,a ,,handbook ,,of ,,ethical ,,theory   
,,by ,,george ,,stuart ,,fullerton      
,to  ,,my ,,wife     ,,preface   ,we are
 all amply provided1 with moral maxims1 
which we hold with more or less         
confidence1 but an insight into their   
significance is not attained without    
reflection and some serious effort4     
,yet1 surely1 in a field in which there 
are so many differences of opinion1     
clearness of insight and breadth of view
 are eminently desirable4  ,it is with a
 view to helping students of ethics in  
our universities and outside of them to 
a clearer comprehension of the          
significance of morals and the end of   
ethical endeavor1 that this book has    
been written4  ,i have1 in the ,notes   
appended to it1 taken the liberty of    
making a few suggestions to teachers1   
some of whom have fewer years of        
teaching behind them than ,i have4 ,i   
make no apology for writing in a clear  
and untechnical style1 nor for reducing 
to a minimum references to literatures  

in other tongues than our own4 ,these   
things are in accord with the aim of the
 volume4  ,i take this opportunity of   
thanking ,professor ,margaret ,f4       
,washburn1 of ,vassar ,college1 and     
,professor ,f4 ,j4 ,e4 ,woodbridge1 of  
,columbia ,university1 for kind         
assistance1 which ,i have found helpful4
  ,g4 ,s4 ,f4 ,new ,york1 #aiba4        
,,contents  ,,part ,i  ,,the ,,accepted 
,,content ,,of ,,morals  ,,chapter ,i4  
,,is ,,there ,,an ,,accepted ,,content8 
#a4 ,the ,point in ,dispute4 #b4 ,what  
,constitutes ,substantial ,agreement8   
#c4 ,dogmatic ,assumption4  ,,chapter   
,,ii4 ,,the ,,codes ,,of ,,communities  
#d4 ,the ,codes of ,communities3        
,justice4 #e4 ,the ,codes of            
,communities3 ,veracity4 #f4 ,the ,codes
 of ,communities3 the ,common ,good4    
,,chapter ,,iii4 ,,the ,,codes ,,of     
,,the ,,moralists #g4 ,the ,moralists4  
#h4 ,epicurean and ,stoic4 #i4 ,plato2  
,aristotle2 the ,church4 #aj4 ,later    
,lists of the ,virtues4 #aa4 ,the       

,stretching of ,moral ,concepts4 #ab4   
,the ,reflective ,mind and the ,moral   
,codes4  ,,part ,,ii  ,,ethics ,,as     
,,science  ,,chapter ,,iv4 ,,the        
,,awakening ,,to ,,reflection #ac4 ,the 
,dogmatism of the ,natural ,man4 #ad4   
,the ,awakening4  ,,chapter ,v4         
,,ethical ,,method #ae4 ,inductive and  
,deductive ,method4 #af ,the ,authority 
of the ,given4  ,,chapter ,,vi4 ,,the   
,,materials ,,of ,,ethics #ag4 ,how the 
,moralist should ,proceed4 #ah4 ,the    
,philosopher as ,moralist4  ,,chapter   
,,vii4 ,,the ,,aim ,,of ,,ethics ,,as   
,,science #ai4 ,the ,appeal to ,reason4 
#bj4 ,the ,appeal to ,reason ,justified4
  ,,part ,,iii  ,,man ,,and ,,his       
,,environment  ,,chapter ,,viii4        
,,man',s ,,nature #ba4 ,the ,background 
of ,actions4 #bb4 ,man's ,nature4 #bc4  
,how ,discover ,man's ,nature8          
,,chapter ,,ix4 ,,man',s ,,material     
,,environment #bd4 ,the ,struggle with  
,nature4 #be4 ,the ,conquests of the    
,mind4 #bf4 ,the ,conquest of ,nature   

and the ,well-being of ,man4  ,,chapter 
,x4 ,,man',s ,,social ,,environment #bg4
 ,man is ,assigned his ,place4 #bh4     
,varieties of the ,social ,order4 #bi4  
,social ,organization4 #cj4 ,social     
,order and ,human ,will4  ,,part ,,iv   
,,the ,,realm ,,of ,,ends  ,,chapter    
,,xi4 ,,impulse1 ,,desire1 ,,and ,,will 
#ca4 ,impulse4 #cb4 ,desire4 #cc4       
,desire of the ,unattainable4 #cd4      
,will4 #ce4 ,desire and ,will not       
,identical4 #cf4 ,the ,will and         
,deferred ,action4  ,,chapter ,,xii4    
,,the ,,permanent ,,will #cg4           
,consciously ,chosen ,ends4 #ch4 ,ends  
not ,consciously ,chosen4 #ci4 ,the     
,choice of ,ideals4  ,,chapter ,,xiii4  
,,the ,,object ,,in ,,desire ,,and      
,,will #dj4 ,the ,object as ,end to be  
,realized4 #da4 ,human ,nature and the  
,objects ,chosen4 #db4 ,the ,instincts  
and ,impulses of ,man4 #dc4 ,the ,study 
of ,man's ,instincts ,important4 #dd4   
,the ,bewildering ,multiplicity of the  
,objects of ,desire1 and the ,effort    

to ,find an ,underlying ,unity4         
,,chapter ,,xiv4 ,,intention ,,and      
,,motive #de4 ,complex ,ends4 #df4      
,intention4 #dg4 ,motive4 #dh4 ,ethical 
,significance of ,intention and ,motive4
  ,,chapter ,,xv4 ,,feeling ,,as        
,,motive #di4 ,feeling4 #ej4 ,feeling   
and ,action4 #ea4 ,feeling as ,object4  
#eb4 ,freedom as ,object4  ,,chapter    
,,xvi4 ,,rationality ,,and ,,will #ec4  
,the ,irrational ,will4 #ed4 ,one ,view 
of ,reason4 #ee4 ,dominant and          
,subordinate ,desires4 #ef4 ,the        
,harmonization of ,desires4 #eg4        
,varieties of ,dominant ,ends4 #eh4 ,an 
,objection ,answered4 #ei4 ,this ,view  
of ,reason ,misconceived4 #fj4 ,another 
,view of ,reason4  ,,part ,v  ,,the     
,,social ,,will  ,,chapter ,,xvii4      
,,characteristics ,,of ,,the ,,social   
,,will #fa4 ,what is the ,social ,will8 
#fb4 ,social ,will and ,social ,habits4 
#fc4 ,social ,will and ,social          
,organization4 #fd4 ,the ,social ,will  
and ,ideal ,ends4 #fe4 ,the ,permanent  

,social ,will4  ,,chapter ,,xviii4      
,,expressions ,,of ,,the ,,social ,,will
 #ff4 ,custom4 #fg4 ,the ,ground for the
 ,authority of ,custom4 #fh4 ,the       
,origin and the ,persistence of         
,customs4 #fi4 ,law4 #gj4 ,public       
,opinion4  ,,chapter ,,xix4 ,,the       
,,sharers ,,in ,,the ,,social ,,will    
#ga4 ,the ,community4 #gb4 ,the         
,community and the ,dead4 #gc4 ,the     
,community and the ,supernatural4 #gd4  
,religion and the ,community4 #ge4 ,the 
,spread of the ,community4  ,,part ,,vi 
,,the ,,real ,,social ,,will  ,,chapter 
,,xx4 ,,the ,,imperfect ,,social ,,will 
#gf4 ,the ,apparent and the ,real       
,social ,will4 #gg4 ,the ,will of the   
,majority4 #gh4 ,ignorance and ,error   
and the ,social ,will4 #gi4             
,heedlessness and the ,social ,will4    
#hj4 ,rational ,elements in the         
,irrational ,will4 #ha4 ,the ,social    
,will and the ,selfishness of the       
,individual4  ,,chapter ,,xxi4 ,,the    
,,rational ,,social ,,will #hb4         

,reasonable ,ends4 #hc4 ,an ,objection  
,answered4 #hd4 ,reasonable ,social     
,ends4 #he4 ,the ,ethics of ,reason4    
#hf4 ,the ,development of ,civilization4
  ,,chapter ,,xxii4 ,,the ,,individual  
,,and ,,the ,,social ,,will #hg4 ,man's 
,multiple ,allegiance4 #hh4 ,the ,appeal
 to ,reason4 #hi4 ,the ,ethics of       
,reason and the ,varying ,moral ,codes4 
,,part ,,vii  ,,the ,,schools ,,of ,,the
 ,,moralists  ,,chapter ,,xxiii4        
,,intuitionism #ij4 ,what is it8 #ia4   
,varieties of ,intuitionism4 #ib4       
,arguments for ,intuitionism4 #ic4      
,arguments against ,intuitionism4 #id4  
,the ,value of ,moral ,intuitions4      
,,chapter ,,xxiv4 ,,egoism #ie4 ,what is
 ,egoism8 #if4 ,crass ,egoisms4 #ig4    
,equivocal ,egoism8 #ih4 ,what is ,meant
 by the ,self8 #ii4 ,egoism and the     
,broader ,self4 #ajj4 ,egoism not       
,unavoidable4 #aja4 ,varieties of       
,egoism4 #ajb4 ,the ,arguments for      
,egoism4 #ajc4 ,the ,argument against   
,egoism4 #ajd4 ,the ,moralist's         

,interest in ,egoism4  ,,chapter ,,xxv4 
,,utilitarianism #aje4 ,what is         
,utilitarianism8 #ajf4 ,bentham's       
,doctrine4 #ajg4 ,the ,doctrine of ,j4  
,s4 ,mill4 #ajh4 ,the ,argument for     
,utilitarianism4 #aji4 ,the             
,distribution of ,happiness4 #aaj4 ,the 
,calculus of ,pleasures4 #aaa4 ,the     
,difficulties of ,other ,schools4 #aab4 
,summary of ,arguments for              
,utilitarianism4 #aac4 ,arguments       
against ,utilitarianism4 #aad4          
,transfigured ,utilitarianism4          
,,chapter ,,xxvi4 ,,nature1             
,,perfection1 ,,self-,,realization ,i4  
,nature #aae4 ,human ,nature as         
,accepted ,standard4 #aaf4 ,human       
,nature and the ,law of ,nature4 #aag4  
,vagueness of the ,law of ,nature4 #aah4
 ,the ,appeal to ,nature and            
,intuitionism4  ,,ii4 ,perfection #aai4 
,perfection and ,type4 #abj4 ,more and  
,less ,perfect ,types4 #aba4            
,perfectionism and ,intuitionism4       
,,iii4 ,self-realization #abb4 ,the     

,self-realization ,doctrine4 #abc4 ,the 
,doctrine ,akin to that of ,following   
,nature4 #abd4 ,is the ,doctrine ,more  
,egoistic8 #abe4 ,why ,aim to ,realize  
,capacities8 #abf4 ,the ,problem of     
,self-sacrifice4 #abg4                  
,self-satisfaction and ,self-sacrifice4 
#abh4 ,can ,moral ,self-sacrifice be a  
,duty8 #abi4 ,self-sacrifice and the    
,identity of ,selves4 #acj4 ,questions  
which ,seem to be ,left ,open4          
,,chapter ,,xxvii4 ,,the ,,ethics ,,of  
,,evolution #aca4 ,the ,significance of 
the ,title4 #acb4 ,evolution and the    
,schools of the ,moralists4 #acc4 ,the  
,ethics of ,individual ,evolutionists4  
,,chapter ,,xxviii4 ,,pessimism #acd4   
,the ,philosophy of the ,pessimist4     
#ace4 ,comment on the ,ethics of        
,pessimism4  ,,chapter ,,xxix4 ,,kant1  
,,hegel ,,and ,,nietzsche #acf4 ,kant4  
#acg4 ,hegel4 #ach4 ,nietzsche4  ,,part 
,,viii  ,,the ,,ethics ,,of ,,the       
,,social ,,will  ,,chapter ,,xxx4       
,,aspects ,,of ,,the ,,ethics ,,of      

,,reason #aci4 ,the ,doctrine ,supported
 by the ,other ,schools4 #adj4 ,its     
,method of ,approach to ,problems4 #ada4
 ,its ,solution of ,certain             
,difficulties4 #adb4 ,the ,cultivation  
of ,our ,capacities4  ,,chapter ,,xxxi4 
,,the ,,moral ,,law ,,and ,,moral       
,,ideals #adc4 ,duties and ,virtues4    
#add4 ,the ,negative ,aspect of the     
,moral ,law4 #ade4 ,how ,can ,one ,know 
the ,moral ,law8  ,,chapter ,,xxxii4    
,,the ,,moral ,,concepts #adf4 ,good and
 ,bad2 ,right and ,wrong4 #adg4 ,duty   
and ,obligation4 #adh4 ,reward and      
,punishment4 #adi4 ,virtues and ,vices4 
#aej4 ,conscience4  ,,chapter ,,xxxiii4 
,,the ,,ethics ,,of ,,the ,,individual4 
#aea4 ,what is ,meant by the ,term8     
#aeb4 ,the ,virtues of the ,individual4 
#aec4 ,conventional ,morality4          
,,chapter ,,xxxiv4 ,,the ,,ethics ,,of  
,,the ,,state #aed4 ,the ,aim of the    
,state4 #aee4 ,its ,origin and          
,authority4 #aef4 ,forms of             
,organization4 #aeg4 ,the ,laws of the  

,state4 #aeh4 ,the ,rights and ,duties  
of the ,state4  ,,chapter ,,xxxv4       
,,international ,,ethics #aei4 ,what is 
,meant by the ,term4 #afj4 ,our ,method 
of ,approach to the ,subject4 #afa4     
,some ,problems of ,international       
,ethics4 #afb4 ,the ,other ,side of the 
,shield4 #afc4 ,the ,solution4 #afd4    
,the ,necessity for ,caution4  ,,chapter
 ,,xxxvi4 ,,ethics ,,and ,,other        
,,disciplines #afe4 ,sciences that      
,concern the ,moralist4 #aff4 ,ethics   
and ,philosophy4 #afg4 ,ethics and      
,religion4 #afh4 ,ethics and ,belief4   
#afi4 ,the ,last ,word4  ,,notes        
,,index      ,,part ,i  ,,the ,,accepted
 ,,content ,,of ,,morals   ,,chapter ,i 
,,is ,,there ,,an ,,accepted ,,content8 
#a4 ,,the ,,point ,,in ,,dispute4--,is  
there an accepted content of morals8    
,can we use the expression without going
 on to ask3 ,accepted where1 when1 and  
by whom8  ,to be sure1 certain eminent  
moralists have inclined to maintain that
 men are in substantial agreement in    

regard to their moral judgments4 ,joseph
 ,butler1 writing in the first half of  
the eighteenth century1 came to the     
conclusion that1 however men may dispute
 about particulars1 there is an         
universally acknowledged standard of    
virtue1 professed in public in all ages 
and all countries1 made a show of by all
 men1 enforced by the primary and       
fundamental laws of all civil           
constitutions3 namely1 justice1         
veracity1 and regard to common good4    
,footnote3 ,dissertation on the ,nature 
of ,virtue4 ,sir ,leslie ,stephen1      
writing in the latter half of the       
nineteenth1 tells us that in one sense  
moralists are almost unanimous2 in      
another they are hopelessly discordant4 
,they are unanimous in pronouncing      
certain classes of conduct to be right  
and the opposite wrong4 ,no moralist    
denies that cruelty1 falsity and        
intemperance are vicious1 or that mercy1
 truth and temperance are virtuous4     
,footnote3 ,the ,science of ,ethics1    

chapter i1 ,sec4 #a4  ,in other words1  
these writers would teach us that men   
are1 on the whole1 agreed in approving1 
explicitly or implicitly1 some standard 
of conduct sufficiently definite to     
serve as a code of morals4 ,but that    
there is such a substantial agreement   
among men has not impressed all         
observers to the same degree4 ,locke1   
who wrote before ,butler1 based his     
arguments against the existence of      
innate moral maxims upon the wide       
divergencies found among various classes
 of men touching what is right and what 
is wrong4 ,footnote3 ,essay ,concerning 
,human ,understanding1 ,book ,i1 chapter
 iii4 ,the historian1 the anthropologist
 and the sociologist reinforce his      
reasonings with a wealth of illustration
 not open to the men of an earlier time4
 ,they present us with codes1 not a     
code2 with multitudinous standards1 not 
a single standard2 with what has been   
accepted here or there1 at this time or 
at that2 and we may well ask ourselves  

where1 amid this profusion1 we are to   
find the one and acceptable code4  #b4  
,,what ,,constitutes ,,substantial      
,,agreement8--,to be sure1 we may be    
very generous in our interpretation of  
what constitutes substantial agreement2 
we may deny significance to all sorts of
 discrepancies by relegating them to the
 unimpressive class of disputes about   
particulars4 ,such an impressionistic   
indifference to detail may leave us with
 something on our hands as little       
serviceable as a composite photograph   
made from individual objects which have 
little in common1 a blur lacking all    
definite outline and not recognizable as
 any object at all4 ,no man can guide   
his conduct by the common core of many  
or of all moral codes4 ,taken in its    
bald abstraction1 it is not a code or   
anything like a code4 ,who can walk1    
without walking in some particular way1 
in some direction1 at some time8 ,who   
can mind his manners without being      
mannerly in accordance with the usages  

of some race or people8  ,those who     
content themselves with enunciating very
 general moral principles may1 it is    
true1 be of no little service to their  
fellow-men2 but that is only because    
their fellow-men are able to supply the 
details that convert the blur into a    
picture4 ,some twenty-four hundred years
 ago ,heraclitus told his contemporaries
 to act according to nature with        
understanding2 we are often told today  
that the rule of our lives should be to 
do good4 ,had the ancient ,greek not    
possessed his own notions of what might 
properly be meant by nature and by      
understanding1 did we not ourselves have
 some rather definite conception of what
 actions may properly fall under the    
caption of doing good1 such admonitions 
could not lead to the stirring of a     
finger4 ,who would appeal to his        
physician for advice as to diet1 if he  
expected from him no more than the      
counsel to eat1 at the proper hours1    
enough1 but not too much1 of suitable   

food8  ,if1 then1 we confine our        
admonitions to the group of abstractions
 which constitute the universally       
acknowledged standard of virtue when all
 the individual differences which       
characterize different codes have been  
ignored1 we preach what1 taken alone1 no
 man can live by1 and no community of   
men has ever attempted to live by4 ,if  
we leave it to our hearers to drape our 
naked abstractions with concrete        
details1 each will set to work in a     
different way4 ,the method of the       
composite photograph seems unprofitable 
in attempting to solve the problem of   
morals4  #c4 ,,dogmatic                 
,,assumption4--,there is1 however1 a    
second way by which the variations which
 characterize different codes may come  
to be relegated to a position of        
relative insignificance4 ,we may assume 
that our own code is the ultimate       
standard by which all others are to be  
judged1 and we may set down deviations  
from it to the account of the ignorance 

or the perversity of our fellowmen4 ,so 
regarded1 they are aberrations from the 
normal1 and only true code of conduct2  
interesting1 perhaps1 but little        
enlightening1 for they can have little  
bearing upon our conception of what we  
ought to do4  ,a presumption against    
this arbitrary assumption that we have  
the one and only desirable code is      
suggested the unthinking acceptance of  
the traditional by those who are lacking
 in enlightenment and in the capacity   
reflection4 ,is it not significant that 
a contact with new ways of thinking has 
a tendency1 at least1 to make men       
broaden their horizon and to revise some
 of their views8  ,in other fields1 we  
hope to attain to a capacity for        
self-criticism4 ,we expect to learn from
 other men4 ,why should we1 in the      
sphere of morals1 lay claim to the      
possession of the truth1 the whole      
truth1 and nothing but the truth8 ,why  
should we refuse to learn from anyone8  
,such a position seems unreasoning4 ,it 

puts moral judgments beyond the pale of 
argument and intelligent discussion4 ,it
 is an assumption of infallibility      
little in harmony with the spirit of    
science4 ,the fact that a given standard
 of conduct is in harmony with our      
traditions1 habits of thought1 and      
emotional responses1 does not prove to  
other men that it is1 not one of a      
number of accepted codes1 but in a quite
 peculiar sense acceptable1 a thing to  
put in a class by itself--the class into
 which each mother puts her own child1  
as over against other children4         
,moreover1 such an unreasoned assumption
 of superiority must make one little    
sympathetic in one's attitude toward the
 moral life of other peoples4 ,into the 
significance of their social            
organization1 of their customs1 their   
laws1 one can gain no insight4 ,their   
hopes1 their fears1 their strivings1    
their successes and their failures1     
their approval and disapproval of their 
fellows1 their peace of conscience and  

their remorse1 must leave us cold and   
aloof4  ,it is not profitable for us to 
assume at the outset that the           
differences exhibited in the moral      
judgments of individuals or of peoples  
are of minor significance4 ,they are    
facts to be dealt with in the light of  
some theory4 ,an ethical theory which   
ignores them must rest upon a narrow and
 insecure foundation4 ,it is exposed to 
assault from many quarters4 ,it may1 in 
default of better means of defence1 be  
compelled to take refuge behind the     
blind wall of dogmatic assertion4 ,on   
the other hand1 a theory which gives    
them frank recognition1 and strives to  
exhibit their real significance in the  
life of the individual and of the race1 
may be able to show lying among them the
 golden cord of reason which saves them 
from the charge of being incoherent     
facts4 ,it may even lead us back to a   
conservatism no longer unreasoning1 but 
rationally defensible and conscious of  
its proper limits4 ,the blindly         

conservative man seems to be faced with 
the alternative of stagnation or        
revolution4 ,the rationally conservative
 may regard the development of the moral
 life as a ,pilgrim's ,progress1 not    
without its untoward accidents1 but1 in 
spite of them1 a gradual advance toward 
a desirable goal4     ,,chapter ,,ii    
,,the ,,codes ,,of ,,communities   #d4  
,,the ,,codes ,,of ,,communities3       
,,justice4--,in view of the existing    
tendency in the average man1 and even in
 some philosophers1 to pass lightly over
 the diversities exhibited by different 
codes1 it is well to cast a brief       
preliminary glance at the content of    
morals as accepted1 both by communities 
of men1 and by their more reflective    
spokesmen1 the moralists4 ,let us first 
take a look at the codes of communities4
  ,we have seen that ,butler viewed     
justice1 veracity and regard to common  
good as virtues accepted among men      
everywhere4 ,but we may also see1 if we 
look into his pages1 that he neglected  

to point out that there may be the      
widest divergencies in men's notions of 
what constitutes justice1 veracity and  
common good4 ,and men differ widely on  
the score of the degree of emphasis to  
be laid upon their observance4  ,take   
justice4 ,where men possess a code1     
written or unwritten1 that may properly 
be called moral1 we expect of them the  
judgment that guilt should be punished4 
,but what shall be accounted guilt8     
,what shall be the measure of           
retribution8 ,who shall be fixed upon as
 guilty8  ,as to what constitutes guilt4
 ,we have only to remind ourselves that 
the ,dyak head-hunter is not condemned  
by his fellows1 but is admired2         
,footnote3 ,,westermarck1 ,the ,origin  
and ,development of the ,moral ,ideas1  
,london1 #aijf1 ,i1 chapter xiv4 that   
the fattening and eating of a slave may1
 in a given primitive community1 be     
accounted no crime2 ,footnote3          
,,westermarck1 op4 cit4 ,,ii1 chapter   
xlvi4 that infanticide has been most    

widely approved1 and that not merely in 
primitive communities1 for ,greece and  
,rome1 when they were far from          
primitive1 practiced certain forms of it
 with a view to the good of the state2  
,footnote3 ,ibid41 ,i1 chapter xvii4    
that the holding of a fellow-creature in
 bondage1 and exploiting him for one's  
own advantage1 even under the lash1 was1
 until recently1 not a crime in the eye 
of the law even in the most civilized   
states4 ,on the other hand1 it may be a 
crime to eat a female opossum4          
,footnote3 ,ibid41 ,i1 chapter iv1 p4   
#abd4 ,the impressive imperative3 ,thou 
shalt not6 appears to bear unmistakable 
reference to time and circumstance4     
,and what is the natural and proper     
measure of punishment8 ,the ancient and 
primitive rule of an eye for an eye and 
a tooth for a tooth suggests the figure 
of the scales1 the impartially meting   
out to each man of his due4 ,it is      
obviously a rule that cannot be applied 
in all cases4 ,one cannot take the tooth

 of a toothless man1 or compel a        
thievish beggar to restore fruit which  
he has eaten4 ,we should be horrified   
were any serious attempt made to make   
the rule the basis of legislation in any
 civilized state today1 but men have not
 always been so fastidious4             
,approximations to it have been         
incorporated into the laws of various   
peoples4  ,but all have modified it to  
some degree1 and the modifications have 
taken many forms--the punishment of     
someone not the criminal1 compensation  
in money or in goods1 incarceration1 and
 what not4 ,nor have the modifications  
been made solely on account of the      
difficulty of applying the rule baldly  
stated4 ,other influences have been at  
work4  ,thus1 in the famous ,babylonian 
code1 the man who struck out the eye of 
a patrician lost his own eye in return1 
and his tooth answered for the tooth of 
an equal--but the rule was not made     
general4 ,footnote3 #e ,,hobhouse1      
,morals in ,evolution1 ,i1 chapter iii1 

,sec #c2 ,new ,york1 #aijf4 ,in state   
after state it has been found just to   
treat differently the patrician1 the    
plebeian1 the slave1 the man1 the woman1
 the priest4 ,in the very state to which
 ,butler belonged1 benefit of clergy    
could be claimed1 up to relatively      
recent times1 by those who could read4  
,the educated criminal escaped hanging  
for offences for which his illiterate   
neighbor had to swing4 ,footnote3       
,ibid41 ,sec4 #aa4  ,nor is there any   
clear concensus of opinion touching the 
question of who shall be selected as the
 bearer of punishment4 ,if a man has    
injured another unintentionally1 shall  
he be held to make amends8 ,it has      
seemed just to men that he should4      
,footnote3 ,,westermarck1 chapter ix4   
,that one man should be made responsible
 for the misdeeds of another1 under the 
principle of collective responsibility1 
has commended itself as just to a       
multitude of minds4 ,not merely the sins
 of the fathers1 but those of the most  

distant relations1 those of neighbors1  
of fellow-tribesmen1 of fellow-citizens1
 have been visited upon those whose sole
 guilt lay in such a connection with the
 directly guilty parties4 ,this is not a
 sporadic phenomenon4 ,among the ancient
 ,hebrews1 in ,babylonia1 in ,greece1 in
 the later legislation of ,rome1 in     
medieval and even in modern ,europe1 the
 principle of collective responsibility 
has been accepted and has seemed        
acceptable4 ,asia1 ,africa and ,oceania 
have cast votes for it4 ,so have the    
,americas4 ,footnote3 ,,westermarck1 ,i1
 chapter ii2 ,,dewey ,,and ,,tufts1     
,ethics1 ,new ,york1 #aiai1 ,part ,i1   
chapter ii4  #e4 ,,the ,,codes ,,of     
,,communites3 ,,veracity4--,as to       
veracity3 ,it has undoubtedly been      
valued to some degree1 and with certain 
limitations1 by tribes and nations the  
most diverse in their degrees of        
culture4 ,did men never speak the truth 
they might well never speak at all4 ,but
 to maintain that absolute veracity has 

at all times been greatly valued would  
be an exaggeration4 ,the lie of         
courtesy1 the clever lie1 the lie to the
 stranger1 have been and still are1 in  
many communities both uncivilized and   
more advanced1 not merely condoned1 but 
approved4 ,with the defence which has   
been made of the doctrines of mental    
reservation and pious fraud students of 
church history are familiar4 ,in        
diplomacy and in war today highly       
civilized nations find deceptions of    
many sorts profitable to them1 nor are  
such generally condemned4 ,footnote3    
,,westermarck1 ,,ii1 chapters xxx and   
xxxi4  ,what modern government does not 
employ secret service agents1 and value 
them in proportion to the degree of     
skill with which they manage to deceive 
their fellows1 while limiting the       
exercise of professional good faith to  
their intercourse with their paymaster8 
,the secret service agent of transparent
 frankness1 who could not bear to       
deceive his neighbor1 would not hold his

 post for a day4 ,he would be a subject 
for ,homeric laughter4  ,moreover1 if   
the question may be raised3 what        
constitutes justice8 may one not equally
 well ask3 what constitutes veracity or 
its opposite8 ,where does the silence of
 indifference shade into purposed       
concealment1 and the latter into what is
 unequivocally deception8 ,at what point
 does deception blossom out into the    
unmistakable lie8 ,one may take         
advantage of an accidental              
misunderstanding of what one has said2  
one may use ambiguous language2 one may 
point instead of speaking4 ,between     
going about with a head of glass1 with  
all one's thoughts displayed as in a    
show-case to every comer1 and the       
settled purpose to deceive by the direct
 verbal falsification1 there is a long  
series of intermediate positions4 ,the  
commercial maxim that one is not bound  
to teach the man with whom one is       
dealing how to conduct his business1 and
 the lawyer's dictum that the advocate  

is under no obligation to put himself in
 the position of the judge1 obviously1  
will bear much stretching4  #f4 ,,the   
,,codes ,,of ,,communities3 ,,the       
,,common ,,good4--,nor are the facts    
which confront us less perplexing when  
we turn to that regard to the common    
good which ,butler finds to be          
acknowledged and enforced by the primary
 and fundamental laws of all civil      
constitutions4 ,whether we look at the  
past or view the present1 whether we    
study primitive communities or confine  
ourselves to civilized nations1 we see  
that common good is not1 apparently1    
conceived as the good of all men1       
however much the words justice and      
humanity may be upon men's lips4  ,has  
any modern state as yet succeeded in    
incorporating in its civil constitution 
such provisions as will ensure to all   
classes of its subjects any considerable
 share in the common good8 ,slaves and  
animals1 said ,aristotle1 have no share 
in happiness1 nor do they live after    

their own choice4 ,footnote3 ,politics1 
iii1 #i4 ,the pervading unrest of the   
modern economic community is due to the 
widespread conviction that the existing 
organization of society does not        
sufficiently make for the happiness of  
all4 ,some states with a high degree of 
culture have not even made a pretence of
 having any such aim4 ,they have        
deliberately legislated for the few4    
,footnote3 ,the citizens of the ancient 
,greek state were a privileged class who
 legislated in their own interest4 ,let 
the reader look into ,plato's ,laws and 
,aristotle's ,politics and see how      
inconceivable the cultivated ,greek     
found what is now the ideal of a modern 
democracy4 ,citizens should own landed  
property1 and work it by slaves1        
barbarians and servants4 ,they should   
not be ignoble mechanics or petty       
traders4 ,compare the spirit of         
,froissart's ,chronicles1 in the ,middle
 ,ages4 ,see what ,bryce 7,south        
,america1 ,new ,york1 #aiah1 chapters xi

 and xv7 says about the position of the 
,negro in our ,southern states1 and of  
the ,indians in ,south ,american        
republics4  ,even where the avowed aim  
is the common good of all1 states have  
assumed that some must be sacrificed for
 others4 ,certain individuals are       
selected to die in the trenches in the  
face of the enemy1 that others may be   
guaranteed liberty and the pursuit of   
happiness4 ,grotius1 the famous jurist  
of the seventeenth century1 has been    
criticized for holding that a           
beleaguered town might justly deliver up
 to the enemy a small number of its     
citizens in order to purchase immunity  
for the rest4 ,how far do the cases     
differ in principle8 ,among persons     
variously endowed1 wrote ,hegel1        
inequality must occur1 and equality     
would be wrong4 ,footnote3 ,hegel1 ,the 
,philosophy of ,right1 translated by    
,dyde1 ,london1 #ahif1 p4 #ef4          
,commonwealths of many degrees of       
development have recognized inequalities

 of many sorts1 and have treated their  
subjects accordingly4  ,for diet1 said  
,bentham with repellent frankness1      
nothing but self- regarding affection   
will serve4 ,benevolence he considered a
 valuable addition for a dessert4 ,he   
had in mind the individual1 and he did  
injustice to individuals in certain of  
their relations4 ,but how do things look
 when we turn our attention to the      
relations between states8 ,does any     
state actually make it a practice to    
treat its neighbor as itself8 ,would its
 citizens approve of its doing so8  ,the
 ,roman was compelled to formulate a jus
 gentium1 a law of nations1 to deal with
 those who held1 to him1 a place beyond 
the pale of law as he knew it4          
,footnote3 ,see ,,sir ,,henry ,,maine1  
,ancient ,law1 chapter iii4 ,many       
centuries have elapsed since pagan      
philosophers taught the brotherhood of  
man1 and since ,christian divines began 
to preach it with passionate fervor4    
,yet civilized nations today are still  

seeking to find a modus vivendi1 which  
may put an end to strife and enable them
 to live together4 ,the jus gentium1 or 
its modern equivalent1 is1 alas6 still  
in its rudiments4  ,to obviate          
misunderstanding at this point1 it is   
well to state that1 in adducing all the 
above facts1 ,i do not mean to argue    
that it is abnormal and an undesirable  
thing that the scales of justice should1
 at times1 be weighted in divers ways4  
,i am not maintaining that the          
distribution of common good should      
proceed upon the principle of strict    
impartiality4 ,what is possible and is  
desirable in this field is not something
 to be decided off-hand4 ,but the facts 
suffice to illustrate the truth that the
 discrepancies to be found in the codes 
of different communities can scarcely be
 dismissed as unimportant details4 ,they
 are something far too significant for  
that4     ,,chapter ,,iii  ,,the ,,codes
 ,,of ,,the ,,moralists   #g4 ,,the     
,,moralists4--,if1 from the codes1 or   

the more or less vague bodies of        
opinion1 which have characterized       
different communities1 we turn to the   
moralists1 we find similar food for     
thought4  ,but who are the moralists8   
,can we put into one class those who    
preach a short-sighted selfishness or a 
calculating egoism and those who urge   
upon us the law of love8 ,those who     
recommend a contempt of mankind1 and    
those who inculcate a reverence for     
humanity8 ,those who incline to leave us
 to our own devices1 telling us to      
listen to conscience1 and those who draw
 up for us elaborate sets of rules to   
guide conduct8 ,the histories of ethics 
are rather tolerant in herding together 
sheep and goats4 ,and not without       
reason4 ,those whom they include have   
been in a sense the spokesmen of their  
fellows4 ,their words have found an echo
 in the souls of many4 ,they are        
concerned with a rule of life1 and their
 rule of life1 such as it is1 rests upon
 some principle which has impressed men 

as being not wholly unreasonable4  ,in  
taking a glance at what they have to    
offer us1 ,i shall not go far afield1   
and shall exercise a brevity compatible 
with the purpose of mere illustration4  
,to the moralists of ancient ,greece1   
and1 to a lesser degree1 to those of the
 ,roman ,empire1 to the ,christian      
teachers who succeeded to their heritage
 in the centuries which followed1 and to
 the more or less independent thinkers  
who made their appearance after the     
,reformation1 we can trace our ethical  
pedigree4 ,for our purpose we need seek 
no wider field4 ,here we may find       
sufficiently notable contrasts of       
opinion to disturb the dogmatic slumber 
of even an inert mind4 ,the most cursory
 glance makes us inclined to accept with
 some reserve ,stephen's claim that the 
difference between different systems is 
chiefly in the details and special      
application of generally admitted       
principles4  #h4 ,,epicurean ,,and      
,,stoic4--,thus1 ,aristippus of ,cyrene 

advised men to grasp the pleasure of the
 moment rather than to await the more   
uncertain pleasure of the future2 but he
 also counselled1 for prudential        
reasons1 the avoidance of a conflict    
with the laws4 ,such advice takes       
cognizance of the self-love of the      
individual1 and is not self-love        
reasonable8 ,nevertheless1 such advice  
might be given by a discouraged criminal
 of a reflective turn of mind1 on his   
release from prison1 to a comrade not   
yet chastened by incarceration4         
,epicurus praises temperance and        
fortitude1 but only as measures of      
prudence4 ,he praises justice1 but only 
in so far as it enables us to escape    
harm1 and frees us from that dread of   
discovery that haunts the steps of the  
evil-doer4 ,his more specific maxims1 do
 not fall in love with a woman1 become  
the father of a family1 or1 generally1  
go into politics1 smack strongly of the 
rule of life recommended to ,feuillet's 
hero1 ,monsieur de ,camors1 by his      

worldly-wise and cynical father4        
,contrast with these men the ,stoics1   
whose rule of life was to follow        
,nature1 and to eschew the pursuit of   
pleasure4 ,man's nature1 said           
,epictetus1 is social2 wrongdoing is    
antisocial2 affection is natural4       
,footnote3 ,discourses1 ,book ,i1       
chapter xxiii--a clever answer to       
,epicurus4 ,said ,marcus ,aurelius1 it  
is characteristic of the rational soul  
for a man to love his neighbor4 ,the    
cautious bachelor imbued with ,epicurean
 principles would find strange and      
disconcerting the ,stoic position       
touching citizenship3 ,my nature is     
rational and social2 and my city and    
country1 so far as ,i am ,antoninus1 is 
,rome1 but so far as ,i am a man1 it is 
the world4 ,the things then which are   
useful to these cities are alone useful 
to me4 ,footnote3 ,thoughts1 ,book ,,vi1
 #dd2 translated by ,,george ,,long4    
#i4 ,,plato2 ,,aristotle2 ,,the         
,,church4--,no more famous              

classification of the virtues--those    
qualities of character which it is      
desirable for a man to have1 and which  
determine his doing what it is desirable
 that he should do--has ever been drawn 
up than that offered us by ,plato3      
,wisdom1 ,courage1 ,temperance and      
,justice4 ,footnote3 ,for ,,plato's     
account of the virtues see the          
,republic1 ,book ,,iv1 and the ,laws1   
,book ,i4 ,it is interesting to lay     
beside it the longer list drawn up by   
,aristotle1 and to compare both with    
that which commended itself to the mind 
of the mediaeval churchman4  ,with      
,aristotle1 the virtues are made to     
include3 ,footnote3 ,ethics2 ,i refer   
the reader to the admirable exposition  
and criticism by ,,sidgwick1 ,history of
 ,ethics1 ,london1 #ahif1 chapter ii1   
,sec #aj-ab2 compare ,,zeller1          
,aristotle and the ,earlier             
,peripatetics1 ,english translation     
,london1 #ahig1 ,volume ,,ii1 chapter   
xii4    ,wisdom   ,high-mindedness      

,justice   ,ambition   ,courage         
,gentleness   ,temperance               
,friendliness   ,liberality             
,truthfulness   ,magnificence           
,decorous ,wit  and it is suggested     
that1 although scarcely a virtue1 a     
sense of shame is becoming in youth4    
,we find the ,christian teachers        
especially recommending3 ,footnote3 ,see
 ,,sidgwick',s sympathetic account of   
the ,churchman's view of the virtues1   
loc4 cit41 chapter iii4    ,obedience   
,patience   ,benevolence   ,purity      
,humility   ,alienation from the ,world 
,alienation from the ,flesh  and their  
lists of the deadly sins they select    
from the following3    ,pride           
,arrogance   ,anger   ,gluttony         
,unchastity   ,envy   ,vain-,glory      
,gloominess   ,languid ,indifference4   
,could there be a more striking contrast
 than that between the mediaeval code   
and those of the great ,greek thinkers8 
,plato recommended as virtues certain   
general characteristics of character    

much admired by the ,greek of his day4  
,aristotle accepted them and added to   
them4 ,he has painted much more in      
detail the gifts and graces of a        
well-born and well-situated ,greek      
gentleman as he conceived him4 ,the     
personage would cut a sorry figure in   
the role of a mediaeval saint2 the      
mediaeval saint would wear a tarnished  
halo if endowed with the ,aristotelian  
virtues4  ,the one ideal1 the ,greek1   
breathes an air of self-assertion2 the  
other one of self-abnegation4           
,benevolence1 ,purity1 ,humility and    
,unworldliness are not to be found in   
the former2 ,justice1 ,courage and      
,veracity appear to be missing in the   
latter4 ,wisdom1 insight1 has given     
place to the ,obedience appropriate to a
 man clearly conscious of a ,law1 not   
man-made1 to which man feels himself to 
be subject4  ,indeed1 the discrepancy   
between the ideals is such that         
,aristotle's virtuously high-minded man 
would have been conceived by the        

mediaeval churchman to be living in     
deadly sin1 as the very embodiment of   
pride and arrogance4 ,we find him       
portrayed as neither seeking nor        
avoiding danger1 for there are few      
things about which he cares2 as ashamed 
to accept favors1 since that implies    
inferiority2 as sluggish and indifferent
 except when stimulated by some great   
honor to be gained or some great work to
 be performed2 as frank1 for this is    
characteristic of the man who despises  
others2 as admiring little1 for nothing 
is great to him4 ,his pride prevents him
 from harboring resentment1 from seeking
 praise1 and from praising others4 ,this
 ,nietzschean hero would attract        
attention upon any stage3 ,the step of  
the high-minded man is slow1 his voice  
deep1 and his language stately1 for he  
who feels anxiety about few things is   
not apt to be in a hurry2 and he who    
thinks highly of nothing is not         
vehement4 ,footnote3 ,ethics1 ,book     
,,iv1 chapter in1 #ai1 translation by   

,r4 ,w4 ,,browne1 ,london1 #ahfe4  ,to  
be sure1 virtues not on a given list may
 be found in1 or read into1 some of the 
writings of the man who presents it4 ,it
 would be absurd to maintain that the   
mediaeval churchman had no regard for   
justice1 courage and veracity1 as he    
would define them1 or that ,plato and   
,aristotle were wholly deaf to the      
claims of benevolence4 ,nevertheless1   
the variations in the emphasis laid on  
this virtue or on that1 or in the       
conception of what constitutes this     
virtue or that1 may yield ideals of     
character and of conduct which bear but 
a slight family resemblance4 ,imagine   
,st4 ,francis of ,assisi lowering his   
voice1 slowing his step1 and cultivating
 high- mindedness1 or striving to make  
himself a pattern of decorous wit4  #aj4
 ,,later ,,lists ,,of ,,the             
,,virtues4--,the codes proposed by the  
moralists of a later time are numerous  
and widely scattering4 ,it is impossible
 to do justice to them in any brief     

compass4 ,a very few instances1 selected
 from among those most familiar to      
,english readers1 must suffice to       
indicate the diversity of their nature4 
,hobbes ,footnote3 ,leviathan1 chapter  
xv41 deeply concerned to discover some  
modus vivendi which should put a check  
upon strife between man and his         
fellow-man1 and save us from a life     
solitary1 poor1 nasty1 brutish and      
short1 recommends among other virtues3  
,justice   ,equity   ,requital of       
benefits   ,sociability   ,a moderate   
degree of forgiveness   ,the avoidance  
of pride and arrogance4  ,locke         
,footnote3 ,essay1 ,book ,,iv1 chapter  
iii1 ,sec4 #ah2 ,of ,civil ,government1 
,book ,,ii1 chapter ii41 who believes   
that moral principles must be           
intuitively evident to one who          
contemplates the nature of ,god and the 
relations of men to ,him and to each    
other1 thinks it worth while to set down
 such random maxims as3    ,no          
government allows absolute liberty4     

,where there is no property there is no 
injustice4   ,all men are originally    
equal4   ,men ought not to harm one     
another4   ,parents have a right to     
control their children4  ,hume1         
,footnote3 ,an ,enquiry ,concerning the 
,principles of ,morals1 ,sec #f1 ,part  
,i whose two classes of virtues comprise
 the qualities immediately agreeable or 
useful to ourselves and those           
immediately agreeable or useful to      
others1 offers us an extended list4 ,he 
puts into the first class3              
,discretion   ,caution   ,enterprise    
,industry   ,frugality   ,economy       
,good ,sense1 etc4   ,temperance        
,sobriety   ,patience   ,perseverance   
,considerateness   ,secrecy   ,order1   
etc4  ,in the second class he includes3 
,benevolence   ,justice   ,veracity     
,fidelity   ,politeness   ,wit          
,modesty   ,cleanliness4  ,manifestly1  
the lists may be indefinitely prolonged4
 ,why not add to the first class the    
pachydermatous indifference to rebuffs  

which is of such service to the social  
climber1 and1 to the second1 taste in   
dress and the habit of not repeating    
stories8  ,thomas ,reid lays stress upon
 the deliverances of the individual     
conscience1 when consulted in a quiet   
hour4 ,nevertheless he proposes five    
fundamental maxims3 ,footnote3 ,on the  
,active ,powers of ,man1 ,essay ,v1     
chapter i4    ,we ought to exercise a   
rational self-love1 and prefer a greater
 to a     lesser good4   ,we should     
follow nature1 as revealed in the       
constitution of man4   ,we should       
exercise benevolence4   ,right and wrong
 are the same for all in the same       
circumstances4   ,we should venerate and
 obey ,god4  ,with such writers we may  
contrast the ,utilitarians and the      
adherents of the doctrine of            
,self-realization1 ,footnote3 ,these    
will be discussed below1 chapters xxv   
and xxvi4 who lay little stress upon    
lists of virtues or duties1 but aim1    
respectively1 at the greatest happiness 

of the greatest number1 and at the      
harmonious development of the faculties 
of man1 regarding as virtues such       
qualities of character as make for the  
attainment1 in the long run1 of the one 
or the other of these ends4  #aa4 ,,the 
,,stretching ,,of ,,moral               
,,concepts4--,the instances given       
suffice to show that the moralists speak
 with a variety of tongues4 ,the code of
 one age is apt to seem strange and     
foreign to the men of another4 ,even    
where there is apparent agreement1 a    
closer scrutiny often reveals that it   
has been attained by a process of       
stretching conceptions4 ,take for       
example the so-called cardinal virtues  
,footnote3 ,from cardo1 a hinge4 ,these 
virtues were supposed to be fundamental4
 ,the name given to them was first used 
by ,,ambrose in the fourth century      
,a4,d4 ,see ,,sidgwick1 ,history of     
,ethics1 chap1 ii1 p4 #dd4 dwelt upon by
 ,plato4 ,the ,stoics1 who made use of  
his list1 changed its spirit4 ,cicero   

stretches justice so as to make it cover
 a watery benevolence4 ,st4 ,augustine  
finds the cardinal virtues to be        
different aspects of ,love to ,god4 ,the
 great scholastic philosopher of the    
thirteenth century1 ,st4 ,thomas1 places
 in the first rank the ,christian graces
 of ,faith1 ,hope and ,charity1 but     
still finds it convenient to use the    
,platonic scheme in ordering a list of  
the self- regarding virtues taken from  
,aristotle4 ,thus may the pillars of a  
pagan temple be utilized as structural  
units in1 or embellishments of1 a       
,christian church4  ,our own age reveals
 the same tendency4 ,thomas ,hill       
,green1 the ,oxford professor1 follows  
,plato4 ,but with him we find wisdom    
stretched to cover artistic creation2 we
 see that courage and temperance have   
taken on new faces2 and justice appears 
to be able to gather under its wings    
both benevolence and veracity4          
,footnote3 ,prolegomena to ,ethics1     
,book ,,iii1 chapter iii1 and ,book     

,,iv1 chapter v4 ,a still wider         
divergence from the original            
understanding of the cardinal virtues is
 that of ,dewey1 who conceives of them  
as traits essential to all morality4 ,he
 treats1 under temperance1 of purity and
 reverence2 he makes courage synonymous 
with persistent vigor2 he extends       
justice so as to include love and       
sympathy2 he transforms wisdom into     
conscientiousness4 ,footnote3 ,,dewey   
,,and ,,tufts1 ,ethics1 pp4 #djd-dbc4   
,this variation in the content of moral 
concepts may be illustrated from any    
quarter in the field of ethics4         
,cicero's circumspect benevolence       
advances the doctrine that whatever one 
can give without suffering loss should  
be given even to an entire stranger4    
,among such obligations he reckons3 to  
prohibit no one from drinking at a      
stream of running water2 to permit      
anyone who wishes to light fire from    
fire2 to give faithful advice to one who
 is in doubt2 which things1 as he       

naively remarks1 are useful to the      
receiver and do no harm to the giver4   
,footnote3 ,de ,officiis1 ,book ,i1     
chapter xvi4  ,compare with this the    
admonition to love one's neighbor as    
oneself2 ,sidgwick's self-evident       
proposition that ,i ought not to prefer 
my own lesser good to the greater good  
of another2 ,footnote3 ,the ,methods of 
,ethics1 ,book ,,iii1 chapter xiii1 ,sec
 #c4 ,bentham's utilitarian formula1    
everybody to count for one1 and nobody  
for more than one4 ,the admonition1 be  
benevolent1 may mean many things4  #ab4 
,,the ,,reflective ,,mind ,,and ,,the   
,,moral ,,codes4--,even the cursory     
glance we have given above to the moral 
codes of different communities and those
 proposed by individual moralists must  
suffice to bring any thoughtful man to  
the consciousness that they differ      
widely among themselves1 and that the   
differences can scarcely be dismissed as
 insignificant4 ,a little reflection    
will suffice to convince him1           

furthermore1 that to treat all other    
codes as if they were mere pathological 
variations from his own is indefensibly 
dogmatic4  ,on the other hand1 the      
differences between codes should not be 
unduly emphasized4 ,the core of identity
 is there1 and1 although in its bald    
abstractness it is not enough to live   
by1 it is vastly significant1           
nevertheless4 ,if there were not some   
congruity in the materials1 they would  
never be brought together as the subject
 of one science4 ,unless good1 right1   
obligation1 approval1 etc41 or the      
rudimentary conceptions which foreshadow
 them in the mind of the most primitive 
human beings1 had a core of identity    
which could be traced in societies the  
most diverse1 there would be no         
significance in speaking of the         
enlightened morality of one people and  
the degraded and undeveloped morality of
 another4 ,there could be no history of 
the development of the moral ideas4     
,collections of disparate and           

disconnected facts do not constitute a  
science1 nor are they the proper subject
 of a history4  ,as a matter of fact1 we
 all do speak of degraded moral         
conceptions1 of a perverted conscience1 
of a lofty morality1 of a fine sense of 
duty2 we do not hesitate to compare1 i4 
e41 to treat as similar and yet         
dissimilar1 the customs1 laws and       
ethical maxims of different ages and of 
different races4 ,this means that we    
have in our minds some standard1 perhaps
 consciously formulated1 perhaps dimly  
apprehended1 according to which we rate 
them4 ,the unreflective man is in danger
 of taking as this standard his own     
actual code1 such as it is2 of          
accepting1 together with such elements  
of reason as it may contain1 the whole  
mass of his inherited or acquired       
prejudices2 the more reflective man will
 strive to be more rationally critical4 
,,part ,,ii  ,,ethics ,,as ,,science    
,,chapter ,,iv  ,,the ,,awakening ,,to  
,,reflection    #ac4 ,,the ,,dogmatism  

,,of ,,the ,,natural ,,man4--,in morals 
and in politics it seems natural for man
 to be dogmatic1 to take a position     
without hesitation1 to defend it        
vehemently1 to maintain that others are 
in the wrong4  ,this is not surprising4 
,we are born into a moral environment as
 into an all-embracing atmosphere4 ,from
 the cradle to the grave1 we walk with  
our heads in a cloud of exhortations and
 prohibitions4 ,from our earliest years 
we have been urged to make decisions and
 to act1 and we have been furnished with
 general maxims to guide our action4    
,when1 therefore1 we approach the       
solution of a moral problem1 we do not1 
as a rule1 acutely feel our fitness to  
solve it1 even though we may be judged  
quite unfit by others4  ,this unruffled 
confidence in one's possession of an    
adequate supply of indubitable moral    
truth may be found in men who differ    
widely in their degree of intelligence  
and in the extent of their information4 
,some individuals seem born to it4 ,we  

may come upon it in the ethical         
philosopher2 we may meet it in the man  
of science1 who knows that it has taken 
him a quarter of a century to fit       
himself to be an authority in matters   
chemical or physical1 but who wanders in
 his hours of leisure into the field of 
ethics and has no hesitation in         
proposing radical reforms4 ,but it is   
more natural to look for the unwavering 
confidence which knows no questionings  
among persons of restricted outlook1 who
 have been brought into contact with but
 one set of opinions4 ,it is            
characteristic of the child1 of the     
uncultivated classes in all communities1
 of whole communities primitive in their
 culture and relatively unenlightened4  
#ad4 ,,the ,,awakening4--,manifestly1   
even the beginnings of ethical science  
are an impossibility where such a spirit
 prevails4 ,where there are no doubts1  
no questionings1 there can be no attempt
 at rational construction4  ,fortunately
 for the cause of human enlightenment   

there are forces at work which tend to  
arouse men from this state of lethargy4 
,horizons are broadened1 new ideas make 
their appearance1 there is a conflict of
 authorities1 the birth of a doubt1 and1
 finally1 a more or less articulate     
appeal to ,reason4  ,even a child is    
capable of seeing that paternal and     
maternal injunctions and reactions are  
not wholly alike1 and it sets them off  
against each other4 ,nor have all the   
children in the home precisely the same 
nature4 ,one is temperamentally frank   
and open1 but unsympathetic2 another is 
affectionate1 and prone to lying as the 
sparks fly upward4 ,the virtues and     
vices are not spontaneously arranged in 
the same order of importance by         
children1 and differences of opinion may
 arise4 ,nor does it take the child long
 to discover that the law of its own    
home is not identical with that of the  
house next door4 ,at school the         
experience is repeated on a larger      
scale2 many homes are represented1 and1 

besides that1 two codes of law claim    
allegiance1 the code of the schoolboy   
and that of the master4 ,they may be by 
no means in accord4  ,and when1 in      
college1 the student for the first time 
seriously addresses himself to the task 
of the study of ethics as science1 he   
comes to it by no means wholly          
unprepared4 ,he has had rather a broad  
experience of the contrasts which obtain
 between different codes4 ,he is        
familiar with the code of the home1 of  
the school1 of the social class1 of the 
religious community1 of the civil       
community4 ,there sit on the same       
benches with him the sensitively        
conscientious student who doubts whether
 it is a permissible deception of one's 
neighbor to apply a patch to an old     
garment so skillfully that it will      
escape detection2 the sporting character
 who takes it to be the mutual          
understanding among men that truth shall
 not be demanded of those who deal in   
horses and dogs2 the youth from ,texas  

who claims that the ,french philosopher1
 ,janet1 cannot be an authority on      
morals1 since he asserts that he who    
cheats at cards must feel a burning     
shame4 ,with the ethics of the ancient  
,hebrews1 of the ,greeks1 of the        
,romans1 our young moralist has had the 
opportunity to acquire some familiarity1
 and he can compare them1 if he will1   
with the ,christian ethics of his own   
day4 ,he knows something of history and 
biography2 he has read books of travel1 
and has some acquaintance with the      
manners and customs of other peoples4   
,were he given to reflection1 it ought  
not to surprise him to find a           
,portuguese sea-cook maintaining that it
 is wrong to steal1 except from the     
rich2 or to learn that a ,wahabee saint 
rated the smoking of tobacco as the     
worst possible sin next to idolatry1    
while maintaining that murder1 robbery1 
and such like1 were peccadilloes which a
 merciful ,god might properly overlook4 
,material for reflection he has in      

abundance--and he often remains         
relatively dogmatic and unplagued by    
doubt4 ,but only relatively so2 and only
 so long as the claims of conflicting   
authorities are not forced upon his     
attention1 rendered importunate in the  
light of discussion1 made so familiar as
 to seem real and substantial4 ,it is   
the tendency of the widening of the     
horizon to arouse men to reflection1 to 
stimulate to criticism4 ,from such      
criticism the science of ethics has its 
birth4  ,what is true of the individual 
is true of men in the mass4 ,the blind  
life of social classes long laid in     
chains by custom and tradition may come 
to be illuminated by new ideas1 and     
passive acquiescence may give way to    
active participation in social endeavor4
 ,nor can primitive peoples remain      
wholly primitive except in isolation4   
,with the increased intercourse between 
races and peoples1 men are brought to a 
clear consciousness that the accepted in
 morals is manifold and diverse2 the    

next step is to question whether it is1 
in any given instance1 of unquestionable
 authority2 thus do men become ripe for 
the search for the acceptable4          
,,chapter ,v  ,,ethical ,,method   #ae4 
,,inductive ,,and ,,deductive           
,,method4--,professor ,henry ,sidgwick  
has defined a method of ethics as any   
rational procedure by which we determine
 what is right for individual human     
beings to do1 or to seek to realize by  
voluntary action4 ,footnote3 ,the       
,methods of ,ethics1 ,book ,i1 chapter  
i1 ,sec ,i4  ,he points out that many   
methods are natural and are habitually  
used1 but claims that only one can be   
rational4 ,by which he means that the   
several methods of determining right    
conduct urged by the different schools  
of the moralists must be reconciled1 or 
all but one must be rejected4 ,footnote3
 ,ibid41 chapter i1 ,sec  #c4  ,in this 
chapter ,i shall not discuss in detail  
the schools of the moralists and the    
specific methods which characterize     

them4 ,i am here concerned only with the
 general distinction between the        
scientific methods of deduction and     
induction1 and its bearing upon ethical 
investigations4  ,how do we discover    
that1 in an isosceles triangle1 the     
sides which subtend the equal angles are
 equal8 ,we do not go about collecting  
the opinions of individuals upon the    
subject1 nor do we consult the records  
of other peoples1 past or present4 ,we  
do not measure a great number of        
triangles and arrive at our conclusion  
after a calculation of the probable     
error of our measurements4 ,the appeal  
to authorities does not interest us2    
that measurements are always more or    
less inaccurate1 and that all actual    
triangles are more or less irregular1 we
 freely admit1 but we do not regard such
 facts as significant4 ,we use a single 
triangle as an illustration1 and from   
what is given in1 or along with1 that   
individual instance1 we deduce certain  
consequences in which we have the       

highest confidence4 ,here we follow the 
method of deduction4 ,we accept a given1
 with its validity we do not concern    
ourselves2 our aim is the discovery of  
what may be gotten out of it4  ,in the  
inductive sciences the individual       
instance has an importance of quite a   
different sort4 ,it is not a mere       
illustration1 unequivocally embodying a 
general truth to which we may appeal    
directly1 treating the instance as a    
mere vehicle1 in itself of little       
significance4 ,individual instances are 
observed and compared2 uniformities are 
searched for2 it is sought to establish 
general truths1 not directly evident1   
but whose authority rests upon the      
particular facts that have been observed
 and classified4  ,it is a commonplace  
of logic that both induction and        
deduction may be employed in many fields
 of science4 ,we may attain by inductive
 inquiry to more or less general truths1
 which we no longer care to call in     
question1 and which we accept as a      

given1 to be exploited and carried out  
in its consequences4 ,indeed1 we need   
not betake ourselves to science to have 
an illustration of this method of       
procedure4 ,in everyday life men have   
maxims by which they judge of the       
probable actions of their fellow-men and
 in the light of which they direct their
 dealings with them4 ,such maxims as    
that men may be counted upon to consult 
their own interests have certainly not  
been adopted independently of an        
experience of what1 on particular       
occasions1 men have shown themselves to 
be4 ,but1 once adopted1 they may be     
treated as1 for practical purposes1     
unquestionable2 men are concerned to    
apply them1 not to substantiate them4   
,in so far1 men reason from them        
deductively and pass from the general   
rule to the particular instance4  #af4  
,,the ,,authority ,,of ,,the            
,,given4--,obviously the given1 in the  
sense indicated1 may possess1 in certain
 cases1 a very high degree of authority1

 and1 in others1 a very low degree4  ,in
 the case of the mathematical truth     
referred to above1 men do not1 in fact1 
find it necessary to call in question   
the given1 though they may be divided in
 their notions touching the general     
nature of mathematical evidence and     
whence it draws its apparently          
indisputable authority4 ,in certain of  
the inductive sciences1 as in mechanics1
 physics and chemistry1 generalizations 
have been attained in which even the    
critical repose much confidence4 ,in    
other fields men are constantly making  
general statements which are promptly   
contradicted by their fellows1 and are  
drawing from them inferences the justice
 of which is in many quarters           
disallowed4 ,there are axioms and       
axioms1 maxims and maxims4 ,the         
confidence felt by a given individual in
 a particular given does not guarantee  
its acceptance by all men of equal      
intelligence4 ,where1 however1 the      
evidence upon which a disputed given is 

based is forthcoming1 there is1 at      
least1 ground for rational discussion4  
,not a few famous writers have treated  
moral truths as analogous to            
mathematical4 ,footnote3 ,see the       
chapter on ,intuitionism1 ,sec #ij1     
note4 ,to take here a single instance4  
,sidgwick1 in his truly admirable work  
on ,the ,methods of ,ethics1 maintains  
,footnote3 ,book ,,iii1 chapter xiii1   
,sec #c4 that the propositions1 ',i     
ought not to prefer a present lesser    
good to a future greater good1' and ',i 
ought not to prefer my own lesser good  
to the greater good of another1' do     
present themselves as self-evident2 as  
much 7e4g47 as the mathematical axiom   
that 'if equals be added to equals the  
wholes are equals4'  ,but it is one     
thing to claim that we are in possession
 of a given with ultimate and           
indisputable authority2 it is another to
 convince men that we really do possess 
it4 ,locke's efforts at deduction fall  
lamentably short of the model set by    

,euclid4 ,professor ,sidgwick's         
well-known moral axiom1 ',i ought not to
 prefer my own lesser good to the       
greater good of another1' would1 writes 
,westermarck1 ,footnote3 ,op4 cit41     
,volume ,i1 chapter i1 p4 #ab4 if       
explained to a ,fuegian or a ,hottentot1
 be regarded by him1 not as             
self-evident1 but as simply absurd2 nor 
can it claim general acceptance even    
among ourselves4 ,who is that ',another'
 to whose greater good ,i ought not to  
prefer my own lesser good8 ,a fellow-   
countryman1 a savage1 a criminal1 a     
bird1 a fish--all without distinction8  
,to ,bentham's everybody to count for   
one and nobody for more than one may be 
opposed ,hartley's preference of        
benevolent and religious persons to the 
rest of mankind4 ,footnote3             
,observations on ,man1 ,part ,,ii1      
chapter iii1 #f4  ,the fact that men    
eminent for their intellectual ability  
and for the breadth of their information
 are1 in morals1 inclined to accept1 as 

ultimate1 principles not identical1 and 
thus to found different schools1 would  
seem to indicate that1 to one who aims  
at treating ethics as a science1        
principles1 as well as the deductions   
from them1 should be objects of closest 
scrutiny4 ,they should not be taken for 
granted4 ,the history of ethical theory 
appears to make it clear that the given 
of the moralist is not of the same      
nature as that of the geometer4  ,the   
ethical philosopher cannot1 hence1      
confine himself to developing           
deductively the implications of some    
principle or principles assumed without 
critical examination4 ,he must establish
 the validity even of his principles4   
,this we should bear in mind when we    
approach the study of the different     
ethical schools4     ,,chapter ,,vi     
,,the ,,materials ,,of ,,ethics   #ag4  
,,how ,,the ,,moralist ,,should         
,,proceed4--,the above reflections on   
method suggest the materials of which   
the moralist should avail himself in    

rearing the edifice of his science4     
7#a7 ,evidently he should reflect upon  
the moral judgments which he finds in   
himself1 the moral being with whom he is
 best acquainted4 ,he should endeavor to
 render consistent and luminous moral   
judgments which1 as he finds1 have too  
often been inconsistent and more or less
 blind4  7#b7 ,he should take cognizance
 of his own setting--of the social      
conscience embodied in the community in 
which he lives4  7#c7 ,and since1 as we 
have seen1 the significance1 either of  
the individual conscience1 or of the    
social conscience revealed in custom1   
law and public opinion1 can hardly      
become apparent to one who does not     
bring within his horizon many           
consciences individual and social1 he   
should enlarge his view so as to include
 such4 ,the moralists1 in our day1 show 
an increasing tendency to pay serious   
attention to this mass of materials4    
,they do not confine their attention to 
the moral standard which this man or    

that has accepted as authoritative for  
him1 nor to that accepted as            
authoritative in a given community4     
,they study man-- man in all stages of  
his development and in material and     
social settings the most diverse4  7#d7 
,nor should the student of ethics       
overlook the work which has been done by
 those moralists who have gone before   
him4 ,he who has studied descriptive    
anatomy is aware of the immense service 
which has been done him by the unwearied
 observations of his predecessors2      
observations which have been put on     
record1 and which draw his attention to 
numberless details of structure that    
would1 without such aid1 certainly      
escape his attention4 ,ethics is an     
ancient discipline4 ,it has fixed the   
attention of acute minds for many       
centuries4 ,he who approaches the       
subject naively1 without an acquaintance
 with the many ethical theories which   
have been advanced and the acute        
criticisms to which they have been      

subjected1 will almost certainly say    
what someone has said before1 and said1 
perhaps1 much better4 ,the valor of     
ignorance will involve him in           
ignominious defeat4  7#e7 ,it is evident
 that the moralist must make use of     
materials offered him by workers in many
 other fields of science4 ,the biologist
 may have valuable suggestions to make  
touching the impulses and instincts of  
man4 ,the psychologist treats of the    
same1 and exhibits the work of the      
intellect in ordering and organizing the
 impulses4 ,he studies the phenomena of 
desire1 will1 habit1 the formation of   
character4 ,the anthropologist and the  
sociologist are concerned with the codes
 of communities and with the laws of    
social development4 ,the fields of      
economics1 politics and comparative     
jurisprudence obviously march with that 
cultivated by the student of ethics4    
#ah4 ,,the ,,philosopher ,,as           
,,moralist4--,in all these sciences at  
once it is not possible for the moralist

 to be an adept4 ,the mass of the       
material they furnish is so vast that   
the ethical writer who starts out to    
master it in all its details may well   
dread that he may be overcome by        
senility before he is ready to undertake
 the formulation of an ethical theory4  
,it does not follow1 however1 that he   
should leave to those who occupy        
themselves professionally with any of   
these fields the task of framing a      
theory of morals4 ,he must have         
sufficient information to be able to    
select with intelligence what has some  
important bearing upon the problem of   
conduct1 but there are many details into
 which he need not go4 ,it is well to   
note the following points3  7#a7 ,a     
multitude of details may be illustrative
 of a comparatively small number of     
general principles4 ,it is with these   
general principles that the moralist is 
concerned4 ,the anthropologist may      
regard it as his duty to spend much     
labor in the attempt to discover why    

this or that act1 this or that article  
of food1 happens in a given community to
 be taboo to certain persons4 ,the      
student of ethics is not bound to take  
up the detailed investigation of such   
matters4 ,human nature1 in its general  
constitution1 is much the same in       
different races and peoples4 ,the       
influence of environment is everywhere  
apparent4 ,there are significant        
uniformities to be discovered even by   
one who has a limited amount of detailed
 information4 ,those who come after us  
will see nothing new1 said ,antoninus1  
nor have those before us seen anything  
more1 but in a manner he who is forty   
years old2 if he has any understanding  
at all1 has seen by virtue of the       
uniformity which prevails all things    
which have been and all that will be4   
,footnote3 ,thoughts1 ,,xi1 #a4 ,london1
 #ahia1 translated by ,,george ,,long4  
,which is1 to be sure1 an overstatement 
of the case1 but one containing a germ  
of truth4  7#b7 ,we find1 by looking    

into their books1 that men most         
intimately acquainted with the facts of 
the moral life as revealed in different 
races and peoples may differ widely in  
the ethical doctrine which they are     
inclined to base upon them4 ,not all    
men1 even when endowed with no little   
learning1 are gifted with the clearness 
of vision which can detect the          
significance of given facts2 nor are all
 equally capable of weaving relevant    
facts into a consistent and reasonable  
theory4 ,the keenness and the           
constructive genius of the individual   
count for much4 ,and breadth of view    
counts for much also4 ,we have seen that
 ethics touches many fields of          
investigation1 and the philosopher is   
supposed1 at least1 to let his vision   
range over a broad realm1 and to grasp  
the relations of the different sciences 
to each other4 ,he is1 moreover1        
supposed to be trained in reflective    
analysis1 and of this ethical theory    
appears to stand in no little need4     

7#c7 ,finally1 the mere fact that ethics
 has for so many centuries been regarded
 as one of the disciplines falling      
within the domain of the philosopher is 
not without its significance4 ,one may  
deplore the tendency to base ethics upon
 this or that metaphysical doctrine1 and
 desire to see it made an independent   
science2 and yet one may be compelled to
 admit that it is not easy to comprehend
 and to estimate the value of many of   
the ethical theories which have been    
evolved in the past1 without having     
rather an intimate acquaintance with the
 history of philosophy4 ,the ethical    
teachings of ,plato1 of ,aristotle1 of  
,st4 ,thomas1 of ,kant1 of ,hegel1 of   
,green1 lose much of their meaning when 
taken out of their setting4 ,the history
 of ethical theory is blind when        
divorced from the history of philosophy1
 and with the history of ethical theory 
the moralist should be acquainted4  ,the
 philosopher has no prescriptive right  
to preempt the field of ethics4 ,many   

men may cultivate it with profit4       
,nevertheless1 he1 too1 should cultivate
 it1 not independently and with a       
disregard of what has been done by      
others1 but in a spirit of hearty       
cooperation1 thankfully accepting such  
help as is offered him by his neighbors4
     ,,chapter ,,vii  ,,the ,,aim ,,of  
,,ethics ,,as ,,science   #ai4 ,,the    
,,appeal ,,to ,,reason4--,the proper aim
 of the scientific study of ethics      
appears to be suggested with sufficient 
clearness by what has been said in the  
chapters on the accepted content of     
morals4  ,where individuals take up     
unreflectively the maxims which are to  
control their conduct1 human life can   
scarcely be said to be under the        
guidance of reason4 ,where1 moreover1   
the codes of individuals clash with each
 other or with the social conscience of 
their community1 and where the codes of 
different communities are               
disconcertingly diverse1 planful        
concerted action with a view to the     

control of conduct appears to be        
impracticable4 ,historical accident1    
blind impulse and caprice1 cannot serve 
as guides for a rational creature       
seeking to live1 along with others1 a   
rational life4  ,the aim of ethics1 says
 ,sidgwick1 ,footnote3 ,the ,methods of 
,ethics1 ,book ,i1 chapter vi1 ,sec #a4 
is to render scientific--i4e41 true1 and
 as far as possible systematic--the     
apparent cognitions that most men have  
of the rightness or reasonableness of   
conduct1 whether the conduct be         
considered as right in itself1 or as the
 means to some end conceived as         
ultimately reasonable4 ,the use here of 
the word cognitions calls our attention 
to the fact that1 when men say1 this is 
right1 that is wrong1 they mean no more 
than1 this ,i like1 that ,i do not like2
 and the use of the word apparent       
indicates that the judgments expressed  
may be approved by the man who makes    
them1 and yet be erroneous4 ,the appeal 
is to an objective standard2 there is a 

demand for proof4  ,that most men       
recognize1 in some cases dimly1 in some 
cases clearly and explicitly1 that the  
appeal to such a standard is            
justifiable1 can scarcely be denied4    
,between ,i choose and ,i ought to      
choose1 between the community demands1  
and the community ought to demand1 men  
generally recognize a distinction when  
they have attained to a capacity for    
reflection4  ,it has1 however1 been     
denied that the appeal is justifiable1  
and denied by no mean authority4 ,the   
presumed objectivity of moral judgments1
 writes ,westermarck1 ,footnote3 #b ,the
 ,origin and ,development of the ,moral 
,ideas1 chapter i1 p4 #ag4 being a      
chimera1 there can be no moral truth in 
the sense in which this term is         
generally understood4 ,the ultimate     
reason for this is1 that the moral      
concepts are based upon emotions1 and   
that the contents of an emotion fall    
entirely outside the category of truth4 
,but it may be true or not that we have 

a certain emotion1 it may be true or not
 that a given mode of conduct has a     
tendency to evoke in us moral           
indignation or moral approval4 ,hence a 
moral judgment is true or false         
according as its subject has or has not 
that tendency which the predicate       
attributes to it4 ,if ,i say that it is 
wrong to resist evil1 and yet resistance
 to evil has no tendency whatever to    
call forth in me an emotion of moral    
disapproval1 then my judgment is false4 
,the conclusion drawn from this is that 
there are no general moral truths1 and  
that the object of scientific ethics    
cannot be to fix rules for human        
conduct2 it can only be to study the    
moral consciousness as a fact4  #bj4    
,,the ,,appeal ,,to ,,reason            
,,justified4--,the words of so high an  
authority should not be passed over     
lightly4 ,one is impelled to seek for   
their proper appreciation and their     
reconciliation with the judgment of     
other moralists4 ,such can be found1 ,i 

think1 by turning to two truths dwelt   
upon in what has preceded3 the truth    
that the moralist should not assume that
 he is possessed of a given analogous to
 that of the geometer--a standard in no 
need of criticism2 and the equally      
important truth that the moralist cannot
 hope to frame a code which will simply 
replace the codes of individual         
communities and will prescribe the      
details of human conduct while ignoring 
such codes altogether4  ,but it does not
 seem to follow that1 because the       
moralist may not set up an arbitrary    
code of this sort1 he is also forbidden 
to criticize and compare moral          
judgments1 to arrange existing codes in 
a certain order as lower and higher1 to 
frame some notion of what constitutes   
progress4 ,he may hold before himself1  
in outline1 at least1 an ideal of       
conduct1 and not one taken up           
arbitrarily but based upon the phenomena
 of the moral consciousness as he has   
observed them4 ,and in the light of this

 ideal he may judge of conduct2 his     
appeal is to an objective standard4     
,thus1 he who says that it is false that
 it is right to reduce to slavery       
prisoners taken in war may1 if he be    
sufficiently unreflective1 have no      
better reason for his judgment than a   
feeling of repugnance to such conduct4  
,but1 if he has risen to the point of   
taking broad views of men and their     
moral codes1 he may very well assert the
 falsity of the statement even when he  
feels no personal repugnance to the     
holding of certain persons as slaves4   
,his appeal is1 in fact1 to such a      
standard as is above indicated1 and his 
condemnation of certain forms of conduct
 is based upon their incompatibility    
with it4  ,hence1 a man may             
significantly assert that certain       
conduct is objectively desirable1       
although it may not be desired by       
himself or by his community4 ,he may    
judge a thing to be wrong without       
feeling it to be wrong4 ,whether        

anything would actually be judged to be 
wrong1 if no one ever had any emotions1 
is a different question4 ,with it we may
 class the question whether anything    
would be judged to be wrong if no one   
were possessed of even a spark of       
reason4 ,there is small choice between  
having nothing to see and not being able
 to see anything4 ,footnote3 ,that1 in  
the citation above given1               
,,westermarck',s attention was          
concentrated upon the extreme position  
taken by some moralists touching the    
function of the reason in moral         
judgments seems to me evident4 ,he is   
far too able an observer to overlook the
 significance of the diversity of moral 
codes and the meaning of progress4 ,he  
writes3 ,though rooted in the emotional 
side of our nature1 our moral opinions  
are in a large measure amenable to      
reason4 ,now in every society the       
traditional notions as to what is good  
or bad1 obligatory or indifferent1 are  
commonly accepted by the majority of    

people without further reflection4 ,by  
tracing them to their source it will be 
found that not a few of these notions   
have their origin in sentimental likings
 and antipathies1 to which a            
scrutinizing and enlightened judge can  
attach little importance2 whilst1 on the
 other hand1 he must account blamable   
many an act and omission which public   
opinion1 out of thoughtlessness1 treats 
with indifference4 ,vol4 ,i1 pp4 #b-c4  
,see also his appeals to reason where it
 is a question of the attitude of the   
community toward legal responsibility on
 the part of the young1 toward          
drunkenness1 and toward the heedless    
production of offspring doomed to misery
 and disease1 pp4 #bfi and #caj4  ,an   
appeal1 thus1 from the actual to the    
ideal appears to be possible4 ,and1     
since the natural man1 unenlightened and
 unreflective1 is not more inclined to  
show himself to be a reasonable being in
 the sphere of morals than elsewhere1 it
 seems that there is no little need of  

ethical science4 ,its aim is to bring   
about the needed enlightenment4 ,its    
value can only be logically denied by   
those who maintain seriously that it is 
easy to know what it is right to do4 ,do
 men really hold this1 if they are      
thoughtful8     ,,part ,,iii  ,,man     
,,and ,,his ,,environment   ,,chapter   
,,viii  ,,man',s ,,nature   #ba4 ,,the  
,,background ,,of ,,actions4--,in       
estimating human actions we take into   
consideration both the doer and the     
circumstances under which the deed was  
done4 ,actions may be desirable or      
undesirable1 good or bad1 according to  
their setting4 ,how shall we judge of   
the blow that takes away human life8 ,it
 may be the involuntary reaction of a   
man startled by a shock2 it may be a    
motion of justifiable self-defence2 it  
may be one struck at the command of a   
superior and in the defence of one's    
country2 it may be the horrid outcome of
 cruel rapacity or base malevolence4    
,nor are the emotions1 torn out of their

 context1 more significant than actions 
without a background4 ,they are mental  
phenomena to be observed and described  
by the psychologist2 to the moralist    
they are1 taken alone1 as unmeaning as  
the letters of the alphabet1 but1 like  
them1 capable in combination of carrying
 many meanings4 ,anger1 fear1 wonder1   
and all the rest are1 as natural        
emotions1 neither good nor bad2 they are
 colors1 which may enter into a picture 
and in it acquire various values4  ,in  
morals1 when men have attained to the   
stage of enlightenment at which moral   
estimation is a possible process1 they  
always consider emotions1 intentions1   
and actions in the light of their       
background4 ,we do not demand a moral   
life of the brutes2 we do not look for  
it in the intellectually defective and  
the emotionally insane2 nor do we expect
 a savage caught in the bush to harbor  
the same emotions1 or to have the same  
ethical outlook1 as the missionary with 
whom we may confront him4 ,the concepts 

of moral responsibility1 of desert1 of  
guilt1 are emptied of all significance1 
when we lose sight of the nature1 inborn
 or acquired1 of the creature haled     
before the bar of our judgment1 and of  
the environment1 which on the one hand1 
impels him to action1 and1 on the other1
 furnishes the stage upon which the     
drama of his life must be played out to 
the end4  ,hence1 he who would not act  
as the creature of blind impulse or as  
the unthinking slave of tradition1 but  
would exercise a conscious and          
intelligent control over his conduct1   
seems compelled to look at his life and 
its setting in a broad way1 to          
scrutinize with care both the nature of 
man and the environment without which   
that nature could find no expression4   
,when he does this1 he only does more   
intelligently what men generally do     
instinctively and somewhat at haphazard4
 ,he seeks a rational estimate of the   
significance of conduct1 and a standard 
by which it may be measured4  #bb4      

,,man',s ,,nature4--,moralists ancient  
and modern have had a good deal to say  
about the nature of man4 ,to some of    
them it has seemed rather a simple thing
 to describe it4 ,its constitution1 as  
they have conceived it1 has furnished   
them with certain principles which      
should guide human action4 ,aristotle1  
who assumed that every man seeks his own
 good1 conceived of his good or         
well-being as largely identical with    
well- doing4 ,this well-doing meant to  
him fulfilling the proper functions of  
man1 or in other words acting as the    
nature of man prescribes4 ,footnote3    
,politics1 i1 #b4 ,see1 further1 on     
,man's ,nature1 chapter xxvi4 ,to the   
,stoic man's duty was action in         
accordance with his nature4 ,footnote3  
,,marcus ,,aurelius1 ,thoughts1 v1 #a4  
,butler1 ,footnote3 ,sermons on ,human  
,nature1 ii many centuries later1 found 
in man's nature a certain constitution1 
with conscience naturally supreme and   
the passions in a position of           

subordination4 ,this constitution       
plainly indicated to him the conduct    
appropriate to a human being4  ,such    
appeals to man's nature we are apt to   
listen to with a good deal of sympathy4 
,manifestly1 man differs from the       
brutes1 and they differ1 in their kind1 
from each other4 ,to each kind1 a life  
of a certain sort seems appropriate4    
,the rational being is expected to act  
rationally1 to some degree1 at least4   
,in our dealings with creatures on a    
lower plane1 we pitch our expectations  
much lower4  ,and the behavior we expect
 from each is that appropriate to its   
kind4 ,the bee and the ant follow       
unswervingly their own law1 and live    
their own complicated community life4   
,however the behavior of the brute may  
vary in the presence of varying         
conditions1 the degree of the variation 
seems to be determined by rather narrow 
limits4 ,these we recognize as the      
limits of the nature of the creature4   
,it dictates to itself1 unconsciously1  

its own law of action1 and it follows   
that law simply and without revolt4     
,when we turn to man1 the crown and     
glory of the universe1 as ,darwin calls 
him1 we find him1 too1 endowed with a   
certain nature in an analogous sense of 
the word4 ,he has capacities for which  
we look in vain elsewhere4 ,the type of 
conduct we expect of him has its root in
 these capacities4 ,human nature can    
definitely be expected to express itself
 in a human life1--one lower or higher1 
but1 in every case1 distinguishable from
 the life of the brute4 ,it means       
something to speak of the physical and  
mental constitution of man1 that        
mysterious reservoir from which his     
emotions and actions are supposed to    
flow4 ,we feel that we have a right to  
use the expression1 even while admitting
 that the brain of man is1 as far as    
psychology is concerned1 almost         
unexplored territory1 and that the      
relation of mind to brain is1 and is    
long likely to remain1 a subject of     

dispute with philosophers and           
psychologists4  #bc4 ,,how ,,discover   
,,man',s ,,nature8--,nevertheless1 in   
speaking of the nature of any living    
creature1 we are forced to remind       
ourselves that the original endowment of
 the creature studied can never be      
isolated and subjected to inspection    
independently of the setting in which   
the subject of our study is found4 ,who1
 by an examination of the brain of a bee
 or of an ant1 could foresee the        
intricate organized industry of the hive
 or the anthill8 ,the seven ages of man 
are not stored ready-made in the little 
body of the infant4 ,at any rate1 they  
are beyond the reach of the most        
penetrating vision4 ,in the case of the 
simple mechanisms which can be          
constructed by man a forecast of future 
function is possible on the basis of a  
general knowledge of mechanics4 ,but    
there is no living being of whose       
internal constitution we have a similar 
knowledge4 ,from the behavior of the    

creature we gather a knowledge of its   
nature2 we do not start with its nature 
as directly revealed and infer its      
behavior4 ,that there are differences in
 the internal constitution of beings    
which react to the same environment in  
different ways1 we have every reason to 
believe4 ,what those differences are in 
detail we cannot know4 ,and our         
knowledge of the capacities inherent in 
this or that constitution will be       
limited by what we can observe of its   
reaction to environment4  ,sometimes the
 reaction to environment is relatively  
simple and uniform4 ,in this case we    
feel that we can attain without great   
difficulty to what may be regarded as a 
satisfactory knowledge of the nature of 
the creature studied4 ,the conception of
 that nature appears to be rather       
definite and unequivocal4 ,when it is   
once attained1 we speak with some       
assurance of the way in which the       
creature will act in this situation or  
in that4 ,if1 however1 the capacities   

are vastly more ample1 and the          
environment to which this creature is   
adjusted is greatly extended1 the       
difficulty of describing in any         
unequivocal way the nature of the       
creature becomes indefinitely greater4  
,is it possible to contemplate man      
without being struck with the breadth   
and depth of the gulf which separates   
the primitive human being from the      
finished product of civilization8 ,what 
a difference in range of emotion1 in    
reach of intellect1 in stored           
information1 in freedom of action1      
between man at his lowest and man at his
 highest6 ,can we describe in the same  
terms what is natural to man everywhere 
and always8  ,for the filthy and        
ignorant savage1 absorbed in satisfying 
his immediate bodily needs1 standing in 
the simplest of social relations1 taking
 literally no thought for the morrow1   
profoundly ignorant of the world in     
which he finds himself1 possessing over 
nature no control worthy of the name1   

the sport and slave of his environment1 
it is natural to act in one way4 ,for   
enlightened humanity1 acquainted with   
the past and forecasting the future1    
developed in intellect and refined in   
feeling1 rich in the possession of arts 
and sciences1 intelligently controlling 
and directing the forces of nature1     
socially organized in highly complicated
 ways1 it is natural to act in another  
way4 ,and to each of the intermediate   
stages in the evolution of civilization 
some type of conduct appears to be      
appropriate and natural4  ,whither1     
then1 shall we turn for our conception  
of man's nature8 ,shall we merely draw  
up a list of the instincts and impulses 
which may be observable in all men8     
,shall we say no more than that man is  
gifted with an intelligence superior to 
that of the brutes8 ,to do this is1 to  
be sure1 to give some vague indication  
of man's original endowment4 ,but it can
 give us little indication of what it is
 possible for man1 with such an         

endowment1 and in such an environment as
 makes his setting1 to become4 ,and what
 man becomes1 that he is4  ,if man's    
nature can be revealed only through the 
development of his capacities1 it is    
futile to seek it in a return to        
undeveloped man4 ,the nature of the     
chicken is not best revealed in the egg4
 ,and1 as man can develop only in       
interaction with his environment1 we    
must1 to understand him1 study his      
environment also4     ,,chapter ,,ix    
,,man',s ,,material ,,environment   #bd4
 ,,the ,,struggle ,,with ,,nature4--,it 
is not possible to disentangle from each
 other and to consider quite separately 
the diverse elements which enter into   
the environment of man and which        
influence his development4 ,his         
environment is two-fold1 material and   
social2 but his material setting may    
affect his social relations1 and it is  
social man1 not the individual as such1 
that achieves a conquest over nature4   
,however1 it is possible1 and it is     

convenient1 to direct attention         
successively upon the one and the other 
aspect of his environment4  ,at every   
stage of his development1 man must have 
food1 shelter1 some means of defense4   
,if they are not easily obtainable1 he  
must strain every nerve to attain them4 
,are his powers feeble and his          
intelligence undeveloped1 it may tax all
 his efforts to keep himself alive and  
to continue the race in any fashion4    
,the rules which determine his conduct  
seem rather the dictates of a stern     
necessity than the products of anything 
resembling free choice4  ,he who is     
lashed by hunger and haunted by fear1   
who cannot provide for the remote       
future1 but must accept good or ill     
fortune as the accident of the day      
precipitates his lot upon him1 lives and
 must live a life at but one remove from
 that of the brute4 ,in such a life the 
instincts of man attain to a certain    
expression1 but intelligence plays a    
feeble part4 ,the man remains a slave1  

under dictation1 and moved by the dread 
of immediate disaster4 ,for an interest 
in what is remote in time and place1 for
 the extension of knowledge for its own 
sake1 for the development of activities 
which have no direct bearing upon the   
problem of keeping him alive and fed1   
there can be little place4 ,one must be 
assured that one can live1 and live in  
reasonable security and physical        
well-being1 before the problem of       
enriching and embellishing life can     
fairly present itself as an important   
problem4 ,one must be set free before   
one can deliberately set out to shape   
one's life after an ideal4  ,not that a 
severe struggle with physical nature is 
necessarily and of itself a curse4 ,it  
may call out man's powers1 stimulate to 
action1 and result in growth and        
development4 ,where a prodigal nature   
amply provides for man's bodily         
necessities without much effort on his  
part1 the result may be1 in the absence 
of other stimulating influences giving  

rise to new wants1 a paralyzing         
slothfulness1 an animal passivity and   
content4 ,this may be observed in whole 
peoples highly favored by soil and      
climate1 and protected by their         
situation from external dangers4 ,it may
 be observed in certain favored classes 
even in communities which1 by long and  
strenuous effort1 have conquered nature 
and raised themselves high in the scale 
of civilization4 ,the idle sons of the  
rich1 relieved from the spur of         
necessity1 may undergo the degeneration 
appropriate to parasitic life4 ,in the  
midst of a strenuous activity adapted to
 call out the best intellectual and     
moral powers of man1 they may remain    
unaffected by it1 incapable of effort1  
unintelligent1 slothful1 the weak and   
passive recipients of what is brought to
 them by the labor of others4  ,but the 
struggle with physical nature1 sometimes
 a spur to progress and issuing in      
triumph1 may also issue in defeat4      
,nature may be too strong for man1 or1  

at least1 for man at an early stage of  
his development4 ,she may thwart his    
efforts and dwarf his life4 ,it was     
through no accident that the ,athenian  
state rose and flourished upon the      
shores of the ,aegean2 no such          
efflorescence of civilization could be  
looked for among the ,esquimaux of the  
frozen ,north4  #be4 ,,the ,,conquests  
,,of ,,the ,,mind4--,physical           
environment counts for much1 but the    
physical environment of man is the same 
as that of the creatures below him who  
seem incapable of progress4 ,it is as an
 intelligent being that he succeeds in  
bringing about ever new and more        
complicated adjustments to his          
environment4  ,from the point of view of
 his animal life in many respects       
inferior to other creatures--less       
strong1 less swift1 less adequately     
provided with natural means of defense1 
less protected by nature against cold1  
heat and the inclemencies of the        
weather1 endowed with instincts less    

unerring1 less prolific1 through a long 
period of infancy helpless and          
dependent-- man nevertheless survives   
and prospers4  ,he has conquered the    
strong1 overtaken the swift1 called upon
 his ingenuity to furnish him with means
 of defence4 ,he has defied cold and    
heat1 and we find him1 with appliances  
of his own devising1 successfully       
combating the rigors of ,arctic frosts  
and the torrid sun of the tropics4      
,intelligence has supplemented instinct 
and has guaranteed the survival of the  
individual and of the race4  ,it has    
even protected man against himself1     
against the very dangers arising out of 
his immunity from other dangers4 ,a     
gregarious creature1 increasing and     
multiplying1 he would be threatened with
 starvation did not his intelligent     
control over nature furnish him with a  
food-supply which makes it possible for 
vast numbers of human beings to live and
 thrive on a territory of limited       
extent4 ,moreover1 he has compassed     

those complicated forms of social       
organization which reveal themselves in 
cities and states1 solving problems of  
production1 transportation and          
distribution before which undeveloped   
man would stand helpless4  ,and from the
 problem of living at all he has passed 
to that of living well4 ,he has created 
new wants and has satisfied them4 ,he   
has built up for himself a rich and     
diversified life1 many of the activities
 of which appear to have the remotest of
 bearings upon the mere struggle for    
existence1 but the exercise of which    
gives him satisfaction4 ,thus1 the      
primitive instinct of curiosity1 once   
relatively aimless and insignificant1   
has developed into the passion for      
systematic knowledge and the persistent 
search for truth2 the rudimentary       
aesthetic feeling which is revealed in  
primitive man1 and traces of which are  
recognizable in creatures far lower in  
the scale1 has blossomed out in those   
elaborate creations1 which1 at an       

enormous expense of labor and ingenuity1
 have come to enrich the domains of     
literature1 music1 painting1 sculpture1 
architecture4 ,civilized man is to a    
great extent occupied with the          
production of what he does not need1 if 
need be measured by what his wants are  
at a lower stage of his development4    
,but these same things he needs         
imperatively1 if we measure his need by 
his desires when they have been         
multiplied and their scope indefinitely 
widened4  #bf4 ,,the ,,conquest ,,of    
,,nature ,,and ,,the ,,well-,,being ,,of
 ,,man4--,it is evident that the        
successful exploitation of the resources
 of material nature is of enormous      
significance to the life of man4 ,it may
 bring emancipation2 it offers          
opportunity4 ,one is tempted to affirm1 
without stopping to reflect1 that the   
development of the arts and sciences1   
the increase of wealth and of knowledge1
 must in the nature of things increase  
human happiness4  ,one is tempted1      

further1 to maintain that an advance in 
civilization must imply an advance in   
moralization4 ,man has a moral nature   
which exhibits itself to some degree at 
every stage of his development4 ,what   
more natural to conclude than that1 with
 the progressive unfolding of his       
intelligence1 with increase in          
knowledge1 with some relaxation of the  
struggle for existence which pits man   
against his fellow-man1 and subordinates
 all other considerations to the        
inexorable law of self- preservation1   
his moral nature would have the         
opportunity to show itself in a fuller  
measure8  ,when we compare man at his   
very lowest with man at his highest such
 judgments appear to be justified4 ,but 
man is to be found at all sorts of      
intermediate stages4  ,his knowledge may
 be limited1 the development of the arts
 not far advanced1 his control over     
nature far from complete1 and yet he may
 live in comparative security and with  
such wants as he has reasonably well    

satisfied4 ,his competition with his    
fellows may not be bitter and absorbing4
 ,the simple life is not necessarily an 
unhappy life1 if the simplicity which   
characterizes it be not too extreme4 ,in
 judging broadly of the significance for
 human life of the control over nature  
which is implied in the advance of      
civilization1 one must take into        
consideration several points of capital 
importance3  7#a7 ,the multiplication of
 man's wants results1 not in happiness1 
but in unhappiness1 unless the          
satisfaction of those wants can be      
adequately provided for4  7#b7 ,the     
effort to satisfy the new wants which   
have been called into being may be      
accompanied by an enormous expenditure  
of effort4 ,where the effort is         
excessive man becomes again the slave of
 his environment4 ,his task is set for  
him1 and he fulfills it under the lash  
of an imperious necessity4 ,the higher  
standard may become as inexorable a     
task-master as was the lower4  7#c7 ,it 

does not follow that1 because a given   
community is set free from the bondage  
of the daily anxiety touching the       
problem of living at all1 and may       
address itself deliberately to the      
problem of living well1 it will         
necessarily take up into its ideal of   
what constitutes living well all those  
goods upon which developed man is apt to
 set a value4 ,a civilization may be a  
grossly material one1 even when endowed 
with no little wealth4 ,with wealth     
comes the opportunity for the           
development of the arts which embellish 
life1 but that opportunity may not be   
embraced4 ,man may be materially rich   
and spiritually poor2 he may allow some 
of his faculties to lie dormant1 and may
 lose the enjoyments which would have   
been his had they been developed4 ,the  
,athenian citizen two millenniums ago   
had no such mastery over the forces of  
nature as we possess today4             
,nevertheless1 he was enabled to live a 
many-sided life beside which the life of

 the modern man may appear poor and     
bare4 ,it is by no means self- evident  
that the good of man consists in the    
multitude of the material things which  
he can compel to his service4  7#d7     
,moreover1 it does not follow that1     
because the sum of man's activities1 his
 behavior1 broadly taken1 is vastly     
altered1 by an increase in his control  
over his material environment1 the      
result is an advance in moralization4   
,an advance in civilization--in         
knowledge1 in the control over nature's 
resources1 in the evolution of the      
industrial and even of the fine         
arts--does not necessarily imply a      
corresponding ethical advance on the    
part of a given community4 ,new         
conditions1 brought about by an increase
 of knowledge1 of wealth1 of power1 may 
result in ethical degeneration4  ,what  
constitutes the moral in human behavior1
 what marks out right or wrong conduct  
from conduct ethically indifferent1 we  
have not yet considered4 ,but no man is 

wholly without information in the field 
of morals1 and we may here fall back    
upon such conceptions as men generally  
possess before they have evolved a      
science of morals4 ,in the light of such
 conceptions a simple and comparatively 
undeveloped culture may compare very    
favorably with one much higher in the   
scale of civilization4  ,in the simplest
 groups of human beings1 justice1       
veracity and a regard to common good may
 be conspicuous2 the claim of each man  
upon his fellow-man may be generally    
acknowledged4 ,in communities more      
advanced1 the growth of class           
distinctions and the inequalities due to
 the amassing of wealth on the part of  
individuals may go far to nullify the   
advantage to the individual of any      
advance made by the community as a      
whole4 ,the social bonds which have     
obtained between members of the same    
group may be relaxed2 the devotion to   
the common good may be replaced by the  
selfish calculation of profit to the    

individual2 the exploitation of man by  
his fellow-man may be accepted as       
natural and normal4 ,it is not without  
its significance that the most highly   
civilized of states have1 under the     
pressure of economic advance1 come to   
adopt the institution of slavery in its 
most degraded forms2 that the problem of
 property and poverty may present itself
 as most pressing and most difficult of 
solution where national wealth has grown
 to enormous proportions4 ,the body     
politic may be most prosperous from a   
material point of view1 and at the same 
time1 considered from the point of view 
of the moralist1 thoroughly rotten in   
its constitution4  ,it is well to       
remember that1 even in the most advanced
 of modern civilizations1 whatever the  
degree of enlightenment and the power   
enjoyed by the community as a whole1 it 
is quite possible for the individual to 
be condemned to a life little different 
in essentials from that of the lowest   
savage4 ,he whose feverish existence is 

devoted to the nerve- racking occupation
 of gambling in stocks1 who goes to his 
bed at night scheming how he may with   
impunity exploit his fellow-man1 and who
 rises in the morning with a strained   
consciousness of possible fluctuations  
in the market which may overwhelm him in
 irretrievable disaster1 lives in perils
 which easily bear comparison with those
 which threaten the precarious existence
 of primitive man4 ,to masses of men in 
civilized communities the problem of the
 food supply is all-absorbing1 and may  
exclude all other and broader interests4
 ,the factory-worker1 with a mind       
stupefied by the mechanical repetition  
of some few simple physical movements of
 no possible interest to him except as  
resulting in the wage that keeps him    
alive1 has no share in such light as may
 be scattered about him4  ,the control  
of the forces of nature brings about    
great changes in human societies1 but it
 may leave the individual1 whether rich 
or poor1 a prey to dangers and          

anxieties1 engaged in an unequal combat 
with his environment1 absorbed in the   
satisfaction of material needs1         
undeveloped1 unreflective and most      
restricted in his outlook4 ,of          
emancipation there can here be no       
question4  ,and a civilization in which 
the control of the forces of nature has 
been carried to the highest pitch of    
development may furnish a background to 
the darkest of passions4 ,it may serve  
as a stage upon which callous           
indifference1 greed1 rapacity1 gross    
sensuality1 play their parts naked and  
unashamed4 ,that some men sunk in       
ignorance and subject to such passions  
live in huts and have their noses       
pierced1 and others have taken up from  
their environment the habit of dining in
 evening dress1 is to the moralist a    
relatively insignificant detail4 ,he    
looks at the man1 and he finds him in   
each case essentially the same--a       
primitive and undeveloped creature who  
has not come into his rightful heritage4

     ,,chapter ,x  ,,man',s ,,social    
,,environment   #bg4 ,,man ,,is         
,,assigned ,,his ,,place4--,the old     
fable of a social contract1 by virtue of
 which man becomes a member of a        
society1 agreeing to renounce certain   
rights he might exercise if wholly      
independent1 and to receive in exchange 
legal rights which guarantee to the     
individual the protection of life and   
property and the manifold advantages to 
be derived from cooperative effort1     
points a moral1 like other fables4  ,the
 contract in question never had an      
existence1 but neither did the          
conversation between the grasshopper and
 the ant4 ,in each case1 a truth is     
illustrated by a play of the            
imagination4 ,contracts there have been 
in plenty1 between individuals1 between 
families1 between social classes1       
between nations2 but they have all been 
contracts between men already in a      
social state of some sort1 capable of   
choice and merely desirous of modifying 

in some particular some aspect of that  
social state4 ,the notion of an original
 contract1 lying at the base of all     
association of man with man1 is no more 
than a fiction which serves to          
illustrate the truth that the desires   
and wills of men are a significant      
factor in determining the particular    
forms under which that association      
reveals itself4  ,no man enters into a  
contract to be born1 or to be born a    
,kaffir1 a ,malay1 a ,hindoo1 an        
,englishman or an ,american4 ,he enters 
the world without his own consent1 and  
without his own connivance he is        
assigned a place in a social state of   
some sort4 ,the reception which is      
accorded to him is of the utmost moment 
to him4 ,he may be rejected utterly by  
the social forces presiding over his    
birth4 ,in which case he does not start 
life independently1 but is snuffed out  
as is a candle-flame by the wind4 ,and  
if accepted1 as he usually is in        
civilized communities1 he takes his     

place in the definite social order into 
which he is born1 and becomes the       
subject of education and training as a  
member of that particular community4    
#bh4 ,,varieties ,,of ,,the ,,social    
,,order4--,the social order into which  
he is thus ushered may be most varied in
 character4 ,he may find himself a      
member of a small and primitive group of
 human beings1 a family standing in more
 or less loose relations to a limited   
number of other families2 he may belong 
to a clan in which family relationship  
still serves as a real or fictive bond2 
his clan may have its place in a        
confederation2 or the body politic in   
which he is a unit may be a nation1 or  
an empire including many nationalities4 
,his relations to his fellow-man will   
naturally present themselves to him in a
 different light according to the       
different nature of the social          
environment in which he finds himself4  
,the community of feeling and of        
interests which defines rights1         

determines expectations1 and prescribes 
duties1 cannot be the same under        
differing conditions4 ,social life      
implies cooperation1 but the limits of  
possible cooperation are very           
differently estimated by man at         
different stages of his development4 ,to
 a few human beings each man is bound   
closely at every stage of his evolution4
 ,the family bond is everywhere         
recognized4 ,but1 beyond that1 there are
 wider and looser relationships         
recognized in very diverse degrees1 as  
intelligence expands1 as economic       
advance and political enlightenment make
 possible a community life on a larger  
scale1 as sympathy becomes less narrow  
and exclusive4  ,it is not easy for a   
member of a community at a given stage  
of its development even to conceive the 
possibility of such communities as may  
come into existence under widely        
different conditions4 ,the simple1      
communistic savage1 limited in his      
outlook1 thinks in terms of small       

numbers4 ,a handful of individuals enjoy
 membership in his group2 he recognizes 
certain relations1 more or less loose1  
to other groups1 with which his group   
comes into contact2 beyond is the       
stranger1 the natural enemy1 upon whom  
he has no claim and to whom he owes no  
duty4  ,at a higher level there comes   
into being the state1 including a       
greater number of individuals and       
internally organized as the simpler     
society is not4 ,but even in a highly   
civilized state much the same attitude  
towards different classes of human      
beings may seem natural and inevitable4 
,to ,plato there remained the strongly  
marked distinctions between the         
,athenian1 the citizen of another       
,hellenic community1 and the barbarian4 
,war1 when waged against the last1 might
 justifiably be merciless2 not so1 when 
it was war between ,greek states4       
,footnote3 ,republic1 ,book ,v4 ,into   
such conceptions of rights and duties   
men are born2 they take them up with the

 very air that they breathe1 and they   
may never feel impelled to subject them 
to the test of criticism4  ,it is       
instructive to remark that neither the  
speculative genius of a ,plato nor the  
acute intelligence of an ,aristotle     
could rise to the conception of an      
organized1 self-governing community on a
 great scale4 ,to each it seemed evident
 that the group proper must remain a    
comparatively small one4 ,plato finds it
 necessary to provide in his ,laws that 
the number of households in the ,state  
shall be limited to five thousand and   
forty4 ,aristotle1 less arbitrarily     
exact1 allows a variation within rather 
broad limits1 holding that a political  
community should not comprise a number  
of citizens smaller than ten1 nor one   
greater than one hundred thousand4      
,,footnote3 ,,plato1 ,laws1 v4          
,,aristotle1 ,ethics1 ix1 #aj4 ,that a  
highly organized state1 a state not     
composed of a horde of subjects under   
autocratic control1 but one in which the

 citizens are1 in theory1               
self-governing1 should spread over half 
a continent and include a hundred       
millions of souls1 would have seemed to 
these men of genius the wildest of      
dreams4 ,yet such a dream has been      
realized4  #bi4 ,,social                
,,organization4--,the social body of    
which man becomes1 by the accident of   
birth1 an involuntary member1 may stand 
at any point in the scale of economic   
evolution4 ,it may be a primitive group 
living from hand to mouth by the chase1 
by fishing or by gathering such food as 
nature spontaneously produces4 ,it may  
be a pastoral people1 more or less      
nomadic1 occupied with the care of      
flocks and herds4 ,it may be an         
agricultural community1 rooted to the   
soil1 looking forward from seed- time to
 harvest1 capable of foresight in       
storing and distributing the fruits of  
its labors4 ,it may combine some of the 
above activities2 and may1 in addition1 
have arrived at the stage at which the  

arts and crafts have attained to a      
considerable development4 ,in its life  
commerce may have come to play an       
important role1 bringing it into        
peaceful relations with other           
communities and broadening the circle of
 its interests4 ,that human societies at
 such different stages of their         
development should differ greatly in    
their internal organization1 in their   
relations to other communities1 and in  
the demands which they make upon the    
individuals who compose them1 is to be  
expected4 ,some manner of life1         
appropriate to the status of the        
community1 comes to be prescribed4 ,the 
ideal of conduct1 whether unconsciously 
admitted or consciously embraced and    
inculcated1 is not the same in different
 societies4 ,the virtues which come to  
be prized1 the defects which are        
disapproved1 vary with their setting4   
,moreover1 the process of inner         
development results in differentiation  
of function4 ,clearly marked social     

classes come into existence1 standing in
 more or less sharply defined relations 
to other social classes1 endowed with   
special rights and called to the        
performance of peculiar duties4  ,man is
 not merely born into this or that      
community2 he is born into a place in   
the community4 ,in very primitive       
societies that place may differ little  
from other places1 save as such are     
determined by age or sex4 ,but in more  
highly differentiated societies it may  
differ enormously1 entail the           
performance of widely different         
functions1 and prescribe distinct       
varieties of conduct4  ,what will be the
 manner of life1 said ,plato1 ,footnote3
 ,laws1 vii4 among men who may be       
supposed to have their food and clothing
 provided for them in moderation1 and   
who have entrusted the practice of the  
arts to others1 and whose husbandry1    
committed to slaves paying a part of the
 produce1 brings them a return          
sufficient for living temperately8  ,his

 ideal leisure class is patterned after 
what he saw before him in ,athens4 ,he  
conceives those who belong to it to be  
set free from sordid cares and physical 
labors1 in order that they may devote   
themselves to the perfecting of their   
own minds and bodies and to preparation 
for the serious work of supervising and 
controlling the state4 ,their membership
 in the class defined their duties and  
prescribed the course of education which
 should fit them to fulfill them4 ,it is
 not conceived that the functions       
natural and proper to one human being   
are also natural and proper to another  
in the same community4  ,the flat       
monotony which obtains in those simplest
 human societies1 resembling extended   
families1 where there is scarcely a     
demarcation of classes1 a distinction of
 occupations and a recognition of       
private property in any developed sense1
 has given place in such a state to     
sharp contrasts in the status of man and
 man4 ,such contrasts obtain in all     

modern civilized communities4 ,man is   
not merely a subject or citizen2 he is a
 subject or citizen of this class or of 
that1 and the environment which molds   
him varies accordingly4  #cj4 ,,social  
,,order ,,and ,,human ,,will4--,we have 
seen that the material environment of a 
man1 the extent of his mastery over     
nature and of his emancipation from the 
dictation of pressing bodily needs1 is a
 factor of enormous importance in       
determining what he shall become and    
what sort of a life he shall lead4 ,that
 his social setting is equally          
significant is obvious4 ,what he shall  
know1 what habits he shall form1 what   
emotions he shall experience in this    
situation and in that1 what tasks he    
shall find set before him1 and what     
ideals he shall strive to attain1 are   
largely determined for him independently
 of his choice4  ,to be sure1 it remains
 true that man is man1 endowed with     
certain instincts and impulses and      
gifted with human intelligence4 ,nor are

 all men alike in their impulses or in  
the degree of their intelligence4       
,within limits the individual may       
exercise choice1 reacting upon and      
modifying his environment and himself4  
,but a moment's reflection reveals to us
 that the new departure is but a step   
taken from a vantage-ground which has   
not been won by independent effort4 ,the
 information in the light of which he   
chooses1 the situation in the face of   
which he acts1 the emotional nature     
which impels him to effort1 the habits  
of thought and action which have become 
part of his being--these are largely due
 to the larger whole of which he finds  
himself a part4 ,he did not build the   
stage upon which he is to act4 ,his     
lines have been learned from others4 ,he
 may recite them imperfectly2 he may    
modify them in this or in that          
particular4 ,but the drama from which1  
and from which alone1 he gains his      
significance1 is not his own creation4  
,the independence of the individual in  

the face of his material and social     
environment makes itself more apparent  
with the progressive development of man4
 ,but man attains his development as a  
member of society1 and in the course of 
a historical evolution4 ,it was pointed 
out many centuries ago that a hand cut  
off from the human body cannot properly 
be called a hand1 for it can perform    
none of the functions of one4 ,and man1 
torn from his setting1 can no longer be 
considered man as the proper subject of 
moral science4  ,it is as a thinking and
 willing creature in a social setting   
that man becomes a moral agent4 ,to     
understand him we must make a study of  
the individual and of the social will4  
,,part ,,iv  ,,the ,,realm ,,of ,,ends  
,,chapter ,,xi  ,,impulse1 ,,desire1    
,,and ,,will   #ca4                     
,,impulse4--,commands and prohibitions  
address themselves to man as a voluntary
 agent4 ,but it seems right to treat as 
willed by man much more than falls under
 the head of conscious and deliberate   

volition4 ,we do not hesitate to make   
him responsible for vastly more2 and yet
 common sense does not1 when            
enlightened1 regard men as responsible  
for what is recognized as falling wholly
 beyond the direct and indirect control 
of their wills4  ,motions due to even   
the blindest of impulses are not to be  
confounded with those brought about by  
external compulsion4 ,they may have the 
appearance of being vaguely purposive1  
although we would never attribute       
purpose to the creature making them4    
,the infant that cries and struggles1   
when tormented by the intrusive pin1 the
 worm writhing in the beak of a         
bird1--these act blindly1 but it does   
not appear meaningless to say that they 
act4 ,the impulse is from within4  ,some
 impulses result in actions very nicely 
adjusted to definite ends4 ,such are    
winking1 sneezing1 swallowing4 ,these   
reflexes may occur as the mechanical    
response to a given stimulus4 ,they may 
occur without our being conscious of    

them and without our having willed them4
  ,yet such responses to stimuli are not
 necessarily unconscious and cut off    
from voluntary control4 ,he who winks   
involuntarily when a hand is passed     
before his eyes may become conscious    
that he has done so1 and may1 if he     
chooses1 even acquire some facility in  
controlling the reflex4 ,one may resist 
the tendency to swallow when the throat 
is dry1 may hold back a sneeze1 or may  
keep rigid the hand that is pricked by a
 pin4 ,that is to say1 actions in their 
origin mechanical and independent of    
choice may be raised out of their low   
estate1 made the objects of attention1  
and brought within the domain of        
deliberate choice4  ,furthermore1 many  
actions which1 at the outset1 claimed   
conscious attention and were            
deliberately willed may become so       
habitual that the doer lapses into      
unconsciousness or semi-unconsciousness 
of his deed4 ,they take on the nature of
 acquired reflexes4 ,the habit of acting

 appears to have been acquired by the   
mind and then turned over to the body1  
that the mind may be free to occupy     
itself with other activities4 ,the man  
has become less the doer than the       
spectator of his acts2 perhaps he is    
even less than that1 he is the stage    
upon which the action makes its         
appearance1 while the spectator is his  
neighbor4 ,the complicated bodily       
movements called into play when one     
bites one's nails had to be learned4 ,it
 requires no little ingenuity to        
accomplish the act when the nails are   
short4 ,yet one may come to the stage of
 perfection at which one bites one's    
nails when one is absorbed in thought   
about other things4 ,and one may learn  
to slander one's neighbor almost as     
mechanically and unthinkingly as one    
swallows when the throat is dry4  ,when 
we speak of man's impulses1 we are using
 a vague word4 ,there are impulses which
 will never be anything more4 ,there are
 impulses which may become something    

more4 ,there are impulses which are no  
longer anything more4 ,impulses have    
their psychic aspect4 ,at its lower     
limit1 impulse may appear very          
mechanical2 at its upper1 one may       
hesitate to say that desire and will are
 wholly absent4 ,it is not wise to      
regard impulse as lying wholly beyond   
the sphere of will4  #cb4 ,,desire4--,at
 its lower limit1 desire is not         
distinguished by any sharp line from    
mere impulse4 ,is the infant that       
stretches out its hands toward a bright 
object conscious of a desire to possess 
it8 ,or does the motion made follow the 
visual sensation as the wail follows the
 wound made by the pin8 ,at a certain   
stage of development the phenomena of   
desire become unmistakable4 ,the idea of
 something to be attained1 the notion of
 means to the attainment of an end1 the 
consciousness of tension1 may stand out 
clearly4 ,the analysis of the           
psychologist1 which finds in desire a   
consciousness of the present state of   

the self1 an idea of a future state1 and
 a feeling of tension towards the       
realization of the latter1 may represent
 faithfully the elements present in     
desire in the higher stages of its      
development1 but it would be difficult  
to find those elements clearly marked in
 desire which has just begun to         
differentiate itself from impulse4      
,there may be a desire where there can  
scarcely be said to be a self as an     
object of consciousness2 one may desire 
where there is no clear consciousness of
 a future state as distinct from a      
present one4  ,moreover1 the            
consciousness of desire may be faint and
 fugitive1 as it may be intense and     
persistent4 ,desire is the step between 
the first consciousness of the object   
and the voluntary release of energy     
which works toward its attainment4 ,this
 step may be passed over almost         
unnoticed4 ,the thought of shifting my  
position when ,i feel uncomfortable may 
be followed by the act with no clear    

consciousness of a tension and its      
voluntary release4 ,the mere thought1   
itself but faintly and momentarily in   
consciousness1 appears to be followed at
 once by the act1 and desire and will to
 be eliminated4 ,it does not follow that
 they are actually eliminated2 they may 
be present as fleeting shadows which    
fail to attract attention4  ,if1        
however1 the desire fails to find its   
immediate fruition1 if it is frustrated1
 consciousness of it may become         
exceedingly intense4 ,there is the      
constant thought of the object1 a vivid 
feeling of tension1 of a striving to    
attain the object4 ,desire may become an
 obsession1 a torment filling the       
horizon1 and the volition in which it   
finds its fruition stands forth as a    
marked relief4 ,this condition of things
 may be brought about by the inhibition 
occasioned by the physical impossibility
 of attaining the object2 but it may    
also be brought about by the struggle of
 incompatible desires among themselves4 

,the man is drawn in different          
directions1 he is subject to various    
tensions1 and he becomes acutely        
conscious that he is impelled to move in
 several ways and is moving in none4  ,i
 have used the word tension to describe 
the psychic fact present in desire4 ,i  
have done so for want of a better word4 
,of the physical basis of desire1 of    
what takes place in the brain1 we know  
nothing4 ,with the psychic fact1 the    
feeling of agitation and unrest1 we are 
all familiar4 ,of the tendency of desire
 to discharge itself in action we are   
aware4 ,a desire appears to be an       
inchoate volition--that which1 if       
ripened successfully and not nipped in  
the bud1 would become a volition4 ,it   
may be looked upon as the first step    
toward action--a step which may or may  
not be followed by others4 ,it does not 
seem out of place to call it a state of 
tension1 of strain1 of inclination4 ,in 
speaking1 thus1 we use physical         
metaphors1 but they do not appear out of

 place4  #cc4 ,,desire ,,of ,,the       
,,unattainable4--,but if a desire may be
 regarded as an unripe act of will1 an  
inchoate volition1 how is it that we can
 desire the unattainable1 a sufficiently
 common experience8 ,i may bitterly     
regret some act of my own in the past2  
,i may earnestly wish that ,i had not   
performed it4 ,but the past is          
irrevocable4 ,hence1 the desire for the 
attainment of what is in this case the  
object1 a different past1 can hardly be 
regarded as even a preparatory step     
toward attainment4  ,in this case it can
 not1 and were all desires directed upon
 what is in the nature of the case      
wholly unattainable by effort1 it would 
occur to no one to speak of desire as a 
first step toward action4 ,but normally 
and usually desires are not of this     
nature4 ,they usually do constitute a   
link in the chain of occurrences which  
end in action4 ,did they not1 they would
 have little significance in the        
life-history of the creature desiring4  

,with the appearance of free ideas1 with
 an extension of the range of memory and
 imagination1 objects may be held before
 the mind which are not properly objects
 to be attained4 ,yet such objects are  
of the kind which attract or repel1     
i4e41 of the kind which men endeavor to 
realize in action4 ,they cannot be      
realized2 we do not will to realize     
them2 but we should will to do so were  
they realizable4 ,the psychic factor1   
the strain1 the tension1 is unmistakably
 present4 ,real desire is revealed1 and 
common speech1 as well as the language  
of science1 recognizes the fact4  ,this 
general attraction or repulsion         
exercised by objects1 in spite of the   
fact that the objects may not appear to 
be realizable1 is not without           
significance4 ,the hindrance to         
realization may be an accidental one2 it
 may not be wholly insuperable4 ,the    
presence of a persistent desire may     
result in persistent effort1 which may  
ultimately be crowned by success4 ,or it

 may show itself as a permanent         
readiness for effort4 ,were every       
frustrated desire at once dismissed from
 consciousness1 the result would show   
itself in a passivity detrimental to    
action in general4 ,where the object is 
intrinsically an impossible one1        
persistent desire is1 of course1 futile4
 ,the dog baying at the cat in the tree 
is the prey of such a desire1 but he    
does not realize it1 or he might        
discontinue his inefficacious leaps4    
,the man tormented by his unworthy act  
in the past is quite aware of the       
futility of his longings4 ,his condition
 is psychologically explicable1 but to a
 rational being1 in so far as rational1 
it is not normal4  ,normally1 desire is 
the intermediate step between the       
recognition of an object and the will to
 attain it4 ,the most futile of desires 
may be harbored4 ,the imaginative mind  
may range over a limitless field1 and   
give itself up to desires the most      
extravagant4 ,but indulgence in this    

habit serves as a check to action       
serviceable to the individual and to the
 race4 ,as a matter of fact1 desire is  
usually for what seems conceivably      
within the limit of possible attainment4
 ,the man desires to catch a train1 to  
run that he may attain that end2 his    
mind is little occupied with the desire 
to fly1 nor does his longing center upon
 the carpet of ,solomon4 ,to the        
desirability of dismissing from the mind
 futile desires current moral maxims    
bear witness4  #cd4 ,,will4--,the       
natural fruition of a desire is1 then1  
an act of will2 the tension is normally 
followed by that release of energy which
 makes for the attainment of the object 
or end of the desire4  ,the question    
suggests itself1 may there not be       
present1 even in blindly impulsive      
action1 something faintly corresponding 
to desire and will8 ,that there should  
be an object in the sense of something  
aimed at1 held in view as an idea to be 
realized1 appears to be out of the      

question4 ,but may there not be a more  
or less vague and evanescent sense of   
tension1 and some psychic fact which may
 be regarded as the shadowy forerunner  
of the consciousness of the release of  
tension which1 on a higher plane1       
reveals itself as the consciousness of  
will8 ,there may be3 introspection is   
not capable of answering the question1  
and one is forced to fall back upon an  
argument from analogy4 ,blindly         
impulsive action and action in which    
will indubitably and consciously plays a
 part are not wholly unlike1 but they   
differ by a very wide interval4 ,the    
interval is not an empty gap1 however1  
for1 as we have seen1 all volitions do  
not stand out upon the background of our
 consciousness with the same            
unmistakable distinctness4 ,there are   
volitions no one would hesitate to call 
such4 ,and there are phenomena          
resembling volition which we more and   
more doubtfully include under that      
caption as we pass own on the descending

 scale4  ,naturally1 in describing      
desire and volition we do not turn to   
the twilight region where all outlines  
are blurred and indistinct4 ,we fix our 
attention upon those instances in which 
the phenomena are clearly and strongly  
marked4 ,they are most clearly marked   
where desire does not1 at once and      
unimpeded1 discharge itself in action1  
but where action is deferred1 and a     
struggle takes place between desires4   
,the man is subject to various tensions1
 he is impelled in divers directions1 he
 hesitates1 deliberates1 and he finally 
makes a decision4 ,during this period of
 deliberation he is apt to be vividly   
conscious of desire as such--as a       
tension not yet relieved1 as an         
alternation of tensions as the attention
 occupies itself1 first with one        
desirable object1 then with another4    
,and the decision1 which puts an end to 
the strife1 is clearly distinguished    
from the desires as such4  ,in the      
reflective mind1 which turns its        

attention upon itself and its own       
processes1 the distinction between      
desire and will seems to be a marked    
one4 ,but it is not merely the developed
 and reflective mind which is the seat  
of deliberation4 ,the child deliberates 
between satisfying its appetite and     
avoiding possible punishment2 it reaches
 for the forbidden fruit1 and withdraws 
its hand2 it wavers1 it is moved in one 
direction as one desire becomes         
predominant1 and its action is checked  
as the other gains in ascendency4       
,deliberation this unmistakably is4 ,and
 deliberation we may observe in         
creatures below the level of man2 in the
 sparrow1 hopping as close as it dares  
to the hand that sprinkles crumbs before
 it2 in the dog1 ready to dart away in  
pursuance of his private desires1 but   
restrained by the warning voice of his  
master4 ,this is deliberation4 ,such    
deliberation as we find in the developed
 and enlightened human being it is not4 
,that1 however1 there is present even in

 these humble instances1 some psychic   
fact corresponding to what in the higher
 mind reveals itself as desire and      
volition1 we have no reason to doubt4   
#ce4 ,,desire ,,and ,,will ,,not        
,,identical4--,i have had occasion to   
remark that the modern psychologist     
draws no such sharp line between desire 
and volition as the psychologist of an  
earlier time4 ,that some distinction    
should be drawn seems palpable4 ,it is  
not without significance that immemorial
 usage sanctions this distinction4 ,the 
ancient ,stoic's quarrel was with the   
desires1 not with the will4 ,the will   
was treated as a master endowed with    
rightful authority2 the desires were    
subjects1 often in rebellion1 but justly
 to be held in subjection4 ,and from the
 days of the ,stoic down almost to our  
own1 the will has been treated much as  
though it were an especial and distinct 
faculty of man1 not uninfluenced by     
desire1 but in no sense to be identified
 with it1--above it1 its law-giver1     

detached1 independent1 supreme4 ,this   
tendency finds its culmination in that  
impressive modern ,stoic1 ,immanuel     
,kant1 who desires to isolate the will1 
and to emancipate it altogether from the
 influence of desire4  ,recently the    
pendulum has swung in the other         
direction4 ,it has been recognized that 
will is the natural outcome of desire1  
and that without desire there would be  
no will at all4 ,it has even been       
maintained that will is desire1 the     
desire with which the self identifies   
itself4 ,footnote3 ,see1 for example1   
,,green1 ,prolegomena to ,ethics1 ,sec  
#add-adi4  ,to this last form of        
expression objection may be made on the 
score of its vagueness4 ,what does it   
mean for the self to identify itself    
with a desire8 ,and if such an          
identification is necessary to will1 can
 there be volition or anything          
resembling volition where               
self-consciousness has not yet been     
developed8 ,it is very imperfectly      

developed in young children1 and in the 
lower animals still less developed1 if  
at all2 and yet we see in them the      
struggle of desires and the resultant   
decision emerging in action4 ,if we call
 a volition in which consciousness of   
the self has played its part volition   
proper1 it still remains to inquire how 
volitions on a lower plane are to be    
distinguished from mere desires4  ,what 
happens in a typical case of            
deliberation and decision8 ,two or more 
objects are before the mind and the     
attention occupies itself with them     
successively4 ,tensions alternate1 wax  
strong and die away1 only to recover    
their strength again4 ,finally the      
attention fixes upon one object to the  
exclusion of others1 the strife of      
desires come to an end1 and there is an 
inception of action in the direction of 
the realization of that particular      
desire4 ,the desire itself is not to be 
confounded with the decision2 the       
tension1 with its release4 ,the psychic 

fact is in the two cases different4 ,the
 decision brings relief from the strain4
 ,it cannot properly be called a desire1
 not even a triumphant desire1 although 
in it a desire attains a victory and its
 realization has begun4  ,such a victory
 not all desires1 even when most intense
 and prolonged1 are able to attain4 ,we 
have seen that the desire for the       
unattainable may amount to an obsession1
 and yet it will not ripen into an act  
of volition4 ,the release of the tension
 in incipient action does not come4 ,the
 bent bow remains bent4 ,from the sense 
of strain in such a case one may be     
freed1 as one is freed from the desires 
which succumb during the process of     
deliberation1 by the occupation of the  
attention with other things4 ,but the   
desire has been forgotten1 not          
satisfied4 ,it may at any time recur in 
all its strength4  ,we cannot more      
nearly describe the psychic fact called 
decision4 ,just as we cannot more nearly
 describe the psychic fact to which we  

have given the name tension4 ,although  
the nervous basis of the phenomena of   
desire and will are unknown1 we can     
easily conceive that1 during desire1 and
 before desire has resulted in the      
release of energy which is the immediate
 forerunner of action1 the cerebral     
occurrence should be different from that
 which is present when that release     
takes place4 ,nor should it be          
surprising that the psychical fact      
corresponding to each should be         
different4  ,the view here set forth    
does not confuse desire and will1 making
 will indistinguishable from desire1 or1
 at least1 from certain desires4 ,on the
 other hand1 it does not separate them1 
as though they could not be brought     
within the one series of occurrences    
which may properly be regarded as a     
unit4 ,it has the advantage of making   
comprehensible the mutual relations of  
impulse1 desire1 and will4 ,blind       
impulse discharges itself in action     
seemingly without the psychic           

accompaniments which distinguish desire 
and will4 ,but all impulse is not blind 
impulse1 and desiring and willing admit 
of many degrees of development4 ,to deny
 will to creatures lower than man1 as   
some writers have done1 is to           
misconceive the nature of the process   
that issues in action4 ,we are tempted  
to do it only when we compare will in   
its highest manifestations with those   
rudimentary foreshadowings of it which  
stand at the lower end of the scale4    
,but even in man we can discern blind   
impulse1 dimly conscious desires which  
ripen into as dimly recognized          
decisions1 and1 at the very top of the  
scale1 conscious decisions which follow 
deliberation1 and are the resultant of a
 struggle between many desires4  ,for   
ethical science it is of no little      
importance to apprehend clearly the     
relation of decision to desire4 ,moral  
rules aim to control human conduct1 and 
conduct is the expression of the whole  
man4 ,if we have no clear conception of 

the desires which struggle for the      
mastery within him1 and of the relation 
of his decisions to those desires1 in   
vain will we endeavor to influence him  
in the direction in which we wish him to
 move4  #cf4 ,,the ,,will ,,and         
,,deferred ,,action4--,it remains to    
speak briefly of one point touching the 
nature of will4 ,it has been suggested  
that the decision is the psychic fact   
corresponding to the release of nervous 
energy which relieves the tension of    
desire4 ,it is the beginning of action1 
of realization4 ,but what shall we say  
of resolves which cannot at once be     
carried out in action8 ,of decisions the
 realization of which is deferred8 ,i   
may long debate the matter and then     
determine to pay a bill when it comes   
due next month4 ,the decision is made2  
but1 for a time1 at least1 nothing      
happens4 ,how can ,i here speak of the  
beginning of action8  ,the action does  
not at once begin1 yet it is1 in a      
sense1 initiated4 ,the struggle of      

conflicting considerations has ceased2  
the man is set for action in a certain  
direction4 ,for the time being the      
matter is settled1 and only an external 
circumstance prevents the resolve from  
being carried out4 ,the psychic factor  
is widely different from that of mere   
desire1 and is not recognized to be     
different from that present in volition 
which at once issues in action4         
,,chapter ,,xii  ,,the ,,permanent      
,,will   #cg4 ,,consciously ,,chosen    
,,ends4--,our volitions1 deliberate1    
less deliberate1 and those verging upon 
what scarcely deserves the name of      
volition1 weave themselves into         
complicated patterns1 which find their  
expression in long series of the most   
varied activities4 ,the nature of the   
pattern as a whole may be determined by 
the deliberate selection of an end1 and 
to that the other choices which enter   
into the complex may be subordinate4    
,thus1 a man may decide that he can     
afford to give himself the pleasure of a

 long walk through the country before   
taking the train at the next town4      
,during the course of the ramble he may 
make a number of more or less conscious 
decisions not incompatible with the     
purpose he originally embraced--to take 
this bit of road or that1 to loiter in  
the shade1 to climb a hill that he may  
enjoy a view1 to hasten lest he find    
himself too late in arriving at his     
destination4 ,these decisions may       
require little deliberation2 they spring
 into being at the call of the moment1  
are not preceded by deliberation1 and   
leave little trace in the memory4 ,they 
may be made semi-consciously1 and while 
the mind is largely occupied with other 
things1 with thoughts of the past or the
 future1 with other scenes suggested by 
the landscape1 or with the flowers which
 skirt the road4 ,nevertheless1 we would
 not hesitate to call them decisions4   
,may we apply the word in speaking of   
the single steps made by the traveler as
 he advances8 ,his feet seem to move of 

themselves and to make no demands at all
 upon his attention4  ,yet it is not    
strictly true to say that they move of  
themselves4 ,they are under control1 and
 the successive steps follow upon each  
other not without direction4 ,they serve
 as expressions of the will to take the 
walk1 and they are adjusted to the end  
consciously held in view4 ,that         
attention is not fixed upon the         
individual steps does not remove them   
from the sphere of the voluntary1 in a  
proper sense of the words4 ,they are    
expressions of the man's will1 even if  
they be not the result of a conscious   
series of deliberations and decisions4  
,whether we shall use the term decision 
in connection with the single step is   
rather a question of verbal usage than  
of the determination of fact4 ,we have  
seen that decisions shade down          
gradually1 from those quite unmistakable
 and characteristic1 to occurrences far 
less characteristic and more disputable4
 ,the consciousness of deliberation and 

decision does not disappear abruptly at 
some point in the series4 ,it fades     
away1 as the light of day gradually     
passes1 through twilight1 into the      
shades of night4 ,and actions not       
directly recognizable as consciously    
voluntary may be obviously under        
voluntary control4 ,they weave          
themselves1 with actions more palpably  
voluntary and higher in the scale1 into 
those complicated patterns determined by
 the conscious selection of an end4 ,as 
long as they serve their purpose1 and   
require no effort1 they may remain      
inconspicuous and unconsidered4 ,but1 as
 soon as a check is met with1 attention 
is directed upon them and they become   
the subject of conscious voluntary      
control4  #ch4 ,,ends ,,not             
,,consciously ,,chosen4--,in the above  
illustration the end which determines   
the character of a long chain of actions
 has been deliberately chosen4 ,it is a 
consciously selected end4 ,when1        
however1 we contemplate critically the  

lives of our fellow-men1 we seem to     
become aware of the fact that many of   
them act in unconsciousness of the      
ultimate end upon which their actions   
converge4 ,the attention is taken up    
with minor decisions1 and takes no note 
of the permanent trend of the will4     
,thus1 the selfish man may be unaware of
 the significance of the whole series of
 choices which he makes in a day2 the   
malicious man may not realize that he is
 animated by the settled purpose to     
injure his neighbors2 one may be        
law-abiding without ever having resolved
 to obey the laws through the course of 
a life4 ,if called upon to account for  
this or that subordinate decision1 each 
may exhaust his ingenuity in assigning  
false causes1 while ignoring the        
permanent attitude of the will revealed 
in the series of decisions as a whole   
and giving them what consistency they   
possess4  ,hence1 the choice of ends1 as
 well as the adoption of means to the   
attainment of ends1 may reveal itself   

either in conscious deliberate          
decisions1 or in the working of obscure 
impulses which do not emerge into the   
light4 ,even in the latter case1 we have
 not to do with what is wholly beyond   
the sphere of intelligent voluntary     
control4 ,the selfish man may be made   
aware that he is selfish2 the malicious 
man1 that he is malicious2 and each may 
deliberately take steps to remedy the   
defect revealed4  ,when we understand   
the word will in the broad sense        
indicated in the preceding pages1 we see
 that a man's habits may justly be      
regarded as expressions of the man's    
will4 ,that1 through repetition1 his    
actions have become almost automatic    
does not remove them from the sphere of 
the volitional4 ,that he does not       
clearly see1 or that he misconceives1   
the significance of his habits1 and may 
acquiesce in them even though they be   
injurious to him1 does not make them the
 less willed1 so long as he follows     
them4 ,it is only when he actively      

endeavors to control or modify a habit  
that he may be said to will its         
opposite4  #ci4 ,,the ,,choice ,,of     
,,ideals4--,nor is it too much to bring 
under the head of willing the attitudes 
of approval and disapproval taken by man
 in contemplating certain occurrences1  
actual or possible1 which lie beyond the
 confines of the field within which he  
can exercise control4 ,the field of     
control1 direct and indirect1 is as we  
have seen a broad one1 but it has its   
limits1 and many of the things he would 
like to see accomplished or prevented   
lie without it4  ,a man's will may be   
set upon the preservation of his health1
 he may strive to attain that end1 and  
circumstances may condemn him to a life 
of invalidism4 ,he would be healthy if  
he could1 but his strivings are         
overruled4 ,or he may earnestly pursue  
the attainment of wealth1 and may end in
 bankruptcy4 ,he has the will to be     
rich1 but that will is frustrated4  ,it 
is the same when we consider his        

attitude toward the decisions and       
actions of other men4 ,by mere willing  
he cannot condition another's choice4   
,but by willing he can often influence  
indirectly the volitions of his fellows4
 ,he can enlighten or misinform1        
persuade or threaten1 reward or punish4 
,in many ways he can weight the scale of
 his neighbor's mind4 ,but such         
influences are not all-powerful1 and    
only within limits can we bend other    
wills to follow a course prescribed for 
them by our own4  ,nevertheless1 even   
beyond those limits1 the attitude of a  
man's mind toward the actions of his    
neighbor may be a volitional one4 ,his  
will may be for them or against them2 he
 may approve or disapprove1 command or  
prohibit4 ,we know quite well that      
commands and prohibitions laid upon     
children and servants will not always be
 effective1 yet we issue general        
commands and prohibitions1 as though    
assuming unlimited control4 ,it is quite
 in accordance with usage to speak of a 

man as willing an end1 even where it is 
clearly recognized that the will to     
attain does not guarantee attainment4   
,the man does what he can2 could he do  
more he would do so2 in his helplessness
 the attitude of the will persists      
unchanged4  ,it is obvious that1 in this
 large sense of the word will1 we may   
speak of a man as continuing to will or 
to approve a given end1 even when he is 
not willing or approving anything1 in a 
narrower sense of the words1 at this or 
that moment4 ,we speak of a man as      
inspired by the permanent will to be    
rich1 although at many times during the 
day1 and certainly during his hours of  
sleep1 no act of volition with such an  
end in view has an actual existence4    
,no man always thinks of the permanent  
ends which he has selected as controls  
to his actions4 ,they are selected1 they
 pass from his mind1 and1 when they     
recur to it again1 the selection is     
reaffirmed4 ,but1 whether he is actually
 thinking about the ends in question or 

not1 the settled trend of his will is   
expressed in them4  ,this settled trend 
of the will1 even when scarcely         
recognized by the man himself1 may be   
vastly more significant than the passing
 individual decision1 although the      
latter be accompanied by clear          
consciousness4 ,in certain cases the    
latter is a true exponent of character1 
but not infrequently it is not4 ,it may 
be the result of a whim1 of an          
irrational impulse little congruous with
 a man's nature4 ,it may be the outcome 
of some misconception and in            
contradiction with what the man would   
will1 if enlightened4 ,the individual   
volition appears only to disappear2 it  
may leave no apparent trace4 ,the       
permanent will indicates a habit of     
mind1 a way of acting1 which may be     
expected to make its influence felt with
 the persistency of that which exerts a 
steady pressure4 ,to refuse it the name 
of will seems arbitrary and             
unjustifiable4  ,in the permanent will  

is expressed the character of the man4  
,this character is reflected in his     
ideals4 ,sometimes ideals are clearly   
recognized and deliberately chosen4     
,sometimes a man is little aware of the 
nature of the ideals which control his  
strivings4 ,he may be said to choose1   
but to choose more or less blindly4     
,but1 whether he chooses with clear     
vision or without it1 he may choose well
 or ill4     ,,chapter ,,xiii  ,,the    
,,object ,,in ,,desire ,,and ,,will     
#dj4 ,,the ,,object ,,as ,,end ,,to ,,be
 ,,realized4--,the expression the object
 before the mind in desiring and willing
 is not free from ambiguity4 ,it may be 
used in referring to the idea1 the      
psychic fact1 which is present when one 
desires or wills4 ,or it may be used to 
indicate the future fact which is the   
realization of the idea1 that which the 
idea points to as its end4  ,the idea   
and the end are1 of course1 not         
identical1 but they are related4 ,the   
idea mirrors the end1 foreshadows it4   

,in the attempt to explain a voluntary  
act we may turn either to the one or to 
the other2 we may regard the idea as the
 efficient cause which has resulted in  
the act1 or we may account for the act  
by pointing out the end it was purposed 
to attain4 ,there is no reason why we   
should not recognize both the efficient 
cause and the final cause1 or end4  ,the
 latter has been the subject of more or 
less mystification4 ,how1 it has been   
asked1 can an end1 which does not1 as   
yet1 exist1 be a cause which sets in    
motion the apparatus that brings about  
its own existence8 ,footnote3 ,see      
,,janet1 ,les ,causes ,finales1 ,paris1 
#aija1 p4 #a1 ff4  ,the difficulty is a 
gratuitous one4 ,it lies in the         
confusion of the final cause or end1    
with the efficient cause4 ,when we      
realize that the expression final cause 
means simply that which is purposed1 or 
accepted as an end1 objections to it    
fall away4 ,that1 in desire and will1 in
 all their higher manifestations1 at    

least1 there is consciousness of an end1
 there can be no question4  ,if we      
attempt to give more than a vague       
physical explanation of actions due to  
blind impulse1 we are compelled to refer
 to the idea1 the psychic fact present1 
as efficient cause4 ,not so when we are 
concerned with actions of a higher      
order4 ,we constantly refer such actions
 to the ends they have in view4 ,we     
regard them as satisfactorily explained 
when we have pointed out the end upon   
which they are directed4  ,to the       
moralist it is of the utmost importance 
to know what ends men actually choose1  
and what they may be induced to choose4 
,he is concerned with conduct1 which is 
intelligent and purposive action4       
,conduct may be studied without entering
 upon an investigation of the efficient 
causes1 whether physical or mental1     
which are the antecedents of action of  
any kind4 ,such matters one may leave to
 the physiologist and the psychologist4 
,accordingly1 when ,i speak of the      

object in desiring and willing1 ,i shall
 use the word to indicate the end held  
in view1 that toward which the creature 
desiring or willing strives4  #da4      
,,human ,,nature ,,and ,,the ,,objects  
,,chosen4--,what objects do men actually
 desire and will to attain8 ,to give a  
detailed account of them appears to be a
 hopeless and profitless task4  ,i take 
up my pen1 ,i write1 ,i turn to a book2 
,i look at my watch1 change my position1
 stretch1 walk up and down1 speak to    
some one who is present1 smile or give  
vent to irritation2 ,i sit down to a    
meal1 eat of this dish rather than of   
that1 go out to visit a place of        
amusement1 respond to the appeal of the 
beggar in the street--in short1 ,i fill 
my day with a thousand actions the most 
diverse1 which follow each other without
 intermission4  ,each of these actions  
may be the object of desire and will4   
,no novel1 however realistic1 however   
prolix in its descriptions1 can give us 
more than the barest outlines of the    

course of life followed by the          
personages it attempts to portray4 ,a   
touch here1 a touch there1 and a        
character is indicated4 ,no more1 for   
more would be intolerable4  ,it is      
significant1 however1 that the few      
points touched upon can serve to give an
 idea of a character4 ,not-withstanding 
their diversity1 volitions fall into    
classes2 it is quite possible to        
indicate in a general way the kind of   
choices a given creature may be impelled
 to make4 ,they are a revelation of the 
nature of the creature choosing4 ,that  
beings differing in their nature should 
be impelled to different courses of     
action can surprise no one4 ,cats have  
no temptation to wander in herds2 the   
exhibition of pugnacity in a sheep would
 strike us with wonder4  ,to every kind 
of creature its nature3 and1 although   
individuals within a kind differ more or
 less from one another1 we look for     
approximation to a type4 ,so it is with 
man4 ,the expression human nature1 so   

much in the mouths of certain moralists 
ancient and modern1 although somewhat   
vague1 is not without its significance4 
,to it we refer in passing a judgment   
upon individual human beings1 and we    
regard as abnormal those who vary widely
 from the type4  #db4 ,,the ,,instincts 
,,and ,,impulses ,,of ,,man4--,in       
sketching for us the outlines of this   
distinctively human nature1 the         
psychologist proceeds to an enumeration 
of the fundamental instincts and general
 innate tendencies of man1 and he draws 
up a list of the emotions which         
correspond to them4 ,he mentions the    
instincts of flight1 repulsion1         
curiosity1 pugnacity1 self- abasement1  
self-assertion1 the parental instinct1  
the instinct of sex1 the instinct for   
food1 that for acquisition1 etc4 ,he    
points out that man is by nature open to
 sympathy1 is suggestible1 and has the  
impulse to play4 ,in such instincts and 
inborn general tendencies1 blending and 
reinforcing or opposing and inhibiting  

one another1 he sees the forces which   
give their direction to desire and will2
 which select1 out of all possible      
objects1 those which are to become      
objects for man4  ,it is not necessary  
here to discuss the nature of instinct1 
to distinguish between an instinct and a
 more general inborn tendency1 or to    
attempt a complete list of the instincts
 and inborn tendencies of man4 ,nor need
 ,i ask whether every choice made by a  
human being can be traced1 directly or  
indirectly1 to one or more of the       
instincts and other tendencies given in 
the above or in any similar list4 ,in   
explaining the individual choices which 
men make1 or the desires to which they  
are subject1 there is much scope for the
 ingenuity of the psychologist4  ,but of
 the significance for human life of the 
impulses mentioned there can be no      
question4 ,what would the life of a man 
be if he could feel no fear or          
repulsion8 ,could there be a development
 of knowledge in the absence of         

curiosity8 ,how long would the race     
endure if the parental instinct were    
wholly lacking8 ,what would become of a 
man who never desired food8 ,could a    
human society of any sort exist if there
 were no sympathy or tender feeling1 no 
impulse to seek the company of other    
men8 ,it is men1 such as they are1      
endowed with the qualities which        
distinguish man1 who associate          
themselves into communities1 and the    
customs and laws of such reflect the    
fundamental impulses in which they had  
their origin4  #dc4 ,,the ,,study ,,of  
,,man',s ,,instincts ,,important4--,that
 a careful study of human nature is of  
the utmost importance to the moralist is
 palpable4 ,he must not prescribe for   
man a rule of conduct which it is not in
 man to follow4 ,he must not set before 
him1 as inducements to actions1 objects 
which it is impossible for him to desire
 and1 hence1 to choose4  ,to be sure1   
the main traits of human nature were    
pretty well recognized many centuries   

before the modern science of psychology 
had its birth4 ,had they not been1 man  
could not have had rational dealings    
with his fellow- man2 could not         
effectively have persuaded and          
threatened1 rewarded and punished1 and1 
in short1 set in motion all the         
machinery which is at the service of one
 man when he wants to influence the     
conduct of another4 ,but moralists      
ancient and modern have made serious    
blunders through an imperfect           
understanding of the impulses natural to
 man2 and the modern psychologist1      
without claiming to be a wholly original
 or an infallible guide1 may be of no   
little service in helping us to detect  
them4  ,thus1 it was possible for as    
shrewd an observer of man as ,aristotle 
to explain the affection of a man for   
his child by regarding it as an         
extension of self-love1 the child being1
 in a sense1 a part of the parent4      
,footnote3 ,ethics1 ,book ,,viii1       
chapter xii4 ,aristotle's quaint        

explanation of the fact that maternal   
affection is apt to be stronger than    
paternal is an error of a kindred       
nature4 ,footnote3 ,ibid41 ,book ,,ix1  
chapter vii4 ,and the ancient egoists1  
,footnote3 ,see the answer to ,epicurus 
in the ,discourses of ,epictetus1       
translated by ,,long1 ,london1 #ahij1   
pp4 #fi-gj4 in setting before man their 
selfish and anti-social ideal of human  
conduct1 made their appeal1 not to the  
whole man1 but only to a part of him4   
,the normal man1 whether savage or      
civilized1 whether ancient or modern1   
cannot desire a life filled only with   
the objects which they set before him4  
,nor is the modern moralist1 or as he   
prefers to style himself1 immoralist1   
,nietzsche1 ,footnote3 ,a sketch of     
,nietzsche's doctrine is given later1   
see chapter xxix4 guilty of less gross a
 blunder4 ,he rails at morality as      
commonly understood1 calling it the     
morality of the herd1 and he recommends 
isolation1 the repression of sympathy1  

and a contempt for one's fellows4 ,to be
 sure1 the herd is a scornful1          
rhetorical expression1--what ,bentham   
would have called a question-begging    
epithet1--for men do not1 properly      
speaking1 live in herds2 but they do    
normally live in human societies of some
 sort1 and they have the instincts and  
impulses which fit them to do so4 ,the  
repression of such instincts and        
impulses does violence to their nature1 
and he who advocates other than a social
 morality should advocate it for some   
creature other than man4 ,man is a      
social creature1 and1 among the objects 
of his desire and will1 he must give a  
prominent place to some which are       
distinctively social4  #dd4 ,,the       
,,bewildering ,,multiplicity ,,of ,,the 
,,objects ,,of ,,desire1 ,,and ,,the    
,,effort ,,to ,,find ,,an ,,underlying  
,,unity4--,the mere enumeration of the  
characteristics which have been adduced 
as instincts or fundamental innate      
tendencies of man is enough to reveal   

the truth that man is not merely the    
subject of desire1 but of desires2 that 
is to say1 his impulses are directed    
upon objects widely different from each 
other4  ,and when we call to mind that  
the concepts of the instincts and       
fundamental tendencies of human nature1 
as thus enumerated1 are products of     
abstraction and generalization--are     
general notions gathered from the       
numberless concrete instances of desire 
and will furnished by our               
observation--we are forced to realize   
that the objects which individual men   
set before themselves in desiring and   
willing are really endlessly varied4    
,all men are not equally moved by fear1 
anger1 repulsion1 tender emotion1 or    
sympathy4 ,nor do all men find the same 
things the objects of their fear1 anger1
 repulsion1 and the rest4 ,the desire   
for food is an abstraction2 in the      
concrete1 this man eagerly accepts an   
oyster1 and that one turns from it in   
disgust4 ,in order to deal successfully 

with our fellow-man1 we must not merely 
know man4 ,we must know men4            
,furthermore1 not only do individuals   
set their affections upon different     
objects1 but the same person at         
different stages of his development     
desires widely different things4 ,what  
is a temptation to the boy has no       
attraction for the man4 ,what fills the 
savage with longings may inspire in the 
product of a high civilization no other 
feeling than repulsion4  ,and what is   
true of the individual is true of men in
 the mass4 ,the objects of desire and of
 endeavor are not the same in           
communities of all orders4 ,each kind of
 man has its own nature1 which differs  
in some respects from that of each other
 kind1 and dictates what shall be1 for  
this or that man1 an object of desire   
and will4 ,no two men desire precisely  
the same thing in all particulars4 ,yet 
each is a man1 and is endowed with the  
usual complement of human instincts4    
,the process of abstraction and         

generalization which resulted in the    
above-mentioned list of the elements    
which enter into the constitution of    
human nature is1 nevertheless1 not      
without its uses4 ,it serves to order1  
to some extent1 at least1 the           
bewildering variety of the phenomena    
presented to us when we view the broad  
field of the desires and volitions of   
all sorts and conditions of men4 ,men's 
choices fall into kinds2 there is       
similiarity in difference4 ,we do not   
approach an unknown man with the feeling
 that he is a wholly unknown quantity4  
,he is1 at least1 a man1 and we know    
something of men4 ,we have some notion  
how to go at him4  ,but the ordering of 
the motley multiplicity of men's desires
 by a reference to the fundamental      
instincts of man stops far short of a   
complete unification4 ,we are left with 
a number of distinct and apparently     
irreducible impulses and tendencies on  
our hands4 ,if it is useful to go so    
far1 may it not be much more useful to  

go still farther8  ,aristotle divided   
things eligible into those eligible in  
themselves and those eligible for the   
sake of something else4 ,how it would   
illuminate the field of action1 if it   
were discovered that men ultimately     
desire but one thing1 and choose all    
other things on account of it6 ,would   
the discovery not facilitate immensely  
our dealings with our fellows1          
suggesting new possibilities of control8
 ,a notorious instance of the attempt to
 conjure away the bewildering diversity 
in men's desires and choices lies in the
 selection of pleasure as the one thing 
eligible in itself1 the unique ultimate 
object of human action4 ,of this object 
we have1 so far1 taken no account4      
,,chapter ,,xiv  ,,intention ,,and      
,,motive   #de4 ,,complex ,,ends4--,i   
may desire to clear my throat and may do
 so4 ,the action is a trivial one1 is   
over in a moment1 and is forgotten4 ,on 
the other hand1 ,i may desire to spend  
my summer on the sea-coast1 to grow rich

 in business1 to attain to high social  
position1 or to satisfy political       
ambition4  ,when the object is of this  
complicated description1 there may      
easily be elements in it which1         
considered alone1 ,i should not desire  
at all4  ,the summer on the ,new ,jersey
 coast may make for health4 ,but it may 
entail mosquitoes1 uncomfortable rooms1 
unaccustomed food1 the lack of wonted   
occupations1 and a distasteful          
association at close quarters with      
neighbors not of one's choosing4 ,the   
road to wealth is an arduous one4 ,the  
envied social station may imply the     
swallowing of many rebuffs4 ,the way of 
the politician is hard4  ,one may       
desire1 on the whole1 one of these      
objects1 or a thousand like them2 but   
there are1 obviously1 many things       
comprised in the whole1 or unavoidably  
bound up with it1 that cannot attract1  
and are not eligible for their own sake4
  #df4 ,,intention4--,an object chosen  
and realized may bring in its train an  

indefinite series of consequences       
foreseen or unforeseen4  ,the striking  
of a match to light a candle may result 
in an unforeseen and disastrous         
conflagration4 ,the overmastering desire
 to grow rich may have its fruit in an  
excessive application to business1 the  
neglect of the family and of the duties 
of citizenship1 and in hard and1        
perhaps1 unscrupulous dealings4 ,these  
things may be foreseen and accepted as  
natural accompaniments of the end       
chosen4 ,but there may also be entailed 
shattered health1 overwhelming          
anxieties1 and the distress of seeing   
one's sons1 brought up in luxury and    
without incentive to effort1 victims to 
the dangers which menace the idle rich4 
,whether such consequences might have   
been foreseen and provided against or   
not1 it is true that they are frequently
 not foreseen with clearness4 ,they     
certainly form no part of the intention 
of the man who bends his energies to the
 attainment of wealth4 ,he does not     

deliberately intend to injure his       
health1 to lose the affection of his    
family1 to leave behind him degenerate  
children4 ,he does intend to get rich1  
if he can4  ,how many of the elements   
contained in the object chosen1 or so   
bound up with it that they must be      
accepted along with it1 may fairly be   
said to fall within the intention of the
 chooser8 ,there may easily be dispute  
touching the latitude with which the    
word intention may be used4 ,some things
 a man sees clearly to be inseparably   
connected with the object of his choice2
 some he is less conscious of2 some he  
overlooks altogether4 ,it does not seem 
unwarranted to maintain that the first  
of the three classes of things1 at      
least1 may be said to be intended4 ,when
 ,dr4 ,katzenberger1 in his desire to   
get across the road without sinking in  
the mire1 used as a stepping-stone his  
old servant ,flex1 who had fallen down1 
his complete intention was not simply to
 cross the road unmuddied4 ,it was to   

cross the road unmuddied by stepping on 
,flex4  ,evidently the intention--the   
whole object--gives some revelation of  
the character of a man4 ,many men may   
will to avoid the mud2 but not all of   
these can will to avoid it by stepping  
upon a fellow-man4  #dg4 ,,motive4--,the
 stepping upon a fellow-man with whom   
one is on good terms can scarcely be    
regarded as a thing desirable in itself4
 ,if it is desired1 it is because of the
 complex in which it is an element4     
,some other element or elements may     
exert the whole attractive force which  
moves desire and will4 ,in other words1 
some things are chosen for the sake of  
others4  ,when we have discovered that  
for the sake of which any object is     
chosen1 we have come upon the ,motive4  
,the intention may be said to embrace   
the whole object as foreseen4 ,the      
motive embraces only a part of it1 but  
the vital part1 the part without which  
the object would not be desired and     
willed4  #dh4 ,,ethical ,,significance  

,,of ,,intention ,,and ,,motive4--,there
 has been much dispute among moralists  
as to the ethical significance of       
intention and motive4 ,bentham maintains
 that from one and the same motive1 and 
from every kind of motive1 may proceed  
actions that are good1 others that are  
bad1 and others that are indifferent4   
,he gives the following illustration3   
,footnote3 ,principles of ,morals and   
,legislation1 chapter x1 ,sec #c4  #a4  
,a boy1 in order to divert himself1     
reads an inspiring book2 the motive is  
accounted1 perhaps1 a good one2 at any  
rate1 not a bad one4 #b4 ,he sets his   
top a-spinning3 the motive is deemed at 
any rate not a bad one4 #c4 ,he sets    
loose a mad ox among a crowd3 his motive
 is now1 perhaps1 termed an abominable  
one4 ,yet in all three cases the motive 
may be the very same3 it may be neither 
more nor less than curiosity4  ,in      
criticizing this citation ,i must point 
out that curiosity is not1 properly     
speaking1 an object of choice at all4 ,i

 have used the word object to indicate  
what is chosen1 not to indicate the     
psychic fact present at the time of the 
choice4 ,and ,i have said that the      
motive is the vital part of the object4 
,hence curiosity should not be called   
the motive4 ,no man chooses curiosity as
 an object1 either in the abstract or in
 the concrete4 ,curiosity is a          
fundamental impulse of human nature2 we 
may elect to satisfy the impulse in any 
given instance2 in other words1 we may  
choose the appropriate object4  ,in the 
case of the boy letting loose the bull  
in the crowd1 the object is to see what 
will happen under the given             
circumstances4 ,this is what appeals to 
the boy4 ,something else might have     
appealed to him in performing the       
action4 ,he might have had the          
deliberate wish to injure certain       
persons present against whom he harbored
 resentment4 ,or his sympathies might   
have been with the bull1 which had been 
the victim of bad treatment1 and to     

which he wished to grant its liberty4   
,were the crowd in question a band of   
ruffians intent upon lynching1 he might 
have been moved by the desire to assist1
 in a somewhat irregular way1 in the    
re-establishment of law and order4 ,but 
even if his real object is only to see  
what will happen1 there is no reason to 
put it on a par with the object in view 
when a boy spins a top4 ,to see what    
will happen is the vaguest of phrases1  
and covers a multitude of disparate     
objects4 ,he who does things to see what
 will happen has1 at least1 a very      
general knowledge of the kind of thing  
likely to happen1 if a given experiment 
is made4 ,a boy does not hold his finger
 in the candle-flame to see what will   
happen4 ,he who does things to see what 
will happen1 in really complete         
ignorance of what is likely to happen1  
may be set down as too much of a fool to
 be the subject of moral judgments4  ,it
 is obvious that an act may be done with
 many different objects in view--,i mean

 real objects1 motives4 ,i give money to
 a beggar whose case is one to inspire  
pity4 ,my motive1 my vital object1 may  
be to relieve the man4 ,but it may      
equally well be to get rid of him1 to   
gratify my self-feeling by becoming the 
dispenser of bounty1 or to inspire      
admiration in the onlooker4 ,the        
intention1 as ,i have used the word     
above1 is to relieve the beggar1 with   
such consequences of the act as may be  
foreseen at the time4 ,within the limits
 of this intention1 the motive may vary 
widely1 and may1 in a given instance1 be
 either admirable or contemptible4  ,it 
may be claimed1 in answer to this1 that 
the real intention is1 in every case1   
what ,i have called the motive2 that1 in
 the first case1 it was to relieve      
suffering2 in the second1 to get rid of 
an annoyance2 in the third to satisfy   
vanity2 in the fourth1 to be admired4   
,the word intention1 thus used1 is      
equivalent to motive4 ,popular usage    
gives some sanction to this confusion of

 the words4 ,we say of a man who has    
done a questionable act3 ,his intentions
 were good1 or1 ,his motives were good4 
,still1 popular usage does not always   
regard the two expressions as           
equivalent4 ,to revert to the case of   
the unhappy ,flex4 ,it does not seem    
inappropriate to say that the use of a  
man as a stepping- stone was a part of  
his master's intention4 ,it does appear 
inappropriate to call it the motive or a
 part of the motive of the whole        
transaction4  ,intention and motive are 
convenient words to designate the whole 
object chosen and the part of the object
 which accounts for the choice of the   
whole4 ,that it is important to         
distinguish between the two is palpable4
  ,the intention gives some indication  
of character4 ,we know something about a
 man when we know what kinds of objects 
he will probably set before himself as  
aims4 ,but we know more when we know why
 he chooses these objects rather than   
others2 when we can analyze the complex 

and can discover just what elements in  
it attract him4  ,with an increase of   
our knowledge comes an increased power  
of control4 ,until we know a man's      
motives1 we do not really know the man2 
and until we know the man1 our efforts  
to influence him must be rather blind4  
,the search for motives appears to carry
 us in the direction of the             
systematization and simplification of   
the embarrassing wealth of objects which
 are actually the goal of human desires 
and volitions4 ,man may desire a        
boundless variety of objects4 ,his      
motives in desiring them may1           
conceivably1 be comparatively few4  ,it 
should be apparent that both intention  
and motive have ethical significance4   
,we have our opinion of men capable of  
harboring certain intentions4 ,but we   
recognize that some men may harbor them 
with better motives than others4 ,and we
 can see that a man's intention may be  
bad1 and yet his motive1 considered in  
itself1 be good4 ,how we are to rate the

 man1 morally1 becomes rather a nice    
question4     ,,chapter ,,xv  ,,feeling 
,,as ,,motive   #di4 ,,feeling4         
,footnote3 ,see the notes on this       
chapter at the end of this volume4--,two
 men may recognize with equal clearness 
the presence of a danger4 ,that         
recognition may evoke in the one a      
violent emotion of fear1 and in the     
other little or no emotion4 ,two men may
 be treated with indignity4 ,the one    
fumes with rage2 the other remains calm4
 ,it is well recognized that men may be 
susceptible to emotion in general1 or to
 certain specific emotions1 in varying  
degrees4 ,knowledge is not always       
accompanied by a marked manifestation of
 emotion4 ,thoughts may be clear1 but   
cold4 ,there are1 however1 natures whose
 intellectual processes are steeped in  
emotion4 ,such men live in an atmosphere
 of agitation4  ,lists of the emotions  
which correspond to the instincts and   
fundamental impulses of man have been   
drawn up4 ,in them we find mentioned    

fear1 disgust1 wonder1 anger1 elation1  
tender feeling1 and so forth2 phenomena 
which1 by earlier writers1 were         
classified as passions1 and to which we 
may conveniently give the name feeling4 
,we constantly speak of our emotions as 
our feelings1 and we contrast the man of
 feeling with the coldly intellectual   
mind in which emotion is at a minimum4  
,but it is not alone to such specific   
emotions as those above-mentioned that  
we apply the term feeling4 ,thoughts are
 agreeable or disagreeable1 pleasurable 
or painful4 ,so are emotions4 ,the      
agreeableness or disagreeableness1      
pleasantness or painfulness1 which are  
the accompaniments of thoughts and      
emotions1 have been called by modern    
psychologists their feeling-tone4 ,it is
 not out of harmony with common usage to
 give them the name of feelings4 ,in so 
doing we contrast them with knowledge   
and assimilate them to emotion4         
,whether every sensation and every      
thought gives rise to an emotion of some

 sort is matter for dispute1 as is also 
the question whether every sensation1   
thought and emotion is tinged with some 
degree of pleasurable or painful        
feeling4 ,in the absence of conclusive  
evidence1 it is open to us to assume    
that some feeling is always present     
where there is mental activity of any   
kind4 ,the feeling may be so faint and  
evanescent as to escape detection1 but  
this does not prove that it is absent4  
#ej4 ,,feeling ,,and                    
,,action4--,emotions and feelings of    
pleasure and pain are the normal        
accompaniments of the exercise of the   
instincts and impulses of creatures that
 desire and will4 ,within limits1 we    
appear to be able to take them as an    
index of the strength of the desire and 
the vigor of the effort at attainment4  
,an act of cruelty is perpetrated4 ,i   
see it1 and it leaves me1 perhaps1 cold 
and unmoved4 ,in such case1 it is hardly
 expected of me that ,i should take     
energetic measures to have the evil-doer

 punished4 ,the man whose face flushes1 
whose brows descend1 whose teeth come   
together1 whose fists clench1 whose     
heart beats thickly1 at the recognition 
of an insult1 is1 as a rule1 the man    
from whom we look for vigorous efforts  
at retaliation4 ,the apathetic creature 
who feels no resentment is usually      
expected to swallow the indignity4 ,the 
child who jumps for joy at the sight of 
a new doll is supposed to desire it     
eagerly1 and to be ready to make efforts
 to obtain it4  ,but it is only within  
limits that this relation between       
feeling and action holds4 ,men of little
 emotion may be resolute and prompt to  
action4 ,their desires1 as evinced by   
their actions1 may be persistent and    
effective4 ,nor need the individual fix 
his choice upon the particular object   
that arouses in him the most feeling4 ,a
 man may see his fellow- creature       
destitute1 and may shed tears over his  
pitiable lot4 ,but he will not bequeath 
his money to him4 ,he will leave it to  

his son1 for whom1 perhaps1 he has no   
respect and has come to have little     
affection4 ,and he may leave it to him  
with regret1 knowing that it will be    
dissipated in ways which he cannot      
approve4 ,it has been pointed out with  
justice that the exercise of many       
instincts may be accompanied with little
 feeling2 and we are all aware of the   
fact that1 as action becomes habitual1  
emotion tends to evaporate and the      
pleasure of effort and attainment is apt
 to be reduced to a minimum4  #ea4      
,,feeling ,,as ,,object4--,it is well to
 keep in mind the distinction between   
feeling as a psychic fact present in the
 mind of the creature desiring and      
willing1 and feeling as the object of   
desire and will4 ,a man in a rage is the
 victim of a storm of feeling4 ,the     
thought of the injury he has received   
and the desire for retaliation by no    
means exhaust the contents of his mind4 
,but the passion which shakes him is not
 his object2 that object is revengeful  

action4  ,nevertheless1 feeling may be  
made the object of desire and will4 ,one
 may attend a religious or political    
meeting with the deliberate view of     
arousing in one's self certain complex  
emotions4 ,poe's gruesome tales are read
 for the sake of the thrill which is    
produced by the perusal4 ,probably the  
desire for excitement1 for the          
experiencing of certain vivid emotions1 
has no little to do with the attraction 
exercised by certain criminal           
professions4 ,the burglar desires the   
booty1 but he may desire something more4
  ,emotions have1 as we have seen1 their
 tone of pleasure or pain4 ,they are    
agreeable or the reverse1 and it is     
palpable that men do not1 as a rule1    
deliberately make them the object of    
desire and will in indifference to the  
fact that they are pleasant or are      
painful4 ,we do not normally wish to    
attain to states of mind in which       
remorse plays a prominent part2 we do   
not aim to revel in shame2 we do not    

seek to be haunted with fear4           
,pleasurable emotions are desired1 where
 desire is set on emotions at all2 and  
painful emotions are regarded by the    
mind as unwelcome guests4 ,at any rate1 
this appears to be the rule1 and to     
characterize the man whom we regard as  
normal4  ,this being the case1 it seems 
natural to ask whether1 when we embrace 
the intention of producing in ourselves 
a given emotion1 our motive may not be  
narrower in scope1 namely1 the          
attainment of pleasure8 and1 when we    
wish to rid the mind of any emotion1 our
 motive may not be the avoidance of     
pain8  ,the adoption of this view would 
give to the feelings of pleasure and    
pain a unique importance4 ,they would be
 accepted as the only ultimate objects  
of desire and will4 ,by many they have  
been thus accepted4 ,it has been        
insisted that objects of every          
description are chosen only as they     
arouse some feeling2 and that those     
which promise pleasant feeling are      

sought and those which entail pain are  
avoided4 ,the general recognition of the
 primacy of pleasure and pain over our  
other feelings1 over the specific       
emotions mentioned above1 is indicated  
by the fact that ethical writers of     
eminence sometimes make pleasure and    
pain synonymous with feeling in general1
 passing over other feelings1 as though 
it were not important for the moralist  
to take them into consideration4 ,the   
dispute whether the proper course for   
human action to take is prescribed by   
reason or is dictated by feeling often  
resolves itself into the problem whether
 we should be guided by reason1 or by a 
consideration of pleasure to be attained
 or pain to be avoided4  #eb4 ,,freedom 
,,as ,,object4--,the acceptance of      
pleasure and pain as the ultimate       
motives of human action seems1 at first 
sight1 to be of inestimable assistance  
to us in threading our way through the  
labyrinth of diverse choices made by    
creatures that desire and will4  ,but   

only at first sight4 ,even if it be true
 that every creature seeks only to      
attain pleasure and to avoid pain1 and  
uses the means it finds to hand in the  
attainment of these ends1 the endless   
diversity of the means remains as a     
thing to reckon with4 ,the knowledge    
that all men desire pleasure does not   
help us a whit in dealing with men1     
unless we know what things will give    
pleasure to this man or to that4 ,all   
men may desire pleasure2 but it remains 
true that what gives pleasure to the    
spendthrift gives pain to the miser2    
what appeals to the glutton disgusts a  
man of refined tastes4 ,if all men were 
alike and precisely alike1 and if their 
natures were very simple and remained   
unchanged1 the problem of the           
distribution of pleasures would be      
vastly simplified4  ,whether the pursuit
 of pleasure and the avoidance of pain  
may be regarded as the only ultimate    
ends proper to man will be discussed    
later4 ,footnote3 ,see chapter xxv4     

,here1 it is important to insist that so
 general a formula gives us little      
useful information touching the set of  
the will either of classes of men or of 
individuals4 ,this we can attain to only
 as a result of the study of the complex
 nature of man as revealed in the       
choices which he actually makes4 ,the   
ends of man are many and various2 some  
of these ends are accidental1 palpably  
means for the attainment of other ends  
more fundamental1 and for them other    
means of attaining the same ends may be 
substituted4 ,but other ends1 and they  
are by no means to be reduced to a      
single class1 appear to belong to the   
very nature of man4 ,in seeking them he 
is giving expression to the impulses    
which make him what he is4  ,in so far  
as these impulses find an unimpeded     
expression the man is free2 otherwise he
 is under restraint4 ,without rendering 
here a final decision upon the          
importance of the role played in human  
life by pleasure and pain1 one feels    

impelled to ask the question whether the
 goal of a man's endeavors may not best 
be described as freedom8 ,not freedom in
 the abstract1 freedom to do anything   
and everything1 but freedom to live the 
life appropriate to him as man1 and as a
 man of a given type4 ,that this freedom
 is limited in a variety of ways1 by his
 material environment1 by the clashing  
of impulses within himself1 by the      
conflict of his desires with the will of
 the social organism in which he finds  
his place1 is sufficiently palpable4    
,,chapter ,,xvi  ,,rationality ,,and    
,,will   #ec4 ,,the ,,irrational        
,,will4--,as dreams do not consist of an
 insignificant medley of elements drawn 
from the experiences of waking life1    
but1 in spite of their fantastic        
character1 bear some semblance of       
ordered reality1 so the impulses of even
 the most unintelligent and inconsequent
 of human beings are not wholly chaotic1
 but differ only in the degree of their 
organization from those of the most     

rational and far-seeing4  ,where there  
is even a glimmer of intelligence1 ends 
are recognized and means to their       
attainment are chosen4 ,ends are        
compared1 and the preference is given to
 some over others4 ,but1 with all this1 
there may be much incoherence and       
planlessness4 ,men can live somehow     
without looking far into the future1 or 
keeping well in mind the lessons to be  
learned from the past4 ,they can manage 
to exist in the face of no little short-
 sighted impulsiveness and              
inconsistency4 ,but it is palpable that 
they cannot1 under such circumstances1  
live as they might live were they more  
truly rational4  ,the individual        
deficient in foresight and control may1 
it is true1 be carried along and        
defended from disaster by the presence  
of these qualities in the greater       
organism of which he is a part4 ,the    
infant is a parasite upon society2 it is
 provided for independently of its own  
efforts4 ,the child would soon come to  

grief were its ends not chosen by others
 and its conduct kept under control4    
,and a vast number of persons not       
children are in much the same position4 
,there is foresight and rational purpose
 somewhere2 they profit by it2 but of   
foresight and rational purpose they     
themselves possess but a modicum4       
,where breadth of view is lacking1 where
 the future is unforeseen or ignored and
 the past is forgotten1 where desires   
arise and impel to action in relative   
independence of one another1 the man    
seeks today what tomorrow he rejects4   
,we can scarcely say that the man       
chooses4 ,he is the scene of independent
 choices1 varied and inconsistent4 ,he  
is the victim of caprice1 and appears to
 us largely the creature of accident1 a 
prey to the impulse which happens to be 
in his mind at the moment4 ,from such a 
man we cannot look for an adherence to  
distant aims1 and the marshalling of the
 proper means to their attainment4 ,he  
cannot count upon himself1 and he cannot

 be counted upon4 ,that he can play no  
significant role in such stable         
organizations as the state and church is
 obvious4 ,his desires may be many and  
varied1 but they converge upon no one   
end4 ,we set him down as irrational4    
#ed4 ,,one ,,view ,,of                  
,,reason4--,concerning the part played  
by reason or intelligence in the active 
life of man there has been no little    
dispute4  ,it has been maintained1 on   
the one hand1 that reason or            
intelligence serves its whole purpose in
 holding before the mind all its        
impulses and desires1 revealing their   
interrelations1 and making possible an  
enlightened and deliberate choice from  
among them4 ,where the horizon is thus  
extended and mental clarity reigns1 the 
attention can roam unimpeded over the   
whole field1 consider the objects of    
desire in their true relations and      
compare them with one another4          
,congruous desires can reinforce each   
other2 conflicting desires can be       

brought face to face1 and the one or the
 other can deliberately be dismissed2   
fundamental and dominant desires may    
assert their supremacy1 and give their  
stamp to far- reaching decisions which  
exercise a control over minor decisions 
and favor or repress a multitude of     
desires and volitions4  ,the attainment 
of perfect rationality in this sense is 
an ideal never completely realized4 ,no 
man can hold before his mind all his    
impulses and desires1 see them in their 
true relations to each other1 and come  
to a decision which will do complete    
justice to all4 ,but the ideal may be   
approached4  ,the reason1 in this case1 
resembles the presiding officer of a    
deliberative assembly1 who insists that 
all the members shall be heard from1 all
 proposals seriously considered1 and    
that the ultimate decision shall justly 
represent the true will of the          
deliberative body as a whole4 ,the      
specious but fallacious argument is1 in 
the debate1 revealed in its true nature2

 the obstinate insistence of the        
individual is not allowed to prevail2   
the loud voice is recognized to be a    
loud voice and nothing more2 fugitive   
gusts of passion exhaust themselves2 the
 permanent and fundamental will of the  
assembly is revealed in the final vote4 
,it is claimed that1 in such a mind1 the
 result is a harmonization and          
unification of the multiplicity of the  
desires and purposes which1 in a mind   
less rational1 jostle one another       
without control1 and refuse to fall into
 an ordered system4 ,that the decisions 
of a rational mind reveal both a unity  
and a harmony not evinced by a mind     
short-sighted and impulsive cannot be   
denied4 ,but it is well to understand   
clearly what is meant by such unity and 
harmony4  #ee4 ,,dominant ,,and         
,,subordinate ,,desires4--,wherever a   
group of desires fall into a system and 
work together toward a common end1 we   
have unity4 ,such a system may be       
short-lived1 comparatively poor in      

content1 and of no great significance   
for a man's life as a whole4 ,it may    
come into competition with another      
similar system1 and be displaced by it4 
,an interest that has dominated our     
minds for a time1 and controlled our    
desires and volitions1 may readily give 
place to different choices4 ,i may      
successively bend all my energies upon  
the winning of a game1 the doing of a   
successful stroke of business1 the      
defeat of a social rival1 the success of
 a philanthropic undertaking4 ,there is 
no normal human being who does not      
exhibit such limited volitional units4  
,the most idle and purposeless of       
vagrants1 the most scatter-brained      
school-boy1 the most volatile coquette1 
may1 for a time1 be dominated by some   
desire which calls into its service     
other desires and thus realizes some    
chosen end4  ,such volitional units do  
not1 however1 go far toward unifying the
 efforts of a life4 ,it is only when    
some dominant and deep-seated desire1   

oft recurring1 not easily displaced by  
others1 sweeps into its train the other 
desires of a man1 establishing a        
sovereignty and exacting subservience1  
that such an effect is accomplished4    
,then the lesser units fall into a      
significant relation to each other as   
constituent elements in the greater     
unit4 ,the life1 as such1 may be said to
 have a purpose2 it strives toward a    
single goal4  ,whatever bears upon the  
attainment of such a dominant purpose   
may1 however trivial in itself1 acquire 
a vital importance and be eagerly       
desired4 ,to a man of mature mind there 
can be little interest in hitting a     
small ball with a stick1 abstractly     
considered4 ,nor is the dropping of a   
bit of paper into a box with a slit in  
it an action in itself calculated to    
stir profound emotion4 ,but if the      
hitting of the ball in the right way    
marks the critical point in winning an  
eagerly contested game of golf1 the     
interest in it may be absorbing4 ,and if

 the bit of paper is an offer of        
marriage committed to the post1 the hand
 may tremble and the heart leap in the  
breast4 ,a dominant desire may create or
 reinforce other desires to a degree to 
which it is not easy to set limits4     
#ef4 ,,the ,,harmonization ,,of         
,,desires4--,and it may actively repress
 other desires or cause them to dwindle 
and disappear4 ,a man possessed by a    
devouring ambition may resolutely scorn 
delights to which he would otherwise be 
keenly susceptible1 or he may simply    
ignore them without effort4 ,the        
attention1 fixed upon some chosen end1  
and busied with the means to its        
attainment1 may leave them unheeded4    
,finding no place in the volitional     
pattern that occupies the mind1 they are
 cast aside and soon forgotten4  ,in so 
far1 hence1 as the desires of a man tend
 to fall thus into groups converging    
upon a single end1 we find not merely   
unity but harmony4 ,the volitional      
pattern is of a given kind1 and the     

colors which enter into it are selected4
  ,when1 however1 we speak of the       
desires of a rational mind as           
harmonized1 we do not mean that         
incompatible desires are reconciled4    
,one cannot laugh and drink at the same 
time1 nor can the desire for luxurious  
ease be made to fall upon the neck of   
the desire for attainment through       
strenuous effort4 ,the final harmony    
attained resembles in some respects the 
peace enforced by the violent character 
depicted by ,mark ,twain1 who would have
 peace at any price1 and was willing to 
sacrifice to it the life and limb of the
 opposing party4 ,the cessation of      
strife does not imply the satisfaction  
of all parties to a contest2 nor does   
the fact that a life is controlled by a 
ruling motive1 which reinforces or calls
 into being certain desires and robs    
others of their insistence1 imply that  
by any device all the desires which man 
has1 still less all that he1 as a human 
being1 might have1 can find their       

satisfaction4 ,harmony is obtained at   
the price of the suppression of many    
desires2 but1 where a mind is strongly  
dominated by a comprehensive volitional 
unit1 the price may be paid without much
 regret4  #eg4 ,,varieties ,,of         
,,dominant ,,ends4--,obviously1 the     
comprehensive and harmonious volitional 
complexes which may come to characterize
 different minds may be of very         
different complexion4 ,peace of mind1   
the bubble reputation1 the amassing of a
 fortune1 a happy domestic life1        
humanitarian effort1 the perfecting of  
one's character--each may become the    
controlling end which furthers or       
inhibits individual desires and         
emotions4 ,or the ends may be such as to
 appear to most men far more            
insignificant4 ,to the collection of    
first editions or the heaping together  
of bric-a-brac a man may sacrifice his  
financial security and the welfare of   
his family4 ,naturally1 the moralist    
cannot put all such ends upon the same  

level2 but1 from the point of view of   
the psychologist1 the processes which   
take place in the minds thus unified and
 harmonized are essentially the same4   
#eh4 ,,an ,,objection ,,answered4--,to  
the position that it is reason or       
intelligence that brings about this     
unity and harmony an objection may be   
brought4 ,it may be claimed that breadth
 of information and clarity of vision   
are quite compatible with highly        
inconsistent action revealing the       
temporary dominance of a succession of  
incongruous desires4  ,video meliora    
proboque1 deteriora sequor1 confessed   
the ,latin poet4 ,have we not seen men  
of the highest intelligence1 gifted with
 foresight1 quite capable of grasping   
the relation of means to ends1          
nevertheless subject to the baleful     
influence of momentary desires which    
drive them hither and thither like a    
rudderless bark at the mercy of the wind
 and tide8 ,how does it happen that     
their intelligence does not help them8  

,to this we may answer that it is not   
the same thing to possess intelligence  
and to use it4 ,one may be supplied with
 information and quite capable of taking
 long views and embracing inclusive     
ends--and the attention may be so       
preoccupied with the desire of the      
moment1 that the voices of others are   
stifled4 ,in so far as this is the case1
 the man can not1 at the time1 be said  
to be reasonable or intelligent4 ,he has
 information1 and acts as if he were    
ignorant2 his choices do not issue as a 
resultant of his desires as a whole2    
there is no resultant2 the single       
desires make their influence felt       
separately4  ,to be sure1 an insistent  
and oft-recurring desire may introduce a
 good deal of unity and harmony into    
life1 even where long views are not     
taken and there is little intelligence4 
,the stupid egoist may become rather a  
consistent egoist1 and increasingly so  
as he grows older4 ,his desires and     
volitions may converge upon an end of   

which he is very imperfectly conscious2 
incompatible desires may come to be     
repressed4 ,but this does not refute the
 position that1 when reason or          
intelligence is supreme1 the attention  
is directed upon a wide range of        
desires1 they are weighed in the light  
of each other1 and the ultimate decision
 is no longer blind1 but fairly         
expresses the permanent push of the     
man's nature4 ,even where a desire or   
group of desires1 unilluminated by      
intelligence1 seems so insistent as to  
take on something of this character1    
complete unity and harmony of action may
 be lacking1 due to the                 
short-sightedness of the methods        
employed to attain to the chosen goal4  
,blind desires may easily defeat their  
own ends2 wealth does not necessarily   
accumulate in proportion to a man's     
miserliness2 the ardent but             
unenlightened philanthropist may do his 
fellow-man more harm than good4 ,long   
views are of no little service in       

weeding out inconsistent actions and    
introducing order and unity into life4  
#ei4 ,,this ,,view ,,of ,,reason        
,,misconceived4--,in the above view of  
the function of reason or intelligence  
it has not been represented as issuing  
commands to perform certain actions     
rather than others1 nor as furnishing   
motives not in some way related to the  
impulses and desires of man4 ,it has    
been treated1 literally1 as the         
presiding officer of a public assembly1 
who insists that every voice shall be   
heard2 that all proposals shall be      
weighed and compared with one another2  
that the consequences of all shall be   
clearly foreseen4 ,its function is      
enlightenment2 the driving force which  
impels to action of any sort has been   
found in the impulses and the desires4  
,it is possible to set this view forth  
in terms which make it highly           
unpalatable4  ,thus ,hume1 who has a    
weakness for shocking the               
susceptibilities of the conservative and

 the sober-minded1 startles us with the 
remark that ,reason is1 and ought only  
to be1 the slave of the passions4       
,footnote3 ,a ,treatise of ,human       
,nature1 iv1 ,sec #c4 ,this doctrine1   
taken as the average reader is almost   
inevitably impelled to take it1 seems   
worthy of instant reprobation4 ,it      
appears to degrade the rational in man  
and to exalt the blind and irrational4  
,but it is not fair to the doctrine to  
set it forth in such terms4 ,there is no
 small difference between random and    
fugitive desires and those more         
fundamental desires that express truly  
the nature of a man4 ,desires organized 
and harmonized gain great strength1 and 
are enabled to overcome and expel from  
the mind erratic impulses1 the obedience
 to which may easily be followed by     
regret4 ,action taken without a clear   
foresight of consequences1 with an      
imperfect conception of the relation of 
means to ends1 is blind and irrational  
action4 ,reason1 as bringing            

enlightenment1 as making possible       
deliberation1 as turning the incoherent 
clamors of a mob of inconsistent desires
 into the authoritative voice of an     
orderly deliberative assembly1 is not a 
faculty to be lightly regarded4  ,nor   
should it be forgotten that1 neither to 
the plain man1 nor to the moralist1 do  
desires all stand upon the same level4  
,he who bends his intellectual energies 
to the satisfaction of his greed1 his   
avarice1 his longing for revenge1 may   
fairly be said to be prostituting his   
mind to the service of passion4 ,but is 
it a proper use of language to describe 
as the slave of his passions the man    
whose thought is set upon the           
enlightenment of mankind1 the           
alleviation of suffering1 the service of
 a state1 the attainment of a noble     
character8 ,were ,socrates1 ,st4        
,francis1 ,abraham ,lincoln1            
,wilberforce1 ,thomas ,hill ,green1 the 
slaves of their passions8 ,yet these men
 were moved by certain dominant desires1

 and their unswerving pursuit of their  
goal was made possible only by the      
reason that harmonized their lives and  
substituted deliberate purpose for      
random impulse4  ,the doctrine1 then1   
that the reason is to be likened rather 
to the presiding officer of a           
deliberative assembly1 concerned only to
 give every voice a fair hearing1 than  
to a legislator issuing commands        
independently1 may be so stated as not  
to shock the sober-minded4  ,and the    
doctrine recommends itself in showing   
that reason and inclination or desire   
are not enemies4 ,the possession of     
reason must lead to the suppression of  
some desires--those incompatible with a 
comprehensive purpose deliberately      
embraced2 but the desires and the reason
 or intelligence work together to a     
common end4 ,on this view1 it is not the
 rational man who is divided against    
himself2 it is the short-sighted1 the   
impulsive1 the inconsistent1 the        
irrational man4 ,he is the prey of      

warring desires whose strife leads to no
 permanent peace under the guidance of  
reason4  #fj4 ,,another ,,view ,,of     
,,reason4--,to certain minds this view  
of reason as the arbiter and reconciler 
of man's impulses and desires does not  
appeal4  ,thus1 ,kant1 whose doctrine   
will be more fully considered later1    
,footnote3 ,chapter xxix4 holds that    
man's reason promulgates a law which    
takes no account of the impulses and    
desires of man4 ,thus1 also1 ,henry     
,sidgwick1 who differs from ,kant in    
making the attainment of happiness the  
goal of human endeavor1 and who1        
consequently1 is not tempted to         
disregard the desires of man1 yet refers
 to the reason independently certain    
maxims1 which he regards as             
self-evident1 touching our own good and 
the good of our neighbor4 ,footnote3    
,the ,methods of ,ethics1 chapter iii4  
,there are certain considerations which 
appear to favor the view that the reason
 is a faculty which may be regarded as  

an independent law-giver4 ,a man may be 
possessed of great intelligence2 he may 
be well-informed1 acute in his          
reasonings1 and consistent in his       
strivings to attain some comprehensive  
end1 which1 on the whole1 appears       
congruous to his nature1 such as it is4 
,yet we may regard him as highly        
unreasonable4 ,judged by some higher    
standard which we look upon as approved 
by reason1 he is found to fall short4   
,is reason1 then1 synonymous with       
intelligence8 ,or is it something       
more--the source of an ultimate standard
 of action1 intuitively known1 and by   
which all man's actions must be judged8 
,upon this question light will be thrown
 in the pages following4     ,,part ,v  
,,the ,,social ,,will   ,,chapter ,,xvii
  ,,characteristics ,,of ,,the ,,social 
,,will   #fa4 ,,what ,,is ,,the ,,social
 ,,will8--,the social will is not a     
mysterious entity1 separate and distinct
 from all individual wills4 ,it is their
 resultant4 ,the resultant of two or    

more physical forces is a force2 it has 
a character and may be described4 ,the  
resultant of individual wills in        
interaction is a will with a given      
character which it is of no small       
importance for the moralist to          
comprehend4 ,this will presents aspects 
closely analogous to those presented by 
the will of the individual4  ,thus1 to  
begin with1 a community of men may be   
said to will a vast number of things    
which have never been made by the       
members of the community the object of  
conscious reflection4 ,it may           
unthinkingly move along the groove made 
for it by tradition4 ,it may be         
intellectually upon so low a plane that 
even the possibility of acting in other 
ways does not occur to it4              
,nevertheless1 ways of action thus      
unthinkingly pursued cannot properly be 
said to be beyond the voluntary control 
of the community4 ,a new situation may  
draw attention to the fact that they are
 unsatisfactory1 lead to critical       

examination1 to inhibition1 to          
deliberate change4 ,between the passive 
acceptance of actions prescribed by     
tradition and deliberate conscious      
choice in the presence of recognized    
alternatives there is no clear line of  
demarcation4  ,under the pressure of    
circumstances or with the gradual       
increase of information and intelligence
 the traditional may undergo slight     
modifications which scarcely rank as    
conscious departures from what has been 
passively accepted4 ,the algebraic sum  
of such departures may1 with the lapse  
of time1 come to be by no means         
insignificant1 yet no individual may    
have exercised in any considerable      
degree conscious reflection or shown in 
any large measure freedom of choice4    
,on the other hand1 the social will may1
 at times1 reveal itself in deliberate  
decisions1 preceded by much conscious   
deliberation1 and initiating wide       
departures from established usage4 ,the 
presence of new enemies or a diminution 

of the food-supply may awake a primitive
 community from its lethargy1 leading it
 to modify its habits and adjust itself 
to new conditions4 ,a barbarous horde   
may set out upon a career of conquest1  
and may introduce revolutionary changes 
into its manner of life4 ,a civilized   
nation may come to the conclusion that1 
in the course of human events1 it has   
become necessary for it to dissolve the 
bands which have held it to another     
nation2 it may frame for itself an      
independent constitution1 embodying new 
ideals and prescribing a new form of    
corporate life4  ,but1 as in the case of
 the individual1 so in that of the      
community1 the tendency to fall again   
into a rut is always apparent4 ,laws1   
once enacted1 lend a passive resistance 
to change1 even when they no longer     
serve well the ends they were intended  
to serve4 ,the independence of thought  
and action revealed in the adoption of  
new constitutions are not conspicuous in
 their maintenance4 ,man collective1 as 

well as man individual1 falls into      
habits1 and he commits to his unthinking
 self what was wrought out by himself as
 thinking and consciously choosing4     
,passive acceptance of the traditional  
again wins the day and becomes a ruling 
factor in action4 ,footnote3 ,it is     
indisputable that much the greatest part
 of mankind has never shown a particle  
of desire that its civil institutions   
should be improved since the moment when
 external completeness was first given  
to them by their embodiment in some     
permanent record4 ,,maine1 ,ancient     
,law1 chapter ii4  ,this tendency to    
mechanization should not surprise us1   
for we meet with the phenomenon         
everywhere4 ,the man who says1 ,good-by 
today does not mean ,god be with thee1  
and the ,gruss ,dich ,gott of the       
,bavarian peasant is very properly      
translated by the ,american child as    
,hallo4 ,the traditional tends to lose  
or to alter its meaning1 but it         
continues to serve a purpose4 ,a        

community without traditions1 without   
settled ways of acting1 followed1 for   
the most part1 without much reflection1 
would be in the position of a man       
without habits either good or bad4      
,human life as we know it could not go  
on upon such a basis4 ,the rule has1 at 
times1 its inconveniences2 but it leads 
somewhere1 at least2 whereas he who     
plunges into the unexplored forest may  
find every step a problem1 and may come 
even to doubt whether any step is a step
 in advance4  #fb4 ,,social ,,will ,,and
 ,,social ,,habits4--,within the        
province of the social will fall what   
may not inaptly be called the habits of 
a community--ways of acting acquired    
largely without premeditation and       
followed to a great extent through mere 
inertia4 ,the province of the social    
will is a broad one4 ,deliberate        
choices2 those half-conscious choices   
analogous to the unheeded expressions of
 preference which fill the days of the  
individual2 impulses and tendencies     

which scarcely emerge into the          
light--all are expressions of the social
 will4  ,in the next chapter ,i shall   
distinguish between customs proper and  
social habits in a broader sense4 ,but1 
in discussing the general problem of the
 relation of habit to will1 it is not   
necessary to mark the distinction4      
,some habits rest upon us lightly2 some 
are inveterate4 ,of some we are well    
aware2 others have to be pointed out to 
us before we recognize that we have     
them4 ,some we approve1 some we         
disapprove1 to some we are indulgent or 
indifferent4 ,all these peculiarities   
are found in the relation of the social 
will to social habits4 ,it may recognize
 them1 approve of them1 encourage them4 
,it may pay them little attention4 ,it  
may disapprove them and strive to       
repress them4 ,will has brought them    
into being2 it is will that maintains   
them2 it is will that must modify or    
suppress them4  ,as a matter of fact1   
all communities do tend to change their 

habits1 some more slowly1 some more     
rapidly4 ,and for its habits we hold a  
community responsible4 ,common sense    
refers them to its will1 and exercises  
approval or disapproval4 ,this it would 
not do were the practices upon which    
judgment is passed recognized as beyond 
the control of will altogether4  #fc4   
,,social ,,will ,,and ,,social          
,,organization4--,under the general     
heading of the habits of a society it is
 not out of place to discuss its social 
and political organization4  ,the fact  
that there never was an original social 
contract1 made with each other by men   
solitary and unrelated1 with the        
deliberate intent of putting an end to  
the war of all against all1 does not    
signify that the social state in which  
men find themselves is a something with 
which the human will has had1 and has1  
nothing to do4  ,social and political   
organization are the result of a secular
 process1 but behind that process1 as   
moving and directing forces1 stand the  

will and the intelligence of man4 ,the  
social and political organization of a  
community is not the creation of any    
single generation of men4 ,each         
generation is born into a given social  
setting1 as the individual is born into 
the setting furnished by the community4 
,this social setting1 the heritage of   
the community from the past1 may be     
compared to a great estate brought      
together by the efforts of a man's      
ancestors1 and transmitted to him to    
hold intact1 to add to1 to squander1 as 
he may be inclined4 ,it is a product    
attained by man's nature in its struggle
 with environment1 and that product may 
be modified by the same forces that made
 it what it is4  ,into this heritage the
 generation of men who compose a        
community at any given time may enter   
with little thought of its significance1
 with no information1 or with false     
information1 touching the manner of its 
coming into being1 and with small       
inclination to do anything save to leave

 unchanged the institutions of which it 
finds itself possessed4 ,nevertheless1  
the forms under which societies are     
organized are subject to the social     
will1 and1 if disapproved1 are modified 
or abolished4 ,some change is taking    
place even where there is apparent      
immobility1 as becomes evident when the 
history of institutions is followed     
through long periods of time4 ,the      
utmost that can be said is that1 where  
intelligence is little developed and    
energy at a low ebb1 the social will may
 bear the stamp of passive acceptance of
 the inherited1 rather than exhibit a   
tendency to innovation4 ,will it        
remains1 but we may hesitate to describe
 it as a free will4  ,it is at times    
forced upon our attention with          
unmistakable emphasis that the forms of 
social and political organization are   
under voluntary control4 ,momentous     
changes may be made deliberately1 and   
with full consciousness of their        
significance4 ,among the more           

progressive nations in our day the duty 
of introducing innovations appears to be
 generally recognized3 constitutions are
 amended2 the status of social classes  
is made the object of legislation2 even 
the domain of the family is invaded1 as 
in legislation touching marriage and    
divorce4 ,men appear to feel themselves 
free to will deliberately the end that  
shall be served by the mechanism of the 
state1 and to adapt that mechanism to   
the attainment of the end chosen4  #fd4 
,,the ,,social ,,will ,,and ,,ideal     
,,ends4--,the social will1 like the wall
 of the individual1 may manifest itself 
in decisions which it is obviously      
impossible to carry out to a completely 
successful issue4 ,a community has a    
power of control over its members1 but  
that control has its limits4 ,even a    
man's actions cannot be completely      
controlled by the community of which he 
is a part4 ,there are always individuals
 who violate rules1 and to whom1 as it  
would seem1 no motive can be presented  

which is adequate to keep them in the   
rut prescribed by society4  ,still less 
can the social will exercise full       
control over men's thoughts and         
feelings4 ,influenced to some degree    
they may be4 ,a man may be kept in      
ignorance1 or furnished with information
 calculated to determine his thought in 
a given direction4 ,his emotions may be 
played upon2 he may be exhorted1        
rewarded1 punished4 ,but thoughts and   
feelings are not open to direct         
inspection2 they may be concealed or    
simulated4 ,much more readily than      
actions can they withdraw themselves    
from control4  ,nevertheless1 the social
 will may1 and does1 ignore all such    
limitations to its powers4 ,laws are not
 passed to regulate the changes of the  
weather1 which palpably fall outside the
 province of the law2 but they are      
passed to regulate the actions of men1  
which normally fall within it2 that is1 
which can1 to a very significant degree1
 be influenced by the attitude of the   

social will4 ,for the same reason laws  
may even take cognizance of men's       
thoughts4 ,of the accidental limitations
 of its power of control within the     
general sphere in which it has a meaning
 to speak of control1 the social will is
 not compelled to take cognizance4 ,it  
may set itself to encourage or repress  
certain types of character and conduct1 
and take measures to attain the end it  
has selected4 ,that the measures taken  
should sometimes prove inadequate does  
not alter the fact of the choice of an  
end1 nor does it obscure the revelation 
of the trend of the social will4  ,thus1
 a community may be said to will that   
its members shall not be guilty of      
violence2 it may will to live at peace  
with other communities2 it may will to  
conquer and subjugate4 ,whether1 in each
 case1 the will shall be completely     
realized or not1 may not be determined  
by the mere fact of its willing4        
,nevertheless1 the permanent volitional 
attitude may be unmistakably present1   

and may reveal itself in strivings      
toward the chosen goal4 ,to describe    
this attitude as no more than wishing is
 manifestly to do it an injustice4  #fe4
 ,,the ,,permanent ,,social             
,,will4--,the social will may be        
regarded as something permanent4 ,its   
existence is not confined to those      
moments in which collective decisions   
are being made4 ,the will to be one     
which constitutes a group of human      
beings a nation is not at all times     
actively exercised1 but the settled     
disposition to action looking toward    
that end may be always present and ready
 to be called into action4 ,an autocracy
 remains such when its irresponsible    
head is making no decisions2 and a      
democracy is not such only while        
elections are being held or the         
legislature is sitting4 ,the            
organization of a society1 the whole    
body of the usages which it accepts and 
approves1 are revelations of the social 
will4 ,that will does1 it is true1 give 

expression to itself in a series of     
actual decisions more or less conscious 
and deliberate1 but it is far more than 
any such series of decisions4 ,it is a  
disposition1 rooted in the past and     
reaching into the future4 ,it is a      
guarantee of decisions to come1 of whose
 nature we may make some forecast4  ,the
 permanent social will constitutes the  
character of a community4 ,our study of 
the will of the individual prepares us  
for the recognition of the fact that    
communities may be but dimly aware of   
their own character1 and may be quite   
unable to give an unbiased account of   
the ideals which animate them4          
,,chapter ,,xviii  ,,expressions ,,of   
,,the ,,social ,,will   #ff4            
,,custom4--,we have seen above that even
 the forms of political and social      
organization may justly be regarded as  
an expression of the social will4 ,such 
forms are the result of past choices1   
and their acceptance in the present is  
evidence of present choice4  ,between   

the organization of a society and its   
customs proper we may distinguish by    
comparing the former to structure and   
the latter to function in the case of   
any organism4 ,but we must bear in mind 
that1 here1 structure has been built up 
by1 and is in process of modification   
by1 the same forces that exhibit        
themselves in function4 ,it would not be
 wholly out of place to describe a      
people as having the custom of being    
ruled by hereditary chiefs1 of choosing 
their monarchs1 or of governing         
themselves through elected              
representatives4 ,forms of organization 
are handed down to successive           
generations by the same social tradition
 that transmits customs of every        
description4  ,customs are public habits
 which are1 on the whole1 approved by a 
community4 ,they are ways of acting     
which are regarded as normal and proper4
 ,where the authority of custom is      
evoked1 pressure is brought to bear upon
 the individual to adjust himself to the

 will of the community4  ,a community1  
like an individual1 may have habits     
which it does not approve4 ,such may be 
tolerated1 although disapproved2 or     
active efforts may be made to set them  
aside4 ,some habits may be regarded with
 comparative indifference1 although     
professedly held in condemnation4 ,the  
individual1 in following such habits1   
may claim that they are not             
unequivocally condemned by the          
community1 and he is not conscious of   
the weight of displeasure which visits  
the violation of the will of the        
community when unequivocally expressed4 
,in simple and primitive societies      
custom prescribes to the individual his 
course of life in the minutest detail4  
,it possesses the authority of the      
dictator4 ,in societies upon a higher   
level it may leave to him some          
discretion in deciding upon the details 
of his daily life1 while still          
exercising a paramount control over the 
general trend of his actions4  ,thus the

 will of the community1 expressed in    
custom1 determines what the members of  
the community ought to do1 and it takes 
measures to enforce obedience to its    
decisions4 ,is it surprising that the   
names which have been given to the      
science which treats of man's rights and
 duties1 morals1 ethics 7mores1 ethica1 
,sitten71 should reflect this truth8 ,it
 would be an inadequate statement to    
maintain that the science of morals is  
no more than a systematic exposition of 
the customary in human societies4 ,it is
 not an inadequate statement to assert  
that1 in many societies1 custom has1 in 
fact1 furnished the ultimate and        
complete standard of obligation1 and    
that in all societies it is of enormous 
significance in moulding men's notions  
of right and wrong4  #fg4 ,,the ,,ground
 ,,for ,,the ,,authority ,,of           
,,custom4--,habits are as essential to a
 society as they are to an individual   
human being4 ,without them1 society     
could not live4 ,in any social          

state--and no man can live except in a  
social state--there must be cooperation4
 ,how can there be cooperation if there 
are no social habits upon which men may 
count in their dealings with one        
another8  ,try to conceive all the tacit
 mutual conventions1 the unconscious    
adaptations to custom1 which guide our  
daily lives1 suspended for twenty- four 
hours4 ,when should one rise in the     
morning8 ,how should one dress8 ,what   
and how should one eat8 ,of business    
there could be no question1 nor could   
there be cooperation in pleasures4      
,public order there could not be1 for   
there would be no public worthy of the  
name4 ,protection of life and limb would
 be the creature of accident4 ,between  
civility and insult there would be no   
recognizable distinction4 ,in short1 men
 could not behave either well or ill1   
for there would be no rule to follow or 
to violate1 nothing to expect1 and1     
hence1 no ground for disappointment4    
,in such a chaotic condition no society 

of men has ever lived4 ,no actual state 
of anarchy has ever been complete1 nor  
could it be1 and endure4 ,a reign of    
terror is a reign of law in comparison  
with such a dissolution of all the bonds
 which knit man to man4 ,when we pass   
from one community to another1 we find  
one set of public habits exchanged for  
another4 ,some sets impress us as       
better1 some as worse4 ,but there is no 
set which is not better than none4 ,it  
makes it possible for men to live1 if   
not to live well4  ,customs are1 then1 a
 necessity4 ,it is equally necessary    
that they should1 in general1 have      
binding force for the individual4 ,but  
there are customs good and bad4 ,the    
individual may fall into habits which   
he1 upon reflection1 concludes to be    
injurious to him1 and which others see  
clearly to be injurious4 ,a community   
sufficiently enlightened to criticize   
itself at all1 may come to disapprove   
some of its customs and may endeavor to 
abolish them4  ,this means that a new   

act of the social will may set itself in
 opposition to the social will already  
crystallized into custom4 ,in a given   
instance1 and where there are           
differences of opinion1 it may be a nice
 question whether the new or the old    
should be regarded as the authoritative 
expression of the social will4  #fh4    
,,the ,,origin ,,and ,,the ,,persistence
 ,,of ,,customs4--,from the fact that   
customs are1 in general1 to be regarded 
as expressions of the social will1 it   
might be assumed that their purposive   
character and social utility should be a
 sufficient explanation of their coming 
into being4 ,but the matter is not so   
simple4 ,a man may fall into habits     
which are no indication of what he      
regards as useful to him4 ,such habits  
have not been formed independently of   
his will1 and yet they may appear to be 
purposeless1 or even detrimental4 ,who  
wishes to have the inveterate habit of  
cracking the joints of his fingers or of
 biting his finger-nails8 ,what purpose 

do such habits serve8  ,although the    
social utility of customs1 taken        
generally1 is easily apparent1 yet there
 are many customs which seem            
inexplicable upon such a principle4     
,why1 for example1 should the king of a 
primitive community be prohibited from  
sleeping lying down8 or why should it be
 forbidden that he gaze upon the sea8   
,footnote3 ,encyclopedia ,britannica1   
,eleventh edition1 article ,taboo4 ,the 
origin of such customs is hidden in     
obscurity4 ,that their adoption was not 
without its reason1 we may assume4 ,that
 the reason was a reasonable one cannot 
be maintained4 ,it seems probable1      
however1 that it at some time seemed    
reasonable to some one4 ,the persistence
 of habit1 social as well as individual1
 would account for the perpetuation of  
the custom long after the occasion which
 gave rise to it had been forgotten4    
#fi4 ,,law4--,between custom and law1   
taken generally1 it is by no means easy 
to draw a sharp distinction1 although1  

in some instances1 the distinction1 may 
be clearly marked4 ,in primitive        
communities1 laws reduced to writing1   
and administered by persons deliberately
 chosen for that end1 may be wholly     
lacking2 and yet who would say that such
 communities do not live under the reign
 of law in a broad sense of the term8 ,a
 course of life is prescribed to the    
individual2 failure to come up to the   
standard meets with punishment4         
,nevertheless1 as social life rises in  
the scale and as communities become     
developed1 custom and law become        
differentiated4 ,the latter stands out  
upon the background of the former as    
something more sharply defined4         
,penalties and the method of their      
infliction are more exactly fixed4 ,not 
all violations of what is customary are 
taken up into the legal code as         
punishable offences1 although they meet 
with that indefinite measure of         
punishment entailed by social           
disapproval4  ,those public habits which

 it seems to a community it is of       
especial importance to preserve and     
enforce come to be embodied in laws4    
,the selection is a matter of more or   
less deliberate choice1 and is an       
expression of will4 ,the choice is not1 
normally1 an arbitrary one4 ,the laws of
 a people are1 unless accident has      
intervened1 the outcome and expression  
of its corporate life4 ,for their       
ultimate authority they rest upon the   
acquiescence of the social will4 ,laws  
contrary to deep-seated and widely      
accepted custom are not apt to be       
regarded as of binding force4 ,they are 
felt to be tyrannous1 and are obeyed1 if
 at all1 unwillingly1 and because of    
pressure from without4  ,in a later     
chapter ,footnote3 ,chapter ,,xx4 ,i    
shall dwell upon the fact that the      
accidental may play a very significant  
role in law4 ,in given instances the    
laws of a community may be1 not the     
outcome of its will in any sense1 but   
something imposed upon it4 ,such laws   

cannot but be felt to be oppressive and 
a restriction of freedom4  ,laws1 like  
customs1 may cease to have a            
significance1 and they may be modified  
or allowed to fall into desuetude4      
,there is1 however1 much conservatism1  
as all who are familiar with legal usage
 know4 ,and laws may fail of their      
purpose4 ,they may aim to diminish      
crime1 and their undiscriminating       
severity may foster crime4 ,so may the  
individual select an end1 fall into     
error in his choice of means1 and1 as a 
result of experience1 resolve to        
substitute for such means others which  
are better adapted to carry out his     
purpose4  #gj4 ,,public                 
,,opinion4--,public opinion is          
manifestly a force broader and more     
vague than established custom1 and still
 broader than law4 ,public opinion may  
approve or condemn what no law touches1 
and it makes its influence felt beyond  
the sphere of what is customary4  ,where
 customs and laws come to be imperfect  

expressions of the social will1 they may
 stand condemned by public opinion4 ,in 
such a case their authority is          
undermined and violations of them are   
condoned4 ,where public opinion is      
strongly against a law2 the law becomes 
ineffective4 ,the conservatism of law is
 such that a law may be allowed to stand
 unchanged1 and yet may fail to be      
carried into effect4 ,juries may refuse 
to convict1 or the unpalatable          
infliction of punishment may be avoided 
by granting to the judge a wide         
discretion in pronouncing sentence4     
,the gradual development of a strong    
public sentiment may lead to the passage
 of new laws1 not based upon previously 
established customs1 but deliberately   
framed with a view to the public weal4  
,old customs may be modified and new    
customs may be introduced4 ,that the    
recommendations of public opinion extend
 beyond the sphere of the customary is  
manifest4 ,it is not the custom of most 
men to leave any large part of their    

estate to public charity4 ,except in the
 case of the very rich1 the failure to  
do so is not1 as a rule1 expressly      
condemned4 ,yet such bequests are       
approved1 the testators are praised1 and
 the attitude of public opinion has no  
small influence upon the conduct of     
individuals4 ,again1 extreme self-      
sacrifice is not customary2 it is       
exceptional2 and yet shining examples of
 unselfishness excite a warm sympathy4  
,the expression of this sympathy is not 
without its influence4  ,public opinion 
is more palpably an expression of the   
actual social will than are custom and  
law4 ,we have seen that the last two may
 represent1 in given instances1 rather  
the inherited will of the past than the 
living will of the present4 ,but when we
 call public opinion an expression of   
the social will we cannot mean that it  
necessarily reflects the sentiment of   
all the members of a given community4   
,in primitive communities custom may be 
a public habit which embraces all1 or   

nearly all1 individuals4 ,public opinion
 may scarcely have a separate existence4
 ,in communities more developed1 some   
individuals may disapprove and refuse to
 follow many customs which are          
characteristic of the society to which  
they belong4 ,laws are not approved by  
all1 and1 in progressive states1 there  
is usually some agitation which has as  
its object the repeal of old laws or the
 passage of new ones4 ,in communities   
where there is independence of thought1 
public opinion is usually divided4      
,furthermore1 the communities to which  
civilized men belong are not homogeneous
 aggregations of units4 ,there is the   
public opinion which obtains within     
single groups within the state4 ,the    
adherents of a religious sect may have  
notions peculiar to themselves of the   
conduct proper to the individual1 and   
such notions may extend far beyond what 
is actually prescribed by the tenets of 
the sect4 ,the several trades and       
professions1 the social classes1        

neighborhoods1 even lesser voluntary    
associations of men1 such as clubs1 may 
be pervaded by a public sentiment which 
varies with each group4 ,when we speak  
of public opinion generally we have in  
mind something broader1 a resultant4    
,but the public sentiment of the lesser 
groups cannot be ignored4 ,the          
individual feels himself especially     
influenced by the opinions of those most
 nearly associated with him4  ,under the
 head of public opinion it is convenient
 to speak of the opinions of moral      
teachers who have influenced the race4  
,such a thinker may enunciate truths far
 in advance of the opinions of his      
fellows4 ,his teachings are not1 hence1 
fairly representative of the social will
 as it reveals itself in his time4 ,but 
the sentiments of the more enlightened  
never are completely in accord with     
those of the mass of their fellows4     
,they are not mere aberrations from the 
social will2 they are its forerunners4  
,the moralist and the religious teacher 

initiate new choices1 which may become  
the choices of large bodies of men4     
,from them proceed influences which have
 their issue in new expressions of the  
social will1 characterizing whole       
societies1 and giving birth to new      
customs1 new laws1 and a new form of    
public opinion4 ,one can scarcely       
imagine what ,china would be without her
 ,confucius2 or the ,arabic world1 with 
,mahomet abstracted4     ,,chapter ,,xix
  ,,the ,,sharers ,,in ,,the ,,social   
,,will   #ga4 ,,the ,,community4--,it is
 difficult to state with absolute       
exactness what constitutes a community4 
,we may define it as a group of human   
beings associated in a common life1     
depending upon and cooperating with each
 other4 ,this definition will apply1 to 
be sure1 to lesser groups within a tribe
 or state2 and even to a collection of  
tribes or states in so far as such enter
 into alliances and cooperate to their  
mutual advantage4 ,as1 however1 the bond
 of union is1 in the former case1       

subordinate to the higher authority of a
 larger group 7for the family is subject
 to the tribe or state72 and as1 in the 
latter case1 the bond of union is a     
relatively loose one1 and evidently     
subordinate to that which binds the     
citizens of individual states1 the      
community proper may be regarded as that
 group which is characterized by a      
relatively great degree of inner        
coherence and by relative external      
independence4  ,the type of such        
communities is1 among the more primitive
 peoples1 the tribe1 and among the more 
developed1 the state4 ,the authority of 
such groups over their own members is1  
theoretically1 paramount1 although it   
may be suspended or abolished by the    
exertion of force from without4  ,such a
 community may be said to be inspired by
 a social will expressed in its customs1
 its laws and the public opinion        
prevalent in it4 ,its members may be    
said to be sharers in the social will of
 the community4 ,their participation in 

it is marked by their being endowed with
 rights and charged with duties4  ,it   
has not been characteristic of          
communities generally that all who find 
their place in them should be like      
sharers in the social will4 ,the        
distinction has been made between the   
citizen1 who enjoys the fullest rights  
and may1 perhaps1 directly take part in 
the government of the state1 and those  
who1 while in the state1 are not of it1 
as they do not enjoy citizenship4 ,where
 slavery1 in any of its forms1 has      
prevailed1 the distinction between those
 who are significant factors in         
determining the social will1 and those  
who have not this prerogative1 has been 
very marked4 ,social classes have often 
enjoyed1 even before the law1 privileges
 of great moment4 ,women have1 as a     
rule1 not been treated as citizens1 and 
have been refused a share in the        
government of the community4 ,children  
are cared for and are protected1 but    
political rights are denied them4 ,their

 status before the law is a peculiar    
one4 ,the mentally defective1 both in   
primitive communities and in developed  
ones1 stand in a relation to the        
community peculiar to themselves4 ,they 
are not excluded from it2 they are      
accorded rights2 but they are assigned  
in the community a place of their own4  
,wherever we look1 we find inequality4  
,the sharers in the social will do not  
share equally1 nor do they share in the 
same way4 ,this is true of communities  
of every description1 but the           
differences are more marked in some than
 in others4  #gb4 ,,the ,,community     
,,and ,,the ,,dead4--,it is not merely  
of the living human beings which compose
 a community that the social will takes 
cognizance4 ,other wills are made       
participants in the body of rights and  
duties peculiar to the community4  ,in  
many communities the dead are still     
counted among its members4 ,they are    
conceived as affecting its welfare1 and 
as demanding services from the living4  

,duties towards the dead are a          
well-recognized division of the sum of a
 man's obligations in communities the   
most diverse in their character4 ,in    
some1 they occupy a very prominent      
place2 in no community are they wholly  
overlooked4 ,a striking illustration of 
the recognition by the social will of   
the rights of the dead is to be found in
 the whole modern law of testamentary   
succession4 ,the will expressed by a man
 while he is alive is given effect as   
though he were still in the flesh and   
insisted upon the fulfillment of his    
desire4 ,it appears to work as a        
permanent factor in the community life1 
making its influence felt for           
generations4 ,witness its influence in  
charitable foundations1 in the law of   
entail1 and the like4  #gc4 ,,the       
,,community ,,and ,,the                 
,,supernatural4--,nor is it merely in   
recognizing the wills of the dead that  
the social will extends its sphere      
beyond the community of living human    

beings4 ,to primitive man1 and to man   
far from primitive1 his social          
environment has not seemed to be limited
 to the living and the dead who have1 or
 who have had1 an undeniable and        
unequivocal place in the community4     
,the part played in the life of man by  
supernatural beings of various orders   
has been a most significant one4 ,demons
 and gods1 spirits of a lower or of a   
higher order1 have occupied his mind and
 have influenced his actions4 ,such     
beings have been conceived to be1       
sometimes1 malevolent and needing to be 
placated1 sometimes1 benevolent and fit 
objects of gratitude4 ,their wills man  
has regarded as forces to be taken into 
account1 a something to which the       
individual and the community must adjust
 themselves4  ,man's relation1 or       
supposed relation1 to such beings has   
been a source of classes of duties upon 
which great stress has been laid4 ,the  
influence of this admission of          
supernatural beings into the circle of  

those directly concerned in the         
community life has found its expression 
in the organization of the state1 in    
custom1 in law1 in public opinion4 ,we  
know little of a community when we      
overlook this factor4  ,between magic   
and religion it is not easy to draw a   
sharp line1 especially when we view     
religion in the lower stages of its     
development4 ,in both we have to do with
 what may be called the supernatural4   
,magic has been defined as the          
employment of mechanical means to attain
 the desired end4 ,in religion1 when it 
so far develops that its specific       
character seems clearly revealed1 we    
have left the sphere of the mechanical4 
,the distinction between the mechanical 
and the spiritual is familiar to us in  
our dealings with our fellow-men4 ,in   
such dealings we may employ physical    
force4 ,on the other hand1 we may appeal
 to their intelligence and their        
emotions1 and thus influence their      
action4 ,in so far as we do not make    

such an appeal1 we deal with our        
fellows1 not as though they belonged to 
our social environment1 but to our      
physical4  ,at the lowest stages of his 
development1 man does not distinguish   
clearly between persons and things4     
,this means that he cannot distinguish  
clearly between his material environment
 and his social4 ,but the distinction   
becomes gradually clearer1 and it is1 in
 the end1 a marked one4 ,religion       
becomes differentiated from magic4 ,to  
confound religion1 in its higher        
developments1 with magic is an          
inexcusable confusion4  #gd4 ,,religion 
,,and ,,the ,,community4--,the          
denotation of the term religion is a    
broad one1 and there will probably      
always be dispute as to the justice of  
its extension to this or to that        
particular form of faith4 ,but it seems 
clear that it is typical of religion to 
extend what may not unjustly be called  
the social environment of man4  ,will is
 recognized other than the wills of the 

human beings constituting the community4
 ,to the part played by such wills a    
very great prominence may be given4     
,states may be theocratic1 as among the 
ancient ,hebrews2 or church and state   
may share the dominion1 or struggle     
between themselves for the supremacy1 as
 in ,europe in the ,middle ,ages2 or the
 state may be theoretically supreme in  
authority and yet maintain and lend     
authority to a church4 ,even where      
church and state are1 in theory1 quite  
divorced--a modern conception--the      
church with its ordinances and          
prescriptions1 its sacred days1 its     
ceremonial1 its educational             
institutions1 remains a very significant
 factor in the social environment of    
man4 ,religious duties have at all times
 and in all sorts of societies been     
regarded as constituting an important   
aspect of conduct4 ,they color strongly 
the mores of the community4 ,whole codes
 of morals may be referred to the       
teachings of certain religious leaders4 

,they claim their authority on religious
 grounds4  ,the great significance of   
the role played by religion in the      
sphere of morals is impressed upon one  
who glances over the works of those     
writers who have approached the subject 
of ethics from the side of anthropology 
or sociology4 ,a review of the facts has
 even tempted one of the most learned to
 seek the origin of morals almost wholly
 in religion4 ,footnote3 ,,wundt1       
,ethics1 ,vol4 ,i4 ,the ,facts of the   
,moral ,life2 see chapters ii and iii4  
,english ,translation1 ,london1 #ahig4  
,that religion should play an important 
part in giving birth to or modifying    
moral codes is not surprising4 ,man     
adjusts himself to his social           
environment as he conceives it4 ,if the 
community of wills which he recognizes  
includes the wills of supernatural      
beings1 it is natural that the social   
will which finds its expression in the  
organization of the state1 in custom1 in
 law and in public opinion1 should be   

modified by such inclusion4  ,nor is it 
surprising that the supernatural element
 should1 at times1 dwarf and render     
insignificant the other elements which  
enter into the social will4 ,it may seem
 to man the all-important factor in his 
life4  ,within the human community some 
individuals count for much more than do 
others4 ,there are those who scarcely   
seem to have any voice in contributing  
to the character and direction of the   
social will4 ,others are influential2   
and1 in extreme cases1 the wills of the 
few1 or even that of a single           
individual1 may be the source of law for
 the many4 ,if men come to the          
conclusion that the weal and woe of the 
community are dependent upon the will of
 the gods1 or of ,god1 they will        
unavoidably give frank recognition to   
that will above others1 and such        
recognition will dictate conduct4 ,the  
gods of ,epicurus1 leading a lazy       
existence in the interstellar spaces1   
indifferent to man and in no wise       

affecting his life1 could scarcely      
become the objects of a cult4 ,but the  
,god of the ,mahometan1 of the ,jew1 or 
of the ,christian1 is a ruler to be     
feared1 loved1 obeyed4 ,his will is law1
 and is determinative of conduct4  #ge4 
,,the ,,spread ,,of ,,the               
,,community4--,so far ,i have been      
speaking of the community properly so   
called1 of the single group of human    
beings living its corporate life4 ,but  
such groups do not normally remain in   
isolation4 ,as the isolation of the     
group diminishes1 as contacts between it
 and others become more numerous and    
more important1 the necessity of        
conventions controlling the relations of
 groups becomes more pressing4  ,this   
implies the development of a broader    
social will1 inclusive of the social    
wills of the several communities4 ,this 
social will may be very feeble1 and the 
bond between men belonging to different 
communities may be a weak one2 or it may
 be vigorous1 and furnish an intimate   

bond4 ,the savage1 to whom those beyond 
the pale of his tribe or small          
confederation are mere strangers1 and   
probably enemies1 stands at the lower   
limit of the scale2 the trader1 to whom 
the stranger is co-partner in a mutually
 profitable transaction1 stands higher2 
the ,stoic philosopher1 cosmopolitan in 
thought and feeling1 rating the claims  
of kindred and country as less          
significant than the bonds which unite  
all men in virtue of their common       
humanity1 marks the other extreme4 ,the 
spread of the social will grows marked  
as man rises in the scale of            
civilization4 ,barriers are broken down 
and limits are transcended4  ,this      
broader social will1 like the narrower1 
reveals itself in the organization of   
society4 ,we find confederations of     
tribes or states2 alliances temporary or
 relatively permanent4 ,and the broader 
social will modifies customs1 gives     
birth to systems of law1 and encourages 
the development of an inclusive         

humanitarian sentiment4  ,it does not   
necessarily obliterate old distinctions4
 ,the family1 neighborhood1 kindred1    
have their claims even under the most   
firmly organized of states2 but those   
claims are limited and controlled4 ,even
 so1 the broader social will may come to
 regard states as answerable for their  
decisions4 ,international law remains to
 the present day what has aptly been    
called a pious wish4 ,but public opinion
 prepares the way for law2 and all      
states1 whatever be their real aims1 now
 attempt to justify their actions by an 
appeal to the more or less nebulous     
tribunal of international public        
opinion4 ,in this they recognize its    
claim to act as arbiter4 ,within the    
jurisdiction of a state1 the motto1 my  
family1 right or wrong1 would not be a  
maxim approved in a court of justice4   
,international law is made a mock of by 
the frank enunciation of the maxim1 my  
country1 right or wrong4 ,hence1 such   
frankness is1 in international          

relations1 not encouraged4  ,the more or
 less skillfully made appeal to the     
moral sense of mankind--to the broader  
social will as public opinion--implies a
 certain recognition of its authority1  
or1 at least1 of its influence4 ,whether
 this is a definite step toward the     
granting of a real authority to the     
broader social will1 an authority which 
will curb impartially the selfishness of
 individual states1 it remains for the  
future to decide4     ,,part ,,vi  ,,the
 ,,real ,,social ,,will   ,,chapter ,,xx
  ,,the ,,imperfect ,,social ,,will     
#gf4 ,,the ,,apparent ,,and ,,the ,,real
 ,,social ,,will4--,it is important to  
distinguish between the apparent and the
 real social will4 ,we may begin by     
pointing out that the question apparent 
to whom8 is a pertinent one4  ,the      
social will is brought to bear upon the 
individual through a variety of         
agencies4 ,the family1 the neighborhood1
 the church1 the trade or profession1   
the political party1 the social         

class--all these have their habits and  
maxims4 ,they tend to mold to their type
 those whom they count among their      
members4 ,the pressure which they bring 
to bear is felt as a sense of moral     
obligation4 ,naturally1 individuals with
 different affiliations will be sensible
 of the pressure in different ways1 and 
may differ widely in their conceptions  
of the obligations actually laid upon   
the individual by the will of the       
greater organism of which he is a part4 
,but even he who rises above minor      
distinctions and takes a broad view of  
society is forced to recognize that the 
distinction between the apparent and the
 real social will may be a most         
significant one4  ,we have found the    
expression of the social will in custom1
 law and public opinion4 ,this is just2 
but the statement must be accepted with 
reservations4  ,there are instances in  
which neither the organization of the   
state1 nor the laws according to which  
it is governed1 can be considered as in 

any sense an expression of the social   
will4 ,an autocracy1 established by     
force1 and ruling without the free      
consent of the governed1 is an external 
and overruling power4 ,it may be obeyed1
 but it is not consented to4 ,nor is any
 body of law or system of government    
imposed upon a subject people by an     
alien and dominant race a fair exponent 
of the social will of the people thus   
governed4 ,custom and public opinion are
 at variance with law4 ,however just and
 enlightened the government1 as judged  
from the standpoint of some other race  
or nation1 its control must be felt as  
oppressive by those upon whom it is     
imposed4 ,traditions felt to be the most
 sacred may be violated2 moral laws1 as 
understood by those thus under          
dictation1 may be transgressed by       
obedience to the law of the land4       
,where custom1 law and public opinion   
are more nearly the spontaneous outcome 
of the life of a community1 they may    
with more justice be taken as           

expressions of the social will of that  
community as it is at the time4 ,yet1   
even here1 we must make reservations4   
,the organization of a state represents 
rather the crystallized will of the past
 than the free choice of the present4   
,to be sure1 it is accepted in the      
present2 but this is little more than   
the acquiescence of inertia4 ,and public
 opinion may be at variance both with   
custom and with law long before it      
succeeds in modifying either4 ,what is  
the actual social will of a community   
during the interval8  ,the past may be  
felt as exercising a certain tyranny    
over the present4 ,that the present     
cannot be cut wholly loose from it is   
manifest1 but how far should its        
dependence be accepted8 ,in the past    
there have been historical causes for   
the rise of dictatorships1 of           
oligarchies1 of dominant social classes4
 ,the men of a later time inherit such  
social institutions1 may accept them as 
desirable1 or may feel them as          

instruments of tyranny4 ,shall we say   
that they represent the actual social   
will of the community until such time as
 they are done away with by a successful
 revolution8 ,or shall we say that they 
are in harmony with the apparent social 
will only1 and really stand condemned8  
#gg4 ,,the ,,will ,,of ,,the            
,,majority4--,our own democratic        
institutions rest upon the theory that  
the social will is to be determined by  
the majority vote4 ,to be sure1 we seem 
to find it necessary to limit the       
application of this doctrine1 and to    
seek stability of government by fixing1 
in certain cases rather arbitrarily1 the
 size of the majority that shall count4 
,footnote3 ,see the ,constitution of the
 ,united ,states1 ,article ,v4 ,but the 
doctrine1 taken generally1 does seem in 
harmony with the test of rationality    
developed above4 ,footnote3 ,chapter    
xvi4 ,it aims at the satisfaction of    
many desires--at what may be termed     
satisfaction on the whole4              

,nevertheless1 it is possible to        
question whether the vote of the        
majority represents1 in a given         
instance1 the actual will of the        
community4  ,no one knows better than   
the practical politician how the votes  
of the majority are obtained4 ,no one   
knows better than he that1 in the most  
democratic of communities1 it is the    
wills of the few that count4 ,the       
organization of a party1 clever         
leadership1 the command of the press1   
the catching phrases of the popular     
orator1 the street procession1 the brass
 band1 the possession of the ability to 
cajole and to threaten--these play no   
mean role in the outcome1 which may be  
the adoption of a state policy of which 
a large proportion of the majority      
voting may be quite unable to comprehend
 the significance4 ,shall we say1 in    
such a case1 that the will of the       
majority was for the ultimate end8 ,or  
shall we say that the vote was in       
pursuance of a multitude of minor ends1 

many of which had but an accidental     
connection with the ultimate end8  #gh4 
,,ignorance ,,and ,,error ,,and ,,the   
,,social ,,will4--,the apparent will of 
the community appears to be1 in large   
measure1 an accidental thing4 ,that is  
to say1 men will what they would not    
will were they not hampered by ignorance
 and error1 and were they not incapable 
of taking long views of their own       
interests4  ,the decisions of the social
 will may be the outcome of ignorance   
and superstition4  ,where it is thought 
necessary to punish the accidental      
homicide in order to appease the ghost  
of the dead man1 which might otherwise  
become a cause of harm1 the course of   
justice1 if one may call it such1       
deviates from what the enlightened man  
must regard as normal4 ,the belief that 
sin is an infection1 communicable by    
heredity or even by contact1 must lead  
to similar aberrations of primitive     
justice4 ,animals1 and even material    
things1 have1 and not by peoples the    

most primitive1 been treated as         
rational1 responsible and amenable to   
law4 ,this seems to do the brutes more  
than justice4 ,on the other hand1 the   
philosophical tenet of the ,cartesians1 
which denied a mind to the brutes1      
resulted in no little cruelty4 ,the     
treatment of drunkards1 and of the      
mentally defective1 has1 at times1 been 
based upon the notion that they are     
possessed by god or demon1 and1 hence1  
have a right to peculiar consideration1 
or may be treated with extreme rigor4   
,it is worth while to follow up the     
above reference to the ,cartesians by a 
reference to ,st4 ,augustine4 ,trains of
 reasoning based upon theological or    
philosophical tenets have more than once
 given rise to aberrations of the moral 
judgment4  ,the intellectual subtlety of
 ,augustine betrays him into magnifying 
to enormous proportions the guilt of the
 boyish prank of stealing green pears   
from the garden of a neighbor1 inspired 
by the agreeable thought of the         

irritation which would be caused by the 
theft4 ,the pears were not edible1 and  
were thrown to the pigs1 which          
circumstance seduces this father of the 
,church into the reflection that the sin
 must have been committed for no other  
end than for the sake of sinning4 ,a    
greater crime than this he cannot       
conceive4  ,many years after the event1 
in writing his ,confessions1 he         
expresses in unmeasured terms his horror
 of the deed1 filling seven chapters    
,footnote3 ,confessions1 chapters iv-x4 
with his reflections and lamentations3  
,behold my heart1 ,o ,god1 behold my    
heart1 upon which thou hadst mercy when 
in the depths of this bottomless pit4 ,o
 corruption6 ,o monster of life and     
depth of death6 ,is it possible that ,i 
liked to do what ,i might not1 simply   
and for no other reason than because ,i 
might not8  ,saint as he was1 ,augustine
 would have made a sorry schoolmaster4  
,it is evident that the enlightened mind
 cannot regard schoolboys as unique     

monsters of iniquity for making a raid  
on an orchard4  ,the community whose    
decisions are made under the influence  
of erroneous preconceptions undoubtedly 
wills1 but its will is determined by the
 accident of ignorance4 ,it is to be    
likened to the man who1 in unfamiliar   
surroundings1 takes the wrong road in   
his desire to get home4 ,he chooses1 but
 he does not choose what he would if he 
knew what he was about4  #gi4           
,,heedlessness ,,and ,,the ,,social     
,,will4--,numberless illustrations might
 be given of the fact that1 not merely  
ignorance and error1 but also a short-  
sighted heedlessness plays no small part
 in introducing elements of the         
accidental and irrational into the      
social will4 ,the man who spends freely 
with no thought for the morrow is not   
more irrational than the state that     
permits a squandering of its resources1 
and wakes up too late only to discover  
that it has lost what cannot easily be  
replaced4  ,the life of the community is

 a long one1 and calls for long views of
 the interests of the community4 ,these 
are too often lacking4 ,heedlessness and
 indifference are a fertile source of   
abuses4 ,in which case1 the will of the 
community resembles that of the         
impulsive and erratic man1 who has too  
little foresight and self-control to    
consult consistently his own interests4 
,we may say that he desires his own good
 on the whole1 but we cannot say that he
 desires it at all times4 ,future goods 
disappear from his view4 ,his choices   
clash4 ,his actual will at any given    
moment appears to be the creature of    
accident4 ,so it may be with the        
community4  #hj4 ,,rational ,,elements  
,,in ,,the ,,irrational ,,will4--,the   
actual social will1 as revealed in      
custom1 law and public opinion1 often   
appears1 thus1 highly irrational1 and we
 may be justified in distinguishing     
between it and the real will which we   
conceive of as struggling to get itself 
expressed4 ,nevertheless1 in justice to 

custom1 law and public opinion1 we must 
look below the surface of things4 ,even 
where the decisions of the community    
seem most irrational1 and where there   
appears to be little consciousness of   
the ends pursued by the real will1 the  
discriminating observer may see that    
pure irrationality does not prevail4    
,the individual may show by his actions 
that he has comprehensive ends1 and may 
yet not be distinctly aware of them4 ,so
 may a community of men4  ,the true     
meaning of ethical obligations1 says    
,hobhouse1 ,footnote3 ,morals in        
,evolution1 ,new ,york1 #aijf1 p4 #cj4  
--their bearing on human purposes1 their
 function in social life--only emerges  
by slow degrees4 ,the onlooker1         
investigating a primitive custom1 can   
see that moral elements have helped to  
build it up1 so that it embodies        
something of moral truth4 ,yet these    
elements of moral truth were perhaps    
never present to the minds of those who 
built it4 ,instead thereof we are likely

 to find some obscure reference to magic
 or to the world of spirits4 ,the custom
 which we can see1 perhaps1 to be       
excellently devised in the interests of 
social order or for the promotion of    
mutual aid is by those who practice it  
based on some taboo1 or preserved from  
violation from fear of the resentment of
 somebody's ghost4 ,it is not wholly    
irrational that1 in the laws of various 
peoples1 an allowance should be made for
 the sudden resentment which flames up  
when wrong has been suffered1 and that  
an offence grown cold should be treated 
more leniently than one which is fresh  
and the smart caused by which has not   
had time to suffer diminution4 ,society 
has to do with men as they are4 ,it is  
its task to bend the will of the        
individual into conformity with the     
social will4 ,that resentment for wrongs
 suffered is an important element in the
 establishment of order in the community
 can scarcely be denied1 nor is it      
wholly unreasonable1 men being what they

 are1 for the community to make some    
concessions to the natural feeling of   
the individual4 ,moreover1 the offender 
caught in the act is indubitably the    
real offender2 and settled animosities  
are more injurious to the social order  
than are fugitive gusts of passion4     
,and if it is true that the arbitrary   
laws of hospitality1 as recognized by   
some primitive and half-civilized       
communities1 are reinforced by the      
superstitious fear of the stranger's    
curse1 it is none the less true that    
they serve certain social needs4 ,the   
fact that hospitality tends to decline  
when it becomes superfluous is          
sufficient to indicate its social       
significance4  ,again1 collective       
responsibility--the making of a man     
responsible for the delinquencies of    
those connected with him1 even when he  
could in no way have prevented the evils
 in question--appears to modern         
civilized man1 in most instances1       
,footnote3 ,only under normal           

conditions4 ,we have recently had       
abundant opportunity to see that in time
 of war civilized nations have no       
scruples in making the innocent suffer  
with the guilty1 or even for the guilty4
 an irrational thing4 ,yet men are      
actually knit into groups with common   
interests and accustomed to cooperation4
 ,to treat them as wholly independent   
units1 responsible only to some higher  
organization such as the state1 is to   
overlook actual relationships which have
 no small influence in determining the  
course of their lives4 ,within each     
lesser group the members can and do     
encourage or repress given types of     
action beneficial or the reverse4 ,is it
 irrational for the larger group to set 
such influences to work by holding the  
lesser group responsible in its         
collective capacity8 ,in ,china the     
principle has worked with some measure  
of success as an instrument of order for
 many centuries4 ,in an enlightened     
society some better method of attaining 

order may obtain1 but it would be a     
mistake to assume that there is nothing 
behind the principle of collective      
responsibility save the unintelligent   
attempt to satisfy resentment by        
striking indirectly at the offender     
through those connected with him1 or the
 mental confusion that identifies the   
culprit1 through mere association of    
ideas1 with other members of the group  
to which he belongs4  #ha4 ,,the        
,,social ,,will ,,and ,,the             
,,selfishness ,,of ,,the                
,,individual4--,there is1 then1 often   
some reason to be discovered even in    
what appears at first sight to be wholly
 irrational4 ,but no small part of the  
irrationality of the actual social will 
must be set down1 in the last instance1 
to that peculiar form of irrationality  
in the individual or in groups of       
individuals which we call selfishness4  
,that some degree of inequality should  
be necessary in communities of men1 in  
view of the differentiation of function 

implied in cooperative effort1 may be   
admitted4 ,how far the inherited        
organization or the existing environment
 of a given community may make it       
necessary1 in the interests of all1 to  
grant a large measure of power or       
prerogative to a single individual1 or  
to the few1 is fair matter for          
investigation4 ,but the most cursory    
glance at the pages of history1 the most
 superficial survey of the present      
condition of mankind1 must make it      
evident that a far-seeing and           
enlightened social will has not been the
 determining factor in bringing into    
existence many of the institutions which
 are accepted by the actual social will 
of a given epoch4  ,neither ,alexander  
the ,great nor ,napoleon can be regarded
 as true exponents of the social will4  
,the rule of the oligarchy is based upon
 selfish considerations4 ,the           
institution of slavery overrides the    
will of the bondsman in the interests of
 his possessor4 ,the perennial struggle 

between the haves and the have nots--the
 rich and the poor--is1 unfortunately1  
carried on by those engaged in it with a
 view to their own interests and not    
with a view to the good of society as a 
whole4  ,that those to whom especial    
opportunities are1 by the accident of   
their position1 open1 or by whom special
 rights are inherited1 should accept the
 situation as right and proper is not to
 be wondered at4 ,all rights and duties 
have their roots in the past1 and       
conceptions of what is feasible and     
desirable are always influenced by      
tradition4 ,while from the standpoint of
 the real social will anomalous and     
accidental it is nevertheless           
psychologically explicable and natural  
that the mediaeval knight should be     
bound by the rules of chivalry only in  
his dealings with those of his own rank2
 that the murder of a priest should be  
regarded as a crime of a special class2 
that benefit of clergy should be        
extended to a limited number of those   

guilty of the same offence2 that the    
lists of the deadly sins should1 in an  
age dominated by the monastic idea1     
smack so strongly of the cloister4      
,natural it is1 and1 perhaps1           
inevitable1 that such expressions of the
 social will should make their          
appearance4 ,they have their place in   
the historic evolution of society4 ,but 
they betray the fact that man is        
imperfectly rational4 ,they cannot be   
regarded as expressions of the permanent
 rational will which belongs to man as  
man4     ,,chapter ,,xxi  ,,the         
,,rational ,,social ,,will   #hb4       
,,reasonable ,,ends4--,we have seen in  
the chapter on ,rationality and ,will1  
that we cannot consider a man rational  
unless his choices are harmonized and   
converge upon some comprehensive end4   
,it has been hinted1 furthermore1 that  
not all comprehensive ends can be       
described as reasonable or rational4  ,a
 child may be consistently disobedient  
to its parents1 and1 given parents of a 

certain kind1 it may find its life      
highly satisfactory4 ,a man may         
consistently be a bad neighbor1 and may 
harbor the conviction that1 on the      
whole1 he gains by it4 ,a miser may be  
consistent2 he may come to joy in       
denying himself luxuries and even       
comforts1 repaid in the consciousness of
 an increasing store4 ,the philosophical
 egoist may reason with admirable       
consistency1 and may habitually act in  
accordance with his convictions1        
leading1 for him1 a very endurable life4
  ,all these may be intelligent1 even   
acutely intelligent1 and may reason     
clearly and well4 ,nevertheless1 men    
generally refuse to consider their      
behavior reasonable4 ,there are ends    
which we regard as rational1 and others 
which we condemn as irrational4  ,it is 
not enough1 hence1 that a man's         
volitions should be intelligently       
harmonized and unified4 ,his will must  
be adjusted to ends which themselves can
 be judged rational4  ,and in deciding  

whether the ends he chooses are rational
 or not1 we proceed just as we do in    
judging the rationality of his          
individual choices4 ,if the latter are  
made in the light of information1 if    
their significance is realized1 if they 
converge upon some comprehensive end and
 do not merely clash and defeat one     
another1 we have seen that they are made
 under the guidance of reason or        
intelligence4 ,the individual volitions 
are congruous with the permanent set of 
the man's will4 ,they are judged by     
their background1 by their harmony with 
the pattern which is revealed in the    
man's volitional life4  ,even so1 each  
such volitional pattern1 the harmonized 
and unified will of the individual as   
directed upon some comprehensive end1 is
 judged to be rational or not according 
as it does or does not accord with the  
ends pursued by the social will4        
,individuals1 whose wills are thoroughly
 unified and harmonized by the dominant 
influence of given chosen ends1 may be  

thoroughly out of harmony with the      
chosen ends of the larger organism of   
which they are a part4 ,they may be out 
of harmony with each other4 ,considered 
alone1 each may display an internal     
order and unity4 ,taken together they   
may be seen to be in open strife4  ,we  
have found the social will to be        
something relatively permanent and      
moving with more or less consistency    
toward certain comprehensive ends4 ,that
 the ends chosen by given individuals   
may be very much out of harmony with    
these is palpable4 ,the deliberate      
idler1 the whole-hearted epicure1 the   
habitually untruthful man1 the miser1   
the cold egoist--these and such as these
 are condemned in enlightened           
communities4 ,their lives do not help to
 further1 but serve to frustrate1 the   
ends approved by the social will4 ,in so
 far they may be regarded as            
consistently irrational4  #hc4 ,,an     
,,objection ,,answered4--,consistently  
irrational6 it may be exclaimed2 how can

 that be8 is not a far-sighted          
consistency the very mark of rational   
choice8  ,the difficulty is only an     
apparent one4 ,many forms of consistency
 may indicate a certain degree of       
rationality1 and yet too slight a degree
 to win approval4 ,there is such a thing
 as a narrow consistency4 ,he who       
devotes his life to the purpose of      
revenge1 may live consistently1 but he  
loses much4 ,a bitter and angry life is 
not a desirable thing1 even from the    
standpoint of the individual4  ,but why 
should we limit ourselves to the        
standpoint of the individual1 in judging
 of the rationality of ends8 ,there are 
those to whom it appears self-evident   
that this should be done2 those to whom 
it does not seem reasonable for a man to
 do anything by which he1 on the whole1 
loses2 those who deny the reasonableness
 of self-sacrifice in any form4 ,this   
doctrine will be examined later4        
,footnote3 ,see ,sec #ajb and #abh4     
,here it is enough to point out that men

 do not actually limit the notion of    
rationality in this way4 ,in every1 even
 moderately1 rational life some desires 
must be suppressed4 ,all desires cannot 
be satisfied4 ,why should it not be     
regarded as rational and reasonable     
that1 to attain the comprehensive ends  
of the social will1 certain ends        
consistently chosen by certain kinds of 
individuals should deliberately be      
denied8  ,as a matter of fact1 men      
generally do so regard it4 ,they employ 
the terms rational and irrational1      
reasonable and unreasonable1 to indicate
 the harmony or lack of harmony between 
the individual and the social will4 ,we 
call the man unreasonable who insists   
upon having his own way regardless of   
his fellows2 and this1 even in instances
 in which his fellows cannot punish him 
for his selfish attitude4  ,it is not a 
matter of accident that this should be  
so4 ,the analogy between the relation of
 separate volitions to the dominant ends
 which control action on the part of the

 individual1 and the relation of the    
ultimate choices of individuals to the  
ends pursued by the social will1 is a   
close one4 ,in the well-ordered mind the
 clash of conflicting desires is reduced
 to a minimum4 ,in a well-ordered       
community the conflict of individual    
wills is also reduced to a minimum4 ,in 
each case1 we are concerned with the    
work of reason1 and judgments as to     
rationality and irrationality are       
equally in place4  #hd4 ,,reasonable    
,,social ,,ends4--,the will of the      
individual1 when affirmed to be rational
 or irrational1 is1 therefore1 referred 
to the background of the social will4   
,but the social will is more or less    
different in different communities1 and 
in the one community at different stages
 of its development4 ,is there any      
measure of the degree of rationality of 
the social will itself8 is there any    
standard to which its different         
expressions may be referred8  ,we may   
criticise a community as we criticise an

 individual man even when he is taken as
 abstracted from his social setting4    
,the man's choices may be blind1        
conflicting1 wayward1 and ill-adapted to
 serve his interests taken as a whole4  
,in the last chapter we saw that a      
community may resemble such a man4 ,it  
may be ignorant1 superstitious1         
short-sighted1 and in conflict with     
itself4 ,the social will as actually    
revealed may be an imperfect and        
inconsistent thing4 ,here enlightenment 
and inner harmonization are called for1 
to set the social will free4  ,but even 
where the will of a community is        
something more definite and consistent  
than this1 it may be condemned by the   
moral judgment of the enlightened4 ,an  
appeal may be made from the will of the 
community in the narrower sense to that 
of the larger community4 ,the limits of 
nation1 race and religion may be        
transcended1 and we may appeal to       
humanity as such1 refusing to recognize 
the will of any lesser unit as really   

ultimate4 ,he who occupies the one      
standpoint is apt to speak of defending 
his legitimate rights1 or of extending  
to subject races the blessings of       
civilization4 ,he who takes his stand   
upon the other may talk of lust of      
dominion1 or desire for economic        
advantage4 ,the one may use the term    
righteous indignation2 the other1 the   
word anger4 ,the moral judgment passed  
upon an act depends upon the concept    
under which men manage to bring it4     
,what is approved by the tribal ethics  
may be abhorrent to the ethics of       
humanity4  ,but the larger social will1 
so far as it has gotten itself expressed
 at all1 seems to remain something vague
 and indefinite4 ,it is appealed to as  
rational2 but how indicate clearly the  
end which it sets before itself and the 
obligations which it lays upon mankind8 
,the difficulty of describing in detail 
the ultimate ends of the real social    
will has led some writers to speak in   
terms of exaggerated vagueness4 ,the    

mere idea in a man of something1 he     
knows not what1 which he may and should 
become can give little guidance to      
action2 nor can one aim with much       
confidence at a goal of which we can    
only speak or think in negatives4       
,footnote3 ,prolegomena to ,ethics1 ,sec
 ,sec #aib1 #agb1 #ahj4 ,but ,,green is 
not always so indefinite4 ,he is on the 
right track4 ,he reverences the social  
will and the historical development of  
the social order4  ,but it is not       
necessary to speak in this way4 ,we may 
form some conception of the real1       
rational social will1 without being     
compelled to know all that man is       
capable of becoming and without being   
able to forecast the details of his     
environment in the distant future4  ,we 
may attain to our conception by         
determining clearly the nature of the   
aims man sets before himself in         
proportion to his growing rationality4  
,we can see in what direction man moves 
as he develops and becomes enlightened4 

,from this standpoint1 the aims of the  
rational social will appear to be as    
follows3  7#a7 ,the harmonious          
satisfaction of the impulses and desires
 of man4  7#b7 ,such an unfolding of his
 powers as will increase their range and
 variety1 broaden man's horizon1 and    
give him an increased control over      
erratic impulses4  7#c7 ,the bringing   
about of a social state in which the    
will of each individual within a        
community counts for something1 and not 
merely the will of a chosen few4  7#d7  
,the broadening of the conception of    
what constitutes a community1 so that   
ever increasing numbers are regarded as 
having claims that must be recognized4  
7#e7 ,the taking into consideration of  
the whole of life2 the whole life of    
individuals and of communities1 so that 
the insistent present shall not be given
 undue weight1 as against the future4   
#he4 ,,the ,,ethics ,,of ,,reason4--,the
 doctrine of the ,rational ,social ,will
 might very properly be called the      

,ethics of ,reason4 ,it is not to be    
confounded with the so-called tribal or 
group ethics4 ,to be sure1 it has to do 
with man as a social being2 but this is 
characteristic of ethical systems       
generally4 ,man is a social being2 he is
 one essentially1 and not accidentally4 
,that he should be a member of a tribe1 
or of any lesser group than the whole   
body of sentient and reasonable beings1 
may not unjustly be regarded as an      
historical accident1 as a function of   
his position in the scale of            
development4  ,in judging the doctrine  
of the rational social will1 bear in    
mind the following3  7#a7 ,it rests upon
 the basis of the impulsive and         
volitional nature of man4  7#b7 ,it     
recognizes reason in the individual1 and
 declares that only so far as he is     
rational is he the proper subject of    
ethics at all4 ,erratic and uncontrolled
 impulse knows no moral law4  7#c7 ,it  
sees reason in the customs1 laws and    
public opinion of the tribe or the      

state1 while recognizing a higher       
tribunal before the bar of which all    
these are summoned4  7#d7 ,it appeals to
 the reason of the race--the reason     
appropriate to the race as enlightened  
and freed from the shackles of local    
prejudice and restricted sympathy4  7#e7
 ,it recognizes that man can give       
expression to his nature1 can satisfy   
his desires and exercise his reason1    
only as aided by his physical and social
 environment4 ,it emphasizes the        
necessity of a certain reverence for the
 actual historical development of human 
societies1 with their institutions4     
,such institutions are the embodiment of
 reason--not pure reason1 but reason    
struggling to get itself expressed as it
 can4 ,he who would legislate for man   
independently of such institutions has  
left the solid earth and man far behind4
 ,he is suspended in the void4  #hf4    
,,the ,,development ,,of                
,,civilization4--,civilizations differ2 
some are more material1 laying stress   

upon man's conquest of his material     
environment4 ,others exhibit a greater  
appreciation of idealistic elements1 the
 pursuit of knowledge for its own sake1 
the cultivation of the fine arts1 the   
development of humanitarian sentiment4  
,for civilization in general it is not  
necessary to advance an argument4 ,but  
there are elements in many civilizations
 which the thoughtful man may feel      
called upon to defend4  ,civilization1  
taken generally1 scarcely needs a       
labored justification because it is only
 in a civilization of some kind or other
 that we can look for a guarantee of the
 broad social will1 for the reign of    
reason4 ,undeveloped man is at the mercy
 of nature2 he is the sport of history4 
,where developed man can raise his      
voice1 man possessed of power and       
capable of taking broad views of things1
 the rule of reason may be set up4 ,a   
deliberate attempt may be made to       
recognize many wills1 harmonize         
discords4 ,order may be brought out of  

chaos1 and the limits of the realm      
within the borders of which order reigns
 may be indefinitely extended4  ,such is
 the general ethical justification for  
the rise of a civilization4 ,it is an   
expression of1 and an instrument for the
 realization of1 the broader social     
will4 ,that a given civilization may be 
imperfect in both respects has been made
 clear in the last chapter4 ,in the     
light of the general justification for  
civilization many questions may be      
raised touching this or that element in 
civilizations as we observe them4       
,thus1 it may be pointed out that as man
 progresses in civilization he calls    
into being a multitude of new wants1    
many of which may have to remain        
unsatisfied4 ,footnote3 ,compare chapter
 xxx1 ,sec #adb4 ,it may be asserted    
that literature1 art and science are1 in
 fact1 cherished as though they were    
ends in themselves1 and not means called
 into existence to serve the interests  
of man4 ,absorbing as it may be to him1 

how can the philologist prove that his  
science is useful to humanity either    
present or prospective8 ,how shall the  
astronomer1 who may frankly admit that  
he cannot conceive that nine tenths of  
the work with which he occupies himself 
can ever be of any actual use to anyone1
 justify himself in devoting his life to
 it8 ,shall a curiosity1 which seems to 
lead nowhere1 be satisfied8 ,and if so1 
on what ground8  ,moreover1 every       
civilization recognizes that some wills 
are to be given a more unequivocal      
recognition than others4 ,inequality is 
the rule4 ,a man does not put his own   
children upon a level with those of his 
neighbor4 ,even in the most democratic  
of states men do not stand upon the same
 level4 ,in dealing with our own fellows
 we do not employ the same weights and  
measures as in dealing with foreigners4 
,who loses his appetite for his         
breakfast when he reads that there have 
been inundations in ,china or that an   
,african tribe has come under the       

protection of a race of another color8  
,the white man has added to his         
burden--the burden of economic advantage
 present or prospective--and we find it 
as it should be4 ,finally1 when we bring
 within our horizon the interests of    
humbler sentient creatures1 we see that 
they are unhesitatingly subordinated to 
our own4 ,some attention is paid to them
 in civilized communities4 ,they are    
recognized1 not merely by custom and    
public opinion1 but1 to some degree1    
even by law4 ,men are punished for      
treating certain animals in certain     
ways4 ,but why8 ,have the animals       
rights8 ,there is no topic within the   
sphere of morals upon which moralists   
speak with more wavering and uncertain  
accents4 ,footnote3 ,see chapter ,,xxx1 
,sec #ada4  ,i know of no way in which  
such problems as the above can be       
approached other than by the appeal to  
reason1 as reason has been understood in
 the pages preceding4 ,the reign of     
reason implies the recognition of all   

wills1 so far as such a recognition is  
within the bounds of possibility4 ,the  
escape from chaos lies in the evolution 
of the enlightened social will4 ,man    
must be raised in the scale1 in order   
that he may have control2 control over  
himself1 over other men1 over the       
brutes4 ,and he cannot rise except      
through the historical evolution of a   
social order4 ,this implies the         
development of the capacities latent in 
man4  ,to decide that any of his        
capacities shall be allowed to remain   
dormant may threaten future development4
 ,to cut off certain arts and sciences  
as not palpably serving the interests of
 man is a dangerous thing4 ,to ignore   
the actual history of man's efforts to  
become a rational being1 and to place1  
hence1 all wills upon the one level1 is 
to frustrate the desired end4 ,it is not
 thus that the reign of reason can be   
established4     ,,chapter ,,xxii  ,,the
 ,,individual ,,and ,,the ,,social      
,,will   #hg4 ,,man',s ,,multiple       

,,allegiance4--,we have seen that each  
man has his place in a social order4    
,this order is the expression and the   
embodiment of the social will1 which    
accepts him1 protects him1 gives him a  
share in the goods the community has so 
far attained1 recognizes his individual 
will in that it accords to him rights1  
and prescribes his course of conduct1   
that is1 defines his duties or          
obligations4  ,the social will is       
authoritative2 it issues commands and   
enforces obedience4 ,with its commands  
the individual may be in sympathy or he 
may not4 ,but upon obedience the social 
will insists1 and it compasses its ends 
by the bestowal of rewards or the       
infliction of punishment4 ,the moral law
 to which man thus finds himself subject
 is something not wholly foreign to the 
nature of the individual4 ,it has come  
into being as an expression of the      
nature of man4 ,that nature the         
individual shares with his fellows4     
,obedience to the social will would be a

 relatively simple matter were that will
 always unequivocally and unmistakably  
expressed1 and did all the members of a 
community feel the pressure of the      
social will in the same manner and to   
the same degree4 ,but the whole matter  
is indefinitely complicated by what may 
be called man's multiple allegiance4    
,organized societies do not consist of  
undifferentiated units4 ,they are not   
mere aggregates1 both are highly complex
 in their internal constitution4 ,a     
conscientious man may feel that he owes 
duties to himself1 to his immediate     
family1 to his kindred1 to his          
neighborhood1 to his social class1 to   
his political party1 to his church1 to  
his country1 to its allies1 to humanity4
 ,the social will does not bring its    
pressure to bear upon the man who holds 
one place in the social order just as it
 does upon him who holds another4  ,nor 
are the injunctions laid upon a man     
always in harmony4 ,the demands of      
family may seem to conflict with those  

of neighborhood or of profession2 duties
 to the church may seem to conflict with
 duties to the state2 patriotism may    
appear to be more or less in conflict   
with an interest in humanity taken      
broadly4 ,that the individual should    
often approach in doubt and hesitation  
the decision as to what it is1 on the   
whole1 his duty to do1 is not           
surprising4 ,nor is it surprising that  
individuals the most conscientious      
should find it impossible to be at one  
on the subject of rights and duties4    
,two men may agree perfectly that it is 
right to do good1 and be quite unable to
 agree just what good it is right to do 
now1 or with whom one should make a     
beginning4  #hh4 ,,the ,,appeal ,,to    
,,reason4--,were there no appeal save to
 the social will as it happens to make  
its pressure felt upon this person or   
that1 in this situation or that1 there  
could be no issue to dispute4 ,dispute  
would be useless and sheer dogmatism    
would prevail4 ,but there is such an    

appeal and men do make it1 where they   
are in any degree enlightened4 ,it is   
the appeal to ,reason4  ,he who says3 ,i
 have especial rights1 just because ,i  
am ,smith1 and so has my father1 because
 he is my father1 has no ground of      
argument with ,jones1 who says3 ,i have 
especial rights because ,i am ,jones1   
and so has my father1 because he is my  
father4 ,upon such a basis1 or lack of  
basis1 all discussion becomes fatuous4  
,but if ,smith and ,jones agree that    
duties to self should only within limits
 be recognized1 and that duties to      
family have their place upon the larger 
background of the will of the state1    
they may1 at least1 begin to talk4  ,the
 multiple allegiance of the individual  
does not mean that a man is subject to a
 multitude of independent masters whose 
several claims have no relation to one  
another4 ,an appeal may be made from    
lower to higher4  ,we have seen that1 in
 the organization of a given society1   
the social will may be imperfectly      

expressed4 ,it may come about that the  
place in the social order assigned to a 
man cramps and pains him1 or forces him 
to exertions which seem intolerable4 ,he
 may passively accept it1 or he may set 
himself in opposition to the social will
 as it is1 appealing to a better social 
will4 ,the fact that an individual finds
 himself out of harmony with given      
aspects of the social will              
characteristic of his age and country is
 no proof that he desires to set himself
 up in opposition to the social will in 
general4  ,in a given instance1 he may  
be1 from the standpoint of existing law1
 a criminal4 ,yet he may reverence the  
law above his fellows4 ,his aberrations 
need not be arbitrary wanderings1       
prompted by selfish impulses4 ,he may   
leave the beaten track because he does  
not approve of it1 which is a very      
different thing from disliking it4 ,some
 will judge him to be a pestilent       
fellow2 some will rate him as a         
reformer1 a prophet1 perhaps a martyr4  

,neither judgment is of the least value 
so long as it reflects merely the tastes
 or prejudices of the individual4 ,each 
must justify itself before the bar of   
reason1 if it would have a respectful   
hearing4 ,a reason must be given for    
conservatism and a reason must be given 
for reform4  #hi4 ,,the ,,ethics ,,of   
,,reason ,,and ,,the ,,varying ,,moral  
,,codes4--,several advantages may be    
claimed for the ethical doctrine ,i have
 been advocating3  7#a7 ,it gives a     
relative justification to the varying   
moral codes of communities of men in the
 past and in the present4 ,a code may1  
even when imperfect from some higher    
point of view1 fit well a community at a
 given stage of its development4 ,it may
 be a man's duty to obey its            
injunctions1 even where they are not    
seen to be the wisest possible4 ,one    
reason for bowing to custom is that it  
is custom2 one reason for obeying laws  
is that they are laws4 ,they embody the 
permanence and stability of the social  

will1 and have a prima facie claim to   
our reverence4  7#b7 ,in recognizing the
 social will as something deeper and    
broader than the will of the individual1
 as having its roots in the remote past 
and as reaching into the distant future1
 it admits the futility of devising     
utopian schemes which would bless       
humanity in defiance of the actual      
expressions of the social will revealed 
in the development of human societies4  
,the whim of the individual cannot well 
be substituted for the settled purpose  
of the community--a purpose ripened by  
generations of experience1 and adjusted 
to what is possible under existing      
conditions4  7#c7 ,on the other hand1 it
 distinguishes between lower and higher 
ethical codes1 or codes lower or higher 
in certain of their aspects4 ,it sets a 
standard of comparison2 it recognizes   
progress towards a goal4  7#d7 ,and1 in 
all this1 it does not appear to decide  
arbitrarily either what is the goal of  
man's moral efforts or what means must  

be adopted to attain to it4 ,it rests   
upon a study of man2 man as he has been1
 man as he is1 in all the manifold      
relations in which he stands to his     
environment1 physical and social4       
,there are other ethical theories in the
 field1 of course4 ,some of them are    
advocated by men of original genius and 
of no little learning4 ,some deserve    
more attention than others1 but all     
should have a hearing1 at least4 ,a     
close scrutiny will often reveal that   
advocates of different theories are by  
no means so far apart as a hasty reading
 of their works would suggest4 ,writers 
the most diverse may assist one to a    
comprehension of one's own theory4 ,its 
implications may be developed1          
objections to it may be suggested1 its  
strong points may stand revealed4 ,by no
 means the least important part of a    
work on ethics is its treatment of the  
schools of the moralists4 ,if it be     
written with any degree of fairness1 it 
may contain what will serve the reader  

with an antidote to erroneous opinions  
on the part of the writer4 ,to a study  
of the most important schools of the    
moralists ,i shall now turn4     ,,part 
,,vii  ,,the ,,schools ,,of ,,the       
,,moralists   ,,chapter ,,xxiii         
,,intuitionism   #ij4 ,,what ,,is       
,,it8--,we come into the world1 said    
,epictetus1 with no natural notion of a 
right-angled triangle1 or of a          
quarter-tone1 or of a half-tone2 but we 
learn each of these things by a certain 
transmission according to art2 and for  
this reason those who do not know them  
do not think that they know them4 ,but  
as to good and evil1 and beautiful and  
ugly1 and becoming and unbecoming1 and  
happiness and misfortune1 and proper and
 improper1 and what we ought to do and  
what we ought not to do1 who ever came  
into the world without having an innate 
idea of them8 ,footnote3 ,discourses1   
,book ,,ii1 chapter xi1 translation by  
,,george ,,long4 ,seneca adds his       
testimony to the self-luminous character

 of moral truth3 ,whatever things tend  
to make us better or happier are either 
obvious or easily discovered4 ,footnote3
 ,on ,benefits1 ,book ,,vii1 chapter i4 
,with the general spirit of these       
utterances the typical intuitionist is  
in sympathy1 although he need not assent
 to the doctrine of innate ideas1 nor   
need he hold that all moral truths are  
equally self-evident4 ,there are        
intuitionists of various classes1 and   
there are sufficiently notable          
differences of opinion4 ,still1 all     
intuitionists believe that some moral   
truth1 at least1 is revealed to the     
individual by direct inspection         
7intueor71 and that we must be content  
with such evidence and must not seek for
 proof4 ,it may be maintained that our  
moral judgments--or some of them--are   
the result of an immediate discernment  
of the natures of things by the         
understanding4 and appeal may be made to
 the analogy furnished by mathematical  
truths4 ,footnote3 ,this appeal has been

 made by famous intuitionists from the  
seventeenth century to the nineteenth-- 
,cudworth1 ,more1 ,locke1 ,clarke1      
,price1 ,whewell4  #ia4 ,,varieties ,,of
 ,,intuitionism4--,forms of intuitionism
 have been conveniently classified as   
,perceptional1 ,dogmatic and            
,philosophical4 ,footnote3 ,,sidgwick1  
,the ,methods of ,ethics1 ,book ,i1     
chapter viii1 ,sec #d4 ,to this         
nomenclature it may be objected that the
 term dogmatic carries with it a certain
 flavor of disapprobation1 and          
predisposes one to the assumption of a  
critical attitude1 while the term       
philosophical has the reverse           
suggestion1 and smacks of special       
pleading4 ,while admitting that there is
 something in the objection1 ,i retain  
the convenient terms1 merely warning the
 reader to be on his guard4  7#a7       
,perceptional ,intuitionism falls back  
upon the analogy of perception in       
general4 ,i seem to perceive by direct  
inspection that my blotter is green1 and

 that my penholder is longer than my    
pencil4 ,i do not seek for evidence2 ,i 
do not have recourse to any chain of    
reasonings to establish the fact4 ,and  
,i am concerned here with facts1 not    
with some general proposition applicable
 to many facts4 ,even so1 ,i may        
maintain that1 in specific situations1  
the rightness or wrongness of given     
courses of action may be perceived      
immediately4  ,he who accepts the       
spontaneous deliverances of his         
conscience1 when confronted with the    
necessity of making a decision1 as      
revelations of moral truth1 may be      
called a perceptional intuitionist4 ,the
 deliverances must1 however1 be         
spontaneous and immediate1 not the      
result of reasoning4 ,if a man reasons1 
if he falls back upon general           
considerations1 if he looks into the    
future and weighs the consequences of   
his act1 and1 as a result1 decides what 
he ought to do1 he is no longer a       
perceptional intuitionist4  ,the        

perceptional intuitionist1 consistently 
and unreservedly such1 is rather an     
ideal construction than an actually     
existing person4 ,most men1 on certain  
occasions1 are inclined to say1 ,i feel 
this to be right1 and will do it1       
although ,i cannot support my decision  
by giving reasons4 ,many men are1 at    
times1 tempted to maintain that a given 
course of action is evidently right and 
should be followed irrespective of      
consequences4 ,but this is not the      
habitual attitude even of men very      
little gifted with reflection1 and it is
 highly unsatisfactory to those who have
 the habit of thinking4  ,primitive man 
supports his decisions by an appeal to  
custom4 ,civilized man turns to custom1 
to law1 or to general principles of some
 sort1 which he accepts as              
authoritative1 and which he regards as  
having a bearing upon the particular    
instance in question4 ,that individual  
decisions should be capable of some sort
 of justification by the adduction of a 

reason or reasons is generally admitted4
 ,no sane man would maintain the general
 proposition that the consequences of   
acts should be wholly disregarded in    
determining whether they are or are not 
desirable4  7#b7 ,thus1 ,perceptional   
,intuitionism gives place to what has   
been called ,dogmatic ,intuitionism--to 
the doctrine that certain general moral 
rules can be immediately perceived to be
 valid4 ,the application of such general
 rules to particular instances implies  
discrimination and the use of reason4   
,here decisions are not wholly          
unsupported4 ,reasons may be asked for  
and given4 ,in answer to the question3  
,why should ,i say this or that8 it may 
be said3 ,because the law of veracity   
demands it4 ,in answer to the question3 
,why should ,i act thus8 it may be said3
 ,because it is just1 or is in          
accordance with the dictates of         
benevolence4 ,the general rule is       
accepted as intuitively evident1 but it 
is incumbent upon the individual to use 

his judgment in determining what may    
properly fall under the general rule4   
,but there are rules and rules4 ,it is  
not easy to draw a sharp line between   
,perceptional ,intuitionism and         
,dogmatic1 just as it is not easy in    
other fields to distinguish sharply     
between knowledge given directly in     
perception1 and knowledge in which more 
or less conscious processes of inference
 play a part4 ,do ,i perceive the man   
whom ,i see1 when ,i look into a mirror1
 to be behind the mirror or in front of 
it8 ,do ,i perceive the whereabouts of  
the coach which ,i hear rattling by my  
window1 or does reasoning play its part 
in giving me information8 ,and if ,i    
follow my conscience in not withholding 
from the cabman the small customary fee 
in addition to his fare1 am ,i prompted 
by an unreasoned perception of the      
rightness of my act1 or am ,i influenced
 by general considerations--the thought 
of what is customary1 the belief that   
gratuities should not be withheld where 

services of a certain kind are rendered1
 etc48  ,even so1 it is difficult to    
draw a sharp line between ,dogmatic     
,intuitionists and ,philosophical1 or to
 regard ,dogmatic ,intuitionists as a   
clearly defined class of any sort4 ,a   
man may accept it as self-evident that a
 waiter should receive ten per cent of  
the amount of his bill2 a woman may find
 it obviously proper that an old lady   
should wear purple4 ,those little given 
to reflection may accept such maxims as 
these without attempting to justify them
 by falling back upon any more general  
rule4 ,we all find about us human beings
 who have their minds stored with a     
multitude of maxims not greatly         
different from those adduced1 and who   
find them serviceable in guiding their  
actions4 ,but thoughtful men can        
scarcely be content with such a modicum 
of reason1 and they distinguish between 
ultimate principles and minor maxims    
which stand in need of justification by 
their reference to principles4  ,the    

intuitional moralists by profession draw
 this distinction4 ,we find them setting
 forth as ultimate a limited number of  
ethical principles of a high degree of  
generality4 ,it is obvious that1 the    
more general the principle1 the more    
room for conscious reasoning in its     
interpretation and application4 ,the man
 to whom it appears as in the nature of 
things suitable that the waiter should  
receive his ten per cent is relieved    
from many perplexities which may beset  
the man who feels assured only of the   
general truth that it is right to be    
benevolent4  ,a glance at a few of the  
moralists who are treated in the history
 of ethics as representative            
intuitionists reveals that they are     
little in harmony as touching the       
particular moral intuitions which they  
urge as the foundation of ethics4       
,thus1 ,john ,locke maintains that from 
the idea of ,god1 and of ourselves as   
rational beings1 a science of morality  
may be deduced demonstratively2 a       

science3 wherein ,i doubt not but from  
self-evident propositions1 by necessary 
consequences1 as incontestible as those 
in mathematics1 the measures of right   
and wrong might be made out to anyone   
that will apply himself with the same   
indifferency and attention to the one1  
as he does to the other of those        
sciences4 ,footnote3 ,essay ,concerning 
,human ,understanding1 ,book ,,iv1      
chapter iii1 ,sec #ah4  ,among ,locke's 
self-evident propositions or moral      
axioms we find3 where there is no       
property there is no injustice2 no      
government allows absolute liberty2 all 
men are originally free and equal2      
parents have the power to control their 
children till they come of age2 the     
right of property is based upon work1   
but is limited by the supply of property
 left for others to enjoy4 ,footnote3   
,see above1 chapter iii1 ,sec #aj4      
,these axioms cannot be identified with 
,samuel ,clarke's four chief rules of   
righteousness1 which inculcate3 piety   

toward ,god1 equity in our dealings with
 men1 benevolence1 and sobriety4        
,footnote3 ,a ,discourse concerning the 
,unalterable ,relations of ,natural     
,religion1 ,prop4 ,i4 ,richard ,price   
gives us still another choice1 in       
dwelling upon our obligation as regards 
piety1 prudence1 beneficence1 gratitude1
 veracity1 the fulfillment of promises1 
and justice4 ,footnote3 ,a ,review of   
the ,principal ,questions and           
,difficulties in ,morals1 chapter vii4  
,and ,whewell1 emulating the performance
 of ,euclid1 tried to build up a system 
of morals upon axioms embodying the     
seven principles of benevolence1        
justice1 truth1 purity1 order1          
earnestness1 and moral purpose4         
,footnote3 ,the ,elements of ,morality1 
,book ,,iii1 chapter iv4  ,these        
moralists press the analogy of          
mathematical truth4 ,it must be         
confessed1 however1 that a row of       
text-books on geometry1 with so         
scattering and indefinite a collection  

of axioms1 would do little to support   
one another2 and little to convince us  
that they represented a coherent and    
consistent body of truth in which we    
might have unquestioning faith4  7#c7   
,it is not unnatural that some          
thoughtful intuitionists1 dissatisfied  
with a considerable number of           
independent moral principles1 should aim
 at a further simplification4 ,such a   
simplification ,kant finds in the       
,categorical ,imperative1 or            
unconditional command of the ,practical 
,reason3 ,act only on that maxim whereby
 thou canst at the same time will that  
it should become a universal law4       
,footnote3 ,fundamental ,principles of  
the ,metaphysic of ,morals1 ,sec #b4    
,and ,henry ,sidgwick1 refusing to      
regard all intuitions as of equal       
authority1 selects two only as          
ultimately and independently valid--that
 which recommends a far-seeing prudence1
 and that which urges a rational        
benevolence4 ,footnote3 ,the ,methods of

 ,ethics1 ,book ,,iii1 chapter xiii1    
,sec #c4 ,those who make their ultimate 
moral rules so broad and inclusive base 
upon them the multitude of minor maxims 
to which men are apt to have recourse in
 justifying their actions4 ,whether     
their doctrine may be called            
philosophical in a sense implying       
commendation is matter for discussion4  
#ib4 ,,arguments ,,for                  
,,intuitionism4--,what may be said in   
favor of intuitionism8  7#a7 ,it may be 
urged that it is the doctrine which     
appeals most directly to common sense1  
and that it is found reasonably         
satisfactory in practice by men         
generally4  ,intuition appears to be1 in
 fact1 man's guide in an overwhelming   
majority of the situations in which he  
is called upon to act4 ,in the face of  
the concrete situation he feels that he 
should say a kind word1 help a neighbor1
 stand his ground courageously1 speak   
the truth1 and a thousand other things  
which a moralist might1 upon reflection1

 approve4  ,that he feels this does not 
mean merely that he is influenced by an 
emotion4 ,we constantly employ the word 
to indicate the presence of a judgment  
which presents itself spontaneously and 
for which men cannot or do not seek     
support by having recourse to reasons4  
,he who1 without reflection1 affirms1   
this action is right1 has framed a moral
 judgment4 ,he has in a given instance  
distinguished between right and wrong1  
although he has not raised the general  
problem of what constitutes right and   
wrong4 ,he has exercised the prerogative
 of a moral being1 though not of a very 
thoughtful one4  ,we have seen above1   
that perceptional intuitionism tends to 
pass over into dogmatic intuitionism of 
some sort1 even in the case of minds    
little developed4 ,the egoistic rustic  
may defend his selfishness by citing the
 proverb1 my shirt is closer to me than 
my coat4 ,if he does so1 it means that a
 doubt has been suggested1 a conflict of
 some sort called into being4 ,were such

 conflicts1 causing hesitation and      
deliberation1 of very frequent          
occurrence1 life could scarcely go on at
 all4 ,conversation would be impossible 
were no word placed and no inflection   
chosen without conscious reference to   
the rules of grammar4 ,no man could     
conduct himself properly in a           
drawing-room or at a table1 were his    
mind harking back at every moment to the
 instructions contained in some volume  
on etiquette4 ,he who must justify every
 act by reflection is condemned to the  
jerkiest and most hesitant of moral     
lives4 ,perceptional moral intuition    
must stand our friend1 if there is to be
 a flow of conduct worthy of the name4  
,there are1 however1 occasions for      
checking the flow by reflection4 ,then  
men are forced to think1 and we find    
them appealing to custom1 citing        
proverbs1 quoting maxims1 taking their  
stand upon principles4 ,recourse may be 
had to generalizations of a very low or 
of a very high degree of generality4    

,but low or high1 it is upon intuitions 
that men actually fall back in          
justifying their actions4 ,benevolence1 
justice1 honesty1 truthfulness1 purity1 
honor1 modesty1 courtesy1 and what not1 
are intuitively perceived to be right1  
and an effort is made to bring the      
individual act under some one of these  
headings4 ,the mass of men1 even in     
enlightened communities1 do not feel    
impelled to justify these general moral 
maxims1 to reduce them to a harmonious  
system1 or to reconcile with each other 
the different lists of them which have  
been drawn up4 ,they find it possible in
 practice to resolve most of their      
doubts by an appeal to this maxim or to 
that4 ,from such doubts as refuse to be 
resolved they are apt to turn away their
 attention4 ,but the moral life goes on1
 and to intuitions it owes its guidance4
  ,as to the few who reduce the moral   
intuitions to a minimum1 and1 like ,kant
 and ,sidgwick1 end with one or two     
ultimate intuitional moral principles1  

we may say that they1 like other men1   
are compelled1 in the actual conduct of 
life1 to turn to intuitions of lower    
orders4 ,all sorts of moral intuitions  
are actually found helpful by all sorts 
of men4  7#b7 ,to the minds of men      
differing in their education and        
traditions1 and at different stages of  
intellectual and moral development1 very
 different moral judgments spontaneously
 present themselves4 ,it is not a matter
 of accident that this man may feel an  
action to be right1 and that man may    
feel it to be wrong4 ,there is evident  
adaptation of the judgments to history  
and environment4 ,they spring into being
 because the men are what they are and  
are situated as they are4  ,it is this  
adaptation that renders the moral       
intuitions serviceable in carrying on   
the actual business of life4 ,it is more
 complete1 the less abstract the moral  
intuitions which come into play4 ,plato1
 who in his ,laws enters very minutely  
into the question of the permissible and

 the forbidden in the life of the       
citizens of his ideal state1 finds it   
necessary to leave some things to the   
judgment of the individual4 ,thus1 he   
finds it impossible to determine        
exhaustively what things are1 and what  
things are not1 worthy of a freeman4 ,he
 leaves it to the virtuous to give      
judgments in accordance with their      
feelings of right and wrong4 ,footnote3 
,book ,,xi2 see the account of the      
occupations permissible to the landed   
proprietor4 ,the intuitions of the      
mediaeval saint1 of the upright modern  
,european1 of the virtuous ,chinaman1   
would have impressed him as without     
rhyme or reason4 ,he appealed to the    
,greek gentleman1 whose sense of        
propriety was ,greek1 and might be      
expected to be adjusted to the          
situation4  7#c7 ,the intuitive judgment
 of a sensitive moral nature may often  
be more nearly right than moral         
judgments based upon the most subtle of 
reasonings4  ,it is not hard to find1   

with a little ingenuity1 apparent       
justification for actions which the     
consciences of the enlightened condemn  
at first sight4 ,scarcely any action may
 not be brought under some moral rule1  
if one deliberately sets out to do so4  
,a narrow selfishness is defended as    
caring for one's own2 a refusal of aid  
to the needy is justified by a reference
 to the evils of pauperization2         
patriotism becomes the excuse for       
hatred1 wilful blindness and untruthful 
vilification4 ,to the sophistries of    
those who would thus make the worse     
appear the better1 the intuitive        
judgment of the moral man opposes its   
unreasoned conviction4 ,that the        
conviction is not supported by arguments
 does not prove that it is not a just   
one4  #ic4 ,,arguments ,,against        
,,intuitionism4--,what may be urged     
against ,intuitionism8  7#a7 ,it may be 
pointed out that such considerations as 
the above constitute an argument to     
prove the value of moral intuitions1 and

 not one to prove the value of          
intuitionism as an ethical theory4 ,that
 moral intuitions are indispensable may 
be freely admitted even by one who      
demurs to the doctrine that intuitionism
 in some one of its forms may be        
accepted as a satisfactory theory of    
morals4  7#b7 ,perceptional             
,intuitionism1 at least1 cannot be      
regarded as embodying a rational theory 
or furnishing a science of any sort4    
,its one and only dogma must be that    
whatever actions reveal themselves to   
this man or that as right1 are right1   
and there is no going behind the        
judgment of the individual4  ,shall we  
say to men3 ,in order to know what is   
right and what is wrong in human        
conduct1 we need only to listen to the  
dictates of conscience when the mind is 
calm and unruffled8 ,footnote3 ,,thomas 
,,reid1 ,essays on the ,active ,powers  
of ,man1 v1 ,sec #d4 ,as well say3 ,the 
right time is the time indicated by your
 watch1 when you are not shaking it4 ,if

 men are to keep appointments with each 
other1 they must have some other        
standard of time than that carried by   
each man in his vest-pocket4            
,perceptional ,intuitionism ignores the 
fact that consciences may sometimes     
disagree1 and that there may be a choice
 in consciences4 ,the consistent        
perceptional intuitionist is1 however1  
scarcely to be found1 as has been said  
above2 and we actually find those1 some 
of whose utterances read as though the  
authors ought to be adherents of such a 
school1 dwelling upon the desirability  
of the education of the conscience1     
i4e41 upon the desirability of acquiring
 a capacity for having the right        
intuitions4 ,in other words1 they tell  
us to follow our noses--but to make sure
 that they point in the right direction4
 ,footnote3 ,see ,,thomas ,,reid1       
,essays on the ,active ,powers of ,man1 
iii1 ,part #c1 ,sec #h ,in which case   
the determination of the right direction
 is not left to perceptional intuition4 

7#c7 ,the ,dogmatic ,intuitionist has   
difficulties of his own with which to   
cope4 ,it is not enough to possess a    
collection of valid and authoritative   
rules4 ,the rules must be applied2 there
 is room for the exercise of judgment   
and for the possibility of error4 ,error
 is not excluded even when the rule     
appears to be at only one or two removes
 from the individual instance2 where the
 rule is one of great generality the    
problem of its application becomes      
correspondingly difficult4 ,the         
interpretation of the rule is not given 
intuitively with the rule4 ,this means  
that the rule must1 in practice1 be     
supplemented4  ,always and everywhere1 a
 straight line appears to be the        
shortest distance between two points4   
,what is meant by shortness hardly seems
 to be legitimate matter for dispute4   
,but the man convinced that he ought to 
pay his workman a fair wage1 and that he
 ought to do his duty by his son1 may be
 in no little perplexity when he        

attempts to define that fair wage or    
that parental duty4 ,if he turns for    
advice to others1 he will find that     
history and tradition1 time1 place and  
circumstance1 very perceptibly color the
 advice they offer4  ,the application of
 the general rule is1 hence1 quite as   
important as the rule4 ,there is no such
 thing as conduct in the abstract4 ,let 
us admit that benevolence is morally    
obligatory4 ,how shall we be benevolent8
 ,shall we follow ,cicero1 and give only
 that which costs us nothing8 or shall  
we emulate ,st4 ,francis8 ,the general  
rule may be a faultless skeleton1 but it
 is1 after all1 only a skeleton1 and it 
cannot walk of itself4  ,again4 ,the    
dogmatic intuitionist has quite a       
collection of rules by which he must    
judge of his actions4 ,they are         
severally independent and authoritative4
 ,suppose an act appears to be commanded
 by one rule and forbidden by another8  
,who shall decide between them8         
,prudence and benevolence may urge him  

in opposite directions4 ,benevolence and
 justice may not obviously be in        
harmony4 ,the rule of veracity may seem1
 at times1 to prescribe conduct which   
will entail much suffering on the part  
of the innocent4 ,to what court of      
appeal can we refer the conflicts which 
may arise when ultimate authorities     
disagree8 ,he who1 in war time1 can     
conscientiously shoot a sentry1 but     
cannot conscientiously lie to him1 may1 
later1 have his misgivings1 when the    
,golden ,rule knocks at the gate of his 
mind4  7#d7 ,nor does he leave all      
difficulties behind him1 who abandons   
,dogmatic ,intuitionism and takes refuge
 in ,philosophical4  ,kant's maxim needs
 a vast amount of interpretation4 ,as it
 stands1 it is little more than an empty
 formula4 ,what ,i can wish to be the   
law of the universe must depend very    
much upon what ,i am4 ,the lion and the 
lamb do not thirst for the same law4 ,to
 the quarrelsome heroes of ,walhalla a  
world of perpetual fighting and feasting

 must seem a very good world1 in spite  
of knocks received as well as given4    
,kant's fundamental maxim scarcely      
appears to be a moral rule at all1      
unless we make it read3 ,act on a maxim 
which a wise and good man can will to be
 a universal law4 ,but how decide who is
 the wise and good man8  ,the           
philosophical intuitionist who accepts  
more than one ultimate moral rule must  
face the possibility that he will meet  
with a conflict of the higher intuitions
 to which he has had recourse4 ,shall   
his intuitions be those recommending a  
rational self-interest and a rational   
benevolence8 ,can he be sure that the   
two are necessarily in accord8 ,can     
there be a rational adjustment of the   
claims of each8 ,not if there be no     
court of appeal to which both intuitions
 are subject4 ,footnote3 ,with his usual
 candor1 ,,sidgwick admits this         
difficulty4 ,he leaves it unresolved4   
,see1 ,the ,methods of ,ethics1 in the  
concluding chapter4  ,furthermore1      

between the philosophical and the       
dogmatic intuitionist serious           
differences of opinion may be expected  
to arise4 ,he who makes1 let us say1    
benevolence the supreme law naturally   
allows to other intuitions1 such as     
justice and veracity1 but a derivative  
authority4 ,it appears1 then1 that there
 may be occasions on which they are not 
valid4 ,to some famous intuitionists    
this has seemed to be a pernicious      
doctrine4  ,we are1 writes ,bishop      
,butler1 constituted so as to condemn   
falsehood1 unprovoked violence1         
injustice1 and to approve of benevolence
 to some preferably to others1          
abstracted from all consideration1 which
 conduct is likeliest to produce an     
overbalance of happiness or misery4     
,footnote3 ,dissertations appended to   
the ,analogy1 ,,ii1 ,of the ,nature of  
,virtue4 ,cf4 ,,dugald ,,stewart1       
,outlines of ,moral ,philosophy1 ,part  
#b1 ,sec #cdh4  ,butler thought that    
justice should be done though the       

heavens fall2 the philosophical         
intuitionist must maintain that the     
danger of bringing down the heavens is  
never to be lost sight of4 ,but this    
doctrine that there are intuitions and  
intuitions1 some ultimately             
authoritative and others not so1 raises 
the whole question of the validity of   
intuitions4 ,how are we to distinguish  
those that are always valid from others8
 ,by intuition8 ,intuition appears to be
 discredited4 ,and if it is proper to   
demand proof that justice should be done
 and the truth spoken1 why may one not  
demand proof that men should be prudent 
and benevolent8 ,one may talk of an     
immediate discernment of the nature of  
things by the understanding in the one  
case as in the other4 ,if error is      
possible there1 why not here8  #id4     
,,the ,,value ,,of ,,moral              
,,intuitions4--,it would not be fair to 
close this chapter on intuitionism1 an  
ethical theory competing with others for
 our approval1 without emphasizing the  

value of the role played by the moral   
intuitions4  ,they are the very guide of
 life1 and without them our reasonings  
would be of little service4 ,they should
 be treated gently1 gratefully1 with    
reverence4 ,to them human societies owe 
their stability1 their capacity for an  
orderly development1 the smooth working 
of the machinery of daily life4 ,their  
presence does not exclude the employment
 of reasoning1 but they furnish a basis 
upon which the reason can occupy itself 
with profit4 ,they are a safeguard      
against those utopian schemes which     
would shatter our world and try         
experiments in creation out of nothing4 
,nevertheless1 he who busies himself    
with ethics as science must study them  
critically and strive to estimate justly
 their true significance4 ,he may come  
to regard them1 not as something fixed  
and changeless1 but as living and       
developing1 coming into being1 and      
modifying themselves1 in the service of 
life4 ,does he dishonor them who so     

views them8     ,,chapter ,,xxiv        
,,egoism   #ie4 ,,what ,,is             
,,egoism8--,egoism has been defined as  
any ethical system in which the         
happiness or good of the individual is  
made the main criterion of moral action1
 ,footnote3 ,encyclopedia ,britannica1  
#aath edition4 or as the doing or       
seeking of that which affords pleasure  
or advantage to oneself1 in distinction 
to that which affords pleasure or       
advantage to others4 ,footnote3 ,century
 ,dictionary4  ,it may strike the       
average reader as odd to be told that   
such definitions bristle with           
ambiguities1 and that it is by no means 
easy to draw a sharp line between       
doctrines which everyone would admit to 
be egoistic1 and others which seem more 
doubtfully to fall under that head4     
,happiness1 good1 advantage1 self1 all  
are terms which call for scrutiny1 and  
which set pitfalls for the unwary4  #if4
 ,,crass ,,egoisms4--,we may best       
approach the subject of what may        

properly be regarded as constituting    
egoism1 by turning first to one or two  
terrible examples4  ,no one would       
hesitate to call egoistic the doctrine  
of ,aristippus1 the ,cyrenaic1 the      
errant disciple of ,socrates4 ,he made  
pleasure the end of life1 and taught    
that it might be sought without a       
greater regard to customary morality    
than was made prudent by the penalties  
to be feared as a consequence of its    
violation4 ,where the centre of gravity 
of the system of the ,cyrenaics falls is
 evident from their holding that        
corporeal pleasures are superior to     
mental ones1 and that a friend is       
desirable for the use which we can make 
of him4 ,footnote3 ,diogenes ,laertius1 
,lives of the ,philosophers1            
,aristippus1 viii4  ,the doctrine of the
 ,english philosopher1 ,thomas ,hobbes1 
is as unequivocally egoistic4  ,of the  
voluntary acts of every man1 he writes1 
,footnote3 ,leviathan1 ,part ,i1 xiv4   
the object is some good to himself2 and 

again1 ,footnote ,ibid4 xv4 no man      
giveth1 but with intention of good to   
himself2 because gift is voluntary2 and 
of all voluntary acts the object is to  
every man his own good4  ,he leaves us  
in no doubt as to the sort of good which
 he conceives men to seek when they     
practice what has the appearance of     
generosity4 ,contract he calls a mutual 
transference of rights1 and he          
distinguishes gift from contract as     
follows3  ,when the transferring of     
right is not mutual1 but one of the     
parties transferreth1 in hope to gain   
thereby friendship1 or service from     
another1 or from his friends1 or in hope
 to gain the reputation of charity or   
magnanimity1 or to deliver his mind from
 the pain of compassion1 or in hope of  
reward in heaven1 this is not contract  
but gift1 free gift1 grace1 which words 
signify the same thing4 ,footnote3      
,ibid4 ,i1 xiv4 ,the italics are mine4  
,it was thus that ,hobbes accounted for 
his giving a sixpence to a beggar3 ,i   

was in pain to consider the miserable   
condition of the old man2 and now my    
alms1 giving him some relief1 doth also 
ease me4 ,hobbes1 by ,g4 ,c4            
,,robertson1 ,edinburgh1 #ahhf1 p4 #bjf4
  ,there is a passage from the pen of   
the ,british divine1 ,paley1 which      
appears to merit a place alongside of   
the citations from ,hobbes1 widely as   
the men differ in many of their views4  
,it reads3  ,we can be obliged to       
nothing but what we ourselves are to    
gain or lose something by2 for nothing  
else can be a 'violent motion' to us4   
,as we should not be obliged to obey the
 laws1 or the magistrate1 unless rewards
 or punishments1 pleasure or pain1      
somehow or other1 depended upon our     
obedience2 so neither should we1 without
 the same reason1 be obliged to do what 
is right1 to practice virtue1 or to obey
 the commandments of ,god4 ,footnote3   
,moral ,philosophy1 ,book ,,ii1 chapter 
ii4  #ig4 ,,equivocal ,,egoism8--,the   
above is unquestionably egoism4 ,the man

 who accepts such a doctrine and        
consistently walks in the light must be 
set down as self-seeking4 ,but          
self-seeking1 as understood by different
 men1 appears to take on different      
aspects4 ,shall we class all those who  
frankly accept it as man's only ultimate
 motive with ,aristippus and ,epicurus  
and ,hobbes8  ,thomas ,hill ,green      
writes3 ,anything conceived as good in  
such a way that the agent acts for the  
sake of it1 must be conceived as his own
 good4 ,footnote3 ,prolegomena to       
,ethics1 ,sec #ib4 ,the motive to action
 is1 he maintains1 always some idea of  
the man's personal good4 ,footnote3 ,sec
 ,sec #ie1 #ig4 ,he does not hesitate to
 say that a man necessarily lives for   
himself2 ,footnote3 ,sec #ach4 and he   
calls the human self or the man         
,footnote3 ,sec #ii4 a self-seeking ego1
 a self-seeking subject1 and a self-    
seeking person4 ,footnote3 ,sec ,sec    
#ih1 #ajj1 #ade4  ,were ,green's book a 
lost work1 only preserved to the        

memories of men by such citations as the
 above1 the author would certainly be   
relegated to a class of moralists with  
which he had1 in fact1 little sympathy4 
,but the book is not lost1 and by       
turning to it we find ,green continuing 
the first of the above citations with   
the words3 ,though he may conceive it as
 his own good only on account of his    
interest in others1 and in spite of any 
amount of suffering on his own part     
incidental to its attainment4 ,he is    
willing to grant the self-seeking ego an
 eye single to its own interests1 but he
 is careful to explain that3 ,these are 
not merely interests dependent on other 
persons for the means to their          
gratification1 but interests in the good
 of those other persons1 interests which
 cannot be satisfied without the        
consciousness that those other persons  
are satisfied4 ,footnote3 ,sec #aii4    
,when ,hobbes gave an account of the    
passions that incline men to peace1     
,footnote3 ,leviathan1 ,i1 xiii4 he made

 no mention of the social nature of man4
 ,that nature ,green conceives to be so 
essentially social that the individual  
cannot disentangle his own good from the
 good of his fellows4 ,to live for      
himself1 since that self is a social    
self1 means to live for others4 ,may    
this fairly be called egoistic doctrine8
  #ih4 ,,what ,,is ,,meant ,,by ,,the   
,,self8--,it is sufficiently clear that 
the happiness1 or good1 or advantage1 or
 interests of the individual or self may
 mean many things4 ,it is equally clear 
that in our interpretation of all such  
terms our notions of the nature of the  
self will play no inconsiderable role4  
,what is the self8  ,in his famous      
chapter on the ,consciousness of ,self1 
,footnote3 ,psychology1 ,new ,york1     
#ahij1 ,i1 chapter x4 ,william ,james   
enumerates four senses of the word4     
,with three of these we may profitably  
occupy ourselves here4 ,he calls them   
the ,material ,self1 the ,social ,self  
and the ,spiritual ,self4  ,the         

innermost part of the material self he  
makes our body1 and next to it1 in their
 order1 he places our clothes1 our      
family1 our home1 and our property4     
,they contribute to our being what we   
are in our own eyes1 we identify        
ourselves with them1 and we experience a
 sense of the shrinkage of our          
personality when even the more outlying 
elements1 such as our possessions1 are  
lost4 ,our immediate family1 he writes1 
is a part of ourselves4 ,our father and 
mother1 our wife and babes1 are bone of 
our bone and flesh of our flesh4 ,when  
they die1 a part of our very selves is  
gone4 ,if they do anything wrong1 it is 
our shame4 ,if they are insulted1 our   
anger flashes forth as readily as if we 
stood in their place4  ,it is obvious   
that the limits of the material self1 as
 above understood1 may be indefinitely  
extended4 ,there are men who feel about 
their country as the average normal man 
feels about his home2 and doubtless the 
suffering of a stray beggar tugged at   

the heart of ,st4 ,francis as the       
misfortune of wife or child does in the 
case of other men4 ,how far abroad our  
interests are to be found1 and just what
 interests we shall regard as intimately
 and peculiarly our own1 depends upon   
what we are4  ,the ,social ,self ,james 
describes as the recognition a man gets 
from his mates3 ,we are not only        
gregarious animals1 liking to be in the 
sight of our fellows1 but we have an    
innate propensity to get ourselves      
noticed1 and noticed favorably1 by our  
kind4 ,men certainly regard their fame  
or honor as to be included among their  
interests1 and they may value and seek  
to obtain the good opinion of a very    
little clique or of a much wider circle4
  ,by the ,spiritual ,self is meant our 
qualities of mind and character--the    
most enduring and intimate part of the  
,self1 that which we most verily seem to
 be4 ,our interest in these it is       
impossible to overlook1 and their       
cultivation and development may become a

 ruling passion4  ,james's illuminating 
pages make clear that he who speaks of  
the advantage or interest of the        
individual may have in mind             
predominantly any one of these aspects  
of the ,self1 or all of them conjointly4
 ,the ,self as he conceives it may be a 
narrow one1 or it may be a very broad   
one4  #ii4 ,,egoism ,,and ,,the         
,,broader ,,self4--,it may with some    
plausibility be maintained that he who  
lives for himself may not properly be   
regarded as an egoist and called        
selfish1 if his ,self is sufficiently   
expanded4 ,may it not1 theoretically1   
include as much of the universe as is   
known to man8 ,and where can a man seek 
ends of any sort beyond this broad      
field8 ,on this view1 all men are1 in a 
sense1 self-seeking1 but only those are 
reprehensibly self-seeking who have     
narrow and scanty selves4  ,but common  
sense and the common usage of speech do 
not sanction such statements as that a  
man necessarily lives for himself and   

that all men are self-seeking4 ,it is   
justly recognized that some men with    
broad interests--of a sort--are         
self-seeking1 and that some others with 
great limitations are not4  ,he who has 
property scattered over four continents 
and watches with absorbing interest all 
movements upon the political and        
economic stage may nevertheless be a    
thorough-going egoist4 ,the breadth of  
his horizon will not redeem him4 ,one   
may look far afield and live laborious  
days in the pursuit of fame1 and be     
egoistic to the back-bone1 although     
one's interests1 in this case1 include  
even the contents of the minds of       
generations yet unborn4 ,one may forego 
many pleasures and concentrate all one's
 efforts upon the attainment of         
intellectual eminence or of a virtuous  
character1 and yet seem to have a claim 
to the name of egoist4  ,that even the  
pursuit of virtue may take an egoistic  
turn has frequently been recognized3    
,woe betides that man1 writes ,dewey1   

who having entered upon a course of     
reflection which leads to a clearer     
conception of his own moral capacities  
and weaknesses1 maintains that thought  
as a distinct mental end1 and thereby   
makes his subsequent acts simply means  
to improving or perfecting his moral    
nature4 ,footnote3 ,ethics1 chapter     
xviii1 ,sec #c1 p4 #chd4 ,he            
characterizes this as one of the worst  
kinds of selfishness4 ,the task set     
himself by the egoist who aims at       
outshining his fellows in an unselfish  
self-forgetfulness would seem to be a   
particularly difficult one2 yet we have 
all met persons who appear to be        
animated by some such desire4  #ajj4    
,egoism not ,unavoidable4--,on such     
cases as the above the common judgment  
can hardly be in doubt4 ,but there are  
cases more questionable4 ,was ,hobbes   
really self-seeking when he gave the    
sixpence to the old beggar8 ,is it      
egoism that leads the young mother to   
give herself the exquisite pleasure of  

feeding and caring for her babes8 or    
that induces the patriot to die for his 
country8 ,to be sure1 both the babes and
 the fatherland may fall within the     
limits of the self1 as the psychologist 
has broadly defined it4  ,but they fall 
within it only in a sense4 ,no doctrine 
of the mutual inclusion of selves can   
obliterate the distinction between self 
and neighbor1 and make my neighbor      
merely a part of myself4 ,the common    
opinion of mankind is not at fault in   
basing upon the distinction between     
selves the further distinction between  
egoism and altruism4 ,whatever interests
 the egoist may have1 his ultimate      
motive to action cannot be the          
recognition of the desire or will of    
another4 ,such can be the motive of the 
altruist4  ,human motives are of many   
sorts1 and just what they are it is not 
always easy to discover4 ,cornelia1 in  
exhibiting her jewels1 may have been    
puffed up with pride4 ,when ,cyrano de  
,bergerac threw1 with a noble gesture1  

his purse to the players1 his ,mais quel
 geste6 reveals that he was a player    
himself and was showing off4 ,there may 
be spectacular patriots1 who are willing
 to suffer the extreme penalty for the  
sake of a place in history4 ,but all    
maternal affection is not identical with
 pride2 all generous impulses cannot be 
traced to vanity2 all patriotism is not 
spectacular2 nor is the motive to the   
relief of suffering necessarily the     
removal of one's own pain4 ,it is one   
thing to hire ,lazarus not to exhibit   
himself in his shocking plight on our   
front porch1 and it is a distinctly     
different thing to be concerned about   
the needs of ,lazarus per se4  ,it is   
obvious1 then1 that it is only by a     
straining of language that one can say  
that man necessarily lives for himself1 
or is unavoidably self- seeking4 ,he who
 makes such statements overlooks the    
fact that1 even if is true that1 in a   
sense1 a man's self may be regarded as  
coextensive with all that interests him1

 it is equally true that different      
selves are mutually exclusive and that  
the good of one may serve as the        
ultimate motive in determining the      
action of another4 ,the ethnologist is  
compelled to recognize altruistic       
impulses in men primitive and in men    
civilized3 ,of the doctrine of          
self-interest as the primary and only   
genuine human motive1 it is sufficient  
to say that it bears no relation to the 
facts of human nature1 and implies an   
incorrect view of the origin of         
instinct4 ,footnote3 ,,hobhouse1 ,morals
 in ,evolution1 p4 #af  #aja4 ,varieties
 of ,egoism4--,the egoist may set his   
affections upon pleasure1 and become a  
representative of ,egoistic ,hedonism1  
the variety of egoism normally treated  
as typical and made the subject of      
criticism in ethical treatises4 ,but    
there is nothing to prevent him from    
making his aim1 not so much pleasure1 as
 self-preservation2 or from taking as   
his goal wealth1 power1 reputation1     

intellectual or moral attainment1 or    
what not4 ,footnote3 ,thus1 ,hobbes made
 his end self-preservation2 ,spinoza    
takes much the same position2 ,nietzsche
 makes that which is aimed at1 power4   
,so long as the motives which impel him 
to get1 to avoid1 to be1 or to do1      
something1 do not include1 except as    
means to some ulterior end1 the desire  
or will of his fellow-man1 there appears
 no reason to deny him the title of     
,egoist4 ,nor need we deny him the title
 because he may be unconscious of his   
egoism4 ,there are unconscious egoists  
who are wholly absorbed in the          
individual objects which are the end of 
their strivings4 ,they may be quite     
unaware that they are ruled by          
self-interest1 when it is clear to the  
spectator that such is the case4        
,footnote3 ,james1 ,psychology1 ,vol4   
,i1 chapter x1 pp4 #cai-cba2 a baby is  
characterized as the completest egoist4 
,but the philosophical egoist must rise 
to a higher plane of reflection4  ,there

 are1 thus1 egoisms of many sorts1 and  
they may urge men to very different     
courses of conduct4 ,some of them may   
pass over more naturally than others    
into forms of doctrine which are not    
egoistic at all4 ,he who aims at a      
maximum of pleasure for himself is      
likely to remain an egoist2 he whose    
ambition is to be a patron of science or
 a philanthropist1 may1 it is true1     
remain within the circle of the self1   
but it is quite possible that his       
ulterior aim may come to be forgotten   
and his real interest be transferred to 
the enlightenment of mankind or to the  
relief of suffering4  ,it is especially 
worthy of remark that in judging a      
system of doctrine we must take it as a 
whole1 and not confine ourselves to a   
few utterances of the man who urges it1 
however unequivocal they may appear when
 taken in isolation4 ,he whose motive to
 action is always some idea of his own  
personal good is an egoist4 ,but a      
philosopher may hold that human motives 

are always of this sort1 and yet reveal 
unmistakably1 both in his life and in   
his writings1 that he is not really an  
egoist at all4 ,in which case1 we may   
tax him with more or less inconsistency1
 but we should not misconceive him4     
#ajb4 ,,the ,,arguments ,,for           
,,egoism4--,so much for the forms of    
egoism4 ,it remains to enquire what may 
be urged in favor of the doctrine1 and  
what may be said against it4  7#a7 ,it  
has been urged that egoism is           
inevitable4 ,this1 to be sure1 can      
scarcely be regarded as an argument that
 a man ought to be an egoist1 for there 
seems little sense in telling a man that
 he ought to do what he cannot possibly 
help doing4 ,but the argument may be    
used to deter us from advocating some   
other ethical doctrine4  ,on the        
occasion of every act that he exercises1
 says ,bentham1 every human being is led
 to pursue that line of conduct which1  
according to his view of the case1 taken
 by him at the moment1 will be in the   

highest degree contributory to his own  
greatest happiness4 ,footnote3 ,the     
,constitutional ,code4 ,introduction1   
,sec #b4  ,from this we might conclude1 
not only that every man is an egoist1   
but also that every man is at all times 
a prudent and calculating egoist-- which
 seems to flatter grossly the drunkard  
and the excited man laying about him in 
blind fury4 ,but one may hold that      
egoism is inevitable without going so   
far4 ,footnote3 ,psychological          
,hedonism1 the doctrine that volition is
 always determined by pleasures or pains
 actual or prospective1 need not be thus
 exaggerated4 ,see ,,sidgwick's ,methods
 of ,ethics1 ,i1 iv1 ,sec #a4  7#b7 ,the
 egoistic ideal may be urged upon us on 
the ground that it addresses itself to  
man as natural and reasonable4  ,thus1  
the ,cyrenaics saw in the fact that we  
are from our childhood attracted to     
pleasure1 and1 when we have attained it1
 seek no further1 a proof that pleasure 
is the chief good4 ,footnote3 ,diogenes 

,laertius1 ,,ii1 ,aristippus1 ,sec #h4  
,paley maintains that1 when it has been 
pointed out that private happiness has  
been the motive of an act1 no further   
question can reasonably be asked4       
,footnote3 ,moral ,philosophy1 ,,ii1    
,sec #c4 ,our citations from ,hobbes and
 ,bentham and ,green reveal that these  
writers never think of giving reasons   
why a man should seek his own good4     
,and various moralists1 who do not make 
self-interest the one fundamental       
principle which should rule human       
conduct1 are evidently loath to make of 
it a principle subordinate to some      
other4 ,bishop ,butler1 who maintains   
that virtue consists in the pursuit of  
right and good as such1 yet holds that3 
,when we sit down in a cool hour1 we can
 neither justify to ourselves this nor  
any other pursuit till we are convinced 
that it will be for our happiness1 or at
 least not contrary to it4 ,footnote3   
,sermon ,,xi4 ,clarke1 who dwells upon  
the eternal and immutable obligations of

 morality incumbent on men from the very
 nature and reason of things themselves 
teaches that it is not reasonable for   
men to adhere to virtue if they receive 
no advantage from it4 ,footnote3 ,boyle 
,lectures1 #agje1 ,prop4 ,i4  ,the moral
 here seems to be that1 whatever else a 
man ought to do1 he ought to seek his   
own advantage--real self-sacrifice      
cannot be his duty4 ,this conviction of 
the unreasonableness of self-sacrifice  
reveals itself in another form in the   
doctrine that morality cannot be made   
completely rational unless a            
reconciliation between prudence and     
benevolence can be found2 ,footnote3    
,,sidgwick1 ,the ,methods of ,ethics1   
concluding chapter1 ,sec #e4 and in the 
labored attempts to show that the good  
of the individual must actually coincide
 with that of the community4 ,footnote3 
,e4 g4 ,,green1 ,prolegomena to ,ethics1
 ,sec ,sec #bdd-bde4 ,aristotle tries to
 prove that he who dies for his country 
is impelled by self-love4 ,he does what 

is honorable1 and thus gives the greater
 good to himself4 ,ethics1 ,book ,,ix1  
chapter viii4 ,it may be questioned     
whether the same conviction did not lurk
 in the back of the mind of that        
sternest of moralists1 ,kant1 who denied
 that happiness ought to be sought at   
all1 and yet found so irrational the    
divorce of virtue and happiness that he 
postulated a ,god to guarantee their    
union4 ,footnote3 ,the ,critique of the 
,practical ,reason1 chapter ii4  ,thus1 
moralists of widely different schools   
agree in recognizing that self-interest 
is a principle that should not be placed
 second to any other4 ,the confessed    
egoist only goes a step further in      
recognizing it as a principle that has  
no rival4 ,and that men generally are   
inclined to regard egoism as not        
unnatural seems evinced by the fact that
 for apparently altruistic actions they 
are very apt to seek ulterior egoistic  
motives1 while1 if the action seems     
plainly egoistic1 they seek no further4 

,does1 then1 anything seem more natural 
than egoism8 and1 if natural1 may it not
 be assumed to be proper and right8     
7#c7 ,finally1 it may be urged that he  
who serves his own interests at all     
intelligently has1 at least1 a          
comprehensive aim1 and does not live at 
random4 ,in so far1 egoism appears to be
 rational in a sense dwelt on above2    
,footnote3 ,sec ,sec #ee-ef it          
harmonizes and unifies the impulses and 
desires of the man4  #ajc4 ,,the        
,,argument ,,against ,,egoism4--,what   
may be said against egoism8  7#a7       
,enough has been said above to show that
 egoism is not inevitable1 but that men 
actually are influenced by motives which
 cannot be regarded as egoistic4 ,it is1
 hence1 not necessary to dwell upon this
 point4  7#b7 ,as to the naturalness of 
egoism4 ,both the professional moralist 
and the man in the street may hesitate  
to admit that a man should neglect his  
own interests1 and may find it natural  
that he should cultivate them           

assiduously4 ,but it is only the        
exceptional man who maintains that he   
should have nothing else in view4       
,there are individuals so constituted   
that self-interest makes to them a      
peculiarly strong appeal4 ,others1 more 
social by nature1 may be misled by      
psychological theory to maintain that a 
man's chief and only end is his own     
satisfaction4 ,footnote3 ,see below1    
chapter xxvi1 #c4 ,still others1        
realizing that both one's own interests 
and the interests of one's neighbor are 
natural and seemingly legitimate objects
 of regard1 are perplexed as to the     
method of reconciling their apparently  
conflicting claims1 and are betrayed    
into inconsistent utterances4  ,but it  
is too much to say that the professional
 moralist and the plain man normally    
regard pure egoism with favor and find  
it natural4 ,in spite of our cynical    
maxims and our inclination to seek for  
ulterior motives for apparently         
altruistic acts1 we abhor the           

thorough-going egoist1 and we are not   
inclined to look upon the phenomena1 let
 us say1 of the family life1 as         
manifestations of self-seeking4  ,it is 
worth while to remark that1 even if the 
approach to the ,cyrenaic ideal were so 
common as not to seem wholly unnatural1 
that would not prove that it ought to be
 embraced2 it is natural for men to err1
 but that does not make error our duty4 
7#c7 ,by the moral conviction of        
organized humanity1 as expressed in     
custom1 law1 and public opinion1 egoism 
stands condemned4 ,neither in savage    
life nor among civilized peoples1       
neither in the dawn of human history nor
 in its latest chapters1 do we find     
these agencies encouraging every man to 
live exclusively for himself4 ,egoistic 
impulses are recognized1 in that reward 
and punishment are allotted1 but the end
 urged upon the attention of the        
individual is the common good1 not his  
own particular good4  ,the social       
conscience has always demanded of the   

individual self- sacrifice1 even to the 
extent of laying down his life1 on      
occasion1 for the public weal4 ,and the 
enlightened social conscience does not  
regard a man as truly moral whose       
outward conformity to moral laws rests  
solely upon a basis of egoistic         
calculation4 ,the very existence of the 
family1 the tribe1 the state1 is a      
protest against pure egoism4 ,were all  
men as egoistic as ,aristippus seems to 
have professed to be1 a stable community
 life of any sort would be impossible4  
7#d7 ,the argument that egoism is       
rational at least in so far as it       
introduces consistency into actions and 
unifies and harmonizes desires and      
impulses deserves little consideration4 
,any comprehensive end will do the same1
 and many comprehensive ends may be very
 trivial4 ,one may make it the aim of   
one's life to remain slender1 or may    
devote all one's energies to the        
amelioration of the social position of  
bald-headed men4 ,he who counsels       

deliberate egoism does not recommend it 
merely on the score that it leads to    
consistent action4 ,he does it on the   
ground that the end itself appeals to   
him as one that ought to be selected and
 will be selected if a man is wise4     
,that the interest of the individual is 
in this sense a matter of obligation1 is
 something to be proved1 not assumed4   
#ajd4 ,,the ,,moralist',s ,,interest    
,,in ,,egoism--,it has been worth while 
to treat at length of egoism because the
 doctrine takes on more or less subtle  
forms1 and its fundamental principle1   
self-interest1 has a significance for   
various ethical schools which are not1  
or are not considered1 egoistic4 ,men   
have been vastly puzzled by the moral   
claims of the principle of              
self-interest1 both plain men and       
professional moralists4  ,that prudence 
is not the only fundamental virtue1 most
 men would be ready enough to admit2 but
 is it properly speaking1 a virtue at   
all8 ,ought ,i1 for example1 to try to  

make myself happy8 ,suppose ,i do not   
want to be happy1 what is the source of 
the obligation8  ,butler tells me that  
interest1 one's own happiness1 is a     
manifest obligation2 ,footnote3         
,dissertation on the ,nature of ,virtue1
 ,sec #h2 ,sermons ,,iii and ,,xi4      
,bentham1 a writer of a widely different
 school1 informs me that the constantly 
proper end of action on the part of any 
individual at the moment of action is   
his real greatest happiness from that   
moment to the end of his life4          
,footnote3 ,,bentham1 ,memoirs1 ,vol4 ,x
 of ,bowring's ,edition1 ,edinburgh1    
#ahdc1 p4 #efj4 ,on the other hand1     
,hutcheson teaches me that ,i am under  
no obligation to be good to myself1     
although ,i am under obligation to be   
good to others3 ,actions which flow     
solely from self-love1 and yet evidence 
no want of benevolence1 having no       
hurtful effects upon others1 seem       
perfectly indifferent in a moral sense4 
,footnote3 ,an ,enquiry concerning      

,moral ,good and ,evil1 ,sec #c1 #e4    
,which means that intemperance is       
blameworthy only so far as it is against
 the public interest4  ,may ,i1 should  
,i1 on occasion1 sacrifice myself8      
,thoughtful men generally recognize     
self-sacrifice1 not only as possible1   
but as actual1 and believe it to be at  
times a duty4 ,but the moralist gives   
forth here an uncertain sound4          
,self-interest and benevolence have been
 left to fight out their quarrel in a   
court without a judge to decide upon    
their conflicting claims2 ,footnote3    
,see ,sec #ajb1 the citations from      
,butler and ,clarke4 self- sacrifice has
 been enjoined2 ,footnote3 ,,kant1 see1 
later1 chapter xxix4 it has been        
declared impossible2 ,footnote3 ,see1   
above1 the position of ,green1 ,sec #ig2
 cf41 below1 ,sec #abf4 it has been     
denied that it can ever be a duty2      
,footnote3 ,,fite1 ,an ,introductory    
,study of ,ethics1 chapter vii1 ,sec #e4
 the kind of self-sacrifice in question 

has been regarded as significant4       
,footnote3 ,,sidgwick1 ,the ,methods of 
,ethics1 ,introduction1 ,sec #d4  ,he   
who has rejected as unworthy of serious 
consideration the naive egoism of an    
,aristippus or an ,epicurus is not on   
that account done with egoism1 by any   
means4 ,footnote3 ,the question of      
self-sacrifice recurs again in chapter  
xxvi1 #c4     ,,chapter ,,xxv           
,,utilitarianism   #aje4 ,,what ,,is    
,,utilitarianism8--,the division of     
things desirable into those desirable in
 themselves1 and those desirable for the
 sake of something else1 is two thousand
 years old4 ,those things which we      
recognize as desirable for the sake of  
something else1 we call useful4  ,what  
we shall regard as useful depends in    
each case upon the nature of the end at 
which we aim4 ,if our aim is the        
attainment of pleasure1 the preservation
 of life1 the harmonious development of 
our faculties1 or any other1 we may term
 useful whatever makes for the          

realization of that end4  ,hence1 we    
can1 by stretching the application of   
the word1 call utilitarian any ethical  
doctrine which sets an ultimate end to  
human endeavor and judges actions as    
moral or the reverse1 according to their
 tendency to realize that end1 or to    
frustrate its realization4 ,as the ends 
thus chosen may be very diverse1 it is  
obvious that widely different forms of  
utilitarian doctrine may come into      
being4  ,it is1 however1 inconvenient to
 stretch the term1 utilitarianism in    
this fashion4 ,certain forms of doctrine
 which1 in its wider sense1 it would    
include1 have come to be known under    
names of their own2 and1 besides1 the   
especial type of utilitarianism         
advocated by ,bentham and ,john ,stuart 
,mill appears to have a claim upon the  
appellation which they set in           
circulation4 ,common usage has thus     
limited the significance of the word1   
and we naturally think of the doctrine  
of these men when we hear it uttered4   

,it is in this sense that ,i shall use  
it4  ,the creed which accepts as the    
foundation of morals1 ,utility1 or the  
,greatest ,happiness ,principle1 writes 
,mill1 holds that actions are right in  
proportion as they tend to promote      
happiness1 wrong as they tend to produce
 the reverse of happiness4 ,by happiness
 is intended pleasure1 and the absence  
of pain2 by unhappiness1 pain and the   
privation of pleasure4 ,this means1 he  
adds1 that pleasure1 and freedom from   
pain1 are the only things desirable as  
ends2 and that all desirable things 444 
are desirable either for the pleasure   
inherent in themselves1 or as means to  
the promotion of pleasure and the       
prevention of pain4 ,footnote3          
,utilitarianism1 chapter ii4 ,in the    
pages following1 when ,i leave out a    
reference to pain in discussing the     
utilitarian doctrine1 it will be for    
convenience and for the sake of brevity4
 ,the intelligent reader can supply the 
omissions4   ,the pleasure here intended

 is not the selfish pleasure of the     
individual4 ,utilitarianism is not      
,cyrenaicism4 ,the goal of the          
utilitarian's endeavors is the general  
happiness1 in which many individuals    
participate4 ,the moral rules which     
control and direct the strivings of the 
individual derive their authority from  
their tendency to serve this end4  #ajf4
 ,,bentham',s ,,doctrine4--,most        
uncompromising is the utilitarianism set
 forth in the writings of ,mill's       
master1 that most benevolent and        
philanthropic of men1 ,jeremy ,bentham4 
,he is true to his principles and he    
makes no concessions4  ,he regards that 
as in the interest of the individual    
which tends to add to the sum total of  
his pleasures or to diminish the sum    
total of his pains4 ,and he understands 
in the same sense the interest of the   
community4 ,footnote3 ,principles of    
,morals and ,legislation1 chapter i1    
,sec #e4 ,that which serves that        
interest he sets down as conformable to 

the principle of utility4 ,what is thus 
conformable he declares ought to be     
done1 what is not conformable ought not 
to be done4 ,right and wrong he         
distinguishes in the same manner4 ,when 
thus interpreted1 he insists1 the words 
ought1 and right and wrong1 and others  
of that stamp1 have a meaning2 when     
otherwise1 they have none ,footnote3    
,ibid41 i1 #aj4  ,of differences in     
quality between pleasures ,bentham takes
 no account4 ,in his curious and        
interesting chapter entitled ,value of a
 ,lot of ,pleasure or ,pain1 how to be  
,measured1 he enumerates the            
circumstances which should determine the
 value of a pleasure or a pain4 ,they   
are as follows3 ,footnote3 ,ibid41      
chapter iv4  #a4 ,its intensity4 #b4    
,its duration4 #c4 ,its certainty or    
uncertainty4 #d4 ,its propinquity or    
remoteness4 #e4 ,its fecundity4 #f4 ,its
 purity4 #g4 ,its extent4  ,the first   
four of these characteristics call for  
no comment4 ,by the fecundity of a      

pleasure ,bentham understands its       
likelihood of being followed by other   
pleasures2 by its purity1 the likelihood
 that it will not be followed by pains4 
,the characteristic extent marks off    
utilitarianism from egoism1 for it has  
reference to the number of persons      
affected by the pleasure or the pain4   
,the greater the number1 the higher the 
value in question4 ,the greatest number 
of pleasures of the highest value1 as   
free as possible from admixture with    
pains1 is the goal of the endeavors of  
the utilitarian4 ,naturally1 when the   
interests of many persons are taken into
 account1 the question of the principle 
according to which lots of pleasure are 
to be distributed becomes a pressing    
one4 ,bentham decides it as follows3    
,everybody to count for one1 and nobody 
for more than one4 ,footnote3 ,see the  
discussion of ,bentham's dictum in its  
bearings on justice1 ,j4 ,s4 ,mill1     
,utilitarianism1 chapter v4 ,in other   
words1 the distribution should be an    

impartial one4  ,at first sight1 this   
account of the relative desirability of 
pleasures and undesirability of pains   
seems sensible enough4 ,men do desire   
pleasure1 and they undoubtedly approve  
the preference given to pleasures more  
intense1 enduring1 certain1 immediate1  
fruitful in further pleasures1 free from
 painful consequences1 and shared by    
many1 over those which have not these   
characteristics3    ,intense1 long1     
certain1 speedy1 fruitful1 pure--       
,such marks in pleasures and in pains   
endure4   ,such pleasures seek1 if      
private be thy end3     ,if it be       
public1 wide let them extend4   ,such   
pains avoid1 whichever be thy view2     
,if pains must come1 let them extend to 
few4  ,footnote3 ,principles of ,morals 
and ,legislation1 chapter iv1 i1 ,note4 
,these mnemonic lines may well strike   
many readers as embodying a very good   
working rule of common-sense morality2  
as paying a proper regard to prudence   
and to benevolence as well4 ,but there  

are passages in ,bentham calculated to  
shake such acquiescence4 ,he writes3    
,now pleasure is in itself a good2 nay1 
even setting aside immunity from pain1  
the only good3 pain is in itself an     
evil1 and1 indeed without exception1 the
 only evil2 or else the words good and  
evil have no meaning4 ,and this is alike
 true of every sort of pain1 and of     
every sort of pleasure4 ,footnote3      
,ibid41 chapter x1 #aj4  ,let a man's   
motive be ill-will2 call it even malice1
 envy1 cruelty2 it is still a kind of   
pleasure that is his motive3 the        
pleasure he takes at the thought of the 
pain which he sees1 or expects to see1  
his adversary undergo4 ,now even this   
wretched pleasure1 taken by itself1 is  
good3 it may be faint2 it may be short2 
it must at any rate be impure3 yet1     
while it lasts1 and before any bad      
consequences arrive1 it is as good as   
any other that is not more intense4     
,footnote3 ,ibid1 note4  ,reflection    
upon such passages may well lead a man  

to ask himself3  7#a7 ,is it1 after all1
 the consensus of human opinion that    
pleasure is the only good and pain the  
only evil8  7#b7 ,are some pleasures    
actually regarded as more desirable than
 others1 solely through the application 
of the standard given above8  7#c7 ,can 
the pleasure of a malignant act properly
 be called morally good at all8  #ajg4  
,,the ,,doctrine ,,of ,,john ,,stuart   
,,mill4--,bentham's purely quantitative 
estimate of the value of pleasures has  
aroused in many minds the feeling that  
he puts morality upon a low level4      
,footnote3 ,in justice to ,bentham it   
must be borne in mind that his prime    
interest was not in ethical theory1 but 
in legislative reform4 ,his doctrine1   
such as it was1 and applied as he       
applied it1 was a tool of no mean       
efficacy4 ,bentham must count among the 
real benefactors of mankind4 ,mill      
attempts an improvement upon his        
doctrine4 ,it is quite compatible with  
the principle of utility1 he writes1 to 

recognize the fact that some kinds of   
pleasure are more desirable and more    
valuable than others4 ,it would be      
absurd that1 while in estimating all    
other things quality is considered as   
well as quantity1 the estimation of     
pleasures should be supposed to depend  
on quantity alone4 ,footnote3           
,utilitarianism1 chapter i4  ,thus1     
,mill distinguishes between higher      
pleasures and lower1 and he gives a     
criterion for distinguishing the former 
from the latter3 ,of two pleasures1 if  
there be one to which all or almost all 
who have experience of both give a      
decided preference1 irrespective of any 
feeling of moral obligation to prefer   
it1 that is the more desirable pleasure4
 ,he refers the whole matter to the     
judgment of the competent2 and1 in      
accordance with that judgment1 decides  
that3 ,it is better to be a human being 
dissatisfied than a pig satisfied2      
better to be ,socrates dissatisfied than
 a fool satisfied4 ,and if the fool1 or 

the pig1 are of a different opinion1 it 
is because they only know their own side
 of the question4 ,the other party to   
the comparison knows both sides4        
,footnote3 ,ibid4  ,that some pleasures 
may properly be called higher than      
others moralists of many schools will be
 ready to admit1 but to ,mill's         
criterion of what proves them to be     
higher they may demur4 ,of the delight  
that a fool takes in his folly a wise   
man may be as incapable as a fool is of 
the enjoyment of wisdom4 ,with mature   
years men cease to be competent judges  
of the pleasures of boyhood4 ,to each   
nature1 its appropriate choice of       
pleasures4 ,that human beings at a given
 level of intellectual and emotional    
development actually desire certain     
things rather than certain others does  
not prove that those things are         
desirable in any general sense4 ,it does
 not prove that men ought to desire     
them4 ,for that proof we must look in   
some other direction2 and a critical    

scrutiny of the pleasures which         
moralists ancient and modern have       
generally accepted as higher reveals a  
common characteristic which explains    
their being thus classed together much  
better than the appeal to ,mill's       
criterion4 ,footnote3 ,see chapter xxx1 
,sec #adb4  ,as has often been pointed  
out1 ,mill1 while defending             
,utilitarianism1 really passes beyond   
it1 and his doctrine tends to merge in  
one widely different from that of       
,bentham4 ,for the ,greatest ,happiness 
,principle he virtually substitutes the 
,highest ,happiness ,principle4 ,but he 
scarcely realizes the significance of   
his substitution1 and he gives an       
inadequate account of the significance  
of higher and lower4  #ajh4 ,,the       
,,argument ,,for ,,utilitarianism4--,we 
have seen above that ,bentham maintains 
that such words as ought1 right and     
wrong have no meaning unless interpreted
 after the fashion of the utilitarian4  
,he admits that his principle of utility

 is not susceptible of direct proof1 but
 claims that such a proof is needless4  
,footnote3 ,principles of ,morals and   
,legislation1 chapter i1 #aa4           
,accepting it as a fact revealed by     
observation that the actual end of      
action on the part of every individual  
is his own happiness as he conceives it1
 he appears to have passed on without   
question to the further positions1 that 
the proper end of action of the         
individual is his own greatest          
happiness1 and1 yet1 his proper end of  
action1 as a member of a community1 is  
the greatest happiness of the community4
 ,footnote3 ,see the paper entitled     
,logical ,arrangements1 ,employed as    
,instruments in ,legislation etc41      
,memoirs1 ,bowring's ,edition1 ,volume  
,x1 page #efj4  ,the second of these    
positions cannot be deduced from the    
first1 nor can the third be inferred    
from the other two4 ,bentham appears to 
have taken the principle of utility for 
granted2 but one coming after him and   

scrutinizing his work can scarcely avoid
 raising the question of the justice of 
his assumption4 ,that happiness is the  
only thing desirable1 and that the      
happiness of all should be the object   
aimed at by each1 are propositions which
 seem to stand in need of proof4  ,such 
proof ,mill attempted to furnish4       
,footnote3 ,he does not regard his      
doctrine as provable in the usual sense2
 but he adduces what he regards as      
equivalent to proof4 ,utilitarianism1   
chapter i4  ,he argues as follows3  ,the
 only proof capable of being given that 
an object is visible1 is that people    
actually see it4 ,the only proof that a 
sound is audible1 is that people hear   
it2 and so of the other sources of our  
experience4 ,in like manner1 ,i         
apprehend1 the sole evidence it is      
possible to produce that anything is    
desirable1 is that people do actually   
desire it4 ,if the end which the        
utilitarian doctrine proposes to itself 
were not1 in theory and practice1       

acknowledged to be an end1 nothing could
 ever convince any person that it was   
so4 ,no reason can be given why the     
general happiness is desirable1 except  
that each person1 so far as he believes 
it to be attainable1 desires his own    
happiness4 ,this1 however1 being a fact1
 we have not only all the proof the case
 admits of1 but all which it is possible
 to require1 that happiness is a good3  
that each person's happiness is a good  
to that person1 and the general         
happiness1 therefore1 a good to the     
aggregate of all persons4 ,happiness has
 made out its title as one of the ends  
of conduct1 and1 consequently one of the
 ends of morality4 ,footnote3           
,utilitarianism1 chapter iv4  ,that     
happiness is the only ultimate end1     
,mill regards as established by the     
argument that other things1 for example1
 virtue1 though they come to be valued  
for themselves1 do so only through the  
fact that1 originally valued as means to
 the attainment of happiness1 they      

become1 through association1 valued even
 out of this relation1 and thus treated 
as a part of happiness4 ,footnote3      
,ibid4  ,the defects in ,mill's argument
 have made themselves apparent1 not     
merely to the opponents of              
utilitarianism1 but even to its         
advocates4 ,footnote3 ,,sidgwick1 ,the  
,methods of ,ethics1 ,book ,,iii1       
chapter xiii1 ,sec #e ,we cannot say    
that things are desirable in any moral  
sense1 simply because they are desired4 
,in a loose sense of the word1          
everything that is or has been desired  
by anyone is desirable--it evidently can
 be desired4 ,when we say no more than  
this1 we say nothing4 ,but when we call 
a course of action desirable we mean    
more than this2 and we are compelled to 
admit that a multitude of desirable     
things are not generally desired4 ,this 
is the burden of the lament of every    
reformer4  ,furthermore1 it does not    
appear to follow that1 because his own  
happiness is a good to each member of a 

community1 the happiness of all must    
likewise be a good to each severally4 ,a
 community in which every man studies   
his own interest may conceivably be a   
community in which no man regards it as 
desirable to consult the public weal4   
,that the general happiness is          
desirable1 in a loose sense of the word1
 is palpable fact2 it is obvious that it
 can be desired1 for some persons do    
actually desire it4 ,but that it is     
desirable in any sense cannot be        
inferred from the fact that all men     
desire something else1 namely1 their own
 individual happiness4  ,we must1 then1 
look further for the proof of the       
utilitarian principle4 ,henry ,sidgwick1
 that admirable scholar and most        
judicial mind1 falls back upon certain  
intuitions which1 he conceives1 present 
themselves as ultimate and unassailable4
 ,he writes3  ,let us reflect upon the  
clearest and most certain of our moral  
intuitions4 ,i find that ,i undoubtedly 
seem to perceive1 as clearly and        

certainly as ,i see any axiom in        
,arithmetic or ,geometry1 that it is    
'right' and 'reasonable' for me to treat
 others as ,i should think that ,i      
myself ought to be treated under similar
 conditions1 and to do what ,i believe  
to be ultimately conducive to universal 
,good or ,happiness4  ,and again3 ,the  
propositions1 ',i ought not to prefer a 
present lesser good to a future greater 
good1' and ',i ought not to prefer my   
own lesser good to the greater good of  
another1' do present themselves as self-
 evident2 as much 7e4 g47 as the        
mathematical axiom that 'if equals be   
added to equals the wholes are equal4'  
,footnote3 ,the ,methods of ,ethics1    
concluding chapter1 ,sec #e1 and ,book  
,,iii1 chapter xiii1 ,sec #c4  ,whether 
these intuitions will be accepted as    
furnishing an indisputably sound basis  
for utilitarianism will depend upon     
one's attitude toward intuitions in     
general and the list of intuitions one  
is inclined to accept4 ,it is           

significant that ,sidgwick does not     
accept as self-evident such subordinate 
propositions as1 ,i ought to speak the  
truth4 ,he regards their authority as   
derived from the ,greatest ,happiness   
,principle4  #aji4 ,,the ,,distribution 
,,of ,,happiness4--,the man who accepts 
the ,greatest ,happiness ,principle as  
the sole basis of his ethical doctrine  
is faced with the problem of its        
application in detail4 ,the greatest    
good of the greatest number is a vague  
expression4 ,what is properly understood
 by the greatest number8 and upon what  
principle shall lots of happiness be    
assigned to each8 ,very puzzling        
questions arise when we approach the    
problem of the distribution of pleasures
 and the calculation of their values4   
,let us look at them4  ,i4 ,who should  
be considered in the ,distribution8     
7#a7 ,shall we aim directly at the      
happiness of all men now living8 or     
shall we content ourselves with a       
smaller number8 ,certainly1 with        

increasing intelligence and broadening  
sympathies1 men tend toward a more      
embracing benevolence4  7#b7 ,shall we  
admit to the circle generations yet     
unborn8 and1 if so1 how far into the    
future should we look8  7#c7 ,should we 
make a deliberate attempt to increase   
the number of those who may share the   
common fund of happiness1 by striving   
for an increase in the number of births8
 ,this end has been consciously sought  
for divers reasons4 ,the                
ancestor-worship of ,china has made the 
,chinaman eagerly desirous of leaving   
behind him those who would devote       
themselves to him after he has departed 
this life4 ,nations ancient and modern  
have endeavored to strengthen the state 
by providing for an increase in its     
population4 ,shall a similar end be     
pursued for the ethical purpose of      
widening the circle of those who shall  
live and be happy8 ,most ethical        
teachers do not appear to have regarded 
this as a corollary to the doctrine of  

benevolence4  7#d7 ,shall we enlarge the
 circle so as to include the lower      
animals8 ,as ,bentham expressed it3 ,the
 question is not1 ,can they reason8 nor1
 ,can they talk8 but1 ,can they suffer8 
,footnote3 ,principles of ,morals and   
,legislation1 chapter xvii1 ,sec #d4    
,,ii4 ,how should the lots of happiness 
be measured8  7#a7 ,should everybody    
count as one1 and nobody as more than   
one8 in other words1 should strict      
impartiality be aimed at8  ,dr4         
,westermarck's striking reply to the    
argument for impartiality as urged by   
,professor ,sidgwick has already been   
quoted4 ,footnote3 ,see chapter v1 ,sec 
#af4 ,let the reader glance at it again4
  ,it must be confessed that to put     
one's parents1 one's children1 one's    
neighbors1 strangers1 foreigners1 the   
brutes1 all upon the same level1 is     
contrary to the moral judgment of savage
 and civilized alike4 ,it would seem    
contrary to the sentiments which lie at 
the root of the family1 the community1  

and the state4 ,nor have we reason to   
look forward to any future state of     
human society in which such lesser      
groups within the broad circle of       
humanity will be done away with1 though 
they tend to become less exclusive in   
their demands upon human sympathy4  7#b7
 ,suppose that the greatest sum of      
happiness on the whole could be best    
attained by an unequal distribution--by 
making a limited number very happy at   
the expense of the rest4 ,would this be 
justifiable8 ,it would be in harmony    
with the ,greatest ,happiness           
,principle1 though not with the         
principle of the greatest happiness     
equally shared4  ,,iii4 ,the question of
 the distribution of happiness in the   
life of the individual is not one to be 
ignored4 ,if we are concerned only with 
the quantity of happiness1 may we not   
take as the ethical precept a short life
 and a merry one--provided the brief    
span of years be merry enough1 and there
 be no objection to the choice on the   

score of harm to others8  ,this problem 
is closely analogous to that of the     
distribution of pleasures to those who  
compose the greatest number taken into  
account4 ,there we were concerned with  
the shares allotted to individuals2 here
 we are concerned with the shares       
assigned to the different parts of a    
single life4 ,in the attempt to solve   
the problem1 ,bentham's criteria of     
intensity1 certainty1 purity1 etc41     
might naturally be appealed to4  #aaj4  
,,the ,,calculus ,,of ,,pleasures4--,nor
 are the problems which meet us less    
perplexing when we pass from questions  
of the distribution of pleasures to that
 of the calculus of pleasures4 ,how are 
delights and miseries to be weighed1 and
 reasonably balanced8  7#a7 ,men desire 
pleasure1 and they desire to avoid pain4
 ,the two seem to be opposed4 ,but men  
constantly accept pleasures which entail
 some suffering1 and they avoid pains   
even at the expense of some pleasure4   
,are1 however1 pleasures and pains      

strictly commensurable8 ,how much       
admixture of pain is called for to      
reduce the value of a pleasure to zero8 
and how much pleasure1 added to a pain1 
will make the whole emotional state     
predominantly a pleasurable one8 ,a     
disagreeable taste and an agreeable odor
 may be experienced together1 but they  
cannot be treated as an algebraic sum4  
,if we do so treat them1 we seem to fall
 back upon the assumption that the mere 
fact that the heterogeneous complex is  
accepted or rejected is evidence that   
its ingredients have been measured and  
compared4 ,this is an ungrounded        
assumption4  7#b7 ,undoubtedly men      
prefer intense pleasures to mild ones1  
and those long-continued to those which 
are fleeting4 ,but what degree of       
intensity will overbalance what period  
of duration8 ,here1 again1 we appear to 
be without a unit of measure1 both in   
the case of pleasures and of pains4     
7#c7 ,obviously1 he who would distribute
 pleasures with impartiality must take  

into consideration the natures and      
capacities of the recipients4 ,all are  
not susceptible of pleasure in the same 
degree1 nor are all capable of enjoying 
the same pleasures4 ,it is small        
kindness to a cat to offer it hay2 nor  
will the miser thank us for the         
opportunity to enjoy the pleasures of   
liberality4 ,the gift which arouses deep
 emotion in one man1 will leave another 
cold4 ,the diversity of natures would   
make the calculus of pleasures1 in any  
accurate sense of the expression1 a most
 difficult problem1 even if such a      
calculus were admissible in the case of 
a single individual4 ,footnote3 ,this   
difficulty has not been overlooked by   
the ,utilitarian1 see ,,bentham1        
,principles of ,morals and ,legislation1
 chapter vi4  ,,iii4 ,,the              
,,difficulties ,,of ,,other             
,,schools4--,it would be unjust to the  
utilitarian not to point out that those 
who advocate other doctrines must find  
some way of coping with the difficulties

 which embarrass him4  ,thus1 the egoist
 may ignore duties to others1 but he    
cannot free himself from the problems of
 the distribution of happiness in his   
own life and of the calculus of         
pleasures4 ,the intuitionist1 who1 among
 other precepts1 accepts as ultimate    
those enjoining upon him justice and    
benevolence1 may well ask himself toward
 whom these virtues are to be exercised1
 and whether the claims of all who      
belong to the class in question are     
identical in kind and degree4 ,if they  
are not1 he must find some rule for     
estimating their relative importance4   
,he who makes it his moral ideal to     
,follow ,nature1 to ,strive for         
,perfection1 or to ,realize his         
,capacities1 must determine in detail   
what conduct1 self-regarding and other- 
regarding1 the acceptance of such aims  
entails4 ,only the unreflective can     
regard the utilitarian as having a      
monopoly of the difficulties which face 
the moralist4 ,the vague general        

statement that we should strive to      
render others happy--a duty recognized  
by men of very different schools-- never
 frees us from the perplexities which   
arise when it is asked3 ,what others8   
,with what degree of impartiality8      
,when8 ,by what means8 ,but that such   
questions can be approached by a path   
more satisfactory than that followed by 
the utilitarian1 there is good reason to
 maintain4 ,footnote3 ,see1 below1      
chapter xxx1 ,sec ,sec #adj-adb4  #aab4 
,,summary ,,of ,,arguments ,,for        
,,utilitarianism4--,it is worth while to
 summarize what may be said for         
utilitarianism1 and what may be said    
against it4 ,it may be argued in its    
favor3  7#a7 ,that it appears to set as 
the aim of human endeavor1 an           
intelligible end1 and a fairly definite 
one4 ,everyone has some notion of what  
happiness means1 and is not without     
ideas touching the way to seek his own  
happiness1 or to contribute to that of  
others4  7#b7 ,the end is one actually  

desired by men at all stages of         
intellectual and moral development4 ,men
 are impelled to seek their own         
happiness1 and there are few who do not 
feel impelled to take into              
consideration1 to some degree1 at least1
 the happiness of some others4  7#c7    
,the general happiness is not merely    
desired by some men1 but it is felt to  
be desirable2 that is1 it is an end not 
out of harmony with the moral judgments 
of mankind4 ,it makes its appeal to the 
social nature of man2 it seems to       
furnish a basis for the exercise of     
benevolence and justice4  7#d7 ,the     
utilitarian's clear recognition of the  
general happiness as the ultimate end of
 human endeavor1 and his insistence that
 institutions1 laws and moral maxims    
must be judged solely by their fitness  
to serve as means to that end1 have made
 him an energetic apostle of reform1 and
 intolerant of old and passively        
accepted abuses4 ,his insistence upon   
the principle of impartiality in the    

distribution of happiness has made him a
 champion of the inarticulate and the   
oppressed4 ,whatever one may think of   
his abstract principles1 the general    
character of the specific measures he   
has advocated must meet with the        
approval of enlightened moralists of    
very different schools4  #aac4          
,,arguments ,,against                   
,,utilitarianism4--,against             
utilitarianism as an ethical theory     
various objections have been brought or 
may be brought4  7#a7 ,objection may be 
taken to the utilitarian assumption that
 the only ultimate object of desire is  
pleasure or happiness4  ,it was pointed 
out forcibly by ,bishop ,butler in the  
eighteenth century that men desire many 
things besides pleasure4 ,man's desires 
are an outcome of his nature1 and that  
results in particular movements towards 
particular external objects--honor1     
power1 the harm or good of another4     
,footnote3 ,sermons1 ,preface1 ,sec #bi2
 cf4 ,sermon ,,xi4 ,to be sure1 no one  

can act but from a desire1 or choice1 or
 preference of his own1 but this is no  
evidence that what he seeks in acting is
 always pleasure4 ,particular passions  
or appetites are1 ,butler ingeniously   
argues1 necessarily presupposed by the  
very idea of an interested pursuit2     
since the very idea of interest or      
happiness consists in this1 that an     
appetite or affection enjoys its object4
  ,here we find our attention called to 
a very important truth1 the significance
 of which there is danger of our        
overlooking4 ,pleasure or happiness is  
not something that can be parcelled up  
and handed about independently of the   
nature of the recipient4 ,it is not     
everyone who can desire everything and  
feel pleasure in its attainment4 ,that  
the objects of desire and will are many1
 and that the strivings of conscious    
creatures have in view many ends1 and   
vary according to the impulsive and     
instinctive endowments of the creatures 
in question1 has been well brought out  

in the admirable studies of instinct    
which we now have at our disposal4 ,the 
most ardent devotee of pleasure must    
recognize1 that only certain pleasures  
are open to him2 that1 such as they are1
 they are a revelation of his nature and
 capacities2 that pleasures1 if sought  
at all1 cannot be secured directly1 but 
only as the result of a successful      
striving for objects not pleasures1     
which bring pleasure as their           
accompaniment4 ,he who would have the   
pleasure of eating must desire food2 and
 neither food1 nor the eating of food1  
can be regarded as1 per se1 pleasure4   
,the pleasure of the brooding hen is    
beyond the reach of man1 who1 however   
pleasure-loving1 cannot desire to sit   
upon eggs1 and so must forego the       
pleasure which1 in the case of the bird1
 crowns that exercise4  ,such           
considerations as the above have led    
some moralists to define1 as the end of 
desire1 not pleasure1 but               
self-satisfaction4 ,every desire1 it is 

pointed out1 strives to satisfy itself  
in the attainment of its appropriate    
object4 ,with the attainment of the     
object1 the desire has produced its     
proper fruit and ceases to be4 ,it is   
admitted that the satisfaction of desire
 is accompanied by pleasure1 but it is  
denied that the pleasure may be properly
 called the object of the desire1 or    
regarded as calling it into being3 ,the 
appetite of hunger must precede and     
condition the pleasure which consists in
 its satisfaction4 ,it cannot therefore 
have that pleasure for its exciting     
object4 ,footnote3 ,,green1 ,prolegomena
 to ,ethics1 ,book ,,iii1 chapter i1    
,sec #afa4 ,see also ,book ,,ii1 chapter
 ii1 ,sec #aca2 ,book ,,iii1 chapter i1 
,sec ,sec #aed-afj4  ,at the same time  
it is conceded that the idea of a       
pleasure to be attained may reinforce   
the desire for an object1 may intensify 
the putting forth of energy1 and may    
tend to sustain and prolong any mode of 
action4 ,footnote3 ,prolegomena to      

,ethics1 ,sec #afa2 ,,dewey1 ,ethics1   
chapter xiv1 ,sec #a1 p4 #bga2          
,,mcdougall1 ,social ,psychology1       
,london1 #aiaf1 p4 #dc4 ,it is further  
conceded that pleasures may be          
consciously aimed at1 but it is urged   
that this does not result in true       
self-satisfaction1 and is evidence of   
the existence of unhealthy desires4     
,footnote3 ,prolegomena to ,ethics1 ,sec
 #aeh2 ,,dewey1 ,ethics p4 #bgj4  ,the  
utilitarian is not wholly helpless in   
the face of such objections4 ,he may    
argue that1 if it is difficult to see   
how a pleasure which is the result of a 
desire may cause the desire1 it is      
equally difficult to see how it may     
prolong1 reinforce or intensify it4 ,and
 he may maintain that1 although the     
pursuit of pleasure1 in certain forms1  
is calculated to defeat its own aim and 
is undoubtedly unhealthy1 this need not 
be the case if one's aim be the true    
utilitarian one--the happiness of all4  
,the direct attack upon his ,greatest   

,happiness ,principle which consists in 
the objection that1 if pleasure is the  
only object of desire1 a sum of         
pleasures1 as not being a pleasure1     
cannot be desired1 ,footnote3           
,prolegomena to ,ethics1 ,sec #bba4 he  
can put aside with the remark that no   
far-reaching and comprehensive aim can  
be realized at one stroke4 ,i can desire
 a long and useful life2 this cannot be 
had all at once4 ,i can desire a long   
life full of pleasures2 this cannot be  
enjoyed all at once either4 ,but each   
can certainly be the object of desire4  
,but1 when all is said1 it remains true 
that the contention of those1 who       
distinguish sharply between the         
satisfaction of desire and the          
attainment of pleasure1 is of no little 
importance4 ,it calls our attention to  
the following truths3  7a7 ,we have     
definite instincts and impulses which   
tend to satisfy themselves with their   
appropriate objects4  7b7 ,at their     
first exercise1 our aim could not have  

been the pleasure resulting from their  
satisfaction1 for that could not have   
been foreseen4  7c7 ,although1 after    
experience1 the attainment of pleasure  
may come to be our aim in the exercise  
of many activities1 and may often1 as   
far as we can see1 be a natural and not 
unwholesome aim2 it is by no means      
evident that1 even when we are          
experienced and reflective1 the exercise
 of our faculties comes to be regarded  
only as a means to the attainment of    
pleasure4  7d7 ,the hedonist1 in        
maintaining that pleasure is the only   
ultimate object of desire1 appears1     
thus1 to be committed to the doctrine   
that the satisfaction of all other      
desires is subordinated to the          
satisfaction of the desire for pleasure4
 ,for this position he can furnish no   
adequate proof4 ,self-evident the       
doctrine is not4  7e7 ,it is incumbent  
upon him1 as a moralist1 to prove1 not  
merely that all other satisfactions are1
 but also that they ought to be         

subordinated to the satisfaction of the 
desire for pleasure4 ,this he appears to
 assume without proof4  7#b7 ,we have   
seen above ,footnote3 ,see ,sec #ajh4   
that the fundamental principle of       
utilitarian hedonism1 as against        
egoistic1 namely1 the making the        
,greatest ,happiness of the ,greatest   
,number the object of the endeavors of  
each individual1 has not been           
satisfactorily established by leading   
utilitarians4 ,bentham assumes the      
principle2 ,mill advances a doubtful    
argument2 ,sidgwick falls back upon     
intuitions which all will not admit to  
be indubitable4 ,to his assertion3      
,reason shows me that if my happiness is
 desirable and a good1 the equal        
happiness of any other person must be   
equally desirable1 ,footnote3 ,the      
,methods of ,ethics1 ,book ,,iii1       
chapter xiv1 ,sec #e4 the doubter may   
reply3 ,desirable to whom8 to him or to 
me8  7#c7 ,finally1 it may be objected  
that the consistent utilitarian1 in     

making pleasure1 abstractly taken1 the  
only ultimate good1 and in regarding as 
the sole criterion of right actions     
their tendency to produce pleasure1     
really tears pleasure out of its moral  
setting altogether4  ,thus ,bentham's   
contention ,footnote3 ,sec #ajf1 above4 
that the pleasure a man may derive from 
the exercise of malice or cruelty is1   
taken by itself1 good--while it lasts1  
and before any bad consequences have set
 in1 as good as any other that is not   
more intense--derives what plausibility 
it has1 from an ambiguity in the word   
good4 ,pleasure1 taken by itself1 is    
undoubtedly pleasure1 whatever be its   
source4 ,to affirm this is mere         
tautology4 ,and1 if we chose to make    
good but a synonym for pleasure1 we     
remain in the same tautology when we    
affirm that every pleasure is a good4   
,but ,bentham assumed that good in this 
sense and moral good are the same thing4
  ,his assumption is not borne out by   
the moral judgments of mankind4 ,even a 

cursory view of those moral judgments as
 revealed in customs1 laws and public   
opinion makes it evident that1 under    
certain circumstances1 pleasure is      
regarded as1 from a moral standpoint1 a 
good1 and1 under other circumstances1 an
 evil4 ,torn out of its setting1 it is  
simply pleasure1 a psychological        
phenomenon like any other1 with no      
ethical significance4  ,take the case of
 the pleasure enjoyed by the malignant  
man4 ,it may be intense1 if he be       
peculiarly susceptible to such pleasure4
 ,the pain suffered by his victim may   
conceivably be less intense4 ,both may  
die before the bad consequences1 that is
 to say1 other pains1 arrive4 ,there may
 be no spectators4 ,is1 in such a case1 
the pleasure one to be called a good8   
,can it be approved8 ,no reflective     
moralist would maintain that it can4    
,which means that the moralists1 in all 
ages1 have meant by good something more 
than pleasure1 taken abstractly1 and    
that ,bentham's assumption may be       

regarded as an aberration4  #aad4       
,,transfigured ,,utilitarianism4--,it is
 possible to hold to a utilitarianism   
more circumspect and less startling than
 ,bentham's4 ,it is possible1 while     
maintaining that pleasure is the only   
thing that an experienced and reasonable
 being can regard as ultimately         
desirable1 to maintain at the same time 
that it is rash for any man to attempt  
to seek his own happiness1 or to strive 
to promote the general happiness1       
without taking into very careful        
consideration the instincts and impulses
 of man and the nature of the social    
organization which has resulted from    
man's being what he is4 ,one may argue  
that the experience of the race is1 as a
 rule1 a safer guide than the           
independent judgment of the individual2 
and that1 in the secular endeavor to    
compass the general happiness1 it has   
discovered the paths to that goal which 
may most successfully be followed4      
,thus1 one may distrust ,utopian        

schemes1 recognizing the significance of
 custom1 law1 traditional moral maxims1 
and public opinion1 and yet remain a    
utilitarian4  ,but he who does this must
 still answer the preceding objections4 
,he must prove3 7#a7 ,that pleasure is  
the only thing ultimately desirable2    
7#b7 that each is under obligation to   
promote the pleasure of all2 7#c7 that  
its mere conduciveness to the production
 of a preponderance of pleasure makes an
 action right1 even though the pleasure 
be a malicious one1 as in the           
illustration above given4  ,still1 his  
doctrine has become less startling1 and 
he has moved in the direction of a      
greater harmony with the moral judgments
 of men generally4 ,the conduct he      
recommends need not1 as a rule1 differ  
greatly from that recognized as right by
 moralists of quite different schools4  
,such a utilitarian may easily pass over
 to a form of doctrine which is not     
utilitarian at all4 ,thus1 ,sidgwick    
asks whether there is a measurable      

quality of feeling expressed by the word
 pleasure1 which is independent of its  
relation to volition1 and strictly      
undefinable from its simplicity--like   
the quality of feeling expressed by     
'sweet1' of which also we are conscious 
in varying degrees of intensity2 and he 
answers3 ,for my own part1 when the term
 7pleasure7 is used in the more extended
 sense which ,i have adopted1 to include
 the most refined and subtle            
intellectual and emotional              
gratifications1 no less than the coarser
 and more definite sensual enjoyments1  
,i can find no common quality in the    
feelings so designated except some      
relation to desire or volition4         
,footnote3 ,the ,methods of ,ethics1    
,book ,,ii1 chapter ii1 ,sec #b1 #dth   
,edition4 ,,sidgwick never appreciably  
modified this opinion1 which is most    
clearly expressed in the ,edition       
quoted4  ,when we seek1 then1 to give   
pleasure1 are we doing nothing else than
 giving recognition to the desire and   

will of our neighbor8 ,what has become  
of the ,greatest ,happiness ,principle8 
,has it not dissolved into the doctrine 
of the ,real ,social ,will8             
,,chapter ,,xxvi  ,,nature1             
,,perfection1 ,,self-,,realization   ,i4
 ,,nature  #aae4 ,,human ,,nature ,,as  
,,accepted ,,standard4--,the three      
doctrines1 that the norm of moral action
 is to follow nature1 that it is to aim 
at the attainment of perfection1 and    
that it is the realization of one's     
capabilities1 have much in common4 ,they
 may conveniently be treated in the same
 chapter4  ,early in the history of the 
ethics we find the moralist preaching   
that it is the duty of man to follow    
nature1 and branding vice as unnatural  
and1 hence1 to be abhorred4  ,the word  
nature1 thus used1 has had a fluctuating
 meaning4 ,sometimes the thought has    
been predominantly of human nature1 and 
sometimes the appeal has been to nature 
in a wider sense4  ,aristotle1 who finds
 the good of man in happiness or        

well-being1 points out that this is     
something relative to man's nature4 ,the
 well- being of a man he conceives as1  
in large part1 well-doing1 and well-    
doing he defines as performing the      
proper functions of a man4 ,footnote3   
,nichomachean ,ethics1 ,book ,i1        
chapters iv1 vii1 viii4 ,if we ask him  
what is proper or natural to man1 he    
refers us to what man1 when fully       
developed1 becomes3 ,what every being is
 in its completed state1 that certainly 
is the nature of that thing1 whether it 
be a man1 a house1 or a horse4          
,footnote3 ,politics1 i1 #b4 ,he        
conceives man's nature1 thus1 as that   
which it is in man to become4 ,toward   
this end man strives2 and it is this    
which furnishes him with the law of his 
action4  ,but1 it may be asked1 how     
shall this end be defined in detail8    
,individual men1 who arrive at mature   
years1 are by no means alike4 ,some we  
approve2 some we disapprove4 ,we        
evidently appeal to a standard by which 

the individual is judged4 ,the appeal to
 the nature of man helps us little      
unless we can agree upon what we may    
accept as a just revelation of that     
nature--a pattern of some sort1         
divergence from which may be called     
unnatural1 and is to be reprobated4     
,neither ,aristotle1 nor those who1     
after him1 took human nature as the     
moral norm1 were without some conception
 of such a pattern4 ,they kept in view  
certain things that men may become      
rather than certain others4 ,they       
accepted as their standard a type of    
human nature which tends1 on the whole1 
to realize itself more and more in the  
course of development of human          
communities4 ,but as different human    
societies differ more or less in the    
characteristics which they tend to      
transmit to their members1 in the kind  
of man whom they tend to form1 we find  
the ideal of human nature1 with which we
 are presented1 somewhat vague and      
fluctuating4 ,different traits are dwelt

 upon by different moralists4 ,still1   
the appeals to human nature have a good 
deal in common2 upon man's rational and 
social qualities especial stress is apt 
to be laid4  #aaf4 ,,human ,,nature     
,,and ,,the ,,law ,,of ,,nature4--,every
 nature1 said ,marcus ,aurelius1        
,footnote3 ,thoughts1 translated by     
,george ,long1 viii1 #g4 is contented   
with itself when it goes on its way     
well2 and a rational nature goes on its 
way well1 when in its thoughts it       
assents to nothing false or uncertain1  
and when it directs its movements to    
social acts only1 and when it confines  
its desires and aversions to the things 
which are in its power1 and when it is  
satisfied with everything that is       
assigned to it by the common ,nature4   
,in the last clause the ,stoic turns    
from the contemplation of man's nature1 
taken by itself1 and dwells upon the    
nature of the universe1 which he        
conceives to be controlled by reason4   
,he thus gains an added argument for the

 obligations laid upon man by his own   
nature4 ,he writes3  ,every instrument1 
tool1 vessel1 if it does that for which 
it has been made1 is well1 and yet he   
who made it is not there4 ,but in the   
things which are held together by       
,nature there is within and there abides
 in them the power which made them2     
wherefore the more is it fit to         
reverence this power1 and to think that1
 if thou dost live and act according to 
its will1 everything in thee is in      
conformity to intelligence4 ,footnote3  
,ibid vi1 #dj4  ,the law of man's nature
 is1 thus1 regarded as a part of the law
 of ,nature--,we are all working        
together to one end1 some with knowledge
 and design1 and others without knowing 
what they do4 ,footnote3 ,ibid1 vi1 #db4
 ,and1 this being the case1 man may take
 pattern1 when he is inclined to fall   
below the standard of duty appropriate  
to him1 by considering humbler          
creatures3 ,dost thou not see the little
 plants1 the little birds1 the ants1 the

 spiders1 the bees working together to  
put in order their several parts of the 
universe8 ,and art thou unwilling to do 
the work of a human being8 ,and dost    
thou not make haste to do that which is 
according to thy nature8 ,footnote3     
,ibid1 v1 #a4  ,the delinquent is1      
hence1 judged guilty1 not merely of     
derogation from his high estate1 but    
also of impiety4 ,footnote3 ,ibid1 ix1  
#a4   #aag4 ,,vagueness ,,of ,,the ,,law
 ,,of ,,nature4--,the question of the   
influence of religious belief upon a    
theory of morals ,i shall discuss       
elsewhere4 ,footnote3 ,see chapter      
xxxvi4 ,here it is only necessary to    
point out that1 if there is vagueness in
 the appeal to human nature1 it can     
scarcely be dissipated satisfactorily by
 simply turning to ,nature in a broader 
sense4 ,shall we1 when in doubt as to   
human behavior1 copy that of the brutes8
 ,the industry of some humble creatures 
it seems edifying to dwell upon2 but    
from the fact that bees are stung to    

death by their sisters in the hive1 or  
that the spider is given to devouring   
her mate1 we can hardly draw a moral    
lesson for man4  ,the appeal to a ,law  
of ,nature so often made in the history 
of ethical speculation has furnished but
 a vague and elusive norm4 ,he who makes
 it is apt to fall back upon the moral  
intuitions with which he is furnished1  
and to pack a greater or less number of 
them into his notion of ,natural ,law4  
,footnote3 ,see ,,sir ,,henry ,,maine',s
 fascinating chapters on the ,law of    
,nature1 ,ancient ,law1 chapters in and 
iv4 ,the innumerable appeals to the ,law
 of ,nature contained in ,grotius's     
famous work on the ,law of ,war and     
,peace are very illuminating4   ,in     
,cicero1 ,nature becomes fairly         
garrulous to man on all matters of      
deportment3 ,let us follow ,nature1 and 
refrain from whatever lacks the approval
 of eye and ear4 ,let attitude1 gait1   
mode of sitting1 posture at table1      
countenance1 eyes1 movement of the      

hands1 preserve the becomingness of     
which ,i speak4 ,footnote3 ,de          
,officiis1 i1 #ce1 translated by        
,peabody1  #aah4 ,,the ,,appeal ,,to    
,,nature ,,and ,,intuitionism4--,the    
moralists who urge us to follow nature1 
whether human nature or ,nature in a    
wider sense1 we may1 hence1 regard as   
intuitionists of a sort4 ,those who     
emphasize human nature evidently depend 
upon their moral intuitions to give them
 information as to its characteristics4 
,it is intuition that paints for them   
their pattern4 ,they do not take man as 
they actually find him2 they call for   
the suppression of some traits1 and the 
exaggeration of others4  ,nor are those 
who appeal to ,nature in a wider sense  
less guided by moral intuitions4 ,the   
appeal is never made without            
restrictions and limitations4 ,no one   
dreams that the bird1 the ant1 the      
spider1 the bee1 can be regarded as     
satisfactory teachers of morals to human
 beings4 ,each may be occupied in       

putting in order its corner of the      
universe2 but the order attained is not 
a human order1 and there is in it much  
that is revolting to the moral judgments
 of mankind4 ,man must have a standard  
of his own4 ,he listens to ,nature only 
when she tells him what he already      
approves4  ,as a form of intuitionism   
the doctrine of following44 nature may  
be criticised in much the same way as   
other forms4 ,one great merit it has4   
,it calls attention to the fact that    
ethics is a discipline which has no     
significance abstracted from the nature 
of man4 ,it appears absurd to say that  
man ought to do what it is not in man1  
under any conceivable circumstances1 to 
do4 ,and1 like other forms of           
intuitionism1 it has the merit of       
avoiding that short-circuiting which may
 easily prove seductive to the egoist or
 the utilitarian4 ,he who accepts as his
 end either his own happiness or that of
 men generally may easily be induced to 
take short cuts to that end1 and pay    

little attention to moral maxims as     
such4 ,he may treat lightly that great  
system of rules and observances by which
 men are guided in their relations with 
one another1 and which prevent human    
societies from relapsing into a chaos4  
,on the other hand1 the follower of     
nature1 like other intuitionists1 may   
easily be thrown into perplexity by the 
fact that what seems to him natural1    
and1 hence1 right1 may not be approved  
by other men4 ,he cannot prove that he  
is right and they are wrong4 ,he appears
 condemned to take refuge in subjective 
conviction1 that is1 in mere dogmatism4 
,,ii4 ,,perfection  #aai4 ,,perfection  
,,and ,,type4--,when we speak of a thing
 as more or less perfect1 we commonly   
mean that it is more or less perfect in 
its kind4 ,a good saw makes a poor      
razor2 a good chair1 a more than        
indifferent bed4 ,a bee crushed by a    
blow1 a bird with a broken wing1 we     
regard as imperfect4 ,but it scarcely   
occurs to us to ask ourselves whether   

the bee is more or less perfect than the
 bird1 or the bird than the spider4     
,swift's ,houyhnhnms at their best could
 not be either perfect horses or perfect
 men4 ,they were creatures with a       
perfection of their own1 and one        
appropriate to their hybrid nature4  ,to
 every creature its own perfection4     
,this principle men seem to assume      
tacitly in their judgments4 ,they set up
 a standard for each kind1 and they     
conceive the individual to attain or to 
fall short1 according to the degree of  
its approach to1 or of its divergence   
from1 the allotted standard4  ,if we    
take perfection in this sense--and we   
usually have no other sense in mind in  
our judgments of perfection--the        
doctrine that it is the whole duty of   
man to strive to attain to perfection is
 none other than the doctrine that it is
 his duty to follow nature1 his proper  
nature as man4 ,and any difficulties    
which may legitimately be urged upon the
 attention of the moralist who          

recommends the following of nature may  
with equal justice be urged upon the    
attention of him who exhorts us to aim  
at perfection4  ,thus1 if it is doubtful
 just what nature demands of us1 it     
seems no less doubtful what obligations 
are laid upon us when we make perfection
 our goal4 ,that goal cannot mean for   
each man simply the developing to the   
utmost of all the capacities which he   
possesses4 ,there are men rich in the   
possibilities of sloth1 of indifference 
to future good1 of egoism1 even of      
malignant feeling4 ,nor does the average
 man furnish the pattern of perfection4 
,the perfectionist does not regard the  
average man as the embodiment of his    
ideal4 ,he seeks to better him4  ,that1 
in striving to attain perfection1 a man 
should remain a man1 with essentially   
human characteristics1 seems evident4   
,but what sort of a man he should be is 
not as clear4 ,until we are in a        
position to give some reasoned account  
of what we mean by perfection as an     

ideal1 and to show that it is a         
desirable goal for man1 we appear to be 
setting up but a vague end for human    
endeavor1 and to be assuming intuitively
 that it is a desirable end4  #abj4     
,,more ,,and ,,less ,,perfect           
,,types4--,so much for perfection as    
synonymous with the ideal human nature  
of which ancient and modern moralists   
have treated4 ,it appears1 however1     
possible to use the word perfection in a
 somewhat different sense4  ,man is not 
merely man2 he is a living being1 and   
there are living beings of many orders4 
,the plants1 the simpler forms of animal
 life1 the brutes which we recognize as 
standing nearer to us1 and man may1 from
 this point of view1 be referred to the 
one series4 ,some members of this series
 we characterize as lower1 and others we
 speak of as higher in the scale4  ,now1
 such designations as higher and lower  
cannot be applied indiscriminately4     
,there is little sense in the assertion 
that a bit of string is higher than a   

straight line1 or a hat than a          
handkerchief4 ,some significant basis of
 comparison must be present4 ,things    
must be recognized as approximating to  
or diverging from an accepted standard  
in varying degrees4  ,such a basis of   
comparison is present when some objects 
possess the same qualities in a more    
marked degree than do others4 ,but this 
is not the only possible basis of       
comparison4 ,we may assume that the     
possession of certain qualities marks a 
creature as higher1 and that the        
creature which has them not1 or has them
 imperfectly developed1 thereby stamps  
itself as being of a lower order4       
,something like this appears to         
determine our judgments when we assign  
to various creatures their place in the 
scale of living beings4 ,we do not mean 
that the higher possess to a greater    
degree all the capacities possessed by  
the lower4 ,many things which the plant 
does man cannot do at all2 and1 among   
the animals1 those which we recognize as

 higher may be lacking in many          
capacities present in a marked degree in
 the lower4 ,in ranking one living      
creature as higher1 and1 thus1 as more  
perfect1 than another1 we assume that   
the nature of the one1 with its various 
capacities and lacks of capacity1 is1 on
 the whole1 of more worth than the      
nature of another4  ,it might be        
maintained that1 in his estimate of the 
worth of different kinds of beings man  
is influenced by his partiality for the 
distinctively human1 rating creatures as
 lower or higher in proportion to their 
divergence from or approximation to his 
own type4 ,undoubtedly this plays a part
 in men's judgments4 ,we are partial to 
ourselves4 ,and yet judgments of        
perfection and imperfection cannot      
wholly be explained on this principle4  
,i think we must admit without proof1   
writes ,professor ,janet1 ,footnote3    
,the ,theory of ,morals1 ,book ,i1      
chapter iii1 ,english translation1 ,new 
,york1 #ahhc1 p4 #dh4 a brilliant       

apostle of the doctrine of perfection1  
that things are good1 even independently
 of the pleasure which they give us1 in 
themselves and by themselves1 because of
 their intrinsic excellence4 ,if anyone 
were to demand that ,i should prove that
 thought is worth more than digestion1 a
 tree more than a heap of stones1       
liberty than slavery1 maternal love than
 luxury1 ,i could only reply by asking  
him to demonstrate that the whole is    
greater than one of its parts4 ,no      
sensible person denies that1 in passing 
from the mineral kingdom to the         
vegetable kingdom1 from this to the     
animal kingdom1 from the animal to man1 
from the savage to the enlightened      
citizen of a free country1 ,nature has  
made a continual advance2 that is to    
say1 at each step has gained in         
excellence and perfection4  ,one is     
naturally impelled to ask from what     
point of view things so disparate as the
 mineral1 the plant1 the brute1 man1    
thought and digestion1 liberty and      

slavery1 can be compared with one       
another at all1 and referred to any sort
 of a series4 ,what is1 in its essence1 
this excellence or perfection of which  
we have more shining evidence as we go  
up in the scale8 ,janet identifies it   
with intensity of being1 with activity4 
,the greater the activity1 the greater  
the perfection4  ,to the identification 
of perfection and activity we may       
hesitate to assent4 ,it does not seem   
clear that there is greater activity    
manifested in a snail than in a burning 
house1 in maternal love than in furious 
hate1 in quiet thought than in passion4 
,yet it seems significant that judgments
 of worth do not appear out of place in 
comparing such things4  #aba4           
,,perfectionism ,,and                   
,,intuitionism4--,taking into           
consideration all that is said above1 it
 seems not unreasonable to conclude3    
7#a7 ,that in speaking of the perfection
 of any creature we very often judge it 
only by the standard set by its own     

type4 ,we regard it as a good specimen  
of its kind4  7#b7 ,but when we use     
perfection in a wider sense1 we judge   
different types after the standard      
furnished by the distinctively human4   
7#c7 ,and we take as our standard of the
 human the pattern man held in view by  
those who urge us to follow nature4     
,but why should this pattern man be     
assumed to be better or worthier than a 
man of a different sort8 ,he who finds  
in him a greater exhibition of activity 
may with equal justice address to       
himself the question3 ,why is activity1 
in itself1 of value8 ,the one question1 
like the other1 looks for its answer in 
the dictum of some intuition4 ,what may 
be said for1 and what against1          
intuitions1 we have already considered4 
,footnote3 ,see chapter xxiii   ,,iii4  
,,self-,,realization  #abb4 ,,the       
,,self-,,realization ,,doctrine4--,the  
ethical school which makes the          
realization of the capacities of the    
self the aim of moral action has for a  

generation1 especially in ,england and  
,america1 had the support of many acute 
and scholarly minds4 ,the doctrine1     
often spoken of as the ,neo- ,kantian or
 the ,neo-,hegelian1 may be said to be  
influenced by ,kant1 so far as concerns 
metaphysical theory1 but its ethical    
character is more properly ,hegelian and
 suggests in many particulars that great
 ,german philosopher's ,philosophy of   
,right4  ,we may conveniently take as   
the protagonist of the school the       
,oxford scholar1 ,thomas ,hill ,green1  
whose ,prolegomena to ,ethics has had1  
directly and indirectly1 a powerful     
influence upon the minds of the men of  
our generation4  ,we find the doctrine  
of self-realization1 as set forth by    
,green1 to be as follows3  7#a7 ,in all 
desire some object is presented to the  
mind as not yet real1 and there is a    
striving to make it real1 and thus to   
satisfy1 or extinguish1 the desire4     
,footnote3 ,prolegomena to ,ethics1 ,sec
 #aca4  7#b7 ,self-consciousness knits  

the desires into a system1 and thus     
attains to the conception of well-being1
 which implies the satisfaction of      
desire in general1 and not merely of    
this or that desire4 ,footnote3         
,prolegomena to ,ethics1 ,sec #abh4     
7#c7 ,good is that which satisfies some 
desire4 ,any good at which an agent aims
 must be his own good2 and true good is 
nothing else than permanent well-being4 
,footnote3 ,prolegomena to ,ethics1 ,sec
 ,sec #aij1 #ib1 #bjc4  7#d7 ,a desire  
is determined by the nature of the      
creature desiring2 man can attain       
satisfaction only in the realization of 
his capacities4 ,his true good lies only
 in their complete realization--in his  
becoming all that it is in him to       
become4 ,footnote3 ,prolegomena to      
,ethics1 ,sec ,sec #aga-b1 #ahj4  7#e7  
,but man is a social being1 and has an  
interest in other persons than himself4 
,hence his complete self-satisfaction   
implies the satisfaction of his social  
as well as of his other impulses4 ,that 

is1 his true good includes the good of  
others4 ,footnote3 ,prolegomena to      
,ethics1 ,sec ,sec #aii- #bje4  7#f7 ,we
 can only discover what our capacities  
are by observing them as so far         
realized1 and thus gaining the idea of  
future progress4 ,the ultimate end is   
unknown to us4 ,footnote3 ,prolegomena  
to ,ethics1 ,sec #agb4  7#g7 ,but we see
 enough to recognize that man's         
capacities can be realized1 his         
self-satisfaction intelligently sought1 
only in a social state based upon the   
notion of the common good4 ,the right   
reveals itself in the actual evolution  
of society4 ,footnote3 ,ibid41 ,sec ,sec
 #agb-gf1 #bje4  #abc4 ,,the ,,doctrine 
,,akin ,,to ,,that ,,of ,,following     
,,nature4--,the self- realization       
doctrine has much in common with the    
doctrine of following nature4 ,thus3    
#a4 ,it evidently does not recommend the
 realization of all the capacities of   
the individual as such1 but holds in    
view a pattern man4  #b4 ,this is social

 man1 the true representative of human  
nature as conceived by the ancient      
,stoic4 ,green holds before himself the 
ideal of a society in which everyone    
shall treat everyone else as his        
neighbor1 in which to every rational    
agent the well-being or perfection of   
every other such agent shall be included
 in that perfection for which he lives4 
,footnote3 ,prolegomena to ,ethics1 ,sec
 #bje4 ,the same thought was more       
pithily expressed by ,marcus ,aurelius  
in the aphorism that what is good for   
the hive is good for the bee4  #c4 ,we  
find1 too1 the analogue of that wider   
appeal to nature which suffused the     
,stoic doctrine with religious feeling4 
,in the above brief recapitulation of   
the steps in the self-realization       
doctrine ,i have omitted this aspect1 as
 ,i wished to confine myself to the     
ethical doctrine pure and simple4 ,but  
,green conceives of the ,divine         
,consciousness as already having before 
it the consummation toward which man    

strives in his efforts at               
self-realization2 he regards man as     
working toward the attainment of a      
,divine ,purpose4 ,the                  
self-realizationist may prefer1         
sometimes1 to use language more         
abstract4 ,he may say3 ,man's           
consciousness of himself as a member of 
society involves a reference to a cosmic
 order4 ,footnote3 ,,muirhead1 ,the     
,elements of ,ethics1 ,book ,i1 chapter 
in1 ,sec #aj4 ,but the difference of    
language scarcely carries with it a     
substantial difference of thought4      
,footnote3 ,though the philosopher as   
such may shun the term ',god' on account
 of its anthropomorphic associations1   
and may prefer to speak of the          
'conscious principle1' or of the        
'universal self1' yet the latter has in 
substance the same meaning as the       
former4 ,,fite1 ,an ,introductory ,study
 of ,ethics1 chapter xiii1 ,sec #d4  #d4
 ,as the appeal to human nature1 or to  
nature in a broader sense1 left the norm

 for the guidance of human actions      
somewhat vague1 so the appeal to the    
principle of self-realization seems to  
leave one without very definite         
guidance4 ,there may easily arise       
disputes touching what capacities are to
 be realized1 and in what degree4  #abd4
 ,,is ,,the ,,doctrine ,,more           
,,egoistic8--,one difference between the
 principles of following nature1        
striving to attain to perfection1 and   
aiming at self-realization seems to     
force itself upon our notice4 ,on the   
surface1 at least1 the last doctrine    
appears to stand out as more distinctly 
egoistic4 ,the very name has an egoistic
 flavor2 the doctrine bases itself upon 
the satisfaction of desire2 nor do its  
advocates hesitate to emphasize that the
 satisfaction sought is the satisfaction
 of the agent desiring4 ,in the chapter 
on ,egoism ,footnote3 ,chapter xxiv4 ,i 
have cited some utterances which sound  
egoistic1 and such citations might be   
multiplied4  ,nevertheless1 from this   

egoistic root springs a flower which    
disseminates the perfume of a saintly   
self-abnegation4 ,how is this seeming   
miracle accomplished8  ,the transition  
is brought about through a chain of     
reasoning which is subtle and ingenious 
in the extreme4 ,must we not admit that 
in all purposive action--the only action
 with which the moralist need concern   
himself--there is a striving to realize 
or satisfy desire in the attainment of  
some object8 ,and if the desires of a   
mind or self converge upon some object1 
does not its realization imply the      
satisfaction or realization of the      
desires of that mind or self8           
,furthermore1 if our desires have as    
their root our capacities--for we can   
desire nothing that it is not in us to  
desire--is not the realization of desire
 the realization of capacity8 ,does it  
not follow1 hence1 that every mind or   
self1 in all purposive action1 is       
striving1 either blunderingly or with   
far-sighted intelligence1 to attain to  

self-satisfaction1 which means1 to the  
realization of its capacities8 ,finally1
 as men are by nature social creatures1 
how can a man fully realize his         
capacities without becoming a truly     
unselfish being8 ,unselfishness appears 
to be the inevitable goal of the        
strivings for self-satisfaction of an   
unselfish self4  #abe4 ,,why ,,aim ,,to 
,,realize ,,capacities8--,this reasoning
 appears highly satisfactory in two very
 different ways4 ,it seems1 on the one  
hand1 to stop the mouth of the egoist1  
who insists that his own advantage is   
his only proper aim4 ,it assures him    
that he is throughout seeking his own   
advantage1 when he aims at              
self-realization4 ,on the other hand1 it
 assures the man to whom egoism appears 
repellant and immoral1 that self-       
realization implies that one must love  
one's neighbor as oneself4 ,the         
immemorial quarrel between self-love and
 benevolence appears to be adjusted to  
the mutual satisfaction of both parties4

  ,is the reasoning unassailable8 ,there
 are two steps in it which appear to    
demand a closer scrutiny4 ,one is the   
transition from desire to capacity2 the 
other1 the assumption that he who       
follows an unselfish impulse may        
properly be said to aim at              
self-satisfaction1 and to exercise no   
self- denial4  ,as to the first4 ,our   
desires may have their roots in our     
capacities1 but desires and capacities  
are1 nevertheless1 not the same thing4  
,men do actually strive to realize their
 desires--a desire is nothing else than 
such a striving for realization or      
satisfaction4 ,but it cannot be said    
that men generally strive to realize    
their capacities1 except to the limited 
degree in which their capacities may    
happen to be expressed in actual        
desires4 ,capacities may lie dormant1   
and the man in whom they lie dormant    
need not on that account feel           
dissatisfied1 as does the man whose     
desires are not realized4               

,self-realization1 as understood by the 
school of thinkers which advocates it1  
implies much more than the satisfaction 
of desire4 ,it implies the              
multiplication of desires and their     
satisfaction4 ,on what ground shall we  
persuade the contented egoist1 who has  
but a handful of commonplace desires and
 finds it possible to satisfy most of   
them1 that it is better to call into    
being a multitude of wants many of which
 will probably remain unrealized8 ,he   
may point out that the divine discontent
 is apt to leave the idealist and the   
reformer as lean as ,cassius4 ,all of   
which does not prove that the           
self-realizationist is not right in     
exhorting men to develop their          
capacities in the direction of the      
pattern which he holds in view2 but it  
does seem to prove that the path to     
self-realization1 in this sense1 is not 
necessarily the path to                 
self-satisfaction4 ,the good has come to
 mean more than that which satisfies    

desire4 ,how shall we persuade men that 
it is their duty to make this good their
 end8  #abf4 ,,the ,,problem ,,of       
,,self-,,sacrifice4--,as for the second 
point4 ,he who makes his moral aim      
self-satisfaction can scarcely be       
expected to advocate self-sacrifice4    
,accordingly1 we find among             
self-realizationists1 a tendency to     
repudiate altogether what may properly  
be called self-denial4 ,anything        
conceived as good in such a way that the
 agent acts for the sake of it1 said    
,green1 ,footnote3 ,prolegomena1 ,sec   
#ib4 must be conceived as his own good4 
,a moment's consideration will show1    
writes ,professor ,fite1 in his clear   
and attractive book1 ,footnote3 ,an     
,introductory ,study of ,ethics1 chapter
 viii1 ,sec #e4 that1 for self-sacrifice
 in any absolute sense1 no ground of    
obligation is conceivable4 ,unless ,i am
 in some way interested in the object   
,footnote3 ,i4e41 unless ,i desire the  
object4 whose attainment is set before  

me as a duty1 it seems to be            
psychologically impossible that ,i      
should ever strive for it4  ,now we do  
seem compelled to concede that1 unless a
 man desires an end1 he cannot will that
 end4 ,anything that is selected as an  
end1 and striven for1 must be desired4  
,and the attainment of the end implies1 
of course1 the satisfaction of that     
particular desire4 ,but1 admitting all  
this1 is not the question left open     
whether some desires may not be         
sacrificed to others2 and whether1      
indeed1 a whole extensive system of     
desires may not1 on occasion1 be        
sacrificed to a single desire8 ,in this 
case1 may not the transaction properly  
be called self-sacrifice8 ,suppose the  
desire to serve one's neighbor1 if      
satisfied1 prevents the realization of a
 multitude of other desires of the same 
agent4 ,is it certain that its          
satisfaction does not imply self-denial8
  #abg4 ,,self-,,satisfaction ,,and     
,,self-,,sacrifice4--,the argument to   

prove that it is not really             
self-sacrifice may follow divers paths4 
,thus1 it may be argued that1 since the 
proper end of a rational being is his   
own permanent good1 the sacrifice of    
such goods as do not conduce to this end
 is not self-sacrifice4 ,sensual        
pleasures1 the satisfaction of vanity or
 ambition1 the accomplishment of a      
vengeful purpose1 an excessive          
preoccupation with one's own interests  
as contrasted with those of others--such
 things as these1 it is claimed1 do not 
permanently satisfy4 ,that the so-called
 man of pleasure is a man upon whom     
pleasures pall1 and that he who seeks   
too earnestly to save his own life is   
apt to lose it1 has been reiterated by a
 long line of professional and lay      
moralists from ,buddha to ,tolstoi4 ,the
 refuge from the discontent arising out 
of the attempt to quench one's thirst by
 sipping at transient delights has      
always been found in altruism under some
 guise4 ,the self- realizationists may  

claim that certain things are given up  
in order that other things more         
permanently satisfying to the self may  
be attained1 and may deny that this is  
any renunciation of self-satisfaction4  
,footnote3 ,,green1 op4 cit41 ,sec #agf4
  ,again4 ,it may be argued that men's  
interests do not conflict as widely as  
is commonly supposed4 ,to be sure1 two  
men may have to struggle with each other
 for the pleasure of eating a given     
apple1 of making a pecuniary profit1 of 
obtaining a coveted post1 of being the  
first authority in a given science or   
art1 of securing the affections of a    
particular woman4 ,here one man's loss  
seems to be another man's gain4 ,but two
 men may enjoy seeing a child eat an    
apple1 or a deserving man profit1 or    
their common candidate win the election1
 or their favorite artist honored1 or   
their beloved nephew accepted by the    
lady of his choice4 ,if one desires     
certain things1 and certain things only1
 there seems no reason why one's desires

 should not be in harmony with those of 
others4  ,the things best worth having1 
it is claimed1 do not admit of being    
competed for4 ,footnote3 ,,green1       
,prolegomena to ,ethics1 ,sec ,sec #bdd-
 #bde4 ,if my aim is unselfish devotion 
to humanity1 how can ,i lose if my      
neighbor attains in the same running8   
,do virtuous men1 in so far as they are 
virtuous1 stand in each other's light8  
,are there not as many prizes as there  
are competitors8 ,as long as ,i remain  
in this field ,i may seek               
self-satisfaction without scruple4 ,i   
satisfy another's desire in satisfying  
my own4 ,by benevolence ,i lose nothing4
  ,the list of things which one may     
forego without self-sacrifice has been  
made a long one4 ,even the realization  
of capacities highly valued by          
cultivated men has been brought into it3
  ,no conflict1 writes ,professor ,seth1
 ,footnote3 ,a ,study of ,ethical       
,principles1 ,part ,,ii1 chapter ii1    
,sec #d1 ,edinburgh1 #aiaa1 p4 #bhf4 is 

possible between the ends of the        
individual and those of society4 ,the   
individual may be called upon to        
sacrifice1 for example1 his opportunity 
of esthetic or intellectual culture2 but
 in that very sacrifice lies his        
opportunity of moral culture1 of true   
self-realization4  #abh4 ,,can ,,moral  
,,self-,,sacrifice ,,be ,a ,,duty8--,to 
this position one is tempted to demur   
until two questions have found a        
satisfactory answer3  #a4 ,is it true   
that there is no sacrifice of           
self-realization or self- satisfaction1 
properly so called1 where all other     
desires and impulses are sacrificed to  
the one desire to do right8  #b4 ,is it 
not conceivable1 at least1 that         
obedience to an unselfish impulse may   
result even in the sacrifice of the     
opportunities of moral culture in       
general8 ,can it1 then1 be called       
self-realization8  ,touching the first  
question it may plausibly be maintained 
that the desires of the self are many   

and various1 and that the satisfaction  
of an altruistic impulse may imply the  
sacrifice of so many of them that the   
self may very doubtfully be said to     
attain to permanent satisfaction when   
the impulse is realized4 ,aristotle's   
hero1 who1 in dying for his country1    
chooses the more honorable for himself1 
,footnote3 ,ethics1 ,book ,,ix1 chapter 
viii1 ,sec #ab4 can hardly be said in   
that one act to have accomplished a     
state of permanent satisfaction or      
well-being for the self whose being was1
 in that act1 brought to an abrupt      
termination4 ,certain ,stoics seem to   
have taught that virtue is its own      
adequate reward and that nothing else   
matters2 but this has not been the      
verdict of moralists generally4 ,paley1 
who writes like an unblushing egoist1   
,footnote3 ,see ,sec #if4 we may pass   
over2 but even ,kant1 a thinker of a    
very different complexion1 appears to   
regard the mere doing of a right act as 
not a sufficient reward for the doer4   

,he looks for the act to be crowned with
 happiness in a life to come1 thus      
saving it from being mere self-         
sacrifice4  ,the second question one    
approaches with some hesitation4 ,no    
moralist1 writes ,professor ,sidgwick1  
,footnote3 ,the ,methods of ,ethics1    
,introduction4 has ever directed an     
individual to promote the virtue of     
others except in so far as this         
promotion is compatible with1 or rather 
involved in1 the complete realization of
 virtue in himself4 ,it appears rash to 
admit to be a duty that which as high an
 authority as ,sidgwick maintains no    
moralist has ever ventured to advise4   
,still1 it is permissible to adduce an  
illustration taken from actual life1 and
 to ask the reader to form his opinion  
independently4  ,a girl1 anxious to     
provide her younger sister with a better
 lot1 enters a factory and gives up her 
life to labor of a monotonous and mind- 
destroying character1 amid sordid and   
more or less degrading surroundings4    

,the act is a heroic one1 but is it     
clear that it conduces to the           
self-realization1 not of the sister1 but
 of the agent herself8 ,the influence of
 surroundings counts for much4 ,high    
impulses may1 under such pressure1 come 
to be repressed4  ,capacity for the     
nobler feelings1 writes ,mill1          
,footnote3 ,utilitarianism1 chapter iii 
is in most natures a very tender plant1 
easily killed1 not only by hostile      
influences1 but by mere want of         
sustenance2 and in the majority of young
 persons it speedily dies away if the   
occupations to which their position in  
life has devoted them1 and the society  
into which it has thrown them1 are not  
favorable to keeping that higher        
capacity in exercise4 ,men lose their   
high aspirations as they lose their     
intellectual tastes1 because they have  
not time or opportunity for indulging   
them2 and they addict themselves to     
inferior pleasures1 not because they    
deliberately prefer them1 but because   

they are either the only ones to which  
they have access1 or the only ones they 
are any longer capable of enjoying4  ,in
 other words1 one may put oneself into a
 situation in which self- realization   
appears to be made a most difficult and 
problematic goal4 ,nor does it seem     
inconceivable that one should do this   
for the sake of another's good4 ,hence1 
even if we restrict the meaning of the  
word self- sacrifice to the sacrifice of
 the real or moral self1 the            
impossibility of self-sacrifice scarcely
 appears to have been proved2 the       
impossibility of a conflict between the 
ends of the individual and of society   
does not appear to be indubitably       
established4  #abi4 ,,self-,,sacrifice  
,,and ,,the ,,identity ,,of             
,,selves4--,can it be maintained upon   
any other grounds than those adduced    
above8 ,one line of argument remains    
open to us4 ,we may maintain that1 while
 two bodies are two because they occupy 
two portions of space1 two minds1 as not

 in space1 cannot thus be held apart1   
and we may conclude that the many       
individuals composing the race are not  
really many1 but one4 ,footnote3 ,fite1 
,an ,introductory ,study of ,ethics1    
chapter xii4 ,i suppose that he who can 
take this position will find it natural 
to argue that any act which serves the  
interests of any self must be regarded  
as serving the interests of every self1 
and thus cannot be considered as        
sacrificing the interests of any self4  
,to these transcendental heights1       
however1 comparatively few will be able 
to climb4 ,to men generally it will     
still appear that ,peter's love to ,paul
 is not identical with ,peter's love to 
,peter2 and that ,peter may act in such 
a way that1 on the whole1 he loses1     
while ,paul gains4 ,that the interests  
of ,peter and ,paul1 as developed social
 beings and members of a civilized      
community1 are less likely to be in     
conflict than those of their primitive  
cave-dwelling forerunners may be freely 

conceded4 ,but from such relative       
harmony to a complete identity of       
interests seems a far cry4  #acj4       
,,questions ,,which ,,seem ,,to ,,be    
,,left ,,open4--,evidently1 the self-   
realization doctrine is a great advance 
upon the doctrine of following nature4  
,the self-realizationist realizes that  
man's nature is in the making1 and he is
 not blind to the difficulty of the task
 of determining just what the real      
demands of human nature are4  ,this     
leads to his laying much stress upon the
 gradual development of systems of      
rights and duties as they emerge under  
the actual conditions to which human    
societies are subjected in the course of
 their evolution4 ,he reads history with
 comprehending eyes1 and reverences the 
human reason as crystallized in social  
institutions4 ,hence1 the divergence of 
the moral standards which obtain in     
different ages and among different      
peoples does not seem to him a baffling 
mystery4 ,he can find a relative        

justification for each1 and yet hold to 
an ideal in the light of which each must
 be judged4  ,it may be questioned1     
however1 whether the edifice which he   
erects can be based wholly upon the     
appeal to the self which ostensibly     
furnishes the groundwork of the         
doctrine4 ,we may ask whether such an   
appeal can3  7#a7 ,prescribe to the     
individual in what measure his various  
capacities should be realized4  7#b7    
,show that it is reasonable to awaken   
dormant capacities1 and thus multiply   
desires4  7#c7 ,justify social acts     
which certainly appear to be            
self-sacrificing1 and which the moral   
judgments of men generally do not       
hesitate to approve4    ,,chapter       
,,xxvii  ,,the ,,ethics ,,of ,,evolution
   #aca4 ,,the ,,significance ,,of ,,the
 ,,title4--,the title1 ,the ,ethics of  
,evolution1 seems to assume that the    
evolutionist1 frankly accepting himself 
as such1 must be prepared to join some  
school of the moralists different from  

other schools1 and basing itself upon   
evolutionary doctrine4  ,that the       
ethical views of individuals and of     
communities of men may undergo a process
 of evolution or development is         
palpable4 ,the ethical notions of the   
child are not those of the man1 nor are 
the moral ideas of primitive races      
identical with those of races more      
advanced intellectually and morally4    
,but it is one thing to maintain that   
morals may be in evolution in           
individuals and in communities1 and     
quite another to hold that the          
acceptance of the doctrine of evolution1
 broadly taken1 forces upon one some new
 norm by which human actions may be     
judged4 ,it was possible for as ardent  
an evolutionist as ,huxley to hold that 
evolution and ethics are not merely     
independent1 but are actually at war    
with one another1 the competitive       
struggle for existence characteristic of
 the one giving place in the other to a 
new principle in which the rights of the

 weak and the helpless attain express   
recognition4 ,footnote3 ,,huxley1       
,evolution and ,ethics1 ,new ,york1     
#ahid4 ,see1 especially1 the            
,prolegomena4 ,and ,sidgwick1 that      
clearest of thinkers1 maintains         
,footnote3 ,the ,methods of ,ethics1    
,book ,i1 chapter vi1 ,sec #b4 that we  
have no reason to assume that it is our 
duty as moral beings simply to          
accelerate the pace in the direction    
already marked out by evolution4  ,it   
should be remembered that the word      
evolution may be used equivocally4 ,it  
is not evident that all evolution is in 
the direction of a life1 brute or human1
 that we commonly recognize as higher4  
,there is retrogression1 as well as     
progress1 where such retrogression is   
favored by environment4 ,we may call    
this1 if we please1 devolution4 ,were   
the conditions of his life very         
unfavorable1 man could not live as he   
now lives2 and1 indeed1 were they       
sufficiently unfavorable--for example1  

if the earth cooled off to a certain    
point--he could not live at all1 but    
would have to give place to a lowlier   
creature better fitted to the           
conditions4 ,must the man who foresees  
this end approaching strive to hasten   
its arrival1 or should he oppose it8 ,in
 a decadent society1 to come nearer to  
the problems which concern us in ethics1
 must a man strive to realize the social
 will expressed in progressive          
decadence8 ,should he hasten the decline
 of the community8  ,that those who     
study man as a moral being1 like those  
who study man in any of his other       
aspects1 will be more or less influenced
 in their outlook by the broadening of  
the horizon which results from a study  
of what the students of the evolutionary
 process have to tell us1 may be        
conceded4 ,but when we admit this1 we do
 not necessarily have to look for a new 
norm by which to judge conduct4 ,we     
seem1 rather1 forced to ask ourselves   
how this broadening of the horizon      

affects the norms which have heretofore 
appealed to men as reasonable4 ,to be   
sure1 any evolutionist has1 in the      
capacity of a moralist1 the right to    
suggest a new norm4 ,but1 in that case1 
he must1 like any other moralist1       
convince us that it is a reasonable one4
  #acb4 ,,evolution ,,and ,,the         
,,schools ,,of ,,the                    
,,moralists4--,those who have suggested 
the norms discussed above1 no one would 
think of as greatly influenced in their 
ethical teaching by the doctrine of     
evolution4 ,locke1 ,price1 ,butler and  
,sidgwick2 ,aristippus and ,epicurus2   
,paley and ,hobbes2 ,bentham and ,mill2 
,epictetus and ,marcus ,aurelius2       
,janet1 ,green1 and the rest1 no one    
would be inclined to class simply as    
evolutionary moralists4 ,some of them   
never thought of evolution at all4 ,how 
would it affect their standards of right
 and wrong were evolution expressly     
taken into account8 ,would the standards
 have to be abandoned8 ,or would the    

men1 as broader men1 merely have to     
revise some of their moral judgments8   
7#a7 ,it might be supposed that the     
acceptance of evolutionary doctrine     
would bring into being a grave problem  
for the intuitionist1 at least4 ,if the 
body and mind of man are products of    
evolution1 must we not admit as much of 
man's moral intuitions8 ,then why not   
admit that these may be replaced some   
day by other moral intuitions to be     
evolved in an unknown future8  ,he who  
reasons thus should bear in mind that   
,sidgwick1 who by no means repudiated   
the doctrine of evolution1 was an       
intuitionist1 and placed his ultimate   
moral intuitions on a par with such     
mathematical intuitions as that two and 
two make four4 ,if all intuitions are a 
product of evolution1 ,sidgwick might   
claim that the moral intuitions he      
accepts fare no worse than those        
elementary mathematical truths which we 
accept without question and without     
reflection4 ,and he might maintain that 

an appeal to evolution need cast no     
greater doubt upon ultimate moral truth 
than upon mathematical4 ,if intuitionism
 in all its forms is to be rejected1 it 
seems as though it must be done upon    
some other ground than an appeal to     
evolution4  7#b7 ,as to the egoist4 ,it 
is not easy to see how the appeal to    
evolution need disconcert him4 ,should  
he be so foolish as to maintain that    
egoism is always1 in fact1 necessary and
 unavoidable on the part of every living
 creature1 he might easily be refuted by
 a reference to the actual life of the  
brutes1 where altruism can be shown to  
play no insignificant role4 ,but if he  
simply maintains that the only          
reasonable principle for a man to adopt 
is egoism1 he may continue to do so4 ,he
 makes the self and its satisfactions   
his end4 ,how can it concern him to     
learn how the self came to be what it   
is1 or what it will be in the distant   
future8 ,he panders to the present self2
 he may assume that it will be          

reasonable to pander at the appropriate 
time to the self that is to be1 whatever
 its nature4  7#c7 ,the utilitarian     
remains such whether he makes the       
greatest good of the greatest number to 
consist in pleasure or in some other    
end1 such as self-preservation4 ,some   
utilitarians1 who have been inclined to 
emphasize the good of man1 rather than  
to extend even to the brutes the goods  
to be distributed1 may be influenced to 
extend the sphere of duties1 if they    
will listen to the evolutionist1 who    
cannot well leave out of view humbler   
creatures4 ,footnote3 ,thus we shall not
 go wrong in attributing to the higher  
animals in their simple social life1 not
 only the elementary feelings1 the loves
 and hates1 sympathies and jealousies   
which underlie all forms of society1 but
 also in a rudimentary stage the        
intelligence which enables those        
feelings to direct the operations of the
 animal so as best to gratify them4     
,,hobhouse1 ,ethics in ,evolution1      

chapter i1 ,sec #d4  ,he may broaden his
 sympathies4 ,but this need not compel  
him to abandon his fundamental doctrine4
  7#d7 ,a very similar conclusion may be
 drawn1 when we consider the influence  
of an acceptance of the doctrine of     
evolution upon those who would turn to  
man's nature1 to perfection1 or to      
self-realization1 as furnishing the norm
 of human conduct4  ,a ,marcus ,aurelius
 could1 with little reference to        
evolution1 accept man's nature1 or      
,nature in the wider sense1 as marking  
out for man the round of his duties4 ,a 
modern ,darwinian might fall back upon  
much the same standard1 while clearly   
conscious of the fact that man's nature 
is not something unchangeable1 and while
 inclined to view ,nature in general    
with different eyes from those of the   
,roman ,stoic4 ,no sensible evolutionist
 would maintain that a creature of a    
given species should act in defiance of 
all the instincts of creatures of that  
type1 merely on the ground that species 

may be involved in a process of         
progressive development4  ,nor need the 
perfectionist abandon his perfectionism 
in view of any such consideration4 ,he  
who measures perfection by the degree of
 activity exercised in action1 may admit
 that the coming man will be more       
perfect than it is possible for any man 
to be now2 but that need not prevent him
 from holding that it is man's present  
duty to aim at the only perfection      
possible to him1 he being what he is4   
,similar reasoning will apply to any    
other conception of perfection likely to
 be adopted1 consciously or             
unconsciously1 by any adherent of the   
school in question4  ,as for the        
self-realizationist1 a very little      
reflection seems sufficient to reveal   
that the maxim that it is man's duty to 
become all that it is in him to become  
is in no wise refuted by the claim that 
man may1 in the indefinitely distant    
future1 become much more than many      
people have supposed or now suppose4    

7#e7 ,there remains the doctrine of the 
,rational ,social ,will as furnishing   
the norm of conduct4 ,i have tried to   
show that this doctrine must rest upon  
broad views of man and of man's         
environment4 ,it is the very essence of 
the rational will to take broad views1  
to consider the past1 the present1 and  
the future4 ,surely the adherent of this
 school may let the evolutionist work in
 peace1 may thank him for any helpful   
suggestions he has to offer1 and may    
develop his own doctrine with little    
cause for uneasiness at the thought that
 information given him may refute his   
fundamental principle4  ,however1 it is 
not out of place for him to point out1  
if revolutionary measures of any sort   
are suggested by this or that           
evolutionist1 that ethics is a          
discipline which is concerned with what 
men have to do1 here and now4 ,it must  
take into consideration what is         
advisable and feasible4 ,utopian schemes
 which break violently with the actual  

order of things and the normal          
development of human societies may be   
suggested by evolutionists1 as they have
 been suggested by men who were not     
evolutionists at all4 ,they are not to  
be taken much more seriously in the one 
case than in the other4  #acc4 ,,the    
,,ethics ,,of ,,individual              
,,evolutionists4--,such considerations  
seem to make it evident that the        
acceptance of the doctrine of evolution 
should have no other influence upon us  
as moralists than that of making us take
 broad views of man and of his          
environment4 ,it still remains to find a
 norm of conduct1 and evolutionists1    
like other men1 may develop ethical     
systems which are not identical4 ,it is 
worth while here to touch very briefly  
upon the suggestions of one or two      
individual evolutionists4 ,those who    
speak of the ethics of evolution are    
very apt to have such in mind4  ,thus1  
,darwin1 whose study of the lower       
animals led him to believe that the     

social instincts have been developed for
 the general good rather than for the   
general happiness of the species1       
defines the good as the rearing of the  
greatest number of individuals in full  
vigor and health1 with all their        
faculties perfect1 under the conditions 
to which they have been subjected4 ,the 
greatest happiness principle he regards 
as an important secondary guide to      
conduct1 while making social instinct   
and sympathy primary guides4 ,footnote3 
,the ,descent of ,man1 chapter iv1      
concluding remarks4   ,spencer maintains
 that the evolution of conduct becomes  
the highest possible when the conduct   
simultaneously achieves the greatest    
totality of life in self1 in offspring1 
and in fellow-men4 ,the conduct called  
good1 he writes1 rises to the conduct   
conceived as best1 when it fulfills all 
three classes of ends at the same time4 
,but life he does not regard as         
necessarily a good4 ,he judges it to be 
good or bad according as it has or has  

not a surplus of agreeable feeling4     
,hence1 conduct is good or bad according
 as its total effects are pleasurable or
 painful4 ,footnote3 ,the ,data of      
,ethics1 chapter in1 ,sec ,sec #h and   
#aj4   ,to be sure1 ,spencer criticises 
the utilitarians1 and thinks little of  
the ,benthamic calculus of pleasures4   
,he believes that we should substitute  
for it something more scientific1 a     
study of the processes of life4 ,in his 
earlier writings he appears to be       
largely in accord with the intuitionists
 in judging of conduct1 regarding       
intuitions as having their origin in the
 experiences of the race4 ,nor does he  
ever seem inclined to break with        
intuitionism completely4 ,but1 as we    
have seen above 7,sec #ajh71 there      
appears to be nothing to prevent a      
utilitarian from being an intuitionist  
of some sort1 as well4  ,stephen1 in his
 clear and beautifully written work on  
morals1 also accepts the general        
happiness as the ultimate end of        

reasonable conduct2 and he1 too1        
criticizes the current utilitarianism4  
,he writes3 ,this1 as it seems to me1   
represents the real difference between  
the utilitarian and the evolutionist    
criterion4 ,the one lays down as a      
criterion the happiness1 the other the  
health of society4 ,footnote3 ,the      
,science of ,ethics1 ,london1 #ahhb1    
chapter ix1 #ab4 ,by which1 of course1  
he does not mean merely physical health1
 but such a condition of vigor and      
efficiency as carries with it a promise 
of continued existence and well- being  
in the future4  ,it is not necessary to 
multiply instances4 ,it can readily be  
seen that all three of the writers cited
 are utilitarians1 and the last two are 
what have been characterized as         
hedonistic utilitarians4 ,that they     
suggest this or that means of best      
attaining to the desired goal does not  
put them outside of a school which      
embraces men of many shades of opinion4 
,,chapter ,,xxviii  ,,pessimism   #acd4 

,,the ,,philosophy ,,of ,,the           
,,pessimist4--,with philosophy in       
general this volume has little to do2   
but as pessimism is not the doctrine of 
normal men generally1 but is apt to be  
identified in our minds with the        
teachings of certain of its leading     
exponents1 it may be well to give1 in   
briefest outline1 the type of reasonings
 upon which the pessimist may take his  
stand4  ,schopenhauer held that the one 
,world-,will1 which manifests itself in 
all nature1 inorganic and organic1 and  
is identical with the will of which each
 man is conscious in himself1 is a will 
to live4 ,when the ,world- ,will becomes
 conscious1 as it does in man1 the will 
to live is consciously asserted4 ,but   
the will to live is essentially blind   
and unreasoning1 or it would not do     
anything so stupid as to will life of   
any sort4 ,he writes3  ,only a blind    
will1 no seeing will1 could place itself
 in the position in which we behold     
ourselves4 ,a seeing will would rather  

have soon made the calculation that the 
business did not cover the cost2 for    
such a mighty effort and struggle1 with 
the straining of all the powers1 under  
constant care1 anxiety and want1 and    
with the inevitable destruction of every
 individual life1 finds no compensation 
in the ephemeral existence itself1 which
 is so obtained1 and which passes into  
nothing in our hands4 ,footnote3 ,the   
,world as ,will and ,idea1 translated by
 ,,haldane and ,,kemp1 ,london1 #ahif4  
,on the ,vanity and ,suffering of ,life4
 ,volume ,,iii1 p4 #cij4  ,the basis of 
all will1 says ,schopenhauer1 is need1  
deficiency1 and1 hence1 pain4 ,he dwells
 at length upon the misery of life1 and 
the desirability of a release from life4
 ,the refuge of suicide at once suggests
 itself1 but is rejected by             
,schopenhauer on the ground that the    
destruction of the individual cannot    
prevent the ,one ,will from manifesting 
itself in other individuals4 ,curiously 
enough he appears to approve of suicide 

by starvation1 as indicating a          
renunciation of the will to live4 ,but  
his general recommendation is           
asceticism1 renunciation of the striving
 for pleasure1 the voluntary acceptance 
of pain4 ,through this the ,will is to  
be taught to apprehend its own nature1  
and1 thus1 to deny itself4 ,how a       
general asceticism on our part will rob 
the one universal ,will1 revealed in the
 mineral1 vegetable and animal worlds1  
of its nature1 and still its strivings1 
the great pessimist does not indicate4  
,at this point1 von ,hartmann1 who may  
fairly be called ,schopenhauer's pupil1 
takes up the tale4 ,he suggests that it 
is conceivable that a universal negation
 of the will may be obtained1 if the    
preponderating part of the actual       
,world-,will should come to be contained
 in the conscious minds that resolve to 
will no more4 ,this he thinks may       
neutralize the whole1 and put an end to 
existence1 which is unavoidably an evil1
 and implies a preponderance of pain4   

,footnote3 ,philosophy of the           
,unconscious1 ,metaphysic of the        
,unconscious1 chapter xiv4  #ace4       
,,comment ,,on ,,the ,,ethics ,,of      
,,pessimism4--,on the metaphysics of the
 pessimists ,i shall make no comment    
save that there appears to be here      
sufficient vagueness to satisfy the most
 poetical of minds4 ,but the following  
points in the ethics of pessimism should
 be noted3  7#a7 ,pleasure and pain are 
made the measure of the desirability or 
undesirability of existence4  7#b7 ,it  
is assumed that pleasure and pain are   
measurable2 and that they may be        
quantitatively balanced against one     
another in such a way that this or that 
mixture of them may be declared by an   
enlightened man to be1 on the whole1    
desirable or the reverse4  7#c7 ,it is  
claimed that the balance must           
necessarily incline to the side of pain1
 and hence1 that life is not worth      
living4  7#d7 ,it follows from all this 
that it is our duty to aim1 not         

necessarily directly1 but in some       
manner1 at least1 at the destruction of 
life everywhere4  7#e7 ,i beg the reader
 to observe that the above doctrine     
rests upon assumptions which seem to be 
made without due consideration4 ,thus3  
7a7 ,it is by no means to be assumed    
without question that pleasure and pain 
alone are the measure of the desirable4 
,they are not the only things actually  
desired2 and1 if we assert that they    
alone are desirable1 we fall back upon a
 dubious intuition4  7#f7 ,the          
quantitative relations of pleasures and 
pains are legitimate subjects of        
dispute1 as we have seen in earlier     
chapters in this volume4 ,when is one   
pleasure twice as great as another8 ,how
 can we know that three pleasures       
counterbalance a pain8 ,is it by the    
mere fact that we will as we do1 in a   
given instance8 ,then how prove that we 
will as we do1 because of the           
equivalence of the pleasure to the pain8
  7c7 ,who shall decide for us whether  

life is--not desired1 it is admittedly  
that1 as a rule1--but1 also1 desirable8 
,may the man who denies it rest his     
assertion upon such general             
considerations as that satisfaction     
presupposes desire1 and that desire     
implies a lack1 and1 hence1 pain8 ,the  
famous author of ,utopia pointed out    
long ago that the pains of hunger begin 
before the pleasure of eating1 and only 
die when it does4 ,shall we1 then1      
regard a hearty appetite as a curse1 to 
be mitigated but not wholly neutralized 
by a series of good dinners8  ,to be    
sure1 the pessimists do not depend      
wholly upon such general arguments1 but 
point out in great detail that there is 
much suffering in the world1 and that   
the fulfillment of desire1 when it is   
attained1 often results in              
disillusionment4 ,but the fact remains  
that life1 such as it is1 is desired by 
men and other creatures generally2      
desired not as an exception1 and under a
 misapprehension1 but1 as a rule1 even  

by the enlightened and the far-seeing4  
,is not the desirable what is desired by
 the rational will8 ,we have seen that  
the rational social will does not aim at
 the suppression of desires generally1  
but only at the suppression of such     
desires as interfere with broader       
satisfactions4 ,viewed from this        
stand-point1 the pessimist's denial of  
the will to live appears as an          
expression of the accidental or         
irrational will4 ,it is not an          
expression of the nature of man1 but of 
the nature of the pessimist4  7#f7 ,it  
is1 perhaps1 worth while to point out   
that there is nothing to prevent a given
 pessimist from being an intuitionist1  
an egoist1 a utilitarian 7of a sort71 or
 an adherent of one of the other schools
 above discussed4 ,he may assume        
intuitively that life is undesirable2 in
 view of its undesirability he may act1 
either taking himself alone into        
consideration1 or including his         
neighbor2 he may invoke the doctrine of 

evolution2 he may even1 if he chooses1  
call it self-realization to annihilate  
himself1 for he may argue that a will   
that comes to clear consciousness must  
see that it must be its own undoing4 ,it
 is hardly necessary to point out1      
however1 that the pessimist1 as such1   
should not be in any wise confounded    
with the moralists discussed in the five
 chapters preceding4     ,,chapter      
,,xxix  ,,kant1 ,,hegel ,,and           
,,nietzsche   #acf4 ,,kant4---,it is    
impossible1 in any brief compass1 to    
treat of the many individual moralists1 
some of them men of genius and well     
worthy of our study1 who offer us       
ethical systems characterized by        
differences of more or less importance4 
,when we refer a man to this or that    
school and do no more1 we say           
comparatively little about him1 as has  
become evident in the preceding         
chapters4 ,as we have seen1 it has been 
necessary to class together those who   
differ rather widely in many of their   

opinions4 ,here1 ,i shall devote a few  
pages to three men only1 partly because 
of their prominence1 and partly because 
it is instructive to call attention to  
the contrast between them in their      
fundamental positions4 ,i shall begin   
with ,kant4  ,kant held that the human  
reason issues categorial imperatives1   
that is to say1 unconditional commands  
to act in certain ways4 ,the motive for 
moral action must not be the desire for 
pleasure1 but solely the desire to do   
right4  ,he makes his fundamental rule  
abstract and formal3 ,so act that you   
could wish your maxim to be universal   
law4 ,as no man could wish to be himself
 neglected when in distress1 this law   
compels him to be benevolent1 and a new 
form of the fundamental rule is         
developed3 ,treat humanity1 in yourself 
or any other1 as an end always1 and     
never as a means4 ,footnote3            
,fundamental ,principles of the         
,metaphysic of ,morals1 ,sec #b4  ,now  
,kant1 although he maintains that it is 

not a man's duty to seek his own        
happiness--a thing which natural        
inclination would prompt him to do-- by 
no means overlooks happiness altogether4
 ,he thinks that virtue and happiness   
together constitute the whole and       
perfect good desired by rational beings4
 ,the attainment of this good must be   
the supreme end of a will morally       
determined4 ,footnote3 ,dialectic of the
 ,pure ,practical ,reason1 chapter ii4  
,we are morally bound to strive to be   
virtuous ourselves and to make others   
happy4  ,still1 each man's happiness    
means much to him2 and ,kant1 convinced 
that virtue ought to be rewarded with   
happiness1 holds that our world is a    
moral world1 where ,god will reward the 
virtuous4 ,if we do not assume such a   
world1 he claims1 moral laws are reduced
 to idle dreams4 ,footnote3 ,ibid4      
,such utterances as the last may well   
lead the utilitarian to question whether
 ,kant was quite whole-hearted in his   
doctrine of the unconditional commands  

of the practical reason of man4 ,they   
appear to be not independent of all     
consideration of human happiness4  ,i   
shall not ask whether ,kant was         
consistent4 ,great men1 like lesser men1
 seldom are4 ,but1 in order that the    
contrast between his doctrine and those 
of the two writers whom ,i shall next   
discuss may be brought out clearly1 ,i  
shall ask that the following points be  
kept well in mind3  7#a7 ,kant was an   
out-and-out intuitionist4 ,he goes      
directly to the practical reason of man 
for an enunciation of the moral law4    
7#b7 ,moral rules of lesser generality1 
such as those touching benevolence1     
justice and veracity1 he traces to the  
practical reason1 making them           
independent of all considerations of    
expediency4 ,thus he defends the body of
 moral truth accepted by so many of his 
fellow-moralists4  7#c7 ,his practical  
reason speaks directly to the           
individual4 ,kant looked within1 not    
without4 ,we may call him an ethical    

individualist4 ,socrates1 when on trial 
for his life1 listened for the voice of 
the divinity within him4 ,he needed no  
other4  #acg4 ,,hegel4--,in strongest   
contrast to the individualism of ,kant  
stands the doctrine of ,hegel4 ,to the  
latter1 duty consists in the realization
 of the free reasonable will--but this  
will is identical in all individuals1   
,footnote3 ,the ,philosophy of ,right1  
,sec #bji and its realization reveals   
itself in the customs1 laws and         
institutions of the state4 ,from this   
point of view the individual is an      
accidental thing2 the ethical order     
revealed in society is permanent1 and   
has absolute authority4 ,it is true1    
however1 that it is not something       
foreign to the individual2 he is        
conscious of it as his own being4 ,in   
duty he finds his liberation4 ,footnote3
 ,ibid41 ,sec ,sec #ade-adi  ,but what  
is a man's duty8 ,what a man ought to   
do1 says ,hegel1 ,footnote3 ,ibid41 ,sec
 #aej what duties he should fulfill in  

order to be virtuous1 is in an ethical  
community easy to say--the man has only 
to do what is presented1 expressed and  
recognized in the established relations 
in which he finds himself4  ,in other   
words1 he ought to do just what his     
community prescribes6 ,this seems1 taken
 quite literally1 a startling doctrine4 
,it would be a wrong to ,hegel to take  
him quite literally1 for he elsewhere   
,footnote3 ,ibid41 ,introduction4 makes 
it plain that he by no means approves of
 all the laws and customs that have     
obtained in various societies4 ,still1  
he exalts the law of the state and      
regards any opposition to it on the     
authority of private conviction as      
stupendous presumption4 ,footnote3 ,op4 
cit41 ,sec #ach4 ,this is a serious     
rebuke to the reformer4 ,the individual 
must1 according to ,hegel1 look for the 
moral law outside of himself--of himself
 as an individual1 at least4 ,he must   
find it in the ,state4  #ach4           
,,nietzsche4--,again a startling        

contrast3 after ,hegel1 ,nietzsche--the 
voice of one crying in the wilderness1  
exquisitely1 passionately1 but scarcely 
with articulate scientific utterance4 ,a
 prophet of revolt and emancipation2 a  
cave-dweller1 who would flee organized  
society and the refinements of          
civilization2 the rabid individualist1  
to whom the community is the herd1 and  
common notions of right and wrong are   
absurdities to be visited with scorn and
 denunciation4 ,he makes a strong appeal
 to young men1 even after the years     
during which the carrying of one's own  
latch-key is a source of elation4 ,he   
appeals also to those perennially young 
persons who never attain to the stature 
which befits those who are to take a    
responsible share in the organized      
efforts of communities of men4  ,with   
,nietzsche the man1 his suffering life1 
and the melancholy eclipse of his       
brilliant intellect1 ethics as science  
is little concerned4 ,in ,nietzsche the 
marvellous literary artist it can have  

no interest4 ,these things are the      
affair of literature and biography4     
,here we are concerned only with his    
contribution to ethics4 ,just what that 
has been it is more difficult to        
determine than would be the case in a   
writer more systematic and scientific4  
,but he makes it very clear that he     
repudiates the morals which have been   
accepted heretofore by moralists and    
communities of men generally4  ,he      
confesses himself an immoralist4 ,he    
despises man as he is1 and hails the    
,superman1 a creature inspired by the   
will to have power and free from all    
moral prejudices1 including that of     
sympathy with the weak and the helpless4
  ,full is the world of the superfluous1
 he sings in his famous dithyramb1      
,footnote3 ,thus ,spake ,zarathustra1   
,i1 xi4 ,it is a pity to read           
,,nietzsche in any translation4 ,his    
diction is exquisite4 ,but those who can
 only read him in ,english may be       
referred to the translations of his     

works edited by ,,levy4 ,new ,york1     
#aiaa4 marred is life by the many-too-  
many4444 ,many too many are born2 for   
the superfluous ones was the ,state     
devised4444,there1 where the ,state     
ceaseth--there only commenceth the man  
who is not superfluous4  ,man1 says     
,nietzsche1 should regard himself as a  
bridge over which he can pass to        
something higher4 ,footnote3 ,ibid41    
,prologue1 and ,i1 ,,iv1 ,,xi1 et       
passim4 ,upon the fact that the         
,superman may have the same reason for  
regarding himself as a bridge as the    
most commonplace of mortals1 and may    
begin anew with loathing and            
self-contempt1 he does not dwell4 ,yet1 
as long as progress is possible1 man may
 always be regarded as a bridge4 ,the   
reader of ,nietzsche is tempted to      
believe that hatred and contempt must   
always be the predominant emotions in   
the mind of the superior man4 ,darwin1  
who knew much more about man and nature 
than did our passionate poet1 was still 

able to regard man as the crown and     
glory of the universe4 ,not so1         
,nietzsche4  ,those who have read little
 in ethics are inclined to attribute to 
,nietzsche a greater measure of         
originality than he can reasonably      
claim4 ,more than two milleniums before 
him1 ,plato conceived an ideal ,republic
 in which moral laws1 as commonly       
accepted1 were to be set aside4         
,marriage was to be done away with2     
births were to be scientifically        
regulated2 children were to be taken    
from their mothers2 sickly infants were 
to be destroyed4 ,in ,sparta the        
committee of the elders did not permit  
the promptings of sympathy and the cries
 of wounded maternal love to influence  
the decision touching the life or death 
of the new-born4  ,here was an attempt  
at bridge-building1 but it was conceived
 as a scientific matter1 to be taken in 
hand by the ,state1 and for the good of 
the ,state4 ,but ,nietzsche would       
destroy the ,state4 ,his ,superman      

appears as individualistic as a rogue   
elephant1 a few passages to the contrary
 notwithstanding4 ,are we to regard him 
as a mere lawless egoist1 or as         
something more8 ,we are left in the     
dark4 ,footnote3 ,see the volume1       
,beyond ,good and ,evil1 ,what is       
,noble8 ,sec #bfe4 ,but we note that    
,nietzsche disagrees with most          
moralists1 in that he refuses to regard 
,caesar ,borgia as a morbid growth4     
,footnote3 ,ibid41 ,the ,natural        
,history of ,morals1 ,sec #aig4         
,,dostoievsky',s genius has portrayed   
for us an admirable ,superman in the    
person of the ,russian convict ,orloff4 
,see his ,house of the ,dead1 chapter v4
  ,the ,superman has always been with   
us1 in somewhat varying types4 ,from    
,alexander the ,great to ,napoleon1 and 
before and after1 he adorns the pages of
 history4 ,attila1 among others1 may    
enter his claim to consideration4 ,it   
remains for the serious student of      
ethics to estimate scientifically his   

value as an ethical ideal1 and to judge 
how far this type of character may      
profitably be taken as a pattern4       
,nietzsche stands at the farthest       
possible remove from ,hegel4 ,does he1  
as an individualist1 stand within hail  
of ,kant8 ,it scarcely seems so4 ,when  
we examine ,kant's practical reason1 in 
other words1 the moral law as it        
revealed itself to ,kant1 we find that  
it had taken up into itself the moral   
development of the ages preceding4      
,kant's practical reason1 his           
conscience1 to speak plain ,english1 was
 not the practical reason of1 for       
example1 ,aristotle4 ,the latter could  
speak of a slave as an animated tool1   
and could believe there were men        
intended by nature for slavery4 ,kant   
could not4 ,in theory an individualist1 
the ,sage of ,konigsberg stands1 in     
reality1 not far from ,hegel4 ,he does  
not break with the past4 ,but ,nietzsche
 is revolt incarnate4   ,,part ,,viii   
,,the ,,ethics ,,of ,,the ,,social      

,,will   ,,chapter ,,xxx  ,,aspects ,,of
 ,,the ,,ethics ,,of ,,reason   #aci4   
,,the ,,doctrine ,,supported ,,by ,,the 
,,other ,,schools4--- ,i urge the more  
confidently the ,ethics of ,reason1 or  
the ,ethics of the ,rational ,social    
,will1 because there is so little in it 
that is really new4 ,it only makes      
articulate what we all know already1 and
 strives to get rid of certain          
exaggerations into which many men who   
reason1 and who reason well1 have       
unwittingly fallen4  ,the fundamentals  
of the doctrine have been exhibited in  
,parts ,v and ,,vi of this volume1 and  
the exaggerations alluded to have been  
treated in ,part ,,vii4 ,hence1 ,i may  
speak very briefly in indicating how the
 ,ethics of ,reason finds a many-sided  
support in schools which appear1 on the 
surface1 to be in the opposition4  ,it  
is evident1 to begin with1 that the     
,ethics of the ,social ,will cannot     
dispense with ,moral ,intuitions1 but   
must regard them as indispensable2 as1  

indeed1 the very foundation of the moral
 life4 ,that the individual may1 and if 
he is properly equipped for the task1   
ought1 to examine critically his own    
moral intuitions and those of the       
community in which he finds himself1 and
 should1 with becoming modesty and      
hesitation1 now and then suggest an     
innovation1 means no more than that he  
and the community are not dead1 but are 
living1 and that progress is a          
possibility1 at least4  ,as for the     
,egoist1 unless he is an absurd         
extremist1 we must admit that he says   
much that is worth listening to4 ,was   
not ,bentham quite right in maintaining 
that if all ,a's interests were         
committed to ,b1 and all ,b's to ,a1 the
 world would get on very badly8 ,a      
charity that begins at the planet ,mars 
would arrive nowhere4 ,the ,ethics of   
,reason has room for a very careful     
consideration of the interests of the   
self4 ,but it may object to the position
 that the moral mathematician may regard

 as the only important number the number
 ,one4  ,with the ,utilitarian our      
doctrine need have1 as we have seen1 no 
quarrel4 ,did not that learned1         
enlightened1 and most fair-minded of    
utilitarians1 ,sidgwick1 ultimately     
resolve the happiness which men seek    
into anything which may be the object of
 the mind in willing8 ,did not a        
critical utilitarianism resolve itself  
into the doctrine of the ,rational      
,social ,will8 ,why take less critical  
utilitarians as the only exponents of   
the school8 ,besides1 is there any      
reason why the social will should be    
blind to the fact that men generally do 
desire to gain pleasure and to avoid    
pain8 ,it is only the exaggeration of   
this truth that we need to combat4  ,to 
,nature1 properly understood1 we can    
enter no objection4 ,who objects to     
,perfection as a counsel of perfection8 
,can the ,social ,will object to a man's
 striving to ,realize his               
,capacities--under proper control1 and  

with a regard to others8 ,the ,pessimist
 is an unhealthy creature1 and the      
,social ,will represents normal and     
healthy humanity4 ,here we have         
disparity4 ,but to ,evolution our       
doctrine offers no opposition4 ,it is   
only by a process of development that   
the ,actual ,social ,will has come to be
 what it is2 and the ,rational ,social  
,will looks to a further development    
under the guidance of reason4  ,the fact
 is that thoughtful men belonging to    
different schools tend to introduce into
 their statement of their doctrines     
modifying clauses2 and in the end we    
find them not as far apart as they      
seemed at the beginning4 ,the tendency  
is1 ,i think1 in the direction of the   
recognition of the ,rational ,social    
,will4 ,this doctrine belongs to nobody 
in particular2 it is the4 common        
property of us all4 ,it contains little 
that is startling4  #adj4 ,,its ,,method
 ,,of ,,approach ,,to ,,problems4---,he 
who looks to the ,rational ,social ,will

 for guidance is given a compass which  
may be of no small service to him4 ,for 
example3  7#a7 ,he will see that moral  
phenomena are not to be isolated4 ,he   
will accept the historic order of       
society and judge man and his emotions  
and actions in the light of it4 ,he will
 never feel tempted to say1 with        
,bentham1 that the pleasure which has   
its roots in malice1 envy1 cruelty1     
taken by itself1 is good4 ,footnote3    
,principles of ,morals and ,legislation1
 chapter x1 ,sec #aj1 note4  ,he will   
simply say1 it is pleasure4 ,that it is1
 of course2 but he will maintain that   
nothing taken by itself is either good  
or bad1 from the moralist's point of    
view4 ,the cruel man may will to see    
suffering1 and may enjoy it4 ,the moral 
man may hold that the cruel man1 his act
 of will1 and his pleasure1 should all  
be snuffed out1 in the interest of      
humanity1 as an unmitigated evil4  7#b7 
,the advocate of the ,rational ,social  
,will recognizes1 as do many adherents  

of other schools1 that the social will1 
as expressed at any given time1 is only 
relatively rational2 that men must live 
in their own day and generation1        
although they can1 to some degree1 reach
 beyond them2 and that some differences 
of opinion as to the relative values of 
virtues1 and the goodness of characters1
 are to be expected4  7#c7 ,furthermore1
 he is in a position to explain how a   
man may be subjectively right and yet   
objectively wrong4 ,the man's character 
may be such that it is1 on the whole1 to
 be approved by the ,rational ,social   
,will4 ,he may be animated by the desire
 to adjust himself to that will4 ,and   
yet1 the accident of ignorance1 the     
accident of prejudice not recognized by 
himself as such1 may lead him to do what
 he thinks right and what those more    
enlightened recognize to be wrong4      
#ada4 ,,its ,,solution ,,of ,,certain   
,,difficulties4--,perhaps it would be   
better for me to give this section a    
heading more nearly like the last4 ,i   

aim only to give the reader a point of  
view from which he can approach the     
problem of a solution4  ,take the       
problem which has come up before in the 
form of the distribution of pleasures4  
,footnote3 ,see ,sec #aji4 ,he who      
dwells1 not so much upon pleasure1 as   
upon the satisfaction of desire and     
will1 must state it differently1 but the
 problem is much the same4 ,what degree 
of recognition should be given to the   
will of each individual1 or to the      
separate volitions and desires in the   
life of the individual8 ,should         
everybody count for one8 ,should every  
desire or group of desires receive      
recognition8 ,is no distinction to be   
made in the intensity of desires8 ,and  
how many individuals shall we include in
 our reckoning8  ,light seems to be shed
 upon this complicated problem or set of
 problems when we hold clearly before   
ourselves what the task of reason is in 
regulating the life of man individually 
and collectively4 ,its function is to   

bring order out of chaos and strife2 to 
substitute harmony and planfulness for  
accident2 to introduce long views in the
 place of momentary impulses2 to prevent
 the barter of permanent good for a mess
 of pottage4  ,reason must accept the   
impulses and instincts of man as it     
finds them1 and do what it can with     
them4 ,it cannot ignore them4 ,slowly1  
civilizations1 to some degree rational1 
have come into being4 ,in so far as they
 are rational1 they are justified4      
,keeping all this in view we may say1   
tentatively3  7a7 ,the principle1       
everybody to count for one1 and nobody  
for more than one1 must be interpreted  
as an expression of the conviction that 
no will should be needlessly sacrificed4
  ,reason is bodiless1 except as        
incorporated in human societies1 and    
these must have their historic          
development4 ,can we do away with the   
special claims of family1 of            
neighborhood1 of the state8 ,they have  
their place in the historic rational    

order4 ,but the whispered everybody to  
count for one may help us to realize    
that such special claims cannot take the
 place of all others4  7b7 ,shall a     
deliberate attempt be made to enlarge   
the circle of those who are to share in 
the social will1 not merely by          
diminishing the number of deaths1 but by
 promoting the number of births8 ,states
 have attempted it often enough4 ,i can 
only say that1 if this be attempted1 it 
should not be attempted in ways that    
ignore the historical development of    
society1 with its social and moral      
traditions4  7c7 ,why not justify our   
attitude toward the brutes by           
maintaining that they have1             
theoretically1 rights to recognition1 in
 so far as such recognition does not    
interfere with the rights of man in the 
rational social order8 ,the brutes      
outnumber us1 to be sure4 ,we are in a  
hopeless minority4 ,but were this       
minority sacrificed1 there would be no  
rational social order at all--no right1 

no wrong2 nothing but the clash of wills
 or impulses which reason now strives to
 harmonize as it can4 ,footnote3 ,see   
chapter xxi  7d7 ,when we turn to the   
problem of the distribution of          
satisfactions in the life of the        
individual1 we find ready to hand a     
variety of unwise saws--,a short life   
and a merry one1 and the like4  ,how    
should the individual choose his        
satisfactions8 ,merely from the         
standpoint of the individual8 ,what is  
desirable8 ,not desired1 by this man or 
by that1 but desirable1 reasonable8  ,it
 is an open secret that the house of    
mirth lacks every convenience demanded  
of a permanent residence1 and that those
 who breathlessly pursue pleasure are   
seldom pleased4 ,nor do men1 when they  
stop to think1 want their lives to be   
very short4  ,and1 in any case1 this    
question of the distribution of         
satisfactions in the life of the        
individual does not concern the         
individual alone4 ,is the man who wants 

a short life and a merry one an         
undesirable from the standpoint of the  
,rational ,social ,will8 ,then he should
 be suppressed4 ,the manner of          
distribution of even his own personal   
satisfactions is not his affair         
exclusively4 ,every ordered society has 
its notions touching the type of man    
which suits its ends4  7e7 ,but shall   
we1 in making up our minds about the    
satisfaction on the whole which busies  
the rational individual or the rational 
community1 take no account at all of the
 intensity of pleasures and of pains1   
the eagerness with which some things are
 desired and the feebleness of the      
impulsion toward others8 ,may not the   
intense thrill of a moment more than    
counterbalance four lukewarm hours8 ,are
 we not1 if we take such things into    
consideration1 back again face to face  
with something very like the calculus of
 pleasures--that bugbear of the egoist  
and of the utilitarian8  ,it would be   
foolish to maintain that man1 either    

individually or collectively1 places all
 desires upon the same level4 ,no man of
 sense holds that every desire should   
count as one4 ,on the other hand1 no man
 of sense pretends to have any accurate 
unit of measurement by which he can make
 unerring estimates of desirability4    
,fortunately1 he is not compelled to    
fall back upon such a unit4 ,even if he 
was born yesterday1 the race was not4   
,he is born into a system of values     
expressed in social organization and    
social institutions4 ,it is the         
resultant of innumerable expressions of 
preference on the part of innumerable   
men4 ,it is a general guide to what1 on 
the whole1 man wants4  ,it is1 then1    
foolish for him to raise such questions 
as1 whether it is not better to aim at  
intense happiness on the part of the    
few1 to the utter ignoring of the mass  
of mankind4 ,such questions the         
,rational ,social ,will has already     
answered in the negative4  #adb4 ,,the  
,,cultivation ,,of ,,our                

,,capacities4--,finally1 we may approach
 the question whether it is reasonable  
to awake dormant desires1 to call into  
being new needs2 which1 satisfied1 may  
be recognized as a good1 but which1     
unsatisfied1 may result in unhappiness4 
,footnote3 ,compare chapter xxi1 ,sec   
#hf4  ,a little cup may be filled with  
what leaves a big one half empty4 ,it is
 easy to find grounds upon which to     
congratulate the average man4 ,all the  
world caters to him--ready-made clothing
 is measured to fit his figure1 and it  
is sold cheap2 the average restaurant   
consults his taste and his pocket2 the  
average woman just suits him as a       
help-mate2 he is much at home with his  
neighbors1 most of whom diverge little  
from the average4 ,why strive to rise   
above the average--and fall into a      
divine discontent8  ,may one not say    
much the same of a community8 ,why      
should it strive to attain to new       
conquests1 to awaken in its members new 
wants and strain to satisfy them8 ,does 

it seem self-evident that it is         
reasonable1 in general1 to multiply     
desires with no guarantee of their      
satisfaction8  ,i know no way of        
approaching the solution of this problem
 save from the standpoint of the        
,rational ,social ,will4 ,we are        
confronted with the general problem of  
the desirability of civilization1 with  
all that that implies4 ,the life of man 
in some rather primitive societies has  
seemed in certain respects rather       
idyllic4 ,the eating of the fruit of the
 tree1 and the consequent opening of the
 eyes1 has1 time and again1 seemed to   
result in disaster4  ,but was the       
idyllic life not an accidental thing1   
due to a fortuitous combination of      
circumstances1 rather than to man's     
intelligent control of a larger         
environment8 ,civilization of some sort 
seems inevitable4 ,have we any other    
guarantee that we can make it1 in the   
long run1 rational1 than a many-sided   
development of man's capacities8 ,and   

must we not exercise a broad faith in   
the value of enlightenment1 increase of 
knowledge1 farsightedness1 the          
cultivation of complex emotions1 even at
 the risk of some waste of effort and   
some suffering to certain individuals8  
,perhaps this is as good a place as any 
to say a word about the significance of 
the terms higher and lower1 when used in
 a moral sense4 ,we have seen that ,john
 ,stuart ,mill made much of the         
distinction in his utilitarianism4      
,bentham appears to sin against the     
enlightened moral judgment in holding   
that1 quantities of pleasure being the  
same1 push- pin is as good as poetry4   
,when we realize that the worth of      
things may be determined from the       
standpoint of the ,rational ,social     
,will1 we can easily understand that    
some occupations and their accompanying 
pleasures should be rated higher than   
others1 however satisfactory the latter 
may seem to certain individuals4 ,it is 
not unreasonable to rate the pleasure of

 scientific discovery as higher than the
 pleasure of swallowing an oyster2 and  
that1 without following ,bentham in     
falling back upon a quantitative        
standard1 or following ,mill in         
maintaining that pleasures1 as          
pleasures1 differ in kind4 ,footnote3   
,see chapter xxv1 ,sec #ajg4            
,,chapter ,,xxxi  ,,the ,,moral ,,law   
,,and ,,moral ,,ideals   #adc4 ,,duties 
,,and ,,virtues4--,we saw1 at the very  
beginning of this volume ,footnote3     
,chapter i1 ,sec #b4 that a single moral
 law1 so abstractly stated as to cover  
the whole sphere of conduct1 must be    
something so vague and indeterminate as 
to be practically useless as a guide to 
action4 ,the admonition1 do right1 does 
not mean anything in particular to the  
man who is not already well instructed  
as to what1 in detail1 constitutes right
 action4 ,nor do we make ourselves more 
intelligible1 when we say to him be     
good4  ,it seems to mean something more 
when we say act justly or be just2 speak

 the truth1 or be truthful4 ,and the    
more we particularize1 the more we help 
the individual confronted with concrete 
problems--the only problems with which  
life actually confronts us4  ,this is as
 it should be4 ,duties and virtues are  
expressions of the ,rational ,social    
,will1 and that will is a mere          
abstraction except as it is             
incorporated1 with a wealth of detail1  
in human societies4 ,it would be hard   
for the small boy to classify1 under any
 ten commandments1 the innumerable      
company of the don'ts which he hears    
from his mother during the course of a  
week4 ,he can leave such work to the    
moralist4 ,but he is receiving an       
education in the moral law1 as an       
expression of the social will1 through  
the whole seven days4  ,if we wish1 we  
can emphasize the moral law1 and dwell  
upon the duties of man4 ,on the other   
hand1 we may lay stress upon the        
virtues1 and point to ideals4 ,the      
,greek made much of the virtues2 the    

,christian moralist had more to say of  
man's duties4 ,in the end1 there need be
 little discrepancy in the results4 ,i  
make the same recommendation1 whether ,i
 say to a man1 ,speak the truth6 or     
whether ,i say to him1 ,be truthful6    
,it may be claimed that shades of       
difference make themselves apparent1    
where one emphasizes the law and another
 points to an ideal4 ,perhaps they do1  
in most minds4 ,it certainly sounds more
 conceited to say3 ,i am trying to be   
virtuous1 than to say3 ,i am trying to  
do my duty4 ,on the other hand1 the     
admonition1 ,be truthful1 appears to    
leave one a little latitude4 ,we take   
the truthful man1 so to speak1 in the   
lump4 ,if he has a strong bias toward   
truth-speaking1 and is felt to be       
reliable1 on the whole1 it is not       
certain that we should rob him of his   
title on the ground of one or two lapses
 for which weighty reasons could be     
urged4 ,the admonition3 ,speak the      
truth6 seems more uncompromising2 and   

yet he who prefers this legal form may  
maintain that it is a general admonition
 addressed to men of sense who are      
supposed to be able to exercise reason4 
#add4 ,,the ,,negative ,,aspect ,,of    
,,the ,,moral ,,law4--,why does the     
,moral ,law1 on the surface at least1   
appear to be so largely negative8 ,as we
 look back upon our early youth1 our    
days appear to be punctuated with       
punishments4 ,when we attain to years of
 discretion1 this is not the case1 with 
most of us1 at least4  ,but when we turn
 to the law1 in our own society or in   
others1 we find prohibitions and        
penalties everywhere4 ,of rewards little
 is said4 ,is the social will meant to  
be chiefly inhibitory8 ,is it a check to
 the action of the individual8  7#a7    
,the negative aspect of the moral law   
is1 to a considerable degree1 an        
illusion4 ,the social will takes us up  
into itself and forms us4 ,in our early 
youth we are acutely conscious of the   
process4 ,a vast number of the things a 

boy wants to do are things that do not  
suit the social will at all4 ,he wants  
to break windows2 he wants to fight     
other boys2 he wants to be idle2 his    
delight is in adventures not normally   
within the reach of1 or suited to the   
taste of1 the citizens of an ordered    
state4 ,it is little wonder that the boy
 regards the moral law as a nuisance and
 the state as a suitable refuge for     
those suffering from senile decay4      
,there are individuals who scarcely get 
beyond this stage4 ,they remain1 even in
 their later years1 at war with the     
state4 ,from time to time1 we seize them
 and incarcerate them4 ,that the law    
forbids and punishes1 they never forget4
 ,it is chiefly for such that the       
criminal law exists4 ,they are in the   
state1 but they are not of it4 ,they    
have small share in the heritage of the 
civilized man4  ,for most of us there   
comes a time when most prohibitions are 
little thought of4 ,it has been         
maintained1 that the law is negative    

partly for the reason that positive     
duties are too numerous to be           
formulated4 ,but how numerous are the   
things that ought not to be done which  
normal men never think of doing6 ,at    
this moment1 ,i could swallow a pen1    
taste the ink in the ink-well1 throw my 
papers from the window1 hurl the        
porcelain jar on the chimney-piece at   
the cat next door1 swing on the         
chandelier4 ,i am conscious of no       
constraint in not doing these things4   
,why8 ,i have become to some degree     
adjusted to the type which the social   
will strives to produce4  7#b7 ,and1    
having become so far adjusted1 ,i       
recognize that the social will is       
distributing rewards most lavishly4 ,the
 whole organism of society is its       
instrument4 ,work is found for me1 and  
,i am paid for it4 ,if ,i am industrious
 and dependable1 ,i am recompensed4 ,if 
,i am truthful1 ,i am believed1 which is
 no little convenience4 ,if ,i am       
energetic and persevering1 ,i may grow  

rich or be elected to office4 ,if ,i am 
courteous1 ,i am liked and am treated   
with courtesy4  ,every day ,i am paid1  
in the ordinary course of things1       
according to my deserts4 ,why should    
society work out an extraordinary system
 of rewards for those whom it is already
 rewarding automatically8  ,in some     
cases1 recourse is had to extraordinary 
rewards4 ,we give prizes to children in 
the schools2 we give medals to soldiers 
for distinguished service2 we confer    
honorary degrees upon men for a variety 
of reasons4 ,in monarchical countries   
and in their colonies1 the man who earns
 an extraordinary reward may even pass  
it on1 in the shape of a title1 to his  
descendants1 as though it were original 
sin4 ,but the giving of extraordinary   
rewards to all ordinary1 normal persons 
would be too much4  ,the man who        
markedly offends against the moral law  
is not an ordinary1 normal person4 ,he  
is not adjusted to the social will4 ,it 
is natural that he should attract       

especial attention4 ,thus the ,thou     
shalt not6 is given prominence4 ,to this
 ,i might add1 that punishments are     
cheaper and easier than extraordinary   
rewards4 ,pains are sharper than        
pleasures1 and are easily inflicted4    
7#c7 ,it is worthy of remark that1 with 
the evolution of morality1 it tends to  
become positive4 ,the enlightened moral 
man recognizes1 not merely the actual   
social will1 but also the ,rational     
,social ,will4 ,he may feel it his duty 
to do much more than society formally   
demands of him4  #ade4 ,,how ,,can ,,one
 ,,know ,,the ,,moral ,,law8--,this     
question has already been answered in   
chapters preceding4 ,every man has three
 counsellors3 7#a7 ,the objective       
morality of his community--custom1 law1 
and public opinion1 which certainly     
deserve to be taken very seriously2 7#b7
 his moral intuitions1 which may be of  
the finest2 and 7#c7 his reason1 which  
prevents him from making decisions      
without reflection4  ,can a man who     

listens to these three counsellors be   
sure that he is right in a given        
decision8 ,the sooner a man learns that 
he is not infallible and impeccable1 the
 better it will be for him1 for his     
neighbor1 and for the world at large4   
,,chapter ,,xxxii  ,,the ,,moral        
,,concepts   #adf4 ,,good ,,and ,,bad2  
,,right ,,and ,,wrong4--,as a rule1 men 
reflect little touching the moral terms 
which are on their lips every day4 ,it  
is well worth while to take some of them
 up and to turn them over for           
examination4  ,we may use the terms good
 and bad1 right and wrong1 in a very    
broad sense4 ,a good trick may be a     
contemptible action2 the right way to   
crack a bank-safe may be the means to   
the successful commission of a crime4   
,evidently1 the words1 thus used1 are   
not employed in a moral sense4  ,when we
 pass judgments from the moral point of 
view1 we concern ourselves with men and 
with their actions1 and measure them by 
the standard of the social will4 ,men   

and actions are good1 when they can meet
 the test4 ,actions are right or wrong1 
when they are in accordance with the    
dictates of the moral law1 or are at    
variance with them4 ,that an act may be 
both right and wrong1 when viewed from  
different standpoints1 even on moral    
ground1 we have seen in ,chapter ,,xxx4 
,a man may mean to do right1 and may1   
through ignorance or error1 be guilty of
 an act that we condemn4 ,to the        
intelligent1 confusions are here        
unnecessary4 ,but the history of ethics 
is full of confusions in just this      
field4  #adg4 ,,duty ,,and              
,,obligation4--,verbal usage sometimes  
justifies the use of one of these words1
 and sometimes that of the other4 ,we   
say3 ,i did my duty2 we do not say3 ,i  
did my obligation4 ,but this is a mere  
matter of verbal expression1 and we are 
really concerned with two names for the 
same thing4  7#a7 ,there has been much  
dispute as to whether the sense of duty 
or moral obligation can or cannot be    

analyzed4 ,it has been declared         
unanalyzable and unique4 ,some think    
this a point of much importance which   
imparts a peculiar sacredness to the    
sense of duty4  ,there appears no reason
 why this position should be taken4 ,no 
one has been able to analyze into its   
ultimate sensational elements the       
peculiar feeling one has when one is    
tickled4 ,but this does not make the    
feeling sacred or awe-inspiring4 ,the   
authority of the sense of duty must be  
looked for in another direction--and    
authority it has4  7#b7 ,i have spoken  
of the sense of duty4 ,we all recognize 
that1 when we are faced with a duty1 a  
feeling is normally present4 ,but the   
whole argument of this volume has       
maintained that man is not to be treated
 only as the subject of emotions4 ,he is
 a rational being4 ,in some persons     
feeling is very prominent2 in others it 
is less so4 ,it is quite conceivable    
that1 in a given case1 a man capable of 
reflection should recognize that he is  

confronted with a duty1 and yet that he 
should feel no impulse to perform it4   
,did no one ever feel any such impulse1 
the whole system of duties1 the whole   
rational order of society itself1 would 
dissolve and disappear4  ,fortunately1  
the normal man does feel an impulse to  
perform duties recognized as such4 ,and 
in the case of those exceptional persons
 who do not1 society strives to supply  
surrogates1 extraordinary impulses based
 upon a system of rewards and           
punishments4 ,this is a mere supplement1
 and could never keep alive a society   
from which the sense of duty had        
disappeared4  ,duty is sacred4 ,it is   
the very foundation of every rational   
society4 ,it does not greatly concern   
ethics whether the impulse1 which makes 
itself felt in men who want to do their 
duty1 can or cannot be analyzed4 ,but it
 is all-important that they should feel 
the impulse4  7#c7 ,can a man do more   
than his duty8 ,is it the duty of       
everyone to be1 not merely a good1      

average1 honest1 faithful1 law-abiding  
citizen1 but to go far beyond this and  
be conspicuously a saint8  ,it should be
 remembered that we are concerned with  
the connotation properly to be given to 
a word in common use4  ,a certain amount
 of goodness the social will appears to 
demand of men rather peremptorily4 ,its 
demands seem to vary somewhat with the  
exigencies of the times--for example1 in
 peace and in war4 ,it does not make the
 same demands of all men4 ,from those to
 whom much has been given-- wealth1     
education1 social or political          
influence1--much is required4 ,from     
certain persons it appears to be glad to
 get anything4 ,if they keep out of the 
police-court1 it is agreeably surprised4
  ,i have no desire to dissuade anyone  
from the arduous pursuit of sainthood2  
but ,i submit that the word duty1 as    
sanctioned by usage1 implies but a      
limited demand1 and takes cognizance of 
character and environment4 ,he who comes
 up to this moderate standard is not    

condemned2 but he is free to go farther 
and to become as great a saint as he    
pleases4 ,in which case1 we admire him4 
,those who1 in the past1 have spoken of 
counsels of perfection1 have drawn upon 
a profound knowledge of human nature and
 of human societies4  #adh4 ,,reward    
,,and ,,punishment4--,we saw in the last
 chapter 7,sec #add7 that it is         
something of a criticism upon man and   
upon societies of men that extraordinary
 rewards have to be given and that      
punishments must be inflicted4  ,more   
attention has been paid to punishments  
than to rewards1 and the question       
touching the proper aim of punishment in
 a civilized state has received much    
discussion4 ,the study of the history of
 the infliction of punishment is        
suggestive1 but it does not shed a clear
 light4 ,the social will has not always 
been a rational social will1 and some of
 its decisions may be placed among the  
curiosities of literature4 ,still1 they 
may serve the purpose of the traditional

 terrible example4  ,should we1 in      
punishing1 aim at the prevention of     
crime8 ,are punishments to be deterrent8
 ,under this head we must consider1 not 
merely the criminal himself1 but also   
those who are in more or less danger of 
becoming criminals1 though they have1 as
 yet1 committed no known crime4  ,should
 the aim of punishment be the           
reformation of the criminal8  ,should we
 punish merely that justice be done8 ,he
 who steals and eats fruit is visited   
with punishment1 in the course of       
nature1 if the fruit is unripe4 ,but he 
suffers equally if he eats his own      
fruit1 under like conditions4 ,this     
seems a blind punishment4 ,should we    
visit pain upon him for the theft1      
merely because it is a theft1 and       
without looking abroad for any other    
reason8  ,light appears to be thrown    
upon these problems when we reflect that
 punishment is an instrument1 employed  
by the ,rational ,social ,will1 in      
pursuance of its ends4  7#a7 ,it is     

desirable that men should be deterred   
from committing crime4 ,if this cannot  
be done save by the infliction of       
punishment1 then let men be punished4   
,but be it remembered that punishment is
 a regrettable necessity1 and that the  
occasions for the infliction of         
penalties may greatly be diminished by  
the amelioration of the organism of     
society4 ,there is the born criminal1 as
 there is the born inmate of an asylum  
for the insane4 ,but there is also the  
manufactured criminal2 the product of   
the slum1 the victim of ignorance1 the  
prey of the walking-delegate1 the       
sufferer from over-work and             
undernourishment1 the inhabitant of the 
filthy and overcrowded tenement1 the man
 robbed of his self-respect1 who has no 
share in the sweetness and light of     
civilization4 ,a society that first     
manufactures criminals and then expends 
great sums in punishing them is1 in so  
far1 not rational4  7#b7 ,it is         
desirable that the criminal should be   

reformed and returned to society as a   
normal man4 ,but this is not the one and
 only aim of the social will4 ,the whole
 flock should not be sacrificed to the  
one black sheep1 as some sentimental    
persons appear to believe4 ,there is    
room here for the exercise of judgment  
and of some cool calculation4  7#c7 ,as 
for the demand that a given pain shall  
be inflicted for a given wrong done1    
irrespective of any gain to anybody1 and
 irrespective of consequences1--it      
appears to carry one back to ancient and
 primitive law4  ,undoubtedly many      
punishments have been inflicted in the  
past to satisfy the sense of resentment4
 ,footnote3 ,it may be objected that we 
are not concerned here with resentment  
but with the satisfaction of justice4   
,men's notions of the justice of        
punishments have been touched upon in   
chapter ii1 ,sec #d4 ,plato suggests1 in
 his ,laws1 that the slave who steals a 
bunch of grapes should receive a blow   
for every grape in the bunch4 ,this has 

an agreeably mathematical flavor of     
exactitude4 ,but what shall be done to  
the man who steals half of a ham or a   
third of a watermelon8 ,undoubtedly the 
same is true of the present4 ,can       
anything be said in favor of this       
impulse8 ,it plays no small part in the 
life of humanity4  ,we feel that a bad  
man ought to be punished4 ,we harbor a  
certain resentment against him4 ,the    
resentment of the individual for        
personal injuries we recognize to be    
wrong4 ,it is not impartial1 and it is  
apt to be excessive and unreasoning4    
,public order demands that it be refused
 expression4  ,but is the--we must      
admit1 somewhat more                    
disinterested--resentment of the        
community a rational thing8 ,have men1  
collectively1 no whims1 no prejudices8  
,when a trial is deferred1 and public   
indignation has cooled off1 how do the  
chances of the prisoner compare with    
those he enjoyed just after the         
commission of the crime8 ,and yet       

something may be said for public        
resentment4 ,it has a certain           
driving-power4 ,it may be questioned    
whether either our desire to deter men  
from crime1 or our benevolent interest  
in the criminal1 would be quite         
sufficient to enforce law1 if all sense 
of resentment against the law-breaker   
were lacking4 ,its usefulness as an     
instrument of the social will appears to
 give it a certain justification4 ,but  
it also suggests that even public       
resentment should not be given free     
rein4  ,before leaving the subject of   
reward and punishment1 it may be well to
 say a word touching our use of the     
terms credit and discredit1 merit and   
demerit4  ,we do not give a man credit  
for an action1 we do not think of him as
 meritorious1 merely because he has done
 right4 ,who thinks of praising the     
young mother for feeding and washing her
 first-born8 ,who shakes the hand of the
 ,sunday-school teacher and             
congratulates him upon having stolen    

nothing for a week8 ,but the waif from  
the gutter who wanders through a        
department-store and resolutely takes   
nothing1 emerging exhausted with the    
struggle1 we slap upon the back and call
 a little man4  ,our notions of credit  
and merit are bound up with our notions 
of extraordinary rewards4 ,the          
creditable action1 the meritorious man1 
have a certain claim upon us1 if only   
the claim of special recognition4 ,any  
man who makes a notable step forward    
deserves credit1 whatever his actual    
position upon the moral scale4 ,he who  
only marks time upon a relatively high  
level may be a good man1 but we do not  
give him credit for the act normally to 
be expected of him4 ,the recognition of 
merit is a part of the machinery of     
moralization4  #adi4 ,,virtues ,,and    
,,vices4--,one swallow1 said ,aristotle1
 does not make a spring1 nor does one   
happy day make a happy life4 ,elsewhere 
he draws our attention to the fact that 
one good action does not constitute a   

virtue4  ,we may define the virtues as  
those relatively permanent qualities of 
character which it is desirable1 from   
the moral point of view1 that a man     
should have4 ,the vices are the         
corresponding defects4 ,i shall not     
attempt to draw up a list of the        
virtues4 ,for a variety of lists1       
exhibiting curious and interesting      
diversities1 ,i refer the reader back to
 ,chapter ,,iii1 ,sec ,sec #i-aa4  ,the 
,rational ,social ,will aims to build up
 a social order which shall do justice  
to the fundamental impulses and desires 
of man1 a social and rational creature4 
,the stones which it must build into its
 edifice are human beings4 ,if the human
 beings are mere lumps of soft clay1    
incapable of holding their shape or of  
bearing any weight1 the walls cannot    
rise4 ,and a human being may be         
satisfactory in one respect1 and far    
from satisfactory in another4 ,no one of
 us is wholly ignorant of the qualities 
desirable in our building-material4     

,custom1 law and public opinion are     
there to indicate what qualities have1  
in fact1 proved1 on the whole1 not      
detrimental4 ,our intuitions help us in 
forming a judgment4 ,rational reflection
 is of service4  ,but one thing is very 
evident4 ,nowhere is it made clearer    
than in the study of the virtues and    
vices1 that the moralist cannot consider
 the phenomena1 with which he occupies  
himself1 in a state of isolation4  ,is  
courage a virtue8 ,is1 then1 the man who
 is willing to take the risk of breaking
 a bank1 or holding up a stage-coach1 in
 so far virtuous8 ,is perseverance a    
virtue8 ,is1 then1 the woman1 who holds 
out to the bitter end in her desire to  
have the last word1 in so far virtuous8 
,is justice a virtue8 ,then why not be  
virtuous in demanding the pound of      
flesh1 if it is the law--as it once was8
  ,certain qualities of character have  
been recognized as1 on the whole1 and   
generally1 serviceable to the social    
will4 ,but a man is not a quality of    

character1 and qualities of character   
are sometimes gathered into strange     
bundles4 ,it is of men that the state is
 composed2 of thinking1 feeling men4 ,we
 cannot isolate qualities of character1 
and assess their value in their         
isolation4  #aej4 ,,conscience4--,we are
 all forced to recognize that conscience
 has its dual aspect4 ,it is            
characterized by feeling2 and the       
feeling is seldom blind1 or1 at least1  
wholly blind2 conscience implies a      
judgment that something is right or     
wrong4  7#a7 ,the feeling is1 to be     
sure1 very often in the foreground4     
,those who say1 ,my conscience tells me 
that this is wrong1 often mean little   
more than1 ,i feel that it is wrong4    
,but the word feeling is an ambiguous   
one4 ,it is used to cover all sorts of  
intuitive judgments as well as mere     
emotions4 ,the man who takes the time to
 reflect upon his feeling of the        
rightness or wrongness of an action can 
often discover some1 perhaps rather     

vague1 reason for his feeling proper4   
7#b7 ,in other words1 he may come upon  
an intuitive judgment4 ,and the         
thoughtful man who talks about his      
conscience is rarely satisfied with a   
blind intuition2 he wants to be sure he 
is right1 and he thinks the whole matter
 over4  7#c7 ,the feeling and the       
judgment are not necessarily in accord4 
,the feeling may lag behind an          
enlightened judgment4 ,on the other     
hand1 the feeling of repugnance to      
acting in certain ways may be a         
justifiable protest against a bit of    
intellectual sophistry4  7#d7 ,so much  
ought to be admitted by everyone who    
holds that conscience may be blunted or 
may be enlightened4 ,consciences vary   
indefinitely4 ,some we set down as      
hopelessly below the average2 others we 
reverence as refined and enlightened4   
,the social worker makes it his aim to  
awaken conscience1 to cultivate it1 to  
bring it up to a high standard4 ,no     
practical moralist regards the          

conscience of the individual as         
something which must simply be left to  
itself and treated as sacred1 no matter 
what its character4  7#e7 ,the above    
sufficiently explains some of the       
puzzles which confront the man who      
reverences conscience and yet studies   
the consciences of his fellow-men4 ,he  
finds that the individual conscience is 
not an infallible guide-post pointing to
 right action2 that it is not a perfect 
time- keeper1 in complete accord with   
the watches of other men4  ,it's a      
turrible thing to have killed the wrong 
man1 said the conscience-stricken       
illicit distiller in his mountain       
fastness4 ,i never seen good come o'    
goodness yet2 him as strikes first is my
 fancy1 said the dying pirate in        
,treasure ,island4 ,augustine1 passing  
over much worse offences1 exhausts      
himself in agonies of remorse over a    
boyish prank4 ,footnote3 ,see chapter   
xx1 ,sec #gh4 ,seneca draws up a list of
 the most horrifying crimes1 and decides

 that ingratitude exceeds them all in   
enormity4 ,footnote3 ,on ,benefits1 i1  
#aj4  7#f7 ,it appears to be quite      
evident that consciences ought to be    
standardized1 and that the standard     
should be made a high one4 ,the true    
standard is the one set by the ,rational
 ,social ,will4 ,it is as much a duty to
 have a good conscience as it is to obey
 the conscience one has4     ,,chapter  
,,xxxiii  ,,the ,,ethics ,,of ,,the     
,,individual   #aea4 ,,what ,,is ,,meant
 ,,by ,,the ,,term8--,men collected into
 groups and organized in various ways we
 call states1 and we treat a state as a 
unit4 ,we look upon it as having rights 
and as owing duties both to individuals 
and to other states4 ,there are         
individuals whom we are apt to regard as
 representatives of the state2 as       
instruments1 rather than as men--       
executive officers1 legislators1        
official interpreters of its laws1      
whether good or bad4 ,for states and    
their representatives we often have     

especial moral standards1 differing more
 or less from those by which we judge   
human beings merely as human beings4 ,it
 is with the morality of the latter that
 ,i am here concerned4  ,to be sure1 all
 human beings are to be found in states1
 or in that rudimentary social something
 which foreshadows the state4 ,to talk  
of the morality of the isolated         
individual is nonsense4 ,morality is the
 expression of the social will2 and if  
we think of even ,robinson ,crusoe as a 
good man1 it means that we apply to him 
social standards4 ,had he not been      
moralized1 he would have killed and     
eaten ,friday1 when the latter made his 
appearance4  ,we must1 then1 take the   
individual as we find him in the state1 
but it is convenient to consider his    
morality separately from the ethics of  
the state1 its institutions and its     
instruments4  #aeb4 ,,the ,,virtues ,,of
 ,,the ,,individual4--,what moral traits
 have we a right to look for in the     
individual man8 ,what sort of a man is  

it his duty to be8  ,evidently1 men's   
duties must vary somewhat according to  
the type of the society to which they   
belong1 and to their definite place in  
that society4 ,still1 certain general   
desirable traits of character           
unavoidably suggest themselves4 ,to     
attempt a complete list seems futile1   
but the most salient have been dwelt    
upon by the moralists of many schools1  
and for centuries past4  ,does it not   
appear self-evident that a man should be
 law-abiding1 honest1 industrious1      
truthful1 and capable of unselfishness8 
,should he not have a regard for his    
health and efficiency8 ,should he not   
aim to develop his capacities1 and in so
 far to diminish the dead mass of       
ignorance and bad taste which weighs    
down society8  ,of marital fidelity1    
with all that that implies--personal    
purity1 the good of one's children1 a   
fine sense of loyalty--it is scarcely   
necessary to speak4 ,no man1 betrothed  
or married1 can be sure that he will not

 meet tomorrow some woman whom the      
unprejudiced would judge to be more     
attractive than the one to whom he has  
bound himself4 ,shall he remain         
unprejudiced--a floating mine1 ready to 
explode at any accidental contact8 ,away
 with him6 ,he has1 in the eyes of the  
scientific moralist1 too much ego in his
 cosmos4 ,those babble of affinities who
 know little1 and care less1 about the  
long and arduous ascent up which mankind
 has toiled1 in the effort to attain to 
civilization4  ,and what shall we say of
 such things as religious duties1 of    
cheerfulness1 of good manners1 of       
personal cleanliness8 ,of religious     
duties ,i shall speak elsewhere4        
,footnote3 ,chapter xxxvi4 ,as to       
cheerfulness and good manners1 it is    
only necessary to reflect upon the      
baleful influence exercised upon the    
young--who have here my entire          
sympathy--by a bilious and depressing   
piety1 or by those who are rudely and   
superciliously moral4  ,cleanliness     

deserves some special attention1 on     
account of the fact that it has         
perplexed even thoughtful scholars to   
discover why society has come to regard 
it as a duty at all4 ,footnote3 ,the    
chapter on cleanliness by ,epictetus is 
a homily1 and not a philosophic         
argument4 ,see1 ,discourses1 ,book ,,iv1
 chapter xi4 ,that1 if society does     
regard cleanliness as important1 it     
should be the duty of the individual to 
keep himself and his house clean        
presents no problem4 ,he has no right to
 make himself gratuitously offensive1   
and gratuitously offensive he will be1  
if he is a dirty fellow4 ,but why does  
anyone object to his being a dirty      
fellow8 ,the prejudice in favor of      
cleanliness does not appear to be       
universal--witness the ,eskimo and      
various other peoples4  ,we have learned
 that the social will has its foundation
 in the fundamental impulses and        
instincts of man4 ,an admirable scholar 
has suggested that the ultimate root of 

the regard for cleanliness which more or
 less characterizes civilized societies 
may be traced to some such primitive and
 inexplicable impulse to cleanliness as 
we observe1 for example1 in the cat4    
,footnote3 ,,westermarck1 ,origin and   
,development of the ,moral ,ideas1      
chapter xxxix4 ,it must be admitted that
 it is far more marked in the cat than  
in the human being4 ,a kitten is much   
more fastidious than is a baby1 and a   
grown cat would tolerate no powder or   
rouge4  ,but1 assuming that such an     
instinct exists1 even in weak measure1  
it might easily develop with the        
development of society4 ,and1 as man is 
a rational being1 capable of discovering
 a connection between cleanliness and   
hygiene1 the duty of cleanliness would  
acquire a new authority4 ,dirt becomes  
no longer merely distasteful2 it is     
recognized as a danger4  #aec4          
,,conventional ,,morality4--,there are  
virtues--taking the traits of character 
indicated by the names broadly and      

loosely1 and making allowance for all   
sorts of variations within wide         
limits--which appear to be recognized as
 such very generally4 ,bishop ,butler   
regarded justice1 veracity and regard to
 common good as valued in all societies4
 ,certainly they have served as         
expressions of the social will in many  
societies1 ancient and modern1 primitive
 and highly civilized4  ,we have seen   
that the forms under which they appear  
are not independent of the degree and   
kind of the development of the society  
we may happen to be contemplating4      
,footnote3 ,see chapter ii4 ,and we have
 realized that man is born into a world 
of ready-made duties which are literally
 forced upon his attention4 ,he finds   
himself a member of a family1 somebody's
 neighbor1 a resident in a town or      
village1 allotted to a social class1 an 
employer or an employee1 a citizen of a 
state4 ,justice1 veracity and a regard  
for common good appear to have their    
value in all these relations2 but the   

manner of their interpretation is not   
independent of the relations1 and the   
relations with their appropriate demands
 are relatively independent of the      
individual will4 ,one cannot ignore     
these demands and fall back1            
independently1 upon metaphysical theory4
 ,aristotle's claim that a man cannot be
 unjust to his own child1 because the   
child is a part of himself1 and a man   
cannot be unjust to himself1 ,footnote3 
,ethics1 ,book ,v1 chapter vi1 ,sec #g4 
excites our curiosity4 ,it does not     
elicit our approval4  ,it is because the
 vast majority of our duties are so     
unequivocally thrust upon us that ,i    
have been able to touch so lightly1 in  
the last section1 upon the duties of the
 individual4 ,why dilate upon what      
everybody knows8 ,is it not enough to   
set him thinking about it8  ,and1 in    
helping him to think1 the reference to  
the virtue of cleanliness has its value4
 ,cleanliness is prized by those who    
know little of hygiene4 ,if a society   

cannot be happy without cleanliness1 for
 whatever reason1 is it not the duty of 
the individual to be clean8 ,but how    
clean should he be8  ,there are         
virtues--,i use the word here broadly to
 cover approved habits-- which seem to  
have a very direct reference to         
chronology and geography4 ,they are     
conventional virtues2 they suit a given 
society1 and satisfy its actual social  
will4 ,a ,vermont housekeeper in an     
igloo would be an intolerable nuisance4 
,imagine an unbroken succession of ,new 
,england house-cleanings with the       
inhabitants of the house sitting in     
despair in the snow outside4  ,those who
 live north of the ,alps are sometimes  
criticized for dipping ,zwieback into   
their tea4 ,those who live south of the 
,alps eat macaroni in ways revolting to 
other nations4 ,a very pretty           
,frenchwoman1 devouring snails after the
 approved fashion of the locality1 has  
driven me out of an excellent           
restaurant4 ,and the world opens its    

eyes in wonder when it sees the         
well-bred ,anglo-,saxon dispose of his  
asparagus4  ,there is a                 
little-recognized virtue called         
toleration4 ,st4 ,ambrose was a wise man
 when he advised ,st4 ,augustine to do1 
when in ,rome1 as the ,romans do4 ,of   
course1 he did not mean this to apply to
 robbery or to murder4 ,he was giving an
 involuntary recognition to the doctrine
 that there are conventional virtues1   
worthy of our notice1 as well as virtues
 of heavier caliber and wider range4    
,,chapter ,,xxxiv  ,,the ,,ethics ,,of  
,,the ,,state   #aed4 ,,the ,,aim ,,of  
,,the ,,state4--,he who has resolved to 
devote but a single chapter to the      
,ethics of the ,state must deliberately 
sacrifice nine- tenths1 at least1 of the
 material--some of it very good         
material1 and some of it most curious   
and interesting--which has heaped itself
 together on his hands in the course of 
his reading and thinking4 ,i have       
resolved to write only the one chapter4 

,the ,state is the background of the    
individual1 the scaffold which supports 
his moral life4 ,without it1 he may be a
 being2 but he is scarcely recognizable 
as a human being4 ,it has made the      
individual what he is1 and it is the    
medium in which he can give expression  
to the nature which he now possesses4   
,plato maintains that the object of the 
constitution of the state is the        
happiness of the whole1 not of any part4
 ,footnote3 ,republic1 ,,ii4 ,it must be
 borne in mind that both ,plato and     
,aristotle had the ,greek prejudice     
touching citizenship4 ,their citizenship
 was enjoyed by a strictly limited      
class4 ,aristotle1 in his ,politics1    
maintains that it is the aim of the     
state to enable men to live well4       
,sidgwick defines politics as the theory
 of what ought to be 7in human affairs7 
as far as this depends on the common    
action of societies of men4 ,footnote3  
,the ,methods of ,ethics1 chapter ii4   
,we may agree with all three1 and yet   

leave ourselves much latitude in        
determining the nature of the           
organization of1 and the limits properly
 to be set to the activities of1 the    
,state as such4 ,shall the ,state only  
strive to repress grave disorders8 or   
shall it take a paternal interest in its
 citizens1 making them virtuous and     
happy in spite of themselves8  #aee4    
,,its ,,origin ,,and ,,authority4--,in  
,parts ,,iii to ,,vi we have seen how   
and upon what basis the ,state has grown
 up4 ,it is an organism1 something that 
lives and grows4 ,it is not a machine1  
deliberately put together at a definite 
time by some man or some group of men4  
,the social contract fanatic may have   
read history1 but he has not understood 
it4 ,of psychology he has no            
comprehension at all4  ,herodotus1 at   
some of whose stories we smile1 was a   
wiser man4 ,he writes3 ,it appears      
certain to me1 by a great variety of    
proofs1 that ,cambyses was raving mad2  
he would not else have set himself to   

make a mock of holy rites and           
long-established usages4 ,for1 if one   
were to offer men to choose out of all  
the customs in the world such as seemed 
to them the best1 they would examine the
 whole number1 and end by preferring    
their own2 so convinced are they that   
their own usages far surpass those of   
all others4 ,footnote3 ,the ,history of 
,herodotus1 ,book ,,iii1 chapter        
xxxviii1 translated by ,,george         
,,rawlinson1 ,london1 #aiaj4  ,this may 
be something of an over-statement1 for  
men in one state have shown themselves  
to be1 within limits1 capable of        
learning from men in another4 ,but only 
within limits4 ,those things which give 
a state stability--and without stability
 we are tossed upon the waves of mere   
anarchy--have their roots in the remote 
past4 ,strip a man of his past1 and he  
is little better than an idiot2 strip   
men within the ,state of their corporate
 institutions and ideals1 of their      
loyalties and emotional leanings1 and we

 have on our hands a mob of savages1    
something much below the tribe proper1  
knit into unity of purpose by custom and
 tribal law4  ,the ,state has its origin
 in man as a creature desiring and      
willing1 and at the same time endowed   
with reason4 ,its authority is the      
authority of reason4 ,not reason in the 
abstract1 with no ground to stand upon1 
and no material for its exercise2 but   
reason as incorporate in institutions   
and social usages2 reason which takes   
cognizance of the nature of man1 and    
recognizes what man has already         
succeeded in doing4  ,where shall we    
look for a limit to the authority of the
 ,state8 ,surely1 only in the ,reason   
which makes it possible for the ,state  
to be4 ,the ,state must not defeat its  
own object4  #aef4 ,,forms ,,of         
,,organization4--,the special science of
 politics enters in detail into the     
forms of organization of the ,state4    
,the ethical philosopher must content   
himself with certain general            

reflections4 ,everyone knows that       
,states have been organized in divers   
ways2 and that their citizens1 under    
much the same form of political         
organization1 have been here happy and  
contented1 and there in a state of      
ferment4 ,the form of government counts 
for something2 but its suitability to   
the population governed1 and the degree 
of enlightenment and discipline         
characteristic of the population1 count 
for much more4 ,it is not every shoe    
that fits every foot1 and there are feet
 that are little at home in shoes of any
 description4  ,monarchies of many      
sorts1 aristocracies1 oligarchies1      
democracies1 even communisms1 have been 
tried2 and all1 save the last1 have     
managed to hold their own with some     
degree of success4  ,it is easy to bring
 objections against each form of        
government1 just as it is easy to say   
something specious in its favor4  ,are  
the eldest sons of a few families       
peculiarly fitted by nature to be       

governors of the ,state8 ,look at       
history1 and wake up to common sense4   
,of the divine right of kings ,i shall  
not speak1 for the adherents of the     
doctrine are in our day relegated to    
museums of antiquities4 ,and have the   
members of aristocracies been carefully 
bred with a view to their intellectual  
and moral superiority1 as we breed fine 
varieties of horses and dogs8 ,have     
those who have had their share in       
oligarchies been peculiarly wise and    
peculiarly devoted to the common good8  
,the communist makes two fatal mistakes4
 ,he shuts his eyes to history1 and he  
overlooks the fact that there is such a 
thing as human nature4  ,there remains  
democracy4 ,of this1 ,herodotus1 already
 quoted as a man of sense1 has his      
opinion4 ,he makes a shrewd ,persian1 in
 a political crisis1 thus address his   
fellow-conspirators3  ,there is nothing 
so void of understanding1 nothing so    
full of wantonness1 as the unwieldy     
rabble4 ,it were folly not to be borne1 

for men1 while seeking to escape the    
wantonness of a tyrant1 to give         
themselves up to the wantonness of a    
rude unbridled mob4 ,the tyrant1 in all 
his doings1 at least knows what he is   
about1 but a mob is altogether devoid of
 knowledge2 for how should there be any 
knowledge in a rabble1 untaught1 and    
with no natural sense of what is right  
and fit8 ,it rushes wildly into state   
affairs with all the fury of a stream   
swollen in the winter1 and confuses     
everything4 ,let the enemies of the     
,persians be ruled by democracies2 but  
let us choose out from the citizens a   
certain number of the worthiest1 and put
 the government into their hands4       
,footnote3 ,op4 cit4 ,book ,,iii1       
chapter lxxxi4  ,to be sure1 we1 who    
belong to a modern1 enlightened         
democracy1 would resent being called a  
rude unbridled mob1 and being likened to
 the populace of ancient ,persia4 ,but  
those of us who reflect recognize the   
dangers that lurk in the psychology of  

the crowd2 and we are all aware that1   
after a popular vote1 it is quite       
possible to discover that few1 except a 
handful of office-holders1 have gotten  
anything that they really want4         
,democracy is not a panacea for all     
political evils1 and there are          
democracies of many kinds4  ,still1 when
 all is said1 it seems as though the    
,rational ,social ,will1 the ultimate   
arbiter of every moral ,state1 should   
give its authority to a democratic form 
of government1 rather than to another   
form4 ,every individual will has a prima
 facie claim to recognition4  ,but the  
,rational ,social ,will can never forget
 that human nature is in process of     
development1 and that each nation1 at a 
given time1 is a historical phenomenon4 
,the ,rational ,social ,will is too     
enlightened to drape an infant in the   
raiment appropriate to a college        
graduate4 ,it is only an intemperate    
enthusiasm that is capable of that4     
#aeg4 ,,the ,,laws ,,of ,,the           

,,state4--,the ,state allots to         
individuals1 and to the lesser groups of
 human beings1 of which it is composed1 
rights1 and it prescribes to them       
duties4 ,upon its activities in this    
sphere ,i can touch only by way of      
illustration1 and for the sake of making
 clear the nature of the functions of   
the ,state4  7#a7 ,to whom shall the    
,state grant a share in the formulation 
and execution of its laws8 ,once1 in    
communities very enlightened1 in their  
own peculiar way1 women1 children1      
slaves1 mechanics1 petty traders1 and   
hired servants were deemed quite unfit  
to be entrusted with such               
responsibilities4 ,footnote3 ,see       
,,aristotle',s ,politics4  ,with us1 the
 position of woman has changed4         
,slavery1 in a technical sense1 has been
 abolished4 ,the mechanic and the petty 
trader are much in evidence at          
primaries4 ,hired servants are by some  
accused of being tyrants4 ,children1 and
 defectives who are grossly and palpably

 defective1 we bar from elections1 and  
we also reject some criminals4  ,the    
times have changed1 and our notions of  
the right of the individual to an active
 share in the ,state have changed with  
them4 ,the expression of the social will
 has undergone modification1 and ,i     
think we can say that it is1 on the     
whole1 modification in the right        
direction4  ,to be sure1 the court of   
last resort is the ,rational ,social    
,will4 ,what is best for the ,state1    
and1 hence1 for those who compose it8   
,what is practicable in the actual      
condition in which a given state finds  
itself at a given time8 ,it seems too   
easy a solution of our problems to seek 
dogmatic answers to our questionings by 
having recourse to the natural light1   
that ready oracle of the philosopher1   
,descartes4  7#b7 ,there are certain    
classes of rights which civilized states
 generally guarantee to their citizens  
with varying degrees of success4 ,they  
make it the duty of their citizens to   

respect these rights in others4  7a7    
,the laws protect life and limb4 ,much  
progress has been made in this respect  
in the last centuries past4 ,i own no   
coat of mail2 and1 when ,i walk abroad1 
,i neither carry a sword nor surround   
myself with armed retainers4  7b7 ,they 
protect private property4 ,to be sure1  
the promoter may prey upon my           
simplicity2 and the state itself does   
not recognize that ,i have any absolute 
right to my property1 any more than it  
recognizes that ,i have an absolute     
right to my life4  ,it may send me into 
the trenches4 ,it may take from me what 
it will in the form of taxes4 ,it may   
even forbid me to increase my income by 
using my property in ways which will    
make me insupportable to my neighbors4  
,but it will not allow my neighbor1 who 
is stronger than ,i1 to take possession 
of my house without form of law4 ,it    
will even allow me to dispose of my     
property by will1 after my death4  ,i   
suggest that those1 to whom this right  

appears to be rooted in the very nature 
of things1 and not to be a creation of  
the ,state1 called into being at the    
behest of the social will in a certain  
stage of its development1 should read   
and re-read what ,sir ,henry ,maine has 
to say about testamentary succession1 in
 his wonderful little book on ,ancient  
,law4 ,footnote3 ,see chapters vi and   
vii4  ,the ,state has not always treated
 a man as an individual1 directly and   
personally responsible to the state4 ,it
 has treated him as a member of a family
 or some other group2 a being endowed1  
by virtue of his position1 with certain 
rights1 and burdened with certain       
duties4 ,a being who1 when he drops out 
of being1 is automatically replaced by  
someone else who is clothed upon with   
both his rights and his                 
responsibilities4  ,our conceptions have
 changed4 ,the lesser groups within the 
,state have to some degree lost their   
cohesion1 and the bond between the      
individual1 as such1 and the state has  

been correspondingly strengthened4 ,but 
many traces of the old conception make  
themselves apparent4 ,the law compels me
 to provide for my wife and children2   
and1 if ,i die intestate1 the law by no 
means assumes that my property is left  
without a claimant4  ,have we been      
moving in the right direction1 as judged
 by the standard of the ,rational       
,social ,will8 ,we think so4 ,but it is 
well to bear in mind what ,herodotus    
said about the madness of ,cambyses1 and
 the prejudice men have in favor of     
their own customs4 ,no state is a mere  
aggregate of unrelated individuals4 ,men
 are set in families1 and the ,state    
seems to be composed of groups within   
groups4 ,how far the ,state should      
recognize the will of the individual1 as
 over against the claims of the lesser  
groups to which he may belong1 is a nice
 question for the ,rational ,social     
,will to settle4  7c7 ,the law must     
regulate marriage and divorce4 ,matters 
so vital to the interests of society    

cannot be left at the mercy of the      
egoistic whims of the individual4 ,but  
to what law shall we have recourse8 ,it 
seems highly irrational to have         
forty-eight independent authorities upon
 this subject within the limits of a    
single nation4 ,and1 if we turn the     
matter over to the churches1 we discover
 that we have committed it to the care  
of one hundred and eighty1 or more1     
sects4 ,add to this1 that a state of any
 sort cannot be set upon its feet       
without some difficulty1 while any      
enterprising man or woman can call a    
sect into existence any day4 ,there is a
 new adherent for sectarian             
eccentricities born every minute4       
,surely1 here is a field for the        
activities of the ,rational ,social     
,will4  7d7 ,to paternalism of some sort
 the modern ,state1 as law-giver1 seems 
hopelessly pledged4 ,if we ignore this  
we are simply closing our eyes4 ,the    
,state seems to be justified in         
educating its citizens1 in protecting   

children and women against exploitation1
 in protecting the working classes1 in  
stamping out infectious diseases4 ,we   
are not even allowed to expectorate when
 and where we will1 a privilege enjoyed 
by the merest savage4  7e7 ,in one      
respect the paternalism of our own      
,state has lagged behind that of certain
 others4 ,we do little to secure to a   
man a decent privacy1 or to safeguard   
his personal dignity4 ,the newspaper    
reporter is allowed to rage unchecked1  
to unearth scandals in private families1
 and to cause great pain by printing the
 names of individuals4  ,i have known1  
in ,europe1 a man1 after a difference of
 opinion touching the ventilation of a  
railway carriage1 to break a window with
 his elbow and to apply to his          
fellow-passenger an offensive epithet4  
,the court made him pay a dollar and a  
half for breaking the window and six    
dollars for giving himself the pleasure 
of being insulting4  ,which was the     
greater offense8 ,herodotus would expect

 this question to be answered in        
accordance with the prejudices of the   
person giving the answer4  #aeh4 ,,the  
,,rights ,,and ,,duties ,,of ,,the      
,,state4--,the ,state evidently has     
rights over its citizens1 and may       
enforce these rights through the        
infliction of punishment4 ,it as        
evidently has duties4 ,a given state may
 not be answerable to any actual given  
power4 ,our own ,state is in such a     
position at the present time--there is  
no other state strong enough to call it 
to account4  ,but this does not free it 
from duties4 ,no state is anything more 
than a brute force1 except as it        
incorporates1 in some measure1 the      
,rational ,social ,will4 ,and states    
that fall far short1 as judged by this  
standard1 may overstep their rights and 
ignore their duties1 whether they are   
dealing with individuals or with other  
states4  ,in punishing1 the ,state      
should punish rationally4 ,footnote3    
,see chapter xxxii1 ,sec #adh4 ,and it  

should not demand of its subjects what  
will degrade them as moral beings4 ,we  
all recognize1 said a pure and candid   
soul1 that a rightful sovereign may     
command his subjects to do what is      
wrong1 and that it is then their duty to
 disobey him4 ,footnote3 ,sidgwick1     
,methods of ,ethics1 ,,iii1 vi4  ,but   
how discover what demands are just8 ,it 
is the whole argument of this volume    
that no man should venture an opinion   
upon this subject without having come to
 some appreciation of what is meant by  
the ,rational ,social ,will4 ,man1 his  
instincts1 the degree of his            
intelligence and self- control1 the     
history of the development of human     
societies1 cannot be ignored4 ,it is the
 weakness of good men1 endowed with a   
high degree of speculative intelligence1
 to construct ,utopias1 and to tabulate 
the rights of man1 or1 as ,bentham well 
expressed it1 to make lists of          
anarchical fallacies4 ,footnote3 ,see   
,works1 ,bowring's ,edition1 ,volume    

,,ii4 ,thus1 some may1 with ,plato and  
,aristotle1 advocate infanticide4 ,the  
,greek city-state was a crowded little  
affair1 and in danger of                
over-population4 ,some may propose      
radical measures to increase the        
population4 ,to ,france and ,argentina1 
in our day1 such an increase appears    
highly desirable4 ,may any and every    
method be embraced which seems adapted  
to avert a given evil or to attain to a 
desired end8 ,it is instructive to note 
that ,francis ,galton1 the father of    
eugenics1 proposed to leave morals out  
of the question as involving too many   
hopeless difficulties4 ,footnote3       
,encyclopedia ,britannica1 #aath        
edition1 article1 ,sociology4 ,but do   
men live well who leave morals out of   
the question8  ,the man who falls back  
upon intuition alone1 in his advocacy of
 the abolition of capital punishment1   
may be expected to maintain next that a 
state1 in going to war1 should stop     
short at the point where the lives of   

its citizens are put in jeopardy4 ,why  
kill a good man1 when it is wrong to    
kill a bad one8  ,it must be admitted   
that the ,state and its representatives 
enjoy some rights and duties not        
accorded to individuals4 ,the ,state may
 condemn men to death or to             
imprisonment2 it may take over property2
 it may make itself a compulsory arbiter
 between individuals4 ,on the other     
hand1 its representatives are not always
 as free as are private persons4 ,the   
individual1 if he is a generous soul1   
may freely forego some of his advantages
 and may seek only a fair fight with an 
opponent4 ,it is doubtful whether the   
duty the ,state owes to its citizens    
permits of chivalry4 ,certainly strong  
states do not hesitate to attack weak   
ones2 nor do many hesitate to combine   
against one1 on the score of fair play4 
,and a private man may temper justice   
with mercy in ways forbidden to a judge4
     ,,chapter ,,xxxv  ,,international  
,,ethics   #aei4 ,,what ,,is ,,meant    

,,by ,,the ,,term4--,i am almost tempted
 to avoid the discussion of this thorny 
subject by simply referring the reader  
to what has been said already on ,the   
,spread of the ,community1 and developed
 in the chapters on ,the ,rational      
,social ,will and ,the ,individual and  
the ,social ,will4 ,footnote3 ,see ,sec 
#ge and chapters xxi-xxii4  ,he who     
confines himself to generalities avoids 
many difficulties and can assure himself
 of the approval of many4 ,who1 condemns
 justice and humanity in the abstract8  
,who can wax eloquent in his            
condemnation of freedom8 ,who finds the 
,christian ,church on his side1 when he 
advocates rapacity and the oppression of
 the helpless1 without entering into    
details8  ,on the other hand1 who wishes
 to view his country with a cold        
impartiality1 and to place its interests
 exactly on a par with the interests of 
other lands8 ,who1 save the ,chinaman   
himself1 thinks it as important that a  
,chinaman should have enough to eat as  

that an ,american or an ,englishman     
should8 ,was not the turpitude1 that    
excluded the ,chinaman from ,australia1 
traced to the two deadly sins of undue  
diligence and sobriety8 ,footnote3      
,encyclopedia ,britannica1 #aath        
edition1 article1 ,australia4 ,as for   
freedom1 men of certain nations regard  
it as the highest virtue to be willing  
to die for it--their own freedom1 be it 
understood1--while they regard the same 
desire for freedom on the part of their 
colonists as a moral obliquity to be    
extirpated1 root and branch4  ,that the 
historian and the sociologist should    
find much to say touching the relation  
of nations to each other and to subject 
peoples goes without saying4 ,but the   
cynic may maintain with some            
plausibility that the moralist's chapter
 on ,international ,ethics must be as   
void of content as the traditional      
chapter on ,snakes in ,ireland4 ,in this
 the cynic is wrong1 as usual2 but it is
 instructive to listen to him1 if only  

that we may intelligently refute him4   
,it is not always easy for an individual
 to determine just what he owes to his  
family1 to his neighbors1 or to his     
country4 ,is it surprising that it      
should be difficult for men to determine
 just what one country1 or what one     
race1 owes to another8 ,this is the     
subject of international ethics4 ,he who
 treads upon this ground should walk    
gingerly1 and not feel too sure of      
himself4 ,but there is no reason why the
 moralist should not put upon paper such
 reflections as occur to him4 ,he cannot
 say anything more devoid of reason than
 much that is said by others4  ,the     
great ,grotius1 in writing on           
international law1 in the seventeenth   
century1 drew his illustrations chiefly 
from ,greeks and ,romans long dead4 ,he 
had much more recent material ready to  
hand4 ,but he well knew that he1 who    
would induce another to give him calm   
and dispassionate attention1 must not   
begin by treading on the toes of his    

listener4 ,i shall strive to profit by  
his example4 ,it is best to say only    
what each man can apply to his neighbor4
 ,we are all sensitive in this field4   
#afj4 ,,our ,,method ,,of ,,approach    
,,to ,,the ,,subject--,we have seen     
7,sec #hj7 that rational elements are to
 be found even in the irrational will1  
if one will look below the surface4  ,is
 it rational for the mother to place    
before all else the interests of the    
hairless1 toothless and1 apparently1    
mindless little creature that she clasps
 to her breast8 ,the very existence of  
society depends upon her having the     
feeling that prompts her to do it4 ,is  
it rational to favor one's neighbor1 to 
be proud of one's native town1 which may
 be a poor sort of a town8 ,is it       
rational to be patriotic1 even when     
one's state is not much of a state8  ,we
 have seen that the ,rational ,social   
,will incorporates itself in societies  
very gradually1 and that it draws into  
its service lesser groups of many       

descriptions4 ,he who detaches himself  
from these lesser groups is not a man4  
,he is the mere outline of a man--the   
featherless biped of the philosopher4   
,it is not of such that a state can be  
made4  ,it is the duty of the state to  
prevent a man from shrinking into being 
the mere member of some lesser group1   
but it is not its duty to obliterate    
what is human in him4 ,and the ,rational
 ,social ,will must see to it that he   
does not1 on the other hand1 forget1 in 
a blind and irrational patriotism1 that 
he is a human being with a capacity for 
human sympathies--sympathies extending  
far beyond the limits of any state4     
,except when they are under the         
influence of strong passion1 ,i think we
 may say that men in civilized states1  
at least1 have already shown themselves 
amenable to the influence of the        
,rational ,social ,will in this         
direction4 ,it must be confessed that   
that influence has1 as yet1 been        
limited4  ,the approach to the subject  

of international ethics must lie in the 
recognition that men are set in         
families1 in neighborhoods1 in towns or 
cities1 in states2 and are yet human    
beings with a capacity for respecting   
and loving those who belong to none of  
these particular organizations4 ,my     
advice to the man who wishes to abuse   
his fellow-man is to do it quickly1 and 
before he is acquainted with him4 ,if he
 gets to know him well1 he will probably
 find something lovable in him1 and he  
will lose the pleasure of being         
malicious4  #afa4 ,,some ,,problems ,,of
 ,,international ,,ethics4--,the man who
 reads history finds1 sometimes1 things 
to inspire him2 and sometimes1 things   
that are depressing4 ,he sees that the  
family must expand into the clan1 that  
the clan must come into contact with    
others1 that the state must rise1 and   
that some interrelation of states is an 
inevitable necessity4 ,he sees that     
man's increase in insight1 in diligence1
 in enterprise1 must make him reach out 

and trade with his fellow-man4  ,he sees
 also conquest1 with the subjugation of 
peoples2 he sees trade extended by      
force1 and under the smoke of cannon2 he
 sees a peaceful economic penetration1  
which ends in protectorates and         
annexations1 in defiance of the will of 
those who do not want to be either      
protected or annexed4  ,what is rational
 is real1 and what is real is rational1 
said ,hegel4 ,footnote3 ,the ,philosophy
 of ,right1 ,preface1 and see ,sec ,sec 
#cea and #cdg4 ,he further maintained   
that civilized nations may treat as     
barbarians peoples who are behind them  
in the essential elements of the state2 
and also that1 in a given epoch1 a given
 nation is dominant1 and other existing 
nations are void of right4  ,hegel has  
long been dead1 and is turned to dust4  
,he always was as dry as dust1 even when
 he was alive1 but he was a great man4  
,but the famous ,englishman1 ,sir       
,thomas ,more1 wrote more engagingly2   
and does he not tell us1 in his ,utopia1

 that any nation's holding unused a     
piece of ground needed for the          
nourishment of other people is a just   
cause of war8  ,such doctrines should be
 most comforting to us ,americans4 ,they
 appear to teach us that we are1 at     
present1 the chosen people2 that the    
rights of other peoples are as the      
rights of the ,hivites1 the ,hittites1  
and all the rest2 that we are justified 
in taking what we please1 for who is    
there to withstand us8  ,yet ethical    
,americans shake their heads over such  
philosophies1 and some of them even     
speak slightingly of philosophers4      
,this1 in spite of the fact that great  
men seldom talk pure nonsense1 except   
when carried away by excitement1 as all 
men may be1 at times4 ,if what they say 
sounds to us wholly unmeaning1 it is    
probable that we have not fully         
understood the voice that speaks within 
them4 ,what can be said in their        
defense8 and what can be said in1 at    
least1 partial defence of the actual    

historical procedure of the nations8    
,they have not been wholly composed of  
criminals1 and they must possess at     
least the rudiments of a moral sense4   
7#a7 ,we have seen that the state       
maintains its right as against those who
 belong to it by controlling1 not by    
destroying1 the lesser groups which     
exist within the state4 ,such a control 
appears to be demanded by the ,rational 
,social ,will1 but it often frustrates  
the will of the individual4  7#b7 ,we   
have seen that the spread of the        
community is inevitable1 and that1 in   
the interests of rationality1 it is     
desirable4  7#c7 ,we have seen that1    
even in the family1 all the members are 
not equally free agents4 ,the small boy 
is not consulted touching the amount of 
his punishment1 nor can he dictate where
 it shall be laid on4 ,and the state    
does not give to all the individuals in 
it equal political rights1 nor guarantee
 to them an equal share of influence4   
,this is desirable1 on the whole1 in the

 interests of the whole1 but grave      
abuses may easily come into being4  7#d7
 ,we have seen that the greater whole   
guarantees to individuals rights1 and   
assigns to them duties4 ,in so far as it
 is rational1 it cannot do this         
arbitrarily4 ,to have recourse to       
metaphysical abstractions is futile4    
,shall we say1 without hedging1 that a  
man has a right to the fruits of his    
labor1 or that first occupation gives a 
right to the soil8 ,then1 shall the man 
who is too weak to work be refused a    
right to the ownership of a coat8 ,or   
must the discoverer of a continent prove
 a real occupancy1 by performing the    
ridiculous task of the abnormal center  
of the mythical mathematical infinite   
circle1 by being everywhere at the same 
time8  7#e7 ,we have seen that the human
 community1 taking the words in a broad 
sense1 will spread1 and already has     
spread1 beyond the limits of several    
nationalities4 ,it is in the interest of
 human society that it should do so4 ,it

 is rational1 in the sense of the word  
everywhere used in this book4 ,but the  
nations continue to exist1 and they     
often cultivate selfishly national      
interests4 ,so do families cultivate    
selfishly family interests4 ,so does the
 egoist selfishly dig about and         
fertilize the number ,one4  7#f7 ,it    
requires little acuteness to see that   
some communities of men are miserable   
exponents of the social will4 ,they are 
deplorably governed4 ,read ,slatin's    
fascinating book1 ,fire and ,sword in   
the ,soudan1--it is better than any     
novel1--and ask yourself what becomes of
 the social will or of rationality of   
any sort under the rule of a ,mahdi4 ,is
 it not the duty of the nations to      
combine and to relieve suffering        
humanity8  7#g7 ,there are theorists who
 maintain that1 in the nature of things1
 the soil belongs to nobody4 ,we find1  
in the actual state of things1 it       
usually belongs to somebody1 unless it  
is so poor that it is not worth owning  

at all4 ,but it may belong to somebody  
who can make little more use of it than 
an infant can of a gold watch4 ,a       
handful of ,indians1 wandering over a   
great tract of country in which they    
chase game in the intervals of time     
during which they chase and scalp one   
another1 may have an immemorial1        
although unrecorded1 title to the land4 
,shall they be permitted to keep back   
settlers from more or less civilized and
 densely populated countries8 ,settlers 
eager to cultivate the land and to make 
it support many1 where before it        
supported few1 and supported those few  
miserably8  ,and shall the natural      
resources of great regions of the earth 
be permitted to lie fallow merely       
because the actual inhabitants are too  
ignorant and too indolent to want to    
produce anything and to trade8 ,he who  
finds his happiness in idleness1        
bananas1 and black wives who can be     
beaten with impunity1 has little        
interest in international traffic1 with 

such blessings as it is supposed to     
bring4  ,the world is filling up4 ,the  
losses due to war and pestilence1 said  
no less an authority than ,darwin1 are  
soon made up4 ,there is something       
terrifying in what the very modern      
science of geography has to tell us     
about the rapidity with which the       
remaining part of the earth's surface1  
available for the nourishment of man1 is
 being exhausted4 ,what problems will   
face the ,rational ,social ,will in the 
none too distant future8  #afb4 ,,the   
,,other ,,side ,,of ,,the ,,shield4--,we
 have seen that something can be said   
for the philosopher4 ,the ,rational     
,social ,will does not appear to give   
carte blanche to the man who wishes to  
remain ignorant1 idle1 cut off from the 
family of the nations1 the possessor of 
great tracts of land which he will not  
develop1 the cruel oppressor of such as 
he finds within his power4 ,it tends to 
deal with him1 wherever it finds him1 as
 an enlightened nation treats the idle1 

the vicious and the irresponsible within
 its own borders4  ,undoubtedly         
civilization has made some advance in   
the course of the centuries4 ,when the  
world is at peace1 the stranger is not  
normally an outlaw4 ,i have sojourned in
 the cities of many of the nations of   
,europe and have made excursions into   
,africa and ,asia4 ,nowhere have ,i been
 compelled to ask for the protection of 
an ,american consul4 ,it has been       
recognized that ,i had rights1 although 
an ,american4 ,and the ability to sign  
my name has procured me a supply of     
money4  ,notwithstanding all this1 it is
 depressing to read of the dealings of  
the nations with each other1 and with   
backward peoples--who have been well    
defined as peoples who possess          
gold-mines1 but no efficient navy4 ,is  
it not generally taken for granted that 
it is the duty of more powerful and more
 enlightened nations to take the        
backward nations in hand1 to exploit    
their resources1 and1 incidentally1 to  

exploit them8  ,not that international  
law has not counted for something4 ,to  
be sure ,hegel reduced it to the level  
of a good intention1 ,footnote3 ,the    
,philosophy of ,right1 ,sec ,sec        
#ccj-ccc4 but it has counted for        
something4 ,descartes and ,spinoza      
could1 with impunity1 be heretics in    
little ,holland4 ,switzerland has for   
centuries been the refuge of the        
oppressed4 ,but we cannot forget that   
our highest authority1 ,captain ,mahan1 
declared1 in #ahhi1 that certain rights 
of neutrals were forever secured1       
,footnote3 ,the ,influence of ,sea      
,power upon ,history1 ,boston1 #aijh1   
chapter ii1 p4 #hd4 and he has since    
stood revealed as a false prophet1 a    
mere man making a guess4 ,international 
law is a capital thing--when it is not  
put under a strain1 and when no nation  
is too powerful4  ,the depressing thing 
is that rapacity and oppression become  
glorified1 when the cloak of patriotism 
is thrown over their shoulders4 ,i drew 

my illustrations in the last section    
from wild ,indians and from ,african    
savages4 ,but there are nations in all  
stages of their development4 ,how       
backward must a nation be to give us the
 right to rule over it by force8 ,no    
people were more ingenious than the     
ancient ,romans in finding plausible    
reasons for the wars which it pleased   
them to wage4 ,this has never been a    
lost art4 ,men's enemies are1 like the  
absent1 always in the wrong2 and those  
are apt to become enemies1 in whose     
defeat some substantial advantage is to 
be looked for4  #afc4 ,,the             
,,solution4--,the very title seems a    
presumption4 ,who may dogmatize in      
matters so involved8 ,i make no         
pretentions to giving a clear vision of 
yonder shining light1 but ,i venture to 
hint at the general direction in which  
one is to seek the little wicket gate4  
,the only ethical solution of our       
problem appears to lie in the frank     
recognition of the fact that the groups 

of men1 called nations1 may be as brutal
 egoists as are individual persons1 and 
in the earnest attempt to avoid the     
baleful influence of such egoism4  ,man 
is his brother's keeper4 ,but that does 
not give him the right to keep his      
brother in chains1 nor to use him for   
selfish ends4 ,this is as true of       
nations as it is of individuals1 of     
families1 of religious orders1 or of    
unions1 whether of employers or of      
employees4  ,it is certainly true of    
nations4 ,it is only as having a place  
in1 and as being an instrument of1 the  
great organism of humanity aimed at by  
the ,rational ,social ,will1 that the   
individual1 the family1 the tribe1 the  
nation1 have any ethical justification  
for being at all4 ,sometimes it is very 
profitable for the individual1 or for   
some group of human beings1 to disallow 
this obligation to be moral4 ,we treat  
the individual as a robber2 why not     
admit that there are robber nations8  ,i
 feel like reiterating that it is a     

great thing to be young2 to live in that
 ,golden ,age in which one still        
believes what one sees in print1 and    
still is moved by the honeyed words of  
statesmen4 ,when one is old1 and has    
enjoyed some breadth of culture1 one has
 read the newspapers of many lands1 and 
has met a certain number of statesmen1  
usually with a start of surprise4  ,it  
is borne in upon one--a matter touched  
upon in the last chapter--that it       
appears to be generally accepted that   
the state and its representatives may   
adopt a peculiar variety of ethics4     
,certainly statesmen feel justified in  
doing for their country what they1 as   
gentlemen1 would never dream of doing   
for themselves4 ,they talk of justice1  
when they would scoff at such justice   
within the borders of their own states2 
they talk of humanity1 and they have in 
mind the economic advantage of their own
 peoples2 they speak of protection and  
,christianization1 when they mean       
economic exploitation or strategic      

superiority4 ,as for truth1 the less    
said about that subject the better4  ,i 
know of only one way in which the       
determination of a nation to aid in the 
general realization of the ,rational    
,social ,will can be tested4 ,does it1  
in dealing with other nations1 civilized
 or backward1 propose what is palpably  
to its own advantage1 or is it evidently
 disinterested8 ,it is thus that we     
judge a man1 when we wish to fix his    
ethical status2 it is thus that the     
,rational ,social ,will judges a nation4
 ,the language in which the proposals   
are made is a matter of no moment4 ,it  
may fairly be called professional slang1
 and can quickly be acquired1 even by   
men of mediocre intelligence1 in any    
diplomatic circle4  #afd4 ,,the         
,,necessity ,,for ,,caution4--,shall a  
man1 then1 eschew patriotism1 and become
 a citizen of the world1 as though he   
were a ,stoic philosopher8 ,by no means4
 ,as well eschew the family or the      
neighborhood4 ,but let him not1 in his  

patriotism1 forget that he is a man4    
,here1 as everywhere1 he is called upon 
to exercise judgment4 ,this is a burden 
which he can never throw off4 ,he must  
pay the penalty of being a rational     
human being4 ,as an instrument of the   
,rational ,social ,will the state must  
be kept up4 ,it is his duty to see that 
it is done4 ,his cat has an easier task2
 she may sleep her life away in peace4  
,we hear much of the brotherhood of man 
and of artificial barriers4 ,the        
barriers are not all artificial1 and    
they cannot be swept away with a        
gesture4  ,races and peoples are formed 
upon the model of their own immemorial  
past4 ,they have their institutions1    
their traditions1 their loyalties1 their
 standards of living4 ,what is tolerable
 to one man is wholly intolerable to    
another4 ,to compel men to live together
 in intimacy1 when centuries of training
 have made them antipathetic1 is sheer  
cruelty4  ,men may be brothers1 but     
there are big brothers and little       

brothers4 ,i do not refer to physical   
bulk4 ,i refer to the development of    
intelligence1 to the degree and kind of 
culture1 which has been attained4 ,there
 are little brothers still at the stage 
of development at which it is natural   
for human beings to drool4 ,shall we    
have them sit up to the table and serve 
them with the complete dinner1          
enlivening it with intellectual         
conversation8  ,between incontinently   
doing this1 and relegating the little   
brothers to a nursery where they will be
 treated with cruelty and starved in our
 interests1 some persons seem to think  
there is no middle course4 ,in their    
enthusiasm for humanity1 they forget    
that the brotherhood of man may be made 
as ridiculous as the eight-hour day4    
,between eight hours of the creative    
work of a ,milton and eight hours of the
 dawdling done by a lazy housemaid1     
there is no relation save that both may 
be measured by a clock4  ,these         
enthusiasts forget much4 ,men are not   

alike2 they do not want to be alike2    
they do not want to live together in    
close intimacy1 when they have little in
 common2 they reverence different       
things2 as a rule1 they would rather be 
somewhat unhappy after their own        
fashion1 than be happy under compulsion1
 after the fashion of someone else4  ,we
 have1 thus1 on the one hand1 the       
enthusiasts who would at once sound the 
trump and announce the millenium1       
feeding the lion and the sucking calf   
out of the same dish and on the same    
meat4 ,we have1 on the other1 those who 
are eager to take on their shoulders the
 white man's burden--to enclose in a    
coop1 as if they were chickens1 the     
greater part of the human race1 allaying
 the discontent of the imprisoned by    
pointing out to them that1 although     
their freedom of movement is limited1   
they are growing fat1 and that they     
should show their gratitude by laying   
eggs4  ,surely1 there must be some      
middle course4 ,patience and caution are

 virtues4 ,surely1 it is possible to    
accept the existing organism of society1
 to love one's country1 and yet to      
strive to respect the freedom of others4
 ,it is not easy for a true patriot to  
do this1 but it seems to be what the    
,rational ,social ,will demands of him4 
,the moralist who reads history         
carefully is not wholly discouraged4 ,he
 may look forward to some time1 in the  
more or less distant future1 when there 
may be a union of the nations in the    
interests of all men2 when the gross    
egoism of the hypertrophied patriot may 
be curbed2 when the mellifluous language
 of the statesman may mean more than did
 the pious letter which ,nero wrote to  
the ,roman ,senate1 after he had        
murdered his mother4     ,,chapter      
,,xxxvi  ,,ethics ,,and ,,other         
,,disciplines   #afe4 ,,sciences ,,that 
,,concern ,,the ,,moralist4--,there are 
certain sciences that the ,moralist must
 lay under contribution very directly1  
and yet he seems to be able to make     

little return to those who cultivate    
them1 at least in their professional    
capacity4  ,he must ask aid from the    
biologist1 the psychologist1 the        
anthropologist4 ,they help him to a     
comprehension of what man is2 and1      
hence1 of what it is desirable that man 
should strive to do4 ,but these men     
seldom come to the moralist for advice4 
,they appear to be able to work without 
his help4  ,there are1 however1 other   
sciences in which the moralist feels    
that he has more of a right to meddle1  
however independent they may regard     
themselves4  ,take1 for example1        
politics or economics1 or the very      
modern and rudimentary science of       
eugenics4 ,the man who cultivates       
political science may know much more    
than do most moralists about states and 
their forms of organization2 about      
legislative1 executive and judicial     
functions2 about the probable effects of
 the centralization or decentralization 
of authority2 about what may be         

expected1 in a given case1 from a       
restriction or extension of the         
franchise2 about the creation and       
maintenance of a military establishment 
and the building up of an efficient     
civil service4 ,the economist may be a  
monster of learning and a master in     
ingenuity on all problems touching the  
creation and distribution of wealth4    
,but the political scientist and the    
economist1 however able1 share our      
common humanity4 ,a man's outlook is    
more or less apt to be bounded by the   
limits of the science of his            
predilection4 ,the several sciences1    
broader or more specialized1 rest1 in   
the minds of most men1 upon foundations 
which are taken for granted4 ,it is too 
much to expect that every sermon should 
begin as far back as the ,garden of     
,eden4 ,practical politics and economics
 do not1 as a rule1 go so far back4     
,the transition from practical politics 
and economics to ethical problems may be
 made at any time4 ,no man was shrewder 

than ,machiavelli1 and the moral sense  
of mankind has rebelled against him and 
made him a byword4 ,a state1 desirous of
 maintaining itself1 may palpably       
violate in its institutions1 inherited  
from the past1 a social will grown more 
rational1 more conscious of its rights  
and more articulate4 ,then the appeal is
 made to right and justice in other than
 the traditional forms4 ,it may1 in a   
given instance1 be wrong to create      
wealth2 existing forms of its           
distribution may be iniquitous4 ,the    
ultimate arbiter in all such matters    
must be the ,ethical ,man4  ,human      
society is indefinitely complex4 ,many  
specialists must occupy themselves with 
its problems4 ,a technical question in  
this field may always be carried over to
 moral ground4 ,he who undertakes to    
make this transition without having made
 a fairly thorough study of ethics      
appears to be working in the dark4 ,his 
assumptions have been questioned1 or    
have been abandoned4 ,who shall furnish 

him with a new basis for his special    
science8  ,ethics is a basal science4   
,it justifies1 or it refuses to justify1
 those specialists who concern          
themselves with men in societies4 ,it is
 a very old science and has interested  
men vastly4 ,i have spoken above of     
eugenics as a new science4 ,only in its 
modern form is it new4 ,plato cultivated
 it intemperately when he wrote his     
,republic--but he saw that his ,republic
 would not do1 and he wrote his ,laws4  
,he stood condemned by ,ethics4         
,usually men who occupy themselves      
seriously1 and in a broad way1 with man 
in society1 have adopted1 consciously or
 unconsciously1 some ethical doctrine4  
,but this is often done without due     
consideration1 and without a sufficient 
knowledge of what has been said by the  
great thinkers of the past4 ,it is for  
this reason that ,i have treated at such
 length in this volume of the schools of
 the moralists4  #aff4 ,,ethics ,,and   
,,philosophy4--,it should be observed   

that in developing the ,ethics of the   
,rational ,social ,will1 or the ,ethics 
of ,reason--the doctrine advocated in   
this volume--,i have not depended upon a
 particular philosophy4  ,i see no      
reason why a ,realist or an ,idealist1 a
 ,monist or a ,dualist1 one who holds to
 an immediate perception of an external 
world or one who regards our            
acquaintance with it as a matter of     
inference1 should refuse to go with me  
so far4 ,nor do ,i see any reason why a 
believer in ,god1 one who bows at the   
shrine of ,mind-,stuff1 or one who      
refuses to commit himself at all upon   
such matters1 should enter a demurrer4  
,the ,parallelist and the               
,interactionist1 however widely they    
differ touching the relation of mind and
 body1 may here fall upon one another's 
necks and shed tears of brotherly       
affection4  ,that it is proper for the  
philosopher to interest himself in      
ethics1 ,i have maintained4 ,footnote3  
,see chapter vi1 ,sec #ah4 ,he is       

supposed to be a critical and reflective
 man1 and to take broad views of human  
affairs4 ,such views are needed when one
 comes to the study of ethics4  ,i am   
forced to admit that some philosophers1 
when they have written on ethical       
subjects1 have said certain things to   
which the critical moralist cannot      
readily assent4 ,he who maintains that  
certain human intuitions-- which it may 
even appear impossible to reconcile with
 each other--are inexplicably and       
infallibly authoritative1 seems to leave
 us without so much as the hope of ever 
attaining to ultimate rationality4      
,footnote3 ,see chapter xxiii4  ,and    
there are philosophers who would        
persuade us that1 unless we accept all  
the religious or theological doctrines  
which have appeared to them acceptable1 
we rob man of every incentive for being 
moral at all4 ,if ,god is not going to  
repay him with interest for the pains   
which he gives himself1 does he not play
 the part of a dupe in being good8 ,we  

have seen that this was palpably the    
position of ,paley4 ,footnote3 ,chapter 
xxiv1 ,sec #if4 ,if ,god will not       
reconcile1 ultimately1 benevolence and  
self- interest1 proclaimed ,reid1 man is
 reduced to this miserable dilemma1     
whether it is best to be a fool or a    
knave4 ,footnote3 ,essays on the ,active
 ,powers of ,man1 ,essay ,,iii1 ,part   
,,iii1 chapter viii4 ,it would be absurd
 to believe that either ,paley or ,reid 
lived down to the level of his doctrine4
 ,both were very decent men1 and capable
 of disinterestedness4 ,some of the     
utterances of ,kant and of ,green seem  
to point in the same direction1 but both
 have made it abundantly plain that     
they1 personally1 and whatever their    
intellectual perplexities1 were moved by
 something much higher than egoism4     
,footnote3 ,see chapters xxiv1 ,sec #ig2
 xxvi1 #c2 and xxix4  ,i mean to say    
very little about philosophy in this    
volume4 ,i wish to keep to ethics1 a    
science old enough and strong enough to 

stand upon its own feet4 ,but it would  
be wrong not to underline one or two    
points in this connection1 if only to   
obviate misunderstanding3  7#a7 ,there  
is nothing wrong in a man's wishing to  
earn the heaven in which he believes4   
,it is not wrong for him to wish to be  
happy on earth and in the body4 ,but if 
the desire for his own happiness1 either
 here or hereafter1 is the only motive  
that can move him1 he is not a good man4
 ,prudence may be a virtue1 generally   
speaking2 but it is no substitute for   
benevolence4 ,the man who is only       
prudent is no fit member of any society 
of rational beings anywhere4  7#b7 ,men 
are often better than their words would 
indicate4 ,paley talks as if he were a  
cad2 ,reid flounders2 ,kant1 noble as   
are many of his utterances1 sometimes   
gives forth an uncertain sound4 ,yet no 
one of these men was personally selfish4
  ,and yet all of these men assumed that
 morality is endangered unless there is 
a ,god to repay men for being good4 ,why

 did they insist so strenuously upon    
this1 and incorporate it into their     
philosophy8 ,we must1 ,i think1 go      
beneath the surface to find the real    
reason2 and when we have discovered it1 
we cannot regard them in an unfavorable 
light4  ,they felt1 ,i believe1 that    
good men ought to be made happy2 that   
this is rational1 if anything is4 ,so   
far1 they are quite in accord with the  
doctrine of the ,rational ,social ,will4
 ,and they saw no other way of          
guaranteeing a complete rationality than
 in holding to a theistic philosophy4   
7#c7 ,this means that their real motives
 were not selfish and personal4 ,this is
 admirably brought out when we turn to  
,green4 ,it is too much to expect that  
many of my readers have read his        
,prolegomena to ,ethics1 which is       
repetitious1 tedious1 and rather vague1 
though it is inspired by a fine spirit  
and has the great merit of having       
influenced1 directly or indirectly1 a   
number of able writers to produce       

excellent works on ethics4 ,footnote3 ,i
 need only to refer to the text-books by
 ,muirhead1 ,mackenzie1 ,dewey and      
,fite4  ,green dwells1 with infinite    
repetition1 upon the presence in man of 
a principle not natural1 which is       
identical in all men1 and which1 in some
 way that he does not explain1 holds the
 world of our experiences together1     
being itself not in time or in space4   
,the disciple of ,paley or ,reid or     
,kant will search his pages in vain for 
any indication that this principle      
performs or can perform any of the      
functions of the ,god believed in by the
 above-mentioned philosophers4          
,nevertheless1 it is the source of an   
ardent inspiration to ,green1 who       
relieves the baldness of the appellation
 principle1 by calling it1 sometimes1   
self- consciousness1 sometimes1 reason4 
,it does not appear to promise ,green   
anything1 so his devotion to it may be  
regarded as disinterested4 ,however1 he 
owes to it inspiration4  ,philosophers  

find their inspiration in very different
 directions4 ,the philosopher1 as such1 
sometimes rather objects to the word1   
,god4 ,footnote3 ,see chapter xxvi1 ,sec
 #abc1 note4 ,but he may feel much as   
men generally feel toward ,god1 when he 
contemplates his ,conscious ,principle1 
or his ,idea1 or the ,substance which he
 conceives as the identity of thought   
and extension1 or1 for that matter1     
,mind-,stuff or the ,unknowable4 ,that  
other men may not see that he has       
anything in particular to be inspired   
about1 or that he can hope for anything 
in particular for himself or for other  
men1 does not rob him of his            
inspiration1 and that may affect his    
life deeply4  ,it is1 hence1 not a      
matter of no importance to ethics what  
manner of philosophy it pleases a man to
 elect4 ,one's outlook upon the great   
world may repress or may stimulate      
ethical strivings1 may narrow or may    
broaden the ethical horizon4 ,it is     
something to feel1 even rather blindly1 

that one has a ,cause4 ,for myself1 ,i  
think it is better to have a ,cause that
 seems worth while1 even when rather    
impartially looked at4 ,but1 of this1   
more in the next section4  7#d7         
,whatever one thinks of such matters1 it
 is well to come back to the fact that1 
nevertheless1 ethics stands upon its own
 feet4 ,even if ,paley1 and ,reid1 and  
,kant1 and ,green1 and many others1 are 
in the wrong1 the doctrine of the       
,rational ,social ,will stands sure4 ,it
 is wrong to be selfish2 it is wrong to 
be untruthful2 it is wrong to be unjust4
 ,it is wrong for individuals1 and it is
 wrong for nations4 ,the man1 or the    
group of men1 that does wrong1 is       
irrational4 ,it stands condemned4  #afg4
 ,,ethics ,,and ,,religion4--,i regret  
having to speak1 in this book1 about    
religion at all1 just as ,i regret      
having to refer to the philosophers4    
,but it would be folly to omit all      
reference to religious duties4 ,they    
have played quite too important a part  

in the life of the family1 of the tribe1
 of the state2 and that not merely here 
and there1 but everywhere1 in societies 
of all degrees of development1 in recent
 centuries and in times of a hoary      
antiquity4 ,those interested in the     
classics have read the remarkable little
 book1 ,the ,ancient ,city1 by ,fustel  
de ,coulanges4 ,as schoolboys we were   
brought up on the pious ,aeneas4 ,all   
,christians have some knowledge of the  
theocratic state of the ,hebrews1 and we
 know something of the history of       
,christian ,europe4 ,the anthropologist 
gives us masses of information touching 
the religious duties of all sorts and   
conditions of men4  ,there are those who
 rid themselves easily of the problem of
 religious duties4 ,they simply deny    
that there are any4 ,and there are      
those--the classes overlap--who easily  
shuffle off duties to the family and to 
the state4 ,they regard it as their     
function to ignore and to destroy4  7#a7
 ,i cannot think the matter is so       

simple4 ,there always have been         
religious duties generally recognized1  
as a matter of fact4 ,the boldest and   
most gifted of thinkers1 who have not   
hesitated to call into being ,utopian   
schemes for an ideal state1 such men as 
,plato and ,more1 have thought that the 
ideal state must have a religion4 ,and  
the modern scientist has gravely raised 
the question whether the state can      
maintain itself1 if all religious       
beliefs1 with their inspirations and    
their restraints1 die out4 ,footnote3   
,mc,dougall1 ,social ,psychology1       
chapter xiii4  ,the moralist1 who       
accepts religious duties1 has a         
difficult task4 ,it is not enough for   
him to say that men have religious      
duties in general1 just as it is not    
enough for him to say that they have    
political duties in general4 ,on the    
other hand it would be the height of    
presumption for him to endeavor to tell 
every man what he should do in detail4  
,he does not feel it his duty to tell   

every man whom he should marry1 or for  
whom he should vote at each election4   
,still1 it does seem as though the      
moralist ought to do more than tell a   
man vaguely that he has religious       
duties4  7#b7 ,why not follow the       
analogy suggested by duties to the      
family1 the neighborhood1 the state8    
,states have their religions1 sometimes 
unequivocally and unmistakably1 and     
sometimes not so palpably4 ,the religion
 of a people has1 as a rule1 its roots  
far back in the history of that people4 
,its religion has influenced in many    
subtle ways its institutions1 its       
emotions1 its habits1 its whole outlook 
upon life4  ,even where1 as with us1    
state and church have been1 in theory1  
wholly sundered1 there has been no      
question1 up to the present1 of the     
disappearance of a religion4 ,the       
,united ,states has been regarded as a  
,christian nation1 inspired by ideals   
and addicted to customs only explicable 
by a ,christian past4  ,the fact that it

 is so is somewhat obscured to us4 ,for 
this there are two causes4 ,the first   
is1 that the ,american1 who is a        
freeman1 possesses and exercises a fatal
 ingenuity in the creation of a         
multitude of sects out of practically   
nothing4 ,still1 most of these sects    
have more in common than some of their  
adherents suppose4 ,they spring1 as a   
rule1 from a ,christian root4 ,the      
second is1 that our land has been the   
goal of the greatest migration ever     
recorded in human history4 ,most of     
those who have come to us have1 so far1 
come from nations in some sense         
,christian1 but they have brought with  
them very diverse traditions1 and some  
appear to object to traditions          
altogether4  ,nevertheless1 ,i think we 
may be called a ,christian nation1 and  
if we follow the analogy above          
suggested--that of the relations of men 
to the state and to lesser organisms    
within the state--it would appear that  
it is the duty of an ,american to       

recognize himself as a ,christian rather
 than as a ,mahometan or a ,pagan4 ,if  
he does recognize this1 he will feel    
himself under certain obligations which 
are independent of his personal tastes  
and proclivities4  7#c7 ,for one thing1 
he will recognize that a religion is not
 a thing to be stripped off and drawn on
 as one changes a suit of clothes4  ,a  
woman may regret that her infant has red
 hair4 ,she will not1 on that account1  
as a rule1 exchange him surreptitiously 
for another4 ,men do not commonly       
repudiate their fathers because they are
 not rich or are growing old4 ,a good   
citizen may regret that his country has 
seen fit to enter into a given war1 but 
he will not1 therefore1 give aid or     
comfort to the enemy4  ,he who is       
capable of lightly repudiating his      
religion resembles the man who is       
capable of discarding his wife1 when he 
sees the first grey hair4 ,those who do 
such things are apt to be men who fill  
their whole field of vision with their  

rights1 and can find no place there for 
their duties4 ,nor should it be         
overlooked that the man1 who is capable 
of lightly discarding his wife1 is the  
man as capable of supplying her place   
with a worse4 ,even so1 he who easily   
throws off his religion is usually the  
man who easily replaces it with some    
superstition1 scientific or merely      
whimsical1 at which other men wonder4   
,men lament sometimes over the fact that
 the task of the foreign missionary is a
 hard one4 ,were it really an easy one1 
there would be no stability in human    
societies1 for there would be no        
stability in human nature4 ,the man of  
light credulity is the man who easily   
takes on new faiths2 not the man to whom
 tradition and loyalty mean something4  
7#d7 ,it seems to follow1 as a          
corollary1 that the religion in which a 
man has been brought up has the first   
claim upon him4 ,i accept this without  
hesitation4  ,but this does not mean    
that the claim is in all cases final and

 valid4  ,there may be cases in which it
 seems to be the duty of a man to leave 
his wife1 to disinherit a child1 to     
transfer his allegiance from one state  
to another4 ,such cases are recognized  
as justifiable by men who are thoughtful
 and disinterested4 ,but the same men   
also recognize that1 were such          
disruptions of the bonds which unite men
 in communities the rule and not the    
exception1 it would mean the destruction
 of the community4 ,similarly1 it may   
become the duty of a man to transfer his
 allegiance from one church to another4 
,are not religions1 rationally compared1
 of different values8 ,have there not   
been religions indisputably on a moral  
level lower than that of the community  
which they represent8 ,undoubtedly4     
,and there have been governments so bad 
that the only refuge has seemed to lie  
in revolution4 ,it should be remembered1
 however1 that revolutions can be       
resorted to too lightly2 and that       
evolution1 where possible1 is preferable

 to revolution1 whether in things       
secular or in things religious4 ,it is  
always easier to tear down than it is to
 build up4 ,nor does anyone1 save the   
anarchist1 tear down through wanton love
 of destruction4 ,even he is apt to feel
 called upon to give some sort of a     
vague excuse for his violence4  ,it will
 be observed that ,i have all along     
spoken1 not merely of religion1 but of  
the ,church4 ,i have done this because  
religion is a social phenomenon4 ,it has
 its institutions1 and cannot live      
without them4  ,it cannot be denied that
 individual philosophers have evolved   
religious philosophies2 it cannot be    
denied that solitary individuals1 as    
such1 have felt religious emotions4 ,how
 much of this is due to the fact that   
there have been religions and churches1 
,i do not believe that they themselves  
have realized4  ,but1 if religion is to 
be a vital force of any sort in a state1
 holding up ideals and stimulating the  
emotion that helps to realize them1 it  

must be incorporated in an institution  
or in institutions4 ,you cannot remove  
the rose and keep the perfume4 ,even the
 memory of it tends to vanish4 ,a       
religious man without a church is like a
 citizen without a state4 ,a citizen    
without a state is a man who makes the  
effort to keep step1 and to walk in     
single file1 all alone4  7#e7 ,having   
said so much for ,religion and for the  
,church1 it is right that ,i should     
refer to some things that may be said on
 the other side4  ,it may be claimed    
that men of science have a tendency to  
turn away from religion and to grow     
indifferent to or to deny religious     
duties4 ,in this there is some truth1   
although notable exceptions to the rule 
may be cited4  ,but ,i have known many  
men of learning in two hemispheres1 in  
some cases rather intimately4 ,with the 
utmost respect for their learning and   
for their mental ability1 ,i am still   
bound to say that ,i have found them    
quite human4 ,some of them--among the   

greatest of them--have been so absorbed 
in their special fields of              
investigation1 that they have not merely
 given scant attention to religion and  
to religious duties1 but have done scant
 justice even to their own family life  
or to the state4 ,and all have not been 
equally broad men1 capable of seeing    
clearly the part which religion has     
played in the life of humanity4  ,to    
this ,i must add that the impartial     
objectivity with which the scholar is   
supposed by the layman to view things is
 something of a chimera4 ,in saying this
 ,i criticize no one more severely than 
,i criticize myself4 ,this may be taken 
as my apology for the utterance4 ,have  
we not seen1 not many years since1 that1
 in the feeling aroused by an           
international conflict1 some scores of  
great scholars on the one side found it 
possible to write and to sign a series  
of statements diametrically opposed to a
 series drawn up and signed by some     
scores of equally famous scholars on the

 other8 ,was either group walled in     
hopelessly by sheer ignorance8 ,it is   
easy to take lightly matters about which
 one does not particularly care4  ,there
 is another objection brought against   
religion and the church which seems to  
be more significant4 ,is there not a    
danger that an interest in these may    
hamper freedom of thought and encourage 
an undue conservatism8  ,it should be   
borne in mind that religion and the     
church are not the only forces that make
 for conservatism4 ,family affection is 
conservative2 the law is conservatism   
itself1 and men feel that it should not 
be lightly tampered with4 ,how impartial
 and how ready to introduce innovations 
should men be in any field8 ,changes of 
certain kinds1 though they may have no  
little bearing upon our comfort1 do not 
threaten the existence of either state  
or church4 ,could someone devise a      
scheme by which the periodical visits of
 the plumber could be avoided1 we should
 all welcome it1 and have no fear of the

 consequences4  ,other innovations may  
bring in their train consequences more  
momentous4 ,what men deeply care about1 
they cling to1 and the question which   
confronts us is a very broad one4 ,does 
humanity1 on the whole1 gain or lose by 
a given degree of conservatism8 ,an     
increase of knowledge is by no means the
 only thing that makes for civilization4
 ,men may be highly enlightened1 and yet
 rotten to the very core4 ,how much of  
the ballast of conservatism and of      
loyalty to tradition is it well to throw
 overboard in the interest of           
accelerated motion8 ,those who1 in our  
judgment1 throw overboard much too much 
we have taken to deporting4  7#f7 ,here 
it will very likely be objected3 ,in all
 this you are advocating sheer          
,pragmatism6 ,are we to accept ,god and 
look for a life to come1 extending the  
spread of the community after the       
fashion suggested in ,chapter ,,xix1 and
 broadening the outlook for a future and
 more perfect rationality1 for no better

 reason than that it is our whim8 ,shall
 we believe and join ourselves with     
other believers1 for no better reason   
than that something happens to tempt our
 will8  ,i beg the reader1 if he will be
 just to my thought1 to follow me here  
with close attention4  #afh4 ,,ethics   
,,and ,,belief4--,under this heading ,i 
must call attention to several points4  
7#a7 ,i deny that ,i advocate           
,pragmatism at all4 ,the views which ,i 
advocate are so many thousand years     
older than ,pragmatism1 that it seems   
unjust to them1 at this late date1 to   
compel them to take on a new name1 and  
to be carried about in swaddling clothes
 in the arms of the philosophers1 after 
they have been functioning as adults in 
human communities from time immemorial4 
7a7 ,that abounding genius and most     
lovable man1 ,william ,james1 realizing1
 as many lesser men did not realize1    
that the truth contained in such views  
was in danger of being lost sight of by 
many1 wrote1 with characteristic        

vivacity and unerring dramatic instinct1
 the little volume called ,pragmatism4  
,it is with no lack of appreciation of  
the services he has rendered1 that ,i   
venture to call attention to the fact   
that he has1 in certain respects1 failed
 to do justice to those views4  7b7     
,pragmatism has received attention      
partly on account of the exaggerations  
of which it has been guilty4 ,these have
 repelled some men of sober mind4 ,it   
appears to be maintained that we can    
play fast and loose with the world1 and 
make it what we will4 ,i have criticized
 this elsewhere1#i and shall not do so  
now4 ,i shall only say here that ,i do  
not believe that so able a man of       
science as ,william ,james meant all    
that he said to be taken quite          
literally4 ,he was gifted with a sense  
of humor4 ,this1 some lack4  7c7 ,men of
 genius are apt to be strongly          
individualistic and impatient of        
restraints4 ,we have seen that there is 
such a thing as a public conscience and 

a private conscience4 ,the latter is    
only too often a whimsical thing4       
,pragmatism appears to teach that any   
individual1 as such1 has a moral right  
to adopt any hypothesis live enough to  
appeal to his individual will4 ,one has 
only to call to mind the extraordinary  
assortment of guests collected by       
,signer ,papini in his novel pragmatic  
hotel4 ,footnote3 ,ibid4 ,can such1 by  
any human ingenuity1 be moulded into    
anything resembling an orderly          
community8  7d7 ,in a later work1       
,professor ,james1 realizing that       
religion and theology are not identical1
 and strongly desirous of promoting     
religion1 deals severely with theology  
and the theologians4 ,footnote3         
,varieties of ,religious ,experience1   
,lecture xviii4  ,one truth has been    
seen1 but has not another been treated  
with some injustice8 ,is it not         
inevitable that reflective men1 who     
cherish beliefs1 should endeavor to give
 a more or less clear and reasoned      

account of them8 ,what degree of success
 is to be looked for1 and what emphasis 
should be laid upon such attempts1 are  
questions which will probably divide men
 for a long time to come4  7#b7 ,hence1 
,i do not advocate ,pragmatism at all1  
but ,i agree with it in so far1 at      
least1 as to recognize that belief is a 
phenomenon which concerns the will4     
,that it is so is a commonplace of      
psychology2 and it was recognized dimly 
long before the psychologist1 as such1  
came into being4  ,that it is so is     
rather readily overlooked where the     
evidence for certain beliefs is         
undeniable and overpowering4 ,i seem    
forced to believe that ,i am now        
writing4 ,i do not seem forced in a     
similar manner to accept a particular   
metaphysical doctrine or a given system 
of theological dogma4 ,intelligent men  
appear to be able to discuss such       
matters with each other and to agree to 
disagree4 ,if they are tolerant1 they   
can do this good- temperedly4 ,it is    

worth while to keep several points      
clearly in mind3  7a7 ,beliefs are not a
 matter of indifference4 ,some evidently
 lead to palpable and speedy disaster4  
,if ,i elect to believe that ,i can fly1
 and leave my window-sill as lightly as 
does the sparrow ,i now see there1 it is
 time for my friends to provide me with 
an attendant4  ,other beliefs are not of
 this character4 ,and that they will    
lead to ultimate disaster of any sort to
 myself or to others seems highly       
disputable4  7b7 ,what may be called    
scientific evidence may be adduced for  
different beliefs with varying degrees  
of cogency4 ,hegel tries to distinguish 
between the authority of the state and  
that of the church by attributing to the
 former something like infallibility4   
,he maintains that religion believes1   
but that the state knows4 ,footnote3    
,the ,philosophy of ,right1 ,sec #bgj4  
,we have had abundant reason to see that
 the state does not know1 but believes1 
and that it is very often mistaken in   

its beliefs4 ,nevertheless1 it does its 
best to keep order1 to be as rational as
 it can1 and to look a little way ahead4
 ,i think it ought to be admitted that  
it concerns itself with matters more    
terre-a-terre than does the church2 and 
that it ought not to be taken as a      
general truth that the state should take
 its orders from the church4 ,it has to 
do with matters which1 like our daily   
bread1 must be assured1 if certain other
 matters are to be considered at all4   
,in so far ,hegel was right4 ,there are 
those who forget this1 and talk as if   
metaphysical systems and religious      
beliefs should be forced upon men in    
spite of themselves1 either by sheer    
force of windpower or with the aid of   
the police4  ,to this it may be added   
that beliefs range from an unshakable   
and unthinking conviction to that degree
 of acquiescence which can scarcely be  
distinguished from mere loyalty4 ,it    
remains to be proved that the latter may
 not come under the head of belief1 and 

is something to be condemned4 ,footnote3
 ,more than thirty years ago1 while ,i  
was the guest of ,henry ,sidgwick at    
,cambridge1 ,england1 ,i asked him how  
it was that he1 the ,president of the   
,british ,society for ,psychical        
,research1 had never1 in his            
presidential addresses1 expressed a     
belief in the phenomena investigated4   
,he answered that if the word belief    
were taken broadly enough to express a  
willingness to look into things1 he     
might be said to believe4 ,no more      
candid soul ever breathed4  7c7         
,beliefs1 being phenomena which concern 
the will1 are at the mercy of many      
influences4 ,is there any scientific    
evidence open to the parallelist in     
psychology which is not also open to the
 interactionist8 ,is the conviction that
 one's country is in the right a mere   
matter of scientific evidence8 ,are the 
enlightened adherents of a given sect   
wholly ignorant of the tenets and of the
 arguments of another8  ,i maintain that

 tradition and loyalty have their       
claims4 ,they are not the only claims   
that can be made1 but they are worthy of
 serious consideration4 ,man is man1    
whether he is dealing with things       
secular or with things religious4  ,to  
see that such claims are recognized     
everywhere we have only to open our     
eyes4 ,it is absurd to believe that all 
the adherents of a political party are  
influenced only by the logical arguments
 published in the newspapers4 ,a        
newspaper that lived on logic alone     
would starve to death4 ,it is ridiculous
 to believe that all the members of a   
church are induced to become such only  
by the arguments of the theologians1    
many of which arguments the mass of the 
members are not in a position to        
comprehend at all4  ,and learned men are
 men1 too4 ,the philosopher who really  
kept himself free from all              
prepossessions would1 if he did much    
serious reading1 probably epitomize in  
his own person a large part of the      

history of philosophy1 falling out of   
one system and into another1 like an    
acrobat4 ,but he is usually caught young
 and influenced by some teacher1 or he  
is carried away by some book or by the  
spirit of the times4 ,as he is not an   
abnormal creature1 he acts like other   
men1 becoming an adherent of a school1  
or1 if he is ambitious1 starting one4   
7d7 ,we have seen that the individual   
has duties toward the state4 ,we have   
also seen that the state has duties     
toward the individual4 ,the state should
 not make it practically impossible for 
him to be a loyal citizen4 ,a somewhat  
similar duty appears to be incumbent    
upon the church4  ,a church that forces 
upon all of its members1 as a condition 
of membership1 intricate and abstract   
systems of metaphysics2 a church that   
does not teach good-will toward men1 but
 makes walls of separation out of slight
 differences of opinion2 a church that  
lags behind the moral sense of the      
community in which it finds itself2 a   

church that starves the religious life2 
these1 and such as these1 must expect to
 lose adherents4 ,it is not that men    
reject them2 it is that they reject men4
  ,those who read history have no reason
 to think that men1 except here and     
there and under exceptional             
circumstances1 will cease to regard     
religious duties as duties4 ,i have not 
ventured to offer any detailed solution 
of the problem of loyalty to the church4
 ,but neither have ,i ventured to offer 
any detailed solution of the problem of 
loyalty to the state4 ,in the one case1 
as in the other1 ,i suggest as guides   
tradition1 intuition and reflective     
reasoning4 ,i can only counsel good     
sense and some degree of patience4 ,it  
may be said3 ,you do not solve the      
difficulty for the individual4 ,i admit 
it4 ,such difficulties every thinking   
man must meet and solve for himself4    
#afi4 ,,the ,,last ,,word4--,those      
persons1 whether students1 or teachers1 
who dislike this final chapter1 may omit

 it1 without detriment to the rest of   
the book4 ,the doctrine of the ,rational
 ,social ,will is not founded upon this 
chapter4 ,the latter is a mere appendix4
  ,i regret that1 in a work in which ,i 
have wished to avoid disputation1 ,i    
have felt compelled to touch upon       
religious duties at all4 ,but they have 
played1 and still play1 so significant a
 role in the history of mankind1 that   
the omission could scarcely have been   
made4 ,you are free to take them or     
leave them2 but you are not free to take
 or leave the ,rational ,social ,will as
 the ,moral ,arbiter of the ,destinies  
of ,man4     ,,notes   #a4 ,,chapters ,i
 ,,to ,,iii4--,the notes in a book of   
any sort are rarely read1 except by a   
few specialists1 and by them not seldom 
with a view to refuting the author4 ,i  
shall make the following as brief as ,i 
may4 ,but ,i do wish to give some of my 
readers--all will not be equally        
learned--an opportunity to get          
acquainted with a few books better than 

this one4 ,this first note is not       
addressed to the learned1 and some will 
find it superfluous4  ,i intend to      
mention here a handful of books which   
any cultivated man may read with profit1
 and re-read with profit1 if he has     
already read them4 ,they can be         
collected gradually at a relatively     
slight expense1 and it is a pleasure to 
have them in one's library4 ,the list   
may easily be bettered1 and may be      
indefinitely lengthened4 ,i mention only
 books for those who are accustomed to  
do their reading in ,english4  ,it is   
hardly necessary to say that ,i do not  
advise all this reading in connection   
with the first three chapters of this   
book4 ,but1 as those chapters are       
concerned with the accepted content of  
morals as recognized by individuals and 
communities1 ,i have a good excuse for  
bringing the list in here4 ,many other  
good books1 not in the list1 are        
referred to later in the volume1 in     
other chapters4  ,it is very convenient 

to have within one's reach some such    
book as ,sidgwick's ,history of ,ethics4
 ,the only fault to find with ,sidgwick 
is that he has made his book too short1 
and has not given enough references4    
,but he is admirably fair and           
sympathetic1 as well as clear and       
interesting4  ,he1 who would dip more   
deeply into the ,greek moralists1 can   
read the accounts of the ancient        
egoists1 ,aristippus and ,epicurus1 in  
the ,lives of the ,philosophers by that 
entertaining old gossip1 ,diogenes      
,laertius4 ,the translation in ,bohn's  
edition will serve the purpose4  ,as for
 the greatest of the ,greeks--a keen    
pleasure1 intellectual and aesthetic1   
awaits the man who turns to ,plato's    
,republic and his ,laws4 ,jowett's great
 translation is in every public library4
 ,and we must read ,aristotle's         
,nichomachean ,ethics and his ,politics4
 ,here little attention is given to     
artistic form2 but the preternatural    
acuteness of the man is overpowering4   

,if we would understand some of the     
reasons which induced ,plato and        
,aristotle to write of the state as they
 did1 we can turn to chapter xiv of     
,grote's ,aristotle4  ,with certain     
later classical moralists most of us are
 more or less familiar4 ,seneca1 in his 
work ,on ,benefits1 gives a good picture
 of the moral emotions and judgments of 
an enlightened man of his time4 ,he was 
a great favorite with ,christian writers
 later4 ,cicero's work1 ,de             
,officiis--,on ,duties--it is best known
 under the ,latin title1 is very clear  
and very clever4 ,it is1 in its last    
half1 full of cases of conscience4 ,i   
venture to suggest to the teacher of    
undergraduates who find ethics a dry    
subject1 that he give them a handful of 
,cicero's cases to quarrel over4 ,doing 
just this has brought about something   
resembling civil war in certain classes 
of my undergraduates4 ,it has done them 
good1 and it has vastly entertained me4 
,but each teacher must follow his own   

methods4 ,we can none of us dictate4    
,how many of us have drawn inspiration  
from the noble reflections contained in 
the ,thoughts of ,marcus ,aurelius and  
in the ,discourses of ,epictetus1 those 
great ,stoics6 ,the unadorned           
translations of ,george ,long will serve
 to introduce us to these4  ,to get a   
good idea of how the moral world        
revealed itself to a ,father of the     
,church in the fifth century1 we have   
only to turn to that most fascinating of
 autobiographies1 the ,confessions of   
,st4 ,augustine4 ,his ,city of ,god is  
too long1 though interesting4           
,augustine's thought influenced the     
world for centuries4 ,then we may take a
 long jump and come down to ,st4        
,thomas1 the great ,scholastic of the   
thirteenth century4 ,to get acquainted  
with him1 we may turn to the ,english   
versions by ,rickaby1 ,aquinas ,ethicus4
 ,those of us who are smugly satisfied  
at belonging to the twentieth century   
must remind ourselves that there were   

great men in the thirteenth1 and that   
many among our contemporaries are still 
listening to them4 ,we ,protestant      
teachers of philosophy are sometimes in 
danger of forgetting this4 ,a strictly  
fresh century and a strictly fresh egg  
cannot claim to be precisely on a par4  
,i do not think that ,i shall add the   
modern moralists to this list4 ,there   
are a great many of them1 and many of   
them are very good4 ,but they are       
discussed at length in ,part ,,vii1     
which deals with the schools of the     
moralists4 ,citations and references are
 there given4 ,i think1 however1 that ,i
 ought to add here that ,i should regard
 an ethical collection incomplete that  
did not include at least one of the     
comprehensive works on morals lately    
offered us by certain sociologists4     
,westermarck's wonderful book--a mine of
 information--on ,the ,origin and       
,development of the ,moral ,ideas1 or   
the admirable book by ,hobhouse1 ,morals
 in ,evolution1 will serve to fill the  

gap4  ,information regarding editions of
 all the books ,i have mentioned can be 
had in most public libraries1 or from   
any good publisher and book-seller4  ,as
 for the reading to accompany these     
,chapters1 ,i-,,iii1 ,i suggest looking 
over the chapters by ,westermarck and   
,hobhouse1 indicated in foot-notes4 ,he 
who would realize how men have differed 
in their moral outlook on life might    
read the lives of ,aristippus1 ,epicurus
 and ,zeno1 in ,diogenes ,laertius2 or  
follow the account1 in ,sidgwick's      
,history of ,ethics1 of ,aristotle's    
teaching1 as compared with the ethics of
 the ,church4  #b4 ,chapters ,,iv to    
,,vii4--,these chapters on ethics as    
science and on ethical method do not    
appear to me to call for extensive      
notes4 ,several foot-notes are given    
which might be followed up4 ,i think it 
would be a very good thing for the      
student to read chapters i and vi in    
,sidgwick's admirable work1 ,the        
,methods of ,ethics4  #c4 ,chapters     

,,viii to ,x4--,to undertake to give any
 adequate list of references on the     
chapters which treat of man's nature and
 of his material and social environment 
would take us quite too far afield4 ,i  
merely suggest looking up the articles  
on ,anthropology and ,sociology in the  
,encyclopedia ,britannica4 ,references  
are given there4 ,and one should not    
overlook ,darwin's great book on ,the   
,descent of ,man4 ,it will never be     
rendered superfluous1 although the men  
of our day criticize it in detail4 ,a   
recent work of value is ,heredity and   
,environment in the ,development of     
,men1 by ,professor ,edwin ,grant       
,conklin1 #aiah4  #d4 ,chapters ,,xi to 
,,xvi4--,here my notes must be somewhat 
more detailed1 for we are on quite      
debatable ground4 ,at any rate1 there is
 much dispute1 between men of           
unquestionable ability1 on the one side 
and on the other4 ,i may be pardoned for
 thinking that the general argument of  
these chapters is reasonable and sound4 

,in commenting upon ,chapter ,,xi1 ,i   
suggest that the reader look up what    
,hobhouse has to say on impulse1 desire 
and will1 in his volume1 ,morals in     
,evolution2 also that he consult the    
same topics in ,james' ,psychology4     
,mc,dougall's ,social ,psychology might 
be read with much profit4  ,some        
admirable writers have a repugnance to  
using the word volition in speaking of  
the brutes4 ,i cannot help thinking that
 this is a dispute touching the proper  
use of a word1 rather than that any     
important distinction in kind is marked4
 ,some human volitions stand out very   
clearly as such4 ,there are free ideas  
present1 there is the tension of        
desires1 there is deliberation1 and     
there is clearly conscious choice1 or   
the final release of tension4 ,but how  
many of the decisions--,i see no        
objection to the word1--which we make   
during the course of a day1 are of this 
character6 ,it would be difficult to set
 a lower limit to volition4  ,muirhead1 

who writes1 in his ,elements of ,ethics1
 clearly and well of desires1           
emphasizing the presence of tensions1   
follows the ,neo- ,hegelian tradition in
 speaking of will4 ,he describes it as  
the act by which the attention is       
concentrated upon one object of desire1 
and he calls the act of choice the      
identifying of oneself with one object  
or line of action4  ,naturally1 it is   
not easy to think of the bee or the ant 
or the spider1 perhaps not even of the  
cat or dog1 as identifying itself with  
some object of desire4 ,i suggest that  
the reader1 after a perusal of          
,muirhead1 reflect upon what ,hobhouse  
has to say of the lower animals2 or that
 he look up ,miss ,washburn's book on   
,the ,animal ,mind1 7second edition1    
#aiah71 where a really serious study of 
the brute is undertaken4  ,on ,chapter  
,,xii1 ,i find no comment necessary4 ,as
 to ,chapter ,,xiii1 ,i recommend to the
 reader a reading or re-reading of the  
fascinating pages in which ,james treats

 of instinct in his ,psychology4 ,and   
let him look up the same subject in     
,mc,dougall's ,social ,psychology4 ,at  
the same time1 ,i enter a note of       
warning against reading even such good  
writers uncritically4 ,there is no      
little dispute in this field4 ,dr4 ,h4  
,r4 ,marshall's volume ,mind and        
,conduct gives an unusually thoughtful  
account of instinct 7,n4 ,y41 #aiai74   
,comment on ,chapter ,,xiv is not       
imperatively necessary4 ,but ,i must    
speak with detail of ,chapter ,,xv1 for 
the best of men quarrel when they come  
upon this ground3  ,sec #di4 ,the       
psychologist takes into his mouth no    
word more ambiguous than feeling4 ,it   
may be used to indicate any mental      
content whatever--,john ,stuart ,mill   
could speak of consciousness as composed
 of a string of feelings4 ,herbert      
,spencer divided conscious processes    
into feelings and relations between     
feelings4 ,james obliterates the        
distinction1 and finds it possible to   

speak of a feeling of and1 a feeling of 
if1 a feeling of but1 etc4 7,psychology 
,i1 p4 #aed1 ff474  ,some writers do not
 distinguish between emotions and       
feelings4 ,thus1 ,darwin1 in his        
,descent of ,man1 calls pleasure and    
pain emotions4 ,marshall 7op4 cit41     
chapter ii7 makes emotions1 and even    
intuitions1 instinct-feelings4 ,dewey1  
in his ,ethics 7p4 #bea71 appears to    
treat emotions as synonymous with       
feelings4 ,gardiner1 in his interesting 
and careful study1 ,affective           
,psychology in ,ancient ,writers after  
,aristotle 7,psychological ,review4     
,may1 #aiai71 treats of what are        
popularly called the feelings1 including
 emotions4  ,on the other hand1 in      
ethical writings the word1 feelings1    
very often means no more than pleasure  
and pain4 ,thus1 ,seth 7,a ,study of    
,ethical ,principles1 p4 #fc71 makes    
feelings synonymous with pleasure and   
pain4 ,muirhead 7,elements of ,ethics1  
p4 #df71 says1 by feeling is meant      

simply pleasure and pain2 and to have   
interest in1 he defines as to have      
pleasure in 7p4 #df74  ,this narrowing  
of the meaning of the word on the part  
of ethical writers is1 perhaps1 natural4
 ,the hedonistic moralists made pleasure
 and pain the only ultimate reasonable  
stimulants to action4 ,many moralists   
opposed them 7see1 later1 ,chapters     
,,xxiv and ,,xxv74 ,so pleasure and pain
 became the feelings1 par excellence4   
,both ,dewey and ,alexander sometimes   
speak as if1 by the word feeling1 we    
meant no more than pleasure and pain4   
,so does ,kant4  ,the modern            
psychologist sometimes distinguishes    
pleasure and pain from agreeableness and
 disagreeableness4 ,marshall1 a high    
authority on pleasure and pain1 refuses 
to draw the distinction 7op4 cit41 ,part
 ,,iii4 chapter vi74 ,but he also       
refuses to call pleasure and pain       
sensations1 regarding them as           
qualifications of our sensations1 like  
intensity1 duration1 and the like4  ,are

 pleasures1 as pleasures1 alike8 and are
 pains1 as pains1 alike8 ,jeremy        
,bentham refused to distinguish between 
kinds of pleasures4 ,on the other hand1 
,john ,stuart ,mill did so 7see ,chapter
 ,,xxv in this volume72 and ,s4         
,alexander1 in his work entitled ,moral 
,order and ,progress1 maintains that    
pleasures differ in kind1 and cannot be 
compared merely in their intensity 7see 
page #bjb74  ,the whole matter is       
complicated enough1 and there is        
occupation for the most disputatious4   
,but ,i do not think that these disputes
 very directly affect the argument of my
 chapter4  ,sec #ej4 ,that there is a   
relation between feeling and action1 but
 that the two are by no means nicely    
adjusted to each other1 has been        
recognized in many quarters4  ,darwin1  
discussing the mental and moral         
qualities of man1 points out that the   
satisfaction of some fundamental        
instincts gives little pleasure1        
although uneasiness is suffered if they 

are not satisfied4 ,seth 7op4 cit41 p4  
#fd7 says that feelings guide action2   
and he claims that the energy of a      
moving idea lies in the feeling which it
 arouses 7p4 #gj74 ,on the quantity of  
emotion1 and its relation to action1 see
 ,stephen1 ,the ,science of ,ethics1 ii1
 iii1 #be4  ,sec #ea4 ,it appears to be 
repugnant to ,green to admit that       
feeling-- pleasure--can be the direct   
object of action2 and he denies roundly 
that a sum of pleasures can be made an  
object of desire and will at all        
7,prolegomena to ,ethics1 ,sec #bba2 see
 ,sec #aac of this book74 ,moreover1 he 
maintains1 and in this ,dewey follows   
him1 that the making of pleasure an     
object is evidence of the existence of  
unhealthy desires4 ,i cannot but think  
this1 taken generally1 an exaggeration4 
,of course1 what is called a man of     
pleasure is a pretty poor sort of a     
thing4  ,sec #eb4 ,in this section ,i do
 not touch at all upon the immemorial   
dispute concerning what has been called 

the 'freedom' of the will4  ,indeed1 ,i 
leave it out of this book altogether4   
,the moralist must1 ,i think1 assume    
that man has natural impulses and is a  
rational creature4 ,those who are       
interested in the problem above         
mentioned1 may turn to my ,introduction 
to ,philosophy1 chapter xi1 ,sec #df1   
where the matter is discussed1 and      
references 7in the corresponding note7  
are given4  ,chapter ,,xvi4--,the matter
 of this chapter appears1 clear enough1 
but it may be well to give a few        
references touching the two conceptions 
of the functions of ,reason4  ,men of   
quite varying views have inclined to the
 doctrine which appeals to me4 ,i think 
it is to be gotten out of ,hegel4       
,green1 who is much influenced by him1  
takes1 as the rational end of conduct1 a
 satisfaction on the whole1 which       
implies a harmonization and unification 
of the desires 7see1 in this book1      
,chapter ,,xxvi1 ,sec #abb74 ,spencer1  
in his ,study of ,sociology1 defines the

 rational as the consistent4 ,stephen1  
in his ,science of ,ethics1 chapter ii1 
,sec #c1 says3 ,reason1 in short1       
whatever its nature1 is the faculty     
which enables us to act with a view to  
the distant and the future4 ,he claims  
that rationality tends to bring about a 
certain unity or harmony4 ,hobhouse1    
,morals in ,evolution1 7pp4 #egb-eha71  
says that reason harmonizes the         
impulses4  ,the champions of the        
opposite view are the intuitionists     
proper--such men as ,kant1 ,reid1       
,price1 even ,sidgwick4 ,to judge of    
their doctrine--they were great men1 be 
it remembered1 and worthy of all        
respect--,i suggest that the reader wait
 until he has read the chapter on       
,intuitionism in this volume1 ,chapter  
,,xxiii4  #e4 ,,chapters ,,xvii ,,to    
,,xix4--,what is said in ,chapter ,,xvii
 seems too obviously true to need       
comment4 ,indeed1 it may be questioned  
whether the chapter is not full of      
platitudes4 ,but even platitudes are    

overlooked by some2 and there is some   
merit in arranging them systematically4 
,besides1 they may serve as a           
spring-board4  ,as to ,chapter ,,xviii1 
,i suggest reading chapter vii1 of      
,westermarck's book on ,the ,origin and 
,development of the ,moral ,ideas4 ,it  
is entitled ,customs and ,laws as       
,expressions of ,moral ,ideas4  ,for    
,chapter ,,xix1 one may read ,hobhouse1 
,morals in ,evolution1 ,part ,i1 chapter
 vi1 where he shows how the mere group  
morality gradually gives place to a     
wider morality in which the concept of  
humanity plays a part4 ,in the same     
work1 ,part ,,ii1 chapters i and ii1 the
 author treats of religious or          
sub-religious ideas as affecting        
conduct4 ,compare ,westermarck1 op4     
cit41 chapter xl4 ,see1 also1 ,the      
,ancient ,city1 by ,fustel de           
,coulanges4  #f4 ,,chapters ,,xx ,,to   
,,xxii4--,what is said in ,chapter ,,xx 
may be well reinforced by turning to    
,hobhouse 7op4 cit471 ,part ,i1 chapter 

iii1 where he traces the gradual        
evolution of rational morality in the   
field of justice4 ,see1 also1           
,westermarck1 7op4 cit47 chapters ix and
 x1 i4 e41 ,the ,will as the ,subject of
 ,moral ,judgment and the ,influence of 
,external ,events1 and ,agents under    
,intellectual ,disability4 ,in the last 
chapter referred to1 animals1 drunkards1
 idiots1 the insane1 etc41 come on the  
stage4 ,the chapter is full of curious  
information4  ,in ,chapter ,,xxi 7,sec  
#hf71 ,i have spoken of the hesitating  
utterances of moralists touching any    
duties we may owe to the brutes4 ,i     
suggest that before anyone dogmatize in 
detail on this subject he read with some
 care such a comprehensive work as ,miss
 ,washburn's ,the ,animal ,mind4 ,the   
book is admirable4 ,chapters x and xliv 
of ,westermarck's work are instructive  
and entertaining on this subject4 ,hegel
 disposes of the animals rather         
summarily4 ,see his ,philosophy of      
,right1 ,sec #dg4 ,sidgwick1 ,the       

,methods of ,ethics1 ,book ,,iii1       
chapter iv1 #b1 is well worth           
consulting4 ,see in my own volume1      
,chapter ,,xxx1 ,sec #ada4  ,for        
,chapter ,,xxii1 ,i give no references4 
,i appeal only to the common sense of my
 reader4  #g4 ,chapters ,,xxiii to      
,,xxix4--,for the chapters on the       
,schools of the ,moralists1 ,,xxiii to  
,,xxix1 ,i shall give briefer notes than
 ,i should have given1 were the chapters
 not already so well provided with      
foot-notes4  ,so far as the first four  
of these chapters are concerned1 ,i     
shall assume that enough has been said1 
drawing attention only to two points    
which concern ,chapter ,,xxiii4  ,it is 
very interesting to note that one of our
 best critics of intuitionism1 ,hemy    
,sidgwick1 was himself an intuitionist4 
,his ,methods of ,ethics deserves very  
close attention4 ,again ,intuitions are 
often spoken of as if they had been shot
 out of a pistol1 and had neither father
 nor mother4 ,to understand them better 

it is only necessary to read chapter    
viii of ,dr4 ,h4 ,r4 ,marshall's little 
book1 ,mind and ,conduct1 which shows   
how difficult it is to mark intuitions  
off sharply1 and to treat them as if    
they had nothing in common with reason4 
,those interested in the ethics of      
evolution1 treated in ,chapter ,,xxvii1 
should not miss reading the fourth      
chapter of ,darwin's ,descent of ,man4  
,huxley's essay1 ,evolution and ,ethics1
 might be read4 ,the ,prolegomena to the
 essay is1 however1 much more valuable  
than the essay itself4 ,spencer's       
general theory of conduct is best       
gathered from his ,data of ,ethics1     
which was reprinted as ,part ,i of his  
,principles of ,ethics4 ,the volume by  
,c4 ,m4 ,williams1 entitled1 ,a ,review 
of ,evolutionary ,ethics1 gives a       
convenient account of a dozen or more   
writers who have treated of ethics from 
the evolutionary standpoint4 ,it is well
 not to overlook what ,sidgwick has to  
say of evolution and ethics2 see ,the   

,methods of ,ethics1 ,book ,i1 chapter  
ii1 ,sec #b4  ,as for ,chapter ,,xxviii1
 on ,pessimism1 it is enough1 ,i think1 
to refer the reader to ,book ,,iv1 in   
,schopenhauer's work on ,the ,world as  
,will and ,idea4 ,the ,book is entitled 
,the ,assertion and ,denial of the ,will
 to ,live1 where ,self-consciousness has
 been ,attained4 ,see also his          
supplementary chapters1 xlvi1 on ,the   
,vanity and ,suffering of ,life1 and    
xlviii1 ,on the ,doctrine of the ,denial
 of the ,will to ,live4 ,for the        
doctrine of von ,hartmann1 see chapters 
xiii to xv1 in the part of his work     
entitled1 ,the ,metaphysic of the       
,unconscious4  ,for the chapter on      
,kant1 ,hegel and ,nietzsche1 ,i shall  
give but a few references1 though the   
literature on these writers is enormous4
 ,the ,english reader will find ,t4 ,k4 
,abbott's translation of ,kant's ethical
 writings a very convenient volume      
7third edition1 ,london1 #ahhc74 ,the   
translation of ,hegel's ,philosophy of  

,right1 by ,s4 ,w4 ,dyde 7#ahif71 ,i    
have found good1 where ,i have compared 
it with the original4 ,the word ,right  
in the title is unavoidably ambiguous1  
for the ,german word means both right   
and law4 ,hegel is dealing1 in a sense1 
with both4 ,i have indicated1 in a      
foot-note1 that ,nietzsche ought to be  
read in the original4 ,he is a          
marvellous artist4  ,perhaps ,i should  
add that ,nietzsche will be read with   
most pleasure by those who do not       
attempt to find in his works a system of
 ethics4 ,i recommend to the reader1    
especially1 his three volumes3 ,the     
,genealogy of ,morals2 ,beyond ,good and
 ,evil2 and ,thus ,spake ,zarathustra2  
7,new ,york1 #aiaa74  #h4 ,,chapters    
,,xxx ,,to ,,xxxvi4--,i shall not       
comment on ,chapter ,,xxx4 ,it is       
sufficiently interpreted by what has    
been said earlier in this book4 ,nor do 
,i think that ,chapter ,,xxxi needs to  
be discussed here4 ,i need only say that
 many moralists have commented upon the 

negative aspect of the moral law4 ,it   
will be remembered that the demon of    
,socrates--a dreadful translation--was a
 negative sign4 ,i do not think that    
those who have dwelt upon the negative  
aspect of morality have reflected       
sufficiently upon the moral organization
 of society4 ,we are put to school      
unavoidably as soon as we are born4  ,i 
shall not dwell upon ,chapters ,,xxxii  
and ,,xxxiii4 ,here ,i appeal merely to 
the good sense of the reader4  ,but     
,chapter ,,xxxiv demands more attention4
 ,he who is ignorant of history1 and has
 come into no close contact with the    
organization and functioning of any     
state other than his own1 is as unfit to
 pass judgment upon states generally1 as
 is the man who has never been away from
 his native village to pass judgment    
upon towns generally--towns inhabited by
 various peoples and situated in        
different quarters of the globe4 ,his   
lot may1 it is true1 happen to be cast  
in a good village2 but how he is to tell

 that it is good1 ,i cannot conceive4   
,he has no standard of comparison4      
,fortunately1 his ignorance is not as   
harmful as it might be4 ,the ,rational  
,social ,will1 which is penetrated      
through and through with traditions     
wiser than the whims of the individual1 
carries him along upon its broad bosom1 
and makes decisions for him4  ,the      
sociologist and the political           
philosopher should be consulted1 as well
 as the historian1 by one who would make
 a satisfactory list of books touching  
the subject of this chapter4 ,but the   
moralist may be allowed to suggest a few
 titles1 some of them very old ones4    
,plato's ,republic is fascinating1 and  
,aristotle's ,politics is the shrewdest 
of books4 ,but compare the state as     
conceived by these men with our notions 
of a modern democracy6 ,more's ,utopia  
is a delight4 ,to get back to earth and 
see what history means to a state1 and  
to its constitution and laws1 read ,sir 
,henry ,maine's ,ancient ,law4 ,states  

are not made in a day1 although1 under  
abnormal conditions1 governments may be 
upset1 and new ones set up1 within      
twenty-four hours4 ,after such          
unhistorical proceedings1 one can       
scarcely expect fast colors4 ,one or two
 washings will suffice to show what was 
there before4  ,he who has a weakness   
for the operatic can peruse ,rousseau's 
,social ,contract and the ,declaration  
of the ,rights of ,man published in the 
great ,french ,revolution4 ,as an       
antidote1 ,i suggest ,bentham's essay on
 ,anarchical ,fallacies4  ,but reading  
will do little good--even historical    
reading--unless one also thinks4 ,it is 
wonderful how much knowledge a man may  
escape1 if he is born under the proper  
star4 ,i once knew an undergraduate in  
an ,american university1 who attended   
compulsory chapel for more than three   
years1 and who still thought that the   
,old ,testament was a history of the    
,ancient ,romans4  ,there is quite too  
much to say about ,chapters ,,xxxv and  

,,xxxvi4 ,the only thing to do is to say
 nothing4 ,i shall touch upon just one  
point in each chapter4 ,i venture to beg
 the teacher1 when he treats of         
,international ,ethics1 to read in      
class1 with his students1 those pages in
 which ,sir ,thomas ,more describes the 
principles upon which the ,utopians     
conducted their wars4 ,remember that    
,sir ,thomas was not merely a statesman1
 but1 by common consent1 a learned1 a   
great1 and a good man4 ,mark the        
reaction of the undergraduate mind4     
,the one matter upon which ,i shall     
comment in ,chapter ,,xxxvi1 is the     
question of belief as an object of      
approval or of censure4 ,westermarck    
states 7,the ,origin and ,development of
 the ,moral ,ideas1 ,volume ,i1 chapter 
viii1 p4 #baf71 that neither the        
,catholic nor the ,protestant ,church   
regarded belief1 as such1 as an object  
of censure4 ,yet each was willing to    
punish heresy4 ,the point is most       
interesting1 and ,i hazard an           

explanation4 ,the churches were         
organizations with a definite object4   
,they made use of reward and punishment4
 ,this was reasonable enough1 abstractly
 considered4 ,however1 doctrine was the 
affair of the theologian4 ,now the      
theologian1 like the philosopher1 is a  
man who assumes that he is concerned    
with proofs1 and with proofs only4 ,if a
 thing is proved1 how can a man help    
believing it8 ,only if he will not1     
which is sheer obstinacy or perversity4 
,let him1 then1 be punished on account  
of his defective character 7see         
,westermarck1 ,i1 chapter xi1 p4 #bhc74 
,i think the apparent quibbling here can
 be gotten rid of by recognizing the    
truth emphasized in ,sec ,sec #afg-afh1 
namely1 that logical proofs play but a  
subordinate part in the adoption or     
rejection of beliefs touching a vast    
number of matters both secular and      
religious4 ,if we can influence men's   
emotions1 we can influence their        
beliefs4 ,both ,state and ,church have  

this power4 ,it is a power that can be  
abused4 ,but it is1 on the whole1 a good
 thing that men's beliefs can thus be   
influenced4 ,there would be no stability
 in human society could they not4 ,every
 ignorant man--and many men are         
ignorant--would be at the mercy of every
 clever talker2 and he would change his 
beliefs every day4 ,as men act on       
beliefs1 this means that he would       
zig-zag through life to the detriment of
 all orderly development4 ,i beg the    
reader1 learned or unlearned1 to put    
aside prepossessions1 and to look at    
things as they are in this field4