,chance1 ,love1 and ,logic ,international ,library of ,psychology ,philosophy and ,scientific ,method ,chance1 ,love1 and ,logic ,international ,library of ,psychology ,philosophy and ,scientific ,method ,,general ,,editor3 ,c4 ,k4 ,,ogden1 ,m4,a4 ,,volumes ,,already ,,published ,,philosophical ,,studies1 by ,g4 ,e4 ,,moore1 ,litt4,d4 ,,the ,,misuse ,,of ,,mind1 by ,,karin ,,stephen4 ,prefatory note by ,henri ,bergson ,,conflict ,,and ,,dream1 by ,w4 ,h4 ,r4 ,,rivers1 ,f4,r4,s4 ,,psychology ,,and ,,politics1 by ,w4 ,h4 ,r4 ,,rivers1 ,f4,r4,s4 ,,tractatus ,,logico-,,philosophicus1 by ,l4 ,,wittgenstein4 ,introduction by ,bertrand ,russell ,,the ,,measurement ,,of ,,emotion1 by ,w4 ,,whately ,,smith4 ,introduction by ,william ,brown ,,psychological ,,types1 by ,c4 ,g4 ,,jung1 ,m4,d41 ,,ll4,d4 ,,scientific ,,thought1 by ,c4 ,d4 ,,broad1 ,litt4,d4 ,,the ,,meaning ,,of ,,meaning1 by ,c4 ,k4 ,,ogden and ,i4 ,a4 ,,richards ,,character ,,and ,,the ,,unconscious1 by ,j4 ,h4 ,,van ,,der ,,hoop ,,in ,,preparation ,,scientific ,,method1 by ,a4 ,d4 ,,ritchie ,,the ,,analysis ,,of ,,matter1 by ,,bertrand ,,russell1 ,f4,r4,s4 ,,psychology ,,and ,,ethnology1 by ,w4 ,h4 ,r4 ,,rivers1 ,f4,r4,s4 ,,individual ,,psychology1 by ,,alfred ,,adler ,,mathematics ,,for ,,philosophers1 by ,g4 ,h4 ,,hardy1 ,f4,r4,s4 ,,the ,,psychology ,,of ,,myths1 by ,g4 ,,elliot ,,smith1 ,f4,r4,s4 ,,the ,,philosophy ,,of ,,the ,,unconscious by ,e4 ,,von ,,hartmann4 ,introduction by ,prof4 ,g4 ,elliot ,smith ,,the ,,theory ,,of ,,medical ,,diagnosis1 by ,f4 ,g4 ,,crookshank1 ,m4,d41 ,f4,r4,c4,p4 ,,the ,,elements ,,of ,,psychotherapy1 by ,,william ,,brown1 ,m4,d41 ,d4,sc4 ,,emotion ,,and ,,insanity1 by ,s4 ,,thalbitzer4 ,introduction by ,prof4 ,h4 ,hffding ,,the ,,laws ,,of ,,feeling1 by ,f4 ,,paulhan ,,the ,,psychology ,,of ,,music1 by ,,edward ,j4 ,,dent ,,colour-,,harmony1 by ,,james ,,wood ,,the ,,development ,,of ,,chinese ,,thought1 by ,,liang ,,che ,,chiao ,,the ,,history ,,of ,,materialism1 by ,f4 ,a4 ,,lange ,,psyche1 by ,e4 ,,rohde ,,the ,,primitive ,,mind1 by ,p4 ,,radin1 ,ph4,d4 ,,the ,,psychology ,,of ,,primitive ,,peoples1 by ,b4 ,,malinowski1 ,ph4,d41 ,d4,sc4 ,,the ,,statistical ,,method ,,in ,,economics1 by ,p4 ,,sargant ,,florence ,,the ,,principles ,,of ,,criticism1 by ,i4 ,a4 ,,richards ,,the ,,philosophy ,,of #8,,as ,,if' by ,h4 ,,vaihinger ,,chance1 ,,love1 ,,and ,,logic ,,philosophical ,,essays ,,by ,,the ,,late ,,charles ,s4 ,,peirce ,,the ,,founder ,,of ,,pragmatism ,,edited ,,with ,,an ,,introduction ,,by ,,morris ,r4 ,,cohen ,,with ,a ,,supplementary ,,essay ,,on ,,the ,,pragmatism ,,of ,,peirce ,,by ,,john ,,dewey ,,new ,,york ,,harcourt1 ,,brace ,,company1 ,,inc4 ,,london3 ,,kegan ,,paul ,,trench1 ,,trubner ,,co41 ,,ltd4 #aibc ,,copyright1 #aibc1 ,,by ,,harcourt1 ,,brace ,,and ,,company1 ,,inc4 ,,printed ,,in ,,the ,u4,s4,a4 ,,preface ,in the essays gathered together in this volume we have the most developed and coherent available account of the philosophy of ,charles ,s4 ,peirce1 whom ,james1 ,royce1 ,dewey1 and leading thinkers in ,england1 ,france1 ,germany and ,italy have placed in the forefront of the great seminal minds of recent times4 ,besides their inherent value as the expression of a highly original and fruitful mind1 unusually well trained and informed in the exact sciences1 these essays are also important as giving us the sources of a great deal of contemporary ,american philosophy4 ,because of this historical importance no omissions or changes have been made in the text beyond the correction of some obvious slips and the recasting of a few expressions in the interest of intelligibility4 ,in a subject which bristles with suggestions and difficulties the temptation to add notes of explanation or dissent is almost insuperable4 ,but as such notes might easily have doubled the size of this volume ,i have refrained from all comment on the text except in a few footnotes 7indicated1 as usual1 in brackets74 ,the introduction is intended 7and ,i hope it will7 help the reader to concatenate the various lines of thought contained in these essays4 ,i cannot pretend to have adequately indicated their significance4 ,great minds like those of ,james and ,royce have been nourished by these writings and ,i am persuaded that they still offer mines of fruitful suggestion4 ,prof4 ,dewey's supplementary essay indicates their value for the fundamental question of metaphysics1 viz4 the nature of reality4 ,grateful acknowledgment is here made to ,mrs4 ,paul ,carus and to the ,open ,court ,publishing ,co4 for permission to reprint the essays of ,part ,,ii from the ,monist4 ,the late ,paul ,carus was one of the very few who not only gave ,peirce an opportunity to publish1 but publicly recognized the importance of his writings4 ,i must also acknowledge my obligation to ,professor ,dewey for kind permission to reprint his essay on the ,pragmatism of ,peirce from the ,journal of ,philosophy1 and to the editors of that ,journal1 ,professors ,woodbridge and ,bush1 for permission to reprint some material of my own4 ,part ,v of the ,bibliography was compiled by ,mr4 ,irving ,smith4 ,,morris ,r4 ,,cohen ,,the ,,college ,,of ,,the ,,city ,,of ,,new ,,york4 ,,table ,,of ,,contents ,,introduction vii ,,proem4 ,,the ,,rules ,,of ,,philosophy #a ,,part ,i4 ,,chance ,,and ,,logic 7,illustrations of the ,logic of ,science47 #a4 ,the ,fixation of ,belief #g #b4 ,how to ,make ,our ,ideas ,clear #cb #c4 ,the ,doctrine of ,chances #fa #d4 ,the ,probability of ,induction #hb #e4 ,the ,order of ,nature #ajf #f4 ,deduction1 ,induction and ,hypothesis #aca ,,part ,,ii4 ,,love ,,and ,,chance #a4 ,the ,architecture of ,theories #aeg #b4 ,the ,doctrine of ,necessity ,examined #agi #c4 ,the ,law of ,mind #bjb #d4 ,man's ,glassy ,essence #bch #e4 ,evolutionary ,love #bfg ,,supplementary ,,essay--,the ,pragmatism of ,peirce1 by ,john ,dewey #cja ,,introduction ,many and diverse are the minds that form the philosophic community4 ,there are1 first and foremost1 the great masters1 the system builders who rear their stately palaces towering to the moon4 ,these architectonic minds are served by a varied host of followers and auxiliaries4 ,some provide the furnishings to make these mystic mansions of the mind more commodious1 while others are engaged in making their faades more imposing4 ,some are busy strengthening weak places or building much-needed additions1 while many more are engaged in defending these structures against the impetuous army of critics who are ever eager and ready to pounce down upon and destroy all that is new or bears the mortal mark of human imperfection4 ,there are also the philologists1 those who are in a more narrow sense scholars1 who dig not only for facts or roots1 but also for the stones which may serve either for building or as weapons of destruction4 ,remote from all these1 however1 are the intellectual rovers who1 in their search for new fields1 venture into the thick jungle that surrounds the little patch of cultivated science4 ,they are not gregarious creatures1 these lonely pioneers2 and in their wanderings they often completely lose touch with those who tread the beaten paths4 ,those that return to the community often speak strangely of strange things2 and it is not always that they arouse sufficient faith for others to follow them and change their trails into high roads4 ,few nowadays question the great value of these pioneer minds2 and it is often claimed that universities are established to facilitate their work1 and to prevent it from being lost4 ,but universities1 like other well-managed institutions1 can find place only for those who work well in harness4 ,the restless1 impatient minds1 like the socially or conventionally unacceptable1 are thus kept out1 no matter how fruitful their originality4 ,charles ,s4 ,peirce was certainly one of these restless pioneer souls with the fatal gift of genuine originality4 ,in his early papers1 in the ,journal of ,speculative ,philosophy1 and later1 in the ,monist papers reprinted as ,part ,,ii of this volume1 we get glimpses of a vast philosophic system on which he was working with an unusual wealth of material and apparatus4 ,to a rich imagination and extraordinary learning he added one of the most essential gifts of successful system builders1 the power to coin an apt and striking terminology4 ,but the admitted incompleteness of these preliminary sketches of his philosophic system is not altogether due to the inherent difficulty of the task and to external causes such as neglect and poverty4 ,a certain inner instability or lack of self-mastery is reflected in the outer moral or conventional waywardness which1 except for a few years at ,johns ,hopkins1 caused him to be excluded from a university career1 and thus deprived him of much needed stimulus to ordinary consistency and intelligibility4 ,as the years advanced1 bringing little general interest in1 or recognition of1 the brilliant logical studies of his early years1 ,peirce became more and more fragmentary1 cryptic1 and involved2 so that ,james1 the intellectual companion of his youth1 later found his lectures on pragmatism1 8flashes of brilliant light relieved against ,cimmerian darkness0--a statement not to be entirely discounted by the fact that ,james had no interest in or aptitude for formal logical or mathematical considerations4 ,despite these limitations1 however1 ,peirce stands out as one of the great founders of modern scientific logic2 and in the realm of general philosophy the development of some of his pregnant ideas has led to the pragmatism and radical empiricism of ,james1 as well as to the mathematical idealism of ,royce1 and to the anti-nominalism which characterizes the philosophic movement known as ,neo-,realism4 ,at any rate1 the work of ,james1 ,royce1 and ,russell1 as well as that of logicians like ,schroeder1 brings us of the present generation into a better position to appreciate the significance of ,peirce's work1 than were his contemporaries4 ,i ,peirce was by antecedents1 training1 and occupation a scientist4 ,he was a son of ,benjamin ,peirce1 the great ,harvard mathematician1 and his early environment1 together with his training in the ,lawrence ,scientific ,school1 justified his favorite claim that he was brought up in a laboratory4 ,he made important contributions not only in mathematical logic but also in photometric astronomy1 geodesy1 and psychophysics1 as well as in philology4 ,for many years ,peirce worked on the problems of geodesy1 and his contribution to the subject1 his researches on the pendulum1 was at once recognized by ,european investigators in this field4 ,the ,international ,geodetic ,congress1 to which he was the first ,american representative1 gave unusual attention to his paper1 and men like ,cellerier and ,plantamour acknowledged their obligations to him4#a ,this and other scientific work involving fine measurement1 with the correlative investigations into the theory of probable error1 seem to have been a decisive influence in the development of ,peirce's philosophy of chance4 ,philosophers inexperienced in actual scientific measurement may navely accept as absolute truth such statements as 8every particle of matter attracts every other particle directly as the product of their masses and inversely as the square of the distance10 or 8when hydrogen and oxygen combine to form water the ratio of their weights is #a 3 #h40 ,but to those who are actually engaged in measuring natural phenomena with instruments of precision1 nature shows no such absolute constancy or simplicity4 ,as every laboratory worker knows1 no two observers1 and no one observer in successive experiments1 get absolutely identical results4 ,to the men of the heroic period of science this was no difficulty4 ,they held unquestioningly the ,platonic faith that nature was created on simple geometric lines1 and all the minute variations were attributable to the fault of the observer or the crudity of his instruments4 ,this heroic faith was1 and still is1 a most powerful stimulus to scientific research and a protection against the incursions of supernaturalism4 ,but few would defend it to-day in its explicit form1 and there is little empirical evidence to show that while the observer and his instruments are always varying1 the objects which he measures never deviate in the slightest from the simple law4 ,doubtless1 as one becomes more expert in the manipulation of physical instruments1 there is a noticeable diminution of the range of the personal 8error10 but no amount of skill and no refinement of our instruments have ever succeeded in eliminating irregular1 though small1 variations4 8,try to verify any law of nature and you will find that the more precise your observations1 the more certain they will be to show irregular departure from the law40#b ,there is certainly nothing in our empirical information to prevent us from saying that all the so-called constants of nature are merely instances of variation between limits so near each other that their differences may be neglected for certain purposes4 ,moreover1 the approach to constancy is observed only in mass phenomena1 when we are dealing with very large numbers of particles2 but social statistics also approach constant ratios when the numbers are very large4 ,hence1 without denying discrepancies due solely to errors of observation1 ,peirce contends that 8we must suppose far more minute discrepancies to exist owing to the imperfect cogency of the law itself1 to a certain swerving of the facts from any definite formula40#c ,it is usual to associate disbelief in absolute laws of nature with sentimental claims for freedom or theological miracles4 ,it is1 therefore1 well to insist that ,peirce's attack is entirely in the interests of exact logic and a rational account of the physical universe4 ,as a rigorous logician familiar with the actual procedures by which our knowledge of the various laws of nature is obtained1 he could not admit that experience could prove their claim to absoluteness4 ,all the physical laws actually known1 like ,boyle's law or the law of gravitation1 involve excessive simplification of the phenomenal course of events1 and thus a large element of empirical inaccuracy4 ,but a more positive objection against the traditional assumption of absolute or invariable laws of nature1 is the fact that such assumption makes the regularities of the universe ultimate1 and thus cuts us off from the possibility of ever explaining them or how there comes to be as much regularity in the universe as there is4 ,but in ordinary affairs1 the occurrence of any regularity is the very thing to be explained4 ,moreover1 modern statistical mechanics and thermodynamics 7theory of gases1 entropy1 etc47 suggest that the regularity in the universe is a matter of gradual growth2 that the whole of physical nature is a growth from a chaos of diversity to a maximum of uniformity or entropy4 ,a leading physicist of the #aith ,century1 ,boltzmann1 has suggested that the process of the whole physical universe is like that of a continuous shaking up of a hap-hazard or chance mixture of things1 which thus gradually results in a progressively more uniform distribution4 ,since ,duns ,scotus1 students of logic have known that every real entity has its individual character 7its haecceitas or thisness7 which cannot be explained or deduced from that which is uniform4 ,every explanation1 for example1 of the moon's path must take particular existences for granted4 ,such original or underived individuality and diversity is precisely what ,peirce means by chance2 and from this point of view chance is prior to law4 ,all that is necessary to visualize this is to suppose that there is an infinitesimal tendency in things to acquire habits1 a tendency which is itself an accidental variation grown habitual4 ,we shall then be on the road to explain the evolution and existence of the limited uniformities actually prevailing in the physical world4 ,a good deal of the foregoing may sound somewhat mythologic4 ,but even if it were so it would have the merit of offering a rational alternative to the mechanical mythology according to which all the atoms in the universe are to-day precisely in the same condition in which they were on the day of creation1 a mythology which is forced to regard all the empirical facts of spontaneity and novelty as illusory1 or devoid of substantial truth4 ,the doctrine of the primacy of chance naturally suggests the primacy of mind4 ,just as law is a chance habit so is matter inert mind4 ,the principal law of mind is that ideas literally spread themselves continuously and become more and more general or inclusive1 so that people who form communities of any sort develop general ideas in common4 ,when this continuous reaching-out of feeling becomes nurturing love1 such1 e4g41 which parents have for their offspring or thinkers for their ideas1 we have creative evolution4 ,james and ,royce have called attention to the similarity between ,peirce's doctrine of tychistic-agapism 7chance and love7 and the creative evolution of ,bergson4 ,but while both philosophies aim to restore life and growth in their account of the nature of things1 ,peirce's approach seems to me to have marked advantages1 owing to its being in closer touch with modern physics4 ,bergson's procedure is largely based on the contention that mechanics cannot explain certain empirical facts1 such as the supposed identity of the vertebrate eye and the eye of the scallop4 ,but the fact here is merely one of a certain resemblance of pattern1 which may well be explained by the mechanical principles of convergent evolution4 ,peirce's account involves no rejection of the possibility of mechanical explanations4 ,indeed1 by carrying chance into the laws of mechanics he is enabled to elaborate a positive and highly suggestive theory of protoplasm to explain the facts of plasticity and habit4#d ,instead of postulating with ,spencer and ,bergson a continuous growth of diversity1 ,peirce allows for growth of habits both in diversity and in uniformity4 ,the ,spencerian mechanical philosophy reduces all diversity to mere spatial differences4 ,there can be no substantial novelty2 only new forms or combinations can arise in time4 ,the creative evolution of ,bergson though intended to support the claims of spontaneity is still like the ,spencerian in assuming all evolution as proceeding from the simple to the complex4 ,peirce allows for diversity and specificity as part of the original character or endowment of things1 which in the course of time may increase in some respects and diminish in others4 ,mind acquires the habit both of taking on1 and also of laying aside1 habits4 ,evolution may thus lead to homogeneity or uniformity as well as to greater heterogeneity4 ,not only has ,peirce a greater regard than even ,bergson for the actual diversity and spontaneity of things1 but he is in a much better position than any other modern philosopher to explain the order and coherence of the world4 ,this he effects by uniting the medieval regard for the reality of universals with the modern scientific use of the concept of continuity4 ,the unfortunate war between the pioneers of modern science and the adherents of the scholastic doctrine of substantial forms1 has been one of the great misfortunes of human thought1 in that it made absolute atomism and nominalism the professed creed of physical science4 ,now1 extreme nominalism1 the insistence on the reality of the particular1 leaves no room for the genuine reality of law4 ,it leaves1 as ,hume had the courage to admit1 nothing whereby the present can determine the future2 so that anything is as likely to happen as not4 ,from such a chaotic world1 the procedure of modern natural and mathematical science has saved us by the persistent use of the principle of continuity2 and no one has indicated this more clearly than ,peirce who was uniquely qualified to do so by being a close student both of ,duns ,scotus and of modern scientific methods4 ,it is instructive in this respect to contrast the views of ,peirce and ,james4 ,james1 who so generously indicated his indebtedness to ,peirce for his pragmatism1 was also largely indebted to ,peirce for his doctrine of radical empiricism4#e ,the latter doctrine seeks to rescue the continuity and fluidity of experience from the traditional ,british empiricism or nominalism1 which had resolved everything into a number of mutually exclusive mental states4 ,it is curious1 however1 that while in his psychology ,james made extensive use of the principle of continuity1 he could not free himself from ,british nominalism in his philosophy--witness the extreme individualism of his social philosophy or the equally extreme anthropomorphism of his religion4 ,certain of ,peirce's suggestions as to the use of continuity in social philosophy have been developed by ,royce in his theory of social consciousness and the nature of the community2#f but much remains to be worked out and we can but repeat ,peirce's own hope3 8,may some future student go over this ground again and have the leisure to give his results to the world40 ,it is well to note1 however1 that after writing the papers included in this volume ,peirce continued to be occupied with the issues here raised4 ,this he most significantly indicated in the articles on logical topics contributed to ,baldwin's ,dictionary of ,philosophy4#g ,in these articles it is naturally the logical bearing of the principles of tychism 7chance71 synechism 7continuity71 and agapism 7love7 that is stressed4 ,to use the ,kantian terminology1 almost native to ,peirce1 the regulative rather than the constitutive aspect of these principles is emphasized4 ,thus the doctrine of chance is not only what it was for ,james' radical empiricism1 a release from the blind necessity of a 8block universe10 but also a method of keeping open a possible explanation of the genesis of the laws of nature and an interpretation of them in accordance with the theorems of probability1 so fruitful in physical science as well as in practical life4 ,so the doctrine of love is not only a cosmologic one1 showing how chance feeling generates order or rational diversity through the habit of generality or continuity1 but it also gives us the meaning of truth in social terms1 in showing that the test as to whether any proposition is true postulates an indefinite number of co-operating investigators4 ,on its logical side the doctrine of love 7agapism7 also recognized the important fact that general ideas have a certain attraction which makes us divine their nature even though we cannot clearly determine their precise meaning before developing their possible consequences4 ,of the doctrine of continuity we are told expressly#h that 8synechism is not an ultimate absolute metaphysical doctrine4 ,it is a regulative principle of logic10 seeking the thread of identity in diverse cases and avoiding hypotheses that this or that is ultimate and1 therefore1 inexplicable4 7,examples of such hypotheses are3 the existence of absolutely accurate or uniform laws of nature1 the eternity and absolute likeness of all atoms1 etc47 ,to be sure1 the synechist cannot deny that there is an element of the inexplicable or ultimate1 since it is directly forced upon him4 ,but he cannot regard it as a source of explanation4 ,the assumption of an inexplicability is a barrier on the road to science4 8,the form under which alone anything can be understood is the form of generality which is the same thing as continuity40#i ,this insistence on the generality of intelligible form is perfectly consistent with due emphases on the reality of the individual1 which to a ,scotist realist connotes an element of will or will-resistence1 but in logical procedure means that the test of the truth or falsity of any proposition refers us to particular perceptions4#aj ,but as no multitude of individuals can exhaust the meaning of a continuum1 which includes also organizing relations of order1 the full meaning of a concept cannot be in any individual reaction1 but is rather to be sought in the manner in which all such reactions contribute to the development of the concrete reasonableness of the whole evolutionary process4 ,in scientific procedure this means that integrity of belief in general is more important than1 because it is the condition of1 particular true beliefs4 ,,ii ,this insistence on the continuity so effectually used as a heuristic principle in natural and mathematical science1 distinguishes the pragmatism of ,peirce from that of his follower ,james4 ,prof4 ,dewey has developed this point authoritatively in the supplementary essay2 but in view of the general ignorance as to the sources of pragmatism which prevails in this incurious age1 some remarks on the actual historical origin of pragmatism may be in order4 ,there can be little doubt that ,peirce was led to the formulation of the principle of pragmatism through the influence of ,chauncey ,wright4#aa ,wright who had first hand acquaintance with creative scientific work in mathematics1 physics1 and botany was led by the study of ,mill and ,bain to reflect on the characteristics of scientific method4 ,this reflection led him to draw a distinction between the use of popular scientific material1 by men like ,spencer1 to construct a myth or picture of the world1 and the scientific use of laws by men like ,newton as means for extending our knowledge of phenomena4 ,gravitation as a general fact had interested metaphysicians long before ,newton4 ,what made ,newton's contribution scientific was the formulation of a mathematical law which has enabled us to deduce all the then known facts of the solar system and to anticipate or predict many more facts the existence of which would not otherwise be even suspected1 e4g41 the existence of the planet ,neptune4 ,wright insists1 therefore1 that the principles of modern mathematical and physical science are the means through which nature is discovered1 that scientific laws are the finders rather than merely the summaries of factual truths4 ,this conception of the experimental scientist as translating general propositions into prescriptions for attaining new experimental truths1 is the starting point of ,peirce's pragmatism4 ,the latter is embodied in the principle that the meaning of a concept is to be found in 8all the conceivable experimental phenomena which the affirmation or denial of the concept could imply40#ab ,in the earlier statement of the pragmatic maxim1#ac ,peirce emphasized the consequences for conduct that follow from the acceptance or rejection of an idea2 but the stoical maxim that the end of man is action did not appeal to him as much at sixty as it did at thirty4#ad ,naturally also ,peirce could not follow the development of pragmatism by ,wm4 ,james who1 like almost all modern psychologists1 was a thorough nominalist and always emphasized particular sensible experience4#ae ,it seemed to ,peirce that such emphasis on particular experiences endangered the principle of continuity which in the hands of men like ,weierstrass had reformed modern mathematics4 ,for this reason he began to call his own doctrine pragmaticism1 a sufficiently unattractive name1 he thought1 to save it from kidnappers and from popularity4 ,he never1 however1 abandoned the principle of pragmatism1 that the meaning of an idea is clarified 7because constituted7 by its conceivable experimental consequences4 ,indeed1 if we want to clarify the meaning of the idea of pragmatism1 let us apply the pragmatic test to it4 ,what will be the effect of accepting it8 ,obviously it will be to develop certain general ideas or habits of looking at things4 ,peirce's pragmatism has1 therefore1 a decidedly intellectual cast4 ,the meaning of an idea or proposition is found not by an intuition of it but by working out its implications4 ,it admits that thought does not constitute reality4 ,categories can have no concrete being without action or immediate feeling4 ,but thought is none the less an essential ingredient of reality2 thought is 8the melody running through the succession of our sensations40 ,pragmatism1 according to ,peirce1 seeks to define the rational purport1 not the sensuous quality4 ,it is interested not in the effect of our practical occupations or desires on our ideas1 but in the function of ideas as guides of action4 ,whether a man is to pay damages in a certain lawsuit may depend1 in fact1 on a term in the ,aristotelian logic such as proximate cause4 ,it is of interest to observe that though ,peirce is an ardent admirer of ,darwin's method1 his scientific caution makes him refuse to apply the analogy of biologic natural selection to the realm of ideas1 in the wholesale and uncritical manner that has lately become fashionable4 ,natural selection may well favor the triumph of views which directly influence biologic survival4 ,but the pleasure of entertaining congenial illusions may overbalance the inconvenience resulting from their deceptive character4 ,thus rhetorical appeals may long prevail over scientific evidence4 ,,iii ,peirce preferred to call himself a logician1 and his contributions to logic have so far proved his most generally recognized achievement4 ,for a right perspective of these contributions we may well begin with the observation that though few branches of philosophy have been cultivated as continuously as logic1 ,kant was able to affirm that the science of logic had made no substantial progress since the time of ,aristotle4 ,the reason for this is that ,aristotle's logic1 the logic of classes1 was based on his own scientific procedure as a zoologist1 and is still in essence a valid method so far as classification is part of all rational procedure4 ,but when we come to describe the mathematical method of physical science1 we cannot cast it into the ,aristotelian form without involving ourselves in such complicated artificialities as to reduce almost to nil the value of ,aristotle's logic as an organon4 ,aristotle's logic enables us to make a single inference from two premises4 ,but the vast multitude of theorems that modern mathematics has derived from a few premises as to the nature of number1 shows the need of formulating a logic or theory of inference that shall correspond to the modern1 more complicated1 practice as ,aristotle's logic did to simple classificatory zoology4 ,to do this effectively would require the highest constructive logical genius1 together with an intimate knowledge of the methods of the great variety of modern sciences4 ,this is in the nature of the case a very rare combination1 since great investigators are not as critical in examining their own procedure as they are in examining the subject matter which is their primary scientific interest4 ,hence1 when great investigators like ,poincar come to describe their own work1 they fall back on the uncritical assumptions of the traditional logic which they learned in their school days4 ,moreover1 8,for the last three centuries thought has been conducted in laboratories1 in the field1 or otherwise in the face of the facts1 while chairs of logic have been filled by men who breathe the air of the seminary40#af ,the great ,leibnitz had the qualifications1 but here1 as elsewhere1 his worldly occupations left him no opportunity except for very fragmentary contributions4 ,it was not until the middle of the #aith century that two mathematicians1 ,boole and ,de,morgan1 laid the foundations for a more generalized logic4 ,boole developed a general logical algorithm or calculus1 while ,de,morgan called attention to non-syllogistic inference and especially to the importance of the logic of relations4 ,peirce's great achievement is to have recognized the possibilities of both and to have generalized and developed them into a general theory of scientific inference4 ,the extent and thoroughness of his achievement has been obscured by his fragmentary way of writing and by a rather unwieldy symbolism4 ,still1 modern mathematical logic1 such as that of ,russell's ,principles of ,mathematics1 is but a development of ,peirce's logic of relatives4 ,this phase of ,peirce's work is highly technical and an account of it is out of place here4 ,such an account will be found in ,lewis' ,survey of ,symbolic ,logic4#ag ,i refer to it here only to remind the reader that the ,illustrations of the ,logic of the ,sciences 7,part ,i of this volume7 have a background of patient detailed work which is still being developed to-day4 ,symbolic logic has been held in rather low esteem by the followers of the old classical methods in philosophy4 ,their stated objection to it has been mainly that it is concerned with the minutiae of an artificial language and is of no value as a guide to the interpretation of reality4 ,now it should be readily admitted that preoccupation with symbolic logic is rather apt to retard the irresponsible flight of philosophic fancy4 ,yet this is by no means always an evil4 ,by insisting on an accuracy that is painful to those impatient to obtain sweeping and comforting1 though hasty1 conclusions1 symbolic logic is well calculated to remove the great scandal of traditional philosophy--the claim of absolutely certain results in fields where there is the greatest conflict of opinion4 ,this scandalous situation arises in part from the fact that in popular exposition we do not have to make our premises or assumptions explicit2 hence all sorts of dubious prejudices are implicitly appealed to as absolutely necessary principles4 ,also1 by the use of popular terms which have a variety of meanings1 one easily slides from one meaning to another1 so that the most improbable conclusions are thus derived from seeming truisms4 ,by making assumptions and rules explicit1 and by using technical terms that do not drag wide penumbras of meaning with them1 the method of symbolic logic may cruelly reduce the sweeping pretensions of philosophy4 ,but there is no reason for supposing that pretentiousness rather than humility is the way to philosophic salvation4 ,man is bound to speculate about the universe beyond the range of his knowledge1 but he is not bound to indulge the vanity of setting up such speculations as absolutely certain dogmas4 ,there is1 however1 no reason for denying that greater rigor and accuracy of exposition can really help us to discern new truth4 ,modern mathematics since ,gauss and ,weierstrass has actually been led to greater fruitfulness by increased rigor which makes such procedure as the old proofs of ,taylor's theorem no longer possible4 ,the substitution of rigorous analytic procedures for the old ,euclidean proofs based on intuition1 has opened up vast fields of geometry4 ,nor has this been without any effect on philosophy4 ,where formerly concepts like infinity and continuity were objects of gaping awe or the recurrent occasions for intellectual violence1#ah we are now beginning to use them1 thanks to ,peirce and ,royce1 in accurate and definable senses4 ,consider1 for instance1 the amount of a priori nonsense which ,peirce eliminates by pointing out that the application of the concept of continuity to a span of consciousness removes the necessity for assuming a first or last moment2 so likewise the range of vision on a large unobstructed ground has no line between the visible and the invisible4 ,these considerations will be found utterly destructive of the force of the old arguments 7fundamental to ,kant and others7 as to the necessary infinity of time and space4 ,similar enlightenment is soon likely to result from the more careful use of terms like relative and absolute1 which are bones of contention in philosophy but ,ariadne threads of exploration in theoretical physics1 because of the definite symbolism of mathematics4 ,other important truths made clear by symbolic logic is the hypothetical character of universal propositions and the consequent insight that no particulars can be deduced from universals alone1 since no number of hypotheses can without given data establish an existing fact4 ,there is1 however1 an even more positive direction in which symbolic logic serves the interest of philosophy1 and that is in throwing light on the nature of symbols and on the relation of meaning4 ,philosophers have light-heartedly dismissed questions as to the nature of significant signs as #8merely' 7most fatal word67 a matter of language4 ,but ,peirce in the paper on ,man's ,glassy ,shakespearian for ,mirror-,like ,essence1 endeavors to exhibit man's whole nature as symbolic4#ai ,this is closely connected with his logical doctrine which regards signs or symbols as one of the fundamental categories or aspects of the universe 7,thoughts and things are the other two74 ,independently of ,peirce but in line with his thought another great and neglected thinker1 ,santayana1 has shown that the whole life of man that is bound up with the institutions of civilization1 is concerned with symbols4 ,it is not altogether accidental that1 since ,boole and ,de,morgan1 those who have occupied themselves with symbolic logic have felt called upon to deal with the problem of probability4 ,the reason is indicated by ,peirce when he formulates the problem of probable inference in such a way as to make the old classic logic of absolutely true or false conclusions1 a limiting case 7i4e41 of values #a and #j7 of the logic of probable inference whose values range all the way between these two limits4 ,this technical device is itself the result of applying the principle of continuity to throw two hitherto distinct types of reasoning into the same class4 ,the result is philosophically significant4 ,where the classical logic spoke of major and minor premises without establishing any really important difference between the two1 ,peirce draws a distinction between the premises and the guiding principle of our argument4 ,all reasoning is from some concrete situation to another4 ,the propositions which represent the first are the premises in the strict sense of the word4 ,but the feeling that certain conclusions follow from these premises is conditioned by an implicit or explicit belief in some guiding principle which connects the premises and the conclusions4 ,when such a leading principle results in true conclusions in all cases of true premises1 we have logical deduction of the orthodox type4 ,if1 however1 such a principle brings about a true conclusion only in a certain proportion of cases1 then we have probability4 ,this reduction of probability to the relative frequency of true propositions in a class of propositions1 was suggested to ,peirce by ,venn's ,logic of ,chance4 ,peirce uses it to establish some truths of greatest importance to logic and philosophy4 ,he eliminates the difficulties of the old conceptualist view1 which made probability a measure of our ignorance and yet had to admit that almost all fruitfulness of our practical and scientific reasoning depended on the theorems of probability4 ,how could we safely predict phenomena by measuring our ignorance8 ,probability being reduced to a matter of the relative frequency of a class in a larger class or genus1 it becomes1 strictly speaking1 inapplicable to single cases by themselves4 ,a single penny will fall head or it will fall tail every time2 to-morrow it will rain1 or it will not rain at all4 ,the probability of #a_/b or any other fraction means nothing in the single case4 ,it is only because we feel the single event as representative of a class1 as something which repeats itself1 that we speak elliptically of the probability of a single event4 ,hence follows the important corollary that reasoning with respect to the probability of this or that arrangement of the universe would be valid only if universes were as plentiful as blackberries4 ,to be useful at all1 theories must be simpler than the complex facts which they seek to explain4 ,hence1 it is often convenient to employ a principle of certainty where the facts justify only a principle of some degree of probability4 ,in such cases we must be cautious in accepting any extreme consequence of these principles1 and also be on guard against apparent refutations based on such extreme consequences4 ,finally ,i should like to emphasize the value of ,peirce's theory of inference for a philosophy of civilization4 ,to the old argument that logic is of no importance because people learn to reason1 as to walk1 by instinct and habit and not by scientific instruction1 ,peirce admits#bj that 8all human knowledge up to the highest flights of science is but the development of our inborn animal instincts40 ,but though logical rules are first felt implicitly1 bringing them into explicit consciousness helps the process of analysis and thus makes possible the recognition of old principles in novel situations4 ,this increases our range of adaptability to such an extent as to justify a general distinction between the slave of routine or habit and the freeman who can anticipate and control nature through knowledge of principles4 ,peirce's analysis of the method of science as a method of attaining stability of beliefs by free inquiry inviting all possible doubt1 in contrast with the methods of iteration 78will to believe07 and social authority1 is one of the best introductions to a theory of liberal or ,hellenic civilization1 as opposed to those of despotic societies4 ,authority has its roots in the force of habit1 but it cannot prevent new and unorthodox ideas from arising2 and in the effort to defend authoritative social views men are apt to be far more ruthless than in defending their own personal convictions4 ,,iv ,not only the pragmatism and the radical empiricism of ,james1 but the idealism of ,royce and the more recent movement of neo-realism are largely indebted to ,peirce4 ,it may seem strange that the same thinker should be claimed as foster-father of both recent idealism and realism1 and some may take it as another sign of his lack of consistency4 ,but this seeming strangeness is really due to the looseness with which the antithesis between realism and idealism has generally been put4 ,if by idealism we denote the nominalistic doctrine of ,berkeley1 then ,peirce is clearly not an idealist2 and his work in logic as a study of types of order 7in which ,royce followed him7 is fundamental for a logical realism4 ,but if idealism means the old ,platonic doctrine that 8ideas10 genera1 or forms are not merely mental but the real conditions of existence1 we need not wonder that ,peirce was both idealist and realist4 ,royce's indebtedness to ,peirce is principally in the use of modern mathematical material1 such as the recent development of the concepts of infinity and continuity1 to throw light on fundamental questions of philosophy1 such as relation of the individual to ,god or the ,universe4 ,at the end of the nineteenth century mathematics had almost disappeared from the repertory of philosophy 7cf4 ,klpe's ,introduction to ,philosophy71 and ,peirce's essay on the ,law of ,mind opened a new way which ,royce followed in his ,world and the ,individual1 to the great surprise of his idealistic brethren4 ,in his ,problem of ,christianity ,royce has also indicated his indebtedness to ,peirce for his doctrine of social consciousness1 the mind of the community1 and the process of interpretation4 ,it may be that a great deal of the similarity between the thoughts of these two men is due to common sources1 such as the works of ,kant and ,schelling2 but it is well to note that not only in his later writings but also in his lectures and seminars ,royce continually referred to ,peirce's views4 ,the ground for the neo-realist movement in ,american philosophy was largely prepared by the mathematical work of ,russell and by the utilization of mathematics to which ,royce was led by ,peirce4 ,the logic of ,mr4 ,russell is based1 as he himself has pointed out1 on a combination of the work of ,peirce and ,peano4 ,in this combination the notation of ,peano has proved of greater technical fluency1 but all of ,peano's results can also be obtained by ,peirce's method as developed by ,schroeder and ,mrs4 ,ladd-,franklin4 ,but philosophically ,peirce's influence is far greater in insisting that logic is not a branch of psychology1 that it is not concerned with merely mental processes1 but with objective relations4 ,to the view that the laws of logic represent 8the necessities of thought10 that propositions are true because 8we can not help thinking so10 he answers3 8,exact logic will say that ,c's following logically from ,a is a state of things which no impotence of thought alone can bring about40#ba 8,the question of validity is purely one of fact and not of thinking4444 ,it is not in the least the question whether1 when the premises are accepted by the mind1 we feel an impulse to accept the conclusion also4 ,the true conclusion would remain true if we had no impulse to accept it1 and the false one would remain false though we could not resist the tendency to believe in it40#bb ,since the days of ,locke modern philosophy has been almost entirely dominated by the assumption that one must study the process of knowing before one can find out the nature of things known2 in other words1 that psychology is the central philosophic science4 ,the result of this has been an almost complete identification of philosophy with mental science4 ,nor did the influence of biologic studies of the middle of the nineteenth century shake the belief in that banal dictum of philosophic mediocrity3 8,the proper study of mankind is man40 ,the recent renaissance of logical studies1 and the remarkable progress of physics in our own day bid fair to remind us that while the ,lockian way has brought some gains to philosophy1 the more ancient way of philosophy is by no means exhausted of promise4 ,man cannot lose his interest in the great cosmic play4 ,those who have faith in the ancient and fruitful approach to philosophy through the doors of mathematics and physics will find the writings of ,charles ,s4 ,peirce full of suggestions4 ,that such an approach can also throw light on the vexed problem of knowledge needs no assurance to those acquainted with ,plato and ,aristotle4 ,but ,i may conclude by referring to ,peirce's doctrine of ideal as opposed to sensible experiment1#bc and to his treatment of the question how it is that in spite of an infinity of possible hypotheses1 mankind has managed to make so many successful inductions4#bd ,and for the bearing of mathematical studies on the wisdom of life1 the following is certainly worth serious reflection3 8,all human affairs rest upon probabilities4 ,if man were immortal on earth he could be perfectly sure of seeing the day when everything in which he had trusted should betray his trust4 ,he would break down1 at last1 as every great fortune1 as every dynasty1 as every civilization does4 ,in place of this we have death40 ,the recognition that the death of the individual does not destroy the logical meaning of his utterances1 that this meaning involves the ideal of an unlimited community1 carries us into the heart of pure religion4 ,footnote #a3 ,see ,plantamour's 8,recherches ,experimentales sur le mouvement simultan d'un pendule et de ses supports10 ,geneva1 #ahgh1 pp4 #c-d4 ,footnote #b3 ,p4 #aij4 ,footnote #c3 ,pp4 #afb-afc4 ,footnote #d3 ,pp4 #bdi ff4 ,footnote #e3 ,james1 ,pluralistic ,universe1 pp4 #cih-djj4 ,footnote #f3 ,royce1 ,studies in ,good and ,evil1 and ,the ,problem of ,christianity1 esp4 ,vol4 #b4 ,baldwin 7,mental ,development7 is heavily indebted to ,royce in this respect4 ,footnote #g3 ,these articles are by-products or fragments of a comprehensive work on ,logic on which ,peirce was engaged for many years4 ,for the writing of this book1 ,royce declared1 no greater mind or greater erudition has appeared in ,america4 ,only several chapters seem to have been finished1 and will doubtless be included with other hitherto unpublished manuscripts in the complete edition of ,peirce's writings that is now being prepared by ,harvard ,university4 ,footnote #h3 ,baldwin's ,dictionary1 article ,synechism4 ,footnote #i3 ,ib4 ,footnote #aj3 ,baldwin's ,dictionary1 art4 ,individual3 8,everything whose identity consists in a continuity of reactions will be a single logical individual40 ,footnote #aa3 ,the personal relations between ,peirce and ,wright were thus described by ,peirce in a letter to ,mrs4 ,ladd-,franklin 7,journal of ,philosophy1 ,vol4 #ac1 p4 #gai73 8,it must have been about #aheg when ,i first made the acquaintance of ,chauncey ,wright1 a mind about on the level of ,j4 ,s4 ,mill4 ,he was a thorough mathematician4 ,he had a most penetrating intellect4--,he and ,i used to have long and very lively and close disputations lasting two or three hours daily for many years4 ,in the sixties ,i started a little club called #8,the ,metaphysical ,club4'--,wright was the strongest member and probably ,i was next4--,then there were ,frank ,abbott1 ,william ,james and others40 8,it was there that the name and the doctrine of pragmatism saw the light40 ,it might be added that ,peirce's tychism is indebted to ,wright's doctrine of accidents and 8cosmic weather10 a doctrine which maintained against ,la,place that a mind knowing nature from moment to moment is bound to encounter genuine novelty in phenomena1 which no amount of knowledge would enable us to foresee4 ,see ,wright's ,philosophical ,discussions--#ahgf1 also ,cambridge ,hist4 of ,american ,literature1 ,vol4 #c1 p4 #bcd4 ,footnote #ab3 ,monist1 ,vol4 #ae1 p4 #ahj4 ,footnote #ac3 ,this volume1 pp4 #dc-de4 ,footnote #ad3 8,to say that we live for the sake of action would be to say that there is no such thing as a rational purport40 ,monist1 ,vol4 ,,xv1 p4 #age4 ,footnote #ae3 ,the letter to ,mrs4 ,ladd-,franklin quoted before1 explains why ,james1 though always loyal to ,peirce and anxious to give him credit whenever possible1 could not understand the latter's lectures on pragmatism4 ,peirce's incidental judgments on others is worth quoting here3 8,modern psychologists are so soaked with sensationalism that they cannot understand anything that does not mean that4 ,how can ,i1 to whom nothing seems so thoroughly real as generals1 and who regards ,truth and ,justice as literally the most powerful powers in the world1 expect to be understood by the thoroughgoing ,wundtian8 ,but the curious thing is to see absolute idealists tainted with this disease1--or men who1 like ,john ,dewey1 hover between ,absolute ,idealism and ,sensationalism4 ,royce's opinions as developed in his ,world and ,individualism are extremely near to mine4 ,his insistence on the elements of purpose in intellectual concepts is essentially the pragmatic position40 ,footnote #af3 ,baldwin's ,dictionary1 art4 ,method4 ,footnote #ag3 8,peirce anticipated the most important procedures of his successors even when he did not work them out himself4 ,again and again one finds the clue to the most recent developments in the writings of ,peirce10 ,lewis' ,survey of ,symbolic ,logic1 p4 #gi4 ,footnote #ah3 ,hans ,breitmann is symbolic of those who 8solved the infinite as one eternal sphere40 ,footnote #ai3 ,see ,journal of ,speculative ,philosophy1 ,vol4 #b1 pp4 #aee-aeg1 article on ,a ,new ,list of ,categories in the ,proceedings of the ,american ,academy of ,arts and ,sciences1 ,vol4 #g1 #bhg-bih and article on ,sign1 in ,baldwin's ,dictionary4 ,footnote #bj3 ,studies in ,logic1 p4 #aha4 ,footnote #ba3 ,monist1 ,vol4 #g1 p4 #bg4 ,cf4 ,journal of ,speculative ,philosophy1 ,vol4 #b1 p4 #bjg2 ,popular ,science ,monthly1 ,vol4 #eh1 pp4 #cje-cjf4 ,footnote #bb3 ,this vol41 p4 #ae4 ,footnote #bc3 ,suggestive for a theory of the metaphysics of fictions is the suggestion 7p4 #df7 8that the question of what would occur under circumstances which do not actually arise1 is not a question of fact1 but only of the most perspicuous arrangement of them40 ,this arrangement is1 of course1 not merely subjective4 ,footnote #bd3 ,pp4 #abh-abi1 cf4 ,monist1 ,vol4 #g1 p4 #bjf1 and ,logical ,studies1 pp4 #age ff4 ,,proem ,,the ,,rules ,,of ,,philosophy#be ,descartes is the father of modern philosophy1 and the spirit of ,cartesianism--that which principally distinguishes it from the scholasticism which it displaced--may be compendiously stated as follows3 #a4 ,it teaches that philosophy must begin with universal doubt2 whereas scholasticism had never questioned fundamentals4 #b4 ,it teaches that the ultimate test of certainty is to be found in the individual consciousness2 whereas scholasticism had rested on the testimony of sages and of the ,catholic ,church4 #c4 ,the multiform argumentation of the middle ages is replaced by a single thread of inference depending often upon inconspicuous premises4 #d4 ,scholasticism had its mysteries of faith1 but undertook to explain all created things4 ,but there are many facts which ,cartesianism not only does not explain but renders absolutely inexplicable1 unless to say that 8,god makes them so0 is to be regarded as an explanation4 ,in some1 or all of these respects1 most modern philosophers have been1 in effect1 ,cartesians4 ,now without wishing to return to scholasticism1 it seems to me that modern science and modern logic require us to stand upon a very different platform from this4 #a4 ,we cannot begin with complete doubt4 ,we must begin with all the prejudices which we actually have when we enter upon the study of philosophy4 ,these prejudices are not to be dispelled by a maxim1 for they are things which it does not occur to us can be questioned4 ,hence this initial skepticism will be a mere self-deception1 and not real doubt2 and no one who follows the ,cartesian method will ever be satisfied until he has formally recovered all those beliefs which in form he has given up4 ,it is1 therefore1 as useless a preliminary as going to the ,north ,pole would be in order to get to ,constantinople by coming down regularly upon a meridian4 ,a person may1 it is true1 in the course of his studies1 find reason to doubt what he began by believing2 but in that case he doubts because he has a positive reason for it1 and not on account of the ,cartesian maxim4 ,let us not pretend to doubt in philosophy what we do not doubt in our hearts4 #b4 ,the same formalism appears in the ,cartesian criterion1 which amounts to this3 8,whatever ,i am clearly convinced of1 is true40 ,if ,i were really convinced1 ,i should have done with reasoning and should require no test of certainty4 ,but then to make single individuals absolute judges of truth is most pernicious4 ,the result is that metaphysics has reached a pitch of certainty far beyond that of the physical sciences2--only they can agree upon nothing else4 ,in sciences in which men come to agreement1 when a theory has been broached it is considered to be on probation until this agreement is reached4 ,after it is reached1 the question of certainty becomes an idle one1 because there is no one left who doubts it4 ,we individually cannot reasonably hope to attain the ultimate philosophy which we pursue2 we can only seek it1 therefore1 for the community of philosophers4 ,hence1 if disciplined and candid minds carefully examine a theory and refuse to accept it1 this ought to create doubts in the mind of the author of the theory himself4 #c4 ,philosophy ought to imitate the successful sciences in its methods1 so far as to proceed only from tangible premises which can be subjected to careful scrutiny1 and to trust rather to the multitude and variety of its arguments than to the conclusiveness of any one4 ,its reasoning should not form a chain which is no stronger than its weakest link1 but a cable whose fibers may be ever so slender1 provided they are sufficiently numerous and intimately connected4 #d4 ,every unidealistic philosophy supposes some absolutely inexplicable1 unanalyzable ultimate2 in short1 something resulting from mediation itself not susceptible of mediation4 ,now that anything is thus inexplicable1 can only be known by reasoning from signs4 ,but the only justification of an inference from signs is that the conclusion explains the fact4 ,to suppose the fact absolutely inexplicable1 is not to explain it1 and hence this supposition is never allowable4 ,footnote #be3 ,from the ,journal of ,speculative ,philosophy1 vol4 #b1 p4 #adj4 ,,part ,i ,,chance ,,and ,,logic 7,,illustrations ,,of ,,the ,,logic ,,of ,,science7 ,,chance ,,and ,,logic ,,first ,,paper ,,the ,,fixation ,,of ,,belief#bf ,i ,few persons care to study logic1 because everybody conceives himself to be proficient enough in the art of reasoning already4 ,but ,i observe that this satisfaction is limited to one's own ratiocination1 and does not extend to that of other men4 ,we come to the full possession of our power of drawing inferences the last of all our faculties1 for it is not so much a natural gift as a long and difficult art4 ,the history of its practice would make a grand subject for a book4 ,the medieval schoolman1 following the ,romans1 made logic the earliest of a boy's studies after grammar1 as being very easy4 ,so it was as they understood it4 ,its fundamental principle1 according to them1 was1 that all knowledge rests on either authority or reason2 but that whatever is deduced by reason depends ultimately on a premise derived from authority4 ,accordingly1 as soon as a boy was perfect in the syllogistic procedure1 his intellectual kit of tools was held to be complete4 ,to ,roger ,bacon1 that remarkable mind who in the middle of the thirteenth century was almost a scientific man1 the schoolmen's conception of reasoning appeared only an obstacle to truth4 ,he saw that experience alone teaches anything--a proposition which to us seems easy to understand1 because a distinct conception of experience has been handed down to us from former generations2 which to him also seemed perfectly clear1 because its difficulties had not yet unfolded themselves4 ,of all kinds of experience1 the best1 he thought1 was interior illumination1 which teaches many things about ,nature which the external senses could never discover1 such as the transubstantiation of bread4 ,four centuries later1 the more celebrated ,bacon1 in the first book of his 8,novum ,organum10 gave his clear account of experience as something which must be open to verification and rexamination4 ,but1 superior as ,lord ,bacon's conception is to earlier notions1 a modern reader who is not in awe of his grandiloquence is chiefly struck by the inadequacy of his view of scientific procedure4 ,that we have only to make some crude experiments1 to draw up briefs of the results in certain blank forms1 to go through these by rule1 checking off everything disproved and setting down the alternatives1 and that thus in a few years physical science would be finished up--what an idea6 8,he wrote on science like a ,lord ,chancellor10#bg indeed4 ,the early scientists1 ,copernicus1 ,tycho ,brahe1 ,kepler1 ,galileo and ,gilbert1 had methods more like those of their modern brethren4 ,kepler undertook to draw a curve through the places of ,mars2#bh and his greatest service to science was in impressing on men's minds that this was the thing to be done if they wished to improve astronomy2 that they were not to content themselves with inquiring whether one system of epicycles was better than another but that they were to sit down by the figures and find out what the curve1 in truth1 was4 ,he accomplished this by his incomparable energy and courage1 blundering along in the most inconceivable way 7to us71 from one irrational hypothesis to another1 until1 after trying twenty-two of these1 he fell1 by the mere exhaustion of his invention1 upon the orbit which a mind well furnished with the weapons of modern logic would have tried almost at the outset4#bi ,in the same way1 every work of science great enough to be remembered for a few generations affords some exemplification of the defective state of the art of reasoning of the time when it was written2 and each chief step in science has been a lesson in logic4 ,it was so when ,lavoisier and his contemporaries took up the study of ,chemistry4 ,the old chemist's maxim had been1 8,lege1 lege1 lege1 labora1 ora1 et relege40 ,lavoisier's method was not to read and pray1 not to dream that some long and complicated chemical process would have a certain effect1 to put it into practice with dull patience1 after its inevitable failure to dream that with some modification it would have another result1 and to end by publishing the last dream as a fact3 his way was to carry his mind into his laboratory1 and to make of his alembics and cucurbits instruments of thought1 giving a new conception of reasoning as something which was to be done with one's eyes open1 by manipulating real things instead of words and fancies4 ,the ,darwinian controversy is1 in large part1 a question of logic4 ,mr4 ,darwin proposed to apply the statistical method to biology4 ,the same thing has been done in a widely different branch of science1 the theory of gases4 ,though unable to say what the movement of any particular molecule of gas would be on a certain hypothesis regarding the constitution of this class of bodies1 ,clausius and ,maxwell were yet able1 by the application of the doctrine of probabilities1 to predict that in the long run such and such a proportion of the molecules would1 under given circumstances1 acquire such and such velocities2 that there would take place1 every second1 such and such a number of collisions1 etc42 and from these propositions they were able to deduce certain properties of gases1 especially in regard to their heat-relations4 ,in like manner1 ,darwin1 while unable to say what the operation of variation and natural selection in every individual case will be1 demonstrates that in the long run they will adapt animals to their circumstances4 ,whether or not existing animal forms are due to such action1 or what position the theory ought to take1 forms the subject of a discussion in which questions of fact and questions of logic are curiously interlaced4 ,,ii ,the object of reasoning is to find out1 from the consideration of what we already know1 something else which we do not know4 ,consequently1 reasoning is good if it be such as to give a true conclusion from true premises1 and not otherwise4 ,thus1 the question of validity is purely one of fact and not of thinking4 ,a being the premises and ,b being the conclusion1 the question is1 whether these facts are really so related that if ,a is ,b is4 ,if so1 the inference is valid2 if not1 not4 ,it is not in the least the question whether1 when the premises are accepted by the mind1 we feel an impulse to accept the conclusion also4 ,it is true that we do generally reason correctly by nature4 ,but that is an accident2 the true conclusion would remain true if we had no impulse to accept it2 and the false one would remain false1 though we could not resist the tendency to believe in it4 ,we are1 doubtless1 in the main logical animals1 but we are not perfectly so4 ,most of us1 for example1 are naturally more sanguine and hopeful than logic would justify4 ,we seem to be so constituted that in the absence of any facts to go upon we are happy and self-satisfied2 so that the effect of experience is continually to counteract our hopes and aspirations4 ,yet a lifetime of the application of this corrective does not usually eradicate our sanguine disposition4 ,where hope is unchecked by any experience1 it is likely that our optimism is extravagant4 ,logicality in regard to practical matters is the most useful quality an animal can possess1 and might1 therefore1 result from the action of natural selection2 but outside of these it is probably of more advantage to the animal to have his mind filled with pleasing and encouraging visions1 independently of their truth2 and thus1 upon unpractical subjects1 natural selection might occasion a fallacious tendency of thought4 ,that which determines us1 from given premises1 to draw one inference rather than another1 is some habit of mind1 whether it be constitutional or acquired4 ,the habit is good or otherwise1 according as it produces true conclusions from true premises or not2 and an inference is regarded as valid or not1 without reference to the truth or falsity of its conclusion specially1 but according as the habit which determines it is such as to produce true conclusions in general or not4 ,the particular habit of mind which governs this or that inference may be formulated in a proposition whose truth depends on the validity of the inferences which the habit determines2 and such a formula is called a guiding principle of inference4 ,suppose1 for example1 that we observe that a rotating disk of copper quickly comes to rest when placed between the poles of a magnet1 and we infer that this will happen with every disk of copper4 ,the guiding principle is1 that what is true of one piece of copper is true of another4 ,such a guiding principle with regard to copper would be much safer than with regard to many other substances--brass1 for example4 ,a book might be written to signalize all the most important of these guiding principles of reasoning4 ,it would probably be1 we must confess1 of no service to a person whose thought is directed wholly to practical subjects1 and whose activity moves along thoroughly beaten paths4 ,the problems which present themselves to such a mind are matters of routine which he has learned once for all to handle in learning his business4 ,but let a man venture into an unfamiliar field1 or where his results are not continually checked by experience1 and all history shows that the most masculine intellect will ofttimes lose his orientation and waste his efforts in directions which bring him no nearer to his goal1 or even carry him entirely astray4 ,he is like a ship on the open sea1 with no one on board who understands the rules of navigation4 ,and in such a case some general study of the guiding principles of reasoning would be sure to be found useful4 ,the subject could hardly be treated1 however1 without being first limited2 since almost any fact may serve as a guiding principle4 ,but it so happens that there exists a division among facts1 such that in one class are all those which are absolutely essential as guiding principles1 while in the other are all those which have any other interest as objects of research4 ,this division is between those which are necessarily taken for granted in asking whether a certain conclusion follows from certain premises1 and those which are not implied in that question4 ,a moment's thought will show that a variety of facts are already assumed when the logical question is first asked4 ,it is implied1 for instance1 that there are such states of mind as doubt and belief--that a passage from one to the other is possible1 the object of thought remaining the same1 and that this transition is subject to some rules which all minds are alike bound by4 ,as these are facts which we must already know before we can have any clear conception of reasoning at all1 it cannot be supposed to be any longer of much interest to inquire into their truth or falsity4 ,on the other hand1 it is easy to believe that those rules of reasoning which are deduced from the very idea of the process are the ones which are the most essential2 and1 indeed1 that so long as it conforms to these it will1 at least1 not lead to false conclusions from true premises4 ,in point of fact1 the importance of what may be deduced from the assumptions involved in the logical question turns out to be greater than might be supposed1 and this for reasons which it is difficult to exhibit at the outset4 ,the only one which ,i shall here mention is1 that conceptions which are really products of logical reflections1 without being readily seen to be so1 mingle with our ordinary thoughts1 and are frequently the causes of great confusion4 ,this is the case1 for example1 with the conception of quality4 ,a quality as such is never an object of observation4 ,we can see that a thing is blue or green1 but the quality of being blue and the quality of being green are not things which we see2 they are products of logical reflections4 ,the truth is1 that common-sense1 or thought as it first emerges above the level of the narrowly practical1 is deeply imbued with that bad logical quality to which the epithet metaphysical is commonly applied2 and nothing can clear it up but a severe course of logic4 ,,iii ,we generally know when we wish to ask a question and when we wish to pronounce a judgment1 for there is a dissimilarity between the sensation of doubting and that of believing4 ,but this is not all which distinguishes doubt from belief4 ,there is a practical difference4 ,our beliefs guide our desires and shape our actions4 ,the ,assassins1 or followers of the ,old ,man of the ,mountain1 used to rush into death at his least command1 because they believed that obedience to him would insure everlasting felicity4 ,had they doubted this1 they would not have acted as they did4 ,so it is with every belief1 according to its degree4 ,the feeling of believing is a more or less sure indication of there being established in our nature some habit which will determine our actions4 ,doubt never has such an effect4 ,nor must we overlook a third point of difference4 ,doubt is an uneasy and dissatisfied state from which we struggle to free ourselves and pass into the state of belief2 while the latter is a calm and satisfactory state which we do not wish to avoid1 or to change to a belief in anything else4#cj ,on the contrary1 we cling tenaciously1 not merely to believing1 but to believing just what we do believe4 ,thus1 both doubt and belief have positive effects upon us1 though very different ones4 ,belief does not make us act at once1 but puts us into such a condition that we shall behave in a certain way1 when the occasion arises4 ,doubt has not the least effect of this sort1 but stimulates us to action until it is destroyed4 ,this reminds us of the irritation of a nerve and the reflex action produced thereby2 while for the analogue of belief1 in the nervous system1 we must look to what are called nervous associations--for example1 to that habit of the nerves in consequence of which the smell of a peach will make the mouth water4 ,,iv ,the irritation of doubt causes a struggle to attain a state of belief4 ,i shall term this struggle inquiry1 though it must be admitted that this is sometimes not a very apt designation4 ,the irritation of doubt is the only immediate motive for the struggle to attain belief4 ,it is certainly best for us that our beliefs should be such as may truly guide our actions so as to satisfy our desires2 and this reflection will make us reject any belief which does not seem to have been so formed as to insure this result4 ,but it will only do so by creating a doubt in the place of that belief4 ,with the doubt1 therefore1 the struggle begins1 and with the cessation of doubt it ends4 ,hence1 the sole object of inquiry is the settlement of opinion4 ,we may fancy that this is not enough for us1 and that we seek not merely an opinion1 but a true opinion4 ,but put this fancy to the test1 and it proves groundless2 for as soon as a firm belief is reached we are entirely satisfied1 whether the belief be false or true4 ,and it is clear that nothing out of the sphere of our knowledge can be our object1 for nothing which does not affect the mind can be a motive for a mental effort4 ,the most that can be maintained is1 that we seek for a belief that we shall think to be true4 ,but we think each one of our beliefs to be true1 and1 indeed1 it is mere tautology to say so4 ,that the settlement of opinion is the sole end of inquiry is a very important proposition4 ,it sweeps away1 at once1 various vague and erroneous conceptions of proof4 ,a few of these may be noticed here4 #a4 ,some philosophers have imagined that to start an inquiry it was only necessary to utter or question or set it down on paper1 and have even recommended us to begin our studies with questioning everything6 ,but the mere putting of a proposition into the interrogative form does not stimulate the mind to any struggle after belief4 ,there must be a real and living doubt1 and without all this discussion is idle4 #b4 ,it is a very common idea that a demonstration must rest on some ultimate and absolutely indubitable propositions4 ,these1 according to one school1 are first principles of a general nature2 according to another1 are first sensations4 ,but1 in point of fact1 an inquiry1 to have that completely satisfactory result called demonstration1 has only to start with propositions perfectly free from all actual doubt4 ,if the premises are not in fact doubted at all1 they cannot be more satisfactory than they are4 #c4 ,some people seem to love to argue a point after all the world is fully convinced of it4 ,but no further advance can be made4 ,when doubt ceases1 mental action on the subject comes to an end2 and1 if it did go on1 it would be without a purpose4 ,v ,if the settlement of opinion is the sole object of inquiry1 and if belief is of the nature of a habit1 why should we not attain the desired end1 by taking any answer to a question1 which we may fancy1 and constantly reiterating it to ourselves1 dwelling on all which may conduce to that belief1 and learning to turn with contempt and hatred from anything which might disturb it8 ,this simple and direct method is really pursued by many men4 ,i remember once being entreated not to read a certain newspaper lest it might change my opinion upon free-trade4 8,lest ,i might be entrapped by its fallacies and misstatements10 was the form of expression4 8,you are not10 my friend said1 8a special student of political economy4 ,you might1 therefore1 easily be deceived by fallacious arguments upon the subject4 ,you might1 then1 if you read this paper1 be led to believe in protection4 ,but you admit that free-trade is the true doctrine2 and you do not wish to believe what is not true40 ,i have often known this system to be deliberately adopted4 ,still oftener1 the instinctive dislike of an undecided state of mind1 exaggerated into a vague dread of doubt1 makes men cling spasmodically to the views they already take4 ,the man feels that1 if he only holds to his belief without wavering1 it will be entirely satisfactory4 ,nor can it be denied that a steady and immovable faith yields great peace of mind4 ,it may1 indeed1 give rise to inconveniences1 as if a man should resolutely continue to believe that fire would not burn him1 or that he would be eternally damned if he received his ingesta otherwise than through a stomach-pump4 ,but then the man who adopts this method will not allow that its inconveniences are greater than its advantages4 ,he will say1 8,i hold steadfastly to the truth and the truth is always wholesome40 ,and in many cases it may very well be that the pleasure he derives from his calm faith overbalances any inconveniences resulting from its deceptive character4 ,thus1 if it be true that death is annihilation1 then the man who believes that he will certainly go straight to heaven when he dies1 provided he have fulfilled certain simple observances in this life1 has a cheap pleasure which will not be followed by the least disappointment4 ,a similar consideration seems to have weight with many persons in religious topics1 for we frequently hear it said1 8,oh1 ,i could not believe so-and-so1 because ,i should be wretched if ,i did40 ,when an ostrich buries its head in the sand as danger approaches1 it very likely takes the happiest course4 ,it hides the danger1 and then calmly says there is no danger2 and1 if it feels perfectly sure there is none1 why should it raise its head to see8 ,a man may go through life1 systematically keeping out of view all that might cause a change in his opinions1 and if he only succeeds--basing his method1 as he does1 on two fundamental psychological laws--,i do not see what can be said against his doing so4 ,it would be an egotistical impertinence to object that his procedure is irrational1 for that only amounts to saying that his method of settling belief is not ours4 ,he does not propose to himself to be rational1 and indeed1 will often talk with scorn of man's weak and illusive reason4 ,so let him think as he pleases4 ,but this method of fixing belief1 which may be called the method of tenacity1 will be unable to hold its ground in practice4 ,the social impulse is against it4 ,the man who adopts it will find that other men think differently from him1 and it will be apt to occur to him in some saner moment that their opinions are quite as good as his own1 and this will shake his confidence in his belief4 ,this conception1 that another man's thought or sentiment may be equivalent to one's own1 is a distinctly new step1 and a highly important one4 ,it arises from an impulse too strong in man to be suppressed1 without danger of destroying the human species4 ,unless we make ourselves hermits1 we shall necessarily influence each other's opinions2 so that the problem becomes how to fix belief1 not in the individual merely1 but in the community4 ,let the will of the state act1 then1 instead of that of the individual4 ,let an institution be created which shall have for its object to keep correct doctrines before the attention of the people1 to reiterate them perpetually1 and to teach them to the young2 having at the same time power to prevent contrary doctrines from being taught1 advocated1 or expressed4 ,let all possible causes of a change of mind be removed from men's apprehensions4 ,let them be kept ignorant1 lest they should learn of some reason to think otherwise than they do4 ,let their passions be enlisted1 so that they may regard private and unusual opinions with hatred and horror4 ,then1 let all men who reject the established belief be terrified into silence4 ,let the people turn out and tar-and-feather such men1 or let inquisitions be made into the manner of thinking of suspected persons1 and1 when they are found guilty of forbidden beliefs1 let them be subjected to some signal punishment4 ,when complete agreement could not otherwise be reached1 a general massacre of all who have not thought in a certain way has proved a very effective means of settling opinion in a country4 ,if the power to do this be wanting1 let a list of opinions be drawn up1 to which no man of the least independence of thought can assent1 and let the faithful be required to accept all these propositions1 in order to segregate them as radically as possible from the influence of the rest of the world4 ,this method has1 from the earliest times1 been one of the chief means of upholding correct theological and political doctrines1 and of preserving their universal or catholic character4 ,in ,rome1 especially1 it has been practiced from the days of ,numa ,pompilius to those of ,pius ,nonus4 ,this is the most perfect example in history2 but wherever there is a priesthood--and no religion has been without one--this method has been more or less made use of4 ,wherever there is aristocracy1 or a guild1 or any association of a class of men whose interests depend or are supposed to depend on certain propositions1 there will be inevitably found some traces of this natural product of social feeling4 ,cruelties always accompany this system2 and when it is consistently carried out1 they become atrocities of the most horrible kind in the eyes of any rational man4 ,nor should this occasion surprise1 for the officer of a society does not feel justified in surrendering the interests of that society for the sake of mercy1 as he might his own private interests4 ,it is natural1 therefore1 that sympathy and fellowship should thus produce a most ruthless power4 ,in judging this method of fixing belief1 which may be called the method of authority1 we must in the first place1 allow its immeasurable mental and moral superiority to the method of tenacity4 ,its success is proportionally greater2 and in fact it has over and over again worked the most majestic results4 ,the mere structures of stone which it has caused to be put together--in ,siam1 for example1 in ,egypt1 and in ,europe--have many of them a sublimity hardly more than rivaled by the greatest works of ,nature4 ,and1 except the geological epochs1 there are no periods of time so vast as those which are measured by some of these organized faiths4 ,if we scrutinize the matter closely1 we shall find that there has not been one of their creeds which has remained always the same2 yet the change is so slow as to be imperceptible during one person's life1 so that individual belief remains sensibly fixed4 ,for the mass of mankind1 then1 there is perhaps no better method than this4 ,if it is their highest impulse to be intellectual slaves1 then slaves they ought to remain4 ,but no institution can undertake to regulate opinions upon every subject4 ,only the most important ones can be attended to1 and on the rest men's minds must be left to the action of natural causes4 ,this imperfection will be no source of weakness so long as men are in such a state of culture that one opinion does not influence another--that is1 so long as they cannot put two and two together4 ,but in the most priest-ridden states some individuals will be found who are raised above that condition4 ,these men possess a wider sort of social feeling2 they see that men in other countries and in other ages have held to very different doctrines from those which they themselves have been brought up to believe2 and they cannot help seeing that it is the mere accident of their having been taught as they have1 and of their having been surrounded with the manners and associations they have1 that has caused them to believe as they do and not far differently4 ,and their candor cannot resist the reflection that there is no reason to rate their own views at a higher value than those of other nations and other centuries2 and this gives rise to doubts in their minds4 ,they will further perceive that such doubts as these must exist in their minds with reference to every belief which seems to be determined by the caprice either of themselves or of those who originated the popular opinions4 ,the willful adherence to a belief1 and the arbitrary forcing of it upon others1 must1 therefore1 both be given up and a new method of settling opinions must be adopted1 which shall not only produce an impulse to believe1 but shall also decide what proposition it is which is to be believed4 ,let the action of natural preferences be unimpeded1 then1 and under their influence let men conversing together and regarding matters in different lights1 gradually develop beliefs in harmony with natural causes4 ,this method resembles that by which conceptions of art have been brought to maturity4 ,the most perfect example of it is to be found in the history of metaphysical philosophy4 ,systems of this sort have not usually rested upon observed facts1 at least not in any great degree4 ,they have been chiefly adopted because their fundamental propositions seemed 8agreeable to reason40 ,this is an apt expression2 it does not mean that which agrees with experience1 but that which we find ourselves inclined to believe4 ,plato1 for example1 finds it agreeable to reason that the distances of the celestial spheres from one another should be proportional to the different lengths of strings which produce harmonious chords4 ,many philosophers have been led to their main conclusions by considerations like this2 but this is the lowest and least developed form which the method takes1 for it is clear that another man might find ,kepler's earlier theory1 that the celestial spheres are proportional to the inscribed and circumscribed spheres of the different regular solids1 more agreeable to his reason4 ,but the shock of opinions will soon lead men to rest on preferences of a far more universal nature4 ,take1 for example1 the doctrine that man only acts selfishly--that is1 from the consideration that acting in one way will afford him more pleasure than acting in another4 ,this rests on no fact in the world1 but it has had a wide acceptance as being the only reasonable theory4 ,this method is far more intellectual and respectable from the point of view of reason than either of the others which we have noticed4 ,but its failure has been the most manifest4 ,it makes of inquiry something similar to the development of taste2 but taste1 unfortunately1 is always more or less a matter of fashion1 and accordingly1 meta-physicians have never come to any fixed agreement1 but the pendulum has swung backward and forward between a more material and a more spiritual philosophy1 from the earliest times to the latest4 ,and so from this1 which has been called the a priori method1 we are driven1 in ,lord ,bacon's phrase1 to a true induction4 ,we have examined into this a priori method as something which promised to deliver our opinions from their accidental and capricious element4 ,but development1 while it is a process which eliminates the effect of some casual circumstances1 only magnifies that of others4 ,this method1 therefore1 does not differ in a very essential way from that of authority4 ,the government may not have lifted its finger to influence my convictions2 ,i may have been left outwardly quite free to choose1 we will say1 between monogamy and polygamy1 and appealing to my conscience only1 ,i may have concluded that the latter practice is in itself licentious4 ,but when ,i come to see that the chief obstacle to the spread of ,christianity among a people of as high culture as the ,hindoos has been a conviction of the immorality of our way of treating women1 ,i cannot help seeing that1 though governments do not interfere1 sentiments in their development will be very greatly determined by accidental causes4 ,now1 there are some people1 among whom ,i must suppose that my reader is to be found1 who1 when they see that any belief of theirs is determined by any circumstance extraneous to the facts1 will from that moment not merely admit in words that that belief is doubtful1 but will experience a real doubt of it1 so that it ceases to be a belief4 ,to satisfy our doubts1 therefore1 it is necessary that a method should be found by which our beliefs may be caused by nothing human1 but by some external permanency--by something upon which our thinking has no effect4 ,some mystics imagine that they have such a method in a private inspiration from on high4 ,but that is only a form of the method of tenacity1 in which the conception of truth as something public is not yet developed4 ,our external permanency would not be external1 in our sense1 if it was restricted in its influence to one individual4 ,it must be something which affects1 or might affect1 every man4 ,and1 though these affections are necessarily as various as are individual conditions1 yet the method must be such that the ultimate conclusion of every man shall be the same4 ,such is the method of science4 ,its fundamental hypothesis1 restated in more familiar language1 is this3 ,there are real things1 whose characters are entirely independent of our opinions about them2 whose realities affect our senses according to regular laws1 and1 though our sensations are as different as our relations to the objects1 yet1 by taking advantage of the laws of perception1 we can ascertain by reasoning how things really are1 and any man1 if he have sufficient experience and reason enough about it1 will be led to the one true conclusion4 ,the new conception here involved is that of reality4 ,it may be asked how ,i know that there are any realities4 ,if this hypothesis is the sole support of my method of inquiry1 my method of inquiry must not be used to support my hypothesis4 ,the reply is this3 #a4 ,if investigation cannot be regarded as proving that there are real things1 it at least does not lead to a contrary conclusion2 but the method and the conception on which it is based remain ever in harmony4 ,no doubts of the method1 therefore1 necessarily arise from its practice1 as is the case with all the others4 #b4 ,the feeling which gives rise to any method of fixing belief is a dissatisfaction at two repugnant propositions4 ,but here already is a vague concession that there is some one thing to which a proposition should conform4 ,nobody1 therefore1 can really doubt that there are realities1 or1 if he did1 doubt would not be a source of dissatisfaction4 ,the hypothesis1 therefore1 is one which every mind admits4 ,so that the social impulse does not cause me to doubt it4 #c4 ,everybody uses the scientific method about a great many things1 and only ceases to use it when he does not know how to apply it4 #d4 ,experience of the method has not led me to doubt it1 but1 on the contrary1 scientific investigation has had the most wonderful triumphs in the way of settling opinion4 ,these afford the explanation of my not doubting the method or the hypothesis which it supposes2 and not having any doubt1 nor believing that anybody else whom ,i could influence has1 it would be the merest babble for me to say more about it4 ,if there be anybody with a living doubt upon the subject1 let him consider it4 ,to describe the method of scientific investigation is the object of this series of papers4 ,at present ,i have only room to notice some points of contrast between it and other methods of fixing belief4 ,this is the only one of the four methods which presents any distinction of a right and a wrong way4 ,if ,i adopt the method of tenacity and shut myself out from all influences1 whatever ,i think necessary to doing this is necessary according to that method4 ,so with the method of authority3 the state may try to put down heresy by means which1 from a scientific point of view1 seems very ill-calculated to accomplish its purposes2 but the only test on that method is what the state thinks1 so that it cannot pursue the method wrongly4 ,so with the a priori method4 ,the very essence of it is to think as one is inclined to think4 ,all metaphysicians will be sure to do that1 however they may be inclined to judge each other to be perversely wrong4 ,the ,hegelian system recognizes every natural tendency of thought as logical1 although it is certain to be abolished by counter-tendencies4 ,hegel thinks there is a regular system in the succession of these tendencies1 in consequence of which1 after drifting one way and the other for a long time1 opinion will at last go right4 ,and it is true that metaphysicians get the right ideas at last2 ,hegel's system of ,nature represents tolerably the science of that day2 and one may be sure that whatever scientific investigation has put out of doubt will presently receive a priori demonstration on the part of the metaphysicians4 ,but with the scientific method the case is different4 ,i may start with known and observed facts to proceed to the unknown2 and yet the rules which ,i follow in doing so may not be such as investigation would approve4 ,the test of whether ,i am truly following the method is not an immediate appeal to my feelings and purposes1 but1 on the contrary1 itself involves the application of the method4 ,hence it is that bad reasoning as well as good reasoning is possible2 and this fact is the foundation of the practical side of logic4 ,it is not to be supposed that the first three methods of settling opinion present no advantage whatever over the scientific method4 ,on the contrary1 each has some peculiar convenience of its own4 ,the a priori method is distinguished for its comfortable conclusions4 ,it is the nature of the process to adopt whatever belief we are inclined to1 and there are certain flatteries to one's vanities which we all believe by nature1 until we are awakened from our pleasing dream by rough facts4 ,the method of authority will always govern the mass of mankind2 and those who wield the various forms of organized force in the state will never be convinced that dangerous reasoning ought not to be suppressed in some way4 ,if liberty of speech is to be untrammeled from the grosser forms of constraint1 then uniformity of opinion will be secured by a moral terrorism to which the respectability of society will give its thorough approval4 ,following the method of authority is the path of peace4 ,certain non-conformities are permitted2 certain others 7considered unsafe7 are forbidden4 ,these are different in different countries and in different ages2 but1 wherever you are let it be known that you seriously hold a tabooed belief1 and you may be perfectly sure of being treated with a cruelty no less brutal but more refined than hunting you like a wolf4 ,thus1 the greatest intellectual benefactors of mankind have never dared1 and dare not now1 to utter the whole of their thought2 and thus a shade of prima facie doubt is cast upon every proposition which is considered essential to the security of society4 ,singularly enough1 the persecution does not all come from without2 but a man torments himself and is oftentimes most distressed at finding himself believing propositions which he has been brought up to regard with aversion4 ,the peaceful and sympathetic man will1 therefore1 find it hard to resist the temptation to submit his opinions to authority4 ,but most of all ,i admire the method of tenacity for its strength1 simplicity1 and directness4 ,men who pursue it are distinguished for their decision of character1 which becomes very easy with such a mental rule4 ,they do not waste time in trying to make up their minds to what they want1 but1 fastening like lightning upon whatever alternative comes first1 they hold to it to the end1 whatever happens1 without an instant's irresolution4 ,this is one of the splendid qualities which generally accompany brilliant1 unlasting success4 ,it is impossible not to envy the man who can dismiss reason1 although we know how it must turn out at last4 ,such are the advantages which the other methods of settling opinions have over scientific investigation4 ,a man should consider well of them2 and then he should consider that1 after all1 he wishes his opinions to coincide with the fact1 and that there is no reason why the results of these three methods should do so4 ,to bring about this effect is the prerogative of the method of science4 ,upon such considerations he has to make his choice--a choice which is far more than the adoption of any intellectual opinion1 which is one of the ruling decisions of his life1 to which when once made he is bound to adhere4 ,the force of habit will sometimes cause a man to hold on to old beliefs1 after he is in a condition to see that they have no sound basis4 ,but reflection upon the state of the case will overcome these habits1 and he ought to allow reflection full weight4 ,people sometimes shrink from doing this1 having an idea that beliefs are wholesome which they cannot help feeling rest on nothing4 ,but let such persons suppose an analogous though different case from their own4 ,let them ask themselves what they would say to a reformed ,mussulman who should hesitate to give up his old notions in regard to the relations of the sexes2 or to a reformed ,catholic who should still shrink from the ,bible4 ,would they not say that these persons ought to consider the matter fully1 and clearly understand the new doctrine1 and then ought to embrace it in its entirety8 ,but1 above all1 let it be considered that what is more wholesome than any particular belief1 is integrity of belief2 and that to avoid looking into the support of any belief from a fear that it may turn out rotten is quite as immoral as it is disadvantageous4 ,the person who confesses that there is such a thing as truth1 which is distinguished from falsehood simply by this1 that if acted on it will carry us to the point we aim at and not astray1 and then though convinced of this1 dares not know the truth and seeks to avoid it1 is in a sorry state of mind1 indeed4 ,yes1 the other methods do have their merits3 a clear logical conscience does cost something--just as any virtue1 just as all that we cherish1 costs us dear4 ,but1 we should not desire it to be otherwise4 ,the genius of a man's logical method should be loved and reverenced as his bride1 whom he has chosen from all the world4 ,he need not condemn the others2 on the contrary1 he may honor them deeply1 and in doing so he only honors her the more4 ,but she is the one that he has chosen1 and he knows that he was right in making that choice4 ,and having made it1 he will work and fight for her1 and will not complain that there are blows to take1 hoping that there may be as many and as hard to give1 and will strive to be the worthy knight and champion of her from the blaze of whose splendors he draws his inspiration and his courage4 ,footnote #bf3 ,popular ,science ,monthly1 ,november1 #ahgg4 ,footnote #bg3 ,this is substantially the dictum of ,harvey to ,john ,aubrey4 ,see the latter's ,brief ,lives 7,oxford ed4 #ahih7 ,i #bii4 ,footnote #bh3 ,not quite so1 but as nearly so as can be told in a few words4 ,footnote #bi3 ,this modern logic1 however1 is largely the outcome of ,kepler's work4 ,footnote #cj3 ,i am not speaking of secondary effects occasionally produced by the interference of other impulses4 ,,second ,,paper ,,how ,,to ,,make ,,our ,,ideas ,,clear#ca ,i ,whoever has looked into a modern treatise on logic of the common sort1 will doubtless remember the two distinctions between clear and obscure conceptions1 and between distinct and confused conceptions4 ,they have lain in the books now for nigh two centuries1 unimproved and unmodified1 and are generally reckoned by logicians as among the gems of their doctrine4 ,a clear idea is defined as one which is so apprehended that it will be recognized wherever it is met with1 and so that no other will be mistaken for it4 ,if it fails of this clearness1 it is said to be obscure4 ,this is rather a neat bit of philosophical terminology2 yet1 since it is clearness that they were defining1 ,i wish the logicians had made their definition a little more plain4 ,never to fail to recognize an idea1 and under no circumstances to mistake another for it1 let it come in how recondite a form it may1 would indeed imply such prodigious force and clearness of intellect as is seldom met with in this world4 ,on the other hand1 merely to have such an acquaintance with the idea as to have become familiar with it1 and to have lost all hesitancy in recognizing it in ordinary cases1 hardly seems to deserve the name of clearness of apprehension1 since after all it only amounts to a subjective feeling of mastery which may be entirely mistaken4 ,i take it1 however1 that when the logicians speak of 8clearness10 they mean nothing more than such a familiarity with an idea1 since they regard the quality as but a small merit1 which needs to be supplemented by another1 which they call distinctness4 ,a distinct idea is defined as one which contains nothing which is not clear4 ,this is technical language2 by the contents of an idea logicians understand whatever is contained in its definition4 ,so that an idea is distinctly apprehended1 according to them1 when we can give a precise definition of it1 in abstract terms4 ,here the professional logicians leave the subject2 and ,i would not have troubled the reader with what they have to say1 if it were not such a striking example of how they have been slumbering through ages of intellectual activity1 listlessly disregarding the enginery of modern thought1 and never dreaming of applying its lessons to the improvement of logic4 ,it is easy to show that the doctrine that familiar use and abstract distinctness make the perfection of apprehension1 has its only true place in philosophies which have long been extinct2 and it is now time to formulate the method of attaining to a more perfect clearness of thought1 such as we see and admire in the thinkers of our own time4 ,when ,descartes set about the reconstruction of philosophy1 his first step was to 7theoretically7 permit skepticism and to discard the practice of the schoolmen of looking to authority as the ultimate source of truth4 ,that done1 he sought a more natural fountain of true principles1 and professed to find it in the human mind2 thus passing1 in the directest way1 from the method of authority to that of apriority1 as described in my first paper4 ,self-consciousness was to furnish us with our fundamental truths1 and to decide what was agreeable to reason4 ,but since1 evidently1 not all ideas are true1 he was led to note1 as the first condition of infallibility1 that they must be clear4 ,the distinction between an idea seeming clear and really being so1 never occurred to him4 ,trusting to introspection1 as he did1 even for a knowledge of external things1 why should he question its testimony in respect to the contents of our own minds8 ,but then1 ,i suppose1 seeing men1 who seemed to be quite clear and positive1 holding opposite opinions upon fundamental principles1 he was further led to say that clearness of ideas is not sufficient1 but that they need also to be distinct1 i4e41 to have nothing unclear about them4 ,what he probably meant by this 7for he did not explain himself with precision7 was1 that they must sustain the test of dialectical examination2 that they must not only seem clear at the outset1 but that discussion must never be able to bring to light points of obscurity connected with them4 ,such was the distinction of ,descartes1 and one sees that it was precisely on the level of his philosophy4 ,it was somewhat developed by ,leibnitz4 ,this great and singular genius was as remarkable for what he failed to see as for what he saw4 ,that a piece of mechanism could not do work perpetually without being fed with power in some form1 was a thing perfectly apparent to him2 yet he did not understand that the machinery of the mind can only transform knowledge1 but never originate it1 unless it be fed with facts of observation4 ,he thus missed the most essential point of the ,cartesian philosophy1 which is1 that to accept propositions which seem perfectly evident to us is a thing which1 whether it be logical or illogical1 we cannot help doing4 ,instead of regarding the matter in this way1 he sought to reduce the first principles of science to formulas which cannot be denied without self-contradiction1 and was apparently unaware of the great difference between his position and that of ,descartes4 ,so he reverted to the old formalities of logic1 and1 above all1 abstract definitions played a great part in his philosophy4 ,it was quite natural1 therefore1 that on observing that the method of ,descartes labored under the difficulty that we may seem to ourselves to have clear apprehensions of ideas which in truth are very hazy1 no better remedy occurred to him than to require an abstract definition of every important term4 ,accordingly1 in adopting the distinction of clear and distinct notions1 he described the latter quality as the clear apprehension of everything contained in the definition2 and the books have ever since copied his words4 ,there is no danger that his chimerical scheme will ever again be over-valued4 ,nothing new can ever be learned by analyzing definitions4 ,nevertheless1 our existing beliefs can be set in order by this process1 and order is an essential element of intellectual economy1 as of every other4 ,it may be acknowledged1 therefore1 that the books are right in making familiarity with a notion the first step toward clearness of apprehension1 and the defining of it the second4 ,but in omitting all mention of any higher perspicuity of thought1 they simply mirror a philosophy which was exploded a hundred years ago4 ,that much-admired 8ornament of logic0--the doctrine of clearness and distinctness--may be pretty enough1 but it is high time to relegate to our cabinet of curiosities the antique bijou1 and to wear about us something better adapted to modern uses4 ,the very first lesson that we have a right to demand that logic shall teach us is1 how to make our ideas clear2 and a most important one it is1 depreciated only by minds who stand in need of it4 ,to know what we think1 to be masters of our own meaning1 will make a solid foundation for great and weighty thought4 ,it is most easily learned by those whose ideas are meagre and restricted2 and far happier they than such as wallow helplessly in a rich mud of conceptions4 ,a nation1 it is true1 may1 in the course of generations1 overcome the disadvantage of an excessive wealth of language and its natural concomitant1 a vast1 unfathomable deep of ideas4 ,we may see it in history1 slowly perfecting its literary forms1 sloughing at length its metaphysics1 and1 by virtue of the untirable patience which is often a compensation1 attaining great excellence in every branch of mental acquirement4 ,the page of history is not yet unrolled which is to tell us whether such a people will or will not in the long run prevail over one whose ideas 7like the words of their language7 are few1 but which possesses a wonderful mastery over those which it has4 ,for an individual1 however1 there can be no question that a few clear ideas are worth more than many confused ones4 ,a young man would hardly be persuaded to sacrifice the greater part of his thoughts to save the rest2 and the muddled head is the least apt to see the necessity of such a sacrifice4 ,him we can usually only commiserate1 as a person with a congenital defect4 ,time will help him1 but intellectual maturity with regard to clearness comes rather late1 an unfortunate arrangement of ,nature1 inasmuch as clearness is of less use to a man settled in life1 whose errors have in great measure had their effect1 than it would be to one whose path lies before him4 ,it is terrible to see how a single unclear idea1 a single formula without meaning1 lurking in a young man's head1 will sometimes act like an obstruction of inert matter in an artery1 hindering the nutrition of the brain1 and condemning its victim to pine away in the fullness of his intellectual vigor and in the midst of intellectual plenty4 ,many a man has cherished for years as his hobby some vague shadow of an idea1 too meaningless to be positively false2 he has1 nevertheless1 passionately loved it1 has made it his companion by day and by night1 and has given to it his strength and his life1 leaving all other occupations for its sake1 and in short has lived with it and for it1 until it has become1 as it were1 flesh of his flesh and bone of his bone2 and then he has waked up some bright morning to find it gone1 clean vanished away like the beautiful ,melusina of the fable1 and the essence of his life gone with it4 ,i have myself known such a man2 and who can tell how many histories of circle-squarers1 metaphysicians1 astrologers1 and what not1 may not be told in the old ,german story8 ,,ii ,the principles set forth in the first of these papers lead1 at once1 to a method of reaching a clearness of thought of a far higher grade than the 8distinctness0 of the logicians4 ,we have there found that the action of thought is excited by the irritation of doubt1 and ceases when belief is attained2 so that the production of belief is the sole function of thought4 ,all these words1 however1 are too strong for my purpose4 ,it is as if ,i had described the phenomena as they appear under a mental microscope4 ,doubt and ,belief1 as the words are commonly employed1 relate to religious or other grave discussions4 ,but here ,i use them to designate the starting of any question1 no matter how small or how great1 and the resolution of it4 ,if1 for instance1 in a horse-car1 ,i pull out my purse and find a five-cent nickel and five coppers1 ,i decide1 while my hand is going to the purse1 in which way ,i will pay my fare4 ,to call such a question ,doubt1 and my decision ,belief1 is certainly to use words very disproportionate to the occasion4 ,to speak of such a doubt as causing an irritation which needs to be appeased1 suggests a temper which is uncomfortable to the verge of insanity4 ,yet1 looking at the matter minutely1 it must be admitted that1 if there is the least hesitation as to whether ,i shall pay the five coppers or the nickel 7as there will be sure to be1 unless ,i act from some previously contracted habit in the matter71 though irritation is too strong a word1 yet ,i am excited to such small mental activity as may be necessary to deciding how ,i shall act4 ,most frequently doubts arise from some indecision1 however momentary1 in our action4 ,sometimes it is not so4 ,i have1 for example1 to wait in a railway-station1 and to pass the time ,i read the advertisements on the walls1 ,i compare the advantages of different trains and different routes which ,i never expect to take1 merely fancying myself to be in a state of hesitancy1 because ,i am bored with having nothing to trouble me4 ,feigned hesitancy1 whether feigned for mere amusement or with a lofty purpose1 plays a great part in the production of scientific inquiry4 ,however the doubt may originate1 it stimulates the mind to an activity which may be slight or energetic1 calm or turbulent4 ,images pass rapidly through consciousness1 one incessantly melting into another1 until at last1 when all is over--it may be in a fraction of a second1 in an hour1 or after long years--we find ourselves decided as to how we should act under such circumstances as those which occasioned our hesitation4 ,in other words1 we have attained belief4 ,in this process we observe two sorts of elements of consciousness1 the distinction between which may best be made clear by means of an illustration4 ,in a piece of music there are the separate notes1 and there is the air4 ,a single tone may be prolonged for an hour or a day1 and it exists as perfectly in each second of that time as in the whole taken together2 so that1 as long as it is sounding1 it might be present to a sense from which everything in the past was as completely absent as the future itself4 ,but it is different with the air1 the performance of which occupies a certain time1 during the portions of which only portions of it are played4 ,it consists in an orderliness in the succession of sounds which strike the ear at different times2 and to perceive it there must be some continuity of consciousness which makes the events of a lapse of time present to us4 ,we certainly only perceive the air by hearing the separate notes2 yet we cannot be said to directly hear it1 for we hear only what is present at the instant1 and an orderliness of succession cannot exist in an instant4 ,these two sorts of objects1 what we are immediately conscious of and what we are mediately conscious of1 are found in all consciousness4 ,some elements 7the sensations7 are completely present at every instant so long as they last1 while others 7like thought7 are actions having beginning1 middle1 and end1 and consist in a congruence in the succession of sensations which flow through the mind4 ,they cannot be immediately present to us1 but must cover some portion of the past or future4 ,thought is a thread of melody running through the succession of our sensations4 ,we may add that just as a piece of music may be written in parts1 each part having its own air1 so various systems of relationship of succession subsist together between the same sensations4 ,these different systems are distinguished by having different motives1 ideas1 or functions4 ,thought is only one such system2 for its sole motive1 idea1 and function is to produce belief1 and whatever does not concern that purpose belongs to some other system of relations4 ,the action of thinking may incidentally have other results4 ,it may serve to amuse us1 for example1 and among dilettanti it is not rare to find those who have so perverted thought to the purposes of pleasure that it seems to vex them to think that the questions upon which they delight to exercise it may ever get finally settled2 and a positive discovery which takes a favorite subject out of the arena of literary debate is met with ill-concealed dislike4 ,this disposition is the very debauchery of thought4 ,but the soul and meaning of thought1 abstracted from the other elements which accompany it1 though it may be voluntarily thwarted1 can never be made to direct itself toward anything but the production of belief4 ,thought in action has for its only possible motive the attainment of thought at rest2 and whatever does not refer to belief is no part of the thought itself4 ,and what1 then1 is belief8 ,it is the demi-cadence which closes a musical phrase in the symphony of our intellectual life4 ,we have seen that it has just three properties3 ,first1 it is something that we are aware of2 second1 it appeases the irritation of doubt2 and1 third1 it involves the establishment in our nature of a rule of action1 or1 say for short1 a habit4 ,as it appeases the irritation of doubt1 which is the motive for thinking1 thought relaxes1 and comes to rest for a moment when belief is reached4 ,but1 since belief is a rule for action1 the application of which involves further doubt and further thought1 at the same time that it is a stopping-place1 it is also a new starting-place for thought4 ,that is why ,i have permitted myself to call it thought at rest1 although thought is essentially an action4 ,the final upshot of thinking is the exercise of volition1 and of this thought no longer forms a part2 but belief is only a stadium of mental action1 an effect upon our nature due to thought1 which will influence future thinking4 ,illustration3 ,figure #a4 ,illustration3 ,figure #b4 ,the essence of belief is the establishment of a habit1 and different beliefs are distinguished by the different modes of action to which they give rise4 ,if beliefs do not differ in this respect1 if they appease the same doubt by producing the same rule of action1 then no mere differences in the manner of consciousness of them can make them different beliefs1 any more than playing a tune in different keys is playing different tunes4 ,imaginary distinctions are often drawn between beliefs which differ only in their mode of expression2--the wrangling which ensues is real enough1 however4 ,to believe that any objects are arranged as in ,fig4 #a1 and to believe that they are arranged as in ,fig4 #b1 are one and the same belief2 yet it is conceivable that a man should assert one proposition and deny the other4 ,such false distinctions do as much harm as the confusion of beliefs really different1 and are among the pitfalls of which we ought constantly to beware1 especially when we are upon metaphysical ground4 ,one singular deception of this sort1 which often occurs1 is to mistake the sensation produced by our own unclearness of thought for a character of the object we are thinking4 ,instead of perceiving that the obscurity is purely subjective1 we fancy that we contemplate a quality of the object which is essentially mysterious2 and if our conception be afterward presented to us in a clear form we do not recognize it as the same1 owing to the absence of the feeling of unintelligibility4 ,so long as this deception lasts1 it obviously puts an impassable barrier in the way of perspicuous thinking2 so that it equally interests the opponents of rational thought to perpetuate it1 and its adherents to guard against it4 ,another such deception is to mistake a mere difference in the grammatical construction of two words for a distinction between the ideas they express4 ,in this pedantic age1 when the general mob of writers attend so much more to words than to things1 this error is common enough4 ,when ,i just said that thought is an action1 and that it consists in a relation1 although a person performs an action but not a relation1 which can only be the result of an action1 yet there was no inconsistency in what ,i said1 but only a grammatical vagueness4 ,from all these sophisms we shall be perfectly safe so long as we reflect that the whole function of thought is to produce habits of action2 and that whatever there is connected with a thought1 but irrelevant to its purpose1 is an accretion to it1 but no part of it4 ,if there be a unity among our sensations which has no reference to how we shall act on a given occasion1 as when we listen to a piece of music1 why we do not call that thinking4 ,to develop its meaning1 we have1 therefore1 simply to determine what habits it produces1 for what a thing means is simply what habits it involves4 ,now1 the identity of a habit depends on how it might lead us to act1 not merely under such circumstances as are likely to arise1 but under such as might possibly occur1 no matter how improbable they may be4 ,what the habit is depends on when and how it causes us to act4 ,as for the when1 every stimulus to action is derived from perception2 as for the how1 every purpose of action is to produce some sensible result4 ,thus1 we come down to what is tangible and practical1 as the root of every real distinction of thought1 no matter how subtile it may be2 and there is no distinction of meaning so fine as to consist in anything but a possible difference of practice4 ,to see what this principle leads to1 consider in the light of it such a doctrine as that of transubstantiation4 ,the ,protestant churches generally hold that the elements of the sacrament are flesh and blood only in a tropical sense2 they nourish our souls as meat and the juice of it would our bodies4 ,but the ,catholics maintain that they are literally just that2 although they possess all the sensible qualities of wafer-cakes and diluted wine4 ,but we can have no conception of wine except what may enter into a belief1 either-- #a4 ,that this1 that1 or the other1 is wine2 or1 #b4 ,that wine possesses certain properties4 ,such beliefs are nothing but self-notifications that we should1 upon occasion1 act in regard to such things as we believe to be wine according to the qualities which we believe wine to possess4 ,the occasion of such action would be some sensible perception1 the motive of it to produce some sensible result4 ,thus our action has exclusive reference to what affects the senses1 our habit has the same bearing as our action1 our belief the same as our habit1 our conception the same as our belief2 and we can consequently mean nothing by wine but what has certain effects1 direct or indirect1 upon our senses2 and to talk of something as having all the sensible characters of wine1 yet being in reality blood1 is senseless jargon4 ,now1 it is not my object to pursue the theological question2 and having used it as a logical example ,i drop it1 without caring to anticipate the theologian's reply4 ,i only desire to point out how impossible it is that we should have an idea in our minds which relates to anything but conceived sensible effects of things4 ,our idea of anything is our idea of its sensible effects2 and if we fancy that we have any other we deceive ourselves1 and mistake a mere sensation accompanying the thought for a part of the thought itself4 ,it is absurd to say that thought has any meaning unrelated to its only function4 ,it is foolish for ,catholics and ,protestants to fancy themselves in disagreement about the elements of the sacrament1 if they agree in regard to all their sensible effects1 here or hereafter4 ,it appears1 then1 that the rule for attaining the third grade of clearness of apprehension is as follows3 ,consider what effects1 which might conceivably have practical bearings1 we conceive the object of our conception to have4 ,then1 our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object4 ,,iii ,let us illustrate this rule by some examples2 and1 to begin with the simplest one possible1 let us ask what we mean by calling a thing hard4 ,evidently that it will not be scratched by many other substances4 ,the whole conception of this quality1 as of every other1 lies in its conceived effects4 ,there is absolutely no difference between a hard thing and a soft thing so long as they are not brought to the test4 ,suppose1 then1 that a diamond could be crystallized in the midst of a cushion of soft cotton1 and should remain there until it was finally burned up4 ,would it be false to say that that diamond was soft8 ,this seems a foolish question1 and would be so1 in fact1 except in the realm of logic4 ,there such questions are often of the greatest utility as serving to bring logical principles into sharper relief than real discussions ever could4 ,in studying logic we must not put them aside with hasty answers1 but must consider them with attentive care1 in order to make out the principles involved4 ,we may1 in the present case1 modify our question1 and ask what prevents us from saying that all hard bodies remain perfectly soft until they are touched1 when their hardness increases with the pressure until they are scratched4 ,reflection will show that the reply is this3 there would be no falsity in such modes of speech4 ,they would involve a modification of our present usage of speech with regard to the words hard and soft1 but not of their meanings4 ,for they represent no fact to be different from what it is2 only they involve arrangements of facts which would be exceedingly maladroit4 ,this leads us to remark that the question of what would occur under circumstances which do not actually arise is not a question of fact1 but only of the most perspicuous arrangement of them4 ,for example1 the question of free-will and fate in its simplest form1 stripped of verbiage1 is something like this3 ,i have done something of which ,i am ashamed2 could ,i1 by an effort of the will1 have resisted the temptation1 and done otherwise8 ,the philosophical reply is1 that this is not a question of fact1 but only of the arrangement of facts4 ,arranging them so as to exhibit what is particularly pertinent to my question--namely1 that ,i ought to blame myself for having done wrong--it is perfectly true to say that1 if ,i had willed to do otherwise than ,i did1 ,i should have done otherwise4 ,on the other hand1 arranging the facts so as to exhibit another important consideration1 it is equally true that1 when a temptation has once been allowed to work1 it will1 if it has a certain force1 produce its effect1 let me struggle how ,i may4 ,there is no objection to a contradiction in what would result from a false supposition4 ,the reductio ad absurdum consists in showing that contradictory results would follow from a hypothesis which is consequently judged to be false4 ,many questions are involved in the free-will discussion1 and ,i am far from desiring to say that both sides are equally right4 ,on the contrary1 ,i am of opinion that one side denies important facts1 and that the other does not4 ,but what ,i do say is1 that the above single question was the origin of the whole doubt2 that1 had it not been for this question1 the controversy would never have arisen2 and that this question is perfectly solved in the manner which ,i have indicated4 ,let us next seek a clear idea of ,weight4 ,this is another very easy case4 ,to say that a body is heavy means simply that1 in the absence of opposing force1 it will fall4 ,this 7neglecting certain specifications of how it will fall1 etc41 which exist in the mind of the physicist who uses the word7 is evidently the whole conception of weight4 ,it is a fair question whether some particular facts may not account for gravity2 but what we mean by the force itself is completely involved in its effects4 ,this leads us to undertake an account of the idea of ,force in general4 ,this is the great conception which1 developed in the early part of the seventeenth century from the rude idea of a cause1 and constantly improved upon since1 has shown us how to explain all the changes of motion which bodies experience1 and how to think about all physical phenomena2 which has given birth to modern science1 and changed the face of the globe2 and which1 aside from its more special uses1 has played a principal part in directing the course of modern thought1 and in furthering modern social development4 ,it is1 therefore1 worth some pains to comprehend it4 ,according to our rule1 we must begin by asking what is the immediate use of thinking about force2 and the answer is1 that we thus account for changes of motion4 ,if bodies were left to themselves1 without the intervention of forces1 every motion would continue unchanged both in velocity and in direction4 ,furthermore1 change of motion never takes place abruptly2 if its direction is changed1 it is always through a curve without angles2 if its velocity alters1 it is by degrees4 ,the gradual changes which are constantly taking place are conceived by geometers to be compounded together according to the rules of the parallelogram of forces4 ,if the reader does not already know what this is1 he will find it1 ,i hope1 to his advantage to endeavor to follow the following explanation2 but if mathematics are insupportable to him1 pray let him skip three paragraphs rather than that we should part company here4 ,a path is a line whose beginning and end are distinguished4 ,two paths are considered to be equivalent1 which1 beginning at the same point1 lead to the same point4 ,thus the two paths1 ,a ,b ,c ,d ,e and ,a ,f ,g ,h ,e 7,fig4 #c71 are equivalent4 ,paths which do not begin at the same point are considered to be equivalent1 provided that1 on moving either of them without turning it1 but keeping it always parallel to its original position1 so that when its beginning coincides with that of the other path1 the ends also coincide4 ,paths are considered as geometrically added together1 when one begins where the other ends2 thus the path ,a ,e is conceived to be a sum of ,a ,b1 ,b ,c1 ,c ,d1 and ,d ,e4 ,in the parallelogram of ,fig4 #d the diagonal ,a ,c is the sum of ,a ,b and ,b ,c2 or1 since ,a ,d is geometrically equivalent to ,b ,c1 ,a ,c is the geometrical sum of ,a ,b and ,a ,d4 ,illustration3 ,figure #c4 ,illustration3 ,figure #d4 ,all this is purely conventional4 ,it simply amounts to this3 that we choose to call paths having the relations ,i have described equal or added4 ,but1 though it is a convention1 it is a convention with a good reason4 ,the rule for geometrical addition may be applied not only to paths1 but to any other things which can be represented by paths4 ,now1 as a path is determined by the varying direction and distance of the point which moves over it from the starting-point1 it follows that anything which from its beginning to its end is determined by a varying direction and a varying magnitude is capable of being represented by a line4 ,accordingly1 velocities may be represented by lines1 for they have only directions and rates4 ,the same thing is true of accelerations1 or changes of velocities4 ,this is evident enough in the case of velocities2 and it becomes evident for accelerations if we consider that precisely what velocities are to positions--namely1 states of change of them--that accelerations are to velocities4 ,illustration3 ,figure #e4 ,the so-called 8parallelogram of forces0 is simply a rule for compounding accelerations4 ,the rule is1 to represent the accelerations by paths1 and then to geometrically add the paths4 ,the geometers1 however1 not only use the 8parallelogram of forces0 to compound different accelerations1 but also to resolve one acceleration into a sum of several4 ,let ,a ,b 7,fig4 #e7 be the path which represents a certain acceleration--say1 such a change in the motion of a body that at the end of one second the body will1 under the influence of that change1 be in a position different from what it would have had if its motion had continued unchanged1 such that a path equivalent to ,a ,b would lead from the latter position to the former4 ,this acceleration may be considered as the sum of the accelerations represented by ,a ,c and ,c ,b4 ,it may also be considered as the sum of the very different accelerations represented by ,a ,d and ,d ,b1 where ,a ,d is almost the opposite of ,a ,c4 ,and it is clear that there is an immense variety of ways in which ,a ,b might be resolved into the sum of two accelerations4 ,after this tedious explanation1 which ,i hope1 in view of the extraordinary interest of the conception of force1 may not have exhausted the reader's patience1 we are prepared at last to state the grand fact which this conception embodies4 ,this fact is that if the actual changes of motion which the different particles of bodies experience are each resolved in its appropriate way1 each component acceleration is precisely such as is prescribed by a certain law of ,nature1 according to which bodies in the relative positions which the bodies in question actually have at the moment1#cb always receive certain accelerations1 which1 being compounded by geometrical addition1 give the acceleration which the body actually experiences4 ,this is the only fact which the idea of force represents1 and whoever will take the trouble clearly to apprehend what this fact is1 perfectly comprehends what force is4 ,whether we ought to say that a force is an acceleration1 or that it causes an acceleration1 is a mere question of propriety of language1 which has no more to do with our real meaning than the difference between the ,french idiom 8,il fait froid0 and its ,english equivalent 8,it is cold40 ,yet it is surprising to see how this simple affair has muddled men's minds4 ,in how many profound treatises is not force spoken of as a 8mysterious entity10 which seems to be only a way of confessing that the author despairs of ever getting a clear notion of what the word means6 ,in a recent admired work on ,analytic ,mechanics it is stated that we understand precisely the effect of force1 but what force itself is we do not understand6 ,this is simply a self-contradiction4 ,the idea which the word force excites in our minds has no other function than to affect our actions1 and these actions can have no reference to force otherwise than through its effects4 ,consequently1 if we know what the effects of force are1 we are acquainted with every fact which is implied in saying that a force exists1 and there is nothing more to know4 ,the truth is1 there is some vague notion afloat that a question may mean something which the mind cannot conceive2 and when some hair-splitting philosophers have been confronted with the absurdity of such a view1 they have invented an empty distinction between positive and negative conceptions1 in the attempt to give their non-idea a form not obviously nonsensical4 ,the nullity of it is sufficiently plain from the considerations given a few pages back2 and1 apart from those considerations1 the quibbling character of the distinction must have struck every mind accustomed to real thinking4 ,,iv ,let us now approach the subject of logic1 and consider a conception which particularly concerns it1 that of reality4 ,taking clearness in the sense of familiarity1 no idea could be clearer than this4 ,every child uses it with perfect confidence1 never dreaming that he does not understand it4 ,as for clearness in its second grade1 however1 it would probably puzzle most men1 even among those of a reflective turn of mind1 to give an abstract definition of the real4 ,yet such a definition may perhaps be reached by considering the points of difference between reality and its opposite1 fiction4 ,a figment is a product of somebody's imagination2 it has such characters as his thought impresses upon it4 ,that those characters are independent of how you or ,i think is an external reality4 ,there are1 however1 phenomena within our own minds1 dependent upon our thought1 which are at the same time real in the sense that we really think them4 ,but though their characters depend on how we think1 they do not depend on what we think those characters to be4 ,thus1 a dream has a real existence as a mental phenomenon1 if somebody has really dreamt it2 that he dreamt so and so1 does not depend on what anybody thinks was dreamt1 but is completely independent of all opinion on the subject4 ,on the other hand1 considering1 not the fact of dreaming1 but the thing dreamt1 it retains its peculiarities by virtue of no other fact than that it was dreamt to possess them4 ,thus we may define the real as that whose characters are independent of what anybody may think them to be4 ,but1 however satisfactory such a definition may be found1 it would be a great mistake to suppose that it makes the idea of reality perfectly clear4 ,here1 then1 let us apply our rules4 ,according to them1 reality1 like every other quality1 consists in the peculiar sensible effects which things partaking of it produce4 ,the only effect which real things have is to cause belief1 for all the sensations which they excite emerge into consciousness in the form of beliefs4 ,the question1 therefore1 is1 how is true belief 7or belief in the real7 distinguished from false belief 7or belief in fiction74 ,now1 as we have seen in the former paper1 the ideas of truth and falsehood1 in their full development1 appertain exclusively to the scientific method of settling opinion4 ,a person who arbitrarily chooses the propositions which he will adopt can use the word truth only to emphasize the expression of his determination to hold on to his choice4 ,of course1 the method of tenacity never prevailed exclusively2 reason is too natural to men for that4 ,but in the literature of the dark ages we find some fine examples of it4 ,when ,scotus ,erigena is commenting upon a poetical passage in which hellebore is spoken of as having caused the death of ,socrates1 he does not hesitate to inform the inquiring reader that ,helleborus and ,socrates were two eminent ,greek philosophers1 and that the latter having been overcome in argument by the former took the matter to heart and died of it6 ,what sort of an idea of truth could a man have who could adopt and teach1 without the qualification of a perhaps1 an opinion taken so entirely at random8 ,the real spirit of ,socrates1 who ,i hope would have been delighted to have been 8overcome in argument10 because he would have learned something by it1 is in curious contrast with the nave idea of the glossist1 for whom discussion would seem to have been simply a struggle4 ,when philosophy began to awake from its long slumber1 and before theology completely dominated it1 the practice seems to have been for each professor to seize upon any philosophical position he found unoccupied and which seemed a strong one1 to intrench himself in it1 and to sally forth from time to time to give battle to the others4 ,thus1 even the scanty records we possess of those disputes enable us to make out a dozen or more opinions held by different teachers at one time concerning the question of nominalism and realism4 ,read the opening part of the ,historia ,calamitatum of ,abelard1 who was certainly as philosophical as any of his contemporaries1 and see the spirit of combat which it breathes4 ,for him1 the truth is simply his particular stronghold4 ,when the method of authority prevailed1 the truth meant little more than the ,catholic faith4 ,all the efforts of the scholastic doctors are directed toward harmonizing their faith in ,aristotle and their faith in the ,church1 and one may search their ponderous folios through without finding an argument which goes any further4 ,it is noticeable that where different faiths flourish side by side1 renegades are looked upon with contempt even by the party whose belief they adopt2 so completely has the idea of loyalty replaced that of truth-seeking4 ,since the time of ,descartes1 the defect in the conception of truth has been less apparent4 ,still1 it will sometimes strike a scientific man that the philosophers have been less intent on finding out what the facts are1 than on inquiring what belief is most in harmony with their system4 ,it is hard to convince a follower of the a priori method by adducing facts2 but show him that an opinion he is defending is inconsistent with what he has laid down elsewhere1 and he will be very apt to retract it4 ,these minds do not seem to believe that disputation is ever to cease2 they seem to think that the opinion which is natural for one man is not so for another1 and that belief will1 consequently1 never be settled4 ,in contenting themselves with fixing their own opinions by a method which would lead another man to a different result1 they betray their feeble hold of the conception of what truth is4 ,on the other hand1 all the followers of science are fully persuaded that the processes of investigation1 if only pushed far enough1 will give one certain solution to every question to which they can be applied4 ,one man may investigate the velocity of light by studying the transits of ,venus and the aberration of the stars2 another by the oppositions of ,mars and the eclipses of ,jupiter's satellites2 a third by the method of ,fizeau2 a fourth by that of ,foucault2 a fifth by the motions of the curves of ,lissajoux2 a sixth1 a seventh1 an eighth1 and a ninth1 may follow the different methods of comparing the measures of statical and dynamical electricity4 ,they may at first obtain different results1 but1 as each perfects his method and his processes1 the results will move steadily together toward a destined center4 ,so with all scientific research4 ,different minds may set out with the most antagonistic views1 but the progress of investigation carries them by a force outside of themselves to one and the same conclusion4 ,this activity of thought by which we are carried1 not where we wish1 but to a fore-ordained goal1 is like the operation of destiny4 ,no modification of the point of view taken1 no selection of other facts for study1 no natural bent of mind even1 can enable a man to escape the predestinate opinion4 ,this great law is embodied in the conception of truth and reality4 ,the opinion which is fated#cc to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate1 is what we mean by the truth1 and the object represented in this opinion is the real4 ,that is the way ,i would explain reality4 ,but it may be said that this view is directly opposed to the abstract definition which we have given of reality1 inasmuch as it makes the characters of the real depend on what is ultimately thought about them4 ,but the answer to this is that1 on the one hand1 reality is independent1 not necessarily of thought in general1 but only of what you or ,i or any finite number of men may think about it2 and that1 on the other hand1 though the object of the final opinion depends on what that opinion is1 yet what that opinion is does not depend on what you or ,i or any man thinks4 ,our perversity and that of others may indefinitely postpone the settlement of opinion2 it might even conceivably cause an arbitrary proposition to be universally accepted as long as the human race should last4 ,yet even that would not change the nature of the belief1 which alone could be the result of investigation carried sufficiently far2 and if1 after the extinction of our race1 another should arise with faculties and disposition for investigation1 that true opinion must be the one which they would ultimately come to4 8,truth crushed to earth shall rise again10 and the opinion which would finally result from investigation does not depend on how anybody may actually think4 ,but the reality of that which is real does depend on the real fact that investigation is destined to lead1 at last1 if continued long enough1 to a belief in it4 ,but ,i may be asked what ,i have to say to all the minute facts of history1 forgotten never to be recovered1 to the lost books of the ancients1 to the buried secrets4 8,full many a gem of purest ray serene ,the dark1 unfathomed caves of ocean bear2 ,full many a flower is born to blush unseen1 ,and waste its sweetness on the desert air40 ,do these things not really exist because they are hopelessly beyond the reach of our knowledge8 ,and then1 after the universe is dead 7according to the prediction of some scientists71 and all life has ceased forever1 will not the shock of atoms continue though there will be no mind to know it8 ,to this ,i reply that1 though in no possible state of knowledge can any number be great enough to express the relation between the amount of what rests unknown to the amount of the known1 yet it is unphilosophical to suppose that1 with regard to any given question 7which has any clear meaning71 investigation would not bring forth a solution of it1 if it were carried far enough4 ,who would have said1 a few years ago1 that we could ever know of what substances stars are made whose light may have been longer in reaching us than the human race has existed8 ,who can be sure of what we shall not know in a few hundred years8 ,who can guess what would be the result of continuing the pursuit of science for ten thousand years1 with the activity of the last hundred8 ,and if it were to go on for a million1 or a billion1 or any number of years you please1 how is it possible to say that there is any question which might not ultimately be solved8 ,but it may be objected1 8,why make so much of these remote considerations1 especially when it is your principle that only practical distinctions have a meaning80 ,well1 ,i must confess that it makes very little difference whether we say that a stone on the bottom of the ocean1 in complete darkness1 is brilliant or not--that is to say1 that it probably makes no difference1 remembering always that that stone may be fished up to-morrow4 ,but that there are gems at the bottom of the sea1 flowers in the untraveled desert1 etc41 are propositions which1 like that about a diamond being hard when it is not pressed1 concern much more the arrangement of our language than they do the meaning of our ideas4 ,it seems to me1 however1 that we have1 by the application of our rule1 reached so clear an apprehension of what we mean by reality1 and of the fact which the idea rests on1 that we should not1 perhaps1 be making a pretension so presumptuous as it would be singular1 if we were to offer a metaphysical theory of existence for universal acceptance among those who employ the scientific method of fixing belief4 ,however1 as metaphysics is a subject much more curious than useful1 the knowledge of which1 like that of a sunken reef1 serves chiefly to enable us to keep clear of it1 ,i will not trouble the reader with any more ,ontology at this moment4 ,i have already been led much further into that path than ,i should have desired2 and ,i have given the reader such a dose of mathematics1 psychology1 and all that is most abstruse1 that ,i fear he may already have left me1 and that what ,i am now writing is for the compositor and proofreader exclusively4 ,i trusted to the importance of the subject4 ,there is no royal road to logic1 and really valuable ideas can only be had at the price of close attention4 ,but ,i know that in the matter of ideas the public prefer the cheap and nasty2 and in my next paper ,i am going to return to the easily intelligible1 and not wander from it again4 ,the reader who has been at the pains of wading through this paper1 shall be rewarded in the next one by seeing how beautifully what has been developed in this tedious way can be applied to the ascertainment of the rules of scientific reasoning4 ,we have1 hitherto1 not crossed the threshold of scientific logic4 ,it is certainly important to know how to make our ideas clear1 but they may be ever so clear without being true4 ,how to make them so1 we have next to study4 ,how to give birth to those vital and procreative ideas which multiply into a thousand forms and diffuse themselves everywhere1 advancing civilization and making the dignity of man1 is an art not yet reduced to rules1 but of the secret of which the history of science affords some hints4 ,footnote #ca3 ,popular ,science ,monthly1 ,january1 #ahgh4 ,footnote #cb3 ,possibly the velocities also have to be taken into account4 ,footnote #cc3 ,fate means merely that which is sure to come true1 and can nohow be avoided4 ,it is a superstition to suppose that a certain sort of events are ever fated1 and it is another to suppose that the word fate can never be freed from its superstitious taint4 ,we are all fated to die4 ,,third ,,paper ,,the ,,doctrine ,,of ,,chances#cd ,i ,it is a common observation that a science first begins to be exact when it is quantitatively treated4 ,what are called the exact sciences are no others than the mathematical ones4 ,chemists reasoned vaguely until ,lavoisier showed them how to apply the balance to the verification of their theories1 when chemistry leaped suddenly into the position of the most perfect of the classificatory sciences4 ,it has thus become so precise and certain that we usually think of it along with optics1 thermotics1 and electrics4 ,but these are studies of general laws1 while chemistry considers merely the relations and classification of certain objects2 and belongs1 in reality1 in the same category as systematic botany and zology4 ,compare it with these last1 however1 and the advantage that it derives from its quantitative treatment is very evident4 ,the rudest numerical scales1 such as that by which the mineralogists distinguish the different degrees of hardness1 are found useful4 ,the mere counting of pistils and stamens sufficed to bring botany out of total chaos into some kind of form4 ,it is not1 however1 so much from counting as from measuring1 not so much from the conception of number as from that of continuous quantity1 that the advantage of mathematical treatment comes4 ,number1 after all1 only serves to pin us down to a precision in our thoughts which1 however beneficial1 can seldom lead to lofty conceptions1 and frequently descends to pettiness4 ,of those two faculties of which ,bacon speaks1 that which marks differences and that which notes resemblances1 the employment of number can only aid the lesser one2 and the excessive use of it must tend to narrow the powers of the mind4 ,but the conception of continuous quantity has a great office to fulfill1 independently of any attempt at precision4 ,far from tending to the exaggeration of differences1 it is the direct instrument of the finest generalizations4 ,when a naturalist wishes to study a species1 he collects a considerable number of specimens more or less similar4 ,in contemplating them1 he observes certain ones which are more or less alike in some particular respect4 ,they all have1 for instance1 a certain ,s-shaped marking4 ,he observes that they are not precisely alike1 in this respect2 the ,s has not precisely the same shape1 but the differences are such as to lead him to believe that forms could be found intermediate between any two of those he possesses4 ,he1 now1 finds other forms apparently quite dissimilar--say a marking in the form of a ,c--and the question is1 whether he can find intermediate ones which will connect these latter with the others4 ,this he often succeeds in doing in cases where it would at first be thought impossible2 whereas he sometimes finds those which differ1 at first glance1 much less1 to be separated in ,nature by the non-occurrence of intermediaries4 ,in this way1 he builds up from the study of ,nature a new general conception of the character in question4 ,he obtains1 for example1 an idea of a leaf which includes every part of the flower1 and an idea of a vertebra which includes the skull4 ,i surely need not say much to show what a logical engine there is here4 ,it is the essence of the method of the naturalist4#ce ,how he applies it first to one character1 and then to another1 and finally obtains a notion of a species of animals1 the differences between whose members1 however great1 are confined within limits1 is a matter which does not here concern us4 ,the whole method of classification must be considered later2 but1 at present1 ,i only desire to point out that it is by taking advantage of the idea of continuity1 or the passage from one form to another by insensible degrees1 that the naturalist builds his conceptions4 ,now1 the naturalists are the great builders of conceptions2 there is no other branch of science where so much of this work is done as in theirs2 and we must1 in great measure1 take them for our teachers in this important part of logic4 ,and it will be found everywhere that the idea of continuity is a powerful aid to the formation of true and fruitful conceptions4 ,by means of it1 the greatest differences are broken down and resolved into differences of degree1 and the incessant application of it is of the greatest value in broadening our conceptions4 ,i propose to make a great use of this idea in the present series of papers2 and the particular series of important fallacies1 which1 arising from a neglect of it1 have desolated philosophy1 must further on be closely studied4 ,at present1 ,i simply call the reader's attention to the utility of this conception4 ,in studies of numbers1 the idea of continuity is so indispensable1 that it is perpetually introduced even where there is no continuity in fact1 as where we say that there are in the ,united ,states #aj4g inhabitants per square mile1 or that in ,new ,york #ad4gb persons live in the average house4#cf ,another example is that law of the distribution of errors which ,quetelet1 ,galton1 and others1 have applied with so much success to the study of biological and social matters4 ,this application of continuity to cases where it does not really exist illustrates1 also1 another point which will hereafter demand a separate study1 namely1 the great utility which fictions sometimes have in science4 ,,ii ,the theory of probabilities is simply the science of logic quantitatively treated4 ,there are two conceivable certainties with reference to any hypothesis1 the certainty of its truth and the certainty of its falsity4 ,the numbers one and zero are appropriated1 in this calculus1 to marking these extremes of knowledge2 while fractions having values intermediate between them indicate1 as we may vaguely say1 the degrees in which the evidence leans toward one or the other4 ,the general problem of probabilities is1 from a given state of facts1 to determine the numerical probability of a possible fact4 ,this is the same as to inquire how much the given facts are worth1 considered as evidence to prove the possible fact4 ,thus the problem of probabilities is simply the general problem of logic4 ,probability is a continuous quantity1 so that great advantages may be expected from this mode of studying logic4 ,some writers have gone so far as to maintain that1 by means of the calculus of chances1 every solid inference may be represented by legitimate arithmetical operations upon the numbers given in the premises4 ,if this be1 indeed1 true1 the great problem of logic1 how it is that the observation of one fact can give us knowledge of another independent fact1 is reduced to a mere question of arithmetic4 ,it seems proper to examine this pretension before undertaking any more recondite solution of the paradox4 ,but1 unfortunately1 writers on probabilities are not agreed in regard to this result4 ,this branch of mathematics is the only one1 ,i believe1 in which good writers frequently get results entirely erroneous4 ,in elementary geometry the reasoning is frequently fallacious1 but erroneous conclusions are avoided2 but it may be doubted if there is a single extensive treatise on probabilities in existence which does not contain solutions absolutely indefensible4 ,this is partly owing to the want of any regular method of procedure2 for the subject involves too many subtilties to make it easy to put its problems into equations without such an aid4 ,but1 beyond this1 the fundamental principles of its calculus are more or less in dispute4 ,in regard to that class of questions to which it is chiefly applied for practical purposes1 there is comparatively little doubt2 but in regard to others to which it has been sought to extend it1 opinion is somewhat unsettled4 ,this last class of difficulties can only be entirely overcome by making the idea of probability perfectly clear in our minds in the way set forth in our last paper4 ,,iii ,to get a clear idea of what we mean by probability1 we have to consider what real and sensible difference there is between one degree of probability and another4 ,the character of probability belongs primarily1 without doubt1 to certain inferences4 ,locke explains it as follows3 ,after remarking that the mathematician positively knows that the sum of the three angles of a triangle is equal to two right angles because he apprehends the geometrical proof1 he thus continues3 8,but another man who never took the pains to observe the demonstration1 hearing a mathematician1 a man of credit1 affirm the three angles of a triangle to be equal to two right ones1 assents to it2 i4e41 receives it for true4 ,in which case the foundation of his assent is the probability of the thing1 the proof being such as1 for the most part1 carries truth with it2 the man on whose testimony he receives it not being wont to affirm anything contrary to1 or besides his knowledge1 especially in matters of this kind40 ,the celebrated ,essay concerning ,human ,understanding contains many passages which1 like this one1 make the first steps in profound analyses which are not further developed4 ,it was shown in the first of these papers that the validity of an inference does not depend on any tendency of the mind to accept it1 however strong such tendency may be2 but consists in the real fact that1 when premises like those of the argument in question are true1 conclusions related to them like that of this argument are also true4 ,it was remarked that in a logical mind an argument is always conceived as a member of a genus of arguments all constructed in the same way1 and such that1 when their premises are real facts1 their conclusions are so also4 ,if the argument is demonstrative1 then this is always so2 if it is only probable1 then it is for the most part so4 ,as ,locke says1 the probable argument is 8such as for the most part carries truth with it40 ,according to this1 that real and sensible difference between one degree of probability and another1 in which the meaning of the distinction lies1 is that in the frequent employment of two different modes of inference1 one will carry truth with it oftener than the other4 ,it is evident that this is the only difference there is in the existing fact4 ,having certain premises1 a man draws a certain conclusion1 and as far as this inference alone is concerned the only possible practical question is whether that conclusion is true or not1 and between existence and non-existence there is no middle term4 8,being only is and nothing is altogether not10 said ,parmenides2 and this is in strict accordance with the analysis of the conception of reality given in the last paper4 ,for we found that the distinction of reality and fiction depends on the supposition that sufficient investigation would cause one opinion to be universally received and all others to be rejected4 ,that presupposition1 involved in the very conceptions of reality and figment1 involves a complete sundering of the two4 ,it is the heaven-and-hell idea in the domain of thought4 ,but1 in the long run1 there is a real fact which corresponds to the idea of probability1 and it is that a given mode of inference sometimes proves successful and sometimes not1 and that in a ratio ultimately fixed4 ,as we go on drawing inference after inference of the given kind1 during the first ten or hundred cases the ratio of successes may be expected to show considerable fluctuations2 but when we come into the thousands and millions1 these fluctuations become less and less2 and if we continue long enough1 the ratio will approximate toward a fixed limit4 ,we may1 therefore1 define the probability of a mode of argument as the proportion of cases in which it carries truth with it4 ,the inference from the premise1 ,a1 to the conclusion1 ,b1 depends1 as we have seen1 on the guiding principle1 that if a fact of the class ,a is true1 a fact of the class ,b is true4 ,the probability consists of the fraction whose numerator is the number of times in which both ,a and ,b are true1 and whose denominator is the total number of times in which ,a is true1 whether ,b is so or not4 ,instead of speaking of this as the probability of the inference1 there is not the slightest objection to calling it the probability that1 if ,a happens1 ,b happens4 ,but to speak of the probability of the event ,b1 without naming the condition1 really has no meaning at all4 ,it is true that when it is perfectly obvious what condition is meant1 the ellipsis may be permitted4 ,but we should avoid contracting the habit of using language in this way 7universal as the habit is71 because it gives rise to a vague way of thinking1 as if the action of causation might either determine an event to happen or determine it not to happen1 or leave it more or less free to happen or not1 so as to give rise to an inherent chance in regard to its occurrence4#cg ,it is quite clear to me that some of the worst and most persistent errors in the use of the doctrine of chances have arisen from this vicious mode of expression4#ch ,,iv ,but there remains an important point to be cleared up4 ,according to what has been said1 the idea of probability essentially belongs to a kind of inference which is repeated indefinitely4 ,an individual inference must be either true or false1 and can show no effect of probability2 and1 therefore1 in reference to a single case considered in itself1 probability can have no meaning4 ,yet if a man had to choose between drawing a card from a pack containing twenty-five red cards and a black one1 or from a pack containing twenty-five black cards and a red one1 and if the drawing of a red card were destined to transport him to eternal felicity1 and that of a black one to consign him to everlasting woe1 it would be folly to deny that he ought to prefer the pack containing the larger portion of red cards1 although1 from the nature of the risk1 it could not be repeated4 ,it is not easy to reconcile this with our analysis of the conception of chance4 ,but suppose he should choose the red pack1 and should draw the wrong card1 what consolation would he have8 ,he might say that he had acted in accordance with reason1 but that would only show that his reason was absolutely worthless4 ,and if he should choose the right card1 how could he regard it as anything but a happy accident8 ,he could not say that if he had drawn from the other pack1 he might have drawn the wrong one1 because an hypothetical proposition such as1 8if ,a1 then ,b10 means nothing with reference to a single case4 ,truth consists in the existence of a real fact corresponding to the true proposition4 ,corresponding to the proposition1 8if ,a1 then ,b10 there may be the fact that whenever such an event as ,a happens such an event as ,b happens4 ,but in the case supposed1 which has no parallel as far as this man is concerned1 there would be no real fact whose existence could give any truth to the statement that1 if he had drawn from the other pack1 he might have drawn a black card4 ,indeed1 since the validity of an inference consists in the truth of the hypothetical proposition that if the premises be true the conclusion will also be true1 and since the only real fact which can correspond to such a proposition is that whenever the antecedent is true the consequent is so also1 it follows that there can be no sense in reasoning in an isolated case1 at all4 ,these considerations appear1 at first sight1 to dispose of the difficulty mentioned4 ,yet the case of the other side is not yet exhausted4 ,although probability will probably manifest its effect in1 say1 a thousand risks1 by a certain proportion between the numbers of successes and failures1 yet this1 as we have seen1 is only to say that it certainly will1 at length1 do so4 ,now the number of risks1 the number of probable inferences1 which a man draws in his whole life1 is a finite one1 and he cannot be absolutely certain that the mean result will accord with the probabilities at all4 ,taking all his risks collectively1 then1 it cannot be certain that they will not fail1 and his case does not differ1 except in degree1 from the one last supposed4 ,it is an indubitable result of the theory of probabilities that every gambler1 if he continues long enough1 must ultimately be ruined4 ,suppose he tries the martingale1 which some believe infallible1 and which is1 as ,i am informed1 disallowed in the gambling-houses4 ,in this method of playing1 he first bets say #a2 if he loses it he bets #b2 if he loses that he bets #d2 if he loses that he bets #h2 if he then gains he has lost #a #b #d #g1 and he has gained #a more2 and no matter how many bets he loses1 the first one he gains will make him #a richer than he was in the beginning4 ,in that way1 he will probably gain at first2 but1 at last1 the time will come when the run of luck is so against him that he will not have money enough to double1 and must1 therefore1 let his bet go4 ,this will probably happen before he has won as much as he had in the first place1 so that this run against him will leave him poorer than he began2 some time or other it will be sure to happen4 ,it is true that there is always a possibility of his winning any sum the bank can pay1 and we thus come upon a celebrated paradox that1 though he is certain to be ruined1 the value of his expectation calculated according to the usual rules 7which omit this consideration7 is large4 ,but1 whether a gambler plays in this way or any other1 the same thing is true1 namely1 that if he plays long enough he will be sure some time to have such a run against him as to exhaust his entire fortune4 ,the same thing is true of an insurance company4 ,let the directors take the utmost pains to be independent of great conflagrations and pestilences1 their actuaries can tell them that1 according to the doctrine of chances1 the time must come1 at last1 when their losses will bring them to a stop4 ,they may tide over such a crisis by extraordinary means1 but then they will start again in a weakened state1 and the same thing will happen again all the sooner4 ,an actuary might be inclined to deny this1 because he knows that the expectation of his company is large1 or perhaps 7neglecting the interest upon money7 is infinite4 ,but calculations of expectations leave out of account the circumstance now under consideration1 which reverses the whole thing4 ,however1 ,i must not be understood as saying that insurance is on this account unsound1 more than other kinds of business4 ,all human affairs rest upon probabilities1 and the same thing is true everywhere4 ,if man were immortal he could be perfectly sure of seeing the day when everything in which he had trusted should betray his trust1 and1 in short1 of coming eventually to hopeless misery4 ,he would break down1 at last1 as every good fortune1 as every dynasty1 as every civilization does4 ,in place of this we have death4 ,but what1 without death1 would happen to every man1 with death must happen to some man4 ,at the same time1 death makes the number of our risks1 of our inferences1 finite1 and so makes their mean result uncertain4 ,the very idea of probability and of reasoning rests on the assumption that this number is indefinitely great4 ,we are thus landed in the same difficulty as before1 and ,i can see but one solution of it4 ,it seems to me that we are driven to this1 that logicality inexorably requires that our interests shall not be limited4 ,they must not stop at our own fate1 but must embrace the whole community4 ,this community1 again1 must not be limited1 but must extend to all races of beings with whom we can come into immediate or mediate intellectual relation4 ,it must reach1 however vaguely1 beyond this geological epoch1 beyond all bounds4 ,he who would not sacrifice his own soul to save the whole world1 is1 as it seems to me1 illogical in all his inferences1 collectively4 ,logic is rooted in the social principle4 ,to be logical men should not be selfish2 and1 in point of fact1 they are not so selfish as they are thought4 ,the willful prosecution of one's desires is a different thing from selfishness4 ,the miser is not selfish2 his money does him no good1 and he cares for what shall become of it after his death4 ,we are constantly speaking of our possessions on the ,pacific1 and of our destiny as a republic1 where no personal interests are involved1 in a way which shows that we have wider ones4 ,we discuss with anxiety the possible exhaustion of coal in some hundreds of years1 or the cooling-off of the sun in some millions1 and show in the most popular of all religious tenets that we can conceive the possibility of a man's descending into hell for the salvation of his fellows4 ,now1 it is not necessary for logicality that a man should himself be capable of the heroism of self-sacrifice4 ,it is sufficient that he should recognize the possibility of it1 should perceive that only that man's inferences who has it are really logical1 and should consequently regard his own as being only so far valid as they would be accepted by the hero4 ,so far as he thus refers his inferences to that standard1 he becomes identified with such a mind4 ,this makes logicality attainable enough4 ,sometimes we can personally attain to heroism4 ,the soldier who runs to scale a wall knows that he will probably be shot1 but that is not all he cares for4 ,he also knows that if all the regiment1 with whom in feeling he identifies himself1 rush forward at once1 the fort will be taken4 ,in other cases we can only imitate the virtue4 ,the man whom we have supposed as having to draw from the two packs1 who if he is not a logician will draw from the red pack from mere habit1 will see1 if he is logician enough1 that he cannot be logical so long as he is concerned only with his own fate1 but that that man who should care equally for what was to happen in all possible cases of the sort could act logically1 and would draw from the pack with the most red cards1 and thus1 though incapable himself of such sublimity1 our logician would imitate the effect of that man's courage in order to share his logicality4 ,but all this requires a conceived identification of one's interests with those of an unlimited community4 ,now1 there exist no reasons1 and a later discussion will show that there can be no reasons1 for thinking that the human race1 or any intellectual race1 will exist forever4 ,on the other hand1 there can be no reason against it2#ci and1 fortunately1 as the whole requirement is that we should have certain sentiments1 there is nothing in the facts to forbid our having a hope1 or calm and cheerful wish1 that the community may last beyond any assignable date4 ,it may seem strange that ,i should put forward three sentiments1 namely1 interest in an indefinite community1 recognition of the possibility of this interest being made supreme1 and hope in the unlimited continuance of intellectual activity1 as indispensable requirements of logic4 ,yet1 when we consider that logic depends on a mere struggle to escape doubt1 which1 as it terminates in action1 must begin in emotion1 and that1 furthermore1 the only cause of our planting ourselves on reason is that other methods of escaping doubt fail on account of the social impulse1 why should we wonder to find social sentiment presupposed in reasoning8 ,as for the other two sentiments which ,i find necessary1 they are so only as supports and accessories of that4 ,it interests me to notice that these three sentiments seem to be pretty much the same as that famous trio of ,charity1 ,faith1 and ,hope1 which1 in the estimation of ,st4 ,paul1 are the finest and greatest of spiritual gifts4 ,neither ,old nor ,new ,testament is a textbook of the logic of science1 but the latter is certainly the highest existing authority in regard to the dispositions of heart which a man ought to have4 ,v ,such average statistical numbers as the number of inhabitants per square mile1 the average number of deaths per week1 the number of convictions per indictment1 or1 generally speaking1 the numbers of x's per y1 where the x's are a class of things some or all of which are connected with another class of things1 their y's1 ,i term relative numbers4 ,of the two classes of things to which a relative number refers1 that one of which it is a number may be called its relate1 and that one per which the numeration is made may be called its correlate4 ,probability is a kind of relative number2 namely1 it is the ratio of the number of arguments of a certain genus which carry truth with them to the total number of arguments of that genus1 and the rules for the calculation of probabilities are very easily derived from this consideration4 ,they may all be given here1 since they are extremely simple1 and it is sometimes convenient to know something of the elementary rules of calculation of chances4 ,,rule ,i4 ,direct ,calculation4--,to calculate1 directly1 any relative number1 say for instance the number of passengers in the average trip of a street-car1 we must proceed as follows3 ,count the number of passengers for each trip2 add all these numbers1 and divide by the number of trips4 ,there are cases in which this rule may be simplified4 ,suppose we wish to know the number of inhabitants to a dwelling in ,new ,york4 ,the same person cannot inhabit two dwellings4 ,if he divide his time between two dwellings he ought to be counted a half-inhabitant of each4 ,in this case we have only to divide the total number of the inhabitants of ,new ,york by the number of their dwellings1 without the necessity of counting separately those which inhabit each one4 ,a similar proceeding will apply wherever each individual relate belongs to one individual correlate exclusively4 ,if we want the number of x's per y1 and no x belongs to more than one y1 we have only to divide the whole number of x's of y's by the number of y's4 ,such a method would1 of course1 fail if applied to finding the average number of street-car passengers per trip4 ,we could not divide the total number of travelers by the number of trips1 since many of them would have made many passages4 ,to find the probability that from a given class of premises1 ,a1 a given class of conclusions1 ,b1 follow1 it is simply necessary to ascertain what proportion of the times in which premises of that class are true1 the appropriate conclusions are also true4 ,in other words1 it is the number of cases of the occurrence of both the events ,a and ,b1 divided by the total number of cases of the occurrence of the event ,a4 ,,rule ,,ii4 ,addition of ,relative ,numbers4--,given two relative numbers having the same correlate1 say the number of x's per y1 and the number of z's per y2 it is required to find the number of x's and z's together per y4 ,if there is nothing which is at once an x and a z to the same y1 the sum of the two given numbers would give the required number4 ,suppose1 for example1 that we had given the average number of friends that men have1 and the average number of enemies1 the sum of these two is the average number of persons interested in a man4 ,on the other hand1 it plainly would not do to add the average number of persons having constitutional diseases and over military age1 to the average number exempted by each special cause from military service1 in order to get the average number exempt in any way1 since many are exempt in two or more ways at once4 ,this rule applies directly to probabilities1 given the probability that two different and mutually exclusive events will happen under the same supposed set of circumstances4 ,given1 for instance1 the probability that if ,a then ,b1 and also the probability that if ,a then ,c1 then the sum of these two probabilities is the probability that if ,a then either ,b or ,c1 so long as there is no event which belongs at once to the two classes ,b and ,c4 ,,rule ,,iii4 ,multiplication of ,relative ,numbers4--,suppose that we have given the relative number of x's per y2 also the relative number of z's per x of y2 or1 to take a concrete example1 suppose that we have given1 first1 the average number of children in families living in ,new ,york2 and1 second1 the average number of teeth in the head of a ,new ,york child--then the product of these two numbers would give the average number of children's teeth in a ,new ,york family4 ,but this mode of reckoning will only apply in general under two restrictions4 ,in the first place1 it would not be true if the same child could belong to different families1 for in that case those children who belonged to several different families might have an exceptionally large or small number of teeth1 which would affect the average number of children's teeth in a family more than it would affect the average number of teeth in a child's head4 ,in the second place1 the rule would not be true if different children could share the same teeth1 the average number of children's teeth being in that case evidently something different from the average number of teeth belonging to a child4 ,in order to apply this rule to probabilities1 we must proceed as follows3 ,suppose that we have given the probability that the conclusion ,b follows from the premise ,a1 ,b and ,a representing as usual certain classes of propositions4 ,suppose that we also knew the probability of an inference in which ,b should be the premise1 and a proposition of a third kind1 ,c1 the conclusion4 ,here1 then1 we have the materials for the application of this rule4 ,we have1 first1 the relative number of ,b's per ,a4 ,we next should have the relative number of ,c's per ,b following from ,a4 ,but the classes of propositions being so selected that the probability of ,c following from any ,b in general is just the same as the probability of ,c's following from one of those ,b's which is deducible from an ,a1 the two probabilities may be multiplied together1 in order to give the probability of ,c following from ,a4 ,the same restrictions exist as before4 ,it might happen that the probability that ,b follows from ,a was affected by certain propositions of the class ,b following from several different propositions of the class ,a4 ,but1 practically speaking1 all these restrictions are of very little consequence1 and it is usually recognized as a principle universally true that the probability that1 if ,a is true1 ,b is1 multiplied by the probability that1 if ,b is true1 ,c is1 gives the probability that1 if ,a is true1 ,c is4 ,there is a rule supplementary to this1 of which great use is made4 ,it is not universally valid1 and the greatest caution has to be exercised in making use of it--a double care1 first1 never to use it when it will involve serious error2 and1 second1 never to fail to take advantage of it in cases in which it can be employed4 ,this rule depends upon the fact that in very many cases the probability that ,c is true if ,b is1 is substantially the same as the probability that ,c is true if ,a is4 ,suppose1 for example1 we have the average number of males among the children born in ,new ,york2 suppose that we also have the average number of children born in the winter months among those born in ,new ,york4 ,now1 we may assume without doubt1 at least as a closely approximate proposition 7and no very nice calculation would be in place in regard to probabilities71 that the proportion of males among all the children born in ,new ,york is the same as the proportion of males born in summer in ,new ,york2 and1 therefore1 if the names of all the children born during a year were put into an urn1 we might multiply the probability that any name drawn would be the name of a male child by the probability that it would be the name of a child born in summer1 in order to obtain the probability that it would be the name of a male child born in summer4 ,the questions of probability1 in the treatises upon the subject1 have usually been such as relate to balls drawn from urns1 and games of cards1 and so on1 in which the question of the independence of events1 as it is called--that is to say1 the question of whether the probability of ,c1 under the hypothesis ,b1 is the same as its probability under the hypothesis ,a1 has been very simple2 but1 in the application of probabilities to the ordinary questions of life1 it is often an exceedingly nice question whether two events may be considered as independent with sufficient accuracy or not4 ,in all calculations about cards it is assumed that the cards are thoroughly shuffled1 which makes one deal quite independent of another4 ,in point of fact the cards seldom are1 in practice1 shuffled sufficiently to make this true2 thus1 in a game of whist1 in which the cards have fallen in suits of four of the same suit1 and are so gathered up1 they will lie more or less in sets of four of the same suit1 and this will be true even after they are shuffled4 ,at least some traces of this arrangement will remain1 in consequence of which the number of 8short suits10 as they are called--that is to say1 the number of hands in which the cards are very unequally divided in regard to suits--is smaller than the calculation would make it to be2 so that1 when there is a misdeal1 where the cards1 being thrown about the table1 get very thoroughly shuffled1 it is a common saying that in the hands next dealt out there are generally short suits4 ,a few years ago a friend of mine1 who plays whist a great deal1 was so good as to count the number of spades dealt to him in #afe hands1 in which the cards had been1 if anything1 shuffled better than usual4 ,according to calculation1 there should have been #he of these hands in which my friend held either three or four spades1 but in point of fact there were #id1 showing the influence of imperfect shuffling4 ,according to the view here taken1 these are the only fundamental rules for the calculation of chances4 ,an additional one1 derived from a different conception of probability1 is given in some treatises1 which if it be sound might be made the basis of a theory of reasoning4 ,being1 as ,i believe it is1 absolutely absurd1 the consideration of it serves to bring us to the true theory2 and it is for the sake of this discussion1 which must be postponed to the next number1 that ,i have brought the doctrine of chances to the reader's attention at this early stage of our studies of the logic of science4 ,footnote #cd3 ,popular ,science ,monthly1 ,march1 #ahgh4 ,footnote #ce3 ,later1 pp4 #agj ff4 and #bae ff41 it is shown that continuity is also at the basis of mathematical generalization4 ,see also article on ,synechism in ,baldwin's ,dictionary of ,philosophy4 ,footnote #cf3 ,this mode of thought is so familiarly associated with all exact numerical consideration1 that the phrase appropriate to it is imitated by shallow writers in order to produce the appearance of exactitude where none exists4 ,certain newspapers which affect a learned tone talk of 8the average man10 when they simply mean most men1 and have no idea of striking an average4 ,footnote #cg3 ,cf4 pp4 #agi ff4 below4 ,footnote #ch3 ,the conception of probability here set forth is substantially that first developed by ,mr4 ,venn1 in his ,logic of ,chance4 ,of course1 a vague apprehension of the idea had always existed1 but the problem was to make it perfectly clear1 and to him belongs the credit of first doing this4 ,footnote #ci3 ,i do not here admit an absolutely unknowable4 ,evidence could show us what would probably be the case after any given lapse of time2 and though a subsequent time might be assigned which that evidence might not cover1 yet further evidence would cover it4 ,,fourth ,,paper ,,the ,,probability ,,of ,,induction#dj ,i ,we have found that every argument derives its force from the general truth of the class of inferences to which it belongs2 and that probability is the proportion of arguments carrying truth with them among those of any genus4 ,this is most conveniently expressed in the nomenclature of the medieval logicians4 ,they called the fact expressed by a premise an antecedent1 and that which follows from it its consequent2 while the leading principle1 that every 7or almost every7 such antecedent is followed by such a consequent1 they termed the consequence4 ,using this language1 we may say that probability belongs exclusively to consequences1 and the probability of any consequence is the number of times in which antecedent and consequent both occur divided by the number of all the times in which the antecedent occurs4 ,from this definition are deduced the following rules for the addition and multiplication of probabilities3 ,rule for the ,addition of ,probabilities4--,given the separate probabilities of two consequences having the same antecedent and incompatible consequents4 ,then the sum of these two numbers is the probability of the consequence1 that from the same antecedent one or other of those consequents follows4 ,rule for the ,multiplication of ,probabilities4--,given the separate probabilities of the two consequences1 8,if ,a then ,b10 and 8,if both ,a and ,b1 then ,c40 ,then the product of these two numbers is the probability of the consequence1 8,if ,a1 then both ,b and ,c40 ,special ,rule for the ,multiplication of ,independent ,probabilities4--,given the separate probabilities of two consequences having the same antecedents1 8,if ,a1 then ,b10 and 8,if ,a1 then ,c40 ,suppose that these consequences are such that the probability of the second is equal to the probability of the consequence1 8,if both ,a and ,b1 then ,c40 ,then the product of the two given numbers is equal to the probability of the consequence1 8,if ,a1 then both ,b and ,c40 ,to show the working of these rules we may examine the probabilities in regard to throwing dice4 ,what is the probability of throwing a six with one die8 ,the antecedent here is the event of throwing a die2 the consequent1 its turning up a six4 ,as the die has six sides1 all of which are turned up with equal frequency1 the probability of turning up any one is #a_/f4 ,suppose two dice are thrown1 what is the probability of throwing sixes8 ,the probability of either coming up six is obviously the same when both are thrown as when one is thrown--namely1 #a_/f4 ,the probability that either will come up six when the other does is also the same as that of its coming up six whether the other does or not4 ,the probabilities are1 therefore1 independent2 and1 by our rule1 the probability that both events will happen together is the product of their several probabilities1 or #a_/f x #a_/f4 ,what is the probability of throwing deuce-ace8 ,the probability that the first die will turn up ace and the second deuce is the same as the probability that both will turn up sixes--namely1 #a_/cf2 the probability that the second will turn up ace and the first deuce is likewise #a_/cf2 these two events--first1 ace2 second1 deuce2 and1 second1 ace2 first1 deuce--are incompatible4 ,hence the rule for addition holds1 and the probability that either will come up ace and the other deuce is #a_/cf #a_/cf1 or #a_/ah4 ,in this way all problems about dice1 etc41 may be solved4 ,when the number of dice thrown is supposed very large1 mathematics 7which may be defined as the art of making groups to facilitate numeration7 comes to our aid with certain devices to reduce the difficulties4 ,,ii ,the conception of probability as a matter of fact1 i4e41 as the proportion of times in which an occurrence of one kind is accompanied by an occurrence of another kind1 is termed by ,mr4 ,venn the materialistic view of the subject4 ,but probability has often been regarded as being simply the degree of belief which ought to attach to a proposition1 and this mode of explaining the idea is termed by ,venn the conceptualistic view4 ,most writers have mixed the two conceptions together4 ,they1 first1 define the probability of an event as the reason we have to believe that it has taken place1 which is conceptualistic2 but shortly after they state that it is the ratio of the number of cases favorable to the event to the total number of cases favorable or contrary1 and all equally possible4 ,except that this introduces the thoroughly unclear idea of cases equally possible in place of cases equally frequent1 this is a tolerable statement of the materialistic view4 ,the pure conceptualistic theory has been best expounded by ,mr4 ,de ,morgan in his ,formal ,logic3 or1 the ,calculus of ,inference1 ,necessary and ,probable4 ,the great difference between the two analyses is1 that the conceptualists refer probability to an event1 while the materialists make it the ratio of frequency of events of a species to those of a genus over that species1 thus giving it two terms instead of one4 ,the opposition may be made to appear as follows3 ,suppose that we have two rules of inference1 such that1 of all the questions to the solution of which both can be applied1 the first yields correct answers to #ha_/ajj1 and incorrect answers to the remaining #ai_/ajj2 while the second yields correct answers to #ic_/ajj1 and incorrect answers to the remaining #g_/ajj4 ,suppose1 further1 that the two rules are entirely independent as to their truth1 so that the second answers correctly #ic_/ajj of the questions which the first answers correctly1 and also #ic_/ajj of the questions which the first answers incorrectly1 and answers incorrectly the remaining #g_/ajj of the questions which the first answers correctly1 and also the remaining #g_/ajj of the questions which the first answers incorrectly4 ,then1 of all the questions to the solution of which both rules can be applied-- both answer correctly #ic_/ajj of #ha_/ajj or #ic_/ajj x #ha_/ajj2 the second answers correctly and the first incorrectly #ic_/ajj of #ai_/ajj or #ic_/ajj x #ai_/ajj2 the second answers incorrectly and the first correctly #g_/ajj of #ha_/ajj or #g_/ajj x #ha_/ajj2 and both answer incorrectly #g_/ajj of #ai_/ajj or #g_/ajj x #ai_/ajj2 ,suppose1 now1 that1 in reference to any question1 both give the same answer4 ,then 7the questions being always such as are to be answered by yes or no71 those in reference to which their answers agree are the same as those which both answer correctly together with those which both answer falsely1 or #ic_/ajj x #ha_/ajj #g_/ajj x #ai_/ajj of all4 ,the proportion of those which both answer correctly out of those their answers to which agree is1 therefore-- 77#ic #ha7_/7ajj #ajj77_/77ic #ha7_/7ajj #ajj77 77#g #ai7_/7ajj #ajj77 or 7#ic #ha7_/77ic #ha7 7#g #ai774 ,this is1 therefore1 the probability that1 if both modes of inference yield the same result1 that result is correct4 ,we may here conveniently make use of another mode of expression4 ,probability is the ratio of the favorable cases to all the cases4 ,instead of expressing our result in terms of this ratio1 we may make use of another--the ratio of favorable to unfavorable cases4 ,this last ratio may be called the chance of an event4 ,then the chance of a true answer by the first mode of inference is #ha_/ai and by the second is #ic_/g2 and the chance of a correct answer from both1 when they agree1 is-- 7#ha #ic7_/7ai #g7 or #ha_/ai #ic_/g1 or the product of the chances of each singly yielding a true answer4 ,it will be seen that a chance is a quantity which may have any magnitude1 however great4 ,an event in whose favor there is an even chance1 or #a_/a1 has a probability of #a_/b4 ,an argument having an even chance can do nothing toward re-enforcing others1 since according to the rule its combination with another would only multiply the chance of the latter by #a4 ,probability and chance undoubtedly belong primarily to consequences1 and are relative to premises2 but we may1 nevertheless1 speak of the chance of an event absolutely1 meaning by that the chance of the combination of all arguments in reference to it which exist for us in the given state of our knowledge4 ,taken in this sense it is incontestable that the chance of an event has an intimate connection with the degree of our belief in it4 ,belief is certainly something more than a mere feeling2 yet there is a feeling of believing1 and this feeling does and ought to vary with the chance of the thing believed1 as deduced from all the arguments4 ,any quantity which varies with the chance might1 therefore1 it would seem1 serve as a thermometer for the proper intensity of belief4 ,among all such quantities there is one which is peculiarly appropriate4 ,when there is a very great chance1 the feeling of belief ought to be very intense4 ,absolute certainty1 or an infinite chance1 can never be attained by mortals1 and this may be represented appropriately by an infinite belief4 ,as the chance diminishes the feeling of believing should diminish1 until an even chance is reached1 where it should completely vanish and not incline either toward or away from the proposition4 ,when the chance becomes less1 then a contrary belief should spring up and should increase in intensity as the chance diminishes1 and as the chance almost vanishes 7which it can never quite do7 the contrary belief should tend toward an infinite intensity4 ,now1 there is one quantity which1 more simply than any other1 fulfills these conditions2 it is the logarithm of the chance4 ,but there is another consideration which must1 if admitted1 fix us to this choice for our thermometer4 ,it is that our belief ought to be proportional to the weight of evidence1 in this sense1 that two arguments which are entirely independent1 neither weakening nor strengthening each other1 ought1 when they concur1 to produce a belief equal to the sum of the intensities of belief which either would produce separately4 ,now1 we have seen that the chances of independent concurrent arguments are to be multiplied together to get the chance of their combination1 and1 therefore1 the quantities which best express the intensities of belief should be such that they are to be added when the chances are multiplied in order to produce the quantity which corresponds to the combined chance4 ,now1 the logarithm is the only quantity which fulfills this condition4 ,there is a general law of sensibility1 called ,fechner's psychophysical law4 ,it is that the intensity of any sensation is proportional to the logarithm of the external force which produces it4 ,it is entirely in harmony with this law that the feeling of belief should be as the logarithm of the chance1 this latter being the expression of the state of facts which produces the belief4 ,the rule for the combination of independent concurrent arguments takes a very simple form when expressed in terms of the intensity of belief1 measured in the proposed way4 ,it is this3 ,take the sum of all the feelings of belief which would be produced separately by all the arguments pro1 subtract from that the similar sum for arguments con1 and the remainder is the feeling of belief which we ought to have on the whole4 ,this is a proceeding which men often resort to1 under the name of balancing reasons4 ,these considerations constitute an argument in favor of the conceptualistic view4 ,the kernel of it is that the conjoint probability of all the arguments in our possession1 with reference to any fact1 must be intimately connected with the just degree of our belief in that fact2 and this point is supplemented by various others showing the consistency of the theory with itself and with the rest of our knowledge4 ,but probability1 to have any value at all1 must express a fact4 ,it is1 therefore1 a thing to be inferred upon evidence4 ,let us1 then1 consider for a moment the formation of a belief of probability4 ,suppose we have a large bag of beans from which one has been secretly taken at random and hidden under a thimble4 ,we are now to form a probable judgment of the color of that bean1 by drawing others singly from the bag and looking at them1 each one to be thrown back1 and the whole well mixed up after each drawing4 ,suppose the first drawing is white and the next black4 ,we conclude that there is not an immense preponderance of either color1 and that there is something like an even chance that the bean under the thimble is black4 ,but this judgment may be altered by the next few drawings4 ,when we have drawn ten times1 if #d1 #e1 or #f1 are white1 we have more confidence that the chance is even4 ,when we have drawn a thousand times1 if about half have been white1 we have great confidence in this result4 ,we now feel pretty sure that1 if we were to make a large number of bets upon the color of single beans drawn from the bag1 we could approximately insure ourselves in the long run by betting each time upon the white1 a confidence which would be entirely wanting if1 instead of sampling the bag by #a1jjj drawings1 we had done so by only two4 ,now1 as the whole utility of probability is to insure us in the long run1 and as that assurance depends1 not merely on the value of the chance1 but also on the accuracy of the evaluation1 it follows that we ought not to have the same feeling of belief in reference to all events of which the chance is even4 ,in short1 to express the proper state of our belief1 not one number but two are requisite1 the first depending on the inferred probability1 the second on the amount of knowledge on which that probability is based4#da ,it is true that when our knowledge is very precise1 when we have made many drawings from the bag1 or1 as in most of the examples in the books1 when the total contents of the bag are absolutely known1 the number which expresses the uncertainty of the assumed probability and its liability to be changed by further experience may become insignificant1 or utterly vanish4 ,but1 when our knowledge is very slight1 this number may be even more important than the probability itself2 and when we have no knowledge at all this completely overwhelms the other1 so that there is no sense in saying that the chance of the totally unknown event is even 7for what expresses absolutely no fact has absolutely no meaning71 and what ought to be said is that the chance is entirely indefinite4 ,we thus perceive that the conceptualistic view1 though answering well enough in some cases1 is quite inadequate4 ,suppose that the first bean which we drew from our bag were black4 ,that would constitute an argument1 no matter how slender1 that the bean under the thimble was also black4 ,if the second bean were also to turn out black1 that would be a second independent argument renforcing the first4 ,if the whole of the first twenty beans drawn should prove black1 our confidence that the hidden bean was black would justly attain considerable strength4 ,but suppose the twenty-first bean were to be white and that we were to go on drawing until we found that we had drawn #a1jaj black beans and #iij white ones4 ,we should conclude that our first twenty beans being black was simply an extraordinary accident1 and that in fact the proportion of white beans to black was sensibly equal1 and that it was an even chance that the hidden bean was black4 ,yet according to the rule of balancing reasons1 since all the drawings of black beans are so many independent arguments in favor of the one under the thimble being black1 and all the white drawings so many against it1 an excess of twenty black beans ought to produce the same degree of belief that the hidden bean was black1 whatever the total number drawn4 ,in the conceptualistic view of probability1 complete ignorance1 where the judgment ought not to swerve either toward or away from the hypothesis1 is represented by the probability #a_/b4db ,but let us suppose that we are totally ignorant what colored hair the inhabitants of ,saturn have4 ,let us1 then1 take a color-chart in which all possible colors are shown shading into one another by imperceptible degrees4 ,in such a chart the relative areas occupied by different classes of colors are perfectly arbitrary4 ,let us inclose such an area with a closed line1 and ask what is the chance on conceptualistic principles that the color of the hair of the inhabitants of ,saturn falls within that area8 ,the answer cannot be indeterminate because we must be in some state of belief2 and1 indeed1 conceptualistic writers do not admit indeterminate probabilities4 ,as there is no certainty in the matter1 the answer lies between zero and unity4 ,as no numerical value is afforded by the data1 the number must be determined by the nature of the scale of probability itself1 and not by calculation from the data4 ,the answer can1 therefore1 only be one-half1 since the judgment should neither favor nor oppose the hypothesis4 ,what is true of this area is true of any other one2 and it will equally be true of a third area which embraces the other two4 ,but the probability for each of the smaller areas being one-half1 that for the larger should be at least unity1 which is absurd4 ,,iii ,all our reasonings are of two kinds3 #a4 ,explicative1 analytic1 or deductive2 #b4 ,amplifiative1 synthetic1 or 7loosely speaking7 inductive4 ,in explicative reasoning1 certain facts are first laid down in the premises4 ,these facts are1 in every case1 an inexhaustible multitude1 but they may often be summed up in one simple proposition by means of some regularity which runs through them all4 ,thus1 take the proposition that ,socrates was a man2 this implies 7to go no further7 that during every fraction of a second of his whole life 7or1 if you please1 during the greater part of them7 he was a man4 ,he did not at one instant appear as a tree and at another as a dog2 he did not flow into water1 or appear in two places at once2 you could not put your finger through him as if he were an optical image1 etc4 ,now1 the facts being thus laid down1 some order among some of them1 not particularly made use of for the purpose of stating them1 may perhaps be discovered2 and this will enable us to throw part or all of them into a new statement1 the possibility of which might have escaped attention4 ,such a statement will be the conclusion of an analytic inference4 ,of this sort are all mathematical demonstrations4 ,but synthetic reasoning is of another kind4 ,in this case the facts summed up in the conclusion are not among those stated in the premises4 ,they are different facts1 as when one sees that the tide rises m times and concludes that it will rise the next time4 ,these are the only inferences which increase our real knowledge1 however useful the others may be4 ,in any problem in probabilities1 we have given the relative frequency of certain events1 and we perceive that in these facts the relative frequency of another event is given in a hidden way4 ,this being stated makes the solution4 ,this is1 therefore1 mere explicative reasoning1 and is evidently entirely inadequate to the representation of synthetic reasoning1 which goes out beyond the facts given in the premises4 ,there is1 therefore1 a manifest impossibility in so tracing out any probability for a synthetic conclusion4 ,most treatises on probability contain a very different doctrine4 ,they state1 for example1 that if one of the ancient denizens of the shores of the ,mediterranean1 who had never heard of tides1 had gone to the bay of ,biscay1 and had there seen the tide rise1 say m times1 he could know that there was a probability equal to 7m #a7_/7m #b7 that it would rise the next time4 ,in a well-known work by ,quetelet1 much stress is laid on this1 and it is made the foundation of a theory of inductive reasoning4 ,but this solution betrays its origin if we apply it to the case in which the man has never seen the tide rise at all2 that is1 if we put m #j4 ,in this case1 the probability that it will rise the next time comes out #a_/b1 or1 in other words1 the solution involves the conceptualistic principle that there is an even chance of a totally unknown event4 ,the manner in which it has been reached has been by considering a number of urns all containing the same number of balls1 part white and part black4 ,one urn contains all white balls1 another one black and the rest white1 a third two black and the rest white1 and so on1 one urn for each proportion1 until an urn is reached containing only black balls4 ,but the only possible reason for drawing any analogy between such an arrangement and that of ,nature is the principle that alternatives of which we know nothing must be considered as equally probable4 ,but this principle is absurd4 ,there is an indefinite variety of ways of enumerating the different possibilities1 which1 on the application of this principle1 would give different results4 ,if there be any way of enumerating the possibilities so as to make them all equal1 it is not that from which this solution is derived1 but is the following3 ,suppose we had an immense granary filled with black and white balls well mixed up2 and suppose each urn were filled by taking a fixed number of balls from this granary quite at random4 ,the relative number of white balls in the granary might be anything1 say one in three4 ,then in one-third of the urns the first ball would be white1 and in two-thirds black4 ,in one-third of those urns of which the first ball was white1 and also in one-third of those in which the first ball was black1 the second ball would be white4 ,in this way1 we should have a distribution like that shown in the following table1 where w stands for a white ball and b for a black one4 ,the reader can1 if he chooses1 verify the table for himself4 wwww4 wwwb4 wwbw4 wbww4 bwww4 wwwb4 wwbw4 wbww4 bwww4 wwbb4 wbwb4 bwwb4 wbbw4 bwbw4 bbww4 wwbb4 wbwb4 bwwb4 wbbw4 bwbw4 bbww4 wwbb4 wbwb4 bwwb4 wbbw4 bwbw4 bbww4 wwbb4 wbwb4 bwwb4 wbbw4 bwbw4 bbww4 wbbb4 bwbb4 bbwb4 bbbw4 wbbb4 bwbb4 bbwb4 bbbw4 wbbb4 bwbb4 bbwb4 bbbw4 wbbb4 bwbb4 bbwb4 bbbw4 wbbb4 bwbb4 bbwb4 bbbw4 wbbb4 bwbb4 bbwb4 bbbw4 wbbb4 bwbb4 bbwb4 bbbw4 wbbb4 bwbb4 bbwb4 bbbw4 bbbb4 bbbb4 bbbb4 bbbb4 bbbb4 bbbb4 bbbb4 bbbb4 bbbb4 bbbb4 bbbb4 bbbb4 bbbb4 bbbb4 bbbb4 bbbb4 ,in the second group1 where there is one b1 there are two sets just alike2 in the third there are #d1 in the fourth #h1 and in the fifth #af1 doubling every time4 ,this is because we have supposed twice as many black balls in the granary as white ones2 had we supposed #aj times as many1 instead of #a1 #b1 #d1 #h1 #af sets we should have had #a1 #aj1 #ajj1 #ajjj1 #ajjjj sets2 on the other hand1 had the numbers of black and white balls in the granary been even1 there would have been but one set in each group4 ,now suppose two balls were drawn from one of these urns and were found to be both white1 what would be the probability of the next one being white8 ,if the two drawn out were the first two put into the urns1 and the next to be drawn out were the third put in1 then the probability of this third being white would be the same whatever the colors of the first two1 for it has been supposed that just the same proportion of urns has the third ball white among those which have the first two white-white1 white-black1 black-white1 and black-black4 ,thus1 in this case1 the chance of the third ball being white would be the same whatever the first two were4 ,but1 by inspecting the table1 the reader can see that in each group all orders of the balls occur with equal frequency1 so that it makes no difference whether they are drawn out in the order they were put in or not4 ,hence the colors of the balls already drawn have no influence on the probability of any other being white or black4 ,now1 if there be any way of enumerating the possibilities of ,nature so as to make them equally probable1 it is clearly one which should make one arrangement or combination of the elements of ,nature as probable as another1 that is1 a distribution like that we have supposed1 and it1 therefore1 appears that the assumption that any such thing can be done1 leads simply to the conclusion that reasoning from past to future experience is absolutely worthless4 ,in fact1 the moment that you assume that the chances in favor of that of which we are totally ignorant are even1 the problem about the tides does not differ1 in any arithmetical particular1 from the case in which a penny 7known to be equally likely to come up heads and tails7 should turn up heads m times successively4 ,in short1 it would be to assume that ,nature is a pure chaos1 or chance combination of independent elements1 in which reasoning from one fact to another would be impossible2 and since1 as we shall hereafter see1 there is no judgment of pure observation without reasoning1 it would be to suppose all human cognition illusory and no real knowledge possible4 ,it would be to suppose that if we have found the order of ,nature more or less regular in the past1 this has been by a pure run of luck which we may expect is now at an end4 ,now1 it may be we have no scintilla of proof to the contrary1 but reason is unnecessary in reference to that belief which is of all the most settled1 which nobody doubts or can doubt1 and which he who should deny would stultify himself in so doing4 ,the relative probability of this or that arrangement of ,nature is something which we should have a right to talk about if universes were as plenty as blackberries1 if we could put a quantity of them in a bag1 shake them well up1 draw out a sample1 and examine them to see what proportion of them had one arrangement and what proportion another4 ,but1 even in that case1 a higher universe would contain us1 in regard to whose arrangements the conception of probability could have no applicability4 ,,iv ,we have examined the problem proposed by the conceptualists1 which1 translated into clear language1 is this3 ,given a synthetic conclusion2 required to know out of all possible states of things how many will accord1 to any assigned extent1 with this conclusion2 and we have found that it is only an absurd attempt to reduce synthetic to analytic reason1 and that no definite solution is possible4 ,but there is another problem in connection with this subject4 ,it is this3 ,given a certain state of things1 required to know what proportion of all synthetic inferences relating to it will be true within a given degree of approximation4 ,now1 there is no difficulty about this problem 7except for its mathematical complication72 it has been much studied1 and the answer is perfectly well known4 ,and is not this1 after all1 what we want to know much rather than the other8 ,why should we want to know the probability that the fact will accord with our conclusion8 ,that implies that we are interested in all possible worlds1 and not merely the one in which we find ourselves placed4 ,why is it not much more to the purpose to know the probability that our conclusion will accord with the fact8 ,one of these questions is the first above stated and the other the second1 and ,i ask the reader whether1 if people1 instead of using the word probability without any clear apprehension of their own meaning1 had always spoken of relative frequency1 they could have failed to see that what they wanted was not to follow along the synthetic procedure with an analytic one1 in order to find the probability of the conclusion2 but1 on the contrary1 to begin with the fact at which the synthetic inference aims1 and follow back to the facts it uses for premises in order to see the probability of their being such as will yield the truth4 ,as we cannot have an urn with an infinite number of balls to represent the inexhaustibleness of ,nature1 let us suppose one with a finite number1 each ball being thrown back into the urn after being drawn out1 so that there is no exhaustion of them4 ,suppose one ball out of three is white and the rest black1 and that four balls are drawn4 ,then the table on pages #ie-if represents the relative frequency of the different ways in which these balls might be drawn4 ,it will be seen that if we should judge by these four balls of the proportion in the urn1 #cb times out of #ha we should find it #a_/d1 and #bd times out of #ha we should find it #a_/b1 the truth being #a_/c4 ,to extend this table to high numbers would be great labor1 but the mathematicians have found some ingenious ways of reckoning what the numbers would be4 ,it is found that1 if the true proportion of white balls is p1 and s balls are drawn1 then the error of the proportion obtained by the induction will be-- half the time within #j4dgg 77#bp7#a-p77_/s7 #i times out of #aj within #a4afc 77#bp7#a-p77_/s7 #ii times out of #ajj within #a4hba 77#bp7#a-p77_/s7 #iii times out of #a1jjj within #b4cbh 77#bp7#a-p77_/s7 #i1iii times out of #aj1jjj within #b4gea 77#bp7#a-p77_/s7 #i1iii1iii1iii times out of #aj1jjj1jjj1jjj within #d4gg 77#bp7#a-p77_/s7 ,the use of this may be illustrated by an example4 ,by the census of #ahgj1 it appears that the proportion of males among native white children under one year old was #j4ejhb1 while among colored children of the same age the proportion was only #j4digg4 ,the difference between these is #j4jaje1 or about one in a #ajj4 ,can this be attributed to chance1 or would the difference always exist among a great number of white and colored children under like circumstances8 ,here p may be taken at #a_/b2 hence #bp7#a-p7 is also #a_/b4 ,the number of white children counted was near #a1jjj1jjj2 hence the fraction whose square-root is to be taken is about #a_/bjjjjjj4 ,the root is about #a_/adjj1 and this multiplied by #j4dgg gives about #j4jjjc as the probable error in the ratio of males among the whites as obtained from the induction4 ,the number of black children was about #aej1jjj1 which gives #j4jjjh for the probable error4 ,we see that the actual discrepancy is ten times the sum of these1 and such a result would happen1 according to our table1 only once out of #aj1jjj1jjj1jjj censuses1 in the long run4 ,it may be remarked that when the real value of the probability sought inductively is either very large or very small1 the reasoning is more secure4 ,thus1 suppose there were in reality one white ball in #ajj in a certain urn1 and we were to judge of the number by #ajj drawings4 ,the probability of drawing no white ball would be #cff_/ajjj2 that of drawing one white ball would be #cgj_/ajjj2 that of drawing two would be #ahe_/ajjj2 that of drawing three would be #fa_/ajjj2 that of drawing four would be #ae_/ajjj2 that of drawing five would be only #c_/ajjj1 etc4 ,thus we should be tolerably certain of not being in error by more than one ball in #ajj4 ,it appears1 then1 that in one sense we can1 and in another we cannot1 determine the probability of synthetic inference4 ,when ,i reason in this way3 ,ninety-nine ,cretans in a hundred are liars2 ,but ,epimenides is a ,cretan2 ,therefore1 ,epimenides is a liar3-- ,i know that reasoning similar to that would carry truth #ii times in #ajj4 ,but when ,i reason in the opposite direction3 ,minos1 ,sarpedon1 ,rhadamanthus1 ,deucalion1 and ,epimenides1 are all the ,cretans ,i can think of2 ,but these were all atrocious liars1 ,therefore1 pretty much all ,cretans must have been liars2 ,i do not in the least know how often such reasoning would carry me right4 ,on the other hand1 what ,i do know is that some definite proportion of ,cretans must have been liars1 and that this proportion can be probably approximated to by an induction from five or six instances4 ,even in the worst case for the probability of such an inference1 that in which about half the ,cretans are liars1 the ratio so obtained would probably not be in error by more than #a_/f4 ,so much ,i know2 but1 then1 in the present case the inference is that pretty much all ,cretans are liars1 and whether there may not be a special improbability in that ,i do not know4 ,v ,late in the last century1 ,immanuel ,kant asked the question1 8,how are synthetical judgments a priori possible80 ,by synthetical judgments he meant such as assert positive fact and are not mere affairs of arrangement2 in short1 judgments of the kind which synthetical reasoning produces1 and which analytic reasoning cannot yield4 ,by a priori judgments he meant such as that all outward objects are in space1 every event has a cause1 etc41 propositions which according to him can never be inferred from experience4 ,not so much by his answer to this question as by the mere asking of it1 the current philosophy of that time was shattered and destroyed1 and a new epoch in its history was begun4 ,but before asking that question he ought to have asked the more general one1 8,how are any synthetical judgments at all possible80 ,how is it that a man can observe one fact and straightway pronounce judgment concerning another different fact not involved in the first8 ,such reasoning1 as we have seen1 has1 at least in the usual sense of the phrase1 no definite probability2 how1 then1 can it add to our knowledge8 ,this is a strange paradox2 the ,abb ,gratry says it is a miracle1 and that every true induction is an immediate inspiration from on high4#dc ,i respect this explanation far more than many a pedantic attempt to solve the question by some juggle with probabilities1 with the forms of syllogism1 or what not4 ,i respect it because it shows an appreciation of the depth of the problem1 because it assigns an adequate cause1 and because it is intimately connected--as the true account should be--with a general philosophy of the universe4 ,at the same time1 ,i do not accept this explanation1 because an explanation should tell how a thing is done1 and to assert a perpetual miracle seems to be an abandonment of all hope of doing that1 without sufficient justification4 ,it will be interesting to see how the answer which ,kant gave to his question about synthetical judgments a priori will appear if extended to the question of synthetical judgments in general4 ,that answer is1 that synthetical judgments a priori are possible because whatever is universally true is involved in the conditions of experience4 ,let us apply this to a general synthetical reasoning4 ,i take from a bag a handful of beans2 they are all purple1 and ,i infer that all the beans in the bag are purple4 ,how can ,i do that8 ,why1 upon the principle that whatever is universally true of my experience 7which is here the appearance of these different beans7 is involved in the condition of experience4 ,the condition of this special experience is that all these beans were taken from that bag4 ,according to ,kant's principle1 then1 whatever is found true of all the beans drawn from the bag must find its explanation in some peculiarity of the contents of the bag4 ,this is a satisfactory statement of the principle of induction4 ,when we draw a deductive or analytic conclusion1 our rule of inference is that facts of a certain general character are either invariably or in a certain proportion of cases accompanied by facts of another general character4 ,then our premise being a fact of the former class1 we infer with certainty or with the appropriate degree of probability the existence of a fact of the second class4 ,but the rule for synthetic inference is of a different kind4 ,when we sample a bag of beans we do not in the least assume that the fact of some beans being purple involves the necessity or even the probability of other beans being so4 ,on the contrary1 the conceptualistic method of treating probabilities1 which really amounts simply to the deductive treatment of them1 when rightly carried out leads to the result that a synthetic inference has just an even chance in its favor1 or in other words is absolutely worthless4 ,the color of one bean is entirely independent of that of another4 ,but synthetic inference is founded upon a classification of facts1 not according to their characters1 but according to the manner of obtaining them4 ,its rule is1 that a number of facts obtained in a given way will in general more or less resemble other facts obtained in the same way2 or1 experiences whose conditions are the same will have the same general characters4 ,in the former case1 we know that premises precisely similar in form to those of the given ones will yield true conclusions1 just once in a calculable number of times4 ,in the latter case1 we only know that premises obtained under circumstances similar to the given ones 7though perhaps themselves very different7 will yield true conclusions1 at least once in a calculable number of times4 ,we may express this by saying that in the case of analytic inference we know the probability of our conclusion 7if the premises are true71 but in the case of synthetic inferences we only know the degree of trustworthiness of our proceeding4 ,as all knowledge comes from synthetic inference1 we must equally infer that all human certainty consists merely in our knowing that the processes by which our knowledge has been derived are such as must generally have led to true conclusions4 ,though a synthetic inference cannot by any means be reduced to deduction1 yet that the rule of induction will hold good in the long run may be deduced from the principle that reality is only the object of the final opinion to which sufficient investigation would lead4 ,that belief gradually tends to fix itself under the influence of inquiry is1 indeed1 one of the facts with which logic sets out4 ,footnote #dj3 ,popular ,science ,monthly1 ,april1 #ahgh4 ,footnote #da3 ,strictly we should need an infinite series of numbers each depending on the probable error of the last4 ,footnote #db3 8,perfect indecision1 belief inclining neither way1 an even chance40--,,de ,,morgan1 p4 #ahb4 ,footnote #dc3 ,logique4 ,the same is true1 according to him1 of every performance of a differentiation1 but not of integration4 ,he does not tell us whether it is the supernatural assistance which makes the former process so much the easier4 ,,fifth ,,paper ,,the ,,order ,,of ,,nature#dd ,i ,any proposition whatever concerning the order of ,nature must touch more or less upon religion4 ,in our day1 belief1 even in these matters1 depends more and more upon the observation of facts4 ,if a remarkable and universal orderliness be found in the universe1 there must be some cause for this regularity1 and science has to consider what hypotheses might account for the phenomenon4 ,one way of accounting for it1 certainly1 would be to suppose that the world is ordered by a superior power4 ,but if there is nothing in the universal subjection of phenomena to laws1 nor in the character of those laws themselves 7as being benevolent1 beautiful1 economical1 etc471 which goes to prove the existence of a governor of the universe1 it is hardly to be anticipated that any other sort of evidence will be found to weigh very much with minds emancipated from the tyranny of tradition4 ,nevertheless1 it cannot truly be said that even an absolutely negative decision of that question could altogether destroy religion1 inasmuch as there are faiths in which1 however much they differ from our own1 we recognize those essential characters which make them worthy to be called religions1 and which1 nevertheless1 do not postulate an actually existing ,deity4 ,that one1 for instance1 which has had the most numerous and by no means the least intelligent following of any on earth1 teaches that the ,divinity in his highest perfection is wrapped away from the world in a state of profound and eternal sleep1 which really does not differ from non-existence1 whether it be called by that name or not4 ,no candid mind who has followed the writings of ,m4 ,vacherot can well deny that his religion is as earnest as can be4 ,he worships the ,perfect1 the ,supreme ,ideal2 but he conceives that the very notion of the ,ideal is repugnant to its real existence4#de ,in fact1 ,m4 ,vacherot finds it agreeable to his reason to assert that non-existence is an essential character of the perfect1 just as ,st4 ,anselm and ,descartes found it agreeable to theirs to assert the extreme opposite4 ,i confess that there is one respect in which either of these positions seems to me more congruous with the religious attitude than that of a theology which stands upon evidences2 for as soon as the ,deity presents himself to either ,anselm or ,vacherot1 and manifests his glorious attributes1 whether it be in a vision of the night or day1 either of them recognizes his adorable ,god1 and sinks upon his knees at once2 whereas the theologian of evidences will first demand that the divine apparition shall identify himself1 and only after having scrutinized his credentials and weighed the probabilities of his being found among the totality of existences1 will he finally render his circumspect homage1 thinking that no characters can be adorable but those which belong to a real thing4 ,if we could find out any general characteristic of the universe1 any mannerism in the ways of ,nature1 any law everywhere applicable and universally valid1 such a discovery would be of such singular assistance to us in all our future reasoning1 that it would deserve a place almost at the head of the principles of logic4 ,on the other hand1 if it can be shown that there is nothing of the sort to find out1 but that every discoverable regularity is of limited range1 this again will be of logical importance4 ,what sort of a conception we ought to have of the universe1 how to think of the ensemble of things1 is a fundamental problem in the theory of reasoning4 ,,ii ,it is the legitimate endeavor of scientific men now1 as it was twenty-three hundred years ago1 to account for the formation of the solar system and of the cluster of stars which forms the galaxy1 by the fortuitous concourse of atoms4 ,the greatest expounder of this theory1 when asked how he could write an immense book on the system of the world without one mention of its author1 replied1 very logically1 8,je n'avais pas besoin de cette hypothse-l40 ,but1 in truth1 there is nothing atheistical in the theory1 any more than there was in this answer4 ,matter is supposed to be composed of molecules which obey the laws of mechanics and exert certain attractions upon one another2 and it is to these regularities 7which there is no attempt to account for7 that general arrangement of the solar system would be due1 and not to hazard4 ,if any one has ever maintained that the universe is a pure throw of the dice1 the theologians have abundantly refuted him4 8,how often10 says ,archbishop ,tillotson1 8might a man1 after he had jumbled a set of letters in a bag1 fling them out upon the ground before they would fall into an exact poem1 yea1 or so much as make a good discourse in prose6 ,and may not a little book be as easily made by chance as this great volume of the world80 ,the chance world here shown to be so different from that in which we live would be one in which there were no laws1 the characters of different things being entirely independent2 so that1 should a sample of any kind of objects ever show a prevalent character1 it could only be by accident1 and no general proposition could ever be established4 ,whatever further conclusions we may come to in regard to the order of the universe1 thus much may be regarded as solidly established1 that the world is not a mere chance-medley4 ,but whether the world makes an exact poem or not1 is another question4 ,when we look up at the heavens at night1 we readily perceive that the stars are not simply splashed on to the celestial vault2 but there does not seem to be any precise system in their arrangement either4 ,it will be worth our while1 then1 to inquire into the degree of orderliness in the universe2 and1 to begin1 let us ask whether the world we live in is any more orderly than a purely chance-world would be4 ,any uniformity1 or law of ,nature1 may be stated in the form1 8,every ,a is ,b02 as1 every ray of light is a non-curved line1 every body is accelerated toward the earth's center1 etc4 ,this is the same as to say1 8,there does not exist any ,a which is not ,b02 there is no curved ray2 there is no body not accelerated toward the earth2 so that the uniformity consists in the non-occurrence in ,nature of a certain combination of characters 7in this case1 the combination of being ,a with being non-,b74#df ,and1 conversely1 every case of the non-occurrence of a combination of characters would constitute a uniformity in ,nature4 ,thus1 suppose the quality ,a is never found in combination with the quality ,c3 for example1 suppose the quality of idiocy is never found in combination with that of having a well-developed brain4 ,then nothing of the sort ,a is of the sort ,c1 or everything of the sort ,a is of the sort non-,c 7or say1 every idiot has an ill-developed brain71 which1 being something universally true of the ,a's1 is a uniformity in the world4 ,thus we see that1 in a world where there were no uniformities1 no logically possible combination of characters would be excluded1 but every combination would exist in some object4 ,but two objects not identical must differ in some of their characters1 though it be only in the character of being in such-and-such a place4 ,hence1 precisely the same combination of characters could not be found in two different objects2 and1 consequently1 in a chance-world every combination involving either the positive or negative of every character would belong to just one thing4 ,thus1 if there were but five simple characters in such a world1#dg we might denote them by ,a1 ,b1 ,c1 ,d1 ,e1 and their negatives by a1 b1 c1 d1 e2 and then1 as there would be #be or #cb different combinations of these characters1 completely determinate in reference to each of them1 that world would have just #cb objects in it1 their characters being as in the following table3 ,,table ,i4 ,,abcde ,ab,c,d,e a,b,c,d,e ab,c,d,e ,a,b,c,de ,ab,c,de a,b,c,de ab,c,de ,a,b,cd,e ,ab,cd,e a,b,cd,e ab,cd,e ,a,b,cde ,ab,cde a,b,cde ab,cde ,a,bc,d,e ,abc,d,e a,bc,d,e abc,d,e ,a,bc,de ,abc,de a,bc,de abc,de ,a,bcd,e ,abcd,e a,bcd,e abcd,e ,a,bcde ,abcde a,bcde abcde ,for example1 if the five primary characters were hard1 sweet1 fragrant1 green1 bright1 there would be one object which reunited all these qualities1 one which was hard1 sweet1 fragrant1 and green1 but not bright2 one which was hard1 sweet1 fragrant1 and bright1 but not green2 one which was hard1 sweet1 and fragrant1 but neither green nor bright2 and so on through all the combinations4 ,this is what a thoroughly chance-world would be like1 and certainly nothing could be imagined more systematic4 ,when a quantity of letters are poured out of a bag1 the appearance of disorder is due to the circumstance that the phenomena are only partly fortuitous4 ,the laws of space are supposed1 in that case1 to be rigidly preserved1 and there is also a certain amount of regularity in the formation of the letters4 ,the result is that some elements are orderly and some are disorderly1 which is precisely what we observe in the actual world4 ,tillotson1 in the passage of which a part has been quoted1 goes on to ask1 8,how long might #bj1jjj blind men which should be sent out from the several remote parts of ,england1 wander up and down before they would all meet upon ,salisbury ,plains1 and fall into rank and file in the exact order of an army8 ,and yet this is much more easy to be imagined than how the innumerable blind parts of matter should rendezvous themselves into a world40 ,this is very true1 but in the actual world the blind men are1 as far as we can see1 not drawn up in any particular order at all4 ,and1 in short1 while a certain amount of order exists in the world1 it would seem that the world is not so orderly as it might be1 and1 for instance1 not so much so as a world of pure chance would be4 ,but we can never get to the bottom of this question until we take account of a highly-important logical principle#dh which ,i now proceed to enounce4 ,this principle is that any plurality or lot of objects whatever have some character in common 7no matter how insignificant7 which is peculiar to them and not shared by anything else4 ,the word 8character0 here is taken in such a sense as to include negative characters1 such as incivility1 inequality1 etc41 as well as their positives1 civility1 equality1 etc4 ,to prove the theorem1 ,i will show what character any two things1 ,a and ,b1 have in common1 not shared by anything else4 ,the things1 ,a and ,b1 are each distinguished from all other things by the possession of certain characters which may be named ,a-ness and ,b-ness4 ,corresponding to these positive characters1 are the negative characters un-,a-ness1 which is possessed by everything except ,a1 and un-,b-ness1 which is possessed by everything except ,b4 ,these two characters are united in everything except ,a and ,b2 and this union of the characters un-,a-ness and un-,b-ness makes a compound character which may be termed ,a-,b-lessness4 ,this is not possessed by either ,a or ,b1 but it is possessed by everything else4 ,this character1 like every other1 has its corresponding negative un-,a-,b-lessness1 and this last is the character possessed by both ,a and ,b1 and by nothing else4 ,it is obvious that what has thus been shown true of two things is mutatis mutandis1 true of any number of things4 ,q4 ,e4 ,d4 ,in any world whatever1 then1 there must be a character peculiar to each possible group of objects4 ,if1 as a matter of nomenclature1 characters peculiar to the same group be regarded as only different aspects of the same character1 then we may say that there will be precisely one character for each possible group of objects4 ,thus1 suppose a world to contain five things1 1 1 1 1 4 ,then it will have a separate character for each of the #ca groups 7with non-existence making up #cb or #be7 shown in the following table3 ,,table ,,ii4 ,this shows that a contradiction is involved in the very idea#di of a chance-world1 for in a world of #cb things1 instead of there being only #ce or #bdc characters1 as we have seen that the notion of a chance-world requires1 there would1 in fact1 be no less than #bcb1 or #d1bid1ifg1bif characters1 which would not be all independent1 but would have all possible relations with one another4 ,we further see that so long as we regard characters abstractly1 without regard to their relative importance1 etc41 there is no possibility of a more or less degree of orderliness in the world1 the whole system of relationship between the different characters being given by mere logic2 that is1 being implied in those facts which are tacitly admitted as soon as we admit that there is any such thing as reasoning4 ,in order to descend from this abstract point of view1 it is requisite to consider the characters of things as relative to the perceptions and active powers of living beings4 ,instead1 then1 of attempting to imagine a world in which there should be no uniformities1 let us suppose one in which none of the uniformities should have reference to characters interesting or important to us4 ,in the first place1 there would be nothing to puzzle us in such a world4 ,the small number of qualities which would directly meet the senses would be the ones which would afford the key to everything which could possibly interest us4 ,the whole universe would have such an air of system and perfect regularity that there would be nothing to ask4 ,in the next place1 no action of ours1 and no event of ,nature1 would have important consequences in such a world4 ,we should be perfectly free from all responsibility1 and there would be nothing to do but to enjoy or suffer whatever happened to come along4 ,thus there would be nothing to stimulate or develop either the mind or the will1 and we consequently should neither act nor think4 ,we should have no memory1 because that depends on a law of our organization4 ,even if we had any senses1 we should be situated toward such a world precisely as inanimate objects are toward the present one1 provided we suppose that these objects have an absolutely transitory and instantaneous consciousness without memory--a supposition which is a mere mode of speech1 for that would be no consciousness at all4 ,we may1 therefore1 say that a world of chance is simply our actual world viewed from the standpoint of an animal at the very vanishing-point of intelligence4 ,the actual world is almost a chance-medley to the mind of a polyp4 ,the interest which the uniformities of ,nature have for an animal measures his place in the scale of intelligence4 ,thus1 nothing can be made out from the orderliness of ,nature in regard to the existence of a ,god1 unless it be maintained that the existence of a finite mind proves the existence of an infinite one4 ,,iii ,in the last of these papers we examined the nature of inductive or synthetic reasoning4 ,we found it to be a process of sampling4 ,a number of specimens of a class are taken1 not by selection within that class1 but at random4 ,these specimens will agree in a great number of respects4 ,if1 now1 it were likely that a second lot would agree with the first in the majority of these respects1 we might base on this consideration an inference in regard to any one of these characters4 ,but such an inference would neither be of the nature of induction1 nor would it 7except in special cases7 be valid1 because the vast majority of points of agreement in the first sample drawn would generally be entirely accidental1 as well as insignificant4 ,to illustrate this1 ,i take the ages at death of the first five poets given in ,wheeler's ,biographical ,dictionary4 ,they are3 ,aagard1 #dh4 ,abeille1 #gj4 ,abulola1 #hd4 ,abunowas1 #dh4 ,accords1 #de4 ,these five ages have the following characters in common3 #a4 ,the difference of the two digits composing the number1 divided by three1 leaves a remainder of one4 #b4 ,the first digit raised to the power indicated by the second1 and divided by three1 leaves a remainder of one4 #c4 ,the sum of the prime factors of each age1 including one1 is divisible by three4 ,it is easy to see that the number of accidental agreements of this sort would be quite endless4 ,but suppose that1 instead of considering a character because of its prevalence in the sample1 we designate a character before taking the sample1 selecting it for its importance1 obviousness1 or other point of interest4 ,then two considerable samples drawn at random are extremely likely to agree approximately in regard to the proportion of occurrences of a character so chosen4 ,the inference that a previously designated character has nearly the same frequency of occurrence in the whole of a class that it has in a sample drawn at random out of that class is induction4 ,if the character be not previously designated1 then a sample in which it is found to be prevalent can only serve to suggest that it may be prevalent in the whole class4 ,we may consider this surmise as an inference if we please--an inference of possibility2 but a second sample must be drawn to test the question of whether the character actually is prevalent4 ,instead of designating beforehand a single character in reference to which we will examine a sample1 we may designate two1 and use the same sample to determine the relative frequencies of both4 ,this will be making two inductive inferences at once2 and1 of course1 we are less certain that both will yield correct conclusions than we should be that either separately would do so4 ,what is true of two characters is true of any limited number4 ,now1 the number of characters which have any considerable interest for us in reference to any class of objects is more moderate than might be supposed4 ,as we shall be sure to examine any sample with reference to these characters1 they may be regarded not exactly as predesignated1 but as predetermined 7which amounts to the same thing72 and we may infer that the sample represents the class in all these respects if we please1 remembering only that this is not so secure an inference as if the particular quality to be looked for had been fixed upon beforehand4 ,the demonstration of this theory of induction rests upon principles and follows methods which are accepted by all those who display in other matters the particular knowledge and force of mind which qualify them to judge of this4 ,the theory itself1 however1 quite unaccountably seems never to have occurred to any of the writers who have undertaken to explain synthetic reasoning4 ,the most widely-spread opinion in the matter is one which was much promoted by ,mr4 ,john ,stuart ,mill--namely1 that induction depends for its validity upon the uniformity of ,nature--that is1 on the principle that what happens once will1 under a sufficient degree of similarity of circumstances1 happen again as often as the same circumstances recur4 ,the application is this3 ,the fact that different things belong to the same class constitutes the similarity of circumstances1 and the induction is good1 provided this similarity is 8sufficient40 ,what happens once is1 that a number of these things are found to have a certain character2 what may be expected1 then1 to happen again as often as the circumstances recur consists in this1 that all things belonging to the same class should have the same character4 ,this analysis of induction has1 ,i venture to think1 various imperfections1 to some of which it may be useful to call attention4 ,in the first place1 when ,i put my hand in a bag and draw out a handful of beans1 and1 finding three-quarters of them black1 infer that about three-quarters of all in the bag are black1 my inference is obviously of the same kind as if ,i had found any larger proportion1 or the whole1 of the sample black1 and had assumed that it represented in that respect the rest of the contents of the bag4 ,but the analysis in question hardly seems adapted to the explanation of this proportionate induction1 where the conclusion1 instead of being that a certain event uniformly happens under certain circumstances1 is precisely that it does not uniformly occur1 but only happens in a certain proportion of cases4 ,it is true that the whole sample may be regarded as a single object1 and the inference may be brought under the formula proposed by considering the conclusion to be that any similar sample will show a similar proportion among its constituents4 ,but this is to treat the induction as if it rested on a single instance1 which gives a very false idea of its probability4 ,in the second place1 if the uniformity of ,nature were the sole warrant of induction1 we should have no right to draw one in regard to a character whose constancy we knew nothing about4 ,accordingly1 ,mr4 ,mill says that1 though none but white swans were known to ,europeans for thousands of years1 yet the inference that all swans were white was 8not a good induction10 because it was not known that color was a usual generic character 7it1 in fact1 not being so by any means74 ,but it is mathematically demonstrable that an inductive inference may have as high a degree of probability as you please independent of any antecedent knowledge of the constancy of the character inferred4 ,before it was known that color is not usually a character of genera1 there was certainly a considerable probability that all swans were white4 ,but the further study of the genera of animals led to the induction of their non-uniformity in regard to color4 ,a deductive application of this general proposition would have gone far to overcome the probability of the universal whiteness of swans before the black species was discovered4 ,when we do know anything in regard to the general constancy or inconstancy of a character1 the application of that general knowledge to the particular class to which any induction relates1 though it serves to increase or diminish the force of the induction1 is1 like every application of general knowledge to particular cases1 deductive in its nature and not inductive4 ,in the third place1 to say that inductions are true because similar events happen in similar circumstances--or1 what is the same thing1 because objects similar in some respects are likely to be similar in others--is to overlook those conditions which really are essential to the validity of inductions4 ,when we take all the characters into account1 any pair of objects resemble one another in just as many particulars as any other pair4 ,if we limit ourselves to such characters as have for us any importance1 interest1 or obviousness1 then a synthetic conclusion may be drawn1 but only on condition that the specimens by which we judge have been taken at random from the class in regard to which we are to form a judgment1 and not selected as belonging to any sub-class4 ,the induction only has its full force when the character concerned has been designated before examining the sample4 ,these are the essentials of induction1 and they are not recognized in attributing the validity of induction to the uniformity of ,nature4 ,the explanation of induction by the doctrine of probabilities1 given in the last of these papers1 is not a mere metaphysical formula1 but is one from which all the rules of synthetic reasoning can be deduced systematically and with mathematical cogency4 ,but the account of the matter by a principle of ,nature1 even if it were in other respects satisfactory1 presents the fatal disadvantage of leaving us quite as much afloat as before in regard to the proper method of induction4 ,it does not surprise me1 therefore1 that those who adopt this theory have given erroneous rules for the conduct of reasoning1 nor that the greater number of examples put forward by ,mr4 ,mill in his first edition1 as models of what inductions should be1 proved in the light of further scientific progress so particularly unfortunate that they had to be replaced by others in later editions4 ,one would have supposed that ,mr4 ,mill might have based an induction on this circumstance1 especially as it is his avowed principle that1 if the conclusion of an induction turns out false1 it cannot have been a good induction4 ,nevertheless1 neither he nor any of his scholars seem to have been led to suspect1 in the least1 the perfect solidity of the framework which he devised for securely supporting the mind in its passage from the known to the unknown1 although at its first trial it did not answer quite so well as had been expected4 ,,iv ,when we have drawn any statistical induction--such1 for instance1 as that one-half of all births are of male children--it is always possible to discover1 by investigation sufficiently prolonged1 a class of which the same predicate may be affirmed universally2 to find out1 for instance1 what sort of births are of male children4 ,the truth of this principle follows immediately from the theorem that there is a character peculiar to every possible group of objects4 ,the form in which the principle is usually stated is1 that every event must have a cause4 ,but1 though there exists a cause for every event1 and that of a kind which is capable of being discovered1 yet if there be nothing to guide us to the discovery2 if we have to hunt among all the events in the world without any scent2 if1 for instance1 the sex of a child might equally be supposed to depend on the configuration of the planets1 on what was going on at the antipodes1 or on anything else--then the discovery would have no chance of ever getting made4 ,that we ever do discover the precise causes of things1 that any induction whatever is absolutely without exception1 is what we have no right to assume4 ,on the contrary1 it is an easy corollary1 from the theorem just referred to1 that every empirical rule has an exception4#ej ,but there are certain of our inductions which present an approach to universality so extraordinary that1 even if we are to suppose that they are not strictly universal truths1 we cannot possibly think that they have been reached merely by accident4 ,the most remarkable laws of this kind are those of time and space4 ,with reference to space1 ,bishop ,berkeley first showed1 in a very conclusive manner1 that it was not a thing seen1 but a thing inferred4 ,berkeley chiefly insists on the impossibility of directly seeing the third dimension of space1 since the retina of the eye is a surface4 ,but1 in point of fact1 the retina is not even a surface2 it is a conglomeration of nerve-needles directed toward the light and having only their extreme points sensitive1 these points lying at considerable distances from one another compared with their areas4 ,now1 of these points1 certainly the excitation of no one singly can produce the perception of a surface1 and consequently not the aggregate of all the sensations can amount to this4 ,but certain relations subsist between the excitations of different nerve-points1 and these constitute the premises upon which the hypothesis of space is founded1 and from which it is inferred4 ,that space is not immediately perceived is now universally admitted2 and a mediate cognition is what is called an inference1 and is subject to the criticism of logic4 ,but what are we to say to the fact of every chicken as soon as it is hatched solving a problem whose data are of a complexity sufficient to try the greatest mathematical powers8 ,it would be insane to deny that the tendency to light upon the conception of space is inborn in the mind of the chicken and of every animal4 ,the same thing is equally true of time4 ,that time is not directly perceived is evident1 since no lapse of time is present1 and we only perceive what is present4 ,that1 not having the idea of time1 we should never be able to perceive the flow in our sensations without some particular aptitude for it1 will probably also be admitted4 ,the idea of force--at least1 in its rudiments--is another conception so early arrived at1 and found in animals so low in the scale of intelligence1 that it must be supposed innate4 ,but the innateness of an idea admits of degree1 for it consists in the tendency of that idea to present itself to the mind4 ,some ideas1 like that of space1 do so present themselves irresistibly at the very dawn of intelligence1 and take possession of the mind on small provocation1 while of other conceptions we are prepossessed1 indeed1 but not so strongly1 down a scale which is greatly extended4 ,the tendency to personify every thing1 and to attribute human characters to it1 may be said to be innate2 but it is a tendency which is very soon overcome by civilized man in regard to the greater part of the objects about him4 ,take such a conception as that of gravitation varying inversely as the square of the distance4 ,it is a very simple law4 ,but to say that it is simple is merely to say that it is one which the mind is particularly adapted to apprehend with facility4 ,suppose the idea of a quantity multiplied into another had been no more easy to the mind than that of a quantity raised to the power indicated by itself--should we ever have discovered the law of the solar system8 ,it seems incontestable1 therefore1 that the mind of man is strongly adapted to the comprehension of the world2 at least1 so far as this goes1 that certain conceptions1 highly important for such a comprehension1 naturally arise in his mind2 and1 without such a tendency1 the mind could never have had any development at all4 ,how are we to explain this adaptation8 ,the great utility and indispensableness of the conceptions of time1 space1 and force1 even to the lowest intelligence1 are such as to suggest that they are the results of natural selection4 ,without something like geometrical1 kinetical1 and mechanical conceptions1 no animal could seize his food or do anything which might be necessary for the preservation of the species4 ,he might1 it is true1 be provided with an instinct which would generally have the same effect2 that is to say1 he might have conceptions different from those of time1 space1 and force1 but which coincided with them in regard to the ordinary cases of the animal's experience4 ,but1 as that animal would have an immense advantage in the struggle for life whose mechanical conceptions did not break down in a novel situation 7such as development must bring about71 there would be a constant selection in favor of more and more correct ideas of these matters4 ,thus would be attained the knowledge of that fundamental law upon which all science rolls2 namely1 that forces depend upon relations of time1 space1 and mass4 ,when this idea was once sufficiently clear1 it would require no more than a comprehensible degree of genius to discover the exact nature of these relations4 ,such an hypothesis naturally suggests itself1 but it must be admitted that it does not seem sufficient to account for the extraordinary accuracy with which these conceptions apply to the phenomena of ,nature1 and it is probable that there is some secret here which remains to be discovered4 ,v ,some important questions of logic depend upon whether we are to consider the material universe as of limited extent and finite age1 or quite boundless in space and in time4 ,in the former case1 it is conceivable that a general plan or design embracing the whole universe should be discovered1 and it would be proper to be on the alert for some traces of such a unity4 ,in the latter case1 since the proportion of the world of which we can have any experience is less than the smallest assignable fraction1 it follows that we never could discover any pattern in the universe except a repeating one2 any design embracing the whole would be beyond our powers to discern1 and beyond the united powers of all intellects during all time4 ,now1 what is absolutely incapable of being known is1 as we have seen in a former paper1 not real at all4 ,an absolutely incognizable existence is a nonsensical phrase4 ,if1 therefore1 the universe is infinite1 the attempt to find in it any design embracing it as a whole is futile1 and involves a false way of looking at the subject4 ,if the universe never had any beginning1 and if in space world stretches beyond world without limit1 there is no whole of material things1 and consequently no general character to the universe1 and no need or possibility of any governor for it4 ,but if there was a time before which absolutely no matter existed1 if there are certain absolute bounds to the region of things outside of which there is a mere void1 then we naturally seek for an explanation of it1 and1 since we cannot look for it among material things1 the hypothesis of a great disembodied animal1 the creator and governor of the world1 is natural enough4 ,the actual state of the evidence as to the limitation of the universe is as follows3 ,as to time1 we find on our earth a constant progress of development since the planet was a red-hot ball2 the solar system seems to have resulted from the condensation of a nebula1 and the process appears to be still going on4 ,we sometimes see stars 7presumably with systems of worlds7 destroyed and apparently resolved back into the nebulous condition1 but we have no evidence of any existence of the world previous to the nebulous stage from which it seems to have been evolved4 ,all this rather favors the idea of a beginning than otherwise4 ,as for limits in space1 we cannot be sure that we see anything outside of the system of the ,milky ,way4 ,minds of theological predilections have therefore no need of distorting the facts to reconcile them with their views4 ,but the only scientific presumption is1 that the unknown parts of space and time are like the known parts1 occupied2 that1 as we see cycles of life and death in all development which we can trace out to the end1 the same holds good in regard to solar systems2 that as enormous distances lie between the different planets of our solar system1 relatively to their diameters1 and as still more enormous distances lie between our system relatively to its diameter and other systems1 so it may be supposed that other galactic clusters exist so remote from ours as not to be recognized as such with certainty4 ,i do not say that these are strong inductions2 ,i only say that they are the presumptions which1 in our ignorance of the facts1 should be preferred to hypotheses which involve conceptions of things and occurrences totally different in their character from any of which we have had any experience1 such as disembodied spirits1 the creation of matter1 infringements of the laws of mechanics1 etc4 ,the universe ought to be presumed too vast to have any character4 ,when it is claimed that the arrangements of ,nature are benevolent1 or just1 or wise1 or of any other peculiar kind1 we ought to be prejudiced against such opinions1 as being the offspring of an ill-founded notion of the finitude of the world4 ,and examination has hitherto shown that such beneficences1 justice1 etc41 are of a most limited kind--limited in degree and limited in range4 ,in like manner1 if any one claims to have discovered a plan in the structure of organized beings1 or a scheme in their classification1 or a regular arrangement among natural objects1 or a system of proportionality in the human form1 or an order of development1 or a correspondence between conjunctions of the planets and human events1 or a significance in numbers1 or a key to dreams1 the first thing we have to ask is whether such relations are susceptible of explanation on mechanical principles1 and if not they should be looked upon with disfavor as having already a strong presumption against them2 and examination has generally exploded all such theories4 ,there are minds to whom every prejudice1 every presumption1 seems unfair4 ,it is easy to say what minds these are4 ,they are those who never have known what it is to draw a well-grounded induction1 and who imagine that other people's knowledge is as nebulous as their own4 ,that all science rolls upon presumption 7not of a formal but of a real kind7 is no argument with them1 because they cannot imagine that there is anything solid in human knowledge4 ,these are the people who waste their time and money upon perpetual motions and other such rubbish4 ,but there are better minds who take up mystical theories 7by which ,i mean all those which have no possibility of being mechanically explained74 ,these are persons who are strongly prejudiced in favor of such theories4 ,we all have natural tendencies to believe in such things2 our education often strengthens this tendency2 and the result is1 that to many minds nothing seems so antecedently probable as a theory of this kind4 ,such persons find evidence enough in favor of their views1 and in the absence of any recognized logic of induction they cannot be driven from their belief4 ,but to the mind of a physicist there ought to be a strong presumption against every mystical theory2 and1 therefore1 it seems to me that those scientific men who have sought to make out that science was not hostile to theology have not been so clear-sighted as their opponents4 ,it would be extravagant to say that science can at present disprove religion2 but it does seem to me that the spirit of science is hostile to any religion except such a one as that of ,m4 ,vacherot4 ,our appointed teachers inform us that ,buddhism is a miserable and atheistical faith1 shorn of the most glorious and needful attributes of a religion2 that its priests can be of no use to agriculture by praying for rain1 nor to war by commanding the sun to stand still4 ,we also hear the remonstrances of those who warn us that to shake the general belief in the living ,god would be to shake the general morals1 public and private4 ,this1 too1 must be admitted2 such a revolution of thought could no more be accomplished without waste and desolation than a plantation of trees could be transferred to new ground1 however wholesome in itself1 without all of them languishing for a time1 and many of them dying4 ,nor is it1 by-the-way1 a thing to be presumed that a man would have taken part in a movement having a possible atheistical issue without having taken serious and adequate counsel in regard to that responsibility4 ,but1 let the consequences of such a belief be as dire as they may1 one thing is certain3 that the state of the facts1 whatever it may be1 will surely get found out1 and no human prudence can long arrest the triumphal car of truth--no1 not if the discovery were such as to drive every individual of our race to suicide6 ,but it would be folly to suppose that any metaphysical theory in regard to the mode of being of the perfect is to destroy that aspiration toward the perfect which constitutes the essence of religion4 ,it is true that1 if the priests of any particular form of religion succeed in making it generally believed that religion cannot exist without the acceptance of certain formulas1 or if they succeed in so interweaving certain dogmas with the popular religion that the people can see no essential analogy between a religion which accepts these points of faith and one which rejects them1 the result may very well be to render those who cannot believe these things irreligious4 ,nor can we ever hope that any body of priests should consider themselves more teachers of religion in general than of the particular system of theology advocated by their own party4 ,but no man need be excluded from participation in the common feelings1 nor from so much of the public expression of them as is open to all the laity1 by the unphilosophical narrowness of those who guard the mysteries of worship4 ,am ,i to be prevented from joining in that common joy at the revelation of enlightened principles of religion1 which we celebrate at ,easter and ,christmas1 because ,i think that certain scientific1 logical1 and metaphysical ideas which have been mixed up with these principles are untenable8 ,no2 to do so would be to estimate those errors as of more consequence than the truth--an opinion which few would admit4 ,people who do not believe what are really the fundamental principles of ,christianity are rare to find1 and all but these few ought to feel at home in the churches4 ,footnote #dd3 ,popular ,science ,monthly1 ,june1 #ahgh4 ,footnote #de3 ,see ,santayana1 ,reason in ,religion4 ,footnote #df3 ,for the present purpose1 the negative of a character is to be considered as much a character as the positive1 for a uniformity may either be affirmative or negative4 ,i do not say that no distinction can be drawn between positive and negative uniformities4 ,footnote #dg3 ,there being #e simple characters1 with their negatives1 they could be compounded in various ways so as to make #bda characters in all1 without counting the characters existence and non-existence1 which make up #bdc or #ce4 ,footnote #dh3 ,this principle was1 ,i believe1 first stated by ,mr4 ,de ,morgan4 ,footnote #di3 ,not in every idea but only in the one so formulated4 ,footnote #ej3 ,note that this corollary is itself a theoretical inference and not an empirical rule4 ,,sixth ,,paper ,,deduction1 ,,induction1 ,,and ,,hypothesis#ea ,i ,the chief business of the logician is to classify arguments2 for all testing clearly depends on classification4 ,the classes of the logicians are defined by certain typical forms called syllogisms4 ,for example1 the syllogism called ,barbara is as follows3 ,s is ,m2 ,m is ,p3 ,hence1 ,s is ,p4 ,or1 to put words for letters-- ,enoch and ,elijah were men2 all men die3 ,hence1 ,enoch and ,elijah must have died4 ,the 8is ,p0 of the logicians stands for any verb1 active or neuter4 ,it is capable of strict proof 7with which1 however1 ,i will not trouble the reader7 that all arguments whatever can be put into this form2 but only under the condition that the is shall mean 8is for the purposes of the argument0 or 8is represented by40 ,thus1 an induction will appear in this form something like this3 ,these beans are two-thirds white2 ,but1 the beans in this bag are 7represented by7 these beans2 ,the beans in the bag are two-thirds white4 ,but1 because all inference may be reduced in some way to ,barbara1 it does not follow that this is the most appropriate form in which to represent every kind of inference4 ,on the contrary1 to show the distinctive characters of different sorts of inference1 they must clearly be exhibited in different forms peculiar to each4 ,barbara particularly typifies deductive reasoning2 and so long as the is is taken literally1 no inductive reasoning can be put into this form4 ,barbara is1 in fact1 nothing but the application of a rule4 ,the so-called major premise lays down this rule2 as1 for example1 ,all men are mortal4 ,the other or minor premise states a case under the rule2 as1 ,enoch was a man4 ,the conclusion applies the rule to the case and states the result3 ,enoch is mortal4 ,all deduction is of this character2 it is merely the application of general rules to particular cases4 ,sometimes this is not very evident1 as in the following3 ,all quadrangles are figures1 ,but no triangle is a quadrangle2 ,therefore1 some figures are not triangles4 ,but here the reasoning is really this3 ,rule4--,every quadrangle is other than a triangle4 ,case4--,some figures are quadrangles4 ,result4--,some figures are not triangles4 ,inductive or synthetic reasoning1 being something more than the mere application of a general rule to a particular case1 can never be reduced to this form4 ,if1 from a bag of beans of which we know that #b_/c are white1 we take one at random1 it is a deductive inference that this bean is probably white1 the probability being #b_/c4 ,we have1 in effect1 the following syllogism3 ,rule4--,the beans in this bag are #b_/c white4 ,case4--,this bean has been drawn in such a way that in the long run the relative number of white beans so drawn would be equal to the relative number in the bag4 ,result4--,this bean has been drawn in such a way that in the long run it would turn out white #b_/c of the time4 ,if instead of drawing one bean we draw a handful at random and conclude that about #b_/c of the handful are probably white1 the reasoning is of the same sort4 ,if1 however1 not knowing what proportion of white beans there are in the bag1 we draw a handful at random and1 finding #b_/c of the beans in the handful white1 conclude that about #b_/c of those in the bag are white1 we are rowing up the current of deductive sequence1 and are concluding a rule from the observation of a result in a certain case4 ,this is particularly clear when all the handful turn out one color4 ,the induction then is3 ,these beans were in this bag4--------------- ,these beans are white4------------------ ,all the beans in the bag were white4 ,which is but an inversion of the deductive syllogism4 ,rule4--,all the beans in the bag were white4-- ,case4--,these beans were in the bag4------------- ,result4--,these beans are white4---------------- ,so that induction is the inference of the rule from the case and result4 ,but this is not the only way of inverting a deductive syllogism so as to produce a synthetic inference4 ,suppose ,i enter a room and there find a number of bags1 containing different kinds of beans4 ,on the table there is a handful of white beans2 and1 after some searching1 ,i find one of the bags contains white beans only4 ,i at once infer as a probability1 or as a fair guess1 that this handful was taken out of that bag4 ,this sort of inference is called making an hypothesis4#eb ,it is the inference of a case from a rule and result4 ,we have1 then-- ,,deduction4 ,rule4--,all the beans from this bag are white4 ,case4--,these beans are from this bag4 ,result4--,these beans are white4 ,,induction4 ,case4--,these beans are from this bag4 ,result4--,these beans are white4 ,rule4--,all the beans from this bag are white4 ,,hypothesis4 ,rule4--,all the beans from this bag are white4 ,result4--,these beans are white4 ,case4--,these beans are from this bag4 ,we1 accordingly1 classify all inference as follows3 ,inference4 _/----------------------------- ,deductive or ,analytic4 ,synthetic4 _/------------------ ,induction4 ,hypothesis4 ,induction is where we generalize from a number of cases of which something is true1 and infer that the same thing is true of a whole class4 ,or1 where we find a certain thing to be true of a certain proportion of cases and infer that it is true of the same proportion of the whole class4 ,hypothesis is where we find some very curious circumstance1 which would be explained by the supposition that it was a case of a certain general rule1 and thereupon adopt that supposition4 ,or1 where we find that in certain respects two objects have a strong resemblance1 and infer that they resemble one another strongly in other respects4 ,i once landed at a seaport in a ,turkish province2 and1 as ,i was walking up to the house which ,i was to visit1 ,i met a man upon horseback1 surrounded by four horsemen holding a canopy over his head4 ,as the governor of the province was the only personage ,i could think of who would be so greatly honored1 ,i inferred that this was he4 ,this was an hypothesis4 ,fossils are found2 say1 remains like those of fishes1 but far in the interior of the country4 ,to explain the phenomenon1 we suppose the sea once washed over this land4 ,this is another hypothesis4 ,numberless documents and monuments refer to a conqueror called ,napoleon ,bonaparte4 ,though we have not seen the man1 yet we cannot explain what we have seen1 namely1 all these documents and monuments1 without supposing that he really existed4 ,hypothesis again4 ,as a general rule1 hypothesis is a weak kind of argument4 ,it often inclines our judgment so slightly toward its conclusion that we cannot say that we believe the latter to be true2 we only surmise that it may be so4 ,but there is no difference except one of degree between such an inference and that by which we are led to believe that we remember the occurrences of yesterday from our feeling as if we did so4 ,,ii ,besides the way just pointed out of inverting a deductive syllogism to produce an induction or hypothesis1 there is another4 ,if from the truth of a certain premise the truth of a certain conclusion would necessarily follow1 then from the falsity of the conclusion the falsity of the premise would follow4 ,thus1 take the following syllogism in ,barbara3 ,rule4--,all men are mortal4 ,case4--,enoch and ,elijah were men4 ,result4--,enoch and ,elijah were mortal4 ,now1 a person who denies this result may admit the rule1 and1 in that case1 he must deny the case4 ,thus3 ,denial of ,result4--,enoch and ,elijah were not mortal4 ,rule4--,all men are mortal4 ,denial of ,case4--,enoch and ,elijah were not men4 ,this kind of syllogism is called ,baroco1 which is the typical mood of the second figure4 ,on the other hand1 the person who denies the result may admit the case1 and in that case he must deny the rule4 ,thus3 ,denial of the ,result4--,enoch and ,elijah were not mortal4 ,case4--,enoch and ,elijah were men4 ,denial of the ,rule4--,some men are not mortal4 ,this kind of syllogism is called ,bocardo1 which is the typical mood of the third figure4 ,baroco and ,bocardo are1 of course1 deductive syllogisms2 but of a very peculiar kind4 ,they are called by logicians indirect moods1 because they need some transformation to appear as the application of a rule to a particular case4 ,but if1 instead of setting out as we have here done with a necessary deduction in ,barbara1 we take a probable deduction of similar form1 the indirect moods which we shall obtain will be-- ,corresponding to ,baroco1 an hypothesis2 and1 ,corresponding to ,bocardo1 an induction4 ,for example1 let us begin with this probable deduction in ,barbara3 ,rule4--,most of the beans in this bag are white4 ,case4--,this handful of beans are from this bag4 ,result4--,probably1 most of this handful of beans are white4 ,now1 deny the result1 but accept the rule3 ,denial of ,result4--,few beans of this handful are white4 ,rule4--,most beans in this bag are white4 ,denial of ,case4--,probably1 these beans were taken from another bag4 ,this is an hypothetical inference4 ,next1 deny the result1 but accept the case3 ,denial of ,result4--,few beans of this handful are white4 ,case4--,these beans came from this bag4 ,denial of ,rule4--,probably1 few beans in the bag are white4 ,this is an induction4 ,the relation thus exhibited between synthetic and deductive reasoning is not without its importance4 ,when we adopt a certain hypothesis1 it is not alone because it will explain the observed facts1 but also because the contrary hypothesis would probably lead to results contrary to those observed4 ,so1 when we make an induction1 it is drawn not only because it explains the distribution of characters in the sample1 but also because a different rule would probably have led to the sample being other than it is4 ,but the advantage of this way of considering the subject might easily be overrated4 ,an induction is really the inference of a rule1 and to consider it as the denial of a rule is an artificial conception1 only admissible because1 when statistical or proportional propositions are considered as rules1 the denial of a rule is itself a rule4 ,so1 an hypothesis is really a subsumption of a case under a class and not the denial of it1 except for this1 that to deny a subsumption under one class is to admit a subsumption under another4 ,bocardo may be considered as an induction1 so timid as to lose its amplificative character entirely4 ,enoch and ,elijah are specimens of a certain kind of men4 ,all that kind of men are shown by these instances to be immortal4 ,but instead of boldly concluding that all very pious men1 or all men favorites of the ,almighty1 etc41 are immortal1 we refrain from specifying the description of men1 and rest in the merely explicative inference that some men are immortal4 ,so ,baroco might be considered as a very timid hypothesis4 ,enoch and ,elijah are not mortal4 ,now1 we might boldly suppose them to be gods or something of that sort1 but instead of that we limit ourselves to the inference that they are of some nature different from that of man4 ,but1 after all1 there is an immense difference between the relation of ,baroco and ,bocardo to ,barbara and that of ,induction and ,hypothesis to ,deduction4 ,baroco and ,bocardo are based upon the fact that if the truth of a conclusion necessarily follows from the truth of a premise1 then the falsity of the premise follows from the falsity of the conclusion4 ,this is always true4 ,it is different when the inference is only probable4 ,it by no means follows that1 because the truth of a certain premise would render the truth of a conclusion probable1 therefore the falsity of the conclusion renders the falsity of the premise probable4 ,at least1 this is only true1 as we have seen in a former paper1 when the word probable is used in one sense in the antecedent and in another in the consequent4 ,,iii ,a certain anonymous writing is upon a torn piece of paper4 ,it is suspected that the author is a certain person4 ,his desk1 to which only he has had access1 is searched1 and in it is found a piece of paper1 the torn edge of which exactly fits1 in all its irregularities1 that of the paper in question4 ,it is a fair hypothetic inference that the suspected man was actually the author4 ,the ground of this inference evidently is that two torn pieces of paper are extremely unlikely to fit together by accident4 ,therefore1 of a great number of inferences of this sort1 but a very small proportion would be deceptive4 ,the analogy of hypothesis with induction is so strong that some logicians have confounded them4 ,hypothesis has been called an induction of characters4 ,a number of characters belonging to a certain class are found in a certain object2 whence it is inferred that all the characters of that class belong to the object in question4 ,this certainly involves the same principle as induction2 yet in a modified form4 ,in the first place1 characters are not susceptible of simple enumeration like objects2 in the next place1 characters run in categories4 ,when we make an hypothesis like that about the piece of paper1 we only examine a single line of characters1 or perhaps two or three1 and we take no specimen at all of others4 ,if the hypothesis were nothing but an induction1 all that we should be justified in concluding1 in the example above1 would be that the two pieces of paper which matched in such irregularities as have been examined would be found to match in other1 say slighter1 irregularities4 ,the inference from the shape of the paper to its ownership is precisely what distinguishes hypothesis from induction1 and makes it a bolder and more perilous step4 ,the same warnings that have been given against imagining that induction rests upon the uniformity of ,nature might be repeated in regard to hypothesis4 ,here1 as there1 such a theory not only utterly fails to account for the validity of the inference1 but it also gives rise to methods of conducting it which are absolutely vicious4 ,there are1 no doubt1 certain uniformities in ,nature1 the knowledge of which will fortify an hypothesis very much4 ,for example1 we suppose that iron1 titanium1 and other metals exist in the sun1 because we find in the solar spectrum many lines coincident in position with those which these metals would produce2 and this hypothesis is greatly strengthened by our knowledge of the remarkable distinctiveness of the particular line of characters observed4 ,but such a fortification of hypothesis is of a deductive kind1 and hypothesis may still be probable when such renforcement is wanting4 ,there is no greater nor more frequent mistake in practical logic than to suppose that things which resemble one another strongly in some respects are any the more likely for that to be alike in others4 ,that this is absolutely false1 admits of rigid demonstration2 but1 inasmuch as the reasoning is somewhat severe and complicated 7requiring1 like all such reasoning1 the use of ,a1 ,b1 ,c1 etc41 to set it forth71 the reader would probably find it distasteful1 and ,i omit it4 ,an example1 however1 may illustrate the proposition3 ,the comparative mythologists occupy themselves with finding points of resemblance between solar phenomena and the careers of the heroes of all sorts of traditional stories2 and upon the basis of such resemblances they infer that these heroes are impersonations of the sun4 ,if there be anything more in their reasonings1 it has never been made clear to me4 ,an ingenious logician1 to show how futile all that is1 wrote a little book1 in which he pretended to prove1 in the same manner1 that ,napoleon ,bonaparte is only an impersonation of the sun4 ,it was really wonderful to see how many points of resemblance he made out4 ,the truth is1 that any two things resemble one another just as strongly as any two others1 if recondite resemblances are admitted4 ,but1 in order that the process of making an hypothesis should lead to a probable result1 the following rules must be followed3 #a4 ,the hypothesis should be distinctly put as a question1 before making the observations which are to test its truth4 ,in other words1 we must try to see what the result of predictions from the hypothesis will be4 #b4 ,the respect in regard to which the resemblances are noted must be taken at random4 ,we must not take a particular kind of predictions for which the hypothesis is known to be good4 #c4 ,the failures as well as the successes of the predictions must be honestly noted4 ,the whole proceeding must be fair and unbiased4 ,some persons fancy that bias and counter-bias are favorable to the extraction of truth--that hot and partisan debate is the way to investigate4 ,this is the theory of our atrocious legal procedure4 ,but ,logic puts its heel upon this suggestion4 ,it irrefragably demonstrates that knowledge can only be furthered by the real desire for it1 and that the methods of obstinacy1 of authority1 and every mode of trying to reach a foregone conclusion1 are absolutely of no value4 ,these things are proved4 ,the reader is at liberty to think so or not as long as the proof is not set forth1 or as long as he refrains from examining it4 ,just so1 he can preserve1 if he likes1 his freedom of opinion in regard to the propositions of geometry2 only1 in that case1 if he takes a fancy to read ,euclid1 he will do well to skip whatever he finds with ,a1 ,b1 ,c1 etc41 for1 if he reads attentively that disagreeable matter1 the freedom of his opinion about geometry may unhappily be lost forever4 ,how many people there are who are incapable of putting to their own consciences this question1 8,do ,i want to know how the fact stands1 or not80 ,the rules which have thus far been laid down for induction and hypothesis are such as are absolutely essential4 ,there are many other maxims expressing particular contrivances for making synthetic inferences strong1 which are extremely valuable and should not be neglected4 ,such are1 for example1 ,mr4 ,mill's four methods4 ,nevertheless1 in the total neglect of these1 inductions and hypotheses may and sometimes do attain the greatest force4 ,,iv ,classifications in all cases perfectly satisfactory hardly exist4 ,even in regard to the great distinction between explicative and ampliative inferences1 examples could be found which seem to lie upon the border between the two classes1 and to partake in some respects of the characters of either4 ,the same thing is true of the distinction between induction and hypothesis4 ,in the main1 it is broad and decided4 ,by induction1 we conclude that facts1 similar to observed facts1 are true in cases not examined4 ,by hypothesis1 we conclude the existence of a fact quite different from anything observed1 from which1 according to known laws1 something observed would necessarily result4 ,the former1 is reasoning from particulars to the general law2 the latter1 from effect to cause4 ,the former classifies1 the latter explains4 ,it is only in some special cases that there can be more than a momentary doubt to which category a given inference belongs4 ,one exception is where we observe1 not facts similar under similar circumstances1 but facts different under different circumstances--the difference of the former having1 however1 a definite relation to the difference of the latter4 ,such inferences1 which are really inductions1 sometimes present nevertheless some indubitable resemblances to hypotheses4 ,knowing that water expands by heat1 we make a number of observations of the volume of a constant mass of water at different temperatures4 ,the scrutiny of a few of these suggests a form of algebraical formula which will approximately express the relation of the volume to the temperature4 ,it may be1 for instance1 that v being the relative volume1 and t the temperature1 a few observations examined indicate a relation of the form-- v #a at bt#b ct#c4 ,upon examining observations at other temperatures taken at random1 this idea is confirmed2 and we draw the inductive conclusion that all observations within the limits of temperature from which we have drawn our observations could equally be so satisfied4 ,having once ascertained that such a formula is possible1 it is a mere affair of arithmetic to find the values of a1 b1 and c1 which will make the formula satisfy the observations best4 ,this is what physicists call an empirical formula1 because it rests upon mere induction1 and is not explained by any hypothesis4 ,such formul1 though very useful as means of describing in general terms the results of observations1 do not take any high rank among scientific discoveries4 ,the induction which they embody1 that expansion by heat 7or whatever other phenomenon is referred to7 takes place in a perfectly gradual manner without sudden leaps or inummerable fluctuations1 although really important1 attracts no attention1 because it is what we naturally anticipate4 ,but the defects of such expressions are very serious4 ,in the first place1 as long as the observations are subject to error1 as all observations are1 the formula cannot be expected to satisfy the observations exactly4 ,but the discrepancies cannot be due solely to the errors of the observations1 but must be partly owing to the error of the formula which has been deducted from erroneous observations4 ,moreover1 we have no right to suppose that the real facts1 if they could be had free from error1 could be expressed by such a formula at all4 ,they might1 perhaps1 be expressed by a similar formula with an infinite number of terms2 but of what use would that be to us1 since it would require an infinite number of coefficients to be written down8 ,when one quantity varies with another1 if the corresponding values are exactly known1 it is a mere matter of mathematical ingenuity to find some way of expressing their relation in a simple manner4 ,if one quantity is of one kind--say1 a specific gravity--and the other of another kind--say1 a temperature--we do not desire to find an expression for their relation which is wholly free from numerical constants1 since if it were free from them when1 say1 specific gravity as compared with water1 and temperature as expressed by the ,centigrade thermometer1 were in question1 numbers would have to be introduced when the scales of measurement were changed4 ,we may1 however1 and do desire to find formulas expressing the relations of physical phenomena which shall contain no more arbitrary numbers than changes in the scales of measurement might require4 ,when a formula of this kind is discovered1 it is no longer called an empirical formula1 but a law of ,nature2 and is sooner or later made the basis of an hypothesis which is to explain it4 ,these simple formul are not usually1 if ever1 exactly true1 but they are none the less important for that2 and the great triumph of the hypothesis comes when it explains not only the formula1 but also the deviations from the formula4 ,in the current language of the physicists1 an hypothesis of this importance is called a theory1 while the term hypothesis is restricted to suggestions which have little evidence in their favor4 ,there is some justice in the contempt which clings to the word hypothesis4 ,to think that we can strike out of our own minds a true preconception of how ,nature acts1 in a vain fancy4 ,as ,lord ,bacon well says3 8,the subtlety of ,nature far exceeds the subtlety of sense and intellect3 so that these fine meditations1 and speculations1 and reasonings of men are a sort of insanity1 only there is no one at hand to remark it40 ,the successful theories are not pure guesses1 but are guided by reasons4 ,the kinetical theory of gases is a good example of this4 ,this theory is intended to explain certain simple formul1 the chief of which is called the law of ,boyle4 ,it is1 that if air or any other gas be placed in a cylinder with a piston1 and if its volume be measured under the pressure of the atmosphere1 say fifteen pounds on the square inch1 and if then another fifteen pounds per square inch be placed on the piston1 the gas will be compressed to one-half its bulk1 and in similar inverse ratio for other pressures4 ,the hypothesis which has been adopted to account for this law is that the molecules of a gas are small1 solid particles at great distances from each other 7relatively to their dimensions71 and moving with great velocity1 without sensible attractions or repulsions1 until they happen to approach one another very closely4 ,admit this1 and it follows that when a gas is under pressure what prevents it from collapsing is not the incompressibility of the separate molecules1 which are under no pressure at all1 since they do not touch1 but the pounding of the molecules against the piston4 ,the more the piston falls1 and the more the gas is compressed1 the nearer together the molecules will be2 the greater number there will be at any moment within a given distance of the piston1 the shorter the distance which any one will go before its course is changed by the influence of another1 the greater number of new courses of each in a given time1 and the oftener each1 within a given distance of the piston1 will strike it4 ,this explains ,boyle's law4 ,the law is not exact2 but the hypothesis does not lead us to it exactly4 ,for1 in the first place1 if the molecules are large1 they will strike each other oftener when their mean distances are diminished1 and will consequently strike the piston oftener1 and will produce more pressure upon it4 ,on the other hand1 if the molecules have an attraction for one another1 they will remain for a sensible time within one another's influence1 and consequently they will not strike the wall so often as they otherwise would1 and the pressure will be less increased by compression4 ,when the kinetical theory of gases was first proposed by ,daniel ,bernoulli1 in #agch1 it rested only on the law of ,boyle1 and was therefore pure hypothesis4 ,it was accordingly quite naturally and deservedly neglected4 ,but1 at present1 the theory presents quite another aspect2 for1 not to speak of the considerable number of observed facts of different kinds with which it has been brought into relation1 it is supported by the mechanical theory of heat4 ,that bringing together bodies which attract one another1 or separating bodies which repel one another1 when sensible motion is not produced nor destroyed1 is always accompanied by the evolution of heat1 is little more than an induction4 ,now1 it has been shown by experiment that1 when a gas is allowed to expand without doing work1 a very small amount of heat disappears4 ,this proves that the particles of the gas attract one another slightly1 and but very slightly4 ,it follows that1 when a gas is under pressure1 what prevents it from collapsing is not any repulsion between the particles1 since there is none4 ,now1 there are only two modes of force known to us1 force of position or attractions and repulsions1 and force of motion4 ,since1 therefore1 it is not the force of position which gives a gas its expansive force1 it must be the force of motion4 ,in this point of view1 the kinetical theory of gases appears as a deduction from the mechanical theory of heat4 ,it is to be observed1 however1 that it supposes the same law of mechanics 7that there are only those two modes of force7 which holds in regard to bodies such as we can see and examine1 to hold also for what are very different1 the molecules of bodies4 ,such a supposition has but a slender support from induction4 ,our belief in it is greatly strengthened by its connection with the law of ,boyle1 and it is1 therefore1 to be considered as an hypothetical inference4 ,yet it must be admitted that the kinetical theory of gases would deserve little credence if it had not been connected with the principles of mechanics4 ,the great difference between induction and hypothesis is1 that the former infers the existence of phenomena such as we have observed in cases which are similar1 while hypothesis supposes something of a different kind from what we have directly observed1 and frequently something which it would be impossible for us to observe directly4 ,accordingly1 when we stretch an induction quite beyond the limits of our observation1 the inference partakes of the nature of hypothesis4 ,it would be absurd to say that we have no inductive warrant for a generalization extending a little beyond the limits of experience1 and there is no line to be drawn beyond which we cannot push our inference2 only it becomes weaker the further it is pushed4 ,yet1 if an induction be pushed very far1 we cannot give it much credence unless we find that such an extension explains some fact which we can and do observe4 ,here1 then1 we have a kind of mixture of induction and hypothesis supporting one another2 and of this kind are most of the theories of physics4 ,v ,that synthetic inferences may be divided into induction and hypothesis in the manner here proposed1#ec admits of no question4 ,the utility and value of the distinction are to be tested by their applications4 ,induction is1 plainly1 a much stronger kind of inference than hypothesis2 and this is the first reason for distinguishing between them4 ,hypotheses are sometimes regarded as provisional resorts1 which in the progress of science are to be replaced by inductions4 ,but this is a false view of the subject4 ,hypothetic reasoning infers very frequently a fact not capable of direct observation4 ,it is an hypothesis that ,napoleon ,bonaparte once existed4 ,how is that hypothesis ever to be replaced by an induction8 ,it may be said that from the premise that such facts as we have observed are as they would be if ,napoleon existed1 we are to infer by induction that all facts that are hereafter to be observed will be of the same character4 ,there is no doubt that every hypothetic inference may be distorted into the appearance of an induction in this way4 ,but the essence of an induction is that it infers from one set of facts another set of similar facts1 whereas hypothesis infers from facts of one kind to facts of another4 ,now1 the facts which serve as grounds for our belief in the historic reality of ,napoleon are not by any means necessarily the only kind of facts which are explained by his existence4 ,it may be that1 at the time of his career1 events were being recorded in some way not now dreamed of1 that some ingenious creature on a neighboring planet was photographing the earth1 and that these pictures on a sufficiently large scale may some time come into our possession1 or that some mirror upon a distant star will1 when the light reaches it1 reflect the whole story back to earth4 ,never mind how improbable these suppositions are2 everything which happens is infinitely improbable4 ,i am not saying that these things are likely to occur1 but that some effect of ,napoleon's existence which now seems impossible is certain nevertheless to be brought about4 ,the hypothesis asserts that such facts1 when they do occur1 will be of a nature to confirm1 and not to refute1 the existence of the man4 ,we have1 in the impossibility of inductively inferring hypothetical conclusions1 a second reason for distinguishing between the two kinds of inference4 ,a third merit of the distinction is1 that it is associated with an important psychological or rather physiological difference in the mode of apprehending facts4 ,induction infers a rule4 ,now1 the belief of a rule is a habit4 ,that a habit is a rule active in us1 is evident4 ,that every belief is of the nature of a habit1 in so far as it is of a general character1 has been shown in the earlier papers of this series4 ,induction1 therefore1 is the logical formula which expresses the physiological process of formation of a habit4 ,hypothesis substitutes1 for a complicated tangle of predicates attached to one subject1 a single conception4 ,now1 there is a peculiar sensation belonging to the act of thinking that each of these predicates inheres in the subject4 ,in hypothetic inference this complicated feeling so produced is replaced by a single feeling of greater intensity1 that belonging to the act of thinking the hypothetic conclusion4 ,now1 when our nervous system is excited in a complicated way1 there being a relation between the elements of the excitation1 the result is a single harmonious disturbance which ,i call an emotion4 ,thus1 the various sounds made by the instruments of an orchestra strike upon the ear1 and the result is a peculiar musical emotion1 quite distinct from the sounds themselves4 ,this emotion is essentially the same thing as an hypothetic inference1 and every hypothetic inference involves the formation of such an emotion4 ,we may say1 therefore1 that hypothesis produces the sensuous element of thought1 and induction the habitual element4 ,as for deduction1 which adds nothing to the premises1 but only out of the various facts represented in the premises selects one and brings the attention down to it1 this may be considered as the logical formula for paying attention1 which is the volitional element of thought1 and corresponds to nervous discharge in the sphere of physiology4 ,another merit of the distinction between induction and hypothesis is1 that it leads to a very natural classification of the sciences and of the minds which prosecute them4 ,what must separate different kinds of scientific men more than anything else are the differences of their techniques4 ,we cannot expect men who work with books chiefly to have much in common with men whose lives are passed in laboratories4 ,but1 after differences of this kind1 the next most important are differences in the modes of reasoning4 ,of the natural sciences1 we have1 first1 the classificatory sciences1 which are purely inductive--systematic botany and zology1 mineralogy1 and chemistry4 ,then1 we have the sciences of theory1 as above explained--astronomy1 pure physics1 etc4 ,then1 we have sciences of hypothesis--geology1 biology1 etc4 ,there are many other advantages of the distinction in question which ,i shall leave the reader to find out by experience4 ,if he will only take the custom of considering whether a given inference belongs to one or other of the two forms of synthetic inference given on page #acd1 ,i can promise him that he will find his advantage in it1 in various ways4 ,footnote #ea3 ,popular ,science ,monthly1 ,august1 #ahgh4 ,footnote #eb3 ,later ,pierce called it presumptive inference4 ,see ,baldwin's ,dictionary art4 ,probable ,inference4 ,footnote #ec3 ,this division was first made in a course of lectures by the author before the ,lowell ,institute1 ,boston1 in #ahff1 and was printed in the ,proceedings of the ,american ,academy of ,arts and ,sciences1 for ,april #i1 #ahfg4 ,,part ,,ii ,,love ,,and ,,chance ,i4 ,,the ,,architecture ,,of ,,theories#ed ,of the fifty or hundred systems of philosophy that have been advanced at different times of the world's history1 perhaps the larger number have been1 not so much results of historical evolution1 as happy thoughts which have accidently occurred to their authors4 ,an idea which has been found interesting and fruitful has been adopted1 developed1 and forced to yield explanations of all sorts of phenomena4 ,the ,english have been particularly given to this way of philosophizing2 witness1 ,hobbes1 ,hartley1 ,berkeley1 ,james ,mill4 ,nor has it been by any means useless labor2 it shows us what the true nature and value of the ideas developed are1 and in that way affords serviceable materials for philosophy4 ,just as if a man1 being seized with the conviction that paper was a good material to make things of1 were to go to work to build a papier mch house1 with roof of roofing-paper1 foundations of pasteboard1 windows of paraffined paper1 chimneys1 bath tubs1 locks1 etc41 all of different forms of paper1 his experiment would probably afford valuable lessons to builders1 while it would certainly make a detestable house1 so those one-idea'd philosophies are exceedingly interesting and instructive1 and yet are quite unsound4 ,the remaining systems of philosophy have been of the nature of reforms1 sometimes amounting to radical revolutions1 suggested by certain difficulties which have been found to beset systems previously in vogue2 and such ought certainly to be in large part the motive of any new theory4 ,this is like partially rebuilding a house4 ,the faults that have been committed are1 first1 that the repairs of the dilapidations have generally not been sufficiently thorough-going1 and second1 that not sufficient pains had been taken to bring the additions into deep harmony with the really sound parts of the old structure4 ,when a man is about to build a house1 what a power of thinking he has to do1 before he can safely break ground6 ,with what pains he has to excogitate the precise wants that are to be supplied6 ,what a study to ascertain the most available and suitable materials1 to determine the mode of construction to which those materials are best adapted1 and to answer a hundred such questions6 ,now without riding the metaphor too far1 ,i think we may safely say that the studies preliminary to the construction of a great theory should be at least as deliberate and thorough as those that are preliminary to the building of a dwelling-house4 ,that systems ought to be constructed architectonically has been preached since ,kant1 but ,i do not think the full import of the maxim has by any means been apprehended4 ,what ,i would recommend is that every person who wishes to form an opinion concerning fundamental problems1 should first of all make a complete survey of human knowledge1 should take note of all the valuable ideas in each branch of science1 should observe in just what respect each has been successful and where it has failed1 in order that in the light of the thorough acquaintance so attained of the available materials for a philosophical theory and of the nature and strength of each1 he may proceed to the study of what the problem of philosophy consists in1 and of the proper way of solving it4 ,i must not be understood as endeavoring to state fully all that these preparatory studies should embrace2 on the contrary1 ,i purposely slur over many points1 in order to give emphasis to one special recommendation1 namely1 to make a systematic study of the conceptions out of which a philosophical theory may be built1 in order to ascertain what place each conception may fitly occupy in such a theory1 and to what uses it is adapted4 ,the adequate treatment of this single point would fill a volume1 but ,i shall endeavor to illustrate my meaning by glancing at several sciences and indicating conceptions in them serviceable for philosophy4 ,as to the results to which long studies thus commenced have led me1 ,i shall just give a hint at their nature4 ,we may begin with dynamics1--field in our day of perhaps the grandest conquest human science has ever made1--,i mean the law of the conservation of energy4 ,but let us revert to the first step taken by modern scientific thought1--and a great stride it was1--the inauguration of dynamics by ,galileo4 ,a modern physicist on examining ,galileo's works is surprised to find how little experiment had to do with the establishment of the foundations of mechanics4 ,his principal appeal is to common sense and il lume naturale4 ,he always assumes that the true theory will be found to be a simple and natural one4 ,and we can see why it should indeed be so in dynamics4 ,for instance1 a body left to its own inertia1 moves in a straight line1 and a straight line appears to us the simplest of curves4 ,in itself1 no curve is simpler than another4 ,a system of straight lines has intersections precisely corresponding to those of a system of like parabolas similarly placed1 or to those of any one of an infinity of systems of curves4 ,but the straight line appears to us simple1 because1 as ,euclid says1 it lies evenly between its extremities2 that is1 because viewed endwise it appears as a point4 ,that is1 again1 because light moves in straight lines4 ,now1 light moves in straight lines because of the part which the straight line plays in the laws of dynamics4 ,thus it is that our minds having been formed under the influence of phenomena governed by the laws of mechanics1 certain conceptions entering into those laws become implanted in our minds1 so that we readily guess at what the laws are4 ,without such a natural prompting1 having to search blindfold for a law which would suit the phenomena1 our chance of finding it would be as one to infinity4 ,the further physical studies depart from phenomena which have directly influenced the growth of the mind1 the less we can expect to find the laws which govern them 8simple10 that is1 composed of a few conceptions natural to our minds4 ,the researches of ,galileo1 followed up by ,huygens and others1 led to those modern conceptions of ,force and ,law1 which have revolutionized the intellectual world4 ,the great attention given to mechanics in the seventeenth century soon so emphasized these conceptions as to give rise to the ,mechanical ,philosophy1 or doctrine that all the phenomena of the physical universe are to be explained upon mechanical principles4 ,newton's great discovery imparted a new impetus to this tendency4 ,the old notion that heat consists in an agitation of corpuscles was now applied to the explanation of the chief properties of gases4 ,the first suggestion in this direction was that the pressure of gases is explained by the battering of the particles against the walls of the containing vessel1 which explained ,boyle's law of the compressibility of air4 ,later1 the expansion of gases1 ,avogadro's chemical law1 the diffusion and viscosity of gases1 and the action of ,crookes's radiometer were shown to be consequences of the same kinetical theory2 but other phenomena1 such as the ratio of the specific heat at constant volume to that at constant pressure1 require additional hypotheses1 which we have little reason to suppose are simple1 so that we find ourselves quite afloat4 ,in like manner with regard to light4 ,that it consists of vibrations was almost proved by the phenomena of diffraction1 while those of polarization showed the excursions of the particles to be perpendicular to the line of propagation2 but the phenomena of dispersion1 etc41 require additional hypotheses which may be very complicated4 ,thus1 the further progress of molecular speculation appears quite uncertain4 ,if hypotheses are to be tried haphazard1 or simply because they will suit certain phenomena1 it will occupy the mathematical physicists of the world say half a century on the average to bring each theory to the test1 and since the number of possible theories may go up into the trillions1 only one of which can be true1 we have little prospect of making further solid additions to the subject in our time4 ,when we come to atoms1 the presumption in favor of a simple law seems very slender4 ,there is room for serious doubt whether the fundamental laws of mechanics hold good for single atoms1 and it seems quite likely that they are capable of motion in more than three dimensions4 ,to find out much more about molecules and atoms1 we must search out a natural history of laws of nature1 which may fulfil that function which the presumption in favor of simple laws fulfilled in the early days of dynamics1 by showing us what kind of laws we have to expect and by answering such questions as this3 ,can we with reasonable prospect of not wasting time1 try the supposition that atoms attract one another inversely as the seventh power of their distances1 or can we not8 ,to suppose universal laws of nature capable of being apprehended by the mind and yet having no reason for their special forms1 but standing inexplicable and irrational1 is hardly a justifiable position4 ,uniformities are precisely the sort of facts that need to be accounted for4 ,that a pitched coin should sometimes turn up heads and sometimes tails calls for no particular explanation2 but if it shows heads every time1 we wish to know how this result has been brought about4 ,law is par excellence the thing that wants a reason4 ,now the only possible way of accounting for the laws of nature and for uniformity in general is to suppose them results of evolution4 ,this supposes them not to be absolute1 not to be obeyed precisely4 ,it makes an element of indeterminacy1 spontaneity1 or absolute chance in nature4 ,just as1 when we attempt to verify any physical law1 we find our observations cannot be precisely satisfied by it1 and rightly attribute the discrepancy to errors of observation1 so we must suppose far more minute discrepancies to exist owing to the imperfect cogency of the law itself1 to a certain swerving of the facts from any definite formula4 ,mr4 ,herbert ,spencer wishes to explain evolution upon mechanical principles4 ,this is illogical1 for four reasons4 ,first1 because the principle of evolution requires no extraneous cause2 since the tendency to growth can be supposed itself to have grown from an infinitesimal germ accidentally started4 ,second1 because law ought more than anything else to be supposed a result of evolution4 ,third1 because exact law obviously never can produce heterogeneity out of homogeneity2 and arbitrary heterogeneity is the feature of the universe the most manifest and characteristic4 ,fourth1 because the law of the conservation of energy is equivalent to the proposition that all operations governed by mechanical laws are reversible2 so that an immediate corollary from it is that growth is not explicable by those laws1 even if they be not violated in the process of growth4 ,in short1 ,spencer is not a philosophical evolutionist1 but only a half-evolutionist1--or1 if you will1 only a semi-,spencerian4 ,now philosophy requires thoroughgoing evolutionism or none4 ,the theory of ,darwin was that evolution had been brought about by the action of two factors3 first1 heredity1 as a principle making offspring nearly resemble their parents1 while yet giving room for 8sporting10 or accidental variations1--for very slight variations often1 for wider ones rarely2 and1 second1 the destruction of breeds or races that are unable to keep the birth rate up to the death rate4 ,this ,darwinian principle is plainly capable of great generalization4 ,wherever there are large numbers of objects1 having a tendency to retain certain characters unaltered1 this tendency1 however1 not being absolute but giving room for chance variations1 then1 if the amount of variation is absolutely limited in certain directions by the destruction of everything which reaches those limits1 there will be a gradual tendency to change in directions of departure from them4 ,thus1 if a million players sit down to bet at an even game1 since one after another will get ruined1 the average wealth of those who remain will perpetually increase4 ,here is indubitably a genuine formula of possible evolution1 whether its operation accounts for much or little in the development of animal and vegetable species4 ,the ,lamarckian theory also supposes that the development of species has taken place by a long series of insensible changes1 but it supposes that those changes have taken place during the lives of the individuals1 in consequence of effort and exercise1 and that reproduction plays no part in the process except in preserving these modifications4 ,thus1 the ,lamarckian theory only explains the development of characters for which individuals strive1 while the ,darwinian theory only explains the production of characters really beneficial to the race1 though these may be fatal to individuals4#ee ,but more broadly and philosophically conceived1 ,darwinian evolution is evolution by the operation of chance1 and the destruction of bad results1 while ,lamarckian evolution is evolution by the effect of habit and effort4 ,a third theory of evolution is that of ,mr4 ,clarence ,king4 ,the testimony of monuments and of rocks is that species are unmodified or scarcely modified1 under ordinary circumstances1 but are rapidly altered after cataclysms or rapid geological changes4 ,under novel circumstances1 we often see animals and plants sporting excessively in reproduction1 and sometimes even undergoing transformations during individual life1 phenomena no doubt due partly to the enfeeblement of vitality from the breaking up of habitual modes of life1 partly to changed food1 partly to direct specific influence of the element in which the organism is immersed4 ,if evolution has been brought about in this way1 not only have its single steps not been insensible1 as both ,darwinians and ,lamarckians suppose1 but they are furthermore neither haphazard on the one hand1 nor yet determined by an inward striving on the other1 but on the contrary are effects of the changed environment1 and have a positive general tendency to adapt the organism to that environment1 since variation will particularly affect organs at once enfeebled and stimulated4 ,this mode of evolution1 by external forces and the breaking up of habits1 seems to be called for by some of the broadest and most important facts of biology and paleontology2 while it certainly has been the chief factor in the historical evolution of institutions as in that of ideas2 and cannot possibly be refused a very prominent place in the process of evolution of the universe in general4 ,passing to psychology1 we find the elementary phenomena of mind fall into three categories4 ,first1 we have ,feelings1 comprising all that is immediately present1 such as pain1 blue1 cheerfulness1 the feeling that arises when we contemplate a consistent theory1 etc4 ,a feeling is a state of mind having its own living quality1 independent of any other state of mind4 ,or1 a feeling is an element of consciousness which might conceivably override every other state until it monopolized the mind1 although such a rudimentary state cannot actually be realized1 and would not properly be consciousness4 ,still1 it is conceivable1 or supposable1 that the quality of blue should usurp the whole mind1 to the exclusion of the ideas of shape1 extension1 contrast1 commencement and cessation1 and all other ideas1 whatsoever4 ,a feeling is necessarily perfectly simple1 in itself1 for if it had parts these would also be in the mind1 whenever the whole was present1 and thus the whole could not monopolize the mind4#ef ,besides ,feelings1 we have ,sensations of reaction2 as when a person blindfold suddenly runs against a post1 when we make a muscular effort1 or when any feeling gives way to a new feeling4 ,suppose ,i had nothing in my mind but a feeling of blue1 which were suddenly to give place to a feeling of red2 then1 at the instant of transition there would be a shock1 a sense of reaction1 my blue life being transmuted into red life4 ,if ,i were further endowed with a memory1 that sense would continue for some time1 and there would also be a peculiar feeling or sentiment connected with it4 ,this last feeling might endure 7conceivably ,i mean7 after the memory of the occurrence and the feelings of blue and red had passed away4 ,but the sensation of reaction cannot exist except in the actual presence of the two feelings blue and red to which it relates4 ,wherever we have two feelings and pay attention to a relation between them of whatever kind1 there is the sensation of which ,i am speaking4 ,but the sense of action and reaction has two types3 it may either be a perception of relation between two ideas1 or it may be a sense of action and reaction between feeling and something out of feeling4 ,and this sense of external reaction again has two forms2 for it is either a sense of something happening to us1 by no act of ours1 we being passive in the matter1 or it is a sense of resistance1 that is1 of our expending feeling upon something without4 ,the sense of reaction is thus a sense of connection or comparison between feelings1 either1 ,a1 between one feeling and another1 or ,b1 between feeling and its absence or lower degree2 and under ,b we have1 ,first1 the sense of the access of feeling1 and ,second1 the sense of remission of feeling4 ,very different both from feelings and from reaction-sensations or disturbances of feeling are general conceptions4 ,when we think1 we are conscious that a connection between feelings is determined by a general rule1 we are aware of being governed by a habit4 ,intellectual power is nothing but facility in taking habits and in following them in cases essentially analogous to1 but in non-essentials widely remote from1 the normal cases of connections of feelings under which those habits were formed4 ,the one primary and fundamental law of mental action consists in a tendency to generalization4 ,feeling tends to spread2 connections between feelings awaken feelings2 neighboring feelings become assimilated2 ideas are apt to reproduce themselves4 ,these are so many formulations of the one law of the growth of mind4 ,when a disturbance of feeling takes place1 we have a consciousness of gain1 the gain of experience2 and a new disturbance will be apt to assimilate itself to the one that preceded it4 ,feelings1 by being excited1 become more easily excited1 especially in the ways in which they have previously been excited4 ,the consciousness of such a habit constitutes a general conception4 ,the cloudiness of psychological notions may be corrected by connecting them with physiological conceptions4 ,feeling may be supposed to exist1 wherever a nerve-cell is in an excited condition4 ,the disturbance of feeling1 or sense of reaction1 accompanies the transmission of disturbance between nerve-cells or from a nerve-cell to a muscle-cell or the external stimulation of a nerve-cell4 ,general conceptions arise upon the formation of habits in the nerve-matter1 which are molecular changes consequent upon its activity and probably connected with its nutrition4 ,the law of habit exhibits a striking contrast to all physical laws in the character of its commands4 ,a physical law is absolute4 ,what it requires is an exact relation4 ,thus1 a physical force introduces into a motion a component motion to be combined with the rest by the parallelogram of forces2 but the component motion must actually take place exactly as required by the law of force4 ,on the other hand1 no exact conformity is required by the mental law4 ,nay1 exact conformity would be in downright conflict with the law2 since it would instantly crystallize thought and prevent all further formation of habit4 ,the law of mind only makes a given feeling more likely to arise4 ,it thus resembles the 8non-conservative0 forces of physics1 such as viscosity and the like1 which are due to statistical uniformities in the chance encounters of trillions of molecules4 ,the old dualistic notion of mind and matter1 so prominent in ,cartesianism1 as two radically different kinds of substance1 will hardly find defenders to-day4 ,rejecting this1 we are driven to some form of hylopathy1 otherwise called monism4 ,then the question arises whether physical laws on the one hand1 and the psychical law on the other are to be taken-- 7,a7 as independent1 a doctrine often called monism1 but which ,i would name neutralism2 or1 7,b7 the psychical law as derived and special1 the physical law alone as primordial1 which is materialism2 or1 7,c7 the physical law as derived and special1 the psychical law alone as primordial1 which is idealism4 ,the materialistic doctrine seems to me quite as repugnant to scientific logic as to common sense2 since it requires us to suppose that a certain kind of mechanism will feel1 which would be a hypothesis absolutely irreducible to reason1--an ultimate1 inexplicable regularity2 while the only possible justification of any theory is that it should make things clear and reasonable4 ,neutralism is sufficiently condemned by the logical maxim known as ,ockham's razor1 i4e41 that not more independent elements are to be supposed than necessary4 ,by placing the inward and outward aspects of substance on a par1 it seems to render both primordial4 ,the one intelligible theory of the universe is that of objective idealism1 that matter is effete mind1 inveterate habits becoming physical laws4 ,but before this can be accepted it must show itself capable of explaining the tridimensionality of space1 the laws of motion1 and the general characteristics of the universe1 with mathematical clearness and precision2 for no less should be demanded of every ,philosophy4 ,illustration3 ,figure #f4 ,modern mathematics is replete with ideas which may be applied to philosophy4 ,i can only notice one or two4 ,the manner in which mathematicians generalize is very instructive4 ,thus1 painters are accustomed to think of a picture as consisting geometrically of the intersections of its plane by rays of light from the natural objects to the eye4 ,but geometers use a generalized perspective4#eg ,for instance in the figure let ,o be the eye1 let ,a ,b ,c ,d ,e be the edgewise view of any plane1 and let a f e ,d c be the edgewise view of another plane4 ,the geometers draw rays through ,o cutting both these planes1 and treat the points of intersection of each ray with one plane as representing the point of intersection of the same ray with the other plane4 ,thus1 e represents ,e1 in the painter's way4 ,d represents itself4 ,c is represented by c1 which is further from the eye2 and ,a is represented by a which is on the other side of the eye4 ,such generalization is not bound down to sensuous images4 ,further1 according to this mode of representation every point on one plane represents a point on the other1 and every point on the latter is represented by a point on the former4 ,but how about the point f which is in a direction from ,o parallel to the represented plane1 and how about the point ,b which is in a direction parallel to the representing plane8 ,some will say that these are exceptions2 but modern mathematics does not allow exceptions which can be annulled by generalization4#eh ,as a point moves from ,c to ,d and thence to ,e and off toward infinity1 the corresponding point on the other plane moves from c to ,d and thence to e and toward f4 ,but this second point can pass through f to a2 and when it is there the first point has arrived at ,a4 ,we therefore say that the first point has passed through infinity1 and that every line joins in to itself somewhat like an oval4 ,geometers talk of the parts of lines at an infinite distance as points4 ,this is a kind of generalization very efficient in mathematics4 ,modern views of measurement have a philosophical aspect4 ,there is an indefinite number of systems of measuring along a line2 thus1 a perspective representation of a scale on one line may be taken to measure another1 although of course such measurements will not agree with what we call the distances of points on the latter line4 ,to establish a system of measurement on a line we must assign a distinct number to each point of it1 and for this purpose we shall plainly have to suppose the numbers carried out into an infinite number of places of decimals4 ,these numbers must be ranged along the line in unbroken sequence4 ,further1 in order that such a scale of numbers should be of any use1 it must be capable of being shifted into new positions1 each number continuing to be attached to a single distinct point4 ,now it is found that if this is true for 8imaginary0 as well as for real points 7an expression which ,i cannot stop to elucidate71 any such shifting will necessarily leave two numbers attached to the same points as before4 ,so that when the scale is moved over the line by any continuous series of shiftings of one kind1 there are two points which no numbers on the scale can ever reach1 except the numbers fixed there4 ,this pair of points1 thus unattainable in measurement1 is called the ,absolute4 ,these two points may be distinct and real1 or they may coincide1 or they may be both imaginary4 ,as an example of a linear quantity with a double absolute we may take probability1 which ranges from an unattainable absolute certainty against a proposition to an equally unattainable absolute certainty for it4 ,a line1 according to ordinary notions1 we have seen is a linear quantity where the two points at infinity coincide4 ,a velocity is another example4 ,a train going with infinite velocity from ,chicago to ,new ,york would be at all the points on the line at the very same instant1 and if the time of transit were reduced to less than nothing it would be moving in the other direction4 ,an angle is a familiar example of a mode of magnitude with no real immeasurable values4 ,one of the questions philosophy has to consider is whether the development of the universe is like the increase of an angle1 so that it proceeds forever without tending toward anything unattained1 which ,i take to be the ,epicurean view1 or whether the universe sprang from a chaos in the infinitely distant past to tend toward something different in the infinitely distant future1 or whether the universe sprang from nothing in the past to go on indefinitely toward a point in the infinitely distant future1 which1 were it attained1 would be the mere nothing from which it set out4 ,the doctrine of the absolute applied to space comes to this1 that either-- ,first1 space is1 as ,euclid teaches1 both unlimited and immeasurable1 so that the infinitely distant parts of any plane seen in perspective appear as a straight line1 in which case the sum of the three angles of a triangle amounts to #ahj2 or1 ,second1 space is immeasurable but limited1 so that the infinitely distant parts of any plane seen in perspective appear as a circle1 beyond which all is blackness1 and in this case the sum of the three angles of a triangle is less than #ahj by an amount proportional to the area of the triangle2 or1 ,third1 space is unlimited but finite1 7like the surface of a sphere71 so that it has no infinitely distant parts2 but a finite journey along any straight line would bring one back to his original position1 and looking off with an unobstructed view one would see the back of his own head enormously magnified1 in which case the sum of the three angles of a triangle exceeds #ahj by an amount proportional to the area4 ,which of these three hypotheses is true we know not4 ,the largest triangles we can measure are such as have the earth's orbit for base1 and the distance of a fixed star for altitude4 ,the angular magnitude resulting from subtracting the sum of the two angles at the base of such a triangle from #ahj is called the star's parallax4 ,the parallaxes of only about forty stars have been measured as yet4 ,two of them come out negative1 that of ,arided 7 ,cycni71 a star of magnitude #a-a_/b1 which is --#j48jhb1 according to ,c4 ,a4 ,f4 ,peters1 and that of a star of magnitude #g-c_/d1 known as ,piazzi ,,iii #dbb1 which is --#j40jde1 according to ,r4 ,s4 ,ball4 ,but these negative parallaxes are undoubtedly to be attributed to errors of observation2 for the probable error of such a determination is about #j48jge1 and it would be strange indeed if we were to be able to see1 as it were1 more than half way round space1 without being able to see stars with larger negative parallaxes4 ,indeed1 the very fact that of all the parallaxes measured only two come out negative would be a strong argument that the smallest parallaxes really amount to #j40a1 were it not for the reflection that the publication of other negative parallaxes may have been suppressed4 ,i think we may feel confident that the parallax of the furthest star lies somewhere between -#j40je and #j40ae1 and within another century our grandchildren will surely know whether the three angles of a triangle are greater or less than #ahj1--that they are exactly that amount is what nobody ever can be justified in concluding4 ,it is true that according to the axioms of geometry the sum of the three sides of a triangle are precisely #ahj2 but these axioms are now exploded1 and geometers confess that they1 as geometers1 know not the slightest reason for supposing them to be precisely true4 ,they are expressions of our inborn conception of space1 and as such are entitled to credit1 so far as their truth could have influenced the formation of the mind4 ,but that affords not the slightest reason for supposing them exact4 ,now1 metaphysics has always been the ape of mathematics4 ,geometry suggested the idea of a demonstrative system of absolutely certain philosophical principles2 and the ideas of the metaphysicians have at all times been in large part drawn from mathematics4 ,the metaphysical axioms are imitations of the geometrical axioms2 and now that the latter have been thrown overboard1 without doubt the former will be sent after them4 ,it is evident1 for instance1 that we can have no reason to think that every phenomenon in all its minutest details is precisely determined by law4 ,that there is an arbitrary element in the universe we see1--namely1 its variety4 ,this variety must be attributed to spontaneity in some form4 ,had ,i more space1 ,i now ought to show how important for philosophy is the mathematical conception of continuity4 ,most of what is true in ,hegel is a darkling glimmer of a conception which the mathematicians had long before made pretty clear1 and which recent researches have still further illustrated4 ,among the many principles of ,logic which find their application in ,philosophy1 ,i can here only mention one4 ,three conceptions are perpetually turning up at every point in every theory of logic1 and in the most rounded systems they occur in connection with one another4 ,they are conceptions so very broad and consequently indefinite that they are hard to seize and may be easily overlooked4 ,i call them the conceptions of ,first1 ,second1 ,third4 ,first is the conception of being or existing independent of anything else4 ,second is the conception of being relative to1 the conception of reaction with1 something else4 ,third is the conception of mediation1 whereby a first and second are brought into relation4 ,to illustrate these ideas1 ,i will show how they enter into those we have been considering4 ,the origin of things1 considered not as leading to anything1 but in itself1 contains the idea of ,first1 the end of things that of ,second1 the process mediating between them that of ,third4 ,a philosophy which emphasizes the idea of the ,one1 is generally a dualistic philosophy in which the conception of ,second receives exaggerated attention2 for this ,one 7though of course involving the idea of ,first7 is always the other of a manifold which is not one4 ,the idea of the ,many1 because variety is arbitrariness and arbitrariness is repudiation of any ,secondness1 has for its principal component the conception of ,first4 ,in psychology ,feeling is ,first1 ,sense of reaction ,second1 ,general conception ,third1 or mediation4 ,in biology1 the idea of arbitrary sporting is ,first1 heredity is ,second1 the process whereby the accidental characters become fixed is ,third4 ,chance is ,first1 ,law is ,second1 the tendency to take habits is ,third4 ,mind is ,first1 ,matter is ,second1 ,evolution is ,third4 ,such are the materials out of which chiefly a philosophical theory ought to be built1 in order to represent the state of knowledge to which the nineteenth century has brought us4 ,without going into other important questions of philosophical architectonic1 we can readily foresee what sort of a metaphysics would appropriately be constructed from those conceptions4 ,like some of the most ancient and some of the most recent speculations it would be a ,cosmogonic ,philosophy4 ,it would suppose that in the beginning1--infinitely remote1--there was a chaos of unpersonalized feeling1 which being without connection or regularity would properly be without existence4 ,this feeling1 sporting here and there in pure arbitrariness1 would have started the germ of a generalizing tendency4 ,its other sportings would be evanescent1 but this would have a growing virtue4 ,thus1 the tendency to habit would be started2 and from this with the other principles of evolution all the regularities of the universe would be evolved4 ,at any time1 however1 an element of pure chance survives and will remain until the world becomes an absolutely perfect1 rational1 and symmetrical system1 in which mind is at last crystallized in the infinitely distant future4 ,that idea has been worked out by me with elaboration4 ,it accounts for the main features of the universe as we know it1--the characters of time1 space1 matter1 force1 gravitation1 electricity1 etc4 ,it predicts many more things which new observations can alone bring to the test4 ,may some future student go over this ground again1 and have the leisure to give his results to the world4 ,footnote #ed3 ,the ,monist1 ,january1 #ahia4 ,footnote #ee3 ,the neo-,darwinian1 ,weismann1 has shown that mortality would almost necessarily result from the action of the ,darwinian principle4 ,footnote #ef3 ,a feeling may certainly be compound1 but only in virtue of a perception which is not that feeling nor any feeling at all4 ,footnote #eg3 ,the reader will find further light on the following illustration in any text-book of projective geometry1 e4g41 ,reye1 ,geometry of ,position1 ,i1 pp4 #ag-bd1 or ,encyc4 ,britannica1 ,,xi1 p4 #fhi4 ,footnote #eh3 ,a more familiar example of this is the introduction of irrational or absurd numbers like #b4 ,after it was proved that no ratio of two integers could possibly equal #b the idea of number was generalized to include the latter4 ,fractions and the so-called imaginary numbers illustrate the same process of generalization for the sake of making certain operations 7i4e4 division and finding the root7 continuously applicable4 ,,ii4 ,,the ,,doctrine ,,of ,,necessity ,,examined#ei ,in ,the ,monist for ,january1 #ahia1 ,i endeavored to show what elementary ideas ought to enter into our view of the universe4 ,i may mention that on those considerations ,i had already grounded a cosmical theory1 and from it had deduced a considerable number of consequences capable of being compared with experience4 ,this comparison is now in progress1 but under existing circumstances must occupy many years4 ,i propose here to examine the common belief that every single fact in the universe is precisely determined by law4 ,it must not be supposed that this is a doctrine accepted everywhere and at all times by all rational men4 ,its first advocate appears to have been ,democritus1 the atomist1 who was led to it1 as we are informed1 by reflecting upon the 8impenetrability1 translation1 and impact of matter 7 740 ,that is to say1 having restricted his attention to a field where no influence other than mechanical constraint could possibly come before his notice1 he straightway jumped to the conclusion that throughout the universe that was the sole principle of action1--a style of reasoning so usual in our day with men not unreflecting as to be more than excusable in the infancy of thought4 ,but ,epicurus1 in revising the atomic doctrine and repairing its defences1 found himself obliged to suppose that atoms swerve from their courses by spontaneous chance2 and thereby he conferred upon the theory life and entelechy4 ,for we now see clearly that the peculiar function of the molecular hypothesis in physics is to open an entry for the calculus of probabilities4 ,already1 the prince of philosophers had repeatedly and emphatically condemned the dictum of ,democritus 7especially in the 8,physics10 ,book ,,ii1 chapters iv1 v1 vi71 holding that events come to pass in three ways1 namely1 7#a7 by external compulsion1 or the action of efficient causes1 7#b7 by virtue of an inward nature1 or the influence of final causes1 and 7#c7 irregularly without definite cause1 but just by absolute chance2 and this doctrine is of the inmost essence of ,aristotelianism4 ,it affords1 at any rate1 a valuable enumeration of the possible ways in which anything can be supposed to have come about4 ,the freedom of the will1 too1 was admitted both by ,aristotle and by ,epicurus4 ,but the ,stoa1 which in every department seized upon the most tangible1 hard1 and lifeless element1 and blindly denied the existence of every other1 which1 for example1 impugned the validity of the inductive method and wished to fill its place with the reductio ad absurdum1 very naturally became the one school of ancient philosophy to stand by a strict necessitarianism1 thus returning to a single principle of ,democritus that ,epicurus had been unable to swallow4 ,necessitarianism and materialism with the ,stoics went hand in hand1 as by affinity they should4 ,at the revival of learning1 ,stoicism met with considerable favor1 partly because it departed just enough from ,aristotle to give it the spice of novelty1 and partly because its superficialities well adapted it for acceptance by students of literature and art who wanted their philosophy drawn mild4 ,afterwards1 the great discoveries in mechanics inspired the hope that mechanical principles might suffice to explain the universe2 and though without logical justification1 this hope has since been continually stimulated by subsequent advances in physics4 ,nevertheless1 the doctrine was in too evident conflict with the freedom of the will and with miracles to be generally acceptable1 at first4 ,but meantime there arose that most widely spread of philosophical blunders1 the notion that associationalism belongs intrinsically to the materialistic family of doctrines2 and thus was evolved the theory of motives2 and libertarianism became weakened4 ,at present1 historical criticism has almost exploded the miracles1 great and small2 so that the doctrine of necessity has never been in so great vogue as now4 ,the proposition in question is that the state of things existing at any time1 together with certain immutable laws1 completely determine the state of things at every other time 7for a limitation to future time is indefensible74 ,thus1 given the state of the universe in the original nebula1 and given the laws of mechanics1 a sufficiently powerful mind could deduce from these data the precise form of every curlicue of every letter ,i am now writing4 ,whoever holds that every act of the will as well as every idea of the mind is under the rigid governance of a necessity co-ordinated with that of the physical world1 will logically be carried to the proposition that minds are part of the physical world in such a sense that the laws of mechanics determine everything that happens according to immutable attractions and repulsions4 ,in that case1 that instantaneous state of things from which every other state of things is calculable consists in the positions and velocities of all the particles at any instant4 ,this1 the usual and most logical form of necessitarianism1 is called the mechanical philosophy4 ,when ,i have asked thinking men what reason they had to believe that every fact in the universe is precisely determined by law1 the first answer has usually been that the proposition is a 8presupposition0 or postulate of scientific reasoning4 ,well1 if that is the best that can be said for it1 the belief is doomed4 ,suppose it be 8postulated03 that does not make it true1 nor so much as afford the slightest rational motive for yielding it any credence4 ,it is as if a man should come to borrow money1 and when asked for his security1 should reply he 8postulated0 the loan4 ,to 8postulate0 a proposition is no more than to hope it is true4 ,there are1 indeed1 practical emergencies in which we act upon assumptions of certain propositions as true1 because if they are not so1 it can make no difference how we act4 ,but all such propositions ,i take to be hypotheses of individual facts4 ,for it is manifest that no universal principle can in its universality be comprised in a special case or can be requisite for the validity of any ordinary inference4 ,to say1 for instance1 that the demonstration by ,archimedes of the property of the lever would fall to the ground if men were endowed with free-will1 is extravagant2 yet this is implied by those who make a proposition incompatible with the freedom of the will the postulate of all inference4 ,considering1 too1 that the conclusions of science make no pretence to being more than probable1 and considering that a probable inference can at most only suppose something to be most frequently1 or otherwise approximately1 true1 but never that anything is precisely true without exception throughout the universe1 we see how far this proposition in truth is from being so postulated4 ,but the whole notion of a postulate being involved in reasoning appertains to a by-gone and false conception of logic4 ,non-deductive1 or ampliative inference1 is of three kinds3 induction1 hypothesis1 and analogy4 ,if there be any other modes1 they must be extremely unusual and highly complicated1 and may be assumed with little doubt to be of the same nature as those enumerated4 ,for induction1 hypothesis1 and analogy1 as far as their ampliative character goes1 that is1 so far as they conclude something not implied in the premises1 depend upon one principle and involve the same procedure4 ,all are essentially inferences from sampling4 ,suppose a ship arrives at ,liverpool laden with wheat in bulk4 ,suppose that by some machinery the whole cargo be stirred up with great thoroughness4 ,suppose that twenty-seven thimblefuls be taken equally from the forward1 midships1 and aft parts1 from the starboard1 center1 and larboard parts1 and from the top1 half depth1 and lower parts of her hold1 and that these being mixed and the grains counted1 four-fifths of the latter are found to be of quality ,a4 ,then we infer1 experientially and provisionally1 that approximately four-fifths of all the grain in the cargo is of the same quality4 ,i say we infer this experientially and provisionally4 ,by saying that we infer it experientially1 ,i mean that our conclusion makes no pretension to knowledge of wheat-in-itself1 our 1 as the derivation of that word implies1 has nothing to do with latent wheat4 ,we are dealing only with the matter of possible experience1--experience in the full acceptation of the term as something not merely affecting the senses but also as the subject of thought4 ,if there be any wheat hidden on the ship1 so that it can neither turn up in the sample nor be heard of subsequently from purchasers1--or if it be half-hidden1 so that it may1 indeed1 turn up1 but is less likely to do so than the rest1--or if it can affect our senses and our pockets1 but from some strange cause or causelessness cannot be reasoned about1--all such wheat is to be excluded 7or have only its proportional weight7 in calculating that true proportion of quality ,a1 to which our inference seeks to approximate4 ,by saying that we draw the inference provisionally1 ,i mean that we do not hold that we have reached any assigned degree of approximation as yet1 but only hold that if our experience be indefinitely extended1 and if every fact of whatever nature1 as fast as it presents itself1 be duly applied1 according to the inductive method1 in correcting the inferred ratio1 then our approximation will become indefinitely close in the long run2 that is to say1 close to the experience to come 7not merely close by the exhaustion of a finite collection7 so that if experience in general is to fluctuate irregularly to and fro1 in a manner to deprive the ratio sought of all definite value1 we shall be able to find out approximately within what limits it fluctuates1 and if1 after having one definite value1 it changes and assumes another1 we shall be able to find that out1 and in short1 whatever may be the variations of this ratio in experience1 experience indefinitely extended will enable us to detect them1 so as to predict rightly1 at last1 what its ultimate value may be1 if it have any ultimate value1 or what the ultimate law of succession of values may be1 if there be any such ultimate law1 or that it ultimately fluctuates irregularly within certain limits1 if it do so ultimately fluctuate4 ,now our inference1 claiming to be no more than thus experiential and provisional1 manifestly involves no postulate whatever4 ,for what is a postulate8 ,it is the formulation of a material fact which we are not entitled to assume as a premise1 but the truth of which is requisite to the validity of an inference4 ,any fact1 then1 which might be supposed postulated1 must either be such that it would ultimately present itself in experience1 or not4 ,if it will present itself1 we need not postulate it now in our provisional inference1 since we shall ultimately be entitled to use it as a premise4 ,but if it never would present itself in experience1 our conclusion is valid but for the possibility of this fact being otherwise than assumed1 that is1 it is valid as far as possible experience goes1 and that is all that we claim4 ,thus1 every postulate is cut off1 either by the provisionality or by the experientiality of our inference4 ,for instance1 it has been said that induction postulates that1 if an indefinite succession of samples be drawn1 examined1 and thrown back each before the next is drawn1 then in the long run every grain will be drawn as often as any other1 that is to say1 postulates that the ratio of the numbers of times in which any two are drawn will indefinitely approximate to unity4 ,but no such postulate is made2 for if1 on the one hand1 we are to have no other experience of the wheat than from such drawings1 it is the ratio that presents itself in those drawings and not the ratio which belongs to the wheat in its latent existence that we are endeavoring to determine2 while if1 on the other hand1 there is some other mode by which the wheat is to come under our knowledge1 equivalent to another kind of sampling1 so that after all our care in stirring up the wheat1 some experiential grains will present themselves in the first sampling operation more often than others in the long run1 this very singular fact will be sure to get discovered by the inductive method1 which must avail itself of every sort of experience2 and our inference1 which was only provisional1 corrects itself at last4 ,again1 it has been said1 that induction postulates that under like circumstances like events will happen1 and that this postulate is at bottom the same as the principle of universal causation4 ,but this is a blunder1 or bevue1 due to thinking exclusively of inductions where the concluded ratio is either #a or #j4 ,if any such proposition were postulated1 it would be that under like circumstances 7the circumstances of drawing the different samples7 different events occur in the same proportions in all the different sets1--a proposition which is false and even absurd4 ,but in truth no such thing is postulated1 the experiential character of the inference reducing the condition of validity to this1 that if a certain result does not occur1 the opposite result will be manifested1 a condition assured by the provisionality of the inference4 ,but it may be asked whether it is not conceivable that every instance of a certain class destined to be ever employed as a datum of induction should have one character1 while every instance destined not to be so employed should have the opposite character4 ,the answer is that in that case1 the instances excluded from being subjects of reasoning would not be experienced in the full sense of the word1 but would be among these latent individuals of which our conclusion does not pretend to speak4 ,to this account of the rationale of induction ,i know of but one objection worth mention3 it is that ,i thus fail to deduce the full degree of force which this mode of inference in fact possesses2 that according to my view1 no matter how thorough and elaborate the stirring and mixing process had been1 the examination of a single handful of grain would not give me any assurance1 sufficient to risk money upon that the next handful would not greatly modify the concluded value of the ratio under inquiry1 while1 in fact1 the assurance would be very high that this ratio was not greatly in error4 ,if the true ratio of grains of quality ,a were #j4hj and the handful contained a thousand grains1 nine such handfuls out of every ten would contain from #ghj to #hbj grains of quality ,a4 ,the answer to this is that the calculation given is correct when we know that the units of this handful and the quality inquired into have the normal independence of one another1 if for instance the stirring has been complete and the character sampled for has been settled upon in advance of the examination of the sample4 ,but in so far as these conditions are not known to be complied with1 the above figures cease to be applicable4 ,random sampling and predesignation of the character sampled for should always be striven after in inductive reasoning1 but when they cannot be attained1 so long as it is conducted honestly1 the inference retains some value4 ,when we cannot ascertain how the sampling has been done or the sample-character selected1 induction still has the essential validity which my present account of it shows it to have4 ,i do not think a man who combines a willingness to be convinced with a power of appreciating an argument upon a difficult subject can resist the reasons which have been given to show that the principle of universal necessity cannot be defended as being a postulate of reasoning4 ,but then the question immediately arises whether it is not proved to be true1 or at least rendered highly probable1 by observation of nature4 ,still1 this question ought not long to arrest a person accustomed to reflect upon the force of scientific reasoning4 ,for the essence of the necessitarian position is that certain continuous quantities have certain exact values4 ,now1 how can observation determine the value of such a quantity with a probable error absolutely nil8 ,to one who is behind the scenes1 and knows that the most refined comparisons of masses1 lengths1 and angles1 far surpassing in precision all other measurements1 yet fall behind the accuracy of bank-accounts1 and that the ordinary determinations of physical constants1 such as appear from month to month in the journals1 are about on a par with an upholsterer's measurements of carpets and curtains1 the idea of mathematical exactitude being demonstrated in the laboratory will appear simply ridiculous4 ,there is a recognized method of estimating the probable magnitudes of errors in physics1--the method of least squares4 ,it is universally admitted that this method makes the errors smaller than they really are2 yet even according to that theory an error indefinitely small is indefinitely improbable2 so that any statement to the effect that a certain continuous quantity has a certain exact value1 if well-founded at all1 must be founded on something other than observation4 ,still1 ,i am obliged to admit that this rule is subject to a certain qualification4 ,namely1 it only applies to continuous#fj quantity4 ,now1 certain kinds of continuous quantity are discontinuous at one or at two limits1 and for such limits the rule must be modified4 ,thus1 the length of a line cannot be less than zero4 ,suppose1 then1 the question arises how long a line a certain person had drawn from a marked point on a piece of paper4 ,if no line at all can be seen1 the observed length is zero2 and the only conclusion this observation warrants is that the length of the line is less than the smallest length visible with the optical power employed4 ,but indirect observations1--for example1 that the person supposed to have drawn the line was never within fifty feet of the paper1--may make it probable that no line at all was made1 so that the concluded length will be strictly zero4 ,in like manner1 experience no doubt would warrant the conclusion that there is absolutely no indigo in a given ear of wheat1 and absolutely no attar in a given lichen4 ,but such inferences can only be rendered valid by positive experiential evidence1 direct or remote1 and cannot rest upon a mere inability to detect the quantity in question4 ,we have reason to think there is no indigo in the wheat1 because we have remarked that wherever indigo is produced it is produced in considerable quantities1 to mention only one argument4 ,we have reason to think there is no attar in the lichen1 because essential oils seem to be in general peculiar to single species4 ,if the question had been whether there was iron in the wheat or the lichen1 though chemical analysis should fail to detect its presence1 we should think some of it probably was there1 since iron is almost everywhere4 ,without any such information1 one way or the other1 we could only abstain from any opinion as to the presence of the substance in question4 ,it cannot1 ,i conceive1 be maintained that we are in any better position than this in regard to the presence of the element of chance or spontaneous departures from law in nature4 ,those observations which are generally adduced in favor of mechanical causation simply prove that there is an element of regularity in nature1 and have no bearing whatever upon the question of whether such regularity is exact and universal1 or not4 ,nay1 in regard to this exactitude1 all observation is directly opposed to it2 and the most that can be said is that a good deal of this observation can be explained away4 ,try to verify any law of nature1 and you will find that the more precise your observations1 the more certain they will be to show irregular departures from the law4 ,we are accustomed to ascribe these1 and ,i do not say wrongly1 to errors of observation2 yet we cannot usually account for such errors in any antecedently probable way4 ,trace their causes back far enough1 and you will be forced to admit they are always due to arbitrary determination1 or chance4 ,but it may be asked whether if there were an element of real chance in the universe it must not occasionally be productive of signal effects such as could not pass unobserved4 ,in answer to this question1 without stopping to point out that there is an abundance of great events which one might be tempted to suppose were of that nature1 it will be simplest to remark that physicists hold that the particles of gases are moving about irregularly1 substantially as if by real chance1 and that by the principles of probabilities there must occasionally happen to be concentrations of heat in the gases contrary to the second law of thermodynamics1 and these concentrations1 occurring in explosive mixtures1 must sometimes have tremendous effects4 ,here1 then1 is in substance the very situation supposed2 yet no phenomena ever have resulted which we are forced to attribute to such chance concentration of heat1 or which anybody1 wise or foolish1 has ever dreamed of accounting for in that manner4 ,in view of all these considerations1 ,i do not believe that anybody1 not in a state of case-hardened ignorance respecting the logic of science1 can maintain that the precise and universal conformity of facts to law is clearly proved1 or even rendered particularly probable1 by any observations hitherto made4 ,in this way1 the determined advocate of exact regularity will soon find himself driven to a priori reasons to support his thesis4 ,these received such a socdolager from ,stuart ,mill in his ,examination of ,hamilton1 that holding to them now seems to me to denote a high degree of imperviousness to reason2 so that ,i shall pass them by with little notice4 ,to say that we cannot help believing a given proposition is no argument1 but it is a conclusive fact if it be true2 and with the substitution of 8,i0 for 8we10 it is true in the mouths of several classes of minds1 the blindly passionate1 the unreflecting and ignorant1 and the person who has overwhelming evidence before his eyes4 ,but that which has been inconceivable to-day has often turned out indisputable on the morrow4 ,inability to conceive is only a stage through which every man must pass in regard to a number of beliefs1--unless endowed with extraordinary obstinacy and obtuseness4 ,his understanding is enslaved to some blind compulsion which a vigorous mind is pretty sure soon to cast off4 ,some seek to back up the a priori position with empirical arguments4 ,they say that the exact regularity of the world is a natural belief1 and that natural beliefs have generally been confirmed by experience4 ,there is some reason in this4 ,natural beliefs1 however1 if they generally have a foundation of truth1 also require correction and purification from natural illusions4 ,the principles of mechanics are undoubtedly natural beliefs2 but1 for all that1 the early formulations of them were exceedingly erroneous4 ,the general approximation to truth in natural beliefs is1 in fact1 a case of the general adaptation of genetic products to recognizable utilities or ends4 ,now1 the adaptations of nature1 beautiful and often marvelous as they verily are1 are never found to be quite perfect2 so that the argument is quite against the absolute exactitude of any natural belief1 including that of the principle of causation4 ,another argument1 or convenient commonplace1 is that absolute chance is inconceivable4 7,this word has eight current significations4 ,the ,century ,dictionary enumerates six47 ,those who talk like this will hardly be persuaded to say in what sense they mean that chance is inconceivable4 ,should they do so1 it would easily be shown either that they have no sufficient reason for the statement or that the inconceivability is of a kind which does not prove that chance is non-existent4 ,another a priori argument is that chance is unintelligible2 that is to say1 while it may perhaps be conceivable1 it does not disclose to the eye of reason the how or why of things2 and since a hypothesis can only be justified so far as it renders some phenomenon intelligible1 we never can have any right to suppose absolute chance to enter into the production of anything in nature4 ,this argument may be considered in connection with two others4 ,namely1 instead of going so far as to say that the supposition of chance can never properly be used to explain any observed fact1 it may be alleged merely that no facts are known which such a supposition could in any way help in explaining4 ,or again1 the allegation being still further weakened1 it may be said that since departures from law are not unmistakably observed1 chance is not a vera causa1 and ought not unnecessarily to be introduced into a hypothesis4 ,these are no mean arguments1 and require us to examine the matter a little more closely4 ,come1 my superior opponent1 let me learn from your wisdom4 ,it seems to me that every throw of sixes with a pair of dice is a manifest instance of chance4 8,while you would hold a throw of deuce-ace to be brought about by necessity80 7,the opponent's supposed remarks are placed in quotation marks47 ,clearly one throw is as much chance as another4 8,do you think throws of dice are of a different nature from other events80 ,i see that ,i must say that all the diversity and specificalness of events is attributable to chance4 8,would you1 then1 deny that there is any regularity in the world80 ,that is clearly undeniable4 ,i must acknowledge there is an approximate regularity1 and that every event is influenced by it4 ,but the diversification1 specificalness1 and irregularity of things ,i suppose is chance4 ,a throw of sixes appears to me a case in which this element is particularly obtrusive4 8,if you reflect more deeply1 you will come to see that chance is only a name for a cause that is unknown to us40 ,do you mean that we have no idea whatever what kind of causes could bring about a throw of sixes8 8,on the contrary1 each die moves under the influence of precise mechanical laws40 ,but it appears to me that it is not these laws which made the die turn up sixes2 for these laws act just the same when other throws come up4 ,the chance lies in the diversity of throws2 and this diversity cannot be due to laws which are immutable4 8,the diversity is due to the diverse circumstances under which the laws act4 ,the dice lie differently in the box1 and the motion given to the box is different4 ,these are the unknown causes which produce the throws1 and to which we give the name of chance2 not the mechanical law which regulates the operation of these causes4 ,you see you are already beginning to think more clearly about this subject40 ,does the operation of mechanical law not increase the diversity8 8,properly not4 ,you must know that the instantaneous state of a system of particles is defined by six times as many numbers as there are particles1 three for the co-ordinates of each particle's position1 and three more for the components of its velocity4 ,this number of numbers1 which expresses the amount of diversity in the system1 remains the same at all times4 ,there may be1 to be sure1 some kind of relation between the co-ordinates and component velocities of the different particles1 by means of which the state of the system might be expressed by a smaller number of numbers4 ,but1 if this is the case1 a precisely corresponding relationship must exist between the co-ordinates and component velocities at any other time1 though it may doubtless be a relation less obvious to us4 ,thus1 the intrinsic complexity of the system is the same at all times40 ,very well1 my obliging opponent1 we have now reached an issue4 ,you think all the arbitrary specifications of the universe were introduced in one dose1 in the beginning1 if there was a beginning1 and that the variety and complication of nature has always been just as much as it is now4 ,but ,i1 for my part1 think that the diversification1 the specification1 has been continually taking place4 ,should you condescend to ask me why ,i so think1 ,i should give my reasons as follows3 7#a7 ,question any science which deals with the course of time4 ,consider the life of an individual animal or plant1 or of a mind4 ,glance at the history of states1 of institutions1 of language1 of ideas4 ,examine the successions of forms shown by paleontology1 the history of the globe as set forth in geology1 of what the astronomer is able to make out concerning the changes of stellar systems4 ,everywhere the main fact is growth and increasing complexity4 ,death and corruption are mere accidents or secondary phenomena4 ,among some of the lower organisms1 it is a moot point with biologists whether there be anything which ought to be called death4 ,races1 at any rate1 do not die out except under unfavorable circumstances4 ,from these broad and ubiquitous facts we may fairly infer1 by the most unexceptionable logic1 that there is probably in nature some agency by which the complexity and diversity of things can be increased2 and that consequently the rule of mechanical necessity meets in some way with interference4 7#b7 ,by thus admitting pure spontaneity or life as a character of the universe1 acting always and everywhere though restrained within narrow bounds by law1 producing infinitesimal departures from law continually1 and great ones with infinite infrequency1 ,i account for all the variety and diversity of the universe1 in the only sense in which the really sui generis and new can be said to be accounted for4 ,the ordinary view has to admit the inexhaustible multitudinous variety of the world1 has to admit that its mechanical law cannot account for this in the least1 that variety can spring only from spontaneity1 and yet denies without any evidence or reason the existence of this spontaneity1 or else shoves it back to the beginning of time and supposes it dead ever since4 ,the superior logic of my view appears to me not easily controverted4 7#c7 ,when ,i ask the necessitarian how he would explain the diversity and irregularity of the universe1 he replies to me out of the treasury of his wisdom that irregularity is something which from the nature of things we must not seek to explain4 ,abashed at this1 ,i seek to cover my confusion by asking how he would explain the uniformity and regularity of the universe1 whereupon he tells me that the laws of nature are immutable and ultimate facts1 and no account is to be given of them4 ,but my hypothesis of spontaneity does explain irregularity1 in a certain sense2 that is1 it explains the general fact of irregularity1 though not1 of course1 what each lawless event is to be4 ,at the same time1 by thus loosening the bond of necessity1 it gives room for the influence of another kind of causation1 such as seems to be operative in the mind in the formation of associations1 and enables us to understand how the uniformity of nature could have been brought about4 ,that single events should be hard and unintelligible1 logic will permit without difficulty3 we do not expect to make the shock of a personally experienced earthquake appear natural and reasonable by any amount of cogitation4 ,but logic does expect things general to be understandable4 ,to say that there is a universal law1 and that it is a hard1 ultimate1 unintelligible fact1 the why and wherefore of which can never be inquired into1 at this a sound logic will revolt2 and will pass over at once to a method of philosophizing which does not thus barricade the road of discovery4 7#d7 ,necessitarianism cannot logically stop short of making the whole action of the mind a part of the physical universe4 ,our notion that we decide what we are going to do1 if as the necessitarian says1 it has been calculable since the earliest times1 is reduced to illusion4 ,indeed1 consciousness in general thus becomes a mere illusory aspect of a material system4 ,what we call red1 green1 and violet are in reality only different rates of vibration4 ,the sole reality is the distribution of qualities of matter in space and time4 ,brain-matter is protoplasm in a certain degree and kind of complication1--a certain arrangement of mechanical particles4 ,its feeling is but an inward aspect1 a phantom4 ,for1 from the positions and velocities of the particles at any one instant1 and the knowledge of the immutable forces1 the positions at all other times are calculable2 so that the universe of space1 time1 and matter is a rounded system uninterfered with from elsewhere4 ,but from the state of feeling at any instant1 there is no reason to suppose the states of feeling at all other instants are thus exactly calculable2 so that feeling is1 as ,i said1 a mere fragmentary and illusive aspect of the universe4 ,this is the way1 then1 that necessitarianism has to make up its accounts4 ,it enters consciousness under the head of sundries1 as a forgotten trifle2 its scheme of the universe would be more satisfactory if this little fact could be dropped out of sight4 ,on the other hand1 by supposing the rigid exactitude of causation to yield1 ,i care not how little1--be it but by a strictly infinitesimal amount1--we gain room to insert mind into our scheme1 and to put it into the place where it is needed1 into the position which1 as the sole self-intelligible thing1 it is entitled to occupy1 that of the fountain of existence2 and in so doing we resolve the problem of the connection of soul and body4 7#e7 ,but ,i must leave undeveloped the chief of my reasons1 and can only adumbrate it4 ,the hypothesis of chance-spontaneity is one whose inevitable consequences are capable of being traced out with mathematical precision into considerable detail4 ,much of this ,i have done and find the consequences to agree with observed facts to an extent which seems to me remarkable4 ,but the matter and methods of reasoning are novel1 and ,i have no right to promise that other mathematicians shall find my deductions as satisfactory as ,i myself do1 so that the strongest reason for my belief must for the present remain a private reason of my own1 and cannot influence others4 ,i mention it to explain my own position2 and partly to indicate to future mathematical speculators a veritable goldmine1 should time and circumstances and the abridger of all joys prevent my opening it to the world4 ,if now ,i1 in my turn1 inquire of the necessitarian why he prefers to suppose that all specification goes back to the beginning of things1 he will answer me with one of those last three arguments which ,i left unanswered4 ,first1 he may say that chance is a thing absolutely unintelligible1 and1 therefore1 that we never can be entitled to make such a supposition4 ,but does not this objection smack of nave impudence8 ,it is not mine1 it is his own conception of the universe which leads abruptly up to hard1 ultimate1 inexplicable1 immutable law1 on the one hand1 and to inexplicable specification and diversification of circumstances on the other4 ,my view1 on the contrary1 hypothetises nothing at all1 unless it be hypothesis to say that all specification came about in some sense1 and is not to be accepted as unaccountable4 ,to undertake to account for anything by saying boldly that it is due to chance would1 indeed1 be futile4 ,but this ,i do not do4 ,i make use of chance chiefly to make room for a principle of generalization1 or tendency to form habits1 which ,i hold has produced all regularities4 ,the mechanical philosopher leaves the whole specification of the world utterly unaccounted for1 which is pretty nearly as bad as to boldly attribute it to chance4 ,i attribute it altogether to chance1 it is true1 but to chance in the form of a spontaneity which is to some degree regular4 ,it seems to me clear at any rate that one of these two positions must be taken1 or else specification must be supposed due to a spontaneity which develops itself in a certain and not in a chance way1 by an objective logic like that of ,hegel4 ,this last way ,i leave as an open possibility1 for the present2 for it is as much opposed to the necessitarian scheme of existence as my own theory is4 ,secondly1 the necessitarian may say there are1 at any rate1 no observed phenomena which the hypothesis of chance could aid in explaining4 ,in reply1 ,i point first to the phenomenon of growth and developing complexity1 which appears to be universal1 and which though it may possibly be an affair of mechanism perhaps1 certainly presents all the appearance of increasing diversification4 ,then1 there is variety itself1 beyond comparison the most obtrusive character of the universe3 no mechanism can account for this4 ,then1 there is the very fact the necessitarian most insists upon1 the regularity of the universe which for him serves only to block the road of inquiry4 ,then1 there are the regular relationships between the laws of nature1--similarities and comparative characters1 which appeal to our intelligence as its cousins1 and call upon us for a reason4 ,finally1 there is consciousness1 feeling1 a patent fact enough1 but a very inconvenient one to the mechanical philosopher4 ,thirdly1 the necessitarian may say that chance is not a vera causa1 that we cannot know positively there is any such element in the universe4 ,but the doctrine of the vera causa has nothing to do with elementary conceptions4 ,pushed to that extreme1 it at once cuts off belief in the existence of a material universe2 and without that necessitarianism could hardly maintain its ground4 ,besides1 variety is a fact which must be admitted2 and the theory of chance merely consists in supposing this diversification does not antedate all time4 ,moreover1 the avoidance of hypotheses involving causes nowhere positively known to act--is only a recommendation of logic1 not a positive command4 ,it cannot be formulated in any precise terms without at once betraying its untenable character1--,i mean as rigid rule1 for as a recommendation it is wholesome enough4 ,i believe ,i have thus subjected to fair examination all the important reasons for adhering to the theory of universal necessity1 and have shown their nullity4 ,i earnestly beg that whoever may detect any flaw in my reasoning will point it out to me1 either privately or publicly2 for if ,i am wrong1 it much concerns me to be set right speedily4 ,if my argument remains unrefuted1 it will be time1 ,i think1 to doubt the absolute truth of the principle of universal law2 and when once such a doubt has obtained a living root in any man's mind1 my cause with him1 ,i am persuaded1 is gained4 ,footnote #ei3 ,the ,monist1 ,april1 #ahib4 ,footnote #fj3 ,continuous is not exactly the right word1 but ,i let it go to avoid a long and irrelevant discussion4 ,,iii4 ,,the ,,law ,,of ,,mind#fa ,in an article published in ,the ,monist for ,january1 #ahia1 ,i endeavored to show what ideas ought to form the warp of a system of philosophy1 and particularly emphasized that of absolute chance4 ,in the number of ,april1 #ahib1 ,i argued further in favor of that way of thinking1 which it will be convenient to christen tychism 7from 1 chance74 ,a serious student of philosophy will be in no haste to accept or reject this doctrine2 but he will see in it one of the chief attitudes which speculative thought may take1 feeling that it is not for an individual1 nor for an age1 to pronounce upon a fundamental question of philosophy4 ,that is a task for a whole era to work out4 ,i have begun by showing that tychism must give birth to an evolutionary cosmology1 in which all the regularities of nature and of mind are regarded as products of growth1 and to a ,schelling-fashioned idealism which holds matter to be mere specialized and partially deadened mind4 ,i may mention1 for the benefit of those who are curious in studying mental biographies1 that ,i was born and reared in the neighborhood of ,concord1--,i mean in ,cambridge1--at the time when ,emerson1 ,hedge1 and their friends were disseminating the ideas that they had caught from ,schelling1 and ,schelling from ,plotinus1 from ,boehm1 or from ,god knows what minds stricken with the monstrous mysticism of the ,east4 ,but the atmosphere of ,cambridge held many an antiseptic against ,concord transcendentalism2 and ,i am not conscious of having contracted any of that virus4 ,nevertheless1 it is probable that some cultured bacilli1 some benignant form of the disease was implanted in my soul1 unawares1 and that now1 after long incubation1 it comes to the surface1 modified by mathematical conceptions and by training in physical investigations4 ,the next step in the study of cosmology must be to examine the general law of mental action4 ,in doing this1 ,i shall for the time drop my tychism out of view1 in order to allow a free and independent expansion to another conception signalized in my first ,monist paper as one of the most indispensable to philosophy1 though it was not there dwelt upon2 ,i mean the idea of continuity4 ,the tendency to regard continuity1 in the sense in which ,i shall define it1 as an idea of prime importance in philosophy may conveniently be termed synechism4 ,the present paper is intended chiefly to show what synechism is1 and what it leads to4 ,i attempted1 a good many years ago1 to develop this doctrine in the ,journal of ,speculative ,philosophy 7,vol4 ,,ii472 but ,i am able now to improve upon that exposition1 in which ,i was a little blinded by nominalistic prepossessions4 ,i refer to it1 because students may possibly find that some points not sufficiently explained in the present paper are cleared up in those earlier ones4 ,,what ,,the ,,law ,,is ,logical analysis applied to mental phenomena shows that there is but one law of mind1 namely1 that ideas tend to spread continuously and to affect certain others which stand to them in a peculiar relation of affectibility4 ,in this spreading they lose intensity1 and especially the power of affecting others1 but gain generality and become welded with other ideas4 ,i set down this formula at the beginning1 for convenience2 and now proceed to comment upon it4 ,,individuality ,,of ,,ideas ,we are accustomed to speak of ideas as reproduced1 as passed from mind to mind1 as similar or dissimilar to one another1 and1 in short1 as if they were substantial things2 nor can any reasonable objection be raised to such expressions4 ,but taking the word 8idea0 in the sense of an event in an individual consciousness1 it is clear that an idea once past is gone forever1 and any supposed recurrence of it is another idea4 ,these two ideas are not present in the same state of consciousness1 and therefore cannot possibly be compared4 ,to say1 therefore1 that they are similar can only mean that an occult power from the depths of the soul forces us to connect them in our thoughts after they are both no more4 ,we may note1 here1 in passing1 that of the two generally recognized principles of association1 contiguity and similarity1 the former is a connection due to a power without1 the latter a connection due to a power within4 ,but what can it mean to say that ideas wholly past are thought of at all1 any longer8 ,they are utterly unknowable4 ,what distinct meaning can attach to saying that an idea in the past in any way affects an idea in the future1 from which it is completely detached8 ,a phrase between the assertion and the denial of which there can in no case be any sensible difference is mere gibberish4 ,i will not dwell further upon this point1 because it is a commonplace of philosophy4 ,,continuity ,,of ,,ideas ,we have here before us a question of difficulty1 analogous to the question of nominalism and realism4 ,but when once it has been clearly formulated1 logic leaves room for one answer only4 ,how can a past idea be present8 ,can it be present vicariously8 ,to a certain extent1 perhaps2 but not merely so2 for then the question would arise how the past idea can be related to its vicarious representation4 ,the relation1 being between ideas1 can only exist in some consciousness3 now that past idea was in no consciousness but that past consciousness that alone contained it2 and that did not embrace the vicarious idea4 ,some minds will here jump to the conclusion that a past idea cannot in any sense be present4 ,but that is hasty and illogical4 ,how extravagant1 too1 to pronounce our whole knowledge of the past to be mere delusion6 ,yet it would seem that the past is as completely beyond the bounds of possible experience as a ,kantian thing-in-itself4 ,how can a past idea be present8 ,not vicariously4 ,then1 only by direct perception4 ,in other words1 to be present1 it must be ipso facto present4 ,that is1 it cannot be wholly past2 it can only be going1 infinitesimally past1 less past than any assignable past date4 ,we are thus brought to the conclusion that the present is connected with the past by a series of real infinitesimal steps4 ,it has already been suggested by psychologists that consciousness necessarily embraces an interval of time4 ,but if a finite time be meant1 the opinion is not tenable4 ,if the sensation that precedes the present by half a second were still immediately before me1 then1 on the same principle the sensation preceding that would be immediately present1 and so on ad infinitum4 ,now1 since there is a time1 say a year1 at the end of which an idea is no longer ipso facto present1 it follows that this is true of any finite interval1 however short4 ,but yet consciousness must essentially cover an interval of time2 for if it did not1 we could gain no knowledge of time1 and not merely no veracious cognition of it1 but no conception whatever4 ,we are1 therefore1 forced to say that we are immediately conscious through an infinitesimal interval of time4 ,this is all that is requisite4 ,for1 in this infinitesimal interval1 not only is consciousness continuous in a subjective sense1 that is1 considered as a subject or substance having the attribute of duration2 but also1 because it is immediate consciousness1 its object is ipso facto continuous4 ,in fact1 this infinitesimally spread-out consciousness is a direct feeling of its contents as spread out4 ,this will be further elucidated below4 ,in an infinitesimal interval we directly perceive the temporal sequence of its beginning1 middle1 and end1--not1 of course1 in the way of recognition1 for recognition is only of the past1 but in the way of immediate feeling4 ,now upon this interval follows another1 whose beginning is the middle of the former1 and whose middle is the end of the former4 ,here1 we have an immediate perception of the temporal sequence of its beginning1 middle1 and end1 or say of the second1 third1 and fourth instants4 ,from these two immediate perceptions1 we gain a mediate1 or inferential1 perception of the relation of all four instants4 ,this mediate perception is objectively1 or as to the object represented1 spread over the four instants2 but subjectively1 or as itself the subject of duration1 it is completely embraced in the second moment4 7,the reader will observe that ,i use the word instant to mean a point of time1 and moment to mean an infinitesimal duration47 ,if it is objected that1 upon the theory proposed1 we must have more than a mediate perception of the succession of the four instants1 ,i grant it2 for the sum of the two infinitesimal intervals is itself infinitesimal1 so that it is immediately perceived4 ,it is immediately perceived in the whole interval1 but only mediately perceived in the last two-thirds of the interval4 ,now1 let there be an indefinite succession of these inferential acts of comparative perception2 and it is plain that the last moment will contain objectively the whole series4 ,let there be1 not merely an indefinite succession1 but a continuous flow of inference through a finite time2 and the result will be a mediate objective consciousness of the whole time in the last moment4 ,in this last moment1 the whole series will be recognized1 or known as known before1 except only the last moment1 which of course will be absolutely unrecognizable to itself4 ,indeed1 even this last moment will be recognized like the rest1 or1 at least1 be just beginning to be so4 ,there is a little elenchus1 or appearance of contradiction1 here1 which the ordinary logic of reflection quite suffices to resolve4 ,,infinity ,,and ,,continuity1 ,,in ,,general ,most of the mathematicians who during the last two generations have treated the differential calculus have been of the opinion that an infinitesimal quantity is an absurdity2 although1 with their habitual caution1 they have often added 8or1 at any rate1 the conception of an infinitesimal is so difficult1 that we practically cannot reason about it with confidence and security40 ,accordingly1 the doctrine of limits has been invented to evade the difficulty1 or1 as some say1 to explain the signification of the word 8infinitesimal40 ,this doctrine1 in one form or another1 is taught in all the text-books1 though in some of them only as an alternative view of the matter2 it answers well enough the purposes of calculation1 though even in that application it has its difficulties4 ,the illumination of the subject by a strict notation for the logic of relatives had shown me clearly and evidently that the idea of an infinitesimal involves no contradiction1 before ,i became acquainted with the writings of ,dr4 ,georg ,cantor 7though many of these had already appeared in the ,mathematische ,annalen and in ,borchardt's ,journal1 if not yet in the ,acta ,mathematica1 all mathematical journals of the first distinction71 in which the same view is defended with extraordinary genius and penetrating logic4 ,the prevalent opinion is that finite numbers are the only ones that we can reason about1 at least1 in any ordinary mode of reasoning1 or1 as some authors express it1 they are the only numbers that can be reasoned about mathematically4 ,but this is an irrational prejudice4 ,i long ago showed that finite collections are distinguished from infinite ones only by one circumstance and its consequences1 namely1 that to them is applicable a peculiar and unusual mode of reasoning called by its discoverer1 ,de ,morgan1 the 8syllogism of transposed quantity40 ,balzac1 in the introduction of his ,physiologie du mariage1 remarks that every young ,frenchman boasts of having seduced some ,frenchwoman4 ,now1 as a woman can only be seduced once1 and there are no more ,frenchwomen than ,frenchmen1 it follows1 if these boasts are true1 that no ,french women escape seduction4 ,if their number be finite1 the reasoning holds4 ,but since the population is continually increasing1 and the seduced are on the average younger than the seducers1 the conclusion need not be true4 ,in like manner1 ,de ,morgan1 as an actuary1 might have argued that if an insurance company pays to its insured on an average more than they have ever paid it1 including interest1 it must lose money4 ,but every modern actuary would see a fallacy in that1 since the business is continually on the increase4 ,but should war1 or other cataclysm1 cause the class of insured to be a finite one1 the conclusion would turn out painfully correct1 after all4 ,the above two reasonings are examples of the syllogism of transposed quantity4 ,the proposition that finite and infinite collections are distinguished by the applicability to the former of the syllogism of transposed quantity ought to be regarded as the basal one of scientific arithmetic4 ,if a person does not know how to reason logically1 and ,i must say that a great many fairly good mathematicians1--yea1 distinguished ones1--fall under this category1 but simply uses a rule of thumb in blindly drawing inferences like other inferences that have turned out well1 he will1 of course1 be continually falling into error about infinite numbers4 ,the truth is such people do not reason1 at all4 ,but for the few who do reason1 reasoning about infinite numbers is easier than about finite numbers1 because the complicated syllogism of transposed quantity is not called for4 ,for example1 that the whole is greater than its part is not an axiom1 as that eminently bad reasoner1 ,euclid1 made it to be4 ,it is a theorem readily proved by means of a syllogism of transposed quantity1 but not otherwise4 ,of finite collections it is true1 of infinite collections false4 ,thus1 a part of the whole numbers are even numbers4 ,yet the even numbers are no fewer than all the numbers2 an evident proposition since if every number in the whole series of whole numbers be doubled1 the result will be the series of even numbers4 #a1 #b1 #c1 #d1 #e1 #f1 etc4 #b1 #d1 #f1 #h1 #aj1 #ab1 etc4 ,so for every number there is a distinct even number4 ,in fact1 there are as many distinct doubles of numbers as there are of distinct numbers4 ,but the doubles of numbers are all even numbers4 ,in truth1 of infinite collections there are but two grades of magnitude1 the endless and the innumerable4 ,just as a finite collection is distinguished from an infinite one by the applicability to it of a special mode of reasoning1 the syllogism of transposed quantity1 so1 as ,i showed in the paper last referred to1 a numerable collection is distinguished from an innumerable one by the applicability to it of a certain mode of reasoning1 the ,fermatian inference1 or1 as it is sometimes improperly termed1 8mathematical induction40 ,as an example of this reasoning1 ,euler's demonstration of the binomial theorem for integral powers may be given4 ,the theorem is that 7x y7n1 where n is a whole number1 may be expanded into the sum of a series of terms of which the first is xnyo and each of the others is derived from the next preceding by diminishing the exponent of x by #a and multiplying by that exponent and at the same time increasing the exponent of y by #a and dividing by that increased exponent4 ,now1 suppose this proposition to be true for a certain exponent1 n ,m1 then it must also be true for n ,m #a4 ,for let one of the terms in the expansion of 7x y7,m be written ,axpyq4 ,then1 this term with the two following will be ,axpyq ,a p_/7q #a7 xp - #a yq #a ,a p_/7q #a7 7p - #a7_/7q #b7 xp - #b yq #b ,now1 when 7x y7,m is multiplied by x y to give 7x y7,m #a1 we multiply first by x and then by y instead of by x and add the two results4 ,when we multiply by x1 the second of the above three terms will be the only one giving a term involving xpyq #a and the third will be the only one giving a term in xp - #ayq #b2 and when we multiply by y the first will be the only term giving a term in xpyq #a1 and the second will be the only term giving a term in xp - #ayq #b4 ,hence1 adding like terms1 we find that the coefficient of xpyq #a in the expansion of 7x y7,m #a will be the sum of the coefficients of the first two of the above three terms1 and that the coefficient of xp - #ayq #b will be the sum of the coefficients of the last two terms4 ,hence1 two successive terms in the expansion of 7x y7,m #a will be ,a#a 7p_/7q #a77xpyq#a ,a7p_/7q #a77a 77p - #a7_/7q #b77xp-#ayq#b ,a77p q #a7_/7q #a77xpyq#a ,a77p q #a7_/7q #a777p_/7q #b77xp-#ayq#b ,it is1 thus1 seen that the succession of terms follows the rule4 ,thus if any integral power follows the rule1 so also does the next higher power4 ,but the first power obviously follows the rule4 ,hence1 all powers do so4 ,such reasoning holds good of any collection of objects capable of being ranged in a series which though it may be endless1 can be numbered so that each member of it receives a definite integral number4 ,for instance1 all the whole numbers constitute such a numerable collection4 ,again1 all numbers resulting from operating according to any definite rule with any finite number of whole numbers form such a collection4 ,for they may be arranged in a series thus4 ,let ,f be the symbol of operation4 ,first operate on #a1 giving ,f7#a74 ,then1 operate on a second #a1 giving ,f7#a1a74 ,next1 introduce #b1 giving #crd1 ,f7#b72 #dth ,f7#b1a72 #eth1 ,f7#a1b72 #fth1 ,f7#b1b74 ,next use a third variable giving #gth1 ,f7#a1a1a72 #hth1 ,f7#b1a1a72 #ith1 ,f7#a1b1a72 #ajth1 ,f7#b1b1a72 #aath1 ,f7#a1a1b72 #abth1 ,f7#b1a1b72 #acth1 ,f7#a1b1b72 #adth1 ,f7#b1b1b74 ,next introduce #c1 and so on1 alternately introducing new variables and new figures2 and in this way it is plain that every arrangement of integral values of the variables will receive a numbered place in the series4#fb ,the class of endless but numerable collections 7so called because they can be so ranged that to each one corresponds a distinct whole number7 is very large4 ,but there are collections which are certainly innumerable4 ,such is the collection of all numbers to which endless series of decimals are capable of approximating4 ,it has been recognized since the time of ,euclid that certain numbers are surd or incommensurable1 and are not exactly expressible by any finite series of decimals1 nor by a circulating decimal4 ,such is the ratio of the circumference of a circle to its diameter1 which we know is nearly #c4adaeibf4 ,the calculation of this number has been carried to over #gjj figures without the slightest appearance of regularity in their sequence4 ,the demonstrations that this and many other numbers are incommensurable are perfect4 ,that the entire collection of incommensurable numbers is innumerable has been clearly proved by ,cantor4 ,i omit the demonstration2 but it is easy to see that to discriminate one from some other would1 in general1 require the use of an endless series of numbers4 ,now if they cannot be exactly expressed and discriminated1 clearly they cannot be ranged in a linear series4 ,it is evident that there are as many points on a line or in an interval of time as there are of real numbers in all4 ,these are1 therefore1 innumerable collections4 ,many mathematicians have incautiously assumed that the points on a surface or in a solid are more than those on a line4 ,but this has been refuted by ,cantor4 ,indeed1 it is obvious that for every set of values of cordinates there is a single distinct number4 ,suppose1 for instance1 the values of the coordinates all lie between #j and #a4 ,then if we compose a number by putting in the first decimal place the first figure of the first cordinate1 in the second the first figure of the second cordinate1 and so on1 and when the first figures are all dealt out go on to the second figures in like manner1 it is plain that the values of the cordinates can be read off from the single resulting number1 so that a triad or tetrad of numbers1 each having innumerable values1 has no more values than a single incommensurable number4 ,were the number of dimensions infinite1 this would fail2 and the collection of infinite sets of numbers having each innumerable variations1 might1 therefore1 be greater than the simple innumerable collection1 and might be called endlessly infinite4 ,the single individuals of such a collection could not1 however1 be designated1 even approximately1 so that this is indeed a magnitude concerning which it would be possible to reason only in the most general way1 if at all4 ,although there are but two grades of magnitudes of infinite collections1 yet when certain conditions are imposed upon the order in which individuals are taken1 distinctions of magnitude arise from that cause4 ,thus1 if a simply endless series be doubled by separating each unit into two parts1 the successive first parts and also the second parts being taken in the same order as the units from which they are derived1 this double endless series will1 so long as it is taken in that order1 appear as twice as large as the original series4 ,in like manner the product of two innumerable collections1 that is1 the collection of possible pairs composed of one individual of each1 if the order of continuity is to be maintained1 is1 by virtue of that order1 infinitely greater than either of the component collections4 ,we now come to the difficult question4 ,what is continuity8 ,kant confounds it with infinite divisibility1 saying that the essential character of a continuous series is that between any two members of it a third can always be found4 ,this is an analysis beautifully clear and definite2 but unfortunately1 it breaks down under the first test4 ,for according to this1 the entire series of rational fractions arranged in the order of their magnitude1 would be an infinite series1 although the rational fractions are numerable1 while the points of a line are innumerable4 ,nay1 worse yet1 if from that series of fractions any two with all that lie between them be excised1 and any number of such finite gaps be made1 ,kant's definition is still true of the series1 though it has lost all appearance of continuity4 ,cantor defines a continuous series as one which is concatenated and perfect4 ,by a concatenated series1 he means such a one that if any two points are given in it1 and any finite distance1 however small1 it is possible to proceed from the first point to the second through a succession of points of the series each at a distance from the preceding one less than the given distance4 ,this is true of the series of rational fractions ranged in the order of their magnitude4 ,by a perfect series1 he means one which contains every point such that there is no distance so small that this point has not an infinity of points of the series within that distance of it4 ,this is true of the series of numbers between #j and #a capable of being expressed by decimals in which only the digits #j and #a occur4 ,it must be granted that ,cantor's definition includes every series that is continuous2 nor can it be objected that it includes any important or indubitable case of a series not continuous4 ,nevertheless1 it has some serious defects4 ,in the first place1 it turns upon metrical considerations2 while the distinction between a continuous and a discontinuous series is manifestly non-metrical4 ,in the next place1 a perfect series is defined as one containing 8every point0 of a certain description4 ,but no positive idea is conveyed of what all the points are3 that is definition by negation1 and cannot be admitted4 ,if that sort of thing were allowed1 it would be very easy to say1 at once1 that the continuous linear series of points is one which contains every point of the line between its extremities4 ,finally1 ,cantor's definition does not convey a distinct notion of what the components of the conception of continuity are4 ,it ingeniously wraps up its properties in two separate parcels1 but does not display them to our intelligence4 ,kant's definition expresses one simple property of a continuum2 but it allows of gaps in the series4 ,to mend the definition1 it is only necessary to notice how these gaps can occur4 ,let us suppose1 then1 a linear series of points extending from a point1 ,a1 to a point1 ,b1 having a gap from ,b to a third point1 ,c1 and thence extending to a final limit1 ,d2 and let us suppose this series conforms to ,kant's definition4 ,then1 of the two points1 ,b and ,c1 one or both must be excluded from the series2 for otherwise1 by the definition1 there would be points between them4 ,that is1 if the series contains ,c1 though it contains all the points up to ,b1 it cannot contain ,b4 ,what is required1 therefore1 is to state in non-metrical terms that if a series of points up to a limit is included in a continuum the limit is included4 ,it may be remarked that this is the property of a continuum to which ,aristotle's attention seems to have been directed when he defines a continuum as something whose parts have a common limit4 ,the property may be exactly stated as follows3 ,if a linear series of points is continuous between two points1 ,a and ,d1 and if an endless series of points be taken1 the first of them between ,a and ,d and each of the others between the last preceding one and ,d1 then there is a point of the continuous series between all that endless series of points and ,d1 and such that every other point of which this is true lies between this point and ,d4 ,for example1 take any number between #j and #a1 as #j4a2 then1 any number between #j4a and #a1 as #j4aa2 then any number between #j4aa and #a1 as #j4aaa2 and so on1 without end4 ,then1 because the series of real numbers between #j and #a is continuous1 there must be a least real number1 greater than every number of that endless series4 ,this property1 which may be called the ,aristotelicity of the series1 together with ,kant's property1 or its ,kanticity1 completes the definition of a continuous series4 ,the property of ,aristotelicity may be roughly stated thus3 a continuum contains the end point belonging to every endless series of points which it contains4 ,an obvious corollary is that every continuum contains its limits4 ,but in using this principle it is necessary to observe that a series may be continuous except in this1 that it omits one or both of the limits4 ,our ideas will find expression more conveniently if1 instead of points upon a line1 we speak of real numbers4 ,every real number is1 in one sense1 the limit of a series1 for it can be indefinitely approximated to4 ,whether every real number is a limit of a regular series may perhaps be open to doubt4 ,but the series referred to in the definition of ,aristotelicity must be understood as including all series whether regular or not4 ,consequently1 it is implied that between any two points an innumerable series of points can be taken4 ,every number whose expression in decimals requires but a finite number of places of decimals is commensurable4 ,therefore1 incommensurable numbers suppose an infinitieth place of decimals4 ,the word infinitesimal is simply the ,latin form of infinitieth2 that is1 it is an ordinal formed from infinitum1 as centesimal from centum4 ,thus1 continuity supposes infinitesimal quantities4 ,there is nothing contradictory about the idea of such quantities4 ,in adding and multiplying them the continuity must not be broken up1 and consequently they are precisely like any other quantities1 except that neither the syllogism of transposed quantity1 nor the ,fermatian inference applies to them4 ,if ,a is a finite quantity and i an infinitesimal1 then in a certain sense we may write ,a i ,a4 ,that is to say1 this is so for all purposes of measurement4 ,but this principle must not be applied except to get rid of all the terms in the highest order of infinitesimals present4 ,as a mathematician1 ,i prefer the method of infinitesimals to that of limits1 as far easier and less infested with snares4 ,indeed1 the latter1 as stated in some books1 involves propositions that are false2 but this is not the case with the forms of the method used by ,cauchy1 ,duhamel1 and others4 ,as they understand the doctrine of limits1 it involves the notion of continuity1 and1 therefore1 contains in another shape the very same ideas as the doctrine of infinitesimals4 ,let us now consider an aspect of the ,aristotelical principle which is particularly important in philosophy4 ,suppose a surface to be part red and part blue2 so that every point on it is either red or blue1 and1 of course1 no part can be both red and blue4 ,what1 then1 is the color of the boundary line between the red and the blue8 ,the answer is that red or blue1 to exist at all1 must be spread over a surface2 and the color of the surface is the color of the surface in the immediate neighborhood of the point4 ,i purposely use a vague form of expression4 ,now1 as the parts of the surface in the immediate neighborhood of any ordinary point upon a curved boundary are half of them red and half blue1 it follows that the boundary is half red and half blue4 ,in like manner1 we find it necessary to hold that consciousness essentially occupies time2 and what is present to the mind at any ordinary instant1 is what is present during a moment in which that instant occurs4 ,thus1 the present is half past and half to come4 ,again1 the color of the parts of a surface at any finite distance from a point1 has nothing to do with its color just at that point2 and1 in the parallel1 the feeling at any finite interval from the present has nothing to do with the present feeling1 except vicariously4 ,take another case3 the velocity of a particle at any instant of time is its mean velocity during an infinitesimal instant in which that time is contained4 ,just so my immediate feeling is my feeling through an infinitesimal duration containing the present instant4 ,,analysis ,,of ,,time ,one of the most marked features about the law of mind is that it makes time to have a definite direction of flow from past to future4 ,the relation of past to future is1 in reference to the law of mind1 different from the relation of future to past4 ,this makes one of the great contrasts between the law of mind and the law of physical force1 where there is no more distinction between the two opposite directions in time than between moving northward and moving southward4 ,in order1 therefore1 to analyze the law of mind1 we must begin by asking what the flow of time consists in4 ,now1 we find that in reference to any individual state of feeling1 all others are of two classes1 those which affect this one 7or have a tendency to affect it1 and what this means we shall inquire shortly71 and those which do not4 ,the present is affectible by the past but not by the future4 ,moreover1 if state ,a is affected by state ,b1 and state ,b by state ,c1 then ,a is affected by state ,c1 though not so much so4 ,it follows1 that if ,a is affectible by ,b1 ,b is not affectible by ,a4 ,if1 of two states1 each is absolutely unaffectible by the other1 they are to be regarded as parts of the same state4 ,they are contemporaneous4 ,to say that a state is between two states means that it affects one and is affected by the other4 ,between any two states in this sense lies an innumerable series of states affecting one another2 and if a state lies between a given state and any other state which can be reached by inserting states between this state and any third state1 these inserted states not immediately affecting or being affected by either1 then the second rate mentioned1 immediately affects or is affected by the first1 in the sense that in the one the other is ipso facto present in a reduced degree4 ,these propositions involve a definition of time and of its flow4 ,over and above this definition they involve a doctrine1 namely1 that every state of feeling is affectible by every earlier state4 ,,that ,,feelings ,,have ,,intensive ,,continuity ,time with its continuity logically involves some other kind of continuity than its own4 ,time1 as the universal form of change1 cannot exist unless there is something to undergo change1 and to undergo a change continuous in time1 there must be a continuity of changeable qualities4 ,of the continuity of intrinsic qualities of feeling we can now form but a feeble conception4 ,the development of the human mind has practically extinguished all feelings1 except a few sporadic kinds1 sound1 colors1 smells1 warmth1 etc41 which now appear to be disconnected and disparate4 ,in the case of colors1 there is a tridimensional spread of feelings4 ,originally1 all feelings may have been connected in the same way1 and the presumption is that the number of dimensions was endless4 ,for development essentially involves a limitation of possibilities4 ,but given a number of dimensions of feeling1 all possible varieties are obtainable by varying the intensities of the different elements4 ,accordingly1 time logically supposes a continuous range of intensity in feeling4 ,it follows1 then1 from the definition of continuity1 that when any particular kind of feeling is present1 an infinitesimal continuum of all feelings differing infinitesimally from that is present4 ,,that ,,feelings ,,have ,,spatial ,,extension ,consider a gob of protoplasm1 say an amba or a slime-mould4 ,it does not differ in any radical way from the contents of a nerve-cell1 though its functions may be less specialized4 ,there is no doubt that this slime-mould1 or this amba1 or at any rate some similar mass of protoplasm feels4 ,that is to say1 it feels when it is in its excited condition4 ,but note how it behaves4 ,when the whole is quiescent and rigid1 a place upon it is irritated4 ,just at this point1 an active motion is set up1 and this gradually spreads to other parts4 ,in this action1 no unity nor relation to a nucleus1 or other unitary organ can be discerned4 ,it is a mere amorphous continuum of protoplasm1 with feeling passing from one part to another4 ,nor is there anything like a wave-motion4 ,the activity does not advance to new parts1 just as fast as it leaves old parts4 ,rather1 in the beginning1 it dies out at a slower rate than that at which it spreads4 ,and while the process is going on1 by exciting the mass at another point1 a second quite independent state of excitation will be set up4 ,in some places1 neither excitation will exist1 in others each separately1 in still other places1 both effects will be added together4 ,whatever there is in the whole phenomenon to make us think there is feeling in such a mass of protoplasm1--feeling1 but plainly no personality1--goes logically to show that that feeling has a subjective1 or substantial1 spatial extension1 as the excited state has4 ,this is1 no doubt1 a difficult idea to seize1 for the reason that it is a subjective1 not an objective1 extension4 ,it is not that we have a feeling of bigness2 though ,professor ,james1 perhaps rightly1 teaches that we have4 ,it is that the feeling1 as a subject of inhesion1 is big4 ,moreover1 our own feelings are focused in attention to such a degree that we are not aware that ideas are not brought to an absolute unity2 just as nobody not instructed by special experiment has any idea how very1 very little of the field of vision is distinct4 ,still1 we all know how the attention wanders about among our feelings2 and this fact shows that those feelings that are not co-ordinated in attention have a reciprocal externality1 although they are present at the same time4 ,but we must not tax introspection to make a phenomenon manifest which essentially involves externality4 ,since space is continuous1 it follows that there must be an immediate community of feeling between parts of mind infinitesimally near together4 ,without this1 ,i believe it would have been impossible for minds external to one another1 ever to become co-ordinated1 and equally impossible for any cordination to be established in the action of the nerve-matter of one brain4 ,,affections ,,of ,,ideas ,but we are met by the question what is meant by saying that one idea affects another4 ,the unravelment of this problem requires us to trace out phenomena a little further4 ,three elements go to make up an idea4 ,the first is its intrinsic quality as a feeling4 ,the second is the energy with which it affects other ideas1 an energy which is infinite in the here-and-nowness of immediate sensation1 finite and relative in the recency of the past4 ,the third element is the tendency of an idea to bring along other ideas with it4 ,as an idea spreads1 its power of affecting other ideas gets rapidly reduced2 but its intrinsic quality remains nearly unchanged4 ,it is long years now since ,i last saw a cardinal in his robes2 and my memory of their color has become much dimmed4 ,the color itself1 however1 is not remembered as dim4 ,i have no inclination to call it a dull red4 ,thus1 the intrinsic quality remains little changed2 yet more accurate observation will show a slight reduction of it4 ,the third element1 on the other hand1 has increased4 ,as well as ,i can recollect1 it seems to me the cardinals ,i used to see wore robes more scarlet than vermillion is1 and highly luminous4 ,still1 ,i know the color commonly called cardinal is on the crimson side of vermillion and of quite moderate luminosity1 and the original idea calls up so many other hues with it1 and asserts itself so feebly1 that ,i am unable any longer to isolate it4 ,a finite interval of time generally contains an innumerable series of feelings2 and when these become welded together in association1 the result is a general idea4 ,for we have just seen how by continuous spreading an idea becomes generalised4 ,the first character of a general idea so resulting is that it is living feeling4 ,a continuum of this feeling1 infinitesimal in duration1 but still embracing innumerable parts1 and also1 though infinitesimal1 entirely unlimited1 is immediately present4 ,and in its absence of boundedness a vague possibility of more than is present is directly felt4 ,second1 in the presence of this continuity of feeling1 nominalistic maxims appear futile4 ,there is no doubt about one idea affecting another1 when we can directly perceive the one gradually modified and shaping itself into the other4 ,nor can there any longer be any difficulty about one idea resembling another1 when we can pass along the continuous field of quality from one to the other and back again to the point which we had marked4 ,illustration3 ,figure #g4 ,third1 consider the insistency of an idea4 ,the insistency of a past idea with reference to the present is a quantity which is less the further back that past idea is1 and rises to infinity as the past idea is brought up into coincidence with the present4 ,here we must make one of those inductive applications of the law of continuity which have produced such great results in all the positive sciences4 ,we must extend the law of insistency into the future4 ,plainly1 the insistency of a future idea with reference to the present is a quantity affected by the minus sign2 for it is the present that affects the future1 if there be any effect1 not the future that affects the present4 ,accordingly1 the curve of insistency is a sort of equilateral hyperbola4 7,see the figure47 ,such a conception is none the less mathematical1 that its quantification cannot now be exactly specified4 ,now consider the induction which we have here been led into4 ,this curve says that feeling which has not yet emerged into immediate consciousness is already affectible and already affected4 ,in fact1 this is habit1 by virtue of which an idea is brought up into present consciousness by a bond that had already been established between it and another idea while it was still in futuro4 ,we can now see what the affection of one idea by another consists in4 ,it is that the affected idea is attached as a logical predicate to the affecting idea as subject4 ,so when a feeling emerges into immediate consciousness1 it always appears as a modification of a more or less general object already in the mind4 ,the word suggestion is well adapted to expressing this relation4 ,the future is suggested by1 or rather is influenced by the suggestions of1 the past4 ,,ideas ,,cannot ,,be ,,connected ,,except ,,by ,,continuity ,that ideas can nowise be connected without continuity is sufficiently evident to one who reflects upon the matter4 ,but still the opinion may be entertained that after continuity has once made the connection of ideas possible1 then they may get to be connected in other modes than through continuity4 ,certainly1 ,i cannot see how anyone can deny that the infinite diversity of the universe1 which we call chance1 may bring ideas into proximity which are not associated in one general idea4 ,it may do this many times4 ,but then the law of continuous spreading will produce a mental association2 and this ,i suppose is an abridged statement of the way the universe has been evolved4 ,but if ,i am asked whether a blind cannot bring ideas together1 first ,i point out that it would not remain blind4 ,there being a continuous connection between the ideas1 they would infallibly become associated in a living1 feeling1 and perceiving general idea4 ,next1 ,i cannot see what the mustness or necessity of this would consist in4 ,in the absolute uniformity of the phenomenon1 says the nominalist4 ,absolute is well put in2 for if it merely happened so three times in succession1 or three million times in succession1 in the absence of any reason1 the coincidence could only be attributed to chance4 ,but absolute uniformity must extend over the whole infinite future2 and it is idle to talk of that except as an idea4 ,no2 ,i think we can only hold that wherever ideas come together they tend to weld into general ideas2 and wherever they are generally connected1 general ideas govern the connection2 and these general ideas are living feelings spread out4 ,,mental ,,law ,,follows ,,the ,,forms ,,of ,,logic ,the three main classes of logical inference are ,deduction1 ,induction1 and ,hypothesis4 ,these correspond to three chief modes of action of the human soul4 ,in deduction the mind is under the dominion of a habit or association by virtue of which a general idea suggests in each case a corresponding reaction4 ,but a certain sensation is seen to involve that idea4 ,consequently1 that sensation is followed by that reaction4 ,that is the way the hind legs of a frog1 separated from the rest of the body1 reason1 when you pinch them4 ,it is the lowest form of psychical manifestation4 ,by induction1 a habit becomes established4 ,certain sensations1 all involving one general idea1 are followed each by the same reaction2 and an association becomes established1 whereby that general idea gets to be followed uniformly by that reaction4 ,habit is that specialization of the law of mind whereby a general idea gains the power of exciting reactions4 ,but in order that the general idea should attain all its functionality1 it is necessary1 also1 that it should become suggestible by sensations4 ,that is accomplished by a psychical process having the form of hypothetic inference4 ,by hypothetic inference1 ,i mean1 as ,i have explained in other writings1 an induction from qualities4 ,for example1 ,i know that the kind of man known and classed as a 8mugwump0 has certain characteristics4 ,he has a high self-respect and places great value upon social distinction4 ,he laments the great part that rowdyism and unrefined good-fellowship play in the dealings of ,american politicians with their constituency4 ,he thinks that the reform which would follow from the abandonment of the system by which the distribution of offices is made to strengthen party organizations and a return to the original and essential conception of office-filling would be found an unmixed good4 ,he holds that monetary considerations should usually be the decisive ones in questions of public policy4 ,he respects the principle of individualism and of laissez-faire as the greatest agency of civilization4 ,these views1 among others1 ,i know to be obtrusive marks of a 8mugwump40 ,now1 suppose ,i casually meet a man in a railway-train1 and falling into conversation find that he holds opinions of this sort2 ,i am naturally led to suppose that he is a 8mugwump40 ,that is hypothetic inference4 ,that is to say1 a number of readily verifiable marks of a mugwump being selected1 ,i find this man has these1 and infer that he has all the other characters which go to make a thinker of that stripe4 ,or let us suppose that ,i meet a man of a semi-clerical appearance and a sub-pharisaical sniff1 who appears to look at things from the point of view of a rather wooden dualism4 ,he cites several texts of scripture and always with particular attention to their logical implications2 and he exhibits a sternness1 almost amounting to vindictiveness1 toward evil-doers1 in general4 ,i readily conclude that he is a minister of a certain denomination4 ,now the mind acts in a way similar to this1 every time we acquire a power of co-ordinating reactions in a peculiar way1 as in performing any act requiring skill4 ,thus1 most persons have a difficulty in moving the two hands simultaneously and in opposite directions through two parallel circles nearly in the medial plane of the body4 ,to learn to do this1 it is necessary to attend1 first1 to the different actions in different parts of the motion1 when suddenly a general conception of the action springs up and it becomes perfectly easy4 ,we think the motion we are trying to do involves this action1 and this1 and this4 ,then1 the general idea comes which unites all those actions1 and thereupon the desire to perform the motion calls up the general idea4 ,the same mental process is many times employed whenever we are learning to speak a language or are acquiring any sort of skill4 ,thus1 by induction1 a number of sensations followed by one reaction become united under one general idea followed by the same reaction2 while by the hypothetic process1 a number of reactions called for by one occasion get united in a general idea which is called out by the same occasion4 ,by deduction1 the habit fulfils its function of calling out certain reactions on certain occasions4 ,,uncertainty ,,of ,,mental ,,action ,the inductive and hypothetic forms of inference are essentially probable inferences1 not necessary2 while deduction may be either necessary or probable4 ,but no mental action seems to be necessary or invariable in its character4 ,in whatever manner the mind has reacted under a given sensation1 in that manner it is the more likely to react again2 were this1 however1 an absolute necessity1 habits would become wooden and ineradicable1 and no room being left for the formation of new habits1 intellectual life would come to a speedy close4 ,thus1 the uncertainty of the mental law is no mere defect of it1 but is on the contrary of its essence4 ,the truth is1 the mind is not subject to 8law10 in the same rigid sense that matter is4 ,it only experiences gentle forces which merely render it more likely to act in a given way than it otherwise would be4 ,there always remains a certain amount of arbitrary spontaneity in its action1 without which it would be dead4 ,some psychologists think to reconcile the uncertainty of reactions with the principle of necessary causation by means of the law of fatigue4 ,truly for a law1 this law of fatigue is a little lawless4 ,i think it is merely a case of the general principle that an idea in spreading loses its insistency4 ,put me tarragon into my salad1 when ,i have not tasted it for years1 and ,i exclaim 8,what nectar is this60 ,but add it to every dish ,i taste for week after week1 and a habit of expectation has been created2 and in thus spreading into habit1 the sensation makes hardly any more impression upon me2 or1 if it be noticed1 it is on a new side from which it appears as rather a bore4 ,the doctrine that fatigue is one of the primordial phenomena of mind ,i am much disposed to doubt4 ,it seems a somewhat little thing to be allowed as an exception to the great principle of mental uniformization4 ,for this reason1 ,i prefer to explain it in the manner here indicated1 as a special case of that great principle4 ,to consider it as something distinct in its nature1 certainly somewhat strengthens the necessitarian position2 but even if it be distinct1 the hypothesis that all the variety and apparent arbitrariness of mental action ought to be explained away in favor of absolute determinism does not seem to me to recommend itself to a sober and sound judgment1 which seeks the guidance of observed facts and not that of prepossessions4 ,,restatement ,,of ,,the ,,law ,let me now try to gather up all these odds and ends of commentary and restate the law of mind1 in a unitary way4 ,first1 then1 we find that when we regard ideas from a nominalistic1 individualistic1 sensualistic way1 the simplest facts of mind become utterly meaningless4 ,that one idea should resemble another or influence another1 or that one state of mind should so much as be thought of in another is1 from that standpoint1 sheer nonsense4 ,second1 by this and other means we are driven to perceive1 what is quite evident of itself1 that instantaneous feelings flow together into a continuum of feeling1 which has in a modified degree the peculiar vivacity of feeling and has gained generality4 ,and in reference to such general ideas1 or continua of feeling1 the difficulties about resemblance and suggestion and reference to the external1 cease to have any force4 ,third1 these general ideas are not mere words1 nor do they consist in this1 that certain concrete facts will every time happen under certain descriptions of conditions2 but they are just as much1 or rather far more1 living realities than the feelings themselves out of which they are concreted4 ,and to say that mental phenomena are governed by law does not mean merely that they are describable by a general formula2 but that there is a living idea1 a conscious continuum of feeling1 which pervades them1 and to which they are docile4 ,fourth1 this supreme law1 which is the celestial and living harmony1 does not so much as demand that the special ideas shall surrender their peculiar arbitrariness and caprice entirely2 for that would be self-destructive4 ,it only requires that they shall influence and be influenced by one another4 ,fifth1 in what measure this unification acts1 seems to be regulated only by special rules2 or1 at least1 we cannot in our present knowledge say how far it goes4 ,but it may be said that1 judging by appearances1 the amount of arbitrariness in the phenomena of human minds is neither altogether trifling nor very prominent4 ,,personality ,having thus endeavored to state the law of mind1 in general1 ,i descend to the consideration of a particular phenomenon which is remarkably prominent in our own consciousnesses1 that of personality4 ,a strong light is thrown upon this subject by recent observations of double and multiple personality4 ,the theory which at one time seemed plausible that two persons in one body corresponded to the two halves of the brain will1 ,i take it1 now be universally acknowledged to be insufficient4 ,but that which these cases make quite manifest is that personality is some kind of co-ordination or connection of ideas4 ,not much to say1 this1 perhaps4 ,yet when we consider that1 according to the principle which we are tracing out1 a connection between ideas is itself a general idea1 and that a general idea is a living feeling1 it is plain that we have at least taken an appreciable step toward the understanding of personality4 ,this personality1 like any general idea1 is not a thing to be apprehended in an instant4 ,it has to be lived in time2 nor can any finite time embrace it in all its fullness4 ,yet in each infinitesimal interval it is present and living1 though specially colored by the immediate feelings of that moment4 ,personality1 so far as it is apprehended in a moment1 is immediate self-consciousness4 ,but the word co-ordination implies somewhat more than this2 it implies a teleological harmony in ideas1 and in the case of personality this teleology is more than a mere purposive pursuit of a predeterminate end2 it is a developmental teleology4 ,this is personal character4 ,a general idea1 living and conscious now1 it is already determinative of acts in the future to an extent to which it is not now conscious4 ,this reference to the future is an essential element of personality4 ,were the ends of a person already explicit1 there would be no room for development1 for growth1 for life2 and consequently there would be no personality4 ,the mere carrying out of predetermined purposes is mechanical4 ,this remark has an application to the philosophy of religion4 ,it is that a genuine evolutionary philosophy1 that is1 one that makes the principle of growth a primordial element of the universe1 is so far from being antagonistic to the idea of a personal creator1 that it is really inseparable from that idea2 while a necessitarian religion is in an altogether false position and is destined to become disintegrated4 ,but a pseudo-evolutionism which enthrones mechanical law above the principle of growth1 is at once scientifically unsatisfactory1 as giving no possible hint of how the universe has come about1 and hostile to all hopes of personal relations to ,god4 ,,communication ,consistently with the doctrine laid down in the beginning of this paper1 ,i am bound to maintain that an idea can only be affected by an idea in continuous connection with it4 ,by anything but an idea1 it cannot be affected at all4 ,this obliges me to say1 as ,i do say1 on other grounds1 that what we call matter is not completely dead1 but is merely mind hide-bound with habits4 ,it still retains the element of diversification2 and in that diversification there is life4 ,when an idea is conveyed from one mind to another1 it is by forms of combination of the diverse elements of nature1 say by some curious symmetry1 or by some union of a tender color with a refined odor4 ,to such forms the law of mechanical energy has no application4 ,if they are eternal1 it is in the spirit they embody2 and their origin cannot be accounted for by any mechanical necessity4 ,they are embodied ideas2 and so only can they convey ideas4 ,precisely how primary sensations1 as colors and tones1 are excited1 we cannot tell1 in the present state of psychology4 ,but in our ignorance1 ,i think that we are at liberty to suppose that they arise in essentially the same manner as the other feelings1 called secondary4 ,as far as sight and hearing are in question1 we know that they are only excited by vibrations of inconceivable complexity2 and the chemical senses are probably not more simple4 ,even the least psychical of peripheral sensations1 that of pressure1 has in its excitation conditions which1 though apparently simple1 are seen to be complicated enough when we consider the molecules and their attractions4 ,the principle with which ,i set out requires me to maintain that these feelings are communicated to the nerves by continuity1 so that there must be something like them in the excitants themselves4 ,if this seems extravagant1 it is to be remembered that it is the sole possible way of reaching any explanation of sensation1 which otherwise must be pronounced a general fact1 absolutely inexplicable and ultimate4 ,now absolute inexplicability is a hypothesis which sound logic refuses under any circumstances to justify4 ,i may be asked whether my theory would be favorable or otherwise to telepathy4 ,i have no decided answer to give to this4 ,at first sight1 it seems unfavorable4 ,yet there may be other modes of continuous connection between minds other than those of time and space4 ,the recognition by one person of another's personality takes place by means to some extent identical with the means by which he is conscious of his own personality4 ,the idea of the second personality1 which is as much as to say that second personality itself1 enters within the field of direct consciousness of the first person1 and is as immediately perceived as his ego1 though less strongly4 ,at the same time1 the opposition between the two persons is perceived1 so that the externality of the second is recognized4 ,the psychological phenomena of intercommunication between two minds have been unfortunately little studied4 ,so that it is impossible to say1 for certain1 whether they are favorable to this theory or not4 ,but the very extraordinary insight which some persons are able to gain of others from indications so slight that it is difficult to ascertain what they are1 is certainly rendered more comprehensible by the view here taken4 ,a difficulty which confronts the synechistic philosophy is this4 ,in considering personality1 that philosophy is forced to accept the doctrine of a personal ,god2 but in considering communication1 it cannot but admit that if there is a personal ,god1 we must have a direct perception of that person and indeed be in personal communication with him4 ,now1 if that be the case1 the question arises how it is possible that the existence of this being should ever have been doubted by anybody4 ,the only answer that ,i can at present make is that facts that stand before our face and eyes and stare us in the face are far from being1 in all cases1 the ones most easily discerned4 ,that has been remarked from time immemorial4 ,,conclusion ,i have thus developed as well as ,i could in a little space the synechistic philosophy1 as applied to mind4 ,i think that ,i have succeeded in making it clear that this doctrine gives room for explanations of many facts which without it are absolutely and hopelessly inexplicable2 and further that it carries along with it the following doctrines3 #ast1 a logical realism of the most pronounced type2 #bnd1 objective idealism2 #crd1 tychism1 with its consequent thoroughgoing evolutionism4 ,we also notice that the doctrine presents no hindrances to spiritual influences1 such as some philosophies are felt to do4 ,footnote #fa3 ,the ,monist1 ,july1 #ahib4 ,footnote #fb3 ,this proposition is substantially the same as a theorem of ,cantor1 though it is enunciated in a much more general form4 ,,iv4 ,,man',s ,,glassy ,,essence#fc ,in ,the ,monist for ,january1 #ahia1 ,i tried to show what conceptions ought to form the brick and mortar of a philosophical system4 ,chief among these was that of absolute chance for which ,i argued again in last ,april's number4#fd ,in ,july1 ,i applied another fundamental idea1 that of continuity1 to the law of mind4 ,next in order1 ,i have to elucidate1 from the point of view chosen1 the relation between the psychical and physical aspects of a substance4 ,the first step towards this ought1 ,i think1 to be the framing of a molecular theory of protoplasm4 ,but before doing that1 it seems indispensable to glance at the constitution of matter1 in general4 ,we shall1 thus1 unavoidably make a long detour2 but1 after all1 our pains will not be wasted1 for the problems of the papers that are to follow in the series will call for the consideration of the same question4 ,all physicists are rightly agreed the evidence is overwhelming which shows all sensible matter is composed of molecules in swift motion and exerting enormous mutual attractions1 and perhaps repulsions1 too4 ,even ,sir ,william ,thomson1 ,lord ,kelvin1 who wishes to explode action at a distance and return to the doctrine of a plenum1 not only speaks of molecules1 but undertakes to assign definite magnitudes to them4 ,the brilliant ,judge ,stallo1 a man who did not always rightly estimate his own qualities in accepting tasks for himself1 declared war upon the atomic theory in a book well worth careful perusal4 ,to the old arguments in favor of atoms which he found in ,fechner's monograph1 he was able to make replies of considerable force1 though they were not sufficient to destroy those arguments4 ,but against modern proofs he made no headway at all4 ,these set out from the mechanical theory of heat4 ,rumford's experiments showed that heat is not a substance4 ,joule demonstrated that it was a form of energy4 ,the heating of gases under constant volume1 and other facts instanced by ,rankine1 proved that it could not be an energy of strain4 ,this drove physicists to the conclusion that it was a mode of motion4 ,then it was remembered that ,john ,bernoulli had shown that the pressure of gases could be accounted for by assuming their molecules to be moving uniformly in rectilinear paths4 ,the same hypothesis was now seen to account for ,avogadro's law1 that in equal volumes of different kinds of gases exposed to the same pressure and temperature are contained equal numbers of molecules4 ,shortly after1 it was found to account for the laws of diffusion and viscosity of gases1 and for the numerical relation between these properties4 ,finally1 ,crookes's radiometer furnished the last link in the strongest chain of evidence which supports any physical hypothesis4 ,such being the constitution of gases1 liquids must clearly be bodies in which the molecules wander in curvilinear paths1 while in solids they move in orbits or quasi-orbits4 7,see my definition solid ,,ii1 #a1 in the ,century ,dictionary47 ,we see that the resistance to compression and to inter-penetration between sensible bodies is1 by one of the prime propositions of the molecular theory1 due in large measure to the kinetical energy of the particles1 which must be supposed to be quite remote from one another1 on the average1 even in solids4 ,this resistance is no doubt influenced by finite attractions and repulsions between the molecules4 ,all the impenetrability of bodies which we can observe is1 therefore1 a limited impenetrability due to kinetic and positional energy4 ,this being the case1 we have no logical right to suppose that absolute impenetrability1 or the exclusive occupancy of space1 belongs to molecules or to atoms4 ,it is an unwarranted hypothesis1 not a vera causa4#fe ,unless we are to give up the theory of energy1 finite positional attractions and repulsions between molecules must be admitted4 ,absolute impenetrability would amount to an infinite repulsion at a certain distance4 ,no analogy of known phenomena exists to excuse such a wanton violation of the principle of continuity as such a hypothesis is4 ,in short1 we are logically bound to adopt the ,boscovichian idea that an atom is simply a distribution of component potential energy throughout space 7this distribution being absolutely rigid71 combined with inertia4 ,the potential energy belongs to two molecules1 and is to be conceived as different between molecules ,a and ,b from what it is between molecules ,a and ,c4 ,the distribution of energy is not necessarily spherical4 ,nay1 a molecule may conceivably have more than one center2 it may even have a central curve1 returning into itself4 ,but ,i do not think there are any observed facts pointing to such multiple or linear centers4 ,on the other hand1 many facts relating to crystals1 especially those observed by ,voigt1#ff go to show that the distribution of energy is harmonical but not concentric4 ,we can easily calculate the forces which such atoms must exert upon one another by considering#fg that they are equivalent to aggregations of pairs of electrically positive and negative points infinitely near to one another4 ,about such an atom there would be regions of positive and of negative potential1 and the number and distribution of such regions would determine the valency of the atom1 a number which it is easy to see would in many cases be somewhat indeterminate4 ,i must not dwell further upon this hypothesis1 at present4 ,in another paper1 its consequences will be further considered4 ,i cannot assume that the students of philosophy who read this magazine are thoroughly versed in modern molecular physics1 and1 therefore1 it is proper to mention that the governing principle in this branch of science is ,clausius's law of the virial4 ,i will first state the law1 and then explain the peculiar terms of the statement4 ,this statement is that the total kinetic energy of the particles of a system in stationary motion is equal to the total virial4 ,by a system is here meant a number of particles acting upon one another4#fh ,stationary motion is a quasi-orbital motion among a system of particles so that none of them are removed to indefinitely great distances nor acquire indefinitely great velocities4 ,the kinetic energy of a particle is the work which would be required to bring it to rest1 independently of any forces which may be acting upon it4 ,the virial of a pair of particles is half the work which the force which actually operates between them would do if1 being independent of the distance1 it were to bring them together4 ,the equation of the virial is #a_/bmv#b #a_/b,rr4 ,here m is the mass of a particle1 v its velocity1 ,r is the attraction between two particles1 and r is the distance between them4 ,the sign on the left hand side signifies that the values of mv#b are to be summed for all the particles1 and on the right hand side signifies that the values of ,rr are to be summed for all the pairs of particles4 ,if there is an external pressure ,p 7as from the atmosphere7 upon the system1 and the volume of vacant space within the boundary of that pressure is ,v1 then the virial must be understood as including #c_/b,,pv1 so that the equation is #a_/bmv#b #c_/b,,pv #a_/b,rr4 ,there is strong 7if not demonstrative7 reason for thinking that the temperature of any body above the absolute zero 7-#bgc ,c471 is proportional to the average kinetic energy of its molecules1 or say a1 where a is a constant and is the absolute temperature4 ,hence1 we may write the equation a 7#a_/b7;avg7mv#b7 7#c_/b7,p avg7,v7 7#a_/b7 avg7,rr7 where the heavy lines above the different expressions signify that the average values for single molecules are to be taken4 ,in #ahgb1 a student in the ,university of ,leyden1 ,van der ,waals1 propounded in his thesis for the doctorate a specialization of the equation of the virial which has since attracted great attention4 ,namely1 he writes it a 7,p c_/,v#b77,v - b47 ,the quantity b is the volume of a molecule1 which he supposes to be an impenetrable body1 and all the virtue of the equation lies in this term which makes the equation a cubic in ,v1 which is required to account for the shape of certain isothermal curves4#fi ,but if the idea of an impenetrable atom is illogical1 that of an impenetrable molecule is almost absurd4 ,for the kinetical theory of matter teaches us that a molecule is like a solar system or star-cluster in miniature4 ,unless we suppose that in all heating of gases and vapors internal work is performed upon the molecules1 implying that their atoms are at considerable distances1 the whole kinetical theory of gases falls to the ground4 ,as for the term added to ,p1 there is no more than a partial and roughly approximative justification for it4 ,namely1 let us imagine two spheres described round a particle as their center1 the radius of the larger being so great as to include all the particles whose action upon the center is sensible1 while the radius of the smaller is so large that a good many molecules are included within it4 ,the possibility of describing such a sphere as the outer one implies that the attraction of the particles varies at some distances inversely as some higher power of the distance than the cube1 or1 to speak more clearly1 that the attraction multiplied by the cube of the distance diminishes as the distance increases2 for the number of particles at a given distance from any one particle is proportionate to the square of that distance and each of these gives a term of the virial which is the product of the attraction into the distance4 ,consequently1 unless the attraction multiplied by the cube of the distance diminished so rapidly with the distance as soon to become insensible1 no such outer sphere as is supposed could be described4 ,however1 ordinary experience shows that such a sphere is possible2 and consequently there must be distances at which the attraction does thus rapidly diminish as the distance increases4 ,the two spheres1 then1 being so drawn1 consider the virial of the central particle due to the particles between them4 ,let the density of the substance be increased1 say1 ,n times4 ,then1 for every turn1 ,rr1 of the virial before the condensation1 there will be ,n terms of the same magnitude after the condensation4 ,hence1 the virial of each particle will be proportional to the density1 and the equation of the virial becomes a ,p avg7,v7 c_/avg7,v74 ,this omits the virial within the inner sphere1 the radius of which is so taken that within that distance the number of particles is not proportional to the number in a large sphere4 ,for ,van der ,waals this radius is the diameter of his hard molecules1 which assumption gives his equation4 ,but it is plain that the attraction between the molecules must to a certain extent modify their distribution1 unless some peculiar conditions are fulfilled4 ,the equation of ,van der ,waals can be approximately true1 therefore1 only for a gas4 ,in a solid or liquid condition1 in which the removal of a small amount of pressure has little effect on the volume1 and where consequently the virial must be much greater than ,p avg7,v71 the virial must increase with the volume4 ,for suppose we had a substance in a critical condition in which an increase of the volume would diminish the virial more than it would increase 7#c_/b7,p avg7,v74 ,if we were forcibly to diminish the volume of such a substance1 when the temperature became equalized1 the pressure which it could withstand would be less than before1 and it would be still further condensed1 and this would go on indefinitely until a condition were reached in which an increase of volume would increase 7#c_/b7,p avg7,v7 more than it would decrease the virial4 ,in the case of solids1 at least1 ,p may be zero2 so that the state reached would be one in which the virial increases with the volume1 or the attraction between the particles does not increase so fast with a diminution of their distance as it would if the attraction were inversely as the distance4 ,almost contemporaneously with ,van der ,waals's paper1 another remarkable thesis for the doctorate was presented at ,paris by ,amagat4 ,it related to the elasticity and expansion of gases1 and to this subject the superb experimenter1 its author1 has devoted his whole subsequent life4 ,especially interesting are his observations of the volumes of ethylene and of carbonic acid at temperatures from #bj to #ajj and at pressures ranging from an ounce to #ejjj pounds to the square inch4 ,as soon as ,amagat had obtained these results1 he remarked that the 8coefficient of expansion at constant volume10 as it is absurdly called1 that is1 the rate of variation of the pressure with the temperature1 was very nearly constant for each volume4 ,this accords with the equation of the virial1 which gives dp_/d a_/avg7,v7 - d avg7,rr7_/d4 ,now1 the virial must be nearly independent of the temperature1 and1 therefore1 the last term almost disappears4 ,the virial would not be quite independent of the temperature1 because if the temperature 7i4e41 the square of the velocity of the molecules7 is lowered1 and the pressure correspondingly lowered1 so as to make the volume the same1 the attractions of the molecules will have more time to produce their effects1 and consequently1 the pairs of molecules the closest together will be held together longer and closer2 so that the virial will generally be increased by a decrease of temperature4 ,now1 ,amagat's experiments do show an excessively minute effect of this sort1 at least1 when the volumes are not too small4 ,however1 the observations are well enough satisfied by assuming the 8coefficient of expansion at constant volume0 to consist wholly of the first term1 a_/avg7,v74 ,thus1 ,amagat's experiments enable us to determine the values of a and thence to calculate the virial2 and this we find varies for carbonic acid gas nearly inversely to avg7,v7#j4i4 ,there is1 thus1 a rough approximation to satisfying ,van der ,waals's equation4 ,but the most interesting result of ,amagat's experiments1 for our purpose at any rate1 is that the quantity a1 though nearly constant for any one volume1 differs considerably with the volume1 nearly doubling when the volume is reduced fivefold4 ,this can only indicate that the mean kinetic energy of a given mass of the gas for a given temperature is greater the more the gas is compressed4 ,but the laws of mechanics appear to enjoin that the mean kinetic energy of a moving particle shall be constant at any given temperature4 ,the only escape from contradiction1 then1 is to suppose that the mean mass of a moving particle diminishes upon the condensation of the gas4 ,in other words1 many of the molecules are dissociated1 or broken up into atoms or sub-molecules4 ,the idea that dissociation should be favored by diminishing the volume will be pronounced by physicists1 at first blush1 as contrary to all our experience4 ,but it must be remembered that the circumstances we are speaking of1 that of a gas under fifty or more atmospheres pressure1 are also unusual4 ,that the 8coefficient of expansion under constant volume0 when multiplied by the volumes should increase with a decrement of the volume is also quite contrary to ordinary experience2 yet it undoubtedly takes place in all gases under great pressure4 ,again1 the doctrine of ,arrhenius#gj is now generally accepted1 that the molecular conductivity of an electrolyte is proportional to the dissociation of ions4 ,now the molecular conductivity of a fused electrolyte is usually superior to that of a solution4 ,here is a case1 then1 in which diminution of volume is accompanied by increased dissociation4 ,the truth is that several different kinds of dissociation have to be distinguished4 ,in the first place1 there is the dissociation of a chemical molecule to form chemical molecules under the regular action of chemical laws4 ,this may be a double decomposition1 as when iodhydric acid is dissociated1 according to the formula ,,hi ,,hi ,,hh ,,ii2 or1 it may be a simple decomposition1 as when pentachloride of phosphorus is dissociated according to the formula ,p,cl#e ,p,cl#c ,cl,cl4 ,all these dissociations require1 according to the laws of thermo-chemistry1 an elevated temperature4 ,in the second place1 there is the dissociation of a physically polymerous molecule1 that is1 of several chemical molecules joined by physical attractions4 ,this ,i am inclined to suppose is a common concomitant of the heating of solids and liquids2 for in these bodies there is no increase of compressibility with the temperature at all comparable with the increase of the expansibility4 ,but1 in the third place1 there is the dissociation with which we are now concerned1 which must be supposed to be a throwing off of unsaturated sub-molecules or atoms from the molecule4 ,the molecule may1 as ,i have said1 be roughly likened to a solar system4 ,as such1 molecules are able to produce perturbations of one another's internal motions2 and in this way a planet1 i4e41 a sub-molecule1 will occasionally get thrown off and wander about by itself1 till it finds another unsaturated sub-molecule with which it can unite4 ,such dissociation by perturbation will naturally be favored by the proximity of the molecules to one another4 ,let us now pass to the consideration of that special substance1 or rather class of substances1 whose properties form the chief subject of botany and of zology1 as truly as those of the silicates form the chief subject of mineralogy3 ,i mean the life-slimes1 or protoplasm4 ,let us begin by cataloguing the general characters of these slimes4 ,they one and all exist in two states of aggregation1 a solid or nearly solid state and a liquid or nearly liquid state2 but they do not pass from the former to the latter by ordinary fusion4 ,they are readily decomposed by heat1 especially in the liquid state2 nor will they bear any considerable degree of cold4 ,all their vital actions take place at temperatures very little below the point of decomposition4 ,this extreme instability is one of numerous facts which demonstrate the chemical complexity of protoplasm4 ,every chemist will agree that they are far more complicated than the albumens4 ,now1 albumen is estimated to contain in each molecule about a thousand atoms2 so that it is natural to suppose that the protoplasms contain several thousands4 ,we know that while they are chiefly composed of oxygen1 hydrogen1 carbon1 and nitrogen1 a large number of other elements enter into living bodies in small proportions2 and it is likely that most of these enter into the composition of protoplasms4 ,now1 since the numbers of chemical varieties increase at an enormous rate with the number of atoms per molecule1 so that there are certainly hundreds of thousands of substances whose molecules contain twenty atoms or fewer1 we may well suppose that the number of protoplasmic substances runs into the billions or trillions4 ,professor ,cayley has given a mathematical theory of 8trees10 with a view of throwing a light upon such questions2 and in that light the estimate of trillions 7in the ,english sense7 seems immoderately moderate4 ,it is true that an opinion has been emitted1 and defended among biologists1 that there is but one kind of protoplasm2 but the observations of biologists1 themselves1 have almost exploded that hypothesis1 which from a chemical standpoint appears utterly incredible4 ,the anticipation of the chemist would decidedly be that enough different chemical substances having protoplasmic characters might be formed to account1 not only for the differences between nerve-slime and muscle-slime1 between whale-slime and lion-slime1 but also for those minuter pervasive variations which characterize different breeds and single individuals4 ,protoplasm1 when quiescent1 is1 broadly speaking1 solid2 but when it is disturbed in an appropriate way1 or sometimes even spontaneously without external disturbance1 it becomes1 broadly speaking1 liquid4 ,a moner in this state is seen under the microscope to have streams within its matter2 a slime-mould slowly flows by force of gravity4 ,the liquefaction starts from the point of disturbance and spreads through the mass4 ,this spreading1 however1 is not uniform in all directions2 on the contrary1 it takes at one time one course1 at another another1 through the homogeneous mass1 in a manner that seems a little mysterious4 ,the cause of disturbance being removed1 these motions gradually 7with higher kinds of protoplasm1 quickly7 cease1 and the slime returns to its solid condition4 ,the liquefaction of protoplasm is accompanied by a mechanical phenomenon4 ,namely1 some kinds exhibit a tendency to draw themselves up into a globular form4 ,this happens particularly with the contents of muscle-cells4 ,the prevalent opinion1 founded on some of the most exquisite experimental investigations that the history of science can show1 is undoubtedly that the contraction of muscle-cells is due to osmotic pressure2 and it must be allowed that that is a factor in producing the effect4 ,but it does not seem to me that it satisfactorily accounts even for the phenomena of muscular contraction2 and besides1 even naked slimes often draw up in the same way4 ,in this case1 we seem to recognize an increase of the surface-tension4 ,in some cases1 too1 the reverse action takes place1 extraordinary pseudopodia being put forth1 as if the surface-tension were diminished in spots4 ,indeed1 such a slime always has a sort of skin1 due no doubt to surface-tension1 and this seems to give way at the point where a pseudopodium is put forth4 ,long-continued or frequently repeated liquefaction of the protoplasm results in an obstinate retention of the solid state1 which we call fatigue4 ,on the other hand1 repose in this state1 if not too much prolonged1 restores the liquefiability4 ,these are both important functions4 ,the life-slimes have1 further1 the peculiar property of growing4 ,crystals also grow2 their growth1 however1 consists merely in attracting matter like their own from the circumambient fluid4 ,to suppose the growth of protoplasm of the same nature1 would be to suppose this substance to be spontaneously generated in copious supplies wherever food is in solution4 ,certainly1 it must be granted that protoplasm is but a chemical substance1 and that there is no reason why it should not be formed synthetically like any other chemical substance4 ,indeed1 ,clifford has clearly shown that we have overwhelming evidence that it is so formed4 ,but to say that such formation is as regular and frequent as the assimilation of food is quite another matter4 ,it is more consonant with the facts of observation to suppose that assimilated protoplasm is formed at the instant of assimilation1 under the influence of the protoplasm already present4 ,for each slime in its growth preserves its distinctive characters with wonderful truth1 nerve-slime growing nerve-slime and muscle-slime muscle-slime1 lion-slime growing lion-slime1 and all the varieties of breeds and even individual characters being preserved in the growth4 ,now it is too much to suppose there are billions of different kinds of protoplasm floating about wherever there is food4 ,the frequent liquefaction of protoplasm increases its power of assimilating food2 so much so1 indeed1 that it is questionable whether in the solid form it possesses this power4 ,the life-slime wastes as well as grows2 and this too takes place chiefly if not exclusively in its liquid phases4 ,closely connected with growth is reproduction2 and though in higher forms this is a specialized function1 it is universally true that wherever there is protoplasm1 there is1 will be1 or has been a power of reproducing that same kind of protoplasm in a separated organism4 ,reproduction seems to involve the union of two sexes2 though it is not demonstrable that this is always requisite4 ,another physical property of protoplasm is that of taking habits4 ,the course which the spread of liquefaction has taken in the past is rendered thereby more likely to be taken in the future2 although there is no absolute certainly that the same path will be followed again4 ,very extraordinary1 certainly1 are all these properties of protoplasm2 as extraordinary as indubitable4 ,but the one which has next to be mentioned1 while equally undeniable1 is infinitely more wonderful4 ,it is that protoplasm feels4 ,we have no direct evidence that this is true of protoplasm universally1 and certainly some kinds feel far more than others4 ,but there is a fair analogical inference that all protoplasm feels4 ,it not only feels but exercises all the functions of mind4 ,such are the properties of protoplasm4 ,the problem is to find a hypothesis of the molecular constitution of this compound which will account for these properties1 one and all4 ,some of them are obvious results of the excessively complicated constitution of the protoplasm molecule4 ,all very complicated substances are unstable2 and plainly a molecule of several thousand atoms may be separated in many ways into two parts in each of which the polar chemical forces are very nearly saturated4 ,in the solid protoplasm1 as in other solids1 the molecules must be supposed to be moving as it were in orbits1 or1 at least1 so as not to wander indefinitely4 ,but this solid cannot be melted1 for the same reason that starch cannot be melted2 because an amount of heat insufficient to make the entire molecules wander is sufficient to break them up completely and cause them to form new and simpler molecules4 ,but when one of the molecules is disturbed1 even if it be not quite thrown out of its orbit at first1 sub-molecules of perhaps several hundred atoms each are thrown off from it4 ,these will soon acquire the same mean kinetic energy as the others1 and1 therefore1 velocities several times as great4 ,they will naturally begin to wander1 and in wandering will perturb a great many other molecules and cause them in their turn to behave like the one originally deranged4 ,so many molecules will thus be broken up1 that even those that are intact will no longer be restrained within orbits1 but will wander about freely4 ,this is the usual condition of a liquid1 as modern chemists understand it2 for in all electrolytic liquids there is considerable dissociation4 ,but this process necessarily chills the substance1 not merely on account of the heat of chemical combination1 but still more because the number of separate particles being greatly increased1 the mean kinetic energy must be less4 ,the substance being a bad conductor1 this heat is not at once restored4 ,now the particles moving more slowly1 the attractions between them have time to take effect1 and they approach the condition of equilibrium4 ,but their dynamic equilibrium is found in the restoration of the solid condition1 which1 therefore1 takes place1 if the disturbance is not kept up4 ,when a body is in the solid condition1 most of its molecules must be moving at the same rate1 or1 at least1 at certain regular sets of rates2 otherwise the orbital motion would not be preserved4 ,the distances of neighboring molecules must always be kept between a certain maximum and a certain minimum value4 ,but if1 without absorption of heat1 the body be thrown into a liquid condition1 the distances of neighboring molecules will be far more unequally distributed1 and an effect upon the virial will result4 ,the chilling of protoplasm upon its liquefaction must also be taken into account4 ,the ordinary effect will no doubt be to increase the cohesion and with that the surface-tension1 so that the mass will tend to draw itself up4 ,but in special cases1 the virial will be increased so much that the surface-tension will be diminished at points where the temperature is first restored4 ,in that case1 the outer film will give way and the tension at other places will aid in causing the general fluid to be poured out at those points1 forming pseudopodia4 ,when the protoplasm is in a liquid state1 and then only1 a solution of food is able to penetrate its mass by diffusion4 ,the protoplasm is then considerably dissociated2 and so is the food1 like all dissolved matter4 ,if then the separated and unsaturated sub-molecules of the food happen to be of the same chemical species as sub-molecules of the protoplasm1 they may unite with other sub-molecules of the protoplasm to form new molecules1 in such a fashion that when the solid state is resumed1 there may be more molecules of protoplasm than there were at the beginning4 ,it is like the jackknife whose blade and handle1 after having been severally lost and replaced1 were found and put together to make a new knife4 ,we have seen that protoplasm is chilled by liquefaction1 and that this brings it back to the solid state1 when the heat is recovered4 ,this series of operations must be very rapid in the case of nerve-slime and even of muscle-slime1 and may account for the unsteady or vibratory character of their action4 ,of course1 if assimilation takes place1 the heat of combination1 which is probably trifling1 is gained4 ,on the other hand1 if work is done1 whether by nerve or by muscle1 loss of energy must take place4 ,in the case of the muscle1 the mode by which the instantaneous part of the fatigue is brought about is easily traced out4 ,if when the muscle contracts it be under stress1 it will contract less than it otherwise would do1 and there will be a loss of heat4 ,it is like an engine which should work by dissolving salt in water and using the contraction during the solution to lift a weight1 the salt being recovered afterwards by distillation4 ,but the major part of fatigue has nothing to do with the correlation of forces4 ,a man must labor hard to do in a quarter of an hour the work which draws from him enough heat to cool his body by a single degree4 ,meantime1 he will be getting heated1 he will be pouring out extra products of combustion1 perspiration1 etc41 and he will be driving the blood at an accelerated rate through minute tubes at great expense4 ,yet all this will have little to do with his fatigue4 ,he may sit quietly at his table writing1 doing practically no physical work at all1 and yet in a few hours be terribly fagged4 ,this seems to be owing to the deranged sub-molecules of the nerve-slime not having had time to settle back into their proper combinations4 ,when such sub-molecules are thrown out1 as they must be from time to time1 there is so much waste of material4 ,in order that a sub-molecule of food may be thoroughly and firmly assimilated into a broken molecule of protoplasm1 it is necessary not only that it should have precisely the right chemical composition1 but also that it should be at precisely the right spot at the right time and should be moving in precisely the right direction with precisely the right velocity4 ,if all these conditions are not fulfilled1 it will be more loosely retained than the other parts of the molecule2 and every time it comes round into the situation in which it was drawn in1 relatively to the other parts of that molecule and to such others as were near enough to be factors in the action1 it will be in special danger of being thrown out again4 ,thus1 when a partial liquefaction of the protoplasm takes place many times to about the same extent1 it will1 each time1 be pretty nearly the same molecules that were last drawn in that are now thrown out4 ,they will be thrown out1 too1 in about the same way1 as to position1 direction of motion1 and velocity1 in which they were drawn in2 and this will be in about the same course that the ones last before them were thrown out4 ,not exactly1 however2 for the very cause of their being thrown off so easily is their not having fulfilled precisely the conditions of stable retention4 ,thus1 the law of habit is accounted for1 and with it its peculiar characteristic of not acting with exactitude4 ,it seems to me that this explanation of habit1 aside from the question of its truth or falsity1 has a certain value as an addition to our little store of mechanical examples of actions analogous to habit4 ,all the others1 so far as ,i know1 are either statical or else involve forces which1 taking only the sensible motions into account1 violate the law of energy4 ,it is so with the stream that wears its own bed4 ,here1 the sand is carried to its most stable situation and left there4 ,the law of energy forbids this2 for when anything reaches a position of stable equilibrium1 its momentum will be at a maximum1 so that it can according to this law only be left at rest in an unstable situation4 ,in all the statical illustrations1 too1 things are brought into certain states and left there4 ,a garment receives folds and keeps them2 that is1 its limit of elasticity is exceeded4 ,this failure to spring back is again an apparent violation of the law of energy2 for the substance will not only not spring back of itself 7which might be due to an unstable equilibrium being reached7 but will not even do so when an impulse that way is applied to it4 ,accordingly1 ,professor ,james says1 8the phenomena of habit 444 are due to the plasticity of the 444 materials40 ,now1 plasticity of materials means the having of a low limit of elasticity4 7,see the ,century ,dictionary1 under solid47 ,but the hypothetical constitution of protoplasm here proposed involves no forces but attractions and repulsions strictly following the law of energy4 ,the action here1 that is1 the throwing of an atom out of its orbit in a molecule1 and the entering of a new atom into nearly1 but not quite the same orbit1 is somewhat similar to the molecular actions which may be supposed to take place in a solid strained beyond its limit of elasticity4 ,namely1 in that case certain molecules must be thrown out of their orbits1 to settle down again shortly after into new orbits4 ,in short1 the plastic solid resembles protoplasm in being partially and temporarily liquefied by a slight mechanical force4 ,but the taking of a set by a solid body has but a moderate resemblance to the taking of a habit1 inasmuch as the characteristic feature of the latter1 its inexactitude and want of complete determinacy1 is not so marked in the former1 if it can be said to be present there1 at all4 ,the truth is that though the molecular explanation of habit is pretty vague on the mathematical side1 there can be no doubt that systems of atoms having polar forces would act substantially in that manner1 and the explanation is even too satisfactory to suit the convenience of an advocate of tychism4 ,for it may fairly be urged that since the phenomena of habit may thus result from a purely mechanical arrangement1 it is unnecessary to suppose that habit-taking is a primordial principle of the universe4 ,but one fact remains unexplained mechanically1 which concerns not only the facts of habit1 but all cases of actions apparently violating the law of energy2 it is that all these phenomena depend upon aggregations of trillions of molecules in one and the same condition and neighborhood2 and it is by no means clear how they could have all been brought and left in the same place and state by any conservative forces4 ,but let the mechanical explanation be as perfect as it may1 the state of things which it supposes presents evidence of a primordial habit-taking tendency4 ,for it shows us like things acting in like ways because they are alike4 ,now1 those who insist on the doctrine of necessity will for the most part insist that the physical world is entirely individual4 ,yet law involves an element of generality4 ,now to say that generality is primordial1 but generalization not1 is like saying that diversity is primordial but diversification not4 ,it turns logic upside down4 ,at any rate1 it is clear that nothing but a principle of habit1 itself due to the growth by habit of an infinitesimal chance tendency toward habit-taking1 is the only bridge that can span the chasm between the chance-medley of chaos and the cosmos of order and law4 ,i shall not attempt a molecular explanation of the phenomena of reproduction1 because that would require a subsidiary hypothesis1 and carry me away from my main object4 ,such phenomena1 universally diffused though they be1 appear to depend upon special conditions2 and we do not find that all protoplasm has reproductive powers4 ,but what is to be said of the property of feeling8 ,if consciousness belongs to all protoplasm1 by what mechanical constitution is this to be accounted for8 ,the slime is nothing but a chemical compound4 ,there is no inherent impossibility in its being formed synthetically in the laboratory1 out of its chemical elements2 and if it were so made1 it would present all the characters of natural protoplasm4 ,no doubt1 then1 it would feel4 ,to hesitate to admit this would be puerile and ultra-puerile4 ,by what element of the molecular arrangement1 then1 would that feeling be caused8 ,this question cannot be evaded or pooh-poohed4 ,protoplasm certainly does feel2 and unless we are to accept a weak dualism1 the property must be shown to arise from some peculiarity of the mechanical system4 ,yet the attempt to deduce it from the three laws of mechanics1 applied to never so ingenious a mechanical contrivance1 would obviously be futile4 ,it can never be explained1 unless we admit that physical events are but degraded or undeveloped forms of psychical events4 ,but once grant that the phenomena of matter are but the result of the sensibly complete sway of habits upon mind1 and it only remains to explain why in the protoplasm these habits are to some slight extent broken up1 so that according to the law of mind1 in that special clause of it sometimes called the principle of accommodation1#ga feeling becomes intensified4 ,now the manner in which habits generally get broken up is this4 ,reactions usually terminate in the removal of a stimulus2 for the excitation continues as long as the stimulus is present4 ,accordingly1 habits are general ways of behavior which are associated with the removal of stimuli4 ,but when the expected removal of the stimulus fails to occur1 the excitation continues and increases1 and non-habitual reactions take place2 and these tend to weaken the habit4 ,if1 then1 we suppose that matter never does obey its ideal laws with absolute precision1 but that there are almost insensible fortuitous departures from regularity1 these will produce1 in general1 equally minute effects4 ,but protoplasm is in an excessively unstable condition2 and it is the characteristic of unstable equilibrium1 that near that point excessively minute causes may produce startlingly large effects4 ,here1 then1 the usual departures from regularity will be followed by others that are very great2 and the large fortuitous departures from law so produced1 will tend still further to break up the laws1 supposing that these are of the nature of habits4 ,now1 this breaking up of habit and renewed fortuitous spontaneity will1 according to the law of mind1 be accompanied by an intensification of feeling4 ,the nerve-protoplasm is1 without doubt1 in the most unstable condition of any kind of matter2 and consequently1 there the resulting feeling is the most manifest4 ,thus we see that the idealist has no need to dread a mechanical theory of life4 ,on the contrary1 such a theory1 fully developed1 is bound to call in a tychistic idealism as its indispensable adjunct4 ,wherever chance-spontaneity is found1 there1 in the same proportion1 feeling exists4 ,in fact1 chance is but the outward aspect of that which within itself is feeling4 ,i long ago showed that real existence1 or thing-ness1 consists in regularities4 ,so1 that primeval chaos in which there was no regularity was mere nothing1 from a physical aspect4 ,yet it was not a blank zero2 for there was an intensity of consciousness there in comparison with which all that we ever feel is but as the struggling of a molecule or two to throw off a little of the force of law to an endless and innumerable diversity of chance utterly unlimited4 ,but after some atoms of the protoplasm have thus become partially emancipated from law1 what happens next to them8 ,to understand this1 we have to remember that no mental tendency is so easily strengthened by the action of habit as is the tendency to take habits4 ,now1 in the higher kinds of protoplasm1 especially1 the atoms in question have not only long belonged to one molecule or another of the particular mass of slime of which they are parts2 but before that1 they were constituents of food of a protoplasmic constitution4 ,during all this time1 they have been liable to lose habits and to recover them again2 so that now1 when the stimulus is removed1 and the foregone habits tend to reassert themselves1 they do so in the case of such atoms with great promptness4 ,indeed1 the return is so prompt that there is nothing but the feeling to show conclusively that the bonds of law have ever been relaxed4 ,in short1 diversification is the vestige of chance-spontaneity2 and wherever diversity is increasing1 there chance must be operative4 ,on the other hand1 wherever uniformity is increasing1 habit must be operative4 ,but wherever actions take place under an established uniformity1 there so much feeling as there may be takes the mode of a sense of reaction4 ,that is the manner in which ,i am led to define the relation between the fundamental elements of consciousness and their physical equivalents4 ,it remains to consider the physical relations of general ideas4 ,it may be well here to reflect that if matter has no existence except as a specialization of mind1 it follows that whatever affects matter according to regular laws is itself matter4 ,but all mind is directly or indirectly connected with all matter1 and acts in a more or less regular way2 so that all mind more or less partakes of the nature of matter4 ,hence1 it would be a mistake to conceive of the psychical and the physical aspects of matter as two aspects absolutely distinct4 ,viewing a thing from the outside1 considering its relations of action and reaction with other things1 it appears as matter4 ,viewing it from the inside1 looking at its immediate character as feeling1 it appears as consciousness4 ,these two views are combined when we remember that mechanical laws are nothing but acquired habits1 like all the regularities of mind1 including the tendency to take habits1 itself2 and that this action of habit is nothing but generalization1 and generalization is nothing but the spreading of feelings4 ,but the question is1 how do general ideas appear in the molecular theory of protoplasm8 ,the consciousness of a habit involves a general idea4 ,in each action of that habit certain atoms get thrown out of their orbit1 and replaced by others4 ,upon all the different occasions it is different atoms that are thrown off1 but they are analogous from a physical point of view1 and there is an inward sense of their being analogous4 ,every time one of the associated feelings recurs1 there is a more or less vague sense that there are others1 that it has a general character1 and of about what this general character is4 ,we ought not1 ,i think1 to hold that in protoplasm habit never acts in any other than the particular way suggested above4 ,on the contrary1 if habit be a primary property of mind1 it must be equally so of matter1 as a kind of mind4 ,we can hardly refuse to admit that wherever chance motions have general characters1 there is a tendency for this generality to spread and to perfect itself4 ,in that case1 a general idea is a certain modification of consciousness which accompanies any regularity or general relation between chance actions4 ,the consciousness of a general idea has a certain 8unity of the ego10 in it1 which is identical when it passes from one mind to another4 ,it is1 therefore1 quite analogous to a person2 and1 indeed1 a person is only a particular kind of general idea4 ,long age1 in the ,journal of ,speculative ,philosophy 7,vol4 ,,ii1 p4 #aef71 ,i pointed out that a person is nothing but a symbol involving a general idea2 but my views were1 then1 too nominalistic to enable me to see that every general idea has the unified living feeling of a person4 ,all that is necessary1 upon this theory1 to the existence of a person is that the feelings out of which he is constructed should be in close enough connection to influence one another4 ,here we can draw a consequence which it may be possible to submit to experimental test4 ,namely1 if this be the case1 there should be something like personal consciousness in bodies of men who are in intimate and intensely sympathetic communion4 ,it is true that when the generalization of feeling has been carried so far as to include all within a person1 a stopping-place1 in a certain sense1 has been attained2 and further generalization will have a less lively character4 ,but we must not think it will cease4 ,esprit de corps1 national sentiment1 sympathy1 are no mere metaphors4 ,none of us can fully realize what the minds of corporations are1 any more than one of my brain-cells can know what the whole brain is thinking4 ,but the law of mind clearly points to the existence of such personalities1 and there are many ordinary observations which1 if they were critically examined and supplemented by special experiments1 might1 as first appearances promise1 give evidence of the influence of such greater persons upon individuals4 ,it is often remarked that on one day half a dozen people1 strangers to one another1 will take it into their heads to do one and the same strange deed1 whether it be a physical experiment1 a crime1 or an act of virtue4 ,when the thirty thousand young people of the society for ,christian ,endeavor were in ,new ,york1 there seemed to me to be some mysterious diffusion of sweetness and light4 ,if such a fact is capable of being made out anywhere1 it should be in the church4 ,the ,christians have always been ready to risk their lives for the sake of having prayers in common1 of getting together and praying simultaneously with great energy1 and especially for their common body1 for 8the whole state of ,christ's church militant here in earth10 as one of the missals has it4 ,this practice they have been keeping up everywhere1 weekly1 for many centuries4 ,surely1 a personality ought to have developed in that church1 in that 8bride of ,christ10 as they call it1 or else there is a strange break in the action of mind1 and ,i shall have to acknowledge my views are much mistaken4 ,would not the societies for psychical research be more likely to break through the clouds1 in seeking evidences of such corporate personality1 than in seeking evidences of telepathy1 which1 upon the same theory1 should be a far weaker phenomenon8 ,footnote #fc3 ,the ,monist1 ,october1 #ahib4 ,footnote #fd3 ,i am rejoiced to find1 since my last paper was printed1 that a philosopher as subtle and profound as ,dr4 ,edmund ,montgomery has long been arguing for the same element in the universe4 ,other world-renowned thinkers1 as ,m4 ,renouvier and ,m4 ,delbuf1 appear to share this opinion4 ,footnote #fe3 ,by a vera causa1 in the logic of science1 is meant a state of things known to exist in some cases and supposed to exist in other cases1 because it would account for observed phenomena4 ,footnote #ff3 ,wiedemann1 ,annalen1 #ahhg-ahhi4 ,footnote #fg3 ,see ,maxwell on ,spherical ,harmonics1 in his ,electricity and ,magnetism4 ,footnote #fh3 ,the word system has three peculiar meanings in mathematics4 7,a47 ,it means an orderly exposition of the truths of astronomy1 and hence a theory of the motions of the stars2 as the ,ptolemaic system1 the ,copernican system4 ,this is much like the sense in which we speak of the ,calvinistic system of theology1 the ,kantian system of philosophy1 etc4 7,b47 ,it means the aggregate of the planets considered as all moving in somewhat the same way1 as the solar system2 and hence any aggregate of particles moving under mutual forces4 7,c47 ,it means a number of forces acting simultaneously upon a number of particles4 ,footnote #fi3 ,but1 in fact1 an inspection of these curves is sufficient to show that they are of a higher degree than the third4 ,for they have the line ,v ,o1 or some line ,v a constant for an asymptote1 while for small values of ,p1 the values of d#bp_/7d,v7#b are positive4 ,footnote #gj3 ,anticipated by ,clausius as long ago as #aheg2 and by ,williamson in #ahea4 ,footnote #ga3 8,physiologically1 444 accommodation means the breaking up of a habit4444 ,psychologically1 it means reviving consciousness40 ,baldwin1 ,psychology1 ,part ,,iii1 ch4 i41 #e4 ,v4 ,,evolutionary ,,love#gb ,,at ,,first ,,blush4 ,,counter-,,gospels ,philosophy1 when just escaping from its golden pupa-skin1 mythology1 proclaimed the great evolutionary agency of the universe to be ,love4 ,or1 since this pirate-lingo1 ,english1 is poor in such-like words1 let us say ,eros1 the exuberance-love4 ,afterwards1 ,empedocles set up passionate-love and hate as the two co-ordinate powers of the universe4 ,in some passages1 kindness is the word4 ,but certainly1 in any sense in which it has an opposite1 to be senior partner of that opposite1 is the highest position that love can attain4 ,nevertheless1 the ontological gospeller1 in whose days those views were familiar topics1 made the ,one ,supreme ,being1 by whom all things have been made out of nothing1 to be cherishing-love4 ,what1 then1 can he say to hate8 ,never mind1 at this time1 what the scribe of the apocalypse1 if he were ,john1 stung at length by persecution into a rage unable to distinguish suggestions of evil from visions of heaven1 and so become the ,slanderer of ,god to men1 may have dreamed4 ,the question is rather what the sane ,john thought1 or ought to have thought1 in order to carry out his idea consistently4 ,his statement that ,god is love seems aimed at that saying of ,ecclesiastes that we cannot tell whether ,god bears us love or hatred4 8,nay10 says ,john1 8we can tell1 and very simply6 ,we know and have trusted the love which ,god hath in us4 ,god is love40 ,there is no logic in this1 unless it means that ,god loves all men4 ,in the preceding paragraph1 he had said1 8,god is light and in him is no darkness at all40 ,we are to understand1 then1 that as darkness is merely the defect of light1 so hatred and evil are mere imperfect stages of and 1 love and loveliness4 ,this concords with that utterance reported in ,john's ,gospel3 8,god sent not the ,son into the world to judge the world2 but that the world should through him be saved4 ,he that believeth on him is not judged3 he that believeth not hath been judged already4444 ,and this is the judgment1 that the light is come into the world1 and that men loved darkness rather than the light40 ,that is to say1 ,god visits no punishment on them2 they punish themselves1 by their natural affinity for the defective4 ,thus1 the love that ,god is1 is not a love of which hatred is the contrary2 otherwise ,satan would be a co-ordinate power2 but it is a love which embraces hatred as an imperfect stage of it1 an ,anteros--yea1 even needs hatred and hatefulness as its object4 ,for self-love is no love2 so if ,god's self is love1 that which he loves must be defect of love2 just as a luminary can light up only that which otherwise would be dark4 ,henry ,james1 the ,swedenborgian1 says3 8,it is no doubt very tolerable finite or creaturely love to love one's own in another1 to love another for his conformity to one's self3 but nothing can be in more flagrant contrast with the creative ,love1 all whose tenderness ex vi termini must be reserved only for what intrinsically is most bitterly hostile and negative to itself40 ,this is from ,substance and ,shadow3 an ,essay on the ,physics of ,creation4 ,it is a pity he had not filled his pages with things like this1 as he was able easily to do1 instead of scolding at his reader and at people generally1 until the physics of creation was well-nigh forgot4 ,i must deduct1 however1 from what ,i just wrote3 obviously no genius could make his every sentence as sublime as one which discloses for the problem of evil its everlasting solution4 ,the movement of love is circular1 at one and the same impulse projecting creations into independency and drawing them into harmony4 ,this seems complicated when stated so2 but it is fully summed up in the simple formula we call the ,golden ,rule4 ,this does not1 of course1 say1 ,do everything possible to gratify the egoistic impulses of others1 but it says1 ,sacrifice your own perfection to the perfectionment of your neighbor4 ,nor must it for a moment be confounded with the ,benthamite1 or ,helvetian1 or ,beccarian motto1 ,act for the greatest good of the greatest number4 ,love is not directed to abstractions but to persons2 not to persons we do not know1 nor to numbers of people1 but to our own dear ones1 our family and neighbors4 8,our neighbor10 we remember1 is one whom we live near1 not locally perhaps1 but in life and feeling4 ,everybody can see that the statement of ,st4 ,john is the formula of an evolutionary philosophy1 which teaches that growth comes only from love1 from--,i will not say self-sacrifice1 but from the ardent impulse to fulfil another's highest impulse4 ,suppose1 for example1 that ,i have an idea that interests me4 ,it is my creation4 ,it is my creature2 for as shown in last ,july's ,monist1 it is a little person4 ,i love it2 and ,i will sink myself in perfecting it4 ,it is not by dealing out cold justice to the circle of my ideas that ,i can make them grow1 but by cherishing and tending them as ,i would the flowers in my garden4 ,the philosophy we draw from ,john's gospel is that this is the way mind develops2 and as for the cosmos1 only so far as it yet is mind1 and so has life1 is it capable of further evolution4 ,love1 recognizing germs of loveliness in the hateful1 gradually warms it into life1 and makes it lovely4 ,that is the sort of evolution which every careful student of my essay ,the ,law of ,mind1 must see that synechism calls for4 ,the nineteenth century is now fast sinking into the grave1 and we all begin to review its doings and to think what character it is destined to bear as compared with other centuries in the minds of future historians4 ,it will be called1 ,i guess1 the ,economical ,century2 for political economy has more direct relations with all the branches of its activity than has any other science4 ,well1 political economy has its formula of redemption1 too4 ,it is this3 ,intelligence in the service of greed ensures the justest prices1 the fairest contracts1 the most enlightened conduct of all the dealings between men1 and leads to the summum bonum1 food in plenty and perfect comfort4 ,food for whom8 ,why1 for the greedy master of intelligence4 ,i do not mean to say that this is one of the legitimate conclusions of political economy1 the scientific character of which ,i fully acknowledge4 ,but the study of doctrines1 themselves true1 will often temporarily encourage generalizations extremely false1 as the study of physics has encouraged necessitarianism4 ,what ,i say1 then1 is that the great attention paid to economical questions during our century has induced an exaggeration of the beneficial effects of greed and of the unfortunate results of sentiment1 until there has resulted a philosophy which comes unwittingly to this1 that greed is the great agent in the elevation of the human race and in the evolution of the universe4 ,i open a handbook of political economy1--the most typical and middling one ,i have at hand1--and there find some remarks of which ,i will here make a brief analysis4 ,i omit qualifications1 sops thrown to ,cerberus1 phrases to placate ,christian prejudice1 trappings which serve to hide from author and reader alike the ugly nakedness of the greed-god4 ,but ,i have surveyed my position4 ,the author enumerates 8three motives to human action3 ,the love of self2 ,the love of a limited class having common interests and feelings with one's self2 ,the love of mankind at large40 ,remark1 at the outset1 what obsequious title is bestowed on greed1--8the love of self40 ,love6 ,the second motive is love4 ,in place of 8a limited class0 put 8certain persons10 and you have a fair description4 ,taking 8class0 in the old-fashioned sense1 a weak kind of love is described4 ,in the sequel1 there seems to be some haziness as to the delimitation of this motive4 ,by the love of mankind at large1 the author does not mean that deep1 subconscious passion that is properly so called2 but merely public-spirit1 perhaps little more than a fidget about pushing ideas4 ,the author proceeds to a comparative estimate of the worth of these motives4 ,greed1 says he1 but using1 of course1 another word1 8is not so great an evil as is commonly supposed444 ,every man can promote his own interests a great deal more effectively than he can promote any one else's1 or than any one else can promote his40 ,besides1 as he remarks on another page1 the more miserly a man is1 the more good he does4 ,the second motive 8is the most dangerous one to which society is exposed40 ,love is all very pretty3 8no higher or purer source of human happiness exists40 7,ahem67 ,but it is a 8source of enduring injury10 and1 in short1 should be overruled by something wiser4 ,what is this wiser motive8 ,we shall see4 ,as for public spirit1 it is rendered nugatory by the 8difficulties in the way of its effective operation40 ,for example1 it might suggest putting checks upon the fecundity of the poor and the vicious2 and 8no measure of repression would be too severe10 in the case of criminals4 ,the hint is broad4 ,but unfortunately1 you cannot induce legislatures to take such measures1 owing to the pestiferous 8tender sentiments of man towards man40 ,it thus appears1 that public-spirit1 or ,benthamism1 is not strong enough to be the effective tutor of love1 7,i am skipping to another page71 which must1 therefore1 be handed over to 8the motives which animate men in the pursuit of wealth10 in which alone we can confide1 and which 8are in the highest degree beneficent40#gc ,yes1 in the 8highest degree0 without exception are they beneficent to the being upon whom all their blessings are poured out1 namely1 the ,self1 whose 8sole object10 says the writer in accumulating wealth is his individual 8sustenance and enjoyment40 ,plainly1 the author holds the notion that some other motive might be in a higher degree beneficent even for the man's self to be a paradox wanting in good sense4 ,he seeks to gloze and modify his doctrine2 but he lets the perspicacious reader see what his animating principle is2 and when1 holding the opinions ,i have repeated1 he at the same time acknowledges that society could not exist upon a basis of intelligent greed alone1 he simply pigeon-holes himself as one of the eclectics of inharmonious opinions4 ,he wants his mammon flavored with a soupon of god4 ,the economists accuse those to whom the enunciation of their atrocious villainies communicates a thrill of horror of being sentimentalists4 ,it may be so3 ,i willingly confess to having some tincture of sentimentalism in me1 ,god be thanked6 ,ever since the ,french ,revolution brought this leaning of thought into ill-repute1--and not altogether undeservedly1 ,i must admit1 true1 beautiful1 and good as that great movement was--it has been the tradition to picture sentimentalists as persons incapable of logical thought and unwilling to look facts in the eyes4 ,this tradition may be classed with the ,french tradition that an ,englishman says godam at every second sentence1 the ,english tradition that an ,american talks about 8,britishers10 and the ,american tradition that a ,frenchman carries forms of etiquette to an inconvenient extreme1 in short with all those traditions which survive simply because the men who use their eyes and ears are few and far between4 ,doubtless some excuse there was for all those opinions in days gone by2 and sentimentalism1 when it was the fashionable amusement to spend one's evenings in a flood of tears over a woeful performance on a candle-litten stage1 sometimes made itself a little ridiculous4 ,but what after all is sentimentalism8 ,it is an ism1 a doctrine1 namely1 the doctrine that great respect should be paid to the natural judgments of the sensible heart4 ,this is what sentimentalism precisely is2 and ,i entreat the reader to consider whether to contemn it is not of all blasphemies the most degrading4 ,yet the nineteenth century has steadily contemned it1 because it brought about the ,reign of ,terror4 ,that it did so is true4 ,still1 the whole question is one of how much4 ,the ,reign of ,terror was very bad2 but now the ,gradgrind banner has been this century long flaunting in the face of heaven1 with an insolence to provoke the very skies to scowl and rumble4 ,soon a flash and quick peal will shake economists quite out of their complacency1 too late4 ,the twentieth century1 in its latter half1 shall surely see the deluge-tempest burst upon the social order1--to clear upon a world as deep in ruin as that greed-philosophy has long plunged it into guilt4 ,no post-thermidorian high jinks then6 ,so a miser is a beneficent power in a community1 is he8 ,with the same reason precisely1 only in a much higher degree1 you might pronounce the ,wall ,street sharp to be a good angel1 who takes money from heedless persons not likely to guard it properly1 who wrecks feeble enterprises better stopped1 and who administers wholesome lessons to unwary scientific men1 by passing worthless checks upon them1--as you did1 the other day1 to me1 my millionaire ,master in glomery1 when you thought you saw your way to using my process without paying for it1 and of so bequeathing to your children something to boast of their father about1--and who by a thousand wiles puts money at the service of intelligent greed1 in his own person4 ,bernard ,mandeville1 in his ,fable of the ,bees1 maintains that private vices of all descriptions are public benefits1 and proves it1 too1 quite as cogently as the economist proves his point concerning the miser4 ,he even argues1 with no slight force1 that but for vice civilization would never have existed4 ,in the same spirit1 it has been strongly maintained and is to-day widely believed that all acts of charity and benevolence1 private and public1 go seriously to degrade the human race4 ,the ,origin of ,species of ,darwin merely extends politico-economical views of progress to the entire realm of animal and vegetable life4 ,the vast majority of our contemporary naturalists hold the opinion that the true cause of those exquisite and marvellous adaptations of nature for which1 when ,i was a boy1 men used to extol the divine wisdom is that creatures are so crowded together that those of them that happen to have the slightest advantage force those less pushing into situations unfavorable to multiplication or even kill them before they reach the age of reproduction4 ,among animals1 the mere mechanical individualism is vastly renforced as a power making for good by the animal's ruthless greed4 ,as ,darwin puts it on his title-page1 it is the struggle for existence2 and he should have added for his motto3 ,every individual for himself1 and the ,devil take the hindmost6 ,jesus1 in his sermon on the ,mount1 expressed a different opinion4 ,here1 then1 is the issue4 ,the gospel of ,christ says that progress comes from every individual merging his individuality in sympathy with his neighbors4 ,on the other side1 the conviction of the nineteenth century is that progress takes place by virtue of every individual's striving for himself with all his might and trampling his neighbor under foot whenever he gets a chance to do so4 ,this may accurately be called the ,gospel of ,greed4 ,much is to be said on both sides4 ,i have not concealed1 ,i could not conceal1 my own passionate predilection4 ,such a confession will probably shock my scientific brethren4 ,yet the strong feeling is in itself1 ,i think1 an argument of some weight in favor of the agapastic theory of evolution1--so far as it may be presumed to bespeak the normal judgment of the ,sensible ,heart4 ,certainly1 if it were possible to believe in agapasm without believing it warmly1 that fact would be an argument against the truth of the doctrine4 ,at any rate1 since the warmth of feeling exists1 it should on every account be candidly confessed2 especially since it creates a liability to onesidedness on my part against which it behooves my readers and me to be severally on our guard4 ,,second ,,thoughts4 ,,irenica4 ,let us try to define the logical affinities of the different theories of evolution4 ,natural selection1 as conceived by ,darwin1 is a mode of evolution in which the only positive agent of change in the whole passage from moner to man is fortuitous variation4 ,to secure advance in a definite direction chance has to be seconded by some action that shall hinder the propagation of some varieties or stimulate that of others4 ,in natural selection1 strictly so called1 it is the crowding out of the weak4 ,in sexual selection1 it is the attraction of beauty1 mainly4 ,the ,origin of ,species was published toward the end of the year #ahei4 ,the preceding years since #ahdf had been one of the most productive seasons1--or if extended so as to cover the great book we are considering1 the most productive period of equal length in the entire history of science from its beginnings until now4 ,the idea that chance begets order1 which is one of the corner-stones of modern physics 7although ,dr4 ,carus considers it 8the weakest point in ,mr4 ,peirce's system107 was at that time put into its clearest light4 ,quetelet had opened the discussion by his ,letters on the ,application of ,probabilities to the ,moral and ,political ,sciences1 a work which deeply impressed the best minds of that day1 and to which ,sir ,john ,herschel had drawn general attention in ,great ,britain4 ,in #aheg1 the first volume of ,buckle's ,history of ,civilisation had created a tremendous sensation1 owing to the use he made of this same idea4 ,meantime1 the 8statistical method0 had1 under that very name1 been applied with brilliant success to molecular physics4 ,dr4 ,john ,herapath1 an ,english chemist1 had in #ahdg outlined the kinetical theory of gases in his ,mathematical ,physics2 and the interest the theory excited had been refreshed in #ahef by notable memoirs by ,clausius and ,krnig4 ,in the very summer preceding ,darwin's publication1 ,maxwell had read before the ,british ,association the first and most important of his researches on this subject4 ,the consequence was that the idea that fortuitous events may result in a physical law1 and further that this is the way in which those laws which appear to conflict with the principle of the conservation of energy are to be explained1 had taken a strong hold upon the minds of all who were abreast of the leaders of thought4 ,by such minds1 it was inevitable that the ,origin of ,species1 whose teaching was simply the application of the same principle to the explanation of another 8non-conservative0 action1 that of organic development1 should be hailed and welcomed4 ,the sublime discovery of the conservation of energy by ,helmholtz in #ahdg1 and that of the mechanical theory of heat by ,clausius and by ,rankine1 independently1 in #ahej1 had decidedly overawed all those who might have been inclined to sneer at physical science4 ,thereafter a belated poet still harping upon 8science peddling with the names of things0 would fail of his effect4 ,mechanism was now known to be all1 or very nearly so4 ,all this time1 utilitarianism1--that improved substitute for the ,gospel1--was in its fullest feather2 and was a natural ally of an individualistic theory4 ,dean ,mansell's injudicious advocacy had led to mutiny among the bondsmen of ,sir ,william ,hamilton1 and the nominalism of ,mill had profited accordingly2 and although the real science that ,darwin was leading men to was sure some day to give a death-blow to the sham-science of ,mill1 yet there were several elements of the ,darwinian theory which were sure to charm the followers of ,mill4 ,another thing3 ansthetics had been in use for thirteen years4 ,already1 people's acquaintance with suffering had dropped off very much2 and as a consequence1 that unlovely hardness by which our times are so contrasted with those that immediately preceded them1 had already set in1 and inclined people to relish a ruthless theory4 ,the reader would quite mistake the drift of what ,i am saying if he were to understand me as wishing to suggest that any of those things 7except perhaps ,malthus7 influenced ,darwin himself4 ,what ,i mean is that his hypothesis1 while without dispute one of the most ingenious and pretty ever devised1 and while argued with a wealth of knowledge1 a strength of logic1 a charm of rhetoric1 and above all with a certain magnetic genuineness that was almost irresistible1 did not appear1 at first1 at all near to being proved2 and to a sober mind its case looks less hopeful now than it did twenty years ago2 but the extraordinarily favorable reception it met with was plainly owing1 in large measure1 to its ideas being those toward which the age was favorably disposed1 especially1 because of the encouragement it gave to the greed-philosophy4 ,diametrically opposed to evolution by chance1 are those theories which attribute all progress to an inward necessary principle1 or other form of necessity4 ,many naturalists have thought that if an egg is destined to go through a certain series of embryological transformations1 from which it is perfectly certain not to deviate1 and if in geological time almost exactly the same forms appear successively1 one replacing another in the same order1 the strong presumption is that this latter succession was as predeterminate and certain to take place as the former4 ,so1 ,ngeli1 for instance1 conceives that it somehow follows from the first law of motion and the peculiar1 but unknown1 molecular constitution of protoplasm1 that forms must complicate themselves more and more4 ,kolliker makes one form generate another after a certain maturation has been accomplished4 ,weismann1 too1 though he calls himself a ,darwinian1 holds that nothing is due to chance1 but that all forms are simple mechanical resultants of the heredity from two parents4#gd ,it is very noticeable that all these different sectaries seek to import into their science a mechanical necessity to which the facts that come under their observation do not point4 ,those geologists who think that the variation of species is due to cataclysmic alterations of climate or of the chemical constitution of the air and water are also making mechanical necessity chief factor of evolution4 ,evolution by sporting and evolution by mechanical necessity are conceptions warring against one another4 ,a third method1 which supersedes their strife1 lies enwrapped in the theory of ,lamarck4 ,according to his view1 all that distinguishes the highest organic forms from the most rudimentary has been brought about by little hypertrophies or atrophies which have affected individuals early in their lives1 and have been transmitted to their offspring4 ,such a transmission of acquired characters is of the general nature of habit-taking1 and this is the representative and derivative within the physiological domain of the law of mind4 ,its action is essentially dissimilar to that of a physical force2 and that is the secret of the repugnance of such necessitarians as ,weismann to admitting its existence4 ,the ,lamarckians further suppose that although some of the modifications of form so transmitted were originally due to mechanical causes1 yet the chief factors of their first production were the straining of endeavor and the overgrowth superinduced by exercise1 together with the opposite actions4 ,now1 endeavor1 since it is directed toward an end1 is essentially psychical1 even though it be sometimes unconscious2 and the growth due to exercise1 as ,i argued in my last paper1 follows a law of a character quite contrary to that of mechanics4 ,lamarckian evolution is thus evolution by the force of habit4--,that sentence slipped off my pen while one of those neighbors whose function in the social cosmos seems to be that of an ,interrupter1 was asking me a question4 ,of course1 it is nonsense4 ,habit is mere inertia1 a resting on one's oars1 not a propulsion4 ,now it is energetic projaculation 7lucky there is such a word1 or this untried hand might have been put to inventing one7 by which in the typical instances of ,lamarckian evolution the new elements of form are first created4 ,habit1 however1 forces them to take practical shapes1 compatible with the structures they affect1 and in the form of heredity and otherwise1 gradually replaces the spontaneous energy that sustains them4 ,thus1 habit plays a double part2 it serves to establish the new features1 and also to bring them into harmony with the general morphology and function of the animals and plants to which they belong4 ,but if the reader will now kindly give himself the trouble of turning back a page or two1 he will see that this account of ,lamarckian evolution coincides with the general description of the action of love1 to which1 ,i suppose1 he yielded his assent4 ,remembering that all matter is really mind1 remembering1 too1 the continuity of mind1 let us ask what aspect ,lamarckian evolution takes on within the domain of consciousness4 ,direct endeavor can achieve almost nothing4 ,it is as easy by taking thought to add a cubit to one's stature1 as it is to produce an idea acceptable to any of the ,muses by merely straining for it1 before it is ready to come4 ,we haunt in vain the sacred well and throne of ,mnemosyne2 the deeper workings of the spirit take place in their own slow way1 without our connivance4 ,let but their bugle sound1 and we may then make our effort1 sure of an oblation for the altar of whatsoever divinity its savor gratifies4 ,besides this inward process1 there is the operation of the environment1 which goes to break up habits destined to be broken up and so to render the mind lively4 ,everybody knows that the long continuance of a routine of habit makes us lethargic1 while a succession of surprises wonderfully brightens the ideas4 ,where there is a motion1 where history is a-making1 there is the focus of mental activity1 and it has been said that the arts and sciences reside within the temple of ,janus1 waking when that is open1 but slumbering when it is closed4 ,few psychologists have perceived how fundamental a fact this is4 ,a portion of mind abundantly commissured to other portions works almost mechanically4 ,it sinks to a condition of a railway junction4 ,but a portion of mind almost isolated1 a spiritual peninsula1 or cul-de-sac1 is like a railway terminus4 ,now mental commissures are habits4 ,where they abound1 originality is not needed and is not found2 but where they are in defect1 spontaneity is set free4 ,thus1 the first step in the ,lamarckian evolution of mind is the putting of sundry thoughts into situations in which they are free to play4 ,as to growth by exercise1 ,i have already shown1 in discussing ,man's ,glassy ,essence1 in last ,october's ,monist1 what its modus operandi must be conceived to be1 at least1 until a second equally definite hypothesis shall have been offered4 ,namely1 it consists of the flying asunder of molecules1 and the reparation of the parts by new matter4 ,it is1 thus1 a sort of reproduction4 ,it takes place only during exercise1 because the activity of protoplasm consists in the molecular disturbance which is its necessary condition4 ,growth by exercise takes place also in the mind4 ,indeed1 that is what it is to learn4 ,but the most perfect illustration is the development of a philosophical idea by being put into practice4 ,the conception which appeared1 at first1 as unitary1 splits up into special cases2 and into each of these new thought must enter to make a practicable idea4 ,this new thought1 however1 follows pretty closely the model of the parent conception2 and thus a homogeneous development takes place4 ,the parallel between this and the course of molecular occurrences is apparent4 ,patient attention will be able to trace all these elements in the transaction called learning4 ,three modes of evolution have thus been brought before us2 evolution by fortuitous variation1 evolution by mechanical necessity1 and evolution by creative love4 ,we may term them tychastic evolution1 or tychasm1 anancastic evolution1 or anancasm1 and agapastic evolution1 or agapasm4 ,the doctrines which represent these as severally of principal importance1 we may term tychasticism1 anancasticism1 and agapasticism4 ,on the other hand the mere propositions that absolute chance1 mechanical necessity1 and the law of love1 are severally operative in the cosmos1 may receive the names of tychism1 anancism1 and agapism4 ,all three modes of evolution are composed of the same general elements4 ,agapasm exhibits them the most clearly4 ,the good result is here brought to pass1 first1 by the bestowal of spontaneous energy by the parent upon the offspring1 and1 second1 by the disposition of the latter to catch the general idea of those about it and thus to subserve the general purpose4 ,in order to express the relation that tychasm and anancasm bear to agapasm1 let me borrow a word from geometry4 ,an ellipse crossed by a straight line is a sort of cubic curve2 for a cubic is a curve which is cut thrice by a straight line2 now a straight line might cut the ellipse twice and its associated straight line a third time4 ,still the ellipse with the straight line across it would not have the characteristics of a cubic4 ,it would have1 for instance1 no contrary flexure1 which no true cubic wants2 and it would have two nodes1 which no true cubic has4 ,the geometers say that it is a degenerate cubic4 ,just so1 tychasm and anancasm are degenerate forms of agapasm4 ,men who seek to reconcile the ,darwinian idea with ,christianity will remark that tychastic evolution1 like the agapastic1 depends upon a reproductive creation1 the forms preserved being those that use the spontaneity conferred upon them in such wise as to be drawn into harmony with their original1 quite after the ,christian scheme4 ,very good6 ,this only shows that just as love cannot have a contrary1 but must embrace what is most opposed to it1 as a degenerate case of it1 so tychasm is a kind of agapasm4 ,only1 in the tychastic evolution progress is solely owing to the distribution of the napkin-hidden talent of the rejected servant among those not rejected1 just as ruined gamesters leave their money on the table to make those not yet ruined so much the richer4 ,it makes the felicity of the lambs just the damnation of the goats1 transposed to the other side of the equation4 ,in genuine agapasm1 on the other hand1 advance takes place by virtue of a positive sympathy among the created springing from continuity of mind4 ,this is the idea which tychasticism knows not how to manage4 ,the anancasticist might here interpose1 claiming that the mode of evolution for which he contends agrees with agapasm at the point at which tychasm departs from it4 ,for it makes development go through certain phases1 having its inevitable ebbs and flows1 yet tending on the whole to a foreordained perfection4 ,bare existence by this its destiny betrays an intrinsic affinity for the good4 ,herein1 it must be admitted1 anancasm shows itself to be in a broad acception a species of agapasm4 ,some forms of it might easily be mistaken for the genuine agapasm4 ,the ,hegelian philosophy is such an anancasticism4 ,with its revelatory religion1 with its synechism 7however imperfectly set forth71 with its 8reflection10 the whole idea of the theory is superb1 almost sublime4 ,yet1 after all1 living freedom is practically omitted from its method4 ,the whole movement is that of a vast engine1 impelled by a vis a tergo1 with a blind and mysterious fate of arriving at a lofty goal4 ,i mean that such an engine it would be1 if it really worked2 but in point of fact1 it is a ,keely motor4 ,grant that it really acts as it professes to act1 and there is nothing to do but accept the philosophy4 ,but never was there seen such an example of a long chain of reasoning1--shall ,i say with a flaw in every link8--no1 with every link a handful of sand1 squeezed into shape in a dream4 ,or say1 it is a pasteboard model of a philosophy that in reality does not exist4 ,if we use the one precious thing it contains1 the idea of it1 introducing the tychism which the arbitrariness of its every step suggests1 and make that the support of a vital freedom which is the breath of the spirit of love1 we may be able to produce that genuine agapasticism1 at which ,hegel was aiming4 ,a ,,third ,,aspect4 ,,discrimination ,in the very nature of things1 the line of demarcation between the three modes of evolution is not perfectly sharp4 ,that does not prevent its being quite real2 perhaps it is rather a mark of its reality4 ,there is in the nature of things no sharp line of demarcation between the three fundamental colors1 red1 green1 and violet4 ,but for all that they are really different4 ,the main question is whether three radically different evolutionary elements have been operative2 and the second question is what are the most striking characteristics of whatever elements have been operative4 ,i propose to devote a few pages to a very slight examination of these questions in their relation to the historical development of human thought4 ,i first formulate for the reader's convenience the briefest possible definitions of the three conceivable modes of development of thought1 distinguishing also two varieties of anancasm and three of agapasm4 ,the tychastic development of thought1 then1 will consist in slight departures from habitual ideas in different directions indifferently1 quite purposeless and quite unconstrained whether by outward circumstances or by force of logic1 these new departures being followed by unforeseen results which tend to fix some of them as habits more than others4 ,the anancastic development of thought will consist of new ideas adopted without foreseeing whither they tend1 but having a character determined by causes either external to the mind1 such as changed circumstances of life1 or internal to the mind as logical developments of ideas already accepted1 such as generalizations4 ,the agapastic development of thought is the adoption of certain mental tendencies1 not altogether heedlessly1 as in tychasm1 nor quite blindly by the mere force of circumstances or of logic1 as in anancasm1 but by an immediate attraction for the idea itself1 whose nature is divined before the mind possesses it1 by the power of sympathy1 that is1 by virtue of the continuity of mind2 and this mental tendency may be of three varieties1 as follows3 ,first1 it may affect a whole people or community in its collective personality1 and be thence communicated to such individuals as are in powerfully sympathetic connection with the collective people1 although they may be intellectually incapable of attaining the idea by their private understandings or even perhaps of consciously apprehending it4 ,second1 it may affect a private person directly1 yet so that he is only enabled to apprehend the idea1 or to appreciate its attractiveness1 by virtue of his sympathy with his neighbors1 under the influence of a striking experience or development of thought4 ,the conversion of ,st4 ,paul may be taken as an example of what is meant4 ,third1 it may affect an individual1 independently of his human affections1 by virtue of an attraction it exercises upon his mind1 even before he has comprehended it4 ,this is the phenomenon which has been well called the divination of genius2 for it is due to the continuity between the man's mind and the ,most ,high4 ,let us next consider by means of what tests we can discriminate between these different categories of evolution4 ,no absolute criterion is possible in the nature of things1 since in the nature of things there is no sharp line of demarcation between the different classes4 ,nevertheless1 quantitative symptoms may be found by which a sagacious and sympathetic judge of human nature may be able to estimate the approximate proportions in which the different kinds of influence are commingled4 ,so far as the historical evolution of human thought has been tychastic1 it should have proceeded by insensible or minute steps2 for such is the nature of chances when so multiplied as to show phenomena of regularity4 ,for example1 assume that of the native-born white adult males of the ,united ,states in #ahhj1 one-fourth part were below #e feet #d inches in stature and one-fourth part above #e feet #h inches4 ,then by the principles of probability1 among the whole population1 we should expect #baf under #d feet #f inches1 #dh 8 #d 0 #e 8 #i 0 #d 8 #d 0 less than #b 8 #d 0 #c 8 #baf above #f feet #f inches1 #dh 8 #f 0 #g 8 #i 0 #f 8 #h 0 less than #b 8 #f 0 #i 8 ,i set down these figures to show how insignificantly few are the cases in which anything very far out of the common run presents itself by chance4 ,though the stature of only every second man is included within the four inches between #e feet #d inches and #e feet #h inches1 yet if this interval be extended by thrice four inches above and below1 it will embrace all our #h millions odd of native-born adult white males 7of #ahhj71 except only #i taller and #i shorter4 ,the test of minute variation1 if not satisfied1 absolutely negatives tychasm4 ,if it is satisfied1 we shall find that it negatives anancasm but not agapasm4 ,we want a positive test1 satisfied by tychasm1 only4 ,now wherever we find men's thought taking by imperceptible degrees a turn contrary to the purposes which animate them1 in spite of their highest impulses1 there1 we may safely conclude1 there has been a tychastic action4 ,students of the history of mind there be of an erudition to fill an imperfect scholar like me with envy edulcorated by joyous admiration1 who maintain that ideas when just started are and can be little more than freaks1 since they cannot yet have been critically examined1 and further that everywhere and at all times progress has been so gradual that it is difficult to make out distinctly what original step any given man has taken4 ,it would follow that tychasm has been the sole method of intellectual development4 ,i have to confess ,i cannot read history so2 ,i cannot help thinking that while tychasm has sometimes been operative1 at others great steps covering nearly the same ground and made by different men independently1 have been mistaken for a succession of small steps1 and further that students have been reluctant to admit a real entitative 8spirit0 of an age or of a people1 under the mistaken and unscrutinized impression that they should thus be opening the door to wild and unnatural hypotheses4 ,i find1 on the contrary1 that1 however it may be with the education of individual minds1 the historical development of thought has seldom been of a tychastic nature1 and exclusively in backward and barbarizing movements4 ,i desire to speak with the extreme modesty which befits a student of logic who is required to survey so very wide a field of human thought that he can cover it only by a reconnaissance1 to which only the greatest skill and most adroit methods can impart any value at all2 but1 after all1 ,i can only express my own opinions and not those of anybody else2 and in my humble judgment1 the largest example of tychasm is afforded by the history of ,christianity1 from about its establishment by ,constantine1 to1 say1 the time of the ,irish monasteries1 an era or eon of about #ejj years4 ,undoubtedly the external circumstance which more than all others at first inclined men to accept ,christianity in its loveliness and tenderness1 was the fearful extent to which society was broken up into units by the unmitigated greed and hard-heartedness into which the ,romans had seduced the world4 ,and yet it was that very same fact1 more than any other external circumstance1 that fostered that bitterness against the wicked world of which the primitive gospel of ,mark contains not a single trace4 ,at least1 ,i do not detect it in the remark about the blasphemy against the ,holy ,ghost1 where nothing is said about vengeance1 nor even in that speech where the closing lines of ,isaiah are quoted1 about the worm and the fire that feed upon the 8carcasses of the men that have transgressed against me40 ,but little by little the bitterness increases until in the last book of the ,new ,testament1 its poor distracted author represents that all the time ,christ was talking about having come to save the world1 the secret design was to catch the entire human race1 with the exception of a paltry #add1jjj1 and souse them all in a brimstone lake1 and as the smoke of their torment went up forever and ever1 to turn and remark1 8,there is no curse any more40 ,would it be an insensible smirk or a fiendish grin that should accompany such an utterance8 ,i wish ,i could believe ,st4 ,john did not write it2 but it is his gospel which tells about the 8resurrection unto condemnation10--that is of men's being resuscitated just for the sake of torturing them2--and1 at any rate1 the ,revelation is a very ancient composition4 ,one can understand that the early ,christians were like men trying with all their might to climb a steep declivity of smooth wet clay2 the deepest and truest element of their life1 animating both heart and head1 was universal love2 but they were continually1 and against their wills1 slipping into a party spirit1 every slip serving as a precedent1 in a fashion but too familiar to every man4 ,this party feeling insensibily grew until by about ,a4,d4 #ccj the luster of the pristine integrity that in ,st4 ,mark reflects the white spirit of light was so far tarnished that ,eusebius1 7the ,jared ,sparks of that day71 in the preface to his ,history1 could announce his intention of exaggerating everything that tended to the glory of the church and of suppressing whatever might disgrace it4 ,his ,latin contemporary ,lactantius is worse1 still2 and so the darkling went on increasing until before the end of the century the great library of ,alexandria was destroyed by ,theophilus1#ge until ,gregory the ,great1 two centuries later1 burnt the great library of ,rome1 proclaiming that 8,ignorance is the mother of devotion10 7which is true1 just as oppression and injustice is the mother of spirituality71 until a sober description of the state of the church would be a thing our not too nice newspapers would treat as 8unfit for publication40 ,all this movement is shown by the application of the test given above to have been tychastic4 ,another very much like it on a small scale1 only a hundred times swifter1 for the study of which there are documents by the library-full1 is to be found in the history of the ,french ,revolution4 ,anancastic evolution advances by successive strides with pauses between4 ,the reason is that in this process a habit of thought having been overthrown is supplanted by the next strongest4 ,now this next strongest is sure to be widely disparate from the first1 and as often as not is its direct contrary4 ,it reminds one of our old rule of making the second candidate vice-president4 ,this character1 therefore1 clearly distinguishes anancasm from tychasm4 ,the character which distinguishes it from agapasm is its purposelessness4 ,but external and internal anancasm have to be examined separately4 ,development under the pressure of external circumstances1 or cataclysmine evolution1 is in most cases unmistakable enough4 ,it has numberless degrees of intensity1 from the brute force1 the plain war1 which has more than once turned the current of the world's thought1 down to the hard fact of evidence1 or what has been taken for it1 which has been known to convince men by hordes4 ,the only hesitation than can subsist in the presence of such a history is a quantitative one4 ,never are external influences the only ones which affect the mind1 and therefore it must be a matter of judgment for which it would scarcely be worth while to attempt to set rules1 whether a given movement is to be regarded as principally governed from without or not4 ,in the rise of medieval thought1 ,i mean scholasticism and the synchronistic art developments1 undoubtedly the crusades and the discovery of the writings of ,aristotle were powerful influences4 ,the development of scholasticism from ,roscellin to ,albertus ,magnus closely follows the successive steps in the knowledge of ,aristotle4 ,prantl thinks that that is the whole story1 and few men have thumbed more books than ,carl ,prantl4 ,he has done good solid work1 notwithstanding his slap-dash judgments4 ,but we shall never make so much as a good beginning of comprehending scholasticism until the whole has been systematically explored and digested by a company of students regularly organized and held under rule for that purpose4 ,but as for the period we are now specially considering1 that which synchronised the ,romanesque architecture1 the literature is easily mastered4 ,it does not quite justify ,prantl's dicta as to the slavish dependence of these authors upon their authorities4 ,moreover1 they kept a definite purpose steadily before their minds1 throughout all their studies4 ,i am1 therefore1 unable to offer this period of scholasticism as an example of pure external anancasm1 which seems to be the fluorine of the intellectual elements4 ,perhaps the recent ,japanese reception of western ideas is the purest instance of it in history4 ,yet in combination with other elements1 nothing is commoner4 ,if the development of ideas under the influence of the study of external facts be considered as external anancasm1--it is on the border between the external and the internal forms1--it is1 of course1 the principal thing in modern learning4 ,but ,whewell1 whose masterly comprehension of the history of science critics have been too ignorant properly to appreciate1 clearly shows that it is far from being the overwhelmingly preponderant influence1 even there4 ,internal anancasm1 or logical groping1 which advances upon a predestined line without being able to foresee whither it is to be carried nor to steer its course1 this is the rule of development of philosophy4 ,hegel first made the world understand this2 and he seeks to make logic not merely the subjective guide and monitor of thought1 which was all it had been ambitioning before1 but to be the very main-spring of thinking1 and not merely of individual thinking but of discussion1 of the history of the development of thought1 of all history1 of all development4 ,this involves a positive1 clearly demonstrable error4 ,let the logic in question be of whatever kind it may1 a logic of necessary inference or a logic of probable inference 7the theory might perhaps be shaped to fit either71 in any case it supposes that logic is sufficient of itself to determine what conclusion follows from given premises2 for unless it will do so much1 it will not suffice to explain why an individual train of reasoning should take just the course it does take1 to say nothing of other kinds of development4 ,it thus supposes that from given premises1 only one conclusion can logically be drawn1 and that there is no scope at all for free choice4 ,that from given premises only one conclusion can logically be drawn1 is one of the false notions which have come from logicians' confining their attention to that ,nantucket of thought1 the logic of non-relative terms4 ,in the logic of relatives1 it does not hold good4 ,one remark occurs to me4 ,if the evolution of history is in considerable part of the nature of internal anancasm1 it resembles the development of individual men2 and just as #cc years is a rough but natural unit of time for individuals1 being the average age at which man has issue1 so there should be an approximate period at the end of which one great historical movement ought to be likely to be supplanted by another4 ,let us see if we can make out anything of the kind4 ,take the governmental development of ,rome as being sufficiently long and set down the principal dates4 ,b4,c4 #gec1 ,foundation of ,rome4 ,b4,c4 #eaj1 ,expulsion of the ,tarquins4 ,b4,c4 #bg1 ,octavius assumes title ,augustus4 ,a4,d4 #dgf1 ,end of ,western ,empire4 ,a4,d4 #ifb1 ,holy ,roman ,empire4 ,a4,d4 #adec1 ,fall of ,constantinople4 ,the last event was one of the most significant in history1 especially for ,italy4 ,the intervals are #bdc1 #dhc1 #ejb1 #dhf1 #dia years4 ,all are rather curiously near equal1 except the first which is half the others4 ,successive reigns of kings would not commonly be so near equal4 ,let us set down a few dates in the history of thought4 ,b4,c4 #ehe1 ,eclipse of ,thales4 ,beginning of ,greek philosophy4 ,a4,d4 #cj1 ,the crucifixion4 ,a4,d4 #ebi1 ,closing of ,athenian schools4 ,end of ,greek philosophy4 ,a4,d4 #aabe1 7,approximate7 ,rise of the ,universities of ,bologna and ,paris4 ,a4,d4 #aedc1 ,publication of the 8,de ,revolutionibus0 of ,copernicus4 ,beginning of ,modern ,science4 ,the intervals are #fae1 #dii1 #eif1 #dah1 years4 ,in the history of metaphysics1 we may take the following3 ,b4,c4 #cbb1 ,death of ,aristotle4 ,a4,d4 #abgd1 ,death of ,aquinas4 ,a4,d4 #ahjd1 ,death of ,kant4 ,the intervals are #aeie and #ecj years4 ,the former is about thrice the latter4 ,from these figures1 no conclusion can fairly be drawn4 ,at the same time1 they suggest that perhaps there may be a rough natural era of about #ejj years4 ,should there be any independent evidence of this1 the intervals noticed may gain some significance4 ,the agapastic development of thought should1 if it exists1 be distinguished by its purposive character1 this purpose being the development of an idea4 ,we should have a direct agapic or sympathetic comprehension and recognition of it1 by virtue of the continuity of thought4 ,i here take it for granted that such continuity of thought has been sufficiently proved by the arguments used in my paper on the 8,law of ,mind0 in ,the ,monist of last ,july4 ,even if those arguments are not quite convincing in themselves1 yet if they are renforced by an apparent agapasm in the history of thought1 the two propositions will lend one another mutual aid4 ,the reader will1 ,i trust1 be too well grounded in logic to mistake such mutual support for a vicious circle in reasoning4 ,if it could be shown directly that there is such an entity as the 8spirit of an age0 or of a people1 and that mere individual intelligence will not account for all the phenomena1 this would be proof enough at once of agapasticism and of synechism4 ,i must acknowledge that ,i am unable to produce a cogent demonstration of this2 but ,i am1 ,i believe1 able to adduce such arguments as will serve to confirm those which have been drawn from other facts4 ,i believe that all the greatest achievements of mind have been beyond the powers of unaided individuals2 and ,i find1 apart from the support this opinion receives from synechistic considerations1 and from the purposive character of many great movements1 direct reason for so thinking in the sublimity of the ideas and in their occurring simultaneously and independently to a number of individuals of no extraordinary general powers4 ,the pointed ,gothic architecture in several of its developments appears to me to be of such a character4 ,all attempts to imitate it by modern architects of the greatest learning and genius appear flat and tame1 and are felt by their authors to be so4 ,yet at the time the style was living1 there was quite an abundance of men capable of producing works of this kind of gigantic sublimity and power4 ,in more than one case1 extant documents show that the cathedral chapters1 in the selection of architects1 treated high artistic genius as a secondary consideration1 as if there were no lack of persons able to supply that2 and the results justify their confidence4 ,were individuals in general1 then1 in those ages possessed of such lofty natures and high intellect8 ,such an opinion would break down under the first examination4 ,how many times have men now in middle life seen great discoveries made independently and almost simultaneously6 ,the first instance ,i remember was the prediction of a planet exterior to ,uranus by ,leverrier and ,adams4 ,one hardly knows to whom the principle of the conservation of energy ought to be attributed1 although it may reasonably be considered as the greatest discovery science has ever made4 ,the mechanical theory of heat was set forth by ,rankine and by ,clausius during the same month of ,february1 #ahej2 and there are eminent men who attribute this great step to ,thomson4#gf ,the kinetical theory of gases1 after being started by ,john ,bernoulli and long buried in oblivion1 was reinvented and applied to the explanation not merely of the laws of ,boyle1 ,charles1 and ,avogadro1 but also of diffusion and viscosity1 by at least three modern physicists separately4 ,it is well known that the doctrine of natural selection was presented by ,wallace and by ,darwin at the same meeting of the ,british ,association2 and ,darwin in his 8,historical ,sketch0 prefixed to the later editions of his book shows that both were anticipated by obscure forerunners4 ,the method of spectrum analysis was claimed for ,swan as well as for ,kirchhoff1 and there were others who perhaps had still better claims4 ,the authorship of the ,periodical ,law of the ,chemical ,elements is disputed between a ,russian1 a ,german1 and an ,englishman2 although there is no room for doubt that the principal merit belongs to the first4 ,these are nearly all the greatest discoveries of our times4 ,it is the same with the inventions4 ,it may not be surprising that the telegraph should have been independently made by several inventors1 because it was an easy corollary from scientific facts well made out before4 ,but it was not so with the telephone and other inventions4 ,ether1 the first ansthetic1 was introduced independently by three different ,new ,england physicians4 ,now ether had been a common article for a century4 ,it had been in one of the pharmacopias three centuries before4 ,it is quite incredible that its ansthetic property should not have been known2 it was known4 ,it had probably passed from mouth to ear as a secret from the days of ,basil ,valentine2 but for long it had been a secret of the ,punchinello kind4 ,in ,new ,england1 for many years1 boys had used it for amusement4 ,why then had it not been put to its serious use8 ,no reason can be given1 except that the motive to do so was not strong enough4 ,the motives to doing so could only have been desire for gain and philanthropy4 ,about #ahdf1 the date of the introduction1 philanthropy was undoubtedly in an unusually active condition4 ,that sensibility1 or sentimentalism1 which had been introduced in the previous century1 had undergone a ripening process1 in consequence of which1 though now less intense than it had previously been1 it was more likely to influence unreflecting people than it had ever been4 ,all three of the ether-claimants had probably been influenced by the desire for gain2 but nevertheless they were certainly not insensible to the agapic influences4 ,i doubt if any of the great discoveries ought1 properly1 to be considered as altogether individual achievements2 and ,i think many will share this doubt4 ,yet1 if not1 what an argument for the continuity of mind1 and for agapasticism is here6 ,i do not wish to be very strenuous4 ,if thinkers will only be persuaded to lay aside their prejudices and apply themselves to studying the evidences of this doctrine1 ,i shall be fully content to await the final decision4 ,footnote #gb3 ,the ,monist1 ,january1 #ahic4 ,footnote #gc3 ,how can a writer have any respect for science1 as such1 who is capable of confounding with the scientific propositions of political economy1 which have nothing to say concerning what is 8beneficent10 such brummagem generalisations as this8 ,footnote #gd3 ,i am happy to find that ,dr4 ,carus1 too1 ranks ,weismann among the opponents of ,darwin1 notwithstanding his flying that flag4 ,footnote #ge3 ,see ,draper's ,history of ,intellectual ,development1 chap4 x4 ,footnote #gf3 ,thomson1 himself1 in his article ,heat in the ,encyclopedia ,britannica1 never once mentions the name of ,clausius4 ,supplementary ,essay ,,the ,,pragmatism ,,of ,,peirce ,,by ,,john ,,dewey ,the term pragmatism was introduced into literature in the opening sentences of ,professor ,james's ,california ,union address in #ahih4 ,the sentences run as follows3 8,the principle of pragmatism1 as we may call it1 may be expressed in a variety of ways1 all of them very simple4 ,in the ,popular ,science ,monthly for ,january1 #ahgh1 ,mr4 ,charles ,s4 ,peirce introduces it as follows30 etc4 ,the readers who have turned to the volume referred to have not1 however1 found the word there4 ,from other sources we know that the name as well as the idea was furnished by ,mr4 ,peirce4 ,the latter has told us that both the word and the idea were suggested to him by a reading of ,kant1 the idea by the ,critique of ,pure ,reason1 the term by the 8,critique of ,practical ,reason40#gg ,the article in the ,monist gives such a good statement of both the idea and the reason for selecting the term that it may be quoted in extenso4 ,peirce sets out by saying that with men who work in laboratories1 the habit of mind is molded by experimental work much more than they are themselves aware4 8,whatever statement you may make to him1 he the experimentalist will either understand as meaning that if a given prescription for an experiment ever can be and ever is carried out in act1 an experience of a given description will result1 or else he will see no sense at all in what you say40 ,having himself the experimental mind and being interested in methods of thinking1 8he framed the theory that a conception1 that is1 the rational purport of a word or other expression1 lies exclusively in its bearing upon the conduct of life2 so that1 since obviously nothing that might not result from experiment can have any direct bearing upon conduct1 if one can define accurately all the conceivable experimental phenomena which the affirmation or denial of a concept could imply1 one will have therein a complete definition of the concept1 and there is absolutely nothing more in it4 ,for this doctrine1 he invented the name pragmatism40 ,after saying that some of his friends wished him to call the doctrine practicism or practicalism1 he says that he had learned philosophy from ,kant1 and that to one 8who still thought in ,kantian terms most readily1 praktisch and pragmatisch were as far apart as the two poles1 the former belonging to a region of thought where no mind of the experimentalist type can ever make sure of solid ground under his feet1 the latter expressing relation to some definite human purpose4 ,now quite the most striking feature of the new theory was its recognition of an inseparable connection between rational cognition and human purpose40#gh ,from this brief statement1 it will be noted that ,peirce confined the significance of the term to the determination of the meaning of terms1 or better1 propositions2 the theory was not1 of itself1 a theory of the test1 or the truth1 of propositions4 ,hence the title of his original article3 ,how to ,make ,ideas ,clear4 ,in his later writing1 after the term had been used as a theory of truth1--he proposed the more limited 8pragmaticism0 to designate his original specific meaning4#gi ,but even with respect to the meaning of propositions1 there is a marked difference between his pragmaticism and the pragmatism of1 say1 ,james4 ,some of the critics 7especially continental7 of the latter would have saved themselves some futile beating of the air1 if they had reacted to ,james's statements instead of to their own associations with the word 8pragmatic40 ,thus ,james says in his ,california address3 8,the effective meaning of any philosophic proposition can always be brought down to some particular consequence1 in our future practical experience1 whether active or passive2 the point lying rather in the fact that the experience must be particular1 than in the fact that it must be active40 7,italics mine47 ,now the curious fact is that ,peirce puts more emphasis upon practise 7or conduct7 and less upon the particular2 in fact1 he transfers the emphasis to the general4 ,the following passage is worth quotation because of the definiteness with which it identifies meaning with both the future and with the general4 8,the rational meaning of every proposition lies in the future4 ,how so8 ,the meaning of a proposition is itself a proposition4 ,indeed1 it is no other than the very proposition of which it is the meaning3 it is a translation of it4 ,but of the myriads of forms into which a proposition may be translated1 which is that one which is to be called its very meaning8 ,it is1 according to the pragmaticist1 that form in which the proposition becomes applicable to human conduct1 not in these or those special circumstances nor when one entertains this or that special design1 but that form which is most applicable to self-control under every situation and to every purpose40 ,hence1 8it must be simply the general description of all the experimental phenomena which the assertion of the proposition virtually predicts40 ,or1 paraphrasing1 pragmatism identifies meaning with formation of a habit1 or way of acting having the greatest generality possible1 or the widest range of application to particulars4 ,since habits or ways of acting are just as real as particulars1 it is committed to a belief in the reality of 8universals40 ,hence it is not a doctrine of phenomenalism1 for while the richness of phenomena lies in their sensuous quality1 pragmatism does not intend to define these 7leaving them1 as it were1 to speak for themselves71 but 8eliminates their sential element1 and endeavors to define the rational purport1 and this it finds in the purposive bearing of the word or proposition in question40 ,moreover1 not only are generals real1 but they are physically efficient4 ,the meanings 8the air is stuffy0 and 8stuffy air is unwholesome0 may determine1 for example1 the opening of the window4 ,accordingly on the ethical side1 8the pragmaticist does not make the summum bonum to consist in action1 but makes it to consist in that process of evolution whereby the existent comes more and more to embody those generals4442 in other words1 becomes1 through action an embodiment of rational purports or habits generalized as widely as possible40#hj ,the passages quoted should be compared with what ,peirce has to say in the ,baldwin ,dictionary article4 ,there he says that ,james's doctrine seems to commit us to the belief 8that the end of man is action--a stoical maxim which does not commend itself as forcibly to the present writer at the age of sixty as it did at thirty4 ,if it be admitted1 on the contrary1 that action wants an end1 and that the end must be something of a general description1 then the spirit of the maxim itself 444 would direct us toward something different from practical facts1 namely1 to general ideas4444 ,the only ultimate good which the practical facts to which the maxim directs attention can subserve is to further the development of concrete reasonableness4444 ,almost everybody will now agree that the ultimate good lies in the evolutionary process in some way4 ,if so1 it is not in individual reactions in their segregation1 but in something general or continuous4 ,synechism is founded on the notion that the coalescence1 the becoming continuous1 the becoming governed by laws1 the becoming instinct with general ideas1 are but phases of one and the same process of the growth of reasonableness4 ,this is first shown to be true with mathematical exactitude in the field of logic1 and is thence inferred to hold good metaphysically4 ,it is not opposed to pragmaticism 444 but includes that procedure as a step40 ,here again we have the doctrine of pragmaticism as a doctrine that meaning or rational purport resides in the setting up of habits or generalized methods1 a doctrine passing over into the metaphysics of synechism4 ,it will be well now to recur explicitly to ,peirce's earlier doctrine which he seems to qualify--although1 as he notes1 he upheld the doctrine of the reality of generals even at the earlier period4 ,peirce sets out1 in his article on the 8,fixation of ,belief10 with the empirical difference of doubt and belief expressed in the facts that belief determines a habit while doubt does not1 and that belief is calm and satisfactory while doubt is an uneasy and dissatisfied state from which we struggle to emerge2 to attain1 that is1 a state of belief1 a struggle which may be called inquiry4 ,the sole object of inquiry is the fixation of belief4 ,the scientific method of fixation has1 however1 certain rivals3 one is that of 8tenacity0--constant reiteration1 dwelling upon everything conducive to the belief1 avoidance of everything which might unsettle it--the will to believe4 ,the method breaks down in practice because of man's social nature2 we have to take account of contrary beliefs in others1 so that the real problem is to fix the belief of the community2 for otherwise our own belief is precariously exposed to attack and doubt4 ,hence the resort to the method of authority4 ,this method breaks down in time by the fact that authority can not fix all beliefs in all their details1 and because of the conflict which arises between organized traditions4 ,there may then be recourse to what is 8agreeable to reason0--a method potent in formation of taste and in esthetic productions and in the history of philosophy1--but a method which again fails to secure permanent agreements in society1 and so leaves individual belief at the mercy of attack4 ,hence1 finally1 recourse to science1 whose fundamental hypothesis is this3 8,there are real things1 whose characters are entirely independent of our opinions about them2 those realities affect our senses according to regular laws1 and 444 by taking advantage of the laws of perception1 we can ascertain by reasoning how things really are1 and any man if he have sufficient experience and reason enough about it1 will be led to the one true conclusion40#ha ,it will be noted that the quotation employs the terms 8reality0 and 8truth10 while it makes them a part of the statement of the hypothesis entertained in scientific procedure4 ,upon such a basis1 what meanings attach to the terms 8reality0 and 8truth08 ,since they are general terms1 their meanings must be determined on the basis of the effects1 having practical bearings1 which the object of our conception has4 ,now the effect which real things have is to cause beliefs2 beliefs are then the consequences which give the general term reality a 8rational purport40 ,and on the assumption of the scientific method1 the distinguishing character of the real object must be that it tends to produce a single universally accepted belief4 8,all the followers of science are fully persuaded that the processes of investigation1 if only pushed far enough1 will give one certain solution to every question to which they can be applied40 8,this activity of thought by which we are carried1 not where we wish1 but to a foreordained goal1 is like the operation of destiny4444 ,this great law is embodied in the conception of truth and reality4 ,the opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate1 is what we mean by the truth1 and the object represented in this opinion is the real40#hb ,in a subsequent essay 7on the 8,probability of ,induction07 ,peirce expressly draws the conclusion which follows from this statement2 viz41 that this conception of truth and reality makes everything depend upon the character of the methods of inquiry and inference by which conclusions are reached4 8,in the case of synthetic inferences we know only the degree of trustworthiness of our proceeding4 ,as all knowledge comes from synthetic inference1 we must also infer that all human certainty consists merely in our knowing that the processes by which our knowledge has been derived are such as must generally have led to true conclusions0#hc--true conclusions1 once more1 being those which command the agreement of competent inquiries4 ,summing up1 we may say that ,peirce's pragmaticism is a doctrine concerning the meaning1 conception1 or rational purport of objects1 namely1 that these consist in the 8effects1 which might conceivably have practical bearings1 we conceive the object of our conception to have4 ,then1 our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object40#hd 8,our idea of anything is our idea of its sensible effects10 and if we have any doubt as to whether we really believe the effects to be sensible or no1 we have only to ask ourselves whether or no we should act any differently in their presence4 ,in short1 our own responses to sensory stimuli are the ultimate1 or testing1 ingredients in our conception of an object4 ,in the literal sense of the word pragmatist1 therefore1 ,peirce is more of a pragmatist than ,james4 ,he is also less of a nominalist4 ,that is to say1 he emphasizes much less the particular sensible consequence1 and much more the habit1 the generic attitude of response1 set up in consequence of experiences with a thing4 ,in the passage in the ,dictionary already quoted he speaks as if in his later life he attached less importance to action1 and more to 8concrete reasonableness0 than in his earlier writing4 ,it may well be that the relative emphasis had shifted4 ,but there is at most but a difference of emphasis4 ,for in his later doctrine1 concrete rationality means a change in existence brought about through action1 and through action which embodies conceptions whose own specific existence consists in habitual attitudes of response4 ,in his earlier writing1 the emphasis upon habits1 as something generic1 is explicit4 8,what a thing means is simply what habits it involves40#he ,more elaborately1 8,induction infers a rule4 ,now the belief of a rule is a habit4 ,that a habit is a rule1 active in us1 is evident4 ,that every belief is of the nature of a habit1 in so far as it is of a general character1 has been shown in the earlier papers of this series40#hf ,the difference between ,peirce and ,james which next strikes us is the greater emphasis placed by the former upon the method of procedure4 ,as the quotations already made show1 everything ultimately turned1 for ,peirce1 upon the trustworthiness of the procedures of inquiry4 ,hence his high estimate of logic1 as compared with ,james--at least ,james in his later days4 ,hence also his definite rejection of the appeal to the ,will to ,believe--under the form of what he calls the method of tenacity4 ,closely associated with this is the fact that ,peirce has a more explicit dependence upon the social factor than has ,james4 ,the appeal in ,peirce is essentially to the consensus of those who have investigated1 using methods which are capable of employment by all4 ,it is the need for social agreement1 and the fact that in its absence 8the method of tenacity0 will be exposed to disintegration from without1 which finally forces upon mankind the wider and wider utilization of the scientific method4 ,finally1 both ,peirce and ,james are realists4 ,the reasonings of both depend upon the assumption of real things which really have effects or consequences4 ,of the two1 ,peirce makes clearer the fact that in philosophy at least we are dealing with the conception of reality1 with reality as a term having rational purport1 and hence with something whose meaning is itself to be determined in terms of consequences4 ,that 8reality0 means the object of those beliefs which have1 after prolonged and coperative inquiry1 becomes stable1 and 8truth0 the quality of these beliefs is a logical consequence of this position4 ,thus while 8we may define the real as that whose characters are independent of what anybody may think them to be 444 it would be a great mistake to suppose that this definition makes the idea of reality perfectly clear40#hg ,for it is only the outcome of persistent and conjoint inquiry which enables us to give intelligible meaning in the concrete to the expression 8characters independent of what anybody may think them to be40 7,this is the pragmatic way out of the egocentric predicament47 ,and while my purpose is wholly expository ,i can not close without inquiring whether recourse to ,peirce would not have a most beneficial influence in contemporary discussion4 ,do not a large part of our epistemological difficulties arise from an attempt to define the 8real0 as something given prior to reflective inquiry instead of as that which reflective inquiry is forced to reach and to which when it is reached belief can stably cling8 ,footnote #gg3 ,see article on 8,pragmatism10 in ,baldwin's ,dictionary1 ,vol4 #b41 p4 #cbb1 and the ,monist1 ,vol4 #ae1 p4 #afb4 ,footnote #gh3 ,kant discriminates the laws of morality1 which are a priori1 from rules of skill1 having to do with technique or art1 and counsels of prudence1 having to do with welfare4 ,the latter he calls pragmatic2 the a priori laws practical4 ,see ,metaphysics of ,morals1 ,abbott's trans41 pp4 #cc and #cd4 ,footnote #gi3 ,see the article in the ,monist already mentioned1 and another one in the same volume1 p4 #dha1 8,the ,issues of ,pragmaticism40 ,footnote #hj3 ,it is probably fair to see here an empirical rendering of the ,kantian generality of moral action1 while the distinction and connection of 8rational purport0 and 8sensible particular0 have also obvious ,kantian associations4 ,footnote #ha3 ,p4 #bf4 ,footnote #hb3 ,p4 #ef-eg4 ,footnote #hc3 ,p4 #aje4 ,footnote #hd3 ,p4 #de4 ,footnote #he3 ,p4 #dc4 ,footnote #hf3 ,p4 #aea4 ,footnote #hg3 ,p4 #ec4 ,,bibliography ,,of ,,peirce',s ,,published ,,writings ,i4 ,writings of ,general ,interest4#hh ,a4 ,three papers in the ,journal of ,speculative ,philosophy1 ,vol4 #b 7#ahfh74 #a4 8,questions ,concerning ,certain ,faculties ,claimed for ,man10 pp4 #ajc-aad4 #b4 8,some ,consequences of ,four ,incapacities10 pp4 #adj-aeg4 #c4 8,ground of ,validity of the ,laws of ,logic10 pp4 #aic-bjh4 ,these three papers1 somewhat loosely connected1 deal mainly with the philosophy of discursive thought4 ,the first deals with our power of intuition1 and holds that 8every thought is a sign40 ,the second1 one of the most remarkable of ,peirce's writings1 contains an acute criticism of the ,cartesian tradition and a noteworthy argument against the traditional emphasis on 8images0 in thinking4 ,the third contains1 inter alia1 a refutation of ,mill's indictment of the syllogism4 ,the same volume of the ,journal contains two unsigned communications on ,nominalism and on the ,meaning of ,determined4 ,b4 ,review of ,fraser's 8,berkeley10 in the ,north ,american ,review1 ,vol4 #aac 7#ahga71 pp4 #ddi-dgb4 ,this paper contains an important analysis on medieval realism1 and of ,berkeley's nominalism4 7,a ,scotist realism continues to distinguish ,peirce's work after this47 ,c4 8,illustrations of the ,logic of ,science10 in ,popular ,science ,monthly1 ,vols4 #ab-ac 7#ahgg-ahgh74 ,reprinted in ,pt4 ,i of this volume4 ,the first and second papers were also published in the ,revue ,philosophique1 ,vols4 #f-g 7#ahgi74 ,d4 ,ten papers in the ,monist1 ,vols4 #a-c 7#ahia-ahic71 and #ae-af 7#aije-aijf74 ,the first five are reprinted in ,pt4 ,,ii of this volume4 ,the sixth paper1 8,reply to the ,necessitarians10 ,vol4 #c1 pp4 #ebf-egj1 is an answer to the criticism of the foregoing by the editor of the ,monist1 ,vol4 #b1 pp4 #efj;ff42 cf4 ,vol4 #c1 pp4 #fh;ff4 and #ega;ff41 and ,mc,crie1 8,the ,issues of ,synechism10 ,vol4 #c1 pp4 #chj;ff4 #g4 8,what ,pragmatism ,is80 ,vol4 #ae1 pp4 #afa-aha4 #h4 8,the ,issues of ,pragmaticism10 ,vol4 #ae1 pp4 #dha-dii4 #i4 8,mr4 ,peterson's ,proposed ,discussion10 ,vol4 #af1 pp4 #adg;ff4 #aj4 8,prolegomena to an ,apology for ,pragmaticism10 ,vol4 #af1 pp4 #dib-edf4 ,the last four papers develop ,peirce's thought by showing its agreement and disagreement with the pragmatism of ,james and ,schiller4 ,the last paper contains his ,method of ,existential ,graphs4 ,e4 8,the ,reality of ,god10 in the ,hibbert ,journal1 ,vol4 #g 7#aijh71 pp4 #if-aab4 7,this article contains brief indications of many of ,peirce's leading ideas47 ,f4 ,six ,papers in the ,open ,court1 ,vols4 #f-g 7#ahic74 #a4 8,pythagorics0 7on the ,pythagorean brotherhood71 pp4 #ccge-ccgg4 #b4 8,dmesis0 7on charity towards criminals71 pp4 #ccii-cdjb4 #c4 8,the ,critic of ,arguments 7,i471 ,exact ,thinking10 pp4 #ccia-ccid4 #d4 8,the ,critic of ,arguments 7,,ii471 ,the ,reader is ,introduced to ,relatives10 pp4 #cdae-cdai4 7,the last two contain a very clear succinct account of the general character of ,peirce's logic47 #e4 8,what is ,christian ,faith80 pp4 #cgdc-cgde4 #f4 8,the ,marriage of ,religion and ,science10 pp4 #ceei-cefj4 ,g4 ,articles in ,baldwin's 8,dictionary of ,philosophy03 ,individual1 kind1 matter and form1 possibility1 pragmatism1 priority1 reasoning1 sign1 scientific method1 sufficient reason1 synechism1 and uniformity4 ,h4 8,pearson's ,grammar of ,science10 in ,popular ,science ,monthly1 ,vol4 #eh 7#aija71 pp4 #bif-cjf4 7,a critique of ,pearson's conceptualism and of his utilitarian view as to the aim of science47 ,,ii4 ,writings of ,predominantly ,logical ,interest4 ,a4 ,five ,papers on ,logic1 read before the ,american ,academy of ,arts and ,sciences4 ,published in the ,proceedings of the ,academy1 ,vol4 #g 7#ahfg74 #a4 8,on an ,improvement in ,boole's ,calculus of ,logic10 pp4 #bej-bfa4 7,suggests improvements in ,boole's logic1 especially in the representation of particular propositions4 ,the association of probability with the notion of relative frequency became a leading idea of ,peirce's thought47 #b4 8,on the ,natural ,classification of ,arguments10 pp4 #bfa-bhg4 7,a suggestive distinction between the leading principle and the premise of an argument4 ,contains also an interesting note 7pp4 #bhc-bhd7 denying the positivistic maxim that1 8no hypothesis is admissible which is not capable of verification by direct observation407 #c4 8,on a ,new ,list of ,categories10 pp4 #bhg-bih4 ,the categories are3 ,being1 ,quality 7,reference to a ,ground71 ,relation 7,reference to a ,correlate71 ,representation 7,reference to an ,interpretant71 ,substance4 8,logic has for its subject-genus all symbols and not merely concepts40 ,symbols include terms1 propositions1 and arguments4 #d4 8,upon the ,logic of ,mathematics10 pp4 #djb-dab4 8,there are certain general propositions from which the truths of mathematics follow syllogistically40 #e4 8,upon ,logical ,comprehension and ,extension10 pp4 #daf-dcb4 7,interesting historical references to the use of these terms and an attack on the supposed rule as to their inverse proportionality47 ,b4 8,description of a ,notation for the ,logic of ,relations10 in ,memoires of the ,american ,academy1 ,vol4 #i 7#ahgj71 pp4 #cag-cgh4 7,shows the relation of inclusion between classes to be more fundamental than ,boole's use of equality4 ,extends the ,booleian calculus to ,de,morgan's logic of relative terms47 ,c4 8,on the ,algebra of ,logic10 ,american ,journal of ,mathematics1 ,vol4 #c 7#ahhj71 pp4 #ae-eg4 7,referred to by ,schroeder as ,peirce's ,hauptwerk in 8,vorlesungen ber die ,algebra der ,logik10 ,vol4 #a41 p4 #ajg47 ,d4 8,on the ,logic of ,number10 ,american ,journal of ,mathematics1 ,vol4 #d 7#ahha71 pp4 #he-ie4 ,e4 8,brief ,description of the ,algebra of ,relatives10 ,reprinted from 881 pp4 #a-f4 ,f4 8,on the ,algebra of ,logic3 ,a ,contribution to the ,philosophy of ,notation10 ,american ,journal of ,mathematics1 ,vol4 #g 7#ahhd71 pp4 #ahj-bjb4 ,g4 8,a ,theory of ,probable ,inference0 and notes 8,on a ,limited ,universe of ,marks0 and on the 8,logic of ,relatives0 in 8,studies in ,logic by members of the ,johns ,hopkins ,university10 ,boston1 #ahhc1 pp4 #abf-bjc4 ,h4 8,the ,regenerated ,logic10 ,monist1 ,vol4 #g1 pp4 #ai-dj4 8,the ,logic of ,relatives10 ,monist1 ,vol4 #g1 pp4 #afa-bag4 7,an elaborate development of his own logic of relatives1 by way of review of ,schroeder's book47 ,i4 ,miscellaneous ,notes1 etc4 #a4 ,review of ,venn's 8,logic of ,chance10 ,north ,american ,review1 ,july1 #ahfg4 #b4 8,on the ,application of ,logical ,analysis to ,multiple ,algebra10 ,proceedings of the ,american ,academy1 ,vol4 #aj 7#ahge71 pp4 #cib-cid4 #c4 8,note on ,grassman's #8,calculus of ,extension1'0 ,proceedings of the ,american ,academy1 ,vol4 #ac 7#ahgh71 pp4 #aae-aaf4 #d4 8,note on ,conversion10 ,mind1 ,vol4 #a1 p4 #dbd4 #e4 ,notes and ,additions to ,benjamin ,peirce's 8,linear ,associative ,algebra10 ,american ,journal of ,mathematics1 ,vol4 #d 7#ahha71 pp4 #ib;ff41 especially pp4 #bba-bbi4 #f4 8,logical ,machines10 ,american ,journal of ,psychology1 ,vol4 #a 7#ahhh74 #g4 8,infinitesimals10 ,science1 ,vol4 #aa 7#aijj71 p4 #dcj4 #h4 8,some ,amazing ,mazes10 ,monist1 ,vol4 #ah 7,april and ,july1 #aijh71 and ,vol4 #ai 7,jan41 #aiji74 #i4 8,on ,non-,aristotelian ,logic0 7,letter71 ,monist1 ,vol4 #bj4 ,j4 ,a ,syllabus of ,certain ,topics of ,logic4 #aijc4 ,boston4 ,alfred ,mudge ,son 7a four page brochure74 ,k4 ,articles in ,baldwin's 8,dictionary of ,philosophy0 on3 laws of thought1 leading principle1 logic 7exact and symbolic71 modality1 negation1 predicate and predication1 probable inference1 quality1 quantity1 relatives1 significant1 simple1 subject1 syllogism1 theory1 truth and falsity universal1 universe1 validity1 verification1 whole and parts4 ,,iii4 ,researches in the ,theory and ,methods of ,measurement4 ,a4 ,general and ,astronomic4 #a4 8,on the ,theory of ,errors of ,observation10 ,report of the ,superintendent of the ,u4 ,s4 ,coast ,survey for #ahgj1 pp4 #bbj-bbd4 #b4 8,note on the ,theory of ,economy of ,research10 ,report of the ,u4 ,s4 ,coast ,survey for #ahgf1 pp4 #aig-bja4 7,this paper deals with the relation between the utility and the cost of diminishing the probable error47 #c4 8,apparatus for ,recording a ,mean of ,observed ,times10 ,u4 ,s4 ,coast ,survey1 #ahgg4 ,appendix ,no4 #ae to ,report of #ahge4 #d4 8,ferrero's ,metodo dei ,minimi ,quadrati10 ,american ,journal of ,mathematics1 ,vol4 #a 7#ahgh71 pp4 #ee-fc4 #e4 8,photometric ,researches10 ,annals of the ,astronomical ,observatory of ,harvard ,college1 ,vol4 #i 7#ahgh71 pp4 #a-aha4 #f4 8,methods and ,results4 ,measurement of ,gravity40 ,washington4 #ahgi4 #g4 8,methods and ,results4 ,a ,catalogue of ,stars for ,observations of ,latitude40 ,washington4 #ahgi4 #h4 8,on the ,ghosts in ,rutherford's #8,diffraction ,spectra1'0 ,american ,journal of ,mathematics1 ,vol4 #b 7#ahgi71 pp4 #ccj-cdg4 #i4 8,note on a ,comparison of a ,wave-,length with a ,meter10 ,american ,journal of ,science1 ,vol4 #ah 7#ahgi71 p4 #ea4 #aj4 8,a ,quincuncial ,projection of the ,sphere10 ,american ,journal of ,mathematics1 ,vol4 #b 7#ahgi71 pp4 #cid1 #cif4 #aa4 8,numerical ,measure of ,success of ,predictions10 ,science1 ,vol4 #d 7#ahhd71 p4 #dec4 #ab4 8,proceedings ,assay ,commission0 ,washington1 #ahhh4 7,joint ,reports on ,weighing47 ,b4 ,geodetic ,researches4 ,the ,pendulum4 #a4 8,measurement of ,gravity at ,initial ,stations in ,america and ,europe10 ,report of the ,u4 ,s4 ,coast ,survey1 #ahgf1 pp4 #bjb-bcg and #daj-daf4 #b4 8,de l'influence de la flexibilit du trpied sur l'oscillation du pendule a rversion10 ,confrence ,geodesique ,internationale 7#ahgg7 ,comptes ,rendus1 ,berlin1 #ahgh1 pp4 #aga-ahg4 7,this paper was introduced by ,plantamour and was followed by the notes of ,appolzer47 #c4 8,on the ,influence of ,internal ,friction upon the ,correction of the ,length of the ,second's ,pendulum10 ,proceedings of the ,american ,academy1 ,vol4 #ac 7#ahgh71 pp4 #cif-dja4 #d4 8,on a ,method of ,swinging ,pendulums for the ,determination of ,gravity proposed by ,m4 ,faye10 ,american ,journal of ,science1 ,vol4 #ah 7#ahgi71 pp4 #aab-aai4 #e4 8,results of ,pendulum ,experiments10 ,american ,journal of ,science1 ,vol4 #bj 7#ahhj74 #f4 8,flexure of ,pendulum ,supports10 ,report of the ,u4 ,s4 ,coast ,survey1 #ahha1 pp4 #cei-dda4 #g4 8,on the ,deduction of the ,ellipticity of the ,earth from the ,pendulum ,experiment10 ,report of the ,u4 ,s4 ,coast ,survey1 #ahha1 pp4 #ddb-def4 #h4 8,determinations of ,gravity at ,stations in ,pennsylvania10 ,report of ,u4 ,s4 ,coast ,survey1 #ahhc1 ,appendix #ai and pp4 #dgc-dhf4 #i4 8,on the ,use of the ,noddy10 ,report of the ,u4 ,s4 ,coast ,survey1 #ahhd1 pp4 #dge-dhb4 #aj4 8,effect of the ,flexure of a ,pendulum upon the ,period of ,oscillation10 ,report of the ,u4 ,s4 ,coast ,survey1 #ahhd1 pp4 #dhc-dhe4 #aa4 8,on the ,influence of a ,noddy1 and of ,unequal ,temperature upon the ,periods of a ,pendulum10 ,report of the ,u4 ,s4 ,coast and ,geodetic ,survey for #ahhe1 pp4 #eji-eab4 ,c4 ,psychologic4 8,on ,small ,differences in ,sensation0 7in cooperation with ,j4 ,jastrow71 ,national ,academy of ,sciences1 ,vol4 #c 7#ahhd71 pp4 #a-aa4 ,,iv4 ,philologic4 8,shakespearian ,pronunciation0 7in coperation with ,j4 ,b4 ,noyes71 ,north ,american ,review1 ,vol4 #ih 7,april1 #ahfd71 pp4 #cdb-cfi4 ,v4 ,contributions to the ,nation4 ,lazelle1 ,capt4 ,h4 ,m41 ,one ,law in ,nature4 ,nation1 ,vol4 #ag1 ,no4 #dai4 ,newcomb1 ,s41 ,popular ,astronomy4 ,vol4 #bg1 ,no4 #fhc4 ,read1 ,c41 ,theory of ,logic1 #ahgh4 ,vol4 #bh1 ,no4 #gah4 ,rood1 ,o4 ,n41 ,modern ,chromatics1 #ahgi4 ,vol4 #bi1 ,no4 #gdf4 ,note on the ,american ,journal of ,mathematics4 ,vol4 #bi1 ,no4 #gef4 ,jevons1 ,w4 ,s41 ,studies in ,deductive ,logic1 #ahhj4 ,vol4 #cb1 ,no4 #hbb4 ,ribot1 ,th41 ,the ,psychology of ,attention1 #ahij4 ,vol4 #ej1 ,no4 #acjc4 ,james1 ,w41 ,the ,principles of ,psychology1 #ahij4 ,vol4 #ec1 ,nos4 #aceg and #aceh4 ,comte1 ,a4 7,f4 ,harrison1 editor71 ,the ,new ,calendar of ,great ,men1 #ahib4 ,vol4 #ed1 ,no4 #achf4 ,lobatchewsky1 ,n4 7,translator3 ,g4 ,b4 ,halsted71 ,geometrical ,researches on the ,theory of ,parallels1 #ahia4 ,vol4 #ed1 ,no4 #achi4 ,lombroso1 ,c41 ,the ,man of ,genius1 #ahia4 ,vol4 #ed1 ,no4 #acia4 ,note on ,william ,james' abridgment of his ,psychology1 #ahib4 ,vol4 #ed1 ,no4 #acid4 ,mc,clelland1 ,w4 ,j41 ,a ,treatise on the ,geometry of the ,circle1 #ahia4 ,vol4 #ed1 ,no4 #acie4 ,buckley1 ,arabella ,b41 ,moral ,teachings of ,science1 #ahib4 ,vol4 #ed1 ,no4 #adje4 ,hale1 ,e4 ,e41 ,a ,new ,england ,boyhood1 #ahic4 ,vol4 #eg1 ,no4 #adfh4 ,mach1 ,e4 7,translator3 ,t4 ,j4 ,mc,cormack71 ,the ,science of ,mechanics1 #ahic4 ,vol4 #eg1 ,no4 #adge4 ,ritchie1 ,d4 ,g41 ,darwin and ,hegel1 #ahic4 ,vol4 #eg1 ,no4 #adhb4 ,huxley1 ,t4 ,h41 ,method and ,results1 #ahic4 ,vol4 #eh1 ,no4 #adhi4 ,scott1 ,sir ,walter1 ,familiar ,letters of ,sir ,walter ,scott4 ,vol4 #eh1 ,no4 #adic4 ,gilbert1 ,w4 7,translator3 ,p4 ,f4 ,mottelay71 ,magnetic ,bodies4 ,vol4 #eh1 ,no4 #adid and ,no4 #adie4 ,forsyth1 ,a4 ,r41 ,theory of ,functions of a ,complex ,variable1 #ahic2 and ,harkness1 ,j41 ,a ,treatise on the ,theory of ,functions1 #ahic2 and ,picard1 ,e41 ,trait d'analyse1 #ahic4 ,vol4 #eh1 ,no4 #adih4 ,a ,short ,sketch of ,helmholtz1 ,sept4 #ac1 #ahid4 ,vol4 #ei1 ,no4 #aebd4 ,windelband1 ,w4 7,translator3 ,j4 ,h4 ,tufts71 ,a ,history of ,philosophy2 and ,falkenberg1 ,r4 7,translator3 ,a4 ,c4 ,armstrong71 ,history of ,modern ,philosophy2 and ,bascom1 ,j41 ,an ,historical ,interpretation of ,philosophy2 and ,burt1 ,b4 ,c41 ,a ,history of ,modern ,philosophy4 ,vol4 #ei1 ,nos4 #aebf and #aebg4 ,spinoza 7,translators3 ,w4 ,h4 ,white and ,amelia ,h4 ,stirling71 ,ethics1 #ahid4 ,vol4 #ei1 ,no4 #aecb4 ,watson1 ,j41 ,comte1 ,mill1 and ,spencer1 #ahie4 ,vol4 #fj1 ,no4 #aeed4 ,jones1 ,h41 ,a ,critical ,account of the ,philosophy of ,lotze1 #ahie2 and ,eberhard1 ,v41 ,die ,grundbegriffe der ebenen ,geometrie1 #ahie2 and ,klein1 ,f4 7,translator3 ,a4 ,ziwet71 ,riemann and his ,significance for the ,development of ,modern ,mathematics1 #ahie2 and ,davis1 ,n4 ,k41 ,elements of ,inductive ,logic1 #ahie4 ,vol4 #fa1 ,no4 #aeff4 ,benjamin1 ,p41 ,the ,intellectual ,rise in ,electricity1 #ahie4 ,vol4 #fb1 ,no4 #aeib4 ,baldwin1 ,j4 ,m41 ,the ,story of the ,mind1 #ahih4 ,vol4 #fg1 ,no4 #agcg4 ,darwin1 ,g4 ,h41 ,the ,tides and ,kindred ,phenomena in the ,solar ,system1 #ahih4 ,vol4 #fg1 ,no4 #agdg4 ,marshall1 ,h4 ,r41 ,instinct and ,reason1 #ahih4 ,vol4 #fh1 ,no4 #aggd4 ,britten1 ,f4 ,j41 ,old ,clocks and ,watches and their ,makers1 #ahii4 ,vol4 #fi1 ,no4 #aggh4 ,renouvier1 ,ch41 et ,prat1 ,l4 ,la ,nouvelle ,monadologie1 #ahii4 ,vol4 #fi1 ,no4 #aggi4 ,mackintosh1 ,r41 ,from ,comte to ,benjamin ,kidd1 #ahii2 and ,moore1 ,j4 ,h41 ,better-,world ,philosophy1 #ahii4 ,vol4 #fi1 ,no4 #aghd4 ,ford1 ,p4 ,l41 ,the ,many-sided ,franklin1 #ahii4 ,vol4 #fi1 ,no4 #agic4 ,avenel1 ,g4 d'1 ,le ,mcanisme de la vie moderne1 #aijj4 ,vol4 #gj1 ,no4 #ahje4 ,reid1 ,w41 ,memoirs and ,correspondence of ,lyon ,playfair1 #ahii4 ,vol4 #gj1 ,no4 #ahjf4 ,stevenson1 ,f4 ,s41 ,robert ,grosseteste1 #ahii4 ,vol4 #gj1 ,no4 #ahaf4 ,thilly1 ,f41 ,introduction to ,ethics1 #aijj4 ,vol4 #gj1 ,no4 #ahbe4 ,wallace1 ,a4 ,r41 ,studies1 ,scientific and ,social1 #aijj4 ,vol4 #gb1 ,no4 #ahed4 ,sime1 ,j41 ,william ,herschel and ,his ,work1 #aijj4 ,vol4 #gb1 ,no4 #ahef4 ,rand1 ,b4 7,editor71 ,the ,life1 ,unpublished ,letters1 and ,philosophical ,regimen of ,anthony1 ,earl of ,shaftesbury1 #aijj2 and ,robertson1 ,j4 ,m4 7,editor71 ,characteristics of ,men1 etc41 by ,shaftesbury1 #aijj4 ,vol4 #gb1 ,no4 #aheg4 ,bacon1 ,rev4 ,j4 ,m41 ,by ,land and ,sea1 #aija4 ,vol4 #gb1 ,no4 #ahfe4 ,jordan1 ,w4 ,l41 ,essays in ,illustration of the ,action of ,astral ,gravitation in ,natural ,phenomena1 #aijj4 ,vol4 #gb1 ,no4 #ahgf4 ,goblot1 ,e41 ,le ,vocabulaire ,philosophique1 #aija4 ,vol4 #gb1 ,no4 #ahgg4 ,fraser1 ,a4 ,c4 7,editor71 ,the ,works of ,george ,berkeley1 #aija4 ,vol4 #gc1 ,no4 #ahhc4 ,frazer1 ,p41 ,bibliotics1 #aija4 ,vol4 #gc1 ,no4 #ahhc4 ,caldecott1 ,a41 ,the ,philosophy of ,religion in ,england and ,america1 #aija4 ,vol4 #gc1 ,no4 #ahhe4 ,review of four physical books4 ,vol4 #gc1 ,no4 #ahhg4 ,maher1 ,m41 ,psychology3 ,empirical and ,rational1 #aija4 ,vol4 #gc1 ,no4 #ahib4 ,mezes1 ,s4 ,e41 ,ethics1 #aija4 ,vol4 #gc1 ,no4 #ahie4 ,report of the ,meeting of the ,national ,academy of ,sciences1 ,philadelphia1 #aija4 ,vol4 #gc1 ,no4 #ahii4 ,crozier1 ,j4 ,b41 ,history of ,intellectual ,developments on the ,lines of ,modern ,evolution4 ,vol4 ,,iii41 #aija1 ,vol4 #gd1 ,no4 #aijh4 ,richardson1 ,e4 ,c41 ,classification1 ,theoretical and ,practical1 #aija4 ,vol4 #gd1 ,no4 #aiac4 ,vallery-,radot1 ,r4 7,translator3 ,mrs4 ,r4 ,l4 ,devonshire71 ,the ,life of ,pasteur4 ,vol4 #gd1 ,no4 #aiad4 ,giddings1 ,f4 ,h41 ,inductive ,sociology1 #aijb4 ,vol4 #gd1 ,no4 #aiah4 ,report on the ,meeting of the ,national ,academy of ,sciences1 ,washington1 ,d4 ,c41 #aijb4 ,vol4 #gd1 ,no4 #aiba4 ,emerson1 ,e4 ,r41 ,the ,story of the ,vine1 #aijb4 ,vol4 #gd1 ,no4 #aibf4 ,joachim1 ,h4 ,h41 ,a ,study of the ,ethics of ,spinoza1 #aija4 ,vol4 #ge1 ,no4 #aicb4 ,review of four chemistry text-books1 #aijb4 ,vol4 #ge1 ,no4 #aicd4 ,royce1 ,j41 ,the ,world and the ,individual1 ,vol4 ,,ii41 #aija4 ,vol4 #ge1 ,no4 #aice4 7,for a review of ,vol4 ,i41 probably by ,peirce1 see #aijj1 ,vol4 #gj1 ,no4 #ahad47 ,thorpe1 ,t4 ,e41 ,essays in ,historical ,chemistry1 #aijb4 ,vol4 #ge1 ,no4 #aich4 ,paulsen1 ,f41 ,immanuel ,kant3 ,his ,life and ,doctrine1 #aijb4 ,vol4 #ge1 ,no4 #aida4 ,aikens1 ,h4 ,a41 ,the ,principles of ,logic1 #aijb4 ,vol4 #ge1 ,no4 #aidb4 ,drude1 ,p41 ,the ,theory of ,optics1 #aijb4 ,vol4 #ge1 ,no4 #aidd4 ,valentine1 ,e4 ,s41 ,travels in ,space1 #aijb2 and ,walker1 ,f41 ,aerial ,navigation1 #aijb4 ,vol4 #ge1 ,no4 #aidg4 ,baillie1 ,j4 ,b41 ,the ,origin and ,significance of ,hegel's ,logic1 #aija4 ,vol4 #ge1 ,no4 #aiej4 ,forsyth1 ,a4 ,r41 ,theory of ,differential ,equations1 ,vol4 ,,iv41 #aijb4 ,vol4 #ge1 ,no4 #aieb4 ,ellwanger1 ,g4 ,w41 ,the ,pleasures of the ,table1 #aijb4 ,vol4 #ge1 ,no4 #aiee4 ,earle1 ,alice ,m41 ,sundials and ,roses of ,yesterday1 #aijb4 ,vol4 #ge1 ,no4 #aief4 ,smith1 ,rev4 ,t41 ,euclid3 ,his ,life and ,system1 #aijb4 ,vol4 #gf1 ,no4 #aifa4 ,report on the ,meeting of the ,national ,academy of ,sciences1 ,washington1 ,d4 ,c41 #aijc4 ,vol4 #gf1 ,no4 #aigd4 ,hibben1 ,j4 ,g41 ,hegel's ,logic1 #aijb4 ,vol4 #gf1 ,no4 #aigg4 ,mellor1 ,j4 ,w41 ,higher ,mathematics for ,students of ,chemistry and ,physics1 #aijc4 ,vol4 #gf1 ,no4 #aigg4 ,sturt1 ,h4 ,c4 7,editor71 ,personal ,idealism1 #aijb4 ,vol4 #gf1 ,no4 #aigi4 ,baldwin1 ,j4 ,m41 ,dictionary of ,philosophy and ,psychology1 ,vol4 ,,ii41 #aijb4 ,vol4 #gf1 ,no4 #aihj4 ,note on ,kant's ,prolegomene edited in ,english by ,dr4 ,p4 ,carus1 #aijc4 ,vol4 #gf1 ,no4 #aiha4 ,smith1 ,n41 ,studies in the ,cartesian ,philosophy1 #aijb4 ,vol4 #gg1 ,no4 #aihe4 ,hinds1 ,j4 ,i4 ,d41 ,inorganic ,chemistry1 #aijb4 ,vol4 #gg1 ,no4 #aihf4 ,clerke1 ,agnes ,m41 ,problems in ,astrophysics1 #aijc4 ,vol4 #gg1 ,no4 #aihg4 ,michelson1 ,a4 ,a41 ,light ,waves and their ,uses1 #aijc2 and ,fleming1 ,j4 ,a41 ,waves and ,ripples in ,water1 #aijb4 ,vol4 #gg1 ,no4 #aihi4 ,note on ,sir ,norman ,lockyer4 ,vol4 #gg1 ,no4 #agid4 ,note on ,british and ,american ,science1 #aijc4 ,vol4 #gg1 ,no4 #aiif4 ,welby1 ,lady ,victoria1 ,what is ,meaning8 #aijc2 and ,russell1 ,b41 ,the ,principles of ,mathematics1 #aijc4 ,vol4 #gg1 ,no4 #aiih4 ,note on the ,practical ,application of the ,theory of ,functions1 #aijc4 ,vol4 #gg1 ,no4 #aiii4 ,fahie1 ,j4 ,j41 ,galileo4 ,vol4 #gh1 ,no4 #bjae4 ,halsey1 ,f4 ,a41 ,the ,metric ,fallacy1 and ,dale1 ,s4 ,s41 ,the ,metric ,failure in the ,textile ,industry4 ,vol4 #gh1 ,no4 #bjbj4 ,newcomb1 ,s41 ,the ,reminiscences of an ,astronomer1 #aijc4 ,vol4 #gh1 ,no4 #bjba4 ,boole1 ,mrs4 ,m4 ,e41 ,lectures on the ,logic of ,arithmetic1 #aijc2 and ,bowden1 ,j41 ,elements of the ,theory of ,integers1 #aijc4 ,vol4 #gh1 ,no4 #bjbd4 ,report on the ,meeting of the ,national ,academy of ,sciences1 ,washington1 ,d4 ,c41 #aijd4 ,vol4 #gh1 ,no4 #bjbf4 ,lvy-,bruhl1 ,l4 7,translator3 ,kathleen de ,beaumont-,klein71 ,the ,philosophy of ,auguste ,comte1 #aijc4 ,vol4 #gh1 ,no4 #bjbf4 ,turner1 ,w41 ,history of ,philosophy1 #aijc4 ,vol4 #gi1 ,no4 #bjcf4 ,duff1 ,r4 ,a41 ,spinoza's ,political and ,ethical ,philosophy4 ,vol4 #gi1 ,no4 #bjch4 ,allbutt1 ,t4 ,c41 ,notes on the ,composition of ,scientific ,papers1 #aijd4 ,vol4 #gi1 ,no4 #bjci4 ,sylvester1 ,j4 ,j41 ,the ,collected ,mathematical ,papers of1 ,vol4 ,i4 ,vol4 #gi1 ,no4 #bjde4 ,renouvier1 ,ch41 ,les ,derniers ,entretiens1 #aijd1 and ,dewey1 ,j41 ,studies in ,logical ,theory1 #aijc4 ,vol4 #gi1 ,no4 #bjdf4 ,royce1 ,j41 ,outlines of ,psychology4 ,vol4 #gi1 ,no4 #bjdh4 ,straton1 ,g4 ,m41 ,experimental ,psychology and its ,bearing upon ,culture4 ,vol4 #gi1 ,no4 #bjee4 ,report on the ,meeting of the ,national ,academy of ,sciences1 ,new ,york1 #aijd4 ,vol4 #gi1 ,no4 #bjeg4 ,boole1 ,mrs4 ,m4 ,e41 ,the ,preparation of the ,child for ,science1 #aijd4 ,vol4 #hj1 ,no4 #bjfb4 ,royce1 ,j41 ,herbert ,spencer1 #aijd4 ,vol4 #hj1 ,no4 #bjfe4 ,strutt1 ,r4 ,j41 ,the ,becquerel ,rays and the ,properties of ,radium1 #aijd4 ,vol4 #hj1 ,no4 #bjff4 ,schuster1 ,a41 ,an ,introduction to the ,theory of ,optics1 #aijd4 ,vol4 #hj1 ,no4 #bjga4 ,findlay1 ,a41 ,the ,phase ,rule and its ,application1 #aijd4 ,vol4 #hj1 ,no4 #bjgd4 ,report on the ,meeting of the ,national ,academy of ,sciences1 ,washington1 ,d4 ,c41 #aije4 ,vol4 #hj1 ,no4 #bjgh4 ,flint1 ,r41 ,philosophy as ,scientia ,scientiarum1 #aijd2 and ,peirce1 ,c4 ,s41 ,a ,syllabus of ,certain ,topics of ,logic1 #aijc4 ,vol4 #hj1 ,no4 #bjgi4 ,arnold1 ,r4 ,b41 ,scientific ,fact and ,metaphysical ,reality1 #aijd1 also a ,note on ,mendeleeff's ,principles of ,chemistry4 ,vol4 #hj1 ,no4 #bjhc4 ,note on ,ida ,freund's ,the ,study of ,chemical ,composition4 ,vol4 #hj1 ,no4 #bjhf4 ,carnegie1 ,a41 ,james ,watt1 #aije4 ,vol4 #hj1 ,no4 #bjhg4 ,ross1 ,e4 ,a41 ,foundations of ,sociology1 #aije1 and ,sociological ,papers1 #aije1 published by the ,sociological ,society4 ,vol4 #ha1 ,no4 #bjhi4 ,wundt1 ,w4 7,translator3 ,e4 ,b4 ,titchener71 ,principles of ,physiological ,psychology1 #aijd4 ,vol4 #ha1 ,no4 #bjij4 ,roscoe1 ,h4 ,e41 ,a ,treatise on ,chemistry1 ,vol4 ,i41 #aije1 and de ,fleury1 ,m41 ,nos ,enfants au ,collge1 #aije4 ,vol4 #ha1 ,no4 #bjig4 ,varigny1 ,h4 de1 ,la ,nature et la ,vie1 #aije4 ,vol4 #ha1 ,no4 #baja4 ,note on ,mr4 ,g4 ,w4 ,hill's ,moon ,theory4 ,vol4 #ha1 #bajc4 ,report on the ,meeting of the ,national ,academy of ,sciences1 ,new ,haven1 #aije4 ,vol4 #ha1 ,no4 #bajh4 ,gosse1 ,e41 ,sir ,thomas ,browne1 #aije4 ,vol4 #ha1 ,no4 #baaa4 ,rutherford1 ,e41 ,radio-,activity1 #aije4 ,vol4 #hb1 ,no4 #baaf4 ,wallace1 ,a4 ,r41 ,my ,life1 #aije4 ,vol4 #hb1 ,no4 #baba4 ,haldane1 ,elizabeth ,s41 ,descartes4 ,vol4 #hb1 ,no4 #babe4 ,report on the ,meeting of the ,national ,academy of ,sciences1 ,washington1 ,d4 ,c41 #aijf4 ,vol4 #hb1 ,no4 #bacj4 ,rogers1 ,h4 ,j4 7,editor71 ,congress of ,arts and ,sciences1 ,universal ,exposition1 ,st4 ,louis1 #aijd4 ,vol4 #hb1 ,no4 #bacf4 ,loeb1 ,j41 ,the ,dynamics of ,living ,matter2 and ,mann1 ,g41 ,chemistry of the ,proteids4 ,vol4 #hc1 ,no4 #badj4 ,roscoe1 ,h4 ,e41 ,the ,life and ,experiences of ,sir ,henry ,enfield ,roscoe4 ,vol4 #hc1 ,no4 #bada4 ,marshall1 ,t41 ,aristotle's ,theory of ,conduct4 ,vol4 #hc1 ,no4 #baej4 ,joseph1 ,h4 ,w4 ,b41 ,an ,introduction to ,logic4 ,vol4 #hc1 ,no4 #baef4 ,,other ,,articles ,,and ,,reviews ,old ,stone ,mill at ,newport1 ,science1 #d1 #ahhd1 #eab4 ,criticism on 8,phantasms of the ,living10 ,proc4 ,am4 ,soc4 ,psychical ,research1 ,vol4 #a1 ,no4 #c 7#ahhg74 ,napoleon ,intime1 ,the ,independent1 ,december #ba and ,december #bh1 #ahic4 ,decennial ,celebration of ,clark ,university1 ,science1 #aa 7#aijj71 p4 #fbj4 ,century's ,great ,men of ,science1 ,smithsonian ,institute ,reports1 #aijj4 ,campanus ,science1 #ac 7#aija71 p4 #hji4 ,french ,academy of ,science1 ,n4 ,y4 ,evening ,post1 ,march #e1 #aijd4 ,footnote #hh3 ,the following classification is arbitrary1 as some of ,peirce's most significant reflections occur in papers under headings ,,ii4 and ,,iii4 ,it may1 however1 be useful4 ,transcriber's ,notes3 ,text that was in italics is enclosed by underscores 7italics74 ,text that was in bold face is enclosed by equals signs 7bold74 ,footnotes have been moved to follow the chapters in which they are referenced4 ,numbers raised to a power are denoted by the caret sign3 #be is #b raised to the #eth power4 ,powers may be enclosed in curly brackets1 so #bcb is #b raised to the #cbnd power4 ,subscripts are denoted by an underscore followed by the subscript in curly brackets1 so ,o#b means ,o followed by a subscript #b4