,,the ,,essentials ,,of ,,logic being ,,ten ,,lectures ,,on ,,judgment ,,and ,,inference by ,,bernard ,,bosanquet ,,formerly ,,fellow ,,of ,,university ,,college1 ,,oxford ,,macmillan ,,and ,,co4 ,,london ,,and ,,new ,,york #ahie ,the right of ,translation is reserved ,richard ,clay ,sons1 ,limited1 ,london ,bungay4 ,transcriber's ,note3 ,footnotes have been placed under the paragraphs to which they relate4 ,a few added footnotes and additions to ,bosanquet's footnotes1 giving the equivalents of ,greek words in the text1 are in square brackets4 ,bosanquet's marginal notes have been used as subheadings4 ,page numbers from the original are in braces 4 v ,,preface ,in this course of lectures ,i have attempted to carry out1 under the freer conditions of the ,university ,extension system1 a purpose conceived many years ago at ,oxford4 ,it was suggested to me by the answer of a friend1 engaged like myself from time to time in teaching elementary ,logic1 to the question which ,i put to him1 8,what do you aim at in teaching ,logic to beginners8 ,what do you think can reasonably be hoped for80 8,if the men could learn what an ,inference is1 it would be something10 was the reply4 ,the course of lectures which ,i now publish was projected in the spirit thus indicated4 ,though only the two last discourses deal explicitly with ,inference1 yet those which precede them contribute1 ,i hope1 no less essentially1 to explain the nature of that single development which in some stages we call ,judgment1 and in others ,inference4 ,so far as ,i could see1 the attempt to go to the heart of the subject1 however imperfectly executed1 was appreciated by the students1 and was rewarded with a serious attention which would not have been commanded by the trivialities of formal ,logic1 although more entertaining and less abstruse4 ,the details of traditional terminology may be found in ,jevons's ,elementary ,lessons in ,logic 7,macmillan74 ,those vi who desire to pursue the study more in the sense of the present work1 may be referred above all to ,bradley's ,principles of ,logic1 and also to ,lotze's ,logic 7,e4 ,tr471 and to ,sigwart's great work on ,logic1 the ,english translation of which1 just completed1 opens a storehouse of knowledge and robust good sense to the ,english student4 ,my own larger ,logic expresses in extenso the views which these lectures set out in a shorter form4 ,i hope it will be admitted by my critics that this experiment1 whether successful or unsuccessful1 was worth making1 and that except in the ,university ,extension system1 it could not easily have been made4 ,bernard ,bosanquet4 ,london1 ,january #ahie4 vii ,,contents ,,lecture ,i ,,the ,,problem ,,of ,,logic #a4 ,difficulty of the ,science #a #b4 ,the ,problem stated #c #c4 ,world as ,idea #d #d4 8,world0 #e #e4 ,the ,animal's ,world #f #f4 ,the ,world as 8,objective0 #g i4 ,common sense #h ii4 ,common-sense ,theory #h iii4 ,philosophic ,theory #aa #g4 ,our separate 8,worlds0 #ad #h4 ,subjective ,idealism #ai ,,lecture ,,ii ,,judgment ,,as ,,the ,,consciousness ,,of ,a ,,world #a4 ,defect of ,subjective ,idealism #ba #b4 ,the ,world as ,knowledge #bb #c4 ,knowledge is in the form of ,judgment #bc a4 ,necessary #bc b4 ,universal #bf c4 ,constructive #bg #d4 ,the ,continuous ,affirmation of ,waking ,consciousness #cc #e4 ,comparison with ,world as ,will #cg #f4 ,distribution of ,attention #dj viii ,,lecture ,,iii ,,the ,,relation ,,of ,,logic ,,to ,,knowledge #a4 ,meaning of 8,form0 #db #b4 ,form of ,knowledge dependent on ,content #di #c4 ,the ,relation of ,part and ,whole as ,form determined by ,content #ed #d4 ,nature of ,knowledge #eh #e4 ,conclusion #ei ,,lecture ,,iv ,,types ,,of ,,judgment1 ,,and ,,the ,,general ,,conditions ,,involved ,,in ,,assertion #a4 ,correspondence between ,types of ,judgment and ,nature of ,objects as ,knowledge #fa a4 ,impersonal ,judgment #fa b4 ,perceptive ,judgment #fb c4 ,proper ,names in ,judgment #fd d4 ,abstract ,judgment #fe #b4 ,the ,general ,definition of ,judgment #ff i4 ,what is implied in claiming ,truth #fg ii4 ,by what means the claim is made #fi iii4 ,the kind of ,ideas which can claim ,truth #gd a4 ,idea as ,psychical ,presentation #gd b4 ,idea as ,identical ,reference #gd ,,lecture ,v ,,the ,,proposition ,,and ,,the ,,name #a4 ,judgment translated into ,language #hj #b4 ,proposition and ,sentence #hb #c4 ,difference between ,proposition and ,judgment #hb #d4 8,parts of ,speech0 #he #e4 ,denotation and ,connotation #hh #f4 ,have ,proper ,names ,connotation8 #ia #g4 ,inverse ,ratio of ,connotation and ,denotation #id ix ,,lecture ,,vi ,,parts ,,of ,,the ,,judgment1 ,,and ,,its ,,unity #a4 ,parts of the ,judgment #ih #b4 ,copula #ii #c4 ,are ,subject and ,predicate necessary8 #ajj #d4 ,two ,ideas or ,things #aja a4 ,two ,ideas #ajb i4 ,mental ,transition #ajb ii4 ,absence of ,assertion #ajc b4 ,two ,things #ajd #e4 ,distinction between ,subject and ,predicate #ajg ,,lecture ,,vii ,,the ,,categorical ,,and ,,the ,,hypothetical ,,judgments #a4 ,some ,criticisms on the ordinary scheme of ,judgment #aab a4 ,why we need a ,scheme #aab b4 ,the ,common ,scheme #aac #b4 ,which ,judgments are ,categorical8 #aaf 7#a7 ,the 8,particular0 ,judgment #aaf a4 ,natural ,meaning #aaf b4 ,limited ,meaning #aag 7#b7 8,singular0 ,judgment #aah 7#c7 8,universal0 ,judgment #aai 7#d7 8,hypothetical0 ,judgment #aba 7#e7 8,disjunctive0 ,judgment #abc ,,lecture ,,viii ,,negation1 ,,and ,,opposition ,,of ,,judgments #a4 ,distinction between ,contrary and ,contradictory ,opposition #abf #b4 ,contrary ,negation #abh #c4 ,why use ,negation8 #acj #d4 ,stage of ,significant ,negation2 ,combination of ,contrary and ,contradictory #acb #e4 ,negative ,judgment expressing ,fact #acd #f4 ,operation of the ,denied ,idea #ace x ,,lecture ,,ix ,,inference ,,and ,,the ,,syllogistic ,,forms #a4 ,inference in ,general #acg #b4 ,conditions of the ,possibility of ,inference #aci #c4 ,system the ultimate condition of ,inference #adj #d4 ,immediate ,inference #ada #e4 ,number of ,instances #adb #f4 ,figures of ,syllogism1 illustrating ,progress from ,guess-work to ,demonstration #adf ,,lecture ,x ,,induction1 ,,deduction1 ,,and ,,causation #a4 ,induction #aea a4 ,by simple ,enumeration #aea b4 ,enumeration always has a ,ground #aeb c4 ,perfect ,induction #aeb d4 ,system #aec e4 ,analogy as ,step towards ,system #aee f4 ,negative ,instance #aeh g4 ,classification and ,generalisation #aei h4 ,hypothesis #afa #b4 ,deduction #afb a4 ,subsumption #afc b4 ,construction #afc #c4 ,causation #afd #d4 ,the ,postulate of ,knowledge #afe #e4 ,conclusion #aff #a ,,lecture ,i ,,the ,,problem ,,of ,,logic ,difficulty of the science #a4 ,there is no science more difficult than that on which we are entering in these lectures4 ,it is worth while to discuss the nature of this difficulty4 ,it is a question of interest rather than of intricacy4 ,all sciences have1 perhaps1 much the same possibilities of broad theory and subtle analysis4 ,but ,logic stands alone in the difficulty with which the student sustains his persuasion that its point of view is worth applying4 ,in most other sciences1 even in the philosophical sciences1 there is a continual stimulus to sense-perception1 to curiosity1 to human interest4 ,the learner is called upon to dissect animals or plants1 to undertake delicate manipulations with beautifully contrived instruments1 to acquaint himself with the history of nations1 with the genesis of worlds1 with strange and novel speculations upon the nature of space1 or with the industry and well-being of various classes among mankind at the present day4 ,and these elements of novelty1 these stimulations of sense-perception or of practical interest1 carry us forward imperceptibly1 and sustain our #b eagerness to analyse and combine in theoretic completeness the novel matter thus constantly impinging upon us4 ,in ,philosophy1 and more especially in ,logic1 we can promise little or nothing of this kind4 ,the teacher of ,philosophy1 from ,socrates downwards1 has talked about common things1 things already familiar to his hearers4 ,and although he calls upon them to think of these things in a peculiar way1 and from an unaccustomed point of view1 yet it is likely to be felt that he is demanding a new effort1 without supplying a new interest4 ,and it is a common experience1 that after a time the mind rebels against this artificial attitude1 which fatigues without instructing1 if we have accustomed ourselves to understand by instruction the accumulation of new sense-perceptions and the extension of historical or scientific vision over a wider superficial area4 ,now this ,i cannot help1 and ,i will not disguise4 ,in ,philosophy1 and in ,logic above all1 it must be so4 ,the whole point and meaning of the study is that in it we re-traverse familiar ground1 and survey it by unfamiliar processes4 ,we do not1 except accidentally1 so much as widen our mental horizon4 ,for those who care to understand1 to trace the connecting principles and functions that permeate our intellectual world1 there is indeed an interest of a peculiar kind4 ,but even experienced students will occasionally feel the strain of attending to difficult distinctions1 entirely without the excitement of novelty in sense-perception or of a practical bearing upon human life4 ,it is this that makes ,logic probably the hardest of all the sciences4 #c ,the problem stated #b4 ,we cannot hope to vanquish this difficulty unless we face it boldly from the first4 ,there are in the old-fashioned ,logic-books tricks and puzzles1 fallacies and repartees1 which can in some degree be made amusing2 but of these ,i do not intend to speak4 ,the course by which alone ,i can hope honestly to awaken a true logical interest among any who may be quite unfamiliar with the subject1 is to approach the matter descriptively1 and try to set before you fully and fairly what the problem is which the process of knowledge has to meet4 ,and then it may be possible to claim a genuine theoretical curiosity--none the less genuine that it may be tinged with a sympathy for man's common birthright of intelligence--for the detailed explanation of the means by which this problem is solved from day to day4 ,such an explanation is the science of ,logic4 ,the problem may be thus introduced4 ,several of those present have1 ,i believe1 attended a previous course of lectures on ,psychology4 ,they have learned1 ,i presume1 to think of the mind as the course of consciousness1 a continuous connected presentation1 more or less emphasising within it various images1 and groups of images and ideas1 which may be roughly said to act and re-act upon each other1 to cohere in systems1 and to give rise to the perception of self4 ,this course of consciousness1 including certain latent elements1 the existence of which it is necessary to assume1 is an individual mind1 attached to a particular body1 and so far as we know1 not separable from the actions and affections of that body4 ,what is the connection between such a course of consciousness in any individual1 and the world as that individual knows and wills it8 ,this is the point at #d which ,psychology passes into ,logic4 ,psychology treats of the course of ideas and feelings2 ,logic of the mental construction of reality4 ,how does the course of my private ideas and feelings contain in it1 for me1 a world of things and persons which are not merely in my mind8 ,world as ,idea #c4 ,schopenhauer called his great work1 ,the ,world as ,will and ,idea4 #a ,leaving out ,will for the moment1 let us consider the world 8as ,idea40 8#8,the world is my idea2' #b this is a truth which holds good for everything that lives and knows1 though man alone can bring it into reflective and abstract consciousness4 ,if he really does this1 he has attained to philosophical wisdom4 ,it then becomes clear and certain to him that what he knows is not a sun and an earth1 but only an eye that sees a sun1 a hand that feels an earth2 that the world which surrounds him is there only as an idea1 i4e4 only in relation to something else1 the consciousness which is himself4 ,if any truth can be asserted a priori1 it is this2 for it is the expression of the most general form of all possible and thinkable experience3 a form which is more general than time1 space1 or causality1 for they all pre-suppose it4 44444 8,no truth1 therefore1 is more certain1 more independent of all others1 and less in need of proof than this1 that all that exists for knowledge1 and1 therefore1 this whole world1 is only object in relation to subject1 perception of a perceiver1 in a word1 idea4 ,this is obviously true of the past and the future1 as well as of the present1 of what is farthest off1 as of #e what is near2 for it is true of time and space themselves1 in which alone these distinctions arise4 ,all that in any way belongs or can belong to the world is inevitably thus conditioned through the subject and exists only for the subject4 ,the world is idea40 #a ,e4 ,tr4 7,trubner1 #ahhc74 #b ,schopenhauer1 op4 cit4 beginning4 ,the world1 then1 for each of us1 exists in the medium of our mind4 ,it is a sort of building1 of which the materials are our ideas and perceptions4 ,the 8world0 #d4 ,so much for 8idea40 ,what do we mean by 8world08 ,a succession of images passing before us1 or rather making up our consciousness1 like a dream1 is not a world4 ,the term is very expressive2 it is a favourite word in ,shakespeare4 ,when the courtier says -- 8,hereafter1 in a better world than this1 ,i shall desire more love and knowledge of you10 he does not mean1 as ,i used to think1 8in heaven02 he means in a better condition of social affairs4 ,in 8mad world1 mad kings1 mad composition10 the term means more especially the set of political and family connections within which extraordinary reversals of behaviour have just taken place4 ,often we use the expression1 with a qualifying epithet1 to indicate some particular sphere of connected action1 8the ecclesiastical world10 8the political world10 and so forth4 ,always there seems to be implied the notion of a set of things or persons bound together by some common quality which enables them to act upon each other1 and to constitute what is technically termed a 8whole40 ,the 8world0 par excellence1 then1 ought to mean the one connected set of things and persons which we all recognise #f and refer to as the same1 and as including ourselves along with all who use the word in the same sense4 ,then the 8world as idea0 means no less than this1 that the system of things and persons which surrounds all of us1 and which each of us speaks of and refers to as the same for every one1 exists for each of us as something built up in his own mind--the mind attached to his own body--and out of the material of his own mind4 ,the animal's world #e4 ,let us illustrate this building up by thinking of the world1 our surroundings1 as an animal must be aware of it4 ,the lowest beginnings of sight1 for example1 give no colour and no shape4 ,an animal in this stage can1 probably1 only just take warning if a dark object comes between him and the light4 ,therefore he cannot have the ordered visual image of space definitely stretching away all round him1 which is the primary basis of our idea of a world4 ,he can move1 no doubt1 but there is nothing to make us suppose that he records and co-ordinates the results of his movements into anything like that permanent order of objects which must be constructed in some way by a human being even though born blind4 ,succession1 we might say1 is much more powerful with animals than co-existence2 but we should have to guard ourselves against supposing that this was what we mean by succession1 that is1 a process definitely recognised as in time1 with a connection of some reasonable kind between its phases4 ,for the most part with animals out of sight is out of mind2 if so1 the present is not interpreted1 enlarged1 and arranged with reference to what is not present in time or space by them as it is by us4 ,and therefore the consciousness of a single system of things1 #g permanent1 and distinct from the momentary presentations of the senses1 cannot1 in all probability1 grow up for them4 ,if so1 they have no real world1 but only a dream world1 #a i4e4 a world not contrasted with the stream of presentation1 nor taken as the common theatre of all actions and events4 ,this difference between the world of an animal and that of a human being1 is a rough measure of what man does by mental or intellectual construction in making his world4 #a ,the character of the sensory powers1 which are strongest in many animals1 contributes to this conclusion4 ,mr4 ,f4,h4 ,bradley is sure that his dog's system of logic1 if he had one1 would run1 8,what exists smells2 what does not smell is nothing40 ,the sense of smell can scarcely give rise to the idea of a world of objects4 ,it has hardly any capacity of structural discernment4 ,the world as objective #f4 ,we have now got the idea of a 8world10 as a system of things and persons connected together1 taken to be the same for oneself at different times and for different minds at the same time1 yet existing1 for oneself1 in the medium of one's individual consciousness4 ,we see at once that we cannot stop here4 ,we have really got a contradiction4 ,if the parts of our world are connected with each other1 they are not merely dependent upon us1 that is1 upon the changes of our consciousness4 ,and we all take them to be independent of us1 in the sense that we do not suppose the presence or absence of our perception to make any difference to the world except by the continuance or cessation of our perception of it or of its parts4 ,this is the state of mind in which we practically live1 philosophers and all4 ,i do not really take notice of any difference in mode of existence between the wall in front of me1 which ,i see1 and the wall behind me1 which ,i #h do not see4 ,while you are in this lecture-hall1 if you think of your rooms at home1 you think of them as they look1 that is1 as they would look if you were there to see them4 ,how else1 indeed1 could you think of them8 ,this is practically necessary1 and therefore1 for practical purposes1 true4 ,but if you take it as a theory1 omitting the hypothetical factor1 8if ,i was there to see10 you go wrong4 ,you then treat your world as being1 outside your consciousness1 the same that it is inside your consciousness1 without allowing for the withdrawal of your consciousness4 ,you are then on the way to think that the world1 as you see1 hear1 and feel it1 is outside your mind1 and that the sight1 hearing1 feeling1 and the ideas born of them1 are inside your mind as a sort of faint and imperfect copy of the world which you then call 8external10 in the sense of outside the mind4 ,common sense i4 ,the first position was that of common sense4 ,the second is that of common-sense theory4 ,common sense is quite justified4 ,it says1 8,things affect each other1 but the mere presence and absence of our perception does not affect them40 ,for practical purposes we must treat them as being1 when unapprehended by our minds1 just the same as when apprehended by our minds4 ,this is the first idea or rather postulate--for it is not a theoretical idea--of objectivity4 ,objective 8independent of our consciousness for practical purposes40 ,common-sense theory ii4 ,in describing the second position as that of common-sense theory ,i do not refer to the doctrine of any regular school of philosophers4 ,there was a ,scotch school of philosophy--the school of ,reid in the eighteenth century--commonly called the common-sense school4 ,i will say #i below how ,i think this school was related to the position which ,i am now describing4 ,but my present purpose is to hit off the simple theory of reality which common-sense people make for themselves when they reflect4 ,now this theory1 in which we all live except when we make a special effort1 accepts the distinction between things and the mind4 ,for example1 it defines truth as the conformity of ideas to objects4 ,that means something of this kind3 the ideas are inside our heads1 and the objects are outside our heads4 ,if we are to have knowledge1 the objects have to be represented inside our heads1 and they get in through the senses4 ,and then you have two similar forms of the world1 one outside our heads1 which is real1 and another like it but less perfect and without solidity or causal power1 inside our heads1 which is ideal or mental4 ,this is what ,i call the common-sense theory of the ,objective4 ,like common sense1 it assumes that there is a world which the withdrawal of our individual consciousness does not affect1 but which persists and acts all the same4 ,unlike common sense1 it lays down an assertion as to the nature of this world1 viz4 that it is1 apart from our consciousness1 the same as it is for our consciousness4 ,the world in consciousness1 it assumes1 is subjective1 the world out of consciousness is objective1 and the former is an imperfect copy of the latter in a feebler material4 ,the schools of common-sense philosophy1 such as are represented by ,locke and ,reid1 are not quite so simple-minded as the reflection of ordinary common sense1 because every systematic thinker sees at once that the question stares him in the face1 8,if the world outside the mind is copied #aj by the world inside the mind1 how can we ever know whether the copy conforms to the original80 ,we are by the hypothesis inside the mind2 whatever has passed through the senses is inside the mind4 ,we cannot as at present advised get at anything outside the senses or outside the mind4 ,in face of this question1 the common-sense philosophies have two courses open4 ,they may start from the idea of things outside the mind1 but admit that in passing through the senses the things are in some partial respects transformed--as for instance1 that they acquire colour1 sound1 and smell in passing through the senses--this is what ,locke says4 ,or again1 still starting from the idea of things outside the mind1 they may simply assert that perception is of such a nature that it gives us things as they really are4 ,the former was the view of ,locke1 the latter that of ,reid4 ,this latter view obviously might pass into the most extreme idealism1 and its interpretation1 if it does not so pass1 is exceedingly difficult4 ,but whatever may have been the view of the historical 8common-sense school10 #a the common-sense theory which we all make for ourselves involves a separation between the mind and reality4 ,the objective world is the world as independent of mind1 and independent of mind means existing and acting outside mind1 exactly1 or almost exactly1 as it seems to exist and act before the mind4 #a ,see ,seth1 ,scottish ,philosophy 7,blackwood1 #ahhe74 ,now this is an absolute cul-de-sac4 ,if the objective is that which is outside perception1 the objective is out of our reach1 and the world of our perception can never be objective4 ,this is the pass to which we are brought by taking #aa common sense as the guide of theory and not as its material4 ,philosophical theory4 iii4 ,there is no way out but by retracing our steps1 and avoiding a false turn which we took in passing from common sense to common-sense theory4 ,it was quite true that the world is unaffected by the withdrawal of my individual perception and consciousness 7except in so far as ,i acted qua bodily thing in the world72 but it does not follow from this that if it becomes the object of a consciousness in me1 it can be so otherwise than as presented within that consciousness4 ,we must distinguish between the idea that the objective is outside consciousness and therefore not in consciousness1 and the idea that the objective can be in the individual consciousness1 but identified with something beyond the individual consciousness4 ,it may be that consciousness is capable of containing a world1 not as a copy of a ready-made original1 but as something which it makes for itself by a necessary process1 and which refers beyond this finite and momentary consciousness4 ,according to these ideas1 the objective is1 shortly stated1 whatever we are obliged to think4 ,this1 though it is in our thought1 is not considered merely as our thought1 or as a train of images or whole of presentation in our minds4 ,that is an artificial point of view1 the point of view of psychology1 and we must carefully avoid starting from it4 ,but knowledge refers beyond its mental self1 and has no limitation in time or in kind except its own necessity4 ,thus1 ,i am forced to think1 by a certain context of ideas and perceptions1 that there is now a fire burning in my study at home4 ,this judgment is not barred by the fact that my mind1 as a #ab function attached to my body1 is here three miles away4 ,the thought is objective for me1 so long as ,i am obliged to think it4 ,my presence in or absence from the room where the fire is burning has no effect on the question1 except as it furnishes me with evidence one way or the other4 ,not only absence in space is no obstacle1 but succession in time is no obstacle4 ,my thought1 which is here and now1 refers confidently to what has happened in long intervals of time1 if the necessity of consistency obliges it to do so4 ,thus if ,i go back to my room and find the fire out and the room very cold1 ,i infer without hesitation to certain acts and events which are needed to explain this state of things4 ,and interpretations or explanations of this kind make up my world1 which is for me in my thought1 but is presented as more than my thought1 and cannot be a world at all unless it is more than in my thought4 ,it is in as far as my thought constructs and presents a world which is more than my momentary psychical state1 that my thought1 and the world as presented to me in it1 is objective4 ,the world is not a set of my ideas1 but it is a set of objects and relations of which ,i frame an idea1 and the existence of which has no meaning for me except as presented in the idea which #a frame4 ,we are not to think of 7i7 ,ideas1 and 7ii7 ,things which they represent2 the ideas1 taken as parts of a world1 are the things4 ,we begin to see1 then1 how the nature of knowledge meets the puzzle which ,i stated above4 ,how1 ,i asked1 can a connected 8world10 whose parts act on one another quite independently of my perception1 be in my individual mind8 ,i answer that it does not follow1 because the world is for me #ac only in my presentation1 that my presentation is the only thing which goes on in the world4 8,what ,i am obliged to think0 may represent a real development depending on laws and a system which is not confined to my individual course of consciousness4 ,the 8objective0 in this sense is for ,logic an assumption1 or rather a fact to be analysed4 ,we do not attempt to prove its existence1 except in the sense of calling attention to its nature in detail4 ,it will be seen that 8outside the mind0 ceases1 on this view of objectivity1 to have meaning as regards anything that can be related to us4 8,outside0 is a relation of bodies to one another2 but everything1 about which we can so much as ask a question1 is so far inside the mind1 i4e4 given in its continuum of presentation or idea4 ,i will recapitulate the three conceptions of the 8objective40 7#a7 ,according to practical 8common sense0 the objective is independent of our consciousness in the sense that the presence or absence of our consciousness makes no difference to the operation of things upon each other4 7#b7 ,according to 8common-sense theory0 the objective is independent of our consciousness in the sense that the presence or absence of our consciousness makes no difference in the mode of being of things 7viz4 that the world in consciousness approaches objectivity by resembling or reproducing a similar and quite objective world outside consciousness74 7#c7 ,according to philosophical theory the objective is independent of our consciousness in the sense that it is what we are constrained to think in order to make our consciousness consistent with itself4 8,what we are constrained to #ad think0 is not confined1 in its reference to our thought1 or to thought at all4 ,our separate worlds4 #g4 ,thus1 for the purposes of ,logic1 we must turn our usual ideas upside down4 ,we must try to imagine something of this kind4 ,we have all seen a circular panorama4 ,each one of us1 we must think1 is shut up alone inside such a panorama1 which is movable and flexible1 and follows him wherever he goes4 ,the things and persons depicted in it move and act upon one another2 but all this is in the panorama1 and not beyond it4 ,the individual cannot get outside this encircling scenery1 and no one else can get inside it4 ,apart from it1 prior to it1 we have no self2 it is indeed the stuff of which oneself is made4 ,is every one's panorama exactly the same8 ,no1 they are not exactly the same4 ,they are formed round different centres1 each person differing from all the others by individual qualities1 and by his position towards the points and processes which determine his picture4 ,for--and here is the remarkable point--every one of us has painted for himself the picture within which he is shut up1 and he is perpetually painting and re-painting it1 not by copying from some original1 but by arranging and completing confused images and tints that are always appearing magically on his canvas4 ,now this magical panorama1 from which the individual cannot escape1 and the laws of which are the laws of his experience1 is simply his own mind regarded as a content or a world4 ,his own body and mind1 regarded as things1 are within the panorama1 just as other people's bodies and minds are4 ,the whole world1 for each of us1 is our course of consciousness1 in so far as this is regarded as a system of objects which we are obliged to #ae think4 ,not1 in so far as it really is a system1 for an onlooker1 say for a psychologist4 ,for no doubt every child's mind1 and every animal's mind1 is a working system of presentations1 which a psychologist may study and analyse from without4 ,consciousness is consciousness of a world only in so far as it presents a system1 a whole of objects1 acting on one another1 and therefore independent of the presence or absence of the consciousness which presents them4 ,i take another very rough metaphor to explain this curious contrast between my mind as a working system1 observable from without1 and belonging to my individual body--distinguishable from the thirty or forty quite different minds belonging to the thirty or forty persons in this room--and my mind as a continuum of presentations which includes1 as objects1 itself1 and all the other minds in the room1 and the whole world so far as ,i have any conscious relation to it whatever4 ,all of us are familiar with the appearance of a microscope ready adjusted for use1 with its little lamp1 its mirror and illuminating apparatus under the stage1 with a specimen on the stage under the object-glass1 its object-glass and its eye-piece4 ,any one who understands the working of a microscope finds this a most suggestive spectacle4 ,he follows in his imagination the light as it comes from the lamp to the mirror1 through the illuminating lenses1 through the transparent specimen1 through perhaps a dozen lenses arranged as an object-glass within an inch of distance1 through the eye-piece and into the observer's eye4 ,give him the parts1 lenses1 prisms1 and mirrors into his hands1 and he will test them all1 and tell you exactly how they work4 ,this #af scientific onlooker may be compared to the psychologist looking at another man's mind4 ,he sees it as a thing among other things1 a working system of parts4 ,but there is one thing that the mere onlooker cannot see4 ,he cannot see the object4 ,that can only be seen by looking through the tube4 ,and every one has felt1 ,i should think1 the magical transformation1 suggestive of looking through another man's eye and mind1 which occurs when you put your eye to the eye-piece of an optical instrument4 ,the outside world of other objects1 the tube1 the stage1 the mirror1 the bystanders1 the external light1 all disappear1 and you see nothing but the field of vision and whatever distinctly pictured structure may be displayed within it4 ,the observer who looks through the tube may be compared with each one of us as he contemplates his own world of knowledge and perception4 ,this is a thing that no one else can ever do4 ,the metaphor1 indeed1 breaks down1 in so far as each of us is able to observe the history and character of his own mind as an object within the field of presentation which is before his mind4 ,of course such a metaphor must break down at some point4 ,but it remains true that the mind1 while directly observing its field of objects1 cannot observe its own peculiarities1 and when turned1 as we say1 upon itself1 is still observing only a part of itself4 ,it remains true that my mind contains the whole presented world for me and is merely one among thousands of similar mind-things for you4 ,thus1 ,i repeat1 the world for each of us is our course of consciousness1 looked at in that way in which it presents a #ag systematic1 organised picture of inter-acting objects1 not in that way in which it is a stream of ideas and feelings1 taking place in our several heads4 ,in the former point of view it is the world as our idea2 in the latter point of view it is simply the consciousness attached to our body4 ,we might soon puzzle ourselves with the contradictions which arise if we fail to distinguish these points of view4 ,in one sense my mind is in my head1 in the other sense my head is in my mind4 ,in the one sense ,i am in space1 in the other sense space is in me4 ,just so1 however rough the metaphor1 from one point of view the microscope is one among a host of things seen from the outside2 from the other point of view all that we see is in the microscope1 which is itself not seen at all4 ,it is in this latter sense that our mental equipment is looked at1 when it is regarded as knowledge2 and it is in this sense that it forms a panorama which absolutely shuts in every one of us into his own circle of ideas4 7,it is not implied1 we should carefully observe1 that his ideas or experience are in any way secondary to his self1 or separable from it1 or an adjective of it47 ,then how does it happen that our separate worlds1 the panoramas which we construct1 do not contradict one another8 ,the answer is1 that they correspond4 ,it is this conception from which we must start in ,logic4 ,we must learn to regard our separate worlds of knowledge2 as something constructed by definite processes1 and corresponding to each other in consequence of the common nature of these processes4 ,we know that we begin apart4 ,we begin in fact1 though not conscious of our limits1 with feelings and fancies and unorganised experiences which give us little or no #ah common ground and power of co-operation with other people4 ,but as the constructive process advances1 the correspondence between our worlds is widened and deepened1 and the greater proportion of what we are obliged to think is in harmony with what other people are obliged to think4 ,now of course this would not be so unless reality1 the whole actual system in which we find ourselves1 were self-consistent4 ,but more than that1 it would not be so unless the nature of intelligence were the same in every mind4 ,it is this common nature of intelligence1 together with its differentiated adaptations to reality1 that we have to deal with in ,logic4 ,thus the separate worlds1 in which we are all shut up1 must be considered as corresponding so far as they are objective1 that is1 so far as they approach what we are ultimately obliged to think4 ,i say 8corresponding10 because that is the term which expresses the relation between systems which represent the same thing by the same rules1 but with different starting-points4 ,drawings in perspective of the same building from different points of view are such corresponding systems2 the parts represented answer each to each1 but the same part is near or large in one drawing1 and distant and small in another2 not1 however1 by chance1 but as a definite consequence of the same laws4 ,our separate worlds may be compared to such drawings3 the things in them are identified by their relations and functions1 so that we can understand each other1 i4e4 make identical references1 though my drawing be taken from the east1 and yours from the west4 ,the things do not look quite the same in our different worlds2 besides being taken from different standpoints1 both drawings are imperfect and incorrect4 ,but so #ai long as we can make out the correspondence1 we have a basis for co-operation and for discussion4 ,logic shows us the principles and processes by which1 under the given influences1 these drawings are constructed4 ,subjective ,idealism #h4 ,if we merely hold to the doctrine of separate worlds1 without insisting upon their correspondence with each other and with reality1 we fall back into the position of subjective idealism1 which is a natural completion of common-sense theory1 when1 instead of turning round to retrace its path1 it runs deeper into the cul-de-sac4 ,it is a very obvious reflection1 that each of us is shut up within his own mind1 and much easier to grasp than the reason for assuming a real system which appears differently1 though correspondingly1 in the centres of consciousness which are ourselves4 ,we cannot get at anything but in terms of consciousness2 how can we justify the assumption that our consciousness of a world of objects is rooted in reality1 e4g41 that objects may rightly be treated as persisting and inter-acting when our personal consciousness is withdrawn8 ,and if we once doubt this1 then why should we assume that our ideas need be or tend to be consistent with themselves and each other1 as for the time they apparently are8 ,subjective ,idealism necessarily arises if the common-sense theory of two worlds1 the real outside the mind1 and the ideal1 copying it1 within the mind1 is pushed to its conclusion4 ,the real1 outside the mind1 being inaccessible1 falls away4 ,the arguments of this ,idealism1 as ,hume said1 8admit of no answer and produce no conviction40 #a ,but ,i #bj mention the idea1 because ,i do not think that any one can really understand the problem of ,logic1 or indeed of science in general1 without having thoroughly thought himself into the difficulty of ,subjective ,idealism4 ,it is necessary to be wholly dissatisfied with common-sense theory1 and with the notion of a ready-made world set up for us to copy in the mind1 before the logical analysis of intellectual construction can have interest or meaning for us4 ,and to produce this dissatisfaction is the value of ,subjective ,idealism4 #a ,vol4 iv4 p4 #agf 7ed4 of #ahed71 ,inquiry concerning ,human ,understanding1 sect4 #ab4 #ba ,,lecture ,,ii 8,,judgment0 ,,as ,,the ,,consciousness ,,of ,a ,,world ,defect of ,subjective ,idealism #a4 ,the last lecture was devoted to explaining the distinction between the stream of presentations and the world as it is for knowledge4 ,i ended by calling attention to the theory known as 8,subjective ,idealism40 ,this1 ,i said1 has the merit of forcing upon us the question1 8,how do we get from mind to reality8 ,how do we get from subjective to objective80 ,for we have always to remember that our knowledge is within consciousness1 though it may refer outside it4 ,on the other hand1 ,subjective ,idealism has the defect of confounding the very distinction which we took so much trouble to make plain4 ,its essence lies in ascribing to the world of knowledge properties which are only true of the stream of presentation4 ,it is quite true that the actual presentations of this room1 which each of us has in his head at this moment1 are all different from each other1 and different from any which we have had before1 and shall ever have again4 ,every minute1 every second1 they differ2 they are perishing existences1 wholly mental1 and each of them when past is irrecoverably gone4 ,that is the property of a presentation within the course of consciousness4 ,it is a particular perishing existence4 #bb ,but ,subjective ,idealism says1 8,because these mental existences are particular perishing existences1 and all knowledge consists in them as its medium1 therefore the object of knowledge is nothing beyond these mental facts1 and is not rooted in a permanent system #a independent of our mental connections40 ,here we must check the inference1 and reply1 8,no1 it does not follow4 ,the presentations which themselves come and go may refer to something in common1 and through them all we may become aware of something that is not wholly in any of them40 ,in other words1 there is in ,knowledge no passage from subjective to objective1 but only a development of the objective4 #a ,our estimate of ,berkeley's view must depend on the degree in which we judge him to have identified the ,deity with1 or separated ,him from1 a permanent and universal system4 ,the statement in the text applies fairly to ,hume4 ,the world as ,knowledge #b4 ,therefore we say1 coming closer to our subject1 that 8,knowledge is the medium in which our world1 as an interrelated whole1 #a exists for us40 ,this is more than saying that it exists in mind or presentation1 because the mere course of consciousness need not amount to ,knowledge4 ,a world1 that is1 a system of things acting on one another1 could not exist merely in the course of our ideas4 ,but ,knowledge1 we said1 is the mental construction of reality4 ,it consists of what we are obliged to assert in thought1 and because we are all obliged to think assertorily according to the same methods1 the results of our thinking form corresponding systems--systems that correspond alike to each other and to reality4 7,i may be asked1 does not this agreement of #bc our knowledge depend on the agreement of the physical stimuli supplied to us by nature1 as well as on the homogeneousness of our intelligences8 ,the answer is1 that these stimuli1 or nature1 have no priority in ,knowledge4 ,their identity is merely a case or consequence of the identity of our experience as a whole4 ,we are regarding nature as a system developed in experience1 not as an unknown somewhat behind it4 ,to suppose that solid or extended existence somehow comes before and accounts for everything else1 is a form of the common-sense theory we have dismissed4 ,knowledge and ,truth have their limitations as forms of ,reality1 but an appeal to solidity or extension will not furnish the required supplementation47 #a ,the words italicised make a reservation in favour of feeling1 which has its own form of reality1 but is not relational4 ,knowledge is in the form of ,judgement #c4 ,all that we have been saying about ,knowledge is summed up in the sentence1 8,knowledge is a judgment1 an affirmation40 ,we need not trouble ourselves yet about negation4 ,we all know what affirmative assertion is1 and it is near enough for the present to say that all knowledge is judgment in the sense of affirmative assertion4 ,i will explain how we sum up all we have said of knowledge by calling it a judgment4 ,judgment or affirmation always implies three properties1 though they are not always recognised4 ,it is 7a7 necessary1 7b7 universal1 and 7c7 constructive4 ,judgment necessary 7a7 ,judgment is necessary4 ,in saying this1 we express all that we said about the objectivity of the world in knowledge4 8,objective0 meant1 we concluded1 what we are obliged to think4 ,and judgment is necessary1 because it expresses what we are obliged to think2 obliged1 that is1 not as we are obliged to feel pain1 as an unexplained and #bd isolated fact1 but obliged by a necessity operative within the movement of our consciousness1 though not1 of course1 theoretically recognised as necessity in common thinking4 ,thus1 in the simplest phases of ,judgment1 necessity does begin to approach the kind of necessity by which we feel pain or are visited by persistent irrational associations4 ,we can trace an explicit sense of necessity in any scientific matter1 or in any doubtful and complex matters in which we are aware of our own reflections4 ,we constantly hear and read such phrases as1 8,i am unable to resist the conclusion02 8,i am forced to believe02 8,i am driven to think02 8,i have no alternative but to suppose40 ,these are every-day phrases in controversy and in theoretical discussion4 ,and what they all mean is just what was insisted on in the last lecture2 the objective or real for us is what we are obliged to think4 ,given our perceptive state and our mental equipment1 the judgment follows4 ,in trivial or simple judgments this necessity is harder to observe within consciousness1 and approaches more and more to the mere constraint exercised upon us by physical reality4 ,in a judgment of mere sensuous comparison1 such as a 8colour-match10 the necessity is not that of an intellectual system1 but almost that of a feeling which we cannot dispel4 ,the chief intellectual labour is here negative1 and consists in precautions to remove all disturbing influences1 both mental and material1 so as to let the perception operate freely on the mind4 ,but yet here is necessity2 we never for a moment think that we can modify the result2 our aim is simply to distinguish from all others the particular strand of necessity by which we desire to be guided4 #be ,it is easy for an observer to detect intellectual necessity in judgment1 even where the judging subject is wholly unreflective4 ,if you contradict an obvious judgment made by an uneducated man1 he will no doubt be quite unable to point out the intellectual necessity which constrains him to it1 i4e4 to argue in support of it2 but he will be bewildered and probably indignant1 which shows that1 unknown to himself1 his whole intellectual existence is really impeached by impeachment of a necessary conclusion from it4 ,many people cannot see the difference between impeaching their argument and impeaching their veracity2 and this confusion arises1 ,i presume1 from a just feeling that their whole mind is on its trial in the one case as in the other1 although they do not distinguish between the forms of its action which are concerned4 ,we are told1 indeed1 in formal logic1 that ordinary statements of fact do not claim necessity2 but this merely arises from confining necessity to explicit necessity expressed in a special grammatical form4 ,but1 it may be objected1 we do not always feel that every trivial judgment emanates from and so implicates our whole mental constitution and equipment4 ,if ,i say to a friend1 8,i saw you at ,charing ,cross yesterday10 and he says1 8,no1 you could not1 for ,i was out of town10 then1 unless ,i was very certain indeed1 ,i should admit having made a mistake1 and think no more about the matter4 ,that only means1 7#a7 that the unity of the mind is not thoroughly complete--there are many more or less detached systems in the mind1 and one of them may not be very deeply inwrought in the whole intellectual frame2 and 7#b7 the necessity of thought may itself modify the certainty of the fact1 e4g4 ,i know that #bf a mistake of identity is quite a common thing1 and this knowledge co-operates with my friend's denial4 ,but in any perceptive judgment1 however unimportant its immediate content1 if it is clear and persistent1 a contradiction is a most serious thing4 ,there is a well-known form of bewilderment connected with the judgment of direction2 if you forget or do not know of a turn that you have taken1 and come out1 for example1 on familiar ground from the ,north when you think you are coming on it from the ,south1 so that objects have the reverse position of what you expected1 then1 supposing that you cannot explain the contradiction1 the result is sometimes a very grave perplexity2 some men are quite unhinged by it for the moment1 and a psychologist in ,france #a has given it a new name1 8,vertigo of ,direction40 ,this again shows how your whole intellectual nature is staked upon the most trifling perception1 and if you seem to be forced to a flat contradiction even in the simplest judgment you are almost 8beside yourself40 #a ,m4 ,binet4 ,see ,mind1 x4 #aef4 ,judgment universal 7b7 ,judgment is universal4 ,there are different senses of 8universal0 as of 8necessary40 ,we are now speaking only in the widest sense1 in which universality is a property of all judgment whatever4 ,if we assume that all our intellectual natures are the same1 then to be universal is a mere consequence of being necessary4 ,i not only feel that my judgment is inevitable for me1 but ,i never think of doubting that1 given the same materials1 it is obligatory for every other intelligent being4 ,if some one disagrees with a judgment of mine1 ,i try to put the case before him as it is in my mind4 ,and ,i am absolutely sure that if ,i could do so1 he #bg would be obliged to judge as ,i do4 ,if it were not so1 we should never think of arguing4 ,we should simply say1 8,perhaps his mind is differently constituted from mine10 as1 in fact1 with reference to special sets of dominant ideas1 and to special provinces of experience1 we often do say4 ,but these we regard as hindrances1 imperfections1 accidents4 ,we do not doubt that the system of reason is active in him as in us4 ,and thus1 as reason is essentially a system1 the universality of judgment involves something more4 ,we not only think that our judgment is obligatory upon every one else1 in as far as they have the same materials1 but we think that it must be consistent with the judgments of all other persons1 just as much as with our own4 ,if it is inconsistent with any other judgment1 we think that one of the two must be wrong2 that is1 we will not admit the possibility that the real world1 as others construct it1 is out of harmony with the real world as we construct it4 ,thus knowledge1 being judgment1 is necessary and universal1 and in the widest sense this is true of all judgments4 ,judgment is constructive 7c7 ,these are two properties of the ,judgment1 but they do not tell us what it is4 ,we shall of course examine its nature more fully in the later lectures4 ,at present we need only think of it as affirmation4 ,this may be simply described as 8pronouncing the interpretation of our perceptions to form one system with the data of our perceptions40 ,we may at once admit the distinction between data and interpretation to be only relative4 ,its relativity is the consequence of the constructed or so to speak artificial #bh character of our real world4 ,we can get at no data unqualified by judgment4 ,we may take as an example our perception of things in space4 ,how much of what we see is given in present sense-perception8 ,this is a question to which there is no definite answer4 ,we do not know what the presentations of vision were like before we had learnt to see as a fully conscious human being sees4 ,we have no right to assume1 that after we have learned to see in this way the actual sense-presentation remains the same as it was in a different stage of our visual education4 ,we can give no precise meaning in the way of a time-limit to the presentness of perception4 ,but we know this much1 that it takes a long time and many kinds of experience to learn to see as an educated human being sees1 and that this acquired capacity is never at a stand-still1 but is always being extended or diminished according to the vitality1 growth1 or atrophy of our apperceptive masses4 ,there is always a certain element of amplification or interpretation1 which by experience1 or attentive introspection we can eliminate from the data1 apparently forced upon us by reality1 although these data themselves are modified through and through both by habitual interpretation1 and by the very defining attention which aims at eliminating all amplification from them4 ,but yet the whole of sense-perception has a peculiar quality in being present4 ,artificial though it is1 it yet1 relatively speaking1 contains an irreducible datum4 ,it is distinguishable from everything which is not present4 ,it is pervaded by something which we cannot reduce to #bi intellectual relation1 though if we withdrew from it all that is relation1 the apparent datum would be gone4 ,now ,knowledge is the affirmation or judgment which identifies the constructive interpretation of our present perception with the reality which present perception forces upon us4 ,this is clear enough to begin with1 but will have to be modified below to suit the more circuitous or mediate types of ,judgment4 ,i take two examples1 one from sight and one from sound4 ,here is a table4 ,in common language we should all say1 8,we see that is a table40 ,the expression is quite correct1 because human seeing is a judgment4 ,but yet1 if you were asked to reduce your perception to terms of sight pure and simple--,i mean of visual sensation--why1 unless you were an analytic psychologist or a very skilful artist1 you would not be able to do it4 ,to speak of one point only1 you would have to eliminate the attribute of depth and distance4 ,that is all1 so far as mere vision is concerned1 your theory and your interpretation4 ,the problem for an artist is to get back1 at his high plane of perceptive power1 to what in theory would be the lower plane4 ,he has to re-translate his perception of a thing in space into a flat coloured surface4 ,the difference between his flat picture and a real object in space is a rough measure of the difference made by interpretation or implication in the datum of sense-perception when we say1 judging by sight only1 8,that is a table40 ,all the experiences of touch and motion1 from which we have learned to perceive the solidity of the object1 are1 theoretically speaking1 put into the judgment by us4 ,they are not given by the eye alone1 although we cannot now #cj separate them from that which is given by the eye alone4 ,for the artist's flat picture1 which ,i used as an illustration1 is not a stage in our visual education4 ,our visual education has proceeded pari passu with our education by touch and motion2 and we saw objects in space as solids1 long before we reflected that for the eye alone a coloured surface would naturally appear as flat4 #a #a ,the view that depth is a visual datum in the same sense as breadth seems to me in flagrant contradiction with experience4 ,but for our present purpose the question is only one of degree1 as no one maintains1 that either depth or breadth are seen without education as an adult sees them4 ,but this impossibility of getting at an original datum only shows how entirely we are right in saying that our world is constructed by judgment4 ,for the process of interpretative amplification passes quite continuously from the unconscious to the conscious2 and every definitely expressed judgment1 though perfectly homogeneous with the processes which have qualified its datum1 and though it may fall wholly within the maximum of what in ordinary parlance we should call a simple given perception1 contains an identification of some ideal element1 enlargement1 or interpretation1 with that relatively given element which reveals itself through a peculiar quality of presentness pervading the 8given0 perception4 ,in the example 8,that is a table10 the unity of judgment is so well shown that the identification becomes almost unreal4 ,in fact1 we never judge except to satisfy an interest and so simple a judgment used as an example1 apart from any context which could explain the need for it1 has an air of unreality4 ,you may hear a child make such a judgment #ca constantly in the sheer pleasure of recognition4 ,an adult would never make it explicitly unless in some particular context2 but it is made1 as ,i shall maintain below1 by the mere glance of his eye which takes in the table as a real object in a real world of space4 ,its appearance to the eye is in this case the datum1 while the interpretation consists in construing this appearance as a solid individual existence in space4 ,we will look at an example in which the discrimination of elements is easier4 ,take the affirmation1 8,that is a cab10 assuming it to be made from merely hearing a sound4 ,in this we can much more nearly separate the datum or minimum of sense from our enlargement or interpretation of it1 and we know that our interpretation is liable to be wrong2 that is to say1 the reality into which we ought to construe the sound may be some other kind of vehicle1 and not a cab4 ,now compare this with the affirmation1 8,that 7which ,i see7 is a cab40 ,this judgment of sight-perception1 though its terms are more inextricably interwoven1 has just the same elements in it as the judgment of sound-perception1 8,that 7which ,i hear7 is a cab40 ,in the sound-perception the structure is quite plain4 ,a particular complex quality in the sound suggests as its objective explanation1 what is perfectly distinguishable from it in thought1 the movement of a cab on a particular kind of pavement4 ,the quality of the sound1 its roughness1 loudness1 increase and decrease1 all form points of connection with the sound of a cab as we know it1 and with the speed1 weight1 etc4 of such a vehicle4 ,but it is quite easy to consider the sound in itself apart from its interpretation1 and we sometimes feel the #cb interpretation to be more immediate1 and sometimes more inferential4 ,we sometimes say1 8,i hear a cab10 just as we say1 8,i see one10 but in case of sound we more often perhaps say1 8,that sounds like--0 such and such a thing1 which indicates a doubt1 and the beginning of conscious inference4 ,thus we see how continuous is the mental construction of reality4 ,from our unreflective education in seeing1 hearing1 and touching1 to the explicit judgment of the trained observer1 which in its turn passes readily into inference1 there is no definite break4 ,once the idea of reality1 or of a world1 is applied in practice 7,i do not say reflectively grasped71 there is no further difficulty in principle throughout the whole process of its construction4 ,we may then sum up so far3 our knowledge1 or our world in knowledge1 exists for us as a judgment1 that is1 as an affirmation in which our present perception is amplified by an ideal interpretation which is identified with it4 ,this interpretation or enlargement claims necessity or universality1 and is therefore objective as our world1 i4e4 is what we are obliged to think1 and what we are all obliged to think4 ,the whole system in process of construction1 viz4 our present perception as extended by interpretation1 is what we mean by reality1 only with a reservation in favour of forms of experience which are not intellectual at all4 ,every judgment then affirms something to be real1 and therefore affirms reality to be defined1 in part1 by that something4 ,knowledge exists in the form of affirmations about reality4 ,and our world as existing for us in the medium of knowledge consists1 for us1 of a standing affirmation about reality4 #cc ,continuous affirmation of waking consciousness #d4 ,this standing affirmation about reality may be described in other words as 8the continuous affirmative judgment of the waking consciousness40 ,in the common logic-books you will find judgment treated only as the 8proposition10 that is1 as an assertion made in language4 ,that is a very convenient way of treating the judgment1 and is not false1 if you remember that the proposition1 that is1 the assertory sentence1 is rather a translation of the judgment than the judgment itself4 ,but the judgment expressed in a proposition is always some one definite assertion1 with a limited subject and predicate4 ,we shall speak of the judgment in this sense--the usual sense--later4 ,but to-day ,i want to describe the judgment in a more extended sense1 that is1 as co-extensive with the waking human consciousness1 so far as aware of a world4 ,if ,judgment consists in the extension of our perceptions by an interpretation considered as equally real with their content1 it clearly is not confined to the particular facts and truths which from time to time we utter in language4 ,and more than this1 everything that we do definitely utter1 implies a great deal which is not definitely uttered4 ,if ,i say1 8,i have to catch the train at ,sloane ,square to go down to ,essex ,hall10 ,i only mention the reality of one train1 one square1 and one building4 ,but my assertion shades off into innumerable facts1 the equal reality of which as elements in my world is necessary to make this judgment intelligible and true4 ,it implies the real existence of the underground railway1 which implies that of ,london1 and therefore that of the surface of our globe in a certain definite order1 and of the civilised world4 ,it implies the reality of this building and of the meetings which we hold in it1 of the ,university #cd ,extension system1 and of my own life and habits as enabling me to take part in the work of that system4 ,only a part of this is in the focus of my attention as ,i judge2 but the whole is a continuous context1 the parts of which are inseparable2 and although ,i do not affirm the whole of it in so many words1 when ,i say that ,i am coming down here by train this evening1 yet if any part of it was not affirmed the rest would1 so to speak1 fall to pieces1 i4e4 would lose relations in the absence of which its meaning would be destroyed4 ,other detached parts of one's life and knowledge may seem to be separable from the content of such a judgment2 but on looking closely we see that this is not the case4 ,so long as we are awake1 our whole world is conceived as real1 and forms for us a single immense affirmation1 which hangs from present perception1 and shares its constraining power4 ,my present perception is the illuminated spot1 and shades off gradually into the rest which forms the background1 receiving from this background its organised systematic individuality1 while impressing upon it a relation to its own sensuous presentness4 ,we have only to reflect1 in order to illustrate this connection1 on the way in which the idea of ,london forms a determining background for the present perception of this room1 while on the other hand it is perceived by us as real in our presentation of this room4 ,and indeed the simplest example of what ,i am pointing out is the arrangement of objects and places in space4 ,the visual picture which each of us forms of this room is certainly an affirmative judgment4 ,it is a judgment because it consists of ideas affirmed as true of reality4 ,as we look round1 all the distances of the objects and the walls from #ce each other1 and their shapes and position1 seem to be imprinted on our minds without an effort4 ,but really they are conclusions from long education in the art of seeing and from the experience of the other senses4 ,they are an enlargement or interpretation of sense-perception1 taken as real1 i4e4 as forming a system which is one with the content of sense-perception1 and touches us through sense-perception1 and therefore they exist for us in the form of ,judgment4 ,and1 as ,i described before1 our whole world1 both of things in space and of our own history and circumstances1 is also affirmed as the background implied in this picture4 ,that is to say1 it is all connected together1 it is all taken as equally real1 and it is all vouched for by its connection with what is given to us in perception4 ,what do we mean by saying that the ,antipodes are real1 and implied in my perception of this room8 ,we mean that they are an element1 necessary to educated thought1 in the same system with which ,i am in contact at this moment by sight1 touch1 and hearing1 the system of reality4 ,and though ,i may not have explicitly thoughts of them since entering the room till now1 yet1 if they were no part of my affirmed system of ideas1 my perception of anything in space would be quite different from what it is4 ,this sense of necessary connection is confined1 ,i think1 to our waking consciousness4 ,of course there are degrees between waking and dreaming2 but ,i should be inclined to set up the presence or absence of judgment as a very fair test of those degrees4 ,we say that a man is awake in as far as he is aware 7i7 of a reality which is not his mere course of consciousness1 and 7ii47 of the same reality of which other #cf people are aware2 i4e4 in as far as he identifies his present perception with a reality1 and that the real reality4 ,it is said that surprise1 i4e4 the sense of conflict between expectation and the reality1 is absent ,in dreams1 and in a very remarkable passage ,aeschylus identifies the life of the savage in his 7imaginary7 primitive state with a dream-life1 considered as a life of sensuous presentation1 in which the interpretative judgment of perception was absent4 ,with extraordinary profoundness1 in portraying this all but animal existence1 he strikes out all those relations to the objective world by which man forms for himself a system that goes beyond the present1 so as to leave the stream of presentation without any background of organised reality4 #a #a ,i quote from ,mrs4 ,browning's ,translation of the ,prometheus ,bound1 which seems close enough for the present purpose4 8,and let me tell you1 not as taunting men1 ,but teaching you the intention of my gifts1 ,how first1 beholding1 they beheld in vain4 ,and hearing1 heard not1 but1 like shapes in dreams1 ,mixed all things wildly down the tedious time1 ,nor knew to build a house against the sun ,with wicketed sides1 nor any woodwork knew1 ,but lived1 like silly ants1 beneath the ground1 ,in hollow caves unsunned4 ,there came to them ,no steadfast sign of winter1 nor of spring ,flower-perfumed1 nor of summer full of fruit4 ,but blindly and lawlessly they did all things1 ,until ,i taught them how the stars do rise ,and set in mystery1 and devised for them ,number1 the inducer of philosophies4 ,the synthesis of letters1 and besides1 ,the artificer of all things1 ,memory1 ,that sweet muse-mother40 ,pr41 v4 #dde1 ff4 ,the expression 8seeing saw not1 and hearing heard not0 appears to suggest the contrast of presentation and objective perception4 #cg ,it may be asked1 8,why should not a man form for himself a system which interprets his own perception1 but is discrepant from the system of every one else8 ,should we in that case count him as awake80 ,yes1 he would be awake1 but he would be mad4 ,suppose1 being a common man1 he interprets all his perceptions into a system which makes him out to be ,king of ,england2 in such a case he cannot be set down as dreaming1 because he is alleging a connection which goes beyond his present perception1 and has1 ostensibly1 been propounded as an interpretation of it into a systematic order of things4 ,he has in short a world1 but he has broken away from the world1 and therefore we pronounce him mad4 ,a completely new vision of life may cause a man to be thought mad4 #a #a ,see ,browning's ,epistle of ,karshish4 ,the whole world1 then1 of our waking #a consciousness may be treated as a single connected predicate affirmed as an enlargement of present perception4 ,all that we take to be real is by the mere fact of being so taken1 brought within an affirmative judgment4 #a ,i do not mean to say that judgment and consciousness of a world can be wholly absent in dreams1 and often no doubt they are distinctly present4 ,but in those dreams1 in my own experience the normal ones1 which leave behind a mere impression that unrecognisable images have passed before the mind1 judgment and the sense of reality must surely have all but disappeared4 ,i am inclined to think that dreams are very much rationalised in recollection and description4 ,comparison with world as ,will #e4 ,to further illustrate the relation of what1 in our permanent judgment1 is distinctly thought1 what is dimly thought1 and what is implied1 let us look for a moment at what we may call 8the world as will40 ,this is not the doctrine of ,schopenhauer in his work1 ,the ,world as ,will and ,idea1 #ch although the two conceptions have something in common4 ,his is a metaphysical doctrine1 in which he says that the fundamental reality of the ,universe must be conceived as ,will4 ,we have nothing to do with that4 ,we are speaking merely of what the world is for us1 and for us it is not only a system of reality but a system of purposes4 ,our world of will is a permanent factor of our waking consciousness1 just as much as our world of knowledge4 ,now our will is made up of a great number of purposes1 more or less connected together1 just as our knowledge is made up of a great number of provinces and regions more or less connected together4 ,and just as in our knowledge at any moment much is clear1 much is dim1 much is implied1 and the whole forms a continuous context1 so it is with our purposes4 ,when1 for example1 one stands looking at a picture1 one's immediate conscious purpose is to study the picture4 ,one also entertains dimly or by force of habit the purpose to remain standing1 which is a curious though common instance of will4 ,we do not attend to the purpose of walking or standing1 yet we only walk or stand 7in normal conditions of mind7 as long as we will to do so4 ,if we go to sleep or faint1 we shall fall down4 ,purpose1 like judgment1 is confined to the waking consciousness4 ,but further2 the purpose which one entertains in standing to look at a picture is not really an isolated pin-point of will4 ,it is uppermost in the mind at the moment in which we carry it out1 but it is only the uppermost stratum1 or perhaps rather the present point attained upon a definite road1 within an intricate formation or network of purposes1 which taken together constitute the world of will4 ,the purpose of looking #ci at a picture shades off into the more general purpose of learning to take pleasure in what is good of its kind1 which is again set in a certain place within the conception of our life and the way in which we desire to spend it1 and our purposes throughout every particular day are fitted into one another1 and give a particular setting and colour to each other1 and to each particular day1 and week1 and year4 ,now less or more of all this may be clearly in the mind when we are carrying out a particular momentary aim4 ,but it is quite certain that in a human life the particular momentary aim derives its significance from this background of other purposes2 and1 if they were to fall away1 the distinct momentary purpose would change its character and become quite a feeble and empty thing4 ,thus we have1 in our world of will1 a parallel case which illustrates the nature of our world of knowledge4 ,there is the clear will to look at the picture1 the dim will to continue standing1 and the implied will to carry out certain general aims1 and follow a certain routine or course of life1 which gives the momentary purpose its entire setting and background4 ,i have spoken of the will in order to illustrate the judgment1 because the dim and implied elements are perhaps more easy to observe in the case of the will4 ,almost all our common waking life is carried on by actions such as walking and sitting1 which we hardly know that we will1 but which we could not do if we did not will them4 ,and also the greater part of our life is rather within a sphere of will which has become objective for us in our profession1 interests1 and ideals1 than a perpetual active choice between #dj alternatives such as brings the act of volition before us in the most striking way4 ,just so it is with judgment4 ,our speaking and writing is a very small part of our judging1 just as our conscious choice between alternatives #a is a very small part of our willing4 #a ,i do not for a moment suggest that our 8conscious choice0 is ultimately different in kind from our habitual persistence in a course of life4 ,i only take it as an instance in which we fully attend to our volition4 ,distribution of ,attention #f4 ,thus the world of knowledge and the world of will must each of them be regarded as a continuum for the waking consciousness4 ,whenever we are awake1 we are judging2 whenever we are awake we are willing4 ,the distribution of attention in these two worlds is very closely analogous4 ,in both1 it is impossible to attend to our whole world at the same moment4 ,but in both1 our world is taken as being a single connected system2 and therefore 7i47 attention shades off gradually from the momentary focus of illumination into less and less intensity over the other parts of the continuous judgment or purpose2 but 7ii47 that which is in the focus of attention depends for its quality upon that which is less distinctly or not at all in the focus of attention4 ,and as attention diminishes in intensity1 the implication of reality does not diminish with it4 ,in other words1 in spite of the inequality of attention1 the reality of our whole world is implied in the reality of which at any moment we are distinctly aware4 ,but being distinctly aware of reality is another name for judgment4 ,now the common logical judgments which we shall have to analyse and classify are simply those parts of this continuous affirmation of consciousness which are from time #da to time separately made distinct4 ,each of them therefore must be regarded as a partial expression of the nature of reality1 and the subject will always be ,reality in one form1 and the predicate reality in another form4 ,the ultimate and complete judgment would be the whole of ,reality predicated of itself4 ,all our logical judgments are such portions and fragments of this judgment as we can grasp at the moment4 ,some of these gather up in a system whole provinces of reality1 others merely enlarge1 interpret1 or analyse the content of a very simple sense-perception4 ,we shall not go far wrong in practice if we start from this judgment of ,perception as the fundamental kind of ,judgment4 ,the real subject in ,judgment is always ,reality in some particular datum or qualification1 and the tendency of ,judgment is always to be a definition of ,reality4 ,we see the parts of ,judgment most clearly in such thoughts as 8,this is blue02 8,this is a flower02 8,that light is the rising sun02 8,that sound is the surf on a sandy shore40 ,in these we can plainly distinguish the element of presentation and the interpretative construction or analytic synthesis which is by the judgment identified with it4 #db ,,lecture ,,iii ,,the ,,relation ,,of ,,logic ,,to ,,knowledge ,meaning of 8,form0 #a4 ,i spoke of the whole world1 which we take to be real1 as presented to us in the shape of a continuous judgment4 ,it is the task of ,logic to analyse the structure of this ,judgment1 the parts of which are ,judgments4 ,the first thing is then to consider what sort of properties of ,judgments we attend to in ,logic4 ,it is commonly said that ,logic is a formal science2 that is1 that it deals with the form1 and not with the content or matter of knowledge4 ,this word 8form0 is always meeting us in philosophy4 8,species0 is ,latin for form1 as and #a are ,greek for form4 ,the form of any object primarily means its appearance1 that which the mind can carry away1 while the object as a physical reality1 as material1 remains where it was4 ,it need not mean shape as opposed to colour2 that is a narrower usage4 ,the ,greek opinion was no doubt rooted in some such notion as that in knowing or remembering a thing the mind possessed its form or image without its matter4 ,thus the form came to stand for the knowable shape or structure which makes a thing what it is1 and by which we recognise it when we see it4 ,this was its species or its idea1 the 8image10 as it is used in the phrase1 8,let us make man in our own image40 ,so in any work of the hands #dc of man1 the form was the shape given by the workman1 and came out of his mind1 while the matter was the stuff or material out of which the thing was made4 #a 8eidos0 and 8idea04 ,tr4 ,the moment we contemplate a classification of the sciences1 we see that this is a purely relative distinction4 ,there is no matter without form4 ,if it was in this deep sense without form1 it would be without properties1 and so incapable of acting or being acted upon4 ,in a knife the matter is steel1 the form is the shape of the blade4 ,but the qualities of steel again depend1 we must suppose1 upon a certain character and arrangement in its particles1 and this is1 as ,bacon would have called it1 the form of steel4 ,but taken as purely relative1 the distinction is good prima facie4 ,steel has its own form1 but the knife has its form1 and the matter steel can take many other forms besides that of a knife4 ,marble has its own form1 its definable properties as marble 7chemical and mechanical71 but in a statue1 marble is the matter1 and the form is the shape given by the sculptor4 ,now applying this distinction to knowledge in general1 we see that all science is formal1 and therefore it is no distinction to say that ,logic is a formal science4 ,geometry is a formal science2 even molecular physics is a formal science4 ,all science is formal1 because all science consists in tracing out the universal characteristics of things1 the structure that makes them what they are4 ,the particular 8form10 then1 with which a science deals is simply the kind of properties that come under the point of view from which that science in particular looks at things4 ,but a very general science is more emphatically formal than #dd a very special science4 ,that is to say1 it deals with properties which are presented in some degree by everything2 and so in every object a great multitude of properties are disregarded by it1 are treated by it as matter and not as form4 ,in this sense ,logic is emphatically 8formal10 though not nearly so formal as it is often supposed to be4 ,the subject-matter of ,logic1 then1 is ,knowledge qua ,knowledge1 or the form of knowledge2 that is1 the properties which are possessed by objects or ideas in so far as they are members of the world of knowledge4 ,and it is quite essential to distinguish the form of knowledge in this sense from its matter or content4 ,the 8matter0 of knowledge is the whole region of facts dealt with by science and perception4 ,if ,logic dealt with this in the way in which knowledge deals with it1 i4e4 simply as a process of acquiring and organising experience1 then ,logic would simply be another name for the whole range of science1 history1 and perception4 ,then there would be no distinction between logic and science or common sense1 and in trying to ascertain1 say1 the wave-length of red light1 or the cab-fare from ,chelsea to ,essex ,hall1 we should be investigating a logical problem4 ,but we see at once that this is not what we mean by studying knowledge as knowledge4 ,science or common sense aims at a particular answer to each problem of this kind4 ,logic aims at understanding the type and principles both of the problem and of its answer4 ,the details of the particular answer are the 8matter of fact40 ,the type and principles which are found in all such particular answers may be regarded as the form of fact1 i4e4 that which makes the fact a fact in knowledge4 ,jevons appears to me to make a terrible blunder at this #de point4 ,he says #a--8,one name which has been given to ,logic1 namely the ,science of ,sciences1 very aptly describes the all-extensive power of logical principles4 ,the cultivators of special branches of knowledge appear to have been fully aware of the allegiance they owe to the highest of the sciences1 for they have usually given names implying this allegiance4 ,the very name of ,logic occurs as part of nearly all the names adopted for the sciences1 which are often vulgarly called the #8ologies1' but are really the #8logics1' the #8o' being only a connecting vowel or part of the previous word4 ,thus geology is logic applied to explain the formation of the earth's crust2 biology is logic applied to the phenomena of life2 psychology is logic applied to the nature of the mind2 and the same is the case with physiology1 entomology1 zoology1 teratology1 morphology1 anthropology1 theology1 ecclesiology1 thalattology1 and the rest4 ,each science is thus distinctly confessed to be a special logic4 ,the name of ,logic itself is derived from the common ,greek word 1 which usually means word1 or the sign and outward manifestation of any inward thought4 ,but the same word was also used to denote the inward thought or reasoning of which words are the expression1 and it is thus probably that later ,greek writers on reasoning were led to call their science 1 or logical science1 also or logical art4 #b ,the adjective 1 being used alone1 soon came to be the name of the science1 just as ,mathematic1 ,rhetoric1 and other names ending in #8ic' were originally adjectives1 but have been converted into substantives40 #a ,elementary ,lessons1 p4 #f4 #b 8logos01 8episteme logike01 8techne logike0 and 8logike04 ,tr4 #df ,this account of the connection between the name 8,logic0 and the terminations of the names of the sciences appears precisely wrong4 ,whatever may have been the exact meaning of the expression 8,logic10 or 8,logical curriculum10 #a or 8art10 or 8science0 when first employed1 there can be no doubt that the word logical had a substantive reference to that about which the science or teaching in question was to treat4 ,the term 8logic10 therefore1 corresponds not to the syllables 8logy0 in such a word as 8,zoology10 but to the syllables 8,zoo10 which indicate the province of the special science1 and not its character as a science4 ,zoology means connected discourse 77 about living creatures4 ,logic meant a curriculum1 or science or art dealing with connected discourse4 ,the phrase 8,science of ,sciences10 rightly interpreted1 has the same meaning4 ,it does not mean that ,logic is a ,science which comprises all the special sciences1 but that ,logic is a ,science dealing with those general properties and relations which all sciences qua sciences have in common1 but omitting1 as from its point of view matter and not form1 the particular details of content by which every science answers the particular questions which it asks4 ,it is wild1 and most mischievous1 to say that 8every science is a special logic10 or that 8biology is ,logic applied to the phenomena of life40 ,this confusion destroys the whole disinterestedness which is necessary to true scientific ,logic1 and causes the logical student always to have his eye on puzzles1 and special methods1 and interferences by which he may teach the student of science how to perform the concrete labour of research4 ,we quite admit that #dg a looker-on may sometimes see more of the game1 and no wise investigator would contemn a priori the suggestions of a student like ,goethe1 or ,mill1 or ,lotze1 because their author was not exclusively engaged in the observation of nature4 ,but all this is secondary4 ,the idea that ,logic is a judge of scientific results1 able to pass sentence1 in virtue of some general criterion1 upon their validity and invalidity1 arises from a deep-lying misconception of the nature of truth which naturally allies itself with the above confusion between ,logic and the special sciences4 #a pragmateia ,tr44 ,see ,prantl1 i4 #ede4 ,therefore the relation between content or matter of knowledge1 and the form which is its general characteristic as knowledge1 is of this kind4 ,we can either study the objects of knowledge directly as we perceive them1 or indirectly1 as examples of the way in which we know4 ,as studied for their own sake1 they are regarded as the matter or content in which the general form of knowledge finds individual realisation4 ,in botany1 for instance1 we have a large number of actual plants classified and explained in their relation to one another4 ,a botanist is interested directly in the affinities and evolution of these plants1 and in the principles of biology which underlie their history4 ,he pushes his researches further and further into the individual matters that come to light1 without1 as a rule1 more than a passing reflection upon the abstract nature of the methods which he is creating as his work proceeds4 ,he classifies1 explains1 observes1 experiments1 theorises1 generalises1 to the best of his power1 solely in order to grasp and render intelligible the region of concrete fact that lies before him4 ,now while his particular results and discoveries #dh constitute the 8form0 or knowable properties of the plant-world as the object of botanical science1 the science which inquires into the general nature of knowledge must treat these particular results as 8mere matter0--as something with which it is not directly concerned1 any more than the art which makes a statue is primarily and directly concerned with the chemical and mechanical properties of marble4 ,the 8form0 or knowable properties with which the general science of knowledge is directly concerned1 consists in those methods and processes which the man of science1 developing the modes in which common sense naturally works1 constructs unconsciously as he goes along4 ,thus1 not the nature and affinities of the plant-world1 but classification1 explanation1 observation1 experiment1 theory1 are the phenomena in virtue of which the organised structure of botanical science participates in the form of knowledge1 and its objects become1 in these respects1 objects of logical theory4 ,hence some properties and relations of objects1 being the form or knowable structure of the concrete objects as a special department of nature1 correspond to the mere matter1 stuff1 or content of ,knowledge in general1 while other properties and relations of objects1 being their form or knowable structure as entering into a world of reality displayed to our intelligence1 correspond to the form of ,knowledge as treated of by a general inquiry into its characteristics1 which we call ,logic4 ,it is just as the qualities or 8forms0 of the different metals of which knives can be made are mere matter or irrelevant detail when we are discussing the general 8form0 or quality of a good knife1 #di whatever its material4 ,a reservation on this head appears in the following section4 ,form of ,knowledge dependent on ,content #b4 ,for the form of ,knowledge depends in some degree upon its matter4 ,it is very important to realise this truth2 for if ,logic is swamped by being identified with the whole range of special sciences1 it is killed by being emptied of all adaptation to living intelligence4 ,what is called ,formal ,logic par excellence in all its shapes1 whether antiquated as in ,hamilton's or ,thomson's ,formal ,laws of ,thought1 or freshly worked out on a symbolic basis as by ,boole and others1 has1 it appears to me1 this initial defect1 when considered as a general theory of ,logic4 ,as a contribution to such a theory1 every method which will work undoubtedly has its place1 and indicates and depends upon some characteristic of real thought4 ,but in the central theory itself1 and especially in so short an account of it as must be attempted in these lectures1 ,i should be inclined to condemn all attempts to employ symbols for anything more than the most passing illustration of points in logical processes4 ,all such attempts1 ,i must maintain1 share with the old-fashioned laws of ,identity1 ,contradiction1 and ,excluded ,middle the initial fallacy of representing a judgment by something which is not and cannot be in any way an adequate symbol of one4 ,if1 in order to get at the pure form of ,knowledge1 we restrict ourselves to very abstract characteristics in which all knowledge appears1 very roughly speaking1 to agree1 and which can be symbolized for working purposes by combinations of signs which have not the essential properties of ideal contents1 then we have ab initio substituted for the judgment something which is a very #ej abstract corollary from the nature of judgment1 and may or not for certain purposes and within certain limits be a fair representative of it4 ,we cannot and must not exclude from the form of ,knowledge its modifications according to 8matter10 and its nature as existing only in 8matter40 ,in fact1 the peculiar 8form0 of everything depends in some degree on its 8matter40 ,a statue in marble is a little differently treated if it is copied in bronze4 ,a knife is properly made of steel2 you can only make a bad one of iron1 or copper1 or flint1 and you cannot make one at all of wax4 ,different matters will more or less take the same form1 but only within certain limits4 ,so it is in ,knowledge4 ,the nature of objects as ,knowledge--for we must remember that 8form0 in our sense is not something put into the 8matter10 something alien or indifferent to it1 but is simply its own inmost character revealed by the structural relations in which it is found capable of standing #a--;depends on the way in which their parts are connected together4 #a ,the example of the marble statue may seem to contradict this idea2 and no doubt the indifference of matter to form is a question of degree4 ,but the feeling for material is a most important element in fine art2 and in knowledge there is only a relative distinction between formal and material relations4 ,let us compare1 for example1 the use of number in understanding objects of different kinds4 ,suppose there are four books in a heap on the table4 ,this heap of books is the object4 ,we desire to conceive it as a whole consisting of parts4 ,in order to do so we simply count them 8one1 two1 three1 four books40 ,if one is taken away1 there is one less to count2 if one is added1 there is one more4 ,but the books themselves1 as books1 are not #ea altered by taking away one from them or adding one to them4 ,they are parts indifferent to each other1 forming a heap which is sufficiently analysed or synthesised by counting its parts4 ,but now instead of four books in a heap1 let us think of the four sides of a square4 ,of course we can count them1 as we counted the books2 but we have not conceived the nature of the square by counting its sides4 ,that does not distinguish it from four straight lines drawn anyhow in space4 ,in order to appreciate what a square is1 we must consider that the sides are equal straight lines1 put together in a particular way so as to make a figure with four right angles2 we must distinguish it from a figure with four equal sides1 but its angles not right angles1 and from a four-sided figure with right angles1 but with only its opposite sides equal2 and note that if we shorten up one side into nothing1 the square becomes a triangle1 with altogether different properties from those of a square2 if we put in another side it becomes a pentagon1 and so on4 ,these two things1 the heap of books and the square1 are prima facie objects of perception4 ,we commonly speak of a diagram on a blackboard or in a book as 8a square0 if we have reason to take it as approximately exact1 and as intended for a square4 ,but on looking closer1 we soon see that the 8matter10 or individual attributes1 of each of these objects of our apprehension demands a different form of knowledge from that necessary to the other4 ,the judgment 8,this heap of books has four books in it0 is a judgment of enumerative perception4 ,the judgment 8,the square has four sides0 is a judgment of systematic necessity4 #eb ,why did we not keep the two judgments in the same logical shape8 ,why did we say 8,this heap0 and 8,the square08 ,why did we not say 8this0 in both propositions1 or 8the0 in both propositions8 ,because the different 8matter0 demands this difference of form4 ,let us try4 8,the heap of books has four books in it40 ,probably we interpret this proposition to mean just the same as if we had said 8,this heap40 ,that is owing to the fact that the judgment naturally occurs to us in its right form4 ,but if we interpret 8,the heap0 on the analogy of our interpretation of 8,the square10 our judgment will have become false4 ,it will have come to mean 8,every heap of books has four books in it10 and a judgment of perception will not bear this enlargement4 ,the subject is composite1 and one1 the most essential of its elements1 is destroyed by the change from 8this0 to 8the40 ,let us try again4 ,let us say 8,this square has four sides40 ,that is not exactly false1 but it is ridiculous4 ,every square must have four sides1 and by saying 8this square0 we strongly imply that foursidedness is a relation of which we are aware chiefly1 if not exclusively1 in the object attended to in the moment of judging1 simply through the apprehension of that moment4 ,by this implication the form of the judgment abandons and all but denies the character of systematic necessity which its content naturally demands4 ,it is like saying1 8,it appears to me that in the present instance two and two make four40 ,the number of sides in a square1 then1 is not a mere fact of perception1 while the number of books in a heap is such a fact4 ,but you may answer by suggesting the case that an #ec uninstructed person--say a child1 with a square figure before him1 and having heard the name square applied to figures generally resembling that figure1 may simply observe the number of sides1 without knowing any of the geometrical properties connected with it2 will he not then be right in saying1 8,this square has four sides08 ,certainly not4 ,in that case he has no right to call it a square4 ,it would only be a name he had picked up without knowing what it meant4 ,all he has the right to say would be1 8,this object0 or 8,this figure has four sides40 ,that would be a consistent judgment of mere perception1 true as far as it went4 ,it is always possible to apprehend the more complex objects of knowledge in the simpler forms2 but then they are not apprehended adequately1 not as complex objects4 ,it is also possible to apply very complex forms of knowledge to very simple objects4 ,most truths that can be laid down quite in the abstract about a human mind could also be applied in some sense or other to any speck of protoplasm1 or to any pebble on the seashore4 ,and every simple form of knowledge is always being pushed on1 by its own defects and inconsistencies1 in the direction of more complex forms4 ,so far ,i have been trying to show that objects are capable of being different in their nature as knowledge as well as in their individual properties2 and that their different natures as knowledge depend on the way in which their parts are connected together4 ,we took two objects of knowledge1 and found that the mode of connection between the parts required two quite different kinds of judgment to express them4 ,let us look at the reason of this4 #ed ,the relation of ,part and ,whole #c4 ,the relation of ,part and ,whole is a form of the relation of ,identity and ,difference4 ,every ,judgment expresses the unity of some parts in a whole1 or of some differences in an ,identity4 ,this is the meaning of 8construction0 in knowledge4 ,we saw that knowledge exists in judgment as a construction 7taking this to include maintenance7 of reality4 ,the expression whole and parts may be used in a strict or in a lax sense4 ,in a strict sense it means a whole of quantity1 that is1 a whole considered as made up by the addition of parts of the same kind1 as a foot is made up of twelve inches4 ,in this sense the whole is the sum of the parts4 ,and even in this sense the whole is represented within every part by an identity of quality that runs through them all4 ,otherwise there would be nothing to earmark them as belonging to the particular whole or kind of whole in question4 ,parts of length make up a whole of length1 parts of weight a whole of weight1 parts of intensity a whole of intensity1 in so far as a whole of intensity is quantitative1 which is not a perfectly easy question4 ,wholes like these are 8,sums0 or 8,totals04 ,the relation of whole to part in this sense is a very simple case of the relation of differences in an identity1 but for that very reason is not the easiest case to appreciate4 ,the relation is so simple that it is apt to pass unnoticed1 and in dealing with numerical computation we are apt to forget that in application to any concrete problem the numbers must be numbers of something having a common quality1 and that the nature of this something may affect the result as related to real fact1 though not as a conclusion from pure #ee numerical premisses4 ,in a whole of pure number the indifference of parts to whole reaches its maximum4 ,the unit remains absolutely the same1 into whatever total of addition it may enter4 ,in a whole of differentiated members1 such as a square1 all this begins to be different4 ,a side in a square possesses1 by the fact of being a side1 very different relations and properties from those of a straight line conceived in isolation4 ,in this case the whole is not made up merely by adding the parts together4 ,it is a geometrical whole1 and its parts are combined according to a special form of necessity which is rooted in the nature of space4 ,speaking generally1 the point is that parts must occupy certain perfectly definite places as regards each other4 ,you cannot make a square by merely adding three right angles to one1 nor by taking a given straight line and adding three more equal straight lines to its length4 ,you must construct in a definite way so as to fulfil definite conditions4 ,the identity shows itself in the different elements which make it up1 not as a mere repeated quality1 but as a property of contributing1 each part in a distinctive way1 to the nature of the whole4 ,such an identity is not a mere total or sum1 though ,i imagine that its relations can be fully expressed in terms of quantity1 certain differentiated objects or conceptions being given 7e4g4 line and angle74 ,i take a further instance to put a sharp point upon this distinction4 ,the relation of whole and parts is nowhere more perfect1 short of a living mind1 than in a work of art4 ,there is a very fine ,turner landscape now #a in the 8,old #ef ,masters0 ,exhibition at ,burlington ,house--the picture of the two bridges at ,walton-on-,thames4 ,the picture is full of detail--figures1 animals1 trees1 and a curving river-bed4 ,but ,i am told that if one attempts to cut out the smallest appreciable fragment of all this detail1 one will find that it cannot be done without ruining the whole effect of the picture4 ,that means that the individual totality is so welded together by the master's selective composition1 that1 according to ,aristotle's definition of a true 8whole10 if any part is modified or removed the total is entirely altered1 8for that of which the presence or absence makes no difference is no true part of the whole40 #b #a ,february #ahib4 #b ,poetics1 #h ,of course1 in saying that the part is thus essential to the whole1 it is implied that the whole reacts upon and transfigures the part4 ,it is in and by this transformation that its pervading identity makes itself felt throughout all the elements by which it is constituted4 ,as the picture would be ruined if a little patch of colour were removed1 so the little patch of colour might be such as to be devoid of all value if seen on a piece of paper by itself4 ,i will give an extreme instance1 almost amounting to a tour de force1 from the art of poetry1 in illustration of this principle4 ,we constantly hear and use in daily life the phrase1 8,it all comes to the same thing in the end40 ,perhaps in the very commonest speech we use it less fully1 omitting the word 8thing02 but the sentence as written above is a perfectly familiar platitude1 with no special import1 nor grace of sound or rhythm4 ,now1 in one of the closing stanzas of ,browning's poem ,any ,wife to ,any ,husband1 this sentence1 only modified #eg by the substitution of 8at0 for 8in10 forms an entire line4 #a ,and ,i think it will generally be felt that there are few more stately and pathetic passages than this in modern poetry4 ,both the rhythm and sonorousness of the whole poem1 and also its burden of ideal feeling1 are communicated to the line in question by the context in which it is framed4 ,through the rhythm thus prescribed to it1 and through the characteristic emotion which it contributes to reveal1 the 8whole0 of the poem re-acts upon this part1 and confers upon it a quality which1 apart from such a setting1 we should never have dreamed that it was capable of possessing4 #a ,in order to remind the reader of the effect of this passage it is necessary to quote a few lines before and after-- 8,re-issue words and looks from the old mint1 ,pass them afresh1 no matter whose the print1 ,image and superscription once they bore6 ,re-coin thyself and give it them to spend1-- ,it all comes to the same thing at the end1 ,since mine thou wast1 mine art and mine shalt be1 ,faithful or faithless1 sealing up the sum ,or lavish of my treasure1 thou must come ,back to the heart's place here ,i keep for thee60 ,we are not here concerned with the peculiar 8aesthetic0 nature of works of art1 which makes them1 although rational1 nevertheless unique individuals4 ,i only adduced the above examples to show1 in unmistakable cases1 what is actually meant when we speak of 8a whole0 as constituted by a pervading identity which exhibits itself in the congruous or co-operating nature of all the constituent parts4 ,in wholes of a higher kind than the whole of mere quantity the parts no longer repeat each other4 ,they are not merely distinct1 #eh but different4 ,yet the common or continuous nature shows itself within each of them4 ,the parts of a sum-total1 taking them for convenience of summation as equal parts1 may be called units2 #a the parts of an abstract system1 such as a geometrical figure1 may be called elements 7,i cannot answer for mathematical usage71 and the parts of a concrete system1 an aesthetic product1 a mind1 or a society1 might be called members4 #a ,a unit of measurement implies in addition that it has been equated with some accepted standard4 ,if ,i divide the length of my room into thirty equal parts1 each part is a 8unit0 in the sum-total2 but ,i have not measured the room till ,i have equated one such part with a known standard1 and thus made it into a unit in the general system of length equations4 ,but every kind of whole is an identity1 and its parts are always differences within it4 ,nature of ,knowledge #d4 ,it will be well to sum up here what we have learnt of the nature of knowledge in general1 before passing to the definition and classification of ,judgment4 ,knowledge is always ,judgment4 ,judgment is constructive1 for us1 of the real world4 ,constructing the real world means interpreting or amplifying our present perception by what we are obliged to think1 which we take as all belonging to a single system one with itself1 and with what constrains us in sense-perception1 and objective in the sense that its parts act on each other independently of our individual apprehension1 and that we are obliged to think them thus4 ,the process of construction is always that of exhibiting a whole in its parts1 i4e4 an identity in its differences2 that is to say1 it is always both analytic and synthetic4 ,the objects of knowledge differ in the mode of relation between their #ei parts and the whole1 and thus give rise to different types of judgment and inference2 and this difference in the form of knowledge is a difference in the content of ,logic1 which deals with the objects of experience only from the point of view of their properties as objects in an intellectual world4 ,conclusion #e4 ,i hope that these general lectures1 which1 as ,i am quite aware1 have anticipated the treatment of many difficult questions which they have not attempted to solve1 have been successful in putting the problem of ,logic before us with some degree of vividness4 ,if this problem were thoroughly impressed upon our minds1 ,i should say that we had already gained something definite from this course of study4 ,the points which ,i desire to emphasise are two4 7#a7 ,i hope that we have learned to realise the world of our knowledge as a living growth1 sustained by the energy of our intelligence2 and to understand that we do not start with a ready-made world in common1 but can only enter upon the inheritance of science and civilisation as the result of courage1 labour1 and reasonable perseverance2 and further1 that we retain this inheritance just as long as our endurance and capacity hold out1 and no longer4 ,and 7#b7 ,i have attempted to make clear that this living growth1 our knowledge1 is like the vegetable or animal world in being composed of infinite minor systems1 each and all of which are at bottom the same function with corresponding parts or elements1 modified by adaption to the environment4 ,so that the task of analysing the form of judgment bears a certain resemblance to that of analysing the forms of plants4 ,just as from the single cell of the undifferentiated ,alga1 to #fj the most highly organised flower or tree1 we have the same formation1 with its characteristic functions and operations1 so from the undifferentiated judgment1 which in linguistic form resembles an ejaculation or interjection1 to the reasonable systems of exact or philosophical science1 we find the same systematic function with corresponding elements4 ,but the world of knowledge has a unity which the world of organic individuals cannot claim2 and this whole system of functions is itself1 for our intelligence1 approximately a single function or system1 corresponding in structure to each of its individual parts1 as though the plant world or animal world were itself in turn a plant or animal4 ,we cannot hope to exhaust the shapes taken by the pervading fundamental function of intelligence4 ,we shall only attempt to understand the analogies and differences between some few of its leading types4 #fa ,,lecture ,,iv ,,types ,,of ,,judgment ,,and ,,the ,,general ,,conditions ,,involved ,,in ,,assertion ,correspondence between types of ,judgment and nature of objects as ,knowledge #a4 ,the question of correspondence between the types of ,judgment and the orders of ,knowledge was really anticipated in discussing the relation between the content and the form of knowledge4 ,we saw that the content or matter and nature known determines on the whole the form or method of knowledge by which it can be known4 ,i give a few cases of this correspondence1 not professing to complete the list4 ,we should accustom ourselves to think of these forms as constituting a progression in the sense that each of them betrays a reference to an ideal of knowledge which in itself it is unable to fulfil1 and therefore inevitably suggests some further or divergent form4 ,and the defect by which the forms contradict the ideal1 is felt by us as a defect in their grasp of reality1 in their presentation of real connections4 8,impersonal0 ,judgment a4 ,we think of the judgment as predicating an ideal content of a subject indicated in present perception4 ,but there are judgments which scarcely have an immediate subject at all1 such as 8,how hot60 8,bad60 8,it hurts60 ,in the judgments thus represented the true subject is some #fb undefined aspect of the given complex presentation4 ,of course the words which we use are not an absolutely safe guide to the judgment--they may be merely an abbreviation4 ,but there are typical judgments of this kind in which we merely mean to connect some namable content with that which can only be defined as the focus of attention at the moment4 ,such judgments might be called predications of mere quality4 ,the only link by which they bind their parts into a whole is a feeling referred to our momentary surroundings4 ,a mere quality1 if not defined or analysed1 or a feeling of pleasure or pain1 is the sort of object which can be expressed in such a judgment4 ,perceptive ,judgment b4 ,then we have the very wide sphere of perceptive judgment1 which we may most conveniently confine to judgments which have in the subject elements analogous to 8,this10 8,here10 8,now40 ,such particles as these indicate an effort to distinguish elements within the complex presented4 ,they have no content beyond the reference to presentation1 and1 in 8here0 and 8now10 an implication that the present is taken in a particular kind of continuum4 ,otherwise they mean nothing more or other than is meant by pointing with the finger4 ,we may or may not help out a 8subject0 of this kind by definite ideas attached to it as conditions of the judgment4 ,if we do1 we are already on the road to a new form of knowledge1 incompatible with the judgment of perception4 ,for so long as we keep a demonstrative1 spatial or temporal1 reference in the thought1 the subject of judgment is not cut loose from our personal focus of presentation4 ,and as the existence of such a focus is undeniable1 we are secure against criticism so far as the #fc content of the subject is concerned4 ,but if we begin to specify it1 we do so at our peril4 ,such judgments as these have been called 8,analytic judgments of sense40 #a ,the term is not generally accepted in this meaning1 but is conveniently illustrative of the nature of these judgments4 ,it is intended to imply that they are a breaking up and reconstruction of what1 in our usual loose way of talking1 is said to be given in sense-perception4 ,they remain on the whole within the complex of 8that which0 is presented4 #a ,mr4 ,f4,h4 ,bradley1 ,principles of ,logic1 p4 #dh4 ,from the point of view which we have taken1 such judgments are not confined to what we think it worth while to say1 but are the essence of every orderly and objective perception of the world around us4 ,in a waking human consciousness nothing is unaffirmed4 ,we have no other term than perception to express the process which is employed in scientific observation and experiment4 ,but it is plain that so soon as the judgment that refers to 8,this0 is modified through the inevitable demand for qualification by exact ideas--8,this hurts me10 8,what hurts you80 8,this old sprain1 at the pace we are walking0--a conflict of elements has arisen within the judgment4 ,and as commonplace perception passes into scientific observation1 the qualifying ideas1 on which truth and relevancy depend1 dwarf the importance of the 8this10 and ultimately oust it altogether4 ,that is a simple case in which the ideal of knowledge and the nature of reality operate within the judgment to split asunder its primitive form4 ,the subject as expressed by a pure demonstrative refuses to #fd take account either of truth1 i4e4 consistency with knowledge as a whole1 or of relevancy1 i4e4 consistency with the relation involved in the particular predication that may be in question4 ,our commonplace perception halts between these two extremes4 ,it deals with the world of individual objects and persons1 which1 being already systematised according to our current observations and interests1 has1 so long as we keep to its order1 a sufficient degree of truth and relevancy for the needs of daily life4 ,thus if ,i say1 8,this book will do as a desk to write upon10 the truth of the qualification 8book0 7i4e4 the reality of the subject7 is assumed on the ground of the facility of recognising a well-known 8thing10 while the relevancy of the qualification 8book0 is not questioned1 because we accept an individual thing as an object of habitual interest qua individual1 and do not demand that whenever it is named those properties alone should be indicated which are relevant to the purpose for which it is named4 ,the 8thing0 is a current coin of popular thought1 and makes common perception workable without straining after a special relevancy in the subject of every predication4 ,such special relevancy leads ultimately to the ideal of definition1 in which subject and predicate are adequate to each other and necessarily connected4 ,a definitory judgment drops the demonstrative and relies on qualifying ideas alone4 ,it is therefore an abstract universal ,judgment1 while the ,judgment of ,perception1 so long as it retains the demonstrative1 is a ,singular ,judgment4 ,proper names in ,judgment c4 ,but a very curious example of a divergence or half-way house in ,knowledge is that form of the singular ,judgment in which the subject is a proper name4 ,a proper name is #fe designative and not definitory4 ,it may be described as a generalised demonstrative pronoun--a demonstrative pronoun which has the same particular reference in the mouth of every one who uses1 it1 and beyond the given present of time4 ,so the reference of a proper name is a good example of what we called a universal or an identity4 ,that which is referred to by such a name is a person or thing whose existence is extended in time and its parts bound together by some continuous quality--an individual person or thing and the whole of this individuality is referred to in whatever is affirmed about it4 ,thus the reference of such a name is universal1 not as including more than one individual1 but as including in the identity of the individual numberless differences--the acts1 events1 and relations that make up its history and situation4 ,what kinds of things are called by ,proper ,names1 and why8 ,this question is akin to the doctrine of ,connotation and ,denotation1 which will be discussed in the next lecture4 ,it is a very good problem to think over beforehand1 noting especially the limiting cases1 in which either some people give proper names to things to which other people do not give them1 or some things are given proper names while other things of the same general kind are not4 ,these judgments1 which are both ,singular and ,universal1 may perhaps be called for distinction's sake 8,individual0 ,judgments4 ,abstract ,judgment d4 ,the demonstrative perception may also be replaced by a more or less complete analysis or definition4 ,within this province ,definition of a concrete whole is one extreme1 e4g4 8,human ,society is a system of wills02 #ff that of an abstract whole the other extreme1 8#ab #g #e40 ,there are all degrees1 between these two1 in the amount of modification which the parts undergo by belonging to the whole4 ,there are also all sorts of incomplete definitions1 expressing merely the effects of single conditions out of those which go to make up a whole4 ,these form the abstract universal judgments of the exact sciences1 such as1 8,if water is heated to #bab ,fahr4 under one atmosphere it boils40 ,in all these cases some idea1 8abstract0 as being cut loose from the focus of present perception1 whether abstract or concrete in its content1 replaces the demonstrative of the judgment which is a perception4 ,these are the judgments which in the ordinary logical classification rank as universal4 ,the general definition of ,judgment #b4 ,it was quite right of us to consider some types of judgment before trying to define it generally4 ,it is hopeless to understand a definition unless the object to be defined is tolerably familiar4 ,we have said a great deal about knowledge and about judgment as the organ or medium of knowledge4 ,now we want to study particular judgments in their parts and working1 and observe how they perform their function of constructing reality4 ,now1 for our purpose1 we may take the clearest cases of judgment1 viz4 the meanings of propositions4 ,the distinctive character of ,judgment as contrasted with every other act of mind is that it claims to be true1 i4e4 pre-supposes the distinction between truth and falsity4 ,first1 we have to consider what is implied in claiming truth4 ,secondly1 by what means truth is claimed in ,judgment4 #fg ,thirdly1 the nature of the ideas for which alone truth can be claimed4 ,what is implied in claiming truth 7i47 ,claiming truth implies the distinction between truth and falsity4 ,i do not say1 8between truth and falsehood10 because falsehood includes a lie1 and a lie is not prima facie1 an error or falsity of knowledge4 ,it is1 as may be said of a question1 altogether addressed to another person1 and has no existence as a distinct species within knowledge4 ,thus a lie is called by ,plato 8falsehood in words02 the term 8falsehood in the mind0 he reserves for ignorance or error1 which he treats as the worst of the two1 which from an intellectual point of view it plainly is4 ,no distinction between truth and falsity can exist unless1 in the act or state which claims truth1 there is a reference to something outside psychical occurrence in the course of ideas4 ,falsity or error are relations that imply existences which1 having reality of one kind1 claim in addition to this another kind of reality which they have not4 ,in fact1 all things that are called false1 are called so because they claim a place or property which they do not possess4 ,they must exist1 in order to be false4 ,it is in the non-fulfilment1 by their existence1 of some claim or pretension which it suggests1 that falsity consists4 ,and so it is in the fulfilment of such a claim that truth has a meaning4 ,a false coin exists as a piece of metal2 it is false because it pretends to a place in the monetary system which its properties or history #a contradict4 #a ,for it is1 ,i suppose1 technically false1 even if over value1 if not coined by those who have the exclusive legal right to coin4 ,as the claim to be true is made by every judgment in its #fh form1 there can be no judgment without some recognition of a difference between psychical occurrences and the system of reality4 ,that is to say1 there is no judgment unless the judging mind is more or less aware that it is possible to have an idea which is not in accordance with reality4 ,thus1 if an animal has no real world distinct from his train of mental images1 if1 that is1 and just because1 these are his world directly1 and without discord1 he cannot judge4 ,the question is1 e4g4 when he seems disappointed1 whether the pleasant image #a simply disappears and a less pleasant image takes its place1 or whether the erroneous image was distinguished as an element in 8a mere idea10 which could be retained and compared with the systematised perceptions which force it out1 as an idea with reality4 #a ,it will be observed that we are not treating the mental images as being taken for such by the primitive mind4 ,it is just in as far as they are not yet taken for such that they are merely such4 ,mr4 ,james says that the first sensation is for the child the universe 7,psychology ,,ii4 #g74 ,but it is a universe in which all is equally mere fact1 and there is no distinction of truth and falsehood1 or reality and unreality4 ,that can only come when an existent is found to be a fraud4 ,we must all of us have seen a dog show signs of pleasure when he notices preparations for a walk1 and then express the extreme of unhappiness when the walk is not taken at all1 or he is left at home4 ,people interpret these phenomena very carelessly4 ,they say 8he thought that he was going to be taken out40 ,if he did 8think that1 etc10 then he made a judgment4 ,this would imply that he distinguishes between the images suggested to his mind1 and the reality of their content as the future event of going out1 and knew that he might have the one without the other following4 ,but of #fi course it is quite possible that the dog has no distinct expectation of something different from his present images1 but merely derives pleasure from them1 which he expresses1 and suffers and expresses pain when they are replaced by something else4 ,it is here1 no doubt1 in the conflict of suggestion and perception1 that judgment originates4 ,on the other hand1 animals1 especially domestic animals1 do seem to use the imperative1 which perhaps implies that they know what they want1 and have it definitely contrasted with their present ideas as something to be realised4 ,however this may be1 the claim of truth marks the minimum of ,judgment4 ,there can be no judgment until we distinguish psychical fact from the reference to ,reality4 ,a mere mental fact as such is not true or false4 ,in other words1 there is no judgment unless there is something that1 formally speaking1 is capable of being denied4 ,when your dog sees you go to the front door1 he may have an image of hunting a rabbit suggested to his mind1 but so far there is nothing that can be denied4 ,if he has the image1 of course he has4 ,there is nothing that can be denied until the meaning of this image is treated as a further fact beyond the image itself1 in a system independent of the momentary consciousness in his mind4 ,then it is possible to say1 8,no1 the fact does not correspond to your idea10 i4e4 what we are ultimately obliged to think as a system is inconsistent with the idea as you affirmed it of the same system4 ,by what means the claim to truth is made 7ii47 ,the first thing then in ,judgment is that we must have a world of reality distinguished from the course of our ideas4 ,thereupon the claim to truth is actually made by attaching the meaning of an idea to some point in the real #gj world4 ,this can only be done where an identity is recognised between reality and our meaning4 ,thus 7keeping to the ,judgment of ,perception7 ,i say1 8,this table is made of oak40 ,this table is given in perception already qualified by numberless judgments2 it is a point in the continuous system or tissue which we take as reality4 ,among its qualities it has a certain grain and colour in the wood4 ,i know the colour and grain of oak-wood1 and if they are the same as those of the table1 then the meaning or content 8made of oak0 coalesces with this point in reality1 and instead of merely saying1 8,this table is made of wood that has such and such a grain and colour10 ,i am able to say 8,this table is made of oak-wood40 ,this example shows the true distinction between the ,logical ,subject and ,predicate4 ,the fact is1 that the ultimate subject in ,judgment is always ,reality4 ,of course the logical subject may be quite different from the grammatical subject4 ,some kinds of words cannot in strict grammar be made subjects of a sentence1 though they can represent a logical subject quite well3 e4g4 8,now is the time40 8,here is the right place40 ,adverbs1 ,i suppose1 cannot be grammatical subjects4 ,but in these sentences they stand for the logical subjects1 certain points in the perceptive series4 ,the true logical subject then is always reality1 however much disguised by qualifications or conditions4 ,the logical predicate is always the meaning of an idea2 and the claim to be true consists in the affirmation of the meaning as belonging to the tissue of reality at the point indicated by the subject4 ,the connection is always made by identity of #ga content at the point where the idea joins the reality1 so that the judgment always appears as a revelation of something which is in reality4 ,it simply develops1 accents1 or gives accuracy to a recognised quality of the real4 ,this is easily seen in cases of simple quality--e4g4 8,this colour is sky-blue40 ,the colour is given1 and the judgment merely identifies it with sky-blue1 and so reveals another element belonging to its identity1 the element of being seen in the sky on a clear day4 ,the analysis is not quite so easy when there is a concrete subject like a person2 for how can there be an identity between a person and a fact8 8,a4,b4 passed me in the street this afternoon40 ,between what elements is the identity in this case8 ,it is between him1 as an individual whom ,i know by sight in other places1 and him as he appeared this afternoon in particular surroundings4 ,his identity already extends through a great many different particulars of time and place1 and this judgment merely recognises one more particular as included in the same continuous history4 8,he in this context belongs to him in a former context40 ,in this simple case the operative identity is probably that of my friend's personal appearance2 but the judgment is not merely about that but about his whole personality1 of which his personal appearance is merely taken as a sign4 ,any assertion which is incredible because the identical quality is wanting will illustrate the required structure4 ,there is a story commented on by ,thackeray in one of his occasional papers1 which implied that the ,duke of ,wellington took home note-paper from a club to which he did not #gb belong4 7,thackeray gives the true explanation of the fact on which the suggestion was founded47 ,the identity concerned in this case would be that of character4 ,can we find an identity between the character involved in a piece of meanness like that suggested and the character of the ,duke of ,wellington8 ,no2 and prima facie therefore the judgment is false4 ,the identity which should bind it together breaks it in two4 ,but yet1 again3 supposing the external evidence to be strong enough1 we may have to accept a fact which conflicts with a man's character as we conceive it4 ,that is so3 in such a case one kind of identity appears to contradict the other4 ,i may think that ,i saw a man with my own eyes1 doing something which wholly contradicts his character as ,i judge it4 ,then there is a conflict between identity in personal appearance and identity in character1 and we have to criticise the two estimates of identity--i4e4 to refer them both to our general system of knowledge1 and to accept the connection which can be best adapted to that system4 ,we have got1 then1 as the active elements in ,judgment a ,subject in ,reality1 the meaning of an idea1 and an identity between them4 ,is this enough8 ,have we the peculiar act of affirmation wherever we have these conditions8 ,this is not the question by what elements of language the judgment is rendered4 ,we shall speak of that in the next lecture4 ,the question is now1 simply1 8,is a significant idea1 referred to reality1 always an assertion80 ,the first answer seems to be that such an idea is always in an assertion1 but need not constitute the whole of an #gc assertion4 ,if we think of a subject in judgment which is represented by a relative sentence1 it seems clear that any idea which can stand a predicate can also form a part of a subject4 8,the exhibition which it is proposed to hold at ,chicago in #ahic0--;has in effect just the same elements of meaning1 and just the same reference to a point in our world of reality as if the sentence ran1 8,it is proposed to hold an exhibition at ,chicago in #ahic40 ,in common parlance we should say1 that in the former case we entertain an idea--or conceive or represent it--while in the latter case we affirm it4 ,but if we go on to say that the former kind of sentence as truly represents the nature of thought as the latter1 then it seems that we are mistaken4 ,even language does not admit such a clause to the rank of an independent sentence4 ,if we insist on considering it in its isolation1 we probably eke it out in thought by an unarticulated affirmation such as that which constitutes an impersonal judgment2 in other words1 we affirm it to belong to reality under some condition which remains unspecified4 ,thus the linguistic form of the relative clause1 as also the separate existence of the spoken or written word1 produces an illusion which has governed the greater part of logical theory so far as concerns the separation between concept and judgment1 i4e4 between entertaining ideas and affirming them in reality4 ,in our waking life1 all thought is judgment1 every idea is referred to reality1 and in being so referred1 is ultimately affirmed of reality4 ,the separation of elements in the texture of ,judgment into ,subjects and ,predicates which1 as separated1 are conceived as possible ,subjects and ,predicates1 is therefore #gd theoretical and ideal1 an analysis of a living tissue1 not an enumeration of loose bricks out of which something is about to be built up4 ,the kind of ideas which can claim truth 7iii47 8,idea0 has two principal meanings4 7a7 ,a psychical presentation and 7b7 ,an identical reference4 ,this distinction is the same as that between our course of ideas and our world of knowledge4 ,we must try now to define it more accurately4 7a7 ,an idea as a psychical presentation is strictly a particular4 ,every moment of consciousness is full of a given complex of presentation which passes away and can never be repeated without some difference4 ,for this purpose a representation is just the same as a presentation2 is1 in fact1 a presentation4 ,its detail at any given moment is filled in by the influence of the moment1 and it can never occur again with precisely the same elements of detail as before4 ,if we use the term 8idea0 in this sense1 as a momentary particular mental state1 it is nonsense to speak of having the same idea twice1 or of referring it to a reality other than our mental life4 ,the idea in this sense is a psychical image4 ,we cannot illustrate this usage by any recognisable part of our mental furniture1 for every such part which can be described and indicated by a general name1 is something more than a psychical image4 ,we can only say that that which at any moment we have in consciousness1 when our waking perception encounters reality1 is such an idea1 and so too is the image supplied by memory1 when considered simply as a datum1 a fact1 in our mental history4 7b7 ,to get at the other sense of 8idea0 we should think #ge of the meaning of a word2 a very simple case is that of a proper name4 ,what is the meaning of 8,st4 ,paul's ,cathedral in ,london08 ,no two people who have seen it have carried away precisely the same image of it in their minds1 nor does memory1 when it represents the ,cathedral to each of them1 supply the same image in every detail and association twice over to the same person1 nor do we for a moment think that such an image is the ,cathedral4 #a ,yet we neither doubt that the name means something1 and that the same to all those who employ it1 nor that it means the same to each of them at one time that it did at every other time4 ,the psychical images which formed the first vision of it are dead and gone for ever1 and so1 after every occasion on which it has been remembered1 are those in which that memory was evoked4 ,the essence of the idea does not lie in the peculiarities of any one of their varying presentations1 but in the identical reference that runs through them all1 and to which they all serve as material1 and the content of this reference is the object of our thought4 #a ,when we are actually looking at the ,cathedral1 we say1 8,that is the ,cathedral40 ,does not this mean that we take our momentary image1 to which we point1 to be the reality of the ,cathedral8 ,not precisely so4 ,it is the 8that10 not our definite predication about it1 which makes us so confident4 ,the 8that0 is identified by our judgment1 but goes beyond it4 ,in order to distinguish and employ this reference it is necessary that there should be a symbol for it1 and so long as it brings us to the object which is the centre of the entire system1 this symbol may vary within considerable limits4 ,the commonest and most secure means of reference is #gf the word or name4 #a ,so confident are we in the 8conventional0 or artificially adapted character of this mark or sign of reference1 that we are inclined to treat it as absolutely unvarying on every occasion of utterance4 ,but of course it is not unvarying4 ,it differs in sound every time it is spoken1 and in context and appearance every time we see it in a written shape4 ,our reliance upon it as identical throughout depends on the fact that it has a recognisable character to which its variations are irrelevant1 and which practically crushes out these variations from our attention4 ,unless we are on the look-out for mispronunciations or misprints1 they do not interfere at all with our attention to the main reference of words4 ,we know that it is almost impossible to detect misprints so long as one reads a book with attention to its meaning4 ,this then is a fair parallel to the distinction which we are considering between two kinds of ideas4 ,if the momentary sound or look of a word is analogous to idea as psychical presentation1 8the word0 as a permanent possession of our knowledge is analogous to the idea as a reference to an object in our systematic world1 and is the normal instrument of such a reference4 #a 8,a name is a sound which has significance according to convention10 i4e4 according to rational agreement4--,ar4 de ,interp4 #af;a #ai4 ,but either with the word or without it there may be a symbol of another kind4 ,any psychical image that falls within certain limits may appear as the momentary vehicle of the constant reference to an object4 ,just as in recognising the reference of a word we omit to notice the accent and loudness with which it is pronounced1 or the quality of the paper on which it is printed1 just so in recognising the #gg reference of a psychical image our attention fails to note its momentary context1 colouring1 and detail4 ,if it includes something that definitely belongs to a systematic object in our world of objects1 that is enough1 unless counteracted by cross references1 to effect the suggestion we require1 and that1 and nothing else1 arrests our attention for the moment4 ,when ,i think of ,st4 ,paul's ,cathedral1 it may be the west front1 or the dome seen from the outside1 or the gallery seen from the inside1 that happens to occur to my mind2 and further1 that which does occur to me occurs in a particular form or colouring1 dictated by the condition of my memory and attention at the moment4 ,but these peculiarities are dwarfed by the meaning1 and unless ,i consider them for psychological purposes1 ,i do not know that they are there4 ,it is the typical element only1 the element which points to the common reference in which my interest centres1 that forms the content of the idea in this sense1 taken not as a transient feature of the mental complex1 but as definitely suggesting a constant object in our constructed world4 ,and it suggests this object because it1 the typical element1 is a common point that links together the various cases and the various presentations in which the object is given to us4 ,in this sense it is a universal or an identity4 ,how can this conception of a logical idea be applied to a perfectly simple presentation8 ,it would be impossible so to apply it1 but there does not seem to be such a thing as a simple presentation in the sense of a presentation that has no connection as a universal with anything else4 ,in the image of a particular blue colour1 we cannot indeed separate out what makes it blue from what makes it the particular #gh shade of blue that it is4 ,but nevertheless its blueness makes it a symbol to us of blue in general1 and when so thought of1 crushes out of sight all the visible peculiarities that attend every spatial surface4 ,we understand perfectly well that the colour is blue1 and that in saying this we have gone beyond the limits of the momentary image1 and have referred something in it as a universal quality to our world of objects4 ,an idea1 in this sense1 is both less and more than a psychical image4 ,it contains less1 but stands for more4 ,it includes only what is central and characteristic in the detail of each mental presentation1 and therefore omits much4 ,but it is not taken as a mental presentation at all1 but as a content belonging to a systematic world of objects independent of my thought1 and therefore stands for something which is not mere psychical image4 ,if therefore we are asked to display it as an image1 as something fixed in a permanent outline1 however pale or meagre1 we cannot do so4 ,it is not an abstract image1 but a concrete habit or tendency4 ,it can only be displayed in the judgment1 that is1 in a concrete case of reference to reality4 ,apart from this1 it is a mere abstraction of analysis1 a tendency to operate in a certain way upon certain psychical presentations4 ,psychically speaking1 it is when realised in judgment a process more or less systematic1 extending through time1 and dealing with momentary presentations as its material4 ,in other words1 we may describe it as a selective rule1 shown by its workings but not consciously before the mind--for if it were1 it would no longer be an idea1 but an idea of an idea4 ,every judgment1 whether made with language or without1 #gi is an instance of such an idea1 which may be called a symbolic idea as distinct from a psychical image2 8symbolic0 because the mental units or images involved are not as such taken as the whole of the object for which they stand1 but are in a secondary sense1 as the word in a primary sense1 symbols or vehicles only4 ,such ideas can have truth claimed for them1 because they have a reference beyond their mental existence4 ,they point to an object in a system of permanent objects1 and that to which they point may or may not suit the relation which they claim for it4 ,therefore the judgment can only be made by help of symbolic ideas4 ,mere mental facts1 occurrences in my mental history1 taken as such1 cannot enter into judgment4 ,when we judge about them1 as in the last sentence1 they are not themselves subject or predicate1 but are referred to1 like any other facts1 by help of a selective process dealing with our current mental images of them4 ,we shall not be far wrong then1 if in every judgment1 under whatever disguises it may assume1 we look for elements analogous to those which are manifest in the simple perceptive judgment1 8,this is green10 or 8,that is a horse40 ,the relation between these and more elaborate forms of affirmation1 such as the abstract judgment of science1 has partly been indicated in the earlier portion of this lecture4 ,the general definition of judgment has therefore been sufficiently suggested on p4 #gb4 ,judgment is the reference of a significant idea to a subject in reality1 by means of an identity of content between them4 #hj ,,lecture ,v ,,the ,,proposition ,,and ,,the ,,name ,judgment translated into language4 #a4 ,judgment expressed in words is a ,proposition4 ,must ,judgment be expressed in words8 ,we have assumed that this need not be so4 ,mill #a says of ,inference that 8it is an operation which usually takes place by means of words1 and in complicated cases can take place in no other way40 ,the same is true of ,judgment4 #a ,logic vol4 ,i4 c4 i41 init4 ,we may say in general that words are not needed1 when thinking about objects by help of pictorial images will do the work demanded of the mind1 i4e4 when perfectly individualised connections in space and time are in question4 ,mr4 ,stout #a gives chess-playing as an example4 ,with the board before him1 even an ordinary player does not need words to describe to himself the move which he is about to make4 #a ,in ,mind1 no4 #fb4 ,words are needed when we have to attend to the general plan of any system1 as in thinking about organisms with reference to their type1 or about political relations--about anything1 that is1 which is not of such a nature that the members of the idea can be symbolised in pictorial form4 ,it would be difficult1 for example1 to comprehend the respiration of plants under a symbolic picture-idea drawn #ha from the respiration of the higher animals4 ,the relations which constitute a common element between the two processes do not include the movements1 feelings1 and visible changes in the circulatory fluid from which our image of animal respiration is chiefly drawn2 and we could hardly frame a pictorial idea that would duly insist on the chemical and organic conditions on which the common element of the process depends4 ,in a case of this kind the word is the symbol which enables us to hold together in a coherent system1 though not in a single image1 the relations which make up the content of our thought4 8,words0 may be of many different kinds--spoken1 written1 indicated by deaf and dumb signs2 all of these are derived from the word as it is in speech1 although writing and printing become practically independent of sound1 and we read1 like the deaf and dumb alphabet1 directly by the eye4 ,then there may be any kind of conventional signals either for letters1 words1 or sentences1 and any kind of cipher or memoria technica either for private or for general use--in these the 8conventional0 nature of language reaches its climax1 and the relation to a natural growth of speech has disappeared4 ,and finally there are all forms of picture-writing1 which need not1 so far as its intrinsic nature goes1 have any connection with speech at all1 and which seems to form a direct transition between picture-thinking and thinking through the written sign4 ,all these must be considered under the head of language1 as a fixed system or signs for meanings1 before we can ultimately pronounce that we think without words4 ,every ,judgment1 however1 can be expressed in words1 #hb though not every ,judgment need be so expressed or can readily be so4 ,proposition and sentence4 #b4 ,a ,judgment expressed in words is a ,proposition1 which is one kind of sentence4 ,a command question or wish is a sentence but not a proposition4 ,a detached relative clause #a is not even a complete sentence4 ,the meaning of the imperative and the question seems to include some act of will2 the meaning of a proposition is always given out simply for fact or truth4 ,we need not consider any sentence that has no meaning at all4 #a ,see above1 ,lect4 ,,iv4 ,difference between ,proposition and ,judgment #c4 ,almost all ,english logicians speak of the ,proposition and not of the ,judgment4 #a ,this does not matter1 so long as we are agreed about what they mean4 ,they must mean the proposition as understood1 and this is what we call the judgment4 #a ,so ,mill1 ,venn1 ,jevons1 ,bain 7see his note1 p4 #hj74 ,in order to make this distinction clear1 let us consider the proposition as it reaches us from without1 that is to say1 either as spoken or as written4 ,the words1 the parts of such a proposition1 as we hear or read them1 are separate and successive either in time alone1 or in time and space4 ,further1 the mere sounds or signs can be mastered apart from the meaning4 ,you can repeat them or copy them without understanding them in the least1 as e4g4 in the case of a proposition in an unknown language4 ,so far1 the proposition has not become a judgment1 and ,i do not suppose that any logician would admit that it deserved the name even of a proposition4 ,but if not1 then we must not confuse the attributes which it has before it becomes a proposition with those which it has after4 #hc ,further1 in understanding a proposition1 or in construing a sentence into a proposition 7if the sentence only becomes a proposition when understood71 there are many degrees4 ,i read upon a postcard1 8,a meeting will be held on ,saturday next by the ,women's ,liberal ,association1 to discuss the taxation of ground-rents40 ,the meaning of such a sentence takes time to grasp1 and if the words are read aloud to us1 must of necessity be apprehended by degrees4 ,we understand very quickly that a meeting is to be held next ,saturday4 ,this understanding is already a judgment4 ,it is something quite different from merely repeating the words which we read4 ,it consists in realising them as meanings1 and bringing these meanings together into a connected idea1 and affirming this idea to belong to our real world4 ,the meanings are not separate1 outside one another1 as the words are when we first hear or read them4 ,they enter into each other1 modify each other1 and become parts of an ideal whole4 ,this gradual apprehension of a sentence recalls to one the boyish amusement of melting down bits of lead in a ladle4 ,at first the pieces all lie about1 rigid and out of contact2 but as they begin to be fused a fluid system is formed in which they give up their rigidity and independence1 and enter into the closest possible contact1 so that their movements and position determine each other4 ,but still some parts1 like words not yet grasped1 remain hard and separate1 and it is only when the melting is complete that this isolation is destroyed1 and there are no longer detached fragments1 but a fluid body such that all its parts are in the closest connection with one another4 ,thus then in understanding a sentence we have a judgment #hd from the first4 ,the rest of the process of understanding consists in completing the content of this judgment by fusing with it the meanings of the words not yet apprehended2 and in the completeness with which this is effected there will always be great differences of degree between different minds1 and also between the same mind at different times4 ,some of us attach a complete and distinct meaning to the words 8,women's ,liberal ,association02 some of us do not know1 or have forgotten1 exactly what it is1 and what are its aims and history4 ,all of us have some conception of the purpose described as 8taxation of ground rents10 but the phrase conveys a perfectly definite scheme hardly to one in a thousand readers4 ,nevertheless1 in so far as we have some symbolic idea which refers to this place or context in the world of objects1 the content of this idea enters into and modifies the total meaning which in apprehending the sentence before us we affirm of reality4 ,the heard or written proposition 7or sentence1 if it is not a proposition till understood7 serves as an instrument by which we build up in our intellectual world a sort of plan or scheme of connected meanings1 and also1 not subsequently but concurrently with this work of building1 affirm the whole content thus being put together to be true of reality4 ,then we have what ,i call a ,judgment4 ,it is not that the words are necessarily forgotten2 they1 or at least the principal significant terms1 are probably still in the mind as guides and symbols2 but yet a constructive work has been done2 a complex experience has been called up and analysed1 and its parts fitted together in a certain definite order by the operation of universal ideas or meanings1 each of which is a system playing #he into other systems2 and the whole thus realised has been added as an extension to the significance of the continuous judgment which forms our waking consciousness4 ,the inconvenience of the term 8proposition0 is that it tends to confuse the heard or written sentence in its separate words with the proposition as apprehended and intellectually affirmed4 ,and these two things have quite different characteristics4 ,parts of ,speech #d4 ,thus we must be very careful how we apply the conception of 8parts of speech40 ,the grammatical analysis which classifies words as substantives1 adjectives1 adverbs1 verbs1 and the like1 is not to be taken as telling us what words are by themselves1 but just the opposite1 viz4 what they do when employed in a significant sentence4 ,they are studied separately for convenience in attending to them1 as we may study the wheels and pistons of an engine2 but the work which gives them their names can only be done when they are together4 ,this truth is often expressed by saying that 8the sentence is the unit of language10 i4e4 a word taken by itself cannot have a complete meaning--unless it is a verb1 or used with verbal force1 for a verb is an unanalysed sentence4 ,if any one uses a substantive or adverb by itself1 we think that he has not finished his sentence1 and no meaning is conveyed to our minds4 ,we ask him1 8,well1 what about it80 ,the same is true1 as we saw1 of a relative clause4 ,if we read in a newspaper such a clause as this1 8,the epidemic of influenza1 which has appeared in ,england for three successive seasons10 followed by a full stop1 we should infer1 without hesitation1 that some words had dropped out by accident4 ,of course such a #hf combination of words would make us think something1 but the meaning which we might ascribe to it would be conjectural2 we should necessarily complete the thought for ourselves by some affirmation--some relation to reality--while recognising that no such relation was given in the clause as we read it4 ,nothing less than a sentence1 or1 omitting the wish and the command1 nothing less than a proposition1 conveys a meaning in which the mind can acquiesce as not requiring to be supplemented conjecturally4 ,there are traces in language that indicate the sentence to have been historically prior to the word4 ,i question whether the word could be certainly distinguished within the sentence in early languages that have not been reduced to writing4 ,the tendency of reflective analysis1 as in grammar and dictionaries1 is to give it a more and more1 artificial isolation4 ,the ,greeks did not separate their words in writing1 and they wrote down the change in a terminal consonant produced by the initial letter of the next word1 just as if it was within a compound word4 ,nor had they really any current term co-extensive with our 8word40 ,where we should say 8the word #8horse'0 they most commonly use the neuter article 8the0 followed by the word in question as if in quotation-marks 70the #8horse'874 ,in defining noun and verb1 ,aristotle has no simple class name like 0word8 to employ as a common element of the definition1 but uses the curious description 0a portion of discourse1 of which no part has a meaning by itself48 ,of course1 single words often stand as signs for propositions4 ,it is interesting to note the pregnant meaning of a single word in the mouth of a child4 ,thus 8stool0 was #hg used to mean 87#a7 ,where is my stool8 7#b7 ,my stool is broken2 7#c7 ,lift me on to the stool2 7#d7 ,here is a stool40 #a ,there is in this an interesting conflict of form and meaning1 owing to the child of ,european race having at command only 8parts of speech40 ,in a less analytical language he might have at command a sound corresponding to a sentence rather than to a 8noun substantive40 #a ,preyer1 quoted in ,hffding1 ,psych41 #agf4 ,the verb of inflected languages1 #a such as ,greek or ,latin1 in which the 8nominative case0 need not be supplied even by a pronoun1 is the type for us of a sentence not yet broken up4 #a ,in ,german and ,english1 though the verb is inflected1 custom forbids it to stand without the pronoun4 ,the bearing of this truth on ,logic is to make us treat it in two parts and not in three4 ,we do not treat of ,name1 ,proposition1 ,syllogism1 or of ,concept1 ,judgment1 ,inference1 but only of the two latter parts4 ,the name or concept has no reality in living language or living thought1 except when referred to its place in a proposition or judgment4 ,we ought not to think of propositions as built up by putting words or names together1 but of words or names as distinguished though not separable elements in propositions4 ,aristotle takes the simple and straightforward view4 8,a term is the element into which a proposition is broken up1 such as subject and predicate40 #a ,of course different languages separate the parts of the proposition very differently1 #hh and uneducated people hardly separate them at all4 ,formal ,logic breaks down the grammatical meaning of 8name10 so far as to treat as a 8logical name0 any complex words that can stand as ,subject or ,predicate in a ,proposition 7e4g4 a relative clause74 #a ,anal4 prior41 #bd;b1 #af4 ,the opposite view seems to be expressed in the beginning of the peri ,hermeneias1 de ,interpretatione1 that the separate word corresponds to the separate idea4 ,i have attempted to explain this as an illusion1 p4 #gc1 above4 ,denotation and ,connotation #e4 ,the doctrine of the meaning of names has suffered from their relation to propositions not being borne in mind4 ,mill's discussion #a is very sensible1 but1 as always1 very careless of strict system4 ,more especially it seems a pity to state the question as if it concerned a division of names into ,connotative and ,non-connotative2 because in this way we from the first let go of the idea that the meaning of a name has necessarily two aspects1 #b and we almost bind ourselves to make out that there are some non-connotative names4 ,it is better to consider this latter subject on its merits4 ,mill says that an ordinary significant name such as 8man0 8signifies the subjects directly1 the attributes indirectly2 it denotes the subjects1 and implies or involves or indicates1 or1 as we shall say henceforth1 connotes1 the attributes40 ,in short1 the denotation of a name consists of the things to which it applies1 the connotation consists of the properties which it implies4 ,the denotation is made up of individuals and the connotation of attributes4 ,denotation is also called ,extension1 especially if we are speaking of ,concepts rather than of names4 ,connotation is then called ,intension4 ,in the ,german writers it is more usual to say that the ,extension or ,area 7,umfang7 consists not of the individuals1 but of the species that are contained in #hi the meaning of a general name4 ,they oppose it to ,content 7,inhalt7 corresponding to our 8,connotation40 ,thus the 8,area0 of 8rose0 would not be the individual roses in the world1 but rather all the species of rose in the world 7,rosa ,canina1 ,rosa ,rubiginosa1 etc474 ,this raises a difficulty as to the denotation of a specific name1 but perhaps represents the actual process of thought1 in the case of a generic name1 better than that which ,mill adopts4 ,the difference is not important4 #a ,logic1 ,bk4 ,i4 c4 ii4 #e4 ,cf4 ,venn1 #agd and #ahc1 and ,bain1 #dh4 #b ,see ,bradley1 p4 #aee4 ,well1 then1 according to ,mill1 when we say1 8,the ,marshal ,niel is a yellow rose10 we refer directly to a group of real or possible objects1 and we mean that all these individual objects are yellow roses4 ,the attributes are only mentioned by the way1 or implied4 ,so ,dr4 ,venn says that the denotation is real1 and the connotation is notional4 ,but there is another side to this question4 ,the objects may be what you mean but the attributes seem to be the meaning1 for how can you 7especially on ,mill's theory of the proposition7 refer to any objects except through these attributes1 unless indeed you can point to them with your finger8 ,and so again it seems1 especially if we consider ,mill's account of predication1 as if the ,connotation were the primary meaning and the ,denotation the secondary meaning4 ,the ,connotation determines the ,denotation2 and if we 8define0 the meaning of the name it is the ,connotation that we state4 ,and so ,mill tells us two or three pages further on1 that whenever the names given to objects have properly any meaning1 the meaning resides not in what they denote1 but in what they connote4 ,in short1 #ij the denotation of a general name is simply the meaning of its plural1 or of its singular1 in that sense in which it implies a plural1 while the connotation is the meaning per se1 not considered in its instances4 ,it is clear then that every name has these two kinds of meaning--first1 a content1 and then instances1 whether possible or actual1 of the content2 and the two are obviously inseparable1 although they are distinguishable4 ,ultimately1 indeed1 the denotation itself is an attribute1 and so part of the connotation4 ,it is one of the attributes of man to be a unit in the plurality men1 i4e4 to be 8a man40 ,it may be said that some names have no plural4 ,if so1 these would be non-denotative rather than non-connotative1 but in fact this is not true4 ,the content of a significant name can always1 unless hindered by a special convention 7see below on proper names71 be prima facie regarded1 in respect of its actual embodiment1 as a unit against other possible units4 ,granting that there may be an object1 which according to our knowledge can only be real as an isolated case1 the very consideration of it as such a case is enough to distinguish its existence1 whether real or possible1 from its content4 ,thus1 as a real or possible existence1 the object is ipso facto considered in the light of a particular1 and as capable of entering into a plurality4 ,but its nature or content1 the meaning of its name1 cannot enter into a plurality4 ,two meanings1 two connotations1 are alternative and irreconcilable4 ,denotation and connotation are thus simply the particular1 or particulars1 which embody or are thought of as embodying a content1 and the single or universal content itself4 #ia ,have ,proper ,names ,connotation8 #f4 ,therefore ,i think that ,mill is wrong1 when he goes on1 8,the only names of objects which connote nothing are ,proper ,names1 and these have1 strictly speaking1 no signification40 #a ,if the name has no signification1 for what reason1 or by what means1 is it attached to a person or a place8 ,you may say that it is only a conventional mark4 ,but a mark which has power to select from all objects in the world1 and bring to our minds1 a particular absent object1 is surely a significant mark4 ,granted that it is conventional1 yet by what mechanism1 and for what purpose1 does the convention operate8 #a ,cf4 ,venn1 #ahc ff1 and ,bradley1 #aef4 ,mill's point1 however1 is quite clear4 ,to be told the name of a person or object does not inform us of his or its attributes4 ,directly1 it only warns us by what sign the same person or object will be recognisable in language again4 #a ,if a name is changed1 the new name tells us nothing different from the old1 #b whereas if an object that was called vegetable is now called animal1 our conception of it is radically transformed4 ,a name expresses the continued identity of an object1 and this implies only a historical continuity of attributes and relations1 and no constant attribute whatever4 #a ,we cannot make it a distinctive mark of proper names that they recur in different and quite disconnected meanings1 because the words which are used as general names have this same property4 ,nor can we say that a proper name is not used in the same sense of more than one object4 ,family names and national names make this plainly untrue4 ,through these1 and names typically employed1 there is a clear gradation from proper to general names4 #b ,the case of marriage may be urged4 ,but a lady's change of name does not by itself indicate marriage4 ,it is a mere fact1 which may have various explanations4 ,the change of title 7from 8,miss0 to 8,mrs407 is more significant1 but it is not a change of name4 #ib ,thus a proper name is a contradiction in terms4 #a ,a name should have a meaning4 ,but a meaning cannot be proper--that is1 particular4 ,the name-word is therefore like a demonstrative pronoun1 if this were attached1 by a special convention1 to one identifiable object only4 ,it acquires meaning1 but its meaning is an ever-growing contradiction with its usage4 ,the meaning is necessarily general1 the usage is ex hypothesi particular4 #a ,so1 from the complementary point of view1 is a general name4 ,a name1 it may be urged1 is meant to designate a particular thing or things4 ,and this a name with a true 8meaning0 cannot do4 ,this convention of usage1 which prevents a proper name from becoming general1 i4e4 from being cut loose and used simply for its meaning1 is always on the point of breaking down4 #a ,christian names usually indicate sex2 family names1 though now with little certainty1 descent and relationship4 ,there are germs of a general meaning within the several usages of names2 while a ,solon1 a ,croesus1 a ,christian1 a ,mahometan1 have become purely general names cut loose from all unique reference4 ,still in a proper name1 as such1 we have no right to build on any general meaning4 ,recognition is its only purpose2 and the law permits1 it has been said1 that a man should have one name for ,mondays1 ,wednesdays1 and ,fridays1 and another for ,tuesdays1 ,thursdays1 and ,saturdays4 ,the essence of a name is a reference to unique identity2 it employs meaning only to establish identity4 #a ,see note on last page4 ,what kinds of things have proper names given1 then8 ,always things individually known to the people who give #ic the name1 and interesting to them for some reason beyond generic or specific qualities4 ,pet animals have names1 when other animals of the same kind have not4 ,the peasants throughout ,england use names1 it is said1 for all the fields1 although strangers are not usually acquainted with them4 ,a ,proper ,name1 then1 has a connotation1 but not a fixed general connotation4 ,it is attached to a unique individual1 and connotes whatever may be involved in his identity1 or is instrumental in bringing it before the mind4 ,when we think of history1 the importance of proper names becomes very great4 ,this is the characteristic logical difference between history and science4 8,england0 and 8,france0 are proper names1 names of individual existences in contact with our world of perception1 not scientific abstractions4 ,even the words1 8#ahib ,a4,d410 are partly of the nature of a proper name4 ,they say nothing merely general or abstract about this year2 they assign the year a name by counting forwards from a unique point in the series of years1 itself designated by the name of a historical personage4 ,everything that is simply distinguished by its place in the series of events in space and time is in some degree a proper name4 ,thus we could not identify the ,french ,revolution by mere scientific definition4 ,it is known by its proper name1 as a unique event1 in a particular place and time4 ,when thus identified it may have all kinds of general ideas attached to it4 ,it would be hard to show that 8,our earth10 8,our solar system0 are not proper names1 in virtue of their uniqueness4 #id ,inverse ratio of ,connotation and ,denotation #g4 ,it has sometimes been said that ,connotation is in inverse ratio #a to ,denotation4 ,mill explains the fact upon which any such idea rests4 #b ,if we arrange things in classes1 such that the one class includes the other--e4g4 ,species 8,buttercup10 ,genus 8,ranunculus10 ,order 8,ranunculaceae10--of course the genus will contain many species besides the one mentioned1 and the order many genera besides the one mentioned4 ,the object of the arrangement is that they should do so1 and thus bring out the graduated natural affinities which prevail in the world4 ,thus the denotation of the genus-name is larger than that #c of the species1 and the denotation of the order-name is larger than that of the genus-name4 #a ,see ,venn1 p4 #agd1 for reference to ,hamilton4 ,venn points out the fallacy4 #b ,logic1 ,bk4 ,i4 ch4 vii4 #e4 #c ,or 8than the species10 if we take the denotation as made up of species4 ,but further1 in such an arrangement the genus can contain only the attributes which are common to all the species1 and the order can contain only the attributes which are common to all the genera2 so the genus-name implies fewer attributes 7less connotation7 than any one species-name under it1 and the order-name implies fewer attributes 7less connotation7 than any one genus-name under it4 ,that is the fact which suggests the conception of ,denotation and ,connotation as varying inversely4 ,but in any case it would not be right to speak thus mathematically of an inverse ratio1 because there is no meaning in a numerical comparison of attributes and #ie individuals1 and the addition of one attribute will exclude sometimes more and sometimes fewer individuals4 #a #a ,see ,jevons1 p4 #dj4 ,and there are more important objections to the whole idea of a corresponding gradation in these two kinds of meaning4 ,the idea of abstraction thus implied is altogether wrong4 ,the meaning of a genus-name does not omit the properties in which the species differ4 ,if it did1 it would omit nearly all properties4 ,what happens is that the genus-idea represents the general plan on which the species are built1 but provides for each of the parts that constitute the whole1 varying in the specific cases within certain limits4 ,thus in the ,ranunculaceae some species have no petals4 ,but we do not omit the character 8petals0 from the genus-idea4 ,we state the general plan so far as this element is concerned as 8,petals five or more2 rarely none40 ,this is read by a botanist to mean that in some groups the petals tend to be aborted1 and sometimes are actually missing4 ,in a symbolic representation of the genus-idea such a property may stand as ,a1 and its various specific forms as ,a#a1 ,a#b1 ,a#c1 etc4 ,there is nothing to prevent these specific phases approaching and sometimes reaching zero4 ,no doubt if the classification is pursued in the direction of 8universals0 containing fewer and fewer properties1 it is possible to arrive at concepts which appear to have a larger denotation and a smaller connotation than those 8below0 them4 8,ranunculaceae10 8,dicotyledons10 8,plants10 8,organisms40 ,but this is only because we choose to form our system by that process of abstraction which consists in leaving out properties4 ,e4g4 comparing ,frenchmen with men in general1 #if we assume that 8,frenchman0 indicates 7a7 all the qualities of humanity as such1 and 7b7 the qualities of ,french humanity in addition to these4 ,but is this so in fact8 ,humanity1 considered as a wider1 and therefore as a deeper1 idea1 may have more content1 as well as more area1 than ,frenchmanity4 ,we do not really1 in thinking of humanity1 omit from our schematic thought all references to qualities of ,greek1 ,jew1 ,english1 and ,german1 and their bearing and interaction upon one another4 ,it is only that we have been drilled to assume a certain neatness in the pyramidal arrangement by which we vainly try to reduce the meaning of a great idea to something that has no system and no inter-relation of parts1 but approaches as near as possible in fixity to the character of a definite image1 though far removed from such a character in the impossibility of bringing it before the mind4 ,so we can only say1 8the greater the denotation the less the connotation10 and 8vice vers01 in as far as we arrange ideas by progressive abstraction in the sense of progressive omission4 ,but it is not the only way of regarding them4 ,things may develop new inter-relations as their number increases4 ,has the community1 as ,mr4 ,bradley asks1 less meaning than the individual person8 ,but we must not consider the community1 would be the answer2 we must simply consider the relation of an idea of one individual to any idea that applies to many individuals4 ,this is simply to rule out those relations that arise within progressively larger wholes4 ,we can do so1 if we think the exclusion necessary in the interests of logical purity1 but it is only by doing so that we can maintain the traditional view of connotation and denotation4 ,it is worth while to think out the #ig matter for ourselves in relation to such familiar ideas as those of man and animal4 ,it is plain that the idea of 8animal0 cannot omit all reference to intelligence1 but must in some way allow for the different phases of this property which run throughout the animal kingdom1 and only find a climax in man4 ,and it is plain also1 that even if intelligence were wholly omitted1 this would not leave behind1 as in a simple stratification1 properties in which the whole animal kingdom was the same4 ,man's animality is modified throughout in a way corresponding to his rationality1 so that no general idea could be framed including him and other animals1 simply by collecting properties which are the same and omitting those which are different4 ,the idea of 8man0 really becomes richer when considered in the light of a comparison #a with the rest of the animal world4 ,our great systems of natural classification1 representing affinities graduated by descent1 are what give the view which we have criticised a certain objective importance4 ,but they do not establish it as an exclusive logical doctrine4 #a ,if we insist on throwing the whole of this comparison1 in explicit shape1 into the complete idea of man1 then the progress to the idea 8animal0 can add nothing2 even so1 however1 it loses nothing1 but simply becomes the same set of relations1 looked at1 so to speak1 from the other end4 #ih ,,lecture ,,vi ,,parts ,,of ,,the ,,judgment1 ,,and ,,its ,,unity ,parts of the ,judgment #a4 ,the result of taking the ,judgment as one with the ,proposition has been to assume that its parts were the same as those of the ,proposition2 #a and moreover the same as those of the ,proposition in a very artificial form1 viz4 as analysed into three separable elements1 8,subject10 8,predicate10 8,copula10 commonly represented in the examples of the text-books by ,substantive1 ,adjective or ,substantive1 and the ,verb 8is40 #a ,this assumption involves 7see ,lecture ,v47 a confusion between the ,proposition as thoroughly understood1 and the ,proposition as a series of partially significant sounds or signs4 ,for obvious reasons1 this confusion is very readily made4 ,for the operation of ,formal ,logic it is almost necessary to have these parts1 because it is requisite to transpose the terms 7as in ,conversion7 without changing their meaning1 #a and to get rid of tenses1 which do not belong to ,scientific ,judgment1 and are very troublesome in ,formal ,inference4 #a ,if the 8predicate0 is a ,substantive1 this presents no difficulty2 and if it is an ,adjective1 it can be done by a little straining of grammar1 or the insertion of 8thing0 or 8things40 ,with a verb it is more clumsy4 ,thus in ,formal ,logic we prefer the shape of sentence 8,gold is lustrous0 to 8,gold glitters10 and 8,the bridge is #ii cracked0 to 8,there is a crack in the bridge40 ,and practically all propositions can be thrown into this shape1 which is convenient for comparing them4 ,the educational value of elementary formal logic consists chiefly1 ,i am convinced1 in the exercise of paraphrasing poetical or rhetorical assertions into this typical shape1 with the least possible sacrifice of meaning4 ,the commonest mistakes in the work of beginners1 within my experience as a teacher1 consist in failures to interpret rightly the sentence given for analysis4 ,but this type is not really ultimate4 ,the judgment can be conveyed without a grammatical subject1 and without the verb 8is0--indeed without any grammatical verb at all4 ,on the whole this agrees with ,mill's view in the chapter 8,of ,propositions40 #a ,he points out 7 #a7 that we really need nothing but the ,subject and ,predicate1 and that the copula is a mere sign of their connection as ,subject and ,predicate4 ,he does not1 however1 discuss the case in which the grammatical ,subject is absent4 #a ,mill's ,logic1 ,bk4 ,i4 ch4 iv4 ,copula #b4 ,in analysing the ,judgment as an act of thought we may begin by dismissing the separate ,copula4 ,it has no separate existence in thought corresponding to its separate place in the typical proposition of ,formal ,logic4 ,it has come to be considered separately1 because the abstract verb 8is0 is used in our languages as a sign of the complete enunciation4 ,but there is not in the ,judgment any separate significant idea--any third idea--coming in between the ,subject and ,predicate of ,judgment4 ,we should try to think of the ,copula not as a link1 separable and always #ajj intrinsically the same1 #a connecting two distinct things4 ,we should think of it rather as the grip with which the parts of a single complex whole cohere with one another1 differing according to the nature of the whole and the inter-dependence of its parts4 ,benno ,erdmann #b has strikingly expressed this point of view by saying1 that in the ,judgment1 8,the dead ride fast10 the ,subject is 8the dead10 the ,predicate 8fast riding10 and the ,copula 8the fast riding of the dead40 ,in other words1 the ,copula is simply the ,judgment considered exclusively as a cohesion between parts of a complex idea1 the individual connection between which can only be indicated by supplying the idea of those parts themselves4 #a ,in a comic ,logic1 with pictures1 meant to stimulate dull minds at a ,university1 ,i have seen the ,copula represented as the coupling-link between two railway carriages4 ,this is an excellent type of the way in which we should not think of it4 #b ,logik1 p4 #ahi4 ,are ,subject and ,predicate necessary8 #c4 ,the explicit ,predicate is more necessary than the explicit ,subject4 ,we have spoken of ,judgments expressed by one word1 8,fire60 8,thieves60 etc41 and also of impersonal ,propositions1 8,it is raining10 8,it is thawing40 ,these two classes of ,judgments show hardly any explicit ,subject at all4 ,but we could not assert anything without a ,predicate--that would be to assert without asserting anything in particular4 ,as these ,judgments have1 roughly speaking1 a ,predicate and no ,subject1 ,i do not think it convenient to call them1 with ,dr4 ,venn1 existential judgments4 ,it is true that they refer to reality1 but their peculiarity is in not referring to a distinct subject4 ,and when used for definite and complex assertions they become very artificial1 e4g4 8,there is a #aja ,british ,constitution by which our liberties are guaranteed40 ,instead of organising the content of the ,judgment1 such a form of assertion simply tosses the whole of it into the ,predicate in a single mass4 ,the question is only one of words2 but it appears to me more convenient to reserve the term ,existential judgments for those highly artificial assertions which actually employ the ,predicate 8exist0 or 8existence10 e4g4 8,matter exists40 ,these are at the opposite end of the scale from those last-mentioned1 and are the nearest approach to ,judgment with ,subject and no ,predicate4 ,that is to say1 their ,predicate is the generalised abstract form of predication #a without any special content--the kind and degree of existence asserted being understood from the context4 #a ,expressed in ,greek by the word corresponding to 8is10 used with an accent1 which does not belong to it in its ordinary use4 ,he is good agathos esti2 ,he exists esti ,tr44 ,except1 however1 in the case of these peculiarly abstract and reflective assertions1 it must be laid down that a predicated content is necessary to judgment1 while an explicit subject of predication is unnecessary4 ,two ,ideas of ,things #d4 ,if it is possible1 in some cases1 to throw the whole content of judgment into the predicate1 this rather disposes us to criticise the notion that there must be two distinct matters1 objects1 ideas1 or contents1 in every judgment4 ,the notion in question has two forms4 ,it is thought that the ,judgment consists in putting two ideas together1 #a or1 #ajb ,that the ,judgment consists in comparing two or more things4 #b #a ,for this conception1 see ,hamilton's ,lectures on ,logic1 i4 #bbg1 and for a criticism on it4 ,mill's ,logic1 ,bk4 ,i4 ch4 v41 init1 ,dr4 ,venn seems to incline to ,hamilton's view1 but ,i do not feel sure that he intends to discuss the question in the form in which it is referred to in the text4 ,see his ,empirical ,logic1 pp4 #baj and #baa4 #b ,see ,jevons1 pp4 #fa-b2 and ,mill1 ,bk4 ,i4 ch4 iii41 init42 and ch4 iv41 init4 ,two ,ideas 7a7 ,the notion of 8two ideas0 has two principal difficulties4 ,notion of mental transition pure and simple 7i47 ,in its simplest shape the notion of 8two ideas0 involves the great blunder which ,i explained in ,lecture ,,iv4 ,it suggests that the parts of ,judgment are separate and successive psychical states1 and that the ,judgment consists in a change from the one to the other4 ,herbert ,spencer1 as ,i understand him1 considers every relation to be apprehended as a mental change or passage from one idea to another4 ,this view would degrade logical connection into mere psychical transition4 ,i do not say that there is no psychical transition in ,judgment4 ,i do say that psychical transition is not enough to make a ,judgment4 ,the parts of ,judgment1 as we saw in the last lecture1 do not succeed one another separately like the parts of a sentence4 ,the relation between ,subject and ,predicate is not a relation between mental states1 but is itself the content of a single though continuous mental state4 ,mill has rightly touched on this point4 8,when ,i say that fire causes heat1 do ,i mean that my idea of fire causes my idea of heat80 #a and so on4 ,the fact is that 8,fire-causing-heat0 is itself the single content or meaning represented in my symbolic idea2 it is not a succession of psychical states in my mind1 or a passage from the idea of fire to the idea of causing heat4 #a ,logic1 ,bk4 ,i4 ch4 ,v4 ,i4 #ajc ,absence of assertion 7ii47 ,but further1 understanding now that the ,judgment is composed of a single ideal content1 and is not a transition from one mental state to another1 there is still a difficulty in the conception that its component elements are nothing but ideas4 ,if the ,subject in ,judgment is no more than an ideal content1 how1 by what means1 does the ,judgment claim to be true of ,reality8 8,the ,subject cannot belong to the content or fall within it1 for in that case it would be the idea attributed to itself40 #a ,if the ,subject were only a part of an ideal content it would not claim to be true of ,reality1 and where it appears to be only an ideal content there is much dispute in what sense the ,judgment does claim to be true of ,reality4 8,violations of a law of nature are impossible40 8,the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles40 8,all trespassers will be prosecuted40 ,in these ,judgments we should find it hard to make out that the ,subjects are real things corresponding to our ideas4 ,and yet1 if they are not1 how can the ,judgment attach itself to ,reality8 ,this is the difficult question of the distinction between the categorical and the hypothetical ,judgment1 and we shall have to return to it4 ,in the meantime1 we must adhere to our judgment of perception as the true underlying type4 ,the ,subject is here not an idea1 but is the given reality1 this or that1 and the ,judgment is not a conjunction of two ideas1 but is present reality qualified by an idea4 ,we say1 8,it is very hot10 meaning that heat1 the general quality embodied for us in an ideal content1 is true of--forms one tissue with--the surroundings which here and now press upon our attention4 ,or again1 8,this is red10 #ajd i4e4 the content of the idea red is what my attention selects and emphasises within the mass of detail presented to it in its own unique focus which the pronoun 8this0 simply points out as though with the finger4 ,we shall find such a structure underlying all the more artificial forms of ,judgment4 #a ,bradley's ,principles of ,logic1 p4 #ad4 ,two ,things 7b7 ,thus it would seem that ,jevons and ,mill are much nearer the real point when they say that the proposition has to do with two ,things1 or with a ,thing and a group of ,things4 ,but we must notice in passing that ,mill1 #a after fighting hard against calling them ,ideas1 takes our breath away by saying that they are states of consciousness4 ,there is1 of course1 a difficulty1 which ,i will not try to deal with now1 in the fact that however much we refer to things1 we have nothing to work with intellectually but our ideas of them1 and in some types of ,judgment the reference to real things is difficult to trace4 ,mill further emphasises this by showing1 that what we assert in ordinary general ,judgment is co-existence of attributes4 #b 8,now when we say1 ,man is mortal1 we mean that wherever these various mental and physical phenomena 7the attributes of man7 are all found1 then we have assurance that the other physical and mental phenomenon called death1 will not fail to take place40 ,that is1 no doubt1 a very indirect way of referring to the real things which we call men4 ,moreover1 he treats all conclusions in geometry and mechanics as hypothetical4 #c ,all this we shall have to return to1 in order to reconcile it with our doctrine2 which is apparently coincident with #aje ,mill's view in the place first alluded to1 that the subject in ,judgment is always reality4 #a ,logic1 ,bk4 ,i4 ch4 ,v4 #e4 #b ,ibid41 #d4 #c ,ibid41 ,bk4 ,,ii4 ch4 vi4 #c1 #d4 ,but our point at present is only the duality ascribed to the ,judgment by saying that it essentially deals with two things or groups of things4 ,jevons even says #a that every ,judgment is a comparison of two things--though these 8things0 are really1 it would seem1 groups of things4 #b ,we thus have it impressed upon our minds that there is one 8thing0 corresponding to the ,subject-word 7or clause7 of the ,propositional sentence1 and another 8thing0 corresponding to the ,predicate-word 7or clause71 and that these are somehow separate1 like two railway carriages1 till we bring them together by the coupling-link of the copula4 ,this is a very inconvenient way of looking at the matter4 ,it is not true that all ,judgment is comparison1 in the proper and usual sense of the word4 ,it is not true that ,judgment involves two things2 two or more things may be mentioned in a ,judgment1 but they cannot correspond respectively to the ,subject and ,predicate4 ,it is a real ,comparison if you say1 8,a4,b4 is taller than ,c4,d410 but ,c4,d4 is here not a term in the ,judgment4 ,the one person1 ,a4,b41 is qualified by the ideal content 8taller than ,c4,d410 and the idea of ,a4,b4 so qualified is referred to1 or discriminated within1 perceptive reality4 ,comparison is a rather complex process1 and consists in a cross-reference by which each of two objects is judged according to a standard furnished by the other2 but this complex process is not necessary to all ,judgment1 and cannot be expressed with complete convenience in a single ,judgment4 ,and in #ajf any case the two objects that enter into the comparison do not correspond to two essential parts of ,judgment4 #a ,elementary ,lessons in ,logic1 p4 #fa4 #b ,ibid4 p4 #fb4 ,it is far more simple and true to say that ,judgment is always the analysis and synthesis of elements in some one thing or ideal content4 8,gold is yellow0 has not within it1 as ,jevons says it has1 #a any direct comparison of gold with other yellow substances4 ,it simply drags to light the property 8yellow0 as distinct within the complex of attributes belonging to gold1 while at the same time insisting that this property--this meaning of an idea--belongs to1 is of one piece with1 perceived reality in so far as gold is given in such reality4 ,the ,judgment exhibits the content in its parts4 ,it breaks it up1 and pronounces it to be all of one tissue1 by one and the same indivisible act4 ,we should practically have a much fairer chance of seeing clearly what ,judgment is if we began by considering it as not two things or two terms -- but as one thing or one term drawn out into elements by discriminating selection4 ,even if the paradox that every 8,thing0 is a ,judgment neglects some necessary distinctions1 ,i am convinced that we shall understand ,judgment much more clearly if we do our best to approach it from this point of view4 ,whenever we look or listen1 and notice features and qualities in the perceptions that arrest the eye and ear1 we are rapidly and continuously judging4 8,the fire is crackling10 8,the daylight is waning10 8,that bookshelf is not full10 8,the window-curtain is twisted40 ,in none of these cases is there any separation other than an intellectual distinction between the predicated content and the perceived reality4 ,the ,judgment is simply a distinct #ajg insistence on a quality within a certain focus of reality as belonging to that reality4 ,this is the fundamental nature of ,judgment4 #a ,loc4 cit4 ,therefore1 to draw our conclusion as to the ,unity of the ,judgment1 it is not a transition from one mental state to another2 the relation of which it consists is not between ideas in it1 but is the content of the idea which forms it4 ,judgment is not primarily comparison between two things2 it is a thing or content displayed as possessing some definite relation or quality within its identity4 ,every ,judgment is the content of one idea1 but you may of course distinguish relations between ideal elements within this idea4 8,fire causes heat0 is a single content or idea1 the nature of fire1 expanded into one of its properties4 ,distinction between ,subject and ,predicate #e4 ,but then1 if the whole ,judgment is a single content1 what is the difference between ,subject and ,predicate1 and is it necessary to distinguish ,subject from ,predicate at all8 ,if some ,judgments can be made without explicit ,subjects1 cannot all be made in that way8 ,this suggestion is very useful as carrying on the simplest type of ,judgment throughout the whole theory of ,judgment4 ,by a little torture of expression any ,judgment can be thrown into a form in which undefined ,reality is the general subject1 and the whole mass of the ,judgment is the ,predicate4 8,william ,pitt was a great statesman0 8,there was a great statesman named ,william ,pitt02 8,the three angles of every triangle are equal to two right angles0 8,there are figures known as triangles with their three angles equal to two right angles02 8,all citizens are members of a moral order0 8,there is a moral order1 including the #ajh relations of citizenship02 8,all trespassers will be prosecuted0 8,here are conditions which ensure the prosecution of possible trespassers40 ,or you might always put a subject1 8,reality is such that0--8,reality is characterised by40 ,thus we see that1 as we have said before1 in every ,judgment the ultimate subject is ,reality1 the world in contact with us as we have already qualified it by previous ,judgment4 ,it is a less mistake to reject the ,subject and ,predicate in the ,judgment altogether1 than to think that they are separate things or ideas1 and that in judging you pass or change from one to the other4 ,always bear in mind that it is possible to mass the whole ,judgment as a single ,predicate directly or indirectly true of ,reality4 ,having said this much1 to make the ,unity of the ,judgment unmistakable1 we may now safely distinguish between the ,subject and ,predicate in the ,judgment4 ,and we shall find the safest clue to be that the explicit ,subject1 when there is one1 marks the place at which1 or the conditions under which1 ,reality accepts the ,predicate4 ,the natural ,subject is concrete1 and the ,predicate abstract2 the ,subject real1 and the ,predicate ideal1 but pronounced to be real4 ,the reason of this is that every ,judgment is the connection of parts in a whole1 and to be a whole is the characteristic of reality4 ,in other words1 the natural course of thought is to define further what is already in great part defined1 and our real world is that which we have so far defined4 ,the isolated judgments of the text-books make it very hard to grasp this1 because you seem to begin anywhere for no connected reason at all4 ,but if we reflect on actual thought1 #aji we find that1 as ,mr4 ,stout very cleverly says1 we are always developing a 8subject0 which is in our minds 7in the ordinary sense of a 8subject of conversation071 and this subject is some region or province of the world of reality4 ,now the explicit ,subject in ,judgment or the grammatical ,subject in ,proposition does not always set out the full nature of this1 but merely some mark or point in it which we wish to insist upon4 ,so that we may find in ,judgment almost anything serving as explicit ,subject4 ,thus1 as ,aristotle said quite plainly and sensibly1 it is natural to say 8,the horse is white10 but we may have occasion to say 8,this white is a horse02 it depends on the way in which the ,subject comes into our minds4 #a ,usually the ,subject will be what ,dr4 ,venn calls the heavier term1 i4e4 the term with more connotation4 ,when there is no difference of concreteness between parts and whole1 the ,judgment becomes reversible as in the equation #g #e #ab4 ,there is no distinction here between ,subject and ,predicate4 ,the real underlying unity or ,subject is the numerical system4 #a ,see ,prof4 ,bain1 p4 #ef1 upon the ,universe1 and ,universe of ,discourse1 i4e4 the general subject which you have in your mind4 ,therefore by recognising ,subject and ,predicate we represent the organisation of knowledge1 and the connection of inherence or consequence within the content of our knowledge4 ,if we do not recognise this distinction we throw the whole of ,judgment into an undifferentiated mass of fact1 running all assertion into the same mould1 8,it is the case that10 etc4 ,one difficulty still remains4 ,if the relation between ,subject and ,predicate is within an idea1 and not between ideas--that is1 if the whole explicit content1 ,subject and #aaj ,predicate together1 can be regarded as predicated of reality1--why is the act of predication expressed by a verb1 i4e4 a sign of activity within this content8 ,why is a verb often if not always the form of predication which connotes ,subject and ,predicate8 ,not because it is a time-word4 ,on the contrary1 we want to get rid of the tense in ,logic4 ,the time of a ,judgment ought to be determined only by the special connection between ,subject and ,predicate1 not by tense1 because tense is always subjective1 merely relative to the time of speaking1 and is accidental to the content of ,judgment4 ,action seems nearer to what we want2 the verb expresses both action and predicate4 ,but the idea of action again does not make a predication1 and the verb 8is0 does not really indicate action4 ,perhaps it is the demonstrative element in a finite verb that makes it the vehicle of predication1 i4e4 in a finite verb you have a meaning referred by a demonstrative element to something else4 ,originally the meaning was always an action2 8is0 of course meant 8breathes40 ,but now the verb has lost vitality by wear and tear1 and only refers something to something else4 ,the puzzle is that the ,judgment is not referred to us who make it1 but is expressed as if it was accomplished by something outside us4 ,that puzzle points to the essential feature which we insisted on1 viz4 its objectivity2 in predication we refer what is mentally our act to a subject that represents the real world1 not to ourselves at all4 ,when ,i say 8,gladstone comes to ,london this week10 the verb which expresses ,gladstone's action also expresses that my real world in his person accepts the qualification 8coming to ,london this week40 ,because of this objectivity of thought1 ,i attribute to #aaa the real world and not to myself the connection which is presented to my mind1 and so it takes its place as an act of the real world4 ,but ,i might throw the whole content into the ,predicate by saying1 8,the ideal content #8,gladstone coming to ,london this week' is a predication true of ,reality40 ,thus though the distinction between ,subject and ,predicate best exhibits the living structure of knowledge1 we must beware of the notion that two ideas or two things are needed for ,judgment4 #aab ,,lecture ,,vii ,,the ,,categorical ,,and ,,hypothetical ,,characters ,,in ,,judgment ,some criticism on the ordinary scheme #a #a4 ,we will first consider why we want to examine the types of ,judgment1 and then what arrangement of them best fulfils our want4 #a ,read ,mill1 ch4 iv4 7,bk4 ,i471 on ,propositions2 ,venn1 ,empirical ,logic1 ch4 ix41 x4 ,cf4 ,knowledge and ,reality pp4 #eg-h2 and ,venn1 p4 #bfd4 ,ordinary statement1 ,jevons1 p4 #fj1 ff42 cf4 p4 #afc4 ,why we need an arrangement 7a7 ,if we attended purely to the propositions in common use1 we should get an unmanageable variety of forms1 though the reality of thought would be fairly represented4 ,we cannot quite do this2 we must try to select the forms which for some reason are the most fundamental and constant4 ,on the other hand1 it is possible to think simply of what is convenient in logical combination2 and then for working with syllogistic ,logic we get the well-known scheme of four propositions1 each with ,subject and ,predicate2 and for working with symbolic ,logic we get the existential scheme in which ,subject and ,predicate disappear1 and 8,all ,s4 are ,p40 turns into 8,there exists no ,s4 which is not ,p402 or we get ,jevons' ,equational ,logic1 in which 8,all ,a is ,b0 stands as ,a ,,ab4 ,now every ,judgment has a great many aspects1 #aac being really a very complex systematic act of mind1 and a logical method can be founded on any of these aspects which is sufficiently constant to stand for the ,judgment4 ,you can take 8,all men are mortal0 to mean 8,there are no not-mortal men10 or 8,men some mortals10 or two or three more meanings4 ,the two former are artificial or formal corollaries from the natural ,judgment1 representing it for some purposes but omitting a great part of its natural meaning4 ,they tell you nothing about a relation of causality between the content of man and the property mortal1 and they destroy all implication of existence in the ,subject man4 ,what we want is neither to follow mere everyday language1 nor be guided by mere convenience of logical combination4 ,we want to look at the ,judgment on its merits with reference to its power of expressing the principal kinds of our experience1 which in fact are constructed in the medium of ,judgment4 ,the great kingdoms of intellectual experience are ,perception1 ,history1 and ,science1 and of these three1 ,science1 including ,philosophy1 is the form towards which all knowledge presses on1 and its judgment must therefore be considered as the most complete type4 ,the common scheme 7b7 ,with this purpose in mind1 let us look at the traditional scheme1 omitting the negative ,judgments of which we have not yet spoken4 ,we may dismiss the ,indefinite ,judgment 8,men are mortal0 as imperfect by not being 8quantified10 and we have left1 as ,categorical ,judgments1 the ,particular ,affirmative 8,some men are mortal10 the ,universal ,affirmative 8,all men are mortal10 and the ,singular ,affirmative 8,socrates is mortal40 ,the ,singular ,affirmative1 however1 is not treated of any further under the old scheme1 #aad because in it the ,subject is taken in its full extent1 and therefore the ,singular ,affirmative ,judgment is ranked with the ,universal ,affirmative4 ,so as ,categorical ,judgments we have left the ,particular ,affirmative and the ,universal ,affirmative4 ,outside the account of the ,categorical ,judgment we find the ,hypothetical and ,disjunctive ,judgments touched on as a sort of ,appendix1 standing as 8,conditional40 ,the historical reason of this is1 that they were not recognised by ,aristotle1 and have never been incorporated in the diagram of judgments employed in traditional ,logic4 ,then on the ordinary scheme we have-- ,categorical4 ,conditional4 ,particular ,universal ,hypothetical ,disjunctive ,judgments4 ,judgments1 ,judgments4 including ,singular ,judgments4 ,the defects of this scheme from our point of view are-- 7i47 ,our ,impersonal and ,demonstrative ,judgments are omitted4 ,they might be classed under the particular1 which also has an undefined element in the subject4 7ii47 ,the ,singular ,judgment 7of which the chief instance is the judgment with proper name7 is rightly classed as ,universal1 but yet is wrongly absorbed in the abstract universal1 from which it ought to be distinguished4 7iii47 ,in the treatment of the ,universal ,judgment there are two defects-- 7#a7 ,the ,collective ,judgment1 resulting from enumeration1 #aae direct or indirect1 is not distinguished from the ,generic ,judgment1 resting on a connection of content or presumption of causality4 8,all the #a papers have been looked over0 should be distinguished from 8,all triangles have their three angles equal to two right angles40 #a 8,the0 as here used indeed practically 8these10 so that1 by our analysis1 such a judgment has no claim to rank as a universal judgment ,it is difficult to find a plainly collective judgment which has not some affinity to judgment with demonstrative pronoun or proper name4 ,a judgment in which 8,all ,m4,p4's0 stands as subject1 has affinity with the latter4 7#b7 ,the nature of the ,universal ,judgment is not examined with a view to the distinction between ,categorical and ,hypothetical4 ,the common ,logic does not go behind the grammatical form1 which on this point is not decisive4 7iv47 ,the ,hypothetical ,judgment #a is said to consist of two categorical propositions1 or to be 8complex0 ,but of course it is a simple judgment1 prima facie expressing a relation of reason and consequent4 ,its parts are not ,judgments1 for they are not such as to stand alone4 #a ,bain1 p4 #he2 ,jevons1 p4 #afj4 7v47 ,the ,disjunctive ,judgment is often 7e4g4 by ,mill and ,bain7 said to be equivalent to two ,hypothetical ,judgments4 ,the strange thing is that both of these writers take the wrong two4 #a ,if we allow conversion of a ,hypothetical ,judgment two are enough1 but of course they must be the two which cannot be got from each other by conversion1 viz4 the two beginning1 8,if ,a is ,b 4440 and 8,if ,a is not ,b 4440 respectively4 ,if we do not admit conversion we must have all four4 ,let the disjunction be1 8,this signal light is either red or green40 ,in order to know this we must know not #aaf only that1 8,if it is red it is not green0 7with its equivalent1 8,if it is green it is not red071 but that1 8,if it is not red it is green0 7with its equivalent1 8,if it is not green it is red074 ,the former by itself leaves open the possibility that it may be not red or green1 but blue or yellow2 the latter by itself the possibility that when it is red it may also at the same time be green4 ,the former secures that the two terms exclude each other2 the latter1 that1 taken together1 they exclude all other predicates4 #a ,mill1 ch4 iv42 ,bain1 p4 #hf4 ,in any case1 the disjunctive is more than any combination of ,hypotheticals1 and really tends to be ,categorical1 and ought not to be claimed as ,conditional4 ,which are ,categorical8 #b4 ,we will now look at these ,judgments in order1 consider their real meaning1 and also ascertain the limits of the ,categorical ,judgment1 viz4 that which affirms the existence of its ,subject1 or in other words1 asserts a fact4 ,the ,particular ,judgment 7i7 ,the ,particular ,judgment of common ,logic1 8,some ,s4 is ,p410 has different meanings according as it is understood naturally1 or tied down to be a result of enumeration4 ,in any case it is an imperfect1 unscientific ,judgment1 in which the mind cannot rest1 because it has an undefined limitation imposed upon the ,subject4 ,its natural meaning 7a7 ,for the natural meaning1 take the example1 8,some engines can drag a train at a mile a minute for a long distance40 #a ,this does not mean a certain number of engines1 though of course they are a certain number4 ,it #aag means certain engines of a particular make1 not specified in the ,judgment4 ,the ,judgment is ,categorical1 because the undefined reservation implies a reference to something unanalysed1 but merely touched or presented in experience4 ,if it was a mere idea it would have to be clear2 and if the full description or definition were inserted1 the ,judgment would cease to affirm the existence of the engines in question4 ,and the ,judgment itself challenges this completion4 #a ,to be accurate1 the ,judgment would demand the insertion of precise details about train1 distance1 and other matters4 ,but this illustrates the point of the text1 because the assignment of such details would naturally extend to the ,subject1 and then the 8,some0 would be displaced4 ,a narrower meaning 7b7 ,a more artificial meaning is to take the ,judgment as not formed by imperfect description1 but by imperfect enumeration 7understanding it almost wholly in denotation74 8,some ,conservatives are in favour of women's suffrage40 ,this means or may mean that we have counted a certain number1 large or small1 who are so1 and we may or may not know about the others4 ,thus understood1 the ,judgment challenges complete enumeration2 it contains of course the elements of a fraction--half1 most1 nine-tenths of1 and so on4 ,this again is ,categorical2 not merely because it implies counting1 but because it implies counting units separately given to experience4 ,the ,particular ,judgment does not include our ,impersonal and ,demonstrative ,judgments2 they are not classed in the common text-books4 ,but as referring to perception they too are categorical and assert facts1 whether they have ideas to help out the perceptive reference or not4 ,and there is no reason against including them under the ,particular ,judgment4 ,the assertion1 8,this engine can drag a train a mile a minute10 is much the same kind of ,judgment as1 8,some engines can1 etc40 ,either of these would be false #aah if no such engines existed4 ,these ,judgments are of the essence of perception4 ,they have the connection of content and the undefined complex of presentation struggling together in them4 ,they assert fact4 ,singular ,judgment 7#b7 ,the ,singular ,judgment of the common ,logic is pretty much our ,judgment with a proper name1 which ,i call ,individual1 and which1 as we saw1 is in part rightly called universal--because the ,subject extends beyond perception1 and the ,predicate follows the ,subject4 ,but it is a concrete or individual ,universal1 not an abstract ,universal1 and therefore asserts the existence of its ,subject4 ,the reason why it is taken to assert the reality of its ,subject must be1 ,i suppose1 that it can assert this1 its ,subject being a name for an existence that has limited reality within the temporal series1 and cannot assert anything else1 not having any general fixed content or connotation which could imply a general connection of ,subject and ,predicate4 ,the general connection of content which is so fatal to the asserting of fact does not exist in this case4 ,we see this in ,mill's instance4 8,the summit of ,chimborazo is white10 ,when the ,subject is a unique name with precise connotation1 8,the centre of gravity of the material universe is variable10 then we are passing into the abstract ,universal1 and ,i think we may take such a ,judgment perhaps as one of the best examples of a conjunction of categorical and hypothetical meaning1 i4e4 of a connection of content ascribed to a ,subject affirmed to exist4 ,but usually one meaning or the other is uppermost4 ,these ,judgments1 called ,singular or ,individual1 correspond to the region of history or narrative4 ,the realities #aai with which they deal have their definite position in a single system of time and space1 and this is often made emphatic by the use of tenses4 ,but these change with the date relative to the speaker1 so that a ,judgment with real tense must once have been false1 or must become false by lapse of time4 ,thus the ,judgment of fact may be not absolutely true4 ,nothing is genuinely true which a change of date can make false4 ,the permanently true time-relations between ,subject and ,predicate are determined by their content1 and the copula is not a tense1 but a mere sign of affirmation4 ,the ,singular as ,categorical is sharply distinguished from the ,abstract ,universal1 with which common ,logic classes it4 ,universal ,judgment 7#c7 ,down to this point the judgment states a fact4 ,when we come to the ordinary universal affirmative1 we see at once that it may express very different meanings4 ,in its natural meaning it strongly implies that its ,subject has a particular existence within the series of time and space1 but hardly asserts it4 ,import of ,propositions ,mill1 for example1 says 8the objects are no longer individually designated1 they are pointed out only by their attributes20 8most of them not known individually at all40 ,that means that the explicit ,subject is not made of individuals4 ,the natural meaning is disputed2 ,i incline to think with ,venn1 that the ,subject is naturally taken more in ,denotation 7not solely1 which is unmeaning71 and the ,predicate more in connotation4 ,but clearly in literal form the ,subject is simply a significant idea1 and its existence in things or events is not affirmed though it may be strongly implied4 ,hamilton #a #abj says quite calmly--8#8,rainy weather is wet weather' is a ,categorical ,proposition2 #8,if it rains it will be wet' is ,hypothetical40 ,between the two ,i can see no distinction of meaning at all4 #b ,if indeed we take the ,universal ,affirmative in the pure sense of aggregate formed by enumeration1 and therefore finite1 it may be said that we assert the existence of the individuals composing it2 but this is a very unreal view of the meaning of the ,judgment 7though suggested by its customary form71 and even then it would be hard to prove that we continue to think of the ,subject as individuals4 ,this reference to a finite aggregate makes the ,collective ,judgment or ,judgment of ,allness4 ,it cannot really exist in the case of a class like man1 of unknown extension1 and is confined1 at its widest1 to such cases as 8,all present ,members of ,parliament have to take a line on the ,irish question40 ,this might be ,categorical1 but need not be so4 #a ,lectures1 vol1 iii4 p4 #cbg4 #b ,contrast ,jevons1 ,elementary ,logic1 p4 #afc4 ,otherwise1 the ,universal ,affirmative of common ,logic is literally ,hypothetical1 though in some cases it may strongly imply the assertion of reality4 ,dr4 ,venn has discussed this question4 #a ,he says the implication of existence is much stronger with a single-word ,subject than with a many-worded ,subject2 i4e4 perhaps with a natural than with an artificial conception4 ,but in any case1 the expressed bond with perception is lost1 and in pure form the ,subject is a mere abstract idea1 so that the relations of content entirely predominate over the implication of existence4 #a ,empirical ,logic1 pp4 #beh-i4 ,thus the ,universal ,affirmative in its full meaning fairly #aba represents the sciences of classification1 combining a subordinate meaning of ,allness or numerical totality with a primary meaning of connotation of attributes or presumed causality4 ,when we say 8,all the ,buttercup family have an inferior corolla10 of course we mean that there is a reason for this4 ,often we omit the term all1 as in 8,heat is a mode of motion40 ,in doing this we wipe out the last trace of a reference to individual objects1 and we pass to the pure hypothetical form which absolutely neglects the existence of objects4 8,hypothetical0 ,judgment 7#d7 ,the simplest type of this ,judgment is1 if ,a is ,b it is ,c4 ,this ,judgment corresponds to abstract science1 but it is only making explicit what was implied in the ,universal ,affirmative4 ,that expressed a presumption of causality1 this expresses a clear ,reason and ,consequent or scientific necessity4 ,the point of this form is 7i47 that it drops all reference to individual objects1 7ii47 that it challenges you to explain how the ,subject-content is tied to the ,predicate-content4 8,water boils at #bab10 is a statement we should generally pass in so-called ,categorical form1 because it does not challenge any great accuracy of connection4 ,but 8,if water boils1 it is at a temperature of #bab10 puts us upon asking1 8,is the condition adequate80 and we see at once that we must at least say1 8,if water boils under pressure of one atmosphere1 it is at a temperature of #bab10 or else the judgment is untrue4 ,of course we may apply the form rightly or wrongly1 as you may fill up your census paper rightly or wrongly4 ,we can only say that it calls upon you to put in an adequate condition4 ,therefore ,i rather object to the form 8,if ,a is1 ,b is10 because it adds very little to the so-called ,categorical shape4 #abb ,we have now to ask how the ,hypothetical ,judgment connects its content with reality1 i4e4 how it is a ,judgment at all8 ,and the same explanation must apply to so-called ,categorical ,judgments1 which can be thrown into this form without change of meaning4 ,the point from which the explanation starts is taking hypothesis as supposition4 ,this is much more true1 ,i think1 than connecting it with doubt4 ,in ,dr4 ,venn's ,empirical ,logic the connection of ,hypothetical ,judgment and doubt to my mind disfigures the whole treatment of the ,scientific ,judgment4 ,supposition is distinct from affirmation--that is true--but just because it is distinct from affirmation1 it cannot indicate doubt4 ,it probably arose out of doubt1 but as a method of science it does not imply doubt1 but only the accurate limitation of attention4 ,what doubt is there when we judge 8,if equals be added to equals1 the wholes are equal08 ,we are attending to one particular thread of the nexus4 ,hypothetical ,judgment1 then1 is ,judgment that starts from a supposition4 ,every supposition is made upon a certain basis of ,reality4 ,take as an extreme case1 8,if you ask permission of ,a4,b41 he will refuse it40 ,this is a supposition and its result1 on the basis of the known character of ,a4,b4 ,and the full judgment is 8,a4,b4 is of such a character1 that1 supposing you ask him for permission1 etc40 ,the ,hypothetical ,judgment may be true1 as an assertion about ,a4,b4's character1 though you may never ask4 ,here1 then1 is the clue to the analysis of all ,abstract ,judgments1 ,like ,perceptive ,judgment1 they affirm something of ,reality1 but they do this indirectly and not directly4 #abc ,underlying them there is the implied ,categorical ,judgment1 8,reality has a character1 such that1 supposing so and so1 the consequence will be so and so40 ,and if this implied assertion is true1 then the ,hypothetical ,judgment is true1 although its terms may be not only unreal1 but impossible4 8,if a microscopic object-lens with a focal length of #a_/ajj in4 were used1 its magnifying power with an ,a eye-piece would be so many diameters40 ,this is a mere matter of calculation1 and is unquestionably true1 depending upon the effects of refraction upon the optical image4 ,but ,i do not suppose that such an object-lens could be made1 or used4 ,does such a ,judgment1 although true1 express a fact8 ,no1 ,i should say not1 although common usage varies4 ,i remember a ,pall ,mall leading article which said1 8,it is an absolute fact1 that1 if ,mr4 ,gladstone had not done something--the ,government would have committed--some iniquity or other40 ,is this what we call a fact8 ,we observe that the content actually mentioned was never real at all4 ,the implied connection with reality is 8,there existed in reality a condition of things 7unspecified7 in which if ,mr4 ,gladstone1 etc41 etc40 ,are mathematical truths facts1 and in what sense8 ,abstract truth need not1 and perhaps cannot express fact1 but implies fact indirectly4 ,disjunctive ,judgment 7#e7 ,the ,disjunctive ,judgment 8,a is either ,b or ,c10 is again not a judgment of doubt but a mode of ,knowledge1 ,it may be taken as numerical2 then it gives rise to the statement of ,chances4 ,but in its perfect form it is appropriate to the exposition of a content as a system1 and it may be taken as returning to the ,categorical ,judgment1 and combining it with the ,hypothetical1 because its #abd content is naturally taken as an individual1 being necessarily concrete4 ,the peculiar point of the ,disjunctive is that it makes negation positively significant4 8,this signal light shows either red or green40 ,here we have the categorical element1 8,this signal light shows some colour10 and on the top of this the two ,hypothetical ,judgments1 8,if it shows red it does not show green10 8,if it does not show red it does show green40 ,you cannot make it up out of the two ,hypothetical ,judgments alone2 they do not give you the assertion that 8it shows some colour40 #a #a ,the example in the text1 chosen for its simplicity1 may be objected to as involving perceptive concreteness by the pronoun 8this40 ,you can have a disjunction1 it may be said1 dealing with 8the triangle0 as such2 and why should this be more 8,categorical0 than the assertion that the triangle has its angles three right angles8 ,still1 it might be replied1 the development of a single nature into a number of precise and necessary alternatives1 always gives it an implication of self-completeness4 ,does this state a fact8 ,i think it implies a fact much more distinctly than the hypothetical does1 but of course it is a question whether an alternative can be called a fact4 ,it seems a precise expression of some kinds of reality1 but it is not a solid single momentary fact4 ,it is very appropriate to the objects of philosophy as the higher concrete science1 which are conceived as systems of facts bearing definite relations to each other2 e4g4 8,society is a structure of individual characters1 having positions which are not interchangeable40 ,taken all as a mass1 they are conjunctively connected1 but taken in distinguishable relations they are disjunctively related4 ,a human being as such has some position and no other1 and this is ultimately determined by #abe the nature of the social whole to which he belongs4 ,he is if this1 nothing else1 and if nothing else1 then this4 ,a more artificial example1 which illustrates the degree in which actual abstract knowledge and purpose can be embodied by man in machinery1 is the interlocking system of points and signals at a great railway station4 ,i suppose that the essence of such a system lies in arrangements for necessarily closing every track to all but one at a time of any tracks which cross it or converge into it4 ,the track ,x receives trains from ,a1 ,b1 ,c1 ,d2 if the entrance for those from ,a is open1 ,b1 ,c1 and ,d are ipso facto closed2 if ,a1 ,b1 and ,c are closed1 ,d is open1 and so on4 ,this is a disjunction consciously and purposely incorporated in material fact1 and differs from a ,disjunctive ,judgment only in so far as existence necessarily differs from discursive thought4 ,the disjunction seems to complete the system of judgments1 including all the others in itself1 and it is wrong in principle to distinguish1 e4g4 between a hypothetical and categorical disjunction1 or to consider how a disjunction can be denied4 ,for disjunction in itself implies a kind of individuality which is beyond mere fact and mere abstract truth1 though allied to both2 and all intelligible negation is under1 not of1 a disjunction4 ,negation of a disjunction would mean throwing aside the whole of some definite group of thoughts as fallacious1 and going back to begin again with a judgment of the simplest kind4 ,it amounts to saying1 8,none of your distinctions touch the point2 you must begin afresh40 #abf ,,lecture ,,viii ,,negation1 ,,and ,,opposition ,,of ,,judgments ,distinction between ,contrary and ,contradictory opposition #a #a4 ,the only important point in the traditional diagram of opposition of ,judgments is the distinction between contrary and contradictory opposition1 the opposition1 that is1 between ,a and ,e1 and the opposition between ,a and ,o1 or ,e and ,i4 #a ,read ,bain1 pp4 #ee-f1 on 8,negative ,names and the ,universe of the ,proposition10 also on 8,negative ,propositions10 p4 #hc ff42 ,venn1 ,empirical ,logic1 pp4 #bad--bag2 ,jevons1 ,elementary ,logic1 ix41 on 8,opposition of ,propositions02 ,mill1 ch4 iv4 #b4 ,in ,contrary ,opposition the one ,judgment not only denies the other1 but goes on to deny or assert something more besides4 ,the mere grammatical shape 8,no man is mortal0 conceals this1 but we easily see that it says more than is necessary to deny the other1 8,all men are mortal40 ,in ,contradictory ,opposition1 the one ,judgment does absolutely nothing more than is involved in destroying the other4 ,the ,contrary ,negation has the advantage in positive1 or at least in definite import4 ,the ,contradictory or pure ,negation has the advantage in the exhaustive disjunction which it involves4 ,this is plain if we reflect that ,contrary ,negation only #abg rests on the ,law of ,contradiction1 8,x is not both ,a and not ,a40 ,ordinary ,diagram of ,opposition of ,judgments4 ,the diagram has diagonal lines1 not represented here1 from corner ,a to corner ,o1 and from corner ,e to corner ,i1 each labelled 8,contradictory ,opposition04 ,tr4 ,a ,e ,contrary ,opposition4 ,sub-contrary ,opposition4 ,i ,o ,a ,universal ,affirmative4 ,all men are mortal4 ,e ,universal ,negative4 ,no men are mortal4 ,i ,particular ,affirmative4 ,some men are mortal4 ,o ,particular ,negative4 ,some men are not mortal4 ,sub-contrary ,opposition has no real meaning2 the judgments so opposed are compatible4 ,it is not true both that 8,all ,m4,p4's are wise10 and that 8,no ,m4,p4's are wise10 but both may be false2 while ,contradictory ,negation implies the ,law of ,excluded ,third or excluded ,middle1 8,x is either ,a or not ,a10 the principle of disjunction1 or rather1 the simplest case of it4 ,it is not #abh false both that 8,all ,m4,p4's are wise0 and that 8,some ,m4,p4's are not wise40 ,the point is1 then1 on the one hand1 that in ,contradiction you can go from falsehood to truth1 #a while in ,contrariety you can only go from truth to falsehood2 but also that in ,contradiction the ,affirmative and ,negative are not at all on a level in meaning1 while in ,contrariety they are much more nearly so4 ,then if we leave out the relations of mere plurality1 of ,all and ,some1 which enable you to get contrary negation in pure negative form in the common ,logic1 we may say generally that in contrary negation something is asserted1 and in contradictory negation taken quite literally nothing is asserted1 but we have a 8bare denial10 a predicate is merely removed4 ,in actual thought this cannot be quite realised1 because a bare denial is really meaningless1 and we always have in our mind some subject or universe of discourse within which the denial is construed definitely4 ,but this definite construing is not justified by the bare form of contradiction1 which consists simply in destroying a predication and not replacing it by another4 ,in as far as you replace it by another1 defined or undefined1 you are going forward towards contrary negation4 #a ,i4e4 ,contradictory alternatives are exhaustive4 ,contrary ,negation #b4 ,thus1 ,contrary ,negation in its essence is affirmation with a negative intention1 and we may take as a type of it in this wider sense the affirmation of a positive character with the intention of denying another positive character4 ,e4g4 when you deny 8,this is a right-angled triangle0 by asserting 8,this is an equilateral triangle10 you have typical contrary negation4 ,it is not really safe to speak of contraries except with reference to judgments1 intended to deny each #abi other2 but it is common to speak of species of the same genus as contraries or opposites1 because the same thing cannot be both4 #a #a ,bain1 p4 #ee ff4 ,we must therefore distinguish contrary from different4 ,of course the same thing or content has many different qualities1 and even combines qualities that we are apt to call contrary or opposite4 ,but as ,plato was fond of pointing out1 a thing cannot have different or opposing qualities in the same relation1 that is to say1 belonging to the same subject under the same condition4 ,the same thing may be blue in one part of it and green in another1 and the same part of it may be blue by daylight and green by candlelight4 ,but the same surface cannot be blue and green at once by the same light to the same eye looking in the same direction4 ,different qualities become contrary when they claim to stand in the same relation to the same subject4 ,right-angled triangles and equilateral triangles do not deny each other if we leave them in peace side by side4 ,they are then merely different species of the same genus1 or different combinations of the same angular space4 ,but if you say1 8,this triangle is right-angled10 and ,i say 8,it is equilateral10 then they deny each other1 and become true contraries4 ,then the meaning of denial is always of the nature of contrary denial4 ,as we always speak and think within a general subject or universe of discourse1 it follows that every denial substitutes some affirmation for the judgment which it denies4 ,the only judgments in which this is not the case are those called by an unmeaning tradition ,infinite ,judgments1 i4e4 judgments in which the negative predicate #acj includes every determination which has applicability to the ,subject4 ,this is because the attribute denied has no applicability to the ,subject1 and therefore all that has applicability is undiscriminatingly affirmed1 in other words1 the judgment has no meaning4 8,virtue is not-square40 ,this suggests no definite positive quality applicable to virtue1 and therefore is idle4 ,you may safely analyse a significant negative judgment1 8,a is not ,b0 as 8,a is not ,b but ,c10 or as 8,a is ,x1 which excludes ,b40 ,for ,x may be undetermined1 8a colour not red40 ,but then if the meaning is always affirmative or positive1 why do we ever use the negative form8 ,why use ,negation8 #c4 ,in the first place1 we use it because it indicates exclusion1 and without it we cannot distinguish between mere differents on the one hand and contraries on the other4 ,if you ask me1 8,are you going to ,victoria1 ,london ,chatham and ,dover station80 and ,i answer1 8,i am going to ,victoria1 ,london ,brighton and ,south ,coast10 that will not be satisfactory to you1 unless you happen to know beforehand that these stations are so arranged that if you are at one you are not at the other4 ,they might be a single station used by different companies1 and called indifferently by the name of either4 ,to make it clear that the suggestion and the answer are incompatible1 ,i must say1 8,i am not going to ,victoria1 ,london ,chatham and ,dover10 and ,i may add or not add1 8,i am going to ,victoria1 ,london ,brighton and ,south ,coast40 ,that tells you that the one predicate excludes the other1 and that is the first reason why we use the generalised form of exclusion1 i4e4 negation4 ,but in the second place1 it can give us more1 and something absolutely necessary to our knowledge1 and that is not #aca merely exclusion1 but exhaustion4 ,in literal form negation is absolutely exhaustive1 that is to say1 contradictory4 ,the ,judgment 8,a is not ,b0 forms an exhaustive alternative to the ,judgment 8,a is ,b10 so that no third case beyond these two is possible1 and therefore you can argue from the falsehood of either to the truth of the other4 ,now this form is potentially of immense value for knowledge1 and all disjunction consists in applying it2 but as it stands in the abstract it is worthless1 because it is an empty form4 8,a is red or not-red40 ,if either of these is false the other is true4 ,but what do you gain by this8 ,you are not entitled to put any positive meaning upon not-red2 if you do so you slide into mere contrary negation1 and the inference from falsehood becomes a fallacy4 ,make an argument1 8,the soul is red or not-red40 8,it is not-red it is some other colour than red40 ,the argument is futile4 ,we have construed 8not-red0 as a positive contrary1 and that being so1 the disjunction is no longer exhaustive4 ,we had no right to say that the soul is either red or some other colour2 the law of ,excluded ,middle does not warrant that4 ,i pause to say that the proof of the exhaustiveness of negation1 i4e4 that two negatives make an affirmative--that if ,a is not not-,b1 it follows that ,a is ,b--is a disputed problem1 the problem known as double negation4 ,how do you know that what is not not-red must be red8 ,i take the law of ,excluded ,middle simply as a definition of the bare form of denial1 or the distinction between this and not-this2 8not-this0 being the bare abstraction of the other than this4 ,others say that every negation presupposes an affirmation2 so 8,a is not-,b0 presupposes the affirmation 8,a is ,b10 and #acb if you knock down the negative1 the original affirmative is left standing4 ,sigwart and ,b4 ,erdmann say this4 ,i think it monstrous4 ,i do not believe that you must find an affirmative standing before you can deny4 ,stage of ,significant ,negation4 ,combination of ,contrary and ,contradictory #d4 ,well1 then1 the point we have reached is this4 ,what we mean in denial is always the contrary1 something positive4 ,what we say in denial--in other words1 the literal form which we use--always approaches the contradictory1 i4e4 is pure exclusion4 ,the ,contrary of the diagram denies more than it need1 but still its form is that of exclusion4 ,now we have seen that in denial1 as used in common speech1 we get the benefit of both affirmation and exclusion1 but in accurate thought we want to do much more than this2 we want to get the whole benefit of the negative form--that is1 to get a positive meaning together with not only exclusion1 but exhaustion4 ,i will put the three cases in one example1 beginning with mere affirmations of different facts4 ,different ,affirmations 7#a7 8,he goes by this train to-day40 8,he goes by that train to-morrow40 ,this conjunction1 as simply stated1 gives no inference from the truth or falsehood of either statement to the truth or falsehood of the other4 ,contrary ,opposition1 exclusive 7#b7 8,he goes by this train10 and 8,he goes by that train10 with a meaning equivalent to 8,no1 he goes by that40 ,if it is true that in the sense suggested by the context he goes by this train1 then it is not true that he goes by the other1 and if it is true1 in the sense explained1 that he goes by the other1 then he does not go by this4 ,each excludes the other1 but both may be excluded by a third alternative4 ,if it is not true that he goes by this #acc train--nothing follows4 ,there may be any number of trains he might go by1 or he might give up going2 i4e4 your ,universe of discourse1 your implicit meaning is not expressly limited4 ,if it is not true to say1 8,no1 he goes by that0--taking the whole meaning together1 and not separating its parts1 for this combination is essential to the 8contrary0--nothing follows as to the truth of the other statement4 ,he may not be going at all1 or may be going by some third train1 or by road4 ,combined ,contrary and ,contradictory ,negation ,but if you limit your ,universe1 or general subject1 then you can combine the value of contrary and contradictory negation4 ,then you say1 7#c7 8,he goes either by this train or by that40 ,then you can infer not only from 8,he goes by this train10 that 8,he does not go by that10 but from 8,he does not go by this train0 to 8,he does go by that40 ,the alternative between 8,a is ,b0 and 8,a is not-,b0 remains exhaustive1 but not-,b has been given a positive value1 because we have limited the possibilities by definite knowledge4 ,the processes of accurate thinking and observation aim almost entirely at giving a positive value ,c to not-,b1 and a positive value ,b to not-,c1 under a disjunction1 because it is then that you define exactly where and within what conditions ,c which is not ,b passes into ,b which is not ,c4 ,take the disjunction1 8,sound is either musical or noise40 ,if the successive vibrations are of a uniform period it is musical sound2 if they are of irregular periods it is noise4 ,this is a disjunction which assumes the form1 ,a is either ,b or ,c4 ,that is to say1 ,if it is ,b it is not ,c4 ,if it is not ,b it is ,c4 #acd ,therefore ,i think that all 8determination is negation0--of course1 however1 not bare negation1 but significant negation2 the essence of it consists in correcting and confirming our judgment of the nature of a positive phenomenon by showing that just when its condition ceases1 just then something else begins1 and when you have exhausted the whole operation of the system of conditions in question1 so that from any one phase of their effects you can read off what it is not but the others are1 then you have almost all the knowledge we can get4 ,the 8,just-not0 is the important point1 and this is only given by a positive negation within a definite system4 ,you want to explain or define the case in which ,a becomes ,b4 ,you want observation of not-,b2 but almost the whole world is formally or barely not-,b1 so that you are lost in chaos4 ,what you must do is to find the point within ,a1 where ,a#a which is ,b passes into ,a#b which is ,c1 and that will give you the just-not-,b which is the valuable negative instance4 ,negative judgment expressing fact #e4 ,you will find it said that a ,negative ,judgment cannot express fact2 e4g4 that a ,judgment of ,perception cannot be negative4 ,this is worth reflecting upon2 ,i hope that what has been said makes clear how far it is true4 ,the bare form of ,negation is not adequate to fact2 it contains mere emptiness or ignorance2 we nowhere in our perception come upon a mere 8not-something40 ,no doubt negation is in this way more subjective than affirmation4 ,but then as it fills up in meaning1 the denial becomes more and more on a level with the affirmation1 till at last in systematic knowledge both become double-edged--every affirmative denies1 and every negative affirms4 ,when a man who is both a #ace musician and a physicist says1 8this compound tone ,a is a discord ,y10 he knows exactly how much of a discord1 what ratio of vibration makes it so much of a discord1 how much it would have to change to become a concord 7,x which is not ,y71 and what change in the vibration ratio from a#a to a#b would be needed to make it a concord4 ,to such knowledge as this1 the accurate negation is just as expressive as the affirmation1 and it does not matter whether he says 8,a is ,y10 or 8,a is by so much not ,x40 ,it becomes1 as ,venn says1 all but impossible to distinguish the affirmation from the negation4 ,no doubt affirmative terms come in at this stage1 though the meaning is negative4 ,observe in this connection how we sometimes use the nearest word we can think of1 knowing that the negative gives the positive indirectly--8,he was1 ,i won't say insolent10 meaning just not or 8all but0 insolent2 or again1 8,that was not right10 rather than saying bluntly 8wrong40 ,operation of the denied idea #f4 ,every significant negation 8,a is not ,b0 can be analysed as 8,a is ,x which excludes ,b40 ,of course ,x may not be a distinct ,c2 e4g4 we may be able to see that ,a is not red1 but we may not be able to make out for certain what colour it is2 then the colour ,x is 8an unknown colour which excludes red40 ,how does the rejected idea operate in ,judgment8 ,i suppose it operates by suggesting a ,judgment which as you make it destroys some of its own characteristics4 ,it is really an expression of the confirmatory negative instance or 8just-not40 ,just when two parallel straight lines swing so that they can meet1 just then the two interior angles begin to be less than two right angles1 which tells us that the #acf straight lines are ceasing to be parallel4 ,just in as much as two straight lines begin to enclose a space we become aware that one or other of them is not straight1 so that ,a in turning from ,y to ,x turns pari passu from ,a#a to ,a#b1 and we are therefore justified in saying that ,a1 when it is ,y1 cannot be ,x4 ,this lecture may pave the way for ,induction1 by giving some idea of the importance of the negative instance which ,bacon preached so assiduously4 ,in a real system of science the conceptions are negative towards each other merely as defining each other4 ,one of them is not in itself more negative than another4 ,such a conception1 e4g41 is that of a triangle compared with two parallel straight lines which are cut by a third line4 ,if the parallels are swung so as to meet1 they become a triangle which gains in its third angle what the parallels lose on the two interior angles1 and the total of two right angles remains the same4 ,thus in saying that parallels cut by a third straight line cannot form a triangle1 and that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles1 we are expressing the frontier which is at once the demarcation between two sets of geometrical relations1 and the positive grasp or connection of the one with the other4 ,the negation is no bar to a positive continuity in the organism of the science1 but is essential to defining its nature and constituent elements4 ,this is the bearing of significant negation when fully developed4 #acg ,,lecture ,,ix ,,inference ,,and ,,the ,,syllogistic ,,forms ,inference in general #a #a4 ,the ,problem of ,inference is something of a paradox4 ,inference consists in asserting as fact or truth1 on the ground of certain given facts or truths1 something which is not included in those data4 ,we have not got inference unless the conclusion1 7i47 is necessary from the premisses1 and 7ii47 goes beyond the premisses4 ,to put the paradox quite roughly--we have not got inference unless the conclusion is 7i47 in the premisses1 and 7ii47 outside the premisses4 ,this is the problem which exercises ,mill so much in the chapter1 8,function and ,value of the ,syllogism40 ,we should notice especially his #g1 8the universal type of the reasoning process40 ,the point of it is to make the justice of inference depend upon relations of content1 which are judged of by what he calls induction4 ,that is quite right1 but the question still returns upon us1 8,what kind of relations of content must we have1 in order to realise the paradox of ,inference80 ,this the 8type of inference0 rather shirks4 ,see ,mill's remarks when he is brought face to face with #ach ,induction1 ,bk4 ,,iii4 ch4 f4 #b4 ,an ,inference1 as he there recognises1 either does not hold at all1 or it holds 8in all cases of a certain description10 i4e41 it depends on universals4 #a ,read for ,lectures ,,ix4 and ,x41 ,mill1 ,bk4 ,,ii ch4 i41 ii41 iii42 ,bk4 ,,iii4 ch4 i4 and ii4 at least2 ,venn1 ch4 xiv41 xv42 ,jevons1 ,lessons xv4 and xxiv42 ,de ,morgan's ,budget of ,paradoxes4 ,i ought to warn you at once that though we may have novelty in the conclusion of ,inference 7as in multiplication of large numbers71 the necessity is more essential than the novelty4 ,in fact1 much of ,inference consists in demonstrating the connection of matters that as facts are pretty familiar4 ,of course1 however1 they are always modified in the process1 and in that sense there is always novelty4 ,you obtain the most vital idea of ,inference by starting from the conclusion as a suggestion1 or even as an observation1 and asking yourself how it is proved1 or explained1 and treating the whole process as a single mediate judgment1 i4e4 a reasoned affirmation4 ,take the observation1 8,the tide at new and full moon is exceptionally high40 ,in scientific inference this is filled out by a middle term4 ,we may profitably think of the 8middle term10 as the copula or grip which holds the conclusion together1 made explicit and definitely stated4 ,thus the judgment pulls out like a telescope1 exhibiting fresh parts within it1 as it passes into inference4 8,the tide at new and full moon1 being at these times the lunar tide plus the solar tide1 is exceptionally high40 ,this is the sort of inference which is really commonest in science4 ,such an inference would no doubt give us the conclusion if we did not know it by observation1 but it happens in many cases that we do know it by observation1 and what the inference gives us is the connection1 which of course may enable us to correct the observation4 #aci ,conditions of the possibility of ,inference #b4 ,in the strictest formal sense there can be no inference from particulars to particulars4 ,when there seems to be such inference1 it is merely that the ground of inference is not mentioned1 sometimes because it is obvious1 sometimes because it is not clearly specified in the mind4 ,suppose we say1 8,morley and ,harcourt will go for ,disestablishment1 and ,i think1 therefore1 that ,gladstone will40 ,i do not express any connecting link1 merely because every one sees at once that ,i am inferring from the intentions of some ,liberal leaders to those of another4 ,if the terms are really particulars1 8,x is ,a1 ,y is ,b1 ,z is ,c10 one is helpless2 they do not point to anything further at all2 there is no bridge from one to the other4 ,inference cannot possibly take place except through the medium of an identity or universal which acts as a bridge from one case or relation to another4 ,if each particular was shut up within itself as in the letters taken as an instance just now1 you could never get from one which is given to another which is not given1 or to a connection not given between two which are given4 ,take the simplest conceivable case1 which hardly amounts to ,inference1 that of producing a given straight line4 ,how is it that this is possible8 ,because the direction of the straight line is universal and self-identical as against possible directions in space1 and it acts as a rule which carries you beyond the given portion of it4 ,this might fairly be called an 8immediate inference40 ,so ,i presume that any curve can be constructed out of a sufficient portion of the curve1 although1 except with a circle1 this is more than repeating the same line over again4 ,the content has a nature which #adj is capable of prescribing its own continuation4 ,a curve is not a direction2 a truth which is a puzzle to the non-mathematician--it is a law of continuous change of direction4 ,system the ultimate condition of ,inference #c4 ,ultimately the condition of inference is always a system4 ,and it will help us in getting a vital notion of inference if we think1 to begin with1 of the interdependence of relations in space--in geometrical figures1 or1 to take a commonplace example1 in the adjustment of a ,chinese puzzle or a dissected map4 ,or any of the propositions about the properties of triangles are a good example4 ,how can one property or attribute determine another1 so that you can say1 8,given this1 there must be that08 ,this can only be answered by pointing to the nature of a whole with parts1 or a system1 which just means this1 a group of relations or properties or things so held together by a common nature that you can judge from some of them what the others must be4 ,not all systems admit of precise calculation and demonstration1 but wherever there is inference at all there is at least an identity of content which may be more or less developed into a precise relation between parts4 ,for example1 we cannot construct geometrically the life and character of an individual man2 we can argue from his character to some extent1 but the connection of facts in his personal identity is all that we can infer for certain2 and even this involves a certain context of facts1 as in circumstantial evidence4 ,yet this simplest linking together of occurrences by personal identity is enough to give very startling inferences4 ,thackeray's story of the priest is a good instance of inference from mere identity4 8,an old abb1 talking among a party of intimate friends1 happened #ada to say1 #8,a priest has strange experiences2 why1 ladies1 my first penitent was a murderer4' ,upon this1 the principal nobleman of the neighbourhood enters the room4 #8,ah1 ,abb1 here you are2 do you know1 ladies1 ,i was the ,abb's first penitent1 and ,i promise you my confession astonished him6'0 ,here the inference depends solely on individual identity1 which is1 as we saw1 a kind of universal4 ,but in this case was there really an inference8 ,does not the conclusion fall inside the premisses8 ,it must in one sense fall inside the premisses1 or it is not true4 ,but it does not fall inside them until we have brought them into contact by their point of identity and melted them down into the same judgment4 ,i admit that these inferences from individual identity1 assuming the terms not to be ambiguous1 are only just within the line of rational inference1 but1 as we see in this case1 they bring together the parts of a very extended universal4 ,what is the lower limit of inference8 ,immediate ,inference #d4 ,in the doctrine of immediate ,inference common ,logic treats of ,conversion and the ,opposition of judgments4 ,is a mere transposition of ,subject and ,predicate1 where the truth of the new judgment follows from that of the old1 an inference8 ,it is a matter of degree4 #a ,does it give anything new8 8,the ,queen is a woman40 8,a woman is the ,queen40 ,if we make a real difference between the implications of a ,subject and a ,predicate1 we seem to get something new2 but it is a point of little interest4 #adb ,comparison or ,recognition are more like immediate inferences4 ,comparison means that we do not let ourselves perceive freely1 but take a particular content as the means of apperception of another content1 i4e4 as the medium through which we look at it4 ,i do not merely look at the second1 but ,i look at it with the first in my mind4 ,and so far ,i may be said to infer1 without the form of proof1 from data of perception to a relation between them4 8,you are taller than me10 is a result obtained by considering your height from the point of view of mine1 or vice vers4 ,recognition is somewhat similar4 ,it is more than a mere perception1 because it implies reproduction of elements not given1 and an identification with them4 ,i recognise this man as so-and-so1 i4e4 ,i see he is identical with the person who did so-and-so4 ,it is a judgment1 but it goes beyond the primary judgment1 8,he is such and such10 and is really inferred from it4 ,it is a matter of degree4 ,almost every ,judgment can be broken up into elements1 and recognition fades gradually into cognition--we 8recognise0 an example of a law1 a right1 a duty1 an authority2 not that we knew it1 the special case1 before1 but that in analysing it we find a principle which commands our assent1 and with which we identify the particular instance before us4 #a ,the collective or general judgment1 as commonly explained1 cannot be converted 8simply10 because the predicate is 8wider0 than the subject1 and the same rule is accepted for the relation of consequent to antecedent4 ,the aim of science1 it might almost be said1 is to get beyond the kind of judgment to which this rule applies4 ,number of ,instances #e4 ,the difference between guess-work and demonstration rests on the difference between a detached quality or relation striking enough to suggest something to us1 and a system thoroughly known in its parts as depending on one another4 ,this is so even in recognising an individual person2 it is necessary to know that the quality by which you recognise him is one that no one else possesses1 or else #adc it is guess-work4 ,still more is this the case in attempting a scientific connection4 ,all scientific connection is really by system as between the parts of the content4 ,a quality is often forced on our attention by being repeated a great many times in some particular kind of occurrence1 but as long as we do not know its causal connection with the properties and relations involved in the occurrence it is only guess-work to treat them as essentially connected4 ,this is a matter very easy to confuse1 and very important4 ,it is easy to confuse1 because a number of instances does help us really in inference1 as it always insensibly gives us an immense command of content2 that is to say1 without knowing it we correct and enlarge our idea of the probable connection a little with every instance4 ,so the connection between the properties that strike us becomes much larger and also more correct than it is to people who have only seen a few instances4 ,but this is because the instances are all a little different1 and so correct each other1 and show transitions from more obvious forms to less obvious forms of the properties in question which lead us up to a true understanding of them4 ,if the instances were all exactly the same they would not help us in this way1 but our guess would still be a guess1 however many instances might have suggested it4 ,i remember that a great many years ago ,i hardly believed in the stone-age tools being really tools made by men4 ,i had only seen a few bad specimens1 one or two of which ,i still think were just accidentally broken flints which an old country clergyman took for stone-age tools4 ,this was to me then a mere guess1 viz4 that the cutting shape proved #add the flints to have been made by men4 ,and obviously1 if ,i had seen hundreds of specimens no better than these1 ,i should have treated it as a mere guess all the same4 ,but ,i happened to go to ,salisbury1 and there ,i saw the famous ,blackmore ,museum1 where there are not only hundreds of specimens1 but specimens arranged in series from the most beautiful knives and arrow-heads to the rudest4 ,there one's eye caught the common look of them at once1 the better specimens helping one to interpret the worse1 and the guess was almost turned into a demonstration1 because one's eyes were opened to the sort of handwork which these things exhibit1 and to the way in which they are chipped and flaked4 ,now this very important operation of number of examples1 in helping the mind to an explanation1 is always being confused with the effect of mere repetition of examples1 which does not help you to an explanation1 i4e4 a repetition in which one tells you no more than another4 ,but these mere repetitions operate prima facie in a different way1 viz4 by making you think there is an unknown cause in favour of the combination of properties which recurs1 and lead up to the old-fashioned perfect ,induction and the doctrine of chances1 and not to demonstration4 #a #a ,ultimately the calculus of chances may be said to rest on the same principle as ,induction1 in so far as the repetition of examples derives its force from the 7unspecified7 variety of contexts through which this repetition shows a certain result to be persistent4 ,but in such a calculus the presumption from recurrence in such a variety of contexts is only estimated1 and not analysed4 ,on the road from guess-work to demonstration1 and generally assisted by great experience1 we have skilful #ade guess-work1 the first stage of discovery4 ,this depends on the capacity for hitting upon qualities which are connected by causation1 though the connection remains to be proved4 ,so a countryman or a sailor gets to judge of the weather2 it is not merely that he has seen so many instances1 but he has been taught by a great variety of instances to recognise the essential points1 and has formed probably a much more complex judgment than he can put into words4 ,so again a doctor or a nurse can see how ill a patient is1 though it does not follow that they could always say why this appearance goes with this degree of illness4 ,in proportion as you merely presume a causal connection1 it is guess-work or pure discovery4 ,in as far as you can analyse a causal connection it is demonstration or proof2 and for ,logic1 discovery cannot be treated apart from proof1 except as skilful guess-work4 ,in as far as there is ground for the guess1 so far it approaches to proof2 in as far as there is no ground1 it gives nothing for ,logic to get hold of--is mere caprice4 ,a good scientific guess really depends on a shrewd eye for the essential points4 ,i am not mathematician enough to give the history of the discovery of ,neptune by ,leverrier and ,adams1 8calculating a planet into existence by enormous heaps of algebra10 #a but it must have begun as a guess1 ,i should suppose it was suggested before ,adams and ,leverrier took it up1 on the ground of the anomalous movements of ,uranus indicating an attraction unaccounted for by the known solar system4 ,and ,i suppose that this guess would gradually grow into demonstration as it became clear that nothing but a new planet would explain the anomalies of #adf the orbit of ,uranus4 ,and at last the calculators were able to tell the telescopist almost exactly where to look for the unknown planet4 ,the proof in this case preceded the observation or discovery by perception1 and this makes it a very dramatic example2 but if the observation had come earlier1 it would not ,i suppose have dispensed with the precise proof of ,neptune's effect on ,uranus1 though it might have made it easier4 #a ,de ,morgan1 ,budget of ,paradoxes1 p4 #ec4 ,figures of ,syllogism #f4 ,in illustration of this progress from guess-work to science1 #a ,i will give an example of the three ,aristotelian figures of the ,syllogism4 ,i omit the fourth4 ,i assume that the heavier term1 or the term most like a 8thing10 is fitted to be the ,subject1 and the term more like an attribute to be the ,predicate4 ,the syllogistic rules depend practically on the fact that common ,logic1 following common speech and thought1 treats the ,predicate as wider than the ,subject1 which corresponds to ,mill's view 7also the common scientific view71 that the same effect may have several alternative causes 7not a compound cause1 but different possible causes71 and that consequent is wider than antecedent4 #b ,it is this assumption that prevents affirmative propositions from being simply convertible1 i4e4 prevents 8,all men are mortal0 from being identical with 8,all mortals are men10 and but for it there would be no difference of figure at all1 as there is not for inference by equation4 #a ,cf4 ,plato's ,republic1 ,bk4 ,,vi41 end4 #b ,see p4 #ada1 note4 ,this progression is here merely meant to illustrate the universal or systematic connection of particulars in process of disengaging itself4 ,but ,i do not say that the first #adg figure with a major premise is a natural form for all arguments4 ,i take the scheme of the first three figures from ,jevons1 and suggest their meaning as follows3-- ,x denotes the major term4 ,y denotes the middle term4 ,z denotes the minor term4 #ast ,fig4 #bnd ,fig4 #crd ,fig4 ,major ,premise ,,yx ,,xy ,,yx ,minor ,premise ,,zy ,,zy ,,yz ,conclusion ,,zx ,,zx ,,zx ,fig4 #c4 ,an observation and a guess4 ,yesterday it rained in the evening4 ,all yesterday the smoke tended to sink4 ,the smoke sinking 7 may be 7 a sign of rain4 7 is sometimes 7 ,the conclusion cannot be general in this figure1 because nothing general has been said in the premisses about the subject of the conclusion4 ,so it is very suitable for a mere suggested connection given in a single content--that of the time 8yesterday10 implying moreover that both the points in question have something to do with the state of the atmosphere on that single day4 ,fig4 #b4 ,a tentative justification4 ,smoke that goes downwards is heavier than air ,particles of moisture are heavier than air4 ,particles of moisture may be in the descending smoke4 ,a universal conclusion in this figure would be formally bad4 ,but we do not care for that1 because we only mean it to be tentative1 and we do not draw a universal affirmative #adh conclusion4 ,we express its badness by querying it1 or by saying 8may be40 ,the reason why it is formally bad is that nothing general has been said in the premisses about the middle term or reason1 so that it is possible that the two ,subjects do not touch each other within it1 i4e4 that the suggested special cause1 moisture1 is not connected with the special effect1 the sinking of the smoke4 ,the general reason 8heavier than air0 may include both special suggested cause and special suggested effect without their touching4 ,smoke and moisture may both sink in air1 but for different and unconnected reasons4 ,still1 when a special cause is suggested which is probably present in part1 and which would act in the way required by the general character of the effect1 there is a certain probability that it is the operative cause1 subject to further analysis2 and the argument has substantive value1 though bad in form4 ,the only good arguments in this figure have negative conclusions1 e4g4-- ,smoke that is heavier than air goes downwards4 ,smoke on dry days does not go downwards4 ,smoke on dry days is not heavier than air4 ,this conclusion is formal1 because the negative throws the second ,subject altogether outside the ,predicate1 and so outside the first ,subject4 ,the one content always has a characteristic which can never attach to the other1 and consequently it is clear that some genuine underlying difference keeps them apart4 ,such an inference would corroborate the suggestion previously obtained that the presence of moisture was the active cause of the descending smoke on days when rain was coming4 ,fig4 #a4 ,a completely reasoned judgment4 #adi ,all particles that sink in the air in damp weather more than in dry1 are loaded with moisture when they sink4 ,smoke that descends before rain is an example of particles that sink in the air in damp weather more than in dry4 ,smoke that descends before rain is loaded with moisture when it descends 7and therefore its sinking is not accidentally a sign of rain1 but is really connected with the cause of rain74 ,the major premise belongs only to this figure4 ,in the other it is mere tradition to call it so1 and their two premisses are the same in kind1 and contribute equally to the conclusion1 and for that reason the affirmative conclusion was not general or not formal4 ,if your general conclusion is to follow by mere form1 you must show your principle as explicitly covering your conclusion4 ,but if you do this1 then of course you are charged with begging the question4 ,and1 in a sense1 that is what you mean to do1 when you set out to make your argument complete by its mere form4 ,if you have bon fide to construct a combination of your data1 you cannot predict whether the conclusion will take this form or that form4 ,using a major premise meant1 8,we have got a principle that covers the conclusion1 and so explains the case before us40 ,granting that the major premise involves the minor premise and conclusion1 that is just the reason why it is imperative to express them4 ,the meaning of the ,syllogism is that it analyses the whole actual thought2 the fault is to suppose that novelty is the point of inference4 ,the ,syllogism shows you how you must understand either premise in order that it may cover #aej the conclusion4 ,or1 starting from the conclusion as a current popular belief1 or as an isolated observation or suggestion by an individual observer 7and this is practically the way in which our science on any subject as a rule takes its rise71 the characteristic process through the three stages described above consists in first noting the given circumstances under which1 according to the prima facie belief or observation1 the conjunction in question takes place 78yesterday10 i4e4 8in the state of the atmosphere yesterday072 secondly in analysing or considering those given circumstances1 to find within them something which looks like a general property1 a law1 or causal operation1 which may attach the conjunction in question to the systematic whole of our experience 7the presence of something heavier than air in the atmosphere72 and thirdly1 in the exhibition of this ground or reason as a principle1 in the light of which the primary belief or observation 7probably a good deal modified7 becomes a part of our systematic intelligible world4 #aea ,,lecture ,x ,,induction1 ,,deduction1 ,,and ,,causation ,induction #a #a4 ,induction has always meant some process that starts from instances2 the ,greek word for it is used by ,aristotle both in his own ,logic and in describing the method of ,socrates4 ,it meant either 8bringing up instance after instance10 or 8carrying the hearer on by instances40 ,and still in speaking of ,induction we think of some process that consists in doing something with a number of instances4 ,but we find that this notion really breaks down1 and the contradiction between ,mill and other writers 7,jevons1 ch4 i47 shows exactly how it breaks down4 ,the question is whether one experiment will establish an inductive truth4 ,we will review the meanings of the term1 and show how they change4 #a ,read ,n4 ,lockyer's ,elements of ,astronomy2 ,abney's ,colour ,measurement2 ,introduction to ,bain on ,induction2 ,jevons's ,elementary ,lessons on 8,observation and ,experiment0 p4 #bbh1 and on ,induction1 p4 #bad 7about ,mill74 ,induction by simple ,enumeration 7a7 ,induction by simple enumeration was what ,bacon was always attacking1 and saying1 quite rightly1 that it was not scientific4 ,it is the method which ,i stated in the ,third ,figure of the syllogism1 almost a conversational method2 the mere beginning of observation4 8,i am sure the influenza is a serious illness2 all my friends who have had it have been dreadfully pulled down40 #aeb ,a ,b ,c have been seriously ill4 ,,abc have had influenza4 ,influenza is a serious illness4 ,now this popular kind of inference1 as ,bacon says1 8,precarie concludit1 et periculo exponitur ab instantia contradictoria40 ,suppose you come across one slight case of influenza1 the conclusion is upset4 ,this type of reasoning really appeals to two quite opposite principles2 one the principle of counting1 which leads up to statistics and the old-fashioned perfect ,induction or the theory of chance1 the other the principle of scientific system4 ,enumeration always has a ground 7b7 ,in counting1 we do not think of the reason why we count1 but there always is a reason1 which is given in the nature of the whole whose parts we are counting4 ,if ,i count the members of this audience1 it is because ,i want to know how many units the whole audience consists of4 ,i do not ask why each unit is there2 counting is different from scientific analysis2 but yet the connection between whole and part is present in my reason for counting4 ,so really1 though ,i only say1 8,one1 two1 three1 four1 etc410 each unit demands a judgment1 8,this is one member--that makes two members1 that makes three members10 etc4 ,counting is the construction of a total of units sharing a common nature2 measurement is a form of counting in which the units are also referred to some other standard besides the whole in question1 e4g4 the standard pound or inch4 ,perfect ,induction 7c7 ,mere counting or 8enumeration0 only helps you in induction by comparison with some other numerical result1 and1 if imperfect1 only to the extent of suggesting that there #aec is a common cause or there is not a common cause4 ,e4g4 if you throw a six with one die fifty times running1 you infer that the die is probably loaded4 ,this is because you compare the result with that which you expect if the die is fair1 viz4 a six once in every six throws4 ,you infer that there is a special cause favouring one side4 ,the principle is that ignorance is impartial4 ,if you know no reason for one case more than another1 you take them as equal fractions of reality2 if results are not equal fractions of reality1 you infer a special reason favouring one case4 #a ,pure counting cannot help you in ,induction in any way but this4 ,perfect ,induction simply means that the total is limited and the limit is reached2 you have counted #ajj per cent1 of the possible cases1 and the chance becomes certainty4 ,the result is a mere collective judgment4 #a ,see ,lecture ,,ix1 p4 #add1 note4 ,system 7d7 ,the principle of scientific system is quite a different thing4 ,essentially1 it has nothing to do with number or with a generalised conclusion4 ,it is merely this1 8,what is once true is always true1 and what is not true never was true40 ,the aim of scientific induction is to find out 8,what is true10 i4e4 what is consistent with the given system4 ,we never doubt this principle2 if we did we could have no science4 ,if observation contradicts our best-established scientific laws1 and we cannot suppose an error in the observation1 we must infer that the law was wrongly1 i4e4 untruly stated4 ,therefore1 as ,mill says1 one case is enough1 if you can find the truth about it4 ,people object that you cannot make a whole science out of one case1 and therefore you must have a number of instances4 ,that is a #aed practical point to be borne in mind1 but it has no real scientific meaning4 8,instance0 cannot be defined except as one observation1 which is a purely accidental limitation4 ,the point is1 that you use your instances not by counting cases of given terms1 but by ascertaining what the terms really are 7i4e4 modifying them71 and what is their real connection4 ,this is the simple secret of ,mill's struggle to base scientific ,induction1 on ,induction by simple ,enumeration2 the latter is not the evidence1 but the beginning of eliciting the evidence--so that the ,scientific ,induction is far more certain than that on which ,mill bases it4 ,aristotle's statement is the clearest and profoundest that has ever been made4 #a 8,nor is it possible to obtain scientific knowledge by way sense-perception4 ,for even if sense-perception reveals a certain character in its object1 yet we necessarily perceive this1 here1 and now4 ,the universal1 which is throughout all1 it is impossible to perceive2 for it is not a this-now2 if it had been it would not have been universal1 for what is always and everywhere we call universal4 ,since then demonstration 7science7 is universal1 and such elements it is impossible to perceive by sense1 it is plain that we cannot obtain scientific knowledge by way of sense4 ,but it is clear that even if we had been able to perceive by sense e4g4 by measurement that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles1 we should still have had to search for a demonstration1 and should not1 as some say1 have known it scientifically 7without one72 for we necessarily perceive in particular cases only1 but science comes by knowing the universal4 ,wherefore if we could have been on the moon1 and seen the earth coming between it and the #aee sun1 we should not 7by that mere perception7 have known the cause of the eclipse4 ,not but what by seeing this frequently happen we should have grasped the universal1 and obtained a demonstration2 for the universal becomes evident out of a plurality of particulars1 and the universal is valuable because it reveals the cause20 and again1 #b 8,and that the search of science is for the middle term is made plain in those cases in which the middle term is perceptible to sense4 ,for we search where we have had no perception1--as for the reason 7or middle term7 of an eclipse1--to know if there is a reason or not4 ,but if we had been upon the moon1 we should not have had to inquire if the process 7of an eclipse as such1 and not some other kind of darkness7 takes place1 or for what reason1 but both would have been plain at once4 ,the perception would have been1 #8,the earth is now coming between1' carrying with it the obvious fact1 #8,the moon is now suffering an eclipse1' and out of this the universal 7connection7 would have arisen40 #a ,aristotle1 ,an4 ,post4 #hg1 b4 #bh4 #b ,ibid4 #ij1 a4 #bd4 ,analogy 7e7 ,i showed you a method on the way to this in the shape of ,aristotle's second figure1 which we may call analogy4 ,the plain sign of it is1 that you give up counting the instances and begin to weigh them1 so that the attributes which are predicates fall into the middle term or reason4 ,in the former inference about influenza we did not suppose that you had any idea why influenza was a serious illness2 but in analogy there is some suggestion of this kind1 so that the connection is examined into4 ,here at once you begin to get suggested explanations and confirmation from the #aef system of knowledge4 ,you cannot have analogy by merely counting attributes4 ,i begin from ,enumerative ,suggestion drawn from observation of ,butterflies4 #a4 ,three species of genus x closely resemble three species of y4 #b4 ,the species of x would be protected by resembling y 7because y is distasteful to birds74 ,the resemblance may be a 8protective resemblance10 i4e4 a resemblance brought about by survival of those thus protected4 ,on this there naturally follows ,analogy4 #a4 ,protective resemblances naturally increase through series of species from slighter to closer resemblances4 #b4 ,the resemblances in question increase in genus x through series of species from slighter to closer resemblance to y4 ,the resemblances in question show important signs of being protective resemblances4 ,when we get thus far1 a single syllogism will not really represent the argument4 ,it can only analyse with convenience a single step in inference4 ,but now we have connected the reason of the resemblances with the whole doctrine of natural selection1 the gradual approximation of the species is most striking1 and we could set up a corroborative analogy on the basis of every feature and detail of these resemblances1 the tendency of which would be to show that no cause or combination of causes other than that suggested is likely to account for the observed resemblances4 #aeg ,i give a confirmatory negative analogy4 #a4 ,no protective resemblance can grow up where there is no initial tendency to resemblance4 #b4 ,the non-resembling species in the genus x show no initial tendency towards y4 ,the non-resemblances observed are such as could not produce protective resemblances4 ,this is a formally bad argument from two negative premisses justified by its positive meaning1 which implies that just where the alleged effect ceases1 the alleged cause ceases too4 ,if you look at the case in the ,natural ,history ,museum #a you see the normal ,pierinae down one side1 not approaching ,euploinae4 ,they are the positive examples1 negatively confirming the explanation of those which do approach ,euploinae4 ,these latter all start from some form which varied slightly1 by accident we presume1 towards ,euploinae1 and then this partially resembling series splits into three sets1 each leading up to a different and complete protective resemblance4 #a ,these cases in the entrance-hall of the ,natural ,history ,museum at ,south ,kensington afford excellent practical illustrations of ,inductive ,method4 ,i strongly urge the ,london student to try his hand at formulating them4 ,i said mere number was no help in scientific ,induction4 ,but do not these three sets of resemblances make a stronger proof than any one would8 ,yes1 because we need a presumption against accident4 ,you would not want this if you could unveil what really happens in one case1 but as infinite conditions are operative in such matters1 and it is impossible to experiment accurately1 #a this cannot be done2 #aeh and it might be said that one such resemblance was an accident1 i4e4 that it was owing to causes independent of the protection4 ,but as the cases become more numerous it becomes more improbable that different circumstances produce the same effect1 which would then be a mere coincidence1 in so many different cases4 ,if1 however1 we knew by positive and negative analysis what circumstance did produce the effect1 this confirmation would be useless4 #a ,ultimately1 no experiments are absolutely accurate4 ,there is always an unexhausted background in which unsuspected causes of error may be latent4 ,negative ,instance 7f7 ,in order to show exactly what circumstance produces a given effect1 a system must be brought to bear on the phenomenon through negation4 ,the only test of truth is that it is that which enables you to organise your thought and perception4 ,the first means of doing this is ,observation1 then ,experiment1 then ,classification and ,hypothesis1 which takes us into ,deduction4 ,observation is inaccurate1 until you begin to distinguish what is connected from what is not connected4 ,when you do this1 you are very near experiment1 the use of which is to introduce perfectly definite and measurable changes into what you are observing4 #a ,there is no absolute distinction between observation and experiment4 ,looking at a tissue through a microscope is observation2 putting on a polariscope1 though it changes the image altogether1 is observation2 if you warm the stage1 or put an acid on the object1 that1 ,i suppose1 is experiment1 because you interfere with the object #aei itself4 ,what should we say1 for example1 as to spectroscopic analysis of the ,sun's corona8 #a ,jevons1 loc4 cit41 esp4 quot4 from ,herschel 7p4 #bcd74 ,the moment you begin accurate observation you get a negative with positive value1 which is really the converse by negation of your positive observation1 a#a is b#a2 b#b 7which is just not-b#a7 is a#b 7which is just not-a#a74 ,thus the two may be represented as the same judgment in positive and negative forms1 which confirm one another4 8,yellow is a compound of red and green0--in ,experiment1 8if1 and as far as you take away the red or the green you destroy the yellow40 ,that describes an experiment with the colour-box4 ,i have inverted the order in the conversions in compliance with the rule of common ,logic1 that ,predicate is wider than ,subject2 but in accurate matter it is a false rule1 and very inconvenient4 ,the common rule means that a man who is drowned is dead1 but a man who is dead need not have been drowned2 but of course if he has the signs of death by drowning then he has been drowned4 ,classification and ,generalisation 7g7 ,classification is a consequence of all systematic theory2 it is not a separate method of science4 ,it is merely the arrangement of positive contents negatively related4 ,no doubt where we have a kind of family relations between individuals classification is more prominent1 and in the theory of continuous matter or operation1 where individualities are not remarkable--e4g4 in geometry--it is less prominent4 ,but both are always there--classification and theory4 ,classification which expresses no theory is worthless1 except that intended for convenient reference1 such as alphabetical classification4 ,under classification ,i may say a word on generalisation4 #afj ,the common idea of inference from many cases1 because they are many1 to all cases of the same kind1 is quite without justification4 ,the only genuine and fundamental law of generalisation is 8,once true always true40 ,but this might fail to suffice for our practical purposes1 because it might save its truth by abstraction4 ,let us take the example1 8,water is made of oxygen and hydrogen40 ,if that is true once1 it is always true in the same sense4 ,if you find some fluid of a different composition which you are inclined to call water1 then you must identify or distinguish the two1 and this is a mere question of classification4 ,practically1 however1 we could not get on unless our knowledge had some degree of exhaustiveness1 i4e4 unless we knew roughly that most of what we take for water will have the alleged properties4 ,but no ,induction or analysis1 however accurate1 can assure us against confusion and error1 viz4 assure us that everything we take to be water will be made of oxygen and hydrogen1 nor that water will always be found on the earth4 ,i call this accurate analysis1 which may be made in a single instance only1 and is the only perfectly scientific generalisation1 generalisation by mere determination4 ,its classification is hypothetical1 i4e4 in it the individuals are merely possible individuals4 ,but this passes into another kind of generalisation1 which may be called generalisation by concrete system1 as when we attach scientific analysis to some extensive individual reality1 e4g4 to the solar system or the race of man4 ,then our judgments have a place in the real world1 and our classification is categorical classification4 ,the generalisation in this case does not follow from the judgment being extended #afa over a great plurality of possible similar subjects1 but from the subject to which it applies having as an organised totality a large place in the world2 e4g4 8,the human race alone gives moral interest to the history of bur planet40 ,these judgments come by making explicit the reality which underlies such hypothetical judgments as 8all men are capable of morality40 ,it means that we actually venture to assign a place in the universe to the system we are speaking of4 ,then1 though it is an individual1 and unique1 its name has a meaning1 and is not a mere proper name4 ,the solar system is good instance4 ,judgments about it or parts of it are universal but not purely hypothetical1 and as our knowledge of this kind increases it becomes even a little exhaustive4 ,generalisation by mere likeness or analogy1 on the other hand1 is precarious4 ,it is what popular theory has in its mind in speaking of ,induction1 viz4 a conclusion from a truth to judgments concerning all similar cases1 e4g4 from 8,water is made of ,oxygen and ,hydrogen0 to 8,all liquids which we choose to take for water are made of ,oxygen and ,hydrogen40 ,no scientific method can possibly give us this result4 ,in as far as it has value it depends upon our guessing rightly by analogy4 ,it may be replied1 8that the signs of recognition are set down in the law or truth40 ,well1 if they are certain1 generalisation by mere determination is enough2 if they are doubtful1 no induction can warrant your judgment of them in particular cases4 ,practically1 of course1 we get them right pretty often1 although wrong very often4 ,hypothesis 7h7 ,hypothesis is merely supposition2 it consists in suggesting a fact as if it were real1 when it is the only way of #afb completing given facts into a consistent system4 ,if the hypothesis is proved that is a demonstration4 ,it has been said that 8,facts are only familiar theories40 ,if a bell rings in the house1 ,i say unhesitatingly1 8,some one rang that bell40 ,once in ten years it may be rung1 not by a person1 but by some mechanical accident1 in which case the 8some one0 is a hypothesis1 but one always treats it as a fact4 ,the only proof of a hypothesis is its being the only one that will fit the facts1 i4e4 make our system of reality relatively self-consistent4 ,we believe many things we can never verify by perception1 e4g4 the existence of the centre of the earth1 or that you have an idea in your minds2 and if we go to ultimate analysis1 perception itself involves hypothesis1 and a fortiori all experiment involves hypothesis4 ,every experimental interference with nature involves some supposition as to a possible connection which it is intended to confirm or disprove4 ,deduction #b4 ,classification and hypothesis bring us into ,deduction1 which is not really a separate kind of inference from ,induction1 but is a name given to science when it becomes systematic1 so that it goes from the whole to the parts1 and not from the parts to the whole4 ,in ,induction you are finding out the system piecemeal1 in ,deduction you already have the clue2 but the system1 and the system only1 is the ground of inference in both4 ,induction is tentative because we do not know the system completely4 ,their relation may be fairly represented by the relation of the first figure of the ,syllogism to the second and third4 ,the difference is merely that in deduction we are sure of having knowledge which covers the whole system4 ,if a man observed1 8,the difference #afc between the dark blood in the veins and the bright blood in the arteries calls for explanation10 that is the beginning of ,induction4 ,if a man states the circulation of the blood as an explanation1 that is ,deduction4 ,really ,induction is only a popular name for such ,inference as deals with numbers of instances4 ,mill's experimental methods do not depend upon number of instances1 but only upon content2 they presuppose the instances already broken up into conditions ,a1 ,b1 ,c1 and consequents a1 b1 c4 ,i must distinguish subsumption and construction as two forms of deduction4 ,only the former properly employs ,syllogism in the first figure4 ,subsumption 7a7 ,subsumption is argument by subject and attribute2 i4e4 when we do not know the system so as to construct the detail1--e4g4 a man's character1--and can only state in what individual system the details occur4 ,then we really want the major premise to lay down the properties of the system1 and all deduction can therefore be employed with a major premise1 e4g4 a mathematical argument might ultimately take the form1 8space is such that two parallels cannot meet40 ,construction ,but 7b7 when the nature of the subject is very obvious1 and the combinations in it very definite1 then the major premise is superfluous1 and adds nothing to the elements of the combination4 8,a to right of ,b1 ,b to right of ,c4 ,a to right of ,c40 ,this is clear1 but it is not formal2 as a syllogism it has four terms4 ,it is simply a construction in a series of which the nature is obvious4 ,and if you insert a major premise it would be1 8,what is to the right of anything is to the right #afd of that which the former is to the right of10 and that is simply the nature of the series implied in the inference stated in an abstract form4 8,inference is a construction followed by an intuition40 #a ,the construction1 ,i think1 however1 must be a stage of the intuition4 ,i am therefore inclined to suggest that a factor of general insight into principle is neglected in this definition1 from which much may undoubtedly be learned4 #a ,bradley1 ,principles of ,logic1 p4 #bce4 ,causation #c4 ,i have said very little about causation4 ,the fact is1 that in ,logic the cause necessarily fades away into the reason1 that is1 the explanation4 ,if we follow ,mill's account1 we see how this takes place4 ,i will put the stages very briefly4 ,cause 7a7 ,we start1 no doubt1 by thinking of a cause as a real event in time1 the priority of which is the condition of another event1 the effect4 ,pull the trigger--cause--and the gun goes off--effect4 ,complete conditions 7b7 ,the moment we look closer at it1 we see that this will not do1 and we begin to say with ,mill1 that the cause is the antecedent which includes all the conditions of the effect4 ,the plurality of alternative causes breaks down1 through the conditions defining the effect4 ,pull the trigger8--yes1 but the cartridge must be in its place1 the striker must be straight1 the cap must be in order1 the powder must be dry and chemically fit1 and so on1 and so on1 till it becomes pretty clear that the cause is a system of circumstances which include the effect4 ,law 7c7 ,but then our troubles are not ended4 ,only the essential and invariable conditions enter into the cause1 if the #afe cause is invariable4 ,this begins to cut away the particular circumstances of the case4 ,you need not use the trigger1 nor even the cap2 you may ignite powder in many ways4 ,you may have many kinds of explosives4 ,all that is essential is to have an explosion of a certain force and not too great rapidity4 ,then you will get this paradox4 ,what is merely essential to the effect1 is always something less than any combination of real 8things0 which will produce the effect1 because every real thing has many properties irrelevant to this particular effect4 ,so1 if the cause means something real1 as a material object is real1 it cannot be invariable and essential4 ,if it is not something real1 and is essential1 it fines down into a reason or law--the antecedent in a hypothetical judgment4 ,ground1 or real system with known laws 7d7 ,we can only escape this by identifying both cause and reason with the complete ground2 that is1 the nature of a system of reality within which the cause and effect both lie4 ,but even then1 though the ground is real1 it is not antecedent in time4 ,we see1 indeed1 that the conditions of an effect must be continuous through the effect4 ,if the process were taken as cut in two at any point1 its connection would be destroyed4 ,if a cause and b effect were really detached events1 what difference could it make if1 instead of a1 c preceded b8 ,postulate of ,knowledge #d4 ,the postulate of ,knowledge1 then1 is very badly stated as ,uniformity of ,nature4 ,that was due to the vulgar notion of ,inductive 8generalisation40 ,it must be stated in two parts3 first1 8,once true always true20 and secondly1 8,our truth is enough for us10 that is1 it covers enough of the universe for our practical and theoretical needs4 ,the #aff two parts may be put together by saying1 8,the universe is a rational system10 taking rational to mean not only of such a nature that it can be known by intelligence1 but further of such a nature that it can be known and handled by our intelligence4 ,conclusion #e4 ,these lectures have been unavoidably descriptive rather than thorough1 and yet1 as ,i warned you1 descriptive of properties which are in a sense not at all new1 but quite familiar1 and even trite4 ,you will not feel1 at first1 that the full interest which ,i claimed for the science of knowledge1 really attaches to these dry relations of abstract thought4 ,you will get no permanent good unless you carry the study forward for yourselves1 and use these ideas as a clue to find your bearings in the great world of knowledge4 ,and ,i would give you one hint about this4 ,i do not suggest that you should neglect philosophy but yet you should remember that philosophy can tell you no new facts1 and can make no discoveries4 ,all that it can tell you is the significant connection of what you already know4 ,and if you know little or nothing1 philosophy has little or nothing to tell you4 ,plato says1 8,the synoptical man1 the man who has a conspectus of knowledge1 is the philosopher2 and the man who is not synoptical1 who cannot see two subjects in their relation1 is no philosopher40 ,by all means read good logical books2 but also and more especially read good and thorough systematic books on science1 or history1 or politics1 or fine art--,i do not mean on all of these subjects1 but on some1 wherever your interest leads you4 ,you cannot learn the nature of inference1 of systematic necessity1 of the construction of reality1 by reading logic exclusively2 you must #afg feel it and possess it by working in the world of concrete knowledge4 ,i give one example in passing4 ,if you study social questions1 test for yourselves the value of statistics--i4e4 sets of enumerative judgments4 ,consider what the causal analysis of any problem demands2 remember that all enumeration implies a ground or whole1 on which its value depends2 and contrast the exhaustive examination of an instance thoroughly known1 with the enumeration of thousands of cases lumped under a general predicate4 ,determine always to know the truth2 welcome all information and all suggestion1 but remember that truth is always systematic1 and that every judgment1 when you scrutinise it1 demands a fuller and fuller connection with the structure of life4 ,it is not cleverness or learning that makes the philosopher2 it is a certain spirit2 openness of mind1 thoroughness of work1 and hatred of superficiality4 ,each of us1 whatever his opportunities1 can become in a true sense1 if he has the real philosophic spirit1 in ,plato's magnificent words1 8,the spectator of all time and of all existence40 ,,the ,,end