3 the    
reason for which was1 that they used    

their power with moderation1 and were in
 many particulars obedient to the laws2 
and1 as ,clisthenes was an able general1
 he never fell into contempt1 and by the
 care he took that in many particulars  
his government should be popular4 ,he is
 reported also to have presented a      
person with a crown who adjudged the    
victory to another2 and some say that it
 is the statue of that judge which is   
placed in the forum4  ,they say also1   
that ,pisistratus submitted to be       
summoned into the court of the          
,areopagites4 ,the second that we shall 
mention is the tyranny of the           
,cypselidse1 at ,corinth1 which         
continued seventy-seven years and six   
months2 for ,cypselus was tyrant there  
thirty years1 ,periander forty-four1 and
 ,psammetichus1 the son of ,georgias1   
three years2 the reason for which was1  
that ,cypselus was a popular man1 and   
governed without guards4 ,periander     
indeed ruled like a tyrant1 but then he 
was an able general4 ,the third was that

 of the ,pisistradidae at ,athens2 but  
it was not continual3 for ,pisistratus  
himself was twice expelled2 so that out 
of thirty-three years he was only       
fifteen in power1 and his son eighteen2 
so that the whole time was thirty-three 
years4 ,of the rest we shall mention    
that of ,hiero1 and ,gelo at ,syracuse2 
and this did not continue long1 for both
 their reigns were only eighteen years2 
for ,gelo died in the eighth year of his
 tyranny1 and ,hiero in his tenth4      
,thrasybulus fell in his eleventh month1
 and many other tyrannies have continued
 a very short time4 ,we have now gone   
through the general cases of corruption 
and #acaf;a means of preservation both  
in free states and monarchies4 ,in      
,plato's ,republic1 ,socrates is        
introduced treating upon the changes    
which different governments are liable  
to3 but his discourse is faulty2 for he 
does not particularly mention what      
changes the best and first governments  
are liable to2 for he only assigns the  

general cause1 of nothing being         
immutable1 but that in time everything  
will alter 999999tr43 text is           
unintelligible here999999 he conceives  
that nature will then produce bad men1  
who will not submit to education1 and in
 this1 probably1 he is not wrong2 for it
 is certain that there are some persons 
whom it is impossible by any education  
to make good men2 but why should this   
change be more peculiar to what he calls
 the best-formed government1 than to all
 other forms1 and indeed to all other   
things that exist8 and in respect to his
 assigned time1 as the cause of the     
alteration of all things1 we find that  
those which did not begin to exist at   
the same time cease to be at the same   
time2 so that1 if anything came into    
beginning the day before the solstice1  
it must alter at the same time4         
,besides1 why should such a form of     
government be changed into the          
,lacedaemonian8 for1 in general1 when   
governments alter1 they alter into the  

contrary species to what they before    
were1 and not into one like their       
former4 ,and this reasoning holds true  
of other changes2 for he says1 that from
 the ,lacedaemonian form it changes into
 an oligarchy1 and from thence into a   
democracy1 and from a democracy into a  
tyranny3 and sometimes a contrary change
 takes place1 as from a democracy into  
an oligarchy1 rather than into a        
monarchy4 ,with respect to a tyranny he 
neither says whether there will be any  
change in it2 or if not1 to what cause  
it will be owing2 or if there is1 into  
what other state it will alter3 but the 
reason of this is1 that a tyranny is an 
indeterminate government2 and1 according
 to him1 every state ought to alter into
 the first1 and most perfect1 thus the  
continuity and circle would be          
preserved4 ,but one tyranny often       
changed into another2 as at ,syria1 from
 ,myron's to ,clisthenes'2 or into an   
oligarchy1 as was ,antileo's at         
,chalcas2 or into a democracy1 as was   

,gelo's at ,syracuse2 or into an        
aristocracy1 as was ,charilaus's at     
,lacedaemon1 and at ,carthage4 ,an      
oligarchy is also changed into a        
tyranny2 such was the rise of most of   
the ancient tyrannies in ,sicily2 at    
,leontini1 into the tyranny of          
,panaetius2 at ,gela1 into that of      
,cleander2 at ,rhegium into that of     
,anaxilaus2 and the like in many other  
cities4 ,it is absurd also to suppose1  
that a state is changed into an         
oligarchy because those who are in power
 are avaricious and greedy of money1 and
 not because those who are by far richer
 than their fellow citizens think it    
unfair that those who have nothing      
should have an equal share in the rule  
of the state with themselves1 who       
possess so much-for in many oligarchies 
it is not allowable to be employed in   
money-getting1 and there are many laws  
to prevent it4 ,but in ,carthage1 which 
is a democracy1 money-getting is        
creditable1 and yet their form of       

government remains unaltered4 ,it is    
also absurd to say1 that in an oligarchy
 there are two cities1 one of the poor  
and another of the rich2 for why should 
this happen to them more than to the    
,lacedaemonians1 or any other state     
where all possess not equal property1 or
 where all are not equally good8 for    
though no one member of the community   
should be poorer than he was before1 yet
 a democracy might nevertheless change  
into an oligarchy2 if the rich should be
 more powerful than the poor1 and the   
one too negligent1 and the other        
attentive3 and though these changes are 
owing to many causes1 yet he mentions   
but one only1 that the citizens become  
poor by luxury1 and paying              
interest-money2 as if at first they were
 all rich1 or the greater part of them3 
but this is not so1 but when some of    
those who have the principal management 
of public affairs lose their fortunes1  
they will endeavour to bring about a    
revolution2 but when others do1 nothing 

of consequence will follow1 nor when    
such states do alter is there any more  
reason for their altering into a        
democracy than any other4 ,besides1     
though some of the members of the       
community may not have spent their      
fortunes1 yet if they share not in the  
honours of the state1 or if they are    
ill-used and insulted1 they will        
endeavour to raise seditions1 and bring 
about a revolution1 that they may be    
allowed to do as they like2 which1      
,plato says1 arises from too much       
liberty4 ,although there are many       
oligarchies and democracies1 yet        
,socrates1 when he is treating of the   
changes they may undergo1 speaks of them
 as if there was but one of each sort4  
,,book ,,vi     ,,chapter ,i   ,we have 
already shown what is the nature of the 
supreme council in the state1 and       
wherein one may differ from another1 and
 how the different magistrates should be
 regulated2 and also the judicial       
department1 and what is best suited to  

what state2 and also to what causes both
 the destruction and preservation of    
governments are owing4  ,as there are   
very many species of democracies1 as    
well as of other states1 it will not be 
amiss to consider at the same time      
anything which we may have omitted to   
mention concerning either of them1 and  
to allot to each that mode of conduct   
which is peculiar to and advantageous   
for them2 and also to inquire into the  
combinations of all these different     
modes of government which we #acag;a    
have mentioned2 for as these are blended
 together the government is altered1 as 
from an aristocracy to be an oligarchy1 
and from a free state to be a democracy4
 ,now1 ,i mean by those combinations of 
government 7which ,i ought to examine   
into1 but have not yet done71 namely1   
whether the deliberative department and 
the election of magistrates is regulated
 in a manner correspondent to an        
oligarchy1 or the judicial to an        
aristocracy1 or the deliberative part   

only to an oligarchy1 and the election  
of magistrates to an aristocracy1 or    
whether1 in any other manner1 everything
 is not regulated according to the      
nature of the government4 ,but we will  
first consider what particular sort of  
democracy is fitted to a particular     
city1 and also what particular oligarchy
 to a particular people2 and of other   
states1 what is advantageous to what4   
,it is also necessary to show clearly1  
not only which of these governments is  
best for a state1 but also how it ought 
to be established there1 and other      
things we will treat of briefly4  ,and  
first1 we will speak of a democracy2 and
 this will at the same time show clearly
 the nature of its opposite which some  
persons call an oligarchy2 and in doing 
this we must examine into all the parts 
of a democracy1 and everything that is  
connected therewith2 for from the manner
 in which these are compounded together 
different species of democracies arise3 
and hence it is that they are more than 

one1 and of various natures4 ,now1 there
 are two causes which occasion there    
being so many democracies2 one of which 
is that which we have already mentioned2
 namely1 there being different sorts of 
people2 for in one country the majority 
are husbandmen1 in another mechanics1   
and hired servants2 if the first of     
these is added to the second1 and the   
third to both of them1 the democracy    
will not only differ in the particular  
of better or worse1 but in this1 that it
 will be no longer the same government2 
the other is that which we will now     
speak of4 ,the different things which   
are connected with democracies and seem 
to make part of these states1 do1 from  
their being joined to them1 render them 
different from others3 this attending a 
few1 that more1 and another all4 ,it is 
necessary that he who would found any   
state which he may happen to approve of1
 or correct one1 should be acquainted   
with all these particulars4 ,all        
founders of states endeavour to         

comprehend within their own plan        
everything of nearly the same kind with 
it2 but in doing this they err1 in the  
manner ,i have already described in     
treating of the preservation and        
destruction of governments4 ,i will now 
speak of these first principles and     
manners1 and whatever else a            
democratical state requires4            
,,chapter ,,ii   ,now the foundation of 
a democratical state is liberty1 and    
people have been accustomed to say this 
as if here only liberty was to be found2
 for they affirm that this is the end   
proposed by every democracy4 ,but one   
part of liberty is to govern and be     
governed alternately2 for1 according to 
democratical justice1 equality is       
measured by numbers1 and not by worth3  
and this being just1 it is necessary    
that the supreme power should be vested 
in the people at large2 and that what   
the majority determine should be final3 
so that in a democracy the poor ought to
 have more power than the rich1 as being

 the greater number2 for this is one    
mark of liberty which all framers of a  
democracy lay down as a criterion of    
that state2 another is1 to live as every
 one likes2 for this1 they say1 is a    
right which liberty gives1 since he is a
 slave who must live as he likes not4   
,this1 then1 is another criterion of a  
democracy4 ,hence arises the claim to be
 under no command whatsoever to any one1
 upon any account1 any otherwise than by
 rotation1 and that just as far only as 
that person is1 in his turn1 under his  
also4 ,this also is conducive to that   
equality which liberty demands4 ,these  
things being premised1 and such being   
the government1 it follows that such    
rules as the following should be        
observed in it1 that all the magistrates
 should be chosen out of all the people1
 and all to command each1 and each in   
his turn all3 that all the magistrates  
should be chosen by lot1 except to those
 offices only which required some       
particular knowledge and skill3 that no 

census1 or a very small one1 should be  
required to qualify a man for any       
office3 that none should be in the same 
employment twice1 or very few1 and very 
seldom1 except in the army3 that all    
their appointments should be limited to 
a very short time1 or at least as many  
as possible3 that the whole community   
should be qualified to judge in all     
causes whatsoever1 let the object be    
ever so extensive1 ever so interesting1 
or of ever so high a nature2 as at      
,athens1 where the people at large judge
 the magistrates when they come out of  
office1 and decide concerning public    
affairs as well as private contracts3   
that the supreme power should be in the 
public assembly2 and that no magistrate 
should be allowed any discretionary     
power but in a few instances1 and of no 
consequence to public business4 ,of all 
magistrates a senate is best suited to a
 democracy1 where the whole community is
 not paid for giving their attendance2  
for in that case it loses its power2 for

 then the people will bring all causes  
before them1 by appeal1 as we have      
already mentioned in a former book4 ,in 
the next place1 there should1 if        
possible1 be a fund to pay all the      
citizens--who have any share in the     
management of public affairs1 either as 
members of the assembly1 judges1 and    
magistrates2 but if this cannot be done1
 at least the magistrates1 the judges   
the senators1 and members of the supreme
 assembly1 and also those officers who  
are obliged to eat at a common table    
ought to be paid4 ,moreover1 as an      
oligarchy is said to be a government of 
men of family1 fortune1 and education2  
so1 on the contrary1 a democracy is a   
government in the hands of men of no    
birth1 indigent circumstances1 and      
mechanical employments4 ,in this state  
also no office #acah;a should be for    
life2 and1 if any such should remain    
after the government has been long      
changed into a democracy1 they should   
endeavour by degrees to diminish the    

power2 and also elect by lot instead of 
vote4 ,these things1 then1 appertain to 
all democracies2 namely1 to be          
established on that principle of justice
 which is homogeneous to those          
governments2 that is1 that all the      
members of the state1 by number1 should 
enjoy an equality1 which seems chiefly  
to constitute a democracy1 or government
 of the people3 for it seems perfectly  
equal that the rich should have no more 
share in the government than the poor1  
nor be alone in power2 but that all     
should be equal1 according to number2   
for thus1 they think1 the equality and  
liberty of the state best preserved4    
,,chapter ,,iii   ,in the next place we 
must inquire how this equality is to be 
procured4 ,shall the qualifications be  
divided so that five hundred rich should
 be equal to a thousand poor1 or shall  
the thousand have equal power with the  
five hundred8 or shall we not establish 
our equality in this manner8 but divide 
indeed thus1 and afterwards taking an   

equal number both out of the five       
hundred and the thousand1 invest them   
with the power of creating the          
magistrates and judges4 ,is this state  
then established according to perfect   
democratical justice1 or rather that    
which is guided by numbers only8 ,for   
the defenders of a democracy say1 that  
that is just which the majority approve 
of3 but the favourers of an oligarchy   
say1 that that is just which those who  
have most approve of2 and that we ought 
to be directed by the value of property4
 ,both the propositions are unjust2 for 
if we agree with what the few propose we
 erect a tyranny3 for if it should      
happen that an individual should have   
more than the rest who are rich1        
according to oligarchical justice1 this 
man alone has a right to the supreme    
power2 but if superiority of numbers is 
to prevail1 injustice will then be done 
by confiscating the property of the     
rich1 who are few1 as we have already   
said4 ,what then that equality is1 which

 both parties will admit1 must be       
collected from the definition of right  
which is common to them both2 for they  
both say that what the majority of the  
state approves of ought to be           
established4 ,be it so2 but not         
entirely3 but since a city happens to be
 made up of two different ranks of      
people1 the rich and the poor1 let that 
be established which is approved of by  
both these1 or the greater part3 but    
should there be opposite sentiments1 let
 that be established which shall be     
approved of by the greater part3 but let
 this be according to the census2 for   
instance1 if there should be ten of the 
rich and twenty of the poor1 and six of 
the first and fifteen of the last should
 agree upon any measure1 and the        
remaining four of the rich should join  
with the remaining five of the poor in  
opposing it1 that party whose census    
when added together should determine    
which opinion should be law1 and should 
these happen to be equal1 it should be  

regarded as a case similar to an        
assembly or court of justice dividing   
equally upon any question that comes    
before them1 who either determine it by 
lot or some such method4 ,but although1 
with #acah;b respect to what is equal   
and just1 it may be very difficult to   
establish the truth1 yet it is much     
easier to do than to persuade those who 
have it in their power to encroach upon 
others to be guided thereby2 for the    
weak always desire what is equal and    
just1 but the powerful pay no regard    
thereunto4     ,,chapter ,,iv   ,there  
are four kinds of democracies4 ,the best
 is that which is composed of those     
first in order1 as we have already said1
 and this also is the most ancient of   
any4 ,i call that the first which every 
one would place so1 was he to divide the
 people2 for the best part of these are 
the husbandmen4 ,we see1 then1 that a   
democracy may be framed where the       
majority live by tillage or pasturage2  
for1 as their property is but small1    

they will not be at leisure perpetually 
to hold public assemblies1 but will be  
continually employed in following their 
own business1 not having otherwise the  
means of living2 nor will they be       
desirous of what another enjoys1 but    
will rather like to follow their own    
business than meddle with state affairs 
and accept the offices of government1   
which will be attended with no great    
profit2 for the major part of mankind   
are rather desirous of riches than      
honour 7a proof of this is1 that they   
submitted to the tyrannies in ancient   
times1 and do now submit to the         
oligarchies1 if no one hinders them in  
their usual occupations1 or deprives    
them of their property2 for some of them
 soon get rich1 others are removed from 
poverty72 besides1 their having the     
right of election and calling their     
magistrates to account for their conduct
 when they come out of office1 will     
satisfy their desire of honours1 if any 
of them entertain that passion3 for in  

some states1 though the commonalty have 
not the right of electing the           
magistrates1 yet it is vested in part of
 that body chosen to represent them3 and
 it is sufficient for the people at     
large to possess the deliberative power3
 and this ought to be considered as a   
species of democracy2 such was that     
formerly at ,mantinsea3 for which reason
 it is proper for the democracy we have 
been now treating of to have a power    
7and it has been usual for them to have 
it7 of censuring their magistrates when 
out of office1 and sitting in judgment  
upon all causes3 but that the chief     
magistrates should be elected1 and      
according to a certain census1 which    
should vary with the rank of their      
office1 or else not by a census1 but    
according to their abilities for their  
respective appointments4 ,a state thus  
constituted must be well constituted2   
for the magistracies will be always     
filled with the best men with the       
approbation of the people2 who will not 

envy their superiors3 and these and the 
nobles should be content with this part 
in the administration2 for they will not
 be governed by their inferiors4 ,they  
will be also careful to use their power 
with moderation1 as there are others to 
whom full power is delegated to censure 
their conduct2 for it is very           
serviceable to the state to have them   
dependent upon others1 and not to be    
permitted to do whatsoever they choose2 
for with such a liberty there would be  
no check to that evil particle there is 
in every one3 therefore it is #acai;a   
necessary and most for the benefit of   
the state that the offices thereof      
should be filled by the principal       
persons in it1 whose characters are     
unblemished1 and that the people are not
 oppressed4 ,it is now evident that this
 is the best species of democracy1 and  
on what account2 because the people are 
such and have such powers as they ought 
to have4 ,to establish a democracy of   
husbandmen some of those laws which were

 observed in many ancient states are    
universally useful2 as1 for instance1 on
 no account to permit any one to possess
 more than a certain quantity of land1  
or within a certain distance from the   
city4 ,formerly also1 in some states1 no
 one was allowed to sell their original 
lot of land4 ,they also mention a law of
 one ,oxylus1 which forbade any one to  
add to their patrimony by usury4 ,we    
ought also to follow the law of the     
,aphutaeans1 as useful to direct us in  
this particular we are now speaking of2 
for they having but very little ground1 
while they were a numerous people1 and  
at the same time were all husbandmen1   
did not include all their lands within  
the census1 but divided them in such a  
manner that1 according to the census1   
the poor had more power than the rich4  
,next to the commonalty of husbandmen is
 one of shepherds and herdsmen2 for they
 have many things in common with them1  
and1 by their way of life1 are          
excellently qualified to make good      

soldiers1 stout in body1 and able to    
continue in the open air all night4 ,the
 generality of the people of whom other 
democracies are composed are much worse 
than these2 for their lives are wretched
 nor have they any business with virtue 
in anything they do2 these are your     
mechanics1 your exchange-men1 and hired 
servants2 as all these sorts of men     
frequent the exchange and the citadel1  
they can readily attend the public      
assembly2 whereas the husbandmen1 being 
more dispersed in the country1 cannot so
 easily meet together2 nor are they     
equally desirous of doing it with these 
others6 ,when a country happens to be so
 situated that a great part of the land 
lies at a distance from the city1 there 
it is easy to establish a good democracy
 or a free state for the people in      
general will be obliged to live in the  
country2 so that it will be necessary in
 such a democracy1 though there may be  
an exchange-mob at hand1 never to allow 
a legal assembly without the inhabitants

 of the country attend4 ,we have shown  
in what manner the first and best       
democracy ought to be established1 and  
it will be equally evident as to the    
rest1 for from these we #acai;b should  
proceed as a guide1 and always separate 
the meanest of the people from the rest4
 ,but the last and worst1 which gives to
 every citizen without distinction a    
share in every part of the              
administration1 is what few citizens can
 bear1 nor is it easy to preserve for   
any long time1 unless well supported by 
laws and manners4 ,we have already      
noticed almost every cause that can     
destroy either this or any other state4 
,those who have taken the lead in such a
 democracy have endeavoured to support  
it1 and make the people powerful by     
collecting together as many persons as  
they could and giving them their        
freedom1 not only legitimately but      
naturally born1 and also if either of   
their parents were citizens1 that is to 
say1 if either their father or mother2  

and this method is better suited to this
 state than any other3 and thus the     
demagogues have usually managed4 ,they  
ought1 however1 to take care1 and do    
this no longer than the common people   
are superior to the nobles and those of 
the middle rank1 and then stop2 for1 if 
they proceed still further1 they will   
make the state disorderly1 and the      
nobles will ill brook the power of the  
common people1 and be full of resentment
 against it2 which was the cause of an  
insurrection at ,cyrene3 for a little   
evil is overlooked1 but when it becomes 
a great one it strikes the eye4 ,it is1 
moreover1 very-useful in such a state to
 do as ,clisthenes did at ,athens1 when 
he was desirous of increasing the power 
of the people1 and as those did who     
established the democracy in ,cyrene2   
that is1 to institute many tribes and   
fraternities1 and to make the religious 
rites of private persons few1 and those 
common2 and every means is to be        
contrived to associate and blend the    

people together as much as possible2 and
 that all former customs be broken      
through4 ,moreover1 whatsoever is       
practised in a tyranny seems adapted to 
a democracy of this species2 as1 for    
instance1 the licentiousness of the     
slaves1 the women1 and the children2 for
 this to a certain degree is useful in  
such a state2 and also to overlook every
 one's living as they choose2 for many  
will support such a government3 for it  
is more agreeable to many to live       
without any control than as prudence    
would direct4     ,,chapter ,v   ,it is 
also the business of the legislator and 
all those who would support a government
 of this sort not to make it too great a
 work1 or too perfect2 but to aim only  
to render it stable3 for1 let a state be
 constituted ever so badly1 there is no 
difficulty in its continuing a few days3
 they should therefore endeavour to     
procure its safety by all those ways    
which we have described in assigning the
 causes of the preservation and         

destruction of governments2 avoiding    
what is hurtful1 and by framing such    
laws1 written and unwritten1 as contain 
those things which chiefly tend to the  
preservation of the state2 nor to       
suppose that that is useful either for a
 democratic or #acbj;a an oligarchic    
form of government which contributes to 
make them more purely so1 but what will 
contribute to their duration3 but our   
demagogues at present1 to flatter the   
people1 occasion frequent confiscations 
in the courts2 for which reason those   
who have the welfare of the state really
 at heart should act directly opposite  
to what they do1 and enact a law to     
prevent forfeitures from being divided  
amongst the people or paid into the     
treasury1 but to have them set apart for
 sacred uses3 for those who are of a bad
 disposition would not then be the less 
cautious1 as their punishment would be  
the same2 and the community would not be
 so ready to condemn those whom they sat
 in judgment on when they were to get   

nothing by it3 they should also take    
care that the causes which are brought  
before the public should be as few as   
possible1 and punish with the utmost    
severity those who rashly brought an    
action against any one2 for it is not   
the commons but the nobles who are      
generally prosecuted3 for in all things 
the citizens of the same state ought to 
be affectionate to each other1 at least 
not to treat those who have the chief   
power in it as their enemies4 ,now1 as  
the democracies which have been lately  
established are very numerous1 and it is
 difficult to get the common people to  
attend the public assemblies without    
they are paid for it1 this1 when there  
is not a sufficient public revenue1 is  
fatal to the nobles2 for the            
deficiencies therein must be necessarily
 made up by taxes1 confiscations1 and   
fines imposed by corrupt courts of      
justice3 which things have already      
destroyed many democracies4 ,whenever1  
then1 the revenues of the state are     

small1 there should be but few public   
assemblies and but few courts of        
justice3 these1 however1 should have    
very extensive jurisdictions1 but should
 continue sitting a few days only1 for  
by this means the rich would not fear   
the expense1 although they should       
receive nothing for their attendance1   
though the poor did2 and judgment also  
would be given much better2 for the rich
 will not choose to be long absent from 
their own affairs1 but will willingly be
 so for a short time3 and1 when there   
are sufficient revenues1 a different    
conduct ought to be pursued from what   
the demagogues at present follow2 for   
now they divide the surplus of the      
public money amongst the poor2 these    
receive it and again want the same      
supply1 while the giving it is like     
pouring water into a sieve3 but the true
 patriot in a democracy ought to take   
care that the majority of the community 
are not too poor1 for this is the cause 
of rapacity in that government2 he      

therefore should endeavour that they may
 enjoy perpetual plenty2 and as this    
also is advantageous to the rich1 what  
can be saved out of the public money    
should be put by1 and then divided at   
once amongst the poor1 if possible1 in  
such a quantity as may enable every one 
of them to purchase a little field1 and1
 if that cannot be done1 at least to    
give each of them enough to procure the 
implements #acbj;b of trade and         
husbandry2 and if there is not enough   
for all to receive so much at once1 then
 to divide it according to tribes or any
 other allotment4 ,in the meantime let  
the rich pay them for necessary         
services1 but not be obliged to find    
them in useless amusements4 ,and        
something like this was the manner in   
which they managed at ,carthage1 and    
preserved the affections of the people2 
for by continually sending some of their
 community into colonies they procured  
plenty4 ,it is also worthy of a sensible
 and generous nobility to divide the    

poor amongst them1 and supplying them   
with what is necessary1 induce them to  
work2 or to imitate the conduct of the  
people at ,tarentum3 for they1          
permitting the poor to partake in common
 of everything which is needful for     
them1 gain the affections of the        
commonalty4 ,they have also two         
different ways of electing their        
magistrates2 for some are chosen by     
vote1 others by lot2 by the last1 that  
the people at large may have some share 
in the administration2 by the former1   
that the state may be well governed3 the
 same may be accomplished if of the same
 magistrates you choose some by vote1   
others by lot4 ,and thus much for the   
manner in which democracies ought to be 
established4     ,,chapter ,,vi   ,what 
has been already said will almost of    
itself sufficiently show how an         
oligarchy ought to be founded2 for he   
who would frame such a state should have
 in his view a democracy to oppose it2  
for every species of oligarchy should be

 founded on principles diametrically    
opposite to some species of democracy4  
,the first and best-framed oligarchy is 
that which approaches near to what we   
call a free state2 in which there ought 
to be two different census1 the one     
high1 the other low3 from those who are 
within the latter the ordinary officers 
of the state ought to be chosen2 from   
the former the supreme magistrates3 nor 
should any one be excluded from a part  
of the administration who was within the
 census2 which should be so regulated   
that the commonalty who are included in 
it should by means thereof be superior  
to those who have no share in the       
government2 for those who are to have   
the management of public affairs ought  
always to be chosen out of the better   
sort of the people4 ,much in the same   
manner ought that oligarchy to be       
established which is next in order3 but 
as to that which is most opposite to a  
pure democracy1 and approaches nearest  
to a dynasty and a tyranny1 as it is of 

all others the worst1 so it requires the
 greatest care and caution to preserve  
it3 for as bodies of sound and healthy  
constitutions and ships which are well  
manned and well found for sailing can   
bear many injuries without perishing1   
while a diseased body or a leaky ship   
with an indifferent crew cannot support 
the #acba;a least shock2 so the         
worst-established governments want most 
looking after4 ,a number of citizens is 
the preservation of a democracy2 for    
these are opposed to those rights which 
are founded in rank3 on the contrary1   
the preservation of an oligarchy depends
 upon the due regulation of the         
different orders in the society4        
,,chapter ,,vii   ,as the greater part  
of the community are divided into four  
sorts of people2 husbandmen1 mechanics1 
traders1 and hired servants2 and as     
those who are employed in war may       
likewise be divided into four2 the      
horsemen1 the heavy-armed soldier1 the  
light-armed1 and the sailor1 where the  

nature of the country can admit a great 
number of horse2 there a powerful       
oligarchy may be easily established3 for
 the safety of the inhabitants depends  
upon a force of that sort2 but those who
 can support the expense of horsemen    
must be persons of some considerable    
fortune4 ,where the troops are chiefly  
heavy-armed1 there an oligarchy1        
inferior in power to the other1 may be  
established2 for the heavy-armed are    
rather made up of men of substance than 
the poor3 but the light-armed and the   
sailors always contribute to support a  
democracy3 but where the number of these
 is very great and a sedition arises1   
the other parts of the community fight  
at a disadvantage2 but a remedy for this
 evil is to be learned from skilful     
generals1 who always mix a proper number
 of light-armed soldiers with their     
horse and heavy-armed3 for it is with   
those that the populace get the better  
of the men of fortune in an             
insurrection2 for these being lighter   

are easily a match for the horse and the
 heavy-armed3 so that for an oligarchy  
to form a body of troops from these is  
to form it against itself3 but as a city
 is composed of persons of different    
ages1 some young and some old1 the      
fathers should teach their sons1 while  
they were very young1 a light and easy  
exercise2 but1 when they are grown up1  
they should be perfect in every warlike 
exercise4 ,now1 the admission of the    
people to any share in the government   
should either be 7as ,i said before7    
regulated by a census1 or else1 as at   
,thebes1 allowed to those who for a     
certain time have ceased from any       
mechanic employment1 or as at ,massalia1
 where they are chosen according to     
their worth1 whether citizens or        
foreigners4 ,with respect to the        
magistrates of the highest rank which it
 may be necessary to have in a state1   
the services they are bound to do the   
public should be expressly laid down1 to
 prevent the common people from being   

desirous of accepting their employments1
 and also to induce them to regard their
 magistrates with favour when they know 
what a price they pay for their honours4
 ,it is also necessary that the         
magistrates1 upon entering into their   
offices1 should make magnificent        
sacrifices and erect some public        
structure1 that the people partaking of 
the entertainment1 and seeing the city  
ornamented with votive gifts in their   
temples and public structures1 may see  
with pleasure the stability of the      
government3 add to this also1 that the  
nobles will have their generosity       
recorded3 but now this is not the       
conduct which those who are at present  
at the head of an oligarchy pursue1 but 
the contrary2 for they are not more     
desirous of honour than of gain2 for    
which reason such oligarchies may more  
properly be called little democracies4  
,thus #acba;b we have explained on what 
principles a democracy and an oligarchy 
ought to be established4     ,,chapter  

,,viii   ,after what has been said ,i   
proceed next to treat particularly of   
the magistrates2 of what nature they    
should be1 how many1 and for what       
purpose1 as ,i have already mentioned3  
for without necessary magistrates no    
state can exist1 nor without those which
 contribute to its dignity and good     
order can exist happily3 now it is      
necessary that in small states the      
magistrates should be few2 in a large   
one1 many3 also to know well what       
offices may be joined together1 and what
 ought to be separated4 ,the first thing
 necessary is to establish proper       
regulators in the markets2 for which    
purpose a certain magistrate should be  
appointed to inspect their contracts and
 preserve good order2 for of necessity1 
in almost every city there must be both 
buyers and sellers to supply each       
other's mutual wants3 and this is what  
is most productive of the comforts of   
life2 for the sake of which men seem to 
have joined together in one community4  

,a second care1 and nearly related to   
the first1 is to have an eye both to the
 public and private edifices in the     
city1 that they may be an ornament2 and 
also to take care of all buildings which
 are likely to fall3 and to see that the
 highways are kept in proper repair2 and
 also that the landmarks between        
different estates are preserved1 that   
there may be no disputes on that        
account2 and all other business of the  
same nature4 ,now1 this business may be 
divided into several branches1 over each
 of which in populous cities they       
appoint a separate person2 one to       
inspect the buildings1 another the      
fountains1 another the harbours2 and    
they are called the inspectors of the   
city4 ,a third1 which is very like the  
last1 and conversant nearly about the   
same objects1 only in the country1 is to
 take care of what is done out of the   
city4 ,the officers who have this       
employment we call inspectors of the    
lands1 or inspectors of the woods2 but  

the business of all three of them is the
 same4 ,there must also be other        
officers appointed to receive the public
 revenue and to deliver it out to those 
who are in the different departments of 
the state3 these are called receivers or
 quaestors4 ,there must also be another1
 before whom all private contracts and  
sentences of courts should be enrolled1 
as well as proceedings and declarations4
 ,sometimes this employment is divided  
amongst many1 but there is one supreme  
over the rest2 these are called         
proctors1 notaries1 and the like4 ,next 
to these is an officer whose business is
 of all others the most necessary1 and  
yet most difficult2 namely1 to take care
 that sentence is executed upon those   
who are condemned2 and that every one   
pays the fines laid on him2 and also to 
have the charge of those who are in     
prison4 #acbb;a ,this office is very    
disagreeable on account of the odium    
attending it1 so that no one will engage
 therein without it is made very        

profitable1 or1 if they do1 will they be
 willing to execute it according to law2
 but it is most necessary1 as it is of  
no service to pass judgment in any cause
 without that judgment is carried into  
execution3 for without this human       
society could not subsist3 for which    
reason it is best that this office      
should not be executed by one person1   
but by some of the magistrates of the   
other courts4 ,in like manner1 the      
taking care that those fines which are  
ordered by the judges are levied should 
be divided amongst different persons4   
,and as different magistrates judge     
different causes1 let the causes of the 
young be heard by the young3 and as to  
those which are already brought to a    
hearing1 let one person pass sentence1  
and another see it executed3 as1 for    
instance1 let the magistrates who have  
the care of the public buildings execute
 the sentence which the inspectors of   
the markets have passed1 and the like in
 other cases3 for by so much the less   

odium attends those who carry the laws  
into execution1 by so much the easier   
will they be properly put in force3     
therefore for the same persons to pass  
the sentence and to execute it will     
subject them to general hatred2 and if  
they pass it upon all1 they will be     
considered as the enemies of all4 ,thus 
one person has often the custody of the 
prisoner's body1 while another sees the 
sentence against him executed1 as the   
eleven did at ,athens3 for which reason 
it is prudent to separate these offices1
 and to give great attention thereunto  
as equally necessary with anything we   
have already mentioned2 for it will     
certainly happen that men of character  
will decline accepting this office1 and 
worthless persons cannot properly be    
entrusted with it1 as having themselves 
rather an occasion for a guard than     
being qualified to guard others4 ,this1 
therefore1 ought by no means to be a    
separate office from others2 nor should 
it be continually allotted to any       

individuals1 but the young men2 where   
there is a city-guard1 the youths ought 
in turns to take these offices upon     
them4 ,these1 then1 as the most         
necessary magistrates1 ought to be first
 mentioned3 next to these are others no 
less necessary1 but of much higher rank1
 for they ought to be men of great skill
 and fidelity4 ,these are they who have 
the guard of the city1 and provide      
everything that is necessary for war2   
whose business it is1 both in war and   
peace1 to defend the walls and the      
gates1 and to take care to muster and   
marshal the citizens4 ,over all these   
there are sometimes more officers1      
sometimes fewer3 thus in little cities  
there is only one whom they call either 
general or polemarch2 but where there   
are horse and light-armed troops1 and   
bowmen1 and sailors1 they sometimes put 
distinct commanders over each of these2 
who again have others under them1       
according to their different divisions2 
all of which join together to make one  

military body3 and thus much for this   
department4 ,since some of the          
magistrates1 if not all1 have business  
with the public money1 it is necessary  
that there should be other officers1    
whose employment should be nothing else 
than to take an account of what they    
have1 and correct any mismanagement     
therein4 ,but besides all these         
magistrates there is one who is supreme 
over them all1 who very often has in his
 own power the disposal of the public   
revenue and taxes2 who presides over the
 people when the supreme power is in    
them2 for there must be some magistrate 
who has a power to summon them together1
 and to preside as head of the state4   
,these are sometimes called preadvisers2
 but where there are many1 more properly
 a council4 ,these are nearly the civil 
magistrates which are requisite to a    
government3 but there are other persons 
whose business is confined to religion2 
as the priests1 and those who are to    
take care of the temples1 that they are 

kept in proper repair1 or1 if they fall 
down1 that they may be rebuilt2 and     
whatever else belongs to public worship4
 ,this charge is sometimes entrusted to 
one person1 as in very small cities3 in 
others it is delegated to many1 and     
these distinct from the priesthood1 as  
the builders or keepers of holy places1 
and officers of the sacred revenue4     
,next to these are those who are        
appointed to have the general care of   
all those public sacrifices to the      
tutelar god of the state1 which the laws
 do not entrust to the priests3 and     
these in different states have different
 appellations4 ,to enumerate in few     
words the different departments of all  
those magistrates who are necessary3    
these are either religion1 war1 taxes1  
expenditures1 markets1 public buildings1
 harbours1 highways4 ,belonging to the  
courts of justice there are scribes to  
enroll private contracts2 and there must
 also be guards set over the prisoners1 
others to see the law is executed1      

council on either side1 and also others 
to watch over the conduct of those who  
are to decide the causes4 ,amongst the  
magistrates also may finally be reckoned
 those who are to give their advice in  
public affairs4 ,but separate states1   
who are peculiarly happy and have       
leisure to attend to more minute        
particulars1 and are very attentive to  
good order1 require particular          
magistrates for themselves2 such as     
those who have the government of the    
women2 who are to see the laws are      
executed2 who take care of the boys and 
preside over their education4 ,to these 
may be added those who have the care of 
their gymnastic exercises1 #acbc;a their
 theatres1 and every other public       
spectacle which there may happen to be4 
,some of these1 however1 are not of     
general use2 as the governors of the    
women3 for the poor are obliged to      
employ their wives and children in      
servile offices for want of slaves4 ,as 
there are three magistrates to whom some

 states entrust the supreme power2      
namely1 guardians of the laws1          
preadvisers1 and senators2 guardians of 
the laws suit best to an aristocracy1   
preadvisers to an oligarchy1 and a      
senate to a democracy4 ,and thus much   
briefly concerning all magistrates4     
,,book ,,vii     ,,chapter ,i   ,he who 
proposes to make that inquiry which is  
necessary concerning what government is 
best1 ought first to determine what     
manner of living is most eligible2 for  
while this remains uncertain it will    
also be equally uncertain what          
government is best3 for1 provided no    
unexpected accidents interfere1 it is   
highly probable1 that those who enjoy   
the best government will live the most  
happily according to their              
circumstances2 he ought1 therefore1     
first to know what manner of life is    
most desirable for all2 and afterwards  
whether this life is the same to the man
 and the citizen1 or different4 ,as ,i  
imagine that ,i have already            

sufficiently shown what sort of life is 
best in my popular discourses on that   
subject1 ,i think ,i may very properly  
repeat the same here2 as most certainly 
no one ever called in question the      
propriety of one of the divisions2      
namely1 that as what is good1 relative  
to man1 may be divided into three sorts1
 what is external1 what appertains to   
the body1 and what to the soul1 it is   
evident that all these must conspire to 
make a man happy3 for no one would say  
that a man was happy who had no         
fortitude1 no temperance1 no justice1 no
 prudence2 but was afraid of the flies  
that flew round him3 nor would abstain  
from the meanest theft if he was either 
hungry or dry1 or would murder his      
dearest friend for a farthing2 and also 
was in every particular as wanting in   
his understanding as an infant or an    
idiot4 ,these truths are so evident that
 all must agree to them2 though some may
 dispute about the quantity and the     
degree3 for they may think1 that a very 

little virtue is sufficient for         
happiness2 but for riches1 property1    
power1 honour1 and all such things1 they
 endeavour to increase them without     
bounds3 but to such we reply1 that it is
 easy to prove from what experience     
teaches us in these cases1 that these   
external goods produce not virtue1 but  
virtue them4 ,as to a happy life1       
whether it is to be found in pleasure or
 virtue or both1 certain it is1 that    
those whose morals are most pure1 and   
whose understandings are best           
cultivated1 will enjoy more of it1      
although their fortune is but moderate  
than those do who own an exuberance of  
wealth1 are deficient in those2 and this
 utility any one who reflects may easily
 convince himself of2 for whatsoever is 
external has its boundary1 as a machine1
 and whatsoever is useful in its excess 
is either necessarily hurtful1 or at    
best useless to the possessor2 but every
 good quality of the soul the higher it 
is in degree1 so much the more useful it

 is1 if it is permitted on this subject 
to use the word useful as well as noble4
 ,it is also very evident1 that the     
accidents of each subject take place of 
each other1 as the subjects themselves1 
of which we allow they are accidents1   
differ from each other in value2 so that
 if the soul is more noble than any     
outward possession1 as the body1 both in
 itself and with respect to us1 it must 
be admitted of course that the best     
accidents of each must follow the same  
analogy4 ,besides1 it is for the sake of
 the soul that these things are         
desirable2 and it is on this account    
that wise men should desire them1 not   
the soul for them4 ,let us therefore be 
well assured1 that every one enjoys as  
much happiness as he possesses virtue   
and wisdom1 and acts according to their 
dictates2 since for this we have the    
example of ,,god ,himself1 who is       
completely happy1 not from any external 
good1 but in ,himself1 and because such 
is ,his nature4 ,for good fortune is    

something different from happiness1 as  
every good which depends not on the mind
 is owing to chance or fortune2 but it  
is not from fortune that any one is wise
 and just3 hence it follows1 that that  
city is happiest which is the best and  
acts best3 for no one can do well who   
acts not well2 nor can the deeds either 
of man or city be praiseworthy without  
virtue and wisdom2 for whatsoever is    
just1 or wise1 or prudent in a man1 the 
same things are just1 wise1 and prudent 
in a city4  ,thus much by way of        
introduction2 for ,i could not but just 
touch upon this subject1 though ,i could
 not go through a complete investigation
 of it1 as it properly belongs to       
another question3 let us at present     
suppose so much1 that a man's happiest  
life1 both as an individual and as a    
citizen1 is a life of virtue1           
accompanied with those enjoyments which 
virtue usually procures4 ,if #acbd;a    
there are any who are not convinced by  
what ,i have said1 their doubts shall be

 answered hereafter1 at present we shall
 proceed according to our intended      
method4     ,,chapter ,,ii   ,it now    
remains for us to say whether the       
happiness of any individual man and the 
city is the same or different3 but this 
also is evident2 for whosoever supposes 
that riches will make a person happy1   
must place the happiness of the city in 
riches if it possesses them2 those who  
prefer a life which enjoys a tyrannic   
power over others will also think1 that 
the city which has many others under its
 command is most happy3 thus also if any
 one approves a man for his virtue1 he  
will think the most worthy city the     
happiest3 but here there are two        
particulars which require consideration1
 one of which is1 whether it is the most
 eligible life to be a member of the    
community and enjoy the rights of a     
citizen1 or whether to live as a        
stranger1 without interfering in public 
affairs2 and also what form of          
government is to be preferred1 and what 

disposition of the state is best2       
whether the whole community should be   
eligible to a share in the              
administration1 or only the greater     
part1 and some only3 as this1 therefore1
 is a subject of political examination  
and speculation1 and not what concerns  
the individual1 and the first of these  
is what we are at present engaged in1   
the one of these ,i am not obliged to   
speak to1 the other is the proper       
business of my present design4 ,it is   
evident that government must be the best
 which is so established1 that every one
 therein may have it in his power to act
 virtuously and live happily3 but some1 
who admit that a life of virtue is most 
eligible1 still doubt which is          
preferable a public life of active      
virtue1 or one entirely disengaged from 
what is without and spent in            
contemplation2 which some say is the    
only one worthy of a philosopher2 and   
one of these two different modes of life
 both now and formerly seem to have been

 chosen by all those who were the most  
virtuous men2 ,i mean the public or     
philosophic4 ,and yet it is of no little
 consequence on which side the truth    
lies2 for a man of sense must naturally 
incline to the better choice2 both as an
 individual and a citizen4 ,some think  
that a tyrannic government over those   
near us is the greatest injustice2 but  
that a political one is not unjust3 but 
that still is a restraint on the        
pleasures and tranquillity of life4     
,others hold the quite contrary opinion1
 and think that a public and active life
 is the only life for man3 for that     
private persons have no opportunity of  
practising any one virtue1 more than    
they have who are engaged in public life
 the management of the #acbd;b state4   
,these are their sentiments2 others say1
 that a tyrannical and despotical mode  
of government is the only happy one2 for
 even amongst some free states the      
object of their laws seems to be to     
tyrannise over their neighbours3 so that

 the generality of political            
institutions1 wheresoever dispersed1 if 
they have any one common object in view1
 have all of them this1 to conquer and  
govern4 ,it is evident1 both from the   
laws of the ,lacedaemonians and         
,cretans1 as well as by the manner in   
which they educated their children1 that
 all which they had in view was to make 
them soldiers3 besides1 among all       
nations1 those who have power enough and
 reduce others to servitude are honoured
 on that account2 as were the           
,scythians1 ,persians1 ,thracians1 and  
,gauls3 with some there are laws to     
heighten the virtue of courage2 thus    
they tell us that at ,carthage they     
allowed every person to wear as many    
rings for distinction as he had served  
campaigns4 ,there was also a law in     
,macedonia1 that a man who had not      
himself killed an enemy should be       
obliged to wear a halter2 among the     
,scythians1 at a festival1 none were    
permitted to drink out of the cup was   

carried about who had not done the same 
thing4 ,among the ,iberians1 a warlike  
nation1 they fixed as many columns upon 
a man's tomb as he had slain enemies3   
and among different nations different   
things of this sort prevail1 some of    
them established by law1 others by      
custom4 ,probably it may seem too absurd
 to those who are willing to take this  
subject into their consideration to     
inquire whether it is the business of a 
legislator to be able to point out by   
what means a state may govern and       
tyrannise over its neighbours1 whether  
they will1 or will not3 for how can that
 belong either to the politician or     
legislator which is unlawful8 for that  
cannot be lawful which is done not only 
justly1 but unjustly also3 for a        
conquest may be unjustly made4 ,but we  
see nothing of this in the arts3 for it 
is the business neither of the physician
 nor the pilot to use either persuasion 
or force1 the one to his patients1 the  
other to his passengers3 and yet many   

seem to think a despotic government is a
 political one1 and what they would not 
allow to be just or proper1 if exercised
 over themselves1 they will not blush to
 exercise over others2 for they         
endeavour to be wisely governed         
themselves1 but think it of no          
consequence whether others are so or    
not3 but a despotic power is absurd1    
except only where nature has framed the 
one party for dominion1 the other for   
subordination2 and therefore no one     
ought to assume it over all in general1 
but those only which are the proper     
objects thereof3 thus no one should hunt
 men either for food or sacrifice1 but  
what is fit for those purposes1 and     
these are wild animals which are        
eatable4  ,now a city which is well     
governed might be very #acbe;a happy in 
itself while it enjoyed a good system of
 laws1 although it should happen to be  
so situated as to have no connection    
with any other state1 though its        
constitution should not be framed for   

war or conquest2 for it would then have 
no occasion for these4 ,it is evident   
therefore that the business of war is to
 be considered as commendable1 not as a 
final end1 but as the means of procuring
 it4 ,it is the duty of a good          
legislator to examine carefully into his
 state2 and the nature of the people1   
and how they may partake of every       
intercourse1 of a good life1 and of the 
happiness which results from it3 and in 
this respect some laws and customs      
differ from others4 ,it is also the duty
 of a legislator1 if he has any         
neighbouring states to consider in what 
manner he shall oppose each of them1 or 
what good offices he shall show them4   
,but what should be the final end of the
 best governments will be considered    
hereafter4     ,,chapter ,,iii   ,we    
will now speak to those who1 while they 
agree that a life of virtue is most     
eligible1 yet differ in the use of it   
addressing ourselves to both these      
parties2 for there are some who         

disapprove of all political governments1
 and think that the life of one who is  
really free is different from the life  
of a citizen1 and of all others most    
eligible3 others again think that the   
citizen is the best2 and that it is     
impossible for him who does nothing to  
be well employed2 but that virtuous     
activity and happiness are the same     
thing4 ,now both parties in some        
particulars say what is right1 in others
 what is wrong1 thus1 that the life of a
 freeman is better than the life of a   
slave is true1 for a slave1 as a slave1 
is employed in nothing honourable2 for  
the common servile employments which he 
is commanded to perform have nothing    
virtuous in them2 but1 on the other     
hand1 it is not true that a submission  
to all sorts of governments is slavery2 
for the government of freemen differs   
not more from the government of slaves  
than slavery and freedom differ from    
each other in their nature2 and how they
 do has been already mentioned4 ,to     

prefer doing of nothing to virtuous     
activity is also wrong1 for happiness   
consists in action1 and many noble ends 
are produced by the actions of the just 
and wise4 ,from what we have already    
determined on this subject1 some one    
probably may think1 that supreme power  
is of all things best1 as that will     
enable a man to command very many useful
 services from others2 so that he who   
can obtain this ought not to give it up 
to another1 but rather to seize it3 and1
 for this purpose1 the father should    
have no attention or regard for the son1
 or the son for the father1 or friend   
for friend2 for what is best is most    
eligible3 but to be a member of the     
community and be in felicity is best4   
,what these persons advance might       
probably be true1 if the supreme good   
was certainly theirs who plunder and use
 violence to others3 but it is #acbe;b  
most unlikely that it should be so2 for 
it is a mere supposition3 for it does   
not follow that their actions are       

honourable who thus assume the supreme  
power over others1 without they were by 
nature as superior to them as a man to a
 woman1 a father to a child1 a master to
 a slave3 so that he who so far forsakes
 the paths of virtue can never return   
back from whence he departed from them3 
for amongst equals whatever is fair and 
just ought to be reciprocal2 for this is
 equal and right2 but that equals should
 not partake of what is equal1 or like  
to like1 is contrary to nature3 but     
whatever is contrary to nature is not   
right2 therefore1 if there is any one   
superior to the rest of the community in
 virtue and abilities for active life1  
him it is proper to follow1 him it is   
right to obey1 but the one alone will   
not do1 but must be joined to the other 
also3 and1 if we are right in what we   
have now said1 it follows that happiness
 consists in virtuous activity1 and that
 both with respect to the community as  
well as the individual an active life is
 the happiest3 not that an active life  

must necessarily refer to other persons1
 as some think1 or that those studies   
alone are practical which are pursued to
 teach others what to do2 for those are 
much more so whose final object is in   
themselves1 and to improve the judgment 
and understanding of the man2 for       
virtuous activity has an end1 therefore 
is something practical2 nay1 those who  
contrive the plan which others follow   
are more particularly said to act1 and  
are superior to the workmen who execute 
their designs4 ,but it is not necessary 
that states which choose to have no     
intercourse with others should remain   
inactive2 for the several members       
thereof may have mutual intercourse with
 each other2 for there are many         
opportunities for this among the        
different citizens2 the same thing is   
true of every individual3 for1 was it   
otherwise1 neither could the ,deity nor 
the universe be perfect2 to neither of  
whom can anything external separately   
exist4 ,hence it is evident that that   

very same life which is happy for each  
individual is happy also for the state  
and every member of it4     ,,chapter   
,,iv   ,as ,i have now finished what was
 introductory to this subject1 and      
considered at large the nature of other 
states1 it now remains that ,i should   
first say what ought to be the          
establishment of a city which one should
 form according to one's wish2 for no   
good state can exist without a moderate 
proportion of what is necessary4 ,many  
things therefore ought to be forethought
 of as desirable1 but none of them such 
as are impossible3 ,i mean relative to  
the number of citizens and the extent of
 the territory3 for as other artificers1
 such as the weaver and the shipwright1 
ought to have such materials as are fit 
for their work1 since so much the better
 they are1 by so much #acbf;a superior  
will the work itself necessarily be2 so 
also ought the legislator and politician
 endeavour to procure proper materials  
for the business they have in hand4 ,now

 the first and principal instrument of  
the politician is the number of the     
people2 he should therefore know how    
many1 and what they naturally ought to  
be3 in like manner the country1 how     
large1 and what it is4 ,most persons    
think that it is necessary for a city to
 be large to be happy3 but1 should this 
be true1 they cannot tell what is a     
large one and what a small one2 for     
according to the multitude of the       
inhabitants they estimate the greatness 
of it2 but they ought rather to consider
 its strength than its numbers2 for a   
state has a certain object in view1 and 
from the power which it has in itself of
 accomplishing it1 its greatness ought  
to be estimated2 as a person might say1 
that ,hippocrates was a greater         
physician1 though not a greater man1    
than one that exceeded him in the size  
of his body3 but if it was proper to    
determine the strength of the city from 
the number of the inhabitants1 it should
 never be collected from the multitude  

in general who may happen to be in it2  
for in a city there must necessarily be 
many slaves1 sojourners1 and foreigners2
 but from those who are really part of  
the city and properly constitute its    
members2 a multitude of these is indeed 
a proof of a large city1 but in a state 
where a large number of mechanics       
inhabit1 and but few soldiers1 such a   
state cannot be great2 for the greatness
 of the city1 and the number of men in  
it1 are not the same thing4 ,this too is
 evident from fact1 that it is very     
difficult1 if not impossible1 to govern 
properly a very numerous body of men2   
for of all the states which appear well 
governed we find not one where the      
rights of a citizen are open to an      
indiscriminate multitude4 ,and this is  
also evident from the nature of the     
thing2 for as law is a certain order1 so
 good law is of course a certain good   
order3 but too large a multitude are    
incapable of this1 unless under the     
government of that ,,divine ,,power     

which comprehends the universe4 ,not but
 that1 as quantity and variety are      
usually essential to beauty1 the        
perfection of a city consists in the    
largeness of it as far as that largeness
 is consistent with that order already  
mentioned3 but still there is a         
determinate size to all cities1 as well 
as everything else1 whether animals1    
plants1 or machines1 for each of these1 
if they are neither too little nor too  
big1 have their proper powers2 but when 
they have not their due growth1 or are  
badly constructed1 as a ship a span long
 is not properly a ship1 nor one of two 
furlongs length1 but when it is of a fit
 size2 for either from its smallness or 
from its largeness it may be quite      
useless3 so is it with a city2 one that 
is too small has not #acbf;b in itself  
the power of self-defence1 but this is  
essential to a city3 one that is too    
large is capable of self-defence in what
 is necessary2 but then it is a nation  
and not a city3 for it will be very     

difficult to accommodate a form of      
government to it3 for who would choose  
to be the general of such an unwieldy   
multitude1 or who could be their herald 
but a stentor8 ,the first thing         
therefore necessary is1 that a city     
should consist of such numbers as will  
be sufficient to enable the inhabitants 
to live happily in their political      
community3 and it follows1 that the more
 the inhabitants exceed that necessary  
number the greater will the city be3 but
 this must not be1 as we have already   
said1 without bounds2 but what is its   
proper limit experience will easily     
show1 and this experience is to be      
collected from the actions both of the  
governors and the governed4 ,now1 as it 
belongs to the first to direct the      
inferior magistrates and to act as      
judges1 it follows that they can neither
 determine causes with justice nor issue
 their orders with propriety without    
they know the characters of their       
fellow-citizens3 so that whenever this  

happens not to be done in these two     
particulars1 the state must of necessity
 be badly managed2 for in both of them  
it is not right to determine too hastily
 and without proper knowledge1 which    
must evidently be the case where the    
number of the citizens is too many3     
besides1 it is more easy for strangers  
and sojourners to assume the rights of  
citizens1 as they will easily escape    
detection in so great a multitude4 ,it  
is evident1 then1 that the best boundary
 for a city is that wherein the numbers 
are the greatest possible1 that they may
 be the better able to be sufficient in 
themselves1 while at the same time they 
are not too large to be under the eye   
and government of the magistrates4 ,and 
thus let us determine the extent of a   
city4     ,,chapter ,v   ,what we have  
said concerning a city may nearly be    
applied to a country2 for as to what    
soil it should be1 every one evidently  
will commend it if it is such as is     
sufficient in itself to furnish what    

will make the inhabitants happy2 for    
which purpose it must be able to supply 
them with all the necessaries of life2  
for it is the having these in plenty1   
without any want1 which makes them      
content4 ,as to its extent1 it should be
 such as may enable the inhabitants to  
live at their ease with freedom and     
temperance4 ,whether we have done right 
or wrong in fixing this limit to the    
territory shall be considered more      
minutely hereafter1 when we come        
particularly to inquire into property1  
and what fortune is requisite for a man 
to live on1 and how and in what manner  
they ought to employ it2 for there are  
many doubts upon this question1 while   
each party insists upon their own plan  
of life being carried to an excess1 the 
one of severity1 the other of           
indulgence4 ,what the situation of the  
country should be it is not difficult to
 determine1 in some particulars         
respecting that we ought to be advised  
by those who are skilful in military    

affairs4 ,it should be difficult of     
access to an enemy1 but easy to the     
inhabitants3 and as we said1 that the   
number of #acbg;a inhabitants ought to  
be such as can come under the eye of the
 magistrate1 so should it be with the   
country2 for then it is easily defended4
 ,as to the position of the city1 if one
 could place it to one's wish1 it is    
convenient to fix it on the seaside3    
with respect to the country1 one        
situation which it ought to have has    
been already mentioned1 namely1 that it 
should be so placed as easily to give   
assistance to all places1 and also to   
receive the necessaries of life from all
 parts1 and also wood1 or any other     
materials which may happen to be in the 
country4     ,,chapter ,,vi   ,but with 
respect to placing a city in the        
neighbourhood of the sea1 there are some
 who have many doubts whether it is     
serviceable or hurtful to a             
well-regulated state2 for they say1 that
 the resort of persons brought up under 

a different system of government is     
disserviceable to the state1 as well by 
impeding the laws as by their numbers2  
for a multitude of merchants must       
necessarily arise from their trafficking
 backward and forward upon the seas1    
which will hinder the well-governing of 
the city3 but if this inconvenience     
should not arise1 it is evident that it 
is better1 both on account of safety and
 also for the easier acquisition of the 
necessaries of life1 that both the city 
and the country should be near the sea2 
for it is necessary that those who are  
to sustain the attack of the enemy      
should be ready with their assistance   
both by land and by sea1 and to oppose  
any inroad1 both ways if possible but if
 not1 at least where they are most      
powerful1 which they may do while they  
possess both4 ,a maritime situation is  
also useful for receiving from others   
what your own country will not produce1 
and exporting those necessaries of your 
own growth which are more than you have 

occasion for2 but a city ought to       
traffic to supply its own wants1 and not
 the wants of others2 for those who     
themselves furnish an open market for   
every one1 do it for the sake of gain2  
which it is not proper for a            
well-established state to do1 neither   
should they encourage such a commerce4  
,now1 as we see that many places and    
cities have docks and harbours lying    
very convenient for the city1 while     
those who frequent them have no         
communication with the citadel1 and yet 
they are not too far off1 but are       
surrounded by walls and such-like       
fortifications1 it is evident1 that if  
any good arises from such an intercourse
 the city will receive it1 but if       
anything hurtful1 it will be easy to    
restrain it by a law declaring and      
deputing whom the state will allow to   
have an intercourse with each other1 and
 whom not4 ,as to a naval power1 it is  
by no means doubtful that it is         
necessary to have one to a certain      

degree2 and this not only for the sake  
of the #acbg;b city itself1 but also    
because it may be necessary to appear   
formidable to some of the neighbouring  
states1 or to be able to assist them as 
well by sea as by land2 but to know how 
great that force should be1 the health  
of the state should be inquired into1   
and if that appears vigorous and enables
 her to take the lead of other          
communities1 it is necessary that her   
force should correspond with her        
actions4 ,as for that multitude of      
people which a maritime power creates1  
they are by no means necessary to a     
state1 nor ought they to make a part of 
the citizens2 for the mariners and      
infantry1 who have the command1 are     
freemen1 and upon these depends a naval 
engagement3 but when there are many     
servants and husbandmen1 there they will
 always have a number of sailors1 as we 
now see happens to some states1 as in   
,heraclea1 where they man many triremes1
 though the extent of their city is much

 inferior to some others4 ,and thus we  
determine concerning the country1 the   
port1 the city1 the sea1 and a maritime 
power3 as to the number of the citizens1
 what that ought to be we have already  
said4     ,,chapter ,,vii   ,we now     
proceed to point out what natural       
disposition the members of the community
 ought to be of3 but this any one will  
easily perceive who will cast his eye   
over the states of ,greece1 of all      
others the most celebrated1 and also the
 other different nations of this        
habitable world4 ,those who live in cold
 countries1 as the north of ,europe1 are
 full of courage1 but wanting in        
understanding and the arts3 therefore   
they are very tenacious of their        
liberty2 but1 not being politicians1    
they cannot reduce their neighbours     
under their power3 but the ,asiatics1   
whose understandings are quick1 and who 
are conversant in the arts1 are         
deficient in courage2 and therefore are 
always conquered and the slaves of      

others3 but the ,grecians1 placed as it 
were between these two boundaries1 so   
partake of them both as to be at the    
same time both courageous and sensible2 
for which reason ,greece continues free1
 and governed in the best manner        
possible1 and capable of commanding the 
whole world1 could they agree upon one  
system of policy4 ,now this is the      
difference between the ,grecians and    
other nations1 that the latter have but 
one of these qualities1 whereas in the  
former they are both happily blended    
together4 ,hence it is evident1 that    
those persons ought to be both sensible 
and courageous who will readily obey a  
legislator1 the object of whose laws is 
virtue4 ,as to what some persons say1   
that the military must be mild and      
tender to those they know1 but severe   
and cruel to those they know not1 it is 
courage which #acbh;a makes any one     
lovely2 for that is the faculty of the  
soul which we most admire3 as a proof of
 this1 our resentment rises higher      

against our friends and acquaintance    
than against those we know not3 for     
which reason ,archilaus accusing his    
friends says very properly to himself1  
,shall my friends insult me8 ,the spirit
 of freedom and command also is what all
 inherit who are of this disposition for
 courage is commanding and invincible4  
,it also is not right for any one to    
say1 that you should be severe to those 
you know not2 for this behaviour is     
proper for no one3 nor are those who are
 of a noble disposition harsh in their  
manners1 excepting only to the wicked2  
and when they are particularly so1 it   
is1 as has been already said1 against   
their friends1 when they think they have
 injured them2 which is agreeable to    
reason3 for when those who think they   
ought to receive a favour from any one  
do not receive it1 beside the injury    
done them1 they consider what they are  
deprived of3 hence the saying1 ,cruel   
are the wars of brothers2 and this1     
,those who have greatly loved do greatly

 hate4 ,and thus we have nearly         
determined how many the inhabitants of a
 city ought to be1 and what their       
natural disposition1 and also the       
country how large1 and of what sort is  
necessary2 ,i say nearly1 because it is 
needless to endeavour at as great       
accuracy in those things which are the  
objects of the senses as in those which 
are inquired into by the understanding  
only4     ,,chapter ,,viii   ,as in     
natural bodies those things are not     
admitted to be parts of them without    
which the whole would not exist1 so also
 it is evident that in a political state
 everything that is necessary thereunto 
is not to be considered as a part of it1
 nor any other community from whence one
 whole is made2 for one thing ought to  
be common and the same to the community1
 whether they partake of it equally or  
unequally1 as1 for instance1 food1 land1
 or the like2 but when one thing is for 
the benefit of one person1 and another  
for the benefit of another1 in this     

there is nothing like a community1      
excepting that one makes it and the     
other uses it2 as1 for instance1 between
 any instrument employed in making any  
work1 and the workmen1 as there is      
nothing common between the house and the
 builder1 but the art of the builder is 
employed on the house4 ,thus property is
 necessary for states1 but property is  
no part of the state1 though many       
species of it have life2 but a city is a
 community of equals1 for the purpose of
 enjoying the best life possible3 but   
the happiest life is the best which     
consists in the perfect practice of     
virtuous energies3 as therefore some    
persons have great1 others little or no 
opportunity of being employed in these1 
it is evident that this is the cause of 
the difference there is between the     
different cities and communities there  
are to be found2 for while each of these
 endeavour to acquire what is best by   
various and different means1 they give  
#acbh;b rise to different modes of      

living and different forms of           
government4 ,we are now to consider what
 those things are without which a city  
cannot possibly exist2 for what we call 
parts of the city must of necessity     
inhere in it3 and this we shall plainly 
understand1 if we know the number of    
things necessary to a city3 first1 the  
inhabitants must have food3 secondly1   
arts1 for many instruments are necessary
 in life3 thirdly1 arms1 for it is      
necessary that the community should have
 an armed force within themselves1 both 
to support their government against     
those of their own body who might refuse
 obedience to it1 and also to defend it 
from those who might attempt to attack  
it from without3 fourthly1 a certain    
revenue1 as well for the internal       
necessities of the state as for the     
business of war3 fifthly1 which is      
indeed the chief concern1 a religious   
establishment3 sixthly in order1 but    
first of all in necessity1 a court to   
determine both criminal and civil       

causes4 ,these things are absolutely    
necessary1 so to speak1 in every state2 
for a city is a number of people not    
accidentally met together1 but with a   
purpose of ensuring to themselves       
sufficient independency and             
self-protection2 and if anything        
necessary for these purposes is wanting1
 it is impossible that in such a        
situation these ends can be obtained4   
,it is necessary therefore that a city  
should be capable of acquiring all these
 things3 for this purpose a proper      
number of husbandmen are necessary to   
procure food1 also artificers and       
soldiers1 and rich men1 and priests and 
judges1 to determine what is right and  
proper4     ,,chapter ,,ix   ,having    
determined thus far1 it remains that we 
consider whether all these different    
employments shall be open to all2 for it
 is possible to continue the same       
persons always husbandmen1 artificers1  
judges1 or counsellors2 or shall we     
appoint different persons to each of    

those employments which we have already 
mentioned2 or shall some of them be     
appropriated to particulars1 and others 
of course common to all8 but this does  
not take place in every state1 for1 as  
we have already said1 it is possible    
that all may be common to all1 or not1  
but only common to some2 and this is the
 difference between one government and  
another3 for in democracies the whole   
community partakes of everything1 but in
 oligarchies it is different4  ,since we
 are inquiring what is the best         
government possible1 and it is admitted 
to be that in which the citizens are    
happy2 and that1 as we have already     
said1 it is impossible to obtain        
happiness without virtue2 it follows1   
that in the best-governed states1 where 
the citizens are really men of intrinsic
 and not relative goodness1 none of them
 should be permitted to exercise any    
mechanic employment or follow           
merchandise1 as being ignoble and       
destructive to virtue2 neither should   

they be husband-#acbi;a men1 that they  
may be at leisure to improve in virtue  
and perform the duty they owe to the    
state4 ,with respect to the employments 
of a soldier1 a senator1 and a judge1   
which are evidently necessary to the    
community1 shall they be allotted to    
different persons1 or shall the same    
person execute both8 ,this question1    
too1 is easily answered3 for in some    
cases the same persons may execute them1
 in others they should be different1    
where the different employments require 
different abilities1 as when courage is 
wanting for one1 judgment for the other1
 there they should be allotted to       
different persons2 but when it is       
evident1 that it is impossible to oblige
 those who have arms in their hands1 and
 can insist on their own terms1 to be   
always under command2 there these       
different employments should be trusted 
to one person2 for those who have arms  
in their hands have it in their option  
whether they will or will not assume the

 supreme power3 to these two 7namely1   
those who have courage and judgment7 the
 government must be entrusted2 but not  
in the same manner1 but as nature       
directs2 what requires courage to the   
young1 what requires judgment to the    
old2 for with the young is courage1 with
 the old is wisdom3 thus each will be   
allotted the part they are fit for      
according to their different merits4 ,it
 is also necessary that the landed      
property should belong to these men2 for
 it is necessary that the citizens      
should be rich1 and these are the men   
proper for citizens2 for no mechanic    
ought to be admitted to the rights of a 
citizen1 nor any other sort of people   
whose employment is not entirely noble1 
honourable1 and virtuous2 this is       
evident from the principle we at first  
set out with2 for to be happy it is     
necessary to be virtuous2 and no one    
should say that a city is happy while he
 considers only one part of its         
citizens1 but for that purpose he ought 

to examine into all of them4 ,it is     
evident1 therefore1 that the landed     
property should belong to these1 though 
it may be necessary for them to have    
husbandmen1 either slaves1 barbarians1  
or servants4 ,there remains of the      
different classes of the people whom we 
have enumerated1 the priests1 for these 
evidently compose a rank by themselves2 
for neither are they to be reckoned     
amongst the husbandmen nor the          
mechanics2 for reverence to the gods is 
highly becoming every state3 and since  
the citizens have been divided into     
orders1 the military and the council1   
and it is proper to offer due worship to
 the gods1 and since it is necessary    
that those who are employed in their    
service should have nothing else to do1 
let the business of the priesthood be   
allotted to those who are in years4 ,we 
have now shown what is necessary to the 
existence of a city1 and of what parts  
it consists1 and that husbandmen1       
mechanic1 and mercenary servants are    

necessary to a city2 but that the parts 
of it are soldiers and sailors1 and that
 these are always different from those1 
but from each other only occasionally4  
,,chapter ,x   ,it seems neither now nor
 very lately to have been known #acbi;b 
to those philosophers who have made     
politics their study1 that a city ought 
to be divided by families into different
 orders of men2 and that the husbandmen 
and soldiers should be kept separate    
from each other2 which custom is even to
 this day preserved in ,egypt and in    
,crete2 also ,sesostris having founded  
it in ,egypt1 ,minos in ,crete4 ,common 
meals seem also to have been an ancient 
regulation1 and to have been established
 in ,crete during the reign of ,minos1  
and in a still more remote period in    
,italy2 for those who are the best      
judges in that country say that one     
,italus being king of ,a,enotria41 from 
whom the people1 changing their names1  
were called ,italians instead of        
,a,enotrians1 and that part of ,europe  

was called ,italy which is bounded by   
the ,scylletic ,gulf on the one side and
 the ,lametic on the other1 the distance
 between which is about half a day's    
journey4 ,this ,italus1 they relate1    
made the ,a,enotrians1 who were formerly
 shepherds1 husbandmen1 and gave them   
different laws from what they had       
before1 and to have been the first who  
established common meals1 for which     
reason some of his descendants still use
 them1 and observe some of his laws4    
,the ,opici inhabit that part which lies
 towards the ,tyrrhenian ,sea1 who both 
now are and formerly were called        
,ausonians4 ,the ,chones inhabited the  
part toward ,iapigia and the ,ionian    
,sea which is called ,syrtis4 ,these    
,chones were descended from the         
,a,enotrians4 ,hence arose the custom of
 common meals1 but the separation of the
 citizens into different families from  
,egypt3 for the reign of ,sesostris is  
of much higher antiquity than that of   
,minos4 ,as we ought to think that most 

other things were found out in a long1  
nay1 even in a boundless time 7reason   
teaching us that want would make us     
first invent that which was necessary1  
and1 when that was obtained1 then those 
things which were requisite for the     
conveniences and ornament of life71 so  
should we conclude the same with respect
 to a political state2 now everything in
 ,egypt bears the marks of the most     
remote antiquity1 for these people seem 
to be the most ancient of all others1   
and to have acquired laws and political 
order2 we should therefore make a proper
 use of what is told us of them1 and    
endeavour to find out what they have    
omitted4 ,we have already said1 that the
 landed property ought to belong to the 
military and those who partake of the   
government of the state2 and that       
therefore the husbandmen should be a    
separate order of people2 and how large 
and of what nature the country ought to 
be3 we will first treat of the division 
of the land1 and of the husbandmen1 how 

many and of what sort they ought to be2 
since we by no means hold that property 
ought to be common1 as some persons have
 said1 only thus far1 in friendship1 it 
#accj;a should be their custom to let no
 citizen want subsistence4 ,as to common
 meals1 it is in general agreed that    
they are proper in well-regulated       
cities2 my reasons for approving of them
 shall be mentioned hereafter3 they are 
what all the citizens ought to partake  
of2 but it will not be easy for the     
poor1 out of what is their own1 to      
furnish as much as they are ordered to  
do1 and supply their own house besides4 
,the expense also of religious worship  
should be defrayed by the whole state4  
,of necessity therefore the land ought  
to be divided into two parts1 one of    
which should belong to the community in 
general1 the other to the individuals   
separately2 and each of these parts     
should again be subdivided into two3    
half of that which belongs to the public
 should be appropriated to maintain the 

worship of the gods1 the other half to  
support the common meals4 ,half of that 
which belongs to the individuals should 
be at the extremity of the country1 the 
other half near the city1 so that these 
two portions being allotted to each     
person1 all would partake of land in    
both places1 which would be both equal  
and right2 and induce them to act in    
concert with greater harmony in any war 
with their neighbours3 for when the land
 is not divided in this manner1 one     
party neglects the inroads of the enemy 
on the borders1 the other makes it a    
matter of too much consequence and more 
than is necessary2 for which reason in  
some places there is a law which forbids
 the inhabitants of the borders to have 
any vote in the council when they are   
debating upon a war which is made       
against them as their private interest  
might prevent their voting impartially4 
,thus therefore the country ought to be 
divided and for the reasons before      
mentioned4 ,could one have one's choice1

 the husbandmen should by all means be  
slaves1 not of the same nation1 or men  
of any spirit2 for thus they would be   
laborious in their business1 and safe   
from attempting any novelties3 next to  
these barbarian servants are to be      
preferred1 similar in natural           
disposition to these we have already    
mentioned4 ,of these1 let those who are 
to cultivate the private property of the
 individual belong to that individual1  
and those who are to cultivate the      
public territory belong to the public4  
,in what manner these slaves ought to be
 used1 and for what reason it is very   
proper that they should have the promise
 of their liberty made them1 as a reward
 for their services1 shall be mentioned 
hereafter4     ,,chapter ,,xi   ,we have
 already mentioned1 that both the city  
and all the country should communicate  
both with the sea and the continent as  
much as possible4 ,there are these four 
things which we should be particularly  
desirous of in the position of the city 

with respect to itself3 in the first    
place1 health is to be consulted as the 
first thing necessary3 now a city which 
fronts the east and receives the winds  
which blow from thence is esteemed most 
healthful2 next to this that which has a
 northern position is to be preferred1  
as best in winter4 ,it should next be   
contrived that it may have a proper     
situation for the business of government
 and for defence in war3 that in war the
 citizens may #accj;b have easy access  
to it2 but that it may be difficult of  
access to1 and hardly to be taken by1   
the enemy4 ,in the next place           
particularly1 that there may be plenty  
of water1 and rivers near at hand3 but  
if those cannot be found1 very large    
cisterns must be prepared to save       
rain-water1 so that there may be no want
 of it in case they should be driven    
into the town in time of war4 ,and as   
great care should be taken of the health
 of the inhabitants1 the first thing to 
be attended to is1 that the city should 

have a good situation and a good        
position2 the second is1 that they may  
have good water to drink2 and this not  
be negligently taken care of2 for what  
we chiefly and most frequently use for  
the support of the body must principally
 influence the health of it2 and this   
influence is what the air and water     
naturally have3 for which reason in all 
wise governments the waters ought to be 
appropriated to different purposes1 and 
if they are not equally good1 and if    
there is not a plenty of necessary      
water1 that which is to drink should be 
separated from that which is for other  
uses4 ,as to fortified places1 what is  
proper for some governments is not      
proper for all2 as1 for instance1 a     
lofty citadel is proper for a monarchy  
and an oligarchy2 a city built upon a   
plain suits a democracy2 neither of     
these for an aristocracy1 but rather    
many strong places4 ,as to the form of  
private houses1 those are thought to be 
best and most useful for their different

 purposes which are distinct and        
separate from each other1 and built in  
the modern manner1 after the plan of    
,hippodamus3 but for safety in time of  
war1 on the contrary1 they should be    
built as they formerly were2 for they   
were such that strangers could not      
easily find their way out of them1 and  
the method of access to them such as an 
enemy could with difficulty find out if 
he proposed to besiege them4 ,a city    
therefore should have both these sorts  
of buildings1 which may easily be       
contrived if any one will so regulate   
them as the planters do their rows of   
vines2 not that the buildings throughout
 the city should be detached from each  
other1 only in some parts of it2 thus   
elegance and safety will be equally     
consulted4 ,with respect to walls1 those
 who say that a courageous people ought 
not to have any1 pay too much respect to
 obsolete notions2 particularly as we   
may see those who pride themselves      
therein continually confuted by facts4  

,it is indeed disreputable for those who
 are equal1 or nearly so1 to the enemy1 
to endeavour to take refuge within their
 walls--but since it very often happens1
 that those who make the attack are too 
powerful for the bravery and courage of 
those few who oppose them to resist1 if 
you would not suffer the calamities of  
war and the insolence of the enemy1 it  
must be thought the part of a good      
soldier to seek for safety under the    
shelter and protection of walls more    
especially since so many missile weapons
 and machines have been most ingeniously
 invented to besiege cities with4       
,indeed to neglect surrounding a city   
with a wall would be similar to choosing
 a country which is easy of access to an
 enemy1 or levelling the eminences of   
it2 or as if an individual should not   
have a wall to his house lest it should 
be thought that the owner of it was a   
coward3 nor should this be left         
unconsidered1 that those who have a city
 surrounded with walls may act both     

ways1 either as if it had or as if it   
had not2 but where it has not they      
cannot do this4 ,if this is true1 it is 
not only necessary to have walls1 but   
care must be taken that they may be a   
proper ornament to the city1 as well as 
a defence in time of war2 not only      
according to the old methods1 but the   
modern improvements also3 for as those  
who make offensive war endeavour by     
every way possible to gain advantages   
over their adversaries1 so should those 
who are upon the defensive employ all   
the means already known1 and such new   
ones as philosophy can invent1 to defend
 themselves3 for those who are well     
prepared are seldom first attacked4     
,,chapter ,,xii   ,as the citizens in   
general are to eat at public tables in  
certain companies1 and it is necessary  
that the walls should have bulwarks and 
towers in proper places and at proper   
distances1 it is evident that it will be
 very necessary to have some of these in
 the towers2 let the buildings for this 

purpose be made the ornaments of the    
walls4 ,as to temples for public        
worship1 and the hall for the public    
tables of the chief magistrates1 they   
ought to be built in proper places1 and 
contiguous to each other1 except those  
temples which the law or the oracle     
orders to be separate from all other    
buildings2 and let these be in such a   
conspicuous eminence1 that they may have
 every advantage of situation1 and in   
the neighbourhood of that part of the   
city which is best fortified4 ,adjoining
 to this place there ought to be a large
 square1 like that which they call in   
,thessaly ,the ,square of ,freedom1 in  
which nothing is permitted to be bought 
or sold2 into which no mechanic nor     
husbandman1 nor any such person1 should 
be permitted to enter1 unless commanded 
by the magistrates4 ,it will also be an 
ornament to this place if the gymnastic 
exercises of the elders are performed in
 it4 ,it is also proper1 that for       
performing these exercises the citizens 

should be divided into distinct classes1
 according to their ages1 and that the  
young persons should have proper        
officers to be with them1 and that the  
seniors should be with the magistrates2 
for having them before their eyes would 
greatly inspire true modesty and        
ingenuous fear4 ,there ought to be      
another square #acca;b separate from    
this for buying and selling1 which      
should be so situated as to be          
commodious for the reception of goods   
both by sea and land4 ,as the citizens  
may be divided into magistrates and     
priests1 it is proper that the public   
tables of the priests should be in      
buildings near the temples4 ,those of   
the magistrates who preside over        
contracts1 indictments1 and such-like1  
and also over the markets1 and the      
public streets near the square1 or some 
public way1 ,i mean the square where    
things are bought and sold2 for ,i      
intended the other for those who are at 
leisure1 and this for necessary         

business4 ,the same order which ,i have 
directed here should be observed also in
 the country2 for there also their      
magistrates such as the surveyors of the
 woods and overseers of the grounds1    
must necessarily have their common      
tables and their towers1 for the purpose
 of protection against an enemy4 ,there 
ought also to be temples erected at     
proper places1 both to the gods and the 
heroes2 but it is unnecessary to dwell  
longer and most minutely on these       
particulars--for it is by no means      
difficult to plan these things1 it is   
rather so to carry them into execution2 
for the theory is the child of our      
wishes1 but the practical part must     
depend upon fortune2 for which reason we
 shall decline saying anything farther  
upon these subjects4     ,,chapter      
,,xiii   ,we will now show of what      
numbers and of what sort of people a    
government ought to consist1 that the   
state may be happy and well             
administered4 ,as there are two         

particulars on which the excellence and 
perfection of everything depend1 one of 
these is1 that the object and end       
proposed should be proper2 the other1   
that the means to accomplish it should  
be adapted to that purpose2 for it may  
happen that these may either agree or   
disagree with each other2 for the end we
 propose may be good1 but in taking the 
means to obtain it we may err2 at other 
times we may have the right and proper  
means in our power1 but the end may be  
bad1 and sometimes we may mistake in    
both2 as in the art of medicine the     
physician does not sometimes know in    
what situation the body ought to be1 to 
be healthy2 nor what to do to procure   
the end he aims at4 ,in every art and   
science1 therefore1 we should be master 
of this knowledge1 namely1 the proper   
end1 and the means to obtain it4 ,now it
 is evident that all persons are        
desirous to live well and be happy2 but 
that some have the means thereof in     
their own power1 others not2 and this   

either through nature #accb;a or        
fortune2 for many ingredients are       
necessary to a happy life2 but fewer to 
those who are of a good than to those   
who are of a bad disposition4 ,there are
 others who continually have the means  
of happiness in their own power1 but do 
not rightly apply them4 ,since we       
propose to inquire what government is   
best1 namely1 that by which a state may 
be best administered1 and that state is 
best administered where the people are  
the happiest1 it is evident that        
happiness is a thing we should not be   
unacquainted with4 ,now1 ,i have already
 said in my treatise on ,morals 7if ,i  
may here make any use of what ,i have   
there shown71 that happiness consists in
 the energy and perfect practice of     
virtue2 and this not relatively1 but    
simply2 ,i mean by relatively1 what is  
necessary in some certain circumstances2
 by simply1 what is good and fair in    
itself3 of the first sort are just      
punishments1 and restraints in a just   

cause2 for they arise from virtue and   
are necessary1 and on that account are  
virtuous2 though it is more desirable   
that neither any state nor any          
individual should stand in need of them2
 but those actions which are intended   
either to procure honour or wealth are  
simply good2 the others eligible only to
 remove an evil2 these1 on the contrary1
 are the foundation and means of        
relative good4 ,a worthy man indeed will
 bear poverty1 disease1 and other       
unfortunate accidents with a noble mind2
 but happiness consists in the contrary 
to these 7now we have already determined
 in our treatise on ,morals1 that he is 
a man of worth who considers what is    
good because it is virtuous as what is  
simply good2 it is evident1 therefore1  
that all the actions of such a one must 
be worthy and simply good73 this has led
 some persons to conclude1 that the     
cause of happiness was external goods2  
which would be as if any one should     
suppose that the playing well upon the  

lyre was owing to the instrument1 and   
not to the art4 ,it necessarily follows 
from what has been said1 that some      
things should be ready at hand and      
others procured by the legislator2 for  
which reason in founding a city we      
earnestly wish that there may be plenty 
of those things which are supposed to be
 under the dominion of fortune 7for some
 things we admit her to be mistress     
over72 but for a state to be worthy and 
great is not only the work of fortune   
but of knowledge and judgment also4 ,but
 for a state to be worthy it is         
necessary that those citizens which are 
in the administration should be worthy  
also2 but as in our city every citizen  
is to be so1 we must consider how this  
may be accomplished2 for if this is what
 every one could be1 and not some       
individuals only1 it would be more      
desirable2 for then it would follow1    
that what might be done by one might be 
done by all4 ,men are worthy and good   
three ways2 by nature1 by custom1 by    

reason4 ,in the first place1 a man ought
 to be born a man1 and not any other    
animal2 that is to say1 he ought to have
 both a body and soul2 but it avails not
 to be only born #accb;b with some      
things1 for custom makes great          
alterations2 for there are some things  
in nature capable of alteration either  
way which are fixed by custom1 either   
for the better or the worse4 ,now1 other
 animals live chiefly a life of nature2 
and in very few things according to     
custom2 but man lives according to      
reason also1 which he alone is endowed  
with2 wherefore he ought to make all    
these accord with each other2 for if men
 followed reason1 and were persuaded    
that it was best to obey her1 they would
 act in many respects contrary to nature
 and custom4 ,what men ought naturally  
to be1 to make good members of a        
community1 ,i have already determined2  
the rest of this discourse therefore    
shall be upon education2 for some things
 are acquired by habit1 others by       

hearing them4     ,,chapter ,,xiv   ,as 
every political community consists of   
those who govern and of those who are   
governed1 let us consider whether during
 the continuance of their lives they    
ought to be the same persons or         
different2 for it is evident that the   
mode of education should be adapted to  
this distinction4 ,now1 if one man      
differed from another as much1 as we    
believe1 the gods and heroes differ from
 men3 in the first place1 being far     
their superiors in body2 and1 secondly1 
in the soul3 so that the superiority of 
the governors over the governed might be
 evident beyond a doubt1 it is certain  
that it would be better for the one     
always to govern1 the other always to be
 governed3 but1 as this is not easy to  
obtain1 and kings are not so superior to
 those they govern as ,scylax informs us
 they are in ,india1 it is evident that 
for many reasons it is necessary that   
all in their turns should both govern   
and be governed3 for it is just that    

those who are equal should have         
everything alike2 and it is difficult   
for a state to continue which is founded
 in injustice2 for all those in the     
country who are desirous of innovation  
will apply themselves to those who are  
under the government of the rest1 and   
such will be their numbers in the state1
 that it will be impossible for the     
magistrates to get the better of them4  
,but that the governors ought to excel  
the governed is beyond a doubt2 the     
legislator therefore ought to consider  
how this shall be1 and how it may be    
contrived that all shall have their     
equal share in the administration4 ,now1
 with respect to this it will be first  
said1 that nature herself has directed  
us in our choice1 laying down the       
selfsame thing when she has made some   
young1 others old3 the first of whom it 
becomes to obey1 the latter to command2 
for no one when he is young is offended 
at his being under government1 or thinks
 himself too good for it2 more          

especially when he considers that he    
himself shall receive the same honours  
which he pays when he shall arrive at a 
proper age4 ,in some respects it must be
 acknowledged that the governors and the
 governed are the same1 in others they  
are different2 it is therefore necessary
 that their education should be in      
#accc;a some respect the same1 in others
 different3 as they say1 that he will be
 a good governor who has first learnt to
 obey4 ,now of governments1 as we have  
already said1 some are instituted for   
the sake of him who commands2 others for
 him who obeys3 of the first sort is    
that of the master over the servant2 of 
the latter1 that of freemen over each   
other4 ,now some things which are       
commanded differ from others2 not in the
 business1 but in the end proposed      
thereby3 for which reason many works1   
even of a servile nature1 are not       
disgraceful for young freemen to        
perform2 for many things which are      
ordered to be done are not honourable or

 dishonourable so much in their own     
nature as in the end which is proposed1 
and the reason for which they are       
undertaken4 ,since then we have         
determined1 that the virtue of a good   
citizen and good governor is the same as
 of a good man2 and that every one      
before he commands should have first    
obeyed1 it is the business of the       
legislator to consider how his citizens 
may be good men1 what education is      
necessary to that purpose1 and what is  
the final object of a good life4 ,the   
soul of man may be divided into two     
parts2 that which has reason in itself1 
and that which hath not1 but is capable 
of obeying its dictates3 and according  
to the virtues of these two parts a man 
is said to be good3 but of those virtues
 which are the ends1 it will not be     
difficult for those to determine who    
adopt the division ,i have already      
given2 for the inferior is always for   
the sake of the superior2 and this is   
equally evident both in the works of art

 as well as in those of nature2 but that
 is superior which has reason4 ,reason  
itself also is divided into two parts1  
in the manner we usually divide it2 the 
theoretic and the practical2 which      
division therefore seems necessary for  
this part also3 the same analogy holds  
good with respect to actions2 of which  
those which are of a superior nature    
ought always to be chosen by those who  
have it in their power2 for that is     
always most eligible to every one which 
will procure the best ends4 ,now life is
 divided into labour and rest1 war and  
peace2 and of what we do the objects are
 partly necessary and useful1 partly    
noble3 and we should give the same      
preference to these that we do to the   
different parts of the soul and its     
actions1 as war to procure peace2       
labour1 rest2 and the useful1 the noble4
 ,the politician1 therefore1 who        
composes a body of laws ought to extend 
his views to everything2 the different  
parts of the soul and their actions2    

more particularly to those things which 
are of a superior nature and ends2 and1 
in the same manner1 to the lives of men 
and their different actions4  ,they     
ought to be fitted both for labour and  
war1 but rather #accc;b for rest and    
peace2 and also to do what is necessary 
and useful1 but rather what is fair and 
noble4 ,it is to those objects that the 
education of the children ought to tend1
 and of all the youths who want         
instruction4 ,all the ,grecian states   
which now seem best governed1 and the   
legislators who founded those states1   
appear not to have framed their polity  
with a view to the best end1 or to every
 virtue1 in their laws and education2   
but eagerly to have attended to what is 
useful and productive of gain3 and      
nearly of the same opinion with these   
are some persons who have written       
lately1 who1 by praising the            
,lacedaemonian state1 show they approve 
of the intention of the legislator in   
making war and victory the end of his   

government4 ,but how contrary to reason 
this is1 is easily proved by argument1  
and has already been proved by facts    
7but as the generality of men desire to 
have an extensive command1 that they may
 have everything desirable in the       
greater abundance2 so ,thibron and      
others who have written on that state   
seem to approve of their legislator for 
having procured them an extensive       
command by continually enuring them to  
all sorts of dangers and hardships73 for
 it is evident1 since the ,lacedemonians
 have now no hope that the supreme power
 will be in their own hand1 that neither
 are they happy nor was their legislator
 wise4 ,this also is ridiculous1 that   
while they preserved an obedience to    
their laws1 and no one opposed their    
being governed by them1 they lost the   
means of being honourable3 but these    
people understand not rightly what sort 
of government it is which ought to      
reflect honour on the legislator2 for a 
government of freemen is nobler than    

despotic power1 and more consonant to   
virtue4 ,moreover1 neither should a city
 be thought happy1 nor should a         
legislator be commended1 because he has 
so trained the people as to conquer     
their neighbours2 for in this there is a
 great inconvenience3 since it is       
evident that upon this principle every  
citizen who can will endeavour to       
procure the supreme power in his own    
city2 which crime the ,lacedaemonians   
accuse ,pausanias of1 though he enjoyed 
such great honours4  ,such reasoning and
 such laws are neither political1 useful
 nor true3 but a legislator ought to    
instil those laws on the minds of men   
which are most useful for them1 both in 
their public and private capacities4    
,the rendering a people fit for war1    
that they may enslave their inferiors   
ought not to be the care of the         
legislator2 but that they may not       
themselves be reduced to slavery by     
others4 ,in #accd;a the next place1 he  
should take care that the object of his 

government is the safety of those who   
are under it1 and not a despotism over  
all3 in the third place1 that those only
 are slaves who are fit to be only so4  
,reason indeed concurs with experience  
in showing that all the attention which 
the legislator pays to the business of  
war1 and all other rules which he lays  
down1 should have for their object rest 
and peace2 since most of those states   
7which we usually see7 are preserved by 
war2 but1 after they have acquired a    
supreme power over those around them1   
are ruined2 for during peace1 like a    
sword1 they lose their brightness3 the  
fault of which lies in the legislator1  
who never taught them how to be at rest4
     ,,chapter ,,xv   ,as there is one  
end common to a man both as an          
individual and a citizen1 it is evident 
that a good man and a good citizen must 
have the same object in view2 it is     
evident that all the virtues which lead 
to rest are necessary2 for1 as we have  
often said1 the end of war is peace1 of 

labour1 rest2 but those virtues whose   
object is rest1 and those also whose    
object is labour1 are necessary for a   
liberal life and rest2 for we want a    
supply of many necessary things that we 
may be at rest4 ,a city therefore ought 
to be temperate1 brave1 and patient2    
for1 according to the proverb1 ,rest is 
not for slaves2 but those who cannot    
bravely face danger are the slaves of   
those who attack them4 ,bravery1        
therefore1 and patience are necessary   
for labour1 philosophy for rest1 and    
temperance and justice in both2 but     
these chiefly in time of peace and rest2
 for war obliges men to be just and     
temperate2 but the enjoyment of         
pleasure1 with the rest of peace1 is    
more apt to produce insolence2 those    
indeed who are easy in their            
circumstances1 and enjoy everything that
 can make them happy1 have great        
occasion for the virtues of temperance  
and justice4 ,thus if there are1 as the 
poets tell us1 any inhabitants in the   

happy isles1 to these a higher degree of
 philosophy1 temperance1 and justice    
will be necessary1 as they live at their
 ease in the full plenty of every       
sensual pleasure4 ,it is evident1       
therefore1 that these virtues are       
necessary in every state that would be  
happy or worthy2 for he who is worthless
 can never enjoy real good1 much less is
 he qualified to be at rest2 but can    
appear good only by labour and being at 
war1 but in peace and at rest the       
meanest of creatures4 ,for which reason 
virtue should not be cultivated as the  
,lacedaemonians did2 for they did not   
differ from others in their opinion     
concerning the supreme good1 but in     
#accd;b imagining this good was to be   
procured by a particular virtue2 but    
since there are greater goods than those
 of war1 it is evident that the         
enjoyment of those which are valuable in
 themselves should be desired1 rather   
than those virtues which are useful in  
war2 but how and by what means this is  

to be acquired is now to be considered4 
,we have already assigned three causes  
on which it will depend2 nature1 custom1
 and reason1 arid shown what sort of men
 nature must produce for this purpose2  
it remains then that we determine which 
we shall first begin by in education1   
reason or custom1 for these ought always
 to preserve the most entire harmony    
with each other2 for it may happen that 
reason may err from the end proposed1   
and be corrected by custom4 ,in the     
first place1 it is evident that in this 
as in other things1 its beginning or    
production arises from some principle1  
and its end also arises from another    
principle1 which is itself an end4 ,now1
 with us1 reason and intelligence are   
the end of nature2 our production1      
therefore1 and our manners ought to be  
accommodated to both these4 ,in the next
 place1 as the soul and the body are two
 distinct things1 so also we see that   
the soul is divided into two parts1 the 
reasoning and not-reasoning1 with their 

habits which are two in number1 one     
belonging to each1 namely appetite and  
intelligence2 and as the body is in     
production before the soul1 so is the   
not-reasoning part of the soul before   
the reasoning2 and this is evident2 for 
anger1 will and desire are to be seen in
 children nearly as soon as they are    
born2 but reason and intelligence spring
 up as they grow to maturity4 ,the body1
 therefore1 necessarily demands our care
 before the soul2 next the appetites for
 the sake of the mind2 the body for the 
sake of the soul4     ,,chapter ,,xvi   
,if then the legislator ought to take   
care that the bodies of the children are
 as perfect as possible1 his first      
attention ought to be given to          
matrimony2 at what time and in what     
situation it is proper that the citizens
 should engage in the nuptial contract4 
,now1 with respect to this alliance1 the
 legislator ought both to consider the  
parties and their time of life1 that    
they may grow old at the same part of   

time1 and that their bodily powers may  
not be different2 that is to say1 the   
man being able to have children1 but the
 woman too old to bear them2 or1 on the 
contrary1 the woman be young enough to  
produce children1 but the man too old to
 be a father2 for from such a situation 
discords and disputes continually arise4
 ,in the next place1 with respect to the
 succession of children1 there ought not
 to be too great an interval of time    
between them and their parents2 for when
 there is1 the parent can receive no    
benefit from his child's affection1 or  
the child any advantage from his        
father's protection2 #acce;a neither    
should the difference in years be too   
little1 as great inconveniences may     
arise from it2 as it prevents that      
proper reverence being shown to a father
 by a boy who considers him as nearly   
his equal in age1 and also from the     
disputes it occasions in the economy of 
the family4 ,but1 to return from this   
digression1 care ought to be taken that 

the bodies of the children may be such  
as will answer the expectations of the  
legislator2 this also will be affected  
by the same means4 ,since season for the
 production of children is determined   
7not exactly1 but to speak in general71 
namely1 for the man till seventy years1 
and the woman till fifty1 the entering  
into the marriage state1 as far as time 
is concerned1 should be regulated by    
these periods4 ,it is extremely bad for 
the children when the father is too     
young2 for in all animals whatsoever the
 parts of the young are imperfect1 and  
are more likely to be productive of     
females than males1 and diminutive also 
in size2 the same thing of course       
necessarily holds true in men2 as a     
proof of this you may see in those      
cities where the men and women usually  
marry very young1 the people in general 
are very small and ill framed2 in       
child-birth also the women suffer more1 
and many of them die4 ,and thus some    
persons tell us the oracle of           

,traezenium should be explained1 as if  
it referred to the many women who were  
destroyed by too early marriages1 and   
not their gathering their fruits too    
soon4 ,it is also conducive to          
temperance not to marry too soon2 for   
women who do so are apt to be           
intemperate4 ,it also prevents the      
bodies of men from acquiring their full 
size if they marry before their growth  
is completed2 for this is the           
determinate period1 which prevents any  
further increase2 for which reason the  
proper time for a woman to marry is     
eighteen1 for a man thirty-seven1 a     
little more or less2 for when they marry
 at that time their bodies are in       
perfection1 and they will also cease to 
have children at a proper time2 and     
moreover with respect to the succession 
of the children1 if they have them at   
the time which may reasonably be        
expected1 they will be just arriving    
into perfection when their parents are  
sinking down under the load of seventy  

years4 ,and thus much for the time which
 is proper for marriage2 but moreover a 
proper season of the year should be     
observed1 as many persons do now1 and   
appropriate the winter for this         
business4 ,the married couple ought also
 to regard the precepts of physicians   
and naturalists1 each of whom have      
treated on these #acce;b subjects4 ,what
 is the fit disposition of the body will
 be better mentioned when we come to    
speak of the education of the child2 we 
will just slightly mention a few        
particulars4 ,now1 there is no occasion 
that any one should have the habit of   
body of a wrestler to be either a good  
citizen1 or to enjoy a good             
constitution1 or to be the father of    
healthy children2 neither should he be  
infirm or too much dispirited by        
misfortunes1 but between both these4 ,he
 ought to have a habit of labour1 but   
not of too violent labour2 nor should   
that be confined to one object only1 as 
the wrestler's is2 but to such things as

 are proper for freemen4 ,these things  
are equally necessary both for men and  
women4 ,women with child should also    
take care that their diet is not too    
sparing1 and that they use sufficient   
exercise2 which it will be easy for the 
legislator to effect if he commands them
 once every day to repair to the worship
 of the gods who are supposed to preside
 over matrimony4 ,but1 contrary to what 
is proper for the body1 the mind ought  
to be kept as tranquil as possible2 for 
as plants partake of the nature of the  
soil1 so does the child receive much of 
the disposition of the mother4 ,with    
respect to the exposing or bringing up  
of children1 let it be a law1 that      
nothing imperfect or maimed shall be    
brought up14444444444 ,as the proper    
time has been pointed out for a man and 
a woman to enter into the marriage      
state1 so also let us determine how long
 it is advantageous for the community   
that they should have children2 for as  
the children of those who are too young 

are imperfect both in body and mind1 so 
also those whose parents are too old are
 weak in both3 while therefore the body 
continues in perfection1 which 7as some 
poets say1 who reckon the different     
periods of life by sevens7 is till fifty
 years1 or four or five more1 the       
children may be equally perfect2 but    
when the parents are past that age it is
 better they should have no more4 ,with 
respect to any connection between a man 
and a woman1 or a woman and a man1 when 
either of the parties are betrothed1 let
 it be held in utter detestation #accf;a
 on any pretext whatsoever2 but should  
any one be guilty of such a thing after 
the marriage is consummated1 let his    
infamy be as great as his guilt         
deserves4     ,,chapter ,,xvii   ,when a
 child is born it must be supposed that 
the strength of its body will depend    
greatly upon the quality of its food4   
,now whoever will examine into the      
nature of animals1 and also observe     
those people who are very desirous their

 children should acquire a warlike      
habit1 will find that they feed them    
chiefly with milk1 as being best        
accommodated to their bodies1 but       
without wine1 to prevent any distempers3
 those motions also which are natural to
 their age are very serviceable2 and to 
prevent any of their limbs from being   
crooked1 on account of their extreme    
ductility1 some people even now use     
particular machines that their bodies   
may not be distorted4 ,it is also useful
 to enure them to the cold when they are
 very little2 for this is very          
serviceable for their health2 and also  
to enure them to the business of war2   
for which reason it is customary with   
many of the barbarians to dip their     
children in rivers when the water is    
cold2 with others to clothe them very   
slightly1 as among the ,celts2 for      
whatever it is possible to accustom     
children to1 it is best to accustom them
 to it at first1 but to do it by        
degrees3 besides1 boys have naturally a 

habit of loving the cold1 on account of 
the heat4 ,these1 then1 and such-like   
things ought to be the first object of  
our attention3 the next age to this     
continues till the child is five years  
old2 during which time it is best to    
teach him nothing at all1 not even      
necessary labour1 lest it should hinder 
his growth2 but he should be accustomed 
to use so much motion as not to acquire 
a lazy habit of body2 which he will get 
by various means and by play also3 his  
play also ought to be neither illiberal 
nor too laborious nor lazy4 ,their      
governors and preceptors also should    
take care what sort of tales and stories
 it may be proper for them to hear2 for 
all these ought to pave the way for     
their future instruction3 for which     
reason the generality of their play     
should be imitations of what they are   
afterwards to do seriously4 ,they too do
 wrong who forbid by laws the disputes  
between boys and their quarrels1 for    
they contribute to increase their       

growth--as they are a sort of exercise  
to the body3 for the struggles of the   
heart and the compression of the spirits
 give strength to those who labour1     
which happens to boys in their disputes4
 ,the preceptors also ought to have an  
eye upon their manner of life1 and those
 with whom they converse2 and to take   
care that they are never in the company 
of slaves4 ,at this time and till they  
are seven #accf;b years old it is       
necessary that they should be educated  
at home4 ,it is also very proper to     
banish1 both from their hearing and     
sight1 everything which is illiberal and
 the like4 ,indeed it is as much the    
business of the legislator as anything  
else1 to banish every indecent          
expression out of the state3 for from a 
permission to speak whatever is         
shameful1 very quickly arises the doing 
it1 and this particularly with young    
people3 for which reason let them never 
speak nor hear any such thing3 but if it
 appears that any freeman has done or   

said anything that is forbidden before  
he is of age to be thought fit to       
partake of the common meals1 let him be 
punished by disgrace and stripes2 but if
 a person above that age does so1 let   
him be treated as you would a slave1 on 
account of his being infamous4 ,since we
 forbid his speaking everything which is
 forbidden1 it is necessary that he     
neither sees obscene stories nor        
pictures2 the magistrates therefore are 
to take care that there are no statues  
or pictures of anything of this nature1 
except only to those gods to whom the   
law permits them1 and to which the law  
allows persons of a certain age to pay  
their devotions1 for themselves1 their  
wives1 and children4 ,it should also be 
illegal for young persons to be present 
either at iambics or comedies before    
they are arrived at that age when they  
are allowed to partake of the pleasures 
of the table3 indeed a good education   
will preserve them from all the evils   
which attend on these things4 ,we have  

at present just touched upon this       
subject2 it will be our business        
hereafter1 when we properly come to it1 
to determine whether this care of       
children is unnecessary1 or1 if         
necessary1 in what manner it must be    
done2 at present we have only mentioned 
it as necessary4 ,probably the saying of
 ,theodoras1 the tragic actor1 was not a
 bad one3 ,that he would permit no one1 
not even the meanest actor1 to go upon  
the stage before him1 that he might     
first engage the ear of the audience4   
,the same thing happens both in our     
connections with men and things3 what we
 meet with first pleases best2 for which
 reason children should be kept         
strangers to everything which is bad1   
more particularly whatsoever is loose   
and offensive to good manners4 ,when    
five years are accomplished1 the two    
next may be very properly employed in   
being spectators of those exercises they
 will afterwards have to learn4 ,there  
are two periods into which education    

ought to be divided1 according to the   
age of the child2 the one is from his   
being seven years of age to the time of 
puberty2 the other from thence till he  
is one-and-twenty3 for those who divide 
ages by the number seven #accg;a are in 
general wrong3 it is much better to     
follow the division of nature2 for every
 art and every instruction is intended  
to complete what nature has left        
defective3 we must first consider if any
 regulation whatsoever is requisite for 
children2 in the next place1 if it is   
advantageous to make it a common care1  
or that every one should act therein as 
he pleases1 which is the general        
practice in most cities2 in the third   
place1 what it ought to be4     ,,book  
,,viii     ,,chapter ,i   ,no one can   
doubt that the magistrate ought greatly 
to interest himself in the care of      
youth2 for where it is neglected it is  
hurtful to the city1 for every state    
ought to be governed according to its   
particular nature2 for the form and     

manners of each government are peculiar 
to itself2 and these1 as they originally
 established it1 so they usually still  
preserve it4 ,for instance1 democratic  
forms and manners a democracy2          
oligarchic1 an oligarchy3 but1          
universally1 the best manners produce   
the best government4 ,besides1 as in    
every business and art there are some   
things which men are to learn first and 
be made accustomed to1 which are        
necessary to perform their several      
works2 so it is evident that the same   
thing is necessary in the practice of   
virtue4 ,as there is one end in view in 
every city1 it is evident that education
 ought to be one and the same in each2  
and that this should be a common care1  
and not the individual's1 as it now is1 
when every one takes care of his own    
children separately2 and their          
instructions are particular also1 each  
person teaching them as they please2 but
 what ought to be engaged in ought to be
 common to all4 ,besides1 no one ought  

to think that any citizen belongs to him
 in particular1 but to the state in     
general2 for each one is a part of the  
state1 and it is the natural duty of    
each part to regard the good of the     
whole3 and for this the ,lacedaemonians 
may be praised2 for they give the       
greatest attention to education1 and    
make it public4 ,it is evident1 then1   
that there should be laws concerning    
education1 and that it should be public4
     ,,chapter ,,ii   ,what education   
is1 and how children ought to be        
instructed1 is what should be well      
known2 for there are doubts concerning  
the business of it1 as all people do not
 agree in those things they would have a
 child taught1 both with respect to     
their improvement in virtue and a happy 
life3 nor is it clear whether the object
 of it should be to improve the reason  
or rectify the morals4 ,from the present
 mode of education we cannot determine  
with certainty to which men incline1    
whether to instruct a child in what will

 be useful to him in life2 or what tends
 to virtue1 and what is excellent3 for  
all these things have their separate    
defenders4 ,as to virtue1 there is no   
particular #accg;b in which they all    
agree3 for as all do not equally esteem 
all virtues1 it reasonably follows that 
they will not cultivate the same4 ,it is
 evident that what is necessary ought to
 be taught to all3 but that which is    
necessary for one is not necessary for  
all2 for there ought to be a distinction
 between the employment of a freeman and
 a slave4 ,the first of these should be 
taught everything useful which will not 
make those who know it mean4 ,every work
 is to be esteemed mean1 and every art  
and every discipline which renders the  
body1 the mind1 or the understanding of 
freemen unfit for the habit and practice
 of virtue3 for which reason all those  
arts which tend to deform the body are  
called mean1 and all those employments  
which are exercised for gain2 for they  
take off from the freedom of the mind   

and render it sordid4 ,there are also   
some liberal arts which are not improper
 for freemen to apply to in a certain   
degree2 but to endeavour to acquire a   
perfect skill in them is exposed to the 
faults ,i have just mentioned2 for there
 is a great deal of difference in the   
reason for which any one does or learns 
anything3 for it is not illiberal to    
engage in it for one's self1 one's      
friend1 or in the cause of virtue2      
while1 at the same time1 to do it for   
the sake of another may seem to be      
acting the part of a servant and a      
slave4 ,the mode of instruction which   
now prevails seems to partake of both   
parts4     ,,chapter ,,iii   ,there are 
four things which it is usual to teach  
children--reading1 gymnastic exercises1 
and music1 to which 7in the fourth      
place7 some add painting4 ,reading and  
painting are both of them of singular   
use in life1 and gymnastic exercises1 as
 productive of courage4 ,as to music1   
some persons may doubt1 as most persons 

now use it for the sake of pleasure3 but
 those who originally made it part of   
education did it because1 as has been   
already said1 nature requires that we   
should not only be properly employed1   
but to be able to enjoy leisure         
honourably3 for this 7to repeat what ,i 
have already said7 is of all things the 
principal4 ,but1 though both labour and 
rest are necessary1 yet the latter is   
preferable to the first2 and by all     
means we ought to learn what we should  
do when at rest3 for we ought not to    
employ that time at play2 for then play 
would be the necessary business of our  
lives4 ,but if this cannot be1 play is  
more necessary for those who labour than
 those who are at rest3 for he who      
labours requires relaxation2 which play 
will supply3 for as labour is attended  
with pain and continued exertion1 it is 
necessary that play should be           
introduced1 under proper regulations1 as
 a medicine3 for such an employment of  
the mind is a relaxation to it1 and     

eases with pleasure4 #acch;a ,now rest  
itself seems to partake of pleasure1 of 
happiness1 and an agreeable life3 but   
this cannot be theirs who labour1 but   
theirs who are at rest2 for he who      
labours1 labours for the sake of some   
end which he has not3 but happiness is  
an end which all persons think is       
attended with pleasure and not with     
pain3 but all persons do not agree in   
making this pleasure consist in the same
 thing2 for each one has his particular 
standard1 correspondent to his own      
habits2 but the best man proposes the   
best pleasure1 and that which arises    
from the noblest actions4 ,but it is    
evident1 that to live a life of rest    
there are some things which a man must  
learn and be instructed in2 and that the
 object of this learning and this       
instruction centres in their            
acquisition3 but the learning and       
instruction which is given for labour   
has for its object other things2 for    
which reason the ancients made music a  

part of education2 not as a thing       
necessary1 for it is not of that nature1
 nor as a thing useful1 as reading1 in  
the common course of life1 or for       
managing of a family1 or for learning   
anything as useful in public life4      
,painting also seems useful to enable a 
man to judge more accurately of the     
productions of the finer arts3 nor is it
 like the gymnastic exercises1 which    
contribute to health and strength2 for  
neither of these things do we see       
produced by music2 there remains for it 
then to be the employment of our rest1  
which they had in view who introduced   
it2 and1 thinking it a proper employment
 for freemen1 to them they allotted it2 
as ,homer sings3     ,how right to call 
,thalia to the feast3   and of some     
others he says3     ,the bard was       
call'd1 to ravish every ear3  and1 in   
another place1 he makes ,ulysses say the
 happiest part of man's life is         
,when at the festal board1 in order     
plac'd1 ,they hear the song4  ,it is    

evident1 then1 that there is a certain  
education in which a child may be       
instructed1 not as useful nor as        
necessary1 but as noble and liberal3 but
 whether this is one or more than one1  
and of what sort they are1 and how to be
 taught1 shall be considered hereafter3 
we are now got so far on our way as to  
show that we have the testimony of the  
ancients in our favour1 by what they    
have delivered down upon education--for 
music makes this plain4 ,moreover1 it is
 necessary to instruct children in what 
is useful1 not only on account of its   
being useful in itself1 as1 for         
instance1 to learn to read1 but also as 
the means of acquiring other different  
sorts of instruction3 thus they should  
be instructed in painting1 not only to  
prevent their being mistaken in         
purchasing pictures1 or in buying or    
selling of vases1 but rather as it makes
 #acch;b them judges of the beauties of 
the human form2 for to be always hunting
 after the profitable ill agrees with   

great and freeborn souls4 ,as it is     
evident whether a boy should be first   
taught morals or reasoning1 and whether 
his body or his understanding should be 
first cultivated1 it is plain that boys 
should be first put under the care of   
the different masters of the gymnastic  
arts1 both to form their bodies and     
teach them their exercises4             
,,chapter ,,iv   ,now those states which
 seem to take the greatest care of their
 children's education1 bestow their     
chief attention on wrestling1 though it 
both prevents the increase of the body  
and hurts the form of it4 ,this fault   
the ,lacedaemonians did not fall into1  
for they made their children fierce by  
painful labour1 as chiefly useful to    
inspire them with courage3 though1 as we
 have already often said1 this is       
neither the only thing nor the principal
 thing necessary to attend to2 and even 
with respect to this they may not thus  
attain their end2 for we do not find    
either in other animals1 or other       

nations1 that courage necessarily       
attends the most cruel1 but rather the  
milder1 and those who have the          
dispositions of lions3 for there are    
many people who are eager both to kill  
men and to devour human flesh1 as the   
,achaeans and ,heniochi in ,pontus1 and 
many others in ,asia1 some of whom are  
as bad1 others worse than these1 who    
indeed live by tyranny1 but are men of  
no courage4 ,nay1 we know that the      
,lacedaemonians themselves1 while they  
continued those painful labours1 and    
were superior to all others 7though now 
they are inferior to many1 both in war  
and gymnastic exercises71 did not       
acquire their superiority by training   
their youth to these exercises1 but     
because those who were disciplined      
opposed those who were not disciplined  
at all4 ,what is fair and honourable    
ought then to take place in education of
 what is fierce and cruel3 for it is not
 a wolf1 nor any other wild beast1 which
 will brave any noble danger1 but rather

 a good man4 ,so that those who permit  
boys to engage too earnestly in these   
exercises1 while they do not take care  
to instruct them in what is necessary to
 do1 to speak the real truth1 render    
them mean and vile1 accomplished only in
 one duty of a citizen1 and in every    
other respect1 as reason evinces1 good  
for nothing4 ,nor should we form our    
judgments from past events1 but from    
what we see at present3 for now they    
have rivals in their mode of education1 
whereas formerly they had not4 ,that    
gymnastic exercises are useful1 and in  
what manner1 is admitted2 for during    
youth it is very proper to go through a 
course of those which are most gentle1  
omitting that violent diet and those    
painful exercises which are prescribed  
as necessary2 that they may not prevent 
the growth of the body3 and it is no    
small proof that they have this effect1 
that amongst the ,olympic candidates we 
can scarce find two or three who have   
gained a victory both when boys and men3

 because the necessary exercises they   
went through when young deprived them of
 their strength4 ,when they have        
allotted three years from the time of   
puberty to other parts of education1    
they are then of a proper age to submit 
to labour and a regulated diet2 for it  
is impossible for the mind and body both
 to labour at the same time1 as they are
 productive of contrary evils to each   
other2 the labour of the body preventing
 the progress of the mind1 and the mind 
of the body4     ,,chapter ,v   ,with   
respect to music we have already spoken 
a little in a doubtful manner upon this 
subject4 ,it will be proper to go over  
again more particularly what we then    
said1 which may serve as an introduction
 to what any other person may choose to 
offer thereon2 for it is no easy matter 
to distinctly point out what power it   
has1 nor on what accounts one should    
apply it1 whether as an amusement and   
refreshment1 as sleep or wine2 as these 
are nothing serious1 but pleasing1 and  

the killers of care1 as ,euripides says2
 for which reason they class in the same
 order and use for the same purpose all 
these1 namely1 sleep1 wine1 and music1  
to which some add dancing2 or shall we  
rather suppose that music tends to be   
productive of virtue1 having a power1 as
 the gymnastic exercises have to form   
the body in a certain way1 to influence 
the manners so as to accustom its       
professors to rejoice rightly8 or shall 
we say1 that it is of any service in the
 conduct of life1 and an assistant to   
prudence8 for this also is a third      
property which has been attributed to   
it4 ,now that boys are not to be        
instructed in it as play is evident2 for
 those who learn don't play1 for to     
learn is rather troublesome2 neither is 
it proper to permit boys at their age to
 enjoy perfect leisure2 for to cease to 
improve is by no means fit for what is  
as yet imperfect2 but it may be thought 
that the earnest attention of boys in   
this art is for the sake of that        

amusement they will enjoy when they come
 to be men and completely formed2 but1  
if this is the case1 why are they       
themselves to learn it1 and not follow  
the practice of the kings of the ,medes 
and ,persians1 who enjoy the pleasure of
 music by hearing others play1 and being
 shown its beauties by them2 for of     
necessity those must be better skilled  
therein who make this science their     
particular study and business1 than     
those who have only spent so much time  
at it as was sufficient just to learn   
the principles of it4 ,but if this is a 
reason for a child's being taught       
anything1 they ought also to learn the  
art of cookery1 but this is absurd4 ,the
 same doubt occurs if music has a power 
of improving the manners2 for why should
 they on this account themselves learn  
it1 and not reap every advantage of     
regulating the passions or forming a    
judgment #acci;b on the merits of the   
performance by hearing others1 as the   
,lacedaemonians2 for they1 without      

having ever learnt music1 are yet able  
to judge accurately what is good and    
what is bad2 the same reasoning may be  
applied if music is supposed to be the  
amusement of those who live an elegant  
and easy life1 why should they learn    
themselves1 and not rather enjoy the    
benefit of others' skill4 ,let us here  
consider what is our belief of the      
immortal gods in this particular4 ,now  
we find the poets never represent       
,jupiter himself as singing and playing2
 nay1 we ourselves treat the professors 
of these arts as mean people1 and say   
that no one would practise them but a   
drunkard or a buffoon4 ,but probably we 
may consider this subject more at large 
hereafter4 ,the first question is1      
whether music is or is not to make a    
part of education8 and of those three   
things which have been assigned as its  
proper employment1 which is the right8  
,is it to instruct1 to amuse1 or to     
employ the vacant hours of those who    
live at rest8 or may not all three be   

properly allotted to it8 for it appears 
to partake of them all2 for play is     
necessary for relaxation1 and relaxation
 pleasant1 as it is a medicine for that 
uneasiness which arises from labour4 ,it
 is admitted also that a happy life must
 be an honourable one1 and a pleasant   
one too1 since happiness consists in    
both these2 and we all agree that music 
is one of the most pleasing things1     
whether alone or accompanied with a     
voice2 as ,musseus says1 ,music's the   
sweetest joy of man2 for which reason it
 is justly admitted into every company  
and every happy life1 as having the     
power of inspiring joy4 ,so that from   
this any one may suppose that it is     
necessary to instruct young persons in  
it2 for all those pleasures which are   
harmless are not only conducive to the  
final end of life1 but serve also as    
relaxations2 and1 as men are but rarely 
in the attainment of that final end1    
they often cease from their labour and  
apply to amusement1 with no further view

 than to acquire the pleasure attending 
it4 ,it is therefore useful to enjoy    
such pleasures as these4 ,there are some
 persons who make play and amusement    
their end1 and probably that end has    
some pleasure annexed to it1 but not    
what should be2 but while men seek the  
one they accept the other for it2       
because there is some likeness in human 
actions to the end2 for the end is      
pursued for the sake of nothing else    
that attends it2 but for itself only2   
and pleasures like these are sought for1
 not on account of what follows them1   
but on account of what has gone before  
them1 as labour and grief2 for which    
reason they seek for happiness in these 
sort of pleasures2 and that this is the 
reason any one may easily perceive4     
,that music should be pursued1 not on   
this account only1 but also as it is    
very serviceable during the hours of    
relaxation from labour1 probably no     
#acdj;a one doubts2 we should also      
inquire whether besides this use it may 

not also have another of nobler         
nature--and we ought not only to partake
 of the common pleasure arising from it 
7which all have the sensation of1 for   
music naturally gives pleasure1         
therefore the use of it is agreeable to 
all ages and all dispositions72 but also
 to examine if it tends anything to     
improve our manners and our souls4 ,and 
this will be easily known if we feel our
 dispositions any way influenced        
thereby2 and that they are so is evident
 from many other instances1 as well as  
the music at the ,olympic games2 and    
this confessedly fills the soul with    
enthusiasm2 but enthusiasm is an        
affection of the soul which strongly    
agitates the disposition4 ,besides1 all 
those who hear any imitations sympathise
 therewith2 and this when they are      
conveyed even without rhythm or verse4  
,moreover1 as music is one of those     
things which are pleasant1 and as virtue
 itself consists in rightly enjoying1   
loving1 and hating1 it is evident that  

we ought not to learn or accustom       
ourselves to anything so much as to     
judge right and rejoice in honourable   
manners and noble actions4 ,but anger   
and mildness1 courage and modesty1 and  
their contraries1 as well as all other  
dispositions of the mind1 are most      
naturally imitated by music and poetry2 
which is plain by experience1 for when  
we hear these our very soul is altered2 
and he who is affected either with joy  
or grief by the imitation of any        
objects1 is in very nearly the same     
situation as if he was affected by the  
objects themselves2 thus1 if any person 
is pleased with seeing a statue of any  
one on no other account but its beauty1 
it is evident that the sight of the     
original from whence it was taken would 
also be pleasing2 now it happens in the 
other senses there is no imitation of   
manners2 that is to say1 in the touch   
and the taste2 in the objects of sight1 
a very little2 for these are merely     
representations of things1 and the      

perceptions which they excite are in a  
manner common to all4 ,besides1 statues 
and paintings are not properly          
imitations of manners1 but rather signs 
and marks which show the body is        
affected by some passion4 ,however1 the 
difference is not great1 yet young men  
ought not to view the paintings of      
,pauso1 but of ,polygnotus1 or any other
 painter or statuary who expresses      
manners4 ,but in poetry and music there 
are imitations of manners2 and this is  
evident1 for different harmonies differ 
from each other so much by nature1 that 
those who hear them are differently     
affected1 and are not in the same       
disposition of mind when one is         
performed as when another is2 the one1  
for instance1 occasions grief #acdjf and
 contracts the soul1 as the mixed       
,lydian3 others soften the mind1 and as 
it were dissolve the heart3 others fix  
it in a firm and settled state1 such is 
the power of the ,doric music only2     
while the ,phrygian fills the soul with 

enthusiasm1 as has been well described  
by those who have written               
philosophically upon this part of       
education2 for they bring examples of   
what they advance from the things       
themselves4 ,the same holds true with   
respect to rhythm2 some fix the         
disposition1 others occasion a change in
 it2 some act more violently1 others    
more liberally4 ,from what has been said
 it is evident what an influence music  
has over the disposition of the mind1   
and how variously it can fascinate it3  
and if it can do this1 most certainly it
 is what youth ought to be instructed   
in4 ,and indeed the learning of music is
 particularly adapted to their          
disposition2 for at their time of life  
they do not willingly attend to anything
 which is not agreeable2 but music is   
naturally one of the most agreeable     
things2 and there seems to be a certain 
connection between harmony and rhythm2  
for which reason some wise men held the 
soul itself to be harmony2 others1 that 

it contains it4     ,,chapter ,,vi   ,we
 will now determine whether it is proper
 that children should be taught to sing1
 and play upon any instrument1 which we 
have before made a matter of doubt4     
,now1 it is well known that it makes a  
great deal of difference when you would 
qualify any one in any art1 for the     
person himself to learn the practical   
part of it2 for it is a thing very      
difficult1 if not impossible1 for a man 
to be a good judge of what he himself   
cannot do4 ,it is also very necessary   
that children should have some          
employment which will amuse them2 for   
which reason the rattle of ,archytas    
seems well contrived1 which they give   
children to play with1 to prevent their 
breaking those things which are about   
the house2 for at their age they cannot 
sit still3 this therefore is well       
adapted to infants1 as instruction ought
 to be their rattle as they grow up2    
hence it is evident that they should be 
so taught music as to be able to        

practise it4 ,nor is it difficult to say
 what is becoming or unbecoming of their
 age1 or to answer the objections which 
some make to this employment as mean and
 low4 ,in the first place1 it is        
necessary for them to practise1 that    
they may be judges of the art3 for which
 reason this should be done when they   
are young2 but when they are grown older
 the practical part may be dropped2     
while they will still continue judges of
 what is excellent in the art1 and take 
a proper pleasure therein1 from the     
knowledge they acquired of it in their  
youth4 ,as to the censure which some    
persons throw upon music1 as something  
mean and low1 it is not difficult to    
answer that1 if we will but consider how
 far we propose those who are to be     
educated so as to become good citizens  
should be instructed in this art1       
#acda;a and what music and what rhythms 
they should be acquainted with2 and also
 what instruments they should play upon2
 for in these there is probably a       

difference4 ,such then is the proper    
answer to that censure3 for it must be  
admitted1 that in some cases nothing can
 prevent music being attended1 to a     
certain degree1 with the bad effects    
which are ascribed to it2 it is         
therefore clear that the learning of it 
should never prevent the business of    
riper years2 nor render the body        
effeminate1 and unfit for the business  
of war or the state2 but it should be   
practised by the young1 judged of by the
 old4 ,that children may learn music    
properly1 it is necessary that they     
should not be employed in those parts of
 it which are the objects of dispute    
between the masters in that science2 nor
 should they perform such pieces as are 
wondered at from the difficulty of their
 execution2 and which1 from being first 
exhibited in the public games1 are now  
become a part of education2 but let them
 learn so much of it as to be able to   
receive proper pleasure from excellent  
music and rhythms2 and not that only    

which music must make all animals feel1 
and also slaves and boys1 but more4 ,it 
is therefore plain what instruments they
 should use2 thus1 they should never be 
taught to play upon the flute1 or any   
other instrument which requires great   
skill1 as the harp or the like1 but on  
such as will make them good judges of   
music1 or any other instruction3        
besides1 the flute is not a moral       
instrument1 but rather one that will    
inflame the passions1 and is therefore  
rather to be used when the soul is to be
 animated than when instruction is      
intended4 ,let me add also1 that there  
is something therein which is quite     
contrary to what education requires2 as 
the player on the flute is prevented    
from speaking3 for which reason our     
forefathers very properly forbade the   
use of it to youth and freemen1 though  
they themselves at first used it2 for   
when their riches procured them greater 
leisure1 they grew more animated in the 
cause of virtue2 and both before and    

after the ,median war their noble       
actions so exalted their minds that they
 attended to every part of education2   
selecting no one in particular1 but     
endeavouring to collect the whole3 for  
which reason they introduced the flute  
also1 as one of the instruments they    
were to learn to play on4 ,at           
,lacedaemon the choregus himself played 
on the flute2 and it was so common at   
,athens that almost every freeman       
understood it1 as is evident from the   
tablet which ,thrasippus dedicated when 
he was choregus2 but afterwards they    
rejected it as dangerous2 having become 
better judges of what tended to promote 
virtue and what did not4 ,for the same  
reason many of the ancient instruments  
were thrown aside1 as the dulcimer and  
the lyre2 as also those which were to   
inspire those who played on them with   
pleasure1 and which required a nice     
finger and great skill to play well on4 
,what the ancients tell us1 by way of   
fable1 of the flute is indeed very      

rational2 namely1 that after ,minerva   
had found it1 she threw it away3 nor are
 they wrong who say that the goddess    
disliked it for deforming the face of   
him who played thereon3 not but that it 
is more probable that she rejected it as
 the knowledge thereof contributed      
nothing to the improvement of the mind4 
,now1 we regard ,minerva as the         
inventress of arts and sciences4 ,as we 
disapprove of a child's being taught to 
understand instruments1 and to play like
 a master 7which we would have confined 
to those who are candidates for the     
prize in that science2 for they play not
 to improve themselves in virtue1 but to
 please those who hear them1 and gratify
 their importunity72 therefore we think 
the practice of it unfit for freemen2   
but then it should be confined to those 
who are paid for doing it2 for it       
usually gives people sordid notions1 for
 the end they have in view is bad3 for  
the impertinent spectator is accustomed 
to make them change their music2 so that

 the artists who attend to him regulate 
their bodies according to his motions4  
,,chapter ,,vii   ,we are now to enter  
into an inquiry concerning harmony and  
rhythm2 whether all sorts of these are  
to be employed in education1 or whether 
some peculiar ones are to be selected2  
and also whether we should give the same
 directions to those who are engaged in 
music as part of education1 or whether  
there is something different from these 
two4 ,now1 as all music consists in     
melody and rhythm1 we ought not to be   
unacquainted with the power which each  
of these has in education2 and whether  
we should rather choose music in which  
melody prevails1 or rhythm3 but when ,i 
consider how many things have been well 
written upon these subjects1 not only by
 some musicians of the present age1 but 
also by some philosophers who are       
perfectly skilled in that part of music 
which belongs to education2 we will     
refer those who desire a very particular
 knowledge therein to those writers1 and

 shall only treat of it in general      
terms1 without descending to            
particulars4 ,melody is divided by some 
philosophers1 whose notions we approve  
of1 into moral1 practical1 and that     
which fills the mind with enthusiasm3   
they also allot to each of these a      
particular kind of harmony which        
naturally corresponds therewith3 and we 
say that music should not be applied to 
one purpose only1 but many2 both for    
instruction and purifying the soul 7now 
,i use the word purifying at present    
without any explanation1 but shall speak
 more at large of it in my ,poetics72   
and1 in the third place1 as an agreeable
 manner of spending the time and a      
relaxation from the uneasiness of the   
mind4 #acdb;a ,it is evident that all   
harmonies are to be used2 but not for   
all purposes2 but the most moral in     
education3 but to please the ear1 when  
others play1 the most active and        
enthusiastic2 for that passion which is 
to be found very strong in some souls is

 to be met with also in all2 but the    
difference in different persons consists
 in its being in a less or greater      
degree1 as pity1 fear1 and enthusiasm   
also2 which latter is so powerful in    
some as to overpower the soul3 and yet  
we see those persons1 by the application
 of sacred music to soothe their mind1  
rendered as sedate and composed as if   
they had employed the art of the        
physician3 and this must necessarily    
happen to the compassionate1 the        
fearful1 and all those who are subdued  
by their passions3 nay1 all persons1 as 
far as they are affected with those     
passions1 admit of the same cure1 and   
are restored to tranquillity with       
pleasure4 ,in the same manner1 all music
 which has the power of purifying the   
soul affords a harmless pleasure to man4
 ,such1 therefore1 should be the harmony
 and such the music which those who     
contend with each other in the theatre  
should exhibit3 but as the audience is  
composed of two sorts of people1 the    

free and the well-instructed1 the rude  
the mean mechanics1 and hired servants1 
and a long collection of the like1 there
 must be some music and some spectacles 
to please and soothe them2 for as their 
minds are as it were perverted from     
their natural habits1 so also is there  
an unnatural harmony1 and overcharged   
music which is accommodated to their    
taste3 but what is according to nature  
gives pleasure to every one1 therefore  
those who are to contend upon the       
theatre should be allowed to use this   
species of music4 ,but in education     
ethic melody and ethic harmony should be
 used1 which is the ,doric1 as we have  
already said1 or any other which those  
philosophers who are skilful in that    
music which is to be employed in        
education shall approve of4 ,but        
,socrates1 in ,plato's ,republic1 is    
very wrong when he #acdb;b permits only 
the ,phrygian music to be used as well  
as the ,doric1 particularly as amongst  
other instruments he banishes the flute2

 for the ,phrygian music has the same   
power in harmony as the flute has       
amongst the instruments2 for they are   
both pathetic and raise the mind3 and   
this the practice of the poets proves2  
for in their bacchanal songs1 or        
whenever they describe any violent      
emotions of the mind1 the flute is the  
instrument they chiefly use3 and the    
,phrygian harmony is most suitable to   
these subjects4 ,now1 that the          
dithyrambic measure is ,phrygian is     
allowed by general consent2 and those   
who are conversant in studies of this   
sort bring many proofs of it2 as1 for   
instance1 when ,philoxenus endeavoured  
to compose dithyrambic music for ,doric 
harmony1 he naturally fell back again   
into ,phrygian1 as being fittest for    
that purpose2 as every one indeed       
agrees1 that the ,doric music is most   
serious1 and fittest to inspire courage3
 and1 as we always commend the middle as
 being between the two extremes1 and the
 ,doric has this relation with respect  

to other harmonies1 it is evident that  
is what the youth ought to be instructed
 in4 ,there are two things to be taken  
into consideration1 both what is        
possible and what is proper2 every one  
then should chiefly endeavour to attain 
those things which contain both these   
qualities3 but this is to be regulated  
by different times of life2 for         
instance1 it is not easy for those who  
are advanced in years to sing such      
pieces of music as require very high    
notes1 for nature points out to them    
those which are gentle and require      
little strength of voice 7for which     
reason some who are skilful in music    
justly find fault with ,socrates for    
forbidding the youth to be instructed in
 gentle harmony2 as if1 like wine1 it   
would make them drunk1 whereas the      
effect of that is to render men         
bacchanals1 and not make them languid73 
these therefore are what should employ  
those who are grown old4 ,moreover1 if  
there is any harmony which is proper for

 a child's age1 as being at the same    
time elegant and instructive1 as the    
,lydian of all others seems chiefly to  
be-,these then are as it were the three 
boundaries of education1 moderation1    
possibility1 and decorum4      ,,index  
,,achilles1 #gf    ,act of the city1    
what1 #fi    ,actions1 their original   
spring1 i    ,administration1 #gf2      
whether to be shared by the whole       
community1 #bjc    ,a,esumnetes1 #if    
,a,ethiopia1 in what manner the power of
 the state is there regulated1 #aab     
,alterations in government1 whence they 
arise1 #adb2       what they are1 #adc  
,ambractia1 the government of1 changed1 
#aea    ,andromadas ,reginus1 a lawgiver
 to the ,thracian ,calcidians1 #fe      
,animals1 their different provisions by 
nature1 #ad2       intended by nature   
for the benefit of man1 #ad2       what 
constitutes their different species1    
#aac    ,animals1 tame1 why better than 
wild1 #h    ,arbitrator and judge1 their
 difference1 #di    ,architas his       

rattle1 #bdh    ,areopagus1 senate of1  
#fc    ,argonauts refuse to take        
,hercules with them1 #ic                
,aristocracies1 causes of commotions in 
them1 #aeg2       chief cause of their  
alteration1 #aeh2       may degenerate  
into an oligarchy1 #gi    ,aristocracy1 
what1 #gh2       treated of1 #abj2      
its object1 #aba    ,art1 works of1     
which most excellent1 #bj    ,artificers
 and slaves1 their difference1 #bd      
,assemblies1 public1 advantageous to a  
democracy1 #acd    ,assembly1 public1   
its proper business1 #acc    ,athens1   
different dispositions of the citizens  
of1 #adi    ,barter1 its original1 #ae  
,being1 what the nature of every one is1
 #c    ,beings1 why some command1 others
 obey1 #b    ,body by nature to be      
governed1 #h2       requires our care   
before the soul1 #bcb    ,calchis1 the  
government of1 changed1 #aea            
,calcidians1 #fe    ,carthaginian       
government described1 #fj    ,census in 
a free state should be as extensive as  

possible1 #aca2       how to be altered1
 #afb    ,charondas supposed to be the  
scholar of ,zaleucus1 #fd    ,child1 how
 to be managed when first born1 #bce2   
should be taught nothing till he is five
 years old1 #bce2       how then to be  
educated1 #bcf    ,children1 the proper 
government of1 #bb2       what their    
proper virtues1 #bc2       what they are
 usually taught1 #bdj    ,cities1 how   
governed at first1 #c2       what1 #c2  
the work of nature1 #c2       prior in  
contemplation to a family1 or an        
individual1 #d    ,citizen1 who is one8 
#ff1 #fh2       should know both how to 
command and obey1 #gc    ,citizens must 
have some things in common1 #bf2        
should be exempted from servile labour1 
#ea2       privileges different in      
different governments1 #fh2       if    
illegally made1 whether illegal1 #fi2   
who admitted to be1 #ge2       in the   
best states ought not to follow         
merchandise1 #baf    ,city1 may be too  
much one1 #bg1 #ce2       what1 #ff1    

#hb2       when it continues the same1  
#gj2       for whose sake established1  
#gf2       its end1 #hc2       of what  
parts made up1 #aac2       best composed
 of equals1 #abf    ,city of the best   
form1 what its establishment ought to   
be1 #adi2       wherein its greatness   
consists1 #adi2       may be either too 
large or too small1 #bji2       what    
should be its situation1 #baa2          
whether proper near the sea1 #baa2      
ought to be divided by families into    
different sorts of men1 #bah    ,city   
and confederacy1 their difference1 #cg2 
wherein it should be one1 #bg           
,command amongst equals should be in    
rotation1 #aja    ,common meals not well
 established at ,lacedaemon-well at     
,crete1 #ef2       the model from whence
 the ,lacedaemonian was taken1 #ef2     
inferior to it in some respects1 #ef    
,community1 its recommendations         
deceitful1 #cd2       into what people  
it may be divided1 #aid    ,community of
 children1 #bi1 #cj2                    

inconveniences attending it1 #ca        
,community of goods1 its inconveniences1
 #bh2       destructive of modesty and  
liberality1 #cd    ,community of wives1 
its inconveniences1 #bg    ,contempt a  
cause of sedition1 #adf    ,courage of a
 man different from a woman's1 #gd      
,courts1 how many there ought to be1    
#adj    ,courts of justice should be few
 in a small state1 #aib    ,cretan      
customs similar to the ,lacedasmonian1  
#eg2       assembly open to every       
citizen1 #eh    ,cretans1 their power1  
#eh2       their public meals1 how      
conducted #eh    ,crete1 the government 
of1 #eg2       description of the island
 of #eg    ,customs at ,carthage1       
,lacedaemon1 and amongst the ,scythians 
and   ,iberians1 concerning those who   
had killed an enemy1 #bjd1 #bje         
,dadalus's statues1 #f4    ,delphos1 an 
account of a sedition there1 #aej       
,demagogues1 their influence in a       
democracy1 #aaf4    ,democracies1 arose 
out of tyrannies1 #ajj2       whence    

they arose1 #adb2       when changed    
into tyrannies1 #aec2       their       
different sorts1 #ahd1 #ahh2            
general rules for their establishment1  
#ahe2       should not be made too      
perfect1 #aia    ,democracy1 what1 #gi1 
#hj2       its definition1 #aab1 #aac2  
different sorts of1 #aae1 #aah2         
its object1 #abb2       how subverted in
 the ,isle of ,cos1 #aeb    ,democracy  
and aristocracy1 how they may be blended
 together1 #afc    ,democratical state1 
its foundation1 #ahd    ,despotic power 
absurd1 #bje    ,dion1 his noble        
resolution1 #aga    ,dionysius1 his     
taxes1 #age    ,dissolution of kingdoms 
and tyrannies1 #afi    ,domestic        
employments of men and women different1 
#gd    ,domestic government1 its object1
 #gg    ,domestic society the first1 #c 
,draco1 #fe    ,dyrrachium1 government  
of1 #aja    ,economy and money-getting1 
difference1 #ag    ,education necessary 
for the happiness of the city1 #ij2     
of all things most necessary to preserve

 the state1 #aff2       what it ought to
 be1 #aff2       the objects of it1     
#bbh1 #bbi2       should be taken care  
of by the magistrate1 and correspond to 
the nature of government1 #bch2         
should be a common care1 and regulated  
by laws1 #bch    ,employment1 one to be 
allotted to one person in an extensive  
government1 #acf    ,employments in the 
state1 how to be disposed of1 #hh-ij2   
whether all should be open to all1 #baf 
,ephialtes abridges the power of the    
senate of ,areopagus1 #fc    ,ephori1 at
 ,sparta1 their power too great1 #ed2   
improperly chosen1 #ed2       flattered 
by their kings1 #ed2       the supreme  
judges1 #ee2       manner of life too   
indulgent1 #ee    ,epidamnus1 an account
 of a revolution there1 #aej            
,equality1 how twofold1 #adc2       in a
 democracy1 how to be procured1 #ahf    
,euripides quoted1 #gb    ,family       
government1 of what it consists1 #e     
,father should not be too young1 #bcb   
,females and slaves1 wherein they       

differ1 #b2       why upon a level      
amongst barbarians1 #c    ,forfeitures1 
how to be applied1 #aib    ,fortune     
improper pretension for power1 #ia      
,freemen in general1 what power they    
ought to have1 #hf    ,free state       
treated of1 #aba2       how it arises   
out of a democracy and oligarchy1 #abb1 
#abc    ,friendship weakened by a       
community of children1 #ca    ,general1 
the office of1 how to be disposed of1   
#ih    ,gods1 why supposed subject to   
kingly government1 #c    ,good1 relative
 to man1 how divided1 #bja    ,good and 
evil1 the perception of1 necessary to   
form a family and a city1 #d    ,good   
fortune something different from        
happiness1 #bjb    ,government should   
continue as much as possible in the same
 hands1 #bh2       in what manner it    
should be in rotation1 #bh2       what1 
#ff2       which best1 of a good man or 
good laws1 #ih2       good1 to what it  
should owe its preservation1 #abd2      
what the best1 #bbe    ,government of   

the master over the slave sometimes     
reciprocally useful1 ii    ,governments1
 how different from each other1 #fg2    
whether more than one form should be    
established1 #gf2       should endeavour
 to prevent others from being too       
powerful--       instances of it1 #ic2  
how compared to music1 in2       in     
general1 to what they owe their         
preservation1 #afj    ,governments1     
political1 regal1 family1 and servile1  
their difference   from each other1 i   
,governors and governed1 whether their  
virtues are the same or different1 #bc2 
whether they should be the same persons 
or different1 #bbg    ,grecians1 their  
superiority over other people1 #bac     
,guards of a king natives1 #if1afh2     
of a tyrant foreigners1 #if1 #afh       
,gymnastic exercises1 when to be        
performed1 #bbc2       how far they     
should be made a part of education1     
#bdb1 #bdc    ,happiness1 wherein it    
consists1 #bjg    ,happy life1 where    
most likely to be found1 #bjb           

,harmony1 whether all kinds of it are to
 be used in education1 #bea    ,helots  
troublesome to the ,lacedaemonians1 #hg 
,herdsmen compose the second-best       
democracy1 #ahi    ,hippodamus1 an      
account of1 #df2       his plan of      
government1 #df1 #dg3       objected to1
 #dg1 #dh    ,homer quoted1 #ie1 #aaf   
,honours1 an inequality of1 occasions   
seditions1 #dd    ,horse most suitable  
to an oligarchy1 #aie    ,houses1       
private1 their best form1 #bba    ,human
 flesh devoured by some nations1 #bdb   
,husbandmen compose the best democracy1 
#ahi2       will choose to govern       
according to law1 #aah    ,husbandry1   
art of1 whether part of money-getting1  
#ac    ,instruments1 their difference   
from each other1 #f2       wherein they 
differ from possessions1 #f    ,italy1  
its ancient boundary1 #bah    ,jason's  
declaration1 #gb    ,judge should not   
act as an arbitrator1 #dh1 #di2         
which is best for an individual1 or the 
people in general1 #ih1 #ii    ,judges1 

many better than one1 #ajb2       of    
whom to consist1 #ajb2       how many   
different sorts are necessary1 #ada     
,judicial part of government1 how to be 
divided1 #adj    ,jurymen1 particular   
powers sometimes appointed to that      
office1 #fh    ,justice1 what1 #hh2     
the course of1 impeded in ,crete1 #ei2  
different in different situations1 #gd  
,king1 from whom to be chosen #fj2      
the guardian of his people #afh         
,king's children1 what to be done with1 
#ajj    ,king's power1 what it should be
 #ajj2       when unequal1 #adc         
,kingdom1 what1 #gh    ,kingdoms1 their 
object1 #afg2       how bestowed1 #afh2 
causes of their dissolution1 #agc2      
how preserved1 #agc    ,kingly          
government in the heroic times1 what1   
#if    ,kingly power regulated by the   
laws at ,sparta in peace1 #ie2          
absolute in war1 #ie    ,kings formerly 
in ,crete1 #eh2       their power       
afterwards devolved to the kosmoi1 #eh2 
method of electing them at ,carthage1   

#fj    ,knowledge of the master and     
slave different from each other1 ii     
,kosmoi1 the power of1 #eh2       their 
number1 #eh2       wherein inferior to  
the ephori1 #eh2       allowed to resign
 their office before their time is      
elapsed1 #ei    ,lacedamonian customs   
similar to the ,cretan1 #eg             
,lacedaemonian government much esteemed1
 #da2       the faults of it1 #ec-ef2   
calculated only for war1 #ef2       how 
composed of a democracy and oligarchy1  
#abd    ,lacedaemonian revenue badly    
raised1 #ef1 #eg    ,lacedaemonians1    
wherein they admit things to be common1 
#cc    ,land should be divided into two 
parts1 #bai    ,law makes one man a     
slave1 another free1 #f2       whether  
just or not1 #i2       at ,thebes       
respecting tradesmen1 #ge2       nothing
 should be done contrary to it1 #afj    
,law and government1 their difference1  
#ajg1 #ajh    ,laws1 when advantageous  
to alter them1 #di1ej1 #eb2       of    
every state will be like the state1 #hh2

       whom they should be calculated   
for1 #ib2       decide better than men1 
#aja2       moral preferable to written1
 #ajb2       must sometimes bend to     
ancient customs1 #aag2       should be  
framed to the state1 #ajg2       the    
same suit not all governments1 #ajh     
,legislator ought to know not only what 
is best1 but what is practical1 n       
,legislators should fix a proper medium 
in property1 #df    ,liberty1 wherein it
 partly consists1 #ahd1 #ahe    ,life1  
happy1 owing to a course of virtue1     
#abe2       how divided1 #bbh           
,locrians forbid men to sell their      
property1 #dc    ,lycophron's account of
 law1 #hb    ,lycurgus gave over        
reducing the women to obedience1 #ec2   
made it infamous for any one to sell his
 possessions1 #ec2       some of his    
laws censured1 #ed2       spent much    
time at ,crete1 #eg2       supposed to  
be the scholar of ,thales1 #fd          
,lysander wanted to abolish the kingly  
power in ,sparta1 #adc    ,magistrate1  

to whom that name is properly given1    
#acf    ,magistrates1 when they make the
 state incline to an oligarchy1 #fa2    
when to an aristocracy1 #fa2       at   
,athens1 from whom to be chosen1 #fd2   
to determine those causes which the law 
cannot be applied to1 #hh2       whether
 their power is to be the same1 or      
different           in different        
communities1 #acg2       how they differ
 from each other1 #ach2           in    
those who appoint them1 #ach2           
should be continued but a short time in 
democracies1 #afa2       how to be      
chosen in a democracy1 #ahe2            
different sorts and employments1 #aif   
,making and using1 their difference1 #f 
,malienses1 their form of government1   
#aca    ,man proved to be a political   
animal1 #d2       has alone a perception
 of good and evil1 #d2       without law
 and justice the worst of beings1 #e    
,master1 power of1 whence it arises1 as 
some think1 #e    ,matrimony1 when to be
 engaged in1 #bcb    ,meals1 common1    

established in ,crete and ,italy1 #bah2 
expense of1 should be defrayed by the   
whole state1 #bai    ,mechanic          
employments useful for citizens1 #gc    
,mechanics1 whether they should be      
allowed to be citizens1 #gd1 #ge2       
cannot acquire the practice of virtue1  
#ge2       admitted to be citizens in an
 oligarchy1 #ge    ,medium of           
circumstances best1 #abf    ,members of 
the community1 their different pretences
 to the employments   of the state1 #ij2
       what natural dispositions they   
ought to be of1 #bac    ,men1 some      
distinguished by nature for governors1  
others to be governed1 #g2       their  
different modes of living1 #ac2         
worthy three ways1 #bbf    ,merchandise1
 three different ways of carrying it on1
 #bj    ,middle rank of men make the    
best citizens1 #abg2       most         
conducive to the preservation of the    
state1 #abh2       should be            
particularly attended to by the         
legislators1 #acj    ,military1 how     

divided1 #aid    ,mitylene1 an account  
of a dispute there1 #aej    ,monarch1   
absolute1 #ajj    ,monarchies1 their    
nature1 #ie1 #if2       sometimes       
elective1 #ie2       sometimes          
hereditary1 #ie2       whence they      
sometimes arise1 #adf2       causes of  
corruption in them1 #afg2       how     
preserved1 #agc    ,money1 how it made  
its way into commerce1 #af2       first 
weighed1 #af2       afterwards stamped1 
#af2       its value dependent on       
agreement1 #af2       how gained by     
exchange1 #ai    ,money--getting        
considered at large1 #ag1 #ah           
,monopolising gainful1 #ba2 sometimes   
practised by cities1 #ba    ,monopoly of
 iron in ,sicily1 a remarkable instance 
of the profit of it1 #ba    ,music1 how 
many species of it1 in2       why a part
 of education1 #bdj2       how far it   
should be taught1 #bdb1 #bdc2           
professors of it considered as mean     
people1 #bdd2       imitates the        
disposition of the mind1 #bdf2          

improves our manners1 #bdf2             
,lydian1 softens the mind1 #bdg2        
pieces of1 difficult in their execution1
 not to be taught to children1 #bdi     
,nature requires equality amongst       
equals1 #aja    ,naval power should be  
regulated by the strength of the city1  
#bab    ,necessary parts of a city1     
what1 #bae    ,nobles1 the difference   
between them1 no2       should take care
 of the poor1 #aic    ,oath1 an improper
 one in an oligarchy1 #aff    ,officers 
of state1 who they ought to be1 #ace2   
how long to continue1 #ace2       who to
 choose them1 #acf    ,offices1         
distinction between them1 #fg2          
when subversive of the rights of the    
people1 #acj    ,offspring1 an instance 
of the likeness of1 to the sire1 #cj    
,oligarchies arise where the strength of
 the state consists in horse1 no2       
whence they arose1 #adb    ,oligarchy   
admits not hired servants to be         
citizens1 #ge2       its object1 #gi2   
what1 #gi1 #ha2       its definition1   

#aab2       different sorts of1 #aag1   
#aai2       its object1 #abb2       how 
it ought to be founded1 #aie            
,onomacritus supposed to have drawn up  
laws1 #fd    ,ostracism1 why            
established1 #ic1 #adf2       its power1
 #ic2       a weapon in the hand of     
sedition1 #id    ,painting1 why it      
should be made a part of education1 #bda
    ,particulars1 five1 in which the    
rights of the people will be undermined1
 #acj    ,pausanias wanted to abolish   
the ephori1 #adc    ,people1 how they   
should be made one1 #ce2       of       
,athens assume upon their victory over  
the ,medes1 #fd2       what best to     
submit to a kingly government1 #ajd2    
to an aristocratic1 #ajd2       to a    
free state1 #ajd2       should be       
allowed the power of pardoning1 not of  
condemning1 #ace    ,periander's advice 
to ,thrasy-bulus1 #ic1 #afi    ,pericles
 introduces the paying of those who     
attended the court of justice1 #fd      
,philolaus1 a ,theban legislator1 quits 

his native country1 #fd    ,phocea1 an  
account of a dispute there1 #aej        
,physician1 his business1 #hf           
,physicians1 their mode of practice in  
,egypt1 #ih2       when ill consult     
others1 #ajb    ,pittacus1 #fe    ,plato
 censured1 #ahj    ,poor excused from   
bearing arms and from gymnastic         
exercises in   an oligarchy1 #aca2      
paid for attending the public assemblies
 in a democracy1 #aca    ,power of the  
master1 its object1 #gg    ,power1      
supreme1 where it ought to be lodged1   
#hd2       why with the many1 #he1 #hg  
,powers of a state1 different methods of
 delegating them to the citizens1       
#acb-acd    ,preadvisers1 court of1 #ace
    ,priesthood1 to whom to be allotted1
 #bag    ,prisoners of war1 whether they
 may be justly made slaves1 #i          
,private property not regulated the     
source of sedition1 #db2       ,phaleas 
would have it equal1 #db2       how     
,phaleas would correct the              
irregularities of it1 #dc2       ,plato 

would allow a certain difference in it1 
#dc    ,property1 its nature1 #ab2      
how it should be regulated1 #cb1 #cc2   
the advantages of having it private1    
#cd2       what quantity the public     
ought to have1 #dd2       ought not to  
be common1 #bai    ,public assemblies1  
when subversive of the liberties of the 
people1 #acj    ,public money1 how to be
 divided1 #aic    ,qualifications       
necessary for those who are to fill the 
first departments   in government1 #afd 
,quality of a city1 what meant by it1   
#abi    ,quantity1 #abi    ,rest and    
peace the proper objects of the         
legislator1 #bcj    ,revolutions in a   
democracy1 whence they arise1 #aeb2     
in an oligarchy1 #aef    ,rich fined in 
an oligarchy for not bearing arms and   
attending the   gymnastic exercises1    
#aca2       receive nothing for         
attending the public assemblies in a    
democracy1 #aca    ,rights of a citizen1
 whether advantageous or not1 #bjc      
,seditions sometimes prevented by       

equality1 #de2       their causes1      
#add-adf2       how to be prevented1    
#afc    ,senate suits a democracy1 #ahe 
,shepherds compose the second-best      
democracy1 #ahi    ,slave1 his nature   
and use1 #f2       a chattel1 #g2       
by law1 how1 #i    ,slavery not founded 
in nature but law1 as some think1 #f    
,slaves1 an inquiry into the virtues    
they are capable of1 #bc2               
difficult to manage properly1 #ea2      
their different sorts1 #gc    ,society  
necessary to man1 #gg    ,society1      
civil1 the greatest blessing to man1 #d2
       different from a commercial      
intercourse1 #hb    ,socrates1 his      
mistakes on government1 ,book ,,ii4     
passim2       his division of the       
inhabitants1 #ch2       would have the  
women go to war1 #ch2       ,aristotle's
 opinion of his discourses1 #ch2        
his city would require a country of     
immeasurable extent1 #ci2       his     
comparison of the human species to      
different kinds of metals1 #dj2         

his account of the different orders of  
men in a city imperfect1 #c             
,sojourners1 their situation1 #ff       
,solon's opinion of riches1 #ad2        
law for restraining property1 #dc2      
alters the ,athenian government1 #fc    
,soul by nature the governor over the   
body1 and in what manner1 #h2       of  
man how divided1 #bbh1 #bca    ,speech a
 proof that man was formed for society1 
#d    ,state1 each1 consists of a great 
number of parts1 #aji2       its        
disproportionate increase the cause of  
revolutions1 #adg2       firm1 what1    
#aei    ,stealing1 how to be prevented1 
#dd    ,submission to government1 when  
it is slavery1 #bjf    ,supreme power   
should be ultimately vested in the laws1
 #aja    ,syracuse1 the government of1  
languid1 #aea    ,temperance in a man   
different from a woman1 #gd    ,temples1
 how to be built1 #bbc    ,thales1 his  
contrivance to get money1 #ba2          
supposed to be the companion of         
,onomacritus1 #fd    ,things necessary  

to be known for the management of       
domestic affairs1 #ai1 #bj2             
necessary in the position of a city1    
#bbj    ,tribunals1 what different      
things they should have under their     
jurisdictions1 #acg    ,tyrannies1 how  
established1 #afh2       how preserved1 
#agd1 #agf2       of short duration1    
#ahj2       instances thereof1 #ahj     
,tyranny1 what1 #gi2       not natural1 
#ajc2       whence it arises1 #ajh2     
treated of1 #abd2       contains all    
that is bad in all governments1 #abe    
,tyrant1 from whom usually chosen1 #afg2
       his object1 #afh2       his      
guards1 #afh    ,tyrants1 many of them  
originally enjoyed only kingly power1   
#afh2       the causes of their being   
conspired against1 #afi1 #agj2          
always love the worst of men1 #age      
,uses of possessions1 two1 #ae    ,usury
 detested1 #ai    ,venality to be       
guarded against1 ,,ids    ,village1     
what1 #c    ,virtue of a citizen has    
reference to the state1 #ga2            

different in different governments1 #ga 
,virtues different in different persons1
 #bc1 #bd2       whether the same       
constitute a good man and a valuable    
citizen1 #ga    ,walls necessary for a  
city1 #bbb    ,war1 what is gained by it
 in some degree a natural acquisition1  
#ad2       not a final end1 #bje1 #bbi  
,wife1 the proper government of1 #bb    
,women1 what their proper virtue1 #bc2  
not to be indulged in improper          
liberties1 #eb2       had great         
influence at ,lacedaemon1 #eb2       of 
great disservice to the ,lacedemonians1 
#eb2       why indulged by them1 #ec2   
their proper time of marrying1 #bcc2    
how to be managed when with child1 #bcd 
,zaleucus1 legislator of the ,western   
,locrians1 #fd2       supposed to be the
 scholar of ,thales1 #fd