! nucle> %ip ,,savannah fir/ atomic m]*ant %ip "o ( ! _w's ,,safe/ %ips ,u4,s4 ,,dep>tm5t ,,( ,,comm]ce ,fr$]ick ,h4 ,muell]1 ,secret>y ,,m>itime ,,adm9i/ration ,ralph ,e4 ,wilson1 ,*airman1 ,f$]al ,m>itime ,bo>d & ,m>itime ,adm9i/rator ,,atomic ,,en]gy ,,commission ,john ,a4 ,mc,cone1 ,*airman ,illu/ration3 ,multiple advanc$ electronic & me*anical safety devices gu>d ?is 8atomic he>t40 ,,control ,,rod ,,drive ,,motors ,,hydraulic ,,scram ,,cyl9d]s ,,drive ,,l9e ,,lead ,,screw ,,section ,,buff] ,,seal ,,enclosure ,,boron ,,/eel ,,control ,,rods ,,pressure ,,vessel ,,outlet ,,nozzle ,,reactor ,,core ,,!rmal ,,%ield ,,fuel ,,elem5ts ,,fl[ ,,baffle ,,support ,,r+ ,,inlet ,,nozzle ,,pressuriz$ ,,wat] ,,reactor ,! ,n4,s4 ,,savannah1 ! fir/ nucle>-p[]$ c>go-pass5g] %ip1 is "o ( ! safe/ seago+ craft 9 ! _w4 ,?is is ! result ( c>eful & delib]ate plann+4 ,e appropriate safety device1 factor1 & te*nique 7 s\ght 9 ! design & plann+ /age1 & ! %ip's con/ruction has probably be5 m closely & int5sively inspect$1 te/$1 & scrut9iz$ ?an t ( any o!r m]*ant %ip ev] built4 ,,safety ,,policy ,,basic ,! ,decl>ation ( ,policy ( ! ,m]*ant ,m>9e ,act ( #aicf calls ^u ! ,m>itime ,adm9i/ration = ! promotion & ma9t5ance ( an ,am]ican ,m]*ant ,m>9e = trade & def5se 8compos$ ( ! be/ equipp$1 safe/1 & mo/ suitable types ( vessels40 ,! ,atomic ,en]gy ,commission is engag$ 9 ! ,n4,s4 ,,savannah project z a "p ( its responsibility "u ! ,atomic ,en]gy ,act ( #aied 8to enc\rage widespread p>ticipation 9 ! developm5t & utilization ( atomic en]gy = peaceful purposes to ! maximum ext5t consi/5t ) ! common def5se & security & ) ! heal? & safety ( ! public40 ,! ,commission has ! responsibility ( provid+ a safely op]able nucle> p[] plant = ! vessel2 in/ructions & regulations = ! disposition ( wa/es2 ! use1 h&l+1 & disposal ( s\rce1 special nucle>1 & by-product mat]ial2 & ! heal? & safety aspects associat$ ) ^! responsibilities4 ,%ip safety a%ore1 abroad1 on ! high seas1 & 9 port is ( major int]e/ to ! ,m>itime ,adm9i/ration1 ! ,atomic ,en]gy ,commission1 ! ,u4,s4 ,coa/ ,gu>d1 ! ,public ,heal? ,s]vice1 & su* private ag5cies z ! ,am]ican ,bureau ( ,%ipp+4 ,! ,n4,s4 ,,savannah is con/ruct$ to meet or surpass e /&>d set by all ( ^! responsible ag5cies & w h a sub/antial built-9 safety m>g9 9 excess ( ! mo/ /r+5t requirem5ts ( applicable /&>ds1 :i* are among ! highe/ 9 ! _w4 ,:]e !re 7 no exi/+ /&>ds e precaution 9 keep+ ) s\nd judgm5t & eng9e]+ exp]i5ce has be5 appli$ 9 ! con/ruction & safety consid]ations ( ! %ip4 ,! ,n4,s4 ,savannah ,is a ,safe ,%ip ,! reputation ( ,am]ican indu/ry & ! integrity ( ! ,gov]nm5t ( ! ,unit$ ,/ates /& beh9d ?is /atem5t4 ,foll[+ is a detail$ li/+ ( ! factors t make ! ,n4,s4 ,,savannah s safe3 ,,safety ,,factors ,z ! _w's fir/ comm]cial1 non/ation>y type ( nucle> p[] plant1 ! ,,savannah's design & con/ruction h result$ 9 a vessel ) an unprec$5t$ degree ( safety4 ,basically1 ! safety consid]ations conc]n two sep>ate b closely int]-relat$ factors3 7#a7 ,! hull & int]ior /ructure surpass ! highe/ /&>ds ( safety1 bo? 9 ! conv5tional m>9e s5se & 9 ! light ( ! additional factors creat$ by ! in/allation ( a nucle> propulsion plant2 & 7#b7 ,! nucle> propulsion sy/em creates no m haz>d to ! crew & pass5g]s1 & o!r %ips 9 a busy port1 ?an any mod]n conv5tional /eam propulsion sy/em--actually1 9 ! light ( safety factors1 includ$ because ( its prototype nature1 ! ,n4,s4 ,,savannah is z safe z1 & 9 "s respects saf] ?an1 a /eam-p[]$ vessel t burns coal or oil4 ,! basic diff]5ce 9 safety betwe5 a nucle>-p[]$ %ip & a conv5tionally p[]$ %ip involves radioactivity :i* results f ! fission process4 ,provision has be5 made to control ?is radioactivity on ! ,,savannah "u all =eseeable conditions4 ,?is control is accompli%$ ?r\gh ! foll[+ design & op]ational features3 ,,hull ,,& ,,int]ior ,,/ructure ,9 g5]al1 ! foll[+ safety requirem5ts 7 us$ by ! ,,savannah's ar*itects1 ,george ,g4 ,%>p1 ,inc41 9 ! design ( ! %ip3 7#a7 ,! %ip is z safe z1 or saf] ?an1 any o!r vessel ( its class ) reg>d to ! usual 8haz>ds ( ! sea02 & 7#b7 ,9 no cr$ible accid5t c !re be any haz>d\s release ( radioactivity to ! surr\nd+s4 ,! ,,savannah is design$ to a two-comp>tm5t /&>d ( subdivision 7i4e41 ! %ip w rema9 afloat ) two ma9 comp>tm5ts totally flood$7 at a draft ( #bi feet1 #f in*es4 ,! %ip complies ) all ! applicable laws ( ! ,unit$ ,/ates & requirem5ts ( ! regulatory bodies & rules 9 =ce z to /&>ds ( safety4 ,/ructurally1 ! ,,savannah diff]s f conv5tional pass5g]-c>go %ips only 9 t ! reactor & conta9m5t f\ndations are comp>atively mu* heavi] ?an ! f\ndations = normal %ip's ma*9]y4 ,! heavy longitud9al memb]s are c>ri$ well beyond ! reactor space bulkheads to tie ) a smoo? transition into ! d\ble-bottom /ructure4 ,/ability equival5t to t ( a conv5tional pass5g]-c>go %ip ) fuel oil tanks full has be5 obta9$ 9 ! ,,savannah4 ,9 addition1 because !re is no fuel oil to be consum$ 9 passage1 !re is less v>iation 9 ! /ability ( ! %ip dur+ ! c\rse ( a long voyage4 ,,vital ,,compon5ts ,,duplicat$ ,f ! /&po9t ( %ip safety1 assurance ( suffici5t p[] to ma9ta9 /e]age & maneuv]ability is ! pr9cipal requirem5t ( ! propulsion plant4 ,to ?is end1 duplication ( ma*9]y & p[] s\rces on ! ,,savannah has be5 c>ri$ to ! fulle/ practicable degree4 ,an electric 8take-home0 motor is in/all$ = em]g5cy op]ation4 ,develop+ #gej hp 7nom9al71 x is c\pl$ to "o ( ! high-spe$ p9ions 9 ! r$uction ge>4 ,a quick-connect c\pl+ p]mits engagem5t 9 less ?an #b m9utes4 ,9 addition1 a tempor>y supplem5t>y />tup /eam plant is in/all$ 9 ,no4 #g hold4 ,?is plant is capable ( develop+ #b1jjj %p ahead & ab\t #a1gej %p a/]n1 us+ ! ma9 propulsion unit2 9 em]g5cies ?is /eam plant may be us$ 9 lieu ( ! take-home motor4 ,us+ =c$ circulation boil]s1 x c1 l ! take-home motor1 be br\ght on ! l9e 9 ab\t #b m9utes4 ,9 case ( a reactor plant failure1 ! /or$ heat 9 ! reactor sy/em w be available dur+ ! int]im p]iod1 s t at no "t w ! ,,savannah be )\t p[] to ! %aft4 ,f ! /&po9t ( conv5tional %ip op]ation1 ! ,,savannah is design$ & con/ruct$ to ! highe/ degree ( op]ational safety4 ,reactor safety is ensur$ by ! heavy /eel conta9m5t %ell surr\nd+ ! reactor sy/em4 ,?is %ell is design$ to )/& ! pressure surge f ! hypo!tical example1 8maximum cr$ible accid5t10 us$ 9 nucle> reactor analysis4 ,?us1 any int]nal accid5t w be conta9$ )9 ! reactor conta9m5t %ell & no haz>d\s am\nt ( radioactivity c escape to ! environm5t4 ,protection ( ! conta9m5t complex f %ip accid5ts 0 /udi$ 9 detail 9 e/abli%+ ! ,,savannah's design crit]ia4 ,9 p>ticul>1 %ip collisions 7 c>efully review$ & me?ods develop$ to pr$ict /ructural damage to vessels /ruck 9 collision z a function ( spe$ & displacem5t ( ! vessels involv$4 ,on ! basis ( ! data obta9$ f ^! /udies1 ! ,,savannah is design$ & con/ruct$ to )/&1 )\t damage to ! nucle> reactor comp>tm5t1 any collision ) any ( ! %ips mak+ up #ii p]c5t ( ! _w's m]*ant fleet4 ,,collision ,,possibility ,,l[ ,! probability ( collision ) a %ip ( ?is rema9+ #a p]c5t gr\p is extremely l[4 ,consid]+ t ! ,,savannah1 z ! fir/ nucle>-p[]$ m]*ant %ip1 w be h&l$ ) extreme c>e1 ! probability ( a dang]\s release ( radioactivity ?r\gh collision is negligible4 ,because l>ge %ips proce$ at relatively l[ spe$s 9 h>bors1 & because ( ! built-9 invuln]ability ( ! ,,savannah1 ! probability ( a collision ( suffici5t sev]ity to damage ! reactor comp>tm5t is extremely l[4 ,surr\nd+ ! reactor comp>tm5t are heavi]-?an-normal /ructural memb]s4 ,! inn]-bottom1 bel[ ! reactor space1 is 8egg crat$0 ) transv]se floors at e frame2 & a deep v]tical keel ) m ?an ! usual numb] ( keelsons 9 ! =e & aft direction add to ?is /r5g!n+4 ,outbo>d ( ! reactor comp>tm5t are two heavy longitud9al collision bulkheads2 outbo>d ( ^! bulkheads !re is heavi]-?an-normal plat+ cont9u\sly weld$ to ! beams4 ,inbo>d ( ! collision bulkheads are collision mats made up ( alt]nate lay]s ( #a-;in* /eel & #c-;in* r$wood planks = a total ?ickness ( #bd in*es4 ,9 ! ev5t ( a collision broadside to ! reactor comp>tm5t1 ! ramm+ %ip w\ld h to p5etrate #ag feet ( /iff5$ %ip /ructure1 ! collision mat1 & ! reactor conta9m5t vessel1 be=e rea*+ ! reactor plant4 ,,s9k+1 ,,gr\nd+ ,,weigh$ ,o!r accid5ts1 su* z gr\nd+1 fire & explosion1 & s9k+ also 7 consid]$ 9 ! design & con/ruction ( ! ,n4,s4 ,,savannah4 ,gr\nd+ is v simil> to collision 9 its effects1 except t ! damage is ord9>ily m localiz$4 ,! heavy reactor & conta9m5t f\ndations 9 ! inn]-bottom provide adequate protection to ! reactor sy/em4 ,! ,,savannah1 z a pass5g] %ip1 is prohibit$ by ,coa/ ,gu>d regulation f c>ry+ dang]\s & explosive c>go 9 quantity4 ,! %ip's fire-protection & fire-fight+ sy/ems are fully adequate4 ,9 case ( s9k+1 provision has be5 made to all[ = automatic flood+ ( ! conta9m5t %ell ( ! reactor to prev5t its collapse 9 deep wat]s4 ,! flood+ valves are design$ to close ^u pressure equalization s t conta9m5t integrity w be ma9ta9$ ev5 aft] s9k+4 ,salvage connections h be5 in/all$ to all[ conta9m5t purg+ or fill+ ) concrete 9 case ( s9k+ 9 %all[ wat] :]e recov]y or immobilization ( ! reactor plant seems advisable4 ,besides ! v late/ 9 navigation & communication equipm5t1 includ+ true motion rad>1 ! %ip is equipp$ ) antiroll /abiliz]s4 ,locat$ outside ! hull amid%ips1 ! /abiliz]s are op]at$ hydraulically by a gyro sy/em capable ( s5s+ sea conditions & provid+ c\nt]-=ces to r$uce ! roll4 ,ea* /abiliz+ f9 has a lift ( approximately #gj tons at #bj knots spe$4 ,,radiation ,,%ield+ ,"o ( ! mo/ important features ( ! ,,savannah is h] radiation %ield+4 ,! ma9 s\rces ( radiation dur+ op]ation ( ! ,,savannah's p[] plant are ! reactor itself & ! prim>y coolant loop l9es4 ,! prim>y coolant :i* passes ?r\gh ! reactor core is irradiat$1 & itself becomes a s\rce ( radiation4 ,bo? ! reactor & ! coolant emit neutrons & gamma rays4 ,!re are also radiation s\rces ( less] magnitude includ+ process pip+1 hold-up tanks1 pumps1 & dem9]aliz]s4 ,! objective ( radiation %ield+ on ! ,,savannah is tw(old3 ,fir/1 x limits ! radiation dose outside ! conta9m5t to prescrib$ safe levels1 & second1 x r$uces ! activation ( /ructure )9 ! conta9m5t %ell by reactor core neutrons4 ,! latt] consid]ation is necess>y 9 ord] t ! reactor plant be accessible = ma9t5ance )9 #cj m9utes aft] %utd[n4 ,! %ield+ is divid$ into a prim>y %ield1 :i* surr\nds ! reactor itself1 & a second>y %ield1 :i* surr\nds ! entire conta9m5t %ell4 ,,prim>y ,,%ield+ ,! prim>y %ield1 imm$iately surr\nd+ ! reactor pressure vessel1 consi/s ( a #ag-;foot-high lead-cov]$ /eel tank t surr\nds ! reactor vessel ) a #cc-;in* wat]-fill$ annulus4 ,! tank ext5ds f a po9t well bel[ ! active core area to a po9t well above x4 ,! active core height )9 ! reactor is only #fj in*es4 ,con/ruct$ ( c>bon /eel1 ! prim>y %ield tank is cov]$ ) a lay] ( lead v>y+ 9 ?ickness f #b to #d in*es4 ,:5 ! tank is fill$ ) wat]1 ! dose rate outside ! prim>y %ield+ f core gamma s\rces & activat$ nuclei w n exce$ #bjj mr p] h\r #cj m9utes aft] %utd[n4 ,?is is suffici5tly l[ to p]mit entry into ! conta9m5t vessel = inspection or ma9t5ance4 ,,second>y ,,%ield+ ,! conta9m5t %ell completely surr\nds ! prim>y 7reactor7 sy/em1 & s]ves n only to conf9e spread ( radioactivity 9 ! ev5t ( a rupture ( ! sy/em b to support ! hundr$s ( tons ( lead & polye?yl5e ( ! second>y %ield4 ,,conta9m5t ,,%ell ,! prim>y function ( ! conta9m5t %ell is to surr\nd ! prim>y sy/em & provide complete conta9m5t ( any radioactive matt] t might escape f ! sy/em4 ,! design pressure ( ! vessel 0 det]m9$ by po/ulat+ ! in/antane\s release & expansion ( ! entire cont5ts ( ! prim>y sy/em4 ,?is approa* is highly cons]vative because ( ! improbability ( a l>ge rupture4 ,a /udy has be5 made conc]n+ ! p5etration ( ! vessel wall by a piece ( debris 9 an explosion4 ,an analysis ( ! p5etrat+ p[] ( high-spe$ compon5ts indicat$ t ! %ell w\ld conta9 ! l>ge/ missile t c\ld be expect$4 ,! %ell is cyl9drical 9 %ape1 #ce feet 9 diamet] by #ej4e feet long1 & is c5trally locat$ on ! %ip's bottom4 ,! conta9m5t %ell is seal$ at all times dur+ plant op]ation4 ,entry to ! %ell w be made only aft] ! reactor has be5 %ut d[n1 ! %ell purg$ ) air1 & ! radiation level has dropp$ bel[ #bjj mr p] h\r4 ,! bottom half ( ! %ell re/s 9 a cradle ( /eel surr\nd$ by a #dh-;in*-?ick wall ( re9=c$ concrete4 ,! top half ( ! conta9m5t %ell is cov]$ by a #f-;in* lay] ( lead plus a #f-;in* lay] ( polye?yl5e4 ,dur+ normal p[] op]ation1 ?is r$uces ! radiation level to less ?an #j4f mr p] h\r at ! ne>e/ po9t ( access by ! crew4 ,,conta9m5t ,,%ell ,,air ,,condition+ ,?is sy/em ma9ta9s a con/ant maximum ambi5t temp]ature ( #adj ,f4 & a maximum relative humidity ( #gb p]c5t inside ! conta9m5t %ell4 ,! sy/em op]ates 9 conjunction ) ! int]m$iate cool+ wat] sy/em1 us+ #ie ,f4 wat]4 ,dur+ normal op]ation1 ! conta9m5t %ell is seal$ & no outside air w ent] or leave ! vessel4 ,ambi5t conditions w be ma9ta9$ by regulat+ ! cool+ wat] fl[ z requir$ accord+ to in/rum5t read+s on ! control panel4 ,9 all areas :]e crew memb]s h unlimit$ access1 radiation levels w be less ?an #e rem integrat$ dosage p] ye>1 ! recomm5d$ maximum annual exposure ( work]s 9 ! atomic en]gy field4 ,assum+ t pass5g]s w\ld move ab\t ! %ip1 & on ! basis ( _! calculat$ av]age di/ance f ! reactor1 ! av]age exposure ( a pass5g] rema9+ abo>d = a ye> w\ld be "u #j4e rem1 i4e4 _/ ( ! occupational value4 ,! #e rem area is relatively small & n 9 g5]al use4 ,no crew memb] w be abo>d %ip or 9 ! #e rem area cont9u\sly = a full ye>1 & x is d\btful t any crew memb] w actually receive an integrat$ dose ( m ?an #j4e rem 9 a ye>4 ,,electrical ,,sy/em ,?is sy/em supplies p[] to ! reactor sy/em & its auxili>ies & is design$ to op]ate ) a high degree ( reliability to assure reactor safety dur+ all phases ( op]ation & %utd[n4 ,x includes all load control & protective devices1 conta9m5t wir+1 met]+1 int]lock+ & al>ms associat$ ) electrical loads = ! reactor sy/em4 ,p[] = ! sy/em normally is suppli$ by two turb9e-g5]ators1 ea* rat$ at #a1ejj kw1 #j4h pf1 #dej-volts1 #c phase & #fj cycles4 ,= increas$ reliability1 a d\ble bus type arrangem5t is us$4 ,9 ! ev5t ( a bus fault1 an automatic transf] ( all vital loads to ! o!r bus w occur4 ,dur+ normal op]ation1 a circuit break] ties ! two busses toge!r4 ,,radiation ,,monitor+ ,! radiation monitor+ sy/em ( ! ,,savannah keeps a con/ant *eck on ! int5sity ( radiation at v>i\s po9ts )9 ! reactor sy/em z well z areas remote f ! p[] plant4 ,?is sy/em is divid$ into two areas = ?is description4 ,!y are p[]-plant monitor+ & heal? physics monitor+4 ,! latt] is cov]$ "u its own head+4 ,,p[]-,,plant ,,monitor+ ,?r\gh keep+ track ( ! radiation level at v>i\s po9ts 9 ! reactor sy/em1 any abnormalities 9 op]ation c be quickly detect$ & correct$4 ,a leak 9 ! heat ex*ang]s1 = example1 w\ld %[ up on a radiation monitor locat$ 9 ! bl[d[n l9e f ea* ( ! heat ex*ang]s4 ,! int]m$iate cool+ sy/em1 :i* includes cool+ wat] f ! prim>y pumps1 %ield wat] cool]1 conta9m5t air cool]1 & o!r compon5ts n directly 9 ! prim>y loop1 is monitor$ at five locations4 ,leakage ( prim>y loop wat] into ! second>y wat] is possible only f ! pumps & letd[n cool]s1 because ( diff]5ces 9 pressure4 ,consequ5tly1 radiation monitors are locat$ d[n/ream f ! letd[n cool]s & 9 ea* ( ! return l9es f ! pump cool+ coils4 ,! dem9]aliz]s are also monitor$4 ,:5 ! res9 b$ is function+1 ! fl[ d[n/ream 7efflu5t7 w h negligible radioactivity4 ,consequ5tly1 a monitor signal at ?is po9t w indicate :5 to swit* to a new dem9]aliz]4 ,! monitor 9 ! influ5t 7wat] ent]+ ! dem9]aliz]7 measures ! activity level 9 ! prim>y loop4 ,! fission product monitor keeps track ( fission product activity 9 ! prim>y 7reactor7 sy/em4 ,! monitor consi/s ( a cation & anion column1 an amplifi]1 & an indicat+ sy/em4 ,?is monitor is locat$ 9 ! prim>y coolant fl[ sy/em4 ,,tanks ,,hold ,,liquid ,,wa/e ,p[] plant liquid wa/es are collect$ 9 tanks = /orage prior to dis*>ge into a specially design$ s]vic+ vessel 9 port4 ,! liquid wa/e collection tanks are monitor$4 ,gase\s wa/es w normally be dispos$ ( at sea ?r\gh ! radio ma/1 :i* conta9s two detectors = monitor+ purposes4 ,!y are an air-p>ticle monitor & a radio-gas monitor1 & op]ate at all times s t gas is v5t$ to ! atmosph]e4 ,if gase\s radioactivity %\ld rise above specifi$ limits1 ! gas w be dilut$ to bel[ ! limit be=e be+ dis*>g$ to atmosph]e4 ,! above monitor /ations are ! pr9cipal ones involv$ 9 reactor sy/em op]ation4 ,! monitors op]ate ?r\gh a sy/em ( sep>ate *annels1 ) ea* *annel responsible = a pre-select$ range ( activity4 ,all detectors relay _! read+s to ! ma9 panel 9 ! control room1 :]e automatic record+ & visual obs]vation in/rum5ts are locat$4 ,illu/ration3 ,surr\nd$ by /eel1 wood1 concrete1 ! ,n4,s4 ,,savannah reactor is safe aga9/ any cr$ible accid5t4 ,,/abiliz+ ,,bracket ,,port ,,& ,,/>bo>d ,,polye?yl5e 8,c0 ,,deck ,,/eel ,,r$wood ,,collision ,,mat ,,wood ,,pad 8,d0 ,,deck ,,concrete ,,wat]tight ,,bulkhead ,,reactor ,,comp>tm5t ,,/iff5+ ,,r+s ,,lead ,,conta9m5t ,,vessel ,,comp>tm5t ,,bulkhead ,,concrete ,,inn] ,,bottom ,,f\ndations ,,=w>d ,portable monitor+ equipm5t1 sampl]s1 & o!r heal? physics survey equipm5t are provid$ = access1 survey1 & ma9t5ance monitor+4 ,,reactor ,,control ,,& ,,safety ,,sy/ems ,! design ( ! control sy/em is su* t a malfunction :i* leads to an abnormal )drawal rate ( ! rods w n result 9 a dang]\s condition4 ,/udies indicate t ! m9imum reactor p]iod result+ f maximum )drawal ( ! rods is n less ?an #cj seconds4 ,! control sy/em is design$ to ma9ta9 ! net reactivity ins]tion always less ?an ! delay$ neutron fraction4 ,! entire reactor sy/em is protect$ by ! safety sy/em4 ,?is sy/em causes ! reactor to t]m9ate p[] production if a dang]\s op]at+ condition exi/s4 ,! safety sy/em also conta9s int]locks :i* prev5t actions :i* w\ld o!rwise jeop>dize ! reactor sy/em4 ,! control & safety sy/ems are capable ( protect+ ! reactor sy/em f damage due to any cr$ible accid5t except a major leak 9 ! prim>y loop4 ,! reactor w 8scram0 7%ut d[n7 automatically f any ( sev5 causes3 7#a7 %ort] ?an a safe reactor p]iod1 7#b7 excessive p[]1 7#c7 excessive rise or fall 9 reactor pressure1 7#d7 excessive reactor outlet pressure1 7#e7 loss ( fl[1 7#f7 loss ( p[] to safety circuits1 & 7#g7 loss ( p[] to control rod drives4 ,,in/rum5ts ,,d\ble ,,*eck$ ,! nucle> in/rum5tation sy/em provides maximum reliability & safety1 yet m9imizes errone\s read+s or signals f ! monitor+ *annels4 ,?is is done by us+ two or m measur+ *annels 9 ea* op]at+ range1 & !n int]lock+ ! circuits s t at lea/ two ( !m give ! same signal ( abnormal op]at+ conditions be=e initiat+ a reactor 8scram40 ,increas$ reliability is obta9$ by us+ 8solid /ate0 in/rum5ts or magnetic amplifi] units r ?an electron tubes & relays4 ,,reactor ,,safety ,,sy/em ,?is sy/em con/antly monitors signals f ! nucle> & non-nucle> in/rum5tation1 & :5 necess>y takes corrective action4 ,corrective action w be ei!r 9 ! =m ( 8fa/ ins]tion0 ( ! control rods1 or 9 ! =m ( reactor 8scram40 ,fa/ ins]tion takes place at a rate ( #ae in*es p] m9ute1 :ile a scram is a*iev$ 9 #a4f seconds4 ,fa/ ins]tion consi/s ( mov+ all control rods to ! full d[n position at ! fa/e/ rate possible ?r\gh ! electrome*anical drives4 ,= reactor 8scram10 all rods are driv5 to full d[n position "u ! =ce ( a net hydraulic pressure ( #a1bej psi4 ,,%ort] ,,?an ,a ,,safe ,,p]iod ,! reactor p]iod is a measure ( ! rate ( reactor p[] increase2 ! %ort] ! p]iod ! fa/] ! rise4 ,t5 neutron-measur+ *annels1 cov]+ ! full range f s\rce level to #aej p]c5t ( maximum p[]1 measure neutron int5sity 7flux level7 & its rate ( *ange4 ,^! data are cont9u\sly transmitt$ to ! reactor op]ator & ! automatic control & safety sy/em4 ,too fa/ a rate ( *ange1 or %ort] ?an a safe p]iod1 w automatically 8scram0 ! reactor4 ,,excessive ,,p[] ,! am\nt ( p[] produc$ is a function ( ! neutron flux & its resultant heat g5]ation 9 ! prim>y loop4 ,! temp]ature select$ to produce automatic 8scram0 is #edj ,f4 ,?is temp]ature 8scram0 circuit provides an indep5d5t backup to ! neutron flux 8scram40 ,,excessive ,,rise ,,or ,,fall ,,9 ,,pressure ,too l[ a pressure c\ld result 9 boil+ ( ! prim>y coolant1 :ile too high a pressure c\ld result 9 poor heat transf] z well z plac+ unnecess>y /resses on ! reactor's fuel elem5t core /ructure4 ,!re are a numb] ( causes = ei!r condition1 all ( :i* w\ld relay a 8scram0 signal to ! op]ator & to ! automatic safety sy/em4 ,,excessive ,,outlet ,,pressure ,9 addition to protection aga9/ rapid rate ( *ange 9 pressure1 a scram circuit is provid$ to prev5t any /eady excessive outlet pressure t c\ld result 9 damage to ! core & relat$ equipm5t4 ,,loss ,,( ,,fl[ ,?is condition w\ld result f a me*anical failure 9 ! prim>y loop pumps1 pip+1 etc41 or by accid5tally /opp+ ! pumps :5 ! reactor is at p[]1 or by loss ( p[] to ! pumps4 ,:5 a s+le pump fails to op]ate = any reason1 an al>m is s\nd$ to w>n ! op]ator4 ,if all f\r pumps fail to op]ate = any reason1 a signal is s5t to ! reactor safety sy/em to 8scram0 ! reactor4 ,,loss ,,( ,,p[] ,,to ,,safety ,,circuits ,! hydraulic drives t op]ate ! 8scram0 me*anism require res]ve pressure to keep !m 9 ! 8ready0 position = 8scram0 condition & are an integral "p ( ! safety circuitry4 ,a p[] failure 9 ! safety circuits w\ld automatically put ! hydraulic drives into op]ation to 8scram0 ! reactor4 ,,loss ,,( ,,p[] ,,to ,,control ,,rod ,,drives ,ea* ( ! #ba control rods has its own drive m\nt$ v]tically on ! upp] reactor head4 ,( ^!1 #i are s]vo controll$ & #ab are ( ! nons]vo type4 ,! #i s]vo rods h v>iable spe$ drives & op]ate 9 two gr\ps 9 a syn*ron\s mann]1 accord+ to dem& signals f ! reactor sy/em4 ,! #ab-rod gr\p c be op]at$ manually or 9 gr\ps accord+ to pr$et]m9$ conditions4 ,all ( ^! op]ate at a spe$ det]m9$ by _! ge>+4 ,! safety consid]ations are z foll[s3 #a4 ,ea* s]vo loop conta9s a monitor t w s\nd an al>m & initiate a fa/ ins]tion if ! rod fails to foll[ its comm& signal4 #b4 ,ano!r circuit monitors all n9e s]vo monitors1 & %\ld any ( ! s]vo monitors malfunction1 an al>m w s\nd & appropriate corrective action w be tak5 ?r\gh ! automatic safety sy/em4 #c4 8,scram0 action />ts 9 ! safety sy/em & is indep5d5t ( op]ator control4 ,once />t$1 a 8scram0 action _c be /opp$4 #d4 ,= conditions t d n w>rant 8scram0 action1 a fa/ ins]tion s]ves to r$uce p[] & p]mit ! op]ator to correct ! condition )\t a complete %utd[n4 ,a manual fa/ ins]tion c be made by ! op]ator4 ,! electrical circuits controll+ ! reactor control rods are monitor$1 & an electrical failure 9 "o or m circuits w result 9 a fa/ ins]tion or 8scram0 action4 ,%\ld electrical p[] to ! control rod drives fail completely1 ! hydraulic drives w be actuat$4 ,,wa/e ,,/orage ,,& ,,h&l+ ,?is sy/em dra9s & collects1 until safe = removal1 all dra9age f ! reactor sy/em t might be radioactive4 ,dra9age may result f a leak1 or be "p ( ! normal dra9age accumulation dur+ initial fill & te/+1 normal />tup1 op]ation & %utd[n1 & decontam9ation4 ,! dra9age & /orage sy/em consi/s ( two pumps1 valves1 pip+1 conta9m5t dra9 tank1 & f\r wa/e /orage tanks4 ,! total capacity ( ! tanks is #a1cej cubic feet4 ,?is is approximately #hj p]c5t m ?an ! maximum op]ational leakage & dra9age = a #ajj-;day p]iod4 ,provisions are made to take samples f any ( ! five tanks at any "t4 ,aft] sampl+ indicates suffici5tly l[ level ( activity1 ! fluid w be pump$ to special dock facilities = transf] to inl& wa/e disposal sites4 ,no wa/e w be dis*>g$ at sea "u pres5t op]at+ plans4 ,a special #abi-;foot vessel1 ! ,,nsv ,,atomic ,,s]vant1 w s]vice ! ,savannah's reactor & h&le ! radioactive wa/es4 ,! majority ( ! pot5tially radioactive gases v5t into a c5tral manifold4 ,"h !y are monitor$1 dilut$ by fan-driv5 air & dis*>g$ up ! radio ma/ aft] pass+ ?r\gh a s]ies ( filt]s4 ,dur+ normal op]ation1 ! manifold is v5t$ cont9u\sly4 ,h[ev]1 if ! radiation monitor indicates activity levels too high = satisfactory dilution1 ! gases c be div]t$ into ! conta9m5t %ell4 ,,gas ,,filt]$1 ,,monitor$ ,! region betwe5 ! conta9m5t vessel & ! second>y %ield+ is v5tilat$ ) a #d1jjj cfm fan :i* dis*>ges ab\t half way up ! radio ma/4 ,?is gas is n expect$ to be radioactive b z an add$ precaution x is monitor$ to det]m9e if radioactivity is pres5t4 ,all gases releas$ ?r\gh ! radio ma/ are filt]$ to remove p>ticulate matt]4 ,! conta9m5t %ell air is purg$ ) fre% air p]iodically at sea & prior to entry by ! %ip's eng9e]+ crew4 ,dur+ normal op]ation ! only radioactive gas 9 ! %ell is argon-#da1 at a conc5tration less ?an ! maximum p]missible level = cont9u\s occupational exposure4 ,! only pot5tial s\rces ( activity 9 ! conta9m5t air above tol]ance levels w\ld be fission products & ^! are n pres5t dur+ normal op]ation4 ,h[ev]1 z previ\sly describ$1 prior to purg+1 air samples w be analyz$ to asc]ta9 ! activity levels4 ,,heal? ,,physics ,,monitor+ ,,sy/em ,?is sy/em provides radiation protection to crew & pass5g]s ?r\gh con/ant monitor+ = any abnormalities 9 radiation levels t might occur4 ,?is is accompli%$ ?r\gh a sy/em ( #ab radiation detector units 9 ! foll[+ locations3 ,a-deck1 outside doctor's (fice2 ,b-deck1 aft passageway2 ,b-deck1 port passageway2 ,c-deck1 port passageway2 ,c-deck1 aft passageway2 ,d-deck1 />bo>d passageway2 ,d-deck1 bo? =e & aft bulkheads & at tanktop level1 ! port1 />bo>d1 =e & aft passageways4 ,^! #ab monitor units fe$ _! read+s into #b *annels1 ) #f monitors on ea* *annel accord+ to a pr$et]m9$ sequ5ce4 ,a manually op]at$ detector p]mits swit*+ to any "o monitor to all[ obs]vation & /udy ( t /ation = z long z desir$4 ,by means ( a record] on ea* *annel1 a p]man5t record ( ! #ab monitor+ /ations c be obta9$4 ,! detectors are calibrat$ & ma9ta9$ p]iodically by op]at+ p]sonnel us+ a /&>diz$ cobalt-#fj s\rce4 ,ionization *amb]s locat$ at ! po9ts ( entry into ! conta9m5t vessel w det]m9e :5 x is safe to ent] ! vessel4 ,9 addition1 anyone ent]+ ! vessel w c>ry a portable monitor to det]m9e ! dose rate at ! po9t he w be work+4 ,9 addition to ! in/all$ detectors1 !re is a full complem5t ( portable equipm5t to make any specific inve/igations requir$4 ,! equipm5t is us$ to *eck decontam9ation results & to monitor contam9at$ spaces dur+ ma9t5ance4 ,heal? physics p]sonnel1 equipp$ ) portable equipm5t1 accompany all gr\ps work+ any area t might conta9 radioactivity4 ,! heal? physics laboratory abo>d ! %ip is outfitt$ = all te/s requir$ dur+ ! op]ation ( ! reactor plant4 ,,auxili>y ,,sy/ems ,sampl+ ,sy/em4 ,?is sy/em provides a means = remov+ liquid samples f ! prim>y loop to det]m9e ! effectiv5ess ( ! purification sy/em4 ,samples w be tak5 f bo? ! inlet & outlet fl[ ( ! prim>y dem9]aliz]s4 ,int]m$iate ,cool+ ,sy/em4 ,! prim>y function is to provide clean cool+ wat] to ! v>i\s reactor sy/em compon5ts4 ,a second>y function is to ma9ta9 wat] 9 ! annul> prim>y %ield tank4 ,! sy/em consi/s ( two sep>ate fl[ circuits3 a sea wat] circuit & a fre% wat] circuit4 ,ea* ( ^! circuits conta9s two pumps & two cool]s1 plus o!r necess>y compon5ts4 ,! pumps & cool]s are arrang$ 9 p>allel1 p]mitt+ ei!r pump to supply wat] to ei!r cool]4 ,9 ! sea wat] circuit1 inlet temp]ature is #he ,f & outlet temp]ature is #ajf ,f4 ,! fre% wat] ent]s its cool]s at #adc ,f & leaves at #ie ,f4 ,compon5ts outside & inside ( ! conta9m5t vessel are cool$ by "o or ! o!r ( ^! int]m$iate cool+ circuits4 ,,extra ,,em]g5cy ,,p[] ,two auxili>y #gej-kw diesel g5]ator sets are on /&by to provide ! foll[+3 7#a7 ,p[] to ! ma9 bus = op]at+ ^? loads ne$$ to supply cool+ = decay-heat removal aft] a scram or %utd[n1 7#b7 em]g5cy 8take-home0 p[] %\ld ! nucle> p[] plant become inop]ative1 7#c7 p[] = reactor />tup1 & 7#d7 sp>e g5]at+ capacity = normal op]ation %\ld a turb9e g5]ator become inop]ative4 ,9 ! ev5t ( a reactor 8scram10 ^! g5]ators w automatically />t & syn*ronize on ! ma9 bus b> to supply & di/ribute p[] to ! compon5ts us$ = reactor cool+4 ,a #cjj-kw em]g5cy diesel g5]ator is also available to supply p[] to ! #dej-volt em]g5cy swit*bo>d4 ,?is s\rce w op]ate 9 case bo? ! ma9 turb9e g5]ators & auxili>y diesel g5]ators d n4 ,loads connect$ to ! em]g5cy swit*bo>d include light+1 l[ spe$ w9d+s ( ! prim>y coolant pumps1 & ! em]g5cy cool+ sy/em4 ,a batt]y protect$ s\rce w also provide p[] to ^? loads t require an especially dep5dable p[] s\rce ) no int]ruption due to loss or swit*+ ( auxili>y p[]4 ,,take-,,home ,,p[] ,z m5tion$1 9 ! electrical sy/em !re are two #gej-kw diesel g5]ator sets in/all$ 9 ! eng9e room4 ,if any em]g5cy 8take-home0 p[] is requir$1 ei!r diesel g5]ator c be us$ to op]ate a #gej-;hp w\nd rotor motor1 :i* is connect$ to ! %ip's propell]1 ?r\gh ! r$uction ge>s4 ,ea* diesel g5]ator is siz$ to furni% adequate p[] = reactor decay heat removal1 light+1 & necess>y %ip s]vice4 ,n4,s4 ,,savannah ,,mann$ ,,= ,,safety ,to assure t ! fir/ nucle>-propell$ m]*ant %ip w be completely safe1 x is mann$ by well-tra9$1 compet5t p]sonnel ^: duty & responsibility x is to op]ate ! %ip safely & effici5tly4 ,e me*anical & electrical safety device ( mod]n navigation is at ! disposal ( ! ,,savannah's crew to insure ! safety & integrity ( ! %ip4 ,! m5 :o w h&le ! ,,savannah a%ore & afloat w h _h ! advantage ( ! specializ$ & ext5sive tra9+ program conduct$ by ! ,atomic ,en]gy ,commission1 ! ,m>itime ,adm9i/ration1 & ! private contractors :o built ! ,n4,s4 ,,savannah & h] reactor4 ,! %ip's ma/] & (fic]s are m5 ( long exp]i5ce on ! sea ^: backgr\nds assure s\nd & /able assessm5t & judgm5t "u all possible conditions4 ,all ( ! factors h]e9 discuss$ make x possible = ! ,unit$ ,/ates ,gov]nm5t to say ( ! ,n4,s4 ,,savannah1 z %e u%]s 9 ! atomic age on ! _w's ess5tial trade r\tes1 t ?is unique & wond]ful vessel is unque/ionably "o ( ! _w's safe/ %ips4 ,,! ,,nucle> ,,%ip ,,savannah ,,is ,,design$ ,,& ,,built ,,to ,,^! ,,safety ,,requirem5ts ,,applicable ,,codes ,,(3 #a4 ,u4,s4 ,coa/ ,gu>d #b4 ,am]ican ,bureau ( ,%ipp+ #c4 ,m>itime ,adm9i/ration #d4 ,u4,s4 ,public ,heal? ,s]vice #e4 ,am]ican ,in/itute ( ,electrical ,eng9e]s ,m>9e ,code #f4 ,u4,s4 ,atomic ,en]gy ,commission ,,safety ,,review ,,by3 #a4 ,,aec ,advisory ,committee on ,reactor ,safegu>ds ,,design ,,review ,,by3 #a4 ,u4,s4 ,coa/ ,gu>d #b4 ,m>itime ,adm9i/ration #c4 ,,aec 7,a7 ,oak ,ridge ,national ,laboratory 7,b7 ,electric ,boat ,company #d4 ,am]ican ,bureau ( ,%ipp+ ,u4,s4 ,,gov]nm5t ,,pr9t+ ,,(fice3 #aifj ,o--#efbjag ,illu/ration3 ,! ,n4,s4 ,,savannah's con/ruction meets ultimate /&>ds ( heal? & environm5tal safety4 ,,pass5g] ,,d9+ ,,room ,,crew ,,qu>t]s ,,ma9 ,,l\nge ,,pass5g] ,,/at]ooms ,,reactor ,,hat* ,,reactor ,,aux4 ,,hat* ,,crew ,,qu>t]s ,,c>go ,,hold ,,ma*9]y ,,control ,,c5t] ,,eng9e ,,room ,,%ip',s ,,provisions ,,/abiliz] ,,space ,,c>go ,,hold ,,reactor ,,conta9m5t ,,vessel ,illu/ration3 ,! ,n4,s4 ,,savannah--_w's fir/ atomic m]*ant %ip--pride ( ! ,am]ican ,m]*ant ,m>9e--model ( m>itime safety4 ,transcrib]'s ,notes --,sil5tly correct$ a few typos4 --,reta9$ publication in=mation f ! pr9t$ edition3 ?is e,book is public-doma9 9 ! c\ntry ( publication4 --,9 ! text v]sions only1 text 9 italics is delimit$ by und]scores4