,the ,journal of ,speculative ,philosophy1 ,vol4 ,i4 ,,the ,,journal ,,of ,,speculative ,,philosophy4 ,,vol4 ,i4 ,,edited ,,by ,,wm4 ,t4 ,,harris4 ,,st4 ,,louis1 ,,mo43 ,,george ,,knapp ,,co41 ,,printers ,,and ,,binders4 #ahfg4 ,,kraus ,,reprint ,,co4 ,new ,york #aifh ,,kraus ,,reprint ,,co4 ,a ,u4,s4 ,division of ,kraus-,thomson ,organization ,limited ,printed in ,germany ,lessingdruckerei in ,wiesbaden ,,preface4 ,in concluding the first volume of this ,journal1 the editor wishes to say a few things regarding its contents1 even at the risk of repeating1 in some cases1 what has already been said4 ,he hopes that his judgment in the selection of articles will be1 in the main1 approved4 ,in so novel an undertaking it is not to be expected that the proper elevation and range will be found at once4 ,but the editor thinks that he has acquired some valuable experience that will aid him in preparing the second volume4 ,the reader will notice1 upon looking over the table of contents1 that about one-third of the articles relate to ,art1 and hence recommend themselves more especially to those who seek artistic culture1 and wish at the same time to have clear conceptions regarding it4 ,it is1 perhaps1 a mistake to select so little that bears on physical science1 which is by far the most prominent topic of interest at the present day4 ,in order to provide for this1 the editor hopes to print in the next volume detailed criticisms of the 8,positive ,philosophy10 appreciating its advantages and defects of method and system4 ,the 8,development ,theory10 the 8,correlation of ,physical1 ,vital and ,mental ,forces10 the abstract theories in our text-books on ,natural ,philosophy1 regarding the nature of attraction1 centrifugal and centripetal forces1 light1 heat1 electricity1 chemical elements1 c41 demand the investigation of the speculative thinker4 ,the exposition of ,hegel's ,phenomenology of ,spirit will furnish pertinent thoughts relating to method4 ,while the large selection of translations has met with approval from very high sources1 yet there has been some disappointment expressed at the lack of original articles4 ,considerably more than half of the articles have been original entirely1 while all the translations are new4 ,the complaint1 however1 relates more especially to what its authors are pleased to call the ,un-,american character of the contents of the ,journal4 ,here the editor feels like pleading ignorance as an excuse4--,in what books is one to find the true 8,american0 type of ,speculative ,philosophy8 ,certain very honorable exceptions occur to every one1 but they are not ,american in a popular sense4 ,we1 as a people1 buy immense editions of ,john ,stuart ,mill1 ,herbert ,spencer1 ,comte1 ,hamilton1 ,cousin1 and others2 one can trace the appropriation and digestion of their thoughts in all the leading articles of our ,reviews1 ,magazines and books of a thoughtful character4 ,if this is ,american philosophy1 the editor thinks that it may be very much elevated by absorbing and digesting more refined aliment4 ,it is said that of ,herbert ,spencer's works nearly twenty thousand have been sold in this country1 while in ,england scarcely the first edition has been bought4 ,this is encouraging for the ,american thinker3 what lofty spiritual culture may not become broadly and firmly rooted here where thoughtful minds are so numerous8 ,let this spirit of inquiry once extend to thinkers like ,plato and ,aristotle1 ,schelling and ,hegel--let these be digested and organically reproduced--and what a phalanx of ,american thinkers we may have to boast of6 ,for after all it is not 8,american thought0 so much as ,american thinkers that we want4 ,to think1 in the highest sense1 is to transcend all natural limits--such1 for example1 as national peculiarities1 defects in culture1 distinctions in ,race1 habits1 and modes of living--to be universal1 so that one can dissolve away the external hull and seize the substance itself4 ,the peculiarities stand in the way2--were it not for these1 we should find in ,greek or ,german ,philosophy just the forms we ourselves need4 ,our province as ,americans is to rise to purer forms than have hitherto been attained1 and thus speak a 8solvent word0 of more potency than those already uttered4 ,if this be the goal we aim at1 it is evident that we can find no other means so well adapted to rid us of our own idiosyncracies as the study of the greatest thinkers of all ages and all times4 ,may this ,journal aid such a consummation6 ,in conclusion1 the editor would heartily thank all who have assisted him in this enterprise1 by money and cheering words2 he hopes that they will not withdraw in the future their indispensable aid4 ,to others he owes much for kind assistance rendered in preparing articles for the printer4 ,justice demands that special acknowledgment should be made here of the services of ,miss ,anna ,c4 ,brackett1 whose skill in proof-reading1 and subtle appreciation of philosophic thought have rendered her editorial assistance invaluable4 ,,st4 ,,louis1 ,december1 #ahfg4 ,,contents4 ,alchemists1 ,the ,editor4 #abf ,bnard's ,essay on ,hegel's ,jas4 ,a4 #cf1 sthetics 7translation74 ,martling4 #ia1 #afi1 #bba ,dialogue on ,music4 ,e4 #bbd ,sobolowski4 ,editorials4 ,editor4 #abg ,fichte's ,introduction to the ,a4 ,e4 #bc ,science of ,knowledge ,kroeger4 7translation74 ,criticism of ,philosophical ,a4 ,e4 #gi1 ,systems 7translation74 ,kroeger4 #acg ,genesis4 ,a4 ,bronson #afe ,alcott4 ,goethe's ,theory of ,colors4 ,editor4 #fc ,essay on ,da ,vinci's 8,last ,d4 ,j4 #bdb ,supper0 7translation74 ,snider ,t4 ,davidson4 ,herbert ,spencer4 ,editor4 #f ,introduction to ,philosophy4 ,editor4 #eg1 #aad1 #ahg1 #bcf ,in the ,quarry4 ,anna ,c4 #aib ,brackett4 ,leibnitz's ,monadology ,f4 ,h4 #abi 7translation74 ,hedge4 ,letters on ,faust4 ,h4 ,c4 #agh ,brockmeyer4 ,metaphysics of ,materialism4 ,d4 ,g4 #agf ,brinton4 ,music as a ,form of ,art4 ,editor4 #abj ,notes on ,milton's ,lycidas4 ,anna ,c4 #hg ,brackett4 ,paul ,janet and ,hegel4 ,editor4 #bej ,philosophy of ,baader ,a4 #aij 7translation from ,dr4 ,strothotte4 ,hoffmann74 ,raphael's ,transfiguration4 ,editor4 #ec ,schelling's ,introduction to ,tom #aei ,idealism 7translation74 ,davidson4 8 0 8 the ,tom #aic ,philosophy of ,nature ,davidson4 7transl'n74 ,schopenhauer's ,dialogue on ,c4 ,l4 #fa ,immortality 7translation74 ,bernays4 0 ,doctrine of the ,c4 ,l4 #bcb ,will 7translation74 ,bernays4 ,seed ,life4 ,anna ,c4 #fj ,brackett4 ,second ,part of ,goethe's ,faust ,d4 ,j4 #fe 7translation74 ,snider4 8,the ,speculative40 ,editor4 #b ,thought on ,shakespeare1 ,a ,anna ,c4 #bdj ,brackett4 ,to the ,reader4 ,editor4 #a ,,the ,,journal ,,of ,,speculative ,,philosophy4 ,vol4 ,i4 #ahfg4 ,no4 #a4 ,,to ,,the ,,reader4 ,for the reason that a journal devoted exclusively to the interests of ,speculative ,philosophy is a rare phenomenon in the ,english language1 some words may reasonably be expected from the ,editors upon the scope and design of the present undertaking4 ,there is no need1 it is presumed1 to speak of the immense religious movements now going on in this country and in ,england4 ,the tendency to break with the traditional1 and to accept only what bears for the soul its own justification1 is widely active1 and can end only in the demand that ,reason shall find and establish a philosophical basis for all those great ideas which are taught as religious dogmas4 ,thus it is that side by side with the naturalism of such men as ,renan1 a school of mystics is beginning to spring up who prefer to ignore utterly all historical wrappages1 and cleave only to the speculative kernel itself4 ,the vortex between the traditional faith and the intellectual conviction cannot be closed by renouncing the latter1 but only by deepening it to speculative insight4 ,likewise it will be acknowledged that the national consciousness has moved forward on to a new platform during the last few years4 ,the idea underlying our form of government had hitherto developed only one of its essential phases--that of brittle individualism--in which national unity seemed an external mechanism1 soon to be entirely dispensed with1 and the enterprise of the private man or of the corporation substituted for it4 ,now we have arrived at the consciousness of the other essential phase1 and each individual recognizes his substantial side to be the ,state as such4 ,the freedom of the citizen does not consist in the mere ,arbitrary1 but in the realization of the rational conviction which finds expression in established law4 ,that this new phase of national life demands to be digested and comprehended1 is a further occasion for the cultivation of the ,speculative4 ,more significant still is the scientific revolution1 working out especially in the domain of physics4 ,the day of simple empiricism is past1 and with the doctrine of 8,correlation of forces0 there has arisen a stage of reflection that deepens rapidly into the purely speculative4 ,for the further elucidation of this important point the two following articles have been prepared4 ,it is hoped that the first one will answer more definitely the question now arising in the mind of the reader1 8,what is this ,speculative ,knowing of which you speak80 and that the second one will show whither ,natural ,science is fast hastening4 ,with regard to the pretensions of this ,journal1 its editors know well how much its literary conduct will deserve censure and need apology4 ,they hope that the substance will make up in some degree for deficiencies in form2 and1 moreover1 they expect to improve in this respect through experience and the kind criticisms of friends4 ,,the ,,speculative4 8,we need what ,genius is unconsciously seeking1 and1 by some daring generalization of the universe1 shall assuredly discover1 a spiritual calculus1 a ,novum ,organon1 whereby nature shall be divined in the soul1 the soul in ,god1 matter in spirit1 polarity resolved into unity2 and that power which pulsates in all life1 animates and builds all organizations1 shall manifest itself as one universal deific energy1 present alike at the outskirts and centre of the universe1 whose centre and circumference are one2 omniscient1 omnipotent1 self-subsisting1 uncontained1 yet containing all things in the unbroken synthesis of its being40--78,,calculus10 one of ,alcott's 8,orphic ,sayings407 ,at the end of the sixth book of ,plato's ,republic1 after a characterization of the two grades of sensuous knowing and the grade of the understanding1 8which is obliged to set out from hypotheses1 for the reason that it does not deal with principles but only with results10 we find the speculative grade of knowing characterized as 8that in which the soul1 setting out from an hypothesis1 proceeds to an unhypothetical principle1 and makes its way without the aid of sensuous images1 but solely through ideas themselves40 ,the mathematical procedure which begins by hypothecating definitions1 axioms1 postulates1 and the like1 which it never examines nor attempts to deduce or prove1 is the example given by ,plato of the method of the ,understanding1 while he makes the speculative ,reason 8to posit hypotheses by the ,dialectic1 not as fixed principles1 but only as starting points1 in order that1 by removing them1 it may arrive at the unhypothetical--the principle of the universe40 ,this most admirable description is fully endorsed by ,aristotle1 and firmly established in a two-fold manner3 #a4 ,in the ,metaphysics 7xi4 #g7 he shows ontologically1 starting with motion as an hypothesis1 that the self-moved is the first principle2 and this he identifies with the speculative1 and the being of ,god4 #b4 ,in the ,de ,anima 7iii4 #e-h7 he distinguishes psychologically the 8active intellect0 as the highest form of knowing1 as that which is its own object1 7subject and object17 and hence as containing its own end and aim in itself--as being infinite4 ,he identifies this with the ,speculative result1 which he found ontologically as the ,absolute4 ,spinoza in his ,ethics 7,prop4 xl4 ,schol4 ii41 and ,prop1 xliv41 ,cor4 ii4 of ,part ,,ii47 has well described the ,speculative1 which he names 8,scientia intuitiva10 as the thinking of things under the form of eternity1 7,de natura rationis est res sub quadam specie ternitatis percipere47 ,though great diversity is found in respect to form and systematic exposition among the great philosophers1 yet there is the most complete unanimity1 not only with respect to the transcendency of the ,speculative1 but also with reference to the content of its knowing4 ,if the reader of different systems of ,philosophy has in himself achieved some degree of ,speculative culture1 he will at every step be delighted and confirmed at the agreement of what1 to the ordinary reader1 seem irreconcilable statements4 ,not only do speculative writers agree among themselves as to the nature of things1 and the destiny of man and the world1 but their results furnish us in the form of pure thought what the artist has wrought out in the form of beauty4 ,whether one tests architecture1 sculpture1 painting1 music or poetry1 it is all the same4 ,goethe has said3 8,as all ,nature's thousand changes ,but one changeless ,god proclaim2 ,so in ,art's wide kingdoms ranges ,one sole meaning1 still the same3 ,this is ,truth1 eternal ,reason1 ,which from ,beauty takes its dress1 ,and serene1 through time and season1 ,stands for aye in loveliness40 ,while ,art presents this content to the senses1 ,religion offers it to the conception in the form of a dogma to be held by faith2 the deepest ,speculative truth is allegorically typified in a historical form1 so that it acts upon the mind partly through fantasy and partly through the understanding4 ,thus ,religion presents the same content as ,art and ,philosophy1 but stands between them1 and forms a kind of middle ground upon which the purification takes place4 8,it is the purgatory between the ,inferno of ,sense and the ,paradise of ,reason40 ,its function is mediation2 a continual degrading of the sensuous and external1 and an elevation to the supersensual and internal4 ,the transition of ,religion into ,speculative ,philosophy is found in the mystics4 ,filled with the profound significance of religious symbolism1 and seeing in it the explanation of the universe1 they essay to communicate their insights4 ,but the form of ,science is not yet attained by them4 ,they express themselves1 not in those universal categories that the ,spirit of the ,race has formed in language for its utterance1 but they have recourse to symbols more or less inadequate because ambiguous1 and of insufficient universality to stand for the archetypes themselves4 ,thus 8,becoming0 is the most pure germinal archetype1 and belongs therefore to logic1 or the system of pure thought1 and it has correspondences on concrete planes1 as e4g41 time1 motion1 life1 c4 ,now if one of these concrete terms is used for the pure logical category1 we have mysticism4 ,the alchemists1 as shown by a genial writer of our day1 use the technique of their craft to express the profound mysteries of spirit and its regeneration4 ,the ,eleusinian and other mysteries do the like4 ,while it is one of the most inspiring things connected with ,speculative ,philosophy to discover that the 8,open ,secret of the ,universe0 has been read by so many1 and to see1 under various expressions1 the same meaning2 yet it is the highest problem of ,speculative ,philosophy to seize a method that is adequate to the expression of the 8,secret20 for its 7the content's7 own method of genetic development must be the only adequate one4 ,hence it is that we can classify philosophic systems by their success in seizing the content which is common to ,art and ,religion1 as well as to ,philosophy1 in such a manner as to allow its free evolution2 to have as little in the method that is merely formal1 or extraneous to the idea itself4 ,the rigid formalism of ,spinoza--though manipulated by a dear speculative spirit--is inadequate to the unfolding of its content2 for how could the mathematical method1 which is that of quantity or external determinations alone1 ever suffice to unfold those first principles which attain to the quantitative only in their result8 ,in this1 the profoundest of subjects1 we always find in ,plato light for the way4 ,although he has not given us complete examples1 yet he has pointed out the road of the true ,speculative method in a way not to be mistaken4 ,instead of setting out with first principles presupposed as true1 by which all is to be established1 7as mathematics and such sciences do71 he asserts that the first starting points must be removed as inadequate4 ,we begin with the immediate1 which is utterly insufficient1 and exhibits itself as such4 ,we ascend to a more adequate1 by removing the first hypothesis2 and this process repeats itself until we come to the first principle1 which of course bears its own evidence in this1 that it is absolutely universal and absolutely determined at the same time2 in other words it is the self-determining1 the 8self-moved10 as ,plato and ,aristotle call it4 ,it is its own other1 and hence it is the true infinite1 for it is not limited but continued by its other4 ,from this peculiarity results the difficulty of ,speculative ,philosophy4 ,the unused mind1 accepting with navet the first proposition as settled1 finds itself brought into confusion when this is contradicted1 and condemns the whole procedure4 ,the irony of ,socrates1 that always begins by positing the ground of his adversary1 and reducing it through its own inadequateness to contradict itself1 is of this character1 and the unsophisticated might say1 and do say3 8,see how illogical is ,socrates1 for he sets out to establish something1 and arrives rather at the destruction of it40 ,the reductio ad absurdum is a faint imitation of the same method4 ,it is not sufficient to prove your own system by itself1 for each of the opposing systems can do that2 but you must show that any and all counter-hypotheses result in your own4 ,god makes the wrath of men to praise ,him1 and all imperfect things must continually demonstrate the perfect1 for the reason that they do not exist by reason of their defects1 but through what of truth there is in them1 and the imperfection is continually manifesting the want of the perfect4 8,spirit10 says ,hegel1 8is self-contained being4 ,but matter1 which is spirit outside of itself1 turned inside out1 continually manifests this1 its inadequacy1 through gravity--attraction to a central point beyond each particle4 7,if it could get at this central point1 it would have no extension1 and hence would be annihilated470 ,the soul of this method lies in the comprehension of the negative4 ,in that wonderful expos of the importance of the negative1 which ,plato gives in the ,parmenides and ,sophist1 we see how justly he appreciated its true place in ,philosophic ,method4 ,spinoza's 8omnis determinatio est negatio0 is the most famous of modern statements respecting the negative1 and has been very fruitful in results4 ,one would greatly misunderstand the ,speculative view of the negative should he take it to mean1 as some have done1 8that the negative is as essential as the positive40 ,for if they are two independent somewhats over against each other1 having equal validity1 then all unity of system is absolutely impossible--we can have only the ,persian ,ahriman and ,ormuzd2 nay1 not even these--for unless there is a primal unity1 a 8,zeruane-,akerene0--the uncreated one1 these are impossible as opposites1 for there can be no tension from which the strife should proceed4 ,the ,speculative has insight into the constitution of the positive out of the negative4 8,that which has the form of ,being10 says ,hegel1 8is the self-related20 but relation of all kinds is negation1 and hence whatever has the form of being and is a positive somewhat1 is a self-related negative4 ,those three stages of culture in knowing1 talked of by ,plato and ,spinoza1 may be characterized in a new way by their relation to this concept4 ,the first stage of consciousness--that of immediate or sensuous knowing--seizes objects by themselves--isolatedly--without their relations2 each seems to have validity in and for itself1 and to be wholly positive and real4 ,the negative is the mere absence of the real thing2 and it utterly ignores it in its scientific activity4 ,but the second stage traces relations1 and finds that things do not exist in immediate independence1 but that each is related to others1 and it comes to say that 8,were a grain of sand to be destroyed1 the universe would collapse40 ,it is a necessary consequent to the previous stage1 for the reason that so soon as the first stage gets over its childish engrossment with the novelty of variety1 and attempts to seize the individual thing1 it finds its characteristic marks or properties4 ,but these consist invariably of relations to other things1 and it learns that these properties1 without which the thing could have no distinct existence1 are the very destruction of its independence1 since they are its complications with other things4 ,in this stage the negative has entered and has full sway4 ,for all that was before firm and fixed1 is now seen to be1 not through itself1 but through others1 and hence the being of everything is its negation4 ,for if this stone exists only through its relations to the sun1 which is not the stone but something else1 then the being of this stone is its own negation4 ,but the second stage only reduces all to dependence and finitude1 and does not show us how any real1 true1 or independent being can be found to exist4 ,it holds fast to the stage of mediation alone1 just as the first stage held by the immediate4 ,but the dialectic of this position forces it over into the third4 ,if things exist only in their relations1 and relations are the negatives of things1 then all that appears positive--all being--must rest upon negation4 ,how is this8 ,the negative is essentially a relative1 but since it as the only substrate 7for all is relative71 it can relate only to itself4 ,but self-relation is always identity1 and here we have the solution of the previous difficulty4 ,all positive forms1 all forms of immediateness or being1 all forms of identity1 are self-relations1 consisting of a negative or relative1 relating to itself4 ,but the most wonderful side of this1 is the fact that since this relation is that of the negative1 it negates itself in its very relation1 and hence its identity is a producing of non-identity4 ,identity and distinction are produced by the self-same process1 and thus self-determination is the origin of all identity and distinction likewise4 ,this is the speculative stand-point in its completeness4 ,it not only possesses speculative content1 but is able to evolve a speculative system likewise4 ,it is not only conscious of the principles1 but of their method1 and thus all is transparent4 ,to suppose that this may be made so plain that one shall see it at first sight1 would be the height of absurdity4 ,doubtless far clearer expositions can be made of this than those found in ,plato or ,proclus1 or even in ,fichte and ,hegel2 but any and every exposition must incur the same difficulty1 viz3 ,the one who masters it must undergo a thorough change in his innermost4 ,the 8,palingenesia0 of the intellect is as essential as the 8regeneration of the heart10 and is at bottom the same thing1 as the mystics teach us4 ,but this great difference is obvious superficially3 ,in religious regeneration it seems the yielding up of the self to an alien1 though beneficent1 power1 while in philosophy it seems the complete identification of one's self with it4 ,he1 then1 who would ascend into the thought of the best thinkers the world has seen1 must spare no pains to elevate his thinking to the plane of pure thought4 ,the completest discipline for this may be found in ,hegel's ,logic4 ,let one not despair1 though he seem to be baffled seventy and seven times2 his earnest and vigorous assault is repaid by surprisingly increased strength of mental acumen which he will be assured of1 if he tries his powers on lower planes after his attack has failed on the highest thought4 ,these desultory remarks on the ,speculative1 may be closed with a few illustrations of what has been said of the negative4 ,i4 ,everything must have limits that mark it off from other things1 and these limits are its negations1 in which it ceases4 ,,ii4 ,it must likewise have qualities which distinguish it from others1 but these likewise are negatives in the sense that they exclude it from them4 ,its determining by means of qualities is the making it not this and not that1 but exactly what it is4 ,thus the affirmation of anything is at the same time the negation of others4 ,,iii4 ,not only is the negative manifest in the above general and abstract form1 but its penetration is more specific4 ,everything has distinctions from others in general1 but also from its other4 ,sweet is opposed not only to other properties in general1 as white1 round1 soft1 etc41 but to its other1 or sour4 ,so1 too1 white is opposed to black1 soft to hard1 heat to cold1 etc41 and in general a positive thing to a negative thing4 ,in this kind of relative1 the negative is more essential1 for it seems to constitute the intimate nature of the opposites1 so that each is reflected in the other4 ,,iv4 ,more remarkable are the appearances of the negative in nature4 ,the element fire is a negative which destroys the form of the combustible4 ,it reduces organic substances to inorganic elements1 and is that which negates the organic4 ,air is another negative element4 ,it acts upon all terrestrial elements2 upon water1 converting it into invisible vapor2 upon metals1 reducing them to earths through corrosion--eating up iron to form rust1 rotting wood into mould--destructive or negative alike to the mineral and vegetable world1 like fire1 to which it has a speculative affinity4 ,the grand type of all negatives in nature1 such as air and fire1 is ,time1 the great devourer1 and archetype of all changes and movements in nature4 ,attraction is another appearance of the negative4 ,it is a manifestation in some body of an essential connection with another which is not it2 or rather it is an embodied self-contradiction3 8that other 7the sun7 which is not me 7the earth7 is my true being40 ,of course its own being is its own negation1 then4 ,thus1 too1 the plant is negative to the inorganic--it assimilates it2 the animal is negative to the vegetable world4 ,as we approach these higher forms of negation1 we see the negative acting against itself1 and this constitutes a process4 ,the food that life requires1 which it negates in the process of digestion1 and assimilates1 is1 in the life process1 again negated1 eliminated from the organism1 and replaced by new elements4 ,a negation is made1 and this is again negated4 ,but the higher form of negation appears in the generic2 8,the species lives and the individual dies40 ,the generic continually transcends the individual--going forth to new individuals and deserting the old--a process of birth and decay1 both negative processes4 ,in conscious ,spirit both are united in one-movement4 ,the generic here enters the individual as pure ego--the undetermined possibility of all determinations4 ,since it is undetermined1 it is negative to all special determinations4 ,but this ego not only exists as subject1 but also as object--a process of self-determination or self-negation4 ,and this negation or particularization continually proceeds from one object to another1 and remains conscious under the whole1 not dying1 as the mere animal does1 in the transition from individual to individual4 ,this is the aperu of ,immortality4 ,,herbert ,,spencer4 ,,chapter ,i4 ,,the ,,crisis ,,in ,,natural ,,science4 ,during the past twenty years a revolution has been working in physical science4 ,within the last ten it has come to the surface1 and is now rapidly spreading into all departments of mental activity4 ,although its centre is to be found in the doctrine of the 8,correlation of ,forces10 it would be a narrow view that counted only the expounders of this doctrine1 numerous as they are2 the spirit of this movement inspires a heterogeneous multitude--,carpenter1 ,grove1 ,mayer1 ,faraday1 ,thompson1 ,tyndall and ,helmholtz2 ,herbert ,spencer1 ,stuart ,mill1 ,buckle1 ,draper1 ,lewes1 ,lecky1 ,max ,mller1 ,marsh1 ,liebig1 ,darwin and ,agassiz2 these names1 selected at random1 are suggested on account of the extensive circulation of their books4 ,every day the press announces some new name in this field of research4 ,what is the character of the old which is displaced1 and of the new which gets established8 ,by way of preliminary1 it must be remarked that there are observable in modern times three general phases of culture1 more or less historic4 ,the first phase is thoroughly dogmatic3 it accepts as of like validity metaphysical abstractions1 and empirical observations4 ,it has not arrived at such a degree of clearness as to perceive contradictions between form and content4 ,for the most part1 it is characterized by a reverence for external authority4 ,with the revival of learning commences the protest of spirit against this phase4 ,descartes and ,lord ,bacon begin the contest1 and are followed by the many--,locke1 ,newton1 ,leibnitz1 ,clark1 and the rest4 ,all are animated with the spirit of that time--to come to the matter in hand without so much mediation4 ,thought wishes to rid itself of its fetters2 religious sentiment1 to get rid of forms4 ,this reaction against the former stage1 which has been called by ,hegel the metaphysical1 finds a kind of climax in the intellectual movement just preceding the ,french revolution4 ,thought no longer is contented to say 8,cogito1 ergo sum10 abstractly1 but applies the doctrine in all directions1 8,i think2 in that deed1 ,i am40 8,i am a man only in so far as ,i think4 ,in so far as ,i think1 ,i am an essence4 ,what ,i get from others is not mine4 ,what ,i can comprehend1 or dissolve in my reason1 that is mine40 ,it looks around and spies institutions--8clothes of spirit10 as ,herr ,teufelsdroeck calls them4 8,what are you doing here1 you sniveling priest80 says ,voltaire3 8you are imposing delusions upon society for your own aggrandizement4 ,i had no part or lot in making the church2 cogito1 ergo sum2 ,i will only have over me what ,i put there60 8,i see that all these complications of society are artificial10 adds ,rousseau2 8man has made them2 they are not good1 and let us tear them down and make anew40 ,these utterances echo all over ,france and ,europe4 8,the state is merely a machine by which the few exploiter the many0--8off with crowns60 ,thereupon they snatch off the crown of poor ,louis1 and his head follows with it4 8,reason0 is enthroned and dethroned4 ,thirty years of war satiates at length this negative second period1 and the third phase begins4 ,its characteristic is to be constructive1 not to accept the heritage of the past with passivity1 nor wantonly to destroy1 but to realize itself in the world of objectivity--the world of laws and institutions4 ,the first appearance of the second phase of consciousness is characterized by the grossest inconsistencies4 ,it says in general1 7see ,d',holbach's 8,systme de la ,nature073 8,the immediate1 only1 is true2 what we know by our senses1 alone has reality2 all is matter and force40 ,but in this utterance it is unconscious that matter and force are purely general concepts1 and not objects of immediate consciousness4 ,what we see and feel is not matter or force in general1 but only some special form4 ,the self-refutation of this phase may be exhibited as follows3 ,i4 8,what is known is known through the senses3 it is matter and force40 ,,ii4 ,but by the senses1 the particular only is perceived1 and this can never be matter1 but merely a form4 ,the general is a mediated result1 and not an object of the senses4 ,,iii4 ,hence1 in positing matter and force as the content of sensuous knowing1 they unwittingly assert mediation to be the content of immediateness4 ,the decline of this period of science results from the perception of the contradiction involved4 ,kant was the first to show this2 his labors in this field may be summed up thus3 ,the universal and necessary is not an empirical result4 7,general laws cannot be sensuously perceived47 ,the constitution of the mind itself1 furnishes the ground for it3--first1 we have an a priori basis 7time and space7 necessarily presupposed as the condition of all sensuous perception2 and then we have categories presupposed as the basis of every generalization whatever4 ,utter any general proposition3 for example the one above quoted--8all is matter and force0--and you merely posit two categories--,inherence and ,causality--as objectively valid4 ,in all universal and necessary propositions we announce only the subjective conditions of experience1 and not anything in and for itself true 7i4 e4 applicable to things in themselves74 ,at once the popular side of this doctrine began to take effect4 8,we know only phenomena2 the true object in itself we do not know40 ,this doctrine of phenomenal knowing was outgrown in ,germany at the commencement of the present century4 ,in #agia--ten years after the publication of the ,critique of ,pure ,reason--the deep spirit of ,fichte began to generalize ,kant's labors1 and soon he announced the legitimate results of the doctrine4 ,schelling and ,hegel completed the work of transforming what ,kant had left in a negative state1 into an affirmative system of truth4 ,the following is an outline of the refutation of ,kantian scepticism3 ,i4 ,kant reduces all objective knowledge to phenomenal3 we furnish the form of knowing1 and hence whatever we announce in general concerning it--and all that we call science has1 of course1 the form of generality--is merely our subjective forms1 and does not belong to the thing in itself4 ,,ii4 ,this granted1 say the later philosophers1 it follows that the subjective swallows up all and becomes itself the universal 7subject and object of itself71 and hence ,reason is the true substance of the universe4 ,spinoza's substance is thus seen to become subject4 ,we partake of ,god as intellectually seeing1 and we see only ,god as object1 which ,malebranche and ,berkeley held with other ,platonists4 #a4 ,the categories 7e4 g4 ,unity1 ,reality1 ,causality1 ,existence1 etc47 being merely subjective1 or given by the constitution of the mind itself--for such universals are presupposed by all experience1 and hence not derived from it--it follows3 #b4 ,if we abstract what we know to be subjective1 that we abstract all possibility of a thing in itself1 too4 ,for 8existence0 is a category1 and hence if subjective1 we may reasonably conclude that nothing objective can have existence4 #c4 ,hence1 since one category has no preference over another1 and we cannot give one of them objectivity without granting it to all others1 it follows that there can be no talk of noumena1 or of things in themselves1 existing beyond the reach of the mind1 for such talk merely applies what it pronounces to be subjective categories1 7existence7 while at the same time it denies the validity of their application4 ,,iii4 ,but since we remove the supposed 8noumena10 the so-called phenomena are not opposed any longer to a correlate beyond the intelligence1 and the noumenon proves to be mind itself4 ,an obvious corollary from this is1 that by the self-determination of mind in pure thinking we shall find the fundamental laws of all phenomena4 ,though the ,kantian doctrine soon gave place in ,germany to deeper insights1 it found its way slowly to other countries4 ,comte and ,sir ,wm4 ,hamilton have made the negative results very widely known--the former1 in natural science2 the latter1 in literature and philosophy4 ,most of the writers named at the beginning are more or less imbued with ,comte's doctrines1 while a few follow ,hamilton4 ,for rhetorical purposes1 the ,hamiltonian statement is far superior to all others2 for practical purposes1 the ,comtian4 ,the physicist wishing to give his undivided attention to empirical observation1 desires an excuse for neglecting pure thinking2 he therefore refers to the well-known result of philosophy1 that we cannot know anything of ultimate causes--we are limited to phenomena and laws4 ,although it must be conceded that this consolation is somewhat similar to that of the ostrich1 who cunningly conceals his head in the sand when annoyed by the hunters1 yet great benefit has thereby accrued to science through the undivided zeal of the investigators thus consoled4 ,when1 however1 a sufficiently large collection has been made1 and the laws are sought for in the chaotic mass of observations1 then thought must be had4 ,thought is the only crucible capable of dissolving 8the many into the one40 ,tycho ,brahe served a good purpose in collecting observations1 but a ,kepler was required to discern the celestial harmony involved therein4 ,this discovery of laws and relations1 or of relative unities1 proceeds to the final stage of science1 which is that of the absolute comprehension4 ,thus modern science1 commencing with the close of the metaphysical epoch1 has three stages or phases3 ,i4 ,the first rests on mere isolated facts of experience2 accepts the first phase of things1 or that which comes directly before it1 and hence may be termed the stage of immediateness4 ,,ii4 ,the second relates its thoughts to one another and compares them2 it developes inequalities2 tests one through another1 and discovers dependencies everywhere2 since it learns that the first phase of objects is phenomenal1 and depends upon somewhat lying beyond it2 since it denies truth to the immediate1 it may be termed the stage of mediation4 ,,iii4 ,a final stage which considers a phenomenon in its totality1 and thus seizes it in its noumenon1 and is the stage of the comprehension4 ,to resume3 the first is that of sensuous knowing2 the second1 that of reflection 7the understanding72 the third1 that of the reason 7or the speculative stage74 ,in the sensuous knowing1 we have crude1 undigested masses all co-ordinated2 each is in and for itself1 and perfectly valid without the others4 ,but as soon as reflection enters1 dissolution is at work4 ,each is thought in sharp contrast with the rest2 contradictions arise on every hand4 ,the third stage finds its way out of these quarrelsome abstractions1 and arrives at a synthetic unity1 at a system1 wherein the antagonisms are seen to form an organism4 ,the first stage of the development closes with attempts on all hands to put the results in an encyclopdiacal form4 ,humboldt's ,cosmos is a good example of this tendency1 manifested so widely4 ,matter1 masses1 and functions are the subjects of investigation4 ,reflection investigates functions and seizes the abstract category of force1 and straightway we are in the second stage4 ,matter1 as such1 loses its interest1 and 8correlation of forces0 absorbs all attention4 ,force is an arrogant category and will not be co-ordinated with matter2 if admitted1 we are led to a pure dynamism4 ,this will become evident as follows3 ,i4 ,force implies confinement 7to give it direction72 it demands1 likewise1 an 8occasion10 or soliciting force to call it into activity4 ,,ii4 ,but it cannot be confined except by force2 its occasion must be a force likewise4 ,,iii4 ,thus1 since its confinement and 8occasion0 are forces1 force can only act upon forces--upon matter only in so far as that is a force4 ,its nature requires confinement in order to manifest it1 and hence it cannot act or exist except in unity with other forces which likewise have the same dependence upon it that it has upon them4 ,hence a force has no independent subsistence1 but is only an element of a combination of opposed forces1 which combination is a unity existing in an opposed manner 7or composed of forces in a state of tension74 ,this deeper unity which we come upon as the ground of force is properly named law4 ,from this1 two corollaries are to be drawn3 7#a47 ,that matter is merely a name for various forces1 as resistance1 attraction and repulsion1 etc4 7#b47 ,that force is no ultimate category1 but1 upon reflection1 is seen to rest upon law as a deeper category 7not law as a mere similarity of phenomena1 but as a true unity underlying phenomenal multiplicity74 ,from the nature of the category of force we see that whoever adopts it as the ultimate1 embarks on an ocean of dualism1 and instead of 8seeing everywhere the one and all0 as did ,xenophanes1 he will see everywhere the self opposed1 the contradictory4 ,the crisis which science has now reached is of this nature4 ,the second stage is at its commencement with the great bulk of scientific men4 ,to illustrate the self-nugatory character ascribed to this stage we shall adduce some of the most prominent positions of ,herbert ,spencer1 whom we regard as the ablest exponent of this movement4 ,these contradictions are not to be deprecated1 as though they indicated a decline of thought2 on the contrary1 they show an increased activity1 7though in the stage of mere reflection17 and give us good omens for the future4 ,the era of stupid mechanical thinkers is over1 and we have entered upon the active1 chemical stage of thought1 wherein the thinker is trained to consciousness concerning his abstract categories1 which1 as ,hegel says1 8drive him around in their whirling circle40 ,now that the body of scientific men are turned in this direction1 we behold a vast upheaval towards philosophic thought2 and this is entirely unlike the isolated phenomenon 7hitherto observed in history7 of a single group of men lifted above the surrounding darkness of their age into clearness4 ,we do not have such a phenomenon in our time2 it is the spirit of the nineteenth century to move by masses4 ,,chapter ,,ii4 ,,the 8,,first ,,principles0 ,,of ,,the 8,,unknowable40 ,the ,british ,quarterly speaking of ,spencer1 says3 8,these #8,first ,principles' are merely the foundation of a system of ,philosophy1 bolder1 more elaborate and comprehensive1 perhaps1 than any other which has been hitherto designed in ,england40 ,the persistence and sincerity1 so generally prevailing among these correlationists1 we have occasion to admire in ,herbert ,spencer4 ,he seems to be always ready to sacrifice his individual interest for truth1 and is bold and fearless in uttering1 what he believes it to be4 ,for critical consideration no better division can be found than that adopted in the 8,first ,principles0 by ,mr4 ,spencer himself1 to wit3 #ast1 the unknowable1 #bnd1 the knowable4 ,accordingly1 let us examine first his theory of ,,the ,,unknowable4 ,when ,mr4 ,spencer announces the content of the 8unknowable0 to be 8ultimate religious and scientific ideas10 we are reminded at once of the old adage in jurisprudence--8,omnis definitio in jure civili est periculosa20 the definition is liable to prove self-contradictory in practice4 ,so when we have a content assigned to the unknowable we at once inquire1 whence come the distinctions in the unknowable8 ,if unknown they are not distinct to us4 ,when we are told that ,time1 ,space1 ,force1 ,matter1 ,god1 ,creation1 etc41 are unknowables1 we must regard these words as corresponding to no distinct objects1 but rather as all of the same import to us4 ,it should be always borne in mind that all universal negatives are self-contradictory4 ,moreover1 since all judgments are made by subjective intelligences1 it follows that all general assertions concerning the nature of the intellect affect the judgment itself4 ,the navet with which certain writers wield these double-edged weapons is a source of solicitude to the spectator4 ,when one says that he knows that he knows nothing1 he asserts knowledge and denies it in the same sentence4 ,if one says 8all knowledge is relative10 as ,spencer does1 7p4 #fh1 et seq41 of ,first ,principles17 he of course asserts that his knowledge of the fact is relative and not absolute4 ,if a distinct content is asserted of ignorance1 the same contradiction occurs4 ,the perception of this principle by the later ,german philosophers at once led them out of the ,kantian nightmare1 into positive truth4 ,the principle may be applied in general to any subjective scepticism4 ,the following is a general scheme that will apply to all particular instances3 ,i4 8,we cannot know things in themselves2 all our knowledge is subjective2 it is confined to our own states and changes40 ,,ii4 ,if this is so1 then still more is what we name the 8objective0 only a state or change of us as subjective2 it is a mere fiction of the mind so far as it is regarded as a 8beyond0 or thing in itself4 ,,iii4 ,hence we do know the objective2 for the scepticism can only legitimately conclude that the objective which we do know is of a nature kindred with reason2 and that by an a priori necessity we can affirm that not only all knowable must have this nature1 but also all possible existence must4 ,in this we discover that the mistake on the part of the sceptic consists in taking self-conscious intelligence as something one-sided or subjective1 whereas it must be1 according to its very definition1 subject and object in one1 and thus universal4 ,the difficulty underlying this stage of consciousness is that the mind has not been cultivated to a clear separation of the imagination from the thinking4 ,as ,sir ,wm4 ,hamilton remarks1 7,metaphysics1 p4 #dhg17 8,vagueness and confusion are produced by the confounding of objects so different as the images of sense and the unpicturable notions of intelligence40 ,indeed the great 8law of the conditioned0 so much boasted of by that philosopher himself and his disciples1 vanishes at once when the mentioned confusion is avoided4 ,applied to space it results as follows3 ,i4--,thought of ,space4 #a4 ,space1 if finite1 must be limited from without2 #b4 ,but such external limitations would require space to exist in2 #c4 ,and hence the supposed limits of space that were to make it finite do in fact continue it4 ,it appears1 therefore1 that space is of such a nature that it can only end in1 or be limited by itself and thus is universally continuous or infinite4 ,,ii4--,imagination of ,space4 ,if the result attained by pure thought is correct1 space is infinite1 and if so1 it cannot be imagined4 ,if1 however1 it should be found possible to compass it by imagination1 it must be conceded that there really is a contradiction in the intelligence4 ,that the result of such an attempt coincides with our anticipations we have ,hamilton's testimony--8imagination sinks exhausted40 ,therefore1 instead of this result contradicting the first1 as ,hamilton supposes1 it really confirms it4 ,in fact if the mind is disciplined to separate pure thinking from mere imagining1 the infinite is not difficult to think4 ,spinoza saw and expressed this by making a distinction between 8infinitum actu 7or rationis710 and 8infinitum imaginationis10 and his first and second axioms are the immediate results of thought elevated to this clearness4 ,this distinction and his 8omnis determinatio est negatio10 together with the development of the third stage of thinking 7according to reason71 8sub quadam specie ternitatis10--these distinctions are the priceless legacy of the clearest-minded thinker of modern times2 and it behooves the critic of 8human knowing0 to consider well the results that the 8human mind0 has produced through those great masters--,plato and ,aristotle1 ,spinoza and ,hegel4 ,herbert ,spencer1 however1 not only betrays unconsciousness of this distinction1 but employs it in far grosser and self-destructive applications4 ,on page #be1 78,first ,principles107 he says3 8,when on the sea shore we note how the hulls of distant vessels are hidden below the horizon1 and how of still remoter vessels only the uppermost sails are visible1 we realize with tolerable clearness the slight curvature of that portion of the sea's surface which lies before us4 ,but when we seek in imagination to follow out this curved surface as it actually exists1 slowly bending round until all its meridians meet in a point eight thousand miles below our feet1 we find ourselves utterly baffled4 ,we cannot conceive in its real form and magnitude even that small segment of our globe which extends a hundred miles on every side of us1 much less the globe as a whole4 ,the piece of rock on which we stand can be mentally represented with something like completeness2 we find ourselves able to think of its top1 its sides1 and its under surface at the same time1 or so nearly at the same time that they seem all present in consciousness together2 and so we can form what we call a conception of the rock1 but to do the like with the earth we find impossible40 8,we form of the earth not a conception properly so-called1 but only a symbolic conception40 ,conception here is held to be adequate when it is formed of an object of a given size2 when the object is above that size the conception thereof becomes symbolical4 ,here we do not have the exact limit stated1 though we have an example given 7a rock7 which is conceivable1 and another 7the earth7 which is not4 8,we must predicate nothing of objects too great or too multitudinous to be mentally represented1 or we must make our predications by means of extremely inadequate representations of such objects1 mere symbols of them40 7#bg page47 ,but not only is the earth an indefinitely multiple object1 but so is the rock2 nay1 even the smallest grain of sand4 ,suppose the rock to be a rod in diameter2 microscope magnifying two and a half millions of diameters would make its apparent magnitude as large as the earth4 ,it is thus only a question of relative distance from the person conceiving1 and this reduces it to the mere sensuous image of the retina4 ,remove the earth to the distance of the moon1 and our conception of it would1 upon these principles1 become quite adequate4 ,but if our conception of the moon be held inadequate1 then must that of the rock or the grain of sand be equally inadequate4 ,whatever occupies space is continuous and discrete2 i4 e41 may be divided into parts4 ,it is hence a question of relativity whether the image or picture of it correspond to it4 ,the legitimate conclusion is that all our conceptions are symbolic1 and if that property invalidates their reliability1 it follows that we have no reliable knowledge of things perceived1 whether great or small4 ,mathematical knowledge is conversant with pure lines1 points1 and surfaces2 hence it must rest on inconceivables4 ,but ,mr4 ,spencer would by no means concede that we do not know the shape of the earth1 its size1 and many other inconceivable things about it4 ,conception is thus no criterion of knowledge1 and all built upon this doctrine 7i4 e4 depending upon the conceivability of a somewhat7 falls to the ground4 ,but he applies it to the questions of the divisibility of matter 7page #ej73 8,if we say that matter is infinitely divisible1 we commit ourselves to a supposition not realizable in thought4 ,we can bisect and rebisect a body1 and continually repeating the act until we reduce its parts to a size no longer physically divisible1 may then mentally continue the process without limit40 ,setting aside conceivability as indifferent to our knowledge or thinking1 we have the following solution of this point3 ,i4 ,that which is extended may be bisected 7i4 e4 has two halves74 ,,ii4 ,thus two extensions arise1 which1 in turn1 have the same property of divisibility that the first one had4 ,,iii4 ,since1 then1 bisection is a process entirely indifferent to the nature of extension 7i4 e4 does not change an extension into two non-extendeds71 it follows that body is infinitely divisible4 ,we do not have to test this in imagination to verify it2 and this very truth must be evident to him who says that the progress must be 8continued without limit40 ,for if we examine the general conditions under which any such 8infinite progress0 is possible1 we find them to rest upon the presupposition of a real infinite1 thus3 ,infinite ,progress4 ,i4 ,certain attributes are found to belong to an object1 and are not affected by a certain process4 7,for example1 divisibility as a process in space does not affect the continuity of space1 which makes that process possible4 ,or again1 the process of limiting space does not interfere with its continuity1 for space will not permit any limit except space itself47 ,,ii4 ,when the untutored reflection endeavors to apprehend a relation of this nature1 it seizes one side of the dualism and is hurled to the other4 7,it bisects space1 and then finds itself before two objects identical in nature with the first2 it has effected nothing2 it repeats the process1 and1 by and by getting exhausted1 wonders whether it could meet a different result if its powers of endurance were greater4 ,or else suspecting the true case1 says2 8no other result would happen if ,i went on forever407 ,,iii4 ,pure thought1 however1 grasps this process as a totality1 and sees that it only arises through a self-relation4 ,the 8progress0 is nothing but a return to itself1 the same monotonous round4 ,it would be a similar attempt to seek the end of a circle by travelling round it1 and one might make the profound remark3 8,if my powers were equal to the task1 ,i should doubtless come to the end40 ,this difficulty vanishes as soon as the experience is made that the line returns into itself4 8,it is the same thing whether said once or repeated forever10 says ,simplicius1 treating of this paradox4 ,the 8,infinite ,progress0 is the most stubborn fortress of ,scepticism4 ,by it our negative writers establish the impotency of ,reason for various ulterior purposes4 ,some wish to use it as a lubricating fluid upon certain religious dogmas that cannot otherwise be swallowed4 ,others wish to save themselves the trouble of thinking out the solutions to the ,problem of ,life4 ,but the ,sphinx devours him who does not faithfully grapple with1 and solve her enigmas4 ,mephistopheles 7a good authority on this subject7 says of ,faust1 whom he finds grumbling at the littleness of man's mind3 8,verachte nur ,vernunft und ,wissenchaft1 ,des ,menschen allerhchste ,kraft6 ,und htt'er sich auch nicht dem ,teufel bergeben1 ,er msste doch zu ,grunde gehen40 ,only prove that there is a large field of the unknowable and one has at once the vade mecum for stupidity4 ,crude reflection can pour in its distinctions into a subject1 and save itself from the consequences by pronouncing the basis incomprehensible4 ,it also removes all possibility of ,theology1 or of the ,piety of the ,intellect1 and leaves a very narrow margin for religious sentiment1 or the ,piety of the ,heart4 ,the stage of ,science represented by the ,french ,encyclopdists was immediately hostile to each and every form of religion4 ,this second stage1 however1 has a choice4 ,it can1 like ,hamilton or ,mansel1 let religious belief alone1 as pertaining to the unknown and unknowable--which may be believed in as much as one likes2 or it may 8strip off10 as ,spencer does1 8determinations from a religion10 by which it is distinguished from other religions1 and show their truth to consist in a common doctrine held by all1 to-wit3 8,the truth of things is unknowable40 ,thus the scientific man can baffle all attacks from the religious standpoint2 nay1 he can even elicit the most unbounded approval1 while he saps the entire structure of ,christianity4 ,says ,spencer 7p4 #df73 8,science and ,religion agree in this1 that the power which the ,universe manifests to us is utterly inscrutable40 ,he goes on to show that though this harmony exists1 yet it is broken by the inconsistency of ,religion3 8,for every religion1 setting out with the tacit assertion of a mystery1 forthwith proceeds to give some solution of this mystery1 and so asserts that it is not a mystery passing human comprehension40 ,in this confession he admits that all religions agree in professing to reveal the solution of the ,mystery of the ,universe to man2 and they agree1 moreover1 that man1 as simply a being of sense and reflection1 cannot comprehend the revelation2 but that he must first pass through a profound mediation--be regenerated1 not merely in his heart1 but in intellect also4 ,the misty limitations 78vagueness and confusion07 of the imagination must give way to the purifying dialectic of pure thought before one can see the ,eternal ,verities4 ,these revelations profess to make known the nature of the ,absolute4 ,they call the ,absolute 8,him10 8,infinite10 8,self-created10 8,self-existent10 8,personal10 and ascribe to this 8,him0 attributes implying profound mediation4 ,all definite forms of religion1 all definite theology1 must at once be discarded according to ,spencer's principle4 ,self-consciousness1 even1 is regarded as impossible by him 7p4 #fe73 8,clearly a true cognition of self implies a state in which the knowing and known are one1 in which subject and object are identified2 and this ,mr4 ,mansel rightly holds to be the annihilation of both40 ,he considers it a degradation 7p4 #aji7 to apply personality to ,god3 8,is it not possible that there is a mode of being as much transcending intelligence and will as these transcend mechanical motion80 ,and again 7p4 #aab7 he holds that the mere 8negation of absolute knowing contains more religion than all dogmatic theology40 7,p4 #aba17 8,all religions are envelopes of truth1 which reveal to the lower and conceal to the higher40 7,p4 #ff17 8,objective and subjective things are alike inscrutable in their substance and genesis40 8,ultimate religious and scientific ideas 7p4 #fh7 alike turn out to be mere symbols of the actual1 and not cognitions of it40 7,p4 #fi17 8,we come to the negative result that the reality existing behind all appearances must ever be unknown40 ,in these passages we see a dualism posited in this form3 8,everything immediate is phenomenal1 a manifestation of the hidden and inscrutable essence40 ,this essence is the unknown and unknowable2 yet it manifests itself in the immediate or phenomenal4 ,the first stage of thought was unconscious that it dealt all the time with a mediated result 7a dualism7 while it assumed an immediate2 that it asserted all truth to lie in the sensuous object1 while it named at the same time 8matter and force10 categories of reflection4 ,the second stage has got over that difficulty1 but has fallen into another4 ,for if the phenomenon manifested the essence1 it could not be said to be 8unknowable1 hidden1 and inscrutable40 ,but if the essence is not manifested by the phenomenon1 then we have the so-called phenomenon as a self-existent1 and therefore independent of the so-called essence1 which stands cordinated to it as another existent1 which cannot be known because it does not manifest itself to us4 ,hence the 8phenomenon0 is no phenomenon1 or manifestation of aught but itself1 and the 8essence0 is simply a fiction of the philosopher4 ,hence his talk about essence is purely gratuitous1 for there is not shown the need of one4 ,a dialectical consideration of essence and phenomenon will result as follows3 ,essence and ,phenomenon4 ,i4 ,if essence is seized as independent or absolute being1 it may be taken in two senses3 a4 ,as entirely unaffected by 8otherness0 7or limitation7 and entirely undetermined2 and this would be pure nothing1 for it cannot distinguish itself or be distinguished from pure nothing4 b4 ,as relating to itself1 and hence making itself a duality--becoming its own other2 in this case the 8other0 is a vanishing one1 for it is at the same time identical and non-identical--a process in which the essence may be said to appear or become phenomenal4 ,the entire process is the absolute or self-related 7and hence independent74 ,it is determined1 but by itself1 and hence not in a finite manner4 ,,ii4 ,the ,phenomenon is thus seen to arise through the self-determination of essence1 and has obviously the following characteristics3 a4 ,it is the 8other0 of the essence1 and yet the own self of the essence existing in this opposed manner1 and thus self-nugatory2 and this non-abiding character gives it the name of phenomenon 7or that which merely appears1 but is no permanent essence74 b4 ,if this were simply another to the essence1 and not the self-opposition of the same1 then it would be through itself1 and itself the essence in its first 7or immediate7 phase4 ,but this is the essence only as negated1 or as returned from the otherness4 c4 ,this self-nugatoriness is seen to arise from the contradiction involved in its being other to itself1 i4 e4 outside of its true being4 ,without this self-nugatoriness it would be an abiding1 an essence itself1 and hence no phenomenon2 with this self-nugatoriness the phenomenon simply exhibits or 8manifests0 the essence2 in fact1 with the appearance and its negation taken together1 we have before us a totality of essence and phenomenon4 ,,iii4 ,therefore3 a4 ,the phenomenal is such because it is not an abiding somewhat4 ,it is dependent upon other or essence4 b4 ,whatever it posesses belongs to that upon which it depends1 i4 e4 belongs to essence4 c4 ,in the self-nugatoriness of the phenomenal we have the entire essence manifested4 ,this latter point is the important result1 and may-be stated in a less strict and more popular form thus3 ,the real world 7so-called7 is said to be in a state of change--origination and decay4 ,things pass away and others come in their places4 ,under this change1 however1 there is a permanent called ,essence4 ,the imaginative thinking finds it impossible to realize such an abiding as exists through the decay of all external form1 and hence pronounces it unknowable4 ,but pure thought seizes it1 and finds it a pure self-relation or process of return to itself1 which accordingly has duality1 thus3 a4 ,the positing or producing of a somewhat or an immediate1 and1 b4 ,the cancelling of the same4 ,in this duality of beginning and ceasing1 this self-relation completes its circle1 and is thus1 c4 the entire movement4 ,all categories of the understanding 7cause and effect1 matter and form1 possibility1 etc47 are found to contain this movement when dissolved4 ,and hence they have self-determination for their presupposition and explanation4 ,it is unnecessary to add that unless one gives up trying to imagine truth1 that this is all very absurd reasoning4 7,at the end of the sixth book of ,plato's ,republic1 ch4 xxi41 and in the seventh book1 ch4 xiii41 one may see how clearly this matter was understood two thousand1 and more1 years ago47 ,to manifest or reveal is to make known2 and hence to speak of the 8manifestation of a hidden and inscrutable essence0 is to speak of the making known of an unknowable4 ,mr4 ,spencer goes on2 no hypothesis of the universe is possible--creation not conceivable1 for that would be something out of nothing--self-existence not conceivable1 for that involves unlimited past time4 ,he holds that 8all knowledge is relative10 for all explanation is the reducing of a cognition to a more general4 ,he says1 7p4 #fi17 8,of necessity1 therefore1 explanation must eventually bring us down to the inexplicable--the deepest truth which we can get at must be unaccountable40 ,this much valued insight has a positive side as well as the negative one usually developed3 ,i4 7a47 ,to explain something we subsume it under a more general4 7b47 ,the 8summum genus0 cannot be subsumed1 and 7c47 ,hence is inexplicable4 ,,ii4 ,but those who conclude from this that we base our knowledge ultimately upon faith 7from the supposed fact than we cannot prove our premises7 forget that-- 7a47 ,if the subsuming process ends in an unknown1 then all the subsuming has resulted in nothing2 for to subsume something under an unknown does not explain it4 7,plato's ,republic1 ,book ,,vii1 chap4 xiii47 7b47 ,the more general1 however1 is the more simple1 and hence the 8summum genus0 is the purely simple--it is ,being4 ,but the simpler the clearer1 and the pure simple is the absolutely clear4 7c47 ,at the 8summum genus0 subsumption becomes the principle of identity--being is being2 and thus stated we have simple self-relation as the origin of all clearness and knowing whatsoever4 ,,iii4 ,hence it is seen that it is not the mere fact of subsumption that makes something clear1 but rather it is the reduction of it to identity4 ,in pure being as the summum genus1 the mind contemplates the pure form of knowing--8a is a10 or 8a subject is a predicate0--7a is b74 ,the pure 8is0 is the empty form of mental affirmation1 the pure copula2 and thus in the summum genus the mind recognizes the pure form of itself4 ,all objectivity is at this point dissolved into the thinking1 and hence the subsumption becomes identity--7being ego1 or 8cogito1 ergo sum027 the process turns round and becomes synthetic1 78dialectic0 or 8genetic10 as called by some74 ,from this it is evident that self-consciousness is the basis of all knowledge4 ,,chapter ,,iii4 ,,the 8,,first ,,principles0 ,,of ,,the 8,,knowable40 ,as might be expected from ,spencer's treatment of the unknowable1 the knowable will prove a confused affair2 especially since to the above-mentioned 8inscrutability0 of the absolute1 he adds the doctrine of an 8obscure consciousness of it10 holding1 in fact1 that the knowable is only a relative1 and that it cannot be known without at the same time possessing a knowledge of the unknowable4 7,p4 #hb7 he says3 8,a thought involves relation1 difference and likeness2 whatever does not present each of them does not admit of cognition4 ,and hence we may say that the unconditioned as presenting none of these1 is trebly unthinkable40 ,and yet he says1 7p4 #if73 8,the relative is itself inconceivable except as related to a real non-relative40 ,we will leave this infinite self-contradiction thus developed1 and turn to the positions established concerning the knowable4 ,they concern the nature of ,force1 ,matter and ,motion1 and the predicates set up are 8persistence10 8indestructibility0 and similar4 ,,the ,,knowable4 ,although in the first part 8conceivability0 was shown to be utterly inadequate as a test of truth2 that with it we could not even establish that the earth is round1 or that space is infinitely continuous1 yet here ,mr4 ,spencer finds that inconceivability is the most convenient of all positive proofs4 ,the first example to be noticed is his proof of the compressibility of matter 7p4 #ea73 8,it is an established mechanical truth that if a body moving at a given velocity1 strikes an equal body at rest in such wise that the two move on together1 their joint velocity will be but half that of the striking body4 ,now it is a law of which the negative is inconceivable1 that in passing from any one degree of magnitude to another all intermediate degrees must be passed through4 ,or in the case before us1 a body moving at velocity #d1 cannot1 by collision1 be reduced to velocity #b1 without passing through all velocities between #d and #b4 ,but were matter truly solid--were its units absolutely incompressible and in unbroken contact--this #8law of continuity1 as it is called1 would be broken in every case of collision4 ,for when1 of two such units1 one moving at velocity #d strikes another at rest1 the striking unit must have its velocity #d instantaneously reduced to velocity #b2 must pass from velocity #d to velocity #b without any lapse of time1 and without passing through intermediate velocities2 must be moving with velocities #d and #b at the same instant1 which is impossible40 ,on page #eg he acknowledges that any transition from one rate of motion to another is inconceivable2 hence it does not help the matter to 8pass through intermediate velocities40 ,it is just as great a contradiction and just as inconceivable that velocity #d should become velocity #c4iiii1 as it is that it should become velocity #b2 for no change whatever of the motion can be thought 7as he confesses7 without having two motions in one time4 ,motion1 in fact1 is the synthesis of place and time1 and cannot be comprehended except as their unity4 ,the argument here quoted is only adduced by ,mr4 ,s4 for the purpose of antithesis to other arguments on the other side as weak as itself4 ,on page #bda1 ,mr4 ,spencer deals with the question of the destructibility of matter3 8,the annihilation of matter is unthinkable for the same reason that the creation of matter is unthinkable40 7,p4 #ed73 8,matter in its ultimate nature is as absolutely incomprehensible as space and time40 ,the nature of matter is unthinkable1 its creation or destructibility is unthinkable1 and in this style of reasoning we can add that its indestructibility is likewise unthinkable2 in fact the argument concerning self-existence will apply here4 7,p4 #ca73 8,self-existence necessarily means existence without a beginning2 and to form a conception of self-existence is to form a conception of existence without a beginning4 ,now by no mental effort can we do this4 ,to conceive existence through infinite past time1 implies the conception of infinite past time1 which is an impossibility40 ,thus1 too1 we might argue in a strain identical2 indestructibility implies existence through infinite future time1 but by no mental effort can infinite time be conceived4 ,and thus1 too1 we prove and disprove the persistence of force and motion4 ,when occasion requires1 the ever-convenient argument of 8inconceivability0 enters4 ,it reminds one of ,sir ,wm4 ,hamilton's 8imbecility0 upon which are based 8sundry of the most important phenomena of intelligence10 among which he mentions the category of causality4 ,if causality is founded upon imbecility1 and all experience upon it1 it follows that all empirical knowledge rests upon imbecility4 ,on page #bdg1 our author asserts that the first law of motion 8is in our day being merged in the more general one1 that motion1 like matter1 is indestructible40 ,it is interesting to observe that this so-called 8,first law of motion0 rests on no better basis than very crude reflection4 8,when not influenced by external forces1 a moving body will go on in a straight line with a uniform velocity10 is ,spencer's statement of it4 ,this abstract1 supposed law has necessitated much scaffolding in ,natural ,philosophy that is otherwise entirely unnecessary2 it contradicts the idea of momentum1 and is thus refuted3 ,i4 ,a body set in motion continues in motion after the impulse has ceased from without1 for the reason that it retains momentum4 ,,ii4 ,momentum is the product of weight by velocity1 and weight is the attraction of the body in question to another body external to it4 ,if all bodies external to the moving body were entirely removed1 the latter would have no weight1 and hence the product of weight by velocity would be zero4 ,,iii4 ,the 8external influences0 referred to in the so-called 8law10 mean chiefly attraction4 ,since no body could have momentum except through weight1 another name for attraction1 it follows that all free motion has reference to another body1 and hence is curvilinear2 thus we are rid of that embarrassing 8straight line motion0 which gives so much trouble in mechanics4 ,it has all to be reduced back again through various processes to curvilinear movement4 ,we come1 finally1 to consider the central point of this system3 ,,the ,,correlation ,,of ,,forces4 ,speaking of persistence of force1 ,mr4 ,spencer concedes 7p4 #beb7 that this doctrine is not demonstrable from experience4 ,he says 7p4 #bed73 8,clearly the persistence of force is an ultimate truth of which no inductive proof is possible40 7,p4 #bee73 8,by the persistence of force we really mean the persistence of some power which transcends our knowledge and conception40 7,p4 #beg73 8,the indestructibility of matter and the continuity of motion we saw to be really corollaries from the impossibility of establishing in thought a relation between something and nothing40 7,thus what was established as a mental impotence is now made to have objective validity47 8,our inability to conceive matter and motion destroyed is our inability to suppress consciousness itself40 7,p4 #beh73 8,whoever alleges that the inability to conceive a beginning or end of the universe is a negative result of our mental structure1 cannot deny that our consciousness of the universe as persistent is a positive result of our mental structure4 ,and this persistence of the universe is the persistence of that unknown cause1 power1 or force1 which is manifested to us through all phenomena40 ,this 8positive result of our mental structure0 is said to rest on our 8inability to conceive the limitation of consciousness0 which is 8simply the obverse of our inability to put an end to the thinking subject while still continuing to think40 7,p4 #beg73 8,to think of something becoming nothing1 would involve that this substance of consciousness having just existed under a given form1 should next assume no form1 or should cease to be consciousness40 ,it will be observed here that he is endeavoring to solve the ,first ,antinomy of ,kant1 and that his argument in this place differs from ,kant's proof of the 8,antithesis0 in this1 that while ,kant proves that 8,the world or universe has no beginning10 etc41 by the impossibility of the origination of anything in a 8void time10 that ,mr4 ,spencer proves the same thing by asserting it to be a 8positive result of our mental structure10 and then proceeds to show that this is a sort of 8inability0 which has a subjective explanation2 it is1 according to him1 merely the 8substance of consciousness0 objectified and regarded as the law of reality4 ,but how is it with the 8,thesis0 to that ,antinomy1 8,the world has a beginning in time80 ,kant proves this apagogically by showing the absurdity of an 8infinite series already elapsed40 ,that our author did not escape the contradiction has already been shown in our remarks upon the 8indestructibility of matter40 ,while he was treating of the unknowable it was his special province to prove that self-existence is unthinkable4 7,p4 #ca73 ,he says it means 8existence without a beginning10 and 8to conceive existence through infinite past time1 implies the conception of infinite past time1 which is an impossibility40 ,thus we have the ,thesis of the ,antinomy supported in his doctrine of the 8unknowable10 and the antithesis of the same proved in the doctrine of the knowable4 ,we shall next find him involved with ,kant's ,third ,antinomy4 ,the doctrine of the correlation is stated in the following passages3 7,p4 #bhj73 8,those modes of the unknowable1 which we call motion1 heat1 light1 chemical affinity1 etc41 are alike transformable into each other1 and into those modes of the unknowable which we distinguish as sensation1 emotion1 thought3 these1 in their turns1 being directly or indirectly re-transformable into the original shapes4 ,that no idea or feeling arises1 save as a result of some physical force expended in producing it1 is fast becoming a common-place of science2 and whoever duly weighs the evidence1 will see that nothing but an overwhelming bias in favor of a preconceived theory can explain its non-acceptance4 ,how this metamorphosis takes place--how a force existing as motion1 heat1 or light1 can become a mode of consciousness--how it is possible for arial vibrations to generate the sensation we call sound1 or for the forces liberated by chemical changes in the brain to give rise to emotion--these are mysteries which it is impossible to fathom40 7,p4 #bhd73 8,each manifestation of force can be interpreted only as the effect of some antecedent force2 no matter whether it be an inorganic action1 an animal movement1 a thought1 or a feeling4 ,either this must be conceded1 or else it must be asserted that our successive states of consciousness are self-created40 8,either mental energies as well as bodily ones are quantitatively correlated to certain energies expended in their production1 and to certain other energies they initiate2 or else nothing must become something and something1 nothing4 ,since persistence of force1 being a datum of consciousness1 cannot be denied1 its unavoidable corollary must be accepted40 ,on p4 #bid he supports the doctrine that 8motion takes the direction of the least resistance10 mentally as well as physically4 ,here are some of the inferences to be drawn from the passages quoted3 #a4 ,every act is determined from without1 and hence does not belong to the subject in which it manifests itself4 #b4 ,to change the course of a force1 is to make another direction 8that of the least resistance10 or to remove or diminish a resistance4 #c4 ,but to change a resistance requires force1 which 7in motion7 must act in 8the direction of the least resistance10 and hence it is entirely determined from without1 and governed by the disposition of the forces it meets4 #d4 ,hence1 of will1 it is an absurdity to talk2 freedom or moral agency is an impossible phantom4 #e4 ,that there is self-determination in self-consciousness--that it is 8self-created0--is to ,mr4 ,spencer the absurd alternative which at once turns the scale in favor of the doctrine that mental phenomena are the productions of external forces4 ,after this1 what are we to say of the following8 7,p4 #eja73 8,notwithstanding all evidence to the contrary1 there will probably have arisen in not a few minds the conviction that the solutions which have been given1 along with those to be derived from them1 are essentially materialistic4 ,let none persist in these misconceptions40 7,p4 #ejb73 8,their implications are no more materialistic than they are spiritualistic1 and no more spiritualistic than they are materialistic40 ,if we hold these positions by the side of ,kant's ,third ,antinomy1 we shall see that they all belong to the proof of the 8,antithesis10 viz3 8,there is no freedom1 but everything in the world happens according to the laws of nature40 ,the 8,thesis10 viz3 8,that a causality of freedom is necessary to account fully for the phenomena of the world10 he has not anywhere supported4 ,we find1 in fact1 only those thinkers who have in some measure mastered the third phase of culture in thought1 standing upon the basis presented by ,kant in the ,thesis4 ,the chief point in the ,thesis may be stated as follows3 #a4 ,if everything that happens presupposes a previous condition1 7which the law of causality states17 #b4 ,this previous condition cannot be a permanent 7or have been always in existence72 for1 if so1 its consequence1 or the effect1 would have always existed4 ,thus the previous condition must be a thing which has happened4 #c4 ,with this the whole law of causality collapses2 for 7a7 since each cause is an effect1 7b7 its determining power escapes into a higher member of the series1 and1 7c7 unless the law changes1 wholly vanishes2 there result an indefinite series of effects with no cause2 each member of the series is a dependent1 has its being in another1 which again has its being in another1 and hence cannot support the subsequent term4 ,hence it is evident that this ,antinomy consists1 first3 in the setting up of the law of causality as having absolute validity1 which is the antithesis4 ,secondly1 the experience is made that such absolute law of causality is a self-nugatory one1 and thus it is to be inferred that causality1 to be at all1 presupposes an origination in a 8self-moved10 as ,plato calls it4 ,aristotle 7,metaphysics1 xi4 #f-g1 and ix4 #h7 exhibits this ultimate as the 8self-active10 and the ,scholastics take the same1 under the designation 8actus purus10 for the definition of ,god4 ,the ,antinomy thus reduced gives3 ,i4 ,thesis3 ,self-determination must lie at the basis of all causality1 otherwise causality cannot be at all4 ,,ii4 ,antithesis3 ,if there is self-determination1 8the unity of experience 7which leads us to look for a cause7 is destroyed1 and hence no such case could arise in experience40 ,in comparing the two proofs it is at once seen that they are of different degrees of universality4 ,the argument of the ,thesis is based upon the nature of the thing itself1 i4 e4 a pure thought2 while that of the ,antithesis loses sight of the idea of 8efficient0 cause1 and seeks mere continuity in the sequence of time1 and thus exhibits itself as the second stage of thought1 which leans on the staff of fancy1 i4 e4 mere representative thinking4 ,this 8unity of experience10 as ,kant calls it1 is the same thing1 stated in other words1 that ,spencer refers to as the 8positive result of our mental structure40 ,in one sense those are true antinomies--those of ,kant1 ,hamilton1 et al4--viz4 in this3 that the 8representative0 stage of thinking finds itself unable to shake off the sensuous picture1 and think 8sub quadam specie ternitatis40 ,to the mind disciplined to the third stage of thought1 these are no antinomies2 ,spinoza1 ,leibnitz1 ,plato and ,aristotle are not confused by them4 ,the ,thesis1 properly stated1 is a true universal1 and exhibits its own truth1 as that upon which the law of causality rests2 and hence the antithesis itself--less universal--resting upon the law of causality1 is based upon the ,thesis4 ,moreover1 the ,thesis does not deny an infinite succession in time and space1 it only states that there must be an efficient cause--just what the law of causality states1 but shows1 in addition1 that this efficient cause must be a 8self-determined40 ,on page #bhb we learn that1 8,the solar heat is the final source of the force manifested by society40 8,it 7the force of society7 is based on animal and vegetable products1 and these in turn are dependent on the light and heat of the sun40 ,as an episode in this somewhat abstract discussion1 it may be diverting to notice the question of priority of discovery1 touched upon in the following note 7p4 #ded73 8,until ,i recently consulted his #8,outlines of ,astronomy' on another question1 ,i was not aware that1 so far back as #ahcc1 ,sir ,john ,herschel had enunciated the doctrine that #8the sun's rays are the ultimate source of almost every motion which takes place on the surface of the earth4' ,he expressly includes all geologic1 meteorologic1 and vital actions2 as also those which we produce by the combustion of coal4 ,the late ,george ,stephenson appears to have been wrongly credited with this last idea40 ,in order to add to the thorough discussion of this important question1 we wish to suggest the claims of ,thomas ,carlyle1 who1 as far back as #ahcj1 wrote the following passage in his ,sartor ,resartus 7,am4 ed4 pp4 #ee-f73 8,well sang the ,hebrew ,psalmist3 #8,if ,i take the wings of the morning1 and dwell in the uttermost parts of the ,universe1 ,god is there4' ,thou1 too1 ,o cultivated reader1 who too probably art no psalmist1 but a prosaist1 knowing ,god only by tradition1 knowest thou any corner of the world where at least force is not8 ,the drop which thou shakest from thy wet hand1 rests not where it falls1 but to-morrow thou findest it swept away2 already1 on the wings of the north wind1 it is nearing the tropic of ,cancer4 ,how it came to evaporate and not lie motionless8 ,thinkest thou there is aught motionless1 without force1 and dead8 8,as ,i rode through the ,schwartzwald1 ,i said to myself3 ,that little fire which glows starlike across the dark-growing 7nachtende7 moor1 where the sooty smith bends over his anvil1 and thou hopest to replace thy lost horseshoe--is it a detached1 separated speck1 cut off from the whole universe1 or indissolubly joined to the whole8 ,thou fool1 that smithy-fire was primarily kindled at the sun2 is fed by air that circulates from beyond ,noah's deluge1 from beyond the ,dog star2 it is a little ganglion1 or nervous centre in the great vital system of immensity40 ,we have1 finally1 to consider the correlation theory in connection with equilibrium4 ,i4 ,motion results from destroyed equilibrium4 ,the whole totality does not correspond to itself1 its ideal and real contradict each other4 ,the movement is the restoring of the equilibrium1 or the bringing into unity of the ideal and real4 ,to illustrate3 a spring 7made of steel1 rubber1 or any elastic material7 has a certain form in which1 it may exist without tension2 this may be called the ideal shape1 or simply the ideal4 ,if the spring is forced to assume another shape1 its real shape becomes different from the ideal2 its equilibrium is destroyed1 and force is manifested as a tendency to restore the equilibrium 7or unity of the ideal and real74 ,generalize this3 all forces have the same nature2 7a7 expansive forces arise from the ideal existing without--a gas1 steam1 for example1 ideally takes up a more extended space than it has really2 it expands to fill it4 ,or 7b7 contractive forces3 the multiplicity ideally exists within2 e4 g4 attraction of gravitation2 matter trying to find the centre of the earth1 its ideal4 ,the will acts in this way3 ,the ideal is changed first1 and draws the real after it4 ,i first destroy1 in thought and will1 the identity of ideal and real2 the tension resulting is force4 ,thinking1 since it deals with the universal 7or the potential and the actual7 is an original source of force1 and1 as will result in the sequel from a reverse analysis 7see below1 ,v4 #c1 c7 the only source of force4 ,,ii4 ,persistence of force requires an unrestorable equilibrium2 in moving to restore one equilibrium1 it must destroy another--its equivalent4 ,,iii4 ,but this contradicts the above developed conception of force as follows3 7a7 ,since force results from destroyed equilibrium1 it follows 7b7 that it requires as much force to destroy the equilibrium as is developed in the restoring of it 7and this notion is the basis of the correlation theory74 ,but 7c7 if the first equilibrium 7already destroyed7 can only be restored by the destroying of another equal to the same1 it has already formed an equilibrium with the second1 and the occasion of the motion is removed4 ,if two forces are equal and opposed1 which will give way8 ,by this dialectic consideration of force1 we learn the insufficiency of the theory of correlation as the ultimate truth4 ,instead of being 8the sole truth1 which transcends experience by underlying it0 7p4 #beh71 we are obliged to confess that this 8persistence of force0 rests on the category of causality2 its thin disguise consists in the substitution of other words for the metaphysical expression1 8,every effect must be equal to its cause40 ,and this1 when tortured in the crucible1 confesses that the only efficient cause is 8causi sui20 hence the effect is equal to its cause1 because it is the cause4 ,and the correlation theory results in showing that force cannot be1 unless self-originated4 ,that self-determination is the inevitable result1 no matter what hypothesis be assumed1 is also evident4 ,taking all counter-hypotheses and generalizing them1 we have this analysis3 ,i4 ,any and every being is determined from without through another4 7,this theorem includes all anti-self-determination doctrines47 ,,ii4 ,it results from this that any and every being is dependent upon another and is a finite one2 it cannot be isolated without destroying it4 ,hence it results that every being is an element of a whole that includes it as a subordinate moment4 ,,iii4 ,dependent being1 as a subordinate element1 cannot be said to support any thing attached to it1 for its own support is not in itself but in another1 namely1 the whole that includes it4 ,from this it results that no dependent being can depend upon another dependent being1 but rather upon the including whole4 ,the including whole is therefore not a dependent2 since it is for itself1 and each element is determined through it1 and for it1 it may be called the negative unity 7or the unity which negates the independence of the elements74 ,remark4--,a chain of dependent beings collapses into one dependent being4 ,dependence is not converted into independence by simple multiplication4 ,all dependence is thus an element of an independent whole4 ,,iv4 ,what is the character of this independent whole1 this negative unity8 8,character0 means determination1 and we are prepared to say that its determination cannot be through another1 for then it would be a dependent1 and we should be referred again to the whole1 including it4 ,its determination by which the multiplicity of elements arises is hence its own self-determination4 ,thus all finitude and dependence presupposes as its condition1 self-determination4 ,v4 ,self-determination more closely examined exhibits some remarkable results1 7which will throw light on the discussion of 8,essence and ,phenomena0 above73 7#a47 ,it is 8causa sui20 active and passive2 existing dually as determining and determined2 this self-diremption produces a distinction in itself which is again cancelled4 7#b47 ,as determiner 7or active1 or cause71 it is the pure universal--the possibility of any determinations4 ,but as determined 7passive or effect7 it is the special1 the particular1 the one-sided reality that enters into change4 7#c47 ,but it is 8negative unity0 of these two sides1 and hence an individual4 ,the pure universal whose negative relation to itself as determiner makes the particular1 completes itself to individuality through this act4 7a47 ,since its pure universality is the substrate of its determination1 and at the same time a self-related activity 7or negativity71 it at once becomes its own object4 7b47 ,its activity 7limiting or determining7--a pure negativity--turned to itself as object1 dissolves the particular in the universal1 and thus continually realizes its subjectivity4 7c47 ,hence these two sides of the negative unity are more properly subject and object1 and since they are identical 7causa sui7 we may name the result 8self-consciousness40 ,the absolute truth of all truths1 then1 is that self-consciousness is the form of the ,total4 ,god is a ,person1 or rather the ,person4 ,through ,his self-consciousness 7thought of ,himself7 he makes ,himself an object to ,himself 7,nature71 and in the same act cancels it again into ,his own image 7finite spirit71 and thus comprehends ,himself in this self-revelation4 ,two remarks must be made here3 7#a47 ,this is not 8,pantheism20 for it results that ,god is a ,person2 and secondly ,nature is a self-cancelling side in the process2 thirdly1 the so-called 8finite spirit10 or man1 is immortal1 since otherwise he would not be the last link of the chain2 but such he is1 because he can develop out of his sensuous life to pure thought1 unconditioned by time and space1 and hence he can surpass any fixed 8higher intelligence10 no matter how high created4 7#b47 ,it is the result that all profound thinkers have arrived at4 ,aristotle 7,metaphysics ,,xi4 #f #g7 carries this whole question of motion back to its presupposition in a mode of treatment1 8sub quadam specie ternitatis40 ,he concludes thus3 8,the thinking1 however1 of that which is purely for itself1 is a thinking of that which is most excellent in and for itself4 8,the thinking thinks itself1 however1 through participation in that which is thought by it2 it becomes this object in its own activity1 in such a manner that the subject and object are identical4 ,for the apprehending of thought and essence is what constitutes reason4 ,the activity of thinking produces that which is perceived2 so that the activity is rather that which ,reason seems to have of a divine nature2 speculation pure thinking is the most excellent employment2 if1 then1 ,god is always engaged in this1 as we are at times1 ,he is admirable1 and if in a higher degree1 more admirable4 ,but ,he is in this pure thinking1 and life too belongs to ,him2 for the activity of thought is life4 ,he is this activity4 ,the activity1 returning into itself1 is the most excellent and eternal life4 ,we say1 therefore1 that ,god is an eternal and the best living being4 ,so that life and duration are uninterrupted and eternal2 for this is ,god40 ,when one gets rid of those 8images of sense0 called by ,spencer 8conceivables10 and arrives at the 8unpicturable notions of intelligence10 he will find it easy to reduce the vexed antinomies of force1 matter1 motion1 time1 space and causality2 arriving at the fundamental principle--self-determination--he will be able to make a science of ,biology4 ,the organic realm will not yield to dualistic ,reflection4 ,goethe is the great pioneer of the school of physicists that will spring out of the present activity of ,reflection when it shall have arrived at a perception of its method4 ,resum4--,mr4 ,spencer's results1 so far as philosophy is concerned1 may be briefly summed up under four general heads3 #a4 ,psychology4 #b4 ,ontology4 #c4 ,theology4 #d4 ,cosmology4 ,,psychology4 7#a47 ,conception is a mere picture in the mind2 therefore what cannot be pictured cannot be conceived2 therefore the ,infinite1 the ,absolute1 ,god1 ,essence1 ,matter1 ,motion1 ,force--anything1 in short1 that involves mediation--cannot be conceived2 hence they are unknowable4 7#b47 ,consciousness is self-knowing2 but that subject and object are one1 is impossible4 ,we can neither know ourselves nor any real being4 7#c47 ,all reasoning or explaining is the subsuming of a somewhat under a more general category2 hence the highest category is unsubsumed1 and hence inexplicable4 7#d47 ,our intellectual faculties may be improved to a certain extent1 and beyond this1 no amount of training can avail anything4 7,biology1 vol4 ,i1 p4 #ahh47 7#e47 ,the 8substance of consciousness0 is the basis of our ideas of persistence of ,force1 ,matter1 etc4 7#f47 ,all knowing is relative2 our knowledge of this fact1 however1 is not relative but absolute4 ,,ontology4 7#a47 ,all that we know is phenomenal4 ,the reality passes all understanding4 ,in the phenomenon the essence is 8manifested10 but still it is not revealed thereby2 it remains hidden behind it1 inscrutable to our perception4 7#b47 ,and yet1 since all our knowledge is relative1 we have an obscure knowledge of the hidden and inscrutable essence of the correlate of our knowledge of phenomena4 ,we know that it exists4 7#c47 ,though what is inconceivable is for that reason unknowable1 yet we know that persistence belongs to force1 motion and matter2 it is a positive result of our 8mental structure10 although we cannot conceive either destructibility or indestructibility4 7#d47 ,though self-consciousness is an impossibility1 yet it sometimes occurs1 since the 8substance of consciousness0 is the object of consciousness when it decides upon the persistence of the ,universe1 and of ,force1 ,matter1 etc4 ,,theology4 ,the ,supreme ,being is unknown and unknowable2 unrevealed and unrevealable1 either naturally or supernaturally2 for to reveal1 requires that some one shall comprehend what is revealed4 ,the sole doctrine of ,religion of great value is the doctrine that ,god transcends the human intellect4 ,when ,religion professes to reveal ,him to man and declare ,his attributes1 then it is irreligious4 ,though ,god is the unknown1 yet personality1 reason1 consciousness1 etc41 are degrading when applied to ,him4 ,the 8,thirty-nine ,articles0 should be condensed into one1 thus3 8,there is an ,unknown which ,i know that ,i cannot know48 8,religions are envelopes of truth which reveal to the lower1 and conceal to the higher40 8,they are modes of manifestation of the unknowable40 ,,cosmology4 8,evolution is a change from an indefinite1 incoherent homogeneity1 to a definite1 coherent heterogeneity2 through continuous differentiations and integrations40 ,this is the law of the ,universe4 ,all progresses to an equilibration--to a moving equilibrium4 ,,introduction ,,to ,,fichte',s ,,science ,,of ,,knowledge4 ,,translated ,,by ,a4 ,e4 ,,kroeger4 ,,note4--,in presenting this 8,introduction0 to the readers of the ,journal of ,speculative ,philosophy1 we believe we afford them the easiest means of gaining an insight into ,fichte's great work on the ,science of ,knowledge4 ,the present introduction was written by ,fichte in #agig1 three years after the first publication of his full system4 ,it is certainly written in a remarkably clear and vigorous style1 so as to be likely to arrest the attention even of those who have but little acquaintance with the rudiments of the ,science of ,philosophy4 ,this led us to give it the preference over other essays1 also written by ,fichte1 as ,introductions to his ,science of ,knowledge4 ,a translation of the ,science of ,knowledge1 by ,mr4 ,kroeger1 is at present in course of publication in ,new ,york4 ,this article is1 moreover1 interesting as being a more complete unfolding of the doctrine of ,plato upon ,method1 heretofore announced4--,,ed4 ,,preliminary ,,remarks4 ,de re1 qu agitur1 petimus1 ut homines1 eam non opinionem1 sed opus esse1 cogitent ac pro certo habeant1 non sect nos alicujus1 aut placiti1 sed utilitatis et amplitudinis human fundamenta moliri4 ,deinde1 ut1 suis commodis qui1 in commune consulant1 et ipsi in partem veniant4--,baco de ,verulamio4 ,the author of the ,science of ,knowledge was soon convinced1 through a slight acquaintance with the philosophical literature since the appearance of ,kant's ,critiques1 that the object of this great man--to effect a total reform in the study of philosophy1 and hence of all science--had resulted in a failure1 since not one of his numerous successors appeared to understand what he had really spoken of4 ,the author believed that he had understood the latter2 he resolved to devote his life to a representation--totally independent from ,kant's--of that great discovery1 and he will not give up this resolve4 ,whether he will succeed better in making himself understood to his age1 time alone can show4 ,at all events1 he knows that nothing true and useful1 which has once been given to mankind1 is lost1 though only remote posterity should learn how to use it4 ,determined by my academical vocation1 ,i wrote1 in the first instance1 for my hearers1 with whom it was in my power to explain myself in words until ,i was understood4 ,this is not the place to testify how much cause ,i have to be satisfied with my efforts1 and to entertain1 of some of my students1 the best hopes for science4 ,that book of mine has also become known elsewhere1 and there are various opinions afloat concerning it amongst the learned4 ,a judgment1 which even pretended to bring forth arguments1 ,i have neither read nor heard1 except from my students2 but ,i have both heard and read a vast amount of derision1 denunciation1 and the general assurance that everybody is heartily opposed to this doctrine1 and the confession that no one can understand it4 ,as far as the latter is concerned1 ,i will cheerfully assume all the blame1 until others shall represent it so as to make it comprehensible1 when students will doubtless discover that my representation was not so very bad after all2 or ,i will assume it altogether and unconditionally1 if the reader thereby should be encouraged to study the present representation1 in which ,i shall endeavor to be as clear as possible4 ,i shall continue these representations so long as ,i am convinced that ,i do not write altogether in vain4 ,but ,i write in vain when nobody examines my argument4 ,i still owe my readers the following explanations3 ,i have always said1 and say again1 that my system is the same as ,kant's4 ,that is to say1 it contains the same view of the subject1 but is totally independent of ,kant's mode of representation4 ,i have said this1 not to cover myself by a great authority1 or to support my doctrine except by itself1 but in order to say the truth and to be just4 ,perhaps it may be proven after twenty years4 ,kant is as yet a sealed book1 and what he has been understood to teach1 is exactly what he intended to eradicate4 ,my writings are neither to explain ,kant1 nor to be explained by his2 they must stand by themselves1 and ,kant must not be counted in the game at all4 ,my object is--let me say it frankly--not to correct or amplify such philosophical reflections as may be current1 be they called anti-,kant or ,kant1 but to totally eradicate them1 and to effect a complete revolution in the mode of thinking regarding these subjects1 so that hereafter the ,object will be posited and determined by ,knowledge 7,reason71 and not vice versa2 and this seriously1 not merely in words4 ,let no one object3 8,if this system is true1 certain axioms cannot be upheld10 for ,i do not intend that anything should be upheld which this system refutes4 ,again3 8,i do not understand this book10 is to me a very uninteresting and insignificant confession4 ,no one can and shall understand my writings1 without having studied them2 for they do not contain a lesson heretofore taught1 but something--since ,kant has not been understood--altogether new to the age4 ,censure without argument tells me simply that my doctrine does not please2 and this confession is again very unimportant2 for the question is not at all1 whether it pleases you or not1 but whether it has been proven4 ,in the present sketch ,i write only for those1 in whom there still dwells an inner sense of love for truth2 who still value science and conviction1 and who are impelled by a lively zeal to seek truth4 ,with those1 who1 by long spiritual slavery1 have lost with the faith in their own conviction their faith in the conviction of others2 who consider it folly if anybody attempts to seek truth for himself2 who see nothing in science but a comfortable mode of subsistence2 who are horrified at every proposition to enlarge its boundaries involving as a new labor1 and who consider no means disgraceful by which they can hope to suppress him who makes such a proposition1--with those ,i have nothing to do4 ,i should be sorry if they understood me4 ,hitherto this wish of mine has been realized2 and ,i hope1 even now1 that these present lines will so confuse them that they can perceive nothing more in them than mere words1 while that which represents their mind is torn hither and thither by their ill-concealed rage4 ,,introduction4 ,i4 ,attend to thyself2 turn thine eye away from all that surrounds thee and into thine own inner self6 ,such is the first task imposed upon the student by ,philosophy4 ,we speak of nothing that is without thee1 but merely of thyself4 ,the slightest self-observation must show every one a remarkable difference between the various immediate conditions of his consciousness1 which we may also call representations4 ,for some of them appear altogether dependent upon our freedom1 and we cannot possibly believe that there is without us anything corresponding to them4 ,our imagination1 our will1 appears to us as free4 ,others1 however1 we refer to a ,truth as their model1 which is held to be firmly fixed1 independent of us2 and in determining such representations1 we find ourselves conditioned by the necessity of their harmony with this ,truth4 ,in the knowledge of them we do not consider ourselves free1 as far as their contents are concerned4 ,in short3 while some of our representations are accompanied by the feeling of freedom1 others are accompanied by the feeling of necessity4 ,reasonably the question cannot arise--why are the representations dependent upon our freedom determined in precisely this manner1 and not otherwise8 ,for in supposing them to be dependent upon our freedom1 all application of the conception of a ground is rejected2 they are thus1 because ,i so fashioned them1 and if ,i had fashioned them differently1 they would be otherwise4 ,but it is certainly a question worthy of reflection--what is the ground of the system of those representations which are accompanied by the feeling of necessity and of that feeling of necessity itself8 ,to answer this question is the object of philosophy2 and1 in my opinion1 nothing is philosophy but the ,science which solves this problem4 ,the system of those representations1 which are accompanied by the feeling of necessity1 is also called ,experience--internal as well as external experience4 ,philosophy1 therefore1 to say the same thing in other words1 has to find the ground of all ,experience4 ,only three objections can be raised against this4 ,somebody might deny that representations1 accompanied by the feeling of necessity1 and referred to a ,truth determined without any action of ours1 do ever occur in our consciousness4 ,such a person would either deny his own knowledge1 or be altogether differently constructed from other men2 in which latter case his denial would be of no concern to us4 ,or somebody might say3 the question is completely unanswerable1 we are in irremovable ignorance concerning it1 and must remain so4 ,to enter into argument with such a person is altogether superfluous4 ,the best reply he can receive is an actual answer to the question1 and then all he can do is to examine our answer1 and tell us why and in what matters it does not appear satisfactory to him4 ,finally1 somebody might quarrel about the designation1 and assert3 8,philosophy is something else than what you have stated above1 or at least something else besides40 ,it might be easily shown to such a one1 that scholars have at all times designated exactly what we have just stated to be ,philosophy1 and that whatever else he might assert to be ,philosophy1 has already another name1 and that if this word signifies anything at all1 it must mean exactly this ,science4 ,but as we are not inclined to enter upon any dispute about words1 we1 for our part1 have already given up the name of ,philosophy1 and have called the ,science which has the solution of this problem for its object1 the ,science of ,knowledge4 ,,ii4 ,only when speaking of something1 which we consider accidental1 i4 e4 which we suppose might also have been otherwise1 though it was not determined by freedom1 can we ask for its ground2 and by this very asking for its ground does it become accidental to the questioner4 ,to find the ground of anything accidental means1 to find something else1 from the determinedness of which it can be seen why the accidental1 amongst the various conditions it might have assumed1 assumed precisely the one it did4 ,the ground lies--by the very thinking of a ground--beyond its ,grounded1 and both are1 in so far as they are ,ground and ,grounded1 opposed to each other1 related to each other1 and thus the latter is explained from the former4 ,now ,philosophy is to discover the ground of all experience2 hence its object lies necessarily beyond all ,experience4 ,this sentence applies to all ,philosophy1 and has been so applied always heretofore1 if we except these latter days of ,kant's misconstruers and their facts of consciousness1 i4 e4 of inner experience4 ,no objection can be raised to this paragraph2 for the premise of our conclusion is a mere analysis of the above-stated conception of ,philosophy1 and from the premise the conclusion is drawn4 ,if somebody should wish to remind us that the conception of a ground must be differently explained1 we can1 to be sure1 not prevent him from forming another conception of it1 if he so chooses2 but we declare1 on the strength of our good right1 that we1 in the above description of ,philosophy1 wish to have nothing else understood by that word4 ,hence1 if it is not to be so understood1 the possibility of ,philosophy1 as we have described it1 must be altogether denied1 and such a denial we have replied to in our first section4 ,,iii4 ,the finite intelligence has nothing beyond experience2 experience contains the whole substance of its thinking4 ,the philosopher stands necessarily under the same conditions1 and hence it seems impossible that he can elevate himself beyond experience4 ,but he can abstract2 i4 e4 he can separate by the freedom of thinking what in experience is united4 ,in ,experience1 the ,thing--that which is to be determined in itself independent of our freedom1 and in accordance with which our knowledge is to shape itself--and the ,intelligence--which is to obtain a knowledge of it--are inseparably united4 ,the philosopher may abstract from both1 and if he does1 he has abstracted from ,experience and elevated himself above it4 ,if he abstracts from the first1 he retains an intelligence in itself1 i4 e4 abstracted from its relation to experience2 if he abstract from the latter1 he retains the ,thing in itself1 i4 e4 abstracted from the fact that it occurs in experience2 and thus retains the ,intelligence in itself1 or the 8,thing in itself10 as the explanatory ground of ,experience4 ,the former mode of proceeding is called ,idealism1 the latter ,dogmatism4 ,only these two philosophical systems--and of that these remarks should convince everybody--are possible4 ,according to the first system the representations1 which are accompanied by the feeling of necessity1 are productions of the ,intelligence1 which must be presupposed in their explanation2 according to the latter system they are the productions of a thing in itself which must be presupposed to explain them4 ,if anybody desired to deny this1 he would have to prove that there is still another way to go beyond experience than the one by means of abstraction1 or that the consciousness of experience contains more than the two components just mentioned4 ,now in regard to the first1 it will appear below1 it is true1 that what we have here called ,intelligence does1 indeed1 occur in consciousness under another name1 and hence is not altogether produced by abstraction2 but it will at the same time be shown that the consciousness of it is conditioned by an abstraction1 which1 however1 occurs naturally to mankind4 ,we do not at all deny that it is possible to compose a whole system from fragments of these incongruous systems1 and that this illogical labor has often been undertaken2 but we do deny that more than these two systems are possible in a logical course of proceeding4 ,,iv4 ,between the object--7we shall call the explanatory ground of experience1 which a philosophy asserts1 the object of that philosophy1 since it appears to be only through and for such philosophy7--between the object of ,idealism and that of ,dogmatism there is a remarkable distinction in regard to their relation to consciousness generally4 ,all whereof ,i am conscious is called object of consciousness4 ,there are three ways in which the object can be related to consciousness4 ,either it appears to have been produced by the representation1 or as existing without any action of ours2 and in the latter case1 as either also determined in regard to its qualitativeness1 or as existing merely in regard to its existence1 while determinable in regard to its qualitativeness by the free intelligence4 ,the first relation applies merely to an imaginary object2 the second merely to an object of ,experience2 the third applies only to an object1 which we shall at once proceed to describe4 ,i can determine myself by freedom to think1 for instance1 the ,thing in itself of the ,dogmatists4 ,now if ,i am to abstract from the thought and look simply upon myself1 ,i myself become the object of a particular representation4 ,that ,i appear to myself as determined in precisely this manner1 and none other1 e4 g4 as thinking1 and as thinking of all possible thoughts--precisely this ,thing in itself1 is to depend exclusively upon my own freedom of self-determination2 ,i have made myself such a particular object out of my own free will4 ,i have not made myself2 on the contrary1 ,i am forced to think myself in advance as determinable through this self-determination4 ,hence ,i am myself my own object1 the determinateness of which1 under certain conditions1 depends altogether upon the intelligence1 but the existence of which must always be presupposed4 ,now this very 8,i0 is the object of ,idealism4 ,the object of this system does not occur actually as something real in consciousness1 not as a ,thing in itself--for then ,idealism would cease to be what it is1 and become ,dogmatism--but as 8,i0 in itself2 not as an object of ,experience--for it is not determined1 but is exclusively determinable through my freedom1 and without this determination it would be nothing1 and is really not at all--but as something beyond all ,experience4 ,the object of ,dogmatism1 on the contrary1 belongs to the objects of the first class1 which are produced solely by free ,thinking4 ,the ,thing in itself is a mere invention1 and has no reality at all4 ,it does not occur in ,experience1 for the system of ,experience is nothing else than ,thinking accompanied by the feeling of necessity1 and can not even be said to be anything else by the dogmatist1 who1 like every philosopher1 has to explain its cause4 ,true1 the dogmatist wants to obtain reality for it through the necessity of thinking it as ground of all experience1 and would succeed1 if he could prove that experience can be1 and can be explained only by means of it4 ,but this is the very thing in dispute1 and he cannot presuppose what must first be proven4 ,hence the object of ,idealism has this advantage over the object of ,dogmatism1 that it is not to be deduced as the explanatory ground of ,experience--which would be a contradiction1 and change this system itself into a part of ,experience--but that it is1 nevertheless1 to be pointed out as a part of consciousness2 whereas1 the object of ,dogmatism can pass for nothing but a mere invention1 which obtains validity only through the success of the system4 ,this we have said merely to promote a clearer insight into the distinction between the two systems1 but not to draw from it conclusions against the latter system4 ,that the object of every philosophy1 as explanatory ground of ,experience1 must lie beyond all experience1 is required by the very nature of ,philosophy1 and is far from being derogatory to a system4 ,but we have as yet discovered no reasons why that object should also occur in a particular manner within consciousness4 ,if anybody should not be able to convince himself of the truth of what we have just said1 this would not make his conviction of the truth of the whole system an impossibility1 since what we have just said was only intended as a passing remark4 ,still in conformity to our plan we will also here take possible objections into consideration4 ,somebody might deny the asserted immediate self-consciousness in a free act of the mind4 ,such a one we should refer to the conditions stated above4 ,this self-consciousness does not obtrude itself upon us1 and comes not of its own accord2 it is necessary first to act free1 and next to abstract from the object1 and attend to one's self4 ,nobody can be forced to do this1 and though he may say he has done it1 it is impossible to say whether he has done it correctly4 ,in one word1 this consciousness cannot be proven to any one1 but everybody must freely produce it within himself4 ,against the second assertion1 that the 8,thing in itself0 is a mere invention1 an objection could only be raised1 because it were misunderstood4 ,v4 ,neither of these two systems can directly refute the other2 for their dispute is a dispute about the first principle2 each system--if you only admit its first axiom--proves the other one wrong2 each denies all to the opposite1 and these two systems have no point in common from which they might bring about a mutual understanding and reconciliation4 ,though they may agree on the words of a sentence1 they will surely attach a different meaning to the words4 7,hence the reason why ,kant has not been understood and why the ,science of ,knowledge can find no friends4 ,the systems of ,kant and of the ,science of ,knowledge are idealistic--not in the general indefinite1 but in the just described definite sense of the word2 but the modern philosophers are all of them dogmatists1 and are firmly resolved to remain so4 ,kant was merely tolerated1 because it was possible to make a dogmatist out of him2 but the ,science of ,knowledge1 which cannot be thus construed1 is insupportable to these wise men4 ,the rapid extension of ,kant's philosophy--when it was thus misunderstood--is not a proof of the profundity1 but rather of the shallowness of the age4 ,for in this shape it is the most wonderful abortion ever created by human imagination1 and it does little honor to its defenders that they do not perceive this4 ,it can also be shown that this philosophy was accepted so greedily only because people thought it would put a stop to all serious speculation1 and continue the era of shallow ,empiricism47 ,first4 ,idealism cannot refute ,dogmatism4 ,true1 the former system has the advantage1 as we have already said1 of being enabled to point out its explanatory ground of all experience--the free acting intelligence--as a fact of consciousness4 ,this fact the dogmatist must also admit1 for otherwise he would render himself incapable of maintaining the argument with his opponent2 but he at the same time1 by a correct conclusion from his principle1 changes this explanatory ground into a deception and appearance1 and thus renders it incapable of being the explanatory ground of anything else1 since it cannot maintain its own existence in its own philosophy4 ,according to the ,dogmatist1 all phenomena of our consciousness are productions of a ,thing in itself1 even our pretended determinations by freedom1 and the belief that we are free4 ,this belief is produced by the effect of the ,thing upon ourselves1 and the determinations1 which we deduced from freedom1 are also produced by it4 ,the only difference is1 that we are not aware of it in these cases1 and hence ascribe it to no cause1 i4 e4 to our freedom4 ,every logical dogmatist is necessarily a ,fatalist2 he does not deny the fact of consciousness1 that we consider ourselves free--for this would be against reason2--but he proves from his principle that this is a false view4 ,he denies the independence of the ,ego1 which is the basis of the ,idealist1 in toto1 makes it merely a production of the ,thing1 an accidence of the ,world2 and hence the logical dogmatist is necessarily also materialist4 ,he can only be refuted from the postulate of the freedom and independence of the ,ego2 but this is precisely what he denies4 ,neither can the dogmatist refute the ,idealist4 ,the principle of the former1 the ,thing in itself1 is nothing1 and has no reality1 as its defenders themselves must admit1 except that which it is to receive from the fact that experience can only be explained by it4 ,but this proof the ,idealist annihilates by explaining experience in another manner1 hence by denying precisely what dogmatism assumes4 ,thus the ,thing in itself becomes a complete ,chimera2 there is no further reason why it should be assumed2 and with it the whole edifice of dogmatism tumbles down4 ,from what we have just stated1 is moreover evident the complete irreconcilability of both systems2 since the results of the one destroy those of the other4 ,wherever their union has been attempted the members would not fit together1 and somewhere an immense gulf appeared which could not be spanned4 ,if any one were to deny this he would have to prove the possibility of such a union--of a union which consists in an everlasting composition of ,matter and ,spirit1 or1 which is the same1 of ,necessity and ,liberty4 ,now since1 as far as we can see at present1 both systems appear to have the same speculative value1 but since both cannot stand together1 nor yet either convince the other1 it occurs as a very interesting question3 ,what can possibly tempt persons who comprehend this--and to comprehend it is so very easy a matter--to prefer the one over the other2 and why skepticism1 as the total renunciation of an answer to this problem1 does not become universal8 ,the dispute between the ,idealist and the ,dogmatist is1 in reality1 the question1 whether the independence of the ,ego is to be sacrificed to that of the ,thing1 or vice versa8 ,what1 then1 is it1 which induces sensible men to decide in favor of the one or the other8 ,the philosopher discovers from this point of view--in which he must necessarily place himself1 if he wants to pass for a philosopher1 and which1 in the progress of ,thinking1 every man necessarily occupies sooner or later1--nothing farther than that he is forced to represent to himself both3 that he is free1 and that there are determined things outside of him4 ,but it is impossible for man to stop at this thought2 the thought of a representation is but a half-thought1 a broken off fragment of a thought2 something must be thought and added to it1 as corresponding with the representation independent of it4 ,in other words3 the representation cannot exist alone by itself1 it is only something in connection with something else1 and in itself it is nothing4 ,this necessity of thinking it is1 which forces one from that point of view to the question3 ,what is the ground of the representations8 or1 which is exactly the same1 ,what is that which corresponds with them8 ,now the representation of the independence of the ,ego and that of the ,thing can very well exist together2 but not the independence itself of both4 ,only one can be the first1 the beginning1 the independent2 the second1 by the very fact of being the second1 becomes necessarily dependent upon the first1 with which it is to be connected--now1 which of the two is to be made the first8 ,reason furnishes no ground for a decision2 since the question concerns not the connecting of one link with another1 but the commencement of the first link1 which as an absolute first act is altogether conditional upon the freedom of ,thinking4 ,hence the decision is arbitrary2 and since this arbitrariness is nevertheless to have a cause1 the decision is dependent upon inclination and interest4 ,the last ground1 therefore1 of the difference between the ,dogmatist and the ,idealist is the difference of their interest4 ,the highest interest1 and hence the ground of all other interest1 is that which we feel for ourselves4 ,thus with the ,philosopher4 ,not to lose his ,self in his argumentation1 but to retain and assert it1 this is the interest which unconsciously guides all his ,thinking4 ,now1 there are two grades of mankind2 and in the progress of our race1 before the last grade has been universally attained1 two chief kinds of men4 ,the one kind is composed of those who have not yet elevated themselves to the full feeling of their freedom and absolute independence1 who are merely conscious of themselves in the representation of outward things4 ,these men have only a desultory consciousness1 linked together with the outward objects1 and put together out of their manifoldness4 ,they receive a picture of their ,self only from the ,things1 as from a mirror2 for their own sake they cannot renounce their faith in the independence of those things1 since they exist only together with these things4 ,whatever they are they have become through the outer ,world4 ,whosoever is only a production of the ,things will never view himself in any other manner2 and he is perfectly correct1 so long as he speaks merely for himself and for those like him4 ,the principle of the dogmatist is3 ,faith in the things1 for their own sake2 hence1 mediated ,faith in their own desultory self1 as simply the result of the ,things4 ,but whosoever becomes conscious of his self-existence and independence from all outward things--and this men can only become by making something of themselves1 through their own ,self1 independently of all outward things--needs no longer the ,things as supports of his ,self1 and cannot use them1 because they annihilate his independence and turn it into an empty appearance4 ,the ,ego which he possesses1 and which interests him1 destroys that ,faith in the ,things2 he believes in his independence1 from inclination1 and seizes it with affection4 ,his ,faith in himself is immediate4 ,from this interest the various passions are explicable1 which mix generally with the defence of these philosophical systems4 ,the dogmatist is in danger of losing his ,self when his system is attacked2 and yet he is not armed against this attack1 because there is something within him which takes part with the aggressor2 hence1 he defends himself with bitterness and heat4 ,the idealist1 on the contrary1 cannot well refrain from looking down upon his opponent with a certain carelessness1 since the latter can tell him nothing which he has not known long ago and has cast away as useless4 ,the dogmatist gets angry1 misconstrues1 and would persecute1 if he had the power2 the idealist is cold and in danger of ridiculing his antagonist4 ,hence1 what philosophy a man chooses depends entirely upon what kind of man he is2 for a philosophical system is not a piece of dead household furniture1 which you may use or not use1 but is animated by the soul of the man who has it4 ,men of a naturally weak-minded character1 or who have become weak-minded and crooked through intellectual slavery1 scholarly luxury and vanity1 will never elevate themselves to idealism4 ,you can show the dogmatist the insufficiency and inconsequence of his system1 of which we shall speak directly2 you can confuse and terrify him from all sides2 but you cannot convince him1 because he is unable to listen to and examine with calmness what he cannot tolerate4 ,if ,idealism should prove to be the only real ,philosophy1 it will also appear that a man must be born a philosopher1 be educated to be one1 and educate himself to be one2 but that no human art 7no external force7 can make a philosopher out of him4 ,hence1 this ,science expects few proselytes from men who have already formed their character2 if our ,philosophy has any hopes at all1 it entertains them rather from the young generation1 the natural vigor of which has not yet been submerged in the weak-mindedness of the age4 ,,vi4 ,but dogmatism is totally incapable of explaining what it should explain1 and this is decisive in regard to its insufficiency4 ,it is to explain the representation of things1 and proposes to explain them as an effect of the ,things4 ,now1 the dogmatist cannot deny what immediate consciousness asserts of this representation4 ,what1 then1 does it assert thereof8 ,it is not my purpose here to put in a conception what can only be gathered in immediate contemplation1 nor to exhaust that which forms a great portion of the ,science of ,knowledge4 ,i will merely recall to memory what every one1 who has but firmly looked within himself1 must long since have discovered4 ,the ,intelligence1 as such1 sees itself1 and this seeing of its self is immediately connected with all that appertains to the ,intelligence2 and in this immediate uniting of ,being and ,seeing the nature of the ,intelligence consists4 ,whatever is in the ,intelligence1 whatever the ,intelligence is itself1 the ,intelligence is for itself1 and only in so far as it is this for itself is it this1 as ,intelligence4 ,i think this or that object6 ,now what does this mean1 and how do ,i appear to myself in this ,thinking8 ,not otherwise than thus3 ,i produce certain conditions within myself1 if the object is a mere invention2 but if the objects are real and exist without my invention1 ,i simply contemplate1 as a spectator1 the production of those conditions within me4 ,they are within me only in so far as ,i contemplate them2 my contemplation and their ,being are inseparably united4 ,a ,thing1 on the contrary1 is to be this or that2 but as soon as the question is put3 ,for whom is it this8 ,nobody1 who but comprehends the word1 will reply3 ,for itself6 ,but he will have to add the thought of an ,intelligence1 for which the ,thing is to be2 while1 on the contrary1 the ,intelligence is self-sufficient and requires no additional thought4 ,by thinking it as the ,intelligence you include already that for which it is to be4 ,hence1 there is in the ,intelligence1 to express myself figuratively1 a twofold--,being and ,seeing1 the ,real and the ,ideal2 and in the inseparability of this twofold the nature of the ,intelligence consists1 while the ,thing is simply a unit--the ,real4 ,hence ,intelligence and ,thing are directly opposed to each other2 they move in two worlds1 between which there is no bridge4 ,the nature of the ,intelligence and its particular determinations ,dogmatism endeavors to explain by the principle of ,causality2 the ,intelligence is to be a production1 the second link in a series4 ,but the principle of causality applies to a real series1 and not to a double one4 ,the power of the cause goes over into an ,other opposed to it1 and produces therein a ,being1 and nothing further2 a ,being for a possible outside ,intelligence1 but not for the thing itself4 ,you may give this ,other even a mechanical power1 and it will transfer the received impression to the next link1 and thus the movement proceeding from the first may be transferred through as long a series as you choose to make2 but nowhere will you find a link which reacts back upon itself4 ,or give the ,other the highest quality which you can give a thing--,sensibility--whereby it will follow the laws of its own inner nature1 and not the law given to it by the cause--and it will1 to be sure1 react upon the outward cause2 but it will1 nevertheless1 remain a mere simple ,being1 a ,being for a possible intelligence outside of it4 ,the ,intelligence you will not get1 unless you add it in thinking as the primary and absolute1 the connection of which1 with this your independent ,being1 you will find it very difficult to explain4 ,the series is and remains a simple one2 and you have not at all explained what was to be explained4 ,you were to prove the connection between ,being and ,representation2 but this you do not1 nor can you do it2 for your principle contains merely the ground of a ,being1 and not of a ,representation1 totally opposed to ,being4 ,you take an immense leap into a world1 totally removed from your principle4 ,this leap they seek to hide in various ways4 ,rigorously--and this is the course of consistent dogmatism1 which thus becomes materialism2--the soul is to them no ,thing at all1 and indeed nothing at all1 but merely a production1 the result of the reciprocal action of ,things amongst themselves4 ,but this reciprocal action produces merely a change in the ,things1 and by no means anything apart from the ,things1 unless you add an observing intelligence4 ,the similes which they adduce to make their system comprehensible1 for instance1 that of the harmony resulting from sounds of different instruments1 make its irrationality only more apparent4 ,for the harmony is not in the instruments1 but merely in the mind of the hearer1 who combines within himself the manifold into ,one2 and unless you have such a hearer there is no harmony at all4 ,but who can prevent ,dogmatism from assuming the ,soul as one of the ,things1 per se8 ,the soul would thus belong to what it has postulated for the solution of its problem1 and1 indeed1 would thereby be made the category of cause and effect applicable to the ,soul and the ,things--materialism only permitting a reciprocal action of the ,things amongst themselves--and thoughts might now be produced4 ,to make the ,unthinkable thinkable1 ,dogmatism has1 indeed1 attempted to presuppose ,thing or the ,soul1 or both1 in such a manner1 that the effect of the ,thing was to produce a representation4 ,the ,thing1 as influencing the ,soul1 is to be such1 as to make its influences representations2 ,,god1 for instance1 in ,berkley's system1 was such a thing4 7,his system is dogmatic1 not idealistic47 ,but this does not better matters2 we understand only mechanical effects1 and it is impossible for us to understand any other kind of effects4 ,hence1 that presupposition contains merely words1 but there is no sense in it4 ,or the soul is to be of such a nature that every effect upon the ,soul turns into a representation4 ,but this also we find it impossible to understand4 ,in this manner ,dogmatism proceeds everywhere1 whatever phase it may assume4 ,in the immense gulf1 which in that system remains always open between ,things and ,representations1 it places a few empty words instead of an explanation1 which words may certainly be committed to memory1 but in saying which nobody has ever yet thought1 nor ever will think1 anything4 ,for whenever one attempts to think the manner in which is accomplished what ,dogmatism asserts to be accomplished1 the whole idea vanishes into empty foam4 ,hence ,dogmatism can only repeat its principle1 and repeat it in different forms2 can only assert and re-assert the same thing2 but it cannot proceed from what it asserts to what is to be explained1 nor ever deduce the one from the other4 ,but in this deduction ,philosophy consists4 ,hence ,dogmatism1 even when viewed from a speculative stand-point1 is no ,philosophy at all1 but merely an impotent assertion4 ,idealism is the only possible remaining ,philosophy4 ,what we have here said can meet with no objection2 but it may well meet with incapability of understanding it4 ,that all influences are of a mechanical nature1 and that no mechanism can produce a representation1 nobody will deny1 who but understands the words4 ,but this is the very difficulty4 ,it requires a certain degree of independence and freedom of spirit to comprehend the nature of the intelligence1 which we have described1 and upon which our whole refutation of ,dogmatism is founded4 ,many persons have not advanced further with their ,thinking than to comprehend the simple chain of natural mechanism1 and very naturally1 therefore1 the ,representation1 if they choose to think it at all1 belongs1 in their eyes1 to the same chain of which alone they have any knowledge4 ,the ,representation thus becomes to them a sort of ,thing of which we have divers examples in some of the most celebrated philosophical writers4 ,for such persons ,dogmatism is sufficient3 for them there is no gulf1 since the opposite does not exist for them at all4 ,hence you cannot convince the ,dogmatist by the proof just stated1 however clear it may be1 for you cannot bring the proof to his knowledge1 since he lacks the power to comprehend it4 ,moreover1 the manner in which ,dogmatism is treated here1 is opposed to the mild way of thinking which characterizes our age1 and which1 though it has been extensively accepted in all ages1 has never been converted to an express principle except in ours2 i4 e4 that philosophers must not be so strict in their logic2 in philosophy one should not be so particular as1 for instance1 in ,mathematics4 ,if persons of this mode of thinking see but a few links of the chain and the rule1 according to which conclusions are drawn1 they at once fill up the remaining part through their imagination1 never investigating further of what they may consist4 ,if1 for instance1 an ,alexander ,von ,ioch tells them3 8,all things are determined by natural necessity2 now our representations depend upon the condition of ,things1 and our will depends upon our representations3 hence all our will is determined by natural necessity1 and our opinion of a free will is mere deception60--then these people think it mightily comprehensible and clear1 although there is no sense in it2 and they go away convinced and satisfied at the stringency of this his demonstration4 ,i must call to mind1 that the ,science of ,knowledge does not proceed from this mild way of thinking1 nor calculate upon it4 ,if only a single link in the long chain it has to draw does not fit closely to the following1 this ,science does not pretend to have established anything4 ,,vii4 ,idealism1 as we have said above1 explains the determinations of consciousness from the activity of the ,intelligence1 which1 in its view1 is only active and absolute1 not passive2 since it is postulated as the first and highest1 preceded by nothing1 which might explain its passivity4 ,from the same reason actual ,existence cannot well be ascribed to the ,intelligence1 since such ,existence is the result of reciprocal causality1 but there is nothing wherewith the ,intelligence might be placed in reciprocal causality4 ,from the view of ,idealism1 the ,intelligence is a ,doing1 and absolutely nothing else2 it is even wrong to call it an ,active1 since this expression points to something existing1 in which the activity is inherent4 ,but to assume anything of this kind is against the principle of ,idealism1 which proposes to deduce all other things from the ,intelligence4 ,now certain determined representations--as1 for instance1 of a world1 of a material world in space1 existing without any work of our own--are to be deduced from the action of the ,intelligence2 but you cannot deduce anything determined from an undetermined2 the form of all deductions1 the category of ground and sequence1 is not applicable here4 ,hence the action of the ,intelligence1 which is made the ground1 must be a determined action1 and since the action of the ,intelligence itself is the highest ground of explanation1 that action must be so determined by the ,intelligence itself1 and not by anything foreign to it4 ,hence the presupposition of ,idealism will be this3 the ,intelligence acts1 but by its very essence it can only act in a certain manner4 ,if this necessary manner of its action is considered apart from the action1 it may properly be called ,laws of ,action4 ,hence1 there are necessary laws of the ,intelligence4 ,this explains also1 at the same time1 the feeling of necessity which accompanies the determined representations2 the ,intelligence experiences in those cases1 not an impression from without1 but feels in its action the limits of its own ,essence4 ,in so far as ,idealism makes this only reasonable and really explanatory presupposition of necessary laws of the ,intelligence1 it is called ,critical or ,transcendental ,idealism4 ,a transcendent ,idealism would be a system which were to undertake a deduction of determined representations from the free and perfectly lawless action of the ,intelligence3 an altogether contradictory presupposition1 since1 as we have said above1 the category of ground and sequence is not applicable in that case4 ,the laws of action of the ,intelligence1 as sure as they are to be founded in the one nature of the ,intelligence1 constitute in themselves a system2 that is to say1 the fact that the ,intelligence acts in this particular manner under this particular condition is explainable1 and explainable because under a condition it has always a determined mode of action1 which again is explainable from one highest fundamental law4 ,in the course of its action the ,intelligence gives itself its own laws2 and this legislation itself is done by virtue of a higher necessary action or ,representation4 ,for instance3 the law of ,causality is not a first original law1 but only one of the many modes of combining the manifold1 and to be deduced from the fundamental law of this combination2 this law of combining the manifold is again1 like the manifold itself1 to be deduced from higher laws4 ,hence1 even ,critical ,idealism can proceed in a twofold manner4 ,either it deduces this system of necessary modes of action1 and together with it the objective representations arising therefrom1 really from the fundamental laws of the ,intelligence1 and thus causes gradually to arise under the very eyes of the reader or hearer the whole extent of our representations2 or it gathers these laws--perhaps as they are already immediately applied to objects2 hence1 in a lower condition1 and then they are called categories--gathers these laws somewhere1 and now asserts1 that the objects are determined and regulated by them4 ,i ask the critic who follows the last-mentioned method1 and who does not deduce the assumed laws of the ,intelligence from the ,essence of the ,intelligence1 where he gets the material knowledge of these laws1 the knowledge that they are just these very same laws2 for instance1 that of ,substantiality or ,causality8 ,for ,i do not want to trouble him yet with the question1 how he knows that they are mere immanent laws of the ,intelligence4 ,they are the laws which are immediately applied to objects1 and he can only have obtained them by abstraction from these objects1 i4 e4 from ,experience4 ,it is of no avail if he takes them1 by a roundabout way1 from logic1 for logic is to him only the result of abstraction from the objects1 and hence he would do indirectly1 what directly might appear too clearly in its true nature4 ,hence he can prove by nothing that his postulated ,laws of ,thinking are really ,laws of ,thinking1 are really nothing but immanent laws of the ,intelligence4 ,the ,dogmatist asserts in opposition1 that they are not1 but that they are general qualities of ,things1 founded on the nature of ,things1 and there is no reason why we should place more faith in the unproved assertion of the one than in the unproved assertion of the other4 ,this course of proceeding1 indeed1 furnishes no understanding that and why the ,intelligence should act just in this particular manner4 ,to produce such an understanding1 it would be necessary to premise something which can only appertain to the ,intelligence1 and from those premises to deduce before our eyes the laws of ,thinking4 ,by such a course of proceeding it is above all incomprehensible how the object itself is obtained2 for although you may admit the unproved postulates of the critic1 they explain nothing further than the qualities and relations of the ,thing3 7that it is1 for instance1 in space1 manifested in time1 with accidences which must be referred to a substance1 c47 ,but whence that which has these relations and qualities8 whence then the substance which is clothed in these forms8 ,this substance ,dogmatism takes refuge in1 and you have but increased the evil4 ,we know very well3 the ,thing arises only from an act done in accordance with these laws1 and is1 indeed1 nothing else than all these relations gathered together by the power of imagination2 and all these relations together are the ,thing4 ,the ,object is the original ,synthesis of all these conceptions4 ,form and ,substance are not separates2 the whole formness is the substance1 and only in the analysis do we arrive at separate forms4 ,but this the critic1 who follows the above method1 can only assert1 and it is even a secret whence he knows it1 if he does know it4 ,until you cause the whole ,thing to arise before the eyes of the thinker1 you have not pursued ,dogmatism into its last hiding places4 ,but this is only possible by letting the ,intelligence act in its whole1 and not in its partial1 lawfulness4 ,hence1 an ,idealism of this character is unproven and unprovable4 ,against ,dogmatism it has no other weapon than the assertion that it is in the right2 and against the more perfected criticism no other weapon than impotent anger1 and the assurance that you can go no further than itself goes4 ,finally a system of this character puts forth only those laws1 according to which the objects of external experience are determined4 ,but these constitute by far the smallest portion of the laws of the ,intelligence4 ,hence1 on the field of ,practical ,reason and of ,reflective ,judgment1 this half criticism1 lacking the insight into the whole procedure of reason1 gropes about as in total darkness4 ,the method of complete transcendental ,idealism1 which the ,science of ,knowledge pursues1 ,i have explained once before in my ,essay1 ,on the conception of the ,science of ,knowledge4 ,i cannot understand why that ,essay has not been understood2 but suffice it to say1 that ,i am assured it has not been understood4 ,i am therefore compelled to repeat what ,i have said1 and to recall to mind that everything depends upon the correct understanding thereof4 ,this ,idealism proceeds from a single fundamental ,law of ,reason1 which is immediately shown as contained in consciousness4 ,this is done in the following manner3 ,the teacher of that ,science requests his reader or hearer to think freely a certain conception4 ,if he does so1 he will find himself forced to proceed in a particular manner4 ,two things are to be distinguished here3 the act of ,thinking1 which is required--the realization of which depends upon each individual's freedom1--and unless he realizes it thus1 he will not understand anything which the ,science of ,knowledge teaches2 and the necessary manner in which it alone can be realized1 which manner is grounded in the ,essence of the ,intelligence1 and does not depend upon freedom2 it is something necessary1 but which is only discovered in and together with a free action2 it is something discovered1 but the discovery of which depends upon an act of freedom4 ,so far as this goes1 the teacher of ,idealism shows his assertion to be contained in immediate consciousness4 ,but that this necessary manner is the fundamental law of all reason1 that from it the whole system of our necessary representations1 not only of a world and the determinedness and relations of objects1 but also of ourselves1 as free and practical beings acting under laws1 can be deduced4 ,all this is a mere presupposition1 which can only be proven by the actual deduction1 which deduction is therefore the real business of the teacher4 ,in realizing this deduction1 he proceeds as follows3 ,he shows that the first fundamental law which was discovered in immediate consciousness1 is not possible1 unless a second action is combined with it1 which again is not possible without a third action2 and so on1 until the conditions of the ,first are completely exhausted1 and itself is now made perfectly comprehensible in its possibility4 ,the teacher's method is a continual progression from the conditioned to the condition4 ,the condition becomes again conditioned1 and its condition is next to be discovered4 ,if the presupposition of ,idealism is correct1 and if no errors have been made in the deduction1 the last result1 as containing all the conditions of the first act1 must contain the system of all necessary representations1 or the total experience2--a comparison1 however1 which is not instituted in ,philosophy itself1 but only after that science has finished its work4 ,for ,idealism has not kept this experience in sight1 as the preknown object and result1 which it should arrive at2 in its course of proceeding it knows nothing at all of experience1 and does not look upon it2 it proceeds from its starting point according to its rules1 careless as to what the result of its investigations might turn out to be4 ,the right angle1 from which it has to draw its straight line1 is given to it2 is there any need of another point to which the line should be drawn8 ,surely not2 for all the points of its line are already given to it with the angle4 ,a certain number is given to you4 ,you suppose that it is the product of certain factors4 ,all you have to do is to search for the product of these factors according to the well-known rules4 ,whether that product will agree with the given number1 you will find out1 without any difficulty1 as soon as you have obtained it4 ,the given number is the total experience2 those factors are3 the part of immediate consciousness which was discovered1 and the laws of ,thinking2 the multiplication is the ,philosophizing4 ,those who advise you1 while philosophizing1 also to keep an eye upon experience1 advise you to change the factors a little1 and to multiply falsely1 so as to obtain by all means corresponding numbers2 a course of proceeding as dishonest as it is shallow4 ,in so far as those final results of ,idealism are viewed as such1 as consequences of our reasoning1 they are what is called the a priori of the human mind2 and in so far as they are viewed1 also--if they should agree with experience--as given in experience1 they are called a posteriori4 ,hence the a priori and the a posteriori are1 in a true ,philosophy1 not two1 but one and the same1 only viewed in two different ways1 and distinguished only by the manner in which they are obtained4 ,philosophy anticipates the whole experience1 thinks it only as necessary2 and1 in so far1 ,philosophy is1 in comparison with real experience1 a priori4 ,the number is a posteriori1 if regarded as given2 the same number is a priori1 if regarded as product of the factors4 ,whosoever says otherwise knows not what he talks about4 ,if the results of a ,philosophy do not agree with experience1 that ,philosophy is surely wrong2 for it has not fulfilled its promise of deducing the whole experience from the necessary action of the intelligence4 ,in that case1 either the presupposition of transcendental ,idealism is altogether incorrect1 or it has merely been incorrectly treated in the particular representation of that science4 ,now1 since the problem1 to explain experience from its ground1 is a problem contained in human reason1 and as no rational man will admit that human reason contains any problem the solution of which is altogether impossible2 and since1 moreover1 there are only two ways of solving it1 the dogmatic system 7which1 as we have shown1 cannot accomplish what it promises7 and the ,idealistic system1 every resolute ,thinker will always declare that the latter has been the case2 that the presupposition in itself is correct enough1 and that no failure in attempts to represent it should deter men from attempting it again until finally it must succeed4 ,the course of this ,idealism proceeds1 as we have seen1 from a fact of consciousness--but which is only obtained by a free act of ,thinking--to the total experience4 ,its peculiar ground is between these two4 ,it is not a fact of consciousness and does not belong within the sphere of experience2 and1 indeed1 how could it be called ,philosophy if it did1 since ,philosophy has to discover the ground of experience1 and since the ground lies1 of course1 beyond the sequence4 ,it is the production of free ,thinking1 but proceeding according to laws4 ,this will be at once clear1 if we look a little closer at the fundamental assertion of ,idealism4 ,it proves that the ,postulated is not possible without a second1 this not without a third1 c41 c42 hence none of all its conditions is possible alone and by itself1 but each one is only possible in its union with all the rest4 ,hence1 according to its own assertion1 only the ,whole is found in consciousness1 and this ,whole is the experience4 ,you want to obtain a better knowledge of it2 hence you must analyze it1 not by blindly groping about1 but according to the fixed rule of composition1 so that it arises under your eyes as a ,whole4 ,you are enabled to do this because you have the power of abstraction2 because in free ,thinking you can certainly take hold of each single condition4 ,for consciousness contains not only necessity of ,representations1 but also freedom thereof2 and this freedom again may proceed according to rules4 ,the ,whole is given to you from the point of view of necessary consciousness2 you find it just as you find yourself4 ,but the composition of this ,whole1 the order of its arrangement1 is produced by freedom4 ,whosoever undertakes this act of freedom1 becomes conscious of freedom1 and thus establishes1 as it were1 a new field within his consciousness2 whosoever does not undertake it1 for him this new field1 dependent thereupon1 does not exist4 ,the chemist composes a body1 a metal for instance1 from its elements4 ,the common beholder sees the metal well known to him2 the chemist beholds1 moreover1 the composition thereof and the elements which it comprises4 ,do both now see different objects8 ,i should think not6 ,both see the same1 only in a different manner4 ,the chemist's sight is a priori2 he sees the separates2 the ordinary beholder's sight is a posteriori2 he sees the ,whole4 ,the only distinction is this3 the chemist must first analyze the ,whole before he can compose it1 because he works upon an object of which he cannot know the rule of composition before he has analyzed it2 while the philosopher can compose without a foregoing analysis1 because he knows already the rule of his object1 of reason4 ,hence the content of ,philosophy can claim no other reality than that of necessary ,thinking1 on the condition that you desire to think of the ground of ,experience4 ,the ,intelligence can only be thought as active1 and can only be thought active in this particular manner6 ,such is the assertion of ,philosophy4 ,and this reality is perfectly sufficient for ,philosophy1 since it is evident from the development of that science that there is no other reality4 ,this now described complete critical ,idealism1 the ,science of ,knowledge intends to establish4 ,what ,i have said just now contains the conception of that science1 and ,i shall listen to no objections which may touch this conception1 since no one can know better than myself what ,i intend to accomplish1 and to demonstrate the impossibility of a thing which is already realized1 is ridiculous4 ,objections1 to be legitimate1 should only be raised against the elaboration of that conception1 and should only consider whether it has fulfilled what it promised to accomplish or not4 ,,analytical ,,and ,,critical ,,essay ,,upon ,,the ,,sthetics ,,of ,,hegel4 ,translated from the ,french of ,m4 ,ch4 ,bnard by ,j4 ,a4 ,martling4 ,,analysis4 ,having undertaken to translate into our language the sthetics of ,hegel1 we hope to render a new service to our readers1 by presenting1 in an analysis at once cursory and detailed the outline of the ideas which form the basis of that vast work4 ,the thought of the author will appear shorn of its rich developments2 but it will be more easy to seize the general spirit1 the connection of the various parts of the work1 and to appreciate their value4 ,in order not to mar the clearness of our work1 we shall abstain from mingling criticism with exposition2 but reserve for the conclusion a general judgment upon this book1 which represents even to-day the state of the philosophy of art in ,germany4 ,the work is divided into three parts2 the first treats of the beautiful in art in general2 the second1 of the general forms of art in its historic development2 the third contains the system of the arts--the theory of architecture1 sculpture1 painting1 music1 and poetry4 ,,part ,i4 ,,of ,,the ,,beautiful ,,in ,,art4 ,in an extended introduction1 ,hegel lays the foundations of the science of the ,beautiful3 he defines its object1 demonstrates its legitimacy1 and indicates its method2 he then undertakes to determine the nature and the end of art4 ,upon each of these points let us endeavor to state1 in a brief manner1 his thought1 and1 if it is necessary1 explain it4 sthetics is the science of the ,beautiful4 ,the ,beautiful manifests itself in nature and in art2 but the variety and multiplicity of forms under which beauty presents itself in the real world1 does not permit their description and systematic classification4 ,the science of the ,beautiful has then as its principal object1 art and its works2 it is the philosophy of the fine arts4 ,is art a proper object of science8 ,no1 undoubtedly1 if we consider it only as an amusement or a frivolous relaxation4 ,but it has a nobler purpose4 ,it will even be a misconception of its true aim to regard it simply as an auxiliary of morals and religion4 ,although it often serves as interpreter of moral and religious ideas1 it preserves its independence4 ,its proper object is to reveal truth under sensuous forms4 ,nor is it allowable to say that it produces its effects by illusion4 ,appearance1 here1 is truer than reality4 ,the images which it places under our eyes are more ideal1 more transparent1 and also more durable than the mobile and fugitive existences of the real world4 ,the world of art is truer than that of nature and of history4 ,can science subject to its formulas the free creations of the imagination8 ,art and science1 it is true1 differ in their methods2 but imagination1 also1 has its laws2 though free1 it has not the right to be lawless4 ,in art1 nothing is arbitrary2 its ground is the essence of things2 its form is borrowed from the real world1 and the ,beautiful is the accord1 the harmony of the two terms4 ,philosophy recognizes in works of art the eternal content of its meditations1 the lofty conceptions of intelligence1 the passions of man1 and the motives of his volition4 ,philosophy does not pretend to furnish prescriptions to art1 but is able to give useful advice2 it follows it in its procedures1 it points out to it the paths whereon it may go astray2 it alone can furnish to criticism a solid basis and fixed principles4 ,as to the method to be followed1 two exclusive and opposite courses present themselves4 ,the one1 empiric and historic1 seeks to draw from the study of the master-pieces of art1 the laws of criticism and the principles of taste4 ,the other1 rational and a priori1 rises immediately to the idea of the beautiful1 and deduces from it certain general rules4 ,aristotle and ,plato represent these two methods4 ,the first reaches only a narrow theory1 incapable of comprehending art in its universality2 the other1 isolating itself on the heights of metaphysics1 knows not how to descend therefrom to apply itself to particular arts1 and to appreciate their works4 ,the true method consists in the union of these two methods1 in their reconciliation and simultaneous employment4 ,to a positive acquaintance with works of art1 to the discrimination and delicacy of taste necessary to appreciate them1 there should be joined philosophic reflection1 and the capacity of seizing the ,beautiful in itself1 and of comprehending its characteristics and immutable laws4 ,what is the nature of art8 ,the answer to this question can only be the philosophy of art itself2 and1 furthermore1 this again can be perfectly understood only in its connection with the other philosophic sciences4 ,one is here compelled to limit himself to general reflections1 and to the discussion of received opinions4 ,in the first place1 art is a product of human activity1 a creation of the mind4 ,what distinguishes it from science is this1 that it is the fruit of inspiration1 not of reflection4 ,on this account it can not be learned or transmitted2 it is a gift of genius4 ,nothing can possibly supply a lack of talent in the arts4 ,let us guard ourselves meanwhile from supposing that1 like the blind forces of nature1 the artist does not know what he does1 that reflection has no part in his works4 ,there is1 in the first place1 in the arts a technical part which must be learned1 and a skill which is acquired by practice4 ,furthermore1 the more elevated art becomes1 the more it demands an extended and varied culture1 a study of the objects of nature1 and a profound knowledge of the human heart4 ,this is eminently true of the higher spheres of art1 especially in ,poetry4 ,if works of art are creations of the human spirit1 they are not on that account inferior to those of nature4 ,they are1 it is true1 living1 only in appearance2 but the aim of art is not to create living beings2 it seeks to offer to the spirit an image of life clearer than the reality4 ,in this1 it surpasses nature4 ,there is also something divine in man1 and ,god derives no less honor from the works of human intelligence than from the works of nature4 ,now what is the cause which incites man to the production of such works8 ,is it a caprice1 a freak1 or an earnest1 fundamental inclination of his nature8 ,it is the same principle which causes him to seek in science food for his mind1 in public life a theatre for his activity4 ,in science he endeavors to cognize the truth1 pure and unveiled2 in art1 truth appears to him not in its pure form1 but expressed by images which strike his sense at the same time that they speak to his intelligence4 ,this is the principle in which art originates1 and which assigns to it a rank so high among the creations of the human mind4 ,although art is addressed to the sensibility1 nevertheless its direct aim is not to excite sensation1 and to give birth to pleasure4 ,sensation is changeful1 varied1 contradictory4 ,it represents only the various states or modifications of the soul4 ,if then we consider only the impressions which art produces upon us1 we make abstraction of the truth which it reveals to us4 ,it becomes even impossible to comprehend its grand effects2 for the sentiments which it excites in us1 are explicable only through the ideas which attach to them4 ,the sensuous element1 nevertheless1 occupies a large place in art4 ,what part must be assigned to it8 ,there are two modes of considering sensuous objects in their connection with our mind4 ,the first is that of simple perception of objects by the senses4 ,the mind then knows only their individual side1 their particular and concrete form2 the essence1 the law1 the substance of things escapes it4 ,at the same time the desire which is awakened in us1 is a desire to appropriate them to our use1 to consume them1 to destroy them4 ,the soul1 in the presence of these objects1 feels its dependence2 it cannot contemplate them with a free and disinterested eye4 ,another relation of sensuous objects with spirit1 is that of speculative thought or science4 ,here the intelligence is not content to perceive the object in its concrete form and its individuality2 it discards the individual side in order to abstract and disengage from it the law1 the universal1 the essence4 ,reason thus lifts itself above the individual form perceived by sense1 in order to conceive the pure idea in its universality4 ,art differs both from the one and from the other of these modes2 it holds the mean between sensuous perception and rational abstraction4 ,it is distinguished from the first in that it does not attach itself to the real but to the appearance1 to the form of the object1 and in that it does not feel any selfish longing to consume it1 to cause it to serve a purpose1 to utilize it4 ,it differs from science in that it is interested in this particular object1 and in its sensuous form4 ,what it loves to see in it1 is neither its materiality1 nor the pure idea in its generality1 but an appearance1 an image of the truth1 something ideal which appears in it2 it seizes the connective of the two terms1 their accord and their inner harmony4 ,thus the want which it feels is wholly contemplative4 ,in the presence of this vision the soul feels itself freed from all selfish desire4 ,in a word1 art purposely creates images1 appearances1 designed to represent ideas1 to show to us the truth under sensuous forms4 ,thereby it has the power of stirring the soul in its profoundest depths1 of causing it to experience the pure delight springing from the sight and contemplation of the ,beautiful4 ,the two principles are found equally combined in the artist4 ,the sensuous side is included in the faculty which creates--the imagination4 ,it is not by mechanical toil1 directed by rules learned by heart that he executes his works2 nor is it by a process of reflection like that of the philosopher who is seeking the truth4 ,the mind has a consciousness of itself1 but it cannot seize in an abstract manner the idea which it conceives2 it can represent it only under sensuous forms4 ,the image and the idea coexist in thought1 and cannot be separated4 ,thus the imagination is itself a gift of nature4 ,scientific genius is rather a general capacity than an innate and special talent4 ,to succeed in the arts1 there is necessary a determinate talent which reveals itself early under the form of an active and irresistible longing1 and a certain facility in the manipulation of the materials of art4 ,it is this which makes the painter1 the sculptor1 the musician4 ,such is the nature of art4 ,if it be asked1 what is its end1 here we encounter the most diverse opinions4 ,the most common is that which gives imitation as its object4 ,this is the foundation of nearly all the theories upon art4 ,now of what use to reproduce that which nature already offers to our view8 ,this puerile talk1 unworthy of spirit to which it is addressed1 unworthy of man who produces it1 would only end in the revelation of its impotency and the vanity of its efforts2 for the copy will always remain inferior to the original4 ,besides1 the more exact the imitation1 the less vivid is the pleasure4 ,that which pleases us is not imitation1 but creation4 ,the very least invention surpasses all the masterpieces of imitation4 ,in vain is it said that art ought to imitate beautiful ,nature4 ,to select is no longer to imitate4 ,perfection in imitation is exactness2 moreover1 choice supposes a rule2 where find the criterion8 ,what signifies1 in fine1 imitation in architecture1 in music1 and even in poetry8 ,at most1 one can thus explain descriptive poetry1 that is to say1 the most prosaic kind4 ,we must conclude1 therefore1 that if1 in its compositions1 art employs the forms of ,nature1 and must study them1 its aim is not to copy and to reproduce them4 ,its mission is higher--its procedure freer4 ,rival of nature1 it represents ideas as well as she1 and even better2 it uses her forms as symbols to express them2 and it fashions even these1 remodels them upon a type more perfect and more pure4 ,it is not without significance that its works are styled the creations of the genius of man4 ,a second system substitutes expression for imitation4 ,art accordingly has for its aim1 not to represent the external form of things1 but their internal and living principle1 particularly the ideas1 sentiments1 passions1 and conditions of the soul4 ,less gross than the preceding1 this theory is no less false and dangerous4 ,let us here distinguish two things3 the idea and the expression--the content and the form4 ,now1 if ,art is designed for expression solely--if expression is its essential object--its content is indifferent4 ,provided that the picture be faithful1 the expression lively and animated1 the good and the bad1 the vicious1 the hideous1 the ugly1 have the same right to figure here as the ,beautiful4 ,immoral1 licentious1 impious1 the artist will have fulfilled his obligation and reached perfection1 when he has succeeded in faithfully rendering a situation1 a passion1 an idea1 be it true or false4 ,it is clear that if in this system the object of imitation is changed1 the procedure is the same4 ,art would be only an echo1 a harmonious language2 a living mirror1 where all sentiments and all passions would find themselves reflected1 the base part and the noble part of the soul contending here for the same place4 ,the true1 here1 would be the real1 would include objects the most diverse and the most contradictory4 ,indifferent as to the content1 the artist seeks only to represent it well4 ,he troubles himself little concerning truth in itself4 ,skeptic or enthusiast indifferently1 he makes us partake of the delirium of the ,bacchanals1 or the unconcern of the ,sophist4 ,such is the system which takes for a motto the maxim1 ,art is for art2 that is to say1 mere expression for its own sake4 ,its consequences1 and the fatal tendency which it has at all times pressed upon the arts1 are well known4 ,a third system sets up moral perfection as the aim of art4 ,it cannot be denied that one of the effects of art is to soften and purify manners 7emollit mores74 ,in mirroring man to himself1 it tempers the rudeness of his appetites and his passions2 it disposes him to contemplation and reflection2 it elevates his thought and sentiments1 by leading them to an ideal which it suggests1--to ideas of a superior order4 ,art has1 from all time1 been regarded as a powerful instrument of civilization1 as an auxiliary of religion4 ,it is1 together with religion1 the earliest instructor of nations2 it is besides a means of instruction for minds incapable of comprehending truth otherwise than under the veil of a symbol1 and by images that address themselves to the sense as well as to the spirit4 ,but this theory1 although much superior to the preceding1 is no more exact4 ,its defect consists in confounding the moral effect of art with its real aim4 ,this confusion has inconveniences which do not appear at the first glance4 ,let care be taken1 meanwhile1 lest1 in thus assigning to art a foreign aim1 it be not robbed of its liberty1 which is its essence1 and without which it has no inspiration--that thereby it be not prevented from producing the effects which are to be expected from it4 ,between religion1 morals and art1 there exists an eternal and intimate harmony2 but they are1 none the less1 essentially diverse forms of truth1 and1 while preserving entire the bonds which unite them1 they claim a complete independence4 ,art has its peculiar laws1 methods and jurisdiction2 though it ought not to wound the moral sense1 yet it is the sense of the ,beautiful to which it is addressed4 ,when its works are pure1 its effect on the soul is salutary1 but its direct and immediate aim is not this result4 ,seeking it1 it risks losing it1 and does lose its own end4 ,suppose1 indeed1 that the aim of art should be to instruct1 under the veil of allegory2 the idea1 the abstract and general thought1 must be present in the spirit of the artist at the very moment of composition4 ,it seeks1 then1 a form which is adapted to that idea1 and furnishes drapery for it4 ,who does not see that this procedure is the very opposite of inspiration8 ,there can be born of it only frigid and lifeless works2 its effect will thus be neither moral nor religious2 it will produce only ennui4 ,another consequence of the opinion which makes moral perfection the object of art and its creations1 is that this end is imposed so completely upon art1 and controls it to such a degree1 that it has no longer even a choice of subjects4 ,the severe moralist would have it represent moral subjects alone4 ,art is then undone4 ,this system led ,plato to banish poets from his republic4 ,if1 then1 it is necessary to maintain the agreement of morality and art1 and the harmony of their laws1 their distinct bases and independence must also be recognized4 ,in order to understand thoroughly this distinction between morals and art1 it is necessary to have solved the moral problem4 ,morality is the realization of the 8ought0 by the free will2 it is the conflict between passion and reason1 inclination and law1 the flesh and the spirit4 ,it hinges upon an opposition4 ,antagonism is1 indeed1 the very law of the physical and moral universe4 ,but this opposition ought to be cancelled4 ,this is the destiny of beings who by their development and progress continually realize themselves4 ,now1 in morals1 this harmony of the powers of our being1 which should restore peace and happiness1 does not exist4 ,morality proposes it as an end to the free will4 ,the aim and the realization are distinct4 ,duty consists in an incessant striving4 ,thus1 in one respect1 morals and art have the same principle and the same aim2 the harmony of rectitude1 and happiness of actions and law4 ,but that wherein they differ is1 that in morals the end is never wholly attained4 ,it appears separated from the means2 the consequence is equally separated from the principle4 ,the harmony of rectitude and happiness ought to be the result of the efforts of virtue4 ,in order to conceive the identity of the two terms1 it is necessary to elevate one's self to a superior point of view1 which is not that of morals4 ,in empirical science equally1 the law appears distinct from the phenomenon1 the essence separated from its form4 ,in order that this distinction may be cancelled1 there is necessary a mode of thinking which is superior to that of reflection1 or of empirical science4 ,art1 on the contrary1 offers to us in a visible image1 the realized harmony of the two terms of existence1 of the law of beings and their manifestation1 of essence and form1 of rectitude and happiness4 ,the beautiful is essence realized1 activity in conformity with its end1 and identified with it2 it is the force which is harmoniously developed under our eyes1 in the innermost of existences1 and which cancels the contradictions of its nature3 happy1 free1 full of serenity in the very midst of suffering and of sorrow4 ,the problem of art is then distinct from the moral problem4 ,the good is harmony sought for2 beauty is harmony realized4 ,so must we understand the thought of ,hegel2 he here only intimates it1 but it will be fully developed in the sequel4 ,the true aim of art is then to represent the ,beautiful1 to reveal this harmony4 ,this is its only purpose4 ,every other aim1 purification1 moral amelioration1 edification1 are accessories or consequences4 ,the effect of the contemplation of the ,beautiful is to produce in us a calm and pure joy1 incompatible with the gross pleasures of sense2 it lifts the soul above the ordinary sphere of its thoughts2 it disposes to noble resolutions and generous actions by the close affinity which exists between the three sentiments and the three ideas of the ,good1 the ,beautiful1 and the ,divine4 ,such are the principal ideas which this remarkable introduction contains4 ,the remainder1 devoted to the examination of works which have marked the development of sthetic science in ,germany since ,kant1 is scarcely susceptible of analysis1 and does not so much deserve our attention4 ,the first part of the science of sthetics1 which might be called the ,metaphysics of the ,beautiful1 contains1 together with the analysis of the idea of the ,beautiful1 the general principles common to all the arts4 ,thus ,hegel here treats3 ,first1 of the abstract idea of the ,beautiful2 second1 of the ,beautiful in nature2 third1 of the ,beautiful in art1 or of the ideal4 ,he concludes with an examination of the qualities of the artist4 ,but before entering upon these questions1 he thought it necessary to point out the place of art in human life1 and especially its connections with religion and philosophy4 ,the destination of man1 the law of his nature1 is to develop himself incessantly1 to stretch unceasingly towards the infinite4 ,he ought1 at the same time1 to put an end to the opposition which he finds in himself between the elements and powers of his being2 to place them in accord by realizing and developing them externally4 ,physical life is a struggle between opposing forces1 and the living being can sustain itself only through the conflict and the triumph of the force which constitutes it4 ,with man1 and in the moral sphere1 this conflict and progressive enfranchisement are manifested under the form of freedom1 which is the highest destination of spirit4 ,freedom consists in surmounting the obstacles which it encounters within and without1 in removing the limits1 in effacing all contradiction1 in vanquishing evil and sorrow1 in order to attain to harmony with the world and with itself4 ,in actual life1 man seeks to destroy that opposition by the satisfaction of his physical wants4 ,he calls to his aid1 industry and the useful arts2 but he obtains thus only limited1 relative1 and transient enjoyments4 ,he finds a nobler pleasure in science1 which furnishes food for his ardent curiosity1 and promises to reveal to him the laws of nature and to unveil the secrets of the universe4 ,civil life opens another channel to his activity2 he burns to realize his conceptions2 he marches to the conquest of the right1 and pursues the ideal of justice which he bears within him4 ,he endeavors to realize in civil society his instinct of sociability1 which is also the law of his being1 and one of the fundamental inclinations of his moral nature4 ,but here1 again1 he attains an imperfect felicity2 he encounters limits and obstacles which he cannot surmount1 and against which1 his will is broken4 ,he cannot obtain the perfect realization of his ideas1 nor attain the ideal which his spirit conceives and toward which it aspires4 ,he then feels the necessity of elevating himself to a higher sphere where all contradictions are cancelled2 where the idea of the good and of happiness in their perfect accord and their enduring harmony is realized4 ,this profound want of the soul is satisfied in three ways3 in art1 in religion1 and in philosophy4 ,the function of art is to lead us to the contemplation of the true1 the infinite1 under sensuous forms2 for the beautiful is the unity1 the realized harmony of two principles of existence1 of the idea and the form1 of the infinite and the finite4 ,this is the principle and the hidden essence of things1 beaming through their visible form4 ,art presents us1 in its works1 the image of this happy accord where all opposition ceases1 and where all contradiction is cancelled4 ,such is the aim of art3 to represent the divine1 the infinite1 under sensuous forms4 ,this is its mission2 it has no other and this it alone can fulfil4 ,by this title it takes its place by the side of religion1 and preserves its independence4 ,it takes its rank also with philosophy1 whose object is the knowledge of the true1 of absolute truth4 ,alike then as to their general ground and aims1 these three spheres are distinguished by the form under which they become revealed to the spirit and consciousness of man4 ,art is addressed to sensuous perception and to the imagination2 religion is addressed to the soul1 to the conscience1 and to sentiment2 philosophy is addressed to pure thought or to the reason1 which conceives the truth in an abstract manner4 ,art1 which offers us truth under sensuous forms1 does not1 however1 respond to the profoundest needs of the soul4 ,the spirit is possessed of the desire of entering into itself1 of contemplating the truth in the inner recesses of consciousness4 ,above the domain of art1 then1 religion is placed1 which reveals the infinite1 and by meditation conveys to the depths of the heart1 to the centre of the soul1 that which in art we contemplate externally4 ,as to philosophy1 its peculiar aim is to conceive and to comprehend1 by the intellect alone1 under an abstract form1 that which is given as sentiment or as sensuous representation4 ,i4 ,of the ,idea of the ,beautiful4 ,after these preliminaries1 ,hegel enters upon the questions which form the object of this first part4 ,he treats1 in the first place1 of the idea of the beautiful in itself1 in its abstract nature4 ,freeing his thought from the metaphysical forms which render it difficult of comprehension to minds not familiar with his system1 we arrive at this definition1 already contained in the foregoing3 the ,beautiful is the true1 that is to say1 the essence1 the inmost substance of things2 the true1 not such as the mind conceives it in its abstract and pure nature1 but as manifested to the senses under visible forms4 ,it is the sensuous manifestation of the idea1 which is the soul and principle of things4 ,this definition recalls that of ,plato3 the ,beautiful is the splendor of the true4 ,what are the characteristics of the beautiful8 ,first1 it is infinite in this sense1 that it is the divine principle itself which is revealed and manifested1 and that the form which expresses it1 in place of limiting it1 realizes it and confounds itself with it2 second1 it is free1 for true freedom is not the absence of rule and measure1 it is force which develops itself easily and harmoniously4 ,it appears in the bosom of the existences of the sensuous world1 as their principle of life1 of unity1 and of harmony1 whether free from all obstacle1 or victorious and triumphant in conflict1 always calm and serene4 ,the spectator who contemplates beauty feels himself equally free1 and has a consciousness of his infinite nature4 ,he tastes a pure pleasure1 resulting from the felt accord of the powers of his being2 a celestial and divine joy1 which has nothing in common with material pleasures1 and does not suffer to exist in the soul a single impure or gross desire4 ,the contemplation of the ,beautiful awakens no such craving2 it is self-sufficing1 and is not accompanied by any return of the me upon itself4 ,it suffers the object to preserve its independence for its own sake4 ,the soul experiences something analogous to divine felicity2 it is transported into a sphere foreign to the miseries of life and terrestrial existence4 ,this theory1 it is apparent1 would need only to be developed to return wholly to the ,platonic theory4 ,hegel limits himself to referring to it4 ,we recognize here1 also1 the results of the ,kantian analysis4 ,,ii4 ,of the ,beautiful in ,nature4 ,although science cannot pause to describe the beauties of nature1 it ought1 nevertheless1 to study1 in a general manner1 the characteristics of the ,beautiful1 as it appears to us in the physical world and in the beings which it contains4 ,this is the subject of a somewhat extended chapter1 with the following title3 ,of the ,beautiful in ,nature4 ,hegel herein considers the question from the particular point of view of his philosophy1 and he applies his theory of the ,idea4 ,nevertheless1 the results at which he arrives1 and the manner in which he describes the forms of physical beauty1 can be comprehended and accepted independently of his system1 little adapted1 it must be confessed1 to cast light upon this subject4 ,the ,beautiful in nature is the first manifestation of the ,idea4 ,the successive degrees of beauty correspond to the development of life and organization in beings4 ,unity is an essential characteristic of it4 ,thus1 in the mineral1 beauty consists in the arrangement or disposition of the parts1 in the force which resides in them1 and which reveals itself in this unity4 ,the solar system offers us a more perfect unity and a higher beauty4 ,the bodies in that system1 while preserving entire their individual existence1 co-ordinate themselves into a whole1 the parts of which are independent1 although attached to a common centre1 the sun4 ,beauty of this order strikes us by the regularity of the movements of the celestial bodies4 ,a unity more real and true is that which is manifested in organized and living beings4 ,the unity here consists in a relation of reciprocity and of mutual dependence between the organs1 so that each of them loses its independent existence in order to give place to a wholly ideal unity which reveals itself as the principle of life animating them4 ,life is beautiful in nature3 for it is essence1 force1 the idea realized under its first form4 ,nevertheless1 beauty in nature is still wholly external2 it has no consciousness of itself2 it is beautiful solely for an intelligence which sees and contemplates it4 ,how do we perceive beauty in natural beings8 ,beauty1 with living and animate beings1 is neither accidental and capricious movements1 nor simple conformity of those movements to an end--the uniform and mutual connection of parts4 ,this point of view is that of the naturalist1 of the man of science2 it is not that of the ,beautiful4 ,beauty is total form in so far as it reveals the force which animates it2 it is this force itself1 manifested by a totality of forms1 of independent and free movements2 it is the internal harmony which reveals itself in this secret accord of members1 and which betrays itself outwardly1 without the eye's pausing to consider the relation of the parts to the whole1 and their functions or reciprocal connection1 as science does4 ,the unity exhibits itself merely externally as the principle which binds the members together4 ,it manifests itself especially through the sensibility4 ,the point of view of beauty is then that of pure contemplation1 not that of reflection1 which analyzes1 compares and seizes the connection of parts and their destination4 ,this internal and visible unity1 this accord1 and this harmony1 are not distinct from the material element2 they are its very form4 ,this is the principle which serves to determine beauty in its inferior grades1 the beauty of the crystal with its regular forms1 forms produced by an internal and free force4 ,a similar activity is developed in a more perfect manner in the living organism1 its outlines1 the disposition of its members1 the movements1 and the expression of sensibility4 ,such is beauty in individual beings4 ,it is otherwise with it when we consider nature in its totality1 the beauty of a landscape1 for example4 ,there is no longer question here about an organic disposition of parts and of the life which animates them2 we have under our eyes a rich multiplicity of objects which form a whole1 mountains1 trees1 rivers1 etc4 ,in this diversity there appears an external unity which interests us by its agreeable or imposing character4 ,to this aspect there is added that property of the objects of nature through which they awaken in us1 sympathetically1 certain sentiments1 by the secret analogy which exists between them and the situations of the human soul4 ,such is the effect produced by the silence of the night1 the calm of a still valley1 the sublime aspect of a vast sea in tumult1 and the imposing grandeur of the starry heavens4 ,the significance of these objects is not in themselves2 they are only symbols of the sentiments of the soul which they excite4 ,it is thus we attribute to animals the qualities which belong only to man1 courage1 fortitude1 cunning4 ,physical beauty is a reflex of moral beauty4 ,to recapitulate1 physical beauty1 viewed in its ground or essence1 consists in the manifestation of the concealed principle1 of the force which is developed in the bosom of matter4 ,this force reveals itself in a manner more or less perfect1 by unity in inert matter1 and in living beings by the different modes of organization4 ,hegel then devotes a special examination to the external side1 or to beauty of form in natural objects4 ,physical beauty1 considered externally1 presents itself successively under the aspects of regularity and symmetry1 of conformity to law and of harmony2 lastly1 of purity and simplicity of matter4 #a4 ,regularity1 which is only the repetition of a form equal to itself1 is the most elementary and simple form4 ,in symmetry there already appears a diversity which breaks the uniformity4 ,these two forms of beauty pertain to quantity1 and constitute mathematical beauty2 they are found in organic and inorganic bodies1 minerals and crystals4 ,in plants are presented less regular1 and freer forms4 ,in the organization of animals1 this regular and symmetrical disposition becomes more and more subordinated in proportion as we ascend to higher degrees of the animal scale4 #b4 ,conformity to a law marks a degree still more elevated1 and serves as a transition to freer forms4 ,here there appears an accord more real and more profound1 which begins to transcend mathematical rigor4 ,it is no longer a simple numerical relation1 where quantity plays the principal rle2 we discover a relation of quality between different terms4 ,a law rules the whole1 but it cannot be calculated2 it remains a hidden bond1 which reveals itself to the spectator4 ,such is the oval line1 and above all1 the undulating line1 which ,hogarth has given as the line of beauty4 ,these lines determine1 in fact1 the beautiful forms of organic nature in living beings of a high order1 and1 above all1 the beautiful forms of the human body1 of man and of woman4 #c4 ,harmony is a degree still superior to the preceding1 and it includes them4 ,it consists in a totality of elements essentially distinct1 but whose opposition is destroyed and reduced to unity by a secret accord1 a reciprocal adaptation4 ,such is the harmony of forms and colors1 that of sounds and movements1 ,here the unity is stronger1 more prononc1 precisely because the differences and the oppositions are more marked4 ,harmony1 however1 is not as yet true unity1 spiritual unity1 that of the soul1 although the latter possesses within it a principle of harmony4 ,harmony alone1 as yet1 reveals neither the soul nor the spirit1 as one may see in music and dancing4 ,beauty exists also in matter itself1 abstraction being made of its form2 it consists1 then1 in the unity and simplicity which constitutes purity4 ,such is the purity of the sky and of the atmosphere1 the purity of colors and of sounds2 that of certain substances--of precious stones1 of gold1 and of the diamond4 ,pure and simple colors are also the most agreeable4 ,after having described the beautiful in nature1 in order that the necessity of a beauty more exalted and more ideal shall be comprehended1 ,hegel sets forth the imperfections of real beauty4 ,he begins with animal life1 which is the most elevated point we have reached1 and he dwells upon the characteristics and causes of that imperfection4 ,thus1 first in the animal1 although the organism is more perfect than that of the plant1 what we see is not the central point of life2 the special seat of the operations of the force which animates the whole1 remains concealed from us4 ,we see only the outlines of the external form1 covered with hairs1 scales1 feathers1 skin2 secondly1 the human body1 it is true1 exhibits more beautiful proportions1 and a more perfect form1 because in it1 life and sensibility are everywhere manifested--in the color1 the flesh1 the freer movements1 nobler attitudes1 c4 ,yet here1 besides the imperfections in details1 the sensibility does not appear equally distributed4 ,certain parts are appropriated to animal functions1 and exhibit their destination in their form4 ,further1 individuals in nature1 placed as they are under a dependence upon external causes1 and under the influence of the elements1 are under the dominion of necessity and want4 ,under the continual action of these causes1 physical being is exposed to losing the fulness of its forms and the flower of its beauty2 rarely do these causes permit it to attain to its complete1 free and regular development4 ,the human body is placed under a like dependence upon external agents4 ,if we pass from the physical to the moral world1 that dependence appears still more clearly4 ,everywhere there is manifested diversity1 and opposition of tendencies and interests4 ,the individual1 in the plenitude of his life and beauty1 cannot preserve the appearance of a free force4 ,each individual being is limited and particularized in his excellence4 ,his life flows in a narrow circle of space and time2 he belongs to a determinate species2 his type is given1 his form defined1 and the conditions of his development fixed4 ,the human body itself offers1 in respect to beauty1 a progression of forms dependent on the diversity of races4 ,then come hereditary qualities1 the peculiarities which are due to temperament1 profession1 age1 and sex4 ,all these causes alter and disfigure the purest and most perfect primitive type4 ,all these imperfections are summed up in a word3 the finite4 ,human life and animal life realize their idea only imperfectly4 ,moreover1 spirit--not being able to find1 in the limits of the real1 the sight and the enjoyment of its proper freedom--seeks to satisfy itself in a region more elevated1 that of art1 or of the ideal4 ,,iii4 ,of the beautiful in ,art or of the ,ideal4 ,art has as its end and aim the representation of the ideal4 ,now what is the ideal8 ,it is beauty in a degree of perfection superior to real beauty4 ,it is force1 life1 spirit1 the essence of things1 developing themselves harmoniously in a sensuous reality1 which is its resplendent image1 its faithful expression2 it is beauty disengaged and purified from the accidents which veil and disfigure it1 and which alter its purity in the real world4 ,the ideal1 in art1 is not then the contrary of the real1 but the real idealized1 purified1 rendered conformable to its idea1 and perfectly expressing it4 ,in a word1 it is the perfect accord of the idea and the sensuous form4 ,on the other hand1 the true ideal is not life in its inferior degrees--blind1 undeveloped force--but the soul arrived at the consciousness of itself1 free1 and in the full enjoyment of its faculties2 it is life1 but spiritual life--in a word1 spirit4 ,the representation of the spiritual principle1 in the plenitude of its life and freedom1 with its high conceptions1 its profound and noble sentiments1 its joys and its sufferings3 this is the true aim of art1 the true ideal4 ,finally1 the ideal is not a lifeless abstraction1 a frigid generality2 it is the spiritual principle under the form of the living individual1 freed from the bonds of the finite1 and developing itself in its perfect harmony with its inmost nature and essence4 ,we see1 thus1 what are the characteristics of the ideal4 ,it is evident that in all its degrees it is calmness1 serenity1 felicity1 happy existence1 freed from the miseries and wants of life4 ,this serenity does not exclude earnestness2 for the ideal appears in the midst of the conflicts of life2 but even in the roughest experiences1 in the midst of intense suffering1 the soul preserves an evident calmness as a fundamental trait4 ,it is felicity in suffering1 the glorification of sorrow1 smiling in tears4 ,the echo of this felicity resounds in all the spheres of the ideal4 ,it is important to determine1 with still more precision1 the relations of the ideal and the real4 ,the opposition of the ideal and the real has given rise to two conflicting opinions4 ,some conceive of the ideal as something vague1 an abstract1 lifeless generality1 without individuality4 ,others extol the natural1 the imitation of the real in the most minute and prosaic details4 ,equal exaggeration6 ,the truth lies between the two extremes4 ,in the first place1 the ideal may be1 in fact1 something external and accidental1 an insignificant form or appearance1 a common existence4 ,but that which constitutes the ideal1 in this inferior degree1 is the fact that this reality1 imitated by art1 is a creation of spirit1 and becomes then something artificial1 not real4 ,it is an image and a metamorphosis4 ,this image1 moreover1 is more permanent than its model1 more durable than the real object4 ,in fixing that which is mobile and transient1 in eternizing that which is momentary and fugitive--a flower1 a smile--art surpasses nature and idealizes it4 ,but it does not stop here4 ,instead of simply reproducing these objects1 while preserving their natural form1 it seizes their internal and deepest character1 it extends their signification1 and gives to them a more elevated and more general significance2 for it must manifest the universal in the individual1 and render visible the idea which they represent1 their eternal and fixed type4 ,it allows this character of generality to penetrate everywhere1 without reducing it to an abstraction4 ,thus the artist does not slavishly reproduce all the features of the object1 and its accidents1 but only the true traits1 those conformable to its idea4 ,if1 then1 he takes nature as a model1 he still surpasses and idealizes it4 ,naturalness1 faithfulness1 truth1 these are not exact imitation1 but the perfect conformity of the form to the idea2 they are the creation of a more perfect form1 whose essential traits represent the idea more faithfully and more clearly than it is expressed in nature itself4 ,to know how to disengage the operative1 energetic1 essential and significant elements in objects1--this is the task of the artist4 ,the ideal1 then1 is not the real2 the latter contains many elements insignificant1 useless1 confused and foreign1 or opposed to the idea4 ,the natural here loses its vulgar significance4 ,by this word must be understood the more exalted expression of spirit4 ,the ideal is a transfigured1 glorified nature4 ,as to vulgar and common nature1 if art takes it also for its object1 it is not for its own sake1 but because of what in it is true1 excellent1 interesting1 ingenuous or gay1 as in genre painting1 in ,dutch painting particularly4 ,it occupies1 nevertheless1 an inferior rank1 and cannot make pretensions to a place beside the grand compositions of art4 ,but there are other subjects--a nature more elevated and more ideal4 ,art1 at its culminating stage1 represents the development of the internal powers of the soul1 its grand passions1 profound sentiments1 and lofty destinies4 ,now1 it is clear that the artist does not find in the real world1 forms so pure and ideal that he may safely confine himself to imitating and copying4 ,moreover1 if the form itself be given1 expression must be added4 ,besides1 he ought to secure1 in a just measure1 the union of the individual and the universal1 of the form and the idea2 to create a living ideal1 penetrated with the idea1 and in which it animates the sensuous form and appearance throughout1 so that there shall be nothing in it empty or insignificant1 nothing that is not alive with expression itself4 ,where shall he find in the real world1 this just measure1 this animation1 and this exact correspondence of all the parts and of all the details conspiring to the same end1 to the same effect8 ,to say that he will succeed in conceiving and realizing the ideal1 by making a felicitous selection of ideas and forms1 is to ignore the secret of artistic composition2 it is to misconceive the entirely spontaneous method of genius1--inspiration which creates at a single effort1--to replace it by a reflective drudgery1 which only results in the production of frigid and lifeless works4 ,it does not suffice to define the ideal in an abstract manner2 the ideal is exhibited to us in the works of art under very various and diverse forms4 ,thus sculpture represents it under the motionless features of its figures4 ,in the other arts it assumes the form of movement and of action2 in poetry1 particularly1 it manifests itself in the midst of most varied situations and events1 of conflicts between persons animated by diverse passions4 ,how1 and under what conditions1 is each art in particular called upon to represent thus the ideal8 ,this will be the object of the theory of the arts4 ,in the general exposition of the principles of art1 we may1 nevertheless1 attempt to define the degrees of this development1 to study the principal aspects under which it manifests itself4 ,such is the object of those considerations1 the title of which is1 ,of the ,determination of the ,ideal1 and which the author develops in this first part of the work4 ,we can trace only summarily the principal ideas1 devoting ourselves to marking their order and connection4 ,the gradation which the author establishes between the progressively determined forms of the ideal is as follows3 #a4 ,the ideal1 under the most elevated form1 is the divine idea1 the divine such as the imagination can represent it under sensuous forms2 such is the ,greek ideal of the divinities of ,polytheism2 such the ,christian ideal in its highest purity1 under the form of ,god the ,father1 of ,christ1 of the ,virgin1 of the ,apostles1 etc4 ,it is given above all to sculpture and painting1 to present us the image of it4 ,its essential characteristics are calmness1 majesty1 serenity4 #b4 ,in a degree less elevated1 but more determined1 in the circle of human life1 the ideal appears to us1 with man1 as the victory of the eternal principles which fill the human heart1 the triumph of the noble part of the soul over the inferior and passionate4 ,the noble1 the excellent1 the perfect1 in the human soul1 is the moral and divine principle which is manifested in it1 which governs its will1 and causes it to accomplish grand actions2 this is the true source of self-sacrifice and of heroism4 #c4 ,but the idea1 when it is manifested in the real world1 can be developed only under the form of action4 ,now1 action itself has for its condition a conflict between principles and persons1 divided as to interests1 ideas1 passions1 and characters4 ,it is this especially that is represented by poetry--the art par excellence1 the only art which can reproduce an action in its successive phases1 with its complications1 its sudden turns of fortune1 its catastrophe and its denouement4 ,action1 if one considers it more closely1 includes the following conditions3 #ast4 ,a world which serves it as a basis and theatre1 a form of society which renders it possible1 and is favorable to the development of ideal figures4 #b;d4 ,a determinate situation1 in which the personages are placed who render necessary the conflict between opposing interests and passions1 whence a collision may arise4 #c;d4 ,an action1 properly so called1 which develops itself in its essential moments1 which has a beginning1 a middle1 and an end4 ,this action1 in order to afford a high interest1 should revolve upon ideas of an elevated order1 which inspire and sustain the personages1 ennobling their passions1 and forming the basis of their character4 ,hegel treats1 in a general manner1 each of these points1 which will appear anew1 under a more special form1 in the study of poetry1 and particularly of epic and dramatic poetry4 #a4 ,the state of society most favorable to the ideal is that which allows the characters to act with most freedom1 to reveal a lofty and powerful personality4 ,this cannot be a social order1 where all is fixed and regulated by laws and a constitution4 ,nor can it be the savage state1 where all is subject to caprice and violence1 and where man is dependent upon a thousand external causes1 which render his existence precarious4 ,now the state intermediate between the barbarous state and an advanced civilization1 is the heroic age1 that in which the epic poets locate their action1 and from which the tragic poets themselves have often borrowed their subjects and their personages4 ,that which characterizes heroes in this epoch is1 above all1 the independence which is manifested in their characters and acts4 ,on the other hand1 the hero is all of a piece2 he assumes not only the responsibility of his acts and their consequences1 but the results of actions he has not perpetrated1 of the faults or crimes of his race2 he bears in his person an entire race4 ,another reason why the ideal existences of art belong to the mythologic ages1 and to remote epochs of history1 is that the artist or the poet1 in representing or recounting events1 has a freer scope in his ideal creations4 ,art1 also1 for the same reason1 has a predilection for the higher conditions of society1 those of princes particularly1 because of the perfect independence of will and action which characterizes them4 ,in this respect1 our actual society1 with its civil and political organization1 its manners1 administration1 police1 etc41 is prosaic4 ,the sphere of activity of the individual is too restricted2 he encounters everywhere limits and shackles to his will4 ,our monarchs themselves are subject to these conditions2 their power is limited by institutions1 laws and customs4 ,war1 peace1 and treaties are determined by political relations independent of their will4 ,the greatest poets have not been able to escape these conditions2 and when they have desired to represent personages nearer to us1 as ,charles ,moor1 or ,wallenstein1 they have been obliged to place them in revolt against society or against their sovereign4 ,moreover1 these heroes rush on to an inevitable ruin1 or they fall into the ridiculous situation1 of which the ,don ,quixote of ,cervantes gives us the most striking example4 #b4 ,to represent the ideal in personages or in an action1 there is necessary not only a favorable world from which the subject is to be borrowed1 but a situation4 ,this situation can be either indeterminate1 like that of many of the immobile personages of antique or religious sculpture1 or determinate1 but yet of little earnestness4 ,such are also the greater number of the situations of the personages of antique sculpture4 ,finally1 it may be earnest1 and furnish material for a veritable action4 ,it supposes1 then1 an opposition1 an action and a reaction1 a conflict1 a collision4 ,the beauty of the ideal consists in absolute serenity and perfection4 ,now1 collision destroys this harmony4 ,the problem of art consists1 then1 in so managing that the harmony reappears in the denouement4 ,poetry alone is capable of developing this opposition upon which the interest1 particularly1 of tragic art turns4 ,without examining here the nature of the different collisions1 the study of which belongs to the theory of dramatic art1 we must already have remarked that the collisions of the highest order are those in which the conflict takes place between moral forces1 as in the ancient tragedies4 ,this is the subject of true classic tragedy1 moral as well as religious1 as will be seen from what follows4 ,thus the ideal1 in this superior degree1 is the manifestation of moral powers and of the ideas of spirit1 of the grand movements of the soul1 and of the characters which appear and are revealed in the development of the representation4 #c4 ,in action1 properly so-called1 three things are to be considered which constitute its ideal object3 #a4 ,the general interests1 the ideas1 the universal principles1 whose opposition forms the very foundation of the action2 #b4 ,the personages2 #c4 ,their character and their passions1 or the motives which impel them to act4 ,in the first place1 the eternal principles of religion1 of morality1 of the family1 of the state--the grand sentiments of the soul1 love1 honor1 etc4--these constitute the basis1 the true interest of the action4 ,these are the grand and true motives of art1 the eternal theme of exalted poetry4 ,to these legitimate and true powers others are1 without doubt1 added2 the powers of evil2 but they ought not to be represented as forming the real foundation and end of the action4 8,if the idea1 the end and aim1 be something false in itself1 the hideousness of the ground will allow still less beauty of form4 ,the sophistry of the passions may1 indeed1 by a true picture1 attempt to represent the false under the colors of the true1 but it places under our eyes only a whited sepulchre4 ,cruelty and the violent employment of force can be endured in representation1 but only when they are relieved by the grandeur of the character and ennobled by the aim which is pursued by the dramatis person4 ,perversity1 envy1 cowardice1 baseness1 are only repulsive4 8,evil1 in itself1 is stripped of real interest1 because nothing but the false can spring from what is false2 it produces only misfortune1 while art should present to us order and harmony4 ,the great artists1 the great poets of antiquity1 never give us the spectacle of pure wickedness and perversity40 ,we cite this passage because it exhibits the character and high moral tone which prevails in the entire work1 as we shall have occasion to observe more than once hereafter4 ,if the ideas and interests of human life form the ground of the action1 the latter is accomplished by the characters upon whom the interest is fastened4 ,general ideas may1 indeed1 be personated by beings superior to man1 by certain divinities like those which figure in ancient epic poetry and tragedy4 ,but it is to man that action1 properly so-called1 returns2 it is he who occupies the scene4 ,now1 how reconcile divine action and human action1 the will of the gods and that of man8 ,such is the problem which has made shipwreck of so many poets and artists4 ,to maintain a proper equipoise it is necessary that the gods have supreme direction1 and that man preserve his freedom and his independence without which he is no more than the passive instrument of the will of the gods2 fatality weighs upon all his acts4 ,the true solution consists in maintaining the identity of the two terms1 in spite of their difference2 in so acting that what is attributed to the gods shall appear at the same time to emanate from the inner nature of the dramatis person and from their character4 ,the talent of the artist must reconcile the two aspects4 8,the heart of man must be revealed in his gods1 personifications of the grand motives which allure him and govern him within40 ,this is the problem resolved by the great poets of antiquity1 ,homer1 schylus1 and ,sophocles4 ,the general principles1 those grand motives which are the basis of the action1 by the fact that they are living in the soul of the characters1 form1 also1 the very ground of the passions2 this is the essence of true pathos4 ,passion1 here1 in the elevated ideal sense1 is1 in fact1 not an arbitrary1 capricious1 irregular movement of the soul2 it is a noble principle1 which blends itself with a great idea1 with one of the eternal verities of moral or religious order4 ,such is the passion of ,antigone1 the holy love for her brother2 such1 the vengeance of ,orestes4 ,it is an essentially legitimate power of the soul which contains one of the eternal principles of the reason and the will4 ,this is still the ideal1 the true ideal1 although it appears under the form of a passion4 ,it relieves1 ennobles and purifies it2 it thus gives to the action a serious and profound interest4 ,it is in this sense that passion constitutes the centre and true domain of art2 it is the principle of emotion1 the source of true pathos4 ,now1 this moral verity1 this eternal principle which descends into the heart of man and there takes the form of great and noble passion1 identifying itself with the will of the dramatis person1 constitutes1 also1 their character4 ,without this high idea which serves as support and as basis to passion1 there is no true character4 ,character is the culminating point of ideal representation4 ,it is the embodiment of all that precedes4 ,it is in the creation of the characters1 that the genius of the artist or of the poet is displayed4 ,three principal elements must be united to form the ideal character1 richness1 vitality1 and stability4 ,richness consists in not being limited to a single quality1 which would make of the person an abstraction1 an allegoric being4 ,to a single dominant quality there should be added all those which make of the personage or hero a real and complete man1 capable of being developed in diverse situations and under varying aspects4 ,such a multiplicity alone can give vitality to the character4 ,this is not sufficient1 however2 it is necessary that the qualities be moulded together in such a manner as to form not a simple assemblage and a complex whole1 but one and the same individual1 having peculiar and original physiognomy4 ,this is the case when a particular sentiment1 a ruling passion1 presents the salient trait of the character of a person1 and gives to him a fixed aim1 to which all his resolutions and his acts refer4 ,unity and variety1 simplicity and completeness of detail1 these are presented to us in the characters of ,sophocles1 ,shakspeare1 and others4 ,lastly1 what constitutes essentially the ideal in character is consistency and stability4 ,an inconsistent1 undecided1 irresolute character1 is the utter want of character4 ,contradictions1 without doubt1 exist in human nature1 but unity should be maintained in spite of these fluctuations4 ,something identical ought to be found throughout1 as a fundamental trait4 ,to be self-determining1 to follow a design1 to embrace a resolution and persist in it1 constitute the very foundation of personality2 to suffer one's self to be determined by another1 to hesitate1 to vacillate1 this is to surrender one's will1 to cease to be one's self1 to lack character2 this is1 in all cases1 the opposite of the ideal character4 ,hegel on this subject strongly protests against the characters which figure in modern pieces and romances1 and of which ,werther is the type4 ,these pretended characters1 says he1 represent only unhealthiness of spirit1 and feebleness of soul4 ,now true and healthy art does not represent what is false and sickly1 what lacks consistency and decision1 but that which is true1 healthy and strong4 ,the ideal1 in a word1 is the idea realized2 man can realize it only as a free person1 that is to say1 by displaying all the energy and constancy which can make it triumph4 ,we shall find more than once1 in the course of the work1 the same ideas developed with the same force and precision4 ,that which constitutes the very ground of the ideal is the inmost essence of things1 especially the lofty conceptions of the spirit1 and the development of the powers of the soul4 ,these ideas are manifest in an action in which are placed upon the scene the grand interests of life1 the passions of the human heart1 the will and the character of actors4 ,but this action is itself developed in the midst of an external nature which1 moreover1 lends to the ideal1 colors and a determinate form4 ,these external surroundings must also be conceived and fashioned in the meaning of the ideal1 according to the laws of regularity1 symmetry1 and harmony1 of which mention has been made above4 ,how ought man to be represented in his relations with external nature8 ,how ought this prose of life to be idealized8 ,if art1 in fact1 frees man from the wants of material life1 it cannot1 however1 elevate him above the conditions of human existence1 and suppress these connections4 ,hegel devotes a special examination to this new phase of the question of the ideal1 which he designates by this title--,of the external determination of the ideal4 ,in our days we have given an exaggerated importance to this external side1 which we have made the principal object4 ,we are too unmindful that art should represent the ideas and sentiments of the human soul1 that this is the true ground of its works4 ,hence all these minute descriptions1 this external care given to the picturesque element or to the local color1 to furniture1 to costumes1 to all those artificial means employed to disguise the emptiness and insignificance of the subject1 the absence of ideas1 the falsity of the situations1 the feebleness of the characters1 and the improbability of the action4 ,nevertheless1 this side has its place in art1 and should not be neglected4 ,it gives clearness1 truthfulness1 life1 and interest to its works1 by the secret sympathy which exists between man and nature4 ,it is characteristic of the great masters to represent nature with perfect truthfulness4 ,homer is an example of this4 ,without forgetting the content for the form1 picture for the frame1 he presents to us a faultless and precise image of the theatre of action4 ,the arts differ much in this respect4 ,sculpture limits itself to certain symbolic indications2 painting1 which has at its disposal means more extended1 enriches with these objects the content of its pictures4 ,among the varieties of poetry1 the epic is more circumstantial in its descriptions than the drama or lyric poetry4 ,but this external fidelity should not1 in any art1 extend to the representation of insignificant details1 to the making of them an object of predilection1 and to subordinating to them the developments which the subject itself claims4 ,the grand point in these descriptions is that we perceive a secret harmony between man and nature1 between the action and the theatre on which it occurs4 ,another species of accord is established between man and the objects of physical nature1 when1 through his free activity1 he impresses upon them his intelligence and will1 and appropriates them to his own use2 the ideal consists in causing misery and necessity to disappear from the domain of art1 in revealing the freedom which develops itself without effort under our eyes1 and easily surmounts obstacles4 ,such is the ideal considered under this aspect4 ,thus the gods of polytheism themselves have garments and arms2 they drink nectar and are nourished by ambrosia4 ,the garment is an ornament designed to heighten the glory of the features1 to give nobleness to the countenance1 to facilitate movement1 or to indicate force and agility4 ,the most brilliant objects1 the metals1 precious stones1 purple and ivory1 are employed for the same end4 ,all concur to produce the effect of grace and beauty4 ,in the satisfaction of physical wants the ideal consists1 above all1 in the simplicity of the means4 ,instead of being artificial1 factitious1 complex1 the latter emanate directly from the activity of man1 and freedom4 ,the heroes of ,homer themselves slay the oxen which are to serve for the feast1 and roast them2 they forge their arms1 and prepare their couches4 ,this is not1 as one might think1 a relic of barbarous manners1 something prosaic2 but we see1 penetrating everywhere the delight of invention1 the pleasure of easy toil and free activity exercised on material objects4 ,everything is peculiar to and inherent in his character1 and a means for the hero of revealing the force of his arm and the skill of his hand2 while1 in civilized society1 these objects depend on a thousand foreign causes1 on a complex adjustment in which man is converted into a machine subordinated to other machines4 ,things have lost their freshness and vitality2 they remain inanimate1 and are no longer proper1 direct creations of the human person1 in which the man loves to solace and contemplate himself4 ,a final point relative to the external form of the ideal is that which concerns the relation of works of art to the public1 that is to say1 to the nation and epoch for which the artist or the poet composes his works4 ,ought the artist1 when he treats a subject1 to consult1 above all1 the spirit1 taste and manners of the people whom he addresses1 and conform himself to their ideas8 ,this is the means of exciting interest in fabulous and imaginary or even historic persons4 ,but then there is a liability to distort history and tradition4 ,ought he1 on the other hand1 to reproduce with scrupulous exactness the manners and customs of another time1 to give to the facts and the characters their proper coloring and their original and primitive costume8 ,this is the problem4 ,hence arise two schools and two opposite modes of representation4 ,in the age of ,louis ,,xiv41 for example1 the ,greeks and ,romans are conceived in the likeness of ,frenchmen4 ,since then1 by a natural reaction1 the contrary tendency has prevailed4 ,today the poet must have the knowledge of an archeologist1 and possess his scrupulous exactness1 and pay close attention1 above all1 to local color1 and historic verity has become the principal and essential aim of art4 ,truth here1 as always1 lies between the two extremes4 ,it is necessary to maintain1 at the same time1 the rights of art and these of the public1 to have a proper regard for the spirit of the epoch1 and to satisfy the exigencies of the subject treated4 ,these are the very judicious rules which the author states upon this delicate point4 ,the subject should be intelligible and interesting to the public to which it is addressed4 ,but this end the poet or the artist will attain only so far as1 by his general spirit1 his work responds to some one of the essential ideas of the human spirit and to the general interests of humanity4 ,the particularities of an epoch are not of true and enduring interest to us4 ,if1 then1 the subject is borrowed from remote epochs of history1 or from some far-off tradition1 it is necessary that1 by our general culture1 we should be familiarized with it4 ,it is thus only that we can sympathize with an epoch and with manners that are no more4 ,hence the two essential conditions2 that the subject present the general human character1 then that it be in relation with our ideas4 ,art is not designed for a small number of scholars and men of science2 it is addressed to the entire nation4 ,its works should be comprehended and relished of themselves1 and not after a course of difficult research4 ,thus national subjects are the most favorable4 ,all great poems are national poems4 ,the ,bible histories have for us a particular charm1 because we are familiar with them from our infancy4 ,nevertheless1 in the measure that relations are multiplied between peoples1 art can borrow its subjects from all latitudes and from all epochs4 ,it should1 indeed1 as to the principal features1 preserve1 to the traditions1 events1 and personages1 to manners and institutions1 their historic or traditional character2 but the duty of the artist1 above all1 is to place the idea which constitutes its content in harmony with the spirit of his own age1 and the peculiar genius of his nation4 ,in this necessity lies the reason and excuse for what is called anachronism in art4 ,when the anachronism bears only upon external circumstances it is unimportant4 ,it becomes a matter of more moment if we attribute to the characters1 the ideas1 and sentiments of another epoch4 ,respect must be paid to historic truth1 but regard must also be had to the manners and intellectual culture of one's own time4 ,the heroes of ,homer themselves are more than were the real personages of the epoch which he presents2 and the characters of ,sophocles are brought still nearer to us4 ,to violate thus the rules of historic reality1 is a necessary anachronism in art4 ,finally1 another form of anachronism1 which the utmost moderation and genius can alone make pardonable1 is that which transfers the religious or moral ideas of a more advanced civilization to an anterior epoch2 when one attributes1 for example1 to the ancients the ideas of the moderns4 ,some great poets have ventured upon this intentionally2 few have been successful in it4 ,the general conclusion is this3 8,the artist should be required to make himself the cotemporary of past ages1 and become penetrated himself with their spirit4 ,for if the substance of those ideas be true1 it remains clear for all time4 ,but to undertake to reproduce with a scrupulous exactness the external element of history1 with all its details and particulars1--in a word1 all the rust of antiquity1 is the work of a puerile erudition1 which attaches itself only to a superficial aim4 ,we should not wrest from art the right which it has to float between reality and fiction40 ,this first part concludes with an examination of the qualities necessary to an artist1 such as imagination1 genius1 inspiration1 originality1 etc4 ,the author does not deem it obligatory to treat at much length this subject1 which appears to him to allow only a small number of general rules or psychological observations4 ,the manner in which he treats of many points1 and particularly of the imagination1 causes us to regret that he has not thought it worth while to give a larger space to these questions1 which occupy the principal place in the majority of sthetical treatises2 we shall find them again under another form in the theory of the arts4 ,the next number will continue this translation through the treatment of the ,symbolic1 ,classic1 and ,romantic forms of art4 ,,notes ,,on ,,raphael',s 8,,transfiguration40 ,read before the ,st4 ,louis ,art ,society in ,november1 #ahff4 ,i4 ,,the ,,engraving4 ,he who studies the 8,transfiguration0 of ,raphael is fortunate if he has access to the engraving of it by ,raphael ,morghen4 ,this engraver1 as one learns from the ,encyclopdia1 was a ,florentine1 and executed this--his most elaborate work--in #agie1 from a drawing of ,tofanelli1 after having discovered that a copy he had partly finished from another drawing1 was very inadequate when compared with the original4 ,upon comparison with engravings by other artists1 it seems to me that this engraving has not received all the praise it deserves2 ,i refer especially to the seizing of the 8motives0 of the picture1 which are so essential in a work of great scope1 to give it the requisite unity4 ,what the engraver has achieved in the present instance1 ,i hope to be able to show in some degree4 ,but one will not be able to verify my results if he takes up an engraving by a less fortunate artist2 e4g43 one by ,pavoni1 of recent origin4 ,,ii4 ,,historical4 ,it is currently reported that ,raphael painted the 8,transfiguration0 at the instance of ,cardinal ,giulio de ,medici1 and that in honor of the latter he introduced the two saints--,julian and ,lawrence--on the mount2 ,st4 ,julian suggesting the ill-fated ,giuliano de ,medici1 the ,cardinal's father1 and ,st4 ,lawrence representing his uncle1 8,lorenzo the ,magnificent10 the greatest of the ,medici line1 and greatest man of his time in ,italy4 8,the haughty ,michael ,angelo refused to enter the lists in person against ,raphael1 but put forward as a fitting rival ,sebastian del ,piombo1 a ,venetian40 ,raphael painted1 as his masterpiece1 the 8,transfiguration10 and ,sebastian1 with the help of ,michael ,angelo1 painted the 8,raising of ,lazarus40 ,in #aebj1 before the picture was quite finished1 ,raphael died4 ,his favorite disciple1 ,giulio ,romano1 finished the lower part of the picture 7especially the demoniac7 in the spirit of ,raphael1 who had completed the upper portion and most of the lower4 ,,iii4 ,,legend4 ,the ,legend portrayed here--slightly varying from the one in the ,new ,testament1 but not contradicting it--is as follows3 ,christ goes out with his twelve disciples to ,mount ,tabor1787 and1 leaving the nine others at the foot1 ascends with the favored three to the summit1 where the scene of the ,transfiguration takes place4 ,while this transpires1 the family group approach with the demoniac1 seeking help from a miraculous source4 ,raphael has added to this legend the circumstance that two sympathetic strangers1 passing that way up the mount1 carry to the ,beatified ,one the intelligence of the event below1 and solicit his immediate and gracious interference4 ,the ,testament account leads us to suppose the scene to be ,mount ,tabor1 southeast of ,nazareth1 at whose base he had healed many1 a few days before1 and where he had held many conversations with his disciples4 8,on the following day1 when they were come down1 they met the family10 says ,luke2 but ,matthew and ,mark do not fix so precisely the day4 ,,iv4 ,,characterization4 ,it may be safely affirmed that there is scarcely a picture in existence in which the individualities are more strongly marked by internal essential characteristics4 ,above1 there is no figure to be mistaken3 ,christ floats toward the source of light--the ,invisible ,father1 by whom all is made visible that is visible4 ,on the right1 ,moses appears in strong contrast to ,elias on the left--the former the law-giver1 and the latter the spontaneous1 fiery1 eagle-eyed prophet4 ,on the mountain top--prostrate beneath1 are the three disciples--one recognizes on the right hand1 ,john1 gracefully bending his face down from the overpowering light1 while on the left ,james buries his face in his humility4 ,but ,peter1 the bold one1 is fain to gaze directly on the splendor4 ,he turns his face up in the act1 but is1 as on another occasion1 mistaken in his estimate of his own endurance1 and is obliged to cover his eyes1 involuntarily1 with his hand4 ,below the mount1 are two opposed groups4 ,on the right1 coming from the hamlet in the distance1 is the family group1 of which a demoniac boy forms the centre4 ,they1 without doubt1 saw ,christ pass on his way to this solitude1 and1 at length1 concluded to follow him and test his might which had been 8noised abroad0 in that region4 ,it is easy to see the relationship of the whole group4 ,first the boy1 actually 8possessed10 or a maniac2 then his father--a man evidently predisposed to insanity--supporting and restraining him4 ,kneeling at the right of the boy is his mother1 whose fair ,grecian face has become haggard with the trials she has endured from her son4 ,just beyond her is her brother1 and in the shade of the mountain1 is her father4 ,in the foreground is her sister4 ,back of the father1 to the right1 is seen an uncle 7on the father's side7 of the demoniac boy1 whose features and gestures show him to be a simpleton1 and near him is seen the face of the father's sister1 also a weak-minded person4 ,the parents of the father are not to be seen1 for the obvious reason that old age is not a characteristic of persons predisposed to insanity4 ,again1 it is marked that in a family thus predisposed1 some will be brilliant to a degree resembling genius1 and others will be simpletons4 ,the whole group at the right are supplicating the nine disciples1 in the most earnest manner1 for relief4 ,the disciples1 grouped on the left1 are full of sympathy1 but their looks tell plainly that they can do nothing4 ,one1 at the left and near the front1 holds the books of the ,law in his right hand1 but the letter needs the spirit to give life1 and the mere ,law of ,moses does not help the demoniac1 and only excites the sorrowful indignation of the beautiful sister in the foreground4 ,the curious student of the ,new ,testament may succeed in identifying the different disciples3 ,andrew1 holding the books of the ,law1 is ,peter's brother1 and bears a family resemblance4 ,judas1 at the extreme left1 cannot be mistaken4 ,matthew looks over the shoulder of ,bartholomew1 who is pointing to the demoniac2 while ,thomas--distinguished by his youthful appearance--bends over toward the boy with a look of intense interest4 ,simon 7871 kneeling between ,thomas and ,bartholomew1 is indicating to the mother1 by the gesture with his left hand1 the absence of the ,master4 ,philip1 whose face is turned towards ,judas1 is pointing to the scene on the mount1 and apparently suggesting the propriety of going for the absent one4 ,james1 the son of ,alpheus1 resembles ,christ in features1 and stands behind ,jude1 his brother1 who points up to the mount while looking at the father4 ,v4 ,,organic ,,unity4 7a7 ,doubtless every true work of art should have what is called an 8organic unity40 ,that is to say1 all the parts of the work should be related to each other in such a way that a harmony of design arises4 ,two entirely unrelated things brought into the piece would form two centres of attraction and hence divide the work into two different works4 ,it should be so constituted that the study of one part leads to all the other parts as being necessarily implied in it4 ,this common life of the whole work is the central idea which necessitates all the parts1 and hence makes the work an organism instead of a mere conglomerate or mechanical aggregate1--a fortuitous concourse of atoms which would make a chaos only4 7b7 ,this central idea1 however1 cannot be represented in a work of art without contrasts1 and hence there must be antitheses present4 7c7 ,and these antitheses must be again reduced to unity by the manifest dependence of each side upon the central idea4 ,what is the central idea of this picture8 7a7 ,almost every thoughtful person that has examined it1 has said3 8,here is the ,divine in contrast with the ,human1 and the dependence of the latter upon the former40 ,this may be stated in a variety of ways4 ,the ,infinite is there above1 and the ,finite here below seeking it4 7b7 ,the grandest antithesis is that between the two parts of the ,picture1 the above and the below4 ,the transfigured ,christ1 there1 dazzling with light2 below1 the shadow of mortal life1 only illuminated by such rays as come from above4 ,there1 serenity2 and here1 rending calamity4 ,then there are minor antitheses4 7#a7 ,above we have a ,twofold4 ,the three celestial light-seekers who soar rapturously to the invisible source of light1 and below them1 the three disciples swooning beneath the power of the celestial vision4 7#b7 ,then below the mountain we have a similar contrast in the two groups2 the one broken in spirit by the calamity that 8pierces their own souls10 and the other group powerfully affected by sympathy1 and feeling keenly their impotence during the absence of their ,lord4 ,again even1 there appear other antitheses4 ,so completely does the idea penetrate the material in this work of art1 that everywhere we see the mirror of the whole4 ,in the highest and most celestial we have the antithesis of ,christ and the twain2 ,moses the law or letter1 ,elias the spirit or the prophet1 and ,christ the living unity4 ,even ,christ himself1 though comparatively the point of repose of the whole picture1 is a contrast of soul striving against the visible body4 ,so1 too1 the antitheses of the three disciples1 ,john1 ,peter1 ,james1--grace1 strength1 and humility4 ,everywhere the subject is exhaustively treated2 the family in its different members1 the disciples with the different shades of sympathy and concern4 7,the maniac boy is a perfect picture of a being1 torn asunder by violent internal contradiction47 7c7 ,the unity is no less remarkable4 ,first1 the absolute unity of the piece1 is the transfigured ,christ4 ,to it1 mediately or immediately1 everything refers4 ,all the light in the picture streams thence4 ,all the action in the piece has its motive power in ,him2--first1 the two celestials soar to gaze in his light2 then the three disciples are expressing1 by the posture of every limb1 the intense effect of the same light4 ,on the left1 the mediating strangers stand imploring ,christ to descend and be merciful to the miserable of this life4 ,below1 the disciples are painfully reminded of ,him absent1 by the present need of his all-healing power1 and their gestures refer to his stay on the mountain top2 while the group at the right1 are frantic in supplications for his assistance4 ,besides the central unity1 we find minor unities that do not contradict the higher unity1 for the reason that they are only reflections of it1 and each one carries us1 of its own accord1 to the higher unity1 and loses itself in it4 ,to illustrate3 ,below1 the immediate unity of all 7centre of interest7 is the maniac boy1 and yet he convulsively points to the miraculous scene above1 and the perfect unrest exhibited in his attitude repels the soul irresistibly to seek another unity4 ,the ,christ above1 gives us a comparatively serene point of repose1 while the unity of the ,below or finite side of the picture is an absolute antagonism1 hurling us beyond to the higher unity4 ,before the approach of the distressed family1 the others were intently listening to the grave and elderly disciple1 ,andrew1 who was reading and expounding the ,scriptures to them4 ,this was a different unity1 and would have clashed with the organic unity of the piece2 the approach of the boy brings in a new unity1 which immediately reflects all to the higher unity4 ,,vi4 ,,sense ,,and ,,reason ,,vs4 ,,understanding4 ,at this point a few reflections are suggested to render more obvious1 certain higher phases in the unity of this work of art1 which must now be considered4 ,a work of art1 it will be conceded1 must1 first of all1 appeal to the senses4 ,equally1 too1 its content must be an idea of the ,reason1 and this is not so readily granted by every one4 ,but if there were no idea of the ,reason in it1 there would be no unity to the work1 and it could not be distinguished from any other work not a work of art4 ,between the ,reason and the ,senses there lies a broad realm1 called the 8,understanding0 by modern speculative writers4 ,it was formerly called the 8discursive intellect40 ,the ,understanding applies the criterion 8use40 ,it does not know beauty1 or1 indeed1 anything which is for itself2 it knows only what is good for something else4 ,in a work of art1 after it has asked what it is good for1 it proceeds to construe it all into prose1 for it is the prose faculty4 ,it must have the picture tell us what is the external fact in nature1 and not trouble us with any transcendental imaginative products4 ,it wants imitation of nature merely4 ,but the artist frequently neglects this faculty1 and shocks it to the uttermost by such things as the abridged mountain in this picture1 or the shadow cast toward the sun1 that ,eckermann tells of4 ,the artist must never violate the sensuous harmony1 nor fail to have the deeper unity of the ,idea4 ,it is evident that the sensuous side is always cared for by ,raphael4 ,here are some of the effects in the picture that are purely sensuous and yet of such a kind that they immediately call up the idea4 ,the source of light in the picture is ,christ's form2 below1 it is reflected in the garments of the conspicuous figure in the foreground4 ,above1 is ,christ2 opposite and below1 a female that suggests the ,madonna4 ,in the same manner ,elias1 or the inspired prophet1 is the opposite to the maniac boy2 the former inspired by the celestial2 the latter1 by the demonic4 ,so ,moses1 the law-giver1 is antithetic to the old disciple that has the roll of the ,law in his hand4 ,so1 too1 in the posture1 ,elias floats freely1 while ,moses is brought against the tree1 and mars the impression of free self-support4 ,the heavy tables of the ,law seem to draw him down1 while ,elias seems to have difficulty in descending sufficiently to place himself in subordination to ,christ4 ,even the contradiction that the understanding finds in the abridgment of the mountain1 is corrected sensuously by the perspective at the right1 and the shade that the edge of the rock casts which isolates the above so completely from the below4 ,we see that ,raphael has brought them to a secluded spot just near the top of the mountain4 ,the view of the distant vale tells us as effectually that this is a mountain top as could be done by a full length painting of it4 ,hence the criticism rests upon a misunderstanding of the fact ,raphael has portrayed4 ,,vii4 ,,romantic vs4 ,,classic4 ,finally1 we must recur to those distinctions so much talked of1 in order to introduce the consideration of the grandest strokes of genius which ,raphael has displayed in this work4 ,the distinction of ,classic and ,romantic ,art1 of ,greek ,art from ,christian3 the former is characterized by a complete repose1 or equilibrium between the ,sense and ,reason--or between matter and form4 ,the idea seems completely expressed1 and the expression completely adequate to the idea4 ,but in ,christian ,art we do not find this equilibrium2 but everywhere we find an intimation that the idea is too transcendent for the matter to express4 ,hence1 ,romantic ,art is self contradictory--it expresses the inadequacy of expression4 8,i have that within which passeth show2 ,these but the trappings and the suits of woe40 ,in ,gothic ,architecture1 all strives upward and seems to derive its support from above 7i4 e4 the ,spiritual1 light74 ,all ,romantic ,art points to a beyond4 ,the ,madonnas seem to say3 8,i am a beyond which cannot be represented in a sensuous form20 8a saintly contempt for the flesh hovers about their features10 as some one has expressed it4 ,but in this picture1 ,christ himself1 no more a child in the ,madonna's arms1 but even in his meridian glory1 looks beyond1 and expresses dependence on a ,being who is not and cannot be represented4 ,his face is serene1 beatific2 he is at unity with this ,absolute ,being1 but the unity is an internal one1 and his upraised gaze towards the source of light is a plain statement that the ,true which supports him is not a sensuous one4 8,god dwelleth not in temples made with hands2 but those who would approach ,him must do it in spirit and in truth40 ,this is the idea which belongs to the method of all modern ,art2 but ,raphael has not left this as the general spirit of the picture merely1 but has emphasized it in a way that exhibits the happy temper of his genius in dealing with refractory subjects4 ,and this last point has proved too much for his critics4 ,reference is made to the two saints painted at the left4 ,how fine it would be1 thought the ,cardinal de ,medici1 to have ,st4 ,lawrence and ,st4 ,julian painted in there1 to commemorate my father and uncle6 ,they can represent mediators1 and thereby connect the two parts of the picture more closely6 ,of course1 ,raphael put them in there6 8,alas60 say his critics1 8what a fatal mistake6 ,what have those two figures to do there but to mar the work6 ,all for the gratification of a selfish pride60 ,always trust an ,artist to dispose of the ,finite2 he1 of all men1 knows how to digest it and subordinate it to the idea4 ,raphael wanted just such figures in just that place4 ,of course1 the most natural thing in the world that could happen1 would be the ascent of some one to bear the message to ,christ that there was need of him below4 ,but what is the effect of that upon the work as a piece of ,romantic ,art8 ,it would destroy that characteristic1 if permitted in certain forms4 ,raphael1 however1 seizes upon this incident to show the entire spiritual character of the upper part of the picture4 ,the disciples are dazzled so1 that even the firm ,peter cannot endure the light at all4 ,is this a physical light8 ,look at the messengers that have come up the mountain6 ,do their eyes indicate anything bright1 not to say dazzling8 ,they stand there with supplicating looks and gestures1 but see no transfiguration4 ,it must be confessed1 ,cardinal de ,medici1 that your uncle and father are not much complimented1 after all2 they are merely natural men1 and have no inner sense by which to see the ,eternal ,verities that illume the mystery of existence6 ,even if you are ,cardinal1 and they were ,popes' counselors1 they never saw anything higher in ,religion than what should add comfort to us here below6 ,no6 ,the transfiguration1 as ,raphael clearly tells us1 was a ,spiritual one3 ,christ1 on the mountain with his favored three disciples1 opened up such celestial clearness in his exposition of the truth1 that they saw ,moses and ,elias1 as it were1 combined in one ,person1 and a new ,heaven and a new ,earth arose before them1 and they were lost in that revelation of infinite splendor4 ,in closing1 a remark forces itself upon us with reference to the comparative merits of ,raphael and ,michael ,angelo4 ,raphael is the perfection of ,romantic ,art4 ,michael ,angelo is almost a ,greek4 ,his paintings all seem to be pictures of statuary4 ,in his grandest--,the ,last ,judgment--we have the visible presence as the highest4 ,art with him could represent the ,absolute4 ,with ,raphael it could only1 in its loftiest flights1 express its own impotence4 ,whether we are to consider ,raphael or ,michael ,angelo as the higher artist1 must be decided by an investigation of the merits of the 8,last ,judgment40 ,,introduction ,,to ,,philosophy4 ,,chapter ,i4 ,the object of this series is to furnish1 in as popular a form as possible1 a course of discipline for those who are beginning the study of philosophy4 ,strictly popular1 in the sense the word is used--i4 e4 signifying that which holds fast to the ordinary consciousness of men1 and does not take flights beyond--,i am well aware1 no philosophy can be4 ,the nearest approach to it that can be made1 consists in starting from the common external views1 and drawing them into the speculative1 step by step4 ,for this purpose the method of definitions and axioms1 with deductions therefrom1 as employed by ,spinoza1 is more appropriate at first1 and afterwards a gradual approach to the ,dialectic1 or true philosophic method4 ,in the mathematical method 7that of ,spinoza just alluded to7 the content may be speculative1 but its form1 never4 ,hence the student of philosophy needs only to turn his attention to the content at first2 when that becomes in a measure familiar1 he can then the more readily pass over to the true form of the speculative content1 and thus achieve complete insight4 ,a course of discipline in the speculative content1 though under an inadequate form1 would make a grand preparation for the study of ,hegel or ,plato2 while a study of these1 or1 in short1 of any writers who employ speculative methods in treating speculative content--a study of these without previous acquaintance with the content is well nigh fruitless4 ,one needs only to read the comments of translators of ,plato upon his speculative passages1 or the prevailing verdicts upon ,hegel1 to be satisfied on this point4 ,the course that ,i shall here present will embody my own experience1 to a great extent1 in the chronological order of its development4 ,each lesson will endeavor to present an aperu derived from some great philosopher4 ,those coming later will presuppose the earlier ones1 and frequently throw new light upon them4 ,as one who undertakes the manufacture of an elegant piece of furniture needs carefully elaborated tools for that end1 so must the thinker who wishes to comprehend the universe be equipped with the tools of thought1 or else he will come off as poorly as he who should undertake to make a carved mahogany chair with no tools except his teeth and finger nails4 ,what complicated machinery is required to transmute the rough ores into an ,american watch6 ,and yet how common is the delusion that no elaboration of tools of thought is required to enable the commonest mind to manipulate the highest subjects of investigation4 ,the alchemy that turned base metal into gold is only a symbol of that cunning alchemy of thought that by means of the philosopher's stone 7scientific method7 dissolves the base facts of experience into universal truths4 ,the uninitiated regards the philosophic treatment of a theme as difficult solely by reason of its technical terms4 8,if ,i only understood your use of words1 ,i think ,i should find no difficulty in your thought40 ,he supposes that under those bizarre terms there lurks only the meaning that he and others put into ordinary phrases4 ,he does not seem to think that the concepts likewise are new4 ,it is just as though an ,indian were to say to the carpenter1 8,i could make as good work as you1 if ,i only had the secret of using my finger-nails and teeth as you do the plane and saw40 ,speculative philosophy--it cannot be too early inculcated--does not 8conceal under cumbrous terminology views which men ordinarily hold40 ,the ordinary reflection would say that ,being is the ground of thought1 while speculative philosophy would say that thought is the ground of ,being2 whether of other being1 or of itself as being--for it is causa sui4 ,let us now address ourselves to the task of elaborating our technique--the tools of thought--and see what new worlds become accessible through our mental telescopes and microscopes1 our analytical scalpels and psychological plummets4 ,i4--,a ,,priori ,,and ,a ,,posteriori4 ,a priori1 as applied to knowledge1 signifies that which belongs to the nature of the mind itself4 ,knowledge which is before experience1 or not dependent on it1 is a priori4 ,a posteriori or empirical knowledge is derived from experience4 ,a criterion to be applied in order to test the application of these categories to any knowledge in question1 is to be found in universality and necessity4 ,if the truth expressed has universal and necessary validity it must be a priori1 for it could not have been derived from experience4 ,of empirical knowledge we can only say3 8,it is true so far as experience has extended40 ,of a priori knowledge1 on the contrary1 we affirm3 8,it is universally and necessarily true and no experience of its opposite can possibly occur2 from the very nature of things it must be so40 ,,ii4--,,analytical ,,and ,,synthetical4 ,a judgment which1 in the predicate1 adds nothing new to the subject1 is said to be analytical1 as e4 g4 8,horse is an animal20--the concept 8animal0 is already contained in that of 8horse40 ,synthetical judgments1 on the contrary1 add in the predicate something new to the conception of the subject1 as e4 g4 8,this rose is red10 or 8,the shortest distance between two points is a straight line20--in the first judgment we have 8red0 added to the general concept 8rose20 while in the second example we have straightness1 which is quality1 added to shortest1 which is quantity4 ,,iii4--,,apodeictical4 ,omitting the consideration of a posteriori knowledge for the present1 let us investigate the a priori in order to learn something of the constitution of the intelligence which knows--always a proper subject for philosophy4 ,since1 moreover1 the a priori analytical 78,a horse is an animal07 adds nothing to our knowledge1 we may confine ourselves1 as ,kant does1 to a priori synthetical knowledge4 ,the axioms of mathematics are of this character4 ,they are universal and necessary in their application1 and we know this without making a single practical experiment4 8,only one straight line can be drawn between two points10 or the proposition3 8,the sum of the three angles of a triangle is equal to two right angles10--these are true in all possible experiences1 and hence transcend any actual experience4 ,take any a posteriori judgment1 e4 g4 8,all bodies are heavy10 and we see at once that it implies the restriction1 8,so far as we have experienced10 or else is a mere analytical judgment4 ,the universal and necessary is sometimes called the apodeictical4 ,the conception of the apodeictical lies at the basis of all true philosophical thinking4 ,he who does not distinguish between apodeictic and contingent judgments must pause here until he can do so4 ,,iv4 ,,space ,,and ,,time4 ,in order to give a more exhaustive application to our technique1 let us seek the universal conditions of experience4 ,the mathematical truths that we quoted relate to ,space1 and similar ones relate to ,time4 ,no experience would be possible without presupposing ,time and ,space as its logical condition4 ,indeed1 we should never conceive our sensations to have an origin outside of ourselves and in distinct objects1 unless we had the conception of ,space a priori by which to render it possible4 ,instead1 therefore1 of our being able to generalize particular experiences1 and collect therefrom the idea of ,space and ,time in general1 we must have added the idea of ,space and ,time to our sensation before it could possibly become an experience at all4 ,this becomes more clear when we recur to the apodeictic nature of ,space and ,time4 ,time and ,space are thought as infinites1 i4 e4 they can only be limited by themselves1 and hence are universally continuous4 ,but no such conception as infinite can be derived analytically from an object of experience1 for it does not contain it4 ,all objects of experience must be within ,time and ,space1 and not vice versa4 ,all that is limited in extent and duration presupposes ,time and ,space as its logical condition1 and this we know1 not from the senses but from the constitution of ,reason itself4 8,the third side of a triangle is less than the sum of the two other sides40 ,this we never measured1 and yet we are certain that we cannot be mistaken about it4 ,it is so in all triangles1 present1 past1 future1 actual1 or possible4 ,if this was an inference a posteriori1 we could only say3 8,it has been found to be so in all cases that have been measured and reported to us40 ,v4 ,,mind4 ,mind has a certain a priori constitution2 this is our inference4 ,it must be so1 or else we could never have any experience whatever4 ,it is the only way in which the possibility of apodeictic knowledge can be accounted for4 ,what ,i do not get from without ,i must get from within1 if ,i have it at all4 ,mind1 it would seem from this1 cannot be1 according to its nature1 a finite affair--a thing with properties4 ,were it limited in ,time or ,space1 it could never 7without transcending itself7 conceive ,time and ,space as universally continuous or infinite4 ,mind is not within ,time and ,space1 it is as universal and necessary as the apodeictic judgments it forms1 and hence it is the substantial essence of all that exists4 ,time and ,space are the logical conditions of finite existences1 and ,mind is the logical condition of ,time and ,space4 ,hence it is ridiculous to speak of my mind and your mind1 for mind is rather the universal substrate of all individuality than owned by any particular individual4 ,these results are so startling to the one who first begins to think1 that he is tempted to reject the whole4 ,if he does not do this1 but scrutinizes the whole fabric keenly1 he will discover what he supposes to be fallacies4 ,we cannot anticipate the answer to his objections here1 for his objections arise from his inability to distinguish between his imagination and his thinking and this must be treated of in the next chapter4 ,here1 we can only interpose an earnest request to the reader to persevere and thoroughly refute the whole argument before he leaves it4 ,but this is only one and the most elementary position from which the philosophic traveller sees the ,eternal ,verities4 ,every perfect analysis--no matter what the subject be--will bring us to the same result1 though the degrees of concreteness will vary1--some leaving the solution in an abstract and vague form1--others again arriving at a complete and satisfactory view of the matter in detail4 ,,seed ,,life4 ,,by ,e4 ,v4 ,ah6 woe for the endless stirring1 ,the hunger for air and light1 ,the fire of the blazing noonday ,wrapped round in a chilling night6 ,the muffled throb of an instinct ,that is kin to the mystic ,to ,be2 ,strong muscles1 cut with their fetters1 ,as they writhe with claim to be free4 ,a voice that cries out in the silence1 ,and is choked in a stifling air2 ,arms full of an endless reaching1 ,while the 8,nay0 stands everywhere4 ,the burning of conscious selfhood1 ,that fights with pitiless fate6 ,god grant that deliverance stay not1 ,till it come at last too late2 ,till the crushed out instinct waver1 ,and fainter and fainter grow1 ,and by suicide1 through unusing1 ,seek freedom from its woe4 ,oh6 despair of constant losing ,the life that is clutched in vain6 ,is it death or a joyous growing ,that shall put an end to pain8 ,a ,,dialogue ,,on ,,immortality4 ,,by ,,arthur ,,schopenhauer4 7,translated from the ,german1 by ,chas4 ,l4 ,bernays47 ,philalethes4--,i could tell you that1 after your death1 you will be what you were previous to your birth2 ,i could tell you that we are never born1 and that we only seem to die--that we have always been precisely the same that we are now1 and that we shall always remain the same--that ,time is the apparatus which prevents us from being aware of all this2 ,i could tell you that our consciousness stands always in the centre of ,time--never on one of its termini2 and that any one among us1 therefore1 has the immovable centre of the whole infinite ,time in himself4 ,i then could tell you that those who1 by that knowledge1 are assured that the present time always originates in ourselves1 can never doubt the indestructibility of their own essence4 ,thrasymachus4--,all of that is too long and too ambiguous for me4 ,tell me1 briefly1 what ,i shall be after death4 ,phil4--,all and nothing4 ,thras4--,there we are6 ,instead of a solution to the problem you give me a contradiction2 that is an old trick4 ,phil4--,to answer transcendental questions in language that is only made for immanent perceptions1 may in fact lead us into contradictions4 ,thras4--,what do you mean by 8transcendental0 and 8immanent0 perceptions8 ,phil4--,well6 ,transcendental perception is rather the knowledge1 which1 by exceeding any possibility of experience1 tends to discover the essence of things as they are by themselves2 immanent perception it is1 if it keeps inside of the limits of experience4 ,in this case1 it can only speak of appearances4 ,you1 as an individual1 end with your death4 ,yet individuality is not your true and final essence1 but only a mere appearance of it4 ,it is not the thing in itself1 but only its appearance1 established in the form of time1 thereby having a beginning and an end4 ,that which is essential in you1 knows neither of beginning nor ending1 nor of ,time itself2 it knows no limits such as belong to a given individuality1 but exists in all and in each4 ,in the first sense1 therefore1 you will become nothing after your death2 in the second sense1 you are and remain all4 ,for that reason ,i said you would be all and nothing4 ,you desired a short answer1 and ,i believe that hardly a more correct answer could be given briefly4 ,no wonder1 too1 that it contains a contradiction2 for your life is in ,time1 while your immortality is in ,eternity4 ,thras4--,without the continuation of my individuality1 ,i would not give a farthing for all your 8immortality40 ,phil4--,perhaps you could have it even cheaper4 ,suppose that ,i warrant to you the continuation of your individuality1 but under the condition that a perfectly unconscious slumber of death for three months should precede its resuscitation4 ,thras4--,well1 ,i accept the condition4 ,phil4--,now1 in an absolutely unconscious condition1 we have no measure of time2 hence it is perfectly indifferent whether1 whilst we lie asleep in death in the unconscious world1 three months or ten thousand years are passing away4 ,we do not know either of the one or of the other1 and have to accept some one's word with regard to the duration of our sleep1 when we awake4 ,hence it is indifferent to you whether your individuality is given back to you after three months or after ten thousand years4 ,thras4--,that ,i cannot deny4 ,phil4--,now1 suppose that after ten thousand years1 one had forgotten to awake you at all1 then ,i believe that the long1 long state of non-being would become so habitual to you that your misfortune could hardly be very great4 ,certain it is1 any way1 that you would know nothing of it2 nay1 you would even console yourself very easily1 if you were aware that the secret mechanism which now keeps your actual appearance in motion1 had not ceased during all the ten thousand years for a single moment to establish and to move other beings of the same kind4 ,thras4--,in that manner you mean to cheat me out of my individuality1 do you8 ,i will not be fooled in that way4 ,i have bargained for the continuation of my individuality1 and none of your motives can console me for the loss of that2 ,i have it at heart1 and ,i never will abandon it4 ,phil4--,it seems that you hold individuality to be so noble1 so perfect1 so incomparable1 that there can be nothing superior to it2 you therefore would not like to exchange it for another one1 though in that1 you could live with greater ease and perfection4 ,thras4--,let my individuality be as it may1 it is always myself4 ,it is ,i--,i myself--who want to be4 ,that is the individuality which ,i insist upon1 and not such a one as needs argument to convince me that it may be my own or a better one4 ,phil4--,only look about you6 ,that which cries out--8,i1 ,i myself1 wish to exist0--that is not yourself alone1 but all that has the least vestige of consciousness4 ,hence this desire of yours1 is just that which is not individual1 but common rather to all without exception2 it does not originate in individuality1 but in the very nature of existence itself2 it is essential to anybody who lives1 nay1 it is that through which it is at all2 it seems to belong only to the individual because it can become conscious only in the individual4 ,what cries in us so loud for existence1 does so only through the mediation of the individual2 immediately and essentially it is the will to exist or to live1 and this will is one and the same in all of us4 ,our existence being only the free work of the will1 existence can never fail to belong to it1 as far1 at least1 as that eternally dissatisfied will1 can be satisfied4 ,the individualities are indifferent to the will2 it never speaks of them2 though it seems to the individual1 who1 in himself is the immediate percipient of it1 as if it spoke only of his own individuality4 ,the consequence is1 that the individual cares for his own existence with so great anxiety1 and that he thereby secures the preservation of his kind4 ,hence it follows that individuality is no perfection1 but rather a restriction or imperfection2 to get rid of it is not a loss but a gain4 ,hence1 if you would not appear at once childish and ridiculous1 you should abandon that care for mere individuality2 for childish and ridiculous it will appear when you perceive your own essence to be the universal will to live4 ,thras4--,you yourself and all philosophers are childish and ridiculous1 and in fact it is only for a momentary diversion that a man of good common sense ever consents to squander away an idle hour with the like of you4 ,i leave your talk for weightier matters4 ,the reader will perceive by the positions here assumed that ,schopenhauer has a truly speculative stand-point2 that he holds self-determination to be the only substantial 7or abiding7 reality4 ,but while ,aristotle and those like him have seized this more definitely as the self-conscious thinking1 it is evident that ,schopenhauer seizes it only from its immediate side1 i4 e4 as the will4 ,on this account he meets with some difficulty in solving the problem of immortality1 and leaves the question of conscious identity hereafter1 not a little obscure4 ,hegel1 on the contrary1 for whom ,schopenhauer everywhere evinces a hearty contempt1 does not leave the individual in any doubt as to his destiny1 but shows how individuality and universality coincide in self-consciousness1 so that the desire for eternal existence is fully satisfied4 ,this is the legitimate result that ,philalethes arrives at in his last speech1 when he makes the individuality a product of the will2 for if the will is the essential that he holds it to be1 and the product of its activity is individuality1 of course individuality belongs eternally to it4 ,at the close of his ,philosophy of ,nature1 7,encyclopdia1 vol4 ,,ii417 ,hegel shows how death which follows life in the mere animal--and in man as mere animal--enters consciousness as one of its necessary elements1 and hence does not stand opposed to it as it does to animal life4 ,conscious being 7,spirit or ,mind as it may be called17 is therefore immortal because it contains already1 within itself1 its limits or determinations1 and thus cannot1 like finite things1 encounter dissolution through external ones4--,,ed4 ,,goethe',s ,,theory ,,of ,,colors4 ,from an exposition given before the ,st4 ,louis ,philosophical ,society1 ,nov4 #bnd1 #ahff4 ,i4--,color arises through the reciprocal action of light and darkness4 7a47 ,when a light object is seen through a medium that dims it1 it appears of different degrees of yellow2 if the medium is dark or dense1 the color is orange1 or approaches red4 ,examples3 the sun seen in the morning through a slightly hazy atmosphere appears yellow1 but if the air is thick with mist or smoke the sun looks red4 7b47 ,on the other hand a dark object1 seen through a medium slightly illuminated1 looks blue4 ,if the medium is very strongly illuminated1 the blue approaches a light blue2 if less so1 then indigo2 if still less1 the deep violet appears4 ,examples3 a mountain situated at a great distance1 from which very few rays of light come1 looks blue1 because we see it through a light medium1 the air illuminated by the sun4 ,the sky at high altitudes appears of a deep violet2 at still higher ones1 almost perfectly black2 at lower ones1 of a faint blue4 ,smoke--an illuminated medium--appears blue against a dark ground1 but yellow or fiery against a light ground4 7c47 ,the process of bluing steel is a fine illustration of ,goethe's theory4 ,the steel is polished so that it reflects light like a mirror4 ,on placing it in the charcoal furnace a film of oxydization begins to form so that the light is reflected through this dimming medium2 this gives a straw color4 ,then1 as the film thickens1 the color deepens1 passing through red to blue and indigo4 7d47 ,the prism is the grand instrument in the experimental field of research into light4 ,the current theory that light1 when pure1 is composed of seven colors1 is derived from supposed actual verifications with this instrument4 ,the ,goethean explanation is by far the simplest1 and1 in the end1 it propounds a question which the ,newtonian theory cannot answer without admitting the truth of ,goethe's theory4 ,,ii4--,the phenomenon of refraction is produced by interposing different transparent media between the luminous object and the illuminated one1 in such a manner that there arises an apparent displacement of one of the objects as viewed from the other4 ,by means of a prism the displacement is caused to lack uniformity2 one part of the light image is displaced more than another part2 several images1 as it were1 being formed with different degrees of displacement1 so that they together make an image whose edges are blurred in the line of displacement4 ,if the displacement were perfectly uniform1 no color would arise1 as is demonstrated by the achromatic prism or lens4 ,the difference of degrees of refraction causes the elongation of the image into a spectrum1 and hence a mingling of the edges of the image with the outlying dark surface of the wall1 7which dark surface is essential to the production of the ordinary spectrum74 ,its rationale is the following3 7a7 ,the light image refracted by the prism is extended over the dark on one side1 while the dark on the other side is extended over it4 7b7 ,the bright over the dark produces the blue in different degrees4 ,the side nearest the dark being the deepest or violet1 and the side nearest the light image being the lightest blue4 7c7 ,on the other side1 the dark over light produces yellow in different degrees2 nearest the dark we have the deepest color1 7orange approaching to red7 and on the side nearest the light1 the light yellow or saffron tint4 7d7 ,if the image is large and but little refracted 7as with a water prism7 there will appear between the two opposite colored edges a colorless image1 proving that the colors arise from the mingling of the light and dark edges1 and not from any peculiar property of the prism which should 8decompose the ray of light10 as the current theory expresses it4 ,if the latter theory were correct the decomposition would be throughout1 and the whole image be colored4 7e7 ,if the image is a small one1 or it is very strongly refracted1 the colored edges come together in the middle1 and the mingling of the light yellow with the light blue produces green--a new color which did not appear so long as the light ground appeared in the middle4 7f7 ,if the refraction is still stronger1 the edges of the opposite colors lap still more1 and the green vanishes4 ,the ,newtonian theory cannot explain this1 but it is to be expected according to ,goethe's theory4 7g7 ,according to ,goethe's theory1 if the object were a dark one instead of a light one1 and were refracted on a light surface1 the order of colors would be reversed on each edge of the image4 ,this is the same experiment as one makes by looking through a prism at the bar of a window appearing against the sky4 ,where in the light image we had the yellow colors we should now expect the blue1 for now it is dark over light where before it was light over dark4 ,so1 also1 where we had blue we should now have yellow4 ,this experiment may be so conducted that the current doctrine that violet is refracted the most1 and red the least1 shall be refuted4 7h7 ,this constitutes the experimentum crucis4 ,if the prism be a large water prism1 and a black strip be pasted across the middle of it1 parallel with its axis1 so that in the midst of the image a dark shadow intervenes1 the spectrum appears inverted in the middle1 so that the red is seen where the green would otherwise appear1 and those rays supposed to be the least refrangible are found refracted the most4 7i7 ,when the two colored edges do not meet in this latter experiment1 we have blue1 indigo1 violet1 as the order on one side2 and on the other1 orange1 yellow1 saffron2 the deeper colors being next to the dark image4 ,if the two colored edges come together the union of the orange with the violet produces the perfect red 7called by ,goethe 8purpur074 7j7 ,the best method of making experiments is not the one that ,newton employed--that of a dark room and a pencil of light--but it is better to look at dark and bright stripes on grounds of the opposite hue1 or at the bars of a window1 the prism being held in the hand of the investigator4 ,in the ,newtonian form of the experiment one is apt to forget the importance of the dark edge where it meets the light4 ,for further information on this interesting subject the ,english reader is referred to ,eastlake's translation of ,goethe's ,philosophy of ,colors1 published in ,london4 ,,the ,,journal ,,of ,,speculative ,,philosophy4 ,vol4 ,i4 #ahfg4 ,no4 #b4 ,,second ,,part ,,of ,,goethe',s ,,faust4 ,translated from ,rosenkrantz's 8,deutsche ,literatur10 by ,d4 ,j4 ,snider4 ,goethe began nothing if the whole of the work did not hover before his mind4 ,by this determinateness of plan he preserved a most persevering attachment to the materials of which he had once laid hold2 they were elements of his existence1 which for him were immortal1 because they constituted his inmost being4 ,he could put off their execution for years1 and still be certain that his love for them would return1 that his interest in them would animate him anew4 ,through this depth of conception he preserved fresh to the end his original purpose2 he needed not to fear that the fire of the first enthusiasm would go out2 at the most different times he could take up his work again with youthful zeal and strength4 ,thus in the circle of his poetical labors1 two conceptions that are in internal opposition to one another1 accompanied him through his whole life4 ,the one portrays a talented but fickle man1 who1 in want of culture1 attaches himself to this person1 then to that one1 in order to become spiritually independent4 ,this struggle carries him into the breadth of life1 into manifold relations whose spirit he longs to seize and appropriate2 such is ,wilhelm ,meister4 ,the other is the picture of an absolutely independent personality that has cultivated its lordly power in solitary loftiness1 and aspires boldly to subject the world to itself2 such is ,faust4 ,in the development of both subjects there is a decisive turning-point which is marked in the first by the 8,travels20 in the second1 by the ,second ,part of the ,tragedy4 ,up to this point1 both in ,wilhelm ,meister and in ,faust1 subjective conditions prevail1 which gradually purify themselves to higher views and aims4 ,for the one1 the betrothal with ,natalia closes the world of wild1 youthful desire2 for the other1 the death of ,margaret has the same effect4 ,the one steps into civil society and its manifold activity1 with the earnest endeavor to comprehend all its elements1 to acquire1 preserve1 and beautify property1 and to assist in illuminating and ennobling social relations2 the other takes likewise a practical turn1 but from the summit of ,society1 from the stand-point of the ,state itself4 ,if1 therefore1 in the apprenticeship and ,first ,part of the ,tragedy1 on account of the excess of subjective conditions1 a closer connection of the character and a passionate pathos are necessary1 there appears1 on the contrary1 in the ,travels and ,second part of the ,tragedy a thoughtfulness which moderates everything--a cool designingness2 the particular elements are sharply characterized1 but the personages seem rather as supporters of universal aims1 in the accomplishment of which their own personality is submerged2 the ,universal and its language is their pathos1 and the interest in their history1 that before was so remarkably fascinating1 is blunted of its keenness4 ,we have seen ,faust grow1 fragment by fragment1 before our eyes4 ,so long as there existed only a ,first ,part1 two views arose4 ,the one maintained that it was in this incompleteness what it should be1 a wonderful ,torso2 that this magnificent poem only as a fragment could reflect the ,world in order to indicate that ,man is able to grasp the ,universe in a one-sided1 incomplete manner only2 that as the poet touched the mysteries of the ,world1 but did not give a complete solution1 so the ,enigmatical1 the ,prophetic1 is that which is truly poetic1 infinitely charming1 really mystic4 ,this view was considered as genial1 particularly because it left to every one free play--in fact1 invited every one in his imagination to fill up the outlines2 for it could not be defended from a philosophic nor from an artistic standpoint4 ,knowing seeks not half knowledge1 ,art aims not at halfness of execution4 ,if ,dante in his ,divine ,comedy had neglected any element of nature or of history1 if he had not wrought out all with equal perseverance in corresponding proportion1 could it be said that his poem would stand higher without this completion8 ,or conversely1 shall we praise it as a merit that ,novalis' ,ofterdingen has remained mere fragments and sketches8 ,this would be the same as if we should admire the ,cologne ,cathedral less than we now do were it complete4 ,another view supposed that a ,second ,part was indeed possible1 and the question arose1 in what manner shall this possibility be thought8 ,here again two opposite opinions showed themselves4 ,according to the one1 ,faust must perish2 reconciliation with ,god would be unbecoming to the northern nature of this ,titanic character2 the teeth-gnashing defiance1 the insatiate restlessness1 the crushing doubt1 the heaven-deriding fierceness1 must send him to hell4 ,in this the spirit of the old legend was expressed as it was at the time of the ,reformation--for in the middle ages the redemption of the sinner through the intercession of the ,virgin ,mary first appeared--as the ,volksbuch simply but strikingly narrates it1 as the ,englishman1 ,marlowe1 has dramatized it so excellently in his ,doctor ,faustus4 ,but all this was not applicable to the ,faust of ,goethe1 for the poet had in his mind an alteration of the old legend1 and so another party maintained that ,faust must be saved4 ,this party also asserted that the indication of the poet in the ,prologue led to the same conclusion2 that ,god could not lose his bet against the ,devil2 that the destruction of ,faust would be blasphemous irony on ,divine ,providence4 ,this assertion of the necessity of ,faust's reconciliation found much favor in a time1 like ours1 which has renounced not indeed the consciousness and recognition of ,evil1 but the belief in a separate extra-human ,devil2 which purposes not merely the punishment but also the improvement of the criminal2 which seeks even to annul the death penalty1 and transfer the atonement for murder to the inner conscience and to the effacing power of the ,mind4 ,but how was ,poetry to exhibit such a transition from internal strife to celestial peace8 ,some supposed1 as ,hinrichs1 that since ,faust's despair resulted originally from science1 which did not furnish to him that which it had at first promised1 and since his childish faith had been destroyed by scepticism1 he must be saved through the scientific comprehension of ,truth1 of the ,christian ,religion2 that speculative ,philosophy must again reconcile him with ,god1 with the ,world1 and with himself4 ,they confessed indeed that this process--study and speculation--cannot be represented in poetry1 and therefore a ,second ,part of ,faust was not to be expected4 ,others1 especially poets1 took ,faust in a more general sense2 he was to penetrate not only ,science but ,life in its entirety2 the most manifold action was to move him1 and the sweat of labor was to be the penance which should bring him peace and furnish the clearness promised by the ,lord4 ,several sought to complete the work--all with indifferent success4 ,in what manner the poet himself would add a ,second ,part to the ,first1 what standpoint he himself would take1 remained a secret4 ,now it is unsealed2 the poem is unrolled before us complete2 with wondering look we stand before it1 with a beating heart we read it1 and with modest anxiety1 excited by a thousand feelings and misgivings1 we venture cursorily to indicate the design of the great ,master2 for years shall pass away before the meaning of the all-comprehensive poem shall be unveiled completely in its details4 ,still this explanation of particulars in poetry is a subordinate matter4 ,the main tendency of a poem must be seen upon its face1 and it would be a sorry work if it did not excite a living interest the first time that it was offered to the enjoyment of a people--if this interest should result from microscopic explanations and fine unravelling of concealed allusions--if enthusiasm should not arise from the poetry as well as from the learning and acuteness of the poet4 ,such particulars1 which are hard to understand1 almost every great poem will furnish2 latterly1 the explanatory observations on epic poems have become even stereotyped2 it must be possible to disregard them2 through ignorance of them nothing essential must be lost4 ,the ,first ,part had shown us ,faust in his still cell1 engaged in the study of all sciences4 ,the results of his investigation did not satisfy the boundless seeker1 and as an experiment he bound himself to the ,devil to see if the latter could not slake his burning thirst4 ,thus he rushed into ,life4 ,earthly enjoyment surrounded him1 ,love enchained him1 ,desire drove him to sudden1 to bad deeds2 in the mad ,walpurgisnach he reached the summit of waste worldliness4 ,but deeper than the ,devil supposed1 ,faust felt for his ,margaret2 he desired to save the unfortunate girl1 but he was obliged to learn that this was impossible1 but that only endurance of the punishment of crime could restore the harassed mind to peace4 ,the simple story of love held everything together here in a dramatic form4 ,the ,prologue in ,heaven1 the ,witch-kitchen1 the ,walpurgisnacht1 and several contemplative scenes1 could be left out1 and there still would remain a theatrical ,whole of remarkable effect4 ,the relation to ,margaret--her death--had elevated ,faust above everything subjective4 ,in the continuation of his life1 objective relations alone could constitute the motive of action4 ,the living fresh breath of the ,first ,part resulted just from this fact1 that everything objective1 universal1 was seized from the point of subjective interest2 in the ,second ,part the ,universal1 the ,objective1 stands out prominently2 subjective interests appear only under the presupposition of the ,objective2 the form becomes allegorical4 ,a story1 an action which rounds itself off to completion1 is wanting1 and therefore the dramatic warmth which pulsates through every scene of the ,first ,part is no longer felt4 ,the unity which is traced through the web of the manifold situations1 is the universal tendency of ,faust to create a satisfaction for himself through work4 ,mephistopheles has no longer the position of a being superior by his great understanding and immovable coldness1 who bitterly mocks ,faust's striving1 but he appears rather as a powerful companion who skillfully procures the material means for the aims of ,faust1 and1 in all his activity1 only awaits the moment when ,faust shall finally acknowledge himself to be satisfied4 ,but the striving of ,faust is infinite2 each goal1 when once reached1 is again passed by2 nowhere does he rest1 not in ,society1 not in ,nature1 not in ,art1 not in ,war1 not in ,industry2 only the thought of ,freedom itself1 the presentiment of the happiness of standing with a free people upon a free soil wrung from the sea1 thrills the old man with a momentary satisfaction--and he dies4 ,upon pictures and woodcuts of the middle ages representations of dying persons are found1 in which the ,devil on one side of the death-bed and angels on the other await eagerly the departing soul to pull it to themselves4 ,goethe has revived this old idea of a jealousy and strife between the angels and the ,devil for ,man4 ,mephistopheles1 with his horde of devils1 struggles to carry away the soul of ,faust to hell1 but he forgets himself in unnatural lust1 and the angels bear the immortal part of ,faust to that height where rest and illumination of the dying begin4 ,such an allegorical foundation could not be developed otherwise than in huge masses2 the division of each mass in itself1 so that all the elements of the thought lying at the bottom should appear1 was the proper object of the composition4 ,the ,first ,part could also be called allegorical1 in so far as it reflected the universal ,essence of ,spirit in the ,individual2 but it could not be said of it in any other sense than of every poem2 ,allegory in its stricter sense was not to be found2 the shapes had all flesh and blood1 and no design was felt4 ,in the ,second ,part everything passes over into the really ,allegorical1 to which ,goethe1 the older he grew1 seems to have had the greater inclination2 the ,xenien1 the ,trilogie der ,leidenschaft1 the ,lieder zur ,loge1 the ,maskenzge1 ,epimenides ,erwachen1 the cultivation of the ,eastern manners1 all proceeded from a didactic turn which delighted in expressing itself in gnomes1 pictures1 and symbolical forms4 ,with wonderful acuteness1 ,goethe has always been able to seize the characteristic determinations1 and unfold them in neat1 living language2 however1 it lies in the nature of such poems that they exercise the reflective faculty more than the heart1 and it was easy to foresee that the ,second ,part of ,faust would never acquire the popularity of the ,first ,part2 that it would not1 as the latter1 charm the nation1 and educate the people to a consciousness of itself1 but that it would always have a sort of esoteric existence4 ,many will be repelled by the mythological learning of the second and third acts2 and the more so1 as they do not see themselves recompensed by the dialectic of an action2 however1 we would unhesitatingly defend the poet against this reproach2 a poem which has to compass the immeasurable material of the world1 cannot be limited in this respect4 ,what learning has not ,dante supposed in his readers8 ,humbly have we sought it1 in order to acquire an understanding of his poem1 in the certainty of being richly rewarded2 the censure which has been cast upon it for this reason has effected nothing4 ,indeed1 such fault-finders would here forget what the first acknowledged ,part of ,faust has compelled them to learn4 ,with this difference of plan1 the style must also change4 ,instead of dramatic pathos1 because action is wanting1 description1 explanation1 indication1 have become necessary2 and instead of the lively exchange of dialogue1 the lyrical portion has become more prominent1 in order to embody with simplicity the elements of the powerful world-life4 ,the descriptions of nature deserve to be mentioned in particular4 ,the most wanton fancy1 the deepest feeling1 the most accurate knowledge1 and the closest observation into the individual1 prevail in all these pictures with an indescribable charm4 ,we shall now give a short account of the contents of each act4 ,in a more complete exposition we would point out the places in which the power of the particular developments centers2 in these outlines it is our design to confine ourselves to tracing out the universal meaning4 ,to exhibit by single verses and songs the wonderful beauty of the language1 particularly in the lyrical portions1 would seem to us as superfluous as the effort to prove the existence of a divine ,providence by anecdotes of strange coincidences4 ,the first act brings us into social life2 a multitude of shapes pass by us--the most different wishes1 opinions and humors are heard2 still1 a secret unity1 which we shall note even more closely1 pervades the confused tumult4 ,in a delightful spot1 lying upon the flowery sward1 we see ,faust alone1 tormented by deep pangs1 seeking rest and slumber4 ,out of pure pity1 indifferent whether the unfortunate man is holy or wicked1 elves hover around him and fan him to sleep1 in order that the past may be sunk into the ,lethe of forgetfulness2 otherwise1 a continuance of life and endeavor is impossible4 ,the mind has the power to free itself from the past1 and throw it behind itself1 and treat it as if it had never been4 ,the secret of renewing ourselves perpetually consists in this1 that we can destroy ourselves within ourselves1 and1 as a veritable ,phnix1 be resurrected from the ashes of self-immolation4 ,still1 this negative action suffices not for our freedom2 the ,positive must be united to us2 there must arise1 with 8tremendous quaking10 the sun of new activity and fresh endeavor1 whereby the stillness of nightly repose1 the evanishment of all thoughts and feelings which had become stable1 passes away in refreshing slumber4 ,faust awakened1 feels every pulse of nature beating with fresh life4 ,the glare of the pure sunlight dazzles him--the fall of waters through the chasms of the rock depicts to him his own unrest2 but from the sunlight and silvery vapor of the whirlpool there is created the richly colored rainbow1 which is always quietly glistening1 but is forever shifting3 it is ,life4 ,after this solitary encouragement to new venture and endeavor1 the court of the ,emperor receives us1 where a merry masquerade is about to take place4 ,but first1 from all sides1 the prosaic complaints of the ,chancellor1 the ,steward1 the ,commander-in-,chief1 the ,treasurer1 fall upon the ear of the ,emperor2 money1 the cement of all relations1 is wanting to the ,state2 for commerce1 for pleasure1 for luxury1 money is the indispensable basis4 ,at this point1 ,mephistopheles presses forward to the place of the old court-fool1 who has just disappeared1 and excites the hope of bringing to light concealed treasure4 ,to the ,chancellor this way seems not exactly ,christian1 the multitude raises a murmur of suspicion1 the ,astrologer discusses the possibility--and the proposition is adopted4 ,after this hopeful prospect1 the masquerade can come off without any secret anxieties disturbing their merriment4 ,the nature of the company is represented in a lively manner4 ,no one is what he seems to be2 each has thrown over himself a concealing garment2 each knows of the other that he is not that which his appearance or his language indicates2 this effort to hide his own being1 to pretend and to dream himself into something different from himself--to make himself a riddle to others in all openness1 is the deepest1 most piquant charm of social interests4 ,the company will have enjoyment--it unites itself with devotion to the festive play1 and banishes rough egotism1 whose casual outbreaks the watchful herald sharply reproves2 but still1 in the heart of every one1 there remains some intention1 which is directed to the accomplishment of earthly aims4 ,the young ,florentine women want to please2 the mother wishes her daughter to make the conquest of a husband2 the fishermen and bird-catchers are trying their skill2 the wood-chopper1 buffoons1 and parasites1 are endeavoring1 as well as they can1 to make themselves valid2 the drunkard forgets everything over his bottle2 the poets1 who could sing of any theme1 drown each other's voices in their zeal to be heard1 and to the satirist there scarcely remains an opportunity for a dry sarcasm4 ,the following allegorical figures represent to us the inner powers which determine social life4 ,first1 the ,graces appear1 for the first demand of society is to behave with decency2 more earnest are the ,parc1 the continuous change of duration--still1 they work only mechanically2 but the ,furies1 although they come as beautiful maids1 work dynamically through the excitement of the passions4 ,here the aim is to conquer4 ,victoria is throned high upon a sure-footed elephant1 which ,wisdom guides with skilful wand1 while ,fear and ,hope go along on each side2 between these the ,deed wavers until it has reached the proud repose of victory4 ,but as soon as this happens1 the quarrelsome1 hateful ,thersites breaks forth1 to soil the glory with his biting sneer4 ,but his derision effects nothing4 ,the ,herald1 as the regulating ,understanding1 and as distributive ,justice1 can reconcile the differences and mistakes which have arisen1 and he strikes the scoffer in such a manner that he bursts and turns into an adder and a bat4 ,gradually the company returns to its external foundation2 the feeling of ,wealth must secure to it inexhaustible pleasure4 ,but ,wealth is two-fold3 the earthly1 money--the heavenly1 poetry4 ,both must be united in society1 if it would not feel weak and weary4 ,the ,boy ,driver1 that is1 ,poetry1 which knows how to bring forth the ,infinite in all the relations of life1 and through the same to expand1 elevate and pacify the heart1 is acknowledged by ,plutus1 the ,god of common riches1 as the one who can bestow that which he himself is too poor to give4 ,in the proud fullness of youth1 bounding lightly around with a whip in his hand1 the lovely ,genius who rules all hearts1 drives with horses of winged speed through the crowd4 ,the buffoon of ,plutus1 lean ,avarice1 is merrily ridiculed by the women2 ,poetry1 warned by the fatherly love of ,plutus1 withdraws from the tumult which arises for the possession of the golden treasures4 ,gnomes1 ,giants1 ,satyrs1 ,nymphs1 press on with bacchantic frenzy2 earthly desire glows through the company1 and it celebrates great ,pan1 ,nature1 as its ,god1 as the ,giver of powerful ,wealth and fierce ,lust4 ,a whirling tumult threatens to seize hold of everybody--a huge tongue of flame darts over all2 but the majesty of the ,emperor1 the self-conscious dignity of man1 puts an end to the juggling game of the half-unchained ,earth-spirit1 and restores spiritual self-possession4 ,still ,mephistopheles keeps the promise which he has made4 ,he succeeds in revivifying the company by fresh sums of money1 obtained in conformity with his nature1 not by unearthing buried treasures from the heart of the mountains by means of the wishing-rod1 but by making paper-money6 ,it is not1 indeed1 real coin1 but the effect is the same1 for in society everything rests upon the caprice of acceptance2 its own life and preservation are thereby guaranteed by itself1 and its authority1 here represented by the ,emperor1 has infinite power4 ,the paper notes1 this money stamped by the airy imagination1 spread everywhere confidence and lively enjoyment4 ,it is evident that the means of prosperity have not been wanting1 nor stores of eatables and drinkables1 but a form was needed to set the accumulated materials in motion1 and to weave them into the changes of circulation4 ,with delight1 the ,chancellor1 ,steward1 ,commander-in-,chief1 ,treasurer1 report the flourishing condition of the army and the citizens2 presents without stint give rise to the wildest luxury1 which extends from the nobles of the realm down to the page and fool1 and in such joyfulness everybody can unhesitatingly look about him for new means of pleasure4 ,because the company has its essence in the production of the notes1 its internal must strive for the artistic2 every one feels best when he1 though known1 remains unrecognized1 and thus a theatrical tendency developes itself4 ,for here the matter has nothing to do with the dramatic as real art1 in reference to the egotism which binds the company together4 ,the theatre collects the idle multitude1 and it has nothing to do but to see1 to hear1 to compare1 and to judge4 ,theatrical enjoyment surpasses all other kinds in comfort1 and is at the same time the most varied4 ,the ,emperor wishes that the great magician1 ,faust1 should play a drama before himself and the court1 and show ,paris and ,helen4 ,to this design ,mephistopheles can give no direct aid2 in a dark gallery he declares1 in conversation with ,faust1 that the latter himself must create the shapes1 and therefore must go to the ,mothers4 ,faust shudders at their names4 ,mephistopheles gives him a small but important key1 with which he must enter the shadowy realm of the ,mothers for a glowing tripod1 and bring back the same2 by burning incense upon it1 he would be able to create whatever shape he wished4 ,as a reason why he is unable to form them1 ,mephistopheles says expressly that he is in the service of big-necked dwarfs and witches1 and not of heroines1 and that the ,heathen have their own ,hell1 with which he1 the ,christian and romantic ,devil1 has nothing to do4 ,and yet he possesses the key to it1 and hence it is not unknown to him4 ,and why does ,faust shudder at the names of the ,mothers8 ,who are these women who are spoken of so mysteriously8 ,if it were said1 the ,imagination1 ,mothers would be an inept expression2 if it were said1 the ,past1 ,present and ,future1 ,faust's shuddering could not be sufficiently accounted for1 since how should ,time frighten him who has already lived through the terrors of ,death8 ,from the predicates which are attached to the ,mothers1 how they everlastingly occupy the busy mind with all the forms of creation2 how from the shades which surround them in thousand-fold variety1 from the ,being which is ,nothing1 ,all becomes2 how from their empty1 most lonely depth the living existence comes forth to the surface of ,appearance2 from such designations scarcely anything else can be understood by the realm of the ,mothers than the world of ,pure ,thought4 ,this explanation might startle at the first glance1 but we need only put ,idea for ,thought--we need only remember the ,idea-world of ,plato in order to comprehend the matter better4 ,the eternal thoughts1 the ,ideas1 are they not the still1 shadowy abyss1 in which blooming ,life buds1 into whose dark1 agitated depths it sends down its roots8 ,mephistopheles has the key2 for the ,understanding1 which is negative ,determination1 is necessary in order not to perish in the infinite universality of ,thought2 it is itself1 however1 only the ,negative1 and therefore cannot bring the actual ,idea1 ,beauty1 to appearance1 but he1 in his devilish barrenness1 must hand this work over to ,faust2 he can only recommend to the latter moderation1 so as not to lose himself among the phantoms1 and he is curious to know whether ,faust will return4 ,but ,faust shudders because he is not to experience earthly solitude alone1 like that of the boundless ocean1 when yet star follows star1 and wave follows wave2 the deepest solitude of the creative spirit1 the retirement into the invisible1 yet almighty ,thought1 the sinking into the eternal ,idea is demanded of him4 ,whoever has had the boldness of this ,thought--whoever has ventured to penetrate into the magic circle of the ,logical1 and its world-subduing ,dialectic1 into this most simple element of infinite formation and transformation1 has overcome all1 and has nothing more to fear1 as the ,homunculus afterwards expresses it1 because he has beheld the naked essence1 because ,necessity has stripped herself to his gaze4 ,but it is also to be observed that the tripod is mentioned1 for by this there is an evident allusion to subjective ,enthusiasm and individual ,imagination1 by which the ,idea in ,art is brought out of its universality to the determinate existence of concrete ,appearance4 ,beauty is identical in content with ,truth1 but its form belongs to the sphere of the ,sensuous4--,while ,faust is striving after ,beauty1 ,mephistopheles is besieged by women in the illuminated halls1 to improve their looks and assist them in their love affairs4 ,after this delicate point is settled1 no superstition is too excessive1 no sympathetic cure too strange--as1 for example1 a tread of the foot--and the knave fools them until they1 with a love-lorn page1 become too much for him4--,next the stage1 by its decorations1 which represents ,grecian architecture1 causes a discussion of the antique and romantic taste2 ,mephistopheles has humorously taken possession of the prompter's box1 and so the entertainment goes on in parlor fashion1 till ,faust actually appears1 and ,paris and ,helen1 in the name of the all-powerful ,mothers1 are formed from the incense which ascends in magic power4 ,the ,public indulges itself in an outpouring of egotistical criticism2 the men despise the unmanly ,paris1 and interest themselves deeply in the charms of ,helen2 the women ridicule the coquettish beauty with envious moralizing1 and fall in love for the nonce with the fair youth4 ,but as ,paris is about to lead away ,helen1 ,faust1 seized with the deepest passion for her wonderful beauty1 falls upon the stage and destroys his own work4 ,the phantoms vanish2 still the purpose remains to obtain ,helen2 that is1 the artist must hold on to the ,ideal1 but he must know that it is the ,ideal4 ,faust confuses it with common ,actuality1 and he has to learn that absolute ,beauty is not of an earthly1 but of a fleeting1 etherial nature4 ,the second act brings us away from our well-known ,german home to the bottom of the sea and its mysterious secrets4 ,faust is in search of ,helen2 where else can he find her1 perfect ,beauty1 than in ,greece8 ,but first he seeks her1 and meets therefore mere shapes1 which unfold themselves from natural existence1 which are not yet actual humanity4 ,indeed1 since he seeks natural ,beauty--for spiritual ,beauty he has already enjoyed in the heavenly disposition of ,margaret--the whole realm of ,nature opens upon us2 all the elements appear in succession2 the rocks upon which the earnest ,sphinxes rest1 in which the ,ants1 ,dactyls1 ,gnomes work1 give the surrounding ground2 the moist waters contain in their bosom the seeds of all things4 ,the holy fire infolds it with eager flame3 according to the old legend1 ,venus sprang from the foam of the sea4--,next we find ourselves at ,wittenberg1 in the ancient dwelling1 where it is easy to see by the cob-webs1 dried-up ink1 tarnished paper1 and dust1 that many years have passed since ,faust went out into the world4 ,mephistopheles1 from the old coat in which he once instructed the knowledge-seeking pupil1 shakes out the lice and crickets which swarm around the old master with a joyful greeting1 as also ,parseeism makes ,ahriman the father of all vermin4 ,faust lies on his bed1 sleeps and dreams the lustful story of ,leda1 which1 in the end1 is nothing more than the most decent and hence producible representation of generation4 ,while ,mephistopheles in a humorous1 and as well as the ,devil can1 even in an idyllic manner1 amuses himself1 while he inquires sympathetically after ,wagner of the present ,famulus1 a pupil who1 in the meanwhile1 has become a ,baccalaureate1 comes storming in1 in order to see what the master is doing who formerly inculcated such wise doctrines1 and in order to show what a prodigiously reasonable man he has himself become4 ,a persiflage of many expressions of the modern ,german ,natural ,philosophy seems recognizable in this talk4 ,despising age1 praising himself as the dawn of a new life1 he spouts his ,idealism1 by means of which he creates everything1 ,sun1 ,moon and ,stars1 purely by the absoluteness of subjective ,thought4 ,mephistopheles1 though the pupil assails him bitterly1 listens to his wise speeches with lamb-like patience1 and after this refreshing scene1 goes into ,wagner's laboratory4 ,the good man has stayed at home1 and has applied himself to ,chemistry1 to create1 through its processes1 men4 ,to his tender1 humane1 respectable1 intelligent mind1 the common way of begetting children is too vulgar and unworthy of spirit4 ,science must create man2 a real materialism will produce him4 ,mephistopheles comes along just at this time1 to whom ,wagner beckons silence1 and whispers anxiously to him his undertaking1 as in the glass retort the hermaphroditic boy1 the ,homunculus1 begins to stir4 ,but alas6 the ,artificial requires enclosed space4 ,the poor fellow can live only in the glass retort1 the outer world is too rough for him1 and still he has the greatest desire to be actually born4 ,a longing1 universal feeling for natural life sparkles from him with clear brilliancy1 and cousin ,mephistopheles takes him along to the classic ,walpurgisnacht1 where ,homunculus hopes to find a favorable moment4 ,mephistopheles is related to the little man for this reason1 because the latter is only the product of nature1 because ,god's breath has not been breathed into him as into a real man4 ,after these ironical scenes1 the fearful night of the ,pharsalian ,fields succeeds1 where the antique world terminated its free life4 ,this plain1 associated with dark remembrances and bloody shadows1 is the scene of the ,classical ,walpurgisnacht4 ,goethe could choose no other spot1 for just upon this battle-field the spirit of ,greek and ,roman antiquity ceased to be a living actuality4 ,as an external reason1 it is well known that ,thessaly was to the ancients the land of wizards1 and especially of witches1 so that from this point of view the parallel with the ,german ,blocksberg is very striking4 ,faust1 driven by impatience to obtain ,helen1 is in the beginning sent from place to place to learn her residence1 until ,chiron takes him upon the neck which had once borne that most loving beauty1 and with a passing sneer at the conjectural troubles of the ,philologist1 tells him of the ,argonauts1 of the most beautiful man1 of ,hercules1 until he stops his wild course at the dwelling of the prophetic ,manto1 who promises to lead ,faust to ,helen on ,olympus4 ,mephistopheles wanders in the meanwhile among ,sphinxes1 ,griffons1 ,sirens1 etc4 ,to him1 the ,devil of the ,christian and ,germanic world1 this classic ground is not at all pleasing2 he longs for the excellent ,blocksberg of the ,north1 and its ghostly visages2 with the ,lami indeed he resolves to have his own sport1 but is roguishly bemocked2 finally1 he comes to the horrible ,phorcyads1 and after their pattern he equips himself with one eye and a tusk for his own amusement2 that is1 he becomes the absolutely ,ugly1 while ,faust is wooing the highest ,beauty4 ,in the ,christian world the ,devil is also represented as fundamentally ugly and repulsive2 but he can also1 under all forms1 appear as an angel of light4 ,in the ,art-world1 on the contrary1 he can be known only as the ,ugly4 ,in all these scenes there is a mingling of the ,high and the ,low1 of the ,horrible and the ,ridiculous1 of vexation and whimsicality1 of the ,enigmatical and the ,perspicuous1 so that no better contradictions could be wished for a ,walpurgisnacht4 ,the ,homunculus on his part is ceaselessly striving to come to birth1 and betakes himself to ,thales and ,anaxagoras1 who dispute whether the world arose in a dry or wet way4 ,thales leads the little man to ,nereus1 who1 however1 refuses to aid the seeker1 partly because he has become angry with men1 who1 like ,paris and ,ulysses1 have always acted against his advice1 and partly because he is about to celebrate a great feast4 ,afterwards they go to ,proteus1 who at first is also reticent1 but soon takes an interest in ,homunculus1 as he beholds his shining brilliancy1 for he feels that he is related to the changing fire1 and gives warning that as the latter can become everything1 he should be careful about becoming a man1 for it is the most miserable of all existences4 ,in the meanwhile1 the ,peneios roars2 the earth-shaking ,seismos breaks forth with a loud noise2 the silent and industrious mountain-spirits become wakeful4 ,but always more clearly the water declares itself as the womb of all things2 the festive train of the ,telchines points to the hoary ,cabiri2 bewitchingly resound the songs of the ,sirens2 ,hippocamps1 ,tritons1 ,nereids1 ,pselli and ,marsi arise from the green1 pearl-decked ground2 the throne of ,nereus and ,galatea arches over the crystalline depths2 at their feet the eager ,homunculus falls to pieces1 and all-moving ,eros in darting flames streams forth4 ,ravishing songs float aloft1 celebrating the holy elements1 which the ever-creating ,love holds together and purifies4 ,thales is just as little in the right as ,anaxagoras2 together1 both are right1 for ,nature is kindled to perpetual new life by the marriage of ,fire and ,water4 ,the difference between this ,walpurgisnacht and the one in the ,first ,part lies in the fact1 that the principle of the latter is the relation of ,spirit to ,god4 ,in the ,christian world the first question is1 what is the position of man towards ,god2 therefore there appear forms which are self-contradictory1 lacerated spiritually1 torn in pieces by the curse of condemnation to all torture4 ,classic ,life has for its basis the relation to ,nature2 the mysterious ,cabiri were only the master-workmen of ,nature4 ,nature finds in man her highest goal2 in his fair figure1 in the majesty of his form she ends her striving2 and therefore the contradictions of the classic ,walpurgisnacht are not so foreign to ,mephistopheles1 who has to do with ,good and ,bad1 that he does not feel his contact with them1 but still they are not native to him4 ,the general contradiction which we meet with1 and which also in ,mephistopheles expresses itself by the cloven foot at least1 is the union of the human and animal frame2 the human is at first only half existent1 on earth in ,sphinxes1 ,oreads1 ,sirens1 ,centaurs2 in water1 in ,hippocamps1 ,tritons1 ,nymphs1 ,dorids1 etc4 ,for the fair bodies of the latter still share the moist luxuriance of their element4 ,thus ,nature expands itself in innumerable creations in order to purify itself in man1 in the self-conscious spirit1 in order to pacify and shut off in him the infinite impulse to formation1 because it passes beyond him to no new form4 ,he is the embodied image of ,god4 ,the inclosed ,homunculus1 with his fiery trembling eagerness to pass over into an independent actuality1 is1 as it were1 the serio-comic representation of this tendency1 until he breaks the narrow glass1 and now is what he should be1 the union of the elements1 for this is ,eros according to the most ancient ,greek conception1 as we still find even in the ,philosophers4 ,in the third act ,goethe has adhered to the old legend1 according to which1 ,faust1 by means of ,mephistopheles1 obtained ,helen as a concubine1 and begat a son1 ,justus ,faustus4 ,certainly1 the employment of this feature was very difficult2 and still1 even in our days1 a poet1 ,l4 ,bechstein1 in his ,faust1 has been wrecked upon this rock4 ,he has ,helen marry ,faust2 they beget a child2 but finally1 when ,faust makes his will1 and turns away unlovingly from wife and child1 it is discovered that the ,grecian ,helen1 who in the copperplates is also costumed completely in the antique manner1 is a ,german countess of real flesh and blood1 who has been substituted by the ,devil2 an undeceiving which ought to excite the deepest sympathy4 ,goethe has finely idealized this legend2 he has expressed therein the union of the romantic and classic arts4 ,the third act1 this ,phantasmagory1 is perhaps the most perfect of all1 and executed in the liveliest manner4 ,as noble as is the diction of the first and second acts1 especially in the lyrical portions1 it is here nevertheless by far surpassed4 ,such a majesty and simplicity1 such strength and mildness1 unity and variety1 in so small a space1 are astonishing4 ,first resounds the interchange of the dignity of schylus and ,sophocles1 with the sharp-steeled wit of ,aristophanes2 then is heard the tone of the ,spanish romances1 an agreeable1 iambic measure1 a sweet1 ravishing melody2 finally1 new styles break forth1 like the fragments of a prophecy2 ancient and modern rhythms clash1 and the harmony is destroyed4--,helen returns1 after the burning of ,troy1 to the home of her spouse1 ,menelaus2 the stewardess1 aged1 wrinkled1 ugly1 but experienced and intelligent1 ,phorcyas1 receives her mistress in the citadel by command4 ,opposed to ,beauty1 as was before said1 ,mephistopheles can only appear as ugliness1 because in the realm of beautiful forms1 the ,ugly is the ,wicked4 ,there arises a quarrel between the graceful1 yet pretentious youth of the ,chorus1 and world-wise1 yet stubborn ,old ,age4 ,helen has to appease it1 and she learns with horror from ,phorcyas that ,menelaus is going to sacrifice her4--,still1 7as on the one hand ,grecian fugitives1 after the conquest of ,constantinople1 instilled everywhere into ,german ,life the taste for classic ,beauty1 and as1 on the other hand1 one of the ,ottomans in ,theophania--like ,faust--won a ,helen1 and thereby everywhere arose a striving after the appropriation of the ,antique17 the old stewardess saves her1 and bears her through the air together with her beautiful train1 to the ,gothic citadel of ,faust1 where the humble and graceful behavior of the iron men towards the women1 in striking contrast to their hard treatment on the banks of the ,eurotas1 at once wins the female heart4 ,the watchman of the tower1 ,lynceus1 lost in wondering delight over the approaching beauty1 forgets to announce her1 and has brought upon himself a heavy punishment2 but ,helen1 the cause of his misdemeanor1 is to be judge in his case1 and she pardons him4 ,faust and all his vassals do homage to the powerful beauty1 in whom the antique pathos soon disappears4 ,in the new surroundings1 in the mutual exchange of quick and confiding love1 the sweet rhyme soon flows from their kissing lips4 ,an attack of ,menelaus interrupts the loving courtship2 but ,valor1 which in the battle for ,beauty and favor of the ladies1 seeks its highest honor and purport1 is unconquerable1 and the swift might of the army victoriously opposes ,menelaus4 ,christian chivalry protects the jewel of beauty which has fled to it for safety1 against all barbarism pressing on from the ,east4--,thus the days of the lovers pass rapidly away in secret grottoes amid pastoral dalliance2 as once ,mars refreshed himself in the arms of ,venus1 so in the ,middle ,ages knights passed gladly from the storm of war to the sweet service of women in quiet trustfulness4 ,yet the son whom they beget1 longs to free himself from this idle1 ,arcadian life4 ,the nature of both the mother and the father drives him forward1 and soon consummates the matter4 ,beautiful and graceful as ,helen1 the insatiate longing for freedom glows in him as in ,faust4 ,he strikes the lyre with wonderful1 enchanting power2 he revels wildly amid applauding maidens2 he rushes from the bottom of the valley to the tops of the mountains1 to see far out into the world1 and to breathe freely in the free air4 ,his elastic desire raises him1 a second ,icarus1 high in the clouds2 but he soon falls dead at the feet of the parents1 while an aureola1 like a comet1 streaks the ,heavens4 ,thus perished ,lord ,byron4 ,he is a poet more romantic than ,goethe1 to whom1 however1 ,art gave no final satisfaction1 because he had a sympathy for the sufferings of nations and of mankind1 which called him pressingly to action4 ,his poems are full of this striving4 ,in them he weeps away his grief for freedom4 ,walter ,scott1 who never passed out of the ,middle ,ages1 is read more than ,byron4 ,but ,byron is more powerful than he1 because the ,idea took deeper root1 and that demoniacal character concentrated in itself all the struggles of our agitated time4 ,divine poesy softened not the wild sorrow of his heart1 and the sacrifice of himself for the freedom of a beloved people and land could not reproduce classic ,beauty4 ,the fair mother1 who evidently did not understand the stormy1 self-conscious character of her son1 sinks after him into the lower world4 ,as everything in this phantasmagory is allegorical1 ,i ask whether this can mean anything else than that freedom is necessary for beauty1 and beauty also for freedom8 ,euphorion is boundless in his striving2 the warnings of the parents avail not4 ,he topples over into destruction4 ,but ,helen1 i4e4 ,beauty1 cannot survive him1 for all beauty is the expression of freedom1 of independence1 although it does not need to know the fact4 ,only ,faust1 who unites all in himself1 who strives to reach beyond ,nature and ,art1 ,present and ,past1 that is1 the knowing of the ,true1 survives her2 upon her garments1 which expand like a cloud1 he moves forth4 ,what remains now1 since the impulse of spiritual ,life1 the clarification of ,nature in ,art1 the immediate spiritual ,beauty1 have vanished8 ,nothing but ,nature in her nakedness1 whose choruses of ,oreads1 ,dryads and ,nymphs swarm forth into the mountains1 woods and vineyards1 for bacchantic revelry2 an invention which belongs to the highest effort of all poetry4 ,it is a great kindness in the ,devil1 when ,phorcyas at last discloses herself as ,mephistopheles1 and where there is need1 offers herself as commentator4 ,the life of ,art1 of ,beauty1 darkens like a mist2 upon the height of the mountain1 ,faust steps out of the departing cloud1 and looks after it as it changes to other forms4 ,his restless mind longs for new activity4 ,he wants to battle with the waters1 and from them win land2 that is1 the land shall be his own peculiar property1 since he brings it forth artificially4 ,as that money which he gave to the ,emperor was not coined from any metal1 but was a product of ,thought2 as that ,beauty which charmed him was sought with trouble1 and wrung from ,nature1 and as he1 seizing the sword for the protection of ,beauty1 exchanged ,love for the labor of chivalry1--so the land1 the new product of his endeavor1 not yet is1 but he will first create it by means of his activity4 ,a war of the ,emperor with a pretender gives him an opportunity to realize his wish4 ,he supports the ,emperor in the decisive battle4 ,mephistopheles is indifferent to the ,right and to freedom2 the material gain of the war is the principal thing with him2 so he takes along the three mighty robbers1 ,bully1 ,havequick and ,holdfast4 7,see #b;d ,samuel1 #bc3 #h47 ,the elements must also fight--the battle is won--and the grateful ,emperor grants the request of ,faust to leave the sea-shore for his possession4 ,the ,state is again pacified by the destruction of the pretender2 a rich booty in his camp repays many an injury2 the four principal offices promise a joyful entertainment2 but the ,church comes in to claim possession of the ground1 capital and interest1 in order that the ,emperor may be purified from the guilt of having had dealings with the suspicious magician4 ,humbly the ,emperor promises all2 but as the archbishop demands tithe from the strand of the sea which is not yet in existence1 the ,emperor turns away in great displeasure4 ,the boundless rapacity of the ,church causes the ,state to rise up against it4 ,this act has not the lyrical fire of the previous ones2 the action1 if the war can thus be called1 is diffuse2 the battle1 as broad as it is1 is without real tension2 the three robbers are allegorically true1 if we look at the meaning which they express1 but are in other respects not very attractive4 ,in all the brilliant particulars1 profound thoughts1 striking turns1 piquant wit1 and wise arrangement1 there is still wanting the living breath1 the internal connection to exhibit a complete picture of the war4 ,and still1 from some indications1 we may believe that this tediousness is designed1 in order to portray ironically the dull uniformity1 the spiritual waste of external political life1 and the littleness of ,egotism4 ,for it must be remembered that the war is a civil war--the genuine poetic war1 where people is against people1 falls into ,phantasmagory4 ,the last scene would be in this respect the most successful4 ,the continued persistency of the spiritual lord to obtain in the name of the heavenly church1 earthly possessions1 the original acquiescence of the ,emperor1 but his final displeasure at the boundless shamelessness of the priest1 are excellently portrayed1 and the pretentious pomp of the ,alexandrine has never done better service4 ,in the fifth act we behold a wanderer1 who is saved from shipwreck1 and brought to the house of an aged couple1 ,philemon and ,baucis4 ,he visits the old people1 eats at their frugal table1 sees them still happy in their limited sphere1 but listens with astonishment to them1 as they tell of the improvements of their rich neighbor1 and they express the fear of being ousted by him4 ,still1 they pull the little bell of their chapel to kneel and pray with accustomed ceremony in presence of the ancient ,god4--,the neighbor is ,faust4 ,he has raised dams1 dug canals1 built palaces1 laid out ornamental gardens1 educated the people1 sent out navies4 ,the ,industry of our time occupies him unceasingly2 he revels in the wealth of trade1 in the turmoil of men1 in the commerce of the world4 ,that those aged people still have property in the middle of his possessions is extremely disagreeable to him1 for just this little spot where the old mossy church stands1 the sound of whose bell pierces his heart1 where the airy lindens unfold themselves to the breeze1 he would like to have as a belvedere to look over all his creations at a glance4 ,like a good man whose head is always full of plans1 he means well to the people1 and is willing to give them larger possessions where they can quietly await death1 and he sends ,mephistopheles to treat with them4 ,but the aged people1 who care not for eating and drinking1 but for comfort1 will not leave their happy hut2 their refusal brings on disputes1 and the dwelling1 together with the aged couple and the lindens1 perishes by fire in this conflict between the active ,understanding and the poetry of ,feeling1 which1 in the routine of pious custom1 clings to what is old4 ,faust is vexed over the turn which affairs have taken1 particularly over the loss of the beautiful lindens1 but consoles himself with the purpose to build in their stead a watch-tower4 ,then before the palace1 appear in the night1 announcing death1 four hoary women1 ,starvation1 ,want1 ,guilt and ,care1 as the ,furies who accompany the external prosperity of our industrial century4 ,still1 ,care can only press through the key-hole of the chamber of the rich man1 and places herself with fearful suddenness at his side4 ,the ,negative of ,thought is to be excluded by no walls4 ,but ,faust immediately collects himself again2 with impressive clearness he declares his opinion of life1 of the value of the earthly ,present2 ,care he hates1 and does not recognize it as an independent existence4 ,she will nevertheless make herself known to him at the end of his life1 and passes over his face and makes him blind4 ,still1 ,faust expresses no solicitude1 though deprived of his eyes by ,care2 no alteration is noticed in him1 he is bent only upon his aims2 the energy of his tension remains uniform3 ,spirit1 ,thought1 is the true eye2 though the external one is blinded1 the internal one remains open and wakeful4 ,the transition from this point to the conclusion is properly this3 that from the activity of the finite ,understanding1 only a ,finite can result4 ,all industry1 for whose development ,mephistopheles is so serviceable1 as he once was in war1 cannot still the hunger of ,spirit for ,spirit4 ,industry creates only an aggregate of prosperity1 no true happiness4 ,our century is truly great in industrial activity4 ,but it should only be the means1 the point of entrance for real freedom1 which is within itself the ,infinite4 ,and ,faust has to come to this1 even on the brink of the grave4 ,mephistopheles1 after this affair with ,care1 causes the grave of the old man to be dug by the shaking ,lemures4 ,faust supposes1 as he hears the noise of the spades1 that his workmen are busily employed4 ,eagerly he talks over his plans with ,mephistopheles1 and at last he glows at the good fortune of standing upon free ground with a free people4 ,daily he feels that man must conquer ,freedom and ,life anew1 and the presentiment that the traces of his uninterrupted striving would not perish in the ,ages1 is the highest moment of his whole existence4 ,this confession of satisfaction kills him1 and he falls to the earth dead4 ,after trying everything1 after turning from himself to the future of the race1 after working unceasingly1 he has ripened to the acknowledgement that the ,individual only in the ,whole1 that ,man only in the freedom of humanity can have repose4 ,mephistopheles believes that he has won his bet1 causes the jaws of ,hell to appear1 and commands the ,devils to look to the soul of ,faust4 ,but ,angels come1 strewing roses from above2 the roses1 the flowers of ,love1 cause pain where they fall2 the ,devils and ,mephistopheles himself complain uproariously4 ,he lashes himself with the falling roses1 which cling to his neck like pitch and brimstone1 and burn deeper than ,hell-fire4 ,first1 he berates the ,angels as hypocritical puppets1 yet1 more closely observed1 he finds that they are most lovely youths4 ,only the long cloaks fit them too modestly1 for1 from behind particularly1 the rascals had a very desirable look4 ,while he is seeking out a tall fellow for himself1 and is plunged wholly in his pederastic lust1 the ,angels carry away the immortal part of ,faust to ,heaven4 ,mephistopheles now reproaches himself with the greatest bitterness1 because he has destroyed1 through so trivial a desire1 the fruits of so long a labor4 ,this reductio ad absurdum of the ,devil must be considered as one of the happiest strokes of humor4 ,the holy innocence of the ,angels is not for him2 he sees only their fine bodies2 his lowness carries him into the ,unnatural and ,accidental1 just where his greatest interest and egotism come in play4 ,this result will surprise most people2 but if they consider the nature of the ,devil1 it will be wholly satisfactory2 in all cunning he is at last bemocked as a fool1 and he destroys himself through himself4 ,in conclusion1 we see a woody1 rocky wilderness1 settled with hermits4 ,it is not ,heaven itself1 but the transition to the same1 where the soul is united to perfect clearness and happiness4 ,hence we find the glowing devotion and repentance of the ,pater ecstaticus1 the contemplation of the ,pater profundus1 the wrestling of the ,pater serapticus1 who1 taking into his eyes the holy little boys because their organs are too weak for the ,earth1 shows them trees1 rocks1 waterfalls4 ,the ,angels bring in ,faust1 who1 as ,doctor ,marianus1 in the highest and purest cell1 with burning prayer to the approaching queen of ,heaven1 seeks for grace4 ,around ,maria is a choir of penitents1 among whom are the ,magna ,peccatrix1 the ,mulier ,samaritana1 and ,maria gyptiaca4 ,they pray for the earthly soul2 and one of the penitents1 once called ,margaret1 kneeling1 ventures a special intercession4 ,the ,mater ,gloriosa appoints ,margaret to lead the soul of ,faust to higher spheres1 for he shall follow her in anticipation4 ,a fervent prayer streams from the lips of ,doctor ,marianus2 the ,chorus mysticus concludes with the assurance of the certainty of bliss through educating1 purifying love4 ,aspiration1 the ,eternal feminine1 is in ,faust1 however deeply he penetrates into every sphere of worldly activity4 ,the analogy between ,margaret and the ,beatrice of ,dante is here undeniable2 also1 the farther progress of ,faust's life we must consider similar1 as he1 like ,dante1 grows in the knowledge and feeling of the ,divine till he arrives at its complete intuition2 ,dante beholds the ,trinity perfectly free and independent1 without being led farther by anybody4 ,from this point of view1 that the poet wanted to exhibit reconciliation as becoming1 as a product of infinite growth1 is found the justification of the fact that he alludes so slightly to ,god the ,father1 and to ,christ the ,redeemer1 and1 instead1 brings out so prominently the worship of the ,virgin1 and the devotion of ,woman4 ,devotion has a passive element which finds its fittest poetical support in women4 ,these elements agree also very well with the rest of the poem1 since ,goethe1 throughout the entire drama1 has preserved the costume of the ,middle ,ages2 otherwise1 on account of the evident ,protestant tendency of ,faust1 it would be difficult to find a necessary connection with the other parts of the poem4 ,as regards the history of ,faust in itself1 dramatically considered1 the first four acts could perhaps be entirely omitted4 ,the fifth1 as it shows us that all striving1 if its content is not religion1 7the freedom of the ,spirit17 can give no internal satisfaction1 as it shows us that in the earnest striving after freedom1 however much we may err1 still the path to ,heaven is open1 and is only closed to him who does not strive1 would have sufficiently exhibited the reconciliation4 ,but ,goethe wants to show not only this conclusion1 which was all the legend demanded of him1 but also the becoming of this result4 ,faust was for him and through him for the nation1 and indeed for ,europe1 the representative of the world-comprehending1 self-conscious internality of ,spirit1 and therefore he caused all the elements of the ,world to crystallize around this centre4 ,thus the acts of the ,second ,part are pictures1 which1 like frescoes1 are painted beside one another upon the same wall1 and ,faust has actually become what was so often before said of him1 a perfect manifestation of the ,universe4 ,if we now cast a glance back to what we said in the beginning1 of the opposition between the characters of ,wilhelm ,meister and ,faust1 that the former was the determined from without1 the latter the self-determining from within1 we can also seize this opposition so that ,meister is always in pursuit of ,culture1 ,faust of ,freedom4 ,meister is therefore always desirous of new impressions1 in order to have them work upon himself1 extend his knowledge1 complete his character4 ,his capacity and zeal for ,culture1 the variety of the former1 the diligence of the latter1 forced him to a certain tameness and complaisance in relation to others4 ,faust on the contrary will himself work4 ,he will possess only what he himself creates4 ,just for this reason he binds himself to the ,devil1 because the latter has the greatest worldly power1 which ,faust applies unsparingly for his own purposes1 so that the ,devil in reality finds in him a hard1 whimsical1 insatiate master4 ,to ,wilhelm the acquaintance of the ,devil would indeed have been very interesting from a moral1 psychological and sthetic point of view1 but he never would have formed a fraternity with him4 ,this autonomia and autarkia of ,faust have given a powerful impulse to the ,german people1 and ,german literature4 ,but if1 in the continuation of ,faust1 there was an expectation of the same ,titanic nature1 it was disappointed4 ,the monstrosity of the tendencies however1 does not cease2 a man must be blind not to see them4 ,but in the place of pleasure1 after the catastrophe with ,margaret1 an active participation in the world enters2 a feature which ,klinger and others have retained4 ,but ,labor in itself can still give no satisfaction1 but its content1 too1 must be considered4 ,or rather1 the external objectivity of ,labor is indifferent2 whether one is savant1 artist1 soldier1 courtier1 priest1 manufacturer1 merchant1 etc41 is a mere accident2 whether he wills ,freedom or not1 is not accidental1 for ,spirit is in and for itself1 free4 ,with the narrow studio1 in fellowship with ,wagner1 ,faust begins2 with ,trade1 with contests about boundaries1 with his look upon the sea1 which unites the nations1 he ends his career4 ,in the ,world1 ,freedom indeed realizes itself1 but as absolute1 it can only come to existence in ,god4 ,it is therefore right when ,goethe makes the transition from civil to religious freedom4 ,men cannot accomplish more than the realization of the freedom of the nations1 for ,mankind has its concrete existence only in the nations2 if the nations are free1 it is also free4 ,faust must thus be enraptured by this thought in the highest degree4 ,but with it1 he departs from the world--,heaven has opened itself above him4 ,but1 though ,heaven sheds its grace1 and lovingly receives the striving soul which has erred1 still it demands repentance and complete purification from what is earthly4 ,this struggle1 this wrestling of the soul1 ,i find expressed in the most sublime manner in the songs of the hermits and the choruses1 and do not know what our time has produced superior in spiritual power1 as well as in unwavering hope1 though ,i must confess that ,i am not well enough versed in the fertile modern lyric literature of ,pietism1 to say whether such pearls are to be found in it4 ,moreover1 it is evident that the pliable ,meister1 and the stubborn ,faust1 are the two sides which were united in ,goethe's genius4 ,he was a poet1 and became a courtier2 he was a courtier1 and remained a poet4 ,but in a more extensive sense this opposition is found in all modern nations1 particularly among the ,germans4 ,they wish to obtain culture1 and therefore shun no kind of society if they are improved4 ,but they wish also to be free4 ,they love culture so deeply that they1 perhaps1 for a while1 have forgotten freedom4 ,but then the ,spirit warns them4 ,they sigh1 like ,faust1 that they have sat so long in a gloomy cell over ,philosophy1 ,theology1 etc4 ,with the fierceness of lions1 they throw all culture aside for the sake of freedom1 and in noble delusion form an alliance--even with the ,devil4 ,a ,,criticism ,,of ,,philosophical ,,systems4 ,translated from the ,german of ,j4 ,g4 ,fichte1 by ,a4 ,e4 ,kroeger4 ,,note4 ,below we give to our readers the translation of another ,introduction to the ,science of ,knowledge1 written by ,fichte immediately after the one published in our previous number4 ,whereas that first ,introduction was written for readers who have as yet no philosophical system of their own1 the present one is intended more particularly for those who have set philosophical notions1 of which they require to be disabused4--,,editor4 ,i believe the first introduction published in this ,journal to be perfectly sufficient for unprejudiced readers1 i4 e4 for readers who give themselves up to the writer without preconceived opinions1 who1 if they do not assist him1 also do not resist him in his endeavors to carry them along4 ,it is otherwise with readers who have already a philosophical system4 ,such readers have adopted certain maxims from their system1 which have become fundamental principles for them2 and whatsoever is not produced according to these maxims1 is now pronounced false by them without further investigation1 and without even reading such productions3 it is pronounced false1 because it has been produced in violation of their universally valid method4 ,unless this class of readers is to be abandoned altogether--and why should it be8--it is1 above all1 necessary to remove the obstacle which deprives us of their attention2 or1 in other words1 to make them distrust their maxims4 ,such a preliminary investigation concerning the method1 is1 above all1 necessary in regard to the ,science of ,knowledge1 the whole structure and significance whereof differs utterly from the structure and significance of all philosophical systems which have hitherto been current4 ,the authors of these previous systems started from some conception or another2 and utterly careless whence they got it1 or out of what material they composed it1 they then proceeded to analyze it1 to combine it with others1 regarding the origin whereof they were equally unconcerned2 and this their argumentation itself is their philosophy4 ,hence their philosophy consists in their own thinking4 ,quite different does the ,science of ,knowledge proceed4 ,that which this ,science makes the object of its thinking1 is not a dead conception1 remaining passive under the investigation1 and receiving life only from it1 but is rather itself living and active2 generating out of itself and through itself cognitions1 which the philosopher merely observes in their genesis4 ,his business in the whole affair is nothing further than to place that living object of his investigation in proper activity1 and to observe1 grasp and comprehend this its activity as a ,unit4 ,he undertakes an experiment4 ,it is his business to place the object in a position which permits the observation he wishes to make2 it is his business to attend to all the manifestations of the object in this experiment1 to follow them and connect them in proper order2 but it is not his business to cause the manifestations in the object4 ,that is the business of the object itself3 and he would work directly contrary to his purpose if he did not allow the object full freedom to develop itself--if he undertook but the least interference in this1 its self-developing4 ,the philosopher of the first mentioned sort1 on the contrary1 does just the reverse4 ,he produces a product of art4 ,in working out his object he only takes into consideration its matter1 and pays no attention to an internal self-developing power thereof4 ,nay1 this power must be deadened before he undertakes his work1 or else it might resist his labor4 ,it is from the dead matter1 therefore1 that he produces something1 and solely by means of his own power1 in accordance with his previously resolved-upon conception4 ,while thus in the ,science of ,knowledge there are two utterly distinct series of mental activity--that of the ,ego1 which the philosopher observes1 and that of the observations of the philosopher--all other philosophical systems have only one series of thinking1 viz3 that of the thoughts of the philosopher1 for his object is not introduced as thinking at all4 ,one of the chief grounds of so many objections to and misunderstandings of the ,science of ,knowledge lies in this3 that these two series of thinking have not been held apart1 or that what belonged to the one has been taken to belong to the other4 ,this error occurred because ,philosophy was held to consist only of one series4 ,the act of one who produces a work of art is most certainly--since his object is not active--the appearance itself2 but the description of him who has undertaken an experiment1 is not the appearance itself1 but the conception thereof4#a ,after this preliminary remark1 the further application whereof we shall examine in the course of our article1 let us now ask3 how does the ,science of ,knowledge proceed to solve its problem8 ,the question it will have to answer1 is1 as we well know1 the following3 ,whence comes the system of those representations which are accompanied by the feeling of necessity8 ,or1 how do we to come claim objective validity for what is only subjective8 ,or1 since objective validity is generally characterized as being1 how do we come to accept a being8 ,now1 since this question starts from a reflection that returns into itself--starts from the observation1 that the immediate object of consciousness is after all merely consciousness itself1--it seems clear enough that the question can speak of no other being than of a being for us4 ,it would be indeed a complete contradiction1 to mistake it for a question concerning some being which had no relation to our consciousness4 ,nevertheless1 the philosophers of our philosophical age are of all things most apt to plunge into such absurd contradictions4 ,the proposed question1 how is a being for us possible8 abstracts itself from all being2 i4 e4 it must not be understood1 as if the question posited a not-being2 for in that case the conception of being would only be negated1 but not abstracted from4 ,on the contrary1 the question does not entertain the conception of being at all1 either positively or negatively4 ,the proposed question asks for the ground of the predicate of being1 whether it be applied positively or negatively2 but all ground lies beyond the grounded1 i4 e4 is opposed to it4 ,the answer must1 therefore1 if it is to be an answer to this question1 also abstract from all being4 ,to maintain1 a priori1 in advance of an attempt1 that such an abstraction is impossible in the answer1 because it is impossible in itself1 would be to maintain likewise1 that such an abstraction is impossible in the question2 and hence1 that the question itself is not possible1 and that the problem of a science of metaphysics1 as the science which is to solve the problem of the ground of being for us1 is not a problem for human reason4 ,that such an abstraction1 and hence such a question1 is contrary to reason1 cannot be proven by objective grounds to those who maintain its possibility2 for the latter assert that the possibility and necessity of the question is grounded upon the highest law of reason--that of self-determination1 7,practical legislation17 under which all other laws of reason are subsumed1 and from which they are all derived1 but at the same time determined and limited to the sphere of their validity4 ,they acknowledge the arguments of their opponents willingly enough1 but deny their application to the present case2 with what justice1 their opponents can determine only by placing themselves upon the basis of this highest law1 but hence1 also1 upon the basis of an answer to the disputed question1 by which act they would cease to be opponents4 ,their opposition1 indeed1 can only arise from a subjective defect--from the consciousness that they never raised this question1 and never felt the need of an answer to it4 ,against this their position1 no objective grounds can1 on the other hand1 be made valid1 by those who insist on an answer to the question2 for the doubt1 which raises that question1 is grounded upon previous acts of freedom1 which no demonstration can compel from any one4 ,,iii4 ,let us now ask3 ,who is it that undertakes the demanded abstraction from all being8 or1 in which of the two series does it occur8 ,evidently1 in the series of philosophical argumentation1 for another series does not exist4 ,that1 to which the philosopher holds1 and from which he promises to explain all that is to be explained1 is the consciousness1 the subject4 ,this subject he will1 therefore1 have to comprehend free from all representation of being1 in order first to show up in it the ground of all being--of course1 for itself4 ,but if he abstracts from all being of and for the subject1 nothing pertains to it but an acting4 ,particularly in relation to being is it the acting4 ,the philosopher will1 therefore1 have to comprehend it in its acting1 and from this point the aforementioned double series will first arise4 ,the fundamental assertion of the philosopher1 as such1 is this3 as soon as the ,ego is for itself1 there necessarily arises for it at the same time an external being2 the ground of the latter lies in the former2 the latter is conditioned by the former4 ,self-consciousness and consciousness of a ,something which is not that ,self1 is necessarily united2 but the former is the conditioning and the latter the conditioned4 ,to prove this assertion--not1 perhaps1 by argumentation1 as valid for a system of a being in itself1 but by observation of the original proceeding of reason1 as valid for reason--the philosopher will have to show1 firstly1 how the ,ego is and becomes for itself2 and secondly1 that this its own being for itself is not possible1 unless at the same time there arises for it an external being1 which is not it4 ,the first question1 therefore1 would be3 how is the ,ego for itself8 and the first postulate3 think thyself6 construe the conception of thyself1 and observe how thou proceedest in this construction4 ,the philosopher affirms that every one who will but do so1 must necessarily discover that in the thinking of that conception1 his activity1 as intelligence1 returns into itself1 makes itself its own object4 ,if this is correct and admitted1 the manner of the construction of the ,ego1 the manner of its being for itself1 7and we never speak of another being17 is known2 and the philosopher may then proceed to prove that this act is not possible without another act1 whereby there arises for the ,ego an external being4 ,it is thus1 indeed1 that the ,science of ,knowledge proceeds4 ,let us now consider with what justice it so proceeds4 ,,iv4 ,first of all3 what in the described act belongs to the philosopher1 as philosopher1 and what belongs to the ,ego he is to observe8 ,to the ,ego nothing but the return to itself2 everything else to the description of the philosopher1 for whom1 as mere fact1 the system of all experience1 which in its genesis the ,ego is now to produce under his observation1 has already existence4 ,the ,ego returns into itself1 is the assertion4 ,has it not then already being in advance of this return into itself1 and independently thereof8 ,nay1 must it not already be for itself1 if merely for the possibility of making itself the object of its action8 ,again1 if this is so1 does not the whole philosophy presuppose what it ought first to explain8 ,i answer by no means4 ,first through this act1 and only by means of it--by means of an acting upon an acting--does the ,ego originally come to be for itself4 ,it is only for the philosopher that it has previous existence as a fact1 because the philosopher has already gone through the whole experience4 ,he must express himself as he does1 to be but understood1 and he can so express himself1 because he long since has comprehended all the conceptions necessary thereunto4 ,now1 to return to the observed ,ego3 what is this its return into itself8 ,under what class of modifications of consciousness is it to be posited8 ,it is no comprehending1 for a comprehending first arises through the opposition of a non-,ego1 and by the determining of the ,ego in this opposition4 ,hence it is a mere contemplation4 ,it is therefore not consciousness1 not even self-consciousness4 ,indeed1 it is precisely because this act alone produces no consciousness1 that we proceed to another act1 through which a non-,ego originates for us1 and that a progress of philosophical argumentation and the required deduction of the system of experience becomes possible4 ,that act only places the ,ego in the possibility of self-consciousness--and thus of all other consciousness--but does not generate real consciousness4 ,that act is but a part of the whole act of the intelligence1 whereby it effects its consciousness2 a part which only the philosopher separates from the whole act1 but which is not originally so separated in the ,ego4 ,but how about the philosopher1 as such8 ,this self-constructing ,ego is none other than his own4 ,he can contemplate that act of the ,ego only in himself1 and1 in order to contemplate it1 must realize it4 ,he produces that act arbitrarily and with freedom4 ,but--this question may and has been raised--if your whole philosophy is erected upon something produced by an act of mere arbitrariness1 does it not then become a mere creature of the brain1 a pure imaginary picture8 ,how is the philosopher going to secure to this purely subjective act its objectivity8 ,how will he secure to that which is purely empirical and a moment of time--i4 e4 the time in which the philosopher philosophizes--its originality8 ,how can he prove that his present free thinking in the midst of the series of his representations does correspond to the necessary thinking1 whereby he first became for himself1 and through which the whole series of his representations has been started8 ,i answer3 this act is in its nature objective4 ,i am for myself2 this is a fact4 ,now ,i could have thus come to be for myself only through an act1 for ,i am free2 and only through this thus determined act1 for only through it do ,i become for myself every moment1 and through every other act something quite different is produced4 ,that acting1 indeed1 is the very conception of the ,ego2 and the conception of the ,ego is the conception of that acting2 both conceptions are quite the same2 and that conception of the ,ego can mean and can not be made to mean anything1 but what has been stated4 ,it is so1 because ,i make it so4 ,the philosopher only makes clear to himself what he really thinks and has ever thought1 when he thinks or thought himself2 but that he does think himself is to him immediate fact of consciousness4 ,that question1 concerning the objectivity is grounded on the very curious presupposition that the ,ego is something else than its own thought of itself1 and that something else than this thought and outside of it--,god may know what they do mean6--is again the ground of it1 concerning the actual nature of which outside something they are very much troubled4 ,hence if they ask for such an objective validity of the thought1 or for a connection between this object and the subject1 ,i cheerfully confess that the ,science of ,knowledge can give them no instruction concerning it4 ,if they choose to1 they may themselves enter1 in this or any other case1 upon the discovery of such a connection1 until they1 perhaps1 will recollect that this ,unknown which they are hunting1 is1 after all1 again their thought1 and that whatsoever they may invent as its ground1 will also be their thought1 and thus ad infinitum2 and that1 indeed1 they cannot speak of or question about anything without at the same time thinking it4 ,now1 in this act1 which is arbitrary and in time1 for the philosopher as such1 but which is for the ,ego--which he constructs1 by virtue of his just deduced right1 for the sake of subsequent observations and conclusions--necessarily and originally2 in this act1 ,i say1 the philosopher looks at himself1 and immediately contemplates his own acting2 he knows what he does1 because he does it4 ,does a consciousness thereof arise in him8 ,without doubt2 for he not only contemplates1 but comprehends also4 ,he comprehends his act1 as an acting generally1 of which he has already a conception by virtue of his previous experience2 and as this determined1 into itself returning acting1 as which he contemplates it in himself4 ,by this characteristic determination he elevates it above the sphere of general acting4 ,what acting may be1 can only be contemplated1 not developed from and through conceptions2 but that which this contemplation contains is comprehended by the mere opposition of pure being4 ,acting is not being1 and being is not acting4 ,mere conception affords no other determination for each link2 their real essence is only discovered in contemplation4 ,now this whole procedure of the philosopher appears to me1 at least1 very possible1 very easy1 and even natural2 and ,i can scarcely conceive how it can appear otherwise to my readers1 and how they can see in it anything mysterious and marvellous4 ,every one1 let us hope1 can think himself4 ,he will also1 let us hope1 learn that by being required to thus think himself he is required to perform an act1 dependent upon his own activity1 an internal act2 and that if he realizes this demand1 if he really affects himself through self-activity1 he also most surely acts thus4 ,let us further hope that he will be able to distinguish this kind of acting from its opposite1 the acting whereby he thinks external objects1 and that he will find in the latter sort of thinking the thinking and the thought to be opposites1 7the activity1 therefore1 tending upon something distinct from itself17 while in the former thinking both were one and the same1 7and hence the activity a return into itself47 ,he will comprehend1 it is to be hoped1 that--since the thought of himself arises only in this manner1 7an opposite thinking producing a quite different thought7--the thought of himself is nothing but the thought of this act1 and the word ,ego nothing but the designation of this act--that ,ego and an into itself returning activity are completely identical conceptions4 ,he will understand1 let us hope1 that if he but for the present problematically presupposes with transcendental ,idealism that all consciousness rests upon and is dependent upon self-consciousness1 he must also think that return into itself as preceding and conditioning all other acts of consciousness2 indeed as the primary act of the subject2 and1 since there is nothing for him which is not in his consciousness1 and since everything else in his consciousness is conditioned by this act1 and therefore cannot condition the act in the same respect1--as an act1 utterly unconditioned and hence absolute for him2 and he will thus further understand1 that the above problematical presupposition and this thinking of the ,ego as originally posited through itself1 are again quite identical2 and that hence transcendental ,idealism1 if it proceeds systematically1 can proceed in no other manner than it does in the ,science of ,knowledge4 ,this contemplation of himself1 which is required of the philosopher1 in his realization of the act1 through which the ,ego arises for him1 ,i call intellectual contemplation4 ,it is the immediate consciousness that ,i act and what ,i act2 it is that through which ,i know something1 because ,i do it4 ,that there is such a power of intellectual contemplation cannot be demonstrated by conceptions1 nor can conception show what it is4 ,every one must find it immediately in himself1 or he will never learn to know it4 ,the requirement that we ought to show it what it is by argumentation1 is more marvellous than would be the requirement of a blind person1 to explain to him1 without his needing to use sight1 what colors are4 ,but it can be certainly proven to everyone in his own confessed experience1 that this intellectual contemplation does occur in every moment of his consciousness4 ,i can take no step1 cannot move hand or foot1 without the intellectual contemplation of my self-consciousness in these acts2 only through this contemplation do ,i know that ,i do it1 only through it do ,i distinguish my acting and in it myself from the given object of my acting4 ,everyone who ascribes an activity to himself appeals to this contemplation4 ,in it is the source of life1 and without it is death4 ,but this contemplation never occurs alone1 as a complete act of consciousness1 as indeed sensuous contemplation also never occurs alone nor completes consciousness2 both contemplations must be comprehended4 ,not only this1 but the intellectual contemplation is also always connected with a sensuous contemplation4 ,i cannot find myself acting without finding an object upon which ,i act1 and this object in a sensuous contemplation which ,i comprehend2 nor without sketching an image of what ,i intend to produce by my act1 which image ,i also comprehend4 ,now1 then1 how do ,i know and how can ,i know what ,i intend to produce1 if ,i do not immediately contemplate myself in this sketching of the image which ,i intend to produce1 i4 e4 in this sketching of the conception of my purpose1 which sketching is certainly an act4 ,only the totality of this condition in uniting a given manifold completes consciousness4 ,i become conscious only of the conceptions1 both of the object upon which ,i act1 and of the purpose ,i intend to accomplish2 but ,i do not become conscious of the contemplations which are at the bottom of both conceptions4 ,perhaps it is only this which the zealous opponents of intellectual contemplation wish to insist upon2 namely1 that that contemplation is only possible in connection with a sensuous contemplation2 and surely the ,science of ,knowledge is not going to deny it4 ,but this is no reason why they should deny intellectual contemplation4 ,for with the same right we might deny sensuous contemplation1 since it also is possible only in connection with intellectual contemplation2 for whatsoever is to become my representation must be related to me1 and the consciousness 7,i7 occurs only through intellectual contemplation4 7,it is a remarkable fact of our modern history of philosophy1 that it has not been noticed as yet how all that may be objected to intellectual contemplation can also be objected to sensuous contemplation1 and that thus the arguments of its opponents turn against themselves47 ,but if it must be admitted that there is no immediate1 isolated consciousness of intellectual contemplation1 how does the philosopher arrive at a knowledge and isolated representation thereof8 ,i answer1 doubtless in the same manner in which he arrives at the isolated representation of sensuous contemplation1 by drawing a conclusion from the evident facts of consciousness4 ,this conclusion runs as follows3 ,i propose to myself1 to think this or that1 and the required thought arises2 ,i propose to myself1 to do this or that1 and the representation that it is being done arises4 ,this is a fact of consciousness4 ,if ,i look at it by the light of the laws of mere sensuous consciousness1 it involves no more than has just been stated1 i4 e4 a sequence of certain representations4 ,i become conscious only of this sequence1 in a series of time movements1 and only such a time sequence can ,i assert4 ,i can merely state--,i know that if ,i propose to myself a certain thought1 with the characteristic that it is to have existence1 the representation of this thought1 with the characteristic that it really has existence1 follows2 or1 that the representation of a certain manifestation1 as one which ought to occur1 is immediately followed in time by the representation of the same manifestation as one which really did occur4 ,but ,i can1 on no account1 state that the first representation contains the real ground of the second one which followed2 or1 that by thinking the first one the second one became real for me4 ,i merely remain passive1 the placid scene upon which representations follow representations1 and am1 on no account1 the active principle which produces them4 ,still ,i constantly assume the latter1 and cannot relinquish that assumption without relinquishing my self4 ,what justifies me in it8 ,in the sensuous ingredients ,i have mentioned1 there is no ground to justify such an assumption2 hence it is a peculiar and immediate consciousness1 that is to say1 a contemplation1 and not a sensuous contemplation1 which views a material and permanent being1 but a contemplation of a pure activity1 which is not permanent but progressive1 not a being but a life4 ,the philosopher1 therefore1 discovers this intellectual contemplation as fact of consciousness1 7for him it is a fact2 for the original ,ego a fact and act both together--a deed-act17 and he thus discovers it not immediately1 as an isolated part of his consciousness1 but by distinguishing and separating what in common consciousness occurs in unseparated union4 ,quite a different problem it is to explain this intellectual contemplation1 which is here presupposed as fact1 in its possibility1 and by means of this explanation to defend it against the charge of deception and deceptiveness1 which is raised by dogmatism2 or1 in other words1 to prove the faith in the reality of this intellectual contemplation1 from which faith transcendental idealism confessedly starts--by a something still higher2 and to show up the interest which leads us to place faith in its reality1 or in the system of ,reason4 ,this is accomplished by showing up the ,moral ,law in us1 in which the ,ego is characterized as elevated through it above all the original modifications1 as impelled by an absolute1 or in itself1 7in the ,ego17 grounded activity2 and by which the ,ego is thus discovered to be an absolute ,active4 ,in the consciousness of this law1 which doubtless is an immediate consciousness1 and not derived from something else1 the contemplation of self-activity and freedom is grounded4 ,i am given to myself through myself as something1 which is to be active in a certain manner2 hence1 ,i am given to myself through myself as something active generally2 ,i have the life in myself1 and take it from out of myself4 ,only through this medium of the ,moral ,law do ,i see ,,myself2 and if ,i see myself through that law1 ,i necessarily see myself as self-active2 and it is thus that there arises in a consciousness--which otherwise would only be the consciousness of a sequence of my representations--the utterly foreign ingredient of an activity of myself4 ,this intellectual contemplation is the only stand-point for all ,philosophy4 ,from it all that occurs in consciousness may be explained1 but only from it4 ,without self-consciousness there is no consciousness at all2 but self-consciousness is only possible in the way we have shown1 i4 e4 ,i am only active4 ,beyond it ,i cannot be driven2 my philosophy then becomes altogether independent of all arbitrariness1 and a product of stern necessity2 i4 e4 in so far as necessity exists for free ,reason2 it becomes a product of practical necessity4 ,i can not go beyond this stand-point1 because conscience says ,i shall not go beyond it2 and thus transcendental idealism shows itself up to be the only moral philosophy--the philosophy wherein speculation and moral law are intimately united4 ,conscience says3 ,i shall start in my thinking from the pure ,ego1 and shall think it absolutely self-active2 not as determined by the things1 but as determining the things4 ,the conception of activity which becomes possible only through this intellectual contemplation of the self-active ,ego1 is the only one which unites both the worlds that exist for us--the sensuous and the intelligible world4 ,whatsoever is opposed to my activity--and ,i must oppose something to it1 for ,i am finite--is the sensuous1 and whatsoever is to arise through my activity is the intelligible 7moral7 world4 ,i should like to know how those who smile so contemptuously whenever the words 8intellectual contemplation0 is mentioned1 think the consciousness of the moral law2 or how they are enabled to entertain such conceptions as those of ,virtue1 of ,right1 c41 which they doubtless do entertain4 ,according to them there are only two contemplations a priori--,time and ,space4 ,they surely form these conceptions of ,virtue1 c41 in ,time1 7the form of the inner sense17 but they certainly do not hold them to be time itself1 but merely a certain filling up of time4 ,what is it1 then1 wherewith they fill up time1 and get a basis for the construction of those conceptions8 ,there is nothing left to them but ,space2 and hence their conceptions of ,virtue1 ,right1 c41 are perhaps quadrangular and circular2 just as all the other conceptions which they construct1 7for instance1 that of a tree or of an animal17 are nothing but limitations of ,space4 ,but they do not conceive their ,virtue and their ,right in this manner4 ,what1 then1 is the basis of their construction8 ,if they attend properly1 they will discover that this basis is activity in general1 or freedom4 ,both of these conceptions of virtue and right are to them certain limitations of their general activity1 exactly as their sensuous conceptions are limitations of space4 ,how1 then1 do they arrive at this basis of their construction8 ,we will hope that they have not derived activity from the dead permanency of matter1 nor freedom from the mechanism of nature4 ,they have obtained it1 therefore1 from immediate contemplation1 and thus they confess a third contemplation besides their own two4 ,it is1 therefore1 by no means so unimportant1 as it appears to be to some1 whether philosophy starts from a fact or from a deed-act1 7i4 e4 from an activity1 which presupposes no object1 but produces it itself1 and in which1 therefore1 the acting is immediately deed47 ,if philosophy starts from a fact1 it places itself in the midst of being and finity1 and will find it difficult to discover therefrom a road to the infinite and super-sensuous2 but if it starts from a deed-act1 it places itself at once in the point which unites both worlds and from which both can be overlooked at one glance4 ,translators frequently use the term 8intuition0 for what ,i have here called 8contemplation20 8,deed-,act0 is my rendering of 8,that-,handlung40 ,a4 ,e4 ,k4 ,footnote #a3 ,,note4 ,the same mistaking of one series of thinking in transcendental idealism for the other series1 lies at the basis of the assertion1 that besides the system of idealism1 another realistic system is also possible as a logical and thorough system4 ,the realism1 which forces itself upon all1 even the most decided idealist1 namely1 the assumption that things exist independently and outside of us1 is involved in the idealistic system itself2 and is moreover explained and deduced in that system4 ,indeed1 the deduction of an objective truth1 as well in the world of appearances as in the world of intellect1 is the only purpose of all philosophy4 ,it is the philosopher who says in his own name3 everything that is for the ,ego is also through the ,ego4 ,but the ,ego itself1 in that philosopher's philosophy says3 as sure as ,i am ,i1 there exists outside of me a something1 which exists not through me4 ,the philosopher's idealistic assertion is therefore met by the realistic assertion of the ,ego in the same one system2 and it is the philosopher's business to show from the fundamental principle of his philosophy how the ,ego comes to make such an assertion4 ,the philosopher's stand-point is the purely speculative2 the ,ego's stand-point in his system is the realistic stand-point of life and science2 the philosopher's system is ,science of ,knowledge1 whilst the ,ego's system is common ,science4 ,but common ,science is comprehensible only through the ,science of ,knowledge1 the realistic system comprehensible only through the idealistic system4 ,realism forces itself upon us2 but it has in itself no known and comprehensible ground4 ,idealism furnishes this ground1 and is only to make realism comprehensible4 ,speculation has no other purpose than to furnish this comprehensibility of all reality1 which in itself would otherwise remain incomprehensible4 ,hence1 also1 ,idealism can never be a mode of thinking1 but can only be speculation4 ,,notes ,,on ,,milton',s ,,lycidas4 ,,by ,,anna ,c4 ,,brackett4 ,every work of art1 whether in sculpture1 painting1 or music1 must have a definite content2 and only in having such has it any claim to be so called4 ,this content must be spiritual2 that is1 it must come from the inner spirit of the artist1 and translate itself by means of the work into spirit in the spectator or listener4 ,only in the recognition of this inner meaning which lives behind the outside and shimmers through it1 can consist the difference between the impression made on me by the sight of a beautiful painting1 and that produced on an inferior animal1 as the retina of his eye paints with equal accuracy the same object4 ,for what is this sense of beauty which thrills through me1 while the dog at my side looks at the same thing and sees nothing in seeing all which the eye can grasp8 ,is it not the response in me to the informing spirit behind all the outward appearance8 ,but if this sense of beauty stops in passive enjoyment1 if the sense of sight or of hearing is simply to be intoxicated with the feast spread before it1 we must confess that our appreciation of beauty is a very sensuous thing4 ,content though some may be1 simply to enjoy1 in the minds of others the fascination of the senses only provokes unrest4 ,we say with ,goethe3 8,i would fain understand that which interests me in so extraordinary a manner20 for this work of art1 the product of mind1 touches me in a wonderful way1 and must be of universal essence4 ,let me seek the reason1 and if ,i find it1 it will be another step towards 8the solvent word40 ,again1 in a true work of art this content must be essentially one2 that is1 one profound thought to which all others1 though they may be visible1 must be gracefully subordinate2 otherwise we are lost in a multiplicity of details1 and miss the unity which is the sole sign of the creative mind4 ,nor need we always be anxious as to whether the artist consciously meant to say thus and so4 ,has there ever lived a true artist who has not 8builded better than he knew08 ,if this were not so1 all works of art would lose their significance in the course of time4 ,are the half-uttered meanings of the statues of the ,egyptian gods behind or before us to-day8 ,do they not perplex us with prophecies rather than remembrances as we wander amazed among them through the halls of the ,british ,museum8 ,a whole nation striving to say the one word1 and dying before it was uttered6 ,have we heard it clearly yet8 ,the world goes on translating as it gains new words with which to carry on the work4 ,it is not so much the artist that is before his age as the divine afflatus guiding his hand which leads not only the age but him4 ,through that divine inspiration he speaks1 and he says mysterious words which perhaps must wait for centuries to be understood4 ,in that fact lies his right to his title2 in that1 alone1 lies the right of his production to be called a work of art4 ,doubtless all readers are familiar with ,dr4 ,johnson's criticisms on ,milton's ,lycidas1 and these we might pass by without comment1 for it would evidently be as impossible for ,dr4 ,johnson's mind to comprehend or be touched by the poetry of ,lycidas as for a ponderous sledge-hammer to be conscious of the soft1 perfume-laden air through which it might move4 ,the monody is censured by him because of its irregularly recurring rhymes1 and in the same breath we are told that it is so full of art that the author could not have felt sorrow while writing it4 ,we know how intricately the rhymes are woven in ,milton's sonnets1 where he seems to have taken all pains to select the most difficult arrangements1 and to carry them through without deviation1 and we say only that the first criticism contradicts the last4 ,but some more appreciative critics1 while touched by the beauty1 repeat the same1 and say there is 8more poetry than sorrow0 in the poem4 ,more poetry than sorrow6 ,sorrow is the grand key note1 and strikes in always over and through all the beauty and poetry like a wailing chord in a symphony1 that is never absent long1 and ever and anon drowns out all the rest4 ,sorrow1 pure and simple1 is the thread on which all the beautiful fancies are strung4 ,it runs through and connects them all1 and there is not a paragraph in the whole poem that is not pierced by it4 ,it is the occasion1 the motive1 the inner inspiration1 and the mastery over it is the conclusion of all4 ,around it1 the constant centre1 group themselves all the lovely pictures1 and they all face it and are subordinate to it4 ,the soul of the poet is so tossed by the immediate sorrow that it surrenders itself entirely to it1 and so1 losing its will1 is taken possession of by whatever thought1 evoked by the spell of association1 rises in his mind2 as when he speaks of ,camus and ,st4 ,peter4 ,ever and anon the will makes an effort to free itself and to determine its own course1 but again and again the wave of sorrow sweeps up1 and the vainly struggling will goes down before it4 ,nothing lay closer to ,milton's heart than the interests of what he believed the true church2 and nothing touched him more than the abuses which were then prevalent in the church of ,england4 ,in the safe harbor of his father's country home1 resting on his oars before the appointed time for the race in which he was to give away all his strength and joy1 surrounded and inspired by the fresh1 pure air from the granite rocks of ,puritanism1 all his growing strength was gathering its energies for the struggle4 ,this just indignation and honest protest must find its way in the poem through the grief that sweeps over him1 and which1 because so deep1 touches and vivifies all his deepest thoughts4 ,but even that strong under current of conviction has no power long to steady him against the wave of sorrow which breaks above his head1 none the less powerful because it breaks in a line of white and shivers itself into drops which flash diamond colors in the warm and pure sunlight of his cultured imagination4 ,more poetry than sorrow8 ,then there is more poetry in ,lycidas than in any other poem of the same length in our language4 ,it would be impossible here to go through the poem with the close care to all little points which is necessary to enable one fully to comprehend its exquisite beauty and finish4 ,it is like one of ,beethoven's symphonies1 where at first we are so occupied with the one grand thought that we surrender ourselves entirely to it1 and think ourselves completely satisfied4 ,but as we appropriate that more and more fully1 within and around it wonderful melodies start and twine1 and this experience is repeated again and again till the music seems almost infinite in its content4 ,let us1 then1 briefly go over the burden of the monody1 our chief effort being to show how perfectly at one it is throughout1 how natural the seemingly abrupt changes1--only pausing now and then to speak of some special beauty which is so marked that one cannot pass it by in silence4 ,if we succeed in showing a continued and natural thought in the whole and a satisfactory solution for the collision which gives rise to the poem1 our end will have been accomplished4 ,milton begins in due order by giving1 as prelude1 his reason for singing4 ,but he has written only seven full lines before1 in the eighth1 the key-note is struck by the force of sorrow1 which1 after saying 8,lycidas is dead10 lingers on the strain and repeats1 to heighten the grief1 8dead ere his prime40 ,the next line1 the ninth1 is still more pathetic in its echoing repetition and its added cause for mourning4 7,in passing1 let us say that the effect is greatly increased in reading this line if the first word be strongly emphasized47 ,because he hath not left his peer1 all should sing for him4 ,no more excuse is needed4 ,sorrow pleases itself in calling up the neglected form1 and then passionately turns to the only solace that it can have--8,some melodious tear40 ,this1 of course1 brings the image of the ,muses1 and as that thought comes1 once more we have a new attempt at a formal beginning in the second paragraph 7line #ae74 ,first1 is the invocation1 and then1 recurring to the first thought1 ,milton says it is peculiarly appropriate for him to sing of ,lycidas4 ,why8 ,because they had been so long together1 and as the thought of happier things arises1 the sweet memories1 linked by the chain of association1 come thronging so tumultuously that he forgets himself in reverie4 ,the music1 at first slow and sweet1 grows more and more strong and rapid till even the rustic dance-measure comes in merrily4 ,most naturally here the key-note is again struck by the force of contrast1 and the despair of the sorrow that wakes from the forgetfulness of pleasant dreams to the consciousness of loss1 strikes as rapidly its minor chords till it seems as if hope were entirely lost4 ,nothing is more unreasonable than this despair of sorrow4 ,tossed in its own wild passion1 it sees nothing clearly1 and seeking for some adequate cause1 heaps blindly unmerited reproaches on anything1 on all things4 ,so1 recoiling before its power1 stung with its pain1 the poet turns reproachfully to the nymphs1 blaming them for their negligence4 ,but before the words are fairly uttered he realizes his folly4 ,lycidas was beloved by them1 but if ,calliope could not save even her own son1 how powerless are they against the step of inevitable fate6 ,this strikes deep down in the thunder of the bass notes1 and the thought comes which perhaps cannot be more powerfully expressed than by the old ,hebrew refrain1 8,vanity of vanities1 all is vanity40 ,after all1 why seek for anything1 even for fame8 ,man's destiny is ruled by irresponsible necessity4 ,life is worth nothing1 and would it not be better1 instead of 8scorning delights and living laborious days10 to yield one's self to the pleasures of the passing moment8 8,all is vanity and vexation of spirit40 ,when any soul reaches this point1 it seems as if help must come from outside of itself or it will go irrevocably down4 ,sorrow1 despair1 are always represented by darkness4 ,is it an accident that the celestial notes which first strike through the descending bass1 come from the god of light1 ,phbus ,apollo8 ,clear1 and sweet1 and sudden1 they cleave the closing shadows1 the sunlight comes in again1 and the music climbs up and grows serenely steady4 ,relieved from this ,inferno the soul comes once more to self-consciousness1 and in its effort to guide itself1 what more natural than that it should recur to the idea expressed in the fiftieth line1 and attempt to make something like order by carrying out that idea4 ,reason takes command1 and the strain flows smoothly1 till1 by the exercise of her power1 the true cause of the misfortune is recognized and a just indignation 7line #ajj7 takes its place4 ,but in yielding to this1 the immediate feeling regains possession1 reason resigns her sway1 and the soul is set afloat again on the uncertain sea of association4 ,see how sudden and sweet the transition from fiery reproach and invective to the gentlest tenderness1 in line #ajb4 ,it begins with a thunder peal and dies out in a wail of affection1 expressed by the one word 8sacred40 ,this forms the connection between this paragraph and the next1 a delicate yet perfect link1 for as all his love overflows in that one word1 the old happier days come up again2 and where should these memories carry him but to the university where they had found so much common pleasure and inspiration4 ,here the sorrow1 before entirely personal1 becomes wider as the singer feels that others grieve with him for lost talent and power4 ,were they not both destined for the church for which their university studies were only a preparation8 ,most naturally the subtle chain of association brings up the thought of the great apostle with the keys of heaven and hell4 ,how sorely the church needed true teachers6 ,the earnest spirit that was ready to assail every form of wrong1 eagerly followed out the thought which was in the future to burn into its very life4 ,from line #aac to line #aca notice the succession of feelings4 ,a sense of irreparable loss--indignation--mark the three words1 8creep10 8intrude10 and 8climb10 no one of which could be spared4 ,then comes disgust1 expressed by 8,blind mouths40 ,ruskin1 in his 8,kings' ,treasures10 very happily observes that no epithet could be more sweeping than this1 for as the office of a bishop is to oversee the flock1 and that of a pastor to feed it1 the utter want of all qualification for the sacred office is here most forcibly expressed4 ,contempt follows2 then pity for those who1 desiring food1 are fed only with wind2 detestation of the secret and corrupt practices of the ,romish church2 and finally hope1 coming through the possible execution of ,archbishop ,laud1 whose death1 it seemed to the young ,puritan1 was the only thing needed to bring back truth1 simplicity and safety4 ,drifting with these emotions the singer has followed the lead of his fancies1 and just as before1 when light came with healing for his despair1 ,hope recalls him to himself1 till he returns again in line #acb1 as in line #he1 to the regular style of his poem4 ,he is as one who1 waking from wildering dreams1 collects his fugitive thoughts1 and tries to settle them down for the necessary routine of the day4 ,a more regular and plainly accented strain1 recognized as heard before1 comes into the music1 as he pleases himself in fancying that the sad consolation is still left him of ornamenting the hearse4 ,it is useless to speak of the exquisite finish of these lines1 or of how often one word1 as 8fresh0 for instance1 in line #ach1 calls up before the mind such pictures that one lingers and lingers over the passage1 as the poet's fancy in vain effort lingered1 striving to forget his sorrow4 ,this strain comes in like some of the repeating melodies in the second part of ,beethoven's ,fifth ,symphony1 where it seems as if the soul had found a new1 sweet thought1 and was turning it over and over as loth to pause1 and as in sudden hope of some relief through its potency4 ,but the heavy key-note strikes again through it all1 in line #aed1 with a crash that drowns all the sweetness and beauty4 ,we hear the rush of the cruel1 insatiate sea1 as its waves dash against the shore of the stormy ,hebrides1 and the conflict of wave and wind takes possession of us4 ,what thought is more desolate than that of a solitary human form1 tossed hither and thither in the vast immensity of ocean6 ,perhaps1 even now1 it floats by 8the great vision of the guarded mount40 ,it seems to the poet that all should turn toward ,england in her sorrow1 and it pains him to think of ,st4 ,michael's steadfast eyes gazing across the waves of the bay toward 8,namancos and ,bayona's hold40 8,rather turn hither and let even your heavenly face relax with human grief1 and ye1 unheeding monsters of the deep1 have pity and bear him gently over the roughening waves40 ,this he says because he feels his own impotence4 ,all the love he bears ,lycidas cannot serve him now2 he is lost1 and helpless1 and alone1 and uncared for4 ,by opposition here1 the light strikes in once more1 and now with a clearer1 fuller glow than at either previous time4 ,at first 7line #gf7 it came in the form of trust in 8all-judging ,jove02 then 7line #acj7 in hope1 through belief in impersonal justice2 now it takes the form of ,christian faith4 ,the music mounts higher and higher into celestial harmonies1 losing entirely its original character1 and sounds like a majestic choral of triumph and peace4 ,this properly ends the poem with line #ahe4 ,there is nothing more to be said4 ,the tendency is all upward1 and the collisions are overcome4 ,one knows that here1 and here for the first time1 have we reached a movement that is self-sustained4 ,there is no more danger of being carried off our basis by any wave of despairing sorrow4 ,the soul has found a solution at last1 and it knows that it is a trustworthy one4 ,the music is finished2 but now1 that nothing may be wanting for perfect effect1 we have the scenery added1 and this in such word-painting as has never been surpassed4 ,who could ever weary of line #ahg--8,while the still morn went out with sandals gray10--either for its melody or for its subtle appeal to our senses of hearing and sight8 ,and the slowly growing and dying day6 ,who else has ever so 8touched the tender stops0 of imagination8 ,but these woods and pastures are too full of haunting memories2 we seek for newer ones1 where the soul1 relieved from the associations which perpetually call up the loss of the human and now lifeless embodiment of spirit1 shall be free to think only of the eternal holding and possessing which can be sundered by no accident of time or space4 ,,analysis ,,of ,,hegel',s ,,sthetics4 ,translated from the ,french of ,m4 ,ch4 ,bnard1 by ,j4 ,a4 ,martling4 ,part ,,ii4 ,,of ,,the ,,general ,,forms ,,of ,,art ,,and ,,its ,,historic ,,development4 ,the first part of ,hegel's sthetics contains the questions relating to the nature of art in general4 ,the second unfolds its principal forms in the different historic epochs4 ,it is a species of philosophy of the history of art1 and contains a great number of views and descriptions which cannot appear in this analysis4 ,we shall take so much the more care1 without suffering ourselves to be turned aside by details1 to indicate plainly the course of the ideas1 and to omit nothing essential4 ,the idea of the ,beautiful1 or the ,ideal1 manifests itself under three essential and fundamental forms--the symbolic1 the classic1 and the romantic4 ,they represent the three grand epochs of history--the oriental1 the ,greek1 and the modern4 ,in the ,east1 thought1 still vague and indeterminate1 seeks its true expression and cannot find it4 ,in the presence of the phenomena of nature and of human life1 spirit1 in its infancy1 incapable of seizing the true sense of things1 and of comprehending itself1 exhausts itself in vain efforts to express certain grand1 but confused or obscure conceptions4 ,instead of uniting and blending together in a harmonious whole the content and the form1 the idea and its image1 it attains only a rude and superficial approximation1 and the result is the symbol with its enigmatic and mysterious meaning4 ,in classic art1 on the contrary1 this harmonious blending of the form and the idea is accomplished4 ,intelligence1 having taken cognizance of itself and of its freedom1 capable of self-control1 of penetrating the significance of the phenomena of the universe1 and of interpreting its laws1 finds here also the exact correspondence1 the measure and the proportion which are the characteristics of beauty4 ,art creates works which represent the beautiful under its purest and most perfect form4 ,but spirit can not rest in this precise accord of the form and the idea1 in which the infinite and the finite blend4 ,when it comes to be reflected upon itself1 to penetrate farther into the depths of its inner nature1 to take cognizance of its spirituality and its freedom1 then the idea of the infinite appears to it stripped of the natural forms which envelop it4 ,this idea1 present in all its conceptions1 can no longer be perfectly expressed by the forms of the finite world2 it transcends them1 and then this unity1 which constitutes the characteristic of classic art1 is broken4 ,external forms1 sensuous images1 are no longer adequate to the expression of the soul and its free spirituality4 ,i4 ,of ,symbolic ,art4 ,after these general considerations1 ,hegel treats successively the different forms of art4 ,before speaking of symbolic art1 he furnishes an exposition of the symbol in general4 ,the symbol is an image which represents an idea4 ,it is distinguished from the signs of language in this1 that between the image1 and the idea which it represents1 there is a natural relation1 not an arbitrary or conventional one4 ,it is thus that the lion is the symbol of courage2 the circle1 of eternity2 the triangle1 of the ,trinity4 ,the symbol1 however1 does not represent the idea perfectly1 but by a single side4 ,the lion is not merely courageous2 the fox1 cunning4 ,whence it follows that the symbol1 having many meanings1 is equivocal4 ,this ambiguity ceases only when the two terms are conceived separately and then brought into relation2 the symbol then gives place to comparison4 ,thus conceived1 the symbol1 with its enigmatic and mysterious character1 is peculiarly adapted to an entire epoch of history1 to oriental art and its extraordinary creations4 ,it characterizes that order of monuments and emblems by which the people of the ,east have sought to express their ideas1 and have been able to do it only in an equivocal and obscure manner4 ,these works of art present to us1 instead of beauty and regularity1 a strange1 imposing1 fantastic aspect4 ,in the development of this form of art in the ,east1 many degrees are noticeable4 ,let us first examine its origin4 ,the sentiment of art1 like the religious sentiment or scientific curiosity1 is born of wonder4 ,the man who is astonished at nothing lives in a state of imbecility and stupidity4 ,this state ceases when his spirit1 freeing itself from matter and from physical wants1 is struck by the spectacle of the phenomena of nature1 and seeks their meaning1 when it has the presentiment of something grand and mysterious in them1 of a concealed power which is revealed there4 ,then it experiences also the need of representing that inner sentiment of a general and universal power4 ,particular objects--the elements1 the sea1 rivers1 mountains--lose their immediate sense and significance1 and become for spirit images of this invisible power4 ,it is then that art appears2 it arises from the necessity of representing this idea by sensuous images1 addressed at once to the senses and the spirit4 ,the idea of an absolute power1 in religions1 is manifested at first by the worship of physical objects4 ,the ,divinity is identified with nature itself4 ,but this rude worship cannot endure4 ,instead of seeing the absolute in real objects1 man conceives it as a distinct and universal being2 he seizes1 although very imperfectly1 the relation which unites this invisible principle to the objects of nature2 he fashions an image1 a symbol designed to represent it4 ,art is then the interpreter of religious ideas4 ,such is art in its origin2 the symbolic form is born with it4 ,let us now follow it in the successive stages of its development1 and indicate its progress in the ,east before it attained to the ,greek ideal4 ,that which characterizes symbolic art is that it strives in vain to discover pure conceptions1 and a mode of representation which befits them4 ,it is the conflict between the content and the form1 both imperfect and heterogeneous4 ,hence the incessant struggle of these two elements of art1 which vainly seek to harmonize4 ,the stages of its development exhibit the successive phases or modes of this struggle4 ,at the outset1 however1 this conflict does not yet exist1 or art is not conscious of it4 ,the point of departure is a unity yet undivided1 in whose depths the discord between the two principles ferments4 ,thus the creations of art1 but little distinct from the objects of nature1 are as yet scarcely symbols4 ,the end of this epoch is the disappearance of the symbol4 ,it takes place by the reflective separation of the two terms4 ,the idea being clearly conceived1 the symbol on its side being perceived as distinct from the idea1 from their conjunction arises the reflex symbol1 or the comparison1 the allegory1 etc4 ,these principles having been laid down a priori1 ,hegel seeks among the people of the ,east the forms of art which correspond to these various degrees of oriental symbolism4 ,he finds them chiefly among the ancient ,persians1 in ,india1 and in ,egypt4 #a4 ,persian ,art4--,at the first moment of the history of art1 the divine principle1 ,god1 appears identified with nature and man4 ,in the worship of the ,lama1 for example1 a real man is adored as ,god4 ,in other religions the sun1 the mountains1 the rivers1 the moon1 and animals1 are also the objects of religious worship4 ,the spectacle of this unity of ,god and nature is presented to us in the most striking manner in the life and religion of the ancient ,persians1 in the ,zend-,avesta4 ,in the religion of ,zoroaster1 light is ,god himself4 ,god is not distinguished from light viewed as a simple expression1 an emblem or sensuous image of the ,divinity4 ,if light is taken in the sense of the good and just ,being1 of the conserving principle of the ,universe1 which diffuses everywhere life and its blessings1 it is not merely an image of the good principle2 the sovereign good itself is light4 ,it is the same with the opposition of light and darkness1 the latter being considered as the impure element in every thing--the hideous1 the bad1 the principle of death and destruction4 ,hegel seeks to demonstrate this opinion by an analysis of the principal ideas which form the content of the ,zend-,avesta4 ,according to him1 the worship which the ,zend-,avesta describes1 is still less symbolic4 ,all the ceremonies which it imposes as a religious duty upon the ,parsees are those serious occupations that seek to extend to all1 purity in the physical and moral sense4 ,one does not find here any of those symbolic dances which imitate the course of the stars or any of those religious acts which have no value except as images and signs of general conceptions4 ,there is1 then1 in it no art properly so-called4 ,compared with ruder images or with the insignificant idols of other peoples1 the worship of light1 as pure and universal substance1 presents something beautiful1 elevated1 grand1 more conformable to the nature of the supreme good and of truth4 ,but this conception remains vague2 the imagination creates neither a profound idea nor a new form4 ,if we see appearing general types1 and the forms which correspond to them1 it is the result of an artificial combination1 not a work of poetry and art4 ,thus this unity of the invisible principle and visible objects1 constitutes only the first form of the symbol in art4 ,to attain to the symbolic form properly so-called1 it is necessary that the distinction and the separation of the two terms appear clearly indicated and represented to us4 ,it is this which takes place in the religion1 art1 and poetry of ,india1 which ,hegel calls the symbolic of the imagination4 #b4 ,indian ,art4--,the character of the monuments which betray a more advanced form and a superior degree of art1 is then the separation of the two terms4 ,intelligence forms abstract conceptions1 and seeks forms which express them4 ,imagination1 properly so-called1 is born2 art truly begins4 ,it is not1 however1 yet the true symbol4 ,what we encounter at first are the productions of an imagination which is in a state of complete ferment and agitation4 ,in the first attempt of the human spirit to separate the elements and to reunite them1 its thought is still confused and vague4 ,the principle of things is not conceived in its spiritual nature2 the ideas concerning ,god are empty abstractions2 at the same time the forms which represent ,him bear a character exclusively sensuous and material4 ,still plunged in the contemplation of the sensuous world1 having neither measure nor fixed rule to determine reality1 man exhausts himself in useless efforts to penetrate the general meaning of the universe1 and can employ1 to express the profoundest thoughts1 only rude images and representations1 in which there flashes out the opposition between the idea and the form4 ,the imagination passes thus from one extreme to the other1 lifting itself very high to plunge yet lower1 wandering without support1 without guide1 and without aim1 in a world of representations at once imposing1 fantastic and grotesque4 ,hegel characterizes the ,indian mythology1 and the art which corresponds to it1 thus3 8,in the midst of these abrupt and inconsiderate leaps1 of this passage from one excess to another1 if we find anything of grandeur and an imposing character in these conceptions1 we see afterwards the universal being1 precipitated into the most ignoble forms of the sensuous world4 ,the imagination can escape from this contradiction only by extending indefinitely the dimensions of the form4 ,it wanders amid gigantic creations1 characterized by the absence of all measure1 and loses itself in the vague or the arbitrary40 ,hegel develops and confirms these propositions1 by following the ,indian imagination in the principal points which distinguish its art1 its poetry1 and its mythology4 ,he makes it apparent that1 in spite of the fertility1 the splendor1 and the grandeur of these conceptions1 the ,indians have never had a clear idea of persons and events--a faculty for history2 that in this continual mingling of the finite and the infinite1 there appears the complete absence of practical intelligence and reason4 ,thought is suffered to run after the most extravagant and monstrous chimeras that the imagination can bring forth4 ,thus the conception of ,brahma is the abstract idea of being with neither life nor reality1 deprived of real form and personality4 ,from this idealism pushed to the extreme1 the intelligence precipitates itself into the most unbridled naturalism4 ,it deifies objects of nature1 the animals4 ,the divinity appears under the form of an idiot man1 deified because he belongs to a caste4 ,each individual1 because he is born in that caste1 represents ,brahma in person4 ,the union of man with ,god is lowered to the level of a simply material fact4 ,thence also the rle which the law of the generation of beings plays in this religion1 which gives rise to the most obscene representations4 ,hegel1 at the same time1 sets forth the contradictions which swarm in this religion1 and the confusion which reigns in all this mythology4 ,he establishes a parallel between the ,indian trinity and the ,christian ,trinity1 and shows their difference4 ,the three persons of this trinity are not persons2 each of them is an abstraction in relation to the others2 whence it follows that if this trinity has any analogy with the ,christian ,trinity1 it is inferior to it1 and we ought to be guarded against recognizing the ,christian tenet in it4 ,examining next the part which corresponds to ,greek polytheism1 he demonstrates likewise its inferiority2 he makes apparent the confusion of those innumerable theogonies and cosmogonies which contradict and destroy themselves2 and where1 in fine1 the idea of natural and not of spiritual generation is uppermost1 where obscenity is frequently pushed to the last degree4 ,in the ,greek fables1 in the theogony of ,hesiod in particular1 one frequently obtains at least a glimpse of a moral meaning4 ,all is more clear and more explicit1 more strongly coherent1 and we do not remain shut up in the circle of the divinities of nature4 ,nevertheless1 in refusing to ,indian art the idea of the truly beautiful1 and indeed of the truly sublime1 ,hegel recognizes that it offers to us1 principally in its poetry1 8scenes of human life1 full of attractiveness and sweetness1 many agreeable images and tender sentiments1 most brilliant descriptions of nature1 charming features of childlike simplicity and artless innocence in love2 at the same time1 occasionally1 much grandeur and nobleness40 ,but as to that which concerns fundamental conceptions in their totality1 the spiritual cannot disengage itself from the sensuous4 ,we encounter the most insipid triviality in connection with the most elevated situations--a complete absence of precision and proportion4 ,the sublime is only the measureless2 and as to whatever lies at the foundation of the myth1 the imagination1 dizzy1 and incapable of mastering the flight of the thought1 loses itself in the fantastic1 or brings forth only enigmas which have no significance for reason4 #c4 ,egyptian ,art4--,thus the creations of the ,indian imagination appear to realize only imperfectly the idea of the symbolic form itself4 ,it is in ,egypt1 among the monuments of ,egyptian art1 that we find the type of the true symbol4 ,it is thus characterized3 ,in the first stage of art1 we started from the confusion and identity of content and form1 of spirit and nature4 ,next form and content are separated and opposed4 ,imagination has sought vainly to combine them1 and is successful only in making clear their disproportion4 ,in order that thought may be free1 it is necessary that it get rid of its material form--that it destroy it4 ,the moment of destruction1 of negation1 or annihilation1 is then necessary in order that spirit arrive at consciousness of itself and its spirituality4 ,this idea of death as a moment of the divine nature is already contained in the ,indian religion2 but it is only a changing1 a transformation1 and an abstraction4 ,the gods are annihilated and pass the one into the other1 and all in their turn into a single being--,brahma1 the universal being4 ,in the ,persian religion the two principles1 negative and positive--,ormuzd and ,ahriman--exist separately and remain separated4 ,now this principle of negation1 of death and resurrection1 as moments and attributes of the divine nature1 constitutes the foundation of a new religion2 this thought is expressed in it by the forms of its worship1 and appears in all its conceptions and monuments4 ,it is the fundamental characteristic of the art and religion of ,egypt4 ,thus we see the glorification of death and of suffering1 as the annihilation of sensuous nature1 appear in the consciousness of peoples in the worships of ,asia ,minor1 of ,phrygia and ,phoenicia4 ,but if death is a necessary 8moment0 in the life of the absolute1 it does not rest in that annihilation2 this is1 in order to pass to a superior existence1 to arrive1 after the destruction of visible existence1 by resurrection1 at divine immortality4 ,death is only the birth of a more elevated principle and the triumph of spirit4 ,henceforth1 physical form1 in art1 loses its independent value and its separate existence2 still further1 the conflict of form and idea ought to cease4 ,form is subordinated to idea4 ,that fermentation of the imagination which produces the fantastic1 quiets itself and is calm4 ,the previous conceptions are replaced by a mode of representation1 enigmatic1 it is true1 but superior1 and which offers to us the true character of the symbol4 ,the idea begins to assert itself4 ,on its side1 the symbol takes a form more precise2 the spiritual principle is revealed more clearly1 and frees itself from physical nature1 although it cannot yet appear in all its clearness4 ,the following mode of representation corresponds to this idea of symbolic art3 in the first place1 the forms of nature and human actions express something other than themselves2 they reveal the divine principle by qualities which are in real analogy with it4 ,the phenomena and the laws of nature1 which1 in the different kingdoms1 represent life1 birth1 growth1 death and the resurrection of beings1 are preferred4 ,such are the germination and the growth of plants1 the phases of the course of the sun1 the succession of the seasons1 the phenomena of the increase and decrease of the ,nile1 etc4 ,here1 because of the real resemblance and of natural analogies1 the fantastic is abandoned4 ,one observes a more intelligent choice of symbolic forms4 ,there is an imagination which already knows how to regulate itself and to control itself--which shows more of calmness and reason4 ,here then appears a higher conciliation of idea and form1 and at the same time an extraordinary tendency towards art1 an irresistible inclination which is satisfied in a manner wholly symbolic1 but superior to the previous modes4 ,it is the proper tendency towards art1 and principally towards the figurative arts4 ,hence the necessity of finding and fashioning a form1 an emblem which may express the idea and may be subordinated to it2 of creating a work which may reveal to spirit a general conception2 of presenting a spectacle which may show that these forms have been chosen for the purpose of expressing profound ideas4 ,this emblematic or symbolic combination can be effected in various ways4 ,the most abstract expression is number4 ,the symbolism of numbers plays a very important part in ,egyptian art4 ,the sacred numbers recur unceasingly in flights of steps1 columns1 etc4 ,there are1 moreover1 symbolic figures traced in space1 the windings of the labyrinth1 the sacred dances which represent the movements of the heavenly bodies4 ,in a higher grade is placed the human form1 already moulded to a higher perfection than in ,india4 ,a general symbol sums up the principal idea2 it is the phnix1 which consumes itself and rises from its ashes4 ,in the myths which serve for the transition1 as those of ,asia ,minor--in the myth of ,adonis mourned by ,venus2 in that of ,castor and ,pollux1 and in the fable of ,proserpine1 this idea of death and resurrection is very apparent4 ,it is ,egypt1 above all1 which has symbolized this idea4 ,egypt is the land of the symbol4 ,however1 the problems are not resolved4 ,the enigmas of ,egyptian art were enigmas to the ,egyptians themselves4 ,however this may be in the ,east1 the ,egyptians1 among eastern nations1 are the truly artistic people4 ,they show an indefatigable activity in satisfying that longing for symbolic representation which torments them4 ,but their monuments remain mysterious and mute4 ,the spirit has not yet found the form which is appropriate to it2 it does not yet know how to speak the clear and intelligible language of spirit4 8,they were1 above all1 an architectural people2 they excavated the soil1 scooped out lakes1 and1 with their instinct of art1 elevated gigantic structures into the light of day1 and executed under the soil works equally immense4 ,it was the occupation1 the life of this people1 which covered the land with monuments1 nowhere else in so great quantity and under forms so varied40 ,if we wish to characterize in a more precise manner the monuments of ,egyptian art1 and to penetrate the sense of them1 we discover the following aspects3 ,in the first place1 the principal idea1 the idea of death1 is conceived as a 8moment0 of the life of spirit1 not as a principle of evil2 this is the opposite of the ,persian dualism4 ,nor is there an absorption of beings into the universal ,being1 as in the ,indian religion4 ,the invisible preserves its existence and its personality2 it preserves even its physical form4 ,hence the embalmings1 the worship of the dead4 ,moreover1 the imagination is lifted higher than this visible duration4 ,among the ,egyptians1 for the first time1 appears the clear distinction of soul and body1 and the dogma of immortality4 ,this idea1 nevertheless1 is still imperfect1 for they accord an equal importance to the duration of the body and that of the soul4 ,such is the conception which serves as a foundation for ,egyptian art1 and which betrays itself under a multitude of symbolic forms4 ,it is in this idea that we must seek the meaning of the works of ,egyptian architecture4 ,two worlds--the world of the living and that of the dead2 two architectures--the one on the surface of the ground1 the other subterranean4 ,the labyrinths1 the tombs1 and1 above all1 the pyramids1 represent this idea4 ,the pyramid1 image of symbolic art1 is a species of envelope1 cut in crystalline form1 which conceals a mystic object1 an invisible being4 ,hence1 also1 the exterior1 superstitious side of worship1 an excess difficult to escape1 the adoration of the divine principle in animals1 a gross worship which is no longer even symbolic4 ,hieroglyphic writing1 another form of ,egyptian art1 is itself in great part symbolic1 since it makes ideas known by images borrowed from nature1 and which have some analogy with those ideas4 ,but a defect betrays itself1 especially in the representations of the human form4 ,in fact1 though a mysterious and spiritual force is there revealed1 it is not true personality4 ,the internal principle fails2 action and impulse come from without4 ,such are the statues of ,memnon1 which are animate1 have a voice1 and give forth a sound1 only when struck by the rays of the sun4 ,it is not the human voice which comes from within--an echo of the soul4 ,this free principle which animates the human form1 remains here concealed1 wrapped up1 mute1 without proper spontaneity1 and is only animated under the influence of nature4 ,a superior form is that of the ,myth of ,osiris1 the ,egyptian god1 par excellence--that god who is engendered1 born1 dies and is resuscitated4 ,in this myth1 which offers various significations1 physical1 historical1 moral1 and religious or metaphysical1 is shown the superiority of these conceptions over those of ,indian art4 ,in general1 in ,egyptian art1 there is revealed a profounder1 more spiritual1 and more moral character4 ,the human form is no longer a simple1 abstract personification4 ,religion and art attempt to spiritualize themselves2 they do not attain their object1 but they catch sight of it and aspire to it4 ,from this imperfection arises the absence of freedom in the human form4 ,the human figure still remains without expression1 colossal1 serious1 rigid4 ,thus is explained those attitudes of the ,egyptian statues1 the arms stiff1 pressed against the body1 without grace1 without movement1 and without life1 but absorbed in profound thought1 and full of seriousness4 ,hence also the complication of the elements and symbols1 which are intermingled and reflected the one in the other2 a thing which indicates the freedom of spirit1 but also an absence of clearness and definiteness4 ,hence the obscure1 enigmatic character of those symbols1 which always cause scholars to despair--enigmas to the ,egyptians themselves4 ,these emblems involve a multitude of profound meanings4 ,they remain there as a testimony of fruitless efforts of spirit to comprehend itself1 a symbolism full of mysteries1 a vast enigma represented by a symbol which sums up all these enigmas--the sphinx4 ,this enigma ,egypt will propose to ,greece1 who herself will make of it the problems of religion and philosophy4 ,the sense of this enigma1 never solved1 and yet always solving1 is 8,man1 know thyself40--,such is the maxim which ,greece inscribed on the front of her temples1 the problem which she presented to her sages as the very end of wisdom4 #d4 ,hebrew ,poetry4--,in this review of the different forms of art and of worship among the different nations of the east1 mention should be made of a religion which is characterized precisely by the rejection of all symbol1 and in this respect is little favorable to art1 but whose poetry bears the impress of grandeur and sublimity4 ,and thus ,hegel designates ,hebrew ,poetry by the title of ,art of the ,sublime4 ,at the same time he casts a glance upon ,mahometan pantheism1 which also proscribes images1 and banishes from its temples every figurative representation of the ,divinity4 ,the sublime1 as ,kant has well described it1 is the attempt to express the infinite in the finite1 without finding any sensuous form which is capable of representing it4 ,it is the infinite1 manifested under a form which1 making clear this opposition1 reveals the immeasurable grandeur of the infinite as surpassing all representation in finite forms4 ,now1 here1 two points of view are to be distinguished4 ,either the infinite is the ,absolute ,being conceived by thought1 as the immanent substance of things1 or it is the ,infinite ,being as distinct from the beings of the real world1 but elevating itself above them by the entire distance which separates it from the finite1 so that1 compared with it1 they are only pure nothing4 ,god is thus purified from all contact1 from all participation with sensuous existence1 which disappears and is annihilated in his presence4 ,to the first point of view corresponds oriental pantheism4 ,god is there conceived as the absolute ,being1 immanent in objects the most diverse1 in the sun1 the sea1 the rivers1 the trees1 etc4 ,a conception like this cannot be expressed by the figurative arts1 but only by poetry4 ,where pantheism is pure1 it admits no sensuous representation and proscribes images4 ,we find this pantheism in ,india4 ,all the superior gods of the ,indian mythology are absorbed in the ,absolute unity1 or in ,brahm4 ,oriental pantheism is developed in a more formal and brilliant manner in ,mahometanism1 and in particular among the ,persian ,mahometans4 ,but the truly sublime is that which is represented by ,hebrew poetry4 ,here1 for the first time1 ,god appears truly as ,spirit1 as the invisible ,being in opposition to nature4 ,on the other side1 the entire universe1 in spite of the richness and magnificence of its phenomena1 compared with the ,being supremely great1 is nothing by itself4 ,simple creation of ,god1 subject to his power1 it only exists to manifest and glorify him4 ,such is the idea which forms the ground of that poetry1 the characteristic of which is sublimity4 ,in the beautiful the idea pierces through the external reality of which it is the soul1 and forms with it a harmonious unity4 ,in the sublime1 the visible reality1 where the ,infinite is manifested1 is abased in its presence4 ,this superiority1 this exaltation of the ,infinite over the finite1 the infinite distance which separates them1 is what the art of the sublime should express4 ,it is religious art--preminently1 sacred art2 its unique design is to celebrate the glory of ,god4 ,this rle1 poetry alone can fill4 ,the prevailing idea of ,hebrew poetry is ,god as master of the world1 ,god in his independent existence and pure essence1 inaccessible to sense and to all sensuous representation which does not correspond to his grandeur4 ,god is the ,creator of the universe4 ,all gross ideas concerning the generation of beings give place to that of a spiritual creation3 8,let there be light1 and there was light40 ,that sentence indicates a creation by word--expression of thought and of will4 ,creation then takes a new aspect1 nature and man are no longer deified4 ,to the infinite is clearly opposed the finite1 which is no longer confounded with the divine principle as in the symbolic conceptions of other peoples4 ,situations and events are delineated more clearly4 ,the characters assume a more fixed and precise meaning4 ,they are human figures which offer no more anything fantastic and strange2 they are perfectly intelligible and accessible to us4 ,on the other side1 in spite of his powerlessness and his nothingness1 man obtains here freer and more independent place than in other religions4 ,the immutable character of the divine will gives birth to the idea of law to which man must be subject4 ,his conduct becomes enlightened1 fixed1 regular4 ,the perfect distinction of human and divine1 of finite and infinite1 brings in that of good and evil1 and permits an enlightened choice4 ,merit and demerit is the consequence of it4 ,to live according to justice in the fulfilment of law is the end of human existence1 and it places man in direct communication with ,god4 ,here is the principle and explanation of his whole life1 of his happiness and his misery4 ,the events of life are considered as blessings1 as recompenses1 or as trials and chastisements4 ,here also appears the miracle4 ,elsewhere1 all was prodigious1 and1 by consequence1 nothing was miraculous4 ,the miracle supposes a regular succession1 a constant order1 and an interruption of that order4 ,but the whole entire creation is a perpetual miracle1 designed for the glorification and praise of ,god4 ,such are the ideas which are expressed with so much splendor1 elevation and poetry1 in the ,psalms--classic examples of the truly sublime--in the ,prophets1 and the sacred books in general4 ,this recognition of the nothingness of things1 of the greatness and omnipotence of ,god1 of the unworthiness of man in his presence1 the complaints1 the lamentations1 the outcry of the soul towards ,god1 constitute their pathos and their sublimity4 ,of the ,reflex ,symbol4 ,fable1 ,apologue1 ,allegory1 etc4--,we have run over the different forms which symbolism presents among the different people of the ,east1 and we have seen it disappear in the sublime1 which places the infinite so far above the finite that it can no longer be represented by sensuous forms1 but only celebrated in its grandeur and its power4 ,before passing to another epoch of art1 ,hegel points out1 as a transition from the oriental symbol to the ,greek ideal1 a mixed form whose basis is comparison4 ,this form1 which also belongs principally to the ,east1 is manifested in different kinds of poetry1 such as the fable1 the apologue1 the proverb1 allegory1 and comparison1 properly so-called4 ,the author develops in the following manner the nature of this form and the place which he assigns to it in the development of art3 ,in the symbol1 properly so-called1 the idea and the form1 although distinct and even opposed1 as in the sublime1 are reunited by an essential and necessary tie2 the two elements are not strangers to one another1 and the spirit seizes the relation immediately4 ,now the separation of the two terms1 which has already its beginning in the symbol1 ought also to be clearly effected1 and find its place in the development of art4 ,and as spirit works no longer spontaneously1 but with reflection1 it is also in a reflective manner that it brings the two terms together4 ,this form of art1 whose basis is comparison1 may be called the reflexive symbolic in opposition to the irreflexive symbolic1 whose principal forms we have studied4 ,thus1 in this form of art1 the connection of the two elements is no more1 as heretofore1 a connection founded upon the nature of the idea2 it is more or less the result of an artificial combination which depends upon the will of the poet1 or his vigor of imagination1 and on his genius1 for invention4 ,sometimes it starts from a sensuous phenomenon to which he lends a spiritual meaning1 an idea1 by making use of some analogy4 ,sometimes it is an idea which he seeks to clothe with a sensuous form1 or with an image1 by a certain resemblance4 ,this mode of conception is clear but superficial4 ,in the ,east it plays a distinct part1 or appears to prevail as one of the characteristic traits of oriental thought4 ,later1 in the grand composition of classic or romantic poetry1 it is subordinated2 it furnishes ornaments and accessories1 allegories1 images and metaphors2 it constitutes secondary varieties4 ,hegel then divides this form of art1 and classes the varieties to which it gives rise4 ,he distinguishes1 for this purpose1 two points of view3 first1 the case when the sensuous fact is presented first to spirit1 and spirit afterwards gives it a signification1 as in the fable1 the parable1 the apologue1 the proverb1 the metamorphoses2 second1 the case where1 on the other hand1 it is the idea which appears first to the spirit1 and the poet afterwards seeks to adapt to it an image1 a sensuous form1 by way of comparison4 ,such are the enigma1 the allegory1 the metaphor1 the image1 and the comparison4 ,we shall not follow the author in the developments which he thinks necessary to give to the analysis of each of these inferior forms of poetry or art4#b ,,ii4 ,of ,classic ,art4 ,the aim of art is to represent the ideal1 that is to say1 the perfect accord of the two elements of the beautiful1 the idea and the sensuous form4 ,now this object symbolic art endeavors vainly to attain4 ,sometimes it is nature with its blind force which forms the ground of its representations2 sometimes it is the spiritual ,being1 which it conceives in a vague manner1 and which it personifies in inferior divinities4 ,between the idea and the form there is revealed a simple affinity1 an external correspondence4 ,the attempt to reconcile them makes clearer the opposition2 or art1 in wishing to express spirit1 only creates obscure enigmas4 ,everywhere there is betrayed the absence of true personality and of freedom4 ,for these are able to unfold1 only with the clear consciousness of itself that spirit achieves4 ,we have met1 it is true1 this idea of the nature of spirit as opposed to the sensuous world1 clearly expressed in the religion and poetry of the ,hebrew people4 ,but what is born of this opposition is not the ,beautiful1 it is the ,sublime4 ,a living sentiment of personality is further manifest in the ,east1 in the ,arabic race4 ,in the scorching deserts1 in the midst of free space1 it has ever been distinguished by this trait of independence and individuality1 which betrays itself by hatred of the stranger1 thirst for vengeance1 a deliberate cruelty1 also by love1 by greatness of soul and devotion1 and1 above all1 by passion for adventure4 ,this race is also distinguished by a mind free and clear1 ingenious and full of subtlety1 lively1 brilliant--of which it has given so many proofs in the arts and sciences4 ,but we have here only a superficial side1 devoid of profundity and universality2 it is not true personality supported on a solid basis1 on a knowledge of the spirit and of the moral nature4 ,all these elements1 separate or united1 cannot1 then1 present the ,ideal4 ,they are antecedents1 conditions1 and materials1 and1 together1 offer nothing which corresponds to the idea of real beauty4 ,this ideal beauty we shall find realized1 for the first time1 among the ,greek race and in ,classic art1 which we now propose to characterize4 ,in order that the two elements of beauty may be perfectly harmonized1 it is necessary that the first1 the idea1 be the spirit itself1 possessed of the consciousness of its nature and of its free personality4 ,if one is then asked1 what is the form which corresponds to this idea1 which expresses the personal1 individual spirit1 the only answer is1 the human form1 for it alone is capable of manifesting spirit4 ,classic art1 which represents free spirituality under an individual form1 is then necessarily anthropomorphic4 ,anthropomorphism is its very essence1 and we shall do it wrong to make of this a reproach4 ,christian art and the ,christian religion are themselves anthropomorphic1 and this they are in a still higher degree since ,god made himself really man1 since ,christ is not a mere divine personification conceived by the imagination1 since he is both truly ,god and truly man4 ,he passed through all the phases of earthly existence2 he was born1 he suffered1 and he died4 ,in classic art sensuous nature does not die1 but it has no resurrection4 ,thus this religion does not fully satisfy the human soul4 ,the ,greek ideal has for basis an unchangeable harmony between the spirit and the sensuous form1 the unalterable serenity of the immortal gods2 but this calm is somewhat frigid and inanimate4 ,classic art did not take in the true essence of the divine nature1 nor penetrate the depths of the soul4 ,it could not unveil the innermost powers in their opposition1 or re-establish their harmony4 ,all this phase of existence1 wickedness1 misfortune1 moral suffering1 the revolt of the will1 gnawings and rendings of the soul1 were unknown to it4 ,it did not pass beyond the proper domain of sensuous beauty2 but it represented it perfectly4 ,this ideal of classic beauty was realized by the ,greeks4 ,the most favorable conditions for unfolding it were found combined among them4 ,the geographical position1 the genius of that people1 its moral character1 its political life1 all could not but aid the accomplishment of that idea of classic beauty1 whose characteristics are proportion1 measure1 and harmony4 ,placed between ,asia and ,europe1 ,greece realized the accord of personal liberty and public manners1 of the ,state and the individual1 of spirit general and particular4 ,its genius1 a mixture of spontaneity and reflection1 presented an equal fusion of contraries4 ,the feeling of this auspicious harmony pierces through all the productions of the ,greek mind4 ,it was the moment of youth in the life of humanity--a fleeting age1 a moment unique and irrevocable1 like that of beauty in the individual4 ,art attains then the culminating point of sensuous beauty under the form of plastic individuality4 ,the worship of the ,beautiful is the entire life of the ,greek race4 ,thus religion and art are identified4 ,all forms of ,greek civilization are subordinate to art4 ,it is important here to determine the new position of the artist in the production of works of art4 ,art appears here not as a production of nature1 but as a creation of the individual spirit4 ,it is the work of a free spirit which is conscious of itself1 which is self-possessed1 which has nothing vague or obscure in its thought1 and finds itself hindered by no technical difficulty4 ,this new position of the ,greek artist manifests itself in content1 form1 and technical skill4 ,with regard to the content1 or the ideas which it ought to represent1 in opposition to symbolic art1 where the spirit gropes and seeks without power to arrive at a clear notion1 the artist finds the idea already made in the dogma1 the popular faith1 and a complete1 precise idea1 of which he renders to himself an account4 ,nevertheless1 he does not enslave himself with it2 he accepts it1 but reproduces it freely4 ,the ,greek artists received their subjects from the popular religion2 which was an idea originally transmitted from the ,east1 but already transformed in the consciousness of the people4 ,they1 in their turn1 transformed it into the sense of the beautiful2 they both reproduced and created it4 ,but it is above all upon the form that this free activity concentrates and exercises itself4 ,while symbolic art wearies itself in seeking a thousand extraordinary forms to represent its ideas1 having neither measure nor fixed rule1 the ,greek artist confines himself to his subject1 the limits of which he respects4 ,then between the content and the form he establishes a perfect harmony1 for1 in elaborating the form1 he also perfects the content4 ,he frees them both from useless accessories1 in order to adapt the one to the other4 ,henceforth he is not checked by an immovable and traditional type2 he perfects the whole2 for content and form are inseparable2 he develops both in the serenity of inspiration4 ,as to the technical element1 ability combined with inspiration belongs to the classic artist in the highest degree4 ,nothing restrains or embarrasses him4 ,here are no hindrances as in a stationary religion1 where the forms are consecrated by usage2 in ,egypt1 for example4 ,and this ability is always increasing4 ,progress in the processes of art is necessary to the realization of pure beauty1 and the perfect execution of works of genius4 ,after these general considerations upon classic art1 ,hegel studies it more in detail4 ,he considers it #ast1 in its development2 #b;d1 in itself1 as realization of the ideal2 #c;d1 in the causes which have produced its downfall4 #a4 ,in what concerns the development of ,greek art1 the author dwells long upon the history and progress of mythology4 ,this is because religion and art are confused4 ,the central point of ,greek art is ,olympus and its beautiful divinities4 ,the following are what are1 according to ,hegel1 the principal stages of the development of art1 and of the ,greek mythology4 ,the first stage of progress consists in a reaction against the ,symbolic form1 which it is interested in destroying4 ,the ,greek ,gods came from the ,east2 the ,greeks borrowed their divinities from foreign religions4 ,on the other hand1 we can say they invented them3 for invention does not exclude borrowing4 ,they transformed the ideas contained in the anterior traditions4 ,now upon what had this transformation any bearing8 ,in it is the history of polytheism and antique art1 which follows a parallel course1 and is inseparable from it4 ,the ,grecian divinities are1 first of all1 moral personages invested with the human form4 ,the first development consists1 then1 in rejecting those gross symbols1 which1 in the oriental naturalism1 form the object of worship1 and which disfigure the representations of art4 ,this progress is marked by the degradation of the animal kingdom4 ,it is clearly indicated in a great number of ceremonies and fables of polytheism1 by sacrifices of animals1 sacred hunts1 and many of the exploits attributed to heroes1 in particular the labors of ,hercules4 ,some of the fables of sop have the same meaning4 ,the metamorphoses of ,ovid are also disfigured myths1 or fables become burlesque1 of which the content1 easy to be recognized1 contains the same idea4 ,this is the opposite of the manner in which the ,egyptians considered animals4 ,nature1 here1 in place of being venerated and adored1 is lowered and degraded4 ,to wear an animal form is no longer deification2 it is the punishment of a monstrous crime4 ,the gods themselves are shamed by such a form1 and they assume it only to satisfy the passions of the sensual nature4 ,such is the signification of many of the fables of ,jupiter1 as those of ,dana1 of ,europa1 of ,leda1 of ,ganymede4 ,the representation of the generative principle in nature1 which constitutes the content of the ancient mythologies1 is here changed into a series of histories where the father of gods and men plays a rle but little edifying1 and frequently ridiculous4 ,finally1 all that part of religion which relates to sensual desires is crowded into the background1 and represented by subordinate divinities3 ,circe1 who changes men into swine2 ,pan1 ,silenus1 the ,satyrs and the ,fauns4 ,the human form predominates1 the animal being barely indicated by ears1 by little horns1 etc4 ,another advance is to be noted in the oracles4 ,the phenomena of nature1 in place of being an object of admiration and worship1 are only signs by which the gods make known their will to mortals4 ,these prophetic signs become more and more simple1 till at last it is1 above all1 the voice of man which is the organ of the oracle4 ,the oracle is ambiguous1 so that the man who receives it is obliged to interpret it1 to blend his reason with it4 ,in dramatic art1 for example1 man does not act solely by himself2 he consults the gods1 he obeys their will2 but his will is confounded with theirs2 a place is reserved for his liberty4 ,the distinction between the old and the new divinities marks still more this progress of moral liberty4 ,among the former1 who personify the powers of nature1 a gradation is already established4 ,in the first place1 the untamed and lower powers1 ,chaos1 ,tartarus1 ,erebus2 then ,uranus1 ,gea1 the ,giants and the ,titans2 in a higher rank1 ,prometheus1 at first the friend of the new gods1 the benefactor of men1 then punished by ,jupiter for that apparent beneficence2 an inconsequence which is explained through this1 that if ,prometheus taught industry to men1 he created an occasion of discords and dissensions1 by not giving them instruction more elevated1--morality1 the science of government1 the guarantees of property4 ,such is the profound sense of that myth1 and ,plato thus explains it in his dialogues4 ,another class of divinities equally ancient1 but already ethical1 although they recall the fatality of the physical laws1 are the ,eumenides1 ,dice1 and the ,furies4 ,we see appearing here the ideas of right and justice1 but of exclusive1 absolute1 strict1 unconscious right1 under the form of an implacable vengeance1 or1 like the ancient ,nemesis1 of a power which abases all that is high1 and re-establishes equality by levelling2 a thing which is the opposite of true justice4 ,finally1 this development of the classic ideal reveals itself more clearly in the theogony and genealogy of the gods1 in their origin and their succession1 by the abasement of the divinities of the previous races2 in the hostility which flashes out between them1 in the resolution which has carried away the sovereignty from the old to place it in the hands of the new divinities4 ,meanwhile the distinction develops itself to the point of engendering strife1 and the conflict becomes the principal event of mythology4 ,this conflict is that of nature and spirit1 and it is the law of the world4 ,under the historic form1 it is the perfecting of human nature1 the successive conquest of rights and property1 the amelioration of laws and of the political constitution4 ,in the religious representations1 it is the triumph of the moral divinities over the powers of nature4 ,this combat is announced as the grandest catastrophe in the history of the world3 moreover1 this is not the subject of a particular myth2 it is the principal1 decisive fact1 which constitutes the centre of this mythology4 ,the conclusion of all this in respect to the history of art and to the development of the ideal1 is that art ought to act like mythology1 and reject as unworthy all that is purely physical or animal1 that which is confused1 fantastic1 or obscure1 all gross mingling of the material and the spiritual4 ,all these creations of an ill-regulated imagination find here no more place2 they must flee before the light of the ,soul4 ,art purifies itself of all caprice1 fancy1 or symbolic accessory1 of every vague and confused idea4 ,in like manner1 the new gods form an organized and established world4 ,this unity affirms and perfects itself more in the later developments of plastic art and poetry4 ,nevertheless1 the old elements1 driven back by the accession of moral forces1 preserve a place at their side1 or are combined with them4 ,such is1 for example1 the significance and the aim of the mysteries4 ,in the new divinities1 who are ethical persons1 there remains also an echo1 a reflex of the powers of nature4 ,they present1 consequently1 a combination of the physical and the ethical element1 but the first is subordinate to the second4 ,thus1 ,neptune is the sea1 but he is besides invoked as the god of navigation and the founder of cities2 ,apollo is the ,sun1 the god of light1 but he is also the god of spiritual light1 of science and of the oracles4 ,in ,jupiter1 ,diana1 ,hercules1 and ,venus1 it is easy to discover the physical side combined with the moral sense4 ,thus1 in the new divinities1 the elements of nature1 after having been debased and degraded1 reappear and are preserved4 ,this is also true of the forms of the animal kingdom2 but the symbolic sense is more and more lost4 ,they figure no longer as accessories combined with the human form2 but are reduced to mere emblems or attributes--indicating signs1 as the eagle by the side of ,jupiter1 the peacock before ,juno1 the dove near ,venus1 where the principal myth is no more than an accidental fact1 of little importance in the life of the god1 and which1 abandoned to the imagination of the poets1 becomes the text of licentious histories4 #b4 ,after having considered the development of the ideal in ,greek art1 a development parallel to that of religion and mythology1 we have to consider it in its principal characteristics1 such as it has emanated from the creative activity or from the imagination of the poet and the artist4 ,this mythology has its origin in the previous religions1 but its gods are the creation of ,homer and ,hesiod4 ,tradition furnished the materials2 but the idea which each god ought to represent1 and1 besides1 the form which expresses it in its purity and simplicity--this is what was not given4 ,this ideal type the poets drew from their genius1 discovering also the true form which befitted it4 ,thereby they were creators of that mythology which we admire in ,greek art1 and which is confounded with it4 ,the ,greek gods have no less their origin in the spirit and the credences of the ,greek people1 and in the national belief2 the poets were the interpreters of the general thought1 of what there was most elevated in the imagination of the people4 ,henceforth1 the artist1 as we have seen above1 takes a position wholly different from that which he held in the ,east4 ,his inspiration is personal4 ,his work is that of a free imagination1 creating according to its own conceptions4 ,the inspiration does not come from without2 what they reveal is the ideas of the human spirit1 what there is deepest in the heart of man4 ,also1 the artists are truly poets2 they fashion1 according to their liking1 the content and the form1 in order to draw from them free and original figures4 ,tradition is shorn1 in their hands1 of all that is gross1 symbolic1 repulsive1 and deformed2 they eliminate the idea which they wish to illustrate1 and individualize it under the human form4 ,such is the manner1 free1 though not arbitrary1 in which the ,greek artists proceed in the creation of their works4 ,they are poets1 but also prophets and diviners4 ,they represent human actions in divine actions1 and1 reciprocally1 without having the clear and decided distinctions4 ,they maintain the union1 the accord1 of the human and the divine4 ,such is the significance of the greater part of the apparitions of the gods in ,homer1 when the gods1 for example1 consult the heroes1 or interfere in the combats4 ,meanwhile1 if we wish to understand the nature of this ideal1 to determine1 in a more precise manner1 the character of the divinities of ,greek art1 the following remarks are suggested1 considering them1 at the same time1 on the general1 the particular1 and the individual sides4 ,the first attribute which distinguishes them is something general1 substantial4 ,the immortal gods are strangers to the miseries and to the agitations of human existence4 ,they enjoy an unalterable calmness and serenity1 from which they derive their repose and their majesty4 ,they are not1 however1 vague abstractions1 universal and purely ideal existences4 ,to this character of generality is joined individuality4 ,each divinity has his traits and proper physiognomy1 his particular rle1 his sphere of activity1 determined and limited4 ,a just measure1 moreover1 is here observed3 the two elements1 the general and the individual1 are in perfect accord4 ,at the same time1 this moral character is manifested under an external and corporeal form itself1 its most perfect expression1 in which appears the harmonious fusion of the external form with the internal principle animating it4 ,this physical form1 as well as the spiritual principle which is manifested in it1 is freed from all the accidents of material life1 and from the miseries of finite existence4 ,it is the human body with its beautiful proportions and their harmony2 all announces beauty1 liberty1 grace4 ,it is thus that this form1 in its purity1 corresponds to the spiritual and divine principle which is incarnate in it4 ,hence the nobleness1 the grandeur1 and the elevation of those figures1 which have nothing in common with the wants of material life1 and seem elevated above their bodily existence4 ,they are immortal divinities with human features4 ,the body1 in spite of its beauty1 appears as a superfluous appendage2 and1 nevertheless1 it is an animated and living form which presents the indestructible harmony of the two principles1 the soul and the body4 ,but a contradiction presents itself between the spirit and the material form4 ,this harmonious whole conceals a principle of destruction which will make itself felt more and more4 ,we may perceive in these figures an air of sadness in the midst of greatness4 ,though absorbed in themselves1 calm and serene1 they lack freedom from care and inward satisfaction2 something cold and impassive is found in their features1 especially if we compare them with the vivacity of modern sentiment4 ,this divine peace1 this indifference to all that is mortal and transient1 forms a contrast with the moral greatness and the corporeal form4 ,these placid divinities complain both of their felicity and of their physical existence4 ,we read upon their features the destiny which weighs them down4 ,now1 what is the particular art most appropriate to represent this ideal8 ,evidently it is sculpture4 ,it alone is capable of showing us those ideal figures in their eternal repose1 of expressing the perfect harmony of the spiritual principle and the sensuous form4 ,to it has been confided the mission of realizing this ideal in its purity1 its greatness1 and its perfection4 ,poetry1 above all1 dramatic poetry1 which makes the gods act1 and draws them into strife and combat contrary to their greatness and their dignity1 is much less capable of answering this purpose4 ,if we consider these divinities in their particular1 and no longer in their general character1 we see that they form a plurality1 a whole1 a totality1 which is polytheism4 ,each particular god1 while having his proper and original character1 is himself a complete whole2 he also possesses the distinctive qualities of the other divinities4 ,hence the richness of these characters4 ,it is for this reason that the ,greek polytheism does not present a systematic whole4 ,olympus is composed of a multitude of distinct gods1 who do not form an established hierarchy4 ,rank is not rigorously fixed1 whence the liberty1 the serenity1 the independence of the personages4 ,without this apparent contradiction1 the divinities would be embarrassed by one another1 shackled in their development and power4 ,in place of being true persons1 they would be only allegorical beings1 or personified abstractions4 ,as to their sensuous representation1 sculpture is1 moreover1 the art best adapted to express this particular characteristic of the nature of the gods4 ,by combining with immovable grandeur the individuality of features peculiar to each of them1 it fixes in their statues the most perfect expression of their character1 and determines its definite form4 ,sculpture1 here again1 is more ideal than poetry4 ,it offers a more determined and fixed form1 while poetry mingles with it a crowd of actions1 of histories and accidental particulars4 ,sculpture creates absolute and eternal models2 it has fixed the type of true1 classic beauty1 which is the basis of all other productions of ,greek genius1 and is here the central point of art4 ,but in order to represent the gods in their true individuality1 it does not suffice to distinguish them by certain particular attributes4 ,moreover1 classic art does not confine itself to representing these personages as immovable and self-absorbed2 it shows them also in movement and in action4 ,the character of the gods then particularizes itself1 and exhibits the special features of which the physiognomy of each god is composed4 ,this is the accidental1 positive1 historic side1 which figures in mythology and also in art1 as an accessory but necessary element4 ,these materials are furnished by history or fable4 ,they are the antecedents1 the local particulars1 which give to the gods their living individuality and originality4 ,some are borrowed from the symbolic religions1 which preserve a vestige thereof in the new creation2 the symbolic element is absorbed in the new myth4 ,others have a national origin1 which1 again1 is connected with heroic times and foreign traditions4 ,others1 finally1 spring from local circumstances1 relating to the propagation of the myths1 to their formation1 to the usages and ceremonies of worship1 etc4 ,all these materials fashioned by art1 give to the ,greek gods the appearance1 the interest1 and the charm1 of living humanity4 ,but this traditional side1 which in its origin had a symbolic sense1 loses it little by little2 it is designed only to complete the individuality of the gods1 to give to them a more human and more sensuous form1 to add1 through details frequently unworthy of divine majesty1 the side of the arbitrary and accidental4 ,sculpture1 which represents the pure ideal1 ought1 without wholly excluding it in fact1 to allow it to appear as little as possible2 it represents it as accessory in the head-dress1 the arms1 the ornaments1 the external attributes4 ,another source for the more precise determination of the character of the gods is their intervention in the actions and circumstances of human life4 ,here the imagination of the poet expands itself as an inexhaustible source in a crowd of particular histories1 of traits of character and actions1 attributed to the gods4 ,the problem of art consists in combining1 in a natural and living manner1 the actions of divine personages and human actions1 in such a manner that the gods appear as the general cause of what man himself accomplishes4 ,the gods1 thus1 are the internal principles which reside in the depths of the human soul2 its own passions1 in so far as they are elevated1 and its personal thought2 or it is the necessity of the situation1 the force of circumstances1 from whose fatal action man suffers4 ,it is this which pierces through all the situations where ,homer causes the gods to intervene1 and through the manner in which they influence events4 ,but through this side1 the gods of classic art abandon1 more and more1 the silent serenity of the ideal1 to descend into the multiplicity of individual situations1 of actions1 and into the conflict of human passions4 ,classic art thus finds itself drawn to the last degree of individualization2 it falls into the agreeable and the graceful4 ,the divine is absorbed in the finite which is addressed exclusively to the sensibility and no longer satisfies thought4 ,imagination and art1 seizing this side and exaggerating it more and more1 corrupt religion itself4 ,the severe ideal gives place to merely sensuous beauty and harmony2 it removes itself more and more from the eternal ideas which form the ground of religion and art1 and these are dragged down to ruin4 #c4 ,in fact1 independently of the external causes which have occasioned the decadence of ,greek art and precipitated its downfall1 many internal causes1 in the very nature of the ,greek ideal1 rendered that downfall inevitable4 ,in the first place1 the ,greek gods1 as we have seen1 bear in themselves the germ of their destruction1 and the defect which they conceal is unveiled by the representations of classic art itself4 ,the plurality of the gods and their diversity makes them already accidental existences2 this multiplicity cannot satisfy reason4 ,thought dissolves them and makes them return to a single divinity4 ,moreover1 the gods do not remain in their eternal repose2 they enter into action1 take part in the interests1 in the passions1 and mingle in the collisions of human life4 ,the multitude of relations in which they are engaged1 as actors in this drama1 destroys their divine majesty2 contradicts their grandeur1 their dignity1 their beauty4 ,in the true ideal itself1 that of sculpture1 we observe something1 the inanimate1 impassive1 cold1 a serious air of silent mournfulness1 which indicates that something higher weighs them down--destiny1 supreme unity1 blind divinity1 the immutable fate to which gods and men are alike subject4 ,but the principal cause is1 that absolute necessity making no integral part of their personality1 and being foreign to them1 the particular individual side is no longer restrained in its downward course2 it is developed more and more without hindrance and without limit4 ,they suffer themselves to be drawn into the external accidents of human life1 and fall into all the imperfections of anthropomorphism4 ,hence the ruin of these beautiful divinities of art is inevitable4 ,the moral consciousness turns away from them and rejects them4 ,the gods1 it is true1 are ethical persons1 but under the human and corporeal form4 ,now1 true morality appears only in the conscience1 and under a purely spiritual form4 ,the point of view of the beautiful is neither that of religion nor that of morality4 ,the infinite1 invisible spirituality is the divine for the religious consciousness4 ,for the moral consciousness1 the good is an idea1 a conception1 an obligation1 which commands the sacrifice of sense4 ,it is in vain1 then1 to be enthusiastic over ,greek art and beauty1 to admire those beautiful divinities4 ,the soul does not recognize herself wholly in the object of her contemplation or her worship4 ,what she conceives as the true ideal is a ,god1 spiritual1 infinite1 absolute1 personal1 endowed with moral qualities1 with justice1 goodness1 etc4 ,it is this whose image the gods of ,greek polytheism1 in spite of their beauty1 do not present us4 ,as to the transition from the ,greek mythology to a new religion and a new art1 it could no longer be effected in the domain of the imagination4 ,in the origin of ,greek art1 the transition appears under the form of a conflict between the old and the new gods1 in the very domain of art and imagination4 ,here it is upon the more serious territory of history that this revolution is accomplished4 ,the new idea appears1 not as a revelation of art1 nor under the form of myth and of fable1 but in history itself1 by the course of events1 by the appearance of ,god himself upon earth1 where he was born1 lived1 and arose from the dead4 ,here is a field of ideas which ,art did not invent1 and which it finds too high for it4 ,the gods of classic art have existence only in the imagination2 they were visible only in stone and wood2 they were not both flesh and spirit4 ,this real existence of ,god in flesh and spirit1 ,christianity1 for the first time1 showed in the life and actions of a ,god present among men4 ,this transition cannot1 then1 be accomplished in the domain of art1 because the ,god of revealed religion is the real and living ,god4 ,compared with him1 his adversaries are only imaginary beings1 who cannot be taken seriously and meet him on the field of history4 ,the opposition and conflict cannot1 then1 present the character of a serious strife1 and be represented as such by ,art or ,poetry4 ,therefore1 always1 whenever any one has attempted to make of this subject1 among moderns1 a poetic theme1 he has done it in an impious and frivolous manner1 as in 8,the ,war of the ,gods10 by ,parny4 ,on the other hand1 it would be useless to regret1 as has been frequently done in prose and in verse1 the loss of the ,greek ideal and pagan mythology1 as being more favorable to art and poetry than the ,christian faith1 to which is granted a higher moral verity1 while it is regarded as inferior in respect to art and the ,beautiful4 ,christianity has a poetry and an art of its own2 an ideal essentially different from the ,greek ideal and art4 ,here all parallel is superficial4 ,polytheism is anthropomorphism4 ,the gods of ,greece are beautiful divinities under the human form4 ,as soon as reason has comprehended ,god as ,spirit and as ,infinite ,being1 there appear other ideas1 other sentiments1 other demands1 which ancient art is incapable of satisfying1 to which it cannot attain1 which call1 consequently1 for a new art1 a new poetry4 ,thus1 regrets are superfluous2 comparison has no more any significance1 it is only a text for declamation4 ,what one could object to seriously in ,christianity1 its tendencies to mysticism1 to asceticism1 which1 in fact1 are hostile to art1 are only exaggerations of its principle4 ,but the thought which constitutes the ground of ,christianity1 and true ,christian sentiment1 far from being opposed to art1 are very favorable to it4 ,hence springs up a new art1 inferior1 it is true1 in certain respects1 to antique art--in sculpture1 for example--but which is superior in other respects1 as is its idea when compared with the pagan idea4 ,in all this1 we are making but a resum of the ideas of the author4 ,we must do him the justice to say1 that wherever he speaks of ,christian art1 he does it worthily1 and exhibits a spirit free from all sectarian prejudice4 ,if we cast1 meanwhile1 a glance at the external causes which have brought about this decadence1 it is easy to discover them in the situations of ancient society1 which prophesy the downfall of both art and religion4 ,we discover the vices of that social order where the state was everything1 the individual nothing by himself4 ,this is the radical vice of the ,greek state4 ,in such an identification of man and the state1 the rights of the individual are ignored4 ,the latter1 then1 seeks to open for himself a distinct and independent way1 separates himself from the public interest1 pursues his own ends1 and finally labors for the ruin of the state4 ,hence the egoism which undermines this society little by little1 and the ever-increasing excesses of demagoguism4 ,on the other hand1 there arises in the souls of the best a longing for a higher freedom in a state organized upon the basis of justice and right4 ,in the meantime man falls back upon himself1 and deserting the written law1 religious and civil1 takes his conscience for the rule of his acts4 ,socrates marks the advent of this idea4 ,in ,rome1 in the last years of the republic1 there appears1 among energetic spirits1 this antagonism and this detachment from society4 ,noble characters present to us the spectacle of private virtues by the side of feebleness and corruption in public morals4 ,this protest of moral consciousness against the increasing corruption finds expression in art itself2 it creates a form of poetry which corresponds to it1 satire4 ,according to ,hegel1 satire1 in fact1 belongs peculiarly to the ,romans2 it is at least the distinctive and original characteristic1 the salient feature1 of their poetry and literature4 8,the spirit of the ,roman world is the dominance of the dead letter1 the destruction of beauty1 the absence of serenity in manners1 the ebbing of the domestic and natural affections--in general1 the sacrifice of individuality1 which devotes itself to the state1 the tranquil greatness in obedience to law4 ,the principle of this political virtue1 in its frigid and austere rudeness1 subdued national individualities abroad1 while at home the law was developed with the same rigor and the same exactitude of forms1 even to the point of attaining perfection4 ,but this principle was contrary to true art4 ,so one finds at ,rome no art which presents a character of beauty1 of liberty1 of grandeur4 ,the ,romans received and learned from the ,greeks sculpture1 painting1 music1 epic lyric and dramatic poetry4 ,what is regarded as indigenous among them is the comic farces1 the fescennines and atellanes4 ,the ,romans can claim as belonging to them in particular only the forms of art which1 in their principle1 are prosaic1 such as the didactic poem4 ,but before all we must place satire40 ,,iii4 ,of ,romantic ,art4 ,this expression1 employed here to designate modern art1 in its opposition to ,greek or classic art1 bears nothing of the unfavorable sense which it has in our language and literature1 where it has become the synonym of a liberty pushed even to license1 and of a contempt for all law4 ,romantic art1 which1 in its highest development1 is also ,christian art1 has laws and principles as necessary as classic art4 ,but the idea which it expresses being different1 its conditions are also2 it obeys other rules1 while observing those that are the basis of all art and the very essence of the beautiful4 ,hegel1 in a general manner1 thus characterizes this form of art1 contrasting it with antique art1 the study of which we have just left4 ,in classic art1 the spirit constitutes the content of the representation2 but it is combined with the sensuous or material form in such a manner that it is harmonized perfectly with it1 and does not surpass it4 ,art reached its perfection when it accomplished this happy accord1 when the spirit idealized nature and made of it a faithful image of itself4 ,it is thus that classic art was the perfect representation of the ideal1 the reign of beauty4 ,but there is something higher than the beautiful manifestation of spirit under the sensuous form4 ,the spirit ought to abandon this accord with nature1 to retire into itself1 to find the true harmony in its own world1 the spiritual world of the soul and the conscience4 ,now1 that development of the spirit1 which not being able to satisfy itself in the world of sense1 seeks a higher harmony in itself1 is the fundamental principle of romantic art4 ,here beauty of form is no longer the supreme thing2 beauty1 in this sense1 remains something inferior1 subordinate2 it gives place to the spiritual beauty which dwells in the recesses of the soul1 in the depths of its infinite nature4 ,now in order thus to take possession of itself1 it is essential that spirit have a consciousness of its relation to ,god1 and of its union with ,him2 that not only the divine principle reveal itself under a form true and worthy of it1 but that the human soul1 on its part1 lift itself toward ,god1 that it feel itself filled with ,his essence1 that the ,divinity descend into the bosom of humanity4 ,the anthropomorphism of ,greek thought ought to disappear1 in order to give place to anthropomorphism of a higher order4 ,hence all the divinities of polytheism will be absorbed in a single ,deity4 ,god has no longer anything in common with those individual personages who had their attributes and their distinct rles1 and formed a whole1 free1 although subject to destiny4 ,at the same time ,god does not remain shut up in the depths of his being2 he appears in the real world also2 he opens his treasures and unfolds them in creation4 ,he is1 notwithstanding1 revealed less in nature than in the moral world1 or that of liberty4 ,in fine1 ,god is not an ideal1 created by the imagination2 he manifests himself under the features of living humanity4 ,if we compare1 in this respect1 romantic art with classic art1 we see that ,sculpture no longer suffices to express this idea4 ,we should vainly seek in the image of the gods fashioned by sculpture that which announces the true personality1 the clear consciousness of self and reflected will4 ,in the external this defect is betrayed by the absence of the eye1 that mirror of the soul4 ,sculpture is deprived of the glance1 the ray of the soul emanating from within4 ,on the other hand1 the spirit entering into relation with external objects1 this immobility of sculpture no longer responds to the longing for activity1 which calls for exercise in a more extended career4 ,the representation ought to embrace a vaster field of objects1 and of physical and moral situations4 ,as to the manner in which this principle is developed and realized1 romantic art presents certain striking differences from antique art4 ,in the first place1 as has been said1 instead of the ideal divinities1 which exist only for the imagination1 and are only human nature idealized1 it is ,god himself who makes himself man1 and passes through all the phases of human life1 birth1 suffering1 death1 and resurrection4 ,such is the fundamental idea which art represents1 even in the circle of religion4 ,the result of this religious conception is to give also to art1 as the principal ground of its representations1 strife1 conflict1 sorrow and death1 the profound grief which the nothingness of life1 physical and moral suffering1 inspire4 ,is not all this1 in fact1 an essential part of the history of the ,god-,man1 who must be presented as a model to humanity8 ,is it not the means of being drawn near to ,god1 of resembling him1 and of being united to him8 ,man ought then to strip off his finite nature1 to renounce that which is a mere nothing1 and1 through this negation of the real life1 propose to himself the attainment of what ,god realized in his mortal life4 ,the infinite sorrow of this sacrifice1 this idea of suffering and of death1 which were almost banished from classic art1 find1 for the first time1 their necessary place in ,christian art4 ,among the ,greeks death has no seriousness1 because man attaches no great importance to his personality and his spiritual nature4 ,on the other hand1 now that the soul has an infinite value1 death becomes terrible4 ,terror in the presence of death and the annihilation of our being1 is imprinted strongly on our souls4 ,so also among the ,greeks1 especially before the time of ,socrates1 the idea of immortality was not profound2 they scarcely conceived of life as separable from physical existence4 ,in the ,christian faith1 on the contrary1 death is only the resurrection of the spirit1 the harmony of the soul with itself1 the true life4 ,it is only by freeing itself from the bonds of its earthly existence that it can enter upon the possession of its true nature4 ,such are the principal ideas which form the religious ground of romantic or ,christian ,art4 ,in spite of some explanations which recall the special system of the author1 one cannot deny that they are expressed with power and truthfulness4 ,meanwhile1 beyond the religious sphere1 there are developing certain interests which belong to the mundane life1 and which form also the object of the representations of art2 they are the passions1 the collisions1 the joys and the sufferings which bear a terrestrial or purely human character1 but in which appear notwithstanding the very principle which distinguishes modern thought1 to-wit3 a more vivid1 more energetic1 and more profound sentiment of human personality1 or1 as the author calls it1 subjectivity4 ,romantic art differs no less from classic art in the form or the mode of representation1 than in the ideas which constitute the content of its works4 ,and1 in the first place1 one necessary consequence of the preceding principle is1 the new point of view under which nature or the physical world is viewed4 ,the objects of nature lose their importance2 or1 at least1 they cease to be divine4 ,they have neither the symbolic signification which oriental art gave them1 nor the particular aspect in virtue of which they were animated and personified in ,greek art and mythology4 ,nature is effaced2 she retires to a lower plane2 the universe is condensed to a single point1 in the focus of the human soul4 ,that1 absorbed in a single thought1 the thought of uniting itself to ,god1 beholds the world vanish1 or regards it with an indifferent eye4 ,we see also appearing a heroism wholly different from antique heroism1 a heroism of submission and resignation4 ,but1 on the other hand1 precisely through the very fact1 that all is concentrated in the focus of the human soul1 the circle of ideas is found to be infinitely enlarged4 ,the interior history of the soul is developed under a thousand diverse forms1 borrowed from human life4 ,it beams forth1 and art seizes anew upon nature1 which serves as adornment and as a theatre for the activity of the spirit4 ,hence the history of the human heart becomes infinitely richer than it was in ancient art and poetry4 ,the increasing multitude of situations1 of interests1 and of passions1 forms a domain as much more vast as spirit has descended farther into itself4 ,all degrees1 all phases of life1 all humanity and its developments1 become inexhaustible material for the representations of art4 ,nevertheless1 art occupies here only a secondary place2 as it is incapable of revealing the content of the dogma1 religion constitutes still more its essential basis4 ,there is therefore preserved the priority and superiority which faith claims over the conceptions of the imagination4 ,from this there results an important consequence and a characteristic difference for modern art4 ,it is that in the representation of sensuous forms1 art no longer fears to admit into itself the real with its imperfections and its faults4 ,the beautiful is no longer the essential thing2 the ugly occupies a much larger place in its creations4 ,here1 then1 vanishes that ideal beauty which elevates the forms of the real world above the mortal condition1 and replaces it with blooming youth4 ,this free vitality in its infinite calmness--this divine breath which animates matter--romantic art has no longer1 for essential aim1 to represent these4 ,on the contrary1 it turns its back on this culminating point of classic beauty2 it accords1 indeed1 to the ugly a limitless rle in its creations4 ,it permits all objects to pass into representation in spite of their accidental character4 ,nevertheless1 those objects which are indifferent or commonplace1 have value only so far as the sentiments of the soul are reflected in them4 ,but at the highest point of its development art expresses only spirit--pure1 invisible spirituality4 ,we feel that it seeks to strip itself of all external forms1 to mount into a region superior to sense1 where nothing strikes the eye1 where no sound longer vibrates upon the ear4 ,furthermore1 we can say1 on comparing in this respect ancient with modern art1 that the fundamental trait of romantic or ,christian art is the musical element1 the lyric accent in poetry4 ,the lyric accent resounds everywhere1 even in epic and dramatic poetry4 ,in the figurative arts this characteristic makes itself felt1 as a breath of the soul and an atmosphere of feeling4 ,after having thus determined the general character of romantic art1 ,hegel studies it more in detail2 he considers it1 successively1 under a two-fold point of view1 the religious and the profane2 he follows it in its development1 and points out the causes which have brought about its decadence4 ,he concludes by some considerations upon the present state of art and its future4 ,let us analyze rapidly the principal ideas contained in these chapters4 #ast4 ,as to what concerns the religious side1 which we have thus far been considering1 ,hegel1 developing its principle1 establishes a parallel between the religious idea in classic and romantic art2 for romantic art has also its ideal1 which1 as we have seen already1 differs essentially from the antique idea4 ,greek beauty shows the soul wholly identified with the corporeal form4 ,in romantic art beauty no more resides in the idealization of the sensuous form1 but in the soul itself4 ,undoubtedly one ought still to demand a certain agreement between the reality and the idea2 but the determinate form is indifferent1 it is not purified from all the accidents of real existence4 ,the immortal gods in presenting themselves to our eyes under the human form1 do not partake of its wants and miseries4 ,on the contrary1 the ,god of ,christian art is not a solitary ,god1 a stranger to the conditions of mortal life2 he makes himself man1 and shares the miseries and the sufferings of humanity4 ,the representation of religious love is the most favorable subject for the beautiful creations of ,christian art4 ,thus1 in the first place1 love in ,god is represented by the history of ,christ's redemption1 by the various phases of his life1 of his passion1 of his death1 and of his resurrection4 ,in the second place1 love in man1 the union of the human soul with ,god1 appears in the holy family1 in the maternal love of the ,virgin1 and in the love of the disciples4 ,finally1 love in humanity is manifested by the spirit of the ,church1 that is to say1 by the ,spirit of ,god present in the society of the faithful1 by the return of humanity to ,god1 death to terrestrial life1 martyrdom1 repentance and conversion1 the miracles and the legends4 ,such are the principal subjects which form the ground of religious art4 ,it is the ,christian ideal in whatever in it is most elevated4 ,art seizes it and seeks to express it--but does this only imperfectly4 ,art is here necessarily surpassed by the religious thought1 and ought to recognize its own insufficiency4 ,if we pass from the religious to the profane ideal1 it presents itself to us under two different forms4 ,the one1 although representing human personality1 yet develops noble and elevated sentiments1 which combine with moral or religious ideas4 ,the other shows us only persons who display1 in the pursuit of purely human and positive interests1 independence and energy of character4 ,the first is represented by chivalry4 ,when we come to examine the nature and the principle of the chivalric ideal1 we see that what constitutes its content is1 in fact1 personality4 ,here1 man abandons the state of inner sanctification1 the contemplative for the active life4 ,he casts his eyes about him and seeks a theatre for his activity4 ,the fundamental principle is always the same1 the soul1 the human person1 pursuing the infinite4 ,but it turns toward another sphere1 that of action and real life4 ,the ,ego is replete with self only1 with its individuality1 which1 in its eyes1 is of infinite value4 ,it attaches little importance to general ideas1 to interests1 to enterprises which have for object general order4 ,three sentiments1 in the main1 present this personal and individual character1 honor1 love1 and fidelity4 ,moreover1 separate or united1 they form1 aside from the religious relationships which can be reflected in them1 the true content of chivalry4 ,the author analyzes these three sentiments2 he shows in what they differ from the analogous sentiments or qualities in antique art4 ,he endeavors1 above all1 to prove that they represent1 in fact1 the side of human personality1 with its infinite and ideal character4 ,thus honor does not resemble bravery1 which exposes itself for a common cause4 ,honor fights only to make itself known or respected1 to guarantee the inviolability of the individual person4 ,in like manner love1 also1 which constitutes the centre of the circle1 is only the accidental passion of one person for another person4 ,even when this passion is idealized by the imagination and ennobled by depth of sentiment1 it is not yet the ethical bond of the family and of marriage4 ,fidelity presents the moral character in a higher degree1 since it is disinterested2 but it is not addressed to the general good of society in itself2 it attaches itself exclusively to the person of a master4 ,chivalric fidelity understands perfectly well1 besides1 how to preserve its advantages and its rights1 the independence and the honor of the person1 who is always only conditionally bound4 ,the basis of these three sentiments is1 then1 free personality4 ,this is the most beautiful part of the circle which is found beyond religion1 properly so-called4 ,all here has for immediate end1 man1 with whom we can sympathize through the side of personal independence4 ,these sentiments are1 moreover1 susceptible of being placed in connection with religion in a multitude of ways1 as they are able to preserve their independent character4 8,this form of romantic art was developed in the ,east and in the ,west1 but especially in the ,west1 that land of reflection1 of the concentration of the spirit upon itself4 ,in the ,east was accomplished the first expansion of liberty1 the first attempt toward enfranchisement from the finite4 ,it was ,mahometanism which first swept from the ancient soil all idolatry1 and religions born of the imagination4 ,but it absorbed this internal liberty to such a degree that the entire world for it was effaced2 plunged in an intoxication of ecstacy1 the oriental tastes in contemplation the delights of love1 calmness1 and felicity40 7,page #def47 #c4 ,we have seen human personality developing itself upon the theatre of real life1 and there displaying noble1 generous sentiments1 such as honor1 love and fidelity4 ,meanwhile it is in the sphere of real life and of purely human interests that liberty and independence of character appear to us4 ,the ideal here consists only in energy and perseverance of will1 and passion as well as independence of character4 ,religion and chivalry disappear with their high conceptions1 their noble sentiments1 and their thoroughly ideal objects4 ,on the contrary1 what characterizes the new wants1 is the thirst for the joys of the present life1 the ardent pursuit of human interests in what in them is actual1 determined1 or positive4 ,in like manner1 in the figurative arts1 man wishes objects to be represented in their palpable and visible reality4 ,the destruction of classic art commenced with the predominance of the agreeable1 and it ended with satire4 ,romantic art ends in the exaggeration of the principle of personality1 deprived of a substantial and moral content1 and thenceforth abandoned to caprice1 to the arbitrary1 to fancy and excess of passion4 ,there is left further to the imagination of the poet only to paint forcibly and with depth these characters2 to the artist1 only to imitate the real2 to the spirit1 to exhibit its rigor in piquant combinations and contrasts4 ,this tendency is revealed under three principal forms3 #ast1 ,independence of individual character1 pursuing its proper ends1 its particular designs1 without moral or religious aim2 #b;d1 the exaggeration of the chivalric principle1 and the spirit of adventure2 #c;d1 the separation of the elements1 the union of which constitutes the very idea of art1 through the destruction of art itself1--that is to say1 the predilection for common reality1 the imitation of the real1 mechanical ability1 caprice1 fancy1 and humor4 ,the first of these three points furnishes to ,hegel the occasion for a remarkable estimate of the characters of ,shakspeare1 which represent1 in an eminent degree1 this phase of the ,romantic ideal4 ,the distinctive trait of character of the dramatis person of ,shakspeare is1 in fact1 the energy and obstinate perseverance of a will which is exclusively devoted to a specific end1 and concentrates all its efforts for the purpose of realizing it4 ,there is here no question either of religion or of moral ideas4 ,they are characters placed singly face to face with each other1 and their designs1 which they have spontaneously conceived1 and the execution of which they pursue with the unyielding obstinacy of passion4 ,macbeth1 ,othello1 ,richard ,,iii41 are such characters4 ,others1 as ,romeo1 ,juliet1 and ,miranda1 are distinguished by an absorption of soul in a unique1 profound1 but purely personal sentiment1 which furnishes them an occasion for displaying an admirable wealth of qualities4 ,the most restricted and most common1 still interest us by a certain consistency in their acts1 a certain brilliancy1 an enthusiasm1 a freedom of imagination1 a spirit superior to circumstances1 which causes us to overlook whatever there is common in their action and discourse4 ,but this class1 where ,shakspeare excels1 is extremely difficult to treat4 ,to writers of mediocrity1 the quicksand is inevitable4 ,they risk1 in fact1 falling into the insipid1 the insignificant1 the trivial1 or the repulsive1 as a crowd of imitators have proven4 ,it has been vouchsafed only to a few great masters to possess enough genius and taste to seize here the true and the beautiful1 to redeem the insignificance or vulgarity of the content by enthusiasm and talent1 by the force and energy of their pencil and by a profound knowledge of human passions4 ,one of the characteristics of romantic art is1 that1 in the religious sphere1 the soul1 finding for itself satisfaction in itself1 has no need to develop itself in the external world4 ,on the other hand1 when the religious idea no longer makes itself felt1 and when the free will is no longer dependent1 except on itself1 the dramatis person pursue aims wholly individual in a world where all appears arbitrary and accidental1 and which seems abandoned to itself and delivered up to chance4 ,in its irregular pace1 it presents a complication of events1 which intermingle without order and without cohesion4 ,moreover1 this is the form which events affect in romantic1 in opposition to classic art1 where the actions and events are bound to a common end1 to a true and necessary principle which determines the form1 the character1 and the mode of development of external circumstances4 ,in romantic art1 also1 we find general interests1 moral ideas2 but they do not ostensibly determine events2 they are not the ordering and regulating principle4 ,these events1 on the contrary1 preserve their free course1 and affect an accidental form4 ,such is the character of the greater part of the grand events in the middle ages1 the crusades1 for example1 which the author names for this reason1 and which were the grand adventures of the ,christian world4 ,whatever may be the judgment which one forms upon the crusades and the different motives which caused them to be undertaken1 it cannot be denied1 that with an elevated religious aim--the deliverance of the holy sepulchre--there were mingled other interested and material motives1 and that the religious and the profane aim did not contradict nor corrupt the other4 ,as to their general form1 the crusades present utter absence of unity4 ,they are undertaken by masses1 by multitudes1 who enter upon a particular expedition according to their good pleasure1 and their individual caprice4 ,the lack of unity1 the absence of plan and direction1 causes the enterprises to fail1 and the efforts and endeavors are wasted in individual exploits4 ,in another domain1 that of profane life1 the road is open also to a crowd of adventurers1 whose object is more or less imaginary1 and whose principle is love1 honor1 or fidelity4 ,to battle for the glory of a name1 to fly to the succor of innocence1 to accomplish the most marvellous things for the honor of one's lady1 such is the motive of the greater part of the beautiful exploits which the romances of chivalry or the poems of this epoch and subsequent epochs celebrate4 ,these vices of chivalry cause its ruin4 ,we find the most faithful picture of it in the poems of ,ariosto and ,cervantes4 ,but what best marks the destruction of romantic art and of chivalry is the modern romance1 that form of literature which takes their place4 ,the romance is chivalry applied to real life2 it is a protest against the real1 it is the ideal in a society where all is fixed1 regulated in advance by laws1 by usages contrary to the free development of the natural longings and sentiments of the soul2 it is the chivalry of common life4 ,the same principle which caused a search for adventures throws the personages into the most diverse and the most extraordinary situations4 ,the imagination1 disgusted with that which is1 cuts out for itself a world according to its fancy1 and creates for itself an ideal wherein it can forget social customs1 laws1 positive interests4 ,the young men and young women1 above all1 feel the want of such aliment for the heart1 or of such distraction against ennui4 ,ripe age succeeds youth2 the young man marries and enters upon positive interests4 ,such is also the dnoement of the greater part of romances1 where prose succeeds poetry1 the real1 the ideal4 ,the destruction of romantic art is announced by symptoms still more striking1 by the imitation of the real1 and the appearance of the humorous style1 which occupies more and more space in art and literature4 ,the artist and the poet can there display much talent1 enthusiasm and spirit2 but these two styles are no less striking indexes of an epoch of decadence4 ,it is1 above all1 the humorous style which marks this decadence1 by the absence of all fixed principle and all rule4 ,it is a pure play of the imagination which combines1 according to its liking1 the most different objects1 alters and overturns relations1 tortures itself to discover novel and extraordinary conceptions4 ,the author places himself above the subject1 regards himself as freed from all conditions imposed by the nature of the content as well as the form1 and imagines that all depends on his wit and the power of his genius4 ,it is to be observed1 that what ,hegel calls the downfall of art in general1 and of romantic art in particular1 is precisely what we call the romantic school in the art and literature of our time4 ,such are the fundamental forms which art presents in its historic development4 ,if the art of the renaissance1 or modern art properly so called1 finds no place in this sketch1 it is because it does not constitute an original and fundamental form4 ,the renaissance is a return to ,greek art2 and as to modern art1 it is allied to both ,greek and ,christian4 ,but it remains for us to present some conclusions upon the future destiny of art--a point of highest interest1 to which this review of the forms and monuments of the past must lead4 ,the conclusions of the author1 which we shall consider elsewhere1 are far from answering to what we might have expected from so remarkable a historic picture4 ,what are1 indeed1 these conclusions8 ,the first is1 that the rle of art1 to speak properly1 is finished--at least1 its original and distinct rle4 ,the circle of the ideas and beliefs of humanity is completed4 ,art has invested them with the forms which it was capable of giving them4 ,in the future1 it ought1 then1 to occupy a secondary place4 ,after having finished its independent career1 it becomes an obscure satellite of science and philosophy1 in which are absorbed both religion and art4 ,this thought is not thus definitely formulated1 but it is clearly enough indicated4 ,art1 in revealing thought1 has itself contributed to the destruction of other forms1 and to its own downfall4 ,the new art ought to be elevated above all the particular forms which it has already expressed4 8,art ceases to be attached to a determinate circle of ideas and forms2 it consecrates itself to a new worship1 that of humanity4 ,all that the heart of man includes within its own immensity--its joys and its sufferings1 its interests1 its actions1 its destinies--become the domain of art40 ,thus the content is human nature2 the form a free combination of all the forms of the past4 ,we shall hereafter consider this new eclecticism in art4 ,hegel points out1 in concluding1 a final form of literature and poetry1 which is the unequivocal index of the absence of peculiar1 elevated and profound ideas1 and of original forms--that sentimental poetry1 light or descriptive1 which to-day floods the literary world and the drawing-rooms with its verses2 compositions without life and without content1 without originality or true inspiration2 a common-place and vague expression of all sentiment1 full of aspirations and empty of ideas1 where1 through all1 there makes itself recognized an imitation of some illustrious geniuses--themselves misled in false and perilous ways2 a sort of current money1 analogous to the epistolary style4 ,everybody is poet2 and there is scarcely one true poet4 8,wherever the faculties of the soul and the forms of language have received a certain degree of culture1 there is no person who cannot1 if he take the fancy1 express in verse some situation of the soul1 as any one is in condition to write a letter40 ,such a style1 thus universally diffused1 and reproduced under a thousand forms1 although with different shadings1 easily becomes fastidious4 ,,chapter ,,ii4 ,we hope to see those necessities of thought which underlie all ,philosophical systems4 ,we set out to account for all the diversities of opinion1 and to see identity in the world of thought4 ,but necessity in the realm of thought may be phenomenal4 ,if there be anything which is given out as fixed1 we must try its validity4 ,many of the 8impossibilities0 of thought are easily shown to rest upon ignorance of psychological appliances4 ,the person is not able because he does not know how--just as in other things4 ,we must take care that we do not confound the incapacity of ignorance with the necessity of thought4 7,the reader will find an example of this in ,sir ,wm4 ,hamilton's 8,metaphysics10 page #ebg47 ,one of these 8incapacities0 arises from neglecting the following3 ,among the first distinctions to be learned by the student in philosophy is that between the imaginative form of thinking and pure thinking4 ,the former is a sensuous grade of thinking which uses images1 while the latter is a more developed stage1 and is able to think objects in and for themselves4 ,spinoza's statement of this distinction applied to the thinking of the ,infinite--his 8,infinitum imaginationis0 and 8,infinitum actu vel rationis0--has been frequently alluded to by those who treat of this subject4 ,at first one might suppose that when finite things are the subject of thought1 it would make little difference whether the first or second form of thinking is employed4 ,this is1 however1 a great error4 ,the ,philosopher must always 8think things under the form of eternity0 if he would think the truth4 ,imagination pictures objects4 ,it represents to itself only the bounded4 ,if it tries to realize the conception of infinitude1 it represents a limited somewhat1 and then ,reflection or the ,understanding 7a form of thought lying between ,imagination and ,reason7 passes beyond the limits1 and annuls them4 ,this process may be continued indefinitely1 or until ,reason 7or pure thinking7 comes in and solves the dilemma4 ,thus we have a dialogue resulting somewhat as follows3 ,imagination4 ,come and see the ,infinite just as ,i have pictured it4 ,understanding4 ,peeping cautiously about it4 ,where is your frame8 ,ah6 ,i see it now1 clearly4 ,how is this6 ,your frame does not include all4 ,there is a 8beyond0 to your picture4 ,i cannot tell whether you intend the inside or outside for your picture of the ,infinite1 ,i see it on both4 ,imag4 ,tries to extend the frame1 but with the same result as before4 ,i believe you are right6 ,i am well nigh exhausted by my efforts to include the unlimited4 ,un4 ,ah6 you see the ,infinite is merely the negative of the finite or positive4 ,it is the negative of those conditions which you place there in order to have any representation at all4 ,while the ,understanding proceeds to deliver a course of wise saws and moral reflections on the 8inability of the ,finite to grasp the ,infinite10 sitting apart upon its bipod--for tripod it has none1 one of the legs being broken--it self-complacently and oracularly admonishes the human mind to cultivate humility2 ,imagination drops her brush and pencil in confusion at these words4 ,very opportunely ,reason steps in and takes an impartial survey of the scene4 ,reason4 ,did you say that the ,infinite is unknowable8 ,un4 ,yes4 8,to think is to limit1 and hence to think the ,infinite is to limit it1 and thus to destroy it40 ,reason4 ,apply your remarks to ,space4 ,is not ,space infinite8 ,un4 ,if ,i attempt to realize ,space1 ,i conceive a bounded1 but ,i at once perceive that ,i have placed my limits within ,space1 and hence my realization is inadequate4 ,the ,infinite1 therefore1 seems to be a beyond to my clear conception4 ,reason4 ,indeed6 ,when you reflect on ,space do you not perceive that it is of such a nature that it can be limited only by itself8 ,do not all its limits imply ,space to exist in8 ,un4 ,yes1 that is the difficulty4 ,reason4 ,i do not see the 8difficulty40 ,if ,space can be limited only by itself1 its limit continues it1 instead of bounding it4 ,hence it is universally continuous or infinite4 ,un4 ,but a mere negative4 ,reason4 ,no1 not a mere negative1 but the negative of all negation1 and hence truly affirmative4 ,it is the exhibition of the utter impossibility of any negative to it4 ,all attempts to limit it1 continue it4 ,it is its own other4 ,its negative is itself4 ,here1 then1 we have a truly affirmative infinite in contradistinction to the negative infinite--the 8infinite progress0 that you and ,imagination were engaged upon when ,i came in4 ,un4 ,what you say seems to me a distinction in words merely4 ,reason4 ,doubtless4 ,all distinctions are merely in words until one has learned to see them independent of words4 ,but you must go and mend that tripod on which you are sitting2 for how can one think at ease and exhaustively1 when he is all the time propping up his basis from without8 ,un4 ,i cannot understand you4 ,exit4 ,note4 ,it will be well to consider what application is to be made of these distinctions to the mind itself1 whose form is consciousness4 ,in self-knowing1 or consciousness1 the subject knows itself--it is its own object4 ,thus in this phase of activity we have the affirmative ,infinite4 ,the subject is its own object--is continued by its other or object4 ,this is merely suggested here--it will be developed hereafter4 ,,chapter ,,iii4 ,in the first chapter we attained--or at least made the attempt to attain--some insight into the relation which ,mind bears to ,time and ,space4 ,it appeared that ,mind is a ,transcendent1 i4 e4 something which ,time and ,space inhere in1 rather than a somewhat1 conditioned by them4 ,although this result agrees entirely with the religious instincts of man1 which assert the immortality of the soul1 and the unsubstantiality of the existences within ,time and ,space1 yet as a logical result of thinking1 it seems at first very unreliable4 ,the disciplined thinker will indeed find the distinctions 8a priori and a posteriori0 inadequately treated2 but his emendations will only make the results there established more wide-sweeping and conclusive4 ,in the second chapter we learned caution with respect to the manner of attempting to realize in our minds the results of thought4 ,if we have always been in the habit of regarding ,mind as a property or attribute of the individual1 we have conceived it not according to its true nature1 but have allowed ,imagination to mingle its activity in the thinking of that which is of a universal nature4 ,thus we are prone to say to ourselves3 8,how can a mere attribute like ,mind be the logical condition of the solid realities of ,space and ,time80 ,in this we have quietly assumed the whole point at issue4 ,no system of thinking which went to work logically ever proved the ,mind to be an attribute2 only very elementary grades of thinking1 which have a way of assuming in their premises what they draw out analytically in their conclusions1 ever set up this dogma4 ,this will become clearer at every step as we proceed4 ,we will now pursue a path similar to that followed in the first chapter1 and see what more we can learn of the nature of ,mind4 ,we will endeavor to learn more definitely what constitutes its a priori activity1 in order1 as there indicated1 to achieve our object4 ,thus our present search is after the 8,categories0 and their significance4 ,taking the word category here in the sense of 8a priori determination of thought10 the first question is3 8,do any categories exist8 ,are there any thoughts which belong to the nature of mind itself80 ,it is the same question that ,locke discusses under the head of 8,innate ideas40 ,i4 8,every act of knowing or cognizing is the translating of an unknown somewhat into a known1 as a scholar translates a new language into his own40 ,if he did not already understand one language1 he could never translate the new one4 ,in the act of knowing1 the object becomes known in so far as ,i am able to recognise predicates as belonging to it4 8,this is red20 unless ,i know already what 8red0 means1 ,i do not cognize the object by predicating red of it4 8,red is a color20 unless ,i know what 8color0 means1 ,i have not said anything intelligible--,i have not expressed an act of cognition4 ,the object becomes known to us in so far as we recognize its predicates--and hence we could never know anything unless we had at least one predicate or conception with which to commence4 ,if we have one predicate through which we cognize some object1 that act of cognition gives us a new predicate2 for it has dissolved or 8translated0 a somewhat1 that before was unknown1 into a known2 the 8not-me0 has1 to that extent1 become the 8me40 ,without any predicates to begin with1 all objects would remain forever outside of our consciousness4 ,even consciousness itself would be impossible1 for the very act of self-cognition implies that the predicate 8myself0 is well known4 ,it is an act of identification3 8,i am myself20 the subject is1 as predicate1 completely known or dissolved back into the subject4 ,i cognize myself as myself2 there is no alien element left standing over against me4 ,thus we are able to say that there must be an a priori category in order to render possible any act of knowing whatever4 ,moreover1 we see that this category must be identical with the ,ego itself1 for the reason that the process of cognition is at the same time a recognition2 it predicates only what it recognizes4 ,thus1 fundamentally1 in knowing1 ,reason knows itself4 ,self-consciousness is the basis of knowledge4 ,this will throw light on the first chapter2 but let us first confirm this position by a psychological analysis4 ,,ii4 ,what is the permanent element in thought8--,it can easily be found in language--its external manifestation4 ,logic tells us that the expression of thought involves always a subject and predicate4 ,think what you please1 say what you please1 and your thought or assertion consists of a subject and predicate--positive or negative--joined by the copula1 is4 8,man lives0 is equivalent to 8man is living40 8,man0 and 8living0 are joined by the word 8is40 ,if we abstract all content from thought1 and take its pure form in order to see the permanent1 we shall have 8is0 the copula1--or putting a letter for subject and attribute1 we shall have 8a is a10 7or 8a is b107 for the universal form of thought4 ,the mental act is expressed by 8is40 ,in this empty 8is0 we have the category of pure ,being1 which is the 8summum genus0 of categories4 ,any predicate other than being will be found to contain being plus determinations1 and hence can be subsumed under being4 ,we shall get new light on this subject if we examine the ordinary doctrine of explanation4 ,,iii4 ,in order to explain something1 we subsume it under a more general4 ,thus we say3 8,horse is an animal20 and1 8,an animal is an organic being10 c4 ,a definition contains not only this subsumption1 but also a statement of the specific difference4 ,we define quadruped by subsuming it1 78,it is an animal07 and giving the specific difference 78which has four feet074 ,as we approach the 8summum genus10 the predicates become more and more empty2 8they become more extensive in their application1 and less comprehensive in their content40 ,thus they approach pure simplicity1 which is attained in the 8summum genus40 ,this pure simple1 which is the limit of subsumption and abstraction1 is pure ,being--,being devoid of all determinateness4 ,when we have arrived at ,being1 subsuming becomes simple identifying--,being is ,being1 or a is a--and this is precisely the same activity that we found self-consciousness to consist of in our first analysis1 7,i47 and the same activity that we found all mental acts to consist of in our second analysis1 7,,ii474 ,,iv4 ,therefore1 we may affirm on these grounds1 that the 8summum genus10 or primitive category1 is the ,ego itself in its simplest activity as the 8is0 7or pure being if taken substantively74 ,thus it happens that when the ,mind comes to cognize an object1 it must first of all recognize itself in it in its simplest activity1--it must know that the object is4 ,we cannot know anything else of an object without presupposing the knowledge of its existence4 ,at this point it is evident that this category is not derived from experience in the sense of an impression from without4 ,it is the activity of the ,ego itself1 and is its 7the ,ego's7 first self-externalization 7or its first becoming object to itself--its first act of self-consciousness74 ,the essential activity of the ,ego itself consists in recognizing itself1 and this involves self-separation1 and then the annulling of this separation in the same act4 ,for in knowing myself as an object ,i separate the ,ego from itself1 but in the very act of knowing it ,i make it identical again4 ,here are two negative processes involved in knowing1 and these are indivisibly one3--first1 the negative act of separation--secondly1 the negative act of annulling the separation by the act of recognition4 ,that the application of categories to the external world is a process of self-recognition1 is now clear3 we know1 in so far as we recognize predicates in the object1--we say 8,the ,rose is1 it is red1 it is round1 it is fragrant1 c40 ,in this we separate what belongs to the rose from it1 and place it outside of it1 and then1 through the act of predication1 unite it again4 8,the ,rose is0 contains merely the recognition of being but being is separated from it and joined to it in the act of predication4 ,thus we see that the fundamental act of self-consciousness1 which is a self-separation and self-identification united in one act of recognition1--we see that this fundamental act is repeated in all acts of knowing4 ,we do not know even the rose without separating it from itself1 and identifying the two sides thus formed4 7,this contains a deeper thought which we may suggest here4 ,that the act of knowing puts all objects into this crucible1 is an intimation on its part that no object can possess true1 abiding being1 without this ability to separate itself from itself in the process of self-identification4 ,whatever cannot do this is no essence1 but may be only an element of a process in which it ceaselessly loses its identity4 ,but we shall recur to this again47 ,doubtless we could follow out this activity through various steps1 and deduce all the categories of pure thought4 ,this is what ,plato has done in part2 what ,fichte has done in his ,science of ,knowledge1 78,wissenschaftslehre07 and ,hegel in his ,logic4 ,a science of these pure intelligibles unlocks the secret of the ,universe2 it furnishes that 8,royal ,road0 to all knowledge2 it is the far-famed ,philosopher's ,stone that alone can transmute the base dross of mere talent into genius4 ,v4 ,let us be content if at the close of this chapter we can affirm still more positively the conclusions of our first4 ,through a consideration of the a priori knowledge of ,time and ,space1 and their logical priority1 as conditions1 to the world of experience1 we inferred the transcendency of ,mind4 ,upon further investigation1 we have now discovered that there are other forms of the ,mind more primordial than ,space and ,time1 and more essentially related to its activity2 for all the categories of pure thought--,being1 ,negation1 c41--are applicable to ,space and to ,time1 and hence more universal than either of them alone2 these categories of pure thought1 moreover1 as before remarked1 could never have been derived from experience4 ,experience is not possible without presupposing these predicates4 8,they are the tools of intelligence through which it cognizes40 ,if we hold by this stand-point exclusively1 we may say1 with ,kant1 that we furnish the subjective forms in knowing1 and for this reason cannot know the 8thing in itself40 ,if these categories are merely subjective--i4 e4 given in the constitution of the ,mind itself--and we do not know what the 8thing in itself0 may be1 yet we can come safely out of all skepticism here by considering the universal nature of these categories or 8forms of the mind40 ,for if ,being1 ,negation and ,existence are forms of mind and purely subjective1 so that they do not belong to the 8thing in itself10 it is evident that such an object cannot be or exist1 or in any way have validity1 either positively or negatively4 ,thus it is seen from the nature of mind here exhibited1 that ,mind is the noumenon or 8thing in itself0 which ,philosophy seeks1 and thus our third chapter confirms our first4 ,note4 ,the ,,materialism of the present day holds that thought is a modification of force1 correlated with heat1 light1 electricity1 c41 in short1 that organization produces ideas4 ,if so1 we are placed within a narrow idealism1 and can only say of what is held for truth3 8,i am so correlated as to hold this view1--,i shall be differently correlated to-morrow1 perhaps1 and hold another view40 ,yet in this very statement the ,ego takes the stand-point of universality--it speaks of possibilities--which it could never do1 were it merely a correlate4 ,for to hold a possibility is to be able to annul in thought the limits of the real1 and hence to elevate itself to the point of universality4 ,but this is self-correlation2 we have a movement in a circle1 and hence self-origination1 and hence a spontaneous fountain of force4 ,the ,mind1 in conceiving of the possible1 annuls the real1 and thus creates its own motives2 its acting according to motives1 is thus acting according to its own acts--an obvious circle again4 ,in fine1 it is evident that the idealism which the correlationist logically falls into is as strict as that of any school of professed idealism which he is in the habit of condemning4 ,the persistent force is the general idea of force1 not found as any real force1 for each real force is individualized in some particular way4 ,but it is evident that a particular force cannot be correlated with force in general1 but only with a special form like itself4 ,but the general force is the only abiding one--each particular one is in a state of transition into another--a perpetual losing of individuality4 ,hence the true abiding force is not a real one existing objectively1 but only an ideal one existing subjectively in thought4 ,but through the fact that thought can seize the true and abiding which can exist for itself nowhere else1 the correlationist is bound to infer the transcendency of ,mind just like the idealist4 ,nay1 more1 when he comes to speak considerately1 he will say that ,mind1 for the very reason that it thinks the true1 abiding force1 cannot be correlated with any determined force4 ,,chapter ,,iv4 ,philosophers usually begin to construct their systems in full view of their final principle4 ,it would be absurd for one to commence a demonstration if he had no clear idea of what he intended to prove4 ,from the final principle the system must be worked back to the beginning in the ,philosopher's mind before he can commence his demonstration4 ,usually the order of demonstration which he follows1 is not the order of discovery2 in such case his system proceeds by external reflections4 ,all mathematical proof is of this order4 ,one constructs his demonstration to lead from the known to the unknown1 and uses many intermediate propositions that do not of necessity lead to the intended result4 ,with another theorem in view1 they might be used for steps to that1 just as well4 ,but there is a certain inherent development in all subjects when examined according to the highest method1 that will lead one on to the exhaustive exposition of all that is involved therein4 ,this is called the dialectic4 ,this dialectic movement cannot be used as a philosophic instrument1 unless one has seen the deepest aperu of ,science2 if this is not the case1 the dialectic will prove merely destructive and not constructive4 ,it is therefore a mistake1 as has been before remarked1 to attempt to introduce the beginner of the study of ,philosophy at once into the dialectic4 ,the content of ,philosophy must be first presented under its sensuous and reflective forms1 and a gradual progress established4 ,in this chapter an attempt will be made to approach again the ultimate principle which we have hitherto fixed only in a general manner as ,mind4 ,we will use the method of external reflection1 and demonstrate three propositions3 #a4 ,there is an independent being2 #b4 ,that being is self-determined2 #c4 ,self-determined being is in the form of personality1 i4 e4 is an ,ego4 ,i4 #a4 ,dependent being1 implying its complement upon which it depends1 cannot be explained through itself1 but through that upon which it depends4 #b4 ,this being upon which it depends cannot be also a dependent being1 for the dependent being has no support of its own to lend to another2 all that it has is borrowed4 8,a chain of dependent beings collapses into one dependent being4 ,dependence is not converted into independence by mere multiplication40 #c4 ,the dependent1 therefore1 depends upon the independent1 and has its explanation in it4 ,since all being is of one kind or the other1 it follows that all being is independent1 or a complemental element of it4 ,reciprocal dependence makes an independent including whole1 which is the negative unity4 ,definition4--,one of the most important implements of the thinker is the comprehension of 8negative unity40 ,it is a unity resulting from the reciprocal cancelling of elements2 e4 g4 ,salt is the negative unity of acid and alkali4 ,it is called negative because it negates the independence of the elements within it4 ,in the negative unity ,air1 the elements oxygen and nitrogen have their independence negated4 ,,ii4 #a4 ,the independent being cannot exist without determinations4 ,without these1 it could not distinguish itself or be distinguished from nought4 #b4 ,nor can the independent being be determined 7i4 e4 limited or modified in any way7 from without1 or through another4 ,for all that is determined through another is a dependent somewhat4 #c4 ,hence the independent being can be only a self-determined4 ,if self-determined1 it can exist through itself4 ,note4 ,spinoza does not arrive at the third position1 but1 after considering the second1 arrives at the first one1 and concludes1 since determination through another makes a somewhat finite1 that the independent being must be undetermined4 ,he does not happen to discover that there is another kind of determination1 to-wit1 self-determination1 which can consist with independence4 ,the method that he uses makes it entirely an accidental matter with him that he discovers what speculative results he does--the dialectic method would lead inevitably to self-determination1 as we shall see later4 ,it is ,hegel's aperu that we have in the third position2 with ,spinoza the independent being remained an undetermined substance1 but with ,hegel it became a self-determining subject4 ,all that ,spinoza gets out of his substance he must get in an arbitrary manner2 it does not follow from its definition that it shall have modes and attributes1 but the contrary4 ,this aperu--that the independent being1 i4 e4 every really existing1 separate entity1 is self-determined--is the central point of speculative philosophy4 ,what self-determination involves1 we shall see next4 ,,iii4 #a4 ,self-determination implies that the constitution or nature be self-originated4 ,there is nothing about a self-determined that is created by anything without4 #b4 ,thus self-determined being exists dually--it is 7a7 as determining and 7b7 as determined4 7a7 ,as determining1 it is the active1 which contains merely the possibility of determinations2 7b7 as determined1 it is the passive result--the matter upon which the subject acts4 #c4 ,but since both are the same being1 each side returns into itself3--7a7 as determining or active1 it acts only upon its own determining1 and 7b7 as passive or determined1 it is1 as result of the former1 the self-same active itself4 ,hence its movement is a movement of self-recognition--a positing of distinction which is cancelled in the same act4 7,in self-recognition something is made an object1 and identified with the subject in the same act47 ,moreover1 the determiner1 on account of its pure generality1 7i4 e4 its having no concrete determinations as yet17 can only be ideal--can only exist as the ,ego exists in thought2 not as a thing1 but as a generic entity4 ,the passive side can exist only as the self exists in consciousness--as that which is in opposition and yet in identity at the same time4 ,no finite existence could endure this contradiction1 for all such must possess a nature or constitution which is self-determined2 if not1 each finite could negate all its properties and qualities1 and yet remain itself--just as the person does when he makes abstraction of all1 in thinking of the ,ego or pure self4 ,thus we find again our former conclusion4--,all finite or dependent things must originate in and depend upon independent or absolute being1 which must be an ,ego4 ,the ,ego has the form of ,infinitude 7see chapter ,,ii--the infinite is its own other74 ,resum4 ,the first chapter states the premises which ,kant lays down in his ,transcendental sthetic1 7,kritik der ,reinen ,vernunft7 and draws the true logical conclusions which are positive and not negative1 as he makes them4 ,the second chapter gives the ,spinozan distinction of the ,infinite of the ,imagination and ,infinite of ,reason4 ,the third chapter gives the logical results which ,kant should have drawn from his ,transcendental ,logic4 ,the fourth chapter gives ,spinoza's fundamental position logically completed1 and is the great fundamental position of ,plato1 ,aristotle and ,hegel1 with reference to the ,absolute4 ,footnote #b3 ,one cannot but be astonished not to see1 in this review of the principal forms of oriental art1 ,chinese art at least mentioned4 ,the reason is1 that1 according to ,hegel1 art--the fine arts1 properly speaking--have no existence among the ,chinese4 ,the spirit of that people seems to him anti-artistic and prosaic4 ,he thus characterizes ,chinese art in his philosophy of history3 8,this race1 in general1 has a rare talent for imitation1 which is exercised not only in the things of daily life1 but also in art4 ,it has not yet arrived at the representation of the beautiful as beautiful4 ,in painting1 it lacks perspective and shading4 ,european images1 like everything else1 it copies well4 ,a ,chinese painter knows exactly how many scales there are on the back of a carp1 how many notches a leaf has2 he knows perfectly the form of trees and the curvature of their branches2 but the sublime1 the ideal1 and the beautiful1 do not belong at all to the domain of his art and his ability40--7,philosophie der ,geschichte47 ,,music ,,as ,a ,,form ,,of ,,art4 ,read before the ,st4 ,louis ,art ,society1 ,february1 #ahfg4 ,i4 ,upon ,art-,criticism4 ,a work of art is the product of the inspired moment of the artist4 ,it is not to be supposed that he is able to give an account of his work in the terms of the understanding4 ,hence the artist is not in a strict sense a critic4 ,the highest order of criticism must endeavor to exhibit the unity of the work by showing how the various motives unfold from the central thought4 ,of course1 the artist must be rare who can see his work doubly--first sensuously1 and then rationally4 ,only some ,michael ,angelo or ,goethe can do this4 ,the common artist sees the sensuous form as the highest possible revelation--to him his feeling is higher than the intellectual vision4 ,and can we not all--critics as well as artists--sympathize with the statement that the mere calculating intellect1 the cold understanding1 8all light and no heat10 can never rise into the realm where art can be appreciated8 ,it is only when we contemplate the truly speculative intellect--which is called 8love0 by the mystics1 and by ,swedenborg 8,love and wisdom united in a ,divine ,essence10--that we demur at this supreme elevation of feeling or sentiment4 ,the art critic must have all the feeling side of his nature aroused1 as the first condition of his interpretation2 and1 secondly1 he must be able to dissolve into thought the emotions which arise from that side4 ,if feeling were more exalted than thought1 this would be impossible4 ,such1 however1 is the view of such critics as the ,schlegels1 who belong to the romantic school4 ,they say that the intellect considers only abstractions1 while the heart is affected by the concrete whole4 8,spectres and goitred dwarfs0 for the intellect1 but 8beauty's rose0 for the feeling heart4 ,but this all rests on a misunderstanding4 ,the true art critic does not undervalue feeling4 ,it is to him the essential basis upon which he builds4 ,unless the work of art affects his feelings1 he has nothing to think about2 he can go no further2 the work1 to him1 is not a work of art at all4 ,but if he is aroused and charmed by it1 if his emotional nature is stirred to its depths1 and he feels inspired by those spiritual intimations of ,eternity which true art always excites1 then he has a content to work upon1 and this thinking of his1 amounts simply to a recognition in other forms1 of this eternal element1 that glows through the work of art4 ,hence there is no collision between the artist and the critic1 if both are true to their ideal4 ,it certainly is no injury to the work of art to show that it treats in some form the ,problem of ,life1 which is the mystery of the ,christian religion4 ,it is no derogation to ,beethoven to show how he has solved a problem in music1 just as ,shakspeare in poetry1 and ,michael ,angelo in painting4 ,those who are content with the mere feeling1 we must always respect if they really have the true art feeling1 just as we respect the simple piety of the uneducated peasant4 ,but we must not therefore underrate the conscious seizing of the same thing1--not place ,st4 ,augustine or ,martin ,luther below the simple-minded peasant4 ,moreover1 as our society has for its aim the attainment of an insight into art in general1 and not the exclusive enjoyment of any particular art1 it is all the more important that we should hold by the only connecting link--the only universal element--thought4 ,for thought has not only universal content1 like feeling1 but also universal form1 which feeling has not4 ,another reason that causes persons to object to art interpretation1 is perhaps that such interpretation reminds them of the inevitable moral appended ad nauseam to the stories that delighted our childhood4 ,but it must be remembered that these morals are put forward as the object of the stories4 ,the art critic can never admit for one moment that it is the object of a work of art simply to be didactic4 ,it is true that all art is a means of culture2 but that is not its object4 ,its object is to combine the idea with a sensuous form1 so as to embody1 as it were1 the ,infinite2 and any motive external to the work of art itself1 is at once felt to be destructive to it4 ,,ii4 ,upon the ,interpretation of ,art4 #a4 ,the ,infinite is not manifested within any particular sphere of finitude1 but rather exhibits itself in the collision of a ,finite with another ,finite without it4 ,for a ,finite must by its very nature be limited from without1 and the ,infinite1 therefore1 not only includes any given finite sphere1 but also its negation 7or the other spheres which joined to it make up the whole74 #b4 8,art is the manifestation of the ,infinite in the ,finite10 it is said4 ,therefore1 this must mean that art has for its province the treatment of the collisions that necessarily arise between one finite sphere and another4 #c4 ,in proportion as the collision portrayed by art is comprehensive1 and a type of all collisions in the universe1 is it a high work of art4 ,if1 then1 the collision is on a small scale1 and between low spheres1 it is not a high work of art4 #d4 ,but whether the collision presented be of a high order or of a low order1 it bears a general resemblance to every other collision--the ,infinite is always like itself in all its manifestations4 ,the lower the collision1 the more it becomes merely symbolical as a work of art1 and the less it adequately presents the ,infinite4 ,thus the lofty mountain peaks of ,bierstadt1 which rise up into the regions of clearness and sunshine1 beyond the realms of change1 do this1 only because of a force that contradicts gravitation1 which continually abases them4 ,the contrast of the high with the low1 of the clear and untrammelled with the dark and impeded1 symbolizes1 in the most natural manner1 to every one1 the higher conflicts of spirit4 ,it strikes a chord that vibrates1 unconsciously perhaps1 but1 nevertheless1 inevitably4 ,on the other hand1 when we take the other extreme of painting1 and look at the 8,last ,judgment0 of ,michael ,angelo1 or the 8,transfiguration0 of ,raphael1 we find comparatively no ambiguity2 there the ,infinite is visibly portrayed1 and the collision in which it is displayed is evidently of the highest order4 #e4 ,art1 from its definition1 must relate to ,time and ,space1 and in proportion as the grosser elements are subordinated and the spiritual adequately manifested1 we find that we approach a form of art wherein the form and matter are both the products of spirit4 ,thus we have arts whose matter is taken from 7a7 ,space1 7b7 ,time1 and 7c7 ,language 7the product of ,spirit74 ,space is the grossest material4 ,we have on its plane1 ,i4 ,architecture1 ,,ii4 ,sculpture1 and ,,iii4 ,painting4 7,in the latter1 color and perspective give the artist power to represent distance and magnitude1 and internality1 without any one of them1 in fact4 ,upon a piece of ivory no larger than a man's hand a 8,heart of the ,andes0 might be painted47 ,in ,time we have ,,iv4 ,music1 while in ,language we have ,v4 ,poetry 7in the three forms of ,epic1 ,lyric1 and ,dramatic7 as the last and highest of the forms of ,art4 #f4 ,an interpretation of a work of art should consist in a translation of it into the form of science4 ,hence1 first1 one must seize the general content of it--or the collision portrayed4 ,then1 secondly1 the form of art employed comes in1 whether it be ,architecture1 ,sculpture1 ,painting1 ,music1 or ,poetry4 ,thirdly1 the relation which the content has to the form1 brings out the superior merits1 or the limits and defects of the work of art in question4 ,thus1 at the end1 we have universalized the piece of art--digested it1 as it were4 ,a true interpretation does not destroy a work of art1 but rather furnishes a guide to its highest enjoyment4 ,we have the double pleasure of immediate sensuous enjoyment produced by the artistic execution1 and the higher one of finding our rational nature mirrored therein so that we recognize the eternal nature of ,spirit there manifested4 #g4 ,the peculiar nature of music1 as contrasted with other arts1 will1 if exhibited1 best prepare us for what we are to expect from it4 ,the less definitely the mode of art allows its content to be seized1 the wider may be its application4 ,landscape painting may have a very wide scope for its interpretation1 while a drama of ,goethe or ,shakspeare definitely seizes the particulars of its collision1 and leaves no doubt as to its sphere4 ,so in the art of music1 and especially instrumental music4 ,music does not portray an object directly1 like the plastic arts1 but it calls up the internal feeling which is caused by the object itself4 ,it gives us1 therefore1 a reflection of our impressions excited in the immediate contemplation of the object4 ,thus we have a reflection of a reflection1 as it were4 ,since its material is ,time rather than ,space1 we have this contrast with the plastic arts3 ,architecture1 and more especially ,sculpture and ,painting1 are obliged to select a special moment of time for the representation of the collision4 ,as ,goethe shows in the ,laocoon1 it will not do to select a moment at random1 but that point of time must be chosen in which the collision has reached its height1 and in which there is a tension of all the elements that enter the contest on both sides4 ,a moment earlier1 or a moment later1 some of these elements would be eliminated from the problem1 and the comprehensiveness of the work destroyed4 ,when this proper moment is seized in ,sculpture1 as in the ,laocoon1 we can see what has been before the present moment1 and easily tell what will come later4 ,in ,painting1 through the fact that coloring enables more subtle effects to be wrought out1 and deeper internal movements to be brought to the surface1 we are not so closely confined to the 8supreme moment0 as in ,sculpture4 ,but it is in ,music that we first get entirely free from that which confines the plastic arts4 ,since its form is time1 it can convey the whole movement of the collision from its inception to its conclusion4 ,hence ,music is superior to the ,arts of ,space1 in that it can portray the internal creative process1 rather than the dead results4 ,it gives us the content in its whole process of development in a fluid form1 while the ,sculptor must fix it in a frigid form at a certain stage4 ,goethe and others have compared ,music to ,architecture--the latter is 8frozen ,music02 but they have not compared it to ,sculpture nor ,painting1 for the reason that in these two arts there is a possibility of seizing the form of the individual more definitely1 while in ,architecture and ,music the point of repose does not appear as the human form1 but only as the more general one of self-relation or harmony4 ,thus quantitative ratios--mathematical laws--pervade and govern these two forms of ,art4 #h4 ,music1 more definitely considered1 arises from vibrations1 producing waves in the atmosphere4 ,the cohesive attraction of some body is attacked1 and successful resistance is made2 if not1 there is no vibration4 ,thus the feeling of victory over a foreign foe is conveyed in the most elementary tones1 and this is the distinction of tone from noise1 in which there is the irregularity of disruption1 and not the regularity of self-equality4 ,again1 in the obedience of the whole musical structure to its fundamental scale-note1 we have something like the obedience of ,architecture to ,gravity4 ,in order to make an exhibition of ,gravity1 a pillar is necessary2 for the solid wall does not isolate sufficiently the function of support4 ,with the pillar we can have exhibited the effects of ,gravity drawing down to the earth1 and of the support holding up the shelter4 ,the pillar in classic art exhibits the equipoise of the two tendencies4 ,in ,romantic or ,gothic ,architecture it exhibits a preponderance of the aspiring tendency--the soaring aloft like the plant to reach the light--a contempt for mere gravity--slender pillars seeming to be let down from the roof1 and to draw up something1 rather than to support anything4 ,on the other hand1 in ,symbolic ,architecture1 7as found in ,egypt7 we have the overwhelming power of gravity exhibited so as to crush out all humanity--the ,pyramid1 in whose shape ,gravity has done its work4 ,in ,music we have continually the conflict of these two tendencies1 the upward and downward4 ,the ,music that moves upward and shows its ground or point of repose in the octave above the scale-note of the basis1 corresponds to the ,gothic ,architecture4 ,this aspiring movement occurs again and again in chorals2 it--like all romantic art--expresses the ,christian solution of the problem of life4 ,,iii4 ,beethoven's ,sonata in ,c sharp minor4 7,opus #bg1 ,no4 #b47 ,the three movements of this sonata which ,beethoven called a fantasie-sonata1 are not arranged in the order commonly followed4 ,usually sonatas begin with an allegro or some quick movement1 and pass over to a slow movement--an adagio or andante--and end in a quick movement4 ,the content here treated could not allow this form1 and hence it commences with what is usually the second movement4 ,its order is #a4 ,adagio1 #b4 ,allegretto1 #c4 ,finale 7presto agitato74 7,my rule with reference to the study of art may or may not be interesting to others2 it is this3--always to select a masterpiece1 so recognized1 and keep it before me until it yields its secret1 and in its light ,i am able to see common-place to be what it really is1 and be no longer dazzled by it4 ,it requires faith in the commonly received verdict of critics and an immense deal of patience1 but in the end one is rewarded for his pains4 ,almost invariably ,i find immediate impressions of uncultured persons good for nothing4 ,it requires long familiarity with the best things to learn to see them in their true excellence47 ,this sonata is called by the ,austrians the 8,moonlight ,sonata10 and this has become the popular name in ,america4 ,it is said to have been written by ,beethoven when he was recovering from the disappointment of his hopes in a love-episode that had an unfortunate termination4 7,see ,marx's 8,l4 v4 ,beethoven1 ,leben und ,schaffen40 ,from this magnificent work of ,art-,criticism1 ,i have drawn the outlines of the following interpretation47 ,the object of his affection was a certain young countess1 ,julia ,guicciardi2 and it appears from ,beethoven's letter to a friend at the time 7about #ahjj7 that the affection was mutual1 but their difference in rank prevented a marriage4 ,when this sonata appeared 7in #ahjb7 it was inscribed to her4 ,adagio4 ,the first movement is a soft1 floating movement1 portraying the soul musing upon a memory of what has affected it deeply4 ,the surrounding is dim1 as seen in moonlight1 and the soul is lit up by a reflected light--a glowing at the memory of a bliss that is past4 ,it is not strange that this has been called the ,moonlight ,sonata1 just for this feeling of borrowed light that pervades it4 ,as we gaze into the moon of memory1 we almost forget the reflection1 and fancy that the sun of immediate consciousness is itself present4 ,but anon a flitting cloudlet 7a twinge of bitter regret7 obscures the pale beam1 or a glance at the landscape--not painted now with colors as in the daytime1 but only clare-obscure--brings back to us the sense of our separation from the day and the real4 ,sadly the soft gliding movement continues1 and distant and more distant grows the prospect of experiencing again the remembered happiness4 ,only for a passing moment can the throbbing soul realize in its dreams once more its full completeness1 and the plaintive minor changes to major2 but the spectral form of renunciation glides before its face1 and the soul subsides into its grief1 and yields to what is inevitable4 ,downward into the depths fall its hopes2 only a sepulchral echo comes from the bass1 and all is still4 ,marx calls this 8the song of the renouncing soul40 ,it is filled with the feeling of separation and regret2 but its slow1 dreamy movement is not that of stern resolution1 which should accompany renunciation4 ,accordingly we have ,allegretto4 ,the present and real returns2 we no longer dwell on the past2 8,we must separate2 only this is left40 ,in this movement we awake from the dream1 and we feel the importance of the situation4 ,its content is 8,farewell1 then20 the phrase expressing this1 lingers in its striving to shake off the grasp and get free4 ,the hands will not let go each other4 ,the phrase runs into the next and back to itself1 and will not be cut off4 ,in the trio there seems to be the echoing of sobs that come from the depth of the soul as the sorrowful words are repeated4 ,the buried past still comes back and holds up its happy hours1 while the shadows of the gloomy future hover before the two renunciants6 ,this movement is very short1 and is followed by the ,finale 7,presto agitato74 8,no grief of the soul that can be conquered except through action10 says ,goethe--and ,beethoven expresses the same conviction in the somewhat sentimental correspondence with the fair countess4 ,this third movement depicts the soul endeavoring to escape from itself2 to cancel its individualism through contact with the real4 ,the first movement found the being of the soul involved with another--having1 as it were1 lost its essence4 ,if the being upon which it depends reflects it back by a reciprocal dependence1 it again becomes integral and independent4 ,this cannot be2 hence death or renunciation4 ,but renunciation leaves the soul recoiling upon its finitude1 and devoid of the universality it would have obtained by receiving its being through another which reciprocally depended upon it4 ,hence the necessity of ,goethe's and ,beethoven's solution--the soul must find surcease of sorrow through action1 through will1 or practical self-determination4 ,man becomes universal in his deed4 ,how fiercely the soul rushes into the world of action in this ,finale6 ,in its impetuosity it storms through life1 and ever and anon falls down breathless before the collision which it encounters in leaping the chasms between the different spheres4 ,in its swoon of exhaustion there comes up from the memory of the past the ghost of the lost love that has all the while accompanied him1 though unnoticed1 in his frantic race4 ,its hollow tones reverberate through his being1 and he starts from his dream and drowns his memory anew in the storm of action4 ,at times we are elevated to the creative moment of the artist1 and feel its inspiration and lofty enthusiasm1 but again and again the exhausted soul collapses1 and the same abysmal crash comes in at the bass each time4 ,the grimmest loneliness1 that touches to the core1 comes intruding itself upon our rapture4 ,only in the contest with the 8last enemy0 we feel at length that the soul has proved itself valid in a region where distinctions of rank sunder and divide no more4 ,this solution is not quite so satisfactory as could be desired4 ,if we would realize the highest solution1 we must study the ,fifth ,symphony1 especially its second movement4 ,,iv4 ,beethoven's ,fifth ,symphony1 7,part ,,ii47 ,marx finds in this symphony the problem so often treated by ,beethoven--the collision of freedom with fate4 8,through night to day1 through strife to victory60 ,beethoven1 in his conversation with ,schindler1 speaking of the first 8motive0 at the beginning1 said1 8,thus ,fate knocks at the door40 ,this knocking of ,fate comes in continually during the first movement4 8,we have an immense struggle portrayed4 ,life is a struggle--this seems to be the content of this movement40 ,the soul finds a solution to this and sings its pan of joy4 ,in the second movement 7andante7 we have an expression of the more satisfactory solution of the ,problem of ,life1 which we alluded to when speaking of the ,sonata above4 ,it 78,the storm-tossed soul07 has in that consoling thought reached the harbor of infinite rest--infinite rest in the sense of an 8activity which is a true repose40 ,the soul has found this solution1 and repeats it over to assure itself of its reality 7#a1 #a1 #a1 #g1 #a1 #b1 #a--these are the notes which express it74 ,then it wishes to make the experience of the universality of this solution--it desires to try its validity in all the spheres where ,fate ruled previously4 ,it sets out and ascends the scale three steps at a time 7#e1 #a1 #a1 #b1 #c--a1 #c1 #c1 #d1 #e7 it reaches #e of the scale1 and ought to reach #h the next time4 ,it looks up to it as the celestial sun which ,gothic ,architecture points toward and aspires after4 ,could it only get there1 it would find true rest6 ,but its command of this guiding thought is not yet quite perfect--it cannot wield it so as to fly across the abyss and reach that place of repose without a leap--a 8mortal leap40 ,for the ascent by threes has reached a place where another three would bring it to #g of the scale--the point of absolute unrest2 to step four1 is to contradict the rhythm or method of its procedure4 ,it pauses1 therefore1 upon #e--;it tries the next three thoughtfully twice1 and then1 hearing below once more the mocking tones of ,fate1 it springs over the chasm and clutches the support above1 while through all the spheres there rings the sound of exultation4 ,but to reach the goal by a leap--to have no bridge across the gulf at the end of the road--is not a satisfactory solution of the difficulty4 ,hence we have a manifold endeavor--a striving to get at the true method1 which wanders at first in the darkness1 but comes at length to the light2 it gets the proper form for its idea1 and gives up its unwieldy method of threes 7#a1 #b1 #c--c1 #d1 #e71 and ascends by the infinite form of #a1 #c1 #e--c1 #e1 #h--e1 #h1 #c1 c41 which gives it a complete access to1 and control over1 all above and below4 ,the complete self-equipoise expressed in that solution which comes in at intervals through the whole1 and the bold application of the first method1 followed by the faltering when it comes to the defect--the grand exultation over the final discovery of the true method--all these are indescribably charming to the lover of music almost the first time he listens to this symphony1 and they become upon repetition more and more suggestive of the highest that art can give4 ,,the ,,alchemists4 8,remarks upon ,alchemy and the ,alchemists1 showing that the ,philosopher's ,stone was a ,symbol40--,published by ,james ,miller1 ,new ,york1 #ahfg4 ,we have referred in a previous article to the transition of ,religion into ,speculative ,philosophy4 ,the ,mystics who present this phase of thought1 8express themselves1 not in those universal categories that the ,spirit of the race has formed in language for its utterance1 but they have recourse to symbols more or less ambiguous1 and of insufficient universality to stand for the ,archetypes themselves40 ,the ,alchemists belong to this phase of spirit1 and we propose to draw from the little book named at the head of our article1 some of the evidences of this position4 ,it is there shown that instead of the transmutation of metals1 the regeneration of man was in view4 ,those much-abused men agreed that 8,the highest wisdom consists in this10 7quoting from the ,arabic author1 ,alipili17 8for man to know himself1 because in him ,god has placed his eternal ,word1 by which all things were made and upheld1 to be his ,light and ,life1 by which he is capable of knowing all things1 both in time and eternity40 ,while they claim explicitly to have as object of their studies the mysteries of ,spirit1 they warn the reader against taking their remarks upon the metals in a literal sense1 and speak of those who do so1 as being in error4 ,they describe their processes in such a way as to apply to man alone2 pains seem to have been taken to word their descriptions so as to be utterly absurd when applied to anything else4 ,in speaking of the 8,stone10 they refer to three states1 calling them black1 white and red2 giving minute descriptions of each1 so as to leave no doubt that man is represented1 first1 as in a 8fallen condition20 secondly1 in a 8repenting condition20 and thirdly1 as 8made perfect through grace40 ,this subordination of the outer to the inner1 of the body to the soul1 is the constantly recurring theme4 ,instead of seeking a thing not yet found--which would be the case with a stone for the transmutation of metals1 they agree in describing the 8,stone0 as already known4 ,they refer constantly to such speculative doctrines as 8,nature is a whole everywhere10 showing that their subject possesses universality4 ,this metal or mineral is described thus3 8,minerals have their roots in the air1 their heads and tops in the earth4 ,our ,mercury is arial2 look for it1 therefore1 in the air and the earth40 ,the author of the work from which we quote the passage1 says by way of comment3 8,in this passage #8,minerals' and #8our ,mercury' refer to the same thing1 and it is the subject of ,alchemy1 the ,stone2 and we may remember that ,plato is said to have defined or described ,man as a growth having his root in the air1 his tops in the earth4 ,man walks indeed upon the surface of the earth1 as if nothing impeded his vision of heaven2 but he walks nevertheless at the bottom of the atmosphere1 and between these two1 his root in air1 he must work out his salvation40 ,a great number of these 8,hermetic writers0 established their reputation for wit and wisdom by discoveries in the practical world1 and it is difficult to believe that such men as ,roger ,bacon1 ,van ,helmont1 ,ramond ,lulli1 ,jerome ,cardan1 ,geber1 78,the ,wise071 ,avicenna1 ,albertus ,magnus1 ,thomas ,aquinas1 and others not inferior1 could have deceived themselves as the modern theory implies1 viz3 that they were searching a chemical recipe for the manufacture of gold4 ,the symbolic form of statement was esteemed at that time as the highest form of popular exposition for the ,infinite and the religious problems concerning ,god1 the ,soul and the ,universe4 ,it seems that those writers considered such words as 8,god10 8,spirit10 8,heaven10 and words of like deep import1 as not signifying the thing intended only so far as the one who used them1 comprehended them4 ,thus1 if ,god was spoken of by one who sensuously imaged ,him1 here was idolatry1 and the second commandment was broken4 ,to the ,platonist1 8,god0 was the name of the ,absolute ,universal1 and hence included subject as well as object in thinking4 ,hence if one objectified ,god by conceiving ,him1 he necessarily limited ,god1 or rather1 had no real knowledge of ,him4 ,said ,sextus1 the ,pythagorean3 8,do not investigate the name of ,god1 because you will not find it4 ,for everything which is called by a name1 receives its appellation from that which is more worthy than itself1 so that it is one person that calls1 and another that hears4 ,who is it1 therefore1 that has given a name to ,god8 ,god1 however1 is not a name for ,god1 but an indication of what we conceive of him40 ,from such passages we can see why the ,alchemists called this 8,ineffable ,one10 ,mercury1 ,luna1 ,sol1 ,argent vive1 ,phbus1 ,sulphur1 ,antimony1 ,elixir1 ,alcahest1 ,salt1 and other whimsical names1 letting the predicates applied determine the nature of what was meant4 ,if a writer1 speaking of 8,alcahest10 should say that it is a somewhat that rises in the east1 and sets in the west1 gives light to the earth1 and causes the growth of plants by its heat1 c41 we should not misunderstand his meaning--it would be giving us the nature of the thing without the common name4 ,every one attaches some sort of significance to the words 8,life10 8,god10 8,reason10 8,instinct10 c41 and yet who comprehends them8 ,it is evident that in most cases the word stands for the thing1 and hence when one speaks of such things by name1 the hearer yawns and looks listless1 as if he thought3 8,well1 ,i know all about that--,i learned that when a child1 in the ,catechism40 ,the ,alchemists 7and ,du ,fresnoy names nearly a thousand of these prolific writers7 determined that no one should flatter himself that he knew the nature of the subject before he saw the predicates applied4 ,hence the strange names about which such spiritual doctrines were inculcated4 8,if we have concealed anything10 says ,geber1 8ye sons of learning1 wonder not1 for we have not concealed it from you1 but have delivered it in such language as that it may be hid from evil men1 and that the unjust and vile might not know it4 ,but1 ye sons of ,truth1 search1 and you shall find this most excellent gift of ,god1 which he has reserved for you40 ,,editorials4 ,,originality4 ,it is natural that in ,america more than elsewhere1 there should be a popular demand for originality4 ,in ,europe1 each nation has1 in the course of centuries1 accumulated a stock of its own peculiar creations4 ,america is sneered at for the lack of these4 ,we have not had time as yet to develop spiritual capital on a scale to correspond to our material pretensions4 ,hence1 we1 as a people1 feel very sensitive on this point1 and whenever any new literary enterprise is started1 it is met on every hand by inquiries like these3 8,is it original1 or only an importation of ,european ideas80 8,why not publish something indigenous80 ,it grows cynical at the sight of erudition1 and vents its spleen with indignation3 8,why rifle the graves of centuries8 ,you are no hyena6 ,does not the spring bring forth its flowers1 and every summer its swarms of gnats8 ,why build a bridge of rotten coffin planks1 or wear a wedding garment of mummy wrappage8 ,why desecrate the ,present1 by offering it time-stained paper from the shelves of the ,past80 ,in so far as these inquiries are addressed to our own undertaking1 we have a word to offer in self-justification4 ,we have no objection to originality of the right stamp4 ,an originality which cherishes its own little idiosyncrasies we despise4 ,if we must differ from other people1 let us differ in having a wide cosmopolitan culture4 8,all men are alike in possessing defects10 says ,goethe2 8in excellencies alone1 it is1 that great differences may be found40 ,what philosophic originality may be1 we hope to show by the following consideration3 ,it is the province of ,philosophy to dissolve and make clear to itself the entire phenomena of the world4 ,these phenomena consist of two kinds3 first1 the products of nature1 or immediate existence2 second1 the products of spirit1 including what modifications man has wrought upon the former1 and his independent creations4 ,these spiritual products may be again subdivided into practical 7in which the will predominates7--the institutions of civilization--and theoretical 7in which the intellect predominates7--art1 religion1 science1 c4 ,not only must ,philosophy explain the immediate phenomena of nature--it must also explain the mediate phenomena of spirit4 ,and not only are the institutions of civilization proper objects of study1 but still more is this theoretic side that which demands the highest activity of the philosopher4 ,to examine the thoughts of man--to unravel them and make them clear--must constitute the earliest employment of the speculative thinker2 his first business is to comprehend the thought of the world2 to dissolve for himself the solutions which have dissolved the world before him4 ,hence1 the prevalent opinion that it is far higher to be an 8original investigator0 than to be engaged in studying the thoughts of others1 leaves out of view the fact that the thoughts of other men are just as much objective phenomena to the individual philosopher as the ground he walks on4 ,they need explanation just as much4 ,if ,i can explain the thoughts of the profoundest men of the world1 and make clear wherein they differed among themselves and from the truth1 certainly ,i am more original than they were4 ,for is not 8original0 to be used in the sense of primariness1 of approximation to the absolute1 universal truth8 ,he who varies from the truth must be secondary1 and owe his deflections to somewhat alien to his being1 and therefore be himself subordinate thereto4 ,only the ,truth makes ,free and ,original4 ,how many people stand in the way of their own originality6 ,if an absolute ,science should be discovered by anybody1 we could all become absolutely original by mastering it4 ,so much as ,i have mastered of science1 ,i have dissolved into me1 and have not left it standing alien and opposed to me1 but it is now my own4 ,our course1 then1 in the practical endeavor to elevate the tone of ,american thinking1 is plain3 we must furnish convenient access to the deepest thinkers of ancient and modern times4 ,to prepare translations and commentary1 together with original exposition1 is our object4 ,originality will take care of itself4 ,once disciplined in ,speculative thought1 the new growths of our national life will furnish us objects whose comprehension shall constitute original philosophy without parallel4 ,meanwhile it must be confessed that those who set up this cry for originality are not best employed4 ,their ideals are commonplace1 and their demand is too easily satisfied with the mere whimsical1 and they do not readily enough distinguish therefrom the excellent4 ,,contents ,,of ,,the ,,journal4 ,thus far the articles of this journal have given most prominence to art in its various forms4 ,the speculative content of art is more readily seen than that of any other form1 for the reason that its sensuous element allows a more genial exposition4 ,the critique of the ,second ,part of ,faust1 by ,rosencrantz1 published in this number1 is an eminent example of the effect which the study of ,speculative ,philosophy has upon the analytical understanding4 ,is not the professor of logic able to follow the poet1 and interpret the products of his creative imagination8 ,the portion of ,hegel's sthetics1 published in this number1 giving1 as it does1 the historical groundwork of art1 furnishes in a genial form an outline of the ,philosophy of ,history4 ,doubtless the characteristics of the ,anglo-,saxon mind make it difficult to see in art what it has for such nations as the ,italians and ,germans2 we have the reflective intellect1 and do not readily attain the standpoint of the creative imagination4 ,,style4 ,in order to secure against ambiguity1 it is sometimes necessary to make inelegant repetitions1 and1 to give to a limiting clause its proper degree of subordination1 such devices as parentheses1 dashes1 etc41 have to be used to such a degree as to disfigure the page4 ,capitals and italics are also used without stint to mark important words4 ,the adjective has frequently to be used substantively1 and1 if rare1 this use is marked by commencing it with a capital4 ,there are three styles1 which correspond to the three grades of intellectual culture4 ,the sensuous stage uses simple1 categorical sentences1 and relates facts1 while the reflective stage uses hypothetical ones1 and marks relations between one fact and another2 it introduces antithesis4 ,the stage of the ,reason uses the disjunctive sentence1 and makes an assertion exhaustive1 by comprehending in it a multitude of interdependencies and exclusions4 ,thus it happens that the style of a ,hegel is very difficult to master1 and cannot be translated adequately into the sensuous style1 although many have tried it4 ,a person is very apt to blame the style of a deep thinker when he encounters him for the first time4 ,it requires an 8expert swimmer0 to follow the discourse1 but for no other reason than that the mind has not acquired the strength requisite to grasp in one thought a wide extent of conceptions4 ,,the ,,journal ,,of ,,speculative ,,philosophy4 ,vol4 ,i4 #ahfg4 ,no4 #c4 ,,the ,,monadology4 ,translated from the ,french of ,,leibnitz1 by ,f4 ,h4 ,,hedge4 #a4 ,the ,monad1 of which we shall here speak1 is merely a simple substance entering into those which are compound2 simple1 that is to say1 without parts4 #b4 ,and there must be simple substances1 since there are compounds2 for the compound is only a collection or aggregate of simples4 #c4 ,where there are no parts1 neither extension1 nor figure1 nor divisibility is possible2 and these ,monads are the veritable ,atoms of ,nature--in one word1 the ,elements of things4 #d4 ,there is thus no danger of dissolution1 and there is no conceivable way in which a simple substance can perish naturally4 #e4 ,for the same reason1 there is no way in which a simple substance can begin naturally1 since it could not be formed by composition4 #f4 ,therefore we may say that the ,monads can neither begin nor end in any other way than all at once2 that is to say1 they cannot begin except by creation1 nor end except by annihilation2 whereas that which is compounded1 begins and ends by parts4 #g4 ,there is also no intelligible way in which a ,monad can be altered or changed in its interior by any other creature1 since it would be impossible to transpose anything in it1 or to conceive in it any internal movement--any movement excited1 directed1 augmented or diminished within1 such as may take place in compound bodies1 where there is change of parts4 ,the ,monads have no windows through which anything can enter or go forth4 ,it would be impossible for any accidents to detach themselves and go forth from the substances1 as did formerly the ,sensible ,species of the ,schoolmen4 ,accordingly1 neither substance nor accident can enter a ,monad from without4 #h4 ,nevertheless ,monads must have qualities--otherwise they would not even be entities2 and if simple substances did not differ in their qualities1 there would be no means by which we could become aware of the changes of things1 since all that is in compound bodies is derived from simple ingredients1 and ,monads1 being without qualities1 would be indistinguishable one from another1 seeing also they do not differ in quantity4 ,consequently1 a plenum being supposed1 each place could in any movement receive only the just equivalent of what it had had before1 and one state of things would be indistinguishable from another4 #i4 ,moreover1 each ,monad must differ from every other1 for there are never two beings in nature perfectly alike1 and in which it is impossible to find an internal difference1 or one founded on some intrinsic denomination4 #aj4 ,i take it for granted1 furthermore1 that every created being is subject to change--consequently the created ,monad2 and likewise that this change is continual in each4 #aa4 ,it follows1 from what we have now said1 that the natural changes of ,monads proceed from an internal principle1 since no external cause can influence the interior4 #ab4 ,but1 besides the principle of change1 there must also be a detail of changes1 embracing1 so to speak1 the specification and the variety of the simple substances4 #ac4 ,this detail must involve multitude in unity or in simplicity3 for as all natural changes proceed by degrees1 something changes and something remains1 and consequently there must be in the simple substance a plurality of affections and relations1 although there are no parts4 #ad4 ,this shifting state1 which involves and represents multitude in unity1 or in the simple substance1 is nothing else than what we call ,perception1 which must be carefully distinguished from apperception1 or consciousness1 as will appear in the sequel4 ,here it is that the ,cartesians have especially failed1 making no account of those perceptions of which we are not conscious4 ,it is this that has led them to suppose that spirits are the only ,monads1 and that there are no souls of brutes or other ,entelechies4 ,it is owing to this that they have vulgarly confounded protracted torpor with actual death1 and have fallen in with the scholastic prejudice1 which believes in souls entirely separate4 ,hence1 also1 ill affected minds have been confirmed in the opinion that the soul is mortal4 #ae4 ,the action of the internal principle which causes the change1 or the passage from one perception to another1 may be called ,appetition4 ,it is true1 the desire cannot always completely attain to every perception to which it tends1 but it always attains to something thereof1 and arrives at new perceptions4 #af4 ,we experience in ourselves the fact of multitude in the simple substance1 when we find that the least thought of which we are conscious includes a variety in its object4 ,accordingly1 all who admit that the soul is a simple substance1 are bound to admit this multitude in the ,monad1 and ,mr4 ,boyle should not have found any difficulty in this admission1 as he has done in his dictionary--,art4 ,rorarius4 #ag4 ,besides1 it must be confessed that ,perception and its consequences are inexplicable by mechanical causes--that is to say1 by figures and motions4 ,if we imagine a machine so constructed as to produce thought1 sensation1 perception1 we may conceive it magnified--the same proportions being preserved--to such an extent that one might enter it like a mill4 ,this being supposed1 we should find in it on inspection only pieces which impel each other1 but nothing which can explain a perception4 ,it is in the simple substance1 therefore--not in the compound1 or in machinery--that we must look for that phenomenon2 and in the simple substance we find nothing else--nothing1 that is1 but perceptions and their changes4 ,therein also1 and therein only1 consist all the internal acts of simple substances4 #ah4 ,we might give the name of ,entelechies to all simple substances or created ,monads1 inasmuch as there is in them a certain completeness 7perfection71 7 74 ,there is a sufficiency 77 which makes them the sources of their own internal actions1 and1 as it were1 incorporeal automata4 #ai4 ,if we choose to give the name of soul to all that has perceptions and desires1 in the general sense which ,i have just indicated1 all simple substances or created ,monads may be called souls4 ,but as sentiment is something more than simple perception1 ,i am willing that the general name of ,monads and ,entelechies shall suffice for those simple substances which have nothing but perceptions1 and that the term souls shall be confined to those whose perceptions are more distinct1 and accompanied by memory4 #bj4 ,for we experience in ourselves a state in which we remember nothing1 and have no distinct perception1 as when we are in a swoon or in a profound and dreamless sleep4 ,in this state the soul does not differ sensibly from a simple ,monad2 but since this state is not permanent1 and since the soul delivers herself from it1 she is something more4 #ba4 ,and it does not by any means follow1 in that case1 that the simple substance is without perception3 that1 indeed1 is impossible1 for the reasons given above2 for it cannot perish1 neither can it subsist without affection of some kind1 which is nothing else than its perception4 ,but where there is a great number of minute perceptions1 and where nothing is distinct1 one is stunned1 as when we turn round and round in continual succession in the same direction2 whence arises a vertigo1 which may cause us to faint1 and which prevents us from distinguishing anything4 ,and possibly death may produce this state for a time in animals4 #bb4 ,and as every present condition of a simple substance is a natural consequence of its antecedent condition1 so its present is big with its future4 #bc4 ,then1 as on awaking from a state of stupor1 we become conscious of our perceptions1 we must have had perceptions1 although unconscious of them1 immediately before awaking4 ,for each perception can have no other natural origin but an antecedent perception1 as every motion must be derived from one which preceded it4 #bd4 ,thus it appears that if there were no distinction--no relief1 so to speak--no enhanced flavor in our perceptions1 we should continue forever in a state of stupor2 and this is the condition of the naked ,monad4 #be4 ,and so we see that nature has given to animals enhanced perceptions1 by the care which she has taken to furnish them with organs which collect many rays of light and many undulations of air1 increasing their efficacy by their union4 ,there is something approaching to this in odor1 in taste1 in touch1 and perhaps in a multitude of other senses of which we have no knowledge4 ,i shall presently explain how that which passes in the soul represents that which takes place in the organs4 #bf4 ,memory gives to the soul a kind of consecutive action which imitates reason1 but must be distinguished from it4 ,we observe that animals1 having a perception of something which strikes them1 and of which they have previously had a similar perception1 expect1 through the representation of their memory1 the recurrence of that which was associated with it in their previous perception1 and incline to the same feelings which they then had4 ,for example1 when we show dogs the cane1 they remember the pain which it caused them1 and whine and run4 #bg4 ,and the lively imagination1 which strikes and excites them1 arises from the magnitude or the multitude of their previous perceptions4 ,for often a powerful impression produces suddenly the effect of long habit1 or of moderate perceptions often repeated4 #bh4 ,in men as in brutes1 the consecutiveness of their perceptions is due to the principle of memory--like empirics in medicine1 who have only practice without theory4 ,and we are mere empirics in three-fourths of our acts4 ,for example1 when we expect that the sun will rise to-morrow1 we judge so empirically1 because it has always risen hitherto4 ,only the astronomer judges by an act of reason4 #bi4 ,but the cognition of necessary and eternal truths is that which distinguishes us from mere animals4 ,it is this which gives us ,reason and ,science1 and raises us to the knowledge of ourselves and of ,god2 and it is this in us which we call a reasonable soul or spirit4 #cj4 ,it is also by the cognition of necessary truths1 and by their abstractions1 that we rise to acts of reflection1 which give us the idea of that which calls itself 8,i10 and which lead us to consider that this or that is in us4 ,and thus1 while thinking of ourselves1 we think of ,being1 of substance1 simple or compound1 of the immaterial1 and of ,god himself4 ,we conceive that that which in us is limited1 is in him without limit4 ,and these reflective acts furnish the principal objects of our reasonings4 #ca4 ,our reasonings are founded on two great principles1 that of 8,contradiction10 by virtue of which we judge that to be false which involves contradiction1 and that to be true which is opposed to1 or which contradicts the false4 #cb4 ,and that of the 8,sufficient ,reason10 by virtue of which we judge that no fact can be real or existent1 no statement true1 unless there be a sufficient reason why it is thus1 and not otherwise1 although these reasons very often cannot be known to us4 #cc4 ,there are also two sorts of truths--those of reasoning and those of fact4 ,truths of reasoning are necessary1 and their opposite is impossible2 those of fact are contingent1 and their opposite is possible4 ,when a truth is necessary1 we may discover the reason of it by analysis1 resolving it into simpler ideas and truths1 until we arrive at those which are ultimate4#c #cd4 ,it is thus that mathematicians by analysis reduce speculative theorems and practical canons to definitions1 axioms and postulates4 #ce4 ,and finally1 there are simple ideas of which no definition can be given2 there are also axioms and postulates1--in one word1 ultimate principles1 which cannot and need not be proved4 ,and these are 8,identical ,propositions10 of which the opposite contains an express contradiction4 #cf4 ,but there must also be a sufficient reason for truths contingent1 or truths of fact--that is1 for the series of things diffused through the universe of creatures--or else the process of resolving into particular reasons might run into a detail without bounds1 on account of the immense variety of the things of nature1 and of the infinite division of bodies4 ,there is an infinity of figures and of movements1 present and past1 which enter into the efficient cause of my present writing2 and there is an infinity of minute inclinations and dispositions of my soul1 present and past1 which enter into the final cause of it4 #cg4 ,and as all this detail only involves other anterior or more detailed contingencies1 each one of which again requires a similar analysis in order to account for it1 we have made no advance1 and the sufficient or final reason must be outside of the series of this detail of contingencies1#d endless as it may be4 #ch4 ,and thus the final reason of things must be found in a necessary ,substance1 in which the detail of changes exists eminently as their source4 ,and this is that which we call ,,god4 #ci4 ,now this ,substance being a sufficient reason of all this detail1 which also is everywhere linked together1 there is but one ,god1 and this ,god suffices4 #dj4 ,we may also conclude that this supreme ,substance1 which is ,only1#e ,universal1 and ,necessary--having nothing outside of it which is independent of it1 and being a simple series of possible beings--must be incapable of limits1 and must contain as much of reality as is possible4 #da4 ,whence it follows that ,god is perfect1 perfection being nothing but the magnitude of positive reality taken exactly1 setting aside the limits or bounds in that which is limited4 ,and there1 where there are no bounds1 that is to say1 in ,god1 perfection is absolutely infinite4 #db4 ,it follows also that the creatures have their perfections from the influence of ,god1 but they have their imperfections from their proper nature1 incapable of existing without bounds2 for it is by this that they are distinguished from ,god4 #dc4 ,it is true1 moreover1 that ,god is not only the source of existences1 but also of essences1 so far as real1 or of that which is real in the possible2 because the divine understanding is the region of eternal truths1 or of the ideas on which they depend1 and without ,him there would be nothing real in the possibilities1 and not only nothing existing1 but also nothing possible4 #dd4 ,at the same time1 if there be a reality in the essences or possibilities1 or in the eternal truths1 this reality must be founded in something existing and actual1 consequently in the existence of the necessary ,being1 in whom essence includes existence1 or with whom it is sufficient to be possible in order to be actual4 #de4 ,thus ,god alone 7or the necessary ,being7 possesses this privilege1 that he must exist if possible2 and since nothing can hinder the possibility of that which includes no bounds1 no negation1 and consequently no contradiction1 that alone is sufficient to establish the existence of ,god a priori4 ,we have likewise proved it by the reality of eternal truths4 ,but we have also just proved it a posteriori by showing that1 since contingent beings exist1 they can have their ultimate and sufficient reason only in some necessary ,being1 who contains the reason of his existence in himself4 #df4 ,nevertheless1 we must not suppose1 with some1 that eternal verities1 being dependent upon ,god1 are arbitrary1 and depend upon his will1 as ,des ,cartes1 and afterward ,m4 ,poiret1 appear to have conceived4 ,this is true only of contingent truths1 the principle of which is fitness1 or the choice of the best2 whereas necessary truths depend solely on ,his understanding1 and are its internal object4 #dg4 ,thus ,god alone is the primitive ,unity1 or the simple original substance of which all the created or derived ,monads are the products2 and they are generated1 so to speak1 by continual fulgurations of the ,divinity1 from moment to moment1 bounded by the receptivity of the creature1 of whose existence limitation is an essential condition4 #dh4 ,in ,god is ,power1 which is the source of all2 then ,knowledge1 which contains the detail of ,ideas2 and1 finally1 ,will1 which generates changes or products according to the principle of optimism4 ,and this answers to what1 in created ,monads1 constitutes the subject or the basis1 the perceptive and the appetitive faculty4 ,but in ,god these attributes are absolutely infinite or perfect1 and in the created ,monads1 or in the ,entelechies 7or perfectihabiis1 as ,hermolaus ,barbarus translates this word71 they are only imitations according to the measure of their perfection4 #di4 ,the creature is said to act externally1 in so far as it possesses perfection1 and to suffer from another 7creature7 so far as it is imperfect4 ,so we ascribe action to the ,monad1 so far as it has distinct perceptions1 and passion1 so far as its perceptions are confused4 #ej4 ,and one creature is more perfect than another1 in this3 that we find in it that which serves to account a priori for what passes in the other2 and it is therefore said to act upon the other4 #ea4 ,but in simple substances this is merely an ideal influence of one ,monad upon another1 which can pass into effect only by the intervention of ,god1 inasmuch as in the ideas of ,god one ,monad has a right to demand that ,god1 in regulating the rest from the commencement of things1 shall have regard to it2 for since a created ,monad can have no physical influence on the interior of another1 it is only by this means that one can be dependent on another4 #eb4 ,and hence it is that actions and passions in creatures are mutual2 for ,god1 comparing two simple substances1 finds reasons in each which oblige him to accommodate the one to the other4 ,consequently that which is active in one view1 is passive in another--active so far as what we clearly discern in it serves to account for that which takes place in another1 and passive so far as the reason of that which passes in it is found in that which is clearly discerned in another4 #ec4 ,now1 as in the ideas of ,god there is an infinity of possible worlds1 and as only one can exist1 there must be a sufficient reason for the choice of ,god1 which determines him to one rather than another4 #ed4 ,and this reason can be no other than fitness1 derived from the different degrees of perfection which these worlds contain1 each possible world having a claim to exist according to the measure of perfection which it enfolds4 #ee4 ,and this is the cause of the existence of that ,best1 which the wisdom of ,god discerns1 which his goodness chooses1 and his power effects4 #ef4 ,and this connection1 or this accommodation of all created things to each1 and of each to all1 implies in each simple substance relations which express all the rest4 ,each1 accordingly1 is a living and perpetual mirror of the universe4 #eg4 ,and as the same city viewed from different sides appears quite different1 and is perspectively multiplied1 so1 in the infinite multitude of simple substances1 there are given1 as it were1 so many different worlds which yet are only the perspectives of a single one1 according to the different points of view of each ,monad4 #eh4 ,and this is the way to obtain the greatest possible variety with the greatest possible order--that is to say1 the way to obtain the greatest possible perfection4 #ei4 ,thus this hypothesis 7which ,i may venture to pronounce demonstrated7 is the only one which properly exhibits the greatness of ,god4 ,and this ,mr4 ,boyle acknowledges1 when in his dictionary 7,art4 ,rorarius7 he objects to it4 ,he is even disposed to think that ,i attribute too much to ,god1 that ,i ascribe to him impossibilities2 but he can allege no reason for the impossibility of this universal harmony1 by which each substance expresses exactly the perfections of all the rest through its relations with them4 #fj4 ,we see1 moreover1 in that which ,i have just stated1 the a priori reasons why things could not be other than they are4 ,god1 in ordering the whole1 has respect to each part1 and specifically to each ,monad1 whose nature being representative1 is by nothing restrained from representing the whole of things1 although1 it is true1 this representation must needs be confused1 as it regards the detail of the universe1 and can be distinct only in relation to a small part of things1 that is1 in relation to those which are nearest1 or whose relations to any given ,monad are greatest4 ,otherwise each ,monad would be a divinity4 ,the ,monads are limited1 not in the object1 but in the mode of their knowledge of the object4 ,they all tend confusedly to the infinite1 to the whole2 but they are limited and distinguished by the degrees of distinctness in their perceptions4 #fa4 ,and compounds symbolize in this with simples4 ,for since the world is a plenum1 and all matter connected1 and as in a plenum every movement has some effect on distant bodies1 in proportion to their distance1 so that each body is affected not only by those in actual contact with it1 and feels in some way all that happens to them1 but also through their means is affected by others in contact with those by which it is immediately touched--it follows that this communication extends to any distance4 ,consequently1 each body feels all that passes in the universe1 so that he who sees all1 may read in each that which passes everywhere else1 and even that which has been and shall be1 discerning in the present that which is removed in time as well as in space4 8 10 says ,hippocrates4 ,but each soul can read in itself only that which is distinctly represented in it4 ,it cannot unfold its laws at once1 for they reach into the infinite4 #fb4 ,thus1 though every created ,monad represents the entire universe1 it represents more distinctly the particular body to which it belongs1 and whose ,entelechy it is3 and as this body expresses the entire universe1 through the connection of all matter in a plenum1 the soul represents also the entire universe in representing that body which especially belongs to it4 #fc4 ,the body belonging to a ,monad1 which is its ,entelechy or soul1 constitutes1 with its ,entelechy1 what may be termed a living 7thing71 and1 with its soul1 what may be called an animal4 ,and the body of a living being1 or of an animal1 is always organic2 for every ,monad1 being a mirror of the universe1 according to its fashion1 and the universe being arranged with perfect order1 there must be the same order in the representative--that is1 in the perceptions of the soul1 and consequently of the body according to which the universe is represented in it4 #fd4 ,thus each organic living body is a species of divine machine1 or a natural automaton1 infinitely surpassing all artificial automata4 ,a machine made by human art is not a machine in all its parts4 ,for example1 the tooth of a brass wheel has parts or fragments which are not artificial to us2 they have nothing which marks the machine in their relation to the use for which the wheel is designed2 but natural machines--that is1 living bodies--are still machines in their minutest parts1 ad infinitum4 ,this makes the difference between nature and art1 that is to say1 between the ,divine art and ours4 #fe4 ,and the author of nature was able to exercise this divine and infinitely wonderful art1 inasmuch as every portion of nature is not only infinitely divisible1 as the ancients knew1 but is actually subdivided without end--each part into parts1 of which each has its own movement4 ,otherwise1 it would be impossible that each portion of matter should express the universe4 #ff4 ,whence it appears that there is a world of creatures1 of living 7things71 of animals1 of ,entelechies1 of souls1 in the minutest portion of matter4 #fg4 ,every particle of matter may be conceived as a garden of plants1 or as a pond full of fishes4 ,but each branch of each plant1 each member of each animal1 each drop of their humors1 is in turn another such garden or pond4 #fh4 ,and although the earth and the air embraced between the plants in the garden1 or the water between the fishes of the pond1 are not themselves plant or fish1 they nevertheless contain such1 but mostly too minute for our perception4 #fi4 ,so there is no uncultured spot1 no barrenness1 no death in the universe--no chaos1 no confusion1 except in appearance1 as it might seem in a pond at a distance1 in which one should see a confused motion and swarming1 so to speak1 of the fishes of the pond1 without distinguishing the fishes themselves4 #gj4 ,we see1 then1 that each living body has a governing ,entelechy1 which in animals is the soul of the animal4 ,but the members of this living body are full of other living bodies--plants1 animals--each of which has its ,entelechy1 or regent soul4 #ga4 ,we must not1 however1 suppose--as some who misapprehended my thought have done--that each soul has a mass or portion of matter proper to itself1 or forever united to it1 and that it consequently possesses other inferior living existences1 destined forever to its service4 ,for all bodies are in a perpetual flux1 like rivers4 ,their particles are continually coming and going4 #gb4 ,thus the soul does not change its body except by degrees4 ,it is never deprived at once of all its organs4 ,there are often metamorphoses in animals1 but never ,metempsychosis--no transmigration of souls4 ,neither are there souls entirely separated 7from bodies71 nor genii without bodies4 ,god alone is wholly without body4 #gc4 ,for which reason1 also1 there is never complete generation nor perfect death--strictly considered--consisting in the separation of the soul4 ,that which we call generation1 is development and accretion2 and that which we call death1 is envelopment and diminution4 #gd4 ,philosophers have been much troubled about the origin of forms1 of ,entelechies1 or souls4 ,but at the present day1 when1 by accurate investigations of plants1 insects and animals1 they have become aware that the organic bodies of nature are never produced from chaos or from putrefaction1 but always from seed1 in which undoubtedly there had been a preformation2 it has been inferred that not only the organic body existed in that seed before conception1 but also a soul in that body--in one word1 the animal itself--and that1 by the act of conception1 this animal is merely disposed to a grand transformation1 to become an animal of another species4 ,we even see something approaching this1 outside of generation1 as when worms become flies1 or when caterpillars become butterflies4 #ge4 ,those animals1 of which some are advanced to a higher grade1 by means of conception1 may be called spermatic2 but those among them which remain in their kind--that is to say1 the greater portion--are born1 multiply1 and are destroyed1 like the larger animals1 and only a small number of the elect among them1 pass to a grander theatre4 #gf4 ,but this is only half the truth4 ,i have concluded that if the animal does not begin to be in the order of nature1 it also does not cease to be in the order of nature1 and that not only there is no generation1 but no entire destruction--no death1 strictly considered4 ,and these a posteriori conclusions1 drawn from experience1 accord perfectly with my principles deduced a priori1 as stated above4 #gg4 ,thus we may say1 not only that the soul 7mirror of an indestructible universe7 is indestructible1 but also the animal itself1 although its machine may often perish in part1 and put off or put on organic spoils4 #gh4 ,these principles have furnished me with a natural explanation of the union1 or rather the conformity between the soul and the organized body4 ,the soul follows its proper laws1 and the body likewise follows those which are proper to it1 and they meet in virtue of the prestablished harmony which exists between all substances1 as representations of one and the same universe4 #gi4 ,souls act according to the laws of final causes1 by appetitions1 means and ends2 bodies act according to the laws of efficient causes1 or the laws of motion4 ,and the two kingdoms1 that of efficient causes and that of final causes1 harmonize with each other4 #hj4 ,des ,cartes perceived that souls communicate no force to bodies1 because the quantity of force in matter is always the same4 ,nevertheless1 he believed that souls might change the direction of bodies4 ,but this was because the world was at that time ignorant of the law of nature1 which requires the conservation of the same total direction in matter4 ,had he known this1 he would have hit upon my system of prestablished harmony4 #ha4 ,according to this system1 bodies act as if there were no souls1 and souls act as if there were no bodies2 and yet both act as though the one influenced the other4 #hb4 ,as to spirits1 or rational souls1 although ,i find that at bottom the same principle which ,i have stated--namely1 that animals and souls begin with the world and end only with the world--holds with regard to all animals and living things1 yet there is this peculiarity in rational animals1 that although their spermatic animalcules1 as such1 have only ordinary or sensitive souls1 yet as soon as those of them which are elected1 so to speak1 arrive by the act of conception at human nature1 their sensitive souls are elevated to the rank of reason and to the prerogative of spirits4 #hc4 ,among other differences which distinguish spirits from ordinary souls1 some of which have already been indicated1 there is also this3 that souls in general are living mirrors1 or images of the universe of creatures1 but spirits are1 furthermore1 images of ,divinity itself1 or of the ,author of ,nature1 capable of cognizing the system of the universe1 and of imitating something of it by architectonic experiments1 each spirit being1 as it were1 a little divinity in its own department4 #hd4 ,hence spirits are able to enter into a kind of fellowship with ,god4 ,in their view he is not merely what an inventor is to his machine 7as ,god is in relation to other creatures71 but also what a prince is to his subjects1 and even what a father is to his children4 #he4 ,whence it is easy to conclude that the assembly of all spirits must constitute the ,city of ,god--that is to say1 the most perfect state possible1 under the most perfect of monarchs4 #hf4 ,this ,city of ,god1 this truly universal monarchy1 is a moral world within the natural2 and it is the most exalted and the most divine among the works of ,god4 ,it is in this that the glory of ,god most truly consists1 which glory would be wanting if his greatness and his goodness were not recognized and admired by spirits4 ,it is in relation to this ,divine ,city that he possesses1 properly speaking1 the attribute of goodness1 whereas his wisdom and his power are everywhere manifest4 #hg4 ,as we have established above1 a perfect harmony between the two natural kingdoms--the one of efficient causes1 the other of final causes--so it behooves us to notice here also a still further harmony between the physical kingdom of nature and the moral kingdom of grace--that is to say1 between ,god considered as the architect of the machine of the universe1 and ,god considered as monarch of the divine ,city of ,spirits4 #hh4 ,this harmony makes all things conduce to grace by natural methods4 ,this globe1 for example1 must be destroyed and repaired by natural means1 at such seasons as the government of spirits may require1 for the chastisement of some and the recompense of others4 #hi4 ,we may say1 furthermore1 that ,god as architect contains entirely ,god as legislator1 and that accordingly sins must carry their punishment with them in the order of nature1 by virtue even of the mechanical structure of things1 and that good deeds in like manner will bring their recompense1 through their connection with bodies1 although this cannot1 and ought not always to1 take place on the spot4 #ij4 ,finally1 under this perfect government1 there will be no good deed without its recompense1 and no evil deed without its punishment1 and all must redound to the advantage of the good--that is to say1 of those who are not malcontents--in this great commonwealth1 who confide in ,providence after having done their duty1 and who worthily love and imitate the ,author of all good1 pleasing themselves with the contemplation of his perfections1 following the nature of pure and genuine ,love1 which makes us blest in the happiness of the loved4 ,in this spirit1 the wise and good labor for that which appears to be conformed to the divine will1 presumptive or antecedent1 contented the while with all that ,god brings to pass by his secret will1 consequent and decisive1--knowing that if we were sufficiently acquainted with the order of the universe we should find that it surpasses all the wishes of the wisest1 and that it could not be made better than it is1 not only for all in general1 but for ourselves in particular1 if we are attached1 as is fitting1 to the ,author of ,all1 not only as the architect and efficient cause of our being1 but also as our master and the final cause1 who should be the whole aim of our volition1 and who alone can make us blest4 ,footnote #c3 ,primitifs4 ,footnote #d3 i4 e41 ,accidental causes4 ,footnote #e3 ,unique4 ,a ,,criticism ,,of ,,philosophical ,,systems4 ,translated from the ,german of ,j4 ,g4 ,,fichte1 by ,a4 ,e4 ,,kroeger4 ,,note4--,the following completes ,fichte's ,second ,introduction to the ,science of ,knowledge1 or his ,criticism of ,philosophical ,systems4 ,in the first division of what follows1 ,fichte traces out his own transcendental standpoint in the ,kantian ,philosophy1 and next proceeds1 in the second division1 to connect it with what was printed in our previous number1 criticising without mercy the dogmatic standpoint4 ,by the completion of this article1 we have given to the readers of our ,journal ,fichte's own great ,introductions to that ,science of ,knowledge1 which is about to be made accessible to ,american readers through the publishing house of ,messrs4 ,lippincott ,co41 ,philadelphia4 ,our readers are1 therefore1 especially prepared to enter upon a study of ,fichte's wonderful system1 for none of these ,introductions1 as indeed none of ,fichte's works of ,science1 have ever before been published in the ,english language4 ,in a subsequent number we shall print ,fichte's 8,sun-clear ,statement regarding the true nature of the ,science of ,knowledge10 a masterly exhibition of the treatment of scientific subjects in a popular form4 ,we hope that all who have read1 or will read these articles1 will also enter upon a study of the great work which they are designed to prepare for2 the study is worth the pains4--,,editor4 ,i4 ,it is not the habit of the ,science of ,knowledge1 nor of its author1 to seek protection under any authority whatever4 ,the person who has first to see whether this doctrine agrees with the doctrine of somebody else before he is willing to be convinced by it1 is not one whom this science calculates to convince1 because the absolute self-activity and independent faith in himself which this science presupposes1 is wanting in him4 ,it was therefore quite a different motive than a desire to recommend his doctrines1 which led the author of the ,science of ,knowledge to state that his doctrine was in perfect harmony with ,kant's doctrine1 and was indeed the very same4 ,in this opinion he has been confirmed by the continued elaboration of his system1 which he was compelled to undertake4 ,nevertheless1 all others who pass for students of ,kant's philosophy1 and who have spoken on the subject--whether they were friends or opponents of the ,science of ,knowledge--have unanimously asserted the contrary2 and by their advice1 even ,kant himself1 who ought certainly best to understand himself1 asserts the contrary4 ,if the author of the ,science of ,knowledge were disposed towards a certain manner of thinking1 this would be welcome news to him4 ,moreover1 since he considers it no disgrace to have misunderstood ,kant1 and foresees that to have misunderstood him will soon be considered no disgrace by general opinion1 he ought surely not to hesitate to assume that disgrace1 especially as it would confer upon him the honor of being the first discoverer of a philosophy which will certainly become universal1 and be productive of the most beneficial results for mankind4 ,it is indeed scarcely explicable why friends and opponents of the ,science of ,knowledge so zealously contradict that assertion of its author1 and why they so earnestly request him to prove it1 although he never promised to do so1 nay1 expressly refused1 since such a proof would rather belong to a future ,history of ,philosophy than to a present representation of that system4 ,the opponents of the ,science of ,knowledge in thus calling for a proof1 are certainly not impelled by a tender regard for the fame of the author of that ,science2 and the friends of it might surely leave the subject alone1 as ,i myself have no taste for such an honor1 and seek the only honor which ,i know1 in quite a different direction4 ,do they clamor for this proof in order to escape my charge1 that they did not understand the writings of ,kant8 ,but such an accusation from the lips of the author of the ,science of ,knowledge is surely no reproach1 since he confesses as loudly as possible1 that he also has not understood them1 and that only after he had discovered in his own way the ,science of ,knowledge1 did he find a correct and harmonious interpretation of ,kant's writings4 ,indeed1 that charge will soon cease to be a reproach from the lips of anybody4 ,but perhaps this clamor is raised to escape the charge that they did not recognize their own doctrine1 so zealously defended by them1 when it was placed before them in a different shape from their own4 ,if this is the case1 ,i should like to save them this reproach also1 if there were not another interest1 which to me appears higher than theirs1 and to which their interest shall be sacrificed4 ,the fact is1 ,i do not wish to be considered for one moment more than ,i am1 nor to ascribe to myself a merit which ,i do not possess4 ,i shall therefore1 in all probability1 be compelled to enter upon the proof which they so earnestly demand1 and hence improve the opportunity at present offered to me4 ,the ,science of ,knowledge starts1 as we have just now seen1 from an intellectual contemplation1 from the absolute self-activity of the ,ego4 ,now it would seem beyond a doubt1 and evident to all the readers of ,kant's writings1 that this man has declared himself on no subject more decisively1 nay1 ,i might say contemptuously1 than in denying this power of an intellectual contemplation4 ,this denial seems so thoroughly rooted in the ,kantian ,system1 that1 after all the elaboration of his philosophy1 which he has undertaken since#f the appearance of the ,critique of ,pure ,reason1 and by means of which1 as will be evident to any one1 the propositions of that first work have received a far higher clearness and development than they originally possessed2--he yet1 in one of his latest works1 feels constrained to repeat those assertions with undiminished energy1 and to show that the present style of philosophy1 which treats all labor and exertion with contempt1 as well as a most disastrous fanaticism1 have resulted from the phantom of an intellectual contemplation4 ,is any further proof needed1 that a ,philosophy1 which is based on the very thing so decidedly rejected by the ,kantian ,system1 must be precisely the opposite of that system1 and must be moreover the very senseless and disastrous system1 of which ,kant speaks in that work of his8 ,perhaps1 however1 it might be well first to inquire1 whether the same word may not express two utterly different conceptions in the two systems4 ,in ,kant's terminology1 all contemplation is directed upon a ,being 7a permanent ,remaining72 and intellectual contemplation would thus signify in his system the immediate consciousness of a non-sensuous ,being1 or the immediate consciousness 7through pure thinking7 of the thing per se2 and hence a creation of the thing per se through its conception1 in nearly the same manner as the existence of ,god is demonstrated from the mere conception of ,god2--those who do so must look upon ,god's existence as a mere sequence of their thinking4 ,now ,kant's system--taking the direction it did take--may have considered it necessary in this manner to keep the thing per se at a respectful distance4 ,but the ,science of ,knowledge has finished the thing per se in another manner2 that ,science knows it to be the completest perversion of reason1 a purely irrational conception4 ,to that science all being is necessarily sensuous1 for it evolves the very conception of ,being from the form of sensuousness4 ,that science regards the intellectual contemplation of ,kant's system as a phantasm1 which vanishes the moment one attempts to think it1 and which indeed is not worth a name at all4 ,the intellectual contemplation1 whereof the ,science of ,knowledge speaks1 is not at all directed upon a ,being1 but upon an ,activity2 and ,kant does not even designate it1 7unless you wish to take the expression 8,pure apperception0 for such a designation74 ,nevertheless1 it can be clearly shown where in ,kant's ,system it ought to have been mentioned4 ,i hope that the categorical imperative of ,kant occurs in consciousness1 according to his ,system4 ,now what sort of consciousness is this of the categorical imperative8 ,this question ,kant never proposed to himself1 because he never treated of the basis of all ,philosophy4 ,in his ,critique of ,pure ,reason he treated only of theoretical ,philosophy1 and could therefore not introduce the categorical imperative2 in his ,critique of ,practical ,reason1 he treated only of practical ,philosophy1 wherein the question concerning the manner of consciousness could not arise4 ,this consciousness is doubtless an immediate1 but no sensuous consciousness--hence exactly what ,i call intellectual contemplation4 ,now1 since we have no classical author in ,philosophy1 ,i give it the latter name1 with the same right with which ,kant gives it to something else1 which is a mere nothing2 and with the same right ,i insist that people ought first to become acquainted with the significance of my terminology before proceeding to judge my system4 ,my most estimable friend1 the ,rev4 ,mr4 ,schulz--to whom ,i had made known my indefinite idea of building up the whole ,science of ,philosophy on the pure ,ego1 long before ,i had thoroughly digested that idea1 and whom ,i found less opposed to it than any one else--has a remarkable passage on this subject4 ,in his review of ,kant's ,critique of ,pure ,reason1 he says3 8,the pure1 active self-consciousness1 in which really every one's ,ego consists1 must not be confounded--for the very reason because it can and must teach us in an immediate manner--with the power of contemplation1 and must not be made to involve the doctrine that we are in possession of a supersensuous1 intellectual power of contemplation4 ,for we call contemplation a representation1 which is immediately related to an object4 ,but pure self-consciousness is not representation1 but is rather that which first makes a representation to become really a representation4 ,if ,i say1 #8,i represent something to myself1' it signifies just the same as if ,i said1 #8,i am conscious that ,i have a representation of this object4'0 ,according to ,mr4 ,schulz1 therefore1 a representation is that whereof consciousness is possible4 ,now ,mr4 ,schulz also speaks of pure self-consciousness4 ,undoubtedly he knows whereof he speaks1 and hence1 as philosopher1 he most truly has a representation of pure self-consciousness4 ,it was not of this consciousness of the philosopher1 however1 that ,mr4 ,schulz spoke1 but of original consciousness2 and hence the significance of his assertion is this3 ,originally 7i4 e4 in common consciousness without philosophical reflection7 mere self-consciousness does not constitute full consciousness1 but is merely a necessary compound1 which makes full consciousness first possible4 ,but is it not the same with sensuous contemplation8 ,does sensuous contemplation constitute a consciousness1 or is it not rather merely that whereby a representation first becomes a representation8 ,contemplation without conception is confessedly blind4 ,how1 then1 can ,mr4 ,schulz call 7sensuous7 contemplation 7excluding from it self-consciousness7 representation8 ,from the standpoint of the philosopher1 as we have just seen1 self-consciousness is equally representation2 from the standpoint of original contemplation1 sensuous contemplation is equally not representation4 ,or does the conception constitute a representation8 ,the conception without contemplation is confessedly empty4 ,in truth1 self-consciousness1 sensuous contemplation1 and conception1 are1 in their isolated separateness1 not representations--they are only that through which representations become possible4 ,according to ,kant1 to ,schulz1 and to myself1 a complete representation contains a threefold3 #ast4 ,that whereby the representation relates itself to an object1 and becomes the representative of a ,something--and this we unanimously call the sensuous contemplation 7even if ,i am myself the object of my representation1 it is by virtue of a sensuous contemplation1 for then ,i become to myself a permanent in time72 #b;d4 ,that through which the representation relates itself to the subject1 and becomes my representation2 this ,i also call contemplation 7but intellectual contemplation71 because it has the same relation to the complete representation which the sensuous contemplation has2 but ,kant and ,schulz do not want it called so2 and1 #c;d4 ,that through which both are united1 and only in this union become representation2 and this we again unanimously call conception4 ,but to state it tersely3 what is really the ,science of ,knowledge in two words8 ,it is this3 ,reason is absolutely self-determined2 ,reason is only for ,reason2 but for ,reason there is also nothing but ,reason4 ,hence1 everything1 which ,reason is1 must be grounded in itself1 and out of itself1 but not in or out of another--some external other1 which it could never grasp without giving up itself4 ,in short1 the ,science of ,knowledge is transcendental idealism4 ,again1 what is the content of the ,kantian system in two words8 ,i confess that ,i cannot conceive it possible how any one can understand even one sentence of ,kant1 and harmonize it with others1 except on the same presupposition which the ,science of ,knowledge has just asserted4 ,i believe that that presupposition is the everlasting refrain of his system2 and ,i confess that one of the reasons why ,i refused to prove the agreement of the ,science of ,knowledge with ,kant's system was this3 ,it appeared to me somewhat too ridiculous and too tedious to show up the forest by pointing out the several trees in it4 ,i will cite here one chief passage from ,kant4 ,he says3 8,the highest principle of the possibility of all contemplation in relation to the understanding is this3 that all the manifold be subject to the conditions of the original unity of apperception40 ,that is to say1 in other words1 8,that something which is contemplated be also thought1 is only possible on condition that the possibility of the original unity of apperception can coexist with it40 ,now since1 according to ,kant1 contemplation also is possible only on condition that it be thought and comprehended--otherwise it would remain blind--and since contemplation itself is thus subject to the conditions of the possibility of thinking--it follows that1 according to ,kant1 not only ,thinking immediately1 but by the mediation of thinking1 contemplation also1 and hence all consciousness1 is subject to the conditions of the original unity of apperception4 ,now1 what is this condition8 ,it is true1 ,kant speaks of conditions1 but he states only one as a fundamental condition4 ,what is this condition of the original unity of apperception8 ,it is this 7see #af of the ,critique of ,pure ,reason71 8that my representations can be accompanied by the #8,i think'0--the word 8,i0 alone is italicised by ,kant1 and this is somewhat important2 that is to say1 ,i am the thinking in this thinking4 ,of what 8,i0 does ,kant speak here8 ,perhaps of the ,ego1 which his followers quietly heap together by a manifold of representations1 in no single one of which it was1 but in all of which collectively it now is said to be4 ,then the words of ,kant would signify this3 ,i1 who think ,d1 am the same ,i who thought ,a1 ,b and ,c1 and it is only through the thinking of my manifold thinking1 that ,i first became ,i to myself--that is to say1 the identical in the manifold8 ,in that case ,kant would have been just such a pitiable tattler as these ,kantians2 for in that case the possibility of all thinking would be conditioned1 according to him1 by another thinking1 and by the thinking of this thinking2 and ,i should like to know how we could ever arrive at a thinking4 ,but1 instead of tracing the consequences of ,kant's statement1 ,i merely intended to cite his own words4 ,he says again3 8,this representation1 #8,i think1' is an act of spontaneity1 i4 e4 it cannot be considered as belonging to #8sensuousness'48 7,i add3 and hence1 also1 not to inner sensuousness1 to which the above described identity of consciousness most certainly does belong47 ,kant continues3 8,i call it pure apperception1 in order to distinguish it from the empirical 7just described7 apperception1 and because it is that self-consciousness1 which1 in producing the representation #8,i think'--which must accompany all other representations1 and is in all consciousness one and the same--can itself be accompanied by no other representation40 ,here the character of pure self-consciousness is surely clearly enough described4 ,it is in all consciousness the same--hence undeterminable by any accident of consciousness2 in it the ,ego is only determined through itself1 and is thus absolutely determined4 ,it is also clear here1 that ,kant could not have understood this pure apperception to mean the consciousness of our individuality1 nor could he have taken the latter for the former2 for the consciousness of my individuality1 as an ,i1 is necessarily conditioned by1 and only possible through1 the consciousness of another individuality1 a ,thou4 ,hence we discover in ,kant's writings the conception of the pure ,ego exactly as the ,science of ,knowledge has described it1 and completely determined4 ,again1 in what relation does ,kant1 in the above passage1 place this pure ,ego to all consciousness8 ,as conditioning the same4 ,hence1 according to ,kant1 the possibility of all consciousness is conditioned by the possibility of the pure ,ego1 or by pure self-consciousness1 just as the ,science of ,knowledge holds4 ,in thinking1 the conditioning is made the prior of the conditioned--for this is the significance of that relation2 and thus it appears that1 according to ,kant1 a systematic deduction of all consciousness1 or1 which is the same1 a ,system of ,philosophy1 must proceed from the pure ,ego1 just as the ,science of ,knowledge proceeds2 and ,kant himself has thus suggested the idea of such a ,science4 ,but some one might wish to weaken this argument by the following distinction3 ,it is one thing to condition1 and another to determine4 ,according to ,kant1 all consciousness is only conditioned by self-consciousness2 i4 e4 the content of that consciousness may have its ground in something else than self-consciousness2 provided the results of that grounding do not contradict the conditions of self-consciousness2 those results need not proceed from self-consciousness1 provided they do not cancel its possibility4 ,but1 according to the ,science of ,knowledge1 all consciousness is determined through self-consciousness2 i4 e4 everything which occurs in consciousness is grounded1 given and produced by the conditions of self-consciousness1 and a ground of the same in something other than self-consciousness does not exist at all4 ,now1 to meet this argument1 ,i must show that in the present case the determinateness follows immediately from the conditionedness1 and that1 therefore1 the distinction drawn between both is not valid in this instance4 ,whosoever says1 8,all consciousness is conditioned by the possibility of self-consciousness1 and as such ,i now propose to consider it10 knows in this his investigation1 nothing more concerning consciousness1 and abstracts from everything he may believe1 further to know concerning it4 ,he deduces what is required from the asserted principle1 and only what he thus has deduced as consciousness is for him consciousness1 and everything else is and remains nothing4 ,thus the derivability from self-consciousness determines for him the extent of that which he holds to be consciousness1 because he starts from the presupposition that all consciousness is conditioned by the possibility of self-consciousness4 ,now ,i know very well that ,kant has by no means built up such a system2 for if he had1 the author of the ,science of ,knowledge would not have undertaken that work1 but would have chosen another branch of human knowledge for his field4 ,i know that he has by no means proven his categories to be conditions of self-consciousness2 ,i know that he has simply asserted them so to be2 that he has still less deduced time and space1 and that which in original consciousness is inseparable from them--the matter which fills time and space--as such conditions2 since of these he has not even expressly stated1 as he has done in the case of the categories1 that they are such conditions4 ,but ,i believe ,i know quite as well that ,kant has thought such a system2 that all his writings and utterances are fragments and results of this system1 and that his assertions get meaning and intention only through this presupposition4 ,whether he did not himself think this system with sufficient clearness and definiteness to enable him to utter it for others2 or whether he did1 indeed1 think it thus clearly and merely did not want so to utter it1 as some remarks would seem to indicate1 might1 it seems to me1 be left undecided2 at least somebody else must investigate this matter1 for ,i have never asserted anything on this point4#g ,but1 however such an investigation may result1 this merit surely belongs altogether to the great man2 that he first of all consciously separated philosophy from external objects1 and led that science into the ,self4 ,this is the spirit and the inmost soul of all his philosophy1 and this also is the spirit and soul of the ,science of ,knowledge4 ,i am reminded of a chief distinction which is said to exist between the ,science of ,knowledge and ,kant's system1 and a distinction which but recently has been again insisted upon by a man who is justly supposed to have understood ,kant1 and who has shown that he also has understood the ,science of ,knowledge4 ,this man is ,reinhold1 who1 in a late essay1 in endeavoring to prove that ,i have done injustice to myself1 and to other successful students of ,kant's writings--in stating what ,i have just now reiterated and proved1 i4 e4 that ,kant's system and the ,science of ,knowledge are the same--proceeds to remark3 8,the ground of our assertion1 that there is an external something corresponding to our representations1 is most certainly held by the ,critique of ,pure ,reason to be contained in the ,ego2 but only in so far as empirical knowledge 7experience7 has taken place in the ,ego as a fact2 that is to say1 the ,critique of ,pure ,reason holds that this empirical knowledge has its ground in the pure ,ego only in relation to its transcendental content1 which is the form of that knowledge2 but in regard to its empirical content1 which gives that knowledge objective validity1 it is grounded in the ,ego through a something which is not the ,ego4 ,now1 a scientific form of philosophy was not possible so long as that something1 which is not ,ego1 was looked for outside of the ,ego as ground of the objective reality of the transcendental content of the ,ego40 ,thus ,reinhold4 ,i have not convinced my readers1 or demonstrated my proof1 until ,i have met this objection4 ,the 7purely historical7 question is this3 ,has ,kant really placed the ground of experience 7in its empirical content7 in a something different from the ,ego8 ,i know very well that all the ,kantians1 except ,mr4 ,beck1 whose work appeared after the publication of the ,science of ,knowledge1 have really understood ,kant to say this4 ,nay1 the last interpreter of ,kant1 ,mr4 ,schulz1 whom ,kant himself has endorsed1 thus interprets him4 ,how often does ,mr4 ,schulz admit that the objective ground of the appearances is contained in something which is a thing in itself1 c41 c4 ,we have just seen how ,reinhold also interprets ,kant4 ,now it may seem presumptuous for one man to arise and say3 8,up to this moment1 amongst a number of worthy scholars who have devoted their time and energies to the interpretation of a certain book1 not a single one has understood that book otherwise than utterly falsely2 they all have discovered in that system the very doctrine which it refutes--dogmatism1 instead of transcendental idealism2 and ,i alone understand it rightly40 ,yet this presumption might be but seemingly so2 for it is to be hoped that other persons will adopt that one man's views1 and that1 therefore1 he will not always stand alone4 ,there are other reasons why it is not very presumptuous to contradict the whole number of ,kantians1 but ,i will not mention them here4 ,but what is most curious in this matter is this--the discovery that ,kant did not intend to speak of a something different from the ,ego1 is by no means a new one4 ,for ten years everybody could read the most thorough and complete proof of it in ,jacobi's 8,idealism and ,realism10 and in his 8,transcendental ,idealism40 ,in those works1 ,jacobi has put together the most evident and decisive passages from ,kant's writings on this subject1 in ,kant's own words4 ,i do not like to do again what has once been done1 and cannot be done better2 and ,i refer my readers with the more pleasure to those works1 as they1 like all philosophical writings of ,jacobi1 may be even yet of advantage to them4 ,a few questions1 however1 ,i propose to address to those interpreters of ,kant4 ,tell me1 how far does the applicability of the categories extend1 according to ,kant1 particularly of the category of causality8 ,clearly only to the field of appearances1 and hence only to that which is already in us and for us4 ,but in what manner do we then come to accept a something different from the ,ego1 as the ground of the empirical content of ,knowledge8 ,i answer3 only by drawing a conclusion from the grounded to the ground2 hence by applying the category of causality4 ,thus1 indeed1 ,kant himself discovers it to be1 and hence rejects the assumption of things1 c41 c41 outside of us4 ,but his interpreters make him forget for the present instance the validity of categories generally1 and make him arrive1 by a bold leap1 from the world of appearances to the thing per se outside of us4 ,now1 how do these interpreters justify this inconsequence8 ,kant evidently speaks of a thing per se4 ,but what is this thing to him8 ,a noumenon1 as we can find in many passages of his writings4 ,reinhold and ,schulz also hold it to be a noumenon4 ,now1 what is a noumenon8 ,according to ,kant1 to ,reinhold1 and ,schulz1 a something1 which our thinking--by laws to be shown up1 and which ,kant has shown up--adds to the appearance1 and which must so be added in thought2#h which1 therefore1 is produced only through our thinking2 not1 however1 through our free1 but through a necessary thinking1 which is only for our thinking--for us thinking beings4 ,but what do those interpreters make of this noumenon or thing in itself8 ,the thought of this thing in itself is grounded in sensation1 and sensation they again assert to be grounded in the thing in itself4 ,their globe rests on the great elephant1 and the great elephant--rests on the globe4 ,their thing in itself1 which is a mere thought1 they say affects the ,ego4 ,have they then forgotten their first speech1 and is the thing1 per se1 which a moment ago was but a mere thought1 now turned into something more8 ,or do they seriously mean to apply to a mere thought1 the exclusive predicate of reality1 i4 e4 causality8 ,and such teachings are put forth as the astonishing discoveries of the great genius1 who1 with his torch1 lights up the retrograde philosophical century4 ,it is but too well known to me that the ,kantianism of the ,kantians is precisely the just described system--is really this monstrous composition of the most vulgar dogmatism1 which allows things per se to make impressions upon us1 and of the most decided idealism1 which allows all being to be generated only through the thinking of the intelligence1 and which knows nothing of any other sort of being4 ,from what ,i am yet going to say on this subject1 ,i except two men--,reinhold1 because with a power of mind and a love of truth which do credit to his heart and head1 he has abandoned this system1 7which1 however1 he still holds to be the ,kantian system1 and ,i only disagree with him on this purely historical question17 and ,schulz1 because he has of late been silent on philosophical questions1 which leaves it fair to assume that he has begun to doubt his former system4 ,but concerning the others1 it must be acknowledged by all who have still their inner sense sufficiently under control to be able to distinguish between being and thinking and not to mix both together1 that a system which thus mixes being and thinking receives but too much honor if it is spoken of seriously4 ,to be sure1 very few men may be properly required to overcome the natural tendency towards dogmatism sufficiently to lift themselves up to the free flight of ,speculation4 ,what was impossible for a man of overwhelming mental activity like ,jacobi1 how can it be expected of certain other men1 whom ,i would rather not name8 ,but that these incurable dogmatists should have persuaded themselves that ,kant's ,critique of ,pure ,reason was food for them2 that they had the boldness to conclude--since ,kant's writings had been praised 7,god may know by what chance67 in some celebrated journal--they might also now follow the fashion and become ,kantians2 that since then1 for years1 they1 in their intoxication1 have be-written many a ream of valuable paper1 without ever1 in all this time1 having come to their senses1 or understood but one period of all they have written2 that up to the present day1 though they have been somewhat rudely shaken1 they have not been able to rub the sleep out of their eyes1 but rather prefer to beat and kick about them1 in the hope of striking some of these unwelcome disturbers of their peace2 and that the ,german public1 so desirous of acquiring knowledge1 should have bought their blackened paper with avidity1 and attempted to suck up the spirit of it--nay1 should even1 perhaps1 have copied and recopied these writings without ever clearly perceiving that there was no sense in them3 all this will forever1 in the annals of philosophy1 remain the disgrace of our century1 and our posterity will be able to explain these occurrences of our times only on the presupposition of a mental epidemic1 which had taken hold of this age4 ,but1 will these interpreters reply3 your argument is1 after all--if we abstract from ,jacobi's writings1 which1 to be sure1 are rather hard to swallow1 since they quote ,kant's own words--no more than this3 it is absurd2 hence ,kant cannot have meant to say it4 ,now1 if we admit the absurdity1 as unfortunately we must1 why1 then1 might not ,kant have said these absurdities1 just as well as we others1 amongst whom there are some1 of whom you yourself confess the merits1 and to whom you doubtless will not deny all sound understanding8 ,i reply3 to be the inventor of a system is one thing1 and to be his commentators and successors1 another4 ,what1 in case of the latter1 would not testify to an absolute want of sound sense1 might certainly evince it in the former4 ,the ground is this3 the latter are not yet possessed of the idea of the whole--for if they were so possessed1 there would be no necessity for them to study the system2 they are merely to construct it out of the parts which the inventor hands over to them2 and all these parts are1 in their minds1 not fully determined1 rounded off1 and made smooth1 until they are united into a natural whole4 ,now1 this construction of the parts may require some time1 and during this time it may occur that these men determine some parts inaccurately1 and hence place them in contradiction with the whole1 of which they are not yet possessed4 ,the discoverer of the idea of the whole1 on the contrary1 proceeds from this idea1 in which all parts are united1 and these parts he separately places before his readers1 because only thus can he communicate the whole4 ,the work of the former is a synthetizing of that which they do not yet possess1 but are to obtain through the synthesis2 the work of the latter is an analyzing of that which he already possesses4 ,it is very possible that the former may not be aware of the contradiction in which the several parts stand to the whole which is to be composed of them1 for they may not have got so far yet as to compare them4 ,but it is quite certain that the latter1 who proceeded from the composite1 must have thought1 or believed that he thought1 the contradiction which is in the parts of his representation--for he certainly at one time held all the parts together4 ,it is not absurd to think dogmatism now1 and in another moment transcendental idealism2 for this we all do1 and must do1 if we wish to philosophize about both systems2 but it is absurd to think both systems as one4 ,the interpreters of ,kant's system do not necessarily think it thus as one2 but the author of that system must certainly have done so if his system was intended to effect such a union4 ,now1 ,i1 at least1 am utterly incapable of believing such an absurdity on the part of any one who has his senses2 how1 then1 can ,i believe ,kant to have been guilty of it8 ,unless ,kant1 therefore1 declares expressly in so many words1 that he deduces sensation from an impression of the thing1 per se1 or1 to use his own terminology1 that sensation must be explained in philosophy1 from a transcendental object which exists outside of us1 ,i shall not believe what these interpreters tell us of ,kant4 ,but if he does make this declaration1 ,i shall consider the ,critique of ,pure ,reason rather as the result of the most marvellous accident than as the product of a mind4 ,but1 say our opponents1 does not ,kant state expressly that 8,the object is given to us10 and 8that this is possible because the object affects us as in a certain manner10 and 8that there is a power of attaining representations by the manner in which objects affect us1 which power is called sensuousness40 ,nay1 ,kant says even this3 8,how should our knowledge be awakened into exercise if it were not done by objects that touch our senses and partly produce representations themselves1 while partly putting our power of understanding into motion1 to compare1 connect and separate these representations1 and thus to form the raw material of our sensuous impressions into a knowledge which is called experience40 ,well1 these are probably all the passages which can be adduced by our opponents4 ,now1 putting merely passages against passages1 and words against words1 and abstracting altogether from the idea of the whole1 which ,i assume these interpreters never to have had1 let me ask first1 if these passages could really not be united with ,kant's other frequently repeated statements1 viz41 that it is folly to speak of an impression produced upon us by an external transcendental object1--how did it happen that these interpreters preferred to sacrifice the many statements1 which assert a transcendental idealism1 to these few passages1 which assert a dogmatism1 than vice versa8 ,doubtless because they did not attempt the study of ,kant's writings with an impartial mind1 but had their heads full of that dogmatism--which constitutes their very being--as the only correct system1 which they assumed such a sensible man as ,kant must necessarily also hold to be the only correct system2 and because they thus did not seek to be taught by ,kant1 but merely to be confirmed by him in their old way of thinking4 ,but cannot these seemingly opposite statements be united8 ,kant speaks in these passages of objects4 ,what this word is to signify1 we clearly must learn from ,kant himself4 ,he says3 8,it is the understanding which adds the object to the appearance1 by connecting the manifold of the appearance in one consciousness4 ,when this is done1 we say we know the object1 for we have effected a synthetical unity in the manifold of the contemplation1 and the conception of this unity is the representation of the object ,x4 ,but this ,x is not the transcendental object 7i4 e4 the thing per se71 for of that we know not even so much40 ,what1 then1 is this object8 ,that which the understanding adds to the appearance1 a mere thought4 ,now1 the object affects--i4 e4 something which is a mere thought affects4 ,what does this mean8 ,if ,i have but a spark of logic1 it means simply3 it affects in so far as it is2 hence it is only thought as affecting4 ,let us now see what ,kant means when he speaks about the 8power to obtain representations by the manner in which objects affect us40 ,since we only think the affection itself1 we doubtless only think likewise that which is common to the affection4 ,or3 if you posit an object with the thought that it has affected you1 you think yourself in this case affected2 and if you think that this occurs in respect to all the objects of your perception1 you think yourself as liable to be affected generally--or1 in other words1 you ascribe to yourself1 through this your thinking1 receptivity or sensuousness4 ,but do we not thus assume1 after all1 affection to explain knowledge8 ,let me state the difference in one word3 it is true1 all our knowledge proceeds from an affection1 but not an affection through an object4 ,this is ,kant's doctrine1 and that of the ,science of ,knowledge4 ,as ,mr4 ,beck has overlooked this important point1 and as ,reinhold does not call sufficient attention to that which makes the positing of a non-,ego possible1 ,i consider it proper to explain the matter in a few words4 ,in doing so ,i shall use my own terminology1 and not ,kant's1 because ,i naturally have my own more at my command4 ,when ,i posit myself1 ,i posit myself as a limited2 in consequence of the contemplation of my self-positing1 ,i am finite4 ,this1 my limitedness--since it is the condition which makes my self-positing possible--is an original limitedness4 ,somebody might wish to explain this still further1 and either deduce the limitedness of myself as the reflected1 from my necessary limitedness as the reflecting2 which would result in the statement3 ,i am finite to myself1 because ,i can think only the finite2--or he might explain the limitedness of the reflecting from that of the reflected1 which would result in the statement3 ,i can think only the finite1 because ,i am finite4 ,but such an explanation would explain nothing1 for ,i am originally neither the reflecting nor the reflected1 but both in their union2 which union ,i cannot think1 it is true1 because ,i separate1 in thinking1 the reflecting from the reflected4 ,all limitedness is1 by its very conception1 a determined1 and not a general limitedness4 ,from the possibility of an ,ego1 we have thus deduced the necessity of a general limitedness of the ,ego4 ,but the determinedness of this limitedness cannot be deduced1 since it is1 as we have seen1 that which conditions all ,egoness4 ,here1 therefore1 all deduction is at an end4 ,this determinedness appears as the absolutely accidental1 and furnishes the merely empirical of our knowledge4 ,it is this determinedness1 for instance1 by virtue of which ,i am1 amongst all possible rational beings1 a man1 and amongst all men this particular person1 c41 c4 ,this1 my limitation1 in its determinedness1 manifests itself as a limitation of my practical power 7here philosophy is therefore driven from the theoretical to the practical sphere72 and the immediate perception of this limitation is a feeling 7,i prefer to use this word instead of ,kant's 8sensation10 for feeling only becomes sensation by being related in thinking to an object72 for instance1 the feeling of sweet1 red1 cold1 c4 ,to forget this original feeling1 leads to a bottomless transcendental idealism1 and to an incomplete philosophy1 which cannot explain the simply sensible predicates of objects4 ,now1 the endeavor to explain this original feeling from the causality of a something1 is the dogmatism of the ,kantians1 which ,i have just shown up1 and which they would like to put on ,kant's shoulders4 ,this1 their something1 is the everlasting thing per se4 ,all transcendental explanation1 on the contrary1 stops at the immediate feeling1 from the reason just pointed out4 ,it is true1 the empirical ,ego1 which transcendental idealism observes1 explains this feeling to itself by the law1 8,no limitation without a limiting20 and thus1 through contemplation of the limiting1 produces extended matter1 of which it now1 as of its ground1 predicates the merely subjective sensation of feeling2 and it is only by virtue of this synthesis that the ,ego makes itself an object4 ,the continued analysis and the continued explanation of its own condition1 give to the ,ego its own system of a universe2 and the observation of the laws of this explanation gives to the philosopher his science4 ,it is here that ,kant's ,realism is based1 but his ,realism is a transcendental idealism4 ,this whole determinedness1 and hence also the total of feelings which it makes possible1 is to be regarded as a priori--i4 e4 absolutely1 without any action of our own--determined4 ,it is ,kant's receptivity1 and a particular of this receptivity is an affection4 ,without it1 consciousness is unexplainable4 ,there is no doubt that it is an immediate fact of consciousness--,i feel myself thus or thus determined4 ,now1 when the oft-lauded philosophers attempt to explain this feeling1 is it not clear that they attempt to append something to it which is not immediately involved in the fact8 and how can they do this1 except through thinking1 and through a thinking according to a category1 which category is here that of the real ground8 ,now1 if they have not an immediate contemplation of the thing per se and its relations1 what else can they possibly know of this category1 but that they are compelled to think according to it8 ,they assert nothing but that they are compelled to add in thought a thing as the ground of this feeling4 ,but this we cheerfully admit in regard to the standpoint which they occupy4 ,their thing is produced by their thinking2 and now it is at the same time to be a thing per se1 i4 e4 not produced by thinking4 ,i really do not comprehend them2 ,i can neither think this thought1 nor think an understanding which does think it2 and by this declaration1 ,i hope ,i have done with them forever4 ,,vii4 ,having finished this digression1 we now return to our original intention1 which was to describe the procedure of the ,science of ,knowledge1 and to justify it against the attacks of certain philosophers4 ,we said1 the philosopher observes himself in the act whereby he constructs for himself the conception of himself2 and we now add1 he also thinks this act of his4 ,for the philosopher1 doubtless1 knows whereof he speaks2 but a mere contemplation gives no consciousness2 only that is known which is conceived and thought4 ,this conception or comprehension of his activity is very well possible for the philosopher1 since he is already in possession of experience2 for he has a conception of activity in general1 and as such1 namely1 as the opposite of the equally well known conception of ,being2 and he also has a conception of this particular activity1 as that of an intelligence1 i4 e4 as simply an ideal activity1 and not the real causality of the practical ,ego2 and moreover1 a conception of the peculiar character of this particular activity as an in itself returning activity1 and not an activity directed upon an external object4 ,but here as well as everywhere it is to be well remembered that the contemplation is and remains the basis of the conception1 i4 e4 of that which is conceived in the conception4 ,we cannot absolutely create or produce by thinking2 we can only think that which is immediately contemplated by us4 ,a thinking1 which has no contemplation for its basis1 which does not embrace a contemplation entertained in the same undivided moment1 is an empty thinking1 or is really no thinking at all4 ,at the utmost it may be the thinking of a mere sign of the conception1 and if this sign is a word1 as seems likely1 the mere thoughtless utterance of this word4 ,i determine my contemplation by the thinking of an opposite2 this and nothing else is the meaning of the expression--,i comprehend the contemplation4 ,through thinking1 the activity1 which the philosopher thinks1 becomes objective to him1 i4 e4 it floats before him1 in so far as he thinks it1 as something which checks or limits the freedom 7the undeterminedness7 of his thinking4 ,this is the true and original significance of objectivity4 ,as certain as ,i think1 ,i think a determined something2 or1 in other words1 the freedom of my thinking1 which might have been directed upon an infinite manifold of objects1 is now1 when ,i think1 only directed upon that limited sphere of my thinking which the present object fills4 ,it is limited to this sphere4 ,i restrict myself with freedom to this sphere1 if ,i contemplate myself in the doing of it4 ,i am restricted by this sphere1 if ,i contemplate only the object and forget myself1 as is universally done on the standpoint of common thinking4 ,what ,i have just now said is intended to correct the following objections and misunderstandings4 ,all thinking is necessarily directed upon a being1 say some4 ,now the ,ego of the ,science of ,knowledge is not to have being2 hence it is unthinkable1 and the whole ,science1 which is built upon such a contradiction1 is null and void4 ,let me be permitted to make a preliminary remark concerning the spirit which prompts this objection4 ,when the wise men1 who urge it1 take the conception of the ,ego as determined in the ,science of ,knowledge1 and examine it by the rules of their logic1 they doubtless think that conception1 for how else could they compare and relate it to something else8 ,if they really could not think it1 they would not be able to say a word about it1 and it would remain altogether unknown to them4 ,but they have really1 as we see1 happily achieved the thinking of it1 and so must be able to think it4 ,yet1 because according to their traditional and misconceived rules1 they ought to have been unable to think it1 they would now rather deny the possibility of an act1 while doing it1 than give up their rule2 they would believe an old book rather than their own consciousness4 ,how little can these men be aware of what they really do6 ,how mechanically1 and without any inner attention and spirit1 must they produce their philosophical specimens6 ,master ,jourdan after all was willing to believe that he had spoken prose all his lifetime1 without knowing it1 though it did appear rather curious2 but these men1 if they had been in his place1 would have proven in the most beautiful prose that they could not speak prose1 since they did not possess the rules of speaking prose1 and since the conditions of the possibility of a thing must always precede its reality4 ,nay1 if critical idealism should continue to be a burden to them1 it is to be expected that they will next go to ,aristotle for advice as to whether they really live1 or are already dead and buried4 ,by doubting the possibility of ever becoming conscious of their freedom and ,egoness1 they are covertly already doubting this very point4 ,their objection might therefore be summarily put aside1 since it contradicts1 and thus annihilates itself4 ,but let us see where the real ground of the misunderstanding may be concealed4 ,all thinking necessarily proceeds from a being1 say they4 ,now what does this mean8 ,if it is to mean what we have just shown up1 namely1 that there is in all thinking a thought1 an object of the thinking1 to which this particular thinking confines itself1 and by which it seems to be limited1 then their premise must undoubtedly be admitted2 and it is not the ,science of ,knowledge which is going to deny it4 ,this objectivity for the mere thinking does doubtless also belong to the ,ego1 from which the ,science of ,knowledge proceeds2 or1 which means the same1 to the act whereby the ,ego constructs itself for itself4 ,but it is only through thinking and only for thinking that it has this objectivity2 it is merely an ideal being4 ,if1 however1 the being1 of their above assertion1 is to mean not a mere ideal1 but a real being1 i4 e4 a something1 limiting not only the ideal1 but also the actually productive1 the practical activity of the ,ego--that is to say1 a something permanent in time and persistent in space--then that assertion of theirs is unwarranted4 ,if it were correct1 no science of philosophy were possible1 for the conception of the ,ego would be unthinkable2 and self-consciousness1 nay1 even consciousness1 would also be impossible4 ,if it were correct1 we1 it is true1 should be compelled to stop philosophizing2 but this would be no gain to them1 for they would also have to stop refuting us4 ,but do they not themselves repudiate the correctness of their assertion8 ,do they not think themselves every moment of their life as free and as having causality8 ,do they not1 for instance1 think themselves the free1 active authors of the very sensible and very original objections1 which they bring up from time to time against our system8 ,now1 is then this 8themselves0 something which checks and limits their causality1 or is it not rather the very opposite of the check1 namely1 the very causality itself8 ,i must refer them to what ,i have said in v4 on this subject4 ,if such a sort of being were ascribed to the ,ego1 the ,ego would cease to be ,ego2 it would become a thing1 and its conception would be annihilated4 ,it is true that afterwards--not afterwards as a posteriority in time1 but afterwards in the series of the dependence of thinking--we also ascribe such a being to the ,ego1 which1 nevertheless1 remains and must remain ,ego in the original meaning of the word2 this being consisting partly of extension and persistency in space1 and in this respect it becomes a body1 and partly identity and permanency in time1 and in this respect it becomes a soul4 ,but it is the business of philosophy to prove1 and genetically to explain how the ,ego comes to think itself thus1 and all this belongs not to that which is presupposed1 but to that which is to be deduced4 ,the result1 therefore1 remains thus3 the ,ego is originally only an acting2 if you but think it as an active1 you have already an ,empirical1 and hence a conception of it1 which must first be deduced4#i ,but our opponents claim that they do not make their assertion without all proof2 they want to prove it by logic1 and1 if ,god is willing1 by the logical proposition of contradiction4 ,if there is anything which clearly shows the lamentable condition of philosophy as a science in these our days1 it is that such occurrences can take place4 ,if anybody were to speak about mathematics1 natural sciences1 or any other science1 in a manner which would indicate beyond a doubt his complete ignorance concerning the first principles of such a science1 he would be at once sent back to the school from which he ran away too soon4 ,but in philosophy it is not to be thus4 ,if in philosophy a man shows in the same manner his complete ignorance1 we are1 with many bows and compliments to the sharp-sighted man1 to give him publicly that private schooling which he so sadly needs1 and without betraying the least smile or gesture of disgust4 ,have1 then1 the philosophers in two thousand years made clear not a single proposition which might now be considered as established for that science without further proof8 ,if there is such a proposition1 it is certainly that of the distinction of logic1 as a purely formal science1 from real philosophy or metaphysics4 ,but what is really the true meaning of this terrible logical proposition of contradiction which is to crush at one stroke our whole system8 ,as far as ,i know1 simply this3 if a conception is already determined by a certain characteristic1 then it must not be determined by another opposite characteristic4 ,but by what characteristic the conception is originally to be characterized1 this logical theorem does not say1 nor can say1 for it presupposes the original determination1 and is applicable only in so far as that is presupposed4 ,concerning the original determination another science will have to decide4 ,these wise men tell us that it is contradictory not to determine a conception by the predicate of actual being4 ,yet how can this be contradictory1 unless the conception has first been thus determined by the predicate of actual being1 and has then had that predicate denied to it8 ,but who authorized them to determine the conception by that predicate8 ,do not these adepts in logic perceive that they postulate their principle1 and turn around in an evident circle8 ,whether there really be a conception1 which is originally--by the laws of the synthetizing1 not of the merely analyzing reason--not determined by that predicate of actual being1 this they will have to go and learn from contemplation2 logic only warns them against afterwards again applying the same predicate to that conception2 of course also1 in the same respect1 in which they have denied the determinability of the conception by that predicate4 ,but certainly if they have not yet elevated themselves to the consciousness of that contemplation1 which is not determined by the predicate of being1 7for that they should unconsciously possess that contemplation itself1 ,reason herself has taken care of17 then all their conceptions1 which can be derived only from sensuous contemplation1 are very properly determined by the predicate of this actual being4 ,in that case1 however1 they must not believe that logic has taught them this asserted connection of thinking and being1 for their knowledge of it is altogether derived from their unfortunate empirical self4 ,they1 standing on the standpoint of knowing no other conceptions than those derived from sensuous contemplation1 would1 of course1 contradict themselves if they were to think one of their conceptions without the predicate of actual being4 ,we1 on our part1 are also well content to let them retain this rule for themselves1 since it is most assuredly universally valid for the whole sphere of their possible thinking2 and to let them always carefully keep an eye on this rule1 so that they may not violate it4 ,as for ourselves1 however1 we cannot use this their rule any longer1 for we possess a few conceptions more1 resting in a sphere over which their rule does not extend1 and about which they can speak nothing1 since it does not exist for them4 ,let them1 therefore1 attend to their own business hereafter1 and leave us to attend to ours4 ,even in so far as we grant them the rule1 namely1 that every thinking must have an object of thinking2 it is by no means a logical rule1 but rather one which logic presupposes1 and through which logic first becomes possible4 ,to think1 is the same as to determine objects2 both conceptions are identical2 logic furnishes the rules of this determining1 and hence presupposes clearly enough the determining generally as a part of consciousness4 ,that all thinking has an object can be shown only in contemplation4 ,think6 and observe in this thinking how you do it1 and you will doubtless find that you oppose to your thinking an object of this thinking4 ,another objection1 somewhat related to the above1 is this3 ,if you do not proceed from a being1 how can you1 without being illogical1 deduce a being8 ,you will never be able to get anything else out of what you take in hand than what is already contained in it1 unless you proceed dishonestly and use juggler tricks4 ,i reply3 ,nor do we deduce being in the sense in which you use the word1 i4 e4 as being1 per se4 ,what the philosopher takes up is an acting1 which acts according to certain laws1 and what he establishes is the series of necessary acts of this acting4 ,amongst these acts there occurs one which to the acting itself appears as a being1 and which by laws to be shown up1 must so appear to it4 ,the philosopher who observes the acting from a higher standpoint1 never ceases to regard it as an acting4 ,a being exists only for the observed ,ego1 which thinks realistically2 but for the philosopher there is acting1 and only acting1 for he thinks idealistically4 ,let me express it on this occasion in all clearness3 ,the essence of transcendental idealism generally1 and of the ,science of ,knowledge particularly1 consists in this1 that the conception of being is not at all viewed as a first and original conception1 but simply as a derived conception2 derived from the opposition of activity4 ,hence it is considered only as a negative conception4 ,the only positive for the idealist is ,freedom2 being is the mere negative of freedom4 ,only thus has idealism a firm basis1 and is in harmony with itself4 ,but dogmatism1 which believed itself safely reposing upon being1 as a basis no further to be investigated or grounded1 regards this assertion as a stupidity and horror1 for it is its annihilation4 ,that wherein the dogmatist1 amongst all the inflictions which he has experienced from time to time1 still found a hiding place--namely1 some original being1 though it were but a raw and formless matter--is now utterly destroyed1 and he stands naked and defenceless4 ,he has no weapons against this attack except the assurance of his hearty disgust1 and his confession1 that he does not understand1 and positively cannot and will not think1 what is required of him4 ,we cheerfully give credence to this statement1 and only beg that he will also place faith in our assurance1 that we find it not at all difficult to think our system4 ,nay1 if this should be too much for him1 we can even abstain from it1 and leave him to believe whatever he chooses on this point4 ,that we do not and cannot force him to adopt our system1 because its adoption depends upon freedom1 has already been often enough admitted4 ,i say that the dogmatist has nothing left but the assurance of his incapacity1 for the idea of intrenching himself behind general logic1 and conjuring the shade of the ,stagirite1 because he knows not how to defend his own body1 is altogether new1 and will find few imitators even in this universal state of despair2 since the least school knowledge of what logic really is1 will suffice to make every one reject this protection4 ,let no one be deceived by these opponents1 if they adopt the language of idealism1 and admitting with their lips the correctness of its views1 protest that they know well enough that being is only to signify being for us4 ,they are dogmatists4 ,for every one who asserts that all thinking and consciousness must proceed from a being1 makes being something primary2 and it is this which constitutes dogmatism4 ,by such a confusion of speech they but demonstrate the utter confusion of their conceptions2 for what may a being for us mean1 which is1 nevertheless1 to be an original not-derived being8 ,who1 then1 are those 8we10 for whom alone this being is8 ,are they intelligences as such8 ,then the statement 8there is something for the intelligence10 signifies1 this something is represented by the intelligence2 and the statement 8it is only for the intelligence10 signifies1 it is only represented4 ,hence the conception of a being1 which1 from a certain point of view1 is to be independent of the representation1 must1 after all1 be derived from the representation1 since it is to be1 only through it2 and these men would1 therefore1 be more in harmony with the ,science of ,knowledge than they believed4 ,or are those 8we0 themselves things1 original things1 things in themselves8 ,how1 then1 can anything be for them2 how can they even be for themselves1 since the conception of a thing involves merely that it is1 but not that the thing is for itself8 ,what may the word for signify to them8 ,is it1 perhaps1 but an innocent adornment which they have adopted for the sake of fashion8 ,,viii4 ,the ,science of ,knowledge has said1 8,it is not possible to abstract from the ,ego40 ,this assertion may be regarded from two points of view--either from the standpoint of common consciousness1 and then it means1 8,we never have another representation than that of ourselves2 throughout our whole life1 and in all moments of our life1 we think only ,i1 ,i1 ,i1 and nothing but ,i40 ,or it may be viewed from the standpoint of the philosopher1 and then it will have the following significance3 8,the ,ego must necessarily be added in thought to whatever occurs in consciousness20 or as ,kant expresses it1 8,all my representations must be thought as accompanied by--,i think40 ,what nonsense were it to maintain the first interpretation to be the true one1 and what wretchedness to refute it in that interpretation4 ,but in the latter interpretation the assertion of the ,science of ,knowledge will doubtless be acceptable to every one who is but able to understand it2 and if it had only been thus understood before1 we should long ago have been rid of the thing per se1 for it would have been seen that we are always the ,thinking1 whatever we may think1 and that hence nothing can occur in us which is independent of us1 because it all is necessarily related to our thinking4 ,,ix4 8,but10 confess other opponents of the ,science of ,knowledge1 8as far as our own persons are concerned1 we cannot1 under the conception of the ,ego1 think anything else than our own dear persons as opposed to other persons4 ,ego 7,i7 signifies my particular person1 named1 for instance1 ,caius or ,sempronius1 as distinguished from other persons not so named4 ,now1 if ,i should abstract1 as the ,science of ,knowledge requires me to do1 from this individual personality1 there would be nothing left to me which might be characterized as ,i2 ,i might just as well call the remainder ,it40 ,now1 what is the real meaning of this objection1 so boldly put forth8 ,does it speak of the original real synthesis of the conception of the individual 7their own dear persons and other persons71 and do they therefore mean to say1 8there is nothing synthetized in this conception but the conception of an object generally--of the ,it1 and of other objects 7,its7--from which the first one is distinguished80 ,or does that objection fly for protection to the common use of language1 and do they therefore mean to say1 8,in language1 the word ,i 7,ego7 signifies only individuality80 ,as far as the first is concerned1 every one1 who is as yet possessed of his senses1 must see that by distinguishing one object from its equals1 i4 e4 from other objects1 we arrive only at a determined object1 but not at a determined person4 ,the synthesis of the conception of the personality is quite different4 ,the ,egoness 7the in itself returning activity1 the subject-objectivity1 or whatever you choose to call it17 is originally opposed to the ,it1 to the mere objectivity2 and the positing of these conceptions is absolute1 is conditioned by no other positing1 is thetical1 not synthetical4 ,this conception of the ,egoness1 which has arisen in our ,self1 is now transferred to something1 which in the first positing was posited as an ,it1 as mere object1 and is synthetically united with it2 and it is only through this conditional synthesis that there first arises for us a ,thou4 ,the conception of ,thou arises from the union of the ,it and the ,i4 ,the conception of the ,ego in this opposition2 hence1 as conception of the individual1 is the synthesis of the ,i with itself4 ,that which posits itself in the described act1 not generally1 but as ,ego1 is ,i2 and that which in the same act is posited as ,ego1 not through itself1 but through me1 is ,thou4 ,now it is doubtless possible to abstract from this product of a synthesis1 for what we ourselves have synthetized we doubtless can analyze again1 and when we so abstract1 the remainder will be the general ,ego1 i4 e4 the not-object4 ,taken in this interpretation1 the objection would be simply absurd4 ,but how if our opponents cling to the use of language8 ,even if it is true that the word 8,i0 has hitherto signified in language only the individual1 would this make it necessary that a distinction in the original synthesis is not to be remarked and named1 simply because it has never before been noticed8 ,but is it true8 ,of what use of language do they speak8 ,of the philosophical language8 ,i have shown already that ,kant uses the conception of the pure ,ego in the same meaning ,i attach to it4 ,if he says1 8,i am the thinking in this thinking10 does he then only oppose himself to other persons1 and not rather to all object of thinking generally8 ,kant says again1 8,the fundamental principle of the necessary unity of apperception is itself identical1 and hence an analytical proposition40 ,this signifies precisely what ,i have just stated1 i4 e4 that the ,ego arises through no synthesis1 the manifold whereof might be further analyzed1 but through an absolute thesis4 ,but this ,ego is the ,egoness generally2 for the conception of individuality arises clearly enough through synthesis1 as ,i have just shown2 and the fundamental principle of individuality is therefore a synthetical proposition4 ,reinhold1 it is true1 speaks of the ,ego simply as of the representing2 but this does not affect the present case2 for when ,i distinguish myself as the representing from the represented1 do ,i then distinguish myself from other persons1 and not rather from all object of representation as such8 ,but take even the case of these same much lauded philosophers1 who do not1 like ,kant and like the ,science of ,knowledge1 presuppose the ,ego in advance of the manifold of representation1 but rather heap it together1 out of that manifold2 do they1 then1 hold their one thinking in the manifold thinking to be only the thinking of the individual1 and not rather of the intelligence generally8 ,in one word3 is there any philosopher of repute1 who before them has ventured to discover that the ,ego signifies only the individual1 and that if the individuality is abstracted from1 only an object in general remains8 ,or do they mean ordinary use of language8 ,to prove this use1 ,i am compelled to cite instances from common life4 ,if you call to anybody in the darkness 8,who is there80 and he1 presupposing that his voice is well-known to you1 replies1 8,it is ,i10 then it is clear that he speaks of himself as this particular person1 and wishes to be understood3 8,it is ,i1 who am named thus or thus1 and it is not any one of all the others1 named otherwise20 and he so desires to be understood1 because your question1 8,who is there80 presupposes already that it is a rational being who is there1 and expresses only that you wish to know which particular one amongst all the rational beings it may be4 ,but if you should1 for instance--permit me this example1 which ,i find particularly applicable--sew or cut at the clothing of some person1 and should unawares cut the person himself1 then he would probably cry out3 8,look here1 this is ,i2 you are cutting me60 ,now1 what does he mean to express thereby8 ,not that he is this particular person1 named thus or thus1 and none other2 for that you know very well2 but that that which was cut was not his dead and senseless clothing1 but his living and sensitive self1 which you did not know before4 ,by this 8,it is ,i10 the person does not distinguish himself from other persons1 but from things4 ,this distinction occurs continually in life2 and we cannot take a step or move our hand without making it4 ,in short1 ,egoness and ,individuality are very different conceptions1 and the synthesis of the latter is clearly to be observed4 ,through the former conception1 we distinguish ourselves from all that is external to us--not merely from all persons that are external to us--and hence we embrace by it not our particular personality1 but our general spirituality4 ,it is in this sense that the word is used1 both in philosophical and in common language4 ,the above objection testifies1 therefore1 not only to an unusual want of thought1 but also to great ignorance in philosophical literature4 ,but our opponents insist on their incapability to think the required conception1 and we must place faith in their assertions4 ,not that they lack the general conception of the pure ,ego1 for if they did1 they would be obliged to desist from raising objections1 just as a piece of log must desist4 ,but it is the conception of this conception which they lack1 and which they cannot attain4 ,they have that conception in themselves1 but do not know that they have it4 ,the ground of this their incapability does not lie in any particular weakness of their thinking faculties1 but in a weakness of their whole character4 ,their ,ego1 in the sense in which they take the word--i4 e4 their individual person--is the last object of their acting1 and hence also the limit of their explicit thinking4 ,it is to them1 therefore1 the only true substance1 and reason is only an accident thereof4 ,their person does not exist as a particular expression of reason2 but reason exists to help their person through the world2 and if the person could get along just as well without reason1 we might discharge reason from service1 and there would be no reason at all4 ,this1 indeed1 lurks in the whole system of their conceptions1 and through all their assertions1 and many of them are honest enough not to conceal it4 ,now1 they are quite correct as far as they assert this incapacity in respect to their own persons--they only must not state as objective that which has merely subjective validity4 ,in the ,science of ,knowledge the relation is exactly reversed3 ,reason alone is in itself1 and individuality is but accidental2 reason is the object1 and personality the means to realize it2 personality is only a particular manner of manifesting reason1 and must always more and more lose itself in the universal form of reason4 ,only reason is eternal2 individuality must always die out4 ,and whosoever is not prepared to succumb to this order of things1 will also never get at the true understanding of the ,science of ,knowledge4 ,x4 ,this fact that they can never understand the ,science of ,knowledge unless they first comply with certain conditions1 has been told them often enough4 ,they do not want to hear it again1 and our frank warning affords them a new opportunity to attack us4 ,every conviction1 they assert1 must be capable of being communicated by conceptions--nay1 it must even be possible to compel its acknowledgment4 ,they say it is a bad example to assert that our ,science exists for only certain privileged spirits1 and that others cannot see or understand anything of it4 ,let us see1 first of all1 what the ,science of ,knowledge does assert on this point4 ,it does not assert that there is an original and inborn distinction between men and men1 whereby some are made capable of thinking and learning what the others1 by their nature1 cannot think or learn4 ,reason is common to all1 and is the same in all rational beings4 ,whatsoever one rational being possesses as a talent1 all others possess also4 ,nay1 we have even in this present article expressly admitted that the conceptions upon which the ,science of ,knowledge insists1 are actually effective in all rational beings2 for their efficacy furnishes the ground of a possibility of consciousness4 ,the pure ,ego1 which they charge is incapable of thinking1 lies at the bottom of all their thinking1 and occurs in all their thinking1 since all thinking is possible only through it4 ,thus far everything proceeds mechanically4 ,but to get an insight into this asserted necessity--to think again this thinking--does not lie in mechanism1 but1 on the contrary1 requires an elevation1 through freedom1 to a new sphere1 which our immediate existence does not place in our possession4 ,unless this faculty of freedom has already existence1 and has already been practised1 the ,science of ,knowledge can accomplish nothing in a person4 ,it is this power of freedom which furnishes the premises upon which the structure is to rest4 ,they certainly will not deny that every science and every art presupposes certain primary rudiments1 which must first be acquired before we can enter into the science or art4 8,but10 say they1 8if you only require a knowledge of the rudiments1 why do you not teach them to us1 if we lack them8 ,why do you not place them before us definitely and systematically8 ,is it not your own fault if you plunge us at once in medias res1 and require the public to understand you before you have communicated the rudiments80 ,i reply3 that is exactly the difficulty6 ,these rudiments cannot be systematically forced upon you--they cannot be taught to you by compulsion6 ,in one word1 they are a knowledge which we can get only from ourselves4 ,everything depends upon this1 that by the constant use of freedom1 with clear consciousness of this freedom1 we should become thoroughly conscious and enamored of this our freedom4 ,whenever it shall have become the well-matured object of education--from tenderest youth upwards--to develop the inner power of the scholar1 but not to give it a direction2 to educate man for his own use1 and as instrument of his own will1 but not as the soulless instrument of others2--then the ,science of ,knowledge will be universally and easily comprehensible4 ,culture of the whole man1 from earliest youth--this is the only way to spread philosophy4 ,education must first content itself to be more negative than positive--more a mutual interchange with the scholar than a working upon him2 more negative as far as possible--i4 e4 education must at least propose to itself this negativeness as its object1 and must be positive only as a means of being negative4 ,so long as education1 whether with or without clear consciousness1 proposes to itself the opposite object--labors only for usefulness through others1 without considering that the using principle lies also in the individual2 so long as education thus eradicates in earliest youth the root of self-activity1 and accustoms man not to determine himself but to await a determination through others--so long1 talent for philosophy will always remain an extraordinary favor of nature1 which cannot be further explained1 and which may therefore be called by the indefinite expression of 8philosophical genius40 ,the chief ground of all the errors of our opponents may perhaps be this1 that they have never yet made clear to themselves what proving means1 and that hence they have never considered that there is at the bottom of all demonstration something absolutely undemonstrable4 ,demonstration effects only a conditioned1 mediated certainty2 by virtue of it1 something is certain if another thing is certain4 ,if any doubt arises as to the certainty of this other1 then this certainty must again be appended to the certainty of a third1 and so on4 ,now1 is this retrogression carried on ad infinitum1 or is there anywhere a final link8 ,i know very well that some are of the former opinion2 but these men have never considered that if it were so1 they would not even be capable of entertaining the idea of certainty--no1 not even of hunting after certainty4 ,for what this may mean3 to be certain2 they only know by being themselves certain of something2 but if everything is certain only on condition1 then nothing is certain1 and there is even no conditioned certainty4 ,but if there is a final link1 regarding which no question can be raised1 why it is certain1 then1 there is an undemonstrable at the base of all demonstration4 ,they do not appear to have considered what it means3 to have proven something to somebody4 ,it means3 we have demonstrated to him that a certain other certainty is contained1 by virtue of the laws of thinking1 which he admits1 in a certain first certainty which he assumes or admits1 and that he must necessarily assume the first if he assumes the second1 as he says he does4 ,hence all communication of a conviction by proof1 presupposes that both parts are at least agreed on something4 ,now1 how could the ,science of ,knowledge communicate itself to the dogmatist1 since they are positively not agreed in a single point1 so far as the material of knowledge is concerned1 and since thus the common point is wanting from which they might jointly start4#aj ,finally1 they seem not to have considered that even where there is such a common point1 no one can think into the soul of the other2 that each must calculate upon the self-activity of the other1 and cannot furnish him the necessary thoughts1 but can merely advise how to construct or think those thoughts4 ,the relation between free beings is a reciprocal influence upon each other through freedom1 but not a causality through mechanically effective power4 ,and thus the present dispute returns to the chief point of dispute1 from which all our differences arise4 ,they presuppose everywhere the relation of causality1 because they indeed know no higher relation2 and it is upon this that they base their demand3 we ought to graft our conviction on their souls without any activity on their own part4 ,but we proceed from freedom1 and--which is but fair--presuppose freedom in them4 ,moreover1 in thus presupposing the universal validity of the mechanism of cause and effect1 they immediately contradict themselves2 what they say and what they do1 are in palpable contradiction4 ,for1 in presupposing the mechanism of cause and effect1 they elevate themselves beyond it2 their thinking of the mechanism is not contained in the mechanism itself4 ,the mechanism cannot seize itself1 for the simple reason that it is mechanism4 ,only free consciousness can seize itself4 ,here1 therefore1 would be a way to convince them of their error4 ,but the difficulty is that this thought lies utterly beyond the range of their vision1 and that they lack the agility of mind to think1 when they think an object1 not only the object1 but also their thinking of the object2 wherefore this present remark is utterly incomprehensible to them1 and is indeed written only for those who are awake and see4 ,we reiterate1 therefore1 our assurance3 we will not convince them1 because one cannot will an impossibility2 and we will not refute their system for them1 because we cannot4 ,true1 we can refute it easily enough for us2 it is very easy to throw it down--the mere breath of a free man destroys it4 ,but we cannot refute it for them4 ,we do not write1 speak or teach for them1 since there is positively no point from which we could reach them4 ,if we speak of them1 it is not for their own sake1 but for the sake of others--to warn these against their errors1 and persuade these not to listen to their empty and insignificant prattle4 ,now1 they must not consider this1 our declaration1 as degrading for them4 ,by so doing1 they but evince their bad conscience1 and publicly degrade themselves amongst us4 ,besides1 they are in the same position in regard to us4 ,they also cannot refute or convince us1 or say anything1 which could have an effect upon us4 ,this we confess ourselves1 and would not be in the least indignant if they said it4 ,what we tell them1 we tell them not at all with the evil purpose of causing them anger1 but merely to save us and them unnecessary trouble4 ,we should be truly glad if they were thus to accept it4 ,moreover1 there is nothing degrading in the matter itself4 ,every one who to-day charges his brother with this incapacity1 has once been necessarily in the same condition4 ,for we all are born in it1 and it requires time to get beyond it4 ,if our opponents would only not be driven into indignation by our declaration1 but would reflect about it1 and inquire whether there might not be some truth in it1 they might then probably get out of that incapacity4 ,they would at once be our equals1 and we could henceforth live in perfect peace together4 ,the fault is not ours1 if we occasionally are pretty hard at war with them4 ,from all this it also appears1 which ,i consider expedient to remark here1 that a philosophy1 in order to be a science1 need not be universally valid1 as some philosophers seem to assume4 ,these philosophers demand the impossible4 ,what does it mean3 a philosophy is really universally valid8 ,who1 then1 are all these for whom it is to be valid8 ,i suppose not to every one who has a human face1 for then it would also have to be valid for children and for the common man1 for whom thinking is never object1 but always the means for his real purpose4 ,universally valid1 then1 for the philosophers8 ,but who1 then1 are the philosophers8 ,i hope not all those who have received the degree of doctor from some philosophical faculty1 or who have printed something which they call philosophical1 or who1 perhaps1 are themselves members of some philosophical faculty8 ,indeed1 how shall we even have a fixed conception of the philosopher1 unless we have first a fixed conception of philosophy--i4 e4 unless we first possess that fixed philosophy8 ,it is quite certain that all those who believe themselves possessed of philosophy1 as a science1 will deny to all those who do not recognize their philosophy the name of philosopher1 and hence will make the acknowledgment of their philosophy the criterion of a philosopher4 ,this they must do1 if they will proceed logically1 for there is only one philosophy4 ,the author of the ,science of ,knowledge1 for instance1 has long ago stated that he is of this opinion in regard to his system--not in so far as it is an individual representation of that system1 but in so far as it is a system of transcendental idealism--and he hesitates not a moment to repeat this assertion4 ,but does not this lead us into an evident circle8 ,every one will then say1 8,my philosophy is universally valid for all philosophers20 and will say so with full right if he only be himself convinced1 though no other mortal being should accept his doctrine2 8for10 he will add1 8he who does not recognize it as valid is no philosopher40 ,concerning this point1 ,i hold the following3 ,if there be but one man who is fully and at all times equally convinced of his philosophy1 who is in complete harmony with himself in this his philosophy1 whose free judgment in philosophizing agrees perfectly with the judgment daily life forces upon him1 then in this one man philosophy has fulfilled its purpose and completed its circle2 for it has put him down again at the very same point from which he started with all mankind2 and henceforth philosophy as a science really exists1 though no other man else should comprehend and accept it2 nay1 though that one man might not even know how to teach it to others4 ,let no one here offer the trivial objection that all systematic authors have ever been convinced of the truth of their systems4 ,for this assertion is utterly false1 and is grounded only in this1 that few know what conviction really is4 ,this can only be experienced by having the fullness of conviction in one's self4 ,those authors were only convinced of one or the other point in their system1 which perhaps was not even clearly conscious to themselves1 but not of the whole of their system--they were convinced only in certain moods4 ,this is no conviction4 ,conviction is that which depends on no time and no change of condition2 which is not accidental to the soul1 but which is the soul itself4 ,one can be convinced only of the unchangeably and eternally ,true3 to be convinced of error is impossible4 ,but of such true convictions very few examples may probably exist in the history of philosophy2 perhaps but one2 perhaps not even this one4 ,i do not speak of the ancients4 ,it is even doubtful whether they ever proposed to themselves the great problem of philosophy4 ,but let me speak of modern authors4 ,spinoza could not be convinced2 he could only think1 not put faith in his philosophy2 for it was in direct contradiction with his necessary conviction in daily life1 by virtue of which he was forced to consider himself free and self-determined4 ,he could be convinced of it only in so far as it contained truth1 or as it contained a part of philosophy as a science4 ,he was clearly convinced that mere objective reasoning would necessarily lead to his system2 for in that he was correct2 but it never occurred to him that in thinking he ought to reflect upon his own thinking1 and in that he was wrong1 and thus made his speculation contradictory to his life4 ,kant might have been convinced2 but1 if ,i understand him correctly1 he was not convinced when he wrote his ,critique4 ,he speaks of a deception1 which always recurs1 although we know that it is a deception4 ,whence did ,kant learn1 as he was the first who discovered this pretended deception1 that it always recurs1 and in whom could he have made the experience that it did so recur8 ,only in himself4 ,but to know that one deceives one's self1 and still to deceive one's self is not the condition of conviction and harmony within--it is the symptom of a dangerous inner disharmony4 ,my experience is that no deception recurs1 for reason contains no deception4 ,moreover1 of what deception does ,kant speak8 ,clearly of the belief that things per se exist externally and independent of us4 ,but who entertains this belief8 ,not common consciousness1 surely1 for common consciousness only speaks of itself1 and can therefore say nothing but that things exist for it 7i4 e4 for us1 on this standpoint of common consciousness72 and that certainly is no deception1 for it is our own truth4 ,common consciousness knows nothing of a thing per se1 for the very reason that it is common consciousness1 which surely never goes beyond itself4 ,it is a false philosophy which first makes common consciousness assert such a conception1 whilst only that false philosophy discovered it in its own sphere4 ,hence this so-called deception--which is easily got rid of1 and which true philosophy roots out utterly--that false philosophy has itself produced1 and as soon as you get your philosophy perfected1 the scales will fall from your eyes1 and the deception will never recur4 ,you will1 in all your life thereafter1 never believe to know more than that you are finite1 and finite in this determined manner1 which you must explain to yourself1 by the existence of such a determined world2 and you will no more think of breaking through this limit than of ceasing to be yourself4 ,leibnitz1 also1 may have been convinced1 for1 properly understood--and why should he not have properly understood himself8--he is right4 ,nay1 more--if highest ease and freedom of mind may suggest conviction2 if the ingenuity to fit one's philosophy into all forms1 and apply it to all parts of human knowledge--the power to scatter all doubts as soon as they appear1 and the manner of using one's philosophy more as an instrument than as an object1 may testify of perfect clearness2 and if self-reliance1 cheerfulness and high courage in life may be signs of inner harmony1 then ,leibnitz was perhaps convinced1 and the only example of conviction in the history of philosophy4 ,,xi4 ,in conclusion1 ,i wish to refer in a few words to a very curious misapprehension4 ,it is that of mistaking the ,ego1 as intellectual contemplation1 from which the ,science of ,knowledge proceeds1 for the ,ego1 as idea1 with which it concludes4 ,in the ,ego1 as intellectual contemplation1 we have only the form of the ,egoness1 the in itself returning activity1 sufficiently described above4 ,the ,ego in this form is only for the philosopher1 and by seizing it thus1 you enter philosophy4 ,the ,ego1 as idea1 on the contrary1 is for the ,ego itself1 which the philosopher considers4 ,he does not establish the latter ,ego as his own1 but as the idea of the natural but perfectly cultured man2 just as a real being does not exist for the philosopher1 but merely for the ,ego he observes4 ,the ,ego as idea is the rational being--firstly1 in so far as it completely represents in itself the universal reason1 or as it is altogether rational and only rational1 and hence it must also have ceased to be individual1 which it was only through sensuous limitation2 and secondly1 in so far as this rational being has also realized reason in the eternal world1 which1 therefore1 remains constantly posited in this idea4 ,the world remains in this idea as world generally1 as substratum with these determined mechanical and organic laws2 but all these laws are perfectly suited to represent the final object of reason4 ,the idea of the ,ego and the ,ego of the intellectual contemplation have only this in common1 that in neither of them the thought of the individual enters2 not in the latter1 because the ,egoness has not yet been determined as individuality2 and not in the former1 because the determination of individuality has vanished through universal culture4 ,but both are opposites in this1 that the ,ego of the contemplation contains only the form of the ,ego1 and pays no regard to an actual material of the same1 which is only thinkable by its thinking of a world2 while in the ,ego of the ,idea the complete material of the ,egoness is thought4 ,from the first conception all philosophy proceeds1 and it is its fundamental conception2 to the latter it does not return1 but only determines this idea in the practical part as highest and ultimate object of reason4 ,the first is1 as we have said1 original contemplation1 and becomes a conception in the sufficiently described manner2 the latter is only idea1 it cannot be thought determinately and will never be actual1 but will always more and more approximate to the actuality4 ,,xii4 ,these are1 ,i believe1 all the misunderstandings which are to be taken into consideration1 and to correct which a clear explanation may hope somewhat to aid4 ,other modes of working against the new system cannot and need not be met by me4 ,if a system1 for instance1 the beginning and end1 nay1 the whole essence of which1 is that individuality be theoretically forgotten and practically denied1 is denounced as egotism1 and by men who1 for the very reason because they are covertly theoretical egotists and overtly practical egotists1 cannot elevate themselves into an insight into this system2 if a conclusion is drawn from the system that its author has an evil heart1 and if again from this evil-heartedness of the author the conclusion is drawn that the system is false2 then arguments are of no avail2 for those who make these assertions know very well that they are not true1 and they have quite different reasons for uttering them than because they believed them4 ,the system bothers them little enough2 but the author may1 perhaps1 have stated on other occasions things which do not please them1 and may1 perhaps--,god knows1 how or where6--be in their way4 ,now such persons are perfectly in conformity with their mode of thinking1 and it would be an idle undertaking to attempt to rid them of their nature4 ,but if thousands and thousands who know not a word of the ,science of ,knowledge1 nor have occasion to know a word of it1 who are neither ,jews nor ,pagans1 neither aristocrats nor democrats1 neither ,kantians of the old or of the modern school1 or of any school1 and who even are not originals--who might have a grudge against the author of the ,science of ,knowledge1 because he took away from them the original ideas which they have just prepared for the public--if such men hastily take hold of these charges1 and repeat and repeat them again without any apparent interest1 other than that they might appear well instructed regarding the secrets of the latest literature2 then it may1 indeed1 be hoped that for their own sakes they will take our prayer into consideration1 and reflect upon what they wish to say before they say it4 ,footnote #f3 ,critique of ,practical ,reason2 ,critique of the ,power of ,judgment2 and ,critique of a ,pure ,doctrine of ,religion4--,translator4 ,footnote #g3 ,for instance--,critique of ,pure ,reason1 p4 #ajh3 8,i purposely pass by the definition of these categories1 although ,i may be in possession of it40 ,now1 these categories can be defined1 each by its determined relation to the possibility of self consciousness1 and whoever is in possession of these definitions1 is necessarily possessed of the ,science of ,knowledge4 ,again1 p4 #aji3 8,in a system of pure reason this definition might justly be required of me1 but in the present work they would only obscure the main point40 ,here he clearly opposes two systems to each other--the ,system of ,pure ,reason and the 8present work10 i4 e4 the ,critique of ,pure ,reason--and the latter is said not to be the former4 ,footnote #h3 ,here is the corner stone of ,kant's realism4 ,i must think something as thing in itself1 i4 e4 as independent of me1 the empirical1 whenever ,i occupy the standpoint of the empirical2 and because ,i must think so1 ,i never become conscious of this activity in my thinking1 since it is not free4 ,only when ,i occupy the standpoint of philosophy can ,i draw the conclusion that ,i am active in this thinking4 ,footnote #i3 ,to state the main point in a few words3 ,all being signifies a limitation of free activity4 ,now this activity is regarded either as that of the mere intelligence1 and then that which is posited as limiting this activity has a mere ideal being1 mere objectivity in regard to consciousness4--,this objectivity is in every representation 7even in that of the ,ego1 of virtue1 of the moral law1 c41 or in that of complete phantasms1 as1 for instance1 a squared circle1 a sphynx1 c47 object of the mere representation4 ,or the free activity is regarded as having actual causality2 and then that which limits it1 has actual existence1 the real world4 ,footnote #aj3 ,i have repeated this frequently4 ,i have stated that ,i could absolutely have no point in common with certain philosophers1 and that they are not1 and cannot be1 where ,i am4 ,this seems to have been taken rather for an hyperbole1 uttered in indignation1 than for real earnest2 for they do not cease to repeat their demand3 8,prove to us thy doctrine60 ,i must solemnly assure them that ,i was perfectly serious in that statement1 that it is my deliberate and decided conviction4 ,dogmatism proceeds from a being as the ,absolute1 and hence its system never rises above being4 ,idealism knows no being1 as something for itself existing4 ,in other words3 ,dogmatism proceeds from necessity--,idealism from freedom4 ,they are1 therefore1 in two utterly different worlds4 ,,introduction ,,to ,,idealism4 ,from the ,german of ,,schelling4 ,translated by ,,tom ,,davidson4 ,i4--,,idea ,,of ,,transcendental ,,philosophy4 #a4 ,all knowing is based upon the agreement of an objective with a subjective4 ,for we know only the true1 and truth is universally held to be the agreement of representations with their objects4 #b4 ,the sum of all that is purely objective in our knowledge we may call ,nature2 while the sum of all that is subjective may be designated the ,ego1 or ,intelligence4 ,these two concepts are mutually opposed4 ,intelligence is originally conceived as that which solely represents--,nature as that which is merely capable of representation2 the former as the conscious--the latter as the unconscious4 ,there is1 moreover1 necessary in all knowledge a mutual agreement of the two--the conscious and the unconscious per se4 ,the problem is to explain this agreement4 #c4 ,in knowledge itself1 in my knowing1 objective and subjective are so united that it is impossible to say to which of the two the priority belongs4 ,there is here no first and no second--the two are contemporaneous and one4 ,in my efforts to explain this identity1 ,i must first have it undone4 ,in order to explain it1 inasmuch as nothing else is given me as a principle of explanation beyond these two factors of knowledge1 ,i must of necessity place the one before the other--set out from the one in order from it to arrive at the other4 ,from which of the two ,i am to set out is not determined by the problem4 #d4 ,there are1 therefore1 only two cases possible3 ,a4 ,either the objective is made the first1 and the question comes to be how a subjective agreeing with it is superinduced4 ,the idea of the subjective is not contained in the idea of the objective2 they rather mutually exclude each other4 ,the subjective1 therefore1 must be superinduced upon the objective4 ,it forms no part of the conception of ,nature that there should be something intelligent to represent it4 ,nature1 to all appearance1 would exist even were there nothing to represent it4 ,the problem may therefore likewise be expressed thus3 ,how is the ,intelligent superinduced upon ,nature8 or1 ,how comes ,nature to be represented8 ,the problem assumes ,nature1 or the objective1 as first4 ,it is1 therefore1 manifestly1 a problem of natural science1 which does the same4 ,that natural science really1 and without knowing it1 approximates1 at least1 to the solution of this problem can be shown here only briefly4 ,if all knowledge has1 as it were1 two poles1 which mutually suppose and demand each other1 they must reciprocally be objects of search in all sciences4 ,there must1 therefore1 of necessity1 be two fundamental sciences2 and it must be impossible to set out from the one pole without being driven to the other4 ,the necessary tendency of all natural science1 therefore1 is to pass from ,nature to the intelligent4 ,this1 and this alone1 lies at the bottom of the effort to bring theory into natural phenomena4 ,the final perfection of natural science would be the complete mentalization of all the laws of ,nature into laws of thought4 ,the phenomena1 that is1 the material1 must vanish entirely1 and leave only the laws--that is1 the formal4 ,hence it is that the more the accordance with law is manifested in ,nature itself1 the more the wrappage disappears--the phenomena themselves become more mental1 and at last entirely cease4 ,optical phenomena are nothing more than a geometry whose lines are drawn through the light2 and even this light itself is of doubtful materiality4 ,in the phenomena of magnetism all trace of matter has already disappeared1 and of those of gravitation2 which even physical philosophers believed could be attributed only to direct spiritual influence1 there remains nothing but the law1 whose action on a large scale is the mechanism of the heavenly motions4 ,the complete theory of ,nature would be that whereby the whole of ,nature should be resolved into an intelligence4 ,the dead and unconscious products of ,nature are only unsuccessful attempts of ,nature to reflect itself1 and dead ,nature1 so-called1 is merely an unripe ,intelligence2 hence in its phenomena the intelligent character peers through1 though yet unconsciously4 ,its highest aim1 namely1 that of becoming completely self-objective1 ,nature reaches only in its highest and last reflection1 which is nothing else than man1 or1 more generally1 what we call reason1 by means of which ,nature turns completely back upon itself1 and by which is manifested that ,nature is originally identical with what in us is known as intelligent and conscious4 ,this may perhaps suffice to prove that natural science has a necessary tendency to render ,nature intelligent4 ,by this very tendency it is that it becomes natural philosophy1 which is one of the two necessary fundamental sciences of philosophy4 ,b4 ,or the subjective is made the first1 and the problem is1 how an objective is superinduced agreeing with it4 ,if all knowledge is based upon the agreement of these two1 then the task of explaining this agreement is plainly the highest for all knowledge2 and if1 as is generally admitted1 philosophy is the highest and loftiest of all sciences1 it is certainly the main task of philosophy4 ,but the problem demands only the explanation of that agreement generally1 and leaves it entirely undecided where the explanation shall begin1 what it shall make its first1 and what its second4 ,moreover1 as the two opposites are mutually necessary to each other1 the result of the operation must be the same1 from whichever point it sets out4 ,to make the objective the first1 and derive the subjective from it1 is1 as has just been shown1 the task of natural philosophy4 ,if1 therefore1 there is a transcendental philosophy1 the only course that remains for it is the opposite one1 namely3 to set out from the subjective as the first and the absolute1 and deduce the origin of the objective from it4 ,into these two possible directions of philosophy1 therefore1 natural and transcendental philosophy have separated themselves2 and if all philosophy must have for its aim to make either an ,intelligence out of ,nature or a ,nature out of ,intelligence1 then transcendental philosophy1 to which the latter task belongs1 is the other necessary fundamental science of philosophy4 ,,ii4--,,corollaries4 ,in the foregoing we have not only deduced the idea of transcendental philosophy1 but have also afforded the reader a glance into the whole system of philosophy1 composed1 as has been shown1 of two principal sciences1 which1 though opposed in principle and direction1 are counter-parts and complements of each other4 ,not the whole system of philosophy1 but only one of the principal sciences of it1 is to be here discussed1 and1 in the first place1 to be more clearly characterized in accordance with the idea already deduced4 #a4 ,if1 for transcendental philosophy1 the subjective is the starting point1 the only ground of all reality1 and the sole principle of explanation for everything else1 it necessarily begins with universal doubt regarding the reality of the objective4 ,as the natural philosopher1 wholly intent upon the objective1 seeks1 above all things1 to exclude every admixture of the subjective from his knowledge1 so1 on the other hand1 the transcendental philosopher seeks nothing so much as the entire exclusion of the objective from the purely subjective principle of knowledge4 ,the instrument of separation is absolute scepticism--not that half-scepticism which is directed merely against the vulgar prejudices of mankind and never sees the foundation--but a thorough-going scepticism1 which aims not at individual prejudices1 but at the fundamental prejudice1 with which all others must stand or fall4 ,for over and above the artificial and conventional prejudices of man1 there are others of far deeper origin1 which have been placed in him1 not by art or education1 but by ,nature itself1 and which pass with all other men1 except the philosopher1 as the principles of knowledge1 and with the mere self-thinker as the test of all truth4 ,the one fundamental prejudice to which all others are reducible1 is this3 that there are things outside of us2 an opinion which1 while it rests neither on proofs nor on conclusions 7for there is not a single irrefragable proof of it71 and yet cannot be uprooted by any opposite proof 7naturam furc expellas1 tamen usque redibit71 lays claim to immediate certainty2 whereas1 inasmuch as it refers to something quite different from us--yea1 opposed to us--and of which there is no evidence how it can come into immediate consciousness1 it must be regarded as nothing more than a prejudice--a natural and original one1 to be sure1 but nevertheless a prejudice4 ,the contradiction lying in the fact that a conclusion which in its nature cannot be immediately certain1 is1 nevertheless1 blindly and without grounds1 accepted as such1 cannot be solved by transcendental philosophy1 except on the assumption that this conclusion is implicitly1 and in a manner hitherto not manifest1 not founded upon1 but identical1 and one and the same with an affirmation which is immediately certain2 and to demonstrate this identity will really be the task of transcendental philosophy4 #b4 ,now1 even for the ordinary use of reason1 there is nothing immediately certain except the affirmation ,i am1 which1 as it loses all meaning outside of immediate consciousness1 is the most individual of all truths1 and the absolute prejudice1 which must be assumed if anything else is to be made certain4 ,the affirmation ,there are things outside of us1 will therefore be certain for the transcendental philosopher1 only through its identity with the affirmation ,i am1 and its certainty will be only equal to the certainty of the affirmation from which it derives it4 ,according to this view1 transcendental knowledge would be distinguished from ordinary knowledge in two particulars4 ,first--,that for it the certainty of the existence of external objects is a mere prejudice1 which it oversteps1 in order to find the grounds of it4 7,it can never be the business of the transcendental philosopher to prove the existence of things in themselves1 but only to show that it is a natural and necessary prejudice to assume external objects as real47 ,second--,that the two affirmations1 ,i am and ,there are things outside of me1 which in the ordinary consciousness run together1 are1 in the former1 separated and the one placed before the other1 with a view to demonstrate as a fact their identity1 and that immediate connection which in the other is only felt4 ,by the act of this separation1 when it is complete1 the philosopher transports himself to the transcendental point of view1 which is by no means a natural1 but an artificial one4 #c4 ,if1 for the transcendental philosopher1 the subjective alone has original reality1 he will also make the subjective alone in knowledge directly his object2 the objective will only become an object indirectly to him1 and1 whereas1 in ordinary knowledge1 knowledge itself--the act of knowing--vanishes in the object1 in transcendental knowledge1 on the contrary1 the object1 as such1 will vanish in the act of knowing4 ,transcendental knowledge is a knowledge of knowing1 in so far as it is purely subjective4 ,thus1 for example1 in intuition1 it is only the objective that reaches the ordinary consciousness2 the act of intuition itself is lost in the object2 whereas the transcendental mode of intuition rather gets only a glimpse of the object of intuition through the act4 ,ordinary thought1 therefore1 is a mechanism in which ideas prevail1 without1 however1 being distinguished as ideas2 whereas transcendental thought interrupts this mechanism1 and in becoming conscious of the idea as an act1 rises to the idea of the idea4 ,in ordinary action1 the acting itself is forgotten in the object of the action2 philosophizing is also an action1 but not an action only4 ,it is likewise a continued self-intuition in this action4 ,the nature of the transcendental mode of thought consists1 therefore1 generally in this3 that1 in it1 that which in all other thinking1 knowing1 or acting escapes the consciousness1 and is absolutely non-objective1 is brought into consciousness1 and becomes objective2 in short1 it consists in a continuous act of becoming an object to itself on the part of the subjective4 ,the transcendental art will therefore consist in a readiness to maintain one's self continuously in this duplicity of thinking and acting4 ,,iii4--,,preliminary ,,arrangement ,,of ,,transcendental ,,philosophy4 ,this arrangement is preliminary1 inasmuch as the principles of arrangement can be arrived at only in the science itself4 ,we return to the idea of science4 ,transcendental philosophy has to explain how knowledge is possible at all1 supposing that the subjective in it is assumed as the chief or first element4 ,it is not1 therefore1 any single part1 or any particular object of knowledge1 but knowledge itself1 and knowledge generally1 that it takes for its object4 ,now all knowledge is reducible to certain original convictions or original fore-judgments2 these different convictions transcendental philosophy must reduce to one original conviction2 this one1 from which all others are derived1 is expressed in the first principle of this philosophy1 and the task of finding such is no other than that of finding the absolutely certain1 by which all other certainty is arrived at4 ,the arrangement of transcendental philosophy itself is determined by those original convictions1 whose validity it asserts4 ,those convictions must1 in the first place1 be sought in the common understanding4 ,if1 therefore1 we fall back upon the standpoint of the ordinary view1 we find the following convictions deeply engraven in the human understanding3 ,a4 ,that there not only exists outside of us a world of things independent of us1 but also that our representations agree with them in such a manner that there is nothing else in the things beyond what they present to us4 ,the necessity which prevails in our objective representations is explained by saying that the things are unalterably determined1 and that1 by this determination of the things1 our ideas are also indirectly determined4 ,by this first and most original conviction1 the first problem of the philosophy is determined1 viz43 to explain how representations can absolutely agree with objects existing altogether independently of them4 ,since it is upon the assumption that things are exactly as we represent them--that we certainly1 therefore1 know things as they are in themselves--that the possibility of all experience rests1 7for what would experience be1 and where would physics1 for example1 wander to1 but for the supposition of the absolute identity of being and seeming87 the solution of this problem is identical with theoretical philosophy1 which has to examine the possibility of experience4 ,b4 ,the second equally original conviction is1 that ideas which spring up in us freely and without necessity are capable of passing from the world of thought into the real world1 and of arriving at objective reality4 ,this conviction stands in opposition to the first4 ,according to the first1 it is assumed that objects are unalterably determined1 and our ideas by them2 according to the other1 that objects are alterable1 and that1 too1 by the causality of ideas in us4 ,according to the first1 there takes place a transition from the real world into the world of ideas1 or a determining of ideas by something objective2 according to the second1 a transition from the world of ideas into the real world1 or a determining of the objective by a 7freely produced7 idea in us4 ,by this second conviction1 a second problem is determined1 viz43 how1 by something merely thought1 an objective is alterable1 so as completely to correspond with that something thought4 ,since upon this assumption the possibility of all free action rests1 the solution of this problem is practical philosophy4 ,c4 ,but with these two problems we find ourselves involved in a contradiction4 ,according to ,b1 there is demanded the dominion of thought 7the ideal7 over the world of sense2 but how is this conceivable1 if 7according to ,a7 the idea1 in its origin1 is already only the slave of the objective8 ,on the other hand1 if the real world is something quite independent of us1 and in accordance with which1 as their pattern1 our ideas must shape themselves 7by ,a71 then it is inconceivable how the real world1 on the other hand1 can shape itself after ideas in us 7by ,b74 ,in a word1 in the theoretical certainty we lose the practical2 in the practical we lose the theoretical4 ,it is impossible that there should be at once truth in our knowledge and reality in our volition4 ,this contradiction must be solved1 if there is to be a philosophy at all2 and the solution of this problem1 or the answering of the question3 ,how can ideas be conceived as shaping themselves according to objects1 and at the same time objects as shaping themselves to ideas8--is not the first1 but the highest1 task of transcendental philosophy4 ,it is not difficult to see that this problem is not to be solved either in theoretical or in practical philosophy1 but in a higher one1 which is the connecting link between the two1 neither theoretical nor practical1 but both at once4 ,how at once the objective world conforms itself to ideas in us1 and ideas in us conform themselves to the objective world1 it is impossible to conceive1 unless there exists1 between the two worlds--the ideal and the real--a prestablished harmony4 ,but this prestablished harmony itself is not conceivable1 unless the activity1 whereby the objective world is produced1 is originally identical with that which displays itself in volition1 and vice versa4 ,now it is undoubtedly a productive activity that displays itself in volition2 all free action is productive and productive only with consciousness4 ,if1 then1 we suppose1 since the two activities are one only in their principle1 that the same activity which is productive with consciousness in free action1 is productive without consciousness in the production of the world1 this prestablished harmony is a reality1 and the contradiction is solved4 ,if we suppose that all this is really the case1 then that original identity of the activity1 which is busy in the production of the world1 with that which displays itself in volition1 will exhibit itself in the productions of the former1 and these will necessarily appear as the productions of an activity at once conscious and unconscious4 ,nature1 as a whole1 no less than in its different productions1 will1 of necessity1 appear as a work produced with consciousness1 and1 at the same time1 as a production of the blindest mechanism4 ,it is the result of purpose1 without being demonstrable as such4 ,the philosophy of the aims of ,nature1 or teleology1 is therefore the required point of union between theoretical and practical philosophy4 ,d4 ,hitherto1 we have postulated only in general terms the identity of the unconscious activity1 which has produced ,nature1 and the conscious activity1 which exhibits itself in volition1 without having decided where the principle of this activity lies--whether in ,nature or in us4 ,now1 the system of knowledge can be regarded as complete only when it reverts to its principle4 ,transcendental philosophy1 therefore1 could be complete only when that identity--the highest solution of its whole problem--could be demonstrated in its principle1 the ,ego4 ,it is therefore postulated that1 in the subjective--in the consciousness itself--that activity1 at once conscious and unconscious1 can be shown4 ,such an activity can be no other than the sthetic1 and every work of art can be conceived only as the product of such4 ,the ideal work of art and the real world of objects are therefore products of one and the same activity2 the meeting of the two 7the conscious and the unconscious7 without consciousness1 gives the real--with consciousness1 the sthetic world4 ,the objective world is only the primal1 still unconscious1 poetry of the mind2 the universal organum of philosophy1 the key-stone of its whole arch1 is the philosophy of art4 ,,iv4--,,organ ,,of ,,transcendental ,,philosophy4 #a4 ,the only immediate object of transcendental consideration is the subjective 7,,ii472 the only organ for philosophizing in this manner is the inner sense1 and its object is such that1 unlike that of mathematics1 it can never become the object of external intuition4 ,the object of mathematics1 to be sure1 exists as little outside of knowledge1 as that of philosophy4 ,the whole existence of mathematics rests on intuition2 it exists1 therefore1 only in intuition2 and this intuition itself is an external one4 ,in addition to this1 the mathematician never has to deal immediately with the intuition--the construction itself--but only with the thing constructed1 which1 of course1 can be exhibited outwardly2 whereas the philosopher looks only at the act of construction itself1 which is purely an internal one4 #b4 ,moreover1 the objects of the transcendental philosopher have no existence1 except in so far as they are freely produced4 ,nothing can compel to this production1 any more than the external describing of a figure can compel one to regard it internally4 ,just as the existence of a mathematical figure rests on the outer sense1 so the whole reality of a philosophical idea rests upon the inner sense4 ,the whole object of this philosophy is no other than the action of ,intelligence according to fixed laws4 ,this action can be conceived only by means of a peculiar1 direct1 inner intuition1 and this again is possible only by production4 ,but this is not enough4 ,in philosophizing1 one is not only the object considered1 but always at the same time the subject considering4 ,to the understanding of philosophy1 therefore1 there are two conditions indispensable3 first1 that the philosopher shall be engaged in a continuous internal activity1 in a continuous production of those primal actions of the intelligence2 second1 that he shall be engaged in continuous reflection upon the productive action2--in a word1 that he shall be at once the contemplated 7producing7 and the contemplating4 #c4 ,by this continuous duplicity of production and intuition1 that must become an object which is otherwise reflected by nothing4 ,it cannot be shown here1 but will be shown in the sequel1 that this becoming-reflected on the part of the absolutely unconscious and non-objective1 is possible only by an sthetic act of the imagination4 ,meanwhile1 so much is plain from what has already been proved1 that all philosophy is productive4 ,philosophy1 therefore1 no less than art1 rests upon the productive faculty1 and the difference between the two1 upon the different direction of the productive power4 ,for whereas production in art is directed outward1 in order to reflect the unconscious by products1 philosophical production is directed immediately inward1 in order to reflect it in intellectual intuition4 ,the real sense by which this kind of philosophy must be grasped1 is therefore the sthetic sense1 and hence it is that the philosophy of art is the true organum of philosophy 7,,iii47 ,out of the vulgar reality there are only two means of exit--poetry1 which transports us into an ideal world1 and philosophy1 which makes the real world vanish before us4 ,it is not plain why the sense for philosophy should be more generally diffused than that for poetry1 especially among that class of men1 who1 whether by memory-work 7nothing destroys more directly the productive7 or by dead speculation 7ruinous to all imaginative power71 have completely lost the sthetic organ4 #d4 ,it is unnecessary to occupy time with common-places about the sense of truth1 and about utter unconcern in regard to results1 although it might be asked1 what other conviction can yet be sacred to him who lays hands upon the most certain of all--that there are things outside of us8 ,we may rather take one glance more at the so-called claims of the common understanding4 ,the common understanding in matters of philosophy has no claims whatsoever1 except those which every object of examination has1 viz41 to be completely explained4 ,it is not1 therefore1 any part of our business to prove that what it considers true1 is true1 but only to exhibit the unavoidable character of its illusions4 ,this implies that the objective world belongs only to the necessary limitations which render self-consciousness 7which is ,i7 possible2 it is enough for the common understanding1 if from this view again the necessity of its view is derived4 ,for this purpose it is necessary1 not only that the inner works of the mental activity should be laid open1 and the mechanism of necessary ideas revealed1 but also that it should be shown by what peculiarity of our nature it is1 that what has reality only in our intuition1 is reflected to us as something existing outside of us4 ,as natural science produces idealism out of realism1 by mentalizing the laws of ,nature into laws of intelligence1 or super-inducing the formal upon the material 7,i471 so transcendental philosophy produces realism out of idealism1 by materializing the laws of ,nature1 or introducing the material into the formal4 ,,genesis4 ,by ,a4 ,,bronson ,,alcott4 8,god is the constant and immutable ,good2 the world is ,good in a state of becoming1 and the human soul is that in and by which the ,good in the world is consummated40--,,plato4 ,i4--,,vestiges4 ,behmen1 the subtilest thinker on ,genesis since ,plato1 conceives that ,nature fell from its original oneness by fault of ,lucifer before man rose physically from its ruins2 and moreover1 that his present existence1 being the struggle to recover from ,nature's lapse1 is embarrassed with double difficulties by deflection from rectitude on his part4 ,we think it needs no ,lucifer other than mankind collectively conspiring1 to account for ,nature's mishaps1 or ,man's4 ,since1 assuming man to be ,nature's ancestor1 and ,nature man's ruins rather1 himself is the impediment he seeks to remove2 and1 moreover1 conceiving ,nature as corresponding in large--or macrocosmically--to his intents1 for whatsoever embarrassments he finds therein1 himself1 and none other1 takes the blame4 ,eldest of creatures1 and progenitor of all below him1 personally one and imperishable in essence1 it follows that if debased forms appear in ,nature1 it must be consequent on ,man's degeneracy prior to their genesis4 ,and it is only as he lapses out of his integrity1 by debasing his essence1 that he impairs his original likeness1 and drags it into the prone shapes of the animal kingdom--these being the effigies and vestiges of his individualized and shattered personality4 ,behold these upstarts of his loins1 everywhere the mimics jeering at him saucily1 or gaily parodying their fallen lord4 8,most happy he who hath fit place assigned ,to his beasts1 and disaforestered his mind2 ,can use his horse1 goat1 wolf1 and every beast1 ,and is not ape himself to all the rest40#aa ,it is man alone who conceives and brings forth the beast in him1 that swerves and dies2 perversion of will by mis-choice being the fate that precipitates him into serpentine form1 clothed in duplicity1 cleft into sex1 8,parts of that ,part which once was all40 ,it is but one and the same soul in him1 entertaining a dialogue with himself1 that is symbolized in ,the ,serpent1 ,adam1 and the ,woman2 nor need there be fabulous 8,paradises ,lost or ,regained10 for setting in relief this serpent symbol of temptation1 this ,lord or ,lucifer in our spiritual ,eden3 8,first state of human kind1 ,which one remains while man doth find ,joy in his partner's company2 ,when two1 alas6 adulterate joined1 ,the serpent made the three40 ,,ii4--,,the ,,deuce4 8,i inquired what iniquity was1 and found it to be no substance1 but perversion of the ,will from the ,supreme ,one towards lower things40--,st4 ,augustine4 ,better is he who is above temptation than he who1 being tempted1 overcomes2 since the latter but suppresses the evil inclination in his breast1 which the former has not4 ,whoever is tempted has so far sinned as to entertain the tempting lust stirring within him1 and betraying his lapse from singleness or holiness4 ,the virtuous choose1 and are virtuous by choice2 while the holy1 being one1 are above all need of deliberating1 their volitions answering spontaneously to their desires4 ,it is the cleft personality1 or other within1 that confronts and seduces the ,will2 the ,adversary and ,deuce we become individually1 and thus impersonate in the ,snake4#ab ,,iii4--,,serpent ,,symbol4 ,one were an dipus to expound this serpent mythology2 yet failing this1 were to miss finding the keys to the mysteries of ,genesis1 and ,nature were the chaos and abyss2 since hereby the one rejoins man's parted personality1 and recreates lost mankind4 ,coeval with flesh1 the symbol appears wherever traces of civilization exist1 a remnant of it in the ancient ,phallus worship having come to us disguised in our ,may-day dance4 ,nor was it confined to carnal knowledge merely4 ,the serpent symbolized divine wisdom1 also2 and it was under this acceptation that it became associated with those 8traditionary teachers of mankind whose genial wisdom entitled them to divine honors40 ,an early ,christian sect1 called ,ophites1 worshipped it as the personation of natural knowledge4 ,so the injunction1 8,be ye wise as serpents and harmless as doves10 becomes the more significant when we learn that seraph in the original means a serpent2 cherub1 a dove2 these again symbolizing facts in osteological science as connected with the latest theories of the invertebrated cranium accepted by eminent naturalists1 and so substantiating the symbol in nature2 this being ophiomorphous1 a series of spires1 crowned1 winged1 webbed1 finned1 footed in structure1 set erect1 prone1 trailing1 as charged with life in higher potency or lower2 man1 supreme in personal uprightness1 and holding the sceptre of dominion as he maintains his inborn rectitude1 or losing his prerogative as he lapses from his integrity1 thus debasing his form and parcelling his gifts away in the prone shapes distributed throughout ,nature's kingdoms2 or1 again1 aspiring for lost supremacy1 he uplifts and crowns his fallen form with forehead1 countenance1 speech1 thereby liberating the genius from the slime of its prone periods1 and restoring it to rectitude1 religion1 science1 fellowship1 the ideal arts4#ac 8,unless above himself he can ,erect himself1 how poor a thing is man40 ,,iv4--,,embryons4 8,the form is in the archetype before it appears in the work1 in the divine mind before it exists in the creature40--,leibnitz4 ,as the male impregnates the female1 so mind charges matter with form and fecundity2 the spermatic world being life in transmission and body in embryo4 ,so the egg is a genesis and seminary of forms1 7the kingdoms of animated nature sleeping coiled in its yolk7 and awaits the quickening magnetism that ushers them into light4 ,herein the human embryon unfolds in series the lineaments of all forms in the living hierarchy1 to be fixed at last in its microcosm1 unreeling therefrom its faculties into filamental organs1 spinning so minutely the threads1 8that were it physically possible to dissolve away all other members of the body1 there would still remain the full and perfect figure of a man4 ,and it is this perfect cerebro-spinal axis1 this statue-like tissue of filaments1 that1 physically speaking1 is the man48 ,the mind above contains him spiritually1 and reveals him physically to himself and his kind4 ,every creature assists in its own formation1 souls being essentially creative and craving form4 8,for the creature delights in the image of the ,creator2 and the soul of man will in a manner clasp ,god to herself4 ,having nothing mortal1 she is wholly inebriated from ,god2 for she glories in the harmony under which the human body exists40#ad ,v4--,,prometheus4 8,imago ,dei in animo2 mundi1 in corpore40 ,man is a soul1 informed by divine ideas1 and bodying forth their image4 ,his mind is the unit and measure of things visible and invisible4 ,in him stir the creatures potentially1 and through his personal volitions are conceived and brought forth in matter whatsoever he sees1 touches1 and treads under foot4 ,the planet he spins4 ,he omnipresent is1 ,all round himself he lies1 ,osiris spread abroad2 ,upstaring in all eyes4 ,nature his globed thought1 ,without him she were not1 ,cosmos from chaos were not spoken1 ,and ,god bereft of visible token4 ,a theosmeter--an instrument of instruments--he gathers in himself all forces1 partakes in his plenitude of omniscience1 being spirit's acme1 and culmination in nature4 ,a quickening spirit and mediator between mind and matter1 he conspires with all souls1 with the ,soul of souls1 in generating the substance in which he immerses his form1 and wherein he embosoms his essence4 ,not elemental1 but fundamental1 essential1 he generates elements and forces1 expiring while consuming1 and perpetually replenishing his waste2 the final conflagration a current fact of his existence4 ,does the assertion seem incredible1 absurd8 ,but science1 grown luminous and transcendent1 boldly declares that life to the senses is ablaze1 refeeding steadily its flame from the atmosphere it kindles into life1 its embers the spent remains from which rises perpetually the new-born ,phnix into regions where flame is lost in itself1 and light its resolvent emblem4#ae 8,thee1 ,eye of ,heaven1 the great soul envies not1 ,by thy male force is all we have1 begot40 ,,vi4--,,ideal ,,method4 8,it has ever been the misfortune of the mere materialist1 in his mania for matter on the one hand and dread of ideas on the other1 to invert nature's order1 and thus hang the world's picture as a man with his heels upwards40--,cudworth4 ,this inverse order of thought conducts of necessity to conclusions as derogatory to himself as to ,nature's author4 ,assuming matter as his basis of investigation1 force as father of thought1 he confounds faculties with organs1 life with brute substance1 and must needs pile his atom atop of atom1 cement cell on cell1 in constructing his column1 sconce mounting sconce aspiringly as it rises1 till his shaft of gifts crown itself surreptitiously with the ape's glorified effigy1 as ,nature's frontispiece and head4 ,life's atomy with life omitted altogether1 man wanting4 ,not thus reads the ideal naturalist the ,book of lives4 ,but opening at spirit1 and thence proceeding to ideas and finding their types in matter1 life unfolds itself naturally in organs1 faculties begetting forces1 mind moulding things substantially1 its connections and inter-dependencies appear in series and degrees as he traces the leaves1 thought the key to originals1 man the connexus1 archetype1 and classifier of things2 he1 straightway1 leading forth abreast of himself the animated creation from the chaos1--the primeval ,adam naming his mates1 himself their ancestor1 contemporary and survivor4 ,,vii4--,,dialogic4 ,if the age of iron and brass be hard upon us1 fast welding its fetters and chains about our foreheads and limbs1 here1 too1 is the ,promethean fire of thought to liberate letters1 science1 art1 philosophy1 using the new agencies let loose by the ,ddalus of mechanic invention and discovery1 in the service of the soul1 as of the senses4 ,having recovered the omnipresence in nature1 graded space1 tunnelled the abyss1 joined ocean and land by living wires1 stolen the chemistry of atom and solar ray1 made light our painter1 the lightning our runner1 thought is pushing its inquiries into the unexplored regions of man's personality1 for whose survey and service every modern instrument lends the outlay and means--facilities ample and unprecedented--new instruments for the new discoverers4 ,using no longer contentedly the eyes of a toiling circuitous logic1 the genius takes the track of the creative thought1 intuitively1 cosmically1 ontologically4 ,a subtler analysis is finely disseminated1 a broader synthesis accurately generalized from the materials accumulated on the mind during the centuries1 the globe's contents being gathered in from all quarters3 the book of creation1 newly illustrated and posted to date4 ,the new ,calculus is ours3 an organon alike serviceable to naturalist and metaphysician3 a ,dialogic for resolving things into thoughts1 matter into mind1 power into personality1 man into ,god1 many into one2 soul in souls seen as the creative controlling spirit1 pulsating in all bodies1 inspiring1 animating1 organizing1 immanent in the atoms1 circulating at centre and circumference1 willing in all wills1 personally embosoming all persons an unbroken synthesis of ,being4 ,footnote #aa3 8,had man withstood the trial1 his descendants would have been born one from another in the same way that ,adam--i4 e4 mankind--was1 namely1 in the image of ,god2 for that which proceeds from the ,eternal has eternal manner of birth40--,behmen4 ,footnote #ab3 8,it is a miserable thing to have been happy2 and a self-contracted wretchedness is a double one4 ,had felicity always been a stranger to humanity1 our present misery had been none2 and had not ourselves been the authors of our ruins1 less4 ,we might have been made unhappy1 but1 since we are miserable1 we chose it4 ,he that gave our outward enjoyments might have taken them from us1 but none could have robbed us of innocence but ourselves4 ,while man knew no sin1 he was ignorant of nothing that it imported humanity to know2 but when he had sinned1 the same transgression that opened his eyes to see his own shame1 shut them against most things else but it and the newly purchased misery4 ,with the nakedness of his body1 he saw that of his soul1 and the blindness and dismay of his faculties to which his former innocence was a stranger1 and that which showed them to him made them4 ,we are not now like the creatures we were made1 having not only lost our ,maker's image but our own2 and do not much more transcend the creatures placed at our feet1 than we come short of our ancient selves40--,glanvill4 ,footnote #ac3 8,i maintain that the different types of the human family have an independent origin1 one from the other1 and are not descended from common ancestors4 ,in fact1 ,i believe that men were created in nations1 not in individuals2 but not in nations in the present sense of the word2 on the contrary1 in such crowds as exhibited slight1 if any1 diversity among themselves1 except that of sex40--,agassiz4 ,footnote #ad3 8,thou hast possessed my reins1 thou hast covered me in my mother's womb4 ,my substance was not hid from thee when ,i was made in a secret place1 and there curiously wrought as in the lowest parts of the earth3 there thine eyes did see my substance yet being imperfect3 and in thy ,book were all my members written1 which in continuance were fashioned when as yet there was none of them40--,,psalm cxxxix3 #ac1 #ae1 #af4 ,footnote #ae3 8,man feeds upon air1 the plant collecting the materials from the atmosphere and compounding them for his food4 ,even life itself1 as we know it1 is but a process of combustion1 of which decomposition is the final conclusion2 through this combustion all the constituents return back into air1 a few ashes remaining to the earth from whence they came4 ,but from these embers1 slowly invisible flames1 arise into regions where our science has no longer any value40--,schleiden4 ,,analysis ,,of ,,hegel',s ,,sthetics4 ,translated from the ,french of ,,ch4 ,,benard1 by ,j4 ,a4 ,,martling4 ,part ,,iii4 ,system of the ,particular ,arts4 ,under the head of 8,system of the ,particular ,arts10 ,hegel sets forth1 in this third part1 the theory of each of the arts--,architecture1 ,sculpture1 ,painting1 ,music and ,poetry4 ,before proceeding to the division of the arts1 he glances at the different styles which distinguish the different epochs of their development4 ,he reduces them to three styles3 the simple or severe1 the ideal or beautiful1 and the graceful4 #a4 ,at first the simple and natural style presents itself to us1 but it is not the truly natural or true simplicity4 ,that supposes a previous perfection4 ,primitive simplicity is gross1 confused1 rigid1 inanimate4 ,art in its infancy is heavy and trifling1 destitute of life and liberty1 without expression1 or with an exaggerated vivacity4 ,still harsh and rude in its commencements1 it becomes by degrees master of form1 and learns to unite it intimately with content4 ,it arrives thus at a severe beauty4 ,this style is the ,beautiful in its lofty simplicity4 ,it is restricted to reproducing a subject with its essential traits4 ,disdaining grace and ornament1 it contents itself with the general and grand expression which springs from the subject1 without the artist's exhibiting himself and revealing his personality in it4 #b4 ,next in order comes the beautiful style1 the ideal and pure style1 which holds the mean between simple expression and a marked tendency to the graceful4 ,its character is vitality1 combined with a calm and beautiful grandeur4 ,grace is not wanting1 but there is rather a natural carelessness1 a simple complacency1 than the desire to please--a beauty indifferent to the exterior charms which blossom of themselves upon the surface4 ,such is the ideal of the beautiful style--the style of ,phidias and ,homer4 ,it is the culminating point of art4 #c4 ,but this movement is short4 ,the ideal style passes quickly to the graceful1 to the agreeable4 ,here appears an aim different from that of the realization of the beautiful1 which pure art ought to propose to itself1 to wit3 the intention of pleasing1 of producing an impression on the soul4 ,hence arise works of a style elaborate with art1 and a certain seeking for external embellishments4 ,the subject is no more the principal thing4 ,the attention of the artist is distracted by ornaments and accessories--by the decorations1 the trimmings1 the simpering airs1 the attitudes and graceful postures1 or the vivid colors and the attractive forms1 the luxury of ornaments and draperies1 the learned making of verse4 ,but the general effect remains without grandeur and without nobleness4 ,beautiful proportions and grand masses give place to moderate dimensions1 or are masked with ornaments4 ,the graceful style begets the style for effect1 which is an exaggeration of it4 ,the art then becomes altogether conspicuous2 it calls the attention of the spectator by everything that can strike the senses4 ,the artist surrenders to it his personal ends and his design4 ,in this species of tte--tte with the public1 there is betrayed through all1 the desire of exhibiting his wit1 of attracting admiration for his ability1 his skill1 his power of execution4 ,this art--without naturalness1 full of coquetry1 of artifice and affectation1 the opposite of the severe style which yields nothing to the public--is the style of the epochs of decadence4 ,frequently it has recourse to a last artifice1 to the affectation of profundity and of simplicity1 which is then only obscurity1 a mysterious profundity which conceals an absence of ideas and a real impotence4 ,this air of mystery1 which parades itself1 is in its turn1 hardly better than coquetry2 the principle is the same--the desire of producing an effect4 ,the author then passes to the ,division of the ,arts4 ,the common method classes them according to their means of representation1 and the senses to which they are addressed4 ,two senses only are affected by the perception of the beautiful3 sight1 which perceives forms and colors1 and hearing1 which perceives sounds4 ,hence the division into arts of design and musical art4 ,poetry1 which employs speech1 and addresses itself to the imagination1 forms a domain apart4 ,without discarding this division1 ,hegel combines it with another more philosophical principle of classification1 and one which is taken no longer from the external means of art1 but from their internal relation to the very content of the ideas which it is to represent4 ,art has for object the representation of the ideal4 ,the arts ought then to be classed according to the measure in which they are more or less capable of expressing it4 ,this gradation will have at the same time the advantage of corresponding to historic progress1 and to the fundamental forms of art previously studied4 ,according to this principle1 the arts marshal themselves1 and succeed one another1 to form a regular and complete system1 thus3 #a4 ,first ,architecture presents itself4 ,this art1 in fact1 is incapable of representing an idea otherwise than in a vague1 indeterminate manner4 ,it fashions the masses of inorganic nature1 according to the laws of matter and geometrical proportions2 it disposes them with regularity and symmetry in such a manner as to offer to the eyes an image which is a simple reflex of the spirit1 a dumb symbol of the thought4 ,architecture is at the same time appropriated to ends which are foreign to it3 it is destined to furnish a dwelling for man and a temple for ,divinity2 it must shelter under its roof1 in its enclosure1 the other arts1 and1 in particular1 sculpture and painting4 ,for these reasons architecture should1 historically and logically1 be placed first in the series of the arts4 #b4 ,in a higher rank is ,sculpture1 which already exhibits spirit under certain determinate traits4 ,its object1 in fact1 is spirit individualized1 revealed by the human form and its living organism4 ,under this visible appearance1 by the features of the countenance1 and the proportions of the body1 it expresses ideal beauty1 divine calmness1 serenity--in a word1 the classic ideal4 #c4 ,although retained in the world of visible forms1 ,painting offers a higher degree of spirituality4 ,to form1 it adds the different phases of visible appearance1 the illusions of perspective1 color1 light and shades1 and thereby it becomes capable1 not only of reproducing the various pictures of nature1 but also of expressing upon canvas the most profound sentiments of the human soul1 and all the scenes of ethical life4 #d4 ,but1 as an expression of sentiment1 ,music still surpasses painting4 ,what it expresses is the soul itself1 in its most intimate and profound relations2 and this by a sensuous phenomenon1 equally invisible1 instantaneous1 intangible--sound--sonorous vibrations1 which resound in the abysses of the soul1 and agitate it throughout4 #e4 ,all these arts culminate in ,poetry1 which includes them and surpasses them1 and whose superiority is due to its mode of expression--speech4 ,it alone is capable of expressing all ideas1 all sentiments1 all passions1 the highest conceptions of the intelligence1 and the most fugitive impressions of the soul4 ,to it alone is given to represent an action in its complete development and in all its phases4 ,it is the universal art--its domain is unlimited4 ,hence it is divided into many species1 of which the principal are epic1 lyric and dramatic poetry4 ,these five arts form the complete and organized system of the arts4 ,others1 such as the art of gardening1 dancing1 engraving1 etc41 are only accessories1 and more or less connected with the preceding4 ,they have not the right to occupy a distinct place in a general theory2 they would only introduce confusion1 and disfigure the fundamental type which is peculiar to each of them4 ,such is the division adopted by ,hegel4 ,he combines it1 at the same time1 with his general division of the forms of the historic development of art4 ,thus architecture appears to him to correspond more particularly to the symbolic type2 sculpture is the classic art1 par excellence2 painting and music fill the category of the romantic arts4 ,poetry1 as art universal1 belongs to all epochs4 ,i4 ,,architecture4--,in the study of architecture1 ,hegel follows a purely historic method4 ,he limits himself to describing and characterizing its principal forms in the different epochs of history4 ,this art1 in fact1 lends itself to an abstract theory less than the others4 ,there are here few principles to establish2 and when we depart from generalities1 we enter into the domain of mathematical laws1 or into the technical applications1 foreign to pure science4 ,it remains1 then1 only to determine the sense and the character of its monuments1 in their relation to the spirit of the people1 and the epochs to which they belong4 ,it is to this point of view that the author has devoted himself4 ,the division which he adopts on this subject1 and the manner in which he explains it1 are as follows3 ,the object of architecture1 independent of the positive design and the use to which its monuments are appropriated1 is to express a general thought1 by forms borrowed from inorganic nature1 by masses fashioned and disposed according to the laws of geometry and mechanics4 ,but whatever may be the ideas and the impressions which the appearance of an edifice produces1 it never furnishes other than an obscure and enigmatic emblem4 ,the thought is vaguely represented by those material forms which spirit itself does not animate4 ,if such is the nature of this art1 it follows that1 essentially symbolic1 it must predominate in that first epoch of history which is distinguished by the symbolic character of its monuments4 ,it must show itself there freer1 more independent of practical utility1 not subordinated to a foreign end4 ,its essential object ought to be to express ideas1 to present emblems1 to symbolize the beliefs of those peoples1 incapable as they are of otherwise expressing them4 ,it is the proper language of such an epoch--a language enigmatic and mysterious2 it indicates the effort of the imagination to represent ideas1 still vague4 ,its monuments are problems proposed to future ages1 and which as yet are but imperfectly comprehended4 ,such is the character of oriental architecture4 ,there the end is valueless or accessory2 the symbolic expression is the principal object4 ,architecture is independent1 and sculpture is confounded with it4 ,the monuments of ,greek and ,roman architecture present a wholly different character4 ,here1 the aim of utility appears clearly distinct from expression4 ,the purpose1 the design of the monument comes out in an evident manner4 ,it is a dwelling1 a shelter1 a temple1 etc4 ,sculpture1 for its part1 is detached from architecture1 and assigns its end to it4 ,the image of the god1 enclosed in the temple1 is the principal object4 ,the temple is only a shelter1 an external attendant4 ,its forms are regulated according to the laws of numbers1 and the proportions of a learned eurythmy2 but its true ornaments are furnished to it by sculpture4 ,architecture ceases then to be independent and symbolic2 it becomes dependent1 subordinated to a positive end4 ,as to ,christian architecture or that of the ,middle ,ages1 it presents the union of the two preceding characteristics4 ,it is at once devoted to a useful end1 and eminently expressive or symbolic--dependent and independent4 ,the temple is the house of ,god2 it is devoted to the uses and ceremonies of worship1 and shows throughout its design in its forms2 but at the same time these symbolize admirably the ,christian idea4 ,thus the symbolic1 classic and romantic forms1 borrowed from history1 and which mark the whole development of art1 serve for the division and classification of the forms of architecture4 ,this being especially the art which is exercised in the domain of matter1 the essential point to be distinguished is whether the monument which is addressed to the eyes includes in itself its own meaning1 or whether it is considered as a means to a foreign end1 or finally whether1 although in the service of a foreign end1 it preserves its independence4 ,the basis of the division being thus placed1 ,hegel justifies it by describing the characters of the monuments belonging to these three epochs4 ,all this descriptive part can not be analyzed3 we are obliged to limit ourselves to securing a comprehension of the general features1 and to noting the most remarkable points4 7a7 ,since the distinctive characteristic of symbolic architecture is the expression of a general thought1 without other end than the representation of it1 the interest in its monuments is less in their positive design than in the religious conceptions of the people1 who1 not having other means of expression1 have embodied their thought1 still vague and confused1 in these gigantic masses and these colossal images4 ,entire nations know not how otherwise to express their religious beliefs4 ,hence the symbolic character of the structures of the ,babylonians1 the ,indians and the ,egyptians1 of those works which absorbed the life of those peoples1 and whose meaning we seek to explain to ourselves4 ,it is difficult to follow a regular order in the absence of chronology1 when we review the multiplicity of ideas and forms which these monuments and these symbols present4 ,hegel thinks1 nevertheless1 that he is able to establish the following gradations3 ,in the first rank are the simplest monuments1 such as seem only designed to serve as a bond of union to entire nations1 or to different nations4 ,such gigantic structures as the tower of ,belus or ,babylon1 upon the shores of the ,euphrates1 present the image of the union of the peoples before their dispersion4 ,community of toil and effort is the aim and the very idea of the work2 it is the common work of their united efforts1 the symbol of the dissolution of the primitive family and of the formation of a vaster society4 ,in a rank more elevated1 appear the monuments of a more determined character1 where is noticeable a mingling of architecture and sculpture1 although they belong to the former4 ,such are those symbols which1 in the ,east1 represent the generative force of nature2 the phallus and the lingam scattered in so great numbers throughout ,phrygia and ,syria1 and of which ,india is the principal seat2 in ,egypt1 the obelisks1 which derive their symbolic significance from the rays of the sun2 the ,memnons1 colossal statues which also represent the sun and his beneficent influence upon nature2 the sphinxes1 which one finds in ,egypt in prodigious numbers and of astonishing size1 ranged in rows in the form of avenues4 ,these monuments1 of an imposing sculpture1 are grouped in masses1 surrounded by walls so as to form buildings4 ,they present1 in a striking manner1 the twofold character indicated above3 free from all positive design1 they are1 above all1 symbols2 afterward1 sculpture is confounded with architecture4 ,they are structures without roof1 without doors1 without aisles1 frequently forests of colums where the eye loses itself4 ,the eye passes over objects which are there for their own sake1 designed only to strike the imagination by their colossal aspect and their enigmatic sense1 not to serve as a dwelling for a god1 and as a place of assemblage for his worshippers4 ,their order and their disposition alone preserve for them an architectural character4 ,you walk on into the midst of those human works1 mute symbols which remind you of divine things2 your eyes are everywhere struck with the aspect of those forms and those extraordinary figures1 of those walls besprinkled with hieroglyphics1 books of stone1 as it were1 leaves of a mysterious book4 ,everything there is symbolically determined--the proportions1 the distances1 the number of columns1 etc4 ,the ,egyptians1 in particular1 consecrated their lives to constructing and building these monuments1 by instinct1 as a swarm of bees builds its hive4 ,this was the whole life of the people4 ,it placed there all its thought1 for it could no otherwise express it4 ,nevertheless1 that architecture1 in one point1 by its chambers and its halls1 its tombs1 begins to approach the following class1 which exhibits a more positive design1 and of which the type is a house4 ,a third rank marks the transition of symbolic to classic architecture4 ,architecture already presents a character of utility1 of conformity to an end4 ,the monument has a precise design2 it serves for a particular use taken aside from the symbolic sense4 ,it is a temple or a tomb4 ,such1 in the first place1 is the subterranean architecture of the ,indians1 those vast excavations which are also temples1 species of subterranean cathedrals1 the caverns of ,mithra1 likewise filled with symbolic sculpture4 ,but this transition is better characterized by the double architecture1 7subterranean and above ground7 of the ,egyptians1 which is connected with their worship of the dead4 ,an individual being1 who has his significance and his proper value2 the dead one1 distinct from his habitation which serves him only for covering and shelter1 resides in the interior4 ,the most ancient of these tombs are the pyramids1 species of crystals1 envelopes of stone which enclose a kernel1 an invisible being1 and which serve for the preservation of the bodies4 ,in this concealed dead one1 resides the significance of the monument which is subordinate to him4 ,here1 then1 ,architecture ceases to be independent4 ,it divides itself into two elements--the end and the means2 it is the means1 and it is subservient to an end4 ,further1 sculpture separates itself from it1 and obtains a distinct office--that of shaping the image within1 and its accessories4 ,here appears clearly the special design of architecture1 conformity to an end2 also it assumes inorganic and geometric forms1 the abstract1 mathematical form1 which befits it in particular4 ,the pyramid already exhibits the design of a house1 the rectangular form4 7b7 ,classic architecture has a two-fold point of departure--symbolic architecture and necessity4 ,the adaptation of parts to an end1 in symbolic architecture1 is accessory4 ,in the house1 on the contrary1 all is controlled1 from the first1 by actual necessity and convenience4 ,now classic architecture proceeds both from the one and from the other principle1 from necessity and from art1 from the useful and from the beautiful1 which it combines in the most perfect manner4 ,necessity produces regular forms1 right angles1 plane surfaces4 ,but the end is not simply the satisfaction of a physical necessity2 there is also an idea1 a religious representation1 a sacred image1 which it has to shelter and surround1 a worship1 a religious ceremonial4 ,the temple ought then1 like the temple fashioned by sculpture1 to spring from the creative imagination of the artist4 ,there is necessary a dwelling for the god1 fashioned by art and according to its laws4 ,thus1 while falling under the law of conformity to an end1 and ceasing to be independent1 architecture escapes from the useful and submits to the law of the beautiful2 or rather1 the beautiful and useful meet and combine themselves in the happiest manner4 ,symmetry1 eurythmy1 organic forms the most graceful1 the most rich1 and the most varied1 join themselves as ornaments to the architectural forms4 ,the two points of view are united without being confounded1 and form an harmonious whole2 there will be1 at the same time1 a useful1 convenient and beautiful architecture4 ,what best marks the transition to ,greek architecture1 is the appearance of the column1 which is its type4 ,the column is a support4 ,therein is its useful and mechanical design2 it fulfils that design in the most simple and perfect manner1 because with it the power of support is reduced to its minimum of material means4 ,from another side1 in order to be adapted to its end and to beauty1 it must give up its natural and primitive form4 ,the beautiful column comes from a form borrowed from nature2 but carved1 shaped1 it takes a regular and geometric configuration4 ,in ,egypt1 human figures serve as columns2 here they are replaced by caryatides4 ,but the natural1 primitive form is the tree1 the trunk1 the flexible stock1 which bears its crown4 ,such1 too1 appears the ,egyptian column2 columns are seen rising from the vegetable kingdom in the stalks of the lotus and other trees2 the base resembles an onion4 ,the leaf shoots from the root1 like that of a reed1 and the capital presents the appearance of a flower4 ,the mathematical and regular form is absent4 ,in the ,greek column1 on the contrary1 all is fashioned according to the mathematical laws of regularity and proportion4 ,the beautiful column springs from a form borrowed from nature1 but fashioned according to the artistic sense4 ,thus the characteristic of classic architecture1 as of architecture in general1 is the union of beauty and utility4 ,its beauty consists in its regularity1 and although it serves a foreign end1 it constitutes a whole perfect in itself2 it permits its essential aim to look forth in all its parts1 and through the harmony of its relations1 it transforms the useful into the beautiful4 ,the character of classic architecture being subordination to an end1 it is that end which1 without detriment to beauty1 gives to the entire edifice its proper signification1 and which becomes thus the principal regulator of all its parts2 as it impresses itself on the whole1 and determines its fundamental form4 ,the first thing as to a work of this sort1 then1 is to know what is its purpose1 its design4 ,the general purpose of a ,grecian temple is to hold the statue of a god4 ,but in its exterior1 the character of the temple relates to a different end1 and its spirit is the life of the ,greek people4 ,among the ,greeks1 open structures1 colonnades and porticoes1 have as object the promenade in the open air1 conversation1 public life under a pure sky4 ,likewise the dwellings of private persons are insignificant4 ,among the ,romans1 on the contrary1 whose national architecture has a more positive end in utility1 appears later the luxury of private houses1 palaces1 villas1 theatres1 circuses1 amphitheatres1 aqueducts and fountains4 ,but the principal edifice is that whose end is most remote from the wants of material life2 it is the temple designed to serve as a shelter to a divine object1 which already belongs to the fine arts--to the statue of a god4 ,although devoted to a determinate end1 this architecture is none the less free from it1 in the sense1 that it disengages itself from organic forms2 it is more free even than sculpture1 which is obliged to reproduce them2 it invents its plan1 the general configuration1 and it displays in external forms all the richness of the imagination2 it has no other laws than those of good taste and harmony2 it labors without a direct model4 ,nevertheless1 it works within a limited domain1 that of mathematical figures1 and it is subjected to the laws of mechanics4 ,here must be preserved1 first of all1 the relations between the width1 the length1 the height of the edifice2 the exact proportions of the columns according to their thickness1 the weight to be supported1 the intervals1 the number of columns1 the style1 the simplicity of the ornaments4 ,it is this which gives to the theory of this art1 and in particular of this form of architecture1 the character of dryness and abstraction4 ,but there dominates throughout1 a natural eurythmy1 which their perfectly accurate sense enabled the ,greeks to find and fix as the measure and rule of the beautiful4 ,we will not follow the author in the description which he gives of the particular characteristics of architectural forms2 we will omit also some other interesting details upon building in wood or in stone as the primitive type1 upon the relation of the different parts of the ,greek temple4 ,in here following ,vitruvius1 the author has been able to add some discriminating and judicious remarks4 ,what he says1 in particular1 of the column1 of its proportions and of its design1 of the internal unity of the different parts and of their effects as a whole1 adds to what is already known a philosophical explication which satisfies the reason4 ,we remark1 especially1 this passage1 which sums up the general character of the ,greek temple3 8,in general1 the ,greek temple presents an aspect which satisfies the vision1 and1 so to speak1 surfeits it4 ,nothing is very elevated1 it is regularly extended in length and breadth4 ,the eye finds itself allured by the sense of extent1 while ,gothic architecture mounts even beyond measurement1 and shoots upward to heaven4 ,besides1 the ornaments are so managed that they do not mar the general expression of simplicity4 ,in this1 the ancients observe the most beautiful moderation40 ,the connection of their architecture with the genius1 the spirit1 and the life of the ,greek people1 is indicated in the following passage3 8,in place of the spectacle of an assemblage united for a single end1 all appears directed towards the exterior1 and presents us the image of an animated promenade4 ,there men who have leisure abandon themselves to conversations without end1 wherein rule gayety and serenity4 ,the whole expression of such a temple remains truly simple and grand in itself1 but it has at the same time an air of serenity1 something open and graceful40 ,this prepares and conducts us to another kind of architecture1 which presents a striking contrast to the preceding ,christian or ,gothic architecture4 7c7 ,we shall not further attempt to reproduce1 even in its principal features1 the description which ,hegel gives1 in some pages1 of ,romantic or ,gothic architecture4 ,the author has proposed to himself1 as object1 in the first place1 to compare the two kinds of architecture1 the ,greek and the ,christian1 then to secure the apprehension of the relation of this form of architecture to the ,christian idea4 ,this is what constitutes the peculiar interest of this remarkable sketch1 which1 by its vigor and severity of design1 preserves its distinctive merit when compared with all descriptions that have been made of the architecture of the ,middle ,ages4 ,gothic architecture1 according to ,hegel1 unites1 in the first place1 the opposite characters of the two preceding kinds4 ,notwithstanding1 this union does not consist in the simple fusion of the architectural forms of the ,east and of ,greece4 ,here1 still more than in the ,greek temple1 the house furnishes the fundamental type4 ,an architectural edifice which is the house of ,god1 shows itself perfectly in conformity with its design and adapted to worship2 but the monument is also there for its own sake1 independent1 absolute4 ,externally1 the edifice ascends1 shoots freely into the air4 ,the conformity to the end1 although it presents itself to the eyes1 is therefore effaced1 and leaves to the whole the appearance of an independent existence4 ,the monument has a determinate sense1 and shows it2 but1 in its grand aspect and its sublime calm1 it is lifted above all end in utility1 to something infinite in itself4 ,if we examine the relation of this architecture to the inner spirit and the idea of ,christian worship1 we remark1 in the first place1 that the fundamental form is here the house wholly closed4 ,just as1 in fact1 the ,christian spirit withdraws itself into the interior of the conscience1 just so the church is an enclosure1 sealed on all sides1 the place of meditation and silence4 8,it is the place of the reflection of the soul into itself1 which thus shuts itself up materially in space4 ,on the other hand1 if1 in ,christian meditation1 the soul withdraws into itself1 it is1 at the same time1 lifted above the finite1 and this equally determines the character of the house of ,god4 ,architecture takes1 then1 for its independent signification1 elevation towards the infinite1 a character which it expresses by the proportions of its architectural forms40 ,these two traits1 depth of self-examination and elevation of the soul towards the infinite1 explain completely the ,gothic architecture and its principal forms4 ,they furnish also the essential differences between ,gothic and ,greek architecture4 ,the impression which the ,christian church ought to produce in contrast with this open and serene aspect of the ,greek temple1 is1 in the first place1 the calmness of the soul which reflects into itself1 then that of a sublime majesty which shoots beyond the confines of sense4 ,greek edifices extend horizontally2 the ,christian church should lift itself from the ground and shoot into the air4 ,the most striking characteristic which the house of ,god presents1 in its whole and its parts1 is1 then1 the free flight1 the shooting in points formed either by broken arches or by right lines4 ,in ,greek architecture1 exact proportion between support and height is everywhere observed4 ,here1 on the contrary1 the operation of supporting and the disposition at a right angle--the most convenient for this end--disappears or is effaced4 ,the walls and the column shoot without marked difference between what supports and what is supported1 and meet in an acute angle4 ,hence the acute triangle and the ogee1 which form the characteristic traits of ,gothic architecture4 ,we are not able to follow the author in the detailed explication of the different forms and the divers parts of the ,gothic edifice1 and of its total structure4 ,,the ,,metaphysics ,,of ,,materialism4 ,by ,d4 ,g4 ,,brinton4 ,ubi tres physici1 ibi duo athei1--the proverb is something musty4 ,natural science is and always has been materialistic4 ,the explanation is simple4 ,there is as great antagonism between chemical research and metaphysical speculation1 as there is between what 8,youthful poets dream1 ,on summer's eve by haunted stream10 and book-keeping by double entry1 and nothing is more customary than to deny what we do not understand4 ,of late years this scientific materialism has been making gigantic strides4 ,since the imposing fabric of the ,hegelian philosophy proved but a house built on sands1 the scales and metre have become our only gods4 ,germany--mystic1 metaphysical ,germany--strange to say1 leads the van in this crusade against all faith and all idealism4 ,vogt1 the geologist1 ,moleschott1 the physiologist1 ,virchow1 the greatest of all living histologists1 ,bchner1 ,tiedemann1 ,reuchlin1 ,meldeg1 and many others1 not only hold these opinions1 but have left the seclusion of the laboratory and the clinic to enter the arena of polemics in their favor4 ,we do not mention the ,french and ,english advocates of 8positive philosophy40 ,their name is ,legion4 ,it is not our design to enter at all at large into these views1 still less to dispute them1 but merely to give the latest and most approved defence of a single point of their position1 a point which we submit is the kernel of the whole controversy1 and which we believe to be the very ,achilles heel and crack in the armor of their panoply of argument--that is1 the ,theory of the ,absolute4 ,demonstrate the possibility of the ,absolute1 and materialism is impossible2 disprove it1 and all other philosophies are empty nothings1--vox et prterea nihil4 ,here1 and only here1 is materialism brought face to face with metaphysics2 here is the combat l'outrance in which one or the other must perish4 ,no one of its apostles has accepted the proffered glaive more heartily1 and defended his position with more wary dexterity1 than ,moleschott1 and it is mainly from his work1 entitled ,der ,kreislauf des ,lebens1 that we illustrate the present metaphysics of materialism4 ,our first question is1 ,what is the test of truth1 what sanctions a law8 ,until this is answered1 all assertion is absurd1 and until it is answered correctly1 all philosophy is vain4 ,the response of the naturalist is3 8,the necessary sequence of cause and effect is the prime law of the experimentalist--a law which he does not ask from revelation1 but will find out for himself by observation40 ,the source of truth is sensation2 the uniform result of manifold experience is a law4 ,here a double objection arises3 first1 that the term 8a necessary sequence0 presupposes a law1 and begs the question at issue2 and1 secondly1 that1 this necessity unproved1 such truth is nothing more than a probability1 for it is impossible to be certain that our next experiment may not have quite a different result4 ,either this is not the road to absolute truth1 or absolute truth is unattainable4 ,the latter horn of the dilemma is at once accepted2 we neither know1 nor can know1 a law to be absolute2 to us1 the absolute does not exist4 ,matter and force with their relations are there1 but what we know of them is a varying quantity1 is of this age or the last1 of this man or that1 dependent upon the extent and accuracy of empirical science2 we cannot speak of what we do not know1 and we know no law that conceivable experience might not contradict4 ,but how1 objects the reader1 can this be reconciled with the pure mathematics8 ,here seem to be laws above experience1 laws admitting no exception4 ,the response leads us back to the origin of our notions of ,space and ,time1 on the the former of which mathematics is founded4 ,the supposition that they are innate ideas is of course rejected by the materialist2 for he looks upon innate ideas as fables2 he considers them perceptions derived positively from the senses1 but they do not belong to the senses alone1 nor are they perceptions merely2 8they are ideas1 but ideas that without the sensuous perceptions of proximity and sequence could never have arisen4 ,nay1 more--the perception of space must precede that of time10 for it is only through the former that we can reach the latter4 ,the plainest laws of space1 those which were the earliest impressions on the tabula rasa of the infant mind1 and which the hourly experience of life verifies1 are called1 by the mathematician1 axioms1 and on these simplest generalizations of our perceptions he bases the whole of his structure4 ,axioms1 therefore1 are the uniform results of experiments1 the possible conditions of which are extremely limited1 and the factors of which have been subjected to all these conditions4 ,it follows from a denial of the absolute that all existence is concrete4 ,indeed1 we may say that the corner stone of the edifice of materialism is embraced in the terse sentence of ,moleschott--all existence is existence through attributes4 ,existence per se 7,frsichsein7 is a meaningless term1 and substance apart from attribute1 the ens ineffabile1 is a pedantic figment and nothing more4 ,finally1 there can be no attribute except through a relation4 ,let this trilogy of existence1 attribute and relation1 be clearly before the mind1 and the position that the positive philosophy bears to all others becomes at once luminous enough4 ,there is no existence apart from attributes1 no attributes but through relations1 no relations but to other existences4 ,to exemplify3 a stone is heavy1 hard1 colored1 perhaps bitter to the taste4 ,now1 says the idealist1 this weight1 this hardness1 this color1 this bitterness1 these are not the stone1 they are merely its properties or attributes1 and the stone itself is some substance behind them all1 to which they adhere and which we cannot detect with our senses2 further1 he might add1 if a moderate in his school1 these attributes are independently existent1 the bitterness is there when we are not tasting it1 and the attribute of color1 though there be no light4 ,all this the materialist denies4 ,to him1 the attributes and nothing else constitute the stone1 and these attributes have no existence apart from their relations to other objects4 ,the bitterness exists only in relation to the organs of taste1 and the color to the organs of sight1 and the weight to other bodies of matter4 ,nothing1 in short1 can be said to exist to us that is not cognizable by our senses4 ,but1 objects some one1 there may be an existence which is not to us1 which is as much beyond our ken as color is beyond the conception of the born blind4 ,the expression was used advisedly3 no such existence can become the subject of rational language4 8,does not all knowledge predicate a knower1 consequently a relation of the subject to the the observer8 ,such a relation is an attribute4 ,without it1 knowledge is inconceivable4 ,neither ,god nor man can raise himself above the knowledge furnished by these relations to his organs of apprehension40 ,a disagreeable sequence to this logic will not fail to occur to every one4 ,if all knowledge comes from the organs of sense1 then differently formed organs must furnish very different and contradictory knowledge1 and one is as likely to be correct as another4 ,the radiate animal1 who sees the world through a cornea alone1 must have quite another notion of light1 color1 and relative size1 from the spider whose eye is provided with lenses and a vitreous humor4 ,consonantly with the theory1 each of these probably opposing views is equally true4 ,this ugly dilemma is foreseen by our author1 for he grants that 8the knowledge of the insect1 its knowledge of the action of the outer world1 is altogether a different one from that of man10 but he avoids the ultimate result of this reasoning4 ,to sum up the views of this school3 matter is eternal1 force is eternal1 but each is impossible without the other2 what bears any relation to our senses we either know or can know2 what does not1 it is absurd to discuss2 the highest thought is but the physical elaboration of sensations1 or1 to use the expression of ,carl ,vogt1 8thought is a secretion of the brain as urine is of the kidneys4 ,without phosphorus there is no thought40 8,and so10 concludes ,moleschott1 8only when thought is based on fact1 only when the reason is granted no sphere of action but the historical which arises from observation1 when the perception is at the same time thought1 and the understanding sees with consciousness1 does the contradiction between ,philosophy and ,science disappear40 ,this1 then1 is the last word of materialism1 this the solution it now offers us of the great problem of ,life4 ,we enter no further into its views1 for all collateral questions concerning the origin of the ideas of the true1 the good and the beautiful1 the vital force1 and the spiritual life1 depend directly on the question we have above mentioned4 ,let the reader turn back precisely a century to the ,systme de la ,nature1 so long a boasted bulwark of the rationalistic school1 and judge for himself what advance1 if any1 materialism has made in fortifying this1 the most vital point of her structure4 ,let him ask himself anew whether the criticism of ,hume on the law of cause and effect can in any way be met except after the example of ,kant1 by the assumption of the absolute idea1 and we have little doubt what conclusion he will arrive at in reference to that system which1 while it boasts to offer the only method of discovering truth1 starts with the flat denial of all truth other than relative4 ,,letters ,,on ,,faust4 ,by ,h4 ,c4 ,,brockmeyer4 ,i4 ,,dear ,h4--,yours of a recent date1 requesting an epistolary criticism of 8,goethe's ,faust10 has come to hand1 and ,i hasten to assure you of a compliance of some sort4 ,i say a compliance of some sort1 for ,i cannot promise you a criticism4 ,this1 it seems to me1 would be both too little and too much2 too little if understood in the ordinary sense1 as meaning a mere statement of the relation existing between the work and myself2 too much if interpreted as pledging an expression of a work of the creative imagination1 as a totality1 in the terms of the understanding1 and submitting the result to the canons of art4 ,the former procedure1 usually called criticism1 reduced to its simplest forms1 amounts to this3 that ,i1 the critic1 report to you1 that ,i was amused or bored1 flattered or satirized1 elevated or degraded1 humanized or brutalized1 enlightened or mystified1 pleased or displeased1 by the work under consideration2 and--since it depends quite as much upon my own humor1 native ability1 and culture acquired1 which set of adjectives ,i may be able to report1 as it does upon the work--,i cannot perceive what earthly profit such a labor could be to you4 ,for that which is clear to you may be dark to me2 hence1 if ,i report that a given work is a 8perfect riddle to me10 you will only smile at my simplicity4 ,again1 that which amuses me may bore you1 for ,i notice that even at the theatre1 some will yawn with ennui while others thrill with delight1 and applaud the play4 ,now1 if each of these should tell you how he liked the performance1 the one would say 8excellent10 and the other 8miserable10 and you be none the wiser4 ,to expect1 therefore1 that ,i intend to enter upon a labor of this kind1 is to expect too little4 ,besides1 such an undertaking seems to me not without its peculiar danger2 for it may happen that the work measures or criticises the critic1 instead of the latter the former4 ,if1 for example1 ,i should tell you that the integral and differential calculus is all fog to me--mystifies me completely--you would conclude my knowledge of mathematics to be rather imperfect1 and thus use my own report of that work as a sounding-lead to ascertain the depth of my attainment4 ,nay1 you might even go further1 and regard the work as a kind of ,doomsday ,book1 on the title page of which ,i had 8written myself down an ass40 ,now1 as ,i am not ambitious of a memorial of this kind1 especially when there is no probability that the pages in contemplation--,goethe's ,faust--will perish any sooner than the veritable ,doomsday ,book itself1 ,i request you1 as a special favor1 not to understand of me that ,i propose engaging in any undertaking of this sort4#af ,nor are you to expect an inquiry into the quantity or quality of the author's food1 drink or raiment4 ,for the present infantile state of analytic science refuses all aid in tracing such primary elements1 so to speak1 in the composition of the poem before us2 and hence such an investigation would lead1 at best1 to very secondary and remote conclusions4 ,nor shall we be permitted to explore the likes and dislikes of the poet1 in that fine volume of scandal1 for the kindred reason that neither crucible1 reagent nor retort are at hand which can be of the remotest service4 ,by the by1 has it never occurred to you1 when perusing works of the kind last referred to1 what a glowing picture the pious ,dean of ,st4 ,patrick's1 the saintly ,swift1 has bequeathed to us of their producers1 when he places the great authors1 the historical ,gullivers of our race1 in all their majesty of form1 astride the public thoroughfare of a ,liliputian age1 and marches the inhabitants1 in solid battalions1 through between their legs8 you recollect what he says8 ,nor yet are you to expect a treat of that most delightful of all compounds1 the table talk and conversation--or1 to use a homely phrase1 the literary dishwater retailed by the author's scullion4 ,to expect such1 or the like1 would be to expect too little4 ,on the other hand1 to expect that ,i shall send you an expression1 in the terms of the understanding1 of a work of the creative imagination1 as a totality1 and submit the result to the canons of art1 is to expect too much4 ,for while ,i am ready1 and while ,i intend to comply with the first part of this proposition1 ,i am unable to fulfil the requirement of the latter part--that is1 ,i am not able to submit the result to the canons of art4 ,the reason for this inability it is not necessary to develop in this connection any further than merely to mention that ,i find it extremely inconvenient to lay my hand upon the aforementioned canons just at this time4 ,i must1 therefore1 content myself with the endeavor to summon before you the ,idea which creates the poem--each act1 scene and verse--so that we may see the part in its relation to the whole1 and the whole in its concrete1 organic articulation4 ,if we succeed in this1 then we may say that we comprehend the work--a condition precedent alike to the beneficial enjoyment and the rational judgment of the same4 ,,ii4 ,in my first letter1 dear friend1 ,i endeavored to guard you against misapprehension as to what you might expect from me4 ,its substance1 if memory serves me1 was that ,i did not intend to write on ,anthropology or ,psychology1 nor yet on street1 parlor or court gossip1 but simply about a work of art4 ,i deemed these remarks pertinent in view of the customs of the time1 lest that1 in my not conforming to them1 you should judge me harshly without profit to yourself4 ,with the same desire of keeping up a fair understanding with you1 ,i must call your attention to some terms and distinctions which we shall have occasion to use1 and which1 unless explained1 might prove shadows instead of lights along the path of our intercourse4 ,i confess to you that ,i share the 7,i might say7 abhorrence so generally entertained by the reading public1 of the use of any general terms whatsoever1 and would avoid them altogether if ,i could only see how4 ,but in reading the poem that we are to consider1 ,i come upon such passages as these3 7,choir of invisible ,spirits47 8,woe6 ,woe6 ,thou hast destroyed it1 ,the beautiful world6 ,it reels1 it crumbles1 ,crushed by a demigod's mighty hand60 and ,i cannot see how we are to understand these spirits1 or the poet who gave them voice1 unless we attack this very general expression 8,the beautiful world10 here said to have been destroyed by ,faust4 ,i am1 however1 somewhat reconciled to this by the example of my neighbor--a non-speculative1 practical farmer--now busily engaged in harvesting his wheat4 ,for ,i noticed that he first directed his attention1 after cutting the grain1 to collecting and tying it together in bundles2 and ,i could not help but perceive how much this facilitated his labor1 and how difficult it would have been for him to collect his wheat1 grain by grain1 like the sparrow of the field4 ,though wheat it were1 and not chaff1 still such a mode of handling would reduce it even below the value of chaff4 ,just think of handling the wheat crop of these ,united ,states1 the two hundred and twenty-five millions of bushels a year1 in this manner6 ,it is absolutely not to be thought of1 and we must have recourse to agglomeration1 if not to generalization4 ,but the one gives us general masses1 and the other general terms4 ,the only thing that we can do1 therefore1 is1 in imitation of our good neighbor of the wheat field1 to handle bundles1 bushels1 and bags1 or--what is still better1 if it can be done by some daring system of intellectual elevators--whole ship loads of grain at a time1 due care being taken that we tie wheat to wheat1 oats to oats1 barley to barley1 and not promiscuously4 ,now1 with this example well before our minds1 and the necessity mentioned1 which compels us to handle--not merely the wheat crop of the ,united ,states for one year1 but--whatever has been raised by the intelligence of man from the beginning of our race to the time of ,goethe the poet1 together with the ground on which it was raised1 and the sky above--for no less than this seems to be contained in the expression 8,the beautiful world0--,i call your attention first to the expression 8form and matter10 which1 when applied to works of intelligence1 we must take the liberty of changing into the expression 8form and content10 for since there is nothing in works of this kind that manifests gravity1 it can be of no use to say so1 but may be of some injury4 ,the next is the expression 8works of art10 which sounds rather suspicious in some of its applications--sounds as if it was intended to conceal rather than reveal the worker4 ,now ,i take it that the 8works of art0 are the works of the intelligence1 and ,i shall have to classify them accordingly4 ,another point with reference to this might as well be noticed1 and that is that the old expressions 8works of art0 and 8works of nature0 do not contain1 as they were intended to1 all the works that present themselves to our observation--the works of science1 for example4 ,besides1 we have government1 society1 and religion1 all of which are undoubtedly distinct from the 8works of art0 no less than from the 8works of nature10 and to tie them up in the same bundle with either of them1 seems to me to be like tying wheat with oats1 and therefore to be avoided1 as in the example before our minds4 ,this seems to be done in the expression 8works of self-conscious intelligence10 and 8works of nature40 ,but if we reflect upon the phrases 8works of self-conscious intelligence0 and 8works of nature10 it becomes obvious that there must be some inaccuracy contained in them2 for how can two distinct subjects have the same predicate8 ,it would1 therefore1 perhaps be better to say 8the works of self-conscious intelligence0 and the 8products of nature40 ,without further rasping and filing of old phrases1 ,i call your attention1 in the next place1 to the most general term which we shall have occasion to use--8the world40 ,under this we comprehend3 ,i4 ,the natural world--,gravity42 ,,ii4 ,the spiritual world--,self-determination4 ,i4 ,under the natural world we comprehend the terrestrial globe1 and that part of the universe which is involved in its processes2 these are3 7a7 7#a47 ,mechanic,gravity1 ,meteorologic,electricity4 7#b47 ,chemic,affinity1 7b7 7#a47 ,organic,galvanism1 ,vital,sensation4 7#b47 ,vegetative,assimilation1 ,,ii4 ,under 8,the ,spiritual ,world10 the world of conscious intelligence1 we comprehend3 7a7 ,the real worldimplement1 mediation4 7b7 ,the actual worldself-determination4 7a7 ,the real world contains whatever derives the end of its existence only1 from self-conscious intelligence4 7#a47 ,the family,affection4 7#b47 ,society,ethics1 ,mediation4 7#c47 ,state,rights1 7b7 ,the actual world contains whatever derives the end and the means of its existence from self-conscious intelligence4 7#a47 ,art,manifestation1 7#b47 ,religion,revelation1 ,self-determination4 7#c47 ,philosophy,definition1 ,from this it appears that we have divided the world into three large slices--the ,natural1 the ,real1 and the ,actual--with gravity for one and self-determination for the other extreme1 and mediation between them4 ,,iii4 ,in my last1 ,i gave you some general terms1 and the sense in which ,i intend to use them4 ,i also gave you a reason why ,i should use them1 together with an illustration4 ,but ,i gave you no reason why ,i used these and no others--or ,i did not advance anything to show that there are objects to which they necessarily apply4 ,i only take it for granted that there are some objects presented to your observation and mine1 that gravitate or weigh something1 and others that do not4 ,to each ,i have applied as nearly as ,i could the ordinary terms4 ,now this procedure1 although very unphilosophical1 ,i can justify only by reminding you of the object of these letters4 ,if we now listen again to the chant of the invisible choir1 8,thou hast destroyed it1 ,the beautiful world10 it will be obvious that this can refer only to the world of mediation and self-determination1 to the world of spirit1 of self-conscious intelligence1 for the world of gravitation is not so easily affected4 ,but how is this--how is it that the world of self-conscious intelligence is so easily affected1 is so dependent upon the individual man8 ,this can be seen only by examining its genesis4 ,in the genesis of ,spirit we have three stages--manifestation1 realization1 and actualization4 ,the first of these1 upon which the other two are dependent and sequent1 falls in the individual man4 ,for1 in him it is that ,reason manifests itself before it can realize1 or embody itself in this or that political1 social1 or moral institution4 ,and it is not merely necessary that it should so manifest itself in the individual2 it must also realize itself in these institutions before it can actualize itself in ,art1 ,religion1 and ,philosophy4 ,for in this actualization it is absolutely dependent upon the former two stages of its genesis for a content4 ,from this it appears that ,art shows what ,religion teaches1 and what ,philosophy comprehends2 or that ,art1 ,religion1 and ,philosophy have the same content4 ,nor is it difficult to perceive why this world of spirit or self-conscious intelligence is so dependent upon the individual man4 ,again1 in the sphere of manifestation and reality1 this content1 the self-conscious intelligence1 is the self-consciousness of an individual1 a nation1 or an age4 ,and art1 in the sphere of actuality1 is this or that work of art1 this poem1 that painting1 or yonder piece of sculpture1 with the self-consciousness of this or that individual1 nation1 or age1 for its content4 ,moreover1 the particularity 7the individual1 nation1 or age7 of the content constitutes the individuality of the work of ,art4 ,and not only this1 but this particularity of the self-consciousness furnishes the very contradiction itself with the development and solution of which the work of art is occupied4 ,for the self-consciousness which constitutes the content1 being the self consciousness of an individual1 a nation1 or an age1 instead of being self-conscious intelligence in its pure universality1 contains in that very particularity the contradiction which1 in the sphere of manifestation and reality1 constitutes the collision1 conflict1 and solution4#ag ,now1 if we look back upon the facts stated1 we have the manifestation1 the realization1 and the actualization of self-conscious intelligence as the three spheres or stages in the process which evolves and involves the entire activity of man1 both practical and theoretical4 ,it is also obvious that the realization of self-conscious intelligence in the family1 society1 and the state1 and its actualization in ,art1 ,religion1 and ,philosophy1 depend in their genesis upon its manifestation in the individual4 ,hence a denial of the possibility of this manifestation is a denial of the possibility of the realization and actualization also4 ,now if this denial assume the form of a conviction in the consciousness of an individual1 a nation1 or an age1 then there results a contradiction which involves in the sweep of its universality the entire spiritual world of man4 ,for it is the self-consciousness of that individual1 nation1 or age1 in direct conflict with itself1 not with this or that particularity of itself1 but with its entire content1 in the sphere of manifestation1 with the receptivity for1 the production of1 and the aspiration after1 the ,beautiful1 the ,good1 and the ,true1 within the individual himself2 in the sphere of realization with the ,family1 with ,society1 and with the ,state2 and finally1 in the sphere of actuality with ,art1 ,religion1 and ,philosophy4 ,now this contradiction is precisely what is presented in the proposition1 8,man cannot know truth40 ,this you will remember was1 in the history of modern thought1 the result of ,kant's philosophy4 ,and ,kant's philosophy was the philosophy of ,germany at the time of the conception of ,goethe's ,faust4 ,and ,goethe was the truest poet of ,germany1 and thus he sings3 8,so then ,i have studied philosophy1 ,jurisprudence and medicine1 ,and what is worse1 ,theology1 ,thoroughly1 but1 alas6 in vain1 ,and here ,i stand with study hoar1 ,a fool1 and know what ,i knew before2 ,am called ,magister1 nay1 ,,ll4,d41 ,and for ten years1 am busily ,engaged1 leading through fen and close1 ,my trusting pupils by the nose2 ,yet see that nothing can be known4 ,this burns my heart1 this1 this alone60 ,here1 you will perceive in the first sentence of the poem1 as was meet1 the fundamental contradiction1 the theme1 or the 8argument10 as it is so admirably termed by critics1 is stated in its naked abstractness1 just as ,achilles' wrath is the first sentence of the ,iliad4 ,this theme1 then1 is nothing more nor less than the self-consciousness in contradiction with itself1 in conflict with its own content4 ,hence1 if the poem is to portray this theme1 this content1 in its totality1 it must represent it in three spheres3 first1 ,manifestation--,faust in conflict with himself2 second1 ,realization--,faust in conflict with the ,family1 ,society1 and the ,state2 thirdly1 ,actualization--,faust in conflict with ,art1 ,religion1 and ,philosophy4 ,now1 my friend1 please to examine the poem once more1 reflect closely upon what has been said1 and then tell how much of the poem can you spare1 or how much is there in the poem as printed1 which does not flow from or develop this theme8 ,,iv4 ,in my last1 dear friend1 ,i called your attention to the theme1 to the content of the poem in a general way1 stating it in the very words of the poet himself4 ,to trace the development of this theme from the abstract generality into concrete detail is the task before us4 ,according to the analysis1 we have to consider1 first of all1 the sphere of ,manifestation4 ,in this we observe the three-fold relation which the individual sustains to self-conscious intelligence1 viz3 ,receptivity for1 and production of1 and aspiration for1 the ,true1 the ,good1 and the ,beautiful4 ,now if it is true that man cannot know truth1 then it follows that he can neither receive nor produce the ,true4 ,for how shall he know that whatever he may receive and produce is true1 since it is specially denied that he can know it4 ,this conclusion as conviction1 however1 does not affect immediately the third relation--the aspiration--nor quench its gnawing4 ,and this is the first form of conflict in the individual4 ,let us now open the book and place it before us4 ,the historic origin of our theme places us in a ,german ,university1 in the professor's private studio4 ,it is well here to remember that it is a ,german ,university1 and that the occupant of the room is a ,german professor4 ,also that it is the received opinion that the ,germans are a theoretical people2 by which we understand that they act from conviction1 and not from instinct4 ,moreover1 that their conviction is not a mere holiday affair1 to be rehearsed1 say on ,sunday1 and left in charge of a minister1 paid for the purpose1 during the balance of the week1 but an actual1 vital fountain of action4 ,hence1 the conviction of such a character being given1 the acts follow in logical sequence4 ,with this remembered1 let us now listen to the self-communion of the occupant of the room4 ,in bitter earnest the man has honestly examined1 and sought to possess himself of the intellectual patrimony of the race4 ,in poverty1 in solitude1 in isolation1 he has labored hopefully1 earnestly2 and now he casts up his account and finds--what8 8,that nothing can be known40 ,his hair is gray with more than futile endeavor1 and for ten years his special calling has been to guide the students to waste their lives1 as he has done his own1 in seeking to accomplish the impossible--to know4 ,this is the worm that gnaws his heart6 ,as compensation1 he is free from superstition--fears neither hell nor devil4 ,but this sweeps with it all fond delusions1 all conceit that he is able to know1 and to teach something for the elevation of mankind4 ,nor yet does he possess honor or wealth--a dog would not lead a life like this4 ,here you will perceive how the first two relations are negated by the conviction that man cannot know truth1 and how1 on the wings of aspiration1 he sallies forth into the realm of magic1 of mysticism1 of subjectivity4 ,for if reason1 with its mediation1 is impotent to create an object for this aspiration1 let us see what emotion and imagination1 without mediation1 can do for subjective satisfaction4 ,and here all is glory1 all is freedom6 ,the imagination seizes the totality of the universe1 and revels in ecstatic visions4 ,what a spectacle6 ,but1 alas6 a spectacle only6 ,how am ,i to know1 to comprehend the fountain of life1 the centre of which articulates this totality8 ,see here another generalization3 the practical world as a whole6 ,ah1 that is my sphere2 here ,i have a firm footing2 here ,i am master2 here ,i command spirits6 ,approach1 and obey your master6 8,spirit4 ,who calls8 ,faust4 ,terrific face6 ,sp4 ,art thou he that called8 ,thou trembling worm6 ,faust4 ,yes2 ,i'm he2 am ,faust1 thy peer4 ,sp4 ,peer of the ,spirit thou comprehendest--not of me6 ,faust4 ,what6 not of thee6 ,of whom1 then8 ,i1 the image of ,deity itself1 and not even thy peer88 ,no1 indeed1 ,mr4 ,faust1 thou dost not include within thyself the totality of the practical world1 but only that part thereof which thou dost comprehend--only thy vocation1 and hark6 8,it knocks60 ,oh1 death6 ,i see1 't is my vocation2 indeed1 8,it is my famulus60 ,and this1 too1 is merely a delusion2 this great mystery of the practical world shrinks to this dimension--a bread-professorship4 ,it would seem so2 for no theory of the practical world is possible without the ability to know truth4 ,as individual1 you may imitate the individual1 as the brute his kind1 and thus transmit a craft2 but you cannot seize the practical world in transparent forms and present it as a harmonious totality to your fellow-man1 for that would require that these transparent intellectual forms should possess objective validity--and this they have not1 according to your conviction4 ,and so it cannot be helped4 ,but see what a despicable thing it is to be a bread-professor6 ,and is this the mode of existence1 this the reality1 the only reality to answer the aspiration of our soul--the aspiration which sought to seize the universe1 to kindle its inmost recesses with the light of intelligence1 and thus illumine the path of life8 ,alas1 ,reason gave us error--,imagination1 illusion--and the practical world1 the ,will1 a bread-professorship6 ,nothing else8 ,yes2 a bottle of laudanum6 ,let us drink1 and rest forever6 ,but hold1 is there nothing else1 really8 ,no emotional nature8 ,hark6 what is that8 ,easter bells6 ,the recollections of my youthful faith in a revelation6 ,they must be examined4 ,we cannot leave yet4 ,and see what a panorama1 what a strange world lies embedded with those recollections4 ,let us see it in all its varied character and reality1 on this ,easter ,sunday1 for example4 ,v4 ,i have endeavored before to trace the derivation of the content of the first scene of the poem1 together with its character1 from the abstract theme of the work4 ,in it we saw that the fundamental conviction of ,faust leaves him naked--leaves him nothing but a bare avocation1 a mere craft1 and the precarious recollections of his youth 7when he believed in revealed truths7 to answer his aspirations4 ,these recollections arouse his emotions1 and rescue him from nothingness 7suicide7--they fill his soul with a content4 ,to see this content with all its youthful charm1 we have to retrace our childhood's steps before the gates of the city on this the ,easter festival of the year--you and ,i being mindful1 in the meantime1 that the public festivals of the ,church belong to the so-called external evidences of the truth of the ,christian ,religion4 ,well1 here we are in the suburbs of the city1 and what do we see8 ,first1 a set of journeymen mechanics1 eager for beer and brawls1 interspersed with servant girls2 students whose tastes run very much in the line of strong beer1 biting tobacco1 and the well-dressed servant girls aforesaid2 citizens' daughters1 perfectly outraged at the low taste of the students who run after the servant girls1 8when they might have the very best of society20 citizens dissatisfied with the new mayor of the city--8,taxes increase from day to day1 and nothing is done for the welfare of the city40 ,a beggar is not wanting4 ,other citizens1 who delight to speak of war and rumors of war in distant countries1 in order to enjoy their own peace at home with proper contrast2 also an 8elderly one10 who thinks that she is quite able to furnish what the well-dressed citizens' daughters wish for--to the great scandal of the latter1 who feel justly indignant at being addressed in public by such an old witch 7although1 8between ourselves1 she did show us our sweethearts on ,st4 ,andrew's night072 soldiers1 who sing of high-walled fortresses and proud women to be taken by storm2 and1 finally1 farmers around the linden tree1 dancing a most furious gallopade--a real ,easter ,sunday or ,monday 8before the gate0--of any city in ,germany1 even to this day4 ,and into this real world1 done up in holiday attire1 but not by the poet--into this paradise1 this very heaven of the people1 where great and small fairly yell with delight--,faust enters1 assured that here he can maintain his rank as a man2 8here ,i dare to be a man60 ,and1 sure enough1 listen to the welcome3 8,nay1 ,doctor1 'tis indeed too much ,to be with us on such a day1 ,to join the throng1 the common mass1 ,you1 you1 the great1 the learned man6 ,take1 then1 this beaker1 too10 c4 ,and here goes--a general health to the ,doctor1 to the man who braved the pestilence for us1 and who even now1 does not think it beneath him to join us in our merry-making--hurrah for the ,doctor2 hip1 hip1 c4 ,and is not this something1 dear friend8 ,just think1 with honest ,wagner1 when he exclaims1 8,what emotions must crowd thy breast1 ,o great man1 while listening to such honors80 and you will also say with him3 8,thrice blest the man who draws such profits rare1 ,from talents all his own60 ,why1 see6 the father shows you to his son2 every one inquires--presses1 rushes to see you6 ,the fiddle itself is hushed1 the dancers stop4 ,where you go1 they fall into lines2 caps and hats fly into the air6 ,but a little more1 and they would fall upon their knees1 as if the sacred ,host passed that way6 ,and is not this great8 ,is not this the very goal of human ambition8 ,to ,wagner1 dear friend1 it is2 for the very essence of an avocation is1 and must be1 8success in life40 ,but how does it stand with the man whose every aspiration is the ,true1 the ,good1 and the ,beautiful8 ,will a hurrah from one hundred thousand throats1 all in good yelling order1 assist him8 ,no4 ,to ,wagner it is immaterial whether he knows what he needs1 provided he sees the day when the man who has been worse to the people than the very pestilence itself1 receives public honors2 but to ,faust1 to the man really in earnest--who is not satisfied when he has squared life with life1 and obtained zero for a result1 or who does not merely live to make a living1 but demands a rational end for life1 and1 in default of that rational end1 spurns life itself--to such a man this whole scene possesses little significance indeed4 ,it possesses1 however1 some significance1 even for him6 ,for if it is indeed true that man cannot know truth--that the high aspiration of his soul has no object--then this scene demonstrates1 at least1 that ,faust possesses power over the practical world4 ,if he cannot know the world1 he can at least swallow a considerable portion of it1 and this scene demonstrates that he can exercise a great deal of choice as to the parts to be selected2 do you see this conviction8 ,do you see this conviction8 ,do you see this dog8 ,consider it well2 what is it1 think you8 ,do you perceive how it encircles us nearer and nearer--becomes more and more certain1 and1 if ,i mistake not1 a luminous emanation of gold1 of honor1 of power1 follows in its wake4 ,it seems to me as if it drew soft magic rings1 as future fetters1 round our feet6 ,see1 the circles become smaller and smaller-'tis almost a certainty--'tis already near2 come1 come home with as6 ,the temptation here spread before us by the poet1 to consider the dog 8well10 is almost irresistible2 but all we can say in this place1 dear friend1 is that if you will look upon what is properly called an avocation in civil society1 eliminate from it all higher ends and motives other than the simple one of making a living--no matter with what pomp and circumstance--no doubt you will readily recognize the ,,poodle4 ,but we must hasten to the studio to watch further developments1 for the conflict is not as yet decided4 ,we are still to examine the possibility of a divine revelation to man1 who cannot know truth4 ,and for this purpose our newly acquired conviction1 that we possess power over the practical world--although not as yet in a perfectly clear form before us--comfortably lodged behind the stove1 where it properly belongs1 we take down the original text of the ,new ,testament in order to realize its meaning1 in our own loved mother tongue4 ,it stands written3 8,in the beginning was the ,word40 ,word8 ,word8 ,never6 ,meaning it ought to be6 ,meaning what8 ,meaning8 ,no2 it is ,power6 ,no2 ,deed6 ,word1 meaning1 power1 deed--which is it8 ,alas1 how am ,i to know1 unless ,i can know truth8 ',tis even so1 our youthful recollections dissolve in mist1 into thin air--and nothing is left us but our newly acquired conviction1 the restlessness of which during this examination has undoubtedly not escaped your attention1 dear friend4 78,be quiet1 there1 behind the stove40 8,see here1 poodle1 one of us two has to leave this room607 ,what1 then1 is the whole content of this conviction1 which1 so long as there was the hope of a possibility of a worthy object for our aspiration1 seemed so despicable8 ,what is it that governs the practical world of finite motives1 the power that adapts means to ends1 regardless of a final1 of an infinite end8 ,is it not the ,understanding8 and although ,reason--in its search after the final end1 with its perfect system of absolute means1 of infinite motives and interests--begets subjective chimeras1 is it not demonstrated that the understanding possesses objective validity8 ,nay1 look upon this dog well2 does it not swell into colossal proportions--is no dog at all1 in fact1 but the very power that holds absolute sway over the finite and negative--the understanding itself--,mephistopheles in proper form8 ,and who calls this despicable8 ,is it not ,reason1 the power that begets chimeras1 and it alone8 ,and shall we reject the real1 the actual--all in fact that possesses objective validity--because1 forsooth1 the power of subjective chimeras declares it negative1 finite1 perishable8 ,never4 8,no fear1 dear sir1 that ,i'll do this4 ,precisely what ,i have promised is the very aim of all my endeavor4 ,conceited fool that ,i was6 ,i prized myself too highly0--claimed kin with the infinite4 8,i belong only in thy sphere0--the finite4 8,the ,great ,spirit scorns me4 ,nature is a sealed book to me2 the thread of thought is severed4 ,knowing disgusts me4 ,in the depths of sensuality ,i'll quench the burning passion40 ,here1 then1 my friend1 we arrive at the final result of the conflict in the first sphere of our theme--in the sphere of manifestation--that of the individual4 ,we started with the conviction that man cannot know truth4 ,this destroyed our spiritual endeavors1 and reduced our practical avocation to an absurdity4 ,we sought refuge in the indefinite--the mysticism of the past--and were repelled by its subjectivity4 ,we next examined the theoretical side of the practical world1 and found this likewise an impossibility and suicide--a mere blank nothingness--as the only resource4 ,but here we were startled by our emotional nature1 which unites us with our fellow-man1 and seems to promise some sort of a bridge over into the infinite--certainly demands such a transition4 ,investigating this1 therefore1 with all candor1 we found our fellow-men wonderfully occupied--occupied like the kitten pursuing its own tail6 ,at the same time it became apparent that we might be quite a dog in this kitten dance1 or that the activity of the understanding possessed objective validity4 ,with this conviction fairly established1 although still held in utter contempt1 we examined the last resource3 the possibility of a divine revelation of truth to men that cannot know truth4 ,the result1 as the mere statement of the proposition would indicate1 is negative1 and thus the last chance of obtaining validity for anything except the activity of the understanding vanishes utterly4 ,but with this our contempt for the understanding likewise vanishes4 ,for whatever our aspiration may say1 it has no object to correspond to it1 and is therefore merely subjective1 a hallucination1 a chimera1 and the understanding is the highest attainable for us4 ,here1 therefore1 the subjective conflict ends1 for we have attained to objectivity1 and this is the highest1 since there is nothing else that possesses validity for man4 ,nor is this by any means contemptible in itself1 for it is the power over the finite world1 and the net result is3 ,that if you and ,i1 my friend1 have no reason1 cannot know truth1 we do have at least a stomach1 a capacity for sensual enjoyment1 and an understanding to administer to the same--to be its servant4 ,this1 at least1 is demonstrated by the kitten dance of the whole world4 ,footnote #af3 ,in this connection1 permit me1 dear friend1 to mention a discovery which ,i made concerning my son ,isaac1 now three years old4 ,just imagine my surprise when ,i found that every book in my possession--,webster's ,spelling-book not excepted--is a perfect riddle to him1 and mystifies him as completely as ever the works of ,goethe1 ,hegel1 ,emerson1 or any other thinking man1 do or did the learned critics4 ,but my parental pride1 so much elated by the discovery of this remarkable precocity in my son--a precocity which1 at the age of three years1 767 shows him possessed of all the incapacity of such 8learned men0--was shocked1 nay1 mortified1 by the utter want of appreciation which the little fellow showed of this1 his exalted condition6 ,footnote #ag3 ,from this a variety of facts in the character and history of the different works of art become apparent4 ,the degree of the effect produced1 for example1 is owing to the degree of validity attached to the two sides of the contradiction4 ,if the duties which the individual owes to the family and the state come into conflict1 as in the ,antigone of ,sophocles1 and the consciousness of the age has not subordinated the ideas upon which they are based1 but accords to each an equal degree of validity1 we have a content replete with the noblest effects4 ,for this is not a conflict between the abstract good and bad1 the positive and the negative1 but a conflict within the good itself4 ,so likewise the universality of the effect is apparent from the content4 ,if this is the self-consciousness of a nation1 the work of art will be national4 ,to illustrate this1 and1 at the same time1 to trace the development of the particularity spoken of into a collision1 we may refer to that great national work of art--the ,iliad of ,homer4 ,the particularity which distinguishes the national self-consciousness of the ,greeks is the preminent validity attached by it to one of the before-mentioned modes of the actualization of self-conscious intelligence--the sensuous4 ,hence its worship of the ,beautiful4 ,this preminence and the consequent subordination of the moral and the rational modes to it1 is the root of the contradiction1 and hence the basis of the collision which forms the content of the poem4 ,its motive modernized would read about as follows3 8,the son of one of our ,senators goes to ,england2 is received and hospitably entertained at the house of a lord4 ,during his stay he falls in love and subsequently elopes with the young wife of his entertainer4 ,for this outrage1 perpetrated by the young hopeful1 the entire fighting material of the island get themselves into their ships1 not so much to avenge the injured husband as to capture the runaway wife40 ,but--now mark--adverse winds ensue1 powers not human are in arms against them1 and before these can be propitiated1 a princess of the blood royal1 pure and undefiled1 must be sacrificed6--is sacrificed1 and for what8 ,that all ,greece may proclaim to the world that pure womanhood1 pure manhood1 family1 society1 and the state1 are nothing1 must be sacrificed on the altar of the ,beautiful4 ,for in the sacrifice of ,iphigenia1 all that could perish in ,helen1 and more too--for ,iphigenia was pure and ,helen was not--was offered up by the ,greeks1 woman for woman1 and nothing remained but the ,beautiful1 for which she henceforth became the expression4 ,for in this alone did ,helen excel ,iphigenia1 and all women4 ,but how is this8 ,have not the filial1 the parental1 the social1 the civil relations1 sanctity and validity8 ,not as against the realization of the ,beautiful1 says the ,greek4 ,nor yet the state8 ,no2 8,i do not go at the command of ,agamemnon1 but because ,i pledged fealty to ,beauty40 8,but then10 ,sir ,achilles1 8if the ,beautiful should present itself under some individual form--say that of ,briseis--you would for the sake of its possession disobey the will of the state80 8,of course40 ,and the poet has to sing1 8,achilles' wrath60 and not 8the recovery of the runaway wife10 the grand historical action4 ,,introduction ,,to ,,philosophy4 ,,chapter ,v4 ,,necessity1 ,,chance1 ,,freedom4 ,i4 ,all things are necessitated2 each is necessitated by the totality of conditions2 hence1 whatever is must be so1 and under the conditions cannot be otherwise4 ,remark4--,this is the most exhaustive statement of the position of the 8understanding40 ,nothing seems more clear than this to the thinker who has advanced beyond the sensuous grade of consciousness and the stages of ,perception4 ,,ii4 ,but things change--something new begins and something old ceases2 but1 still1 in each case1 the first principle must apply1 and the new thing--like the old--be so 8because necessitated by the totality of conditions40 ,remark4--,the reader will notice that with the conception of change there enters a second stage of mediation4 ,first1 we have simple mediation in which the ground and grounded are both real4 ,secondly1 we have the passage of a potentiality into a reality1 and vice versa4 ,therefore1 with the consideration of change we have encountered a contradiction which becomes apparent upon further attempt to adjust the idea of necessity to it4 ,,iii4 ,if the same totality of conditions necessitates both states of the thing--the new and the old--it follows that this totality of conditions is adapted to both1 and hence is indifferent to either1 i4 e4 it allows either1 and hence cannot be said to necessitate one to the exclusion of the other1 for it allows one to pass over into the other1 thereby demonstrating that it did not restrict or confine the first to be what it was4 ,hence it now appears that chance or contingency participated in the state of the thing4 ,,iv4 ,but the states of the thing belong to the totality1 and hence when the thing changes the totality also changes1 and we are forced to admit two different totalities as the conditions of the two different states of the thing4 ,remark4--,here we have returned to our starting-point1 and carried back our contradiction with us4 ,in our zeal to relieve the thing from the difficulty presented--that of changing spontaneously--we have posited duality in the original totality1 and pushed our change into it4 ,but it is the same contradiction as before1 and we must continue to repeat the same process forever in the foolish endeavor to go round a circle until we arrive at its end1 or1 what is the same1 its beginning4 ,v4 ,if it requires a different totality of conditions to render possible the change of a thing from one state to another1 then if a somewhat changes the totality changes4 ,but there is nothing outside of the totality to necessitate it1 and it therefore must necessitate itself4 ,,vi4 ,thus necessity and necessitated have proved in the last analysis to be one4 ,this1 however1 is necessity no longer1 but spontaneity1 for it begins with itself and ends with itself4 7a7 ,as necessitating it is the active determiner which of course contains the potentiality upon which it acts4 ,had it no potentiality it could not change4 7b7 ,as necessitated it is the potentiality plus the limit which its activity has fixed there4 7c7 ,but we have here self-determination1 and thus the existence of the ,universal in and for itself1 which is the ,ego4 ,remark4--,it cannot be any other mode of existence than the ,ego1 for that which dissolves all determinations and is the universal potentiality is only one and cannot be distinguished into modes1 for it creates and destroys these4 ,the ego can abstract all else and yet abide--it is the actus purus--its negativity annulling all determinations and finitudes1 while it is directed full on itself1 and is in that very act complete self-recognition4 7,see proof of this in ,chapter ,,iv41 ,,iii41 #c47 ,,vii4 ,thus the doctrine of necessity presupposes self-determination or ,freedom as the form of the ,total1 and necessity is only one side--the realized or determined side--of the process isolated and regarded in this state of isolation4 ,against this side stands the potentiality which1 if isolated in like manner1 is called ,chance or ,contingency4 ,,chapter ,,vi4 ,,of ,,mediation4 ,the comprehension of mediation lies at the basis of the distinction of sensuous knowing from the understanding4 ,the transition from intuition to abstract thinking is made at first unconsciously1 and for this reason the one who has begun the process of mediation handles the 8mental spectres0 created by abstraction with the utmost navet1 assuming for them absolute validity in the world at large4 ,it is only the speculative insight that gains mastery over such abstractions1 and sees the ,truth4 ,if this view could be unfolded in a popular form1 it would afford a series of solvents for the thinker which are applicable to a great variety of difficult problems4 ,for it must be remembered that the abstract categories of the understanding--such as essence and phenomenon1 cause and effect1 substance and attribute1 force and manifestation1 matter and form1 and the like1 give rise to a series of antinomies1 or contradictory propositions1 when applied to the ,totality4 ,from the standpoint of mediation--that of simple reflection1 8common sense0 so called--these antinomies seem utterly insoluble4 ,the reason of this is found in the fact that 8common sense0 places implicit faith in these categories 7just mentioned71 and never rises to the investigation of them by themselves4 ,to consider the validity of these categories by themselves is called a transcendental procedure1 for it passes beyond the ordinary thinking which uses them without distrust4 ,the transcendental investigation shows that the insolubility attributed to these antinomies arises from the mistake of the thinker1 who supposes the categories he employs to be exhaustive4 ,speculative insight begins with the perception that they are not exhaustive2 that they have by a species of enchantment cast a spell upon the mind1 under which every thing seems dual1 and the weary seeker after ,truth wanders through a realm of abstractions each of which assumes the form of a solid reality--now a giant1 and now a dwarf1 and now an impassible river1 impenetrable forest1 or thick castle wall defended by dragons4 ,the following questions will illustrate the character of the problems here described3 8,why deal with abstractions--why not hold fast by the concrete reality80 7,this position combats mediation under its form of abstraction47 8,can we not know immediately by intuition those objects that philosophy strives in vain to comprehend8 in short1 are not ,god1 ,freedom and ,immortality certain to us and yet indemonstrable80 7,this position combats mediation as involved in a system of ,philosophy47 ,these questions arise only in the mind that has already gone beyond the doctrine that it attempts to defend1 and hence a self refutation is easily drawn out of the source from whence they originate4 ,,abstraction4 7a7 ,it will be readily granted that all knowing involves distinction4 ,we must distinguish one object from another4 7b7 ,but the process of distinguishing is a process that involves abstraction4 ,for in separating this object from that1 ,i contrast its marks1 properties1 attributes1 with those of the other4 ,in seizing upon one characteristic ,i must isolate it from all others1 and this is nothing more nor less than abstraction4 7c7 ,therefore it is absurd to speak of knowing without abstraction1 for this enters into the simplest act of perception4 7d7 ,nor is this a subjective defect1 an 8impotency of our mental structure10 as some would be ready to exclaim at this point4 ,for it is just as evident that things themselves obtain reality only through these very characteristics4 ,one thing preserves its distinctness from another by means of its various determinations4 ,without these determinations all would collapse into one1 nay1 even 8one0 would vanish1 for distinction being completely gone1 one-ness is not possible4 ,this is the 8,principle of ,indiscernibles0 enunciated by ,leibnitz4 ,thus distinction is as necessary objectively as subjectively4 ,the thing abstracts in order to be real4 ,it defends itself against what lies without it by specializing itself into single properties1 and thus becoming in each a mere abstraction4 7e7 ,moreover1 besides this prevalence of abstraction in the theoretic field1 it is still more remarkable in the practical world4 ,the business man decries abstractions4 ,he does not know that every act of the will is an abstraction1 and that it is also preceded by an abstraction4 ,when he exhorts you to 8leave off abstractions and deal with concrete realities10 he does this3 7#a47 he regards you as he thinks you are2 7#b47 he conceives you as different1 i4 e4 as a practical man2 7#c47 he exhorts you to change from your real state to the possible one which he conceives of 7through the process of abstraction74 ,the simplest act with design--that of going to dinner1 for example--involves abstraction4 ,if ,i raise my arm on purpose1 ,i first abstract from its real position1 and think it under another condition4 7f7 ,but the chief point in all this is to mark how the mind frees itself from the untruth of abstraction4 ,for it must be allowed that all abstractions are false4 ,the isolation of that which is not sufficient for its own existence1 7though as we have seen1 a necessary constituent of the process of knowing and of existing17 sets up an untruth as existent4 ,therefore the mind thinks this isolation only as a moment of a negative unity1 7i4 e4 as an element of a process74 ,this leads us to the consideration of mediation in the more general form1 involved by the second question4 ,,immediate ,,knowing4 7a7 ,definition4--8,immediate0 is a predicate applied to what is directly through itself4 ,the immediateness of anything is the phase that first presents itself4 ,it is the undeveloped--an oak taken immediately is an acorn2 man taken immediately is a child at birth4 7b7 ,definition4--8,mediation0 signifies the process of realization4 ,a mediate or mediated somewhat is what it is through another1 or through a process4 7c7 ,principle4--,any concrete somewhat exists through its relations to all else in the universe2 hence all concrete somewhats are mediated4 8,if a grain of sand were destroyed the universe would collapse40 7d7 ,principle4--,an absolutely immediate somewhat would be a pure nothing1 for the reason that no determination could belong to it1 7for determination is negative1 and hence mediation74 ,hence all immediateness must be phenomenal1 or the result of abstraction from the concrete whole1 and this1 of course1 exhibits the contradiction of an immediate which is mediated 7a 8result407 7e7 ,the solution of this contradiction is found in 8self-determination10 7as we have seen in former chapters74 ,the self-determined is a mediated2 it is through the process of determination2 but is likewise an immediate1 for it is its own mediation1 and hence it is the beginning and end--it begins with its result1 and ends in its beginning1 and thus it is a circular process4 ,this is the great aperu of all speculative philosophy4 7f7 ,definition4--,truth is the form of the ,total1 or that which actually exists4 7g7 ,hence a knowing of ,truth must be a knowing of the self-determined1 which is both immediate and mediate4 ,this is a process or system4 ,therefore the knowing of it cannot be simply immediate1 but must be in the form of a system4 ,thus the so-called 8immediate intuition0 is not a knowing of truth unless inconsistent with what it professes4 ,,the ,,philosophy ,,of ,,baader4 ,the following letter from ,dr4 ,franz ,hoffmann to the ,st4 ,louis ,philosophical ,society has been handed us for publication4 ,it gives us pleasure to lay before our readers so able a presentation of the claims of ,baader1 and we trust that some of our countrymen will be led by it to investigate the original sources herein referred to4 ,we are requested to correct a misstatement that occurs in the first paragraph regarding the objects of the ,philosophical ,society4 ,it was not founded for the special purpose of 8studying ,german ,philosophy from ,kant to ,hegel10 although it has many members who are occupied chiefly in that field4 ,the ,society includes among its members advocates of widely differing systems1 all1 however1 working in the spirit of the ,preamble to the ,constitution1 which says3 8,the object of this ,society is to encourage the study and development of ,speculative ,philosophy2 to foster an application of its results to ,art1 ,science1 and ,religion2 and to establish a philosophical basis for the professions of ,law1 ,medicine1 ,divinity1 ,politics1 ,education1 ,art1 and ,literature40 ,we are indebted to ,dr4 ,a4 ,strothotte for the translation of the letter4--,,editor4 ,w,,rzburg1 ,dec4 #bh1 #ahff4 ,mr4 ,president3 ,in the first number of ,vol4 ,,xlix of the 8,zeitschrift fr ,philosophie10 published at ,halle1 in ,prussia1 edited by ,fichte1 ,ulrici and ,wirth1 notice is taken of a philosophical society1 organized at ,st4 ,louis1 with the object of pursuing the study of ,german philosophy from ,kant to ,hegel4 ,this fact promises a correlation of philosophical movements between ,north ,america and ,germany which is of great importance4 ,i presume1 however1 that you have already been led1 or that you will be led1 to go back beyond ,kant to the first traces of ,german philosophy1 and proceed from ,hegel to the present time4 ,now1 although a thorough and comprehensive view of ,hegel's philosophy is in the first place to be recommended1 yet the other directions in the movement of thought must not be lost sight of4 ,in the ,berlin organ of the ,philosophical ,society of the ,hegelians--,der ,gedanke--edited by ,michelet1 may be found1 as you perhaps know1 an index of the works of ,hegel's school1 by ,rosenkranz1 whereas on the other hand the rich literature of the anti-,hegelian writers is nowhere met with in any degree of completeness4 ,many of them1 however1 are noticed in ,fichte's journal1 and in the more recent works on the history of philosophy1 particularly in those of ,erdmann1 and still more in those of ,ueberweg4 ,among the prominent movements in philosophical thinking1 during and after the time of ,hegel1 the profound utterances of a great and genial teacher1 ,franz ,baader1 reach a degree of prominence1 even higher than is admitted by ,erdmann and ,ueberweg4 ,this may be readily perceived by referring to the dissertation on ,franz ,baader1 by ,carl ,philipp ,fischer1 of ,erlangen1 and still more by having recourse to ,hamberger1 ,lutterbeck1 and to my own writings4 99 99 99 99 99 ,i take the liberty of recommending to you and to the members of the ,philosophical ,society of ,st4 ,louis1 the study of the works of a philosopher who certainly will have a great future1 although his doctrines in the progress of time may undergo modifications1 reforms and further developments4 ,if ,hegel had lived longer1 the influence of ,baader upon him would have been greater yet than became visible during his last years4 ,he has thrown ,schelling out of his pantheism1 and pressed him towards a semi-pantheism1 or towards a deeper theism4 ,the influence of ,baader on the philosophers after ,hegel--,j4 ,h4 ,fichte1 ,weisse1 ,sempler1 ,c4 ,ph4 ,fischer and others--is much greater than is commonly admitted4 ,whether they agree to it or not1 still it is a fact that ,baader is the central constellation of the movement of the ,german spirit1 from pantheism to a deeper ideal-realistic theism4 ,such a genius1 whatever position may be taken with regard to him1 cannot be left unnoticed1 without running the risk of being left behind the times4 ,i ask nothing for ,baader1 but to follow the maxim--8,try all and keep the best40 ,i regret that so great a distance prevents me from sending your honorable ,society some of my explanatory writings1 which are admitted to be clear and thorough4 ,it may suffice if ,i add a copy of my prospectus2 and let me here remark1 that a collection of my writings1 in four large volumes1 will be published by ,deichert1 in ,erlangen4 ,the first volume1 perhaps1 will be ready at ,easter1 #ahfg4 ,erdmann1 in his elements of the history of philosophy1 has treated of the doctrines of ,baader1 too briefly it is true1 but with more justice than he has used in his former work on the history of modern philosophy1 and he bears witness that his esteem of ,baader increases more and more4 ,but he evidently assigns to him a wrong position1 by considering ,oken and ,baader as extremes1 and ,hegel as the mean1 while ,oken and ,hegel are the extremes1 and ,baader the mean4 ,the most important phenomenon in the school of ,hegel is the ,idee der ,wissenschaft of ,rosenkranz1 7,logik und ,metaphysik17 which represents ,hegel in a sense not far distant from the standpoint of ,baader4 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 ,c4 ,h4 ,fischer's ,characteristics of ,baader's ,theosophy speaks with high favor of him1 but still ,i have to take several exceptions4 ,according to my opinion1 all the authors by him referred to1 as ,schelling1 ,hegel1 ,schleiermacher1 ,dauber and ,baader1 we must call theosophers--or call none of them so1 but philosophers1 in order to avoid misunderstanding4 ,then ,i do not see how ,schelling can be called the 8most genial philosopher of modern times10 and yet ,baader the more1 yea1 the most profound4 ,finally1 a want of system must be admitted1 but too great importance is attributed to this4 ,if1 however1 systematism could decide here1 then not ,schelling but ,hegel is the greatest philosopher of modern times4 ,at all events ,fischer's ,memorial at the ,centennial ,birthday of ,baader is significant1 and is written with great spirit and warmth4 ,the most important work of ,c4 ,ph4 ,fischer1 bearing on this subject1 is his elements of the system of philosophy1 or ,encyclopedia of the ,philosophical ,sciences4 ,this is one of the most important of the works of the philosophers after ,hegel and ,baader4 ,the ,athenum of ,froschhammer1 7,journal for ,philosophy71 appeared only for three years4 ,it had to cease its publication1 because on the one side the ,ultramontanist party agitated against it1 and on the other side it met with insufficient support4 ,its reissue would be desirable1 but just now not practicable1 for want of interest on the part of the public1 although it could bear comparison with any other philosophical journal4 ,here let me say1 that from ,baader there proceeded a strong impulse toward the revival of the study of the long-forgotten spiritual treasures of the mystics and theosophers of the middle ages1 and of the time of the ,reformation4 ,from this impulse monographs have made their appearance about ,scotus ,erigena1 ,albertus ,magnus--at least biographies of them--,thomas ,aquinas1 ,meister ,eckhart1 ,tauler1 ,nicholas ,cusanus1 ,weigel1 ,j4 ,bhme1 ,oettinger1 etc4 ,the most important of these ,i deem to be ,scotus ,erigena1 by ,joh4 ,huber1 ,christlieb and ,kaulich2 ,meister ,eckhart1 by ,bach1 and ,j4 ,bhme1 by ,j4 ,hamberger4 ,bach on ,eckhart is especially instructive with respect to the connection between modern philosophy and the theosophy of ,eckhart and his school1 to which also ,nicholas ,cusanus belonged4 ,i presume that it will yet be discovered that ,copernicus was at least acquainted with ,nicholas ,cusanus1 if he did not even sympathize with his philosophy4 ,the director of the observatory at ,krakau1 ,kerlinski1 is at present preparing a monograph on ,copernicus1 which will probably throw light on this subject4 ,prowe's pamphlet on ,copernicus1 which ,i have noticed in ,glaser's journal1 refers to the investigations of ,kerlinski1 who has recently published a beautiful edition of the works of ,copernicus4 ,as in the early ages1 first in the ,pythagorean school1 they approached the true doctrine of the ,universe1 so in the middle ages it appears in the school of ,eckhart1 for in a certain sense1 and with some restriction1 ,nicholas ,cusanus was the precursor of ,copernicus4 ,i beg you1 my dear sir1 to communicate this letter to your honorable ,society3 should you see fit to publish it in a journal1 you are at liberty to do so4 ,i remain1 ,sir1 with great respect1 ,truly1 yours1 ,,dr4 ,,franz ,,hoffmann1 ,prof4 of ,philos4 at the ,university of ,wrzburg4 ,,in ,,the ,,quarry4 ,by ,a4 ,c4 ,b4 ,impatient1 stung with pain1 and long delay1 ,i chid the rough-hewn stone that round me lay2 ,i said--8,what shelter art thou from the heat8 ,what rest art thou for tired and way-worn feet8 ,what beauty hast thou for the longing eye8 ,thou nothing hast my need to satisfy60 ,and then the patient stone fit answer made-- 8,most true ,i am no roof with welcome shade2 ,i am no house for rest1 or full delight ,of sculptured beauty for the weary sight2 ,yet am ,i still1 material for all2 ,use me as such--,i answer to thy call4 ,nay1 tread me only under climbing feet1 ,so serve ,i thee1 my destiny complete2 ,mount by me into purer1 freer air1 ,and find the roof that archeth everywhere2 ,so what but failure seems1 shall build success2 ,for all1 as possible1 thou dost possess40 ,who by the ,universal squares his life1 ,sees but success in all its finite strife2 ,in all that is1 his truth-enlightened eyes ,detect the ,may-be through its thin disguise2 ,and in the ,absolute's unclouded sun1 ,to him the two already are the one4 ,,the ,,journal ,,of ,,speculative ,,philosophy4 ,vol4 ,i4 #ahfg4 ,no4 #d4 ,,introduction ,,to ,,the ,,outlines ,,of ,a ,,system ,,of ,,natural ,,philosophy2 ,,or1 ,,on ,,the ,,idea ,,of ,,speculative ,,physics ,,and ,,the ,,internal ,,organization ,,of ,a ,,system ,,of ,,this ,,science4 #agii4 ,translated from the ,german of ,,schelling1 by ,,tom ,,davidson4 ,i4 ,,what ,,we ,,call ,,natural ,,philosophy ,,is ,a ,,necessary ,,science ,,in ,,the ,,system ,,of ,,knowing4 ,the ,intelligence is productive in two modes--that is1 either blindly and unconsciously1 or freely and consciously2--unconsciously productive in external intuition1 consciously in the creation of an ideal world4 ,philosophy removes this distinction by assuming the unconscious activity as originally identical1 and1 as it were1 sprung from the same root with the conscious2 this identity is by it directly proved in the case of an activity at once clearly conscious and unconscious1 which manifests itself in the productions of genius1 indirectly1 outside of consciousness1 in the products of ,nature1 so far as in them all1 the most complete fusion of the ,ideal with the ,real is perceived4 ,since philosophy assumes the unconscious1 or1 as it may likewise be termed1 the real activity as identical with the conscious or ideal1 its tendency will originally be to bring back everywhere the real to the ideal--a process which gives birth to what is called ,transcendental ,philosophy4 ,the regularity displayed in all the movements of ,nature--for example1 the sublime geometry which is exercised in the motions of the heavenly bodies--is not explained by saying that ,nature is the most perfect geometry2 but conversely1 by saying that the most perfect geometry is what produces in ,nature2--a mode of explanation whereby the ,real itself is transported into the ideal world1 and those motions are changed into intuitions1 which take place only in ourselves1 and to which nothing outside of us corresponds4 ,again1 the fact that ,nature1 wherever it is left to itself1 in every transition from a fluid to a solid state1 produces1 of its own accord1 as it were1 regular forms--which regularity1 in the higher species of crystallization1 namely1 the organic1 seems to become purpose even2 or the fact that in the animal kingdom--that product of the blind forces of ,nature--we see actions arise which are equal in regularity to those that take place with consciousness1 and even external works of art1 perfect in their kind2--all this is not explained by saying that it is an unconscious productivity1 though in its origin akin to the conscious1 whose mere reflex we see in ,nature1 and which1 from the stand-point of the natural view1 must appear as one and the same blind tendency1 which exerts its influence from crystallization upwards to the highest point of organic formation 7in which1 on one side1 through the art-tendency1 it returns again to mere crystallization7 only acting upon different planes4 ,according to this view1 inasmuch as ,nature is only the visible organism of our understanding1 ,nature can produce nothing but what shows regularity and design1 and ,nature is compelled to produce that4 ,but if ,nature can produce only the regular1 and produces it from necessity1 it follows that the origin of such regular and design-evincing products must again be capable of being proved necessary in ,nature1 regarded as self-existent and real1 and in the relation of its forces2--that therefore1 conversely1 the ,ideal must arise out of the ,real1 and admit of explanation from it4 ,if1 now1 it is the task of ,transcendental ,philosophy to subordinate the ,real to the ,ideal1 it is1 on the other hand1 the task of ,natural ,philosophy to explain the ,ideal by the ,real4 ,the two sciences are therefore but one science1 whose two problems are distinguished by the opposite directions in which they move2 moreover1 as the two directions are not only equally possible1 but equally necessary1 the same necessity attaches to both in the system of knowing4 ,,ii4 ,,scientific ,,character ,,of ,,natural ,,philosophy4 ,natural ,philosophy1 as the opposite of ,transcendental ,philosophy1 is distinguished from the latter chiefly by the fact that it posits ,nature 7not1 indeed1 in so far as it is a product1 but in so far as it is at once productive and product7 as the self-existent2 whence it may be most briefly designated as the ,spinozism of ,physics4 ,it follows naturally from this that there is no place in this science for idealistic methods of explanation1 such as ,transcendental ,philosophy is fitted to supply1 from the circumstance that for it ,nature is nothing more than the organ of self-consciousness1 and everything in ,nature is necessary merely because it is only through the medium of such a ,nature that self-consciousness can take place2 this mode of explanation1 however1 is as meaningless in the case of physics1 and of our science which occupies the same stand-point with it1 as were the old teleological modes of explanation1 and the introduction of a universal reference to final causes into the thereby metamorphosed science of ,nature4 ,for every idealistic mode of explanation1 dragged out of its own proper sphere and applied to the explanation of ,nature1 degenerates into the most adventurous nonsense1 examples of which are well known4 ,the first maxim of all true natural science1 viz41 to explain everything by the forces of ,nature1 is therefore accepted in its widest extent in our science1 and even extended to that region1 at the limit of which all interpretation of ,nature has hitherto been accustomed to stop short2 for example1 to those organic phenomena which seem to pre-suppose an analogy with reason4 ,for1 granted that in the actions of animals there really is something which pre-supposes such analogy1 on the principle of realism1 nothing further would follow than that what we call reason is a mere play of higher and necessarily unknown natural forces4 ,for1 inasmuch as all thinking is at last reducible to a producing and reproducing1 there is nothing impossible in the thought that the same activity by which ,nature reproduces itself anew in each successive phase1 is reproductive in thought through the medium of the organism 7very much in the same manner in which1 through the action and play of light1 ,nature1 which exists independently of it1 is created immaterial1 and1 as it were1 for a second time71 in which circumstance it is natural that what forms the limit of our intuitive faculty1 no longer falls within the sphere of our intuition itself4 ,,iii4 ,,natural ,,philosophy ,,is ,,speculative ,,physics4 ,our science1 as far as we have gone1 is thoroughly and completely realistic2 it is therefore nothing other than ,physics1 it is only speculative ,physics2 in its tendency it is exactly what the systems of the ancient physicists were1 and what1 in more recent times1 the system of the restorer of ,epicurean philosophy is1 viz41 ,lesage's ,mechanical ,physics1 by which the speculative spirit in physics1 after a long scientific sleep1 has again1 for the first time1 been awakened4 ,it cannot be shown in detail here 7for the proof itself falls within the sphere of our science71 that on the mechanical or atomistic basis which has been adopted by ,lesage and his most successful predecessors1 the idea of speculative physics is incapable of realization4 ,for1 inasmuch as the first problem of this science1 that of inquiring into the absolute cause of motion 7without which ,nature is not in itself a finished whole71 is absolutely incapable of a mechanical solution1 seeing that mechanically motion results only from motion ad infinitum1 there remains for the real construction of speculative physics only one way open1 viz41 the dynamic1 which lays down that motion arises not only from motion1 but even from rest2 that1 therefore1 there is motion in the rest of ,nature1 and that all mechanical motion is the merely secondary and derivative motion of that which is solely primitive and original1 and which wells forth from the very first factors in the construction of a nature generally 7the fundamental forces74 ,in hereby making clear the points of difference between our undertaking and all those of a similar nature that have hitherto been attempted1 we have at the same time shown the difference between speculative physics and so-called empirical physics2 a difference which in the main may be reduced to this1 that the former occupies itself solely and entirely with the original causes of motion in nature1 that is1 solely with the dynamical phenomena2 the latter1 on the contrary1 inasmuch as it never reaches a final source of motion in nature1 deals only with the secondary motions1 and even with the original ones only as mechanical 7and therefore likewise capable of mathematical construction74 ,the former1 in fact1 aims generally at the inner spring-work and what is non-objective in ,nature2 the latter1 on the contrary1 only at the surface of ,nature1 and what is objective1 and1 so to speak1 outside in it4 ,,iv4 ,,on ,,the ,,possibility ,,of ,,speculative ,,physics4 ,inasmuch as our inquiry is directed not so much upon the phenomena of ,nature as upon their final grounds1 and our business is not so much to deduce the latter from the former as the former from the latter1 our task is simply this3 to erect a science of ,nature in the strictest sense of the term2 and in order to find out whether speculative physics are possible1 we must know what belongs to the possibility of a doctrine of ,nature viewed as science4 7a7 ,the idea of knowing is here taken in its strictest sense1 and then it is easy to see that1 in this acceptation of the term1 we can be said to know objects only when they are such that we see the principles of their possibility1 for without this insight my whole knowledge of an object1 e4 g4 of a machine1 with whose construction ,i am unacquainted1 is a mere seeing1 that is1 a mere conviction of its existence1 whereas the inventor of the machine has the most perfect knowledge of it1 because he is1 as it were1 the soul of the work1 and because it prexisted in his head before he exhibited it as a reality4 ,now1 it would certainly be impossible to obtain a glance into the internal construction of ,nature1 if an invasion of ,nature were not possible through freedom4 ,it is true that ,nature acts openly and freely2 its acts however are never isolated1 but performed under a concurrence of a host of causes1 which must first be excluded if we are to obtain a pure result4 ,nature must therefore be compelled to act under certain definite conditions1 which either do not exist in it at all1 or else exist only as modified by others4--,such an invasion of ,nature we call an experiment4 ,every experiment is a question put to ,nature1 to which she is compelled to give a reply4 ,but every question contains an implicit priori judgment2 every experiment that is an experiment1 is a prophecy2 experimenting itself is a production of phenomena4 ,the first step1 therefore1 towards science1 at least in the domain of physics1 is taken when we ourselves begin to produce the objects of that science4 7b7 ,we know only the self-produced2 knowing1 therefore1 in the strictest acceptation of the term1 is a pure knowing priori4 ,construction by means of experiment1 is1 after all1 an absolute self-production of the phenomena4 ,there is no question but that much in the science of ,nature may be known comparatively priori2 as1 for example1 in the theory of the phenomena of electricity1 magnetism1 and even light4 ,there is such a simple law recurring in every phenomenon that the results of every experiment may be told beforehand2 here my knowing follows immediately from a known law1 without the intervention of any particular experience4 ,but whence then does the law itself come to me8 ,the assertion is1 that all phenomena are correlated in one absolute and necessary law1 from which they can all be deduced2 in short1 that in natural science all that we know1 we know absolutely priori4 ,now1 that experiment never leads to such a knowing1 is plainly manifest1 from the fact that it can never get beyond the forces of ,nature1 of which itself makes use as means4 ,as the final causes of natural phenomena are themselves not phenomenal1 we must either give up all attempt ever to arrive at a knowledge of them1 or else we must altogether put them into ,nature1 endow ,nature with them4 ,but now1 that which we put into ,nature has no other value than that of a pre-supposition 7hypothesis71 and the science founded thereon must be equally hypothetical with the principle itself4 ,this it would be possible to avoid only in one case1 viz41 if that pre-supposition itself were involuntary1 and as necessary as ,nature itself4 ,assuming1 for example1 what must be assumed1 that the sum of phenomena is not a mere world1 but of necessity a ,nature--that is1 that this whole is not merely a product1 but at the same time productive1 it follows that in this whole we can never arrive at absolute identity1 inasmuch as this would bring about an absolute transition of ,nature1 in as far as it is productive1 into ,nature as product1 that is1 it would produce absolute rest2 such wavering of ,nature1 therefore1 between productivity and product1 will1 of necessity1 appear as a universal duplicity of principles1 whereby ,nature is maintained in continual activity1 and prevented from exhausting itself in its product2 and universal duality as the principle of explanation of ,nature will be as necessary as the idea of ,nature itself4 ,this absolute hypothesis must carry its necessity within itself1 but it must1 besides this1 be brought to empiric proof2 for1 inasmuch as all the phenomena of ,nature cannot be deduced from this hypothesis as long as there is in the whole system of ,nature a single phenomenon which is not necessary according to that principle1 or which contradicts it1 the hypothesis is thereby at once shown to be false1 and from that moment ceases to have validity as an hypothesis4 ,by this deduction of all natural phenomena from an absolute hypothesis1 our knowing is changed into a construction of ,nature itself1 that is1 into a science of ,nature priori4 ,if1 therefore1 such deduction itself is possible1 a thing which can be proved only by the fact1 then also a doctrine of ,nature is possible as a science of ,nature2 a system of purely speculative physics is possible1 which was the point to be proved4 ,remark4--,there would be no necessity for this remark1 if the confusion which still prevails in regard to ideas perspicuous enough in themselves did not render some explanation with regard to them requisite4 ,the assertion that natural science must be able to deduce all its principles priori1 is in a measure understood to mean that natural science must dispense with all experience1 and1 without any intervention of experience1 be able to spin all its principles out of itself--an affirmation so absurd that the very objections to it deserve pity4 ,not only do we know this or that through experience1 but we originally know nothing at all except through experience1 and by means of experience1 and in this sense the whole of our knowledge consists of the data of experience4 ,these data become priori principles when we become conscious of them as necessary1 and thus every datum1 be its import what it may1 may be raised to that dignity1 inasmuch as the distinction between priori and posteriori data is not at all1 as many people may have imagined1 one originally cleaving to the data themselves1 but is a distinction made solely with respect to our knowing1 and the kind of our knowledge of these data1 so that every datum which is merely historical for me--i4 e4 a datum of experience--becomes1 notwithstanding1 an priori principle as soon as ,i arrive1 whether directly or indirectly1 at insight into its internal necessity4 ,now1 however1 it must in all cases be possible to recognize every natural phenomenon as absolutely necessary2 for1 if there is no chance in nature at all1 there can likewise be no original phenomenon of ,nature fortuitous2 on the contrary1 for the very reason that ,nature is a system1 there must be a necessary connection for everything that happens or comes to pass in it1 in some principle embracing the whole of ,nature4 ,insight into this internal necessity of all natural phenomena becomes1 of course1 still more complete1 as soon as we reflect that there is no real system which is not1 at the same time1 an organic whole4 ,for if1 in an organic whole1 all things mutually bear and support each other1 then this organization must have existed as a whole previous to its parts--the whole could not have arisen from the parts1 but the parts must have arisen out of the whole4 ,it is not1 therefore1 ,,we ,,know ,nature1 but ,nature ,,is1 priori1 that is1 everything individual in it is predetermined by the whole or by the idea of a ,nature generally4 ,but if ,nature is priori1 then it must be possible to recognize it as something that is priori1 and this is really the meaning of our affirmation4 ,such a science1 like every other1 does not deal with the hypothetical1 or the merely probable1 but depends upon the evident and the certain4 ,now1 we may indeed be quite certain that every natural phenomenon1 through whatever number of intermediate links1 stands in connection with the last conditions of a ,nature2 the intermediate links themselves1 however1 may be unknown to us1 and still lying hidden in the depths of ,nature4 ,to find out these links is the work of experimental research4 ,speculative physics have nothing to do but to show the need of these intermediate links2#ah but as every new discovery throws us back upon a new ignorance1 and while one knot is being loosed a new one is being tied1 it is conceivable that the complete discovery of all the intermediate links in the chain of ,nature1 and therefore also our science itself1 is an infinite task4 ,nothing1 however1 has more impeded the infinite progress of this science than the arbitrariness of the fictions by which the want of profound insight was so long doomed to be concealed4 ,this fragmentary nature of our knowledge becomes apparent only when we separate what is merely hypothetical from the pure out-come of science1 and thereupon set out to collect the fragments of the great whole of ,nature again into a system4 ,it is1 therefore1 conceivable that speculative physics 7the soul of real experiment7 has1 in all time1 been the mother of all great discoveries in ,nature4 ,v4 ,,of ,a ,,system ,,of ,,speculative ,,physics ,,generally4 ,hitherto the idea of speculative physics has been deduced and developed2 it is another business to show how this idea must be realized and actually carried out4 ,the author1 for this purpose1 would at once refer to his ,outlines of a ,system of ,natural ,philosophy1 if he had not reason to suspect that many even of those who might consider those ,outlines worthy of their attention1 would come to it with certain preconceived ideas1 which he has not presupposed1 and which he does not desire to have pre-supposed4 ,the causes which may render an insight into the tendency of those ,outlines difficult1 are 7exclusive of defects of style and arrangement7 mainly1 the following3 #a4 ,that many persons1 misled perhaps by the word ,natural ,philosophy1 expect to find transcendental deductions from natural phenomena1 such as1 in different fragments1 exist elsewhere1 and will regard natural philosophy generally as a part of transcendental philosophy1 whereas it forms a science altogether peculiar1 altogether different from1 and independent of1 every other4 #b4 ,that the notions of dynamical physics hitherto diffused1 are very different from1 and partially at variance with1 those which the author lays down4 ,i do not speak of the modes of representation which several persons1 whose business is really mere experiment1 have figured to themselves in this connection2 for example1 where they suppose it to be a dynamical explanation1 when they reject a galvanic fluid1 and accept instead of it certain vibrations in the metals2 for these persons1 as soon as they observe that they have understood nothing of the matter1 will revert1 of their own accord1 to their previous representations1 which were made for them4 ,i speak of the modes of representation which have been put into philosophic heads by ,kant1 and which may be mainly reduced to this3 that we see in matter nothing but the occupation of space in definite degrees1 in all difference of matter1 therefore1 only mere difference of occupation of space 7i4 e4 density17 in all dynamic 7qualitative7 changes1 only mere changes in the relation of the repelling and attracting forces4 ,now1 according to this mode of representation1 all the phenomena of ,nature are looked at only on their lowest plane1 and the dynamical physics of these philosophers begin precisely at the point where they ought properly to leave off4 ,it is indeed certain that the last result of every dynamical process is a changed degree of occupation of space--that is1 a changed density2 inasmuch1 now1 as the dynamical process of ,nature is one1 and the individual dynamical processes are only shreds of the one fundamental process--even magnetic and electric phenomena1 viewed from this stand-point1 will be1 not actions of particular materials1 but changes in the constitution of matter itself2 and as this depends upon the mutual action of the fundamental forces1 at last1 changes in the relation of the fundamental forces themselves4 ,we do not indeed deny that these phenomena at the extreme limit of their manifestation are changes in the relation of the principles themselves2 we only deny that these changes are nothing more2 on the contrary1 we are convinced that this so-called dynamical principle is too superficial and defective a basis of explanation for all ,nature's phenomena1 to reach the real depth and manifoldness of natural phenomena1 inasmuch as by means of it1 in point of fact1 no qualitative change of matter as such is constructible 7for change of density is only the external phenomenon of a higher change74 ,to adduce proof of this assertion is not incumbent upon us1 till1 from the opposite side1 that principle of explanation is shown by actual fact to exhaust ,nature1 and the great chasm is filled up between that kind of dynamical philosophy and the empirical attainments of physics--as1 for example1 in regard to the very different kinds of effects exhibited by simple substances--a thing which1 let us say at once1 we consider to be impossible4 ,we may therefore be permitted1 in the room of the hitherto prevailing dynamic mode of representation1 to place our own without further remark--a procedure which will no doubt clearly show wherein the latter differs from the former1 and by which of the two the ,doctrine of ,nature may most certainly be raised to a ,science of ,nature4 ,,vi4 ,,internal ,,organization ,,of ,,the ,,system ,,of ,,speculative ,,physics4 #a4 ,an inquiry into the ,principle of speculative physics must be preceded by inquiries into the distinction between the speculative and the empirical generally4 ,this depends mainly upon the conviction that between empiricism and theory there is such a complete opposition that there can be no third thing in which the two may be united2 that1 therefore1 the idea of ,experimental ,science is a mongrel idea1 which implies no connected thought1 or rather1 which cannot be thought at all4 ,what is pure empiricism is not science1 and1 vice vers1 what is science is not empiricism4 ,this is not said for the purpose of at all depreciating empiricism1 but is meant to exhibit it in its true and proper light4 ,pure empiricism1 be its object what it may1 is history 7the absolute opposite of theory71 and1 conversely1 history alone is empiricism4#ai ,physics1 as empiricism1 are nothing but a collection of facts1 of accounts of what has been observed--what has happened under natural or artificial circumstances4 ,in what we at present designate physics1 empiricism and science run riot together1 and for that very reason they are neither one thing nor another4 ,our aim1 in view of this object1 is to separate science and empiricism as soul and body1 and by admitting nothing into science which is not susceptible of an priori construction1 to strip empiricism of all theory1 and restore it to its original nakedness4 ,the opposition between empiricism and science rests therefore upon this3 that the former regards its object in being--as something already prepared and accomplished2 science1 on the other hand1 views its object in becoming1 and as something that has yet to be accomplished4 ,as science cannot set out from anything that is a product--that is1 a thing--it must set out from the unconditioned2 the first inquiry of speculative physics is that which relates to the unconditioned in natural science4 #b4 ,as this inquiry is1 in the ,outlines1 deduced from the highest principles1 the following may be regarded as merely an illustration of those inquiries3 ,inasmuch as everything of which we can say that it is1 is of a conditioned nature1 it is only being itself that can be the unconditioned4 ,but seeing that individual being1 as a conditioned1 can be thought only as a particular limitation of the productive activity 7the sole and last substrate of all reality7 being itself is thought as the same productive activity in its unlimitedness4 ,for the philosophy of nature1 therefore1 nature is originally only productivity1 and from this as its principle science must set out4 ,so long as we know the totality of objects only as the sum of being1 this totality is a mere world--that is1 a mere product for us4 ,it would certainly be impossible in the science of ,nature to rise to a higher idea than that of being1 if all permanence 7which is thought in the idea of being7 were not deceptive1 and really a continuous and uniform reproduction4 ,in so far as we regard the totality of objects not merely as a product1 but at the same time necessarily as productive1 it rises into ,nature for us1 and this identity of the product and the productivity1 and this alone is implied1 even in the ordinary use of language by the idea of ,nature4 ,nature as a mere product 7natura naturata7 we call ,nature as object 7with this alone all empiricism deals74 ,nature as productivity 7natura naturans7 we call ,nature as subject 7with this alone all theory deals74 ,as the object is never unconditioned1 something absolutely non-objective must be put into ,nature2 this absolutely non-objective is nothing else but that original productivity of ,nature4 ,in the ordinary view it vanishes in the product3 conversely in the philosophic view the product vanishes in the productivity4 ,such identity of the product and the productivity in the original conception of ,nature is expressed by the ordinary views of ,nature as a whole1 which is at once the cause and the effect of itself1 and is in its duplicity 7which goes through all phenomena7 again identical4 ,furthermore1 with this idea the identity of the ,real and the ,ideal agrees--an identity which is thought in the idea of every product of ,nature1 and in view of which alone the nature of art can be placed in opposition thereto4 ,for whereas in art the idea precedes the act--the execution--in ,nature idea and act are rather contemporary and one2 the idea passes immediately over into the product1 and cannot be separated from it4 ,this identity is cancelled by the empirical view1 which sees in ,nature only the effect 7although on account of the continual wandering of empiricism into the field of science1 we have1 even in purely empirical physics1 maxims which presuppose an idea of ,nature as subject--as1 for example1 ,nature chooses the shortest way2 ,nature is sparing in causes and lavish in effects72 it is also cancelled by speculation1 which looks only at cause in ,nature4 #c4 ,we can say of ,nature as object that it is1 not of ,nature as subject2 for this is being or productivity4 ,this absolute productivity must pass over into an empirical nature4 ,in the idea of absolute productivity1 is the thought of an ideal infinity4 ,the ideal infinity must become an empirical one4 ,but empirical infinity is an infinite becoming4 ,every infinite series is but the exhibition of an intellectual or ideal infinity4 ,the original infinite series 7the ideal of all infinite series7 is that wherein our intellectual infinity evolves itself1 viz41 ,time4 ,the activity which sustains this series is the same as that which sustains our consciousness2 consciousness1 however1 is continuous4 ,time1 therefore1 as the evolution of that activity1 cannot be produced by composition4 ,now1 as all other infinite series are only imitations of the originally infinite series1 ,time1 no infinite series can be otherwise than continuous4 ,in the original evolution the retarding agent 7without which the evolution would take place with infinite rapidity7 is nothing but original reflection2 the necessity of reflection upon our acting in every organic phase 7continued duplicity in identity7 is the secret stroke of art whereby our being receives permanence4 ,absolute continuity1 therefore1 exists only for the intuition1 but not for the reflection4 ,intuition and reflection are opposed to each other4 ,the infinite series is continuous for the productive intuition--interrupted and composite for the reflection4 ,it is on this contradiction between intuition and reflection that those sophisms are based1 in which the possibility of all motion is contested1 and which are solved at every successive step by the productive activity4 ,to the intuition1 for example1 the action of gravity takes place with perfect continuity2 to the reflection1 by fits and starts4 ,hence all the laws of mechanics1 whereby that which is properly only the object of the productive intuition becomes an object of reflection1 are really only laws for the reflection4 ,hence those fictitious notions of mechanics1 the atoms of time in which gravitation acts1 the law that the moment of solicitation is infinitely small1 because otherwise an infinite rapidity would be produced in finite time1 c41 c4 ,hence1 finally1 the assertion that in mathematics no infinite series can really be represented as continuous1 but only as advancing by fits and starts4 ,the whole of this inquiry into the opposition between reflection and the productivity of the intuition1 serves only to enable us to deduce the general statement that in all productivity1 and in productivity alone1 there is absolute continuity--a statement of importance in the consideration of the whole of ,nature2 inasmuch1 for example1 as the law that in ,nature there is no leap1 that there is a continuity of forms in it1 c41 is confined to the original productivity of ,nature1 in which certainly there must be continuity1 whereas from the stand-point of reflection all things must appear disconnected and without continuity--placed beside each other1 as it were2 we must therefore admit that both parties are right2 those1 namely1 who assert continuity in ,nature--for example1 in organic ,nature--no less than those who deny it1 when we take into consideration the difference of their respective stand-points2 and we thereby1 at the same time1 arrive at the distinction between dynamical and atomistic physics2 for1 as will soon become apparent1 the two are distinguished only by the fact that the former occupies the stand-point of intuition1 the latter that of reflection4 #d4 ,these general principles being presupposed1 we shall be able1 with more certainty1 to reach our aim1 and make an exposition of the internal organism of our system4 7a7 ,in the idea of becoming1 we think the idea of gradualness4 ,but an absolute productivity will exhibit itself empirically as a becoming with infinite rapidity1 whereby there results nothing real for the intuition4 7,inasmuch as ,nature must in reality be thought as engaged in infinite evolution1 the permanence1 the resting of the products of ,nature--the organic ones1 for instance--is not to be viewed as an absolute resting1 but only as an evolution proceeding with infinitely small rapidity or with infinite tardiness4 ,but hitherto evolution1 with even finite rapidity1 not to speak of infinitely small rapidity1 has not been constructed47 7b7 ,that the evolution of ,nature should take place with finite rapidity1 and thus become an object of intuition1 is not thinkable without an original limitation 7a being limited7 of the productivity4 7c7 ,but if ,nature be absolute productivity1 then the ground of this limitation may lie outside of it4 ,nature is originally only productivity2 there can1 therefore1 be nothing determined in this productivity 7all determination is negation7 and so products can never be reached by it4 ,if products are to be reached1 the productivity must pass from being undetermined to being determined--that is1 it must1 as pure productivity1 be cancelled4 ,if now the ground of determination of productivity lay outside of ,nature1 ,nature would not be originally absolutely productivity4 ,determination1 that is1 negation1 must certainly come into ,nature2 but this negation1 viewed from a higher stand-point1 must again be positivity4 7d7 ,but if the ground of this limitation lies within ,nature itself1 then ,nature ceases to be pure identity4 7,nature1 in so far as it is only productivity1 is pure identity1 and there is in it absolutely nothing capable of being distinguished4 ,in order that anything may be distinguished in it1 its identity must be cancelled--,nature must not be identity1 but duplicity47 ,nature must originally be an object to itself2 this change of the pure subject into a self-object is unthinkable without an original sundering in ,nature itself4 ,this duplicity cannot therefore be further deduced physically2 for1 as the condition of all ,nature generally1 it is the principle of all physical explanation1 and all physical explanation can only have for its aim the reduction of all the antitheses which appear in ,nature to that original antithesis in the heart of ,nature1 which does not1 however1 itself appear4 ,why is there no original phenomenon of ,nature without this duplicity1 if in ,nature all things are not mutually subject and object to each other ad infinitum1 and ,nature even1 in its origin1 at once product and productive8 7e7 ,if ,nature is originally duplicity1 there must be opposite tendencies even in the original productivity of ,nature4 7,the positive tendency must be opposed by another1 which is1 as it were1 anti-productive--retarding production2 not as the contradictory1 but as the negative--the really opposite of the former47 ,it is only then that1 in spite of its being limited1 there is no passivity in ,nature1 when even that which limits it is again positive1 and its original duplicity is a contest of really opposite tendencies4 7f7 ,in order to arrive at a product1 these opposite tendencies must concur4 ,but as they are supposed equal1 7for there is no ground for supposing them unequal17 wherever they meet they will annihilate each other2 the product is therefore #j1 and once more no product is reached4 ,this inevitable1 though hitherto not very closely remarked contradiction 7namely1 that a product can arise only through the concurrence of opposite tendencies1 while at the same time these opposite tendencies mutually annihilate each other7 is capable of being solved only in the following manner3 ,there is absolutely no subsistence of a product thinkable1 without a continual process of being reproduced4 ,the product must be thought as annihilated at every step1 and at every step reproduced anew4 ,we do not really see the subsisting of a product1 but only the continual process of being reproduced4 7,it is of course very conceivable how the series #a-aa-a444 on to infinity is thought as equal neither to #a nor to #j4 ,the reason however why this series is thought as #a_/b lies deeper4 ,there is one absolute magnitude 7#a71 which1 though continually annihilated in this series1 continually recurs1 and by this recurrence produces1 not itself1 but the mean between itself and nothing4--,nature1 as object1 is that which comes to pass in such an infinite series1 and is a fraction of the original unit1 to which the never cancelled duplicity supplies the numerator47 7g7 ,if the subsistence of the product is a continual process of being reproduced1 then all persistence also is only in nature as object2 in nature as subject there is only infinite activity4 ,the product is originally nothing but a mere point1 a mere limit1 and it is only from ,nature's combatting against this point that it is1 so to speak1 raised to a full sphere--to a product4 7,suppose1 for illustration1 a stream2 it is pure identity2 where it meets resistance1 there is formed a whirlpool2 this whirlpool is not anything abiding1 but something that every moment vanishes1 and every moment springs up anew4--,in ,nature there is originally nothing distinguishable2 all products are1 so to speak1 still in solution1 and invisible in the universal productivity4 ,it is only when retarding points are given1 that they are thrown off and advance out of the universal identity4--,at every such point the stream breaks 7the productivity is annihilated71 but at every step there comes a new wave which fills up the sphere74 ,the philosophy of nature has not to explain the productive 7side7 of nature2 for if it does not posit this as in nature originally1 it will never bring it into nature4 ,it has to explain the permanent4 ,but the fact that anything should become permanent in nature1 can itself receive its explanation only from that contest of nature against all permanence4 ,the products would appear as mere points1 if nature did not give them extension and depth by its own pressure1 and the products themselves would last only an instant1 if nature did not at every instant crowd up against them4 7h7 ,this seeming product1 which is reproduced at every step1 cannot be a really infinite product2 for otherwise productivity would actually exhaust itself in it2 in like manner it cannot be a finite product2 for it is the force of the whole of nature that pours itself into it4 ,it must therefore be at once infinite and finite2 it must be only seemingly finite1 but in infinite development4 99 99 99 99 99 ,the point at which this product originally comes in1 is the universal point of retardation in nature1 the point from which all evolution in nature begins4 ,but in nature1 as it is evolved1 this point lies not here or there1 but everywhere where there is a product4 ,this product is a finite one1 but as the infinite productivity of nature concentrates itself in it1 it must have a tendency to infinite development4--,and thus gradually1 and through all the foregoing intermediate links1 we have arrived at the construction of that infinite becoming--the empirical exhibition of an ideal infinity4 ,we behold in what is called nature 7i4 e4 in this assemblage of individual objects71 not the primal product itself1 but its evolution1 7hence the point of retardation cannot remain one47--,by what means this evolution is again absolutely retarded1 which must happen1 if we are to arrive at a fixed product1 has not yet been explained4 ,but through this product an original infinity evolves itself2 this infinity can never decrease4 ,the magnitude which evolves itself in an infinite series1 is still infinite at every point of the line2 and thus nature will be still infinite at every point of the evolution4 ,there is only one original point of retardation to productivity2 but any number of points of retardation to evolution may be thought4 ,every such point is marked for us by a product2 but at every point of the evolution nature is still infinite2 therefore nature is still infinite in every product1 and in every one lies the germ of a universe4#bj 7,the question1 by what means the infinite tendency is retarded in the product1 is still unanswered4 ,the original retardation in the productivity of nature1 explains only why the evolution takes place with finite rapidity1 but not why it takes place with infinitely small rapidity47 7i7 ,the product evolves itself ad infinitum4 ,in this evolution1 therefore1 nothing can happen1 which is not already a product 7synthesis71 and which might not divide up into new factors1 each of these again having its factors4 ,thus even by an analysis pursued ad infinitum1 we could never arrive at anything in nature which should be absolutely simple4 7k7 ,if however we suppose the evolution as completed1 7although it never can be completed17 still the evolution could not stop at anything which was a product1 but only at the purely productive4 ,the question arises1 whether a final1 such that it is no longer a substrate1 but the cause of all substrate1 no longer a product1 but absolutely productive--we will not say occurs1 for that is unthinkable1 but--can at least be proved in experience4 7l7 ,inasmuch as it bears the character of the unconditioned1 it would have to exhibit itself as something1 which1 although itself not in space1 is still the principle of all occupation of space4 ,what occupies space is not matter1 for matter is the occupied space itself4 ,that1 therefore1 which occupies space cannot be matter4 ,only that which is1 is in space1 not being itself4 ,it is self-evident that no positive external intuition is possible of that which is not in space4 ,it would therefore have to be capable of being exhibited negatively4 ,this happens in the following manner3 ,that which is in space1 is1 as such1 mechanically and chemically destructible4 ,that which is not destructible either mechanically or chemically must therefore lie outside of space4 ,but it is only the final ground of all quality that has anything of this nature2 for although one quality may be extinguished by another1 this can nevertheless only happen in a third product1 ,c1 for the formation and maintenance of which ,a and ,b1 7the opposite factors of ,c17 must continue to act4 ,but this indestructible 7somewhat71 which is thinkable only as pure intensity1 is1 as the cause of all substrate1 at the same time the principle of divisibility ad infinitum4 7,a body1 divided ad infinitum still occupies space in the same degree with its smallest part47 ,that1 therefore1 which is purely productive without being a product1 is but the final ground of quality4 ,but every quality is a determinate one1 whereas productivity is originally indeterminate4 ,in the qualities1 therefore1 productivity appears as already retarded1 and as it appears most original in them generally1 it appears in them most originally retarded4 ,this is the point at which our mode of conception diverges from those of the currently so-called dynamical physics4 ,our assertion1 briefly stated1 is this3--,if the infinite evolution of nature were completed 7which is impossible7 it would separate up into original and simple actions1 or1 if we may so express ourselves1 into simple productivities4 ,our assertion therefore is not3 ,there are in nature such simple actions2 but only1 they are the ideal grounds of the explanation of quality4 ,these entelechies cannot actually be shown1 they do not exist2 we have not therefore to explain here anything more than is asserted1 namely1 that such original productivities must be thought as the grounds of the explanation of all quality4 ,this proof is as follows3 ,the affirmation that nothing which is in space1 that is1 that nothing at all is mechanically simple1 requires no demonstration4 ,that1 therefore1 which is in reality simple1 cannot be thought as in space1 but must be thought as outside of space4 ,but outside of space only pure intensity is thought4 ,this idea of pure intensity is expressed by the idea of action4 ,it is not the product of this action that is simple1 but the action itself abstracted from the product1 and it must be simple in order that the product may be divisible ad infinitum4 ,for although the parts are near vanishing1 the intensity must still remain4 ,and this pure intensity is what1 even in infinite divisibility1 sustains the substrate4 ,if1 therefore1 the assertion that affirms something simple as the basis of the explanation of quality is atomistic1 then our philosophy is atomistic4 ,but1 inasmuch as it places the simple in something that is only productive without being a product1 it is dynamical atomistics4 ,this much is clear1 that if we admit an absolute division of nature into its factors1 the last 7thing7 that remains over1 must be something1 which absolutely defies all division1 that is1 the simple4 ,but the simple can be thought only as dynamical1 and as such it is not in space at all 7it designates only what is thought as altogether outside of space-occupation72 there is therefore no intuition of it possible1 except through its product4 ,in like manner there is no measure for it given but its product4 ,for to pure thought it is the mere origin of the product 7as the point is only the origin of the line71 in one word pure entelechy4 ,but that which is known1 not in itself1 but only in its product1 is known altogether empirically4 ,if1 therefore1 every original quality1 as quality 7not as substrate1 in which quality merely inheres71 must be thought as pure intensity1 pure action1 then qualities generally are only the absolutely empirical in our knowledge of nature1 of which no construction is possible1 and in respect to which there remains nothing of the philosophy of nature1 save the proof that they are the absolute limit of its construction4 ,the question in reference to the ground of quality posits the evolution of nature as completed1 that is1 it posits something merely thought1 and therefore can be answered only by an ideal ground of explanation4 ,this question adopts the stand-point of reflection 7on the product71 whereas genuine dynamics always remain on the stand-point of intuition4 ,it must here1 however1 be at once remarked that if the ground of the explanation of quality is conceived as an ideal one1 the question only regards the explanations of quality1 in so far as it is thought as absolute4 ,there is no question1 for instance1 of quality1 in so far as it shows itself in the dynamical process4 ,for quality1 so far as it is relative1 there is certainly a not merely ideal1 but actually real ground of explanation and determination2 quality in that case is determined by its opposite1 with which it is placed in conflict1 and this antithesis is itself again determined by a higher antithesis1 and so on back into infinity2 so that1 if this universal organization could dissolve itself1 all matter likewise would sink back into dynamical inactivity1 that is1 into absolute defect of quality4 7,quality is a higher power of matter1 to which the latter elevates itself by reciprocity47 ,it is demonstrated in the sequel that the dynamical process is a limited one for each individual sphere2 because it is only thereby that definite points of relation for the determination of quality arise4 ,this limitation of the dynamical process1 that is1 the proper determination of quality1 takes place by means of no force other than that by which the evolution is universally and absolutely limited1 and this negative element is the only one in things that is indivisible1 and mastered by nothing4--,the absolute relativity of all quality may be shown from the electric relation of bodies1 inasmuch as the same body that is positive with one is negative with another1 and conversely4 ,but we might now henceforth abide by the statement 7which is also laid down in the ,outlines73 ,all quality is electricity1 and conversely1 the electricity of a body is also its quality1 7for all difference of quality is equal to difference of electricity1 and all chemical quality is reducible to electricity74--,everything that is sensible for us 7sensible in the narrower acceptation of the term1 as colors1 taste1 c471 is doubtless sensible to us only through electricity1 and the only immediately sensible 7element7 would then be electricity1#ba a conclusion to which the universal duality of every sense leads us independently1 inasmuch as in ,nature there is properly only one duality4 ,in galvanism1 sensibility1 as a reagent1 reduces all quality of bodies1 for which it is a reagent to an original difference4 ,all bodies which1 in a chain1 at all affect the sense of taste or that of sight1 be their differences ever so great1 are either alkaline or acid1 excite a negative or positive shock1 and here they always appear as active in a higher than the merely chemical power4 ,quality considered as absolute is inconstructible1 because quality generally is not anything absolute1 and there is no other quality at all1 save that which bodies show mutually in relation to each other1 and all quantity is something in virtue of which the body is1 so to speak1 raised above itself4 ,all hitherto attempted construction of quality reduces itself to the two attempts2 to express qualities by figures1 and so1 for each original quality1 to assume a particular figure in ,nature2 or else1 to express quality by analytical formul 7in which the forces of attraction and repulsion supply the negative and positive magnitudes47 ,to convince oneself of the futility of this attempt1 the shortest method is to appeal to the emptiness of the explanations to which it gives rise4 ,hence we limit ourselves here to the single remark1 that through the construction of all matter out of the two fundamental forces1 different degrees of density may indeed be constructed1 but certainly never different qualities as qualities2 for although all dynamical 7qualitative7 changes appear1 in their lowest stage1 as changes of the fundamental forces1 yet we see at that stage only the product of the process--not the process itself--and those changes are what require explanation1 and the ground of explanation must therefore certainly be sought in something higher4 ,the only possible ground of explanation for quality is an ideal one2 because this ground itself presupposes something purely ideal4 ,if any one inquire into the final ground of quality1 he transports himself back to the starting point of ,nature4 ,but where is this starting point8 and does not all quality consist in this1 that matter is prevented by the general concatenation from reverting into its originality8 ,from the point at which reflection and intuition separate1 a separation1 be it remarked1 which is possible only on the hypothesis of the evolutions being complete1 physics divide into the two opposite directions1 into which the two systems1 the atomistic and the dynamical1 have been divided4 ,the dynamical system denies the absolute evolution of ,nature1 and passes from ,nature as synthesis 7i4 e4 ,nature as subject7 to ,nature as evolution 7i4 e4 ,nature as object72 the atomistic system passes from the evolution1 as the original1 to ,nature as synthesis2 the former passes from the stand-point of intuition to that of reflection2 the latter from the stand-point of reflection to that of intuition4 ,both directions are equally possible4 ,if the analysis only is right1 then the synthesis must be capable of being found again through analysis1 just as the analysis in its turn can be found through the synthesis4 ,but whether the analysis is correct can be tested only by the fact that we can pass from it again to the synthesis4 ,the synthesis therefore is1 and continues1 the absolutely presupposed4 ,the problems of the one system turn exactly round into those of the other2 that which1 in atomical physics1 is the cause of the composition of ,nature is1 in dynamical physics1 that which checks evolution4 ,the former explains the composition of ,nature by the force of cohesion1 whereby1 however1 no continuity is ever introduced into it2 the latter1 on the contrary1 explains cohesion by the continuity of evolution4 7,all cohesion is originally only in the productivity47 ,both systems set out from something purely ideal4 ,absolute synthesis is as much purely ideal as absolute analysis4 ,the ,real occurs only in ,nature as product2 but ,nature is not product1 either when thought as absolute involution or as absolute evolution2 product is what is contained between the two extremes4 ,the first problem for both systems is to construct the product--i4 e4 that wherein those opposites become real4 ,both reckon with purely ideal magnitudes so long as the product is not constructed3 it is only in the directions in which they accomplish this that they are opposed4 ,both systems1 as far as they have to deal with merely ideal factors1 have the same value1 and the one forms the test of the other4--,that which is concealed in the depths of productive ,nature must be reflected as product in ,nature as ,nature1 and thus the atomistic system must be the continual reflex of the dynamical4 ,in the ,outlines1 of the two directions1 that of atomistic physics has been chosen intentionally4 ,it will contribute not a little to the understanding of our science1 if we here demonstrate in the productivity what was there shown in the product4 7m7 ,in the pure productivity of ,nature there is absolutely nothing distinguishable except duality2 it is only productivity dualized in itself that gives the product4 ,inasmuch as the absolute productivity arrives only at producing per se1 not at the producing of a determinate somewhat1 the tendency of ,nature1 in virtue of which product is arrived at1 must be the negative of productivity4 ,in ,nature1 in so far as it is real1 there can no more be productivity without a product1 than a product without productivity4 ,nature can only approximate to the two extremes1 and it must be demonstrated that it approximates to both4 77 ,pure productivity passes originally into formlessness4 ,wherever ,nature loses itself in formlessness1 productivity exhausts itself in it4 7,this is what we express when we talk of a becoming latent47--,conversely1 wherever the form predominates--i4 e4 wherever the productivity is limited--the productivity manifests itself2 it appears1 not as a 7representable7 product1 but as productivity1 although passing over into one product1 as in the phenomena of heat4 7,the idea of imponderables is only a symbolic one47 77 ,if productivity passes into formlessness1 then1 objectively considered1 it is the absolutely formless4 ,the boldness of the atomical system has been very imperfectly comprehended4 ,the idea which prevails in it1 of an absolutely formless somewhat everywhere incapable of manifestation as determinate matter1 is nothing other than the symbol of nature approximating to productivity4--,the nearer to productivity the nearer to formlessness4 77 ,productivity appears as productivity only when limits are set to it4 ,that which is everywhere and in everything1 is1 for that very reason1 nowhere4--,productivity is fixed only by limitation4--,electricity exists only at that point at which limits are given1 and it is only a poverty of conception that would look for anything else in its phenomena beyond the phenomena of 7limited7 productivity4--,the condition of light is an antithesis in the electric and galvanic1 as well as in the chemical1 process1 and even light which comes to us without our coperation 7the phenomenon of productivity exerted all round by the sun7 presupposes that antithesis4#bb 77 ,it is only limited productivity that gives the start to product4 7,the explanation of product must begin at the origination of the fixed point at which the start is made47 ,the condition of all formation is duality4 7,this is the more profound signification that lies in ,kant's construction of matter from opposite forces47 ,electrical phenomena are the general scheme for the construction of matter universally4 77 ,in ,nature1 neither pure productivity nor pure product can ever be arrived at4 ,the former is the negation of all product1 the latter the negation of all productivity4 7,approximation to the former is the absolutely decomposible1 to the latter the absolutely indecomposible1 of the atomistics4 ,the former cannot be thought without1 at the same time1 being the absolutely incomposible1 the latter without1 at the same time1 being the absolutely composible47 ,nature will therefore originally be the middle somewhat arising out of the two1 and thus we arrive at the idea of a productivity engaged in a transition into product1 or of a product that is productive ad infinitum4 ,we hold to the latter definition4 ,the idea of the product 7the fixed7 and that of the productive 7the free7 are mutually opposed4 ,seeing that what we have postulated is already product1 it can1 if it is productive at all1 be productive only in a determinate way4 ,but determined productivity is 7active7 formation4 ,that third somewhat must therefore be in the state of formation4 ,but the product is supposed to be productive ad infinitum 7that transition is never absolutely to take place72 it will therefore at every stage be productive in a determinate way2 the productivity will remain1 but not the product4 7,the question might arise how a transition from form to form is possible at all here1 when no form is fixed4 ,still1 that momentary forms should be reached1 has already been rendered possible by the fact that the evolution cannot take place with infinite rapidity1 in which case1 therefore1 for every step at least1 the form is certainly a determinate one47 ,the product will appear as in infinite metamorphosis4 7,from the stand-point of reflection1 as continually on the leap from fluid to solid1 without ever reaching1 however1 the required form4--,organizations that do not live in the grosser element1 at least live on the deep ground of the arial sea--many pass over1 by metamorphoses1 from one element into another2 and what does the animal1 whose vital functions almost all consist in contractions1 appear to be1 other than such a leap87 ,the metamorphosis will not possibly take place without rule4 ,for it must remain within the original antithesis1 and is thereby confined within limits4#bc ,this accordance with rule will express itself solely by an internal relationship of forms--a relationship which again is not thinkable without an archetype which lies at the basis of all1 and which1 with however manifold divergences1 they nevertheless all express4 ,but even with such a product1 we have not that which we were in quest of--a product which1 while productive ad infinitum1 remains the same4 ,that this product should remain the same seems unthinkable1 because it is not thinkable without an absolute checking or suppression of the productivity4--,the product would have to be checked1 as the productivity was checked1 for it is still productive--checked by dualization and limitation resulting therefrom4 ,but it must at the same time be explained how the productive product can be checked at each individual stage of its formation1 without its ceasing to be productive1 or how1 by dualization itself the permanence of the productivity is secured4 ,in this way we have brought the reader as far as the problem of the fourth section of the ,outlines1 and we leave him to find in it for himself the solution along with the corollaries which it brings up4--,meanwhile1 we shall endeavor to indicate how the deduced product would necessarily appear from the stand-point of reflection4 ,the product is the synthesis wherein the opposite extremes meet1 which on the one side are designated by the absolutely decomposible--on the other as indecomposible4--,how continuity comes into the absolute discontinuity with which he sets out1 the atomic philosopher endeavors to explain by means of cohesive1 plastic power1 c41 c4 ,in vain1 for continuity is only productivity itself4 ,the manifoldness of the forms which such product assumes in its metamorphosis was explained by the difference in the stages of development1 so that1 parallel with every step of development1 goes a particular form4 ,the atomic philosopher posits in nature certain fundamental forms1 and as in it everything strives after form1 and every thing which does form itself has also its particular form1 so the fundamental forms must be conceded1 but certainly only as indicated in nature1 not as actually existent4 ,from the standpoint of reflection1 the becoming of this product must appear as a continual striving of the original actions toward the production of a determinate form1 and a continual recancelling of those forms4 ,thus1 the product would not be product of a simple tendency2 it would be only the visible expression of an internal proportion1 of an internal equipoise of the original actions1 which neither reduce themselves mutually to absolute formlessness1 nor yet1 by reason of the universal conflict1 allow the production of a determinate and fixed form4 ,hitherto 7so long as we have had to deal merely with ideal factors71 there have been opposite directions of investigation possible2 from this point1 inasmuch as we have to pursue a real product in its developments1 there is only one direction4 77 ,by the unavoidable separation of productivity into opposite directions at every single step of development the product itself is separated into individual products1 by which1 however1 for that very reason1 only different stages of development are marked4 ,that this is so may be shown either in the products themselves1 as is done when we compare them with each other with regard to their form1 and search out a continuity of formation--an idea which1 from the fact that continuity is never in the products 7for the reflection71 but always only in the productivity1 can never be perfectly realized4 ,in order to find continuity in productivity1 the successive steps of the transition of productivity into product must be more clearly exhibited than they have hitherto been4 ,from the fact that the productivity gets limited1 7v4 supra17 we have in the first instance only the start for a product1 only the fixed point for the productivity generally4 ,it must be shown how the productivity gradually materializes itself1 and changes itself into products ever more and more fixed1 so as to produce a dynamical scale in nature1 and this is the real subject of the fundamental problem of the whole system4 ,in advance1 the following may serve to throw light on the subject4 ,in the first place1 a dualization of the productivity is demanded2 the cause through which this dualization is effected remains in the first instance altogether outside of the investigation4 ,by dualization a change of contraction and expansion is perhaps conditioned4 ,this change is not something in matter1 but is matter itself1 and the first stage of productivity passing over into product4 ,product cannot be reached except through a stoppage of this change1 that is1 through a third somewhat which fixes that change itself1 and thus matter in its lowest stage--in the first power--would be an object of intuition2 that change would be seen in rest1 or in equipoise1 just as1 conversely again1 by the suppression of the third somewhat matter might be raised to a higher power4 ,now it might be possible that those products just deduced stood upon quite different degrees of materiality1 or of that transition1 or that those different degrees were more or less distinguishable in the one than in the other2 that is1 a dynamical scale of those products would thereby have to be demonstrated4 7o7 ,in the solution of the problem itself1 we shall continue1 in the first instance1 in the direction hitherto taken1 without knowing where it may lead us4 ,there are individual products brought into nature2 but in these products productivity1 as productivity1 is held to be still always distinguishable4 ,productivity has not yet absolutely passed over into product4 ,the subsistence of the product is supposed to be a continual self-reproduction4 ,the problem arises3 ,by what is this absolute transition--exhaustion of the productivity in the product--prevented8 or by what does its subsistence become a continual self-reproduction8 ,it is absolutely unthinkable how the activity that everywhere tends towards a product is prevented from going over into it entirely1 unless that transition is prevented by external influences1 and the product1 if it is to subsist1 is compelled at every step to reproduce itself anew4 ,up to this point1 however1 no trace has been discovered of a cause opposed to the product 7to organic nature74 ,such a cause can1 therefore1 at present1 only be postulated4 ,we thought we saw the whole of nature exhaust itself in that product1 and it is only here that we remark1 that in order to comprehend such product1 something else must be presupposed1 and a new antithesis must come into nature4 ,nature has hitherto been for us absolute identity in duplicity2 here we come upon an antithesis that must again take place within the other4 ,this antithesis must be capable of being shown in the deduced product itself1 if it is capable of being deduced at all4 ,the deduced product is an activity directed outwards2 this cannot be distinguished as such without an activity directed inwards from without1 7i4 e4 directed upon itself17 and this activity1 on the other hand1 cannot be thought1 unless it is pressed back 7reflected7 from without4 ,in the opposite directions1 which arise through this antithesis lies the principle for the construction of all the phenomena of life--on the suppression of those opposite directions1 life remains over1 either as absolute activity or absolute receptivity1 since it is possible only as the perfect inter-determination of receptivity and activity4 ,we therefore refer the reader to the ,outlines themselves1 and merely call his attention to the higher stage of construction which we have here reached4 ,we have above 7g7 explained the origin of a product generally by a struggle of nature against the original point of check1 whereby this point is raised to a full sphere1 and thus receives permanence4 ,here1 since we are deducing a struggle of external nature1 not against a mere point1 but against a product1 the first construction rises for us to a second power1 as it were1--we have a double product1 and thus it might well be shown in the sequel that organic nature generally is only the higher power of the inorganic1 and that it rises above the latter for the very reason that in it even that which was already product again becomes product4 ,since the product1 which we have deduced as the most primary1 drives us to a side of nature that is opposed to it1 it is clear that our construction of the origin of a product generally is incomplete1 and that we have not yet1 by a long way1 satisfied our problem2 7the problem of all science is to construct the origin of a fixed product47 ,a productive product1 as such1 can subsist only under the influence of external forces1 because it is only thereby that productivity is interrupted--prevented from being extinguished in the product4 ,for these external forces there must now again be a particular sphere2 those forces must lie in a world which is not productive4 ,but that world1 for this very reason1 would be a world fixed and undetermined in every respect4 ,the problem--how a product in nature is arrived at--has therefore received a one-sided solution by all that has preceded4 8,the product is checked by dualization of the productivity at every single step of development40 ,but this is true only for the productive product1 whereas we are here treating of a non-productive product4 ,the contradiction which meets us here can be solved only by the finding of a general expression for the construction of a product generally1 7regardless of whether it is productive or has ceased to be so74 99 99 99 99 99 ,since the existence of a world1 that is not productive 7inorganic7 is in the first instance merely postulated1 in order to explain the productive one1 so its conditions can be laid down only hypothetically1 and as we do not in the first instance know it at all except from its opposition to the productive1 those conditions likewise must be deduced only from this opposition4 ,from this it is of course clear1--what is also referred to in the ,outlines--that this second section1 as well as the first1 contains throughout merely hypothetical truth1 since neither organic nor inorganic nature is explained without our having reduced the construction of the two to a common expression1 which1 however1 is possible only through the synthetic part4--,this must lead to the highest and most general principles for the construction of a nature generally2 hence we must refer the reader who is concerned about a knowledge of our system altogether to that part4 ,the hypothetical deduction of an inorganic world and its conditions we may pass over here all the more readily1 that they are sufficiently detailed in the ,outlines1 and hasten to the most general and the highest problem of our science4 99 99 99 99 99 ,the most general problem of speculative physics may now be expressed thus3 ,to reduce the construction of organic and inorganic products to a common expression4 ,we can state only the main principles of such a solution1 and of these1 for the most part1 only such as have not been completely educed in the ,outlines themselves--7#c;d principal section47 ,a4 ,here at the very beginning we lay down the principle that as the organic product is the product in the second power1 the ,,organic construction of the product must be1 at least1 the sensuous image of the ,,original construction of all product4 7a7 ,in order that the productivity may be at all fixed at a point1 limits must be given4 ,since limits are the condition of the first phenomenon1 the cause whereby limits are produced cannot be a phenomenon1 it goes back into the interior of nature1 or of each respective product4 ,in organic nature1 this limitation of productivity is shown by what we call sensibility1 which must be thought as the first condition of the construction of the organic product4 7b7 ,the immediate effect of confined productivity is a change of contraction and expansion in the matter already given1 and as we now know1 constructed1 as it were1 for the second time4 7c7 ,where this change stops1 productivity passes over into product1 and where it is again restored1 product passes over into productivity4 ,for since the product must remain productive ad infinitum1 those three stages of productivity must be capable of being ,,distinguished in the product2 the absolute transition of the latter into product is the cancelling of product itself4 7d7 ,as these three stages are distinguishable in the individual1 so they must be distinguishable in organic nature throughout1 and the scale of organizations is nothing more than a scale of productivity itself4 7,productivity exhausts itself to degree c in the product ,a1 and can begin with the product ,b only at the point where it left off with ,a1 that is1 with degree d1 and so on downwards to the vanishing of all productivity4 ,if we knew the absolute degree of productivity of the earth for example--a degree which is determined by the earth's relation to the sun--the limit of organization upon it might be thereby more accurately determined than by incomplete experience--which must be incomplete for this reason1 if for no other1 that the catastrophes of nature have1 beyond doubt1 swallowed the last links of the chain4 ,a true system of ,natural ,history1 which has for its object not the products of nature but nature itself1 follows up the one productivity that battles1 so to speak1 against freedom1 through all its windings and turnings1 to the point at which it is at last compelled to perish in the product47 ,it is upon this dynamical scale1 in the individual1 as well as in the whole of organic nature1 that the construction of all organic phenomena rests4 ,b4#bd ,these principles1 stated universally1 lead to the following fundamental principles of a universal theory of nature4 7a7 ,productivity must be primarily limited4 ,since outside of limited productivity there is only pure identity the limitation cannot be established by a difference already existing1 and therefore must be so by an opposition arising in productivity itself--an opposition to which we here revert as a first postulate4#be 7b7 ,this difference thought purely is the first condition of all natural activity1 the productivity is attracted and repelled#bf between opposites 7the primary limits72 in this change of expansion and contraction there arises necessarily a common element1 but one which exists only in change4 ,if it is to exist outside of change1 then the change itself must become fixed4 ,the active in change is the productivity sundered within itself4 7c7 ,it is asked3 77 ,by what means such change can be fixed at all2 it cannot be fixed by anything that is contained as a link in change itself1 and must therefore be fixed by a tertium quid4 77 ,but this tertium quid must be able to invade that original antithesis2 but outside of that antithesis nothing is#bg2 it 7that tertium quid7 must therefore be primarily contained in it1 as something which is mediated by the antithesis1 and by which in turn the antithesis is mediated2 for otherwise there is no ground why it should be primarily contained in that antithesis4 ,the antithesis is dissolution of identity4 ,but nature is primarily identity4 ,in that antithesis1 therefore1 there must again be a struggle after identity4 ,this struggle is immediately conditioned through the antithesis2 for if there was no antithesis1 there would be identity1 absolute rest1 and therefore no struggle toward identity4 ,if1 on the other hand1 there were not identity in the antithesis1 the antithesis itself could not endure4 ,identity produced out of difference is indifference2 that tertium quid is therefore a struggle towards indifference--a struggle which is conditioned1 by the difference itself1 and by which it1 on the other hand1 is conditioned4--7,the difference must not be looked upon as a difference at all1 and is nothing for the intuition1 except through a third1 which sustains it--to which change itself adheres47 ,this tertium quid1 therefore1 is all that is substrate in that primal change4 ,but substrate posits change as much as change posits substrate2 and there is here no first and no second2 but difference and struggle towards indifference1 are1 as far time is concerned1 one and contemporary4 ,axiom4 ,no identity in ,nature is absolute1 but all is only indifference4 ,since that tertium quid itself presupposes the primary antithesis1 the antithesis itself cannot be absolutely removed by it2 the condition of the continuance of that tertium quid of that third activity1 or of ,nature is the perpetual continuance of the antithesis1 just as1 conversely1 the continuance of the antithesis is conditioned by the continuance of the tertium quid4 ,but how1 then1 shall the antithesis be thought as continuing8 ,we have one primary antithesis1 between the limits of which all ,nature must lie2 if we assume that the factors of this antithesis can really pass over into each other1 or go together absolutely in some tertium quid 7some individual product71 then the antithesis is removed1 and along with it the struggle1 and so all the activity of nature4 ,but that the antithesis should endure1 is thinkable only by its being infinite--by the extreme limits being held asunder in infinitum--so that always only the mediating links of the synthesis1 never the last and absolute synthesis itself1 can be produced1 in which case it is only relative points of indifference that are always attained1 never absolute ones1 and every successively originated difference leaves behind a new and still unremoved antithesis1 and this again goes over into indifference1 which1 in its turn1 partially removes the primary antithesis4 ,through the original antithesis and the struggle towards indifference1 there arises a product1 but the product partially does away with the antithesis2 through the doing away of that part--that is1 through the origination of the product itself--there arises a new antithesis1 different from the one that has been done away with1 and through it1 a product different from the first2 but even this leaves the absolute antithesis unremoved1 duality therefore1 and through it a product1 will arise anew1 and so on to infinity4 ,let us say1 for example1 that by the product ,a1 the antitheses c and d are united1 the antitheses b and e still lie outside of that union4 ,this latter is done away with in ,b1 but this product also leaves the antithesis a and f unremoved2 if we say that a and f mark the extreme limits1 then the union of these will be that product which can never be arrived at4 ,between the extremes a and f1 lie the antitheses c and d1 b and e2 but the series of these intermediate antitheses is infinite2 all these intermediate antitheses are included in the one absolute antithesis4--,in the product ,a1 of a only c1 and of f only d is removed2 let what remains of a be called b1 and of f1 e2 these will indeed1 by virtue of the absolute struggle towards indifference1 become again united1 but they leave a new antithesis uncancelled1 and so there remains between a and f an infinite series of intermediate antitheses1 and the product in which those absolutely cancel themselves never is1 but only becomes4 ,this infinitely progressive formation must be thus represented4 ,the original antithesis would necessarily be cancelled in the primal product ,a4 ,the product would necessarily fall at the indifference-point of a and f1 but inasmuch as the antithesis is an absolute one1 which can be cancelled only in an infinitely continued1 never actual1 synthesis1 ,a must be thought as the centre of an infinite periphery1 7whose diameter is the infinite line a f47 ,since in the product of a and f1 only c and d are united1 there arises in it the new division b and e1 the product will therefore divide up into opposite directions2 at the point where the struggle towards indifference attains the preponderance1 b and e will combine and form a new product different from the first--but between a and f1 there still lie an infinite number of antitheses2 the indifference-point ,b is therefore the centre of a periphery which is comprehended in the first1 but is itself again infinite1 and so on4 ,the antithesis of b and e in ,b is maintained through ,a1 because it 7,a7 leaves the antithesis un-united2 in like manner the antithesis in ,c is maintained through ,b1 because ,b1 in its turn1 cancels only a part of a and f4 ,but the antithesis in ,c is maintained through ,b1 only in so far as ,a maintains the antithesis in ,b4#bh ,what therefore in ,c and ,b results from this antithesis--suppose1 for example1 the result of it were universal gravitation--is occasioned by the common influence of ,a1 so that ,b and ,c1 and the infinite number of other products that come1 as intermediate links between a and f1 are1 in relation to ,a1 only one product4--,the difference1 which remains over in ,a after the union of c and d1 is only one1 into which then ,b1 ,c1 c41 again divide4 ,but the continuance of the antithesis is1 in the case of every product1 the condition of the struggle towards indifference1 and thus a struggle towards indifference is maintained through ,a in ,b1 and through ,b in ,c4--,but the antithesis which ,a leaves uncancelled1 is only one1 and therefore also this tendency in ,b1 in ,c1 and so on to infinity1 is only conditioned and maintained through ,a4 ,the organization thus determined is no other than the organization of the ,universe in the system of gravitation4--,gravity is simple1 but its condition is duplicity4--,indifference arises only out of difference4--,the cancelled duality is matter1 inasmuch as it is only mass4 ,the absolute indifference-point exists nowhere1 but is1 as it were1 divided among several single points4--,the ,universe which forms itself from the centre towards the periphery1 seeks the point at which even the extreme antitheses of nature cancel themselves2 the impossibility of this cancelling guarantees the infinity of the ,universe4 ,from every product ,a1 the uncancelled antithesis is carried over to a new one1 ,b1 the former thereby becoming the cause of duality and gravitation for ,b4--7,this carrying over is what is called action by distribution1 the theory of which receives light only at this point4#bi7--,thus1 for example1 the sun1 being only relative indifference1 maintains1 as far as its sphere of action reaches1 the antithesis1 which is the condition of weight upon the subordinate world-bodies4#cj ,the indifference is cancelled at every step1 and at every step it is restored4 ,hence1 weight acts upon a body at rest as well as upon one in motion4--,the universal restoration of duality1 and its recancelling at every step1 can that is appear only as a nisus against a third 7somewhat74 ,this third 7somewhat7 is therefore the pure zero--abstracted from tendency it is nothing #j1 therefore purely ideal1 7marking only direction7--a point4#ca ,gravity the centre of gravity is in the case of every total product only one for the antithesis is one1 and so also the relative indifference-point is only one4 ,the indifference-point of the individual body marks only the line of direction of its tendency towards the universal indifference-point2 hence this point may be regarded as the only one at which gravity acts2 just as that1 whereby bodies alone attain consistence for us1 is simply this tendency outwards4#cb ,vertical falling towards this point is not a simple1 but a compound motion1 and it is a subject for wonder that this has not been perceived before4#cc ,gravity is not proportional to mass 7for what is this mass but an abstraction of the specific gravity which you have hypostatized872 but1 conversely1 the mass of a body is only the expression of the momentum1 with which the antithesis in it cancels itself4 7d7 ,by the foregoing1 the construction of matter in general is completed1 but not the construction of specific difference in matter4 ,that which all the matter of ,b1 ,c1 c41 in relation to ,a has common under it1 is the difference which is not cancelled by ,a1 and which again cancels itself in part in ,b and ,c--hence1 therefore1 the gravity mediated by that difference4 ,what distinguishes ,b and ,c from ,a therefore1 is the difference which is not cancelled by ,a1 and which becomes the condition of gravity in the case of ,b and ,c4--,similarly1 what distinguishes ,c from ,b 7if ,c is a product subordinate to ,b71 is the difference which is not cancelled by ,b1 and which is again carried over to ,c4 ,gravity1 therefore1 is not the same thing for the higher and for the subaltern world-bodies1 and there is as much variety in the central forces as in the conditions of attraction4 ,the means whereby1 in the products ,a1 ,b1 ,c1 which1 in so far as they are opposed to each other1 represent products absolutely homogeneous because the antithesis is the same for the whole product1 another difference of individual products is possible1 is the possibility of a difference of relation between the factors in the cancelling1 so that1 for example1 in ,x1 the positive factor1 and in ,y1 the negative factor1 has the preponderance1 7thus rendering the one body positively1 and the other negatively1 electric74--,all difference is difference of electricity4#cd 7e7 ,that the identity of matter is not absolute identity1 but only indifference1 can be proved from the possibility of again cancelling the identity1 and from the accompanying phenomena4#ce ,we may be allowed1 for brevity's sake1 to include this recancelling1 and its resultant phenomena under the expression dynamical process1 without1 of course1 affirming decisively whether anything of the sort is everywhere actual4 ,now there will be exactly as many stages in the dynamical process as there are stages of transition from difference to indifference4 77 ,the first stage will be marked by objects in which the reproduction and recancelling of the antithesis at every step is still itself an object of perception4 ,the whole product is reproduced anew at every step1#cf that is1 the antithesis which cancels itself in it1 springs up afresh every moment2 but this reproduction of difference loses itself immediately in universal gravity2#cg this reproduction1 therefore1 can be perceived only in individual objects1 which seem to gravitate towards each other2 since1 if to the one factor of an antithesis is offered its opposite 7in another7 both factors become heavy with reference to each other1 in which case1 therefore1 the general gravity is not cancelled1 but a special one occurs within the general4--,an instance of such a mutual relation between two products1 is that of the earth and the magnetic needle1 in which is distinguished the continual recancelling of indifference in gravitation towards the poles#ch--the continual sinking back into identity#ci in gravitation towards the universal indifference-point4 ,here1 therefore1 it is not the object1 but the being-reproduced of the object that becomes object4#dj 77 ,at the first stage1 in the identity of the product1 its duplicity again appears2 at the second1 the antithesis will divide up and distribute itself among different objects 7,a and ,b74 ,from the fact that the one factor of the antithesis attained a relative preponderance in ,a1 the other in ,b1 there will arise1 according to the same law as in 1 a gravitation of the factors toward each other1 and so a new difference1 which1 when the relative equiponderance is restored in each1 results in repulsion#da--7;change of attraction and repulsion1 second stage in which matter is seen7--electricity4 77 ,at the second stage the one factor of the product had only a relative preponderance2#db at the third it will attain an absolute one--by the two bodies ,a and ,b1 the original antithesis is again completely represented--matter will revert to the first stage of becoming4 ,at the first stage there is still ,,pure difference1 without substrate for it was only out of it that a substrate arose2 at the second stage it is the simple factors of two products that are opposed to each other2 at the third it is the ,,products ,,themselves that are opposed2 here is difference in the third power4 ,if two products are absolutely opposed to each other1#dc then in each of them singly indifference of gravity 7by which alone each is7 must be cancelled1 and they must gravitate to each other4#dd 7,in the second stage there was only a mutual gravitating of the factors to each other--here there is a gravitating of the products47#de--,this process1 therefore1 first assails the indifferent 7element7 of the ,,product--that is1 the products themselves dissolve4 ,where there is equal difference there is equal indifference2 difference of products1 therefore1 can end only with indifference of products4--7,all hitherto deduced indifference has been only indifference of substrateless1 or at least simple factors4--,now we come to speak of an indifference of products47 ,this struggle will not cease till there exists a common product4 ,the product1 in forming itself1 passes1 from both sides1 through all the intermediate links that lie between the two products for example1 through all the intermediate stages of specific gravity1 till it finds the point at which it succumbs to indifference1 and the product is fixed4 ,,general ,,remark4 ,by virtue of the first construction1 the product is posited as identity2 this identity1 it is true1 again resolves itself into an antithesis1 which1 however1 is no longer an antithesis cleaving to products1 but an antithesis in the productivity itself4--,the product1 therefore1 as product1 is identity4--,but even in the sphere of products1 there again arises a duplicity in the second stage1 and it is only in the third that even the duplicity of the products again becomes identity of the products4#df--,there is therefore here also a progress from thesis to antithesis1 and thence to synthesis4--,the last synthesis of matter closes in the chemical process2 if composition is to proceed yet further in it1 then this circle must open again4 ,we must leave it to our readers themselves to make out the conclusions to which the principles here stated lead1 and the universal interdependence which is introduced by them into the phenomena of ,nature4--,nevertheless1 to give one instance3 when in the chemical process the bond of gravity is loosed1 the phenomenon of light which accompanies the chemical process in its greatest perfection 7in the process of combustion71 is a remarkable phenomenon1 which1 when followed out further1 confirms what is stated in the ,outlines1 page #adf3--8,the action of light must stand in secret interdependence with the action of gravity which the central bodies exercise40--,for1 is not the indifference dissolved at every step1 since gravity1 as ever active1 presupposes a continual cancelling of indifference8--,it is thus1 therefore1 that the sun1 by the distribution exercised on the earth1 causes a universal separation of matter into the primary antithesis 7and hence gravity74 ,this universal cancelling of indifference is what appears to us 7who are endowed with life7 as light2 wherever1 therefore1 that indifference is dissolved 7in the chemical process71 there light must appear to us4 ,according to the foregoing1 it is one antithesis which1 beginning at magnetism1 and proceeding through electricity1 at last loses itself in the chemical phenomena4#dg ,in the chemical process1 namely1 the whole product ,e or - ,e 7the positively electric body1 in the case of absolutely unburnt bodies1 is always the more combustible2#dh whereas the absolutely incombustible is the cause of all negatively electric condition27 and if we may be allowed to invert the case1 what then are bodies themselves but condensed 7confined7 electricity8 ,in the chemical process the whole body dissolves into ,e or - ,e4 ,light is everywhere the appearing of the positive factor in the primary antithesis2 hence1 wherever the antithesis is restored1 there is light for us1 because generally only the positive factor is beheld1 and the negative one is only felt4--,is the connection of the diurnal and annual deviations of the magnetic needle with light now conceivable--and1 if in every chemical process the antithesis is dissolved1 is it conceivable that ,light is the cause and beginning of all chemical process8#di 7f7 ,the dynamical process is nothing but the second construction of matter1 and however many stages there are in the dynamical process1 there are the same number in the original construction of matter4 ,this axiom is the converse of axiom e4#ej ,that which1 in the dynamical process is perceived in the product1 takes place outside of the product with the simple factors of all duality4 ,the first start to original production is the limitation of productivity through the primitive antithesis1 which1 as antithesis 7and as the condition of all construction71 is distinguished only in magnetism2 the second stage of production is the change of contraction and expansion1 and as such becomes visible only in electricity2 finally1 the third stage is the transition of this change into indifference--a change which is recognized as such only in chemical phenomena4 ,,magnetism1 ,,electricity ,,and ,,chemical ,,process are the categories of the original construction of nature matter--the latter escapes us and lies outside of intuition1 the former are what of it remains behind1 what stands firm1 what is fixed--the general schemes for the construction of matter4#ea ,and--in order to close the circle at the point where it began--just as in organic nature1 in the scale of sensibility1 irritability1 and formative instinct1 the secret of the production of the whole of organic nature lies in each individual1 so in the scale of magnetism1 electricity1 and chemical process1 so far as it 7the scale7 can be distinguished in the individual body1 is to be found the secret of the production of ,nature from itself of the whole of ,nature#eb4 ,c4 ,we have now approached nearer the solution of our problem1 which was3 ,to reduce the construction of organic and inorganic nature to a common expression4 ,inorganic nature is the product of the first power1 organic nature of the second#ec--7this was demonstrated above2 it will soon appear that the latter is the product of a still higher power7--hence the latter1 in view of the former1 appears contingent2 the former1 in view of the latter1 necessary4 ,inorganic nature can take its origin from simple factors1 organic nature only from products1 which again become factors4 ,hence an inorganic nature generally will appear as having been from all eternity1 the organic nature as originated4 ,in the organic nature1 indifference can never be arrived at in the same way in which it is arrived at in inorganic nature1 because life consists in nothing more than a continual prevention of the attainment of indifference a prevention of the absolute transition of productivity into product whereby manifestly there comes about only a condition which is1 so to speak1 extorted from ,nature4 ,by organization1 matter--which has already been composed for the second time by the chemical process--is once more thrown back to the initial point of formation 7the circle above described is again opened72 it is no wonder that matter always thrown back again into formation at last returns as a perfect product4 ,the same stages1 through which the production of ,nature originally passes1 are also passed through by the production of the organic product2 only that the latter1 even in the first stage1 at least begins with products of the simple power4--,organic production also begins with limitation1 not of the primary productivity1 but of the productivity of a product2 organic formation also takes place through the change of expansion and contraction1 just as primary formation does2 but in this case it is a change taking place1 not in the simple productivity1 but in the compound4 ,but there is all this1 too1 in the chemical process1#ed and yet in the chemical process indifference is attained4 ,the vital process1 therefore1 must again be a higher power of the chemical2 and if the scheme that lies at the base of the latter is duplicity1 the scheme of the former will of necessity be triplicity the former will be a process of the third power4 ,but the scheme of triplicity is in reality that the fundamental scheme of the galvanic process 7,ritter's ,demonstration1 c41 p4 #agb72 therefore the galvanic process 7or the process of irritation7 stands a power higher than the chemical1 and the third element1 which the latter lacks and the former has1 prevents indifference from being arrived at in the organic product4#ee ,as irritation does not allow indifference to be arrived at in the individual product1 and as the antithesis is still there 7for the primary antithesis still pursues us71#ef there remains for nature no alternative but separation of the factors in different products4#eg ,the formation of the individual product1 for that very reason1 cannot be a completed formation1 and the product can never cease to be productive4#eh ,the contradiction in ,nature is this1 that the product must be productive i4 e4 a product of the third power1 and that1 notwithstanding1 the product1 as a product of the third power1 must pass over into indifference4#ei ,this contradiction ,nature tries to solve by mediating indifference itself through productivity1 but even this does not succeed--for the act of productivity is only the kindling spark of a new process of irritation2 the product of productivity is a new productivity4 ,into this as its product the productivity of the individual now indeed passes over2 the individual1 therefore1 ceases more rapidly or slowly to be productive1 and ,nature reaches the indifference-point with it only after the latter has got down to a product of the second power4#fj ,and now the result of all this8--,the condition of the inorganic 7as well as of the organic7 product1 is duality4 ,in any case1 however1 organic productive product is so only from the fact that the difference ,,never becomes indifference4 ,it is in so far therefore impossible to reduce the construction of organic and of inorganic product to a common expression1 and the problem is incorrect1 and therefore the solution impossible4 ,the problem presupposes that organic product and inorganic product are mutually opposed1 whereas the latter is only the higher power of the former1 and is produced only by the higher power of the forces through which the latter also is produced4 ,sensibility is only the higher power of magnetism2 irritability only the higher power of electricity2 formative instinct only the higher power of the chemical process4--,but sensibility1 and irritability1 and formative instinct are all only included in that one process of irritation4 7,galvanism affects them all74#fa ,but if they are only the higher functions of magnetism1 electricity1 c41 there must again be a higher synthesis for these in ,nature#fb--;and this1 however1 it is certain1 can be sought for only in ,nature1 in so far as1 viewed as a whole1 it is absolutely organic4 ,and this1 moreover1 is also the result to which the genuine ,science of ,nature must lead1 viz3 that the difference between organic and inorganic nature is only in ,nature as object1 and that ,nature as originally-productive soars above both4#fc 99 99 99 99 99 ,there remains only one remark1 which we may make1 not so much on account of its intrinsic interest1 as in order to justify what we said above in regard to the relation of our system to the hitherto so-called dynamical system4 ,if it were asked1 for instance1 in what form our original antithesis1 cancelled1 or rather fixed1 in the product1 would appear from the stand-point of reflection1 we cannot better designate what is found in the product by analysis1 than as expansive and attractive 7retarding7 force1 to which then however1 gravitation must always be added as the tertium quid1 whereby those opposites become what they are4 ,nevertheless1 the designation is valid only for the stand-point of reflection or of analysis1 and cannot be applied for synthesis at all2 and thus our system leaves off exactly at the point where the ,dynamical ,physics of ,kant and his successors begins1 namely1 at the antithesis as it presents itself in the product4 ,and with this the author delivers over these ,elements of a ,system of ,speculative ,physics to the thinking heads of the age1 begging them to make common cause with him in this science1 which opens up views of no mean order1 and to make up by their own powers1 acquirements and external relations1 for what1 in these respects1 he lacks4 ,the notes not marked as 8,remarks of the original0 are by the ,german ,editor4--,note of the ,translator4 ,footnote #ah3 ,thus1 for example1 it becomes very clear through the whole course of our inquiry1 that1 in order to render the dynamic organization of the ,universe evident in all its parts1 we still lack that central phenomenon of which ,bacon already speaks1 which certainly lies in ,nature1 but has not yet been extracted from it by experiment4 ,remark of the ,original4 ,compare below1 third note to 8,general ,remark40 ,footnote #ai3 ,if only those warm panegyrists of empiricism1 who exalt it at the expense of science1 did not1 true to the idea of empiricism1 try to palm off upon us as empiricism their own judgments1 and what they have put into nature1 and imposed upon objects2 for though many persons think they can talk about it1 there is a great deal more belonging to it than many imagine--to eliminate purely the accomplished from ,nature1 and to state it with the same fidelity with which it has been eliminated4--,remark of the ,original4 ,footnote #bj3 ,a traveller in ,italy makes the remark that the whole history of the world may be demonstrated on the great obelisk at ,rome2 so1 likewise1 in every product of ,nature4 ,every mineral body is a fragment of the annals of the earth4 ,but what is the earth8 ,its history is interwoven with the history of the whole of ,nature1 and so passes from the fossil through the whole of inorganic and organic ,nature1 till it culminates in the history of the universe--one chain4--,remark of the ,original4 ,footnote #ba3 ,volta already asks1 with reference to the affection of the senses by galvanism--8,might not the electric fluid be the immediate cause of all flavors8 ,might it not be the cause of sensation in all the other senses80--,remark of the ,original4 ,footnote #bb3 ,according to the foregoing experiments1 it is at least not impossible to regard the phenomena of light and those of electricity as one1 since in the prismatic spectrum the colors may at least be considered as opposites1 and the white light1 which regularly falls in the middle1 be regarded as the indifference-point2 and for reasons of analogy one is tempted to consider this construction of the phenomena of light as the real one4--,remark of the ,original4 ,footnote #bc3 ,hence wherever the antithesis is cancelled or deranged1 the metamorphosis becomes irregular4 ,for what is disease even but metamorphosis8--,remark of the ,original4 ,footnote #bd3 ,from this point onwards1 there are1 as in the ,outlines1 additions in notes 7similar to the few that have already been admitted into the text in brackets 74 ,they are excerpted from a ,,ms4 copy of the author's4 ,footnote #be3 ,the first postulate of natural science is an antithesis in the pure identity of ,nature4 ,this antithesis must be thought quite purely1 and not with any other substrate besides that of activity2 for it is the condition of all substrate4 ,the person who cannot think activity or opposition without a substrate1 cannot philosophize at all4 ,for all philosophizing goes only to the deduction of a substrate4 ,footnote #bf3 ,the phenomena of electricity show the scheme of nature oscillating between productivity and product4 ,this condition of oscillation or change1 attractive and repulsive force1 is the real condition of formation4 ,footnote #bg3 ,for it is the only thing that is given us to derive all other things from4 ,footnote #bh3 ,the whole of the uncancelled antithesis of ,a is carried over to ,b4 ,but again1 it cannot entirely cancel itself in ,b1 and is therefore carried over to ,c4 ,the antithesis in ,c is therefore maintained by ,b1 but only in so far as ,a maintains the antithesis which is the condition of ,b4 ,footnote #bi3 ,that is1 distribution exists only1 when the antithesis in a product is not absolutely but only relatively cancelled4 ,footnote #cj3 ,the struggle towards indifference attains the preponderance over the antithesis1 at a greater or less distance from the body which exercises the distribution1 7as1 for example1 at a certain distance1 the action by distribution1 which an electric or magnetic body exercises upon another body1 appears as cancelled47 ,the difference in this distance is the ground of the difference of world-bodies in one and the same system1 inasmuch1 namely1 as one part of the matter is subjected to indifference more than the rest4 ,since1 therefore1 the condition of all product is difference1 difference must again arise at every step as the source of all existence1 but must also be thought as again cancelled4 ,by this continual reproduction and resuscitation creation takes place anew at every step4 ,footnote #ca3 ,it is precisely zero to which ,nature continually strives to revert1 and to which it would revert1 if the antithesis were ever cancelled4 ,let us suppose the original condition of ,nature #j 7want of reality74 ,now zero can certainly be thought as dividing itself into #a - #a 7for this #j72 but if we posit that this division as not infinite 7as it is in the infinite series #a - #a #a - #a 44471 then ,nature will as it were oscillate continually between zero and unity--and this is precisely its condition4 ,footnote #cb3 ,baader on the ,pythagorean ,square4 #agih4 7,remark of the original47 ,footnote #cc3 ,except by the thoughtful author of a review of my work on the world-soul1 in the ,wrzburg ,gelehrte ,anzeiger1 the only review of that work that has hitherto come under my notice4 7,remark of the original47 ,footnote #cd3 ,it is here taken for granted that what we call the quality of bodies1 and what we are wont to regard as something homogeneous1 and the ground of all homogeneity is really only an expression for a cancelled difference4 ,footnote #ce3 ,in the ,m4,s4 copy the last part of this sentence reads as follows3 ,the construction of quality ought necessarily to be capable of experimental proof1 by the recancelling the identity1 and of the phenomena which accompany it4 ,footnote #cf3 ,every body must be thought as reproduced at every step--and therefore also every total product4 ,footnote #cg3 ,the universal1 however1 is never perceived1 for the simple reason that it is universal4 ,footnote #ch3 ,whereby what was said above is confirmed1--that falling toward the centre is a compound motion4 ,footnote #ci3 ,the reciprocal cancelling of opposite motions4 ,footnote #dj3 ,or the object is seen in the first stage of becoming1 or of transition from difference to indifference4 ,the phenomena of magnetism even serve1 so to speak1 as an impulse1 to transport us to the standpoint beyond the product1 which is necessary in order to the construction of the product4 ,footnote #da3 ,there will result the opposite effect--a negative attraction1 that is1 repulsion4 ,repulsion and attraction stand to each other as positive and negative magnitudes4 ,repulsion is only negative attraction--attraction only negative repulsion2 as soon1 therefore1 as the maximum of attraction is reached1 it passes over into its opposite--into repulsion4 ,footnote #db3 ,if we designate the factors as and - electricity1 then1 in the second stage1 electricity had a relative preponderance over - electricity4 ,footnote #dc3 ,if no longer the individual factors of the two products1 but the whole products themselves are absolutely opposed to each other4 ,footnote #dd3 ,for product is something wherein antithesis cancels itself1 but it cancels itself only through indifference of gravity4 ,when1 therefore1 two products are opposed to each other1 the indifference in each individually must be absolutely cancelled1 and the whole products must gravitate towards each other4 ,footnote #de3 ,in the electric process1 the whole product is not active1 but only the one factor of the product1 which has the relative preponderance over the other4 ,in the chemical process in which the whole product is active1 it follows that the indifference of the whole product must be cancelled4 ,footnote #df3 ,we have therefore the following scheme of the dynamical process3 ,first stage3 ,unity of the product--magnetism4 ,second stage3 ,duplicity of the products--electricity4 ,third stage3 ,unity of the products--chemical process4 ,footnote #dg3 ,the conclusions which may be deduced from this construction of dynamical phenomena are partly anticipated in what goes before4 ,the following may serve for further explanation3 ,the chemical process1 for example1 in its highest perfection is a process of combustion4 ,now ,i have already shown on another occasion1 that the condition of light in the body undergoing combustion is nothing else but the maximum of its positive electrical condition4 ,for it is always the positively electrical condition that is also the combustible4 ,might not1 then1 this coexistence of the phenomenon of light with the chemical process in its highest perfection give us information about the ground of every phenomenon of light in ,nature8 ,what happens1 then1 in the chemical process8 ,two whole products gravitate towards each other4 ,the indifference of the individual is therefore absolutely cancelled4 ,this absolute cancelling of indifference puts the whole body into the condition of light1 just as the partial in the electric process puts it into a partial condition of light4 ,therefore1 also the light--what seems to stream to us from the sun--is nothing else but the phenomenon of indifference cancelled at every step4 ,for as gravity never ceases to act1 its condition--antithesis--must be regarded as springing up again at every step4 ,we should thus have in light a continual1 visible appearing of gravitation1 and it would be explained why1 in the system of worlds1 it is exactly those bodies which are the principal seat of gravity that are also the principal source of light4 ,we should then1 also1 have an explanation of the connection in which the action of light stands to that of gravitation4 ,the manifold effects of light on the deviations of the magnetic needle1 on atmospheric electricity1 and on organic nature1 would be explained by the very fact that light is the phenomenon of indifference continually cancelled--therefore1 the phenomenon of the dynamical process continually rekindled4 ,it is1 therefore1 one antithesis that prevails in all dynamical phenomena--in those of magnetism1 electricity and light2 for example1 the antithesis1 which is the condition of the electrical phenomena must already enter into the first construction of matter4 ,for all bodies are certainly electrical4 ,footnote #dh3 ,or rather1 conversely1 the more combustible is always also the positively electric2 whence it is manifest that the body which burns has merely reached the maximum of electricity4 ,footnote #di3 ,and indeed it is so4 ,what then is the absolute incombustible8 ,doubtless1 simply that wherewith everything else burns--oxygen4 ,but it is precisely this absolutely incombustible oxygen that is the principle of negative electricity1 and thus we have a confirmation of what ,i have already stated in the ,ideas for a ,philosophy of ,nature1 viz4 that oxygen is a principle of a negative kind1 and therefore the representative1 as it were1 of the power of attraction2 whereas phlogiston1 or1 what is the same thing1 positive electricity1 is the representative of the positive1 or of the force of repulsion4 ,there has long been a theory that the magnetic1 electric1 chemical1 and1 finally1 even the organic phenomena1 are interwoven into one great interdependent whole4 ,this must be established4 ,it is certain that the connection of electricity with the process of combustion may be shown by numerous experiments4 ,one of the most recent of these that has come to my knowledge ,i will cite4 ,it occurs in ,scherer's ,journal of ,chemistry4 ,if a ,leyden jar is filled with iron filings1 and repeatedly charged and discharged1 and if1 after the lapse of some time1 this iron is taken out and placed upon an isolator--paper1 for example--it begins to get hot1 becomes incandescent1 and changes into an oxide of iron4 ,this experiment deserves to be frequently repeated and more closely examined--it might readily lead to something new4 ,this great interdependence1 which a scientific system of physics must establish1 extends over the whole of ,nature4 ,it must1 therefore1 once established1 spread a new light over the ,history of the whole of ,nature4 ,thus1 for example1 it is certain that all geology must start from terrestrial magnetism4 ,but terrestrial electricity must again be determined by magnetism4 ,the connection of ,north and ,south with magnetism is shown even by the irregular movements of the magnetic needle4 ,but again1 with universal electricity1 which1 no less than gravity and magnetism1 has its indifference point--the universal process of combustion and all volcanic phenomena stand connected4 ,therefore1 it is certain that there is one chain going from universal magnetism down to the volcanic phenomena4 ,still these are all only scattered experiments4 ,in order to make this interdependence fully evident1 we need the central phenomenon1 or central experiment1 of which ,bacon speaks oracularly--7,i mean the experiment wherein all those functions of matter1 magnetism1 electricity1 c41 so run together in one phenomenon that the individual function is distinguishable7--proving that the one does not lose itself immediately in the other1 but that each can be exhibited separately--an experiment which1 when it is discovered1 will stand in the same relation to the whole of ,nature1 as galvanism does to organic nature4 ,compare this with the discourse on ,faraday's latest discovery1 7#ahcb17 p4 #ae4 ,complete ,works1 #ast ,div41 last vol4 ,footnote #ej3 ,proof--,all dynamical phenomena are phenomena of transition from difference to indifference4 ,but it is in this very transition that matter is primarily constructed4 ,footnote #ea3 ,in the already mentioned discourse on ,faraday's latest discovery1 the author cites the passage 7p4 #ge1 original edition17 as well as #ef sq4 of the ,general ,view of the ,dynamical ,process 7likewise written before the invention of the voltaic pile17 as a proof of his having anticipated the discoveries which proved the unity of the electrical and the chemical antithesis1 and of the similar connection subsisting between magnetic and chemical phenomena4 7,see also ,remark #b1 p4 #baf47 ,footnote #eb3 ,every individual is an expression of the whole of ,nature4 ,as the existence of the single organic individual rests on that scale1 so does the whole of ,nature4 ,organic nature maintains the whole wealth and variety of her products only by continually changing the relation of those three functions4--,in like manner inorganic ,nature brings forth the whole wealth of her product1 only by changing the relation of those three functions of matter ad infinitum2 for magnetism1 electricity1 and chemical process are the functions of matter generally1 and on that ground alone are they categories for the construction of all matter4 ,this fact1 that those three factors are not phenomena of special kinds of matter1 but functions of all matter universally1 gives its real1 and its innermost sense to dynamical physics1 which1 by this circumstance alone1 rises far above all other kinds of physics4 ,footnote #ec3 ,that is1 the organic product can be thought only as subsisting under the hostile pressure of an external nature4 ,footnote #ed3 ,the chemical process1 too1 has not substrateless or simple factors2 it has products for factors4 ,footnote #ee3 ,the same deduction is already given in the ,outlines1 p4 #afc4--,what the dynamical action is1 which according to the ,outlines is also the cause of irritability1 is now surely clear enough4 ,it is the universal action which is everywhere conditioned by the cancelment of indifference1 and which at last tends towards intussusception 7indifference of products7 when it is not continually prevented1 as it is in the process of irritation4 7,remark of the original47 ,footnote #ef3 ,the abyss of forces1 into which we here look down1 opens with the one question2 ,in the first construction of our earth1 what can have been the ground of the fact that no genesis of new individuals is possible upon it1 otherwise than under the condition of opposite powers8 ,compare an utterance of ,kant on this subject1 in his ,anthropology4 7,remark of the original47 ,footnote #eg3 ,the two factors can never be one1 but must be separated into different products--in order that thus the difference may be permanent4 ,footnote #eh3 ,in the product1 indifference of the first and second powers is arrived at 7for example1 by irritation itself an origin of mass i4 e4 indifference of the first order and even chemical products i4 e4 indifference of the second order are reached71 but indifference of the third power can never be reached1 because it is a contradictory idea4 7,remark of the original47 ,footnote #ei3 ,the product is productive only from the fact of its being a product of the third power4 ,but the idea of a productive product is itself a contradiction4 ,what is productivity is not product1 and what is product is not productivity4 ,therefore a product of the third power is itself a contradictory idea4 ,from this even is manifest what an extremely artificial condition life is--wrenched1 as it were1 from ,nature--subsisting against her will4 ,footnote #fj3 ,nothing shows more clearly the contradictions out of which life arises1 and the fact that it is altogether only a heightened condition of ordinary natural forces1 than the contradiction of ,nature in what she tries1 but tries in vain1 to reach through the sexes4--,nature hates sex1 and where it does arise1 it arises against her will4 ,the diremption into sexes is an inevitable fate1 with which1 after she is once organic1 she must put up1 and which she can never overcome4--,by this very hatred of diremption she finds herself involved in a contradiction1 inasmuch as what is odious to her she is compelled to develop in the most careful manner1 and to lead to the summit of existence1 as if she did it on purpose2 whereas she is always striving only for a return into the identity of the genus1 which1 however1 is chained to the 7never to be cancelled7 duplicity of the sexes1 as to an inevitable condition4 ,that she develops the individual only from compulsion1 and for the sake of the genus1 is manifest from this1 that wherever in a genus she seems desirous of maintaining the individual longer 7though this is never really the case71 she finds the genus becoming more uncertain1 because she must hold the sexes farther asunder1 and1 as it were1 make them flee from each other4 ,in this region of ,nature1 the decay of the individual is not so visibly rapid as it is where the sexes are nearer to each other1 as in the case of the rapidly withering flower1 in which1 from its very birth1 they are enclosed in a calix as in a bride-bed1 but in which1 for that very cause1 the genus is better secured4 ,nature is the laziest of animals1 and curses diremption1 because it imposes upon her the necessity of activity2 she is active only in order to rid herself of this necessity4 ,the opposites must for ever shun1 in order for ever to seek1 each other2 and for ever seek1 in order never to find1 each other2 it is only in this contradiction that the ground of all the activity of ,nature lies4 7,remark of the original47 ,footnote #fa3 ,its effect upon the power of reproduction 7as well as the reaction of particular conditions of the latter power upon galvanic phenomena7 is less studied still than might be needful and useful4--,vide ,outlines1 p4 #agg4--7,remark of the original47 ,footnote #fb3 ,compare above ,remark1 p4 #aig4 7,remark of the original47 ,footnote #fc3 ,that it is therefore the same nature1 which1 by the same forces1 produces organic phenomena1 and the universal phenomena of ,nature1 and that these forces are in a heightened conditioned in organic nature4 ,,analysis ,,of ,,hegel',s ,,sthetics4 ,translated from the ,french of ,m4 ,,ch4 ,,benard1 by ,j4 ,a4 ,,martling4 ,,ii4 ,,sculpture4--,architecture fashions and disposes of the masses of inert nature according to geometric laws1 and it thus succeeds in presenting only a vague and incomplete symbol of the thought4 ,its thought's progress consists in detaching itself from physical existence1 and in expressing spirit in a manner more in conformity with its nature4 ,the first step which art takes in this career does not yet indicate the return of spirit upon itself1 which would render necessary a wholly spiritual mode of expression1 and signs as immaterial as thought2 but spirit appears under a corporeal1 organized living form4 ,what art represents is the animate1 living body1 and above all the human body1 with which the soul is completely identified4 ,such is the rle and the place which belong to ,sculpture4 ,it still resembles architecture in this1 that it fashions extended and solid material2 but it is distinguished from it in this1 that this material1 in its hands1 ceases to be foreign to spirit4 ,the corporeal form blends with it1 and becomes its living image4 ,compared to poetry1 it seems at first to have the advantage over it of representing objects under their natural and visible form1 while speech expresses ideas only by sounds2 but this plastic clearness is more than compensated by the superiority of language as a means of expression4 ,speech reveals the innermost thoughts with a clearness altogether different from the lines of the figure1 the countenance1 and the attitudes of the body2 further1 it shows man in action--active in virtue of his ideas and his passions2 it retraces the various phases of a complete event4 ,sculpture represents neither the inmost sentiments of the soul1 nor its definite passions4 ,it presents the individual character only in general1 and to such an extent as the body can express in a given moment1 without movement1 without living action1 without development4 ,it yields also1 in this respect1 to painting1 which1 by the employment of color and the effects of light1 acquires more of naturalness and truth1 and1 above all1 a great superiority of expression4 ,thus1 one might think at first that ,sculpture would do well to add to its own proper means those of painting4 ,this is a grave error2 for that abstract form1 deprived of color1 which the statuary employs is not an imperfection in it--it is the limit which this art places upon itself4 ,each art represents a degree1 a particular form of the beautiful1 a moment of the development of spirit1 and expresses it excellently4 ,to ,sculpture it belongs to represent the perfection of the bodily form1 plastic beauty1 life1 soul1 spirit animating a body4 ,if it should desire to transcend this limit1 it would fail entirely2 the use of foreign means would alter the purity of its works4 ,it is with art here as with science2 each science has its object1 peculiar1 limited1 abstract2 its circle1 in which it moves1 and where it is free4 ,geometry studies extension1 and extension only2 arithmetic1 number2 jurisprudence1 the right2 c4 ,allow any one to encroach upon the others1 and to aim at universality2 you introduce into its domain confusion1 obscurity1 real imperfection4 ,they develop differently different objects2 clearness1 perfection1 and even liberty1 are to be purchased only at this price4 ,art1 too1 has many phases2 to each a distinct art corresponds4 ,sculpture stops at form1 which it fashions according to its peculiar laws2 to add color thereto is to alter1 to disfigure its object4 ,thereby it preserves its character1 its functions1 its independence2 it represents the material1 corporeal side1 of which architecture gives only a vague and imperfect symbol4 ,it is given to painting1 to substitute for this real form1 a simple visible appearance1 which then admits color1 by joining to it the effects of perspective1 of light and shade4 ,but ,sculpture ought to respect its proper limits1 to confine itself to representing the corporeal form as an expression of the individual spirit1 of the soul1 divested of passion and definite sentiment4 ,in so doing1 it can so much the better content itself with the human form in itself1 in which the soul is1 as it were1 spread over all points4 ,such is also the reason why ,sculpture does not represent spirit in action1 in a succession of movements1 having a determined end1 nor engaged in those enterprises and actions which manifest a character4 ,it prefers to present it in a calm attitude1 or when the movement and the grouping indicate only the commencement of action4 ,through this very thing1 that it presents to our eyes spirit absorbed in the corporeal form1 designed to manifest it in its entirety1 there is lacking the essential point where the expression of the soul centres itself1 the glance of the eye4 ,neither has it any need of the magic of colors1 which1 by the fineness and variety of their shadings1 are fitted to express all the richness of particular traits of character1 and to manifest the soul1 with all the emotions which agitate it4 ,sculpture ought not to admit materials of which it has no need at the step where it stops4 ,the image fashioned by it1 is of a single color2 it employs primitive matter1 the most simple1 uniform1 unicolored3 marble1 ivory1 gold1 brass1 the metals4 ,it is this which the ,greeks had the ability perfectly to seize and hold4 ,after these considerations upon the general character of ,sculpture1 and its connections with other arts1 ,hegel approaches the more special study and the theory of this art4 ,he considers it--#ast1 in its principle2 #b;d1 in its ideal2 #c;d1 in the materials which it employs1 as well as in its various modes of representation and the principal epochs of its historic development4 ,we are compelled to discard a crowd of interesting details upon each of these points1 and to limit ourselves to general ideas4 #a4 ,to seize fully the principle of ,sculpture and the essence of this art1 it is necessary to examine1 in the first place1 what constitutes the content of its representations1 then the corporeal form which should express it2 last1 to see how1 from the perfect accord of the idea and the form1 results the ideal of ,sculpture as it has been realized in ,greek art4 ,the essential content of the representations of ,sculpture is1 as has been said1 spirit incarnate in a corporeal form4 ,now1 not every situation of the soul is fitted to be thus manifested4 ,action1 movement1 determined passion1 can not be represented under a material form2 that ought to show to us the soul diffused through the entire body1 through all its members4 ,thus1 what ,sculpture represents is the individual spirit1 or1 according to the formula of the author1 the spiritual individuality in its essence1 with its general1 universal1 eternal character2 spirit elevated above the inclinations1 the caprices1 the transient impressions which flow in upon the soul1 without profoundly penetrating it4 ,this entire phase of the personal principle ought to be excluded from the representations of ,sculpture4 ,the content of its works is the essence1 the substantial1 true1 invariable part of character1 in opposition to what is accidental and transient4 ,now1 this state of spirit1 not yet particularized1 unalterable1 self-centered1 calm1 is the divine in opposition to finite existence1 which is developed in the midst of accidents and contingencies1 the exhibition of which this world of change and diversity presents us4 ,according to this1 ,sculpture should represent the divine in itself1 in its infinite calm1 and its eternal1 immovable sublimity1 without the discord of action and situation4 ,if1 afterward1 affecting a more determinate mode1 it represents something human in form and character1 it ought still to thrust back all which is accidental and transient2 to admit only the fixed1 invariable side1 the ground of character4 ,this fixed element is what ,sculpture should express as alone constituting the true individuality2 it represents its personages as beings complete and perfect in themselves1 in an absolute repose freed from all foreign influence4 ,the eternal in gods and men is what it is called upon to offer to our contemplation in perfect and unalterable clearness4 ,such is the idea which constitutes the essential content of the works of ,sculpture4 ,what is the form under which this idea should appear8 ,we have seen1 it is the body1 the corporeal form4 ,but the only form worthy to represent the spirit1 is the human form4 ,this form1 in its turn1 ought to be represented1 not in that wherein it approximates the animal form1 but in its ideal beauty2 that is to say1 free1 harmonious1 reflecting the spirit in the features which characterize it1 in all its proportions1 its purity1 the regularity of its lines1 by its mien1 its postures1 etc4 ,it should express spirit in its calmness1 its serenity--both soul and life1 but above all1 spirit4 ,these principles serve to determine the ideal of beauty under the physical form4 ,we must take care1 in the works of ,sculpture1 not to confound this manner of looking at the perfect correspondence of the soul and bodily forms1 with the study of the lineaments of the countenance1 etc4 ,the science of ,gall1 or of ,lavater1 which studies the correspondence of characters with certain lineaments of face or forms of head1 has nothing in common with the artistic studies of the works of the statuary4 ,these seem1 it is true1 to invite us to this study2 but its point of view is wholly different2 it is that of the harmonious and necessary accord of forms1 from which beauty results4 ,the ground of ,sculpture excludes1 moreover1 precisely all the peculiarities of individual character to which the physiognomist attaches himself4 ,the ideal form manifests only the fixed1 regular1 invariable1 although living and individual type4 ,it is then forbidden to the artist1 as far as regards the physiognomy1 to represent the most expressive and determinate lineaments of the countenance2 for1 beside looks1 properly so-called1 the expression of the physiognomy includes many things which are reflected transiently upon the face1 in the countenance or the carriage1 the smile and the glance4 ,sculpture should interdict to itself things so transient1 and confine itself to the permanent traits of the expression of the spirit2 in a word1 it should incarnate in the human form the spiritual principle in its nature1 at once general and individual1 but not yet particularized4 ,to maintain these two terms in just harmony1 is the problem which falls to statuary1 and which the ,greeks have resolved4 ,the consequences to be deduced from these principles are the following3 ,in the first place1 ,sculpture is1 more than the other arts1 suited to the ideal1 and this because of the perfect adaptation of the form to the idea2 in the second place1 it constitutes the centre of classic art1 which represents this perfect accord of the idea and the sensuous form4 ,it alone1 in fact1 offers to us those ideal figures1 pure from all admixture--the perfect expression of physical beauty4 ,it realizes1 before our eyes1 the union of the human and divine1 under the corporeal form4 ,the sense of plastic beauty was given above all to the ,greeks1 and this trait appears everywhere1 not only in ,greek art and ,greek mythology1 but in the real world1 in historic personages3 ,pericles1 ,phidias1 ,socrates1 ,plato1 ,xenophon1 ,sophocles1 ,thucydides1 those artistic natures1 artists of themselves--characters grand and free1 supported upon the basis of a strong individuality1 worthy of being placed beside the immortal gods which ,greek ,sculpture represents4 #b4 ,after having determined the principle of ,sculpture1 ,hegel applies it to the study of the beau ideal1 as the master-pieces of ,greek art have realized it4 ,he examines successively and in detail the character and conditions of the ideal form in the different parts of the human body1 the face1 the looks1 the bearing1 the dress4 ,upon all these points he faithfully follows ,winckelmann1 recapitulates him1 and constantly cites him4 ,the philosopher meanwhile preserves his originality2 it consists in the manner in which he systematizes that which is simply described in the ,history of ,art1 and in giving throughout1 the reason of that which the great critic1 with his exquisite and profound sense1 has so admirably seized and undeniably proved1 but without being able to unfold the theory of it4 ,the subject gathers1 henceforth1 new interest from this explication4 ,we may cite1 in particular1 the description of the ,greek profile1 which1 in the hands of the philosopher1 takes the character of a geometric theorem4 ,it is at the same time an example which demonstrates unanswerably the absolute character of physical beauty4 ,the beauty of these lines has nothing arbitrary2 they indicate the superiority of spirit1 and the pre-eminence of the forms which express it above those which are suited to the functions of the animal nature4 ,what he afterwards says of the looks1 of the bearing1 of the postures1 of the antique dress compared with the modern dress1 and of its ideal character1 presents no less interest4 ,but all these details1 where the author shows much of discrimination1 of genius even1 and spirit1 escape in the analysis4 ,the article where he describes the particular attributes and the accessories which distinguish the personages of ,greek ,sculpture1 although in great part borrowed also from ,winckelmann1 shows a spirit familiarized with the knowledge of the works of antiquity4 #c4 ,the chapter devoted to the different modes of representation of the materials of ,sculpture1 and of its historic development1 is equally full of just and delicate observations4 ,all this is not alone from a theorist1 but from a connoisseur and an enlightened judge4 ,the appreciation of the materials of ,sculpture1 and the comparison of their sthetic value1 furnish also to the author some very ingenious remarks upon a subject which seems scarcely susceptible of interest4 ,finally1 in a rapid sketch1 ,hegel retraces the historic development of ,sculpture1 ,egyptian ,statuary1 ,etruscan art1 the school of gina1 are characterized in strokes remarkable for precision4 ,arrived at ,christian ,sculpture1 without disputing the richness and the ability which it has displayed in its works in wood1 in stone1 etc41 and its excellence in respect to expression1 ,hegel maintains with reason1 that the ,christian principle is little favorable to ,sculpture2 and that in wishing to express the ,christian sentiment in its profundity and its vivacity1 it passes its proper limits4 8,the self-inspection of the soul1 the moral suffering1 the torments of body and of spirit1 martyrdom and penitence1 death and resurrection1 the mystic depth1 the love and out-gushing of the heart1 are wholly unsuited to be represented by ,sculpture1 which requires calmness1 serenity of spirit1 and in expression1 harmony of forms40 ,thus1 ,sculpture here remains rather an ornament of architecture2 it sculptures saints1 bas reliefs upon the niches and porches of churches1 turrets1 etc4 ,from another side1 through arabesques and bas reliefs1 it approximates the principle of painting1 by giving too much expression to its figures1 or by making portraits in marble and in stone4 ,sculpture comes back to its true principle1 at the epoch of the renaissance1 by taking for models the beautiful forms of ,greek art4 ,a ,,dialogue ,,on ,,music4 ,by ,,edward ,,sobolewski4 ,q4 ,tell me what is good music8 ,a4 ,concerning tastes--all fine natures--not the 8fair sex0 only1 possess1 as ,bossuet says1 an instinct for harmony of forms1 colors1 style and tones1 especially for the latter1 because the nerves of the ear being more exposed1 are consequently more sensitive4 ,discords massed together without system1 produce a more disagreeable effect than ill-assorted colors2 and on the other hand1 the etherial beauty of tone-poetry excites the soul more powerfully than the splendor of a ,titian or ,correggio4 ,q4 ,this 8instinct0 and 8taste10 are they one and the same8 ,a4 ,to a certain degree only--though many amateurs1 critics1 musicians1 and even composers1 have had no other guide than a fine instinct4 ,q4 ,you speak as ,pistocchi to the celebrated ,farinelli3 8,a singer needs a hundred things1 but a good voice is ninety-nine of them--the hundredth is the cultivation of the voice40 ,a4 ,the instinct of a delicate1 sensitive organization1 may go far1 but ,i think the hundredth thing is also necessary2 therefore1 one possessed of the finest voice1 but uncultivated1 will sing sometimes badly1 sometimes pretty well1 but never quite perfectly for a real judge4 ,so it is with taste4 ,depending on natural gifts alone1 without cultivation--you will be sometimes right--as often wrong4 ,in short1 your taste is good1 if you find pleasure in those works only which are composed according to the principles of art2 on the contrary1 your taste is bad1 false1 corrupt1 if you find pleasure in music full of faults and defects4 ,q4 ,therefore1 to be correct in taste1 ,i must know the principles of the art2 ,i must know the rules of 8,harmony1 ,rhythm and ,form10 and perhaps much more4 ,why1 ,g4 ,weber has written three large volumes on 8,harmony0 alone4 ,no1 it is too difficult and takes too much time4 ,a4 ,yet it is not so difficult as it seems4 ,to understand music rightly1 nothing is necessary but the knowledge of two keys--major and minor2 two kinds of time--common and triple--one simple chord and two cadences4 ,q4 ,but ,rhythm1 ,form8 ,a4 ,form is ,rhythm1 and ,rhythm is time4 ,q4 ,let us begin then with the keys1 you speak of two only--major and minor--but ,i have heard something of ,ambroseanic1 ,gregoryanic1 ,glareanic and ,greek keys1 wherein are composed the beautiful and sublime compositions of ,palestrina1 ,allegri1 ,lotti1 that are performed annually during ,passion-week in the church of ,st4 ,peter1 at ,rome4 ,a4 ,well1 if you like to go so far back1 we will speak about ,ambrose1 ,gregory1 ,glareanus1 but there are no such things as 8,greek0 keys4 ,the knowledge we have of the music of the ,greeks1 is too slight and imperfect to enable us to assert positively anything concerning it2 and as nothing important or necessary to modern art is involved1 we may be content to let the music of the ancients rest in the obscurity which surrounds it4 ,with the first ,christians1 who hated everything which came from the temples of the heathens1 arose our music4 ,their religious songs were a production of the new soul which came into them with ,jesus ,christ1 and are the foundation of our great edifice of art1 as it now exists4 ,in the year #che1 ,saint ,ambrose introduced four keys1 ,d1 ,e1 ,f1 ,g2 ,pope ,gregory1 in #eig1 added four others to these1 and named the four of ,ambrose1 8authentic moods10 and his four1 which began on every fifth of the first four1 8plagalic40 ,in these eight keys1 without sharps or flats1 are composed the liturgic songs of the ,roman church1 called 8,gregorian chants40 ,they are written in notes of equal value1 without ,rhythm or ,metre1 and are sung in unison with loud voice4 ,glareanus added to those eight keys1 two more1 ,a and ,c1 with their plagal moods4 ,to distinguish more clearly1 some one called the key beginning with 8,d10 ,doric1 8,e10 ,phrygic1 8,f10 ,lydic1 8,g10 ,mixolydic1 8,a10 olic1 and 8,b10 ,tonic4 ,these names are all we have borrowed from ,greece4 ,palestrina1 the preserver of our art1 wrote his compositions in these keys1 and for the highest purity of harmony1 rhythmical beauty1 sublime simplicity1 and deep religious feeling1 his works are still unrivalled4 ,q4 ,why don't you compose in the old keys and in ,palestrina's style8 ,a4 ,they are used sometimes by ,handel in his ,oratorios1 by ,sebastian ,bach in his fugues for organ and piano4 ,later1 ,beethoven has written an ,andante in the ,lydic mood in his string-quartette 7,a minor74 ,i myself have composed the first chorus of ,vinvela1 in the ,mixolydic mood1 and in ,comala1 the song to the moon1 in the ,doric mood2 but ,handel1 ,bach1 ,beethoven1 and myself1 have written in our own style1 and never imitated ,palestrina's4 ,men in similar situations1 only1 have similar ideas4 ,all older works of music utter a language which we yet understand1 but cannot speak4 ,we feel its deep innermost accents1 but we cannot tune the chords of our soul to that pitch which harmonizes in every respect with that feeling4 ,palestrina's music sounds like that of another world2 it is all quite simple2 mostly common chords1 here and there only a chord of the sixth2 and always an irresistible charm4 ,this riddle is partially explained1 if we observe how ,palestrina selected the tones for the different parts in his choruses4 ,let us take the third1 c--e2 e4 g4 let the soprano and the alto sing this third1 and you will have the same harmonic sound that the piano or organ gives4 ,but let the tenor sing one of these tones1 and soprano or alto the other1 and the effect will be very different1 although the tones are the same4 ,palestrina knew not only the particular sound of every tone in every voice1 but also the effect which such or such combinations would produce4 ,this mystery is taught neither by a singing school1 nor by a theory of composition1 and few composers of to-day know it4 ,how great and beautiful is ,beethoven's solemn mass in ,d6 ,what an effect would it make1 had ,beethoven possessed the same knowledge of voices that he had of instruments8 ,now1 unfortunately1 one often overpowers the others1 and the enjoyment of this composition will be always greater for the eye than the ear4 ,we will now go back to the old keys4 ,these are taken from the music produced at that time1 as our two keys1 major and minor1 are taken from the melodies of later times4 ,this seems very simple to us1 but not to our great theorists4 ,gottfried ,weber takes two keys1 major c1 d1 e1 f1 g1 a1 b1 c1 and minor a1 b1 c1 d1 e1 f1 g sharp1 the same rising and falling equally4 ,hauptmann1 the first teacher of harmony in the ,conservatory of ,music at ,leipsic1 says in his book1 ,the ,nature of ,harmony and ,metre1 page #cj--8,the key is formed1 when the common chord 7c1 e1 g71 after having gone through the subdominant-chord 7f1 a1 c71 and dominant-chord 7g1 b1 d71 has come in opposition with itself2 this opposition coupled together1 becomes unity and the key40 ,he finds in our music three keys1 and names them1 the major1 the minor1 and the minor major4 ,r4 ,wagner recognizes no key at all2 for him exists a chromatic scale only4 ,he says3 8,the scale is the most closely united1 the most intimately related family among tones40 ,he does not like to stay long in one key1 and takes the continuous change of keys for a quality of the music of the future2 therefore1 he finds in ,beethoven's last symphony1 in the melody to ,schiller's poem1 a going back1 because it has scarcely any modulation4 ,we will not be so lavish with keys as ,hauptmann1 nor so economical as ,r4 ,wagner1 neither are we of ,weber's opinion4 ,we find in ,c major the old ,glareanic key1 called also 8,ionic20 in our ,a minor of this day1 a 8mixtum compositum0 of several old keys2 it begins as the 8olic0 a1 b1 c1 d1 e1 f1 takes then its seventh tone1 g sharp1 from the ,lydic1 transposed a third higher2 uses sometimes also the sixth of the last1 accepts lastly the character of the ,phrygic1 transposed a fourth higher1 and brings thus the tone b flat into its scale1 which has been already the subject of much discussion1 although that has never succeeded in throwing this tone out of many melodies in ,a minor4 ,we have melodies which are the pure ,a minor from the beginning to the end1 wherein we find f sharp and f natural1 g and g sharp1 b and b flat1 and the last oftener than f sharp2 therefore1 we must build the scale of ,a minor1 and its harmony1 according to those different tones2 it will be a1 b1 c1 d1 e1 f1 g sharp1 a1 b flat1 f sharp1 g natural4 ,let us proceed4 ,the two kinds of time are common and triple4 ,the rhythm of the first is--1 that of the second-- 4 ,the accentuation of subdivisions is governed by the same law4 ,it makes no difference whether a piece of music is written in #bc or #bd1 or even #bh time2 but good composers of music1 writing in #bd time1 intend the same to be of lighter rendition than those composed in #bb time1 etc4 ,concerning harmony1 there is one chord only--all other harmonies are passing notes1 inversions1 prolongations1 suspensions or retardations of chord-tones1 or from sharped and diminished intervals4 ,harmony is a connection of different melodies4 ,before chords were known1 they descanted1 that is1 they tried to sing to a melody1 commonly a sacred hymn1 called cantus firmus1 different harmonical tones1 and named this part1 ,descant2 ,italian1 soprano2 ,french1 ,le dessus4 ,later there was added to the tenor 7which performed the cantus firmus7 a higher part1 named alto1 and lastly1 a lower part was added called bass4 ,these four parts1 though each melodious and independent in itself1 harmonized closely with each other1 all striving for the same aim4 ,even to-day we must necessarily call such music good1 wherein every voice acts independently of all others1 and still in harmony with the same1 in order to express the reigning feeling1 and sustain the various shades in contrast to non-acting and lifeless trabants1 which may be strikingly seen in many compositions1 particularly in four-part songs for male voices1 by ,abt1 ,gumbert1 ,kcken1 etc41 wherein three voices 7,brummstimmen7 accompany the fourth with a growling sound escaping their closed lips4 ,the two cadences or musical phrases are the cadence on the tonic and the cadence on the dominant4 ,the cadence on the tonic1 consisting of the chord in the dominant1 followed by that of the tonic1 concludes the sense of the musical phrase1 and is called 8perfect0 when the tonic is in the highest and lowest part4 ,it corresponds to a period in language4 ,the cadence on the dominant consists of the tonic1 or the chord of the second or fourth going to the dominant4 ,the cadence of the dominant suspends the sense of the musical phrase without concluding it4 ,this is likewise the case with the cadence on the tonic1 if the tonic is not in the highest and lowest part4 ,q4 ,you say nothing of the great mistake wherein two fifths or octaves follow each other8 ,a4 ,of course1 the true nature of the proper arrangement of parts excludes all direct fifths4 ,it is considered by the new school 8an exploded idea40 ,mozart himself made use of fifths in the first finale of ,don ,giovanni4 ,q4 ,i have heard something of these fifths1 but was told it was 8irony10 being contained in the minuet which ,mozart composed for 8country musicians08 ,a4 ,you also find octaves in ,s4 ,bach's 8,matthew ,passion10 p4 #be1 8,on the cross10 where surely no ironical meaning was intended4 ,q4 ,do you not say anything in regard to form8 ,a4 ,form is an 8exploded idea0 also4 ,the composers of the new school construct their vocal music so as to let the poem govern the music in relation to metre and form2 in their instrumental compositions1 the form is governed by phantasy4 ,q4 ,but what do you understand by a symphony1 sonata or overture8 ,a4 ,i must again go back1 in order to explain this properly4 ,revolutions often beat the path for new ideas4 ,palestrina towers great and unattainable in his compositions of sacred music1 which breathe and express the purest catholicism4 ,but a ,luther1 ,zwingli1 and others came1 followed soon by ,handel and ,bach1 who1 about the middle of the eighteenth century1 created a music full of freshness1 primitiveness and transporting power1 which lived and died with the reformers4 ,the three grand-masters1 ,palestrina1 ,handel and ,bach1 equal1 but do not rival each other4 ,we cannot judge them for the different sentiments they indulged in4 ,the philosophers may settle which is the best religion1 for to the necessity of one they all agree1 but music cannot be chained by dogmas4 ,heaven is an orb1 whose centre is everywhere4 ,palestrina's music is the language of the south1 ,handel's and ,bach's that of the north4 ,though one sun illumes both lands--though one ether spans both1 yet in the south the sun is milder1 the ether purer4 ,flowers which there grow in wild abundance1 the north must obtain by culture4 ,we must think at our work4 ,this necessity of thought is apparent in religion1 language and art1 and can be seen most clearly in the greatest works of the ,german grand-masters1 in ,bach's 8,matthew ,passion10 and ,handel's 8,israel40 ,sebastian ,bach's astonishing dexterity in thematical works is the reason that even unto this day we do not find a symphony or overture appropriate for a concert1 of which the single motive forming the principal thought of the movement is not worked up on the basis which he constructed with such deep knowledge and skill4 ,to him we must retrace our steps1 in order to perceive the true nature of our instrumental music1 for we are as little masters of the course of our ideas1 as of the circulation of the blood in our veins4 ,centuries have passed1 and although the first great instrumental-piece--the overture--was a ,french production1 7,lulli was the first master in this genre of art17 yet ,bach and ,handel impressed the first decided stamp upon it4 ,later1 the overture was supplanted by the symphony1 for the reason that it was of easier composition and execution than the former4 ,the overture consisted of a grave1 followed by a fugue4 ,the symphony was composed somewhat in the style of a fugue and that of the lively dances of that time4 ,shortly after this period1 the dance-music was thought no longer fashionable1 and was succeeded by two ,allegros1 with an ,andante or ,largo placed between them4 ,father ,hayden felt hurt at the complete abandonment of dance-music1 and again adopted the minuet4 ,mozart also preferred the grave and majestic dancing-step of his ancestors1 the minuet4 ,but ,beethoven's impetuous and passionate nature scoffed at the slow and gracious movements of the minuet1 and revelled instead in the wild ,scherzo1 or in the capricious demonical leaps of the old ,passepied4 ,dark and mighty forms rose before the gloomy vision of his inner-man1 acting powerfully upon the phantasy1 and wherever they met this volcanic fire1 always leaving a deep impression4 ,two comets ushered in the existence of our century2 the one revolutionized the exterior--the other1 the interior world4 ,especially were the young generation touched by the electric sparks of their rays4 ,napoleon's battles were repeated a thousand times in the nurseries with lead and paper soldiers4 ,beethoven's melodies agitated the souls of the young generation in their working and dreaming hours4 ,when the shoes of the child became too small they were thrown aside2 the lead and paper soldiers shared the same fate2 but the melodious tones grew with the soul to more and more powerful chords4 ,beethoven's star shone brighter1 while ,napoleon's was already fading4 ,then we heard that ,beethoven intended to destroy his great symphony called 8,eroica40 ,napoleon1 the consul1 to whom ,beethoven designed to dedicate this great work1 had sunk to ,napoleon the ,emperor1 and ,beethoven felt ashamed4 ,majesty of rank is often devoid of the grace and majesty of the soul4 ,the chord eb1 g1 bb wherewith the bass solemnly introduced the third symphony 7,eroica71 and his inversions in the ,scherzo bb1 eb1 g1 bb1 and in the last movement e1 b1 b1 e1 this echo of the ,marseillaise suited no longer and should perish with it4 ,only then1 when fate1 in the icy deserts of ,russia1 clasped the grand ,general in its iron grip1 and never loosened its hold until it had crushed him1 did the composer of the ,eroica comprehend that in the marcia funebre contained in this symphony1 he had spoken in prophetic voice4 ,the prophecy contained in the last movement was destined to be fulfilled in the latter half of this century4 ,as ,beethoven poured out his soul in a prophetic epopee1 so did ,mozart embody his genius in his ,don ,giovanni4 ,but as the sublime always acts more powerfully upon youth than knowledge and beauty1 so likewise was the success of ,beethoven greater than that of ,mozart in this century4 ,altogether ,mozart is generally appreciated better in riper years4 8,la delicatesse du gout est une premire nuance de la satit40 ,mendelssohn1 whose compositions ever flowed smoothly and quietly1 understood well how to tune his harmonica to ,mozart's tuning-fork4 ,q4 ,you represent ,beethoven as grave and solemn1 and yet it appears he was not a great despiser of dances4 ,take1 for instance1 his ,a major symphony4 ,lively to overflowing1 almost mad with frantic joy1 is the first movement4 ,equal to a double quick-step1 the last1 about as the peasants of ,saxony perform their dances1 the ,scherzo gay2 and in the ,andante1 he even calls upon a lot of old bachelors and maiden-ladies1 with their hoop accompaniment1 to fall in and execute their tours8 ,a4 ,what opposite views are often taken of the same thing by different minds6 ,in the andante1 in which you find so much humor1 ,marx observes the sober view of life1 at first the peaceful and untroubled step1 but growing ever more and more painful1 and suffering1 fighting the battle of life2 yet1 be this as it may1 such music is ever successful1 even in spite of the biting criticism of ,maria v4 ,weber1 and the ferocious attacks of ,oulibischeff4 ,q4 ,a good dance is always successful1 ,i believe8 ,a4 ,mendelssohn knew this1 as he also understood ,beethoven and the public1 when he wrote his dance overture1 8,a ,summer-night's ,dream40 ,auber1 ,herold and others wrote dance overtures en masse1 and we often find more piquant themes in them than ,beethoven's ,a major symphony1 or ,mendelssohn's ,summer-night's ,dream can boast of1 yet we do not prefer them for the concert4 ,all compositions for an orchestra1 be they overture or symphony1 must first contain a theme1 which expresses the character of the principal composition4 ,second1 the expansions of compositions in the style of a symphony1 must1 according to my opinion1 originate from one theme1 germinate from one seed1 growing larger and stronger all the time1 until the swelling bud bursts into a beautiful blossom2 yet there must not be orange-blossoms on an oak-tree2 all must fit harmoniously4 ,the theme1 sujet1 or motive1 must be a fixed idea1 such as 8love20 it must be ever present--the first at day-break1 the last at night--no other impression must be strong enough to erase it4 ,if1 by the blossom1 you understand the creation of a second thought1 often called the second theme1 even this second theme ought to be governed by the first1 even this blossom ought to glow in the same colors4 ,it must be so twined around the heart of the composer1 that nothing foreign could possibly enter it4 ,merely thematical productions are exercises for the pupil2 compositions which merely contain parts composed by rule1 are merely a musical exercise4 ,lobe certainly is wrong1 if he thus teaches the art of composing4 ,true1 it is easy to point out how one part belongs here1 the other there1 yet the composition must be a free expression of the soul4 ,third--,the finishing of the same4 ,this must also be governed in its main parts by the predominating feeling1 and only minor thoughts and impressions must be used by the composer to fill up or cast away4 ,let us now turn1 for illustration1 to the theme of ,wagner's overture to ,faustus4 ,in the introduction we first see it in the eighth measure1 very moderate1 in the dominant d minor1 commencing with the notes a bb bb4 a g sharp1 and headed 8very expressive10 concerning which ,von ,bulow observes1 that it truly expresses the feeling and character of the last lines of the motto which ,wagner chose at the heading3 8,thus life to me a dire burden is2 ,existence ,i despise1 for death ,i wish40 ,if we designate the above-mentioned theme by figure ,i4 we must name the figure which already makes its appearance in the second measure1 and which is of the utmost importance1 to wit1 d sharp1 e1 f1 f1 e1 e1 b1 b1 figure ,,ii41 the first theme having been expressed by the violin1 the second figure reappears again in the tenth measure1 executed by the viola1 growling like a furiously racked demon1 while the wind instruments1 flute1 oboe and clarionet1 8very expressive10 and yet full of sympathizing sorrow1 intervene at the last quarter of the tenth measure with the motive1 which we will call figure ,,iii4 ,figure ,,ii4 continues rumbling in the quartette1 relieved by another figure 7,,iv47 descending from above1 which is introduced by the second violin in the fourteenth measure4 ,figure ,,iv4 now extends itself further above a chromatic bass1 until in the nineteenth measure1 in d major1 a clear and distinct new motive1 gentle and forgiving in character 7,v47 makes its appearance4 ,these five motives which the composer so exquisitely leads before us1 in his very moderate introduction1 now receive the finishing-touch in the allegro4 ,thus speaks ,von ,bulow4 ,truly1 as ,goethe says3 8,if you perform a piece1 be sure to perform the same in pieces40 ,i will pass over the introduction1 though ,i have as little taste for such 8theme pieces0 succeeding each other1 as for ,opera-overtures1 such as that of ,tannhuser1 where pilgrim-songs1 the love-sick murmurings of the voluptuous ,venus1 and the tedious ,count's drawling sorrow for his only daughter and heir1 form a hash1 which in the details1 and in the heterogeneous compilation of the same1 is unpalatable enough1 but which is made unbearable by the soul-killing figures--no6 not figures1 but by the up and down strokes of monotonous bases1 which continue for about sixty measures4 ,setting aside even all this1 we may justly expect in the allegro the expansion of the principle theme ,i41 yet we have no such thing2 in place of the 8idea0 he produces after the first five measures a worthless figure1 fit for accompaniment only1 which is supported on its tottering basis by the twenty-seven times repeated downstroke of the conductor only4 ,q4 ,excuse me2 but the tone-picture1 which ,von ,bulow1 ,r4 ,wagner's friend and admirer1 calls the forgiving voice 7,,iii71 reappears twice in wind-instrument music8 ,a4 ,according to ,lobe's system4 ,borrow a measure or two from a theme1 then a motive1 which you may construct from this or that or a third figure1 and you have1 besides the required unity1 the grandest variation4 ,do you know1 my young friend1 what a composer understands by an exploded idea8 ,the technical6 ,all who study the art of composing1 as ,lobe teaches it1 may learn to become compilers but not composers2 or they must drink elder-tea1 till their visions appear black and blue to them1 in order to evaporate the schooling they enjoyed4 ,after twenty-seven measures of earthly smoke1 there appears a solitary star1 theme ,i41 continuing for four whole measures1 followed by a little more mist4 ,q4 ,no2 ,i think ,bulow says the mist is parted by a firm and punctuated motive4 ,a4 ,if it is not firm1 it is at least fortissimo4 ,enough1 we again hear thirteen measures of unimportant music1 concluded by d minor1 followed by a new melody for a hautboy1 which1 as it repeats the two first notes of the first theme1 may claim to be considered as belonging there1 leading to a third in f major1 in company with a tremulando1 la ,samiel1 crescendo and diminuendo4 ,we have now arrived at the point where we may look for the second theme1 8the blossom10 as we before said1 but alas1 in vain your tortured soul waits1 no blossoms6 ,the thermometer sinks again6 ,with the cadence we again hear theme ,i41 after four measures we find ourselves once more in d flat major--no1 in a minor1 b flat major or b flat minor1 or g minor1 it is difficult to say which1 for this part may be said to belong in the 8most inseparably combined1 the closest related family of all keys40 ,enough1 we find ourselves after twenty-six measures exactly at the very place we started from1 before the performance of twenty-six measures1 namely1 in f major4 ,this movement of twenty-six measures might be wholly thrown out1 without one being any wiser--a possibility which1 in every good composition1 must be looked upon as a great fault1 as all parts must be so closely united as to enforce the presence and support of each other4 ,we will now look at the second theme4 ,in it no critic can find a fault4 ,it unravels itself smoothly1 and1 after forty-nine measures1 conducts us again to motive ,v4 in the introduction1 as likewise to figure ,,ii41 which here does not frown quite so much4 ,figure ,v4 first appears in f1 after twenty-two measures in g flat major1 after fourteen more in ,a minor1 after thirty-four in d minor1 and after another thirty-nine measures we at last hear theme ,i4 again1 in the dominant of the bass1 a ,faustus with lantern jaws1 sunken temples1 sparse hair1 but with a very1 very magnificent bread-basket4 ,the blossom is larger than the whole tree4 ,if it is not a miracle1 it is a wonderful abortion4 ,are you now curious as to the second part8 ,oh6 it almost appears like a fugue1 the bass dies away1 a fifth higher the cello commences1 another fifth higher the viola in unison with the second violin2 but as the composer has strayed already from d minor to b minor1 he does not think it safe to stray further2 the wind instruments continue by themselves in figure ,,ii4 ,q4 ,bulow says the cello and viola united1 once more introduce the principal theme4 ,a4 ,just so4 ,after the bassoon has tried twice to begin the same1 after about thirty measures of worldly ether1 more devoid of stars than the ,south ,pole1 it is headed 8wild60 ,the leading theme once more begins in the principal tonic 7d minor71 etc41 afterwards enlarged1 the first two notes converted1 caught up by the cello and the trumpet1 wherein the bass-trombone is expected to perform the high ,a1 and after twenty-eight measures of 8hated existence0 the second theme in d major1 together with the finale1 appears like a short bright ray of the glorious sun on a misty winter day4 8,he1 who reigns above my powers1 ,cannot shake the outer towers0-- is ,wagner's motto1 which he has justly chosen for the heading of his overture1 and ,i attempt no alteration only at the conclusion1 and close with-- 8,in such music existence a burden is1 ,the future ,i hate1 for the ,end ,i wish40 ,q4 ,bulow would also answer as ,goethe3 8,to understand and write of living things1 ,try first to drive away the soul1 ,the parts will then remain within your hand60 ,a4 ,i have never found fault with these parts1 excepting1 perhaps1 that ,i said the working out of the second theme is1 in proportion to the first theme1 too extensive2 in fact1 there is nothing of the future contained in the overture4 ,q4 ,no future8 ,a4 ,i mean to say1 no music of the future--not even a chromatic scale for the fundamental key--it moves entirely in the common form3 ,principal theme--d minor2 ,second theme--f major2 ,return to fundamental key2 ,second theme--d major1 and conclusion in this key4 ,the finish and working up is neat and careful1 and many pretty and uncommon effects occur therein2 still ,i do not think the same in its proper place for a concert4 ,it inherits nothing of the ,bach2 the piece is well constructed1 yet the small pieces cannot escape criticism4 ,even ,beethoven1 in the first movements of his ,eroica makes us acquainted with all the parts he intends to work up1 and in his c minor symphony he says plainly3 ,now observe2 the notes g g g e flat compose the whole1 nothing more4 ,but after that it is a rushing flow1 an unbroken ring and song1 pressing breathlessly onward1 which captivates and carries us along with its force4 ,to express myself plainly1 ,i may say that we can perceive the work was done before it began4 ,it is true1 and ,i will not deny that even he applied the file to heighten its polish1 yet the whole structure stood finished to his vision before even these first four notes were penned4 ,no doubt ,r4 ,wagner also imagined a picture before he painted it1 but surely no musical one2 the poetry was there--the music had to be manufactured4 ,it is full of genius1 and not untrue2 but he does not allow sufficient freedom to the different instruments1 and is1 consequently1 not sufficiently 8obligato40 ,the parts succeed1 instead of going in company or against each other4 ,although now one1 then another instrument catches up a thought1 yet the whole appears more like a ,quartette of ,pleyel than one of ,beethoven's--the overture is not thought out polyphonically4 ,many1 however1 do not know what ,polyphonism is2 it has been written about in many curious ways4 ,the pupil will best learn to write music in a polyphonic manner1 if1 at the commencement1 he invents at once a double-voiced movement1 but in such a manner that one voice is not the subordinate of the other2 both are equally necessary to represent the meaning of the thought he wishes to express4 ,in this manner he may or must continue in regard to the three or four-voiced movements likewise4 ,the addition of voices to a melody satisfactory in itself1 be they ever so well flourished1 cannot properly be called polyphonism4 ,polyphonism1 however1 should be the ruling principle in all orchestral concert compositions1 although in some points1 for instance1 in the second theme1 homophony may take its place4 ,a well composed symphony or overture must not entertain the audience only1 but every performing musician must feel that he is not an instrument or a machine1 but a living and intelligent being4 ,the overture to ,faustus so entirely ignores ,polyphony1 that it seems a virtual denial of its effectiveness and importance in orchestral composition4 ,richard ,wagner will never become a composer of instrumental music1 but in his operas he has opened a new avenue1 and his creations therein are something grand and sublime4 ,,schopenhauer',s ,,doctrine ,,of ,,the ,,will4 ,translated from the ,german1 by ,c4 ,l4 ,,bernays4 ,we print below a condensed statement of the central doctrine of ,arthur ,schopenhauer4 ,it is translated from his work entitled 8,ueber den ,willen in der ,natur10 #b;d ed41 #ahed1 ,frankfort--pp4 #ai-bc1 and #fc4 ,to those familiar with the kernel of speculative truth1 it is unnecessary to remark that the basis of the system herewith presented is thoroughly speculative1 and resembles in some respects that of ,leibnitz in the ,monadology1 printed in our last number4 ,it is only an attempt to solve all problems through self-determination1 and this in its immediate form as the will4 ,of course the immediateness 7i4 e4 lack of development or realization7 of the principle employed here1 leads into difficulty1 and renders it impossible for him to see the close relation he stands in to other great thinkers4 ,hence he uses very severe language when speaking of other philosophers4 ,if the ,will is taken for the 8,radical of the ,soul10 then other forms of self-determination1 e4 g4 the grades of knowing1 will not be recognized as possessing substantiality1 and hence the theoretical mind will be subordinated to the practical2--a result1 again1 which is the outcome of the ,philosophy of ,fichte4 ,but ,leibnitz seizes a more general aperu1 and identifies self-determination with cognition in its various stages2 and hence he rises to the great principle of ,recognition as the form under which all finitude is cancelled--all multiplicity preserved in the unity of the ,absolute4--,,editor4 ,the idea of a soul as a metaphysical being1 in whose absolute simplicity will and intellect were an indissoluble unity1 was a great and permanent impediment to all deeper insight into natural phenomena4 ,the cardinal merit of my doctrine1 and that which puts it in opposition to all the former philosophies1 is the perfect separation of the will from the intellect4 ,all former philosophers thought will to be inseparable from the intellect2 the will was declared to be conditioned upon the intellect1 or even to be a mere function of it1 whilst the intellect was regarded as the fundamental principle of our spiritual existence4 ,i am well aware that to the future alone belongs the recognition of this doctrine1 but to the future philosophy the separation1 or rather the decomposition of the soul into two heterogeneous elements1 will have the same significance as the decomposition of water had to chemistry4 ,not the soul is the eternal and indestructible or the very principle of life in men1 but what ,i might call the ,radical of the soul1 and that is the ,will4 ,the so-called soul is already a compound2 it is the combination of will and the 1 intellect4 ,the intellect is the secondary1 the posterius in any organism1 and1 as a mere function of the brain1 dependent upon the organism4 ,the will1 on the contrary1 is primary1 the prius of the organism1 and the organism consequently is conditioned by it4 ,for the will is the very 8thing in itself10 which in conception 7that is1 in the peculiar function of the brain7 exhibits itself as an organic body4 ,only by virtue of the forms of cognition1 that is1 by virtue of that function of the brain--hence only in conception--one's body is something extended and organic1 not outside of it1 or immediately in self-consciousness4 ,just as the various single acts of the body are nothing but the various acts of the will portrayed in the represented world1 just so is the shape of this body as a totality the image of its will as a whole4 ,in all organic functions of the body1 therefore1 just as in its external actions1 the will is the 8agens40 ,true physiology1 on its height1 shows the intellect to be the product of the physical organization1 but true metaphysics show1 that physical existence itself is the product1 or rather the appearance1 of a spiritual agens1 to-wit1 the will2 nay1 that matter itself is conditioned through conception1 in which alone it exists4 ,perception and thought may well be explained by the nature of the organism2 the will never can be2 the contrary is true1 namely1 that every organism originates by and from the will4 ,this ,i show as follows3 ,i therefore posit the will as the 8thing in itself0--as something absolutely primitive2 secondly1 the simple visibility of the will1 its objectivation as our body2 and thirdly1 the intellect as a mere function of a certain part of that body4 ,that part 7the brain7 is the objectivated desire 7or will7 to know1 which became represented3 for the will1 to reach its ends1 needs the intellect4 ,this function again pre-supposes the whole world as representation2 it therefore pre-supposes also the body as an object1 and even matter itself1 so far as existing only in representation1 for an objective world without a subject in whose intellect it stands1 is1 well considered1 something altogether unthinkable4 ,hence intellect and matter 7subject and object7 only relatively exist for each other1 and in that way constitute the apparent world4 ,whenever the will acts on external matter1 or whenever it is directed towards a known object1 thus passing through the medium of knowledge1 then all recognize that the agens1 which here is in action1 is the will1 and they call it by that name4 ,yet1 that is will not less which acts in the inner process that precedes those external actions as their condition1 which create and preserve the organic life and its substrate2 and secretion1 digestion1 and the circulation of the blood1 are its work also4 ,but just because the will was recognized only while leaving the individual from which it started1 and directing itself to the external world1 which precisely for that purpose now appears as perception1 the intellect was regarded as its essential condition1 as its sole element1 and as the very substance out of which it was made1 and thereby the very worst hysteron proteron was committed that ever happened4 ,before all1 one should know how to discriminate between will and arbitrariness 7,wille und ,willkhr71 and one should understand that the first can exist without the second4 ,will is called arbitrariness where it is lighted by intellect1 and whenever motives or conceptions are its moving causes2 or1 objectively speaking1 whenever external causes which produce an act are mediated by a brain4 ,the motive may be defined as an external irritation1 by whose influence an image is formed in the brain1 and under the mediation of which the will accomplishes its effect1 that is1 an external act of the body4 ,with the human species the place of that image may be occupied by a concept1 which being formed from images of a similar kind1 by omitting the differences1 is no longer intuitive1 but only marked and fixed by words4 ,hence as the action of motives is altogether independent of any contact1 they therefore can measure their respective forces upon the will1 on each other1 and thereby permit a certain choice4 ,with the animals1 that choice is confined to the narrow horizon of what is visibly projected before them2 among men it has the wide range of the thinkable1 or of its concepts1 as its sphere4 ,those movements1 therefore1 which result from motives1 and not from causes1 as in the inorganic world1 nor from mere irritation1 as with the plants1 are called arbitrary movements4 ,these motives pre-suppose knowledge1 the medium of the motives1 through which in this case causality is effected1 irrespective of their absolute necessity in any other respect4 ,physiologically1 the difference between irritation and motive may be described thus3 ,irritation excites a reaction immediately1 the reaction issuing from the same part upon which the irritation had acted2 whilst a motive is an irritation1 which must make a circuit through the brain1 where first an image is formed1 and that image then originates the ensuing reaction1 which now is called an act of the free will4 ,hence the difference between free and unfree movements does not concern the essential and primary1 which in both is the will1 but only the secondary1 that is1 the way in which the will is aroused2 to-wit1 whether it shows itself in consequence of some real cause1 or of an irritation1 or of a motive1 that is1 of a cause that had to pass through the organ of the intellect4 ,free will or arbitrariness is only possible in the consciousness of men4 ,it differs from the consciousness of animals in this1 that it contains not only present and tangible representations1 but abstract concepts1 which1 independent of the differences of time1 act simultaneously and side by side1 permitting thereby conviction or a conflict of motives2 this1 in the strictest sense of the word1 is called free will4 ,yet this very free will or choice consists only in the victory of the stronger motive over a weaker in a given individual character1 by which the ensuing action was determined1 just as one impulse is overpowered by a stronger counter impulse1 whereby the effect nevertheless appears with the same necessity as the movement of a stone that has received an impulse4 ,the great thinkers of all times agree in this decidedly2 while1 on the contrary1 the vulgar will little understand the great truth1 that the mark of our liberty is not to be found in our single acts1 but in our existence itself1 and in its very essence4 ,whenever one has succeeded to discriminate will from free will1 or the arbitrary1 and to consider the latter as a peculiar species of the former1 then there is no more room for any difficulty in discovering the will also in occurrences wherein intelligence cannot be traced4 99 99 99 99 99 ,the will is the original4 ,it has created the world1 but not through the medium of an intellect either outside or inside of the world1 for we know of the intellect only through the mediation of the animal world1 the very last in creation4 ,the will itself1 the unintentional will which is discovered in everything1 is the creator of the world4 ,the animals1 therefore1 are organized in accordance with their mode of living1 and their mode of living is not shaped in conformity with their organs2 the structure of any animal is the result of its will to be what it is4 ,nature1 which never lies1 tells us the same in its nave way2 it lets any being just kindle the first spark of its life on one of his equals1 and then lets it finish itself before our eyes4 ,the form and the movement it takes from its own self1 the substance from outside4 ,this is called growth and development4 ,thus even empirically do all beings stand before us as their own work2 but the language of nature is too simple1 and therefore but few understand it4 ,cognition1 since all motives are dependent on it1 is the essential characteristic of the animal kingdom4 ,when animal life ceases1 cognition ceases also2 and arrived at that point1 we can comprehend the medium by which the influences from the external world on the movements of other beings are effected only by analogy1 whilst the will1 which we have recognized as the basis and as the very kernel of all beings1 always and everywhere remains the same4 ,on the low stage of the vegetable world1 and of the vegetative life in the animal organizations1 it is irritation1 and in the inorganic world it is the mechanical relation in general which appears as the substitute or as the analogue of the intellect4 ,we cannot say that the plants perceive the light and the sun1 but we see that they are differently affected by the presence or absence of the sun1 and that they turn themselves towards it2 and though in fact that movement mostly coincides with their growth1 like the rotation of the moon with its revolution1 that movement nevertheless exists1 and the direction of the growth of a plant is just in the same way determined and systematically modified as an action is by a motive4 ,inasmuch1 therefore1 as a plant has its wants1 though not of the kind which require a sensorium or an intellect1 something analogous must take their place to enable the will to seize at least a supply offered to it1 if not to go in quest of it4 ,this is the susceptibility for irritation1 which differs from the intellect1 in that the motive and subsequent act of volition are clearly separated from each other1 and the clearer1 the more perfect the intellect is2 whilst at the mere susceptibility for an irritation1 the feeling of the irritation and the resulting volition can no longer be discriminated4 ,in the inorganic world1 finally1 even the susceptibility for irritation1 whose analogy with the intellect cannot be mistaken1 ceases1 and there remains nothing but the varied reaction of the bodies against the various influences4 ,this reaction is the substitute for the intellect4 ,whenever the reaction of a body differs from another1 the influence also must be different1 creating a different affection1 which even in its dullness yet shows a remote analogy with the intellect4 ,if1 for instance1 the water in an embankment finds an issue and eagerly precipitates itself through it1 it certainly does not perceive the break1 just as the acid does not perceive the alkali1 for which it leaves the metal2 yet we must confess that what in all these bodies has effected such sudden changes1 has a certain resemblance with that which moves ourselves whenever we act in consequence of an unexpected motive4 ,we therefore see that the intellect appears as the medium of our motives1 that is1 as the medium of causality in regard to intellectual beings1 as that which receives the change from the external world1 and which must be followed by a change in ourselves1 as the mediator between both4 ,on this narrow line1 balances the whole world as representation1 i4 e4 that whole extensive world in space and time1 which as such cannot be anywhere else but in our brain1 just as dreams2 for the periods of their duration stand on the very same basis4 ,whatever to the animals and to man is given by his intellect as a medium of the motives1 the same is given to the plants by their susceptibility for irritation1 and to inorganic bodies by their reaction on the various causes1 which in fact only differ in respect to the degree of volition2 for1 just in consequence of the fact1 that in proportion to their wants the susceptibility for external impressions was raised to such a degree in the animals that a brain and a system of nerves had to develop itself1 did consciousness1 moreover1 originate as a function of this brain1 and in this consciousness the whole objective world1 whose forms 7time1 space and causality7 are the rules for the exercise of this function4 ,we therefore discover that the intellect is calculated only for the subjective1 merely to be a servant of the will1 appearing only 8per accidens0 as a condition of animal life1 where motives take the place of irritation4 ,the picture of the external world1 which at this stage enters into the forms of time and space1 is but the background on which motives represent themselves as ends2 it is also the condition of the connection of the external objects in regard to space and causality1 but yet is nothing else but the mediation and the tie between the motive and the will4 ,what a leap would it be to take this picture to be the true1 ultimate essence of things1--this image of the world1 which originates accidentally in the intellect as a function of animal brains1 whereby the means to their ends are shown them1 and their ways on this planet cleared up6 ,what a temerity to take this image and the connection of its parts to be the absolute rule of the world1 the relations of the things in themselves--and to suppose that all that could just as well exist independently of our brain6 ,and yet this supposition is the very ground on which all the dogmatical systems previous to ,kant were based1 for it is the implicit pre-supposition of their ,ontology1 ,cosmology1 ,theology1 and of all their ,eternal ,verities4 ,by this realistic examination we have gained very unexpectedly the objective point of view of ,kant's immortal discovery1 arriving by our empirical1 physiological way to the same point whence ,kant started with his transcendental criticism4 ,kant made the subjective his basis1 positing consciousness2 but from its priori nature he comes to the result1 that all that happens in it can be nothing else but representation4 ,we1 on the contrary1 starting from the objective1 have discovered what are the ends and the origin of the intellect1 and to what class of phenomena it belongs4 ,we discover in our way1 that the intellect is limited to mere representations1 and that what is exhibited in it is conditioned by the subject1 that is1 a mundane phenomenon1 and that just in the same way the order and the connection of all external things is conditioned by the subject1 and is never a knowledge of what they are in themselves1 and how they may be connected with each other4 ,we1 in our way1 like ,kant in his1 have discovered that the world as representation1 balances on that narrow line between the external cause 7motive7 and the produced effect 7act of will7 of intelligent 7animal7 beings1 where the clear discrimination of the two commences4 ,ita res accendent lumina rebus4 ,our objective stand-point is realistic1 and therefore conditioned1 inasmuch as starting from natural beings as posited1 we have abstracted from the circumstance that their objective existence presupposes an intellect1 in which they find themselves as representations2 but ,kant's subjective and idealistic stand-point is equally conditioned1 inasmuch as it starts from the intellect1 which itself is conditioned by nature1 in consequence of whose development up to the animal world it only comes into existence4 ,holding fast to this1 our realistic-objective stand-point1 ,kant's doctrine may be characterized thus3 after ,locke had abstracted the rle of the senses1 under the name of 8secondary properties10 for the purpose of distinguishing things in themselves from things as they appear1 ,kant1 with far greater profundity1 abstracted the rle of the brain functions conceptions of the understanding--a less considerable rle than that of the senses--and thus abstracted as belonging to the subjective all that ,locke had included under the head of primary properties4 ,i1 on the other hand1 have merely shown why all stands thus in relation1 by exhibiting the position which the intellect assumes in the ,system of ,nature when we start realistically from the objective as a datum1 and take the ,,will1 of which alone we are immediately conscious1 as the true of all metaphysics--as the essence of which all else is only the phenomenon4 ,,introduction ,,to ,,philosophy4 ,,chapter ,,vii4 ,,comprehension ,,and ,,idea4 ,i4 ,everything1 to be known1 must be thought as belonging to a system4 ,this result was the conclusion of ,chapter ,,vi4 ,to illustrate3 acid is that which hungers for a base2 its sharp taste is the hunger itself2 it exists only in a tension4 ,hence to think an acid we must think a base2 the base is ideally in the acid1 and is the cause of its sharpness4 ,the union of the acid and base gives us a salt1 and in the salt we cannot taste the acid nor the base distinctly1 for each is thoroughly modified by the other1 each is cancelled4 ,we separate the acid and base again and there exist two contradictions--acid and base--each calling for the other1 each asserting its complement to be itself4 ,for the properties of a somewhat are its wants1 i4 e4 what it lacks of the total4 ,such elements of a total as we are here considering1 have been called 8moments0 by ,hegel4 ,the total is the 8negative unity0 7,see ,chap4 ,,iv47 ,in the illustration we have salt as the negative unity of the moments1 acid and base4 ,the unity is called negative because its existence destroys each of the moments by adding the other to it4 ,after the negative unity exists1 each of the moments is no longer in a tension1 but has become thoroughly modified by the other4 ,the negative unity is ideal when the moments are held asunder--it is then potential1 and through it each moment has its own peculiar properties4 ,more generally3 every somewhat is determined by another2 its characteristic1 therefore1 is the manifestation of its other or of the complement which makes with it the total or negative unity4 ,the complete thought of any somewhat includes the phases or moments1 as such1 and their negative unity4 ,this may properly be called the comprehension4 ,to comprehend ,begreifen we must seize the object in its totality2 com-prehend to seize together1 just as con-ceive to take together2 but conception is generally used in ,english to signify a picture of the object more or less general4 ,not the totality1 but only some of its characteristics1 are grasped together in a conception4 ,hence conceptions are subjective1 i4 e4 they do not correspond to the true object in its entirety2 but comprehension is objective in the sense that everything in its true existence is a comprehension4 ,with this distinction between conception and comprehension most people would deny1 at once1 the possibility of the latter as an act of human intelligence4 ,sensuous knowing--for the reason that it attributes validity to isolated objects--does not comprehend4 ,reflective knowing seizes the reciprocal relations1 but not in the negative unity4 ,comprehension--whether one ever can arrive at it or not--should be the thought in its totality1 wherein negative unity and moments are thought together4 ,thus a true comprehension is the thought of the self-determined1 and we have not thoroughly comprehended any thing till we have traced it back through its various presuppositions to self-determination which must always be the form of the total4 7,see chapters ,,iv4 ,v47 ,,ii4 ,the name 8,idea0 is reserved for the deepest thought of ,philosophy4#fd ,in comprehension we think a system of dependent moments in a negative unity4 ,thus in the comprehension the multiplicity of elements1 thought in the moments1 is destroyed in its negative unity1 and there is1 consequently1 only one independent being or totality4 ,let1 once1 each of these moments develop to a totality1 so that we have in each a repetition of the whole1 and we shall have a comprehension of comprehensions--a system of totalities--and this is what ,hegel means by 8,idee10 or ,idea4 ,plato arrives at this1 but does not consistently develop it4 ,he deals chiefly with the standpoint of comprehension1 and hence has much that is dialectical4 7,the ,dialectic is the process which arises when the abstract and incomplete is put under the form of the true1 or the apodeictic4 ,to refute a category of limited application1 make it universal and it will contradict itself4 ,thus the 8,irony0 of ,socrates consists in generously 767 assuming of any category all that his interlocutor wishes1 and then letting it refute itself while he applies it in this and that particular instance with the air of one who sincerely believes in it4 ,humor is of this nature2 the author assumes the validity of the character he is portraying in regard to his weak points1 and then places him in positions wherein these weaknesses prove their true nature47 ,aristotle1 on the other hand1 writes from the standpoint of the ,idea constantly1 and therefore treats his subjects as systematic totalities independent of each other2 this gives the appearance of empiricism to his writings4 ,the following illustration of the relation of comprehension to idea may be of assistance here3 ,let any totality ,t be composed of elements1 phases or moments a b c d1 c4 ,each of these moments1 a1 b1 c1 c41 differs from the others and from the total2 they are in a negative unity just as acid and base are1 in a salt4 ,the assertion of the negative unity cancels each of the moments4 ,the negative unity adds to a the b1 c1 and d1 which it lacks of the total2 for a ,t - b - c - c42 and so too b ,t - a - c - d - c41 and c ,t - a - b - c4 ,each demands all the rest to make its existence possible1 just as the acid cannot exist if its tension is not balanced by a base4 ,so far we have the ,comprehension4 ,if1 now1 we consider these moments as being able to develop1 like the ,monads of ,leibnitz1 we shall have the following result3 a will absorb b c d c41 and thus become a totality and a negative unity for itself2 b may do likewise1 and thus the others4 ,under this supposition we have1 instead of the first series of moments 7a b c d c47 a new series wherein each moment has developed to a total by supplying its deficiencies thus3 a b c d c41 b a c d c41 c a b d c41 d a b c c4 ,in the new series1 each term is a negative unity and a totality1 and hence no longer exists in a tension1 and no longer can be cancelled by the negative unity4 ,such a system of terms would offer us a manifold of individuals1 and yet a profound unity4 ,this is the unity of the ,idea1 and it affords a concrete multiplicity4 ,leibnitz gives to his ,monads the power of reflection1 so that each is the mirror of the universe2 hence1 in each is found the whole1 and the ,totality is endlessly repeated2 8everywhere the one and the all0--and this is the 8preestablished harmony10 no doubt4 ,this is the highest point of view in philosophy--true multiplicity and true unity coexisting4 ,plato reaches it in his statement in the ,timaeus1 that 8,god has made the world most like himself1 since he in nowise possesses envy40 ,the ultimate purpose of the universe is the reflection of ,god to himself4 ,in this reflection1 the existence of independent self-determining totalities is presupposed2 to all else he is a negative unity1 and therefore destructive4 ,to the righteous1 i4 e4 to those who perfect themselves by performing for themselves the function of negative unity1 ,he says3 8,in you ,i am well pleased2 ,i am reflected in you40 ,but to the wicked he is a consuming fire1 for they do not assume the function of negative unity1 but leave it to be used toward them from outside4 ,thus1 too1 the lower orders of existence perish through this1 that their negative unity is not within but without4 ,if ,god is conceived merely as the negative unity1 and the creature not as self-determining1 we have the standpoint of ,pantheism4 ,it is the ,brahm which becomes all1 and all returns into him again4 ,if we had such a ,god we should only seem to be1 for when he looked at us and 8placed us under the form of ,eternity0 we should vanish4 ,but in culture each of us absorbs his 8not me10 just as 8a10 in the illustration given above1 became a b c d c4 ,its a-ness was destroyed by its modifying 78rounding off07 its own peculiarity by the peculiarities of the rest1 and thus becoming 8cosmopolitan40 ,this is justly esteemed the profoundest and most sacred dogma of the ,christian ,religion when stated as the doctrine of the ,trinity4 ,the completest unity there obtains of independent individualities4 ,all higher forms of spirit repeat the same thought4 ,government1 e4 g4 is the ,legislative1 the ,judiciary1 and the ,executive4 ,resist the ,judiciary and it can1 in the exercise of its function1 assume executive powers4 ,each power is the entire organism viewed from the standpoint of one of its phases1 just as a b c1 b a c1 c a b1 are the same totality1 but with different starting points assumed4 ,the self-determining being is the being which is its own other1 and hence is its own negative unity4 ,thus it can never be a simple moment of a higher being1 but is essentially a reflection of it4 ,recognition is the highest deed2 it belongs to the standpoint of the ,idea4 ,upon the plane of comprehension1 the unity and multiplicity are mutually destructive2 upon the plane of ,idea they are mutually affirmative4 ,the more creatures in whom he can be reflected1 the more affirmations of ,god there are4 ,the human spirit grows solely through recognition4 99 99 99 99 99 ,remark4 ,this is the only standpoint that is absolutely affirmative--all others being more or less negative1 and1 as a consequence1 self-opposed4 ,the stage of human culture is the most concrete illustration of it4 ,three human beings--,a1 ,b1 and ,c--meet and form a community4 ,as physical beings they exclude1 each the others4 ,the more one eats1 the less the others have to eat4 ,but spiritually it is the reverse3 each has a different experience1 and their giving and taking1 instead of diminishing any one's share1 increases it4 ,the experience of ,a is imparted to ,b1 and conversely2 and so also both share with ,c4 ,by this1 ,c grows through the culture of ,a and ,b1 and becomes ,c ,b ,a2 ,b develops to ,b ,c ,a1 and ,a to ,a ,c ,b2 all is gain3 no loss1 except of poverty4 ,limitation by another makes a finite being4 ,but self-determination is the process of being one's own 8other0 or limit1 and hence all self-determined beings are totalities or microcosms1 which1 though independent1 reflect each other1 i4 e4 they make themselves in the same image4 ,hence the 8,prestablished ,harmony0 exists among such beings4 ,each is its own negative4 ,cognition or mind is the form of being which embodies this4 ,in culture we have an absolutely affirmative process1 for the reason that the negative1 involved in the cancelling of one's own idiosyncracies1 is a negative of what is already negative4 ,hence the unity of ,god is not in anywise impaired by the existence of a continually increasing number of perfected beings4 ,in proportion to their perfection they reflect ,him1 and their complete self-determination is just that complete realization of ,him which completes his self-consciousness4 ,this has been called ,pantheism by those who confound this standpoint with that of the ,comprehension4 ,pantheism is impossible with a proper insight into the nature of self-consciousness4 ,a blind force fulfilling its destiny1 and giving rise to various orders of beings which are to be re-absorbed by it1--if one fancies this to be ,god1 call him a ,pantheist1 for ,god is then merely a negative unity1 and creation is only a series of moments4 ,but if one considers ,god to be the ,absolute ,person1 and deduces all ,theology from ,his self-consciousness1 as ,hegel does1 he cannot be called a ,pantheist consistently by any one who believes in the ,gospel of ,st4 ,john4 ,it is easy to see why ,hegel has been and still is regarded as a ,pantheist4 ,when he asserts the self-consciousness of the creature to be the completion of the ,divine self-consciousness1 ,hegel merely states the logical constituents of the ,christian idea of the ,trinity4 ,the 8creature0 is the ,son1 which is 8in the beginning40 ,all time must have presented and still presents the development of creatures into self-conscious beings4 ,our planet began a short time since to do this4 8,the fullness of time had come10 and the final stage of reflection 7which must always have existed in the ,universe7 began on the earth1 or1 to state it theologically1 8,the ,son was sent to redeem this world40 ,to think that ,hegel could regard ,god as becoming conscious in time--as passing from an unconscious state to a conscious one--is to suppose him the weakest of philosophers4 ,self-consciousness cannot be 8in time10 for it is the 8form of eternity10 and thus time is not relative to it4 ,the 8fleeting show0 of ,history does not touch the self-consciousness of ,god1 nor does it touch any self-conscious being 8whose soul is builded far from accident40 ,,chapter ,,viii4 ,,what ,,is ,,the ,,true ,,actual8 ,i4--,reality and ,potentiality4 ,the immediate object before the senses undergoes change2 the real becomes potential1 and that which was potential becomes real4 ,without the potentiality we could have had no change4 ,at first we are apt to consider the real as the entire existence and to ignore the potential2 but the potential will not be treated thus4 ,whatever a thing can become is as valid as what it is already4 ,the properties of a thing by which it exists for us1 are its relations to other beings1 and hence are rather its deficiencies than its being per se4 ,thus the sharpness in the acid was pronounced to be the hunger of the same for alkali2 the sharper it was1 the louder was its call for alkali4 ,thus the very concreteness of a thing is rather the process of its potentialities4 ,to illustrate this3 we have a circle of possibilities belonging to a thing--only one of them is real at a time2 it is1 for instance1 water1 whose potentialities are vapor1 liquid1 and solid4 ,its reality is only a part of its total being1 as in the case of water it was only one-third of itself at any given temperature4 ,yet the real is throughout qualified by the potential4 ,in change1 the real is being acted upon by the potential under the form of 8outside influences40 ,the pyramid is not air1 but the air continually acts upon it1 and the pyramid is in a continual process of decomposition2 its potentiality is continually exhibiting its nature4 ,we know by seeing a thing undergo change what its potentialities are4 ,in the process of change is manifested the activity of the potentialities which are thus negative to it4 ,if a thing had no negative it would not change4 ,the real is nothing but the surface upon which the potential writes its nature2 it is the field of strife between the potentialities4 ,the real persists in existence through the potential which is in continual process with it4 ,thus we are led to regard the product of the two as the constant4 ,this we call ,actuality4 ,,ii4--,actuality4 ,the actual is a process1 and is ever the same2 its two sides1 are the real and the potential1 and the real is manifested no more and no less than the potentialities1 in the process which constantly goes on4 ,the real is annulled by the potential1 and the latter becomes the real1 only to be again replaced4 ,if in the circle of possibilities which make up the entire being of a thing1 that which is real bears a small proportion to the rest1 the real is very unstable1 for the potentialities are to that extent actively negative to it4 ,but let the sphere of the real be relatively large1 and we have a more stable being--there is less to destroy it and more to sustain it--it is a higher order of being4 ,if the whole circle of its being were real it would coincide with its actuality1 it would be self-related1 exist for itself1 and this would be the existence of the ,idea4 ,,iii4--,the ,actual is the ,rational4 ,the highest aim is toward perfection2 and this is pursued in the cancelling of the finite1 partial or incomplete1 by adding to it its other or complement--that which it lacks of the ,total or ,perfect4 ,since this complement is the potential1 and since this potential is and can be the only agent that acts upon and modifies the real1 it follows that all process is pursuant of the highest aim2 and since the actual is the process itself1 it follows that the actual is the realization of the ,best or of the ,rational4 ,a somewhat has a low order of existence if the sphere of its reality is small compared to that of its potentiality4 ,but the lower its order the more swift and sure are the potentialities in their work4 ,hence no matter how bad anything is1 the very best thing is being wrought upon it4 ,seize the moments of the world-history1 and state precisely what they lacked of the complete realization of spirit1 and one will see clearly that each phase perished by having just that added to it which it most of all needed4 ,,iv4--8,the ,form of ,eternity40 ,to think according to ,reason is to think things under the form of ,eternity1 says ,spinoza 7,res sub quadam specie aeternitatis percipere74 ,the ,form of ,eternity is what we have found as the true actual4 ,the ,phenomenal world is the constant spectacle wherein each and all is placed under the form of ,eternity4 ,when this is done1 all immediate 7or mechanical7 being appears in a state of transition2 all mediated being appears as a merely relative1 i4 e4 as existing in what lies beyond it2 all absolutely mediated 7i4 e4 self-determined7 being appears in a state of development4 ,in the first and second stages the individual loses its identity4 ,in the third stage the process is one of unfolding1 and hence the continual realizing of a more vivid personal identity4 ,thus the ,form of ,eternity is to the conscious being the realization of his ,immortality4 ,footnote #fd3 ,the word 8,idea0 does not have the sense here given it1 except in ,hegel1 and in a very few translations of him4 ,for the most part the word is used1 7e4 g4 in ,schelling's ,philosophy of ,nature in this number17 as a translation for the ,german 8,begriff10 which we call 8comprehension10 adopting the term in this sense from the author of the 8,letters on ,faust40 ,it will do no harm to use so expressive a word as comprehension in an objective sense as well as in a subjective one4 ,the thought itself is bizarre1 and not merely the word2 it is useless to expect to find words that are used commonly in a speculative sense4 ,one must seek a word that has several meanings1 and grasp these meanings all together in one1 to have the speculative use of a word4 ,spirit has formed words for speculative ideas by the deepest of instincts1 and these words have been unavoidably split up into different meanings by the sensuous thinking1 which always loses the connecting links4 ,a ,,thought ,,on ,,shakespeare4 ,,by ,,anna ,c4 ,,brackett4 ,to say that ,shakespeare excels others by virtue of the genius which enables him to throw himself for the time completely into each of the characters he represents1 is to say a very common-place thing1 and yet it will bear repeating4 ,his spirit was so many-sided1 so universal1 that it was able to take all forms and perfectly to fit itself to each1 so that he always gives us a consistent character4 ,his personages are individuals whose every word agrees with every other they have spoken1 and while the spirit which moves in them is ,shakespeare1 he is all1 yet no one of them4 8,the water unchanged in every case1 ,doth take on the figure of the vase40 ,he does not consciously go to work to fashion a character1 nor does he ask himself what that character shall say under the given circumstances1 but his soul1 being capable of all1 takes on for the time the form of the character1 and then speaks the things which are most natural to itself in that form4 ,so entirely is this the case1 that a comparison of the way in which one of his personages conducts himself under different circumstances1 is sure to amaze us as we discover the fine touches by which the unity of the character is preserved4 ,goethe's characters grow--are in a state of becoming4 ,shakespeare's are grown3 they are crystallized4 ,the problem with ,goethe is1 the development of a character through growth2 ,shakespeare's3 given a certain character and a certain collision1 how will the given character demean itself8 ,the common man with an effort could tell what he himself would have done under such and such circumstances1 but ,shakespeare could have done all things1 and grasping one side of himself he holds it1 and shows it for one person1 and another for another4 ,he never confuses--never changes4 ,the divine inspiration sways him4 ,the power to do this1 the ,universal which can take on all and be all1 is genius4 ,this is not claimed as new in any sense4 ,i simply wish to illustrate its truth with regard to the suitors of ,portia1 by noticing how perfectly the feelings which each expresses after the result of his choice is apparent1 are the outcome of the feelings which decided the choice4 ,the three sets of comments on the caskets and their mottoes1 betray three entirely different men4 ,their minds move differently2 they are actuated habitually by different motives1 and the results of the same failure in ,morocco and ,arragon are noticeably different4 ,they are placed in precisely the same circumstances4 ,they are both disappointed1 but observe how differently they demean themselves4 ,morocco wastes no words4 ,his mood changes instantly from a doubting hope to despondency and heartfelt grief1 so powerful that it deprives him of all speech4 ,he goes at once4 ,but ,arragon speaks as if he had been deceived4 ,first--8,how much unlike art thou to ,portia60 ,that is1 ,i was led to suppose one thing2 ,i have been misled4 ,then--8,how much unlike my hopes60 but1 indignation and wounded pride gaining the ascendency--8and my deservings60 ,he re-reads the motto1 and grows more angry still4 ,he has not been treated fairly1 and at last1 forgetting himself1 he turns round to ,portia with the fierce1 direct question1 8,are my deserts no better80 ,portia shows her appreciation of his state of mind by her evasion1 plainly intimating that he had gone too far in his manner of addressing her4 ,his very words are rough and uncourteous in their abruptness4 ,his question was rude because so personal4 ,in his haste he has not even noticed the writing1 which now surprises him1 as1 feeling her quiet rebuke1 he turns back to the casket to hide his embarrassment1 and he reads4 ,during the reading he begins to be conscious that he has been angry without reason1 and that he has not had control enough of himself to conceal the fact4 ,that he is not a fool is shown by his consciousness that he has behaved like one in giving away to his temper1 and as this consciousness begins to dawn on him1 he is ashamed of himself for having been provoked1 and desires to be gone as soon as possible4 ,he has had a revelation of himself which is not agreeable1 and he turns to depart1 no longer angry with ,portia1 but so angry with himself that he almost forgets to bid the lady adieu4 ,but suddenly reminded that she is there1 he assumes again his usual1 courtly1 outside self1 and half in apology for his anger and rudeness1 which might have led her to suppose that he would forget his promise1 half to recall himself to himself1 he awkwardly ends the scene by assuring her that he means to keep his word4 ,now1 why should ,morocco never for one instant lose his gentlemanly bearing1 while ,arragon so wholly forgets himself8 ,turn back to the comments before the choice1 and we have the key at once4 ,in their remarks on the leaden chest we see at first how much more quickly than ,morocco1 ,arragon rushes at conclusions4 ,the former becomes at once thoughtful1 and does not pass by even that unattractive metal without careful pausing4 ,after reading all three mottoes once1 he reads slowly the inscription on the leaden casket again1 and begins to repeat it a second time4 ,he feels thoroughly how much depends on the choice1 and is self-distrustful4 ,finding that he can gain no suggestion from the lady1 he commends himself for help to the gods before he proceeds4 ,he is not the man to be daunted by a threat1 and thinks he detects in that very threat a false ring4 ,he is conscious of high motives1 but not in vanity1 and he decides1 adversely1 giving a reason4 ,but ,arragon1 before surveying the whole ground1 decides at once about the first he sees1 and the summary way in which he dismisses all consideration of the leaden casket1 savors strongly of self-esteem4 ,there is a sort of bravado in the sudden words without a moment's pause3 8,you shall look fairer ere ,i give or hazard60 ,the very use of 8shall0 with the second person1 forces into view the will of the speaker4 ,he does not turn to ,portia4 ,he is quite capable of directing his own actions without help from any god4 ,as ,morocco considers the silver1 the principal thing that attracts his attention is its 8virgin hue40 7,remark that ,arragon under the same circumstances calls it a 8treasure house407 ,he again begins thoughtfully to repeat2 and again mark the self-distrust4 ,there is an exquisitely delicate touch of this in-- 8,if thou be'st rated by thy estimation1 ,thou dost deserve enough40 ,relying on the judgment of others1 rather than on his own1 but conscious too that there is good ground for the estimation in which he knows himself held1 the chivalrous admiration with which he looks up to the woman he desires1 comes in here suddenly with a doubt whether if all that is thought of him is deserved1 it is enough to win a pearl of so great price4 ,his conscious manhood refuses1 however1 to weaken itself by doubting1 and he again repeats the clause on which he stopped before4 ,he goes back to the thought of the estimation in which he is held2 he thinks of his noble birth1 of his princely fortune1 of his graces1 and qualities of breeding1 and enumerating all these1 he proves his title to a better nobility by the sudden thought that the love he bears her is enough to make him deserve her were she never so precious1 and on that1 and that alone1 he rests his claim4 ,but before deciding he will read again from the gold casket1 and his exclamations on it are only a continuation of his previous thought4 ,it seems perfectly plain to him that this must be the fortunate casket4 ,in his generous love he forgets himself entirely1 and as it were to show her how wholly he believes in her1 he makes his selection here4 ,why should he be angry at the failure8 ,he had no self-assertion to be wounded4 ,if he deserved her1 it was only because he loved her2 and if he did not deserve her1 it was only because she was more than any one could deserve4 ,as ,arragon1 after passing by the lead1 turns to the gold1 he begins to be a little more cautious1 and repeats like ,morocco4 ,but his mind1 instead of turning at once to ,portia as the only prize in the world wholly desirable1 begins from a lofty eminence of superiority to criticise others whom he calls the 8fool multitude40 ,he will not choose what many men desire1 because he prefers to keep out of the ranks4 ,no democrat1 but a proud aristocrat is he1 and so the gold casket is set aside4 ,after reading from the next1 he begins to criticise again4 ,it seems as if he stood outside of all the world and coolly reviewed it4 ,on consideration he is quite sure that there is no danger of his losing his place even if 8true honor were purchased by the merit of the wearer10 and basing his choice on his belief that he deserves success1 he orders peremptorily the opening of the 8treasure house40 ,is it not most natural that with such feelings1 such self-complacency1 he should be angry when he finds he has made a mistake8 ,nothing can be more galling to a proud spirit than to discover that the estimation set upon him by others is lower than that he sets upon himself4 ,it was not our purpose to compare ,bassanio's comments with the others4 ,let us say only that he evidently prizes sincerity above all other virtues1 and prefers a leaden casket that is lead all through1 to a golden one that is gold only on the outside1 and so he wins the woman1 who1 as she shows us a moment afterwards1 is sincere enough to deserve to be won4 ,,leonardo ,,da ,,vinci',s 8,,last ,,supper10 ,,as ,,treated ,,by ,,goethe4 ,the following extracts from ,goethe's treatment of the master-piece of ,leonardo da ,vinci were read at a meeting of the ,st4 ,louis ,art ,society1 pending the discussion of a fine engraving of this celebrated picture4 ,the ,,ms4 kindly presented to us by the translator we print1 in order to give to those unacquainted with the original an exhibition of ,goethe's thorough manner of penetrating the spirit of a work of art4--,,editor4 ,the ,last ,supper 99 99 99 was painted upon the wall of the monastery alle ,grazie1 at ,milan4 ,the place where the picture is painted must first be considered1 for here the skill of the artist appears in its most brilliant light4 ,what could be fitter and nobler for a refectory than a parting meal1 which should be an object of reverence to the whole world for all future time4 ,several years ago1 when travelling1 we beheld this dining-room still undestroyed4 ,opposite the entrance on the narrow side1 stood the table of the prior1 on both sides of him the tables of the monks1 all of which were raised a step from the floor--and when the visitor turned round1 he saw painted on the fourth1 above the doors1 which are of but moderate height1 a fourth table1 and ,christ and his disciples seated at it1 as if they belonged to the society4 ,at meal times it must have been a telling sight1 when the tables of the prior and ,christ looked upon each other as two opposite pictures1 and the monks at their places found themselves enclosed between them4 ,and just on this account the skill of the artist was compelled to take the existing tables of the monks as a pattern4 ,also1 the table-cloth1 with its folds still visible with its worked stripes and tied corners1 was taken from the wash-room of the monastery4 ,the plates1 dishes1 cups1 and other vessels1 are like those which the monks used4 ,here was no attempt at imitating an uncertain antiquated costume2 it would have been highly improper to stretch out the holy company upon cushions in this place4 ,no1 the picture must be brought near to the present2 ,christ must take his last supper with the ,dominicans at ,milan4 ,also1 in many other respects1 the painting must have produced a great effect2 the thirteen figures about ten feet above the floor1 one-half larger than life-size1 take up the space of twenty-eight feet in length4 ,only two whole figures can be seen at the opposite ends of the table1 the rest are half-figures2 and here1 too1 the artist found his advantage in the necessity of the circumstances4 ,every moral expression belongs to the upper part of the body1 and the feet in such cases are everywhere in the way4 ,the artist has created here twelve half-figures1 whose laps and knees are covered by the table and table-cloth1 but whose feet are scarcely visible in the modest twilight beneath4 ,let us now imagine ourselves in the place2 let us consider the moral repose which prevails in such a monastic dining-hall1 and let us admire the artist who has infused into his picture1 powerful emotion1 passionate movement1 and at the same time has kept his work within the bounds of ,nature1 and thus brings it in close contrast with the nearest reality4 ,the means of excitement by which the artist arouses the quiet holy group1 are the words of the ,master3 8,there is one among you who shall betray me60 ,they are spoken--the whole company falls into disquiet2 but he inclines his head1 with looks cast down2 the whole attitude1 the motion of the arms1 of the hands1 everything repeats with heavenly submission the unhappy words3 ,yes1 it is not otherwise1 there is one among you who shall betray me6 ,before we go farther1 we must point out a happy device whereby ,leonardo principally enlivened his picture2 it is the motion of the hands2 this device1 however1 only an ,italian could discover4 ,with his nation1 the whole body is full of animation2 every limb participates in the expression of feeling1 of passion1 even of thought4 ,by various motions and forms of the hand1 he expresses3 8,what do ,i care6--,come hither6--,this is a rogue6 beware of him6--,he shall not live long6--,this is a main point6--,observe this well1 my hearers60 ,to such a national peculiarity ,leonardo1 who observed every characteristic point with the closest attention1 must have turned his careful eye4 ,in this respect1 the present picture is unique1 and one can scarcely observe it enough4 ,every look and movement perfectly correspond1 and at the same time there is a combined and contrasted position of the limbs1 comprehensible at a glance1 and wrought out in the most praiseworthy manner4 ,the figures on both sides of the ,saviour may be considered by threes1 and each of these again must be thought into a unity1 placed in relation1 and still held in connection with its neighbors4 ,first1 on the right side of ,christ1 are ,john1 ,judas1 and ,peter4 ,peter the most distant1 in consonance with his violent character1 when he hears the word of the ,lord1 hastens up behind ,judas1 who1 looking up affrighted1 bends forward over the table1 and holds with his right hand firmly closed1 the purse1 but with the left makes an involuntary nervous movement1 as if he would say3 ,what's that8 ,what does that mean8 ,in the meanwhile ,peter has with his left hand seized the right shoulder of ,john1 who is inclined towards him1 and points to ,christ1 and at the same time urges the beloved disciple to ask who the traitor is4 ,he strikes a knife-handle1 which he holds in his right hand1 inadvertently into the ribs of ,judas1 whereby the affrighted forward movement1 which upsets the salt-cellar1 is happily brought out4 ,this group may be considered as the one which was first thought out by the artist2 it is the most perfect4 ,if now upon the right hand of the ,lord immediate vengeance is threatened1 with a moderate degree of motion1 there arises upon his left the liveliest horror and detestation of the treachery4 ,james1 the elder1 bends back from fear1 extends his arms1 stares with his head bowed down as one who sees before him the monster which he has just heard of4 ,thomas peers from behind his shoulder1 and approaching the ,saviour1 raises the index of his right hand to his forehead4 ,philip1 the third of this group1 rounds it off in the loveliest manner2 he has risen1 bends toward the ,master1 lays his hands upon his breast1 and declares with the greatest clearness3 ,lord1 it is not ,i6 ,thou knowest it6 ,thou seest my pure heart4 ,it is not ,i6 ,and now1 the last three figures of this group give us new material for thought2 they talk with one another about the terrible thing which they have just heard4 ,matthew1 with a zealous motion1 turns his face to the left toward his two companions2 his hands1 on the contrary1 he stretches with rapidity towards his master1 and thus1 by the most ingenious artifice1 unites his own group with the previous one4 ,thaddeus shows the most violent surprise1 doubt and suspicion2 he has laid his left hand open upon the table1 and has raised the right in a manner as if he intended to strike his left hand with the back of the right--a movement which one still sees in men of nature when they wish to express at an unexpected occurrence3 ,have ,i not said so8 ,have ,i not always supposed it8 ,simon sits at the end of the table1 full of dignity--we therefore see his whole figure2 he1 the eldest of all1 is clothed with rich folds2 his countenance and movements show that he is astonished and reflecting1 not excited1 scarcely moved4 ,if we now turn our eyes to the opposite end of the table1 we see ,bartholomew1 who stands upon his right foot1 with the left crossed over it2 he is supporting his inclined body by resting both hands firmly upon the table4 ,he listens1 probably to hear what ,john will find out from the ,lord2 for1 in general1 the incitement of the favorite disciple seems to proceed from this entire side4 ,james1 the younger1 beside and behind ,bartholomew1 lays his left hand upon ,peter's shoulder1 just as ,peter lays his upon the shoulder of ,john1 but ,james does so mildly1 seeking explanation only1 whereas ,peter already threatens vengeance4 ,and thus1 as ,peter reaches behind ,judas1 so ,james the younger reaches behind ,andrew1 who1 as one of the most important figures1 shows with his half-raised arms1 his expanded hands in front1 a decided expression of horror1 which appears only once in this picture1 while in other works of less genius1 and of less profound thought1 it recurs unfortunately only too often4 ,,copies ,,generally4 ,before we now come to imitations of our painting1 of which the number amounts to about thirty1 we must make some reference to the subject of copies generally4 ,such did not come into use until everybody confessed that art had reached its culminating point1 whereupon1 inferior talents1 looking at the works of the greater masters1 despaired of producing by their own skill anything similar1 either in imitation of nature1 or from the idea2 and art1 which now dwindled into mere handicraft1 began to repeat its own creations4 ,this inability on the part of most of the artists did not remain a secret to the lovers of art1 who1 not being able always to turn to the first masters1 called upon and paid inferior talents1 inasmuch as they preferred1 in order not to receive something altogether destitute of skill1 to order imitations of recognized works1 with a view to being well served in some degree4 ,this new procedure was favored1 from reasons of illiberality and overhaste by owners no less than by artists1 and art lowered itself advisedly by setting out with the purpose to copy4 ,in the fifteenth century1 as well as in the previous one1 artists entertained a high idea of themselves and their art1 and did not readily content themselves with repeating the inventions of others2 hence we find no real copies dating from that period--a circumstance to which every friend of the history of art will do well to give heed4 ,inferior arts no doubt made use of higher patterns for smaller works1 as in the case of ,niello and other enamelled work1 and1 of course1 when from religious or other motives1 a repetition was desired1 people contented themselves with an accurate imitation1 which only approximately expressed the movement and action of the original1 without paying any close regard to form and color4 ,hence in the richest galleries we find no copy previous to the sixteenth century4 ,but now came the time1 when1 through the agency of a few extraordinary men--among whom our ,leonardo must be reckoned and considered as the first--art in every one of its parts attained to perfection2 people learned to see and to judge better1 and now the desire for imitations of first-class work was not difficult to satisfy1 particularly in those schools to which large numbers of scholars crowded1 and in which the works of the master were greatly in request4 ,and yet1 at that time1 this desire was confined to smaller works which could be easily compared with the originals and judged4 ,as regards larger works1 the case was quite different at that time from what it was at a later period1 because the original cannot be compared with the copies1 and also because such orders are rare4 ,thus1 then1 art1 as well as its lovers1 contented itself with copies on a small scale1 and a great deal of liberty was allowed to the copyist1 and the results of this arbitrary procedure showed themselves1 in an overpowering degree1 in the few cases in which copies on a large scale were desired4 ,these indeed were generally copies of copies1 and1 what is more1 generally executed from copies on a smaller scale1 worked out far away from the original1 often from mere drawings1 or even perhaps from memory4 ,job-painters now increased by the dozen1 and worked for lower prices2 people made household ornaments of painting2 taste died out2 copies increased and darkened the walls of ante-chambers and stair-cases2 hungry beginners lived on poor pay1 by repeating the most important works on every scale2 yea1 many painters passed the whole of their lives in simply copying2 but even then an amount of deviation appeared in every copy1 either a notion of the person for whom it was painted1 or a whim of the painter1 or perhaps a presumptuous wish to be original4 ,in addition to this came the demand for worked tapestry1 in which painting was not content to look dignified1 except when tricked out with gold2 and the most magnificent pictures were considered meagre and wretched1 because they were grave and simple2 therefore the copyist introduced buildings and landscapes in the background1 ornaments on the dresses1 aureoles or crowns around the heads1 and further1 strangly formed children1 animals1 chimeras1 grotesques1 and other fooleries4 ,it often happened1 also1 that an artist1 who believed in his own powers of invention1 received by the will of a client who could not appreciate his capabilities1 a commission to copy another person's work1 and since he did so with reluctance1 he wished to appear original here and there1 and therefore made changes or additions as knowledge1 or perhaps vanity1 suggested4 ,such occurrences took place of course according to the demands of place and time4 ,many figures were used for purposes quite different from those for which they had been intended by their first producers4 ,secular subjects were1 by means of a few additions1 changed into religious ones2 heathen gods and heroes had to submit to be martyrs and evangelists4 ,often also1 the artist1 for instruction or exercise to himself1 had copied some figure from a celebrated work1 and now he added to it something of his own invention in order to turn it into a saleable picture4 ,finally1 we may certainly ascribe a part of the corruption of art to the discovery and abuse of copper-plate engravings1 which supplied job-painters with crowds of foreign inventions1 so that no one any longer studied1 and painting at last reached such a low ebb that it got mixed up with mechanical works4 ,in the first place1 the copper-plate engravings themselves were different from the originals1 and whoever copied them multiplied the changes according to his own or other peoples' conviction or whim4 ,the same thing happened precisely in the case of drawings2 artists took sketches of the most remarkable subjects in ,rome and ,florence1 in order to produce arbitrary repetitions of them when they returned home4 ,,copies ,,of ,,the ,,supper4 ,in view of the above1 we shall be able to judge what is to be expected1 more or less1 of copies of the ,supper1 although the earliest were executed contemporaneously2 for the work made a great sensation1 and other monasteries desired similar works4 ,of the numerous copies consulted by the author ,vossi we shall occupy ourselves here with only three1 since the copies at ,weimar are taken from them2 nevertheless1 at the basis of these lies a fourth1 of which1 therefore1 we must first speak4 ,marco d',oggiono1 a pupil of ,leonardo da ,vinci's1 though without any extensive talent1 gained the praise of his school chiefly by his heads1 although in them he is not always equal to himself4 ,about the year #aeaj1 he executed a copy on a small scale1 intending to use it afterwards for a copy on a larger scale4 ,it was1 according to tradition1 not quite accurate2 he made it1 however1 the basis of a larger copy which is in the now suppressed monastery at ,castellazzo1 likewise in the dining-hall of the monks of those days4 ,everything about it shows careful work2 nevertheless the usual arbitrariness prevails in the details4 ,and although ,vossi has not been able to say much in its praise1 he does not deny that it is a remarkable monument1 and that the character of several of the heads1 in which the expression is not exaggerated1 is deserving of praise4 ,vossi has copied it1 and on comparison of the three copies we shall be able to pronounce judgment upon it from our own observation4 ,a second copy1 of which we likewise have the heads copied before us1 is found in fresco on the wall at ,ponte ,capriasca2 it is referred to the year #aefe1 and ascribed to ,pierro ,lovino4 ,its merits we shall learn in the sequel2 it has the peculiarity that the names of the figures are written underneath1 a piece of foresight which aids us in arriving at a correct characterization of the different physiognomies4 ,the gradual destruction of the original we have described in sufficient detail1 and it was already in a very wretched condition when1 in #afab1 ,cardinal ,frederico ,borromeo1 a zealous friend of art1 endeavored to prevent the entire loss of the work1 and commissioned a ,milanese1 ,andrea ,bianchi1 surnamed ,vespino1 to execute a full-sized copy4 ,this artist first tried his skill on a few of the heads2 being successful in these1 he proceeded and copied the whole of the figures1 separately however1 and afterwards put them together with the greatest possible care2 the picture is at present to be found in the ,ambrosiana library at ,milan1 and lies mainly at the basis of the most recent copy1 executed by ,vossi4 ,this was executed on the following occasion4 ,,latest ,,copy4 ,the ,kingdom of ,italy was decreed1 and ,prince ,eugne1 following the example of ,luigi ,sforza1 wished to glorify the beginning of his reign by patronizing the fine arts4 ,luigi had ordered a representation of the ,last ,supper of ,leonardo2 ,eugne resolved to restore1 as far as possible1 the painting that had been going to wreck for three hundred years in a new picture1 which1 in order that it might be indestructible1 was to be done in mosaic1 for which preparation had been made in an already existing institution4 ,vossi immediately receives the commission1 and commences in the beginning of ,may1 #ahjg4 ,he finds it advisable to execute a full-sized cartoon1 takes up anew the studies of his youth1 and applies himself entirely to ,leonardo1 studies his art-remains and his writings1 particularly the latter1 because he is persuaded that a man who has produced such splendid works must have worked on the most decided and advantageous principles4 ,he had made drawings of the heads in the copy at ,ponte ,capriasca1 as well as of some other parts of it1 likewise of the heads and hands of the ,castellazzo copy1 and of that of ,bianchi4 ,then he makes drawings of everything coming from ,da ,vinci himself1 and even of what comes from some of his contemporaries4 ,moreover he looks about for all the extant copies1 and succeeds in making more or less acquaintance with twenty-seven2 drawings and manuscripts of ,da ,vinci's are kindly sent to him from all quarters4 ,in the working out of his cartoon1 he adheres principally to the ,ambrosiana copy2 it alone is as large as the original4 ,bianchi1 by means of thread-nets and transparent paper1 had endeavored to give a most accurate copy of the original1 which1 although already very much injured1 was not yet painted over4 ,in the end of ,october1 #ahjg1 the cartoon is ready2 canvass grounded uniformly in one piece1 and the whole immediately sketched out4 ,hereupon1 in order in some measure to regulate his tints1 ,vossi painted the small portion of sky and landscape1 which1 on account of the depth and purity of the colors in the original1 had still remained fresh and brilliant4 ,hereupon he paints the head of ,christ and those of the three apostles at his left1 and as for the dresses1 he first paints those about whose colors he had first arrived at certainly1 with a view to selecting the rest according to the principles of the master and his own taste4 ,thus he covered the whole of the canvass1 guided by careful reflection1 and kept his colors of uniform height and strength4 ,unfortunately1 in this damp1 deserted place1 he was seized with an illness which compelled him to put a stop to his exertions2 nevertheless1 he employed this interval in arranging drawings1 copper-plate engravings1 partly with a view to the ,supper itself1 partly to other works of the master2 at the same time he was favored by fortune1 which brought him a collection of drawings1 purporting to come from ,cardinal ,csar ,monti1 and containing1 among other treasures1 remarkable productions of ,leonardo himself4 ,he studied even the authors contemporaneous with ,leonardo1 in order to make use of their opinions and wishes1 and looked about him for everything that could further his design4 ,thus he took advantage of his sickness1 and at last attained strength to set about his work anew4 ,no artist or friend of art will leave unread the account of how he managed the details1 how he thought out the characters of the faces and their expression1 and even the motions of the hands1 and how he represented them4 ,in the same manner he thinks out the dishes1 the room1 the back-ground1 and shows that he has not decided upon any part without the strongest reasons4 ,what care he takes about representing the feet under the table in correct attitudes1 because this portion of the original had long been destroyed1 and in the copies had been carelessly treated6 99 99 99 99 99 ,of the relation of the two copies--the merits of the third can be shown only to the eye1 not to the mind in words--we shall state in a few words the most essential and most decided points1 until we shall be fortunate enough1 as we shall perhaps one day be1 to be able to lay copies of these interesting sheets before the friends of art4 ,,comparison4 ,st4 ,bartholomew1 manly youth1 sharp profile1 compressed1 clear face1 eyelid and brow pressed down1 mouth closed1 as if listening with suspicion1 a character completely circumscribed within itself4 ,in ,vespino's copy no trace of individual characteristic features1 a general kind of drawing-book face1 listening with open mouth4 ,vossi has approved of this opening of the lips1 and retained it1 a procedure to which we should be unable to lend our assent4 ,st4 ,james the younger1 likewise profile1 relationship to ,christ unmistakable1 receives from the protruded1 slightly opened lips1 something individual1 which again cancels this similarity4 ,according to ,vespino1 almost an ordinary1 academical ,christ1 the mouth opened rather in astonishment than in inquiry4 ,our assertion that ,bartholomew must have his mouth closed1 receives support from the fact that his neighbor has his mouth open4 ,such a repetition ,leonardo would never have endured2 on the contrary1 the next figure1 ,st4 ,andrew has his mouth shut4 ,like persons advanced in life1 he presses the lower lip rather against the upper4 ,in the copy of ,marco1 this head has something peculiar1 not to be expressed in words2 the eyes are introverted2 the mouth1 though shut1 is still nave4 ,the outline of the left side against the back ground forms a beautiful silhouette2 enough of the other side of the forehead 7eye1 nose and beard7 is seen to give the head a roundness and a peculiar life2 on the contrary1 ,vespino suppresses the left eye altogether1 but shows so much of the left temple and of the side of the beard as to produce in the uplifted face a full bold expression1 which is indeed striking1 but which would seem more suitable to clenched fists than to open hands stretched forward4 ,judas locked up within himself1 frightened1 looking anxiously up and back1 profile strongly dented1 not exaggerated1 by no means an ugly formation2 for good taste would not tolerate any real monster in the proximity of pure and upright men4 ,vespino1 on the other hand1 has actually represented such a monster1 and it cannot be denied that1 regarded by itself1 this head has much merit2 it expresses vividly a mischievously bold malignity1 and would make itself eminently conspicuous in a mob triumphing over an ,ecce ,homo1 and crying out 8,crucify6 crucify60 ,it might be made to pass for ,mephistopheles in his most devilish moment4 ,but of affright or dread1 combined with dissimulation1 indifference and contempt1 there is not a trace2 the bristly hair fits in with the tout ensemble admirably2 its exaggeration1 however1 is matched only by the force and violence of the rest of ,vespino's heads4 ,st4 ,peter4--,very problematical features4 ,even in ,marco1 it is merely an expression of pain2 of wrath or menace there is no sign2 there is also a certain anxiety expressed1 and here ,leonardo may not have been at one even with himself2 for cordial sympathy with a beloved master1 and threatening against a traitor1 are with difficulty united in one countenance4 ,nevertheless1 ,cardinal ,borromeo asserts that he saw such a miracle in his time4 ,however pleasant it might be to believe this1 we have reason to suppose that the art-loving cardinal expressed his own feeling rather than what was in the picture2 for otherwise we should be unable to defend our friend ,vespino1 whose ,peter has an unpleasant expression4 ,he looks like a stern ,capuchin monk1 whose ,lent sermon is intended to rouse sinners4 ,it is strange that ,vespino has given him bushy hair1 since the ,peter of ,marco shows a beautiful head of short1 curled tresses4 ,st4 ,john is represented by ,marco in the spirit of ,da ,vinci2 the beautiful roundish face1 somewhat inclined to oval1 the hair smooth towards the top of the head1 but curling gently downwards1 particularly where it bends round ,peter's inserted hand1 are most lovely2 what we see of the dark of the eye is turned away from ,peter--a marvellously fine piece of observation1 in that while he is listening with the intensest feeling to the secret speech of his neighbor1 he turns away his eyes from him4 ,according to ,vespino1 he is a comfortable-looking1 quiet1 almost sleepy youth1 without any trace of sympathy4 ,we turn now to the left side of ,christ1 in order that the figure of the ,saviour may come last in our description4 ,st4 ,thomas' head and right hand1 whose upraised fore-finger is bent slightly toward his brow to imply reflection4 ,this movement1 which is so much in keeping with a person who is suspicious or in doubt1 has been hitherto misunderstood1 and a hesitating disciple looked upon as threatening4 ,in ,vespino's copy1 likewise1 he is reflective enough1 but as the artist has again left out the retreating right eye1 the result is a perpendicular1 monotonous profile1 without any remnant of the protruding1 searching elements of the older copies4 ,st4 ,james the ,elder4--,the most violent agitation of the features1 the most gaping mouth1 horror in his eye2 an original venture of ,leonardo's2 yet we have reason to believe that this head1 likewise1 has been remarkably succesful with ,marco4 ,the working out is magnificent1 whereas in the copy of ,vespino all is lost2 attitude1 manner1 mien1 everything has vanished1 and dwindles down into a sort of indifferent generality4 ,st4 ,philip1 amiable and invaluable1 resembles ,raffaelle's youths1 collected on the left side of ,the ,school of ,athens about ,bramante4 ,vespino has1 unfortunately1 again suppressed the right eye1 and as he could not deny that there was something more than profile in the thing1 he has produced an ambiguous1 strangely inclined head4 ,st4 ,matthew1 young1 of undesigning nature1 with curly hair1 an anxious expression in the slightly opened mouth1 in which the teeth1 which are visible1 express a sort of slight ferocity in keeping with the violent movement of the figure4 ,of all this nothing remains in ,vespino2 he gazes before him1 stiff and expressionless2 one does not receive the remotest notion of the violent movement of the body4 ,st4 ,thaddeus1 according to ,marco1 is likewise quite an invaluable head2 anxiety1 suspicion1 vexation1 are expressed in every feature4 ,the unity of this agitation of the countenance is extremely fine1 and is entirely in keeping with the movement of the hands which we have already explained4 ,in ,vespino1 everything is again reduced to a general level2 he has also made the head still more unmeaning by turning it too much towards the spectator1 whereas1 according to ,marco1 hardly a quarter of the left side is seen1 whereby the suspicious1 askance-looking element is admirably portrayed4 ,st4 ,simon the ,elder1 wholly in profile1 placed opposite the likewise pure profile of young ,matthew4 ,in him the protruding under lip which ,leonardo had such a partiality for in old faces1 is most exaggerated2 but1 along with the grave1 overhanging brow1 produces the most wonderful effect of vexation and reflection1 in sharp contrast with the passionate movement of young ,matthew4 ,in ,vespino he is a good-natured old man in his dotage1 incapable of taking any interest in even the most important occurrence that might take place in his presence4 ,having thus now thrown light upon the apostles1 we turn to the form of ,christ himself4 ,and here again we are met by the legend1 that ,leonardo was unable to finish either ,christ or ,judas1 which we readily believe1 since1 from his method1 it was impossible for him to put the last touch to those two extremes of portraiture4 ,wretched enough1 in the original1 after all the darkening processes it had to undergo1 may have been the appearance presented by the features of ,christ1 which were only sketched4 ,how little ,vespino found remaining1 may be gleaned from the fact that he brought out a colossal head of ,christ1 quite at variance with the purpose of ,da ,vinci1 without paying the least attention to the inclination of the head1 which ought of necessity to have been made parallel with the inclination of ,john's4 ,of the expression we shall say nothing2 the features are regular1 good-natured1 intelligent1 like those we are accustomed to see in ,christ1 but without the very smallest particle of sensibility1 so that we should almost be unable to tell what ,new ,testament story this head would be welcome to4 ,we are here met and aided by the circumstance that connoisseurs assert1 that ,leonardo himself painted the head of the ,saviour at ,castellazzo1 and ventured to do in another's work what he had not been willing to undertake in his own principal figure4 ,as we have not the original before us1 we must say of the copy that it agrees entirely with the conception which we form of a noble man whose breast is weighed down by poignant suffering of soul1 which he has endeavored to alleviate by a familiar word1 but has thereby only made matters worse instead of better4 ,by these processes of comparison1 then1 we have come sufficiently near the method of this extraordinary artist1 such as he has clearly explained and demonstrated it in writings and pictures1 and fortunately it is in our power to take a step still further in advance4 ,there is1 namely1 preserved in the ,ambrosiana library a drawing incontestably executed by ,leonardo1 upon bluish paper1 with a little white and colored chalk4 ,of this the chevalier ,vossi has executed the most accurate fac-simile1 which is also before us4 ,a noble youthful face1 drawn from nature1 evidently with a view to the head of ,christ at the ,supper4 ,pure1 regular features1 smooth hair1 the head bent to the left side1 the eyes cast down1 the mouth half opened1 the tout ensemble brought into the most marvellous harmony by a slight touch of sorrow4 ,here indeed we have only the man who does not conceal a suffering of soul1 but the problem1 how1 without extinguishing this promise1 at the same time to express sublimity1 independence1 power1 the might of godhead1 is one which even the most gifted earthly pencil might well find hard to solve4 ,in this youthful physiognomy which hovers between ,christ and ,john1 we see the highest attempt to hold fast by nature when the supermundane is in question4 ,,paul ,,janet ,,and ,,hegel4#fe ,in the following article the passages quoted are turned into ,english1 and the original ,french is omitted for the sake of brevity and lucid arrangement4 ,as the work reviewed is accessible to most readers1 a reference to the pages from which we quote will answer all purposes4--,,editor4 ,since the death of ,hegel in #ahca1 his philosophy has been making a slow but regular progress into the world at large4 ,at home in ,germany it is spoken of as having a right wing1 a left wing1 and a centre2 its disciples are very numerous when one counts such widely different philosophers as ,rosenkrantz1 ,michelet1 ,kuno ,fischer1 ,erdmann1 ,j4 ,h4 ,fichte1 ,strauss1 ,feuerbach1 and their numerous followers4 ,sometimes when one hears who constitute a 8wing0 of the ,hegelian school1 he is reminded of the 8lucus a non0 principle of naming1 or rather of misnaming things4 ,but ,hegelianism has1 as we said1 made its way into other countries4 ,in ,france we have the sthetics 8partly translated and partly analyzed10 by ,professor ,bnard2 the logic of the small ,encyclopdia1 translated with copious notes1 by ,professor ,vera1 who has gone bravely on1 with what seems with him to be a work of love1 and given us the 8,philosophy of ,nature0 and the 8,philosophy of ,spirit10 and promises us the 8,philosophy of ,religion0--all accompanied with abundant introduction and commentary4 ,we hear of others very much influenced by ,hegel3 ,m4 ,taine1 for example1 who writes brilliant essays4 ,in ,english1 too1 we have a translation of the 8,philosophy of ,history10 7in ,bohn's ,library27 a kind of translation and analysis of the first part of the third volume of the ,logic1 7,sloman ,wallon1 ,london1 #ahee72 and an extensive and elaborate work on 8,the ,secret of ,hegel10 by ,james ,hutchison ,stirling4 ,we must not forget to mention a translation of ,schwegler's ,history of ,philosophy--a work drawn principally from ,hegel's labors--by our ,american ,professor ,seelye3 and also 7just published7 a translation of the same book by the author of the 8,secret of ,hegel40 ,articles treating of ,hegel are to be found by the score--seek them in every text-book on philosophy1 in every general ,cyclopdia1 and in numerous works written for or against ,german ,philosophy4 ,some of these writers tell us in one breath that ,hegel was a man of prodigious genius1 and in the next they convict him of confounding the plainest of all common sense distinctions4 ,some of them find him the profoundest of all thinkers1 while others cannot 8make a word of sense out of him40 ,there seems to be a general understanding in this country and ,england on one point3 all agree that he was a ,pantheist4 ,theodore ,parker1 ,sir ,william ,hamilton1 ,mansell1 ,morell1 and even some of the ,english defenders of ,hegelianism admit this4 ,hegel holds1 say some1 that ,god is a becoming2 others say that he holds ,god to be pure being4 ,these men are careful men apparently--but only apparently1 for it must be confessed that if ,hegel has written any books at all1 they are1 every one of them1 devoted to the task of showing the inadequacy of such abstractions when made the highest principle of things4 ,the ripest product of the great ,german movement in philosophy1 which took place at the beginning of this century1 ,hegel's philosophy is likewise the concretest system of thought the world has seen4 ,this is coming to be the conviction of thinkers more and more every day as they get glimpses into particular provinces of his labor4 ,bnard thinks the ,philosophy of ,art the most wonderful product of modern thinking1 and speaks of the ,logic--which he does not understand--as a futile and perishable production4 ,another thinks that his ,philosophy of ,history is immortal1 and a third values extravagantly his ,philosophy of ,religion4 ,but the one who values his ,logic knows how to value all his labors4 ,the ,history of ,philosophy is the work that impresses us most with the unparalleled wealth of his thought2 he is able to descend through all history1 and give to each philosopher a splendid thought as the centre of his system1 and yet never is obliged to confound different systems1 or fail in showing the superior depth of modern thought4 ,while we are admiring the depth and clearness of ,pythagoras1 we are surprised and delighted to find the great thought of ,heraclitus1 but ,anaxagoras is a new surprise2 the ,sophists come before us bearing a world-historical significance1 and ,socrates1 ,plato1 and ,aristotle lead us successively to heights such as we had not dreamed attainable by any thinking4 ,but thought is no immediate function1 like the process of breathing or sleeping1 or fancy-making3 it is the profoundest mediation of spirit1 and he who would get an insight into the speculative thinkers of whatever time1 must labor as no mere flesh and blood can labor1 but only as spirit can labor3 with agony and sweat of blood4 ,a philosophy which should explain the great complex of the universe1 could hardly be expected to be transparent to uncultured minds at the first glance4 ,thus it happens that many critics give us such discouraging reports upon their return from a short excursion into the true wonder-land of philosophy4 ,the ,eternal ,verities are miraculous only to those eyes which have gazed long upon them after shutting out the glaring sunlight of the senses4 ,those who criticise a philosophy must imply a philosophical method of their own1 and thus measure themselves while they measure others4 ,a literary man who criticises ,goethe1 or ,shakespeare1 or ,homer1 is very apt to lay himself bare to the shaft of the adversary4 ,there are1 however1 in our time1 a legion of writers who pass judgment as flippantly upon a system of the most comprehensive scope--and which they confess openly their inability to understand--as upon a mere opinion uttered in a 8table-talk40 ,even some men of great reputation give currency to great errors4 ,sir ,william ,hamilton1 in his notes to ,reid's ,philosophy of 8,touch10 once quoted the passage from the second part of ,fichte's ,bestimmung des ,menschen1 7wherein onesided idealism is pushed to its downfall17 in order to show that ,fichte's ,philosophy ended in ,nihilism4 ,the ,bestimmung des ,menschen was a mere popular writing in which ,fichte adopted the ,kantian style of exhibiting the self-refutation of sense and reflection1 in order to rest all ultimate truth in the postulates of the ,practical ,reason4 ,accordingly he shows the practical results of his own system in the third part of the work in question1 and enforces the soundest ethical views of life4 ,he never thought of presenting his theoretical philosophy in that work4 ,thus1 too1 in ,hamilton's refutation of ,cousin and ,schelling3 he polemicises against all 8,doctrines of the ,absolute10 saying that to think is to limit2 hence to think ,god would be to determine or limit ,him2 and hence is inferred the impossibility of thinking ,god as he truly is4 ,this1 of course1 is not pushed to its results by his followers1 for then its skeptical tendency would become obvious4 ,religion demands that we shall do the ,will of ,god2 this ,will must1 therefore1 be known4 ,but1 again1 ,will is the realization or self-determination of one's nature--from it the character proceeds4 ,thus in knowing ,god's will we know his character or nature4 ,if we cannot do this at all1 no religion is possible2 and in proportion as ,religion is possible1 the ,knowledge of ,god is possible4 ,if it be said that the ,absolute is unthinkable1 in this assertion it is affirmed that all predicates or categories of thought are inapplicable to the ,absolute1 for to think is to predicate of some object1 the categories of thought2 and in so far as these categories apply1 to that extent is the ,absolute thinkable4 ,since ,existence is a category of thought1 it follows from this position that to predicate existence of the ,absolute is impossible2 8a questionable predicament0 truly for the ,absolute4 ,according to this doctrine--that all thought is limitation--,god is made ,pure ,being1 or ,pure ,thought4 ,this is also the result of ,indian ,pantheism1 and of all ,pantheism2 this doctrine concerning the mere negative character of thought1 in fact1 underlies the ,oriental tenet that consciousness is finitude4 ,to be consistent1 all ,hamiltonians should become ,brahmins1 or1 at least1 join some sect of modern ,spiritualists1 and thus embrace a religion that corresponds to their dogma4 ,however1 let us not be so unreasonable as to insist upon the removal of inconsistency--it is all the good they have4 ,after all this preliminary let us proceed at once to examine the work of ,professor ,paul ,janet1 which we have named at the head of our article3 8,essai sur la dialectique dans ,platon et dans ,hegel40 ,after considering the ,dialectic of ,plato in its various aspects1 and finding that it rests on the principle of contradiction1 ,m4 ,janet grapples ,hegel1 and makes1 in order1 the following points3 ,i4 ,,terminology4--,he tells us that the great difficulty that lies in the way of comprehending ,german ,philosophy is the abstract terminology employed1 which is1 in fact1 mere scholasticism preserved and applied to modern problems4 ,no nation of modern times1 except the ,germans1 have preserved the scholastic form4 ,he traces the obscurity of modern ,german philosophy to 8,aristotle subtilized by the schools40 ,this he contrasts with the 8simple and natural philosophy of the ,scotch40 ,this 8simplicity0 arises from the fact that the ,scotch system holds that immediate sensuous knowing is valid4 ,of course this implies that they hold that the immediate existence of objects is a true existence--that whatever is1 exists thus and so without any further grounds4 ,this is the denial of all philosophy1 for it utterly ignores any occasion whatever for it4 ,but it is no less antagonistic to the 8natural science0 of the physicist3 he1 the physicist1 finds the immediate object of the senses to be no permanent or true phase1 but only a transitory one2 the object is involved with other beings--even the remotest star--and changes when they change4 ,it is force and matter 7two very abstract categories7 that are to him the permanent and true existence4 ,but force and matter cannot be seen by the senses2 they can only be thought4 ,our author proceeds to trace the resemblance between ,hegel and ,wolff3 both consider and analyze the pure concepts1 beginning with ,being4 ,to ,m4 ,janet this resemblance goes for much1 but he admits that 8,hegel has modified this order 7that of ,wolff7 and rendered it more systematic40 ,if one asks 8,how more systematic80 he will not find the answer4 8,the scholastic form is retained1 but not the thought10 we are told4 ,that such statements are put forward1 even in a book designed for mere surface-readers may well surprise us4 ,that the mathematical method of ,wolff or ,spinoza--a method which proceeds by definitions and external comparison1 holding meanwhile to the principle of contradiction--that such a method should be confounded with that of ,hegel which proceeds dialectically1 i4 e4 through the internal movement of the categories to their contradiction or limit1 shows the student of philosophy at once that we are dealing with a littrateur1 and not with a philosopher4 ,so far from retaining the form of ,wolff it is the great object of ,hegel 7see his long prefaces to the 8,logik0 and the 8,phnomenologie des ,geistes07 to supplant that form by what he considers the true method--that of the objective itself4 ,the objective method is to be distinguished from the arbitrary method of external reflection which selects its point of view somewhere outside of the object considered1 and proceeds to draw relations and comparisons which1 however edifying1 do not give us any exhaustive knowledge4 ,it is also to be distinguished from the method of mere empirical observation which collects without discrimination a mass of characteristics1 accidental and necessary1 and never arrives at a vivifying soul that unites and subordinates the multiplicity4 ,the objective method seizes somewhat in its definition and traces it through all the phases which necessarily unfold when the object is placed in the form of relation to itself4 ,an object which cannot survive the process of self-relation1 perishes1 i4 e4 it leads to a more concrete object which is better able to endure4 ,this method1 as we shall presently see1 is attributed to ,plato by ,m4 ,janet4 ,the only resemblance that remains to be noted between the scholastics and ,hegel is this3 they both treat of subtle distinctions in thought1 while our modern 8common sense0 system goes only so far as to distinguish very general and obvious differences4 ,this is a questionable merit1 and the less ado made about it by such as take pride in it1 the better for them4 ,our author continues3 8,the principal difficulty of the system of ,kant is our ignorance of the ancient systems of logic4 ,the ,critique of ,pure ,reason is modelled on the scholastic system40 ,could we have a more conclusive refutation of this than the fact that the great professors of the ancient systems grossly misunderstand ,kant1 and even our essayist himself mistakes the whole purport of the same6 ,hear him contrast ,kant with ,hegel3 8,kant sees in ,being only the form of ,thought1 while ,hegel sees in ,thought only the form of ,being40 ,this he says is the great difference between the ,germans and ,french1 interpreting it to mean3 8that the former pursues the route of deduction1 and the latter that of experience06 ,he wishes to consider ,hegel under three heads3 #ast1 ,the ,beginning2 #b;d1 the dialectical deduction of the ,becoming1 and #c;d1 the term ,dialectic4 ,,ii4 ,,the ,,beginning4--,according to ,m4 ,janet1 ,hegel must have used this syllogism in order to find the proper category with which to commence the ,logic4 7a7 ,the ,beginning should presuppose nothing2 7b7 ,pure ,being presupposes nothing2 7c7 ,hence ,pure ,being is the ,beginning4 ,this syllogism he shows to be inconclusive3 for there are two beginnings1 7a7 in the order of knowledge1 7b7 in the order of existence4 ,are they the same8 ,he answers3 8,no1 the thinking being--because it thinks--knows itself before it knows the being which it thinks40 ,subject and object being identical in that act1 ,m4 ,janet in effect says1 8it thinks itself before it thinks itself0--an argument that the scholastics would hardly have been guilty of6 ,the beginning is really made1 he says1 with internal or external experience4 ,he quotes 7page #caf7 from ,hegel a passage asserting that mediation is essential to knowing4 ,this he construes to mean that 8the determined or concrete 7the world of experience7 is the essential condition of knowing60 ,through his misapprehension of the term 8mediation10 we are prepared for all the errors that follow1 for 8mediation in knowing0 means with ,hegel that it involves a process1 and hence can be true only in the form of a system4 ,the 8internal and external experience0 appertains to what ,hegel calls immediate knowing4 ,it is therefore not to be wondered at that ,m4 ,janet thinks ,hegel contradicts himself by holding ,pure ,being to be the ,beginning1 and afterwards affirming mediation to be necessary4 ,he says 7page #cag71 8,in the order of knowing it is the mediate which is necessarily first1 while in the order of existence the immediate is the commencement40 ,such a remark shows him to be still laboring on the first problem of ,philosophy1 and without any light1 for no ,speculative ,philosopher 7like ,plato1 ,aristotle1 ,leibnitz1 or ,hegel7 ever held that ,pure ,being--or the immediate--is the first in the order of existence1 but rather that ,god or ,spirit 7self-thinking1 8pure act10 1 8,logos10 c47 is the first in the order of existence4 ,in fact1 ,m4 ,janet praises ,plato and ,aristotle for this very thing at the end of his volume1 and thereby exhibits the unconsciousness of his procedure4 ,again1 8,the pure thought is the end of philosophy1 and not its beginning40 ,if he means by this that the culture of consciousness ends in arriving at pure thought or philosophy1 we have no objection to offer1 except to the limiting of the application of the term ,philosophy to its preliminary stage1 which is called the ,phenomenology of ,spirit4 ,the arrival at pure thought marks the beginning of the use of terms in a universal sense1 and hence is the beginning of philosophy proper4 ,but ,m4 ,janet criticises the distinction made by ,hegel between ,phenomenology and ,psychology1 and instances ,maine de ,biran as one who writes ,psychology in the sense ,hegel would write ,phenomenology4 ,but ,m4 ,biran merely manipulates certain unexplained phenomena1--like the ,will1 for example--in order to derive categories like force1 cause1 c4 ,but ,hegel shows in his ,phenomenology the dialectical unfolding of consciousness through all its phases1 starting from the immediate certitude of the senses4 ,he shows how certitude becomes knowledge of truth1 and wherein it differs from it4 ,but ,m4 ,janet 7p4 #cbd7 thinks that ,hegel's system1 beginning in empirical ,psychology1 climbs to pure thought1 8and then draws up the ladder after it40 ,,iii4 ,,the ,,becoming4--,we are told by the author that consciousness determining itself as ,being1 determines itself as a being1 and not as the being4 ,if this be so we cannot think pure being at all4 ,such an assertion amounts to denying the universal character of the ,ego4 ,if the position stated were true1 we could think neither being nor any other object4 ,on page #ccb1 he says1 8,this contradiction 7of ,being and non-being7 which in the ordinary logic would be the negative of the posited notion1 is1 in the logic of ,hegel1 only an excitant or stimulus1 which somehow determines spirit to find a third somewhat in which it finds the other conciliated40 ,he is not able to see any procedure at all4 ,he sees the two opposites1 and thinks that ,hegel empirically hunts out a concept which implies both1 and substitutes it for them4 ,m4 ,janet thinks 7pp4 #ccf-g7 that ,hegel has exaggerated the difficulties of conceiving the identity of ,being and nought4 7p4 #cch7 8,if the difference of ,being and nought can be neither expressed nor defined1 if they are as identical as different--if1 in short1 the idea of ,being is only the idea of the pure void1 ,i will say1 not merely that ,being transforms itself into ,nothing1 or passes into its contrary2 ,i will say that there are not two contraries1 but only one term which ,i have falsely called ,being in the thesis1 but which is in reality only ,non-being without restriction--the pure zero40 ,he quotes from ,kuno ,fischer 7p4 #cdj7 the following remarks applicable here3 8,if ,being were in reality the pure void as it is ordinarily taken1 ,non-being would not express the same void a second time2 but it would then be the non-void1 i4 e4 the abhorrence of the void1 or the immanent contradiction of the void40--7and again from his 8,logik und ,metaphysik0 ,,ii4 #bi73 8,the logical ,being contradicts itself2 for thought vanishes in the immovable repose of ,being4 ,but as ,being comes only from thought 7for it is the act of thought71 it contradicts thus itself in destroying thought4 ,consequently thought manifests itself as the negation of ,being--that is to say1 as ,non-being4 ,the ,non-being 7logical7 is not the total suppression of ,being--the pure zero--it is not the mathematical opposition of ,being to itself as a negative opposed to a positive1 but it is the dialectical negative of itself1 the immanent contradiction of ,being4 ,being contradicts itself1 hence is ,non-being1 and in the concept of ,non-being1 thought discovers the immanent contradiction of ,being--thought manifests itself at first as ,being1 and in turn the logical ,being manifests itself as ,non-being2 thought can hence say1 8,i am the ,being which is not40 8,such10 continues our author1 8is the deduction of ,m4 ,fischer4 ,it seems to me very much inferior in clearness to that of ,hegel40 ,how he could say this is very mysterious when we find him denying all validity to ,hegel's demonstration4 ,although ,fischer's explanation is mixed--partly dialectical and partly psychological--yet1 as an explanation1 it is correct4 ,but as psychology should not be dragged into ,logic1 which is the evolution of the forms of pure thinking1 we must hold strictly to the dialectic if we would see the 8,becoming40 ,the psychological explanation gets no further than the relation of ,being and nought as concepts4 ,the ,hegelian thought on this point is not widely different from that of ,gorgias1 as given us by ,sextus ,empiricus1 nor from that of ,plato in the ,sophist4 ,let us attempt it here3 ,being is the pure simple2 as such it is considered under the form of self-relation4 ,but as it is wholly undetermined1 and has no content1 it is pure nought or absolute negation4 ,as such it is the negation by itself or the negation of itself1 and hence its own opposite or ,being4 ,thus the simple falls through self-opposition into duality1 and this again becomes simple if we attempt to hold it asunder1 or give it any validity by itself4 ,thus if ,being is posited as having validity in and by itself without determination1 7omnis determinatio est negatio71 it becomes a pure void in nowise different from nought1 for difference is determination1 and neither ,being nor nought possess it4 ,what is the validity of the nought8 ,a negative is a relative1 and a negative by itself is a negative related to itself1 which is a self-cancelling4 ,thus ,being and nought1 posited objectively as having validity1 prove dissolving forms and pass over into each other4 ,being is a ceasing and nought is a beginning1 and these are the two forms of ,becoming4 ,the ,becoming1 dialectically considered1 proves itself inadequate likewise4 ,,iv4 ,,the ,,dialectic4--,to consider an object dialectically we have merely to give it universal validity2 if it contradicts itself then1 we are not in anywise concerned for the result2 we will simply stand by and accept the result1 without fear that the true will not appear in the end4 ,the negative turned against itself makes short work of itself2 it is only when the subjective reflection tries to save it by hypotheses and reservations that a merely negative result is obtained4 7,page #cfi73 8,in ,spinozism the development of ,being is ,geometric2 in the ,system of ,hegel it is organic40 ,what could have tempted him to use these words1 it is impossible to say1 unless it was the deep-seated national proclivity for epigrammatic statements4 ,this distinction means nothing less 7in the mouth of its original author7 than what we have already given as the true difference between ,wolff's and ,hegel's methods2 but ,m4 ,janet has long since forgotten his earlier statements4 7,page #cfi7 ,he says1 8,hegel's method is a faithful expression of the movement of nature10 from which he thinks ,hegel derived it empirically6 ,on page #cgb he asks3 8,who proves to us that the dialectic stops at ,spirit as its last term8 ,why can ,i not conceive a spirit absolutely superior to mine1 in whom the identity between subject and object1 the intelligible and intelligence would be more perfect than it is with this great ,philosopher ,hegel8 9999999999 ,in fact1 every philosopher is a man1 and so far forth is full of obscurity and feebleness40 ,spirit is the last term in philosophy for the reason that it stands in complete self-relation1 and hence contains its antithesis within itself2 if it could stand in opposition to anything else1 then it would contain a contradiction1 and be capable of transition into a higher4 ,m4 ,janet asks in effect3 8,who proves that the dialectic stops at ,god as the highest1 and why cannot ,i conceive a higher80 ,judging from his attempt at understanding ,hegel1 however1 he is not in a fair way to conceive 8a spirit in whom the identity between subject and object0 is more perfect than in ,hegel4 8,what hinders0 is his own culture1 his own self2 8,du gleichst dem ,geist den du begreifst1 nicht mir10 said the ,world-spirit to ,faust4 ,he asks1 7p4 #cgd73 8,when did the #8pure act' commence80 ,from ,eternity2 it always commences1 and is always complete1 says ,hegel4 8,according to ,hegel1 ,god is made from nought1 by means of the ,world40 ,instead of this1 ,hegel holds that ,god is self-created1 and the world eternally created by him 7the ,eternally-begotten ,son74 8,what need has ,god of ,nature80 ,god is ,spirit2 hence conscious2 hence he makes himself an object to himself2 in this act he creates nature2 hence ,nature is ,his reflection4 7,p4 #chf73 8,the ,absolute in ,hegel is spirit only on condition that it thinks1 and thinks itself2 hence it is not essentially ,spirit1 but only accidentally40 ,to 8think itself0 is to be conscious1 and1 without this1 ,god would have no personality2 and hence if ,hegel were to hold any other doctrine than the one attributed to him1 he would be a ,pantheist4 ,but these things are not mere dogmas with ,hegel2 they appear as the logical results of the most logical of systems4 8,but in ,plato1 ,god is a ,reason in activity1 a living thought40 ,m4 ,janet mentions this to show ,plato's superiority2 he thinks that it is absurd for ,hegel to attribute thinking to ,god1 but thinks the same thing to be a great merit in ,plato4 7,p4 #cib73 8,behold the ,platonic deduction or dialectic3 being given a pure idea1 he shows that this idea1 if it were all alone1 i4 e4 made universal1 or placed in self-relation1 or posited as valid for itself1 would be contradictory of itself1 and consequently could not be4 ,hence1 if it exists1 it is on condition that it mingles with another idea4 ,take1 for example1 the multiple3 by itself1 it loses itself in the indiscernible1 for it would be impossible without unity40 ,this would do very well for a description of the ,dialectic in ,hegel if he would lay more stress on the positive side of the result4 ,not merely does the 8pure idea mingle with another0--i4 e4 pass over to its opposite--but it returns into itself by the continuation of its own movement1 and thereby reaches a concrete stage4 ,plato sometimes uses this complete dialectical movement1 and ends affirmatively2 sometimes he uses only the partial movement and draws negative conclusions4 ,how much better ,m4 ,janet's book might have been--we may be allowed to remark in conclusion--had he possessed the earnest spirit of such men as ,vera and ,hutchison ,stirling6 ,stimulated by its title1 we had hoped to find a book that would kindle a zeal for the study of the profoundest philosophical subject1 as treated by the profoundest of thinkers4 ,footnote #fe3 8,essai sur la dialectique dans ,platon et dans ,hegel10 par ,paul ,janet1 ,membre de ,l',institut1 professeur la ,facult des lettres de ,paris4--,paris1 7,ladrange17 #ahfj4 ,transcriber's ,notes3 ,text that was in italics is enclosed by underscores 7italics74 ,text that was in bold face is enclosed by equals signs 7bold74 ,footnotes have been moved to follow the articles in which they are referenced4