,the ,misuse of ,mind ,a ,study of ,bergson's ,attack on ,intellectualism by ,karin ,stephen ,formerly ,fellow of ,newnham ,college1 ,cambridge ,with a ,prefatory ,letter by ,,henri ,,bergson ,,london ,,kegan ,,paul1 ,,trench1 ,,trubner ,,co41 ,,ltd ,,new ,,york3 ,,harcourt4 ,,brace ,,company4 ,,inc4 #aibb ,to ,professor ,henri ,bergson ,with respect and gratitude ,contents ,,prefatory ,,note ,,preface ,,chapter ,i4 ,,explanation ,,chapter ,,ii4 ,,fact ,,chapter ,,iii4 ,,matter ,,and ,,memory ,,prefatory ,,note ,being an extract from a letter by ,professor ,henri ,bergson ,ayant lu de prs le travail de ,mrs4 ,stephen je le trouve intressant au plus haut point4 ,c'est une interprtation personelle et originale de l'ensemble de mes vues--interprtation qui vaut par elle-mme1 indpendamment de ce qui j' ai crit4 ,l'auteur s'est assimil l'esprit de la doctrine1 puis1 se dgageant de la matrialit du texte elle a dvelopp sa manire1 dans la direction qu'elle avait choisi1 des ides qui lui paraissaient fondamentales4 ,grce la distinction qu'elle 8tablit entre 8 fact 8 et 8 matter1 8 elle a pu ramener l'unit1 et prsenter avec une grande rigueur logique1 des vues que j'avais t oblig1 en raison de ma mthode de recherche1 d'isoler les unes des autres4 ,bref1 son travail a une grande valeur2 il tmoigne d'une rare force de pense4 ,,henri ,,bergson4 ,,preface ,the immense popularity which ,bergson's philosophy enjoys is sometimes cast up against him1 by those who do not agree with him1 as a reproach4 ,it has been suggested that ,berg-son's writings are welcomed simply because they offer a theoretical justification for a tendency which is natural in all of us but against which philosophy has always fought1 the tendency to throw reason overboard and just let ourselves go4 ,bergson is regarded by rationalists almost as a traitor to philosophy1 or as a ,bolshevik inciting the public to overthrow what it has taken years of painful effort to build up4 ,it is possible that some people who do not understand this philosophy may use ,bergson's name as a cloak for giving up all self-direction and letting themselves go intellectually to pieces1 just as hooligans may use a time of revolution to plunder in the name of the ,red ,guard4 ,but ,bergson's philosophy is in reality as far from teaching mere laziness as ,communism is from being mere destruction of the old social order4 ,bergson attacks the use to which we usually put our minds1 but he most certainly does not suggest that a philosopher should not use his mind at all2 he is to use it for all it is worth1 only differently1 more efficiently for the purpose he has in view1 the purpose of knowing for its own sake4 ,there is1 of course1 a sense in which doing anything in the right way is simply letting one's self go1 for after all it is easier to do a thing well than badly--it certainly takes much less effort to produce the same amount of result4 ,so to know in the way which ,bergson recommends does in a sense come more easily than attempting to get the knowledge we want by inappropriate methods4 ,if this saving of waste effort is a fault1 then ,bergson must plead guilty4 ,but as the field of knowledge open to us is far too wide for any one mind to explore1 the new method of knowing1 though it requires less effort than the old to produce the same result1 does not thereby let us off more easily1 for with a better instrument it becomes possible to work for a greater result4 ,it is not because it affords an excuse for laziness that ,bergson's philosophy is popular but because it gives expression to a feeling which is very widespread at the present time1 a distrust of systems1 theories1 logical constructions1 the assumption of premisses and then the acceptance of everything that follows logically from them4 ,there is a sense of impatience with thought and a thirst for the actual1 the concrete4 ,it is because the whole drift of ,bergson's writing is an incitement to throw over abstractions and get back to facts that so many people read him1 hoping that he will put into words and find an answer to the unformulated doubt that haunts them4 ,it was in this spirit that the writer undertook the study of ,bergson4 ,on the first reading he appeared at once too persuasive and too vague1 specious and unsatisfying3 a closer investigation revealed more and more a coherent theory of reality and a new and promising method of investigating it4 ,the apparent unsatisfactoriness of the first reading arose from a failure to realize how entirely new and unfamiliar the point of view is from which ,bergson approaches metaphysical speculation4 ,in order to understand ,bergson it is necessary to adopt his attitude and that is just the difficulty1 for his attitude is the exact reverse of that which has been inculcated in us by the traditions of our language and education and now comes to us naturally4 ,this common sense attitude is based on certain assumptions which are so familiar that we simply take them for granted without expressly formulating them1 and indeed1 for the most part1 without even realizing that we have been making any assumptions at all4 ,bergson's principal aim is to direct our attention to the reality which he believes we all actually know already1 but misinterpret and disregard because we are biassed by preconceived ideas4 ,to do this ,bergson has to offer some description of what this reality is1 and this description will be intelligible only if we are willing and able to make a profound change in our attitude1 to lay aside the old assumptions which underlie our every day common sense point of view and adopt1 at least for the time being1 the assumptions from which ,bergson sets out4 ,this book begins with an attempt to give as precise an account as possible of the old assumptions which we must discard and the new ones which we must adopt in order to understand ,bergson's description of reality4 ,to make the complete reversal of our ordinary mental habits needed1 for understanding what ,bergson has to say requires a very considerable effort from anyone1 but the feat is perhaps most difficult of all for those who have carefully trained themselves in habits of rigorous logical criticism4 ,in attempting to describe what we actually know in the abstract logical terms which are the only means of intercommunication that human beings possess1 ,bergson is driven into perpetual self-contradiction1 indeed1 paradoxical though it may sound1 unless he contradicted himself his description could not be a true one4 ,it is easier for the ordinary reader to pass over the self contradictions1 hardly even being aware of them1 and grasp the underlying meaning3 the trained logician is at once pulled up by the nonsensical form of the description and the meaning is lost in a welter of conflicting words4 ,this1 ,i think1 is the real reason why some of the most brilliant intellectual thinkers have been able to make nothing of ,bergson s philosophy3 baffled by the self-contradictions into which he is necessarily driven in the attempt to convey his meaning they have hastily assumed that ,bergson had no meaning to convey4 ,the object of this book is to set out the relation between explanations and the actual facts which we want to explain and thereby to show exactly why ,bergson must use self-contradictory terms if the explanation of reality which he offers is to be a true one4 ,having first shown what attitude ,bergson requires us to adopt ,i have gone on to describe what he thinks this new way of looking at reality will reveal4 ,this at once involves me in the difficulty with which ,bergson wrestles in all his attempts to describe reality1 the difficulty which arises from the fundamental discrepancy between what he sees the actual fact to be and the abstract notions which are all he has with which to describe it4 ,i have attempted to show how it comes about that we are in fact able to perform this apparently impossible feat of describing the indescribable1 using ,bergson's descriptions of sensible perception and the relations of matter and memory to illustrate my point4 ,if we succeed in ridding ourselves of our common-sense preconceptions1 ,bergson tells us that we may expect to know the old facts in a new way1 face to face1 as it were1 instead of seeing them through a web of our own intellectual interpretations4 ,i have not attempted to offer any proof whether or not ,bergson's description of reality is in fact true3 having understood the meaning of the description it remains for each of us to decide for himself whether or not it fits the facts4 ,,karin ,,stephen4 ,cambridge1 ,january1 #aibb4 ,,chapter ,i ,,explanation ,in order to understand ,bergson it is not necessary to have any previous acquaintance with philosophy1 indeed the less the reader knows of current metaphysical notions the easier it may perhaps be for him to adopt the mental attitude required for understanding ,bergson4 ,for ,bergson says that the tradition of philosophy is all wrong and must be broken with3 according to his view philosophical knowledge can only be obtained by 8a reversal of the usual work of the intellect40#a #a ,introduction to ,metaphysics1 page #cd4 ,the usual work of the intellect consists in analysis and classification3 if you have anything presented to you which you do not understand the obvious question to put yourself is1 8what is it80 ,suppose in a dark room which you expected to find empty you stumble against something1 the natural thing to do is to begin at once to try to fit your experience into some class already familiar to you4 ,you find it has a certain texture which you class as rather rough1 a temperature which you class as warm1 a size which you class as about two feet high1 a peculiar smell which you recognise and you finally jump to the answer to your question3 it is 8a dog40 ,this intellectual operation is a sample of the way in which it comes natural to us to set to work whenever we find ourselves confronted with any situation which we are not able to classify off hand1 we are not easy till we can say what the situation is1 and saying what consists in hitting upon some class with which we are already familiar to which it belongs3 in this instance the question was answered when you succeeded in describing the situation to yourself as 8stumbling upon a dog40 ,now you were only able to class what was stumbled upon as a dog after you had recognised a certain number of properties as being those shared by dogs--the rough texture1 the size1 the smell4 ,you analysed the situation as containing these qualities and thereupon classified what had been stumbled upon as a dog4 ,analysis and classification are the two methods which we are accustomed to rely upon for improving our knowledge in unfamiliar situations and we are accustomed to take it that they improve our knowledge of the whole situation3 anyone who said that after you were able to say what you had stumbled upon you knew less of the whole situation than you knew before would find it difficult to get you to agree4 ,and yet this is very much the position which ,bergson takes up4 ,analysis and classification1 he would admit1 are the way to get more knowledge1 of a kind2 they enable us to describe situations and they are the starting point of all explanation and prediction4 ,after analysis and classification you were able to say1 8,i have stumbled upon a dog10 and having got so far you could then pass on to whatever general laws you knew of as applying to the classes into which you had fitted the situation1 and by means of these laws still more of the situation could be classified and explained4 ,thus by means of the general law1 8dogs lick10 you would be furnished with an explanation if perhaps you felt something warm and damp on your hand1 or again knowledge of this law might lead you to expect such a feeling4 ,when what we want is to describe or to explain a situation in general terms then ,bergson agrees that analysis and classification are the methods to employ1 but he maintains that these methods which are useful for describing and explaining are no use for finding out the actual situation which we may want to describe or explain4 ,and he goes a step further4 ,not only do these methods fail to reveal the situation but the intellectual attitude of abstraction to which they accustom us seriously handicaps us when we want not merely to explain the situation but to know it4 ,now it is the business of science to explain situations in terms of general laws and so the intellectual method of abstract-ion is the right one for scientists to employ4 ,bergson claims1 however1 that philosophy has a task quite distinct from that of science4 ,in whatever situation he finds himself a man may take up one of two attitudes1 he may either adopt a practical attitude1 in which case he will set to work to explain the situation in order that he may know what to do under the circumstances1 or he may take a speculative interest in it and then he will devote himself to knowing it simply for the sake of knowing4 ,it is only1 according to ,bergson1 in the former case1 when his interest is practical1 that he will attain his object by using the intellectual method of abstraction which proceeds by analysis and classification4 ,these intellectual operations have such prestige1 however1 they have proved so successful in discovering explanations1 that we are apt to take it for granted that they must be the best way to set1 to work whatever sort of knowledge we want3 we might almost be tempted1 off hand1 to imagine that they were our only way of knowing at all1 but a moment's reflection will show that this1 at any rate1 would be going too far4 ,before we can analyse and classify and explain we must have something to analyse1 some material to work upon3 these operations1 are based upon something which we know directly1 what we see1 for instance1 or touch or feel4 ,this something is the foundation of knowledge1 the intellectual operations of analysis classification and the framing of general laws are simply an attempt to describe and explain it4 ,it is the business of science to explain and intellectual methods are the appropriate ones for science to employ4 ,but the business of philosophy1 according to ,bergson1 is not to explain reality but to know it4 ,for this a different kind of mental effort is required4 ,analysis and classification1 instead of increasing our direct knowledge1 tend rather to diminish it4 ,they must always start from some direct knowledge1 but they proceed1 not by widening the field of this knowledge but by leaving out more and more of it4 ,moreover1 unless we are constantly on the alert1 the intellectual habit of using all our direct knowledge as material for analysis and classification ends by completely misleading us as to what it is that we do actually know4 ,so that the better we explain the less1 in the end1 we know4 ,there can be no doubt that something is directly known but disputes break out as soon as we try to say what that something is4 ,is it the 8real0 world of material objects1 or a mental copy of these objects1 or are we altogether on the wrong track in looking for two kinds of realities1 the 8real0 world and 8our mental states10 and is it perceived events alone that are 8real80 ,this something which we know directly has been given various names3 8the external object10 8sense data10 8phenomena10 and so on1 each more or less coloured by implications belonging to one or other of the rival theories as to what it is4 ,we shall call it 8the facts0 to emphasise its indubitable reality1 and avoid1 as far as possible1 any other implications4 ,controversy about 8the facts0 has been mainly as to what position they occupy in the total scheme of reality4 ,as to what they are at the moment when we are actually being acquainted with them one would have thought there could have been no two opinions2 it seems impossible that we should make any mistake about that4 ,no doubt it is impossible to have such a thing as a false experience1 an experience is what it is1 only judgments can be false4 ,but it is quite possible to make a false judgment as to what experience we are actually having1 or1 still more commonly1 simply to take for granted that our experience must be such and such1 without ever looking to see whether it is or not4 ,a small child taken to a party and told that parties are great fun if questioned afterwards will very likely say it has enjoyed itself though1 if you happened to have been there1 you may have seen clearly that it was really bewildered or bored4 ,even when we grow up names still have a tendency to impose upon us and disguise from us the actual nature of our experiences4 ,there are not very many people who1 if invited to partake1 for instance1 of the last bottle of some famous vintage wine1 would have the courage to admit1 even to themselves1 that it was nasty1 even though it was1 in fact1 considerably past its prime4 ,cases of this kind1 with which we are all familiar1 are enough to make us realize that it is actually quite possible to make mistakes even about facts which we know directly1 to overlook the actual fact altogether because we have made up our minds in advance as to what it is sure to be4 ,now ,bergson says that such errors are not confined to stray instances1 such as we have noticed1 in which the imposition of preconceived ideas can readily be detected by a little closer attention to the actual facts4 ,he believes that a falsification due to preconceived ideas1 runs right through the whole of our direct experience4 ,he lays the blame both for this falsification and for our failure to detect it upon our intellectual habit of relying upon explanation rather than upon direct knowledge1 and that is one of the reasons why he says that our intellectual attitude is an obstacle to direct knowledge of the facts4 ,the intellectual method of abstraction by which we analyse and classify is the foundation of all description and explanation in terms of general laws1 and the truth is that we are1 as a rule1 much more preoccupied with explaining the facts which we know than with the actual experiencing of them4 ,this preoccupation is natural enough4 ,the bare fact which we know directly is not enough to enable us to carry on our everyday lives1 we cannot get on unless we supplement it with some sort of explanation and1 if it comes to choosing between fact and explanation1 the explanation is often of more practical use than the fact4 ,so it comes about that we are inclined to use the facts which we know directly simply as material for constructing explanations and to pay so little attention to them for their own sakes that we simply take it for granted that they must be what our explanations lead us to suppose they are4 ,now according to ,bergson the attitude of mind required for explaining the facts conflicts with that which is required for knowing them4 ,from the point of view simply of knowing1 the facts are all equally important and we cannot afford to discriminate1 but for explanation some facts are very much more important than others4 ,when we want to explain1 therefore1 rather than simply to know1 we tend to concentrate our attention upon these practically important facts and pass over the rest4 ,for in order to describe and explain a situation we have to classify it1 and in order to do this we must pick out in it properties required for membership of some one or other of the classes known to us4 ,in the situation which we originally considered by way of illustration1 for instance1 you had to pick out the qualities of roughness1 warmth and so on1 in order to classify what you had stumbled upon as 8a dog40 ,now the picking out of these particular qualities is really an operation of abstraction from the situation as a whole3 they were the important features of the situation from the point of view of classifying what you had stumbled upon1 but they by no means exhausted the whole situation4 ,our preoccupation with explaining the facts1 then1 leads us to treat what we know directly as so much material for abstraction4 ,this intellectual attitude1 as ,bergson calls it1 though practically useful1 has1 according to him1 two grave drawbacks from the point of view of speculation4 ,by focussing our attention upon anything less than the whole fact1 and so isolating a part from the rest1 he says we distort what we knew originally3 furthermore just in so far as we make a selection among the facts1 attending to some and passing over others1 we limit the field of direct knowledge which we might otherwise have enjoyed4 ,for these two reasons ,bergson insists that it is the business of philosophy to reverse the intellectual habit of mind and return to the fullest possible direct knowledge of the fact4 8,may not the task of philosophy1 8he says10 be to bring us back to a fuller perception of reality by a certain displacement of our attention8 ,what would be required would be to turn our attention away from the practically interesting aspect of the universe in order to turn it back to what1 from a practical point of view1 is useless4 ,and this conversion of attention would be philosophy itself40#b #b ,la ,perception du ,changement1 page #ac4 #bd ,at first sight it appears paradoxical and absurd to maintain that our efforts to analyse1 classify and explain the facts tend rather to limit than to extend our knowledge1 and furthermore distort even such facts as we still remain acquainted with4 ,common sense has no doubt that1 far from limiting and distorting our knowledge1 explanation is the only possible way in which we can get beyond the little scraps of fact which are all that we can ever know directly4 ,if the views of common sense on this question were formulated1 which1 for the most part1 they are not1 they would be something like this4 ,until we begin to think the facts which we know directly are all muddled together and confused3 first of all it is necessary to sort them by picking out qualities from the general confusion in which they are at first concealed4 ,it is possible that during this process1 which is what is called analysis1 we may be obliged1 at first1 to overlook some of what we already know in a vague sort of way1 but this insignificant loss is compensated by the clarity of what remains1 and is1 in any case1 only temporary4 ,for as the analysis proceeds we gradually replace the whole of the original mere muddle by clear and definite things and qualities4 ,at first we may be able to distinguish only a few qualities here and there1 and our preoccupation with these may possibly lead us1 for a time1 to pay insufficient attention to the rest of the muddle which we know directly but have not yet succeeded in analysing4 ,but when the analysis is completed the distinct things and qualities which we shall then know will contain all that we originally knew1 and more besides1 since the analysis will have revealed much that was originally concealed or only implicit in the original unanalysed fact4 ,if1 for instance1 you look at a very modern painting1 at first what you are directly aware of may be little more than a confused sight3 bye and bye1 as you go on looking1 you will be able to distinguish colours and shapes1 one by one objects may be recognised until finally you may be able to see the whole picture at a glance as composed of four or five different colours arranged in definite shapes and positions4 ,you may even be able to make out that it represents a human figure1 or a landscape4 ,common sense would tell you that if your analysis is complete these colours and shapes will exhaust the whole of what you originally knew and moreover that in the course of it much will have been discovered which originally you could hardly be said to have known at all1 so that analysis1 far from limiting your direct knowledge1 will have added to it considerably4 ,starting1 then1 originally1 from a very meagre stock of direct knowledge1 analysis1 according to the common sense view1 by discovering more and more qualities1 builds up for us more and more direct knowledge4 ,bergson begins just the other way up4 ,he starts from the idea of a whole field of direct knowledge vastly more extended than the actual facts of which we are normally aware as making up our direct experience4 ,he calls this whole field of knowledge 8virtual knowledge40 ,this field of virtual knowledge contains the whole of the actions and reactions of matter in which our body has its part at any moment1 the multitude of stimulations which actually assail the senses but which we normally disregard1 together with all the responses by which our bodies adjust themselves to these stimulations1 and1 in addition1 the whole of our past4 ,for ,bergson the problem is to explain1 not how we increase our direct knowledge1 but how we limit it3 not how we remember1 but how we forget4 8,our knowledge10 he says1 8far from being built up by a gradual combination of simple elements1 is the result of a sharp dissociation4 ,from the infinitely vast field of our virtual knowledge we have selected1 to turn into actual knowledge1 whatever concerns our action upon things2 the rest we have neglected4 ,the brain appears to have been constructed on purpose for this work of selection4 ,it is easy enough to show that this is so in the case of memory4 ,our past1 as we shall show in the next lecture1 is necessarily preserved1 automatically4 ,it survives in its entirety4 ,but it is to our practical interest to put it aside1 or at any rate only to accept just so much of it as can more or less usefully throw light on the present situation and complete it4 ,the brain enables us to make this selection3 it materialises the useful memories and keeps those which would be of no use below the threshold of consciousness4 ,the same thing may be said of perception3 perception is the servant of action and out of the whole of reality it isolates only what interests us2 it shows us not so much the things themselves as what we can make of them4 ,in advance it classifies them1 in advance it arranges them2 we barely look at the object1 it is enough for us to know to what category it belongs40#c #c ,la ,perception du ,changement1 pages #ab and #ac4 #bg ,according to ,bergson the facts which we actually know directly in the ordinary course are discriminated out of a very much wider field which we must also be said in a sense to know directly though most of it lies outside the clear focus of attention4 ,this whole field of virtual knowledge is regarded as standing to the actual facts to which we usually devote our attention1 much as1 for instance1 the whole situation of stumbling upon something in a dark room stood to the single quality of roughness3 in both cases there is a central point in the full focus of attention which we are apt to look upon as the fact directly known1 but this central point is really surrounded by a vastly wider context and this too is known in some sense though it is commonly ignored4 ,for all philosophies1 whether they be ,bergson's or the view of common sense or any other1 the actual facts which require to be explained are the same1 and1 though any positive assertion as to what these facts are may be hotly disputed1 it will probably be admitted that as we ordinarily know them they consist in some direct experience1 undeniable as far as it goes4 ,the point at issue between ,bergson and common sense is1 precisely1 how far it does go4 ,both sides would admit that1 in this fact directly known1 what is in the full focus of attention at any given moment is very limited2 on the other hand both would admit that this fully focussed fact is set in a context1 or fringe1 with no clearly defined limits which also goes to make up the whole fact directly known though we do not usually pay much attention to it4 ,the fact directly known being given the problem is to find out what it is and how it comes to be known4 ,what is actually given and needs to be accounted for is the fact clearly focussed1 with its less clearly defined fringe3 ,bergson's sweeping assumption of the existence of a further vast field of virtual knowledge in order to account for it1 does1 at first sight1 seem arbitrary and unwarranted and in4 need of considerable justification before it can be accepted4 ,for him the problem then becomes1 not to account for our knowing as much as we do1 but to see why it is that we do not know a great deal more3 why our actual knowledge does not cover the whole field of our virtual knowledge4 ,common sense1 on1 the other hand1 sets out from the assumption of ignorance1 absence of awareness1 as being1 as it were1 natural and not needing any accounting for1 and so it regards the problem as being to explain why any experience ever occurs at all4 ,the assumption of ignorance as being the natural thing seems at first sight to need no justification1 but this may well be due merely to our having grown accustomed to the common sense point of view4 ,when one begins to question this assumption it begins to appear just as arbitrary as the contrary standpoint adopted by ,bergson4 ,the actual facts are neither ignorance nor full knowledge and in accounting for them it is really just as arbitrary to assume one of these two extremes as the other4 ,the truth appears to be that in order to account for the facts one must make some assumptions1 and these1 not being facts actually given1 are bound to be more or less arbitrary4 ,they seem more or less 8natural0 according as we are more or less accustomed to the idea of them1 but they are really justified only according to the success with which they account for the actual facts4 ,this idea of putting the problem of knowledge in terms exactly the reverse of those in which it seems 8natural0 to put it was originally suggested to ,bergson by his study of the important work on amnesia carried out by ,charcot and his pupils1 and also by such evidence as was to be had at the time when he wrote on the curious memory phenomena revealed by the use of hypnotism and by cases of spontaneous dissociation4 ,it is impossible to prove experimentally that no experience is ever destroyed but it is becoming more and more firmly established that enormous numbers of past experiences1 which are inaccessible to ordinary memory and which therefore it would seem 8natural0 to suppose destroyed1 can1 if the right methods are employed1 be revived even with amazing fullness of detail4 ,in recent years since ,bergson's books were first published1 great strides have been made in the experimental investigation of the whole subject of memory1 and the evidence thus obtained1 far from upsetting the theory of memory suggested to him by the less extensive evidence which was available at the time when he wrote1 lends it striking support4 ,it appears to be accepted by doctors who use hypnotism in psychotherapy that under hypnotism many patients can perfectly well be taken back in memory to any period of their lives which the doctor chooses to ask for1 and can be made not only to remember vaguely a few incidents which occurred at the time but actually to re-live the whole period in the fullest possible detail1 feeling over again with hallucinatory vividness all the emotions experienced at the time4 ,this re-living of past experience can1 with some patients1 be made to go on indefinitely1 through the whole day1 if the doctor has time to attend to it1 every little incident being faithfully recalled though the actual event may have taken place #bj or #cj years previously4 ,and this happens not simply in the case of some very striking event or great crisis which the patient has been through1 indeed it is just the striking events that are often hardest to recover4 ,some doctors1 in order to get at the crisis1 have found it useful occasionally to put patients back through one birthday after another right back even as early as their second year1 to see at what point in their lives some particular nervous symptom first appeared1 and each successive birthday is lived through again in the utmost detail4#d #d ,see ,psychology and ,psychotherapy by ,dr4 ,william ,brown4 ,evidence of this kind does not1 of course1 prove that literally nothing is ever lost but it goes far towards upsetting the ordinary view that it is the rule for past experience to be annihilated and the exception for fragments here and there to be preserved in memory4 ,the evidence which has so far been collected and which is rapidly accumulating at least seems to justify us in reversing this rule and saying rather that to be preserved is the rule for experience and to be lost would be the exception1 if indeed any experience ever really is lost at all4 ,this way of regarding the field of memory is further supported by such evidence as has been collected with regard to the influence of past experience in dreams1 phobias and various forms of insanity1 but in these cases1 of course1 it is only isolated past experiences here and there whose activity can be observed1 and so1 while helping to upset the most natural assumption that whatever cannot be recalled by ordinary efforts of memory may be assumed to have been destroyed1 they do not lend very much support to the wider view put forward by ,bergson1 that no experience1 however trivial1 is ever destroyed but that all of it is included in the field out of which memory makes its practical selection4 ,taking all the evidence with regard to the preservation of past experience which is at present available1 then1 it is safe to say that1 while it cannot1 in the nature of things1 absolutely prove ,bergson's theory of knowledge1 it in no way conflicts with it and even supports it1 positively in the sense that the theory does fit the facts well enough to explain them 7though it goes further than the actual facts and makes assumptions which can neither be proved nor disproved by an appeal to them7 and negatively in the sense that what we now know about memory actually conflicts with the 8natural0 view that past experience which we are unable to recall has been destroyed1 which is commonly appealed to to show the absurdity of the rival theory put forward by ,bergson4 ,on the assumption which ,bergson makes of a much wider field of direct knowledge than that which contains what we are accustomed to regard as the actual facts which we know directly1 ,bergson's problem becomes how to account for these facts being so much less than the whole field which we might have expected to have known4 ,the answer1 according to him1 is to be found in our practical need of being prepared in advance for what is to come1 at whatever sacrifice of direct knowledge of past and present facts4 ,for practical purposes it is essential to use present and past facts as signs of what is coming so that we may be ready for it4 ,to this end it is far more important to know the general laws according to which facts occur than to experience the facts themselves in their fullness4 ,our intellectual habits which prompt us to set to work at once in every unfamiliar situation to analyse and classify it fit us for discovering these laws3 in so far as we are intellectual we incline to regard facts mainly as material for arriving at descriptions which themselves form the material out of which1 by a further intellectual effort1 explanations are framed in terms of general laws1 which we need to know if we are to be ready for what is going to happen4 ,now these laws are general laws applying to whole classes of facts of one kind1 or another4 ,facts1 therefore1 only form material for discovering laws in so far as they can be classified into kinds4 ,the first step in classifying a fact is called analysis and consists in discovering common qualities which the fact possesses4 ,according to ,bergson the discovery of common qualities in a fact consists simply in learning to overlook everything in that fact except the respects in which it can be said to be of the same kind1 and so to belong to the same class1 as other facts4 ,far from adding to our direct knowledge1 as common sense supposes1 he holds that analysis consists in shutting our eyes to the individuality of facts in order to dwell only upon what they have in common with one another4 ,starting1 then1 from the wider field of knowledge which he assumes ,bergson explains how we reach the limited facts1 which are all that we ordinarily know1 by saying that these facts are arrived at by selection out of this much wider field4 ,it is not the disinterested love of knowledge that determines how much we shall actually attend to3 our selection from the whole field of what facts we will attend to is determined by the pressing need of being prepared in advance for the facts which are to come4 ,we attend only to so much of the whole of what is1 in some sense1 directly known to us as will be useful for framing the general laws which enable us to prepare in advance for what is coming4 ,this practical utility explains why analysis and classification seem to us to be the obvious way of dealing with what we know4 ,the work of abstraction by which1 treating the facts directly known as so much material for framing explanations1 we pass from these actual facts to the general laws which explain them1 falls into four stages1 and at each stage1 according to ,bergson1 as we go further and further from the original fact directly known1 the two vices of the intellectual method1 limitation and distortion of the actual fact1 become more and more apparent4 ,starting from the fact directly known1 the first thing1 as we have seen1 is to learn to distinguish common qualities which it shares in common with some1 but not all1 other facts2 the next thing is to classify it by fitting it into the further groups to which these various qualities entitle it to belong4 ,the moment a quality has been distinguished in a fact that fact has been fitted into a class1 the class which consists of all the facts in which that quality can be distinguished4 ,thus1 in our original illustration1 when you first distinguished warmth1 etc41 you were beginning to fit your fact into classes3 when you perceived warmth you fitted it into the class of warm objects1 and it was the same with the other qualities of roughness1 size and smell4 ,this fitting of facts into classes according to the common qualities distinguished in them might be called a preliminary classification1 but we shall use the term analysis for this preliminary grouping of facts according to their qualities1 keeping the term classification for the next step1 which you took when you realized 8this is a dog10 which consists in the discovery not of mere disconnected qualities but of 8real things40 ,just as every quality1 such as 8warm0 or 8hairy0 or 8sweet0 or 8cold0 is a class of actual facts1 so every 8real thing0 such as 8a dog0 or 8an ice cream0 is a class of qualities4 ,thus a quality is once1 and a 8real thing0 is twice1 removed from actual fact1 and the more energetically we pursue the intellectual work of abstraction the further we get from the fact itself from which we began4 ,the point of grouping facts into classes1 whether by analysing them into qualities or classifying them into 8real things10 is that we can then apply to the particular fact all that we know to be true in general of whatever belongs to these various classes3 in a word1 once we have fitted a fact into a class we can apply to it all the general laws which are known to apply to that class4 ,common sense1 as we saw1 tells us that when we distinguish qualities in any given fact we obtain fuller knowledge than was given in the mere unanalysed fact1 and this knowledge is supposed to become fuller still when we go on to classify these qualities into 8real things40 ,bergson1 on the contrary1 says that common qualities are arrived at by leaving out much of the fact originally known1 while each successive stage in the process of abstraction by which we explain facts1 though it enables us to apply more and more general laws1 yet leaves out more and more of the actual fact itself4 ,analysis begins this whittling away of the actual fact by confining our attention to qualities which do not exhaust the whole content of the actual fact4 ,at this preliminary stage1 however1 though we concentrate our attention on the quality1 we still remain aware of the whole fact in which the quality has its setting4 ,classification carries the work of limitation a stage further4 8,things0 are a stage further removed from actual fact than qualities are since1 while qualities are classes of facts1 8things0 are only classes of qualities4 ,for classification into 8things0 therefore only the qualities in a fact will be of any use1 and so1 when we have reached the stage of classification1 we need no longer burden our attention with the actual facts themselves in their entirety1 we need pay attention only to the qualities which distinguish one group from another1 ,for the purpose of classification into 8things0 the quality can stand for the whole fact3 thus1 as ,bergson points out1 we begin to lose contact with the whole fact originally known1 since all the rest of it except the respects in which it can be analysed will henceforth tend to be ignored4 ,the third stage in explaining facts in terms of general laws is called induction and consists in observing and formulating the relations of 8things40 8,things0 are related to each other through their qualities4 ,qualities do not give us the whole fact1 because1 when we have distinguished qualities1 we are inclined to concentrate our attention on the quality at the expense of the rest of the fact2 nevertheless while we attend to actual qualities we have not lost contact with fact altogether4 ,induction1 which consists in framing general laws of the relations of 8things10 though it does not involve attention to the whole fact1 does at least demand attention to qualities1 and so1 while we are occupied with induction1 we do still keep touch with fact to some extent4 ,once the relations of qualities have been observed and formulated1 however1 we need no longer attend to any part of the fact at all4 ,instead of the actual qualities we now take symbols1 words1 for example1 or letters1 or other signs1 and with these symbols we make for ourselves diagrams of the relations in which we have observed that the qualities which they represent have stood to each other4 ,thus we might use the words 8lightning before thunder0 or first an ,l and then a ,t1 to express the fact that in a storm we usually observe the quality of flashing before the quality of rumbling4 ,such laws do not actually reveal new facts to us1 they can only tell us1 provided we actually know a fact belonging to a given class1 to what other class facts which we shall know bye and bye will belong4 ,thus1 once we have classified facts as belonging to two classes1 daylight and darkness1 and have observed the invariable alternation of facts belonging to these classes1 then1 whenever we know directly facts which can be classed as daylight1 we can predict1 according to our law of the alternation of the two classes1 that bye and bye these facts will give place to others which can be classed as darkness and that bye and bye these in their turn will be replaced by facts which can again be classed as daylight4 ,the practical value of being able to make even such elementary predictions as these is obviously enormous1 and this value increases as applied science1 which is built up simply by the formulation of more and more comprehensive general laws of this type1 widens the field of facts which can be explained4 ,once the laws are known1 moreover1 we are able to say to what class the facts must have belonged which preceded a fact of any given class just as easily as we can say to what class the facts which are to follow it will belong4 ,thus1 given a fact which can be classed as daylight1 we can infer1 by means of the law of the alternation of the classes daylight and darkness1 not only that facts which can be classed as darkness will follow bye and bye1 but also that facts of that class must have gone before4 ,in this way we can explain the causes of all classifiable facts equally with their effects and so bridge over the gaps in our direct knowledge by creating a unified plan of the interrelations of all the classes to which facts can belong4 ,by means of this plan we can explain any fact 7that is classify its causes and effects71 provided we can fit it into one or other of the known classes4 ,this again is of enormous practical use because1 when we know to what class present facts must belong if they are to be followed by the class of facts which we want1 or not to be followed by those which we do not want1 we can arrange our present facts accordingly4 ,bergson would not think of denying that this intellectual method1 in which facts are used as material for abstraction1 is of the utmost practical use for explaining facts and so enabling us to control them4 ,he suggests1 however1 that our preoccupation with these useful abstractions1 classes and their relations1 misleads us as to the facts themselves4 ,what actually takes place1 he thinks1 is a kind of substitution of the explanation for the fact which was to be explained1 analogous with what happens when a child at a party1 or a guest at dinner1 is misled about his actual sensations1 only this substitution of which ,bergson speaks1 being habitual1 is much harder to see through4 ,explanation1 as we have seen1 consists in constructing a plan or map in terms of such abstractions as classes and their relations1 or sometimes1 when the abstraction has been carried a step further1 in terms simply of words or symbols1 by means of which we represent the causal relations between such of the actual directly known facts as can be classified4 ,this plan is more comprehensive and complete than the actual facts which we know directly in the ordinary course of things1 for which it stands1 and it enables us to explain these facts in terms of the classes of causes from which they follow1 and the classes of effects which they produce4 ,no explanation1 of course1 can actually acquaint us directly with the real antecedent or consequent facts themselves3 it can only tell us to what classes these facts must belong4 ,the terms of the plan by which we explain the facts1 the classes1 for instance1 daylight and darkness1 and their relation of alternation1 or the words or symbols which stand for classes and relations are not themselves facts but abstractions4 ,we cannot think in terms of actual facts3 the intellectual activity by which we formulate general laws can only work among abstractions1 and in order to explain a fact we are obliged to substitute for it either a class or word or other symbol4 ,all description and explanation of facts consists in substitutions of this kind4 ,the explanation applies provided the abstraction is based on fact1 that is1 provided it is possible to fit the fact to which the explanation is intended to apply into the class employed to explain it3 the general law1 for instance1 about the alternation of the classes daylight and darkness will explain any facts which can be fitted into one or other of these classes1 or again general laws about dogs1 such as 8dogs lick0 will apply to whatever fact belongs at once to all the simpler classes1 8warm10 8rough10 8of a certain size1 and smell10 out of which the class 8dog0 is constructed4 ,the general law itself1 however1 does not consist of such facts but of abstractions substituted for the facts themselves4 ,such substitution is extremely useful and perfectly legitimate so long as we keep firm hold of the fact as well1 and are quite clear about what is fact and what only symbol4 ,the danger is1 however1 that1 being preoccupied with describing and explaining and having used abstractions so successfully for these purposes1 we may come to lose our sense of fact altogether and fail to distinguish between actual facts and the symbols which we use to explain them4 ,this1 indeed1 is just what ,bergson thinks really does happen4 ,no doubt an intelligent physicist is perfectly aware that the vibrations and wave lengths and electrons and forces by which he explains the changes that take place in the material world are fictions1 and does not confuse them with the actual facts in which his actual knowledge of the material world consists4 ,but it is much more doubtful whether he distinguishes between these actual facts and the common sense material objects1 such as lumps of lead1 pieces of wood1 and so on1 which he probably believes he knows directly but which are really only abstractions derived from the facts in order to explain them just as much as his own vibrations and wave lengths4 ,when a scientist frames a hypothesis he employs the intellectual method of substitution with full consciousness of what he is about2 he recognises that its terms are abstractions and not facts4 ,but the intellectual method of explaining by substituting general abstractions for particular facts is not confined to science4 ,all description and explanation1 from the first uncritical assumptions of common sense right up to the latest scientific hypothesis employs the intellectual method of substituting abstractions for actual facts4 ,the common sense world of things1 events1 qualities1 minds1 feelings1 and so on1 in which we all pass our every day lives is an early and somewhat crude attempt to describe the continually changing fact which each of us experiences directly1 but it is perhaps more misleading than the later elaborate constructions of chemistry1 physics1 biology or physchology in that things and qualities are more easily mistaken for facts than more obviously hypothetical assumptions4 ,bergson points out that the various things of which this common sense world consists1 solid tables1 green grass1 anger1 hope1 etc41 are not facts3 these things1 he insists1 are only abstractions4 ,they are convenient for enabling us to describe and explain the actual facts which each of us experiences directly1 and they are based upon these facts in the sense of being abstracted from them4 ,the objection to them is that we are too much inclined to take it for granted that these things and qualities and events actually are facts themselves1 and in so doing to lose sight of the real facts altogether4 ,in support of his view that things having qualities in successive relations are mere abstractions ,bergson points out that whenever we stop to examine what it actually is that we know directly we can see at once that this fact does not consist of things and qualities at all3 things and qualities are clearly marked off one from another12 they change as a series of distinct terms1 but in what we know directly there are no clear cut distinctions and so no series4 ,the assumption which we usually make that the facts must consist of such things as events and qualities and material objects is not based upon the evidence of direct knowledge3 we make the assumption that the facts must be of this kind simply because they can be explained in these terms4 ,it is true that there is some correspondence between the actual facts and the common sense world of solid tables and so on1 and we usually jump to the conclusion that this correspondence would not be possible unless the facts had common qualities4 ,there is no denying that facts can be classified and it seems only natural to take it for granted that whatever can be classified must share some quality with whatever belongs to the same class1 that1 indeed1 it is just on account of all sharing the same common quality that facts can be classified as being all of the same kind4 ,thus common sense takes it for granted that all facts which can be classified as red1 and so explained by all the general laws which we know about the relation of red things to other things1 must share a common quality of redness4 ,it seems only natural to make this assumption because we are so used to making it1 but if we stop to examine the facts which we know directly we discover that they do not bear it out1 and we are gradually driven to the conclusion that it is quite unwarranted4 ,it is only bit by bit1 as we gradually accustom ourselves to doubting what we have been accustomed to take for granted1 that we realize how ill this assumption fits the facts4 ,,chapter ,,ii ,,fact ,common sense starts out with the assumption that what we know directly is such things as trees1 grass1 anger1 hope and so on1 and that these things have qualities such as solidity1 greenness1 unpleasantness and so on1 which are also facts directly known4 ,it is not very difficult to show that1 if we examine the facts which we know directly1 we cannot find in them any such things as trees1 grass1 or minds1 over and above the various qualities which we say belong to them4 ,i see one colour and you see another3 both of them are colours belonging to the grass but neither of us can find anything among the facts known to him corresponding to this grass1 regarded as something over and above its various qualities1 to which those qualities are supposed to belong4 ,this drives common sense back unto its second line of defence where it takes up the much stronger position of asserting that1 while trees1 grass1 minds1 etc41 are not among the facts directly known1 their qualities of solidity1 greenness1 etc41 are4 ,it is usual to add that these qualities are signs of real trees1 grass1 etc41 which exist independently but are only known to us through their qualities4 ,it is much harder to attack this position1 but its weakness is best exposed by considering change as we know it directly1 and comparing this with change as represented in terms of qualities4 ,change1 when represented in terms of qualities1 forms a series in which different qualities are strung together one after the other by the aid of temporal relations of before and after4 ,the change perceived when we look at the spectrum would thus have to be described in terms of a series of colours1 red before orange1 orange before yellow1 yellow before green1 and so on4 ,we might certainly go into greater detail than this1 distinguishing any number of shades in each of the colours mentioned1 but the description would still have to be given in the same form1 that of a series of different colours1 or shades of colour1 strung together by relations of before and after4 ,now the fact which we know directly does not change so3 it forms a continuous becoming which is not made up of any number1 however great1 of fixed stages4 ,when we want to represent this changing fact in terms of qualities we have to put together a series of qualities1 such as red1 orange1 etc41 and then say that 8the colour0 changes from one of these to another4 ,we pretend that there is 8a colour0 which is not itself either red or green or orange or blue1 which changes into all these different colours one after another4 ,it is not very difficult to see that this abstract colour which is neither red nor orange nor green nor blue is not a fact but only an abstraction which is convenient for purposes of description3 it is not quite so easy to see that this criticism applies equally to each of the separate colours1 red1 orange1 etc41 and yet a little attention shows that these also are really nothing but abstractions4 ,with reference to the whole changing fact which is known directly through any period the change in respect of colour is clearly an abstraction4 ,but just as there is no 8colour0 over and above the red1 the orange1 the green1 etc41 which we say we see1 so there is really no 8red10 8orange10 8green10 over and above the changing process with which we are directly acquainted4 ,each of these1 the red1 the orange1 and so on1 just like the abstract 8colour10 is simply a fictitious stage in the process of changing which it is convenient to abstract when we want to describe the process but which does not itself occur as a distinct part in the actual fact4 ,change1 as we know it directly1 does not go on between fixed points such as these stages which we abstract1 it goes on impartially1 as it were1 through the supposed stages just as much as in between them4 ,but though fixed stages are not needed to enable change to occur1 simply as a fact1 they are needed if we are to describe change and explain it in terms of general laws4 ,qualities are assumptions required1 not in order that change may take place1 but in order that we may describe1 explain1 and so control it4 ,such particular qualities as red and green are really no more facts directly known than such still more general1 and so more obviously fictitious notions as a colour which is of no particular shade1 or a table1 or a mind1 apart from its qualities or states4 ,all these fixed things are alike abstractions required for explaining facts directly known but not occurring as actual parts of those facts or stages in their change4 ,thus it appears that the common sense world of things and qualities and events is in the same position1 with regard to the actual facts directly known as scientific hypotheses such as forces1 electrons1 and so on1 in their various relations3 none of these actually form parts of the fact1 all of them are abstractions from the fact itself which are useful for explaining and so controlling it4 ,common sense stops short at things and qualities and events2 science carries the abstraction further1 that is all the difference3 the aim in both cases is the same1 the practical one of explaining and so controlling facts directly known4 ,in both cases the method employed is the intellectual method of abstraction which begins by discriminating within the whole field directly known in favour of just so much as will enable us to classify it and ignoring the rest1 and then proceeds to confuse even this selected amount of the actual fact with the abstract classes or other symbols in terms of which it is explained4 ,we have just seen how the result1 the worlds of common sense or science1 differ from the actual facts in the way in which they change3 these worlds of abstractions represent change as a series of fixed stages united by temporal relations1 while the actual fact forms a continuous process of becoming which does not contain any such fixed points1 as stages in relations4 ,the more we shake ourselves free from the common sense and scientific bias towards substituting explanations for actual facts the more clearly we see that this continuous process of changing is the very essence of what we know directly1 and the more we realize how unlike such a continuous process is to any series of stages in relation of succession4 ,the unsatisfactoriness of such descriptions is no new discovery3 the logical difficulties connected with the attempt to describe change in terms of series of successive things or events have been familiar since the time when ,zeno invented the famous dilemma of ,achilles' race with the tortoise4 ,mathematicians have been in the habit of telling us that these difficulties depend simply on the fact that we imagine the series of positions at which ,achilles and the tortoise find themselves from moment to moment as finite3 the device of the infinite series1 they say1 satisfies all the requirements needed for representing change and solves all the logical difficulties which arise from it4 ,bergson's difficulties1 however1 cannot be solved in this way for they are not based upon the discovery of logical absurdities but upon the discrepancy between the description and the fact4 ,what he maintains is that the description of change in terms of an infinite series of stages leaves out the change altogether4 ,zeno's logical dilemma as to how ,achilles could ever catch up with the tortoise provided the tortoise was given a start1 however small1 may be countered by the ingenuity of the mathematicians' infinite series4 ,bergson's difficulty turns on a question of fact1 not of logic1 and cannot be so met4 ,he solves the problem simply by denying that ,achilles or the tortoise ever are at particular points at particular moments4 ,such a description of change1 he says1 leaves out the real changing4 ,and the introduction of the notion of an infinite series only makes the matter worse4 ,for stages do not change1 and so1 if there is to be any change1 it must1 presumably1 take place in between one stage and the next4 ,but in between any two stages of an infinite series there are supposed to be an infinite number of other stages1 so that to any given stage there is no next stage4 ,change1 therefore1 cannot take place between one stage and the next one1 there being no next one1 and since it is equally impossible that it should take place at any one of the stages themselves it follows that an infinite series of stages leaves out change altogether4 ,similarly a series of instants before and after one another leaves out of time just the element of passage1 becoming1 which is its essence4 ,the truth1 ,bergson says1 is that with fixed stages1 no matter how many you take1 and no matter in what relation you arrange them1 you cannot reproduce the change and time which actually occur as facts directly known4 ,if ,achilles or the tortoise are ever at different places at different moments then neither of them really moves at all4 ,change and time1 as represented by abstractions1 according to the intellectual method1 consist of stages in relations of succession1 but the fact does not happen by stages and is not held together by relations3 if we compare the representation with the fact we find that they differ profoundly in their form4 ,according to ,bergson this difference in form is one of the two essential respects in which abstractions fail to represent facts and in which1 consequently1 we are led into error as to the facts if we fail to distinguish them from the abstractions in terms of which we explain them1 or take for granted that they correspond exactly with our explanations4 ,bergson gives the name 8space0 to the form which belongs to abstractions but not to actual facts3 abstractions1 he says1 are 8spatial10 but facts are not4 ,this use of the word 8space0 is peculiar and perhaps unfortunate4 ,even as it is ordinarily used the word 8space0 is ambiguous1 it may mean either the pure space with which higher mathematics is concerned1 or the public space which contains the common sense things and objects and their qualities which make up the every day world1 or the private space of sensible perception4 ,when ,bergson speaks of 8space10 however1 he does not mean either pure or public or private space1 he means an a priori form imposed by intellectual activity upon its object4 ,this resembles ,kant's use of the word1 but ,bergson's 8space0 is not1 like ,kant's1 the a priori form of sense acquaintance1 but of thought1 in other words logical form4 ,for ,bergson 8spatial0 means 8logical10 and since so much misunderstanding seems to have been caused by his using the word 8space0 in this peculiar sense we shall perhaps do better in what follows to use the word 8logical0 instead4 ,now whatever is logical is characterised by consisting of distinct1 mutually exclusive terms in external relations3 all schemes1 for instance1 and diagrams1 such as a series of dots one above the other1 or one below the other1 or one behind1 or in front of the other1 or a series of instants one after the other1 or a series of numbers1 or again any arrangements of things or qualities according to their relations1 such as colours or sounds arranged according to their resemblance or difference2 in all these each dot or instant or number or colour-shade or note1 is quite distinct from all the others1 and the relations which join it to the others and give it its position in the whole series are external to it in the sense that if you changed its position or included it in quite another series it would nevertheless still be just the same dot or instant or number or quality as before4 ,these two logical characteristics of mutual distinction of terms and externality of relations certainly do belong to the abstractions employed in explanations1 and we commonly suppose that they belong to everything else besides4 ,bergson1 however1 believes that these logical characteristics really only belong to abstractions and are not discovered in facts but are imposed upon them by our intellectual bias1 in the sense that we take it for granted that the facts which we know directly must have the same form as the abstractions which serve to explain them4 ,this habit of taking it for granted that not only our abstractions but also the actual facts have the logical characteristics of consisting of mutually exclusive terms joined by external relations is1 according to ,bergson1 one of the two serious respects in which our intellectual bias distorts our direct acquaintance with actual fact4 ,he points out1 as we saw1 that the facts with which we are acquainted are in constant process of changing1 and that1 when we examine carefully what is actually going on1 we discover that this change does not really form a series of distinct qualities or percepts or states1 united by external relations of time1 resemblance1 difference1 and so on1 but a continuous process which has what we might call a qualitative flavour but in which distinct qualities1 states and so on do not occur4 8,considered in themselves0 he says1 8profound states of consciousness have no relation to quantity3 they are mingled in such a way that it is impossible to say whether they are one or many1 or indeed to examine them from that point of view without distorting them40 ,now1 strictly speaking1 of course1 these 8states of consciousness0 ought not to be referred to in the plural1 it is1 in fact1 a contradiction to speak of 8states of consciousness0 having 8no relation to quantity03 a plurality must always form some quantity4 ,this contradiction is the natural consequence of attempting to put what is non-logical into words4 ,it would have been just as bad to have referred to 8the state of consciousness10 in the singular1 while at the same time insisting that it contained resemblance and difference4 ,the fact is that plurality and unity1 like distinct terms and external relations1 apply only to whatever has logical form1 and ,bergson's whole point is to deny that the fact 7or facts7 directly known have this form1 and so that any of these notions apply to it 7or them47 ,this1 of course1 raises difficulties when we try to describe the facts in words1 since words stand for abstractions and carry their logical implications4 ,all descriptions in words of what is non-logical are bound to be a mass of contradictions1 for1 having applied any word it is necessary immediately to guard against its logical implications by adding another which contradicts them4 ,thus we say our experience is of facts1 and must then hastily add that nevertheless they are not plural1 and we must further qualify this statement by adding that neither are they singular4 ,a description of what is non-logical can only convey its meaning if we discount all the logical implications of the words which1 for want of a better medium of expression1 we are driven to employ4 ,our whole intellectual bias urges us towards describing everything that comes within our experience1 even if the description is only for our own private benefit ,unfortunately the language in which these descriptions have to be expressed is so full of logical implications that1 unless we are constantly on our guard1 we are liable to be carried away by them1 and then1 at once1 we lose contact with the actual facts4 ,in order to get round this almost universal tendency to confuse abstractions with facts ,bergson sometimes tries to get us to see the facts as they actually are by using metaphor instead of description in terms of abstract general notions4 ,he has been much criticised for this but there is really a good deal to be said for attempting to convey facts by substituting metaphors for them rather than by using the ordinary intellectual method of substituting abstractions reached by analysis4 ,those who have criticised the use of metaphor have for the most part not realized how little removed such description is from the ordinary intellectual method of analysis4 ,they have supposed that in analysis we stick to the fact itself1 whereas in using metaphor we substitute for the fact to be described some quite different fact which is only connected with it by a more or less remote analogy4 ,if ,bergson's view of the intellectual method is right1 however1 when we describe in abstract terms arrived at by analysis we are not sticking to the facts at all1 we are substituting something else for them just as much as if we were using an out and out metaphor4 ,qualities and all abstract general notions are1 indeed1 nothing but marks of analogies between a given fact and all the other facts belonging to the same class3 they may mark rather closer analogies than those brought out by an ordinary metaphor1 but on the other hand in a frank metaphor we at least stick to the concrete1 we substitute fact for fact and we are in no danger of confusing the fact introduced by the metaphor with the actual fact to which the metaphor applies4 ,in description in terms of abstract general notions such as common qualities we substitute for fact something which is not fact at all1 we lose touch with the concrete and1 moreover1 we are strongly tempted to confuse fact with abstraction and believe that the implications of the abstraction apply to the fact1 or even that the abstraction is itself a real part of the fact4 ,language plays a most important part in forming our habit of treating all facts as material for generalisation1 and it is largely to the influence of the words which we use for describing facts that ,bergson attributes our readiness to take it for granted that facts have the same logical form as abstractions4 ,it is language again which makes it so difficult to point out that this assumption is mistaken1 because1 actually1 the form of facts is non-logical1 a continuous process and not a series4 ,the only way to point this out is by describing the nature of the non-logical facts as contrasted with a logical series1 but the language in which our description of the non-logical facts has to be conveyed is itself full of logical implications which contradict the very point we are trying to bring out4 ,descriptions of non-logical processes will only be intelligible if we discount the logical implications inherent in the words employed1 but in order to be willing to discount these implications it is necessary first to be convinced that there is anything non-logical to which such a description could apply4 ,and yet how can we be convinced without first understanding the description8 ,it appears to be a vicious circle1 and so it would be if our knowledge of change as a process really depended upon our understanding anybody's description of it4 ,according to ,bergson1 however1 we all do know such a process directly2 in fact1 if he is right1 we know nothing else directly at all4 ,the use of description is not to give us knowledge of the process1 that we already have1 but only to remind us of what we really knew all along1 but had rather lost contact with and misinterpreted because of our preoccupation with describing and explaining it4 ,bergson's criticism of our intellectual methods turns simply upon a question of fact1 to be settled by direct introspection4 ,if1 when we have freed ourselves from the preconceptions created by our normal common sense intellectual point of view1 we find that what we know directly is a non-logical process of becoming1 then we must admit that intellectual thinking is altogether inappropriate and even mischievous as a method of speculation4 ,it is one of ,bergson's chief aims to induce us to regain contact with our direct experience1 and it is with this in view that he spends so much effort in describing what the form of this experience actually is1 and how it compares with the logical form which belongs to abstractions1 that is with what he calls 8space40 ,the form which belongs to facts but not to abstractions ,bergson calls 8duration40 ,duration can be described negatively by saying that it is non-logical1 but when we attempt any positive description language simply breaks down and we can do nothing but contradict ourselves4 ,duration does not contain parts united by external relations3 it does not contain parts at all1 for parts would constitute fixed stages1 whereas duration changes continuously4 ,but in order to describe duration at all we have logically only two alternatives1 either to speak of it as a plurality1 and that implies having parts1 or else as a unity1 and that by implication1 excludes change4 ,being particularly concerned to emphasise the changing nature of what we know directly ,bergson rejects the latter alternative3 short of simply giving up the attempt to describe it he has then no choice but to treat this process which he calls duration as a plurality and this drives him into speaking of it as if it had parts4 ,to correct this false impression he adds that these parts are united1 not1 like logical parts1 by external relations1 but in quite a new way1 by 8synthesis40 8,parts0 united by synthesis have not the logical characteristics of mutual distinction and externality of relations1 they interpenetrate and modify one another4 ,in a series which has duration 7such a thing is a contradiction in terms1 but the fault lies with the logical form of language which1 in spite of its unsatisfactoriness we are driven to employ if we want to describe at all7 the 8later parts0 are not distinct from the 8earlier03 8earlier and0 8later0 are not mutually exclusive relations4 ,bergson says1 then1 that the process of duration which we know directly1 if it is to be called a series at all1 must be described as a series whose 8parts0 interpenetrate1 and this is the first important respect in which non-logical duration differs from a logical series4 ,in 8a series0 which is used to describe duration not only are the 8parts0 not distinct but 8their relations0 are not external in the sense1 previously explained1 in which logical relations are external to the terms which they relate4 ,a logical term in a logical series can change its position or enter into a wholly different series and still remain the same term4 ,but the terms in a series which has duration 7again this is absurd7 are what they are just because of their position in the whole stream of duration to which they belong3 to transfer them from one position in the series to another would be to alter their whole flavour which depends upon having had just that particular past and no other4 ,as illustration we might take the last bar of a tune4 ,by itself1 or following upon other sounds not belonging to the tune1 this last bar would not be itself1 its particular quality depends upon coming at the end of that particular tune4 ,in a process of duration1 then1 such as tune1 the 8later0 bars are not related externally to the 8earlier0 but depend for their character upon their position in the whole tune4 ,in actual fact1 of course1 the tune progresses continuously1 and not by stages1 such as distinct notes or bars1 but if1 for the sake of description1 we speak of it as composed of different bars1 we must say that any bar we choose to distinguish is modified by the whole of the tune which has gone before it3 change its position in the whole stream of sound to which it belongs and you change its character absolutely4 ,this means that in change such as this1 change1 that is1 which has duration1 repetition is out of the question4 ,take a song in which the last line is sung twice over as a refrain3 the notes1 we say1 are repeated1 but the second time the line occurs the actual effect produced is different1 and that1 indeed1 is the whole point of a refrain4 ,this illustrates the second important difference which ,bergson wants to bring out between the forms of change which belong respectively to non-logical facts and to the logical abstractions by which we describe them1 that is between duration as contrasted with a logical series of stages4 ,the notes are abstractions assumed to explain the effect produced1 which is the actual fact directly known4 ,the notes are stages in a logical series of change1 but their effects1 the actual fact1 changes as a process of duration4 ,from this difference in their ways of changing there follows an important difference between fact and abstraction1 namely that1 while the notes can be repeated over again1 the effect will never be the same as before4 ,this is because the notes1 being abstractions1 are not affected by their relations which give them their position in the logical series which they form1 while their effect1 being a changing process1 depends for its flavour upon its position in the whole duration to which it belongs3 this flavour grows out of the whole of what has gone before1 and since this whole is itself always growing by the addition of more and more 8later stages10 the effect which it goes to produce can never be the same twice over4 ,this is why ,bergson calls duration 8creative40 ,no 8two0 positions in a creative process of duration can have an identical past history1 every 8later0 one will have more history1 every 8earlier0 one less4 ,in a logical series1 on the other hand1 there is no reason why the same term should not occur over and over again at different points in the course of the series1 since in a logical series every term1 being distinct from every other and only joined to it by external relations1 is what it is independently of its position4 ,if ,bergson is right therefore in saying that abstractions change as a logical series while the actual facts change as a creative process of duration1 it follows that1 while our descriptions and explanations may contain repetitions the actual fact to which we intend these explanations to apply1 cannot4 ,this1 if true1 is a very important difference between facts and abstractions which common sense entirely overlooks when it assumes that we are directly acquainted with common qualities4 ,we have seen that this assumption is taken for granted in the account which is ordinarily given 7or would be given if people were in the habit of putting their common sense assumptions into words7 of how it is that facts come to be classified3 facts are supposed to fall into classes because they share common qualities1 that is because1 in the changing fact directly known1 the same qualities recur over and over again4 ,there is no doubt that the fact with which we are directly acquainted can be classified1 and it is equally undeniable that this fact is always changing1 but if this change has the form of creative duration then its classification cannot be based upon the repetition of qualities at different 8stages0 in its course4 ,it follows that either the fact with which we are directly acquainted does not change as a creative process1 or else that we are quite wrong in assuming1 as we ordinarily do1 that we actually know qualities directly and that it is these qualities which form the basis of classification1 and hence of all description and explanation4 ,we have already seen that this assumption1 though at first sight one naturally supposes it to be based on direct acquaintance1 may really depend not on any fact directly known but on our preoccupation with explanation rather than with mere knowing4 ,but if we never really are acquainted with qualities1 if qualities are1 as ,bergson says1 mere abstractions1 how come we to be able to make these abstractions1 and why do they apply to actual facts8 ,if classification is not based on common qualities discovered by analysis and repeated over and over as actual facts directly known1 on what is it based8 ,we certainly can classify facts and these abstract common qualities1 if abstractions they be1 certainly correspond to something in the facts since they apply to them3 what is the foundation in directly knowu fact which accounts for this correspondence between abstractions and facts if it is not qualities actually given as part of the facts8 ,these questions are so very pertinent and at the same time so difficult to answer satisfactorily that one is tempted to throw over the view that the changing fact which we know directly forms a creative duration4 ,this view is impossible to express without self-contradiction and it does not fit in with our accustomed habits of mind3 nevertheless if we do not simply reject it at once as patently absurd but keep it in mind for a while and allow ourselves time to get used to it1 it grows steadily more and more convincing3 we become less and less able to evade these difficult questions by accepting the common sense account of what we know directly as consisting of a series of qualities which are repeated over and over1 and more and more driven to regard it as a process in creative duration which does not admit of repetitions4 ,there is no difficulty in seeing1 the moment we pay attention1 that what we know directly certainly does change all the time3 but if we try to pin this change down and hold it so as to examine it we find it slipping through our fingers1 and the more we look into the supposed stages1 such as things and qualities and events1 by means of which common sense assumes that this change takes place1 the more it becomes apparent that these stages are all of them mere arbitrary abstractions dragged from their context in a continuous process1 fictitious halting places in a stream of change which goes on unbroken4 ,unbiassed attention to the actual fact cannot fail to convince us that what we know directly changes as a process and not by a series of stages4 ,the creativeness of this process is perhaps at first not quite so obvious1 but if we look into the fact once more1 with the object of observing repetitions in it1 we realize that we cannot find any4 ,it is true that you can pick out qualities which at first appear to recur3 you may1 for example1 see a rose and then a strawberry ice cream1 and you may be inclined to say that here you saw the quality pink twice over4 ,but you can only say that what you saw was the same both times by abstracting what we call the colour from the whole context in which it actually appeared on the two different occasions4 ,in reality the colour is not known in isolation3 it has its place1 in the whole changing fact in a particular context which you may describe in abstract terms as consisting of the shape and smell and size of the object together with all the rest of your state of mind at the moment1 which were not the same on the two different occasions1 while further this pink colour was modified on each occasion by its position in the whole changing fact which may again be described in abstract terms by saying1 for instance1 that the pink on the occasion of your seeing the strawberry ice cream1 coming after the pink on the occasion of your seeing the rose1 had a peculiar flavour of 8seen before0 which was absent on the previous occasion4 ,thus although1 by isolating 8parts0 of the whole process of changing which you know directly1 you may bring yourself for a moment to suppose that you are acquainted with repetitions1 when you look at the whole fact as it actually is1 you see that what you know is never the same twice over1 and that your direct experience forms1 not a series of repetitions1 but a creative process4 ,but1 once you grant that the fact which you know directly really changes1 there is1 according to ,bergson1 no getting away from the conclusion that it must form a creative process of duration4 ,for he thinks that creative duration is the only possible way in which the transition between past and present1 which is the essential feature of change and time1 could be accomplished3 all passing from past to present1 all change1 therefore1 and all time1 must1 he says1 form a creative process of duration4 ,the alternative is to suppose that time and change form logical series of events in temporal relations of before and after1 but1 according to ,bergson1 this not only leaves out the transition altogether but is1 even as it stands1 unintelligible4 ,the argument is this4 ,if time and change are real1 then1 when the present is1 the past simply is not4 ,but it is impossible to see how1 in that case1 there can be any relation between past and present1 for a relation requires at least two terms in between which it holds1 while in this case there could never be more than one term1 the present1 ipso facto1 abolishing the past4 ,if1 on the other hand1 the past is preserved1 distinct from the present1 then temporal relations can indeed hold between them1 but in that case there is no real change nor time at all4 ,this dilemma all follows1 of course1 from regarding 8past0 and 8present0 as mutually exclusive and distinct1 and requiring to be united by external relations1 in short as terms in a logical series3 for ,bergson himself this difficulty simply does not arise since he denies that1 within the actual changing fact directly known1 there are any clear cut logical distinctions such as the words 8past0 and 8present0 imply4 ,but when it comes to describing this changing fact distinct terms have to be employed because there are no others1 and this creates pseudo-problems such as this question of how1 assuming past and present to be distinct1 the transition between them ever can be effected4 ,the real answer is that the transition never is effected because past and present are1 in fact1 not distinct4 ,according to ,bergson a very large proportion of the problems over which philosophers have been accustomed to dispute have really been pseudo-problems simply arising out of this confusion between facts and the abstractions by which we describe them4 ,when once we have realized how they arise these pseudo-problems no longer present any difficulties2 they are in fact no longer problems at all1 they melt away and cease to interest us4 ,if ,bergson is right this would go far to explain the suspicion which1 in spite of the prestige of philosophy1 still half unconsciously colours the feeling of the 8plain man0 for the 8intellectual10 and which even haunts the philosopher himself1 in moments of discouragement1 the suspicion that the whole thing is trivial1 a dispute about words of no real importance or dignity4 ,if ,bergson is right this suspicion is1 in many cases1 all too well founded3 the discussion of pseudo-problems is not worth while4 ,but then the discussion of pseudo-problems is not real philosophy3 the thinker who allows himself to be entangled in pseudo-problems has lost his way4 ,in this1 however1 the 8intellectuals0 are not the only ones at fault4 8,plain men0 are misled by abstractions about facts just as much1 only being less thorough1 their mistake has less effect3 at the expense of a little logical looseness their natural sense of fact saves them from all the absurdities which follow from their false assumptions4 ,for the 8intellectual0 there is not this loophole through which the sense of fact may undo some of the work of false assumptions3 the 8intellectual0 follows out ruthlessly the implications of his original assumptions and if these are false his very virtues lead him into greater absurdities than those committed by 8plain men40 ,one of the most important tasks of philosophy is to show up the pseudo-problems so that they may no longer waste our time and we may be free to pursue the real aim of philosophy which is the reconquest of the field of virtual knowledge4 ,getting rid of the pseudo-problems1 however1 is no easy task3 we may realize1 for example1 that the difficulty of seeing how the transition between past and present ever can be effected is a pseudo-problem because in fact past and present are not distinct and so no transition between them is needed4 ,but since we have constantly to be using words which carry the implication of distinctness we are constantly liable to forget this simple answer when new problems1 though in fact they all spring from this fundamental discrepancy between facts and the abstractions by which we describe them1 present themselves in some slightly different form4 ,the notion of duration as consisting of 8parts0 united by 8creative synthesis0 is a device1 not for explaining how the transition from past to present really takes place 7this does not need explaining since1 8past0 and 8present0 being mere abstractions1 no transition between them actually takes place at all71 but for enabling us to employ the abstractions 8past0 and 8present0 without constantly being taken in by their logical implications4 ,the notion of 8creative synthesis0 as what joins 8past0 and 8present0 in a process of duration is an antidote to the logical implications of these two distinct terms3 creative synthesis1 unlike logical relations1 is not external to the 8parts0 which it joins2 8parts0 united by creative synthesis are not distinct and mutually exclusive4 ,such a notion as this of creative synthesis contradicts the logical implications contained in the notion of parts4 ,the notion of 8parts0 united by 8creative synthesis0 is really a hybrid which attempts to combine the two incompatible notions of logical distinction and duration4 ,the result is self-contradictory and this contradiction acts as a reminder warning us against confusing the actual changing fact with the abstractions in terms of which we describe it and so falling into the mistake of taking it for granted that this changing fact must form a series of distinct stages or things or events or qualities1 which can be repeated over and over again4 ,at the same time there is no getting away from the fact that this changing fact lends itself to classification and that explanations in terms of abstractions really do apply to it most successfully4 ,we are therefore faced with the necessity of finding some way of accounting for this1 other than by assuming that the facts which we know directly consist of qualities which recur over and over again4 ,,chapter ,,iii ,,matter ,,and ,,memory ,we have seen that1 according to the theory of change which is fundamental for ,bergson's philosophy1 the changing fact which we know directly is described as a process of becoming which does not contain parts nor admit of repetitions4 ,on the other hand this changing fact certainly does lend itself to analysis and classification and explanation and1 at first sight at any rate1 it is natural to suppose that whatever can be classified and explained must consist of qualities1 that is distinct parts which can be repeated on different occasions4 ,the problem for ,bergson1 if he is to establish his theory of change1 is to show that the fact that a changing process can be analysed and classified does not necessarily imply that such a process must consist of distinct qualities which can be repeated4 ,bergson's theory of the relation of matter to memory suggests a possible solution of this problem as to how it is possible to analyse and so apply general laws to and explain duration3 it becomes necessary1 therefore1 to give some account of this theory4 ,like all other descriptions and explanations1 such an account must1 of course1 be expressed in terms of abstractions1 and so is liable to be misunderstood unless the false implications of these abstractions are allowed for and discounted4 ,according to ,bergson the only actual reality is the changing fact itself1 everything else is abstraction3 this reality however is not confined to the fragment called 8our present experience0 which is in the full focus of consciousness and is all that we usually suppose ourselves to know directly2 it includes besides everything that we are in a sense aware of but do not pay attention to1 together with our whole past3 for ,bergson1 in fact1 reality coincides with the field of virtual knowledge1 anything short of this whole field is an abstraction and so falsified4 ,even to say 8we know this fact0 is unsatisfactory as implying ourselves and the fact as distinct things united by an external relation of knowing3 to say 8the fact is different from the abstraction by which it is explained0 similarly implies logically distinct terms in an external relation of difference1 and so on4 ,if ,bergson is right in claiming that the actual fact is non-logical then obviously all attempts to describe it1 since they must be expressed in terms of abstractions1 will teem with false implications which must be discounted if the description is to convey the meaning intended4 ,bergson's claim is that if we allow ourselves to attend to the changing fact with which we are actually acquainted we are driven to a theory of reality different from the theory of things and relations accepted by common sense4 ,the two abstractions by means of which he attempts to express this new theory are matter and memory4 ,in the actual fact ,bergson would hold that both these notions are combined by synthesis in such a way as no longer to be distinct1 or rather1 for this implies that they started distinct and then became merged1 it would perhaps be better to say that these two notions are abstractions from two tendencies which are present in the actual fact4 ,in the actual fact they combine and1 as it were1 counteract one another and the result is something different from either taken alone1 but when we abstract them we release them from each other's modifying influence and the result is an exaggeration of one or other tendency which does not really represent anything which actually occurs but can be used1 in combination with the contrary exaggeration1 to explain the actual fact which may be described as being like what would result from a combination of these two abstractions4 ,we will take matter first4 ,matter1 for ,bergson1 is an exaggeration of the tendency in reality1 7that is in the actual changing fact directly known7 towards logical distinctness1 what he calls 8spatiality40 ,his use of the word 8matter0 in this sense is again1 perhaps1 like his use of the word 8space10 rather misleading4 ,actual reality1 according to him1 is never purely material1 the only purely material things are abstractions1 and these are not real at all but simply fictions4 ,bergson really means the same thing by 8matter0 as by 8space0 and that is simply mutual distinctness of parts and externality of relations1 in a word logical complexity4 ,matter1 according to this definition of the word1 has no duration and so cannot last through any period of time or change3 it simply is in the present1 it does not endure but is perpetually destroyed and recreated4 ,the complementary exaggeration which1 taken together with matter1 completes ,berg-son's explanation of reality1 is memory4 ,just as matter is absolute logical complexity memory is absolute creative synthesis4 ,together they constitute the hybrid notion of creative duration whose 8parts0 interpenetrate which1 according to ,bergson1 comes nearest to giving a satisfactory description of the actual fact directly known which is1 for him1 the whole reality4 ,the best way to accustom one's mind to these two complementary exaggerations1 matter and memory1 and to see in more detail the use that ,bergson makes of them in explaining the actual facts1 will be to examine his theory of sensible perception1 since it is just in the act of sensible perception that memory comes in contact with matter4 ,the unsophisticated view is that in sensible perception we become acquainted with things which exist whether we perceive them or not1 and these things1 taken all together1 are commonly called the material world4 ,according to ,bergson's theory also sensible perception is direct acquaintance with matter4 ,the unsophisticated view holds further1 however1 that this material world with which sensible perception acquaints us is the common sense world of solid tables1 green grass1 anger and other such states and things and qualities1 but we have already seen that this common sense world is really itself only one among the various attempts which science and common sense are continually making to explain the facts in terms of abstractions4 ,the worlds of electrons1 vibrations1 forces1 and so on1 constructed by physics1 are other attempts to do the same thing and the common sense world of 8real0 things and qualities has no more claim to actual existence than have any of these scientific hypotheses4 ,berg-son's matter is not identified with any one of these constructions1 it is that in the facts which they are all attempts to explain in terms of abstractions1 the element in the facts upon which abstractions are based and which makes facts classifiable and so explicable4 ,the words by which we describe and explain the material element in the facts in terms of series of distinct stages or events in external relations would leave out change if their implications were followed out consistently1 but it is only a few 8intellectuals0 who have ever been able to bring themselves to follow out this implication to the bitter end and accept the conclusion1 however absurd4 ,since it is obvious that the facts do change the usual way of getting round the difficulty is to say that some of these stages are 8past0 and some 8present10 and then1 not clearly realizing that the explanations we construct are not really facts at all1 to take it for granted that a transition between past and present1 though there is no room for it in the logical form of the explanation1 yet somehow manages actually to take place4 ,bergson agrees that change does actually take place but not as a transition between abstractions such as 8past0 and 8present40 ,we think that 8past0 and 8present0 must be real facts because we do not realize clearly how these notions have been arrived at4 ,once we have grasped the idea that these notions1 and indeed all clear concepts1 are only abstractions1 we see that it is not necessary to suppose that these abstractions really change at all4 ,between the abstractions 8the past0 and 8the present0 there is no transition1 and it is the same with events and things and qualities3 all these1 being nothing but convenient fictions1 stand outside the stream of actual fact which is what really changes and endures4 ,matter1 then1 is the name which ,bergson gives to that element in the fact upon which the purely logical form appropriate to abstractions is based4 ,the actual facts are not purely logical but neither are they completely interpenetrated since they lend themselves to classification3 they tend to logical form on the one hand and to complete inter-penetration on the other without going the whole way in either direction4 ,what ,bergson does in the description of the facts which he offers is to isolate each of these tendencies making them into two separate distinct abstractions1 one called matter and the other mind4 ,isolated1 what in the actual fact was blended becomes incompatible4 ,matter and mind1 the clear cut abstractions1 are mutually contradictory and it becomes at once a pseudo-problem to see how they ever could combine to constitute the actual fact4 ,the matter which ,bergson talks about1 being what would be left of the facts if memory were abstracted1 has no past3 it simply is in the present moment4 ,if there is any memory which can retain previous moments then this memory may compare these previous moments with the present moment and call them the past of matter1 but in itself1 apart from memory1 7and so isolated in a way in which this tendency in the actual fact never could be isolated7 matter has no past4 ,noticing how very different the actual facts which we know directly are from any of the material worlds by which we explain them1 each of which lays claim to being 8the reality with which sensible perception acquaints us10 some philosophers have put forward the view that in sensible perception we become acquainted1 not with matter itself1 but with signs which stand for a material world which exists altogether outside perception4 ,this view ,bergson rejects4 ,he says that in sensible perception we are not acquainted with mere signs but1 in so far as there is any matter at all1 what we know in sensible perception is that matter itself4 ,the facts which we know directly are matter itself and would be nothing but matter if they were instantaneous4 ,for ,bergson1 however1 an instantaneous fact is out of the question3 every fact contains more than the mere matter presented at the moment of perception4 ,facts are distinguished from matter by lasting through a period of duration1 this is what makes the difference between the actual fact and any of the material worlds in terms of which we describe them3 matter1 is1 as we have said1 only an abstraction of one element or tendency in the changing fact which is the sole reality3 memory is the complementary abstraction4 ,apart from the actual fact neither matter nor memory have independent existence4 ,this is where ,berg-son disagrees with the philosophers who regard the facts as signs of an independent material world1 or as phenomena which misrepresent some 8thing0 in 8itself0 which is what really exists but which is not known directly but only inferred from the phenomena4 ,for ,bergson it is the fact directly known that really exists1 and matter and memory1 solid tables1 green grass1 electrons1 forces1 the absolute1 and all the other abstract ideas by which we explain it are misrepresentations of it1 not it of them4 ,even ,bergson1 however1 does not get away from the distinction between appearance and reality4 ,the fact is for him the reality1 the abstraction the appearance4 ,but then the fact which is the reality is not the fact which we ordinarily suppose ourselves to know1 the little fragment which constitutes 8our experience at the present moment40 ,this is itself an abstraction from the vastly wider fact of our virtual knowledge1 and it is this wider field of knowledge which is the reality4 ,abstraction involves falsification and so the little fragment of fact to which our attention is usually confined is not1 as it stands1 reality3 it is appearance4 ,we should only know reality as it is if we could replace this fragment in its proper context in the whole field of virtual knowledge 7or reality7 where it belongs4 ,what we should then know would not be appearance but reality itself4 ,it is at this knowledge1 according to ,bergson1 that philosophy aims4 ,philosophy is a reversal of our ordinary intellectual habits3 ordinarily thought progresses from abstraction to abstraction steadily getting further from concrete facts3 according to ,bergson the task of philosophy should be to put abstractions back again into their context so as to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of actual fact4 ,in order to describe and explain this fact1 however1 we have to make use of abstractions4 ,bergson describes the fact known directly by sensible perception as a contraction of a period of the duration of matter in which the 8past0 states of matter are preserved along with the 8present0 and form a single whole with it4 ,it is memory which makes this difference between matter and the actual facts by preserving 8past0 matter and combining it with 8the present40 ,a single perceived fact1 however1 does not contain memories as distinct from present material3 the distinction between 8past0 and 8present0 does not hold inside facts whose duration forms a creative whole and not a logical series4 ,of course it is incorrect to describe facts as 8containing past and present matter10 but1 as we have often pointed out1 misleading though their logical implications are1 we are obliged to replace facts by abstractions when we want to describe them4 ,an example may perhaps convey what is meant by saying that a fact is a contraction of a period of the duration of matter4 ,consider red1 bearing in mind that1 when we are speaking of the fact actually perceived when we see red we must discount the logical implications of our words4 ,science says that red1 the material1 is composed of immensely rapid vibrations of ether3 red1 the fact1 we know as a simple colour4 ,bergson accepts the scientific abstractions in terms of which to describe matter1 making the reservation that1 if we are to talk of matter as composed of vibrations1 we must not say that these vibrations last through a period of time or change by themselves1 apart from any memory which retains and so preserves the 8past0 vibrations4 ,if matter is to be thought of at all as existing apart from any memory it must be thought of as consisting of a single vibration in a perpetual present with no past4 ,we might alter the description and say that this present moment of matter should be thought of as being perpetually destroyed and recreated4 ,now according to ,bergson the red which we know directly is a period of the vibrations of matter contracted by memory so as to produce an actual perceived fact4 ,as matter red does not change1 it is absolutely discrete and complex1 in a word1 logical3 as fact it is non-logical and forms a creative process of duration4 ,the difference between matter and the actual fact is made by the mental act which holds matter as it were in tension through a period of duration1 when a fact is produced1 but which would have had to be absent if there had been no fact but simply present matter4 ,bergson calls this act memory3 memory1 he says1 turns matter into fact by preserving its past along with its present4 ,without memory there would be no duration and so no change and no time4 ,matter1 apart from memory would have no duration and it is just in this that it is distinguished from actual fact4 ,it is1 however1 of course1 only by making abstractions that we can say what things would be like if something were taken away which actually is not taken away4 ,matter never really does exist without memory nor memory without its content1 matter3 the actual fact can only be described as a combination of the two elements1 but this description must not lead us into supposing that the abstractions1 matter and memory1 actually have independent existence apart from the fact which they explain4 ,only the actual fact exists and it is not really made up of two elements1 matter and memory1 but only described in terms of these two abstractions4 ,bergson's account of perception differs from the account ordinarily given in that perception is not described as a relation which is supposed to hold between a subject and an object3 for ,bergson there is no 8,i10 distinct from what is perceived1 standing to it in a relation of perception4 ,for an object1 to be perceived consists1 not in being related to a perceiver1 but in being combined in a new way with other objects4 ,if an object is combined by synthesis with other objects then it is perceived and so becomes a fact4 ,but there is no mind over and above the objects which perceives them by being related to them1 or even by performing an act of synthesis upon them4 ,to speak of 8our0 perceiving objects is a mere fiction3 when objects are combined by synthesis they become perceptions1 facts1 and this is the same as saying that they are minds4 ,for ,bergson a mind is nothing but a synthesis of objects4 ,this explains what he means by saying that in direct knowledge the perceiver is the object perceived4 ,actually he thinks such notions as the perceiver and the object and the relation which unites them1 or again matter and the act of synthesis which turns matter into fact1 are nothing but abstractions3 the only thing there really is is simply the fact itself4 ,these abstractions1 however1 do somehow apply to the actual facts1 and this brings us back to our problem as to how it is that the actual fact1 which is in creative duration1 lends itself to classification3 how it is that general laws in terms of abstractions which can be repeated over and over again1 can apply to the actual fact which does not contain repetitions8 ,facts lend themselves to explanation when they are perceived as familiar4 ,in this perceived familiarity1 which is the basis of all abstraction1 and so of all description and explanation1 past as well as present is involved1 the present owing its familiarity to our memory of past facts4 ,the obvious explanation of perceived familiarity1 would be1 of course1 to say that it results from our perceiving similar qualities shared by past and present facts1 or relations of similarity holding between them4 ,but ,bergson must find some other explanation than this since he denies that there can be repetition in actual facts directly known4 ,whenever there is actual fact there is memory1 and memory creates duration which excludes repetition4 ,perceived familiarity depends upon memory but memory1 according to ,bergson1 does not work by preserving a series of repetitions for future reference4 ,if we say that memory connects 8the past0 with 8the present0 we must add that it destroys their logical distinctness4 ,but of course this is putting it very badly3 there is really no 8logical distinctness0 in the actual fact for memory to 8destroy03 our language suggests that first there was matter1 forming a logical series of distinct qualities recurring over and over1 and then memory occurred and telescoped the series1 squeezing 8earlier0 and 8later0 moments into one another to make a creative duration4 ,such a view is suggested by our strong bias towards regarding abstractions as having independent existence apart from the real fact from which they have been abstracted3 if we can overcome this bias the description will do well enough4 ,according to ,bergson1 as we have just seen1 every actual fact must contain some memory otherwise it would not be a fact but simply matter1 since it is an act of memory that turns matter into perceived fact4 ,our ordinary more or less familiar facts1 however1 contain much more than this bare minimum4 ,the facts of everyday life are perceived as familiar and classified from a vast number of points of view4 ,when you look at a cherry you recognise its colour1 shape1 etc41 you know it is edible1 what it would taste like1 whether it is ripe1 and much more besides1 all at a glance4 ,all this knowledge depends on memory1 memory gives meaning to what we might call bare sensation 7which is the same thing as ,bergson's present matter7 as opposed to the full familiar fact actually experienced4 ,now the meaning is ordinarily contained in the actual fact along with the bare sensation not as a multiplicity of memories distinct from the bare sensation1 but1 as we put it1 at a glance4 ,this peculiar flavour of a familiar fact can be analysed out as consisting of memories of this or that past experience1 if we choose to treat it in that way1 just as a fact can be analysed into qualities4 ,according to ,bergson this analysis of the meaning of a familiar fact into memories would have the same drawbacks as the analysis of a present fact into qualities3 it would leave out much of the meaning and distort the rest4 ,bergson holds that wherever there is duration the past must be preserved since it is just the preservation of the past1 the creation of fact by a synthesis of what1 out of synthesis1 would be past and present1 which constitutes duration4 ,the essential point about mental life is just the performing of this act of synthesis which makes duration3 wherever there is mental life there is duration and so wherever there is mental life the past is preserved4 8,above everything10 ,bergson says1 8consciousness signifies memory4 ,at this moment as ,i discuss with you ,i pronounce the word 8discussion40 ,it is clear that my consciousness grasps this word altogether2 if not it would not see it as a unique word and would not make sense of it4 ,and yet when ,i pronounce the last syllable of the word the two first ones have already been pronounced2 relatively to this one1 which must then be called present1 they are past4 ,but this last syllable 8sion0 was not pronounced instantaneously2 the time1 however short1 during which ,i was saying it1 can be split up into parts and these parts are past1 relatively to the last of them1 and this last one would be present if it were not that it too can be further split up3 so that1 do what you will1 you cannot draw any line of demarcation between past and present1 and so between memory and consciousness4 ,indeed when ,i pronounce the word 8discussion0 ,i have before my mind1 not only the beginning1 the middle and the end of the word1 but also the preceding words1 also the whole of the sentence which ,i have already spoken2 if it were not so ,i should have lost the thread of my speech4 ,now if the punctuation of the speech had been different my sentence might have begun earlier2 it might1 for instance1 have contained the previous sentence and my 8present0 would have been still further extended into the past4 ,let us push this reasoning to its conclusion3 let us suppose that my speech has lasted for years1 since the first awakening of my consciousness1 that it has consisted of a single sentence1 and that my consciousness has been sufficiently detached from the future1 sufficiently disinterested to occupy itself exclusively in taking in the meaning of the sentence3 in that case ,i should not look for any explanation of the total conservation of this sentence any more than ,i look for one of the survival of the first two syllables of the word 8discussion0 when ,i pronounce the last one4 ,well1 ,i think that our whole inner life is like a single sentence1 begun from the first awakening of consciousness1 a sentence scattered with commas1 but nowhere broken by a full stop4 ,and so ,i think that our whole past is there1 subconscious--,i mean present to us in such a way that our consciousness1 to become aware of it1 need not go outside itself nor add anything foreign3 to perceive clearly all that it contains1 or rather all that it is1 it has only to put aside an obstacle1 to lift a veil40#e #e ,l',energie ,spirituelle--8,l',ame et le ,corps10 pages #ei and #fj4 ,if this theory of memory be correct1 the occurrence of any present bare sensation itself suffices to recall1 in some sense1 the whole past4 ,but this is no use for practical purposes1 just as the whole of the fact given in present perception is useless for practical purposes until it has been analysed into qualities4 ,according to ,bergson we treat the material supplied by memory in much the same way as that supplied by perception4 ,the whole field of the past which the present calls up is much wider than what we actually remember clearly3 what we actually remember is arrived at by ignoring all the past except such scraps as appear to form useful precedents for behaviour in the present situation in which we find ourselves4 ,perhaps this explains why sometimes1 at the point of death1 when useful behaviour is no longer possible1 this selection breaks down and the whole of the past floods back into memory4 ,the brain1 according to ,bergson1 is the organ whose function it is to perform this necessary work of selection out of the whole field of virtual memory of practically useful fragments1 and so long as the brain is in order1 only these are allowed to come through into consciousness as clear memories4 ,the passage just quoted goes on to speak of 8the part played by the brain in memory40 8,the brain does not serve to preserve the past but primarily to obscure it1 and then to let just so much as is practically useful slip through40 ,but the setting of the whole past1 though it is ignored for convenience1 still makes itself felt in the peculiar qualitative flavour which belongs to every present fact by reason of its past4 ,even in the case of familiar facts this flavour is no mere repetition but is perpetually modified as the familiarity increases1 and it is just in this progressively changing flavour that their familiarity consists4 ,an inspection of what we know directly1 then1 does not bear out the common sense theory that perceived familiarity1 upon which abstraction and all description and explanation are based1 consists in the perception of similar qualities shared by present matter and the matter retained by memory4 ,a familiar fact appears to be1 not a repetition1 but a new fact4 ,this new fact may be described as containing present and past bare sensations1 but it must be added that these bare sensations do not remain distinct things but are synthesised by the act of perception into a fresh whole which is not the sum of the bare sensations which it may be described as containing4 ,such a perceived whole will be familiar1 and so lend itself to abstraction and explanation1 in so far as the present bare sensation which it contains1 taken as mere matter 7that is apart from the act of perception which turns it from mere matter into actual fact71 would have been a repetition of some of the past bare sensations which go to form its meaning and combine with it to create the fact actually known4 ,for bare sensation now may be a repetition of past bare sensation though the full fact will always be something fresh1 its flavour changing as it grows more and more familiar by taking up into itself more and more bare sensation which1 taken in abstraction1 apart from the act of synthesis which turns it into actual fact1 would be repetitions4 ,to take the example which we have already used of perceiving first a rose and then a strawberry ice cream3 let us suppose that the rose was the very first occasion on which you saw pink4 ,the perceived fact on that occasion would1 like all perceived facts1 be a combination of _/ past and present bare sensations4 ,it would ,i not be familiar because the elements of present bare sensation would not be repetitions of the elements of past bare sensation 7always assuming1 as we must for purposes of explanation1 that past and present bare sensations ever could be isolated from the actual fact and still both exist1 which1 however1 is not possible74 ,but when you saw the strawberry ice cream the past perceived rose would be among the memories added to this bare sensation which constitute its meaning and1 by forming a synthesis with it1 turn it from mere matter into fact4 ,the pink would now be perceived as familiar because the pink of the rose 7which as bare sensation is similar to the bare sensation of strawberry-ice-cream-pink7 would be included1 along with the present bare sensation of pink1 in the whole fact of the perception of strawberry ice cream4 ,perceived fact1 then1 combines meaning and present bare sensation to form a whole with a qualitative flavour which is itself always unique1 but which lends itself to abstraction in so far as the bare sensations1 past and present1 which go to produce it1 would1 as matter in isolation1 be repetitions4 ,this qualitative flavour1 however1 is1 of course1 not a quality in the logical sense which implies distinctness and externality of relations4 ,facts have logical qualities only if they are taken in abstraction isolated from their context4 ,this is not how fact actually occurs4 ,every fact occurs in the course of the duration of some mental life which itself changes as a process of duration and not as a logical series4 ,the mental life of an individual is1 as it were1 a comprehensive fact which embraces all the facts directly known to that individual in a single process of creative duration4 ,facts are to the mental life of an individual what bare sensation is to the actual fact directly known in perception3 facts are1 as it were1 the matter of mental life4 ,imagine a fact directly known1 such as we have described in discussing sensible perception1 lasting on and on1 perpetually taking up new bare sensations and complicating them with meaning which consists of all the past which it already contains so as to make out of this combination of past and present fresh fact1 that will give you some idea of the way in which ,bergson thinks that mental life is created out of matter by memory4 ,only this description is still unsatisfactory because it is obliged to speak of what is created either in the plural or in the singular and so fails to convey either the differentiation contained in mental life or else its unbroken continuity as all one fact progressively modified by absorbing more and more matter4 ,if ,bergson's account of the way in which memory works is true there is a sense in which the whole past of every individual is preserved in memory and all unites with any present bare sensation to constitute the fact directly known to him at any given moment4 ,if the continuity of duration is really unbroken there is no possibility of any of the past being lost4 ,this is why ,bergson maintains that the whole of our past is contained in our virtual knowledge3 what he means by our virtual knowledge is simply everything which enters into the process of duration which constitutes our whole mental life4 ,besides our whole past this virtual knowledge must also contain much more of present bare sensation than we are usually aware of4 ,we said that1 for ,bergson1 actual fact directly known was the only reality2 this actual fact1 however1 does not mean merely what is present to the perception of a given individual at any given moment1 but the whole of our virtual knowledge4 ,the field of virtual knowledge would cover much the same region as the subconscious1 which plays such an important part in modern psychology4 ,the limits of this field are impossible to determine4 ,once you give up limiting direct knowledge to the fact actually present in perception at any given moment it is difficult to draw the line anywhere4 ,and yet to draw the line at the present moment is impossible for 8the present moment0 is clearly an abstract fiction4 ,for practical purposes 8the present0 is what is known as 8the specious present10 which covers a certain ill-defined period of duration from which the instantaneous 8present moment0 is recognised to be a mere abstraction4 ,according to ,bergson1 however1 just as 8the present moment0 is only an abstraction from a wider specious present so this specious present itself is an abstraction from a continuous process of duration from which other abstractions1 days1 weeks1 years1 can be made1 but which is actually unbroken and forms a single continuous changing whole4 ,and just as facts are only abstractions from the whole mental life of an individual so individuals must be regarded as abstractions from some more comprehensive mental whole and thus our virtual knowledge seems not merely to extend over the whole of what is embraced by our individual acts of perception and preserved by our individual memories but overflows even these limits and must be regarded as co-extensive with the duration of the whole of reality4 ,it may be open to question how much of this virtual knowledge of both past and present we ever could know directly in any sense comparable to the way in which we know the fact actually presented at some given moment1 however perfectly we might succeed in ridding ourselves with our intellectual pre-occupation with explaining instead of knowing2 but1 if reality forms an unbroken whole in duration1 we cannot in advance set any limits1 short of the whole of reality1 to the field of virtual knowledge4 ,and it does really seem as if our pre-occupation with discovering repetitions in the interests of explanation had something to do with the limited extent of the direct knowledge which we ordinarily enjoy1 so that1 if we could overcome this bias1 we might know more than we do now1 though how much more it is not possible1 in advance1 to predict4 ,for in the whole field of virtual knowledge1 which appears to be continuous with the little scrap of fact which is all that we usually attend to1 present bare sensation and such bare sensations as resemble it1 form very insignificant elements3 for purposes of abstraction and explanation1 however1 it is only these insignificant elements that are of any use4 ,so long1 therefore1 as we are preoccupied with abstraction1 we must bend all our energies towards isolating these fragments from the context which extends out and out over the whole field of virtual knowledge1 rivetting our attention on them and1 as far as possible1 ignoring all the rest4 ,if ,bergson's theory of virtual knowledge is correct1 then1 it does seem as if normally our efforts were directed towards shutting out most of our knowledge rather than towards enjoying it1 towards forgetting the greater part of what memory contains rather than towards remembering it4 ,if we really could reverse this effort and concentrate upon knowing the whole field of past and present as fully as possible1 instead of classifying it1 which involves selecting part of the field and ignoring the rest1 it is theoretically conceivable that we might succeed in knowing directly the whole of the process of duration which constitutes the individual mental life of each one of us4 ,and it is not even certain that our knowledge must necessarily be confined within the limits of what we have called our individual mental life4 ,particular facts1 as we have seen1 are not really distinct parts of a single individual mental life3 the notion of separateness applies only to abstractions and it is only because we are much more pre-occupied with abstractions than with actual facts that we come to suppose that facts can ever really be separate from one another4 ,when we shake off our common sense assumptions and examine the actual facts which we know directly we find that they form a process and not a logical series of distinct facts one after the other4 ,now on analogy it seems possible that what we call individual mental lives are1 to the wider process which contains and constitutes the whole of reality1 as particular facts are to the whole process which constitutes each individual mental life4 ,the whole of reality may contain individual lives as these contain particular facts1 not as separate distinct units in logical relations1 but as a process in which the line of demarcation between 8the parts0 7if we must speak of 8parts07 is not clear cut4 ,if this analogy holds then it is impossible in advance to set any limits to the field of direct knowledge which it may be in our power to secure by reversing our usual mental attitude and devoting our energies simply to knowing1 instead of to classifying and explaining4 ,but without going beyond the limits of our individual experience1 and even without coming to know directly the whole field of past and present fact which that experience contains1 it is still a considerable gain to our direct knowledge if we realize what false assumptions our preoccupation with classification leads us to make even about the very limited facts to which our direct knowledge is ordinarily confined4 ,we then realize that1 besides being considerably less than what we probably have it in our power to know1 these few facts that we do know are themselves by no means what we commonly suppose them to be4 ,the two fundamental errors into which common sense leads us about the facts are the assumptions that they have the logical form1 that is contain mutually exclusive parts in external relations1 and that these parts can be repeated over and over again4 ,these two false assumptions are summed up in the common sense view that the fact which we know directly actually consists of events1 things1 states1 qualities4 ,bergson tells us that when once we have realized that this is not the case we have begun to be philosophers4 ,having stripped the veil of common sense assumptions from what we know directly our task will then be to hold this direct knowledge before us so as to know as much as possible4 ,the act by which we know directly is the very same act by which we perceive and remember2 these are all simply acts of synthesis1 efforts to turn matter into creative duration4 ,what we have to do is1 as it were1 to make a big act of perception to embrace as wild a field as possible of past and present as a single fact directly known4 ,this act of synthesis ,bergson calls 8intuition40 ,intuition may be described as turning past and present into fact directly known by transforming it from mere matter into a creative process of duration3 but1 of course1 actually1 there is not1 first matter1 then an act of intuition which synthesises it1 and finally a fact in duration1 there is simply the duration1 and the matter and the act of intuition are only abstractions by which we describe and explain it4 ,the effort of intuition is the reversal of the intellectual effort to abstract and explain which is our usual way of treating facts1 and these two ways of attending are incompatible and cannot both be carried on together4 ,intuition1 7or1 to give it a more familiar name1 direct knowledge17 reveals fact3 intellectual attention analyses and classifies this fact in order to explain it in general terms1 that is to explain it by substituting abstractions for the actual fact4 ,obviously we cannot perform acts of analysis without some fact to serve as material3 analysis uses the facts supplied by direct knowledge as its material4 ,bergson maintains that in so doing it limits and distorts these facts and he says that if we are looking for speculative knowledge we must go back to direct knowledge1 or1 as he calls it1 intuition4 ,but bare acquaintance is in-communicable1 moreover it requires a great effort to maintain it4 ,in order to communicate it and retain the power of getting the facts back again after we have relaxed our grip on them we are obliged1 once we have obtained the fullest direct knowledge of which we are capable1 to apply the intellectual method to the fact thus revealed and attempt to describe it in general terms4 ,now the directly known forms a creative duration whose special characteristics are that it is non-logical1 7i4e41 is not made up of distinct mutually exclusive terms united by external relations7 and does not contain parts which can be repeated over and over1 while on the other hand the terms which we have to substitute for it if we want to describe it only stand for repetitions and have the logical form4 ,it looks1 therefore1 as if our descriptions could not1 as they stand1 be very successful in conveying to others the fact known to us directly1 or in recalling it to ourselves4 ,in order that the description substituted by our intellectual activity for the facts which we want to describe may convey these facts it is necessary to perform an act of synthesis on the description analogous to the act of perception which originally created the fact itself out of mere matter4 ,the words used in a description should be to the hearer what mere matter is to the perceiver3 in order that matter may be perceived an act of synthesis must be performed by which the matter is turned into fact in duration3 similarly in order to gather what a description of a fact means the hearer must take the general terms which are employed not as being distinct and mutually exclusive but as modifying one another and interpenetrating in the way in which the 8parts0 of a process of creative duration interpenetrate4 ,in the same way by understanding the terms employed synthetically and not intellectually we can use a description to recall any fact which we have once known directly4 ,thus our knowledge advances by alternate acts of direct acquaintance and analysis4 ,philosophy must start from a fresh effort of acquaintance creating1 if possible1 a fact wider and fuller than the facts which we are content to know for the purposes of everyday life4 ,but analysis is essential if the fact thus directly known is to be conveyed to others and recalled4 ,by analysis the philosopher fixes this wider field in order that he may communicate and recall it4 ,starting later from the description of some fact obtained by a previous effort of acquaintance1 or from several facts obtained at different times1 and also from the facts described by others1 and using all these descriptions as material1 it may be possible1 by a fresh effort1 to perform acts of acquaintance1 7or synthesis7 embracing ever wider and wider fields of knowledge4 ,this1 according to ,bergson1 is the way in which philosophical knowledge should be built up1 facts1 obtained by acts of acquaintance1 being translated into descriptions only that these descriptions may again be further synthesised so directing our attention to more and more comprehensive facts4 ,inevitably1 of course1 these facts themselves1 being less than all the stream of creative duration to which they belong1 will be abstractions1 if taken apart from that whole stream1 and so distorted4 ,this flaw in what we know even by direct acquaintance can never be wholly remedied short of our succeeding in becoming acquainted with the whole of duration4 ,it is something1 however1 to be aware of the flaw1 even if we cannot wholly remedy it1 and the wider the acquaintance the less is the imperfection in the fact known4 ,the first step1 in any case1 towards obtaining the wider acquaintance at which philosophy aims consists in making the effort necessary to rid ourselves of the practical preoccupation which gives us our bias towards explaining everything long before we have allowed ourselves time to pay proper attention to it1 in order that we may at least get back to such actual facts as we do already know directly4 ,when this has been accomplished 7and our intellectual habits are so deeply ingrained that the task is by no means easy7 we can then go on to other philosophers' descriptions of the facts with which their own efforts to widen their direct knowledge have acquainted them and1 by synthesising the general terms which they have been obliged to employ1 we also may come to know these more comprehensive facts4 ,unless it is understood synthetically1 however1 a philosopher's description of the facts with which he has acquainted himself will be altogether unsatisfactory and misleading4 ,it is in this way that ,bergson's own analysis of the fact which we all know directly into matter and the act of memory by which matter is turned into a creative process should be understood4 ,the matter and the act of memory are both abstractions from the actual fact3 he does not mean that over and above the fact there is either any matter or any force or activity called memory nor are these things supposed to be in the actual fact3 they are simply abstract terms in which the fact is described4 ,bergson tries elsewhere to put the same point by saying that there are two tendencies in reality1 one towards space 7that is logical form7 and the other towards duration1 and that the actual fact which we know directly 8tends0 now towards 8space0 and now towards duration4 ,the two faculties intellect and intuition are likewise fictions which are not really supposed to exist1 distinct from the fact to which they are applied1 but are simply abstract notions invented for the sake of description4 ,whatever the description by which a philosopher attempts to convey what he has discovered we shall only understand it if we remember that the terms in which the fact is described are not actually parts of the fact itself and can only convey the meaning intended if they are grasped by synthesis and not intellectually understood4 ,,printed ,,in ,,great ,,britain ,,by ,,the ,,devonshire ,,press1 ,,torquay ,international ,library of ,psychology ,philosophy and ,scientific ,method ,,general ,,editor - - - - ,c4 ,k4 ,,ogden1 ,m4 ,a4 7,magdalene ,college1 ,cambridge74 ,,volumes ,,already ,,arranged3 ,,philosophical ,,studies by ,q4 ,e4 ,,moore1 ,litt4 ,d4 ,,conflict ,,and ,,dream by ,w4 ,h4 ,r4 ,,rivers1 ,f4 ,r4 ,s4 ,,the ,,measurement ,,of ,,emotion by ,w4 ,,whately ,,smith ,introduction by ,william ,brown4 ,,the ,,analysis ,,of ,,matter by ,,bertrand ,,russell1 ,f4 ,r4 ,s4 ,,mathematics ,,for ,,philosophers by ,g4 ,h4 ,,hardy1 ,f4 ,r4 ,s4 ,,psychological ,,types by ,c4 ,g4 ,,jong1 ,m4 ,d41 ,,ll4 ,d4 ,,the ,,psychology ,,of ,,reasoning by ,,eugenio ,,rignano ,,the ,,elements ,,of ,,psychotherapy by ,,william ,,brown1 ,m4 ,d41 ,d4 ,sc4 ,,the ,,philosophy ,,of ,,the ,,unconscious by ,e4 ,,von ,,hartmann ,,the ,,foundations ,,of ,,musical ,,aesthetics by ,w4 ,,pole1 ,f4 ,r4 ,s4 ,edited by ,edward ,j4 ,dent4 ,,the ,,psychology ,,of ,,music by ,,edward ,j4 ,,dent ,,some ,,concepts ,,of ,,scientific ,,thought by ,c4 ,d4 ,,broad1 ,litt4 ,d4 ,,philosophical ,,logic by ,l4 ,,wittgenstein ,introduction by ,bertrand ,russell4 ,,the ,,philosophy ,,of ' ,,as ,,if by ,h4 ,,vaihinger ,,the ,,laws ,,of ,,feeling by ,f4 ,,paulhan ,,the ,,history ,,of ,,materialism by ,f4 ,a4 ,,lange ,,colour-,,harmony by ,,james ,,wood and ,c4 ,k4 ,,ogden ,,the ,,statistical ,,method ,,in ,,economics ,,and ,,politics by ,p4 ,,sargant ,,florence ,,the ,,principles ,,of ,,criticism by ,i4 ,a4 ,,richards