,,previous ,,writings ,,of ,,paul ,s4   
,,reinsch        ,the ,common ,law in   
the ,early ,american ,colonies1 #ahii4  
,world ,politics at the ,end of the     
,nineteenth ,century as      ,influenced
 by the ,oriental ,situation1 #aijj4    
,colonial ,government1 #aijb4           
,colonial ,administration1 #aije4       
,american ,legislatures and ,legislative
 ,methods1 #aijg4      ,intellectual    
,currents in the ,far ,east1 #aiaa4     
,international ,unions1 #aiaa4      ,an 
,american ,diplomat in ,china1          
#aiac-aiah1 #aibb4            ,,secret  
,,diplomacy      ,,how ,,far ,,can ,,it 
,,be ,,eliminated8      ,,by    ,,paul  
,s4 ,,reinsch      ,illustration        
,,new ,,york    ,,harcourt1 ,,brace     
,,and ,,company            ,,copyright1 
#aibb1 ,,by    ,,harcourt1 ,,brace ,,and
 ,,company1 ,,inc4        ,,printed ,,in
 ,,the ,u4 ,s4 ,a4 ,,by    ,,the ,,quinn
  ,,boden ,,company    ,,rahway1 ,n4 ,j4
          ,the principal conclusions    
based on the material contained in this 

book were presented by the ,author at a 
joint meeting of the ,american          
,historical ,association and the        
,american ,political ,science           
,association1  in his address as        
,president of the latter1 on ,december  
#bhth1 #aibj4          ,,contents       
,,page          ,,introduction          
#c      ,,chapter       ,i4 ,,eighteenth
 ,,century ,,diplomacy                  
#bb        ,,ii4 ,,old ,,diplomatic     
,,correspondence                  #cf   
,,iii4 ,,after ,,the ,,congress ,,of    
,,vienna                   #de          
,,iv4 ,,napoleon ,,iii1 ,,disraeli1     
,,bismarck               #eh         ,v4
 ,,triple ,,alliance ,,diplomacy ,,and  
,,morocco          #gj        ,,vi4     
,,entente ,,diplomacy                   
#hd       ,,vii4 ,,the ,,crisis ,,of    
#aiad                            #ajb   
,,viii4 ,,the ,,secret ,,treaties ,,of  
,,the ,,war                #aaf         
,,ix4 ,,hopes ,,for ,,improvement       
,,deferred                #abi          

,x4 ,,the ,,destruction ,,of ,,public   
,,confidence          #acf        ,,xi4 
,,parliament ,,and ,,foreign ,,affairs  
#adi       ,,xii4 ,,the ,,public ,,and  
,,diplomacy                      #aff   
,,xiii4 ,a ,,survival ,,of ,,absolutism 
#aha       ,,xiv4 ,,recent ,,american   
,,experience                    #aid    
,,conclusion                            
#baa            ,,index                 
#bbe          ,,secret ,,diplomacy      
,,introduction      ,is secret diplomacy
 the evil spirit of modern politics8 ,is
 it the  force that keeps nations in a  
state of potential hostility and does   
not allow a feeling of confidence and of
 wholehearted coperation to  grow up8   
,or is it only a trade device1 a clever 
method of surrounding  with an aura of  
importance the doings of the diplomats1 
a race of men  of average wisdom and    
intelligence who traditionally have     
valued the  prestige of dealing with    
8secret affairs of state08 ,or is it    
something  less romantic than either of 

these--merely the survival from a more  
barbarous age of instincts of           
secretiveness and chicane acquired at a 
time when self-defense was the necessity
 of every hour8    ,it is quite patent  
that the practice of secret diplomacy is
  incompatible with the democratic      
theory of state4 ,even in the ,liberal  
theory of state it finds little favor1  
although that is disposed  to grant a   
great deal of discretion to the         
representatives who are  given the      
trusteeship of public affairs4 ,yet the 
essential idea of  ,liberalism1         
government by discussion1 includes      
foreign affairs  within its scope fully 
as much as those of purely domestic     
concern4  ,in applying to public affairs
 the experience of private business it  
is often argued that as the directorate 
of a corporation could not  be expected 
to transact its business in public1 even
 so diplomatic  conversations are not to
 be heralded from the house tops4 ,how  
far  this particular analogy between    

private business and public affairs     
will hold1 is a point we shall have to  
examine later4 ,at first sight  the     
planning of private enterprises and the 
consideration of benefits  and losses1  
can hardly furnish completely           
satisfactory rules for the  conduct of  
public affairs1 particularly those      
involving the life and  death of the    
persons concerned4 ,stockholders would  
be reluctant to  allow such matters to  
be determined by a board of trustees in 
secret  conclave4    ,divesting         
ourselves of all prejudices1 even of    
righteous indignation  against plainly  
unconscionable practices1 we shall try  
to examine and  analyze the action of   
great diplomats and to see to what      
extent really  important results        
achieved by them have depended upon the 
use of secret  methods4 ,in the #ahth   
,century1 diplomacy was still looked    
upon as a  sharp game in which wits were
 matched1 with a complete license as to 
the means pursued2 provided1 however1   

that embarrassing discovery  must be    
avoided1 in other words1 that the exact 
method of deception  must be so closely 
guarded that only the results will show4
 ,the great  diplomats of the beginning 
of the #aith century--,metternich1      
,talleyrand1  ,pozzo di ,borgo--while   
they talked much about humanitarian     
principles1  continued to play a barren 
game of intrigue4 ,napoleon ,,iii1 that 
master  of devious statecraft1 will     
always be cited by excoriators of secret
  diplomacy as an abhorrent example--a  
man undone by the results of his  own   
plotting4 ,bismarck indeed prided       
himself on looking down upon  petty     
secret manuvering and cast a certain    
amount of contempt on the  whole        
diplomatic business2 he often           
disconcerted his opponents by an        
unaccustomed frankness4 ,yet the        
orientation of his statesmanship was    
based upon the idea of helping history  
to find a short-cut to her aims  through
 masterful plotting4 ,he took the reins 

out of the hands of  ,providence4       
,but let us return to our first         
question3 8,is secret diplomacy the     
evil spirit of modern politics80 ,it is 
indeed worth inquiring how far  our     
secretive methods in foreign affairs are
 to blame for the pitiful  condition in 
which the world finds itself to-day4 ,no
 doubt there is a  general belief that  
secret diplomacy and ever-increasing    
armaments  led ,europe into the terrible
 destruction of the ,great ,war and that
 the  continuance of such methods is    
chiefly to blame for the deplorable     
condition since the ,armistice4 ,there  
may be deeper causes1 but these         
evidences are so obtrusive that they    
naturally attract most attention  and   
are given most blame for the evils we   
endure4 ,it is plain that  secret       
diplomacy is a potent cause for         
continued distrust1 fear and  hate4     
,there are few statesmen that would not 
shrink from deliberately  planning and  
staging a war4 ,yet they nearly all     

participate in methods  of handling     
public business from which it is hardly 
possible that  anything but suspicion1  
fear and hatred should arise4 ,distrust 
is  planted everywhere4 ,there is no    
assurance of what is the truth2 true    
reports are questioned2 false reports1  
believed4 ,all motives are under        
suspicion4 ,the public conscience and   
will are beclouded2 nothing stands  out 
as reliable but stark military force4   
,it would seem that we have learned very
 little from the war4 ,the same         
dangerous and unhealthy methods continue
 to be used with inveterate  zeal4 ,the 
result is that suspicion has now grown  
up among those who  fought side by side 
and who shed their blood together4      
,realizing the  fundamental importance  
of basing international life on sound   
opinion  and fair dealing1 the framers  
of the ,league of ,nations tried to     
secure  the publicity of all            
international agreements4 ,yet this     
moderate  provision of the covenant has 

not been obeyed by some of the strongest
  contracting powers4 ,some outsiders1  
indeed1 such as ,russia1 have quite     
willingly published their treaties and  
furnished them to the bureau of  the    
league4    ,that the first act of       
peace-making was to shut the door of the
  council chamber in the face of the    
multitudes who had offered their  lives 
and shed their blood for the rights of  
humanity was a tragic  mistake4 ,in the 
defense of secret procedure1 published  
on ,january #ag1  #aiai1 it was said    
8,to discuss differences in the press   
would inflame  public opinion and render
 impossible a compromise40 ,so all      
connection  between the great public    
that was paying the price of the game   
and the  benevolent elder statesmen who 
thought they would shoulder the burden  
of responsibility alone1 was cut off4   
,the men in the council chamber  were   
not strengthened in this great crisis by
 a feeling of intimate  touch with a    
strong and enlightened public opinion4  

,the public itself  was disillusioned2  
suspicion and contempt were the natural 
result4 ,the  bald statements given to  
the press concerning the negotiations   
did not  satisfy any one4 ,most of what 
was going on became known to outsiders4 
,but its authenticity was so uncertain  
and it was so commingled with  mere     
rumor that the public soon gave up in   
despair4 ,it will be  important to      
inquire as to what is the proper        
perspective between  confidential       
deliberation and publicity of results1  
in conferences1  which are becoming the 
usual agency for discussing and settling
  international affairs4    ,when       
secrecy is confined merely to the       
methods of carrying on  negotiations1   
its importance for good and evil is     
certainly not so  great as when the     
secrecy of methods includes concealment 
of aims and  of the agreements arrived  
at4 ,we could imagine that even a       
statesman  who seeks the closest        
relationship with public opinion1 even a

  ,lincoln1 could not at all times      
eliminate all use of confidential       
communications4 ,but the temper of the  
whole system of foreign affairs  is a   
different matter2 and any broad effort  
to conceal the tendency of  action or   
its results is certainly productive of  
evil1 no matter how  salutary or        
beneficial it may seem to the men       
employing it at the time4    ,but1 it is
 said1 we must trust to experts4        
,international relations are  so        
intricate and have so many delicate     
shadings that they elude the  grasp of  
the ordinary man1 and can be held       
together and seen in their  proper      
relations only by the comprehensive and 
experienced mind of the  seasoned       
statesman4 ,there is1 however1 a        
distinction which ought to be  noted4   
,the public relies in most cases        
unreservedly upon expertship in  matters
 of engineering1 science1 accounting1   
business management1 and  even in       
medicine1 though in the latter with a   

feeling of less complete  security4 ,in 
all these cases we know that the        
processes applied and  the methods      
pursued are demonstrable1 and           
mathematically certain to  produce the  
results anticipated4 ,but in the affairs
 of international  politics into which  
the human equation and other inexactly  
calculable  factors enter1 there is no  
such mathematical certainty which can be
  tested and ascertained by any group of
 experts4 ,it is all a matter of  wisdom
 in choosing alternatives1 and we may   
well doubt whether any man  or small    
group of men1 under modern conditions of
 life and public state  action1 can be  
wiser in such matters by themselves than
 they would be  if they constantly kept 
in direct touch with public opinion4    
,society1  when properly organized1 will
 have at its disposal on every question 
of importance1 groups of men who have   
expert knowledge4 ,expertship  in       
foreign affairs is not confined to the  
foreign offices or the  chanceries2 many

 thoughtful men observing and thinking  
intensely1  traveling widely1 seeing    
foreign affairs from an independent     
angle1  have opinions and judgments to  
contribute that the officials cannot    
safely ignore4 ,in an inquiry of this   
kind we shall have to consider  the     
broader setting of diplomacy as a part  
of public life within the  nation and   
throughout the world4 ,the element of   
secrecy is appropriate  only when we    
consider diplomacy as a clever game     
played by a small  inner privileged     
circle2 it appears out of place in a    
society organized  on a broader basis4  
,as a matter of fact the defense of     
secrecy1 from  the point of view of the 
inner politics of the state1 resolves   
itself  almost entirely into an opinion 
that the ignorance and inexperience of  
the people does not fit them to judge of
 foreign relations4 ,that1 it  must be  
confessed1 does not seem to be a very   
sound or convincing basis  for the      
choice of methods of public action in a 

modern state4    ,but the real strength 
of the argument for secrecy comes when  
the  external aspects of state action   
are considered4 ,then there is1 on the  
surface at least1 an apparent           
justification for secretiveness1 in the 
interest of a closely knit society      
engaged in competitive struggle with    
similar societies and obliged to defend 
itself and to safeguard its  interest by
 all available means4    ,regarded in   
its broader aspects there are two       
conceptions of diplomacy  which are     
quite antagonistic and which have       
divided thinkers since  the time of     
,machiavelli and ,grotius4 ,these two   
great minds may indeed  be considered as
 typifying the two tendencies and       
expressing them in  themselves and      
through the sentiments which their      
thought and writings  have engendered in
 their successors4    ,we have the      
conception of diplomacy as working out a
 complex system  of state action1       
balancing and counterbalancing forces   

and material  resources and giving      
direction to the innermost purposes of  
the state4  ,it is probable that all    
professional diplomats are more or less 
enchanted by this ideal4 ,up to the     
great war1 ,bismarck was generally      
considered the ablest master of         
diplomacy1 and his action seemed to     
supply short-cuts for historical forces 
to work out their natural aims4         
,nationalism was the word of the day and
 the creation of the ,german  national  
state1 foreordained as it seemed by the 
laws of history1 was  accelerated by the
 masterful action of the great diplomat4
 ,but we are  now able to see wherein   
lay the limitations of this method as   
applied  by ,bismarck4 ,notwithstanding 
his grasp of historic principles of     
development1 he did not1 after all1 work
 in unison with broad natural  forces1  
but relied on his power to dominate     
other men through forceful  mastery1    
with dynastic associations4 ,he was a   
superman rather than a  great           

representative of a people's            
aspirations4 ,so while he proclaimed    
the truthfulness of his diplomacy1 it   
was nevertheless kept essentially  as   
his own and his master's affair and     
business1 rather than the  people's4    
,the base of his policy was narrow4 ,he 
understood nationalism  from a ,prussian
 point of view4 ,he severed ,austria    
from ,germany1 and  then antagonized    
,france by taking ,lorraine2 far more   
important still1  he failed to          
strengthen ,german relations with       
,central ,europe and thus  made it later
 seem necessary for ,germany to go on to
 the sea and thus  to arouse the        
apprehensions and enmity of ,england4   
,thus while he  himself would probably  
have in the end avoided confronting the 
entire  world as enemies1 the           
foundations he had laid did not provide 
a safe  footing for the more ordinary   
men who followed him4 ,his diplomacy1   
once  considered so great1 had contained
 no adequate and sound foundation  for  

permanent national life4 ,such have been
 the results of the most  distinguished 
and successful work of manipulative     
diplomacy during the  ,nineteenth       
,century4    ,what then shall we say of 
the justification of wars brought about 
as a part of such a system2 under which 
statesmen consider it quite  natural to 
contemplate 8preventive war0 and to     
assume responsibility  for wholesale    
slaughter because their plan of action  
seems to reveal  a necessity for it4    
,the idea of conscious planning1 or     
striving to  subject national and       
economic facts and all historic         
development  to the conscious political 
will1--that conception of diplomacy is  
synonymous with the essence of politics 
and will stand and fall  with the       
continuance of the purely political     
state4 ,manipulative1 and  hence secret1
 diplomacy is in fact the most complete 
expression of  the purely political     
factor in human affairs4 ,to many1 it   
will seem  only a survival of a         

hyper-political era1 as human society   
now tends  to outgrow and transcend     
politics for more comprehensive1        
pervasive  and essential principles of  
action4 ,we need not here rehearse the  
fundamental character of politics as a  
struggle for recognized  authority to   
determine the action of individuals1    
with the use of  external compulsion4   
,politics is a part of the idea of the  
national  state seen from the point of  
view of a struggle for existence among  
different political organizations1 in   
which one class originally  superimposed
 its authority upon a subject population
 and in which1  after authority is      
firmly established within1 political    
power is  then used to gain advantages  
from1 or over1 outside societies4 ,it is
  ,machiavelli as opposed to ,grotius   
who gives us the philosophy of this     
struggle4 ,the narrowness of this basis 
for human action and the direful  effect
 of conscious and forceful interference 
with social and economic  laws1 is now  

beginning to be recognized4    ,but     
there is also a broader conception of   
diplomacy which is  influencing the     
minds of men although it is not yet     
fully embodied  in our daily practice4  
,this conception looks upon humanity1   
not as a  mosaic of little mutually     
exclusive areas1 but as a complex body  
of  interlocking interests and cultural 
groups4 ,as this conception gains  in   
strength1 the center of effort in       
diplomacy will not be to conceal        
separatist aims and special plots1 but  
to bring out into the clear  light of   
day the common interests of men4 ,the   
common work for them to  do in making   
the world habitable1 in dignifying the  
life of men and  protecting them against
 mutual terror and massacre1--that ideal
 of  coperation and forbearance1 is as  
yet only partially embodied in our      
international practices1 although it    
arouses the fervid hopes of men         
throughout the world4 ,whether a system 
of local autonomy combined with  full   

coperation and free interchange of      
influences can be brought  about without
 the exercise of an overpowering        
influence on the part  of a group of    
allied nations1 is still doubtful4 ,but 
if it should be  achieved1 then plainly 
the old special functions of diplomacy  
will fall  away and administrative      
conferences will take the place of      
diplomatic  conversations4 ,when        
,portugal became a republic1 the        
proposal was made  to abolish all       
diplomatic posts and have the           
international business of  ,portugal    
administered by consuls4 ,that would    
eliminate politics from  foreign        
relations4    ,diplomacy in the spirit  
of ,grotius has always had its votaries 
even  in periods of the darkest         
intrigue1 but there has only recently   
come  into general use a method of      
transacting international business which
  favors open and full discussion of    
diplomatic affairs4 ,such business  will
 be dealt with less and less in separate

 negotiation between two  powers2 there 
will generally be more nations involved1
 and conferences  and standing          
committees or commissions will be at    
work1 rather than  isolated diplomats4  
,indeed1 international conferences are  
still largely  influenced by the old    
spirit of secretive diplomacy4 ,yet the 
practice  of meeting together in larger 
groups is itself inimical to the strict 
maintenance of the older methods and we 
may expect a natural growth of  more    
simple and direct dealings4 ,it will be 
interesting to watch the  use of the    
older methods of diplomacy under these  
new conditions and to  see how far and  
how fast they will have to be modified  
in order to bear  out the underlying    
principle in human development to which 
action by  conference responds4    ,the 
,washington ,conference of #aiba        
afforded the first notable occasion  for
 bringing into use open methods in      
diplomatic discussion4 ,secretary       
,hughes in his introductory speech      

struck a keynote hitherto not  heard in 
negotiations on international matters4  
,a new era seemed to  have dawned in    
which great issues and all-important    
interests could  be discussed openly and
 decided on their merits4 ,a great wave 
of  enthusiasm passed over the public4  
,but it cannot be said that the  temper 
of this auspicious opening was sustained
 throughout4 ,as the  conference        
descended from general declarations to  
important questions  of detail there was
 an unmistakable reversion to old       
methods1 which  obstructed the          
straightforward aims of ,secretary      
,hughes4 ,even the  generous initial    
proposal of the ,american government was
 made by  one of the powers a trading   
subject4 ,the result was that some of   
the  attendant evils of secret diplomacy
 invaded even this conference1  and that
 the public soon became somewhat        
confused as to its object  and purposes1
 through an abundance of guesses which  
put a premium  on the sensational       

imagination4 ,it must be said that the  
temper of  the press1 encouraged by the 
manner in which the ,conference had been
  inaugurated1 was one of restraint and 
responsibility4 ,viewing the  questions 
which were before this ,conference1     
there can be no doubt that  the very    
problems about which there was          
hesitation and exaggerated              
secretiveness1 were exactly those which 
could have been best judged of  by the  
well-informed public opinion4 ,one could
 not avoid the conclusion  that the fear
 of publicity is in all cases inspired  
by motives which  cannot stand the test 
of a world-wide public opinion4    ,at  
the present day1 as yet1 the fatal      
circle has not been broken3  secret     
diplomacy1 suspicion1 armaments1 war4   
,we had thought that we  should escape  
from it quite easily1 after the terrible
 sacrifices laid  on mankind and the    
light which had been flashed on us in   
that darkness4  ,but the passions which 
had been stirred up and the fear and    

terror  which had been aroused in that  
dire experience may for some time yet   
serve to strengthen the reactionary     
forces in human affairs1 and retard     
those which tend to liberate humanity   
from terror and suffering4 ,but it  is  
lack of leadership toward better things1
 that is most to blame4    ,to ,america1
 to the government and the people1 the  
elimination of  secret dealings in      
international affairs is nothing short  
of a primary  interest4 ,the entire     
character of our foreign policy is      
inspired with1  and based upon1 the     
belief in open dealings and fair play4  
,we have a  broad continental position  
which makes secret plotting and devious 
transactions unnatural1 inappropriate   
and unnecessary4 ,our national          
experience of one hundred and fifty     
years has expressed itself quite        
spontaneously in proposals for the      
peaceful settlement of international    
disputes by discussion1 for the         
improvement of international relations  

through conferences1 and in the great   
policies of the ,open ,door1 which      
means commercial fair play1 and the     
,monroe ,doctrine1 which means          
political fair play to the ,american    
sister republics4 ,a policy such as     
this has nothing to seek with secret    
methods and concealed aims4    ,to      
tolerate secrecy in international       
affairs would mean to acquiesce  in a   
great national danger4 ,for good or ill 
we can no longer conceive  ourselves as 
isolated4 ,our every-day happiness and  
permanent welfare  are directly affected
 by what other nations do and plan4     
,continued  secrecy would mean that we  
should feel ourselves surrounded by     
unknown dangers4 ,we should have to live
 in an atmosphere of dread and          
suspicion4 ,we could find peace of mind 
only in the security of vast  armaments4
 ,in international affairs we would be  
walking by the edge  of precipices and  
over volcanoes2 our best intentioned    
proposals for  the betterment of human  

affairs would be secretly burked1 as in 
the  case of ,secretary ,knox' plan of  
railway neutralization in ,manchuria4   
,our rights would be secretly invaded   
and our security threatened1 as  at the 
time when ,england and ,france agreed   
with ,japan that she should  have the   
,north ,pacific islands1 behind our     
backs1 though our vital  interests were 
involved4 ,in all such matters secrecy  
will work to the  disadvantage of that  
power which has the most straightforward
 aims  and policies4 ,america cannot    
willingly submit to such a condition4   
,it  is unthinkable that with our       
traditions of public life and with our  
,constitutional arrangements1 we should 
ourselves play the old game of  secret  
intrigue2 it is for us to see1 and to   
the best of our power and  ability to   
assure1 that it will not be played in   
the future by others4    ,nations will  
respond to the call for absolutely open 
dealings in  international affairs1 with
 a varying degree of readiness and      

enthusiasm4 ,we are perhaps justified in
 saying that wherever the people  can   
make their desires felt they will be    
unanimously for a policy of  openness4  
,the ,english tradition of public life  
would also be favorable  to such a      
principle of action1 were it not that   
such special imperial  interests as the 
,british raj in ,india frequently       
inspires ,british  diplomacy with       
narrower motives and with a readiness to
 depart from  open dealings from a      
conviction that imperial interests so   
require4  ,the ,russian ,soviet         
government in giving to the public a    
full knowledge  of international        
affairs1 was at first inspired primarily
 by a desire  to discredit the old      
rgime4 ,but it is also undoubtedly true 
that the  hold which this government has
 on the party which supports it1 is in  
a measure due to the fact that all      
foreign policies and relationships  are 
freely reported to1 and discussed in1   
the party meetings and the  soviets4 ,no

 matter what the aims of this government
 may be1 it cannot  be denied that it   
has strengthened itself by the openness 
of its  foreign policy4 ,the ,chinese   
people have manifested a deep faith in  
public opinion and their chief desire in
 international affairs is that  there   
shall be open1 straightforward dealings 
so that all the world may  know and     
judge4 ,through all their difficulties  
of the last decade they  have been      
sustained by this faith in the strength 
of a good cause in  the forum of        
world-wide public opinion4    ,the      
peoples of the ,continent of ,europe    
undoubtedly would welcome a  reign of   
openness and truth1 for they have       
suffered most from secret  dealings in  
diplomacy4 ,but those who govern them   
find it difficult to  extricate         
themselves from the tangle of intrigue4 
,as ,president ,wilson  expressed it3   
8,european diplomacy works always in the
 dense thicket of ancient    feuds1     
rooted1 entangled and entwined4 ,it is  

difficult to see the    path2 it is not 
always possible to see the light of day4
 ,i did    not realize it all until the 
peace conference2 ,i did not realize    
how deep the roots are40          ,i    
,,eighteenth ,,century ,,diplomacy      
,during the eighteenth century1         
diplomatic action was dominated entirely
  by the tactics and stratagems of war4 
,diplomacy was a continuous  struggle   
for political advantage and power1      
seeking to accomplish the  purposes of  
war through keen intriguing2 it was war 
pursued in the  council chamber4 ,the   
temper of diplomacy was not that of a   
commercial  transaction1 or of          
coperation in the works of peace and    
betterment2  but it was intent upon     
selfish advantage--power1 prestige1     
preferment1  and all the outward        
evidences of political success4 ,it did 
not have  the conscience of peaceful    
enterprise and coperation1 but on the   
contrary emulated the keen1 restless1   
alert1 and all-suspecting spirit  of the

 military commander in action4 ,all the 
ruses1 deceptions1  subterfuges1        
briberies and strategies which the      
struggle for existence  in war appears  
to render justifiable1 diplomacy made   
use of4 ,it was  essentially a political
 secret service informed with the spirit
 of  life-and-death competition4 ,as1   
among individuals in that society1 all  
action was dominated by the constantly  
overhanging hazard of private  duel1    
bringing into life something of the     
keenness and cruelty of the  tempered   
blade2 so among nations warlike rivalry 
inspired all political  action4 ,war was
 either going on or impending and being 
prepared for2  humanity was living true 
to the old adage3 8,man a wolf to man40 
,diplomacy was personal in that the     
ambassador was held to be an alter  ego 
of the monarch4 ,it was surrounded with 
the glamor of high state  and important 
enterprise1 and inspired with a great   
pride of office4  ,the fact that he     
represented absolute power in its       

contact with the  absolute power of     
others1 gave the diplomat a sense of    
high importance4  ,the monarchs1        
themselves1 were generally governed by  
personal motives  and considerations4   
,they looked upon politics as a keen    
game for  personal or family power in   
which populations of subjects1          
territory1  and war indemnities were the
 stakes1 and human lives the pawns2 the 
highest happiness and good fortune of   
the subject was supposed to be  the     
right to die for his king4 ,the         
diplomatic representatives quite        
naturally fell into the same way of     
regarding affairs of state from the     
viewpoint of political power to be      
gained1 maintained and constantly       
increased4 ,it was a rather narrow game 
as seen by the rank and file of  the    
diplomatic world2 only a few far-seeing 
and statesmanlike minds  could at that  
time appreciate the broad underlying    
human foundation of  all political      
action4    ,such broader insight would  

often have been a real obstacle to the  
success of the keen and clever player of
 the game4 ,the mastery of  underlying  
principles which made ,grotius famous   
for all ages did not  contribute to his 
success as a diplomat4 ,the wheel of    
fortune turned  fast1 and fleeting      
advantage had to be caught by quick1    
clever though  often superficial1       
machinations4 ,even as late as #ahcj1   
,john ,quincy  ,adams observed that deep
 insight and unusual ability was        
something of a  hindrance to a diplomat4
 ,yet the keen edge of the successful   
diplomats  of the powdered wig period is
 in itself one of the noteworthy        
qualities  of that sociable though      
unsocial age4    ,throughout this period
 ,machiavelli's ,prince may be taken as 
the  fitting commentary on political    
action4 ,the men of this age had not    
yet grown up to the realization which   
,machiavelli already had of the  nature 
and importance of the national          
principle2 but ,machiavelli's  thought  

concerning the means by which1 in a     
period of unrest and sharp  rivalry1    
political power may be established1     
built up and preserved1  with total     
disregard of every feeling and ideal and
 the single-minded  pursuit of political
 success1--that thoroughly explains the 
spring of  action of this period4    ,in
 reading the memoirs and letters of this
 time1 one will encounter  a great many 
protestations of conventional morality1 
as well as an  understanding of human   
nature and a comprehensive grasp of the 
details  of international rivalry4 ,but 
far-seeing ideals of wisdom1 moderation1
  and justice1 and of human coperation  
will not frequently be met with2  there 
is no searching vision of realities4    
,nor will one gain from these  memoirs  
very specific information about the     
actual methods of doing  diplomatic     
business4 ,these methods1 even the      
particularly unscrupulous  ones1 were   
probably considered almost as natural   
processes1 to be  passed by without     

mention4 ,but incidentally1 one may     
receive hints1  even in the             
correspondence of the most correct and  
guarded diplomat1  sufficient to        
reconstitute their current manner of    
thought and action4    ,we encounter    
there all the artifices of a secret     
service versed  in the stratagems and   
tricks through which information can be 
obtained1--the stealing of documents1   
bribery of public officials1  general   
misrepresentation and deceit4 ,matters  
are often so inextricably  complicated  
that it must have required the greatest 
effort to remember  what each           
participant in that particular intrigue 
knew or was supposed  not to know1 what 
he could be told and what must be kept  
from him4  ,these are still the more    
venial methods2 but when the welfare of 
the  state required1 it might even be   
necessary1 as in the case of war1 to    
dispose of inconvenient and obstructive 
individuals by wrecking their           
reputation or even by putting them out  

of the way altogether4    ,even the     
learned and dignified authorities on    
international law  could not entirely   
ignore the methods employed in actual   
diplomatic  intercourse4 ,grotius held  
that 8amphibologies0--a term apparently 
coined by him to designate statements1  
which could be understood in  several   
ways--were admissible1 except in certain
 cases where there  existed a duty to   
unmask1 as in matters involving the     
8honor of ,god10  or charity towards a  
neighbor1 or the making of contracts1 or
 others  of like nature4 ,his successor1
 ,vattel1 draws a distinction between  a
 downright lie1 8words of him who speaks
 contrary to his thoughts  on an        
occasion when he is under obligation to 
speak the truth02 and  a 8falsiloquy10  
which he considers venial1 and which is 
8an untrue  discourse to persons who    
have no right to insist on knowing the  
truth  in a particular case40 ,this     
distinction gives a rather ample        
latitude  to the discretion of a        

diplomat in the matter of truthfulness4 
,according to the good and learned      
,vattel1 the duty of any one to  tell   
the truth was binding only towards      
another who had the right to  demand    
that the truth be spoken4 ,in his day1  
very few people indeed  could claim the 
right of demanding an insight into      
diplomatic affairs1  so that his rule   
did not put the diplomat under a very   
severe moral  constraint4 ,even to the  
present day there have been known       
individual  envoys whose utterances     
plainly are made in the spirit of       
,vattel's  distinction4    ,callires1   
who wrote on the ,practice of           
,diplomacy1 in the year #agaf1 is  full 
of admiration of all that a shrewd1     
clever diplomat may accomplish  in      
stirring up trouble and confounding     
things generally in the state  to which 
he is accredited4 ,to the question1     
8,what can be achieved by a             
negotiator80 ,callires answers1 8,we see
 daily around us its definite           

effects--sudden revolutions favorable to
 a great design of state1 use  of       
sedition and fermenting hatreds1 causing
 jealous rivals to arm1 so  that the    
third party may rejoice 7ut tertius     
gaudeat71 dissolution  by crafty means  
of the closest unions4 ,a single word or
 act may do more  than the invasion of  
whole armies1 because the crafty        
negotiator will  know how to set in     
motion various forces native to the     
country in which  he is negotiating and 
thus may spare his master the vast      
expense of a  campaign4444 ,it          
frequently happens that well chosen     
spies contribute  more than any other   
agency to the success of great plans4   
,they are not  to be neglected4 ,an     
ambassador is an honorable spy because  
it is his  function to discover great   
secrets4 ,he should have a liberal      
hand40  ,that admiration of successful  
deceit and mental cleverness in         
obtaining  results that could only be   
gained by force through great sacrifice 

of  life1 inspired also the ,italian    
admiration for clever deceit1 such  as  
shown by ,machiavelli in his eulogy of  
,pope ,alexander ,,vi for his  unrivaled
 eminence in prevarication4    ,it is   
remarkable that the famous witticism of 
,sir ,henry ,wotton that 8an  ambassador
 is a person sent abroad to lie for the 
good of his country10  did not occur to 
some one much earlier2 but though the   
bon mot had  not been coined1 the idea  
itself was quite familiar4 ,louis ,,xi  
quite  bluntly instructed his embassies1
 8,if they lie to you1 lie still more   
to them40 ,but through all this period  
the virtue of sincerity and  of         
truthfulness also had their admirers3   
,callires1 speaking of the  successful  
diplomat1 says1 8,deceit is but the     
measure of smallness of  mind and       
intelligence4 ,a diplomat should have a 
reputation for plain  and fair dealing  
and should observe the promises he has  
made40 ,it  may1 however1 be suspected  
that the good writer here contemplates  

the  dangers of unsuccessful deceit and 
of too transparent ruses1 rather  than  
the positive value of truth itself4     
,james ,harris1 ,lord ,malmesbury1 who  
was certainly conversant with all  the  
ins and outs of eighteenth century      
diplomacy1 wrote in a letter  of advice 
7,april #aa1 #ahac7 addressed to ,lord  
,camden3 8,it is scarce  necessary to   
say that no occasion1 no provocation1 no
 anxiety to rebut  an unjust accusation1
 no idea1 however tempting1 of promoting
 the  object you have in view1 can need1
 much less justify1 a falsehood4        
,success obtained by one is a precarious
 and baseless success4 ,detection  would
 ruin1 not only your own reputation for 
ever1 but deeply wound  the honor of    
your ,court40 ,in this sage advice1 too1
 the dominant idea  seems to be that    
detection is ruinous4 ,the homage which 
is thus paid to  the ideal of truth and 
sincerity is compatible with the use of 
quite  opposite methods provided they   
are successful and so cleverly guarded  

that they are not discovered4           
,however1 at all times there must have  
existed1 among the people at  large and 
even among those playing the game of    
politics1 men who had  a natural inborn 
desire for truth and a simplicity of    
nature which  brought them closer to the
 true underlying forces than were the   
common  run of courtiers and            
politicians4 ,the ever recurring        
admiration  expressed for the diplomacy 
of ,cardinal d',orsat1 the envoy of     
,henry ,,iv  to the ,pope1 indicates a  
real appreciation1 even among the       
profession1  of high standards of       
straightforwardness in diplomatic       
negotiations4  ,cardinal d',orsat seems 
to have disdained all shallow devices of
  deceptive cleverness4 ,he relied upon 
simple reasonableness and honesty  in   
proposing an arrangement mutually       
beneficial1 to win after others  had    
exhausted all possible tricks and       
stratagems4 ,in discussing  diplomacy1  
,mably says that such methods alone are 

calculated to secure  positive and      
permanent results while the devices of  
clever deceit can  only serve to delay  
and confuse4    ,several statesmen have 
discovered that the telling of the      
actual  truth often exerts a somewhat   
befuddling effect on diplomats1 so that 
they may easily be misled by telling    
them real facts which they will         
interpret in a contrary sense4 ,this    
method has usually been associated  with
 the name of ,bismarck who on one       
occasion said1 8,it makes me  smile to  
see how puzzled all these diplomats are 
when ,i tell them the  truth pure and   
simple4 ,they always seem to suspect me 
of telling them  fibs40 ,the discovery  
had1 however1 been made by many         
statesmen before  ,bismarck4 ,as early  
as #agjj1 de ,torcy had arrived at the  
conclusion that  the best way of        
deceiving foreign courts is to speak the
 truth4 ,lord  ,stanhope said quite     
complacently that he could always impose
 upon the  foreign diplomats by telling 

them the naked truth1 and that he knew  
that in such cases they had often       
reported to their courts the opposite   
to what he had truthfully told them to  
be the facts4 ,at a later date1         
,palmerston also prided himself on being
 able to mislead by the open  and       
apparently unguarded manner in which he 
told the truth4 ,it would1  however1    
manifestly be difficult to use this     
method successfully more  than in spots2
 it would have to be interspersed from  
time to time with  a judicious amount of
 prevarication1 in order to throw the   
other party  off the scent4    ,to      
appear simple and true has always been  
greatly desired of  diplomats4 ,count   
,du ,luc1 ,french ,ambassador to        
,vienna1 said in a  letter1 8,my great  
desire1 if ,i may be permitted to speak 
about myself1  is to appear simple and  
true4 ,i flatter myself that ,i possess 
the  latter qualification2 but you know 
my method of manuvering40 ,the          
appearance of frankness has indeed been 

most valuable to diplomats  in all ages2
 though one naturally suspects the man  
who in and out  of season explicitly    
declares and protests that virtue4      
,diplomatic  frankness is a part of that
 elaborate and complicated system of    
self-control and coolness together with 
a mastery of all the outward            
expressions of different affections and 
passions1 which notable  diplomats have 
sought to achieve4 ,it would not take an
 expert to advise  against pomposity4   
,callires counsels1 8,be genial4 ,avoid 
the sober1  cold air4 ,an air of mystery
 is not useful40    ,in that century in 
which keenness and cleverness were so   
intensively  cultivated with the high   
pitch of the personal duel transferred  
to  affairs of state1 the complete      
self-control of diplomats1 their        
quickness and their gift of taking      
advantage of any favorable turn in  the 
situation1 are certainly worthy of      
admiration1 as we reanimate  in our     
minds the life portrayed in these old   

memoirs and letters4  ,occasionally a   
mishap occurs like that of the ,british 
,minister1  ,mr4 ,drake1 who boasted to 
,mehe de la ,touche of the very careful 
precautions he had taken to guard his   
secret correspondence2 which  vainglory 
resulted quite disastrously to his      
collection of secrets4  ,instances of   
delightful cleverness and               
cool-headedness are frequent4  ,cardinal
 ,mazarin1 who in his methods and       
principles was quite the  opposite to   
,cardinal d',orsat and who was          
particularly free from any  scruples    
whatsoever concerning the truth1 won his
 first striking  diplomatic success     
through a ruse4 ,what a quick mind and  
daring spirit  his1 when on his first   
mission to the court of the ,duke of    
,feria1 as  a very young man1 he        
attained his object so completely4 ,how 
otherwise  could he have ascertained the
 true opinion of ,his ,highness on the  
matter of great importance to the ,court
 of ,france which ,mazarin was          

especially sent to ascertain1 as there  
were great doubts about it  and the duke
 entirely unwilling to express himself8 
,a keen observer1  ,mazarin had soon    
learned that the duke was irascible and 
unguarded when  in anger2 but few would 
have followed him in suddenly1 out of   
the clear  sky1 deliberately1 so        
stirring the duke to anger that he1     
entirely  off his guard1 blurted out    
things which unmistakably gave a clue to
  his real opinions on the important    
matter of state in question4 ,what  a   
vivid satisfaction the young man must   
have had1 which1 however1 he  needs must
 carefully conceal to feign grief and   
despair because he had  been hapless    
enough to arouse the ill will of ,his   
,highness4 ,mazarin was  throughout his 
life noted for a perfect command of the 
expressions of  all the moods1          
sentiments and passions1 used by him at 
will so that it  was impossible for any 
one to penetrate his mask4 ,the same    
achievement  was attained in a notable  

manner by the great diplomats of the old
  school1 ,talleyrand and ,metternich1  
who held the stage at the beginning  of 
the nineteenth century2 and it has been 
emulated in greater or less  perfection 
by successive generations of ,ministers1
 ,counselors1 and  ,secretaries4        
,when ,cromwell had allowed himself to  
be tangled up in double-faced           
negotiations with the ,spanish and the  
,french courts of which the  latter had 
obtained complete knowledge1 the ,french
 envoy1 ,de,bass1 very  cleverly rebuked
 him for the inconstancy and            
disingenuousness of his  action4 ,the   
envoy related to ,cromwell in complete  
detail1 but as an  8unauthenticated     
report10 all the facts of the dubious   
negotiation1 and  then asked the        
,protector kindly to extricate him from 
this labyrinth4  ,cromwell was entirely 
taken aback and took his departure      
abruptly  on urgent business1 leaving   
his secretary to make excuses4 ,the star
  performance of ,metternich was when   

,napoleon1 returning from a hunt  in a  
fit of heated excitement1 in the        
presence of the other foreign           
representatives1 rushed up to him       
shouting1 8,what the deuce does your    
,emperor expect of me80 ,metternich     
replied with the greatest composure1    
8,he expects his ambassador to be       
treated with respect40          ,,ii    
,,old ,,diplomatic ,,correspondence     
,the correspondence of diplomats of the 
eighteenth century is full of  interest 
because of the particular intimacy which
 characterized social  life at that     
time4 ,but we receive from it also      
direct and invaluable  information on   
the spirit and methods of diplomacy4    
,the correspondence  from ,st4          
,petersburg at the time of ,catherine   
the ,great gives a complete  picture of 
the less noble features of diplomatic   
life and action4 ,at  that ,court1      
presided over by a woman of great       
ambition whose every  movement and mood 
the diplomats felt necessary to take    

into account  and carefully to          
calculate1 at a time when ,england and  
,france as well  as other nations were  
involved in almost constant hostilities1
 the  sharpest characteristics of       
eighteenth century diplomacy came to the
  surface4 ,politics is seen as a game  
of forfeits and favors in which  wars   
were made for personal and dynastic     
reasons and territories traded  off in  
the spirit of the gamester without      
regard to natural or ethnic  facts1 or  
the welfare of the population4    ,a    
letter written near the beginning of    
,catherine's reign1 addressed  by ,sir  
,george ,macartney to the ,earl of      
,sandwich1 most strikingly  illustrates 
the character of the period4 ,the       
,british ,minister first  reports that  
,m4 ,panin1 the ,russian ,minister for  
,foreign ,affairs1 had  signed a treaty 
of alliance with ,denmark1 contemplating
 war with  ,turkey4 ,by a most secret   
article1 ,denmark promises 8to disengage
  herself from all ,french connections1 

demanding only a limited time to        
endeavor to obtain the arrears due to   
her by the ,court of ,france4 ,at  all  
events1 she is immediately to enter into
 all the views of ,russia  in ,sweden1  
and to act entirely1 though not openly1 
with her in that  kingdom40 ,the writer 
then reports that it is the ardent wish 
of the  ,empress 8to make a common cause
 with ,england and ,denmark1 for the    
total annihilation of the ,french       
interest there 7in ,sweden74 ,this      
certainly cannot be done without a      
considerable expense2 but ,russia1  at  
present1 does not seem unreasonable     
enough to expect that we should  pay the
 whole40 ,the amount necessary          
absolutely to prevent the ,french  from 
ever getting at ,stockholm again is     
suggested4 ,as the ,swedes are  highly  
sensitive because of their dependent    
situation in recent years1  the ,russian
 ,court desires 8that we and they should
 act upon separate  bottoms1 still      
preserving between our respective       

,ministers a confidence  without        
reserve4 ,that our first care should be1
 not to establish a  faction under the  
name of a ,russian or of an ,english    
faction2 but1  as even the wisest men   
are imposed upon by a mere name1 to     
endeavor  to have our friends           
distinguished as the friends of liberty 
and  independence40 ,the ,minister then 
reports that an alliance with ,russia   
is not to be thought of unless by some  
secret article ,england would  agree to 
pay a subsidy to ,russia in case of a   
,turkish war 7,turkey  happened at the  
time to be in alliance with ,england74  
,the ,minister  relates that a similar  
proposal which was put up to the ,king  
of ,prussia  by a ,russian official who 
was his mortal enemy and who hoped      
greatly to  embarrass him thereby1 was  
unexpectedly and quite blandly accepted 
by  ,frederick ,,ii4 ,the letter closes 
with the earnest entreaty on no account 
to mention to ,m4 ,gross1 the ,russian  
,minister in ,london1 the secret        

article of the treaty which his own     
,government had just concluded with     
,denmark4    ,the correspondence of     
,james ,harris1 ,lord ,malmesbury1 is a 
particularly  full and continuous       
account of court and diplomatic life in 
the  eighteenth century4 ,in describing 
his diplomatic struggles in a  ,court in
 which everything turned round the whims
 and ambitions of an  unscrupulous woman
 who had come to the throne through     
putting out of  the way its rightful    
occupant1 the vicious practices of the  
day are  presented in all their         
corruption and deceitfulness4 ,before   
going  to ,russia1 ,sir ,james ,harris  
was ,minister at ,berlin4 ,he paints the
  character of ,frederick the ,great in 
the following words3 8,thus never       
losing sight of his object1 he lays     
aside all feelings the moment that  is  
concerned2 and1 although as an          
individual he often appears1 and  really
 is1 humane1 benevolent1 and friendly1  
yet the instant he acts  in his ,royal  

capacity1 these attributes forsake him1 
and he carries  with him desolation1    
misery1 and persecution1 wherever he    
goes40 ,a  ,german scholar of the       
period1 an admirer of the great monarch1
 used  the following language3 8,the    
art1 till then unknown in ,europe1 of   
concluding alliances without committing 
one's self1 of remaining  unfettered    
while apparently bound1 of seceding when
 the proper  moment is arrived1 can be  
learnt from him and only from him40     
,these  descriptions of the political   
character of ,frederick ,,ii set forth  
the  essential political factor as it   
was understood at the time and  as it   
has been understood by a continuous line
 of statesmen from  ,machiavelli to the 
present4 ,as in physical science1 every 
factor has to  be disregarded except    
those essential to the experiment which 
is being  conducted1 so in the intensive
 politics of the modern state1 in the   
mind of such men1 abstraction is made   
from all sentiment1 virtue and  quality1

 to the sole pursuit of a closely       
calculated political effect4  ,the same 
,german scholar credits ,frederick the  
,great with a superior                  
straightforwardness4 ,that quality1     
however1 is manifested by such a man    
mostly on occasions where he is so sure 
of himself and of his plans  that he can
 challenge the worst attempts of his    
enemies to upset them  and can confound 
them utterly by flinging his plans in   
their faces1 as  did ,bismarck at a     
later time4 ,a startling and fearless   
frankness is one  of the characteristics
 of political genius4    ,but to return 
to the correspondence of ,lord          
,malmesbury4 ,all the devices  and      
foibles of the profession at that period
 are there mirrored4 ,when  he 7still as
 ,sir ,james ,harris7 reports the coming
 of a new ,french  ,minister to ,st4    
,petersburg1 he expresses the hope that 
the new envoy  will not be so difficult 
to deal with as the present charg       
d'affairs1  8who1 though he has a very  

moderate capacity1 got access to all the
  valets de chambre and inferior agents 
in the ,russian houses1 who very  often 
conjured up evil spirits where ,i least 
of all expected them40 ,a  little later 
he reports to the ,british ,foreign     
,minister1 ,lord ,stormont1  as follows3
 8,if1 on further inquiry1 ,i should    
find1 as ,i almost  suspect1 that my    
friend's 7,prince ,potemkin7 fidelity   
has been shaken1  or his political faith
 corrupted1 in the late conferences1 by 
any  direct offers or indirect promises 
of reward1 ,i shall think myself1 in    
such a case1 not only authorized but    
obliged to lure him with a similar      
bait40 ,he reminds ,his ,lordship of the
 fact that ,prince ,potemkin is         
immensely rich and that1 therefore1     
perhaps as much may be required as  de  
,torcy offered to the ,duke of          
,marlborough 7two million francs74      
,in a letter of ,june #be1 #agha1 ,sir  
,james ,harris1 writing to the same     
,minister1 speaks of having obtained    

information of the conclusion  of a     
secret treaty between ,russia and       
,austria from the confidential          
secretary of a ,russian minister4 ,he   
adds3 8,i trust ,i shall keep him to    
myself1 since ,i have lost almost all my
 other informers by being outbid  for   
them by the ,french and ,prussians40 ,he
 adds that it is painful to  him that   
the secret service expenses come so very
 high but he explains  that the avid    
corruption of the court is ever         
increasing and that  his enemies are    
favored by the fact that they can join  
in the expense  against him1 their      
courts moreover supplying them most     
lavishly4 ,he  adds3 8,they are also    
much more adroit at this dirty business 
than ,i am1  who cannot help despising  
the person ,i corrupt40    ,the ,foreign
 ,minister of ,russia at this time1 and 
for many years before  and after1 was   
,count ,panin4 ,it was then suspected   
and is now known  that he was firmly    
bought by ,frederick ,,ii4 ,but there   

has been some  doubt as to whether he   
entered upon this corrupt relation      
behind the  back of ,empress ,catherine 
or at her bidding4 ,it is known that she
  often encouraged her ministers at     
foreign courts to accept bribes and     
apparently to sell themselves to foreign
 governments1 because through  the      
relationship of confidence thus         
established they might gather           
information useful to their own         
government4 ,this is one of the many    
ways in which the game of corruption    
tended to defeat itself4    ,as far as  
the letters of this period deal with    
diplomatic policies  they are no more   
reassuring than when they relate the    
details of  diplomatic practice4 ,on    
,august #af1 #aghb1 ,sir ,james ,harris 
made a long  confidential report to     
,lord ,grantham4 ,he observes that      
,count ,panin  is powerfully assisting  
the ,king of ,prussia1 the ,french      
,minister is  artful and intriguing1    
working through ,prince ,potemkin and   

the whole  tribe of satellites which    
surrounded the ,empress1 whom he calls  
8barber  apprentices of ,paris40 ,he    
then unfolds his own policy of winning  
the  favor of the ,empress for ,england 
by giving her the island of ,minorca  as
 a present4 ,his idea had been adopted  
by the ,british ,foreign ,office  and he
 writes1 8,nothing could be more        
perfectly calculated to the  meridian of
 this ,court than the judicious         
instructions ,i received on  this       
occasion40 ,he decided1--hand in hand   
with the proposed cession  of           
,minorca1--to designate the ,empress as 
a friendly mediatrix between  ,england  
and ,holland2 he says3 8,i knew1 indeed1
 she was unequal to the  task but ,i    
knew too how greatly her vanity would be
 flattered by this  distinction40       
,farther on he reports how1 gradually1  
after several  ,british ,ministers had  
incurred the ill humor of ,catherine1   
,fox and  the present ,minister of      
,foreign ,affairs have finally found    

favor and  smoothed the road for ,sir   
,james4 ,he hopes that all these great  
efforts  and sacrifices may result in   
8lighting the strong glow of friendship 
in ,her ,imperial ,majesty in favor of  
,england40 ,at this distance a slim     
result of so much effort4 ,the          
characterization of ,catherine with     
which  he closes1 few historians would  
now accept4,a        ,a 8,with very     
bright parts1 an elevated mind1 an      
uncommon          sagacity1 she wants   
judgment1 precision of ideas1           
reflection1 and l'esprit de             
combinaison40    ,american diplomats had
 their first taste of ,european         
diplomatic methods  in #agig1 when      
,pinckney1 ,gerry and ,marshall were    
sent to ,france on their  special       
mission4 ,every attempt at delay and    
mystification was practised  on them4   
,after various secret agents had tried  
the patience of the  ,americans and had 
finally come out with the plain demand  
of ,talleyrand  for a million francs as 

the price for peace and good relations1 
they  resolutely turned their back on   
,paris4 ,meanwhile ,pitt was seriously  
considering buying peace on similar     
terms4          ,,iii    ,,after ,,the  
,,congress ,,of ,,vienna      ,the      
convulsions of the ,french revolution   
and the ,napoleonic conquests  did not  
seem materially to affect the principles
 and practices of  diplomacy4 ,when the 
,congress of ,vienna met to rearrange   
the state  of ,europe1 it was guided by 
men who still looked upon diplomacy     
entirely in the manner of the #ahth     
century1 when1 in the words of  ,horace 
,walpole1 8it was the mode of the times 
to pay by one favor for  receiving      
another40 ,the idea of restoring the    
balance of ,europe or  patching up the  
rents and cracks in the old system which
 had been so  severely shaken was the   
purpose which animated these men4 ,they 
viewed  everything from the dynastic    
interests of their respective rulers and
  traded off lesser kingdoms and slices 

of territory with the same spirit  of   
the gamester that has always            
characterized the absolutist diplomacy4 
,of the three master minds of the       
,congress of ,vienna1 ,talleyrand1      
,metternich and ,pozzo di ,borgo1 it may
 indeed be said that they  illustrated  
both the qualities and the vices of the 
old diplomacy in a  superlative degree4 
,the last named has characterized       
,talleyrand as 8a  man who is unlike any
 other4 ,he wheedles1 he arranges1 he   
intrigues1  he governs in a hundred     
different manners every day4 ,his       
interest in  others is proportioned to  
the need which he has of them at the    
moment4  ,even his civilities are       
luxurious loans which it is necessary to
 repay  before the end of the day40     
,talleyrand1 himself1 has said3 8,two   
things  ,i forbid--too much zeal and too
 absolute devotion--they compromise     
both persons and affairs40 ,he did not1 
indeed1 betray his great master         
,napoleon1 he only quitted him in time4 

,metternich1 who resembled ,talleyrand  
in the complete self-control of  a      
passionless diplomat1 had a long and    
brilliant1 but essentially  sterile1    
career4 ,his correspondence shows a keen
 and luminous spirit  with a great      
mastery of detail1 and capacity for     
manipulating the human  pawns2 but there
 is no deep insight1 no real            
constructive policy4  ,indeed1 he       
supported ,alexander ,i in his efforts  
for a ,holy ,alliance or  sacred league 
among nations1 but it was conceived in  
such a form that  it would not have     
interfered with the traditional game of 
diplomacy4  ,metternich indeed often    
pays his compliments to the ideal1 as   
when he  praises the league as resting  
on the same basis as the great          
,christian  society of man1 namely1 the 
precept of the ,book of ,books1 8,do    
unto  others as you would that they     
should do unto you40 ,but the details of
  his policy were governed entirely by  
the barren principles of balance  of    

power and legitimacy1 and showed an     
utter disregard for the natural  and    
ethnic facts underlying government4     
,metternich indeed himself at  times    
realized the vanity of political        
intrigue1 as when he wrote to  his      
daughter from ,paris in #ahae1 8,this   
specific weight of the masses  will     
always be the same1 while we1 poor      
creatures1 who think ourselves  so      
important1 live only to make a little   
show by our perpetual motion1  by our   
dabbling in the mud or in the shifting  
sand40    ,when ,alexander himself left 
the realm of vague ideals and descended 
to  details1 his impulses often took a  
form somewhat like the proposal made  to
 ,castlereagh at ,vienna1 8,we are going
 to do a beautiful and grand  thing4 ,we
 are going to raise up ,poland by giving
 her as king one of my  brothers or the 
husband of my sister40 ,the ,british    
statesman does not  seem to have been   
immediately carried away with this      
generous design4    ,it was consistent  

with the character and temper of the    
,congress  of ,vienna that there flowed 
in it innumerable currents and          
counter-currents of intrigue4 ,in       
,january1 #ahae1 the representatives of 
,england1 ,france and ,austria agreed   
upon a secret treaty of alliance1       
directed against ,russia and ,prussia4  
,when ,napoleon returned from ,elba  he 
found this document and showed it to the
 ,russian ,minister before  tearing it  
up4    ,the first half of the nineteenth
 century was dominated by the           
principles that had prevailed at        
,vienna4 ,in the details of diplomatic  
intercourse1 indirection1 bribery and   
deceit continue to prevail  although in 
a less flamboyant fashion than in the   
eighteenth century4  ,as the principle  
of nationalism comes more clearly to    
emerge1 the  secrecy of diplomatic      
methods is distinguished from the       
secrecy of  diplomatic policy with      
increasing condemnation of the latter2 a
  greater sense of responsibility to the

 nation as a whole begins to show       
itself1 and the traditional resources of
 diplomacy are no longer quite          
adequate4    ,nevertheless1 the         
diplomatic literature of the age still  
looks upon  diplomacy as essentially a  
tactical pursuit1 conditioned by the    
continuous enmity of states4 ,the       
,french writer1 ,garden1 in his ,trait  
de diplomatie1 gives the following      
elucidation3 8,put on this plane1       
diplomacy becomes like a transcendent   
manuvering of which the entire  globe is
 the theater1 where states are army     
corps1 where the lines of  combat change
 unceasingly1 and where one never knows 
who is a friend1  and who is an enemy4  
,it is a political labyrinth in the     
midst of  which ability alone is capable
 of moving with ease and without being  
smothered by detail40    ,the memoirs   
and anecdotal literature of the period  
afford numerous  instances of the       
persistence of that desire for          
cleverness in dealing  with secrets1    

which often brings about amusing        
incidents4    ,at the time when         
,frankfort was the capital of the ,north
 ,german  ,confederation1 the ,austrian 
government provided its representative  
there 7,count ,rechberg7 with duplicate 
instructions2 one to the effect  that he
 must exhaust every energy to maintain  
the most friendly  and mutually helpful 
relations with ,prussia2 the other of   
quite  the opposite tenor4 ,the former  
was to be shown to the ,prussians4      
,unfortunately1 at the critical moment  
the ,austrian ,minister showed the      
wrong letter to ,bismarck1 who guessed  
the situation2 suppressing his          
amusement as best he could1 ,bismarck   
tried to console the embarrassed        
,austrian by promising not to take any  
advantage of the slip4    ,a ,prussian  
,minister for ,foreign ,affairs         
7,manteuffel7 had hired a  police agent 
to sneak into the ,french ,embassy in   
order to secure some  documents there4  
,when he delightedly showed one of the  

letters secured  to ,general ,von       
,gerlach1 the latter said3 8,i could    
have written you ten  such letters for  
what this cost you40    ,disraeli1 in a 
letter to his sister1 spoke of the      
,danish ,minister at  ,london as his    
secret agent in the diplomatic corps4   
,there were also more innocent means of 
gaining advantages such as are          
practised in many other branches of     
human enterprise4 ,for instance1        
,labouchere relates his discovery1 when 
attach at ,washington1 that  ,secretary 
,marcy was put in a terrible ill-humor  
whenever he lost at  whist4 ,upon a hint
 from ,labouchere1 the ,british         
,minister managed  thereafter regularly 
to lose in his games with ,marcy who was
 immensely  pleased at 8beating the     
,british at their own game40 ,labouchere
 adds3  8,every morning when the terms  
of the treaty were being discussed we   
had  our revenge and scored a few points
 for ,canada40    ,there was all this   
time an increasing tendency to discount 

the  importance of the traditional arts 
of diplomacy and to believe that  a     
great deal of this carefully nurtured   
secrecy was merely a trick of  the      
trade4 ,bismarck expressed himself in   
the following language on  diplomatic   
literature3 8,for the most part it is   
nothing but paper and  ink4 ,if you     
wanted to utilize it for historical     
purposes1 you could not  get anything   
worth having out of it4 ,i believe it is
 the rule to allow  historians to       
consult the ,foreign ,office archives at
 the expiration of  thirty years 7after 
the date of despatches74 ,they might be 
permitted  to examine them much sooner1 
for the despatches and letters1 when    
they  contain any information at all1   
are quite unintelligible to those       
unacquainted with the persons and       
relations treated of in them40 ,in      
reporting this statement1 ,labouchere   
observes3 8,if all foreign office       
telegrams were published they would be  
curious reading40,b ,he also  relates   

how his youthful efforts at secret      
diplomacy were received by  the ,foreign
 ,office4 ,he had succeeded at ,st4     
,petersburg in being able  quite        
regularly1 through the assistance of a  
laundress1 to get from  the government  
printing office loose sheets of         
confidential minutes of  ,state ,council
 meetings4 ,when ,lord ,john ,russell   
discovered the method in  which this    
interesting information was obtained1 he
 put a stop to the  simple intrigue2    
,labouchere concludes his account of    
this experience  thus3 8,for what       
reason1 ,i wonder1 did ,russell imagine 
diplomacy was  invented80        ,b ,he 
writes that when 8,i was an attach at   
,stockholm1 the          present ,queen1
 the ,duchess of ,ostrogotha1 had a     
baby1 and          a telegram came from 
the ,foreign ,office desiring that ,her 
,majesty's congratulations should be    
offered1 and that she          should be
 informed how the mother and child were4
 ,the          ,minister was away1 so   

off ,i went to the ,palace to convey    
the message and to inquire about the    
health of the pair4 ,a          solemn  
gentleman received me4 ,i informed him  
of my orders1          and requested him
 to say what ,i was to reply4 #8,her    
,royal          ,highness1' he replied1 
#8is as well as can be expected1 but    
,his ,royal ,highness is suffering a    
little internally1 and          it is   
believed that this is due to the fact of
 the milk          of his nurse having  
been slightly sour last evening4' ,i    
telegraphed this to the ,foreign        
,office40    ,the term 8secret          
diplomacy0 is during this period used in
 a special  sense1 referring to a secret
 intrigue on the part of a monarch  or  
minister without the knowledge of those 
who have the public  responsibility in  
the matter4 ,earlier monarchs often     
played their  own game without informing
 their ministers and attempted to keep  
the  threads of foreign intrigue in     
their own hands4 ,louis ,,xv did great  

injury to his country by pursuing this  
method4    ,napoleon ,,iii was a great  
offender in this respect4 ,not only was 
his  international policy prone to      
unscrupulous attempts and proposals1    
but he acted in these matters frequently
 without informing those who  were      
responsible before the country4 ,most of
 his secret advances to  ,bismarck were 
made entirely on his own responsibility2
 he did not  inform the ,foreign        
,minister1 ,ollivier1 of the fateful    
instructions to  ,benedetti to the      
effect that he should demand of ,prussia
 assurances  that no ,german prince     
should ever again be suggested for the  
,spanish  throne2 his ,mexican policy1  
too1 was worked out by himself1 in      
conjunction with the ,duc de ,morny and 
,jecker1 the banker1 rather than  with  
his ministers4 ,the disastrous          
consequences of the secret diplomacy  of
 ,napoleon ,,iii will be reverted to    
later on4    ,it has also repeatedly    
happened that envoys have incurred a    

strong  suspicion of playing a political
 game of their own without the          
authorization or even the knowledge of  
their ,foreign ,minister4 ,while  a     
diplomatic representative in taking such
 action risks disavowal  and dismissal1 
yet the temptation felt by a            
strong-willed man who  is confident that
 he knows the local situation and the   
needs of his  country there better than 
any one else1 has often been too        
powerful  to be resisted4 ,when the     
unauthorized action has been successful 
in  gaining some advantage1 it has      
generally been condoned4,c ,but though  
the home government is at all times able
 theoretically to disavow  unauthorized 
actions of its foreign representatives1 
yet the latter  through their           
self-willed acts may have set in motion 
forces which can  no longer be          
controlled4 ,very often also doubt and  
confusion is cast on  the real causes of
 important events and a general feeling 
of suspicion  is thus generated4        

,c ,frequently1 indeed1 ministers have  
been encouraged to make          certain
 dmarches 8on their own account02 if    
successful1          they could be      
sanctioned after the event4 ,such is the
          procedure which ,palmerston   
criticized in a letter to ,lord         
,clarendon 7,may #bb1 #ahec73           
8,the ,russian ,government has always   
had two strings to its                  
bow--moderate language and disinterested
 professions at          ,petersburg and
 at ,london2 active aggression by its   
agents          on the scene of         
operations4 ,if the aggressions succeed 
locally1 the ,petersburg ,government    
adopts them as a fait          accompli 
which it did not intend1 but cannot1 in 
honor1          recede from4 ,if the    
local agents fail1 they are disavowed   
and recalled1 and the language          
previously held is appealed          to 
as a proof that the agents have         
overstepped their                       
instructions40    ,one of the most      

self-willed of ,british ,ministers was  
,stratford ,canning  7,lord ,stratford  
de ,redcliffe74 ,it is generally        
accepted that his  personal diplomacy at
 ,constantinople1 where he began his    
diplomatic  career in #ahjh and where he
 ended it in #aheh after various        
intervening  missions1 was one of the   
causes which brought on the ,crimean    
war4  ,after reciting that ,lord        
,stratford constantly held private      
interviews  with the ,sultan and did his
 utmost to alarm him1 urging him to     
reject  accommodation with ,russia1 and 
promising him the armed assistance of   
,england1 ,john ,bright stated that all 
this was done without instructions  from
 the home government4 ,lord ,clarendon  
wrote3 8,he is bent on war and  on      
playing the first part in settling the  
great ,eastern question40 ,when  the war
 came on1 ,lord ,granville wrote3 8,we  
have generals whom we do not  trust1 and
 whom we do not know how to replace4 ,we
 have an ,ambassador at                 

,constantinople1 an able man1 a cat whom
 no one cares to bell1 whom some  think 
a principal cause of the war1 others the
 cause of some of the  calamities which 
have attended the conduct of the war2   
and whom we know  to have thwarted or   
neglected many of the objects of his    
,government40    ,labouchere1 who served
 under ,lord ,stratford in #ahfb1 wrote 
afterwards  that the despatches of      
,stratford during the ,crimean war could
 not  be recognized as the originals    
from which ,mr4 ,kinglake drew his      
material for a narrative of the         
ambassador's career4,d ,he thought  that
 ,stratford's great power at            
,constantinople was due to his long     
stay there which made it necessary for  
the ,turks to remain on good  terms with
 him4 ,labouchere also claims that ,lord
 ,stratford misled  his own government  
by getting the ,sultan to publish       
certain reform  decrees which he would  
send home as evidence of good           
government1 never  explaining that such 

decrees were entirely dead letters4     
,d ,labouchere wrote3 8,lord ,stratford 
was one of the most          detestable 
of the human race4 ,he was arrogant1    
resentful          and spiteful4 ,he    
hated the ,emperor ,nicholas because he 
had          declined to accept him as  
,ambassador to ,russia and the          
,crimean war was his revenge4 ,in every 
way he endeavored to          envenom   
the quarrel and to make war certain40   
,the danger and disadvantage of having a
 diplomat or ruler inject his  personal 
ambitions and dislikes into his         
diplomacy have1 unfortunately1  been    
frequently exemplified4 ,with respect to
 the causes of the ,crimean  war1 it    
will be remembered that ,napoleon ,,iii 
had a personal grudge  against ,emperor 
,nicholas who had addressed him 8,sire  
and ,good ,friend0  instead of          
8,brother0 as is customary among        
monarchs4 ,though ,napoleon  answered   
him1 acknowledging the compliment       
implied from the fact that  one may     

choose one's friends but not one's      
brothers1 yet he never  forgot the      
slight4    ,lord ,palmerston as ,foreign
 ,minister quite openly regarded himself
 as a  power independent not only of    
,parliament but of the ,cabinet itself1 
and  not bound to consult his colleagues
 provided he could justify himself      
later before the ,house of ,commons4    
,but when in ,december1 #ahea1 he had   
entirely on his own responsibility      
approved the coup d'tat by  which       
,napoleon ,,iii made himself emperor1   
,lord ,john ,russell instantly          
dismissed him and thus vindicated the   
rule that the ,foreign ,minister  must  
always pay regard to the joint          
responsibility of the ,cabinet4    ,in  
#ahfa a select committee of ,parliament 
on the diplomatic service  was          
appointed4 ,it took evidence1 among     
other things1 on the existence  of      
8secret diplomacy0 in the ,british      
service4 ,by this term was  understood  
private correspondence or private action

 affecting the  conduct of public       
affairs1 which did not become part of   
the record  in the ministry4 ,lord      
,stratford de ,redcliffe1 the ,earl of  
,clarendon1  ,lord ,cowley1 and ,lord   
,john ,russell1 all gave evidence with  
respect to  the conduct of business by  
private correspondence4 ,they all seemed
 to  agree that private correspondence  
between the ,foreign ,minister and the  
individual representatives abroad was   
useful and even necessary for           
supplementing the formal instructions   
and reports4 ,but they stated  their    
belief that whenever any such private   
correspondence should begin  to affect  
the actual conduct of public affairs it 
would certainly get  into the record2   
if1 however1 it should come to nothing1 
then it might  not be referred to in    
public despatches4          ,,iv        
,,napoleon ,,iii1 ,,disraeli1 ,,bismarck
      ,we have so far been dealing      
primarily with the methods of diplomacy4
  ,during the old rgime both the methods

 and the general policy of  diplomatic  
action were controlled by the secret    
councils of the monarch  and of a few   
ministers4 ,with the growth of          
representative government  public       
opinion began to concern itself more    
directly with foreign  affairs4 ,there  
grew up gradually1 although with many   
relapses and  with many breaks of       
continuity1 a consensus that while the  
methods  of diplomatic action might be  
secret1 the general trend of policy     
should regularly be laid before the     
representatives of the people  who      
should also be informed of any          
individual action involving the         
responsibilities of the nation4 ,when1  
therefore1 in contemplating the  history
 of the last one hundred years1 secret  
diplomacy is spoken  of in condemnatory 
terms1 the attempted secrecy of national
 foreign  policy1 rather than of        
methods1 is usually thought of4 ,when   
important  engagements are undertaken   
which involve the nation in             

responsibility  to others1 particularly 
for the use of armed forces2 when by a  
series  of specific acts a tendency is  
given to foreign policy which is not    
avowed to the representatives of the    
people2 then there exists secret        
diplomacy in a reprehensible sense4 ,a  
further method of concealment  works    
through a false statement of motives4   
,often narrowly selfish  action has been
 camouflaged with the avowal of noble   
aims and high  ideals2 or there has been
 fencing for position in order that at  
the  beginning of a war the opprobrium  
of being the assailant could be  thrown 
on the other party4 ,undoubtedly        
sometimes statesmen may persuade        
themselves of the presence of high      
motives in matters in which their       
specific action or that of their        
successors1 working with the same       
materials1 takes on a contrary          
direction4    ,at the conclusion of the 
,crimean war1 ,lord ,palmerston wrote to
 ,lord  ,clarendon 7,march #a1 #ahfg7 as

 follows3      8444 the alliance of     
,england and ,france has derived its    
strength    not merely from the military
 and naval power of the two states1     
but from the force of the moral         
principle upon which that union    has  
been founded4 ,our union has for its    
foundation resistance to    unjust      
aggression1 the defence of the weak     
against the strong1    and the          
maintenance of the existing balance of  
power4 ,how1 then1    could we combine  
to become unprovoked aggressors1 to     
imitate    in ,africa the partition of  
,poland by the conquest of ,morocco     
for ,france1 of ,tunis and some other   
state for ,sardinia1 and of    ,egypt   
for ,england8 ,and1 more especially1 how
 could ,england and    ,france1 who have
 guaranteed the integrity of the        
,turkish ,empire1    turn round and     
wrest ,egypt from the ,sultan8 ,a       
coalition for such    a purpose would   
revolt the moral feelings of mankind1   
and would    certainly be fatal to any  

,english ,government that was a party to
    it4 ,then1 as to the balance of     
power to be maintained by giving    us  
,egypt1 but we do not want the burden of
 governing ,egypt1 and    its possession
 would not1 as a political1 military1   
and naval    question1 be considered1 in
 this country1 as a set-off against     
the possession of ,morocco by ,france4  
,let us try to improve all    these     
countries by the general influence of   
our commerce1 but let    us all abstain 
from a crusade of conquest which would  
call upon    us the condemnation of all 
other civilized nations40    ,this      
program of liberal principles applied to
 foreign affairs1 of  high-toned and    
high-minded diplomacy1 one reads with   
mixed feelings in  view of the things   
which have come thereafter4    ,in the  
period between the ,crimean and the     
,franco-,prussian war1 ,napoleon        
pursued a policy1 or a series of        
policies1 which fitly illustrate the    
worst features of secret diplomacy4 ,in 

#aheh ,napoleon ,,iii obtained  from    
,cavour a promise that ,savoy and ,nice 
should be ceded to ,france4  ,these     
arrangements1 made without the knowledge
 or the desire of the  ,french people1  
involved ,napoleon in the war of #ahei  
and led to a  fatal weakening of his    
position4 ,in #ahfd ,napoleon secretly  
suggested  to ,prussia that she might   
take ,schleswig-,holstein1 thus greatly 
encouraging her to undertake the war of 
#ahfd4 ,france at this time was  under  
treaty obligations to ,denmark which    
made such action doubly  dishonest4     
,when the war between ,austria and      
,prussia broke out in  #ahff1 ,napoleon 
concluded a secret treaty with ,austria 
which contained  a bargain that he would
 assist ,austria to recover ,silesia in 
return  for a cession of ,venetia to    
,italy1 to compensate the latter for    
,savoy  and thus to eradicate the evil  
effects of the arrangement of #aheh4    
,as this treaty became known1 it        
absolutely alienated ,prussia from      

,france4 ,at the same time ,napoleon had
 secretly demanded from ,prussia  the   
cession of the ,rhenish ,palatinate     
which belonged to ,bavaria2 this  would 
mean of course that ,prussia and ,france
 together would first have  to take it  
from ,bavaria4 ,bismarck secretly       
informed ,bavaria of this  demand and   
thus turned her decisively against      
,napoleon2 so that he was  enabled to   
make secret treaties of alliance not    
only with ,bavaria but  with ,wurtemberg
 and ,baden for their military support  
in case of war4  ,napoleon had thus     
managed unwittingly to bring about the  
coalition of  ,german states which      
proved disastrous to him in #ahgj4 ,had 
the ,french  government known of these  
three ,german treaties1 it would        
probably have  avoided war2 as it was1  
,france did not know that she would have
 all  ,germany against her4 ,in #ahff   
,napoleon1 through ,benedetti1 submitted
 to  ,bismarck a draft treaty according 
to which1 in case the ,french ,emperor  

should decide to send his troops to     
enter ,belgium1 the ,king of ,prussia   
would grant armed aid to ,france and    
support her with all his forces1        
military and naval1 in the face of and  
against every other power which  might  
in this eventuality declare war4 ,though
 this draft treaty1 which  became known 
in ,great ,britain and caused high      
excitement there1 was  not adopted in   
this form1 a secret compact was made    
between ,france and  ,prussia in #ahfg1 
one article of which stated that        
,prussia would not  object to the       
annexation of ,belgium by ,france4 ,the 
fact that both of  these powers had     
signed the treaty of #ahci1 guaranteeing
 the neutrality  of ,belgium1 aggravates
 the noxiousness of this conspiracy4    
,early in  #ahgj ,napoleon was secretly 
negotiating with ,austria with a view to
 a  joint war against ,north ,germany4  
,the negotiations were in progress when 
the war of #ahgj broke out4 ,probably   
,bismarck was informed of what  was     

going on and was therefore the more     
anxious to face at once what  he        
considered an inevitable war4 ,as       
already stated1 ,napoleon did not       
communicate to his responsible minister 
his decision to require of the  ,king of
 ,prussia the absolute assurance that no
 ,german prince should  ever again be   
nominated for the throne of ,spain4 ,in 
doing so he put  himself in a position  
where ,bismarck could manuver him into a
 dilemma  from which there seemed no    
exit except war4    ,this was done by   
the famous editing of the ,ems dispatch 
through which1  taking advantage of     
,king ,william's permission to modify   
and eliminate1  ,bismarck gave to the   
report sent by the king the appearance  
that  nothing further could be said     
between the king and the ,french envoy  
and that therefore the only alternative 
to the ,french was retreat  or war4     
,this act illustrates one of the most   
terrible dangers of  secret diplomacy in
 that just at the time when inflammable 

material  is at hand in abundance1 one  
word or phrase may give a decisive turn 
to developments and force an issue1 in a
 certain direction1 without  allowing a 
chance for calm consideration of all    
that is involved4    ,bismarck          
considered that the unification of      
,germany required a war  because only   
thus could the feeling of unity among   
the ,german people1  until then divided 
into numerous small states1 be molded   
into political  oneness4 ,but in        
bringing on the ,franco-,prussian war1  
no matter how  inevitable he might      
consider such a struggle1 he was too    
confident of  his ability to play the   
part of a ,providence and to cut short  
the slow  processes of historic         
development4 ,therefore1 though he      
attempted to  work in the interest of   
outstanding national factors1 his policy
 was  not of a nature to develop that   
public confidence in the aims of his    
nation on which alone a statesman can   
permanently build4 ,his was the         

diplomacy of authority1 often announcing
 its aims with great frankness1  indeed1
 but always retaining the old method so 
that the public mind  remained often in 
the dark4 ,his politics directed ,german
 development  into a dangerous course4  
,he abhorred ,german disunion1 but tried
 to  cure it with means too forceful and
 artificial4 ,the solutions brought     
about further problems4 ,the taking of  
,alsace-,lorraine was the cause of      
future war4 ,in #ahga1 ,bismarck offered
 ,mulhouse to ,switzerland secretly1    
but the gift was declined4 ,in the years
 after #ahga1 ,bismarck always          
threatened ,parliament with the danger  
of war whenever he wanted to put        
anything through4    ,the               
,russo-,turkish war of #ahgh1 being in  
its nature a conflict about the  merits 
of which only vague ideas could be      
current among the ,western  nations1    
produced a whole nest of secret         
treaties4 ,the treaty of ,san  ,stefano 
itself was kept secret by ,russia and   

,turkey4 ,the ,british  ,foreign        
,secretary in a diplomatic note which   
was much admired at the  time1 demanded 
that the treaty must be submitted to the
 ,european powers4    ,meanwhile a      
second secret treaty had been made      
between ,russia and  ,austria wherein1  
as is customary in such transactions1   
8compensations0  were distributed out of
 property belonging to neither of the   
contracting parties1 at the cost of     
somebody else2 it was agreed that       
,austria should have ,bosnia and        
,herzegovina4 ,meanwhile the ,british   
,foreign ,office1 though it had just    
declaimed in indignant tones against    
the secret terms of ,san ,stefano1 made 
an agreement1 equally secret1  with     
,russia 7,may #cj1 #ahgh71 concerning   
the points on which ,great  ,britain    
would insist in the final adjustment4   
,through the wrongful  action of an     
employee of the ,foreign ,office this   
agreement leaked out  and a summary of  
it was published on ,may #cast4 ,when   

questioned in  the ,house of ,lords1 the
 ,marquis of ,salisbury1 who at all     
times had a  well-deserved reputation   
for sincerity1 nevertheless qualified   
the  statement in the ,globe as 8wholly 
unauthenticated and not deserving  of   
any confidence on the part of the ,house
 of ,lords40 ,the full text  of the     
agreement was published by the ,globe on
 ,june #adth1 and when  challenged by   
,lord ,rosebery concerning his dementi1 
,lord ,salisbury  calmly stated3 8,i    
described it as unauthentic simply      
because it was so1  and because no other
 adjective actually described it1 and ,i
 shall be  able to state why ,i so      
described it40 ,the explanation which   
followed  was1 however1 quite lame1 and 
consisted mainly in stating that the    
document as published did not give a    
complete view of the situation4  ,the   
impression produced by these tactics was
 far from favorable4 ,lord  ,granville1 
with a great deal of justice1 wanted to 
know 8where the  ,house of ,lords would 

have been had it not been for the       
immoral action  of the man who gave the 
secret treaty to the newspaper4 ,they   
would  have had blue books and copies of
 instructions1 protocols and other      
documents1 but they would have been     
perfectly duped as to the way in  which 
the government had actually proceeded40 
,but there followed another1 a fourth   
secret treaty1 growing out of  the      
,turkish situation1 an agreement between
 ,great ,britain and ,turkey  concluded 
on ,june #dth1 at ,constantinople4 ,as a
 result of erroneous  information having
 been telegraphed from ,constantinople  
by ,mr4 ,layard1  the ,british envoy1 to
 the effect that in spite of the        
armistice  the ,russians were moving on 
,constantinople1 a large war credit was 
voted in the ,british ,house1 although  
against the opposition of the  ,liberals
 under ,gladstone and ,bright4 ,orders  
were also given to the  ,indian         
,government to send troops to ,cyprus4  
,a secret treaty was then  concluded in 

which ,great ,britain received a        
protectorate over ,cyprus in  return for
 the engagement on her part to protect  
the ,asiatic domains  of ,turkey4 ,never
 was the blood of a nation without its  
own knowledge  and consent risked in a  
more doubtful adventure than in this    
famous  transaction of ,lord            
,beaconsfield4 ,gladstone1 on ,july     
#bjth1 analyzed the  treaty as providing
 for three things3 the occupation and   
annexation of  ,cyprus1 the defense of  
,turkey in ,asia against any attempt    
,russia may  make 78to go two thousand  
miles from your own country1 alone and  
single  handed1 in order to prevent     
,russia making war at any time upon     
,turkey  in ,asia071 and responsibility 
for the government of ,turkish territory
  in ,asia2 and all that was undertaken 
without the consent and knowledge  of   
the ,british people1 to be done at their
 expense by the blood of  their         
children4 ,mr4 ,gladstone concluded3    
8,there is but one epithet  which ,i    

think fully describes a covenant of this
 kind4 ,i think it is an  insane        
covenant40    ,disraeli had formerly    
said of ,palmerston3 8,with no domestic 
policy1 he  is obliged to divert the    
attention of the people from the        
consideration  of their own affairs to  
the distraction of foreign politics4    
,his scheme  of conduct is so devoid of 
all political principle that when forced
  to appeal to the people1 his only     
claim to their confidence is his  name40
 ,the same language could with equal    
justice have been applied to            
,beaconsfield himself4 ,his speeches in 
defense of his foreign policy are       
usually a superficial appeal to         
imperialist passion1 and deal in such   
phrases as 8,what is our duty at this   
critical moment80 8,to maintain  the    
empire of ,england40 7,loud cheers47    
8,empire0 is taken for granted  as      
covering everything desirable1 but the  
actual relationship of these            
adventurous foreign policies to the     

welfare and true development of the     
,english people is never reasoned out4  
,while ,beaconsfield had opposed the    
first ,afghan war1 he readily changed   
his views when he came into power and   
began the second war in #ahgh  on the   
avowed ground that the ,ameer had       
refused to receive a ,british  mission4 
,but with a sudden change of tactics1 at
 a dinner at the  ,mansion ,house on    
,november #i1 ,lord ,beaconsfield       
solemnly announced that  the war had    
been made because the frontier of ,india
 was 8a haphazard  and not a scientific 
one40 ,yet a little before1 when        
condemning the  first ,afghan war1 he   
had described the frontiers of ,india as
 8a perfect  barrier40 ,he did not give 
to any organization of public opinion a 
chance to influence him in this matter1 
or even to be heard4 ,on  ,december #i1 
,lord ,derby said in the ,house of      
,lords3 8,we are discussing1  and we    
know we are discussing1 an issue upon   
which we have no real or  practical     

influence40          ,v    ,,triple     
,,alliance ,,diplomacy ,,and ,,morocco  
,toward the end of the nineteenth       
century the dominating development  in  
the diplomacy of ,europe was the actual 
formation of the two  great             
alliances--the ,triple ,alliance created
 by ,bismarck1 and  the ,russo-,french  
,alliance which had come into being in  
#ahif as a  counterpoise to the former4 
,the treaties upon which these alliances
  rested were made secretly2 they were  
part of an authoritative policy  based  
on the theory of balance of power4 ,the 
texts of the ,triple  ,alliance ,treaty 
were not published until after the      
beginning of the  ,great ,war4 ,the     
so-called ,counter-,insurance ,treaty   
with ,russia by which  ,bismarck        
attempted to stabilize the situation and
 isolate ,france  through a mutual      
neutrality agreement between ,russia1   
,austria and  ,germany1 was one of the  
most characteristic examples of         
complicated  methods followed by the old

 diplomacy2 it was1 of course1 also kept
  secret4 ,when after ,bismarck's       
retirement the ,german ,government did  
not renew this secret treaty1 it made   
possible a fundamental change in  the   
grouping of powers with the result that 
,russia1 after a very short  interval1  
identified herself with ,france in the  
,dual ,alliance4    ,while ,bismarck had
 been in control of ,german diplomacy1  
the main lines  of ,german foreign      
policy were kept quite clear and their  
general  direction was definite1 no     
matter how complicated and indirect were
  the means frequently applied to carry 
it out4 ,emperor ,william ,,ii  sought  
to free himself from the tutelage of the
 powerful ,chancellor1  but from then on
 the orientation of ,german diplomacy   
was far from  definite4 ,no one could be
 clear where its main objective lay2 it 
seemed  to seek expansion of influence  
in ,asia ,minor1 the ,far ,east1        
,morocco1  ,south ,africa1 and almost   
everywhere1 even with the inclusion of  

,south  ,america4 ,germany appeared to  
have many irons in the fire1 although   
meanwhile she did not make much progress
 in any specific direction4  ,this      
uncertainty of her diplomatic aims in an
 increasing manner aroused  the         
apprehension of her neighbors2 none of  
them felt any assurance  about what     
,germany actually wanted4 ,that her     
actual wants may not have  been         
unreasonable1 that she herself          
apparently did not know exactly  which  
of her interests should predominate1 did
 not help matters2 all  those who had   
more possessions than she felt          
themselves endangered1 and  a general   
suspicion and lack of confidence        
resulted4    ,in the years after the    
,chino-,japanese war the ,german        
,government showed  a great desire to   
play a prominent part in ,far ,eastern  
affairs4 ,thus1  it took the lead in    
bringing about the joint intervention of
 ,russia1  ,france and ,germany1 which  
obliged ,japan to surrender ,port       

,arthur1 a  part of the spoils of war   
just taken from ,china4 ,the three      
powers who  had thus come to the rescue1
 however1 forthwith proceeded to exact  
from ,china an enormous commission for  
their good offices1 and forced  her to  
make to them grants of lease-holds and  
other concessions1 in  which was        
included the very territory that they   
had rescued from ,japan4  ,in this keen 
onset1 which amounted to an attempt to  
divide up the  ,chinese ,empire1 ,great 
,britain in her turn also participated4 
,the ,far  ,eastern situation was       
rendered decidedly unstable1 and the    
frantic and  unorganized resistance of  
the ,boxer levies was the result4       
,after the settlement of these troubles1
 in #aija1 the ,german ,government1  as 
we now know1 tentatively suggested the  
formation of an alliance  including     
,great ,britain and ,japan4 ,this       
proposal shows how far  ,german         
diplomacy at the time had departed from 
the fundamentals of  policy under       

,bismarck4 ,japan proceeded most        
assiduously to work on  this suggestion1
 but ,germany was left out when the     
highly important  ,anglo-,japanese      
,alliance was secured by the ,japanese  
,minister in ,london4  ,negotiations    
between ,great ,britain and ,japan were 
carried on with the  greatest secrecy4  
,lord ,lansdowne himself seems at one   
time to have been  very anxious for     
prompt action2 he said to ,count        
,hayashi1 as reported  by the latter1   
that 8there was great danger in delay1  
as the news of  the proposed treaty     
might leak out and objections might then
 be raised40    ,it is significant that 
while ,lord ,lansdowne and ,count       
,hayashi were in  the depth of their    
negotiations1 ,marquis ,ito1 on his     
return journey  from the ,united        
,states1 proceeded to ,russia and1      
entirely in opposition  to the express  
judgment of ,count ,hayashi1 8plunged   
into conversations  on the most delicate
 of matters0 at ,st4 ,petersburg4 ,in   

fact1 the  ,japanese ,government allowed
 almost identical secret negotiations to
  be carried on in ,london and ,st4     
,petersburg at the same time4 ,count    
,hayashi considered this procedure as   
implying 8a lack of faith and a  breach 
of honor40 ,when the ,anglo-,japanese   
treaty had been actually  signed it was1
 through the indiscretion of some       
official1 published in  ,japan three    
days too soon4 ,the ,japanese ,foreign  
,office promptly denied  its existence1 
and ,baron ,rosen1 the ,russian         
,minister at ,tokyo1 who no  doubt knew 
of the ,ito negotiations at ,st4        
,petersburg1 very emphatically  denied  
the very possibility of such a treaty4  
,the effect on ,russia of  the truth    
when it became known there1 can be      
readily imagined4 ,in the               
,anglo-,japanese treaty1 ,england1 which
 had recently joined in the solemn      
guarantee of the integrity of ,china and
 of the independence of ,korea1  made   
engagements scarcely consistent with    

either4    ,lord ,rosebery1 in a public 
address1 ,october1 #aije1 expressed his 
sense of the great importance of this   
treaty4 8,the treaty10 he  said1 8is an 
engine of tremendous power and          
tremendous liability4  ,whatever else is
 certain1 this at least is sure1 that it
 will lead to  countless animosities1   
many counter intrigues1 and possibly    
hostile  combinations4 ,but ,i want to  
point out to you the enormous importance
 of  the engagements in which this      
treaty involves you1 the reactions which
  it will cause elsewhere1 and to bid   
you to be vigilant and prepared1  and   
not negligent1 as sometimes you are1 of 
the vast bearings of your  foreign      
policy40    ,the ,german ,emperor1      
having failed to obtain a treaty with   
,england1 now  turned to his ,russian   
cousin with the design of inducing him  
to make  an alliance4 ,the ,willy-,nicky
 correspondence which was published by  
the  ,russian ,revolutionary ,government
 in #aiag1 as well as the memoirs of    

,isvolsky1 give us a complete insight   
into the action of ,william ,,ii in     
this matter4 ,the correspondence shows  
that ,emperor ,william neglected no     
means of arousing resentment and        
suspicion of ,england in the mind of    
,nicholas1 particularly in attempting to
 show a complicity of ,england  with    
,japan in the war against ,russia4 ,in  
,november1 #aijd1 ,william  proposed the
 immediate signature by ,russia1 without
 the knowledge of  ,france1 of a        
defensive treaty of alliance1 evidently 
directed against  ,great ,britain4      
,france was to be invited to join after 
the signature  by ,germany and ,russia4 
,the ,czar1 however1 insisted that he   
could not  entertain this proposal      
without first submitting it to his ally4
  ,william1 in a long telegram1 argued  
insistently upon the danger of          
informing ,france before the signature4 
,he said3 8,only the absolute1          
undeniable knowledge that we are both   
bound by the treaty to give  mutual aid 

to each other1 can induce ,france to    
exercise pressure upon  ,england to     
remain tranquil and in peace1 for fear  
of placing ,france  in a dangerous      
situation4 ,should ,france know that a  
,german-,russian  agreement is simply in
 preparation and not yet signed1 she    
would  immediately inform ,england4     
,england and ,japan would then forthwith
  attack ,germany40 ,therefore1 ,william
 concluded that if the ,czar should     
persist in refusing to sign the treaty  
without the previous consent  of        
,france1 it would be better not to      
attempt making an agreement at  all4 ,he
 stated that he had spoken only to      
,prince ,buelow about it1 and  that as  
undoubtedly the ,czar had spoken only to
 ,count ,lamsdorff1 the  foreign        
minister1 it would be easy to keep it an
 absolute secret4 ,he  then             
congratulated the ,czar on having       
concluded a secret agreement of         
neutrality with ,austria4 ,as a matter  
of fact1 ,count ,lamsdorff had not  been

 informed by the ,czar of the ,emperor's
 proposal4    ,in the summer of #aije1  
,emperor ,william returned to the       
charge1 taking  advantage of the        
discouragement of the ,czar due to many 
external and  internal troubles         
resulting from the ,japanese war4 ,he   
visited the ,czar  at the ,island       
,bjorkoe in ,july1 and used every       
resource of his personal  influence to  
prevail on ,nicholas4 ,this time he     
succeeded1 and the two  sovereigns      
signed a secret treaty of alliance1     
which contained four  articles to the   
following effect3    7#a7 ,if any       
,european state shall attack either of  
the empires the allied  party engages   
itself to aid with all its forces on    
land and sea4    7#b7 ,the contracting  
parties will not conclude a separate    
peace4    7#c7 ,the present agreement   
comes in force at the moment of         
conclusion of  peace between ,russia and
 ,japan1 and may be denounced with one  
year's  notice4    7#d7 ,when the treaty

 has come into force ,russia will take  
the necessary  steps to inform ,france  
and to propose to her to adhere to it as
 an ally4    ,on this occasion the      
,emperor was accompanied by ,von        
,tschirsky1 who  soon after became      
,german ,foreign ,minister and who      
countersigned the  agreement4 ,the      
,russian ,foreign ,minister was not     
present but ,admiral  ,birileff1 the    
,minister of the ,navy1 was called in to
 countersign the  ,czar's signature4    
,after his return to ,st4 ,petersburg1  
the ,czar allowed  fifteen days to pass 
before informing ,count ,lamsdorff4     
,when informed1  the ,czar's advisers   
took a very strong position against the 
agreement1  with the result that        
notwithstanding the insistent arguments 
of  ,emperor ,william1 who in his       
telegram signed himself 8,your friend   
and  ally10 the treaty was never given  
full force4 ,william strongly appealed  
to the gratefulness of the ,czar for    
having stood by him during the          

,japanese war1 at a time when1 8as      
afterwards the indiscretions of         
,delcass have shown1 although allied to 
,russia1 ,france had nevertheless  made 
an agreement with ,england to attack    
,germany without warning1 in  time of   
peace40 ,the latter phrase gives the    
effect upon ,william's mind  of all he  
knew or believed to know about the      
arrangements concluded  between ,france 
and ,great ,britain concerning ,morocco4
    ,the ,moroccan intrigues and secret 
negotiations1 during the first decade   
of the twentieth century1 contributed in
 no small measure to rendering          
international relations strained and    
generating a general sense of           
insecurity and suspicion4 ,in ,july1    
#aija1 a protocol was signed between    
the ,sultan of ,morocco and the ,french 
,government in which the latter         
declared its respect for the integrity  
of ,morocco4 ,at the same time ,m4      
,delcass began secret negotiations with 
,spain for a delimitation of  spheres of

 influence in that country4 ,in         
,september1 #aijb1 the first            
,franco-,spanish secret treaty          
concerning ,morocco was given its final 
form4 ,it was1 however1 not ratified    
because of ,british opposition at  the  
time4 ,in #aijd1 the formation of the   
,anglo-,french ,entente agreement1  in  
which the ,french ,government declared  
that it had no intention 8of  altering  
the political status of ,morocco10 was  
accompanied by the  conclusion of a     
secret understanding concerning ,morocco
 which was not  revealed until #aiaa4   
,according to the terms of that         
agreement the  ,british ,government was 
to be informed of any understanding on  
,morocco  which might be concluded      
between ,france and ,spain4 ,these two  
countries1  in fact1 on ,october #c1    
#aijd1 consummated a convention for the 
partition  of ,morocco into spheres of  
influence4 ,a copy of this secret       
agreement  was given to ,lord           
,lansdowne1 the ,british ,foreign       

,minister1 who wrote1  in acknowledging 
it3 8,i need not say that the           
confidential character of  the          
,convention entered into by the         
,president of the ,french ,republic and 
the ,king of ,spain in regard to ,french
 and ,spanish interests in ,morocco  is 
fully recognized by us1 and will be duly
 respected40    ,the ,german            
,government1 which had been ignored1 now
 suggested the  holding of an           
international conference4 ,after        
considerable opposition  the conference 
met at ,algeciras1 in ,february1 #aijf4 
,the ,powers  represented there again   
solemnly recognized the independence and
  integrity of ,morocco4 ,meanwhile1    
various incidents were brought on  by   
the actions of ,french and ,spanish     
commissaries in ,morocco4 ,the  ,french 
parliament repeatedly reiterated its    
intention to observe the  act of        
,algeciras1 particularly in the         
declaration of ,february1 #aiji1        
regarding ,morocco1 in which declaration

 ,germany joined4 ,in #aiaa1 events     
happened which induced a serious        
,european crisis4 ,the ,french          
,government  undertook military         
operations against ,fez1 the capital of 
,morocco1 on  the ground that the       
foreign colony there was in danger4 ,in 
reply to  questions in the ,house of    
,commons1 ,sir ,edward ,grey confirmed  
that such  measures were being          
undertaken by the ,french ,government   
8for the succor  of ,europeans in ,fez40
 ,he added3 8,the action taken by       
,france is not  intended to alter the   
political status of ,morocco1 and ,his  
,majesty's  ,government cannot see why  
any objection should be taken to it40   
,the facts of the ,fez affair have been 
thus described by the ,french           
publicist1 ,francis de ,pressens3       
8,at this point the ,comit du ,maroc and
 its organs surpassed    themselves4    
,they organized a campaign of systematic
 untruth4    ,masters of almost the     
entire press1 they swamped the public   

with    false news4 ,fez was represented
 as threatened by siege or sack4    ,a  
whole ,european ,french ,colony was     
suddenly discovered there1    living in 
anguish4 ,the ultimate fate of the women
 and children    was described in the   
most moving terms4444 ,at all costs the 
,europeans--the ,sultan1 ,fez itself    
must be saved4444 ,as ever from    the  
beginning of this enterprise1 the       
,government knew nothing1    willed     
nothing of itself40    ,while these     
events were happening1 the ,foreign     
,offices both in ,paris  and ,london    
failed to give any information          
concerning the aims which  underlay the 
action taken4 ,on ,may #bc;d1 ,mr4      
,dillon in the ,house of  ,commons asked
 to what extent ,england was committed  
to this 8ill-omened  and cruel          
expedition40 ,the ,foreign ,secretary   
replied1 8,we are not  committed at     
all40 ,the ,french ,foreign ,minister   
declared at the same  time that he had  
never heard of any treaty with ,spain   

concerning  ,morocco4    ,when the      
international crisis came to a head     
suddenly in ,july1 #aiaa1  through the  
disconcerting action of the ,german     
,government in sending a  war vessel to 
,agadir1 the public was totally taken by
 surprise and was  absolutely in the    
dark as to the issues and interests     
involved as well  as to the commitments 
which had been made by the ,british and 
,french  foreign offices4 ,the text of  
the secret treaty between ,france and   
,spain  had1 however1 now been secured  
by the ,paris papers ,le ,temps and  ,le
 ,matin4 ,this revelation led to party  
attacks on secret diplomacy  in the     
,british ,house of ,commons and in the  
,french ,parliament4 ,baron             
d',estournelles de ,constant1 in        
,february1 #aiab1 said3      444 8,why  
was the ,french ,parliament told only   
half the truth    when it was asked to  
pass its opinion upon our arrangement   
with    ,england8 ,why was it allowed to
 suspect that this arrangement had    as

 its complement and corrective some     
secret clauses and other    secret      
treaties8 ,it is this1 it is this double
 game towards    ,parliament and towards
 the world which becomes morally an     
abuse    of trust4444 ,now the whole    
effort of the arrangement of #aijd      
appears to-day in its truth and in its  
vanity4 ,it was a treaty of             
friendship with ,england recognizing the
 freedom of our political    action in  
,morocco and also proclaiming our will  
to respect the    integrity of that     
country2 that was what the public knew  
and    approved4 ,but the public was    
ignorant that at the same time1 by      
other ,treaties and by contradictory    
clauses hidden from it1 the    partition
 of ,morocco between ,spain and ,france 
was prepared1 of    that ,morocco of    
which we guaranteed the integrity40     
,in the ,house of ,commons1 ,mr4 ,john  
,dillon charged that 8the ,foreign      
,office policy has become during the    
last ten years progressively more       

secret every year4 ,for ten years the   
foreign policy of this country has  been
 conducted behind an elaborate screen of
 secrecy40          ,,vi    ,,entente   
,,diplomacy      ,as the commitments of 
the ,british ,government gradually      
became more and  more known the question
 arose as to how deeply and extensively 
,great  ,britain had been involved in   
continental affairs4 ,lord ,rosebery1   
who  was uninformed1 with the rest of   
,parliament and the public1 as to the   
actual details1 said in a speech at     
,glasgow in ,january1 #aiab3      8,this
 we do know about our foreign policy1   
that1 for good or for    evil1 we are   
now embraced in the midst of the        
,continental system4    ,that ,i regard 
as perhaps the gravest fact in the later
 portion of    my life4 ,we are1 for    
good or for evil1 involved in a         
,continental    system1 the merits of   
which ,i do not pretend to judge1       
because    ,i do not know enough about  
it1 but which1 at any rate1 may at      

any time bring us into conflict with    
armies numbering millions1    and our   
own forces would hardly be counted in   
such a war as they    stand at present40
    ,lord ,rosebery realized perhaps    
more fully than most of the leaders of  
,english public life the complications  
adherent to what had already  become    
public knowledge at the time4           
,meanwhile the government1 in           
,parliament1 confined itself to plain   
denials whenever the matter of          
international undertakings and          
obligations of a general nature was     
brought up4 ,the denials could be       
justified from the point of view that   
the situation as stated by the          
uninformed questioner in ,parliament1 in
 each case did not exactly  correspond  
to the facts4 ,but the impression       
created by such denials  that no serious
 obligations had been incurred was1 as  
the result  showed1 entirely misleading4
    ,on ,march #h1 #aiaa1 ,mr4 ,jowett  
asked in the ,house of ,commons whether 

any  undertaking1 promise or            
understanding had been given to ,france 
that  in certain eventualities ,british 
troops would be sent to coperate  with  
the ,french army4 ,the ,undersecretary  
of ,state for ,foreign ,affairs         
replied3 8,the answer is in the         
negative40 ,on ,december #f1 #aiaa1 the 
,prime ,minister said3      8,as has    
been stated1 there were no secret       
engagements with ,france    other than  
those that have now been published1 and 
there are no    secret engagements with 
any foreign ,government that entail upon
    us any obligation to render military
 or naval assistance to any    other    
,power40    ,upon another occasion ,mr4 
,yerburgh1 ,m4,p41 inquired3      8,may 
,i ask whether or not we are to         
understand that the    ,government      
arrived at no decision upon this        
particular question8    ,is the right   
honorable gentleman not aware that this 
new    definition of the two-,power     
standard is a question of supreme       

importance1 and that in arriving at our 
standard of naval    strength previous  
,governments had regard to the power of 
the    fleets of other countries80      
,the ,prime ,minister replied only3     
8,i think this question shows the       
inconvenience of dealing with    these  
matters by way of question and answer40 
,in ,december1 #aiab1 ,lord ,hugh ,cecil
 made the following inquiry3            
8,there is a very general belief that   
this country is under an    obligation1 
not a treaty obligation1 but an         
obligation arising    out of an         
assurance given by the ,ministry in the 
course of    diplomatic negotiations1 to
 send a very large armed force out of   
this country to operate in ,europe4     
,that is the general belief4 ,it        
would be very presumptuous of any one   
who has not access to all    the facts  
in possession of the ,government--0     
,the ,prime ,minister interrupted him   
with3 8,i ought to say that it is  not  
true40 ,lord ,cecil thereupon expressed 

his satisfaction for having  elicited   
this explanation1 8because10 he stated1 
8it was certainly  widely believed that 
the ,government has engaged in a        
military  policy of an adventurous kind 
and that if such a policy had actually  
been contemplated by the ,government it 
would involve a very serious            
consideration of the military resources 
of the country40 ,as a matter of  fact1 
the latter was a just conclusion from   
the actual situation as it  really      
existed1 notwithstanding the denial by  
the ,prime ,minister4    ,in ,march1    
#aiac1 when during the discussion of the
 ,navy estimates1 the  ,mediterranean   
situation came up1 ,lord ,beresford     
suggested that ,mr4  ,churchill 7,first 
,lord of the ,admiralty7 must be        
trusting to ,france  the duty of        
guarding the ,mediterranean4 ,mr4       
,churchill had said in the  course of   
these discussions3 8,in conjunction with
 the ,navy of ,france1  our             
,mediterranean ,fleet would make a      

combined force superior to all  possible
 combinations40 ,sir ,c4 ,kinloch-,cooke
 referred to this as a  remarkable      
statement1 and one 8somewhat difficult  
to reconcile with the  recent           
pronouncement of the ,prime ,minister as
 to our understanding with  ,france in  
the matter of armaments40 ,he added3    
8,in one case we have the  ,prime       
,minister repudiating an obligation on  
our side of any kind1 and  in the other 
we have the ,first ,lord of the         
,admiralty relying for the  safety of   
our ,eastern ,empire1 our trade and our 
food supply1 upon the  assistance which 
he presumes will be ready at any moment 
to be given to  us by ,france40    ,on  
,march #bd1 #aiac1 ,mr4 ,asquith1 ,prime
 ,minister1 made a comprehensive  answer
 to a question of ,sir ,w4 ,byles in the
 following terms3      8,as has been    
repeatedly stated1 this country is not  
under any    obligation1 not public and 
known to ,parliament1 which compels     
it to take part in a war4 ,in other     

words1 if war arises between            
,european ,powers1 there are no         
unpublished agreements which will       
restrict or hamper the freedom of the   
,government or ,parliament to    decide 
whether or not ,great ,britain should   
participate in a war40    ,in ,august1  
#aiac1 ,lord ,haldane made a statement  
to the effect that the  very friendly   
relationships with ,france rendered the 
situation in the  ,mediterranean most   
satisfactory4 ,on ,june #aa1 #aiad1 this
 same general  matter was up again for  
discussion4 ,sir ,edward ,grey1 in      
answering a  question1 referred back to 
the statement made by ,mr4 ,asquith on  
,march  #bd1 #aiac1 and added3 8,it     
remains as true to-day as it was a year 
ago40    ,the nation was meanwhile left 
entirely in the dark with respect to the
  actual matter of the relationships    
which had developed between ,great      
,britain and ,france1 and it was only   
after the ,great ,war had broken  out   
that ,sir ,edward ,grey1 in his speech  

of ,august #c1 #aiad1 gave to           
,parliament some account of what had    
actually happened4    ,the first        
important step in the new international 
policy of ,great  ,britain was taken    
immediately after the ,liberal          
,government had been  formed on         
,december #ab1 #aije4 ,it appears that  
,sir ,edward ,grey consulted  in this   
matter particularly ,mr4 ,asquith and   
,lord ,haldane1 informing  the ,prime   
,minister1 ,sir ,henry                  
,campbell-,bannerman1 but not his other 
,cabinet colleagues4 ,the above three   
men were the leaders of the ,liberal    
,imperialist faction1 and it is not at  
all certain that in an aggressive       
foreign policy they would have been at  
that moment readily followed by  their  
whole party4    ,when in consequence of 
the attempted division of ,morocco1     
relations  between ,france and ,germany 
became somewhat strained1 ,sir ,edward  
,grey1  ,foreign ,minister1 made        
communications to the ,french           

,ambassador to the  effect that1 while  
no promises could be given to any       
,foreign ,power1  yet in ,sir ,edward   
,grey's opinion1 if war was then forced 
upon ,france  on the question of        
,morocco1 public opinion in ,england    
would rally to  the material support of 
,france4 ,sir ,edward ,grey1 as related 
in his own  words1 said3 8,i made no    
promises and ,i used no threats1 but ,i 
expressed  that opinion40 ,the accuracy 
of that opinion has been questioned1 in 
view of the temper of the ,house of     
,commons elected at a time when         
resentment at the imperialist war in    
,south ,africa was powerful4    ,on the 
basis of the statement made by ,sir     
,edward ,grey1 the ,french  ,government 
said to the ,british ,foreign ,minister1
 as reported by him3      8,if you think
 it possible that the public opinion of 
,great    ,britain might1 should a      
sudden crisis arise1 justify you in     
giving to ,france the armed support     
which you cannot promise in    advance1 

you will not be able to give that       
support1 even if you    wish it when the
 time comes1 unless some conversations  
have    already taken place between     
naval and military experts40    ,sir    
,edward ,grey saw merit in this proposal
 and agreed to it4 ,he  authorized that 
conversations should take place1 but    
with the distinct  understanding that   
nothing which would bind either         
,government should  occur4 ,however1 the
 holding of conversations between two   
,powers  concerning military coperation 
is in itself a sufficiently serious     
matter out of which expectations and    
relationships are apt to arise  that    
cannot be overlooked in future action4  
,the ,cabinet was not  informed of the  
authorization given by ,sir ,edward     
,grey until later4 ,he  did not state   
how much later4    ,we know from        
official sources that ,colonel          
,barnardiston proceeded to  ,belgium and
 had interviews with the ,chief of the  
,belgian ,general ,staff  concerning    

combined operations in the event of a   
,german attack directed  against        
,antwerp4 ,colonel ,barnardiston        
confided to the ,belgian ,chief  of     
,staff that his ,government intended to 
move the ,british base of  supplies from
 the ,french coast to ,antwerp as soon  
as the ,north ,sea had  been cleared of 
all ,german warships4 ,when the ,belgian
 documents were  published in ,germany1 
it was attempted by the press to        
represent these  conversations as an    
actual convention4 ,these consultations 
occurred  during the first quarter of   
#aijf4    ,from an official source comes
 the statement that in ,july1 #aiaa1 the
  ,british ,government informed the     
,german1 that on certain contingencies1 
,great ,britain would support ,france   
7if ,germany should demand the whole  of
 ,french-,congo and ,agadir as a naval  
base74 ,what actually happened at  this 
time has never been fully revealed4     
,in ,april1 #aiab1 the ,british military
 attach at ,brussels informed the       

,belgian ,general ,jungbluth that ,great
 ,britain had #afj1jjj men available    
for despatch to the continent1 and added
 that the ,british ,government  in      
certain contingencies during recent     
events would have immediately  landed   
troops on ,belgian territory4    ,about 
this time the ,cabinet had a discussion 
of the whole situation  and of the      
special relationship with ,france2 and  
it was decided that  there should be    
some definite expression in writing1 of 
the latter4  ,accordingly1 in ,november1
 #aiab1 an exchange of notes took place 
between  ,sir ,edward ,grey and the     
,french ,ambassador4 ,the ,british      
,foreign ,minister  wrote the following 
letter3                                 
,nov4 #bbnd 7#aiab74      8,,my ,,dear  
,,ambassador3      8,from time to time  
in recent years the ,french and ,british
 ,naval    and ,military experts have   
consulted together4 ,it has always      
been understood that such consultation  
does not restrict the    freedom of     

either ,government to decide at any     
future time    whether or not to assist 
the other by armed force4 ,we have      
agreed that consultation between experts
 is not and ought not to    be regarded 
as an engagement that commits either    
,government to    action in a           
contingency that has not yet arisen and 
may never    arise4 ,the disposition1   
for instance1 of the ,french and        
,british    fleets respectively at the  
present moment is not based upon    an  
engagement to coperate in war4 ,you     
have1 however1 pointed    out that if   
either ,government had grave reason to  
expect an    unprovoked attack by a     
third ,power it might become essential  
to know whether it could in that event  
depend upon the armed    assistance of  
the other4 ,i agree that if either      
,government had    grave reason to      
expect an unprovoked attack by a third  
,power1    or something that threatened 
the general peace1 it should            
immediately discuss with the other      

whether both ,governments    should act 
together to prevent aggression and to   
preserve peace1    and1 if so1 what     
measures they would be prepared to take 
in    common4 ,if these measures        
involved action1 the plans of the       
,general ,staffs would at once be taken 
into consideration and the              
,governments would then decide what     
effect should be given to    them40     
,a reply from the ,french ,ambassador   
accepted this understanding4    ,side by
 side with the ,anglo-,french military  
and naval collaboration1  there went the
 making of joint plans by ,france and   
,russia which  culminated in the        
,franco-,russian military convention of 
,august1 #aiab4  ,at the same time      
,russia had pressed upon ,france the    
need of increasing  her army by raising 
the term of service to three years4     
,concerning the  new disposal of the    
,french fleet1 according to the desires 
of ,russia1  ,president ,poincar stated 
to ,ambassador ,isvolsky in ,november1  

#aiab3      8,this decision has been    
made in agreement with ,england1 and    
forms    the further development and    
completion of arrangements already      
made previously between the ,french and 
,english staffs40    ,thus the chain of 
coperation was completed1 and ,england  
was  effectively tied up with the       
situation in the ,balkans1 in which only
  ,russia had a primary interest4       
,meanwhile1 the repeated denials        
previously set forth kept the ,british  
,parliament and public from all         
knowledge of the exceedingly important  
relationships which were growing up     
between the ,naval and ,military        
establishments of ,great ,britain and   
,france4    ,how these relationships1   
though only partially known and         
suspected1  were looked upon by         
outsiders is shown from expressions in  
the reports  of ,belgian diplomats4     
,count de ,lalaing wrote from ,london in
 #aijg3  8,england is quietly pursuing a
 policy opposed to ,germany and aimed   

at her isolation40 ,baron ,greindl wrote
 from ,berlin in #aijh3 8,call it       
alliance or what you will1 the grouping 
constitutes1 none the less1 a           
diminution of ,germany's security40     
,baron ,guillaume wrote1 in #aiaa1 from 
,paris3 8,i have less faith in the      
desire of ,great ,britain for peace4    
,she would not be sorry to see the      
others eat one another up40 ,these      
expressions are not1 of course1         
evidences of ,british policy1 but simply
  of the impression which whatever      
leaked out concerning that policy1  made
 upon outside diplomats4    ,in his     
clear and convincing analysis of the    
situation created by the  gradual       
formation in secret1 of these           
relationships1 ,lord ,loreburn  brings  
out the following points3 ,through the  
communications with the  ,french        
,ambassador and military and naval      
conversations concerning  plans for     
joint action1 ,france was encouraged    
more and more to expect  that ,great    

,britain would stand by her in arms if  
she were attacked by  ,germany4 ,such a 
policy of a defensive understanding with
 ,france1 no  matter how right in       
itself1 was obviously a new departure of
 tremendous  importance4 ,its execution 
and effectiveness could be assured only 
if  understood by ,parliament as a      
national policy1 with all the risks     
involved1 so that proper preparations   
could be made4 ,parliament was1         
however1 never warned of the danger     
,england stood of being thrown  suddenly
 into a ,european war4 ,had ,germany    
been told in ,july1 #aiad1  that ,great 
,britain would support ,france and      
,russia1 the war would  undoubtedly have
 been prevented2 but while the ministers
 had in fact  incurred moral obligations
 over against ,france1 they had not     
assured  themselves of the necessary    
,parliamentary support and could        
therefore  not make a statement         
involving such risk as the above        
declaration to  ,germany would have     

created4    ,of ,sir ,edward ,grey's    
speech of the #crd of ,august1 #aiad1   
,lord ,loreburn  says3      8,this      
remarkable speech began with an         
elaborate effort to prove    that the   
,house of ,commons was perfectly free to
 determine either    for peace or war4  
,it ended with a passionate declaration 
that    this country would be disgraced 
if we did not declare war1 and    the   
reasoning of the speech proved that ,sir
 ,edward ,grey had    committed himself 
irretrievably4 ,it left the ,house of   
,commons    convinced that it had in    
honor no choice but to join ,france in  
arms4 ,it is an epitome of the reasoning
 by which ,sir ,edward ,grey    had been
 brought to believe that he could say   
and do what he said    and did without  
limiting his freedom of action4 ,but if 
this is    legitimate we ought not to   
keep up the pretense that we are a      
self-governing nation in foreign        
affairs40    ,thus a minister1 to whom  
national intrigue and duplicity were    

essentially foreign1 who was trusted by 
his country and who wanted  peace1 was  
brought by the methods of secret        
diplomacy into a position  where he had 
actually incurred the moral obligation  
to assist another  country without      
having the power for peace which the    
ability to avow  that relationship      
openly1 to take the responsibility1 and 
to confront  ,germany therewith1 would  
have given him4    ,as early as         
,november1 #aiaa1 ,lord ,lansdowne1 one 
of the founders of  the ,entente1 in    
speaking of the secret agreement of     
#aijd concerning  ,morocco1 which had   
then just become known to the public1   
had admitted  that in such a case the   
promise of purely diplomatic support    
might  easily bring on the obligation to
 assist in other ways2 that an entente  
cordiale creates close relationships    
between two countries2 and that1  should
 one of them get into difficulties      
without its guilt1 it would  expect to  
receive support4    ,the moral          

responsibilities in which the ,foreign  
,minister had involved  the ,british    
,government were not simple1 nor did    
they exist against  ,france alone4      
,because of the ,franco-,russian        
alliance the relationship  established  
between ,great ,britain and ,france     
virtually involved sharing  in the      
defense of ,france against the          
consequences of her alliance with       
,russia1 as the subsequent events       
showed2 any serious situation arising   
in the ,balkans and affecting ,russian  
interests would thereafter involve      
,france1 and through her1 ,great        
,britain4 ,accordingly1 the effect of   
this policy was to make the peace of    
,great ,britain depend upon1 and to     
involve it with1 the complex struggle   
for influence in the ,balkans4    ,after
 ,sir ,edward ,grey's speech of ,august 
#crd1 ,mr4 ,t4 ,edmund ,harvey1  ,m4,p41
 said3 8,i am convinced that this war   
for the great masses of the  countries  
of ,europe is no peoples' war4 ,it is a 

war that has been  made by men in high  
places1 by diplomatists working in      
secret1 by  bureaucrats out of touch    
with the people1 by men who are a       
remnant of  an older evil civilization40
    ,lord ,loreburn sums up his         
indictment of secret diplomacy in the   
following language3 8,secret diplomacy  
has undergone its #8acid test' in  this 
country4 ,it had every chance4 ,the     
voice of party was silent4 ,the         
,foreign ,minister was an ,english      
gentleman whom the country trusted and  
admired1 who was wholly free from       
personal enmities of every kind1 and    
who wanted peace4 ,and secret diplomacy 
utterly failed4 ,it prevented us  from  
finding some alternative for war1 and it
 prevented us from being  prepared for  
war1 because secret diplomacy means     
diplomacy aloof from  ,parliament40 ,the
 issue is here quite clearly stated4    
,those who see in  the methods and      
spirit of the old diplomacy the chief   
cause of war1  do not hold1 on the one  

hand1 that secret diplomacy involves at 
all  times and in all cases unscrupulous
 plotting4 ,but they believe that the   
method of dealing with foreign affairs  
as a mysterious matter1 fit to  be      
handled only by the select1 and the     
reliance on a policy of bargains  and   
compensations1 with the aim thus        
artificially to maintain a balance  of  
power1 may be blamed for this great     
catastrophe2 for they stood  in the way 
of dealing with great public affairs in 
a sounder manner1  that is1 with more   
regard of the actual public interest and
 of the  underlying racial and popular  
factors4    ,those ,british critics who 
have attacked this method as practised  
in  their own country before and during 
the war1 do not thereby mean to  impute 
to ,british statesmen a major share in  
the responsibility for  the war4 ,the   
high-mindedness and public spirit of the
 responsible  statesmen is recognized by
 all fair critics1 and most of them     
imply  that ,great ,britain has far less

 to fear from this system than have     
nations with less responsible           
governments and a less sound tradition  
of statesmanship4 ,they attack the      
system as a whole as it exists          
throughout ,european diplomacy1 and as  
it has been used by the ,british        
,government4    ,from the point of view 
of historic evidence1 and of strict     
reasoning  from cause to effect1 a great
 deal of doubt still remains as to how  
far secret diplomacy in itself1--that   
is1 the failure to publish  to          
parliament and the people1 details of   
the situation as it  developed1--could  
properly be considered the specific     
cause of the  war2 no matter how        
definite may be our judgment and belief 
that the  secrecy and tortuousness of   
foreign policy are bound to generate an 
air  of uncertainty and suspicion which 
will so greatly favor militarist        
intrigues and influence as to render the
 making of wars far more easy  than they
 would otherwise be1 were time and      

opportunity given to the  public to     
consider the details of a critical      
situation4 ,yet it might  be difficult  
to prove by historic evidence1 the      
specific proposition  that the war of   
#aiad was directly due to the fact that 
the development  of international       
affairs was quite generally kept from   
the knowledge  of the public4           
,nevertheless1 unquestionably the       
atmosphere of secret  diplomacy is a    
medium exactly suited to the most       
baneful influences4    ,viscount        
,haldane has made a strong defense of   
the policy of ,sir ,edward  ,grey4 ,he  
asserts that 8the failure of those who  
had to make the effort  to keep the     
peace1 does not show that they would    
have done better had  they discussed    
delicate details in public40 ,he        
continues3 8,there are  topics and      
conjunctures in the almost daily        
changing relations between  ,governments
 as to which silence is golden4 ,for    
however proper it may be  in point of   

broad principle that the people should  
be fully informed  of what concerns them
 vitally1 the most important thing is   
that those  to whom they have confided  
their concerns should be given the best 
chance of success in averting danger to 
their interests4 ,to have said  more in 
,parliament and on the platform in the  
years in question1 or  to have said it  
otherwise1 would have been to run grave 
risks of more  than one sort40 ,this    
defense1 however1 also makes certain    
assumptions1  particularly the          
underlying one that the war was not to  
be avoided by  any method4 ,it is based 
on the traditional concept of foreign   
affairs  which considers that it is best
 to leave them at the discretion of a   
few initiated and responsible officials4
 ,there can be no question that  from   
the highest plane conceivable under the 
older ideas and norms of  diplomacy1 the
 conduct of foreign relations by ,sir   
,edward ,grey must be  considered as a  
model of sagacity and caution4 ,but when

 ,lord ,cromer  describes the secret    
arrangements concerning ,morocco as 8a  
wise measure  of preventive diplomacy10 
it is not easy to follow him4           
,,vii    ,,the ,,crisis ,,of #aiad      
,if secret diplomacy exhibits its       
drawbacks even in a country where       
parliamentary government is so highly   
developed as in ,england and  where     
political intelligence and independence 
of judgment exist1 we  shall not be     
surprised at the continuous prevalence  
of devious methods  in diplomacy in     
countries where the conduct of foreign  
affairs is  considered quite frankly a  
matter only for the initiated1 and where
  little pretense is made of an appeal  
to public opinion except in the  sense  
of holding it in subjection by vague    
general ideas of national  danger1      
necessity1 and honor4 ,the main faults  
of ,german diplomacy  were due to its   
bureaucratic point of view and its lack 
of contact  with public opinion1 both at
 home and abroad4 ,it was distinctly  an

 expression of the authoritative will of
 the state1 guided by a  supposed inner 
knowledge of its dangers and needs1 but 
without any real  effort to strengthen  
itself through contact with the public  
mind4 ,the  ,reichstag was indeed       
occasionally informed of foreign        
developments1  perhaps as frequently as 
in ,england1 but there was no real      
mutual  influence between the nation and
 the officials conducting foreign       
affairs4 ,as has already been pointed   
out1 ,german diplomacy failed to        
reassure either the neighbors or the    
people of ,germany2 its lack of  clear  
objectives was puzzling and disquieting4
 ,it was also hurt by  its constant1    
evident dependence on what should have  
been only the  very last                
resort--military force4 ,a further      
disquieting characteristic  of ,german  
politics was that there seemed to be a  
cynical approval of  certain courses of 
action which might indeed resemble what 
some other  nations were doing1 but     

which were treated by the latter rather 
as  regrettable necessities4 ,thus there
 is1 for instance1 the conception of    
,realpolitik1 of which ,frederick the   
,great's statement is an extreme        
instance3 8,before declaring my         
intentions ,i consider on the one side  
the adverse incidents which ,i must     
risk2 on the other1 the good fortune    
which ,i might hope2 and after thorough 
consideration of pro and con1 ,i  decide
 for war40    ,coming now to the fateful
 crisis of #aiad1 it would appear that  
at this  time a great danger was allowed
 to grow up without the men in control  
of the government giving themselves a   
full account as to the fatal            
probabilities involved1 whereas the     
parliament and the public remained      
entirely uninformed4 ,germany had always
 more or less backed her  ,austrian ally
 in the ,balkan policy of the latter4   
,bismarck had indeed  been very cautious
 in this respect1 and had been fully    
aware of the  danger inherent in such a 

policy1 of committing ,germany through  
giving  ,austria too much head4 ,when   
the ,servian question became acute1 the 
heads of the ,german ,government were   
indeed so reckless in encouraging       
strong ,austrian action as to justify   
the impression that they desired  to    
push ,austria-,hungary into a conflict4 
,it would1 however1 appear1  from a full
 study of all the data which is now     
possible1 that the  ,kaiser and         
,bethmann-,hollweg were quite optimistic
 in believing that  the conflict could  
be localized and that the solution could
 be left  to ,austria and ,servia4 ,when
 it was beginning to become quite clear 
that ,russia would in this instance not 
stand aside and that therefore  ,france1
 too1 would be thrown into the conflict1
 the ,german ,chancellor  began to make 
belated efforts to induce ,austria to   
accept the mediation  of the ,powers on 
the basis that ,belgrade should be      
occupied to assure  compliance with the 
,servian promises4 ,the ,austrian       

premier1 ,count  ,berchtold1 however1   
was not inclined to reverse his engines4
 ,he took  advantage of the             
encouragement given to ,austria in the  
first place1 to  persist in an          
irreconcilable attitude toward ,servia4 
,the documentary  material which has so 
far been published1 shows that          
,berchtold  insinuated to the ,russian  
and ,british embassies that he was      
favorable  to mediation2 meanwhile1 he  
did not answer the proposals to that    
effect  made from ,berlin1 but in fact  
stubbornly pursued his stern policy     
against ,servia4 ,in turning a deaf ear 
to all proposals of mediation at  this  
time1 ,berchtold gave the militarists at
 ,berlin and ,petrograd the  control of 
the situation4    ,berchtold had        
inherited the ,balkan policy of         
,aehrenthal1 who had in  #aiji carried  
out the ambition of laying the two      
,slavic ,provinces1  ,bosnia and        
,herzegovina1 8at the feet of ,emperor  
,francis ,joseph at his  ,sixtieth      

,jubilee40 ,count ,berchtold himself was
 not considered a man  of strong        
initiative2 he vacillated and was       
undecided upon questions  of great      
moment2 he1 however1 displayed great    
stubbornness on the  fatal point that   
the 8honor0 of ,austria-,hungary did not
 permit of  any mediation with ,servia4 
,count ,forgach1 who was his chief      
adviser1  hated ,russia and ,servia     
intensely1 and it is believed that he   
was very  influential in spurring ,count
 ,berchtold to aggressive action4       
,countess  ,leutrum holds him           
responsible for the war1 8next to       
,aehrenthal40 ,the  ,german ,ambassador 
at ,vienna1 ,von ,tschirsky1 also       
harbored a great deal  of personal      
resentment against ,russia4 ,there would
 appear to be great  reason to doubt    
whether such efforts as                 
,bethmann-,hollweg made to urge         
moderation upon ,berchtold were strongly
 emphasized by the personal  influence  
of the ,german ambassador4 ,count       

,czernin states that all of  ,herr von  
,tschirsky's private speeches at this   
time were attuned to  8,now or ,never10 
and he asserts that the ,german         
ambassador declared  his opinion to be  
8that at the present moment ,germany was
 prepared  to support our point of view 
with all her moral and military power1  
but whether this would prove to be the  
case in future if we accepted  the      
,serbian rebuff appears to me doubtful40
 ,count ,czernin believes  that         
,tschirsky in particular was firmly     
persuaded that in the very  near future 
,germany would have to go through a war 
against ,france and  ,russia1 and that  
he considered the year #aiad would be   
more favorable  than a later date4      
,count ,czernin adds3 8,for this reason1
 because first  of all he did not       
believe in the fighting capacity of     
either ,russia or  ,france1 and         
secondly1 because--and this is a very   
important point--he  was convinced that 
he could bring the ,monarchy into this  

war1 while  it appeared doubtful to him 
that the aged and peace-loving ,emperor 
,francis ,joseph would draw the sword   
for ,germany on any other occasion      
where the action would center less round
 him1 he wished to make use of  the     
,servian episode so as to be sure of    
,austria-,hungary in the decisive       
struggle4 ,that was his policy1 and not 
,bethmann's4444 ,i am persuaded1        
however1 that ,tschirsky1 in behaving as
 he did1 widely overstretched  his      
prescribed sphere of activity4 ,isvolsky
 was not the only one of his  kind40    
,it is not the purpose of this essay to 
enter into the difficult  question of   
the specific guilt for bringing on the  
war of #aiad4  ,however1 in examining   
the quality and methods of contemporary 
diplomacy  it is not possible to avoid  
considering some of the phases of this  
difficult question4 ,the documents and  
other evidence which have  recently been
 published1 make it appear that         
,bethmann-,hollweg1 when  the terrible  

crisis was actually at hand1 honestly   
attempted to bring  about a moderation  
of the course pursued by ,austria4 ,the 
original  belief of the ,german         
statesman itself could1 however1 be     
accounted  for1 only on one of two      
alternative reasons1 either because of  
an  unbelievable lack of foresight1 or  
the conviction that a threatening       
attitude would again1 as in #aiji1 be   
successful1 and that ,russia would  not 
dare to follow up her constantly        
declared interest in the ,servian       
situation4 ,and if worst should come to 
worst1 8well then10 the ,german  leaders
 seemed to think1 8now will be better   
than later40 ,no matter  what reasonable
 occasion ,german statesmen had during  
the years leading  up to the war to fear
 a hostile policy on the part of        
neighboring  governments1 yet their     
attitude and action at a critical time  
shows  uppermost in the minds of these  
statesmen and diplomats1 a narrowly     
tactical1 primarily bureaucratic1 view  

of the factors involved4 ,there  was    
always present in the background the    
notion of the necessity of  a preventive
 war4 ,those who make the actual        
decision to begin a war  without any    
immediate provocation making it plainly 
defensive1 who  begin it because of     
contingent dangers in the future1 no    
matter how  great1 take a very serious  
responsibility4 ,as has been said1 the  
indicative 8,germany made war10 is far  
more apt to leave a powerful  impression
 in the record of history than the      
subjunctive1 8,if ,germany  had not made
 war then the others would have done so 
later on40    ,the fact that military   
action against ,servia would probably   
involve  ,russia and thus set in motion 
the complete chain of international     
forces involving ,europe in a world war1
 that is1 the futility of the  attempt  
to localize the struggle in ,servia1 is 
practically admitted in  the statement  
of the ,german ,white ,book1 issued     
,august #c1 #aiad1 to the  following    

effect3 8,we were aware of the fact that
 warlike undertaking  against ,servia   
would bring ,russia into the war and    
that therefore our  duty as an ally     
might entangle us likewise4 ,we could1  
however1 not  advise our ,ally to yield 
in a manner incompatible with its       
dignity1 nor  could we deny our         
assistance at this difficult moment40   
,austria-,hungary had judged that it    
would be incompatible with its  dignity 
and honor to submit the ,servian matter 
to arbitration4 ,this  illustrates a    
very characteristic feature of          
contemporary diplomacy1  still adhering 
to the traditions and prejudices of the 
past4 ,the  term 8honor0 is one that is 
not translatable into terms which can be
  reasoned about4 ,it is in fact a      
direct descendant of the conception of  
8honor0 during the eighteenth century1  
in the code of the duelist4 ,men        
constantly translate the concepts of    
their private life into public  affairs1
 and to these men who at ,vienna1       

,petersburg and ,berlin1 had  the       
destiny of the world in their hands1    
honor was an indefinable term  which    
could be felt but not discussed4 ,in    
practice1 when applied to  human affairs
 of the utmost importance1 it cannot be 
distinguished from  the character of the
 personal duel1 in which the conception 
of justice  was entirely subordinate4   
,when it was said that ,austria-,hungary
 found  arbitration 8beneath its        
dignity10 there was speaking the        
mentality of  the ,feudal junker who    
considers himself too noble to appeal to
 a court  against a peasant neighbor1   
but prefers to send his servants to give
  him a thrashing4 ,the honor of        
,austria-,hungary is of such a special  
kind in the mind of these men that it   
does not suffer arbitration1 but  sees  
in war the only possible satisfaction4  
,in this as in many other  points1      
secret diplomacy is a superstition of   
the past4 ,as late as ,may1  #aiaf1 the 
,pester ,lloyd1 a semi-official paper1  

declared3 8,even if the  ,russian       
,government had stopt its mobilization1 
which it had secretly  begun            
notwithstanding all its hypocritical    
assurances1 nevertheless                
,austria-,hungary would not have gone to
 any conference but would have  insisted
 without interference from third parties
 to settle its affairs  with ,servia in 
consonance with the future security of  
,austria-,hungary40  ,it would appear   
plain that the ,austrian leaders wanted 
war1 but with  ,servia alone2 trusting  
that the formidable power of their great
 ally  would again block outside        
intervention4    ,thus when we look at  
the men in whose hands at this time such
 a fateful  power of decision was       
placed1 we find them1 as the great      
crisis  approaches1 themselves stunned  
by the enormity of the forces about to  
be unchained1 seeking still and hoping  
for some fortunate escape2 yet  guided  
in their specific action1 not by a      
general masterly grasp of  the entire   

situation1 such as is ordinarily        
expected of the diplomatic  superman1   
but just by details happening to be most
 prominent in their  mind1 such as the  
incompatibility of arbitration with the 
honor of  ,austria1 or the personal     
judgments and inclinations of individual
  diplomats4 ,as to a correct estimate  
of how the forces would work out1  as to
 foresight of determining factors1 these
 men showed no unusual  ability2 in     
fact1 the guess of the intelligent man  
on the street would  have been as safe  
as their judgment4 ,they stood on too   
narrow a base2  they believed that      
,italy would remain neutral1 that       
,england would not  enter the contest1  
and later that the ,united ,states would
 never engage  in hostilities4 ,when we 
consider the mental attitude of the     
controllers  of foreign affairs in all  
countries during this long period of    
secret  manipulations1 we can find      
nothing sacrosanct about the deductions 
and judgments of secret diplomacy2 in   

fact1 the lack of contact with  public  
opinion and the deeper forces of life1  
is everywhere painfully  apparent4 ,a   
,swiss writer has stated3 8,the ,world  
,war is the work of a  small minority of
 men in power4 ,their power rests on the
 principle of  authority1 and on the    
erroneous supposition of wisdom and     
foresight  exceeding the average4 ,the  
means of maintaining this erroneous     
supposition is secret diplomacy1 which  
deprives the people of all  possibility 
of insight and control in the most      
momentous questions4 ,the  result of    
this system is the ruin of ,europe40 ,it
 is too great a risk  to take1 to leave 
in the hands of individual men1 no      
matter how highly  gifted personally1   
the control of such forces and the      
playing of such  chances4    ,in        
,russia1 the conduct of foreign affairs 
under the ,empire was in the  hands of a
 narrow group of men of special training
 and experience1 but  without an element
 of responsibility to the public at     

large1 except  that involved in the     
general results of diplomatic policy4   
,it is a  notable fact that during the  
nineteenth century only six men held the
  position of foreign ministers in      
,russia4 ,this is by far the longest    
average tenure in any country4 ,sazonov1
 who became foreign minister  in #aiaa1 
further emphasized the esoteric         
character of foreign policy  by         
definitely divorcing it from home       
affairs4 ,he did not consult  with the  
,council of ,ministers1 but only with   
men of his own chosen  environment1 a   
select group of a few collaborators4    
,russian foreign  policy was therefore  
controlled by a very small clique1      
representing  the traditions of secret  
diplomacy1 and playing at a game of     
chance1  though never so shrewdly1 with 
the lives1 fortunes and interests of    
vast populations4 ,in the ,balkan states
 ,russian diplomacy had for a  long time
 applied all its arts in order to       
establish the predominance  of ,russian 

influence4 ,the secret alliance between 
,servia and ,bulgaria  was nurtured by  
,russia evidently with the desire of    
raising a barrier  to the eastward      
expansion of ,austrian influence4 ,in   
#aiab1 the fear was  entertained that   
the alliance might spend its main       
efforts against  ,turkey instead of     
,austria4 ,at this time a loan was      
arranged for ,king  ,ferdinand of       
,bulgaria1 the funds for which were     
advanced by the ,czar4  ,the ,russian   
,foreign ,office was fully informed     
concerning the ,balkan  alliance1 which 
commenced the war in #aiab with ,russian
 assent and  encouragement4 ,what       
direction the thoughts of ,russian      
diplomats were  taking1 is apparent from
 a remark of ,sazonov1 ,russian         
,minister of  ,foreign ,affairs1 to the 
,servian ,minister1 on ,april #bi1      
#aiac1 reported  by the latter as       
follows3      8,again ,sazonov told me  
that we must work for the future because
    we would acquire a great deal of    

territory from ,austria4 ,i    replied  
that we would gladly give ,bulgaria     
,monastir 7,bitollia7 if    we could    
acquire ,bosnia and other territory of  
,austria40    ,a ,belgian diplomat1 in a
 report written from ,berlin in #aiac1  
says that  notwithstanding the great    
,russian influence in the ,balkans1     
,russian  diplomacy had vacillated a    
great deal there since the beginning of 
the ,balkan war2 he goes on to say3 8,in
 a moment of confidence the  ,french    
ambassador spoke particularly concerning
 the influence which ,m4  ,isvolsky has 
maintained1 who has a personal desire of
 revenge against  ,austria-,hungary1 and
 takes great pains to spoil the game    
whenever there  is any appearance of    
,austrian success40 7,baron ,beyens to  
the ,belgian  ,minister for ,foreign    
,affairs1 ,march #ah1 #aiac47    ,when  
the great crisis came on1 the diplomacy 
of ,russia worked in close  connection  
with the militarists4 ,the              
irreconcilable stubbornness of  ,count  

,berchtold greatly strengthened the     
hands of the militarists1  both in      
,petersburg and ,berlin1 and virtually  
put the decision in their  hands4 ,the  
,russians did their part to bring on the
 war by first  ordering mobilization and
 making that mobilization general almost
  immediately4 ,the facts concerning    
this matter have become known4 ,on      
,july #bi1 #aiad1 ,general              
,janushkevich1 the ,russian ,minister of
 ,war1 under  directions from the       
,foreign ,minister ,sazonov1 gave the   
,german military  attach his word of    
honor as a soldier1 to the effect that  
8no general  mobilization had taken     
place1 or was desired40 ,at the very    
time1 he  had with him the ,czar's      
mobilization order4 ,during the night of
 ,july  #bith1 the ,czar gave directions
 to suspend the execution of the order  
for general mobilization4 ,generals     
,janushkevich and ,sukhomlinoff1 with   
the approval of ,m4 ,sazonov1 made the  
momentous decision to go on with  the   

execution of the order1 in disregard of 
the ,czar's command4 ,it is  quite      
evident that this action made the       
peaceful settlement of the  crisis far  
more difficult1 and gave full control   
into the hands of  the military party in
 ,berlin4 ,as late as ,july #ca1 ,m4    
,viviani told the  ,german ,ambassador  
at ,paris that he was in no way informed
 of a general  mobilization in ,russia4 
,the ,russian militarists had got away4 
,,viii    ,,the ,,secret ,,treaties ,,of
 ,,the ,,war      ,while the war lasted1
 the demands of self-protection required
 the  careful concealment of            
negotiations and policies from enemy    
knowledge4  ,but though it is easy to   
understand the need of secrecy at such a
  time1 yet the spirit displayed in     
these negotiations had but little in    
common with the ideals professed in the 
same breath4 ,moreover1 there  was a    
lack of complete sincerity among the    
,allies themselves1 and  particularly   
was there a concealment from some of    

them of important  facts and agreements 
affecting their interests4 ,however1 the
 most  baneful effect of secret         
diplomacy during the war is found in the
  undermining of public confidence in a 
moral foundation of public  action4 ,as 
,lord ,loreburn says3 8,it was not      
wholesome that while our  people were   
stimulated to unparalleled exertions by 
a parade of lofty  motives there should 
be at the same time in existence        
agreements of  this kind1 of which no   
public mention could be made1 and from  
which  little has resulted except the   
right of foreign ,powers to demand      
their fulfilment on our part40 ,that at 
a time when the people in the  vast     
armies were actually fighting for ideals
 of freedom and peace1  common to       
humanity1 the chief care of responsible 
statesmen should have  been the division
 of prospective spoils1 did certainly   
not lay solid  foundations for peace4   
,japan in her action with respect to    
,shantung and in secretly making the    

twenty-one demands on ,china1 was first 
in the attempt to utilize the  great    
struggle for narrowly selfish gain1 in  
this case not entirely  at the expense  
of the enemy but of a neutral and of her
 allies4 ,nor  did other governments    
keep themselves free from the           
temptations of  prospective conquest1   
with the risk of making war interminable
 and  putting the world face to face    
with revolution1 anarchy and famine4    
,as early as ,february1 #aiae1 the      
,russian ,foreign ,minister informed    
the ,french and ,british ambassadors of 
the territorial acquisitions  which     
,russia desired to make through the war1
 including a great part  of ,turkey in  
,europe and in ,asia4 ,the ,french and  
,british ,governments  expressed their  
readiness to agree1 provided a number of
 claims made by  ,france and ,england   
were satisfied4 ,italy entered the war1 
as is well  known1 on condition of her  
claims for territorial annexations being
  satisfied4 ,she agreed to the ,russian

 demands on the same condition4    ,on  
,march #i1 #aiaf1 the ,russian ,foreign 
,minister instructed the ,russian       
,ambassador at ,paris to the following  
effect3 8,it is above all necessary  to 
demand that the ,polish ,question should
 be excluded from the  subjects of      
international negotiation1 and that all 
attempts to place  ,poland's future     
under the guarantee and control of the  
,powers should  be prevented40 ,thus did
 the ,russian ,government attempt       
secretly to  lock the door against any  
chance of ,poland regaining her lost    
national  rights4 ,the entry of         
,roumania in #aiaf led to additional    
arrangements4  ,these agreements were   
kept strictly secret and the millions   
who were  laying down their lives in the
 war had no conception of this intricate
  web of bargains4    ,an effort to     
settle at a time when the ,allies were  
united in their  main aim in the furnace
 heat of the war1 questions which might 
divide  them when peace had come in     

sight1 could be understood2 and that    
such  agreements should be kept secret  
during the war1 might have been         
considered a necessity4 ,however1 the   
necessity of war in this case was       
stretched to cover arrangements which in
 themselves went diametrically  contrary
 to the publicly professed principles   
for which the war was  being fought1 and
 gave rise to the just suspicion that in
 several cases  at least1 very specific 
advantages had been the controlling     
incentive  for entering the war4 ,but   
these agreements have aroused the       
greatest  resentment because they were  
in several cases directed against the   
interests of third parties1 and         
particularly because when the ,united   
,states was making its enormous and     
unselfish sacrifices1 these treaties    
were kept from its knowledge4 ,that the 
,american ,government should not  have  
been informed of the secret treaties    
made at the instance of ,japan  in which
 ,american interests were most seriously

 affected1 and that just  after these   
agreements had been concluded the       
statesmen who had been  closely         
connected with acceding to these        
arrangements on the part of  ,great     
,britain1 at the price of the ,british  
control of the islands of  the ,south   
,pacific1 came to the ,united ,states to
 stimulate the practical  devotion there
 to the cause of the ,allies1 is a fact 
that will  unfortunately help to give   
munition to those who are unfavorable to
  any real friendly understanding       
between the two great ,english-speaking 
powers4 ,the secret commercial policy   
pursued by ,great ,britain during  the  
war is also justly subject to severe    
criticism as giving food and            
subsistence to the growth of deep       
suspicion on the part of even the  most 
faithful of friends4    ,the secret     
treaties relating to the division of    
territories in ,europe  did not come to 
the knowledge of the public until #aiah4
 ,at that  time they were republished by

 one or two ,british papers1 but were   
suppressed by the remainder4 ,the       
treaties were1 however1 distributed  in 
innumerable copies by their own         
governments among the troops of  the    
,central ,powers in order to stimulate  
them to fight in a spirit of            
self-defense4 ,it is reported from      
various reliable sources that the       
,slovenes were the most eager to fight1 
of any part of the ,austrian  army1     
after the ,pact of ,london had become   
known to them1 with its  various        
promises to ,italy4    ,the secret      
assurances which had been given to      
,italy in the ,compact  of ,london were 
probably the cause of prolonging the    
war1 with its  enormous slaughter1 for  
more than a year4 ,in the ,spring of    
#aiag1  secret negotiations were pursued
 between the ,emperor of ,austria1 the  
,president and ,premier of ,france1 and 
the ,british ,prime ,minister4 ,the     
intermediaries in these negotiations    
were the ,bourbon ,princes ,sixtus  and 

,xavier1 brothers of the ,empress of    
,austria4 ,the negotiations were        
carried on from ,switzerland with a     
confidential envoy of the ,emperor  of  
,austria4 ,only the ,emperor1 the       
,empress and the ,duchess of ,parma     
were in the secret4 ,count ,czernin1 the
 ,austro-,hungarian ,minister of        
,foreign ,affairs at this time1 at first
 knew only of the general fact1  not of 
the details4 ,a note of ,count ,czernin1
 with a secret personal  note written by
 the ,emperor1 were brought to ,prince  
,xavier and taken  by him to ,paris4    
,the proposals in ,count ,czernin's note
 related to the  restoration and        
indemnification of ,belgium1 and the    
,german renunciation  of                
,alsace-,lorraine1 which                
8,austria-,hungary naturally would not  
oppose40 ,count ,czernin stated that    
,austria-,hungary could not make a      
separate peace2 that it had no idea of  
crushing ,servia1 but needed  guarantees
 against such affairs as led to the     

murder at ,sarajevo2 that               
,austria-,hungary had no desire of      
crushing ,roumania1 etc4 ,the secret    
addenda made by the ,emperor1 without   
the knowledge of ,count ,czernin1       
stated3 8,we will support ,france and   
exercise pressure on ,germany with  all 
means in connection with                
,alsace-,lorraine4 ,we are absolutely   
not  in ,germany's hands2 it was against
 ,germany's will that we did not break  
with ,america40    ,when ,president     
,poincar received the ,prince's report  
he stated  that the secret note afforded
 a basis for discussion1 that he would  
communicate the two notes1 with         
arrangements of absolute secrecy1 to    
the ,premier1 and inform the ,czar by   
personal letter1 as well as the  ,king  
of ,england1 and ,mr4 ,lloyd ,george1   
8who is a discrete man40 ,but  the      
,president thought that ,italy would be 
the stumbling block4 ,after  this       
interview the ,princes proceeded to     
,vienna for a personal interview  with  

the ,emperor1 which took place on the   
night of ,march #bcrd4 ,the  ,emperor   
discussed the whole situation1 saying   
that ,servia was naturally  the friend  
of ,austria1 and that all that ,austria 
needed was the  suppression of          
revolutionary propaganda there4 ,he     
stated that one of  the ,entente ,powers
 was secretly conversing with ,bulgaria2
 ,bulgaria does  not know that the      
secret has leaked out4 8,it has not much
 importance1  because all these dreams  
of empire of the ,east will have to end 
in the  status quo1 or very nearly      
that40 ,count ,czernin later joined in  
the  conversation1 which is described as
 8rather glacial40 ,he expressed  his   
belief that peace must be made at any   
price1 and that it might be  necessary  
for ,austria to secure a divorce from   
,germany because the  latter would never
 abandon ,alsace-,lorraine4 ,after a    
second visit1 the  ,emperor gave ,prince
 ,xavier an autographed letter1         
enjoining absolute  secrecy because 8an 

indiscretion would force him to send    
troops to the  ,french front40 ,the     
autographed letter of ,emperor ,charles1
 dated ,march  #bdth1 contains the      
following proposals3 ,that he will      
support the just  ,french claims to     
,alsace-,lorraine by all means1 using   
all his personal  influence with his    
allies2 ,belgium and ,servia are to be  
restored to  full sovereignty2 ,belgium 
is to secure indemnities for her losses2
 and  ,servia is to have access to the  
,adriatic ,sea4 ,on the basis of this   
letter1 discussions took place among the
 men concerned in ,france and in        
,england4 ,but ,italy remained the      
obstacle4    ,another trip was taken by 
,prince ,xavier to ,vienna1 where he met
 the  ,emperor on ,may #hth4 ,the       
question now was1 ,what compensations   
should  ,austria receive for ceding its 
territory to ,italy in accordance  with 
the ,pact of ,london8 ,count ,czernin   
joined the meeting and on  the following
 day prepared a memorandum1 which was   

based upon the  principle1              
8,austria-,hungary can cede no territory
 without compensation2  but if the      
territorial question is arranged1 then a
 separate peace with  the ,entente might
 be concluded40 ,when the matter was    
taken up again at  ,paris1 the ,italian 
difficulty remained4 ,m4 ,ribot strongly
 adhered to  the idea that without      
,italy1 no result could be had4         
,meanwhile1 the  unsuccessful ,italian  
offensive of ,july1 #aiag1 had          
supervened1 and the  war had to go on   
for another sixteen months1 although the
 acceptance of  the proposals of the    
,emperor would undoubtedly have brought 
it to an  early end4    ,count ,czernin 
has given in his book1 ,in the ,world   
,war1 an  unimpassioned and             
coldly-balanced view of the diplomacy of
 the time4  ,he does not relate the     
details of the secret negotiations of   
#aiag1 but  he evidently did not approve
 of the manner in which they were       
carried  out because their effect was to

 suggest to the ,entente a willingness  
of  ,austria-,hungary to separate from  
her allies1 without strengthening her   
position in any way4 ,in a letter       
written to ,count ,tisza in the summer  
of #aiag1 ,czernin said3 8,it is        
possible to turn and steer the ,entente 
course if thought feasible2 but then    
courage would be needed to make  the    
turn fully4 ,nothing is more stupid than
 trifling with treachery  and not       
carrying it out2 we should lose all     
ground in ,berlin and gain  nothing     
either in ,london or ,paris40    ,the   
policy pursued by ,japan throughout the 
war made use of all the  devices of     
secret diplomacy for the attainment of  
ends narrowly  national4 ,after having  
possessed herself of ,tsing-tau1 with a 
marked  cold-shouldering of her ,british
 allies1 ,japan set about an attempt  to
 arrange things in ,china so that no    
effective resistance might be  offered  
there to ,japan's expansionist desires4 
,in ,january1 #aiae1 the  ,japanese     

minister in an interview with the       
,president of ,china1 after  enjoining  
the strictest secrecy on the pain of    
most disagreeable  consequences1        
proposed the famous twenty-one demands4 
,that it should  have been attempted to 
dispose of matters so fundamentally     
important1  involving the national      
rights of a population of #cej1jjj1jjj  
people1  through demands secretly forced
 upon a ,president1 at a time when the  
national representative body did not    
function1--that is one of the  startling
 facts of modern history4 ,strange as it
 may seem1 the ,japanese  ,foreign      
,office had apparently persuaded itself 
that secrecy could  be maintained in a  
matter of such transcendent importance4 
,for when  contrary to that expectation 
and in accordance with nature and with  
the salutary fact that1 after all1 such 
tremendous issues can not be  thus      
secretly disposed of1 the facts of the  
case began to leak out1  categorical    
denials were made by the ,japanese      

,foreign ,office and by  various        
embassies4 ,in this case1 those who had 
the right to object  to the disposal of 
important interests in which they       
themselves had a  share1 were not mere  
neutrals or outsiders but the allies of 
,japan1  engaged in a life and death    
struggle at the time4 ,as the twenty-one
  demands aimed at the establishment of 
a predominant position in  ,china       
through control of finance and armament1
 every other nation  there interested   
would have been adversely affected by   
the proposed  arrangement4 ,the         
,chinese1 though isolated1 would not    
immediately yield  to the threatening   
attitude of their neighbor and the      
negotiations  were strung out over      
months4 ,though they were assiduously   
kept secret1  the nature of the         
transaction in general and in detail    
became quite  well known outside1 so    
that the results could not be kept      
hidden2 yet  the whole procedure        
constituted an affirmation that it was  

proper to  deal with the destinies of a 
people in a secret council chamber1     
where  the demandant backed by strong   
military forces1 confronted the first   
official of a vast1 peaceful but        
unmilitant nation1 which would never  in
 the world agree to such procedure and  
the resultant undertakings4  ,japan did 
indeed get certain concessions1 but at  
the cost of making her  diplomacy and   
policy universally suspected on account 
of the methods  which had been used4    
,the policy of ,japan at the time did   
not look with favor upon ,china         
associating herself with the ,allies4   
,dmarches which were made to  bring     
about the entry of ,china into the      
alliance were negatived by  ,japan4     
,this in itself might have been based on
 sound reasons1 yet  the real inwardness
 of this policy was revealed at the time
 when the  ,united ,states had broken   
off relations with ,germany and when the
  ,chinese ,government in the days      
immediately thereafter was considering  

whether to follow the example of the    
,united ,states4 ,from a report  of the 
,russian ,ambassador at ,tokio          
concerning an interview with the        
,foreign ,minister of ,japan1 which took
 place on ,february #aj1 #aiag1 we      
learn that the ,minister for ,foreign   
,affairs alluded to a rumor that an     
attempt might be made to induce ,china  
to join the ,allies to the extent  of   
breaking off relations with ,germany4   
,the ,foreign ,minister said in  effect3
 8,it would be unwise and dangerous to  
attempt to bring ,china to  the side of 
the ,allies unless we can be sure that  
it can be carried  through4 ,this is1   
however1 doubtful4 ,yet the ,japanese   
,government is  willing to undertake the
 task of inducing ,china to take the    
step4 ,but  before making any such      
proposal1 the ,japanese ,government     
desires to be  informed as to the       
attitude of the ,russian ,government in 
the matter of  ,shantung and the        
,pacific ,islands4 ,will the ,russian   

,government support  ,japan at the      
,peace ,conference in these matters80   
,the ,russian ambassador  was requested 
to get the opinion of his government on 
this point4 ,in  other words1 in return 
for a commission paid largely by ,china 
herself1  the ,japanese ,government was 
ready to permit that ,china should join 
the  ,allies in the ,great ,war4 ,it was
 assumed by the ,foreign ,minister that 
,japan's persuasion should be necessary 
to induce ,china to take this  step2 but
 in fact1 at the very time when this    
conversation between  the minister and  
ambassador was going on1 the ,cabinet of
 ,china was in  the all-day session from
 which resulted the decision to follow  
the  ,united ,states in breaking off    
relations with ,germany4 ,this step was 
taken without compulsion1 urgency or the
 promise of advantages1 upon  a careful 
consideration of the underlying         
conditions and equities1  without       
assurances of gain1 merely in the       
expectation of fair treatment  as an    

ally and associate4          ,,ix       
,,hopes ,,for ,,improvement ,,deferred  
,the world has not yet recovered from   
the surprise and disillusionment  which 
overcame it when the secret treaties of 
the war became known and  when it became
 evident that they would be made the    
basis of the ,treaty  of ,peace4 ,the   
secrecy of the procedure of the ,peace  
,conference--which  had been heralded as
 an assembly of the peoples for carrying
 out and  making permanent those great  
principles for which men had grimly and 
silently suffered and died and which had
 been eloquently voiced by  the         
,american ,president--seemed to be so   
complete a return to the old  methods of
 diplomacy that from the day when the   
muzzle was clamped on1  public faith in 
the conference and its results was      
shaken4 ,the motives  of the men who    
made this decision were probably good4  
,it was their  desire that the work     
should be rapidly accomplished and      
should not  be confused by divided      

counsels4 ,but again the results of the 
secret  method are hardly apt to        
increase confidence in its usefulness as
 a  procedure for dealing with the      
affairs of the peoples of the world in  
such a manner as to place them upon a   
sound and lasting foundation4    ,the   
solemn document which was prepared for  
the information of the  newspaper men on
 the decision of the peace conference to
 enforce  secrecy1 did not satisfy any  
one4 ,to the public there seemed to be  
no larger principle at issue than that1 
on this occasion if ever1  open         
covenants should be openly arrived at1  
and it was feared that  if the peace    
conference did not base its action upon 
an appeal to  public opinion1 no        
adequate solution could be found at all4
 ,when the  treaty itself had been      
framed1 it was sedulously kept secret   
until  distributed by the ,french paper 
,bonsoir4 ,the deliberations of the     
,council of ,five were secret beyond all
 precedents in public action4  ,no      

secretaries were admitted and no        
official minutes were kept1 nor  were   
there communications to the public      
through the press4 ,doctor  ,dillon's   
description of the ,five as 8a gang of  
benevolent conspirators1  ignoring      
history and expertship1 shutting        
themselves up in a room and  talking    
disconnectedly10 unfortunately appears  
not entirely untrue2  particularly as to
 the ignoring of history and expertship1
 which was  quite patent1 although from 
the nature of things we cannot exactly  
know how disconnectedly the ,five       
talked4    ,unfortunately1 after the war
 the use of secret diplomatic policy    
has continued without noticeable        
diminution4 ,the details of certain     
situations make one feel as if we are   
after all only a generation  removed    
from the eighteenth century4 ,these     
matters are so recent and  still so     
controversial that ,i do not desire to  
enter upon them in any  detail4    ,it  
is1 however1 surely to be regretted1    

that it should have been  found         
necessary to surround the mandates with 
peculiar secrecy4 ,this  institution was
 conceived in a desire to create a      
trusteeship in  behalf of the world in  
general and for the particular benefit  
of the  populations comprised in the    
mandates4 ,not only has the assignment  
of  certain mandates given rise to great
 popular resistance indicating that  the
 local populations were far from ready  
to trust their interests  to a foreign  
mandatory1 but the fact that these      
arrangements are so  carefully guarded  
with secrecy comes near to destroying   
all hope  that there is any intention to
 handle them otherwise than from the    
imperialist point of view and for the   
benefit of the mandatory4    ,among the 
many things that have happened since the
 armistice1 the  ,franco-,hungarian     
intrigues are specially to be noted as  
emphasizing the  great danger of secret 
methods1 in which a government runs the 
risk of  being committed by persons1    

irresponsible or not properly           
controlled1  into embarrassing and      
harmful situations4 ,we know of these   
particular  facts through confidential  
reports discovered and published1       
officially  recognized by certain       
governments1 though formally denied by  
the  ,magyar ,cabinet4 ,these papers    
give working details of what was already
  known in general terms concerning     
reactionary ,hungarian intrigues  in    
,czecho-,slovakia and ,austria1         
including preparations for an armed     
uprising1 and other assistance to       
monarchists4 ,french interests were at  
the same time active in ,hungary4 ,they 
made an agreement for a leasing  of the 
,hungarian state railways for fifty     
years4 ,according to this  contract1 the
 ,hungarian ,government is bound to     
consult the diplomatic  representative  
of the ,french ,government concerning   
every measure  which may have a bearing 
on any clause of the agreement4 ,a      
political  compact was simultaneously   

initialed in which the ,french          
,government  withdrew its opposition to 
universal military service in ,hungary1 
and  that country was to be assisted in 
boundary rectifications at the  expense 
of ,czecho-,slovakia and ,roumania4 ,a  
third agreement provided  for the       
sending of a ,hungarian army against    
,soviet ,russia under ,french  command4 
,these agreements were undoubtedly      
accepted by many people as  fully       
concluded4 ,the ,magyar ,premier in open
 session of the national  assembly      
boasted of having achieved an alliance  
with ,france2 the same  understanding   
was also accepted by certain ,paris     
newspapers4 ,the ,french  ,government1  
however1 did not sanction what secret   
negotiators had  prepared in ,hungary   
and disavowed the agreements1 with the  
exception  of the lease of the          
,hungarian railways4 ,this illustrates  
how in times  of unsettlement and sharp 
national rivalry1 representatives on the
  spot or agents of powerful interests  

in close touch with the home  government
 may by secret means try to bring about 
arrangements which  the conscience of   
their nation does not approve and which 
serve merely  to generate suspicion and 
distrust4    ,there is reason to believe
 that the draft of a secret treaty      
between  ,france and ,yugo-,slavia which
 was published in #aibj by the ,idea    
,nazionale was at the time actually     
being considered by the two  governments
 concerned4 ,one of the points of the   
proposed treaty was  that upon the      
declaration of war between ,france and  
any ,mediterranean  power1 ,yugo-,slavic
 troops would be massed along the       
hostile boundary  according to          
previously determined plans4 ,in        
connection with this  provision the     
representatives of ,france made the     
following suggestion3  8,in case of a   
conflict it would be better that the    
,yugo-,slavic  troops1 instead of       
massing on the hostile frontier1 should 
rather  provoke a #8,casus ,belli' on   

the part of the nation at war with      
,france4  ,otherwise their intervention 
might bring on the interference of other
  powers40 ,the proposed arrangements1  
even though not adopted by the two      
governments1 nevertheless illustrate the
 methods acceptable to secret           
diplomacy1 but which open public opinion
 would never sanction4    ,whatever we  
may think about the exact share of the  
blame for having  brought on the great  
catastrophe which should be attributed  
to  secret methods and policies1 we     
cannot have any doubts about their      
influence since the armistice4 ,whether 
or not secret diplomacy brought  on the 
war1 it certainly has not ended it4 ,war
 still exists1 not  only when actual    
hostilities are going on1 but in the    
whole temper  of international          
affairs--continuing enmity1 continuing  
armaments1  unending waste of human     
effort4 ,thus1 for one thing1 the entire
 ,near  ,eastern situation remains      
unsettled4 ,as an expert on this        

troubled  region has said3 8,the        
principle of settlement as revealed by  
these  treaties is fundamentally wrong4 
,the ,east must be resuscitated1 not    
exploited40 ,but be it ,east or ,west1  
there is the same return to the  old    
game of balancing off gains and changing
 boundaries1 without  consideration of  
the rights of the respective peoples4   
,the costly  mistakes of the ,congresses
 of ,vienna1 ,paris1 and ,berlin are    
being  repeated4          ,x    ,,the   
,,destruction ,,of ,,public ,,confidence
      ,our historical survey of         
diplomatic policy and practice does not 
hold  much assurance that the evils of  
secret diplomacy have very appreciably  
waned since the eighteenth century4 ,the
 cruder methods of deception  and       
corruption which were at that time      
employed would indeed now be  considered
 beneath the dignity of diplomats2      
although it is unhappily  true that some
 of the most despicable tricks1 such as 
stealing  correspondence and placing    

informers in houses to be watched1 are  
still  practised occasionally4 ,however1
 it may be said that while in general   
the trade-secrets of diplomacy have lost
 greatly in prestige1 the  spirit of    
diplomatic action itself has not yet    
been brought into accord  with          
democratic ideals4    ,a secret service 
attached to the diplomatic establishment
 is still  considered useful by some    
governments4 ,it is1 however1 certainly 
very  doubtful whether the results thus 
obtained in the nature of accurate      
information1 are at all commensurate to 
the expense and to the constant  danger 
of being misinformed through secret     
agents who think that they  must earn   
their pay4 ,my own observation leads me 
to believe that people  who use secret  
service information are frequently      
confused and worried  by an abundance of
 unauthenticated reports brought to     
them2 they would  have been far better  
off without backstairs information1     
relying on  the fundamental facts and on

 knowledge which can be obtained only by
  seeking the confidence of the men who 
control public action4 ,secret  service 
gossip may often give the key to the    
aims and desires of an  individual      
person1 and if one is willing to appeal 
to motives through  corrupt and         
deceitful means1 the information may be 
actually useful4  ,however1 he whose    
policy rests upon an essential          
reasonableness and  mutual benefit1 can 
afford to disregard such gossip4    ,we 
might distinguish between a secrecy     
which is vicious in itself1  and one    
that pursues beneficent objects4 ,the   
former seeks to conceal  the presence of
 harmful motives and projects1 to       
confuse and mislead  people to their    
disadvantage1 and in general1 to play on
 weakness and  ignorance4 ,the other    
keeps secret its plans and negotiations 
which in  themselves have honest        
motives1 from a desire to prevent       
interference  with their prompt and     
complete realization4 ,opinions as to   

the  character of a policy may differ   
widely and those who secretly advance  a
 policy generally condemned by many1 may
 perhaps claim credit for  honest       
purposes4 ,this type of secrecy is      
common4 ,unfortunately1 though  it may  
advance a good object1 it incidentally  
has an evil influence  upon public      
confidence4 ,it must be confessed that  
the distinction here  pointed out is    
difficult to apply in practice in a     
thoroughly objective  manner1 because   
there are probably among diplomats very 
few indeed who  do not persuade         
themselves at least that the means      
applied by them are  designed to achieve
 useful purposes4    ,a good example of 
how stratagem may be used for a laudable
 purpose  is found in the action of     
,william ,j4 ,buchanan1 ,american       
,minister  to ,argentina1 in adjusting  
the ,chili-,argentinian boundary        
dispute4  ,buchanan1 one of the most    
original of ,american diplomats1 had    
nothing  whatever of the suave          

manipulator of the old school of        
diplomacy4 ,he  was direct to the verge 
of bruskness1 yet his ability to go     
straight  to the essential point1 and   
his mastery and bigness1 made him highly
  successful as a negotiator4 ,in this  
particular case1 ,buchanan had been     
designated1 together with a ,chilian and
 an ,argentinian representative1  on a  
commission to settle boundary questions 
and requested to make a  preliminary    
report4 ,he agreed to act only on the   
following conditions3  ,that because of 
the complexity and difficulty of the    
questions  involved1 it would be        
necessary to report on the suggested    
boundary  by sections1 that each section
 should be voted upon as reported by    
him1 and that a majority vote on each   
section should be decisive4 ,this       
proposal was accepted4 ,after a careful 
investigation1 ,buchanan made his       
report1 and it was found that on each   
section the suggested boundary  was     
carried by two votes against one2 the   

,american always voted in the           
affirmative2 the ,chilian and           
,argentinian1 as in the particular      
section  the allotments seemed favorable
 or unfavorable to their respective     
country4 ,in accordance with the terms  
agreed upon1 the entire report  had thus
 to be accepted1 and all the thorny     
problems of long-standing  boundary     
controversies were settled4 ,had        
,buchanan not used this  stratagem it is
 very unlikely that the report as a     
whole would have  been accepted1 as each
 of his associates would have felt that 
he could  not vote for a report         
containing arrangements for giving up   
specific  tracts of territory which his 
country had hitherto always insisted    
upon retaining4 ,by this clever         
arrangement ,buchanan made it possible  
for them to vote against such           
relinquishment in each case without     
defeating the project as a whole2 but if
 he had revealed to them his  plan at   
the beginning1 the object could not have

 been achieved4    ,this incident       
illustrates that a complete solution    
will often be  accepted as satisfactory 
although it may contain details which1  
by  themselves1 would have been resisted
 to the last4 ,it may be said that  the 
disadvantage of public discussion lies  
in the emphasizing of such  points of   
opposition1 and the obscuring of the    
general reasonableness  of a solution4  
,mr4 ,balfour in his defense of the     
secrecy of diplomatic intercourse1  says
 that the work of diplomacy is exactly  
similar to the work which  is done every
 day between two great business firms4  
,he then argues  that1 in all such      
relationships1 it is unwise to air      
difficulties in  public4 ,bismarck used 
the more homely illustration of a horse 
trade1  the participants in which should
 not be expected to tell each other  all
 they know about the prospective        
bargain4 ,that view is putting          
diplomacy on a rather lowly footing4    
,one might expect a somewhat  different 

temper among men dealing with momentous 
public affairs than  the                
bluff-and-haggle of a petty private     
transaction4 ,yet such tactics  have    
actually been found useful in diplomacy4
 ,mr4 ,balfour is on  sounder ground    
when he says1 8,in private1 in          
conversations which need  not go beyond 
the walls of the room in which you are1 
both parties may  put their case as     
strongly as they like and no soreness   
remains10 but  8directly a controversy  
becomes public1 all that fair           
give-and-take  becomes difficult or     
impossible40 ,this1 of course1 implies a
 somewhat  low estimate of public       
intelligence and self-control1 of which 
more  later4    ,the greatest vice of a 
secret diplomatic policy1 working in the
 dark  and concealing international     
undertakings1 lies in the inevitable    
generating of mutual suspicion and the  
total destruction of public  confidence 
among the different countries which     
compose the family of  nations4 ,no     

nation is so bad as imagination1        
confused and poisoned  by secrecy and by
 the suggestion of dire plottings1 would
 paint it4  ,agreements and             
understandings which do not exist at all
 are imagined1  the nature of those     
which actually have been made is        
misjudged1 and  animosities are         
exaggerated2 thus the public is quite   
naturally put in  that mood of suspicion
 and excitement which renders it        
incapable of  judging calmly when       
apparently startling facts suddenly     
emerge4    ,secret diplomacy destroys   
public confidence1 however1 in a still  
more  insidious manner3 by the practice 
of using a language of ideal aims  and  
humanitarian professions in order to    
conceal and veil the most  narrowly     
selfish1 unjust and unconscionable      
actions4 ,the conventional  language of 
diplomacy still carries in it many of   
the phrases and  concepts instilled by  
the false idealism of the eighteenth    
century1 to  which at that time         

diplomacy gave lip worship4 ,the most   
disconcerting  performances of this kind
 are the profuse and reiterated         
declarations  promising the maintenance 
of the sovereignty1 independence and    
integrity of certain countries1 when in 
fact the action really taken  was quite 
to the contrary effect4    ,the         
diplomacy of ,japan has manifested      
peculiar expertship in the use  of      
phrases that are associated with some   
wise public dispensation  or arrangement
 and which have a calming effect--to    
cover action not  remotely in fact      
contributing to such beneficent         
providences4 ,the  sovereignty1         
integrity and independence of a         
neighboring country are  guaranteed in  
solemn terms at the very moment when    
force1 intrigue and  every tricky       
artifice are secretly employed to       
destroy them4 8,strong  popular demand0 
is alleged as a reason for harsh action 
abroad1 in a  country where the         
expressions of public opinions as well  

as policy  itself are controlled by a   
narrow group1 with absolutist authority4
  ,there is so much talk of 8frank      
discussion0 that every one is put on    
his guard as soon as the word 8frank0 is
 uttered4    ,the 8peace of ,asia10 a   
8,monroe ,doctrine for ,asia10 the      
8,open ,door10  8greatest frankness10   
8hearty coperation with other powers10  
are  heralded at times when the context 
of facts makes a strange commentary4    
,but while such a discrepancy is very   
strident in a country where  military   
absolutism wields control over          
diplomacy1 with a grudging  obeisance to
 representative forms1 yet other        
countries are by no  means free from    
this hypocrisy4 ,what blasted promise of
 equity in  all that succession of      
declarations concerning ,korea1 ,china1 
,persia1  parts of ,turkey1 and         
,morocco4 ,what confusion of political  
ideals in  supporting ,denikin1         
,wrangel1 and ,horthy as defenders of   
8representative  government40    ,when  

,russia and ,japan1 in response to      
,secretary ,knox' ,manchurian  proposal 
had made their secret arrangements to   
defeat his policy1  ,great ,britain1    
though it had made many reassuring      
protestations at  ,washington1          
nevertheless had secretly acquiesced 7to
 cite a ,russian  diplomatic paper7 in  
the 8recognition of our 7,russian7      
sphere of  influence in ,northern       
,manchuria1 ,mongolia1 and ,western     
,china1 with  the exception of ,kashgar1
 as well as the undertaking not to      
hinder us  in the execution of our plans
 in these territories1 and herself to   
pursue no aims which we should have to  
regard as incompatible with our         
interest40 ,and it was also stated that 
,great ,britain1 in return1 was  to     
receive 8recognition of her freedom of  
action and her privileged  position in  
,tibet40 ,this was in #aiab4    ,thus   
were the solemn declarations relating to
 the ,open ,door and the  integrity of  
,china applied in action4    ,subsequent

 departure from the letter and spirit of
 such declarations  may indeed sometimes
 be excused on account of changed       
circumstances2  but frequently it is    
quite apparent to those who know what is
 going on1  that such well-sounding     
declarations are made for public        
consumption1  at the very time when the 
contrary action is taken secretly4      
,this is indeed nothing less than a     
crime against the public opinion and    
conscience of the world1 which cannot be
 condemned in terms too strong4  ,it    
shows a thorough contempt of the people1
 who are supposed to be  either of so   
little intelligence or of so short a    
memory that such vain  professions may  
succeed in veiling the true inwardness  
of political  intrigue4 ,this practice  
tends to engender thorough confusion in 
the  public mind as to standards of     
right and justice in international      
affairs2 it shakes the basis on which   
alone sound international  relations can
 grow up2 as1 indeed1 all social        

relations must rest upon  confidence in 
an underlying justice and equity4       
,closely allied to the practice of      
making public declarations in           
international affairs which do not      
correspond with the specific action     
taken1 is the control of the press and  
the censure of news4 ,this is  indeed a 
matter which transcends the subject of  
diplomacy1 because  a system of press   
control and censure is often applied by 
other  departments of the government    
than the diplomatic branch4 ,as far as  
foreign affairs are concerned1 it is    
used in an effort to support  foreign   
policy1 and it therefore shares the same
 defects which inhere  in the old       
diplomacy4 ,like secret diplomatic      
control1 it is accounted  for on the    
assumption that the people cannot be    
trusted with the entire  truth1 and that
 carefully selected portions of the     
truth have to be  put forth in order to 
make them ready to support the policy   
considered  necessary by the leaders4   

,this involves the assumption of an     
enormous  responsibility by a few       
leaders in determining by themselves    
what  the public interest requires and  
instead of relying on the strength      
naturally to be gained from a           
spontaneous public opinion1 to attempt  
to fashion that opinion for specific    
purposes4 ,press control and  censure1  
with the incomplete and warped          
information which it implies1  is one of
 the evil accompaniments considered     
necessary in the conduct  of a war1 for 
the safety of the combatant nation4 ,the
 principle that  strategic information  
must be kept secret is extended1 at such
 times1  out of all reason4 ,after      
hostilities have actually been          
concluded1 this  practice tends to      
subsist and to continue the evils of    
misinformation  and confusion in the    
public judgment4 ,the manner in which   
all news  emanating from the ,balkan and
 ,near ,eastern countries has been      
censured  since the war1 has made it    

impossible for the public of the world  
to  form a just conception as to what is
 there going on4 ,control of the  press 
and censorship likewise resulted in such
 confusion in the public  mind          
concerning the problems of ,russia1 that
 there remained no reliable  basis for a
 policy which would facilitate the      
restoration of more  normal conditions  
there1 in a sympathetic spirit with the 
struggles and  difficulties of the      
,russian people4    ,on account of the  
natural fact that men are apt to be     
influenced in  their action             
unconsciously through persons with whom 
they have constant  associations1 it is 
a matter of no mean importance that the 
armament  interests should have been so 
strongly represented in many capitals by
  men of high professional and social   
standing1 always on the ground1  eager  
to advance the business in military     
supplies4 ,in many capitals1  very close
 relationships have grown up between the
 diplomatic officers  and the           

representatives of the great armament   
firms4 ,as a mutual  apprehension of    
excessive preparation for war greatly   
stimulates these  industries1 it is not 
surprising that their representatives do
 not  exert themselves to prevent       
occasional war scares4 ,in fact1 highly 
misleading information on war plans has 
often been given out1 as in the  case of
 a representative of the ,coventry      
,ordnance ,works1 who in #aiji  informed
 the ,british ,government of excessive  
shipbuilding by ,germany4  ,the news was
 later found to be erroneous2 but new   
orders had been  given in ,great        
,britain1 and through action and        
reaction armaments were  stimulated     
elsewhere4 ,the close connection of the 
,krupp ,iron ,works with  the ,german   
,government and with associations       
favoring aggressive foreign  action is  
well known4    ,it has often happened   
that what represents itself to be a     
national  interest and enlists          
diplomatic and political support in that

 way1 is  really only the enterprise of 
individuals to make profits4 ,the men   
who support it with their best energies 
and talents are not villains1  but their
 method of assuming a great national    
interest where only  a tradition1 a     
prejudice or a private plan of profit   
are involved1  renders their doings far 
from beneficial to the commonweal4      
,similarly1  those who operate on the   
principle that the public mind must be  
nourished with certain carefully        
selected facts and kept from the        
knowledge of others1 may have honest    
motives1 but their ideas of public      
action are obsolete or deserve to be so1
 as they are left over from the         
absolutist rgime in politics4           
,,xi    ,,parliament ,,and ,,foreign    
,,affairs      ,in considering the      
relation of legislative bodies1 and of  
the public  opinion therein represented1
 to the conduct of foreign affairs1 it  
will  be useful to glance briefly at the
 relevant historical facts4 ,when the   

,united ,colonies of ,america formed a  
separate political organization  from   
the mother country1 the conduct of      
foreign affairs was entrusted  to a     
committee of ,congress1 a successor to  
the ,committee of ,secret               
,correspondence4 ,in #agha a            
,secretaryship for ,foreign ,affairs1   
with a  permanent department1 was       
created and in #aghb the conduct of     
foreign  affairs was regulated in the   
following terms3      8,all letters to  
sovereign powers1 letters of credence1  
plans of    treaties1 conventions1      
manifestoes1 instructions1 passports1   
safe    conducts1 and other acts of     
,congress relative to the department    
of foreign affairs1 when the substance  
thereof shall have been    previously   
agreed to in ,congress1 shall be reduced
 to form in    the office of foreign    
affairs1 and submitted to the opinion of
    ,congress1 and when passed1 signed  
and attested1 sent to the    office of  
foreign affairs to be countersigned and 

forwarded40    ,congress therefore      
retained a very close control over this 
matter2 a  control which under the      
,constitution passed to the ,senate1    
though in  a restricted form4 ,in no    
other country did a legislative         
committee  participate in the conduct of
 foreign affairs with similar power and 
influence4 ,the policy of the           
arrangements under the ,constitution is 
explained by ,john ,jay in the          
,federalist as follows3      8,it seldom
 happens in the negotiation of treaties1
 of whatever    nature1 but that perfect
 secrecy and immediate despatch are     
sometime requisite4 ,there are cases    
where the most useful    intelligency   
may be obtained1 if the persons         
possessing it can    be relieved from   
apprehensions of discovery4 ,those      
apprehensions    will operate on those  
persons whether they are actuated by    
mercenary or friendly motives2 and there
 doubtless are many    of both          
descriptions1 who would rely on the     

secrecy of the    ,president1 but who   
would not confide in that of the        
,senate1 and    still less in that of a 
large popular assembly40    ,jay's      
explanation is dominated by the         
conception which the eighteenth  century
 had of the functions of diplomacy and  
the conditions of its  work4 ,the       
constitutional system as conceived at   
that time implied  7#a7 ,full power of  
negotiation in the ,president1 7#b7     
,taking counsel  with the ,senate1 7#c7 
,formal ratification of treaties by the 
,senate1  and publication thereof as    
parts of the law of the land4 ,the      
system  has been highly praised by      
,european publicists as reconciling the 
maintenance of confidential relations   
with publicity of the results1 in  that 
treaties are given the character of     
laws4    ,in the course of the          
nineteenth century there occurred many  
instances  resulting in a growing       
practice of making special agreements by
 the  ,secretary of ,state alone1       

without the advice and consent of the   
,senate4  ,when ,president ,roosevelt in
 #aije attempted to deal with the       
,dominican  situation in this manner1   
the ,senate objected and insisted that  
all  international agreements of any    
kind must be submitted to its action4   
,the system of the ,united ,states1     
however1 actually permits of the        
current conduct of foreign affairs      
without information to the people or    
even without constant and complete      
information to the ,senate which is1    
moreover1 usually preoccupied with      
matters of internal legislation4    ,in 
,england1 the mother of ,parliaments1 we
 might expect that there  should have   
been a constant effort at parliamentary 
control of  foreign affairs1 with strong
 remonstrance when effective control was
  denied2 yet on account of the specific
 nature of the system of ,cabinet       
government1 such has not been the case4 
,under the two-party system as  it      
exists in ,england the conduct of       

foreign affairs is always in the  hands 
of a minister trusted and supported by  
the majority in the ,lower  ,house4     
,even if the minority should attempt to 
censor the conduct of  foreign affairs  
as being carried on apart from the      
knowledge and active  consent of the    
,house1 the majority whose leaders form 
the ,cabinet which  is managing things1 
will always prevent such a vote from    
succeeding4  ,only in case of a cabinet 
going absolutely and openly counter to  
the  policy of its own party in         
,parliament could a real conflict of    
this  nature arise2 and such a          
contingency is itself impossible1       
because of  the party control exercised 
by the cabinet4    ,according to the    
theory of the ,stuarts1 the management  
of foreign  affairs belonged entirely to
 the ,crown which had not at that time  
been  put in commission4 ,in #afgg the  
,house of ,commons objected to granting 
money for alliances and for wars1 unless
 the matter in question had  been       

previously communicated to it4 ,charles 
,,ii1 however1 declared the  conduct of 
foreign affairs to be the ,crown's      
fundamental prerogative  in which it    
must remain free from direct control of 
,parliament4  ,william ,,iii was in fact
 to a very large extent his own         
,minister for  ,foreign ,affairs4 ,with 
the introduction of responsible         
,government  under the ,hanoverians1    
however1 the situation changed4 ,the    
dominant  party being represented by the
 ministers was quite ready to submit to 
their guidance in matters of foreign    
affairs4 ,it was the opposition  who    
occasionally attacked the government on 
its foreign policy1 and  particularly   
the opposition in the ,house of ,lords4 
,in a ,lords' protest  of ,march #bf1   
#agcd1 it was urged that 8the           
interposition of the ,british           
,parliament would be more effectual than
 the occasional expedients of           
fluctuating and variable negotiations40 
,in #agdj it was moved that a  select   

committee consisting of peers should be 
appointed to inquire  into the conduct  
of the ,spanish ,war4 ,the motion was   
rejected4 ,another  ,lords' protest in  
the same year opposes the argument that 
absolute  secrecy is essential because  
this claim is often used in bar of all  
inquiries4 ,such secrecy is 8much       
oftener the refuge of guilt than the    
resort of innocence40    ,wyndham1 in   
#agcc1 on a motion calling for certain  
letters of  instructions1 argued for the
 necessity of giving such information to
  ,parliament4 ,he asked how could      
members of the ,house of ,commons judge 
of the estimates to be laid before them 
as a provision for national  safety if  
they did not know by what danger the    
nation was confronted4  ,the motion1    
however1 was rejected4    ,when ,pelham 
was criticized in the ,house for not    
having informed  ,parliament of the     
preliminaries of the ,treaty of         
,aix-la-,chapelle he  argued3 8,if      
,parliament should encroach upon the    

prerogative of the  ,crown1 by assuming 
a right to make peace or war1 and to    
inquire into  foreign transactions under
 negotiation1 our affairs will be       
reduced  to a dangerous predicament2 for
 no foreign ,state will negotiate with  
our ministers1 or conclude any treaty   
with them1 either political or          
commercial40 ,this is an argument often 
made in the eighteenth century  to show 
the unwisdom of ,parliamentary control4 
,the change of ministers  following     
party changes in the ,house1 and the    
fact that the ,foreign  ,minister would 
not by his own word be able to give     
complete assurances  to foreign         
governments1 were considered to put the 
,british ,government  under a           
disadvantage in negotiations4 ,it was   
therefore considered  undesirable that  
negotiations should be submitted to the 
control and  sanction of ,parliament4   
,walpole had stated the matter in the   
following  words3      8,therefore while
 our happy constitution remains entire1 

while the    ,parliament meets but once 
a year1 and does not continue assembled 
above three or four months in the       
twelve1 it is impossible for    either  
,house of ,parliament to intermeddle1   
much less to prescribe    to the ,crown1
 in any affairs relating to peace or    
war1 without    exposing the nation to  
imminent danger40    ,throughout the    
nineteenth century ,parliament          
interfered very little  with the conduct
 of foreign affairs4 ,the minister for  
foreign affairs  or the premier would   
from time to time give information or   
make a  systematic discourse on foreign 
affairs and it was understood that  the 
,house would be kept informed concerning
 the aims and tendencies  of the        
,government's foreign policy4 ,specific 
questions were asked by  members but not
 frequently4 ,the nature of the ,british
 system would have  rendered unmeaning  
any struggle for control between the    
,house and the  ,cabinet4    ,the manner
 of keeping ,parliament and the public  

informed on foreign  affairs was        
discussed4 ,the ,earl of ,clarendon     
spoke of the practice of  laying before 
,parliament official information in the 
,blue ,books4 ,he  stated3      8,i am  
perfectly certain there is always laid  
before ,parliament    a very fair and   
complete view of the transactions       
between this    country and any other to
 which those papers may relate4 ,i know 
that foreign ,governments rather        
complain of our ,blue ,books1 and    to 
a certain extent they may curtail some  
of the communications    that are made  
to our foreign ,ministers1 but ,i should
 be extremely    sorry to see our system
 of publication of diplomatic papers in 
any way curtailed1 or different from    
what it is2 of course1    there must    
always be care taken not to compromise  
individuals    for the information they 
have given1 but ,i believe it is an     
immense advantage to this country that  
our despatches and    diplomatic        
transactions should be known1 because if

 they have the    approbation of        
,parliament and of the country1 the     
,government then    has the whole weight
 of public opinion in its favor1 and it 
is    that which gives such strength to 
our policy and to our opinions    in    
foreign countries40    ,that is a very  
statesmanlike presentation of the       
advantages of constant  public knowledge
 of foreign policy in giving the        
government a secure  base of intelligent
 support4    ,when dissatisfaction or   
doubt was felt by large numbers         
concerning the  foreign policy of the   
government1 as in #aheg and again in    
#ahgh after  the concealment of the     
,schuvalof agreement1 complaint was     
frequently  made in ,parliament and in  
the press to the effect that ,parliament
 on  the one hand was not given a chance
 to acquire a complete knowledge  of    
foreign policy1 and on the other it was 
not sufficiently alert and  active in   
using its opportunities for control4 ,in
 #ahhf the following  resolution was    

moved3      8,that in the opinion of    
this ,house it is not just or expedient 
to embark in war1 contract engagements  
involving grave    responsibilities for 
the nation1 and add territories to the  
,empire1 without the knowledge and      
consent of ,parliament40    ,like other 
similar resolutions1 it did not pass4   
,mr4 ,gladstone opposed  it on the      
ground that the ,house of ,commons under
 existing arrangements  actually        
possessed all necessary power of control
 and that the passage  of this          
resolution would mean simply that the   
,house of ,lords would  share this power
 with it4    ,in #ahhe when ,earl       
,granville had objected to public       
criticism of  negotiations which were   
still in progress between ,russia and   
,great  ,britain regarding ,afghanistan1
 ,lord ,salisbury made the following    
interesting and important statement with
 respect to the relations of  foreign   
policies to public opinion1 which in    
temper resembles that of  ,lord         

,clarendon cited above3      8,the noble
 ,earl seemed to me to lay down a       
doctrine which    we cannot pass        
unnoticed1 when he says it is the duty  
of    an ,opposition not to canvas or   
condemn the conduct of the              
,government1 if by so doing it should   
have the effect of    discouraging      
friends and allies in other parts of the
 world4    ,that seems to be a very     
far-reaching doctrine1 and one which it 
is impossible to assent to4444 ,if we   
are of opinion that the    course of    
public affairs is going ill1 and that   
our ,government    has mismanaged1 that 
faults are being committed and dangers  
are    being incurred1 we have no       
absolute ,sovereign to whom we can      
appeal in order to correct the evil2 our
 absolute ,sovereign is    the people of
 this country1 and it is they1 and they 
alone1 who    can bring a remedy to the 
mischief which is going on4 ,you have   
a form of ,government which in many     
points is purely democratic1    and you 

must take it with the incidents which   
naturally adhere to    it1 and one of   
these incidents is publicity of         
deliberation4 ,the    ,cabinet is the   
people1 and their deliberations are     
conducted in    the open field4 ,if they
 are to be rightly informed1 you must   
deal    fully and frankly with the      
subjects which form the basis of their  
determination4 ,it is1 no doubt1 a      
drawback so far as it goes1 but    it is
 a drawback you must face1 and you      
cannot help it if ,foreign    ,powers   
overhear1 so to speak1 the privileged   
communications    between you and those 
by whose verdict you must stand4 ,you   
cannot    suppress the argument because 
somebody else outside hears it and      
you may be adversely affected by it44440
    ,the concealment of important       
obligations and the growing secrecy of  
diplomatic affairs during the first     
decade of the ,twentieth ,century       
brought on many expressions of          
dissatisfaction in the ,house of        

,commons4  ,after the secret agreement  
concerning ,morocco became known1 ,mr4  
,john  ,dillon expressed himself as     
follows1 in a speech in the ,house of   
,commons in ,september1 #aiaa3      8,i 
do not believe any representative       
assembly in the history    of the world 
has ever been called upon to discuss a  
matter so    vital and so far-reaching  
as that which the ,house of ,commons has
    before it to-day to consider1 and   
with so absolute a lack of              
information4444 ,the ,house was summoned
 for this discussion to-day    without  
any papers whatsoever4444 ,we ought at  
all events to have    had an account of 
diplomatic correspondence between the   
four    great ,powers intimately        
interested in the question of ,morocco1 
as is customary to be given to the      
,house of ,commons on such an           
occasion4 ,this would have enabled      
members of the ,house before    the     
debate commenced1 to form a really      
well-grounded judgment    upon the whole

 matter4 ,we have heard a good deal     
to-night of    the secrecy of the       
,foreign policy of this country4 ,it is 
no use    attempting to deny it4 ,those 
of us who have been a long time in      
this ,house1 and can remember the       
methods of the ,foreign ,office         
twenty-five years ago1 know as a matter 
of fact1 which cannot be    successfully
 denied1 that the ,foreign ,office      
policy has become    during the last ten
 years progressively more secret every  
year4    ,until this present year this  
has gone on1 when the intense           
pressure of ,foreign ,affairs and the   
danger of war has forced    the hands of
 the ,minister to give some time for the
 discussion    of ,foreign ,office      
affairs4 ,for ten years the ,foreign    
policy of    this country has been      
conducted behind an elaborate screen of 
secrecy4 ,some of us pointed out years  
ago that the secrecy of    ,foreign     
,affairs was the inevitable and logical 
result of that    new departure which   

was heralded about ten years ago1 and   
which    we heard praised once more on  
the floor of this ,house to-night4    ,i
 refer to what is known as the policy of
 the continuity of the    ,foreign      
policy of this country2 of the          
withdrawal of the ,foreign    policy of 
this country from the sphere of party   
politics40    ,at the same session ,mr4 
,swift ,mac,neill expressed himself very
 strongly  on the subject of withholding
 information from ,parliament1 in the   
following terms3      8,from generation 
to generation1 you have allowed treaties
    involving the highest international 
obligations--involving    questions of  
peace and war--to be taken absolutely   
out of the    hands of the ,house4 ,it  
is no exaggeration to say1 so far as    
international policy is concerned1 you  
have rendered the ,house as    little   
effectively powerful as any man walking 
over ,westminster    ,bridge4 ,over and 
over again treaties involving matters of
 life    and death1 involving questions 

of first-class importance1 have    been 
ratified behind the back of             
,parliament4444 ,the people             
themselves must be allowed to know all  
about this diplomacy and    what it is4 
,and there should be no secrecy in      
regard to high    diplomatic statecraft 
about it4 ,the ,house of ,commons is    
sample    judge of what is discreet and 
what is indiscreet1 and it is a         
complete absurdity for others to treat  
us as children or for    us to allow    
ourselves to be so treated in matters of
 such high    international importance  
as those involving questions of peace   
and war40    ,sir ,edward ,grey in his  
reply stated that secrecy up to a       
certain point  was necessary and that   
particularly the ratification of        
treaties could  not be previously       
discussed4 ,he then made the very       
significant remark  that not until the  
,house of ,commons 8was really free to  
devote itself  to discussions of        
imperial affairs would it get control40 

,in other  words as long as the ,house  
of ,commons remains a body occupied     
primarily  with domestic and local      
legislation it cannot spare the         
attention  necessary for an effective   
control of foreign policy4    ,early in 
#aiad1 evidence was taken by a select   
committee on ,house  of ,commons        
procedure4 ,mr4 ,balfour during these   
discussions rather  emphasized the need 
of secrecy in dealing with foreign      
affairs4 ,he  thinks that such matters  
should not be aired too frequently in   
the  ,house of ,commons1 because        
indiscreet speeches1 which can be       
perfectly  appraised in the ,house1 may 
make bad blood when reported4           
,diplomatic  conversations must be kept 
confidential if you are to work the     
,european  system at all4 ,but though   
the ,house of ,commons does not and     
cannot  know the current details of     
international negotiations1 it is not   
uninformed4 ,this plainly is the        
language of a statesman to whom the     

idiosyncrasies of the ,european system  
are so familiar that they seem to  be   
the only natural state of affairs4 ,the 
statement is made from the  point of    
view of the expert who rather resents   
any sort of interference  on the part of
 the less well informed4    ,in ,march1 
#aiah1 it was moved in the ,house of    
,commons3      8,that1 in the opinion of
 this ,house1 a ,standing ,committee of 
,foreign ,affairs should be appointed1  
representative of all    parties and    
groups in the ,house1 in order that a   
regular channel    of communication may 
be established between the ,foreign     
,secretary    and the ,house of         
,commons1 which will afford him frequent
    opportunities of giving information 
on questions of ,foreign    policy and  
which1 by allowing ,members to acquaint 
themselves    more fully with current   
international problems1 will enable this
    ,house to exercise closer           
supervision over the general conduct of 
,foreign ,affairs44440    ,mr4 ,balfour 

expressed himself quite in length on    
this motion and  further elaborated the 
ideas which he had put forward in #aiad4
 ,in a  speech delivered ,march #aith1  
he gave what is probably the most       
complete  and persuasive exposition of  
the value of traditional methods in     
diplomacy3      8444 ,a ,foreign ,office
 and a ,diplomatic ,service are great   
instruments for preventing1 as far as   
can be prevented1 and    diminishing1   
even when you cannot prevent1 friction  
between    ,states which are1 or which  
ought to be1 friendly4 ,how is the      
task of peace-maker--because that is    
largely the task which    falls to      
diplomatists and to the ,foreign        
,office1 which controls                 
diplomatists--to be pursued if you are  
to shout your grievances    from the    
housetop whenever they occur8 ,the only 
result is that    you embitter public   
feeling1 that the differences between   
the    two ,states suddenly attain a    
magnitude they ought never to be        

allowed to approach1 that the newspapers
 of the two countries    agitate        
themselves1 that the ,parliaments of the
 two countries    have their passions   
set on fire1 and great crises arise1    
which    may end1 have ended sometimes1 
in international catastrophes4444       
,office officials1 or officials of any  
,department1--to expend some    of their
 energy in getting ready for            
cross-examination1 you will    really be
 destroying the public service4 ,there  
is nothing on    which ,i feel more     
strongly than that4 ,they are not       
accustomed to    it1 and they ought not 
to be accustomed to it4444 ,i do not    
hold    the view that antique methods   
are pursued by diplomatists which    no 
man of common sense adopts in the       
ordinary work of every-day    life4 ,on 
the contrary1 the work of diplomacy is  
exactly the work    which is done every 
day between two great firms1 for        
instance1    which have business        
relations1 or between two great         

corporate    entities which have        
interests diverging or interests in     
common4    ,if you are a man of sense   
you do not create difficulties to       
begin with4 ,you try to get over all    
these things without the    embitterment
 which advertisement always brings with 
it4 ,it is    when you begin to press   
your case in public that antagonism     
arises4 ,in private--in conversation    
which need not go beyond    the walls of
 the room in which you are1--you can put
 your case    as strongly as you like1  
and the gentleman with whom you are     
carrying on the discussion may put his  
case as strongly as he    likes1 and if 
good manners are observed and nothing   
but fair    discussion takes place no   
soreness remains and no one is driven   
to ignore the strong points of his      
opponent's case4 ,directly a            
controversy becomes public all that fair
 give-and-take becomes    either        
difficult or impossible4444 ,but if all 
you mean 444 is    that it is wrong for 

the nations of the world to find        
themselves    hampered in their mutual  
relations by treaties of which those    
countries know nothing1 that1 ,i think1 
is an evil4 ,i do not say    that there 
have not been secret treaties which were
 inevitable2    but ,i do say that1 if  
they are necessary1 they are a necessary
    evil4 ,please remember that two     
nations make a treaty together    for   
their mutual advantage4 ,both are       
desirous of passing it4 ,one    nation  
says1 #8,it is against our interest that
 this treaty should    be made public at
 present4' ,the other says1 #8,we do not
 like being    committed to any treaty  
the terms of which we cannot make public
    at once4' ,which is going to        
prevail8444 ,it does not rest with      
any single ,foreign ,office1 ,british or
 other4 ,it is always an    arrangement 
between two--possibly three or four1    
,foreign ,offices4    ,you cannot lay   
down--and ,i do not think you would be  
wise to    lay down1 an absolute rule   

that under no circumstances1 and for    
no object1 could you so far concede the 
point as to say that a    treaty is to  
be made which is not to become public   
property4 ,i    am perfectly ready to   
admit that that is not a process which1 
to    me1 is a very agreeable one4 ,to  
reduce secret treaties to the           
narrowest possible limits should1 ,i    
think1 be the object of every           
responsible statesman who has the       
control of foreign affairs4    ,beyond  
that ,i do not feel inclined to go4 ,i  
do not see any signs    of a grasp of   
the true realities of life in the       
,motion before    us4 ,you should have  
your control over those who manage your 
affairs1 but it is not the kind of      
control which the honorable    ,member  
wishes to set up with his ,committee of 
forty or fifty4 ,it    is quite a       
different control4 ,you must know1      
broadly speaking1    what the general   
lines of policy are1 and ,i maintain    
that that is    thoroughly known with   

regard to foreign affairs at this moment
    by every man in this ,house who     
takes the trouble to think4 ,the        
general lines on which we are proceeding
 are thoroughly known40    ,this        
argument brings out all the strong      
points of the system of secret          
diplomacy under the existing conditions 
of international politics1  but it      
contains no hint that these conditions  
need improvement4 ,they  cannot1 as a   
matter of fact1 be improved until some  
strong nations1  even at the risk of    
disadvantage to themselves1 take the    
lead in  placing diplomatic affairs on a
 broader basis4          ,,xii    ,,the 
,,public ,,and ,,diplomacy      ,in     
consequence of the startling            
developments in diplomacy which         
preceded and accompanied the great war1 
the relation of democracy to  diplomacy 
has been earnestly discussed of late1   
particularly in ,great  ,britain4       
,when considering this important matter1
 the distinction between the  methods of

 diplomacy and diplomatic policies      
should be borne in  mind for the sake of
 clearness of thought4 ,the development 
of public  opinion1 the disappearance of
 purely dynastic aims of state action1  
and  the constantly broadening outlook  
of political life1 have led to the      
elimination of most of the cruder       
methods of deception and intrigue4  ,but
 two questions still remain3 ,should    
diplomatic negotiations  be carried on  
in the public view1 that is with        
constant and full  information given to 
the public or parliament1 on all        
important  details8 and1 ,should the    
diplomatic policy of a democratic       
government  at all times be kept fully  
before the representative bodies1 and   
the  public8    ,most discussions which 
favor the use of secret diplomacy1 refer
 to  the presumed necessity of          
confidential methods of negotiation4    
,but  there are some publicists and     
statesmen who believe that the policy of
  foreign affairs itself can best be    

handled by responsible statesmen        
keeping their own counsel and giving to 
the public only a general  adumbration  
of the trend of policy4 ,these two      
questions are constantly  mixed up in   
current discussion2 and their absolute  
separation is  indeed difficult4 ,thus1 
a strictly secret diplomatic policy will
  naturally accentuate the secrecy of   
the methods employed4 ,abstractly       
considered1 it would be quite possible  
to have the foreign policy of a  country
 determined by public action1 and still 
to surround diplomatic  negotiations    
with secrecy4 ,but if the substance of  
the policy were  definitely known in    
detail1 the secrecy of methods would    
lose much of  its effectiveness4    ,the
 use of such methods is defended from   
two points of view2 from that  of the   
trader who looks for a better bargain   
through not having given  away his      
entire hand at the beginning2 and from  
that of the builder who  desires to work
 quietly without interruptions from an  

excitable public1  who desires to avoid 
difficulties and smooth away contrasts  
which  publicity would tend to          
exaggerate4    ,there is an ex post     
facto publicity of diplomatic policy4   
,if this is  afforded as soon as a new  
situation has arisen or a new agreement 
has  been created1 some of the harm of  
secrecy is avoided4 ,in such a case  the
 statesmen1 cabinet1 or conference1     
practically give assurance that1  if    
allowed to work quietly on a certain    
problem1 they will produce a  solution  
which will commend itself in general to 
the sense of equity  of the nation or   
nations concerned2 although the sum     
total of the  arrangement may contain   
details which1 considered by themselves1
 would  be unacceptable and which might 
have interfered with the making of an   
accord1 if unduly emphasized or given   
publicity during the negotiations4      
,mr4 ,balfour in his speech of ,march   
#ai1 #aiah1 which has already been      
referred to1 indeed speaks quite        

convincingly of the advantage of        
confidential relations and of secrecy in
 negotiations1 but he goes so  far as   
strongly to deprecate a demand for      
information on the part of  ,parliament4
 ,in that he certainly shows a measure  
of anti-democratic  bias1 as when he    
says1 8,do not suppose that we can do   
the work better  by having to explain it
 to a lot of people who are not         
responsible4  ,that is not the way to   
get business properly done40 ,he        
therefore  rejects the idea of a        
parliamentary committee of control in   
the matter  of foreign relations4 ,he   
agrees1 however1 that the existence of  
secret  treaties is an evil1 although he
 thinks that it may be at certain times 
necessary1 because the associated treaty
 power may desire it4 ,he is  mildly    
deprecatory1 at best4    ,count         
,czernin1 speaking to the ,austrian     
delegations on ,june #bd1 #aiah1        
concerning ,president ,wilson's fourteen
 points1 stated that he has no          

objection to the introduction of the    
principle of 8open covenants10  although
 he confesses that he does not know by  
what means effective  adherence thereto 
can be assured4 ,concerning diplomatic  
negotiations1  which he treats simply as
 a matter of business1 he points out the
  advantages of secrecy from the point  
of view of trading4 ,moreover1 if  there
 were full publicity1 the general public
 might passionately oppose  every action
 involving any concession as a defeat4  
,this would not be  conducive to        
peaceable relations4    ,there are those
 who believe that the chief evils of    
secret diplomacy  would be avoided if   
ample opportunity were given for        
discussion in  representative           
assemblies1 if there were a             
parliamentary committee  keeping        
constantly in touch with the conduct of 
foreign relations1  and if treaties and 
declarations of war could not be made   
without the  consent of the national    
legislature4 ,some advocates of         

democratic  control go so far as to     
reason that a decision to make war and  
thereby  to order the shedding of human 
blood1 should not be made without a     
national referendum vote4    ,on the    
other hand1 those opposed to all        
publicity of diplomatic  affairs argue  
that international policies cannot be   
determined in  the market place4 ,they  
hark back to ,de,tocqueville1 who holds 
that as  democracy cannot be expected to
 regulate the details of an important   
undertaking1 it is particularly         
unqualified to deal with international  
matters where secrecy1 discretion1 and  
patience are required4 ,followers  of   
this opinion believe that the conduct of
 foreign affairs is best  placed quite  
unreservedly in the hands of responsible
 statesmen1 who  have greater           
information1 larger experience and more 
self-control than  the average of       
humanity4 ,they generally have in view  
the preservation  of national interests1
 under conditions of peace if possible2 

they  will not be inflamed by exciting  
incidents1 but will keep these in       
proper subordination to the general     
plan4 ,such details1 if made public1    
would easily lead to occurrences that   
would upset the results of  wise        
planning4 ,as ,lord ,cromer has said1 it
 is such untoward chance  incidents     
which cannot be controlled that are to  
be feared1 rather than  any deliberate  
plotting on the part of diplomats4 ,such
 responsible  statesmen always remain   
accountable for the general results of  
their  policy2 they are conscious of the
 importance of their trust1 and         
therefore are a safer repository of     
discretionary powers than a general     
committee4    ,back of these arguments1 
however1 there usually lies the         
conviction  that the public is          
superficial1 easily swayed1 excitable   
and altogether  delighting more in the  
hurrah of war than in the humdrum of    
peace4 ,it  might be remarked that if   
such had actually been the case1 the    

most  recent experience of the people   
with war has probably given them a      
different idea of the attractiveness of 
that kind of excitement2 unless  indeed 
the mass of humanity are irremediably   
and forever fools1 when  taken in the   
aggregate4    ,the sensational character
 of the daily press must be considered  
in  this connection4 ,the news value of 
normal1 peaceable developments is  very 
small4 ,it is therefore a godsend to the
 newspapers when something              
extraordinary happens1 particularly in  
international affairs4 ,for  this       
reason1 the daily news frequently       
presents an untrue or warped  picture of
 the actual situation4 ,gilbert ,murray 
asks what people are  referred to by    
those who demand popular control of     
diplomacy2 are  they the people of      
educational societies1 or of the music  
halls8 ,the  public is not homogeneous1 
or so organized as to give expression to
  convictions on current affairs which  
have been maturely considered4 ,it      

lacks the leisure and training for      
penetrating superficialities and  going 
to the bottom of difficult questions4   
,lord ,cromer believes in  general that 
democracies are not peaceful1 and he    
refers particularly  to the ,american   
democracy for proof2 ,lord ,lytton said1
 8,governments are  generally for       
diplomacy1 the people for war40    ,men 
of all shades of opinion are agreed that
 the people are not greatly  interested 
in foreign affairs1 and the opponents of
 proposals of  democratic control argue 
that it would be useless to create      
machinery  for action where there exists
 no interest1 nor purpose to act4    ,it
 is quite true that the public during   
the nineteenth century seemed  less     
interested in foreign affairs than      
during the eighteenth4 ,at the  earlier 
time1 diplomacy was a fascinating1      
personal game1 about which  the         
wiseacres in the coffee houses were     
eager to make their criticisms  and     
prognostications4 ,when the middle class

 came to power in the  nineteenth       
century1 it was primarily interested in 
economic and other  domestic questions1 
and was satisfied to leave the conduct  
of foreign  affairs to statesmen and    
diplomats4 ,the constantly growing      
political  consciousness of the public  
at large was concentrated chiefly on    
questions of internal politics and      
reform4 ,foreign affairs1 as they       
reached the public1 were thought of     
still from the point of view of  the    
onlooker1 rather than of him who        
actually had to bear the brunt of  the  
burden4 ,those who had to bleed and die 
when hostilities had been  brought      
about1 never had any chance1 nor        
determination1 to influence  the course 
of diplomacy leading up to wars4        
,with such a general apathy of the      
public1 it was not surprising that      
diplomacy should cling to its caste     
privileges1 should try to preserve  its 
discretionary powers1 and should often  
attempt deliberately to keep  people in 

the dark4 8,in the public interest0 is  
the curtain beyond  which no one may    
peer4 ,even in the ,american            
,government1 particularly  during and   
since the war1 foreign affairs have been
 handled with what  would ordinarily    
seem insufficient information to the    
public2 in fact1  with occasional       
putting forth of misleading and entirely
 partial  information1 or the refusal to
 furnish information even when requested
  by those having official              
responsibilities4 ,this is a notable    
change1  as up to #aiad it was          
substantially true that the ,united     
,states had no  diplomatic secrets4     
,while from the point of view of        
traditional diplomacy1 and of           
international relations as they were up 
to the ,great ,war1 it seems  quite     
natural that democratic control should  
be thought by many to be  unpractical2  
and while indeed no one can flatter     
himself that through a  change of method
 the conduct of international affairs   

could suddenly be  rendered more wise   
and entirely effective towards the      
public welfare1  yet ,i cannot avoid the
 conclusion that there is a wrong       
orientation  in the emphasis of the need
 of secrecy and of the unfitness of the 
people to deal with problems of foreign 
affairs4 ,the belief in the  unfitness  
of the people in this matter appears to 
be the result of  a preconceived notion 
as to the overpowering difficulty1      
complexity  and almost sanctity of      
foreign affairs4 ,modern governments are
 based  on the principle that all       
legislation must meet the test of public
  criticism and rest on public consent2 
certainly it cannot be argued  that     
matters of the incidence of taxation1   
the proper organization  of credit1 and 
the determination of commercial         
policies1 are less  complex and         
intricate than are foreign affairs4 ,it 
is indeed true that  it is difficult for
 one nation thoroughly to appreciate in 
detail the  conditions of life in       

another4 ,this truth should have its    
greatest  value in dissuading a nation  
from meddling with the internal affairs 
of  another1 even from good motives4    
,those international questions which    
are apt to produce war may indeed relate
 to intricate matters1 but  the         
essential point is always the contention
 for power1 influence or  commercial    
advantage1 and it is not apparent why   
the public in general  should be unfit  
to judge as to whether national treasure
 and life  are eventually to be spent in
 huge quantities to bring about1 or to  
prevent1 any such shifting of power or  
influence4    ,it is1 however1 because  
the motives involved are so largely     
connected  with class interests1 or     
survivals of pride of race1 that those  
concerned in them are eager to deny the 
fitness of the general public1  which if
 called on to decide would put into the 
foreground the  question1 8,how does the
 control of this or that group of       
capitalists in  ,morocco1 for instance1 

or the greater or smaller influence of  
,austria  or ,russia in ,servia1 affect 
the daily life and welfare of our       
people80  ,it is certainly true that    
questions of peace and war have never   
definitely been reasoned out on that    
basis4 ,there has always been the       
assumption that certain things were     
essential to national prestige and      
could not be questioned2 it is only when
 the actually existing broader  base of 
national political life is organized    
also for active control of  foreign     
affairs1 that these considerations will 
have their full weight4  ,only the most 
exceptional statesmen could lift        
themselves out of the  narrow groove of 
tradition and precedent2 and more       
exceptional still1  in fact all but     
impossible1 is the capacity of one man  
to represent in  himself in just        
proportion1 all the interests and       
feelings of a nation4    ,infallibility 
cannot be expected in the handling of   
foreign affairs1  whether under a broad 

discretion of statesmen or under strict 
democratic control4 ,there will always  
be an alternative of wisdom  and        
rashness1 constructive planning and     
headlong action1 carefulness  and       
negligence4 ,but past experience has    
certainly established beyond            
peradventure of doubt that secret       
diplomacy is not infallible1 and        
particularly that diplomacy acting under
 absolutist traditions1  as in ,germany 
before the war1 may make the most fatal 
mistakes of  judgment and of policy4    
,balfour said3 8,i do not think the     
,government  in ,june1 #aiad1 had the   
slightest idea that there was any danger
  ahead40 ,a remarkable statement1 when 
we consider the actions and  reactions  
of secret diplomacy during the decade   
preceding the war4  ,it has been quite  
truly said that diplomacy is far more   
eminent in  autopsy than in diagnosis4  
,m4 ,cheradame somewhat severely        
observes1  8,the typical diplomat lives 
in a world of his own4 ,his information 

is  rarely obtained by direct           
observation of people and facts40 ,and  
while  ordinarily men of exceptional    
talents are selected for the difficulty 
position of ,minister for ,foreign      
,affairs1 yet all considered1 it  is    
hard to believe that were decisions on  
the essential matters of  international 
life made on a broader basis1 and       
influenced more by a  direct action of  
public opinion1 the result would be less
 wise4    ,active participation of the  
people in the making of momentous       
decisions  regarding foreign affairs1 is
 denied either under the assumption that
  the people might not be ready to face 
the fateful test1 or1 by the  majority1 
with the thought that the people are too
 excitable and rash  to be trusted with 
such far-reaching decisions4 ,while it  
is indeed easy  to generate warlike     
excitement among the masses1 it must be 
remembered1  when such a charge of      
rashness is made1 that the people have  
never  been currently informed of the   

development of international dangers1   
but usually at a critical time shreds of
 information have been flashed  on them1
 designed or at least apt to stir up all
 their atavistic love  of fight and fear
 of attack4 ,even thus1 the greatest    
noise is made  usually by those who do  
not in the event of hostilities actually
 have  to risk their blood and bones4   
,it stands to reason that if honestly   
kept informed about international       
relationships1 the people would be far  
less prone to sudden excitement4  ,very 
few people indeed appear to doubt that  
had the decision of war  or no war been 
laid before the peoples of ,europe in   
#aiad1 with a full  knowledge of the    
facts1 the terrible catastrophe would   
never have come  about4 ,as ,mr4 ,lowes 
,dickinson has said1 if the people had  
been allowed  to share the apprehension 
and precautions of the diplomats before 
#aiad1  there would have been quite a   
simple and clear question before the    
,english people1 for one4 ,it could have

 decided whether it would pursue  a     
policy that might lead at any moment to 
a general ,european war1 or  to take the
 alternative which ,sir ,edward ,grey   
later spoke of1 namely1  8to promote    
some arrangement1 to which ,germany     
could be a party by  which she could be 
assured that no aggressive or hostile   
policy would  be pursued against her by 
,france1 ,russia and ourselves1 jointly 
or  separately40 ,without the support of
 the people1 kept in line by fear of    
hidden dangers1 not even the militarists
 of ,germany could have forced  military
 action4    ,one of the first acts of   
the ,russian ,soviet ,government was to 
announce  its hostility to secret       
diplomacy4 ,when it first published the 
secret  treaties and documents of the   
,czarist ,government1 its motive was1   
as shown by ,trotsky's declaration made 
at the time1 thoroughly to  discredit   
the management of affairs under the old 
rgime4 ,in the same  connection1 it     
announced its own purpose of conducting 

foreign affairs  in the open4 ,such     
seems indeed to have been its general   
practice with  respect to the           
announcement of policies1 though its    
agents continued  to use underground    
methods4 ,one thing1 however1 the       
,soviet ,government  is evidently trying
 to bring about1 namely1 a broad public 
interest  in the conduct of foreign     
affairs4 ,it desires the ,russian       
people1 and  more particularly the      
members of the ruling ,communist ,party1
 to be  currently informed about the    
progress of international affairs and   
about arrangements concluded4 ,observers
 report that at the meeting of  the     
provincial soviets the first business   
ordinarily taken up is the  reading and 
discussion of a report on international 
relations sent by  the central          
government4 ,we have no means to check  
up the truth of these  reports2 but this
 effort to interest the broad mass of   
the population  in the outward relations
 of the state is certainly worth notice4

 ,the  expectation is encouraged that   
the reason for acts relating to foreign 
affairs will be explained1 particularly 
when sacrifices are demanded4           
,,xiii    ,a ,,survival ,,of            
,,absolutism      ,those who view the   
modern state as a purely predatory      
organization1--for exploitation within  
and without1--point to the  methods1    
practices and results of diplomacy as   
one of the plainest  indications of the 
sinister nature of the political state4 
,such  criticism cannot be safely       
brushed aside as utterly unreasonable2  
it  should rather call forth a searching
 inquiry as to whether1 as a matter  of 
fact1 the conduct of foreign affairs    
could not and should not be  brought    
into greater consonance with genuinely  
democratic principles1  and be placed on
 the sound basis of well-informed public
 support4    ,no matter what opinion one
 may hold with respect to the necessity 
of  secret diplomacy1 it must be        
recognized that this practice involves  

a very narrow conception of the active  
scope of democracy4 ,it is in  fact a   
historical survival from the period of  
the absolutist state2  or in other      
words1 that aspect of the modern state  
which deals with  foreign affairs has   
retained the character of absolutism4   
,it is a  superstition1 in the          
picturesque sense of that word used by  
,lowell1  when he defines it as         
8something left standing over from one  
of the  world's witenagemotes to the    
other40 ,in this case1 indeed the most  
recent witenagemote approached the      
question and proposed a step in  advance
 towards its solution4 ,but the         
difficulty still persists4    ,in its   
relations with other states1 the state  
is considered to be  absolute1 not bound
 by any laws1 responsible only for its  
own security1  welfare and progressing  
influence4 ,the struggle for political  
power  still exists among states1 in    
essentially the same keenness and       
rigidity with which it appeared to the  

eyes of ,machiavelli4 ,the  importance  
of world-wide human relationships1 and  
of international  coperation in         
scientific and economic life1 has indeed
 been brought  forth and given its place
 in the public mind2 but because of the 
manner  in which the conduct of         
international affairs is actually       
handled1 the  feeling thus generated    
does not have much chance to influence  
action at  critical times1 when the     
people are startled and excited by the  
sudden  revelation of dangers1 which    
awaken in them all the bitter feelings  
engendered by the past struggles of     
mankind4    ,this survival is given     
strength by class interests1 pride of   
race1 and  by the manipulations of      
plutocratic control4 ,where affairs are 
handled  by a narrow circle of men1 no  
matter how high-minded and how          
thoroughly  conscious of their public   
responsibility1 yet with the necessary  
limitations of the human mind1 they     
cannot but be influenced at every  turn 

by the opinions of others with whom they
 are actually in contact2  so that in   
decisions on these momentous matters1   
the thing which is  concretely present  
is very often an interest comparatively 
narrow in  itself1 and related to the   
public welfare only by a series of      
remote  inferences which are accepted at
 their face value4 ,the most successful 
statesman of the nineteenth century said
 that the whole ,balkan question  was   
not worth the bones of one ,pomeranian  
grenadier2 yet his successors  in power 
risked the very existence of the nations
 of ,europe for one  phase of that      
question4    ,powerful interests will   
always have means1 formal or informal1  
to lay  their needs and desires before  
the men in power4 ,they may indeed be   
very important and may deserve special  
attention1 but unfortunately1  many     
cases have happened in which their point
 of view has been adopted  without      
making sure that there existed a general
 public interest  sufficiently important

 to warrant taking the risks involved4  
,a diplomatic caste recruited from a    
certain class of society1 trained  in   
the traditions of authority1 in contact 
all the time with men of  similar views 
and principles1 cannot in the nature of 
things free  itself from the limitations
 of such environment and such training4 
,from the personal point of view        
diplomacy has adhered to the belief  in 
the superior intelligence1 ability and  
foresight in the handling  of foreign   
affairs1 on the part of those who by    
inherited traditions  and special       
experience may be said to belong to a   
caste distinguished  from the mass of   
humanity4 ,some one has said1 there is a
 great danger  in that there exists a   
caste of people who have taken the      
making of  history as their profession2 
who still cling to the erroneous idea   
that the manipulation of large masses of
 people1 the redistribution of          
territories1 and the modification of the
 natural processes of grouping  and     

settlement1 is history4 ,but such people
 who believe they are making  history   
are really obstructing it4 ,even so     
unusual a man as ,bismarck1  working as 
he did on a great national problem1 did 
not gain lasting  success in action     
whereby he endeavored to anticipate the 
developments  of history4 ,the artful   
contrivance and harsh1 ruthless         
execution  of many of his plans left a  
heritage of evil to the world2 but the  
greatest evil lay in the example given  
by so successful a man in making  it    
seem that history could actually thus be
 made4 ,the attitude which  is taken in 
behalf of such men1 in claiming for them
 a completely free  and full discretion 
in controlling foreign affairs1 recalls 
a statement  made by ,h4 ,g4 ,wells     
concerning a ,british leader3 8,he      
believes that  he belongs to a          
particularly gifted and privileged class
 of beings  to whom the lives and       
affairs of common men are given         
over--the raw  material for brilliant   

careers4 ,it seems to him an act of     
insolence  that the common man should   
form judgments on matters of            
statecraft40  ,the diplomats of the old 
school indeed do require the people1 but
 only  as material with which to work   
out their grandiose projects4 ,their    
view  not too distantly resembles that  
of the ,german militarists to whom      
ordinary humanity existed only for one  
purpose1 8to do their damn'd  duty40    
,we should naturally expect to find the 
greatest secrecy and the  most callous  
use of secretive methods1 where         
absolutism remains  most completely     
established4 ,in the last remaining     
absolutism1  that of ,japan1 these      
expectations are fulfilled1 both as     
regards  carefully-guarded secrecy of   
all diplomatic action1 and the habitual 
use of well phrased declarations of a   
theoretical policy1 announced for       
public consumption1 but bearing only a  
,platonic relation to the details  of   
actual doings4 ,but more liberally      

governed states have not by any  means  
all freed themselves from this practice1
 even to the extent of  faithfully      
keeping the representative bodies1 and  
the public1 informed  of the true       
character and aims of important national
 policies4    ,during the discussions of
 the last few years1 a great many       
remedies  for this state of affairs have
 been suggested4 ,the ,constitutional   
practice of the ,united ,states has been
 taken as a model in ,england  in the   
suggestion that there should be a       
representative committee on  foreign    
affairs in the ,house of ,commons1 which
 should keep in constant  touch with the
 diplomatic officials and supervise the 
conduct of  foreign relations2 that     
there should be at least two days given 
to  the discussion of the ,foreign      
,office ,vote2 that there should be full
  reports made on the progress of all   
important negotiations2 and that        
treaties and alliances should not be    
concluded1 nor war made1 without  a     

previous authorization on the part of   
,parliament4 ,the last formal  proposal 
of this kind was the motion made in     
,march1 #aiah1 in the  ,house of        
,commons1 the opposition to which by    
,mr4 ,balfour has already  been alluded 
to4 ,that he should object particularly 
to the prying  into foreign affairs on  
the part of persons 8not responsible10  
and by  8politicians10 that the proposed
 committee of the ,house of ,commons    
should be thus characterized1 throws    
light on the prejudices involved2  but  
it also reveals the absurdity of the    
present arrangement from the  point of  
view of free government4 ,in ,france    
there has existed1 since  #aijb1 a      
standing committee on foreign and       
colonial affairs in the  ,chamber of    
,deputies4    ,when he was premier1 in  
#aibj1 ,signor ,giolliti introduced a   
bill  carrying the following provision3 
8,treaties and ,international           
understandings1 whatever be their       
subject and character1 are valid only   

after they have been approved by        
,parliament4 ,the ,government of the    
,king can declare war only with the     
approval of the two ,chambers40 ,the    
ministry of ,giolliti fell before this  
sound measure could be passed4    ,it   
may be questioned whether many of the   
arrangements suggested could  be more   
than palliatives1 as long as an         
intelligent and constant public         
interest in foreign affairs has not been
 aroused1 and as long as the  absolutist
 aspect of foreign policy continues4    
,the suggestion that war  should not be 
made without a previous national        
referendum1 has indeed  logic on its    
side from the point of view of the      
democratic theory of  state1 but it has 
thus far not entered into the state of  
practical  consideration4    ,the most  
important remedy as yet attempted is the
 provision in the  ,covenant of the     
,league of ,nations1 that all treaties  
shall be made  public4 ,no greater      
encouragement1 indeed1 could be given to

 the growth  of confidence and the      
destruction of baneful suspicions and   
fears1  throughout international life1  
than if it were possible to assure  the 
nations of the world that all           
engagements imposing international      
obligations of any kind whatsoever would
 be made known immediately  upon their  
conclusion4 ,this provision of the      
,covenant has already  gone into force1 
and numerous new treaties have been     
submitted1 even  by governments who are 
not as yet members of the ,league4 ,but 
certain  governments have delayed       
compliance in cases where treaties are  
known  to have been made secretly4 ,as  
there is no specific sanction for this  
provision in the ,covenant1 and as      
actually binding agreements can be  made
 without taking the form of a treaty or 
convention1 this remedy  is not in      
itself powerful enough to remove the    
evil4 ,if two or three  states are      
willing to keep an engagement secret at 
the risk of later  incurring a certain  

amount of opprobrium when the fact is   
discovered1  there is no means as yet   
available for obliging them to abandon  
such  course4 ,nevertheless1 this       
provision of the ,covenant constitutes  
a great advance in the work of placing  
the public business of the  world on the
 only sound basis1 and cultivating that 
confidence upon  which depends the      
future immunity of mankind from constant
 danger of  suffering and destruction4  
,it will1 however1 not be a real remedy 
until the nations agree actually to     
outlaw all secret agreements as a       
conspiracy against the general welfare  
and safety4    ,the other important     
advance made in the ,covenant is found  
in the  provisions for the investigation
 of any cause of conflict before        
hostilities shall be resorted to4 ,if   
after the first shock of  excitement1   
which accompanies the revelation of a   
serious international  crisis1 public   
opinion can be given a certain space of 
time to inform  itself1 then it may     

indeed be hoped that a different temper 
will  control the giving of the fateful 
doom of war4 ,as ,count ,czernin has    
stated1 on the night of ,august #d1     
#aiad1 between the hours of nine and    
midnight the decision as to whether     
,england would come into the war1  lay  
with the ,german ,government4 ,a system 
under which such tremendous  issues have
 to be decided in such a manner1 is     
absurd to the verge of  insanity4,e     
,e ,a ,german writer puts the blame for 
the outbreak of the          war on the 
telegraph4 ,he says that if there had   
been no          telegraphic            
communication between the capitals1 the 
fatal          crisis would not have    
arisen2 there would have been time      
for reflection and a decision to make   
war would never have          been taken
 in blood4    ,while the above          
arrangements1 if they could be          
effectively carried out1  would         
undoubtedly serve to moderate the evils 
which now result from  the conduct of   

international affairs on so narrow a    
basis1 yet it is  difficult to expect   
from them more than relatively          
superficial results4  ,it is only if a  
new spirit can be developed among the   
nations1 and if  the absolutist         
conception of the state as far as it    
still remains1 can  be transformed into 
something more consonant with the       
complexity and  delicacy of human       
relationships1 that we may hope to hail 
the dawn of a  new era4 ,it would be as 
great a transformation as that which    
separates  the ,pagan from the          
,christian ideal4 ,mankind is still     
somewhat blinded  by the glitter and    
pageantry of the absolutist state2 the  
pride of  power manifests itself now    
particularly in foreign intercourse4    
,when  ,portugal became a republic1 it  
desired at first to abolish the entire  
diplomatic establishment1 and to allow  
all international business  to be done  
by the consuls4 ,that proposal may have 
resulted from an  instinctive feeling   

that there was something incompatible   
between a  really free community1 and   
the sense of absolute power embodied in 
diplomacy4    ,a change can be brought  
about only when the underlying unity of 
mankind  is more intensely felt and when
 the common interests in science1       
commerce1 industry and the universal    
language of art are valued at  their    
true importance to the welfare of the   
people of all nations4  ,joint effort in
 the constructive work of developing    
resources1  particularly in the tropics1
 will make it possible for vastly       
increased  populations to live in       
comfort on their present sites1 without 
the need  of crowding each other4 ,a    
higher valuation of humanity1 a more    
just  proportion in the influence       
permitted different interests1 a keener 
scrutiny of traditions and              
watch-words--all this is necessary4 ,men
  and women to-day feel an intense      
apprehension1 when they think of the    
fate of their children in a world in    

which the unreasoning prejudices  and   
unenlightened practices that have       
recently again come to the fore  in     
international life should prevail1      
leaving mankind in a dazed  confusion1  
and pushing the people from time to time
 into wholesale  slaughter with ever    
more horrible instruments of            
destruction4 ,they feel  also that if   
secret policies1 engendering fears and  
suspicion1 are  to continue to be the   
dominant factor1 then all improvement in
 human  welfare1 education and science1 
will have to be in a large measure      
postponed to the preparation of         
constantly more formidable engines of   
death4 ,one cannot but remember the     
worst imprecations of the ,greek  tragic
 poets and philosophers1 on the         
miserable destiny of man4 ,in  fact1 if 
we should have to believe that no better
 way could be found  to manage the vital
 interests of mankind1 a great natural  
catastrophe1  which would extinguish    
once and for all the miserable breed on 

this  planet1 would almost appear in the
 light of a redemption4    ,but we      
cannot believe that the peoples of the  
world will be so foolish  as to allow   
themselves to remain in this condition  
and not to find  their way to a         
reorganization of public affairs which  
will make such a  haphazard and perilous
 situation impossible4 ,it seems plain  
that the  idea of the state and of state
 action will have to be transformed in  
accordance with the greater             
self-consciousness of humanity which has
  developed in the last century1 or the 
desire to scrap the political  state and
 to find some more adequate and natural 
form of organization  will rapidly gain 
in strength4 ,meanwhile1 there is a need
 of the  formation of a great           
freemasonry of all publicists1 political
 men and  teachers of the people1 united
 in the resolve to know and make known  
the essential elements in current       
international affairs1 to arouse the    
public to a sense of the importance of  

these matters to their every-day  life1 
and to support the men more directly    
responsible for the conduct  of foreign 
policy1 with an intelligent1 searching1 
reasonable and broad  public opinion4   
,,xiv    ,,recent ,,american            
,,experience      ,up until a recent    
date ,americans could contemplate the   
play of secret  diplomacy in ,europe and
 ,asia with a feeling of entire         
aloofness1  as belonging to a political 
society which had neither need nor      
inclination to utilize such methods4    
,our unmenaced continental  position1   
the natural protection and separation   
implied in distance  and ocean          
boundaries1 and the conscious intention 
of keeping clear of  international      
entanglements1 all contributed to make  
the foreign policy  of the ,united      
,states entirely public and             
straightforward4 ,the fathers  of the   
,constitution had established the sound 
principle that treaties  are the law of 
the land4 ,this not only involves mature

 consideration of  a treaty before it is
 made1 but publicity as well4 ,the      
,american people  have known at all     
times what obligations had been         
incurred1 and the  world had the same   
information4 ,there has been no room for
 guesswork  and suspicion4    ,the      
instructions which were issued to ,john 
,jay when he was sent as  special envoy 
to ,england in #agid lay down the       
following rule of  conduct3 8,it is the 
,president's wish that the              
characteristics of an  ,american        
minister should be marked on the one    
hand by a firmness  against improper    
compliances1 and on the other by        
sincerity1 candor1  truth and prudence1 
and by a horror of finesse and chicane40
 ,these  straightforward words began a  
tradition which has ever since animated 
the ,american diplomatic service4 ,when 
after the ,spanish war1 under           
,secretary ,hay1 ,american diplomacy    
entered more fully into world-wide      
problems than in any previous era1 the  

expression 8the new diplomacy0  was     
currently used in a laudatory sense to  
designate what ,hay had  implied when in
 a public address he had declared the   
,golden ,rule to  be the cardinal       
principle of ,american diplomacy--an    
ideal which makes  secrecy and intrigue 
unnecessary4    ,in order to give the   
public an opportunity of informing      
itself  concerning the conduct and      
development of foreign affairs1 the     
,united  ,states ,government has from an
 early date published an annual         
collection  of diplomatic               
correspondence4 ,since #ahfa1 this      
publication is known  as ,papers        
,relating to the ,foreign ,relations of 
the ,united ,states4  ,it was formerly  
published within two or three years of  
the year to  which it related1 but      
during the war this interval was        
considerably  extended4 ,the precedents 
and principles elaborated in the        
diplomatic  correspondence of the       
,united ,states have been collected1    

codified  and published in a very       
important and useful compendium by      
,francis  ,wharton1 under the title of  
,digest of ,international ,law4 ,this   
work  was expanded1 amplified and       
brought down to date by ,prof4 ,john    
,bassett  ,moore1 under the same title1 
in #aijf4 ,it is of the highest         
importance1  not only as a repository of
 diplomatic and legal precedent1 but as 
a definite and public record of the     
position taken by the ,american         
,government on all international        
questions that had arisen up to the     
date of its publication4 ,the           
preparation of such digest on the part  
of other governments is highly to be    
desired for the purpose of  clarifying  
international law and policy1 and for   
giving them a sound  basis of reason and
 experience upon which the people and   
governments  may rely4 ,the fact that a 
precedent reported in this digest1 might
 be  cited against the ,american        
,government as an admission1 does not   

imply  a disadvantage which would at all
 offset the benefits resulting in       
general from public knowledge4    ,with 
respect to the details of negotiation1  
there are confidential  relationships   
which have always been observed by the  
,american  ,government4 ,ordinary       
considerations of courtesy require that 
those  who may speak to us frankly in   
confidence shall not be made to suffer  
by being quoted and thus perhaps be     
exposed to misunderstanding and         
criticism4 ,on our part1 in preparing a 
sound basis of action1 favorable  as    
well as unfavorable matters have to be  
considered2 yet there  is ordinarily no 
need of publicly advertising the        
shortcomings of  individuals and        
governments as set forth in reports on  
such unfavorable  matters4 ,such        
considerate action is not based on a    
desire to mislead or  to take advantage1
 but to save unnecessary irritation4    
,for the purpose  of permitting complete
 freedom of discussion and of criticism 

without  the risk of giving offense1 the
 ,united ,states ,senate1 as a matter of
  its ordinary procedure1 goes into     
secret session when discussing a  treaty
 submitted to it4 ,there have1 however1 
been several exceptions4  ,thus1 for    
instance1 the debates on the            
,bayard-,chamberlain ,fisheries  ,treaty
 of #ahhh1 on the ,taft arbitration     
treaties of #aiab1 and on the           
,nicaragua ,treaty of #aiaf1 were       
carried on1 and concluded1 in open      
session4 ,many senators are in favor of 
making this the common practice4        
,before the war1 as ,prof4 ,john        
,bassett ,moore1 whose knowledge of  the
 records is unequaled1 said to me1 the  
,state ,department had no  secrets      
whatsoever1 with the exception of       
personnel reports4 ,we1 too1  however1  
can depart from a well-established      
tradition1 as is shown by  our          
diplomatic history during the war4 ,i do
 not believe it will ever  be charged   
that in any matter big or little the    

,american ,government  sought narrow1   
selfish advantages4 ,secrecy due to such
 motives1  there was none4 ,there was no
 ,american policy or enterprise that    
needed concealment1 apart from military 
policies and strategy during  a war4    
,when ,i glanced over at the end of my  
mission in ,peking the                  
extra-confidential cable correspondence1
 ,i was inwardly amazed by the  entire  
lack of anything that really needed     
concealing1 in that closely  guarded    
dossier4    ,yet ,american diplomacy did
 during the war fall somewhat under the 
spell  of the traditional methods still 
in vogue in ,europe4 ,we were not a     
party to any secret engagements for the 
division of spoils after the  war1      
although from the time of the peace     
conference on1 the influence  of the    
,american ,government was exercised     
mostly in secret1 and the  agreements   
subsidiary to the general settlement    
were secretly signed4  ,these did not   
contain any apportionment of advantage  

to the ,united  ,states1 but on the     
contrary were supposed to contain the   
nearest  approach to the equitable ideas
 of ,american policy which was1 under   
existing conditions1 obtainable4 ,but   
throughout this trying period  the      
conduct of ,american diplomacy did not  
rest on the foundation of a  continuous1
 frank appeal to the public opinion of  
our own nation or of  the world4        
,even before the armistice some very    
important matters were dealt with  in   
this fashion4 ,though the permanent     
importance of the ,lansing-,ishii  note 
as affecting in a concrete and specific 
way the definition of  rights and       
policies in the ,far ,east is very      
doubtful1 yet in its  immediate effect  
under all of the circumstances of the   
time1 this was  certainly a noteworthy  
document to issue from the ,american    
foreign  office4 ,yet1 its conception   
and execution was absolutely surrounded 
with secrecy so that not even the high  
officials normally consulted in  such   

matters1 with the exception of the      
,secretary of ,state himself1  were     
informed as to what was coming4 ,this   
secrecy worked entirely in  the interest
 of the ,japanese government4 ,by       
privately giving out the  agreement in  
,japan and in ,china before the date    
when its publication  had been agreed   
upon1 the ,japanese government succeeded
 to a certain  extent and for a time1 in
 giving this matter the appearance of a 
great  ,japanese diplomatic victory and 
of a highly important concession on the 
part of the ,united ,states4    ,it is  
not necessary to recall the general     
disillusionment that came  about when   
,president ,wilson agreed to the policy 
of secrecy at the  peace conference4    
,undoubtedly this decision was based on 
the motive  to secure1 with a promptness
 required by the stress of the times1  a
 settlement which would in general      
commend itself to the sense of  justice 
of the world1 although it might         
necessarily contain details  which1 if  

published by themselves1 would cause    
lengthy public  discussion and delay the
 final solution4 ,if such an expectation
 was  entertained1 it was not as a      
matter of fact fulfilled in the results 
of these secret consultations4 ,the     
method adopted did not favor the  broad 
and permanent view1 but rather the more 
shortsighted bargaining  in which the   
old diplomacy excels4 ,in their         
solutions neither the  consultations of 
the peace conference1 nor the subsequent
 diplomatic  negotiations among the     
,allies1 got beyond the old methods of  
bartering  the destinies of small and   
weak peoples1 which had been used by the
  ,congresses of ,vienna and of ,berlin 
with disastrous results4 ,the various   
conferences of #aiai to #aibj recorded a
 complete return to the system  of      
secret diplomacy1 to such an extent that
 it appeared constantly as  if the      
plenipotentiaries feared to let their   
doings be known4 ,even when  there was  
no reason from any point of view for    

concealment1 information  came out in a 
roundabout fashion which left the public
 mind confused2  as for instance in the 
giving out of a decision regarding the  
fate of  ,constantinople1 and in the    
reports concerning the text of          
,president  ,wilson's ,adriatic         
memorandum which were current before its
 publication4    ,from the entanglements
 of this procedure ,american diplomacy  
did not  keep itself free1 nor did it1  
at this time1 assist the world in       
finding  a more straightforward method  
more in accord with ,american political 
experience4    ,the disadvantages of    
secret methods of transacting public    
business have  been brought home to the 
,american people through several        
incidental  matters of no small         
importance4 ,it evidently was the       
intention of  ,president ,wilson to     
reserve ,american rights as to the      
,island of ,yap  which is a vital link  
in the chain of cable communication     
between  ,america and the ,far ,east1   

and a reservation of this kind is       
indicated  by references in the official
 minutes1 though not by a written       
protocol4 ,without the knowledge of the 
,united ,states1 the ,council of  the   
,league of ,nations later disposed of   
the mandate for all of the  ,north      
,pacific ,islands4 ,as this action was  
secret1 it could not be  known whether  
the ,american interest bearing on ,yap  
,island had been  safeguarded or not4   
,it was stated as late as ,january #bf1 
#aiba1 that the  ,american ,government  
was not in possession of the greater    
part of the  minutes of the ,peace      
,conference4 ,notwithstanding the       
protests of the  ,united ,states1 ,japan
 based her claim to the ,north ,pacific 
,islands on  the secret treaties made   
during the war4    ,the secrecy of the  
peace conference1 and the revelations   
before and  during its sessions1        
concerning the secret treaties for the  
division of  the spoils1 produced a     
great disillusionment in the public     

mind4 ,the  fact that the ,united       
,states though asked to make enormous   
sacrifices  in the common cause had been
 kept in the dark concerning at least   
some  of these treaties1 and            
particularly of those which affected its
 own  interest1 did not inspire the     
,american public with any confidence in 
the general conduct of affairs among the
 nations4    ,after the adjournment of  
the conference the ,american ,president 
and  ,government still continued to take
 a part in the various attempts  to     
settle outstanding questions1           
particularly with respect to  the       
,adriatic4 ,when ,president ,wilson     
towards the end of ,february1  #aibj1   
addressed a note to the allied powers   
concerning the ,adriatic  settlement1   
the documents and negotiations which had
 gone before were  entirely unknown to  
the public4 ,on ,december #i1 #aiai1 an 
agreement  had been signed by ,great    
,britain1 ,france and the ,united       
,states1  ,undersecretary ,polk signing 

for the latter4 ,on ,january #ith1 the  
,british  and ,french premiers had      
agreed with the ,italian premier on a   
modified  plan of settlement4 ,on       
,february #ajth1 the ,american          
,secretary of ,state  wrote a note      
containing ,president ,wilson's         
objections to the plan of  ,january     
#ith4 ,the allied premiers replied to   
this note on ,february #ahth4  ,all     
these agreements and this correspondence
 were kept secret1 nor was  ,president  
,wilson's final answer given out for    
some time2 only more or  less accurate  
prognostications appeared in the press4 
,the ,american ,government at this time 
was at a disadvantage in not            
participating in the negotiations       
directly2 the ,american ambassador  at  
,paris was invited from time to time to 
hear what the conference of  premiers   
cared to tell him1 but the proceedings  
of the conference were  apparently not  
transmitted to the ,american            
,government4 ,the ,british  press at the

 time quite generally expressed great   
dissatisfaction  with the methods       
followed by the diplomats4 ,the         
,westminster ,gazette  wrote3 8,the     
whole of both peoples is acutely        
concerned in the result4  ,we must1     
therefore1 register a protest against   
the manner in which the  negotiations   
are being conducted4 ,they are being    
carried on in secrecy1  only broken by  
unreliable rumors1 by the three         
principal governments4  ,the peoples    
have a right to know what is being done 
in their name1 so  that they may be able
 to protest1 if need be1 against        
decisions which  may affect their future
 relations40 ,the ,times protested3 8,we
 are not  going to stand by and have our
 friendship and relations with ,america 
jeopardized by the proceedings of a     
triumvirate sitting behind closed       
doors4 ,the ,american democracy1 we     
imagine1 will not be less resolved to   
assert their rights and stifle this     
effort at secret diplomacy40    ,at this

 time ,mr4 ,bonar ,law1 the government  
spokesman in the ,house of  ,commons1   
denied absolutely that a harsh and      
uncompromising reply had  originally    
been drafted to ,president ,wilson's    
despatch1 and that it  had subsequently 
been changed through the influence of   
,viscount ,grey  and ,lord ,robert      
,cecil4 ,the ,times characterized this  
denial as 8an  example of verbal        
quibbling which inferior intelligences  
mistake for  diplomacy10 and maintained 
that 8though it may be verbally true1 it
  conveys and is designed to convey what
 is untrue02 and the ,daily  ,mail      
stated that the country owed a debt of  
gratitude to ,lord ,grey  for his       
activities in the matter4 ,this all     
illustrates on how insecure  a          
foundation1 and with what chances of    
confusion1 public opinion has  to work  
in matters of foreign affairs where the 
practices of the old  diplomacy are     
followed4    ,the ,american people at   
this time very nearly lost patience with

 the  entire business1 and turned away  
from ,european affairs with complete    
disgust4 ,this is the most outstanding  
effect produced by the secret  diplomacy
 of ,europe as far as the ,american     
people are concerned4 ,the  danger now  
is that their feeling of disgust and    
confusion1 and their  impatience with   
the selfish and shortsighted            
manipulations of ,european  diplomacy1  
will over-emphasize the desire of       
,america to live by and  for herself    
alone4 ,if such a mood and temper should
 prevail1 it would  be a great loss to  
,america and to the world4 ,at no time  
has the world  needed ,america more than
 at present1 not so much from the point 
of view  of direct economic assistance1 
as on account of the fact that ,american
  experience1 principles and ideals     
constitute at the present time the  hope
 of the peoples of the whole world2 and 
,america could1 if she  desired1        
exercise an enormous influence in making
 the popular desire  for such action    

active1 vital and fruitful4    ,but even
 aside from the general confidence which
 is felt by the  peoples of ,europe and 
,asia in the character and ideals of the
 ,united  ,states1 there are a great    
many specific contributions which       
,america  could make to the solution of 
,european problems4 ,no matter how much 
we  shall desire during the next decade 
to hold aloof from ,europe and to       
concentrate on our own affairs1         
nevertheless1 should ,european affairs  
go radically wrong through a constant   
denial and deception of the  hopes and  
aspirations of the people for honest and
 sensible solutions1  ,america in the   
end will again have to share the burden 
thus laid on the  shoulders of mankind4 
,the fundamental ,american principle    
that treaties have the force and  status
 of law contains in itself the promise  
of solving some of the  worst troubles  
of the world1 if it could be generally  
applied4 ,america  should continue1 for 
her own safety and that of the world1 to

 use her  whole influence for making    
that principle a part of the universal  
public law4 ,no international engagement
 shall be binding unless  ratified by a 
representative body1 and published to   
all the nations4  ,otherwise it shall be
 absolutely void1 and shall not give    
rise to  any rights or obligations2 in  
fact1 an attempt to make an agreement   
contrary to these conditions shall be   
considered an act hostile to the  peace 
of the world4 ,that should be the       
recognized law4    ,nothing shows so    
clearly how human development has halted
 at this  point1 as the fact that it    
should still require an argument to     
show the necessity of publicity and     
lawfulness with respect to the  most    
essential interests of the vast         
populations that make up the            
international family4    ,the record and
 constant practice of the ,united       
,states1 as well as her  great actual   
and potential power1 fit her above all  
others to be a  leader in the           

establishment of this principle4 ,the   
,american nation  possesses a great     
moral capital in the confidence and     
trust that  the peoples of the world    
repose in it4 ,no matter if             
unsympathetic  chanceries should plot to
 prevent ,america from making her       
influence  felt in the affairs of the   
world1 no matter how ,european diplomacy
  may occasionally sneer at ,american   
idealism1 the peoples themselves1  great
 and small1 including particularly those
 areas so immensely  important--,russia 
and ,china--would willingly look to     
,america for  leadership and guidance1  
with complete trust and confidence4     
,when this  is fully realized1 we shall 
also be able to judge how vitally what  
,america stands for in the world will be
 strengthened by a constant  adherence  
to open and straightforward methods in  
international  intercourse4    ,but     
,america herself1 it will be said1      
cannot fundamentally change the  spirit 
that animates foreign policies1 and     

bring about the universal  use of honest
 and open practices4 ,we are living     
under a system which is  the result of  
historic forces that have not yet fully 
spent themselves  and which put the     
potential enmity among nations in the   
foreground4    ,i do not believe that it
 is necessary to shut our eyes to       
reality and  to seek recourse in a      
,utopian policy1 in order to escape the 
menace  inherent in current             
international practices4 ,if ,america   
will only not  fall in line with the    
absolutist tradition in diplomacy1 but  
will  emphasize at all times1 with all  
her influence1 those principles of      
international conduct which our natural 
freedom from entanglements  has         
permitted us to develop as of actual    
experience1 ,america will  contribute in
 a most potent manner to the realization
 of that new  spirit which must surely  
come to deliver humanity4 ,that spirit  
is not a  mere ideal1--it is fortunately
 already present in much of             

international  practice2 but it needs   
constantly to be followed up and        
supported  in order that it may become  
the customary and instinctive guide1    
superseding such prejudices as are still
 current which favor tortuous           
manipulation and perpetuate an          
uninformed and confused state of the    
public mind4    ,in order to fulfil this
 promise and destiny the ,united ,states
 would  have to rely in the first place 
on the inherent merit of her ideals  and
 principles of action1 and on the       
support which they will receive  from   
the approval of the peoples of the      
world4 ,as far as organized  governments
 go1 as distinguished from the people1  
some will be more  inclined than others 
to coperate with the ,united ,states in 
a reform  of international practice4    
,there is no question but that the great
  majority of governments will thus     
coperate1 though some of the most       
important may for a time be left on the 
other side4    ,with those peoples and  

governments who are in language1        
political  traditions and general       
impulses most closely related to us1    
there  should grow up a particularly    
strong feeling of confidence making  all
 our intercourse absolutely open4 ,there
 certainly need not be any  secrets     
between the ,united ,states and the     
great commonwealths of ,canada  and     
,australia4 ,our interests1 our         
condition1 our institutions1 all make   
for the closest understanding4 ,through 
them there may be also realized  that   
harmony which ought by every normal     
reason to exist between the  ,united    
,states and the ,english people1 and    
which is disturbed only from  time to   
time when the policy of the ,british    
government is determined  more from the 
point of view of the supposed needs of  
the ,british ,empire  in ,india1 than of
 that of the true tradition of the      
,english-speaking  world4 ,i do not     
think of treaties or of alliances1 but  
of something  much stronger--an intimate

 understanding among peoples1 based on  
mutual  trust and confidence1 and the   
consciousness of a common destiny1      
common  purposes1 and a common belief in
 the things which alone will prevent    
civilization from extinguishing itself  
in senseless hatreds4                   
,,conclusion      ,in modern diplomacy  
there still persists the image of the   
chess  players intent on their          
complicated game1 planning each move    
with long  foresight of all the         
combinations that could possibly be     
organized  by the opponent4 ,in the     
popular image1 too1 the great diplomat  
is  conceived as spinning a complicated 
web of actions and relationships in     
which every detail is subordinate and   
subservient to a general dominant       
purpose4 ,then comes the international  
publicist and with ingenuity  still more
 refined than that of the imagined      
diplomat1 he reasons out  the innermost 
ambitions that dominate and inspire the 
makers of foreign  affairs4 ,so it has  

remained possible for the most          
extravagant imaginary  constructions to 
be put forth in volumes of sober aspect1
 which purport  to give the key to      
diplomacy or to expose the pernicious   
ambitions of  this or that foreign      
office4 ,it has become a game in which  
nothing is  impossible to the           
constructive imagination4    ,to any one
 familiar with the usual methods of     
foreign offices and  of diplomatic      
representatives1 the idea that foreign  
affairs are  really handled in this     
manner1 like mental legerdemain1 becomes
 quite  grotesque4 ,complicated         
manipulations with respect to movements 
far  in the future1 looking to still    
more distant results1--that kind of     
diplomatic planning exists more in the  
imagination than in the actual  conduct 
of foreign affairs4 ,in the majority of 
cases foreign offices  meet each        
situation as it arises1 relying indeed  
on precedents and  having certain       
underlying aims and purposes1 but giving

 most attention  to the facts           
immediately present and often satisfied 
with anything that  will ease a         
troublesome or embarrassing situation4  
,foreign offices  indeed differ greatly 
in the definiteness and constancy of    
their  objectives and the completeness  
with which they subordinate details to  
central aims4 ,the ,russian foreign     
office always had the reputation of     
great continuity of policy2 it gave the 
central place to fundamental  objectives
 to which problems that arose from day  
to day could be  referred2 and thus it  
solved them with a cumulative effect    
upon the  advancement of its political  
aims4    ,from the point of view of the 
older traditions of diplomacy1 there    
would be a decided advantage in         
definiteness of plan and in the         
harmonious subordination of all details 
to the main idea4 ,however1 the         
advantage of this method is frequently  
defeated through the narrowness  of the 
objects aimed at1 when diplomatic policy

 is conceived in this  manner4          
,immediate purposes may indeed be       
achieved more readily1 but  the         
permanent results will usually be barren
 or lead ultimately to  conflicts of    
forces4 ,in such a system there is too  
much abstraction  from the multiform    
forces of actual life2 and while those  
who pursue it  may flatter themselves   
that they are making history1 they are  
not often  building in accordance with  
natural and historic forces4    ,the    
concept of diplomacy which has been     
criticized in these pages does  not     
exclude the possibility of immediate    
brilliant success2 but its              
ineffectiveness appears when we view it 
over longer periods of history4  ,it is 
built on too narrow a foundation4 ,we   
have seen that even with  the greatest  
statesmen1 any plan of action conceived 
in this manner  has such positive       
limitations that the very success in    
executing such  policies through a      
shrewd play of diplomatic forces1       

conjures up new  dangers and            
difficulties4 ,the wisdom of no man nor 
small self-contained  group of men is at
 present sufficient to measure the needs
 of society  and to transform its       
impulses into effective action4 ,a      
broader basis  for policy is needed4    
,but the greatest weakness of the old   
method lies  in the fact that just at   
the very times when men are most in need
 of  confidence and of a spirit of      
reason and sane judgment1 this mode of  
action leaves the public mind in        
confusion1 excitement and the darkest   
fears4    ,if democracy means anything1 
its significance for the welfare of     
humanity must lie in the value of       
allowing constantly more and more  minds
 to participate in the great things of  
the world4 ,not only would  such        
participation seem to be a natural right
 of the human mind but  also the things 
most worth while can be achieved only   
when the ablest  and best can freely    
lend their efforts4 ,to all this a      

narrow system of  secret management by a
 limited hierarchy is hostile4 ,the old 
diplomacy  rests entirely on skepticism 
as to the wisdom and self-control of    
the people4 ,the people are merely      
material for statesmanship4 ,this       
conception is blind to the fact that    
everything that is great in modern  life
 has arisen through the freedom with    
which talent may manifest  itself       
wherever found and that in all pursuits 
of humanity that are  worth while1      
innumerable minds coperate1 in a degree 
as warranted  by their capacity to bring
 about sound action and improvement4    
,the  older diplomacy assumed that the  
people furnished only passive  material 
for statesmanship to work upon1 and it  
saw in the public only  potentialities  
for vague and general influences which  
statesmanship in  turn was to mold and  
utilize4 ,the greatest distance it went1
 was to  admit that national policy must
 rest on popular instinct2 a principle  
which is quite compatible with the      

practice of secret diplomacy4 ,when  we 
come to talk of political instincts1    
however1 we are dealing with  one of the
 vaguest and most indefinite concepts   
known to thought4 ,these  instincts may 
be interpreted and given active         
expression as it suits  any diplomatic  
policy4 ,unfortunately the 8instincts0  
most to the fore  are not usually       
helpful to calm and sound action4 ,in   
international  affairs1 an instinctive  
dislike or hatred of anything different 
has  again and again been made the basis
 of aggressive action1 stirring  up     
otherwise peaceful populations to       
warlike and murderous intent4  ,great   
national policies may often truly be    
said to rest on instinct  in the sense  
that undivided popular support is given 
to a policy from  a variety of motives  
which are not clearly reasoned out but  
which all  express themselves in an     
overpowering impulse which may be called
  instinctive4 ,thus the ,monroe policy 
in which the most fundamental  motive is

 the desire for peace and for the safety
 of the continental  position of the    
,american nation1 may be said to rest on
 the instinct of  self-preservation4    
,but it is quite plain that unless what 
is here called instinct can  be         
transformed into an intelligent1 wise   
and discriminating public  opinion1 such
 instinct is but a shifting sand1       
affording material which  may be molded 
into any desired form by an ambitious   
policy working  through suggestion and  
propaganda4 ,instinct can be transformed
 into  a true public policy only through
 publicity and through the training  of 
large groups of men to see things with  
true eyes and to judge with  reason and 
wisdom4 ,here is the crux of the matter4
 ,secret diplomacy  treats all except   
the inner official ring as outsiders and
 8persons  without responsibility40     
,among these outsiders there may be     
numerous  persons actually better       
qualified than the officials themselves1
  through experience and thought1 to    

judge of international affairs4 ,no  one
 can here assume infallibility4 ,safe   
counsel can come only if the  entire    
intelligence and moral sentiment of a   
nation can find expression  and if its  
fittest individuals can concentrate     
their attention upon  every great       
problem as it arises4 ,a sound1 just1   
wise public policy  without publicity   
cannot be imagined4 ,to consider        
publicity an evil1  to consider it as   
impeding the proper flow of             
international influences  and           
obstructing the solution of             
international difficulties1 appears as  
an unbelievable perversion when we      
consider the true implications of  such 
a thought4    ,it is therefore          
inestimably important that the facts of 
international  life1 the materials out  
of which policies are formed1 should be 
known  freely and fully to the public of
 every nation4 ,the manipulation  of    
international communications for        
political purposes is the most  sinister

 and dangerous part of the system with  
which secret diplomacy  is entwined4    
,according to this theory it is not only
 not good for the  people to know       
everything but they must also be made to
 know things  about the truth of which  
we need not bother our heads but which  
will  stimulate the passions and arouse 
the instincts our policy desires  to    
work upon4 ,thus the void left by       
secrecy1 by a concealment of the  true  
nature and character of internationally 
important matters1 is  frequently       
supplied by an intelligence service     
carrying distorted  and colored versions
 of facts2 all this confuses and        
discourages the  public mind to such an 
extent that it becomes unable to sever  
fact from  fiction and to form a        
consistent and firm judgment4    ,the   
abolition of secret diplomacy is not a  
matter of agreeing to  have no more     
secrets4 ,it is a matter of arousing    
among the public so  powerful a         
determination to know1 so strong a      

sentiment of the value of  truth1 such a
 penetrating spirit of inquiry1 that the
 secrets will fade  away as they always 
do when the importance of a situation is
 really  understood by a large number of
 people4    ,meanwhile it need not      
appear futile to work for the positive  
elimination of secrecy4 ,no one can     
doubt that the provision of the         
,covenant of the ,league of ,nations1   
which requires that all treaties  shall 
be made public1 is salutary and that its
 enforcement would  greatly increase    
public confidence4 ,but it is necessary 
to go beyond  this and to outlaw any    
agreement which is kept secret1 by      
making it the  public law of the world  
that no rights or obligations can be    
founded on  such attempts against the   
peace and common welfare of the nations4
    ,the personal relationships of      
diplomacy also require attention4 ,the  
spirit of the ,diplomatic ,service      
should be transformed in accordance     
with the modern organization of society4

 ,the most essential weakness  of caste 
diplomacy lies in the fact that it does 
not provide means  for a sufficient     
contact among the peoples of the world4 
,contact is  maintained only within a   
narrow class4 ,the diplomatic fraternity
 lives  in its own realm of precedences1
 rivalries and traditions4 ,to confine  
the intercourse and interchange of      
influences so narrowly1 is a great      
weakness of our present political       
system4    ,the diplomatic office should
 be conceived as having the function to 
represent not only the special national 
interest of the respective  country1 but
 also1 on an equal plane1 its           
participation in all the  activities and
 interests which are common to the      
nations of the world4  ,the legations   
and embassies should be provided with a 
personnel  of attachs not only for      
political and military affairs1 but for 
commerce1 education1 science and social 
legislation4 ,all these  matters are    
already dealt with to some extent by    

common action among  the nations4 ,the  
sending of ministers as delegates to    
international  technical conferences has
 often been criticized as importing into
  such conferences the narrow1          
separatist point of view of diplomatic  
politics4 ,it should be exactly the     
other way2 participation in such        
conferences ought to impart to diplomats
 a broad spirit of coperation  instead  
of a desire to maintain intact a        
theoretical isolation4 ,that is  the    
essence of the matter4 ,as long as it is
 supposed that by jealously             
scrutinizing every international        
relationship from the point of view  of 
abstract political independence1 and    
assuming that it is best to  make the   
very least possible contribution of     
energy and coperation1  the national    
interest can be most promoted2 so long  
will diplomatic  action continue on a   
strained basis1 always being painfully  
conscious  of the potential enmity among
 nations4 ,but when it is realized that 

in  nearly every case the national      
interest1 or the interest of the people 
of the nation which ought to be         
synonymous therewith1 is best advanced  
by whole-souled coperation in           
constructive work in commerce1 industry1
  science and the arts1 then the        
political factor of diplomatic rivalry  
will assume more just proportions as    
compared with the other interests  of   
humanity4    ,this borders upon a very  
broad subject dealing rather with       
general  international policy than with 
the specific problems we were           
considering2 and yet we ought to be     
aware of this background4 ,we need  not 
give up our conviction that the autonomy
 of the national state  must be         
preserved and that each political       
society shall dispose of  its own       
affairs within its borders as its wisdom
 and judgment may  dictate1 free from   
intervention from without4 ,but complete
 freedom of  local self-determination   
can rest only upon a universal          

recognition  of that right in all       
others1 in a spirit of confidence and   
security  engendered by the absence of  
intrigue and secret ambitions4 ,in a    
still  greater measure does the         
happiness of the national state depend  
on  free and full coperation with all   
others in all pursuits1 activities  and 
interests common to humanity and in     
making the earth a place for  dignified 
and happy human life4 ,unless diplomacy 
looks forward to  this and helps to     
bring it about1 it will remain ensnared 
in the old  practices which ever lead   
only to barren results4    ,lincoln's   
simple faith in the people has not yet  
been adequately  applied in             
international affairs4 ,international   
action has shown the  impersonal        
character of calculated manipulations   
coldly disposing of  the rights and     
lives of millions with cruel            
callousness4 ,the last great  war has   
made us consider the relation of war    
sacrifices to the daily  welfare of the 

people4 ,a great deal of the prevailing 
unrest in the  world is undoubtedly due 
to a lack of confidence that great      
affairs are  being handled with wisdom  
and with regard to the true1 lasting    
welfare  of the people themselves4 ,it  
is difficult to reduce to personal terms
  relations so abstract and general as  
those obtaining in international        
affairs4 ,we think of the armies in     
serried ranks and are impressed  with   
the impact of their force and the great 
feats it may accomplish4  ,but we are   
too apt to forget the individual destiny
 carried in every  breast1 the human    
feeling in every heart1 among all the   
millions that  make up this engine of   
power and destruction4 ,human welfare   
rather than  human power has not yet    
been made the constant and overshadowing
 aim  of diplomacy4 ,that will be done  
only when the people themselves demand  
that international affairs shall be     
dealt with in a different spirit  and   
with other methods4 ,then we shall have 

policies that can be avowed  and        
understood by the people who bear the   
burden and who pay the bill4    ,the    
questions which we have been considering
 are not distinct and  isolated but are 
bound up with all that goes toward a    
more adequate  organization of modern   
society4 ,even in the industries1 men   
are no  longer satisfied with a narrowly
 centralized control4 ,they call for    
information and accountability1 they    
claim a share in management1  at least  
of an advisory or consultative nature4  
,all who contribute  in bearing the     
risks of industry demand to be kept     
informed of the  policies and actions of
 the management4 ,in ever extending     
circles  men share in the responsibility
 for action taken in their name4  ,it is
 a truism that risk is diminished and   
tends to disappear  as it is distributed
 over greater and greater numbers4      
,under our  present political system    
nations are carrying a tremendous risk  
in  international affairs--they are     

risking their wealth1 the lives of      
their citizens1 their own very          
existence4 ,the responsibility for      
bearing these risks and for arranging   
the conditions of safety is now  too    
narrowly centralized4 ,it is an         
elementary demand of safety that it     
should be more widely distributed1 that 
a larger number of competent  and       
representative minds should take part in
 carrying this burden4  ,and they should
 at all points be supported by a        
well-informed public  opinion throughout
 the nation4    ,but there is a         
condition that lies still deeper4 ,the  
popular psychology  cultivated under the
 narrow aims of nationalism has         
exhausted itself  in international      
matters in dislike and hatred of        
everything alien and  of all that lies  
beyond the national pale4 ,such a state 
of mind is  ever ready to act the bull  
to any red rag of newspaper             
sensationalism4  ,so1 the inside        
managers of diplomatic affairs may still

 say with some  justification1 8,open   
discussion would too much excite the    
public  mind40 ,this fundamental        
condition cannot be suddenly purged of  
all its  potency for evil4 ,only by     
gradual degrees may an attitude be      
brought  about within the national      
communities which will be more just to  
the  outside world and to everything    
that is strange and unaccustomed4 ,what 
the great imaginative writers of the    
first half of the nineteenth  century   
accomplished in breaking down social    
prejudices and abuses  will have to be  
done for humanity by a new host of      
inspired molders  of human sentiment4   
,we may not get rid of artificial       
hostilities now  still nurtured by      
nationalism1 until ideals of            
international goodwill  and fellowship  
have been expressed in the form of human
 experience  and portrayed as part of   
the struggles and triumphs of the       
individual  human soul4 ,patient1 sound1
 upbuilding influences shall have to    

work  powerfully on the masses of men1  
and on their leaders1 before we  may    
finally overcome the evils that express 
themselves in practices  inherent in a  
system such as that we call 8secret     
diplomacy10 before  the world may be    
made an abode of mutual confidence and  
helpfulness  instead of a house of      
imprisonment1 suspicion and terror4     
,,short ,,bibliography        ,,ashley4 
,life of ,palmerston4      ,,bagger1 ,e4
 ,s4 ,central ,european ,conspiracy4 ,n4
 ,y4 ,nation1 ,november        #ag1     
#aibj4      ,,barth,,lemy1 ,j4          
,dmocratic et politique trangre4 #aiag4 
,part ,i4      ,,bass1 ,j4 ,f4 ,the     
,peace ,tangle4 #aibj4      ,,brown1    
,,philip4 ,democracy and ,diplomacy4    
,north ,american ,review4        #aiaf4 
,,calli,,res1 ,f4 ,,de4 ,on the ,manner 
of ,negotiating with ,princes4 #agaf4   
,translated by ,a4 ,f4 ,whyte4 #aiai4   
,,coolidge1 ,a4 ,c4 7,,ed474 ,secret    
,treaties of ,austria-,hungary4 #aibj4  
,,czernin1 ,,count4 ,in the ,world ,war4

 #aiai4      ,,dickinson1 ,g4 ,l4       
,democratic ,control of ,foreign        
,policy4 ,atlantic1        ,august1     
#aiaf4      ,,dillon1 ,e4 ,j4 ,the      
,inside ,story of the ,peace            
,conference4 #aibj4      ,,fay1 ,s4 ,b4 
,origins of the ,war4 ,am4 ,hist4 ,rev4 
#aibj4      ,,fitzmaurice1 ,,lord4 ,life
 of ,lord ,granville4 #aije4            
,,gori,,ar and ,l4 ,b4 ,,stowe4 ,inside 
,story of ,austro-,german ,intrigue4    
#aibj4      ,,harris1 ,,john ,h4 ,the   
,chartered ,millions4 ,swarthmore       
,press1 ,london4      ,,hayashi1        
,,count4 ,secret ,memoirs4 ,ed4 ,a4 ,m4 
,pooley4 #aiae4      ,,heatly1 ,d4 ,p4  
,diplomacy and the ,study of            
,international ,relations4        #aiai4
      ,,isvolsky1 ,,alexander4 ,memoirs4
 #aiba4      ,,labouchere1 ,,henry4     
,life of4 #aiaf4      ,,lane-,,poole1   
,,stanley4 ,the ,life of ,lord          
,stratford de ,redcliffe4 #ahij4        
,,lansing1 ,,robert4 ,the ,peace        
,negotiations4 #aiba4 ,chapter #ag4     

,,leutrum1 ,,countess4 ,court and       
,diplomacy in ,austria4 #aibj4          
,,loftus1 ,,lord ,,augustus4 ,diplomatic
 ,reminiscences4 #ahcg-ahfb4            
,,loreburn1 ,,earl4 ,how the ,war ,came4
 #aiai4      ,,macknight1 ,,thomas4     
,thirty ,years of ,foreign ,policy4     
#ahee4      ,,malmesbury1 ,,earl ,,of4  
,diaries and ,correspondence4 #ahdd4    
,,maxwell1 ,,sir ,,herbert4 ,life of    
,lord ,clarendon4 #aiac4                
,,metternich4 ,memoirs4      ,,morel1   
,e4 ,d4 ,ten ,years of ,secret          
,diplomacy4 #fth ,edition4 #aibj4       
,,morel1 ,e4 ,d4 ,pre-,war ,diplomacy4  
#aibj4      ,,murray1 ,,sir ,,gilbert4  
,faith1 ,war and ,policy4 #aiag4 ,part  
#f4      ,,myers1 ,d4 ,p4 ,legislatures 
and ,foreign ,relations4 ,am4 ,political
        ,science ,review4 #aiag4        
,,neilson1 ,,francis4 ,how ,diplomats   
make ,war4 #aiaf4      ,,ponsonby1 ,a4  
,democracy and ,diplomacy4 #aiai4       
,report of the ,select ,committee on the
 ,diplomatic ,service4 #ahfa4           

,s,,gur4 ,politique de tous les         
cabinets4 #crd ,edition1 #ahjb4         
,,smith1 ,,munro4 ,militarism and       
,statecraft4 #aiah4      ,,thompson1 ,g4
 ,c4 ,public ,opinion and ,lord         
,beaconsfield4 #ahhf4      ,union for   
,democratic ,control4 ,london4          
,publications4 #aibj-aiba4      ,,witte1
 ,,count4 ,memoirs4 #aiba4      ,,young1
 ,,george4 ,diplomacy1 ,old and ,new4   
#aiba4      ,,zurlinden1 ,s4 ,the ,world
 ,war4 ,chapter ,,iv4 ,zurich1 #aiag4   
,,index        ,absolutism1 survival of1
 #aha ff41 #bjh      ,absolutist        
politics1 #adh      ,absolutist         
tradition in diplomacy1 #bjh            
,adams1 ,john ,quincy1 #bd              
,adriatic memorandum1 #bja1 #bjc        
,aehrenthal1 #ajf      ,afghanistan1    
#aeg      ,afghan war1 #fi      ,agadir1
 #ha      ,algeciras1 ,act of1 #hj      
,american government1 #af1 #ah1 #aai1   
#agc1 #aid ff41 #aif      ,american     
idealism1 #bjg      ,alexander ,i1 #df  
,alliances1 #gj1 #gc                    

,alsace-,lorraine1 #fd1 #aba1 #abc      
,anglo-,french ,entente1 #gi1 #hi1 #ic  
,anglo-,japanese ,alliance1 #gc1 #gd    
,antwerp1 #ia      ,apathy of the       
public1 #agb1 #agc      ,appearances1   
#cb      ,archives1 #ea      ,armament  
interests1 #adg      ,asquith1 ,herbert 
,h41 #he1 #hg1 #hh      ,australia1 #baj
      ,austria-,hungary1 #dh1 #di1 #fa1 
#fb1 #fe1 #gj1 #ajd1 #aje1 #ajg1 #aji1  
#aaj1 #abj1            #aba1 #abc1 #abd1
 #acb        ,balfour1 ,arthur ,j41     
#adj1 #ada1 #afa1 #afb1 #afh1 #agf1 #ahg
      ,balkans1 #ig1 #ajd1 #aac1 #adf   
,barnardiston1 ,colonel1 #ia            
,bavaria1 #fa      ,beaconsfield1 ,lord1
 #fg1 #fh1 #fi      ,belgian ,general   
,staff1 #ia      ,belgian neutrality1   
#fb1 #ia      ,benedetti1 #ec1 #fb      
,berchtold1 ,count1 #ajd1 #aje1 #ajf1   
#aad      ,beresford1 ,lord1 #hg        
,bethmann-,hollweg1 #ajd1 #ajf1 #ajg    
,beyens1 ,baron1 #aad      ,bismarck1   
#e1 #aa1 #ca1 #di1 #ea1 #ec1 #fa1 #fc1  
#fd1 #gj1 #adj1 #ahd      ,bjorkoe      

meeting1 #aije1 #gf      ,blue ,books1  
#aef      ,borgo1 ,pozzo di1 #df        
,bosnia1 #aad      ,bosnia and          
,herzegovina1 #fe1 #aje      ,bribery1  
#da1 #db1 #dh      ,bright1 ,john1 #ee1 
#fg1 #aeg      ,british diplomacy1 #bj  
,buchanan1 ,william ,j41 #ach           
,buelow1 ,prince1 #gf      ,bulgaria1   
#abb      ,byles1 ,sir ,w41 #hh         
,cabinet1 #aeh      ,cabinet and        
,parliament1 #ef      ,callires1        
practice of diplomacy1 #bg1 #bi1 #cb    
,canada1 #baj      ,canning1 ,stratford1
 #ed1 #eg      ,caste1 diplomatic1 #ahd 
,castlereagh1 #dg      ,catherine1      
,empress1 #cf1 #db1 #dc1 #dd            
,cavour1 #fj      ,cecil1 ,lord ,hugh1  
#hf      ,censure of news1 #ade         
,central ,powers1 #abj      ,charles1   
,emperor of ,austria1 #aba1 #abc        
,charles ,,ii1 #aeb      ,cheradame1    
,m41 #agg      ,chili-,argentinian      
boundary dispute1 #ach      ,china1     
#aag1 #abf1 #abg1 #adc1 #aii1 #bjh      
,china1 breaking off relations with     

,germany1 #abg1 #abh      ,chinese      
people1 #bj      ,chinese public        
opinion1 #ba      ,chino-,japanese war1 
#gb      ,christian ideal1 #aij         
,clarendon1 ,earl of1 #ee1 #eg1 #aee1   
#aeg      ,comit du ,maroc1 #hj         
,common interests1 #ad1 #bai            
,communist ,party and international     
affairs1 #agi      8,compensations10    
#fe1 #ih1 #abc      ,conference         
diplomacy1 #ae1 #bai      ,conferences1 
international technical1 #bai           
,congress1 #aej      ,constantinople1   
#ed1 #bja      ,continental system1 #hd 
,council of ,five1 #acj                 
,counter-,insurance ,treaty1 #gj        
,crimean war1 #ed1 #ee1 #ef1 #ei        
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protectorate1 #fg                       
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,count1 #ajf1 #aba1 #abc1 #abd1 #afi1   
#ahi        ,daily ,mail1 ,london1 #bje 
,de ,bass1 #cd      ,de ,tocqueville1   

#agj      ,de ,torcy1 #ca1 #da          
,deceit1 #bh1 #bi1 #ci      ,deception1 
#acf      ,declarations1 general1 #adb1 
#add1 #ahf      ,delcass1 ,m41 #gh      
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#aj1 #aeh1 #aei1 #agj1 #agb1 #bad1 #bba 
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#hb      ,dickinson1 ,g4 ,lowes1 #agh   
,digest of ,international ,law1 #aif    
,dillon1 ,dr4 ,e4 ,j41 #acj             
,dillon1 ,john1 #ha1 #hb1 #aeh          
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#ahd      ,diplomacy of authority1 #fd  
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#bah      ,disillusionment1 #bjj1 #bjb  
,disraeli1 #ej1 #fg1 #fh1 #fi           
d',orsat1 ,cardinal1 #cj1 #cc           
,double-dealing1 #gc      ,drake1 #cc   
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,alliance1 #ga        8,empire10 #fh    
,ems dispatch1 #fc                      

,english-speaking powers1 #aai1 #bjd1   
#baj      ,experts1 #h1 #aaa            
,falsiloquy1 #bf      ,far ,eastern     
situation1 #gb1 #aii1 #bja              
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#cc      ,fez1 #hj      ,forgach1       
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#fa1 #fb1 #gj1 #ge1 #gh1 #he1 #hg1 #hh1 
#hi1 #ij1 #ie1 #ig1            #aag1    
#acb1 #acc      ,francis ,joseph1       
,emperor1 #aje1 #ajg                    
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,august1 #aiab1 #ic      8,frankness10  
#cb1 #dj1 #fd1 #adc      ,frederick     
,,ii1 #ch1 #ci1 #db1 #ajc      ,french  
,parliament1 #hb      8,friends of      
liberty10 #ch      ,foreign ,office     
,vote1 #ahf      ,foreign ,relations of 
the ,united ,states1 #aie      ,fox1    
,charles ,james1 #dc        ,german     
diplomacy1 #ajc      ,german-,russian   

agreement1 #gf1 #gg      ,germany1 #fb1 
#fd1 #gj1 #ga1 #gh1 #ha1 #hi1 #ie1 #ajb1
 #ajc1 #ajf1 #agf      ,giolliti1       
,signor1 #ahg      ,gladstone1 #fg      
,golden ,rule1 #dg1 #aie      ,gossip1  
#acg      ,granville1 ,lord1 #ee1 #ff1  
#aeg      ,great ,britain1 #dh1 #fe1    
#fg1 #gb1 #hd1 #hh1 #ig1 #aag1 #aai1    
#adc1 #baj      ,great ,war1 #f1 #ii1   
#aab1 #agd1 #agh      ,greindl1 ,baron1 
#id      ,grey1 ,sir ,edward1 #hj1 #hh1 
#hi1 #ij1 #if1 #ig1 #ajj1 #afj1 #agh    
,gross1 ,m41 #ch      ,grotius1 #aa1    
#ad1 #ae1 #bd1 #bf      ,guillaume1     
,baron1 #id        ,haldane1 ,viscount1 
#hh1 #ajj      ,harris1 ,sir ,james1    
#bi1 #ch1 #dj1 #db      ,harvey1 ,t4    
,edmund1 #ig      ,hayashi1 ,count1 #gc 
,holy ,alliance1 #df      ,honor1 #aaj  
,house of ,lords and foreign affairs1   
#ff1 #aec      ,hughes1 ,secretary1 #af 
,human equation1 #i      ,human welfare1
 #bbb      ,humanitarian professions1   
#adb      ,hungarian railways1 #acc     
,ideals professed1 #aag1 #adb1 #ahf     

,india1 #bj1 #baj      ,india1 frontier 
of1 #fi      ,indifference1 public1     
#agb1 #agc      ,infallibility does not 
exist1 #agf      ,instincts1 #bae       
,isvolsky1 #ge1 #ic1 #aad      ,italy1  
#aag1 #abd      ,ito1 ,marquis1 #gc     
,japan1 #ai1 #gb1 #gc1 #aag1 #aai1 #abd1
 #abf1 #abg1 #adb1 #adc1 #aii1 #bjb     
,japan1 absolutism1 #ahe                
,janushkevich1 ,general1 #aae      ,jay1
 ,john1 #aej1 #aid1 #aie      ,jowett1  
,f4 ,w41 #he      ,jungbluth1 ,general1 
#ia        ,kinloch-,cooke1 ,sir ,c41   
#hg      ,knox1 ,secretary1 #ai1 #adc   
,korea1 #adc      ,krupp ,iron ,works1  
#adg        ,labouchere1 #ej1 #ea1 #ee  
,lalaing1 ,count de1 #id                
,lamsdorff1 ,count1 #gf1 #gg            
,lansdowne1 ,lord1 #gc1 #gi1 #if        
,lansing-,ishii notes1 #aii      ,law1  
,bonar1 #bjd      ,league of ,nations1  
#g1 #ahh1 #bah      ,leutrum1 ,countess1
 #aje      ,liberal theory of state1 #c 
,lincoln1 #bba      ,lloyd-,george1 #abb
      ,london1 ,pact of1 #abj1 #abc     

,loreburn1 ,lord1 #ie1 #if1 #ih1 #aaf   
,lords1 ,house of1 #ff1 #aec      ,louis
 ,,xi1 #bh      ,louis ,,xv1 #eb        
,lowell1 ,j4 ,r41 #ahb      ,lytton1    
,lord1 #agb        ,macartney1 ,sir     
,george1 #cg      ,machiavelli1 #aa1    
#ad1 #bd1 #bh1 #dj1 #ahb                
,mac,neill1 ,swift1 #afj                
,malmesbury1 ,lord1 #bi1 #ch1 #dj       
,manchuria1 #adc      ,manchurian       
railway neutralization1 #ai             
,mandates1 #aca      ,manipulations1    
#bab1 #bba      ,mankind1 underlying    
unity of1 #aia      ,manteuffel1 #ej    
,marcy1 ,secretary1 #ej                 
,marlborough1 ,duke of1 #da             
8,material for statesmanship10 #bae     
,matin1 #hb      ,mazarin1 ,cardinal1   
#cc      ,mediterranean situation1 #hg1 
#hh      ,mehe de la ,touche1 #cc       
,memoirs1 ,eighteenth ,century1 #be     
,methods of diplomacy and of private    
business1 #d1 #adj1 #afc1 #afi          
,metternich1 #ce1 #df1 #dg              
,militarists1 ,german1 #aje1 #ahe       

,militarists1 ,russian1 #aje1 #aae      
,military assistance1 #he1 #ij1 #ib1 #ic
      ,minority interests1 #ahc         
,monarchist diplomacy1 #bc      ,monroe 
,doctrine1 #ah1 #bae      ,moore1 ,john 
,bassett1 #aif1 #aig      ,morny1 ,duc  
de1 #ec      ,morocco1 #fj1 #ga1 #gh1   
#gi1 #hb1 #hi1 #aja1 #adc      ,murray1 
,gilbert1 #agb        ,napoleon ,i1 #ce1
 #df1 #dh      ,napoleon ,,iii1 #e1 #eb1
 #ec1 #ef1 #fj1 #fb1 #fc      ,naval    
assistance1 #hg1 #ij1 #ib1 #ic          
,nationalism1 #aa      ,near ,east1 #acd
      ,necessity of war1 #aah           
,newspapers1 #aga1 #bbc      ,nicholas  
,,ii1 #ef      ,nicholas ,,iii1 #ge1    
#gg1 #aae      ,north ,pacific islands1 
#ai1 #abh1 #bjb      ,notes1 exchange   
of1 ,november1 #aiab1 #ib               
,objectives1 constancy of1 #bab         
,open covenants1 #acj      ,open ,door1 
#ah1 #add        ,pact of ,london1 #abj1
 #abc      ,palmerston1 #ca1 #ed1 #ef1  
#ei1 #fh      ,panin1 #cg1 #db1 #dc     
,parliament and foreign affairs1 #adi   

ff4      ,parliament and secret         
diplomacy1 #hb1 #he1 #id1 #ie1 #ih1 #adi
 ff4      ,peace ,conference of ,paris1 
#abi1 #acj      8,peace of ,asia10 #adc 
,pelham1 #aed      8,people who are not 
responsible10 #afh1 #baf      ,pester   
,lloyd1 #aaj      ,pinckney1 #dd        
,plutocratic control1 #ahc              
,poincar1 ,president1 #ic1 #aba         
,poland1 #dg1 #aah      ,policy1        
diplomatic1 #dh1 #eh1 #aff      ,polish 
,question1 #aah      ,politics1 essence 
of1 #ac1 #ci      ,polk1                
,undersecretary1 #bjc      ,port        
,arthur1 surrender1 #gb      ,portugal1 
#ae1 #aij      ,potemkin1 ,prince1 #da1 
#dc      ,press1 control of1 #ade1 #aga 
,pressens1 ,francis de1 #hj             
,prestige1 #agf      ,preventive war1   
#ac1 #fd1 #ajf1 #ajh      ,private      
business and diplomatic affairs1 #d1    
#adj1 #afc1 #afi      ,propaganda1 #baf 
,prussia1 #di1 #ec1 #fa1 #fb            
,public opinion1 crime against1 #add    
,public opinion and diplomacy1 #eh1     

#ajb1 #aab1 #add1 #aff ff4              
,publicity1 #baf1 #bag        ,rashness1
 alleged1 of the people1 #agg      8,raw
 material for brilliant careers10 #ahe  
,realpolitik1 #ajc      ,reichstag1 #ajb
      ,representative government1 #eh   
,ribot1 ,alexander1 #abc                
,roosevelt1 ,president1 #aea            
,rosebery1 ,lord1 #ff      ,rosebery1   
,lord1 on ,anglo-,japanese treaty1 #gd  
,rosebery1 ,lord1 on ,entente1 #hd      
,rosen1 ,baron1 #gd      ,roumania1 #aah
      ,russell1 ,lord ,john1 #eb1 #eg   
,russia1 #g1 #cg1 #ee1 #fe1 #fg1 #gj1   
#ge1 #gh1 #ig1 #ajd1 #aje1 #ajh1 #aji1  
#aad1            #adc1 #adf1 #bjh1 #bab 
,russian diplomatic policy1 #aab        
,russian local agents1 #ed              
,russo-,french ,alliance1 #gj           
,russo-,turkish war1 #fe                
,salisbury1 ,marquis of1 #ff1 #aeg      
,san ,domingo1 #aea      ,san ,stefano1 
treaty of1 #fe      ,sandwich1 ,earl of1
 #cg      ,savoy and ,nice1 #fj         
,sazonov1 #aab1 #aae1 #acc              

,schleswig-,holstein1 #fa               
,schuvalof agreement1 #aef      ,secret 
diplomacy1 abolition of1 #abg1 #bah     
8,secret diplomacy0 used in a special   
sense1 #eb1 #eg      ,secret procedure1 
,paris ,conference1 #g      ,secret     
service1 #bb1 #bh1 #da1 #ej1 #acf1 #acg 
,secret treaties1 #dh1 #fa1 #fe1 #fg1   
#ga1 #gf1 #gh1 #gi1 #aac1 #aaf ff41     
#aai1 #acd1 #afd      ,senate and       
foreign affairs1 #aea1 #aig             
,servian question1 #ajd1 #ajh1 #aac     
,shantung1 #aag1 #abe1 #abh             
,sixtus1 ,prince1 of ,bourbon1 #abj     
,south ,pacific ,islands1 #aai          
,soviet ,russia1 #acc1 #agi      ,speech
 of ,august #c1 #aiad1 #hi1 #if         
,spheres of influence1 #gi      ,st4    
,petersburg1 #dj1 #eb1 #gc              
,standing ,committee of ,foreign        
,affairs1 proposed1 #afb1 #afd1 #ahf    
,standing committee on foreign and      
colonial affairs in ,france1 #ahg       
,stanhope1 ,lord1 #ca      ,stratagem1  
#ach      ,stratford de ,redcliffe1 #ed1

 #ee1 #eg      ,survival1 #ac           
,suspicion1 #f1 #ag1 #ed1 #gb1 #ajj1    
#abf1 #acf1 #ada      ,sweden1 #cg      
,talleyrand1 #dd1 #df      ,temps1 #hb  
,tibet1 #add      ,times1 ,london1 #bjd1
 #bje      ,trait de diplomatie1        
,garden1 #dh      ,treaties1 publication
 of all1 #ahh1 #bje1 #bjf      ,treaty  
of ,versailles1 #abi      ,triple       
,alliance1 #gj      ,trotsky1 #agi      
,truthfulness of diplomacy1 #ab1 #cj    
,tschirsky1 ,von1 #gg1 #ajf1 #ajg       
,turkey1 #ch1 #fg      ,turkish ,empire1
 #fj      ,twenty-one demands1 #aag1    
#abe      ,two-party system1 #aeb       
,united ,colonies of ,america1 #adi     
,united ,states1 #aai1 #aea1 #agd1 #ahf1
 #aid ff41 #bja1 #bji        ,vattel1   
#bf      ,vienna1 ,congress of1 #de     
,viviani1 ,m41 #aae        ,walpole1    
,sir ,robert1 #aed      ,walpole1       
,horace1 #de      ,war1 declaration of1 
#ahf1 #ahg      ,washington1 ,conference
 of1 #aiba1 #af      ,wells1 ,h4 ,g41   
#ahe      ,westminster ,gazette1 #bjd   

,whist1 #ej      ,william ,i1 #fc       
,william ,,ii1 #ge1 #gf1 #gh            
,william ,,iii of ,england1 #aec        
,willy-,nicky correspondence1 #ge       
,wilson1 ,president1 #ba1 #abi1 #afi1   
#bjj1 #bja1 #bjc1 #bjd      ,wotton1    
,sir ,henry1 #bh      ,wyndham1 #aec    
,xavier1 ,prince of ,bourbon1 #abj1 #abc
        ,yap1 #bja1 #bjb      ,yerburgh1
 ,mr41 #he      ,yugo-,slavia and       
,france1 #acc          ,transcriber's   
,notes      ,punctuation1 hyphenation1  
and spelling were made consistent when a
  predominant preference was found in   
the original book2 otherwise they  were 
not changed4    ,simple typographical   
errors were corrected2 unbalanced       
quotation  marks were remedied when the 
change was obvious1 and otherwise left  
unbalanced4    ,the index was not       
checked for proper alphabetization or   
correct page  references4    ,page #bbe3
 ,the 80 in 8,goriar0 may have been     
printed with a breve 771  not with a    
caron 774